Sample Paper Manuscript Preparation 53 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 Journal of Mountain Area Research CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT ON MOUNTAIN BIODIVERSITY: A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GILGIT-BALTISTAN OF PAKISTAN S. Ishaq1*, M. Z. Khan1, F. Begum1, K. Hussain2, R. Amir3, A. Hussain1, S. Ali1 1.
Department of Environmental Sciences, Karakoram International University, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan 2.
Forest, Wildlife and Environment Department of Gilgit-Baltistan 3.
Pakistan Institute of development economics Islam Abad ABSTRACT Climate Change is not a stationary phenomenon; it moves from time to time, it represents a major threat to mountainous biodiversity and to ecosystem integrity.
The present study is an attempt to identify the current knowledge gap and the effects of climate change on mountainous biodiversity, a special reference to the Gilgit-Baltistan is briefly reviewed.
Measuring the impact of climate change on mountain biodiversity is quite challenging, because climate change interacts with every phenomenon of ecosystem.
The scale of this change is so large and very adverse so strongly connected to ecosystem services, and all communities who use natural resources.
This study aims to provide the evidences on the basis of previous literature, in particular context to mountain biodiversity of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).
Mountains of Gilgit-Baltistan have most fragile ecosystem and are more vulnerable to climate change.
These mountains host variety of wild fauna and flora, with many endangered species of the world.
There are still many gaps in our knowledge of literature we studied because very little research has been conducted in Gilgit-Baltistan about climate change particular to biodiversity.
Recommendations are made for increased research efforts in future this including jointly monitoring programs, climate change models and ecological research.
Understanding the impact of climate change particular to biodiversity of GB is very important for sustainable management of these natural resources.
The Government organizations, NGOs and the research agencies must fill the knowledge gap, so that it will help them for policy making, which will be based on scientific findings and research based.
KEYWORDS: Mountainous biodiversity, Ecosystem services, Sustainable management, Wild Fauna *Corresponding Author: (Email: Sultan.iq11@gmail.com) 1.
INTRODUCTION Climate is not a stationary phenomenon it varies from time to time.
It is a product of weather which always experiences variations over space and time [1].
Climate change is resulting from a growing concentration of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) and uses of fossil fuels and other anthropogenic activities has become a major worldwide concern [2].
Anthropogenic emissions of GHS such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) have led to increases in their atmospheric concentration and cause warming of the lower atmosphere [3].
Human induced climate change threatens ecosystems and human health on global scale.
Climate change has greatest impact on those countries that are already poor due to lack of resources and access to scientific information.
Earth’s average surface temperature rises are likely to surpass the safe threshold of 2°C [4].
The average temperature of today's world has already increased by 0.6°C from the middle of the 1800s.
Vol.
1, 2016 http://journal.kiu.edu.pk/index.php/JMAR Review Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 54 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 The instrumental records from the past years have shown an increase in mean temperature all over the globe [4], with the global mean temperature increase at the rate of 0.007oC decade -1over the last century [5].
The overall global mean sea level rose by 19 cm from 19012010 [6].
At present climate is changing rapidly, the atmosphere has responded to the increased inflows of CO2 and other GHGs through worldwide [7, 8].
The land use change brings number of changing in climatic pattern.
Excessive deforestation leads to decrease in precipitation level and increase in surface temperature on global scale, thus it change whole global climatic model [9].
The scale of this change is so large and very adverse so strongly connected to ecosystem services, and all communities who use natural resources.
Biodiversity change is now considered an important global change [10].
Since first “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (IPCC) it has been observed that earth global temperature has been increasing because of climate change, which is more dangerous for over all biodiversity.
The altitudinal distribution of vegetation is expected to shift to higher elevation and some species with climatic ranges limited to mountain tops possibly will become extinct because of disappearance of their habitat or reduced migration potential [11].
Mountain Region are Considered as sensitive ecosystem.
Climate Change represents major threats to the ecosystems integrity and global biodiversity.
The consequences of these climatic changes have negative impact on number of wildlife and other natural ecosystems [12].
Mountains have most fragile ecosystem in the world [13].
Change in the global temperature and local precipitation might significantly change the altitudinal ranges of some keystone species existing in the different ranges of mountainous areas, and create more stresses on the fragile ecosystem of mountainous areas [14, 15].
According to Nogues-Bravo et al.
[16], it is difficult to estimate the exact effect of climate change on mountainous areas because of the doubts associated with the climatic scenario and also the presence of nonlinear feedback and the knowledge gap between the impacts.
Many Studies show that the mountain ecosystems are more vulnerable to climate change [17, 18, 19].
According to Theurillat and Guisan, 2001, indicated that climate change in mountainous ecosystem are most noticeable in the areas such as at Boundary Ecosystems (“Ecocline”) or at Eco tones, where two ecosystems are meet.
Species can response either by migrating or though adaptation [20].
2.
CLIMATE CHANGE IN PAKISTAN South Asia is considered as one of the most susceptible regions for global climatic changing.
In Pakistan there has not been such extensive research carried out regarding climate change and biodiversity as compared to other parts of the world.
As Pakistan is an agricultural based country, the country depends on the Indus irrigation system, as Indus River is one of the key water carriers of South Asia rising from the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas [21].
The country is highly vulnerable to climate change, hence large floods, drought and biodiversity loss is expected in future [1].
According to a survey conducted by Khan et al.
[2] about 40% of Pakistani’s believe that climate is changing moderately while 60% of them believe that it has been changing harshly.
Many studies indicate that change in climate affecting, directly or indirectly the whole biodiversity and their habitats [22, 23, 24] Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 55 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 leading to their displacement and in most harsh cases, even extinction.
Change in climate also affecting the competitiveness of many species by changing growth, death rates and regeneration success rates [25].
However a vital problem in mountain ecosystem concern to climate change is the increased in the erosion and in reduction of the slope stability [14].
It is being found that change in climate has caused a shift in habitat from wet monsoon forest to savannah [26].
Many unique species of flora and fauna are also on the edge of extinction due changing in habitat conditions.
Increase in high temperature and precipitation patterns can has also increase forest insects, pest and weeds which result in greater damage of forest vegetation, change the species composition and reduce the area of forest [26].
Globally the natural ecosystem has been affected by current climate change.
Slatyer [27] stated that, the Australian natural ecosystem is more vulnerable to climate change, the particular impact will depends on the adaptation and resilience of individual species.
Due to increase in warming at alpine areas[13, 18, 27, 28] the species which are already occupying the high altitudes areas have less possibility for up moving migration [29, 30].
Most of the species in particular ecosystem cannot adapt to the sudden climate change, in the cause forest, the species with very limited ranges, which have nowhere to migrate are more vulnerable to climate change.
And the probability of species to higher altitudes to find the similar condition of those at present will certainly be limited by some other factors like water availability and soil type and many other external factors [31].
As from literature it is found that Pakistan in more vulnerable to climate change in coming decades.
Most of the areas in Pakistan are showing positive trend in temperature for the period 2011-2050 and maximum rise is expected in Gilgit-Baltistan, Central and Southern Punjab and lower KPK [32].
This Increase in rate of temperatures will increase the heat waves which have likely to be adverse effect on biodiversity and water resources in Pakistan [33].
As Pakistan is agriculture dependent country; change in climate is expected to decrease the crop production that would have a great effect on the livelihood of Pakistan [34].
3.
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT ON MOUNTAIN BIODIVERSITY Mountainous ecosystems are Fragile [35] and more susceptible to climate change [36, 37].
Most of the global biological diversity hotspots are located in mountainous and coastal regions.
Mountains are the most fragile environment on earth, and one of the major “experimental fields of nature” because of steep environmental slope, wilderness and habitat types, and rich for biodiversity and water and they also provide services with tangible economic value [16, 38].
Mountain ecosystems cover about one-fifth of the earth’s continental areas [18] and so called storehouses of global biodiversity [39] these area host many threatened and endemic species of world so climate change is considered to be big threat to mountain biodiversity, because they are likely to be more exposed to extreme events of weather [40].
The hotspots of Himalayas, Karakorum and Hindu Kush (HKH) have a rich of species, gene pools and ecosystems which have global importance.
Human-induced climate change is predictable threat to species of Himalayas.
These mountain environments are strongly Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 56 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 affected by climate, due to their vertical (altitudinal) dimension [41, 42].
Environmental change is by now beginning in the high-altitude areas where glaciers are abundant.
Accelerated glacier melting is only one of the continuing changes in regions of HKH, which faces many different pressures, among them the impacts of climate change [43].
Nogue´s-Bravo et al.
[16] have provided an assessment on surface temperature changes in mountainous area of the world.
They projected that the average temperature change varied between “+3.2 1C (+0.4 1C/per decade) and +2.1 1C (+0.26 1C/per decade) for 2055 and +5.3 1C (+0.48 1C/per decade) and +2.8 1C for 2085 (+0.25 1C/per decade)”.
And it will expect to rise in northern latitude mountain systems than in mountains located in tropical and temperate zones [44].
Some of the world’s most endangered and endemic species are found in mountain ecosystems [45].
Mountain ecosystems are more susceptible for small climate change.
Because little change in climate can melts both the snow and ice to water.
Many species can response to climate by adaptation, shifting of their geographic ranges, altering their abundance or vanishing altogether [46, 47].
Protected areas and national parks are the cornerstones of biodiversity and conservation and acting as valuable buffer against the impacts change.
These areas are more vulnerable for climate change.
Habitat fragmentation reduced the species movement and dispersal.
Already many species are not able to survive without adequate protection of landscape [48].
Due to climate change many species of wildlife are forced to moved away from their natural habitat [49].
However if distribution of species is controlled by variations in climatic conditions or soils within certain geographic area, dispersal processes may have little consequence [50].
Sala et al.
[10] carried a study about global biodiversity scenarios, they investigate that little change in precipitation or temperature in arctic, alpine, boreal forest and deserts will bring large change in biodiversity and also in species composition.
By coming 2020 major loss of biodiversity is projected in ecologically rich area of the world.
While the loss of biodiversity, extinction of species already happening [51].
Wetlands are best indicators of climate change.
Global warming accelerates the rate of glacial melting which directly cause flooding.
Loss of wetlands is a major problem because they provide a specific life support system to unique biodiversity [52].
The mountains of Himalayas, Karakorum and Hindu Khush are more Vulnerable to Climate change [53, 54].
A most recent study conducted by Khan et al.
[53] reveals that the mountains Karakorum, Himalayas and the Hindu Khush, which are the most vital source of water for Pakistan, are more vulnerable to climate change, so that there is great need of study on the alpine ecosystems and to develop strategies and management actions for the restoration purposes.
Apart from the amount of flow in the rivers the excessive melting of glaciers affects the fauna and flora of mountainous areas, the indigenous species may become extinct and exotic species may get their part in the snowless environment.
Human society and the alpine ecosystems are interlinked [55].
It has been stated through many researches that, the mountain biota (tree line) is moving upward, Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 57 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 due to global, climate warming, in many mountains system [56, 57, 58].
4.
CLIMATE CHANGE IN GILGITBALTISTAN The climate of Earth is changing and the impacts are already being felt by biodiversity and wildlife habitats across the whole planet [59].
Very little research has been conducted in the Himalayan and Karakorum Highlands of northern Pakistan on the aspects of biodiversity and conservation [60].
Like other mountainous area of the world, climate changing is also taking place in Mountainous areas of Pakistan.
In Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) the climate stations in Gilgit, Skardu, Gupis and Bunji shows increase in the total temperature in last two decades from 1980 to 2006, and increased by 0.440 C per decades observed.
All most all the natural ecosystems are vulnerable to climate change in GB.
The rapidly melting of glaciers causes habitat loss of many species and it cause damaged in migratory routs of many migratory species [61].
GB of Pakistan has seems to be increase in precipitation and temperature has shown different trends in different seasons.
There found to be more rainfall than snow [62].
Through a detailed analysis of past records of different meteorological stations of the GB, it was observed that, the night temperatures are increasing in the Northern Areas (GB) of Pakistan [63].
According to a research conducted by Hussain et al.
[64], the maximum temperatures have increased all around the year, especially in high mountainous regions in Pakistan during the period between 1971 to 2000.
Climatic conditions vary widely in the GB, and are characterized by low annual precipitation, a great range of mean monthly temperature values, low winter temperatures, and harsh frosts during portions of the winter season.
Climate change is taking place in Gilgit-Baltistan.
Information taken from different climate stations like Gilgit, Skardu, Gupis and Bunji an increase in mean temperature was observed between the years 1980 to 2006 by 0.19oC per decade [65].
Figure 1: Mean temperature in Gilgit for 1980 to 2006.
An increase by 0.19 oC per decade has been observed (p<0.10) [65] Figure 2: An increasing trend was found for maximum temperature from 1980 to 2006.
Significant (p<0.10) was a warming by 0.63 and 0.41 oC decadeIshaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 58 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 1 for Gilgit and Gupis, respectively, and 0.37 oC decade-1 for Skardu [65].
The HKH region is home to some of the world richest and varied ecosystems on the planet.
These mountains are important sources of genetic diversity and resources such as timber minerals being an important source of livelihood for locals.
Changes in the climatic conditions and the resulting changes in the availability of water have found adverse effect on biodiversity of these ecosystems [64, 66].
It was discovered that change in climate caused flash floods and river bank erosion in Skardu district GB.
The flash floods emanating from glacial melting, leading to river bank which causes erosion and flooding of fields [67].
The general overview about the climate change and their associate hazards in Gilgit-Baltistan are loss of habitat, species extinction, less grasses in pasture, pest attacks, increased frequency of glacial melting, high turbid water, cold spell, GLOF, and destruction of water bank infrastructure are common ideals of the communities [68].
According to Ahmad (2010) the loss and deaths Markhor in Chitral are occurring due to disturbances and variations in the local environmental conditions, possibly triggered by climate change [69].
According to some elders in Gilgit-Baltistan a decade ago there were various birds and animal species which are now disappeared and less sited [70].
5.
FUTURE DIRECTION Climate change and its influence is on biodiversity is an important topic all over the world.
On local scale in Gilgit-Baltistan some Non-Government Organization like Worldwide fund for nature (WWF-P), United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and International Union for Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN) has been trying to protect and conserve the natural resources of GB and has keen interest to implement the adaptation and mitigation strategies for the Gilgit-Baltistan.
It is very imperative and necessary to conserve the mountainous biodiversity, because directly or indirectly we depend on it.
Gilgit-Baltistan is gifted with umber of natural resources, such as wildlife, fertile soil, glaciers, fresh water and natural forest.
The climate change has got a pressure on these natural resources particular to biodiversity in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).
Understanding the impact of climate change particular to biodiversity of GB is very important for sustainable livelihood development.
The mountain communities of Gilgit-Baltistan are totally dependent on natural resources.
These resources are under pressure due to over exploitation.
Many communities have started migration to other areas to cope from climate change.
There is need of scientific research, climate modeling and ecological research to provide pertinent recommendations for climate change adaptations at community level.
Ecosystem based adaptation (EBA) and Community based adaptation (CBA) is needed to focus and important for the mountain poorest communities who are badly hit by climate change and who also disproportionally reliant on the ecosystem services.
6.
KNOWLEDGE GAP IN KEY RESEARCH AREAS There is knowledge gap about the climate change and its impact on different components of biodiversity, especially in reference to GilgitBaltistan.
Because there is no reliable data is available about the impact of climate on Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 59 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 biodiversity of GB.
After literature review we have found the following knowledge gap.
1.
The effect of climate change is more adverse on aquatic life (fish fauna).
This component of biodiversity is still need to be debated.
2.
There is need of research on climate change impact on floral species, especially the ones which are economically important for the livelihood of GB.
(fruit plants, vegetation, crops) 3.
The impact of climate change on migration patterns of faunal species like, migratory birds and altitudinal migration of large mammals.
( snow leopard and ungulates of GB) 4.
There is lack of understanding of climate change impact on high altitudes ecosystem of GB.
Therefore its resources are over exploited which results in habitat loss and fragmentation, mismanagement of pastures and loss of important biodiversity.
5.
The impact of climate change on range lands is still to be documented in GB.
6.
The impact of climate change behavior of people of GB 7.
CONCLUSION An unavoidable conclusion form the above mentioned literature is that, the climate Change is not a static phenomenon, it is changing with time.
The biosphere has been reacting to climate change and the effects are highly complex, in the shape of biodiversity loss.
The impact of climate change is expected to increase in future.
Most of the species are moving towards poles and to higher elevations [71].
Many small mammals over the world are found to be niche specialist and are more vulnerable to climate change.
These small mammals are considered as indicators of climate change [72].
As GilgitBaltistan is a fragile mountainous ecosystem, little change in climate alters the ecosystem services.
Human being are directly depends on biodiversity for their survival.
So it is necessary that biologists should need to make better understanding of what our living world will look like in the near future [73].
People of Gilgit-Baltistan are totally dependent on natural resources, so there is great need of policy implementation for better management of natural resources and livelihood support in the changing climate.
The Government organizations, NGOs and the research agencies must fill the knowledge gap, so that it will help them for policy making, which will be based on scientific findings and research base.
References [1] G. Rasul, Climate Data and Modelling Analysis of the Indus Ecoregion.
WWF – Pakistan, (2012).
[2] S. Khan, M. U. Hasan, & M. A. Khan, People Perception about Climate Change and Adaptation in the Arid Region of Pakistan.
Peshawar: Institute of Geography, Urban and Regional Planning University of Peshawar KPK, Pakistan, (2012).
[3] J. K. Rosenthal, E. D. Sclar, P. L. Kinney, K. Knowlton, R. Crauderueff, & P. W. Brandt-Rauf, Links between the Built Environment, Climate and Population Health: Interdisciplinary Environmental Change Research in New York City.
Annals Academy of Medicine , 36 (2007) 834-46.
[4] IPCC, 2001: Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 60 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 Panel on Climate Change [Houghton, J.T., Y. Ding, D.J.
Griggs, M. Noguer, P.J.
van der Linden, X. Dai, K. Maskell, and C.A.
Johnson (eds.)].
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp.
881.
[5] P. D. Jones, A. Moberg, Hemispheric and large-scale surface air temperature variations: An extensive revision and update to 2001.
J.
Climate, 16 (2003 ) 206-223.
[6] R. K. Pachauri, Conclusion of IPCC Working Group I Fifth Assessment Report, AR4, SREX, and SRREN.
Warsaw Plaond, (2013).
[7] P. Hari, M. O. Andreae, P. Kabat, & M. Kulmala, A comprehensive Network of Measuring Stations to Moniter Climate change.
Boreal Environment Research , (2009) 442-446.
[8] E. Nickens, C. Bowes, M. Mieja, J. Mendelson, & M. l Murray, Air Pollution, a Warming Climate, and the Troubled Future for America's Hunting and Fishing Heritage.
(2011) Retrieved 01 14, 2013, from Game Changers: http://www.nwf.org/news-andmagazines/mediacenter/reports/archive/2011/gamechangers.aspx [9] V. BROVKIN, S. SITCH, W. V. BLOH, M. CLAUSSEN, E. BAUER, W. CRAMER, Role of land cover changes for atmospheric CO2 increase and climate change during the last 150 years.
Global Change Biology , (2004)1253–1266.
[10] O. E. Sala, F. S. Chapin, J. J. Armesto, E. Berlow, J. BloomÞeld, R. Dirzo, et al., Global Biodiversity Scenarios for the Year 2100.
SCIENCE, 287 (2000) 1770-1774.
[11] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
1995.
IPCC Second Assessment Report.
[12] A. Markham, Potential impacts of climate change on ecosystems: a review of implications for policymakers and conservation biologists.
Climate Research, 6 (1996) 179-191.
[13] H. F. Diaz, M. Grosjean, L. Graumlich, Climate variability and change in high elevation regions: past, present and future.
Climatic Change 59 (2003) 1-4.
[14] M. Beniston, Impact of Climate Change on Mountain Region.
A review of possible impacts.
Climatic Change 59 (2003) 5-31.
[15] A. Guisan, A, J. Holten, R. Spichiger, and L. Tessier (eds.
), 1995.
Potential Ecological Impacts of Climate Change in the Alps and Fennoscandian Mountains.
Publication Series of the Geneva Conservatory and Botanical Gardens, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, 194 pp.
[16] D. Nogues-Bravo, M. B. Arau´jo, M. P. Errea, J. P. Martı´nez-Rica, Exposure of global mountain systems to climate warming during the 21st Century.
Science Direct, Global Environmental Change, 17 (2007) 420-428.
[17] S. Dullinger, T. Dirnböck, & G. Grabherr, Patterns of Shrub Invasion into High Mountain Grasslands of the Northern Calcareous Alps, Austria.
Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine Research, 35 (2003) 434441.
[18] M. Beniston , H. F. Diaz, R. S. Bradley, Climatic change at high-elevation sites: an overview.
Climatic Change 36 (1997) 233-252.
[19] J.
Solar, Effect of Climate Change on Mountain Pine Distribution in Western Tatra Mountains, (2013) http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/54724 [20] S. G. Byars, Y. Parsons, A.A. Hoffmann, Effect of altitude on the genetic structure of an Alpine grass, Poahiemata.
Annals of Botany 110 (2009) 885-99.
[21] A.
A. Tahir, P. Chevallier, Y. Arnaud, L. Neppel, & B. Ahmad, Modeling snowmeltrunoff under climate scenarios in the Hunza River basin, Karakoram Range, Northern Pakistan.
Hydrology , (2011) 04-117.
[22] W. Foden, G. Mace, J. C. Vié, A. Angulo, S. Butchart, L. DeVantier, H. Dublin, A. Gutsche, S. Stuart, and E. Turak.
Species susceptibility to http://www.nwf.org/news-and-magazines/media-center/reports/archive/2011/game-changers.aspx http://www.nwf.org/news-and-magazines/media-center/reports/archive/2011/game-changers.aspx http://www.nwf.org/news-and-magazines/media-center/reports/archive/2011/game-changers.aspx http://www.nwf.org/news-and-magazines/media-center/reports/archive/2011/game-changers.aspx http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/54724 Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 61 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 climate change impacts.
In: J.-C. Vié, C. HiltonTaylor and S.N.
Stuart (eds).
The 2008 Review of The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (2008).
IUCN Gland, Switzerland.
[23] A. Campbell, V. Kapos, J. P. Scharlemann, P. Bubb, A. Chenery, L. Coad, et al., REVIEWOF THE LITERATURE ON THE LINKS BETWEEN BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE; Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation.
Montreal, Quebec, Canada: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
(2009).
[24] A. Shah, Climate change affects Biodiversity.
Global Issues (2012).
http://www.globalissues.org/article/172/climate change-affects-biodiversity [25] M. M. Iqbal, & A. M. Khan, CLIMATE CHANGE THREATS TO BIODIVERSITY IN PAKISTAN.
Islamabad: World Environment Day, (2010).
[26] J.A.
Khan, CHANGING CLIMATIC PATTERNS AND THEIR IMPACTS WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON PAKISTAN, (2010).
[27] R. Slatyer, Climate change impacts on Australia’s alpine ecosystems.
The ANU Undergraduate Research Journal 2 (2010).
[28] H. F. Diaz, & R. S. Bradley, Temperature variations during the last century at High elevation sites.
Climatic Change, 36, (1997) 253–279.
[29] K. Hennessy, P. Whetton , L. Smith, J. Bathols, M. Hutchinson, & J. Sharples, The impact of climate change on snow conditions in mainland Australia.
CSIRO Atmospheric Research, Aspendale, (2003).
[30] G. R. Walther, S. Beissner& C. A. Burga, Trends in the upward shift of alpine plants.
Journal of Vegetation Science 16, (2005) 541-8.
[31] M. Beniston, W. Haeberli, SENSITITVITY OF MOUNTAIN REGIONS TO CLIMATIC CHANGE.
GEO Publications, Hamburg, (2001) 237-244.
[32] Q.-u.
Z. Chaudhry, A. Mahmood, G. Rasul, & M. Afzaal, Climate Change Indicators of Pakistan .
PAkistan Meterological Department (2009).
[33] M. Zahida, & G. Rasula, FREQUENCY OF EXTREME TEMPERATURE & PRECIPITATION EVENTS IN PAKISTAN 1965-2009.
Sci.Int.
(Lahore) , (2011) 313-319.
[34] A.
A. Chaudhry, Forest and climate Change.
World Environmental Day, June 2011.
[35] M. A. Munoz, A. Faz, A. R. Memut, Soil Carbon Reservoirs at High-Altitude Ecosystems in the Andean Plateau.
Climate Change Impacts on High-Altitude Ecosystems, Springer International Publishing, (2015) 135-153.
[36] N. Nikolaishvili, L. Matchanariani, Impacts of Climate Change on Georgia’s Mountain Ecosystems.
Climate Change Impacts on HighAltitude Ecosystems.
Springer International Publishing, (2015) 245-274.
[37] G. Parolly, The High-Mountain Flora and Vegetation of the Western and Central Taurus Mts.
(Turkey) in the Times of Climate Change.
Climate Change Impacts on High-Altitude Ecosystems.
Springer International Publishing, (2015) 9-133.
[38] Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats.
Impact of Climate Change on Mountain Biodiversity in Eurpoe.
(2010).
[39] E. M. Spehn, K. Rudmann-Maurer, C. Körner, D. Maselli (eds.
), Mountain Biodiversity and Global Change.
GMBA-DIVERSITAS, Basel, (2010) [40] T. Kohler and D, Maselli (eds).
Mountains and Climate Change From Understanding to Action.
Published by GeographicaBernensia with the support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and an international team of contributors.
Bern.
(2009).
[41] International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development.
(2009).
Mountain Biodiversity and Climate Change.
Kathmandu, Nepal: ICIMOD.
[42] N. Chettri, B. Shakya, & E. Sharma, Biodiversity Conservation in the Kangchenjunga Landscape.
Kathmandu, Nepal: International Centre for http://www.globalissues.org/article/172/climate http://www.globalissues.org/article/172/climate Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 62 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 Integrated Mountain Development (ICMOD), (2008).
[43] USAID.
2001.
CHANGING GLACIERS AND HYDROLOGY IN ASIA ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES TO GLACIER MELT IMPACTS.
USAID Environmental Health IQC (EHIQC, Contract GHA-I-00-04-00006/Task Order # 2, Line Item # 2), managed by CDM International Inc. [44] N. D. Bravo, M. B. Araujo, M. P. Errea, & J. P. Martınez-Rica, Exposure of global mountain systems to climate warming during the 21st Century.
Global Environmental Change , (2007) 420–428.
[45] S.K.
Behera, Impact of Climate Change on Mountains Ecosystems of India: Special Reference to the Himalayas.
International Society of Environmental Botanist, Enviro News, 18 (2012).
[46] K. Tse-ring, E. Sharma, N. Chettri, & A. Shrestha, Climate Change Impact and Vulnerability in the Eastern Himalayas – Synthesis Report.
Kathmandu, Nepal: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development ( ICMOD), (2010) [47] M. A. Nawaz, P. Shadie, V. Zalaria, Central Karakorum Conservation Complex, Draft Management Plan (IUCN).
GilgitBaltistan (2009).
[48] K. MacKinnon, C. Sobrevila, & V. Hickey, Biodiversity, Climate Change and Adaptation; Nature-Based Solutions from the World Bank Portfolio.
Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK (2008).
[49] B. Walsh, How Climate Change Will Impact Animals.
Retrieved jan 9, 2013, from Time Sciences and space: (2008) http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599 ,1849698,00.htmlConvention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats.
Impact of Climate Change on Mountain Biodiversity in Eurpoe, (2010).
[50] G. P. Juli & P. A. Mike, Patterns of plant species richness in relation to different environments: An appraisal.
Vegetation Science , (2001)153-166.
[51] D. Leary, B. Pisupati, (eds).
2010.
The Future International Environmental Law.
United Nation University Press.
[52] M. Malik, A. Imran, N. Naseer, R. Mahmood, & et, al., Wetlands as Indicators of Climate Change.
Nature, A quarterly magazine of WWF-Pakistan, 34 (2010)1-32 [53] M. A. Khan, B. Gul, H. Khan, Impact of Climatic Change on Flora of High Altitudes in Pakistan.
Springer International Publishing.
(2015) 361-381.
[54] J. Y. Gerlitz, S. Banerjee, N. Brooks, M. Macchi, An Approach to Measure Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Hindu Kush Himalayas.
Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
(2014) 122.
[55] P.W.
Bierman-Lytle, Climate Change Impact on High-Altitude Ecosystems and Their Impact on Human Communities.
Climate Change Impacts on High-Altitude Ecosystems.
Springer International Publishing, (2015) 289-341.
[56] G. Grabherr, M. Gottfried, H. Pauli, Climate effects on mountain plants.
Nature, 369 (1994) 448.
[57] H. Pauli, M. Gottfried, K. Reiter, C. Klettner, G. Grabherr, Signals of range expansions and contractions of vascular plants in the high Alps: observations (1994–2004) at the GLORIA master site Schrankogel, Tyrol, Austria.
Glob Change Biol 13 (2007) 147-156.
[58] A. El-Keblawy, Impact of Climate Change on Biodiversity Loss and Extinction of Endemic plants of Arid Land Mountains.
J Biodivers Endanger Species 1 (2014) 2-20.
[59] R. E. Green, M. Harley, L. Miles, J. Scharlemann, A. Watkinson, & O. Watts, Global Climate Change and Biodiversity.
East Anglia, Norwich, UK: University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, (2003).
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1849698,00.html http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1849698,00.html http://link.springer.com/search?facet-creator=%22Paul+W.+Bierman-Lytle%22 Ishaq et al., J. mt.
area res.
01 (2016) 53-63 63 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
1, 2016 [60] K. Sheikh, T. Ahmad, M. A. Khan, Use, exploitation and prospects for conservation: people and plant biodiversity of Naltar Valley, northwestern Karakorums, Pakistan.
Biodiversity and Conservation, 28 (2002) 715–742.
[61] B. Khan, F. Ali, Understanding sectorial impacts of climate change on Gilgit-Baltistan.
Regional climate risk reduction project ( RCRRP); .
(2011), UNDP-ECHO initiative.
[62] International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development.
(2010).
Climate change impacts on the water resources of the Indus Basin.
Kathmandu, Nepal: ICIMOD.
[63] S. B. Cheema, G. Rasul, & D. H. Kazmi, Evaluation of Projected Minimum Temperatures for Northern Pakistan.
Pakistan Journal of Meteorology, (2011) 63-70.
[64] S. S. Husnain, M. Mudasser, M. M. Sheikh, N. Manzoor, Climate Change and Variability in [64] Mountain Regions of Pakistan Implication for Water and Agriculture.
Pakistan Journal of Meteorology, 2 (2005) 75-90.
[65] M. J. Steinbauer, & J. Zeidler, Climate Change in the Northern Areas Pakistan Impacts on glaciers, ecology and livelyhoods.
Gilgit: World Wide Fund for Nature-Pakistan Gilgit Conservation and Information Center (GCIC) NLI Colony, Jutial Gilgit, (2008).
[66] S. P. Singh, I.
B. Khadka, B. S. Karky, & E. Sharma, Climate Change in the Hindu KushHimalayas; The State of Current Knowledge.
Kathmandu, Nepal,: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICMOD), (2011).
[67] World Wide Fund.
2012.
Facing the Future with Confidence Shigar Community Adapts to Changing Environment and Economics.
WWF-P [68] F. Ali, (2010, Dec 2).
CLIMATE CHANGE PROBABILITY IN GILGIT-BALTISTAN.
Retrieved Feb 1, 2013, from Pamir Times: http://pamirtimes.wordpress.com/tag/climatechange/ [69] K. Ahmad, (2010, April 14).
Wildlife official sees climate change behind the death of 7 Markhors in Chitral.
Retrieved feb 1, 2013, from Pamir Times: http://pamirtimes.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/wil dlife-official-sees-climate-change-behind-thedeath-of-7-markhors-in-chitral/ [70] S. Ishaq, People Perception of climate Change Impact on Mountain Biodiversity in GilgitBaltitsan, (2013), GCIC-GB WWF-Gilgit (Unpublished report) [71] A. M. FRANCO, J. K. HILL, C. KITSCHKE, Y. C. COLLINGHAM, D. B. ROY, R. FOX, et al.
Impacts of climate warming and habitat loss on extinctions at species’ low-latitude range boundaries.
Global Change Biology, (2006) 1545– 1553.
[72] H. B. Katuwal, and S. Koirala (Eds.
), Proceedings of Third Seminar on Small Mammals Issues.
Small Mammals Conservation and Research Foundation, New Baneshwor, Kathmandu, Nepal, (2012) 55.
[73] F. Krupp, L. J. Musselman, M. A. Kotb, I. Weidig, The effects of Climate change on biodiversity: Pressing issues and research priorities.
BioRisk, 3 (2009) 1-4.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
http://pamirtimes.wordpress.com/tag/climate-change/ http://pamirtimes.wordpress.com/tag/climate-change/ http://pamirtimes.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/wildlife-official-sees-climate-change-behind-the-death-of-7-markhors-in-chitral/ http://pamirtimes.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/wildlife-official-sees-climate-change-behind-the-death-of-7-markhors-in-chitral/ http://pamirtimes.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/wildlife-official-sees-climate-change-behind-the-death-of-7-markhors-in-chitral/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Microsoft Word GJPHM-2022climate change 2 .docx 579 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 Review Research IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON ABUNDANCE, DISTRIBUTION, AND SURVIVAL OF AEDES SPECIES: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW Lavanyah Sivaratnam.1, Chin Mun Wong1, Diana Safraa Selimin1, Rozita Hod1, Sazaly Abu Bakar2, Hasanain Faisal Ghazi3, Mohd Rohaizat Hassan1 1Department of Community Health, Faculty of Medicine, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras, 56 000, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
2Department of Tropical Infectious Diseases Research &Education Center (TIDREC), Medical Microbiology, Faculty of Medicine, University Malaya Medical Centre, Jalan Universiti, Lembah Pantai, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
3 College of Nursing, Al-Bayan University, Baghdad, Iraq.
*Corresponding author: rohaizat@ppukm.ukm.edu.my ABSTRACT Introduction: Aedes species is a common vector that causes various types of infection.
One of the factors that can affect their distribution is the climate change.
Identifying the components of climate change that can affect this distribution and how they affect it can aid in predicting and controlling the Aedes species distribution.
Methods: Systematic search on articles related to the impact of climate change on Aedes species distribution was conducted using four databases namely Cochrane Library, PubMed, Ovid Medline and Science Direct.
All the articles which were published within year 2014 till 2019, was then assesses by using the PRISMA checklist 2009 guided by the inclusion and exclusion criteria set.
Results: Ultimately, 19 articles inclusive of six cross-sectional studies, six modelling and seven ecological studies were subjected to narrative and objective quality analysis using NewcastleOttawa Scale.
Each component of climate change – rainfall, temperature, humidity and wind velocity were examined on its relational impact towards vector Aedes species distribution and survival.
All studied climate components showed a unidirectional effect on the distribution and survival of Aedes species Temperature range 3.4oC-34.2oC, humidity <70%, post rainfall (<70mm) and low wind velocity related to increased vector Aedes species distribution, abundance and survival.
Quality assessment yielded 17 high quality articles and two moderate quality.
Conclusion: Climate change affects the Aedes species distribution and survival.
By incorporating the knowledge on the effects of each 580 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 component of climate change Aedes species vector control effort, a more objective and effective mitigation can be achieved.
Keywords: Aedes species, climate change, impact, rainfall, Dengue, Aedes aegypti, Aedes Albopictus, vector abundance, vector survival, vector distribution Introduction Aedes species is the vector for seven important communicable diseases that are causing a pandemic in humans and other reservoir hosts, including Dengue fever, Chikungunya, Zika virus, Yellow fever, West Nile fever, Ross River fever and Murray Valley Encephalitis (Cavrini et al., 2009; Walter Reed Biosystematics Unit, 2011).
Aedes aegypti is a small to medium-sized mosquito of 4 to 7 millimetres (Yimer, Beyene, & Shewafera, 2016).
The adult Aedes aegypti has white scales on the dorsal surface of that thorax resembled the shape of a violin or lyre while adult Aedes albopictus have one central white stripe at the top of the thorax.
The abdomen of Aedes species is generally dark brown to black, some with white scales, the proboscis and the tip of the abdomen of the Aedes species come to a point, which is characteristic of all Aedes species (Carpenter & LaCasse, 1995; CDC, 2006; Cutwa & O’Meara, 2007).
Generally, the females are larger than males, which can be distinguished by small palps of white or silver scales at tip.
The female mosquitoes have sparse short hairs while mouthparts are modified for blood feeding; while male mosquitoes have plumose antennae and their mouthparts are modified for nectar feeding (Yimer et al., 2016).
The female Aedes aegypti feed almost exclusively on human blood only for the reason of oviproduction, other than that, the mosquito survived long with food other than blood (Zettel & Kaufman P., 2013).
Feeding on humans generally occurs at one to two hours intervals, preferring to bite typically from below or behind, usually the feet and ankles (Yimer et al., 2016).
The female Aedes aegypti are active biters, they are read to feed when the environment are favourable (Zettel & Kaufman P., 2013).
Aedes albopictus is an aggressive diurnal feeder feeding on a wider variety of hosts than the Aedes aegypti , they often present near human habitat, breeds well in artificial containers around the human habitat such as standing water bodies, coconut / durian shells, empty tins, opened water storage containers, as well as in natural containers such as leaf axils of water-holding plants like the bromeliads, or tree holes (Mu˜nnoz, Eritja, Alcaide, & al., 2011).
The Aedes albopictus populations is capable to resist desiccation in temperate regions by produce diapausing eggs to curb the freezing cold winter season; and can feed on a wider diversity of vertebrate hosts by facilitating the establishment of enzootic arbovirus transmission cycles as a bridge vector in the America continent from spill-over of Dengue virus of sylvatic cycles in Asia (Motoki et al., 2019).
With this, Aedes albopictus has a larger geographical distribution than Aedes aegypti (La Ruche, Dejour-Salamanca, & Debruyne, 2010).
After taking a complete blood meal, female mosquitoes produce an average of 100 to 200 eggs per batch placed at varying distances above the water line, usually clutching at two or more sites (Yimer et al., 581 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 2016).
The number of eggs produced is dependent upon the volume of blood meal feed.
Females can produce up to five batches of eggs during a lifetime (Yimer et al., 2016).
The adult Aedes aegypti life span can range from two to four weeks depending on environmental conditions.
Aedes aegypti comes in three polytypic forms: domestic, sylvan and per domestic.
The domestic form breeds in urban habitat, often around or inside houses.
The sylvan form is a more in rural form, breeds in tree holes and forests while the per domestic form thrives in environmentally modified areas such as coconut groves and farms (Maricopa County Environmental Services, 2006).
The increasing vector-animal-human interaction has diverged the sylvatic cycle of transmission into the form of domestic, anthropophilic and phagic transmission forms (Powell & Tabachnick, 2013).
Various natural habitat displacement and habitat creation by human activities, climate change and transmission tetrad (vector, agent, host, environment interaction) have successfully enlarged the distribution of Aedes species the region away from its originality (Shragai T, Tesla B, Murdock C, & LC., 2017).
Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus seem to have different susceptibilities to ZIKV, feeding rates, and feeding preferences, as Aedes aegypti feeds more often and almost exclusively on human as compared to Aedes albopictus which feeds on a broader range of hosts (Caminade C, McIntyre KM., & AE., 2017).
Therefore, given equal mosquito and human densities, regions with Aedes aegypti will have a higher affinity for DENV, ZIKV, CHKV and YFV, but since Aedes albopictus extends beyond the range of Aedes aegypti into more temperate regions, it is more often found as the Aedes species which carry flavivirus transmission risk (Caminade C et al., 2017).
Extreme Weathers More than 50% of the earth’s climate change was a result of anthropogenic activities and is happening at a rate faster than the earth ecosystem can recover (Stocker et al., 2013).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change forecasts an increase in world average temperature by year 2100 within the range 1.4 ºC –5.8ºC since year 1995; and the global temperature is rising at the rate of 0.5ºC annually since year 1970 (McMichael, Woodruff, & Hales, 2006), more remarkably seen at higher latitudes areas.
This leads to extreme weather events in a more frequent, severe and higher variable mode (Hainesa, Kovatsa, Campbell-Lendrumb, & Corvalanb, 2006; McMichael et al., 2006).
The mortality rate related to extreme weather is well established and represented by the U-shape / J-shape curve, where median temperature (the thermo comfort zone) has the lowest death rate, and the mortality rate increases in exponential relationship with the rise of temperature, also to lesser extent, the fall to low temperature (Abdul Rahman, 2009; Hainesa et al., 2006; McMichael et al., 2006).
In a warming climate, extreme events like floods and droughts are likely to become more frequent.
More frequent floods and droughts will affect water quality and availability.
Increases in drought in some areas may increase the frequency of water shortages and lead to more restrictions on water usage.
An overall increase in precipitation or rain may create greater flood potential.
Rising sea levels, meanwhile, 582 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 heighten flood dangers for coastal farms, and increase saltwater intrusion into coastal freshwater sources making those water sources too salty for irrigation or drink (Backlund, Janetos, & Schimel, 2008).
Precipitation also can washes-off pesticide from the agricultural site and spread the pesticide to water sources such as underground water thus making it contaminated.
Same as food supply, extreme climate can result in greater water source spoilage and disrupt water distribution, water storage, transport and dissemination.
Climate Change in Relation to Vector Distribution Flood / rain fall related vector borne diseases like dengue fever, malaria, leptospirosis, Chikungunya endemics are more prevalent in the country and worldwide; through the development of more breeding sites, contamination of surface run-off and poor hygiene practice during the disaster.
Urbanization brings forth more complex human-vector interaction epidemiologically and ecologically, account for the worsen endemicity (World Health Organization & United Nations Environment Programme, 2007).
The illegal logging activities may result in malaria virus transmission via rural-urban vector-human interaction (World Health Organization & United Nations Environment Programme, 2007).
Mosquito Aedes species usually live between the latitudes of 35°N and 35°S below an elevation of 1000m at both natural and artificial terrestrial and aquatic habitats (NC.
Dom, Abu, & Rodziah, 2013).
Climatic factors are strong environmental drivers for arbovirus disease transmission, this is particularly true for factors such as environmental temperature, relative humidity and rainfall patterns (Rodo, Pascual, & Doblas-Reyes, 2013).
The risk of viral transmission from Aedes species is highly sensitive to climate.
Temperature impacts the ectoderm’s internal body temperature, hence directly affecting the mosquito physiology (e.g., immunity) (Murdock, Blanford, & Luckhart, 2014), the mosquito development, survival, reproduction, biting rates (Ciota, Matacchiero, & Kilpatrick, 2014), vector competence and extrinsic incubation periods) (Ciota et al., 2014).
In hot and dry climates, Aedes albopictus eggs may be more susceptible to desiccation, thus becoming less competitive to Aedes aegypti (Shragai T et al., 2017).
This capacity of vector-borne disease transmission and affinity of transmission are influenced by the mean number of blood meals in a typical mosquito’s remaining lifespan after mosquitoes were infected (Shragai T et al., 2017).
Urbanization further changes the natural habitat of both mosquitoes and of human, as well as climate suitable for the vector survival and transmission (Pincebourde, Murdock, & Vickers, 2016).
Temperature, humidity, and the number of breeding sites in the city appeared heterogenous, vary depending on the economic status of the landowner or resident, mosquito control, zoning, and cultural norms.
Micro environmental niche in the urban that turn out to be the mosquitoes hotspots are usually congested area with high population density, limited space, poor hygiene, sanitation and suboptimal sewage management; and these niches are often inhabited by human population with higher vulnerability to infection due to low socioeconomic and low sociodemographic status (Shragai T et al., 2017).
583 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 Modelling and Prediction of Vector Survival Environmental niche modelling is usually used to predict suitability for disease transmission for Aedes Species.
Modelling uses disease prevalence report against hypothesized environmental covariates to derive future potential of vector distribution (Messina et al., 2016).
For example, modelling results indicate that temperature conditions related to the 2015 El Niño climate phenomenon were exceptionally conducive for Aedes species mosquito-borne transmission of ZIKV over South America (Caminade C et al., 2017).
Regions with model prediction of high ZIKV transmission risk has high correlation with the subsequent large outbreaks occurring in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela in year 2015–2016.
This optimum thermal zones show largest simulated biting rates and lowest mosquito mortality rates and the shortest extrinsic incubation period in year 2015 (Caminade C et al., 2017).
The sub-Saharan Africa regions demonstrated continuous suitability for ZIKV survival since the 1950s (Messina et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, the interpretation of relationships between mosquito abundance and land-use patterns is not as straight forward.
The variation occurs due to different categorizations of landscapes used, such as the percent of vegetative coverage, human population density, outdated geographical map, map resolution.
The inaccuracy is complicated by inappropriate scales used to quantifying these patterns.
When large regions are used, the over broad geography may not appropriately representing the microclimate and available habitats within the regions, obscuring pattern of transmission (Shragai T et al., 2017).
With climate change being recognized fast as a determinant of health, this has become utmost important to estimate the effect of weather on vector borne diseases (Roy, Gupta, Chopra, Meena, & Aggarwal, 2018).
Even though various control measures have been done, vector borne cases are still persistent which is likely due to the changing climate that is not factored to our control measures.
There is no recent review done on the effect of climate change on Aedes species distribution globally.
Being able to anticipate vector abundance in relation to the changing climate, a better vector control can be implemented.
The review aims to understand how each component of climate change impacts the distribution and survival of vector Aedes species.
Methods Literature Search Systematic search related to relevant articles from four major search engines using Boolean search strategy, search engines including Cochrane library, PubMed and Ovid Medline and Science Direct, retrieving all articles published from year 2014 until 2019.
PRISMA checklist 2009 is used to describe the workflow of articles search for this study (Page MJ et al., 2021).
The keywords used to search for the articles are stated in Table 1.
Table 1: Initial keyword search using P.I.C.O.
strategy 584 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 Keyword Concepts Alternative Patient / problem Aedes sp Aedes sp OR Dengue cases OR Dengue Haemorrh#gic Fever cases OR Chikungunya cases OR Yellow fever case OR Zika case OR Flavivirus case Intervention Comparison Climate change in SEA Current Rain fall OR Current temperature OR current wind direction Outcome Vector distribution Vector survival Vector distribution OR Aedes sp new case OR Pattern of Aedes sp.
Distribution OR Vector Aedes sp.
Evolution OR Vector life cycle OR Vector transmission OR Vector survival Boolean Strategy Keyword search: As the keyword combination did not yield sufficient search result after two rounds of Boolean Strategy Keyword search, contraction using a set of new keywords was done.
Aedes sp OR Dengue cases OR Dengue Haemorrh#gic Fever cases AND Rain fall OR temperature OR wind direction AND distribution OR new case OR Pattern OR Evolution OR transmission OR survival Inclusion criteria for the article search including: (1) full text, primary research articles on prevalence of vector-borne diseases in relation to climate change (2) reported at least one outcome of the vector distribution due to climate change (3) articles published from year 2014 – 2019.
Exclusion criteria set were: (1) reviewed articles of no original research work empirical data (2) entomology with no association to climate change (3) Knowledge, Attitude, Practice studies (4) clinical treatment (5) pharmaceutical study (6) vector distribution other than Aedes species The articles obtained from the keyword search were first screened by titles to exclude totally irrelevant articles, then abstracts of the articles to look for P.I.C.O.
criteria.
When full texts are retrieved, it was assessed for relevance to include our inclusion and exclusion criteria.
In total, there is a total of 440 articles retrieved based on Boolean search strategy, 36 accepted by title and further subjected for abstract screening yielding 31 articles.
After excluding one duplicate article and eight that did not fit the inclusion criteria, a total of 22 articles were subjected for full text review.
In the review, three more articles were excluded due to irrelevant content.
The final full article reviewed and proceeded for analysis was 19.
The progress of screening and selection is described through the Prisma flow chart in Error!
Reference source not found.. 585 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo Figure 1: Prisma flow chart Results & Discussion Characteristic of study A total of 19 articles which consist of six cross-sectional, six modelling and seven ecological studies were finalized for full text analysis.
The articles are mostly from Europe and Asia.
Amongst which 17 articles studied on temperature in relation concerning vector survival, eight on rainfall, eight on humidity, two on seasonality change and one on wind velocity.
Table 2 provides a narrative review on the study design, tools, variables used, outcome of vector and challenge / limitation / public health implications.
Total of 11 studies using ovitrap for mosquitoes sampling, the other eight uses secondary data from meteorology data, environmental survey or geographical intelligence systems.
Table 3 provide the narrative analysis summary of various climate components effect on vector Aedes species distribution and survival.
Nine studies reported on rainfall, where 55.5% (n=5) studies shows inverse relationship of rainfall with Aedes sp abundance, with each 1mm increase of rainfall contribute to 1% increase in vector abundance, up to 70mm.
Nine studies were done on humidity, 66.7% (n=6) studies reported increased humidity will lead to increase in Aedes sp vector abundance, (Betanzos-Reyes, Rodríguez, Romero-Martínez, Sesma-Medrano, & Rangel-Flores, 2018) specified that humidity range 30-70% is 586 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo suitable for vector survival, and consistently supported by (Da Cruz Ferreira et al., 2017) that humidity beyond 70% leads to reduction of vector survival.
Seventeen studies studied effect of temperature with Aedes sp abundance and survival, 94.1% (n=16) supported that increase temperature proportionate to the increase of vector abundance, but (Limper et al., 2016) provided contrast opinion.
The lowest temperature recorded for vector increment was 3.4oC (Taber, Hutchinson, & Smithwick, 2017), and temperature maximum for increased vector was 34.3oC by (Das et al., 2014).
Review supported the Jshape relationship between temperature and vector abundance and survival, (Phung, Talukder, Rahman, Shannon, & Cordia, 2016) reported with every 1˚C increment, there will be an additional 11% risk to get Dengue infection (proxy to vector survival).
Only three studies reviewed on wind velocity in relation to Aedes sp survival, all studies show inverse relationship.
Table 2: Narrative Review of Characteristics of Studied Articles N O Author/ Year Country Study Design Tool Variables Outcome Challenge / Limitation / Public Health Implication 1 Barrera et al.
2019 (Barrer a, Amador , Aceved o, Beltran, & Munoz, 2019) Puerto Rico (US Territory) Comparat ive cross sectional (2014/201 6) Mosquito collection Mosquito density Rainfall Temperatur e Relative humidity Accumulated rain significantly influenced mosquitoes density (reduced during rain fall and increase post rain) Comparing the results with a previous study may not be comparabl e as the number of samples, sampling tools, techniques and analysis may differ.
2 Roy et al.
2018 (Roy et al., 2018) India Cross sectional study Secondary data Laboratory confirmed cases Rainfall Temperatur e Relative humidity 1.
Relative humidity was associated with burden of positive dengue cases 2.
Dengue admission was preceded by heavy rain 4–6 weeks earlier -limited number of paediatric cases 3 Xiang et al.
2017 (Limper China Modelling Dengue notification system data Clinical and laboratory confirmed cases Rainfall 1.
Positive temperature -Dengue association s were Nonclimatic data was not accounte 587 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo et al., 2016) Meteorologi cal data Temperatur e Relative humidity Sunshine duration Wind velocity found for both Tmax and Tmin at the range of 21.6– 32.9°C and 11.2– 23.7°C 2.
Relative humidity was positively associated with dengue; however, a negative association was observed during extremely humidity.
3.
Extreme rainfall and high wind velocity are associated with reduced cases.
d for in this model as data was not available 4 Phung et al.
2016 (Phung et al., 2016) Vietnam Modelling Secondary data Dengue cases Rainfall Temperatur e Relative humidity 1.
A 1 ̊C increase in temperatu re increased the Dengue risk 11% (95%CI, 9-13) at 14 weeks and 7% (95%CI, 6-8) at 58weeks.
2.
A 1% rise in humidity increased Dengue risk 0.9% (95%CI, 0.2-1.4) at lag 1-4 and 0.8% (95%CI, 0.2-1.4) at Uses mean value of climate factors rather than minimu m, maxim um or diurnal .
588 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo lag 5-8 weeks 3.
A 1 mm increase in rainfall increased Dengue risk 0.1 % (95%CI, 0.05-0.16) at lag 1-4 and 0.11% (95%CI, 0.07-0.16) at lag 5-8 weeks 5 Limper et al.
2016 (Dhimal , Gautam , Joshi, O’hara, & Ahrens, 2015.)
Netherland s Modelling Distributed lag nonlinear model Secondary data Dengue cases, Rainfall, Temperatur e, Relative humidity, Sunshine duration lower temperatures lead to higher rates of infection -data for Dengue cases is obtained by month unlike climate changes by week.
6 William s et al.
2015 (William s et al., 2015) Malaysia Modelling mechanistic entomology and disease model – secondary data Dengue cases Daily temperatur e Increase in temperature resulted in an overall decrease in Dengue activity Model unable to predict future number of Dengue cases 7 IM NurinZulkifli et al.
2015 (IM NurinZulkifli.
et al., 2015) Malaysia Cross sectional study Mosquito collection HLC – human landing catch Mean number of Ae.
albopictus mosquitoes and meteorologi cal parameters -mosquito population correlated significantly with humidity & temperature -no significant correlation of mosquito species with Temperature and humidity 8 Taber E.D et.
al.
2016 (Ciota et al., 2014) Pennsylva nia, USA Modelling geographic information systems (GIS) over 10 years risk of Dengue virus transmissio n using a model that captures the probability of -Ae.
albopictus population density -monthly pattern of population increase correlate with BG Sentinel traps was not used during earlier part of the study, given lower yield of Ae.
589 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo transmissio n temperature 3.4-32.7oC -winter temperatures limit Aedes sp.
egg survival Albopictus catch evaluation of temperate Ae.
albopictus population s helps in developme nt of better biological models of DENV transmissio n. 9 Dutto M. & Mosca A.
2017 (Dutto & Mosca, 2017) Northwest ern Italy Cross sectional study Environmen tal risk assessment interview, larvae sampling Indoor mosquito breeding sites -for Ae albopictus only Low external temperature (winter, 26oC) restricted vector survival, encourage indoor vector survival Insufficient survey sites to define real entity of winter presence of Aedes species in the area and the associated risk of vectortransmitted diseases 10 Rodrigu es et.
al.
2015 (Grech et al., 2019) Brazil Cross sectional study Mosquito collection Portable electrical catcher Female Aedes aegypti & Ae.
Albopictus over number of residents for intradomicili ary and peridomicili ary premises strong association between no.
of female adult mosquitoes and the number of residents in both intradomiciliar y and peridomiciliar y premises 77% (p = 0.000) female adult Aedes sp intradomiciliar y premises and and 48% female adult Aedes sp peridomiciliar y premises due to mean high probability of humanvector contact can increase possible transmissio n and spread of the DEN virus.
Part of the Aedes sp mosquito behaviour is the adaptability to vast differentiat ed environme nts 590 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo rainfall (p=0.001) Min temperature in both types of premises contributes to 40% of no.
of female mosquitoes Entomologi cal indicators of adult females should be use for vector control 11 Marta R.H.S et.
al.
2018 (Marta, 2018) Brazil Cross sectional study Mosquito collection using ovitrap rainfall and temperatur e oviposition rates seasonal variation (min, max temperatures significantly associated with oviposition rate of both Aedes sp.
Cumulative rainfall (weekly) not associated with vector abundance Ae.
aegypti, closely associated with inhabited region (more human); Ae.
albopictus was more closely associated with area with a greater vegetation coverage 12 Sadie J.R. et.
al.
2019 (Sadie J. R., Colin J. C., Erin, & Leah, 2019) USA Modelling general circulation models – secondary data Temperatur e mosquito range shifts track optimal temperature ranges for transmission (21.3–34.0˚C for Ae.
aegypti; 19.9–29.4˚C for Ae.
albopictus -poleward shift pattern observed significant reductions in climate suitability at southeast Asia and west Africa are expected for Ae.
albopictus climate change will lead to increased net and new exposures to Aedesborne viruses both Aedes species vary in transmissio n rate under climate change, Ae.
Aegypti endures wider range of climate change, but intermediat e climate changes 591 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo make Ae.
albopictus a more suitable survival and successful competitor 13 Dhimal et al.
2014 (Dhimal , Gautam , Kreß, & Müller, 2014) Nepal Ecologica l study Entomologi cal survey: Adult mosquito collection by using BGSentinel and CDC light traps Number of mosquitoes per trap and meteorologi cal parameters Temperature, rainfall and relative humidity had significant effects on the mean number of A. aegypti per BGSentinel trap:• Each degree rise in temp increased female A. aegypti abundanc e (ß = 1.63; 95% CI = 1.34– 1.98; p,0.001) • Every increased in rainfall (mm) reduced abundanc e (ß = 0.94; 95%CI =0.92– 0.97; p,0.001) • Every increased humidity (%) also reduced abundanc e (ß= 0.59; 95%CI=0.
44–0.77; p,0.001).
No significant effect of rainfall and temperature Ae.
aegypti and Ae.
albopictus established stable population s up to the Middle Mountains of Nepal, but not in the High Mountain localities.
Ae.
aegypti and Ae.
albopictus trapped even when minimum temperatur es had dropped to 8oC suggesting a considerab le adaptive capacity of local Ae.
aegypti and Ae.
albopictus population s to low temperatur es à for better planning and scaling-up of mosquitoborne disease control programm es in the mountaino us areas of Nepal that had 592 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo on the number of Aedes eggs per ovitrap (p.0.05).
Humidity had significantly negative effects on the mean number of Aedes eggs per ovitrap (b = 0.83; 95%CI = 0.71–0.97; p,0.001).
previously been considered risk free Increase temp shorten the extrinsic incubation period of pathogens, lead to increases in biting frequency and extensions of the average life span of mosquitoe s è Increas ing temp can make temper ate regions of Nepal vulnera ble to DF epidem ic 14 Da Rocha Taranto et al.
2015 (M. F. Da Rocha Taranto et al., 2015) Brazil Ecologica l study Mosquito egg collection by using ovitrap Average monthly temperatur e and precipitatio n was compared with the number of eggs collected in each month The presence of the vector was significantly influenced by temperature variation (P < 0.05) Rainfall provided physical and climatic conditions favourable to the development of eggs and to the increased survival of the mosquito.
However, The higher temperatur es provided better conditions for mosquito breeding, thus greater probability of transmittin g DENV 593 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo extreme rainfall conditions are not associated with vector presence over time, as the pattern may result from the elimination of larvae from overflowing containers.
15 Betanz osReyes et al.
2018 (IM NurinZulkifli.
et al., 2015) Mexico Ecologica l study Mosquito egg collection by using ovitraps Correlation between climate variables eg.
weekly report of temperatur e (average, minimum and maximum), rainfall (mm accumulate d) and relative humidity (RH, percentage) and ovitraps data Daily mean temperature, relative humidity and rainfall parameters were associated with mosquito egg abundance: Significant correlation was seen between the weekly Aedes egg counts with: The mean weekly egg counts (WEC): increased with 12oC to 18oC, but decreased as temperature increased beyond this point.
similar at RH between 30 and 70% and increased as humidity increased beyond 70% increased as rainfall increased up to 70mm, but unchanged with further Time lags between egg counts and dengue incidence could be useful for prevention and control interventio ns.
This time lag represents an opportunity to use ovitrap monitoring as a predictive tool for Dengue fever incidence increments.
594 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo increases in rainfall 16 Da Cruz Ferreira et al.
2017 (Da Cruz Ferreira et al., 2017) Brazil Ecologica l study MI-Dengue system (intelligent dengue monitoring, or MosquiTRA Ps) Daily rainfall, temperatur e parameters (minimum, average and maximum), and average relative humidity -Dengue incidence Adult mosquito abundance was strongly seasonal, with low infestation indices during the winters and high infestation during the summers.
Weekly minimum temperatures above 18 °C were strongly associated with increased mosquito abundance, whereas humidity above 75% had a negative effect on abundance.
Continuous monitoring of dengue vector population allows for more reliable predictions of infestation indices.
The adult mosquito infestation index was a good predictor of dengue occurrence .
Weekly adult Dengue vector monitoring is a helpful dengue control strategy especially in subtropical areas 17 Bezerra et al.
2016 (Bezerr a et al., 2016) Brazil Ecologica l study Adult female Aedes albopictus (and other Aedes sp.)
were caught using BGSentinel Full Version®tra ps -rainfall, temperatur e (minimum, maximum and average) and relative humidity -The fieldcaught Ae.
albopictus collected females The fieldcaught DENVinfected Ae.
albopictus 1.
Minimum temp of 12.123.2DegC (r=0.34, p< 0.0001 and maximum temp of 18.634.2oC (r=0.25, p= 0.004) were correlated with the fieldcaught Ae.
albopictus (n=511) in four different periods and districts.
Neither the rainfall nor relative humidity was associated Inverse association between the number of human Dengue cases and fieldcaught DENVinfected Ae.
albopictus à in Brazil, possible that Ae.
albopictus would be a less efficient DENV vector 595 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo with the fieldcaught Ae.
albopictus collected females 2.
None of the climate variables were correlated with the fieldcaught DENVinfected Ae.
albopictus (n = 79) in four different periods and districts 18 Dhimal et al.
2015 (Dhimal et al., 2015.)
Nepal Ecologica l study Entomologi cal survey: Collecting Aedes spp.
Larvae -daily rainfall, temperatur e and relative humidity Significant effects of climatic variables on the mean abundance of each mosquito species: 1.
Aedes aegypti: Each degree rise in mean temperature increased Ae.
aegypti abundance (β = 1.23; 95% CI = 1.18– 1.29; P< 0.001) Increased rainfall reduced abundance (β = 0.99; 95%CI = 0.99–0.99; P<0.001) Increased relative humidity reduced the vector abundance (β = 0.91; 95% CI = 0.85– 0.98; P<0.05).
Abundance of DENV vectors with mean temperatur e ranging from 10– 25°C: shorten the extrinsic incubation period of pathogens, lead to increases in biting frequency and extensions of the average life span of mosquitoe s 596 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo 2.
Aedes albopictus: An increase of mean temperature had a positive effect (β = 1.12; 95% CI = 1.06– 1.20; P<0.05), Total rainfall had a significant negative effect (β = 0.99; 95% CI = 0.99–0.99, P<0.001) Relative humidity had a significant positive effect (β = 1.21; 95% CI = 1.08–1.35, P<0.001) 19 Das et al.
2014 (Das et al., 2014) India Ecologica l study Ovitrap surveillance Larvae density per trap Data on max.
temperatur e (Tmax), min.
temperatur e (Tmin), morning relative humidity (0830 h), evening relative humidity (1730 h, total rainfall 1.
Positive and significant correlations to vector density: Maximum temperature (r = 0.45; P = 0.01) Mean temperature (r = 0.408; P = 0.021) Minimum temperature (r = 0.381; P = 0.032).
The relationshi ps established between the weather parameters and the abundance of dengue vectors in the study areas could provide valuable inputs for the developme nt of a decision support system for dengue esp.
in Northeaste rn India.
However, disease outbreaks also 597 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo depend on factors such as the source of infection, susceptible human population apart from vector density and climate All the climate factors were associated with at least one outcome of vector distribution or vector survival.
Error!
Reference source not found.3 analysed on the summative effect of each climate components to the vector survival / distribution.
Objective analysis of quality of the studies was assessed using Newcastle-Ottawa Scale, with score range from 6 to 9 as described in Table 4.
Total of 16 articles were rated as of good quality, two others with moderate quality of evidence from the objective quality assessment.
Table 3: Summarised Effects of Climate Components on Vector Distribution / Survival NO.
STUDY RAIN HUMIDITY TEMPERATURE WIND VELOCITY 1.
Barrera et al.
2019 (Barrera et al., 2019) ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
during rain ↑ abundance of Aedes sp.
after rain 2.
Roy et al.
2018 (Rodrigues et al., 2015) ↑ humidity ↑ Dengue cases 3.
Xiang et al.
2017 (Oliveira Custódio et al., 2019) ↓ Dengue cases during extreme rainfall ↑ humidity ↑ dengue cases extreme humidity ↓ Dengue cases ↑ Dengue cases during: Tmax: 21.6˚C-32.9˚C Tmin: 11.2˚C -23.7˚C extreme wind velocity will ↓ Dengue cases 4.
Phung et al.
2016 (Taber et al., 2017) ↑ 1mm rain ↑ 0.1% Dengue cases 1% ↑ humidity will ↑ 0.9% risk to get Dengue 1˚C ↑ in temp.
will ↑ 11% risk to get Dengue 5.
Limper et al.
2016 (Rodo et al., 2013) ↓ temp.
will ↑ Dengue cases 6.
Williams et al.
2015 (Williams et al., 2015) ↑ temp.
will ↑ Dengue cases 598 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo 7.
IM Nurin-Zulkifli et al.
2015 (IM Nurin-Zulkifli.
et al., 2015) ↑ humidity ↑ Dengue cases ↑ temp.
↑ Dengue cases 8.
Taber E.D et.
al.
2016 (LiuHelmersson, Stenlund, & Wilder-Smith, 2014) Optimal temp.
between 3.4˚C32.7˚C will ↑ Aedes sp.
Winter temp.
limit egg survival 9.
Dutto M. & Mosca A.
2017 (Dutto & Mosca, 2017) ↓ temp.
during winter (2˚C-6˚C) will ↓ Aedes sp.
survival outdoor, and ↑ Aedes sp.
indoor 10.
Rodrigues et.
al.
2015 (Xiang et al., 2017) ↑ rainfall will ↓Aedes sp.
density ↓ temp.
will ↓ Aedes sp.
11.
Marta R.H.S.
et.
al.
2018 (Marta, 2018) 1˚C ↑ in min.
temp.
will ↑ 8% abundance of Aedes sp.
1˚C ↑ in max.
temp.
will ↑ 7% abundance of Aedes sp.
For Ae.
albopictus, the abundance ↑ in summer, winter & autumn For Ae.
aegypti, the abundance ↑ in spring 12.
Sadie J.R. et.
al.
2019 (Sadie J. R. et al., 2019) ↑ Ae.
aegypti during temp.
between 21.3˚C-34˚C ↑ Ae.
albopictus during temp.
between 19.9˚C-29.4˚C 13.
Dhimal et al.
2014 (Powell & Tabachnick, 2013) ↑ rainfall will ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
↑ humidity: ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
↓ Aedes sp.
eggs ↑ temp.
will ↑ Aedes sp.
14.
Da Rocha Taranto et al.
2015 (M. F. Da Rocha Taranto et al., 2015) ↑ rainfall ↑ Aedes sp.
eggs extreme rainfall will ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
eggs ↑ temp.
will ↑ Aedes sp.
eggs 15.
Betanzos-Reyes et al.
2018 (Walter Reed Biosystematics Unit, 2011) ↑ rainfall up to 70mm will ↑ Aedes sp.
eggs rainfall > 70mm will have no change in Aedes sp.
eggs ↑ humidity 30-70% will ↑ abundance of Aedes sp.
eggs Humidity > 70% will ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
eggs ↑ Aedes sp.
eggs during temp.
between 12˚C-18˚C ↓ Aedes sp.
eggs during temp.
>18˚C -599 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo 16.
Da Cruz Ferreira et al.
2017 (Da Cruz Ferreira et al., 2017) ↑ humidity >75% will ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
↑min.
temp.
>18˚C will ↑ abundance of Aedes sp.
Abundance of Aedes sp.
: ↓ in winter ↑ in summer 17.
Bezerra et al.
2016 (Bezerra et al., 2016) ↑ Ae.
albopictus during: min.
temp.
between 12.1˚C-23.2˚C max.
temp.
between 18.6˚C-34.2˚C 18.
Dhimal et al.
2015 (Dhimal et al., 2015.)
↑ rainfall will ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
↑ humidity will ↓ abundance of Aedes sp.
↑ temp.
will ↑ abundance of Aedes sp.
19.
Das et al.
2014 (Das et al., 2014) ↑ max temp.
between 21.6˚C34.3˚C will ↑ abundance of Ae.
albopictus larvae density Table 4: Newcastle Ottawa Quality Assessment Scale N o Study Selection Comparability Outcome Quality score Rep rese ntati ven ess of the sam ple Sam ple size Nonrespo ndents Ascerta inment of the exposu re (risk factor) The study control s for the most importa nt factor The study control for any additio nal factor Asses sment of the outco me Statisti cal test 1.
Barrera et al.
2019 (Barrera et al., 2019) * * * ** * 6 2.
Roy et al.
2018 (Dhimal et al., 2014) * * * ** * 6 3.
Xiang et al.
2017 (Xiang et al., 2017) * * ** * ** * 8 4.
Phung et al.
2016 (Zainon, Mohd Rahim, Roslan, & Abd Samat, 2016) * * * * ** * 7 5.
Limper et al.
2016 (Limper et al., 2016) * * ** * ** * 8 6.
Williams et al.
2015 (Williams et al., 2015) * * ** * ** * 8 7.
IM NurinZulkifli et al.
2015 (IM Nurin-Zulkifli.
et al., 2015) * * * * ** * 7 600 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo 8.
Taber E.D et.
al.
2016 (Taber et al., 2017) * * ** * ** * 8 9.
Dutto M. & Mosca A.
2017 (Dutto & Mosca, 2017) * ** * ** * 7 1 0.
Rodrigues et.
al.
2015 (Rodrigues et al., 2015) * * * ** * ** * 9 1 1.
Marta R.H.S.
et.
al.
2018 (Marta, 2018) * * * * ** * 7 1 2.
Sadie J.R. et.
al.
2019 (Sadie J. R. et al., 2019) * ** * * * 6 1 3.
Dhimal et al.
2014 (Dhimal et al., 2014) * * * * ** * 7 1 4.
Da Rocha Taranto et al.
2015 (M. F. Da Rocha Taranto et al., 2015) * * ** * ** * 8 1 5.
BetanzosReyes et al.
2018 (Á. F. BetanzosReyes et al., 2018) * * ** * ** * 8 1 6.
Da Cruz Ferreira et al.
2017 (Da Cruz Ferreira et al., 2017) * * ** * ** * 8 1 7.
Bezerra et al.
2016 (Bezerra et al., 2016) * * ** * ** * 8 1 8.
Dhimal et al.
2015 (Maricopa County Environmental Services, 2006) * * ** * ** * 8 1 9.
Das et al.
2014 (Das et al., 2014) * * ** * ** * 8 601 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo Climate Components and Recommendation of Vector Control Rainfall Findings showed that extreme rainfall will cause reduction in vector abundance (Martinelle Ferreira da Rocha Taranto et al., 2015; Dhimal et al., 2015.; Dhimal et al., 2014; Rodrigues et al., 2015; Xiang et al., 2017), but the abundance increases post rainfall.
This could be due to its catastrophic effects on a local population of vectors by constant washing of soil by flooding, reducing the vector habitat, leads to an inverse relation to vector intensity (Epstein, 2004).
Rainfall up to 70mm is found to be the optimal for mosquito breeding, thus supportive factor towards Aedes species abundance in the environment (Ángel Francisco Betanzos-Reyes et al., 2018).
A study done in Kuala Lumpur concluded that there was strong association between dengue cases and monthly rainfall, where incidence always preceded by rainy season (Aziz et al., 2014).
In Tirunelveli, India where city has poor rainfall stored water in various containers for daily use, in which these containers became the main breeding habitats for Aedes mosquito, the situation is similar to root cause of urban dengue in Petaling Jaya District, Malaysia (Zainon et al., 2016).
This result provided privilege of vector control which is in contrast with the conventional belief that rainy season causes increased in vector abundance, as 10mm rainfall and humidity of 30-70% only contributes to 1% of increased vector abundance (Phung et al., 2016).
Therefore, increasing awareness for search and destroy of stagnant water bodies post rainfall is an effective measure to prevent vector breeding, as rainfall does not contribute to the increase of vector abundance, but the human activities do.
Temperature Temperature change will lead towards change in incidence and prevalence of disease pattern by adjustment of vector’s biting rates, human contacts, and also the vector abundance (Figueroa, 2015).
Amazingly, vector Aedes species adapt well to temperature changes by changing their geographic distributions, and there is evidence that some have produced genetic adaptation to increasing temperatures (Patz et al., 2003).
Any increase in the temperature will cause increase in growth rate of vectors, and decrease the extrinsic incubation period which may prolonged the pathogen’s transmission period (Figueroa, 2015).
The feeding frequency (estimated by biting rates), longevity of the mosquitoes and the time to virus replication (extrinsic incubation period) are highly sensitive to environmental temperature conditions (Caminade, McIntyre, & Jones, 2017).
Both the Aedes species and viral life cycle exhibit non-linear relationships of transmission with temperature.
A parabolic relationship with temperature is exhibited, where maximum biting performance occurs at optimum thermal zones, while lower or higher temperature than the optimum thermal zones exhibits lower vector performance in zero order, similar to previous findings (Liu-Helmersson et al., 2014).
Our review showed that optimum temperature range of Tmin 3.4˚Cto Tmax 34.3˚C (minimum and maximum temperatures) is suitable for vector Aedes sp survival.
At different temperature regimens the length of the Aedes aegypti life cycle showed variety of development rate.
Faster development of life cycle recorded at temperature of 34◦C than at 32◦C, while most larvae found to be dead at temperature of 36◦C (Mohammed & Chadee, 2011).
A study done also found almost the same findings, in which immature Aedes sp stage dead when temperature more than 34.5◦C (Chadee & Martinez, 2016).
Malaysia weather is predicted to have 0.6602 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo 1.2ºC rise of surface temperature in the next 50 years (1969-2009) and projected to increase another 1.5-2.0ºC by year 2050 (Begum, March 1, 2017; Ministry Of Natural Resources And Environment Malaysia, 2015).
This is clear evidence that climate conditions alterations such as global warming in sub-tropical countries has resulted in a regional temperature closer to the thermal optima, explaining the increased vector-borne disease transmission.
At the same time, global warming of geopolitical regions of current flavivirus endemicity which is conducive to mosquito-borne diseases transmission may experience lower rate of disease transmission as the warming temperatures might move the environment away from the thermal optimum that becomes less favourable to the Aedes sp survival (Shragai T et al., 2017).
Understanding temperature-vector survival relationship, health advises to modify time to daily outdoor activity, such rubber harvesting, palm oil harvesting and working in construction to noon hours where temperature peaks beyond the thermal comfort zone 3.4-34.2oC may reduce human-vector contact.
Heat modality above 34oC can be used to destroy the vector habitat.
Humidity The acceptable range for Aedes species survival would be around 30-70mm.
The annual cumulative precipitation with is higher would strongly increase transmission for not only DENV but also ZIKV (Messina et al., 2016).
In Malaysia, there was an average increase of 17% in one-hour duration and 29% in three hours duration of precipitation intensity in 2000-2017 when compared to 1971-1980) and is projected to experience increment in frequency of extremes weather within wet cycles (-5 to +9 ºC change in Peninsular Malaysia, -6 to +11 ºC in Sabah and Sarawak) by year 2050 (Begum, March 1, 2017; Ministry Of Natural Resources And Environment Malaysia, 2015).
In the subtropics country of Brazil, an increase in humidity of more than 75% showed a reduction of Aedes species Density, similar to our review (Da Cruz Ferreira et al., 2017).
The development cycle of larvae and pupae is also affected with the changing of humidity, where it varied from 5 to 42 days, with an average of 9.4 days at 24.3 °C and 62% relative humidity but an increase relative humidity reduced the duration of development cycles (Oliveira Custódio et al., 2019).
Absolute humidity would also restrict the distribution from the drier areas and increase in coastal areas, this will lead to an increase in vector importation due to human and trade movement.
Since humidity beyond 70% does not favour survival of vector, in which Malaysia is having 70-72% of humidity and humidity is always associated with monsoon season; search and destroy activity should be intensify during dry season in April-September yearly, such as elimination of plastic containers, tyres, durian shells and coconut husks outdoor by the residence as well as local sewage management company and the local authority, dengue cases can be controlled.
This is correlate with the data of increased dengue cases in Selangor and Johor compared to other states for the past 5 years in Malaysia, where both states have undergone rapid urbanization in recent years, which has introduced problem of worsen irrigation, sewage management due to increased population density and further displacement to high-risk environment, with pre-existing vulnerability due to low socioeconomic status.
603 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo By picking up this strong point, Communication for Behavioural Impact strategy used by the health authority (COMBI) shows important role in vector control for Aedes species both globally and in Malaysia.
Wind Velocity In Malaysia, the optimum speed for survival and breeding of the mosquitoes are 0.05 ± 0.01 m/s.
Higher wind speed will contribute to immature mosquitoes (N. Dom & Abu, 2013), whereas a slower wind speed will facilitate the production of larvAedes In Argentina, the average speed of more than 3km/h will lead to a reduced density in that area (Grech et al., 2019).
Since the wind velocity affects the flight range of Aedes species mosquitoes, utilizing meteorological data in conjunction to Wolbachia release shall synergizes the success of biological control.
Wolbachia infection to Aedes species aim to induce wingless female mosquito Aedes offspring, in which a high windspeed background can produce synergistic effect with it for the reduction of vector abundance.
Having the optimal speed would help in the successful dispersion of the Wolbachia.
(Liu, Sun, Wang, & Guo) Strengths The strength to this review is that no recent review on climate change in association with vector distribution or survival was done to the best of our knowledge.
Secondly, specific analysis is done on different climate components in relation to vector distribution and survival.
Recommendations of vector control are tailored to Malaysia setting utilizing review of climate change components.
The quality of articles is being accessed narratively and objectively; combining articles on ecology, entomology, modelling and vector prevalence worldwide and the recommendations of vector control are tailored to local situations.
Limitations Limitations encountered included only limited representative articles from Southeast Asian countries, particularly Malaysia, mmodeling studies gave general estimation without considering variation in microenvironment niche and also that most entomological / genetic studies that relates to climate change do not directly associate to prevalence of disease during study period.
Lastly would be the possible dilutional effect of outcome from non-pathogenic carrying Aedes species has been controlled by article selection / inclusion.
Conclusion In conclusion, we can conclude that climate components like rain fall, temperature, humidity, wind velocity and season affects the distribution of Aedes species Among all the components, the one that has the most effect on the mosquito density are the rainfall and temperature.
Climate change expanded 604 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo the transmission zone of dengue by latitude and altitude.
Therefore, the climate factors should be considered in the planning and implementation process of mosquito control and prevention.
By the implementation, improved outbreak prediction and detection through coordinated epidemiological, meteorological and entomological surveillance can be achieved.
Also, by understanding their distributions, new technologies can be developed to reduce vector density and vector borne diseases.
List of Abbreviations Aedes aegypti : Aedes aegypti PRISMA: Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-analysis ZIKV: Zika Virus DENV: Dengue virus CHKV: Chikungunya Virus YFV: Yellow fever virus P.I.C.O.
: population, intervention, comparison, outcome COMBI: communication for behavioral impact Conflicts of Interest The author declares no conflicts of interest.
References • Abdul Rahman, H. (2009).
Global Climate Change and Its Effects on Human Habitat and Environment in Malaysia.
Malaysian Journal of Environmental Management, 10(2), 17-32.
• Aziz, S., Aidil, R., Nisfariza, M., Ngui, R., Lim, Y., Yusoff, W. W., & Ruslan, R. (2014).
Spatial density of Aedes distribution in urban areas: A case study of breteau index in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Journal of vector borne diseases, 51(2), 91.
• Backlund, P., Janetos, A., & Schimel, D. (2008).
The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources and Biodiversity in the United States.
U.S.
Climate Change Science Program, 121-150.
• Barrera, R., Amador, M., Acevedo, V., Beltran, M., & Munoz, J. L. (2019).
A comparison of mosquito densities, weather and infection rates of Aedes aegypti during the first epidemics of Chikungunya (2014) and Zika (2016) in areas with and without vector control in Puerto Rico.
.
Ovid Medical &amp; Veterinary Entomology, 33(1), 68-77, March 2019. doi:DOI 10.1111/mve.12338 • Begum, R. A.
(March 1, 2017).
Tackling Climate Change And Malaysia’s Emission Reduction Target.
Scientific Malaysian Journal, 1-5.
• Betanzos-Reyes, Á. F., Rodríguez, M. H., Romero-Martínez, M., Sesma-Medrano, E., & Rangel-Flores, H. S.-L., R. (2018).
Association of Dengue Fever with Aedes Spp.
Abundance and Climatological Effects.
salud pública de méxico, 60, 12-20.
• Bezerra, J. M., Araújo, R. G., Melo, F. F., Gonçalves, C. M., Chaves, B.
A., Silva, B. M., .
.
.
Secundino, N. F. N., D. E. (2016).
Aedes (Stegomyia) Albopictus’ Dynamics Influenced by Spatiotemporal Characteristics in a Brazilian Dengue-Endemic Risk City.
Acta tropica, 164, 431-437.
• Caminade C, McIntyre KM., & AE., J.
(2017).
Climate change and vector-borne diseases: where are we next heading?
J Infect Dis, 214, 1300–1301.
• Carpenter, S., & LaCasse, W. (1995).
Mosquitoes of North America (North of Mexico).
University of California Press, Berkeley CA.
605 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo • Cavrini, F., Gaiban, P., Pierro, A. M., Rossini, G., Landini, M. P., & Sambri, V. (2009).
Chikungunya : an emerging and spreading arthropod-borne viral disease.
J. Infect.Dev.Ctries, 3, 744–752.
• CDC.
(2006).
Public Health Image Library (PHIL).
• Chadee, D. D., & Martinez, R. (2016).
Aedes aegypti (L.) in Latin American and Caribbean region: With growing evidence for vector adaptation to climate change?
Acta tropica, 156, 137143.
• Ciota, A. T., Matacchiero, A. C., & Kilpatrick, A. M. e. a.
(2014).
The effect of temperature on life history traits of culex mosquitoes.
J. Med.
Entomol., 51, 55–62.
• Cutwa, F., & O’Meara, G. (2007).
An Identification Guide to the Common Mosquitoes of Florida.
Florida Medical Entomology Laboratory.
• Da Cruz Ferreira, D. A., Degener, C. M., De Almeida Marques-Toledo, C., Bendati, M. M., Fetzer, L. O., & Teixeira, C. P. E., Á. E. (2017).
Meteorological Variables and Mosquito Monitoring Are Good Predictors for Infestation Trends of Aedes Aegypti, the Vector of Dengue, Chikungunya and Zika.
Parasites & Vectors, 10(1), 78.
• da Rocha Taranto, M. F., Pessanha, J. E. M., dos Santos, M., dos Santos Pereira Andrade, A. C., Camargos, V. N., Alves, S. e. N., .
.
.
de Magalhaes, J. C. (2015).
Dengue outbreaks in Divinopolis, south-eastern Brazil and the geographic and climatic distribution of Aedes albopictus and Aedes aegypti in 2011–2012.
Tropical Medicine & International Health, 20(1), 77-88.
• Das, M., Gopalakrishnan, R., Kumar, D., Gayan, J., Baruah, I., & Veer, V. D., P. (2014).
Spatiotemporal Distribution of Dengue Vectors & Identification of High Risk Zones in District Sonitpur, Assam, India.
The Indian journal of medical research, 140(2), 278.
• Dhimal, M., Gautam, I., Joshi, H. D., O’hara, R. B., & Ahrens, B. K., U.
(2015.).
Risk Factors for the Presence of Chikungunya and Dengue Vectors (Aedes Aegypti and Aedes Albopictus), Their Altitudinal Distribution and Climatic Determinants of Their Abundance in Central Nepal.
PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 9(3), e0003545.
• Dhimal, M., Gautam, I., Kreß, A., & Müller, R. K., U.
(2014).
Spatio-Temporal Distribution of Dengue and Lymphatic Filariasis Vectors Along an Altitudinal Transect in Central Nepal.
PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 8(7), e3035.
• Dom, N., Abu, H., & Rodziah, I.
(2013).
Habitat characterization of Aedes sp.
Breeding in urban hotspot areas.
Vietnam: ASEAN Conference on Environment Behavior Studies.
• Dutto, M., & Mosca, A.
(2017).
Preliminary Considerations about the Presence of Aedes albopictus (Skuse 1897) (Diptera:Culicidae) during Winter in the Northwestern Italy.
Ann Ig, 29, 86-90. doi:doi:10.7416/ai.2017.2135 • Epstein, P. R. (2004).
Climate change and public health: emerging infectious diseases.
Encyclopedia of Energy, 1(38), 392.
• Figueroa, D. (2015).
Mosquitoes: disease vectors in context of climate change in Chile.
Laboratorio de Entomología Médica, Instituto de Salud Pública de Chile.
5 …, • Grech, M., Manzo, L., Epele, L., Laurito, M., Claverie, A., Ludueña-Almeida, F., .
.
.
Almirón, W. (2019).
Mosquito (Diptera: Culicidae) larval ecology in natural habitats in the cold temperate Patagonia region of Argentina.
Parasites & Vectors, 12. doi:10.1186/s13071-019-3459-y • Hainesa, A., Kovatsa, R. S., Campbell-Lendrumb, D., & Corvalanb, C. (2006).
Climate change and human health: Impacts, vulnerability and public health.
Journal of Royal Institute of Public Health, 120, 585–596.
• IM Nurin-Zulkifli., Chen, C., ., O Wan-Norafikah., Lee, H., Faezah, K., Izzul, A., ., .
.
.
SofianAzirun, M. (2015).
Temporal Changes of Aedes and Armigeres Populations In Suburban and Forested Areas in Malaysia.
Southeast Asian J Trop Med Public Health, 46, No.
4 July 2015.
• La Ruche, G., Dejour-Salamanca, D., & Debruyne, M. e. a.
(2010).
Surveillance par les laboratoires des cas de dengue et de chikungunya import´es en France m´etropolitaine 2008– 2009.
Bulletin ´epid´emiologique hebdomadaire, 31–32, 325–329.
• Limper, M., Thai, K. T. D., Gerstenbluth, I., Osterhaus, A. D. M. E., Duits, A. J., & van Gorp, E. C. M. (2016).
Climate Factors as Important Determinants of Dengue Incidence in Curacao.
.
Zoonoses and Public Health, 63(2), 129-137, March 2016. doi:DOI: 10.1111/zph.12213 • Liu-Helmersson, J., H. , Stenlund, A., & Wilder-Smith, e. a.
(2014).
Vectorial capacity of Aedes aegypti: effects of temperature and implications for global dengue epidemic potential.
PLoS ONE, 9.
• Liu, Y., Sun, G., Wang, L., & Guo, Z.
Establishing Wolbachia in the wild mosquito population: The effects of wind and critical patch size.
606 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo • Maricopa County Environmental Services.
(2006).
Lifecycle and information on Aedes aegypti mosquitoes.
• Marta, R. H. S. (2018).
Seasonal and spatial distribution of Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus in a municipal urban park in São Paulo, SP, Brazil.
Acta tropica, 189. doi:10.1016/j.actatropica.2018.09.011 • McMichael, A. J., Woodruff, R. E., & Hales, S. (2006).
Climate change and human health: present and future risks.
Lancet, 367, 859–869.
• Messina, J. P., Kraemer, M. U., Brady, O. J., Pigott, D.M.,, Shearer, F. M., Weiss, D. J., .
.
.
Hay, S. I.
(2016).
Mapping global environmental suitability for Zika virus.
eLife, 5, e15272.
doi:DOI: 10.7554/eLife.15272 • Ministry Of Natural Resources And Environment Malaysia.
(2015).
Malaysia Second National Communication (NC2) – A Report Submitted To The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change (UNFCCC), Conservation And Environmental Management Division (CEMD).
Retrieved from http://nc2.nre.gov.my • Mohammed, A., & Chadee, D. D. (2011).
Effects of different temperature regimens on the development of Aedes aegypti (L.)(Diptera: Culicidae) mosquitoes.
Acta tropica, 119(1), 38-43.
• Motoki, M. T., Fonseca, D. M., Miot, E. F., Demari-Silva, B., Thammavong, P., Chonephetsarath, S., .
.
.
Marcombe, S. (2019).
Population genetics of Aedes albopictus (Diptera: Culicidae) in its native range in Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
Parasites & Vectors, 12(1), 477. doi:10.1186/s13071-019-3740-0 • Mu˜nnoz, J., Eritja, R., Alcaide, M., & al., e. (2011).
Hostfeeding patterns of native Culex pipiens and invasive Aedes albopictus mosquitoes (Diptera: Culicidae) in urban zones from Barcelona, Spain.
J. Med.
Entomol., 48, 956–960.
• Murdock, C. C., Blanford, S., & Luckhart, S. e. a.
(2014).
Ambient temperature and dietary supplementation interact to shape mosquito vector competence for malaria.
J. Insect Physiol, 67, 37–44.
• Oliveira Custódio, J. M., Nogueira, L. M. S., Souza, D. A., Fernandes, M. F., Oshiro, E. T., Oliveira, E. F., .
.
.
Oliveira, A. G. (2019).
Abiotic factors and population dynamic of Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus in an endemic area of dengue in Brazil.
Rev Inst Med Trop Sao Paulo, 61, e18.
doi:doi: 10.1590/S1678-9946201961018 • Page MJ, McKenzie JE, Bossuyt PM, Boutron I, Hoffmann TC, & Mulrow CD, e. a.
(2021).
The PRISMA 2020 statement: an updated guideline for reporting systematic reviews.
PLoS Medicine, 18(3), 18(13):e1003583.
doi:doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1003583 • Patz, J., Githeko, A., McCarty, J., Hussein, S., Confalonieri, U., & De Wet, N. (2003).
Climate change and infectious diseases.
Climate change and human health: risks and responses, 2, 103-132.
• Phung, D., .
;, Talukder, Rahman, M. R., Shannon, R., & Cordia, C. (2016).
A climate-based prediction model in the high-risk clusters of the Mekong Delta region, Vietnam: towards improving dengue prevention and control.
Ovid Tropical Medicine &amp; International Health, 21(10), 1324-1333, October 2016. doi:DOI 10.1111/tmi.12754 • Pincebourde, S., Murdock, C. C., & Vickers, M. e. a.
(2016).
Fine-scale microclimatic variation can shape the responses of organisms to global change in both natural and urban.
• Powell, J. R., & Tabachnick, W. J.
(2013).
History of domestication and spread of Aedes aegypti—a review.
Mem.
Inst.
Oswaldo Cruz, 108(1), 11-17.
• Rodo, X., Pascual, M., & Doblas-Reyes, F. J., et al.
(2013).
Climate change and infectious diseases: can we meet the needs for better prediction?
Clim.
Change, 118, 625-640.
• Rodrigues, M. M., Monteiro Marques, G. R. A., Serpa, L. L. N., Brito Arduino, M., Voltolini, J. C., Barbosa, G. L., .
.
.
Lima, V. L. C. (2015).
Density of Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus and its association with number of residents and meteorological variables in the home environment of dengue endemic area, São Paulo, Brazil.
Parasites & Vectors, 8, 115. doi:DOI 10.1186/s13071-015-0703-y • Roy, M. P., Gupta, R., Chopra, N., Meena, S. K., & Aggarwal, K. C. (2018).
Seasonal Variation and Dengue Burden in Paediatric Patients in New Delhi.
Ovid Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, 64(4), 336-341, August 2018. doi:DOI: 10.1093/tropej/fmx077 • Sadie J. R., Colin J. C., Erin, A. M., & Leah, R. J.
(2019).
Global expansion and redistribution of Aedes-borne virus transmission risk with climate change.
PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 13(3), e0007213.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.000721 • Shragai T, Tesla B, Murdock C, & LC., H. (2017).
Zika and chikungunya: mosquito-borne viruses in a changing world.
Ann N Y Acad Sci.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13306.
607 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2022, VOL 4, ISSUE 1 gggggglo • Stocker, T. F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., Allen, S. K., Boschung, J., .
.
.
Midgley, P. M. (2013).
Summary For Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution Of Working Group I To The Fifth Assessment Report Of The Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press.
• Taber, E. D., Hutchinson, M. L., & Smithwick, E. A.
B., J. I.
(2017).
A Decade of Colonization: The Spread of the Asian Tiger Mosquito in Pennsylvania and Implications for Disease Risk.
Journal of vector ecology, 4(2), 3-12.
• Walter Reed Biosystematics Unit.
(2011).
Keys to Medically Important Mosquito Species.
Silver Spring, MA: Smith sonian Institution.
• Williams, C. R., Gill, B. S., Mincham, G., Mohd Zaki, A. H., Abdullah, N., Mahiyuddin, W. R. W., .
.
.
Kamaluddin, A.
(2015).
Testing the impact of virus importation rates and future climate change on dengue activity in Malaysia using a mechanistic entomology and disease model.
Ovid Epidemiology &amp; Infection, 143(13), 2856-2864, October 2015. doi:DOI No 10.1017/S095026881400380X • World Health Organization, & United Nations Environment Programme.
(2007).
Climate Change 2007: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation And Vulnerability.
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change.
Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch8s8-4-1-2.html • Xiang, J., Hansen, A., Liu, Q., Liu, X., Tong, M. X., Sun, Y., .
.
.
Bi, P. (2017).
Association between dengue fever incidence and meteorological factors in Guangzhou, China, 2005-2014.
Ovid Environmental Research, 153(February 2017), 17-26. doi:DOI: 10.1016/j.envres.2016.11.009 • Yimer, M., Beyene, N., & Shewafera, A.
(2016).
Aedes aegypti as a Vector of Flavivirus.
Journal of Tropical Diseases, 04. doi:10.4172/2329-891X.1000223 • Zainon, N., Mohd Rahim, F. A., Roslan, D., & Abd Samat, A. H. (2016).
Prevention Of Aedes Breeding Habitats For Urban High-Rise Building In Malaysia.
Journal of the Malaysian Institute of Planners, 5(SPECIAL ISSUE), 115-128.
Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com.my/metro/metro-news/2019/01/31/over-200-spike-in-dengue-casesin-petaling-jaya#t6Hl5RxvXBSEDU52.99 • Zettel, C., & Kaufman P. (2013).
Yellow fever mosquito Aedes aegypti (Linnaeus) (Insect: Diptera:Culicidae).
Print www.pol icyschool.ca SPP Research PapersSPP Research Papers Volume 4•Issue 15• December 2011 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION Alastair R. Lucas and Jenette Yearsley* SUMMARY Over the last decade, the Canadian government has not managed to produce a comprehensive climate change statute and has failed to adequately consider the constitutional implications of doing so.
The Clean Air Bill, an unsuccessful 2006 amendment to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), focused on carbon credit trading and a technology fund credit mechanism to permit certain emissions-heavy industries to mitigate their production of greenhouse gases.
However, this bill would likely have infringed on provincial jurisdiction over electricity generation facilities, trumping any attempt to address greenhouse gas emissions beneath the rubric of criminal law.
The present federal government’s proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations are similarly flawed.
This paper thoroughly analyzes both pieces of legislation from a constitutional standpoint, using a rich body of case law to offer policymakers invaluable guidance in properly framing legally sound emission reduction statutes.
* Alastair R. Lucas, QC is Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Calgary; Jenette Yearsley is Regulatory Counsel at AltaLink Calgary.
INTRODUCTION In 2002, Nigel D. Bankes and Alastair R. Lucas assessed the constitutionality of Alberta’s Climate Change and Emissions Management Act.1 They concluded that there is a strong likelihood that it is intra vires the province, primarily as in relation to property and civil rights in the province under Section 92 (13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The authors also ventured in a preliminary way to examine the federal government’s potential ability to implement Canada’s then-current climate change plan.
But here the analysis could be no more than hypothetical — limited to potentially relevant federal heads of power.
Without legislation, or at least draft legislation, a full constitutional analysis was premature.
This article focuses on federal constitutional jurisdiction.
The question is how detailed constitutional analysis would be applied to determine the validity of federal climate change legislation.
The idea is to contribute to legal thinking about what constitutionally valid federal greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction legislation might look like.
The ability of the federal government to exercise leadership in this complex and controversial area may depend on this, perhaps even in the face of very different provincial policies and legislation.
The specific target is the theory supporting federal jurisdiction based on an expansive federal criminal law power.
While we do address potential federal jurisdiction under other heads of federal constitutional power to legislate, including the peace, order and good government and regulation of trade and commerce powers, the focus is criminal law.
This is because of its recognized support for federal criminal prohibition and penalty provisions and the importance of prohibition-backed GHG emission targets, whatever form the legislation may take.
As will be seen, this constitutional analysis centres on statutory text and its context within the entire statute and related legislation and the broader societal context that led to its enactment (or potential enactment) in that particular form and in those particular words.
The result is an overlong introduction and context that sets up and explains the specific legislation to be analyzed followed by a constitutional analysis that delves deeply into this internal statutory and external societal context.
This is the kind of analysis a court would carry out.
We have attempted in the article to closely follow this analytical process.
We still lack comprehensive, enforceable federal climate change legislation.
But we do know a bit more than we did in 2002.
Major climate change amendments to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) were introduced in 2006 (the amended Bill), but not ultimately enacted.
In 2007, a Conservative minority government uncommitted to the Kyoto Protocol enacted the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, then failed to take regulatory action beyond monitoring and reporting under it.
Then, in August 2011, the first set of sectoral regulations — for coal-fired electricity generation facilities — was published for comment in the Canada Gazette.2 The latter are based on existing CEPA authority.
The text of these statutes and regulations are the best legislative data that we have.
The current federal position3 emphasizes 1 N. Bankes and A. Lucas, “Kyoto, Constitutional Law and Alberta’s Proposals,” (2004) 42 Alberta Law Review 355.
2 Government of Canada, “Notice concerning Proposed Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-Fired Generation of Electricity Regulations,” Canada Gazette Part I, Vol.
145, No.
35, 27 August, 2011.
[Proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations].
3 See Government of Canada, Canada’s Action on Climate Change www.climatechange.gc.ca.
2 targeted regulations on a sector-bysector basis to reduce GHG emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020.4 Canadian action is intended, because of the integration of the Canadian and United States economies, to mirror initiatives (apparently including a cap and trade system) that the US may eventually take.
However, as of 2011, climate change initiatives are not a high priority for the US federal government.
Now it appears that Canadian federal legislation is likely to take the form of regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA).5 WHY NOT ANALYZE THE KYOTO PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION ACT?
The 2007 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act6 requires preparation of a climate change plan that describes measures to be taken and includes estimates of resulting GHG emission reductions as well as annual progress reports.
However, this act does not itself mandate directly specific emission reduction actions.
It does authorize regulations to impose certain requirements including limiting the amount of GHG releases and, “within the limits of constitutional authority,”7 limiting GHG releases in provinces by applying Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol,8 establishing performance standards, respecting trading in GHG emission reductions, respecting monitoring and inspection, and designating contraventions to be the subject of offences.
No regulations have been made.
More important, these regulation making powers provide only a menu of instruments.
Unlike the amended Clean Air Bill, which established a price for carbon and proposed emission intensity-based caps for “large industrial emitters,” particularly the coal-fired electricity generation and upstream oil and gas subsectors, the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act lacks detail about the specific strategy, including instruments and processes that might actually be adopted.
In August 2011, regulations under CEPA to regulate CO2 emissions from coal-fired electricity generation facilities were published for comment in the Canada Gazette.9 These regulations, intended to be implemented in 2015, indicate a policy shift from an emphasis on cap and trade instruments to GHG-emitter performance standard regulations.
However, while cap and trade is rejected for the electricity generation sector because of the small number of facilities and marginal cost similarity, there is no clear indication that cap and trade has been abandoned for a wider spectrum of emission sources.
Consequently, this analysis will focus on the amended Clean Air Bill.
But it will include some preliminary analysis of the proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations.
4 In the Copenhagen Accord, December 2009.
See supra note 2, Regulatory Impact Analysis.
[Proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations].
5 S.C. 1999, c. 3.
6 S.C. 2007, c. 30.
7 Ibid., s. 6(1)(a.1).
8 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S.
148, 37 I.L.M.
22 (ratified by Canada 17 Dec. 2002, in force 16 February 2005).
9 Proposed Electricity Generation Regulations, supra note 2.
3 THE HOGG ANALYSIS This constitutional analysis will address in particular the work of Peter Hogg10 on federal constitutional competence to implement a GHG reduction scheme based on the 2008 Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions.11 We recognize that Hogg’s analysis is based not on the amended Clean Air Bill, but on the subsequent federal regulatory policy.
Nevertheless, we question Hogg’s conclusion that the federal criminal law power under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867 would necessarily support climate change legislation that includes mandatory GHG reduction as well as a compliance system featuring tradable emission reduction credits, offset credits resulting from other emission-reducing activities and credits based on contributions to a technology fund.
Instead, we turn to the development of federal GHG-reduction policy and choose to base our analysis on the CEPA amendments (the amended Clean Air Bill) that were proposed in 2006 and the 2011 proposed CEPA coal-fired electricity generation regulations.
FEDERAL CLIMATE POLICY The federal government’s policy on climate change has undergone a metamorphosis since Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002.12 Canada committed to a six percent reduction in GHGs over 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 period.
This target proved to be overly ambitious.
While Canada is a comparatively small contributor to global GHG emissions (about two percent), it is among the highest in terms of per capita emissions.13 By 2008, Canada’s GHG emissions were 24 percent above 1990 levels.14 As it became apparent that voluntary measures and public education were inadequate to the task of reducing Canada’s GHG emissions, the federal government incorporated regulatory instruments in an attempt to meet its Kyoto obligations.
Now the federal government’s stance on Kyoto has changed but it is likely that there will be legislation (most likely in the form of regulations) on the subject of climate change.
The first explicit sign that CEPA was the federal instrument of choice was the publication of a federal notice of intent15 to regulate Large Final Emitters (LFEs) under the 2005 Climate Change Plan.16 This action was directed toward meeting Canada’s commitment under the 10 Peter Hogg, “Constitutional Authority over Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (2009) 46 Alta.L.Rev.
207; “A Question of Parliamentary Power: Criminal Law and the Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, C.D.
Howe Institute Backgrounder, August 2008.
11 Environment Canada, “Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions” (Ottawa: Minister of Environment, 2007) .
12 Supra note 8.
13 Environment Canada, “A Climate Change Plan for the Purposes of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act – 2007” (Ottawa: 2007) at 1.
14 Environment Canada, “A Climate Change Plan for the Purposes of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act” (Ottawa: 2010) at 31.
15 Notice of Intent to regulate greenhouse gas emissions by Large Final Emitters, Canada Gazette 2005.I.
2489 (Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999), [Notice of Intent], online: http://gazette.gc.ca/archives/p1/2005/2005-07-16/html/notice-avis-eng.html#i3.
16 Government of Canada, “Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for Honouring our Kyoto Commitment” Project Green (Ottawa: 2005).
A review of the plan is found in Alastair R. Lucas, “Mythology, Fantasy and Federalism: Canadian Climate Change Policy and Law” (2007) 20 Pac.
McGeorge Global Bus.
& Dev.
L.J.
41.
4 Kyoto Protocol.
The federal notice of intent was followed by a posting on the Environment Canada website containing “Drafting Instructions” for implementing regulations.17 Legislation was enacted to support the administrative and subsidy elements of the federal climate change plan.
This was the Canadian Emission Reduction Incentives Agency Act,18 which established a climate fund (from the private purchase of emission credits) and created a new administrative agency to oversee it, and the Greenhouse Gas Technology Investment Fund Act,19 which established a technology fund and provided for its administration.
In October 2006, the federal government tabled Bill C-30, entitled “An Act to amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, the Energy Efficiency Act and the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act (Canada’s Clean Air Act).”20 At the same time, a notice of intent to “develop and implement regulations and other measures to reduce air emissions” was published.21 Bill C-30 was extensively revised in Committee.
The resulting revised bill did not progress through the legislative process22 and eventually died on the order paper.
In spite of the legislative stalemate, the federal government, in April 2007, replaced its 2005 climate change plan with a new policy entitled “Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution.”23 The Turning the Corner Plan is based on the notice of intent and was touted as the cornerstone of the government’s efforts to address climate change and air pollution.
The details of the plan were outlined in the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions.24 The reason for the policy change became clear when the government announced that while it was not formally withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, its commitment to meet the emission targets under the Protocol were over.25 The government stated its intention to rely on a domestic plan — the Turning the Corner Plan — to tackle climate change.
The government fleshed out its climate policy by tabling additional documents in March 2008 including: (i) Taking Action to Fight Climate Change; (ii) Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions; (iii) Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases; (iv) Canada’s Credit for Early Action Program; and (v) Detailed Emissions and Economic Modelling.26 17 Environment Canada “Drafting Instructions Cross-Cutting Provisions Large Final Emitters Regulations” CEPA Environmental Registry, online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/CEPARegistry/documents/part/LFE_drft_inst/LFE_drft_inst.cfm 18 S.C. 2005, c. 30, s. 87.
This act is not yet in force.
19 S.C. 2005, c. 30, s. 96.
20 1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006.
Provocatively parenthetically titled, “Canada’s Clean Air Act”.
21 Notice of Intent, supra note 15.
22 1st Sess., 39th Parl., 2006 (as amended by the Legislative Committee on Bill C-30 as a working copy for the use of the House of Commons as Report Stage and as reported to the House on March 30, 2007) [Amended Clean Air Act].
23 Environment Canada News Release, “Canada’s New Government Announces Mandatory Industrial Targets to Tackle Climate Change and Reduce Air Pollution”, (Toronto April 26, 2007), online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-1&news=4F2292E9-3EFF-48D3-A7E4-CEFA05D70C21.
24 Government of Canada, “Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions”, (Minister of Environment, 2007) [Air Emissions Framework], online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/media/m_124/p1_eng.htm.
25 CBC News, “Canada will not withdraw from Kyoto: Baird” (October 19, 2007), online: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/10/19/baird-kyoto.html?ref=rss#ixzz0nGhsUTzV.
26 Environment Canada News Release, “Government Delivers Details of Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Framework”, (Ottawa: March 10, 2008), online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-1&news=B2B42466B768-424C-9A5B-6D59C2AE1C36.
5 Subsequently however, the state of the federal policy was uncertain.
The federal ecoAction website stated: In April 2007, we announced Turning the Corner, however, following the economic downturn and the renewed engagement by the new US administration, we took the opportunity to fine-tune our approach to tackling climate change.”27 The results included: (i) increasing the amount of electricity provided by non-emitting sources; (ii) new regulations on automotive emissions; (iii) continuing the Clean Energy Dialogue with the US administration; (iv) investing money from the Economic Action Plan into projects to protect the environment; and (v) participating at the UN climate change talks.
Even with this new focus, the government did not appear to have scrapped the Turning the Corner policy.
In the summer of 2009, Environment Minister James Prentice announced that Canada was moving toward a carbon market by developing an offset system for GHGs.28 Although the Turning the Corner Plan has not survived in its original form, it still provides part of the context in which to analyze constitutionally the federal climate change legislation as it developed.29 The starting point for understanding this context is the notice of intent.
1.
A Closer Look at the Federal Approach to Climate Change A.
THE NOTICE OF INTENT The notice of intent took a multi-pollutant approach to the regulation of GHGs and air pollutants (collectively air emissions).
Underlying this approach was a recognition of the significant threat to Canadians’ health posed by air pollutants and the contribution of anthropogenic GHGs to climate change.30 A further factor was commonality of emission sources.
The major sources of air emissions that cause smog and acid rain also produce a significant proportion of the anthropogenic GHG emissions.
A multi-pollutant strategy involved coordinated requirements that allow sources to maximize synergies and cost efficiencies.
It also allowed Canada to align its efforts with those of other industrialized countries — particularly the US.
27 Government of Canada, ecoAction, online: http://ecoaction.gc.ca/climatechange-changementsclimatiques/indexeng.cfm.
The federal government focused on a clean energy dialogue with the US, Environment Canada News Release “Canada and the U.S. work together on Clean Energy Dialogue,” (Ottawa: June 30, 2009), online: http://www.ecoaction.gc.ca/news-nouvelles/20090630-eng.cfm.
Details on the Clean Energy Dialogue can be found online at: http://climatechange.gc.ca.
28 Environment Canada News Release “Offset System A Step Towards A Carbon Market In Canada” (Ottawa: June 10, 2009), online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-1&news=23C6502E-4307-4647-A5C738B3B7EDDDF0.
Details of the proposed offset system rules can be found online at: http://www.ec.gc.ca/creditscompensatoires-offsets/default.asp?lang=En&n=0DCC4917-1 .
29 Notice of Intent, supra note 15 at 9.4.
30 Notice of Intent, supra note 15 at 4.
6 There were hints of constitutional advice in the language of the notice of intent.
It noted that the federal government took responsibility to introduce an integrated, nationally consistent approach to reduce air emissions in order to protect the health of Canadians and the environment and to avoid falling further behind Canada’s trading partners.31 There was also a statement that “reducing air emissions is a matter of national concern” since Canada’s performance on air emissions lags behind most OECD countries.32 Thus, we had broad references to health and environment, judicially recognized as at least potentially valid federal criminal law power objectives, and explicit peace, order and good government power language of “national concern.” The regulatory approach under the notice of intent was to develop and implement regulatory measures primarily, but not exclusively, under CEPA.33 This was the purpose of the amended Clean Air Bill.
The bill would also amend the Energy Efficiency Act34 and the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act.35 This indicated the government’s intention to regulate all major sources of air emissions including transportation, industrial emissions, consumer and commercial products and indoor air.36 More specifically the government intended to take the following actions: • Harmonize Canadian vehicle emissions standards with the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); • Support the development of international standards for emissions for aviation and shipping; • Support emission standards for rail that are consistent with US EPA standards; • Reduce volatile organic compounds from various consumer and commercial products and align requirements with the US; • Establish or strengthen energy efficiency requirements for residential and commercial products; • Develop a regulatory framework for industrial air emissions sources.
The last item — a regulatory framework for industrial air emissions — was expected to include short, medium and long-term emissions goals.
This process of goal-setting involved consultations between the federal government and provinces, territories, affected sectors and other stakeholders.
The government expected that this would provide flexible compliance options such as industry-led emissions trading, opt-in mechanisms, incentives for investment in technology such as carbon capture and storage and credit for early action and offsets.
A key mechanism was to be the establishment of a technology investment fund to which industry and government could contribute in order to promote the development of transformational technologies.
31 Ibid.
at 1.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
at 3.
34 S.C. 1992, c. 36.
35 R.S.C.
1985, c. M-9.
36 Notice of Intent, supra note 15 at 5-9.
7 Finally, the notice of intent addressed the relationship between federal and provincial regulation.37 The intention was that the federal Ministers of the Environment and Health would engage their provincial counterparts with a view to entering into equivalency or administrative agreements.
Equivalency agreements, specifically provided for in CEPA,38 permit CEPA regulations to withdraw in favour of provincial equivalents where there is rule and enforcement equivalency and provincial law includes a mechanism for citizen enforcement requests.
Work on these agreements would take place alongside work on the development of federal regulations so that both federal and equivalent provincial regimes would be designed to achieve the same outcome and take effect at the same time.
The result would be a common national regulatory approach.
In 2005, the federal cabinet made an order under section 332(1) of CEPA that added CO2 and five other GHGs to CEPA’s Schedule I List of Toxic Substances.
The order explained that an assessment, which relied on the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, confirmed that these substances met the CEPA section s. 64 toxicity criteria, namely (a) harmful effect on the environment, (b) danger to the environment on which life depends, and (c) danger in Canada to human life or health.
As Schedule 1 substances these GHGs could then be the subject of comprehensive regulations under CEPA, section 93(1).
B.
BILL C-30: THE CLEAN AIR ACT Bill C-30 was introduced in the House of Commons and given first reading on October 19, 2006.
Canada’s Clean Air Act was a set of amendments targeted primarily at CEPA.39 It did not mention the Kyoto Protocol and it did not set any firm limits on GHG emissions.
The original bill was rejected by all opposition parties and was not approved in principle by the House of Commons.
By agreement, it was referred to committee before the second-reading stage.
The Legislative Committee on Bill C-30 effectively rewrote the bill to emphasize the action necessary to fulfil Canada’s Kyoto obligations.
There was no second reading or debate on the revised bill.
The original version of the Clean Air Bill defined “air pollutant” and “greenhouse gas.”40 It removed both air pollutants and GHGs from Part 5 of CEPA and moved them into a new Part 5.1: “Clean Air.” The purpose of Part 5.1 was “to promote the reduction of air pollution and to promote air quality in order to protect the environment and the health of all Canadians, especially that of the more vulnerable members of society.” Part 5.1 allowed the government to issue guidelines, gather information, publish projections of air pollution or air quality and to create regulations.
The only mandatory requirement was to create national air quality objectives for respirable particulate matter and ozone.41 37 Ibid.
at 9.4.
38 CEPA, s.10.
39 Canada, Library of Parliament, Bill C-30: Canada’s Clean Air and Climate Change Act by Frédéric BeauregardTellier et al., Legislative Summary, LS-539E (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 14 November 2006, Revised 19 April 2007).
40 Canada’s Clean Air Act, supra note 22, s.
3.(2).
The bill expanded the definition of “air” to include indoor air.
41 Ibid., s. 103.07.
8 The amended Clean Air Bill is significantly different from the original text.42 The committee changed the title to “Canada’s Clean Air and Climate Change Act” and included a reference to Kyoto in the preamble.
Similar to the original bill, the amended bill recognized that air pollution and GHG emissions are of national and international concern.43 This was softened by an explicit statement that the federal government recognizes that air pollution and GHGs are “matters within the jurisdiction of both the Government of Canada and the governments of the provinces.” In the amended Clean Air Bill, air pollutants and GHGs were defined as substances that appear in Schedule 1 to CEPA (List of Toxic Substances).
It also set out a more comprehensive system to reduce GHG emissions.
The amended bill defined new terms including “carbon credit,” “carbon permit,” “domestic offset system” and “sectoral carbon budget”.
It set a carbon price that would increase from $20 in 2008 to $30 in 2011.
Perhaps the most significant change was the addition of three new parts to CEPA: Part 5.1 on Climate Change Action; Part 5.1.1 on Greenhouse Gases; and Part 5.2 on Ambient Air Quality Standards and Emissions Standards.
Part 5.1 sets mandatory caps for GHGs starting in 2020 rather than the intensity-based caps proposed in the Notice of Intent.
Targets for large industrial emitters44 were based on sector specific carbon budgets set at six percent below 1990 levels.
These budgets must take into account early action by emitters and allow emitters to transfer and trade permits and purchase offsets.
They must also ensure “fair treatment” for emitters whose rate of growth exceeds the average rate of growth for the sector.45 Part 5.1.1 establishes a territorial approach for GHGs that is compatible with federal–provincial equivalency agreements under s.10 of CEPA.
The amended bill would not apply within the jurisdiction of another government that has enacted legal provisions that are “equivalent to the reductions required by the national carbon budget” and provisions equivalent to those in CEPA for the investigation of alleged offences.46 The amended bill also strengthened the requirements for air pollution under Part 5.2.
Ambient air quality standards must be issued for each air pollutant within six months of the provision coming into force.
The Environment Minister would divide the country into geographical zones and issue standards for each zone.
Ultimately, no further legislative action was taken on the amended Clean Air Bill, but policy action continued.
The next move was by the federal government which announced its Turning the Corner Plan in 2007.
This plan was based on the notice of intent and was followed by additional policy papers in March, 2008.
Two of those policy papers are relevant here.
These are the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions and the Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
42 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22.
43 Ibid., Preamble.
44 Large industrial emitters are those particularly responsible for a large portion of Canada’s GHG emissions including the electricity generation sector, upstream oil and gas sector and energy-intensive industries, Ibid., s. 103.05.
45 Ibid., s. 103.02.
46 Ibid., s. 103.051.
9 C. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR AIR EMISSIONS47 Like the notice of intent, the Air Emissions Framework was based on reducing emissions intensity in key parts of Canada’s industrial sector.
The policy was not directed at meeting Canada’s commitment under Kyoto but rather started Canada “on the road to making real progress towards its Kyoto commitments.”48 Free from Kyoto, the government adopted 2006 as its base year for emission intensity targets rather than the Kyoto base year of 1990.
The policy distinguishes between existing facilities and new facilities.
Existing facilities would be required to make a six percent improvement each year (from a 2006 base level) beginning in 2007.
Since the regulations were not in place, the policy considered these reductions unenforceable until 2010.
Existing facilities were expected to achieve a cumulative 18 percent reduction in emissions intensity by that time.
The government did not enforce these targets but it has not stated that it has abandoned the general approach.
New facilities were treated differently.
A new facility was one whose first year of operation is 2004 or later.
New facilities would have a three-year grace period after coming on stream before being required to reduce their emissions intensity.
After that, the new facility would be required to improve its emission intensity by two percent a year.
The initial target for the facility would be based on so-called “clean-fuel standards” which in most cases would likely be the emissions profile that would result if the facility were to use natural gas.
The Air Emissions Framework held that regulated emitters would be able to comply with their targets in a number of ways.
These included: (i) actual reductions in emissions; (ii) contributions to a “climate technology fund”; and (iii) emissions trading.
Contributions to the climate technology fund would be at the rate of $15 per tonne from 2010 through 2012 and $20 per tonne effective 2013, escalating each year thereafter at the rate of growth of nominal GDP.
A regulated emitter would not be able to meet its entire reduction commitments through this mechanism but would be subject to an initial cap of 70 percent.
This cap would fall to zero in 2018 at which point contributions to the fund would no longer be available as a compliance option.
Emissions trading could be used in several ways to meet emissions targets.
These options include: (i) trading between firms; (ii) purchasing credits through the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (to a maximum of 10 percent per firm) and (iii) purchasing credits through a domestic offset system.
The offset system could link to other trading systems both in North America and globally.
47 Supra note 4.
Commentators observed that despite mutual criticism by the governments and calls for new approaches, the 2007 plan bears an odd resemblance to the 2005 climate change plan: Shi-Ling Hsu & Robin Elliot, “Regulating Greenhouse Gases in Canada,” (2009) 54 McGill L.J.
463 at para 12.
48 Ibid.
at 4.
10 D. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INDUSTRIAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS49 The basic elements of the GHG Emissions Framework remained the same as those of the Air Emissions Framework.
The GHG Framework expected existing facilities to reduce their emissions intensity by 18 percent in 2010 and a further two percent for each following year.
Targets could be facility-specific, sector-wide or corporate.
Facility-specific targets would be applied in sectors where there are factors beyond the control of a facility operator that affect emissions50 and in sectors with complex and diverse facility structures.
Facility-specific targets will be applied in the following sectors: iron ore pelletizing, potash, base metal smelting, chemicals, fertilizers, iron and steel, ilmenite (titanium), oil sands, petroleum refining, natural gas pipelines and upstream oil and gas.
Sector-wide targets would be used in sectors where facility structures are less complex and more homogeneous.
Those were the lime, pulp and paper, aluminum and alumina and cement sectors.
Finally, corporate-specific targets would be used in the electricity sector because this would provide an incentive for investment in new clean and low-emission power generation.
The framework provided an exclusion for fixed process emissions for both existing and new facilities.
Fixed process emissions were emissions tied to production where there is no reduction technology currently available.
The definition of a “new” facility was expanded.
In the Air Emissions Framework, new facilities were defined as those whose first year of operation was 2004 or later.
The GHG Emissions Framework expanded that definition to include major expansions or transformations of existing plants.
Only the expanded or transformed portion of the facility would be treated as new, unless the integrated nature of the facility required that the entire facility be treated as new.
Re-opened facilities would typically be treated as existing facilities.
Not all facilities were subject to regulation.
The GHG Emissions Framework contemplated targeting major industrial sectors.
Targets would apply to chemical, fertilizer and natural gas pipeline operations that emit more than 50,000 CO2e per year, to electricity generators of more than 10 MW per year and to upstream oil and gas facilities with minimum emissions of 3,000 CO2e and 10,000 BOE/day/company.
This coverage plan was not set in stone.
The framework contemplated further discussions with the provinces in order to seek “a common practical approach to emissions coverage.”51 The menu of compliance options was more developed.
The choices included: a technology fund, inter-firm trading, an offset system, a clean development mechanism and a one-time credit for early action.
Each of these is discussed in turn.
Technology Fund: In the initial years, industry would be able to meet a significant part of its regulatory obligations by contributing to the technology fund.
Each year the cost of contribution to the fund ($/tonne CO2e) would rise while the number of credits a firm may 49 Government of Canada, “Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, (Minister of Environment, March 2008) [GHG Emissions Framework], online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/200803/541_eng.htm.
50 Ibid., Section 2.1, “Targets”.
(e.g.
terrain characteristics, elevation, configuration, and diameter of pipe).
51 Ibid., Section 3, “Consultations”.
11 obtain falls.
In this way, the technology fund would eventually be eliminated as a compliance option.52 Money in the fund would be invested in qualifying GHG emission-reduction technology projects.
These projects could result in an inter-regional transfer of wealth.
In some cases, firms would have an alternative to contributing directly to the technology fund.
Under the pre-certified investment option, a firm could receive credits for investing directly in large-scale transformative projects selected from a menu set out by the federal government.
Carbon capture and storage was the only project type that qualified as a pre-certified investment option.
There was a possibility that contributions to provincial funds could be used to meet federal targets.
A firm contributing to a recognized provincial fund would be eligible to receive credits, at the contribution rate and up to the contribution limit, in the federal plan.
The decision to recognize a provincial fund would be the responsibility of the federal government.
To ensure a nationally consistent approach, other funds would be required to have a mandate and criteria equivalent to those governing the federal technology fund.
Inter-firm trading: Firms whose actual emission intensity in a given year is below their target would receive tradable credits equal to the difference between their target and their actual emission intensity, multiplied by their production in that year.
These credits could be banked for future use or sold to other regulated entities.
Offset scheme: Offsets were projects undertaken by non-regulated entities that result in incremental real, verified domestic reductions or removals of GHG emissions.
These projects would generate credits that regulated entities could use to meet targets.
After publication of the GHG Emissions Framework, the federal government developed the rules for the offset system.53 Three draft guides – Guide for Protocol Developers; Program Rules and Guidance for Project Proponents; and Program Rules for Verification and Guidance for Verification Bodies – were published in the Canada Gazette.54 The first guide — the Guide for Protocol Developers — provided the rules and offered guidance on the requirements and processes to complete an offset system quantification protocol.
The quantification protocol described the approach that must be used to quantify the GHG reductions for a specific project type.
Protocols could be fast-tracked if the protocol is a complete document that has been approved for use by the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism, Alberta’s Specified Gas Emitters Regulation,55 the California Climate Action Registry, the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme in New South Wales, France’s Offset System, or the North American Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.56 52 Ibid., Section 2.2, “Compliance Mechanisms”; Section 5.1, “Technology Fund”.
53 Minister of the Environment, “Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases, Overview: Draft for Public Comment” (Ottawa: 2009), online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/creditscompensatoires-offsets/default.asp?lang=En&n=92CA76F4-1.
54 Notice of intent to publish Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases: Guide for Protocol Developers as one of three proposed Guides under Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases, C. Gaz.
2008.I.2410 (Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999); Notice of intent to publish Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases: Program Rules and Guidance for Project Proponents and Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases: Program Rules for Verification and Guidance for Verification Bodies as two of three proposed guides under Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases, C. Gaz.
2009.I.1698 (Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999).
All guides are available online: http://www.ec.gc.ca/creditscompensatoires-offsets/default.asp?lang=En&n=0DCC4917-1.
55 Alta.
Reg.
139/2007.
56 Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases Guide for Protocol Developers, supra note 54 Annex J.
12 The second guide — the Program Rules and Guidance for Project Proponents — provided the rules and offered guidance on the requirements and processes to create offset credits, from the registration of the project to the issuance of offset credits.
The third guide — the Program Rules for Verification and Guidance for Verification Bodies — set out the rules and offered guidance on the requirements and processes to verify the eligible GHG reductions or removals achieved from a registered project.
The federal government planed to administer the offset system as a voluntary program under s. 322 of CEPA.57 Clean Development Mechanism: Firms could use certain credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism to meet emissions targets.
Access to these credits for compliance purposes would be limited to 10 percent of the firm’s total target.
One-time credit for early action: Firms that took verified action between 1992 and 2006 to reduce their GHG emissions would be potentially eligible for a share of a one-time credit for early action.
The program allowed a one-time allocation of credits up to a maximum of 15 Mt.
The credits were bankable and tradable.
A major feature of the GHG Emissions Framework was the promotion of carbon capture and storage (CCS).
This was done in several ways.
First, certain new facilities commencing operations in 2012 or later will face additional target requirements based on CCS.
These targets will apply starting in 2018.
Facilities covered by these additional requirements include in situ oil sands facilities, upgraders and coal-fired power plants.
Second, new facilities commencing operations in 2004 or later in the oil sands, electricity, petroleum refining, chemicals and fertilizer sectors would not have to comply with the more stringent clean fuel standards until 2018 provided they are built CCS-ready.
Third, a firm could meet 100 percent of its regulatory obligation by investing in CCS projects in the oil sands and coal-fired electricity sectors.
This option was limited to firms in the oil sands, electricity, chemicals, fertilizers and petroleum refining sectors.
It is clear that the federal policy on climate change extended far beyond simply setting limits on GHG emissions.
But the important point of this analysis is that all of this was only policy.
There was no regulatory framework, nor were there a comprehensive implementing statute and regulations.
This underlines the reason that this analysis focuses on the nearest thing to climate change legislation that emerged during this period — the proposed Clean Air Bill and CEPA amendments that were introduced in Parliament but not enacted.
The 2007 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, as noted above, was at a high level of generality and was not used for regulatory implementation.
No further legislative action occurred until the 2011 proposal for coal-fired electricity generation regulations.
57 Nevertheless there would be potential authority and fairness issues: see A. Lucas and O. Daudu, “Disputes and Dispute Resolution in the Offsets System” (March, 2006) BIOCAP Canada Research Integration Synthesis Paper http://www.biocap.ca/rif/report/Lucas_A.pdf.
13 PROPOSED COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY GENERATION REGULATIONS Coal-fired generation of electricity generation regulations under CEPA, section 93(1) and 330(3.2) were proposed in August 2011.58 The performance standard would be 375 tonnes of CO2 per gigawatt hour of electricity produced.
This emissions intensity standard is based on emissions that would be produced by electricity generation using natural gas combined-cycle technology.
The expectation is that these regulations will come into force in 2013, with these central performance standard requirements in effect in 2015.59 However, generators can apply for a temporary deferral up to 2025 of application of the performance standard to generation units if they agree to implement carbon capture and storage.60 Where existing generating units capture at least 30 percent of CO2 emissions for five years, an 18-month deferral for old units is available.61 There is even recognition of the expiry of power purchase agreements in determining the “useful life” of generating facilities.62 Further adjustments recognize the potential deferral of performance standards in emergency circumstances.
It is apparent that a central objective is the forced decommissioning of old generation units during a transition toward less emission-intensive natural gas-fired or renewable energy generation.
The objective is emissions reduction of 65 Mt, approximately 25 percent of Canada’s target of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020.63 At the same time the intention is to encourage investment in less emissions-intensive electricity generation, provide predictability in planning for large capital investments, avoid stranded generation assets and limit costs through incremental action.64 In the next part we assess the constitutionality of the amended Clean Air Bill outlined above.
This is done in the bill’s context that includes the notice of intent65 that preceded the bill’s introduction, the subsequent Turning the Corner66 Action Plan with the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions67 and the more specific Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions.68 Finally, we will assess in a preliminary way, the constitutionality of the proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations.69 58 Proposed coal-fired electricity generationrRegulations, supra note 2.
59 Ibid., s. 28.
60 Ibid., s. 8.
61 Ibid., s. 13.
62 Ibid., definition of “useful life” in respect of a unit.
63 Notice-proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations, supra note 2, Regulatory Impact Analysis at 3.
64 Ibid., pp.
3-4.
65 Supra note 15.
66 Supra note 23.
67 Supra note 24.
68 Supra note 49.
69 Supra note 58.
14 3.
Constitutional Analysis A.
THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH Initially, we can readily identify heads of federal legislative power, under section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, that may potentially support the amended Clean Air Bill.70 This is a preliminary step — an outline of potential federal subject areas.
These heads of power include: the federal taxation power (s.91(3)), criminal law (s.91(27)), regulation of trade and commerce (s.91(2)), and the national concern aspect of the residual peace order and good government (POGG) power.
Other commentators add the emergency power under POGG.71 Analytically, the identification of potentially relevant heads of power involves making a preliminary assessment.
The next step is to put the potential powers aside, notionally blinding oneself to the potential powers identified72 and turn full attention to the characterization of the legislation.
Normally, judges don’t even mention this preliminary consideration of heads of power.
They simply recite the constitutional questions, if specified, or review the constitutional positions of the parties.
Then they go directly to the act or regulation in question and its legislative context.73 The court asks, what is the “pith and substance,” “dominant purpose,” “true character” or “dominant or most important characteristic” of the legislation.74 It considers both the purpose and the effects of the act or regulations and the specific provisions challenged.75 When the court has reached a conclusion on pith and substance, the final step is to classify the subject matter to the appropriate head of legislative power.
This usually involves interpretation to determine the scope of potentially relevant powers.
B. CHARACTERIZING THE AMENDED CLEAN AIR BILL Purpose On one level, the purpose of the amended Clean Air Bill seems obvious.
It deals with the risks to human health and the environment caused by air pollution and GHGs.
The preamble added by the Legislative Committee on Bill C-30 points to this.
The preamble also recognizes the international dimension of these risks and Canada’s obligations under the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.
However, risks may additionally be to “the environment and the economy.”76 There is also the curious circumstance that none of 70 Supra note 22.
71 Hsu & Elliot, supra note 47 at paras.
75-79.
72 Albert Able, “The Neglected Logic of 91 and 92” (1969) 19 U.Tor.L.J.
487.
73 [1997] 3 S.C.R.
213 [Hydro Quebec] Sometimes judges slide prematurely into analysis of the scope of constitutional powers identified, as in R. v. Hydro Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
213, where the majority focused on the criminal law power at para 108-118; Reference Re: Firearms Act (Can.
), [2000] 1 S.C.R.
783 [Firearms Reference] at para 15.
74 Hydro Quebec (majority), ibid.
at para 113; Firearms Reference, ibid.
at para 16.
75 Reference re: Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61.
76 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22.
15 these preambular statements were in the bill at first reading.
Does the added preamble suggest an emphasis of purpose by the legislators; or does it indicate relative weakness or uncertainty of purpose when the bill was introduced?
This latter view is not implausible when it is remembered that the original bill took a multi-pollutant approach, addressing regulation of “air pollutants” and “greenhouse gases” in the same part,77 with no distinct part of the bill concerning GHG emissions.
However, GHGs had already been assessed under Part 5 of CEPA, which concerns control of toxic substances generally, and added to the list of toxic substances under Schedule I to the act.78 Because substances in the schedule can then be the subject of detailed regulations, this is an alternative to the amended Clean Air Bill that could have been taken.
It is the approach now adopted to regulate coal-fired electricity generation facilities.79 Though perhaps an equally problematic approach could have been to make GHGs the subject of regulations that establish a detailed regulatory system.
Further, despite the reference in the preamble to the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, the language of the bill makes it clear that these international obligations, particularly the Kyoto Protocol commitment to reduce emissions by six percent from 1990 levels by 2012, will be treated as merely aspirational.
Home grown GHG emissionreduction targets are specified in the form of a “Domestic Carbon Budget,” to be 20 percent less than 1990 levels by 2020, 35 percent less by 2035 and 60-80 percent less by 2050.80 But core provisions in the Clean Air Bill do aim at GHG emission reduction.
In addition to the overall domestic carbon budget81 with prescribed and decreasing totals, industrial carbon budgets, portions of the domestic budget, are established each year by the Environment Minister for carbon emitters.
Criteria for industrial carbon budgets include early emissionreduction actions taken, the internal transfer of emission reductions and “fair treatment as regards [a] person’s average economic growth compared with the applicable average sectoral growth.”82 Certain economic sectors are specified, with the Minister empowered to designate “Large Industrial Emitters:” a) in the electricity generation sector that uses fossil fuels b) upstream oil and gas operators (excluding petroleum refiners and natural gas distributors), and c) energy intensive industries including “persons that use energy derived from fossil fuels.83 For each of these subsectors, the Minister is authorized to set a “sectoral carbon budget.”84 77 Ibid., s.18 adding s.103.09.
78 Government of Canada, “Order Adding Toxic Substances to Schedule 1 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act,” /SOR/2005-345, November 21, 2005, Canada Gazette Part II, Vol.
139, No.
24, 21 November, 2005 [CEPA SO2 Scheduling Order].
79 Proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations, supra note 2.
80 Ibid., s.103.2.
81 Ibid., s.103.2.
82 Ibid., s.103(3)(c).
83 Ibid., s.103.05.
84 Ibid., s.103.05(1).
16 Offences added by the amended Clean Air Bill include s.103.11, concerning release of a GHG in contravention of a regulation made under s.103.09 or an order requiring a report and remedial measures under s103.1.
CEPA’s main offence provision is also amended85 to include an offence of failing to remit a required tradable emission unit to the Minister.
Already included in CEPA are offences concerning contravention of the act, the regulations, or any obligation, prohibition or order under the act or the regulations.86 All of these provisions suggest that the intended purpose of the bill is GHG emission reduction.
This is to be accomplished through a complex regulatory scheme.
The scheme is founded on establishment of general and individual emission “budgets” — emission limits.
Failure to meet these individual budgets is the subject of offences tailored to the regulatory scheme, including failure to remit tradable emission units required to meet individual emission budgets.
These tradable units would be created under the GHG emission trading system that the Governor-in-Council is authorized under s.94.1(1)(a) to establish by regulation.
Tradable units could also be created under the domestic offset system, previously the subject of a major government report, that the Governor-in-Council would set up by regulation under s.94.1(1)(b).
Finally, emission units under foreign or international systems might also be used to meet emission budgets should the Governor-in-Council, under s.94.1(1)(c), make regulations to “link” with those systems.
So while the detail of these emission trading systems is speculative, depending on the making of complex regulations, the objective of creating these market-based mechanisms, to be part of the overall GHG emissions-reduction scheme, is clear.
However it must be kept in mind that the scheme, with its core emission limits and market mechanisms, is targeted.
While GHGs are produced by a variety of specific sources and industrial sectors, only certain sectors are specifically mentioned in the bill.87 These major sectors are fossil fuel-based electricity generation and upstream oil and gas.
Both sectors would appear to be included in the third category mentioned, namely “energy intensive industries …”88 This suggests that the purpose of GHG emission reduction is not general, but rather aimed at certain emission-producing sectors and more specifically at the category of large industrial emitters within those sectors.
If focus is placed on the emissions trading system that centres on large industrial emitters, a more nuanced view of Parliament’s purpose emerges.
This is consistent with the necessity, underlined by four members of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, to identify the pith and substance of impugned provisions as precisely as possible.89 Their concern was that vague and general pith and substance characterizations could lead to confusion and dilution of established constitutional doctrines and to erosion of the scope of provincial powers through operation of the federal paramountcy 85 CEPA s.27.
86 Ibid., s.272(2).
87 The fossil fuel electricity generation and upstream oil and gas sectors, along with base metal smelters, iron and steel cement, forest producers and chemicals production account for only 47 percent of Canada’s GHG emissions: Notice of Intent, supra note 15 at 15.
88 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22, s.14.1 adding s.103.05(1)(c).
89 2010 SCC 61 at para 190, per Justices Lebel and Deschamps.
(Justices Abella and Rothstein concurring).
While not a majority, these judges were part of a 5-4 majority (the fifth judge simply adopted a more robust pith and substance characterization).
Their theory and analysis represents strong persuasive authority.
17 doctrine.90 They noted, for example, that a finding that a provision is in pith and substance in relation to health or to the environment would be problematic and concluded that it is necessary to undertake further analysis to determine what aspect of the field in question is being addressed.91 Effects In particular, pith and substance identification requires, as the Supreme Court noted in the Firearms Reference, an assessment of the effects of the impugned provisions.92 This inquiry is directed to actual impact of the provisions on Canadians.
Here, that inquiry shows that specific industrial sectors are targeted — energy production and industrial operations located in provinces.93 These are classic local works and undertakings.94 Furthermore, the offset system paper reveals that the proposed system will recognize emissions offsets created primarily through forestry and land use change actions within provinces, including on provincial Crown lands.95 This leads to a more restricted pith and substance characterization for sections 94.1 and 103.2 that authorize creation of emissions trading and offset systems, namely regulation of energy, production, industrial operations and land use activities to reduce GHG emissions from those operations and activities.
These effects become even clearer if the technique chosen is based on reduction of emissions intensity (GHG emissions as a function of production), as was the case for the Clean Air Bill as originally introduced.96 This would take the decisions necessary to establish emissions limits down to the level of plant operations and production processes.
Corporate planning and plant and facility operations would be directly affected by this kind of regulation.
Focus sharpens when regulations envisioned to create a technology investment fund are considered.
The idea is that industry could contribute toward development of new technologies for emissions reduction and receive credits that could be used to meet emission limits.
Furthermore, the notice of intent97 specifically mentioned carbon capture and storage, a technology particularly relevant to the energy sector, that has been the subject of industry and government research investment.
The result is that while those provisions of the amended Clean Air Bill that authorize establishment of GHG emission limits through carbon budgets may in a broad sense be in pith and substance concerned with GHG emission reduction, closer examination suggests that they concern the GHG emissions element of the management and operation of specific categories of industrial facilities within provinces.
This alternative characterization is particularly plausible for the provisions to establish a system for emission credit creation and trading.
The pith and substance of the latter provisions would be regulation of industrial operations in particular sectors.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Reference Re Firearms Act (Can) 2000 SCC 31 at para 18 [Firearms Reference].
93 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22 adding s.103.05.
94 As this term is used in s.92(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
95 Minister of the Environment, Canada’s Offset System for Greenhouse Gases, supra note 53; amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22, s. 10, adding s.94.1(1)(b).
96 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22, s.18, adding s.103.09.
97 Notice of Intent, supra note 15 at 3360.
18 C. CLASSIFICATION TO HEADS OF POWER What are the heads of federal legislative power to which the proposed regulations can be classified?
The primary choices are: criminal law, peace, order and good government (POGG) and possibly regulation of trade and commerce.98 Each of these is discussed below.
The classification to a federal head of power involves matching the legislation’s dominant purpose with an enumerated power of the constitution.
POGG is relied upon only if there is no applicable enumerated power.99 At the classification stage of the federalism analysis, there is no authoritative template or set of criteria.
Determination of which head of legislative power can best accommodate a particular law has been described as “not an exact science.”100 The formal question is what head of power the law in its substance is “in relation to.”101 But it may be inferred that courts are guided by functional criteria such as relative efficiency in addressing the problem.102 This may be expressed as which government is best situated to deal with the issues identified in the characterization exercise.
Whether and the extent to which the enacting government was sensitive to the need for cooperation and coordination may be considered for this purpose.103 Subsidiarity — the idea that action should be taken by the government closest to affected citizens — is also a relevant constitutional principle.104 History and tradition may be significant factors.
This can be seen in the Firearms Reference where the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “gun control has traditionally been considered valid criminal law …”105 proved important.
The basis given for this was the obvious link to public safety.
Analogous is Justice La Forest’s conclusion in R. v. Hydro Quebec that stewardship of the environment has emerged as a fundamental value of Canadian society that is consequently appropriate for criminal law protection.106 Democratic values such as accountability, diversity and responsiveness are also relevant.107 However, in the Firearms Reference the Supreme Court firmly rejected application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Section 1 justification analysis.
The court was clear that a balancing approach based on rationality and proportionality criteria would not be helpful in determining the appropriate balance between the federal and provincial heads of power.108 98 Should the government choose to implement a carbon tax, it would trigger s. 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to legislate in relation to “The Raising of Money by Any Mode or System of Taxation.” 99 R. v. Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 116, 117.
100 Firearms Reference, supra note 73 at para 26.
101 Ibid.
at para 25.
102 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 154.
Justice La Forest referred to efficiency in the sense of not preventing Parliament from exercising leadership in protecting environmental values – a role “expected of it by the international community.” 103 Ibid.
at para 153.
The argument that equivalency provision s are indicative of the essentially regulatory nature of federal legislation (this pointing to provincial heads of power) was rejected by Chief Justice MacLachlin in the Assisted Human Reproduction Reference, supra note 89 at para 1153.
104 Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 183.
105 Firearms Reference, supra note 73 at para 33.
106 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 127.
107 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th Ed.
Supplemented Vol.
(Toronto: Carswell) [Hogg, Constitutional Law] at 15-50.
108 Firearms Reference, supra note 73 at para 48.
19 Classification analysis involves, as shown in Hydro Quebec, interpretation of the scope and content of those legislative powers that appear on an initial scan to be most relevant.
As La Forest stated in Hydro Quebec:109 …I have gone on at this length to demonstrate the simple proposition that the validity of a legislative provision (including one relating to environmental protection) must be tested against the specific characteristics of the head of power under which it is proposed to justify it.
For each constitutional head of power has its own particular characteristics and raises concerns peculiar to itself in assessing it in the balance of Canadian federalism… i.
Regulation of Trade and Commerce Notwithstanding the emissions trading element of the amended Clean Air Bill’s overall scheme, jurisdiction under the federal trade and commerce power is not a good fit.
Not even the intention to link the domestic emissions trading scheme to international instruments under the Kyoto Protocol and potentially to international emissions credit markets is likely to find support under this federal class of subjects.110 The federal power over trade and commerce has been narrowly interpreted.
The Privy Council, in Citizens Insurance v. Parsons restricted the federal power to two branches:111 (i) interprovincial and international trade and commerce; and (ii) general trade and commerce affecting the whole country.
The policy behind this decision appears to be limitation of the federal power in order to preserve the autonomy of the provinces.
More recently, there has been a pulling back from this position as Canada’s economy developed.112 Simply creating a trading mechanism for air emissions is not likely to be enough to uphold the legislation under the first branch.
Significantly, the “goods” in the trade concerned are constructs created under specific environmental legislation that are instrumental in a scheme of GHG emission reduction.
One commentator suggests that the federal government can rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act.113 He states that an emissions trading scheme contains parallels, particularly the setting of national quotas of production, to the regime in that case.
Hogg disagrees.
He thinks that Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act is very fact-specific.114 In particular the marketing scheme had been agreed to by all provincial governments and both provincial and federal governments had enacted regulations to implement the plan.
Even if the provinces and federal government were to reach a similar agreement, the nature of the trade — instruments for GHG emission reduction — makes federal jurisdiction under the first branch of the trade and commerce power unlikely.
109 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 117.
110 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22, s.14.1 adding s. 94.1(1)(c).
111 (1881), 7 App.
Cas.
96 [Parsons].
112 Brian Morgan, “The Trade and Commerce Power,” in Joseph Magnet (Ed.
), Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol.
1 (Edmonton: Juriliber Limited) 476 at 486.
113 Joesph F. Castrilli “Legal Authority for Emissions Trading in Canada,” in Elizabeth Atkinson, ed.
The Legislative Authority to Implement a Domestic Emissions Trading System, January 1999 (Ottawa: National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy) at Appendix 1, 15 citing the Reference Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2.
S.C.R.
1198.
114 Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 107 at 20-7 – 20-8.
20 A more interesting question is whether the proposed act can be upheld under the second branch of Parsons: general trade.
The challenge is to balance the general trade and commerce power of the federal government with the provincial power over property and civil rights.115 The legislation must meet five criteria in order to be classified as a valid exercise of the general trade and commerce power:116 • the impugned legislation must be part of a general regulatory scheme; • the scheme must be monitored by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency; • the legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole rather than with a particular industry; • the legislation should be of a nature that the provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of enacting; and • the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country.
The criteria are not exhaustive and the absence or presence of any one of them is not necessarily determinative.
The first criterion, the presence of a regulatory scheme, is a fundamental characteristic of valid trade and commerce legislation.117 It is clear that the scheme intended under the amended Clean Air Bill would be a complex regulatory scheme including required and prohibited conduct, a mechanism to establish an emissions credit “market,” investigatory procedures, public regulators, and remedial and punitive provisions.
It is also clear that the scheme would be under the constant oversight of some type of regulatory agency.118 The third criterion is whether the scheme is national.
The scheme would apply to all of Canada and to a variety of individuals and corporate entities — but not to all industrial sectors.
Certain sectors, particularly oil and gas and electricity generation, would be targeted.
However, GHG emissions are not a purely local issue, but rather a national and international one.
Provinces can enact GHG emissions reduction legislation; Alberta, for example, has done so.119 But it is unclear whether climate change legislation in a small jurisdiction, particularly emissions trading schemes limited to provinces, can be successful.
Similarly, it is not clear whether the failure of one or several provinces to act would jeopardize the efforts of the remaining provinces.
There are deep divisions between provinces — particularly between hydrocarbon energy producers and hydroelectricity reliant provinces — that are likely to make broad interprovincial agreements difficult.
115 General Motors of Canada v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
641 at 659 [General Motors].
116 Ibid.
at 677.
117 Ibid.
at 667.
118 In the amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22 the Minister of the Environment (Environment Canada) is authorized to exercise a range of specific regulatory powers.
119 N. Bankes and A. Lucas, supra note 1.
21 There is a limit to how much the federal government can intrude incidentally into provincial jurisdiction.
In Calioil v. Canada, the Supreme Court upheld a law that limited the transportation or sale of imported oil west of the Ottawa Valley.120 The legislation was determined to be an extra-provincial marketing scheme designed to protect Alberta’s oil industry.
Although the law had a direct impact on trade within Ontario, it was incidental.
It was “an integral part of the control of imports in the furtherance of an extra-provincial trade policy.”121 The conclusion, whether the pith and substance is GHG emission reduction or even (concerning the emissions trading and technology fund elements) if it is regulation of GHG emissions by energy and industrial operations, is that the bill is unlikely to be valid under the trade and commerce power.122 ii.
Peace Order and Good Government The federal power under POGG is essentially residual.
It is limited to matters not coming within those powers assigned exclusively to the provincial legislatures.123 Early guidance in the Local Prohibition Reference opinion was that this power “ought to be strictly confined to such matters as are unquestionably of Canadian interest and importance, and ought not to encroach upon provincial legislation with respect to any of the classes enumerated in s. 92.”124 Perhaps the most significant discussion of the national concern doctrine is found in R. v. Crown Zellerbach125 in which the Supreme Court’s approach suggested a reluctance to make frequent use of this branch of POGG.
This reluctance was reinforced in R. v. Hydro Quebec.126 The problem is that assigning a matter to POGG impacts the fundamental balance of power between the provinces and the federal government.
Consequently, potential classification to potentially appropriate enumerated heads of power should be tested before resort is had to POGG.127 The test to determine whether a matter falls within the national concern branch, under which a subject that might otherwise fall within a provincial head of power may be classified under POGG, is as follows: • Is it a new matter that did not exist at Confederation or an old matter that has become one of national concern?
• To qualify as a matter of national concern, the matter must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern.
120 [1971] S.C.R.
543 [Caloil].
121 Ibid, at 552.
122 Stewart Elgie, in “Kyoto, the Constitution and Carbon Trading: Waking a Sleeping BNA Bear,” (2007).
Review of Constitutional Studies, 67 at 110-120, argues that the emissions trading propositions of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, S.C. 2007, c. 30 can be upheld under the trade and commerce power.
Central to his analysis is the idea that provinces are functionally unable to regulate matter that by its nature requires federal regulation.
123 S. 91, Constitution Act.
124 Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1896] A.C. 348 (P.C.)
[Local Prohibition Reference] at 360-361.
125 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd. [1988] 1 SCR 401 [Crown Zellerbach].
126 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 115 and Crown Zellerbach, supra at para 62.
127 Hydro Quebec, ibid.
at para 116.
22 • Is the scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power?
• The above questions are modified with an evaluation of the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal effectively with the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.128 The Supreme Court has held consistently that the environment is a matter of shared jurisdiction.129 Even so, the Court, in a 5-4 split, upheld under POGG federal legislation dealing with dumping in marine waters.
The majority found the test for singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility was met by limiting the application to marine waters.
The minority disagreed, concluding that the power under POGG is broad and could, on the majority’s view, conceivably extend deep into provincial jurisdiction including regulation of land-based air contaminants that fall into marine waters.
The point is that it is rarely a clear and simple matter to validate legislation under POGG.
The matter of air pollution and even of climate change is not new.
Air pollution, including the release of GHGs into the atmosphere, has been occurring as long as humans have burned anything for heat.
However, it could be argued that the emergent critical nature of climate change and its consequences transformed this issue into one of national concern.
Yet the amended Clean Air Bill does not formulate the matter in a way that meets the test for singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility.
It deals with GHG emissions in parts 5.1 and 5.2.
The problem is that a wide range of modern human activity produces GHG emissions so that it is difficult to discern the limits of the provisions.
It is a case of the legislation defining the regulated substances with some precision, but the substances themselves being so pervasive that the scope and impact is rendered uncertain.
Hsu and Elliot see the matter as both federal and provincial.130 The lack of singleness would lead to extensive intrusion into provincial powers.
The scale of impact on provinces, particularly energy producing provinces such as Alberta, faced with the provisions targeting energy producers, would be serious.
Moreover, classification of a broadly conceived climate change or even a GHG emission subject as a POGG matter could prevent provincial regulation on a local scale.131 This may be a subject to which the principle of subsidiarity — the idea that the legislature closest to particular citizen concerns is in the best position to take action — is particularly applicable.
Four Supreme Court judges in Reference Re: Assisted Human Reproduction Act recognized that the Constitution Act’s division of power is “largely consistent with the principle of subsidiarity.”132 Commentators do not agree on the use of this power.
Hogg states that there is “no doubt” that the federal government could enact environmental protection legislation under this branch.133 128 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 125 at para 62.
129 Ibid.
at para 59.
130 Supra note 47 at para 74.
131 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 115.
132 Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 183.
133 Hogg, “A Question of Parliamentary Power,” supra note 10 at 3.
23 Hsu and Elliot disagree.
They suggest that the matter of climate change is not single, distinctive and indivisible and that the scale of impact into provincial jurisdiction would be too extreme.134 Underlying these differences may be whether the provinces are unable to deal with the problem of climate change and GHG emissions.
Hogg suggests that the provincial inability test is a critical factor:135 The most important element of national concern is a need for one national law which cannot realistically be satisfied by cooperative provincial action because failure of one province to cooperate would carry with it adverse consequences for the residents of other provinces.
A subject-matter of legislation which has this characteristic has the necessary national concern to justify invocation of the p.o.g.g.
power.
There is an argument that the seriousness of climate change and the inability of the provinces to reach an agreement brings the subject matter into the domain of the federal government.
However, it is the scale of the impact on provincial jurisdiction that seems most telling against POGG classification of the amended Clean Air Bill.
As framed, the bill would cut deeply into core provincial jurisdiction in relation to regulation of industrial and energy facilities — “local works and undertakings.” The scheme reaches to the level of facility technology and operations — matters of property in the province.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court’s expressed reluctance to sweep broad environmental matters under federal POGG jurisdiction is significant.
The court’s approach to POGG classification of the toxics regulation provisions of CEPA, part of the very statute the Clean Air Bill amends, is apparent in Hydro Quebec.
As articulated by Justice La Forest in his Crown Zellerbach minority judgment, and applied in writing for the Hydro Quebec majority, the court should, before consideration of POGG, first focus on potentially relevant enumerated heads of federal power and pay close attention to the “ambit and contours” of those powers.136 In Hydro Quebec, it was the criminal law power that was held to support the provisions in question.
iii.
Criminal Law CHARACTER OF CRIMINAL LAW To be in relation to criminal law, a law must have (i) a valid criminal purpose; (ii) the backing of a prohibition and; (iii) a penalty.137 Some matters, such as gun control138 which address risks to public safety, have “traditionally” been considered to be valid criminal law.
Though the position is not as clear for environmental harm, the Supreme Court majority in Hydro Quebec stated that “stewardship of the environment is a fundamental value of our society so that Parliament may use its criminal law power to underline that value”.
Because this is surprisingly broad and sweeping language, it is useful to place these words in the context of a longer quotation.
The court quoted Justice 134 Supra note 47 at para74.
135 Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra note 107, 17-16.
136 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 125 at para 117.
In Hydro Quebec, the majority judges did not consider it necessary to determine whether the legislation fell within federal jurisdiction to legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada.
137 Firearms Reference, supra note 73 at para 31.
138 Ibid.
24 Gonthier speaking for the majority in Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., where he cited the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s report, ‘Recodifying the Criminal Law,’ in which the Commission proposed a new federal environmental crime to address “widespread, cumulative and chronic” effects of what it described as “industrial pollution.” From this, the Hydro Quebec majority concluded:139 What the foregoing underlines is what I referred to at the outset, that the protection of the environment is a major challenge of our time.
It is an international problem, one that requires action by governments at all levels.
And, as is stated in the preamble to the Act under review, “Canada must be able to fulfill its international obligations in respect of the environment”.
I am confident that Canada can fulfill its international obligations, in so far as the toxic substances sought to be prohibited from entering into the environment under the Act are concerned, by use of the criminal law power.
The purpose of the criminal law is to underline and protect our fundamental values.
While many environmental issues could be criminally sanctioned in terms of protection of human life or health, I cannot accept that the criminal law is limited to that because “certain forms and degrees of environmental pollution can directly or indirectly, sooner or later, seriously harm or endanger human life and human health”, as the paper approvingly cited by Gonthier J. in Ontario v. Canadian Pacific, supra, observes.
But the stage at which this may be discovered is not easy to discern, and I agree with that paper that the stewardship of the environment is a fundamental value of our society and that Parliament may use its criminal law power to underline that value.
The criminal law must be able to keep pace with and protect our emerging values.
On this basis, the Supreme Court in Hydro Quebec upheld the CEPA provisions that govern the assessment of substances to determine toxicity, the listing of substances found to be toxic in a schedule to the act and the regulations with criminal penalties governing the release of those toxic substances into the environment.
GHGs were subsequently assessed in this way and added to the schedule of toxic substances.
This is what led Hogg to conclude that federal legislation based on the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions, released after the amended Clear Air Bill died on the order paper, which would prescribe emissions limits for GHGs, would be “a perfectly safe exercise of Parliament’s criminal law power.”140 The purpose of the amended Clean Air Bill is to reduce air emissions in order to protect the environment and the health of all Canadians — particularly the most vulnerable members of society.141 The bill adds the offence of failure to remit a tradable unit.142 Following conviction on indictment, the penalty can be a fine and/or imprisonment for a term not to exceed three years.
On summary conviction, the penalty can be a fine and/or imprisonment for a term of not more than six months.
CEPA already includes an offence of failing to comply with any provision of the act or regulations and with any orders made under the statute or the regulations.
139 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 127.
140 P. Hogg, “A Question of Parliamentary Power”, supra note 10 at 6.
141 S.103.01.
The purpose of the Clean Air Bill Amendment is similar.
Section 103.06 reads, “The purpose of this Part is to protect the health of Canadians and improve the environment by addressing the anthropogenic deterioration of air quality.” 142 Ibid., s.272(2.1).
The amended Clean Air Bill has the same penalty provisions as the original Bill.
25 A factor that may be significant in assessing criminal law support for the amended Clean Air Bill is that the original bill introduced in Parliament included a new CEPA Part 5.1 headed “Clean Air,” that addressed both air pollutants as defined, and GHGs.
Thus, GHGs were no longer to be listed in the CEPA Toxic Substances Schedule and as such regulated under Part 5, the CEPA provisions that were upheld under the criminal law power in Hydro Quebec.
Part 5.1 commenced with a purpose statement, namely “to promote the reduction of air pollution and to promote air quality in order to protect the environment and the health of all Canadians …”143 The objective appears to be to focus on the core environmental values recognized by the Supreme Court in Hydro Quebec.
But addressing GHGs indirectly, as part of a broader class of air contaminants that includes “air pollutants,” could be taken as indicating at least uncertainty about the urgency of protecting Canadians from the harm caused by GHGs.
In introducing the original Clean Air Bill, the Environment Minister did not single out GHGs (from “air pollutants”) as a significant concern.
However, all of this changed with the Parliamentary Committee’s review of the bill and the amendments that created the amended Clean Air Bill that is the subject of this analysis.
The preambular statements concerning climate change and the international treaties cited above were added, along with the specific provisions for regulation of GHGs, including national and individual carbon budget emission limits, and authority to create a GHG emissions trading system.
So, while the amended bill would increase focus on GHGs, it still would not bring GHGs under CEPA Part 5, the provisions upheld in Hydro Quebec.
The about-face is troubling and indicates uncertainty about whether GHGs are substances that belong in the toxics assessment and regulation process under Part 5 of CEPA.
All of this suggests that while there is a plausible basis for criminal law jurisdiction to support the amended Clean Air Bill, provincial powers over local works and undertakings and property and civil rights may also be engaged, particularly when effects on industrial and energy facilities and operations within provinces are considered.
There is little doubt that there can be incidental overlap or overflow of federal criminal law power into provincial subjects.144 But the insistence of four judges in the Assisted Reproduction Act Reference that the scope of the criminal law power must be assessed to prevent incursion on provincial powers is a strong indication that the nature and extent of overflow must be carefully considered with the subsidiarity principle (power should be exercised by the government closest to the contested subject matter) in mind.145 Characterization of the pith and substance as regulation of GHG emissions by persons and corporations — particularly by certain energy sectors — would point to the amended Clean Air Bill being not essentially criminal, but regulatory.
Appropriate prohibitions within the federal criminal law power have been described as “discrete.”146 But the carbon budget limits system, along with the emission-credit trading system with credits tendered to meet carbon budget limits, is anything but discrete.
The prohibition is not directed against specified emissions, but against emissions that cannot, in effect, be paid for by tendering the required quantity of emission credits.
143 s.18, adding s.103.01.
144 Assisted Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 190.
Chief Justice McLachlin, at para 32, spoke of either level of government being permitted to enact laws that have “substantial impact on matters outside its jurisdiction.” 145 Ibid., para 183.
146 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 128.
26 The source and therefore the fundamental nature of these nominally fungible credits varies considerably.
Credits are generated by reducing emissions below individual emission budgets.
Other credits (offsets) are created by sequestration of CO2 in agricultural and geological sinks.
The amended Clean Air Bill proposed a regulatory system for issuance of these offset credits.147 Still other credits could result from GHG reductions in other countries.148 Even credits based on investment in GHG-reduction technology could be used.149 All of these various types of credit could be acquired by purchase or trade.
The prohibition would establish limits or standards on a different basis for different segments of industry.
There were also fiscal elements of this GHG emission reduction regime, including the federal government’s $15 per tonne cap on the cost of emission credits.150 All of this adds up to a complex and comprehensive regulatory scheme.
The summary in the amended Clean Air Bill stated that the legislation “enables the Government of Canada to regulate air pollutants and greenhouse gases, including establishing emission-trading programs…”.
The notice of intent referred to the federal government’s intention to “develop and implement regulatory measures…”.151 UNDUE INTRUSION INTO PROVINCIAL POWERS The Supreme Court of Canada has often stated that the only limitation on the criminal law power is that it cannot be used colourably.152 But if colourability involves improper motives or a kind of constitutional aggression through federal occupation of provincial jurisdiction under the guise of criminal legislation, this amounts to a rather narrow limitation.
More important, such a concept would be extremely difficult to apply in a reasoned and coherent manner.
Perhaps for this reason, in the Firearms Reference the Supreme Court openly addressed undue intrusion into provincial powers.
It considered colourability in the sense of improper purpose or bad faith to be part of the question of whether the federal government is using the criminal law power to enter a new field and thus expand its powers relative to those of the provinces.153 This intrusion factor appears to be analogous to the scale of impact on the provincial powers criterion154 that is part of the POGG national concern analysis.
It permits the court to avoid speculation about Parliament’s motives, a question that goes beyond legislative intent in the usual sense, and focus on relevant functional considerations.
These include hindrance of provincial ability to regulate a matter, preemption of provincial choice whether or not to legislate, effects on established provincial subjects and federal entry into a new field.155 147 Canada’s Offset System, supra note 43.
148 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22, s.14.1 adding s.9.4.1(i)(c).
149 Notice of Intent, supra note 15 at 14.
150 Subsequently proposed in the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions, supra note 24 at 12-13.
151 Notice of Intent, supra note 15 at 3352.
152 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 121 and authorities cited.
153 Firearms Reference, supra note 73 at para 53.
154 “For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense it must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution,” Crown Zellerbach, supra note 125 at para 3.
155 Firearms Reference, supra note 73 at paras.
50-53.
27 Applying this intrusion test to the amended Clean Air Bill, it is not immediately clear that provinces are hindered in their ability to exercise their property and civil rights-centred jurisdiction to regulate emission of GHGs.
Alberta has already enacted the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act,156 mandated GHG emissions reporting, set emission targets and established a legal framework for emissions trading.157 Other provinces have proposed alternative approaches to reducing GHG emissions.158 Provincial choice of whether or not to legislate is undoubtedly affected.
Future provincial climate change legislation would obviously have to take account of the federal legislation.
But this is normal where jurisdiction is uncertain.
Alberta did this in enacting its Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, by including provision for inter-jurisdictional agreements.159 The amended Clean Air Bill contained equivalency provisions based on federal-provincial agreements.160 Previously, the notice of intent made it clear that the federal policy involves cooperation and consultation with provinces.
This is to be achieved through CEPA equivalency agreements that would leave the equivalent provincial laws as the effective instruments.
As to effects on established provincial subject matter, the provincial position is stronger.
The GHG emission budgets (emission limits) contemplated by the amended Clean Air Bill and the notice of intent161 targeted the largest producers in the industrial and natural resource sectors.
This is no incidental effect on provincial industrial and natural resource activities.
These are core economic activities in the provinces — local works and undertakings contemplated by s.92(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
They involve conservation and management of: nonrenewable resources (s.92A) and public lands generally (s.92(5)) and, of course, property and civil rights in the province (s.92(13)) and matters of a local or private nature (s.92(16)).
Further, these federal provisions would represent federal entry into a new field.
While it is not an attempt to occupy the field of environmental regulation generally, the importance of the industrial sectors regulated and the role of this regulatory scheme in national economic transformation, present more than incidental effects on traditional provincial subjects.162 The focus in the Notice of Intent on consultation with the provinces in setting targets suggested federal concern about potential impacts on industry.
The Supreme Court has recognized that it must, in reaching a conclusion on undue intrusion, step back to assess the impact of the federal prohibitory measures on the overall balance between federal and provincial heads of power.
Justice La Forest’s conclusion in Hydro Quebec was that concern about the federal toxic substances assessment regime and resulting prohibition on release of PCBs, was “overstated.”163 But the broader objectives underlying the amended Clean Air Bill, namely the idea of economic transformation to achieve a less carbonintensive economy, and the economic impact on the largest industrial and energy producers, 156 S.A. 2003, c. C-16.7 [CCEMA].
157 Specified Gas Reporting Regulation, Alta.
Reg.
251/2004; Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, Alta.
Reg.
139/2007.
158 For example British Columbia has established carbon tax, Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C.
2008, c. 40.
159 CCEMA, s.8.
160 Amended Clean Air Bill, supra note 22, s.103.051.
161 And confirmed by the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions, supra note 24.
162 Though criminal prohibitions can undoubtedly target economic interests: Hydro Quebec, supra note 73 at para 121, per La Forest J.
163 Ibid., para 131.
28 make undue intrusion in provincial powers at least a much more plausible argument than it was in either Hydro Quebec or the Firearms Reference.
This, coupled with uncertainty about federal jurisdiction based on the peace, order and good government power, discussed above, undoubtedly prompted the CEPA equivalency agreement approach.
The federal government offered upfront to use this cooperative legislative mechanism which, upon agreement, would leave the provinces in charge of the system.
It chose not to hold equivalency as a bargaining chip.
ANCILLARY POWERS AND OVERFLOW The idea of federal “ancillary” powers or “overflow” of legislative power becomes important where only certain provisions of a statute are challenged.164 This is potentially a basis for upholding the validity of the amended Clean Air Bill as criminal law.
Here, we are assessing an amending bill that adds to, and to a limited extent modifies, an existing statute, the element of which concerning toxic substances was already upheld as valid criminal law in Hydro Quebec.165 Certain specific provisions of the amended Clean Air Bill that appear to create significant jurisdictional overflow require examination.
These are the provisions that authorize establishment of an emission-credit trading system based on GHG emissions and “offset” emission credits from a variety of GHG reduction activities, and provisions for a technology fund, contributions to which could also create marketable emission credits.
The analytical approach requires the court to determine whether (1) there is potential overflow into provincial powers, (2) the act (or a severable part) is valid and if so, (3) the impugned provision (or provisions) is sufficiently integrated with the overall scheme of the act.166 The more serious the overflow, the higher the threshold — reaching that of necessity — for upholding the provisions.167 As suggested above, it is arguable that the pith and substance of the Clean Air Bill is regulation of GHG emissions to protect the environment and the health of Canadians.
But the result, as suggested above, overflows into provincial powers over local works and undertakings that produce emissions, and the property and civil rights of their owners and operators.
Specific industrial and natural resource sectors would be targeted.
Carbon budgets that express the emission limits would be tailored to these sectors.
The emission-credit trading system involves a mandated carbon price and credits that can be created not merely by emission reductions but by contributions to a technology fund and offsets — carbon reduction by a range of activities not directly regulated by the statute.
The result is establishment of a specific foundation for a carbon management system in which firms in the target sectors will be compelled by economic necessity to participate.
From an individual firm perspective, this would require creation of new business units and management systems — activities at the heart of local firm operations.
There is a serious overflow, bringing core local matters — industrial and energy facilities and their operations — within federal jurisdiction.
This is particularly so if these provisions are viewed in isolation from the remainder of the amended Clean Air Bill and the remainder of CEPA.168 164 Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 275, 125, 126.
165 Hydro Quebec, supra note 73.
166 General Motors, supra note 115 at 667-670.
167 Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 127, 193, 275.
168 Ibid.
at para 275.
29 A number of criteria that may be used to assess integration and potentially justify overflow of legislative powers have been identified by the Supreme Court.
These include whether a provision is remedial, whether it is limited, whether there is precedent for overflow of the subject matter in question and whether a head of power is — like the criminal law power169 — broad in scope.
Jurisdictional overflow under legislation supported by broader powers is, in general, likely to be less serious.170 However, this list is not exhaustive, and in any event, these criteria are guidelines only, to be applied, as Justices LeBel and Deschamps pointed out in the Assisted Human Reproduction Reference, with “… reference to the context.”171 Here, the emissions trading provisions in question are remedial only in a broad sense of remediating conditions that may give rise to harmful climate change.
They are limited in their application to persons and commercial entities, but because these are particular local activities — sectors linked to provincial lands and resources — this, if anything, underlines the overflow.
There is no precedent for federal environmental legislation reaching so deeply into regulating the industrial processes of particular local, provincial economic sectors.172 But most telling is that it is not clear that the prohibitions on release of GHGs beyond carbon budget limits depend on the provisions that authorize establishment of the emissions trading scheme.
The trading scheme may make it easier for regulated individuals and corporations to comply with carbon budget limits, but there is no compelling evidence that a trading mechanism is a necessity for the overall scheme.173 It must be remembered that the trading scheme provisions were not included in the original Clean Air Bill.174 Moreover, it is at least arguable that if prices prescribed for credits created by payments into a technology fund are favourable, there may, as is the case under Alberta’s scheme in which unlimited fund based credits are available,175 be very little credit trading activity.
The result is that the emission trading provisions may not be considered necessary and therefore ancillary to the otherwise valid prohibitory scheme.
169 General Motors, supra note 115 at pp.
671-674, discussed in Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 128-132 per Chief Justice McLachlin.
170 General Motors, supra note 115 at 671.
171 Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 195.
172 Apart perhaps from water quality legislation, particularly the Fisheries Act based on the specific “Seacoast and Inland Fisheries” (Constitution Act 1867, s. 91(12) power.
173 Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89 at para 276 where Justices Lebel and Deschamps observe that the scheme established by the prohibitory provisions of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act does not depend on the existence of the scheme for regulatory assisted human reproduction activities.
174 Ibid.
at para 276 where the judges note that the regulatory mechanisms were not included in the first assisted human reproduction bills, “which contained only absolute prohibitions.” 175 Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, supra note 156, s. 8.
30 Hogg concludes that properly drafted federal legislation for the regulation of GHG emissions would be upheld under the broad criminal power.
He reviewed the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions under the assumption that regulation would involve GHGs classified as toxins — the approach taken in the amended Clean Air Bill.176 He states that once emissions standards are prescribed by regulation, any firm not in compliance would be subject to criminal sanction and that this is a “perfectly safe exercise of Parliament’s criminal law powers.”177 Though he acknowledges that the validity of “additional means of compliance” — emissions credits, emission offsets and a technology fund — raise specific questions, he concludes that they are nevertheless valid.
His conclusion is that though these techniques are not typical of criminal law, they promote the same public purpose — protecting the environment by reduction of GHG emissions — as the specific prohibitions.178 Other commentators disagree.
Hsu and Elliot see the problem of climate change as immediate and extremely serious, but do not find the directness required between the emissions of CO2 and the changing climate.179 This, along with the regulatory approach to cap and trade schemes, suggests to them that criminal law is not a likely candidate to uphold federal legislation.
All of this points to a conclusion that the federal government’s approach in drafting the notice of intent and the amended Clean Air Bill does not result in clear criminal law power support.
An equally plausible result is that what has been enacted is emission limits backed by prohibitions and penalties, plus a regulatory scheme that cuts deeply into provincial powers and is not fundamentally necessary to support the criminal prohibitions.
CEPA, SECTION 330(3.2) AND THE COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY GENERATION REGULATIONS The regulations are proposed under the authority of CEPA’s Part 5 Toxics provisions following a 2005 Ministerial order under sections 90(1) and 332(1) that added GHGs, including CO2, to Schedule 1.180 This meant that under CEPA section 93(1) regulations were authorized to permit comprehensive regulation and management of CO2.
Section 330(3.2), enacted in 2008,181 purported to add authority to target persons, undertakings or activities on the basis of factors, including production capacity, production or manufacturing technology and feedstocks.
Because of the close connection between the section 330(3.2) authority and the regulations’ technique of targeting a specific subsector — electricity generation — using specific production technology and fuel (coal related to natural gas combined-cycle generation) and linking the performance standard to production capacity (emissions intensity), the constitutional reach of this section is assessed along with that of the proposed regulations.
176 Hogg “A Question of Parliamentary Power”, supra note 10; Hogg, “Constitutional Authority over Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” supra note 10.
177 Hogg, “A Question of Parliamentary Power,” Ibid.
at 6.
178 Ibid.
at 7.
179 Hsu & Elliot, supra note 47 at paras.
63-66.
180 Proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations, supra note 2.
181 S.C. 2008, c. 31, s. 5.
31 First, as a result of R. v. Hydro Québec,182 the constitutional validity of the CEPA Part 5: Toxicity Assessment and Regulation of Toxic Substance provisions has been confirmed.
But the Hydro Québec decision has limits.
Justice La Forest recognized this in his judgment when he said: “I quite understand that a particular prohibition may be so broad or allencompassing as to be found to be, in pith and substance, really aimed at regulating an area falling within the provincial domain and not exclusively at protecting the environment.”183 He went on to recognize that “certain types of legislation” may raise “very nice issues”184 concerning the scope of cabinet discretion to make orders beyond federal jurisdiction.
Thus CEPA Part 5 and its regulations may exceed federal jurisdiction in their particular application.
Though Justice La Forest was at pains to say that the Hydro Québec decision concerned CEPA’s toxic substances assessment and regulation, and not merely specific orders concerning PCB substances, his discussion of CEPA suggested that he considered the act to be concerned essentially with regulation of toxic chemical substances.185 He noted that CEPA replaced the Environmental Contaminants Act, and that Environment Canada publications discussed the need to control widespread and often negligent use of chemical products that resulted in these substances entering the environment.186 This perspective on CEPA and the Hydro Québec majority judgment may explain why the federal government considered it necessary to add section 330(3.2).
The latter was apparently thought to clarify that regulatory authority is not limited to addressing particular chemical substances by imposing general limits or requirements, but can include fuels and can specify classes of producers and their facilities, along with manufacturing techniques, production capacity and feedstocks.
Regulatory jurisdiction was extended to industrial operations of defined classes of producers, thus moving a step beyond regulatory action aimed at substances themselves — the approach used in CEPA to deal with toxic chemical substances.
There are two possibilities for challenging the coal-fired electricity generation regulations’ constitutionality.
The first is to focus the attack on the regulation (and their s. 330(3.2) support) and direct the pith and substance analysis to the regulations.
This approach is consistent with the desirability, noted in Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference,187 of addressing pith and substance analysis to the impugned provisions rather than the entire act or its parts, in order to avoid potentially distorting federalism.
A second possible attack is to follow Hydro Québec by conceding that the pith and substance of the whole of Part 5, including s. 330(3.2) is environmental protection that relates to the federal criminal law power, but challenge the applicability of Part 5 and the regulations to matters within exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
The analysis thus homes in on the classification part of the analysis and assesses the scope of the relevant federal head or heads of power.
182 Hydro Québec, supra note 73.
183 Ibid., para 130.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid., para 135.
186 Ibid., para 136.
187 Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference, supra note 89.
32 THE PITH AND SUBSTANCE OF THE REGULATIONS Purpose Supported by section 330(3.2) of CEPA, the regulations create a specific performance standard for coal-fired electricity generating facilities expressed as a prohibition that links existing CEPA penalty provisions.188 The standard is connected in emissions intensity terms to average CO2 emissions from a combined-cycle natural gas generating unit, namely 375 tonnes of emissions for each gigawatt hour of electricity produced annually.
But unlike the amended Clean Air Act, there are no provisions for emissions or offset credit trading or a technology fund.
Nor is a national or regional emissions target expressed.
Rather the regulations create a schedule for achieving the generating facility performance standard by means of temporary exemptions reaching as far into the future as 2025.
Commitment by particular generators to carbon capture and storage is a major exemption factor,189 as is the existence and term of power purchase agreements.190 It is apparent, and the published regulatory impact analysis statement makes clear, that the purpose is a transition away from high-emission coal fuel technology to lower emission natural gas and renewable energy techniques.191 A guiding principle is “balancing environmental and economic considerations,”192 with the need for low incremental energy investment and avoidance of stranded generation assets.
Effects The effect for coal-fired electricity generators is not merely regulation of their production technology and fuel source.
Coal fuel use is limited and eventually phased out; but the scheme does this in part by essentially requiring generators, if they want temporary exemption, to invest in a new business — carbon capture and storage.193 The regulations implement new energy policy that imposes requirements on a specific category of electricity producers.
SO2 emissions will be reduced, along with other contaminant emissions from power plants.
But the technique used is felt by generators as long-term energy policy implemented through required facility fuel and operating technology changes mitigated by carbon capture and storage projects.
188 Proposed coal-fired electricity generation regulations, supra note 2, s. 3.
189 Ibid., s. 8.
190 Ibid., s. 2, definition of “useful life”.
191 Ibid., Regulatory Impact Statement at 3.
192 Ibid., s. 8.
193 Ibid., s. 8.
33 Classification If the pith and substance of the regulation is environment protection, specifically reduction of GHG emissions in order to combat global warming, then the federal criminal law power analysis from the Hydro Québec case is highly relevant.
GHG emission reduction is widely recognized as promoting desirable environmental and broader societal values.
It would qualify as a valid criminal law purpose — a necessary condition for application of the federal criminal law power.
The core provision establishes the 375 Mt per annum performance standard, linking this to the lower emission natural gas-fired generation technology.
In form, it is a prohibition against exceeding this limit backed by CEPA penalty-necessary conditions for criminal law power jurisdiction.
There may be some incidental spillover effects on subjects of provincial jurisdiction including property and civil rights and local works and undertakings.
But this would not affect the federal jurisdiction conclusion.
If, however, environmental protection through reduction of GHG emissions is accepted as the pith and substance of CEPA Part 5, it is possible that effects on electricity generation facilities otherwise subject to provincial jurisdiction as outlined above, are too great.
The key factors are targeting a specific energy subsector and regulating not by discrete prohibition, but through a scheme involving new long-term energy policy, implemented in a manner that addresses specific facility operations and management including essentially mandatory new technology and facilities involving carbon capture and storage.
On the other hand, if pith and substance concerns regulation of the operations and technology of a particular class of energy facilities, it is a short step to identify provincial property and civil rights and local works and undertakings as appropriate heads of legislative jurisdiction.
Though framed as a prohibition and linked to a regulatory offence provision in CEPA, other factors suggest the closer connection to provincial powers.
These include application to a specific class of energy generation facilities and provisions designed to restructure this specific industry in its technology and operations and even to essentially mandate a related industrial activity — carbon capture and storage.
Also significant is the emissions intensity form of the standard, which has the effect of making the prohibition dependent on specific plant operations and technology without imposing real quantifiable limits on emissions.
The analysis above suggests at least a strong argument in favour of recognizing targeted energy facility regulation as the pith and substance of the regulations.
If so, the classification analysis would, as outlined above, lead to the conclusion that the regulations are outside federal constitutional power.
Their subject is properly within provincial powers, particularly property and civil rights and local works and undertakings.
4.
CONCLUSION The ill-fated 2006 CEPA amending bill entitled “Canada’s Clean Air Act,” as amended by the Legislative Committee on Bill C-30, is (the unimplemented Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act notwithstanding) the closest approximation we have of a comprehensive federal climate change statute.
It included enforceable emission limits for major industrial emitters, particularly energy industry operators, emission credit and offset credit trading, and credits based on technology fund contributions.
There is little doubt that direct and discrete federal GHG emission prohibition provisions are constitutionally valid as criminal law.
But if constitutional attack focuses on the complex regulatory compliance provisions, a different picture emerges — one that suggests that the amended Clean Air Bill was not within federal constitutional jurisdiction.
34 Four Supreme Court of Canada judges in the 2010 Assisted Human Reproduction Reference have reminded us that the characterization of the leading features of those provisions should be as specific as possible and that the characterization and classification to appropriate heads of constitutional power should be consistent with the principle of subsidiarity.
Targeting certain industrial sectors with emission intensity-based GHG emission limits that affect specific facility operations and introducing market instruments that modify prohibitions, suggests leading legislative features framed around local industrial operations and management effects rather than broad GHG emission-reduction goals.
These local features point to classic provincial subjects including property and civil rights and local works and undertakings rather than federal criminal law or peace, order and good government.
Federal coal-fired electricity generation regulations proposed in 2011, based on CEPA’s Part 5 toxics regulation provisions, would create a performance-based emission prohibition backed by penalties.
This suggests potential criminal law constitutional jurisdiction.
However, the focus on a specific category of industrial facilities, the emission intensity standard based on links to alternative fuel and technology and a scheme designed to restructure the electricity generation industry over a long timeframe involving essentially forcing generators to invest in a related business — carbon capture and storage — reveal significant effects on provincial electricity generating facilities and their operations and management.
There is a strong possibility that these effects would be recognized as the pith and substance or leading feature of the proposed regulations.
This would result in the regulations being unconstitutional as in relation to provincial property and civil rights and local works and undertakings powers rather than federal criminal law.
35 About the Authors Professor Al Lucas has been a member of the Alberta Bar since 1968.
Before joining the University of Calgary in 1976 as a founding faculty member, Professor Lucas was at the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia from 1968 to 1976.
During his term with the U of C Law School, he has served as Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Resources Law and as Associate Dean (Research & Graduate Studies).
He has been a consultant and policy advisor to several government departments, and held numerous professional appointments.
At present, his professional involvements include serving as a Trustee of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, a Special Legal Advisor to the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, and as a member of the Governing Council of the International Bar Association’s Section on Energy, Environment, Resources and Infrastructure Law (SEERIL).
His academic interests are concentrated on regulatory issues related to energy and environmental law, oil and gas law, constitutional law, and judicial review.
Special teaching and research interests focus on Canadian international and comparative environmental and energy law, and include the project published as McHarg et al, “Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources”, Oxford University Press, 2010, and (with Roger Cotton), “Canadian Environmental Law” (2nd), LexisNexis.
Professor Lucas is also an Adjunct Professor in the University of Calgary’s Faculty of Environmental Design, teaches in the University’s Interdisciplinary Masters Program in Sustainable Energy Development, and serves as an Acting Member of Alberta’s Energy Resources Conservation Board.
His awards include the Law Society of Alberta / Canadian Bar Association Distinguished Service Award for Legal Scholarship.
Jenette Yearsley is currently the Director of Regulatory Applications at AltaLink LLP.
She completed this paper prior to joining AltaLink while she was a LLM graduate student in the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law.
Prior to joining AltaLink, Ms. Yearsley was a Research Associate at the Canadian Institute of Resources Law (CIRL) from 2007 to 2010.
Her research areas included sustainable energy; energy regulation; legal aspects of carbon capture and storage – primarily the potential regulatory regime and long-term liability; climate change; the Alberta Land Stewardship Act; and public participation in natural resources development.
She is a past editor of the Canada Energy Law Service – Alberta (Thomson/Carswell).
Before joining CIRL, she practiced law in Calgary and articled with the Courts of Appeal and Queen’s Bench.
In 2011, she completed her LLM degree.
Her thesis addressed tort theory and liability rules for carbon capture and storage projects.
She received her JD from the University of Calgary Faculty of Law in 2005 where she received the William A. McGillivray Gold Medal in Law.
36 DISTRIBUTION Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors’ alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT Copyright © 2011 by The School of Public Policy.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief passages quoted in critical articles and reviews.
ISSN 1919-112x SPP Research Papers (Print) 1919-1138 SPP Research Papers (Online) DATE OF ISSUE December 2011 MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-453-0062.
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The School’s events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT For information about contributing to The School of Public Policy, please contact Candice Naylen by telephone at 403-210-7099 or by e-mail at cnaylen@ucalgary.ca.
EDITOR Timothy Giannuzzi ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION The School of Public Policy Research Papers provide in-depth, evidence-based assessments and recommendations on a range of public policy issues.
Research Papers are put through a stringent peer review process prior to being made available to academics, policy makers, the media and the public at large.
Views expressed in The School of Public Policy Research Papers are the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the view of The School of Public Policy.
OUR MANDATE The University of Calgary is home to scholars in 16 faculties (offering more than 80 academic programs) and 36 Research Institutes and Centres including The School of Public Policy.
Under the direction of Jack Mintz, Palmer Chair in Public Policy, and supported by more than 100 academics and researchers, the work of The School of Public Policy and its students contributes to a more meaningful and informed public debate on fiscal, social, energy, environmental and international issues to improve Canada’s and Alberta’s economic and social performance.
The School of Public Policy achieves its objectives through fostering ongoing partnerships with federal, provincial, state and municipal governments, industry associations, NGOs, and leading academic institutions internationally.
Foreign Investment Advisory Committee of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Finance Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, and Government of Alberta, are just some of the partners already engaged with the School’s activities.
For those in government, The School of Public Policy helps to build capacity and assists in the training of public servants through degree and non-degree programs that are critical for an effective public service in Canada.
For those outside of the public sector, its programs enhance the effectiveness of public policy, providing a better understanding of the objectives and limitations faced by governments in the application of legislation.
37 38 RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY THE MYTHS AND FACTS OF FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES: A CRITIQUE OF EXISTING STUDIES http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/MCKENZIE%20MINTZ%20online.pdf Kenneth J. McKenzie and Jack M. Mintz | October 2011 HOMELESSNESS IN ALBERTA: THE DEMAND FOR SPACES IN ALBERTA’S HOMELESS SHELTERS http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/homelessness%20in%20alberta.pdf Ronald Kneebone, J.C. Herbert Emery and Oksana Grynishak | September 2011 THE NEW SECURITY PERIMETER WITH THE UNITED STATES http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/flemming%20sept011.pdf Brian Flemming | September 2011 INCOME SUPPORT FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Kneebone_Disability_Study.pdf Ronald Kneebone and Oksana Grynishak | September 2011 INVESTMENT REVIEW IN CANADA – WE CAN DO BETTER http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Herman%20Invest%20Canada%20online.pdf Lawrence L. Herman | September 2011 PLUCKING THE GOLDEN GOOSE: HIGHER ROYALTY RATES ON THE OIL SANDS GENERATE SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN GOVERNMENT REVENUE http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/KMckenzie%20comm%20sept11.pdf Kenneth J. McKenzie | September 2011 ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF USING WIND GENERATION TO POWER PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/enviro%20hybrid%20wind%20energy.pdf Mahdi Hajian, Monishaa Manickavasagam, William D. Rosehart and Hamidreza Zareipour | August 2011 A FRESH START ON IMPROVING ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS AND PERIMETER SECURITY http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/dburney.pdf Derek H. Burney | August 2011 PIIGS “Я” US?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/US%20debt%20crisis.pdf Stephen R. Richardson | July 2011 RHETORIC AND REALITIES: WHAT INDEPENDENCE OF THE BAR REQUIRES OF LAWYER REGULATION http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/A_Woolley_lawregulat_c.pdf Alice Woolley | June 2011 TAX IMPACT OF BC’S HST DEBATE ON INVESTMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/tax%20impact%20BCHST%20communique%20c.pdf Jack Mintz | May 2011 SMALL BUSINESS TAXATION: REVAMPING INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE GROWTH http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/mintzchen%20small%20business%20tax%20c.pdf Duanjie Chen & Jack Mintz | May 2011 IS THIS THE END OF THE TORY DYNASTY?
THE WILDROSE ALLIANCE IN ALBERTA POLITICS http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/wildrose%20online%20final3.pdf Anthony M. Sayers & David K. Stewart | May 2011 << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Generic Gray Gamma 2.2 Profile) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (Uncoated FOGRA29 \050ISO 12647-2:2004\051) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /RelativeColorimetric /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /CMYK /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize false /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues false /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo true /PreserveOPIComments true /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Preserve /UCRandBGInfo /Remove /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile (None) /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 300 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile () /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /CreateJDFFile false /Description << /ARA <FEFF06270633062A062E062F0645002006470630064700200627064406250639062F0627062F0627062A002006440625064606340627062100200648062B062706260642002000410064006F00620065002000500044004600200645062A064806270641064206290020064406440637062806270639062900200641064A00200627064406450637062706280639002006300627062A0020062F0631062C0627062A002006270644062C0648062F0629002006270644063906270644064A0629061B0020064A06450643064600200641062A062D00200648062B0627062606420020005000440046002006270644064506460634062306290020062806270633062A062E062F062706450020004100630072006F0062006100740020064800410064006F006200650020005200650061006400650072002006250635062F0627063100200035002E0030002006480627064406250635062F062706310627062A0020062706440623062D062F062B002E0635062F0627063100200035002E0030002006480627064406250635062F062706310627062A0020062706440623062D062F062B002E> /BGR <FEFF04180437043f043e043b043704320430043904420435002004420435043704380020043d0430044104420440043e0439043a0438002c00200437043000200434043000200441044a0437043404300432043004420435002000410064006f00620065002000500044004600200434043e043a0443043c0435043d04420438002c0020043c0430043a04410438043c0430043b043d043e0020043f044004380433043e04340435043d04380020043704300020043204380441043e043a043e043a0430044704350441044204320435043d0020043f04350447043004420020043704300020043f044004350434043f0435044704300442043d04300020043f043e04340433043e0442043e0432043a0430002e002000200421044a04370434043004340435043d043804420435002000500044004600200434043e043a0443043c0435043d044204380020043c043e0433043004420020043404300020044104350020043e0442043204300440044f0442002004410020004100630072006f00620061007400200438002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020043800200441043b0435043404320430044904380020043204350440044104380438002e> /CHS <FEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065876863900275284e8e9ad88d2891cf76845370524d53705237300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002> /CHT <FEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef69069752865bc9ad854c18cea76845370524d5370523786557406300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002> /CZE <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> /DAN <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> /DEU <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> /ESP <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> /ETI <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> /FRA <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> /GRE <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a stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke.
Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 5.0 i kasnijim verzijama.)
/HUN <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> /ITA <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> /JPN <FEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002> /KOR <FEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /LTH <FEFF004e006100750064006f006b0069007400650020016100690075006f007300200070006100720061006d006500740072007500730020006e006f0072011700640061006d00690020006b0075007200740069002000410064006f00620065002000500044004600200064006f006b0075006d0065006e007400750073002c0020006b00750072006900650020006c0061006200690061007500730069006100690020007000720069007400610069006b007900740069002000610075006b01610074006f00730020006b006f006b007900620117007300200070006100720065006e006700740069006e00690061006d00200073007000610075007300640069006e0069006d00750069002e0020002000530075006b0075007200740069002000500044004600200064006f006b0075006d0065006e007400610069002000670061006c006900200062016b007400690020006100740069006400610072006f006d00690020004100630072006f006200610074002000690072002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002000610072002000760117006c00650073006e0117006d00690073002000760065007200730069006a006f006d00690073002e> /LVI <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> /NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit.
De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
/NOR <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> /POL <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> /PTB <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> /RUM <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> /RUS <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> /SKY <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> /SLV <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> /SUO <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> /SVE <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> /TUR <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> /UKR <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> /ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing.
Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 5.0 and later.)
>> /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ << /AsReaderSpreads false /CropImagesToFrames true /ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue /FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false /IncludeGuidesGrids false /IncludeNonPrinting false /IncludeSlug false /Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (4.0) ] /OmitPlacedBitmaps false /OmitPlacedEPS false /OmitPlacedPDF false /SimulateOverprint /Legacy >> << /AddBleedMarks false /AddColorBars false /AddCropMarks false /AddPageInfo false /AddRegMarks false /ConvertColors /ConvertToCMYK /DestinationProfileName () /DestinationProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /Downsample16BitImages true /FlattenerPreset << /PresetSelector /MediumResolution >> /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [600 600] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice
Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement Vol.
14, No.
2 December 2021 © 2021 by the author(s).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercial, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license.
Citation: Haverkamp, J.
2021.
Where’s the Love?
Recentering Indigenous and Feminist Ethics of Care for Engaged Climate Research.
Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, 14:2, 1–15.
http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.
v14i2.7782 ISSN 18363393 | Published by UTS ePRESS | http://ijcre.
epress.lib.uts.edu.au RESEARCH ARTICLE (PEER-REVIEWED) Where’s the Love?
Recentring Indigenous and Feminist Ethics of Care for Engaged Climate Research Jamie Haverkamp1 1 Department of Sociology & Anthropology, James Madison University, Virginia, USA DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v14i2.7782 Article History: Received 19/06/2021; Revised 20/10/2021; Accepted 16/11/2021; Published 12/2021 Abstract Across a range of environmental change and crisis-driven research fields, including conservation, climate change and sustainability studies, the rhetoric of participatory and engaged research has become somewhat of a normative and mainstream mantra.
Aligning with cautionary tales of participatory approaches, this article suggests that, all too often, ‘engaged’ research is taken up uncritically and without care, often by pragmatist, post-positivist and neoliberal action-oriented researchers, for whom the radical and relational practice of PAR is paradigmatically (ontologically, epistemologically and/or axiologically) incommensurable.
Resisting depoliticised and rationalist interpretations of participatory methodologies, I strive in this article to hold space for the political, relational and ethical dimensions of collaboration and engagement.
Drawing on four years of collaborative ethnographic climate research in the Peruvian Andes with campesinos of Quilcayhuanca, I argue that resituating Participatory Action Research (PAR) within a feminist and indigenous ethics of care more fully aligns with the radical participatory praxis for culturally appropriate transformation and the liberation of oppressed groups.
Thus, I do not abandon the participatory methodology altogether, rather this article provides a hopeful reworking of the participatory methodology and, specifically, participatory and community-based adaptation (CBA) practices, in terms of a feminist and indigenous praxis of love-care-response.
In so doing, I strive to reclaim the more radical feminist and Indigenous elements – the affective, relational and political origins of collaborative knowledge production – and rethink research in the rupture of climate crises, relationally.
The ethico-political frictions and tensions inherent in engaged climate scholarship are drawn into sharp relief, and deep reflection on the responsibility researchers take on when asking questions in spaces and times of ecological loss, trauma and grief is offered.
1 DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTEREST The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
FUNDING This work was supported by the United States National Sience Foundation IGERT program (#DGE – 1144423).
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v14i2.7782 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v14i2.7782 http://ijcre.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://ijcre.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v14i2.7782 Keywords Care; Relationality; Knowledge Production; Participatory Action Research; Climate Adaptation; Peru Introduction ‘It makes us sad when you ask us these questions.’ Yovana’s comment stopped me from the next bite of my breakfast.
Her face was a mixture of grief and nostalgia.
She didn’t need to say anything more.
I knew then that my work and my constant informal interviewing and asking about the loss of the glaciers, the loss of the waters, the loss of the frogs, fish and harvests had imposed upon the people who had invited me into their community a painful exercise in knowledge co-production.
It was at this moment in the Peruvian Andes when Yovana, a dear friend and community collaborator on this participatory research project, called my attention to the affective and relational dimensions of my research.
Four years into my doctoral research and my fourth field visit to a single highland valley in the Peruvian Andes – Quebrada Quilcayhuanca – I finally began to feel the embodied gravity of the ecological loss and notice the subtle signs of communal love and communal grief in the wake of radical environmental change.
The loss of kin relations with humans and non-humans is expected to be amplified in the coming years, decades and centuries under extractive terracide and colonial-capitalist climatic change (even under scenarios where there is ambitious climate action).
When researchers show up in communities under climate or environmental distress, ‘inclusively’ asking the people about environmental change, they are directly asking about loss, and in some cases loss as great as losing a member of the family.
The loss of kin relations; diminished sharing and resource exchange; loss of traditional medicine; and the loss of human and more than human relatives, social cohesion, reciprocity and mutual aid leave climate impacted communities with feelings of ‘dislocation and uncertainty that pervades their everyday lives’ (Peterson & Maldonado 2016, p. 343).
Given the affective and material dimensions of climate impacts and social vulnerability, in this article, I draw into question the ethico-political frictions and tensions inherent in engaged climate scholarship.
In particular, I ask: what responsibility does a researcher take on when asking research questions in spaces and times of ecological loss, trauma and grief?
What knowledge is generated from these encounters and who does this knowledge serve?
Part of the impetus for this article stems from noticing that research funding and programmatic incentives are increasingly directed towards knowledge production on crises and complex socioenvironmental changes – e.g.
the climate crisis, the crisis of mass extinction, the COVID-19 crisis and the crisis of racial inequality, among others – using collaborative and engaged research approaches (Brondizio et al.
2016; Norström et al.
2020).
However, critical feminist and Indigenous scholars highlight the lack of attention given to the relational and ethical dimensions of these research practices, which are too often ambiguously ‘engaged’ via neocolonial and extractive (masculinist) knowledge-making practices (Coombes et al.
2014; Kanngieser & Todd 2020; TallBear 2014; Tsing 2015).
Throughout, I explore what it means to do research under the banner of ’participatory’, ‘collaborative’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘engaged’ modalities in the rupture of a crisis; what does it mean to produce knowledge in situations of suffering and loss; and what is the responsibility of the universities and researchers who make inquiries and interventions in these spaces?
These questions summon up the ethical and relational dimensions of engaged research, not only for research carried out today, but these questions will become increasingly salient in the uncertain and troubling future that a certain kind of humanity has set in motion.
This dystopic present and future is characterised by untold socio-environmental change, disasters and increasing inequality, as well as, paradoxically, ‘opportunity zones’ and new ‘research frontiers’ that I argue are structurally designed to benefit an already privileged social class.
Beginning with the view that power and the political are woven throughout the life of research, I suggest that research conducted about, and even with, so-called ‘vulnerable’ communities involves a complex Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20212 negotiation of power that has historically proven to be prone to power imbalances and the wrong use of power (Tuhiwai Smith 2005).
In this article, I draw upon my own attempt at collaborative climate ethnography over a four-year timespan with campesinos (small-scale farmers and agropastoralists) of the Peruvian Andes.
Reflecting on this research program in the wake of devastating climate impacts of rapid glacier melt and ecological devastation and loss, I hope to elucidate the relational, ethical and political dimensions of what it means to be an engaged researcher in the rupture of crisis.
By storytelling and reflecting on the relational and affective moments of my collaborative research project, such as the dialogue with Yovana at the beginning of this article, I intend to illuminate the power relations that are inherent in participatory and engaged research.
I argue that collaborative and participatory methodologies taken-up uncritically remain extractive and neo-colonial, even when mobilised through Liberalism’s language of ‘inclusion’ and ‘justice’.
Despite this critique, I do not abandon the participatory methodology altogether, but provide here a hopeful reworking of the participatory action research (PAR) framework in terms of a feminist and Indigenous praxis of love-care-response.
In so doing, I strive to reclaim PAR for engaged climate research from all too uncritical and rationalist (masculine) interpretations imbued with notions of ‘objectivity’, ‘concern’ and ‘individualism’ – and also reclaim the more radical feminist and Indigenous elements, the affective, relational and ethico-political origins of this participatory research tradition.
New Ways of Knowing are Needed for Just Climate Action Participatory action research (PAR) has long stood as a methodology for taking colonial oppression, power and relationships seriously in the production of knowledge.
As a counter-methodology, PAR is a mode of knowledge-making that resists colonial research and the tradition of positivism, which values knowledge only after what is ‘knowable’ has been divorced from the relational, political, emotional and spiritual context in which it is embedded/embodied.
The architects of PAR fiercely reject the epistemic violence and colonisation produced by a universalising scientific superiority that asserts Western ways of knowing as the best way of knowing.
Latin American PAR is perhaps the most radical and transformative branch of participatory inquiry and is attributed to the thinking of Fals-Borda & Rahman 1991, Orlando Fals-Borda 1988 and Paolo Freire 1970, among other Latin American scholars.
In this tradition, Fals-Borda explains that the purpose of PAR is clear – ‘to create knowledge upon which to construct power for the oppressed in their struggle for autonomy and self-determination’ (Fals-Borda, 1988).
The autonomy and self-determination that Fals-Borda sought to address through a liberatory PAR praxis remains an ongoing struggle for local and Indigenous communities under climate duress.
Colonialism and intensified globalisation, coupled with the post-political imaginary of climate change urgency (Swyngedouw 2013), usher in new kinds of (neo)colonial land and resource grabs in the emerging climate frontier space (Benjaminsen & Bryceson 2012; Fairhead, Leach & Scoones 2012).
Inherent in the political project of resilient world making (formal politics, policy and development) remains an unfettered commitment to Western knowledge production and politics as usual, where market-based and technoscientific climate solutions rooted in Enlightenment rationalism remain privileged and desirable in the climate knowledge– policy interface (Nightingale et al.
2020).
The conventional alliance between colonial knowledge production and climate resilient worldmaking (planning and policy) is increasingly called into question by climate justice scholars and activists (Haverkamp 2017; McGreavy et al.
2021; Nightingale et al.
2020; Whyte et al.
2016; Yeh 2016).
For these scholars, just adaptation to climate change is not myopically about addressing carbon budgets and biophysical climate impacts, but requires ‘changing hegemonic systems of knowledge production and opening-up of deliberative spaces for defining possible futures’ (Nightingale et al.
2020, p. 344).
Here, just resilient worlding requires renewed commitments to multiple knowledges and plural worlds (ontologies), which returns us to PAR’s original intention to resist imperial processes of knowing and worlding, and to take up the peoples’ struggle for sovereignty and self-determination.
Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20213 Rejecting neocolonial climate adaptation and technoscientific decision-making from above, participatory research approaches under new names, such as community-based adaptation (CBA), have (re)emerged as alternative modes of collaborative knowledge production that operate with and for climate-afflicted communities (Forsyth 2013; Schipper et al.
2014).
A critical approach to participatory and collaborative adaptation, like a critical PAR praxis, is far more than a mechanism for participation and inclusion.
It is a mechanism for social transformation and depends upon a relational way, as opposed to a rational way, of knowing and meaning-making with the aim of overturning entrenched social, political and economic inequalities and systems of oppression.
However, as participatory research modalities have rapidly increased in popularity, they themselves have become (paradoxically) hegemonically enshrined as ‘best practice’ for doing ‘engaged’ research in the context of environmental change: climate change and disasters (Button & Peterson 2009; Crate 2011; Roncoli 2006; Schipper et al.
2014); conservation and biodiversity loss (Berkes 2007; Brosius et al.
2005; Roncoli 2006); and development and sustainability planning (Brondizio et al.
2016; Chambers 1994; McGreavy et al.
2021; Norström et al.
2020).
Noticing this trend, Geographer David Demeritt states that ‘[f ]rom natural resource management to medicine, the rhetoric of public engagement, participation and dialogue has become something of a mantra across a wide sweep of policy fields that were once the exclusive preserve of scientific experts’ (Demeritt 2015, p. 2).
Through the popular institutionalisation of PAR, the liberatory, participatory and dialogic praxis for environmental justice is made palatable and complicit in dominant worldviews and values, and thus devoid of the potential for decolonial and transformational ends (Nightingale et al.
2020).
A co-opted PAR asserts a more rational agenda through instrumentalist and disembodied (objective) reasoning that seeks to employ PAR for the purpose of better science (i.e.
increasing knowledge production, scientific accuracy) and for obtaining consensus and community buy-in for expert-led interventions – all things that do nothing to redress longstanding power imbalances and social inequalities.
After several decades of critical participatory inquiry (Cooke & Kothari 2001; Lindroth & Sinevaara-Niskanen 2014; Mosse 1994; Nadasdy 2003, 2021; Willow 2015), it can be argued that, too often, participatory and collaborative research is taken up uncritically and without care, often by pragmatist, post-positivist and neoliberal research programs, for which the radical and relational practice of liberating methodologies is paradigmatically incommensurable.
Recentring Feminist and Indigenous Ethics of Care in Climate Knowledge-Action The institutionalisation of PAR and its methodological variants in environmental knowledge production and decision-making is most often employed from a rationalist (masculine and ethnocentric) moral philosophy – an ethics of justice and concern anchored in Western onto-epistemologies.
Feminist thinkers are particularly helpful here in understating how rationalism’s dichotomy between reason (rationality) and emotion, in which the former is ascribed to a masculine (public) domain and the latter to the private, domestic and feminine sphere (Plumwood 1991) stymies the realisation of transformative environmental justice goals (e.g.
healing, liberation, decolonisation).
A rationalist (masculine) praxis of PAR centres around Liberalism’s rights-based discourses, and specifically on achieving procedural equity through the upholding of fundamental democratic rights of participation (Demeritt 2015).
Yet, as feminist critiques of Liberalism suggest, a rights-based justice is cognitive and universal: it is the ‘rational’ and normative discourse that appeals to NGOs, policy worlds and donors in a secularised knowledge economy that demands a politics of reason, not emotion.
Feminist thinkers have urged us to rethink individualistic rights-based justice after locating it as part of the ‘prestige of the public sphere and the masculine [domain]’ (Plumwood 1991, pp.
8–9).
For Plumwood, a more promising approach, and one that is much more in line with the current directions in feminism, ‘would be to remove Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20214 rights from the centre of the moral stage and pay more attention to some other, less dualistic concepts such as respect, sympathy, care, concern, compassion, gratitude, friendship and responsibility’.
A feminist and Indigenous approach to engaged climate research centres around a relational axis.
This means bringing the heart, feelings and senses back into the research praxis, not separate from reason but with mind/reason.
Arturo Escobar (2016; 2020), drawing upon Fals-Borda, has referred to this as a praxis of sentipensar, or thinking-feeling, with the Earth, and here I also mean a thinking-feeling with human and nonhuman others.
Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars Anja Kanngieser and Zoe Todd refer to the relational, attentive, thinking–feeling methodology with human and more than human kin – which acknowledges the radical interconnectedness between ‘land and ocean, people, plants, animals and spiritual worlds’ – as ‘kin-studies’, and not as ‘case-studies’ (Kanngieser & Todd 2020, p. 388).
For relational knowledge making in Indigenous worlds, Indigenous scholars call upon engaged researchers to ‘bring their whole selves’ to research (Montgomery, personal communication, 27 January 2021).
Engaging in holistic meaning-making involves using the heart (emotions), mind (intellect), body (physical action) and spirit (spirituality), as well as recognising the relationships of these realms to oneself, family, community, land, environment and wider society (Archibald 2008, p. 4).
As colonial domination and worldmaking violently disrupt human relationships with the environment (Whyte 2018), a relational approach to climate change knowledge-action opens up to possibilities of decolonising, restoring and healing human and more-thanhuman relations.
Drawing participatory methodologies into an intimate conversation with feminist and Indigenous ethics of care allows me to think through an alternative framework to the rationalist deployment of collaborative and participatory research, driven by a cognitive ethics of (masculine) concern and justice, and to recentre the relationality of engagement.
Taking Root in a Love-Care-Response Framework The Spanish word for ‘care’ is a fuller approximation of the care that I am trying to invoke here.
Cariño, as Peruvian Anthropologist Marisol de la Cadena reminded me (personal communication 2020), is a ‘lovecare-response’, for which there is no English synonym.
Taking cariño as my conceptual framework, I use it here to think through the praxis of engaged research.
Specifically, to ask what engaged research might become if it is de-linked from colonial, rationalist and masculine orientations of concern-rights-justice and re-linked to Indigenous and feminist moral orderings of love-care-response.
In what follows, I strive to breathe life into the love-care-response framework by animating it with my own experiences of undertaking collaborative climate research with campesinos of the Peruvian Andes.
The collaborative climate research reflected on in this article is the participatory ethnographic work of my doctoral studies.
From June 2015 to April 2018, I worked with campesinos of the Peruvian Cordillera Blanca mountains, specifically 250 agro-pastoralists of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, on issues of climate impact, adaptation and resilience.
Engaged climate ethnography in the Andes meant co-researching with campesinos and at times included work with government officials, NGOs and other actors related to climate adaptation in Qulicayhuanca.
Twenty-one semi-structured interviews, 17 oral histories, 2 participatory adaptation workshops and 35 questionnaire responses were gathered (for more on methodology see Haverkamp 2021).
The struggle with climate impacts in Quilcayhuanca is both cognitively known and physically embodied.
Quilcayhuanca, a historically stable, glacier-fed waterway, cuts through the hybrid grassland–wetland valley floor in an alpine mountain landscape that is vast and expansive.
The Cordillera Blanca (White Mountain range) is a glacierscape, home to over 6000 tropical glaciers, which have stood as the water towers of Peru for millennia (Carey 2010).
Today, Quilcayhuanca River no longer carries the cool blue–green colour of alpine glacier melt, but rather runs a copper-reddish colour.
This aesthetic change serves as a dystopic daily Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20215 symbol of the sweeping ecological changes and climate impacts facing campesinos and their ancestral lifeways.
The reddish colour of Quilcayhuanca River is the result of rapid glacier melt, which has triggered unprecedented mineral leaching of the newly thawed and exposed bedrock.
The increased loading of heavy metal minerals into Quilcayhuanca from glacier melt has brought the river to a pH of 3 in some places, a level so acidic that it is not suitable for animal or human consumption, nor can it sustain the forms of life(ways) that thrived in this landscape throughout the Holocene.
Quilcayhuanca was clean before.
It wasn’t contaminated; you could drink it.
My grandparents, my parents used to drink it … But in these last years it has changed a fair amount.
Some ten years ago it became contaminated I believe, because there used to be trout too, there were in that river that descended Quilcayhuanca.
In the past, I was still going to fish.
[But] Now there simply aren’t any left due to the minerals, because a lot of iron – rust I believe in Quilcayhuanca… Yes, this has killed everything.
(Hernando Ucharima, Interview 16 January 2018) To show up and ask questions in Quilcayhuanca about environmental change is to incur a responsibility for radical transformation, loss, death, killings, grief, and even hopeless hope (Haverkamp 2021).
In what follows, I reflect on what it is to navigate this research terrain through a love-care-response approach.
LOVE My research training in Western knowledge centres failed to prepare me for doing relational research.
Despite graduate courses in qualitative and mixed methods, the completion of a two-year National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship (NSF-IGERT) and summer research workshops that characterised my graduate education in Geography and Anthropology, I was not prepared for navigating the relational dimensions of knowledge (co)production for climate adaptation.
Instead, my approach to research was disciplined, according to Eurocentric and masculine worldviews and ways of knowing.
Accordingly, emotions, subjectivities and feelings were to have no place in rigorous and objective Scientific knowledge production.
For me, the process of unlearning the received wisdoms of masculinist and positivist training and relearning the importance of affective and relational matters (feelings, emotions and sentient connections) was made possible through ethnographic engagements with Andean campesinos with whom I collaborated.
In particular, learning the role of love in the context of engaged climate research came from the informal, everyday teachings of campesinos such as Sr Pablo Pachari, an Andean campesino and President of the Users’ Association of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca.
Pablo and I co-laboured to create a safe and generative space for campesino-led, justice-centred climate dialogues through the organisation of participatory adaptation workshops.
An ongoing history of extractive and (neo)colonial relations characterises the Andean highland landscape today.
Campesinos of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca experience a racialised and marginalised position in environmental governance and have resisted and negotiated engagements with the state in various ways since the 16th century Spanish Inquisition (de la Cadena 1998; Rasmussen 2015).
As the climate crisis unfolds within this socio-political context, state-led and technoscientific adaptation solutions continue to impose patriarchal, rationalist and colonial ways of knowing and being on the campesinos of Quilcayhuanca – even when its through the language of ‘resilience’ and ‘adaptation’ (Haverkamp 2021; Carey 2010; Rasmussen 2015).
In particular, the state-led adaptation plan – an ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) design – continues the centuries-old colonisng discourses and visions in Quilcayhuanca.
Through the proposed EbA project, developed by a transnational network of scientists, NGOs, state agencies and international aid donors, campesinos’ agrarian ways of life are imagined as that which must be ‘adapted’ and ‘transformed’ so as to Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20216 avoid dangerous climate change.
Colonial adaptation in Quilcayhuanca does not hold the global capitalist economy accountable as the primary threat to highland livability despite the climate-induced acidification of the glacier waters, but rather leverages rationalist and racialised Malthusian narratives of ‘overgrazing’ to frame campesinos and their agropastoralist way of life as the greatest threat to a livable future under rapid glacier melt in Quilcayhuanca (Haverkamp 2021).
The EbA project thus incentivises campesinos to move away from agro-pastoral activities in their homelands in the name of adaptation, without providing any viable options for their indigenous and ancestral ways of life to survive and flourish.
It is by way of the neocolonial and rationalist adaptation design that the erasure of Quechua indigeneity persists in the 21st century and campesinos may be dispossessed of their agro-pastoralist livelihoods and ancestral homelands.
Through an ad-hoc approach to implementing the EbA project, state agencies and NGOs impose the green EbA plan through various governance strategies, including coercive grassland management and neoliberal ‘voluntary’ payment for ecosystem services schemes.
Regardless of the coercive or neoliberal governance approach taken, the overall goal of the EbA project remains consistently fixed on the erasure of campesinos and their ‘irrational’ way of life from Quilcayhuanca.
In this political context, Pablo and I began to co-organise participatory workshops for campesinos to discuss their own climate change experiences, knowledges and adaptation visions in a dialogic fashion.
I understood this work to be grassroots and in resistance to managerial (albeit ‘collaborative’) and technocratic approaches.
Community-led adaptation that resisted neocolonial and technoscientific adaptation planning seemed an appropriate counter-approach.
Yet, Pablo challenged my own Western dualistic notions of ‘us/ other’ and ‘local/global’ when he decided to create a participatory workshop that was porous and open to ‘those who care for Quilcayhuanca’ (Fieldnotes, 22 April 2018) – including historically antagonistic State agencies.
Instead of reinscribing an ‘us/other’ (nos/otros) colonial binary, and leading a locally exclusive grassroots adaptation planning process, Pablo’s instruction to gather ‘caring’ participants together for collaborative adaptation was a way of stakeholder mapping that ruptured my own Western notions of stakeholders fitting neatly into separate spatial and political scales.
Pablo destabilised the discursive boundaries that I had drawn around those who ‘belonged’ to Quilcayhuanca and those who did not (including my own unease with my researcher identity as another Western researcher in the so-called ‘Global South’).
My geographic imaginary of Quilcayhuanca was predicated on colonial constructs of land rights and maintained notions of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ according to land claims, property rights and colonially imposed borders.
Yet instead, affinity networks connected by relations of love-care are more akin to Pablo’s inclusive and anti-colonial practice.
Accordingly, Quilcayhuanca itself was not overly determined as indigenous space, campesinos’ land, or property of the State (i.e.
National Park Huascarán), but rather was conceptualised as what feminist geographers call relational space (Massey 2004).
While planning the workshop, Pablo was asking me to ontologically shift to understand those who belong in conversation with and for Quilcayhuanca through a relational, not just a historical or critical, frame.
In this way, Quilcayhuanca is not static, fixed or essentialised space, nor is it historically and structurally determined, but is processual, dynamic, agential, and always in-becoming through the relationships, partial-connections and interconnections that compose it.
Pablo’s relational ontology necessitated transgressing the human/ non-human, local/global, past/present and indigenous/modern binaries inherent in my own rationalist assumptions of procedural justice and notions of who belonged at the adaptation decision-making table.
Pablo’s ethico-political commitment to multiple belongings, respectful interdependence, mutual aid and land stewardship demonstrated – and evoked in me – a politics of love for place, for people and for creation.
This, I argue, is the foundation for ethical participatory research with communities in crisis.
This ethicopolitical praxis of love is the necessary foundation for realising climate actions that aim for just transitions, just transformation, and community healing.
Love, as storied through these moments of co-labouring with Pablo, is not sentimental or romanticised; rather, it is understood as a relational force of inclusion politics (Tsing 2010).
Like gravity, which draws things into relation with one another – love is a force that gathers Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20217 participants together.
When love is the propensity that gathers, unlikely alliances are able to be brought into relations of co-learning, co-labouring and co-belonging capaciously.
By this I mean love is the force that enables a relational politics, whereby relations across human, and more than human, differences exceed the ‘self/other’ border thinking imposed by dualistic reason and recognise radical inter-dependence and multiple belongings.
From a politics of love, the seed of separateness cannot manifest into ‘nature/culture’, ‘self ’/’other’, ‘insider’/’outsider’ dualities.
Instead, love disrupts this colonial frontier space and dissolves the apartheid of dualistic onto-epistemologies.
Love in participatory research is not new.
Early PAR practitioners also recognised the importance of loving relations in knowledge production for emancipatory social change.
According to Orlando Fals Borda (1991), there is no revolution in which the oppressed can be liberated without love.
The critical pedagogies of Paulo Freire similarly argue that research and a pedagogical praxis encoded with love is the only praxis that can be transformative (2005 [1970]).
For Freire, the liberation of the oppressed comes through dialogue.
‘Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself.
It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination.
[...] love is commitment to others.
No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause – the cause of liberation’ (Freire 2005 [1970], p. 89).
Freire’s dialogic praxis is increasingly called for in climate adaptation and crises research (Haverkamp 2021; Fazey et al.
2021; McGreavy et al.
2021; Norström et al.
2020).
Just as climate change adaptation necessitates transformative social change, liberation theory instructs that just and equitable transformation necessitates a praxis of love.
In Quilcayhuanca, Pablo graciously navigated contentious encounters in the ‘climate frontier’ space with those who had historically been hostile and oppressive to agro-pastoralists’ way of life.
His approach to working across campesino, state and NGO worlds was relational, loving and inclusive.
Yet, I do not want to romanticise this approach, or claim it as a panacea for ‘safe’ collaboration.
For when the participatory workshop occurred and State and NGO participants came to the table with the campesinos of Quilcayhuanca, the encounter was neither loving nor dialogic, an experience I chronicled elsewhere (Haverkamp 2021).
Pablo’s conviction in and advancement of collaborative and inclusive adaptation planning, even with those most antagonistic to campesinos, I believe was a courageous act of love – love for his people, for his lands and for all his relations (including non-human, ancestral and multi-generational).
However, not all actors came to the workshop from this ethico-political space and our intention for dialogic praxis, in which all were able to speak and all were able to listen, was not realised.
Instead, the workshop became another hostile neocolonial experience, in which Eurocentric technoscientific expertise commanded the room and dominated the discourse on climate realities and adaptation solutions.
The co-opting of the participatory workshop by State and NGO technical ‘experts’ denied campesinos full participation by discarding their knowledges, wisdoms and visions through patriarchal and managerial corrections.
The hegemony of Western ways of knowing and the legacy of shaming Quechua-speaking and illiterate campesinos resulted in the silencing of Andean knowledges, wisdoms and experiences.
The women – las campesinas – in particular, fell silent and did not speak of Pachamama or the indigenous, sentient and affective dimensions of environmental change that they had previously shared with me.
Retelling this moment calls attention to the situated vulnerabilities of participants in collaborative research undertaken in stratified social contexts and suggests that a love-care-response approach necessitates that all participants entering into collaborative and participatory action must gather through an ethical-obligation of love that is anti-colonial, anti-racist and anti-discriminatory.
Asymmetrical love is not an option as it opens the door to abusive and traumatic encounters for vulnerable and oppressed groups.
A day after the workshop, Pablo and I reflected on the workshop happenings.
After this workshop, I was convinced that the oppressed cannot work with their oppressors towards liberating ends.
Yet Pablo charted a less-dualistic path.
He turned not to the hostile actors at the workshop, who were unable to hear, Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20218 unable to understand and unable to love.
Rather, his next steps were full of hope in collaborating with those with whom he had found affinity and solidarity (Fieldnotes and Interview, 1 May 2018).
This was a heterogeneous and selective group of State and NGO participants.
I share this outcome from the workshop to illuminate the fierce politics of inclusion that love enables, and to notice that Pablo’s love-care-response approach makes possible his openness to collaboration, which also requires his vulnerability to collaborative harms.
For Pablo, this condition meant not always remaining open, but also closing the door to ‘adaptation options’ presented by stakeholders at the workshop who were not gathering through the same love ethic, but by other motivating forces such as ‘empowerment’, ‘capacity building’ and ‘winning’.
Thus, in the practice of PAR, encoded with cariño (love–care–response-ability), the objective is not to become ‘empowered’ per se, but rather how to become vulnerable.
This may sound strange, but I wonder what justice would mean if, instead of all becoming equally powerful actors endowed with our weapons of individual rights and knowledge claims, we were to become equally vulnerable agents of love-care.
Justice, then, would no longer be defined by Liberalism’s rationalist imagination, but as feminist Indigenous scholar Michelle Montgomery says, ‘Justice is about recreating a new world that really is about love’ (Montgomery 2021).
CARE I started this article in conversation with Yovana Lliuya – a friend and PAR collaborator – calling my attention to the ways in which my research in Quilcayhuanca intersected with the profound experiences of loss and grief that were ongoing in the community.
She noticed that my research questions about environmental change summoned up sadness and grief for research participants and called my attention to these cultural/affective/emotional dimensions of the study.
Asking questions about the loss of the glaciers summoned up responses more profound than the rationalist framing of water (in)security and instrumental use of resources could register.
Similarly, the drying of Quilcayhuanca grasslands is more than an ‘impact’ on land use; the emaciation of campesino’s cattle and the disappearance of frogs and native plants species are more than ‘losses’ in biodiversity and livelihood options.
These are relational losses.
To name the experience of climate change in Quilcayhuanca is to name a suffering as great as the loss of ‘a member of the family’, Sr Maximo Morales, a campesino of Quilcayhuanca, explained to me in 2016.
I did not know this loss, this grief, until the loss of my own baby – a year after my last field visit.
Living intimately within a web of relations in which part of your interconnected-self dies is a kind of love-grief that can only be engaged with the most radical praxis of lovecare-response.
Showing up in any other way is to deny the vulnerability of the situation and the intimacy of our interconnectedness, and shuts down any possibility for healing, liberation, or just transformational outcomes.
Interdependent relationships based on giving, nurturing, healing and protecting are a relational politics of care that I ground in my embodied knowledge as a mother and primary care-provider to six children.
The sleepless nights devoted to moments of tireless care: walking, holding, rocking, singing, nursing, affirming and thus caring for the sleepless baby to whom I am committed.
This is not only a cognitive exercise of love-care-response; these acts of nurturing and care are the heart-mind-body of my mother-work.
I extend these experiences to research, in which relational research is not only made up of cognitive (masculine) concern, but also a feminist ethics of care that demands action and response-ability beyond contemplation, worry and theorisation (rationality and reason).
I make this statement in cautious awareness of essentialising notions of the ‘feminine’ that have relegated women to the motherly or domestic role.
Yet, I do not want to deny the wisdom of the so-called ‘domestic’ sphere, and so I draw upon my motherwork as the grounding source of my lessons in care and to draw care out as a ‘labour of love’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017) that is not only a matter of the mind, but a matter of the heart and body – the matter required for creating a nourishing research praxis.
Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 20219 In the age of the Anthropocene, characterised by mass extinction, unprecedented environmental disasters and climate change, researchers are incentivised to engage in community struggles and to ‘care’.
Counter to positivist assumptions of pure a-political research, granting agencies and philanthropic foundations now award problem-based research that sells crises through affective frames of novelty, urgency, finitude and techno-optimism.
Yet, still rooted in rationalist research approaches, knowledge production in the Anthropocene hegemonically narrates grounded climate realities, flattening the relational, emotional, spiritual and embodied elements of climate impacts through discourses of ‘(in)security’, ‘resources’, and ‘loss and damage’.
These meta-discourses are in service to policy experts, and technical and managerial interventions.
The problem with such global abstractions and generalities is that the reality of loss becomes disembodied and dis-emplaced, and distorts grounded realities.
A solely rationalist approach to PAR, or community-based research, is myopically cognitive and disembodied, and asserts reason over the emotional, spiritual and embodied experiences of research participants.
As rational friends showed up in moments of intervention to my own embodied experience of the loss of my daughter, their secularised, dis-placed and dis-embodied interventions imposed a reality that distorted my own reality of stillbirth, of life and non-life, and failed to tend to what remained vital.
In Quilcayhuanca, death and loss of glaciers, species, waters and harvests are not so clearly defined by an absolute finitude – or an end to life and livability.
Nor are local ‘solutions’ imagined through a human/ nature binary and a mastery and control over the lands and resources.
Rather, moments of destruction and loss are also fertile ground for nurturing and caring interventions – a vital politics that works in service to a flourishing of ecological, human and non-human creation.
I was confronted with this paradox of death and loss that manifested simultaneously alongside life and vitality as Esteban Nicanor, a sixty-five-year-old campesino elder of Llupa, described the farmers’ experiences with unseasonal precipitation and frost events.
‘Cold snaps,’ Sr Nicanor declared – ‘When the cold snaps come they come like thunder and damage the fields.
[…] The skies are clear, there is no fog, the cold snaps come [without warning] and damage everything when they are just beginning to sprout’ (Sr Nicanor, Interview 17 January 2018).
Cold snaps that kill the harvest lead to real material conditions of destroyed foods, loss of labour, seeds and fertiliser – ‘you do lose all of that’, Sr Nicanor explained.
And yet, in the next moments he goes beyond this reality of loss, stating that – ‘Obviously not everything is ruined.
At least a little remains … [It] doesn’t spoil everything, isn’t that true.
Of course, where the cold snap hits things are ruined, but if there is a small section [unburned/unfrozen]with just that you can sustain yourself with food, with what remains.
And also, that which is injured by the cold sprouts again if it’s still young.
If it’s mature it can’t anymore.
That’s why we need to have two, three little plots, so that in another plot, some can survive to fix all of this’ (Sr Nicanor, interview in Llupa, 2018).
When looking at climate impacts in Quilcayhuanca through a rationalist policy framing of food and water insecurity, the possibility for tending to that which remains is obscured and the fear-driven emphasis on control and securitisation of ‘resources’ leaves little room for reimagining the practice of cultivating, caring and nurturing the remainders.
Similarly, by focusing on the ‘loss’ of my daughter, relatives and wellwishers overlooked the continuation of my relations (visible and non-visible, knowable and unknowable, physical and metaphysical), and in so doing did not see or hear my reality and my experience.
Taking care of that which remains in the wake of disaster, traumatic events, or even death necessitates grounding in a particular embodied, emplaced reality, queering rationalist binaries, and engaging the possibility of an otherwise.
This is critically important, because in spaces of transformation and crisis, the narrative process of meaning-making and naming of reality is done.
Indeed, moments of grief and loss are sacred and transformational spaces that require nothing less of researchers than a love-care-response commitment.
Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 202110 RESPONSE-ABILITY Throughout the duration of the participatory project in Quilcayhuanca, I encountered researcher fatigue and scepticism among the local agropastoralists.
Many of them would ask me directly, what can this research do for them?
– a legitimate question to ask of a probing researcher who is posing intimate questions around their experiences with climate change and thus loss, death and grief.
For over half a century now, far too many engineers, ecologists, geologists, glaciologists, anthropologists and interventionists have been poking around the Cordillera Blanca, promising projects of hope, improvement, knowledge and aid, most without fruitful outcomes for the highland inhabitants.
After speaking with Estaban Nicanor at his home in Llupa about the cold snaps and frosts, he confronted me with this scepticism of Western research and researchers: “How can you help?
In what way are you going to…?
For all of that, you must have time.
Sure, you can say, “we’re going to do this, we’re going to…” But there isn’t enough time.
[Turning and speaking to my translator] She’ll be doing something else, the other …, a year passes, two years and they [researchers] don’t live up to their promises.
They don’t live up to their promises.
When she finishes her studies, she won’t even remember this place and that will be the end.
[For] what she has studied, she has seen how it is, but after all that she won’t do anything.
That’s how it is.” (Esteban Nicanor, Interview 17 January 2018) Moments like this one with Esteban were recurrent when meeting with campesinos and required a great deal of reflection and humility.
Esteban’s statement holds the historical trauma of extractive research and a fierce critique of the wrong use of knowledge/power.
Indeed, I had seen the communities’ struggle with capitalist climatic change and its articulation with the coloniality of power in which it was entangled.
It was clear that climate adaptation in Quilcayhuanca was not only about climate, but also, once again, about the struggle for sovereignty (that is, not government abandonment) and self-determination.
Esteban was directly asking, how could my study aid campesinos in adapting to climate change in a way that was also about justice.
I had no easy answers to the serious question ‘how can you help?’ Steeped in privileged positionalities and through the logic of ‘co-benefits’, researchers often suggest that a study will usher winwins for all participants – for both the oppressed and the oppressors, will inform policy, or will ‘empower historically marginalised groups’.
Yet, how could such claims be made after a year, four years, or even a decade of collaborative research in the face of centuries-long colonialism, racism and hetero-patriarchy?
In offering my response, I take my cue from feminist indigenous philosophies to rethink ‘help’ in less cognitive and masculine justice-framed terms and instead reimagine procedural and restorative justice relationally.
In this way, what I could offer campesinos through my engaged climate ethnography were spaces in which to gather – to be in community, allyship, love, care, friendship and nourishing connection with each other in troubling times.
Through a labour of love for the people and place, I co-laboured with campesinos in order to gather together and co-produce knowledge that would be in service to campesinos’ cause of self-determination and just climate futures.
I have no fantasies that this work ‘empowered’ campesinos or restructured power-relations, and I remain sceptical of studies that assert participatory successes over short time scales and according to win-win logics or co-benefits.
Engagement alone does not offer any guarantees of equity, justice or liberated peoples and knowledges, and must be more humbly acknowledged as a multi-generational and relational process of the heart-mind-body-spirit.
Esteban’s statement exposed this local critique of Western research, but he also included a flicker of hope for doing research otherwise: an invitation to do research another way, a non-extractive way, a relational way that registers and meets the needs of oppressed communities.
Linda Tuhiwai Smith calls researchers’ attention to the importance of moments of invitation, the exchange, the ask and the response.
She writes that:  When the invitation comes, many research institutions are ill-prepared—[…] Many discipline-based researchers may not even understand the issue and have often turned communities away rather than listen Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 202111 deeply to their concerns.
Being invited is a first and tentative step in rebuilding a relationship between indigenous communities and researchers–how often those invitations come is entirely dependent on how researchers respond (Tuhiwai Smith 2012, p.20).
Estaban’s critique was not only a critique, but an invitation to respond.
The questions he posed were sceptical about what he and his community will gain from this research engagement, and simultaneously an invitation for doing collaborative research another way.
He did not close me out, but instead invited me into his home, offered me time and an interview, and then posed his inquiry.
The responsibility of a communityengaged researcher is to show up, open and ready to be in relation with people, history and place over an untold trajectory of time and space that will likely exceed the project horizon.
Yet, a researcher’s response to this invitation is shaped as much by their situated motivations and positionality as it is by larger structures of the academy and Western knowledge production.
In this way, the ability to do research otherwise, decolonially and relationally, often goes against the institutionalised norms and values of modern positivist science.
Enabling infrastructures (policy, platforms, research calls, funding solicitations) for doing relational research rarely exist, although they are flourishing for participatory and collaborative research that is complicit and compatible with current power structures that privilege the rational over the relational.
National science academies seek ‘measurable’ and ‘concrete’ outcomes in relatively short time scales; however, relational outcomes are messy, often intangible and unquantifiable.
This is not a challenge to quantify and make measurable the messy intangibles of relational research (feelings, emotions, senses and experiences).
Rather, it is a call for loosening the totalising grip of a certain way of knowing and registering the invisible relational labour (care) embodied in ethical engaged research.
In the last recorded interview with campesinos after four years of relationship building, four cycles of showing up in community – leaving – returning, and two participatory climate workshops, I feared that I had not met the expectations of the community, that my work had not elevated their voices or aided their struggle for just climate adaptation.
This (perhaps not unusual) anxiety of a community-engaged researcher is rooted in linear and short temporalities, and ‘best practice’ rhetoric for Liberalism’s participatory justice.
Although my own PAR research did not realise goals of liberated knowledges, restorative justice, or level power relations across stakeholder groups in ‘measurable’ ways, it was not without meaning and value to the community, and myself, and is still unfolding in untold ways.
During my last day in community, Pablo met with me, thanked me for co-labouring with him on the participatory adaptation workshops and invited me back.
His comments reassured me that this research had meaning for the community and recentred the relational research elements of mutual aid, respect, reciprocity and care: Thank you for gathering us….then at least they [State agencies] will realize that there is a volunteer lady who has come to gather us all together.
[…] Yes, thanks for your cooperation, to show us how to do it [organize community climate workshops], eventually we’ll do the same, because if we don’t do it, they [the State] will never care about campesinos.
[...] we needed more dialogue but it’s over now.
God bless you […] and the day you think of Peru, you’ll be welcome and we’ll talk [with you] in our valley about our reality and experiences (Sr Pachari, Interview 1 May 2018).
At this moment, I was unsure of when I’d return to ‘fieldwork’ – to continue co-labouring.
My funding had run out, my dissertation was due, and I had no academic job secured for the next year.
The precarity of academic life imposes hardships on relational research in ways that rational and extractivist approaches don’t endure.
However, instead of adhering to funders’ research timelines and capitalist temporality, Pablo’s ‘goodbye’ was not an end to the project, but a vision of a cyclical, continued relational research commitment, reminding me that this research is in its infancy, and that this is just the beginning of our relational research engagement.
Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 202112 Conclusion Calling participatory research into an ethics of love-care-response only makes sense when engaged research is conceived of as relational research, and is therefore situated as a political, historical, subjective and affective mode of knowledge-making.
The more that scientific experts and practitioners of engaged research can forefront this reality, the more possible it then becomes to disrupt the rationalist (masculine) and colonial narratives and norms that have co-opted the transformative potential of this methodology.
By reflecting on my own collaborative climate ethnography work in the wake of devastating climate impacts of rapid glacier melt and ecological death, I highlighted the relational, ethical and political dimensions of what it means to be an engaged researcher in the rupture of crisis.
In this article, I strived to reclaim a co-opted PAR and reconnect it with its origins as a praxis of knowledge-making that serves the cause of liberation of oppressed peoples.
Thus, the intellectual exercise undertaken is not so much a focus on method, but on intentionality, positionality and relationality.
The concern for replicability is thus not about creating a relational research model to be implemented anywhere and everywhere, but rather an ethico-political framework that, when applied to a grounded context, will and should reflect the unique particularities of that place and of that community.
Storytelling the relational, personal–political and affective moments of collaboration with campesinos who co-laboured in this research project, allows me to explain a research politics of cariño and a love-care-response approach to doing relational (engaged) research in times of climate crisis.
References Archibald, J 2008, Indigenous storywork: Educating the heart, mind, body and spirit, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver and Toronto.
Benjaminsen, T & Bryceson, I 2012, ‘Conservation, green/blue grabbing and accumulation by dispossession in Tanzania’, Journal of Peasant Studies, vol.
39, no.
2, pp.
335–55.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.667405 Berkes, F 2007, ‘Community-based conservation in a globalized world', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences’, vol.
104, no.
39, pp.
15188–193.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702098104 Brondizio, E et al.
2016, ‘Re-conceptualizing the Anthropocene: A call for collaboration’, Global Environmental Change, vol.
39, pp.
318–27.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.02.006 Brosius, J et al.
2005, Communities and conservation: Histories and politics of community-based natural resource management, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland.
Button, G & Peterson, K 2009, ‘Participatory Action Research: Community partnership with social and physical scientists’, in Anthropology and Climate Change: From encounters to action, Routledge, pp.
209–17.
de la Cadena, M 1998, ‘Silent racism and intellectual superiority in Peru’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol.
17, no.
2, pp.
143–64.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1470-9856.1998.tb00169.x Carey, M 2010, In the shadow of melting glaciers: Climate Change and Andean society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195396065.001.0001 Chambers, R 1994, ‘The origins and practice of participatory rural appraisal’, World Development, vol.
22, no.
7, pp.
953–69.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(94)90141-4 Cooke, B & Kothari, U 2001, Participation: The new tyranny?
Zed Books, London, New York.
Coombes, B et al.
2014, ‘Indigenous geographies III: Methodological innovation and the unsettling of participatory research’.
Progress in Human Geography, vol.
38, no.
6, pp.
845–54.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132513514723 Crate, S 2011, ‘Climate and culture: Anthropology in the era of contemporary climate change’, Annual Review of Anthropology, vol.
40, no.
1, pp.
175–94.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.012809.104925 Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 202113 https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.667405 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702098104 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.02.006 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1470-9856.1998.tb00169.x https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195396065.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(94)90141-4 https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132513514723 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.012809.104925 Demeritt, D 2015 (eds), ‘The promise of participation in Science and Political Ecology’, in T Perreault, G Bridge & J McCarthy.
Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Routledge, London.
Escobar, A 2016, ‘Sentipensar con la Tierra: Las Luchas Territoriales y la Dimensión Ontológica de las Epistemologías del Sur’, AIBR, Revista de Antropología Iberoamericana, vol.
11, no.1, pp.
11–32.
https://doi.org/10.11156/aibr.110102 Escobar, A 2020, Pluriversal politics, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478012108 Fairhead, J, Leach, M & Stoones, I 2012, ‘Green Grabbing: A new appropriation of nature?’ Journal of Peasant Studies, vol.
39, no.
2, pp.
237–61.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.671770 Fals Borda, O 1988, Knowledge and people’s power: Lessons with peasants in Nicaragua, Mexico and Columbia, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, India.
Fals-Borda, O & Rahman, M 1991, Action and knowledge: Breaking the monopoly with Participatory Action Research, The Apex Press, New York.
https://doi.org/10.3362/9781780444239 Fazey, I et al.
2021, ‘Social dynamics of community resilience building in the face of climate change: The case of three Scottish communities’, Sustainability Science, https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11625-021-00950-x [Accessed: 18 June 2021].
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-021-00950-x Forsyth, T 2013, ‘Community-based adaptation: A review of past and future challenges: Community-based adaptation’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, vol.
4, no.
5, pp.
439–46.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.231 Freire, P 2005 (1970), Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th Anniversary Edition), Continuum International Publishing Group, New York.
Haverkamp, J 2021, ‘Collaborative survival and the politics of livability: Towards adaptation otherwise’.
World Development, vol.
137, p. 105152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105152 Haverkamp, J 2017, ‘Politics, values, and reflexivity: The case of adaptation to climate change in Hampton Roads, Virginia’, Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, vol.
49, no.
11, pp.
2673–92.
https://doi.
org/10.1177/0308518X17707525 Kanngieser, A & Todd, Z 2020, ‘From environmental case study to environmental kin study', History and Theory, vol.
59, no.
3, pp.
385–93.
https://doi.org/10.1111/hith.12166 Lindroth, M & Sinevaara-Niskanen, H 2014, ‘Adapt or Die?
The biopolitics of Indigeneity: From the civilising mission to the need for adaptation’, Global Society, vol.
28, no.
2, pp.
180–94.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2014.887557 Massey, D 2004, ‘Geographies of responsibility', Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, vol.
86, no.
1, pp.
5–18.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0435-3684.2004.00150.x McGreavy, B et al.
2021, ‘Science in Indigenous homelands: Addressing power and justice in sustainability science from/ with/in the Penobscot River’, Sustainability Science, vol.
16, no.
3, pp.
937–47.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-02100904-3 Montgomery, M 2021, MLK Jr. Lecture Series, James Madison University, 18 January.
Mosse, D 1994.
‘Authority, gender and knowledge: Theoretical reflections on the practice of participatory rural appraisal‘.
Development and Change.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.1994.tb00524.x Nadasdy, P 2003, ‘Reevaluating the co-management success story’, ARCTIC, vol.
56, no.
4, pp.
367–80.
https://doi.
org/10.14430/arctic634 Nightingale, A et al.
2020, ‘Beyond technical fixes: Climate solutions and the great derangement’, Climate and Development, vol.
12, no.
4, pp.
343–52.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2019.1624495 Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 202114 https://doi.org/10.11156/aibr.110102 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478012108 https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.671770 https://doi.org/10.3362/9781780444239 https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11625-021-00950-x https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-021-00950-x https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.231 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105152 https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X17707525 https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X17707525 https://doi.org/10.1111/hith.12166 https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2014.887557 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0435-3684.2004.00150.x https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-021-00904-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-021-00904-3 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.1994.tb00524.x https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic634 https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic634 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2019.1624495 Norström, A et al.
2020, ‘Principles for knowledge co-production in sustainability research’, Nature Sustainability, vol.
3, no.
3, pp.
182–90.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0448-2 Peterson, K & Maldonado, J 2016, ‘When adaptation is not enough: Between the “Now and Then” of community-led resettlement’, in S Crate & M Nuttall (eds), Anthropology and Climate Change: From actions to transformations, 2nd edn, Routledge.
Plumwood, V 1991, ‘Nature, self, and gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the critique of Rationalism’, Hypatia, vol.
6, no.
1, pp.
3–27.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1991.tb00206.x Puig de la Bellacasa, M 2017, Matters of care: Speculative ethics in more than human worlds, University Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S2753906700002096 Rasmussen, M 2015, Andean waterways: Resource politics in highland Peru, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London.
Roncoli, C 2006, ‘Ethnographic and participatory approaches to research on farmers’ responses to climate predictions’, Climate Research, vol.
33, no.
1, pp.
81–99.
https://doi.org/10.3354/cr033081 Schipper, L et al.
2014, Community-based adaptation to Climate Change: Scaling it up, 1st edn, Rutledge.
https://doi.
org/10.4324/9780203105061 Swyngedouw, E 2013, ‘The Non-political politics of Climate Change’, ACME, vol.
12, no.
1, pp.
1–8.
TallBear, K 2014, ‘Standing with and speaking as Faith: A Feminist-Indigenous approach to inquiry’, Journal of Research Practice, vol.
10, no.
2, p. N17.
Tsing, A 2010, ‘Arts of inclusion, or How to love a mushroom’, Manoa, vol.
22, no.
2, pp.
191–203.
Tsing, A 2015, The mushroom at the end of the world: On the possibility of life in capitalist ruins, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873548 Tuhiwai Smith, L 2005, ‘On tricky ground: Researching the Native in the Age of Uncertainty’.
in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd edn, Sage Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA.
Tuhiwai Smith, L 2012, Decolonizing methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2nd edn.
Zed Books, London.
Whyte, K 2018, ‘Settler Colonialism, Ecology, and Environmental Injustice’, Environment and Society, vol.
9, no.
1, pp.
125–44.
https://doi.org/10.3167/ares.2018.090109 Whyte, K et al.
2016, ‘Weaving Indigenous science, protocols and sustainability science’.
Sustainability Science, vol.
11, no.
1, pp.
25–32.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-015-0296-6 Willow, A 2015, ‘Collaborative conservation and contexts of resistance: New (and enduring) strategies for survival’, American Indian Culture and Research Journal, vol.
39, no.
2. https://doi.org/10.17953/aicrj.39.2.willow Yeh, E 2016, ‘How can experience of local residents be “knowledge”?’ Challenges in interdisciplinary Climate Change research’, Area, vol.
48, no.
1, pp.
34–40.
https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12189 Haverkamp Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
14, No.
2 December 202115 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0448-2 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1991.tb00206.x https://doi.org/10.1017/S2753906700002096 https://doi.org/10.3354/cr033081 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203105061 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203105061 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873548 https://doi.org/10.3167/ares.2018.090109 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-015-0296-6 https://doi.org/10.17953/aicrj.39.2.willow https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12189
Journal of Applied Botany and Food Quality 87, 234 242 (2014), DOI:10.5073/JABFQ.2014.087.033 University of Rostock, Faculty of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, Crop Health, Rostock, Germany Important maize weeds profit in growth and reproduction from climate change conditions represented by higher temperatures and reduced humidity Kristian Peters*, Bärbel Gerowitt (Received May 27, 2014) * Corresponding author Summary Climate change is predicted to result in rising temperatures and reduced precipitation during spring and summer in Central Europe.
As a consequence, crops and weeds will be affected.
Our study focuses on the three weed species in maize Amaranthus retroflexus, Echinochloa crus-galli and Setaria viridis.
These weeds occur numerously in European maize fields and populations are likely to further increase.
Yet, there is a lack of knowledge about particular biological strategies of the weeds.
Our study focuses on how the weed species respond biologically to the climate change conditions.
Experiments were conducted in two climate chambers with a 2 °C difference in temperature and the warmer one with 13 % less humidity.
Emergence, development, biomass and seed production were determined of the weeds grown individually in pots and grown within maize.
All tested weed species were taller during the first weeks under the climate change scenario.
At later growth phases there was a trade-off between traits measured during vegetative growth and at the time when seeds were produced.
To summarize the results, the weed species profited in the order E. crus-galli, S. viridis and A. retroflexus from the climate change conditions.
Knowledge of the weeds biological responses to the predicted conditions helps to reduce their long-term population development by targeting crop protection measures at specific growth phases of the weeds.
To ensure control of the tested weed species under climate change conditions various weed management strategies are necessary.
Introduction Climate change will result in rising temperatures (TUBIELLO et al., 2007) and modified precipitation (ROBINSON and GROSS, 2010).
Summer droughts will be more likely and will affect weeds in springsown crops.
According to PATTERSON et al.
(1999) temperature and precipitation are the most important factors for the geographical distribution, the growth and the competitive abilities of weeds.
Our study focuses these two climate variables.
We have chosen three important Central European C4 weeds in maize: Amaranthus retroflexus, Echinochloa crus-galli and Setaria viridis, since currently a shift of the local weed flora is occurring in favour of weeds of the C4 photosynthesis type.
Most of these weeds are late germinators and emerge from early summer to early autumn.
Thus, they are considered thermophilous in Central Europe and these weeds are expected to migrate further north with changes in climate conditions (WALTHER et al., 2002).
These weeds are already most numerous and most competitive in maize fields of Southern Europe (NOVÁK et al., 2009).
They may also extend their damage potential in springsown crops, such as maize, under the predicted future conditions in Central Europe.
Therefore, our study focuses on three thermophilous C4 weeds, whose future status and biological strategies are not well understood for Central European populations.
Amaranthus retroflexus L. (redroot pigweed) is a successful weed in maize (OVEISI et al., 2013).
Fast growth and indeterminate flowering enable a single plant to produce up to 500,000 seeds (STECKEL et al., 2004).
The reaction of European populations to warming and different humidity is not well studied so far (HYVÖNEN, 2011).
Nevertheless, because the species produces more biomass and more seeds in a warmer climate in North America and Canada (SCHIMPF, 1977), we expect the species to develop better with warmer conditions in Europe as well (KIGEL et al., 1977; OVEISI et al., 2013).
Setaria viridis (L.) P. Beauv.
(green foxtail) is currently the most wide-spread species of the Setaria genus in Europe (DEKKER, 2003).
It generally emerges after the last herbicide treatment in maize fields.
Thus, plants are often not affected by herbicides (MEHRTENS et al., 2005; BECKIE and TARDIF, 2012).
A high genetic variability enables the species to grow under a great range of temperatures (DEKKER, 2003).
Plants of North-American populations produce less biomass but increase generative reproduction under warmer conditions (SWANTON et al., 1999).
Echinochloa crus-galli (L.) Beauv.
(barnyard grass) exhibits high phenotypic plasticity (BARRETT and WILSON, 1981; MAUN and BARRETT, 1986).
Central European populations are most competitive under high temperatures, high nutrient availability and mid level humidity (OTTE et al., 2006).
The species benefits from higher temperatures but not from dry conditions (BARRETT and WILSON, 1981; CHAUHAN and JOHNSON, 2011).
Most studies focus on the development of weeds under various agricultural practices or on their resistance to herbicides (BARRETT and WILSON, 1981; POTVIN, 1986; CHAUHAN and JOHNSON, 2011).
With a special focus on European populations, we ascertain a lack of biological knowledge concerning the vegetative development, the development speed and the generative reproduction for the studied weeds under climate change conditions.
The aim of our study is to explore how the three species perform under the predicted future conditions and which distinct biological strategies they realise.
Furthermore, this study attempts to assess which biological weed properties are important with climatic changes.
Based on these biological data, a better framework for weed management and crop protection can be devised.
To achieve this, the effects of the raised temperature and less humidity on the weeds were studied combined in the experiment.
Materials and methods The three weed species Amaranthus retroflexus, Setaria viridis and Echinochloa crus-galli used in the experiments were collected near Göttingen, Germany in 2007.
Seeds originated from different field populations in that area and were stored for two years until the experiments started in 2009.
Preliminary germination tests showed high germination rates (approx.
50-75 % germination percentage).
Thus, the seeds were not subjected to any special treatment.
The experiment was conducted in two climate chambers, 2.15 m in width, 3.45 m in length and 2.10 m in height.
Temperature, humidity and light were independently adjustable.
The first climate chamber had temperatures that represent the conditions of the current Climate change and three maize weed species 235 Tab.
1: Conditions in the two climate chambers.
Values given after ± are the mean variations between replications.
period factor chamber with current climate chamber with predicted future climate 0-2 weeks night/day temperature 7 °C/13 °C ±0.3 % 9 °C/15 °C ± 0.6 % night/day length 12/12 12/12 night/day humidity 70 %/66 % ± 1 % 58 %/52 % ± 3 % 2-6 weeks night/day temperature 9 °C/18 °C ± 0.3 % 11 °C/20 °C ± 0.6 % night/day length 14/10 14/10 night/day humidity 70 %/66 % ± 1 % 58 %/52 % ± 3 % 6-12 weeks night/day temperature 11 °C/20 °C ± 0.3 % 13 °C/22 °C ± 0.6 % night/day length 14,5/9,5 14,5/9,5 night/day humidity 70 %/66 % ± 1 % 58 %/52 % ± 3 % 12-15 weeks night/day temperature 11 °C/20 °C ± 0.3 % 13 °C/22 °C ± 0.6 % night/day length 14/10 14/10 night/day humidity 70 %/66 % ± 1 % 58 %/52 % ± 3 % 15-21 weeks night/day temperature 9 °C/18 °C ± 0.3 % 11 °C/20 °C ± 0.6 % night/day length 13/11 13/11 night/day humidity 70 %/66 % ±1 % 58 %/52 % ± 3 % climate of Northern Germany.
The humidity (air moisture content) was raised slightly with water nozzles when compared to the second chamber that represented predicted future climate conditions (Tab.
1).
Mean humidity was set to 68 % in the climate chamber with current conditions and was 13 % lower in the other chamber due to the disabled water nozzles.
As light source ten Phillips Son-T Agro 400 were used, which were embedded in the ceiling of each climate chamber.
Light levels at the centre of the chambers were 24,900 lux measured 90 cm from the ground and 120 cm below the lights.
This is equal to a PPFD of approx.
400 μmol/s/m2 at the aforementioned distance.
The chosen conditions were based on the A1B scenario of the IPCC (2013), which predicted an increase in temperatures of 2 °C until 2070 for Central Europe and less humidity during summer months.
Thus, daily minimum and maximum temperatures were always set 2 °C higher in the second chamber (Tab.
1).
The day-length was the same in both chambers, but adjusted over time to simulate an advancing season.
To ensure the intended climate levels (Tab.
1), temperate and humidity in the chambers were continuously adapted and monitored with data loggers 5 cm above ground and with additional air temperature sensors 1.60 m above ground.
Each climate chamber had two large plant tubs, 1.30 m x 1.10 m in size and a depth of 0.90 m. The bottom of each tub was equipped with a 2 cm thick layer of small stones to allow excessive water to run off through small holes at the bottom-side of the tubs.
Gauze was stretched above the stone layer to prevent soil from the 60 cm thick soil layer above to agglutinate at the bottom.
Maize seeds were sown directly into the tubs’ soil (at a depth of 3 cm) at the beginning of each replication to simulate a row typical for maize fields (80 cm row distance, 10 cm plant distance in row).
These tubs were already installed for preliminary studies and thus were equipped with an established soil-bed under the two climate conditions.
Due to the resulting weight, they were immovable between the chambers.
Therefore, the tubs rested in the same climate chamber under the same conditions in time of the experiment.
The tubs were fertilized with 90 g Compo Hakaphos® Blue (equal to 135 kg N and 90 kg P per ha) before the start of each replication and again before weed seedlings were planted.
For studying the emergence of the weed species and to provide seedlings for further experiments, 130 seeds of each species were sown at a soil depth of 1 cm in five germination trays in each climate chamber at the same time.
The number of seedlings was counted every day (Fig.
1).
GDD = ( T max +T min 2 ) Tb emergence sowing early-growth 0 4 12 mid-growth final-growth 21 plant tubs + m aize crop plant pots harvest harvest time [weeks] Fig.
1: Overview of the treatments performed in each replication in both climate chambers.
In order to characterize, compare and correlate processes during emergence, various parameters were calculated (GRUNDY, 2003).
For predicting the cumulative emergence of seedlings, Growing Degree Days (GDD) were calculated (DORADO et al., 2009): where Tmax and Tmin are the daily maximum and minimum temperatures measured by the dataloggers in the climate chamber.
Tb is the base temperature for each weed.
The Tb values were taken from various authors: Tb=4.0 °C for A. retroflexus from GARDARIN et al.
(2009), Tb=6.2 °C for E. crus-galli from GUILLEMIN et al.
(2013) and Tb=6.1 °C for S. viridis from GARDARIN et al.
(2010).
In order to estimate and compare the progress of seedling emergence, Mean Emergence Time (MET) and Emergence Rate Index (ERI) were calculated as follows (DORADO et al., 2009): 236 K. Peters, B. Gerowitt where Ni represents the newly emerged seedlings since the previous count, ti represents the GDD after sowing and n is the number of sampling occasions.
For characterizing emergence speed, the emergence rate at mid emergence (v50) was additionally calculated (GARDARIN et al., 2011, modified): where m is the number of emerged seeds until mid emergence, b is a shape parameter correlated with the emergence rate at mid emergence, D0 represents the day after sowing on which first emergence was recorded, and D50 is a factor which represents the day on which 50 % the total emerged seedlings were recorded.
The prediction curve of the cumulative emergence Gi was fitted (GARDARIN et al., 2011, modified): where Di represents the day of measurement.
Seedling height of every emerged seedling was determined after 4 weeks (BBCH stage 15) (Fig.
1, early-growth phase).
Ten randomly chosen seedlings of each species were then planted in pots in each climate chamber to study further development.
Pots were 30 cm in diameter and 20 cm deep.
Another 10 seedlings of each weed were put in the two plant tubs between the maize rows in each climate chamber.
Sampling and positioning of the weeds was random.
Both maize and weeds in the large plant tubs were harvested at the end of the mid-growth phase (Fig.
1, beginning of flower onset of maize, BBCH stage 53, after approx.
12 weeks).
Plant height and above ground dry mass were determined for each weed and maize plant.
Height and development stage (BBCH, HESS et al., 1997) were additionally determined for the weeds in the smaller plant pots.
The remaining weeds in the pots were harvested at the reproduction phase (Fig.
1, after 21 weeks) and their height and vegetative above ground dry mass (without seeds) were determined.
Panicles, tillers and seeds of all weed plants were also counted.
The experiment involved three replications, which were conducted consecutively.
Each replication in time was set-up independently.
The calculated emergence coefficients were tested for significant differences using the t-test (Fig.
3).
As described above, two tubs were available within each climate chamber.
Hence, the involved factor levels (chambers, tubs) were not arranged orthogonally, excluding classical ANOVA approaches.
Instead, for comparing the biological parameters at the end of the early and mid-growth phases, as well as the reproduction phase (Tab.
2, 3), Linear Models with Random Effects (LMER) were used.
In these models, climate (temperature and humidity combined) was chosen as fixed factor, whereas replications in time were introduced as random factor.
When tubs were involved (Tab.
4), they were also introduced as random factor.
Each weed species was tested separately for significant differences between the climate chambers.
To investigate the properties of the random coefficients of the LMER, probability values for the parameters of models fitted with LMER were calculated with a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) approach, choosing 10,000 sample simulations of the model (BAAYEN et al., 2008).
Distribution and homogeneity of variance were visually checked with the help of histograms and diagnostic plots.
Data were log or square root transformed before statistical analysis if conditions of normality were not met or to improve homogeneity of variances.
The residual vs. fitted plots and the normal qq-plots were examined for each tested parameter according to FARAWAY (2006).
Statistical analysis was carried out with the software R (IHAKA and GENTLEMAN, 1997).
The additional packages languageR, Hmisc, agricolae and lme4 were used.
Results Seedling emergence In both climate chambers maize seedlings emerged regularly at the 11th day after sowing, whereas first weed emergence was recorded between the 9th and 13th day after sowing (Fig.
2).
First seedlings of Amaranthus retroflexus appeared about one day earlier in the climate chamber with future conditions.
Only for Setaria viridis a significantly different D0 was measured.
Seedlings emerged two days earlier under the climate change scenario.
Whereas the Mean Emergence Time (MET) was significantly different for A. retroflexus and S. viridis between both climate chambers (Fig.
3), seedlings of ERI = nP i=1 Ni MET Gi = m h 1 eln(2) ⇣ D i D0 D50D0 ⌘ b i MET = nP i=1 Niti nP i=1 Ni v50 = m · b · ln(2) 2 · (D50 D0) Tab.
2: Comparison of the influence of predicted future conditions on plant height [cm] at the end of early-growth phase, mid-growth phase and reproduction phase of plants grown in pots for the three replications, mean and standard error (se) are given for predicted future and current climate, significant pLMER-values are bold.
plant height [cm] / phase early-growth phase mid-growth phase reproduction phase weed species measurement predicted current predicted current predicted current A. retroflexus mean 3.12 1.83 31.33 23.39 26.12 24.38 se 0.07 0.04 2.21 3.08 1.85 2.42 pLMER 0.001 0.040 0.577 E. crus-galli mean 13.84 8,44 92.50 73.22 107.77 102.15 se 0.23 0.15 2.46 1.39 2.59 3.53 pLMER 0.001 0.001 0.130 S. viridis mean 3.17 1.92 45.61 37.33 89.50 83.04 se 0.08 0.05 2.31 1.73 4.98 3.23 pLMER 0.001 0.002 0.186 Climate change and three maize weed species 237 Tab.
4: Parameters of plants grown in tubs at the end of mid-growth phase for the three replications; mean and standard error (se) are given for predicted future and current climate, significant differences LMER (pLMER) are bold.
weed species A. retroflexus E. crus-galli S. viridis Maize factor measurement predicted current predicted current predicted current predicted current height [cm] mean 13.37 14.15 75.33 48.97 24.30 19.40 162.55 141.05 se 1.14 1.28 3.09 2.03 2.11 1.65 2.78 1.91 pLMER 0.650 0.001 0.034 0.001 dry mass [g] mean 1.06 1.34 8.17 3.94 0.76 0.57 78.91 62.15 se 0.23 0.16 1.51 0.62 0.11 0.06 9.96 7.71 pLMER 0.245 0.002 0.026 0.006 Tab.
3: Parameters with significant results of plants grown in pots at the end of reproduction phase for the three replications; mean and standard error (se) are given for predicted future and current climate, significant differences LMER (pLMER) are bold.
weed species A. retroflexus E. crus-galli S. viridis factor measurement predicted current predicted current predicted current panicles mean 17.50 18.35 34.96 19.12 17.50 16.42 per plant se 3.18 4.92 4.20 1.44 1.30 1.61 pLMER 0.705 0.001 0.418 tillers mean 2.85 2.23 15.81 18.23 15.31 15.8 per plant se 0.43 0.40 0.81 0.76 0.91 1.39 pLMER 0.035 0.030 0.870 panicles mean 6.05 6.60 2.35 1.07 1.18 1.14 per tillers se 0.52 1.12 0.29 0.08 0.08 0.10 pLMER 0.663 0.001 0.458 number of seeds mean 2135.38 2654.46 4996.73 3553.58 2926.35 2401.12 per plant se 290.76 546.14 545.57 410.86 322.13 233.77 pLMER 0.956 0.002 0.123 seeds mean 73.28 46.03 150.97 187.84 171.94 171.71 per panicles se 7.11 4.22 7.15 17.94 18.66 19.25 pLMER 0.004 0.024 0.976 Fig.
2: Cumulated emergence of weed seeds over time for (A) Amaranthus retroflexus, (B) Echinochloa crus-galli, (C) Setaria viridis for the three replications; square, diamond and circles mark readings in the climate chamber with predicted future conditions; +, x and * mark readings in the climate chamber with normal conditions; normal lines represent fitted curves under predicted future climate, dashed lines represent fitted curves under current climate.
0 5 10 15 20 25 0.
0 0.
4 0.
8 time [days] em er ge nc e [% ] (A) 0 5 10 15 20 25 0.
0 0.
4 0.
8 time [days] em er ge nc e [% ] (B) 0 5 10 15 20 25 0.
0 0.
4 0.
8 time [days] em er ge nc e [% ] (C) Echinochloa crus-galli appeared nearly at the same time in both climate chambers.
The time span from sowing to mid emergence (D50) differed significantly for S. viridis (Fig.
3).
A D50 of 13.8 days was recorded in the chamber with the predicted future conditions compared to 16.4 days in the other chamber.
The D50 of E. crus-galli was reached 1.8 days earlier and the D50 of A. retroflexus was reached 1.5 days earlier under the climate change scenario (Fig.
3).
The mid emergence rate (v50) differed not significantly for all species between both climate chambers.
However, Echinochloa crus-galli had the highest v50 ratio 238 K. Peters, B. Gerowitt (0.8), whereas S. viridis had the lowest v50 ratio (0.1) of the tested species (Fig.
3).
The number of emerged A. retroflexus seedlings increased with each replication.
Whereas in replication one, the ratio was 41 % for current climate conditions and 50 % for the chamber with predicted future conditions after 4 weeks, the ratio was 79 % vs. 91 % in replication three (Fig.
2).
The emergence rate of E. crus-galli seedlings was high and differences between replications were small four weeks after sowing.
A rate of 75 % was reached after four weeks (Fig.
2).
For Setaria viridis the rate was 58 % after four weeks in both chambers (Fig.
2).
Only E. crus-galli had a significantly different Emergence Rate Index (ERI).
The seedlings emerged quicker and more uniformly in the chamber with the predicted future conditions.
A. retroflexus showed no significant differences (Fig.
3).
Development without crop competition of plants grown individually in pots Early-growth phase: Plants of all three species were significantly taller in the climate chamber with the predicted future conditions (Tab.
2).
Whereas seedlings of E. crus-galli developed quite regularly, the variance of seedling height and development stage of S. viridis and A. retroflexus were more conspicuous between the different replications.
The mean plant height of E. crus-galli seedlings was 14 cm in the chamber with the climate change scenario and 8 cm in the chamber with current conditions.
Seedlings of A. retroflexus and S. viridis were significantly smaller under current conditions: 2 cm vs. 3 cm (Tab.
2).
Mid-growth phase: Amaranthus retroflexus showed a rather undefined growth habit.
Most plants did not grow upright, were less elongated and branched more than plants grown under similar conditions in the field.
Plants were also slightly smaller in the climate chamber with current conditions (Tab.
2).
No significant differences in development stages between the two climate chambers were found, since first flower buds were developed after only 4 to 5 weeks in both chambers (BBCH stage 71).
Setaria viridis grew taller under the climate change scenario (Tab.
2).
The average time of panicle development was the same in both climate chambers, although variance was higher in the chamber with the predicted future conditions (data not shown).
Echinochloa crus-galli developed panicles significantly earlier (1 to 2 weeks) under the climate change scenario.
Plants grown under the climate change scenario were at stage 67, whereas plants grown under current conditions were still at BBCH 55 on the mean average.
Plant height was also increased under the climate change scenario (Tab.
2).
Reproduction phase: We observed better growth of all species at the end of earlyand mid-growth phase under the climate change scenario.
Nevertheless, this relationship diminished at the end of the reproduction phase (Tab.
2).
Amaranthus retroflexus plants still did not grow upright in both climate chambers (see above).
We did not find any significant differences in plant height, panicles and seed production for A. retroflexus.
The number of seeds per plant varied strongly between plants and replications.
However, plants had more tillers per plant and more dry mass under the climate change scenario (Tab.
3).
Echinochloa crus-galli developed quicker under predicted future conditions.
First panicles were visible in the 11th week and flowering occurred over a longer period compared to the chamber with current conditions, which resulted in 550 more seeds/plant under the climate change scenario.
The weed developed significantly more panicles with more seeds under the climate change conditions (Tab.
3).
Echinochloa crus-galli also produced slightly less tillers under this scenario, which resulted also in slightly less vegetative dry matter (Tab.
3).
The species was also the tallest of the three Fig.
3: Parameters characterising emergence: MET = Mean Emergence Time, ERI = Emergence Rate Index, v50 = emergence rate at time of mid emergence, D50 = the calculated day on which 50% the total emerged seeds have emerged; n = 3, triangles show values under predicted future conditions, circles show values recorded under current conditions.
MET 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ● ● ● predicted current predicted current predicted current A. retroflexus E. crus−galli S. viridis ● ● ● ● ● ● ERI 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 ● ● ● predicted current predicted current predicted current A. retroflexus E. crus−galli S. viridis ● ● ● ● ● ● v50 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 ● ● ● predicted current predicted current predicted current A. retroflexus E. crus−galli S. viridis ● ● ● ● ● ● D50 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ● ● ● predicted current predicted current predicted current A. retroflexus E. crus−galli S. viridis ● ● ● ● ● ● Climate change and three maize weed species 239 weed species (Tab.
3).
Setaria viridis produced first panicles after 17 weeks.
They occurred at the same time in both climate chambers.
Plant height, the number of panicles and tillers were rather homogeneous after 21 weeks in both climate chambers.
The weed tended to develop slightly more seeds under climate change conditions (Tab.
3).
Vegetative dry matter was not affected (Tab.
3).
Development with crop competition in the large plant tubs Plant height and dry mass of A. retroflexus grown in the maize rows in the large plant tubs did not differ significantly between the climate chambers.
Both plant height and dry mass were slightly less in the chamber with the predicted future conditions (Tab.
4).
Plants of E. crus-galli were significantly taller in the chamber with the predicted future conditions.
This was also reflected by an increase in dry matter content (Tab.
4).
Average height and dry mass of S. viridis plants differed strongly between the three replications.
Plants grew taller and produced also more dry mass under the climate change scenario (Tab.
4).
The maize plants were significantly taller when grown under the predicted future conditions.
However, above ground dry mass was similar between both climate conditions (Tab.
4).
All weeds were significantly smaller and had significantly less dry mass when grown in competition with maize in the large plant tubs compared to plants grown individually in smaller pots (Fig.
4).
This was true for both climate chambers.
Weed plants in the tubs and the pots had the same development stage.
Discussion For discussing and evaluating the results, it is crucial to acknowledge that the two factors temperature and humidity were combined in our study.
Consequently, we link the discussion mainly to these factors and conclude for climate change.
Seedling emergence The growth, speed and timing of weed seedling emergence are important factors for the development and seed production of weeds in maize (SARABI et al., 2011).
Our results showed different emergence for all three species, which resulted in species-specific strategies to cope with the predicted future conditions.
In summary, the predicted future conditions are beneficial for the tested weed species, as most of their emergence factors were enhanced under these conditions.
This mainly leads to enhanced vegetative growth at later development phases (see below).
The emergence results confirm that A. retroflexus seedlings typically emerge under warmer conditions later in the season (STECKEL et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, Amaranthus retroflexus is also able to germinate in early spring with lower rates (BASKIN and BASKIN, 1985).
As the emergence of seedlings is strongly affected by their parent plants, our findings also represent conditions the populations experienced near Göttingen, in Central Germany (KIGEL et al., 1977).
The number of emerged A. retroflexus seedlings almost doubled in both climate chambers in the third replication.
Such high emergence rates are untypical for A. retroflexus under low temperatures (GUILLEMIN et al., 2013).
Conditions for emergence were equal in all replications.
Thus, we expect the dormancy status of the weeds had changed over time of storage.
Seeds were stored for a total of 4 years and 2 months before the last replication started.
Some other weed species show lower dormancy the longer their seeds were buried (BASKIN and BASKIN, 1985).
Our findings that A. retroflexus changed its dormancy status over time of storage should be verified by another experiment, as dormancy changes were not reported by other authors (THOMPSON et al., 1997; OMAMI et al., 1999).
Seedlings of E. crus-galli are able to grow faster than maize once they find sufficient conditions during the first four weeks.
We found that E. crus-galli seedlings were less dependent on temperature and humidity, when compared to maize seedlings.
CHAUHAN and JOHNSON (2011) reported similar results.
The resulting high v50 ratio is a good indicator for the effects of higher thermal time (GARDARIN et al., 2009).
The relatively low emergence rate of Setaria viridis seedlings confirm that the species typically germinates under warmer conditions later in the season (DEKKER, 2003) and not simultaneously with the sowing of maize as it was defined by the experiment.
This also explains why more seedlings emerged considerably earlier under climate change conditions.
Current temperature conditions in Northern parts of Central Europe are still below the considered optimum for the species (WALCK et al., 2011).
Therefore, Setaria viridis will likely benefit more than the other tested weed species from higher temperatures at emergence.
Development without crop competition This series of measurements was performed to study various parameters of the weeds at the most important stages of their life and to Fig.
4: Comparison of the plant height of weeds grown in pots and tubs at the end of mid-growth phase for both climate chambers for the three replications.
tubs pots 10 20 30 40 pl an t h ei gh t [ cm ] Amaranthus retroflexus tubs pots 20 40 60 80 10 0 pl an t h ei gh t [ cm ] Echinochloa crus−galli tubs pots 10 20 30 40 50 60 pl an t h ei gh t [ cm ] Setaria viridis 240 K. Peters, B. Gerowitt provide answers concerning how weeds perform individually under climate change conditions.
We found distinct differences between measurements taken at the time of emergence, at the end of the early and mid-growth phase and reproduction phase.
The tested weeds balanced their growth and biomass allocation according to abiotic conditions and competition from neighbouring plants.
Their response to the predicted future conditions started to become species-specific with the end of the mid-growth phase.
Early and mid-growth phase: All tested weed species benefitted from the predicted future conditions at the end of the mid-growth phase.
To conclude, greater plant heights under the climate change scenario suggest an increase in vegetative growth and thus, also enhanced interference capabilities of the weeds during the first weeks of their development.
This may give them an advantage over single maize plants.
For A. retroflexus, we observed no differences in panicle onset speed between the climate chambers, although findings by KNEZEVIC et al.
(2001) and STECKEL et al.
(2004) suggest a different relationship.
E. crus-galli had an earlier onset of flowers and a longer flowering time, which increases the opportunities for outcrossing (CLEMENTS and DITOMMASO, 2011).
This is in accordance with other studies (POTVIN, 1986).
These phenomena can also occur when seedlings emerge later in the season.
Thus, climate change conditions may accelerate the life cycle as described by POTVIN (1986) for E. crus-galli and by ORYOKOT et al.
(1997), KNEZEVIC et al.
(2001) and HYVÖNEN (2011) for A. retroflexus.
This process results in more fertile seeds at the end of the reproductive stage, but probably not in more biomass.
By contrast, Setaria viridis develops panicles after midsummer when photoperiods are getting shorter (DEKKER, 2003).
Plants grown in the climate chambers set panicles at the same time as would plants grown under natural conditions (DEKKER, 2003).
We observed that the earlier seedlings emerge, the longer they delay development of reproductive parts.
Therefore, later emerging arable plants have a shorter vegetative development period (FORCELLA et al., 2000; DEKKER, 2003).
Similar behaviour was reported for A. retroflexus (COSTEA et al., 2004), but was not confirmed by our experiment for this species.
Reproduction phase: Amaranthus retroflexus plants in the climate chambers were creeping near the ground, grew sideward and tillered more, when compared to plants grown in the fields.
This growth habit was likely a response on low red and far-red light levels in the climate chamber (COSTEA et al., 2004; GIMPLINGER and KAUL, 2009).
Plants grown outside from seeds of the same population did show a normal growth habit (PETERS and GEROWITT, 2014).
This could explain why A. retroflexus was less competitive in comparison to the other two weed species.
Some A. retroflexus plants also seemed to lack senescence.
Unlike E. crus-galli and S. viridis, this species did not match its life cycle to the length of the season (SAUER, 1967).
Even towards the end, some plants were still green and had not finished ripening.
Some plants just grew and grew.
As a result, we have not found differences in seed production and we can only partly confirm with HYVÖNEN (2011), who reported that raised temperatures enhance seed output but not overall growth.
Echinochloa crus-galli is better suited to the predicted future conditions because plants had more panicles and tillers under these conditions.
This resulted in totally more seeds per plant (BARRETT and WILSON, 1981).
If arable cropping conditions allow, the species will likely extend its seed bank.
This is especially the case under continuous maize cropping (FRIED et al., 2010).
Since we have not found any differences in vegetative biomass, we assume that E. crus-galli mainly invests the possible benefits of warmer conditions into reproduction.
Setaria viridis is well adapted to current and future climatic conditions and can make use of its phenotypic plasticity (DEKKER, 2003).
We observed higher variances of plant parameters throughout the replications under the climate change scenario.
Since several biotypes are typical for the genus Setaria, the high variance reflects genetic plasticity within the used Setaria population (DEKKER, 2003).
A future climate may select for certain ecotypes that are better suited for future conditions, thus enhancing fitness.
Our results are in accordance with SWANTON et al.
(1999), who reported less biomass but increased reproductive output under warmer conditions.
For S. viridis, we determined also a slight increase in seed production per plant and less dry matter content per plant in the chamber with predicted future conditions.
However, higher temperature difference between the climate chambers may have been needed for significant results (DOUGLAS et al., 1985; SWANTON et al., 1999).
In summary, although the responses were species-specific, E. crusgalli and S. viridis had higher reproductive output under the scenario with predicted future conditions.
This may lead to better long-term population development, as the weeds are able to build-up their seed banks.
Development under crop competition This series of measurements was performed to study the effect of maize competition on the vegetative development of the weeds under climate change conditions.
The broad phenotypic responses of E. crus-galli and S. viridis when grown with maize suggest that they likely will increase their success in maize when cropped under climate change conditions.
Plants of A. retroflexus grew even more deformed as single plants grown in the smaller pots (see above).
Contrarily, OTTE et al.
(2006) reported that A. retroflexus is highly competitive even when shading occurs.
It is also possible that temperatures in the climate chambers were still too low for the plants (GIMPLINGER and KAUL, 2009; HYVÖNEN, 2011; OVEISI et al., 2013).
Under the maize competition, S. viridis was able to balance growth to match optimally the low light levels.
Plants grown in the smaller pots showed no differences in habit and other phenological properties compared to plants grown together with maize.
This result confirms studies of DEKKER (2003).
However, we cannot confirm the reported result that S. viridis responds to increasing shade levels by reducing tiller production (DOUGLAS et al., 1985; DEKKER, 2003).
The determined high phenotypic plasticity may enable the weed to adapt to a broad range of changing conditions.
Of the three weed species investigated, E. crus-galli was the least affected in growth and development by the shading of maize.
Compared to plants grown individually in the smaller pots, the weed balances the low light availability with growing upwards instead of tillering.
The species is able to adapt fast to ecological factors such as shading, because of its broad genome, proliferation and crop mimicking.
Nevertheless, BARRETT and WILSON (1981) also showed that high phenotypic plasticity may result in differences in tiller production of E. crus-galli.
Implications for crop protection From the predicted future conditions Echinochloa crus-galli profited most, followed by Setaria viridis.
Amaranthus retroflexus was the least benefiting species of the three tested weeds possibly due to the artificial conditions in the climate chambers.
In detail, our study revealed that each weed species responded differently to changes in climate conditions.
Narrow crop rotations and continuous cropping of maize are likely in Central Europe in the future (MEHRTENS et al., 2005; WEBER and GUT, 2005; FRIED et al., 2010).
In subsequent years, S. viridis and Climate change and three maize weed species 241 E. crus-galli will likely build up their seed banks due to better emergence and higher seed output (BARRETT and WILSON, 1981; DEKKER, 2003).
Better growth and faster vegetative development when grown within maize under climate change conditions will also lead to better long-term population development of the weeds in the future (DOUGLAS et al., 1985).
The results of our study indicate that under future climate conditions various weed management strategies are needed to ensure control of the tested weeds (OLESEN and BINDI, 2002; PETERS et al., 2014).
For agricultural purposes, we suggest to integrate management practices such as variations in the sowing date of maize or in the choice of cultivars that result in timely harvesting, and thus reduce the chance for the late emerging weeds to fully develop and produce seeds under climate change conditions.
A challenge for maize breeding is to select for fast growing and developing cultivars, since our study revealed a trade-off between the vegetative growth of the weed species and their generative reproduction when cropped together with maize (SARABI et al., 2011).
Farmers themselves should avoid short crop rotations with maize alone or other late spring sown crops.
Continuous cropping of this type of crop will select for particularly prolific biotypes of S. viridis and E. crus-galli (BARRETT and WILSON, 1981; DEKKER, 2003).
Furthermore, we propose that necessary herbicide treatments should be applied late in the season to cover late emerging weed cohorts with high temperature requirements, especially those of S. viridis (DEKKER, 2003; BECKIE and TARDIF, 2012).
Conclusions Climate change exerts impacts on weeds during their whole life cycle.
In order to get insight into underlying processes, it is necessary to determine biological parameters at the time of emergence, early growth and at the time of reproduction.
As a result, climate mediated alterations in the measured biological and demographic attributes allow predictions of long-term population development of the weed species (FRIED et al., 2010; PETERS et al., 2014).
Biological properties and demographic data can also be used to predict the population development under future conditions and to improve bioclimatic models (PETERS and GEROWITT, 2014).
Furthermore, with future climate change costly crop protection measures at different development stages of the weeds may be needed for successful weed management.
In order to continue high production under future conditions, crop protection has to be adapted to the biological responses of weeds to climate change.
Acknowledgements This study was supported by the Ministry for Science and Culture of Lower Saxony within the network KLIFF − climate impact and adaptation research in Lower Saxony.
We thank Ingolf Gliege and Martina Goltermann for assisting in the experiments.
References BAAYEN, R.H., DAVIDSON, D.J., BATES, D.M., 2008: Mixed-effects modeling with crossed random effects for subjects and items.
J. Mem.
Lang.
59, 390-412.
BARRETT, S.C.H., WILSON, B.F., 1981: Colonizing ability in the Echinochloa crus-galli complex (barnyard grass).
I.
Variation in life-history.
Can.
J. Botany 59, 1844-1860.
BASKIN, J.M., BASKIN, C.C., 1985: The Annual Dormancy Cycle in Buried Weed Seeds: A Continuum.
BioScience 35(8), 492-498.
BECKIE, H.J., TARDIF, F.J., 2012.
Herbicide cross resistance in weeds.
Crop Protection 35, 15-28.
CHAUHAN, B.S., JOHNSON, D.E., 2011: Ecological studies on Echinochloa crus-galli and the implications for weed management in direct-seeded rice.
Crop Prot.
30, 1385-1391.
CLEMENTS, D.R., DITOMMASO, A., 2011: Climate change and weed adaptation: Can evolution of invasive plants lead to greater range expansion than forecasted?
Weed Res.
51, 227-240.
COSTEA, M., WEAVER, S.E., TARDIF, F.J., 2004: The biology of Canadian weeds.
130.
Amaranthus retroflexus L., A. powellii S. Watson and A. hybridus L.. Can.
J.
Plant Sci.
84(2), 631-668.
DEKKER, J., 2003: Evolutionary biology of the Foxtail (Setaria) speciesgroup.
In: Inderjit (ed.
), Weed Biology and Management, 65-114.
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
DORADO, J., SOUSA, E., CALHA, I.M., GONZALEZ-ANDUJAR, J.L., FERNANDEZ-QUINTANILLA, C., 2009: Predicting weed emergence in maize crops under two contrasting climatic conditions.
Weed Res.
49, 251-260.
DOUGLAS, B.J., THOMAS, A.G., MORRISON, I.N., MAW, M.G., 1985: The Biology of Canadian Weeds.
70.
Setaria viridis (L.) Beauv.
Can.
J.
Plant Sci.
65(3), 669-690.
FARAWAY, J.J., 2006: Extending the Linear Model with R: Generalized Linear, Mixed Effects and Nonparametric Regression Models, Chapman & Hall / CRC.
FORCELLA, F., COLBACH, N., KEGODE, G.O., 2000: Estimating seed production of three Setaria species in row crops.
Weed Sci.
48, 436-444.
FRIED, G., PETIT, S., REBOUD, X., 2010: A specialist-generalist classification of the arable flora and its response to changes in agricultural practices.
BioMedCentral Ecology 10(20), 1-11.
GARDARIN, A., DÜRR, C., COLBACH, N., 2009: Which model species for weed seedbank and emergence studies?
A review.
Weed Res.
49, 117130.
10.1111/j.1365-3180.2008.00683.x GARDARIN, A., GUILLEMIN, J.P., MUNIER-JOLAIN, N.M., COLBACH, N., 2010: Estimation of key parameters for weed population dynamics models: Base temperature and base water potential for germination.
Eur.
J. Agron.
32(2), 162-168.
GARDARIN, A., DÜRR, C., COLBACH, N., 2011: Prediction of germination rates of weed species: Relationships between germination speed parameters and species traits.
Ecol.
Model.
222(3), 626-636.
GIMPLINGER, D.M., KAUL, H.-P., 2009: Calibration and validation of the crop growth model LINTUL for grain amaranth (Amaranthus sp.).
J. Appl.
Bot.
Food Qual.
82, 183-192.
GRUNDY, A.C., 2003: Predicting weed emergence: a review of approaches and future challenges.
Weed Res.
43(1), 1-11.
GUILLEMIN, J.-P., GARDARIN, A., GRANGER, S., REIBEL, C., MUNIERJOLAIN, N., COLBACH, N., 2013: Assessing potential germination period of weeds with base temperatures and base water potentials.
Weed Res.
53, 76-87.
HESS, M., BARRALIS, G., BLEIHOLDER, H., BUHR, L., EGGERS, T., HACK, H., STAUSS, R., 1997: Use of the extended BBCH scale – general for the descriptions of the growth stages of monoand dicotyledonous weed species.
Weed Res.
37, 433-441.
HYVÖNEN, T., 2011: Impact of temperature and germination time on the success of a C4 weed in a C3 crop: Amaranthus retroflexus and spring barley.
Agr.
Food Sci.
20, 183-190.
IHAKA, R., GENTLEMAN, R., 1996: R: A Language for data analysis and graphics.
J. Comput.
Graph.
Stat.
5(3), 299-314.
IPCC, 2013: 5th Assessment Report: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
http://www.ipcc.ch/, IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.
KIGEL, J., OFIR, M., KOLLER, D., 1977: Control of the Germination Responses of Amaranthus retroflexus L. Seeds by their Parental Photothermal Environment.
J. Exp.
Bot.
23(106), 1125-1136.
KNEZEVIC, S.Z., VANDERLIP, R.L., HORAK, M.J., 2001: Relative time of redroot pigweed emergence affects dry matter partitioning.
Weed Sci 49, 617-621.
MAUN, M.A., BARRETT, S.C.H., 1986: The Biology of Canadian Weeds.
77.
Echinochloa crus-galli (L.) Beauv.
J.
Plant Sci.
66, 739-759.
MEHRTENS, J., SCHULTE, M., HURLE, K., 2005: Unkrautflora in Mais – Ergebnisse eines Monitorings in Deutschland.
Gesunde Pflanzen 57, 206-218.
242 K. Peters, B. Gerowitt NOVÁK, R., DANCZA, I., SZENTEY, L., KARAMÁN, J., 2009: Arable weeds of Hungary.
Fifth national weed survey (2007-2008).
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Hungary, 1-95.
OLESEN, J.E., BINDI, M., 2002: Consequences of climate change for European agricultural productivity, land use and policy.
Eur.
J. Agron.
16, 239-262.
OMAMI, E.N., HAIGH, A.M., MEDD, R.W., NICOL, H.I., 1999: Changes in germinability, dormancy and viability of Amaranthus retroflexus as affected by depth and duration of burial.
Weed Res.
39, 345-354.
ORYOKOT, J.O.E., MURPHY, S.D., THOMAS, A.G., SWANTON, C.J., 1997: Temperatureand moisture-dependent models of seed germination in green and redroot pigweed (Amaranthus powellii, A. retroflexus).
Weed Sci.
45, 488-496.
OTTE, A., BISSELS, S., WALDHARDT, R., 2006: Samen-, Keimungsund Habitateigenschaften: Welche Parameter erklären Veränderungstendenzen in der Häufigkeit von Ackerwildkräutern in Deutschland?
J.
Plant Dis.
Protect.
Sp.
I. XX, 507-516.
OVEISI, M., RAHIMIAN MASHHADI, H., YOUSEFI, A.R., ALIZADE, H., BAGHESTANI, M.A., GONZALEZ-ANDUJAR, J.L., 2013: Predicting maize yield in a multiple species competition with Xanthium strumarium and Amaranthus retroflexus: Comparing of approaches to modeling herbicide performance.
Crop Prot.
45, 15-21.
PATTERSON, D.T., 1995: Weeds in a Changing Climate.
Weed Sci.
43, 685701.
PETERS, K., BREITSAMETER, L., GEROWITT, B., 2014: Impact of climate change on weeds in agriculture.
A Review.
Agriculture for Sustainable Development 34(4): 707-721. doi: 10.1007/s13593-014-0245-2 PETERS, K., GEROWITT, B., 2014: Weed growth properties of Amaranthus retroflexus, Echinochloa crus-galli and Setaria viridis as influenced by shifts in the maize cropping season.
J.
Plant Dis.
Protect.
In review.
POTVIN, C., 1986: Biomass allocation and phenological differences among southern and northern populations of the C4 grass Echinochloa crusgalli.
J. Ecol.
74, 915-923.
ROBINSON, T.M.P., GROSS, K.L., 2010: The impact of altered precipitation variability on annual weed species.
Am.
J. Bot.
97(10), 1625-1629. doi: 10.3732/ajb.1000125 SARABI, V., MAHALLATI, M.N., NEZAMI, A., MOHASSEL, M.H.R., 2011: Effects of the relative time of emergence and the density of common lambsquarters (Chenopodium album) on corn (Zea mays) yield.
Weed Biol.
Manag.
11(3), 127-136.
SAUER, J.D., 1967: The grain Amaranths and their relatives: A revised taxonomic and geographic survey.
Ann.
Mo Bot.
Gard.
54(2), 103-137.
SCHIMPF, D.J., 1977: Seed weight of Amaranthus retroflexus in relation to moisture and length of growing season.
Ecology 58, 450-453.
STECKEL, L.E., SPRAGUE, C.L., STOLLER, E.W., WAX, L.M., 2004: Temperature effects on germination of nine Amaranthus species.
Weed Sci.
52, 217-221.
SWANTON, C.J., HUANG, J.Z., DEEN, W., TOLLENAAR, M., SHRESTHA, A., RAHIMIAN, H., 1999: Effects of temperature and photoperiod on Setaria viridis.
Weed Sci.
47, 446-453.
THOMPSON, K., BAKKER, J.P., BEKKER, R.M., 1997: The soil seed banks of North West Europe: methodology, density and longevity.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
TUBIELLO, F.N., SOUSSANA, J.-F., HOWDEN, S.M., 2007: Crop and pasture response to climate change, Proc.
Natl.
Ac.
Sci.
104(50), 19686-19690.
WALCK, J.L., HIDAYATI, S.N., DIXON, K.W., THOMPSON, K., POSCHLOD, P., 2011: Climate change and plant regeneration from seed.
Glob.
Change Biol.
17, 2145-2161.
WALTHER, G.-R., POST, E., CONVEY, P., MENZEL, A., PARMESAN, C., BEEBEE, T.J.C., FROMENTIN, J.-M., HOEGH-GULDBERG, O., BAIRLEIN, F., 2002: Ecological responses to recent climate change.
Nature 416, 389-395.
WEBER, E., GUT, D., 2005: A survey of weeds that are increasingly spreading in Europe.
Agron.
Sustain.
Dev.
25, 109-121.
Address of the corresponding author: Kristian Peters, University of Rostock, Faculty of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, Crop Health, Satower Straße 48, D-18051 Rostock, Germany.
E-mail: kristian.peters@uni-rostock.de
Microsoft Word PORTALfisherSpecialIssueFINAL PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
Special issue details: Global Climate Change Policy: Post-Copenhagen Discord Special Issue, guest edited by Chris Riedy and Ian McGregor.
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia.
Shifting Global Climate Governance: Creating Long-Term Goals Through UNFCCC Article 2 P. Brian Fisher, College of Charleston Since our exit from Bonn (June 2011), the climate regime has taken significant steps toward developing short-range standards for global emission reductions based on a temperature threshold of 2° C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC 2010c).
However, as the climate regime pursues a post-Kyoto agenda to establish specific greenhouse gas (GHG) targets, the question that now stands is how these short-term standards, fixed to a temperature threshold, fit into more holistic climate policy objectives.
This article seeks to situate these short-term objectives within longer-term climate policy goals by examining five different approaches to developing climate architecture and policy.
The conclusion is that the current approach based on national targets and timetables is insufficient to generate long-term equitable and efficacious climate policy.
Since the Bali Road Map1 was constructed, focus has been on what the IPCC (2007) established as a dangerous threshold temperature of +2° C (IPCC 2007b; UNFCCC 2009; UNFCCC 2010b; UNFCCC 2010c).
From Copenhagen in 2009 through Bonn 2011, the mitigation discourse has centered this threshold as the target for cultivating specific emission reductions.2 While the threshold has been agreed upon generally3 and 1 A two-year plan to generate a legally binding agreement in Copenhagen in 2009 based on fixed national emissions targets.
2 In addition, significant progress has also been made in concatenating the diversity of country reduction commitments and in developing more transparency in the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) processes.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
2 some headway made, three critical issues have emerged that threaten the future of effective climate governance.
First, mitigation in a post-Kyoto scheme is based on a ‘pledge and review’ system, where individual countries promise to cut emissions and agree to a monitoring of their progress.
This pledge relies exclusively on the good intentions of individual countries to meet global emission goals, one that can be easily subverted or deprioritized, and subjected to traditional collective action dilemmas.
Second, there is no consensus and ambition to develop a ‘shared vision’ for longer-term commitments.
The AWG-LCA (Ad hoc Working Group on Long-range Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC) explicitly directs, ‘Parties share a vision for long-term cooperative action in order to achieve the objective of the Convention under its Article 2’ (UNFCCC 2010b).
Little has been accomplished since Kyoto in formulating this vision.
In fact, long-term cuts in emissions and concentrations were excluded from consideration as part of the shared vision, and put on the agenda for COP 18 in Durban, South Africa in 2011 (WRI 2010).
There also remains little in common between the developed and developing countries in mitigating emissions.
Finally, there are no common targets to fulfill long-range objectives as outlined in Article 2 of the UNFCCC.
Third, there are significant issues in the implementation of emission controls to meet the 2° C temperature target.
As it stands, current pledges are inadequate to reach this target.
Specifically, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) concluded in Cancun (2010) that existing pledges only amounted to 60 percent of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction necessary to meet the 2° C target (UNEP 2010; see also, Levin and Bradley 2010).
This leaves a critical gap in meeting the target itself.
So, while the ‘pledge system’ may stimulate interest initially from China and the USA (whose emissions represent more than 40 percent of the global total), it also means that these two countries can hold the rest of the regime attendant to its national self-interests.
Specifically, the universal nature of the current approach allows for certain countries to continue holding the regime hostage to its interests (Prins & Rayner 2007).
Overall, while the focus has been on minimizing emissions to avoid this threshold temperature, scant attention has been paid to longer-term goals and approaches to reach 3 Some within the regime, particularly those already vulnerable to climate changes like Small Island States, have advocated a 1.5° C threshold; however, many in the regime have countered that this is not pragmatically feasible.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
3 those goals.
Despite the optimism surrounding the recent developments in climate governance, these issues raise important questions about the viability of the current global governance to meet the +2° C target to prevent long-term climate disruption.
The thesis of this article is that existing deficiencies emphasize the need for long-term goals within the regime to guide short-term policy objectives.
In many ways, the longterm trajectory is more salient to building and establishing effective climate policy than short-term objectives of national emission targets (Rayner 2010).
As it stands now, the hope is that by meeting short-term goals, long-term consequences will be mitigated.
I argue that this may lead to ineffective results.
Without a clear set of long-term objectives to drive climate negotiations, ‘ad hoc approaches and incremental decisions may prematurely foreclose options for protecting the climate’ (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003) now and for future generations.
In addition, this approach neglects to address the underlying drivers of climate change, that is, the systems, institutions, and discourses in which the problem itself is created.
If these drivers are not addressed, the efficaciousness of climate governance will be limited.
This possibly will exacerbate present global inequities, and create a subclass of displaced and vulnerable populations.
In short, the current short-term approach does little to change the global structure in which the problem is embedded.
There are larger implications from this approach that are not extensively considered in literature or policies.
Article 2 lays out the purpose of the climate regime, stating that the ‘objective’ is to avoid ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (italics mine).
Article 2 hinges on how ‘dangerous’ is defined and what exactly constitutes the ‘climate system’—that is, is it merely the biophysical changes in the atmosphere or does it include impacts that affect people?
The current approach to climate governance renders the definition of ‘dangerous’ to be a simple function of limiting global GHG emissions to avoid exceeding the 2° C threshold.
This short-term prescriptive approach sees the issue as purely an environmental problem that can be managed through technical solutions to limit national GHGs based on discretionary country pledges.
This unnecessarily mischaracterizes the problems posed by climate change.
In addition, despite recent progress in bringing climate adaptation into the discussions through the Cancun Adaptation Framework and securing pledges for funding ($100B) over the next ten years (UNFCCC 2010c), there has been little Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
4 practical global governance and implementation on large-scale adaptation.
By treating climate problems exclusively as an environmental issue, the current adaptation structure treats the symptoms rather than the cause, ignoring other significant implications for policy.
Efficient and equitable climate policy cannot be achieved without first a definitional dialogue funneled toward developing long-term policy goals that should precede any short-range solutions.
Hard targets may not be set, but particularly the USA and China must establish long-term goals; otherwise, short-term successes can be quickly undermined.
Establishing long-term goals can offer multifarious approaches to meet those goals, rather than a direct, linear based on a ‘one size fits all’ approach that has led to the present inadequacies in climate governance.4 It also allows shifts in political and economic global structure to accommodate more equitable and effective institutional arrangements to meet the long-term goals.
While the objective of the regime should remain climate stabilization to avoid dangerous interference, it should not be done based on GHG targets.
In this light, establishing long-term goals for climate policy is imperative and it must: (i) include differing paths for the differing circumstances of states, (ii) address the fundamental drivers of climate change, and (iii) address the ‘effects’ side of the equation based on the three pillars of sustainable development, i.e.
social & economic development, environment and climate protection and equity.
Based on these critical elements, what follows will analyze various approaches to addressing the climate change problem to determine what may help establish long-term goals for the regime.
Based on this, I argue for discarding national emission targets in favor of long-term goals based on renewable energy and enhanced security for those most vulnerable to climate impacts.
Article 2 of the UNFCCC The history of Article 2 The core of the UNFCCC centers on Article 2, which outlines the objective of the agreement, and Article 3, which provides guiding principles to implement the Convention.
These two Articles set up the remainder of the agreement, including the 4 Domestically it requires constituents to buy into short-term political sacrifice for longer-term goals— goals that they may or may not recognize as in their interest.
This is particularly true for the USA.
For key states like the USA, if domestic constituencies cannot support global policy on climate change, there is a serious risk of undermining the entire regime.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
5 commitments required by signatories, and a practical agenda on observations, education and training, future Conferences of the Parties (COPs), scientific bodies, and a financial mechanism.
Since the early 1970s, the climate policy debate focused on how to stabilize GHG concentrations, and this aspect was enshrined in Article 2 as the core objective of the Convention.
Article 2 (UN 1992) states, in full: The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system [emphasis added].
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
Since the adoption of the UNFCCC, however, attention in policy circles gradually shifted to the near term, particularly to the development, ratification, and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.
Specifically, most developed countries have focused on mitigation targets in the Kyoto Protocol while developing countries have focused more on burden sharing than on Article 2 (See UNFCCC/SBSTA/2002/INF.14 2002; Blanchard et al.
2002; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005).5 Recently, this focus continued in Copenhagen and Cancun with an attempt to generate post-Kyoto agreement for reducing GHG emissions through binding national targets.
To date, a post-Kyoto agreement has not been reached, and binding national targets have been reduced to a ‘pledge and review’ system.
These developments have led increasingly to a narrowing of focus by the regime to ensure: a) the viability of the regime itself; b) tangible short-term imperatives are agreed to; and c) attempt to build consensus on these objectives.
However, this narrowing of concentration has also led to discounting longterm goals.
Questions arising from Article 2 Article 2 is indeterminate, as it ‘conveys some degree of the substance of the long-term goal while carefully avoiding any quantitative expression of it’ (Gupta & van Asselt 2006: 83; Bodansky 1993).
As a result, it raises critical definitional questions that inhibit determining long-term goals for addressing global climate change.
Article 2 centers on the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations … at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ [emphasis 5 In addition, the G77, including China, has objected to discussions of Article 2 for fear that it might lead to emissions caps for them (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003).
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
6 added].
Three critical points can be made about this first half of Article 2.
First, and most importantly, it is not at all clear what ‘dangerous’ means.
Is there a specific level of danger associated with climate change that represents a trigger point for the biophysical climate system?
Second, GHG concentrations become the de facto measuring stick for anthropogenic interference, and not for example, mean global temperature.6 Third, who is in danger?—that is, is it a measure of targets and timetables, or danger to regions, or specific locales and peoples?
How these fundamental questions are approached, and ultimately answered, brings a host of critical, secondary issues to the fore.
These point to the role of ‘climate impacts’ in the climate governance equation, prompting three questions.
First, where along the causal path is ‘danger’ or risk to be measured?
Second, how do we regulate and manage ‘anthropic interference with the climate system’?
Third, how is ‘climate system’ defined (that is, what constitutes the ‘climate system’ that is in danger)?
These questions prompt a second set of questions.
How is ‘danger’ or risk to be measured; in other words, at what point in the climate cycle do we measure what is dangerous to the climate system?
How do we govern the danger or risk?
That is, do we address GCC by adjustments in emissions reductions through mitigation and trading, the process itself (by empower decision making), the structures that create the material and ideational underpinnings of GHG emissions (e.g.
an energy revolution), or the impacts?
Is it a combination?
To date, there has been but one approach—mitigation through national targets (or now ‘pledge and review’) with an increasing discourse around adaptation.
Finally, what is included in the climate system?
Is it simply a measure of environmental or more specifically atmospheric danger, or regional or local climate systems that then impact people?
Does the definition include how people are affected by changes in the climate system?
Who is prioritized, if at all, within the ‘climate system’?
These questions are imperative for developing future climate policy.
Where we are today on Article 2 Since the inception of the UNFCCC, most of the activity on Article 2 has focused on the scientific and economic aspects of GHG concentration stabilization.
Early on, the IPCC 6 There is criticism about the use of GHG concentrations as the measuring stick for slow climate change, primarily because there is no fixed quantifiable measure for anticipating future or anticipated GHG emissions.
See, for example Victor (2001).
In addition, as the language has shifted to the 2 C threshold, it seems to run counter to the Article 2 standard.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
7 interpreted Article 2 by seeing GHG ‘concentrations stabilization’ as a function of national emissions that aggregate in generating future temperature and sea level changes (Wigley 1995; Wigley et al.
1996; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005; Schellnhuber et al.
2006).
Therefore, from this early stage, much of the discussion focused on emission stabilization pathways on the mitigation side of the climate equation, and has ‘largely bypassed the explicit consideration of climate change impacts’ (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003).
Moreover, these ‘stabilization pathways’ were primarily considered from the perspective of aggregate national emissions.
In fact, since 1997, international climate negotiations were dominated by short-term issues such as the design of rules of the Kyoto Protocol (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003).
Even today (through Cancun and Bonn 2011), the discourse continues to center around emission targets and timetables.
Similarly, the focus on what constitutes ‘danger’ has focused primarily on scientific and economic considerations, while social, cultural and ethical dimensions have received scant attention (Rayner & Malone 1998; Adger 2001; Elzen & Berk 2003; Gupta 2003; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005; Gupta & van Asselt 2006; Fisher 2011).
In addition, the psychological aspects of ‘danger’ remain dormant within a climate change context (Kasperson et al.
1988; McDaniels et al.
1996; Henry 2000).
That is, to the degree impacts were discussed, much of it focused on those direct biophysical impacts with global consequences, such as ice sheets (that would contribute to sea level rise), global coral bleaching, and the economic costs of these types of impacts and of mitigation.
In 2001, the third assessment report by the IPCC restructured their thinking on Article 2 by referring to ‘five areas of concern,’ including: (i) risk of large scale singularities; (ii) aggregate impacts; (iii) distribution of impacts; (iv) risks of extreme weather events; and (v) risks to unique and threatened systems.
Nevertheless, the ‘climate change policy debate in the last few years has focused more on the costs of mitigation than on the avoided impacts or potential benefits of mitigation’ (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003: 277–278).
Although recently there has been increasing attention to adaptation, particularly in light of economic development, the negotiation calculus for large emitters continues to focus on the costs of mitigation, rather than avoided impacts and/or the impacts to those most vulnerable.
Simply, negotiations are driven by costs and economics.
This is even more so after the ‘pledge and review’ system adoption, since key countries can use their discretion on GHG reductions and to what degree they will comply.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
8 In this regard, in the most recent IPCC AR4 report (2007), contributors drew upon Article 2 directly in a call to determine ‘key vulnerabilities’ (IPCC 2007d: 784).
For the first time, there was a specific call for scientific assessment of what impacts might be associated with different levels of GHG concentrations, and ‘normative evaluation by policy-makers of which potential impacts and associated likelihoods are significant enough to constitute, individually or in combination, DAI [Dangerous Anthropic Interference]’ (IPCC 2007d: 784).
As a result, today Article 2 and ‘key vulnerabilities’ are one of the seven crosscutting themes for all working groups (Patwardhan et al.
2003; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005).
As the IPCC AR4 and the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010c) demonstrate, there is increasing dialogue on vulnerability and adaptation.
However, the discussions remain at the periphery of climate policy, which remains driven by mitigation through national emission targets to reduce global GHGs.
The goal of this policy approach is to prevent global mean surface temperature from exceeding another 2 C, after which many scientists agree certain key tipping points in the climate system may be triggered.
However, despite this near consensus on beyond 2 C temperature target, there remains uncertainty on what amount would prevent triggering dangerous tipping points.
Thus the policy plan is based on reaching short-term targets and hoping that it is enough to achieve this 2 C goal.
Operationalizing UNFCCC Article 2 The climate process: How it works At the global level, dynamics of IPAT, population growth, affluence and technology contribute to degradation of the biosphere.
These drivers have tentacles reaching into the national and local levels influenced by more complex drivers of poverty, urbanization, land use, income distribution, values and governance ideology.
These global drivers contribute to the structure that facilitates activities that generate GHGs.
These drivers merge and combine with anthropogenic drivers at the local level and individual level (see Figure 1).
There, anthropogenic drivers of GHG emissions take place within national and global contexts.
These ‘agency’ drivers include fossil fuel burning (transportation, refrigeration, and so on), increasing waste in landfills, land use (for example, deforestation, rice paddies), and industrial processes (such as cement Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
9 production).7 In addition, individual environmental values play an important role in supporting and justifying these material practices that lead to GHG emissions.
These individual anthropogenic drivers lead to an accumulation of GHG emissions that enter the biophysical climate cycle, which then ‘force’ or produce local biophysical climate impacts such as changes in temperature, precipitation, and sea level rise (SLR).
These climate changes impact human populations, which can be positive or negative, depending on sociopolitical and economic structure as well as geography.
For many, particularly in vulnerable regions, this impact will be negative and will result in some form of human and societal impact (see Figure 1 below).8 Global Anthropogenic Structural Drivers Population Dynamics Affluence/ Energy Use Technology (+/-) Local Anthropogenic Drivers Fossil fuel burning Industrial processes Waste Disposal Land use Values Atmospheric Concentrations “Climate Drivers” Radiative Forcing (+/-) Biophysical Climate Response Carbon Cycle Feedback Biophysical Climate Cycle Natural Drivers National GHG Emissions ( CO2; CH4; N2O; HCs) Local Climate Changes ( Temp, precip, SLR, coastal erosion) Human Impact (damage, displacement, degradation) Humans directly causing harm to other humans Outcome Approach Structural Approach Source Approach T&T Approach Process Approach Access, Voice, Standing (legal & political) Figure 1.
A linear depiction of the ‘climate process.’ This figure illustrates the full range of the climate process and how humans cause direct harm to other humans through the medium of earth’s climate system.
It also represents the five (5) policy approaches to address fuller range of the climate problem.
7 Structural drivers at the local level are different from IPAT at the global level and include policy, institutions, organizations/NGOs, culture/traditions, social factors (such as family), and so on.
8 I do not necessarily see the ‘climate process’ as a linear cause-effect, as depicted in this figure, but it helps to demonstrate where in the process may be most effective in addressing climate change.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
10 Approaches to climate governance: Framing the ‘Big Picture’ A fundamental question for climate governance is where along the cause-effect chain provides the most effective and equitable position to address climate change (see Figure 1).
The UNFCCC and recent climate agreements assert climate change must be addressed in part through sustainable development.
Sustainable Development, it is argued by the UN, is a three-sided equation of equity, environment, and economic development—the 3 E’s.
I will examine five possible approaches to address climate change (as depicted in Figure 1) in light of UNFCCC Article 2 and the three pillars of sustainable development.
The targets and timetables approach The first approach is best characterized by the Targets and Timetables (T&T) approach (see Table 1).
Currently, the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol (KP), and the Cancun Agreements (CA) all seek to regulate GHG emissions as the primary source of climate change at the national level.
Based on this approach, the Kyoto Protocol commits developed countries to reduce GHG emissions to target limits.
The single largest advantage of this approach is that it is already in use by the UNFCCC and IPCC (Torvanger et al.
2004: 9).
A second significant advantage is that it works within the current constructs of the state-based international system.
So the incentive system runs parallel with the state-based system, providing rules and norms that help guide, implement, and to some extent, enforce GHG emissions’ mitigation through binding global agreements supported by domestic mechanisms.
Thus, this approach holds the state responsible for determining and implementing its own mitigation mechanisms to reach target emissions.
A third advantage is that it is empirically calculable.
A fourth advantage is that it is only one step removed from individual behavior (person, firm, plant, or corporation) that generates emissions.
This reduces the level of uncertainty and enhances the validity of empirical measurements.
Finally, as technology changes, new technical options are easily implemented to mitigate emissions, creating an attractive synergy between national governments and corporations that incentivizes new technology.
There are significant drawbacks to this approach, however.
First, and most importantly, it relies heavily on the current international system, which is subject to severe disparities in power and leverage.
The structure inherently serves the interests of the dominant Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
11 Table 1.
Differing approaches to the architecture and development of climate policy.
powers.
This has led to fractious negotiations that have ended in entrenched, seemingly intractable, positions by various states and their collaborative partners.
Second, this represents only a short-term perspective for addressing climate change, with consequent solutions designed to slow the global GHG emissions that may trigger irreparable harm (which as discussed is the current medium-run goal of the regime).
Source Targets & Timetables (T&T) Structural Process Outcome Description Regulate individual activities that produce GHGs Regulate at the national source of GHGs Regulate Global Political & Economic Systems How int’l decisions are made in regulating commitments Regulate based on effects of CC Examples Individual allotments National GHG emissions Address dynamics of PAT (pop, tech, & affluence) International negotiation; participation; markets Impacts of climate change on local populations (e.g.
adaptation) Level of Focus Local/Individual/ Corps: individual emissions National National & Global Global Local/community: impacts on community Advantages * Addressing fundamental indiv drivers of GCC; * attacks ‘values’ underpinning behavior * Provides common ground * allows for clean technology to address the core of emissions * GHG emissions are source of GCC * calculable * In use (IPCC) * step close to emissions * bring in corps/tech * addresses structural driver of GCC * inherently builds on equity considerations * problems in both poor & affluent * considers the global feedback impact of GCC * focus is on means of producing equity * fairer participation = fairer outcome * those most effected have voice & standing (access) * Rawls: welfare of the worst-off nations maximized * Fairer burdensharing * prevents longer term problems * ensures most vulnerable covered *helps to redress structural inequities *polluter pays Disadvantages * Equity = egalitarian?
* Unrealistic for historic GHG emitters * emasculates sovereignty * need structural equality at same time * subject to power in int’l sys * distant from ‘real’ impacts * no consideration of global impacts * becomes a function of GDP *same int’l deadlock issues * execution Welfare system?
* negotiation about leverage & thus subject to power * state’s interest paramount * Increases costs * inhibits climate action * builds a case for compensation/ damages Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
12 A third disadvantage is that it remains far removed from the effects and consequences of climate change.
In fact, this approach offers no calculus of climate impacts, making it a highly inequitable policy approach for those who will suffer from significant climate effects.
Because GHG emissions cannot be simply turned off, and even in the best mitigation scenario will continue through inertia, this approach has significant inequity built into it for those vulnerable to climate change impacts.
In addition, this approach does little to address either the drivers of climate change and the political and economic structure in which climate change takes place.
Thus, it entails deep structural inequity.
A fourth disadvantage is that it counts emissions based on the source of production and not consumption.
This creates inequitable results because it provides a secondary incentive to locate the highest GHG producing activities in the poorest states.
Already for economic competitive advantage, the ‘dirtiest’ production plants and firms are located in these areas, which overall tend to be the most vulnerable to environmental change.
In essence, this provides cheap goods to the affluent with little or no environmental cost.
In fact, people largely assume the environmental cost where the plant or industry is located through degradation and increased emissions, which could offset positive economic development in developing countries.
Therefore, this approach creates a double incentive to locate these activities in poor states because powerful national governments would want the GHG emissions to be counted against least powerful states (with the power to do it).9 Incentives converge for both national governments and corporations to locate high GHG emission-producing plants in developing countries generating severe inequity.
Only by counting the GHGs where the good is consumed can climate policy generate equitable and economic benefits in line with sustainable development.
However, this is not the case with the T&T approach.
The source approach A second approach characterized by the source approach focuses on individual or local level emissions as the foundational drivers of GHG emissions.
That is, people— individually, in communities or as part of corporations, produce and use fossil fuels that augment global GHG levels contributing directly to GCC.
This approach would regulate those activities at the local level.
This approach can take many forms, from emission 9 This is only offset under the targets and timetables approach to the degree that CDM in the KP works to share of technology through clean energy programs in these countries.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
13 taxes, fuel standards, promoting clean energy use, or ‘contraction and convergence,’10 in which global emissions are reduced by reducing per capita (or individual) GHG emissions.11 Both the precautionary principle and principles of equity underscore some form of per capita approach to stabilizing and ultimately limiting GHG emissions.
The advantages of a source approach are that it is inherently based on principles of equity and thus has a strong justice component that will appeal to a variety of states for many reasons.
Specifically, a ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) policy is based on egalitarian criteria; that is, theoretically every person has the right to pollute to the same extent (and implicitly to be equally protected from pollution) (Meyer 2000; den Elzen et al.
2006).
Even global fuel or energy standards are undergirded by egalitarian principles, preserving justice as a primary force in climate policy.
Yet, it should be noted that historical responsibility, a highly debatable aspect of climate ethics, remains outside the scope of C&C (Oberheitmann 2010).12 Second, at this individual/local level, the drivers of climate change are addressed at its most fundamental level—the industry or energy producer and the individual as the consumer of fossil fuels.
This is the only approach that directly addresses the values that support environmentally degrading behavior.
Most importantly, clean energy technology can be applied at this level both to reduce emissions at the extraction/production site as well as at the consumer level.
This provides a direct link to generating GHG reductions at the base level and does so as part of a long-term goal.
In the current T&T approach, this is a tertiary goal—driven by the primary goal of reducing emissions at the national level.
Here, the primary goal and focus of the regime is upon developing core technologies that can be used to produce cleaner energy, and use this cleaner energy in homes and buildings thereby enhancing efficiency, effectiveness, equity and security.
Finally, it does offer some common ground for getting recalcitrant (yet differently positioned) countries like the USA and China to join in the global effort to combat global climate change, both through an incentivized approach based on technology and clean economies, as well as long-term 10 ‘Contraction’ is the reducing of global GHG emissions, and ‘convergence’ is the closing of the gap between per capita emissions between the affluent and the developing countries to a level (in the future) where ultimately emission outputs are equal for every person.
The total budget of carbon is to be equally shared through ‘entitlements’ based on a negotiable rate of linear convergence by an agreed upon timeline.
11 C&C was first formally proposed to the UNFCCC at COP-2 in 1996 by the Global Commons Institute, and at Copenhagen (2009) became a controversial subject.
As expected, it lacked support among developed countries.
12 The ‘Brazilian Proposal’ allocated national emission limits based on historic responsibility, which is based on the polluter pays principle (See, Meira Filho & Gonzalez Miguez 2000).
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
14 goal of recognizing per capita emissions.
For example, China already supports C&C, while the USA may be enticed by incentives that reduce their obligations (initially) toward contraction with higher investment in clean energy.
If this technology and clean energy were shared with the developing world, this would further soften the ground for agreement.
This could actually build common ground, rather than feebly attempting to ‘find’ common ground, around long-run per capita emissions for states with divergent interests.
The primary disadvantage of the source approach is that it may be unrealistic for historic GHG emitters, who would have to consent (through international negotiation) to it—something that to date is rare in international politics.
At this point, without technology to guarantee low per capita emissions, historical emitters may resist even soft long-term targets for several reasons.
First, there may be a greater chance to bridge the China-USA gap through this approach than the T&T approach, particularly if tethered to clean energy incentives.
Second, it emasculates sovereignty and a nation’s control over its territory and citizens, which is historically a particularly hard sell for countries like the USA and China.
In this regard, it is extremely doubtful that any progress could be expected on C&C or GHG emissions per capita except as a nonbinding long-term goal without other incentives.
Third, enforcement would be a challenge, because it requires the state to hold individuals accountable for greenhouse contributions—a highly unlikely scenario.
Fourth, it is difficult to implement if the structural conditions that lead to global economic inequality are not addressed concomitantly.
Finally, it is also difficult to standardize between countries and is dependent then on the incentives to develop technology outside of the formal climate architecture.
The structural approach A third approach is a structural approach, where the focus of addressing climate change is on the structures that create and perpetuate GHG emissions.
This approach addresses the underlying structural drivers of emissions leading to climate change.
It would regulate climate change through changes to the political and economic systems at both the global and national scale.
The primary advantage of this approach is that it attempts to get at the structural and institutional impediments to addressing climate change.
For example, this approach would examine traditional structural dynamics leading to Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
15 environmental degradation, such as population increases, technology, and affluence.
This leads to a second advantage in that it seeks to recognize the extent to which each state is contributing to the problem regardless of socio-economic starting point (based on GDP).
Theoretically, this is formed upon equity grounds; however, it would ultimately turn on whether historical antecedents for socio-economic conditions and population growth were concomitantly taken into consideration.
Another significant advantage is that it recognizes global climate change as a process that continually influences and changes the political and economic structure.
So part of this calculus considers the feedback of biophysical processes from climate changes upon the macro human subsystem.
There are serious drawbacks to the structural approach.
First, in many ways it relies heavily on GDP for determining responsibility toward climate change.
As a result, it would not differ much in international negotiations from the current T&T approach and thus have the same limitations.
Second, if climate change is seen as a problem of structural drivers, then attending to those institutional drivers becomes a complex problem—one that may be as complex as the climate problem itself.
For example, addressing trade disparities, conditional loans and investment streams that favor developed countries, is a complex and highly politicized debate.
Increasing consumption in both developed and rapidly developing countries is another example—a significant issue that has been left off the discussion table altogether.
Yet the climate problem is embedded within these structural disparities.
Finally, addressing climate change through structural adjustments runs the risk of appearing as a welfare system designed to funnel financial and technological resources from the developed to the underdeveloped in a way that seems separate from the impacts of and responsibility for climate change.
Most likely, these are fatal flaws that would lead to intractable collective action problems.
However, the structural approach does demonstrate that addressing emission reductions and adaptation without attending to the structural drivers merely treats the symptoms of the climate problem.
The process approach A fourth approach centers on the process and/or procedure through which international decisions are made in regulating commitments.
The focus is on the international negotiation process, participation in the global environmental decision-making, access Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
16 to information and data, and the market as a medium for addressing GCC.
The biggest advantage of this approach is that those who are (or will be) adversely affected by climate change have both a voice and presumably some form of standing (that is, access) to the international system to redress their vulnerabilities, impacts, and damages from climate change.
A second distinct advantage is that it can produce procedural justice by focusing on the means of generating policy.
A third, related advantage is, in principle, that there is a correlation between fair participation and de minimus fairer outcomes.
Finally, Rawls’s maxim (1971) is implicit in this approach in that the welfare of the worst-off nations should be maximized, and thus operate as a net benefit to the poorest nations.13 Although Rawls did not endorse use of his theory directly as an argument for economic redistribution in the international arena, and instead confined it to a single society, it represents a specific justice approach to climate change that is not only relevant to generating equitable policy but one that cannot be ignored (Rawls, 1999:106).
Henry Shue argues that through this process, the well off should not be enriched at the expense of the not so well-off, thereby expanding inequality (Shue 1999).
Finally, it offers a platform for discussing burden sharing, and how to spread the costs of mitigation and adaptation (See, Shue 1999; Meyer & Roser 2006; Page 2008).
A distinct advantage of this approach is therefore that it highlights inequality in deriving decisions as well as in the outcomes of decisions.
The disadvantage of the process approach is that ultimately negotiation (at any level) is about leverage, and thus is about power.
Power in the international system is inherently unequal, giving little leverage for those disenfranchised.
Similarly, the international system continues to be dominated by sovereignty and state self-interest, which again diminishes procedural aspects of standing and access for those disaffected by climate changes.
Moreover, the powerful can use bargaining tactics to undermine collective action.
As Henry Shue points out, many countries such as the United States (and now China) are employing a strategy of waiting for others to do their ‘fair share’ before they will agree do the same, resulting in paralysis (Shue 2011).
So, the powerful can manipulate the procedural process through which climate outcomes are negotiated, 13 This theory is here applied generally to the international arena in the climate context.
The argument here is that fundamentally distributive justice (in theory) lacks the capacity of imposing differing obligations between the domestic and international arenas, as ‘nationality’ would be an arbitrary characteristic similar to innate talent, race or social status.
In addition, this process approach would not necessitate direct wealth redistribution, but a duty to assist those who are directly affected by human induced climate change, and to do so to the extent of full reparations.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
17 leading once again to unjust outcomes.
This suggests that representation and standing do not necessarily guarantee an efficient or equitable outcome for parties, and may be ineffectual as a global instrument.
In addition, a voice without standing (political or legal) has little meaning, and further without a legal structure or venue to protect access, the procedural approach may make little difference in outcome.
Finally, this approach cannot represent a stand-alone approach to climate policy; in fact, it must operate as a complement to another approach.
The outcomes approach Finally, the fifth approach is one based on outcomes of climate change.
That is, climate policy is developed by examining the effects of GCC, particularly in local communities and specific contexts.
The most compelling rationale supporting the outcome approach is that, because there are multiple ways to achieve just and efficacious climate policy, it offers a more diverse platform for equitable burden sharing (Rayner 2010).
Second, there are underlying legal and political justifications for this approach, as GHG emission inputs (by human beings) are a direct causal force in harming both the environment and other human beings.14 This causational link moves the GCC issue into a sphere of justice that demands (in some form) the outcome approach (that is, adaptation).
This argument is strengthened by two other variables—disproportionality and predisposed vulnerability.
Climate change has locally disproportionate effects on those already marginalized and vulnerable (Pielke et al.
2007; Fisher 2011), and this approach acknowledges and addresses this important aspect of the climate problem.
Third, this approach emphasizes dealing with the consequences of climate change, which will help mitigate additional unintentional effects, like the loss of culture and sovereignty, and climate-related diasporas that post a threat to the global community and economy, and to individual states.
Fourth, this approach includes forms of bottomup, context-driven adaptation, but also compensatory justice, providing for broader prescriptions and forms of reparations from the damages caused by GCC.
Fifth, contrary to the other approaches, this approach does not necessarily require international consensus to work or to build new institutions out of whole cloth.
Sixth, the outcome approach breaks down the state-based formula necessary within the T&T approach and allows for vulnerable populations in developed countries, like impoverished sectors in 14 Admittedly, proving specific causation, legally or even politically, is a significant issue, but one that does not subvert the argument here.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
18 the USA or the Inuit (in the USA, Canada, and Russia), to be recognized based on how they are affected by climate change.
Finally, making the outcome approach, more than any other, has the potential to galvanize (Rayner 2010) because all parties need to adapt and build more resilient societal spaces.
All in all, by including a fuller range of costs, an outcome approach changes the GCC calculus in ways that provide a more accurate reflection of the GCC problem and its consequences.
The major disadvantage of this approach is that it raises the perceived ‘costs’15 of GCC, which create clear disincentives to broadening the approach to GCC.
Although perceived costs do not include costs to the environment, vulnerable communities, security, or the costs of ‘doing nothing’.
Second, a pure ‘justice’ angle rarely generates political action that counters national self-interest.
A third drawback would be getting the global community to recognize climate impacts for those most vulnerable and to adequately fund adaptation.
The proposed US$100 billion for adaptation in the Cancun Agreements does not come close to the amount deemed necessary for large-scale adaptation globally (Stern 2009).
In addition, global financial constraints and political perceptions of the climate issue suggest that as more resources are devoted to mitigation to prevent 2 C, less will be devoted toward adaptation.
This ‘pendulum of costs’ is beyond the scope of this article, but it does provide a potentially significant limitation to the outcome approach.
This stresses the importance of incentivized connection with another approach that properly incentivizes the development of clean energy with climate adaptation.
Finally, ‘cost’ calculi represents a Pandora’s box, as who determines what is a climate-related impact, to what degree is it climate-related, who gets the money (what hierarchy), and who collects and distributes it with the capability of monitoring to ensure its proper use?
These questions are not fatal flaws, but they point to significant impediments to international agreement and future climate policy.
Reframing the approach to climate governance Changing the climate change frame: Justifying outcome and source approaches In evaluating the five approaches, the key question is not so much about mitigation or adaptation as it is how much of climate change can (and should) be accepted.
In the 15 I say perceived costs here, because multifarious and significant costs are associated with GCC, far beyond mitigation costs and/or even adaptation costs, such as the damage to culture, indirect costs to local or national economies, or even administrative costs (at all levels).
However, to date, the singular focus of climate negotiation has been on national level mitigation costs.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
19 language of Article 2, the question is how much climate change can be endured yet avoid DAI (‘dangerous anthropic interference’).
Today, mitigation and adaptation are considered in separate spheres or more recently as ‘two sides to the same coin.’ That said, much of the discussion and policy remains based on the T&T approach toward mitigation (that is, regulating GHG emissions at the national scale).
This becomes an economic question—how much climate mitigation can be afforded?
In this short-term view, economic self-interest will prevail over the environmental considerations, at least until such environmental costs become more apparent and significant or economic interests align with environmental ones.
This directly suggests that, even at the national level, it is economically rational to delay action until those costs become increasingly clear or until new technology develops.
The success of the regime, even if fully implemented, is then completely dependent on the degree to which technology provides answers.
Even with motivation toward developing clean development technologies, finding cooperative arrangements when varying states have different historical responsibilities, capacities, political ideologies, and goals is difficult.
In other words, the T&T approach in many ways inhibits economic motivation from being fully pursued and realized.
It politicizes the climate regime and inhibits both market incentives and fails to address the human security of vulnerable peoples.
As a result, at the global level the targets and timetables strategy inspires various forms of free riding, as larger national economies can continue business-as-usual without any additional economic costs,16 while others suffer the consequences.
Without long-term goals and assessments, this free riding remains and national economic self-interest and externalizing economic and environmental costs become the driving forces of the climate regime.
However, when the question is changed to ask how much of climate change can (and should) be accepted by the global community, the calculus changes.
I am not suggesting that nations will not continue to view climate policy through a lens of self-interest.
Rather, climate change is a global problem that creates changes in global climate, and thus to solve it requires a global perspective—not a conglomeration of national perspectives.
This global perspective is further justified by two elements, one that humans are directly and disproportionately affected by the actions of other humans, and second, that the earth’s biosphere is a global commons that all human beings are entitled 16 Some scholars may suggest that economic opportunity costs arelost by delay, particularly in developing renewable energy technologies, and has been suggested, there are many who suggest that the long-term consideration of climate change has present economic costs of delaying action now (Stern 2007).
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
20 to enjoy free of harm.
On the former, the disproportionate effects create not only severe inequity but also serious security risks at the national and global levels.
In shifting the question to a global perspective and away from national self-interest, the foci of the problem itself are transformed in two ways.
First, it includes those adversely affected by climate change and therefore brings the outcome approach to the fore, and second, the question emphasizes some form of an approach that is best for the global community, and not exclusively based on state self-interest.
The emphasis then is on a source approach, one that may focus on creating clean energy and new technology— which can be employed to the benefit of the global community.
Simply put, this is a global problem affecting all nations (and people) and solutions should benefit all nations and the global community.
This approach transforms the climate debate into a positive sum game.
When outcomes and sources are included in climate policy discussion, the calculus for mitigation is also changed.
That is, adaptation becomes a cost of mitigation, and more emphasis is put on preventing the damage caused by human augmented GHG emissions (to reduce the costs of adaptation).
So, if mitigation is solely part of the economic calculus, then for self-interested individuals, the equation is simple: is the harm from global climate change (to themselves or community) greater than economic costs of mitigation?
Most in the USA see little harm from GCC to themselves personally, and therefore any economic cost is likely too high.
However, if adaptation is part of the cost equation—that is, harm to others caused by GHG emissions, then the costs of doing nothing increase and becomes part of tradeoff analysis for climate policy.
Action to prevent future harm (and costs) becomes imperative.
In this form, justice emerges naturally from the cost equation, not as a function of strict national mitigation and/or historic responsibility.
In addition, it provides political justification for domestic policies on climate change, particularly for the USA.
As such, this is the core strength of the outcome approach to global climate change.
Even further, this can be incentivized through the source approach based on developing clean technologies.
Assessing ‘danger’ in Article 2 The threshold question from Article 2 for long-term climate policy centers on assessing (i) DAI—dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, and (ii) what are the subject(s) of the prevention.
In preventing DAI with the climate system, the Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
21 question becomes: what is the mandate designed to prevent or protect?
Most scholars and policy makers have interpreted this aspect of DAI to mean the establishment of formal mechanisms designed around stabilizing national emissions by the largest polluters to ultimately ‘stabilize’ global GHGs to prevent a 2 C increase.
Thus the regime has advocated and promoted for the last 20 years the T&T approach to climate policy.
The argument here is not to dismiss informal mechanisms and/or formal monitoring of national GHGs, but rather, that this approach as the core of the regime misses the mark.
Rather, the source approach, particularly when long-term goals are considered, offers a more substantive and effective path forward for the regime.
It places energy at the center rather than aggregated emissions and targets and timetables.
This offers more pragmatic pathways to generating effective GHG mitigation and international agreement.
On the second question—what is climate policy designed to protect from DAI, closer examination of the secondary aspects of Article 2 provides some insight.
Specifically, Article 2 states (in the second part) that the ceiling for global GHG emissions should be kept at a level ‘to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner’ (UN 1992).
The focus here is on maintaining global GHG concentrations at a given level to allow natural ecosystem adaptation, not threaten agricultural production, and promote sustainable development.
The question is whether Article 2, in establishing the purpose and goal of the regime, included consideration of the impacts from climate change, and if so, to what degree and in what form should we consider the effects from climate change as part of the core mandate of the climate regime?
Considering the whole of Article 2, should concentrations (through radiative climate forcing) reach a level where changes to the ecosystem outpace adaptation and/or threaten food production, it would indeed constitute ‘dangerous’ interference with the climate system.
This provides an initial clue that the framers were thinking to include ‘impacts’ to human support systems when drafting the Article.
In fact, in some parts of the world—for example, atolls, the Arctic, lowlands of Africa—we are already seeing the pace of changes outstrip natural adaptation, food production, and adaptive capacity.
In addition, much of international environmental law (IEL) has evolved primarily based Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
22 on the norms that states are responsible for ‘transboundary harm’ from activities within their dominion and control.17 This principle of IEL that states are responsible for transboundary harm reinforces that states should be theoretically responsible for climate impacts.
This, in conjunction with anthropogenic interference with the climate system that threatens food production implies that climate impacts must be part of the initial design of Article 2.
Article 1 of the UNFCCC (UN 1992) also provides guidance on ‘adverse effects of climate change’ as it states: ‘Adverse effects of climate change’ means changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socioeconomic systems or on human health and welfare.
As part of the Convention, Article 1 suggests concern for socio-economic and health aspects of climate impacts, not just biophysical impacts (See Jamieson 1992, 1996; Rayner & Malone 1998; Adger 2001; Gupta et al.
2003; Gardiner 2006).
In addition, Article 4.1(f) asks all parties to minimize adverse climate effects on: ‘[T]he economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change’ (UN 1992, UNFCCC Article 4(1)(f)).
However, despite this reading of Article 1, there has been less attention to the socioeconomic aspects as a source of ‘danger’ in discussions on Article 2.
Rather, the ‘political and diplomatic process through which it evolved paid much more attention to physical and biological vulnerabilities as sources of danger, and rather less attention to economic issues …[while] ethical and cultural considerations have been nearly absent’ (Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005: 213).
Clearly if there are socio-economic considerations as part of ‘danger,’ the broader aspects of human systems, i.e.
cultural, ethical and psychological, must also be part of the calculus.
17 See the Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21, which is echoed in the Rio Declaration, Principle 2: ‘States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’ Principle 21 has now become customary law, which means that it applies to all states and not only states to a particular agreement.
In IEL, see: Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1911 (1938), reprinted in 33 A.J.I.L.
182 (1939), 3, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1938 (1941), reprinted in 35 A.J.I.L.
684 (1941).
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
23 In further support of this interpretation, the final sentence of Article 2 gives significant primacy to ‘sustainable development.’ Although this could be an attempt to privilege economic development relative to climate change and environmental harm, it nevertheless demonstrates a linkage between climate ‘danger,’ its outcomes (effects), and sustainable development (Brundtland 1987).
Given the history of sustainable development and climate change, the nexus between sustainable development—defined by the WCED as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’—and climate change fit naturally with the ideas of stabilizing future concentrations and preventing dangerous outcomes—particularly for future generations (Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005).
This emphasizes the three Es of Environment (protection), economic (development) and equity (fairness in process and substance) as part of climate governance.
Reading both the precepts of sustainable development in line with Article 1 of the UNFCCC strongly suggests that not only would DAI include climate impacts, but it would also include socio-economic, cultural, and health (mental, emotional and psychological) impacts in addition to the biophysical ones (IPCC 2007d; Schneider et al.
2001).
To include these necessary elements therefore endorses the outcome approach to climate policy.
Article 2: A ‘danger’ to whom?
What remains unanswered, however, is what a ‘danger’ is to whom and how should those ‘in danger’ be assessed?
Here, there is no easy answer.
A single, absolute metric of ‘dangerous anthropic interference’ cannot be attained due to differential impacts and vulnerabilities (Dessai et al.
2003, 2004; Schneider 2001, 2004; Jacoby 2004).
Moreover, ‘dangerous’ is a socially constructed term that requires knowledge of local context to understand how these impacts and vulnerabilities contextually play out.
In determining DAI, value judgments are necessary to determine who is affected.
Such value judgments are context specific (Dessai et al.
2004) and imply judgments about selection, comparability and significance, which in turn suggest that peoples’ perceptions play a large role in defining ‘dangerous’ (see, generally, Azar & Sterner 1996).
In other words, ‘various societies and peoples may value the significance of impacts and vulnerabilities on human and natural systems differently’ (IPCC 2007d: 784).
For example, a resource-dependent society will value protecting its resource base more than most developed countries, and will thus prioritize the risk or ‘danger’ to those Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
24 resources.
As a result, biophysical indicators cannot sufficiently capture that communities—particularly those with different socio-economic positions, will be affected differently by the same level of climate change, and therefore they will not share the same meaning of ‘dangerous.’ Finally, the choice of scale is ‘also crucial, as considerations of fairness, justice and equity require examination of the distribution of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation potential, not only among, but also within groupings’ (IPCC 2007d: 784; Jamieson 1992; Gardiner 2004).
Thus in operationalizing Article 2, examining how climate impacts affect people in a local context, and how people perceive those risks associated with climate change are critical features in determining DAI.
These aspects of climate policy and policy discussions are understated in negotiations and understudied in climate scholarship.
This suggests that DAI is both how people are contributing to GHGs that change the biophysical climate system, but also how people are affected by these changes in climate and how they perceive that their exposure to the danger (posed by climate changes) has been augmented.
As a result, before there can be a logical first step toward defining DAI at the global level, it must be understood from a climate impact perspective at the local level, including people’s perception of risk.
Therefore, longterm goals for equitable global climate policy (in meeting the objective of the UNFCCC as outlined by Article 2) can only be attained by understanding locally derived conditions that assess and establish ‘risk’ and DAI.
A second insight from these approaches to DAI is that it provides a cogent argument for establishing long-term goals and targets around DAI, which help guide near-term decisions on mitigation commitments under the Convention (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003) as well as protect the most vulnerable by understanding their exposure to climate changes in their local context (Fisher 2011).
Conclusion: Implications and consequences for climate governance I have argued that by establishing long-term goals for climate policy we can deduce more effective short-term climate policy (instead of the current approach of starting with short-term goals and moving forward).
This requires understanding the tangible threats from climate change and recognizing synergistic linkages for incentivizing climate action.
It necessitates reframing the political problem of global climate change Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
25 to define ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ with the climate system in identifying those threats.
Developing long-term goals to address these threats from global climate change depends in large part on defining and operationalizing elements of UNFCCC Article 2.
In attempting to operationalize Article 2, I showed that there are several stages in the causal process where climate changes could be measured, monitored and addressed by the regime.
Currently, the regime has adopted the T&T approach to address climate changes, which has been shown to be politically difficult in international negotiations, particularly considering China and the USA are reluctant to engage in national emissions caps.
Without addressing the unsustainable drivers of GCC, this approach may not address effectively the climate problem even if fully implemented.
It also runs the risk that it may exacerbate current global inequalities, which places additional emphasis on developing a climate architecture that includes fair distribution of the responsibility and burdens from climate change.
However, despite the proliferation of literature on burden allocation, from a policy perspective, it is very difficult to negotiate and get self-interested actors to comply with agreed-on parameters.
One of the primary risks from climate change to global (and national) economic and political systems is the increasing cost from growing insecurity and inequity.
Both elements provide a challenge to the global system, a risk that is underrepresented in current international negotiations and climate policy calculi.
Instead of climate security, responsibility and equity framing the climate debate, it has been mischaracterized as a singular environmental issue using the T&T approach.
Climate change however is not a function of environmental degradation per se, but rather a function of unsustainable drivers of human development that represents significant threats to human systems, particularly those most vulnerable.
This explains why traditional environmental methods and solutions have been ineffective in addressing the climate problem.
Therefore, the climate regime must replace the T&T approach with a combination of outcome and source approaches.
By adopting these approaches, it essentially splits mitigation and adaptation into two separate strategies.
The first is based on energy transformation and sources of emissions, where major polluters, the USA and China, can build common ground.
By focusing on energy transformation will deviate each country from the business as usual path, while bypassing what may be an intractable Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
26 problem of fair allocation and responsibility.
The second is an explicit focus on adaptation because as currently constituted in the regime, adaptation is a secondary priority to mitigation.
The source approach shifts the focus away from national GHG emissions’ limits to the development of clean energy toward long-term goals of carbon neutrality and (relatively) equal per capita emissions.
In operationalizing this aspect of Article 2, it establishes targets based on the development of clean energy and renewable energy implementation (and targets), which can be more effectively integrated into an incentivized climate regime as well as address directly the drivers of GHG emissions.
This approach also offers synergies and incentives for the USA and China to cooperate.
Both countries recognize that ‘green growth’ is a key to the future of economic development, and both recognize not only the harmful effects to ecosystems and humans from industrial processes, but also that energy systems must be transformed.
In addition, energy targets could be integrated into a system of contraction and convergence that allows for higher emissions, at least temporarily, the more funding and research put into energy development.
This would create more equitable framework, based on contracting emissions per capita, while emphasizing energy transformation.
The source approach therefore is a bridge between the seemingly growing gap between China and the USA, as well as bridges the divide between developed and developing countries.
It provides a path forward where none exists currently based on the T&T approach.
This shift would also recognize, through the outcome approach, the need to protect those most immediately threatened by the effects of climate change.
It was established that this includes climate impacts more generally, and includes not only biophysical effects but also socio-economic, cultural and psychological effects.
Next, this process should be examined at the local level and by studying how people are affected by a combination of causal and consequential pathways.
These macro-approaches to climate change would be more effective in both addressing the drivers of GHG emissions (rather than based purely on outcomes) and provides clearer incentives to climate action.
They also work together to create a more equitable approach (a mandate from both UNFCCC regime and sustainable development), both normatively in establishing longterm non-binding goals as well as empirically through active protection of the most Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
27 vulnerable as a function of security—not merely as a handout or opaque notions of justice.18 In the final analysis, creating long-term goals with guideposts built around the source and outcome approaches is critical not only to creating an efficacious and equitable climate architecture but to the policy and governance of the issue.
Reference List Adger, W. N. 2001, ‘Scales of Governance and Environmental Justice for Adaptation and Mitigation of Climate Change,’ Journal of International Development, vol.
13, no.
7, 921–931.
Azar, C. & Sterner, T. 1996.
‘Discounting and Distributional Considerations in the Context of Climate Change,’ Ecological Economics, vol.
19, 169–185.
Blanchard, O., Baumert, K.A., Perkaus, J.F., & Llosa, S. 2002, Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate.
World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
Berkes, F. & Jolly, D. 2001, ‘Adapting to Climate Change: Social-ecological Resilience in a Canadian Western Arctic Community,’ Conservation Ecology, vol.
5, no.
2, article 18.
Online, available: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol5/iss2/art18/ [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].
Brundtland, G. 1987, Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Corfee-Morlot, J. and Höhne, N. 2003, ‘Climate Change: Long-term Targets and Short-term Commitments,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
13, 277–293.
den Elzen, M. G. J., & Meinshausen, M. 2006, ‘Multi-gas Emission Pathways for Meeting the EU 2 C Climate Target,’ In Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, (eds) H. J. Schellnhuber, W. Cramer, N. Nakicenovic, T. Wigley, & G. Yohe.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Dessai, S., Adger, W.N., Hulme, M., Turnpenny, J., Kohler, J.
& Warren, R. 2004, ‘Defining and Experiencing Dangerous Climate Change,’ Climatic Change, vol.
64, 11–25.
Douglas, B., Kearney, M. S., & Leatherman, S. P (eds).
2001, Sea Level Rise: History and Consequences.
Academic Press, San Diego.
Elzen, M. D. & Berk, M. 2003, ‘How Can the Parties Fairly and Effectively Establish Future Obligations under Long-term Climate Objectives?,’ in Climate Policy for the 21st Century: Meeting the LongTerm Challenge of Global Warming, (ed.)
D. Michel.
Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 113–151.
Fisher, P. B.
2011 (forthcoming), ‘Climate Change in Tuvalu: The effect of Marine Ecosystem Changes on Human Security,’ Global Change, Peace and Security, vol.
23, no.
3.
Gardiner, S. M. 2004, ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change,’ Ethics, vol.
114, 555–600.
_____ 2006, ‘A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption,’ Environmental Values, vol.
15, 397–413.
Goklany, I. M. 2002, ‘From Precautionary Principle to Risk-risk Analysis,’ Nature Biotechnology, vol.
20, 1075.
Gupta, J.
2003, ‘Engaging Developing Countries in Climate Change,’ in Climate Policy for the 21st Century: Meeting the Long-Term Challenge of Global Warming, (ed.)
D. Michel.
Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 233–264.
Gupta, J.
& van Asselt, H. 2006, ‘Helping Operationalize Article 2: A Transdisciplinary Methodological Tool for Evaluating When Climate Change is Dangerous,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
16, 83–94.
Henry, A. D. 2000, ‘Public Perceptions of Global Warming,’ Human Ecology Review, vol.
7, 25–30.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2001a, Climate Change 2001: A Summary for Policymakers.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York.
_____ 2007a, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York.
_____ 2007b, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the 18 This is not meant to say that there aren’t fundamental issues of justice inherent to the climate change problematique, there are.
However, it is difficult to see justice as a primary vehicle for international political cooperation and political change to address climate change.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
28 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (eds) S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor & H. L. Miller (eds).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York.
_____ 2007c, ‘Summary for Policymakers,’ in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (eds) S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B.
Averyt, M.Tignor & H. L. Miller.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York.
_____ 2007d, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (eds) M. Parry, O. Canziani, J. Palutikof, P. van der Linden & C. Hanson.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York.
Jacoby, H. D. 2004, ‘Informing Climate Policy Given Incommensurable Benefits Estimates,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
14, 287–297.
Jamieson, D. 1992, ‘Ethics, Public Policy and Global Warming,’ Science, Technology, and Human Values, vol.
17, 139–153.
Kanie, N., Nishimoto H., Hijioka, Y.
& Kameyama, Y.
2010, ‘Allocation and Architecture in Climate Governance Beyond Kyoto: Lessons from Interdisciplinary Research on Target Setting,’ International Environmental Agreements, vol.
10, 299–310.
Kasperson, R. E., Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, H. S., Emel, J., Goble, R., Kasperson, J.
& Ratick, S. 1988, ‘The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework,’ Risk Analysis, vol.
8, 177–187.
Keller, U.
2003, ‘Operationalizing Article 2 of the UNFCCC,’ Development Alternatives Newsletter, vol.
13, no.
11, 19–20.
Kenny, G. J., Warrick, R. A., Campbell, B. D., Sims, G. C., Camilleri, M., Jamieson, P. D. and Mitchell, N.D. 2000, ‘Investigating Climate Change Impacts and Thresholds: An Application of the CLIMPACTS Integrated Assessment Model for New Zealand Agriculture,’ Climatic Change, vol.
46, 91–113.
Laidler, G.J.
2006, ‘Inuit and Scientific Perspectives on the Relationship Between Sea Ice and Climate Change: The Ideal Complement?,’ Climatic Change, vol.
78, 407–444.
McDaniels, T., Lawrence J.
A., and Slovic, P. 1996, ‘Perceived Ecological Risks of Global Change: A Psychometric Comparison of Causes and Consequences,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
6, 159–171.
Meira Filho, L. G. & Gonzalez Miguez, J. D. 2000, Note on the Time-dependent Relationship Between Emissions of Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change.
Ministry of Science and Technology, Federal Republic of Brazil, Brazilia.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/brazil/documents/proposta.pdf [Accessed 1 Sep 2011].
Melkas, E. 2002, ‘Sovereignty and Equity Within the Framework of the Climate Regime,’ Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, vol.
11, no.
2, 115–128.
Meyer, A.
2000, Contraction and Convergence.
The Global Solution to Climate Change.
Green Books, London.
Meyer, L. H. & Roser, D., 2006, ‘Distributive Justice and Climate Change: The Allocation of Emissions Rights,’ Analyse and Kritik, vol.
28, 222–48.
Moss, R.H. and Schneider, S.H.
2000, ‘Uncertainties in the IPCC TAR: Recommendations to Lead Authors for More Consistent Assessment and Reporting,’ in Guidance Papers on the Cross Cutting Issues of the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC, (eds) R. Pachauri, T. Taniguchi & K. Tanaka.
World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, 33–51.
Oberheitmann, A.
2011, ‘A New Post-Kyoto Climate Regime Based on Per-capita Cumulative CO2emission Rights—Rationale, Architecture and Quantitative Assessment of the Implication for the CO2-emissions from China, India and the Annex-I countries by 2050,’ Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, vol.
15, 137–168.
OECD 2003, ‘Development and Climate Change in Nepal: Focus on Water Resources and Hydropower,’ Document COM/ENV/EPOC/DCD/DAC(2003)1/FINAL.
OECD Environment Directorate, Paris.
Online, available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/51/19742202.pdf [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].
Oppenheimer, M. 2005, ‘Defining Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference: The Role of Science, the Limits of Science,’ Risk Analysis vol.
25, 1399–1407.
Oppenheimer, M. & Petsonk, A.
2003, ‘Global Warming: The Intersection of Long-term Goals and Nearterm Policy,’ Climate Policy for the 21st Century: Meeting the Long-Term Challenge of Global Warming, (ed.)
D. Michel, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 79–112.
Ott, K., Klepper, G., Lingner, S., Schäfer, A., Scheffran, J.
& Sprinz, D. 2004, ‘Reasoning Goals of Climate Protection,’ Specification of Article 2 UNFCCC.
Berlin: Umweltbundesamt.
Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
29 Page, E. 2008, ‘Distributing the Burdens of Climate Change,’ Environmental Politics, vol.
17, 556–75.
Parry, M. L., Carter, T. & Hulme, M. 1996, ‘What is Dangerous Climate Change?,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
6, 1–6.
Patwardhan, A., Schneider, S. H. and Semenov, S. M. 2003, ‘Assessing the Science to Address UNFCCC Article 2,’ IPCC Concept Paper.
Online, available: http://www.fiacc.net/data/cct3_Art_2_key_vulnerabilities.pdf [Accessed 1 Sep 2011].
Paavola, J.
& Adger, W. N. 2006, ‘Fair Adaptation to Climate Change,’ Ecological Economics, vol.
56, no.
4, 594–609.
Pearce, D. W. 2003, ‘The Social Cost of Carbon and its Policy Implications,’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol.
19, 362–384.
Pielke Jr, R., Prins, G., Rayner, S. & Sarewitz, D., 2007, ‘Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation,’ Nature, vol.
445, 597–598.
Pittini, M. & Rahman, M. 2004, ‘Social Costs of Carbon,’ in The Benefits of Climate Policies: Analytical and Framework Issues,(eds) J. Corfee-Morlot & S. Agrawala.
OECD, Paris, 189–220.
Prins, G. & Rayner, S., 2007, The Wrong Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate Policy.
MacKinder Programme for the Study of Long Wave Events, LSE and Institute for Science, Innovation & Society, University of Oxford, Oxford.
Online, available: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/insis/Documents/TheWrongTrousers.pdf [Accessed 22 June 2011].
Raper, S., Wigley, T. M. L. & Warrick, R. A.
1996, ‘Global Sea Level Rise: Past and Future,’ in Sea Level Rise and Coastal Subsidence: Causes, Consequences and Strategies, (eds) J. D. Milliman & B. U. Haq.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA.
Rawls, J.
1971, A Theory of Justice.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
_____ 1999, The Law of Peoples.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Rayner, S. & Malone, E. L. (eds) 1998, Human Choice and Climate Change (Vol.
1: The Societal Framework).
Battelle Press, Washington, DC.
Rayner, S. 2010, ‘How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy, Climate Policy, vol.
10, 615–621.
Schellnhuber, H. J., Cramer, W., Nakićenović, N., Yohe, G. & Wigley, T. M. L. (eds).
2006, Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Schneider, S. H. 2001, ‘What is ‘dangerous’ climate change?,’ Nature, vol.
411, 17–19.
_____ 2004, ‘Abrupt Non-linear Climate Change, Irreversibility and Surprise,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
14, 245–258.
Shue, H. 1999.
‘Global Environment and International Equity,’ International Affairs vol.
75, 531-45.
_____ 2011, ‘Face reality?
After You!—A Call for Leadership on Climate Change,’ Ethics and International Affairs, vol.
25, 17–26.
Stern, N. 2007, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
_____ 2009, The Global Deal: Climate Change and the Creation of a New Era of Progress and Prosperity.
Public Affairs, New York.
Torvanger, A., Twena, M. & Vevatne, J.
2004, ‘Climate Policy Beyond 2012: A Survey of Long-Term Targets and Future Frameworks,’ CICERO Report 2004:02.
CICERO, Oslo.
United Nations.
1992, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
FCCC/INFORMAL/84, GE.05-62220 (E) 200705.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [Accessed 5 May 2011].
_____ 1998, Kyoto Protocol.
Accessed May 5, 2010 at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
United Nations.
2009, Copenhagen Accord.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf [Accessed 24 May 2011].
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1994, Human Development Report 1994.
Oxford University Press, New York _____ 2007, ‘Summary—Human Development Report 2007/2008,’ Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World.
Palgrave-MacMillan, New York.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 2010.
The Emissions Gap Report: Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit Global Warming to 2°C or 1.5°C?.
Technical Report, Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme.
Online, available: http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport [Accessed 22 June 2011] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2010a.
Copenhagen Accord.
In: Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, decision 2/CP.15.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, Germany.
Online, available: Fisher Shifting Global Climate Governance PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
30 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf [Accessed 14 June 2011].
_____ 2010b.
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the Convention (The Cancun Agreements for the AWG-LCA).
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, Germany.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf [Accessed 14 June 2011].
_____ 2010c.
The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Longterm Cooperative Action under the Convention.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, Germany.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf [Accessed 22 June 2011].
Van Aalst, M. K., Cannon, T. & Burton, I.
2008, ‘Community Level Adaptation to Climate Change: The Potential Role of Participatory Community Risk Assessment,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
18, 165–179.
Wigley, T. M. L. 1995, ‘Global Mean Temperature and Sea Level Consequence of Greenhouse Gas Concentrations Stabilization,’ Geophysical Research Letters, vol.
22, 45–48.
_____ 1999, The Science of Climate Change: Global and US Perspectives.
Pew Center for Climate Change, Washington, DC.
Wilbanks, T. J.
& Robert K. 1999, ‘Global Change in Local Places: How Scale Matters,’ Climatic Change, vol.
43, 601–628.
World Resources Institute (WRI) 2010, Reflections on the Cancun Agreements.
WRI Working Paper, Washington, DC.
Online, available: http://pdf.wri.org/reflections_on_cancun_agreements.pdf [Accessed 22 June 2011].
FINALriedyandherrimanPORTALDec72011 PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
Special issue details: Global Climate Change Policy: Post-Copenhagen Discord Special Issue, guest edited by Chris Riedy and Ian McGregor.
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia.
Deliberative Mini-publics and the Global Deliberative System: Insights from an Evaluation of World Wide Views on Global Warming in Australia Chris Riedy and Jade Herriman, Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney Introduction In December 2009, more than 25,000 people converged on Copenhagen’s Bella Center for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP-15.
They came together to discuss the international response to climate change, to try and influence the discussions, or to observe or report on them.
Among the participants were 120 Heads of State empowered to act on behalf of their citizens, supported by delegations of Ministers and bureaucrats.
Dimitrov (2010: 18) contends that COP-15 brought together ‘the highest concentration of robust decision-making power the world had seen.’ Yet this unprecedented gathering of global decision-makers was unable to deliver an effective global response to climate change.
The Copenhagen Accord that emerged from COP-15 was not legally binding and was not formally adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
While climate scientists warn that the rise in global average temperatures must be kept to less than 2° C to avoid dangerous climate change (Allison et al.
2009; Rockström et al.
2009), and this is the stated goal Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
2 of the Copenhagen Accord, the pledges contained in the Accord are not sufficient to prevent global average temperatures from rising by more than 2° C (Dimitrov 2010; Rogelj et al.
2010) and perhaps as high as 3.5° C (Kartha 2010).
The subsequent United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, COP-16, gave formal status to the Copenhagen Accord but did not make it legally binding or increase its emission reduction ambition.
The outcome of COP-15 fuelled existing debates about the ability of current systems of international governance to satisfactorily respond to global challenges like climate change.
There is a large and diverse body of literature proposing normative global governance systems.
Some, like James Lovelock (Hickman 2010), propose more authoritarian responses to environmental challenges.
Frustrated with the performance of the United Nations, some propose the replacement of multilateral negotiations with an exclusive ‘minilateralism’ (Naim 2009), reducing the number of negotiating nations to a smaller set, such as the Group of Twenty (G20) or major emitters.
Others see the extension of market mechanisms delivering more effective global governance of climate change (Pearce 2008; Stripple 2010).
Still others are committed to democratisation of global governance, through the institutionalisation of cosmopolitan philosophy (Held 2009), establishment of frameworks for earth system governance (Biermann 2007; Biermann et al.
2010), reform of the United Nations (Figueres 2007), development of new global representative bodies (Raskin & Xercavins 2010) or the promotion of global deliberative politics (Dryzek 2006, 2011; Bohman 2010; Dryzek & Stevenson 2011).
In this paper, our focus is on the potential contribution of deliberative democracy to more effective—and more democratic—global environmental governance.
The ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory has ‘put communication and reflection at the center of democracy’ so that democracy ‘is not just about the making of decisions through the aggregation of preferences’ but ‘also about processes of judgment and preference formation and transformation within informed, respectful, and competent dialogue’ (Dryzek 2011: 3).
Thus deliberative democracy puts talking, rather than voting, at the heart of democracy (Chambers 2003).
In addition to an expanding body of normative theory on deliberative democracy, there is also growing empirical and practical experience with its application to environmental governance (e.g.
Backstrand et al.
2010) and with the design and implementation of temporary deliberative Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
3 institutions (Fung 2003; Chambers 2009; Smith, G 2009; Dryzek 2011).
The latter are often discrete, facilitated events that bring together relatively small numbers of ordinary citizens to deliberate, typically on issues that are controversial or defy more conventional decision-making processes.
Fung (2003) calls these deliberative events mini-publics; they include diverse techniques such as deliberative polls, citizens’ juries and consensus conferences, often involving randomly selected citizens (Smith, G. 2009).
Mini-publics offer a practical means to investigate the conditions for facilitating deliberation but the contribution of discrete mini-publics to the normative goal of creating a more deliberative democracy remains uncertain (Chambers 2009; Dryzek 2011).
Chambers (2009) argues that an exclusive focus on such discrete deliberative initiatives risks abandonment of larger questions about how civil society relates to the state.
Dryzek (2011) is generally supportive of mini-publics but locates them within large-scale political systems where they may or may not contribute to the emergence of more deliberative systems.
Our intent in this paper is to examine the role that deliberative mini-publics can play in facilitating the emergence of a global deliberative system for climate change response.
We pursue this intent through a reflective evaluation of the Australian component of the World Wide Views on Global Warming project (WWViews).
WWViews was an ambitious attempt to democratise COP-15 by giving people from around the world an opportunity to deliberate on international climate policy and to make recommendations to the delegations meeting in Copenhagen.
The Danish Board of Technology (DBT) and the Danish Cultural Institute (DCI) initiated the project as a way of feeding public deliberative opinion into national and international climate change decision-making processes (Danish Board of Technology 2009b).
Held on 26 September 2009, with roughly 4,000 participants across 38 countries, WWViews was the first attempt to create a deliberative mini-public at a global scale.
The Australian WWViews event brought 100 randomly selected citizens from across Australia to Sydney to deliberate for a day and a half.
As an example of a deliberative mini-public, WWViews provides an opportunity to reflect on theoretical concerns about the role of mini-publics in furthering the cause of deliberative democracy.
Further, as a global mini-public, WWViews potentially reveals new challenges for deliberative democratisation of global governance systems.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
4 Therefore, the objective of our evaluation is to draw out lessons for the design of future mini-publics, particularly at a global scale.
We reflect on WWViews from the perspective of one of the National Partners in WWViews, responsible for organising the Australian WWViews event.
As such, it is not our intention to evaluate the entire WWViews project across all of the participating countries.
Instead, we evaluate the Australian event and our partial experiences of the international project.
We do not provide detailed descriptions of the project and its outcomes, except where these are needed to support our evaluation.
Full reports on the Australian WWViews event (Atherton & Herriman 2009) and the global WWViews project (Danish Board of Technology 2009b) are available to interested readers.1 Normative characteristics of deliberative systems To reflect on the contribution of WWViews we first need to establish an evaluative framework.
To do this we reflect on existing evaluative frameworks for public participation processes in general and deliberative events in particular, and existing approaches to assessing the deliberativeness of socio-political systems.
From this we draw a set of evaluative criteria to apply to this case.
Evaluative frameworks for public participation processes (e.g.
Burton 2009; Rowe & Frewer 2004; Rowe & Frewer 2000) and sets of principles for community engagement (International Conference on Engaging Communities 2005; NCDD 2009) are readily available.
However, few of these frameworks and principles specifically draw attention to the quality of deliberation.
One exception is the Brisbane Declaration of the International Conference on Engaging Communities, which identifies integrity, inclusion, deliberation and influence as the core principles of community engagement (International Conference on Engaging Communities 2005).
Drawing on Carson and Hartz-Karp (2005: 122) and the text of the Brisbane Declaration, these principles can be expressed as follows: • Integrity: There should be ‘openness and honesty about the scope and purpose of engagement’ (International Conference on Engaging Communities 2005).
• Inclusion: The process should be representative of the population and inclusive of diverse viewpoints and values, providing equal opportunity for all to participate.
• Deliberation: The process should provide open dialogue, access to information, respect, space to 1 Additional information can be found at the Australian (http://wwviews.org.au) and international (http://wwviews.org) websites.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
5 understand and reframe issues, and movement toward consensus.
• Influence: The process should have the ability to influence policy and decision-making.
These principles provide a useful starting point for evaluating WWViews as a community engagement process.
However, more specific literature on the normative characteristics of deliberative processes helps to flesh out these principles, particularly the latter three.
Edwards et al.
(2008) offer a more detailed evaluation framework, developed specifically for deliberative events.
They propose and apply 37 evaluation criteria covering inputs (for example, diversity of participants, training for facilitators), process (covering quality of dialogue, participant knowledge and logistics) and outputs (i.e.
new discourses and networks developed, and influence over policy).
The criteria align well with the four principles above but provide more detailed questions to ask when evaluating a deliberative process, like WWViews.
We believe that these evaluative frameworks are more useful for our current purposes when considered within the context of a normative deliberative system.
Mansbridge (1999) introduced the idea of a deliberative system that stretches beyond any single deliberative event and Dryzek (2009, 2011) developed a generally applicable scheme for analysing deliberative systems comprising: • Public space, ideally allowing free communication with few barriers or legal restrictions on what can be said.
Designed citizen forums like WWViews occur in public space, as does media commentary, political activism, public consultation and informal conversation.
For discussions on global climate change response, global civil society provides an important deliberative arena within public space (Brassett & Smith, W 2010).
• Empowered space, ‘home to deliberation among actors in institutions clearly producing collective decisions’ (Dryzek 2011: 11).
These institutions can be formal or informal and include legislatures, cabinets, courts, or international negotiations like those at COP-15.
• Transmission refers to ‘some means through which deliberation in public space can influence that in empowered space’ (Dryzek 2011: 11).
Transmission can occur through advocacy, criticism, questioning, support or other means.
• Accountability, ‘whereby empowered space answers to public space’ (Dryzek 2011: 11).
Elections are one form of accountability and others can occur through public consultation processes or simply giving a public account that justifies decisions.
• Meta-deliberation, ‘or deliberation about how the deliberative system itself should be organized’ (Dryzek 2011: 12).
Dryzek argues that a healthy deliberative system should have the capacity for self-examination and potentially self-transformation.
• Decisiveness captures the idea that a functioning deliberative system should be able to make collective decisions that are responsive to the other five elements.
Bohman (2010a) draws further attention to the elements of a deliberative system when he argues that both communicative freedom and communicative power are essential to democratisation.
Communicative freedom ‘is the exercise of a communicative status, Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
6 the status of being recognised as a member of the public.
Communicative freedom is transformed into communicative power when it is incorporated into institutionalised processes of decision making’ (Bohman 2010a: 432).
Communicative freedom is an aspect of Dryzek’s public space and the existence of mini-publics is a testament to communicative freedom.
However, the transformation of communicative freedom into communicative power is very challenging.
Dryzek identifies mechanisms of transmission and accountability through which communicative power could be developed but says little about how citizens in public space can accumulate the power to effectively use these mechanisms.
Thus issues of power need to be taken into account in our evaluative framework.
Dryzek (2011) argues that a system has deliberative capacity to the extent that it can accommodate deliberation that is authentic, inclusive and consequential.
Deliberation is authentic if it is ‘able to induce reflection upon preferences in noncoercive fashion and involve communicating in terms that those who do not share one’s point of view can find meaningful and accept’ (Dryzek 2011: 10).
This notion of authenticity adds a new dimension to the principle of deliberation from the Brisbane Declaration above.
Dryzek’s (2011) other two criteria, inclusivity and consequentiality, align closely with the principles of inclusion and influence respectively from the Brisbane Declaration.
However, Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010: 43) point out that deliberative democracy ‘can entail the representation of discourses as well as persons, interests, or groups’ and inclusion of diverse discourses may be as or more important than demographic representation (although demographic representation remains important for both procedural fairness (Brackertz & Meredyth, 2008: 11) and as a way to deliver diversity of discourse).
This leads to a richer understanding of the principle of inclusion.
Following on from the above discussion, our evaluation of WWViews will proceed in two stages.
First, we will situate WWViews as a component within a normative global deliberative system for decision-making on climate change.
Second, we will evaluate WWViews against four principles that integrate the above sources: • Integrity: the origins and purpose of the deliberative process should be transparent and the process should be adequately resourced and respectfully facilitated without any attempt to influence the outcomes.
• Inclusion: The process should be representative of the affected population and their diverse discourses and provide equal opportunity for all to participate.
• Authentic deliberation: The process should support communicative freedom by providing access Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
7 to information, space for open and respectful dialogue between participants and sufficient time for reflection.
It should encourage but not coerce reflection on preferences.
• Influence and consequence: The process should develop the communicative power to make a difference, whether by influencing policy and decision-making or facilitating broader sociocultural change (e.g.
new discourses or networks).
These four principles capture a normative ideal for a deliberative mini-public.
As others have pointed out (Backstrand et al.
2010a), real practice inevitably falls short of the deliberative ideal, yet these principles do provide a useful evaluative vantage point for suggesting future progress towards such an ideal.
WWViews in a global deliberative system Dryzek’s (2009) conception of a deliberative system was first published in April 2009, when the WWViews process had already been designed.
Consequently, the organisers around the world did not have the benefit of this thinking and terminology to conceptualise how WWViews could contribute to a deliberative global system.
What follows, then, is not intended as criticism of the project for failing to apply this concept but an attempt to use this emerging concept to open up a broader conversation about the future of global mini-publics.
We analyse WWViews as an element within a global deliberative system, which helps to both explain what WWViews sought to achieve and to highlight the challenges it and future mini-publics face.
Public space The global WWViews project brought together 44 separate mini-publics in simultaneous events run by local organisations in 38 participating countries.2 Each event involved around 100 participants and together the events brought together a global minipublic of more than 4,000 people.
Although the DBT and DCI provided global coordination of the project, the national implementation was the responsibility of partner organisations in each country, which were typically universities or nongovernment organisations with interest in citizen engagement and democracy.
WWViews took place in public space as an exercise in communicative freedom—a response to the perception of a democratic gap between citizens and policymakers and a need to involve citizens more directly in deliberation on global climate change policy 2 Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium (Flanders), Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Saint Lucia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Maldives, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, and Vietnam.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
8 (Danish Board of Technology 2009b).
It did not have any formal decision-making status itself but sought to exert influence on decision-makers.
As an exercise within global public space, WWViews entered into a clamorous climate policy debate, populated by multiple competing discourses (Dryzek 2011).
Some of the challenges for mini-publics in such a crowded public space include being heard at all, and being seen as a legitimate voice of global civil society.
This latter challenge is particularly difficult given the diverse discourses that play out within global civil society (Brassett & Smith 2010).
Empowered space According to the Danish Board of Technology (2009: 10), the ‘target groups for receiving the WWViews results are politicians, negotiators and interest groups engaged in the UN climate negotiations leading up to COP15 and beyond.’ The empowered space addressed here is a complex one, comprising decision-making bodies such as parliaments and cabinets within nation-states and formal and informal negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
WWViews sought to influence this empowered space in multiple ways, outlined in more detail below.
We believe, however, that the project did not develop sufficient understanding of the mechanisms of this empowered space.
For example, despite long lead-time in planning the global project, all of the WWViews deliberative events were scheduled to take place only two months before COP-15, when negotiating positions for many countries had already firmed.
Earlier engagement with empowered space at national scales could have increased the potential to influence negotiating positions.
Instead, there was a strong emphasis on influencing the negotiations themselves, which was perhaps an unrealistic goal given that negotiators would have limited flexibility to alter their position at COP-15 based on their mandate from national empowered space.
Transmission The organisers of WWViews were very aware that a mini-public can only influence empowered space if it works to develop a means of transmission to empowered space.
Consequently, much effort was put into development of dissemination strategies in each participating country.
In Australia, we sought to influence government decision makers by engaging them directly with the results and process, and also sought to influence policy indirectly by introducing new discourses into public space.
The dissemination strategy had three components: Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
9 • Political engagement strategy: engaging directly with politicians and policy makers through meetings and provision of reports, and supporting participant outreach to politicians.
The goal was to influence politicians and policy makers to at least reflect on their own positions and perhaps adopt positions more consistent with those expressed by the mini-public.
• Media and communications strategy: use of a website, media releases, social media and direct contacts with journalists to increase media coverage of WWViews and introduce the positions expressed by the participants into public debate.
This was accompanied by a strategy of communications that engaged directly (via project newsletters and invitations to become involved) with key stakeholders such as environment NGOs, senior bureaucrats and businesses.
The goal was to disseminate a new discourse that could shift the public debate and increase pressure on decision-makers within empowered space to deliberate on their positions.
• Research strategy: this included critical reflection on WWViews and provision of information about the WWViews process to business leaders, teaching and learning institutions, professionals from varied fields, researchers, and citizens.
The aim here was not to influence empowered space on climate change policy but to build awareness of deliberative mini-publics so that others might consider this kind of approach in the future.
The success of this transmission strategy will be considered in a later section.
Here, it is sufficient to point out that the conversion of communicative freedom into communicative power is difficult for a mini-public operating with limited resources in a crowded public space.
Accountability Following on from this last point, a mini-public convened in public space has few avenues to hold empowered space to account.
Elections are the main accountability mechanism in liberal democracies and politicians are unlikely to feel that the views of a mini-public convened on a single issue are going to make much difference to the choices of the voting public.
Mini-publics often turn to other forms of accountability, such as asking decision-makers to ‘give an account’ of how they will respond to the views of the mini-public.
We were not able to persuade any Australian politicians to accept the results from WWViews and make a statement on how they would respond.
We did, however, obtain a letter and video message endorsing the event, prior to it being held, from the Federal Minister for Climate Change and Water, Penny Wong.
In addition, Australia’s Climate Change Ambassador, Louise Hand, spoke in person at the event.
This association of politicians with a mini-public opens up the potential to hold them accountable through the public sphere, by pointing out their support for the event and drawing their attention publicly to the results.
Nevertheless, this is a weak and tenuous form of accountability and establishment of reliable accountability mechanisms is perhaps the single biggest challenge for mini-publics contributing to the development a deliberative system.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
10 Meta-deliberation There was no significant reflection in advance about the role of WWViews in facilitating the establishment of a broader deliberative system, except for the optimistic intent that holding a global, linked series of events would raise the profile of citizen deliberation and highlight its potential benefit to policy makers and citizens.
This intent was mirrored in the Australian event in which organisers identified two linked but distinct communication messages—the policy preferences of citizens, and the value of such processes for future policy making.
One of the purposes of this paper is to contribute to meta-deliberation about the role of events like WWViews in a normative global deliberative system.
Decisiveness As Dryzek (2011) points out, the global deliberative system has not been particularly decisive in its policy response to climate change, with global emissions continuing to rise and a lack of binding commitments to halt this rise.
Given the problems of transmission and accountability identified above, WWViews offered little to improve the decisiveness of the global deliberative system.
The position that emerges from analysing WWViews as a component in a broader deliberative system is that minipublics are excellent examples of Bohman’s communicative freedom but due to problems of transmission and accountability they fail to convert that freedom into communicative power.
In the case of WWViews, it is very difficult to point to any real influence of the project on the empowered space that decides on climate change policy.
We will take up this point again later in the paper.
Evaluating WWViews against norms of deliberative democracy Above, we identified integrity, inclusion, authentic deliberation and influence and consequence as normative characteristics of deliberative democracy against which to evaluate WWViews.
This section evaluates WWViews against these norms and discusses lessons that emerge.
Integrity The origins and purpose of the deliberative process should be transparent and the process should be adequately resourced and respectfully facilitated without any attempt to influence the outcomes.
The organisers of WWViews in Australia sought to be open, honest and transparent Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
11 about the objectives of the project, the reasons for involving participants and what the project could realistically hope to achieve.
Participants were given information prior to the event about the kind of process being used, why using this kind of process is important, who was responsible for initiating and organising the event and how the information about climate change and climate policy provided to participants was developed.
Participants received information about the purpose of the event through newsletters, a website,3 a dedicated participant support person and information packages.
For example, the second newsletter for the Australian event stated that ‘a full report on proceedings will be prepared by ISF and disseminated widely to decision-makers and other interested groups in the lead up to COP-15 in December.’ It was also stressed to participants that there was no guarantee that the results of the project would influence decision-makers at COP-15.
Beyond misrepresentation of the purpose of an event, the main threats to the integrity of a mini-public are systematic bias in the information provided to participants or facilitation that influences the deliberations in particular directions.
To address the first threat, the DBT established a rigorous process for developing the information provided to participants before and at the event.
Participants in all countries received the same information—a booklet of background reading material in advance of the event and a set of videos shown during the event—translated into local languages.
The material was based primarily on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007).
The DBT established an international Scientific Advisory Board to review the information and the material was tested at an early stage of its development in citizen focus groups in different parts of the world.
Partner organisations in each country were not allowed to add to the provided material or develop country-specific information for participants.
These processes sought to eliminate any systematic bias in the information provided to participants.
To minimise the risk of facilitation that would influence the deliberations in a particular direction, the DBT sought to recruit partner organisations that were ‘unbiased with regards to climate change’ (Danish Board of Technology 2009b).
Although the Institute for Sustainable Futures is an independent research institute, many of its researchers have commented in the public domain on what constitutes an effective response to 3 See: http://wwviews.org.au [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
12 climate change and taken critical positions against government policy on climate change.
Therefore, to avoid influencing the views of the participants, the Institute for Sustainable Futures and WWF (one of the sponsors) did not take on facilitation roles during the event.
Instead, a neutral lead facilitator was engaged and volunteer table facilitators were drawn from sponsors and other organisations perceived as having a more neutral position on the issue of climate change response.
Whether the association of the Institute for Sustainable Futures and WWF with the event was itself enough to influence the deliberation in a particular direction is an open question, and one that we did not set out to test in our evaluation.
Evaluating the integrity of an event that you have designed is difficult.
However, we can point to some evidence that the event did have integrity.
First, the Australian results on issues such as the urgency of climate change response and the strength of the proposed policy responses did not differ substantially or systematically from those in other developed countries (Atherton & Herriman 2009; Danish Board of Technology 2009b), indicating that the facilitation in Australia did not influence the participants to take a stronger position than their international counterparts.
Second, the quantitative evaluation surveys completed by participants and qualitative feedback comments revealed no significant criticism of the way the process was conducted or its objectives.
To give one quantitative measure from the survey, 98 percent of survey respondents agreed that ‘The event used my time productively.
4 Qualitative feedback indicated that participants felt the event was a good investment of their time, was well run, followed good process and made a meaningful contribution (Atherton & Herriman 2009).
Inclusion The process should be representative of the affected population and their diverse discourses and provide equal opportunity for all to participate.
WWViews sought to include a representative group of countries in the global project, and to include citizens within each country that reflected the demographic distribution in that country ‘with regards to age, gender, occupation, education, and geographical zone of residency (that is, city and countryside)’ (Danish Board of Technology 2009: 8).
The DBT (2009: 8) also specified that participants ‘should not be experts on climate change, neither as scientists nor stakeholders.’ Beyond these criteria, the DBT left the 4 This combines results for the three answer categories: Absolutely agreed; agreed; or somewhat agreed.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
13 specific details of participant recruitment to the national partner organisations.
WWViews did not specifically seek to include a representative set of discourses in the deliberations, as advocated by Dryzek (2011), although there was a tacit assumption that demographic diversity would deliver discourse diversity.
We will start by evaluating inclusion within Australia, before broadening to evaluate inclusion at the global scale and then considering Dryzek’s challenge to achieve discourse rather than demographic representation.
For the Australian WWViews event, Australian citizens were randomly recruited by a market research company to match national demographic quotas based on Australian Bureau of Statistics data for location, age, gender, ethnicity, income, household composition, employment status and education.
The market research company randomly generated 5,000 telephone numbers and recruited a shortlist of 250 people via telephone interviews within this sample.
The shortlist of 250 people was sent a complete information pack about the event and a Participant Agreement Form that they were asked to return if they wanted to participate.
From the pool of returns, 110 participants were selected to match demographic quotas as closely as possible.
On the day of the event, 105 participants took part.
Despite operating from a principle of inclusion, the participant recruitment process specifically excluded some groups and unintentionally excluded others.
Dryzek (2011: 156) notes a general tendency for mini-publics to ‘disproportionately attract politically active, highly educated, high income, and older participants.’ Similarly, Halvorsen (2006: 153) finds that public meetings and other community engagement activities ‘frequently generate viewpoints from a group of people older, whiter, more affluent, more educated, and more likely to be male than the citizens within their community.’ WWViews Australia was somewhat typical in this respect.
Table 1 summarises the ways in which representation fell short of the demographic ideal.
First, children under the age of 18 were excluded to simplify permission and supervision processes.
While this is standard practice in many mini-publics it is not ideal, particularly on an issue like climate change that will strongly impact today’s young people.
As the worst impacts of climate change are projected to occur in the future if action is not taken, the children of today have a greater stake in decisions on climate change and their voice deserves to be included.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
14 For WWViews Australia, the exclusion of children was exacerbated by underrepresentation of people aged 18–34.
Sarkissian et al.
(2009: 134) note that young people often don’t become involved in community engagement approaches because they find them ‘irrelevant, a waste of time and boring’ and because they do not experience results relevant to their concerns.
However, it is possible and important to find ways to engage youth in mini-publics and various guidelines are available for doing so (for example, Ministry of Youth Affairs 2003).
Characteristic Issues Geographic location While all Australian states and territories were represented, including both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, participants from metropolitan New South Wales (NSW) were under-represented (15% of the total compared to the quota of 21%).
The event was held in Metropolitan NSW (Sydney) and we assumed that participants would want to stay with their families rather than in a hotel close to the event, and designed our level of reimbursement for these participants accordingly.
This lower level of support for out-of-pocket expenses may have contributed to under-representation of these participants.
Age Participants under 18 were excluded to simplify permission and supervision processes.
Participants aged 18-34 were substantially under-represented (19% of the total, compared to the quota of 36%) and participants aged 50-64 were over-represented (31% of the total compared to the quota of 21%).
Gender No issues – approximately equal representation of males and females.
Ethnicity Participants born outside Australia were under-represented (18% of the total compared to the quota of 24%).
Indigenous Australians were represented in line with the quota.
Household income No issues – income bands (from under $20,000 to over $120,000) were appropriately represented.
Household composition Participants in the “other” household category (which includes, for example, share houses) were under-represented (8% of the total compared to a quota of 16%), but families with dependent children and couple/single with no dependent children were over-represented.
Work status No issues – different types of work status (working, unemployed, student and retired) were appropriately represented.
Education Participants with highest level of education “some secondary” were under-represented (11% compared to the quota of 16%) and participants with highest level of education “completed tertiary” were heavily over-represented (41% compared to a quota of 24%).
Table 1: Summary of representation problems for WWViews Australia.
Second, following the instructions provided by the DBT, participants that were professionally involved with climate change were excluded.
The intention here was to ensure participation by ordinary citizens in a non-partisan forum and avoid a repeat of the partisan debates already prevalent on climate change.
Partisan deliberation has different characteristics to non-partisan deliberation and is generally less able to achieve quality deliberation (Hendriks, Dryzek & Hunold 2007).
In a random selection process like that used in Australia, exclusion of climate change experts is unnecessary, as few would be recruited and they would have little opportunity to unduly influence the deliberations.
However, some of the other participating countries used processes other Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
15 than random selection to recruit participants and these processes could have been more open to dominance by partisan stakeholders if such stakeholders were not excluded.
Third, the recruitment process itself inevitably leads to exclusion of some groups of citizens.
People not listed in telephone directories or with poor English communication skills would not have been recruited.
This is reflected in under-representation of people born outside Australia and people with less formal education in the final group.
We would expect people with higher levels of education and stronger English language skills to be more likely to understand what is being asked of them and to feel confident in their ability to participate, making them more likely to take up the offer.
Fourth, while ethnic diversity was sought through the recruitment category ‘born outside Australia,’ the participants did not fully reflect Australia’s ethnic diversity.
Participants on the day observed that the group was predominantly ‘white’ and, although we did not collect specific data on language groups, it appeared that most of the people born overseas were of European origin.
This raises questions about the most appropriate recruitment variable to use to capture ethnic diversity, and whether there are significant cultural barriers to participation in an event of this type even within a single country.
A more diverse and representative result could potentially be achieved by setting quotas for specific language groups, or countries of origin.
As Brackertz & Meredyth (2008: 16) suggest, increasing participation in relation to characteristics that pose a barrier to participation requires thinking about how and where members of these groups already come together, which existing information networks already exist, who they trust, who influences the group, and how other organisations facilitate access.
However, this increases the time and cost for recruitment and potentially adds the need for interpreters, time to build relationships, and time for learning about and communicating through existing networks—making it difficult for mini-publics that are often already stretched for resources and may not have been designed with adequate timelines for engagement of this nature.
A further area of research for Australian events could be the framing during recruitment or designing of such events to increase participation of culturally and linguistically diverse participants.
Fifth, as mentioned above, education levels represented at the event did not mirror the distribution within the population; there were proportionally more people with tertiary education and less with only some secondary education.
Education levels can be a proxy Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
16 for ensuring socio-economic diversity and representation of a range of life experiences, including that of work.
Interestingly, income and ‘types of work’ categories were still representative, and we achieved representation of a variety of household types, despite the under representation of participants with less formal education.
The group that participated in WWViews did constitute a diverse cross-section of Australian society that was demographically representative in most categories.
In those categories in which representation fell short of the quotas, it is reasonable to assume that representation was better than it would have been without the efforts to meet the quotas, although it is not possible to prove this.
The participants themselves felt that the minipublic was diverse; comments relating to diversity were one of the most frequent given to an open-ended ‘what did you like best about today?’ question posed at the end of the first half-day session.
For example participants said: ‘Surprisingly brilliant job of mixing up the cross-section of participants, definitely added to the interest and diversity of discussion,’ ‘Meeting people from a range of areas and different points of views has been very insightful and interesting’ and ‘Lovely to meet such a diverse bunch of Australians.’ Nevertheless, the important exclusions identified above, most of which are typical of mini-publics, mean that WWViews fell short of an ideal of including the views of all stakeholders in climate change policy.
Additional problems of inclusion and representativeness emerge as we turn our attention to the global scale.
If achieving demographic representation is difficult at a national level, as outlined above, then it becomes even more challenging to bring together a group of participants that is reasonably representative of the world demographic profile.
In WWViews, the approach taken to this challenge was to recruit a representative group of nations into the project and to ask each nation to identify a representative group of participants within that nation.
Recruitment of nations was opportunistic, drawing on networks of deliberative democracy practitioners around the world and requiring organisations to source their own funding to run a national event.
There was targeted recruitment of developing nations and specific efforts to secure funding to allow poorer countries to participate.
In the end, 38 countries participated, including 18 developed and 20 developing nations.
All continents were represented, but there were important regional gaps; most notably, despite attempts to identify suitable partner organisations, there was no participation from the Middle East or Central Asian countries.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
17 Apart from these gaps, the group of participating nations was reasonably representative of the diversity of world nations.
It also included many of the major players in international climate change negotiations, such as the United States, China, India, Brazil, South Africa and several European Union members.
However, it is questionable whether this model of national representation, closely paralleling the United Nations model, is the best way to achieve representativeness and inclusion at a global scale.
To illustrate, China’s population of more than 1.3 billion and St Lucia’s population of 170,000 were both represented by a single event, giving the views of St Lucians disproportionate weight when the global results were aggregated.
A more representative model would be to seek to match the global pool of participants to a world demographic profile, using similar techniques to those described above for Australia.
This may be an ideal to work towards but would pose substantial logistical difficulties to implement, with many countries lacking the detailed and comprehensive databases required to support such an approach.
Although falling short of this ideal, an improvement over the WWViews approach would be to ensure that the number of participants from any country is proportional to the population they are representing and/or that the views expressed in particular events are weighted to take into account the population represented.
These proposed changes to recruitment processes might improve global demographic representation but they would likely suffer from the same exclusions that we identified above for Australia.
Thus we would expect low participation from the global poor, oppressed or linguistic minorities, young people and those with less formal education.
A possible response is to reconceptualise what inclusion means in a deliberative democratic system.
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) argue that representation can be usefully conceived as representation of discourses.
Diverse discourses exist on issues like climate change and ensuring that all of these discourses are represented in a minipublic may be a more practically inclusive approach than seeking demographic representation.
For example, if there are concerns about directly including children in a mini-public, adult participants could be recruited that can represent the discourses in which children participate.
Further, participants could be recruited to represent the discourses of unborn future generations who cannot possibly participate in a current mini-public but have the Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
18 greatest stake in climate change response.
The marginalised discourses of the global poor and disadvantaged can be brought into a mini-public through specific discourse representation rather than simple demographic weight of numbers.
While the concept of discourse representation is an attractive one, more work is needed to investigate the practical implications for design of mini-publics and the balance between demographic representation and discourse representation.
There are important questions about how discourses requiring representation would be identified, how representatives of these discourses would be selected and who should make these decisions.
These questions would themselves be suitable topics for deliberation.
WWViews did not make any attempt to identify the discourses that would need to be represented in a mini-public on global climate change response.
Nor did it attempt to identify the discourses that participants adhered to.
Consequently, it is not possible to evaluate whether WWViews achieved a reasonable level of discourse representation.
We can state, however, that participants in WWViews in Australia and internationally exhibited greater levels of concern about climate change and called for stronger action than is typical in public debate as revealed through the media or opinion polling (Danish Board of Technology 2009b).
This may indicate that the WWViews mini-publics did not have sufficient representation from diverse discourses as a starting point, or that substantial shifts occurred through the process of deliberation.
It is to the quality of deliberation that we now turn.
Authentic deliberation The process should support communicative freedom by providing access to information, space for open and respectful dialogue between participants and sufficient time for reflection.
It should encourage but not coerce reflection on preferences.
Gundersen (1995) describes deliberation as an active process of challenging unconsidered beliefs and values, encouraging individuals to arrive at a defensible position on an issue.
For Dryzek (2002: 1), it is a non-coercive, reflective and pluralistic process, allowing ‘argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or storytelling, and gossip,’ through which people arrive at a particular judgement, preference or view.
For Carson and Hartz-Karp (2005: 122), as noted previously, deliberation requires ‘open dialogue, access to information, respect, space to understand and reframe issues, and movement toward consensus.’ Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
19 Numerous engagement methods are now available for facilitating deliberation by minipublics (Fung 2003; Smith, G. 2009).
WWViews used a hybrid method that drew on the DBT’s several decades of experience in engaging citizens in deliberation within political decision-making processes.
The method combined elements of deliberative opinion polling (Fishkin 1997), the 21st Century Town Meeting process developed by America Speaks5 and the Voting Conference process used by the Danish Board of Technology.6 Partner organisations were given opportunities to contribute to the development of the WWViews method, which was then documented in a Process Manual (Danish Board of Technology 2009a) that all national partners were expected to follow.
Participants in each country were provided with information to support informed deliberation in the form of written material prior to the event and video presentations during the event.
They were divided into small groups around a table, each with a facilitator.
The groups discussed a series of pre-established questions directly relevant to the COP15 negotiations in four themed deliberation sessions.
Facilitators provided participants with space to express and defend their views and gently encouraged them to question their existing beliefs and those of other participants at their table.
At the end of each themed session, participants chose their preferred response to each question from a set of pre-established choices.
In a final session, the groups at each table collectively wrote a recommendation to their climate negotiators through a process of consensus building.
All participants then voted on their favourite recommendations from those developed by each group.
No attempt was made to systematically measure the quality of the deliberation in the WWViews Australia event, although methods such as the Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et al.
2003) are available for this purpose.
However, it is clear that the process supported more deliberation than the participants would normally engage in on climate change by providing them with information and a facilitated space to engage with other views, consider questions they would not normally consider, and reflect on their own preferences.
In a survey of participants, 99 percent felt that the recommendation developed by their group reflected an open and thoughtful discussion 5 See: www.americaspeaks.org [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].
6 See: http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=469&toppic=kategori12&language=dk [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
20 based on diverse views from a diverse group of people (Atherton & Herriman 2009).
Nevertheless, the process could have been more deliberative in some important ways.
To make efficient use of limited time and to allow easy quantitative comparison of results across different countries, the four themed sessions required participants to express their views by voting on a set of predefined questions with multiple-choice answers.
The use of predefined questions and answers closed down opportunities for participants to reframe issues or express responses in their own words.
The limited set of available responses may not have adequately reflected the real diversity of opinion within the participating group.
In addition, the voting process resorted to aggregation of views rather than seeking to move discussions towards consensus.
This meant that participants could opt out of reflecting on their views or having them challenged by other participants, as they did not have to participate in reaching a consensus.
These process limitations were consciously addressed through the inclusion of the final session in which participants worked together in small groups to develop a recommendation to the COP-15 delegates.
This process did encourage consensus and allowed participants to express themselves in their own words.
A second point to note is the impact of the pace of the deliberations.
The process established by the DBT in consultation with partner organisations encouraged national organisers to fit the entire process into a single day.
Again, this was meant to maximise the issues that could be covered while keeping costs down to make the process more accessible around the world.
For the Australian event, we added an extra half-day to the process to provide more time for deliberation.
However, each deliberation and voting session only allowed 45 minutes for participants to discuss the information provided, the questions and the possible responses.
This is not sufficient time to fully reflect on and think through the consequences of decisions.
This is perhaps echoed in some of the voting results.
For example, 31 percent of Australian participants supported greenhouse gas reduction targets of more than 40 percent by 2020.
Such targets would have a substantial impact on energy prices and bills in Australia.
Although table facilitators relayed many participants’ stories of weighing up the personal impacts of increased prices versus their responsibilities to future generations, it is unlikely that all participants had time to make these personal connections to an issue; those that did would have had little specific information on the magnitude of personal impacts.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
21 Making such connections was further hindered by the decision to focus all of the information provided to participants on the international negotiations.
Provision of country-specific information was not allowed.
This decision was made both to reduce time requirements and to ensure that participants from around the world received the same information to inform their deliberation.
However, there is strong evidence that people are more able to connect with the issue of climate change and more likely to change their behaviour if they see it as a tangible, local issue, rather than an abstract, global issue (CRED 2009).
In addition, the implications of international decisions only become apparent by shifting focus to the national level.
Participants in WWViews had no opportunity to reflect and deliberate on how their decisions would play out in their own countries and the results are consistent with low awareness of national and local impacts.
Future global-scale deliberative democracy processes on climate change will need to find ways to connect issues across scales, from global to local and vice versa.
The difficult question that needs to be asked here is whether bigger is necessarily better for global mini-publics.
The choice to use standardised questions and responses, to limit the length of the event and to avoid country-specific discussions certainly reduced costs and allowed countries to participate that would not have been able to do so otherwise, but deliberative quality was sacrificed to achieve this.
While in Australia we have anecdotal evidence that the scale of the project gave it a point of difference when trying to get the attention of decision makers (and potential funders), it is unknown whether the sheer number of people and countries involved made the project any more influential.
A longer, smaller process, perhaps prioritising good discourse representation rather than number of participants, could have delivered greater deliberative quality without sacrificing the potential to influence.
The organisers also justified standardisation of the questions, answers and process as a way of supporting comparability of the results across participating countries.
We question whether comparability is sufficiently important to justify the resulting loss of deliberative quality.
Indeed, we question whether comparability is even possible across different cultural and linguistic contexts.
In the case of WWViews, all the decisions made to achieve comparability and standardisation were undermined by allowing (appropriately) local translation of the information materials and local design of participant recruitment processes.
We contend that authentic deliberation requires Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
22 process flexibility to account for differences in culture, resources, democratic tradition and political system (Dryzek 2011).
For example, different cultures have different expectations about regularity of breaks, allowing time for religious practices and how men and women should interact.
A more flexible and culturally responsive process would have delivered greater deliberative quality without having to sacrifice potential for comparability or influence.
Our final evaluative discussion addresses this question of influence.
Influence and consequence The process should develop the communicative power to make a difference, whether by influencing policy and decision-making or facilitating broader sociocultural change (e.g.
new discourses or networks).
A starting point for evaluating the influence of a mini-public is to understand what influence the project sought to achieve.
Ostensibly, WWViews sought to influence the outcomes of COP-15 and measured against this ambitious aim it was a failure.
The outcomes of COP-15 fell far short of what the participating citizens demanded and there is no evidence that WWViews had any influence on negotiating positions at COP-15.
In reality, most of the organisers had more modest aims for the project.
In Australia, we certainly sought to influence the positions held by politicians and other decision-makers in relation to climate change, but we also sought to build discursive awareness of deliberative democracy and the potential of mini-publics.
There is no definitive evidence that the former objective was achieved, but there is some evidence that the latter was achieved.
As noted above, WWViews Australia developed a dissemination strategy that sought to influence politicians, bureaucrats and the media to adopt the positions advocated by the mini-public.
We sought face-to-face meetings with Australian Government climate policy-makers and negotiators, other influential bureaucrats, and politicians from the three major political parties (the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal-National Coalition, and the Greens).
Gaining access to key politicians and climate change negotiators during the period of the dissemination efforts (Oct.–Nov.
2009) was difficult.
Key individuals had limited availability due to the demands on their time of preparation for COP-15 (including attending preparatory talks elsewhere) and the (thwarted) passage through Federal Parliament of domestic climate change policy.
Meetings were ultimately held with public servants in the Department of Climate Change (one of Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
23 whom was on the COP-15 negotiating team), some advisers to Ministers and Shadow Ministers, the Australian Greens Deputy Leader and the Lord Mayor of Sydney (Herriman, White & Atherton 2011).
Reports were also mailed to all Federal politicians (both Houses), all State Government Ministers and selected State Government MPs, and senior Federal and State civil servants, including Federal climate negotiators.
While we hope that at least some of the politicians that received reports read them and are now a little bit more familiar with deliberative mini-publics, there is no evidence in the public domain that WWViews Australia had any influence at all on their views on how to respond to climate change.
If anything, the views expressed by politicians now are less consistent with the outcomes of WWViews than they were at the time it was held, as the politics of climate change in Australia has become more partisan and oppositional in the intervening period.
Further evaluation of the influence of WWViews would require investigative research with key politicians and decision-makers, which has not been undertaken.
The lack of apparent influence on climate change policy is perhaps not surprising, and it could be argued, in hindsight, that the strategies that the global project established and that we employed in the Australian context were politically naïve.
First, we assumed that it would be possible to influence negotiating positions two months out from COP15, when these positions had already firmed through the preceding ten months of negotiations.
Second, we assumed that a one-off event like WWViews could create enough noise in the public space to hold those occupying empowered space accountable.
In reality, sustained pressure over a longer period is more likely to deliver communicative power.
WWViews did not even deliver enough communicative power to secure meetings with some of the key participants in empowered space, let alone to influence their positions.
The conversion of communicative freedom to communicative power is a critical challenge if mini-publics are to achieve any influence within deliberative systems.
Deliberative theorists tend to underplay the difficulty of challenging existing power structures (Brassett & Smith 2010) and there has been little thinking to date about how mini-publics can be designed to increase their likelihood of achieving influence.
As noted above, one of the key strategies for making WWViews an influential and consequential project was to maximise the credibility and perceived legitimacy of the Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
24 event with policy makers through rigorous standardisation and broad participation.
The intent was to make the WWViews method above reproach and the weight of numbers compelling.
Unfortunately, as also noted above, deliberative quality was sacrificed in favour of this model of influence, yet it is doubtful that either standardisation or the numbers involved delivered any more influence.
One of the reasons that standardisation is unlikely to help to deliver greater influence is that different countries have substantially different political systems and, as a result, the appropriate role for mini-publics differs across countries (Dryzek 2011).
Dryzek (2011) distinguishes between four different types of state based on their orientation to social interests; that is, whether they include or exclude interests, and whether they do so actively or passively.
The path to achieve influence is very different in each type of state.
Actively inclusive states, like Denmark, work to create formal channels for public participation in decision-making, including mini-publics.
There is a tradition of public deliberation and decision-makers are expected to heed the results of mini-publics.
In contrast, in a pluralist (passive-inclusive) state like the USA (or Australia), there are few formal opportunities for participation but all are free to advocate their interests and achieve influence.
Being heard above the resulting clamour is difficult.
Any voice, including that of a mini-public, becomes just another voice at the bargaining table; there is limited potential for influence unless this voice is loud and persists over time, which is rare for mini-publics.
The pathways to influence are different again in exclusive states.
WWViews did not take into account these political differences in its process design.
Rather, the design was modelled on processes that work well in actively inclusive Denmark but may be less suited to other types of state.
Future attempts to convene global mini-publics would do well to avoid standardisation in favour of developing country-specific deliberative designs that are tailored to achieving the type of influence that is appropriate in each country.
While there is no evidence that WWViews Australia influenced the positions taken by decision-makers, there is some tentative evidence that it did contribute to a stronger discourse on deliberative democracy in Australia.
Television, radio and print media covered the event, nationally and locally, exposing new audiences to the idea of deliberative democracy.
The Lord Mayor of Sydney, after a meeting about WWViews, went on to chair a session on citizen participation at the Copenhagen Mayors’ Summit Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
25 during COP-15.
Finally, in her 2010 election campaign, the Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced plans for a Citizens’ Assembly on climate change (Morton & Arup 2010), which would have been the first time the Australian Government had convened a mini-public to directly inform policy.
Given the work done to inform politicians about WWViews, it is possible (although not proven) that communication about WWViews helped to make the idea of convening a mini-public sufficiently plausible for a political announcement.
Unfortunately, the plan was later abandoned following media and public criticism (Franklin 2010), so it seems there is a long way to go before mini-publics become an accepted part of the Australian political landscape.
Conclusion: The future of global mini-publics The outcome of our evaluation of WWViews is decidedly mixed.
The event was delivered with integrity, was reasonably successful at bringing together a representative group of citizens from around the world to deliberate, and received substantial media and practitioner attention.
WWViews demonstrated that it is feasible to convene a global mini-public and that citizens are capable of deliberating on complex global issues.
For the Australian organisers and participants, feedback on the event was almost universally positive.
On the other hand, as a transient event, its contribution towards the emergence of a global deliberative system for climate change response was limited and it achieved little influence on global climate change policy.
In part, this was due to the lack of attention to appropriate pathways and strategies for achieving influence in different countries.
The quality of deliberation was compromised by attempts at standardisation that seem misguided in light of cultural and political differences between the participating countries.
Despite these negatives, we continue to believe that global mini-publics can make a contribution towards a more deliberative global governance system on climate change and other issues.
Future global mini-publics have the opportunity to learn from WWViews, so it is worth summarising the key lessons here.
First, if a mini-public is to contribute towards a global deliberative system then the quality of deliberation is paramount.
This means that events must allow sufficient time for reflection on preferences and that methods relying on voting on pre-determined responses should be avoided.
Participants should be given as much opportunity as possible to frame issues in their own terms, formulate their own responses and express Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
26 these in their own words.
Second, representing discourse diversity instead of, or in addition to, a demographic profile may be a more appropriate goal for mini-publics, particularly at a global scale.
Identifying the discourses that need to be included and finding suitable discourse representatives will be challenging but potentially offers a more feasible pathway to legitimacy for global mini-publics.
Further, through discourse representation it may be possible to find innovative ways to use special representatives to incorporate the presumed discourses of future generations, or even other species.
Third, where global mini-publics are made up of smaller national mini-publics, flexibility to respond to cultural and political differences is critical.
Mini-publics are more likely to deliver authentic deliberation and to achieve influence if they have freedom to respond to the local cultural and systemic context, even if this means the results from different countries are not directly comparable.
Strategic thinking about how best to achieve political influence needs to be at the heart of mini-public design.
Fourth, mini-publics may be more likely to achieve influence if they are long and loud, forcing empowered space to be accountable.
One-off events can potentially be loud, in that they may get a lot of media attention, but the effect quickly dissipates without sustained action.
Processes that bring mini-publics back together for multiple events over a longer period of time have greater potential to build discursive momentum and influence empowered space.
In other words, designers of mini-publics need to consider their role in building a movement for change that can accrue sufficient communicative power to force a response.
Finally, there are many other ways in which a global mini-public could be convened and these need to be explored.
WWViews essentially mimicked the United Nations system by convening discrete mini-publics at a national scale and simply aggregating national results.
An alternative way to convene a global mini-public would be to involve participants from across the globe in a single process, where the views of the rich can be challenged by those of the poor and the full global implications of decisions become clear.
WWViews insulated participants in each country from each other, missing an opportunity for cross-cultural deliberation.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
27 Global mini-publics are certainly not the only way to democratise systems of global governance, or even the only way to bring more deliberation into global governance.
There is space for more deliberation in all elements of the global deliberative system, whether through new permanent or temporary institutions, reform of existing institutions, or the messy debates of global civil society.
What is critical, if we are to develop governance systems that can effectively respond to climate change, is that we continue to experiment with diverse approaches to democratisation and learn from the successes and failures.
Acknowledgements The authors thank all the organisations and individuals who helped to make World Wide Views possible.
In particular we are grateful to: the partners in the international World Wide Views Alliance, especially the Danish Board of Technology and the Danish Cultural Institute; the World Wide Views Australia sponsors (University of Technology Sydney, PricewaterhouseCoopers, National Australia Bank, WWF Australia and the Department of Sustainability and Environment Victoria) and other supporting individuals and organisations; the facilitators and event logistics team; and the World Wide Views participants themselves.
The World Wide Views Australia core project team included staff of the Institute for Sustainable Futures at the University of Technology, Sydney: Alison Atherton, Amber Colhoun, Jennifer Croes, Jade Herriman, Dr Chris Riedy, Nicole Thornton and Professor Stuart White; and independent contractors: Dr Kath Fisher (Lead Facilitator) and Rebecca Short (Media Officer).
We also thank two anonymous reviewers for detailed and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Reference List Allison, I., et al.
2009, The Copenhagen Diagnosis: Updating the World on the Latest Climate Science.
Sydney, Australia.
Atherton, A.
& Herriman, J.
2009, The World Wide Views on Global Warming Australia Story.
The Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology, Sydney.
Backstrand, K., Khan, J., Kronsell, A.
& Lovbrand, E. 2010a, ‘Environmental Politics after the Deliberative Turn,’ in Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance, (eds) K. Backstrand, J. Khan, A. Kronsell & E. Lovbrand.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, 217–234.
Backstrand, K., Khan, J., Kronsell, A.
& Lovbrand, E. (eds) 2010b, Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance.
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA.
Biermann, F. 2007, ‘“Earth System Governance” as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change Research,’ Global Environmental Change, vol.
17, no.
3–4: 326–337.
Biermann, F., et al.
2010, ‘Earth System Governance: A Research Framework,’ International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol.
10, no.
4: 277–298.
Bohman, J.
2010, ‘Democratising the Global Order: From Communicative Freedom to Communicative Power,’ Review of International Studies, vol.
36, no.
2: 431–447.
Brackertz, N. & Meredyth, D. 2008, Social Inclusion of the Hard to Reach.
Swinburne Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, Victoria.
Online, available: http://www.sisr.net/cag/docs/htr_final.pdf [Accessed 18 June 2011].
Brassett, J.
& Smith, W. 2010, ‘Deliberation and Global Civil Society: Agency, Arena, Affect,’ Review of International Studies, vol.
36, no.
2: 413–430.
Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
28 Burton, P. 2009, ‘Conceptual, Theoretical and Practical Issues in Measuring the Benefits of Public Participation,’ Evaluation, vol.
15, no.
3: 263–284.
CRED 2009, The Psychology of Climate Change Communication: A Guide for Scientists, Journalists, Educators, Political Aides, and the Interested Public.
CRED, New York.
Carson, L. & Hartz-Karp, J.
2005, ‘Adapting and Combining Deliberative Designs: Juries, Polls, and Forums,’ in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century, (eds) J. Gastil & P. Levine.
Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 120–138.
Chambers, S. 2003, ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory,’ Annual Review of Political Science, vol.
6, no.
1: 307–326.
______ 2009, ‘Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?,’ Political Theory, vol.
37, no.
3: 323–350.
Danish Board of Technology 2009a, World Wide Views on Global Warming A Global Citizen Consultation on Climate Policy (Process Manual).
The Danish Board of Technology, Copenhagen.
______ 2009b, World Wide Views on Global Warming: From the World’s Citizens to the Climate PolicyMakers, Policy Report.
The Danish Board of Technology, Copenhagen.
Dimitrov, R. S. 2010, ‘Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance,’ Global Environmental Politics, vol.
10, no.
2: 18–24.
Dryzek, J. S. 2002, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
______ 2006, Deliberative Global Politics.
Polity Press, Cambridge.
______ 2009, ‘Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building,’ Comparative Political Studies, vol.
42, no.
11: 1379–1402.
______ 2011, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Dryzek, J. S. & Niemeyer, S. 2010, ‘Representation,’ in Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, (ed.)
J. S. Dryzek.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 42–65.
Dryzek, J. S. & Stevenson, H. 2011, ‘Global Democracy and Earth System Governance,’ Ecological Economics, DOI:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.021.
[Accessed 8 August 2011].
Edwards, P. B., Hindmarsh, R., Mercer, H., Bond, M. & Rowland, A.
2008, ‘A Three-Stage Evaluation of a Deliberative Event on Climate Change and Transforming Energy,’ Journal of Public Deliberation, vol.
4, no.
1, Article 6.
Figueres, C. 2007, ‘From Tons to Trends: Transformation of the Climate Regime,’ in Global Environmental Governance: Perspectives on the Current Debate, (eds) L. Swart & E. Perry.
Center for UN Reform Education: 87–102.
Online, available: http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/GEG_Figueres.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2011].
Fishkin, J. S. 1997, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy.
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Franklin, M. 2010, ‘Gillard’s Forum Takes a Dark Shade of Green,’ The Australian, 8 October.
Online, available: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/gillards-forum-takes-a-dark-shade-ofgreen/story-fn59niix-1225935657943 [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].
Fung, A.
2003, ‘Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences,’ The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol.
11, no.
3: 338–367.
Gundersen, A. G. 1995, The environmental promise of democratic deliberation, Univ of Wisconsin Press.
Halvorsen, K. E. 2006, ‘Critical Next Steps in Research on Public Meetings and Environmental Decision Making,’ Human Ecology Review, vol.
13, no.
2: 150–160.
Held, D. 2009, ‘Restructuring Global Governance: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and the Global Order,’ Millennium Journal of International Studies, vol.
37, no.
3: 535–547.
Hendriks, C. M., Dryzek, J. S. & Hunold, C. 2007, ‘Turning Up the Heat: Partisanship in Deliberative Innovation,’ Political Studies, vol.
55, no.
2: 362–383.
Herriman, J., White, S. & Atherton, A.
2011, ‘World Wide Views Australia: Political influence in the Australian context,’ in Citizen Participation in Global Environmental Governance, (eds) M. Rask, R .Worthington & M. Lammi.
Earthscan, London.
Hickman, L. 2010, ‘James Lovelock on the Value of Sceptics and Why Copenhagen was Doomed,’ The Guardian, 29 March.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2010/mar/29/james-lovelock [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].
IPCC 2007, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (eds) Core Writing Team, R. K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger.
IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland: 12–17.
International Conference on Engaging Communities 2005, Brisbane Declaration, International Riedy and Herriman Deliberative Mini-publics PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
29 Conference on Engaging Communities, Brisbane, Australia, 15–17 August.
Kartha, S. 2010, Assessing the Current Level of Pledges and Scale of Emission Reductions by Annex 1 Parties in Aggregate, Stockholm Environment Institute, Presentaton to AWG-KP In-session Workshop, Bonn, 2 August.
Mansbridge, J.
1999, ‘Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System,’ in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, (ed.)
S. Macedo.
Oxford University Press, New York: 211–238.
Ministry of Youth Affairs 2003, Youth Development Participation Guide: “Keepin’ it Real” A Resource for Involving Young People, Children.
Wellington, New Zealand.
Morton, A.
& Arup, T. 2010, ‘PM Pledges “People”s Assembly” on Climate,’ Brisbane Times, 23 July.
NCDD 2009, Core Principles for Public Engagement, 1 May, vol.
20, National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, Boiling Springs, PA. Naim, M. 2009, ‘Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action,’ Foreign Policy, no.
173: 135–136.
Pearce, F. 2008, ‘Dirty, Sexy Money,’ New Scientist, vol.
198, no.
2652: 38–41.
Raskin, P. & Xercavins, J.
2010, We the People of Earth: Toward Global Democracy.
The Great Transition Initiative, The Tellus Institute, Boston, MA.
Rockström, J., et al.
2009, ‘A Safe Operating Space for Humanity,’ Nature, vol.
461, no.
7263: 472–475.
Rogelj, J., et al.
2010, ‘Copenhagen Accord Pledges are Paltry,’ Nature, vol.
464, no.
7292: 1126–1128.
Rowe, G. & Frewer, L. J.
2000, ‘Public Participation Methods: A Framework for Evaluation,’ Science, Technology, & Human Values, vol.
25, no.
1: 3–29.
______ 2004, ‘Evaluating Public-Participation Exercises: A Research Agenda,’ Science, Technology & Human Values, vol.
29, no.
4: 512–556.
Sarkissian, W., Hofer, N., Shore, Y., Vajda, S. & Wilkinson, C. 2009, Kitchen Table Sustainability: Practical Recipes for Community Engagement with Sustainability.
Earthscan, London.
Smith, G. 2009, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation.
Cambridge University Press.
Steenbergen, M. R., Bächtiger, A, Spörndli, M & Steiner, J 2003, ‘Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse Quality Index,’ Comparative European Politics, vol.
1, no.
1: 21–48.
Stripple, J.
2010, ‘Weberian climate policy: administrative rationality organized as a market,’ in Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance, (eds) K. Backstrand, J. Khan, A. Kronsell & E. Lovbrand.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 67–84.
www.policyschool.ca Volume 14:27 October 2021 PUBLICATIONSPUBLICATIONS SPP Research PaperSPP Research Paper THE KEY ROLE OF NO-CARBON NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION: LEVERAGING THE G20 FORUM TO ACCELERATE ENERGY TRANSITION Leonardo Beltrán-Rodríguez and Juan Roberto Lozano-Maya The energy sector is the world’s largest producer of CO 2 emissions, with about 90 per cent of the total derived from burning fossil fuels.
Even under the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) sustainable development scenario, the world will experience a long-term average temperature rise of 1.65oC.
Central in the ongoing global energy transition are international oil companies (IOCs), and although many of them have announced investments in lowor zero-carbon activities, few state-owned national oil companies (NOCs) have followed suit.
This is a major oversight, as the combined greenhouse gas emissions from the top 50 state-owned energy companies rank them third in the world behind only China and the U.S. NOCs must reduce their carbon emissions and set net-zero targets to reach the Paris Agreement’s climate change goals.
Conceived as national champions, NOCs wield enormous influence over state economies and global energy supply chains.
With a few exceptions, their lowcarbon actions have been focused on Scope 1 and 2 emissions, leaving Scope 3 emissions generated by end users of their products largely untouched.
National governments must transform NOCs to meet international climate agreements and to create sustained value for the societies they lead.
Failing to reduce emissions will make it difficult for NOCs to attract investment and sell their products in global markets.
National governments have tremendous potential to achieve multiple policy goals in sustainable development and should give NOCs clear mandates to shift to lowor no-carbon operations and transform themselves into no-carbon NOCs (no-C NOCs).
Achieving ambitious results requires governments to co-ordinate on an 1 international scale, since this effort involves technology, economics, research and politics that extend far beyond national boundaries.
The G20, which accounts for 62 per cent of the world’s population, 82 per cent of GDP and 77 per cent of global CO 2 emissions, should take the lead.
The G20 should establish a no-carbon NOC fund to finance the development of clean technologies and retrain NOC workers.
Member states should mandate sustainability for NOCs as part of nations’ commitments to climate goals.
They should also create NOCs4Climate, an international platform to enable NOCs to share best practices on sustainability, co-operate on projects of common interest and promote technology sharing and innovation.
The future of humanity is at stake over the issue of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.
So are the competitiveness of NOCs and the economic and social stability of countries that rely on them for a large portion of public revenues.
With so much to gain and so much to lose, the time to switch NOCs to no-carbon NOCs is now.
2 ABSTRACT The energy sector is the single largest source of CO 2 emissions and reducing its carbon intensity is critical to effectively tackling climate change.
A great and yet largely untapped potential to reduce its emissions lies with oil and gas companies.
Cognizant of this potential, in recent years several international oil companies (IOCs), publicly traded organizations with large capital access and wide geographical reach, have looked to effectively reduce their carbon intensity by shifting their operations to non-core lowcarbon energy development.
In addition to bringing about positive climate-driven outcomes, the IOCs that have embraced this energy transition strive to leverage business opportunities presented by political and social environments which are progressively more aware of the energy sector’s contributions to climate change.
As much as this paradigm shift has sparked great interest by an increasing number of stakeholders in the energy sector, most national oil companies (NOCs) are notoriously absent.
In comparison to IOCs, not only do NOCs dominate the global oil and gas industry, but they typically enjoy more favourable industry conditions, as they benefit from improved capital access and governmental support.
This is because their overall value proposition, business strategies and budgets are interlinked with, or heavily influenced by, government policies.
Under a mutable business environment which favours the development of energy resources with lowor zero-carbon content, it is reasonable to anticipate that national governments will become more determined to join the energy transition through their NOCs for two main reasons: meeting their national targets under global emissions reductions commitments while sustaining shareholder value.
Moreover, given the complex efforts and resources in carrying out decarbonization at a pace and scale that effectively helps mitigate climate change, it is more likely that the world will enter a stronger decarbonization pathway if the largest economies and their NOCs fully embrace such an initiative.
The implementation of this initiative at a truly deep scale would eventually allow NOCs in these economies to transform themselves into no-carbon NOCs (No-C NOCs) that would strive for socially accountable sustainable growth, higher economic value and meaningful contributions in the global fight against climate change.
This paper analyzes these issues and advances a proposal for the G20, which combines some of the largest oil and gas producer and consumer economies.
3 1.
INTRODUCTION The energy sector stands as the largest emitter of CO 2 emissions worldwide.
By the end of 2019, approximately 90 per cent of CO 2 emissions produced from human activities came from the burning of fossil fuels alone; namely, from coal, oil and gas, in decreasing order (Global Carbon Atlas 2019).
This lion’s share of CO 2 emissions in a world increasingly constrained by the effects of climate change calls for less carbon-intensive processes and more sustainable patterns of energy production and use, all of which are framed under the global energy transition.
This transition recognizes the key role that the deep decarbonization of the energy sector plays to help the world stay safe within the temperature limits set by the United Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement.
According to the most recent energy outlook released by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2020b), even under a more favourable scenario than business-as-usual, known as the sustainable development scenario, worldwide CO 2 emissions from the operation of energy infrastructure would result in a long-term average temperature rise of 1.65°C.
This would be well below the 2°C limit the international community pledged in the Paris Agreement but likely not below 1.5°C, unless more profound net-zero measures are taken.
Achieving the sustainable development scenario would pose substantial challenges and investments, as it requires overhauling the energy sector by 2030, to double solar-based and wind-based power generation, in addition to halving coal-based generation over 2019 levels.
Against this background of increasingly stringent pressures to develop more sustainable business models in the energy sector, several international oil (and gas) companies (IOCs) — publicly traded organizations with the widest geographical reach, largest capital access and greatest integrated technological capabilities to find and produce fossil fuels — have started assessing in recent years how to reorient their strategic activities.
Their goal is to keep sustaining value for their shareholders by increasingly exploring more lowor zero-carbon operations in their portfolios, even including renewable-based electricity generation.
So far, however, the majority of these activities have addressed only Scope 1 and 2 emissions, while the game-changer for oil and gas operations lies in tackling their Scope 3 emissions.1 Even though there is mounting pressure on oil and gas companies, whether stateor publicly owned, to decarbonize their operations considerably, it is mostly IOCs that have implemented comprehensive clean energy actions and announced ambitious pledges 1 Full life-cycle emissions in the oil and gas industry are classified as direct or indirect and broken down into three resulting layers or scopes.
Scope 1 is direct emissions coming from sources controlled by a company, such as its operations and facilities in activities that include venting, flaring and leaking; Scope 2 refers to indirect emissions that come from the power and heat purchased and are generally negligible; and Scope 3 refers to indirect emissions produced by end users and sectors from fuel combustion, most distinctively in the transport sector.
On average, Scope 3 emissions represent as much as 80 per cent and 75 per cent of the full-cycle emissions for oil and gas, respectively, for which they represent a great opportunity for oil and gas companies to drastically reduce their emissions.
Due to their nature though, the reduction of Scope 3 emissions is more elusive and complex, as it may entail curtailments in the company’s marketed output of fossil fuels as well as offsetting and capturing emissions from end users.
(IEA 2020a; Viscidi et al.
2020).
4 to reduce their carbon intensity.2 So far, very few state-owned oil and gas companies, known as national oil companies (NOCs), have undertaken or plan to follow similar lowcarbon pathways.
Despite the NOCs’ generally scarce climate-driven efforts, which have been predominantly limited to targeted investments to implement certain decarbonization technologies, these companies have a great potential to reduce their operations’ carbon intensity.
The combined amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the top 50 global energy-related, state-owned enterprises3 would rank third on a country basis, only after China and the United States (IEA 2016).
Just in the oil and gas industry, out of the 15 NOCs with crude oil production levels over one million barrels of oil equivalent in 2018, the joint volume of GHG emitted by only seven of them amounted to 537 million tonnes of CO 2 equivalent,4 an amount similar to Canada’s total emission during that same year, equivalent to 568 million tonnes of CO 2 (Global Carbon Atlas 2020).
Consequently, despite their dominance and strategic importance, NOCs fall behind in setting ambitious climate targets and investing in low-carbon projects in comparison to IOCs.
Given the volume of emissions that could be avoided and the political influence of national governments in the strategic management, there is an ample opportunity to transform the NOCs’ vision and mandate to considerably reduce their carbon emissions and set a net-zero target in line with the Paris Agreement’s goals.
Engaging in such a way to reach their Scope 3 emissions would allow NOCs to transcend their traditional oil and gas core activities, not only to venture into new markets and more sustainable operations but also to replace the conventional fuels that are marketed to final consumers with zerocarbon options.
This in turn would pave the way for their ultimate evolution as no-carbon NOCs (No-C NOCs), companies fully dedicated to deploying low-carbon energy systems, products and services — reminiscent of the emerging business models several IOCs are currently pursuing in the oil and gas industry.
In addition to supporting the transformation of no-carbon NOCs for climate-driven purposes, there is a stronger case for national governments to adopt this proposal if it can also become a tool that provides economic recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In addition to certain trends already identified to shape the energy sector in the next few years,5 the pandemic’s immediate and long-term effects are now considered additional major drivers that will make more complex the economic, social and technical considerations embedded in the energy sector (WEC 2020; WEF 2020).
Much of the IOCs’ recent strategic business shift has been extensively covered by news outlets (The Economist 2020; Mufson 2020), financial and consulting firms (Goldman 2 During 2020, major IOCs BP (2020a) and Shell (2020) announced their respective goals to become net-zero energy companies by 2050 or sooner.
3 Analyzed companies were involved in both fossil fuels and power generation industries.
4 This list includes Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Rosneft (Russia), Gazprom (Russia), Petrobras (Brazil), PEMEX (Mexico), Petronas (Malaysia) and Equinor (formerly Statoil, from Norway).
5 These usually refer to the increasing decarbonization, decentralization (of energy sources) and digitalization.
Implicit among these trends is a growing electrification of end-use sectors, particularly in transport (WEC 2020).
5 Sachs 2018; Wood Mackenzie 2020), institutional sources (IEA 2020a) and academic literature (Shuen, Feiler and Teece 2014; Stevens 2016; Zhong and Bazilian 2018; Pickl 2019).
However, there is still very little attention given to the crucial impact that NOCs may play in the fight against climate change whenever they decide to pursue similar decarbonization strategies.
Moreover, while several authors (IEA 2016; Prag, Röttgers and Scherrer 2018; Benoit 2019; Beltrán 2020) have addressed the relevance of engaging NOCs in climate policies, there is a lack of deeper research to continue shedding light on the benefits of translating these arguments into policy action.
The time is ripe to call for bolder climate action in the energy sector, because of the expected sustained growth of renewable energy generation during the coming decades (IEA 2020b).
Tackling climate change requires international collaboration to move the needle faster and in the right direction.
Governments have historically joined international energy initiatives to support the exchange of best practices and collaborative efforts to fight climate change.
Consequently, these issues must be capitalized upon within the context of a high-level international platform.
The proposal in this paper would be more influential on a global scale if fully adopted by the world’s largest economies; namely, within the scope of the G20 forum.
Not only is the G20 likely the most influential international political forum, but since 2009 its member countries have agreed to phase out fossil fuel subsidies.
They have become aware of the interdependence between economic growth, climate change and energy sustainability.
As the need for climate action grows more critical, the G20 members may want to increase their political influence by supporting a co-ordinated decarbonization pathway through their own NOCs.
The implementation of this initiative would also allow these companies to become no-carbon NOCs that would yield economic, social and environmental benefits by providing sustainable growth, bringing higher economic value to their stakeholders and helping offset carbon emissions that worsen global climate change.
To elaborate on these ideas, this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 examines, from different perspectives, the energy transition underway, including its effects on oil and gas companies and the low-carbon strategies implemented by IOCs to become new energy firms.
Section 3 reviews the NOCs’ role and analyzes their possible evolution into no-carbon NOCs.
Section 4 explores the influence, scope and strategic alignment of the G20 forum to adopt this initiative.
Section 5 summarizes this paper’s findings and puts forward some policy recommendations.
6 2.
AN EMERGING PARADIGM IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY In general, the emissions-intensive value chain in the global oil and gas industry shown in Figure 1 consists of two main types of players.
IOCs, publicly traded firms, are usually the largest and with vertically integrated operations, which compete for the exploration and development of resources across the world; and NOCs, companies wholly or largely controlled by national governments, established with the main objective of managing domestic oil and gas resources in their respective home countries.
FIGURE 1: VALUE CHAIN IN THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY Source: (Inkpen and Moffett 2011, 21) 2.1 RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE IOCS’ TILT FOR SUSTAINABILITY Strategic readjustments are not uncommon among IOCs.
Historically, the oil and gas industry has entered different periods of business turbulence that have eroded the IOCs’ competitive premises and triggered their strategic responses to help them stay in the business and sustain value creation for their shareholders (Grant 2003).
As publicly traded companies with increased market visibility for a wider range of stakeholders, IOCs have reflected growing concerns over the environmental, social and governance (ESG) effects of their activities, which has helped them mitigate reputational, financial and operational risks to facilitate their attraction of capital and social licence to operate.
In recent years, several IOCs have acted to transform their overall operations by integrating stronger sustainability approaches and commitments.
These shifts can be largely regarded as oriented to renovating their competitive advantages under rapidly changing economic, financial, social and political environments worldwide.
These various environments have converged in urgently placing value on energy systems with lower or zero-carbon content.
7 In embracing this new business model, IOCs can pave the way for their ultimate evolution into integrated energy companies (IECs), firms characterized by an aspiration of “broadening into electric power, energy services, and new technologies […] with the energy transition in mind” (Yergin 2020, 904).
In practice though, the efforts several of these companies have undertaken have mainly lowered the carbon footprintsof the activities pertaining their Scope 1 and 2 emissions.
This opens a window of opportunities for implementing more ambitious actions that target their Scope 3 emissions as well.
From a strategic management perspective, these moves can be explained under the dynamic capabilities approach, whereby firms “integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, 516).
However, the scope of these dynamic capabilities has become rapidly ineffective, in line with shorter life cycles in traditional oil and gas business models.
Certain industry drivers that built up for decades resulted in the IOCs’ continual adjustment of their dynamic capabilities to expand oil and gas production through frontier resources6 and to operate under more complex business interactions with NOCs and national governments.
However, no driver ever had such a game-changing effect in the industry as the mainstream call to decarbonize oil and gas activities (Shuen, Feiler and Teece 2014).7 Essentially, this call for decarbonization is disruptive, because it puts forward the unprecedented notion that to effectively fight climate change, oil demand must start dwindling.
This is contrary to the industry’s cornerstone of finding and producing more fossil resources to match expanding demand.
The permanence of low oil prices associated with a long-term outlook of shrinking oil demand and the falling costs of renewable technologies — which have brought down solar photovoltaic electricity generation to equal or lower costs than those of coaland gas-fired power plants (Weijermars, Clint and Pyle 2014; IEA 2020b) — provides additional economic incentives for IOCs to act in gradually leaving oil and gas operations for the integration of low-carbon and renewable-based assets in their portfolios.
In addition, the unprecedented economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020 have given the international community an opportunity to reconsider the configuration of our current energy systems.
So far, there are an increasing number of political, 6 The development of those oil and gas resources involving more complex technologies and processes than those conventionally employed by the industry, which typically result in higher costs and environmental risks.
Example of frontier resources include those coming from deepwater and ultra-deepwater reservoirs, unconventional formations (including low-permeability shales) and Arctic territories as well as extra-heavy oil in the form of oilsands and oil shales.
7 BP, the U.K.-based IOC, attempted to enter the renewable energy market as early as 2005 by establishing its Alternative and Renewable Energy venture, but after billionaire expenditures and little success, it aimed to exit the market and tried to sell its non-fossil fuels assets in 2011 and 2013 (Pickl 2019).
This case is useful for stressing the convergence of external forces in supporting a strategic decision.
8 technological and economic signals that suggest they will phase out fossil fuels more rapidly to foster a sustainable energy transition at full throttle.8 From a political economy perspective, insights also match strategic management and economic considerations.
Stevens (2016) notes that while IOCs were the dominant industry players for most of the 20th century, their strategies had to be reformulated once the energy shocks and the emergence of strong national governments took place in the global oil and gas arena in the 1970s, indelibly changing the rules of the game in favour of NOCs.
Consequently, in the early 1990s, the IOCs were driven to create shareholder value by finding and booking more cost-competitive oil and gas reserves, even at the expense of increased technological complexity and typically higher development costs.
Nevertheless, this strategy fell short recently, not exactly because of operational or economic inefficiencies but because of external environmental forces.
This involved a progressively changing public mindset to leave oil and gas resources in the ground (i.e., unburnable carbon) to avoid their combustion, thus limiting the continuous rise in average world temperatures to reduce the perilous effects of climate change.
2.2 CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EVOLUTION OF IOCS INTO IECS Climate change stands as one of the most serious global challenges ever, given its devastating effects for every country.
These effects are only set to grow in line with the steady rise in average world temperatures.
The energy sector, and in particular the combustion of fossil fuels, represents the single largest source of emissions that bring about climate change.
The policies and actions leading to a large and rapid decrease in the carbon intensity of oil and gas operations are now considered fundamental to achieving emissions reductions linked to the commitments to curb climate change pledged by the international community.
The annual gathering of the international community to assess progress in the fight against climate change — Conference of the Parties (COP) under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) — has placed global attention on this issue.
The 2015 launch of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, a set of 17 ambitious objectives to be achieved by 2030,9 has stressed the need for academia, government, industry and society stakeholders to develop more sustainable energy systems, shifting away as much as possible from fossil fuels and strongly promoting lowor zero-carbon solutions using renewable energy sources.
Public 8 These signals include a weaker long-term demand outlook for oil-based fuels, which would be partially influenced by an economic downturn expected in the transport sector’s energy demand resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and by a higher penetration of electricity in its sectoral energy mix (IEA 2020b).
This electrification would be brought about not only by more sustainable public policies, but also by larger electric vehicles sales and by the possible displacement of conventional oil-based jet fuel in the aviation industry in favour of alternative fuels.
In September 2020, European aerospace manufacturer Airbus (2020) announced its plans to develop a zero-emissions, hydrogen-fuelled commercial aircraft that could enter into service as soon as 2035.
9 These goals are part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and represent a call for collective action from all countries in a shared task of achieving greater prosperity and reducing inequality while tackling climate change and preserving the natural environment.
Of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), one of them is directly related to the sustainable use of energy: Ensuring universal, affordable and sustainable energy access (SDG 7).
Taking urgent action to fight climate change and its impacts (SDG 13) is also closely related to the energy sector (UNSD 2020).
9 policies and progressively lower costs resulting from economies of scale and continuous technological improvements have also favoured renewable energy development (IEA 2020b).
Climate-driven changes in the IOCs’ business models have been primarily concerned with reducing the GHG intensity of their direct oil and gas operations, but the bulk of their full life-cycle emissions comes from indirect sources.
Consequently, to reduce emissions on a larger scale, IOCs require the implementation of more complex methods across their upstream, midstream and downstream activities, which, as shown in Figure 2, involve reducing their respective to-market output of fossil fuels as well as offsetting and capturing emissions.
Furthermore, the IEA (2020a) has estimated that in order to meet international emissions commitments, 50 to 59 per cent and 52 to 58 per cent of the global proven reserves of crude oil and natural gas, respectively, must be left in the ground.
FIGURE 2: MAJOR DECARBONIZATION METHODS ACROSS THE OIL AND GAS VALUE CHAIN MidstreamUpstream Downstream • Switch to cleaner power sources (Renewable energy and natural gas over diesel and other heavy fuels) • Electrify equipment • Minimize fugitive emissions • Minimize flaring • Rebalance resource portfolios (Reduce the share of carbonintensive assets) • Increase CCUS* (Apply as EOR**) • Switch to cleaner fuels for crude oil and fuels transport • Power pipelines with renewable energy • Improve energy efficiency • Use of bio-based feedstocks and fuels • Electrify equipment • Produce hydrogen (from fossil fuels or renewable energy) • Increase CCUS* • Use of Artificial Intelligence, Blockchain Technology and Industrial Internet of Things Note: *CCUS: carbon capture, utilization and storage; **EOR: enhanced oil recovery.
Source: Authors’ based on Beck et al.
(2020); Viscidi et al.
(2020) and Lu, Guo and Zhang (2019).
These methods also incur higher costs and demand more sophisticated technologies that jointly affect the companies’ profitability.
Some IOCs have announced more ambitious capital investments to amplify and diversify their portfolios into low-carbon areas.10 This may encompass the development of renewable energy and other clean energy sources which may not be already commercial, but bear promising potential, such as massive hydrogen use.
Despite these milestones, as shown in Figure 3, the IOCs’ capital investments outside their core operations — mergers, acquisitions and venture capital 10 Shell is expected to increase its capital investments in new energy ventures during 2021 and 2022 to US$23 billion, while BP’s budget in new energy ventures could grow to US$5 billion by 2030.
Eni and Repsol are expected to announce similar measures (Wood Mackenzie 2020).
10 activities — have been marginal and represented less than one per cent of their total expenditure (IEA 2020a).
FIGURE 3: CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENTS BY IOCS, 2016-2020 Note: In the oil and gas industry, the term “majors” is often interchangeably used with “IOC”; M&A: mergers and acquisitions; VC: venture capital.
Source: Wood Mackenzie (2020) The low-carbon strategies several IOCs have implemented differ in their breadth and depth, but in general, as seen in Figure 4, they have striven to mitigate emissions in their conventional operations with fossil fuels while making some progress into more complex non-core activities that aim to reduce their overall carbon intensity and diversify their business lines.
In the first stage, non-core activities may relate to the use of technologies to capture, use and offset carbon emissions (CCUS).
This may include enhanced oil recovery technologies through the injection of captured CO 2 to wells, but may later advance into the supply of low-carbon gases and biofuels up to the development of renewable-based electricity and even into electricity distribution and retail.
This scope of activities shows how far IOCs are venturing in their quest for sustainability and diversification, undertaking projects and business very different from their traditional expertise — in which other type of low-carbon energy and power companies have already attained competitive advantages — but in which their transferable skills and technologies may give them a competitive edge.
The shift into renewable energy and power transmission activities, for example, is more noticeable in the strategies carried out by European-based IOCs (BP, Eni, Shell, Total and Repsol), likely because of the different political stances and corporate weight respectively given in Europe and the 11 U.S. to climate change over financial and economic criteria.11 Although it may seem unrelated, the diversification in operations of IOCs to power-related activities is a rational consequence, because just as in the case of fossil fuels, the expansion of renewablebased generation largely rests on its transmission and distribution to end users as electricity.
FIGURE 4: SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES FROM SELECTED IOCS Reducing methane emissions Reducing CO2 emissions Generating renewable power For centralized emissions For EOR Low-carbon gases Advanced biofuels Solar PV and wind-based generation Other power generation Electricity distribution and retail Electrified services and efficiency BP Chevron Eni ExxonMobil Shell Total Repsol Company Enhancing traditional oil and gas operations Deploying carbon capture, utilization and storage Supplying liquids and gases for energy transitions Transitioning from International Oil Companies to International Energy Companies Notes: Green-shaded cells refer to a growth area supported by observed strategic investments and/or capital/operational expenditures in commercial-scale activities.
Yellow-striped cells refer to announced strategy and/or minor investments, venture capital and/or research and development spending.
Whitestriped cells refer to a limited evidence of investment activity.
For methane and CO2 emissions, which are not based on project and spending data, assessments reflect the presence and strength of methane reduction and emissions intensity targets, as well as evidence of their implementation, the emissions intensity trend of new investment, transparent reporting of absolute emissions and sources, and linking of executive and staff compensation to achieving goals.
Power generation and efficiency investments in the Transitioning category pertain to projects destined for commercial sales (not own use).
Electrified services include battery storage and electric vehicle (EV) charging.
Low-carbon gases include low-carbon hydrogen and biomethane.
Source: Adapted from IEA (2020a).
Different voices from civil society, national and subnational governments, institutional investors and shareholders, multilateral financial institutions and energy developers12 are calling for more restrictive policies and financial measures to drive IOCs toward low-carbon energy.
Their voices have been by far the most powerful force in the oil and gas industry’s transformation.
These pressures have pushed IOCs to reduce their environmental footprint and enhance their operations’ sustainability.
However, in the face of an urgent call for more substantial climate action, these can actually become — if bolder, better harmonized and more widely distributed — the major catalysts in the evolution of IOCs into IECs.
11 This issue may be well reflected by the differing views on the Paris Climate Change Agreement by governments in Europe and the European Union on one hand, and the U.S. under the Trump administration on the other.
However, as of 2021, the situation in the U.S. has changed with the Biden administration, whose plans are to put climate change and low-carbon energy development at the forefront of its economic and foreign affairs agendas.
12 Although IOCs do not hold the majority of oil and gas reserves or production, their survival is critical to wealth creation.
As of 2015, pension funds and individuals held 47 per cent of the shares in United States’ oil and gas companies in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (Stevens 2016).
12 Ultimately, this transformation will be brought about by measures that not only are intended to limit the production of end-use oil-based products but also to facilitate their replacement with energy options with much lower or zero emissions.
Parallel shifts on an international scale to both the production and demand of oil-based fuels will effectively force international, vertically integrated oil and gas companies to operate more aggressively across the low-carbon energy value chain.
To remain competitive in a more sustainable energy landscape constrained by the business drivers shown in Figure 5, IOCs will have to deliver new products and services, which will involve the integration of drastically different asset portfolios.
FIGURE 5: MAIN FEATURES OF THE IOCS’ BUSINESS TRANSITION TO IECS Integrated Energy Company Integrated Oil (and gas) Company Primary business Primary business Business driver Sustain and increase shareholder’s financial and economic value Oil, fuels and natural gas Leverage innovation and legacy technology to stay cost-effective and competitive across the oil and gas value chain Find and develop more oil and gas resources Provide social, economic and environmental value to a diversity of stakeholders concerned with climate change Mix of renewablebased electricity and energy, power transmission and distribution and low-carbon fuels including hydrogen Leverage legacy technology, knowledge and infrastructure to decarbonize operations across a (wider) energy value chain Deploy low and zero carbon energy systems and services Business driver Main services and products Main services and products Main practices Main practices TRANSITION Source: Authors’, based on Zhong and Bazilian (2018), Lu, Guo and Zhang (2019) and Wood Mackenzie (2020).
3.
THE ROLE OF NOCS IN A CLIMATE-DRIVEN ENERGY INDUSTRY NOCs hold the majority of assets and emissions in the global energy sector.
They are the dominant industry players.
In 2010, these companies concentrated 90 per cent of global oil and gas proven reserves and 75 per cent of production, in addition to holding most undiscovered resources to be developed (Tordo 2011).
Their national governments created them to become a key fiscal source from the economic rents obtained from the extraction of natural resources, as well as a vehicle of massive economic development and positive spillovers that include job creation, technology transfer and development and increased productivity.
There has always been a close link between the NOCs’ organizational value propositions and corporate strategies with specific national or subnational public policies that interweave fiscal, economic and environmental priorities.
In their home countries, NOCs typically hold a privileged status and become economy champions, insofar as they 13 frequently enjoy a legal monopoly, preferential or exclusive access to natural resources that facilitate their dominant industry position.
They also have enhanced access to government funding and resources in comparison to privately owned companies.
In fact, many NOCs may even operate under non-financial mandates (Benoit 2019) to favour other types of goals or visions.
Because of their NOCs’ power, national governments exert a strong influence on the global oil industry and on the potential for decarbonization across the supply chain.
3.1 COLLECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION INVOLVING NOCS The NOCs’ climate-driven efforts lag those of IOCs.
Low-carbon actions from NOCs have been generally scarce or not profound enough to target their Scope 3 emissions and have been predominantly limited to some targeted investments on the application of certain decarbonization technologies.
Except for the notable low-carbon corporate strategies from Denmark’s Ørsted and Norway’s Equinor,13 NOCs’ experiences in this subject have been focused at best on reducing the environmental footprint and carbon intensity of the Scope 1 and 2 emissions from their regular operations.
These examples include carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) projects and low-carbon applications for upstream and downstream operations in Saudi Arabia’s NOC, Saudi Aramco (2019).
They also include the enforcement of stricter environmental standards and improvements in flaring and venting to reduce fugitive methane and greenhouse gas emissions by 70 per cent in the operations of Russia’s NOC, Rosneft (2019).
Nevertheless,14 a previous attempt at a collective deal was forged between private companies and NOCs in response to the Paris Agreement.
In 2014, 11 oil and gas companies, IOCs and NOCs alike, partnered to reduce their methane emissions and implement low-carbon technologies in what became the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI).
The OGCI partnership is very active and despite a few changes in its membership composition,15 from July 2017 to November 2020 invested over US$1 billion in 19 advanced low-carbon and other emission-offsetting projects.
These included the reduction of methane and CO 2 emissions and the application of CCUS technologies (Oil and Gas Climate Initiative 2020).
13 Ørsted embraces a very ambitious “green transformation” strategy among NOCs, as it aims to achieve carbon neutrality in its full life cycle of emissions (Scope 1 to 3) by 2040.
Actions include sourcing, producing and selling green energy through an asset portfolio made up of onshore and offshore renewable energy and storage.
While Equinor is not deliberately targeting and reducing its Scope 3 emissions, it strives to become carbon-neutral in its oil and gas operations by 2030.
Equinor aims to reduce its reliance on oil and gas assets while developing a robust renewable business portfolio.
Its most significant change came with its corporate rebranding in 2018 from Statoil to Equinor, to strongly signal to energy markets its departure from its core fossil fuels operations.
As remarkable as both these decarbonization experiences are, they still represent isolated cases among NOCs worldwide.
14 Public-private partnerships are common practice in the energy sector, especially in the oil and gas industry, where most IOCs compete across borders and team up with NOCs, which seldom operate beyond their home countries.
15 As of 2020, OGCI had the following 12 members: eight IOCs (BP, Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Occidental, Repsol, Shell and Total) and four NOCs (China’s CNPC, Norway’s Equinor, Brazil’s Petrobras and Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco).
14 NOCs in the energy sector could follow many IOCs in diversifying their activities to encompass non-core operations in low-carbon technologies, such as clean energy generated from wind and solar technologies.
The intrinsic technical complexity and high economic costs in the energy industry compel incumbent companies to pool resources, combine complementary capabilities and spread their risk to foster innovation, improve cost efficiency and increase profitability.
Under this rationale, national governments are expected to explore the transition of their NOCs more eagerly to decarbonize their portfolios for two main reasons: to fulfil more effectively their pledges before the international community about global emissions and to create sustained value, not only for their shareholders but also for society.16 By targeting a wider range of stakeholders beyond the company’s own shareholders and investors, NOCs may provide increased prosperity and sustainability for a growing number of people, including workers, suppliers, customers and communities, in a mutable business environment that increasingly prices the development of energy assets with improved sustainability and merit in the fight against climate change.
Driving the NOCs toward a low-carbon energy path would also help them avoid further fiscal and geopolitical risks.
As Figure 6 shows, the revenues from NOCs are expected to drop considerably.
Inaction from home countries in seizing upon these new market trends will only erode the competitiveness of these organizations.
In an international business environment poised to become more cognizant of the negative consequences of fossil fuel production and use, NOCs will certainly face more severe difficulties monetizing their natural resources in international energy markets.
This will jeopardize their stability as critical sources of revenue for their economies.
Furthermore, attracting capital for the development of carbon-intensive infrastructure might be more complex, as the use of oil-based fuels will be increasingly at a disadvantage over other energy options with lower or zero emissions, thus posing a much higher long-term risk of becoming stranded assets and liabilities (Goldman Sachs 2018; IEA 2020a).
16 This matches the redefinition of a corporation purpose put forward in the U.S. in August 2019, which moves away from an exclusive focus on shareholders (Business Roundtable 2019).
15 FIGURE 6: AVERAGE ANNUAL NET OIL AND GAS INCOME OF NOCS* BEFORE TAX, BY SCENARIO *Data include those NOCs which operate in their home countries and those which do so internationally.
Note: Scenarios refer to the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook.
Net income before tax: revenue minus finding and development costs and operating costs.
Source: IEA (2020a, 106) The gradual shift toward the development of renewable resources and other new low-carbon energy products and services is also likely to impact the power and geopolitical relationships among energy producers and consumers, especially as physical dependency on the naturally asymmetrical endowments of fossil resources becomes less relevant (O’Sullivan, Overland and Sandalow 2017).
First movers are likely to create new competitive advantages and economic opportunities under the challenges created by the array of stakeholders and relations in a renovated industry landscape.
16 3.2 GOING ONE STEP FURTHER, FROM NOCS TO NO-CARBON NOCS Most NOCs have lagged the IOCs in setting more ambitious climate-driven paths, and yet their direction, performance and operations can be leveraged to help them transform the energy sector’s entire value chain.
As Figure 7 shows, there is an ample range of approaches to decarbonize energy activities, which involve fuel switching, increased efficiency, widespread renewable energy use and carbon emissions capture.
FIGURE 7: ENERGY-RELATED CO2 EMISSIONS AND CO2 EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS BY MEASURE IN THE SDS Note: SDS: World Energy Outlook’s Sustainable Development Scenario.
Source: IEA (2020a, 50) Those national governments owning NOCs can benefit from the pivotal role these organizations play to develop more sustainable operations and to reduce their GHG emissions.17 Reminiscent of the aspirational goal of IOCs to transform into IECs, fostering the transition of NOCs into no-carbon NOCs, companies spanning the widest range of lowto zero-carbon energy activities would greatly accelerate the pace to a more sustainable energy future.
If fully engaged in energy transition and climate action programs, no-carbon NOCs bear a tremendous potential to facilitate the harmonization of policy goals that foster longterm sustainable development: provision of energy services with lower carbon intensity, mitigation of worsening environmental conditions and effective contribution to economic growth.
NOCs can be given a clear mandate to develop specific assets with explicit deliverables by which they can measure their accountability and operational success.
They may also underpin public policies by allowing the pool of resources (public and private, domestic and international, technological or operational) to increase their 17 According to the Natural Resource Governance Institute (2019), out of 61 countries owning NOCs in 2019, at least 25 of them were NOC-dependent, meaning that the revenues collected from their extractive activities made up more than 20 per cent of the government’s total revenues.
17 effectiveness and performance.
For these reasons, the no-carbon NOCs have competitive advantages in supporting actions to achieve net-zero emissions goals in their countries.
The NOCs’ ability to modify their investment criteria hinges on their institutional mandates.
Although NOCs have increased their investments in renewables, either through direct investment or through mergers and acquisitions, they have also increased their investments in fossil fuel-based power plants (Prag, Röttgers and Scherrer 2018).
As renewable-based energy integration will require expanded, modern transmission infrastructure, the impacts of the NOCs’ actions could pave the way for global decarbonization while reviving economic activity after COVID-19.
To achieve these ambitious results, governments must co-ordinate their actions internationally, given that energy projects are not exclusively technical or economical endeavours.
Rather, they are interrelated, multidimensional constructs that reflect political positions affecting the benefits of all stakeholders and their perceptions, and which call for appropriate governance mechanisms (Lozano-Maya 2016).
Successfully implementing a climate change initiative involves effective international co-ordination and collaboration.
Governments have already collaborated in successful international initiatives in the energy sector to share best practices and fight climate change.
Twentyfive countries have been working since 2015 in Mission Innovation (2020) to double their clean energy research and development expenditures, from US$15 billion to US$30 billion over five years.
This proposal also creates the possibility of aligning the current programs and policies of no-carbon NOCs with their governments’ contributions-compliant emissions trajectory.
This would positively affect national climate goals and make a stronger case for coordinated action among countries owning no-carbon NOCs and those which are major consumers of their products.
This co-ordination can align investment behaviours that facilitate financial resources oriented to climate action for those no-carbon NOCs’ host governments.
A CALL FOR BOLDER CLIMATE ACTION IN THE G20 The G20 was created in 1999 by seven of the most developed economies to discuss international economic issues.18 Over the years, however, the G20 has expanded its membership to cover a wider geographical reach with a presence on every continent.
The G20 is formed by 19 countries plus the European Union, which is represented by the European Commission.19 Due to its membership profiles, which combine the most developed and the largest economies worldwide, by the end of 2019 the G20 accounted for 62 per cent of the global population, 82 per cent of global GDP (World Bank 2020) and 75 per cent of global trade (G20 2020a).
18 The forum was born in response to the 1998 financial crisis and its global effects.
19 Member countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.
Spain has also become a permanent guest.
It is worth noting the simultaneous membership of several European countries along with the European Union.
18 This combination of remarkable economic and political weight grants the G20 a privileged status among other multilateral forums, as far as being regarded “the premier forum for international cooperation” (G20 Foundation 2017).
While this status makes the forum particularly privileged to discuss major economic issues, it also influences other key topics and trends affecting the global policy agenda.
For climate issues, the G20 represented over 77 per cent of the global volume of 36,441 MtCO2 emitted in 2019; furthermore, due to the configuration and size of several of its member economies, as seen in Figure 8, the CO 2 emitted only by China, the United States and the European Union accounted for more than half of that global amount (Global Carbon Atlas 2020).
FIGURE 8: INDIVIDUAL CO2 EMISSIONS IN THE G20 FORUM 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 M tC O 2 Country/*Group Note: Data refer to individual countries with the exception of *the European Union, which is formed by 27 countries.
Source: Global Carbon Atlas (2020).
To capitalize on the G20’s relative weight on global emissions, its member countries could benefit from more effective energy sustainability policies.
Both the Transition Readiness Index (WEF 2020) and the Trilemma Energy Index (WEC 2020) are influential composite scores that assess country-wide energy transition aptness.
The scores are contingent on several elements, including the energy system’s performance and transition readiness, as well as energy affordability and universal access in contexts of reliable carbon-neutral supply that is progressively diversified.
According to the data shown in Table 1, while most G20 members looked forward to strengthening a transition of their energy systems, 19 all but a few European countries still fell short in 2020 of becoming exemplary models of sustainability and decarbonization.
This leaves the door open for better policies and coordinated action to increase their impacts.
TABLE 1: POSITIONS OF G20 MEMBER COUNTRIES IN ENERGY TRANSITIONRELATED INTERNATIONAL RANKINGS WEC Energy Transition Index, 2020 Ranking* Score Ranking** Score 1 Argentina 56 55.8 30 73.6 2 Australia 36 59.7 25 75.4 3 Brazil 47 57.9 28 74.9 4 Canada 28 61.7 6 81.5 5 China 78 50.9 55 67.0 6 France 8 68.7 5 81.7 7 Germany 20 63.9 7 80.9 8 India 74 51.5 86 56.2 9 Indonesia 70 52.4 56 66.8 10 Italy 26 62.0 11 78.9 11 Japan 22 63.2 24 75.7 12 Korea 48 57.7 31 73.4 13 Mexico 50 56.5 45 69.6 14 Russia 80 50.5 29 73.8 15 Saudi Arabia 86 48.7 55 67.0 16 South Africa 106 42.7 74 62.1 17 Turkey 67 53.1 58 66.6 18 United Kingdom 7 69.9 5 81.7 19 United States 32 60.7 9 79.8 20 European Union NA NA NA NA # Country WEF Transition Readinesss Index, 2020 Notes: WEF: World Economic Forum; WEC: World Energy Council.
NA: Not available.
* Out of 115 countries.
** Out of 108 countries.
Source: World Economic Forum (2020) and World Energy Council (2020).
4.1 THE G20’S STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT WITH ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT OF NOCS Unlike other international forums, the G20 lacks a permanent secretariat.
Instead, its management and agenda are carried out by rotating presidencies, whereby the predecessor and successor countries work with the current presidency to ensure continuity in the forum’s work.
From December 2019 to November 2020, Saudi Arabia held the G20 presidency and published its Vision 2030, a strategic planning document that contained a set of longterm goals and expectations for the country’s own economic and social configuration but that resonated as well across the G20.
The long-term plan offered two features related to shaping a more sustainable energy future.
First, despite having some of the largest crude oil reserves in the world,20 the country aims to reduce its dependence on that energy source, while investing heavily in the development of solar-based and windbased renewable energy.
It aims to become an industry champion capitalizing on the 20 According to BP (2020b), by 2020 Venezuela held the largest crude oil reserves in the world, which amounted to 303.8 billion barrels, although Saudi Arabia remained slightly behind, with a volume of 297.6 billion barrels.
20 energy knowledge from its legacy oil and energy industries.
Second, while Saudi Arabia’s NOC, Saudi Aramco, was one of the top-producing companies of crude oil in the world in 2020 and the best valued in financial terms,21 Vision 2030 anticipates the company’s transition from a NOC into a global industrial conglomerate, suggestive of the no-carbon NOC concept, in order to support a more diversified economy that will become less reliant on crude oil production and fiscal revenues (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2020).
This clearly signals a paradigm shift that interweaves energy, climate change and economic considerations.
In December 2020, Italy took up the G20 presidency until November 2021.
Italy’s G20 presidency has underscored that multilateralism is fundamental to addressing critical global issues, and the G20 must step in to use its powerful influence to fill that role.
These critical issues are further defined in the form of three priorities.
The first one, “People,” refers to shaping a better social, sanitary and economic future after the COVID-19 pandemic.
The second one, “Planet,” seeks to ensure the sustainable use of our natural resources, achieving the United Nations’ SDG and promoting a widespread renewable energy transition.
The last priority, “Prosperity,” aims to build up resiliency to foster a more prosperous and inclusive global economy; to do so, it seeks to leverage digitalization and technology, which includes the deployment of more efficient energy distribution networks and grids (G20 2020b).
The G20’s current governance structure, which is shown in Figure 9, includes 11 working groups that span diverse topics, two of which particularly address energy transition and climate sustainability, as well as the environment (G20 2020c).
To strengthen its decisionmaking process and the understanding of the different issues spread across its priorities and working groups, the G20 has reached out to a diversity of stakeholders through several engagement activities.
21 Information based on Platts’ “Top 250 Global Energy Company Rankings” (2020), which are calculated from a set of financial variables that include asset worth, revenues, profits and return on invested capital.
21 FIGURE 9: GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE G20, 2020* People Planet Prosperity Working Groups 1.
Education 2.
Health 3.
Trade and Investment 4.
Development 5.
Digital Economy Task Force 6.
Anti-corruption 7.
Labor 8.
Energy Transition and Climate Sustainability 9.
Environment 10.
Culture 11.
Tourism Engagement Groups 1. Business 20 (business community) 2.
Think 20 (think tanks and research centers) 3.
Women 20 (Gender issues and women empowerment) 4.
Youth 20 (Young people’s ideas) 5.
Labor 20 (Trade Union Leaders) 6.
Urban 20 (Urban environments from 25 cities in G20) 7.
Civil 20 (Civil society topics: sustainable development, gender equality, human rights and social, economic and climate justice) 8.
Science 20 (Academies of Science from G20) G20 Topical priorities Note: Applicable to the G20 presidency under Italy, effective from December 2020.
Source: Authors’, based on G20 (2020b, 2020c).
Engagement with these stakeholders takes place in regular meetings, which are independent from the work of member governments, but which provide recommendations and critical input to the forum’s work.
These outreach activities provide more legitimacy to the forum’s work and amplify its power and influence in the international policy agenda, to voice collective concerns and find more effective solutions.
For all these reasons, the G20 is the most appropriate and conducive multilateral forum to undertake this initiative and promote the transition of their NOCs to no-carbon NOCs.
Considering that G20 member countries agreed to phase out fossil fuel subsidies beginning in 2009, and as the need to act on climate change builds, they may want to support a common decarbonization path by getting their NOCs to use their shareholders’ influence to accelerate the low-carbon transition while retaining public service obligations and financial return requirements.
Therefore, G20 member governments with an urgent need to act on reducing emissions have a substantial opportunity to work together based on the policy recommendations offered in the next section.
22 5.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS In addition to the energy sector’s dynamics, there are market levers that would enhance the competitiveness of no-carbon NOCs.
Today, consumer preference tilts towards sustainability.
Whether it is a product or a service, consumers are pushing for more organic food, alternative means of transport and clean power generation.
The faster the NOCs move towards sustainability, the more competitive they will become, leading the way to a low-carbon future.
Services are also switching to accommodate these new preferences.
Financial services are moving away from fossil fuel investments towards renewables.
Large banks, investment firms, mutual funds and insurance companies are acting to reduce or even eliminate their exposure to fossil fuel investments.
Blackrock, one of the largest investment firms worldwide, announced earlier this year that it will pull back from investments in coal.
Thus, the cost of finance in the long run will have a positive effect on profitability for companies and industries that speed up their decisions to adapt to the new normal.
In 2018, a survey by the Bank of America Merrill Lynch found that firms with a better record than their peers on environmental, social and governance issues produced higher three-year returns, were more likely to become high-quality stocks, were less likely to have large price declines and were also less likely to go bankrupt (Eccles and Klimenko 2019).
NOCs can also take advantage of their access to capital and even complement and expand their sources of funding to galvanize the transition with a more competitive balance sheet, a larger portfolio of investors and a much better risk profile diversifying their focus and entering or creating new markets.
For example, NOCs have developed a thorough skill in building and managing complex projects over the years; they could re-channel their efforts to incursion into offshore wind or ocean energy.
Governments can lead and accelerate the pace towards the energy transition by creating a no-carbon NOC fund, reorienting NOCs towards sustainability and supporting an international platform of co-operation for NOCs, in accordance with the actions proposed below.
1.
Create a No-Carbon NOC Fund (“No-C NOC Fund”).
The OECD and the G20 put forward a landmark international collaboration initiative to end tax avoidance and announced an agreement to set a 15 per cent global minimum corporate income tax rate, which is expected to generate around US$150 billion yearly.
Although the rules are yet to be determined, one possible alternative for allocating part of these resources could be speeding up the energy transition process and ensuring that no one is left behind.
With the help of the Climate Investment Fund, the G20 can create a no-carbon NOC fund, which would provide “financing for advanced and clean technologies, including CCUS/Carbon Recycling and other related technologies to abate their emissions”; and “support to provide retraining and social protection for NOC workers, thus facilitating a just and inclusive transition” (G20 2021).
2.
Reorienting NOCs towards Sustainability.
G20 member countries can strengthen their NOCs’ mandates by incorporating sustainability to drive their mission and their raison d’être, which can result in many benefits to their stakeholders 23 (Beltrán 2020).
The new mandate would be consistent with national and international obligations on climate action and would certainly send a strong signal of the government’s commitment to tackle climate change.
This tilt towards sustainability would improve NOCs’ competitiveness by aligning their mission with the new low-carbon development architecture, and by granting them access to climate finance, clean energy technology and carbon-planning tools.
It will be easier for the public to hold their governments accountable, assess the value of taking climate action, and eventually, enjoy the social revenue of a low-carbon future.
3.
Establish NOCs4Climate, an International Platform of Co-operation for Climate Action.
Governments can create an international platform within the G20 framework to share NOCs’ best practices and lessons learned in their sustainability efforts, foster international co-operation on projects of common interest and facilitate technological co-operation and innovation.
NOCs4Climate would bring several benefits to stakeholders.
The platform would allow NOCs to access new business models and technology to improve their competitiveness and to leverage their joint market power in projects to speed up climate action across the energy sector and industry.
It would help governments multiply their actions by collaborating with similar companies, and pool resources to be much more cost efficient; it would grant them access to a wealth of knowledge and experience to inform and redesign policies.
It would provide the public with a framework to assess the NOCs’ individual performances, and to learn and request revisions based on benchmark information.
NOCs would thus drive the energy transition and help their shareholders and the planet.
While several G20 member economies do not have NOCs, the combination of some of the largest producers and consumers of oil-based products in the world in this premier group and the alignment of their incentives can jumpstart a profound change that facilitates agreements in the production and demand of oil products with rippling effects for global CO 2 emissions.
By leading a sweeping effort away from the production and demand of conventional oil-based fuels in favour of options with much lower or zero-carbon content, the G20’s strong political, economic and energy forces can set a landmark example that will certainly influence other economies to set in motion likeminded actions and critical climate responses.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to express their appreciation to an anonymous reviewer whose valuable insights helped improve the scope of this paper.
24 REFERENCES Airbus.
2020.
“Airbus Reveals New Zero-emission Concept Aircraft.” (September 21).
Accessed November 19, 2020. https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/ en/2020/09/airbus-reveals-new-zeroemission-concept-aircraft.html.
Beck, Chantal, Sahar Rashidbeigi, Occo Roelofsen, and Eveline Speelman.
2020.
The Future is Now: How Oil and Gas Companies Can Decarbonize.
London: McKinsey and Company.
Beltrán, Leonardo.
2020.
“Walking the Talk on Climate Change after the Pandemic: Reorienting State-Owned Enterprises towards Sustainability.” Interpress News Service.
(March 31).
Accessed September 20, 2020. http://www.ipsnews.
net/2020/03/walking-the-talk-on-climate-change-after-the-pandemic-reorientingstate-owned-enterprises-towards-sustainability/.
Benoit, Philippe.
2019.
Engaging State-Owned Enterprises in Climate Actions.
New York: Columbia SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy.
BP.
2020a.
“From International Oil Company to Integrated Energy Company: BP Sets Out Strategy for Decade of Delivery towards Net Zero Ambition.” (August 4).
Accessed October 17, 2020. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/ press-releases/from-international-oil-company-to-integrated-energy-company-bpsets-out-strategy-for-decade-of-delivery-towards-net-zero-ambition.html.
———.
2020b.
Statistical Review of World Energy June 2020.
(June).
London: BP.
https:// www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2014/BPstatistical-review-of-world-energy-2014-full-report.pdf.
Business Roundtable.
2019.
“Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy that Serves All Americans.’” (August 19).
Último acceso: July 20, 2021. https://www.businessroundtable.org/businessroundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-thatserves-all-americans.
Eccles, Robert G., and Svetlana Klimenko.
2019.
“The Investor Revolution.” Harvard Business Review (May–June).
Equinor.
2020.
2019 Annual Report and Form 20-F. Stavanger: Equinor.
G20.
2020a.
“About the G20.” Accessed December 6, 2020. https://www.g20.org/en/ilg20.html.
———.
2020b.
“Priorities.” Accessed December 10, 2020. https://www.g20.org/en/ priorita.html.
———.
2020c.
“Working Groups.” Accessed December 3, 2020. https://www.g20.org/en/ gruppi-lavoro.html.
——— 2021.
«Joint G20 Energy-Climate Ministerial Communiqué.» G20.
(July 23).
Último acceso: August 9, 2021. https://www.g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021_ G20-Energy-Climate-joint-Ministerial-Communique.pdf.
25 G20 Foundation.
2017.
“What is the G20.” Accessed September 18, 2020. https://www.
g20foundation.org/g20/what-is-the-g20.
Global Carbon Atlas.
2019.
“Visualizing Human Impact.” Accessed October 22, 2020. http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/outreach.
———.
2020.
“Country Emissions.” (December 12).
Accessed December 17, 2020. http:// www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions.
Goldman Sachs.
2018.
“Re-imagining Big Oils.
How Energy Companies Can Successfully Adapt to Climate Change.” Grant, Robert M. 2003.
“Strategic Planning in a Turbulent Environment: Evidence from the Oil Majors.” Strategic Management Journal 24: 491–517.
Inkpen, Andrew, and Michael H. Moffett.
2011.
The Global Oil and Gas Industry.
Management, Strategy and Finance.
Tulsa: PennWell Corporation.
International Energy Agency.
2016.
Energy, Climate Change and Environment.
2016 Insights.
Paris: OECD/IEA.
———.
2020a.
The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions.
Insights from IEA Analysis.
Paris: OECD/IEA.
———.
2020b.
World Energy Outlook 2020.
Paris: OECD/IEA.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2020.
“Vision 2030.” Accessed September 19, 2020. https:// vision2030.gov.sa/.
Lozano-Maya, Juan Roberto.
2016.
“Looking through the Prism of Shale Gas Development: Towards a Holistic Framework for Analysis.” Energy Research and Social Science 20: 63–72.
Lu, Hongfang, Lijun Guo, and Yitong Zhang.
2019.
“Oil and Gas Companies’ Lowcarbon Emission Transition to Integrated Energy Companies.” Science of the Total Environment 686: 1202–1209.
Mission Innovation.
2020.
“Our Members.” Accessed November 17, 2020. http://missioninnovation.net/our-members/.
Mufson, Steven.
2020.
“BP Built its Business on Oil and Gas.
Now Climate Change is Taking it Apart.” The Washington Post.
(August 4).
Accessed November 20, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2020/08/04/bp-built-itsbusiness-oil-gas-now-climate-change-is-taking-it-apart/.
Natural Resource Governance Institute.
2019.
The National Oil Company Database.
New York: NRGI.
O´Sullivan, Meghan, Indra Overland, and David Sandalow.
2017.
The Geopolitics of Renewable Energy.
New York and Cambridge: Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
26 Oil and Gas Climate Initiative.
2020.
“OGCI Progress Report 2020.” (December).
Accessed December 6, 2020. https://oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/wp-content/ uploads/2020/12/OGCI-Progress-Report-2020.pdf.
Ørsted.
2020.
Ørsted Annual Report 2019.
Fredericia: Ørsted .
Pickl, Matthias.
2019.
“The Renewable Energy Strategy of Oil Majors: From Oil to Energy?” Energy Strategy Reviews 26: 100370.
Platts.
2020.
The Platts Top 250 Global Energy Company Rankings.
Accessed December 2, 2020. https://www.spglobal.com/platts/top250/rankings.
Prag, Andrew, Dirk Röttgers, and Ivo Scherrer.
2018.
State-owned Enterprises and the Low-Carbon Transition.
Working Paper No.
129 .
Paris: OECD.
Rosneft.
2019.
Annual Report 2019.
Moscow: Rosneft.
Saudi Aramco.
2019.
Saudi Aramco Annual Report 2019.
Dhahran: Saudi Aramco.
Shell.
2020.
“A Net-zero Emissions Energy Business.” (April 16).
Accessed October 17, 2020. https://www.shell.com/media/speeches-and-articles/2020/a-net-zeroemissions-energy-business.html.
Shuen, Amy, Paul F. Feiler, and David J. Teece.
2014.
“Dynamic Capabilities in the Oil and Gas Sector: Managing Next Generation Competition.” Energy Strategy Reviews 3: 5–13.
Stevens, Paul.
2016. International Oil Companies.
The Death of the Old Business Model.
London: Chatham House.
The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Teece, David, Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen.
1997.
“Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management.” Strategic Management Journal 18 (7): 509–533.
The Economist.
2020.
“America’s Domination of Oil and Gas Will Not Cow China.” (September 17).
Accessed November 23, 2020. https://www.economist.com/ briefing/2020/09/17/americas-domination-of-oil-and-gas-will-not-cow-china.
Tordo, Silvana.
2011.
National Oil Companies and Value Creation.
Washington DC: The World Bank.
United Nations Sustainable Development.
2020.
The 17 Goals.
Accessed October 27, 2020. https://sdgs.un.org/goals.
Viscidi, Lisa, Sarah Phillips, Paola Carvajal, and Carlos Sucre.
2020.
Latin American State Oil Companies and Climate Change.
Decarbonization Strategies and Role in Energy Transition.
Washington: The Dialogue and the Inter-American Development Bank.
Weijermars, Ruud., Oswald Clint, and Iain Pyle.
2014.
“Competing and Partnering for Resources and Profits: Strategic Shifts of Oil Majors during the Past Quarter of a Century.” Energy Strategy Reviews 3: 72–87.
Wood Mackenzie.
2020.
The Majors’ Energy Transition.
Wood Mackenzie.
27 World Bank.
2020.
World Bank Data Indicators.
Accessed September 20, 2020. https:// data.worldbank.org/.
World Economic Forum (WEF).
2020.
Fostering Effective Energy Transition.
2020 edition.
Geneva: World Economic Forum.
World Energy Council (WEC).
2020.
World Energy Trilemma Index.
London: World Energy Council.
Yergin, Daniel.
2020.
The New Map: Energy, Climate and the Clash of Nations.
New York: Penguin Press.
Zhong, Minjia, and Morgan D. Bazilian.
2018.
“Contours of the Energy Transition: Investment by International Oil and Gas Companies in Renewable Energy.” The Electricity Journal 31: 82–91.
28 About the Authors Leonardo Beltrán-Rodríguez is an Executive Fellow of the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary.
Mr. Beltran is also a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Columbia University´s Center for Global Energy Policy and a non-resident fellow at the Institute of the Americas.
He is also serving his second three-year term on the Administrative Board of Sustainable Energy for All.
Mr. Beltran had a distinguished 13-year career in public service in the government of Mexico, including as the longest serving Deputy Secretary of Energy (2012-2018).
In this capacity, he led the Ministry´s coordination of Mexico´s National Energy Strategy, policy document that served as the foundation for the energy reform of 2013.
He was also on the Board of Directors of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico´s national oil company and the world´s 10th largest oil producer and was alternate Chairman of the Board of Directors of Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), Mexico´s national power utility and a Global 500 company.
Mr. Beltran also chaired the boards of the national laboratories of the energy sector (Mexican Petroleum Institute; National Institute of Electricity and Clean Energies; National Nuclear Research Institute), and presided the board of a billion usd R&D trust funds that created the Mexican Centers for Innovation on Energy (biofuels, CCS, geothermal, ocean, solar, and wind), the largest clean energy technology innovation networks in Latin America, and invested in the biggest talent development effort in the energy sector in the country.
Before serving as Deputy Secretary of Energy, Mr. Beltran held other leadership positions in the Ministry of Energy, including Director-General for Information and Energy Studies and Director for International Negotiations.
Mr. Beltran is currently also a member of the Advisory Board of the Just Transition Initiative (partnership between the Climate Investment Funds and the Center for Strategic and International Studies); a member of the Board of Fundación Por México (NGO focused on providing educational services to underserved communities); a member of the IPS International Association (global news agency); a member of the expert´s network and the Global Futures Council of the World Economic Forum; and a mentor of the Global Women´s Network for the Energy Transition.
He is also consulting the Inter-American Development Bank, the Latin American Energy Organization, and the World Bank on issues surrounding the energy transition.
Mr. Beltran is a leading expert in the energy transition, he has been named several times as one of the most influential leaders in the energy sector in Mexico and personality of the year in renewable energy (including in 2018).
He holds a Master’s in Public Administration in International Development from Harvard Kennedy School and a Bachelor of Science in Economics from Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM).
Juan Roberto Lozano-Maya is a Senior Specialist in the design and implementation of energy cooperative projects and public policies.
At Mexico's Electricity Independent System and 29 Market Operator he founded the Institutional Affairs Unit, which he has led since 2016 to address the organization's international and governmental affairs.
Prior to his current tenure, he was a Senior Researcher at the Tokyo-based energy think tank serving the 21 member economies of APEC, where he provided advice to enhance regional cooperation on common energy challenges that included the advance of natural gas trade and development in the form of LNG and unconventional gas.
His academic research has centered on governance mechanisms of international energy initiatives and has appeared in institutional publications, books and peer-reviewed journals.
He holds a MSc in International Management with Merit from the University of Liverpool and a BA in Economics with First-Class Honors from Mexico’s National Autonomous University (UNAM).
He is also a holder of the Project Management Professional (PMP) certification.
30 ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY The School of Public Policy has become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada.
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance for the betterment of our families, communities and country.
We do this by: • Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree programs, giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital interests both here and abroad; • Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures; • Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
The School of Public Policy relies on industry experts and practitioners, as well as academics, to conduct research in their areas of expertise.
Using experts and practitioners is what makes our research especially relevant and applicable.
Authors may produce research in an area which they have a personal or professional stake.
That is why The School subjects all Research Papers to a double anonymous peer review.
Then, once reviewers comments have been reflected, the work is reviewed again by one of our Scientific Directors to ensure the accuracy and validity of analysis and data.
The School of Public Policy University of Calgary, Downtown Campus 906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9 Phone: 403 210 3802 DISTRIBUTION Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors' alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT Copyright © Beltrán-Rodríguez and Lozano-Maya 2021.
This is an openaccess paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons license CC BY-NC 4.0, which allows non-commercial sharing and redistribution so long as the original author and publisher are credited.
ISSN ISSN 2560-8312 The School of Public Policy Publications (Print) ISSN 2560-8320 The School of Public Policy Publications (Online) DATE OF ISSUE October 2021 MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-220-2540.
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The School's events, publications, and staff.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 31 RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY WHY EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FAIL IN THE SHORT-TERM RENTAL MARKET: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF REGULATORY FRACTURES https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/UP32_Short-Term-Rental-Market_Tedds-et-al.pdf Lindsay Tedds, Anna Cameron, Mukesh Khanal and Daria Crisan | October 2021 SHAPING AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN THE ANTHROPOCENE ERA: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE DPSIR FRAMEWORK?
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/JSC11_DPSIR-Framework_Lhermie.pdf Guillaume Lhermie | October 2021 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: PROSPER AND LIVE LONG https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/HSP84-SPT-Oct-Prosper-and-Live-Long-Kneebone.pdf Ron Kneebone | October 2021 A NEW APPROACH TO IMPROVING SMALL-BUSINESS TAX COMPETITIVENESS https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/FMK1_Small-Business-Tax_Mintz-et-al.pdf Jack Mintz, Patrick Smith and V. Balaji Venkatachalam | October 2021 INTERPROVINCIAL TRADE BARRIERS IN CANADA: OPTIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/JSC7_Trade-Barriers_Carlberg.pdf Jared Carlberg | October 2021 STRENGTHENING CANADA’S FOOD SYSTEM BY REDUCING FOOD WASTE https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/JSC8_Canadas-Food-System_Holland.pdf Kerri L. Holland | September 2021 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: IMMIGRANT INCOMES AND CREDIT https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Social-Trends-Immigrant-Microloans-FINAL.pdf Robert Falconer | September 2021 2020 TAX COMPETITIVENESS REPORT: CANADA’S INVESTMENT CHALLENGE https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/FMK2_2020-Tax-Competitiveness_Bazel_Mintz.pdf Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz | September 2021 GENDER DISPARITIES IN THE LABOUR MARKET?
EXAMINING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN ALBERTA https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/AF4_Gender-Disparities_Baker-et-al.pdf John Baker, Kourtney Koebel and Lindsay Tedds | September 2021 TAX POLICY TRENDS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA’S PROPOSED CHILDCARE REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TEG66_Childcare_Tax_Credit.pdf Gillian Petit, Lindsay Tedds and Tammy Schirle | September 2021 NORTHERN AND ARCTIC SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A NORTHERN CORRIDOR https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EN_FR_NC25_Arctic-Security_Lackenbauer-Koch.pdf P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Katharina Koch | August 2021 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: OVERCROWDING AS A RESPONSE TO HIGH RENT https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/SPT-Aug.pdf Ron Kneebone | August 2021 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TRENDS: CANADA’S GHG EMISSIONS FROM TRANSPORTATION AND ELECTRICITY SECTORS https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/EEPT-August-2021-FINAL.pdf Alaz Munzur | August 2021
47 Journal of Multidisciplinary Applied Natural Science Vol.
2 No.
1 (2022) Research Article Analysis of Climate Change Induced Parameters of SouthEastern Coastal Islands of Bangladesh: Comparison from 1977 to 2017 Prabal Barua*, Syed Hafizur Rahman, and Morshed Hossan Molla Received : November 29, 2021 Revised : January 20, 2022 Accepted : January 21, 2022 Online : January 22, 2022 Abstract Climate change is one of the biggest threats for the new millennium, and Bangladesh is considered as "Poster Child" as an impact on climate change in the world.
The main focus of this study is to investigate the changing pattern of climate parameters, particularly temperature, rainfall, humidity, cloud coverage, and wind speed in two coastal islands of the southeastern coast of Bangladesh from 1977 to 2017.
The linear regression model described that the temperature in Kutubdia and Sandwip islands was 0.0298 and 0.0444 times increased from 1977 to 2017.
Besides, rainfall patterns in Kutubdia decreased by 0.4083, and Sandwip Islands increased by 0.875 every year from its previous counterpart.
The humidity level also increased due to the rise of temperature and water availability for evaporation from irrigation.
Moreover, significant changes in wind speed and the cloud coverage rate in the Island areas increased with the increasing value of temperature and humidity.
It also means the rainfall rate increases with cloud cover in the sky.
However, the study found decreasing rates of bright sunshine in the Island areas.
The declining rate of sunshine is very high and is a matter of great concern for the agriculture and health sectors in particular areas.
Therefore, the community's concept of climate parameters, association, and extremes is well apparent.
Identify poor land use planning as the primary anthropogenic driver of the change, and they advocated boosting the capacity of linked fields that are in danger owing to climate change.
To conclude, the coastal inhabitants recommended that taking preparedness would be easier if the information transmitted through quicker and reliable sources such as news broadcasts, phone messages, or the internet.
Keywords climate change, climate parameters, coastal islands, coastal inhabitants, linear regression model 1.
INTRODUCTION Climate, as opposed to weather, is the long-term (usually about 30 years) generalized pattern of weather conditions, including temperature, rainfall, humidity, wind, pressure, and cloudiness, in a particular area.
However, in addition to the averages, the deviation from the averages, or seasonal oscillations, as well as the weather extremes, are essential components of climate.
The seasonal oscillations and deviations are very pronounced in Bangladesh because of the monsoon type of climate prevailing here.
In the study, 40 years long term average of the seasonal cycle of climate parameters is used for assessing the changing pattern of climate data in the three coastal islands.
Forty years of data are considered long enough to calculate an average that is not affected by year-to-year variability [1]–[3].
Climate change poses a significant threat for Bangladesh, particularly the projected climate change effects include sea-level rise, higher temperature, enhanced monsoon precipitation, and run-off, potentially reduced dry season precipitation, and increase in cyclone intensity in the coastal region.
Those threats would induce severe impediments to the socio-economic development of Bangladesh including coastal areas.
A subjective ranking of key climate change effects for coastal Bangladesh identifies cyclone and sealevel rise as being of the highest priority in terms of severity, certainty, and urgency of impact.
Among the 64 districts of Bangladesh, 26 districts are evidence of climate displacement in Bangladesh.
Climate Displacement is a major consequence of climate change in Bangladesh because due to climate change-induced natural disasters, people are losing housing and land from their origin and are forced to be displaced in new areas to survive [4]– [6].
Bangladesh ranked 7 th in the Global Climate Risk Index 2021, which said it was the seventhworst hit by climate change-induced natural disasters between 2000 and 2019, where the country lost 15,000 people, damaged the economic losses worth $ 3.72 billion, and experienced 185 extreme weather events because of climate change [7].
At Copyright Holder: © Barua, P., Rahman, S. H., and Molla, M. H. (2022) First Publication Right: Journal of Multidisciplinary Applied Natural Science Publisher’s Note: Pandawa Institute stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Article is Licensed Under: https://doi.org/10.47352/jmans.2774-3047.107 OPEN ACCESS https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.id https://doi.org/10.47352/jmans.2774-3047.107 https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.47352/jmans.2774-3047.107&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2022-01-25 J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
48 present, Bangladesh has been called the “ground zero” of climate change.
However, the impact of ‘climate change’ is reasoning an increase in the frequency and severity of these disasters adversely affecting agriculture, water and sanitation, infrastructure, and health.
Bangladesh is having a coastal area of 47,211 sq.
km, which is 32 % of its entire land.
The coast of Bangladesh is approximately 710 km long and has very low-lying flat land.
62 % of the land has an elevation of fewer than three meters, and 86% have less than five meters [8]–[10].
The Coastal zone of Bangladesh is comprised of 19 administrative districts stretching into 147 Upazilas, delineated based on the tidal fluctuations, cyclone, storm surge risk, and salinity intrusion.
Among the Upazilas, 48 from 12 districts face the coast or lower estuary and are known as exposed coast, and the rest 99 Upazilas that are behind the exposed coast is known as interior coast [11]–[13].
The climate of Bangladesh is conquered by seasonal reversal of winds from the southwest during summer and from the northwest during winter, consequences for wet southwest monsoon and dry north-west monsoon respectively.
The South-Eastern coastal area of Bangladesh is comparatively susceptible to cyclones, tidal floods, coastal erosion, heavy rainfall that varies from year to year, both in terms of intensity and duration.
Several studies were conducted on climatic trends and climate change impacts in the coastal region of Bangladesh.
Analysis of global observations of surface temperature shows that there has been a warming of about 0.6 °C over the past hundred years [14].
The trend is toward a more substantial increase in minimum than in maximum daily temperatures.
The reason for this difference is linked to associated increases in low cloudiness and aerosol effects as well as the enhanced greenhouse effect.
Changes in precipitation and other components of the hydrological cycle are determined more by changes in the weather systems and their tracks than by changes in temperature.
Because such weather systems are so variable in both space and time, patterns of change in precipitation are much more complicated than patterns of temperature change.
Precipitation has increased over land in the high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, especially during the cold season [15][16].
From the record of temperature data over the last 100 years in Bangladesh, it is found that the rate of temperature increment found higher than the present which is 0.5 °C.
Another study shows the mean annual temperature of Bangladesh has increased between 1895 and 1980 at 0.3 °C over the past two decades and from 1900 to 2017, the rate increased by nearly 0.80 °C.
In general, the associated degree of the increasing trend is found in both summer and winter temperatures [17]–[19].
There was no significant trend within the annual rainfalls of Bangladesh.
The study on the long-term monsoon rainfall pattern at 12 stations in Bangladesh found no overall trend in seasonal total Figure 1.
Rainfall pattern.
J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
49 rainfall but there detected some trends in monthly rainfalls [20].
Climate analysis results are also dependent on the quality of the datasets, above all on their homogeneity.
This study intends to understand the trend of climate parameters such as temperature, rainfall, humidity, cloud coverage, sunshine, and wind speed over the 40 years (1977-2017) for the coastal islands of the south-eastern coast of Bangladesh through regression analysis to help farmers in increasing crop yields, minimize crop failures and equip them in adapting to erratic weather patterns and natural disasters triggered by global warming and climate change.
Detection of trends in long-time series of hydrological data is of paramount scientific and practical significance.
2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 2.1.
Selection of the study area To conduct the study, researchers selected the three coastal Islands of the Southeastern coast of Bangladesh which included Sandwip and Kutubdia for analysis of climate parameters.
Climate susceptibility, the trend of climate parameters, displacement rates, land erosion, recurrent disaster has been considered during the selected study areas.
Regionally the study area includes the Southeastern coastal margin of Bangladesh having the complex nature of physico-chemical condition which deals with the day-to-day lifestyle of the region.
Sandwip Island belongs to the Chittagong district with an area of 762.42 km 2 .
Besides, Kutubdia Island belongs to Cox’s Bazar district with an area of 215.8 km 2 which is bounded by the Bay of Bengal.
2.2.
Data acquisition and analysis Data of climate parameters (temperature, rainfall, humidity, wind speed, cloud coverage, bright sunshine) in Kutubdia and Sandwip islands were collected from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) from 1977 to 2017.
For statistical analysis of climate parameters, the researcher used average yearly data from the time series data which were conducted on the monthly average value for the last 40 years (1977-2017).
The equation of a linear regression line is given as eq.1, where y is the observation on the dependent variables is the observation on the independent variable ‘a’ is the intercept of the line on the vertical axis, and ‘b’ is the slope of the line.
The estimate of intercept ‘a’ and the regression coefficient ‘b’ by the least square method: (1) i.e.
(2) and (3) Coefficient of determination, (4) To fit regression lines of the rainy season monthly average Rainfall, Humidity, Temperature, Figure 2.
Changing pattern of temperature.
J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
50 Cloud Coverage, Wind Speed, Humidity level (dependent variables) against time (independent variable) in years were plotted.
Linear regression lines were then fitted to determine the trends of rainfall.
The drawing of the diagrams and the fitting of the regression lines were done in Microsoft Excel.
The correlation coefficient determines the strength of the linear relationship between two variables.
It always takes a value between –1 and +1, with 1 or –1 indicating a perfect correlation (all points would lie along a straight line in this case and have a residual of zero).
A correlation coefficient close to or equal to zero indicates no relationship between the variables.
The correlation coefficients between rainfall and time were calculated as follows.
Given the pairs of values (x1, y1), (x2, y2), ……….
(xn, yn), the formula for computing the correlation coefficient is given by the regression equations, and the coefficient of determination (R 2 ) have been obtained through scattering diagrams by taking two indices at a time [21]–[23].
3.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 3.1.
Rainfall Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) provided the climate data for Kutubdia and Sandwip upazila over the period 1977-2017.
The climate data comprised monthly, seasonal, and annual average maximum, minimum climate parameters over the period.
The annual total rainfall of the study was observed.
The pattern of the total rainfall for the period of 1977-2017 was irregular but increased significantly from 2015 to 2017.
For time-series data analysis of climatic components, particularly rainfall, the three climatic hotspot area's data were intended and analyzed.
The following section has been depicted the real scenarios of rainfall variability in three different geographical locations.
Figure 1 shows the annual mean rainfall pattern in Kutubdia upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression model was y = -0.4083x + 243.34 and R 2 = 0.0107.
Where, y = year; x, outcome variable = rainfall; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 243.34 means that every year the constant maximum rainfall was 243.34 in the Kutubdia area.
The regression co-efficient -0.4083 means that the rainfall decreased by 0.4083 mm/year.
Figure 1 indicates the annual mean rainfall pattern in Sandwip Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y= 0.8572x + 278.23 and R 2 = 0.0342.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = rainfall; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 278.23 means that every year the constant maximum rainfall was 278.23 in the Sandwip area.
The regression coefficient of 0.8572 means the rainfall was increased by 0.8572 mm/year.
3.2.
Temperature change Figure 2 indicates the annual mean temperature pattern in Kutubdia Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = 0.0298x – 29.62 and R 2 = 0.5882.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = Figure 3.
Changing pattern of relative humidity.
J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
51 temperature; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 29.62 means that every year the constant maximum temperature was 29.62 in the Kutubdia area.
The regression co-efficient 0.0298 means that the temperature was increased by 0.0298 times every year.
The annual mean temperature pattern in Sandwip Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = 0.0444x – 58.595 and R 2 = 0.6605.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = temperature; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 58.595 means that every year the constant maximum temperature was 58.595 in the Sandwip area.
The regression co-efficient 0.044 means that the temperature was increased by 0.044 °C per year (Figure 2).
Thus, the changing pattern of temperature in the two study areas was positively changed.
Last 42 years (from 1977 to 2017) climatic years, the temperature was changing nearly (+) 1.25 °C in Kutubdia Upazila, (+) and 1.85 °C in Sandwip upazila respectively.
Among the 2 study locations, Sandwip upazila was increased temperature among these regions.
3.3.
Humidity level Figure 3 illustrates the annual mean humidity pattern in Kutubdia Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = 0.075x + 80.686 and R 2 = 0.2066.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = humidity; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 80.686 means that every year the constant maximum humidity was 80.686 in the Kutubdia area.
The regression co-efficient 0.075 means that the humidity level increased by 0.075% per year.
The annual mean humidity pattern in Sandwip Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = -0.0027x + 83.229 and R 2 = 0.0003.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = humidity; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 83.229 means that every year the constant maximum humidity was 83.229 in the Sandwip area.
The regression coefficient -0.0027 means that the humidity level decreased 0.0027 % per year.
3.4.
Wind speed Figure 4 indicates Kutubdia has a special and potential natural resource which is wind for electricity production.
Figure 7 indicates the annual mean wind speed pattern in Kutubdia Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = 0.0643x + 1.422 and R 2 = 0.627.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = wind speed; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 1.422 means that every year the constant maximum wind speed was 1.422 m/s in the Kutubdia area.
The regression co-efficient 0.064 means that the wind speed was increased by 0.064 m/year.
Figure 4 indicates the annual mean wind speed pattern in Sandwip Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = 0.068x + 0.705 and R 2 = 0.3731.
Where, y= Year; x, outcome variable = wind speed; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 0.705 means that every year the constant maximum wind speed was 0.705 m/s in Sandwip Upazila.
The regression co-efficient 0.068 means the wind speed was increased by 0.068 m/ year.
Figure 4.
Changing pattern of wind speed.
J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
52 3.5.
Cloud coverage Figure 5 indicates the annual mean cloud coverage pattern in Kutubdia Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = 0.021x + 3.417 and R 2 = 0.2428.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = cloud coverage; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 3.417 means that every year the constant maximum cloud coverage was 3.417 okta/year in Kutubdia Upazila.
The regression co-efficient 0.021 means the cloud coverage was increased by 0.021 okta/year.
Figure 5 explores the annual mean cloud coverage pattern in Sandwip upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = 0.0203x 36.979 and R 2 = 0.2738.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = cloud coverage; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 3.078 means that every year the constant maximum cloud coverage was 3.078 in Sandwip upazila.
The regression coefficient of 0.020 means the cloud coverage increased by 0.020 okta/year.
3.6.
Sunshine Figure 6 indicates the mean bright sunshine pattern in Kutubdia Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression line was y = -0.062x + 8.540 and R 2 = 0.6094.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = bright sunshine; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 8.540 means that every year the constant maximum bright sunshine was 8.540 in Kutubdia Upazila.
The regression coefficient -0.062 means the bright sunshine decrease by 0.062 every year.
Figure 6 shows the mean bright sunshine pattern in Sandwip Upazila.
Here the fixed linear regression model was y = -0.067x + 8.270 and R 2 = 0.6967.
Where, y= year; x, outcome variable = bright sunshine; independent variable.
Here, the intercept term 8.270 means that every year the constant maximum bright sunshine was 8.270 in Sandwip Upazila.
The regression coefficient -0.067 means the bright sunshine decrease by 0.067 every year.
The study found the increasing trend of temperature for Kutubdia and Sandwip (+) 0.029 °C and (+) 0.044 °C from 1977 to 2017 respectively.
Besides, Ghosh et al.
[22] mentioned that the average minimum temperature in the Kutubdia area was recorded from November to February and varied generally from 6.2 °C to 13.4 °C; while the maximum temperature of 39.5°C is observed in May.
Thus, the correlation coefficient between year and temperature was positive for all the study areas.
Rainfall variability in space and time is one of the most relevant characteristics of the climate of Bangladesh.
This will cause a cruel combination of more extreme floods and longer periods of droughts.
Bangladesh has been termed as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world due to climatic change [24].
The trend of rainfall (19772017) is calculated to envisage the temporal pattern of rainfall in Bangladesh.
The authors found the increasing pattern of rainfall in Kutubdia was 1.957 mm/year and 0.875mm/year at Sandwip.
The correlation coefficient between year and rainfall was positive for the study areas.
During 1961-1991 Figure 5.
Changing pattern of cloud coverage.
J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
53 Bangladesh faced 19 droughts.
Major drought occurred in 1973, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986 and 2000.
It was noticeable that in 1979 rainfall was abruptly decreased and severe drought caused widespread damage to crops.
The consecutive droughts of 1979 directly affected about 42% of cultivated land, 44% of the population, and reduced rice production by an estimated 2 million tons and it was one of the severest in recent times [25].
The increasing trends in annual maximum rainfalls in Kutubdia and Sandwip upazila are eventually the path of traverse of the south-western monsoon wind.
This indicates that the intensity of heavy rainfall may have increased along the main route of the monsoon wind.
Relative humidity (RH) is another important climatic factor and is also responsible for the formation of any kind of unsteady condition.
Study on this parameter is also important because temperature and RH relate good influence on the formation of the cyclone [26]–[28].
The study found significant changes in wind speed over the study areas.
During the initiation time of the study area in 1977, the wind speed of Kutubdia and Sandwip were 1.9 m/s and 1.45 m/s.
During 2017, the average wind speed of the 2 study areas was now 5.5 m/s and 5.7 m/s in Kutubdia and Sandwip respectively.
Hoque et al., [29] assess the wind speed of Sandwip for the design of a wind farm in the coastal island Sandwip.
They calculated the data for one year 2015 round and found that the average wind speed is 3.56 m/s at Sandwip.
The recent development of wind rotor aerodynamics makes it feasible to extract energy from wind speed as low as 2.0 m/s.
Considering the per capita demand, the electricity demand of Kutubdia was 138250 MWh in 2011 and 378 MWh per day.
On the other hand, the Southern and Eastern part of Kutubdia emerges to be gifted for wind electricity generation using large turbines where wind power density at the height of 50 m or higher is found to be above 200 W/m 2 annually over the year Date of Occurrence Nature of Phenomenon Maximum Wind Speed (km/hr) Tidal Surge Height (ft) Death People Displaced 15.10.83 Cyclonic Storm 93 3 50 5,000 09.11.83 Severe Cyclonic Storm 136 5 300 15,000 24.05.85 Severe Cyclonic Storm 154 15 12000 45,000 18.12.90 Cyclonic Storm (crossed as a depression) 115 5-7 400 20,000 29.04.91 Severe Cyclonic Storm with a core of hurricane wind 225 12-22 150,000 450,000 02.05.94 Severe Cyclonic Storm with a core of hurricane wind 278 5-6 400 15,000 25.11.95 Severe Cyclonic Storm 140 10 650 30,000 19.05.97 Severe Cyclonic Storm with a core of hurricane wind 232 15 150 15,000 27.09.97 Severe Cyclonic Storm with a core of hurricane wind 150 10-15 30 12,000 20.05.98 Severe Cyclonic Storm with a core of hurricane winds 173 3 45 20,000 16.05.13 Cyclonic Storm (MAHASEN) 100 5 25 70,000 30.07.15 Cyclonic Storm (KOMEN) 100 5-7 132 120,000 21.05.16 Cyclonic Storm (Ruano) 120 7-8 25 100,000 29.05.17 Cyclonic Storm ( Mora) 130 5-7 20 70,000 Table 1.
List of Major Cyclonic Storm’s heat in South-Eastern coast from 1977 to 2017.
Source: Barua et al.
[4] J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
54 September 1996 to August 1997.
It is found that at 30 m height, the coast side of Kutubdia should be sustainable for small turbines [27].
During the study, the authors found that cyclonic storm surge responsible for enormous life and property losses for the inhabitants of the Kutubdia and Sandwip islands.
From the literature, it is found that 31 cyclones occurrence in the Bay of Bengal and responsible for disruption of significant damages to the assets and human life in the study areas (Table 1).
From the statistics of cyclone history of 1960 to 2017, approximately, 574,000 inhabitants of the south-eastern coast of Bangladesh experienced displacement from their home and living land.
Inhabitants of Kutubdia and Sandwip islands stated that 350,000 inhabitants of Kutubdia and Sandwip islands have been forced to displaced and migrated from their living places from 1980 to 2018 because of natural disasters such as cyclones, tidal flood, coastal erosion, and waterlogging problem (Table 2).
One of the researchers found that Bangladesh higher rate of cloud cover from June to August and in July it is maximum.
He mentioned that the cloud cover of different locations in Bangladesh is not the same.
Geological position, humidity variation, plant density, wind speed variation, temperature changes, etc.
are important parameters to form clouds and causes for cloud cover variation [28].
During the investigation, the authors found average cloud coverage in Kutubdia, and Sandwip in 2017 was 5.2 okta/sec and 4.7 okta/sec while the cloud coverage was 3.56 okta/sec and 3.52 okta/sec in 1977 on Kutubdia and Sandwip respectively.
Besides, the annual average cloud coverage from 1953 to 2011 in Kutubdia and Sandwip was 3.45 okta/sec and 3.27 okta/sec respectively [29][30].
The correlation coefficient (r) between cloud cover with temperature, humidity, and rainfall is large and positive.
It means the cloud cover rate is increased with the increasing value of temperature and humidity.
It also means rainfall rate increases with the increase of cloud cover in the sky.
On the other hand, the author found the decreasing rate of bright District Upazila Reason for Displacement Displaced Peoples Destination Chittagong Sandwip Cyclone, Erosion, Tidal Inundation, and Water Logging.
150,000 Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar Cox’s Bazar Kutubdia Cyclone, Erosion, Tidal Inundation, Sudden Flood, and Water Logging.
200,000 Cox’s Bazar Total 350,000 Table 2.
Numbers of climate displaced peoples of the study areas from 1977 to 2017.
Source: Barua et al.
[6] Figure 6.
Changing pattern of bright sunshine level.
J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
55 sunshine levels in Kutubdia and Sandwip was 0.0216 m/sec times and 0.039 m/sec per year from the 1977 to 2017 timeline.
4.
CONCLUSIONS The finding of the study describes the changing pattern of annual climate parameters like temperature, rainfall, humidity, bright sunshine, cloud coverage, and wind speed for Kutubdia and Sandwip Island from 1977 to 2017.
Long-term year -to-year anomalies over 40 years show that the increasing pattern of Kutubdia and Sandwip upazila are not the same in a consecutive year.
Of all climate parameters, rainfall is the single most crucial variable which has been widely considered as one of the starting points towards the apprehension of climate change courses.
Most of the island dwellers frequently complained that they might not survive very long if government agencies would not do anything for them.
For protection from coastal erosion, some households have applied hard structures in parallel with the coast to protect their house/ land which is heightening of the dike, bamboo revetment, and Concrete-pole breakwater.
The function of such construction is to lessen the impact of waves and storms.
The individual options cannot substitute for others but rather support other options.
So, from the finding of the study, it was found the somewhat increase in temperature, rainfall, humidity, cloud coverage, wind speed but decreased in the bright sunshine level over the coastal islands of the south-eastern coast of Bangladesh has been observed during the last forty years.
However, the data and the analysis presented in the paper are inadequate to remark about the global climate change impact on climate trends in the south-eastern islands of Bangladesh.
Increased temperature, rainfall, and monsoon precipitation are probably responsible for the frequent tropical disease outbreak and raised sternness and incidence of hydrological different disasters.
On the other hand, amplified rainfall could assist to remain the groundwater in balance and agriculture production in the coastal areas.
This is anticipated that the climate trend maps and the research finding will support to outline of the planning of climate change policy perspective in Bangladesh and to understand the regional climate changes to realize the broad features of the Asian coupled-land-atmospheric system.
AUTHOR INFORMATION Corresponding Author Prabal Barua — Department of Environmental Sciences, Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka 1342 (Bangladesh); orcid.org/0000-0003-1372-0042 Email: prabalims@gmail.com Authors Syed Hafizur Rahman — Department of Environmental Sciences, Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka 1342 (Bangladesh); orcid.org/0000-0003-0112-9124 Morshed Hossan Molla — Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Chittagong, Chittagong 4331 (Bangladesh); orcid.org/0000-0001-6012-3238 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The authors express the highly acknowledged to the Bangladesh Meteorological Department officials for providing the climate parameters statistics over the mentioned period 1977 to 2017 which help to conduct the research study successfully.
REFERENCES [1] S. Hastenrath, A. Nicklis, and L. Greischar.
(1993).
“Atmospheric-hydrospheric mechanisms of climate anomalies in the western equatorial Indian Ocean”.
Journal of Geophysical Research.
98 (3): 20219–20235.
10.1029/93jc02330.
[2] N. H. Saji, B. N. Goswami, P. N. Vinayachandran, and T. Yamagata.
(1999).
“A dipole mode in the tropical Indian ocean”.
Nature.
401 (6751): 360–363.
10.1038/43854.
[3] J. Hansen, M. Sato, P. Kharecha, and K. Von Schuckmann.
(2011).
“Earth’s energy imbalance and implications”.
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics.
11 (24): 13421– https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1372-0042 mailto:prabalims@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0112-9124 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6012-3238 https://doi.org/10.1029/93jc02330 https://doi.org/10.1029/93jc02330 J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
56 13449.
10.5194/acp-11-13421-2011.
[4] P. Barua, S. H. Rahman, and M. H. Molla.
(2017).
“Sustainable adaptation for resolving climate displacement issues of south eastern islands in Bangladesh”.
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management.
9 (6): 790–810.
10.1108/ IJCCSM-02-2017-0026.
[5] R. W. Bell, M Mainuddin, E. G. BarrettLennard, S K. Sarangi, M. Maniruzzaman, K. Brahmachari, K. K. Sarker, D. Burman, D. S. Gaydon, J. M. Kirby, M. Glover, M. S. I. Khan, M. E. Kabir, M. A. Rahman, M. B. Hossain.
(2019).
“Cropping Systems Intensification in the Coastal Zone of the Ganges Delta : Opportunities and Risks”.
Journal of Indian Society of Coastal Agricultural Research.
37 (2): 153–161.
[6] P. Barua, S. H. Rahman, and M. H. Molla.
(2020).
“Impact of river erosion on livelihood and coping strategies of displaced people in South-Eastern Bangladesh”.
International Journal of Migration and Residential Mobility.
2 (1): 34.
10.1504/ ijmrm.2019.10024811.
[7] D. Eckstein, K. Vera, and L. Schäfer.
(2021).
“Global Climate Risk Index 2021: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events (2021): 2000-2019”.
Berlin, Heidelberg.
[8] B. Mallick.
(2014).
“Cyclone shelters and their locational suitability: an empirical analysis from coastal Bangladesh”.
Disasters.
38 (3): 654–671.
10.1111/disa.12062.
[9] M. R. Islam and M. Shamsuddoha.
(2017).
“Socioeconomic consequences of climate induced human displacement and migration in Bangladesh”.
International Sociology.
32 (3): 277–298.
10.1177/0268580917693173.
[10] M. B. Sikder, A. H. M. A. Baqee, S. Begum, and M. N. Kabir.
(2021).
In: “M.
N. Islam and A. van Amstel (Eds) Bangladesh II: Climate Change Impacts, Mitigation and Adaptation in Developing Countries”.
Springer, Cham.
10.1007/978-3-030-719500_10.
[11] K. E. Trenberth, J. T. Fasullo, and T. G. Shepherd.
(2015).
“Attribution of climate extreme events”.
Nature Climate Change.
5 (8): 725–730.
10.1038/nclimate2657.
[12] M. Latif, E. Roeckner, M. Botzet, M. Esch, H. Haak, S. Hagemann, J. Jungclaus, S. Legutke, S. Marsland, U. Mikolajewicz, J. Mitchell.
(2004).
“Reconstructing, Monitoring, and Predicting MultidecadalScale Changes in the North Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation with Sea Surface Temperature.” Journal of Climate.
17 (7): 1605–1614.
10.1175/1520-0442(2004) 017<1605:RMAPMC>2.0.CO;2.
[13] C. M. Brierley and A. V. Fedorov.
(2010).
“Relative importance of meridional and zonal sea surface temperature gradients for the onset of the ice ages and Pliocene-Pleistocene climate evolution”.
Paleoceanography.
25 (2).
10.1029/2009PA001809.
[14] M. Shaltout and A. Omstedt.
(2014).
“Recent sea surface temperature trends and future scenarios for the Mediterranean Sea”.
Oceanologia.
56 (3): 411–443.
10.5697/oc.56 -3.411.
[15] A. E. Dessler.
(2013).
“Observations of climate feedbacks over 2000-10 and comparisons to climate models”.
Journal of Climate.
26 (1): 333–342.
10.1175/JCLI-D11-00640.1.
[16] A. Donohoe, K. C. Armour, A. G. Pendergrass, and D. S. Battisti.
(2014).
“Shortwave and longwave radiative contributions to global warming under increasing CO2”.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
111 (47): 16700–16705.
10.1073/ pnas.1412190111.
[17] M. Rouf, M. Uddin, S. Debsarma, and M. M. Rahman.
(2011).
“Climate of Bangladesh: An Analysis of Northwestern and Southwestern Part Using High Resolution AtmosphereOcean General Circulation Model (AOGCM)”.
The Agriculturists.
9 (1–2): 143 –154.
10.3329/agric.v9i1-2.9489.
[18] S. Shahid, S. Bin Harun, and A. Katimon.
(2012).
“Changes in diurnal temperature range in Bangladesh during the time period 1961-2008”.
Atmospheric Research.
118 : 260–270.
10.1016/j.atmosres.2012.07.008.
[19] S. Shahid, X. J. Wang, and S. Harun.
(2014).
“Unidirectional trends in rainfall and temperature of Bangladesh”.
IAHS-AISH https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-11-13421-2011 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-02-2017-0026 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-02-2017-0026 https://doi.org/10.1504/ijmrm.2019.10024811 https://doi.org/10.1504/ijmrm.2019.10024811 https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12062 https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580917693173 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71950-0_10 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71950-0_10 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2657 https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0442(2004)017%3c1605:RMAPMC%3e2.0.CO;2 https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0442(2004)017%3c1605:RMAPMC%3e2.0.CO;2 https://doi.org/10.1029/2009PA001809 https://doi.org/10.5697/oc.56-3.411 https://doi.org/10.5697/oc.56-3.411 https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-11-00640.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-11-00640.1 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1412190111 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1412190111 https://doi.org/10.3329/agric.v9i1-2.9489 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2012.07.008 J. Multidiscip.
Appl.
Nat.
Sci.
57 Proceedings and Reports.
363 : 177–182.
[20] M. Ahasan, M. A. Chowdhary, and D. Quadir.
(2010).
“Variability and Trends of Summer Monsoon Rainfall over Bangladesh”.
Journal of Hydrology and Meteorology.
7 (1): 1–17.
10.3126/ jhm.v7i1.5612.
[21] R. A. Bradley, B. W. Lindgren, and G. W. McElrath.
(1960).
“Introduction to Probability and Statistics”.
The American Mathematical Monthly.
67 (7): 708.
10.2307/2310140.
[22] M. Ghosh, L. Kumar, and C. Roy.
(2017).
“Climate Variability and Mangrove Cover Dynamics at Species Level in the Sundarbans, Bangladesh”.
Sustainability.
9 (5): 805.
10.3390/su9050805.
[23] M. Clavero, D. Villero, and L. Brotons.
(2011).
“Climate Change or Land Use Dynamics: Do We Know What Climate Change Indicators Indicate?”.
PLoS ONE.
6 (4): e18581.
10.1371/journal.pone.0018581.
[24] M. A. Rahman.
(2018).
“Governance matters: climate change, corruption, and livelihoods in Bangladesh”.
Climatic Change.
147 (1–2): 313–326.
10.1007/s10584-018-2139-9.
[25] M. R. Chowdhury.
(2003).
“The El NiñoSouthern Oscillation (ENSO) and seasonal flooding Bangladesh”.
Theoretical and Applied Climatology.
76 (1–2): 105–124.
10.1007/s00704-003-0001-z.
[26] S. Bahrebar and R. Ambat.
(2021).
“Investigation of critical factors effect to predict leakage current and time to failure due to ECM on PCB under humidity”.
Microelectronics Reliability.
127 : 114418.
10.1016/j.microrel.2021.114418.
[27] Z. Li, Y. Xue, Y. Fang, and K. Li.
(2021).
“Modulation of environmental conditions on the significant difference in the super cyclone formation rate during the preand postmonsoon seasons over the Bay of Bengal”.
Climate Dynamics.
57 (9–10): 2811–2822.
10.1007/s00382-021-05840-7.
[28] C. Tian, W. Jiao, D. Beysens, K. Farai Kaseke, M. G. Medici, F. Li, L. Wang.
(2021).
“Investigating the role of evaporation in dew formation under different climates using 17O-excess”.
Journal of Hydrology.
592.
10.1016/j.jhydrol.2020.125847.
[29] M. N. Hoque, S. K. Nandi, and H. R. Ghosh.
(2016).
“Wind resource assessment for southern part of Bangladesh”.
Asian Journal on Energy and Environment.
11 (1): 1–9.
[30] F. Hossain, I. Jeyachandran, and R. Pielke.
(2010).
“Dam safety effects due to human alteration of extreme precipitation”.
Water Resources Research.
46 (3): 10.1029/2009WR007704.
https://doi.org/10.3126/jhm.v7i1.5612 https://doi.org/10.3126/jhm.v7i1.5612 https://doi.org/10.2307/2310140 https://doi.org/10.3390/su9050805 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0018581 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2139-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-003-0001-z https://doi.org/10.1016/j.microrel.2021.114418 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-021-05840-7 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2020.125847 https://doi.org/10.1029/2009WR007704
Microsoft Word PORTALmarshallSpecialIssueFINALcheck PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
Special issue details: Global Climate Change Policy: Post-Copenhagen Discord Special Issue, guest edited by Chris Riedy and Ian McGregor.
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia.
Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder Jonathan Paul Marshall, University of Technology, Sydney Given the obvious dangers of climate change, the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference requires social theorists to investigate reasons for the breakdown that go beyond pointing out the fear of change, describing denial, talking of conflict between particular power-blocks, demanding justice, or positing that the ruling class is determined to make money at the expense of the ecological system and their own survival.
If we are to talk of ‘interests’ we need to talk of how people come to know their interests, and how they frame the world so as to make those interests seem real and possible.
In taking this step we move into the interwoven realms of cosmology and psychology.
I assume that human social dynamics grows out of the nature of human being and cannot be completely abstracted away from that being.
At the same time I want to be attentive to matters arising around ‘disorder,’ so that disorder is not considered a residue, a pathology, or something to be bypassed as inessential.
Disorder is at the heart of our problem and needs to be part of our theory.
This essay looks at responses to climate change as psycho-social responses mediated through myth and disordered networks.
It begins with an account of editing a book on climate change (Marshall 2009), and takes the insights from this process to an analysis of the Copenhagen conference and its aftermath.
Within the international process, I particularly investigate whether myths of Justice provide useful templates for behaviour.
Disorder Disorder, as implied by the early writings of Mary Douglas (1969), is that part of the Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
2 world which slides out of our ego-based conceptual categories, and that we then recognise or label as bad.
This includes both internal and external orders and disorders—which can appear to mesh together.
Disorder that is repressed does not go away; it returns and disrupts our hold on order.
What is labelled as disorder always has troubling internal resonance: it becomes a source and object of projections of what we deny or repress in ourselves (in Jungian terms our ‘shadow’), and contributes to the process of those selves and the varied (and conflicting) systems they are part of.1 Social theory immersed in this view does not discard disorder, rubbish, exceptions, aberrations, or individual oddities.
When compared to other disciplines, anthropology’s strength has been its interest in those things which others have ignored—magic, gifts, kinship, and so on.
Here this welcoming of discards is simply extended, and I attempt to refuse the violence that is done to the material through explanations which order through excessive simplification; turning mess into perfect structures; reducing variants to a single story; looking for simple abstract models or core elements; or building ideal types and discarding everything which does not fit.
With sufficient ingenuity anything can be made to resemble almost anything else, but the differences and disorders may remain significant.
A disorder sensitive social theory would not be just a typology of disorders, although the attempt might teach something.
It would not aim for simplicity but for complexity; for not making the discard taboo, but knowing it probably would do so anyway.
Perhaps it might become symbolic-poetic itself, in order to make the lack of clarity clear.
Each attempt would be a different ‘way in’ and self confessedly incomplete.
However, it would recognise that disorder and resistance to ordering is a vital part of psychosocial dynamics, just as culture conflict is a vital living part of culture.
A metaphor A ‘thrum’ is the fringe of warp threads left on a loom after the cloth has been cut off; the unwoven ends of warp thread remaining on the loom when the web has been removed; a short or loose end of thread projecting from the surface of a woven fabric; the odd bits of waste; the knots and negatives on the back of the carpet that make the decorations.
Without the discard or underneath thrum there is no weaving.
Afterwards 1 This is necessarily a brief schematic outline of the relevant psychology.
For more detail see Marshall (2009).
Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
3 thrums can be ordered or felted together and used elsewhere.
Waste can serve a purpose.
Socially a thrum is a company or body of people (or animals), a crowd, a bundle (of arrows); it suggests mess.
Oddly it could once mean ‘magnificence’ and ‘splendour.’ It can also mean careless playing or a smooth sound.
Thrum is paradoxical—a linkage in rhythm and resonance—it implies the background sound, the decaying resonance of piano notes as they shift into their own musics—the interactive space hanging between notes which is usually discarded in the rush to the next notes.
It implies that the momentary makes the moment, the waste makes the product and that the order there is not necessarily an order underlying anything.
Such an order is just another thrum, elsewhere.
Climate change as a symbolic event Climate change might be ideal for our purpose in exploring thrums and sociopsychology given that it is multifaceted, falling into many contested categories, and a subject for inner and outer life.
Climate is already highly symbolic and can encapsulate our inner storm, frosts, droughts, floods, fires or desert.
It is already part of our inner lives and dreams; we cannot feel dispassionately about it.
We respond deeply to these events and they map both our inner awareness and our unconsciousness.
These psychological resonances cannot be stripped away from the reality of climate change, however much we might try; they disorder pure ‘rationality’ and provide its driving thrum.
We are in the middle of several major pollution and ecological crises—declines in arable land, over-population, the sixth great extinction, and transgenic escapes for example—yet it is climate change that has taken hold of the imagination, becoming the centre of argument—perhaps because it has such symbolic resonances.
It is, as LeviStraus remarked in another context,‘good to think with’ (1967).
Perhaps the first thing to say about climate change is that it is big.
It cannot be conceived in its entirety.
At the least, it involves the mysteries of: the world, nature, social and political action, morals, our psychology, the future, death, and the distribution of suffering.
It joins together a whole series of otherwise disparate existential issues and problems.
As such it is precisely the kind of ‘thing’ that becomes ‘numinous’ and becomes caught up in the mythic narratives that we use to make sense of the world, such as ‘justice’ or ‘apocalypse.’ Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
4 Furthermore, change in climate is inherently disordering of previous orders.
Indeed previous orders might be the waste thrum not yet discarded.
There is no known state we can pretend is equilibrium.
Taking disorder seriously and not thrusting it aside, we can say that climate change and the sense of disorder it encapsulates do produce psychological disordering.
We can start to trace this particular disorder, not as an aberration, which might otherwise not be happening, but in itself, or in its selves.
Climate change resonates with social and psychological disorder, provoking ego breakdown or increased rigidity, and threatens organisational breakdown.
It is usually defended against in relatively predictable ways, given particular social backgrounds and mythic vocabulary.
This defence may further reinforce the disordering and its effects.
This paper attempts to tease out some of the threads, knowing that they are not the weaving, yet that without them the weaving could not come to be, and to relate this to both the process of editing a collection of essays on depth psychology and climate change and then the Copenhagen Conference and its aftermath.
The book The book, Depth Psychology, Disorder and Climate Change (Marshall 2009) grew out of a panel on climate change organised by Sally Gillespie, then President of the Jung Society of Sydney.
The panel was successful enough for the Society Committee to try and persuade more people to contribute and turn the event into a collection of essays.
I sent around a call for papers to people who were suggested to me, and whom I knew through the Society or through Gillespie.
The call was enthusiastically received and nearly everyone who was approached stated they should easily be able to find something to write about.
We moved out of the local Jungian circle as people were suggested by other people.
Some people who gave talks to the Society were also approached, perhaps too many people: it resulted in a messy book.
We had network and contact based sociality in action.
Tenuous threads became temporarily concrete; yet the network was never closed, in the sense that communication never proceeded amongst all participants—or, if it did, I was not included.
Probably most contact, but not all, was via email or attempted, but missed, email.
Sometimes, the weaving was through people visiting, or conversations occurring quickly and hesitantly ‘elsewhere’ in passing.
The network was never clear; people saw knots rather than patterns.
This was a temporary, Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
5 semi-contingent, network, woven out of other ties—in other words the network existed for a function and was likely to break when the function was fulfilled or failed.
This temporariness is common in contemporary social formation.
It was not an ordered network, nor a resilient network, simply the thrum of the potential book, without which the book would not exist and of which the book is the trace; itself a thrum of this passing network.
I would suggest that this temporary thrumming, (edges, passing knots and resonance) is the way we generally act together in contemporary western society, while nostalgically or projectively (paranoically) thinking others act in a more orderly, coordinated, or rigid manner.
This formation had a temporary hub in myself and the Jung Society.
This hubbing had something of a radial formation.
Some of the contacts continued in other forms later, or carried on, in a slightly transformed manner the loose ties previously existing.
Thrums that persisted perhaps—of which new orders were made and then left no trace?
It faded in and out like a wave on other waves.
Although it is tempting to claim networks are orders, they are often at best temporary, hidden orders, easily broken by even one person.
The knot holding it all together gets cut and the weaving unravels.
The more central the knot or the person the more it unravels, or the more it separates into other parts.
Networks are hard to rescue once broken.
They need endless maintenance and repair to keep existing, so as not to fragment into individual threads, or rather for the threads not to be caught in other projects and pulled apart.
Gaps and forgetting occurred, people who should have been asked were not; the consequences never certain.
It would seem especially that networks are always unravelling themselves as well as being unravelled by others.
In Copenhagen the powerful also found that sociality slips away, hanging into nothingness.
Power relations are a network, with pathways and patterns which are easily triggered, yet always unstable, so we can never tell where the unravelling will begin.
In this weaving we also have the shifting thrums of sense-making, of bodily stolidity, symbols and psychology—a base perhaps, or just a bass line, figured but improvised, depending on what comes next from the others thrumming along.
Then the book network started to get complicated in a repetitiously disordered manner—the interference became the thing or, again, the thrum that made the process.
Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
6 Most of the contributors seemed concerned about climate change.
Many of them showed, what seemed to me, a surprising familiarity with official reports and public science—more surprising still given the ‘anti-science,’ poetic and religious bent of a fair number of those contributors.
The contradictions, or edges of disturbance, emerge continuously.
Many of the contributors, including myself, repeatedly felt themselves being called to write, but blocked as to the actual writing in many different ways.
In some cases people had to drop out as other things took greater precedence, or their lives were consumed by chaos and other networks.
This is, of course, what you expect.
Nobody ever finds editing a collection is smooth, especially with a one-year deadline, but we composed a collection of people who were aware of the importance of the issues they were supposed to conceive, but many of whom found speaking or writing close to impossible.
They were often stuck, and stuck quite badly.
Promising starts flattened into halting ventures.
Vagueness, even to readers familiar with Jungian discourse, was common.
There were clear gaps in argument.
Repeated corrections and changes of direction were presented.
Our ideas often appeared disordered, disconnected, dislocated, disoriented, disjointed, disrupted, disorganised and sometimes disengaged.
The chaos supposedly located within the external world leaked into a chaos of the internal world and was not easily separated out.
It constituted us as individuals socially engaged and sharing.
‘Internal’ and ‘external’ mirrored and perhaps magnified each other.
Yet how else can conception occur, other than through symbols, the thrum not yet discarded as people reached out, or the symbols reached out of them, to deal with the disordering and the unknown they were immersed in?
Frequently contributors ignored my request not to list the facts of climate change.
I felt we already had enough books about ‘the facts.’ However, some people felt compelled to write at length about how climate change was appalling, or to tell readers, or themselves, that the situation was urgent.
They listed facts.
Quite often this listing had no discernable connection with the rest of their paper.
I have since been told this urge for listing and condemnation (or ‘moral clarity’) is common in climate change projects and I, certainly, have heard people give academic presentations in which they repeat these facts and their anger about them, without ever reaching what they had declared to be the point of their papers.
It is as if, in the face of horror, or visceral uncertainty, people feel compelled to recap what is known, as if this will clear something up, or reassure us—as if the repetition will give us an order in which to act.
The chaos slides Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
7 away, under the litany of what we call reality.
Or perhaps the repetition reinforces the ego by its nature; the ego dwelling in repetition, it reweaves or restates.
Listing becomes ritual, which serves to let ourselves ride through chaos, or state yet again where we are, and state that we are right and good.
Perhaps it prevents us confronting the turmoil within and allows us to see the turmoil as outside?
The crisis induces frantic attempts to solve the issue within the framework we already have, and perhaps to condemn others.
The binary seems to be marked here.
Whichever ‘side’ we are on, we have to be both right and righteous—and while ‘side’ does not have to be binary, it usually falls that way for us.
Politics ideally has two sides, so does football; in business it tends to be ‘us’ versus the world—which it would seem already stacks ‘the world’ up as an enemy, to preserve the order that orders us.
Morality slides in, in other ways as well.
As writers, people involved in the project often seemed swayed by morals or common sense, knotting beneath and making linkages between symbols.
Sometimes the argument seemed to be that climate change is bad and therefore we should change our behaviour (and this from depth psychologists—if only therapy was that easy).
Sometimes the argument seemed to be that as climate change was bad then our behaviour might change automatically.
These arguments and repetitions, by naming the iniquity, could be seen to be attempts at creating unity both in ego and group simultaneously, by finding or making an evil or an immoral other, and expelling it by making a scapegoat and turning it to thrum.
Once the scapegoat, whether internal or external, was gone then all would be well, at least until the pattern perishes.
Morals are an ordering (which often prevents exploration) and which require things to fall out of them to be condemned and prove those morals worthwhile: this is the pattern of justice.
However, with morals the psyche could pretend to harmony, the ego would be temporarily safe, at least until the ritual could be performed again.
But each time is different, and the cutting of the weaving to finish off, leaves remains behind—it is not whole cloth, our disorder is not gone.
The moral argument when deployed by people convinced that climate change is real, often implies that those who deny climate change are deliberate and often conscious deniers, people who take a stand against social change, or who lie in favour of capital, or just want to have fun, or something.
I am deeply uncomfortable about this kind of argument, as despite the ease of seeing the deniers of climate change as destroying us Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
8 through their greed, or protecting their profit and status, it seems to me, that if you read their writings and listen to their speeches, that the ‘bad guys’ are also consumed by panic, incoherence, uncertainty and repetition.
Frequently everyone is searching for order and justice where none can exist.
Justice Oppositions to capitalist orders of climate change are frequently woven together in terms of Justice.
There is the ‘climate justice movement,’ for example, and this is not just an opposition but, as we shall see, a not inessential knot of the Copenhagen negotiations, which helped them unravel.
Justice is a myth that ‘justifies’ one’s moral superiority over others, and allows the projection of ‘evil’ onto others.
In the myths of States and Empires, Justice occurs when the divine sets aside its proclaimed love, compassion or benevolence and engages in retribution.
It excludes the unjust and often destroys them; something which might not be possible if we recognise our connections, or don’t want to authorise war.
Justice can also allow one to continue what one does, as: ‘Everyone is more or less a bad guy because everyone contributes to climate change, and controlling it goes to the heart of every national economy’ (M’Gonigle 2009).
Concepts of climate justice seem inadequate for the project of reducing climate emissions.
Let us take two examples of arguments from Australia.
First, Barnaby Joyce, a National Party member, before the talks began: Penny Wong [Australian Climate Change Minister] is arguing countries like China should be entitled to produce more emissions and set their own targets because they are an emerging economy.
If that is the case, then why can’t parts of rural and regional Australia, with their developing economies, be allowed the same concession?
(Joyce 2009) Second, Tony Abbott, Leader of the Liberal Party and the Federal Opposition, in December 2009: ‘Now we have about one per cent, or a little over, of global emissions.
We could reduce our emissions to zero and China would make up the difference in less than a year given its increasing rate of emissions’ (Abbott 2009).
Similarly, it was reported that the G77 nations, did not want binding emissions targets for themselves, only for the developed nations, ‘arguing that they need to keep access to cheap, plentiful fossil fuels to haul themselves out of poverty’ (‘UN Climate Talks’ 2009).
Labor Primeminister Kevin Rudd responded: ‘Go to the future, if we the developed countries became carbon neutral tomorrow let me tell you the combined impact of China and Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
9 India into the medium term future would be huge’ (Rudd 2009b).
Something likewise stated by Jonathan Pershing, the US deputy special climate change envoy, who said that China, India, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia ‘will be responsible for 97 percent of the future growth in emissions’ (Corn 2009).
There is nothing particularly illogical about these positions, and they are making claims about justice and about fairness.
Emissions can be both just and unjust depending on where you are.
If you look at China and India’s actual emissions and potential emissions, then they constitute a large proportion of the actual global emissions.
If you look at emissions per head then they are quite small.
Further, if you regard emissions as essential for relieving poverty then, by objecting to their emissions, you are also condemning their people to poverty.
Yet, if they don’t make cuts then other people in small island states and in Africa will probably suffer.
Ideas of Justice cannot get you out of this position as there are competing and conflicting ideas of what is just and what is fair.
Justice can also be incapacitating and lead to positions demanding purity, which can imply that as everything must be done to be effective, nothing can be done.
An AP report in the Sydney Morning Herald quoted NASA Scientist James Hansen’s argument that: dealing with climate change allowed no room for political compromises.
“This is analogous to the issue of slavery faced by Abraham Lincoln or the issue of Nazism faced by Winston Churchill ... On those kind of issues you cannot compromise.
You can’t say let’s reduce slavery, let’s find a compromise and reduce it 50 per cent or reduce it 40 per cent.” (‘Global Warming “Godfather”’ 2009)2 Everyone has different notions of justice, but each surely thinks that they are just and the others criminal.
Justice, indeed, requires a criminal other—which is always likely to make some people nervous and attack in return.
By demanding a scapegoat, it also panders to our own ‘shadows,’ our own ego defences and blindness.
We also have to ask ‘who it is that determines what is just or not?
Who is to enforce it?
What kind of hierarchy of violence will make that enforcement work?
How are we going to adjudicate between competing claims?
Is it just for developing countries to have their chance to pollute?
And so on.
It might be possible to argue that, in the same way as it is easier to get agreement on what constitutes disorder than it is to get agreement on what constitutes order because disorder can occur in many more ways, it might be possible to get people to agree on what is unjust.
However, such agreement will not change the 2 Besides, slavery was not ended all over the world at one time; it was reduced in parts.
Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
10 disagreement about what is fair and just, what time frames should be involved, what the continuum of emissions should be, the relationship between development and emissions, or the relationship between current and ideal emissions.
It simply enables us to eliminate states of affairs that are not actually probable or existent.
For example, we might agree it would be unjust if an already highly polluting country (however we separate high from low polluters) doubled its greenhouse pollution in less than two years, when all other countries had decreased their emissions.
Such elimination does not remove conflict from justice, the thrum of our own repressions, or the need for enforcement.
Justice demands that all worldviews and social formations are uniform, or else it risks being unjust; yet without recognising that forms of life conflict, it cannot deal with reality.
Choosing justice as the rubric for action, is possibly better than choosing the myth of apocalypse, because apocalypse immobilises altogether, but it does not let us deal with the mess of climate or power relations.
Justice requires a unity and coordination which has not yet been woven, and cannot be built out of the clash without risking war.
Copenhagen itself Before we even get to the likely impossibility of anyone weaving an all-encompassing plan out of the Copenhagen meeting, we need to look at the complexity of the patterns of participation—the mess, the knots and thrum without a pattern.
This account is something of a broken patchwork of presentation but it expresses the reports; and the expression of that disorder is more necessary than use of unexamined assumptions that the truth is whole and hidden.
There were a total of 194 registered State parties to the conference, with 10,583 delegates.
There were another two observer States, 900 registered observer organisations with a further 13,482 participants and another 3,221 media people (UNFCCC 2010: 2).
Among the observers were the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank.
This was reduced from the numbers who wanted to attend: ‘The UNFCCC secretariat revealed last night that 34,000 people had applied for accreditation to the meeting, taking place in a conference centre which only holds 15,000’ (McCarthy 2009a).
Although background negotiations and alliances had been building up over the year and people have relatively clear ideas of what can be done (even if they differ), the Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
11 provisional timetable is confronting in the amount to be done (see UNFCCC 2009).
Just to give some further idea of the mix; the official Norwegian delegation included parliamentarians, public servants, diplomats, scientists, business people, unionists, environmental activists, members of charities, and unmarked individuals (UNFCCC 2009: 154ff).
Coherence was not always that marked even within state delegations.
The recognised power blocks at the Conference were:  The G-77, a loose coalition of 131 “developing nations,” including China, India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sudan, Cuba, Papua New Guinea and Saudi Arabia.
 The 41 Industrialised (Annex 1) countries.
Annex 1 was defined in earlier treaties.
It not only includes the USA, Australia, the UK, Germany, Japan, Russia etc, but Liechtenstein, Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania and other relatively poor small states.
At the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it was agreed that only these countries had to reduce emissions.
 The 38 Small Island Developing States who make up about 20 percent of the UN general assembly, with another 14 non-UN members.
 The least developed countries bloc.
 And, the OPEC block, which could be expected to oppose any limits on selling oil.
 Some sources also mention an African climate-negotiating group headed by Ethiopia.
On top of this there were simultaneous international activist forums, the most notable being the Klimaforum09, again with a roughly joined patchwork of players.
George Monbiot (2010) commented: I came back from the Copenhagen climate talks depressed for several reasons, but above all because, listening to the discussions at the citizens’ summit, it struck me that we no longer have movements; we have thousands of people each clamouring to have their own visions adopted.
We might come together for occasional rallies and marches, but as soon as we start discussing alternatives, solidarity is shattered by possessive individualism.
There was also the so-called Climate Group, which focused on a meeting of regional governments with at least 60 premiers, governors and ministers, featuring Al Gore, Prince Charles and Helen Clark.
This meeting asked the main meeting to recognise that ‘up to 80 per cent of mitigation and adaptation actions are implemented at the subnational level’ and awarded the ‘inaugural State Leadership Award for Action on Climate Change’ to Arnold Schwarzenegger (Posner 2009).
A trade union delegation led by Sharan Burrow, then president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), claimed to represent ‘168 million workers in 154 countries,’ and attempted to lock in ‘labour standards and good quality jobs’ (Baggio 2009).
Finally, there was also a parallel meeting, of climate sceptics.
As Ian Plimer (2009) writes: Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
12 Two Copenhagen climate conferences took place last week….
The conference I attended used science to understand the past, present environments and pollution.
This was essentially unreported because journalists are scientific illiterates and this is not sensational news … The other conference, the UN’s political conference, is about the redistribution of your money through sticky fingers.
The tearing web While there are ‘ecological’ connections between all these people, there are not going to be ‘human’ connections; the sheer numbers and potential differences involved have to be acknowledged.
There are few simple coherent networks here.
These are knots without a visible tapestry.
So not only do people face the kind of psycho-social disruption we have discussed, but it is likely that groups will fragment, networks dissolve, and alliances will fracture, making little basis for mutually agreed justice.
For example, there are obvious overlaps in block membership; the categories are not coherent or mutually exclusive.
India and China are not easily classified as ‘developing’ or powerless when compared to some Annex 1 countries.
China is somewhere between the second and third largest economy in the world with a GDP of close to US$8 trillion, Tuvalu’s GDP is US$15 million (Borofsky et al.
2009).
Estonia, an Annex 1 country has a GDP of less than US$22 billion.
Annex 1 countries don’t have much in common, or many historical unities, but the most obvious conflict amongst them over reduction targets was between the USA and the EU.
Conflicts also manifested between relatively poor States with large forests (Papua New Guinea and Indonesia) and those without, as REDD proposals are of little use if you have no industrial emissions, limited agricultural emissions or no forests.
The small island states argued that they faced destruction with the treaties being proposed, and broke with China and India.
Venezuela and Bolivia, seemed to consider themselves a separate independent Marxist block, but Venezuela is an oil producer.
Categories like ‘West’ and ‘the rest,’ or ‘North’ and ‘South,’ don’t begin to capture the complex patterns of alliance and fracture manifested here or, perhaps more importantly, the potential change in the world’s power balance.
The USA has in less than twenty years gone from being the world’s only unchallengeable superpower, to a troubled player amongst many.
Furthermore, countries themselves were not coherent.
Members on both sides of the US Senate were openly opposed to restrictions on US activities.
The conservative Opposition in Australia opposed the Government’s scheme for carbon reduction as did the Greens.
There was a vocal and popular ‘climate sceptic’ movement in the USA, Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
13 Australia and the UK supported by much of the mainstream media, which was largely hostile to any action at all; it can be seen in any online newspaper article of the period that allows comments.
Frequently sceptics argue that action hurting the economy would hurt the poor and cost jobs, and thus, by implication, be unjust.
There was no web at the conference, only potentials and broken patterns.
One of the problems that arose repeatedly was the problem of sovereignty.
Climate change cannot be solved nationally and thus it changes the relationships between states.
India and China objected strongly to the idea of their emission cuts being inspected, just as much as the USA objected to other states putting limits on them.
There is a suspicion of unjust freeloading by others, which implies that generous actions would be unfairly exploited.
The same fragility exists elsewhere; even in an era which has celebrated neo-liberalist ‘free trade,’ it is notable that multi-party trade talks have continually broken down, and that most trade agreements have been bilateral, cutting down the number of participants and limiting complexity.
Even these, such as the 2004 Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, have frequently been attacked as giving too much leeway to one or the other side, and overpowering local legislations.
Categories of national self and national ego are challenged by international regulation.
Incidentally the World Trade Organisation’s Seventh Ministerial Conference in Geneva, took place in the weeks before Copenhagen, with the focus on increasing world trade and hence on increasing carbon emissions from transport.
Conflict and incoherence reign everywhere—this is part of the politics that must be dealt with.
Confusion is not only present in the interactions.
Process is also confused.
Thus in one article from 6 December environmentalist Bill McKibben argued that climate change was unlike other political problems in that it could not be solved by incrementalism: the adversary here is not Republicans, or socialists, or deficits, or taxes, or misogyny, or racism, or any of the problems we normally face—adversaries that can change over time, or be worn down, or disproved, or cast off.
The adversary here is physics … physics doesn’t just impose a bottom line, it imposes a time limit.
This is like no other challenge we face because every year we don’t deal with it, it gets much, much worse, and then, at a certain point, it becomes insoluble.
(McKibben 2009a) A mere four days later, perhaps faced with deadlock, he compared climate change to the fight for health care in the USA, and said that something is better than nothing (McKibben 2009b).
Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
14 Demands I do not want to reiterate the science here, as that is well known.
What is significant is that the Small Island States captured a large amount of publicity for their plight, and for demands that temperature rises should be kept to less than 2 degrees Centigrade and CO2 be restricted to 350 parts per million or less.
This was never going to be agreed to by the big emitters, such as the USA and China.
One commentator wrote: The dispute is fundamental because the amount of greenhouse gases already in the air condemns the world to an increase of at least 1.5 degrees.
Meeting the victims’ demand, therefore, would mean either stopping all emissions immediately, which would be impossible, or reducing them much faster than expected and finding a way of getting carbon dioxide out of the air.
(Lean 2009) We are arguing as the world weave tears.
Conference moods The conference moods and conflicts display the psychological processes.
Geoffrey Lean stated that the conference ‘started in a more optimistic frame of mind than any I can remember in four decades of similarly tricky negotiations’ (Lean 2009).
Interviewed on the ABC on 8 December, Sydney Morning Herald Correspondent Marian Wilkinson said there ‘is a hell of a lot of energy here and there is a buzz around this conference.
There’s no doubt about that.
The optimism/pessimism is very difficult to judge because, frankly, people swing quite wildly between the two extremes’ (‘Copenhagen Climate Change Summit’ 2009).
A day or so later Time Magazine reported that: ‘Already, grinding diplomacy and criticism have overshadowed the good feelings and pageantry of the opening day of the summit’ (Walsh 2009).
Australian Climate Change Minister Penny Wong agreed with the statement on 10 December that ‘the atmosphere that you have flown into is not promising … the conflict between developing and developed nations and even within the developing nations themselves, a lotta harsh words going around?’ (‘Penny Wong Live’ 2009).
Afterwards Todd Stern, the US State Department Climate Change Envoy, said that the summit was ‘a snarling, aggravated, chaotic event’ (Watts et al.
2010).
Richard Black of the BBC noted that the Danish chief negotiator was sacked as a result of conflict between Danish Premier Lars Lokke Rasmussen and the Climate Minister Connie Hedegaard.
‘This destroyed the atmosphere of trust that developing country negotiators had established with Mr Becker’ (Black 2009).
The Danes, probably Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
15 worried that there was too much to get through, hurried people along, leaving players feeling their position had not been taken into account: ‘China’s chief negotiator was barred by security for the first three days of the meeting … This was said to have left the Chinese delegation in high dudgeon’ (Black 2009).
Rasmussen also offended people by implying he could not trust some delegates: ‘Criticism of [Rasmussen] has been backed by China, India—and Brazil, which Denmark has viewed as an ally’ (Rothenberg et al.
2009).
This fragmentation of expected alliances and organisation could be expected to produce paranoia-like analysis.
The release of emails hacked from the East Anglia Climatic Research Unit, which allowed climate sceptics to claim climate science was ‘cooked,’ led UN officials to claim the hackers were probably paid to undermine the Copenhagen summit (Totaro 2009).
Similarly, a day after the conference started, there was a leaked document: ‘a secret draft agreement worked on by a group of individuals known as ‘the circle of commitment’—but understood to include the UK, US and Denmark [which] has only been shown to a handful of countries since it was finalised this week’ (Vidal 2009a).
The document was supposed to indicate that the agreement had already been stitched up, and that the conference was to hand power to the ‘rich countries.’ Fury was expressed at the document.
One anonymous diplomat said: ‘Clearly the intention is to get Obama and the leaders of other rich countries to muscle it through when they arrive next week.
It effectively is the end of the UN process’ (Vidal 2009a).
On the other hand it was reported that: ‘U.S.
delegate Jonathan Pershing played down the implications of the document.
“There is no single Danish text, there are many Danish texts.” He went on, “If there was no Danish text, I would be appalled [since the delegates’ …] job is to bring something to the table’ (Stone 2009).
Marian Wilkinson reported further fears: We’ve been told by negotiators here that there is a fear from the Chinese and the Indians.
They fear that the verification measures put in place could be used against them, especially by the US Congress, also perhaps by some of the European parliaments, to impose carbon tariffs on them; that this will be used as a weapon to slug them in the international trade sphere (‘Crunch Time’ 2009).
India’s Environment Minister, Jairam Ramesh, accused Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of lying about his position on climate change and pulled out of a meeting with Australian Climate Change Minister Penny Wong.
She reportedly said that ‘she did Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
16 not know why Mr Ramesh pulled out of the crucial meeting.
“You will have to ask him’” (Wilkinson 2009).
Ramesh claimed he had been too busy.
Ramesh also called Australia an ayatollah for wanting a single treaty to bind everyone (Wilkinson 2009).
In other talks, members of the G77 walked out to protest about the apparent abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, and Australia ‘then shut down the talks on emission cuts for rich countries’ (Wilkinson 2009).
About the same time, Lumumba Di-Aping, a Sudanese diplomat who was the official chief negotiator for the G77 group, said: ‘The message Kevin Rudd is giving to his people, his citizens, is a fabrication, it’s fiction’ (Alberici 2009).
After the event, a journalist asked Penny Wong if she got ‘the feeling that India is really boasting that it has sort of put one over the larger nations?’ (Wong 2009).
Reports of the final day of negotiation suggest that there was a clash between China and the USA, in particular, and that there was also an attempt to generate a sub-conference to make things more controllable.
A Guardian report claimed that after ‘eight draft texts and all-day talks between 115 world leaders, it was left to Barack Obama and Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, to broker a political agreement’ (Vidal 2009b).
The Independent reported that the ‘day’s most remarkable feature was a direct and unprecedented personal clash between … Barack Obama, and … Wen Jiabao’ (McCarthy 2009b).
The reporter explains the clash as stemming from Obama’s public insistence that the Chinese should allow their announced cuts to be inspected, and that without such verification an agreement was worthless.
Wen sent subordinates to all further meetings and Obama was deeply annoyed (McCarthy 2009b).
If this were the case, then this was not a new demand.
Many Annex 1 countries wanted everyone to make cuts and have them verified; it could seem the Chinese were ‘seeking’ to be insulted and insulting.
People were not happy with the process of the final day.
Journalist George Monbiot said: Obama went behind the backs of the UN and most of its member states and assembled a coalition of the willing to strike a deal that outraged the rest of the world.
This was then presented to poorer nations without negotiation: either they signed it or they lost the adaptation funds required to help them survive the first few decades of climate breakdown.
(Monbiot 2009) Richard Black of the BBC, agreed that the deal was struck behind closed doors: ‘The end of the meeting saw leaders of the US and the BASIC group of countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) hammering out a last-minute deal in a back room as Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
17 though the nine months of talks leading up to this summit, and the Bali Action Plan to which they had all committed two years previously, did not exist’ (Black 2009).
The most detailed account of part of the final day was given by Mark Lynas (2009), the climate advisor to Mohamed Nasheed, the President of the Maldives.
He said about 5060 people were in the room, and that Wen Jiabao did not attend.
The Chinese insisted that the previously agreed upon 2050 targets be taken out of the deal: ‘“Why can’t we even mention our own targets?” demanded a furious Angela Merkel.
Australia’s prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone.’ (Lynas 2009).
The Chinese further insisted that statements that emissions should peak by 2020 be removed: [T]he Chinese delegate [also] insisted on removing the 1.5C target so beloved of the small island states and low-lying nations who have most to lose from rising seas.
President Nasheed of the Maldives, supported by [Gordon] Brown, fought valiantly to save this crucial number.
“How can you ask my country to go extinct?” demanded Nasheed.
The Chinese delegate feigned great offence—and the number stayed, but surrounded by language which makes it all but meaningless.
(Lynas 2009) Later on, Kevin Rudd said: At about one o’clock this morning in Copenhagen, after seventeen hours straight of negotiation today, we agreed on a Copenhagen Accord on climate change.
This was agreed in a negotiating group of about twenty-five nations … This last round of negotiations with that group began at 11pm last night.
It ran through to three this morning, with myself in attendance, and then Penny Wong remained through the night.
I resumed at 8am this morning and we have just concluded at 1am the next day.
It has been a long day … The truth is, as of twenty four hours ago, these negotiations stood at a point of complete collapse.
(Rudd 2009c) With this level of exhaustion, it is improbable that anyone was thinking straight.
Obama left immediately, ironically and officially because of weather issues, but leaving distanced him, or attempted to distance him, from the mess of the involvement and the potential insecurity of his position, when not backed by Congress.
Networks fractured, and perhaps had little chance of holding the threads of coherent constructive power in these psychosocial circumstances; unthreading was more likely.
Aftermath John Sauven, executive director of Greenpeace UK, said: ‘The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, with the guilty men and women fleeing to the airport’ (Vidal 2009b).
Lumumba Di-Aping, chairman of the G77, and thus notionally a supporter of continuing Chinese emissions, stated that the agreement ‘is asking Africa to sign a Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
18 suicide pact, an incineration pact in order to maintain the economic dependence of a few countries.
It’s a solution based on values that funnelled six million people in Europe into furnaces’ (Batty 2009).
Indian and Chinese representatives tried to explain the breakdown in unity, and their power, in the G77 by conspiracy: “There have been some efforts to deliberately divide us,” one of the senior Chinese negotiators, Qingtai Yu told the BBC.
“We have seen such moves here and this is nothing new” … An Indian negotiator echoed the same message, adding, “In fact some of the poor countries have been threatened (by some developed countries not to toe the line of the G77) and we know there will be many such efforts” … “The allegation that we are trying to divide them is baseless and incomprehensible,” said Karl Falkenberg, a representative of the European Commission.
“You can see how divided they are on issues like average temperature rise and blaming us for that state does no good.” (Khadka 2009) The Guardian reported that a Chinese government think tank reinforced Chinese conclusions after the talks: ‘“A conspiracy by developed nations to divide the camp of developing nations [was] a success,” it said, citing the Small Island States’ demand that … Brazil, South Africa, India, China … impose mandatory emission reductions’ (Watts et al.
2010).
Mark Lynas, climate advisor to the President of the Maldives, said in response: It’s astonishing that this document suggests the Chinese really believe the absurd conspiracy theory that small island states were being played like puppets by rich countries.
The truth is that the small island states and most vulnerable countries want China and its allies to cut their emissions because without these cuts they will not survive.
Bluntly put, China is the world’s No1 emitter, and if China does not reduce its emissions by at least half by mid-century, then countries like the Maldives will go under.
(Watts et al.
2010) I’m not entirely convinced that UK Prime Minster Gordon Brown was not right to say: ‘This is the first step we are taking towards a green and low-carbon future for the world, steps we are taking together.
But like all first steps, the steps are difficult and they are hard’ (Batty 2009).
Perhaps too much was expected, and expectations also disrupted the process.
In March 2010 it was reported that: Many countries resented that it had been thrashed out and imposed on them outside the formal UN negotiation process.
But 114 countries have backed up their initial support by formally associating themselves with the accord and 74 have submitted targets to cut or slow greenhouse gas emissions.
Nearly 80 per cent of the world’s emissions are included.
(Morton 2010a) Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
19 In June 2010 claims were made that China’s leaders were preparing ‘the ground to exceed China’s pledge to reduce carbon emissions intensity by 40 to 45 per cent by 2020” (Garnaut 2010).
Advice from the Australian Department of Climate Change suggested that ‘steps being taken by China might be equivalent to Australia cutting emissions by 25 per cent” (Morton 2010b).
China cannot be accused of simple reluctance and resistance; things are much messier than that.
In terms of comparative complexity we need to remember that the Kyoto accord was initially signed as a framework in 1997.
The rulebook was completed in 2001.
It took effect in February 2005.
It was ratified by Australia only in 2008, and was never agreed to by the USA.
Reports of the Tianjin conference, which appeared as I wrote the first draft of this essay (October 2010), suggest that the fracture, weaving and unravelling, the discarding and the felting, the ordered and the contingent, the distress and cries of injustice, continue to have play and will not fall into a simple order.
Yet out of the chaos has come something, the thrum has become felt.
Perhaps it is not useful, and perhaps it will be unthreaded, perhaps it did not matt thoroughly enough, but at the same time this disorder and dismembering is part of the politics and part of the social process and cannot be ignored by attempting to render what happened simple and coherent.
Conclusion and suggestions This paper has attempted to show that disorder is inherent in climate change and our psychosocial responses to it.
With climate change, our certainties, alliances and social categories breakdown, as do the ways we organise our egos and our realities.
The metaphor of thrum allows play with the intertwined mess and order, and shows that disorder cannot be ignored.
Networks, personal and political tend to be fragile.
Use of power disorders as much as it orders.
Old guiding myths such as Justice are no longer useful for ordering this course of events.
Justice fails because it seeks a scapegoat, demands elimination of disorder and requires a uniformity, agreement and enforcement that cannot be present.
On the other hand, disorder can be a sign of something neglected, of the unconscious or the unknown, as well as of a burgeoning creativity that can look like vandalism.
Depth psychology suggests that it is useful to listen to the disorder rather than discard it.
It suggests that, with listening, this disorder can be symbolically synthesised with one’s ordering, so as to produce a new state that allows the person, or group, to better deal Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
20 with their problems.
This renders disorder, no longer simply disorder but something symbolically conceivable, or recognisable, which is neither obstacle nor discard.
Disorder is no longer trash, but incorporated, transformed, as part of the pattern.
Depth psychology does not claim to know what this new order is in advance; that has to be formed, and uncertainty accepted during this process.
The new order does not mean that there is no longer disorder.
Disorder is always present because our conceptual apparatus is always limited, and there is always something left over.
Just as we cannot describe anything completely in a finite period of time, so we cannot order everything.
We can only work within the limits of what is orderable at the time, hoping for a minimum of relevant or repressed disorder.
We move from one disorder to the next, which hopefully will test out as more adaptive and more moral.
Rather than demanding fairness and justice, perhaps we can ask all who are concerned to act now, to cut back emissions, to find new lives and morals which apply to them rather than are demanded of others.
This is not denying the social power in a group of people moving together, but a wariness of a group that exists against another.
Such a group will create this ‘other’ and is likely to unconsciously become it.
Similarly we can ask people to respect the disorder of reality; not to demand or rush to an order which is not present, but rather to seek to listen to the thrumming, however much it appears to be part of the background, the mess, or the breakdown.
We may likewise need to learn how to deal with disordered, fragmentary and fragile networks, as opposed to ordered institutions, and to keep them unravelling long enough to serve their momentary purpose.
Calling for ourselves and our leaders to listen to disorder rather than demanding certainty and ultimatums, may seem as impractical as calling for Justice, but it may also be less destructive and more productive of new solutions which are not locked into our current ways of being and relations of power.
Reference List Abbott, T. 2009.
‘Interview with Fran Kelly.’ Radio National, 16 December.
Online, available: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/AYHV6/upload_binary/ayhv60.pdf;fi leType=application/pdf [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Alberici, E. 2009, ‘Copenhagen Negotiator Accuses Rudd of Lying,’ ABC News, 16 December.
Online, available: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/12/16/2772948.htm [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
21 Baggio, G. 15 December 2009, ‘History in the Making, Slowly,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 15 December.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/history-in-the-makingslowly-20091214-ksdp.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Batty, D. 2009, ‘Copenhagen reaction: delegates speak,’ The Guardian, 19 December.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/19/copenhagen-reaction-delegates-speak [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Black, R. 2009, ‘Why Did Copenhagen Fail to Deliver a Climate Deal?’ BBC News, 22 December.
Online, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8426835.stm [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Borofsky, Y. Nordhaus, T. & Shellenberger, M. 14 December 2009.
‘The End of ‘Developing Countries,’ Breakthrough Insitute, 14 December.
Online, available: http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/2009/12/the_end_of_developing_countrie.shtml [Accessed 9 October 2010].
‘Copenhagen Climate Change Summit Kicks Off’ 2009, 7.30 Report, ABC, 8 December.
Online, available: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2009/s2765603.htm [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Corn, D. 2009, ‘Who Needs a Binding Climate Treaty?’ Mother Jones, 8 December.
Online, available: http://motherjones.com/politics/2009/12/us-who-needs-binding-climate-treaty [Accessed 9 October 2010].
‘Crunch Time in Copenhagen,’ 7.30 Report, ABC, 14 December.
Online, available: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2009/s2771588.htm [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Douglas, M. 1969, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Garnaut, J.
2010, ‘China to Cut Energy Use and Emissions,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/business/china-to-cut-energy-use-and-emissions-20100617yjuv.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
‘Global Warming ‘Godfather’ Goes Cold on Copenhagen’ 2009, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/global-warminggodfather-goes-cold-on-copenhagen-20091203-k7ds.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Joyce, B.
2009, ‘Bangkok Climate Change Talks Fail: Precursor to Failure in Copenhagen.
09-October2009.’ Media Release.
Online, available: http://www.barnabyjoyce.com.au/Newsroom/MediaReleases/tabid/74/articleType/ArticleView/arti cleId/968/Bangkok-Climate-Change-Talks-Fail-Precursor-to-failure-in-Copenhagen.aspx [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Khadka, N. 2009, ‘Developed Countries Accused of Dividing Developing Ones,’ Climate Change Media Partnerships, 12 December.
Online, available: http://www.climatemediapartnership.org/reporting/stories/developed-countries-accused-ofdividing-developing-ones/ [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Lean, G. 2009, ‘Copenhagen: The Lessons We are Being Forced to Learn,’ Telegraph.co.uk, 12 December.
Online, available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/copenhagen-climate-changeconfe/6791053/Copenhagen-the-lessons-we-are-being-forced-to-learn.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Levi-Strauss, C, 1967, The Savage Mind.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Lynas, M. 2009, ‘How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal?
I was in the Room.’ Guardian, 22 December.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Marshall, J. P. 2009, Depth Psychology, Disorder and Climate Change.
Jungdownunder Books, Sydney.
McCarthy, M. 2009a, ‘Greenhouse Gas Cuts Just “Token Gestures,”’ The Independent, 7 December.
Online, available: http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/greenhouse-gascuts-just-token-gestures-1835499.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
_____ 2009b, ‘Obama’s Climate Accord Fails the Test,’ The Independent, 19 December.
Online, available: http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/obamas-climate-accordfails-the-test-1845090.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
McKibben, B.
2009a, ‘Why Politics-As-Usual May Mean the End of Civilization,’ The Huffington Post, 6 December.
Online, available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-mckibben/why-politics-asusual-may_b_382013.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
_____ 2009b, ‘Obama’s Climate Position: A Lie Inside a Fib Coated with Spin,’ Mother Jones, 12 December.
Online, available: http://motherjones.com/environment/2009/12/obamas-climateposition-lie-inside-fib-coated-spin [Accessed 9 October 2010].
M’Gonigle, M. 2009, ‘Against Copenhagen: Why We Need to “Lose” at this Week’s Climate Summit If We are to Win the Fight against Global Warming,’ The Tyee, 6 December.
Online, available: Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
22 http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2009/12/06/CopenhagenContradictions/ [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Monbiot, G. 2009, ‘If You Want to Know Who’s to Blame for Copenhagen, Look to the US Senate,’ The Guardian, 21 December.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/21/copenhagen-failure-us-senate-vestedinterests [Accessed 9 October 2010].
_____ 2010, ‘After this 60-year Feeding Frenzy, Earth Itself has Become Disposable,’ The Guardian, 4 January.
Online, available:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/04/standard-ofliving-spending-consumerism [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Morton, A.
2010a, ‘Climate Can-do in Cancun?,’ The Age, 27 March.
Online, available: http://www.theage.com.au/environment/climate-change/climate-cando-in-cancun-20100326r33g.html [Accessed 10 December 2010].
_____ 2010b, “Australia’s wake-up call on emissions target”, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 November.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/australias-wakeup-call-onemissions-target-20101129-18dxb.html [Accessed 9 October 2010] ‘Penny Wong Live from Copenhagen,’ 7.30 Report, ABC, 10 December.
Online, available: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2009/s2768309.htm [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Plimer, I.
2009, ‘The Copenhagen Charade,’ ABC ‘Unleashed.’ Online, available: http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/28144.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Posner, R. 2009, ‘Emissions Terminator Shows How to Inspire a Crowd,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 17 December.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/emissionsterminator-shows-how-to-inspire-a-crowd-20091216-kxlo.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Rothenberg, M., Aagaard, M., & Andersen, E. O.
2009, ‘Løkke har problemer med topmøde-formen,’ politiken.dk, 18 December.
[translated via Google translate] Online, available: http://politiken.dk/klima/klimapolitik/article862988.ece [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Rudd, K. 2009a, ‘Transcript of COAG Press Conference,’ 7 December.
Online, available: http://pmrudd.archive.dpmc.gov.au/node/6380 Accessed 9 October 2010].
_____ 2009b, ‘Transcript of interview.
ABC AM,’ 14 December.
Online, available: http://pmrudd.archive.dpmc.gov.au/node/6395 [Accessed 9 October 2010].
_____ 2009c, ‘Transcript of joint press conference with the Minister for Climate Change, Copenhagen,’ 19 December.
Online, available: http://pmrudd.archive.dpmc.gov.au/node/6403 [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Stone, D. 2009, ‘The ‘Danish Text’ Disrupts Copenhagen: What You Need to Know,’ Newsweek, 8 December.
Online, available: http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/the-gaggle/2009/12/08/the-danishtext-disrupts-copenhagen-what-you-need-to-know.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Totaro, P. 2009, ‘UN Blames Professional Hackers’ Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/un-blames-professional-hackers20091207-kffs.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
‘UN Climate Talks: The Key Players,’ The Independent, 30 November, Online, available: http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/un-climate-talks-the-key-players-1831330.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
UNFCCC 2009, Overview Schedule, 8 December.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/overview_schedule_cop15.pdf [Accessed 9 October 2010].
_____ 2010, List of participants.
Part One.
Parties (A–O).
FCCC/CP/2009/INF.1 (Part 1).
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/inf01p01.pdf [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Vidal, J.
2009a, ‘Copenhagen Climate Summit in Disarray after “Danish Text’ Leak,’ The Guardian, 8 December.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagenclimate-summit-disarray-danish-text [Accessed 9 October 2010].
_____ 2009b, ‘Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure.’ The Guardian, 19 December.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Walsh, B.
2009, ‘Copenhagen’s Real Challenge: Technology to Meet the Targets,’ Time, 9 December.
Online, available: http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1929071_1929070_1946649,00.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Watts, J., Carrington, D., & Goldenberg, S. 2010, ‘China’s Fears of Rich Nation ‘Climate Conspiracy’ at Copenhagen Revealed,’ The Guardian, 11 February.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/11/chinese-thinktank-copenhagen-document [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Marshall Climate Change, Copenhagen and Psycho-social Disorder PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
23 Wilkinson, M. 2009, ‘India Lashes Out at Climate Stance’ Sydney Morning Herald, 17 December.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/india-lashes-out-at-climate-stance20091215-kuof.html [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Wong, P. 2009, ‘Transcript of Press Conference Adelaide 23 December 2009.’ Australian Parliament House, Canberra.
Online, available: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/DFKV6/upload_binary/dfkv60.pdf;fil eType=application/pdf#search=%2200AOU|ReporterId00AOU|SpeakerId00AOU%202000s%20m edia%22 [Accessed 9 October 2010].
Research on the effect of climate variability/climate change on runoff is limited in humid tropical regions.
Climate change has implications beyond the water resources sector, such as effects on agriculture and fisheries.
Hence, such studies are becoming increasingly important.
This study uses both historical field data and future climate forecasts from General Circulation Model Hadley Centre Coupled Model, version 3 GCM HadCM3.
These data are further downscaled using third generation of the Hadley Centre’s regional climate model (HadRM3), with Providing REgional Climates for Impacts Studies (PRECIS) software under the three Quantifying Uncertainties in Model Projections (QUMPs) with a horizontal resolution of 25 km X 25 km by the Centre for Climate Change and Adaptation Research, Anna University Chennai, for the state of Tamil Nadu.
These downscaled data are used to study runoff changes due to climate change for the Kosasthaliyar sub-basin in South India.
A trend analysis of the hydro-meteorological data for the sub-basin indicates that future rainfall is expected to decrease by approximately 10%, while the mean temperatures will increase by the year 2100.
The runoff changes from 2011 to 2040 are not perceptible when compared to the historical period of 1971 to 2000.
This study attempts to provide information on climate variability and its impacts on runoff in the Kosasthaliyar sub-basin.
La investigación del efecto variabilidad climática/cambio climático en el modelo pluviosidad/escorrentía es limitada en regiones tropicales húmedas, donde el cambio climático tiene implicaciones tanto en los recursos acuíferos, como en la agricultura y la pesca.
Por lo tanto este tipo de estudios han incrementado su importancia.
Este estudio utiliza tanto los datos adquiridos en este campo como las predicciones climáticas del Modelo General de Circulación de la Célula de Hadley, en su versión 3GCM HadCM3.
Estos datos fueron reducidos luego al utilizar la tercera generación del modelo climático regional del Centro Hadley (HadRM3), con el programa de Estipulación de Climas Regionales para Estudios de Impacto (PRECIS, en inglés), bajo los tres modelos de Cuantificación de la Incertidumbre en Proyecciones (QUMPs, en inglés).
El Centro para el Cambio Climático y la Investigación de Adaptación de la Universidad Anna, de Chennai, en el estado Tamil Nadu, utiliza una escala horizontal de 25 kilómetros por 25 kilómetros.
Esta reducción de datos se utiliza para estudiar los cambios de escorrentía por el cambio climático en la subcuenca de Kosasthaliyar, al sur de la India.
Un análisis de tendencia de los datos hidrometeorológicos en la subcuenca indica que en el futuro la pluviosidad caerá en un 10 %, mientras que la temperatura media se incrementará para el año 2100.
Los cambios de escorrentía para el período 2011-2040 no difieren de los del período 1971-2000.
Este estudio es uno de los primeros acercamientos para proveer información sobre la variabilidad climática y sus impactos en la escorrentía de la subcuenca de Khosastaliyar.
EARTH SCIENCES RESEARCH JOURNAL Eart Sci.
Res.
J. Vol.
18, No.
1 (June, 2014): 45 49 ABSTRACT RESUMEN Key words: GCM, HadCM3, HadRM3, QUMP, runoff Palabras clave: GCM; HadCM3; HadCM3; QUMP; Escorrentía.
Climate Variability and its impacts on runoff in the Kosasthaliyar sub-basin, India Balambal Usha1 and B V Mudgal2 1.
Research Scholar, Centre for Water Resources, Anna University Chennai.
Email: u_seshadri@rediffmail.com 2.
Professor, Centre for Water Resources, Anna University Chennai.
Introduction Evidence is mounting that climate change is occurring (Alavian et al (2009)).
Every region of the world is expected to experience climate change.
The impact of climate change on water resources may be positive or negative, depending on the geographical region (Rao et al (2012)).
Each river basin faces a unique set of climate-related water challenges, depending on the hydrological regime.
The extent that each water system will be affected by climate change will depend on the area’s degree of vulnerability, including its internal capacity to adapt to such change.
Internal capacity refers to the ability or resilience of the system to cope with this externality.
In general, warming increases the variability in precipitation, i.e., the number of rainy days may decrease, while the intensity of rainfall may increase (Mukerji 2009).
This trend is likely to create excessive runoff within a short period (Mall et al, 2006).
Additionally, as the atmosphere warms, the evaporation from soil moisture increases (Chattopadhyay and Hulme 1997; Mall et al 2006).
Runoff is decreasing in some regions and increasing in other regions.
Whether runoff increases or decreases in a region is basin-specific within the context of climate change.
Meteorological data are fundamental inputs for hydrological investigations.
A critical issue is that “due to changing climate past data and hydrological experience may no longer be a guide for decision making”, i.e., the stationarity of climate, which is a key assumption in planning for water resources, is no METEOROLOGY Record Manuscript received: 19/09/2013 Accepted for publication: 31/05/2014 46 Balambal Usha and B V Mudgal longer valid [EBNFLO Environmental Aqua Resource Inc.(2010)].
Hence, all impact assessments of climate change will need to incorporate a wide range of climate scenarios to study the potential of future water resources potential.
The study was conducted by considering the above factors.
The main aim is to assess the impacts of climate variability on the reservoir inflows of the major reservoirs located within the sub-basin of Kosasthaliyar.
A number of authors have used WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning System) to study stream flow impacts under climate change.
A notable study was conducted by Harma (2010) on the Okanagan Basin in British Columbia.
In this study, land use and climate, which are changing simultaneously, were considered for modeling stream flows using WEAP.
The results demonstrate that all future climate conditions will critically reduce streamflows relative to the societal and ecological demands in at least a few months of “normal” and “dry” years.
In all cases, the combination of demand, reservoir operations and climate variability will result in less than optimal conditions for instream flow needs.
In another study by Yates et al (2009), the Sacramento Basin in California was chosen to study the effects of climate change on reservoir inflows.
The Sacramento Basin was divided into more than 100 sub-basins.
A 37-year monthly climate time series from 1962 to 1998 was applied to a distributed hydrological model in WEAP.
The results showed that the WEAP model was able to simulate the inflows well for this period.
The problem The IPCC (2007) AR4 states that India could suffer from water stress – an annual water availability of less than 1000 cubic meters per capita – by 2025, and groundwater availability could decrease as much as 37 percent by mid-century.
Chennai Basin is situated in a humid tropical climate in South India.
Water availability in this region depends on rainfall, particularly its spatial and temporal distribution.
The basin receives approximately 1300 mm of rainfall annually.
Approximately 90 percent of this annual rainfall is received from two monsoons spread over a period of six months from June to December.
The remaining rainfall occurs during a six-month period encompassing the summer months.
Most of the reservoirs in the basin are sources of domestic water for the city (indicated in the Chennai Basin Micro Level Report).
Hence, the inflow into these reservoirs is very important because it dictates the supply of water for the basin.
Groundwater, which is a major water source, has been subjected to large withdrawals.
Therefore, surface water resources must be judiciously conserved and managed.
Quantifying hydrological responses to climate change is extremely important for proper water resources management (IPCC 2007).
Global climate models (GCMs) are the best tools to study climatic variations at the global scale.
However, GCMs do not capture local details, which are necessary for impact assessments at the regional level.
Hence, there is a need to link the output from GCMs by further downscaling so that they can be used as input for hydrological modeling at basin level .
So far, such studies have apparently not been reported at the regional level for Chennai Basin.
Study area and methodology 3.1 Study Area Chennai Basin is situated in South India.
The Kosasthaliyar subbasin is the part of Chennai Basin located between 12°40’N-13°40’N and 79°10’E-80°25’E at the northeast corner of Tamil Nadu.
The total area of the basin is 7282 km², 5542 km² of which is in Tamil Nadu; the remaining area is in Andhra Pradesh.
The Kosasthaliyar sub-basin covers an area of 2013.58 km².
The Poondi Reservoir is a single purpose reservoir that was constructed in 1944 as a source of drinking water for the city of Chennai.
Cholavaram and Red Hills are the other two reservoirs of the Kosasthaliyar sub-basin.
The map of the study area is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Study area (Source: Water Resources Department, Tamil Nadu) 3.2 Trend Analysis The non-parametric Mann-Kendall (MK) test (Mann, (1945); Kendall, (1975)) has been commonly used to assess the significance of trends in hydrometeorological series (Chiew and McMohan 1993 and others).
First, the presence of a monotonic increase or decrease has been tested using the slope of the linear trend estimated from regression analysis.
Second, the significance of the trend is estimated using the Mann –Kendall method.
3.3 WEAP model The Water Evaluation and Planning System (WEAP) is a physically based, semi-distributed river basin model developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute.
WEAP was developed to assess water resource allocation problems, and it is also used to study the impacts of climate change on hydrology.
It is a complex integrated river basin model that operates with a flexible time step, i.e., hourly, daily, etc.
The WEAP rainfall runoff model requires data on soil, land use, climate, etc., for the assessment of water resource availability at desired locations of a drainage basin.
3.4 Research Stages The methodology flowchart is given in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 Methodology flowchart TREND AND VARIABILITY ANALYSIS (1971-2000) PROJECTION (2011-2098) CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON WATER RESOURCES OF CHENNAI BASIN HYDROMETEOROLICAL PARAMETERS OF RAINFALL AND TEMPERATURE RUNOFF CHANGES DUE TO CHANGES IN HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL PARAMETERS INFERENCES BASED ON RESULTS FROM ABOVE 47Climate Variability and its impacts on runoff in the Kosasthaliyar sub-basin, India To conduct this research, rainfall and temperature field data of the past 30 years were analyzed; subsequently, the virgin flows for the same 30-year historical period (1971-2000) were used to develop a hydrological model.
The rainfall and temperature data are used to drive the model to study past runoff impacts.
Along with this analysis, RCM data of rainfall and temperature for the same period are used to simulate the runoff.
Then, the results from the two simulations are compared.
Furthermore, RCM data are used for predicting future flows for the period of 2011-2040.
For past impact analysis, field data of monthly rainfall and virgin flows were obtained from the Institute for Water Studies, Taramani, Chennai.
Data for temperature were obtained from the IMD (India Meteorological Department).
To study the future changes in the basin, 120 years of daily climatic data were obtained by dynamically downscaling GCM HadCM3 output using PRECIS software.
The A1B emission scenario under the three QUMP (Quantifying Uncertainties in Model Projections) was considered.
The spatial resolution of HadRM3 (Regional Climate Model) was 25 km X 25 km.
A land use map from satellite images was obtained from the Institute of Remote Sensing (IRS) , Anna University, Chennai.
The land use map of the catchment of Poondi Reservoir is given in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Land use map of the catchment of Poondi Reservoir IRS 1997.
Data for the WEAP input parameters, such as soil water capacity, hydraulic conductivity, crop coefficients, net irrigated area, deep water capacity and deep conductivity, were obtained from the Institute for Water Studies, Chennai.
The leaf area index (LAI) was calculated by using the FAO method.
The leaf area index is obtained from crop coefficients of both the mid-season and harvesting season.
The initial value of the crop coefficient is 0.1.
To assess the effects of climate change on future flows, WEAP was used to first calibrate and validate the model for the Kosasthaliyar reservoirs with virgin flow data.
A monthly time step was selected, as climate change is a longterm phenomenon.
Hence, monthly flows aggregated to annual flows were considered more representative of stream flows than shorter time steps.
Upon consultation with a few field experts, it was found that the catchment of the Red Hills is a highly urbanized sub-watershed.
The virgin flows into both the Red Hills reservoir and the Cholavaram tank are negligible.
The runoff from Kosasthaliyar is stored in Poondi Reservoir.
Therefore, only the virgin flows of Poondi were considered, and the watershed was considered a single reservoir system.
The stream flows were modeled accordingly.
Results and discussion 4.1 Trend Analysis – Past (1971-2000) The main aim of this paper is to study the climate variability impacts on runoff.
Therefore, a detailed description of the work conducted on trend analysis is not presented.
Instead, a snapshot of the results of the trend analysis is shown in Figure 4.
An initial analysis indicates increases for both rainfall and temperature during 1971-2000 (control climate).
The MK test at a significance level of 0.85 showed that these trends are statistically significant.
Further rainfall and runoff trends for the sub-basin of Kosasthaliyar showed an increase.
4.1 Trend Analysis – Future (2011-2100) The graphs show that rainfall will decrease in the coming years, whereas temperatures will increase.
The maximum mean temperature (during May) is likely to increase from 34.5 degrees Celsius in 1970-2000 to 37.5 degrees Celsius by 2098.
4a 4b Figure 4(a-b) Chennai Basin climatology – past and future monthly rainfall and temperature trends 4.3 WEAP Model The upstream catchment of the Poondi Reservoir was considered for the analysis.
The same period of analysis was taken into consideration, where1971-2000 is the control period and 2011 – 2040 is the future climate.
The runoff in relation to the rainfall for the Kosasthaliyar Basin was plotted.
The runoff increases in accordance with the rainfall for this sub-basin.
To test the statistical significance of this trend, the Mann-Kendall test was performed 48 Balambal Usha and B V Mudgal using XLSTAT.
The trend is statistically significant at the significance level of alpha equal to 0.3 with a p-value of 0.288.
To assess the effects of climate change on future flows, WEAP was used to first calibrate and validate the model for the Poondi Reservoir with virgin flow data.
For rainfall data that used field data for the first simulation run, the mean of five relevant rain gauge stations was considered for the analysis.
For the second simulation run using RCM data, a monthly bias correction factor was applied to the RCM rainfall data for the average rainfall of the nearby grids because there were seasonal biases compared to the field data.
Literature on RCM studies indicates that RCM data should never be used in hydrological studies without bias correction (Maraun et al 2010).
The details of the calibration and validation periods are given in Table 1.
Table 1 Model testing period for the calibration and validation Reservoir Calibration Validation Poondi 1971-1998 1998-2000 The model performance was assessed using NSE and other indices, as shown in Table 2.The Nash Sutcliffe efficiency (NSE) produced very high values for both the calibration and validation of the field data.
For the RCMderived runoff, the NSE values were within an acceptable range.
Per the performance rating recommended by Moriasi et al (2007) for the monthly time step, this model is very good for Chennai Basin.
Table 2 Indices for testing the model efficiency NSE Calibration Validation FIELD DATA 0.92 0.85 RCM BIAS CORRECTED 0.26 0.4 4.4 Future Impacts on Runoff of the Kosasthaliyar Sub-basin The WEAP model was used to predict inflows under climate change.
To build a future scenario, a single land use change was considered for each decade i.e., 2011-2020, 2021-2030 and 2031-2040.
For Poondi, the change in land use was an increase in the wasteland, which leads to a reduction in water bodies, as shown in Figure 5.
It might be noted that there were no major perceptible changes in the land use extrapolated for the future period.
This process, coupled with climate change under the A1B emission scenario, was used to model future inflows.
These results are graphically represented in Figure 6.
5a Figure 5 (a-c) Future land use changes/land cover for the Poondi Reservoir 6a 6b 6c Figure 6(a-c) Climate change effects on runoff – baseline and future periods The graphs show that overall, there will be no significant change in the runoff in the coming years.
49Climate Variability and its impacts on runoff in the Kosasthaliyar sub-basin, India Conclusions In this study, runoff changes due to climate change were investigated for the Kosasthaliyar sub-basin, South India.
Both past and future impacts on runoff were mapped using field data and climate model data, i.e., data from RCM PRECIS using a horizontal resolution of 25 km X 25 km.
The climatic data obtained were superimposed on a hydrological model using WEAP software.
From a trend analysis of the climatic data and runoff data, the following are observed: Approximately a 3°C rise in temperature is expected by the end of 2100.
This is consistent with other studies on Chennai Basin using the same A1B scenario (NIC Report).
Additionally, the rainfall projections for the same scenario in the regionindicate a 10 percent reduction for the basin.
This result is also consistent with the cited literature.
Runoff is mainly influenced by rainfall in the area.
The WEAP model is able to simulate the hydrology of Chennai Basin under changing climatic conditions.
This study attempts to estimate runoff changes due to climate change in the study area using the very high spatial resolution RCM HadRM3, the A1B scenario, and QUMP projections.
Notably, a larger set of climate simulations is necessary to improve the robustness of the conclusion that there is no significant change in the future runoff when compared to the baseline period for this sub-basin.
This conclusion is based on the RCM data, which was derived from one ensemble run.
This limitation was mainly due to the run-time of the simulations (approximately six months).
Using simulations from multiple runs could provide a better estimate of the range of variability in the future stream flows.
REFERENCES Alavian, V., Qaddumi, H. M., Dickson, E., Diez, S. M., Danilenko, A. V., Hirji, R. F., and Blankespoor, B.
(2009).
Water and climate change: understanding the risks and making climate-smart investment decisions.
World Bank, Washington DC http://water.
worldbank.
org/ publications/water-and-climate-change-understanding-risks-andmaking-climate-smart-investment-decisions.
Chattopadhyay, N., and Hulme, M. (1997).
Evaporation and potential evapotranspiration in India under conditions of recent and future climate change.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 87(1), 55-73.
Chennai Basin Micro Level Report (2006), Institute of Water Studies, Taramani, Chennai.
Chiew, F. H. S., and McMahon, T. A.
(1993).
Detection of trend or change in annual flow of Australian rivers.
International Journal of Climatology, 13(6), 643-653.
EBNFLO Environmental Aqua Resource Inc .
(2010).
Guide for Assessment of Hydrologic Effects of Climate Change in Ontario,www.env.uwaterloo.ca Harma, K. J.
(2010).
Changing with the flow: an analysis of water supply and demand in a subwatershed of the Okanagan Basin, British Columbia.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (2007).
The physical science basis.
Contribution of WG 1 to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Available at: http://ipcc-wg1/wg1-report.html.
Kendall M. G. (1975).
Rank correlation Methods, 4 th ed., Charles Griffin, London Mall, R. K., Gupta, A., Singh, R., Singh, R. S., & Rathore, L. S. (2006).
Water resources and climate change: an Indian perspective.
Current Science, 90(12), 1610-1626.
Mann, H.
B.(1945).
Non-parametric test against trend, Econometrica, 13, 245-259.
Maraun, D., Wetterhall, F., Ireson, A. M., Chandler, R. E., Kendon, E. J., Widmann, M and Thiele-Eich, I.
(2010).
Precipitation downscaling under climate change: Recent developments to bridge the gap between dynamical models and the end user.
Reviews of Geophysics, 48(3).
Moriasi, D. N., Arnold, J. G., Van Liew, M. W., Bingner, R. L., Harmel, R. D., & Veith, T. L. (2007).
Model evaluation guidelines for systematic quantification of accuracy in watershed simulations.
Trans.
ASABE, 50(3), 885-900.
Mukerji, R. (2009).
Vulnerability and adaptation experiences from Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, Water Resources Management SDC V & A Programme, India, pp 19 NIC Report.
Observed climate and climate change projections.
Available from: http://www.environment.tn.nic.in/doc/pdf/Chapter%204.pdf Rao P.G.S.L.H.V., Peter K.V., Gopakumar C. S. (2012).
Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture in India, Proceedings of the International Meet on Impact of Climate Change on Water Resources, pp 41 Yates, D., Purkey, D., Sieber, J., Huber-Lee, A., Galbraith, H., West, J and Rayej, M. (2009).
Climate driven water resources model of the Sacramento Basin, California.
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 135(5), 303-313.
Microsoft Word 2-2171_s Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3505-3507 3505 www.etasr.com Laghari et al.
: Assessment of Climate Driven Changes in Flow Series of Alpine Basin: A Case Study … Assessment of Climate Driven Changes in Flow Series of Alpine Basin: A Case Study of Danube River Basin Abdul Nasir Laghari Department of Energy and Environment, Quaid-e-Awam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan a.n.laghari@quest.edu.pk A. Rajper Department of Mechanical Engineering, Quaid -eAwam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan altafrajpar@yahoo.com Gordhan Das Walasai Department of Mechanical Engineering, Quaid-e-Awam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan valasai@quest.edu.pk Abdul Rehman Jatoi Department of Energy and Environment, Quaid-e-Awam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan arjatoi@quest.edu.pk Nabi Bux Jalbani Department of Chemical Engineering, Quaid-e-Awam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan n.bux@quest.edu.pk Hira Soomro Department of Basic Sciences and Related Studies, Mehran University of Engineering and Technology, Jamshoro, Pakistan hirasoomro47@gmail.com Abstract—This study was carried out in order to analyze the climate change driven influence on mean monthly flow series of Danube River and its tributaries during the last century.
The study confirms some signs of climate driven alterations in monthly river flow series along with change in flow seasonality during the last century.
In spite of this, man-made interference in the basin like i.e.
groundwater extraction, irrigation, river regulation, land use alteration and urbanization, has significantly changed Danube flow regime in most areas of the catchment.
The analysis of Achleiten station demonstrates that average annual flow regime is a little bit increased.
Major increase is observed in winter and autumn months and decrease in summer months.
These seasonal alterations clearly signal a future glimpse of reduced water availability in alpine basins.
This will mainly occur due to the change in the form of precipitation in winter, from snow to rain and the consequent less snow accumulation, and the early melt of snow storage, less precipitation and high evaporation rate in summer.
Keywords-climate change; man-made abstraction; seasonal flow regime; Alpine river I.
INTRODUCTION Earth’s atmosphere has experienced an extraordinary warming over the 20th century.
The average atmospheric temperature has risen by approximately 0.8°C during the last 200 years, and since the ‘80s, earth has witnessed the warmest years over the last 1400 years.
The rise in average global temperature has caused a major change in weather patterns and properties of earth’s atmosphere [1].
The temperature increase over the last century emerged in two phases, during 1910-1940 and at higher rate since 1980.
The increase in the average surface temperature has been caused by perturbations in the radiation system of earth’s atmosphere.
Perturbations might happen due to volcanic eruptions resulting in release of gases, changes in solar irradiation or greenhouse gas emissions.
IPCC relates the increase in the average earth surface temperature to human activities [2].
IPCC reported that many river basins in mountain regions would suffer a massive decrease in water resources due to climate change.
Due to increased precipitation and decreased evapotranspiration with altitude, mountain regions are characterized by high discharge values [3].
Their contribution in total water supply to global population is far greater than their areas [4].
Their future global water resource role would likely be altered from the anticipated climate change.
Therefore, climate change impacts on the hydrological cycle of mountain watersheds and subsequent water availability which is critical for sustainable future water resource planning and management.
IPCC reported that the change level is higher in mountain regions-approximately 300% more than the average global temperature [5-7].
The warming rate in the lower-troposphere rises with elevation.
This makes mountainous regions very vulnerable [8].
Therefore, any change in climatic parameters, i.e.
temperature and precipitation patterns, will change significantly the snow storage and subsequently alter both timing and volume of the discharge regime of mountain rivers [8-18] and accordingly the water availability in downstream regions [19-20].
This may have severe implications on freshwater systems and their management [21].
Under this study, flow series of Danube river major tributaries originated from European Alps have been investigated to check out the climate change driven signs.
This would help water resource planning and development Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3505-3507 3506 www.etasr.com Laghari et al.
: Assessment of Climate Driven Changes in Flow Series of Alpine Basin: A Case Study … managers to understand future changes in alpine region.
II.
STUDY AREA DESCRIPTION Danube River is the second largest in European region.
It originates from Black Forest Mountains of Germany and cascades into Black Sea.
It flows through Germany, Austria, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Croatia, passes through Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova (Figure 1).
Approximately around 81 million people inhabit within its proximity.
The basin is approximately 2900km long.
It possesses drainage area of about 817000km 2 .
Plain and hilly areas are around the two thirds of the total basin area, while the remaining one third consists of mountains.
Its average flow is approximately 6500m 3 /sec.
Its elevation ranges from a few hundred meters at lowlands to over 3000m a.s.l with a mean height of about 475m a.s.l.
Fig.
1.
Geographical map of Danube with both up and downstream gauge stations Achleiten and Ceatal Izmail.
The basin climate varies considerably from mountainous to plain areas due to diverse relief and surface area: Mediterranean climate dominates Sava and Drava catchments, whereas in the western part, high precipitation is the main characteristic of the upper basin due to Atlantic climate while low precipitation and cold winters are the main features of continental climate.
The precipitation amount also varies from high altitude to low altitude: the upper part receives around 2000mm per year, while the lower basin receives around 500mm.
Similarly, temperature varies from 5-6°C at upper Danube to 11-12°C at middle to lower part.
Snow cover is the dominant feature above 1500m a.s.l from November to March.
The seasonal variation rises from western to eastern part [7, 10].
III.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The surface runoff and discharge levels of the main river and its tributaries are highly influenced by seasonal and spatial variations.
The tributaries Morava, Tisza, Sava, Drava and Inn are the most vital ones.
Overall, Danube River consists of 26 main tributaries.
Sava tributary is considered the leading one by average annual discharge volume (approx.
50km 3 ) and the second one by drainage area (approx.
95400km 2 ).
Whereas, Inn river is the third main tributary regarding volume with approx.
23km 3 and the seventh by drainage area with 26128km 2 .
The hydrological characteristics of several Danube tributaries have been analyzed in [22].
Authors in [22] monitored the alpine gauging stations (i.e.
Hofkirchen, Passau, Wien), found higher specific discharges compared to low land streams monitored at gauging stations (i.e.
Tisza, Silistra, Ceatal Izmail).
Alpine tributaries, e.g.
Inn, originate at the upper basin and possess high runoff per unit area, whereas lower to middle region of Danube basin produces small values.
The mean annual specific value reduces from head waters of Alpine part towards tributaries of the eastern region of Carpathians i.e.
25 to 30l/s/km 2 for Alpine headwaters to 14.59l/s/km 2 for Drava, towards 6.03l/s/km 2 for Tisza.
The contribution of Alpine tributaries is more than 25% of the total mean annual flow and particularly in summer months its average contribution is around 40-45%, and may even reach to 80% in dry years like in the hot summer of 2003.
The Austrian part of Alpine region mostly lies with Danube basin and adds up approximately 20% of total basin flow volume with mean flow of 1448m 3 /s [22].
The assessment of monthly flow series of Achleiten station demonstrates that the average annual flow volume is marginally increased [22], however the main effect has been noticed over seasonal flows, i.e.
flow volume is increased in winter and autumn and significantly decreased in summer.
The increase in volume is most probably due to the increased precipitation rates in winter and recent general temperature increase.
Similarly, reduced precipitation rates in summer and early onset of snow melt including high summer evaporation rates are the main cause of reduced summer flows (Figure 2).
Fig.
2.
The linear trends of mean seasonal flow series of Danube at high alpine gauging station Achleiten over 1900-2008.
Linear trends indicate a significant shift in seasonality: increase in winter and decrease in summer.
Station flow data was provided by GRDC, Germany.
These seasonal tendencies point the future, when the water availability might be affected during summer months like it did in the summer draught of 2003.
The situation clearly demonstrates the importance of Alpine contribution.
The region fairly offsets the water scarcity through enlarged glacial melt.
In a nutshell, there is little indication that climate change has altered seasonal or annual flow volume during the last century.
However man-made interferences i.e.
groundwater extraction, irrigation demand, urbanizations have remarkably changed river flow regime in most parts of catchment.
IV.
CONCLUSION This study has been carried out to assess the climate change effect on mean annual and seasonal flow series of Danube River and its tributaries during the 20th century.
The study reveals the variations driven by climate change in mean annual and seasonal flow series.
The analysis of Achleiten station demonstrates that the average annual flow regime is a little bit increased.
Major increase is observed during winter and autumn months and while decrease is observed during summer months.
This points out that in future, climate driven changes Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3505-3507 3507 www.etasr.com Laghari et al.
: Assessment of Climate Driven Changes in Flow Series of Alpine Basin: A Case Study … may have a significant effect over snow storage and subsequently alter both timing and volume of the flow regime of mountain rivers and accordingly water availability in downstream regions.
Severe implications may emerge on fresh water management and development.
However, currently manmade inventions have possibly been the main reason behind Danube flow series alterations.
REFERENCES [1] D. L. Hartmann, A. M. K. Tank, M. Rusticucci, L. V. Alexander, S. BrOnnimann, Y.
A. R. Charabi, F. J. Dentener, E. J. Dlugokencky, D. R. Easterling, A. Kaplan, “Observations: Atmosphere and Surface”, in: Climate Change 2013 the Physical Science Basis: Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2013 [2] IPCC, The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, 2007 [3] R. Weingartner, D. Viviroli, B. Schadler, “Water resources in mountain regions: a methodological approach to assess the water balance in a highland‐lowland‐system”, Hydrological Processes, Vol.
21, No.
5, pp.
578-585, 2007 [4] B. Messerli, D. Viviroli, R. Weingartner, “Mountains of the world: vulnerable water towers for the 21st century”, Ambio, Vol.
2004, pp.
2934, 2004 [5] D. Nogues-Bravo, M. B. Araujo, M. Errea, J. Martinez-Rica, “Exposure of global mountain systems to climate warming during the 21st Century”, Global Environmental Change, Vol.
17, No.
3-4, pp.
420-428, 2007 [6] M. Beniston, “Impacts of climatic change on water and associated economic activities in the Swiss Alps”, Journal of Hydrology, Vol.
412413, pp.
291-296, 2012 [7] M. Beniston, “Is snow in the Alps receding or disappearing?”, WIREs: Climate Change, Vol.
3, No.
4, pp.
349-358, 2012 [8] S. U. Islam, S. J. Dery, “Evaluating uncertainties in modelling the snow hydrology of the Fraser River Basin, British Columbia, Canada”, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, Vol.
21, No.
3, pp.
1827-1847, 2017 [9] B. C. Bates, Z. Kundzewicz, S. Wu, Climate Change and Water, IPCC, Geneva, 2008 [10] D. Vanham, E. Fleischhacker, W. Rauch, “Impact of an extreme dry and hot summer on water supply security in an alpine region”, Water Science and Technology, Vol.
59, No.
3, pp.
469-477, 2009 [11] M. M. Elsner, L. Cuo, N. Voisin, J. S. Deems, A. F. Hamlet, J.
A. Vano, K. E. Mickelson, S. Y. Lee, D. P. Lettenmaier, “Implications of 21st century climate change for the hydrology of Washington State”, Climatic Change, Vol.
102, No.
1-2, pp.
225-260, 2010 [12] E. Kerkhoven, T. Y. Gan, “Differences and sensitivities in potential hydrologic impact of climate change to regional-scale Athabasca and Fraser River basins of the leeward and windward sides of the Canadian Rocky Mountains respectively”, Climatic Change, Vol.
106, No.
4, pp.
583-607, 2011 [13] S. J. Dery, M. A. Hernandez-Henriquez, P. N. Owens, M. W. Parkes, E. L. Petticrew, “A century of hydrological variability and trends in the Fraser River Basin”, Environmental Research Letters, Vol.
7, No.
2, pp.
024019-024028, 2012 [14] F. Strauss, H. Formayer, E. Schmid, “High resolution climate data for Austria in the period 2008–2040 from a statistical climate change model”, International Journal of Climatology, Vol.
33, No.
2, pp.
430443, 2013 [15] A. Laghari, D. Vanham, W. Rauch, “The Indus basin in the framework of current and future water resources management”, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, Vol.
16, No.
4, pp.
1063-1083, 2012 [16] A. Laghari, D. Vanham, W. Rauch, “To what extent does climate change result in a shift in Alpine hydrology?
A case study in the Austrian Alps”, Hydrological Sciences Journal, Vol.
57, No.
1, pp.
103-117 [17] T. Kohler, A. Wehrli, M. Jurek, Mountains and Climate Chance: A Global Concern, CDE, SDC and Geographica Bernensia, 2014 [18] D. H. Kang, H. Gao, X. Shi, S. ul Islam, S. J. Dery, “Impacts of a rapidly declining mountain snowpack on streamflow timing in Canada’s Fraser River basin”, Scientific Reports, Vol.
6, Article Number 19299, 2016 [19] D. Viviroli, D. R. Archer, W. Buytaert, H. J. Fowler, G. Greenwood, A. F. Hamlet, Y. Huang, G. Koboltschnig, I. Litaor, J. I. Lopez-Moreno, “Climate change and mountain water resources: overview and recommendations for research, management and policy”, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, Vol.
15, No.
2, pp.
471-504, 2011 [20] M. Beniston, M. Stoffel, “Assessing the impacts of climatic change on mountain water resources”, Science of the Total Environment, Vol.
493, pp.
1129-1137, 2014 [21] Z. Kundzewicz, L. J. Mata, N. W. Arnell, P. Doll, B. Jimenez, K. Miller, T. Oki, Z. Sen, I. Shiklomanov, “The implications of projected climate change for freshwater resources and their management”, Hydrological Sciences Journal, Vol.
53, No.
1, pp.
3-10, 2008 [22] K. Tockner, S. E. Bunn, C. Gordon, R. J. Naiman, G. P. Quinn, J.
A. Stanford, “4 A Flood plains: critically threatened ecosystems”, in: Aquatic Ecosystems: Trends and Global Prospects, pp.
45-61, Cambridge University Press, 2008
Acta Herpetologica 15(2): 87-94, 2020 ISSN 1827-9635 (print) © Firenze University Press ISSN 1827-9643 (online) www.fupress.com/ah DOI: 10.13128/a_h-9670 Potential effects of climate change on the distribution of invasive bullfrogs Lithobates catesbeianus in China Li Qing Peng1, Min Tang1, Jia Hong Liao1, Hai Fen Qing1, Zhen Kun Zhao1, David A. Pike2, Wei Chen1,* 1 Ecological Security and Protection Key Laboratory of Sichuan Province, Mianyang Normal University, Mianyang 621000, China 2 Department of Biology, Rhodes College, Memphis Tennessee 38111, USA *Corresponding author.
E-mail: wchen1949@163.com Submitted on 2020, 4th September; revised on 2020, 10th October; accepted on 2020, 26th October Editor: Rocco Tiberti Abstract.
Climate plays important roles in determining the geographical distribution of species, including the invasion area of alien species.
Little is known, however, about the influence of climate change on the distribution area of invasive amphibian species in China.
We adopted a maximum entropy model to predict the potential suitable invasive range of invasive bullfrogs Lithobates catesbeianus in China under two future climate scenarios in 2050 and 2070.
Our results reveal that bullfrogs were mainly distributed in East and Central China at present, and the suitable area for the species may decrease in future.
This suggests that climate change may negatively impact this alien-invasive species.
Keywords.
Bullfrog, climate change, environmental limitations, invasive species, potential distribution, species distribution model.
INTRODUCTION Biological invasion of alien invasive species is considered to be the second leading cause of global biodiversity loss and habitat degradation (Pimentel et al., 2000; Bellard et al., 2012; Runyon et al., 2012), seriously threatening the health of ecosystems (Hobbs and Huenneke, 1992; D’Antonio et al., 2004; Vilà et al., 2011; Espíndola et al., 2012; Sorte et al., 2013) and causing significant economic losses (Pimentel et al., 2000).
The proliferation and outbreak of invasive species are becoming more and more serious (Pyšek and Hulme, 2010).
The acceleration of globalization has affected the distribution of invasive species and almost no ecosystem is immune to the impact of alien species (Weber and Li, 2008; Catford et al., 2012).
China is a large country encompassing many different climatic regions, where many invasive species can find suitable habitats where to establish.
Investigating the potential distribution of invasive species could help to address the conservation efforts to eliminate or reduce the negative effects of biological invasions on local wildlife and ecosystems (Xie et al., 2001).
As in the rest of the world, climate change is affecting also China’s ecosystems (Hu et al., 2012).
Climate change has shown enormous influence on species distribution (Erasmus et al., 2002; Walther et al., 2002; Root et al., 2003; Hari et al., 2006; Guralnick, 2007).
For example, climate change in the 20th century has changed the distribution of butterflies (Parmesan et al., 1999), birds (Thoms and Lennon, 1999), amphibians (Araújo et al., 2006) and mammals (Hersteinsson and Macdonald, 1992).
Climate change has attracted wide attention of governments and scientists because of its enormous influences on ecosystem functions and global environmental quality (Thomas et al., 2004; Kiritani, 2011).
The bullfrog Lithobates catesbeianus is native to eastern North America, but has been introduced throughout the world during the past two centuries (Lever, 2003).
88 Li Qing Peng et alii The species is considered as one of the most harmful and threatening invasive species, since it is relatively large and negatively affects native amphibians through competition (Zhou et al., 2005), predation (Kiesecker and Blaustein, 1998; Lowe et al., 2000) and disease transmission (Hanselmann et al., 2004).
Knowledge of the patterns of bullfrog invasion is, therefore, extremely important for planning conservation strategies aiming to understand and reduce the impacts of their invasion.
Bullfrogs were introduced into China in 1959 via the aquaculture and aquarium trades (Han, 1991).
The species successfully established wild populations, and it is spreading locally (Li and Xie, 2004; Wu et al., 2004).
Once established it is extremely difficult to eradicate (Li and Xie, 2004).
Although the distribution of the species has been simulated at a global scale (Ficetola et al., 2007) to predict areas susceptible to invasion, little is known about its potential distribution in China and how future climate scenarios will influence its distribution.
We therefore modeled the potential distribution of bullfrog based on current climatic models and projected the results onto future climate scenarios (2050 and 2070) under two emissions scenarios, RCP4.5 (a radiative forcing of 4.5 W/ m2 at the end of 2100) and RCP8.5 (a radiative forcing of 8.5 W/m2 at the end of 2100).
Our main aims were to describe the current potential distribution of the bullfrogs in China and to model its distribution under future climate change scenarios.
MATERIALS AND METHODS We collected individual records of bullfrogs in China from: 1) the relevant literature (n = 83 records); 2) the Global Biodiversity Information Facility database (GBIF, http://data.gbif.
org, n = 6 records); and 3) our own field investigations (n = 6 records).
We used Arcgis 10.2, combined with Google Earth, to extract the longitude and latitude coordinates and discard duplicate records (Warren and Seifert, 2011).
All the distribution points with a spatial resolution of 30 arc-sec are buffered in GIS to ensure that only one point exists within the range of 30 arc-seconds (approximately 1 km × 1 km).
Totally, we achieved 95 individual records of bullfrogs in China.
We downloaded climate data with a spatial resolution of 30 arc-sec from the Worldclim database (http//www.worldclim.org/ bioclim).
We used Arcgis 10.2 to unify all the factors into the same coordinate system and extent (Tang and Yang, 2006).
As our base map, we used a 1: 4,000,000 map of China as original map from the national basic geographic information system (http://nfgis.nsdi.gov.cn).
We prepared a total of 22 layers of variables (19 environmental variables and 3 topography variables), that mainly reflect seasonal variation in temperature and precipitation (Hijmans et al., 2005), and topography factors (elevation, aspect and slope).
We extracted their values at each distribution point and we calculated the pairwise Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients.
In the cases where two variables were inter-correlated to a high degree (r > 0.75, Nori et al., 2011a, b), we selected the most important biologically factors (Bourke et al., 2018).
We selected 6 final bioclimatic variables and 3 topography variables that did not show high correlation with other variables (r < 0.75) (Nori et al., 2011a, b).
The final variable set included “Annual Mean Temperature” (bio1), “Mean diurnal range of temperature” (bio2; the mean of monthly maximum temperatures minus the monthly minimum temperatures), “Isothermality” (bio3, Mean Diurnal Range/(Max Temperature of Warmest Month-Min Temperature of Coldest Month)×100), “Mean Temperature of Wettest Quarter” (bio8), “Annual Precipitation” (bio12), and “Precipitation Seasonality” (bio15, Coefficient of Variation), elevation, aspect and slope.
To estimate the influence of global climate change on the potential distribution of the species, we modeled the distribution for three different time slices: present, 2050 and 2070.
The climate data was available from the Worldclim data (http//www.worldclim.org/bioclim).
Due to the large effect of different Atmosphere Global Circulation Models (AGCMs) in species range projections (Diniz-Filho et al., 2009), we selected three different AGCMs (BCC-CSM1-1, ACCESS1-0 and IPSL_CM4) for each time slice with each climate models involving two future emissions scenarios developed by IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5) (http//www.worldclim.org/bioclim).
The selected AGCMs have different equilibrium climate sensitivity values ranging from 0.9 °C to 4.8 °C.
Maximum Entropy Modeling (Maxent) is a useful method to simulate the potential habitat redistribution under climate change, due to high predictive accuracy and strong stability (Phillips et al., 2006; Steven et al., 2006; Wisz et al., 2008).
We used a maximum entropy approach to model climatically suitable areas of bullfrogs in China using Maxent 3.3.3e (www.
cs.princeton.edu/~shapire/maxent), and we validated the model using a cross-fold approach (Hijmans, 2012).
We randomly selected 75% of bullfrog records for model training (Bourke et al., 2017) and the remaining 25% for model testing, with a logistic output format ranging from 0 (unsuitable environmental conditions) to 1 (optimal) (values near 0.5 representative of average habitat quality; Phillips and Dudík, 2008).
Jackknife tests were run to measure variable importance (Phillips et al., 2006).
In addition, a bias file was included in the run to represent sampling effort to reduce the sampling bias and increasing speed (Young et al., 2011).
The accuracy of the model was evaluated by using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve called AUC (Swets, 1988), commonly recognized as the optimal model prediction since it is unaffected by the threshold value and insensitive to incidence of species (Fielding and Bell, 1997).
AUC scores quantify the SDM’s ability to differentiate between random prediction (AUC = 0.5) and perfect identification of suitable grid cells (AUC = 1.0) (Hanley and McNeil, 1982; Phillips et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2007).
After converting the Maxent output avg.asc into raster format, we reclassified the results of Maxent with thresholds in ArcGIS (Lu et al., 2012) and divided the suit bal environmental conditions into 4 levels based on the fitness index size (Wang et al., 2007; Zhai and Li, 2012) with 89Potential effects of climate change on the distribution of invasive bullfrogs Lithobates catesbeianus in China low potential (< 0.2), moderate potential (0.2-0.4), good potential (0.4-0.6), high potential (> 0.6) (Yang et al., 2013).
To test for possible differences of the predicted distribution under different climate scenarios, each out of the twelve maps was compared to the current distribution map using Map Comparison Kit software (version 3.2.3; MCK, 2017) and an overall similarity index was computed between a map pair.
We applied the “fuzzy numerical” algorithm as these maps were numerical (Visser and de Nijs, 2006; Falaschi et al., 2018).
RESULTS We obtained a good SDM performance with an average test AUC value of 0.867, which indicated that the prediction has high credibility.
Analysis of variable contributions revealed that the “Annual Precipitation” had the highest explanative power, explaining 34.7% of the variation, followed by “Mean Diurnal Range” (33.9%), “Elevation” (20.4%) and “Annual Mean Temperature” (3.1%), suggesting that the geographical distribution of bullfrog was most affected by these four factors.
The results from Maxent analysis showed at present there were many areas unsuitable for habitation by bullfrogs: Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet.
Overall, mainly the center, east, southeast and the southwest of China were suitable area of bullfrog survival, with a small number of suitable areas in Xinjiang, Ningxia, Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang (Fig.
1).
The AUC values were above 0.8 in all of the models, indicating that the prediction results have high credibility.
Generally, climatically suitable areas may become narrower as the invasion begins to retract in the southeast coastal the north of the north China plain, Sichuan basin and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River (Fig.
2; Table 1).
Only minor differences were observed in model projection onto climate change scenarios derived from BCC-CSM1-1, ACCESS1-0 and IPSL_CM4 (Fig.
3; Table 1), and these differences and similarities were also confirmed by the fuzzy numerical comparison performed in MCK: similarity maps (Fig.
4) showed only slight differences between current distribution map and these future distribution maps with the similarity index rose from 0.552 to 0.773.
DISCUSSION We investigated the current potential and future distribution for bullfrogs under different climate change scenarios.
The results show that under the current climatic conditions, bullfrogs have a wide range of potential distribution in China, located in the center, east, southeast and southwest China, with only a small number of suitable areas in north China including Xinjiang, Ningxia, Liaoning, Jilin and Helongjiang.
Generally, our models also revealed that global climate change is likely to shrink slightly the extent of suitable habitat under future scenarios.
Compared to Ficetola et al.
(2007), who found that bullfrogs are mainly distributed in eastern China, our study results extend its distribution area to central China, with a few locations in the west and northeast China, which may represent new invasion areas.
This can be explained by the facts that some new invasion sites have been found in China recently (Fei et al., 2012).
The current distribution pattern of bull frogs in China can mainly be explained by precipitation and temperatures.
Previous study also showed that bullfrog presence seems to be positively related to precipitation (Ficetola et al., 2007).
The availability of water (including the presence of permanent wetlands) for breeding are commonly recorded important environmental features needed for the presence of bullfrogs (Maret et al., 2006) and their tadpoles’ growth, development and metamorphosis (Govindarajulu et al., 2006).
In addition, Mean Diurnal Range also influences the distribution of bullfrogs.
This is also similar to the results from Ficetola et al.
(2007) and, indeed, Bullfrog is a ‘warm-adapted species’ (Bachmann, 1969; Harding, 1997).
Besides, previous studies showed that the current distribution of bullfrogs in China is also explained by 1) the proximity to the frogfarms, from where bullfrogs can escape: most of the bullfrog farming in China is surrounded by highly suitable habitats, and the frogs can establish wild population there (Wu et al., 2004; Li and Xie, 2004); 2) the abandonment/release of bullfrogs mainly by religious groups, which also led to the establishment of new wild population, e.g., in Yunnan Fig.
1.
Map of the suitable distribution of bullfrog in China (Present).
90 Li Qing Peng et alii and Sichuan (Wu et al., 2004; Li and Xie, 2004).
As shown by the fuzzy numerical comparison performed in MCK, slight differences between current and future distribution maps have been observed.
Also, projecting bullfrogs’ climatically suitable areas on future climate change scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP8.0) indicated that climatically suitable areas will become narrower in China.
The potential habitats of bullfrogs in China will retreat to the most suitable area including the north of the north China plain, Sichuan basin and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River (Fig.
2), where bullfrog farming is particularly common (Fei et al., 2012).
Biological invasions are complex and the potential habitat distribution is determined by a variety of factors (Li et al., 2009).
In this study, we only considered the effect of the climate and terrain, but we did not consider the effect of the other factors including the vegetation cover, biotic interactions with other species, species Fig.
2.
Maps of the potential suitable distribution of bullfrog in China in 2050 and 2070.
91Potential effects of climate change on the distribution of invasive bullfrogs Lithobates catesbeianus in China migration capacity, species evolutionary adaptations, and human exploitation of wild populations, on the potential distribution of the bullfrog.
If these factors were fully considered, the predicted results could have been more closely related to the current distribution of species (Graham and Hijmans, 2006).
To effectively prevent further invasions of bullfrogs in China, management policies should be more pragmatic, preventing new introductions within suitable habitats and eradicating populations when possible.
Based on the predictions on bullfrog potential habitats from SDMs, the authorities should consider the model results to focus the management strategies on these potentially sensitive regions.
In addition, authorities should tighten control of bullfrog farming to prevent their escape.
In addition, frog factories could be moved to areas which are surrounded by unsuitable habitats of bullfrogs, which would reduce a lot the possibility of survival of escaped captive individuals.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Litao Gan, Kejun Hua and Xuli Ren for assistance in the field, and Rocco Tiberti, Marco Mangiacotti and anonymous reviewers for their kind suggestion.
This study was funded by the Natural Sciences Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholar of Sichuan (grant number 2016JQ0038), Key Foundation of Sichuan Provincial Department of Education (grant number 18ZA0255) and the National Sciences Foundation of China (grant number 31670392).
REFERENCES Araújo, M.B., Thuiller, W., Pearson, R.G.
(2006): Climate warming and the decline of amphibians and reptiles in Europe.
J. Biogeogr.
33: 1712-1728.
Bachmann, K. (1969): Temperature adaptations of amphibian embryos.
Am.
Nat.
103: 115-130.
Bellard, C., Bertelsmeier, C., Leadley, P., Thuiller, W., Courchamp, F. (2012): Impacts of climate change on the future of biodiversity.
Ecol.
Lett.
15: 365-377.
Bourke, J., Busse, K., Böhme, W. (2018): Potential effects of climate change on the distribution of the endangered Darwin’s frog.
North-West.
J. Zool.
14: 165-170.
Catford, J.A., Vesk, P.A., Richardson, D.M., Pyšek, P. (2012): Quantifying levels of biological invasion: towards the objective classification of invaded and invasible ecosystems.
Global Change Biol.
18: 44-62.
D’Antonio, C.M., Jackson, N.E., Horvitz, C.C., Hedberg, R. (2004): Invasive plants in wild land ecosystems: merging the study of invasion processes with management needs.
Front.
Ecol.
Environ.
2: 513-521.
Diniz Filho, J.A.F., Bini, L.M., Range, T.F., Loyola, R.D., Hof, C., Nogués-Bravo, D., Araújo, M.B.
(2009): Partitioning and mapping uncertainties in ensembles of forecasts of species turnover under climate change.
Ecography 32: 897-906.
Erasmus, B.F., Jaarsveld, A.S., Chown, S.L., Chown, S.L., Kshatriya, M., Wessels, K.J.
(2002): Vulnerability of South African animal taxa to climate change.
Global Change Biol.
8: 679-693.
Espíndola, A., Pellissier, L., Maiorano, L., Hordijk, W., Guisan, A., Alvarez, N. (2012): Predicting present and future intra-specific genetic structure through niche hind casting across 24 millennia.
Ecol.
Lett.
15: 649-657.
Table 1.
Changes in the potential distribution area under climate change in 2050 and 2070.
Climate scenarios Atmosphere Global Circulation Models (AGCMs) Area of the most suitable zone (the red part of the map)/ Million square kilometers Percentage (%) Present 82.27201 9.19% 2050RCP4.5 ACCESS1-0 BCC-CSML-1 IPSL-CM$ 66.06528 68.44306 80.92153 6.88% 7.12% 8.42% 2050RCP8.0 ACCESS1-0 BCC-CSML-1 IPSL-CM$ 59.2675 69.33708 89.20736 6.18% 7.22% 9.28% 2070RCP4.5 ACCESS1-0 BCC-CSML-1 IPSL-CM$ 67.75792 72.75847 78.15097 7.05% 7.57% 8.13% 2070RCP8.0 ACCESS1-0 BCC-CSML-1 IPSL-CM$ 55.53778 60.97194 78.69361 5.78% 6.35% 8.19% Fig.
3.
Comparison of potential suitable distribution of bullfrog at present, in 2050 and in 2070 under future climatic conditions with low potential (< 0.2), moderate potential (0.2-0.4), good potential (0.4 – 0.6), high potential (> 0.6).
92 Li Qing Peng et alii Falaschi, M., Mangiacotti, M., Sacchi, R., Scali, S., Razzetti, E. (2018): Electric circuit theory applied to alien invasions: a connectivity model predicting the Balkan frog expansion in Northern Italy.
Acta Herpetol.
13: 33-42.
Fei, L., Ye, C.Y., Jiang, J.P. (2012): Colored atlas of Chinese amphibians and their distributions.
Chengdu, Sichuan publishing group, Sichuan Publishing House of Science and Technology.
Ficetola, G.F., Thuiller, W., Miaud, C. (2007): Prediction and validation of the potential global distribution of a problematic alien invasive species-the American bullfrog.
Divers.
Distrib.
13: 476-485.
Fielding, A.H., Bell, J.F.
(1997): A review of models for the assessment of prediction errors in conservation presence/absence models.
Environ.
Conserv.
24: 38-49.
Fig.
4.
Similarity maps of the fuzzy numerical comparison between current distribution map and future potential distribution maps under future climatic conditions performed in MCK with similarity index of each map 93Potential effects of climate change on the distribution of invasive bullfrogs Lithobates catesbeianus in China Govindarajulu, P., Price, S., Anholt, B.R.
(2006): Introduced bullfrogs (Rana catesbeiana) in western Canada: has their ecology diverged?
J. Herpetol.
40: 249260.
Graham, C.H., Hijmans, R.J. (2006): A comparison of methods for mapping species range and species richness.
Global Ecol.
Biogeogr.
15: 578-587.
Guralnick, R. (2007): Differential effects of past climate warming on mountain and flatland species distributions: a multispecies North American mammal assessment.
Global Ecol.
Biogeogr.
16: 14-23.
Han, D.B., Lu, Y., Wang, D.R., Zhang, Z.Z.
(1991): Assay of the common nutritional compositions on the bullfrog.
Zoology 12: 161-162.
Hanley, J., McNeil, B.
(1982): The meaning of use of the area under a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
Radiology 143: 29-36.
Hanselmann, R., Rodriguez, A., Lampo, M., FajardoRamos, L., Aguirre, A.A., Kilpatrick, A.M., Rodriguez, J.P., Daszak, P. (2004): Presence of an emerging pathogen of amphibians in recently introduced Rana catesbeiana in Venezuela.
Biol.
Conserv.
120: 115-119.
Harding, J.H.
(1997): Amphibians and reptiles of the great lakes region.
The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Hari, R., Livingstone, D.M., Siber, R., Burkhardt-holm, P., Güttinger, H. (2006): Consequences of climate change for water temperature and brown trout populations in alpine rivers and streams.
Global Change Biol.
12: 10-26.
Hersteinsson, P., Macdonald, D.W. (1992).
Interspecific competition and the geographical distribution of red and arctic foxes Vulpes vulpes and Alopex lagopus.
Oikos 64: 505-515.
Hijmans, R.J. (2012): Cross‐validation of species distribution models: removing spatial sorting bias and calibration with a null model.
Ecology 93: 679-688.
Hijmans, R.J., Cameron, S.E., Parra, J.L., Jones, P.G., Jarvis, A.
(2005): Very high-resolution interpolated climate surfaces for global land areas.
Internat.
J. Climatol.
25: 1965-1978.
Hobbs, R.J., Huenneke, L.F. (1992): Disturbance, diversity and invasion: implication for conversation.
Conver.
Biol.
6: 324-337.
Hu, L.L., Zhang, H.Y., Qin, L., Yan, B.Q.
(2012): Current distribution of Schisandra chinensi in China and its predicted responses to climate change.
Chinese J. Appl.
Ecol.
23: 2445-2450.
Kiesecker, J.M., Blaustein, A.R.
(1998): Effects of introduced bullfrogs and small mouth bass on microhabitat use, growth, and survival of native red-legged frogs (Rana aurora).
Conser.
Biol.
12: 776-787.
Kiritani, K. (2011): Impacts of global warming on Nezara viridula and its native congeneric species.
J. Asia-Pac.
Entomol.
14: 221-226.
Lever, C. (2003): Naturalized amphibians and reptiles of the world.
Oxford University Press, New York.
Li, B., Liao, C.H., Zhang, X.D., Chen, H.L., Wang, Q., Chen, Z.Y., Gan, X.J., Wu, J.H., Zhao, B., Ma, Z.J., Cheng, X.L., Jiang, L.F., Chen, J.K. (2009): Spartina alterniflora invasions in the Yangtze River estuary, China: An overview of current status and ecosystem effects.
Ecol.
Eng.
35: 511-520 Li, C., Xie, F. (2004): Analysis of new cases and management counter measures of bullfrog invasion.
Journal of applied and environmental biology.
Biodiversity 10: 95-98.
Lowe, S., Browne, M., Boudjelas, S., de Poorter, M. (2000): 100 of the world’s worst invasive alien species: a selection from the global invasive species database (Vol.
12).
Auckland: Invasive Species Specialist Group.
Lu, C.Y., Gu, W., Dai, A.H., Wei, H.Y.
(2012): Assessing habitat suitability based on geographic information system (GIS) and fuzzy: a case study of Schisandra sphenanthera Rehd.
et Wils.
in Qinling Mountains, China.
Ecol.
Model.
242: 105-115.
Maret, T.J., Snyder, J.D., Collins, J.P. (2006): Altered drying regime controls distribution of endangered salamanders and introduced predators.
Biol.
Conserv.
127: 129-138.
MCK (2017): Map Comparison Kit.
Available at: http:// mck.riks.nl/software.
Nori, J., Akmentins, M., Ghirardi, R., Frutos, N., Leynaud, G.C.
(2011a): American Bullfrog invasion in Argentina: where should we take urgent measures?
Biodivers.
Conserv.
20: 1125-1132.
Nori, J., Urbina-Cardona, J.N., Loyola, R.D., Lescano, J.N., Leynaud, G.C.
(2011b): Climate change and American bullfrog invasion: what could we expect in South America?
Plos One e25718 Parmesan, C., Ryholm, N., Stefanescu, C., Hill, J.K., Thomas, C.D., Descimon, H., Huntley, B., Kaila, L., Kullberg, J., Tammaru, T., Tennent, W.J., Thomas, J., Warren, M. (1999): Poleward shifts in geographical range of butterfly species associated with regional warming.
Nature 399: 579-583.
Phillips, S. J., Dudík, M. (2008): Modeling of species distributions with Maxent: new extensions and a comprehensive evaluation.
Ecography 31: 161-175.
Phillips, S.J., Anderson, R.P., Schapire, R.E.
(2006): Maximum entropy modeling of species geographic distribution.
Ecol.
Model.
190: 231-259.
Pimentel, D., Lach, L., Zuniga, R., Morrison, D. (2000): Environmental and economic costs of non-indigenous species in the United States.
Bioscience 50: 53-65.
94 Li Qing Peng et alii Pyšek, P., Hulme, P.E.
(2010): Biological invasions in Europe 50 years after Elton: time to sound the alarm // Richardson D M. Fifty Years of Invasion Ecology: the Legacy of Charles Elton.
Oxford, UK: Wiley Blackwell.
Root, T.L., Price, J.T., Hall, K.R., Schneider, S.H., Rosenzweig, C., Pounds, J.A.
(2003): Fingerprints of global warming on wild animals and plants.
Nature 421: 57-40.
Runyon, J.B., Butler, J.L., Friggens, M.M., Meyer, S.E., Sing, S.E.
(2012): Invasive species and climate change / / Finch D.M.
Climate Change in Grasslands, Shrub lands and Deserts of the Interior American West: A Review and Needs Assessment.
USDA Forest Service RMRS-GTR-285, Fort Collins, CO.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain research Station.
97-115.
Sorte, C.J.B., Ibanze, I., Blumantal, D.M.
(2013): Poised to prosper across system comparison of climate change effects on native and non-native species performance.
Ecol.
Lett.
16: 261-270.
Steven, J.P., Robert, P.A., Robert, E.S.
(2006): Maximum entropy modeling of species geographic distributions.
Ecol.
Model.
190: 231-259.
Swets, K. (1988): Measuring the accuracy of diagnostic systems.
Science 240: 1285-1293.
Tang, G.A., Yang, X.
(2006): ArcGIS Geographic information systems spatial analysis experiments tutorial.
Science Press, Beijing.
Thomas, C.D., Cameron, A., Green, R.E., Bakkenes, M., Beaumont, L.J., Collingham, Y.C., Erasmus, B.F.N., de Siqueira, M.F., Grainger, A., Hannah, L., Hughes, L., Huntley, B., van Jaarsveld, A., Midgley, G.F., Miles, L., Ortega-Huerta, M.A., Peterson, A.T., Phillips, O.L., Williams, S.E.
(2004): Extinction risk from climate change.
Nature 427: 145-148.
Thoms, C.D., Lennon, J.J. (1999): Birds extend their range northwards.
Nature 399: 213.
Vilà, M., Espinar, J.L., Hejda, M., Hulme, P.E., Jarošík, V., Maron, J.L., Pergl, J., Schaffner, U., Sun, Y., Pyšek, P. (2011): Ecological impacts of invasive alien plants: a meta-analysis of their effects on species, communities and ecosystems.
Ecol.
Lett.
14: 702-708.
Visser, H., de Nijs, T. (2006): The Map Comparison Kit.
Environ.
Model.
Softw.
21: 346-358.
Walther, G.R., Post, E., Convey, P., Menzel, A., Parmesan, C., Beebee, T.J., Fromentin, J.M., Hoegh-Guldberg, O., Bairlein, F. (2002): Ecological responses to recent climate change.
Nature 416: 389-395.
Wang, Y.S., Xie, B.Y., Wan, F.G., Xiao, Q.M., Dai, L.Y.
(2007): Application of ROC curve analysis in evaluating the performance of alien species’ potential distribution models.
Biodivers.
Sci.
15: 365-372.
Warren, D.L., Seifert, S.N.
(2011): Ecological niche modeling in Maxent: the importance of model complexity and the performance of model selection criteria.
Ecol.
Appl.
21: 335-342.
Weber, E., Li, B.
(2008): Plant invasions in China: what is to be expected in the wake of economic development?
Bioscience 58: 437-444.
Wisz, M.S., Hijmans, R.J., Peterson, A.T., Graham, C.H., Guisan, A.
(2008): Effects of sample size on the performance of species distribution models.
Divers.
Distrib.
14: 763-773.
Wu, Z.J., Wang, Y.P., Li, Y.M.
(2004): Natural population and potential hazards of bullfrog in eastern Zhejiang province, Biodiversity Science 12: 441-446.
Xie, Y., Li, Z.Y., Gregg, W.P., Dianmo, L. (2001): Invasive species in China—an overview.
Biodivers.
Conserv.
10: 1317-1341.
Yang, X.Q., Kushwaha, S.P.S., Saran, S., Xu, J., Roy, P.S.
(2013): Maxent modeling for predicting the potential distribution of medicinal plant, Justicia adhatoda L. in Lesser Himalayan foothills.
Ecol.
Eng.
51: 83-87.
Young, N., Carter, L., Evangelista, P., Jarnevich C. (2011): A MaxEnt Model v3.3.3e Tutorial (ArcGIS v10).
Fort Collins, Colorado.
Zhai, T.Q., Li, X.H.
(2012): Climate change induced potential range shift of the Crested Ibis based on ensemble models.
Acta Ecol.
Sin.
32:168-177.
Zhou, W., Li, M.H., Zhang, X.Y., He, J.F.
(2005): Food Comparison between tadpoles of Rana catebeiana and R. chaochiaoensis from the same habitat.
Zool.
Res.
26: 89-95.
Acta Herpetologica Vol.
15, n. 2 December 2020 Firenze University Press Estimating abundance and habitat suitability in a micro-endemic snake: the Walser viper Gentile Francesco Ficetola1,2,*, Mauro Fanelli3, Lorenzo Garizio3, Mattia Falaschi1, Simone Tenan4, Samuele Ghielmi5, Lorenzo Laddaga6, Michele Menegon7,8, Massimo Delfino3,9.
Potential effects of climate change on the distribution of invasive bullfrogs Lithobates catesbeianus in China Li Qing Peng1, Min Tang1, Jia Hong Liao1, Hai Fen Qing1, Zhen Kun Zhao1, David A. Pike2, Wei Chen1,* A bibliometric-mapping approach to identifying patterns and trends in amphibian decline research Claudio Angelini1,*, Jon Bielby2, Corrado Costa3 Food composition of a breeding population the endemic Anatolia newt, Neurergus strauchii (Steindachner, 1887) (Caudata: Salamandridae), from Bingöl, Eastern Turkey Kerim Çiçek1,*, Mustafa Koyun2, Ahmet Mermer1, Cemal Varol Tok3 Stomach histology of Crocodylus siamensis and Gavialis gangeticus reveals analogy of archosaur “gizzards”, with implication on crocodylian gastroliths function Ryuji Takasaki1,2,*, Yoshitsugu Kobayashi3 Does chronic exposure to ammonium during the pre-metamorphic stages promote hindlimb abnormality in anuran metamorphs?
A comparison between natural-habitat and agrosystem frogs Sonia Zambrano-Fernández1, Francisco Javier Zamora-Camacho2,3,*, Pedro Aragón2,4 Confirming Lessona’s brown frogs distribution sketch: Rana temporaria is present on Turin Hills (Piedmont, NW Italy) Davide Marino1, Angelica Crottini2, Franco Andreone3,* Phylogenetic relationships of the Italian populations of Horseshoe Whip Snake Hemorrhois hippocrepis (Serpentes, Colubridae) Francesco Paolo Faraone1, Raffaella Melfi2, Matteo Riccardo Di Nicola3, Gabriele Giacalone4, Mario Lo Valvo5* First karyological analysis of the endemic Malagasy phantom gecko Matoatoa brevipes (Squamata: Gekkonidae) Marcello Mezzasalma1,2,*, Fabio M. Guarino3, Simon P. Loader1, Gaetano Odierna3, Jeffrey W. Streicher1, Natalie Cooper1 Notes on sexual dimorphism, diet and reproduction of the false coral snake Oxyrhopus rhombifer Duméril, Bibron & Duméril, 1854 (Dipsadidae: Pseudoboini) from coastal plains of Subtropical Brazil Fernando M. Quintela1,*, Felipe Caseiro¹, Daniel Loebmann¹
wrapper.cdr 6417 1 Ph.D Scholar and 2Professor, Department of Agricultural Extension, Annamalai University, Annamalainagar 608002, Tamil Nadu, India.
Received : 03-03-2020; Accepted : 05-06-2020 Strategies to Mitigate the Adverse Effects of Climate Change Perspectives of the Farmers of North-East India Sesenlo Kath ¹ and K. Kanagasabapathi ² AbstrACt Climate change is one of the biggest environmental threats facing the world, potentially impacting food production and security.
There is increasing evidence that climate change will strongly affect the North eastern region of India, especially the state of Nagaland and will be one of the challenging issues for future development.
An attempt has been made to collect data from three hundred farmer respondents for providing suggestions to overcome the ill effects of climate change.
The farmers suggested measures such as ‘provision of adequate funds to the grassroots level workers and functionaries’, ‘creating intensive awareness among farmers about climate change and adaptation’ and ‘developing low cost adaptation technology’.
Keywords: Climate change; Vulnerability; mitigate; intensive awareness; climate change; adaptation; Nagaland.
Climate change is one the biggest challenges facing the world, potentially impacting food production and security, sustained water supply, biodiversity of forests and other natural ecosystems, human health and settlements.
Climate change modeling studies for India show that the Indian subcontinent in likely to experience a warming of over 3-5°C and significant changes (increases and decreases) in flood and drought frequency and intensity.
Nagaland, one of the agrarian states of North -East India is also characterized by diverse climate regimes which are highly dependent on the southwest monsoon (June-October).
Over 70.00% of the crop area is under rainfed agriculture, and it is highly vulnerable to climate variability and climate change.
The natural resources are also subjected to degradation and loss due to deforestation, unsustainable shifting cultivation practices, increased extraction of fuel wood, shortening of Jhum cycle (shifting cultivation) and forest fire leading to deforestation.
Further, the poorest people are the most vulnerable to adverse impacts of climate change because they often reside in high exposure areas and also have low adaptive capacity to cope with climate risks.
The objective of this study is to solicit suggestions from the grassroots farmers so that the policies by development Research Note Journal of Extension Education Vol.
31 No.
4, 2019 DOI:https://doi.org/10.26725/JEE.2019.4.31.6417-6420 6418 Table 1.
Distribution of Respondents based on Suggestions to Mitigate the Adverse Effects of Climate Change in Agriculture (n= 300) Sl.
No.
Suggestions of farmers Frequency Percentage Rank 1.
Provision of adequate funds to the grassroot level workers and farmers for adoption of adaptation measures.
285 95.00 I 2.
Creating intensive awareness among farmers about climate change and adaptation strategies towards climate change.
280 93.33 II 3.
Developing low cost adaptation technology to be adopted by all irrespective of their socioeconomic conditions.
264 88.00 III 4.
Establishing a Research centre for adaptation to climate change, so that farmers can access information and technology.
250 83.33 IV 5.
Providing farm machineries and equipment suited for hilly terrain areas 240 80.00 V 6.
Establishing more number of value additions and processing units for agricultural produce.
235 78.33 VI 7.
Arranging for proper road infrastructure and connectivity to all the farms.
225 75.00 VII 8.
Providing timely information and early warning about changes in weather.
210 70.00 VIII 9.
Constructing infrastructural facilities for cold storage 204 68.00 IX 10.
Developing more number of drought and heat tolerant varieties of crops.
180 60.00 X 11.
Developing crop varieties which can withstand frost and water logging.
174 58.00 XI 12.
Offering compensation to the farmers in case of natural calamities.
135 45.00 XII 13.
Extending crop insurance to all the crops.
120 40.00 XIII Journal of Extension Education 6419 agencies can be designed to improve the most vulnerable sectors.
METHODOLOGY The present investigation was carried out in Tseminyu sub-division of Kohima district in Nagaland, a constituent state in India.
The respondents were identified and selected from eleven villages under Chunlikha Rural development blocks (R.D.
block).
Proportionate random sampling technique was followed to select a sample size of 300 respondents .The data were collected using a well-structured and pre-tested interview schedule.
The respondents were requested to offer their suggestions to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change which they feel more important from the listed items.
Suitable statistical analysis like percentage analysis and rank correlation were done to interpret the results.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION The various suggestions given by the farmer respondents to overcome the constraints in the adoption of improved agricultural practices to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change in North-East India are given in Table 1.
Thirteen suggestions were identified from the farmers and they are reported in percentages and ranked accordingly.
The data from Table 1 reveal that majority of the respondents (95.00%) suggested ‘provision of adequate funds to the grassroots level workers and farmers for adoption of adaptation measures’ and this was ranked as the first major suggestion.
‘Creating intensive awareness among farmers about climate change and adaptation strategies towards climate change’ (93.33%) was ranked as the second major suggestion given by the respondents.
‘Developing low cost adaptation technologies so that it can be adopted by all irrespective of their socio-economic conditions’ (88.00 %) was ranked as the third major suggestion given by the respondents.
‘Establishing a Research centre or Institute for adaptation to climate change; so that the farmers can easily access the information and technology’ (83.33 %) was ranked as the fourth major suggestion given by the respondents.
‘Providing farm machineries and equipments suited for hilly terrain areas’ (80.00 %) was ranked as the fifth major suggestion given by the respondents.
‘Establishing more number of value addition and processing units for agricultural produce’ (78.33 %) was ranked as the sixth major suggestion given by the respondents.
‘Arranging for proper road development and connectivity to all the farms’ (75.00 %) was ranked as the seventh major suggestion given by the respondents.
‘Providing timely information and early warning about changes in weather’ (70.00 %) was ranked as the eighth major suggestion given by the respondents.
Similar observation was also made by Vinaykumar (2015).
Thus the farmers of Nagaland offered suggestions to administrators, researchers and policy makers to design policies and programmes to face the threats of climate change to agriculture and food security.
The suggestions of the farmers need to be looked and analyzed further by the researchers, planners, policy makers and Strategies to Mitigate the Adverse Effects of Climate Change Perspectives of the Farmers of North-East India 6420 developmental agencies.
Programmes need to be designed in such a way that they satisfy, fulfill and address their grievances towards climate change.
Also it is necessary to reorient the policies and programmes so that the threats of climate change can be addressed effectively.
REFERENCE Vinaykumar, C.T.
& Umesh K.B.
(2015).
Perception and Adaptation of the Farmers to Climate Change.
Karnataka Journal of Agricultural Science, (Special Issue) 28(5): 822-824.
Journal of Extension Education
57 © Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77):57-70 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: Myers, G., Walz, J.
& Jumbe, A.
2020.
Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania.
Town and Regional Planning, no.77, pp.
57-70.
Dr. Garth A. Myers, PhD.
Paul E. Rather Distinguished Professor of Urban International Studies and Director, Center for Urban and Global Studies, 300 Summit Street, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, USA 06106.
Phone: 1-860-297-4273, email: <garth.myers@trincoll.edu>, ORCID: https:// orcid.org/0000-0001-5370-2389.
Dr. Jonathan R. Walz, PhD.
Associate Professor, Climate and Environment, School for International Training-Graduate Institute, Brattleboro, Vermont, USA and Zanzibar, Tanzania.
P.O.
Box 3040 Vuga, Zanzibar, Tanzania.
Phone: 255-754313545, email: <jwalz.us@gmail.com>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/000-0003-4647-8504.
Dr. Aboud S. Jumbe, PhD.
Environmental Scientist, Department of Environment, Government of Zanzibar, P.O.
Box 628, Zanzibar, Tanzania.
Tel: 255-778900448, email: <aboud.jumbe@gmail.com>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8563-3071.
Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania Garth Myers, Jonathan Walz & Aboud Jumbe DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.5 Peer reviewed and revised November 2020 Published December 2020 *The authors declared no conflict of interest for this title or article Abstract Over recent decades, there has been substantial change in Zanzibar, due to, among others, global climate change impacts.
The semi-autonomous polity faces challenges to foster resilient urban communities and planning for mitigation and adaptation to climate change, not least because of its island nature and rapid urbanization.
This article addresses urban and environmental planning measures from 2010 to 2020 aimed at confronting the impacts of climate change and working toward resilience and adaptation in urban Zanzibar.
The study was conducted between June and August 2020, and primarily involved a combination of desktop studies, online discussions, and virtual meetings with key actors in the land, climate, and disaster risk policy and governance aspects in Zanzibar.
The review provides information on the current responses to policy, legal and institutional setup in terms of the key issues related to land use, climate and disaster risk reduction in Zanzibar.
Thematic analysis was used to connect land-use planning, climate adaptation, and disaster risk reduction documentation of the situational assessment, determination and respective recommendations concerning land use and climate adaptation.
It is argued that planning for climate change requires greater social will, financial investment, and the conversion of science to policy than currently exists in Zanzibar.
Dynamic individual and governmental efforts and select community engagement are likely insufficient to produce resilience, as large-scale donor-funded climate adaptation interventions are largely top-down in orientation and often miss out on local community-oriented climate solutions.
Smaller NGOs are more practical for understanding and addressing community-oriented priorities to support climateresilient initiatives and enhance local livelihood priorities and participation against climate impacts, including natural disasters and everyday degradation.
The article concludes with policy recommendations both specific to Zanzibar and relevant across the region.
Keywords: Adaptation, global climate change, policy interventions, urban planning, Zanzibar TENDENSE IN STEDELIKE BEPLANNING, KLIMAATSAANPASSING EN VEERKRAGTIGHEID IN ZANZIBAR, TANZANIË Die afgelope dekades het daar aansien like verandering in Zanzibar plaasgevind, onder meer weens die wêreldwye impak op klimaatsverandering.
Die semi-outonome regering staar uitdagings in die gesig om veerkragtige stedelike gemeenskappe te bevorder en te beplan vir die versagting en aanpassing by klimaatsverandering, nie die minste nie, te wyte aan die aard van die eiland en vinnige verstedeliking.
Hierdie artikel handel oor stadsen omge wings beplanningsmaatreëls van 2010 tot 2020 wat daarop gemik is om die gevolge van klimaatsverandering die hoof te bied en te werk aan veerkragtigheid en aanpassing in stedelike Zanzibar.
Tematiese ontledings is gebruik om landgebruiksbeplanning, klimaats aanpassing en rampri sikover minderingsdokumentasie van die situasiebepaling, vasstelling en onderskeie aanbevelings rakende grondgebruik en klimaatsaanpassing te verbind.
Die argument is dat die beplanning vir klimaatsverandering groter maatskaplike wil, finansiële investering en die omskakeling van weten skap tot beleid vereis as wat tans in Zanzibar bestaan.
Dinamiese individuele en regeringspogings en uitgesoekte gemeen skapsbetrokken heid is waarskynlik onvoldoende om veer kragtigheid te bewerkstellig, aangesien grootskaalse skenkers gefinansierde klimaat saan passingsintervensies grotendeels van bo na onder in oriëntering is en die plaaslike gemeenskapsgerigte klimaat op lossings mis.
Kleiner NRO’s is meer prakties om gemeenskapsgerigte prioriteite te verstaan en aan te spreek om klimaatsbestande inisiatiewe te ondersteun en plaas like lewens bestaanprioriteite en deelname teen klimaatsinvloede te verbeter, insluitend natuurrampe en alledaagse agteruitgang.
Die artikel gee beleidsaanbevelings, spesifiek http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:garth.myers@trincoll.edu https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5370-2389 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5370-2389 mailto:jwalz.us@gmail.com https://orcid.org/000-0003-4647-8504 mailto:aboud.jumbe@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8563-3071 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.5 58 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) vir Zanzibar en ook relevant in die hele streek.
Sleutelwoorde: Aanpassing, beleidsintervensies, stedelike beplanning, wêreldwye klimaats verandering, Zanzibar MEKHOA EA MERALO EA LITOROPO, HO IKAMAHANYA LE MAEMO A LEHOLIMO LE BOTSITSO TOROPONG EA ZANZIBAR, TANZANIA Lilemong tse mashome tsa ho feta, ho bile le phetoho e kholo Zanzibar, ka lebaka la hara tse ling, litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo.
Leano le ikemetseng la boipuso le tobane le liphephetso ho matlafatsa sechaba sa litoropo se ikemiselitseng le ho rala bakeng sa ho fokotsa le ho ikamahanya le phetoho ea maemo a leholimo, haholoholo ka lebaka la hore kesehlekehleke seo litoropo tsa sona li holang ka potlako e kholo.
Sengoliloeng sena se bua ka mehato ea moralo oa litoropo le tikoloho ho tloha 2010 ho isa 2020 e reretsoeng ho tobana le litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo le ho sebeletsa ho ba le botsitso le ho ikamahanya le maemo a leholimo litoropong tsa Zanzibar.
Phuputso e entsoe pakeng tsa Phuptjane le Phato 2020, mme e kenyelletsa haholo-holo motswako oa lithuto tsa desktop, lipuisano le likopano tsa inthanete le batšehetsi ba ka sehloohong molemong oa maano a mobu, maemo a leholimo, maemo a leholimo le likotsi tsa koluoa ‘mooho le puso toropong ea Zanzibar.
Tlhatlhobo ena e fana ka tlhaiso-leseling mabapi le likarabo tsa hajoale ho maano, melao le tlhophiso ea setheo ho latela lintlha tsa bohlokoa tse amanang le ts’ebeliso ea mobu, maemo a leholimo le likotsi tsa likoluoa Zanzibar.
Tlhatlhobo ea lihloho e sebelisitsoe ho hokahanya moralo oa ts’ebeliso ea mobu, ho ikamahanya le maemo a leholimo, le litokomane tsa phokotso ea likotsi tsa likoluoa, boikemisetso le likhothaletso tse fapaneng mabapi le ts’ebeliso ea mobu le phetoho ea maemo a leholimo.
Ho hlahisoa hore ho rala phetoho ea maemo a leholimo ho hloka thato e kholo ea sechaba, tsetelo ea lichelete le phetolelo ea mahlale ho maano, ‘me sena se lokela ho etsahala maemoong a holimo ho feta a teng Zanzibar.
Boiteko bo matla ba motho ka mong le ba mmuso le ho khetha tšebelisano ‘moho le sechaba li kanna tsa se lekane ho hlahisa mamello, joalo ka ha liphallelo tse kholo tse tšehelitsoeng ke bafani li le maemong a holimo haholo’ me hangata li fetoa ke tharollo ea maemo a leholimo a lehae.
Mekhatlo e ikemetseng e sebetsa haholo bakeng sa kutloisiso le ho sebetsana le lintho tse tlang pele sechabeng tse tšehetsang mehato ea ho loants’a maemo a hlobaetsang a leholimo le ho ntlafatsa merero ea boipheliso ea lehae le ho nka karolo khahlanong le litlamorao tsa maemo a leholimo, ho kenyeletsoa likoluoa tsa tlhaho le ho senyeha hoa letsatsi le letsatsi.
Sengoloa se phetheloa ka likhothaletso tsa maano a ikhethileng ho Zanzibar le ho sebetsa ho potoloha le naha.
1.
INTRODUCTION The years 1990 to 2020 brought tremendous political, economic, social and environmental changes to Zanzibar.
Since 1990, the semi-autonomous polity within the United Republic of Tanzania has experienced the re-introduction of both a multiparty political system and a capitalist economy built primarily around tourism (Keshodkar, 2013: 55-86; Gössling, 2002: 540-541; Killian, 2008: 100-109).
These transformations have coincided with both the substantial migration of mainland Tanzanians to the islands and significant influences from global social forces, including the near-constant presence of many thousands of European and North American tourists amid the global revitalization of Islam (Keshodkar, 2013: 111-138; Larsen, 2005: 145-157).
This change has both produced significant environmental change and coincided with the acceleration of palpable impacts from global climate change (Myers, 2002: 149; Myers, 2016: 83-11).
Change creates an extraordinarily challenging landscape in which to foster resilient urban communities and planning for mitigation and adaptation to accelerating climate change impacts.
Zanzibar has rapidly urbanized throughout the period since its independence (December 1963), revolution (January 1964), and union with Tanganyika to form Tanzania (April 1964) (Muhajir, 2020: 9; Myers, 1993: 21; Myers, 2016: 83).
This small archipelago (with its main islands of Unguja – often called Zanzibar – where the city of Zanzibar is located, and Pemba) has a population of roughly 1.8 million (Muhajir, 2020: 15).
The urban area also known as Zanzibar serves as the capital, with an estimated metropolitan population of just over 700,000 as of 2020 (Muhajir, 2020: 26).
This figure combines the Zanzibar Urban District, with slightly over 200,000 people (including the small ‘Stone Town’ historic district, now home to less than 10,000) and the rapidly urbanizing West A and West B districts with 500,000 residents (Myers, 2020: 82).
The urban area’s population is now 14 times the size it was (less than 50,000) in 1963 (Myers, 1993: 347; Muhajir, 2020: 28).
This rapid pace of urbanization comes with a sprawling geographical footprint, since most of the residential development consists of single-family homes, compounding sustainability challenges in spheres such as solid waste management, air and water pollution, soil and beach erosion, and environmental health (Paula, 2016: 91-93).
From 2010 to 2020, environmental planning measures sought to confront climate change impacts and ensure resilience and adaptation in urban Zanzibar.
However, such efforts became entangled in a power dynamic between land-use authorities and the city’s residents.
The land tenure system in Zanzibar is guided under the Land Tenure Act – the principal land legislation that was promulgated in 1992.
The Commission for Lands (COLA) is mandated to implement the Zanzibar land policy, subsequent land management related acts, set standards and norms for land ownership and rights, including dispute settlements, as well as integrate land-use planning, conservation and management activities (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2017: 1).
The Land Tenure Act has since undergone numerous amendments in response to the growing friction between landuse authorities and local communities over the land ownership-development nexus.
As a result, the Act has been implemented under conditions of growing challenges that result from accelerated population growth, urban sprawl, non-inclusive land-use Garth Myers, Jonathan Walz & Aboud Jumbe • Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania 59 planning approaches, and social inequity.
This compounding effect of social and environmental pressures has precipitated endless land-use conflicts and induced numerous impediments to address the impacts of climate change.
Such precipitous outcomes have often negatively affected the sustainability of the country’s development plan.
This article examines the government-led, poverty-reduction and strategic growth development (popularly known by its Swahili acronym as “MKUZA”) planning efforts working toward resilience, mitigation, and adaptation in urban Zanzibar.
Given the size of Unguja Island (Zanzibar island) and the intertwined economies of urban Zanzibar and communities throughout the island – for example, the city’s landfill is miles outside the Urban-West Region, and all tourist arrivals depend on the city’s infrastructure regardless of their eventual destination on Unguja –, the entire island is included in the analysis, with some reference to the urbanizing contexts of lesspopulated but nearby Pemba island (Myers, 2016: 98).
It is argued that planning for climate change requires greater social will and a sustained financial investment than currently exist in Zanzibar.
Dynamic individual and governmental efforts and select community engagement are likely insufficient to produce resilience, unless there is a cohesive strategy to ensure social equity and inclusion aimed at the islands’ local community-oriented climate solutions that enhance local livelihood priorities against climate impacts.
The narrative begins by framing climate change and urban planning in Africa, including the continent’s contributions and vulnerabilities.
Zanzibar is targeted as a case study, because it is an island exposed to intensifying cyclonic episodes from the outer western Indian Ocean region, fluctuating precipitation, flooding, rising seas, and changed air and sea surface temperatures.
These documented changes have impacted on its people and their livelihoods, its urban infrastructure, and its natural resources.
Next, Zanzibar’ primary climate adaptation strategies and action plans are reviewed, including their policy and financing interventions for sustainability.
It is noted that Zanzibar’s planning and implementation have not sufficiently addressed climate change impacts, due in part to the island’s rapid population growth and a climate-land nexus scenario that is overwhelming natural resources accessibility.
It is argued that there is an urgent need to strengthen institutional capacity for planning, implementation, and inter-sectoral collaboration, in order to reduce the threats and impacts of climate-linked natural disasters.
While Zanzibar has had remarkable productivity in terms of new climate and environmental change plans and institutions for urban and island-wide management, evidence suggests that these have not been sufficient to mitigate impacts and ensure resilience in the archipelago.
Large scale, but particularly NGO-based financing and mainstreaming of climate adaptation is urgently needed.
Probabilistic assessments of climate risks impacts should employ technology and data sets to address and reduce vulnerabilities.
The conclusion suggests new and updated strategies to tackle the ongoing challenges of urban planning and climate change resilience and adaptation in Zanzibar and the wider region.
2.
METHODOLOGY The study was conducted between June and August 2020, and primarily involved a combination of desktop studies, online discussions, and virtual meetings with key actors in the land, climate, and disaster risk policy and governance aspects in Zanzibar.
Specifically, the study entailed the desktop review of relevant policies, strategies, legislation, documentation, and grey literature related to climate, disaster risk and land-use planning in Zanzibar.
The key focus was to address progress, opportunities, and challenges that Zanzibar faced in the midst of the Government of Zanzibar’s efforts to address climate change adaptation, disaster risk preparedness and land-use planning – under resource limitations.
The review of secondary data, including peer-reviewed and academic sources, publications from official development assistance programmes relevant to climate, disaster risk and development interventions in Zanzibar were key in the development of this study.
Secondary data was collected via an online search or personal contacts with relevant agencies, and selective online and virtual meetings on climate, disaster risk and land nexus with purposively selected stakeholders in Zanzibar.
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic severely limited the targeted attempt to address cross-sectoral institutional consultations, in-person meetings, and focused discussions with stakeholders.
Alternatively, we reviewed key Government policy and legal documents, publications from development partners such as the United Nations, World Bank, United Kingdom Aid, and other support initiatives carried out by NGOs such as The Hague Institute for Global Justice, The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), and others.
Important cases from natural disaster episodes in Zanzibar were sourced via global news platforms such as the BBC and Al Jazeera, while certain secondary data on disaster loss was cited from the Relief web platform.
The review provided information of current responses to policy, legal and institutional setup on the key issues related to land use, climate and disaster risk reduction in Zanzibar.
Thematic analysis was used to connect land-use planning, climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction documentation of the situational assessment, determination and respective recommendations concerning land use and climate adaptation.
60 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) 3.
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND URBAN PLANNING IN AFRICA Global climate change constitutes perhaps the most urgent arena of development planning and environmental policy for Africa’s urban areas.
Yet the knowledge bases and policy frameworks for dealing with climate change are often skewed.
Addaney and Cobbinah (2019: 7) note that “Africa’s contribution to global climate change is comparably negligible [yet] it remains the most affected region”.
Climate change is also under-researched in both rural and urban studies in Africa.
The study by Addaney and Cobbinah (2019) is the first comprehensive survey for the region’s cities, and no such survey exists for rural Africa (see also Simon & Leck, 2014; Du Toit, Cilliers, Dallimer, Goddard, Guenat & Cornelius, 2018).
Moreover, African actors and agents have had less of a voice in developing and implementing global climate change adaptation and mitigation policy frameworks.
Policies imposed on Africa from the global North often ‘undermine’ local actions to combat climate change, and instead “privileging international actors and financial markets” (Ernstson & Swyngedouw, 2019: 15; Silver, 2019: 133).
There is a great diversity to impacts, outcomes and planning capacities on the continent.
Addaney and Cobbinah’s (2019: 4) edited volume forges past the potentially debilitating realisation that such diversity might engender, while acknowledging that “adaptation to … climatic variations has become a daunting task for governments, city authorities and residents”.
Their research showed the diversity within Ghana alone.
Zanzibar manifests both the outsized reliance on global North actors and institutions common in Africa and the diversity across Tanzania, comparable to the Ghana case studied by Addaney and Cobbinah (2019: 4).
Addaney (2019: 482) noted that, in Africa, the urban vulnerabilities “are well-documented [but] less attention has been paid to how the city government plans to adapt to climate change and enhance the resilience of the local population.” Urban Africans are not always hopelessly incapable of developing adaptation and resilience strategies.
African governments and NGOs play important roles, for example, in the Sustainable Urban Development Network out of United Nations Habitat in Nairobi, which launched its Cities and Climate Change Initiative in 2008 (Myers, 2020: 173).
This study contributes to building this understanding of the actions and capacities of local governments.
Water is one of the most complicated sources of risk in the context of global climate change in African environments, especially in cities.
Half of all Africa’s cities with over 750,000 people are within 50 miles of the coast, and many others (including some of the region’s largest urban areas such as Kinshasa, Khartoum, and Brazzaville) are predominantly located in low-lying riverine settings (UN-Habitat, 2014: 45).
Coastal cities or near-coastal cities are likewise also often on river mouths, estuaries, or deltas.
UN-Habitat (2014: 45) considers 14 big cities (those with over one million people), six intermediate cities (500,000 to a million residents), and 37 small cities (100,000-500,000 people) in Africa to be at risk, due to rising sea levels.
A great many cities in Africa face other significant flood risks, which are often most severe in poor, informal settlements.
Even in cities at relatively high average elevations, poorer areas and informal settlements are typically at lower elevations in zones subject to seasonal flooding.
Khartoum, Dar es Salaam, Mogadishu, Maputo, Dakar and many other major urban areas have experienced severe flooding over the past few years alone (Myers, 2016: 35; Kebede & Nicholls, 2011: 16-22; Aljazeeranews, 2019; Reliefweb, 2018).
Vulnerabilities from climate change do not stop with sea-level risk and flooding.
As a low-lying coastal city, Zanzibar has had very comparable experiences to other cities on the continent examined in these other studies.
Zanzibar is selected for this study because it represents the uniqueness of a sub-national “semi-autonomous” island-state planning dilemma on climate adaptation and showcases the socio-economic complexities of coastal climate-related vulnerabilities facing the United Republic of Tanzania.
The study area is thus an excellent setting for comparison with the regional trends discussed earlier.
Many of the risks and challenges are exceedingly comparable.
4.
PLANNING IN ZANZIBAR AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT 4.1 Climate change vulnerabilities in Zanzibar Zanzibar, like many other coastal cities in the western Indian Ocean region, is experiencing higher than average physical growth and development rates.
This is causing urban, economic, environmental and future development constraints, which increase coastal vulnerability (Celliers & Ntombela, 2015: 337).
Land-use planning in Zanzibar has existed since 1923, but the first island-wide planning was achieved in 1995, with the formulation of the national land-use plan (Muhajir, 2020: 40).
However, lack of effective coordination, low levels of enforcement and monitoring, and poor communications continue to remain as prevalent challenges (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2014: 2).
This article highlights land planning-related issues of unplanned settlement, unsustainable development, and inadequate capacity for environmental management from a climate vulnerability perspective, in the context of the recently approved national spatial development strategy (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2014: 2).
As a small island state, Zanzibar has become increasingly more prone to climate risk, as well as vulnerable to natural disasters, including floods, Garth Myers, Jonathan Walz & Aboud Jumbe • Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania 61 droughts and tropical storms.
Zanzibar is particularly vulnerable, because it has an extensive low-lying coastline, with the total land area of 2,654 square kilometres.
The majority of the archipelago’s 1.8 million people live just under an average of 5 metres above sea-level (Muhajir, 2020: 45).
=Rising sea water levels, saltwater intrusion, land degradation, erratic rainfalls, and urban sprawl have imposed a huge burden on the socio-economic drivers and livelihoods of Zanzibar’s vulnerable communities, perhaps even more so than elsewhere on Tanzania’s coastline (Yanda, Bryceson, Mwevura & Mung’ong’o, 2019: 3-13).
The recent record of direct damage to infrastructure, crops, and settlements has contributed to the increased deficits in terms of development goals.
These damages have also imposed new challenges on the development commitments intended to pull the population out of poverty and into the middleincome level of development.
4.2 Planning responses and adaptation 4.2.1 Climate adaptation study The Zanzibar Government developed its first climate adaptation study in 2010, under the bilateral Sustainable Management of Lands and Environment Support Program financed by Finland.
This report, ‘Preparation of an Adaptation Program of Action for Zanzibar’, served as the local equivalent to the National Adaptation Program of Action Requirement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Report identified the climate priorities that were of great concern to the local communities.
These included extreme weather events; sea level rise and beach erosion; decreasing access to freshwater quality; saltwater intrusion; food insecurity; re-emergence of threats on human health; loss of forestry and biodiversity, and decreasing fisheries catch (Moller, 2010: 13).
The direct links between land-use planning and climate-induced impacts identified in the initial national adaptation study focused on coastal zone management, the tourism sector, groundwater conservation, sustainable practices in agriculture, and the protection of existing forest cover.
4.2.2 Merging science and policy for climate adaptation However, addressing these measures required a systematic climate change response and adaptation strategy.
Without cross-sectoral mobilization of the socio-economic pillars of growth and development, it would always be difficult for the islands to cope with the widening scope of impacts of climate change that had already begun to affect its strategic development planning.
The 2012 study on Economic impacts of climate change in Zanzibar, or EICC (Watkiss, Pye, Hendriksen, MacLean, Bonjean, Jiddawi, Shaghude, Sheikh & Khamis, 2012: 1) revealed extreme climate variability projections for the next 50 years from 2012 to 2062, with continued patterns of erratic rainfall, rising temperatures, rough sea waves, and strong winds.
Since a large proportion of Zanzibar’s GDP was associated with climate-sensitive activities, people’s livelihoods (the majority of which include agriculture, fishing, or tourism) were greatly dependent on these changing weather and climate dynamics that exacerbated patterns such as floods, droughts, and storms (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2012: 1).
The EICC study identified key sectoral priorities to be integrated into the development paradigm.
Rising sea water levels, salt-water intrusion, land degradation, erratic rainfalls, and urban sprawl have imposed a huge burden on the socio-economic drivers and livelihoods of Zanzibar’s vulnerable communities, perhaps even more so than elsewhere on Tanzania’s coastline (Yanda, Bryceson, Mwevura & Mung’ong’o, 2019: 3-13).
The recent record of direct damage to infrastructure, crops, and settlements has contributed to the increased deficits in terms of development goals.
These damages have also imposed new challenges on the development commitments intended to pull the population out of poverty and into the middle-income level of development.
Figure 1: The main island of Zanzibar.
The spots indicate areas that are currently directly affected by the impacts of climate change Figure 1: The main island of Zanzibar.
The spots indicate areas that are currently directly affected by the impacts of climate change Source: Zanzibar, Department of Environment, 2019: 7 62 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) Figure 3: Map of the Town of Zanzibar.
The red colorations indicate areas and wards in the city at risk of flood hazards, due to impacts of climate change Source: Badui, 2020 4.2 Planning responses and adaptation 4.2.1 Climate adaptation study The Zanzibar Government developed its first climate adaptation study in 2010, under the bilateral Sustainable Management of Lands and Environment Support Program financed by Finland.
This report, ‘Preparation of an Adaptation Program of Action for Zanzibar’, served as the local equivalent to the National Adaptation Program of Action Requirement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Report identified the climate priorities that were of great concern to the local communities.
These included extreme weather events; sea level rise and beach erosion; decreasing access to freshwater quality; saltwater intrusion; food insecurity; re-emergence of threats on human health; loss of forestry and biodiversity, and decreasing fisheries catch (Moller, 2010: 13).
The direct links between land-use planning and climate-induced impacts identified in the initial national adaptation study focused on coastal zone management, the tourism sector, groundwater conservation, sustainable practices in agriculture, and the protection of existing forest cover.
4.2.2 Merging science and policy for climate adaptation Figure 3: Map of the Town of Zanzibar.
The red colorations indicate areas and wards in the city at risk of flood hazards, due to impacts of climate change Source: Badui, 2020 These priorities, as ranked by local participants, included sustainable land-management issues, such as tackling coastal erosion; addressing the widening problem of saltwater intrusion and inundation of lowland agricultural fields; reducing impacts of urban flooding; curbing rampant deforestation and land degradation; preserving Zanzibar’s tourism “attractiveness” assets such as the heritage of its historic Stone Town and its constituent infrastructure; protecting coral sands and beaches, and addressing biomass energy challenges (Watkiss et al., 2012: 1).
4.3 Development of a Zanzibar climate change adaptation strategy and action plan The Zanzibar climate change strategy of 2014 set up five key sectoral priorities for the Government of Zanzibar to be integrated into its poverty reduction and economic growth development strategy (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2013a: 2).
These sustainable land-use planning priorities focus on natural disaster risk reduction and resilient urban settlements; climate smart agriculture; natural resources management; low-carbon tourism; sustainable forests and energy, as well as resilient coastal zone and adjacent marine ecosystems management approaches.
The Zanzibar climate change action plan called for the immediate need to identify priority sites affected by climate change, and these largely related to land areas affected by salinization and flood risk (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2016: 2).
4.4 Strategic implementation of major adaptation initiatives In Zanzibar, climate-smart agricultural programmes have been mobilized.
Reconstruction and strengthening of dykes were prioritized.
Mangrove reforestation is being carried out under multiple support from regional and global facilities.
Rainwaterharvesting programmes through the construction of check dams under the Zanzibar Irrigation Masterplan Source: Zanzibar, Department of Environment, 2019: 7 Figure 2: The map of the sister island of Pemba showing sites affected by the impacts of climate change Source: Department of Environment, Zanzibar, 2019: 7 Figure 2: The map of the sister island of Pemba showing sites affected by the impacts of climate change Source: Department of Environment, Zanzibar, 2019: 7 Garth Myers, Jonathan Walz & Aboud Jumbe • Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania 63 are being implemented under a partnership with the Korea Overseas International Cooperation Agency.
An expanded borehole control and monitoring programme emerged as another proposed regulatory action in addressing land-based climate issues in Zanzibar.
Other popular climate adaptation initiatives included construction of seawalls and groynes at Kilimani locality in Zanzibar Town (and at Kisiwa Panza islet off Pemba); dissemination of environmental, climate education, and awareness programmes to local communities; selection of ecosystem-based management options; introduction of smart technologies; promotion of alternative livelihoods; building institutional capacity in climate financing, and enforcement of coastal setback buffer zones to slow down vulnerabilities and prolong resilience for the archipelago (UNEP & GEF, 2015: 2).
Moreover, as Tanzania is updating its intended Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to a more graduated pace within the Paris Agreement on climate change, key land-related focal areas that have been identified in the proposed NDC implementation plan for the country include adopting climate-smart land-use planning and management systems, human settlements, agriculture, water, tourism, protected areas, and waste management (United Republic of Tanzania, 2016: 1).
In the Zanzibar context, these NDC measures form the bulk of the archipelago’s development planning priorities that recognize the impacts of climate change on its vulnerable population.
4.5 Challenges of climate financing and global outreach Despite these measures, Zanzibar’s responses to climate impacts were already exacerbated by lack of institutional arrangements and planning systems, inadequate finance allocations on adaptation measures, and lack of specific economic and finance planning systems targeted at climate change.
According to the International Institute for Environment and Development, the country’s capacity to absorb climate finance per year was less than US$500,000, while adaptation demand exceeded US$2 million each year (Vuai, 2014: 1).
The 2017 natural catastrophic risk profile assessment by the World Bank’s Southwest Indian Ocean Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (World Bank, 2016a: 2) puts Zanzibar’s potential catastrophic losses from natural disasters (including floods and cyclonic weather events) at US$2.2 million each year, with an annual emergency cost of US$500,000.
The urban residential sector experiences nearly 87% of the combined losses, while the commercial sector absorbs nearly 11% (World Bank, 2017: 1).
4.6 Prioritizing climate-related policy interventions What does the existing policy context entail in addressing climate adaptation in Zanzibar?
The Zanzibar Vision 2020 government plan recognized the role of the environment, biodiversity and forestry in the promotion of sustainable development, decrease in forest cover, and rapid and unplanned land-use conversion into other nonforest activities such as agriculture, urbanization, and quarrying (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2000: 1).
Forest resources in the coral rag areas, agroforestry systems and mangroves have decreased significantly.
The major causes are population increase and the demand for economic development, exacerbated by the fast-growing tourism industry (Kingazi, 2013).
Moreover, the Zanzibar Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy recognizes that attaining environmental sustainability and climate resilience is one of the five principal pillars towards achieving social and economic prosperity and reaching middle-income status.
The MKUZA Strategy (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2015: 2) underscores the need for a genderresponsive climate adaptation plan that targets the resilience of all socio-economic safeguards, in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
However, its implementation plan is extremely dependent on the international climate finance mechanisms and on donor support.
Moreover, were Zanzibar to actually achieve middle-income status, numerous international funding opportunities for climate mitigation would disappear, since they are set aside for low-income countries.
4.7 Integrating climate, land use and sustainability The last decade from 2010 to 2020 has witnessed a substantive rise in planning endeavours and environmental policy development for the islands, and notably for urban Zanzibar.
Between 2013 and 2020 alone, the government of Zanzibar created the first master plan for the city in 33 years (DOURP, 2015: 1), a national spatial development strategy (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2014: 2) that included 10 focused ‘local area plans’ (e.g., DOURP, 2016), a new national environmental policy (2013), a new land policy (2017: 2), the new Zanzibar Environmental Management Authority (2015), and the US$193 million World Bank-funded Zanzibar Urban Services Project (ZUSP) (World Bank, 2016b).
There have been real and tangible impacts from many of these new plans and institutions.
ZUSP, for example, produced almost 20kms of a drainage network in poorer outlying neighbourhoods that has the prospect of reducing the susceptibility of these areas to water-borne diseases such as cholera, and diseases exacerbated by standing water such as malaria.
The banning of plastic bags under the new environmental policy has made the city and coastline visibly cleaner, while raising the environmental consciousness of ordinary residents.
However, implementation and enforcement mechanisms lag behind the impressive record on paper.
The government’s new land policy attests that climate change, rapid population 64 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) growth, and urbanization as experienced in Zanzibar will exhaust the carrying capacity of the already over-exploited land and impose unbearable pressure on existing ecosystems and environmental services.
The policy cautions that the urban areas of Zanzibar are forecast to be comprised of 60% (or 1.25 million people) of the total population projection of nearly 2.2 million by 2035 – mainly in Zanzibar Urban-West Region, and in Chake Chake and Wete towns on Pemba island (Muhajir, 2020: 64).
This climate-land nexus scenario is expected to overwhelm the carrying capacity of the fragile archipelagic environment, its settlements, and its agricultural land.
This will impose further pressure on the limited government resources for managing or enhancing accessibility to affordable urban housing, sustainable infrastructure, public transport, or utility services (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2017: 2).
The land policy, therefore, calls for an immediate cross-sectoral and integrated approach, or a new mechanism in achieving resilience in land-use planning through climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and implementation of sustainable development goals (Muhajir, 2020: 75).
4.8 Is climate-land scenario planning the answer?
A practical example of how the integration of land-use planning and climate adaptation can be achieved in urban settlements of Zanzibar can be referenced from The Hague Institute’s pilot study in three smaller urbanized localities – Mjini Kiuyu (Pemba), Mkokotoni (Unguja), and Nungwi (Unguja) – between 2015 and 2017 (The Hague Institute, 2017: 33).
The program’s overall objective was to develop a Zanzibarcentric model of a participatory and community-oriented local adaptation plan of action for urbanized localities in the implementation of Zanzibar’s climate strategy (The Hague Institute, 2017: 33).
The three localities were selected because of their diverse climate impact challenges related to land, freshwater, rise in sea level, agriculture, livestock, and other issues.
The local action plans for these urbanized localities were meant to contribute to sustainable economic development, climate change adaptation, and disaster risk reduction for these townships by developing effective institutional, sectoral and spatial governance arrangements in a participatory process.
The Pilot Study helped generate mutual trust and the development of consensus-based solutions.
It also assisted policymakers in identifying relevant good practices among the persons and organizations involved in climate change issues in those localities.
Over a period of two years, the formulation of the 23 recommended adaptation measures and a road map to their implementation were successfully completed (The Hague Institute, 2017: 33).
The plans were effectively established while taking into consideration the priorities of these localities, including attempts to strengthen institutional capacity for planning and implementation; inter-sectoral collaboration and synergies, and community capacity for planning and implementation.
However, significant challenges in both land-use planning and the decision-making hierarchy for addressing climate adaptation actions have emerged.
Although the study provided the Government of Zanzibar with concrete building blocks that would support the implementation of the Zanzibar climate change strategy, its full-scale implementation has not yet been carried out and will depend on how these solutions are integrated into the current spatial development strategy.
4.9 Managing climate vulnerabilities, natural disasters and land-use planning The Zanzibar National Spatial Development Strategy (NSPDS) was formulated to replace the national land-use plan of 1995, which had not been successfully implemented.
The current strategy marks a departure from the traditional proactive “spatial planning” per se and instead focuses on strategic planning dialogue, in order to address key strategic measures to offset the socio-economic and environmental impacts associated with land-use planning and degradation.
The Government faces the huge and seemingly insurmountable challenge of having to cope with an increasing proportion of unplanned settlements.
It is now estimated that at least 60% of housing construction projects in urban areas of Zanzibar have been done without formal permit clearance (Muhajir, 2020: 65).
In this scenario, where many of these structures are located within designated monsoon-season flood zones of the urban areas, the vulnerabilities to potential threats from natural disasters increase haphazardly and astronomically (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2014: 2).
Another serious challenge emanates from the fact that Zanzibar’s disaster risk reduction governance framework faces both policy coordination and capacity impediments.
While the disaster management policy and communication strategy recognizes the urgent need to address risks related to extreme weather events, changing sea level, and coastal pressure dynamics, the absence of practical linkages between disaster management, land-use planning, and climate adaptation safeguards has affected preventive response measures against climate impacts.
As a consequence, not enough concrete cross-sectoral steps have been taken at the policy and planning level to collectively prevent or mitigate the existing fallout of the recent urban floods in Zanzibar Town (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2013b; Pardoe, Conway, Namaganda, Vincent, Dougill & Kashaigili, 2018: 865-870; BBC, 2017).
Thompson (2020: 191) argues that the following constitute significant challenges to mainstream climate strategy across the board in Zanzibar: Garth Myers, Jonathan Walz & Aboud Jumbe • Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania 65 (1) insufficient funding levels towards climate adaptation that are heavily dependent on donor support; (2) a presence of little systematic mainstreaming of climate action plans at strategic or programmatic levels across the development sectors; (3) a disconnect that continues to exist between national and local government adaptation priorities, hindering the implementation of climate action plans, and (4) limited climate change knowledge and low-level institutional capacities.
These prevalent challenges underscore the fundamental need for the Government to employ cross-sectoral policy and structural interventions to collectively address land-use planning, climate adaptation, and natural disaster risk reduction measures.
4.10 Linking climate, land use and urban flooding The recent World Bank-financed disaster risk profile for Zanzibar focused on three perils: tropical cyclones, floods, and earthquakes (World Bank, 2016a: 1).
However, there is an evidence-based agreement that flooding is by far the most significant risk in the study, causing nearly 90 of the average loss per year.
A 100-year return period flood event would produce direct losses of US$13 million and require approximately US$2.9 million in emergency costs (World Bank, 2016a: 1).
Unguja (Zanzibar) island has slightly higher absolute flood losses than Pemba island.
Recent episodes have underscored the urgent importance of enhancing the resilience of Zanzibar City against increasing episodes of extreme weather events induced by climate change.
From 15 to 17 April 2005, the flooding episode caused by incessant rains directly affected 10,000 people in the urban areas and resulted in significant loss to the municipal infrastructure.
The 2005 floods along with the 2011 monsoon in Zanzibar were considered rare events (Myers, 2016: 102).
However, recently, the frequency of monsoon flood events in Zanzibar has increased, with a deadly intensity.
In April 2016, the rains that were induced by the remnants of a dissipated regional cyclone Fantala resulted in at least one person dead and many displaced after their houses were flooded following heavy rains.
At least 300 households within the Zanzibar municipality were damaged (Juma, 2016: 1).
Kombo and Faki (2019: 1) later revised the damage assessment of the Fantala episode, stating that the thermodynamic conditions of Fantala influenced heavy rainfall of greater than 170mm over most stations in Zanzibar, rendering 420 people homeless, with at least 3,330 houses destroyed, and 2 fatalities.
In May 2017, the Government had to temporarily close schools, due to the onset of deadly monsoon floods, affecting over 350,000 students throughout the island.
Similarly, the intense monsoon rains of 12-18 April 2018 resulted in 191 households being displaced and 225 houses damaged.
As a result, the majority of flood victims sought refuge with relatives and neighbours, while 19 households did not relocate and continued to haphazardly live in their flooded houses.
These intense monsoon episodes continued through 2019, when Zanzibar airport recorded 328mm of rain in just three days.
5.
DISCUSSION 5.1 Resilience and food security Fundamentally, “resilience” is the persistence of healthy individuals, communities and environments to exogenous shock (Folke, 2006).
The ability to make incremental social and socio-ecological adjustments increases the capacity to absorb shocks, including those linked to climate (Friend & Moench, 2013; Tanner, Lewis, Wrathall, Bronen, Cradock-Henry, Huq, Lawless, Nawrotzki, Prasad, Rahman, Alaniz, King, McNamara, Nadiruzzaman, Henly-Shepard & Thomalla, 2015: 23-25).
Exogenous shock may impact on ecosystem functions and services, public health, and livelihood sustainability, especially in vulnerable and sensitive settings and communities (HernandezDelgado, 2015: 12-15).
Inevitably, there is a complex mix of changes in political, economic and social terms, too vast for inclusion in this article, that would be essential to a more extensive analysis of climate change impacts and other environmental compounding factors now prevalent in Zanzibar and the wider Southeast Africa (Douglass, Walz, Quintana-Morales, Marcus, Myers & Pollini, 2019: 262-271; Pardoe et al., 2018: 869-871).
Even remaining strictly within the climate change policy framework and assessment of implementation, while Zanzibar has had remarkable productivity in the formation of new plans and institutions for urban and environmental management and planning for climate change, the evidence demonstrated by the impacts of climate change specifically on urban flooding suggests that these have not been sufficient.
The net effect is that Zanzibar must be viewed as ill-prepared to confront the climate emergency that is already happening, let alone the greater climate vulnerability crises to come.
The city-scale resilience of Zanzibar City is enmeshed with its outer landscape and the rural communities and resources of Unguja (Myers, 2016: 98; Muhajir, 2020: 75).
Thus, climate change impacts that influence the city’s social, economic, and environmental outcomes have reverberating consequences throughout the island, and vice versa.
It is important, then, to also consider how climate change degrades and damages farmland, forests, coastlines, and the marine ecosystems that directly interface with Zanzibar City and Unguja.
The coastal niches of significance are mangrove forests, seagrass beds, and fringing coral reefs, all critical for ecosystem function and sustainable livelihoods, and as carbon reservoirs.
For instance, coral reefs bleached by increased sea surface temperatures reduce nearshore fish catches (and negatively impact on the livelihoods of fisher people) and 66 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) expose coastlines to destructive wave action.
Fish are an essential food protein in Zanzibar, and they also meet the needs of hotels and restaurants in the city’s tourist sector.
5.2 The role of large-scale and NGO financing in mainstreaming climate adaptation Large-scale donor-funded climate adaptation interventions provide a critical level of impact alleviation approach and a strategic guidance for climate resiliency in both urban and rural settings relevant to Zanzibar.
But these interventions are largely top-down in orientation, and do not sufficiently integrate community participation, experiences and solutions into overall approaches, a typical challenge.
Smaller NGOs in both urban and rural Zanzibar usually have the potential to be closer to the communities and, therefore, more practical in understanding and addressing community-oriented priorities in climate adaptation and sustainable livelihoods.
However, these NGOs’ abilities to receive, digest, adopt, communicate, mainstream, and implement plans do not necessarily mean that their desired interventions are often inculcated in the wider nationally recognized response measures.
Nonetheless, there are some positive developments or examples in this regard, for instance the collaboration between the International Institute for Environment and Development and the Zanzibar Climate Change Alliance to support climate resilient cooperative-led enterprises in the archipelago (IIED, 2018).
The project emphasizes capacitybuilding, including for civil society organizations, and decentralized climate finance projects.
Although two years in duration, its initiatives on deep-water seaweed farming, citrus farming (especially limes), and honey production integrated local needs and experiences with in-country financing that boosted local livelihoods and rural products for markets in Zanzibar City.
5.3 The future of disaster risk, climate and planning for Zanzibar A lack of evidence-based policy guidance on loss and risk information with respect to climate-induced natural hazards will likely affect the data-driven demand for urban spatial planning.
A recent study on loss and risk analysis of public finance shows a complete absence of investments in disaster loss and risk prevention or of taking contingency measures into budgetary and financial consideration (UNISDR, 2015: 32).
Critical infrastructure remains fully exposed and increasingly vulnerable to climate impact.
Without sufficiently protected safeguards against disaster risk or contingency financing mechanisms on critical infrastructure and settlements, the local communities will continue to bear the brunt of the impacts of climate change.
Pilot risk probabilistic assessments using Des Inventar and CAPRA tools have been demonstrated to respond to spatial and descriptive data needs for integrated land-use planning; their long-term sustainability has been put under question, due to lack of national prioritization and budgetary finance commitments (SDG Partnership Platform, 2014).
Another encouraging example is the use of drones for spatial mapping to develop efficient and updated GIS data on land-use planning in Zanzibar.
These interventions show the pace of progress in addressing environmentclimate-land dynamics in Zanzibar, but they fall far short of complete adoption by the relevant sectors and are not mainstreamed into development processes (ZMI, 2016).
5.4 Can the current interventions save the vulnerable tourism economy of Zanzibar?
The implications and consequences of the rapid physical growth of the tourism industry in Zanzibar are contentious areas of interest that require an in-depth analysis in the context of a climate-land interface.
By 2018, Zanzibar had received over 520,000 international tourists, in addition to the growing tourist clientele from mainland Tanzania.
This raised the islands’ prospects of becoming highly competitive with the likes of Seychelles and Mauritius, both of which also face climate change impacts, in regional tourism dynamics (UNECA, 2014: 3).
With the infrastructure to accommodate such a growing demand increasingly overwhelmed, the World Bank’s “Green Corridor” initiative in the middle of the Zanzibar municipality is helping the Government cope with the urban spatial planning dilemma.
It is injecting funds into local urban regeneration initiatives, mobility improvements, reducing congestion, and preserving historical monuments in Stone Town (World Bank, 2018: 3).
The success of this initiative, implemented under the ZUSP project, will depend on how the climate-land interface has been effectively taken into consideration.
There must be an effective establishment of dedicated financing solutions that do not in the long term rely solely on donor support.
Many other environmental impacts from the rapid growth of tourism have thus far gone on without sufficient implementation of mitigation efforts (Myers, 2016: 102; Keshodkar, 2013: 193-206).
6.
CONCLUSION Zanzibar already has a considerable disparity between rural and urban socio-economic conditions that exacerbate climate vulnerabilities.
With population growth increasing and unequal socio-economic activities widening, both climaterelated and anthropogenic drivers of land exploitation and degradation, urbanization, deforestation, poor agricultural production, and water scarcity have been proven to have a direct bearing on the policy implementation context of climate adaptation and socio-economic justice (Kingazi, 2013).
The land tenure system, along with the latest spatial planning strategy, will have to recalculate the socio-economic cost of climate change.
The fact that this is not yet being prioritized in the spatial planning hierarchy risks increasing social inequities Garth Myers, Jonathan Walz & Aboud Jumbe • Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania 67 and exacerbating already tense land disputes between communities and major industries such as tourism.
The World Bank-financed ZUSP initiative to improve access to urban services and conserve physical cultural heritage through a series of development interventions in integrated waste management, surface drainage systems, and rehabilitation of some urban and waterfront infrastructure, has significantly transformed the surface drainage and waterfront façade of the Zanzibar municipality (World Bank, 2016b).
However, there are still some long-term climate-disaster implications that continue to affect the overall sustainability of the existing climate-land planning dynamics in Zanzibar.
Without the practical implementation of the current national spatial development strategy that integrated environment, climate and disaster risk reduction priorities, Zanzibar will continue to bear the brunt of the increasing impacts of climate change.
Direct impacts of climate change such as seasonal displacement of local communities from floodprone urban areas will continue to affect land-use planners in the archipelago.
This will also exacerbate secondary impacts on the effective implementation of policy-oriented conflict resolution mechanism vis-à-vis land disputes (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2009).
Nevertheless, the existing rate of migration of a predominantly tourism-related labour force from the mainland to Zanzibar will continue to induce the haphazard growth of informal settlements in the major and peripheral urban settings of the islands (Muhajir, 2020: 75).
These will, in turn, exert more physical pressure on the coastal zone and accelerate the negative exploitation of the fragile coralline environment that forms the core basis of the tourism attraction index for the country.
There is also the issue of international climate finance flow into the United Republic of Tanzania and how Zanzibar can effectively access and utilize the funds for its local integrated planning priorities in the face of climate-induced GDP losses.
In this context of Tanzania, there is always a risk of structurally separating Zanzibar’s climate finance needs based on its size, and not on its climate vulnerabilities as a small island developing country.
Priorities for a strategic funding versus reactive funding (Watkiss, Dyszynski, Hednriksen, Mathur & Savage, 2013: 2) compel Zanzibar to maximize its climate finance needs via the United Republic of Tanzania, given its only semi-autonomous status as part of the Union.
This is extremely important, as all these policy and planning intervention measures will require sustainable pooling of resources to implement Zanzibar’s development plan.
Currently, these cannot be achieved without the direct involvement of the Government of the United Republic.
In order to effectively address issues of vulnerabilities affecting the socio-economic stability and climate security of the islands’ 1.8 million people, the challenge of misallocation of limited land resources should be addressed by utilizing a dynamic and horizontal urban spatial development strategy approach in decisionmaking.
Participatory involvement of local communities will help augment the desired development results, by enhancing their sense of ownership of land-related development plans.
It is about time that the conventional allocation of land for housing, roads, tourism resorts, and settlements was revised in favour of a more efficient and climate-smart strategy that does not marginalize the economically disadvantaged.
An integrated strategic, social, environmental, and climate assessment of major development infrastructure plans should be made mandatory to all socioeconomic and industrial sectors.
Despite the increase in availability of area-based planning and management tools that have been provided under various external interventions, the current dynamism of a land-use governance approach within the country will eventually affect the strategic direction of any new climate-sensitive development vision.
For a small island developing state such as Zanzibar, land and population will continue to be the single most important driving forces in sustainable development planning.
This will in effect directly enhance the intensity of climate dialogue into the political sensitivities of the Government (e.g., in sustainable development, climate change, disaster risk reduction, and so forth).
Ultimately, the desired level of resilience can only be achieved alongside the need for optimized climate adaptation solutions that include an equitable landtenure system, and community ownership of the solutions.
This article therefore suggests the following key policy recommendations on the basis of the above observations: i.
Challenge: Fragmented approach to the human-climate change interface with insufficient planning and implementation.
ii.
Recommendation: Realization of an overarching integrated development planning authority that combines the environment, climate and sustainability nexus into development, land-use planning, and human settlement paradigms.
Without the reconstituted mandate of a proactive planning commission that is empowered to directly engage in climate-smart biophysical and spatial planning decisions on land use, environment and industrial sectors on the ground, the adaptation efforts may fall far short of the targeted long-term goals of sustainability.
iii.
Challenge: Artificial dichotomy of land and sea and their link to human livelihood threats and resilience.
iv.
Recommendation: Recognition of the urgency of a development vision that is centred around the land-sea interaction and ecological connectivity that has defined the cultural 68 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) settings and the livelihoods of local communities.
It is thus imperative that the policy drivers stress the need to re-integrate policy, planning, institutional, and implementation aspects of their socio-economic priorities around sustainable land-use planning, disaster risk, and climate adaptation interface on the islands.
v. Challenge: Underdeveloped treatment of disaster risk and collaboration for sustainable financing.
vi.
Recommendation: Enhance disaster risk reduction and climate change policy openings that provide Zanzibar with longterm and sustainable financing mechanisms and opportunities based on their existing natural resource base that extends from the land into the marine domain.
This includes widening the ability to access long-term climate finance resources via the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, mainstream nature finance solutions via biodiversity-related financing mechanisms, and preservation of the ocean to sustain the land resources.
vii.
Challenge: Overly specific urban and climate change planning scenario.
viii.
Recommendation: Effective collaboration with other island planning regimes in the western Indian Ocean region such as those in Mauritius and Seychelles may help Zanzibar attain a comparative and transformative planning scenario that is centred around the Climate Change, Disaster Risk and Sustainable Development Goals resilience triangle.
ix.
Challenge: Relatively hierarchical and static research model.
x.
Recommendation: Revamp Zanzibar’s research agenda for the archipelago.
Embrace an evidence-based planning approach that is horizontal, data driven, dynamic, and flexible, which will better address rapid changes in Zanzibar’s socio-environmental sphere.
These key interventions will depend on the level of engagement of local communities, taking into consideration their participatory strength, equity, social and environmental justice towards their land heritage.
REFERENCES ADDANEY, M. 2019.
Adaptation governance and building resilience in the face of climate change in African cities: Policy responses and emerging practices from Accra.
In: Cobbinah, P.B.
& Addaney, M. (Eds).
The geography of climate change adaptation in urban Africa.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.
479-498. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-04873-0_17 ADDANEY, M. & COBBINAH, P.B.
2019.
Climate change, urban planning and sustainable development in Africa: The difference worth appreciating.
In: Cobbinah, P.B.
& Addaney, M. (Eds).
The geography of climate change adaptation in urban Africa.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.
3-26. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04873-0_1 ALJAZEERANEWS.
2019.
Roads closed as flooding hits Dar es Salaam; warnings issued as more thunderstorms threaten coastal Tanzania.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2019/05/roads-closed-floodinghits-dar-es-salam-190507083430691.
html> [Accessed: 21 July 2020].
BADUI, A.A. 2020.
Map produced for this article by Ali A. Badui, Zanzibar Environmental Management Authority, 23 November 2020.
BBC (BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION).
2017.
Zanzibar floods close schools.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-39881954> [Accessed: 21 July 2020].
CELLIERS, L. & NTOMBELA, C. 2015.
Urbanization, coastal development and vulnerability, and catchments.
In: Paula, J.
(Ed.).
The regional state of the coast report.
Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP & WIOMSA, pp.
337-394. https://doi.
org/10.18356/cd2f1dd6-en DOUGLASS, K., WALZ, J., QUINTANA-MORALES, E., MARCUS, R., MYERS, G. & POLLINI, J.
2019.
Historical perspectives on humanenvironment dynamics in Southeast Africa.
Conservation Biology, 33(2), pp.
260-274. https://doi.org/10.1111/ cobi.13244 DOURP (DEPARTMENT OF URBAN AND RURAL PLANNING), ZANZIBAR.
2015.
ZanPlan 2015: Master plan for Zanzibar urban area.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, pp.1-43.
DOURP (DEPARTMENT OF URBAN AND RURAL PLANNING), ZANZIBAR.
2016.
Ng’ambo local area plan.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and African Architecture Matters, pp.
265-371.
DU TOIT, M., CILLIERS, S., DALLIMER, M., GODDARD, M., GUENAT, S. & CORNELIUS, M. 2018.
Urban green infrastructure and ecosystem services in sub-Saharan Africa.
Landscape and Urban Planning, vol.
180, pp.
328-338. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2018.08.016 ERNSTSON, H., & SWYNGEDOUW, E. 2019.
Politicizing the environment in the urban century.
In: Ernstson, H. & Swyngedouw, E. (Eds).
Urban political ecology in the Anthropo-obscene: Interruptions and possibilities.
New York: Routledge, pp.
3-21. https://doi.
org/10.4324/9781315210537-1 FOLKE, C. 2006.
Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for socio-ecological systems analyses.
Global Environmental Change, 16(3), pp.
253-267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2006.04.002 FRIEND, R. & MOENCH, M. 2013.
What is the purpose of urban climate resilience?
Implications for addressing poverty and vulnerability.
Urban Climate, vol.
6, pp.
98-113. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.uclim.2013.09.002 GÖSSLING, S. 2002.
Humanenvironmental relations with tourism.
Annals of Tourism Research, 29(4), pp.
539-556. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0160-7383(01)00069-X HERNANDEZ-DELGADO, E.A.
2015.
The emerging threats of climate change on tropical coastal ecosystem services, public health, local economies and livelihood sustainability of small islands: Cumulative impacts and synergies.
Marine Pollution Bulletin, 101(1), pp.
5-28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpolbul.2015.09.018 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04873-0_17 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04873-0_17 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04873-0_1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04873-0_1 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/roads-closed-flooding-hits-dar-es-salam-190507083430691.html https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/roads-closed-flooding-hits-dar-es-salam-190507083430691.html https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/roads-closed-flooding-hits-dar-es-salam-190507083430691.html https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/roads-closed-flooding-hits-dar-es-salam-190507083430691.html https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39881954 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39881954 https://doi.org/10.18356/cd2f1dd6-en https://doi.org/10.18356/cd2f1dd6-en https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13244 https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.13244 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2018.08.016 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2018.08.016 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210537-1 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210537-1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.04.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.04.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.uclim.2013.09.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.uclim.2013.09.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-7383%2801%2900069-X https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-7383%2801%2900069-X https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2015.09.018 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2015.09.018 Garth Myers, Jonathan Walz & Aboud Jumbe • Trends in urban planning, climate adaptation and resilience in Zanzibar, Tanzania 69 IIED (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT).
2018.
Decentralised climate finance in Tanzania, Final Report, 30-04-2018.
Dar es Salaam: IIED, pp.
1-67.
JUMA, B.
2016.
Tanzania – 3 dead, 100s displaced after floods in Mbeya, Zanzibar and Kilimanjaro regions.
[Online].
Available at: <http://floodlist.
com/africa/tanzania-floods-mbeyazanzibar-kilimanjaro> [Accessed: 24 July 2020].
KEBEDE, A.
& NICHOLLS, R. 2011.
Exposure and vulnerability to climate extremes: Population and asset exposure to coastal flooding in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania): Vulnerability to climate extremes.
Regional Environmental Change, 12(1), pp.
81-94. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10113-011-0239-4 KESHODKAR, A.
2013.
Tourism and social change in post-socialist Zanzibar: Struggles for identity, movement, and civilization.
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
KILLIAN, B.
2008.
The state and identity politics in Zanzibar: Challenges to democratic consolidation in Tanzania.
African Identities, 6(2), pp.
99-125. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14725840801933932 KINGAZI, S.P.
2013.
Zanzibar woody biomass survey: Prepared for REDD+ readiness phase – socio-economic survey component.
Dar es Salaam: Indufor Forest Intelligence & Norwegian Embassy, pp.
1-61.
KOMBO, H.K.
& FAKI, M.M.
2019.
Assessment of the impacts of tropical cyclone Fantala to the Tanzanian coastline: The case of Zanzibar.
Paper presented to the 2019 Symposium of the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association, Zanzibar.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// symposium.wiomsa.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/06/7-548-Kai-Kombo.
pdf> [Accessed: 24 July 2020].
LARSEN, K. 2005.
Where humans and spirits meet: The politics of rituals and identified spirits in Zanzibar.
New York: Berghahn Books.
MOLLER, L. 2010.
Adaptation to climate change – preparation of an adaptation programme of action for Zanzibar.
Zanzibar: Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE-II) Project, pp.
13-40.
MUHAJIR, M. 2020.
Diagnostic report for the national urban policy, Zanzibar.
Zanzibar: United Nations Habitat and Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.
MYERS, G. 1993.
Reconstructing Ng’ambo: Town planning and development on the other side of Zanzibar.
Unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, United States of America.
MYERS, G. 2002.
Local communities and the new environmental planning: A case study from Zanzibar.
Area, 34(2), pp.
149-159. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1475-4762.00067 MYERS, G. 2016.
Urban environments in Africa: A critical analysis of environmental politics.
Bristol, United Kingdom: Policy Press.
https://doi.org/10.1332/ policypress/9781447322917.001.0001 MYERS, G. 2020.
Rethinking urbanism: Lessons from postcolonialism and the global south.
Bristol, United Kingdom: Bristol University Press.
https://doi.
org/10.2307/j.ctv12fw6wq PARDOE, J., CONWAY, D., NAMAGANDA, E., VINCENT, K., DOUGILL, A.
& KASHAIGILI, J.
2018.
Climate change and the water-energyfood nexus: Insights from policy and practice in Tanzania.
Climate Policy, 18(7), pp.
863-877. https://doi.org/10.10 80/14693062.2017.1386082 PAULA, J.
(Ed.).
2016.
Regional state of the coast report – Western Indian Ocean: A summary for policy makers.
Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, pp.
91-93.
RELIEFWEB.
2018.
Tanzania Floods.
[Online].
Available at: <https://reliefweb.
int/disaster/fl-2018-000043-tza> [Accessed: 24 July 2020].
SDG PARTNERSHIP PLATFORM.
2014.
Disaster risk management in the islands of the Indian Ocean.
Port Louis: Indian Ocean Commission.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ partnership/?p=7675> [Accessed: 7 July 2020].
SILVER, J.
2019.
Suffocating cities: Climate change as socio-ecological violence.
In: Ernstson, H. & Swyngedouw, E. (Eds).
Urban political ecology in the Anthropo-obscene: Interruptions and possibilities.
New York: Routledge, pp.
129-147. https:// doi.org/10.4324/9781315210537-7 SIMON, D. & LECK, H. 2014.
Urban dynamics and the challenges of global environmental change in the south.
In: Parnell, S. & Oldfield, S. (Eds).
The Routledge handbook on cities of the global south.
London: Routledge, pp.
613-628.
TANNER, T., LEWIS, D., WRATHALL, D., BRONEN, R., CRADOCKHENRY, N., HUQ, S., LAWLESS, C., NAWROTZKI, R., PRASAD, V., RAHMAN, A., ALANIZ, R., KING, K., MCNAMARA, K., NADIRUZZAMAN, M., HENLY-SHEPARD, S. & THOMALLA, F. 2015.
Livelihood resilience in the face of climate change.
Nature Climate Change, vol.
1, pp.
23-26. https://doi.org/10.1038/ nclimate2431 THE HAGUE INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE.
2017.
Governance of climate change adaptation in Zanzibar – final report.
The Hague, The Netherlands: The Hague Institute for Global Justice, May 2017, pp.
33-49.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.
org/information-for-policy-makers/ policy-brief/local-climate-action-plansmjini-kiuyu-mkokotoni-and-nungwi/> [Accessed: 17 July 2020].
THOMPSON, D.D.P.
2020.
Disaster risk governance in Zanzibar.
In: Thompson, D.D.P.
Disaster risk governance – four cases from developing countries.
London: Routledge, pp.
191-212. https://doi.
org/10.4324/9781315401171-9 UNECA (UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA).
2014.
Climate change in the African small island developing states: From vulnerability to resilience.
Addis Ababa: UNECA, pp.
3-12.
UNEP (UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM) & GEF (GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY).
2015.
Developing core capacity to address adaptation to climate change in productive coastal zones of Tanzania: Project general information report, fiscal year 2015.
Dodoma, Tanzania: Vice President’s Office, United Republic of Tanzania, pp.
2-31.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/ PIRs/2017/UNEP%20FY17%20 APMR%20Part%20II%20PIR%20 Reports/Climate%20Change%20 Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_ UNEP_Tanzania.doc> [Accessed: 17 July 2020].
http://floodlist.com/africa/tanzania-floods-mbeya-zanzibar-kilimanjaro http://floodlist.com/africa/tanzania-floods-mbeya-zanzibar-kilimanjaro http://floodlist.com/africa/tanzania-floods-mbeya-zanzibar-kilimanjaro https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-011-0239-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-011-0239-4 https://doi.org/10.1080/14725840801933932 https://doi.org/10.1080/14725840801933932 https://symposium.wiomsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/7-548-Kai-Kombo.pdf https://symposium.wiomsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/7-548-Kai-Kombo.pdf https://symposium.wiomsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/7-548-Kai-Kombo.pdf https://symposium.wiomsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/7-548-Kai-Kombo.pdf https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4762.00067 https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4762.00067 https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447322917.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447322917.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv12fw6wq https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv12fw6wq https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1386082 https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1386082 https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2018-000043-tza https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2018-000043-tza https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=7675 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=7675 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=7675 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210537-7 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210537-7 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2431 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2431 https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/information-for-policy-makers/policy-brief/local-climate-action-plans-mjini-kiuyu-mkokotoni-and-nungwi/ https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/information-for-policy-makers/policy-brief/local-climate-action-plans-mjini-kiuyu-mkokotoni-and-nungwi/ https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/information-for-policy-makers/policy-brief/local-climate-action-plans-mjini-kiuyu-mkokotoni-and-nungwi/ https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/information-for-policy-makers/policy-brief/local-climate-action-plans-mjini-kiuyu-mkokotoni-and-nungwi/ https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/information-for-policy-makers/policy-brief/local-climate-action-plans-mjini-kiuyu-mkokotoni-and-nungwi/ https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315401171-9 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315401171-9 https://projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/PIRs/2017/UNEP%2520FY17%2520APMR%2520Part%2520II%2520PIR%2520Reports/Climate%2520Change%2520Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_UNEP_Tanzania.doc https://projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/PIRs/2017/UNEP%2520FY17%2520APMR%2520Part%2520II%2520PIR%2520Reports/Climate%2520Change%2520Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_UNEP_Tanzania.doc https://projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/PIRs/2017/UNEP%2520FY17%2520APMR%2520Part%2520II%2520PIR%2520Reports/Climate%2520Change%2520Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_UNEP_Tanzania.doc https://projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/PIRs/2017/UNEP%2520FY17%2520APMR%2520Part%2520II%2520PIR%2520Reports/Climate%2520Change%2520Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_UNEP_Tanzania.doc https://projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/PIRs/2017/UNEP%2520FY17%2520APMR%2520Part%2520II%2520PIR%2520Reports/Climate%2520Change%2520Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_UNEP_Tanzania.doc https://projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/PIRs/2017/UNEP%2520FY17%2520APMR%2520Part%2520II%2520PIR%2520Reports/Climate%2520Change%2520Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_UNEP_Tanzania.doc https://projects.unep.org/docs/gef/documents/PIRs/2017/UNEP%2520FY17%2520APMR%2520Part%2520II%2520PIR%2520Reports/Climate%2520Change%2520Adaptation-FY17/4141_2017_PIR_UNEP_Tanzania.doc 70 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) UN-HABITAT.
2014.
State of African cities 2014: Re-imagining sustainable urban transitions.
Nairobi, Kenya: UN-Habitat.
UNISDR (UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION).
2015.
Working papers on public investment planning and financing strategy for disaster risk reduction: Review of Zanzibar.
Geneva: UNISDR (now UNDRR), pp.
32-69.
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA.
2016.
Intended nationally determined contributions (INDC), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), pp.
1-8.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www4.unfccc.int/ sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/ The%20United%20Republic%20 of%20Tanzania%20First%20NDC/ The%20United%20Republic%20 of%20Tanzania%20First%20NDC.pdf> [Accessed: 15 July 2020].
VUAI, S.H.
2014.
Zanzibar planning and financing systems for climate change initiatives.
IIED Briefing.
London: IIED.
https://pubs.iied.
org/17225IIED/, pp.
1-4.
WATKISS, P., DYSZYNSKI, J., HENDRIKSEN, G., MATHUR, V. & SAVAGE, M. 2013.
Options for climate finance mechanism: Climate fund in Tanzania – Global climate adaptation partnership.
London: United Kingdom Department for International Development (UK DFID) Climate, Environment, Infrastructure and Livelihoods Professional Evidence and Applied Knowledge Services (CEIL PEAKS) Programme, pp.
2-86.
WATKISS, P., PYE, S., HENDRIKSEN, G., MACLEAN, A., BONJEAN, M., JIDDAWI, N., SHAGHUDE, Y., SHEIKH, M.A.
& KHAMIS, Z.
2012.
Economics impacts of climate change in Zanzibar.
London: Global Climate Partnership, UKAID, pp.
1-36 [Online].
Available at: <http://www.economicsof-cc-in-zanzibar.org/images/ Final_Summary_vs_3.pdf.> [Accessed: 21 July 2020].
WORLD BANK.
2016a.
Disaster risk profile – Zanzibar.
Washington, DC: World Bank Southwest Indian Ocean Risk and Finance Initiative, pp.
1-16.
[Online].
Available at: <https://reliefweb.
int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ zanzibar.pdf> [Accessed: 18 July 2020].
WORLD BANK.
2016b.
Tanzania – Zanzibar Urban Services Project: Additional financing and restructuring.
Washington, DC: World Bank, pp.
1-21 [Online].
Available at: <http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/711101468194964127/TanzaniaZanzibar-Urban-Services-Projectadditional-financing-and-restructuring> [Accessed: 18 July 2020].
WORLD BANK.
2017.
Southwest Indian Ocean Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative: Summary Report and Risk Profiles.
Washington, DC: World Bank, pp.
1-24.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.gfdrr.org/ en/publication/southwest-indianocean-risk-assessment-and-financinginitiative-summary-report-and-risk> [Accessed: 18 July 2020].
WORLD BANK.
2018.
Boosting inclusive growth for Zanzibar: Integrated development project (P165128) project information document, integrated safeguards datasheet, concept stage.
Report No.
PIDISDSC23660.
Prepared 4th April 2018.
Washington, DC: World Bank, pp.
3-14.
[Online].
Available at: <http:// documents1.
worldbank.org/curated/ en/170331525794513472/pdf/ Concept-Project-InformationDocument-Integrated-SafeguardsData-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growthfor-Zanzibar-Integrated-DevelopmentProject-P165128.pdf > [Accessed: 17 July 2020].
YANDA, P., BRYCESON, I., MWEVURA, H. & MUNG’ONG’O, C. (Eds).
2019.
Climate change and coastal resources in Tanzania: Studies on socio-ecological systems’ vulnerability, resilience and governance.
New York: Springer.
https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-04897-6 ZANZIBAR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT.
2019.
Unpublished report on the environmental impacts of climate change in Zanzibar.
Zanzibar: Department of Environment.
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2000.
Vision 2020.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, pp.
1-44.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.
sheriasmz.go.tz/docs/dvv9M8AK3f_ ZANZIBAR_VISION_2020.pdf> [Accessed: 15 July 2020].
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2009.
The status of Zanzibar coastal resources: Towards the development of integrated coastal management strategies and action plan.
Zanzibar: Department of Environment, with the support of the World Bank Marine and Coastal Environment Project, pp.
61-80.
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2012.
The economics of climate change in Zanzibar.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, pp.
1-36.
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2013a.
Zanzibar climate change strategy.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, pp.
2-12.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.paulwatkiss.co.uk/ newimagesanddocs/Zanzibar%20 SummaryLR%20draft%20final.pdf> [Accessed: 21 July 2020].
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2013b.
National operational guidelines for the Zanzibar disaster management policy.
Zanzibar: Disaster Management Commission.
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2014.
National spatial development strategy.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, pp.
2-88.
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2015.
Gender analysis for climate adaptation and low carbon development.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2016.
Zanzibar climate change action plan, 2016-2021.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, pp.
2-46.
ZANZIBAR, REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF.
2017.
Land policy.
Zanzibar: Commission of Lands, pp.
2-69.
ZMI (ZANZIBAR MAPPING INITIATIVE).
2016.
Zanzibar: Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.
zmi-geonode.org/> [Accessed: 19 July 2020].
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC.pdf https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC.pdf https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC.pdf https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC.pdf https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC.pdf https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC/The%2520United%2520Republic%2520of%2520Tanzania%2520First%2520NDC.pdf https://pubs.iied.org/17225IIED https://pubs.iied.org/17225IIED http://www.economics-of-cc-in-zanzibar.org/images/Final_Summary_vs_3.pdf http://www.economics-of-cc-in-zanzibar.org/images/Final_Summary_vs_3.pdf http://www.economics-of-cc-in-zanzibar.org/images/Final_Summary_vs_3.pdf https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/zanzibar.pdf https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/zanzibar.pdf https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/zanzibar.pdf http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711101468194964127/Tanzania-Zanzibar-Urban-Services-Project-additional-financing-and-restructuring http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711101468194964127/Tanzania-Zanzibar-Urban-Services-Project-additional-financing-and-restructuring http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711101468194964127/Tanzania-Zanzibar-Urban-Services-Project-additional-financing-and-restructuring http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711101468194964127/Tanzania-Zanzibar-Urban-Services-Project-additional-financing-and-restructuring http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711101468194964127/Tanzania-Zanzibar-Urban-Services-Project-additional-financing-and-restructuring https://www.gfdrr.org/en/publication/southwest-indian-ocean-risk-assessment-and-financing-initiative-summary-report-and-risk https://www.gfdrr.org/en/publication/southwest-indian-ocean-risk-assessment-and-financing-initiative-summary-report-and-risk https://www.gfdrr.org/en/publication/southwest-indian-ocean-risk-assessment-and-financing-initiative-summary-report-and-risk https://www.gfdrr.org/en/publication/southwest-indian-ocean-risk-assessment-and-financing-initiative-summary-report-and-risk worldbank.org/curated/en/170331525794513472/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growth-for-Zanzibar-Integrated-Development-Project-P165128.pdf worldbank.org/curated/en/170331525794513472/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growth-for-Zanzibar-Integrated-Development-Project-P165128.pdf worldbank.org/curated/en/170331525794513472/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growth-for-Zanzibar-Integrated-Development-Project-P165128.pdf worldbank.org/curated/en/170331525794513472/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growth-for-Zanzibar-Integrated-Development-Project-P165128.pdf worldbank.org/curated/en/170331525794513472/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growth-for-Zanzibar-Integrated-Development-Project-P165128.pdf worldbank.org/curated/en/170331525794513472/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growth-for-Zanzibar-Integrated-Development-Project-P165128.pdf worldbank.org/curated/en/170331525794513472/pdf/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Boosting-Inclusive-Growth-for-Zanzibar-Integrated-Development-Project-P165128.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04897-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04897-6 sheriasmz.go.tz/docs/dvv9M8AK3f_ZANZIBAR_VISION_2020.pdf sheriasmz.go.tz/docs/dvv9M8AK3f_ZANZIBAR_VISION_2020.pdf http://www.paulwatkiss.co.uk/newimagesanddocs/Zanzibar%2520SummaryLR%2520draft%2520final.pdf http://www.paulwatkiss.co.uk/newimagesanddocs/Zanzibar%2520SummaryLR%2520draft%2520final.pdf http://www.paulwatkiss.co.uk/newimagesanddocs/Zanzibar%2520SummaryLR%2520draft%2520final.pdf http://www.zmi-geonode.org http://www.zmi-geonode.org
Microsoft Word GJPHM-2020Climate change.docx 203 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo Review Research CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIONS: CRITICAL FACTORS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS Narinderjeet Kaur1, Syed Sharizman Syed Abdul Rahim1*, Zahir Izuan Azhar2, Mohd Yusof Ibrahim1, Mohammad Saffree Jeffree1, Mohd Rohaizat Hassan3, Rozita Hod3 and Azizan Omar1,4 1 Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 88400 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia 2 Department of Public Health Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), 47000, Sungai Buloh, Selangor, Malaysia 3 Department of Community Health, Faculty of Medicine, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 56000, Bandar Tun Razak, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 4 Rural Medical Education Center, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, 89050 Kudat, Sabah, Malaysia Corresponding author: syedsharizman@gmail.com ABSTRACT Climate change has been deemed the biggest global health threat of the 21st century.
Multiple factors contribute to this global phenomenon including anthropogenic causes.
This review is to explore causes of climate change and recognise the impacts on population health as well as to look at strategies to mitigate climate change.
This narrative review included articles searched through databases of SCOPUS, PubMed and PROQUEST from the year 2006 to 2018.
Climate change is mainly due to man-made activities such as fossil fuels combustion, livestock farming and deforestation.
The public health effects include increased vector-borne diseases, heat-related illnesses and respiratory illnesses.
Strategies such as strengthening the adaptations to climate-related hazards, climate change integration into national policies, education, awareness-raising, impact reduction and early warnings have been put in place to tackle this crisis.
The climate change agenda has been given an important platform as it is the 13th goal of the 17 United Nations Sustainable developmental goals (SDG).
In conclusion, climate change has been going on for decades and is threatening the earth.
Multi sectoral collaboration and working together towards a common goal is crucial as the wellbeing of our planet is our collective responsibility.
Keywords: Climate Change, Global Warming, Health Impact, SDG 204 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo Introduction: Climate change by definition is the change in the statistical distribution of weather patterns that occurs over an extended period of time regardless of the cause (Schütte et al., 2017).
Another term widely used is global warming which refers to the increase in the surface temperature of the earth and appears to be synonymous with the term anthropogenic climate change (manmade causes).
Broadly, climate change includes global warming as well as every other reason for the change in weather patterns.
It is therefore now widely used as a technical description of the process as well as a noun to describe the process.
This change in climate has been something in the making for decades.
The earth’s surface temperature has warmed by 0.85°C in the past 130 years.
And since the year 1850, each decade appears to be warmer than the previous decade (Smith, 2012).
The 2°C increase is very crucial, because if earth’s temperature rises beyond 2 degrees then there is a risk of irreversible changes to the climate and the ecosystem (Schütte et al., 2017).
What is further worrying is that it has been recently projected that there will be an increase in temperature by 3.2°C by the year 2100 (Rogelj et al., 2016).
Climate change effects include oceans getting warmer and sea levels rising.
The Arctic ice has been shrinking 1.07 km square every decade due to the increased temperatures at the poles (Hák, Janoušková, & Moldan, 2016).
Sea levels have risen by 19 cm in a mere hundred years and it is predicted that by the year 2065, sea levels will rise by 24-30cm and 40-63cm by 2100.
Extreme weather patterns such as flash floods and typhoons, increasing number of infectious diseases and crop yield reductions are just some of the effects of climate change.
These events will eventually cause social, demographic, economic and health disruption to the population (McMichael, Woodruff, & Hales, 2006).
By knowing the devastating repercussions of climate change, more policies need to be developed to ensure that there are adequate adaptation and mitigation strategies.
The aim of this review is to understand the causes of climate change, especially on anthropogenic causes and to understand the impact of this phenomenon in contributing to individual and population health.
This review looked into articles from 2006 to 2018.
The focus of the review was on the causes, health effects and the strategies to mitigate climate change.
The strategies reviewed were compared to the goals set under the 13th United Nations Sustainable Developmental Goal (SDG).
Methods: This is a narrative review that focuses on causes, health effects and mitigation strategies for climate change This review included articles searched through databases of SCOPUS, PubMed and PROQUEST.
This review looked into articles in these databases from the year 2006 to 2018.
Keywords used were “climate change” AND “health effects” AND “mitigation”.
The strategies reviewed were compared to the goals set under the 13th United Nations Sustainable Developmental Goal (SDG).
The Causes of Climate Change The causes of climate change can be explained via the forcing mechanisms which are divided into internal and external mechanisms.
Internal mechanisms are the natural processes that occur within the climate system itself.
For example, the thermohaline circulation which is 205 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo part of the oceans circulation which is caused by density differences.
It is commonly known as the Global Ocean Conveyor or Great Ocean Conveyor Belt.
This process drives warmer surface waters originating from the equator regions towards the north and south poles (Yehudai et al., 2016).
External mechanisms can be divided into natural and anthropogenic causes (man-made).
Natural causes are events such as volcano eruptions, changes in solar output, and the earth’s orbit.
Natural causes are rather difficult to predict and almost completely beyond our control.
It has been anonymously concluded that human activities are the primary cause of climate change (McMichael et al., 2006) as it leads to an increased emission of greenhouse gasses.
The main contributions to the rising greenhouse gas levels are burning of fossil fuel, livestock farming, industrial activity and deforestation.
This phenomenon is called the greenhouse effect.
Greenhouse gasses are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) and nitrous oxide (Schütte et al., 2017).
Climate Change Impact on Public Health A study conducted in 2017 concluded that by 2050, there would be a 257% increase in climate change related deaths (Schütte et al., 2017).
Health impacts can be better understood based on events that occur due to climate change.
The first is the disruption in the ecosystem.
Vector-borne diseases are very influenced by climatic conditions (CampbellLendrum, Manga, Bagayoko, & Sommerfeld, 2015).
Currently, vector-borne diseases are contributing significantly towards the global burden of disease.
A change in climate will increase the transmission season of mosquitoes.
Previously, vectors were only active during the hot seasons, but with increasing temperatures, the hot seasons will be prolonged, allowing the mosquitoes to be active for a longer period.
Taking malaria as an example, due to the altered environment, which favours the agent by having more vectors (due to the increased range and period of transmission), the hosts become more susceptible.
By the end of this century, 60% of the world’s population will be living in a malaria potential zone (Andrew K, et al.
2000, Campbell-Lendrum et al.
2015, D.J Rogers & S.E Randolph 2006, Badrul Hisham A.S et al 2012).
Other effects of climate change include extreme weather events which range from heat waves to typhoons.
These events are triggered and heightened by climate change (McGuire, 2012).
These events can either affect health directly or indirectly.
Extreme high temperatures directly cause respiratory and cardiovascular diseases particularly among the elderly (Levi & Baldasseroni, 2017).
This was evident when the heatwave in Europe during the summer of 2003 claimed over 70 000 deaths (Robine et al., 2008).
Higher temperatures have been known to cause a rise in the ozone gas which gives rise to respiratory and cardiovascular symptoms.
Elevated temperatures are usually accompanied by weak winds, causing air to stagnate, giving time for the air to rise in temperature and absorb more ozone.
(Zandalinas, Mittler, Balfagón, Arbona, & Gómez-Cadenas, 2018).
This also gives rise to increased circulation of allergens and pollens which gives rise to more allergies and bronchial asthma cases.
Bronchial asthma already affects 300 million people annually.
The 206 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo indirect health effect of these extreme temperatures can be seen from a decrease in the yields of crops of staple foods.
High temperatures year-long will make the soil dry, and even with irrigation, it won’t be able to sustain the moisture needed for crops like rice, wheat and corn to grow (Caruso, Petrarca, & Ricciuti, 2016).
This will further increase the number of deaths caused by malnutrition which is already at 3.1 million annually.
This issue is bound to be most evident in the poorest regions of the world where agriculture is the main economy of the country.
Changing precipitation is also an effect of climate change which leads to more rainfall than normal.
This increased rainfall leads to floods that are considered as an extreme weather event (McGuire, 2012).
For example, in Malaysia, the damages due to flooding cost of around 915 million ringgit (Akasah & Doraisamy, 2015).
Floods cause people to evacuate to temporary makeshift shelters that may not have facilities such as safe water.
This can lead to water-borne disease such cholera and typhoid.
It also causes an increase in vector-borne diseases like dengue as increase in stagnant water is perfect for mosquito breeding.
Besides that, other infectious diseases such as leptospirosis has shown to increase 2–3 weeks after heavy rainfall and flooding.
Aside from directly causing infectious diseases, flooding also causes physical injury and drowning.
Massive damage to properties and infrastructures such as roads and houses can occur.
It is estimated that over 1 million ringgit is needed annually to restore and repair the roads that have been damaged by floods in one district (Ismail & Ghani, 2017).
This damage also includes housing, schools and medical facilities which impacts millions of people.
Strategies to Mitigate Climate Change Countries are targeting for cleaner and more resilient economies.
People are converting to renewable energy and various strategies were introduced to reduce emissions and increase adaptation efforts.
However, the required actions need to be coordinated at the international level, in order to facilitate developing countries to move towards low carbon economy.
To increase the global response to climate change threat, the Paris Agreement were adopted by many countries, at the COP21 in Paris.
This agreement went into force in 2016.
This Paris Agreement states that all countries will work to limit global temperature rise to well below 20oC (Paris Agreement COP 21 2016).
Another strategy is to reduce energy usage.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) stated that by improving energy efficiency in buildings, industrial processes and transportation could reduce the world's energy needs in 2050 by one third.
This will help reduce the global emissions of greenhouse gases for example carbon dioxide.
In addition to reduction of energy usage, another strategy is to improve on the efficiency of energy.
This include building insulation, energy saving electrical equipments and gadgets, as well as energy efficient public transport system (IEA Report 2019).
The framework for the climate change policies have been made and policies have been implemented.
However, there still lies many challenges regarding climate change policies.
In regard to policy formation and construction, 207 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo a strong policy direction is needed to ensure that the goals towards reduced carbon emissions is achieved (Schütte et al., 2017).
The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) 5th Assessment Report 2014 states that given the current greenhouse emissions especially Carbon dioxide, it is likely by the end of this century, the global mean temperature will continue to rise well above the pre-industrial level (IPCC 2014).
In October 2018, the IPCC issued a special report on the impacts of the global warming of 1.50 Celcius (IPCC 2018; Climate Summit 2019).
Sustainable Developmental Goal No 13 focuses on Climate Action.
Climate Change is now affecting most countries of the world.
The detrimental impacts are on the national economies, communities especially the vulnerable groups.
There are increasing reports on changing weather patterns, sea level rise, extreme weather events becoming more frequent and the greenhouse gases emissions are at the highest level since history.
Without serious and concerted actions, the global ambient surface temperature is projected to surpass the 30C by the end of this century.
If this happens, the most serious impacts will be upon the vulnerable groups such as the poor communities and the elderly (IPCC Climate Report 2018).
Challenge faced is the lack of expertise regarding climate change.
There are not many noted environmentalist and experts on climate change, especially among the developing nations.
This can be attributed to the fact that there is always lack of funding and research for climate change in developing countries (McSweeney, New, Lizcano, & Lu, 2010) .
Ironically, due the dependence to natural resources, developing countries should have the most expertise.
This leads them to rely on experts from other nations, which may delay the initiation of efforts in their own country.
Another limitation is following the public understanding and awareness towards climate change.
There has not been much awareness and emphasis regarding climate change (Tiew et al., 2019).
This mindset of the public needs to change.
People must understand that overconsumption and wastage of electricity leads to more power demands and this means more fossil fuel burning.
Another common misconception among the public is regarding the reduced use of plastic bags.
Plastic bags are detrimental, as they are mostly single use, nonbiodegradable and is commonly discarded into land fields, seas and ocean (Wagner, 2017).
This causes harm to the flora and fauna especially in the oceans.
The manufacturing process of plastics also leads to many greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants as plastic is made from petroleum based products (Othman, Adam, Najafi, & Mamat, 2017).
There have been campaigns to ban the use of single use plastic bags and it is a great long-term strategy.
However, the bigger concern currently is actually regarding the proper disposal of plastics.
Banning its use will not prevent ignorant people from throwing it into the seas and oceans.
Therefore, current public awareness regarding plastics should be more focused on the proper disposal and not just to limit its use.
208 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo Another challenge regarding climate change policies are the issues of inequity in socioeconomic development.
Installing solar panels, for instance, is a way of using sustainable energy.
However, it is costly to install solar panels in houses (Kardooni, Yusoff, Kari, & Moeenizadeh, 2018) .
A household earning minimum wage may not be able to afford such methods.
Another issue is regarding the industries such as logging.
The logging industry provides an income for many and especially in the rural areas (Kaur, 2016).
By shutting down the logging industries, these people will end up losing their livelihoods.
The renewable energy industry has not reached the level where it can compensate and provide jobs to those who have lost jobs from logging in these affected countries.
This matter, therefore, needs to be handled delicately and small steps need to be taken one at a time to ensure that the low and middle-income people do not suffer in the process.
The number of countries pledging towards the climate change agenda is still not satisfactory.
Many nations still believe that climate change is not a big issue and that the repercussions are exaggerated (Zhang, Dai, Lai, & Wang, 2017) .
In actuality, the health effects are detrimental.
If actions are not taken early, these effects may become irreversible.
All nations must be clear that if health is not prioritized, the economy and the whole nation will be affected.
Conclusion: From this review report, we can conclude that climate change is catastrophic, it has begun and will only get worse in years to come.
Unfortunately, the main cause of climate change is us, humans.
Cooperation between all the stakeholders is crucial in combating climate change.
Some success has been achieved but there is still a long road ahead.
Earth is our home and as inhabitants, we must take full responsibility and face this problem collectively to ensure that we do not cause further harm to our planet.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declare no conflicts of interest.
209 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo References: • Akasah, Z.
A., & Doraisamy, S. V. (2015).
2014 Malaysia flood: impacts and factors contributing towards the restoration of damages.
J Sci Res Dev, 2, 53-59.
• Andrew K. Githeko, Steve W. Lindsay, Ulisses E. Confalonieri & Jonathan A.Patz.
2000.
Climate Change and Vector borne diseases: a regional analysis.Bulletin of WHO.
78(9): 1136-1147.
• Assesment Report 5 Synthesis Report: Climate Change 2014.
(http:// ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr) (assessed on 16 April 2020).
• Badrul Hisham Abd Samad, Er Ah Choy, Hidayatulfathi Othman, Lokman Hakim Sulaiman, Mazrura Sahani, Mohd Hanif Zailani, Nik Muhammad Nizam Nik Hassan, Nurul Ashikin Zainon, C.P Ramachandran, Rozita Hod, Zainudin Mohd Ali.
2012.
ASM Series on Climate Change.
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
• Campbell-Lendrum, D., Manga, L., Bagayoko, M., & Sommerfeld, J.
(2015).
Climate change and vector-borne diseases: what are the implications for public health research and policy?
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 370(1665).
doi:10.1098/rstb.2013.0552 • Caruso, R., Petrarca, I., & Ricciuti, R. (2016).
Climate change, rice crops, and violence: Evidence from Indonesia.
Journal of Peace Research, 53(1), 66-83.
• Climate Summit 2019.
World Meteorological Organization.
Statement of the state of the global climate in 2019.
(htpp://un.org/eng/climate change) (assessed on 16 April 2020).
• D.J Rogers & S.E Randolph.
2006.
Climate Change and Vector Borne diseases.
Advances in Parasitology Vol 62.Elservier Ltd. United Kingdom.
• Global Energy and CO2 Status Report.
2019.Climate Change: The energy sector is central to efforts combating climate change.
IEA.
(http:// iea.org) • Hák, T., Janoušková, S., & Moldan, B.
(2016).
Sustainable Development Goals: A need for relevant indicators.
Ecological Indicators, 60, 565-573.
• Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC).
5th Assessment Report 2018.
(htpp://un.org/eng/climate change) (assessed on 16 April 2020).
• Ismail, M. S. N., & Ghani, A. N. A.
(2017).
An overview of road damages due to flooding: Case study in Kedah state, • Malaysia.
Paper presented at the AIP Conference Proceedings.
• Kardooni, R., Yusoff, S. B., Kari, F. B., & Moeenizadeh, L. (2018).
Public opinion on renewable energy technologies and climate change in Peninsular Malaysia.
Renewable Energy, 116, 659-668. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2017.09.07 3 • Kaur, A.
(2016).
Economic Change in East Malaysia: Sabah and Sarawak since 1850: Springer.
• Levi, M., & Baldasseroni, A.
(2017).
0241 Results of a systematic review on the effects of climate change on the health and productivity of workers.
Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 74(Suppl 1), A72-A73.
doi:10.1136/oemed-2017-104636.192 • McGuire, B.
(2012).
Waking the giant: How a changing climate triggers earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanoes: OUP Oxford.
• McMichael, A. J., Woodruff, R. E., & Hales, S. (2006).
Climate change and human health: present and future risks.
The Lancet, 367(9513), 859-869. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S01406736(06)68079-3 • McSweeney, C., New, M., Lizcano, G., & Lu, X.
(2010).
The UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles: Improving the accessibility of observed and projected climate information for studies of climate change in developing countries.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 91(2), 157-166.
• Othman, M. F., Adam, A., Najafi, G., & Mamat, R. (2017).
Green fuel as alternative fuel for diesel engine: A review.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 80, 694-709.
• Paris Agreement COP 21.
Paris.
2016.
(htpp://un.org/eng/climate change) (assessed on 16 April 2020).
• Robine, J.-M., Cheung, S. L. K., Le Roy, S., Van Oyen, H., Griffiths, C., Michel, J.-P., & Herrmann, F. R. (2008).
Death toll exceeded 70,000 in Europe during the summer of 2003.
Comptes rendus biologies, 331(2), 171-178.
• Rogelj, J., Den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Winkler, H., .
.
.
Meinshausen, M. (2016).
Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 C. Nature, 534(7609), 631.
• Schütte, S., Depoux, A., Vigil, S., Kowalski, C., Gemenne, F., & Flahault, A.
(2017).
The influence of health concerns in scientific and policy debates on climate change.
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 71(8), 747-749. doi:10.1136/jech-2015-206962 210 GLOBAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH MEDICINE 2020, VOL 2, ISSUE 2 gggggglo • Smith, P. (2012).
Architecture in a Climate of Change: Routledge.
• Tiew, K.-G., Basri, N. E. A., Deng, H., Watanabe, K., Zain, S. M., & Wang, S. (2019).
Comparative study on recycling behaviours between regular recyclers and non regular recyclers in Malaysia.
Journal of Environmental Management, 237, 255-263. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.
02.033 • Wagner, T. P. (2017).
Reducing single-use plastic shopping bags in the USA.
Waste Management, 70, 3-12. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2017.
09.003 • Yehudai, M., Kim, J., Seguí, M., Goldstein, S., Pena, L., Haynes, L., .
.
.
Raymo, M. (2016).
Changes in Equatorial Atlantic Ocean Thermohaline Circulation Across the Mid-Pleistocene Transition.
Paper presented at the AGU Fall Meeting Abstracts.
• Zandalinas, S. I., Mittler, R., Balfagón, D., Arbona, V., & Gómez-Cadenas, A.
(2018).
Plant adaptations to the combination of drought and high temperatures.
Physiologia plantarum, 162(1), 2-12.
• Zhang, H.-B., Dai, H.-C., Lai, H.-X., & Wang, W.-T. (2017).
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, impacts, and China's response.
Advances in Climate Change Research, 8(4), 220-225. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.09.
002
18 © 2020 Adama Science & Technology University.
All rights reserved Ethiopian Journal of Science and Sustainable Development e-ISSN 2663-3205 Volume 7 (1), 2020 Journal Home Page: www.ejssd.astu.edu.et ASTU Review Article Predictions of Climate Change Impacts on Agricultural Insect Pests vis-à-vis Food Crop Productivity: a Critical Review Daniel Getahun Debelo  Department of Applied Biology, School of Applied Natural Science, Adama Science and Technology University, P.O.Box 1888, Adama, Ethiopia Article Info Abstract Keywords: Crop loss global warming greenhouse gases increased temperature pest outbreak Climate change is a broad range of global phenomena created predominantly by burning fossil fuels, which add heat-trapping gases called greenhouse gases to Earth’s atmosphere.
Insects are poikilothermic animals and thus sensitive to climate warming.
Global warming and climate change trigger major changes in diversity and abundance of arthropods, geographical distribution of insect pests, population dynamics, insect biotypes, herbivore plant interactions, activity and abundance of natural enemies, species extinction, and efficacy of crop protection technologies.
Climate change also will have severe impacts on insects, especially honeybees, which pollinate crop plants and thus affect crop production highly.
Combined effects of these will increase the extent of crop losses, and thus, will have a major bearing on crop production and food security.
Prediction of changes in geographical distribution and population dynamics of insect pests will be useful for adapting pest management strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change on crop production.
This paper summarized the different ways in which climate change impacts on insect pests and will increase the extent of crop losses.
Governments should respond to climate change both by reducing the rate and magnitude of change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation), and by adapting to its impacts.
Many impacts can be avoided, reduced or delayed by mitigation, but adaptation will be necessary to address impacts resulting from the warming which is already unavoidable due to past emissions.
Therefore, there is a need to take a concerted look at the likely effects of climate change on crop protection and devise appropriate measures to mitigate the effects of climate change on food security.
1.
Introduction The world’s climate has changed frequently during human history.
Yet the term ‘climate change’ usually refers to those changes that have been observed since the early 1900s and includes anthropogenic and natural drivers of climate (Masters and Norgrove, 2010).
Climate change is defined as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (for example, by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or variability of its properties, and that persists for an  Corresponding author, e-mail: daniel.debelo@astu.edu.net https://doi.org/10.20372/ejssdastu:v7.i1.2020.128 extended periods, typically decades or longer”.
This definition is not limited to changes contributed directly or indirectly by human activity.
It therefore, includes changes to the climate caused by natural phenomena such as volcanic eruptions.
While humans are unable to influence the effects of such natural phenomena on the climate, such events will interact with the influences of human activities.
Human influences will be superimposed on natural variability (IPCC, 2007).
http://www.ejssd.astu.edu/ mailto:daniel.debelo@astu.edu.net https://doi.org/10.20372/ejssdastu:v7.i1.2020.128 Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 19 Over the past hundred years, the global temperature has increased by 0.80c (IPCC, 2007).
If greenhouse gases concentration continue to rise, future warming is likely to be even more dramatic, with global surface temperatures likely to increase 1.1 6.2°c by the end of this century (Diffenbaugh1 et al., 2008).
This change is attributed mainly to the overexploitation and misuse of natural resources for various anthropogenic developmental activities such as increased urbanization, deforestation, rising fossil fuel burning and industrialization.
These have emitted, and are continuing to emit increasing quantities of greenhouse gases into the Earth’s atmosphere.
These greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), and a rise in these gases has caused a rise in the amount of heat from the sun withheld in the Earth’s atmosphere, heat that would normally be radiated back into space.
This increase in heat has led to the greenhouse effect, resulting in climate change (Adams et al., 1998).
The main characteristics of climate change are increases in average global temperature (global warming); changes in cloud cover and precipitation particularly over land; melting of ice caps and glaciers and reduced snow cover; and increases in ocean temperatures and ocean acidity due to seawater absorbing heat and carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (Adams et al., 1998).
Besides, climate change results in frequent droughts and floods, increased intensity and frequency of heat and cold waves, outbreaks of insectpests and diseases, etc.
affecting profoundly, many biological systems and ultimately human beings (Fand et al., 2012).
Higher temperatures will make dry seasons drier, and conversely, may increase the amount and intensity of rainfall; making wet seasons wetter than at present (Isman, 1997).
Climate change is concerned with everyone since it poses potential threat to environment, and agricultural productivity and production throughout the world.
It has implications for livelihood and survival of human beings (Pareek et al., 2017).
Crop and livestock yields are directly affected by changes in climatic factors such as temperature and precipitation and the frequency and severity of extreme events like droughts, floods, and wind storms.
Climate change may also change the types, frequencies, and intensities of various crop and livestock pests (Adams et al., 1998).
Climate and weather patterns are of primary importance for the distribution, development, and population dynamics of insects.
Insects are coldblooded organisms and hence the temperature of their bodies is approximately the same as that of the environment.
Therefore, temperature is the most important environmental factor influencing insect behavior, distribution, development, survival, and reproduction.
Insect physiology is primarily driven by temperature and thus phenology, reproduction, and developmental rates significantly change when populations are exposed to different climatic regimes (Tobin et al., 2008; Lamichhane et al., 2014).
One can safely presume that climate change would be a major causal factor in increasing pest damage to crops.
Increasing outbreaks of key pests due to changing climate is virtually certain.
With regard to food security, increasing pest damage is predicted to result in significant losses in food production and food supplies (IPCC, 2007).
Pest menace under the influence of climatic factors, at various stages of crop growth is one of the factors limiting agricultural productivity (Oerke et al., 1994).
Most analyses concur that in a changing climate, pests may become even more active than they are currently, thus posing the threat of greater economic losses to farmers (Coakley et al., 1999) and insect pests in agricultural systems are the major cause of damage to yield quantity (Rosenzweig et al., 2000).
Insects represent the largest percentage (over 75 %) of the world’s known animal species and there are more than one million species of insects that have been documented and studied by scientists.
Crop plants used as a food by human beings are damaged by over 10,000 species of insects, and cause an estimated annual loss of 13.6% globally.
Losses due to insect damage are likely to increase as a result of changes in crop diversity and increased incidence of insect pests due to global warming (Sharma, 2010).
In the future, pest species are likely to differ in their responses to global warming, changing the relative impacts of pests geographically and among crops.
A warmer climate will alter at least two agriculturally relevant characteristics of insect pests.
First, an Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 20 individual insect’s metabolic rate accelerates with temperature, and an insect’s rate of food consumption must rise accordingly.
Second, the number of insects will change, because population growth rates of insects also vary with temperature.
The total energy consumption of a pest population (the “population metabolism”) is proportional to the product of these two factors and directly relates to the crop yield loss caused by insect herbivory (Deutsch et al., 2018).
Climate change will affect significantly the diversity and abundance of insect-pests through geographic range expansion, increased overwintering survival and more number of generations per year, thereby increasing the extent of crop losses.
It may result in upsetting ecological balance because of unpredictable changes in the population of insect-pests along with their existing and potential natural enemies (IPCC, 2007).
2.
Ways in which Climate Change Aggravates Insect pests The increase in temperature associated with climatic change, would impact crop pest insect populations in several complex ways like expansion of geographic ranges of insect pests, increased over-wintering survival, increase in number of generations and rapid population growth, risk of introducing invasive alien species, increased risk of invasion by migrant pests, impact on pest population dynamics and outbreaks, breakdown of host-plant resistance, changes in insecthost plant interactions, increased incidence of insectvectored plant diseases, reduced effectiveness of biological control agents, disruption of plant-pollinator interactions, and reduced effectiveness of crop protection technologies (Diffenbaugh1 et al., 2008; Sharma, 2010; Fand et al., 2012; Pareek et al., 2017).
Climate change impact on insects is one of the different ways by which it affects global agricultural food production and thus food security.
2.1.
Expansion of geographic ranges Not all places would be affected the same way by climate change.
Effect of climate change is more in temperate insects, and it permits range expansion.
Insects have optimal temperature where their population grows best.
If the temperature is too cold or too hot, the population will grow more slowly.
That is why the losses will be greatest in temperate regions, but less severe in the tropics.
Temperate regions are not at that optimal temperature, so if the temperature increases there, populations will grow faster, but insects in the tropics are already close to their optimal temperature, so the populations will actually grow slower as the temperature becomes too hot for them (Deutsch et al., 2018).
Any increase in temperature is bound to influence the distribution of insects.
It is predicted that a 1ºC rise in temperature would enable speed 200 km northwards (in northern hemisphere) or 40 m upward (in altitude).
The areas which are not favorable for insects at present due to low temperature may become favorable with rise in temperature.
Minimum temperature rather than maximum temperature plays an important role in influencing the global distribution of insect species; hence any increase in temperature will result in a greater ability to overwinter at higher altitudes, ultimately causing a shift of pest intensity from south to north.
Many insect species have geographic ranges that are not directly limited by vegetation, but instead are restricted by temperature (Pareek et al., 2017).
Geographical distribution of insect pests confined to tropical and subtropical regions will extend to temperate regions along with a shift in the areas of production of their host plants, while distribution and relative abundance of some insect species vulnerable to high temperatures in the temperate regions may decrease as a result of global warming.
These species may find suitable alternative habitats at greater latitudes (Sharma, 2010).
The general prediction is that if global temperatures increase, the species will shift their geographical ranges closer to the poles or to higher elevations and increase their population size (Bale et al., 2002).
Warming in temperate region may lead to decrease in the relative abundance of temperature sensitive insect population.
Mostly the Polar Regions are constrained from the insect outbreaks due to low temperature and frequently occurring frosts (Volney and Fleming, 2000).
In the future, projected climate warming and increased drought incidence is expected to cause more frequent insect outbreaks in temperate regions also (Fand et al., 2012).
Distribution of insect pests will also be influenced by changes in the cropping patterns triggered by climate change.
Major insect pests such as cereal stem borers Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 21 (Chilo, Sesamia, and Scirpophaga), the pod borers (Helicoverpa, Maruca, and Spodoptera), aphids, and white flies may move to temperate regions, leading to greater damage in cereals, grain legumes, vegetables, and fruit crops.
Changes in geographical range and insect abundance will increase the extent of crop losses, and thus, will have a major bearing on crop production and food security (Sharma, 2010).
2.2.
Pest population dynamics and outbreaks Temperature is identified as a dominant abiotic (Fleming & Volney, 1995) regulating factor for insects, they respond to higher temperature with increased rates of development and with less time between generations.
Warmer winters reduce winterkill and consequently induce increased insect populations in the subsequent growing season (Rosenzweig et al., 2000).
Global increase in temperature within certain favorable range may accelerate the rates of development, reproduction and survival in tropical and subtropical insects.
Consequently, insects will be capable of completing more number of generations per year and ultimately it will result in more crop damage (Fand et al., 2012).
The assessment report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts an increment in mean temperature from 1.1 to 5.4 °C toward the year 2100 (IPCC, 2007).
It has been estimated that with a 2°C temperature increase insects might experience one to five additional life cycles per season (Ramya et al., 2012).
Laboratory and modeling experiments support the notion that the biology of insect pests are likely to respond to increased temperatures (Fleming & Volney, 1995).
With every degree rise in global temperature, the life cycle of insect will be shorter.
The quicker the life cycle, the higher will be the population of pests (Pareek et al., 2017).
With temperatures within their viable range, insects respond to higher temperature with increased rates of development and with less time between generations.
Very high temperatures reduce insect longevity.
Warmer winters will reduce winterkill, and consequently there may be increased insect populations in subsequent growing seasons.
With warmer temperatures occurring earlier in the spring, pest populations can become established and thrive during earlier and more vulnerable crop growth stages (Rosenzweig et al., 2000).
In increasing temperature, tropical and subtropical insect species may advance continuously pole-ward (as far as their cold hardiness allows) because they lack diapause in their lifecycles.
Temperate species will expand stepwise, as they need to reach the required temperature to allow them to develop one additional generation before reaching the diapause stage.
In fact, diapause introduction is driven by photoperiodic cues (Tobin et al., 2008).
Since warmer temperature will bring longer growing seasons in temperate regions, this should provide opportunity for increased insect damage.
A longer growth period may allow additional generations of insect pests and higher insect populations.
The Mexican bean beetle and bean leaf beetle, both major pests of soybeans, presently have two generations in the U.S. Midwest and three in the Southeast.
An additional generation may be possible in the Midwest if the growing season there lengthens (Rosenzweig et al., 2000).
Some pests which are already present, but only occur in small areas or at low densities, may be able to exploit the changing conditions by spreading more widely and reaching damaging population densities.
Aphids, for instance, key pests of agriculture, horticulture, and forestry throughout the world, are expected to be particularly responsive to climate change because of their low developmental threshold temperature, short generation time, and considerable dispersal abilities (Sutherst et al., 2007).
Projections of insect-crop dynamics through the 21st century suggest increases in pest pressure over much of the American Midwest, which could result in substantial increases in pesticide use to maintain productivity (Taylor et al., 2018).
Crop losses will be most acute in areas where global warming increases both population growth and metabolic rates of insects, primarily in temperate regions, where most grain is produced.
As the climate warms and temperatures rise, we might lose more crops to insects.
With warming climate insects’ metabolism speeds up, and the faster they burn energy, the more they eat and reproduce.
That means a greater number of increasingly hungry insects feeding on our staple crops.
Using a mathematical model, scientists were able to predict just how much damage they could do: for every degree Celsius rise in temperature, insects could do an Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 22 extra ten to twenty-five percent of damage to wheat, maize, and rice.
Reduced yields in these three staple crops are a particular concern, because so many people around the world rely on them.
Together they account for 42 % of direct calories consumed by humans worldwide.
Increased crop losses will result in a rise in food insecurity, especially in those parts of the world where it is already rife, and could lead to conflict (Deutsch et al., 2018).
2.3.
Increased incidence of insect-vectored plant diseases It has been reported that, global climate warming may lead to latitudinal and altitude wise expansion of the geographic range of insect-pests (Parry and Carter, 1989), increased abundance of tropical insect species (Diffenbaugh et al., 2008), decrease in the relative proportion of temperature sensitive insect population, more incidence of insect-transmitted plant diseases through range expansion and rapid multiplication of insect vectors.
Climate change creates new ecological niches, potentially allowing for the establishment and spread of plant pests and diseases to new geographical areas and from one region to another.
Accordingly, it might also result in the emergence of new plant diseases and pests (Fahim et al., 2013).
Climate change will also result in increased problems of insect-transmitted diseases through range expansion and rapid multiplication of insect vectors.
These changes will have major implications for crop protection and food security, particularly in the developing countries, where the need to increase and sustain food production is most urgent (Pareek et al., 2017).
Thus, with changing climate it is expected that the growers of crops have to face new and intense pest problems in the years to come (Fand et al., 2012).
Higher temperatures and greater precipitation in some regions are likely to result in the spread of plant pests and diseases.
Higher temperatures reduce insect winterkill, and lead to increased rates of development and shorter times between generations.
Wet vegetation promotes the germination of spores and the proliferation of bacteria, fungi, and nematodes.
Prolonged droughts can encourage other pests and diseases; especially those carried by insects (Rosenzweig et al., 2000).
Increased temperatures, particularly in early season, have been reported to increase the incidence of viral diseases in potato due to early colonization of virusbearing aphids, the major vectors for potato viruses in Northern Europe (Fand et al., 2012; Pareek et al., 2017).
2.4.
Risk of introducing invasive alien species Increasing temperatures and other alterations in weather patterns (e.g., drought, storm events) resulting from climate change are likely to have significant effects on outbreaks of pests and pathogens in natural and managed systems, and are also expected to facilitate the establishment and spread of invasive alien species (Backlund et al., 2008).
Even though the causes of biological invasions are manifold and multifaceted, changes in abiotic and/or biotic components of the environment (climate change, biological control) are recognized as primary drivers of species invasion (IPCC, 2007).
Invasion of new insectpests will be the major problem with changing climate favoring the introduction of insect-susceptible cultivars or crops (Gregory et al., 2009).
Invasive insect, disease and weed pests are likely to benefit most from climate change, leading to increased pesticide and herbicide use or greater reductions in yield (Masters and Norgrove, 2010).
2.5.
Disruption of plant-pollinator interactions The economic significance of pollination is underscored by the fact that about three-quarters of the world’s flowering plants depend on pollinators, and that almost a third of the food that we consume results from their activity.
The majority of pollinators are insects, whose distributions, phenology, and resources are all being affected by climate change (Backlund, 2008).
Pollination is one of the 15 major ecosystem services, a foundation for human life on earth (Kannan and James, 2009).
Many of the economically important crops (Murugan, 2006) and majority of the flowering plants require insect pollinators like flies, butterflies, moths, beetles and especially bees for their reproduction and formation of fruits and seeds.
Pollination is currently under threat from mounting pressures exerted by growing population, depleting natural resource base and global climate change (Fand et al., 2012).
Earlier studies have clearly shown that the population abundance, geographic range and pollination Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 23 activities of important pollinator species like bees, moths and butterflies are declining considerably with changing climate (FAO, 2008).
The climatic factors like temperature and water availability have been found to affect profoundly the critical events like flowering, pollination and fruiting in the life cycle of plants (Cleland et al., 2007).
The majority of the flowering plants require insect pollinators like flies, butterflies, moths, beetles and especially bees for their reproduction and formation of fruits and seeds.
Honey bees are perhaps the best known pollinators because of their floral fidelity.
Insect pollination, mostly by bees, is necessary for 75% of all crops that are used directly for human food worldwide.
Thus, entomophilous pollination is a fundamental process for the production of about one-third of the world human food (Klein et al., 2007).
Some insects also contribute directly to the human economies through valuable products like silk by silk worms; lac by lac insects; and honey, wax and other products by honeybees (Murugan, 2006).
Many pollinators have synchronized their life cycles with plant phenological events.
Impending climate change is expected to disrupt the synchrony between plantpollinator relationships by changing the phenological events in their life cycles and may thus affect the extent of pollination.
The quality and the quantity of pollination have multiple implications for food security, species diversity, ecosystem stability and resilience to climate change (FAO, 2008).
2.6.
Impact on crop-pest interactions The increasing temperature and CO2 have been found to exert both bottom-up and top-down effects on the tri-tropic interactions between crops, insects and natural enemies by means of certain physiological changes especially related to host-suitability and nutritional status.
The CO2 enriched environment reduces the nitrogen content of the plant tissue due to widening of Carbon: Nitrogen (C: N) ratio, thus cause a slight decrease in nitrogen-based defenses like alkaloids and in turn may increase in carbon-based defenses such as tannins.
This enhances the feeding by insect herbivores in order to obtain sufficient nitrogen for their metabolism.
Ultimately, it slows down the insect development and increases the length of life stages resulting in more foliage feeding than the normal (Fand et al., 2012).
3.
Reduced Effectiveness of Crop Protection Technologies Host-plant resistance, bio-pesticides, natural enemies, and synthetic chemicals are some of the potential options for integrated pest management.
However, the relative efficacy of many of these pest control measures is likely to change as a result of global warming.
Global warming will also reduce the effectiveness of host plant resistance, transgenic plants, natural enemies, biopesticides, and synthetic chemicals for pest management (Sharma, 2010).
3.1.
Breakdown of host plant resistance Host plant resistance is one of the ecofriendly options for managing harmful insect-pests of crops wherein the plant can lessen the damage caused by insect-pests through various mechanisms like antixenosis, antibiosis and tolerance.
However, expression of the host plant resistance is greatly influenced by environmental factors like temperature, sunlight, soil moisture, air pollution, etc.
Under stressful environment, plant becomes more susceptible to attack by insect-pests because of weakening of their own defensive system resulting in pest outbreaks and more crop damage.
Thermal and drought stress associated breakdown of plant resistance have been widely reported.
With global temperature rise and increased water stress, tropical countries like India may face the problem of severe yield loss in sorghum due to breakdown of resistance against midge Stenodiplosis sorghicola (Coq.)
and spotted stem borer Chilo partellus Swinhoe (Fand et al., 2012).
3.2.
Reduced effectiveness of biological control agents Biological control of insect-pests is one of the important ecofriendly components of integrated pest management.
Natural enemies of crop pests mainly, predators, parasitoids and pathogens are prompt density responsive in their action subjected to the action of abiotic components.
Being tiny and delicate, natural enemies of the insect-pests are more sensitive to the climatic extremes like heat, cold, wind and rains.
Precipitation changes due to climate change can also affect predators, parasites and pathogens of insect-pests resulting in a complex dynamics.
With changing climate, incidence of entomopathogenic fungi might be Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 24 favored by prolonged humidity conditions and obstinately be reduced by drier conditions.
Thus, climate change can affect the natural enemies negatively, reducing their pest control efficacy.
The effects of climate change are expected to act directly on all the trophic levels as well as indirectly on soil, water, the host crop, and hyper parasitoids (Fand et al., 2012).
4.
Implications of Climate Change for Food Security Climate change has serious impacts on diversity, distribution, incidence, reproduction, growth, development, voltinism and phenology of insect pests.
Climate changes also affect the activity of plant defense and resistance, biopesticides, synthetic chemicals, invasive insect species, expression of Bt toxins in transgenic crops.
Considering such declining production efficiency due to depleting natural resource base, serious consequences of climate change on diversity and abundance of insect-pests and the extent of crop losses, food security for 21st century is the major challenge for human kind in years to come Pareek et al., 2017).
The greatest challenge for humanity in the coming century is to double the present levels of food production to meet the needs of ever increasing population by sustainable use of shrinking natural resource base (Deka et al., 2008).
The aggravating pest problems under changing climate regimes are expected to intensify the yield losses; threatening the food security of the countries with high dependency on agriculture (IPCC, 2007).
The climate change is likely to affect the extent of entomophilous pollination by disrupting the synchrony between plant-pollinator life cycles (Kudo et al., 2004), with an estimated risk of reduction in world food production by one-third (Klein et al., 2007).
This has major implication for food and nutritional security (FAO, 2008).
This may have direct bearing on the livelihood of the rural poor as their survival is directly linked to outcomes from food production systems.
The increased food prices resulting from declining food production may also impact negatively the urban population (Fand et al., 2012).
5.
Conclusion It has been noted that insect population under increasing temperature is under move towards higher altitudes and elevation.
Various insect responds differently to atmospheric temperature and carbon dioxide rise and it is obvious of having varied impact depend on insect and regions.
Due to the climate change there is an increase in number of insect pest population, out breaks of insects and increase in number of insect generations.
This would definitely increase the damage caused by the insect, decrease the crop yields, increase the cost on crop protection and thereby affect the economy.
Further, as with temperature, precipitation changes can impact insect pest, predators and parasitoids resulting in a complex dynamic situation.
Climate change could upset the balance between insect crop pests and their natural enemies particularly in tropics leading to more frequent outbreaks (Kambrekar et al., 2015).
Impacts of climate change on crop production mediated through changes in populations of serious insect-pests need to be given careful attention for planning and devising adaptation and mitigation strategies for future pest management programs.
Therefore, there is a need to have a concerted look at the likely effects of climate change on crop protection, and devise appropriate measures to mitigate the effects of climate change on food security.
The current escalated use of fossil fuels which contributes to increased production of greenhouse gases and increase atmospheric CO2 concentration that enhances increase of global warming should be shifted to renewable green energy.
Deforestation should be controlled and afforestation should be encouraged so that forest plants can absorb and decrease CO2 concentration and play significant role in regulating the environmental temperature at a fairly constant level.
References Adams, R.M., Hurd, B.H., Lenhart S., and Leary, N. (1998).
Effects of global climate change on agriculture: an interpretative review, 11: 19–30.
Backlund, P., Janetos, A., & Schimel, D. (2008).
The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United States, U.S.
Climate Change Science Program Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3.
Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 25 Bale, J., Masters, G. J., Hodkins, I. D., Awmack, C., Bezemer, T. M., Brown, V. K., Buterfield, J.,Buse, A.,Coulson, J. C., Farrar, J., Good, J. E. G., Harrigton, R., Hartley, S., Jones, T. H., Lindroth, R. L., Press, M. C., Symrnioudis, I., Watt, A.D. and Whittaker, J.B. (2002).
Herbivory in global climate change research: direct effects of rising temperature on insect herbivores.
Global Change Biology, 8: 1-16.
Cleland, E.E., Chuine, I., Menzel, A., Mooney, H.A., and Schwartz, M.D.
(2007).
Shifting plant phenology in response to global change, TREE, 22: 357-365.
Coakley, S.M., Scherm, H., & Chakraborty, S. (1999).
Climate change and plant disease management.
Annual Review of Phytopathology, 37: 399-426.
Deka, S., Byjesh, K., Kumar, U., & Choudhary, R. (2008).
Climate change and impacts on crop pestsa critique.
ISPRS Archives XXXVIII-8/W3 Workshop Proceedings: Impact of climate change on Agriculture, pp.147-149.
Deutsch, C.A., Tewksbur, J.J., Tigchelaar, M., Battisti, D.S., Merrill, S.C., Huey, R.B., & Naylor R.L.
(2018).
Increase in crop losses to insect pests in a warming climate, Science, 361: 916–919.
https://dx.doi.org/10.5061/dryad.b7q3g2q.
DOI: 10.1126/science.aat3466 Diffenbaugh1, N.S., Krupke, C.H., White, M.A.
& Alexander, C.E.
(2008).
Global warming presents new challenges for maize pest management, Env.Res.
Letter, 3: 1-9.
Fahim, M.A., Hassanein, M.K., Abolmaty, S.M.
and Fargalla, F.H.
(2013).
Challenges to Crop Pests and Livestock Diseases Management in Irrigated African Agroecosystems under a Changing Climate.
Journal of Researcher, 5(12): 129-138. http://www.sciencepub.net/researcher.
18 FAO (2008).
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Rapid Assessment of Pollinators’ Status.
FAO, Rome, Italy.
Fleming, R.A., and Volney, W.J.
(1995).
Effects of climate change on insect defoliator population processes in Canada.s boreal forests: some plausible scenarios.
Water, Air, & Soil Pollution, 82: 445 454.
Fand, B.B., Kamble, A.L.
and Kumar, M. (2012).
Will climate change pose serious threat to crop pest management: A critical review?
International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 2 (11): 1-114.
Gregory, P.J., Johnson, S.N., Newton, A.C. & Ingram, J.S.I.
(2009).
Integrating pests and pathogens into the climate change/food security debate, Journal of Experimental Botany, 60: 2827-2838.
IPCC (Climate ChangeImpacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability) (2007).
In: (Eds.
: Parry, M.L., Canziani, O.F., Palutikof, J.P., van der Linden, P.J., Hanson, C. E.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp.
976.
Isman, M.B.
(1997).
Neem and other botanical pesticides: Barriers to commercialization.
Phytoparasitica, 25: 339-344.
Kambrekar, D.N., Guledgudda, S.S., & Katti, A.
(2015).
Impact of climate change on insect pests and their natural enemies.
Karnataka Journal of Agricultural Sciences, 28(5): 814-816.
Kannan, R. and James, D.A.
(2009).
Effects of climate change on global diversity: a review of key literature, Tropical Ecology, 50: 31-39 (2009).
Klein, A.M., Vaissiere, B., Cane, J.H., Steffan-Dewenter, I., Cunningham, S.A., Kremen, C. and Tscharntke, T. (2007).
Importance of pollinators in changing landscapes for world crops.
Proceedings of the Royal Society, 274: 303-313.
Kudo, G., Nishikawa, Y., Kasagi, T. and Kosuge, S. (2004).
Does seed production of spring ephemerals decrease when spring comes early?
Ecological Researh, 19: 255-259.
Lamichhane, J.R., Barzman, M., Booij K., Boonekamp, P., Desneux, N., Huber, L., Kudsk, P., Langrell, S.R.H., Ratnadass, A., Ricci, P., Sarah, J., and Messean, A.
(2014).
Robust cropping systems to tackle pests under climate change: A review, Agronomy for Sustainable Development.
DOI 10.1007/s13593-014-0275-9 Masters, G. and Norgrove, L. 2010.
Climate change and invasive alien species.
CABI Working Paper 1, 30 pp.
Murugan, K. (2006).
Biodiversity of insects, Curr.Sci., 91: 1602-1603.
Oerke, E.C., Debne, H.W., Schonbeck, F. and Weber, A.
(1994).
Crop Production and Crop Protection.
Elsevier, Amsterdam Pareek, A., Meena, B.M., Sharma, S.,Tetarwal, M.L.,Kalyan, R.K., and Meena, B.L.
(2017).
Impact of Climate Change on Insect Pests and their Management Strategies.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/32847622 Parry M.L.
and Carter, T.R.
(1989).
An assessment of the effects of climatic change on agriculture, Climatic Change, 15: 95116 Porter, J.H., Parry, M.L., Carter, T.R.
(1991).
The potential effects of climatic change on agricultural insect pests, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 57 (1–3): 221-240. https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1923(91)90088-8 Ramya, M., Kennedy, J.S., Lakshmi, V.G., Lakshmanan A, Manikandan, N. & Sekhar, N.U.
(2012).
Impact of elevated temperature on major pests of rice: "Testing Climate uncertainties and validating selected technologies on farmers’ fields”, CLIMARICE Technical Brief 10-2012. https://nibio.brage.unit.no › bitstream › handle › Technical+Brief1086498 Rosenzweig, C., Iglesias, A., Yang, X.B., Epstein, P.R., and Chivian, E. (2000).
Climate Change and U.S. Agriculture: The Impacts of Warming and Extreme Weather Events on Productivity, Plant Diseases, and Pests, Center for Health and the Global Environment, http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/ Sharma, H.C. (2010).
Global warming and climate change: Impact on arthropod biodiversity, pest management, and food security.
In Souvenir, National Symposium on Perspectives and Challenges of Integrated Pest Management for http://www.sciencepub.net/researcher.%2018 https://academic.oup.com/jxb https://academic.oup.com/jxb https://link.springer.com/journal/13593 https://link.springer.com/journal/13593 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/32847622 https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1923(91)90088-8 http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/ Daniel Getahun Ethiop.J.Sci.Sustain.Dev., Vol.
7 (1), 2020 26 Sustainable Agriculture, 19-21 Nov 2010 (Thakur RK, Gupta, PR and Verma AK, eds.).
Nauni, Solan, Himachal Pradesh, India: Pages 1-14.
Sutherst, R., Baker, R.H.A., Coakley, S.M, Harrington, R., Kriticos, D.J, and Scherm, H. (2007).
Pests under global change: meeting your future landlords?
In: Canadell JG, ed.
Terrestrial ecosystems in a changing world.
Berlin: Springer, 211–225.
Taylor, R.A.J., Herms, D.A., Cardina, J. and Moore, R.H. (2018).
Climate Change and Pest Management: Unanticipated Consequences of Trophic Dislocation.
Agronomy.
doi:10.3390/agronomy8010007 www.mdpi.com/journal/agronomy Tobin, P.C., Nagarkatti, S., Loeb, G. and Saunders, M.C.
(2008).
Historical and projected interactions between climate change and insect voltinism in multivoltine species.
Global Change Biology, 14: 951–957.
doi: 10.1111/j.13652486.2008.01561.x Volney, W.J.A.
and Fleming, R.A. (2000).
Climate change and impacts of boreal forest insects.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 82: 283-294. http://www.mdpi.com/journal/agronomy https://www.journals.elsevier.com/agriculture-ecosystems-and-environment https://www.journals.elsevier.com/agriculture-ecosystems-and-environment
http://www.press.ierek.com ISSN (Print: 2537-0154, online: 2537-0162) International Journal on: The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
1 DOI: 10.21625/archive.v6i1.875 Climate-Proof Planning for an Urban Regeneration Strategy Carmela Mariano1 1 Department of Planning, Design, Technology of Architecture, Sapienza University of Rome Abstract This paper deals with the issue of the relationship between climate change and the government’s land management policies, investigating how urban planning regulation may provide responses to the need for planning and designing the coastal urban settings affected by flooding phenomena as a consequence of gradual sea-level rise (SLR).
In this frame of reference, comparison among the strategic planning experiences put into play in a variety of national and international settings suggests the urgency for policymakers to implement knowledge frameworks on planning instruments, in order to identify– as a prerequisite for defining site-specific design actions – the territorial settings affected by the phenomenon of flood risk.
© 2022 The Authors.
Published by IEREK press.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of ARChive’s International Scientific Committee of Reviewers.
Keywords sea level rise; climate-proof planning; urban regeneration; strategic planning 1.
Introduction The need to identify new references for a sustainable transformation of the territories affected by the risks and degenerative processes related to climate change (IPCC, 2013; UNISDR, 2015; UNFCCC, 2015; EEA, 2016), has solicited, therefore, in the last decades the scientific and disciplinary debate on the key role of urban and territorial planning, as well as on the urgency of an update of the planner's competences and of the instruments of territorial government in the elaboration of possible strategies of regeneration and resilience to climate change (Musco, 2008).
Strategies that imply, as we have seen, an overcoming of the traditionally sectoral approach on these issues, in favour of an integrated approach to urban complexity (Mariano, Marino, 2018) ascribable to the Ecosystem Based Approach (IUCN; 2020), as also advocated by the document Guidelines for Ecosystem-based Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (Secretariat of the Convention on biological diversity, 2019) placing, in particular, emphasis on the need to define the elements of a knowledge process aimed at a spatial definition of the vulnerability of territories to climate change, with specific reference to the possible impacts on the landscapeenvironmental system, settlement-morphological, infrastructural and territorial endowments, and on the system of socio-economic relations.
Process capable of introducing and accompanying the construction of integrated strategies of climate-proof regeneration, in coherence with the objectives of the European Strategy on adaptation to climate change (EC, 2021), combining the emergency dimension with a perspective of design and transformation of the territory in a sustainable key, in which all the elements of the built environment adapt to the new balances with efficiency and high performance levels.
http://www.press.ierek.com/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
2 In the general framework of the research activities carried out by the author, this paper is part of the research conducted within the Department of Planning, Design, and Technology of Architecture (PDTA) at Sapienza University of Rome, with the university research work entitled “Strategie di rigenerazione urbana per territori climate proof.
Strumenti e metodi per la valutazione della vulnerabilità e per l'individuazione di tattiche di resilienza degli ambiti urbani costieri soggetti a sea level rise” (“Urban regeneration strategies for climate-proof territories.
Instruments and methods for assessing vulnerability and identifying tactics of coastal urban environments subject to sea-level rise”) (Principal investigator: Prof. Carmela Mariano).
Dealing with the issue of the relationship between climate change and the government’s land management policies, the paper investigates how urban planning regulation may provide responses to the need for planning and designing the coastal urban settings affected by flooding phenomena as a consequence of gradual sea-level rise (SLR).
Associated with other climate events like storm surges, this phenomenon doubtlessly represents one of the next challenges with which the “world risk society” (Beck, 2013) will have to grapple, both for the growing impact on cities and territories, and for the empirical evidence of the economic, social, and environmental damage it causes.
2.
Literature review and objectives of the research The global mean sea level (GMSL) is constantly rising, accelerating in recent decades due on the one hand to the shrinking ice caps of Greenland and Antarctica, and on the other to windier tropical cyclones and increasingly intense rains – all phenomena that may be blamed on the higher temperatures highlighted in the SR1,5 report (IPCC, 2018).
In a nutshell, the global forecasts on SLR at 2100 vary from 53 to 97 cm according to the IPCC (2013), and from 50 to 140 cm according to Rahmstorf (2007).
In this scenario, a major impact will be seen along the coasts, causing widespread erosion.
This impact on the territories’ morphological characteristics will probably trigger internal migration inside the coastal erosion, significantly increasing flood-related risk (Mariano, Marino, 2019a).
An interesting study titled “Mediterranean UNESCO World Heritage at risk from coastal flooding and erosion due to sea-level rise” (Reimann et al., 2018), calls attention to the UNESCO sites located in the coastal areas of the Mediterranean most exposed to flood risk caused by sea-level rise, emphasizing the risk of loss not only on a material level, but also in terms of the people’s cultural identity.
This brings the consequent risk of losing the perception of certain landscapes that we may define as “sub limen” , from the Latin Sub Limen (“under the threshold, limit” – the etymological root of “subliminal”), which in this context refers to the limit of the coast, the physical limit between earth and sea that determines the landscape, the transition between the present and future landscapes of territories that are in actuality “suspended” because they are affected by a phenomenon of potential risk of loss1.
The relevance and currency of the issue dealt with is emphasized by numerous international research institutions, including the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2016) which, in the report “Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016”, expresses the need for European countries to define strategies and plans for territorial adaptation on a national, regional, and local level in order to prevent and manage the risk linked to the climate crisis.
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015), in its document “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030”, also enshrined the key role of territorial planning in reducing the vulnerability of territories, stressing on the one hand the inadequacy of the approaches and of the sectoral instruments put into play thus far to prevent and mitigate risks, and on the other the need for a transdisciplinary approach that goes beyond the specific points and purview of regulations.
Not least, The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development emphasizes the need to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” and urges the signatory states to “take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” (UN, 2015).
A study by ENEA, titled “Sea-level rise and potential drowning of the Italian coastal plains: Flooding risk scenarios for 2100,” (Antonioli et al, 2017), published in Quaternary Science Reviews, is an essential, prerequisite document 1 The issue of "sublimen landscapes" is studied within the research "MEDWAYS Le vie del Mediterraneo", international scientific cluster, National Academy of Lincei (resp.
Mosè Ricci, University of Trento) in the contribution of the PDTA Department, Sapienza University of Rome “Landscapes of the SubLimen.
Itinerary between the "suspended" territories of the Adriatic coast "by Carmela Mariano and Marsia Marino (2022 forthcoming).
Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
3 for this research.
In Europe, approximately 86 million people (19% of the population) live within 10 km of the coastline, and in the Mediterranean area this figure rises to 75%.
This scenario was also determined by the rapid urbanization of the 1960s, which contributed towards what was in many cases an unplanned development of coastal settlements now exposed to serious flood risk (Sterr et al., 2003).
The areas at greatest risk are those in Turkey (Anzidei et al, 2011), the coastal area of the Northern Adriatic (Antonioli et al., 2007; Lambeck et al., 2011), the Aeolian Islands (Anzidei et al., 2016), the coasts of Central Italy (Aucelli et al, 2016) and eastern Morocco (Snoussi et al., 2008).
As for Italy, the study by Lambeck et al.
projected a sea-level rise in 2100 based on the IPCC 2007 report and Rahmstorf (2007), whose results show that, assuming a minimum rise of 18 cm and a maximum of 140 cm, 33 Italian costal areas will be flooded by the projection date.
For the Italian region being investigated (Northern Adriatico, Gulf of Taranto, and Sardinia), by the year 2100, a sea-level rise of 53-97 cm (IPCC, 2013 – RCP 8.5) and 140 cm (Rahmstorf, 2007) is hypothesized.
In addition to the social and environmental stressors that have long been acknowledged to affect urban areas, IPCC Reports have unequivocally identified cities as exposed and vulnerable to climate change, and liable to be subject to the projected impacts of sea level rise and of an increased frequency of extreme events, such as heatwaves and floods.
At the same time, due to their high population density and concentration of human activities, cities are themselves major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions.
It is therefore urgent that specific planning strategies are developed and implemented, jointly addressing both mitigation and adaptation targets, highlighting potential synergies, and resolving conflicts and trade-offs.
The urgency to face the challenges related to climate change in terms of mitigation, adaptation and possible transformation of sensitive territories affected by risks and degenerative processes has prompted in recent years a reflection on the responsibilities of policy makers in transposing these issues into urban agendas.
More generally, this aspect has brought out the need to both update the skills of the urban planner and territorial governance tools, with the aim of developing possible regeneration and resilience strategies to climate change.
The objective of the research is to identify theoretical/methodological and operative references for trialling and innovating the content of urban planning regulation, with particular reference to the need, on the one hand, to expand the framework of knowledge of the possible impacts on the territory produced by climate change, and, on the other, to provide for adaptation strategies and site-specific actions aimed at resolving the risk.
For this reason, the research highlights the need to overcome land governance policies’ traditionally sectoral approach to the issue of climate change, in favour of climate-proof planning, through lines of deeper analysis that adopt an experimental, integrated, multi-scalar, and iterative method, and that bring the work fully into the scientific and disciplinary debate.
3.
Methodology In the general framework of the research activities carried out by the author, the contribution gives back part of the results of a work of analysis and critical evaluation of some planning experiences carried out at national and European level, which allowed, through an inductive method, to identify two different approaches of the tools promoted by the Local Authorities and Territorial Agencies in a climate-proof perspective (Maragno et al, 2020).
A first approach refers to a strategic dimension, related to the supra-municipal planning level (metropolitan or regional area), which identifies the main strategies for adaptive and resilient cities to climate change.
A second one recalls a regulatory dimension, mainly referred to the municipal planning level, which highlights a gradual process of integration of the plan contents, both in terms of implementation of the cognitive framework of the vulnerability of the territories, with the preparation of management drawings that give the consistency of the areas affected by the risk phenomenon, differentiated by level of hazard and in relation to possible time horizons analysed (heat islands, floods, alluvial phenomena, subsidence, etc.
); both in terms of identifying possible mitigation and adaptation project actions on "target" areas identified by the Plan, from which to identify quantitative and qualitative indicators/requirements/standards, referring to the measures adopted (Mariano et a, 2021).
Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
4 In particular, the activity of analysis and critical analysis was based, on the one hand, on the study of dossiers and reports prepared by public administrations (PAs) and published on institutional websites, articles and scientific proceedings, and, on the other, on interviews and meetings with representatives of the PAs concerned.
In particular, the criterion for choosing the case studies, attributable to the two approaches, considers the prevalence of a strategic approach in the planning tools adopted in the Italian national context, instead the examples of the international context also highlight the presence of a experimental with the identification of specific actions and guidelines for climate adaptation.
In general, the plans were analyzed that in general terms deal with the issue of the response to climate change, regardless of the presence in the reference territory of a specific sea level rise risk problem.
For this reason, among the plans of the Italian national context, the Strategic Plan of Milan is present, in addition to that of Milan and Venice, because it is configured as a recent example of strategic planning of a large area, the Metropolitan City (established in following Law 56/2014), which highlights a focus on new issues and new perspectives for action prompted by climate-change.
4.
Case studies The research activity concentrated on a comparative assessment of certain trials of strategic plans in italian national (Genoa, Milan, Venice) and international (Vejle, Rotterdam, New York) settings.
With reference to the examples of strategic planning in a national setting (referring to the metropolitan cities of Genoa, Venice, and Milan), general guidelines emerge with respect to the issue of the territory’s adaptation to climate change.
By priority, these are oriented towards implementing urban policies with a short-term (3 years) temporal horizon that does not meet the need to outline a structured mediumand long-term vision, in order to respond to the issues related to climate change.
These guidelines are, in particular: sharing a common horizon and a multi-actor convergence upon an action strategy, while at the same time recognizing the various players’ specific characteristics and autonomy; strengthening dialogue between the various levels of governance and between public and private players, involving stakeholders and citizens in close connection with the world of research and innovation; adopting a knowledge-based approach and fostering the integration of the various land governance instruments with a view to “downscaling” (Musco, Fregolent, 2014), as recommended by the Venice strategic plan (2018) that emphasizes the need to promote a coordinated management of the environmental Plans system, and by the Milan plan (2019) that highlights the need to join together the land governance instruments that, on various levels, deal with the environment; considering the adaptation actions’ complementariness with the mitigation interventions alone; promoting forms of sustainable financing for urban projects aimed at reducing land consumption and at increasing urban and environmental quality (Milan, 2019); carrying out the regular monitoring and assessment of progress towards adaptation (Genoa, 2017).
On the other hand, as to the analysis of strategic planning case studies in an international setting, alongside the content of a general nature and of urban policy, a markedly experimental approach emerges, more oriented towards identifying site-specific planning responses depending on the orographic and geomorphological characteristics of the territory (Todaro et al., 2009).
This requires strategic approaches diversified depending on the cases and articulated in accordance with scenarios of a short, medium and long-term vision although some of the strategic plans are mainly oriented towards a long-term (Rotterdam) or medium-term (New York) vision.
The temporal horizons often referred to for mediumand long-term visions are 2050 and 2100, while through 2050, short-term strategies and good practices are outlined.
Each territory requires a site-specific approach.
However, it is equally true that, on a strategic level, certain, recurring conditions can be found; this has made it possible to systematize the cases deemed, in this research’s opinion, essential Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
5 for defining urban regeneration strategies in settings affected by the effect of sea-level rise, or considered at future risk of flooding – strategies that are such as to guarantee an urban planning development that is long-lasting and resilient over the long term.
Table 1.
Comparative overview of the contents of strategic plans (by C. Mariano, 2021) National setting Strategies Strategic plan of the metropolitan city of Genoa climate-proof urban policies Strategic plan of the metropolitan city of Milan climate-proof urban policies Strategic plan of the metropolitan city of Venice climate-proof urban policies International setting Vejle’s Resilient Strategy climate-proof urban policies and design strategies for defense, adaptation and delocalization Rotterdam Climate Change Adaptation Strategy climate-proof urban policies and design strategies for defense, adaptation and delocalization One NYC 2050.
Building a strong and fair city climate-proof urban policies and design strategies for defense, adaptation and delocalization The Vejle’s Resilient Strategy (approved in 2013 and updated in 2019), promoted in the context of the 100 Resilient Cities partnership, takes into its corpus the three macrostrategies (defence, adaptation, delocalization), theorized in the research setting.
It is articulated in four key strategies for a resilient urban development (Mariano, Marino, 2018), making reference to the content of a general nature already surveyed in the strategic plans analyzed in the national setting: “Co-creating city,” a slogan that refers to public/private collaboration for the performance of structural interventions, like the creation of an information and experimentation centre – the “Laboratory for climate change adaptation and flood control” – aimed at managing fjord flood risk; “Climate resilient city,” which makes reference to the repercussions of climate change on the city’s infrastructures, such as for example the port, the coastal area, communications infrastructure, the water system and the sewer system, and for which it calls for targeted actions aimed at increasing these systems’ resilience; “Socially resilient city,” which instead aims to increase social and economic cohesion thanks to the citizens’ active involvement from the decision-making to the realization phase; this is also done by promoting the dissemination of the strategies proposed through the drawing up of updated catalogues, in order to promote Vejle as a “pilot city,” an international model of urban resilience; “Smart city,” which promotes the introduction of digital technologies for managing the risks connected to climate change, but also relating to the daily management of traffic, modes of parking, and information on the climate and on tourism (Vejle Kommune, 2013).
However, beyond the content of a general or urban policy nature, the strategic plan defines the areas at flood risk and identifies priority settings for intervention, for which a vision, articulated in various temporal horizons – 2025, 2050, 2100 (Figure 1) – was outlined.
Articulated by temporal horizons, the site-specific actions relate to planning interventions included in the defence strategies, with works of environmental engineering, adaptation with nature-based solutions, and delocalization with the possibility of building resilient neighbourhoods (Vejle’s Resilient Strategy, 2013).
Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
6 Figure 1.
Settings at flood risk starting from 2030; areas above 2 metres in elevation are in yellow.
Source: Stormflodsstrategi.
Stormflodsbeskyttelse der gror med byen (2019).
The Rotterdam Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2013) identifies four general strategies for the city’s adaptation to the flooding phenomenon: Reinforcing and constantly updating the defence system against floods, storm surges, and sea-level rise, to protect settled areas); Adapting the urban space to flood impacts; Promoting an integrated planning in favour of a resilient urban development; Promoting working opportunities in the field of adaptation to climate change, thus strengthening the economy, improving quality of life, and protecting biodiversity.
Figure 2.
Settings at flood risk, forecast at 2100, indicating the infrastructure at risk.
Source: Rotterdam Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2013).
Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
7 In this case as well, the plan defines certain settings at flood risk in 2100, emphasizing the main infrastructures affected by possible flooding (Figure 2).
For these infrastructures, a vision is set out that, despite the prevalence of the defensive strategy approach, articulates three strategies for a resilient metamorphosis of the public spaces exposed to risk: “sponge”: water plazas, infiltration zones, and green spaces; “protection”: dams and coastal protection; “control” of flood events: evacuation routes, water-resistant buildings, and floating structures (Rotterdam Climate initiative climate proof, 2013).
The One NYC 2050.
Building a strong and fair city (2019) Strategic Plan, drawn up as part of the 100 Resilient Cities and Mayor’s Office of Resiliency project, considers the City of New York to be one of the metropolitan areas most affected by flooding phenomena caused or aggravated by sea-level rise, as took place on the occasion of Hurricane Sandy (2014).
The plan, which anticipates the municipal administration’s vision at 2050, is structured in eight general goals articulated into thirty specific initiatives.
In particular, as regards the specific initiatives of goal no.
6 “A livable climate,” we find: Achieve carbon neutrality and 100 percent clean electricity; Strengthen communities, buildings, infrastructure, and the waterfront to be more resilient; Create economic opportunities for all New Yorkers through climate action; Fight for climate accountability and justice.
As with other international examples, the Plan identifies some settings for which, while not setting the exact perimeter of the areas at flood risk, it shows the areas currently subject to flooding, and that will continue to be so in the future; areas not currently affected by flooding but that will be so in the future (2020, 2050, and 2080); and areas that are not – and that are estimated not to be – affected by flooding phenomena.
(Figure 3).
The One NYC 2050 Strategic Plan outlines a medium-term vision and has 2050 as its temporal horizon of reference.
Of the plan’s thirty specific initiatives articulating the eight goals, initiative 21 “Strengthen communities, buildings, infrastructure, and the waterfront to be more resilient” defines certain strategic lines referring specifically to urban adaptation to the phenomenon of sea-level rise: Mitigation of risk, which calls for the implementation of projects to protect vulnerable coastal areas in Lower Manhattan, Red Hook, the Rockaways, Jamaica Bay, the East Shore of Staten Island and other risk areas; an initiative to strengthen sewer infrastructure in order to deal with possible flood events is planned; “Climate-smart” adaptation, which calls for building awareness among property owners in the floodplain on climate change issues, in order to incentivize ordinary and extraordinary maintenance on their properties so as to make the building stock resilient to possible flood events (subsidies for this are provided); promoting and supporting non-profit organizations providing assistance to citizens residing in risk areas; and increasing the percentage of public greenery and green infrastructures; Integration of policies and instruments of land governance, which will involve updating building codes and zoning on a local level in support of the planned adaptation initiatives (One NY2050, 2019).
Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
8 Figure 3.
Areas at flood risk from the present to 2080.
Source: One NYC 2050.
Building a strong and fair city.
5.
Results and Discussion These research experiences, show the search for a transcalar continuity of objectives and actions, in the dual strategic and regulatory form of plans, and take on and operationally decline crucial issues at the heart of EU policies for sustainable development (Europe 2020 Strategy) and climate change, for the improvement of territorial connectivity and the harmonisation of ecological, landscape and cultural values (EU, 2011), the promotion of city efficiency in a smart and green perspective, concretely pursuing an integration between urban planning and ecology.
With reference to the analysis of the Strategic Planning case studies in the international context, the research highlighted the presence, alongside the contents properly referred to the construction of a general vision of mitigation and adaptation strategy, of a markedly more experimental approach oriented towards also identifying site-specific project responses articulated according to short, medium and long-term vision scenarios.
For these horizons, certain prevalent action strategies are outlined that are placed within the strategies of ecological urban regeneration.
Within them, they articulate general guidelines for climate-proof urban policies and objectives and actions that may be placed in three design macrostrategies identified after the analysis: defence, adaptation, and delocalization (Mariano, Marino, 2019b).
The three prevalent approaches refer respectively to the need to defend the territory by means of environmental engineering works; to the appropriateness of increasing the urban structure’s resilience to flooding phenomena in those areas for which defense works should prove insufficient; and to the appropriateness of delocalizing activities and settlements present in the areas exposed to greater risk, to others that are geomorphologically safer.
The defense strategy identifies (short-term) actions for the mitigation of and protection from the risk phenomenon, relying on hydraulic engineering works able to attenuate the extreme event’s impacts on the territory.
Adaptation actions and strategies represent a complementary approach to mitigation.
This approach implies the population’s ability to continue living their habitat while making adjustments that can reduce flood impact to a minimum; and it involves practices of urban regeneration of compromised territories (Boateng, 2008) – practices that Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
9 can effect urban development with a view to sustainability and resilience (Salata, Giaimo, 2016), also by relying on the adoption of nature-based solutions (NbS) as “actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified ecosystems, that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits” or solutions inspired to the Ecosystem-based Approach (EbA) that involve a wide range of ecosystem management activities to increase the resilience and reduce the vulnerability of people and the environment to climate change (IUCN, 2020).
The third macrostrategy that has been conceived refers to the need to rethink the urban planning development of the settled coastal strips with a view to their ecological regeneration.
This raises the need for new, flexible urban models capable of responding to heightened usership on existing services, while guaranteeing the population’s access (Bukvic, 2015; Bates, 2002; Mele et al., 2016; Davenport et al., 2016), to the point of outlining certain potential scenarios for the long-term relocation of the stricken population, possibly to be adopted as part of a regional relocation strategy for “climate crisis migrants” (Brent et al., 2015).
6.
Conclusions The comparative analysis of the strategic planning experiences conducted in an international setting, with particular reference to the content referring to climate-proof planning, underscores the “strategic role of knowledge” (Talia, 2020) in identifying – as a prerequisite for defining site-specific design actions – the territorial settings affected by the flood risk phenomenon as a consequence of sea-level rise.
Developing this knowledge framework allows policymakers and planners to interpret the content of the areas affected by the risk phenomenon, differentiated by level of danger and in relation to any temporal horizons analyzed for the medium and long term; and to provide for a possible adoption of indications relating to the detailed intervention categories aimed at resolving the risk within the planning instruments, with particular reference to the scale of local urban planning.
In this sense, it is emphasized, in the Italian national setting, how urgent it is to support and incentivize the building of complete and comprehensive databases, and to expand the framework of deliverables for more in-depth knowledge of the territory, aided by geographic information systems (GIS) and relying on the tools and methods of remote sensing and climate modelling aimed at the preliminary construction of vulnerability and risk maps of coastal urban settings, and at the consequent implementation of the planning instruments’ territorial knowledge frameworks.
The purpose is to guide the definition of intervention macrostrategies and the choice among the actions of defence, adaptation, and relocation for the territories affected by the risk phenomenon (Mariano et al., 2021).
Monitoring of actions is a very important aspect of a successful adaptation plan, as is the case for any spatial planning tool.
The main difficulty in monitoring urban adaptation to climate change arises, in fact, when trying to measure (in quantitative terms through indicators) the effects of an action defined by the plan and its contribution to increasing the resilience of the area targeted by that action.
In this sense, the need is highlighted for a constant updating of the cognitive framework of the territory, through innovative elaborations and databases able to manage and share environmental, climatic, urban and economic information and a periodical evaluation of the results obtained through the implementation of strategies and sitespecific climate-proof actions, which allows, in relation to new instances and monitoring results, to start a constant process of updating and adjustment of the Plan.
References Antonioli, F., Anzidei, M.K., Auriemma, R., Gaddi, D., Furlani, S., Orrù, P., Solinas, E., Gaspari, A., Karinja, S., Kovacic, V., Surace, L. (2007).
Sea level change during Holocene from Sardinia a nd northeastern Adriatic from archaeological and geomorphological data.
Quat.
Sci.
Rev., 26, 2463-2486. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2007.06.022.
Antonioli, F.; Anzidei, M.; Amorosi, A.; Presti, V.L.
; Mastronuzzi, G.; Deiana, G.; De Falco, G.; Fontana, A.; Fontolan, G.; Lisco, S.; et al.(2017).
Sea-level rise and potential drowning of the Italian coastal plains.
Flooding risk scenarios for 2100.
Quat.
Sci.
Rev., 158, 29-43, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2016.12.021.
Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
10 Anzidei, M., Antonioli, F., Lambeck, K., Benini, A., Soussi, M. (2011).
New insights on the relative sea level change during Holocene along the coasts of Tunisia and western Libya from archaeological and geomorphological markers.
Quat.
Int., 232(1-2), 5-12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quaint.2010.03.018.
Anzidei, M., Bosman, A., Carluccio, R., Casalbore, D., D'Ajello Caracciolo, F., Esposito, A., Nicolosi, I., Pietrantonio, G., Vecchio, A., Carmisciano, C., Chiappini, M., Chiocci, F.L., Muccini, F., Sepe, V. (2016).
Flooding scenarios in coastal volcanic areas due to land subsidence and sea level rise: a case study for Lipari Island (Italy).
Terra Nova 29(1).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ter.12246.
Aucelli, P.C., Di Paola, G., Incontri, P., Rizzo, A., Vilardo, G., Benassai, G., Buonocore, B., Pappone, G. (2016).
Coastal inundation risk assessment due to subsidence and sea level rise in a Mediterranean alluvial plain (Volturno coastal plain esouthern Italy).
Estuar.
Coast.
Shelf Sci., 198(B), 597-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.ecss.2016.06.017.
Bates, D.C. (2002).
Environmental refugees?
Classifying human migrations caused by environmental change.
Population and environment.
23, 465-477 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015186001919.
Beck, U.
(2013).
La società del rischio.
In Verso una Seconda Modernità; Carocci: Rome, Italy.
Boateng, I.
(2008).
Integrating Sea-Level Rise Adaptation into Planning Policies in the Coastal Zone, in Integrating GenerationsFIG Working Week 2008, Stockholm, Sweden.
Brent D., R., Zegras, P.C., Vega-Barachowitz, D., Perkins-High, L., Rocco, V., Han, Y., Li, M. (2015).Rising tides: relocation and Sea Level Rise in metropolitan Boston.
LCAU.
MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Bukvic, A.
(2015).
Identifying gaps and inconsistencies in the use of relocation rhetoric: a prerequisite for sound relocation policy and planning.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change.
Springer, vol.
20(7), pages 1203-1209. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s11027-013-9532-5.
Città metropolitana di Genova.
Genova Piano strategico metropolitano.
(2017).
Available online: https://pianostrategico.cittametropolitana.genova.it/ (accessed on 23.07.2020).
Città metropolitana di Milano.
Piano strategico metropolitano milanese 2019-21.
(2019).
Available online: https://www.cittametropolitana.mi.it/Piano_Strategico_2019_2021/ (accessed on 23.07.2020).
Città metropolitana di Venezia.
Piano strategico metropolitano 2019-2021.
(2018).
Available online: https://forumpsm.cittametropolitana.ve.it/ (accessed on 24.07.2020).
Davenport, C., Campbell, R. (2016).
Resettling the First American ‘Climate Refugees’.
The New York Times.
May 3, 2016.
European Commission [EC] (2021).
Forging a climate-resilient Europe the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, Available online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2021:82:FIN, 2021.
European Environment Agency [EEA].
(2016).
Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe.
IUCN (2020).
Ecosystem-based Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation.
Disponibile al link: https://www.iucn.org/theme/ecosystemmanagement/our-work/ecosystem-based-approaches-climate-change-adaptation.
(accessed on 05.07.2020).
Kommune, V. (2013).
Vejle’s Resilient Strategy.
Available online: https://www.vejle.dk/borger/mit-liv/ (accessed on 25.07.2021).
Lambeck, K., Antonioli, F., Anzidei, M., Ferranti, L., Leoni, G., Scicchitano, G., Silenzi, S. (2011).
Sea level change along Italian coast during Holocene and a projection for the future.
Quat.
Int., 232(1e2), 250e257.
http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.quaint.2010.04.026.
Maragno, D. Dalla Fontana M. Musco F. (2020).
Mapping Heat Stress Vulnerability and Risk Assessment at the Neighborhood Scale to Drive Urban Adaptation Planning.
Sustainability, 12, 1056.
Mariano, C., Marino, M. (2018).
Water landscapes: from risk management to a urban regeneration strategy.
UPLanD Journal of Urban Planning, Landscape & Environmental Design, 3(1), 55-74. https://doi.org/10.6092/2531-9906/5846.
Mariano C., Marino M., (2019a).
Inondazioni costiere nel Mediterraneo.
Strategie di trasformazione per città resilienti.
AGATHÓN International Journal of Architecture, Art and Design, 6(online), 104-113. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.19229/2464-9309/6102019.
Mariano C., Marino M., (2019b).
Defense, adaptation and relocation.
Three strategies for urban planning of coastal areas at risk of flooding, TeMA.
J.
Land Use Mobil.
Environ.
704-713, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.6093/978-88-6887-054-6.
Mariano C., Marino M., Pisacane G., Sannino G. (2021).
Sea level rise and coastal impacts: innovation and improvement of the Local Urban Plan for a climate-proof adaptation strategy.
Sustainability 13(3): 1565. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13031565.
Mele, C., Daniel, V. (2016).
Reeling from Effects of Climate Change, Alaskan Village Looks to Relocate.
The New York Times.
August 19, 2016.
Musco, F. (2008).
Cambiamenti Climatici, Politiche di Adattamento e Mitigazione: Una Prospettiva Urbana, in Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali, 93, 5–38, 2008.
Musco, F., Fregolent, L. (2014).
Eds.
Pianificazione Urbanistica e Clima Urbano.
Manuale per la riduzione dei fenomeni di isola di calore urbano; Il Poligrafo casa editrice: Padova, Italy.
Rahmstorf, S. (2007).
A semi-empirical approach to projecting future sea-level rise.
Science, 315(5810), 368–370, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1135456.
Reimann, L., Vafeidis, A.T., Brown, S., Hinkel, J., Tol, R.S.J.
(2018).
Mediterranean UNESCO World Heritage at risk from coastal flooding and erosion due to sea-level rise.
Nature Communications 9(4161), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-06645-9.
Rotterdam.
(2013).
Climate.
Initiative.
Rotterdam Climate Change Adaptation Programme.
Connecting Water with Opportunities.
Available online: http://www.deltacityofthefuture.nl/cities/rotterdam/climate-change-adaptation (accessed on 23.07.2021).
Salata, S., Giaimo, C. (2016).
Nuovi paradigmi per la pianificazione urbanistica: i servizi ecosistemici per il buon uso del suolo.
in Un nuovo ciclo della pianificazione urbanistica tra tattica e strategia.
Planum publisher, Milan.
Secretariat of the Convention on biological diversity.
(2019).
Voluntary guidelines for the design and effective implementation of ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and supplementary information.
Technical Series No.
93.
Montreal, 156 pages, 2019.
Carmela Mariano/ The Academic Research Community Publication pg.
11 Snoussi, M., Ouchani, T., Niazi, S. (2008).
Vulnerability assessment of the impact of sea-level rise and flooding on the Moroccan coast: the case of the Mediterranean eastern zone.
Estuar.
Coast.
Shelf Sci.
77(2), 206-213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecss.2007.09.024.
Sterr, H., Klein, R.J.T., Reese, S. (2003).
Climate Change and Coastal Zones: an Overview of the State-of the-art on Regional and Local Vulnerability Assessment.
Published.
Climate Change and the Mediterranean: Socio-economics of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation.
Available at https://www.feem.it/m/publications_pages/NDL2000-038.pdf (accessed on 03.07.2020).
Talia, M. (2020).
(ed.)
Le Nuove Comunità Urbane e il Valore Strategico Della Conoscenza.
In Atti Della Conferenza Internazionale Urbanpromo XVII Edizione Progetti per il Paese; Planum Publisher: Rome-Milan, Italy.
The City of New York.
One NYC 2050.
Building a Strong and Fair City.
2019.
Available online: https://onenyc.cityofnewyork.us/about/ (accessed on 25.07.2021).
Todaro, V., Abbate, G., Giampino, A., & Orlando, M. (2009).
Territori costieri.
(Urbanistica).
FrancoAngeli.Rome-Milan, Italy.
UNFCCC.
(2015) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015.
Available online: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
UNISDR.
(2015).
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.
Available online: https://www.undrr.org/publication/sendaiframework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030 (accessed on 03.07.2020).
United Nation.
(2015).
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Available online: https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda (accessed on 03.07.2020).
ISSN 1827-9635 (print) © Firenze University Press ISSN 1827-9643 (online) www.fupress.com/ah Acta Herpetologica 6(1): 105-118, 2011 Climate change and peripheral populations: predictions for a relict Mediterranean viper José C. Brito1, Soumia Fahd2, Fernando Martínez-Freiría1, Pedro Tarroso1, Said Larbes3, Juan M. Pleguezuelos4, Xavier Santos5 1 CIBIO, Centro de Investigação em Biodiversidade e Recursos Genéticos da Universidade do Porto, Campus Agrário de Vairão, R. Padre Armando Quintas, 4485-661 Vairão, Portugal.
Corresponding author.
E-mail: fmartinez_freiria@yahoo.es 2 Département de Biologie, Faculté des Sciences, Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi, Tétouan, Morocco.
3 Faculté des Sciences Biologiques et Agronomiques, Université M. Mammeri.
Tizi-Ouzou, Algeria.
4 Departamento de Biología Animal, Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de Granada, E-18071 Granada, Spain.
5 Departament de Biologia Animal, Universitat de Barcelona, Av.
Diagonal 645, E-08028 Barcelona, Spain.
Submitted on: 2010, 26th December; revised on 2011, 10th May; accepted on 2011, 26h May.
Abstract.
Ecological niche-based models were developed in peripheral populations of Vipera latastei in North Africa to: 1) identify environmental factors related to species occurrence; 2) identify present suitable areas; 3) estimate future areas according to forecasted scenarios of climate change; and 4) quantify habitat suitability changes between present and future climatic scenarios.
Field observations were combined with environmental factors to derive an ensemble of predictions of species occurrence.
The resulting models were projected to the future North African environmental scenarios.
Species occurrence was most related to precipitation variation.
Present suitable habitats were fragmented and ranged from coastal to mountain habitats, and the overall fragmented range suggests a relict distribution from wider past ranges.
Future projections suggest a progressive decrease in suitable areas.
The relationship with precipitation supports the current unsuitability of most North Africa for the species and predicts future increased extinction risk.
Monitoring of population trends and full protection of mountain forests are key-targets for long-term conservation of African populations of this viper.
Predicted trends may give indications about other peripheral populations of Palearctic vertebrates in North Africa which should be assessed in detail.
Keywords.
Climate change, conservation, Mediterranean, biogeography, range regression, Vipera latastei.
mailto:fmartinez_freiria@yahoo.es 106 J.C. Brito, S. Fahd, F. Martínez-Freiría, P. Tarroso, S. Larbes, J.M.
Pleguezuelos and X. Santos INTRODUCTION The complex geographic shifts around the Strait of Gibraltar over the past 14 million years (De Jong, 1998) resulted in high percentages of European and African species found in Morocco and Iberian Peninsula, respectively (Schleich et al., 1996; Sindaco and Jeremcenko, 2008).
The Pleistocene climatic oscillations have also produced shifts in species ranges (Hewitt, 2000): during cold periods, European species in North Africa expanded their range, but in warm periods, they have experienced severe reductions in the southern part of their range, with populations remaining isolated in mountainous areas (Santos et al., 2009).
Currently, North-western Africa has the highest diversity and number of Europeanoriginated relicts of terrestrial reptiles in the Mediterranean Basin (Bons and Geniez, 1996; Schleich et al., 1996; Pleguezuelos et al., 2010).
During the last 10,000 years, the region has been subjected to enormous landscape changes for both natural reasons (climate warming during the Holocene) and human activities (Charco, 1999).
Presently, it is estimated that only 4.7% of the original Mediterranean forests remain (Cuttelod et al., 2008).
Thus, many European taxa in North Africa are presently restricted to isolated mountains where suitable habitats endure (Bons and Geniez, 1996; Schleich et al., 1996).
Range reductions and shifts to higher elevations are expected in mountain specialists (Peterson, 2003) and highlands may act as refuges against climatic constraints (Nogués-Bravo et al., 2007).
Climate change scenarios for North Africa predict a decrease in rainfall of 10-200 mm by 2025 (Paeth and Thamm, 2007), which may increase the vulnerability of these populations to extinction.
The Lataste’s viper, Vipera latastei, is an appropriate taxon to analyse potential effects of climate change in the extinction vulnerability of European-originated relicts in Northwestern Africa because: 1) it is a species of European origin that colonised North-western Africa prior to the formation of the Strait of Gibraltar (Saint-Girons, 1980; authors, unpub.
data); 2) the global distribution is well known (Brito et al., 2008); 3) several lifehistory traits, such as low growth rates, frequency of reproduction and dispersion capacity, and feeding specialisation, make it prone to local extinction (Brito and Rebelo, 2003; Pleguezuelos et al., 2007; Santos et al., 2007a); 4) the rare reported occurrences in Northwestern African, even in areas relatively well sampled (Bons and Geniez, 1996; Real et al., 1997; Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001), suggest low population densities; and 5) its distribution is highly related to an environmental variable, the annual precipitation, at both regional and local scales (Brito et al., 2008; Martínez-Freiría et al., 2008).
Populations of V. latastei in North Africa were ascribed to the subspecies V. l. gaditana (Saint-Girons, 1977).
They have been shown to constitute morphologically differentiated groups (Brito et al., 2008) and genetical substructuring has been identified for Morocco and Algeria, probably related to the opening of the Gibraltar Strait (authors, unpub.
data).
African populations occur within a concise area, from the Rif and Middle Atlas mountains of Morocco to western Tunisia, isolated by the Mediterranean from the remaining European populations.
Previous biogeographical studies suggested that local environmental pressures are related with the African range of the species (Brito et al., 2008).
These factors, combined with the Near-Threatened status in Morocco (Pleguezuelos et al., 2010) and the rareness and fragmented character of the species in Africa, stress the need for the development of regional evaluations of species vulnerability to climate change.
Analyses within geographical limits are useful (Czech and Krausman, 1997) 107Climate change and relict viper populations because most decisions and budgets on the management of a species of conservation concern are planned independently by the different countries within the range of a species (Rodrigues and Gaston, 2002; Samways, 2003).
This study uses ecological niche-based models in African relict populations of V. latastei to: 1) identify suitable areas for species occurrence in present time; 2) estimate future suitable areas according to forecasted scenarios of climate change; and 3) quantify habitat suitability changes between present and future climatic scenarios.
We intend to provide insights on the vulnerability to extinction of European-originated relict taxa in North Africa to predicted climate change impacts.
MATERIAL AND METHODS Data The study area comprises northern regions of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (Fig.
1).
A total of 33 viper localities (Table 1) were collected from bibliographic records (Boettger, 1883; Dolfus and Beaurieux, 1928; Chpakowsky and Chnéour, 1953; Bons, 1958, 1963; Saint-Girons, 1977; Mediani et al., 2009), museum collections (MNHN Paris, MNCN Madrid, Univ.
Salamanca), unpublished observations given to authors, and fieldwork conducted between 1989 and 2009 (Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001; Fahd et al., 2005, 2007; authors, unpub.
data).
Fieldwork observations were georeferenced to the GPS precision (WGS84 datum).
Given the restricted range of microhabitats occupied by the species (Santos et al., 2006; Brito et al., 2008; Martínez-Freiría et al., 2008), bibliographic and museum localities were georeferenced with a precision of 1 × 1 km.
Environmental factors, or ecogeographical variables (hereafter EGV), were selected according to their importance to the distribution of V. latastei (Santos et al., 2006; Brito et al., 2008; MartínezFreiría et al., 2008): annual average temperature (ANTE), annual temperature range (TANR), maximum temperature of warmest month (TMAX), annual precipitation (ANPR) (Hijmans et al., 2005), and one topographical grid (USGS, 2006) from which slope (SLOP) was derived with the Geographical Information System (GIS) ArcGIS 9.2 (Table 2).
Future climate data from three Global Circulation Models (GCM: CCCMA, HADCM3 and CSIRO) and two IPPC 3rd Assessment emission scenarios (A2a and B2a) for three time periods (2020-2050, 2050-2080 and 2080-2100) (IPCC-TGICA, 2007) Fig.
1.
Location of the study area within the Mediterranean context, distribution of observations of Vipera latastei in North-western Africa and major toponomies in the study area.
108 J.C. Brito, S. Fahd, F. Martínez-Freiría, P. Tarroso, S. Larbes, J.M.
Pleguezuelos and X. Santos were obtained from WorldClim (Hijmans et al., 2005).
The resolution of EGVs was standardised to a grid cell size of 0.0110 degrees (about 1 × 1 km) for matching the resolution of observations.
Analyses were developed using a geographic coordinate system given the limited latitudinal extent of the study area.
Correlations between EGVs were relatively negligible (r < 0.599 in all cases).
The presence sample size available for developing ecological models was very small which is mostly related to the rareness and localised character of the species in Africa (Bons and Geniez, 1996; Schleich et al., 1996) and sampling restrictions in politically unstable areas.
These constraints Table 1.
Location of observations of Vipera latastei used to develop the ecological models.
The year and the origin of the observation are also included.
Locality, Country Year Reference Oued Bou Regieg, Morocco 1959 Bons, 1963 Mamora forest, Morocco 2008 unpub.
data given to authors Tanger, Morocco 1982 Boettger, 1883 Jbel Haouch Ben Lake’aa, Morocco 2009 Mediani et al., 2009 Astouf, Morocco 1990 Collection DBA Granada Jbel El Alem, Morocco 2000 authors, unpub.
data Oued Laou, Morocco 1986 unpub.
data given to authors Kelti, Morocco 2005 authors, unpub.
data Ain Rami, Morocco 1992 Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001 Chaouen, Morocco 1992 Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001 Fifi, Morocco 2008 unpub.
data given to authors Azrou, Morocco 1928 Dolfus and Beaurieux, 1928 Talassemtane, Morocco 2001 authors, unpub.
data Bou Slimane, Morocco 1992 Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001 Béni M’Hamed, Morocco 2005 authors, unpub.
data Sidi Ali Aguelmane, Morocco 2006 Fahd et al., 2007 Khandak Lanasser, Morocco 1992 Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001 Jbel Tidghine, Morocco 2005 Fahd et al., 2006 Ain Zora, Morocco 1992 Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001 Ras El Ma, Morocco 1908 Collection MNCN Madrid Moulouya river mouth, Morocco 1988 Collection Univ.
Salamanca Saïdia, Morocco 1958 Bons, 1958 Aïn Benian, Algeria 1891 Collection MNHN Paris Djebel Heidzer, Algeria 2005 authors, unpub.
data Tikjda, Algeria 2004 authors, unpub.
data Darna, Algeria 2004 authors, unpub.
data Darna, Algeria 2005 authors, unpub.
data Ait Ouabane, Algeria 2005 authors, unpub.
data Akfadou, Algeria 2006 authors, unpub.
data Mountain Edough, Algeria 1977 Saint-Girons, 1977 Annaba, Algeria 1901 Collection MNHN Paris Ain Soltane, Tunisia 1953 Chpakowsky and Chnéour, 1953 Ain Draham, Tunisia 1953 Chpakowsky and Chnéour, 1953 109Climate change and relict viper populations forced using four localities (Table 1) where vipers were observed outside the temporal range of present environmental data, 1950 to 2000 (Hijmans et al., 2005).
Removing such localities would imply an even smaller sample size for calibrating models, which would probably increase uncertainties in model predictions.
Ecological Niche-based models Models were developed with Maximum Entropy approach, using MaxEnt 3.3.0f (Phillips et al., 2006).
This modelling technique requires only presence data as input, but consistently performed well in comparison to other methods, especially at low samples sizes and in assessments of climate change effects (Elith et al., 2006; Hernandez et al., 2006; Hijmans and Graham, 2006; Wisz et al., 2008).
A total of 25 replicates were run with random seed, which allows a different random 20% test / 80% train data partition in each run.
Presence data for each replicate were chosen by bootstrap allowing sampling with replacement.
Models were run with auto-features (Phillips et al., 2006), and the Area under the Curve (AUC) of the receiver-operating characteristics (ROC) plot was taken as a measure of individual model fit (Liu et al., 2005).
The importance of an EGV for explaining the species distribution was determined by its average percent contribution to the model.
The relationship between viper occurrence and EGVs was determined by examination of response curves profiles from univariate models (Martínez-Freiría et al., 2008; Brito et al., 2008, 2009).
The individual model replicates (N = 25) were added to generate a mean forecast of probability of species presence under present climatic conditions (Araújo and New, 2007; Marmion et al., 2009).
Standard deviation between individual model probabilities of occurrence was used as an indication of prediction uncertainty (Buisson et al., 2010; Carvalho et al., 2010).
The individual model replicates were projected for each GCM and emission scenario, resulting in 150 simulations for each year.
Models were averaged by year to generate a future probability of presence.
The maximum standard deviation between replicate uncertainties across combinations of GCMs and emission scenarios were taken as a measure of final prediction uncertainty.
The consensus predictions of mean models were reclassified into three categories of habitat suitability: core habitats with more than 0.5 mean probability of occurrence, marginal habitats (between 0.25 and 0.5) and unsuitable habitats (less than 0.25).
The area of each category was quantified and percentage change of each category from the present to the future predicted models were calculated (Carvalho et al., 2010).
Total presence data (N = 33) were overlaid with present and future mean models to calculate percentages of presences in each habitat suitability category.
Table 2.
Environmental variation (minimum maximum) in the study area in the present time and predicted for 2020, 2050, 2080 from the ensemble of two emission scenarios (A2a and B2a) and three global circulation models (CCCMA, CSIRO and HADCM3).
Variable Units Current 2020 2050 2080 ANPR mm 168 1430 156 1423 152 1370 131 1276 TANR ºC 18.4 36.9 18.3 38.6 17.8 39.7 18.2 40.9 TMAX ºC 25.7 37.2 26.4 40.7 27.6 40.8 28.8 43.7 ANTE ºC 4.2 20.1 5.3 21.4 6.6 22.3 7.3 24.6 SLOP % 0 69 110 J.C. Brito, S. Fahd, F. Martínez-Freiría, P. Tarroso, S. Larbes, J.M.
Pleguezuelos and X. Santos RESULTS The ROC plots for the training and testing datasets exhibited high average AUCs (above 0.934 and 0.886, respectively) with low standard deviations (Table 3).
All observations in the present model were identified as occurring in core and marginal habitat suitability areas.
Annual average precipitation was the EGV most related to occurrence (average contribution above 58%), but slope (above 13%), annual temperature range (above 9%), and maxiTable 3.
Sample sizes, average (and standard deviation) training and test AUC, and average percent (and standard deviation) contribution of each variable for the 25 Maximum Entropy models projected to four climatic scenarios (Present, 2020, 2050 and 2080), and number (and percentage) of observations of Vipera latastei in North-western Africa in each habitat suitability category in each climatic scenario.
Present 2020 2050 2080 N training samples 26 per model 26 per model 26 per model 26 per model N test samples 7 per model 7 per model 7 per model 7 per model Training AUC (SD) 0.935 (0.013) 0.934 (0.018) 0.934 (0.019) 0.935 (0.018) Test AUC (SD) 0.895 (0.067) 0.886 (0.093) 0.887 (0.087) 0.892 (0.087) ANPR (SD) 57.7 (14.1) 64.7 (15.6) 63.7 (15.2) 63.0 (17.2) TANR (SD) 9.0 (5.4) 11.0 (9.4) 9.3 (6.6) 9.8 (8.3) TMAX (SD) 9.1 (9.4) 7.9 (8.8) 9.4 (11.9) 8.2 (11.7) ANTE (SD) 6.4 (6.7) 3.6 (5.8) 4.0 (5.1) 3.6 (4.7) SLOP (SD) 17.7 (11.2) 12.8 (9.3) 13.6 (13.4) 15.5 (11.7) Suitability category Unsuitable (%) 0 (0) 3 (9.1) 6 (18.2) 8 (24.2) Marginal (%) 16 (48.5) 14 (42.4) 17 (51.5) 22 (66.7) Core (%) 17 (51.5) 16 (48.5) 10 (30.3) 3 (9.1) Fig.
2.
Response curves for the most related environmental factors to the distribution of Vipera latastei in North-western Africa.
Curves depict probability of occurrence along the environmental gradients.
111Climate change and relict viper populations Fig.
3.
Mean probability of occurrence of Vipera latastei in North-western Africa, at a 1x1km scale, for the present and projected models (2020, 2050 and 2080), based on three global circulation models (GCM) and two emission scenarios (150 bootstrap models for each year).
Maximum standard deviation of predictions across GCMs and scenarios are represented in smaller insets.
112 J.C. Brito, S. Fahd, F. Martínez-Freiría, P. Tarroso, S. Larbes, J.M.
Pleguezuelos and X. Santos mum temperature of warmest month (above 8%) were also related (Table 3).
The profiles of the response curves suggest that the species is restricted to precipitation and slopes roughly above 900 mm and 15%, respectively, and maximum temperatures below 30 ºC (Fig.
2).
Core habitat-suitability areas according to the present model (Fig.
3) were fragmented and restricted to the Rif and few cells in central Middle Atlas and coastal Tangier in Morocco, eastern Tellian Atlas in Algeria, and El Feidja in Tunisia.
Marginal suitability habitats surrounded core areas and included also the Middle Atlas and coastal regions of Salé, Melilla, Saidia and Oran.
The areas of prediction uncertainty were common to the habitats identified as marginal and core.
Future projection of models predicted a progressive decrease in the availability of suitable areas (Table 4).
Compared with the model for the present time, a decrease of 89% and 57% in the availability of core and marginal habitats, respectively, is predicted by 2080.
Core habitat areas will be extremely fragmented and restricted to the Rif and Tellian mountains (Fig.
3) and would include only 9% of present-day viper localities in core areas (Table 3).
The distribution of future predicted suitability areas suggests that most currentviper localities (67%) will be located in marginal habitats (Table 4).
Areas of prediction uncertainty were restricted to few squares, especially for 2080 (Fig.
3).
DISCUSSION The low number of observations available, the large dimensions of the study area and the projection to future climates stressed the importance of incorporating distinct sources of uncertainty in model projections for future climatic conditions.
First, average predictions from different GCMs and emission scenarios were analysed, which allowed recovering patterns emerging from the noise associated with distinct model outputs (Buisson et al., 2010; Carvalho et al., 2010).
Secondly, average predictions from model replicates using distinct presence data sets were analysed, which partially accounted for the effects of low sample size (Pearson et al., 2007).
The Maximum Entropy algorithm was employed due to its good performance under climate change scenarios (Hijmans and Graham, 2006) and ability to deal with low sample sized data sets (Elith et al., 2006; Hernandez et al., 2006; Wisz et al., 2008).
However, uncertainties associated to modelling techniques have been emphasised (Thuiller, 2004; Wiens et al., 2009; Buisson et al., 2010) and should be Table 4.
Forecasted evolution of habitat suitability for Vipera latastei in North-western Africa.
Number of 1x1 km squares classified by the present model and 2020, 2050 and 2080 scenarios in each habitat suitability category (unsuitable, marginal and core habitat).
Percentage of gain (+) or loss (-) in number of squares relatively to the present model are given in brackets.
Unsuitable Marginal Core Present 103958 47905 7609 2020 120751 (+16.2) 32493 (-32.2) 6228 (-18.1) 2050 131074 (+26.1) 25120 (-47.6) 3278 (-56.9) 2080 142193 (+36.8) 16440 (-65.7) 839 (-89.0) 113Climate change and relict viper populations addressed in future studies.
Nevertheless, models were apparently robust and all presence data were identified in core and marginal areas of present model predictions.
Uncertainties in projections of models related to low sample size were mostly located in cells identified with core and marginal suitability, but not in cells of unsuitable habitat, suggesting that potential areas for the occurrence of the viper may actually be smaller, on average, than predicted.
Present models were calibrated with restricted-range of environmental conditions in comparison to the predicted environmental range for the future (Table 2) which may produce biases in model projections for the future (Barbet-Massin et al., 2010).
However, the lower precipitation and higher temperatures predicted for the future that fall outside the present variation, mostly located in lower altitude areas between the Rif and Middle Atlas of Morocco and south-eastern valleys of El Feidja in Tunisia (data not shown), correspond already to present-day unsuitable areas (Fig.
3).
The uncertainties arriving from these biases are thus negligible because these areas are very unlikely to become suitable habitats in the future.
About 65% of the study area was quantified as unsuitable in the present model, which agrees with the biogeographical pattern of the peripheral limit of a species distribution.
The proximity of the Sahara desert as a true ecological barrier for V. latastei further supports the observed relationship between high annual precipitation and low maximum temperature with species presence.
Presently, V. latastei is less common in flatter areas, which correspond essentially to coastal and agricultural regions, and slope is probably acting as surrogate for habitat loss in plain areas where human activities tend to be more intense (Charco, 1999; Ramdani et al., 2001; Cuttelod et al., 2008).
In fact, local extinction in Morocco was suggested for coastal regions, where recent intensive sampling effort (Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001; Fahd et al., 2005, 2007; Harris et al., 2008; authors, unpub.
data) failed to confirm previous observations.
These localities corresponded to coastal cells located in the Salé beach, Moulouya mouth and Tangiers peninsula, and have been most affected recently by tourism urbanisation (Ramdani et al., 2001; Fahd et al., 2005) that probably induced severe habitat loss for the viper.
Local extinction in the coastal belt is a pattern also reported for the snake community of Mediterranean coastal Spain, deriving from intense tourism and agricultural activities (Santos et al., 2006, 2007b).
The modelling approach used in this study considered all observations available because the secretive behaviour of the viper hampers the accurate determination of local extinction.
However, if the suggested disappearance from certain areas of coastal Morocco is confirmed, then the current predictions of suitable habitats may be overestimated, as well as future range predictions.
Present suitable areas for V. latastei in North-western Africa are fragmented and mostly restricted to mountain areas of low habitat change.
Most recent observations come from protected areas holding forests of high environmental and economic value, where grazing is relatively restricted to favour natural seedling.
Alarmingly, pine plantations (e.g., in Northwestern Tunisia, Brito et al., 2008), cannabis culture (in the Rif, Fahd et al., 2005), and extensive agriculture and overexploitation of livestock outside protected areas, continue to threaten habitats (Charco, 1999).
The models further suggested that the species may be present in currently undetected mountains, such as in Jbel Bou Naceur (Morocco).
Likewise, large core habitat areas in Algeria were predicted for eastern Tellian Atlas, but field work is needed to confirm viper presence in these politically unstable areas.
114 J.C. Brito, S. Fahd, F. Martínez-Freiría, P. Tarroso, S. Larbes, J.M.
Pleguezuelos and X. Santos Future projections are not optimistic for viper persistence, given the predicted declines in suitable habitats with no new suitable areas identified.
The significant increase of temperature in North Africa during the mid-Piacenzian warm interval (ca 3 Myr ago) of the Late Pliocene (Jost et al., 2009) probably induced refugia in suitable mountain valleys during warming stages and triggered for the current fragmented range of V. latastei.
Thus, the projected decrease in precipitation (Paeth and Thamm, 2007) should imply even smaller suitable areas in the future.
Dispersal was suggested as a possible mechanism for decreasing the impacts of climate change (e.g., Araújo et al., 2006), but severe population declines are expected in species with low dispersal capacities surrounded already by unsuitable habitats (Foden et al., 2007).
In the case of V. latastei, colonisation of new cells is highly unlikely during the time-period of the study, given its climatic specialisation in North Africa and the systematically occurrence in preserved habitats (Real et al., 1997; Fahd and Pleguezuelos, 2001).
This pattern is consistent with the Iberian Peninsula, where this viper is present in various habitat types (from coastal dunes to highland shrublands) but preferably in localities where habitats are well preserved (Santos et al., 2006).
Additionally, several biological traits of this viper make it a slow coloniser (Brito and Rebelo, 2003; Pleguezuelos et al., 2007; Santos et al., 2007b).
According to future predictions, mountains will become climatic refugia, as predicted also for Cedrus atlantica forests in Morocco (Cheddadi et al., 2009).
Therefore, the currently existing mountain parks are priority areas for the conservation of this species.
Although it is unknown if species will be able to adapt to future climate conditions and persist in the current range, monitoring of population trends and full protection of mountain forests are key-targets for long-term conservation of V. latastei in North Africa.
However, current predictions should also be evaluated for the first projected scenario (year 2020), with viper sampling in current suitable habitats and/or confirmation of forecasted decrease in precipitation.
Field sampling should take into account detectability biases related to rareness and cryptic behaviour (Mazerolle et al., 2007).
If predicted reductions in habitat suitability to 2020 are correct, conservation actions must be accomplished, including the strict protection of all areas with viper populations, the exclusion of grazing from these areas, and potentially population translocation.
Under the scenario of habitat suitability decrease in 2020, the delay of these management actions would be catastrophic for long-term conservation of this viper.
Trends in the availability of suitable habitats observed in this study may give indications about other European-originated vertebrates with relict populations in North Africa, including fishes (Barbus sp.
), amphibians (Salamandra algira), reptiles (Coronella girondica), birds (Cinclus cinclus), and mammals (Mustela putorius), which should evidence similar environmental responses and extinction risks as the studied viper.
The conservation of these species would benefit from modelling procedures to examine their distribution tendencies which would assist in management actions for their conservation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was partially supported by project POCTI/BIA-BDE/55596/2004 from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT, Portugal) and by Cooperation CNRST-FCT (2008-09).
JCB has a 115Climate change and relict viper populations contract (Programme Ciência 2007).
FMF and PT have grants (SFRH/BPD/69857/2010 and SFRH/ BD/42480/2007, respectively) from FCT.
Acknowledgments extended to the numerous researchers who gave unpublished observations.
REFERENCES Araújo, M.B., New M. (2007): Ensemble forecasting of species distributions.
TREE 22: 42-47.
Araújo, M.B., Thuiller, W., Pearson, R.G.
(2006): Climate warming and the decline of amphibians and reptiles in Europe.
J. Biogeogr.
33: 1712-1718.
Barbet-Massin, M., Thuiller, W., Jiguet, F. (2010): How much do we overestimate future local extinction rates when restricting the range of occurrence data in climate suitability models?
Ecography 33: 878-886.
Boettger, O.
(1883): Die Reptilien und Amphibien von Marokko II.
Abhandl.
Senckenb.
Ges.
13: 93-146.
Bons, J.
(1958): Contribution a l’étude de l’herpétofaune marocaine (Reptiles de la région d’Ifrane).
Bull.
Soc.
Sci.
Nat.
Phys.
Maroc 38: 167-182.
Bons, J.
(1963): Notules herpétologiques marocaines.
Comptes Rendus des Sèances Mensuelles de la Société des Sciences Naturelles et Physiques du Maroc 29: 135-137.
Bons, J., Geniez, Ph.
(1996).
Amphibiens et Reptiles du Maroc.
AHE, Barcelona.
Brito, J.C., Acosta, A.L., Álvares, F., Cuzin, F. (2009): Biogeography and conservation of taxa from remote regions: An application of ecological-niche based models and GIS to North-African canids.
Biol.
Conserv.
142: 3020-3029.
Brito, J.C., Rebelo, R. (2003): Differential growth and mortality affect sexual size dimorphism in Vipera latastei.
Copeia 2003: 865-871.
Brito, J.C., Santos, X., Pleguezuelos, J.M., Sillero, N. (2008): Inferring evolutionary scenarios with geostatistics and geographical information systems for the viperid snakes Vipera latastei and Vipera monticola.
Biol.
J. Linn.
Soc.
95: 790-806.
Buisson, L., Thuiller, W., Casajus, N., Lek, S., Grenouillet, G. (2010): Uncertainty in ensemble forecasting of species distribution.
Glob.
Chang.
Biol.
16: 1145-1157.
Carvalho, S.B., Brito, J.C., Crespo, E.J., Possingham, H.P.
(2010): From climate change predictions to actions – conserving vulnerable animal groups in hotspots at a regional scale.
Glob.
Chang.
Biol.
16: 3257–3270.
Charco, J.
(1999): El Bosque Mediterráneo en el Norte de África: biodiversidad y lucha contra la desertificación.
Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Madrid.
Cheddadi, R., Fady, B., François, L., Hajar, L., Suc, J.-P., Huang, K., Demarteau, M., Vendramin, G.G., Ortu, E. (2009): Putative glacial refugia of Cedrus atlantica deduced from Quaternary pollen records and modern genetic diversity.
J. Biogeogr.
36: 1361-1371.
Chpakowsky, N., Chnéour, A.
(1953): Les serpents de Tunisie.
Bull.
Soc.
Sci.
Nat.
Tunisie 6: 125-146.
Cuttelod, A., García, N., Abdul Malak, D., Temple, H., Katariya, V. (2008): The Mediterranean: a biodiversity hotspot under threat.
In: The 2008 Review of the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species.
Vié, J.C., Hilton-Taylor, C., Stuart, S.N., Eds, IUCN, Gland.
116 J.C. Brito, S. Fahd, F. Martínez-Freiría, P. Tarroso, S. Larbes, J.M.
Pleguezuelos and X. Santos Czech, B., Krausman, P.R.
(1997): Distribution and causation of species endangerment in the United States.
Science 277: 1116-1117.
De Jong, H. (1998): In search of historical biogeographic patterns in the western Mediterranean terrestrial fauna.
Biol.
J. Linn.
Soc.
65: 99-164.
Dolfus, R.P., Beaurieux, C. (1928): Tableau pour la détermination facile des serpents du Maroc.
Var.
Sci.
Soc.
Sci.
Nat.
Phys.
Maroc 1: 1-29.
Elith, J., Graham, C.H., Anderson, R.P., Dudyk, M., Freer, S., Guisan, A., Hijmans, R.J., Huettmann, F., Leathwick, J.R., Lehmann, A., Li, J., Lohmann, L.G., Loiselle, B.A., Manion, G., Moritz, C., Nakamura, M., Nakazawa, Y., McOverton, J., Peterson, A.T., Phillips, S., Wisz, M.S., Zimmermann, N.E.
(2006): Novel methods improve prediction of species’ distributions from occurrence data.
Ecography 29: 129-151.
Fahd, S., Barata, M., Benítez, M., Brito, J.C., Caro, J., Carvalho, S., Chirosa, M., Feriche, M., Herrera, T., Márquez-Ferrando, R., Nesbitt, D., Pleguezuelos, J.M., Reques, R., Paz Rodríguez, M., Santos, X., Sicilia, M., Vasconcelos, R. (2007): Presencia de la víbora hocicuda Vipera latastei en el Atlas Medio (Marruecos) y otras citas herpetológicas para la región.
Bol.
Asoc.
Herpetol.
Esp.
18: 26-34.
Fahd, S., Benítez, M., Brito, J.C., Caro, J., Chirosa, M., Feriche, M., Fernández-Cardenete, J.R., Martínez-Freira, F., Márquez-Ferrando, R., Nesbitt, D., Pleguezuelos, J.M., Reques, R., Paz Rodríguez, M., Santos, X., Sicilia, M. (2005): Distribución de Vipera latastei en el Rif y otras citas herpetológicas para el norte de Marruecos.
Bol.
Asoc.
Herpetol.
Esp.
16: 19-25.
Fahd, S., Pleguezuelos, J.M.
(2001): Los reptiles del Rif (Norte de Marruecos), II: anfisbenios y ofidios.
Comentarios sobre la biogeografia del grupo.
Rev.
Esp.
Herpetol.
15: 13-36.
Foden, W., Midgley, G.F., Hughes, G., Bond, W.J., Thuiller, W., Hoffman, M.T., Kaleme, P., Underhill, L.G., Rebelo, A., Hannah, L. (2007): A changing climate is eroding the geographical range of the Namib Desert tree Aloe through population declines and dispersal lags.
Divers.
Distrib.
13: 645-653.
Harris, D.J., Carretero, M.A., Brito J.C., Kaliontzopoulou, A., Pinho, C., Perera A., Vasconcelos R., Barata M., Barbosa, D., Carvalho, S., Fonseca, M.M., Pérez-Lanuza, G., Rato, C. (2008): Data on the distribution of the terrestrial herpetofauna of Morocco: records from 2001-2006.
Herpetol.
Bull.
103: 19-28.
Hernandez, P.A., Graham, C.H., Master, L.L., Albert, D.L.
(2006): The effect of sample size and species characteristics on performance of different species distribution modeling methods.
Ecography 29: 773-785.
Hewitt, G.M.
(2000): The genetic legacy of the Quaternary ice ages.
Nature 405: 907-913.
Hijmans, R.J., Cameron, S.E., Parra, J.L., Jones, P.G., Jarvis, A.
(2005): Very high resolution interpolated climate surfaces for global land areas.
Int.
J. Climatol.
25: 1965-1978.
Hijmans, R.J., Graham, C.H.
(2006): The ability of climate envelope models to predict the effect of climate change on species distributions.
Glob.
Chang.
Biol.
12: 2272-2281.
IPCC-TGICA (2007): General Guidelines on the Use of Scenario Data for Climate Impact and Adaptation Assessment.
Version 2.
Prepared by T.R.
Carter on behalf of the IPCC, Task Group on Data and Scenario Support for Impact and Climate Assessment.
Jost, A., Fauquette, S., Kageyama, M., Krinner, G., Ramstein, G., Suc, J.-P., Viollete, S. (2009): High resolution climate and vegetation simulations of the Late Pliocene, a 117Climate change and relict viper populations model-data comparison over Western Europe and the Mediterranean region.
Climate in the Past 5: 585-606.
Liu, C., Berry, P.M., Dawson, T.P., Pearson, R.G.
(2005): Selecting thresholds of occurrence in the prediction of species distributions.
Ecography 28: 385-393.
Marmion, M., Parviainen, M., Luoto, M., Heikkinen, R.K.., Thuiller, W. (2009): Evaluation of consensus methods in predictive species distribution modelling.
Divers.
Distrib.
15: 59-69.
Martínez-Freiría, F., Sillero, N., Lizana, M., Brito, J.C. (2008): GIS-based niche models identify environmental correlates sustaining a contact zone between European vipers.
Divers.
Distrib.
14: 452-461.
Mazerolle, M.J., Bailey, L.L., Kendall, W.L., Royle, J.A., Converse, S.J., Nichols, J.D.
(2007): Making great leaps forward: accounting for detectability in herpetological field studies.
J. Herpetol.
41: 672-689.
Mediani, M., Amezian, M., Tattou, M.I., Benhoussa, A., Idrissi, H.R., El Agbani, M.A., Qninba, A.
(2009): Nouvelles citations de deux espèces reliques paléarctiques, Emys orbicularis Linnaeus, 1758 et Vipera latastei Boscá, 1878 dans la Péninsule Tingitane (Rif occidental, Maroc).
Bulletin de l’Institut Scientifique, Rabat 31: 99-102.
Nogués-Bravo, D., Araújo, M.B., Errea, M.P., Martínez-Rica, J.P. (2007): Exposure of global mountain systems to climate warming during the 21st Century.
Glob.
Environ.
Change 17: 420-428.
Paeth, H., Thamm, H.-H. (2007): Regional modelling of future African climate north of 15ºS including greenhouse warming and land degradation.
Clim.
Change 83: 401-427.
Pearson, R.G., Raxworthy, C.J., Nakamura, M., Peterson, A.T. (2007): Predicting species distributions from small numbers of occurrence records: a test case using cryptic geckos in Madagascar.
J. Biogeogr.
34: 102-117.
Peterson, A.T. (2003): Projected climate change on Rocky Mountain and Great plains birds: generalities of biodiversity consequences.
Glob.
Chang.
Biol.
9: 647-655.
Phillips, S.J., Anderson, R.P., Schapire, R.E.
(2006): Maximum entropy modeling of species geographic distributions.
Ecol.
Modell.
190: 231-259.
Pleguezuelos, J.M., Brito, J.C., Fahd, S., Feriche, M., Mateo, J.A., Moreno-Rueda, G., Reques, R., Santos, X.
(2010).
Setting conservation priorities for the Moroccan herpetofauna: the utility of Regional Red Listing.
Oryx 44: 501–508.
Pleguezuelos, J.M., Santos, X., Brito, J.C., Parellada, X., Llorente, G.A., Fahd, S. (2007): Reproductive ecology of Vipera latastei, in the Iberian Peninsula: Implications for the conservation of a Mediterranean viper.
Zoology 110: 9-19.
Ramdani, M., Flower, R.J., Elkhiati, N., Kraiem, M.M., Fathi, A.A., Birks, H.H., Patrick, S.T.
(2001): North African wetland lakes: characterization of nine sites included in the CASSARINA project.
Aquat.
Ecol.
35: 281-302.
Real, R., Pleguezuelos, J.M., Fahd, S. (1997): The distribution patterns of reptiles in the Rif region, northern Morocco.
Afr.
J. Ecol.
35: 312-325.
Rodrigues, A.S.L., Gaston, K.J.
(2002): Rarity and conservation planning across geopolitical units.
Cons.
Biol.
16: 674-682.
Saint-Girons, H. (1977): Systématique de Vipera latastei latastei Boscá, 1878 et description de Vipera latastei gaditana, subsp.
n. (Reptilia, Viperidae).
Rev.
Suisse Zool.
84: 599-607.
118 J.C. Brito, S. Fahd, F. Martínez-Freiría, P. Tarroso, S. Larbes, J.M.
Pleguezuelos and X. Santos Saint-Girons, H. (1980): Biogéographie et évolution des vipéres européennes.
C. R. Soc.
Biogeogr.
496: 146-172.
Samways, M.J. (2003): Marginality and national red listing of species.
Biodiv.
Cons.
12: 2523-2525.
Santos, X., Brito, J.C., Caro, J., Abril, A.J., Lorenzo, M., Sillero, N., Pleguezuelos, J.M.
(2009): Habitat suitability, threats and conservation of isolated populations of the smooth snake (Coronella austriaca) in the southern Iberian Peninsula.
Biol.
Conserv.
142: 344-352.
Santos, X., Brito, J.C., Pleguezuelos, J.M., Llorente, G.A.
(2007b): Comparing Filippi and Luiselli’s (2000) method with a cartographic approach to assess the conservation status of secretive species: the case of the Iberian snake-fauna.
Amphibia-Reptilia 28: 17-23.
Santos, X., Brito, J.C., Sillero, N., Pleguezuelos, J.M., Llorente, G.A., Fahd, S., Parellada, X.
(2006): Inferring habitat-suitability areas with ecological modelling techniques and GIS: A contribution to assess the conservation status of Vipera latastei.
Biol.
Conserv.
130: 416-425.
Santos, X., Llorente, G.A., Pleguezuelos, J.M., Brito, J.C., Fahd, S., Parellada, X.
(2007a): Variation in the diet of the Lataste’s viper Vipera latastei in the Iberian Peninsula: seasonal, sexual and size-related effects.
Animal Biol.
57: 49-61.
Schleich, H.H., Kästle, W., Kabisch, K. (1996): Amphibians and Reptiles of North Africa.
Koeltz Scientific Books, Koenigstein.
Sindaco, R., Jeremcenko, V.K.
(2008): The Reptiles of the Western Palearctic 1.
Edizioni Belvedere, Latina.
Thuiller, W. (2004): Patterns and uncertainties of species’ range shifts under climate change.
Glob.
Chang.
Biol.
10: 2020-2027.
USGS (2006): Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM).
USGS.
http://srtm.usgs.gov/ index.html.
Wiens, J.A., Stralberg, D., Jongsomjit, D., Howell, C.A., Snyder, M.A.
(2009): Niches, models, and climate change: assessing the assumptions and uncertainties.
PNAS 106: 19729-19736.
Wisz, M.S., Hijmans, R.J., Li, J., Peterson, A.T., Graham, C.H., Guisan, A., NCEAS Predicting Species Distribution Working Group (2008): effects of sample size on the performance of species distribution models.
Diversity and Distributions 14: 763-773. bbib67 OLE_LINK1 OLE_LINK2 bbib28 OLE_LINK5 OLE_LINK6 OLE_LINK7 OLE_LINK8 _GoBack OLE_LINK1 OLE_LINK2 OLE_LINK3 OLE_LINK4 OLE_LINK1 OLE_LINK2 OLE_LINK19 OLE_LINK20 OLE_LINK21 OLE_LINK29 OLE_LINK3 OLE_LINK4 OLE_LINK5 OLE_LINK31 OLE_LINK14 OLE_LINK15 OLE_LINK12 OLE_LINK13 OLE_LINK16 OLE_LINK17 OLE_LINK22 OLE_LINK23 OLE_LINK24 OLE_LINK8 OLE_LINK9 OLE_LINK10 OLE_LINK11 OLE_LINK18 OLE_LINK27 OLE_LINK28 OLE_LINK25 OLE_LINK26 OLE_LINK6 OLE_LINK7 OLE_LINK34 OLE_LINK37 OLE_LINK38 Acta Herpetologica Vol.
6, n. 1 June 2011 Firenze University Press Widespread bacterial infection affecting Rana temporaria tadpoles in mountain areas Rocco Tiberti Extreme feeding behaviours in the Italian wall lizard, Podarcis siculus Massimo Capula1, Gaetano Aloise2 Lissotriton vulgaris paedomorphs in south-western Romania: a consequence of a human modified habitat?
Severus D. Covaciu-Marcov*, Istvan Sas, Alfred Ş. Cicort-Lucaciu, Horia V. Bogdan Body size and reproductive characteristics of paedomorphic and metamorphic individuals of the northern banded newt (Ommatotriton ophryticus) Eyup Başkale1, Ferah Sayım2 , Uğur Kaya2 Genetic characterization of over hundred years old Caretta caretta specimens from Italian and Maltese museums Luisa Garofalo1, John J. Borg2, Rossella Carlini3, Luca Mizzan4, Nicola Novarini4, Giovanni Scillitani5, Andrea Novelletto1 The phylogenetic position of Lygodactylus angularis and the utility of using the 16S rDNA gene for delimiting species in Lygodactylus (Squamata, Gekkonidae) Riccardo Castiglia*, Flavia Annesi Localization of glucagon and insulin cells and its variation with respect to physiological events in Eutropis carinata Vidya.
R. Chandavar1, Prakash.
R. Naik2* The Balearic herpetofauna: a species update and a review on the evidence Samuel Pinya1, Miguel A. Carretero2 Effects of mosquitofish (Gambusia affinis) cues on wood frog (Lithobates sylvaticus) tadpole activity Katherine F. Buttermore, Paige N. Litkenhaus, Danielle C. Torpey, Geoffrey R. Smith*, Jessica E. Rettig Food composition of Uludağ frog, Rana macrocnemis Boulenger, 1885 in Uludağ (Bursa, Turkey) Kerim Çiçek Preliminary results on tail energetics in the Moorish gecko, Tarentola mauritanica Tommaso Cencetti1,2, Piera Poli3, Marcello Mele3, Marco A.L.
Zuffi1 Climate change and peripheral populations: predictions for a relict Mediterranean viper José C. Brito1, Soumia Fahd 2, Fernando Martínez-Freiría1, Pedro Tarroso1, Said Larbes3, Juan M. Pleguezuelos4, Xavier Santos5 Assessing the status of amphibian breeding sites in Italy: a national survey Societas Herpetologica Italica* Osservatorio Erpetologico Italiano ACTA HERPETOLOGICA Journal of the Societas Herpetologica Italica ACTA HERPETOLOGICA Rivista della Societas Herpetologica Italica
Prioritization on cultivation and climate change adaptation techniques: a potential option in strengthening climate resilience in South Africa Received for publication:29 January, 2019.
Accepted for publication: 30April, 2019 Doi: 10.15446/agron.colomb.v37n1.77545 1 Department of Agriculture and Animal Health, University of South Africa, Florida Campus, South Africa.
* Corresponding author: seunshaun@gmail.com Agronomía Colombiana 37(1), 62-72, 2019 Prioritization on cultivation and climate change adaptation techniques: a potential option in strengthening climate resilience in South Africa Priorización de técnicas de cultivo y adaptación al cambio climático: una opción potencial para fortalecer la resiliencia climática en Sudáfrica Oduniyi Oluwaseun Samuel1*, Antwi Micheal Akwasi 1, and Tekana Sibongile Sylvia1 ABSTRACT RESUMEN Numerous challenges currently experienced in the world today stemmed from global scientific collaborations that rely mainly on the ecosystem.
Impact of climate variability threatens food security and production especially among the rural farming households.
The study was conducted in North West Province of South Africa, to identify climate change adaptation techniques and to analyze prioritization of farmers on cultivation, both in the past and present.
A total number of 497 rural household maize farmers were selected through a stratified sampling method from two district municipalities.
Descriptive statistics were used to compute the mean, frequency and percentages, while Wilcoxon sign rank test established farmers’ prioritization on cultivation.
The results show different adaptation strategies used.
On the other hand, Wilcoxon sign rank test showed a statistically significant difference (P<0.05) between the farmers prioritization on cultivation both in the past and present.
The study recommends incorporation of conservation agricultural practices to the existing strategies.
Los numerosos desafíos que se experimentan actualmente en el mundo provienen de colaboraciones científicas globales que se basan principalmente en el ecosistema.
El impacto de la variabilidad climática amenaza la seguridad alimentaria y la producción, especialmente entre los hogares de agricultores rurales.
El estudio se realizó en la Provincia Noroeste de Sudáfrica, para identificar técnicas de adaptación al cambio climático y analizar la priorización de los agricultores en el cultivo, tanto en el pasado como en el presente.
Un total de 497 productores de maíz de hogares rurales fueron seleccionados a través de un método de muestreo estratificado de dos municipios del distrito.
Las estadísticas descriptivas se utilizaron para calcular la media, la frecuencia y los porcentajes, mientras que la prueba de clasificación de Wilcoxon estableció la prioridad de los agricultores en el cultivo.
Los resultados muestran diferentes estrategias de adaptación utilizadas.
Por otro lado, la prueba de clasificación de signos de Wilcoxon mostró una diferencia estadísticamente significativa (P<0.05) entre la priorización de los agricultores en el cultivo, tanto en el pasado como en el presente.
El estudio recomienda la incorporación de prácticas agrícolas de conservación a las estrategias existentes.
Key words: climate variability, maize production, Wilcoxon test, North West Province.
Palabras clave: variabilidad climática, producción de maíz, prueba de Wilcoxon, provincia Noroeste.
(IPCC, 2007).
In South Africa, climate variability has been responsible for periods of surplus in grain production as well as periods of poor production during which grains have had to be imported.
Climate change can affect climate variability by increasing the frequency of extreme climatic events such as extreme temperature, drought, and flood.
Climate change is a threat that further exacerbates the already precarious living conditions of many smallholder farmers (Donatti et al., 2018).
Agriculture is highly exposed to climate change, as farming activities directly depend on climatic conditions.
It follows that global climate change impact on agricultural Introduction Global challenges currently experienced in the world today stemmed from global scientific collaborations that rely mainly on the ecosystem.
The upshots gave rise to the excessive and formidable environmental problem cited by Udenyi (2010).
Climate variability describes the way in which climatic elements such as temperature and rainfall fluctuate over a period.
It is a variation around the mean or average that can occur in regular cycles over the years, or more randomly without any specific patterns.
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), climate variability is the principal cause of changes in food production, South Africa inclusively http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/agron.colomb.v37n1.77545 63Oduniyi Oluwaseun Samuel, Antwi Micheal Akwasi, Tekana Sibongile Sylvia: Prioritization on cultivation and climate change adaptation techniques: a potential option in strengthening climate resilience in South Africa production should be considered important (Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994).
Several studies reviewed that climate change and variability pose a negative threat to agricultural production and food security.
According to Bilham (2011), it was reported that temperature had more impact on the yield of the crop.
The impact of climate change is very likely to affect food production at the global, regional, and local level.
In every society, agriculture and food are issues that are very sensitive to climate change variability.
Naturally, climate change will have overarching impacts on crop, livestock and fisheries production, and will increase the prevalence of crop pests (Campbell et al., 2016).
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2009) reported that, in Asia, recurrent and extreme events will be experienced such as droughts and floods, which are anticipated to make maize production even more problematic.
It was predicted that a change in climate will put about 49 million people at risk of hunger by 2020.
In the same train of thought, maize production in Africa and Latin America due to the impact of climate variability would be reduced by 10% by the year 2055 (Jones and Thornton, 2003).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) revealed a comprehensive appraisal of the likely outcomes of climate change on agriculture in the African region.
The report depicted that Africa will be the most susceptible to climate change due to numerous stresses such as poor infrastructure, poverty, governance, amongst others.
FAO (2009) stated that climate change is unfolding as a central challenge to the advancement of agriculture in Africa.
The impact of climate change on maize production is becoming more elongated in the drylands of Southern Africa.
The occurrence of drought is anticipated to escalate on account of higher temperatures and reduced rainfall.
IPCC (2001) confirmed there is a prevalent tendency for an increase in temperature in different parts of the subregion, in association with climate variability and extreme weather events.
This impact of climate change affects maize production in South Africa.
According to Grain South Africa (GSA, 2010), the industry is one of the largest food supplies, producing between 25 and 33% of the country total gross agricultural production.
However, the current situation as a result of climate change has led to a drastic decrease in the production of maize.
The climate situation, which is becoming hotter and drier, will generate a remarkable decrease in the production of maize by approximately 10-20% over the next 50 years (BFAP, 2007).
Following the current trends of rainfall patterns, maize production would be adversely affected by the impact of climate change.
The current inconsistency of patterns in weather in South Africa could consequently have a substantial negative impact on the maize economy (Mqadi, 2005).
Over the last few years, there has been a major shift in area and production of maize in South Africa.
The areas where maize is planted have declined significantly.
In the view of this, adaptation practices are considered as a technique worthy of strengthening climate resilience among rural household maize farmers in the study area.
Climate impacts and adaptation strategies are the major distress area to the body of science; as such, it is paramount that farmers should possess the ability to perceive the incongruity associated with climate, for it is a requisite for the adoption of adaptation (Moyo et al., 2012; Kihupi et al., 2015).
As postulated by Adger et al.
(2005), in a bid to combat climate change through the implementation of adaptation, necessity is laid upon the farmers to first perceive a change in climatic condition after which there is a need to identify and apply potential useful adaptations.
According to Kihupi et al.
(2015), adaptation strategies of smallholder farmers largely depend on their level of perception knowledge on climate change.
However, several studies have been conducted around the globe on how smallholder farmers adapt to climate variations and the significance of adapting agriculture to climate change in the continent (Deressa et al., 2009; Mertz et al., 2009; Hisali et al., 2011; Kemausuor et al., 2011; Below et al., 2012).
There are various adaptation practices to implement in the face of climate change impacts.
In this regard, Osbahr et al.
(2010) opined that crop varieties and livelihood diversification are some of the major adaptation measures adopted by farmers throughout the continent.
In India, there are some noticeable changes in the agricultural practices (maize farming), which include adaptation strategies such as groundwater for irrigation and the use of PVC pipes to transport water on farms (Mudrakartha, 2012).
Other methods are the use of early matured cultivars, the increase in the use of high yield crop varieties, change in planting date and harvesting, crop diversification, mixcropping, and agroforestry.
Improving irrigation facilities and introducing cultivars were identified by Wang et al.
(2001) in a research conducted on maize farming adaptation measures in China.
However, adaptation options are subjective to different environmental factors such as flood, drought, extreme weather condition, etc.
(Gbetibouo et al., 2010; Hisali et al., 2011; Below et al., 2012).
According to Deressa et al.
(2011), adaptation measures used in the Eastern coast of Africa in maize farming were 64 Agron.
Colomb.
37(1) 2019 the utilization of different maize cultivars, irrigation, and change of planting dates.
Equally, Mary and Majule (2009) reported that, in Tanzania, the rural farmers adapt by simply changing the date of planting.
Furthermore, the rural household in Tanzania engages in the burying of crop residues to improve soil fertility as well burning the residues to control pest infestation.
Additionally, in SSA diversification of livelihood strategies to non-farm activities were practiced.
In southern Africa, Zvigadza et al.
(2010) reported that, in Zimbabwe, traditional coping strategies were identified with the aim of adapting to the aftereffects of climate change.
The use of water recycling on the farm, the indigenous method of water conservation, practicing spiritual exercise requesting for rain were all used.
According to Ndhleve et al.
(2017), in South Africa, supplementary irrigation and change of planting date were identified for adaptation strategy.
Farmers engage in the adaptation by re-planning or shifting the planting date to earlier or later moments; additionally, the use of forecasting and weather reports were all measures used.
The impact of climate change on farmers’ production brought about prioritization of farmers determinant to cultivation.
Today, farmers’ priority on cultivation has changed due to climatic events.
Farmers considered some activities imperative in the present world of farming unlike in the past.
This study seeks to provide an insight to farmers’ prioritization to cultivation both in the past and present, as no study of such has been carried out in the area.
The objectives of this study were to identify various adaptation techniques and analyze farmers’ prioritization on cultivation in the past and present, used among the rural household maize farmers in the study area.
Materials and methods Study area The study was carried out in the North West Province, which lies in the north of South Africa on the Botswana border, with the Kalahari Desert to the west, Gauteng province to the east and the Free State to the south.
Its landscape is demarcated by Magaliesberg Mountain in the northeast, which extends to about 130 km from Pretoria to Rustenburg, while the Vaal River forms the province’s southern border.
The region is flat and consists of grassland and bushveld scattered with trees and shrubs, with the capital city situated in Mahikeng and the largest city is Rustenburg.
A summer-rainfall region, in which temperatures range from up to 31°C in summer to 3°C in winter.
Mahikeng (previously Mafeking) is the capital and most economic activity in the province is concentrated in the Southern region between Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp, as well as Rustenburg and the Eastern region, where more than 80% of the province’s economic activity takes place.
North West Province comprises four district municipal councils which are in turn divided into 18 local municipalities.
The largest is Bojanala Platinum District Municipality covering about 18,333 km2; the other include Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality, Dr. Ruth Segomotsi Mompati District Municipality, and Dr. Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality.
However, the study was carried out in two district municipalities which are Bojanala and Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality.
Bojanala district comprises five local municipalities, which include: Rustenburg, Moretele, Kgetleng, Moses Kotane, and Madibeng.
The population of the district is approximately 1.5 million.
On the other hand, Ngaka Modiri Molema District consists of Mahikeng, Ditsobotla, Ramotshere Moiloa, Tswaing, and Ratlou.
The area of the district is 28,206  km2 with a population 842,699.
Farming is most predominant in these areas and they are known as the first largest white maize producing areas in the country.
Other farming activities include planting of sunflowers, rearing of cattle and vegetables.
Figure 1 shows the two districts where the study was carried out including their local municipalities.
Method of data collection Permission to collect data was granted by the districts and local municipalities together from the rural household heads and the extension officers to conduct the research.
The data used in the research was primary data which was collected in the year 2016.
Data was collected through face-to-face interviews with the farmers, in which 497 questionnaires were administered in the research area.
A wellstructured questionnaire written in English was used as a research tool to collect data.
This tool was selected because of its low cost and the little expertise required to run.
The questionnaires were tested and validated before the final administration to the respondents.
The questionnaires were explained to the local extension officers before the survey because they understand the farmers better and can translate the questionnaires into a local language.
Face-toface interviews and focus group discussion was conducted in each local municipality where each session lasted for 45 minutes.
The questionnaires were filled in anonymously as no personal questions regarding names, addresses and identity numbers were asked.
Questionnaires consisted of a logical flow of questions which addressed matters related to (a) demographic characteristics, (b) land characteristics, 65Oduniyi Oluwaseun Samuel, Antwi Micheal Akwasi, Tekana Sibongile Sylvia: Prioritization on cultivation and climate change adaptation techniques: a potential option in strengthening climate resilience in South Africa (c) climate change related issues, such as climate change perception and adaptation practices, and (d) farmers’ prioritization of determinants of cultivation in the past and present.
Furthermore, the distribution of rainfall patterns and temperature across the study area were accessed and collected from South African Weather Services.
Population, sampling procedure, and sample size The research was designed in such a way that data were collected from two district municipalities (Bojanala District and Ngaka Modiri Molema) in North West Province, which consists of 10 local municipalities altogether.
The list of small-scale maize farmers in the two districts was obtained from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (DAFF).
Raosoft sample size calculator was used to determine the sample size from the population of the small and emerging maize farmers in the study area.
Raosoft presents a sample size calculator that takes into account the margin of error, the confidence level, and the response distribution.
The calculation of the sample size n and margin of error E are given by: x = Z (c/100)2 r (100-r) (1) n = N x/(N-1) E2 + x) (2) E = Sqrt [(N n) x/n(N-1)] (3) Stratified random sampling technique was used to group the population of the farmers from the 10 local municipalities in the two districts into strata, after which a random sample was used to select from each stratum.
A specific number of sample sizes was selected from the population from each local municipality.
A total of 497 questionnaires were administered in the two districts to participate in the research study.
Statistical analysis Data collected were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, version 23 of 2015) software.
SPSS software can be used to assist in calculating a variety of statistical analysis which has a dynamic data processing ability.
The data were subjected to descriptive statistics such as frequency, percentages, mean and graphical representations.
These were employed to analyze the household FIGURE 1.
Districts and local municipalities in North West Province.
Source: Municipality and Demarcation Board of South Africa (2009).
66 Agron.
Colomb.
37(1) 2019 demographics information and observe climate variability and adaptation strategies in other to fulfill the objectives of the study.
On the other hand, Wilcoxon Sign-rank Sum Test was used to analyze farmers’ prioritization of determinants on cultivation in the past and present.
Farmers’ prioritization of determinants on cultivation using Wilcoxon Signed-rank computation The Wilcoxon Signed-rank Sum Test applies to twosample designs involving repeated measures, matched pairs, or “before” and “after” measures like the t-test for correlated samples.
The Wilcoxon Signed-rank Test is a non-parametric version of a paired samples t-test, used to test the difference between paired data and it compares two groups.
The Wilcoxon Signed-rank statistics can be computed as sign statistic of the pair-wise averages of data (Hettmaspherger et al., 1997).
Null hypothesis: There is no statistically significant difference between the two variables.
Farmers’ prioritization on cultivation in the past is same with cultivation in the present.
Alternative hypothesis: There is a statistically significant difference between the two variables.
Farmers’ prioritization on cultivation in the past is not the same with cultivation in the present.
Empirical Model: M = Σ X / N Formula for the normal distribution: ƒ(x) = e ( x µ )² / 2 σ ² (4) σ √ 2π For a given mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ), plug in any value of x to receive the proportional frequency of that value in that particular normal distribution.
With sample taken from Population A being smaller than the sample from Population B) reject H0 if TA ≥ TU or TA ≤ TL Results and Discussion Distribution of municipalities Table 1 below shows the distribution of households according to the municipalities.
Most of the farmers interviewed were from Ngaka Modiri Molema with 76.5% of the total sample.
This area is known for maize production in the country with five local municipalities namely; Tswaing, Ditsobotla, Mahikeng, Ratlou, and Zeerust.
Most maize farmers were from Tswaing local municipalities with 25.2%, followed by Ditsobotla with 21.1%, Mahikeng with 15.7%, Ratlou with 2.0% and Ramotshere Moiloa, which is the smallest with 1.8%.
On the other hand, Bojanala District constitutes 23.5% of the total respondents, with 5 local municipalities which include; Kgetleng with 8.9%, Rustenburg is 9.1%, Moses Kotane constitutes 7.0%, Madibeng is 6.0% and Moretele with a proportion of 3.2% as shown below.
TABLE 1.
Distribution of the municipalities.
Characteristics Frequency Percentage District municipalities Bojanala District 117 23.5 Ngaka Modiri Molema 380 76.5 Total 497 100.0 Local municipalities Kgetleng 44 8.9 Rustenburg 45 9.1 Moses Kotane 35 7.0 Madibeng 30 6.0 Moretele 16 3.2 Tswaing 125 25.2 Ditsobotla 105 21.1 Mahikeng 78 15.7 Ratlou 10 2.0 Ramotshere Moiloa 9 1.8 Total 497 100.0 Demography The findings regarding demographics in the study area are shown in Table 2.
These include information about farmer’s household size, gender, age, marital status, educational background and the source of income.
Results of the survey in Table 2 showed that 76.3% of the farmers were male, while 23.7% were female.
As regards to marital status, 26.6% were single, 54.7% were married, 8.0% were divorced, and 5.8% were widows, while 4.8% was separated.
Agriculture provides food and fiber for the people; 67.4% of the farmers have their major source of income from agriculture while 32.6% do not have their major source of income from agriculture.
The results for the age group indicated that the majority of the farmers fall within the age group of 61-70 years old.
According to Bayard et al.
(2007), age is positively related to some climate change adaptation measures that are related to agricultural activities.
The age group 41-50 constitutes 24.9%, while the smallest age group is 71-80 with 1.2%.
The youth age group (18-30 years) constituted 8.5% and they seem not to be interested in farming.
The computer age enables young people to divert attention from 67Oduniyi Oluwaseun Samuel, Antwi Micheal Akwasi, Tekana Sibongile Sylvia: Prioritization on cultivation and climate change adaptation techniques: a potential option in strengthening climate resilience in South Africa agriculture into information technology and other related professions.
This result confirmed to the findings of Maponya and Mpandeli (2012), who stated that young people in the communities are involved in other activities and use opportunities in the fields of information technology, tendering and jobs in various government departments in the province.
TABLE 2.
Demography (composition and household characteristics).
Characteristics Percentage Household size 1-3 30.6 4-6 39.4 7-9 21.1 10-12 4.6 13-15 4.2 Total 100.0 Household gender Male 76.3 Female 23.7 Total 100.0 Household age 18-30 8.5 31-40 17.5 41-50 24.9 51-60 19.9 61-70 28.0 71-80 1.2 Total 100.0 Household marital status Single 26.6 Married 54.7 Divorced 8.0 Widowed 5.8 Separated 4.8 Total 100.0 Educational level Pre-school 3.4 Sub Standard A & B 9.3 Standard 1-5 36.0 Standard 6-10 28.4 Higher 7.2 None 15.7 Total 100.0 Farming as major income Yes 67.4 No 32.6 Total 100.0 Education is a key to power.
The result on the level of education indicated that most of the farmers fall under standard 1-5 (grade 3 to grade 7), with 36% while 15.7% has no formal education.
The level of education has a significant difference in farmers’ perception to climate change.
According to Asfaw and Admassie (2004) and Bamire et al.
(2002), it was reported that education affected agriculture productivity by increasing the ability of farmers to produce more output from given resources and by enhancing the capacity of farmers to obtain and analyze information.
Maddison (2007) revealed that educated and experienced farmers are expected to have more knowledge and information about climate change and adaptation measures to use in response to climate challenges.
About 28.4% fall under standard 6-10 (grade 8 to grade 12), while 3.4% attended preschool.
Many of the household size falls under the household grouping of 4-6 household members, with 39.4%.
The household size of 1-3 is 30.6%, 7-9 is 21.1%, while household sizes of 10-12 and 13-15 constitute 4.6 and 4.2%, respectively.
Adaptation measure and strategies in the study area Table 3 shows various adaptation strategies used by the farmers in the study area.
Most of the strategies above were targeted towards drought as increased temperature is the most perceived element in the study area.
About 29.8% of the farmers in the study area practiced minimum or zero tillage to cope with drought by conserving soil moisture content and preserve soil organic carbon.
Minimum tillage is considered to be an environmentally agricultural practice which helps to enhance the soil arrangement.
Environmentally agricultural practice is defined as a practice that supports both agricultural production and biodiversity conservation, working in harmony together to improve the livelihoods of rural communities.
It is one of the practices used in conservation agriculture to promote sustainability.
According to Maponya and Mpandeli (2012), it was reported that farmers from Limpopo engaged in minimum tillage to cope with drought.
Ndamani and Watanabe (2016) revealed by a research carried out in Ghana that a slim majority of respondents (51%) use crop diversification strategies in response to climatic variability.
Changing the planting date was chosen by 22% of the respondents, while improving crop varieties was chosen by 12%.
Farmers also use farm diversification measures (6%), income generating activities (6%) and irrigation (2%) to mitigate the effects of climate change on their farming activities.
About 1% of the respondents also undertakes agroforestry.
From the results, it was shown that about 5.2% of the farmers practiced crop diversification.
Many adaptations to climate change and variability by rural household farmers 68 Agron.
Colomb.
37(1) 2019 were centered on diversification.
For example, Fisher et al.
(2015) reported that, in a rainfed systems that are prone to drought, farm diversification could take advantage of spatial variability in rainfall.
The most common diversification strategy identified by the several studies was to grow a variety of crops (Bryan et al., 2009, 2013; Bele et al., 2014; Westengen and Brysting, 2014).
Previous research demonstrated a positive correlation between crop diversity and production (Di Falco et al., 2010).
The likelihood of crop diversification is positively influenced by secure land tenure, access to information and credit, labor supply, and farming experience (Hassan and Nhemachena 2008; Gbetibouo et al., 2010; Fosu-Mensah et al., 2012).
Another adaptation strategy from the study was the planting of different crops.
About 5.2% of the respondents were involved in planting different crops to adapt to climate change, especially if one crop fails the other crops can still generate an income.
Climate change will likely affect regional cropping patterns in sub-Saharan Africa (Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn, 2006).
Many studies revealed farmers reassessed and cultivated different crops in response to perceived changes in temperature and rainfall.
For example, Kenyan farmers switched to cassava, sweet potatoes, and pigeon peas (Bryan et al., 2013).
Cassava, in particular, is potentially useful for adaptation to climate change in sub-Saharan Africa, because it grows in marginal soils, tolerates periodic and extended periods of drought and heat, and is left in the ground until needed (Jarvis et al., 2012).
Malawian farmers migrated to cassava growing areas during the 2001-2002 famine (Brooks, 2014).
Important factors enabling crop switching are access to irrigation and to extension information (Bryan et al., 2009, 2013).
Few of the farmers are planting improved seeds.
About 3.6% of the farmers engaged in plant tolerant maize seeds.
Maize is the most important food crop in SSA, where it is almost completely rainfed and, therefore, dependent on the region’s increasingly erratic precipitation.
Around 40% of Africa’s maize-growing area faces occasional drought stress in which yield losses are 10-25%.
Around 25% of the maize crop suffers frequent drought, with losses of up to half the harvest.
To reduce vulnerability and improve food security, the Drought Tolerant Maize for Africa (DTMA) project has released 160 drought tolerant (DT) maize varieties, between 2007 and 2013.
The yield advantage of the new DT maize varieties over local maize varieties is greater.
Research in SSA has indicated a consistent yield advantage of improved maize varieties over local maize varieties at different levels of fertilizer use and various soil fertility and rainfall conditions (Smale and Jayne, 2003).
However, while farmers expressed a demand for drought tolerance, availability of improved DT maize and sorghum seed limited their use in several countries (Cavatassi et al., 2011; Fisher and Snapp, 2014; Westengen and Brysting, 2014).
Only in Nigeria farmers did have access to improved DT varieties due to the presence of two development projects (Tambo and Abdoulaye, 2013).
A change to drought-tolerant crops such as sunflowers was also practiced.
Switching to crop varieties less sensitive to climatic stress is one of the preferred strategies of farmers in SSA.
The study reviewed that about 2.4% of the farmers switched to drought tolerance crops.
This is in accordance with Fisher et al.
(2015), who reported that policymakers also support this approach: a UN General Assembly resolution in 2009 emphasized the development of crop varieties that tolerate environmental stresses, including drought (Westengen and Brysting, 2014).
New varieties of staple crops, many still under development, provide drought and heat tolerance as well as early maturation (Karaba et al., 2007; Cairns et al., 2013).
The studies revealed that improved short-season varieties were available and farmers were growing them to escape drought (Thomas et al., 2007; Fosu-Mensah et al., 2012; Fisher and Snapp, 2014; Westengen and Brysting, 2014).
Changing the planting dates is another adaptation strategy, with 4.2% of the farmers using this method in the study area.
According to Reason et al., (2005), the onset of the rainy season is crucial to the timing of rain-fed crops: if the farmer plants too early, soil moisture will be insufficient for seed germination; if the farmer plants too late, intense rain might wash the seeds away.
Farmers in several SSA countries reported they shift crop planting dates in response to year-to-year variability in the rainy season onset (Sofoluwe et al., 2011; Fosu-Mensah et al., 2012; Bryan et al., 2013; Bele et al., 2014).
Crop rotation strategies were adopted by about 5.6% of the farmers.
It plays an important role in increasing maize production in the study area.
The result shows a similar report with other recent studies.
Crop rotation or switching crops was still found to have an effect on maize productivity (Kuntashula et al., 2014).
Crop rotations are a temporal diversity through crop rotations.
For example, alternating cereal crops with broadleaf crops and changing stand densities disrupts the disease cycles (Krupinsky et al., 2002).
In Tanzania, farmers diversify crop types in a form of rotation as a way of spreading risks on the farm (Adger et al., 2003; Orindi and Eriksen, 2005).
This serves as an insurance against climate variability.
69Oduniyi Oluwaseun Samuel, Antwi Micheal Akwasi, Tekana Sibongile Sylvia: Prioritization on cultivation and climate change adaptation techniques: a potential option in strengthening climate resilience in South Africa However, some strategies from Table 3 are combined by the farmers to adapt to climate change.
For example, some farmers apply a combination of crop diversification, plant tolerant maize seeds, and change to drought-tolerant crops, while others apply a combination of planting mature cultivars and shorten the growing period.
TABLE 3.
Adaptation strategies.
Practices Frequency Percentage Minimum or low tillage 148 29.8 Crop diversification 26 5.2 Plant different crops 26 5.2 Plant tolerant maize seeds 18 3.6 Change to drought tolerance crops 12 2.4 Crop rotation 28 5.6 Changing of planting date 21 4.2 Planting in different area 3 0.6 Reduced cultivated land 7 1.4 Ripping deeper and ploughing every year 20 4.0 Prayers 23 4.6 Improved land management 7 1.4 Change of production practices 1 0.2 Combination of 2, 3 and 5 72 14.5 Combination of 12 and 13 51 10.3 None 34 6.8 Total 497 100.0 Analysis of farmers’ prioritization of cultivation determinants in the past and present Tables 4 and 5 summarize the prioritization determinants used by the farmers prior to planting in the past and at present.
In the past, soil management (29%) and network with cultural groups (23.7%) were the farmers’ priority.
They seemed to engage in networking with a cultural association, religious groups, committees in the community, farmers’ associations and other farmers.
However, at present, farmers’ prioritization determinant involves more infrastructural and structural facilities, acquiring new skills to cope with the impact of climate change and assessing available strategies option.
Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the analysis of farmers’ prioritization determinants on cultivation both in the past and present.
The interpretation of the tables is summarized below.
A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test indicated that the prioritization of determinant on cultivation present (mean rank = 267.08) was rated more favorably than the prioritization of determinant of cultivation before (mean rank = 95.87), Z = -15.434, P = 0.000”.
The Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that the observed difference between both measurements is significant.
There is a statistically significant difference and TABLE 4.
Frequency table for prioritization of determinants on cultivation in the past.
Prioritization of determinants Frequency Percentage Network with cultural association 118 23.7 Network with religious group 40 8.0 Network with committees in the community 61 12.3 Network with other farmers 79 15.9 Network with farmers’ association 10 2.0 Soil management 144 29.0 Access to water for farm production 45 9.1 Total 497 100.0 TABLE 5.
Frequency table for prioritization of determinants on cultivation in the present.
Prioritization of determinants Frequency Percentage Extension service access 53 10.7 Agribusiness skill 8 1.6 Water management 74 14.9 Innovative and creative thinking 4 0.8 Decision making skill 1 0.2 Soil management 51 10.3 Access to production infrastructure 1 0.2 Network with financial institution 3 0.6 Network with farmers’ association 56 11.3 Network with farmers’ cooperative 40 8.0 Infrastructural facilities 65 13.1 Structural facilities 108 21.7 Education and training 33 6.6 Total 497 100.0 TABLE 6.
Descriptive statistics.
N Mean Std.
Deviation Minimum Maximum Prioritization of determinant on cultivation before 497 3.88 2.138 1 7 Prioritization of determinant on cultivation present 497 8.65 4.561 1 14 70 Agron.
Colomb.
37(1) 2019 we reject the null hypothesis that both samples are different.
We assume here that there is a difference between present and past.
The mean rank for prioritization determinants at present is higher than in the past.
Conclusions The study brought a limelight by identifying the different adaptation strategies used, which include minimum or zero tillage, crop diversification, planting different crops, planting tolerant maize seeds, changing to drought tolerant crops, crop rotation, changing planting dates, planting in different areas, reducing cultivated land, ripping deeper and ploughing every year, prayers, planting mature cultivars, shortening the growing period, improving land management and changing production practices.
However, minimum tillage is the most used practice with about 29.8% of the respondents.
The evidence of climate variability in the study area was established, which revealed a continuous increase in temperature and low rainfall patterns over the years.
In the same manner, the study investigated farmers’ prioritization of determinants of cultivation in the past and present.
It showed the descriptive statistics of prioritization options used by the farmers in the past and present.
The result revealed that soil management and network with cultural groups were the most used priorities by farmers in the past.
However, in the present, farmers’ prioritization has been altered in other to cope with climate change scenarios and variability.
At present, farmers use varieties of prioritization options ranging from agribusiness skill, water management skill, decision-making skill, innovative and creative thinking, soil management, infrastructural facilities, structural facilities, education and training, network with farmers’ association, among many others.
The result emphasized that there was a statistically significant difference between farmers’ prioritization of determinants of cultivation in the past and present.
Prioritization of determinant of cultivation at present is greater than that of the past, with a mean rank of 267.08, N is 366b (positive rank) and P<0.000.
The study recommends that present prioritization should be look to enhance adaptation, along with the incorporation of conservation agricultural practices to the existing strategies.
Acknowledgments We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for improving the quality of this paper.
We also acknowledge the support of the University of South Africa (UNISA) for the bursary and grant given for the research, and thanks are extended to those who have contributed to the success of this paper.
Literature cited Adger, W.N., S. Huq, K. Brown, D. Conway, and M. Hulme.
2003.
Adaptation to climate change in the developing world.
Prog.
Dev.
Stud.
3, 179-195.
Doi: 10.1191/1464993403ps060oa Adger, W.N., N.W.
Arnell, and E.L. Tompkins.
2005.
Successful adaptation to climate change across scales.
Global Environ.
Chang.
15, 77-86.
Doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2004.12.005 Asfaw, A. and A. Admassie.
2004.
The role of education on the adoption of chemical fertiliser under different socioeconomic environments in Ethiopia.
J. Agric.
Econ.
30(3), 215-228.
Doi: 10.1016/j.agecon.2002.12.002 Bamire, A.S., Y.L.
Fabiyi, and B. Manyong.
2002.
Adoption pattern of fertiliser technology among farmers in the ecological zones of south-western Nigeria: a Tobit analysis Aust.
J. Agric.
Res.
5, 901-910.
Doi: 10.1071/AR01095 Bayard, B., C.M.
Jolly, and D.A.
Shannon.
2007.
The economics of adoption and management of alley cropping in Haiti.
J. Environ.
Manage.
84, 62-70.
Doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2006.05.001 Bele, M.Y., D.J.
Sonwa, and A.M. Tiani.
2014.
Local communities vulnerability to climate change and adaptation strategies in Bukavu in DR Congo.
J. Env.
Dev.
23(3), 331-357.
Doi: 10.1177/1070496514536395 Below, T.B., K.D.
Mutabazi, D. Kirschke, C. Franke, S.R.
Sieber, and K. Tscherning.
2012.
Can farmers’ adaptation to climate change be explained by socio-economic household-level variables?
Global Environ.
Change 22(1), 223-235.
Doi: 10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2011.11.012 BFAP (Bureau for food and Agricultural Policy).
2007.
Modeling the economic impact of climate change on the South African maize industry.
BFAP report # 2007-02.
Pretoria, South Africa.
Bilham, J.
2011.
Climate change impacts upon crop yields in Kenya: learning from the past.
Earth Environ.
6, 1-45.
TABLE 7.
Ranks.
N Mean rank Sum of ranks Negative ranks 96a 95.87 9203.50 Positive ranks 366b 267.08 97749.50 Ties 35c Total 497 TABLE 8.
Statistics based on Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.
Prioritization of determinant on cultivation present Prioritization of determinant on cultivation before Z -15.434a Asymp.
Sig.
(2-tailed) 0.000 a.
Based on negative ranks.
71Oduniyi Oluwaseun Samuel, Antwi Micheal Akwasi, Tekana Sibongile Sylvia: Prioritization on cultivation and climate change adaptation techniques: a potential option in strengthening climate resilience in South Africa Brooks, S. 2014.
Enabling adaptation?
Lessons from the new ‘Green Revolution’ in Malawi and Kenya.
Clim.
Change 122, 15-26.
Doi: 10.1007/s10584-013-0992-0 Bryan, E., T.T.
Deressa, G.A.
Gbetibouo, and R. Claudia.
2009.
Adaptation to climate change in Ethiopia and South Africa: options and constraints.
Environ.
Sci.
Policy 12, 413-426.
Doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2008.11.002 Bryan, E., R. Claudia, B. Okoba, C. Roncoli, S. Silvestri, and M. Herrero.
2013.
Adapting agriculture to climate change in Kenya: household strategies and determinants.
J. Environ.
Manage.
114, 26-35.
Doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.10.036 Cairns, J.E., J. Hellin, S. Kai, L.A. Jose, F.M.
John, C. Thierfelder, and B.M.
Prasanna.
2013.
Adapting maize production to climate change in sub-Saharan Africa.
Food Sec.
5, 345-360.
Doi: 10.1007/s12571-013-0256-x Campbell, B.M., S.J.
Vermeulen, P.K.
Aggarwal, C. Corner-Dolloff, G. Evan, A.M. Loboguerrero, J. Ramirez-Villegas, T. Rosenstock, L. Sebastian, P.K.
Thornton, and E. Wollenberg.
2016.
Reducing risks to food security from climate change.
Glob.
Food Sec.
11, 34-43.
Doi: 10.1016/j.gfs.2016.06.002 Cavatassi, R., L. Lipper, and U. Narloch.
2011.
Modern variety adoption and risk management in drought prone areas: insights from the sorghum farmers of eastern Ethiopia.
Agr.
Econ.
42, 279-292.
Doi: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00514.x Deressa, T.T., R.M.
Hassan, C. Ringler, T. Alemu, and M. Yesuf.
2009.
Determinants of farmer’s choice of adaptation methods to climate change in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia.
Global Environ.
Change 19, 248-255.
Doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.01.002 Deressa, T.T., R.M.
Hassan, and C. Ringler.
2011.
Perception and adaptation to climate change by farmers in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia.
J. Agric.
Sci.
149, 23-31.
Doi: 10.1017/S0021859610000687 Di Falco, S., M. Bezabih, and M. Yesuf.
2010.
Seeds for livelihood: crop biodiversity and food production in Ethiopia.
Ecol.
Econ.
69, 1695-1702.
Doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.03.024 Donatti, C.I., C.A.
Harvey, M.R.
Martinez-Rodriguez, R. Vignola, and C.M.
Rodriguez.
2018.
Vulnerability of smallholder farmers to climate change in Central America and Mexico: current knowledge and research gaps.
Clim.
Dev.
3(11), 264-286.
Doi: 10.1080/17565529.2018.1442796 FAO.
2009.
The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2009 An FAO Perspective.
Rome, London.
Fisher, M. and S. Snapp.
2014.
Smallholder farmers’ perceptions of drought risk and adoption of modern maize in Southern Malawi.
Exp Agr.
50(4), 533-548.
Doi: 10.1017/S0014479714000027 Fisher, M., T. Abate, R.W.
Lunduka, W. Asnake, Y. Alemayehu, and R.B.
Madulu.
2015.
Drought tolerant maize for farmer adaptation to drought in sub-Saharan Africa: determinants of adoption in eastern and southern Africa.
Clim.
Change.
133, 283-299.
Doi: 10.1007/s10584-015-1459-2 Fosu-Mensah, B.Y., P.L.G.
Vlek, and D.S.
MacCarthy.
2012.
Farmers’ perception and adaptation to climate change: a case study of Sekyedumase district in Ghana.
Environ.
Dev.
Sustain.
14(4), 495-505.
Doi: 10.1007/s10668-012-9339-7 Gbetibouo, G.A., R.M.
Hassan, and C. Ringler.
2010.
Modelling farmers’ adaptation strategies for climate change and variability: the case of the Limpopo basin, South Africa.
Agrekon 49(2), 217-234.
Doi: 10.1080/03031853.2010.491294 GSA (Grain South Africa).
2010.
A report on the trends in the Agricultural Sector.
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Pretoria, South Africa.
Nhemachena, C. 2008.
Agriculture and future climate dynamics in Africa: Impacts and adaptation options.
PhD thesis.
Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development, University of Pretoria, South Africa.
Hisali, E., P. Birungi, and F. Buyinza.
2011.
Adaptation to climate change in Uganda: evidence from micro level data.
Global Environ.
Change 21, 1245-1261.
Doi: 10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2011.07.005 IFAD.
2009.
High food prices: Impact and recommendations.
URL: http://www.ifad.org/operations/food/ceb.htm.
(accessed 26 March 2013).
IPCC (Inter governmental Panel for Climate Change).
2001.
Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
In: McCarthy, J.J., O.F.
Canziani, N.A.
Leary, D.J.
Dokken, and K.S.
White (eds.).
IPCC working group II, third assessment report.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
IPCC.
2007.
Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
In: Parry, M.L., O.F.
Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J.
van der Linder, C.E.
Hanson.
(eds.).
Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC fourth assessment report.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Jarvis, A., J. Ramirez-Villegas, B.V. Herrera Campo, and C. Navarro-Racines.
2012.
Is cassava the answer to African climate change adaptation?
Trop.
Plant Biol.
5(1), 9-29.
Doi: 10.1007/ s12042-012-9096-7 Jones, P.G.
and P.K.
Thornton.
2003.
The potential impacts of climate change on maize production in Africa and Latin America in 2055 Glob.
Environ.
Change 13(1), 51-59.
Doi: 10.1016/ S0959-3780(02)00090-0 Karaba, A., S. Dixit, R. Greco, A. Aharoni, K. Trijatmiko, N. MarschMartinez, A. Krishnan, K. Nataraja, M. Udayakumar, and A. Pereira.
2007.
Improvement of water use efficiency in rice by expression of HARDY, an Arabidopsis drought and salt tolerance gene.
Proc.
Natl.
Acad.
Sci.
USA 104(39), 15270.
Doi: 10.1073/pnas.0707294104 Kemausuor, F., E. Dwamena, A. Bart-Plange, and N. Kyei-Baffour.
2011.
Farmer’s perception of climate change in the EjuraSekyeredumase district of Ghana.
ARPN J. Biol.
Agric.
Sci.
6, 26-37.
Kihupi, M.L., E.E.
Chingonikaya, and C. Mahonge.
2015.
‘Smallholder farmers’ perception of climate change versus meteorological data in semi-arid areas of Iringa district, Tanzania.
Environ.
Earth Sci.
5(2), 137-147.
Krupinsky, J.M., K.L.
Bailey, M.P.
McMullen, B.D.
Gossen, and T.K.
Turkington.
2002.
Managing plant disease risk in diversified cropping systems.
Agron.
J.
94, 198-209.
Doi: 10.2134/ agronj2002.955a Kuntashula, E., L.M.
Chabala, and B.P.
Mulenga.
2014.
Impact of minimum tillage and crop rotation as climate change adaptation strategies on farmer welfare in smallholder farming systems of Zambia.
J.
Sustain.
Dev.
7(4).
Doi:10.5539/jsd.v7n4p95 Kurukulasuriya, P., R.H. Mendelsohn, and R. Benhin.
2006.
Will African agriculture survive climate change?
World Bank Econ.
Rev.
20(3), 367-388.
Doi: 10.1093/wber/lhl004 72 Agron.
Colomb.
37(1) 2019 Maddison, D. 2007.
The perception of an adaptation to climate change in Africa.
Policy research working paper 4305.
World Bank, Washington DC.
Maponya, P. and S. Mpandeli.
2012.
Climate change and agricultural production in South Africa: impacts and adaptation options.
J. Agric.
Sci.
4(10).
Doi:10.5539/jas.v4n10p48 Mary, A.L.
and A.E.
Majule.
2009.
Impacts of climate change, variability and adaptation strategies on agriculture in semi-arid areas of Tanzania: The case of Manyoni district in Singida region, Tanzania.
Afr.
J. Environ.
Sci.
Technol.
3, 206-208.
Mertz, O., C. Mbow, and A. Reenberg.
2009.
Farmers’ perceptions of climate change and agricultural adaptation strategies in Rural Sahel.
J. Environ.
Manage.
43, 804-816.
Doi: 10.1007/ s00267-008-9197-0 Moyo, M., B.M.
Mvumi, M. Kunzekweguta, K. Mazvimavi, P. Craufurd, and P. Dorward.
2012.
Farmer perceptions on climate change and variability in semi-arid Zimbabwe in relation to climatology evidence.
Afr.
Crop Sci.
J.
20, 317-335.
Mqadi, Z.
2005.
Production function analysis of the sensitivity of maize production to climate change in South Africa.
MSc thesis, University of Pretoria, South Africa.
Mudrakartha, S. 2012.
Groundwater recharge management in Saurashtra, India: Learnings for Water Governance.
PhD thesis, University Mahal, Jagatpura, Jaipur, India.
Ndamani, F. and T. Watanabe.
2016.
Determinants of farmers’ adaptation to climate change: a micro level analysis in Ghana.
Sci.
Agric.
73(3), 201-208.
Doi: 10.1590/0103-9016-2015-0163 Ndhleve, S., M.D.V.
Nakin, and B. Longo-Mbenza.
2017.
Impacts of supplemental irrigation as a climate change adaptation strategy for maize production: a case of the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa.
Water SA 43(2), 222-228.
Doi: 10.4314/wsa.
v43i2.06 Orindi, V.A.
and S. Eriksen.
2005.
Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in the development process in Uganda.
Ecopolicy Series 15.
African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), Nairobi, Kenya.
Osbahr, H., C. Twyman, W. Adger, and D. Thomas.
2010.
Evaluating successful livelihood adaptation to climate variability and change in southern Africa.
Ecol.
Soc.
15(2), 27.
Doi: 10.5751/ ES-03388-150227 Reason, C.J.C., S. Hachigonta, and R.F.
Phaladi.
2005.
Interannual variability in rainy season characteristics over the Limpopo region of southern Africa.
Int.
J. Climatol.
25, 1835-1853.
Doi: 10.1002/joc.1228 Rosenzweig, C. and M.L.
Parry.
1994.
Potential impact of climate change on world food supply.
133-138.
Doi: 10.1038/367133a0 Smale, M. and T.S.
Jayne.
2003.
Maize breeding in East and Southern Africa, 1900-2000. International Food Policy Research Institute.
URL: http://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/2020br/1204.html.
(accessed 18 December 2008).
Sofoluwe, N.A., A.A. Tijani, and O.I.
Baruwa.
2011.
Farmers’ perception and adaptation to climate change in Osun State, Nigeria.
Afr.
J. Agric.
Res.
6(20), 4789-4794.
Tambo, J.A.
and T. Abdoulaye.
2013.
Smallholder farmers’ perceptions of and adaptations to climate change in the Nigerian savanna.
Reg.
Environ.
Change 13, 375-38.
Doi: 10.1007/ s10113-012-0351-0 Thomas, D., H. Twyman, H. Osbahr, and B. Hewitson.
2007.
Adaptation to climate change and variability: farmer responses to intra-seasonal precipitation trends in South Africa.
Clim.
Change 83(3), 301-22.
Doi: 10.1007/s10584-006-9205-4 Udenyi, O.G.
2010.
Impacts of climate change.
Nigeria Social Network.
Wang, M., Y. Li, W. Ye, J.F.
Bornman, and X. Yan.
2011.
Effects of climate change on maize production, and potential adaptation measures: a case study in Jilin Province, China.
Clim.
Res.
46, 223-242.
Doi: 10.3354/cr00986 Westengen, O.T.
and A.K.
Brysting.
2014.
Crop adaptation to climate change in the semi-arid zone in Tanzania: the role of genetic resources and seed systems.
Agric.
Food Secur.
3(1), 3.
Doi: 10.1186/2048-7010-3-3 Zvigadza, S., G. Mharadze, and S. Ngena.
2010.
Communities and climate change: Building local capacity for adaptation in Goromonzi District, Munyawiri ward, Zimbabwe.
URL: http: eepsea.org/en/ev-156352-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html (accessed 4 September 2010).
Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page1 | 15 POLICY BRIEF IMPACT Ideal Measures for Participation and Awareness of Climate Change: Stronger Together Citizen participation in achieving the European Green Deal in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion Issam Moussa Alsamara1, Stefanie Felicitas Beinert1, Jeanne Catelijne de Jong, Maaike Jeannette Barbara Klappe1, Viktoria Sirkku Marewski1, Rana Orhan1,2* 1Department of International Health, Care and Public Health Research Institute – CAPHRI, Faculty of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands 2The Association of Schools of Public Health in the European Region *Senior advisor Corresponding author: Maaike Klappe, Email: m.klappe@student.maastrichtuniversity.nl Address: Universiteitssingel 60 6229 ER Maastricht, The Netherlands mailto:m.klappe@student.maastrichtuniversity.nl Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page2 | 15 Abstract Context: The European Green Deal is a tool to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050.
To reach this goal, action is needed on all organizational levels.
At the same time, temperatures keep rising, and the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion (EMR) suffered from heavy floods in the summer of 2021and extreme weather events are expected to increase.
This is an example of a cross-border issue and therefore shows the need for cross-border climate action.
The EMR could be a showcase for climate action and collaboration for other border regions across Europe and worldwide.
Policy Options: Citizens often do not feel responsible for taking climate action; however, everyone should contribute to achieving the biggest results in tackling climate change.
Therefore, three policy options are presented to increase citizen participation in climate action: local climate measurements, sustainable food consumption, less food waste, and sustainable cities through urban gardening.
These policy areas deserve more attention and have room for improvement.
Recommendations: · Encourage the implementation of citizen science projects in the EMR.
· Gather insights on the region's greenhouse gas emissions.
· Provide more sustainable food in institutional canteens and reduce food waste.
· Use social media as a tool to provide information about sustainable food.
· Use urban areas for urban gardening projects.
· Create community sustainability challenges.
Keywords: Citizen participation; Climate change; European Green Deal; Meuse-Rhine Euroregion Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page3 | 15 Introduction Climate change is one of the main challenges that encounter humanity, and its consequences will keep on affecting the current forms of life on earth for the decades and centuries to come.
The human influence on warming the atmosphere is unequivocal (1).
Moreover, in every region across the globe, the environment is affected by humaninduced climate change.
With the continuing global warming, it is projected that the global water cycle and other weather extremes will be further intensified (1, 2, 3).Furthermore, the projected change in climate is expected to alter the geographic range and burden of various climate-sensitive health outcomes and affect the functioning of public health and health care systems (4).
Substantial increases in morbidity and mortality are expected over the coming decades if no additional actions are taken (5).
Figure 1 illustrates the pathways by which climate change can affect health (6).
Global actions to mediate and counter climate change have started taking shape since the second half of the twentieth century and kept on gaining momentum and support from growing stakeholders around the world.
The Paris Agreement in 2015 is one of the most significant steps the international community has taken toward limiting global warming in the last two decades.
It is a result of the continuing efforts of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Besides, the latest Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP26) in November 2021 set several objectives, like committing to more ambitious targets to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 and other matters regarding adaptation measures and funds for developing countries (8).
Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page4 | 15 Europe is a key stakeholder in humanity's fight against climate change due to several reasons.
One is the historical and ongoing contribution of the European states to warming the climate.
Moreover, Europe must deal with the severe consequences of climate change, as it threatens high temperatures, droughts and wildfires, availability of freshwater, and sea-level rise across Europe (9).
Finally, and most importantly, there is a desperate need for a global leader who spearheads the fight against climate change.
Through its endeavors, the European Union is claiming such a position.
That is by leading by example, i.e., through adopting advanced environmental legislation, achieving its international obligations regarding its CO₂ emission reduction, stepping up its goals to cut down emissions, and even making it a legal obligation through the European Climate Law (10, 11).
Those endeavors could be spotted in the objectives of the European Green Deal, where the Member States agreed on an array of policy initiatives that set out how to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 (12).
One of the main strategies of the European Green Deal is the Farm to Fork Strategy (F2F), which is at the heart of the Deal.
This strategy addresses the challenges of sustainable food systems and recognizes the inextricable links between healthy people, healthy societies, and a healthy planet.
F2F is also essential to the European Commission's agenda to achieve the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 12 (Sustainable Consumption and production) and SDG 13 (climate action) (13).
The F2F approach aims to ensure that agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture, and the food value chain contribute appropriately to the process of curbing the GHG emissions, as stated by the EU goals (14).
According to the European Environment Agency, the 2019 levels of GHG emissions correspond to a higher reduction rate than the original target set for 2020 (15).
Moreover, bringing citizens together in the development and implementation of the European Green Deal is the aim of the European Climate Pact.
That is because citizens' just and inclusive participation and engagement in all areas of the deal is essential for the transition towards a climate-neutral, sustainable Europe (1).
Context During the Summer of 2021, the European continent witnessed one of the direct effects of global warming.
After the unprecedented heatwave in June, the hottest one since 1901, devastating floods hit different river basins across Europe, killing hundreds of people, displacing thousands, and damaging the infrastructure and the agricultural lands, resulting in billions of euros in losses (17).
These floods contributed to the truth that the effects of climate change know no borders.
This fact necessitates cross-border collaboration in climate action and makes cross-border regions within Europe the main stage to initiate actions and mediate changes.
Furthermore, the similarity in context and culture in those regions create, to an extent, a similar theme of challenges and barriers, thus, similar solutions as well.
The dreadful disaster was evident in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion (EMR), where the most intense floods occurred.
The EMR is a cross-border collaboration composed of three languages (French, Dutch, and German) and five partner regions, including the Dutch Province of Limburg, the German Zweckverband of the Aachen Region, the German-speaking community of Belgium, and the Belgian provinces of Liège and Limburg (18,19).
This policy brief will target the citizens of the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion in its options due to Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page5 | 15 several reasons.
The EMR is one of the oldest cross-border regions in Europe, and it retains a high population density, numerous industrial activities, high traffic, and frequent large-scale events.
Therefore, it is at high risk of large-scale disasters (20,21).
Moreover, the environment is one of the critical subjects the EMR wants to work on in the upcoming years (22).
Additionally, the EMR could be a showcase for other border regions across Europe and worldwide.
This policy brief aims to provide decisionmakers in the EMR with several policy options to promote climate literacy and climate action among citizens of the Meuse– Rhine Euroregion under the umbrella of the Farm to Fork strategy and the European Green Deal Policy Options Although a long-term strategy to mitigate climate risks is needed, research in Hollands Noorderkwartier in The Netherlands has shown that citizens often do not feel responsible for taking climate action.
Even though the urgency of climate change is apparent, they do not feel like they would be the ones responsible for inducing change (23).
So, to achieve the biggest results in tackling climate change and increasing citizen participation in the EMR, new policy areas should get more attention.
Firstly, citizen participation throughout local climate measurements is an under-explored area that can play an essential role in improving the feeling of responsibility in citizens.
Secondly, food waste and sustainability are some of the most significant contributors to climate change, making it a relevant policy area with great opportunities.
Lastly, urban sustainability is needed in the increasing urban-focused communities of the EMR.
These broad policy options are required to achieve the biggest results for a sustainable future in the EMR.. Citizen participation support throughout the use of local climate measurements Citizen involvement in scientific measurements, or citizen science, could be beneficial in the early detection and communication of climate events through monitoring and sharing data.
The risk management for the flooding in the EMR was insufficient to provide safe evacuations for all citizens in the affected areas.
In these cases, early detection and risk communication could save lives by allowing for early-stage evacuation (24).
For example, the EMR could draw on the experiences of a citizen observatory for flood risk reduction in Brenta-Bacchiglione, Italy (25).
Local climate measurements could thus be an efficient way to obtain reliable data on air quality while increasing awareness and Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page6 | 15 knowledge of environmental change indicators, like air pollution.
Citizen science has recently gained attention in environmental monitoring projects, and communities could potentially greatly expand the scope.
In the Netherlands, the project 'Measure Together' supports citizen science locally (26).
Climate participation projects have efficiently increased knowledge and awareness (27).
So far, similar projects have not been implemented in the EMR.
Different types of citizen science projects exist; some are contributory, others collaborative, and some are co-created projects in which researchers and citizens design together (28).
An example of an effective citizen science project is a tool for carbon calculation, which contributed to achieving the local CO2 targets in various cities in Austria, Germany, and Spain.
This online tool gives insights into the carbon footprint of citizens by collecting data on several aspects of environmental factors.
Besides increasing awareness and knowledge of CO2 impacts, the CO2 emissions of participants slightly decreased during the project (29).
Sustainable food consumption and less food waste Current food consumption patterns are neither sustainable for health nor the environment (30).
Besides contributing to cardiovascular diseases and death in humans, tonnes of waste and increased amounts of emissions per capita are hazardous consequences for the planet (31).
In the EMR, these emissions are almost twice as high as the global average (32).
That is why the EMR must transform the environmentally friendly choice into the easiest choice.
Thus, for that purpose, alternative approaches are to follow.
Firstly, provide information; Customers often do not pay attention to storage instructions on the packaging.
As a result, food is usually thrown away both because it is not consumed before it has passed its "best by" date or because many goods in retail shops remain unsold since consumers prefer to buy food with a longer shelf life (33).
Besides this information about food waste, education about food production and its impacts on health and the environment is needed.
The arrangement of this explicit information makes it less demanding for people to select healthy and economic diets that will benefit their well-being (30).
Therefore, innovative ways to provide this information through other means, including digital possibilities, social media, and more regional-related announcements, are needed.
Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page7 | 15 Secondly, creating opportunities: The EMR could be a best practice example by setting minimum mandatory criteria for sustainable food procurement in institutional catering.
By integrating daily vegetarian and vegan food in public canteens, a large part of the population would consume fewer animal products and eat a healthier diet (34).
Vegetarian and vegan food in canteens can also inspire people to change their daily lives.
Additionally, the third-largest source of food waste in Europe is the food service industry, including school canteens (35).
One of the main reasons for this plate waste is a lack of knowledge and awareness (36).
Cities, regions, and public authorities could assume responsibility for sourcing sustainable food for schools, universities, and local institutions.
In this manner, the EU plans to enhance its commitment to feasible nourishment utilization and, specifically, reinforce informational messages on the significance of healthy nutrition, ecologic production, and diminishing food waste (30).
And lastly, promote awareness; To shift the consumer's attention to the process of food production, the EMR could promote the extension of nutritional labeling on the front of the packaging.
In addition, origin or provenance information should become obligatory to indicate CO2 and water pollution.
If the product proved an appropriate balance, it could receive its own EMR Eco-label (32).
Furthermore, citizens should be more aware of the impact of customer behavior on food waste and, therefore, the environment.
On the other hand, decision-makers should also be mindful of the different motivations of citizens to change behavior, such as saving money and social responsibility (37).
The aim is to create awareness of food's background and strengthen regional offers related to this, and canteens could state where the products are from and how disrupting they are for the environment (32).
Sustainable Cities through Urban Gardening Due to the advancing climate change, urban areas are currently facing significant challenges.
On the one hand, ways must be found to deal with more frequent weather extremes (38).
On the other hand, urban areas should involve residents in land use, provide opportunities for them to be outdoors, be physically active, interact with each other, and learn more about our environment and the consequences of Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page8 | 15 climate change.
One way to get closer to these goals is to use urban spaces for community projects such as urban gardens to combine urban planning with social aspects.
Considering the weather extremes of recent years, areas used for urban gardening can be very beneficial because they help infiltrate large amounts of water, reducing the risk of flooding.
They also support groundwater replenishment.
In addition, the influence of green spaces on temperatures must be considered.
Unsealed surfaces such as grass or patches do not store heat as much as asphalt or pavement do and, thus, contribute to regulating the urban climate in summer (39).
It has also been shown that urban green areas positively affect air quality as they absorb, e.g., carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen oxide, or sulfur dioxide (39, 40, 41).
Furthermore, this type of space increases the urban landscape's biodiversity by providing habitats for insects, birds, small mammals, and a wide range of different vegetation, both ornamental and crop plants (39, 41, 42).
The social dimension of community gardening is another considerable advantage.
People from all generations can contact each other and grow their food (42).
Physical work outdoors and social engagement can prevent or improve health-related issues such as stress, social isolation, and depression (43, 44).
It has also been shown that people integrated into such projects by growing their food, consuming more fruits and vegetables, and having better food knowledge (45).
Furthermore, an argument for these projects within cities is the accompanying educational opportunities.
Children and adolescents especially can learn more about nature, conservation, sustainability, seasonality, and our food production (45).
Working in a community garden makes it possible to raise environmental awareness and promote citizen participation in the fight against climate change (39).
Recommendations The recommendations provided in this section elaborate on implementing practical solutions to promote climate literacy and climate action among citizens.
To provide an integrative approach to tackling climate change, we call on policymakers and researchers to follow our holistic recommendations.
● Prioritize funding of citizen science, urban gardening, and sustainable food projects in the EMR Internal or external money, current or new staff time, technical skills, or stakeholder buy-in may be necessary to support a project or program, depending on the goals.
Noteworthy, the EMR is part of an EU fund for a stronger Euregion (21).
To reach a significant impact, it is necessary to invest in implementing the proposed projects.
● Ensure equal participation options for every citizen A precondition of successful implementation is accessibility to all citizens within the EMR.
It must not be related to their education, age, disabilities, country of origin, or financial situation.
● Empower implementation of the projects through organizational support Policymakers should contribute to measures that look beyond country borders.
Citizens should be provided with the possibility to gain insights into climate data.
Early-stage participation of partners should be considered, for example, by stimulating https://www.linguee.de/englisch-deutsch/uebersetzung/accompanying.html Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page9 | 15 debates, gathering information, or seeking neighbors to sign a sustainability pledge.
● Stimulate the formulation of clear sustainability goals Program designers should work with clearly defined goals, communicate the goals of such programs to the public, and choose specific actions to pursue.
These goals should be coherent, well-designed, relevant to the community, and proactive.
All measures must be evaluated to improve the value and create long-term advancements.
● Encourage the implementation of citizen science projects in the EMR Citizen science projects aim to increase environmental awareness among citizens while simultaneously gathering valuable data on the state of the environment.
Reforms, as mentioned above, are needed to allow all citizens to take part in such projects.
● Gather insights on the region's greenhouse gas emissions Help local governments determine and track progress towards goals by better understanding activities and emission sources.
● Provide more sustainable food in institutional canteens and reduce food waste A big part of the EMR student population eats a few times per week in an institutional canteen.
Therefore, this would be a suitable place to create opportunities for citizens to include more sustainable food into their diet.
● Use social media as a tool to provide information about sustainable food Young citizens are progressive and openminded, and they appear to be open to receiving advice through social media and find it easy to communicate with peers about societal subjects (46).
Therefore, they are most likely to change their behavior more sustainably if they are aware of the importance and know-how to act.
● Use urban areas for urban gardening projects Urban areas should be used more intensively for urban gardening projects to promote the health of the residents, reduce environmental pollution, save biodiversity, and mitigate the effects of weather extremes in cities.
Furthermore, the initiators must pay particular attention to the quality of the soil to prevent harmful consequences to health.
The terrain must be suitable.
Issues such as accessibility, water supply, and possible pollutants in the soil must be considered.
The initiators have the task of ensuring this by reporting on the project as widely as possible, making it easily accessible, and ensuring that participation is free of charge.
● Create community sustainability challenges Creating little public challenges (such as a one-month vegetarian diet), discounts for regional offerings, accessible outreach, and education, hosting a discussion on recycling and waste reduction, building a green gardening demonstration project, and so on might all be adopted.
Community-based social marketing is critical, as it uses direct neighbor-to-neighbor communication and influence to encourage behavior change (47).
Giving people and organizations in your audience short-term action checklists with doable tasks can help them feel accomplished.
Such a list can offer suggestions and be a starting point for longterm behavior adjustment.
The action items must be carried out in a low-key manner Conclusion Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page10 | 15 The climate is changing, and the human influence on it is unmistakable.
This policy brief stresses the urgent need for leadership to tackle these changes and provide opportunities for citizen participation.
Implementing the suggested measures in the EMR will increase the knowledge and awareness of the environment among the EMR citizens and the local authorities, consequently leading to empowering people to engage in climate action.
Even though there is a long way to go, the recommendations of this policy brief are provided in the belief that measures to include citizens in climate action are of high necessity to tackle climate change Conflicts of interest None declared.
Funding None declared Acknowledgments The authors wish to acknowledge and thank Rana Orhan for her help and support in developing this policy brief.
In addition, they want to thank Katarzyna Czabanowska for her guidance and assistance throughout the Public Health Leadership course at Maastricht University.
“The content of this publication has not been approved by the United Nations and does not reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States”.
References 1.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [MassonDelmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L.
Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I.
Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R.
Matthews, T.K.
Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)].
IPCC, 2021: Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis [Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Dec 2].
Available from: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/d ownloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_S PM_final.pdf.
2.
Smith KR, Woodward A, CampbellLendrum D, Chadee Trinidad DD, Honda Y, Liu Q, et al.
Human Health: Impacts, Adaptation, and Co-Benefits Coordinating.
Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA; 2014.
3.
Romanello M, McGushin A, Di Napoli C, Drummond P, Hughes N, Jamart L, et al.
The 2021 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: code red for a healthy future.
Lancet.
2021;398(10311):1619-1662.
Doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(21)017876.
4.
Mitchell D, Heaviside C, Vardoulakis S, Huntingford C, Masato G, P Guillod B, et al.
Attributing human mortality during extreme heat waves to anthropogenic climate change.
Environ Res Lett [Internet].
2016 [cited 2021 Dec 8];11(7):074006.
Available from: https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1 088/1748-9326/11/7/074006.
5.
Haines A, Ebi K. The Imperative for Climate Action to Protect Health.
N Engl J Med.
2019;380(3):263-273.
Doi:10.1056/NEJMra1807873.
6.
Kendrovski V, Schmoll Oliver, Matthies-Wiesler F. Health and climate action: Policy brief [Internet].
World Health Organization.
2019 [cited 2021 Dec 8].
Available from: https://www.preventionweb.net/publi https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/health-and-climate-action-policy-brief Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page11 | 15 cation/health-and-climate-actionpolicy-brief.
7.
World Health Organization – Regional Office Europe.
Protecting health in Europe from climate change: 2017 update [Internet].
Copenhagen; 2017 [cited 2021 Nov 9].
Available from:http://www.euro.who.int/__data/ assets/pdf_le/0004/355792/Protecting HealthEuropeFromClimateChange.pd f?ua=1.
8.
European Council.
Climate change: what the EU is doing [Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Dec 2].
Available from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/p olicies/climate-change/.
9.
European Commission.
How will we be affected?
[Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Dec 2].
Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/euaction/adaptation-climatechange/how-will-we-be-affected_en.
10.
European Council.
Climate change summit COP26 [Internet] 2021 [cited 2021 Dec 3].
Available from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/p olicies/climate-change/parisagreement/cop26/.
11.
Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’).
PE/27/2021/REV/1 (June 30, 2021).
12.
European Commission.
A European Green Deal: Striving to be the first climate-neutral continent [Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Nov 22].
Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/prio rities-2019-2024/european-greendeal_en.
13.
United Nations Development Programme.
Sustainable Development Goals [Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Nov 9].
Available from: https://www.undp.org/sustainabledevelopment-goals.
14.
European Commission.
Farm to fork strategy: for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system.
Internet].
2020 [cited 2021 Nov 9].
Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/food/horizontaltopics/farm-fork-strategy_en.
15.
Environmental European Agency (EEA).
Is Europe reducing its greenhouse gas emissions?
[Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Dec 3].
Available from: https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/cli mate/eu-greenhouse-gas-inventory/iseurope-reducing-its-greenhouse.
16.
European Commission.
European Climate Pact [Internet].
2020 [cited 2021 Nov 25].
Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/euaction/european-green-deal/europeanclimate-pact_en.
17.
The Economist.
Devastating floods in Germany warn Europe of the dangers of warming [Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Dec 6].
Available from: https://www.economist.com/eu rope/2021/07/16/devastating-floodsin-germany-warn-europe-of-thedangers-of-warming.
18.
World Health Organisation.
MeuseRhine Euroregion [Internet].
2018 [cited 2021 Nov 12].
Available from: https://www.euro.who.int/__data/asse ts/pdf_file/0008/373157/rhn-meuserhine-eng.pdf.
19.
Paquay, M., Chevalier, S., Sommer, A., Ledoux, C., Gontariuk, M., Beckers, S. K., et al.
Disaster management training in the euregiomeuse-rhine: What can we learn from https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/health-and-climate-action-policy-brief https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/health-and-climate-action-policy-brief https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/ https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/adaptation-climate-change/how-will-we-be-affected_en https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/adaptation-climate-change/how-will-we-be-affected_en https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/adaptation-climate-change/how-will-we-be-affected_en https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/eu-greenhouse-gas-inventory/is-europe-reducing-its-greenhouse https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/eu-greenhouse-gas-inventory/is-europe-reducing-its-greenhouse https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/eu-greenhouse-gas-inventory/is-europe-reducing-its-greenhouse https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/07/16/devastating-floods-in-germany-warn-europe-of-the-dangers-of-warming https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/07/16/devastating-floods-in-germany-warn-europe-of-the-dangers-of-warming https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/07/16/devastating-floods-in-germany-warn-europe-of-the-dangers-of-warming https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page12 | 15 each other to improve cross-border practices?
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2021; (56):102134.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.10 2134.
20.
Ramakers M, on behalf of: Eumed members GGD Zuid Limburg, Staedteregion Aachen, Stadt Aachen, Kreis Heinsberg, Kreis Dueren.
Eumed: a long history in cross-border acute care in the Euregio MeuseRhine.
Eur J Public Health [Internet].
2014 [cited 2021 Dec 8]; 24(2):2018.
Available from: https://academic.oup.com/eurpub/arti cle/24/suppl_2/cku164-052/2839479.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/cku16 4.052 21.
Interreg Euregio Meuse-Rhine.
Lettre d'information: L'assistance transfrontalière Emric+ sauve des vies.
[Internet] 2011 [cited 2021 Nov 5].
Available from: http://www.interregemrnews.e u/fr/lettre-dinformation/interregeuregio-maas-rijn-5-zomer2011/l39assistance-transfrontaliereemric-sauve-des-vies/60/.
22.
Regions for health network & World Health Organisation.
Meuse-Rhine Euroregion.
[Internet].
2018 [cited 2021 Nov 7].
Available from: https://www.euro.who.int/__data/asse ts/pdf_file/0008/373157/rhn-meuserhine-eng.pdf.
23.
Kreemers LM, van Brecht J, Bakker T, Renes RJ.
Samen naar een klimaatbestendige omgeving: burgerparticipatie bij klimaatadaptatie in Hollands Noorderkwartier.
HBO kennisbank.
Amsterdam.
2020.
24.
Mathiesen K, Posaner J, Gehrke L. Europe’s floods: How a modern warning system was overwhelmed.
Politico [Internet].
2021 [cited 2021 Nov 7].
Available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/unnatu ral-disaster-the-german-belgianfloods-climate-change/.
25.
Ferri M, Wehn U, See L, Monego M, Fritz S. The value of citizen science for flood risk reduction: Cost-benefit analysis of a citizen observatory in the Brenta-Bacchiglione catchment.
Hydrol Earth Syst Sci.
2020; 24(12): 5781–98.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-24-57812020.
26.
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport.
Welcome to the knowledge portal ‘Samen meten’ / ‘Measure together’.
[Internet] 2021 [cited 2021 Oct 13].
Available from: https://www.samenmetenaanluchtkwa liteit.nl/international.
27.
Peter M, Diekötter T, Kremer K. Participant Outcomes of Biodiversity Citizen Science Projects: A Systematic Literature Review.
Sustainability [Internet].
2019 [cited 2021 Dec 3];11(10):2780.
Available from: https://www.mdpi.com/20711050/11/10/2780/htm.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.3390/su11102780.
28.
Bonney R, Mccallie E, Phillips T. Public Participation in Scientific Research: Defining the Field and Assessing Its Potential for Informal Science Education.
Washington, D.C. Center for Advancement of Informal Science Education (CAISE).
2000.
29.
Aichholzer G, Allhutter D, Strauß S. Using online carbon calculators for participation in local climate initiatives.
In: Tambouris E, Macintosh A, Sæbø Ø, editors.
International Conference on https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/cop26/ http://www.interregemrnews.eu/fr/lettre-dinformation/interreg-euregio-maas-rijn-5-zomer-2011/l39assistance-transfrontaliere-emric-sauve-des-vies/60/ http://www.interregemrnews.eu/fr/lettre-dinformation/interreg-euregio-maas-rijn-5-zomer-2011/l39assistance-transfrontaliere-emric-sauve-des-vies/60/ http://www.interregemrnews.eu/fr/lettre-dinformation/interreg-euregio-maas-rijn-5-zomer-2011/l39assistance-transfrontaliere-emric-sauve-des-vies/60/ http://www.interregemrnews.eu/fr/lettre-dinformation/interreg-euregio-maas-rijn-5-zomer-2011/l39assistance-transfrontaliere-emric-sauve-des-vies/60/ http://www.interregemrnews.eu/fr/lettre-dinformation/interreg-euregio-maas-rijn-5-zomer-2011/l39assistance-transfrontaliere-emric-sauve-des-vies/60/ https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/373157/rhn-meuse-rhine-eng.pdf https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/373157/rhn-meuse-rhine-eng.pdf https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/373157/rhn-meuse-rhine-eng.pdf https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/373157/rhn-meuse-rhine-eng.pdf https://www.samenmetenaanluchtkwaliteit.nl/international https://www.samenmetenaanluchtkwaliteit.nl/international https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/10/2780/htm https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/10/2780/htm Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page13 | 15 Electronic Participation.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
pp.
85-96.
30.
European Commission.
Farm to Fork Strategy.
For a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system.
Brussels; 2020.
31. International Food Container Organization.
Food waste by country: who's the biggest waster?
2020 [cited 2021 Nov 17].
Available from: https://www.ifco.com/countries-withthe-least-and-most-food-waste/.
32.
Federal Ministry for the Environment Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety Germany (BMU).
Environmental Sustainability, Consumption and Products and sustainable consumption [Internet].
2020 [cited 2021 Oct 13].
Available from: https://www.umwelt-imunterricht.de/hintergrund/umweltbew usstsein-konsumverhalten-undnachhaltiger-konsum/.
German.
33.
Nicastro R, Carillo P. Food Loss and Waste Prevention Strategies from Farm to Fork.
Sustainability.
2021;13(10):5443.
Doi https://doi.org/10.3390/su13105443.
34.
Umweltbundesamt.
Biolebensmittel [Internet].
2020 [cited 2021 Oct 27].
Available from: https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/um welttipps-fuer-den-alltag/essentrinken/biolebensmittel#gewusst-wie.
German.
35.
Eriksson M, Giovannini S, Ghosh R. Is there a need for greater integration and shift in policy to tackle food waste?
Insights from a review of European Union legislations.
SN Applied Sciences.
2020; 2(8):1-13.
36.
Pinto R, Pinto R, Melo F, Campos S, Cordovil C. A simple awareness campaign to promote food waste reduction in a University canteen.
Waste Management.
2018;76:28-38.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.201 8.02.044.
37.
Kim J, Rundle-Thiele S, Knox K, Burke K, Bogomolova S. Consumer perspectives on household food waste reduction campaigns.
Journal of Cleaner Production.
2020;243:118608.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.
118608.
38.
World Health Organization.
WHO Global Strategy on Health, Environment and Climate Change.
The transformation needed to improve lives and wellbeing sustainably through healthy environments.
Geneva: The World Health Organization.
2020.
39.
Okvat HA, Zautra AJ.
Community gardening: A parsimonious path to individual, community, and environmental resilience.
American journal of community psychology.
2011;47(3-4):374-87.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10464-0109404-z.
40.
Demuzere M, Orru K, Heidrich O, Olazabal E, Geneletti D, Orru H, Bhave AG, Mittal N, Feliú E, Faehnle M. Mitigating and adapting to climate change: Multi-functional and multiscale assessment of green urban infrastructure.
Journal of environmental management.
2014;146:107-15.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.201 4.07.025.
41.
Lin BB, Philpott SM, Jha S. The future of urban agriculture and biodiversity-ecosystem services: Challenges and next steps.
Basic and applied ecology.
2015; 16(3):189201.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.baae.2015.01 .005. https://www.umwelt-im-unterricht.de/hintergrund/umweltbewusstsein-konsumverhalten-und-nachhaltiger-konsum/ https://www.umwelt-im-unterricht.de/hintergrund/umweltbewusstsein-konsumverhalten-und-nachhaltiger-konsum/ https://www.umwelt-im-unterricht.de/hintergrund/umweltbewusstsein-konsumverhalten-und-nachhaltiger-konsum/ https://www.umwelt-im-unterricht.de/hintergrund/umweltbewusstsein-konsumverhalten-und-nachhaltiger-konsum/ https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/umwelttipps-fuer-den-alltag/essen-trinken/biolebensmittel#gewusst-wie https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/umwelttipps-fuer-den-alltag/essen-trinken/biolebensmittel#gewusst-wie https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/umwelttipps-fuer-den-alltag/essen-trinken/biolebensmittel#gewusst-wie Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page14 | 15 42.
Goddard MA, Dougill AJ, Benton TG.
Scaling up from gardens: biodiversity conservation in urban environments.
Trends in ecology & evolution.
2010; 25(2):90-8.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2009.07.
016.
43.
Schram-Bijkerk D, Dirven van Breemen EM, Otte PF.
Healthy Urban Gardening.
In: National Institute for Public Health and the Environment.
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (Ed.
), RIVM.
2015.
Report no: 2015-0172.
44.
Soga M, Gaston KJ, Yamaura Y.
Gardening is beneficial for health: A meta-analysis.
Preventive medicine reports.
2017; 5:92-9.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pmedr.2016.
11.007.
45.
Nettle C. Community Gardening and Food Security.
Chain Reaction.
2010; 109: 18–19.
46.
Klassen K, Douglass C, Brennan L, Truby H, Lim M. Social media use for nutrition outcomes in young adults: a mixed-methods systematic review.
International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity.
2018; 15(1):1-18.
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1186/s12966-0180696-y.
47.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Learning from EPA’s Climate Showcase Communities: Climate and Energy Resources for State, Local, and Tribal Governments; 2020 [cited 2021 Nov 12].
Available from: https://19january2017snapshot.epa.go v/statelocalclimate/learning-epasclimate-showcase-communities_.html _______________________________________________________ © 2021 Alsamara et al.
; This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12966-018-0696-y https://doi.org/10.1186/s12966-018-0696-y https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/learning-epas-climate-showcase-communities_.html https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/learning-epas-climate-showcase-communities_.html https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/learning-epas-climate-showcase-communities_.html Alsamara, I.; Beinert, S. F.; De Jong, J. C.; Klappe, M. J. P.; Marewski, V. S. (Policy brief).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 23 June 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5603 Page15 | 15 Editable graphics:
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 219 Volume 1 Issue 3 October (2021) DOI: 10.47540/ijias.v1i3.290 Page: 219 – 228 Expressed Willingness and Awareness of Students towards Climate Change in Lahore, Pakistan Khadija Gulraiz1, Aabgeen Ali2 1,2Department of Environmental Sciences, Kinnaird College for Women, Pakistan Corresponding Author: Khadija Gulraiz; Email: khadijagulraiz77@gmail.com A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: Climate Change, Global Warming, Students Awareness, Students Attitude, Students Willingness.
Received : 05 July 2021 Revised : 19 October 2021 Accepted : 21 October 2021 Global climate change is one of the most significant threats to our generation, the fundamentals of the issue lie in the fact that the anthropogenic contribution of greenhouse gases is changing the global climate at a rapid rate causing immense warming trends and displaced cold weather.
This study examined the awareness levels of college/university students on climate change and their willingness to mitigate the effects of climate change.
69 students from Lahore’s different public and private sector universities were asked to fill out a survey questionnaire form online and were questioned on their attitudes about climate change and their willingness to take action to mitigate its effects.
INTRODUCTION One serious threat that the human generation faces today is global climate change (GCC) also more commonly known as global warming.
The crux of this emergent issue is that increased urbanization and foul anthropogenic activities have rendered our planet vulnerable and hence more prone to disasters and catastrophes, the earth is warming up, glaciers are melting, drastic heat waves are being recorded all around the world, and occurrence of natural forest fires have increased manifold in the past years.
In addition to these, several other factors are also permanently altering our atmosphere and earth as we know it.
The only solution to this issue is mitigation, which involves conscious efforts by countries to stop fossil fuel burning, shift to cleaner energy sources, and other strategies (Sinatra et al, 2012).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a group consisting of about 2400 prominent scientists from all around the world who frequently evaluate the status of indicators and update the world governments on prospects and doubts of coming changes.
Ever since the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 (the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro), the countries that agreed to study and respond to climate issues have been considering alternatives for addressing what is perceived as causes of the problem.
About 5000 delegates from those 150 countries met in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan.
Their efforts produced the Kyoto Protocol, with national targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
The debates in Kyoto reflect internal debates in the representative countries (Fortner et al, 2000).
Climate change is an environmental crisis that requires extensive attention all over the world is not just policymakers but also the general public.
To check public knowledge on climate change in Pakistan we chose college students as our target audience.
There are many conceptual difficulties faced by students on such topics due to limited knowledge and many misconceptions.
Due to limited media coverage around the topic locally, students may believe anything and everything which might make a simple scientific phenomenon a controversy in their heads, many might question the legitimacy of the claim that climate is warming although the question should only be how much and how fast is human activities promoting the warming trends.
The common challenges faced in the understanding of climate change issues are that the science is complex, lengthy, multidimensional, and INDONESIAN JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND APPLIED SCIENCES (IJIAS) Journal Homepage: https://ojs.literacyinstitute.org/index.php/ijias ISSN: 2775-4162 (Online) Research Article mailto:khadijagulraiz77@gmail.com https://ojs.literacyinstitute.org/index.php/ijias http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1587190067&1&&2020 Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 220 requires systematic and analytical thinking.
In addition to conceptual errors, certain misguided judgments lead to thinking adrift on the issue of worldwide climate change, such as the difference between weather and climate.
For example, when people are generally inquired about their views and understanding of climate change, they often use their memory of temperature fluctuations in their own life to evaluate whether the planet is warming.
Misattributing short-term weather instabilities to long-term climate influences may affect in part the conceptual misconceptions of understanding timing and relationship between geophysical events that have occurred during the Earth’s history (Sinatra et al, 2012).
Another issue, one displayed by socioscientific subjects, is that learners are frequently committed to their own opinions on the issue and this commitment may cause a motivation to actively counterchange.
Strong commitment to a specific point of view may ascend from private experiences (such as recalling a few recent scorching hot summers) but may also arise from one’s beliefs, or outlooks toward new knowledge.
Strong, steadfast notions are extremely resilient to change in part due to their rich interconnections with other ideas.
Resistance creates barriers to learning that range from the absolute rejection of new ideas and concepts to a thoughtful review of old concepts to fit with preexisting notions (Sinatra et al, 2012).
Charlton Research Company, Gallup, Krosnick & Visser, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and many more NGOs/governmental organizations have internationally conducted extensive surveys to gauge public opinions and trends amongst people, classes and societies on their understanding and opinion on global climate change the science and also its implications (Fortner et al, 2000).
The purpose of the present study is to elaborate on previous researches and to get a more localized take on global climate change and its knowledge in the college students of Lahore, Pakistan.
The survey is also supposed to understand the willingness of students to adopt mitigative steps at the individual level to reduce drastic effects of climate change at local, city levels.
This study is inspired by prior surveys conducted internationally in reputable journals targeting college students to understand their knowledge on climate change and willingness to take action against it.
METHODS A famous city in Pakistan, Lahore was chosen for the research.
Lahore has been facing drastic climate change recently.
Lahore is the capital of the province of Punjab and is the 2nd largest city of Pakistan after Karachi, as well as it is the 26th largest city in the world.
The population of Lahore is around 12,642,000.
Lahore has many educational institutes.
Most of the reputable colleges and universities are public, but in recent years there has also been an increase in the number of private colleges and universities.
The current literacy rate of Lahore is 64%.
Lahore has a wide range of schools, colleges, and universities that caters to diverse streams.
This study is based on a narrative and quantitative research design which helped gain access to information like the level of awareness and attitudes in the students towards climate change.
Responses were collected from college students, undergraduate and postgraduate university students of different majors such as pure sciences, environmental sciences, biotechnology, botany, zoology, and psychology, etc.
Questionnaires were used as a medium for the research.
A google-form based questionnaire was developed and conducted online keeping the current situation of Covid-19 in mind.
The questionnaires were kept in a simplified and easy language so that it is comprehendible.
The questionnaire was reviewed multiple times before finalizing.
The definitive version of the survey consists of 24 statements in total and these statements were divided into four sections.
The first section was related to participants’ profiles which included information like participant’s email address, gender, age, educational level, and household income.
Then comes the second section of the questionnaire which included almost 6 statements regarding the awareness towards climate change.
The third section again contains 6 statements in total.
These statements were to check the agreement of the participants towards different aspects of climate change.
Lastly, the fourth section contains 7 statements in total.
The statements of this section were designed to check the attitude of the participants towards climate change.
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 221 A three-point Likert scale was used to quantify the responses of students.
The second section of the questionnaire included the three-point Likert scale where 0 represented ‚Aware‛, 1 represented ‚Moderately aware ‚and 2 represented ‚Unaware.
This scale was used to indicate students’ level of awareness towards the given statements.
However, the third section of the questionnaire included the same scale where 0 represented ‚Agree‛, 1 represented ‚Disagree‛ and 2 represented ‚Unsure‛.
This scale was used to indicate students’ level of agreement towards the given statements.
Lastly, the fourth section of the questionnaire again included the three-point Likert scale but there 0 represented ‚Totally willing‛, 1 represented ‚Not willing at all ‚and 2 represented ‚Willing enough to convince others‛.
This scale was used to gain information regarding the attitude of the respondents towards the environment.
Total 69 responses were collected, out of which 53 (76.8%) were female respondents and 16 (23.2%) male respondents.
(34.8%) were below 20, (60.9%) were in the age limit of 20-25, and (4.3%) were older than 25.
(11.6%) participants were college students, (87%) were bachelor's students and very few were postgraduate students.
(18.2%) respondents have their house income below 50000, (47%) have their house income ranging from 60000-100000 and (34.8%) have house income above 150000.
The results were concluded from the responses in the form of percentages and the discussion was generated from the results.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION To gauge the understanding and knowledge of students we started with statements related to the science of climate change.
Climate does not mean the same thing as weather Out of the 69 answers 58 answers marked ‘aware’ to the above statement, while 9 were moderately aware and 2 were unaware of the difference.
This showed that 84.1% of students at the university level are aware of the difference between climate and weather, whereas 13% are somewhat conscious and 2.9% are oblivious.
So, if we combine the students that are somewhat aware and those who are completely unaware, we’ll get a percentage of 15% of university students who are not sure about the difference between climate and weather, which is as simple as that weather is the state of the atmosphere at a particular place and at a particular time as regards to heat, sunshine, wind, and rain.
However, the climate is the longterm average of weather, typically averaged for 10 to 30 years (Schneider, S. H. 2011).
The results of this statement are not so shocking as there is little to no importance given to how climate and the changes it is undergoing will affect every being on this planet.
Table 1.
Climate does not mean the same thing as weather Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Aware 58 84.1 84.1 84.1 Moderately aware 9 13.0 13.0 97.1 Unaware 2 2.9 2.9 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 Climate change comes with the rise in sea level The responses to this statement were varying.
40 (58%) students were ‘aware’, 24 (34.8%) were ‘moderately aware’ and 5 (7.2%) were completely unaware of this phenomenon.
As global temperatures rise, glaciers and ice caps melt resulting in a lot of water flowing downstream and ending up in oceans.
This rise in oceanic levels is causing drastic climatic changes especially in urban areas located near the seas, they’re experiencing heavy rainfalls causing urban flooding and temperatures never seen before in winters and summer months.
Overall, rising sea levels are increasing the threat of coastal floods.
High-tide flooding is already a serious problem in many coastal communities, and it is only expected to get worse soon with this trend of continued rising seas (Rahmstorf, S. 2010).
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 222 Table 2.
Climate change comes with rise in sea level Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Aware 40 58.0 58.0 58.0 Moderately aware 24 34.8 34.8 92.8 Unaware 5 7.2 7.2 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 Acid rain causes climate change 56 (81.2%) marked ‚aware‛, 11 (15.9%) were ‚moderately aware‛ whilst 2 (2.9%) were unaware.
This statement might sound confusing to an average student at university who has not engaged in any environmental science since high school, but the phenomenon is quite simple to comprehend and grasp.
Acid rain is caused when accelerated anthropogenic activities impart acids (chemicals) in the atmosphere that start to precipitate downwards in the form of fog/smog or rain.
In an instance, we can consider a coal-fired powerplant which daily emits huge amounts of chemicals into the air out of which NOX’s, CO2, and CH4are primary, these chemicals are also good absorbers of heat causing global warming and later due to the frequency of this phenomenon also start causing climatic changes (Reis et al, 2012).
Table 3.
Acid rain causes climate change Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Aware 56 81.2 81.2 81.2 Moderately aware 11 15.9 15.9 97.1 Unaware 2 2.9 2.9 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 More garbage/waste causes climate change 58 (84.1%) marked ‚aware‛, 9 (13%) were ‚moderately aware‛ and 2 (2.9%) unmarked ‚unaware‛.
Similarly, to the statements above this statement might confuse students who are not studying science subjects or have little know-how about climate change.
Garbage/waste/rubbish ends up in landfills or at random dumping grounds, here, when they decompose carbon dioxide and methane are released and both these contribute to climate change (Ackerman, F. 2000).
Table 4.
More garbage/waste causes climate change Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Aware 58 84.1 84.1 84.1 Moderately aware 9 13.0 13.0 97.1 Unaware 2 2.9 2.9 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 Climate change causes more floods and droughts 55 (79.7%) were aware of this, 11 (15.9%) were moderately aware while 3 (4.3%) were unaware.
This statement is pretty obvious in its nature since climate changes cause extreme temperatures and in the case of extreme summers sea levels rise causes more rains, floods and at some places, climate change causes long periods without any rains causing droughts to occur (Whetton et al, 1993).
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 223 Table 5.
Climate change causes more floods and droughts Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Aware 55 79.7 79.7 79.7 Moderately aware 11 15.9 15.9 95.7 Unaware 3 4.3 4.3 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 People can prevent climate change by using renewable energy sources and by planting more trees This statement is pretty self-explanatory hence a majority of 64 students (92.8%) marked ‚aware‛, 4 (5.8%) were ‚moderately aware‛ and 1 (1.4%) marked ‚unaware‛.
Climate change mitigation can be adopted by avoiding and reducing emissions of heat-trapping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere to avoid the planet from warming to more extreme temperatures.
Mitigation includes retrofitting buildings to make them more energyefficient, implementing renewable energy sources like solar, wind, and small hydro-powerplants, helping cities develop more sustainable transport such as bus rapid transit, electric vehicles, and biofuels, and promoting more sustainable uses of land (Teller et al, 2002).
Table 6.
People can prevent climate change by using renewable energy sources and by planting more trees Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Aware 64 92.8 92.8 92.8 Moderately aware 4 5.8 5.8 98.6 Unaware 1 1.4 1.4 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 In the following section, we targeted the questions in a way to know the opinions of our subjects.
Scientific evidence points to a warming trend in global climate 59 (85.5%) marked ‚agree‛, 1 (1.4%) marked ‚disagree‛ and 9 (13%) were ‚unsure‛.
The earth is warming up due to global warming caused by various anthropogenic and some natural events (Rahmstorf et al, 2017).
Table 7.
Scientific evidence points to a warming trend in global climate Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Agree 59 85.5 85.5 85.5 Disagree 1 1.4 1.4 87.0 Unsure 9 13.0 13.0 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 Human activity has been the driving force behind the warming trend over the last 50 years 60 (87%) marked ‚agree‛, 3 (4.3%) marked ‚disagree‛ whilst 6 (8.7%) marked ‚unsure‛.
Table 8.
Human activity has been the driving force behind the warming trend over the last 50 years Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Agree 60 87.0 87.0 87.0 Disagree 3 4.3 4.3 91.3 Unsure 6 8.7 8.7 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 224 Climate change is a very big problem 63 (91.3%) persons agreed, 1 (1.4%) disagreed and 5 (7.2%) was unsure.
Table 9.
I believe climate change is a very big problem Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Agree 63 91.3 91.3 91.3 Disagree 1 1.4 1.4 92.8 Unsure 5 7.2 7.2 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 There is still time to prepare for climate change problems 54 (78.3%) agreed, 5 (7.2%) disagreed and 10 (14.5%) were unsure regarding this.
Expert opinion says it's still not too late to start mitigation efforts.
However, it is also true that there is a time lag between what we do and when we feel it, so the things we humans are doing right now will show the magnitude of their effects much later on.
Hence if we right our wrongs from today, start using cleaner energy and promote sustainability, we have a promising future ahead of us.
Table 10.
There is still time to prepare for climate change problems Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Agree 54 78.3 78.3 78.3 Disagree 5 7.2 7.2 85.5 Unsure 10 14.5 14.5 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 Read news and keep myself updated on climate change and its effects 35 (50.7%) students read the news to stay updated about climate change, 22 (31.9%) don’t really read news for getting updates on climate change and 12 (17.4%) students are not sure about it.
So according to the survey half of the students read the news and are aware of the changing climate.
But why is climate still changing drastically and is becoming a big issue?
A very common idiom ‚Go in one ear and out the other‛ perfectly answers this question.
People listen to the news of climate change and feel bad about it but they do not dig in and find out what is causing the climate change.
Humans are the biggest reason for climate change but they are not willing to change their lifestyles.
On the other hand, many students marked that they do not read news about climate change.
One of its reason could be that our traditional and social media are busy highlighting many other affairs hence they do not address important issues like climate change.
Table 11.
I read the news and keep myself updated on climate change and its effects Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Agree 35 50.7 50.7 50.7 Disagree 22 31.9 31.9 82.6 Unsure 12 17.4 17.4 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 It is arrogant to assume that humans can influence climate temperature 23 (33.3%) students marked ‚agree‛, 35 (50.7%) marked ‚disagree‛ and 11 (15.9%) marked ‚unsure‛ for the above statement.
Almost half of the students think that it is not arrogant to assume that humans can influence climate change while quite a sum thinks that it is arrogant.
But the reality is that humans are the major cause behind the increasing temperature resulting in global warming leading to climate change.
The use of modern technologies like air conditioners, refrigerators, and other electronic appliances, vehicles, burning of fossil fuel and deforestation for urbanization is all the anthropogenic causes of climate change (Stern et al, 2014).
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 225 Table 12.
It is arrogant to assume that humans can influence climate temperature Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Agree 23 33.3 33.3 33.3 Disagree 35 50.7 50.7 84.1 Unsure 11 15.9 15.9 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 In the following section, we asked questions in a way to get an idea of the ratio of students who are willing to change their lifestyles to save our environment.
Willing to stop using plastic grocery bags and use recycled bags instead 55 (79.7%) students were totally willing to stop using plastic bags, 1 (1.4%) were not willing at all and 12 (17.4%) were willing enough to convince others.
According to the questionnaire survey, the majority of the students were willing to stop using plastic bags anymore and were ready to replace plastic bags with recycled bags.
But still, the country is facing plastic waste management problems.
The government has put a ban on the use of plastic bags in the markets but we see many shopkeepers selling their products to the customers in plastic bags.
Those respondents who marked ‚totally willing‛ might use plastic bags in their routine life.
People want to change society but do not understand that it begins with your individual efforts.
Table 13.
I’m willing to stop using plastic grocery bags and use recycled bags instead Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Totally willing 55 79.7 80.9 80.9 Not willing at all 1 1.4 1.5 82.4 Willing enough to convince others 12 17.4 17.6 100.0 Total 68 98.6 100.0 Missing System 1 1.4 Total 69 100.0 Willing to stop buying bottled water because the manufacturing process for plastic water bottles is carbon-intensive 42 (60.9%) students marked ‚Totally willing‛, 9 (13%) marked ‚Not willing at all‛ and 17 (24.6%) marked ‚Willing enough to convince others‛ in response to the above-mentioned statement.
Again, the majority of the respondents showed that they are willing to stop buying bottled water.
But they might not be able to convince their families to stop using bottled water and as the majority of the respondents have their house income above 50000 so their families might afford bottled water and use it for drinking instead of boiled water.
24.6% of students said that they were willing enough to convince others.
They should start convincing their families to stop using plastic bottles or bottled water so that plastic pollution can be reduced.
People generally go for fresh products and hesitate in using recycled products.
The use of recycled products should be encouraged otherwise we would not be able to recover the loss of the country from solid waste pollution.
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 226 Table 14.
I’m willing to stop buying bottled water because the manufacturing process for plastic water bottles is carbon-intensive Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Totally willing 42 60.9 61.8 61.8 Not willing at all 9 13.0 13.2 75.0 Willing enough to convince others 17 24.6 25.0 100.0 Total 68 98.6 100.0 Missing System 1 1.4 Total 69 100.0 Willing to pay more money to buy a hybrid car 34 (49.3%) students were willing to pay more money to buy a hybrid car, 19 (27.5%) were not willing at all and 15 (21.7%) were willing enough to convince others.
Almost half of the students were willing to use hybrid cars by paying more.
That’s a good thing because hybrid cars are eco-friendly.
Hybrid cars use electric motors so they consume less fuel.
Reduced fuel consumption means less fuel is burned and there will be fewer emissions (Barry et al, 2016).
Ultimately, the human-enhanced greenhouse effect will be reduced.
Many respondents were willing enough to convince others.
Hopefully, they will get succeed in convincing people around them.
On the other hand, many respondents were not willing at all because hybrid cars are expensive and they cannot afford them.
Table 15.
I’m willing to pay more money to buy a hybrid car Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Totally willing 34 49.3 50.0 50.0 Not willing at all 19 27.5 27.9 77.9 Willing enough to convince others 15 21.7 22.1 100.0 Total 68 98.6 100.0 Missing System 1 1.4 Total 69 100.0 Willing to replace all the light bulbs in my house with energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs 50 (72.5%) participants marked ‚Totally willing‛, 3 (4.3%) marked ‚Not willing at all‛ and 14 (20.3%) marked ‚Willing enough to convince others‛ in response to this statement.
The majority of the respondents were willing to replace the light bulbs in their houses with energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs.
And many were willing enough to convince others.
Energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs not only bring down your energy bills but are also beneficial for the environment.
They consume fewer energy units of light emitted and so fewer greenhouse gases are emitted from the power plants as less fuel is burnt (Thejokalyani et al, 2014).
It will be good if the families of the respondents are also willing to replace all the bulbs of their houses with energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs just like them.
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 227 Table 16.
I’m willing to replace all the light bulbs in my house with energy efficient fluorescent bulbs Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Totally willing 50 72.5 74.6 74.6 Not willing at all 3 4.3 4.5 79.1 Willing enough to convince others 14 20.3 20.9 100.0 Total 67 97.1 100.0 Missing System 2 2.9 Total 69 100.0 Willing to reduce the number of hours a week I use electronic devices (computer, cell phone, TV, etc.
34 (49.3%) of the respondents were totally willing to reduce their screen time, 20 (29%) were not willing at all and 14 (20.3%) were willing enough to convince others.
So basically, the questionnaire survey was done among students and our youth is spending more time on electronic devices than any other age group.
That’s why many of the respondents were not willing at all to make this change in their lives.
At the same time, almost half of the respondents were willing to change this habit of being a phone or TV addict which is a very appreciating thing.
Table 17.
I’m willing to reduce the number of hours a week I use electronic devices (computer, cell phone, TV, etc.)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid Totally willing 34 49.3 50.0 50.0 Not willing at all 20 29.0 29.4 79.4 Willing enough to convince others 14 20.3 20.6 100.0 Total 68 98.6 100.0 Missing System 1 1.4 Total 69 100.0 Support environmental education in schools 67 (97.1%) respondents were in favor of this statement, 1 (1.4%) was against and 1 (1.4%) believe that her support would not help.
So almost everyone among the respondents was supporting environmental education in schools.
Environmental education is very important as the climate is changing rapidly.
It is necessary to give our children environmental education.
This will help them in acknowledging the importance of the environment and will also change their attitude and behavior towards the environment.
They will be more cautious and that’s how we can save the world.
Table 19.
I support environmental education in schools Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid I would 67 97.1 97.1 97.1 No, I wouldn't 1 1.4 1.4 98.6 I don’t think it will help 1 1.4 1.4 100.0 Total 69 100.0 100.0 Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-228 228 Students are often confronted with socioscientific topics in the course of instruction.
The topic of a human causative role in climate change is abstractly difficult and some students perceive it as debatable.
Our goals were to examine attitudes towards human-induced climate change as well as expressions of willingness to take action to reduce human impact.
Our results indicated that students expressed great inclination to take mitigatory actions to reduce their own carbon footprint.
CONCLUSION Climate change is a very important phenomenon.
Climate is changing fast and the reason behind this change is humans.
Different human activities like deforestation and industrialization are causing the climate to change.
This research-based on questionnaire survey was done to know the awareness and attitude of students towards climate change.
This survey would also be a help to the respondents in reflecting themselves.
Many students were aware of the changing climate and were willing to make efforts to stop the climate from deteriorating any further.
But practically many of them might not put effort to save the environment.
The same could be the case with other people that is why we are still facing major issues like climate change.
Government and the public should both play their role in reducing greenhouse emissions.
Government should enforce laws and the public should strictly follow them.
REFERENCES 1.
Barry, M., & Damar-Ladkoo, A.
(2016).
Consumer Behaviours Towards ECO-Cars: A Case of Mauritius.
Studies in Business & Economics, 11(1).
2.
Fortner, R. W., Lee, J. Y., Corney, J. R., Romanello, S., Bonnell, J., Luthy, B., ... & Ntsiko, N. (2000).
Public understanding of climate change: Certainty and willingness to act.
Environmental Education Research, 6(2), 127-141.
3.
Rahmstorf, S. (2010).
A new view on sea level rise.
Nature Climate Change, 1(1004), 44-45.
4.
Rahmstorf, S., Foster, G., & Cahill, N. (2017).
Global temperature evolution: recent trends and some pitfalls.
Environmental Research Letters, 12(5), 054001.
5.
Reis, S., Grennfelt, P., Klimont, Z., Amann, M., ApSimon, H., Hettelingh, J. P., ... & Williams, M. (2012).
From acid rain to climate change.
Science, 338(6111), 1153-1154.
6.
Schneider, S. H. (2011).
Encyclopedia of climate and weather (Vol.
1).
Oxford University Press.
7.
Sinatra, G. M., Kardash, C. M., Taasoobshirazi, G., & Lombardi, D. (2012).
Promoting attitude change and expressed willingness to take action toward climate change in college students.
Instructional Science, 40(1), 1-17.
8.
Stern, D. I., & Kaufmann, R. K. (2014).
Anthropogenic and natural causes of climate change.
Climatic change, 122(1), 257-269.
9.
Teller, E., Hyde, T., & Wood, L. (2002).
Active climate stabilization: Practical physics-based approaches to prevention of climate change (No.
UCRL-JC-148012).
Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
(LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States).
10.
Thejokalyani, N., & Dhoble, S. J.
(2014).
Importance of eco-friendly OLED lighting.
In Defect and Diffusion Forum (Vol.
357, pp.
1-27).
Trans Tech Publications Ltd. 11.
Whetton, P. H., Fowler, A. M., Haylock, M. R., & Pittock, A.
B.
(1993).
Implications of climate change due to the enhanced greenhouse effect on floods and droughts in Australia.
Climatic Change, 25(3), 289-317.
Received for publication: 4 April, 2016.
Accepted for publication: 30 June, 2016.
Doi: 10.15446/agron.colomb.v34n2.56799 1 Department of Agronomy, Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
Bogota (Colombia).
gfischer@unal.edu.co 2 Independent researcher.
Bogota (Colombia).
3 Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Universidad Pedagogica y Tecnologica de Colombia.
Tunja (Colombia).
Agronomía Colombiana 34(2), 190-199, 2016 Ecophysiological aspects of fruit crops in the era of climate change.
A review Aspectos de la ecofisiología de los frutales en los tiempos del cambio climático.
Una revisión Gerhard Fischer1, Fernando Ramírez2, and Fánor Casierra-Posada3 ABSTRACT RESUMEN The increased concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse effect gases has led to global warming, which has resulted in climate change, increased levels of ultraviolet (UV) radiation and changes in the hydrological cycle, affecting the growth, development, production and quality of fruit crops, which undoubtedly will be difficult to predict and generalize because the physiological processes of plants are multidimensional.
This review outlines how the effects of high/low solar radiation, temperature, water stress from droughts, flooding and rising levels of CO2 in the atmosphere affect fruit crops and their growth and physiology.
La elevada concentración de dióxido de carbono (CO2) y otros gases de efecto invernadero ha resultado en un calentamiento global, mayores niveles de radiación ultravioleta (UV) y cambios en el ciclo hidrológico afectando el crecimiento, desarrollo, producción y calidad de los cultivos frutales, que sin duda, serán difíciles de predecir y generalizar debido a que los procesos fisiológicos de las plantas son multidimensionales.
Se reseña, cómo los efectos de una alta y baja radiación solar y temperatura, estrés hídrico por sequía e inundación y el aumento del nivel de CO2 en la atmósfera inciden sobre los cultivos y afectan su crecimiento y fisiología.
Key words: radiation, temperature, water stress, carbon dioxide.
Palabras clave: radiación, temperatura, estrés hídrico, dióxido de carbono.
given site, growing conditions decide on the size of the plant, the duration of phenological stages, the time and volume of the harvest.
Considering the dependence of crops on the environment, the effects of climate change can be very large depending on the fruit species and the climate conditions.
It is very difficult to adopt experiences from one country to another one because the plant effect is different at each plantation site (Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez, 2012).
On the other hand, Pritchard and Amthor (2005) mentioned that it is difficult to predict and generalize how climate change would affect growth, development, production, and quality of crops since highly varied responses of plants resulting from physiological processes are multidimensional.
In addition, climate change affects important plant pests with consequences on physiological potential, yield and quality of fruit species (Seidel, 2016).
Climate change, observed since 1950, has shown, among other factors, an increase in extremes of high air temperatures, reducing peaks of low temperature and an increase in the number of heavy rains in several regions.
The average global temperature between the land surface and oceans Introduction Ecophysiology is the study of environmental effects on plant physiology; these conditions are of paramount importance for the success of any crop (Fischer and OrduzRodriguez, 2012).
Ecophysiological research is conducted to describe the physiological mechanisms during development and growth of plants that interact with physical and biotic environmental factors (Lambers et al., 2008).
An orchard is characterized by an environment composed of light, temperature, water, humidity, wind, various atmospheric gases, soil nutrients and other conditions of the rhizosphere.
During the growth of plants several climate and stress factors are influential at the same time for the crop, such as drought, heat, UV light, etc.
(Mittler, 2006), i.e.
no climatic factor alone can decide the physiological performance.
For example, photosynthesis depends not only on radiation, but also on temperature, CO2, water and nutritional elements (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012).
As shown by these authors, planting a crop in an eco-physiologically unfit place increases the costs of production and, thus, reduces the chance of high economic success.
Taking into account environmental factors, at a http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/agron.colomb.v34n2.56799 191Fischer, Ramírez, and Casierra-Posada: Ecophysiological aspects of fruit crops in the era of climate change.
A review shows an increasing trend of 0.85°C (0.65 to 1.06°C) for 1880-2012 (IPCC, 2015).
For the 21st century, a temperature increase of nearly 3°C is projected by 2050 and values of as high as 6°C by the end of the century (Stöckle et al., 2011).
Pritchard and Amthor (2005) mentioned factors such as (a) the overall increase in the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide, (b) global warming related to the increase in the concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, (c) increase in the concentration of ozone (O3) in the troposphere and the lower layer of stratospheric O3, (d) soil salinization in irrigated crops and (e) changes in the hydrological cycle as important phenomena of changing climate effects on agriculture.
These authors claim that crops exposed to these conditions of altered growth must be able to harmonize the multiple effects of those changes to maintain a balance between the activities of the different organs.
To adapt fruit production to these new situations, mostly adverse to crops, a complete understanding of multiple effects of climate change on plant physiology is required (Swaminathan and Kesavan, 2012).
The aim of this review was to elucidate how these factors, focusing on solar radiation, temperature, water and carbon dioxide, affect the physiology of the fruit plants, in general, with emphasis on fruits from the tropics and subtropics, and with some experiences of species from the temperate zones.
Effect of changing climatic factors on the ecophysiology of fruit plants Solar radiation The visible solar radiation is essential as a source of energy for photosynthetic activity in plants (Koyama et al., 2012), with its key role as an energy source for biomass production and finally fruit crops yield.
If climate change causes high light intensity for long periods, the more CO2 is reduced and more carbohydrates produced that are available for filling and increasing the sweetness of fruits if soil moisture permits (Sherman and Beckman, 2003).
In this context, an increased radiation and temperature require a lower leaf area in plants to produce the same amount of fruit as before climate change (Fischer et al., 2012a) and this situation gives space for varieties with higher photosynthetic performance and less susceptibility to early photoinhibition.
The leaf area of a plantation is determined by the leaf area index (LAI), which is the ratio between the total leaf area and the floor area covered by it and can range in many fruit crops from 1.5 (minimum in apple) to 11 (maximum in citrus), depending on factors such as variety, rootstock, pruning, trellising, fertilization, and other cultural practices (Jackson, 1980; Fischer et al., 2012a).
As Casierra-Posada (2007) reported, reducing the leaf area may be a defense mechanism of plants to reduce the capture and use of light quanta.
Thus, there may be two cases: a dynamic photoinhibition, which manifests itself during the midday hours, especially in the tropics, when the leaves are exposed to a large amount of incident radiation, and a chronic photoinhibition, which occurs as a result of failures or overload in foliar protection mechanisms (Casierra-Posada, 2007).
The plants would be severely affected in its photosynthetic efficiency when photoinhibition results from alterations in radiation levels or temperature (Rivas, 2008).
A greater radiation absorption and reduced transpiration (stomatal closure) heat up the canopy, which affects the meristem temperature, without changing the surrounding air temperature, increasing or lowering the developmental rate of plants depending on the temperature range (Pritchard and Amthor, 2005).
Long periods of low radiation, with diffused or reduced light, stimulate the longitudinal growth of fragile vegetative structures because of an undersupply with carbohydrates (Dwivedi and Dwivedi, 2012).
Therefore, the correct and not excessive density of plants and branches as well as the tree height and shape of the crown, which are regulated by pruning and espalier, and also by the direction of the rows from north to south, are important aspects to maximize light interception in plantations (Fischer and OrduzRodriguez, 2012).
In banana passionfruit (Passiflora tripartita var.
mollissima), in areas of high incidence of mist, the training and pruning of plant canopy in a 45° espalier, orientated to the east, increases interception of light and, therefore, fruit production (Miranda et al., 2009).
The reduction of light intensity affects the reproductive more than the vegetative phase because it directly influences floral induction, differentiation of flower bud, and also set, size, color, and organoleptic quality of fruits (Fischer et al., 2012b).
Thus, in fleshy fruits, optimum solar radiation benefits color, synthesis of anthocyanin pigments, the refractive index (°Brix) and dry matter content, as well as increases the concentration of vitamin C (ascorbic acid) (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012; Parra-Coronado and Miranda, 2016).
A. Castro (personal communication, 2015) confirmed that, in the Colombian highlands within the orchard of deciduous fruit trees located at 2,500 m a.s.l.
in Duitama (Boyaca), the high solar radiation produces 192 Agron.
Colomb.
34(2) 2016 apples of good coloration (through a high anthocyanin synthesis) and also with an increased thickness of the epidermis and cuticle, which are less susceptible to pathogens and insectpests.
However, during dry periods, longer than 15 d, such as the “El Niño” in the northern part of South America, plants can suffer from high solar radiation, when the chlorophylls in the thylakoid membranes of chloroplasts absorb excess light energy that can no longer be used in the photosynthetic process (Tadeo, 2000) causing photoinhibition, which induces damage to the photosystem II (PS II) and degradation of D1 protein (Casierra-Posada, 2007).
Moreover, high and prolonged solar radiation causes sunburn on juicy fruits and, through its additional effect on increasing the temperature in the irradiated cells, can generate fruit cracking (Fischer, 2000), an adverse effect that may be aggravated by pathogens attacking these unprotected tissues.
In tomato plants, high light intensities caused a strong negative effect on the photosynthesis and leaf stomatal opening, reducing the [Ca2+]Cyt concentration from 252 to 52 nM in stomatal guard cells (O’Carrigan et al., 2014).
Climate change produces droughts (clear skies) and increases the levels of ultraviolet rays, especially UV-B (280-320 nm), that get higher with altitude and are getting worse because of the activities of man, which have led to the release of compounds that destroy the ozone layer (Martínez-Lüscher et al., 2014).
To withstand the negative effect of increasing altitude, some fruit species, for example cape gooseberry (Physalis peruviana), have developed adaptations such as a dense pubescence that covers all of the green parts of the plant (Fischer and Melgarejo, 2014), but plant tolerance to moderate levels of UV radiation can be seriously affected by the progressive reduction of the ozone layer (Casierra-Posada, 2007).
In general, crops should actively respond to environmental stress, such as O3 exposure, by increasing respiration rates of several repair and detoxification mechanisms, but these stand for a loss of assimilates that will no longer be used for increasing plant biomass (Pritchard and Amthor, 2005).
However, in sensitive plants, prolonged UV-B radiation can prevent photosynthetic activity and plant growth by damaging DNA, proteins, membranes, and lipids (Hideg et al., 2013).
But, natural UV-B radiation levels can have favorable effects on several species, including the grapevine, favoring secondary metabolism, reducing abundant vegetative growth and the incidence of pathogens.
Plants are able to develop different protection mechanisms against UV-B radiation, such as an increased synthesis of phenylpropanoids (flavonoids e.g.
anthocyanins) in the epidermis that absorb this radiation and act as antioxidants (Caldwell et al., 1998).
M. Quijano (personal communication, 2012) informed that during berry ripening of vine grapes the UV light stimulates a higher synthesis of carotenoids, anthocyanins and flavonoids and, therefore, increases phenolic compounds that are important for improvig taste, color and aroma of the wine.
Das (2012) and Fischer and Melgarejo (2014) reported that UV-B radiation can increase leaf thickness and specific leaf weight, as a protective mechanism, at the expense of a reduced leaf area.
With low solar radiation, which occurs during rainy periods, fruits can be smaller due to reduced photosynthesis in the leaves close to them or have fewer grape berries per inflorescence on the vine or develop a poor color and brightness of its skin, such as in strawberries (Kays, 1999).
If radiation levels fall below 10 to 30% of the light within the canopy, compared to those out of the canopy, the flowers are not differentiated in many fruit species (Rom, 1996) and production will occur only in the apical and lateral periphery of the tree (Sherman and Beckman, 2003).
Temperature Das (2012) stated clearly that “plants can grow only within certain limits of temperature”.
Global warming stimulates crop growth and, thus, shortens the time of fruit formation, and the number of fruits and seeds within may be reduced by the effects of high temperatures on reproduction, particularly the formation and function of pollen (Larcher, 2003; Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012).
In peaches, a shortening of the earlier phases of fruit development by elevated temperatures can decrease fruit size and yield (Stöckle et al., 2011).
These authors indicated that the shorter growing season would result in lower seasonal water loss by transpiration despite of increased temperature.
Pritchard and Amthor (2005) estimated that an increase in air temperature by a few degrees will significantly reduce the yield of many crops, which are currently grown in typical producing regions and, moreover, extreme temperatures during anthesis, can severely affect harvest index.
Countries in the northern hemisphere will benefit more from rising temperatures because the growing season will be extended (Kesavan and Swaminathan, 2012).
Advanced flowering, due to the increase in temperature, as reported by Ramírez and Kallarackal (2015, and the authors cited by them), occurs during several days, or even weeks, as compared to what happened 100 years ago, depending 193Fischer, Ramírez, and Casierra-Posada: Ecophysiological aspects of fruit crops in the era of climate change.
A review on the species.
This reaction is more pronounced in the temperate zones than in the tropics or subtropics.
Sherman and Beckman (2003) reported that peach cultivars with 80 d for fruit development, at an optimum temperature site, can take 120 d at a cooler place.
The temperature affects the rate of physiological processes, with great influence on the kinetic energy of the enzyme systems and each fruit species has an optimum temperature range, in the case of cape gooseberry between 13 and 18°C, in the Andean blackberry between 16-19°C, etc.
(Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012).
The increase in average temperature can cause more flattened and less elongated fruits, especially when higher temperatures occur in the early phase of fruit development, when cell division takes place (Westwood, 1993).
The temperature increase in the era of climate change reduces the duration of phenological phases, as counted in “heat units” or “degree days” expressing the heat accumulation above a base temperature (Parra et al., 2015).
In a recent study with pineapple guava (Acca sellowiana) in two growing zones with contrasting altitudes of Cundinamarca (Colombia), at 2,580 m and 1,800 m a.s.l., Parra et al.
(2015) found the following base temperatures for four different reproductive phenological stages: (1) flower bud to anthesis 2.89°C, (2) anthesis to fruit set 3.04 °C, (3) fruit set to harvest 1.76°C, and (4) flower bud to harvest 1.74°C.
In general, for citrus the physiological minimum is estimated at 12.5°C (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012), while in cape gooseberry Salazar et al.
(2008) reported 6.29°C as a base temperature for stem growth.
High temperatures High temperatures greatly affect fruit crops, especially with poor fruit set and decreases in production.
For example, in grape vine, temperatures >35°C hinder fruit set, in cape gooseberry ≥30°C can inhibit flowering, in mango >35°C reduce the viability of pollen and fruit set (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012, and cited references therein).
Hot tissues are softer and lose their texture and, hence, resistance to attacks by pathogens and insects-pests; in addition, high temperatures cause the degradation of organic acids required primarily for the respiration of ripe fleshy fruits and make them insipid (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012).
Also, high night temperatures greatly degrade photoassimilates, affecting the filling and organoleptic quality of fruits (Das, 2012; Gariglio et al., 2007).
Global warming affects photosynthesis, especially in C3 plants, i.e.
all commercially fruit species (except the few CAM fruit species); however, this effect has been little studied.
In general, in C3 fruit plants, requiring lower temperatures, heat increases photorespiration because the Rubisco in C3 plants reacts with increased oxygenation to the cost of carboxylation and therefore a lower production of biomass than C4 plants (maize, sorghum, etc.)
(Pritchard and Amthor, 2005).
In their review about climate change on crop plants, Jarma et al.
(2012) concluded that high temperatures can have adverse effects on physiological processes such as photosynthesis, respiration, water relations, hormone regulation and secondary plant metabolism, as well as on membrane stability.
Low temperatures Climate change causes less events on extreme low temperatures in tropical and subtropical areas and, but in these areas, not enough chilling hours originate a shortage of low temperatures to break bud dormancy in deciduous fruits (Petri and Leite, 2004), such as apple, pear, peach, and plum.
These species will demand higher concentrations of dormancy breaking products and varieties with lower requirements of chilling hours (Fischer, 2000).
In addition, cool nights are necessary to reduce the maintenance respiration of fruits, which lowers their energy costs and increases the positive carbon balance and, hence, the accumulation of dry matter (Gariglio et al., 2007).
Also, cool nights favor the coloring of fruits, with an increased production of anthocyanins (Sherman and Beckman, 2003).
In wine grapes, cool nights advance berry coloration and, nowadays, indicate an important criterion for classifying grape-growing regions globally (Tonietto and Carbonneau, 2004).
In relation to the “El Niño” phenomenon, the fruit grower must not only avoid areas exposed to frost, but also has to take into account that crops such as pineapple, banana, starfruit, mango and papaya need climates with minimum temperatures of the coldest month of the year higher than 8°C (Paull and Duarte, 2011), also in the peach, night temperatures above 10°C force flowering (Sherman and Beckman, 2003).
Soil temperature The soil temperature influences such important processes as the germination and emergence of seeds, absorption of water and nutrients and synthesis of hormones (cytokinins and gibberellins) in the roots, among others (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012).
For example, in the citrus root zone, the temperature must exceed 12°C for bud sprouting and this event can be at any time of the year (Agustí, 2003).
194 Agron.
Colomb.
34(2) 2016 Global warming will also increase soil temperature and, consequently, enhance soil organic matter decomposition, which may lead to soil fertility depletion (Osman, 2013), especially in hot dry o desert climates of the tropics.
Too hot edaphic temperatures might harm the symbiosis between the roots and Rhizobia sp.
and mycorrhizae (Pritchard and Amthor, 2005).
As the optimum soil temperature for many tropical species lies between 20 and 25°C (Marschner, 2002), these should not exceed 30-32°C and above 35°C severely affects benefic soil microorganism (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012).
Overheating of soils can be avoided by covers such as organic mulch and living short growing plants (e.g.
short cut grass).
Water Pritchard and Amthor (2005) reported an increase of 1 to 8% for the annual global precipitation, taking into account differences in their geographical distribution.
In the past century, precipitation increased between 5 and 10%, preferably in areas of middle and high latitudes of the northern hemisphere, meanwhile, fell by 3% on average in the subtropical zone (Neenu et al., 2013).
Water not only plays a key role in plant physiological ecology but also in the enrichment of the planet atmosphere with oxygen.
In the process of photosynthesis, two H2O molecules are broken to produce O2, released into the atmosphere, while the resulting hydrogen is used in the reduction of CO2 to carbohydrates (Taiz and Zeiger, 2010).
In fruit trees, many juicy fruits contain between 80 and 90% water, while young twigs and leaves about 50-60% (Friedrich and Fischer, 2000).
Fruit are very demanding in water throughout plant reproductive stages starting from the flower formation until the filling of the fruit, considering that species with indeterminate growth, such as the Passifloraceae, Solanaceae and Caricaceae families, require a constant supply of water (Fischer et al., 2012b).
In these species, water shortage stops growth and development, while heavy rains during flowering, fruit set or maturation are harmful for flowers and recently set fruits (Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez, 2012).
Species with determinate growth (flowering, fruiting and harvesting occur in defined periods, as in citrus, mango, etc.)
require about 1,000 to 2,000 mm annual rainfall, well distributed, especially from the start of the reproductive phase (Fischer and Orduz-Rodriguez, 2012).
However, there is evidence that rainfall patterns, modified by climate change affect the phenology and reproductive behavior of many fruits, especially in the tropics (Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
A prolonged rainy season or heavy rain after a long dry period can cause cracking of fleshy fruits, thus, water and nutrition have become of great interest to fruit growers (Fischer and Melgarejo, 2014).
Fischer (2005) reported that an imbalance between the volume of water entering the fruit and extensibility of the epidermis and juicy fruits in the ripeness state are more susceptible to cracking by senescence of their epidermal layers.
Furthermore, high humidity environments inhibit transpiration which raises the pressure inside the fruit and therefore may cause cracking (Fischer and Melgarejo, 2014).
Because of these reasons, the nutritional elements that influence the stability and extensibility of the skin play an important role in controlling this disorder (Fischer, 2005).
Therefore, the soil in orchards must be kept at a constant moisture level, slightly below field capacity, with optimum contents of calcium, boron, potassium and magnesium, maintaining nitrogen fertilization at the low average levels (Gordillo et al., 2004; Fischer, 2005).
Water stress Plant stress occurs whenever more water is lost through transpiration than absorbed from the soil (Kramer, 1989).
Water is an important component of the cell ś turgor pressure and essential media for biochemical processes; furthermore, a water deficit translates into dehydration, which severely affects the plant́ s metabolism and survival (Dwivedi and Dwivedi, 2012).
Water stress is known to damage chloroplasts, thus, affecting photosynthesis (Kramer, 1989).
Early stomatal closure, effective cuticular transpiration, the ability to change leaf orientation toward the sun, or reduce leaf area (by abscission) are key aspects for cultivar selection for drought areas (Gariglio et al., 2007).
Also, fruit tree cultivars with deep and expanded root systems are relevant during drought periods (Fischer and OrduzRodríguez, 2012).
Fruit trees have different mechanisms to overcome water stress.
For example, leaves can extract water from fruits by mid-day stomatal closure (Westwood, 1993).
Also, CAM (crassulacean acid metabolism) fruit plants such as cacti (Opuntia sp.)
extract water from their fleshy cladoses through the phloem, under extreme water stress conditions (Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez, 2012).
Furthermore, 195Fischer, Ramírez, and Casierra-Posada: Ecophysiological aspects of fruit crops in the era of climate change.
A review prolonged water stress conditions during flowering and fruit filling in avocado are conducive to flower and fruit drop, which is a consequence of superficial growing roots (Paull and Duarte, 2011).
In lulo (Solanum quitoense), fruit drop occurs if drought periods extend more than 3 weeks (Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez, 2012).
Floral induction in Citrus sp.
and some other subtropical fruit trees occurs in response to water stress conditions (Paull and Duarte, 2011).
Similarly, f loral induction in ‘Arrayana’ mandarin takes place in response to water stress conditions on oxisols in the foothills of Meta province, Colombia.
In this zone, the “natural” water stress from late December through late February induces shoot initiation and flowering after a two week period (Orduz-Rodríguez and Fischer, 2007).
Water stress affects the number of fruits produced and their quality characteristics.
Thus, fruits are smaller if water stress occurs during the cellular expansion phase (Gariglio et al., 2007).
Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez (2012) recommended, in fruit trees, in general, removing all plant parts that are unimportant for increasing productivity and fruit quality in prolonged “El Niño” scenarios.
Plant parts to be removed include: basal and mature senescent leaves, unproductive branches, low quality fruits.
Also, for the tree an adequate nutrient supply has to be guaranteed, such as potassium which reduces water consumption and phosphorous stimulating deep soil root growth.
Regulated deficit irrigation has been applied at selected phenological stages of fruit trees to control vegetative growth without yield reduction (Stöckle et al., 2011).
Molina-Ochoa et al.
(2015) found no yield or quality reduction in pear fruits in Sesquile (Cundinamarca, Colombia), when trees were irrigated with only 55% of the amount of water of the control plants.
Soil waterlogging Large cropping areas within Colombia have been affected by climate change abiotic stresses such as waterlogging and flooding (Aldana et al., 2014).
Both stresses have been intensified by climate change conditions.
Since 2007, there has been an increase in heavy and prolonged rains in numerous provinces across Colombia.
These heavy rains also can occur during the “dry” months of the year, affecting large scale fruit tree orchards lacking an efficient drainage system (Moreno and Fischer, 2014).
Root anaerobic conditions are generated as a consequence of poor drainage (Das, 2012).
Furthermore, many fruit trees require a water table level ≥1.5 m (Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez, 2012).
In waterlogged soils, ionic buildup and anaerobe derived products generate phytotoxic conditions (Dwivedi and Dwivedi, 2012).
These conditions increase the occurrence of fungal pathogens such as Phytophthora, Pythium and Fusarium (Villareal, 2014).
Moreover, oxygen depletion inhibits water and nutrient uptake.
And this in turn, reduces the stomatal resistance causing stomatal closure and negatively impacting photosynthesis (Moreno and Fischer, 2014).
Six to eight days of waterlogged conditions caused reduced plant biomass (particularly roots), f lowering and fruit production in cape gooseberry.
Furthermore, the plants died after 8 d in flooded conditions (Aldana et al., 2014).
Moreover, cape gooseberry plants waterlogged over a sixday-period and inoculated with Fusarium oxysporum had a prominent reduction in root system, root width and foliar area; also, reduced photosynthesis and transpiration were evidenced by stomatal closure (Villareal, 2014).
Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez (2012) reported that in plants sensitive to waterlogging fine and fibrous roots die first under hypoxic conditions, while leaves undergo chlorosis, due to deficient absorption and translocation of water and nutrients from the roots.
As a consequence, leaves and fruits abscise and drop, respectively.
This adversary effect increases with the rise in soil (and water) temperature within a climate change context.
Casierra-Posada and Vargas (2007) found that waterlogging significantly affected the production of fruit and plant dry weight of strawberry cultivars, this situation reduced the production of fresh fruits in Chandler than in Sweet Charlie.
In relation to the dry weight, the opposite occurred (Tab.
1), suggesting a differential tolerance among cultivars of this species to tolerate excess water in the soil.
TABlE 1.
Percentage decline in production values of fresh fruits and dry weight in three strawberry cultivars exposed to waterlogging, as compared with plants grown under normal conditions (adapted from Casierra-Posada and Vargas, 2007).
Cultivar Total fresh fruit production/plant (%) Total dry weight/ plant (%) Chandler -82.2 -46.7 Camarosa -37.4 -45.9 Sweet Charlie -19.6 -52.9 Carbon dioxide Because of the high level of emissions, the concentration of CO2 is now as high as 398 μmol mol-1 in the atmosphere (Swaminathan and Kesavan, 2012), the carbon dioxide 196 Agron.
Colomb.
34(2) 2016 level is one of the most limiting growth factor for fruit trees.
Thus, the increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will have a high impact on determining fruit tree productivity in the future since CO2 is a limiting factor for photosynthesis (Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
This is linked to the photosynthesis derived matter (85 to 92% of dry matter) (Larcher, 2003).
In general, crops require from 150 to 220 kg ha-1 CO2 and this is supplied by the atmosphere though wind, air flow and turbulence (Fischer and Orduz-Rodríguez, 2012).
Furthermore, it should be noted that publications pertaining fruit trees and elevated CO2 are relatively few in comparison to other crops (Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
The increase of CO2 concentration in the air near the leaf blade decreases stomatal aperture, stomatal conductance and transpiration; in consequence, photosynthesis and growth increase because of an elevated water use efficiency (Pritchard and Amthor, 2005; Stöckle et al., 2011).
An increase in growth because of an elevated CO2 requires higher water and fertilizer supply.
This is because more nitrogen is required to ensure high crop productivity under climate change conditions (Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
Hiratsuka et al.
(2015) found that Satsuma mandarin increased gross photosynthetic rate of the fruit rind with increasing CO2 concentrations up to 500 μmol CO2 mol-1.
Parra-Coronado and Miranda (2016) mentioned that an increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration improves the nutritional quality of fruits.
Thus, Moretti et al.
(2010, and the authors cited therein) reported that an elevated CO2 concentration had a positive effect on the postharvest quality of fruits and ascorbic acid increase in strawberries and oranges.
Also, Bindi et al.
(2001) observed that an elevated CO2 concentration increased total fenolics and flavonoids in grape, but, in mango, it decreased volatile compounds (Lalel et al., 2003).
Bindi et al.
(2001) found an increase in grape production, when the carbon dioxide concentration was shifted from 550 a 700 μmol mol-1 CO2, noting a 40 to 45% increase in production, respectively.
Moreover, these authors reported no negative impacts on grape or wine quality.
The effects of rising CO2 in plants are well known and include: reduced stomatal transpiration and conduction, increased water use efficiency, higher photosynthetic rates, augmented light use efficiency (Fig.
1) (Drake and González-Meler, 1997; Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
Whenever CO2 is increased from an ambient level of 350 to 550 ppm at 25°C, over time, the photosynthetic rates are reduced in some species relative to plants grown at ambient levels of CO2 (Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
This aspect is termed photosynthetic acclimation and has been attributed to five mechanisms that occur at the cellular level: (1) sugar buildup and gene repression (Krapp et al., 1993), (2) not enough nitrogen uptake by the plant (Stitt and Krapp, 1999), (3) a tie-up of carbohydrate accumulation with inorganic phosphate and a consequent limitation in RuBP renewal capacity (Sharkey, 1985), (4) starch buildup in the chloroplast (Lewis et al., 2002), and (5) triose phosphate consumption capability (Fig.
1) (Hogan et al., 1996).
Furthermore, increased CO2 has been known to increase the following aspects in sour orange trees: truck diameter, the number of fruits produced and branch number (Fig.
1) (Kimball et al.
(2007).
The fruit grower needs to find possible solutions to mediate the increase in CO2 concentration, thus, growers can increase nutrient and water applications and supply sufficient light for leaf growth and development (Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
Also, growers need to guarantee adequate “CO2 soil fertilization”, which increases soil respiration; in Italy, organically managed vineyards (with manure and burying of pruning residues) showed higher soil respiration rates than conventional ones (Brunori et al., 2016).
Applying organic fertilizers can increase the soil’s CO2 production by 2/3 in the case of microorganisms and by 1/3 in the case of root respiration (Fischer and OrduzRodríguez, 2012).
Conclusions Through its influence on the physiology of fruit plants, climate change affects differentially growth, development, production and quality of fruits that can be favorable in its response, but conversely if these factors occur at excessive levels.
Examples are solar radiation, which promotes photosynthesis, but in the case of too high levels can cause photoinhibition and/or sunburn.
Increasing temperatures accelerate the crop cycle of the plant and enable crops at higher altitudes, but also increases the harmful effects of water stress and high radiation.
Elevated carbon dioxide will require growers to apply more nitrogen derived fertilizers and water.
Growers need to mitigate climate change by selecting hardier cultivars that respond to elevated CO2 levels and are able to adapt to drought or waterlogged conditions.
The use of phenological scales (for example the BBCH [Biologische Bundesanstalt, Bundessortenamt und CHemische Industrie] or the landmark stage proposed by 197Fischer, Ramírez, and Casierra-Posada: Ecophysiological aspects of fruit crops in the era of climate change.
A review Ramírez et al.
(2014) and Ramírez and Davenport (2016) are another key factor for understanding the responses of trees to climate change.
Furthermore, there is an urgent need to develop mathematical models to be used in the particular case of fruit trees in the tropics.
These models could help predict future scenarios and consequences of flooding, droughts, and elevated CO2, etc.
in times of climate change.
literature cited Agustí, M. 2003.
Citricultura.
Ediciones Mundi-Prensa, Madrid.
Aldana, F., P.N.
García, and G. Fischer.
2014.
Effect of waterlogging stress on the growth, development and symptomatology of cape gooseberry (Physalis peruviana L.) plants.
Rev.
Acad.
Colomb.
Cienc.
Exact.
Fis.
Nat.
38, 393-400.
Doi: 10.18257/raccefyn.114 Bindi, M., L. Fibbi, and F. Miglietta.
2001.
Free air CO2 Enrichment (FACE) of grapevine (Vitis vinifera L.): II.
Growth and quality of grape and wine in response to elevated CO2 concentrations.
Eur.
J. Agron.
14, 145-155.
Doi: 10.1016/S1161-0301(00)00093-9 Brunori, E., R. Farina, and R. Biasi.
2016.
Sustainable viticulture: The carbon-sink function of the vineyard agro-ecosystem.
Agr.
Ecosyst.
Environ.
223, 10-21.
Doi.
10.1016/j.agee.2016.02.012 Caldwell, M.M., L.O.
Björn, J.F.
Bornman, S.D.
Flint, G. Kulandaivelu, A.H. Teramura, and M. Tevini.
1998.
Effects if increased solar ultraviolet radiation on terrestrial ecosystems.
J. Photochem.
Photobiol.
B: Biol.
46, 40-52.
Doi: 10.1016/ S1011-1344(98)00184-5 Casierra-Posada, F. 2007.
Fotoinhibición: Respuesta fisiológica de los vegetales al estrés por exceso de luz.
Rev.
Colomb.
Cienc.
Hortic.
1, 114-123.
Doi: 10.17584/rcch.2007v1i1.1150 Casierra-Posada, F. and Y.A.
Vargas.
2007.
Crecimiento y producción de fruta en cultivares de fresa (Fragaria sp.)
afectados por encharcamiento.
Rev.
Colomb.
Cienc.
Hortic.
1, 21-32.
Doi: 10.17584/rcch.2007v1i1.1142 Das, H.P.
2012.
Agrometeorology in extreme events and natural disasters.
BS Publikations, Hyderabad, India.
Drake, B.G.
and M.A.
González-Meler.
1997.
More efficient plants: a consequence of rising atmospheric CO2?
Annu.
Rev.
Plant.
Physiol.
Plant.
Mol.
Biol.
48, 609-639.
Doi: 10.1146/annurev.
arplant.48.1.609 Dwivedi, P. and R.S.
Dwivedi.
2012.
Physiology of abiotic stress in plants.
Agrobios, Jodhpur, India.
Fischer, G. 2000.
Ecophysiological aspects of fruit growing in tropical highlands.
Acta Hortic.
531, 91-98.
Doi: 10.17660/ ActaHortic.2000.531.13 Fischer, G. 2005.
El problema del rajado del fruto de uchuva y su posible control.
pp.
55-82.
In: Fischer, G., D. Miranda, W. Piedrahita, and J. Romero (eds.).
Avances en cultivo, poscosecha y exportación de la uchuva (Physalis peruviana L.) en Colombia.
Unibiblos, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota.
Fischer, G., P.J.
Almanza-Merchán, and F. Ramírez.
2012a.
Sourcesink relationships in fruit species.
A review.
Rev.
Colomb.
Cienc.
Hortic.
6, 238-253.
Doi: 10.17584/rcch.2012v6i2.1980 Fischer, G. and L.M.
Melgarejo.
2014.
Ecofisiología de la uchuva (Physalis peruviana L.).
pp.
31-47.
In: Carvalho, C.P.
and D.A.
Moreno (eds.).
Physalis peruviana: fruta andina para el mundo.
Programa Iberoamericano de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo – CYTED, Limencop SL, Alicante, Spain.
Fischer, G. and J.O.
Orduz-Rodríguez.
2012.
Ecofisiología en frutales.
pp.
54-72.
In: Fischer, G.
(ed.).
Manual para el cultivo de frutales en el trópico.
Produmedios, Bogota.
Fischer, G., F. Ramírez y P.J.
Almanza-Merchán.
2012b.
Inducción floral, floración y desarrollo del fruto.
pp.
120-140.
In: Fischer, G.
(ed.).
Manual para el cultivo de frutales en el trópico.
Produmedios, Bogota.
Friedrich, G. and M. Fischer.
2000.
Physiologische Grundlagen des Obstbaues.
Verlag Ulmer, Stuttgart, Germany.
Gariglio, N.F., R.A. Pilatti, and M. Agustí.
2007.
Requerimientos ecofisiológicos de los árboles frutales.
pp.
41-82.
In: Sozzi, G.O.
(ed.).
Árboles frutales.
Ecofisiología, cultivo y aprovechamiento.
Editorial Facultad de Agronomía, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires.
Greater number of fruits} Insufficient nitrogen uptake } Stimulation of productivity} Limitation in RuBP regeneration} Starch accumulation chloroplast} Thicker trunks and more branches} {Higher photosynthesis rates {Improved water use efficiency {Reduction of stomatal conductance {Sugar accumulation and gene repression {Enhancement of biomass production FIGURE 1.
Effects of elevated CO2 in trees (after Ramírez and Kallarackal, 2015).
Reproduced with permission after Springer Briefs in Plant Science, Berlin.
http://dx.doi.org/10.18257/raccefyn.114 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1161-0301%2800%2900093-9 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.agee.2016.02.012 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1011-1344%2898%2900184-5 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1011-1344%2898%2900184-5 http://dx.doi.org/10.17584/rcch.2007v1i1.1150 http://dx.doi.org/10.17584/rcch.2007v1i1.1142 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.arplant.48.1.609 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.arplant.48.1.609 http://dx.doi.org/10.17660/ActaHortic.2000.531.13 http://dx.doi.org/10.17660/ActaHortic.2000.531.13 http://dx.doi.org/10.17584/rcch.2012v6i2.1980 198 Agron.
Colomb.
34(2) 2016 Gordillo, O.P., G. Fischer, and R. Guerrero.
2004.
Efecto del riego y de la fertilización sobre la incidencia del rajado en frutos de uchuva (Physalis peruviana L.) en la zona de Silvania (Cundinamarca).
Agron.
Colomb.
22, 53-62.
Hideg, E., M.A.
Jansen, and A. Strid.
2013.
UV-B exposure, ROS, and stress: inseparable companions or loosely linked associates?
Trends Plant Sci.
18, 107-15.
Doi: 10.1016/j.tplants.2012.09.003 Hiratsuka, S., Suzuki, M., H. Nishimura, and K. Nada 2015.
Fruit photosynthesis in Satsuma mandarin.
Plant Sci.
241, 65-69.
Doi: 10.1016/j.plantsci.2015.09.026 Hogan, K.P., D. Whitehead, J. Kallarackal, J.G.
Buwalda, J. Meekings, and G.N.D.
Rogers.
1996.
Photosynthetic activity of leaves of Pinus radiata and Nothofagus fusca after 1 year of growth at elevated CO2.
Aust.
J.
Plant Physiol.
23, 623-630.
Doi: 10.1071/ PP9960623 IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2015.
Climate change 2014 Synthesis report Summary for policymakers.
Switzerland.
Jackson, J.E.
1980.
Light interception and utilization by orchard systems.
Hort.
Rev.
2, 208-267.
Doi: 10.1002/9781118060759.ch5 Jarma, A., C.C.
Ayala, and H. Araméndis.
2012.
Efecto del cambio climático sobre la fisiología de las plantas cultivadas: Una revisión.
Rev.
UDCA Act.
& Div.
Cient.
15, 63-76.
Kays, S. 1999.
Preharvest factors affecting appearance.
Postharvest Biol.
Technol.
15, 233-247.
Doi: 10.1016/S0925-5214(98)00088-X Kimball, B.A., S.B.
Idso, S. Johnson, and M.C.
Rillig.
2007.
Seventeen years of carbon dioxide enrichment of sour orange trees: final results.
Glob.
Change Biol.
13, 2171-2183.
Doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2486.2007.01430.x Koyama, K., H. Ikeda, P.R.
Poudel, and N. Goto-Yamamoto.
2012.
Light quality affects flavonoid biosynthesis in young berries of Cabernet Sauvignon grape.
Phytochem.
78, 54-64.
Doi: 10.1016/j.phytochem.2012.02.026 Kramer, P.J.
1989.
Relaciones hídricas de suelos y plantas.
Ediciones Harla, Mexico DF.
Krapp, A., B. Hofmann, C. Schafer, R.L.
La Morte, G.W.
Wall, D.J.
Hunsaker, G. Wechsung, F. Wechsung, and T. Kartschall.
1993.
Regulation of the expression of rbcS and other photosynthetic genes by carbohydrates: a mechanism for the ‘sink’ regulation of photosynthesis?
Plant J.
3, 817-828.
Doi: 10.1111/j.1365-313X.1993.00817.x Lalel, H.J.D., Z. Singh, and S.C. Tan.
2003.
Distribution of aroma volatile compounds in different parts of mango fruit.
J. Hort.
Sci.
Biotechnol.
78, 131-138.
Doi: 10.1080/14620316.2003.11511595 Lambers, H., F.S.
Chapin III, F. Stuart, and T.L.
Pons.
2008.
Plant physiological ecology.
Springer, New York, NY.
Doi: 10.1007/978-0-387-78341-3 Larcher, W. 2003.
Physiological plant ecology.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-05214-3 Lewis, J.D., X.Z.
Wang, K.L.
Griffin, and D.T.
Tissue.
2002.
Effects of age and ontogeny on photosynthetic responses of a determinate annual plant to elevated CO2 concentrations.
Plant Cell Environ.
25, 359-368.
Doi: 10.1046/j.0016-8025.2001.00815.x Marschner, H. 2002.
Mineral nutrition of higher plants.
2nd ed.
Elsevier Science, London.
Martínez-Lüscher, J., N. Torres, G. Hilbert, T. Richard, M. SánchezDíaz, S. Delrot, J. Aguirreolea, I. Pascual, and E. Gomès.
2014.
Ultraviolet-B radiation modifies the quantitative and qualitative profile of flavonoids and amino acids in grape berries.
Phytochem.
102, 106-114.
Doi: 10.1016/j.phytochem.2014.03.014 Miranda, D., G. Fischer, C. Carranza, S. Magnitskiy, F. Casierra, W. Piedrahíta, and L.E.
Flórez (eds.).
2009.
Cultivo, poscosecha y comercialización de las pasifloráceas en Colombia: maracuyá, granadilla, gulupa y curuba.
Sociedad Colombiana de Ciencias Hortícolas, Bogota.
Mittler, R. 2006.
Abiotic stress, the field environment and stress combination.
Trends Plant Sci.
11, 15-19.
Doi: 10.1016/j.
tplants.2005.11.002 Molina-Ochoa, M.J., J.E.
Vélez-Sánchez, and A. Galindo-Egea.
2015.
Resultados preliminares del efecto del riego deficitario durante el periodo de crecimiento rápido del fruto de pera (var.
Triunfo de Viena) en la producción y calidad del fruto.
Rev.
Colomb.
Cienc.
Hort.
9, 38-45.
Doi: 10.17584/rcch.2015v9i1.3744 Moreno, A. and G. Fischer.
2014.
Efectos del anegamiento en los frutales.
Una revisión.
Temas Agrarios 19, 108-125.
Moretti, C.L., L.M.
Mattos, A.G. Calbo, and S.A. Sargent.
2010.
Climate changes and potential impacts on postharvest quality of fruit and vegetable crops: A review.
Food Res.
Int.
43, 1824-1832.
Doi: 10.1016/j.foodres.2009.10.013 Neenu, S., A.K.
Biswas, and A. Subba Rao.
2013.
Impact of climatic factors on crop production – A review.
Agric.
Rev.
34, 97-106.
O’Carrigan, A., E. Hinde, N. Lu, X.-Q.
Xu, H. Duan, G. Huang, M. Mak, B. Bellotti, and Z.-H. Chen.
2014.
Effects of light irradiance on stomatal regulation and growth of tomato.
Environ.
Exp.
Bot.
98, 65-73.
Doi: 10.1016/j.envexpbot.2013.10.007 Orduz-Rodríguez, J. and G. Fischer.
2007.
Balance hídrico e influencia del estrés hídrico en la inducción y desarrollo floral de la mandarina ‘Arrayana’ en el piedemonte llanero de Colombia.
Agron.
Colomb.
25, 255-263.
Osman, K.T.
2013.
Soils: Principles, properties and management.
pp.
129-159.
In: Osman, K.T.
(ed.).
Plant nutrients and soil fertility management.
Springer Science + Business Media, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-5663-2_10 Parra, A., G. Fischer, and B. Chaves.
2015.
Tiempo térmico para estados fenológicos reproductivos de la feijoa (Acca sellowiana (O. Berg) Burret).
Acta Biol.
Colomb.
20, 167-177.
Parra-Coronado, A. and D. Miranda.
2016.
La calidad poscosecha de los frutos en respuesta a los factores climáticos en el cultivo.
Agron.
Colomb.
Supl.
1.
Doi: 10.15446/agron.colomb.
sup.2016n1.58156 Paull, R.E.
and O. Duarte.
2011.
Tropical fruits.
Vol 1.
2nd ed.
Cabi, Wallingford, UK.
Petri, J.L.
and G.B.
Leite.
2004.
Consequences of insufficient winter chilling on apple tree budbreak.
Acta Hortic.
662, 53-60.
Doi: 10.17660/ActaHortic.2004.662.4 Pritchard, S.G. and J.S.
Amthor.
2005.
Crops and environmental change.
Food Products Press, The Haworth Press, New York, NY.
Ramírez, F. and T.L.
Davenport.
2016.
The phenology of the capuli cherry [Prunus serotina subsp.
capuli (Cav.)
McVaugh] characterized by the BBCH scale, landmark stages and implications http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2012.09.003 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plantsci.2015.09.026 http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/PP9960623 http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/PP9960623 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118060759.ch5 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0925-5214%2898%2900088-X http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2486.2007.01430.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.phytochem.2012.02.026 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-313X.1993.00817.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14620316.2003.11511595 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-78341-3 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05214-3 http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.0016-8025.2001.00815.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.phytochem.2014.03.014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2005.11.002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tplants.2005.11.002 http://dx.doi.org/10.17584/rcch.2015v9i1.3744 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodres.2009.10.013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envexpbot.2013.10.007 http://dx.doi.org/10.17660/ActaHortic.2004.662.4 199Fischer, Ramírez, and Casierra-Posada: Ecophysiological aspects of fruit crops in the era of climate change.
A review for urban forestry in Bogotá, Colombia.
Urban For.
Urban Green.
19, 202-211.
Doi: 10.1016/j.ufug.2016.06.028 Ramírez, F., G. Fischer, T.L.
Davenport, J.C.A.
Pinzón, and C. Ulrichs.
2014.
Mango trees have no distinct phenology: the case of mangoes in the tropics.
Sci.
Hortic.
168, 258-266.
Doi: 10.1016/j.scienta.2014.01.040 Ramírez, F. and J. Kallarackal.
2015.
Responses of fruit trees to global climate change.
Springer Briefs in Plant Science.
Springer International Publishing, New York, NY.
Rivas, J.
2008.
La luz y el aparato fotosintético.
pp.
165-189.
In: Azcón-Bieto, J. and M. Talón (eds.).
Fundamentos de la fisiología vegetal.
McGraw-Hill Interamericana de España, Madrid.
Rom, C.R.
1996.
Environmental factors regulating growth: light, temperature, water, nutrition.
pp.
11-29.
En: Maib, K.M., P.K.
Andrews, G.A.
Lang, and K. Mullinix (eds.).
Tree fruit physiology: growth and development Washington State Fruit Commission.
Good Fruit Grower, Washington.
Salazar, M.R., J. W. Jones, B. Chaves, A. Cooman, and G. Fischer.
2008.
Base temperature and simulation model for nodes appearance in cape gooseberry (Physalis peruviana L.).
Rev.
Bras.
Frutic.
30, 862-867.
Doi: 10.1590/S0100-29452008000400004 Seidel, P. 2016.
Impacts of extreme weather events o pests, damage caused by pests and plant protection measures first evidence.
J. Kulturplanzen 68(9), 253-269.
Doi: 10.5073/JfK.2016.09.02 Sharkey, T.D.
1985.
O2-insensitive photosynthesis in C3 plants.
Its occurrence and a possible explanation.
Plant Physiol.
78, 71-75.
Doi: 10.1104/pp.78.1.71 Sherman, W.B.
and T.G.
Beckman.
2003.
Climate adaptions in fruit crops.
Acta Hortic.
622, 411-428.
Doi: 10.17660/ ActaHortic.2003.622.43 Stitt, M. and A. Krapp.
1999.
The interaction between elevated carbon dioxide and nitrogen nutrition: the physiological and molecular background.
Plant Cell Environ.
22, 583-621.
Doi: 10.1046/j.1365-3040.1999.00386.x Stöckle, C.O., J. Marsal, and J.M.
Villar.
2011.
Impact of climate change on irrigated tree fruit production.
Acta Hort.
889, 4152.
Doi: 10.17660/ActaHortic.2011.889.2 Swaminathan, M.S.
and P.C.
Kesavan.
2012.
Agricultural research in an era of climate change.
Agric.
Res.
1, 3-11.
Doi: 10.1007/ s40003-011-0009-z Tadeo, F.R.
2000.
Fisiología de las plantas y el estrés.
pp.
481-498.
In: Azcón-Bieto, J. and M. Talón (eds.).
Fundamentos de la fisiología vegetal.
McGraw-Hill Interamericana, Madrid.
Taiz, L. and E. Zeiger.
2010.
Plant physiology.
5th ed.
Sinauer Associates, Sunderland, MA.
Tonietto, J. and A. Carbonneau, A.
2004.
A multicriteria climatic classification system for grape-growing regions worldwide.
Agr.
For.
Meteor.
124, 81-97.
Doi: 10.1016/j.agrformet.2003.06.001 Villareal, A.
2014.
Evaluación fisiológica de plantas de uchuva (Physalis peruviana L.), en la respuesta al estrés por anegamiento e infección de Fusarium oxysporum.
MSc thesis.
Facultad de Ciencias Agrarias, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota.
Westwood, M.N.
1993.
Temperate-zone pomology: physiology and culture.
3rd ed.
Timber Press, Portland, OR.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0100-29452008000400004 http://dx.doi.org/10.1104/pp.78.1.71 http://dx.doi.org/10.17660/ActaHortic.2003.622.43 http://dx.doi.org/10.17660/ActaHortic.2003.622.43 http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-3040.1999.00386.x http://dx.doi.org/10.17660/ActaHortic.2011.889.2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40003-011-0009-z http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40003-011-0009-z http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.agrformet.2003.06.001
GUEST EDITORIAL July 2021.
Christian Journal for Global Health 8(1) Caring for the Earth for better health and well-being of all: addressing climate change as a planetary health emergency James Hospedales a a MD, MSc, former Director of Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), and founder of EarthMedic/EarthNurse.
Introduction Most of the major public health problems with which I have wrestled in my life—epidemics and pandemics, natural disasters, and chronic noncommunicable diseases (NCDs)—are all symptomatic of, or related to, climate change and/or destruction of the environment.
As a Christian, the roots lie in lack of respect for our Creator and lack of reverence for the goodness and inter-dependence of all of creation.
Climate change is a public health crisis because it is destroying the conditions for life.
The unprecedented, deadly heatwaves in the Pacific Northwest of the United States are a current example.
“Patient Earth” is showing many signs of ill-health, particularly the increasing global temperature after thousands of years of stability, caused mainly by human activities (Figure 1).1 Figure 1.
Global land temperature index Source: NASA.
Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet (https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/globaltemperature/) Though natural cycles have altered Earth’s climate previously, current global warming is mainly attributable to human activity —specifically to burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, gasoline, and natural gas (particularly with the advent of globalized industrialization), causing a stronger greenhouse effect2 with atmospheric carbon dioxide levels now at 419 ppm, the highest in 4 million years.3 The implications are profound for the health and wellbeing of people, economies, and the planet.
In response, 196 countries joined in the United Nations Convention for Climate Change in 2015 with the aim of limiting global warming to well below 2, preferably 1.5, degrees Celsius, compared to preindustrial levels.4 The G7/G20 and others have long recognised the vulnerability of Small Island and lowlying Developing States (SIDS) to the adverse impacts of climate change5, including food insecurity6, population displacement, and forced migration.7 Faith community partnerships have started to take a role in addressing these issues for the Pacific SIDS, which highlights opportunities to address climate-related global health risks in other regions.8 Bearing Witness In my observation of the environment in Trinidad and the Caribbean for 50+ years, across “climate timescales,” I have seen continued degradation of natural systems, with many direct and indirect health impacts.
As a boy in Trinidad, we had sea grass beds and clear seawater; then seagrass beds became barren mudflats, the fiddler crabs disappeared, there were far fewer fish, and the water grew turbid.
Much of the coastline became polluted https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/global-temperature/ https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/global-temperature/ 4 Hospedales July 2021.
Christian Journal for Global Health 8(1) from the oil and gas industry, and plastic waste choking drains and rivers contributed to worsening floods, littering coasts, and harming wildlife.
The weather has become hotter and drier in Trinidad and Tobago (0.7 degrees Celsius increase from 1990 to 2019).9 Near-annually, human-made forest fires last longer and spread further, destroying some 300,000 acres of forest, wildlife, property and sometimes, lives.10 The damaged watersheds contribute to worse floods during the rainy season, undermining agriculture, and food security11, and increasing the risk for vector borne diseases.
Record floods in October 2018 effectively cut Trinidad in half, resulting in temporary disruption in access to health and other essential services.
As coordinator of chronic disease prevention and control in the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) 2006-2012, I could discern that the costly epidemics of NCDs—cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, chronic respiratory diseases, and cancer— had similar associations with climate change.
For example, fossil fuel-dependent, mechanised agriculture, and motorised transport contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, and pollution as well as sedentariness, unhealthy diets, and obesity, major risk factors for the burdensome NCDs.
Epidemics and Extreme Weather As inaugural Director of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)12, I was faced with two new arboviral disease epidemics, Chikungunya13 and Zika14 viruses, in 2014 and 2016, respectively, the latter declared by WHO as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).
The Aedes aegypti mosquito vector thrives in breeding sites in water drums, discarded tires, etc., and warming weather is projected to increase its invasive potential.15 At the same time, we faced “slow-moving disasters” such as increasing childhood obesity, an unhealthy food environment —high in sugar, animal fats, salt and calories—and a loss of use of sustainably grown, indigenous crops.
These and other conditions compound adverse health impacts of climate change.
Focusing the science to the Caribbean16, we are to expect hotter, drier weather, overall; with longerlasting Category 4/5 super storms and inundations of rain.
As Epidemiologist at the Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC) 1987-1993 and on the PAHO/WHO Caribbean disaster response team, we mobilised after major hurricanes, e.g., Gilbert, Hugo, in the late 80s and early 90s.
Over the almost three decades since, I’ve seen that hurricanes have become more frequent and destructive.
From Hurricane Matthew in 2015, the longest-lived Category 4/5 hurricane; to the triple-whammy of Hurricanes Jose, Irma, and Maria in 2017, that destroyed 225% of Dominica’s GDP, damaging health facilities and severely affecting health determinants such as water and sanitation; to the slow-moving hurricane Dorian, that ravaged the Bahamas; to the wild Atlantic hurricane 2020 season with a record 30 named storms; we are living in an era of consequences.
Theological Reflections I believe science gives us tools to better glimpse the amazing nature of God, and the Earth as a delicately balanced, living system, which we are only just beginning to comprehend.
In Genesis, the opening book of the Bible, God said “it was good” five times as the Earth, seas, plants, animals, and humans were created.
Yet, we are not being good stewards over what we have been given charge (Gen 1:28).
Global populations of mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and amphibians have dropped by 68% between 1970 and 2016.
Insects, trees and forests— part of the whole web of life—are also being threatened on an unprecedented scale with irreplaceable biodiversity loss.17 Much of this is driven by human overconsumption, population growth and intensive agriculture, according to a major new assessment of the abundance of life on Earth.18 This situation has stimulated much theological reflection worldwide, including the Papal 5 Hospedales July 2021.
Christian Journal for Global Health 8(1) encyclical of 2015, “On care for our common home.”19 If God made the Earth and everything in it and saw that “it was good” and commissioned the first humans to have responsible dominion of the whole creation, does the lack of respect, exploitation, and neglected care for nature offend God?
Two themes can be discerned in the Old and New Testaments: respect for the Creator and respect for the interdependence of creation.
Psalm 104 echoes the goodness of all of creation and the inter-dependence of creation, the cycle of life, and the responsibility of people to manage their environment.
Romans 1:1920 speaks of the wonder of creation being a manifestation of God’s power and divine nature, so that those who fail to glorify him in practicing this dual respect for God and nature are “without excuse.” Gus Speth, co-founder of the NRDC and CEO of the UN Development Program, had some insights worthy of consideration: I used to think that top environmental problems were biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and climate change.
I thought that thirty years of good science could address these problems.
I was wrong.
The top environmental problems are selfishness, greed and apathy, and to deal with these we need a cultural and spiritual transformation.20 Conclusion A lifetime of environmental observations, my scientific and medical training, my engagement with the public sector, and my faith in God all point to the conclusion that the Earth is sick and “dying” as we face the 6th great extinction crisis, traced mostly to human activities.21 Only with an unprecedented coming together of diverse partners, including the faith community, to care for our common home can we maintain our life support systems, see the world transformed, and protect the most vulnerable in our societies.
The signs and symptoms of an ailing Earth in 2020/21 are myriad: Record heat and CO2 levels, with drought, population displacement and migration; extensive wildfires—e.g., Australia, Brazil, California; wild Atlantic hurricane and Pacific typhoon seasons; major floods in China; irreplaceable bio-diversity loss; and loss of the Arctic ice shield, our planet’s air conditioning system.22 How can we regain and foster hope and see healing in our ailing world?
Addressing climate change can have many benefits for population health.
Based on decades of research, The Lancet in 2018 published a review which stated that while climate change was the greatest threat to public health, addressing climate change could be the “greatest global health opportunity of the 21st century,”23 as climate action at scale has immediate health co-benefits.
As an epidemiologist, I worry that we have no controls; that we do not know what happens to a planet exposed to such widespread insults, since we have not been here before.
This editorial therefore issues a call to all doctors, nurses, faith leaders, and public health professionals to awaken to the climate and health crisis at hand; get better informed and then act to improve the health of individuals, society, and the planet to avoid a catastrophe.
God made the world and everything in it, and remarked upon the goodness of all of creation, interdependent for their lives and livelihoods, but corrupted at the core.
God’s work is to make all things new and to establish justice and peace.
He asks us to join in that objective.
In serving God and caring for others and the environment, there is no conflict.
We must recognize the importance of human activity both to draw down or to build up human and planetary health.
In many ways, we are exceeding the amazing regenerative capacity of the underlying natural systems on which our health and well-being, lives and livelihoods depend.
In order to restore the balance and to mitigate catastrophe, aligning with divine objectives and seeking His participation is a good starting place.
6 Hospedales July 2021.
Christian Journal for Global Health 8(1) “May God give us the grace to come together in one accord to care for all that He has created.” EarthNurse Candace Scofield, Trinidad.
References 1.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report [Internet]; 2014.
Available from: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5 _SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf 2.
NASA.
The causes of climate change.
Global climate change: Vital signs of the planet.
[Internet] Available from https://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ 3.
NOAA Research News.
Carbon dioxide peaks near 420 parts per million at Mauna Loa observatory [Internet]; 2021 June 7.
Available from: https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleI D/2764/Coronavirus-response-barely-slows-risingcarbon-dioxide 4.
United Nations Climate Change.
The Paris Agreement [Internet]; 2016.
Available from: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-parisagreement/the-paris-agreement 5.
United Nations Climate Change.
Global Climate Action Pathway Finance Vision and Summary [Internet]; 2021.
Available from: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Finance_ Vision%26Summary.pdf 6.
Lenderking HL, Robinson S, Carlson G. Climate change and food security in Caribbean small island developing states: challenges and strategies.
International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology.
2020 Aug 11;28(3):238-245. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504509.2020.1804477 7.
Julca A, Paddison O. Vulnerabilities and migration in Small Island Developing States in the context of climate change.
Nat Hazards.
2010;55:717–728.
https://doi-org.online.uchc.edu/10.1007/s11069-0099384-1 8.
Mitchell R B, Grills N J.
A historic humanitarian collaboration in the Pacific context.
Christ J Global Health.
2017 Jul;4(2):87-94. https://doi.org/10.15566/cjgh.v4i2.160 9.
World Data.info.
The climate in Trinidad and Tobago.
[Internet].
Available from: https://www.worlddata.info/america/trinidad-andtobago/climate.php 10.
Rampersad S. Destruction of the Northern Range between 1987-2018. .
.
276,000 acres ravaged by fire [Internet].
Trinidad & Tobago Guardian.
2021 Jul 26.
Available from: https://www.guardian.co.tt/news/destruction-of-thenorthern-range-6.2.802110.0bc76ef0b3 11.
Eitzinger A, Farrell A, Rhiney K, Camona S, van Loosen I, Taylor M. Trididad & Tobago: Assessing the impact of climate change on cocoa and tomato [Internet].
International Center for Tropical Agriculture Policy Brief No.
27.
December 2015.
Available from: https://cdkn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/CIAT_PB27_TRINIDADAND-TOBAGO-ASSESSING-THE-IMPACT-OFCLIMATE-CHANGE-ON-COCOA-ANDTOMATO.pdf 12.
Hospedales CJ.
Caribbean public health: achievements and future challenges.
The Lancet Public Health.
2019 July 1;4(7):E324.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(19)30102-1 13.
Olowokure B, Francis L, Polson-Edwards K, Nasci R, Quénel R, Aldighieri S, Rousset D, Gutierrez C, Ramon-Pardo P, dos Santos T, Hospedales CJ.
The Caribbean response to chikungunya.
The Lancet Infectious Diseases.
2014 Nov 11;4(11):1039-1040. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(14)70948-X 14.
Francis L, Hunte S-A, Valadere AM, Polson-Edwards K, Asin-Oostburg V, Hospedales CJ.
Zika virus outbreak in 19 Englishand Dutch-speaking Caribbean countries and territories, 2015-2016.
Revista Panamericana De Salud Pública.
2018;42: E120.
15.
Iwamura T, Guzman-Holst A, Murray K. Accelerating invasion potential of disease vector Aedes aegypti under climate change.
Nature Commun.
2020;11: 2130. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16010-4 16.
London JB.
Implications of climate change on small island developing states: experience in the Caribbean region.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management.
2007 Jan 22;47(4):491-501. https://doi.org/10.1080/0964056042000243195 17.
Greenfield P. Humans exploiting and destroying nature on unprecedented scale – report [Internet].
The Guardian.
2020 Sept 9.
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/ 10/humans-exploiting-and-destroying-nature-onunprecedented-scale-report-aoe https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf https://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2764/Coronavirus-response-barely-slows-rising-carbon-dioxide https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2764/Coronavirus-response-barely-slows-rising-carbon-dioxide https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2764/Coronavirus-response-barely-slows-rising-carbon-dioxide https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Finance_Vision%26Summary.pdf https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Finance_Vision%26Summary.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/13504509.2020.1804477 https://doi-org.online.uchc.edu/10.1007/s11069-009-9384-1 https://doi-org.online.uchc.edu/10.1007/s11069-009-9384-1 https://doi.org/10.15566/cjgh.v4i2.160 https://www.worlddata.info/america/trinidad-and-tobago/climate.php https://www.worlddata.info/america/trinidad-and-tobago/climate.php https://www.guardian.co.tt/news/destruction-of-the-northern-range-6.2.802110.0bc76ef0b3 https://www.guardian.co.tt/news/destruction-of-the-northern-range-6.2.802110.0bc76ef0b3 https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CIAT_PB27_TRINIDAD-AND-TOBAGO-ASSESSING-THE-IMPACT-OF-CLIMATE-CHANGE-ON-COCOA-AND-TOMATO.pdf https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CIAT_PB27_TRINIDAD-AND-TOBAGO-ASSESSING-THE-IMPACT-OF-CLIMATE-CHANGE-ON-COCOA-AND-TOMATO.pdf https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CIAT_PB27_TRINIDAD-AND-TOBAGO-ASSESSING-THE-IMPACT-OF-CLIMATE-CHANGE-ON-COCOA-AND-TOMATO.pdf https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CIAT_PB27_TRINIDAD-AND-TOBAGO-ASSESSING-THE-IMPACT-OF-CLIMATE-CHANGE-ON-COCOA-AND-TOMATO.pdf https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CIAT_PB27_TRINIDAD-AND-TOBAGO-ASSESSING-THE-IMPACT-OF-CLIMATE-CHANGE-ON-COCOA-AND-TOMATO.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(19)30102-1 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(14)70948-X https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16010-4 https://doi.org/10.1080/0964056042000243195 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/10/humans-exploiting-and-destroying-nature-on-unprecedented-scale-report-aoe https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/10/humans-exploiting-and-destroying-nature-on-unprecedented-scale-report-aoe https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/10/humans-exploiting-and-destroying-nature-on-unprecedented-scale-report-aoe 7 Hospedales July 2021.
Christian Journal for Global Health 8(1) 18.
Almond REA, Grooten M, Petersen T. (Eds).
Living Planet Report 2020 Bending the curve of biodiversity loss [Internet].
WWF, Gland, Switzerland.
2020.
Available from: https://www.wwf.org.uk/sites/default/files/202009/LPR20_Full_report.pdf 19.
Francis.
Encyclical letter LAUDATO SI’ of the Holy Father Francis on the care for our common home.
[Internet] 2015.
Available from: https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclic als/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclicalaudato-si.html 20.
Speth G. Gus Speth calls for a new environmentalism [audio program].
Living on Earth; 2016 May 5.
Available from: https://loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=15P13-00007&segmentID=6 21.
N Ceballos G, Ehrlich PR, Raven PH.
Vertebrates on the brink as indicators of biological annihilation and the sixth mass extinction.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
2020 Jun;117(24):1359613602. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1922686117 22.
Nuccitelli D, Masters J.
The top 10 weather and climate events of a record-setting year [Internet].
Yale Climate Connection.
2020 Dec 21.
Available from: https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2020/12/the-top10-weather-and-climate-events-of-a-record-settingyear/ 23.
Watts N, Amann M, Ayeb-Karlsson S, Belesova K, Bouley T, Boykoff M, et.al.
The Lancet countdown on health and climate change: from 25 years of inaction to a global transformation for public health.
The Lancet 2018 Feb 10-16;391(10120):581-630. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 Submitted: 15 July 2021, modified 28 July 2021, accepted 29 July 2021, published 30 Dec 2021 Competing Interests: None declared.
Correspondence: Dr. James Hospedales, Trinidad & Tobago jameshospedales@earthmedic.com Cite this article as: Hospedales CJ.
Caring for the Earth for better health and well-being of all: addressing climate change as a planetary health emergency.
Christ J Global Health.
July 2021; 8(1):3-7. https://doi.org/10.15566/cjgh.v8i1.575 © Author.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly cited.
To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ cjgh.org https://www.wwf.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020-09/LPR20_Full_report.pdf https://www.wwf.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020-09/LPR20_Full_report.pdf https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html https://loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=15-P13-00007&segmentID=6 https://loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=15-P13-00007&segmentID=6 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1922686117 https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2020/12/the-top-10-weather-and-climate-events-of-a-record-setting-year/ https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2020/12/the-top-10-weather-and-climate-events-of-a-record-setting-year/ https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2020/12/the-top-10-weather-and-climate-events-of-a-record-setting-year/ https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 mailto:jameshospedales@earthmedic.com https://doi.org/10.15566/cjgh.v8i1.575 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Microsoft Word ETASR_V12_N5_pp9404-9408 Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
12, No.
5, 2022, 9404-9408 9404 www.etasr.com Said: Visitors’ Knowledge, Awareness, and Perception (KAP) of Climate Change in Mashar National … Visitors’ Knowledge, Awareness, and Perception (KAP) of Climate Change in Mashar National Park, Hail-Saudi Arabia Mohamed Ahmed Said Architectural Engineering Department, College of Engineering, University of Hail, Hail, Saudi Arabia and Department of Architecture and Planning, College of Architecture and Planning, Sudan University of Science and Technology, Khartoum, Sudan mo.said@uoh.edu.sa Received: 3 August 2022 | Revised: 22 August 2022 | Accepted: 28 August 2022 Abstract-This paper assesses the Knowledge, Awareness, and Perception (KAP) of Climate Change among the visitors of Mashar National Park, Hail, Saudi Arabia.
Empirically, it has been established that climate change has an impact not only on the cultural and natural heritage but also on the visitor traffic patterns in national parks.
The objectives guiding the study center on the identification of the level of knowledge and the investigation of the perception of park visitors regarding climate change.
In the Hail Region, which is in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's north central region, the average temperature ranges from 39°F to 103°F and is infrequently lower than 31°F or higher than 108°F.
This KAP research adopted quantitative methods using a questionnaire survey for data collection.
A total of 120 park visitors were purposively sampled for the study.
It was concluded that the visitors in Al-Mashar Park are not fully prepared to mitigate the impact of climate change even though Hail is undoubtedly experiencing climate variability.
According to the study's findings, recommendations were made to maintain the park and provide opportunities for managing the park in a way that would allow it to better adapt to the effects of climate change, maintain effective resource management, and improve tourist satisfaction.
Keywords-climate change; knowledge; park visitors; perception I.
INTRODUCTION Climate change is a phenomenon that has been identified by numerous academic fields and authorities.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, defined climate change as a shift in the condition of the climate that may be identified and measured by changes in the mean and/or variation of its parameters [1].
Extreme weather conditions, including those related to temperature, wind, rainfall, and humidity, may come from climate change, which has been ongoing for decades [2].
Variable consequences of climate change affect the environment, human health, agriculture, and transport.
Climate change has resulted, among others, in heat waves and wildfires.
According to [3], climate change refers to changes in the typical meteorological occurrences as well as their extremes, timing, and spatial distribution that express as hot or chilly, dry or moist, snowfall or winds, floods, or thunderstorm tracks, and increasing temperatures, as well as water currents or upwelling.
Climate change is a proven tendency toward extremes in the global climate, independent of underlying reason [3].
As a result, in order to discuss climate crisis, the indicators in issue must be quantifiable and show extreme behavior, i.e.
a trend that deviates from the usual.
Extreme Temperatures (ETs) have a negative influence on socioeconomic events and human health in Middle Eastern countries [4].
With regard to local climate change, Saudi Arabia, the largest nation in the Middle East, has seen a number of ET occurrences and their aftereffects.
For instance, on June 22, 2010, Jeddah city experienced summertime high of 52°C [5].
Several communities lost power as a result of the country's 8 power stations being forced to shut down due to the high temperature.
Due to the tremendous negative effects of ETs, it is crucial for every region and nation to conduct thorough investigations of temperature extremes utilizing current records.
This is crucial for Saudi Arabia, in which the semiarid and arid environment is dominant [6].
The two basic factors that trigger climate change are aspects related to biogeography, such as natural forces and factors that are caused by human activity, or anthropogenic influences.
Climate changes may result from human actions that lessen the amount of carbon that is absorbed from the atmosphere [7].
Deforestation, farming methods, and other detrimental changes in land use are a few examples of these actions.
Growing population, rapid urbanization, and the lack of land use planning, in addition to the effects of changing temperatures, precipitation, wind, and solar radiation, continue to contribute to the degradation of the environment and water supplies [8].
In addition, industrialization, gas flaring, and forest burning contribute to the release of significant quantities of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, which contributes to climate change.
Researchers have cautioned that changes in climatic factors could affect the ability of mountain tributaries to store snow and ice.
The shift in seasonality could impede agricultural Corresponding author: Mohamed Ahmed Said Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
12, No.
5, 2022, 9404-9408 9405 www.etasr.com Said: Visitors’ Knowledge, Awareness, and Perception (KAP) of Climate Change in Mashar National … development, including future hydrological installation planning and operation [9].
Parks and protected areas are a germane context to investigate the perceptions of climate change because some visitors interact with climate-influenced resources and often notice climate-related biophysical impacts [9, 10].
Conversely, many impacts (e.g.
increased temperatures, decreased water in the soil, species migration) from a changing climate remain relatively unnoticeable in heavily developed metropolitan areas where the 80% of U.S. citizens reside [11].
Therefore, parks and other nature-based areas provide unique opportunities to experience, notice, and respond to climate change impacts, which are perhaps much less apparent in the metropolitan built environment.
National parks' ecological and cultural resources, as well as visitor patterns, will surely be impacted by climate change.
With further global warming, it's conceivable that the places, times, and the number of people who visit parks will change.
For instance, visitors may avoid the hottest months in low-latitude parks, whereas the season for visiting northern parks may last for several extra weeks or months.
Several environmental and social elements will determine whether park visitors monitor climate change and alter their behavior.
However, a crucial first step for park management and surrounding communities to predict, plan for, and actively influence future attendance is recognizing likely change in visits based on past records and anticipated trends of change in temperature [12].
According to a UN Habitat report, cities cover 2% of the earth’s surface — yet, as hubs of social and economic activity, they consume about 78%of the world’s energy.
And cities produce, on average, more than 60% of the CO2 emissions and greenhouse gases that give rise to global warming and climate change.
Clearly however, the impact of climate change affects urban and rural dwellers alike — and Saudi Arabia has been experiencing it for at least during the last decade.
With dry climatic conditions, its ecosystems are sensitive, water resources are limited, and agricultural fields are vulnerable to environmental transitions.
The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report showed that climate change has caused worldwide changes in precipitation levels, and that these have manifested in Saudi Arabia as increased levels of rainfall.
In the major cities of the country, this increased rainfall, coupled with the presence of unplanned settlements, has led to increased hazards such as flash floods [13].
The physical infrastructure, natural ecosystem, cultural resources, visitor experience, and other intrinsic values of parks are at risk from the effects of climate change [14].
Impacts from localized changes in climate may influence the quality of visitors’ experience and, therefore, visitors’ perceptions of climate change are a concern for resource professionals who manage nature-based leisure services [15, 16].
Several studies show that climate related factors are important considerations for visitors making travel related decisions [17-21].
For example, it was found that certain climate variables, such as rain, storms, and higher humidity are likely to negatively influence travel decisions, in addition to higher temperatures alone, which are not always perceived as negative.
Similar researches [20, 21] all found that seasonality, extreme weather events, and annual climate variability impact visitor decisions.
Further, increased temperatures and changes in precipitation impact recreation opportunities and particularly the activities highly reliant on weather conditions [22, 23].
Further, visitor experiences can also be impacted by climatic condition changes that result in loss or relocation of native species, introduction of invasive species, alteration of vegetation patterns, reduced availability of water, and increase in the frequency, severity, and size of wildfires [24].
According to [25], climate change is modifying species distribution, which makes conservation efforts more challenging.
According to [16], measurable plant and animal responses to recent climate change within national parks have already been documented.
As such, the management may need to alter practices and policies regarding allowable activities to accommodate changing species distributions and invasive species.
In addition, the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events can impact the park resources and animal habitats [26-28].
The public's knowledge, understanding, and perception of climate change must be assessed in order to successfully implement sustainable environmental practices.
The KAP strategy of this study is therefore very helpful.
KAP research techniques are used to discover what people understand, believe, and act regarding a specific topic [29].
In light of this, research was conducted to determine the KAP of park visitors in Mashar National Park regarding climate change.
II.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES The dominant rationale behind this KAP survey is to address the gaps in climate change knowledge, awareness and perception among park visitors in Al-Mashar National Park.
This would be achieved through the objectives guiding the current study, which are: • To identify the level of knowledge of visitors regarding climate change in Al-Mashar National Park.
• To determine the awareness of visitors on Climate Change in Al-Mashar National Park.
• To investigate the perception of visitors regarding climate change in Al-Mashar National Park.
III.
MATERIALS AND METHODS A.
Study Area The Hail Region is situated in the northernmost region of Saudi Arabia.
The area is 118,232km 2 in size.
The only important city in the area is Ha'il (Hael), which is situated in the region's center.
It is roughly 600km from Riyadh, 450km from Madinah, and 650km from Tabuk, and has good connectivity to other regional centers.
Due to its elevation of 915m above sea level, Ha'il experiences a mild climate.
Ha'il's geographic location offers a number of benefits, including a moderate climate and picturesque mountain and desert landscapes [12].
In Ha'il, the winters are chilly, dry, windy, and mainly clear while the summers are lengthy, scorching, desert, and clear.
The average annual temperature ranges from 39 to 103 o F, rarely falling below 31 or rising over 108 [22].
Early May through early July and early September through midEngineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
12, No.
5, 2022, 9404-9408 9406 www.etasr.com Said: Visitors’ Knowledge, Awareness, and Perception (KAP) of Climate Change in Mashar National … October are the ideal seasons to visit Ha'il for hot-weather activities, according to the beach/pool score [13].
Fig.
1.
Mashar National Park.
B.
Methodology This research uses a social constructionist approach to examine subjective meanings, experiences, and behaviors of visitors related to global standards of climate change.
This KAP research adopted the quantitative method using a questionnaire survey for data collection.
There were 4 sections in the questionnaire.
Information on the sociodemographic characteristics of park visitors was presented in Section A and Sections B, C, and D consisted of questions regarding the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions relating to climate change respectively.
The content was validated to make sure that the items measured the things they were meant to measure.
Quantitative data analysis was done using SPSS software and was further presented and interpreted using frequency distribution tables and narratives were scripted to discuss the findings.
IV.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION A.
Visitors Knowledge on Climate Change Table I presents whether the visitors are informed of climate change as a concept.
We see that the majority of 108 (90%) visitors claim to know what climate change is while 12 (10%) were not informed about climate change.
Table II presents the sources of knowledge on climate change.
Table III presents the visitors’ perception on the types of change in climate change.
It should be noted that the majority of the respondents is aware of at least one major change in weather patterns due to climate change, but a significant minority (22.8%) claims to be unaware or uninformed.
TABLE I.
BEING INFORMED ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Informed Frequency Percentage Yes 108 90% No 12 10% TABLE II.
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ON CLIMATE CHANGE Sources Frequency Percentage Newspapers 25 15.4% Radio 19 11.7% Television 32 19.7% Health workers 9 5.5% Teachers 51 31.4% Family members 13 8.3% Religious leaders 10 6.2% Others 3 1.8% TABLE III.
CLIMATE CHANGE ACKNOWLEDGED TYPES Change Frequency Percentage Excessive temperature 41 26.7% Excessive cold 19 9.8% Alteration in the rainfall pattern 42 27.4% Recurring cyclones or tides 3 1.9% Periodic floods 10 6.5% Logging in water 7 4.5% Unaware or uninformed 35 22.8% TABLE IV.
CAUSES OF CLIMATE CHANGE Causes Frequency Percentage Deforestation 45 29.4% Industrial effluents 21 13.7% Population growth 19 12.4% Automobiles' dark exhaust smoke 15 9.8% High carbon emissions from developed nations 17 12.5% Rapid urbanization and lifestyle changes 7 4.5% Astrophysical event (polar wander) 3 1.9% Unaware or uninformed 26 16.9% Table IV presents visitors’ perception of the causes of climate change.
B.
Visitors Awareness on Climate Change Table V presents how often visitors are getting informed on climate change.
We can see that the majority is informed either frequently or very frequently.
Table VI presents the sources of information on climate change.
It should be noted that the majority does not mention mass media as the source of information.
Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
12, No.
5, 2022, 9404-9408 9407 www.etasr.com Said: Visitors’ Knowledge, Awareness, and Perception (KAP) of Climate Change in Mashar National … TABLE V. FREQUENCY OF AWARENESS OF CLIMATE CHANGE Frequency level Frequency Percentage Very frequently 41 34.1% Frequently 35 29.1% Occasionally 16 13.3% Rarely 11 9.1% Very rarely 7 5.8% Never 10 8.3% TABLE VI.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE Source Frequency Percentage Scientist 44 36.6% Teacher 40 33.4% Neighbour/friend 6 5% Mass media 30 25% C. Visitors Perception on Climate Change Table VII presents visitor’s perception of climate change while Table VIII presents the component of climate change felt the most by the respondents the majority of which reported temperature change as the most vivid climate change indicator.
TABLE VII.
PERCEPTIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE Agree Undecided Disagree Perception Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Rainfall pattern is changing 90 78 10 10.3 20 16.6 Timing of the rainfall is changing 70 58.8 8 6.6 42 33 The amount of rainfall is changing 80 66.6 4 3.3 36 30 The intensity of rainfall is changing 66 55 23 19.1 31 25.8 Summer temperature is changing 60 50 15 12.5 45 37.5 Hot waves are changing 90 75.1 8 6.6 22 18.3 Cold waves are changing 70 58.3 20 16.6 30 25.1 Winter temperature is changing 77 64.1 19 15.8 24 20.1 The overall annual temperature is changing 88 73.3 12 10 20 16.6 Hail-storm event frequency is changing 100 83.3 0 0 20 16.6 Thunderstorm and lightening event frequency is changing 60 50 40 33.3 20 16.6 Wind velocity is changing 85 70.8 17 14.1 18 15 TABLE VIII.
COMPONENTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FELT THE MOST Component Frequency Percentage Temperature 71 59.1% Rainfall 32 26.6% Wind 10 8.3% Hail-storm 3 2.5% Lightening 4 3.3% TABLE IX.
BEHAVIORS EXHIBITED TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE FELT THE MOST Behaviour Frequency Percentage Reducing energy consumption 15 11.8% Reducing water consumption 16 12.5% Waste recycling 19 14.9% Reducing consumption of disposable items 17 13.3% Buying environmentally friendly products 12 10% Installing renewable energy equipment, e.g.
solar panels 8 6.2% None 17 13.3% Don’t know/don’t understand 23 18.1% Table IX presents the behaviors reported by the visitors on what they do to reduce the impact of climate change.
It should be noticed that the majority already does something regarding climate change in their everyday life, but a significant minority of 23 (18.1%) visitors don’t know/understand the habits to be exhibited in order to reduce the impact of climate change.
V. DISCUSSION This research has made it clear that visitors to Al-Mashar national park feel responsible for the protection of the park but are not fully equipped with the necessary technical know-how in terms of capacity on issues surrounding climate change in their region.
It is also evident that the research subjects, i.e the Al-Mashar National Park visitors, want to learn more about climate change and the actions they can take to mitigate its effects on these treasured landscapes.
Furthermore, with proper education and access to varying information sources about climate change, visitors can become important advocates in the need to respond to climate change, within the parks and their communities.
VI.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Since climate change is a complicated topic that is frequently met with skepticism, there is a need for convincing evidence to prove its truth.
The findings of this study prove that, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is clearly experiencing climate variability, visitors to Al-Mashar Park are not adequately equipped to lessen the effects of climate change.
The administration of protected areas, visitor traffic, and regional economics are all expected to be impacted in a complicated and cascading manner by a changing climate.
Recognizing the strong correlation between visitation and climate allows for future planning and has two main effects on the management of protected areas and municipal services: travel patterns will change [14] and services and facilities will need to adapt to changing needs.
To adjust to the changing conditions, which are a result of climate change, involves minimizing harm and seizing advantageous chances [15].
In the future, it might be necessary for the administration of AlMashar National Park to balance the benefits of shifting Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
12, No.
5, 2022, 9404-9408 9408 www.etasr.com Said: Visitors’ Knowledge, Awareness, and Perception (KAP) of Climate Change in Mashar National … visiting patterns with the negative effects of both too few and too many people attend (either not enough tourists to support local businesses and far too many tourists that interfere with recreational fun), e.g.
by increased recreation and education opportunities and visitation during shoulder seasons.
Changes in the environment as well as modifications in visitor usage and preference patterns are predicted to occur in the ensuing decades.
Protected places and their surrounding communities, like Al-Mashar National Park, will need to adapt to the opportunities provided by changing visitors, and they may be able to take use of them.
Globally comparable historical weather data and future estimates are available, however the availability and methodology of visitation data in different protected areas varies greatly.
Al-Mashar National Park management can increase tourist satisfaction and combine it with increased efforts to measure human visitation trends.
The current analysis can be followed by additional studies into relatively brief visitation patterns and other drivers of visitation in order to help the management adapt to the effects of climate change.
REFERENCES [1] IPCC, "AR4 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report — IPCC," IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 2007.
[2] O. C. Korie et al., "An Overview of Benefits of Organic Agriculture as a Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategy for Nigeria," International Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development, vol.
14, no.
2, pp.
638–643, 2011, https://doi.org/10.4314/ijard.v14i2.
[3] C. Rynikiewicz, "Meeting the Climate Change Challenge," in Innovation in Life Cycle Engineering and Sustainable Development, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2006, pp.
33–48, https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4617-0_3.
[4] F. Abdulla, "21st Century Climate Change Projections of Precipitation and Temperature in Jordan," Procedia Manufacturing, vol.
44, pp.
197– 204, Jan. 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.promfg.2020.02.222.
[5] M. Salimi and S. G. Al-Ghamdi, "Climate change impacts on critical urban infrastructure and urban resiliency strategies for the Middle East," Sustainable Cities and Society, vol.
54, Mar.
2020, Art.
no.
101948, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2019.101948.
[6] M. Almazroui, M. Nazrul Islam, H. Athar, P. D. Jones, and M. A. Rahman, "Recent climate change in the Arabian Peninsula: annual rainfall and temperature analysis of Saudi Arabia for 1978–2009," International Journal of Climatology, vol.
32, no.
6, pp.
953–966, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.3446.
[7] K. E. Trenberth, "Attribution of climate variations and trends to human influences and natural variability," WIREs Climate Change, vol.
2, no.
6, pp.
925–930, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.142.
[8] M. N. Sharabian, S. Ahmad, and M. Karakouzian, "Climate Change and Eutrophication: A Short Review," Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research, vol.
8, no.
6, pp.
3668–3672, Dec. 2018, https://doi.org/10.48084/etasr.2392.
[9] A. N. Laghari, W. Rauch, and M. A. Soomro, "A Hydrological Response Analysis Considering Climatic Variability: Case Study of Hunza Catchment," Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research, vol.
8, no.
3, pp.
2981–2984, Jun.
2018, https://doi.org/10.48084/etasr.2056.
[10] J. Thompson, S. Davis, and K. Mullen, "Climate Change Communication Campaign Planning: Using Audience Research to Inform Design," The George Wright Forum, vol.
30, no.
2, pp.
182–189, 2013.
[11] M. T. J. Brownlee, J. C. Hallo, and B. D. Krohn, "Botanical garden visitors’ perceptions of local climate impacts: awareness, concern, and behavioral responses," Managing Leisure, vol.
18, no.
2, pp.
97–117, Apr.
2013, https://doi.org/10.1080/13606719.2013.752209.
[12] "Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2009-2013 5-Year American Community Survey."
U.S. Census Bureau, 2013.
[13] M. T. J. Brownlee and R. I. Verbos, "Measuring outdoor recreationists’ beliefs in climate change: Testing the Occurrence and Anthropogenic Causation Scale (OC-AN)," Journal of Outdoor Recreation and Tourism, vol.
11, pp.
1–12, Oct. 2015, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jort.
2015.06.003.
[14] M. T. J. Brownlee, J. C. Hallo, and B. D. Krohn, "Botanical garden visitors’ perceptions of local climate impacts: awareness, concern, and behavioral responses," Managing Leisure, vol.
18, no.
2, pp.
97–117, Apr.
2013, https://doi.org/10.1080/13606719.2013.752209.
[15] S. M. De Urioste-Stone, M. D. Scaccia, and D. Howe-Poteet, "Exploring visitor perceptions of the influence of climate change on tourism at Acadia National Park, Maine," Journal of Outdoor Recreation and Tourism, vol.
11, pp.
34–43, Oct. 2015, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jort.
2015.07.001.
[16] W. B. Monahan and N. A. Fisichelli, "Climate Exposure of US National Parks in a New Era of Change," PLOS ONE, vol.
9, no.
7, 2014, Art.
no.
e101302, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0101302.
[17] J.
B. Elsner, S. C. Elsner, and T. H. Jagger, "The increasing efficiency of tornado days in the United States," Climate Dynamics, vol.
45, no.
3, pp.
651–659, Aug. 2015, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-014-2277-3.
[18] B. Saghir, "Climate Change in Saudi Arabia: Rethinking the Role of Local Government," King Salman Center for Local Governance, 2022. http://www.ksclg.org/en/publication-project/climate-change-in-saudiarabia-rethinking-the-role-of-local-government/.
[19] N. A. Fisichelli, G. W. Schuurman, W. B. Monahan, and P. S. Ziesler, "Protected Area Tourism in a Changing Climate: Will Visitation at US National Parks Warm Up or Overheat?," PLOS ONE, vol.
10, no.
6, 2015, Art.
no.
e0128226, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0128226.
[20] Stop TB Partnership, Advocacy, Communication and Social Mobilization for TB Control: A Guide to Developing Knowledge, Attitude and Practice Surveys.
Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2008.
[21] Hael City Profile.
UN-Habitat, 2019.
[22] "Ha’il Climate, Weather By Month, Average Temperature (Saudi Arabia)," Weather Spark.
https://weatherspark.com/y/101927/AverageWeather-in-Ha'il-Saudi-Arabia-Year-Round.
[23] A. Bigano, J. M. Hamilton, D. J. Maddison, and R. S. J. Tol, "Predicting tourism flows under climate change," Climatic Change, vol.
79, no.
3, pp.
175–180, Dec. 2006, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9190-7.
[24] IPCC, "Summary for policymakers," in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, C. B.
Field, V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea, and L. L. White, Eds.
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[25] A. R. Gitlin et al., "Mortality Gradients within and among Dominant Plant Populations as Barometers of Ecosystem Change During Extreme Drought," Conservation Biology, vol.
20, no.
5, pp.
1477–1486, 2006, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2006.00424.x.
[26] C. A. Monz, K. J. Gutzwiller, V. H. Hausner, M. W. Brunson, R. Buckley, and C. M. Pickering, "Understanding and managing the interactions of impacts from nature-based recreation and climate change," Ambio, vol.
50, no.
3, pp.
631–643, Mar.
2021, https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s13280-020-01403-y.
[27] M. A.
Said and M. Touahmia, "Evaluation of Allocated Areas for Parks and their Attributes: Hail City," Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research, vol.
10, no.
1, pp.
5117–5125, Feb. 2020, https://doi.org/10.48084/etasr.3253.
[28] O. L. Kupika, E. Gandiwa, S. Kativu, and G. Nhamo, "Impacts of Climate Change and Climate Variability on Wildlife Resources in Southern Africa: Experience from Selected Protected Areas in Zimbabwe," in Selected Studies in Biodiversity, B. Sen and O. Grillo, Eds.
IntechOpen, 2017, https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70470.
[29] "The KAP Survey Model (Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices)," SPRING.
https://www.spring-nutrition.org/publications/tool-summaries/ kap-survey-model-knowledge-attitudes-and-practices.
001.docx CHEMICAL ENGINEERING TRANSACTIONS VOL.
83, 2021 A publication of The Italian Association of Chemical Engineering Online at www.cetjournal.it Guest Editors: Jeng Shiun Lim, Nor Alafiza Yunus, Jiří Jaromír Klemeš Copyright © 2021, AIDIC Servizi S.r.l.
ISBN 978-88-95608-81-5; ISSN 2283-9216 Mathematical Approach to Forecast Oil Palm Plantation Yield under Climate Change Uncertainties Jaya Prasanth Rajakala, Viknesh Andiappanb, Yoke Kin Wana,* aSchool of Computer Science and Engineering, Faculty of Innovation and Technology, Taylor’s university, Lakeside Campus, No.
1 Jalan Taylor’s, 47500 Subang Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia.
bSchool of Engineering and Physical Sciences, Heriot-Watt University Malaysia, 62200, Putrajaya, Wilayah Persekutuan Putrajaya, Malaysia yokekin.wan@taylors.edu.my Climate change is affecting crop yields and disrupting the global food system.
Oil palm is one of the important vegetable oil crops and is widely cultivated in the tropical belt.
Accounting the climate change effects while forecasting the oil palm yield is critical in building a resilient palm supply chain and ensuring food security.
Though the productivity of oil palm plantations depends on various agroclimatic conditions and agronomic practices, the palm age, rainfall, and temperature are critical variables determining the yield.
However, most works have failed to account for the age of palms.
This work aims to account for the age of palms and also the impact of changing rainfall patterns and rise in temperature in forecasting the yield.
A simple but robust mathematical approach is proposed to forecast yield at plantation level by accounting for the above-mentioned factors.
An illustrative case study is solved to demonstrate the model.
The results show that climate change effects results in 33.31 % 8.18 % reduction in FFB yield.
The proposed model allows effective planning and management of activities at plantations and can offset the impact of fresh fruit bunch yield uncertainties due to climate change effects on the downstream units of the palm supply chain.
1.
Introduction Oil palm is a humid tropical crop that thrives well under high rainfall and moderate temperatures.
Palm oil is produced from the fresh fruit bunches (FFB) harvested from oil palm plantations.
Palm oil production has increased from a mere 1.8 Mt in 1968 to 65.15 Mt in 2018 and currently contributes around 35 % of global vegetable oil production.
It also accounts about 40 % of edible oil exports (Chong et al., 2017) and unlike other vegetable oils which have only regional relevance, palm oil is widely traded at the international market.
Oil palm has positioned itself as one of the major oil crops.
It has emerged as a crucial commodity in meeting global vegetable oil demand where a large population, especially in the developing countries, rely on cheap and available cooking oil.
Given the significance of palm oil, any disruption in its production will not only affect the palm supply chain but also have large implications on global food security.
Climate change has negative impacts on oil palm plantations (Flesis et al., 2017).
The major climate change effects at the tropics are erratic rainfall patterns resulting in floods or drought, rise in mean temperature, new pests and plant diseases, etc.
It is expected that the frequency and intensity of such extreme events to increase in the coming years (Nelson et al., 2014).
Under these circumstances, forecasting the FFB yield can help to improve the ability to respond to disruptions caused by climate change.
Also, forecasting allows effective planning and management of activities at downstream units in the supply chain synchronising with the disruption in the yield at plantations (Feng, 2016).
However, any such attempt can be successful only with a reasonably accurate forecast of the yield accounting for the climate change effects.
Most of the works in forecasting the FFB yields have used either statistical (Keong and Keng, 2012), artificial neural network (Kartika et al., 2016) or remote sensing (Carolita et al., 2017) methods.
The statistical and artificial neural network methods require historical data while remote sensing requires high-level satellite imagery.
Such requirements restrict the usage of these models by decision-makers at the plantation level.
More often these models are used for forecasting at a regional or national level.
Also, these works have not DOI: 10.3303/CET2183020 Paper Received: 29/06/2020; Revised: 04/08/2020; Accepted: 06/08/2020 Please cite this article as: Rajakal J.P., Andiappan V., Wan Y.K., 2021, Mathematical Approach to Forecast Oil Palm Plantation Yield under Climate Change Uncertainties, Chemical Engineering Transactions, 83, 115-120 DOI:10.3303/CET2183020 115 mailto:yokekin.wan@taylors.edu.my explicitly considered the climate change effects in forecasting the FFB yield.
Oil palm is a perennial crop with a lifespan of 25 y – 30 y and the FFB yield from the tree varies with its age.
The above-mentioned works have also failed to account this varying yield due to maturity.
Apart from this, previous research works studied the impacts of climate change effects like rainfall (Christensen et al.
2013), temperature (Paterson et al.
2015), sea level rise (Siwar et al.
2013), increased atmospheric carbon concentration (Long et al.
2006), pests and diseases (Paterson et al.
2015) independently on the FFB yield.
However, none of the works accounted for the cumulative impact of the different climate change effects on the FFB yield.
The literature analysis has allowed to synthesis the following research gaps,  Very limited works are focused exclusively on forecasting yield at plantation level.
 The previous works did not consider the varying yield due to maturity of the plantations in forecasting  A comprehensive tool accounting the cumulative impacts of the different climate change effects on oil palm yield has not been developed.
To address the above discussed research gaps, this paper aims to develop a simple but robust mathematical approach to forecast the FFB yield of plantations accounting for the age of the plantation and climate change effects.
This work restricts in considering water deficit and rise in temperature due to their significant impact on yield and availability of established data.
This work intends to integrate the cumulative impacts from the physiological (oil palm maturity) and climate change factors (rainfall and temperature) in yield forecasting as shown in Figure 1a.
2.
Problem statement The formal problem definition is as follows: Given are a set of plantations 𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺 with area A𝑔𝑔 producing fresh fruit bunches (FFB).
The FFB production from the plantation g depends on its age or maturity (𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡MTY) at the period t. Also, climate change effects like water deficit (WD𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡−1) and rise in temperature (𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡−1) have a significant negative impact on the FFB yield.
This work aims to account these factors in forecasting the FFB production (𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡FC) from the plantations 𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺 during the year t. 3.
Mathematical formulation 3.1 Modelling oil palm yield profile As discussed in Section 1, the yield of the oil palm depends on its age.
Typically, the yield from an oil pam varies every year.
A yield profile plots the age of the palm against its maximum yield under optimal agro climatic condition as shown in Figure 1b.
This section presents the mathematical technique to model Figure 1b and is referred to as the yield profile model.
(a) (b) Figure 1: Illustration of a) Overview of FFB forecasting and b) Typical yield profile of an oil palm tree (Tan, 2014) The FFB yield of an oil palm tree (𝑤𝑤) is a function of its age (𝑚𝑚) as shown in Eq(1).
It can be noted that age or maturity is the independent variable and yield is the dependent variable.
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑚) (1) 116 A set of discrete points 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3, .
.
.
𝐼𝐼) are identified with 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,1and 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝐼𝐼 as the lower and upper limits.
The points 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 are taken along the horizontal axis as shown in Figure 2.
The points 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 are identified such that to segmentize each linear section of the curve.
It can be noted that the oil palm yield profile curve has linear sections or approximate linear sections from age 0 2, 2 5, 5 7, 7 9, 9 11, 11 14, 14 19 and 19 26.
Therefore, the points 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,1, 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,2, 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,3, 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,4, 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,5, 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,6, 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,7, 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,8 and 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,9 are identified at age 0, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 19 and 26 as shown in Figure 2.
On substituting 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 in Eq(1), corresponding yield values for each point can be determined, obtaining another set of discrete points referred to as 𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3, .
.
.
𝐼𝐼) as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Modelling oil palm yield profile 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡MTY (y) and 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔YLD (t) are the age and maximum FFB yield of the plantation 𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺 with area 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔during the year t. 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a set of variables that relates 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡MTYand 𝐹𝐹𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡YLD as shown in Eq(2) and Eq(3).
𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡MTY = �𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖=1 × 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡 (2) 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡YLD = �𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 × 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖=1 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡 (3) 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡MTY might not necessarily be amongst the selected discrete points 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖.
It can be any value in-between two adjacent 𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖points.
𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖 is constrained as shown in Eq(4) and Eq(5).
�𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖=1 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡 (4) 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡 (5) 117 However, not more than two adjacent 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 values can be non-zero.
This is achieved by introducing a new set of binary variables 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 using the method previously discussed by Zhou et al.
(2013) in optimising utility operations and is presented in Eqs(6) – (9).
�𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1 𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖=1 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡 (6) 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = 1 (7) 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖−1,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 < 1 < 𝐼𝐼 (8) 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔,𝑖𝑖−1,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼 (9) The age or maturity, 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡MTY is a parameter provided by the decision maker, based on which the corresponding maximum FFB yield 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡YLD is determined.
3.2 Modelling climate change effects on FFB yield As discussed in Section 1, this work accounts for two climate change induced events water deficit and rise in temperature.
The climate change effects usually have no immediate impact on the FFB yield.
There exists a lag period between the period of climate change effect and the impact on the FFB yield.
Typically, the lag period for rainfall is from 9 12 months while for temperature changes is 12 months (Shanmuganathan and Narayanan, 2012).
Therefore, a lag period of 1 y is considered in this work.
Figure 3a and Figure 3b presents the impact of water deficit (Carr, 2011) and temperature rise (Sarkar et al., 2020) on the losses in FFB yield.
Figure 3a is referred to as water deficit curve while Figure 3b as temperature rise curve.
These relationships obtained from literature are based on experimental studies conducted on mature oil palms which have a potential FFB yield of 30 t/y under optimal agroclimatic conditions.
This value is taken as the benchmark value or potential yield of oil palm and is denoted as 𝑋𝑋PL_YLD.
The water deficit curve and temperature rise curve are modelled using the same technique presented in Section 3.1 and are referred to as water deficit model and temperature model.
The water deficit (𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡−1) and rise in temperature (𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡−1) for the plantation 𝑔𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐺 for the year t-1 are provided as input to get the corresponding losses in yield, 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 LS_YLD_WDand 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 LS_YLD_T for the year t. (a) (b) Figure 3: Illustration on a) Impact of water deficit on FFB yield (Carr, 2011) and b) Impact of rise in temperature on FFB yield (Sarkar, 2020) 3.3 FFB yield forecast The water deficit index (𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX) and temperature index (𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX) represent the percentage of the actual FFB yield with respect to the potential yield (𝑋𝑋PL_YLD).
Based on the yield loss, the water deficit index and temperature index are estimated as shown in Eq(10) and Eq(11).
𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX = �𝑋𝑋PL_YLD−𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 LS_YLD_WD� 𝑋𝑋PL_YLD ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡 (10) 118 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX = �𝑋𝑋PL_YLD − 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 LS_YLD_T� 𝑋𝑋PL_YLD ∀𝑔𝑔∀𝑡𝑡 (11) The maximum yield from the oil palm during the year t under optimal agro-climatic conditions is given by 𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡YLD.
The impact of water deficit and temperature rise on the maximum yield is provided by the water deficit index (𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX) and temperature index (𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX).
These indices are multiplied with the maximum yield to determine the actual yield.
The forecast of the FFB production for the year t can be determined as shown in Eq(12).
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡FC = �𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡YLD × 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX × 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡INDEX 𝐺𝐺 𝑔𝑔=1 × 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔 ∀𝑡𝑡 (12) The developed mathematical model can be validated using historical data.
The FFB forecast of a given year can be determined using the data on rainfall and temperature of the preceding year.
The results from the model can be validated with the actual data.
The accuracy of the model depends on factors like proximity of weather station to the plantation, accuracy of the climate variable readings, etc.
4.
Case study This section presents a case study to illustrate the proposed mathematical approach.
It involves forecasting the total FFB production for a plantation company which owns plantation A, B and C for the year t. At first, the yield profile, water deficit curve and temperature rise curve are modelled as presented in Section 3.1 and 3.2.
Later, the plantation age during t; water deficit and mean temperature rise values during t-1 are provided as input parameters.
Table 1 presents the area, plantation maturity, water deficit and mean temperature rise.
The maximum FFB yield from the plantations A, B and C are determined from the yield profile model.
Similarly, the loss in FFB yield is determined from the water deficit and temperature rise model.
Based on the FFB yield loss value, the water deficit index and temperature index are calculated using Eq(10) and Eq(11).
Table 2 presents the maximum yield of the plantations at t; the water deficit and temperature index computed by the model.
Finally, the forecast for FFB production is calculated using Eq(12).
The case study which was solved in LINGO v18 contained 235 variables and 159 constraints with an elapsed run time less than 2 s. The solver was run-in a HP Pavilion x360 with Intel Core i5 8250 (1.80 GHz) processor and 8 GB RAM under a 64bit operating system.
Table 1: Agroclimatic data of the plantation Plantation Area (ha) Maturity at t (y) Water deficit at t-1 (mm) Temperature rise at t-1 (℃) Plantation A 300 7 190 1 Plantation B 300 16 70 0.5 Plantation C 300 11 130 0.8 Table 2: Yield, water deficit index and temperature rise index Plantation Potential Yield at t (t) Water deficit index Temperature rise index Plantation A 18 0.68 0.989 Plantation B 23 0.93 0.999 Plantation C 27 0.81 0.999 The maximum FFB yield determined from the yield profile model for Plantation A, B and C are 5,400 t, 6,900 t and 8,100 t during t. Though the plantations are of the same size (300 ha), the variations in maximum possible yield is due to their different maturity levels.
Plantation A and B with maturity of 7 and 16 y produce 33.33 % and 14.80 % less FFB compared to Plantation C of maturity 11 y, independent of the impact due to water deficit and temperature rise.
The FFB forecast estimated at the Plantations A, B and C accounting for the climate change effects for the period t is 3,602.50 t, 6,379.02 t and 6,618.87 t. The cumulative impact of water deficit and temperature rise has resulted in yield drop of 33.31 %, 8.18 % and 18.29 % at plantations A, B and C from their maximum possible yield.
119 5.
Conclusion This work presents a mathematical approach to forecast FFB production for plantation companies.
This work has focused on discussing the mathematical technique to represent the relationship of plantation maturity and different climate change factors on FFB yield.
The technique provides the flexibility to update data emerging from future studies.
Also, other climate change effects like CO2 concentration, pest, diseases, etc can also be considered in forecasting by modelling their impacts using the same technique.
The approach requires minimal data and user friendly to decision makers.
The approach can aid in planning their activities like labour management, storage, marketing, etc.
Unlike the other units in the palm supply chain, plantation is largely a biological unit which is highly vulnerable to disruption from climate change effects which are beyond management and operational intervention.
This work can potentially improve the reliability and resilience of the palm supply change by mitigating the uncertainties in FFB production.
Also, the current work can be extended to optimise the required plantation maturity based on the palm oil demand.
Acknowledgment The authors acknowledge the academic support provided by Taylors Ph.D.
Scholarship Programme (TUFR/2017/001/01) and technical support provided by LINDO systems.
References Carolita I., Sitorus J., Manalu J., Wiratmoko D., 2017, Growth profile analysis of oil palm by using SPOT 6 the case of North Sumatra.
International Journal of Remote Sensing and Earth Sciences, 12, 21-26.
Carr M.K.V., 2011, The water relations and irrigation requirements of oil palm (Elaeis guineensis): a review, Experimental Agriculture, 47(4), 629.
Chong M.Y., Ng W.P.Q., Ng D.K.S., Lam H.L., Lim D.L.K., Law K.H., 2017, A mini review of palm based fertiliser production in Malaysia, Chemical Engineering Transactions, 61, 1585-1590.
Christensen J.H., Kanikicharla K.K., Aldrian E., An S.I., Cavalcanti I.F.A., De Castro M., Dong W., Goswami P., Hall A., Kanyanga J.K. and Kitoh A., 2013, Climate phenomena and their relevance for future regional climate change, In Climate Change 2013 the Physical Science Basis: Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 1217-1308.
Feng Y., 2016, Study on medium and long term power load forecasting based on combination forecasting model, Chemical Engineering Transactions, 51, 859-864.
Flesis S., Hill J.K., Mclean C., Lucey J.M., 2017, Potential impacts of climate change on oil palm cultivation, A science for policy paper by SENSOR programme, York, United Kingdom, 1-17.
Kartika N.D., Astika I.W., Santosa, E., 2016, Oil palm yield forecasting based on weather variables using artificial neural network, Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 3(3), 626633.
Keong Y.K., Keng W.M., 2012, Statistical modeling of weather-based yield forecasting for young mature oil palm, APCBEE Procedia, 4, 58-65.
Long S.P., Ainsworth E.A., Leakey A.D., Nösberger J., Ort D.R., 2006, Food for thought: lower-than-expected crop yield stimulation with rising CO2 concentrations, Science, 312, 1918-1921.
Nelson G.C., Valin H., Sands R.D., Havlík P., Ahammad H., Deryng D., Elliott J., Fujimori S., Hasegawa T., Heyhoe E., Kyle P., 2014, Climate change effects on agriculture: Economic responses to biophysical shocks, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(9), 3274-3279.
Paterson R.R.M., Sariah M., Lima N., 2013, How will climate change affect oil palm fungal diseases?, Crop Protection, 46, 113-120.
Paterson R.R.M., Kumar L., Taylor S., Lima N., 2015, Future climate effects on suitability for growth of oil palms in Malaysia and Indonesia, Scientific reports, 5, 14457.
Sarkar M.S.K., Begum R.A., Pereira J.J., 2020, Impacts of climate change on oil palm production in Malaysia, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 1, 1-11.
Shanmuganathan S., Narayanan A., 2012, Modelling the climate change effects on Malaysia's oil palm yield, IEEE Symposium on E-Learning E-Management and E-Services, 19th – 21st November, Penang, Malaysia, 1, 1-6.
Siwar C., Ahmed F., Begum R.A., 2013, Climate change, agriculture and food security issues: Malaysian perspective, Journal: Food, Agriculture and Environment, 11(2), 1118-1123.
Tan K.W., 2014.
Plantation companies with best growth potential (Part 1/2), <klse.i3investor.com/blogs/kianweiaritcles/48513.jsp>, accessed 12.05.2020.
120
Microsoft Word PORTALmcgeeSpecialIssueFINAL PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
Special issue details: Global Climate Change Policy: Post-Copenhagen Discord Special Issue, guest edited by Chris Riedy and Ian McGregor.
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia.
Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging Discourse within International Climate Change Governance?
Jeffrey Scott McGee, University of Newcastle Introduction This paper explores an important recent development in the process of international climate change governance.
That development is the formation of a number of selective state-based forums for dialogue and/or decision-making on climate change outside the established institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
A number of these selective state-based climate forums were instigated by the USA and Australia, the two developed countries under Annex 1 of the UNFCCC that, for the most part of the last decade, remained opposed to the binding emission reduction targets and differentiated emission reduction obligations of the Kyoto Protocol.1 The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), the APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration of 2007 (APEC Sydney Declaration) and the US Major Economies Process (MEP) of 2007–2008 were all instigated and/or heavily supported by the US and Australia.
A common thread to these three selective state-based climate change forums is a willingness to allow important decision making on climate change to be devolved to a small group of key state actors, with little or no formal input from environmental or research non-governmental organisations.
This paper seeks to analyse this recent development in international climate governance in 1 Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol upon the Rudd Labor Government coming to power in November 2007.
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
2 terms of its compatibility with the democratic governance principles of cosmopolitan and deliberative democratic theory.
The first section outlines the interdisciplinary research design of the paper that draws on the disciplines of international law (IL) and critical constructivist international relations (IR) theory.
This section also outlines the concept of ‘discourse’ that is later relied on to analyse the emergence of these selective state-based forums and the contestation they offer to existing intersubjective meaning on the process for international governance of climate change.
The second section outlines the two key theoretical traditions of democratic theory, cosmopolitan and deliberative, that are later used in analysis of these selective state-based climate forums.
The third section of the paper builds on this by introducing the concept of ‘minilateralism’ that has been developed by a number of academics and policy commentators to support a shift towards more exclusive modes of governance of international problems.
The fourth section briefly outlines the process of the UN climate regime and the three selective state-based climate change governance forums that have arisen and been promoted by the USA and Australia in the second half of the last decade.
The final section of the paper argues these selective state-based climate change forums embody a discourse of ‘exclusive minilateralism’ that is contesting the inclusive multilateral discourse on the process of international climate governance.
The paper concludes with observations on the challenges that the exclusive minilateralism discourse poses for cosmopolitan and discursive democracy in international climate governance, and suggestions on how these challenges might be managed.
Research design Critical Constructivist International Relations Theory Constructivism is an interpretive IR theory that focuses upon the ‘role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and arguments in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held intersubjective ideas and understanding on social life’ (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001: 392).
Unlike the three more established IR theories of realism, institutionalism and liberalism, constructivists: reject the notion that states or other actors have objectively determined interests that they can pursue by selecting strategies and designing effective institutions.
Rather, international actors operate within a social context of shared subjective understandings and norms, which constitute their identities and roles and define appropriate forms of conduct … Most specific norms and McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
3 understandings are generated, disseminated, and internalised through the efforts and discourse of diverse actors … In the constructivist view, even as states and other actors create norms and institutions to further their interests and values, those norms and institutions are redefining those interests and values, perhaps even the identities of the actors themselves.
(Abbott 2004: 367).
The constructivist emphasis on ideas, which are often referred to as ‘norms’ in this literature, is an obvious common starting point for interdisciplinary research designs incorporating IL and constructivist IR theory (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97).
The constructivist IR tradition is divided into two broad strands.
Firstly, conventional constructivism, seeks to trace the causal impact of identities and norms on state behaviour (100).2 The conventional constructivist approach is concerned with identifying the causative effect of particular ideas or norms on state behaviour during a specific event or series of events in the international system (100).
Conventional constructivist work adopts a research design more closely aligned with the positivist social science paradigm in formulating hypotheses regarding the causal influence of norms on past state behaviour and subjecting them to empirical testing and investigation (Pettenger 2007: 9–10).
However, the second strand of constructivist work, critical constructivism, is less wedded to the positivist paradigm.
Critical constructivism is more concerned with ‘uncovering the power relations that underpin and are reproduced by social relations, including knowledge-creating and knowledge-laden relations’ that privilege some actors over others (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97).
Finnemore and Sikkink describe critical constructivism as having: intellectual roots in critical social theory, including such figures as Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault.
Although it shares the core features of constructivism identified above, critical constructivism adds a belief that constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power.
Critical constructivists believe that certain powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of social construction.
The task of the critical scholar is both to unmask these ideational structures of domination and to facilitate the imagining of alternative worlds.
Critical constructivists thus see a weaker autonomous role for ideas than do other constructivists because ideas are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of material power.
(2001: 398) Critical constructivist IR theory is thus concerned with how ideas are used as an expression of power to shape the intersubjective meaning of international phenomena and the interests of the actors concerned.
Critical constructivist IR theory usefully complements IL research in providing a theoretical framework for analysis of the political context in which international law and international legal institutions are formed.
Unlike conventional constructivism, the critical IR approach does not seek to test the effect of international law as a causal mechanism on particular instances of state 2 For a prominent example of conventional constructivist work, see Wendt (1999).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
4 behaviour.3 Rather, critical constructivism provides understanding of the power-laden web of intersubjective meaning embodied in international law and legal institutions.
Critical constructivist IR theory also offers a theoretical framework for analysing how such intersubjective meaning is contested and altered over time.
The ‘critical’ (i.e.
emancipatory) potential of constructivism is in providing understanding of the powerladen web of intersubjective meaning that constitutes, and is constituted by, international law and legal institutions.
This understanding opens up the possibility of international collective self-reflection for change.
As Neufeld explains: it is clear how interpretative approaches offer support for notions of progressive and emancipatory change in the global order.
The intersubjective meanings which constitute the global order are themselves the product of an ongoing process of self-definition and self reflection, they are, then like all practices which instantiate them, open to change.
(1993: 58) Current international law, institutions and practices might therefore be viewed not as a natural ‘given’ reality, impervious to substantial change, but rather one of many possible socially constructed orders of intersubjective meaning available to the international community (Neufeld 1993: 59).
A critical constructivist understanding of international affairs thus opens the possibility for understanding discursive contestation over current international law, legal institutions and practices (Dryzek 2006).
Interdisciplinarity: Critical Constructivist IR Theory and International Law Despite the areas of common ground between the theoretical frameworks of critical constructivist IR theory and international legal analysis there have been only limited attempts to specifically link the two in research design.
One of the more substantial explorations of the use of critical constructivist IR theory in analysis of international institutions is contained in the work of John Dryzek (2005; 2007: 44–62).4 Dryzek invites international lawyers to look beneath the text of an international agreement to the underlying ideas and intersubjective meanings upon which the agreement is structured.5 Dryzek refers to this set of underlying ideas and intersubjective beliefs as a ‘discourse,’ which he defines as ‘a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents with a framework for making sense of situations, embodying judgements, assumptions, capabilities, dispositions and intentions’ (2006: 1).
3 Even more adventurous sociological analysis within international legal scholarship has not been able to prove international law as a decisive causal mechanism in the behaviour of states, see Chayes (1974).
4 See Dryzek (2006: 23) for discussion of the critical constructivist research design of his work.
5 Dryzek (2007: 60) uses the IT metaphor that discourses ‘can provide the “software” that makes international regimes work, while more formal organizations and rules provide the “hardware.’” McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
5 Dryzek provides a typology of the more prominent discourses operating in environmental governance and international politics more generally over recent decades (2005; 2006; 2007; 2009).6 He suggests that discourses are social structures that both enable and constrain actions (Dryzek 2006: 24–25).7 Discourse is constraining in the sense that it is constitutive of the subject dispositions and capacities of actors and is produced and reproduced by subsequent actions and interactions (Dryzek 2007: 62).
Discourse is also enabling in the sense that actors draw on existing discourses to ‘subtly affect the content and weight of discourses’ within a given social structure (Dryzek 2006: 24–25).
Dryzek thus comments: Discourses can embody power in that they condition norms and perceptions of actors, suppressing some interests whilst advancing others.
Discourses pervade, constitute, and help explain the structure of international affairs.
The power of discourses arises in their ability to structure and coordinate the actions of individuals’ subject wholly or partly to them.
(2006: 3) Dryzek argues that some discourses are ‘hegemonic’ in the sense that they are so ingrained in social structures that they are ‘not even recognised by those subject to them, but are instead treated as the natural order of things’ (2006: 8).
However, discourses are not static.
Over time, coalitions of actors (that is, discourse coalitions) emerge with alternate discourses that seek to contest even hegemonic discourses (Dryzek 2006).
This contestation leads to change through either a dialectical accommodation/merging of competing discourses or the defeat of a competing discourse.
Although Dryzek argues that discourses are important in understanding international affairs, he importantly points out that they cannot alone explain international social life and collective outcomes.
Dryzek concedes that other factors such as material factors and non-linguistic practices are also important (2007: 62).
This article adopts Dryzek’s concept of discourse in analysing contestation over the process of international climate governance that flows from the emergence of the selective state-based climate governance forums introduced above.
Leading models of democracy Democracy is itself a highly contested concept (Dryzek 2010: 21).
However, as Dryzek (2000: 7–12) explains, there are two leading theoretical models of democracy at a 6 Dryzek (2009: 187) identifies a number of discourses operating in the field including; ecological limits, climate science scepticism, energy security and ecological modernisation.
This article argues that a further discourse of ‘exclusive minilateralism’ must also be recognised.
7 Dryzek’s approach builds on Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory, most fully described in his 1984 work, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
6 domestic level.
Liberal democracy ‘deals only in the reconciliation and aggregation of preferences defined prior to political interaction’ (Dryzek 2000: 10).
Liberal democratic theory views democracy as a social choice mechanism which reconciles conflict by aggregating individual actor preferences that are pre-formed and unaffected by political interaction.
Liberal democratic activity is pursued by actors who strategically further their pre-formed interests by voting in elections to determine the make-up of constitutionally entrenched institutions of the domestic state.
Liberal democratic theory is thus directed towards the effectiveness of the aggregative and reconciliatory functions of the constitutionally entrenched institutions of the domestic liberal state.
The second leading model of democracy at a domestic level is deliberative democracy.
In deliberative democracy, institutions ought to be designed primarily to facilitate deliberation by political actors (Dryzek 2000: 1).
As Dryzek explains, deliberation is ‘a social process distinguished from other kinds of communication in that deliberators are amenable to changing their judgements, preferences, and views during the course of their interactions, which involve persuasion, manipulation and deception’ (2000: 1).
Deliberative democracy is thus concerned with the ‘authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged in by competent citizens’ (2000: 1).
Domestic institutions designed to promote deliberative democracy are concerned with improving the circumstances of communication and hence the capacity of actors to reflect upon and change their preferences (and ultimately voting patterns and other forms of political participation) in response to the better argument.
At an international level, there is no institutional equivalent to the sovereign of the domestic liberal democratic state that has the power to make, enforce and administer laws that may override the consent of an individual citizen.
The various institutions of the United Nations system (that is, the Security Council, General Assembly, and International Court of Justice) come the closest to replication of the functions of the domestic sovereign, however, ultimately derive their authority from the ongoing consent of the states involved.
Despite the lack of an equivalent to the domestic sovereign, liberal and deliberative theories of democracy have been used to analyse the democratic credentials of international institutions.
The liberal democratic model of democracy has been adapted to the international sphere through the concept of cosmopolitan McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
7 democracy as developed by authors such as Held (1995; 2002; 2006; 2009) and Archibugi (1995; 2004).
Cosmopolitan democracy posits not only the furthering of government by democratic popular election at a domestic level but also the extension of democratic process to governance between states at a regional and global level (Archibugi 2004; 442–452).
Held (2009: 538) points to the post-1945 proliferation of international governmental organisations in the areas of the ‘rules governing war, weapons systems, war crimes, human rights and the environment’ as evidence of a reconception of the traditional strict sovereignty of the state and indicative of an emergent cosmopolitanism in international society.
Dryzek describes the cosmopolitan desire to extend formal, democratically constituted, rule-based governance structures to the international sphere with: Cosmopolitan democracy favours an international system more densely populated by institutions that both secure order and are democratically accountable in direct fashion that is, not just at one remove, through any accountability of states that take part in such arrangement… The project looks forward ultimately to an international legal system enforcing democratically determined laws, a global parliament to hold all other global institutions to account and international control of a military that would in the long run yield demilitarisation.
(2006: 151– 152).
However, cosmopolitan democracy also focuses on protection of the rights of the individual within the domestic state, with each individual to be accorded equal worth and dignity, active agency and personal responsibility (Held 2002: 24).
As Held explains: In the first instance, cosmopolitanism can be taken as those basic values that set down standards or boundaries that no agent, whether a representative of government, state, or civil association should be able to cross.
Focussed on the claims of each person as an individual or as a member of humanity as a whole, these values espouse the idea that human beings are in a fundamental sense equal and deserve equal political treatment (2002: 23) At its more ambitious edge, the cosmopolitan democratic project proposes direct citizen election of representatives to supranational institutions that would have the authority to override state sovereignty (Monbiot 2003).
The primary focus of all variants of cosmopolitan democracy is to extend the aggregative, reconciliatory and accountability features of the domestic liberal democratic model into international governance structures.
The underlying premise of the cosmopolitan project is that individual citizens will come to see themselves as world citizens and hence subordinate their more local identities and interests to a common global project (Dryzek 2006: 153).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
8 However, Dryzek’s discursive democracy is a model for the pursuit of democratic ideals in international society that draws more particularly on the deliberative tradition of domestic democratic theory.
Dryzek argues that in the international sphere, which lacks centralised authority and has more dispersed power structures, the deliberative democratic project is best pursued through a democratic design that is: transnational and discursive, highlighting dispersed and competent control over the engagement of discourses in transnational public spheres, which in turn constructs or influences international outcomes in a variety of ways.
Transnational democracy of this sort is not electoral democracy, and it is not institutionalised in formal organizations.
Instead it is to be sought in communicatively competent decentralised control over the content and weight of globally consequential discourses, which in turn resonates with theories of deliberative democracy stressing communicative action in the public sphere … The public sphere encompasses social movements and media communications, and can reach into corporations, states, and intergovernmental organisations.
It is an informal, communicative realm that can be contrasted with the constitutional exercise of authority.
(Dryzek 2006: 154) The weakness of centralised authority in the international system and recourse to principles of state sovereignty (that is, sovereign independence) to avoid international obligations are no impediments to discursive democracy.
The ‘transnational public sphere’ of civil society movements and media operations does not require a centralised source of authority or state consent in order to engage citizens and other actors in reflective, deliberative and communicative processes.
As Dryzek explains, activity in the international public sphere has a capacity to shape actor perceptions, interests and identities and hence the outcome of more formal international institutions (2000: 121– 122).
The formal institutions of international society thus embody and reproduce discourses.
The discourses operating in the transnational public sphere and formal international institutions therefore operate in a mutually constitutive manner (121).
Multilateralism and minilateralism in international climate governance Multilateralism in international affairs involves ‘creating international bodies, agreements, and rules through negotiation on the part of the states that will be subject to the arrangements in question, who agree to be bound by the arrangements’ (Dryzek 2006: 129).
The creation of formal rule-based institutions at an international level to foster a cooperative approach to international issues lies at the heart of the multilateral project.
However, this does not mean that multilateral institutions will all have a high level of democratic process.
The United Nations Security Council is one of the key multilateral institutions of the post-war period, yet its five permanent members (that is, McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
9 the victorious allied powers of WW2) have an individual veto power over any substantive decisions of that forum.8 The democratisation of multilateral institutions is one of the key elements of the cosmopolitan democratic project an international level, as discussed above (Dryzek 2006: 129).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Kyoto Protocol are the agreements that form the central basis of the multilateral institutions of international climate governance.
At a formal level, the UNFCCC and Kyoto meetings, have a solid claim to cosmopolitan democratic principles in that they are inclusive (all states party to those treaties may attend relevant meetings and have a single vote in decision making) and have near universal participation (most states are party to those treaties).
Cosmopolitan theory favours at least a majority decision-making rule in intergovernmental institutions (Archibugi 2004: 449).9 UNFCCC Draft rule 42 provides that the voting requirements for a ‘matter of substance’ are to be decided by the COP.10 However, in the absence of agreement by the COP on majority voting (which to date has not occurred) ‘there is a broad understanding in the climate change regime that substantive decisions should be adopted by consensus’ (Farhana & Depledge 2004).11 This consensus decision-making rule of the UNFCCC provides formal equality of state participation in the UNFCCC COP meetings so that even the smallest states have a potential veto power over substantial decisions.12At least formally, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol decisionmaking rules are highly democratic when viewed through a cosmopolitan lens.
However, the formal equality of states in participation and voting at UNFCCC COP meetings still operates in a world of states with significantly differing levels of resources.
Practically speaking, smaller developing states often have only very limited financial and human resources to participate in UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol meetings whilst larger developed and developing states often having several hundred representatives present.
8 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art 27(3).
9 Although, as Archibugi (2004: 448–449) points out, there is some tension within cosmopolitan thought as to whether majority decision making should be based on a majority of states or majority of global population.
10 For Draft Rule 42, see UNFCCC (1996).
Draft Rule 42 contains two draft voting rules for the COP to make decisions on ‘matters of substance.’ The first rule allows for a retreat from a consensus voting rule to a two-thirds or three-quarters majority voting rule once attempts to reach consensus are exhausted.
The second requires a consensus vote except on financial matters.
11 Consensus is generally taken to be present if no party raises a formal objection to a particular decision; see Farhana & Depledge (2004: 443–444).
12 The consensus decision-making rule within the UNFCCC appeared to be strained at the 2010 COP 16 meeting in Cancun, Mexico.
Towards the end of the COP meeting, the COP President chairing the meeting, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Ms Espinosa, overruled the express formal objection of Bolivia, in order for the COP to formally adopt a package of decisions on mitigation, climate finance, adaptation and technology (Vihma 2011).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
10 As Timmons-Roberts and Parks explain: Vast differences in absolute and relative income have a tremendous impact upon the ability of countries to attend international conferences, participate in international organizations and hire skilled negotiators.
This is what we call the direct route through which inequality reduces the likelihood of cooperation on climate change.
It determines whether nations can pay for the salaries and accommodations, draft proposals with proper legal argumentation and nomenclature, attend the many formal and informal meetings at conferences and respond to the demands of powerful nations with well-thought-out counterproposals.
(2006: 15–16) This lack of resources limits small state participation in COP decision making processes and effectively forces small states to participate in larger negotiating blocks that may act to practically constrain individual state choice and the exercise of their veto power on COP decisions.
In sum, the formal multilateral decision-making structures of the UNFCCC COP and Kyoto Protocol meetings are largely consistent with cosmopolitan democratic principles despite acknowledged practical difficulties with small states having sufficient resources to fully participate in such meetings.
Cosmopolitan democracy is generally supportive of improving the voice of non-state actors to assist in improving the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of states and intergovernmental organisations (Held 2006: 172).
Consistent with this, the UNFCCC formally encourages civil society participation in lobbying and educational roles with the COP meeting process.
The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including environmental groups, is formally recognised in the UNFCCC with NGO’s able to attend COP meetings.13 For the purposes of COP meetings, nongovernmental organisations are divided into various categories including business nongovernmental organisations (BINGOs), research non-governmental organisations (RINGOs) and environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs).
As Fisher (2010: 11) explains, the UNFCCC COP meetings have traditionally provided NGOs with significantly greater access to and influence with state negotiators than in other international institutions.
McGregor (2011: 1) also describes the practice of NGOs using their access at UNFCCC COP meetings to pursue ‘insider strategies’ to influence government delegates through lobbying.
13 For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 June 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 107, art 7(2)(l), states the COP shall: ‘Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies’; art 7(6) also states ‘Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object.’ McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
11 Despite the difficulties that arose at the Copenhagen COP 15 meeting,14 the UN climate meeting process is at least formally designed for a reasonably high level of inclusiveness, openness and transparency for all involved states and interested NGO groups.
At this formal level, the UN climate regime has generally promoted an intersubjective understanding regarding the process of the international climate change governance that is consistent with cosmopolitan democratic principles.
This understanding might be described as a discourse of inclusive multilateralism.
However, there is a growing body of academic literature and policy commentary on international climate governance that is significantly contesting the formal inclusive multilateralism discourse of the UN climate regime.
This work argues that greater effectiveness in responding to climate change might be found in institutions involving a smaller number of key states, particularly the large emitting countries.15 For example, US author David Victor is a keen advocate of these select decision making forums on climate change: In the area of international cooperation the solutions lie in efforts to create a club of a small number of important countries and craft the elements of serious cooperation.
The efforts probably can’t emerge within the UNFCCC process because it is too large and inclusive.
Nor can it easily arise from other available forums such as the G8, because their membership is too skewed to include the dozen or so countries that must be part of an effective solution.
The most interesting idea for a new institution is outgoing Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin’s concept for a forum of leaders from the twenty key countries.
(Victor 2006: 101) This call for key decisions on international climate change governance to be reduced to a select forum of key states has been echoed by US foreign policy commentator Wright (2009: 167), Australian climate policy commentator Kellow (2006: 287–303) and Australian Opposition climate change spokesman Greg Hunt M.P (2009).
Prominent UK sociologist Anthony Giddens has similarly advocated for smaller forums of key nations: The large bulk of greenhouse gas emissions is produced by only a limited number of countries as far as mitigation is concerned, what the majority of states do pales in significance compared to the activities of the large polluters.
Only a limited number of states have the capability seriously 14 As Fisher (2010: 11) describes it, following COP 15 at Copenhagen there were criticisms particularly from ENGO groups claiming they were disenfranchised during the meeting.
This is discussed further in this article.
15 It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the claims to greater effectiveness in reducing emissions made by supporters of minilateralism.
For the purposes of the following discussion, it shall be assumed that there is significant merit in the minilateralist claims in this regard.
Certainly the minilateral argument that decision making amongst a small group of key states is easier to affect than consensus decision making across nearly 200 states carries some persuasive weight.
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
12 to pioneer technological innovation relevant to climate change … To be able to exploit this situation, we need quite a different perspective from those that emerged from Kyoto and Bali.
An approach based on agreements or partnerships between individual nations, groups of countries and regions makes more senseand could eventually strengthen more universal measures....A body representing the major polluters should be established post-haste.
If we include the EU as a single entity, then 70 percent of cumulative world emissions of greenhouse gases have been produced by just six countries.
They should be meeting regularly with one another.
(2009: 220–221).
This view is supported by leading Oxford climate change policy commentators, Steven Rayner and Gwyn Pryns: Relying on an international agreement that requires the consent of all national governments inevitably results in the very lowest of common denominators.
Since fewer than twenty countries account for 80% of the world’s emissions and therefore have the potential to make any serious contribution to their mitigation, it would be better for diplomacy to focus upon them.
In these early stages, the other 150 countries only get in the way.
(2007: 27) US foreign policy commentator Moisés Naím has coined the expression ‘minilateralism’ to explain this approach of seeking a ‘magic number’ of key states with influence upon an issue to craft smaller more responsive international institutions (2009: 135–136).
Naím argues that for climate change the ‘magic number’ of states to meet to thrash out a global deal is about twenty (2009: 135–136).
The minilateral model for international climate governance proposed by Victor, Wright, Kellow, Rayner and Pryns, Naím, Giddens and Hunt essentially excludes the 175 or so states with the least greenhouse gas emissions and all NGO involvement.
This discourse on international climate change policy might therefore be described as exclusive minilateralism.
The exclusive minilateralism discourse has been significantly criticised by Eckersley (2010) on three grounds.
First, many of the key disagreements in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiating process are due to a stand off between countries that are amongst the top emitters.16 An exclusive minilateral approach to climate governance may therefore still carry the same key negotiating obstacles of the larger forums.
Second, those states most exposed to the risk of climate impacts, such as the low lying island states, would most likely be excluded from participation and advocacy in the proposed minilateral forums.
This breaches ethical principles of due process and will likely result in climate agreements that are self-serving to the large emitting states and sacrifice the interests of smaller, more vulnerable states (Eckersley 2010).
Third, due to exclusion of those most affected a climate agreement struck in an exclusive minilateral forum would 16 For one influential eye-witness account of the stand off between China and the USA over emission reduction obligations see Lynas (2009).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
13 likely lack legitimacy within international society (Eckersley 2010).
The following section provides a brief outline and history of the United Nations climate regime and three leading small group, non-UN forums for international climate change governance and that were formed over the past five years.
The United Nations climate regime and its others UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol The UNFCCC was formed in 1992 as a global agreement to provide broad principles to guide the human response to climate change.
The UNFCCC was formed in response to the scientific advice provided by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).17 The UNFCCC established an agreed global goal of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at a level that will prevent dangerous climate change (art 2), a general obligation on all countries to collect data on and report their greenhouse gas emissions (art 4(1)(a)) and the important burden-sharing principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) to guide the future level of obligations from developed and developing countries (art 3(1)).
Initially the developed states, listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC, set an aspirational, non-binding target to reduce their national greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (art 4(2)(a)).
However, it was soon recognised that stronger action was required from the Annex 1 developed states than merely aspirational emission reduction targets.
In 1995 the Berlin Mandate (UNFCCC 1995: 4-6) of the UNFCCC, initiated a two-year period of global negotiations with a view to setting binding emission reduction targets for the UNFCCC Annex 1 countries.
Negotiations for these binding emission reductions targets were completed at the UNFCCC Third Conference of the Parties (COP3) meeting in Kyoto, Japan in 1997.
The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change contains obligation for developed countries (listed in Annex B) to lead on reducing greenhouse gas emissions by taking binding targets to reduce or limit their greenhouse gas emissions, against a 1990 baseline, by the target period of 2008–2012.
The developing countries were exempted from this initial period of emission reduction targets due to the burden sharing principle of common but differentiated responsibilities agreed to in the UNFCCC.
The CBDR principle required that developed countries 17 See Houghton, Jenkins & Ephraums (1990).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
14 initially lead the way in emission reduction activities.
The US Clinton Administration argued strongly at the Kyoto UNFCCC COP 3 meeting for including market-based flexibility mechanisms in the treaty, namely, emissions trading, joint implementation and a clean development mechanism, to assist the developed countries in meeting their emission targets at a least financial cost (Depledge 1995: 16–19).
However, in early in 1997, the US Senate indicated that it would oppose US ratification of any climate change treaty that placed binding emission reductions on developed countries only, or which would harm the US economy.
This presented a potentially fatal obstacle to US participation in the Kyoto Protocol.
Despite the position of the US Senate, the Clinton Administration signed Kyoto in 1998 and continued attending meetings to negotiate the finer details of its implementation, including rules for the flexibility mechanisms.
Doubts over US participation in the Kyoto Protocol further escalated towards the end of the Clinton Administration.
In late 2000, at the UNFCCC COP 6 meeting at The Hague, the Clinton Administration abandoned negotiations on rules for implementing the flexibility mechanisms of Kyoto.
In early 2002, the incoming G.W.
Bush Administration formally announced the USA would not ratify Kyoto and would withdraw from all further discussions under the Protocol.
Australia made a similar announcement shortly thereafter.
The USA and Australia, two Annex 1 countries that had agreed to emission limitation targets at Kyoto, thus indicated they would not ratify the treaty and were openly opposed to developing nations being granted a period of grace without binding emission reduction obligations.
Despite the US and Australian stand against Kyoto, international negotiations on the rules to implement the treaty continued during 2001 with agreement on fine details to implement Kyoto finally reached at the UNFCCC COP 7 meeting in Marrakech in late 2001 (UNFCCC 2002).
The Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto Protocol in November 2004 (UNFCCC 2009a), thereby bringing the treaty into force.
The developed countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol were then bound to meet their emission targets for the first commitment period of 2008–2012.
The UNFCCC COP 13 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007, agreed on a twoyear period of negotiations to agree on the shape of the international climate change regime after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires in late 2012 (UNFCCC 2007).
This negotiation was carried out under ‘two tracks,’ track one McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
15 involving the Kyoto Protocol states that looked to strengthen the Annex B emission reduction commitments of developed countries (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol), the second (Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention) that included all states party to the UNFCCC, including the USA.
The Copenhagen COP15 meeting in late 2009 was supposed to be a point of agreement on a new global architecture for the post–2012 period.
However, after a near collapse of negotiations (Meilstrup 2010: 131), the COP15 meeting only produced the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009b), an agreement of two pages in length negotiated by a sub-group of approximately six countries, agreed to by approximately twenty countries at the meeting and ultimately only ‘noted’ by the wider COP meeting, rather than formally endorsed as a COP decision.
However, all major elements of the Copenhagen Accord have now been formally adopted by the UNFCCC COP process through the agreement reached at the COP16 meeting in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010 (Oberthür 2010: 6).
The Asia Pacific Partnership 2005 The launch of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) in mid–2005 came us a surprise to the international community and media.18 The APP states had provided no prior indication that they were negotiating an international climate change agreement.
The partnership was officially announced at a press conference at the 2005 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial meeting in Vientiane, Laos (Downer 2005).
Government Ministers from the six original APP countries (China, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea and the USA) were at the launch (Downer 2005).
The Ministers explained the partnership was an ‘innovative and a fresh new development for the environment, for energy, security and for economic development in the region’ (Downer 2005).
An APP ‘Vision Statement’ was released at the launch however it contained little information on how the partnership would operate.19 The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Downer, was the first to indicate the official APP position that the partnership was intended to complement the Kyoto Protocol rather than provide an alternative (Downer 2005).
18 For example, see Brown and Wilson (2005).
19 See, Asia Pacific Partnership (2009a, 2009b).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
16 The first Ministerial meeting of the APP was held in Sydney, Australia, in January 2006.
A ‘Charter’ document was released at the Sydney meeting that describes the organisational structure of the partnership.20 The APP Charter establishes a governing body known as the ‘Policy and Implementation Committee’ (PIC) comprised of representatives from the seven partner governments (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009b).
The Charter also establishes eight sectoral (that is, industry based) Task Forces comprised of representatives from the partner governments, public research bodies and the private sector.
It is the role of the APP Task Forces to formulate project plans for approval and funding allocation by the PIC (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009b).
At the 2006 Sydney Ministerial meeting the PIC approved over 100 projects for the eight Task Forces (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009b).
By 2009, the total number of Task Force projects approved by the PIC was over 170 (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2010).
The APP Task Forces meet several times each year although the exact number and timing of these meetings is not known.
As at 2008, the APP had received only a total of US$200 million in public funding pledged by the seven partner governments (US State Department 2008).
The APP expected the private sector to provide a significant amount of the funding for the implementation of APP Task Force projects (US State Department 2008).
A number of countries expressed interest in joining the APP.
In October 2006, New Zealand released cabinet minutes indicating a desire to participate in the APP, initially by seeking involvement in APP Task Force activities (New Zealand Government 2006).
The Russian Federation and Mexico also expressed interest in joining the APP (van Asselt 2007: 17–28).
In late-2007, Canada was admitted as the seventh partnership country.
To date, Canada is the only country that has been granted membership to expand the APP.
The APP thus comprises a select grouping of seven countries.
PIC meetings of the APP have only involved elite state actors.
ENGO’s have been excluded from APP meetings although business and research organisations are key participants in the APP sectoral task forces (Black 2006; McGee & Taplin 2008: 209).
APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration 2007 The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings were initiated by Australia in the late–1980s as an informal forum for dialogue amongst countries of the Asia Pacific 20 See Asia-Pacific Partnership (2009b).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
17 region on trade liberalization issues.
APEC has twenty-one member economies, including all APP nations except India.
An APEC member state acts as coordinator and host an annual round of meetings for national leaders and senior business and government officials.
APEC does not have a founding charter or formal constitution but instead relies upon an agreed set of procedures for hosting of its meetings.
In September 2007, Australia hosted the annual APEC Ministerial Meeting and Leaders Meeting in Sydney.
At the meeting, Australia attempted to negotiate an APEC position on a longterm, aspirational (that is, non-binding) global emissions reduction goal (Wilkinson 2007).
The meeting produced the ‘Sydney APEC Leaders Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development’ (Sydney APEC Declaration).
Given China’s reluctance to discuss global emissions goals, the Sydney APEC Declaration contains only a commitment by APEC countries to ‘work to achieve a common understanding on a long-term aspirational global emission reduction goal to pave the way for an effective post–2012 international arrangement’ (APEC 2007).
The Sydney APEC Declaration adopts an approach similar to the APP of shifting the focus of international cooperation on climate change toward voluntary commitments for research, information sharing and development of cleaner technologies.
The Sydney Declaration also parallels the APP by focussing climate change policy on non-binding targets for reduction in carbon intensity.
The Declaration contains an aspirational target for a 25 percent reduction in energy intensity in the APEC economies by 2030, using 2005 as a base year (APEC 2007).
This energy intensity target is ‘APEC-wide’ so does not apply individually to any one country.
The APEC Sydney Declaration again represented a shift towards international climate change policy being determined by a sub-group of states, with ENGOs excluded from the APEC forums (Feinberg 2008).
US Major Economies Process 2007–2008 In early 2007, President G. W. Bush announced a new US initiative climate change initiative that was initially called the ‘Major Emitters and Energy Consumers’ process (MEP) (White House 2007a).
The US MEP proposed a series of US-sponsored meetings of fifteen of the world’s ‘top greenhouse economies and polluters’ to ‘develop a long-term global goal to reduce greenhouse gasses’ with each country working to ‘achieve this emissions goal by establishing ambitious mid-term national targets and programs, based on national circumstances’ (White House 2007a).
The initiative envisioned that national targets and programs would be determined by each state McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
18 individually (White House 2007a).
The initiative also proposed that major emitting nations ‘develop parallel national commitments to promote key clean energy technologies,’ with the US facilitating international development banks to provide lowcost financing options for clean energy technology transfer (White House 2007a).
The MEP was specifically intended to ‘build on and advance US relations with the AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and other technology and bilateral partnerships’ (White House 2007a).
The MEP process would adopt the APP approach of drawing together representatives from various sectors such as power generation and energy production to devise a ‘common work program on best practices’ (White House 2007b).
Despite launching the MEP, the Bush Administration claimed to be committed to the UNFCCC process and that the MEP meetings would ‘complement’ ongoing UN activity.
The final MEP meeting was held at the conclusion of the G8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, in July 2008.
This meeting produced the first publicly released document of the MEP, the ‘Declaration of Leaders Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change’ (MEP Leaders Declaration) (White House 2008).
The MEP Leaders Declaration contains a ‘shared vision’ for a long-term cooperative global goal for emission reduction, but does not contain any attempt to quantify such reduction (White House 2008).
The MEP Leaders Declaration notes that developed states will implement economy wide mid-term goals and actions to achieve absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (White House 2008).
However, this statement on developed state mid-term goals is heavily qualified in that ‘where applicable’ developed states may simply focus on ‘stopping the growth’ of emissions (White House 2008).
This wording accommodated the Bush Administration’s approach of the USA concentrating on ‘stopping the growth’ of national emissions at least until 2025, rather than engaging in any absolute cut in emission levels.
The MEP Leaders Declaration also strongly emphasised the APP approach of sectoral-based technology cooperation and information exchange (White House 2008).
The MEP Leaders Declaration quite clearly draws inspiration from the APP task force approach to technology development.
In March 2009, the US Major Economies Process was re-badged by the Obama Administration as the ‘Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate’ (US State Department 2010).
The seventeen countries of this new Obama-backed forum met on five occasions in the lead up to the Copenhagen COP 15 meeting with a view to reaching agreement on key climate related McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
19 issues (US State Department 2009).
Both the Bush Major Economies Process and Obama Major Economies Forum meetings were state-to-state forums that excluded access for ENGOs, RINGOs and BINGOs (Greenpeace 2008).21 Exclusive minilateralism: A strengthening discourse in international climate change governance?
The exclusive minilateralism discourse has been steadily building strength in academic and policy commentating circles particularly amongst authors opposed to the binding targets and timetables approach of the Kyoto Protocol (Kellow 2010).
However, the strength of the exclusive minilateralism discourse is even more evident in the intersubjective understanding underlying the APP, APEC Sydney Declaration and US Major Economies Process.
These non-UN climate change forums have sought to facilitate dialogue outside the UNFCCC process with a view to reaching important understandings on the level of ambition for medium and long-term emission reduction at a regional and/or global level.
For example, the APP encourages each participating state to set its own non-binding greenhouse target to reduce greenhouse gas intensity, the level of ambition to be based on its own national circumstances (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009b).
The APEC Sydney Declaration contains a non-binding, APEC-wide, energy intensity reduction target of very modest substance (APEC 2007).
The Obama US Major Economies Forum meetings failed to agree on a figure for a medium term collective emission reduction target.
However, the Bush US MEP endorsed a mediumterm approach of all countries (including developed countries) setting and implementing their own economy wide mid-term goals and actions on emission reduction that may be based on ‘stopping the growth’ of their emissions (reduction of greenhouse gas intensity only) rather than reducing emissions in absolute terms (below a 1990 or similar baseline) (White House 2008).
Important understandings were built in these select nonUN forums as to the level ambition of future medium and long-term emission reduction targets (McGee and Taplin 2009).
Discussions have occurred and understandings have been built in these select, non-UN minilateral forums that have excluded over 170 countries, many of which will be impacted hardest by the early climate change impacts.
As discussed above, environmental NGOs in particular have also been largely excluded from attending and lobbying at these non-UN, minilateral forums.
21 For a more detailed comparison of the APP, APEC Sydney Declaration and the US Major Economies Process, see McGee and Taplin (2009).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
20 Further, the understandings built in these minilateral forums appear to have influenced the process of the Copenhagen COP 15 meeting.
The COP15 meeting was dogged by criticism from smaller developing countries that key negotiating texts were developed in an opaque manner by a small group of developed countries22 rather than in the open, transparent and participatory process of earlier UNFCCC meetings.
Meilstrup (2010) provides a detailed history of the diplomatic negotiations that lead to the outcome at COP 15.
He explains that in 2009 Denmark sought to take advantage of its’ Presidency of the COP 15 meeting to reconceptualise that role from one of simply facilitating dialogue between meeting participants to one of agenda setting and leadership (2010:116–117).
Denmark broke from usual UNFCCC process by entering into discussions outside the UNFCCC preparatory meetings for COP 15 to broker a ‘Danish Proposal’ for the COP 15 meeting (Meilstrup 2010: 124).
During 2009, Denmark organised bilateral meetings with the EU, USA, Australia, Canada, the Maldives, Africa, Mexico, Brazil, China and India (Meilstrup 2010: 125) to advocate for the Danish proposal.
Denmark also arranged a multilateral meeting between 20-30 countries in early December 2009 to discuss the Danish Proposal (Meilstrup 2010: 127).
This again occurred outside the formal UNFCCC preparatory meetings for COP15 that involved all state parties to the Convention.
However, the ‘Danish Proposal’ was leaked to the United Kingdom newspaper The Guardian on the second day of the COP 15 meeting (Vidal 2009) thereby alienating the vast bulk of states that were unaware of its existence (Phelan 2010: 15, Rajamani 2010: 826).
The G-77 plus China then denounced the Danish text as “undemocratic, unfair and draft with a lack of transparency” (Meilstrup 2010: 128).
As the negotiations at COP 15 moved towards their final days there was still no agreement on the extensive text being negotiated in the formal UNFCCC meeting process (Meilstrup 2010:128).
A group of 26 state leaders worked over the Thursday night/Friday morning before the closure of the COP to generate a text however failed to reach agreement (Meilstrup 2010: 128; Dimitrov 2010).
Finally, on the Friday before closure of the COP the leaders of five states—China, India, South Africa and Brazil and the USA—met in private and agreed on the modest three page document that became the Copenhagen Accord (Meilstrup 2010: 128; Grubb 2010).
The text of this document was then hastily presented to the group of twenty six other countries that had been seeking to draft an 22 See, for example, Vidal (2009).
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
21 agreement (Meilstrup 2010: 128).
In the dying hours of COP 15 the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009b) was presented to the meeting for adoption.
In a heated and at times acrimonious debate the Copenhagen Accord was rejected by Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Sudan and Tuvalu (Rajamani 2010: 826).
Due to lack of consensus on the text of the Copenhagen Accord the COP only ‘noted’ rather than ‘adopted’ the document as a decision (Rajamani 2010: 826).
Importantly, this history shows the influence of minilateralism on the events at Copenhagen.
The failed Danish Proposal arose from a minilateral forum of confidential discussions between only 20-30 states.
The Copenhagen Accord was also essentially produced in the minilateral setting of a confidential meeting between the USA and four large developing countries.
The Copenhagen Accord was then presented to a slightly larger group of 26 countries that had been earlier negotiating a text before finally being unsuccessfully presented to the full COP meeting (a further 160 states) for approval.
The Copenhagen COP 15 meeting therefore shows strong evidence of a willingness of key states to marginalise the open development of text through the UNFCCC meetings and instead have recourse to minilateral climate discussion forums as pioneered in the APP, APEC Sydney Declaration and US Major Economies Process.
As discussed above, ENGO delegations at COP15 were also highly critical of the unusual opaqueness of negotiations and generation of negotiating texts at the meeting (Fisher 2010; McGregor 2011; Phelan 2010; Rajamani 2010: 3).
The difficulty of NGO involvement at COP15 has been linked to the large number of NGO delegates, poor planning at the conference venue by the host Danish Government and a broadening of the agenda of climate justice groups present at the meeting (Fisher 2010).
However, McGregor (2011: 4) argues that COP 15 demonstrated a more general disenfranchisement of smaller countries and ENGOs within the COP process.
The logistical problems at COP 15 no doubt played some part in NGO marginalisation at Copenhagen.
However, it is important that this should not mask a more general disenfranchisement of ENGOs in international climate governance that had been building in the years leading to COP15 through the exclusive minilateralist institutions of the APP and US Major Economies Process.
In summary, from 2005 onwards a number of significant non-UN forums for climate change dialogue show clear affinity with the exclusive minilateralism discourse.
The McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
22 approach of the Denmark as COP President in the lead up to the COP 15 meeting and actions of key states at that meeting also show a propensity of exclusive small group negotiations and/or marginalisation of the of role ENGOs.
When combined with significant academic advocacy for small group negotiations in international climate governance these developments indicate a growing strength of the exclusive minilateralist discourse.
What challenges does the Exclusive Minilateralism Discourse provide for the furtherance of democracy in international climate change governance?
The exclusive minilateralism discourse is in direct contestation with cosmopolitan democratic version of liberal multilateralism.
First, the very significant reduction in franchise advocated by the exclusive minilateral discourse (from all countries concerned with climate change to only the key emitters and/or economically power states) is obviously at odds with the expansion of democratic representation23 in international institutions that lies at the heart of cosmopolitan democratic project (Held 2006: 170– 172).
The exclusive minilateralism discourse is therefore vulnerable to attack on the basis of its lack of legitimacy and failure to adhere to cosmopolitan democratic ideal of ‘all inclusiveness’ (Held 2006: 171).
Second, the exclusive minilateralism discourse openly excludes civil society, particularly ENGOs, from participation in meetings of the ‘inner sanctum’ of decision-making on international climate change policy.
This conflicts with cosmopolitan democratic theory that promotes the voice of non-state actors as means of representing the aggregated interests of individuals and as an agent to monitor the accountability of states (Held 2006: 171).
Third, the exclusive minilateralism discourse is also difficult to reconcile with cosmopolitan democratic ideal of enhancing the transparency and accountability of intergovernmental organisations (Held 2006: 172).
In sum, the cosmopolitan democrat should be significantly concerned at the strengthening of the exclusive minilateralism discourse.
The exclusive minilateralism discourse also has potential negative effects upon the level of discursive democracy in international climate governance.
Dryzek indicates that in assessing a deliberative system it is important to consider the connections between the 23 Held (2006: 171) explains this expansion of democratic representation in international decision making forums on the basis of a principle of ‘all-inclusiveness,’ that is ‘those whose life expectancy and life chances are significantly affected by social forces and processes ought to have a stake in the determination of the conditions and regulation of these forces and processes, either directly or indirectly through political representatives.’ McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
23 ‘public spaces’ of social movements, media outlets, internet, public hearings and other popular sites of communication and the ‘empowered spaces’ of formal collective decision making bodies such as the UNFCCC COP meetings (Dryzek 2010: 10).
He suggests that effective deliberative systems have mechanisms by which public spaces can adequately transmit information and influence to the empowered space and thereby hold the decision makers in the empowered space to account (Dryzek 2010: 10).
The Copenhagen COP 15 meeting demonstrated a flowering of the public spaces of international climate governance with intense media coverage of the meeting and a record number of NGO representatives registered to attend (Fisher 2010: 13).
There were several large protest marches by ENGOs and climate justice movements during the two weeks of COP 15 demanding a fair, binding and ambitious treaty from the state representatives in the empowered space of the meeting halls and back rooms of the Bella Centre (McGregor 2011: 2; Fisher 2010: 14–15).
However, despite the vibrancy of the public space surrounding the COP15 meeting, within the empowered space of the Bella Centre, there was a strong feeling from ENGOs of marginalisation and reduced ability to participate and effectively lobby state representatives (McGregor 2011: 3–4, Fisher 2010: 1).
The minilateral approach of reducing negotiations to small groups of key states appears to have a significant negative impact upon the flows of influence and accountability between the public space and the empowered space of the formal negotiations.
Discursive democracy is thus weakened if a flourishing public space is unable to transmit its discursive influence into the empowered space of international climate governance and hold actors in that space accountable for their decisions.
Further, a continued strengthening of the exclusive minilateralism discourse and prevalence of exclusive minilateral institutions in international climate change governance carries significant risk that economically powerful states will seek a subtle redefinition of the ‘problem’ of human induced climate change and limit the range of acceptable policy options to those serving their immediate economic interests.
The nonUN minilateral climate forums discussed above have either explicitly or implicitly supported a rise in greenhouse emissions to 2050 that on the science of the IPCC will deliver in excess of a three degree average surface temperature increase above preindustrial levels (McGee & Taplin 2006: 183; McGee & Taplin 2009: 222–227).
The country pledges made to the Copenhagen Accord and modelling done in support of the McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
24 APP both tacitly accept a rise in surface temperature of this magnitude.24 The key nations involved in these agreements have thus already affected a subtle shift in intersubjective understanding on what level of ambition might realistically be expected in global emission reduction and hence what global ambition should be on the level of acceptable climate change.
If the level of ambition of greenhouse gas mitigation arising from minilateral forums remains low there is a significant risk that the subsequent world of three degree plus warming will not be one that is friendly to either cosmopolitan or discursive conceptions of democracy in international climate governance.25 Arguments against that the consensus decision making rule of the UNFCCC COP process will likely continue to gather strength.
As the necessity to act more ambitiously to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions dawns it may well become more difficult to obtain the consent of every state at COP meetings.
It is therefore important that the COP reforms its decision making rule to allow for some form of majority decision making that will avoid grid lock in decision making on key issues.
Such a proposal is currently being discussed within the UNFCCC26 and offers a useful starting point for reforming the cosmopolitan design of the COP process.
However, there is also the possibility of attempting to formally incorporate some elements of the minilateralism discourse within the UNFCCC COP process.
Eckersley (2010: 2011) has recently argued that the difficulties of the consensus decision making rule in the UNFCCC might be eased by the formation of a minilateral ‘Climate Council’ within the COP comprising 15 states that represent 70 percent of world population.
The Climate Council would be comprised of the states that are most responsible for climate change, most vulnerable to climate change and with the greatest capacity to respond by providing resources for mitigation and/or adaptation (Eckersley 2010: 2011).
The Climate Council would comprise a mixture of developed and developing state voices27.
The Climate Council would have a role of providing a forum for discussion of difficult to resolve issues on mitigation and adaptation and make persuasive recommendations back to the full COP meeting 24 See, for example Climate Action Tracker (2010) and Ford et al.
(2006).
25 For instance, Flannery (2005; 291–295) warns of the danger that a failure of current generations to stem greenhouse gas emissions through democratic may lead to more authoritarian responses when more severe climate change impacts start to appear.
26 In May 2011 Mexico and Papua New Guinea formally proposed that substantive decisions of the COP might be based, in the absence of consensus, on a three quarter majority vote (UNFCCC 2011).
27 Eckersley (2010) suggests that one configuration for membership on the Climate Council would be: the USA UE, Japan, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France , Poland, China, India, Brazil, South Africa and three representatives from the Association of Small Island States, the African Group and the least developed countries.
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
25 (Eckersley 2010: 2011).
In order to improve the discursive democratic design of the Climate Council it might also be possible to include representatives from peak NGOs such as Climate Action Network, World Business Council on Sustainable Development and the chairman of the IPCC.
The inclusion of these voices from civil society might improve the transmission of influence and accountability between the public spaces of NGO activity and the empowered space of the UNFCCC COP meeting.
Conclusion The exclusive minilateralism discourse in international climate change governance has strengthened significantly over the past five years through both academic and policy commentary and non-UN climate forums arising chiefly from the Asia-Pacific region.
This experimentation with minilateral forums for climate change negotiations appears also to have also been present in the lead up to and during the Copenhagen COP15 meeting.
There is a significant prospect that the exclusive minilateralism discourse will continue to strengthen and further shape global climate change governance.
The discourse represents a challenge to the pattern of inclusive multilateral climate governance that has been established in the UN climate regime over the past two decades.
A possible response to the exclusive minilateralism discourse is to consider reforming the consensus decision making rule of the UNFCCC to make it easier for the COP to obtain binding agreement on difficult issues relating to mitigation and adaptation.
Drawing on Eckersley (2010: 2011), it might also be possible to formally include the exclusive minilateralism discourse within the UNFCCC COP process by the formation of a peak advisory body comprising representatives from the most responsible, vulnerable and capable states and peak environmental, business and scientific NGOs.
This body might have a strong advisory role on issues that become bogged down in the wider COP process.
Both strategies need to be considered carefully in deciding how the institution of the UNFCCC should respond to the exclusive minilateralism discourse.
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
26 Reference List Abbott, K. 2004, ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,’ American Journal of International Law, vol.
93, no.
2, 361–378.
APEC 2007, Sydney APEC Leaders' Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development.
Online, available: http://www.apec.org/en/Meeting-Papers/LeadersDeclarations/2007/2007_aelm/aelm_climatechange.aspx [accessed 3 December 2010].
Archibugi, D. & Held, D. (eds), 1995, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order.
Polity Press, Oxford, and Cambridge, MA.
Armstrong, D., Farrell, T. & Lambert, H. 2007, International Law and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009a, Vision Statement.
Online, available: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/resources/vision.pdf [accessed 3 December 2010].
Asia-Pacific Partnership, 2009b, Charter.
Online, available: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/resources/charter.pdf [accessed 3 December 2010].
Asia-Pacific Partnership, 2010, Project Roster.
Online, available: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/project_roster.aspx [accessed 3 December 2010].
Black, R. 2006, ‘Business Deal or Bright Idea,’ BBC News, 12 January.
Online, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4602296.stm [accessed 3 December 2010].
Brown, P. & Wilson, J.
2005, ‘US Plan to Bypass Kyoto Protocol,’ The Guardian, 28 July.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/28/environment.usa [accessed 2 December 2010].
Charter of the United Nations 1945, United Nations.
Online, available: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ [accessed 3 December 2010].
Chayes, A.
1974, The Cuban Missile Crisis.
Oxford University Press, London.
Climate Action Tracker 2010, No Major Changes in Ambition: High Chance to Exceed 3˚C.
Online, available: http://www.climateactiontracker.org/ [accessed 3 December 2010].
Depledge, J.
1995, ‘Against the Grain: The United States and the Global Climate Change Regime,’ Global Change Peace and Security, vol.
17, no.
1, 16–19.
Dimitrov, R. 2010.
‘Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance,’ Global Environmental Politics, vol.
10, 18–24.
Downer, A.
2005, Press Conference: ITECC, Vientiane, Laos, 28 July Online, available: http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/25167/200606020000/www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2005/050728_vientiane.html [accessed 3 December 2010].
Dryzek, J.
2000, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
______ 2005, The Politics of the Earth.
Second Edition.
Oxford University Press, New York.
______ 2006, Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World.
Polity Press, Cambridge.
______ 2007, ‘Paradigms and Discourses,’ in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, (eds) D. Bodansky, J. Brunee, J.
& E. Hey.
Oxford University Press, New York, 44–62.
______ 2010, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford University Press, United States.
Eckersley, R. 2010.
‘Railing at the Mexican Standoff,’ The Age, 16 December.
Online, available: http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/railing-at-a-mexican-standoff-20101215-18y49.html [Accessed 10 July 2011].
Eckersley, R. 2011 (forthcoming), ‘Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations; Multilateralism or Minilateralism?’ Global Environmental Politics.
Farhana, Y.
& Depledge, J.
2004, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Feinberg, R. 2008, ‘Seeking Balance: Two Decades of the APEC Forum,’ APEC Global Asia Feature Essay.
Online, available: http://www.apec.org.au/docs/08_ASCconf/012_Feinberg_pr.pdf [Accessed 10 July 2011].
Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. 2001, ‘The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,’ Annual Review of Political Science, vol.
4, 391–416.
Fisher, D. 2010, ‘COP-15 in Copenhagen: How the Merging of Movements Left Civil Society Out in the Cold,’ Global Environmental Politics, vol.
10, 11–16.
Ford, M. et al.
2006, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics Conference Paper 06.3: Perspectives on International Climate Policy.
Online, available: McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
27 http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/conference/conference_06/CP06_03.pdf [accessed 3 December 2010].
Giddens, A.
1984, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Polity Press, Cambridge.
______ 2009, The Politics of Climate Change.
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Greenpeace, 2008, ‘Bush Major Emitters Meetings: The Wrong way on Climate Change,’ Greenpeace Briefing, January.
Online, available: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/bush-mem.pdf [accessed 10 July 2011].
Grubb, M. 2010, ‘Copenhagen: Back to the Future?,’ Climate Policy, no.
10, 127–130.
Held, D. 1995, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Polity Press, Cambridge.
______ 2002, ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples,’ Legal Theory, vol.
8, 1–44.
______ 2006, ‘Reframing Global Governance; Apocalypse Soon or Reform,’ New Political Economy, vol.
11, 157–176.
______ 2009, ‘Restructuring Global Governance: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and Global Order, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.
37, 535–547.
Houghton, J., Jenkins, G. & Ephraums J.
(eds.)
1990, IPCC First Assessment Report 1990, Scientific Assessment of Climate Change: Report of Working Group 1.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hunt, G. 2009, ‘After Copenhagen: Time for the Major Economies Forum,’ The Australian, 31 December.
Online, available: http://www.greghunt.com.au/Pages/Article.aspx?ID=1642 [accessed 2 December 2010].
Kellow, A.
2006, ‘A New Process for Negotiating Multilateral Environmental Agreements?
The AsiaPacific Partnership Beyond Kyoto,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.
60, no.
2, 287–303.
Kellow, A.
2010, ‘Is the Asia-Pacific Partnership a Viable Alternative to the Kyoto Protocol?,’ Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews; Climate Change, vol.
1, 10–15.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 11 December 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S 148, UN Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1.
Online, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [accessed 2 December 2010].
Levett, C., Dodson, L. & Banham, C. 29 July 2005, ‘Pact Halves Emissions by Next Century,’ Sydney Morning Herald.
Online, available: http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/pact-halvesemissions-by-the-next-century/2005/07/28/1122143966688.html [accessed 3 December 2010].
Lynas, M. 2009, ‘How Do I know that China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal?
I was in the Room,’ The Guardian, 22 December.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas [accessed 10 July 2011).
McGee, J & Taplin, R. 2006,‘The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: A Compliment or Competitor to the Kyoto Protocol,’ Global Change Peace and Security, vol.
18, 173–192.
_____ 2008, ‘The Asia-Pacific Partnership and United States International Climate Change Policy,’ Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, vol.
19, 179–218.
_____ 2009, ‘The Role of the Asia-Pacific Partnership in Discursive Contestation of the International Climate Regime,’ International Environmental Agreements; Politics, Law, Economics, vol.
9, 213–238.
McGregor, I.
2011, ‘Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen,’ Global Environmental Politics, vol.
11, 1–7.
Meilstrup, P. 2010, ‘The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15, the UN Climate Change Conference,’ in the Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, Danish Institute of International Studies, Copenhagen, 113–135.
Monbiot, G. 2003, The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order.
Harper Collins, London.
Naím, M. 2009, ‘Minilateralism; The Magic Number to Get Real International Action,’ Foreign Policy, July/August, no.
173, 136–135.
Neufeld, M. 1993, ‘Interpretation and the Science of International Relations,’ Review of International Studies, vol.
19, no.
1, 39–61.
New Zealand Government 2006, Cabinet Business Committee Min 06 17/19: Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean development and Climate.
Online, available: http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/resources/cabinet-papers/cbc-min-06-17-19.html [accessed 3 December 2010].
McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
28 Pettenger, M. 2007, The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses.
Ashgate, Burlington, VT. Oberthür, S. 2010, ‘Global Climate Governance after Cancun: Options for EU Leadership,’ The International Spectator, vol.
49, 5–13.
Phelan, L. 2010, ‘What to Make of COP 15?
A Ringside Report,’ Air Quality and Climate Change, vol.
44, 14–15.
Prins, G. & Rayner, S. 2007, ‘The Wrong Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate Policy,’ Joint Discussion Paper.
Online, available: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/mackinderProgramme/pdf/mackinder_Wrong%20Trousers.pdf [accessed 2 December 2010].
Rajamani, L. 2010, ‘The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord,’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.
59, 824–843.
Timmons-Roberts, J.
& Parks, B.
2006, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics and Climate Policy.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
UNFCCC, 1995, The Berlin Mandate Decision 1/CP.1, UN doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1.
Online, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf [accessed 2 December 2010].
______ 1996, Organizational Matters: Adoption of Rules of Procedure.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/02.pdf [accessed 2 December 2010].
_____ 2002, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session: Marrakesh 29 October to 10 November 2001, UN Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2.
_____ 2007, Bali Action Plan.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf [accessed 2 December 2010].
______ 2009a, Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification_2009 0826corr.pdf [accessed 2 December 2010].
______ 2009b, Copenhagen Accord.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf [accessed 2 December 2010].
______ 2011, Letter dated 26 May 2011 from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/nv_parties_20110603.p df [accessed 19 July 2011].
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 107.
US State Department, 2008, US Involvement in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.
Online, available: http://www.app.gov/library/111306.htm [accessed 3 December 2010].
US State Department, 2009, Chair's Summary: Fifth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, 20 October.
Online, available: http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/other/2009/130717.htm [accessed 3 December 2010].
______ 2010, Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.
Online, available: http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/mem/ [accessed 3 December 2010].
van Asselt, H. 2007, ‘From UN-ity to Diversity?
The UNFCCC, the Asia-Pacific Partnership, and the Future of International Law on Climate Change,’ Carbon Climate Law Review, vol.
1, 17–28.
Victor, D. 2006, ‘Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Institutions,’ Global Environmental Politics, vol.
6, no.
3, 90–103.
Vidal, J.
8 December 2009, ‘Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after “Danish text” leak,’ The Guardian.
Online, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagenclimate-summit-disarray-danish-text [accessed 3 December 2010].
Vihma, A.2011, ‘A Climate of Consensus: The UNFCCC Faces Challenges of legitimacy and Effectiveness,’ Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 75.
Online, available: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/173/a_climate_of_consensus/ [accessed 10 July 2011] Wendt, A.
1999, A Social Theory of International Politics.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
White House, The 2007a, Fact Sheet: A New International Climate Change Framework, 31 May.
Online, available: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/2007053113.html [accessed 3 December 2010].
______ 2007b, Press Briefing by Tony Snow and Jim Connaughton, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, 31 May.
Online, available: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070531-17.html [accessed 3 December 2010].
______ 2008, Declaration of Leaders Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change, 9 July.
Online, available: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080709-5.html McGee Exclusive Minilateralism PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
29 [accessed 3 December 2010].
Wilkinson, M. 2007, ‘APEC Soft on Emissions,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 August, 6.
Online, available: http://newsstore.smh.com.au/apps/viewDocument.ac?multiview=true&sy=smh&page=1&kw=A PEC+Soft+on+Emissions&pb=smh&dt=selectRange&dr=5years&so=relevance&sf=headline&r c=10&rm=200&sp=nrm&clsPage=1&hids=&sids=SMH070818FF5QP7LPQ8G [accessed 3 December 2010].
Wright, T. 2009, ‘Toward Effective Multilateralism: Why Bigger May Not Be Better,’ The Washington Quarterly, July, 163–180.
Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 1 | 12 REVIEW ARTICLE Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus.
Zeynep Cigdem Kayacan1, Ozer Akgul1 1 Department of Medical Microbiology, Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey Corresponding author: Prof. Dr. Zeynep Cigdem Kayacan.
Istanbul Aydin University, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Medical Microbiology, Istanbul, Turkey.
E-mail: zeynepkayacan@aydin.edu.tr mailto:zeynepkayacan@aydin.edu.tr Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 2 | 12 Abstract Climate change results from natural processes and human-made activities influencing the atmosphere.
Many infectious diseases are climate-sensitive, and their nature and epidemiology are changing in parallel with the change in climatic conditions and global warming.
Increased replication rates of pathogens at higher temperatures, extended transmission seasons, migration of vectors or human populations are some outcomes of the changing climate to trigger new concerns, including new epidemics with old or new pathogens.
Climate change is presenting itself today as an urgent global health threat, and it requires immediate international action with high priority.
Infectious diseases in relation to changing climatic conditions are reviewed with predominating current examples, focusing on Europe with particular emphasis on South Eastern European and Eurasian regions.
Keywords: Climate change, Communicable diseases, Disease reservoirs, Europe, Vectorborne diseases Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 3 | 12 Background The United Nations Framework “Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)”, signed in 1992, defines climate change as a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods (1).
In fact, the climate discussions had given way much earlier to gathering of the First World Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979, sponsored by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and attended by scientists from a wide range of disciplines.
The first evidence of human interference in climate was presented and plans made to establish a World Climate Programme under the joint responsibility of the WMO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) at this same meeting to “prevent man-made changes in climate” that might harm the well-being of humanity (2, 3).
In 1988, the UN decided to establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in collaboration with WMO for providing the scientific basis of climate change and its environmental, economic and social impacts as well as its future risks, and for developing possible response strategies (3).
Following, the before mentioned UNFCCC was established in 1992 as the first intergovernmental convention and 195 countries signed it but it remained as a goodwill act since it had no sanctions.
The UNFCCC declared the dangerous effects of man-made environmental pollutions on climate and the aim to decrease the levels and sustain the negative effects of the atmospheric greenhouse gases.
The Kyoto Protocol, which was constituted as an operational tool of the UNFCCC in 1997 but came into force not before 2005, recognized that the developed countries are largely responsible for the high levels of atmospheric greenhouse gas, and it obliged the parties to decrease their emissions.
Addendum 1 – Annex B of the Kyoto Protocole stated the parties separately as “industrialized countries” such as the OECD members and EU countries and as “economies in transition”, placing a heavier burden on the industrialized and developed countries according to their higher responsive capabilities and greater contributions to high emission levels (4).
Being an OECD member, Turkey was included in the UNFCCC but did not immediately sign the Convention and had not yet become a party in UNFCC when the Kyoto Protocol was accepted in 1997, having, therefore, no listed responsibility to decrease its emission levels (4, 5).
Later, Turkey became a UNFCCC party in 2004 and of the Kyoto Protocole in 2009.
As the strongest health agreement of this century, the Paris Agreement was launched at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in 2015.
The agreement came into force in 2016 after 196 countries adopted and signed it.
It was a legally binding international treaty concerning climate change, with a specific goal to limit global warming to at least 1.5°C below the pre-industrial levels (6).
Turkey signed the Paris Agreement in 2016 but did not approve it at its parliament till October 2021, which in fact was a “must”.
The coal-based energy policies of Turkey have to change now for decreasing emissions.
COP25 was held in Madrid and was most talked about all over the World, due to the on-site performance of a group of young activists led by Greta Thunberg.
Beyond all other warnings and complaints, Greta and the 15 activists aged between 8 and 17, complained about five countries to the UN-UNICEF for neglecting the struggle against climate change.
These countries were France, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey (7).
Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 4 | 12 Greenhouse gases, global warming and extreme weather events The greenhouse gases surround the globe like a blanket and inhibit energy escape from the surface and atmosphere, giving way to extreme warming.
Sources of human-induced greenhouse gas increases are mainly the use of carbon-containing fossil fuels for energy and production, as well as deforestation, population increase and mobility, planless urbanization and unsuitable agriculture.
Due to all of these, the arctic ice mass is melting by 2.7% per decade, the sea level is rising by 1.8 mm per year, and extreme weather events are getting more frequent.
The IPCC predicted a global average temperature rise of 1.5– 5.8°C for the 21st century, accompanied by increased abnormal weather events (8-10).
Unless preventive measures are taken, the global temperature will continue to rise, rain patterns will change to cause floods in some regions and droughts in others, and the health effects of climate change are expected to be particularly adverse (11).
El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is an extreme weather event defined as the hot water wave arising from the Pacific Ocean and a climate pattern resulting from the aquatic and atmospheric temperature differences.
It has a hot phase called El Niño and a counter cold phase called La Niña.
Since the Pacific Ocean is the greatest water mass in the World, every change in its temperature affects the weather and the climate.
There are 33 El Niño events since 1900, and three of them in 1982, 1997 and 2015 are called Super El Niños when temperature peaks were recorded.
During the 1997 El Niño, an area of oceanic water as large as the USA warmed up and pumped a large volume of heat into the atmosphere, changing the weather patterns all over the world.
Hurricanes, regional floods and droughts resulted in many health problems and thousands of deaths.
The 1997 El Niño was followed by La Niña in 1998-1999, having similar effects in different regions than El Niño.
The 2015-16 El Niño was followed by La Niña in 2017-2018, as expected.
The ENSO events always had influence on climate.
Global warming is strengthening their influences, as well as increasing their frequency.
All these occur as the inevitable results of the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases, influencing in return the global weather events and climate (12, 13).
Climate change and infectious diseases A pathogen, a host or a vector, and suitable transmission conditions are fundamental for infectious diseases.
Nearly 75% of the emerging infections are zoonoses hosted by domestic or wild animals and 30% are caused by vector-borne pathogens.
Zoonoses are sensitive to climate conditions and environment.
Appropriate climate and weather conditions are necessary for survival, growth, distribution and transmission of pathogens, and geographic expansion of vectors and hosts.
Most vector-borne and particularly insect-borne infections are linked directly or indirectly to the climate factors such as rainfall, moisture, wind and temperature.
Global warming changes the habitats of the vectors, pushing them to northern and higher new locations where non-immune people live and get infected more readily.
This means new epidemics with the old pathogens (1416).
Deforestation also causes animals and vectors to lose their habitats and pushes them to search for new ones, getting sometimes closer to humans and increasing the vector-borne human infections (17).
Global warming favors the spread of infectious diseases, while extreme weather events enhance disease outbreaks at nontraditional places at unexpected times and intensities.
Climate change has the potential to enhance development of epidemics and probable emergence of new pathogens and new threats.
(14-18).
Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 5 | 12 Climate-sensitive infections Climate-sensitive infections are handled in three categories in general: Vector-borne, water-borne, and air-borne.
The climatesensitive vector-borne infections include viral infections such as Dengue, Zika and Hantavirus infections; or bacterial infections such as Lyme disease, plague and tularemia; or parasitic infections such as malaria and leishmaniasis.
The climatesensitive water-borne pathogens may also be viral such as Norwalk virus; or bacterial such as salmonella, Vibrio cholerae, noncholera vibrios, legionella or campylobacter; or parasitic such as giardia and cryptosporidium.
The major climatesensitive air-borne infections are mainly viral such as influenza and respiratory syncytial virus, in addition to the meningococcic meningitis which is bacterial (17, 18).
When temperature increases and rainfall and moisture also increase, water-borne infections such as cholera, as well as leptospirosis and Weil’s Disease or leishmania infections are more frequent in the relevant regions and mosquitos get more abundant to transmit infections such as malaria or Dengue fever.
When temperature increases but rainfall and moisture decrease, meningococcal meningitis and West Nile virus infection can get more frequent.
Two million deaths due to diarrheas, one million to malaria and thousands due to meningitis are recorded each year, and there are approximately 50 millions of Dengue patients globally.
If, however temperature decreases but moisture increases, influenza infections and even epidemics are enhanced (17, 18).
La Niña had preceded the 1918, 1957, 1968 and 2009 influenza pandemics.
The primary reservoirs of Influenza-A virus are birds.
The migrating birds are affected by the weather and ecosystem changes induced by ENSO events.
Not the epidemia-causing ones but the pandemia-causing viral strains are emerging as a result of viral reassortment processes.
The ENSO events change the flight routes and stopover times of the migrating birds, thereby changing the pathogens they carry.
Under these conditions, different influenza virus subtypes make simultaneous multi-agent infections and therefore reassortments in birds.
Then, new viruses emerge, infecting animals and humans, making new pandemics from time to time (19).
Particularly in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, the population increase, agriculture types and changing routes of migrating birds induced by frequent extreme weather events have provoked the evolution of new influenza virus strains easily extending into far regions (11).
Vector-borne infections a) Tick-borne infections The Ixodes ricinus tick is the primary vector in Europe (Annex Fig.1a) for Lyme borreliosis and tick-borne viral encephalitis (TBE).
Caused by the Ixodes-transmittedbacterium Borrelia burgdorferi, Lyme borreliosis loades the EU with the largest disease burden with 65,000 cases per year and is linked to warm winters and high summer temperatures.
TBE was detected to be more prevalent in Eastern and Northern Europe with 2,057 cases in 2014 (Annex 1b), indicating a four-fold increase of reported cases in European endemic areas during the last 30 years (20, 21).
Since global warming pushes the tick-vectors to higher altitudes and northern parts, the TBE risk is expected to diminish in southern Europe while Lyme disease is being surveyed currently to predict its future spread (22).
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is caused by Nairovirus transmitted to humans by Hyalomma ticks.
Difficult to prevent and treat with a case fatality ratio of up to 40%, CCHF is endemic in most of Africa, Asia, as well as the Balkans and the Middle East (Annex Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 6 | 12 Fig.
2a, 2b) (23).
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Greece, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russia are endemic for CCHF.
Turkey was affected by CCHF outbreaks with more than 12,000 cases but with a case fatality ratio of only 5% in 2002-2019 (23-25).
b) Mosquito-borne infections The vector-borne infections were endemic to tropical and subtropical regions until recently.
Due to the long-term changes in temperature and rainfall patterns with global warming, the northern movement of the vectors will put the temperate countries into a greatest threat for emergence and reemergence of the vector-borne diseases, and mosquito-borne diseases may become more epidemic (26).
Malaria is transmitted to humans through the vector Anopheles mosquito.
The causative parasite is Plasmodium and its most deadly species is Plasmodium falciparum.
More than 200 million malaria cases and one million deaths per year worldwide were recorded in 2010 (18).
Control efforts dropped malaria mortality to 409,000 in 2019.
The Anopheles mosquito survives in environments above 16°C and global warming would support its survival.
Even though malaria’s current main location is Africa, it is projected by the European Environment Agency (EEA) that different countries including Turkey and some of South Eastern Europe will be affected due, among other factors, to the changing climate (18, 27, 28).
Dengue fever is a vector-borne viral hemorrhagic fever transmitted by Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus mosquitos.
The pathogen carried by these vectors is the Dengue virus which is an RNA virus of the Flaviviridae family.
Rainfall and moisture together with temperature increase enhance the vector survival and spread which may be very rapid.
During epidemics, the infection easily spreads into cities and urban life.
The infection was limited to tropical and subtropical areas until recently and was the cause of 50-100 millions of cases with 15,000 deaths per year in roughly 100 countries.
The vector Aedes albopictus (the Asian tiger mosquito) which is the most invasive mosquito species in the world gained access to Europe by 2010 and cases in Croatia, southern France, Germany, Italy and much of the Mediterranean coastal region got acquainted with the Dengue Fever.
Aedes aegypti exists more on the Black sea coast of Europe and in Portugal (Annex Fig.
3), and Dengue Fever mortality is increasing in the affected regions (18, 29).
In 2012-2013, Madeira province of Portugal reported the first European outbreak with more than 2,000 cases, via Aedes aegypti.
More than 390 million cases worldwide are estimated currently and it is known that many travelers from dengue-affected areas enter Europe (18, 20, 30, 31).
The first case in Turkey was an imported one, detected in a traveler in 2013 (32).
Dengue is currently the most widely spread mosquito-borne disease in WHO's Eastern Mediterranean Region and is actively surveyed for keeping the blood transfusion safety measures under control (31).
Chikungunya is a viral disease transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes to humans.
It is manifest with fever, arthralgia and rash, with a probability to end up with chronic arthritis.
There is no antiviral treatment or licensed vaccine.
Although all index cases were imported to Europe by travelers from endemic regions, the autochthonous transmission of the infection via local Aedes albopictus produced two large outbreaks of chikungunya with a total of 550 confirmed and probable cases in Italy in 2007 and 2017.
More than 30 cases in France between 2010 and 2017 were also recorded.
The risk of the chikungunya virus spread in EU is high due to importation through infected travelers, population susceptibility and presence of the specific vectors particularly around the Mediterranean coast (33).
Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 7 | 12 West Nile virus (WNV) infection is transmitted to humans by the vector Culex mosquito.
Human WNV infection had entered Europe in 1950.
An increased number of outbreaks have been observed over the last twenty years.
In 20% of infected cases, the virus develops the West Nile Fever (WNF), a febrile illness with symptoms similar to those of influenza or dengue.
High temperatures in summer have been associated with a West Nile Fever epidemic in 2010 in Southeast Europe and following outbreaks have followed the same trend.
The largest outbreak of human WNV infections in the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) was in 2018, with 11 countries reporting 1,548 locally acquired mosquito-borne infections.
The most affected countries were Serbia (126 cases), Italy (123), Greece (75), Hungary (39) and Romania (31).
The number of WNV cases dropped considerably in 2019, except in Greece (34, 35).
During the 2020 transmission season from June 1st till mid-November, EU/EEA countries reported through the European Surveillance System a total of 315 human cases of WNV infection, including 22 deaths.
The affected countries were again mostly in central and Southern Europe: Greece (143 cases), Spain (77), Italy (66), Germany (13), Romania (6), the Netherlands (6), Hungary (3) and Bulgaria (1) (35).
In the 2021 transmission season and as of 21 October 2021, 135 human cases of WNV infection have been reported from EU/EEA countries including Greece (55), Italy (54), Hungary (7), Romania (7), Spain (6), Austria (3) and Germany (3), with 9 deaths in Greece (7), Spain (1) and Romania (1).
EU-neighboring countries had 18 human cases of WNV infection and 3 deaths in Serbia (36).
The past and present distribution of WNV infection cases in Europe are shown in Annex Fig.
4a and 2025 and 2050 projections for its future distribution are shown in Fig.
4b and 4c, respectively.
WNV is transmitted also through blood transfusion or organ transplantation (16).
Hantavirus infection is a rodent-borne, climate-sensitive zoonosis transmitted to humans by different Hantaviruses to cause three different clinical syndromes.
Also referred to as epidemic nephropathy, hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome by Puumala virus is the most prevalent (98%) type in Europe with 4,046 cases in 2019 (38, 39).
Candida auris is an antifungal-resistant yeast preferring mainly the healthcare settings and making difficult-to-control outbreaks of invasive healthcare-associated infections.
After its first identification in 2009, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced it as a catastrophic risk when its infections appeared in three continents simultaneously.
Within a decade, it spread to 23 countries in five continents, also entering Greece and Turkey (40, 41).
The explanation or hypothesis was its adaptation to global warming.
More heat-resistant microbes are being selected while those heat-sensitive are being eliminated.
Fungi are favored under these trends.
The surviving more heat-resistant microbes will also resist endothermic regulations in humans and high fever, which is a defense mechanism for eliminating infectious agents, and serve for insistent infections (42).
Conclusions Climate change brings up complicated health issues already.
Infectious diseases, many of which are sensitive to the climatic and environmental conditions, may occupy a considerable place in the global agenda for a long time with probable new pathogens, new diseases, new epidemics and pandemics.
Due to the nature of the climatesensitive infections, the steps leading to solutions can only be within a One-Health frame, but legally binding intergovernmental precautions should be followed and monitored in the first place by Paris Agreement signatory parties, as well as all the remaining public who sincerely Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 8 | 12 believe in “ensuring that the health of a child born today is not defined by a changing climate” (29, 43).
References 1.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
United Nations, New York, 1992.
2.
Zillman JW.
A History of Climate Activities.
Available from: https://public.wmo.int/en/bulletin/histo ry-climate-activities (Accessed: May 01, 2021).
3.
Information Unit for Conventions (IUC), United Nations Environment Programme.
Climate Change Information Sheet 17.
Available from: https://unfccc.int/cop3/fccc/climate/fac t17.htm (Accessed: May 01, 2021).
4.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Available from: https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol (Accessed: May 02, 2021).
5.
Yunus Arıkan.
Birleşmiş Milletler İklim Değişikliği Çerçeve Sözleşmesi ve Kyoto Protokolü: Metinler ve Temel Bilgiler.
Regional Environmental Center (REC) Turkey, 2006 [Turkish].
6.
The Paris Agreement.
Available from: https://unfccc.int/process-andmeetings/the-paris-agreement/theparis-agreement (Accessed: May 08, 2021).
7.
Unicef Press Report.
Available from: https://www.unicef.org/pressreleases/16-children-including-gretathunberg-file-landmark-complaintunited-nations (Accessed: September 20, 2021).
8.
Wu X, Lub Y, Zhou S, Chen L, Xua B.
Impact of climate change on human infectious diseases: Empirical evidence and human adaptation.
Environment International 2016; 86: 14–23.
9.
Altizer S, Ostfeld RS, Johnson PTJ, Kutz S, Harvell CD.
Climate change and infectious disease s: from evidence to a predictive framewo rk.
Science 2013; 341: 514-519.
10.
IPCC, 2001.
Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report.
In: Watson, R.T., Team, C.W.
(Eds.
), A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third Assessment Report of the Integovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, USA.
11.
Cai W et al.
Increasing frequency of extreme El Niño events due to greenhouse warming.
Nature Climate Change 2014; 111–116.
12.
Lindsey R. Global impacts of El Niño and La Niña.
Available from: https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/featured-images/globalimpacts-el-ni%C3%B1o-and-lani%C3%B1a (Accessed: May 09, 2021).
13.
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
What are El Nino and La Nina?
Available from: https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/nin onina.html (Accessed: May 09, 2021).
14.
Prüss-Ustün A, Wolf J, Corvalán C, Bos R and Neira M (Eds).
Preventing disease through healthy environments: A global assessment of the burden of disease from environmental risks.
WHO, France.
2016.
15.
Githeko AK, Lindsay SW, Confalonieri UE, Patz JA.
Climate change and vector-borne diseases: a regional analysis.
Bulletin of the https://public.wmo.int/en/bulletin/history-climate-activities https://public.wmo.int/en/bulletin/history-climate-activities https://unfccc.int/cop3/fccc/climate/fact17.htm https://unfccc.int/cop3/fccc/climate/fact17.htm https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/16-children-including-greta-thunberg-file-landmark-complaint-united-nations https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/16-children-including-greta-thunberg-file-landmark-complaint-united-nations https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/16-children-including-greta-thunberg-file-landmark-complaint-united-nations https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/16-children-including-greta-thunberg-file-landmark-complaint-united-nations https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/global-impacts-el-ni%C3%B1o-and-la-ni%C3%B1a https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/global-impacts-el-ni%C3%B1o-and-la-ni%C3%B1a https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/global-impacts-el-ni%C3%B1o-and-la-ni%C3%B1a https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/global-impacts-el-ni%C3%B1o-and-la-ni%C3%B1a https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ninonina.html https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ninonina.html Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 9 | 12 World Health Organization, 2000; 78: 1136-1147.
16.
Semenza JC, Tran A, Espinosa L, Sudre B, Domanovic D, Paz S. Climate change projections of West Nile virus infections in Europe: implications for blood safety practices.
Environ Health.
2016; 15(1): 28.
17.
McIntyre KM, Setzkorn C, Hepworth PJ, Morand S, Morse AP, Baylis M. Systematic Assessment of the Climate Sensitivity of Important Human and Domestic Animals Pathogens in Europe.
Scientific Reports 2017; 7: 7134.
18.
World Health Organization and World Meteorological Organization.
Atlas of Health and Climate.
WHO Press, Switzerland, 2012.
19.
Shamana J, Lipsitchb M. The El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO)– pandemic Influenza connection: Coincident or causal?
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2013; 110 (Suppl 1): 3689– 3691.
20.
Semenza JC, Suk JE.
Vector-borne diseases and climate change: a European perspective.
FEMS Microbiol Lett.
2018; 365 :fnx244.
21.
Estrada-Peña A, Cutler S, Potkonjak A, Vassier-Tussaut M, Van Bortel W, Zeller H, Fernández-Ruiz N, Mihalca AD.
An updated meta-analysis of the distribution and prevalence of Borrelia burgdorferi s.l.
in ticks in Europe.
Int J Health Geogr.
2018; 17(1): 41.
22.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
Small bites, big problems: tick-borne diseases in Europe.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publica tions-data/small-bites-big-problemstick-borne-diseases-europe (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
23.
World Health Organization.
CrimeanCongo haemorrhagic fever.
Avilable from: https://www.who.int/healthtopics/crimean-congo-haemorrhagicfever#tab=tab_1 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
24.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
CrimeanCongo haemorrhagic fever; Annual Epidemiological Report for 2019.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publica tions-data/crimean-congohaemorrhagic-fever-annualepidemiological-report-2019 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
25.
Ergönül Ö. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever and its importance for Turkey.
Klimik Derg.
2019; 32(3): 221 (Turkish).
26.
Ogden NH.
Climate change and vector-borne diseases of public health significance.
FEMS Microbiol Lett.
2017; 16: 364-319.
27.
European Environment Agency (EEA).
Malaria in 2050.
Available from: https://www.eea.europa.eu/dataand-maps/figures/malaria-in-2050 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
28.
Centers for Diseae Control and Prevention (CDC).
Malaria's Impact Worldwide.
Available from: https://www.cdc.gov/malaria/malaria_ worldwide/impact.html (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
29.
Watts N, Amann M, Arnell N, et al.
The 2019 report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: ensuring that the health of a child born today is not defined by a changing climate.
Lancet.
2019; 394(10211): 1836-1878.
30.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
Mosquitoborne diseases: An emerging threat.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publica tions-data/mosquito-borne-diseasesemerging-threat (Accessed: October 08, 2021).
31.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
The climatic suitability for dengue transmission in https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/small-bites-big-problems-tick-borne-diseases-europe https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/small-bites-big-problems-tick-borne-diseases-europe https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/small-bites-big-problems-tick-borne-diseases-europe https://www.who.int/health-topics/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever#tab=tab_1 https://www.who.int/health-topics/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever#tab=tab_1 https://www.who.int/health-topics/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever#tab=tab_1 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever-annual-epidemiological-report-2019 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever-annual-epidemiological-report-2019 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever-annual-epidemiological-report-2019 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/crimean-congo-haemorrhagic-fever-annual-epidemiological-report-2019 https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/malaria-in-2050 https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/malaria-in-2050 https://www.cdc.gov/malaria/malaria_worldwide/impact.html https://www.cdc.gov/malaria/malaria_worldwide/impact.html https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/mosquito-borne-diseases-emerging-threat https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/mosquito-borne-diseases-emerging-threat https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/mosquito-borne-diseases-emerging-threat Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 10 | 12 continental Europe.
Stockholm: ECDC; 2012.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publica tions-data/climatic-suitability-denguetransmission-continental-europe 32.
Uyar Y, Aktaş E, Yağcı Çağlayık D, Ergönül O, Yüce A. Yurt Dışı Kaynaklı Bir Dang Ateşi Olgusu ve Literatürün Gözden Geçirilmesi [An imported dengue Fever case in Turkey and review of the literature].
Mikrobiyol Bul.
2013 Jan;47(1):17380.
Turkish.
33.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
Autochthonous transmission of chikungunya virus in mainland EU/EEA, 2007–present.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/alltopics-z/chikungunya-virusdisease/surveillance-threats-andoutbreaks/autochthonous (Accessed: October 11, 2021).
34.
Bakonyi T, Haussig JM.
West Nile virus keeps on moving up in Europe.
Euro Surveill.
2020; 25(46): 2001938.
35.
World Health Organization.
West Nile virus infections spike in southern and central Europe.
Available from: https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries /italy/news/news/2018/8/west-nilevirus-infections-spike-in-southernand-central-europe (Accessed: October 07, 2021).
36.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
West Nile virus infection.
In: ECDC.
Annual epidemiological report for 2019.
Stockholm: ECDC; 2021.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publica tions-data/west-nile-virus-infectionannual-epidemiological-report-2019 (Accessed: October 07, 2021).
37.
37.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
West Nile virus in Europe in 2021-human cases compared to previous seasons, updated 21 October 2021.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publica tions-data/west-nile-virus-europe2021-human-cases-comparedprevious-seasons-updated-21 (Accessed: October 24, 2021).
38.
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
Hantavirus infection Annual Epidemiological Report for 2019.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/defa ult/files/documents/AER-hantavirus2019.pdf (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
39.
Çelebi G, Öztoprak N, Öktem İMA, Heyman P, Lundkvist Å, Wahlström M, Köktürk F, Pişkin N. Dynamics of Puumala hantavirus outbreak in Black Sea Region, Turkey.
Zoonoses Public Health.
2019; 66(7): 783-797.
40.
Ahima RS.
Global warming threatens human thermoregulation and survival.
J Clin Invest.
2020; 130(2): 559-561.
41.
Kömeç S, Karabıçak N, Ceylan AN, Gülmez A, Özalp O. Türkiye İstanbul’dan Bildirilen Üç Candida auris Olgusu.
Mikrobiyol Bul.
2021; 55(3): 452-460.
42.
Johns Hopkins Researchers.
Climate Change Threatens to Unlock New Microbes and Increase Heat-Related Illness and Death.
Available from: https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/new s/newsroom/news-releases/johnshopkins-researchers-climate-changethreatens-to-unlock-new-microbesand-increase-heat-related-illness-anddeath (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
43.
Abed Y, Sahu M, Ormea V, Mans L, Lueddeke G, Laaser U, Hokama T, Goletic R, Eliakimu E, Dobe M, Seifman R. South Eastern European Journal of Public Health (SEEJPH), The Global One Health Environment, Special Volume No.
1, 2021. doi: 10.11576/seejph-4238.
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/climatic-suitability-dengue-transmission-continental-europe https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/climatic-suitability-dengue-transmission-continental-europe https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/climatic-suitability-dengue-transmission-continental-europe https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/all-topics-z/chikungunya-virus-disease/surveillance-threats-and-outbreaks/autochthonous https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/all-topics-z/chikungunya-virus-disease/surveillance-threats-and-outbreaks/autochthonous https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/all-topics-z/chikungunya-virus-disease/surveillance-threats-and-outbreaks/autochthonous https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/all-topics-z/chikungunya-virus-disease/surveillance-threats-and-outbreaks/autochthonous https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/italy/news/news/2018/8/west-nile-virus-infections-spike-in-southern-and-central-europe https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/italy/news/news/2018/8/west-nile-virus-infections-spike-in-southern-and-central-europe https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/italy/news/news/2018/8/west-nile-virus-infections-spike-in-southern-and-central-europe https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/italy/news/news/2018/8/west-nile-virus-infections-spike-in-southern-and-central-europe https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/west-nile-virus-infection-annual-epidemiological-report-2019 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/west-nile-virus-infection-annual-epidemiological-report-2019 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/west-nile-virus-infection-annual-epidemiological-report-2019 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/AER-hantavirus-2019.pdf https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/AER-hantavirus-2019.pdf https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/AER-hantavirus-2019.pdf https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/johns-hopkins-researchers-climate-change-threatens-to-unlock-new-microbes-and-increase-heat-related-illness-and-death https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/johns-hopkins-researchers-climate-change-threatens-to-unlock-new-microbes-and-increase-heat-related-illness-and-death https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/johns-hopkins-researchers-climate-change-threatens-to-unlock-new-microbes-and-increase-heat-related-illness-and-death https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/johns-hopkins-researchers-climate-change-threatens-to-unlock-new-microbes-and-increase-heat-related-illness-and-death https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/johns-hopkins-researchers-climate-change-threatens-to-unlock-new-microbes-and-increase-heat-related-illness-and-death https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/johns-hopkins-researchers-climate-change-threatens-to-unlock-new-microbes-and-increase-heat-related-illness-and-death Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 11 | 12 Annex Figure 1.
Tick-borne encephalitis.
(a) Distribution of Ixodes ricinus ticks in Europe, March 2021.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/ixodes-ricinuscurrent-known-distribution-march-2021 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
(b) Number of confirmed tick-borne encephalitis cases in EU/EEA, 2014.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/figure-1-number-confirmed-tbe-caseseueea-2014 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
Figure 2.
Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF).
(a) Distribution of Hyalomma marginatum ticks as the major vector for CCHF, September 2021.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/hyalomma-marginatum-current-knowndistribution-september-2021 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
(b) Endemic areas for CCHF.
Available from: https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/crimean-congo/outbreaks/distribution-map.html (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/ixodes-ricinus-current-known-distribution-march-2021 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/ixodes-ricinus-current-known-distribution-march-2021 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/figure-1-number-confirmed-tbe-cases-eueea-2014 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/figure-1-number-confirmed-tbe-cases-eueea-2014 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/hyalomma-marginatum-current-known-distribution-september-2021 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/hyalomma-marginatum-current-known-distribution-september-2021 https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/crimean-congo/outbreaks/distribution-map.html Kayacan ZC, Akgul O.
Climate change and its extensions in infectious diseases: South Eastern Europe under focus (Review article).
SEEJPH 2022, posted: 21 January 2022.
DOI: 10.11576/seejph-5111.
P a g e 12 | 12 © 2022 Kayacan et al.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Figure 3.
Distribution of Aedes mosquitos in Europe.
(a) Aedes albopictus, March 2021.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/aedes-albopictus-currentknown-distribution-march-2021 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
(b) Aedes aegypti, January 2019.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/aedes-aegypticurrent-known-distribution-january-2019 (Accessed: October 10, 2021).
Figure 4.
West Nile virus epidemiology.
(a) WNV in Europe with human cases compared to previous seasons, updated 21 October 2021 (37) (Accessed: October 24, 2021).
(b) 2025 prediction (16).
(c) 2050 prediction (16).
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/aedes-albopictus-current-known-distribution-march-2021 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/aedes-albopictus-current-known-distribution-march-2021 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/aedes-aegypti-current-known-distribution-january-2019 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/aedes-aegypti-current-known-distribution-january-2019 9.
Altizer S, Ostfeld RS, Johnson PTJ, Kutz S, Harvell CD.
Climate change and infectious diseases: from evidence to a predictive framework.
Science 2013; 341: 514-519.
10.
IPCC, 2001.
Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report.
In: Watson, R.T., Team, C.W.
(Eds.
), A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third Assessment Report of the Integovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cam... 12.
Lindsey R. Global impacts of El Niño and La Niña.
Available from: https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/global-impacts-el-ni%C3%B1o-and-la-ni%C3%B1a (Accessed: May 09, 2021).
13.
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
What are El Nino and La Nina?
Available from: https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ninonina.html (Accessed: May 09, 2021).
40.
Ahima RS.
Global warming threatens human thermoregulation and survival.
J Clin Invest.
2020; 130(2): 559-561.
42.
Johns Hopkins Researchers.
Climate Change Threatens to Unlock New Microbes and Increase Heat-Related Illness and Death.
Available from: https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/newsroom/news-releases/johns-hopkins-researchers-climate-change-threatens-... 43.
Abed Y, Sahu M, Ormea V, Mans L, Lueddeke G, Laaser U, Hokama T, Goletic R, Eliakimu E, Dobe M, Seifman R. South Eastern European Journal of Public Health (SEEJPH), The Global One Health Environment, Special Volume No.
1, 2021. doi: 10.11576/seejp...
Figure 2.
Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF).
(a) Distribution of Hyalomma marginatum ticks as the major vector for CCHF, September 2021.
Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/hyalomma-marginatum-current-known-distributio...
Figure 4.
West Nile virus epidemiology.
(a) WNV in Europe with human cases compared to previous seasons, updated 21 October 2021 (37) (Accessed: October 24, 2021).
(b) 2025 prediction (16).
(c) 2050 prediction (16).
Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
4, 2018, 3234-3237 3234 www.etasr.com Laghari et al.
: Effects of Climate Change on Mountain Waters: A Case Study of European Alps Effects of Climate Change on Mountain Waters: A Case Study of European Alps Abdul Nasir Laghari Department of Energy and Environment Engineering, Quaid-e-Awam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan a.n.laghari@quest.edu.pk Gordhan Das Walasai Department of Mechanical Engineering, Quaid-e-Awam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan valasai@quest.edu.pk Abdul Rehman Jatoi Department of Energy and Environment Engineering, Quaid-e-Awam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan jatoi.ar@gmail.com Daddan Khan Bangwar Department of Civil Engineering, Quaid -eAwam University of Engineering, Science and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan skb_khan2000@yahoo.com Abdul Hannan Shaikh Department of Mathematics.
Quaid e Awam University of Engineering, Science, and Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan hanangul12@yahoo.co.uk Abstract—The Alps play a vital role in the water supply of the region through the rivers Danube, Rhine, Po and Rhone while they are crucial to the ecosystem.
Over the past two centuries, we witnessed the temperature to increase by +2 degrees, which is approximately three times higher than the global average.
Under this study, the Alps are analyzed using regional climatic models for possible projections in order to understand the climatic changes impact on the water cycle, particularly on runoff.
The scenario is based on assumptions of future greenhouse gases emissions.
The regional model results show the consistent warming trend in the last 30-year span: temperature in winter may increase by 3 to 4.5°C and summers by 4 to 5.5°C.
The precipitation regime may also be altered: increasing about 1050% in winter and decreasing about 30-60% in summer.
The changes in the amount of precipitation are not uninformed.
Differences are observed particularly between the North West and South East part of the Alps.
Due to the projected changes in alpine rainfall and temperature patterns, the seasonality of alpine flow regime will also be altered: massive rise will occur in winter and a significant reduction in summer.
The typical low flow period during winter will also be shifted to late summer and autumn.
Keywords-climate change; European Alps; flow regime; impact assessment I.
INTRODUCTION The Alps, spanning over the central part of Europe, play a key role in the water supply of the region.
The chain of this mountain region known as the “water towers” of Europe are a mother to number of rivers, i.e., Danube, Rhine, Po, and Rhone.
These rivers provide key services to the ecosystem both at upstream and the downstream regions.
Worryingly, mountain regions and the Alps in particular are highly exposed to the climate change.
The region has witnessed a remarkably rise in temperature of approximately +2°C during the last two hundred years against the global mean surface temperature increase of 0.74°C [1].
The Alps are highly sensitive to climate change, even a slight variation in climatic parameters can significantly change the hydrological cycle.
Seasonal snow and ice factor have strong altitude sensitivity concerning temperature conditions, so the variation in temperature could result in sharp changes both to the Alpine climate and hydrology [2].
The increased temperature rate has severely affected the alpine hydro-climate system, i.e., extensive glacier retreat, decline in snow cover duration, rise of snowline, variations in seasonal runoff regime etc.
[3].
Authors in [4-6] analyzed the precipitation in the region and reported a rise in rainfall in winter season by 20-30% and a reduction in autumn by 20-40%.
The buildup of snow at higher elevations may form glaciers, and during summer, when precipitation and runoff are low, their melting provides water to low-lying areas.
The rivers Rhine, Rhone, and Inn, show stable and higher mean specific discharges of 28-33l/s per km2 in comparison with Po, Adige and Mur which show lower and variable mean specific discharges of 17-24l/s per km2.
However, due to the three times higher impact of global warming, any further temperature change shall result in change in the Alps hydrological cycle.
The two-third of this water volume were lost by 2000 and 10% of the volume was lost just in the hot summer of 2003 [7].
If this trend continues, the large glaciers will lose about 30-70% of their remaining volume by 2050 [8, 9].
It is projected that the changes in the hydro-climate system will be further intensified in the coming decades, resulting into increased number of summer droughts, winter floods and higher inter-mean annual variation in river runoff regimes [1012].
Anticipated shortfall of water along with continual intense events and with the growth in water demand will have negative impact on the ecosystem.
Agriculture, energy use, forestry, winter-tourism, and river transportation are highly susceptible to water shortage.
These changes in temperature have left dra cyc am in inc the dec tem cyc on SR evo can on em dev are em fut sce pat cen 20 Th Me Sw Slo ext mo Ita sto reg ori bas im los wa is hig mo the wh pro ave Da bas flo mo 34 dis res bet the flo Engineerin www.etasr astic impacts o cle of Alps.
T mounts and ext alpine glacier creased flood ese impacts w cades [20, 22 mperature and cle depends he energy use a RES scenarios olution under n used to analy the future mission scena velopment, de e the primary mission scenar ture water cy enario A2 an tterns, and flow The Alpine ntral Europe.
I 0km in width he arc is elon editerranean witzerland.
Th ovenia [23-25 tends to the so ost of the alpin aly and France orage site its gion, i.e.
Rhin iginate from th sins originatin mportance due t The increase ss due to its lo ater availability snowfall at h gh altitudes ma ountain hydrol e total area o hen precipitat ovides importa erage yearly sh anube and Po sin (around 10 ow, producing ountain parts o %, 41%, and sproportional spectively [27] tween seasons e Po basin, th ow in winter an ng, Technology r.com on the alpine This could be n treme precipit rs [13-15], dec events [18, 1 will further 2].
Carrying o d precipitation eavily upon th and emissions s. These sce a variety of a yze the role o greenhouse g ario A2 is emographic ch y precursors b rio family.
T ycle is based nd their impa w volume gen II.
STUDY A region is a cu It forms an ar h. The mean a ngated above Sea, stretch he arc prolong ].
It descends outhern borde ne territory is e. The region reserves bene ne, Danube, P he alpine regio ng in the Alps.
to its abundant ed precipitatio ow temperatur y in region.
Th high elevation ay form a glac logy.
These g of the Alpine tion and run ant services to hare varies fro o respectively.
0% of total b 2.6 of disprop of the Rhine, d 53% of th influence of 2 ].
The contrib s. The major c he mountain p nd more than 8 y & Applied Sci La ecosystem, e. noticed in: a r tation events [ cline in snow 9].
The exten be worsened ut future proj n change will he future world s. The IPCC enarios are li assumptions a f driving force gases emissio used due t hanges and hibehind the de Therefore, the on the assum act on temper nerated in Alpi AREA DESCRIP urvy shaped g rc of approxim altitude of alpi e the Po bas hing through gs towards A into northern er of Germany covered by Sw n serves as a efit many riv Po and Rhone, on.
Figure 1 sh .
The region p t water resourc on rate and re re is the main he greater part s. The accum ciera promine laciers occupy region.
Durin noff are low, o low-laying ar om 25%-53% .
The mounta basin area) pro portional influ Rhone, and P heir total disc 2.3, 1.8, and ution from the contribution co part provides b 80% in summe ience Research aghari et al.
: Ef g., the hydrol rise in mean ra [2, 10-12], a r cover [16, 17 nt and frequen over the co jections of ho l impact the d evolution in uses four dif ikely imageri and are tools w es and their im ons.
In this to socio-econ -tech change, w evelopment o prediction o mption of em rature, precipi ine region.
PTION geographic fa mately 800km ine peaks is 2 sin from the h France to Austria, and e n Italy in Sout y in North [23] witzerland, Au huge natural vers throughou , whose headw hows the major possesses param ces.
educed evapo n reason for su t of the precipi mulation of sn ent feature of a y about 2900k ng summer se , the glacier reas [26].
The of the total flo ain part of D ovides 25% of uence.
Similarl Po basin accou charge, imply 1.5 for each e Alpine part omes in summ below 40% of er months.
h V Effects of Clima ogical ainfall retreat 7], and ncy of oming ow the water terms fferent ies of which mpacts study nomic which of this of the mission itation acet of and is 2.5km.
north owards east to th and ].
The ustria, water ut the waters r river mount oration urplus itation now at alpine km2 of eason, melt Alp’s ow for anube f total ly, the unt for ying a basin varies mer.
In f total Fig.
and war mea in s emi be sho tem proj IPC Fig.
temp A2 s web futu 210 abo slig var wil abo effe sen incr that dec ove proj com is a wer deg dec Vol.
8, No.
4, 20 ate Change on M 1.
Major riv Danube The regional rming trends d an alpine temp summers by 4 ission scenari higher in cold ows the future mperature by ojections were CC emissions s 2.
Absolute perature till the la scenario.
Rasters bsite, http://pruden The A2 scen ure directions 00 period sho out 4-5°C in ghtly changed ried from seas l be increased out 30-60%.
Th ect on seaso nsitivity of alpi rease is a recu t the projecte cades of the c er the middle ojected that th mpletely vanis also expected re also confirm gree of rise in crease by few 018, 3234-3237 Mountain Wate vers originating in III.
FUTUR l climate mo during the last perature in wi 4 to 5.5°C de o A2 [28].
Th d season and e projections the end of th simulated thr scenario A2.
seasonal changes ast 30-year span o are developed fro nce.dmi.dk/.
nario represen .
The CLM m ow an average the Alps wh d. However, th son to season.
d to about 10-5 he increased te onal snowfall ine snow cove urring research ed increase o current centur e to low alti he current sn sh to altitudes to be reduced med in [30, 31 n the temperat w weeks at m 7 ers: A Case Stud n the European A RE PROJECTION odel (CLM) t 30 years of th nters may rise epending on t he precipitatio lower in warm of relative s he 21st centur rough the CLM s ((2070-2099) / of the 21st century om the data availa nts a typical model simulat e rise in year hile annual pr he precipitatio The precipita 50% and in su emperature sc l and meltin er towards pro h topic.
Analys f about 4°C ry will have a itude catchme now volume i up to 1000m.
d at large exte 1].
By their co ture, the snow mid altitudes.
3235 dy of European Alps: Rhine, Rho NS shows cons he 21st century e by 3 to 4.5°C the greenhous on is anticipat m season.
Fig seasonal chang ry.
These clim M under the s (1961-1990)) in y, as per regional able at Prudence p range of prob tions for the 2 rly temperatu recipitation ra on rate is stro ation rate in w ummer decreas enario has a dr ng processes.
ojected temper sis in [29] indi until the last a significant e ents.
The ana in the Alps m The snow dur ent.
These fin onclusion, for w-cover is like Particularly b n Alps one, Po istent y: the C and se-gas ted to ure 2 ge in matic strong n mean l CLM project bable 2071ure of ate is ongly winter sed to rastic The rature icated t two effect alysis might ration dings each ely to below 70 30 is tem tem Au 5°C me siz inc in be Th red pro con sum dro the and dur alt Fig Fig pre sce pro hy sea mo tem for dur cli sea sea 40 the or [16 in enh sum sea Engineerin www.etasr 0m, the snow days reductio projected to mperature in mperatures ha uthors in [9] su C, the glacier eans the smal zable glaciers creased glacier the alpine riv reduced, sum he flows of hi duction in su ojected reduc ntribution from mmer flows oughty conditi e projected in d faster snowm ring the wi eration in the gure 3. g. 3.
Relative ecipitation amoun nario Geo-Raste oject website, http Figure 4 sh drological reg asonal runoff odel (CLM) u mperature in w rm (from soli ring winter ( mate change asonality of asonal runoffs -50% decreas e similar trend the Rhone.
S 6], which high different seaso hancing flood mmer and ea asons (except ng, Technology r.com w depletion ma on in the winte decrease arou ncrease [32] ave a very ne uggest that at r cover will b ll glaciers wi will face a r melt will ini ers, but later o mmer flows ar ighly glacieriz ummer season ced summer m glacier mel [34-36], and ions at downst creased precip melt may also inter season.
e hydrologica seasonal change nt till the last 30-y ers are developed p://prudence.dmi.d hows the imp gime of the Al fs), simulated under IPCC e winter not only id to liquid) (instead of sp will undoubt alpine river s ranges from 7 e in summer.
ds in seasonali Similar conclu hlights the sub ons throughou ding in late win arly autumn.
in winter) m y & Applied Sci La ay reach 33% er season.
The und 150m w ].
The pr egative impact a rise in temp be reduced mo ill be disappe 30-70% volu itially enhance on, when the re projected t zed basins ma n [32].
In th precipitation lt may all resu may even r tream regions.
pitation rates o create a high The projec l cycle of Al es ((2070-2099) / year span of 21st c d from the data dk/.
act of climat lps (e.g.
tempo d through the emissions scen y results in cha but also caus pring).
Figure tedly induce flow regime.
70% to 80% in Runoff regim ity of alpine ri usion were als bstantial shift i ut the year, wit nter and enhan These decrea may affect the ience Research aghari et al.
: Ef with an avera e average snow ith each degr rojected incr t on glacier c perature of ab ore than 80% eared by 2050 ume reduction e the summer glacier volum to be reduced ay face up to he long term amount and ult in much-re result in incr .
On the other together with her risk of flo cted tempo-s lps can be se / (1961-1990)) in century, as per CL a available at Pr te change ove o-spatial chan e regional cl nario A2.
The anging precipi ses early snow 4 shows tha drastic effect .
The variati ncrease in win me analysis con ivers, e.g.
the so drawn earl in water availa th a potential r nced drought i asing trends e different de h V Effects of Clima age of w line ree of reased cover.
out 4.
This 0 and n. The flows me will d [33].
o 50% m, the little educed reased hand, h early ooding spatial een in n mean LM A2 rudence er the ges in limate e high itation wmelt at the t over on in nter to nfirms Rhine lier in ability risk of in late in all emand stak crea Fig.
runo scen web exp and tren hig futu win sno is p van red flow a si [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Vol.
8, No.
4, 20 ate Change on M keholders with ated in adjacen 4.
Relative s off till the last 3 nario.
Rasters are bsite, http://pruden The Alps are periencing high d global avera nd of changes her increase uristic precipi nter and fall in ow-cover span projected to nished, and th duction by the w regime will ignificant fall i IPCC, The Four Climate Change A. Laghari, D. V result in a shift Hydrological Sc I. Auer, R. Bo Schoner, M. Efthymiadis, M J.‐M.
Moissel Bochnicek, P. M. Dolinar, M Nieplova, “HIS time series of Journal of Clim I. Auer, R. Boh Ungersbock, M Efthymiadis, O Bochnicek, T. C S. Szalai, T. Sz dataset for the International Jo C. Schar, C. F Global Change J. Schmidli, C precipitation va 018, 3234-3237 Mountain Wate hin the Alps, nt lowland reg seasonal changes 30-year span of e developed from nce.dmi.dk/ throu IV.
CO sensitive to c her increases i age.
The CLM s during the l in winter a itation pattern n summer.
Thi shall be reduc shift upwards he sizable gla last decades o be highly affe in summer mo REFER rth Assessment R e, IPCC, 2007 Vanham, W. Rau in Alpine hydrolo ciences Journal, V ohm, A. Jurkovic Ungersbock, C. M. Brunetti, T. Nan lin, M. Begert, G Stastny, M. Lapi M. Gajic ‐ Capk STALP — Histor the Greater Alp matology, Vol.
27, hm, A. Jurkovic, M. Brunetti, T. Na O. Mestre, J.‐M Cegnar, M. Gajic zentimrey, L. Mer e greater alpine ournal of Climatol Frei, “Orographic and Mountain Re .
Schmutz, C. F ariability in the r 7 ers: A Case Stud but the majo gions.
s ((2070-2099) / 21st century, as m the data availab ugh the application ONCLUSION climatic chang in temperature M model resu last decades o and summer ns give mixe s would clearl ced to fewer w s, the smalle aciers shall su of this century.
fected having a onths.
RENCES Report of the Inter uch, “To what exte ogy?
A case study Vol.
57, No.
1, pp c, W. Lipa, A. O .
Matulla, K. nni, M. Maugeri, G. Muller‐Weste in, S. Szalai, T. S ka, K. Zaninovi rical instrumental pine Region 176 , No.
1, pp.
17–46 A. Orlik, R. Potz anni, M. Maugeri, M. Moisselin, M. c‐Capka, K. Zan rcalli, “A new ins e region for the logy, Vol.
25, No c precipitation an egions, pp.
255-26 Frei, H. Wanner, region of the Eur 3236 dy of European or problem ma (1961-1990)) in per regional CL ble at Prudence p n of Arc GIS soft ges and are alr e than the Euro ults show the of the 21st cen temperature.
ed signals: ris ly point out tha weeks, the snow r glaciers wi uffer huge vo The seasonal a rise in winte rgovernmental Pa ent does climate c y in the Austrian p. 103-117, 2012 Orlik, R. Potzman Briffa, P. Jone L. Mercalli, O. M ermeier, V. Kvet Szentimrey, T. C ic, Z. Majstorov l climatological s 60–2003”, Interna 6, 2007 zmann, W. Schon , K. Briffa, P. Jon Begert, R. Brazd ninovic, Z. Majsto strumental precip e period 1800–2 o.
2, pp.
139-166, nd climate chang 66, Springer, 200 C. Schar, “Mes ropean Alps duri n Alps ay be n mean LM A2 project tware.
ready opean same ntury: The se in at the wline ill be olume ity of er and anel on change Alps”, nn, W. es, D. Mestre, ton, O. Cegnar, vic, E. surface ational ner, M. nes, D. dil, O. orovic, pitation 2002”, 2005 ge”, in: 05 soscale ing the Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
4, 2018, 3234-3237 3237 www.etasr.com Laghari et al.
: Effects of Climate Change on Mountain Waters: A Case Study of European Alps 20th century”, International Journal of Climatology,Vol.
22, No.
9, pp.
1049-1074, 2002 [7] W. Haeberli, Spuren des Hitzesommers 2003 im Eis der Alpen.
Submission to the parliament of Switzerland, 2003 (in German) [8] L. K. Bogataj, “Effects of Climate Change to the Alps – Water Towers to Europe”, in: Adaptation of Water Management to Effects of Climate Change in the Danube River Basin, Conference Proceedings, Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, 2007 [9] F. Paul, A. Kaab, M. Maisch, T. Kellenberger, W. Haeberli, “Rapid disintegration of Alpine glaciers observed with satellite data”, Geophysical Research Letters, Vol.
31, No.
21, 2004 [10] C. D. Schonwiese, J. Rapp, Climate trend atlas of Europe based on observations 1891–1990, Springer, 1997 [11] D. Gellens, “Trend and correlation analysis of k-day extreme precipitation over Belgium”, Theoretical and Applied Climatology, Vol.
66, No.
1-2, pp.
117–129, 2000 [12] C. Frei, C. Schar, “Detection probability of trends in rare events: theory and application to heavy precipitation in the Alpine region”, Journal of Climate, Vol.
14, No.
7, pp.
1568-1584, 2001 [13] R. Frauenfelder, M. Laustela, A. Kaab, “Relative age dating of Alpine rockglacier surfaces”, Zeitschrift fur Geomorphologie, Vol.
49, No.
2, pp.
145–166, 2005 [14] 14.
M. Huss, S. Sugiyama, A. Bauder, M. Funk “Retreat scenarios of Unteraargletscher, Switzerland, using a combined ice-flow mass-balance model”, Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine Research, Vol.
39, No.
3, pp.
422– 431, 2007 [15] W. Haeberli, M. Hoelzle, F. Paul, M. Zemp, “Integrated monitoring of mountain glaciers as key indicators of global climate change: the European Alps”, Annals of Glaciology, Vol.
46, pp.
150-160, 2007 [16] M. Beniston, “Mountain Climates and Climatic Change: An Overview of Processes Focusing on the European Alps”, Pure Applied Geophysics, Vol.
162, No.
8-9, pp.
1587-1606, 2005 [17] D. Vanham, W. Rauch, “Climate Change and its Influence on Mountain Snow Covers: Implication for Drinking Water in the European Alps”, International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses, Vol.
1, No.
4, pp.
101-112, 2009 [18] P. Y. Groisman, R. W. Knight, T. R. Karl, “Heavy precipitation and high streamflow in the contiguous United States: trends in the twentieth century”, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol.
82, No.
2, pp.
219–246, 2001 [19] P. C. D. Milly, R. T. Wetherald, K. A. Dunne, T. L. Delworth, “Increasing risk of great floods in a changing climate”, Nature, Vol.
415, pp.
514–517, 2002 [20] G. A. Meehl, T. Karl, D. R. Easterling, S. Changnon, R. Pielke Jr., D. Changnon, J. Evans, P. Ya.
Groisman, T. R. Knutson, K. E. Kunkel, L. O. Mearns, C. Parmesan, R. Pulwarty, T. Root, R. T. Sylves, P. Whetton, F. Zwiers, “An introduction to trends in extreme weather and climate events: Observations, socioeconomic impacts, terrestrial ecological impacts, and model projections”, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol.
81, pp.
413–416, 2000 [21] P. D. Jones, P. A. Reid, “Assessing future changes in extreme precipitation over Britain using regional climate model integrations”, International Journal of Climatology, Vol.
21, pp.
1337–1356, 2001 [22] T. N. Palmer, J. Raisanen, “Quantifying the risk of extreme seasonal precipitation events in a changing climate”, Nature, Vol.
415, pp.
512– 514, 2002 [23] K. M. Fleming, J.
A. Dowdeswell, J. Oerlemans, “Modelling the mass balance of northwest Spitsbergen glaciers and responses to climate change”, Annals of Glaciology, Vol.
24, pp.
203-210, 1997 [24] A. Beattie, The Alps: A cultural history, Oxford University Press, 2006 [25] B. Chatre, G. Lanzinger, M. Macaluso, W. Mayrhofer, M. Morandini, M. Onida, B. Polajnar, “The Alps: People and Pressures in the Mountains, the Facts at a Glance”, in: Permanent Secretariat of the Alpine Convention: Vademecum, Innsbruck, Austria, 2010 [26] H. P. Liniger, R. Weingartner, R. Grosjean, M. Agenda, Mountains of the World: Water Towers for the 21st Century, Mountain Agenda c/o Institute of geography University of Berne, 1998.
[27] R. Weingartner, D. Viviroli, B. Schadler, “Water resources in mountain regions: a methodological approach to assess the water balance in a highland-lowland-system”, Hydrological Processes, Vol.
21, pp.
578– 585, 2007 [28] ClimChAlp, Final report on Climate Change, Impacts and Adaptation Strategies in the Alpine Space, 2008 [29] M. Beniston, F. Keller, B. Koffi, S. Goyette, “Estimates of snow accumulation and volume in the Swiss Alps under changing climatic conditions”, Theoretical and Applied Climatology, Vol.
76, No.
3-4, pp.
125-140, 2003 [30] E. Martin, P. Etchevers, “Impact of climatic change on snow cover and snow hydrology in the French Alps”, in: Global Change and Mountain Regions (A State of Knowledge Overview), pp.
235-242, Springer, 2005 [31] M. Hantel, L. M. Hirtl-Wielke, “Sensitivity of Alpine snow cover to European temperature”, International Journal of Climatology, Vol.
27, No.
10, pp.
1265–1275, 2007 [32] B. Zierl, H. Bugmann, “Global change impacts on hydrological processes in Alpine catchments”, Water Resources Research, Vol.
41, No.
2, 2005 [33] R. Hock, P. Jansson, L. Braun, “Modelling the response of mountain glacier discharge to climate warming”, in: Global Change and Mountain Regions, pp.
243-252, Springer, 2005 [34] J. Andreasson, G. Lindstrom, G. Grahn, B. Johansson, “Runoff in Sweden – Mapping of Climate Change Impacts on Hydrology”, in: XXIII Nordic Hydrological Conference, Tallinn, Estonia, August, 2004 [35] K. Jasper, P. Calanca, D. Gyalistras, J. Fuhrer, “Differential impacts of climate change on the hydrology of two alpine river basins”, Climate Research, Vol.
26, No.
2, pp.
113–129, 2004 [36] T. P. Barnett, J. C. Adam, D. P. Lettenmaier, “Potential impacts of a warming climate on water availability in snow-dominated regions”, Nature, Vol.
438, No.
7066, pp.
303-309, 2005
Climate Projections Indicate Catastrophic Consequences in the Middle East and North Africa Region Why healthcare workers are conspicuously absent in climate change discourse Samir Al-Adawi Sultan Qaboos University Med J, November 2022, Vol.
22, Iss.
4, pp.
441–442, Epub.
7 Nov 22 Editor-in-Chief, Sultan Qaboos University Medical Journal, Muscat, Oman Author’s e-mail: adawi@squ.edu.om As the gregorian calendar reaches theend of 2022, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or Eastern Mediterranean region has been lauded for hosting the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC), widely dubbed as COP27 (Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC).
The meeting has been held at a critical junction for projected climate change: the MENA region has been documented to be the region most vulnerable to experiencing the vagaries of the climate crisis, which means long-term changes in temperatures and weather patterns.1 Historically, variations in the solar cycle contribute to natural changes in temperature and weather.
More recently, however, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of the United Nations has identified human activities as the "primary driver" for climate change.2 According to a recent article, the MENA region will continue to experience climatic changes ‘two times faster than the global average’ in climatic changes.2 The region has already been dubbed as being part of the ‘global climate change hot spots’.2 Due to these factors, Vohra has suggested that the MENA region will be “uninhabitable” before the end of the century.3 The situation is already more critical as the scorching sun in the summer dwells longer in the sky and the weather is becoming hotter and hotter.
As a result of the lack of precipitation, rivers are dying, devastating wildfires are becoming common and the once-tranquil Arabian Sea is now more frequented by more devastating winds with rougher waves and clouds.4,5 The MENA region has experienced increasing population growth, resulting in rapid urbanisation.
Studies have suggested that the growth of these cities has the potential to trigger the ‘urban heat island effect’ defined as the “phenomenon where roads and buildings in urban areas absorb and re-emit heat, resulting in warmer temperatures than surrounding nonurban areas by upward of 10° C”.6,7 For the MENA region, possessing the ‘superpower’ of fossil fuels, climate projections are a cause for concern.
Although it is essential, if not paramount, for the MENA region to kickstart decarbonisation strategies, in some of the countries in the MENA region, fiscal policies strongly hinge on the exploitation of hydrocarbons.
Despite such a caveat, there is evidence to suggest that concerted efforts are underway in some of the oil producing countries to find alternative sources of energy.
However, these efforts appear to have stalled due to geopolitical instability, the tribulations of COVID-19 and the fact that the region itself is beset by many conflicts.
But the issue of climate change should not only be gleaned from the ‘ism and schism' of global politics; healthcare workers (HCWs) have a stake in the climate discourse.
Rising temperatures and meteorological conditions should alert HCWs to ‘think globally, act locally’.
Extensive empirical evidence suggests that the effect of climate change, directly and indirectly, affects the health and well-being of the world's population.
Extreme shifts in temperature and weather patterns have the potential to precipitate injuries and illnesses as well as disrupt the functioning of healthcare facilities.8 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of USA, adverse temperatures and weather conditions exacerbate the magnitude and pattern of ill-health and diseases.9 Exposure to untimely floods, sandstorms, rising seas and wildfires has the potential to prompt poor coping, which, in turn, adversely impacts the integrity of the biopsychological system setting off cascades of pathological processes in the body and mind.10 Depending on the organ of inferiority, the development of a spectrum of medical, psychological and neurological problems is likely to ensue.
Hence, such a scenario would increase the utilisation of healthcare services as well as spike morbidity and mortality.4 Some of the evidence for the link between climate change and the pattern of diseases is becoming increasingly obvious.
First, human activities burning fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas tend to increase ground-level ozone and pollute the air, which, in turn, spikes the incidence of respiratory MESSAGE FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
https://doi.org/10.18295/squmj.10.2022.061 “This century is a special one, where we as humans destroy ourselves.” Martin Rees https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/ Climate Projections Indicate Catastrophic Consequences in the Middle East and North Africa Region Why healthcare workers are conspicuously absent in climate change discourse 442 | SQU Medical Journal, November 2021, Volume 21, Issue 4 disorders.4 Related to this, living in a polluted setting has been documented to be critically associated with diminution of efficiency of higher human faculty, namely cognition with all the consequences this may entail.11 Second, climate changes increase pollen concentrations in the atmosphere, which exacerbates the conditions that are associated with pollen and allergens.
Third, numerous vector-borne diseases and zoonotic phenomena are linked to climate change.4 The re-emergence of non-communicable diseases such as cholera and other killer diseases have recently been documented in Lebanon and Pakistan and climate change appears to be a strong suspect in this.
This unfortunate occurrence is due to the fact that the MENA region is still struggling with the ‘doubleedged sword’ of communicable diseases amid noncommunicable diseases.
The prevalent poverty rate, food insecurity and inequality in the MENA region imply that the region will have little recourse to mitigate the seismic effect of changes in temperatures and weather patterns.
It is not clear whether the legal agreement reached at the COP27 at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, or for that matter, the previous meeting in the MENA region (COP22 in 2016 held in Bab Ighli, Marrakech, Morocco) would recoup the tangible result to come to grips with the catastrophic consequences of projected and already prevailing climate change in the region.
This implies that HCWs in the region cannot stand on the sidelines when the world is experiencing these menacing temperatures and weather patterns.
On the one hand, a study has examined awareness of the health implications of climate change among the general population and HCWs.
The data suggests that HCWs tend to have suboptimal awareness of the health implications of climate change.12 According to Kotcher et al., “health professionals have an extraordinary opportunity to become trusted voices in support of global efforts to reduce emissions and protect people from the threat of climate change”.13 Such dormant power needs to be resuscitated and accompanied by the building of an evidence-based database of the health implications of climate change.
According to the Working Group to Advance Action on Climate Change and Health, all spheres of HCWs should be able to “identify, prevent, and respond to the health impacts of climate change and environmental degradation”.14 Part of this initiative is to incorporate the health implications of climate change into curriculum and research.13 Intuitively, some healthy human activities (e.g.
walking, less gluttony) reduce the carbon footprint.
This means all cadres of the caring profession should not be bystanders of simply ‘treating the symptoms’ but be critically involved in thwarting the growing threat of a climate apocalypse.
To echo a Jamaican reggae singer, “How can you be sitting there, telling me that you care, that you care?
When every time I look around, the people suffer in the suffering, in every way, in everywhere”.
References 1.
IPCC.
Summary for policymakers.
In: Masson-Delmotte V, Zhai P, Pirani A, Connors SL, Péan C, Berger S, et al, Eds.
Climate Change 2021: The physical science basis.
Contribution of working group I to the sixth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021. pp.
3–32.
2.
Zittis G, Almazroui M, Alpert P, Ciais P, Cramer W, Dahdal Y, et al.
Climate change and weather extremes in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.
Rev Geophys 2022; 60:e2021RG000762.
3.
Vohra A.
The Middle East Is Becoming Literally Uninhabitable.
From: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/24/the-middle-eastis-becoming-literally-uninhabitable/ Accessed: Oct 2022.
4.
Neira M, Erguler K, Ahmady-Birgani H, DaifAllah Al-Hmoud N, Fears R, Gogos C, et al.
Climate change and human health in the Eastern Mediterranean and middle east: Literature review, research priorities and policy suggestions.
Environ Res 2022; 114537. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2022.114537.
5.
Evan AT, Kossin JP, Chung CE, Ramanathan V. Arabian Sea tropical cyclones intensified by emissions of black carbon and other aerosols.
Nature 2011; 479:94–7.
https://doi.org/10.1038/ nature10552.
6.
Shandas V, Voelkel J, Williams J, Hoffman J.
Integrating satellite and ground measurements for predicting locations of extreme urban heat.
Climate 2019; 7:5.
7.
Patel L, Conlon KC, Sorensen C, McEachin S, Nadeau K, Kakkad K, Kizer KW.
Climate change and extreme heat events: how health systems should prepare.
NEJM Catalyst Innovations Care Delivery 2022; 3:CAT–21.
8.
Arcaya M, Raker EJ, Waters MC.
The social consequences of disasters: Individual and community change.
Ann Rev Sociol 2020; 46:671–91.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurevsoc-121919-054827.
9.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Climate Effects on Health.
CDC 24/7: Saving lives, Proteching People.
From: https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/effects/default .
htm#:~:text=The%20health%20effects%20of%20these,and%20 threats%20to%20mental%20health Accessed: Oct 2022.
10.
Crews DE, Kawa NC, Cohen JH, Ulmer GL, Edes AN.
Climate change, uncertainty and allostatic load.
Ann Hum Biol 2019; 46:3–16.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2019.1584243.
11.
Hu K, Hale JM, Kulu H, Liu Y, Keenan K. A longitudinal analysis of the association between long-term exposure to air pollution and cognitive function among adults aged 45 and over in China.
J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci 2022; gbac162.
https://doi.
org/10.1093/geronb/gbac162.
12.
Hathaway J, Maibach EW.
Health implications of climate change: A review of the literature about the perception of the public and health professionals.
Curr Environ Health Rep 2018; 5:197–204.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40572-018-0190-3.
13.
Kotcher J, Maibach E, Miller J, Campbell E, Alqodmani L, Maiero M, et al.
Views of health professionals on climate change and health: a multinational survey study.
Lancet Planet Health 2021; 5:e316–23.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S25425196(21)00053-X.
14.
World Heart Federation.
A call for strengthening climate change education for all health professionals.
From: https:// world-heart-federation.org/news/a-call-for-strengtheningclimate-change-education-for-all-health-professionals/ Accessed: Oct 2022.
© Firenze University Press www.fupress.com/ah Acta Herpetologica 5(1): 119-130, 2010 Future climate change spells catastrophe for Blanchard’s cricket frog, Acris blanchardi (Amphibia: Anura: Hylidae) Malcolm L. McCallum Texas A&M University-Texarkana, 2600 Robison Road, Texarkana, Texas 75501, USA.
E-mail: malcolm.mccallum@herpconbio.org Submitted on: 2009, 5th June; revised on 2010, 16th March; accepted on: 2010, 19th April.
Abstract.
Climate change may be one of the greatest environmental catastrophes encountered by modern human civilization.
The potential influence of this global disaster on wildlife populations is subject to question.
I interpolated how seasonal variation in weather patterns influences growth and reproduction in the Blanchard’s cricket frog (Acris blanchardi).
Then I extrapolated the influence of future climate conditions on these life history characteristics using fuzzy regression.
Fuzzy regression was an accurate predictor of growth and reproduction based on the climate conditions present from 1900–2007.
It predicted that the climate projections expected for Arkansas by 2100 could reduce total reproductive investment in the Blanchard’s cricket frog by 33–94%.
If these results reflect responses by other poikilotherms, climate change could induce major population declines in many species.
Because poikilotherms represent the vast majority of vertebrates and significant ecosystem components, it is imperative that we implement strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and circumvent this possible catastrophe.
Key Words.
Acris blanchardi, amphibians, climate change, fuzzy regression, global warming, growth, reproduction, reproductive investment IntrodUCtIon The impending threat of climate change is a serious concern for the global scientific community (opdam and Wascher, 2004; travis, 2000).
I am especially concerned about how amphibians respond to this stressor because current amphibian extinction rates are progressing so fast (Blaustein et al., 1994; McCallum, 2007; roelants et al., 2007; Stuart et al., 2005; Wheeler et al.
2002).
The potential causes of these declines are numerous and include habitat degradation and loss (Brooks et al., 2002), introduced species (Adams, 1999), pollution (dunson et al., 1992), contaminants (reeder et al., 1998; relyea, 2005), pathogens (Berger et al., 1998; daszak et al., 2002), climate change (Pounds and Crump, 120 M.L.
McCallum 1994; Pounds et al., 1999), or interactions among several factors (McCallum and trauth, 2003; Pounds et al., 2006; trauth et al., 2006).
Alteration of precipitation patterns due to climate change may influence many aspects of the biology of an organism.
It may partly explain the demise of the golden toad (Pounds et al., 1999) and may drive amphibian disease epidemics such as chytrids (Pounds et al., 2006).
The warming climate may even reduce the intensity of sexual selection, especially by influencing call parameters (Gerhardt and Mudry, 1980; Sullivan, 1982; Cocroft and ryan, 1995).
It can reduce the overall abundance in anurans (Piha et al., 2007).
Climate associated drought can drive population fluctuations by selecting against specific age classes of rainforest frogs (Stewart, 1995) and certainly would positively or negatively influence temperate species as well.
In the case of the golden toad and the harlequin frog, the humid climate needed for survival migrated above the mountain leaving no acceptable habitat for these species (Pounds et al., 1994).
Interactions between the increased drought and agriculture-induced landscape homogenization may lead to catastrophic species declines (Piha et al., 2007).
Unfortunately, the complex relationships among climate variables and other stressors (Gunn et al., 2004) make it difficult to study their influence on amphibian life history and declines (Blaustein and Kiesecker, 2002; davidson et al., 2002).
We lack a firm understanding of the natural history for many amphibians (Bury, 2006; McCallum and McCallum, 2006; trauth, 2006).
Conservation biologists use the natural history of species as the backbone for orchestrating conservation programs and making management decisions (Bury, 2006; Greene, 2005; Wilcox and Possingham, 2002).
This makes understanding how climate change may influence natural history characteristics of utmost importance as we plan necessary conservation responses (Stenseth and Mysterud, 2002; Winkler et al., 2002).
Growth and reproduction are two of the four primary aspects of natural history traits typically related to the health of an organism (the other two are development and behavior; newman, 2001).
Growth rate and duration play major roles in determining the ultimate body size (Werner, 1986) and reproductive output (Blueweiss et al., 1978) of an individual.
Body size and growth are important metabolic determinants of an organism’s overall competitive ability (Batzli et al., 1977; Blueweiss et al., 1978; Werner, 1986) and metabolism in poikilotherms is influenced by ambient temperature (Lofts, 1972).
Generally, larger individuals have fewer predators (Werner, 1986; rowe and Ludwig, 1991; Jung, 1995; Laurila and Kujasalo, 1999), can compete better for mates (Berven, 1981; Howard, 1998; Smith, 1987), and are more resistant of desiccation (nevo, 1973a; Stewart, 1995; Wilmer et al., 2000).
Larger females typically produce larger eggs and egg clutches (darwin, 1874; Lofts, 1974; McCallum, 2003), although there are exceptions (Shine, 1988).
Therefore, stressors that suppress growth can affect reproduction and survivorship (Batzli et al., 1977; Fraser and Gilliam, 1992).
The systematics of Blanchard’s cricket frog has been the subject of much debate (McCallum, 2006; rose et al., 2006; Gamble et al., 2008).
These frogs frequently occur along stream banks and around springs (trauth et al.
2004), where they are known for their seemingly haphazard jumping patterns when escaping pursuers (McCallum, 1999).
Blanchard’s cricket frog hibernates terrestrially under rocks in Arkansas (McCallum and trauth, 2003b), oklahoma (Blair, 1951), Louisiana (Walker, 1963), and in cracks in the 121Future climate change spells catastrophe for Blanchard’s cricket frog soil in Illinois (Gray, 1971).
They have a low tolerance for inundation while hibernating (Irwin and Lee, 1999) and they often die when forced to hibernate in an aquatic laboratory setting (McCallum and trauth, 2003b).
Calling behavior and immune function are closely tied to temperature (McCallum and trauth, 2007), and we could not maintain these frogs in reproductive condition without orchestrating a combination of cool water and hot air temperatures (McCallum, 2003).
They rapidly succumb in captivity to eutrophication arising from warm water (pers.
observ.).
Males often call from inside clusters of emergent grasses near oviposition sites (pers.
observ.).
oviposition typically occurs in heavily vegetated (e.g., Myriophyllum sp., Ceratophyllum sp., and algal mats comprised of Spirogyra sp.
and Lemna sp.
), shallow water habitats (regan, 1972; McCallum, unpubl.
data) that provide ideal habitat for their larvae (Johnson 1988).
In Arkansas, metamorphs emerge from these habitats starting in early July and extending through early winter (McCallum, 2003).
They disperse along stream banks and riparian areas, generally avoiding adults possibly due to cannibalism (McCallum et al., 2001).
Froglets feed on various insects, especially Collembola (Johnson and Christiansen, 1976), with the size of prey generally increasing with body size to encompass small Hymenoptera and orthoptera (McCallum, unpubl.
data).
There is a report of attempted cannibalism by adults on metamorphs (McCallum et al., 2001).
Body size of Blanchard’s cricket frog (Acris blanchardi) varies geographically with precipitation levels (nevo, 1973b).
Males and females reach a minimum adult size in about two months after metamorphosis, but continue to grow until they die, usually within one year post-metamorphosis (McCallum, 2003).
Males begin calling in early summer, with gravid females entering the chorus largely from late May through June.
By September, juveniles of near adult size dominate the population and adults from the previous breeding season are seldom encountered (McCallum, 2003).
Because the biology of Blanchard’s cricket frog is tied to temperature, and its body size correlates regionally with precipitation, and temperature-precipitation regimes influence the biology of other poikilotherms (Kristensen et al., 2006; McCallum et al., 2009), I asked if climate change-induced temperature and precipitation flux may influence the growth rates and resulting body sizes of this frog.
I report how Blanchard’s cricket frog (A. blanchardi), may respond to these predicted changes in temperature and precipitation.
I hypothesized that annual changes in seasonal rainfall and temperature may influence growth and reproduction in the A. blanchardi leading to future changes in growth and reproduction.
If this were true, I could model interpolated growth and climate data with regression techniques (α = 0.05), and then extrapolate the influence of projected climate change on growth and reproduction using fuzzy regression techniques.
If no relationship existed, then no dependable models should be identified, making extrapolation impossible.
MAtErIALS And MEtHodS Fuzzy mathematics is a conservative, non-subjective generalization of interval analysis that is used for dealing with uncertainty, and requires fewer data than alternative methods like Monte Carlo simulations (Silvert, 1997, 2000; Ferson et al., 1999).
This method is useful with all kinds of uncertainty, and the subjective interpretations characteristic of Monte Carlo approaches are unneed122 M.L.
McCallum ed.
It is based on a consistent axiomatic system that is different from that used in probability theory (Ferson et al., 1999).
Fuzzy mathematics rates data (x-axis) based on degrees of possibility called membership values (y-axis) where y = 0 = lowest possibility and y = 1= highest possibility.
If the graphical representation is a triangle, then only one value has the membership value y = 1.
If the representation is a trapezoid, then a series of values across the top of the polygon are equally possible and all have membership values y = 1.
All other x-values have decreasing membership values (i.e., possibilities) as y approaches zero.
Fuzzy mathematics is particularly useful where high levels of uncertainty such as ambiguity, non-specificity, discord, and fuzziness exist (Klir and Yuan 1994).
Extrapolation of future events is difficult to interpret and plagued by uncertainty.
Fuzzy mathematics is specifically useful for dealing with this kind of uncertainty and the associated questionable data sets (Silvert, 1997, 2000; Ferson et al., 1999), making it well suited for analyzing the effects of future climate change on the life history of an organism.
I interpolated climate patterns (national oceanic and Atmospheric Association [noAA], 2000) with reproduction and growth data from A. crepitans (table 1; McCallum, 2003) using multiple and best subsets regression (neter et al., 1996).
I used seasonal average temperatures and levels of precipitation because seasonal timing of climate events may be more important than annual variation (Arak, 1983; McCallum et al., 2009).
Then I used fuzzy regression techniques where the variables were fuzzy (taheri, 2003) with previously reported climate change scenarios (U.S. EPA, 1998) to extrapolate growth and reproductive outcomes.
I constructed fuzzy numbers using the maximum, minimum, and best predictions of climate change in Arkansas by 2100 (table 1; U.S. EPA, 1998).
I substituted fuzzy numbers for the variables in the predictive regression models, then I combined the regression models using substitution to construct more complex regression models that predicted the snout-vent length (SVL), body mass (BM), body condition score (BCS), ovarian length (oL), number of mature ova (Mo), maximum ova diameter (od), egg volume (EV), and total investment Table 1.
Average seasonal temperature (ºC) and precipitation (cm) data observed from 1901 – 2007 (noAA, 2000), predicted due to climate change by 2100 (U.S. EPA 1998), and the associated fuzzy numbers.
The mean/best column refers to the average from 1901-2007 or the best estimate from the United Kingdom Hadley Center’s Climate Model (HadCM2).
Low Mean/Best High Fuzzy number Mean Winter temperature 1901-2007 1.28 5.42 9.11 [1.28, 5.42, 9.11] Mean Spring temperature 1901-2006 13.60 15.74 17.61 [13.60, 15.74, 17.61] Mean Summer temperature 1901-2006 24.28 26.04 26.33 [24.28, 26.04, 26.33] Mean Fall temperature 1901-2006 13.50 19.34 19.56 [13.50, 19.34, 19.56] Mean Winter Precipitation 1901-2007 10.26 30.86 58.62 [10.26, 30.86, 58.62] Mean Spring Precipitation 1901-2006 6.21 14.90 26.83 [6.21, 14.90, 26.83] Mean Summer Precipitation 1901-2006 10.64 28.07 44.78 [10.64, 28.07, 44.78] Mean Fall Precipitation 1901-2006 11.61 28.75 58.65 [11.61, 28.75, 58.65] Predicted Winter temperature 2100 5.97 6.01 8.74 [5.97, 6.01, 8.74] Predicted Spring temperature 2100 16.32 17.43 18.54 [16.32, 17.43, 18.54] Predicted Summer temperature 2100 26.60 27.15 29.37 [26.60, 27.15, 29.37] Predicted Fall temperature 2100 17.14 18.25 19.36 [17.14, 18.25, 19.36] Predicted Winter Precipitation 2100 10.26 30.86 58.62 [10.26, 30.86, 58.62] Predicted Spring Precipitation 2100 39.58 43.35 47.12 [39.58, 43.35, 47.12] Predicted Summer Precipitation 2100 30.73 34.93 39.12 [30.73, 34.93, 39.12] Predicted Fall Precipitation 2100 30.38 33.27 36.16 [30.38, 33.27, 36.16] 123Future climate change spells catastrophe for Blanchard’s cricket frog in reproduction (tI).
I validated these models by comparing observed reproductive and growth data to the average values that were derived from fuzzy regressions using weather data from 1901-2007.
Then I compared the modeled results from 1901-2007 to the extrapolated results for 2100 to infer the risk of climate change to reproduction in A. blanchardi.
rESULtS Interpolation of climate effects on growth and reproduction resulted in equations 9 – 11 (table 2).
Many of the equations predicted intervals for life history traits resembled previously reported values (McCallum, 2003).
For example, fuzzy climate variables gave accurate fuzzy intervals for SVL and BM.
BCS was a better predictor of oL than was SVL, although SVL provided accurate results for the number of Mo.
BCS and oL that was derived from the BCS (oLBCS) gave similar outputs and reflected previous reports for the diameter of the od (McCallum, 2003).
ovarian length that was derived from SVL (oLSVL) was not a good Table 2. regression models for growth and reproductive traits in the northern Cricket Frog (Acris crepitans).
Key: BM = body mass (g), SVL = Snout-vent length (mm), BCS = body condition score, oL = ovarian length (mm), Lo = largest ova diameter (µm), MF = mature follicles (n), VF = vitellogenic follicles (n), Wt = winter temperature (ºC), SPt = spring temperature (ºC), Fr = fall rain (cm), SPr = spring rain (cm), SUr = summer rain (cm), Wr = winter rain (cm).
1.
SVL♀ vs. oL (r2 = 0.200, df = 3, 57, P = 0.005): oL = 30.8410 – 4.11180 SVL + 0.198410 SVL2 – 0.0028678 SVL3 2.
BCS♀ vs. oL (r2 = 0.156, df = 1, 45, P = 0.006): oL = 2.40320 + 77.6546 BCS 3.
BCS♀ vs.
Lo (r2 = 0.311, df = 1, 45, P < 0.001) Lo = -179.298 + 14024.0 BCS 4. oL vs.
Lo (r2 = 0.612, df = 2, 62, P < 0.001): Lo = -420.728 + 190.576 oL – 5.15409 oL2 5.
SVL♀ vs. MF (r2 = 0.273, df = 3, 28, P = 0.028): MF = (1253.58 – 147.312 SVL + 5.5347 SVL2 – 0.0568778 SVL3) (2 ovaries) 6.
SVL♀ vs. Vo (r2 = 0.231, df = 31, P = 0.022): Vo = 632.575 – 47.9119 SVL + 1.22306 SVL2 7.
BM♀ (r2 = .840, P < 0.001): BM = 0.193950 – 0.0449324 SVL + 0.0029810 SVL2 + 0.0000419 SVL3 8.
BM♂ (r2 = 0.771, P < 0.001): BM = 0.560328 + 0.0213750 SVL + 0.0024595 SVL2 9.
SVL♀ vs. Wt, SPt, SUr, and SPr (r2 = 0.031, df = 4, 1386, P < 0.001: SVL = 33.1 0.835 Wt – 0.626 SPt + 0.0453 SUr – 0.0334 SPr 10.
BCS♀ vs. Wt, Fr, Wr, SPr (r2 = 0.049, df = 4, 1386, P < 0.001: BCS = 0.0850 – 0.00431 (Wt) – 0.000298 (Fr) + 0.000224 (Wr) – 0.000194 (SPr).
11.
BM♀ vs Wt, Fr, Wr, SPr (r2 = 0.035, df = 4, 1386, P < 0.001: BM = 2.00 – 0.109 (Wt) – 0.00648 (Fr) + 0.0565 (Wr) – 0.00604 (SPr) 124 M.L.
McCallum Ta bl e 3.
F uz zy e st im at es o f lif e hi st or y ch ar ac te ri st ic s un de r th e cl im at e ob se rv ed f ro m 1 90 120 07 a nd p re di ct ed c ha ng es b y 21 00 .
n um be rs i n br ac ke ts a re fu zz y es tim at es r ep re se nt in g th e ve rt ic es o f th ei r tr ia ng ul ar o r tr ap ez oi da l s ha pe .
P er ce nt ag es i n pa re nt he se s ar e th e pe rc en ta ge c ha ng e in t he s ta tis tic w ith a m em be rs hi p va lu e = 1.
M V 0 i s th e m em be rs hi p va lu e w he n th e lif e hi st or y tr ai t = 0 .
Li fe H is to ry t ra it M cC al lu m 2 00 3 C al cu la te d 19 01 -2 00 7 Pr ed ic te d 21 00 % C ha ng e SV L ♀ ( m m ) 21 .5 3 Sd = 1 .8 7 [1 4.
06 , 1 9.
49 , 2 5.
34 ] [1 4.
01 5, 1 7.
30 , 1 8.
35 ] [44 .6 9, 11 .2 3, 3 0.
55 ] B M ♀ ( g) 1.
71 S d = 0 .7 4 [1 .0 4, 2 .8 8, 5 .0 6] [2 .2 7, 2 .6 1, 2 .6 6] [55 .1 0, 9.
23 , 1 54 .3 6] B C S ♀ 0.
05 1 Sd = 0 .2 9 [0 .0 25 , 0 .0 57 , 0 .0 88 ] [0 .0 34 , 0 .0 46 8, 0 .0 47 6, 0 .4 95 ] [60 .9 7, 16 .4 8, 1 85 0.
6] o L us in g SV L (m m ) 5.
86 m m S d = 2 .0 [80 .7 9, 4 .8 4, 9 2.
46 ] [23 .3 5, 4 .2 4, 3 2.
12 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -1 2.
4% ) o L us in g B C S (m m ) 5.
86 m m S d = 2 .0 [4 .3 7, 6 .8 4, 9 .2 3] [5 .0 7, 6 .1 1, 4 0.
80 ] [45 .1 0, 10 .6 9, 8 33 .3 ] Lo u si ng B C S (µ m ) 48 0.
9 Sd = 2 77 .9 [1 76 .2 3, 6 21 .3 9, 1 05 4.
11 ] [3 02 .1 , 4 89 .4 42 , 4 89 .4 45 , 6 75 5.
8] [71 .3 , 21 .2 , 21 .2 , 3 73 4] Lo u si ng o L S V L (µ m ) 48 0.
9 Sd = 2 77 .9 [59 87 9, 3 80 .9 2, 1 71 99 .9 ] [10 18 9.
25 , 2 94 .8 3, 5 70 0.
98 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -1 2.
4% ) Lo u si ng o L B C S ( µm ) 48 0.
9 Sd = 2 77 .9 [27 .0 0, 6 41 .6 7, 1 23 9.
86 ] [80 36 .3 1, 5 50 .7 9, 5 50 .8 0, 7 22 3.
20 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -2 2.
6% ) A ve ra ge L o ( µm ) 48 0.
9 Sd = 2 77 .9 [19 90 9.
93 ,5 47 .9 9, 64 97 .9 6] {59 74 ,4 45 ,6 56 0] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -1 8.
8% ) M F 15 7, S d = 1 7.
87 [46 22 ,1 28 ,5 15 6] [14 28 ,1 34 ,1 79 2] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( +4 .5 % ) EV B C S ( µm 3 ) -[2 .2 9e 7, 1 .0 1e 9, 4 .9 1e 9] [1 .4 4 e7 , 6 .1 4 e7 , 1 .6 1 e1 1] [99 .7 , 93 .9 , 7 03 0] EV o LS V L (µ m 3 ) -[1.
12 e1 4, 2 .8 9e 7, 2 .6 6e 12 ] [5.
54 e1 1, 1 .3 4e 7, 9 .7 0e 10 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -5 3.
6% ) EV o LB C S ( µm 3 ) -[1 .0 3e 4, 1 .3 8e 8, 9 .9 8e 8] [2.
72 e1 1, 8 .7 5e 7, 1 .9 7e 11 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -3 6.
6% ) t I B C S (µ m 3 ) -[2.
27 e1 3, 1 .2 9e 11 , 2 .5 3e 13 ] [ -2 .3 e1 4, 8 .2 3e 09 , 2 .8 9e 14 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -9 3.
6% ) t I o LS V L (µ m 3 ) -[5.
77 e1 7, 3 .7 0e 09 , 5 .1 8e 17 ] [ -9 .9 3e 14 , 1 .8 0e 09 , 7 .9 1e 14 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -5 1.
4% ) t I o LB C S (µ m 3 ) -[4.
61 e1 2, 1.
77 e1 0, 5.
15 e1 2] [ -4 .8 7e 14 , 1 .1 7e 10 , 3 .8 8e 14 ] M V 0 > 0 .9 , ( -3 3.
9% ) 125Future climate change spells catastrophe for Blanchard’s cricket frog predictor of od.
Some of the fuzzy regression results gave large intervals, but x-values with high membership values (Y > 0.5) resembled previous reports (McCallum 2003).
These data predict reduced SVL, BM, BCS, oL, and od by 2100; whereas, they predict increased Mo relative to 1901-2007 predictions (table 3).
This culminated in a large reduction in EV (36-94% drop) and ultimately, tI (37-94% drop; table 3).
Mo, EV, and tI had high membership values greater than 0.9 for X = 0.
Any time X < 0, it was considered to be biologically zero because no investment existed in that trait.
dISCUSSIon The fuzzy regression produced fuzzy intervals for 1901-2007, which included values similar to actual observations (McCallum, 2003).
That finding appears to validate the accuracy of the fuzzy regression approach for predicting climate effects on life history traits.
This method provides us with greater confidence in the fuzzy regression forecasts (Heshmaty and Kandel, 1985) for future climate influences on these life history traits.
overall, it revealed that both growth and reproduction in this species could be severely hampered by prospective climate change scenarios.
not surprisingly, BCS and oLBCS provided similar predictions of od.
The small differences between these results may reflect differences in rounding between the calculations for each, or amplification of error in the oLBCS results.
The oLSVL underestimated od relative to actual observations and calculations obtained from BCS and oLBCS.
This is probably because egg size is generally related to both the body size and the amount of fat stores available for investment in ova (Lofts, 1974).
The SVL tells little about the available fat stores, whereas individuals with sufficient resources for reproduction will generally have higher BCS values (darwin, 1874; Lofts, 1974).
Therefore, the variation between these predictors seems to follow conventional wisdom in that larger females have larger ovaries, hence greater numbers of larger ova (Zera and Harshman, 2001).
Although most life history traits decreased under the predicted changes in Arkansas climate, Mo increased 4.5%.
Generally, we expect larger females to produce more ova (Zera and Harshman, 2001).
This trade-off between ova size and ova number may be adaptive under high stress conditions.
Unfortunately, the small increase does not counterbalance the ultimately reduced reproductive investment experienced by frogs in 2100.
The frogs are producing a few more eggs, but these are much smaller than ideal.
Smaller egg size due to climate change is likely to reduce survivorship of larvae and ultimately recruitment (Zera and Harshman, 2001).
These results suggest future concern for populations of A. crepitans.
These anurans are adapted to current climate conditions.
I thought that increased precipitation would promote this species, but the complex interactions among seasonal perturbations in rainfall and ambient temperature may instead be detrimental.
This is a critical point for those studying the influence of climate variables on life histories.
timing of climate patterns may be more important than the annual changes involved.
Summer temperature was not a factor in any model.
This may be because predicted increases in summer temperatures are unrelated to periods of dormancy in this species.
Warmer spring or fall temperatures resulting from climate change would shorten the dormancy period as warmer tempera126 M.L.
McCallum tures persist longer into the winter and ensue earlier in the spring.
This could lengthen the period of activity for this species and/or increase the metabolic rate of the frogs that do not return from dormancy.
This could reduce the BCS as they burn resources due to these periods of warm weather leading to increased metabolism without raised intake of food (Lofts, 1972).
This could drain resources available for growth and reproduction during the following breeding season.
other kinds of stressors such as immune stress are known to similarly reduce reproduction and growth in male A. crepitans (McCallum and trauth, 2007).
reduced reproduction and body growth can influence age-specific reproduction, survival rates, population growth rates, effective population sizes, and censused population sizes (Soule and Mills, 1998), and these factors can feed back on themselves (Gilpin and Soule, 1986) leading to an extinction vortex.
(Mills, 2007).
Therefore, my extrapolations provide evidence that future climate change could seriously impair this species, especially the already declining populations in the northern parts of its range (Lehtinen and Skinner, 2006).
on a broader scale, the results of this study draw concern about the potential for climate change to similarly impact poikilothermic vertebrates, potentially driving them to extinction.
Amphibians, reptiles, and fishes represent most of the vertebrate species on the planet (Wilson, 1992) and are responsible for significant ecosystem services (Balvanera et al., 2001; Schlaepfer et al., 1999; Myers, 1996), form the prey base for many other organisms (Blaustein and Kiesecker, 2002.
), and provide population control of many pest organisms (Hirai and Matsui, 1999) including vectors of serious human diseases (durvasula et al., 1997).
Most of these organisms have poor dispersal ability (Gibbs, 2004; Bohonak, 1999) are unlikely to migrate with moving climates during a mere century, and their physiology is tightly tied to temperature (McCallum and trauth, 2007), thereby amplifying effects of local climate change on life history traits.
For this reason, pre-emptive strategies that aim for elimination of greenhouse gasses remain both the best and imperative courses of action for the conservation of amphibians and similar poikilotherms.
ACKnoWLEdGEMEntS Many thanks to W. Meshaka for his valuable input on a previous version of this manuscript.
rEFErEnCES Adams, M.J. (1999): Correlated factors in amphibian decline: exotic species and habitat change in western Washington.
J. Wildl.
Manage.
63: 1162-1171.
Arak, A.
(1983): Male-male competition and mate choice in anuran amphibians.
In: Bateson, P.P.G., Ed, Mate Choice, p. 181-210.
Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge.
Balvanera, P., daily, G.C., Erlich, P.r., ricketts, t., Bailey, S.A., Kark, S., Kremen, C., Pereira, H. (2001): Conserving biodiversity and ecosystem services.
Science 291: 2047.
Berger, L., Speare, r., daszak, P., Green, d.E., Cunningham, A.A., Goggin, C.L., Slocombe, r., ragan, M.A., Hyatt, A.d., Mcdonald, K.r., Hines, H.B., Lipps, K.r., Marantelli, 127Future climate change spells catastrophe for Blanchard’s cricket frog G., Parkes, H. (1998): Chytridiomycosis causes amphibian mortality associated with population declines in the rain forests of Australia and Central America.
Proc.
nat.
Acad.
Sci.
U.S.A. 95: 9031-9036.
Berven, K.A.
(1981): Mate choice in the Wood Frog, Rana sylvatica.
Evolution 35: 707-722.
Blaustein, A.r., Kiesecker, J.M.
(2002): Complexity in conservation: lessons from the global decline of amphibian populations.
Ecol.
Let.
5: 597-608.
Blaustein, A.r., Wake, d.B., Sousa, W.P.
(1994): Amphibian declines judging stability, persistence, and susceptibility of populations to local and global extinctions.
Conserv.
Biol.
8: 60-71.
Blueweiss, L., Fox, H., Kudzma, V., nakashima, d., Peters, r., Sams, S. (1978): relationships between body size and some life history parameters.
oecologia 37: 257-272.
Bohonak, A.J.
(1999): dispersal, gene flow, and population structure.
Quart.
rev.
Biol.
74: 21-45.
Brooks, t.M., Mittermeier, r.A., Mittermeier, C.G., da Fonseca, G.A.B., rylands, A.B., Konstant, W.r., Flick, P., Pilgrim, J., oldfield, S., Magin, G., Hilton-taylor, C. (2002): Habitat loss and extinction in the hotspots of biodiversity.
Conserv.
Biol.
16: 1523-1739.
Bury, r.B.
(2006): natural history, field ecology, and conservation: time to connect the dots.
Herpetol.
Conserv.
Biol.
1: 56-61.
Cocroft, r.B., ryan, M.J. (1995): Patterns of advertisement call evolution in toads and chorus frogs.
Anim.
Behav.
49: 283-303. darwin, C.r.
(1874): The descent of Man, and Selection in relation to Sex, 2nd edition.
d. Appleton and Company, new York, new York, U.S.A. daszak, P., Cunningham, A.A., Hyatt, A.d. (2003): Infectious diseases and amphibian population declines.
divers.
distrib.
9: 141-352. davidson, C., H.B., Shaffer, Jennings, M.r.
(2002): Spatial tests of the pesticide drift, habitat destruction, UV-B, and climate-change hypotheses for California amphibian declines.
Conserv.
Biol.
16: 1588-1601. dunson, W.A., Wyman, r.L., Corbett, E.S.
(1992): A symposium on amphibian declines and habitat acidification.
J. Herpetol.
26: 349-352. durvasula, r.V., Gumbs, A., Panackal, A., Kruglov, o., Aksoy, S., Merrifield, r.B., richards, F.F., Beard, C.B.
(1997): Prevention of insect-borne disease: An approach using transgenic symbiotic bacteria.
Proc.
natl.
Acad.
Sci.
U.S.A. 94: 3274-2378.
Ferson, S., root, W., Kuhn, r. (1999): rAMAS risk Calc: risk Assessment with Uncertain numbers.
Applied Biomathematics, Setauket, new York, USA.
Fraser, d.F., Gilliam, J.F.
(1992): nonlethal impacts of predator invasion: facultative suppression of growth and reproduction.
Ecology 73: 959-970.
Gamble, t., Berendzen, P.B., Shaffer, H.B., Starkey, d.E., Simons, A.M. (2008): Species limits and phylogeography of north American cricket frogs (Acris: Hylidae).
Mol.
Phyl.
Evol.
48: 112-115.
McCallum, M.L.
(2006): An evaluation of the subspecies Acris crepitans blanchardi (Anura, Hylidae).
Zootaxa 1104: 1-21.
Gerhardt, H.C., Mudry, K.M.
(1980): temperature effects on frequency preferences and mating call frequencies in the green treefrog, Hyla cinerea (Anura: Hylidae).
J. Comp.
Physiol.
A: neuroethol.
Sens.
neural Behav.
Physiol.
137: 1432-1351.
Gibbs, J.P. (1998): distribution of woodland amphibians along a forest fragmentation gradient.
Land.
Ecol.
13: 263-268.
128 M.L.
McCallum Gilpin, M.E, Soule, M.E.
(1986): Minimum viable populations: processes of species extinction.
In: Soule, M.E., Ed, Conservation Biology: the Science of Scarcity and diversity, p. 18-34.
Sinauer Associates, Sunderland.
Green, H.W.
(2005): organisms in nature as a central focus for biology.
trends Ecol.
Evol.
20: 23-27.
Gunn, J.M., Snucins, E., Yan, n.d., Arts, M.t.
(2004): Use of water clarity to monitor the effects of climate change and other stressors on oligotrophic lakes.
Environ.
Monit.
Assess.
67: 1573-2959.
Heshmaty, B., Kandel, A.. (1985): Fuzzy linear regression and its applications to forecasting in uncertain environments.
Fuzzy Sets Sys.
15: 159-191.
Hirai, t., Matsui, M. (1999): Feeding habits of the Pond Frog, Rana nigromaculata, inhabiting rice fields in Kyoto, Japan.
Copeia 1999: 940-947.
Howard, r.d., Martens, r.S., Innis, S.A., drnevich, J.M., Hale, J.
(1998): Mate choice and mate competition influence male body size in Japanese Medaka.
Anim.
Behav.
55: 1151-1163.
IUCn, Conservation International, and natureServe.
(2006): Global Amphibian Assessment.
Available: http://www.globalamphibians.org.
Accessed on 29 october 2008.
Johnson, B.K., Christiansen, J.L.
(1976): The food habits of Blanchard’s cricket frog, Acris crepitans blanchardi (Amphibia, Anura, Hylidae), in Iowa.
J. Herpetol.
10: 63-74.
Johnson, L.M.
(1988): Habitat selection in relation to food and feeding strategies of larval northern cricket frogs (Acris crepitans).
Unpublished Masters Thesis, Illinois State University.
normal.
Jung, r.E., and Jagoe, C.H.
(1995): Effects of low pH and aluminum on body size, swimming performance, and susceptibility to predation of green tree frog (Hyla cinerea) tadpoles.
Can.
J. Zool.
73: 2171-2183.
Klir, G.J., Yuan, B.
(1994): Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic: Theory and Applications.
Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle river.
Kristensen, d.M., Jourgensen, t.r., Larsen, r.K., Forchhammer, M.C., Christoffersen, K.S.
(2006): Inter-annual growth of Arctic Charr (Salvelinus alpines, L.) in relation to climate variation.
BMC Ecology 6: 85-93.
Laurance, W.F.
(1996): Catastrophic declines of Australian rainforest frogs: Is unusual weather responsible?
Biol.
Conserv.
77: 203-212.
Laurila, A. Kujasalo, J.
(1999).
Habitat duration, predation risk and phenotypic plasticity in common frog (Rana temporaria) tadpoles.
J. Anim.
Ecol.
68:1123-1132.
Lehtinen, r.M., Skinner, A.A. (2006): The enigmatic decline of Blanchard’s Cricket Frog (Acris crepitans blanchardi) hypothesis.
Copeia 2006: 159-167.
McCallum, M. L. (2007): Amphibian decline or extinction?
Current declines dwarf background extinction rate.
Journal of Herpetology 41:483-491.
McCallum, M.L.
(2003): reproductive Ecology and taxonomic Status of Acris crepitans blanchardi with Additional Investigations on the Hamilton and Zuk Hypothesis.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
Arkansas State University, Jonesboro.
McCallum, M.L.
(1999): Acris crepitans (northern cricket frog).
death feigning.
Herpetol.
rev.
30: 90.
129Future climate change spells catastrophe for Blanchard’s cricket frog McCallum, M.L., McCallum, J.L.
(2006): Publication trends of natural history and field studies in herpetology.
Herpetol.
Conserv.
Biol.
1: 62-67.
McCallum, M.L., trauth, S.E.
(2007): Physiological trade-offs between immunity and reproduction in the northern Cricket Frog (Acris crepitans).
Herpetologica 63: 269-274.
McCallum, M.L., trauth, S.E.
(2003): A forty-three year museum study of northern Cricket Frog (Acris crepitans) abnormalities in Arkansas: upward trends and distributions.
J. Wildl.
dis.
39: 522-528.
McCallum, M.L., trauth, S.E.
(2003): Acris crepitans (northern cricket frog).
Communal hibernaculum.
Herpetol.
rev.
34: 241.
McCallum, M.L., McCallum, J.L., trauth, S.E.
(2009): Prediction of climate change impacts on the growth and size at maturity of three-toed box turtles.
Amphibiareptilia 30: 259-264.
McCallum, M.L., Wheeler, B.A., trauth, S.E.
(2001): Acris crepitans (northern cricket frog).
Attempted cannibalism.
Herpetol.
rev.
32: 99-100.
Mills, L.S.
(2007): Conservation of Wildlife Populations: demography, Genetics, and Management.
Blackwell Publishing, Malden.
Myers, n. (1996): Environmental services of biodiversity.
Ecology 93: 2764-2769. national oceanic and Atmospheric Association (noAA) (2000): U.S.
Climate at a Glance.
<http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/cag3.html>.
Accessed on 29 october 2008. neter, J., Kutner, M.H., nachsheim, C.J., Wasserman, W. (1996): Applied Linear Models, 4th ed.
McGraw Hill, St. Louis.
nevo, E. (1973a): Adaptive color polymorphism in cricket frogs.
Evolution 27: 353-367. nevo, E. (1973b): Adaptive variation in size of cricket frogs.
Ecology 54: 1271-1281. newman, M.C.
(1998): Fundamentals of Ecotoxicology.
Ann Arbor Press.
Ann Arbor, MI, USA.
opdam, P., Wascher, d. (2004): Climate change meets habitat fragmentation: linking landscape and biogeographical scale levels in research and conservation.
Biol.
Conserv.
117: 285-297.
Piha, H.A., Luoto, M., Piha, M., and Merila, J.
(2007): Anuran abundance and persistence in agricultural landscapes during a climatic extreme.
Global Change Biol.
13: 300-311.
Pounds, J.A., Crump, M.L.
(1994): Amphibian declines and climate disturbance: the case of the Golden toad and the Harlequin Frog.
Conserv.
Biol.
8: 72-85.
Pounds, J.A., Fogeden, M.P., Campbell, J.H.
(1999): Biological response to climate change on a tropical mountain.
nature 398: 611-615.
Pounds, J.A., Bustamante, M.r., Coloma, L.A., Consuegra, J.A., Fogden, M.P.L., Foster, P.n., La Marca, E., Masters, K.L., Merino-Viteri, A., Puschendorf, r., ron, S.r., Sanchez-Azofeifa, G.A., Still, C.J., Young, B.E.
(2006): Widespread amphibian extinctions from epidemic disease driven by global warming.
nature 439: 161-167.
Schlaepfer, F., Schmid, B., Seidl, L. (1999): Expert estimates about effects of biodiversity on ecosystem processes and services.
oikos 84: 346-351. reeder, A.L., Foley, G.L., nichols, d.K., Hansen, L.G., Wikoff, B., Faeh, S., Eisold, J., Wheeler, M.B., Warner, r., Murphy, J.E., Beasley, V.r.
(1998): Forms and prevalence of intersexuality and effects of environmental contaminants on sexuality in Cricket Frogs (Acris crepitans).
Environ.
Health Persp.
106: 261-266. regan, G.t.
(1972): natural and man-made conditions determining the range of Acris.
Unpublished Ph.
d. dissertation.
University of Kansas.
Lawrence.
130 M.L.
McCallum reylea, r.A., Schoeffner, n.M., Hoverman, J.t.
(2005): Pesticides and amphibians: the importance of community context.
Ecol.
Appl.
15: 1125-1134. roelants, K., Gower, d.J., Wilkinson, M., Loader, S.P., Biju, S.d., Guillaume, K., Moriau, L., Bossuyt, F. (2007): Global patterns of diversification in the history of modern amphibians.
Proc.
natl.
Acad.
Sci.
U.S.A. 104: 887-892. rose, F.L., Simpson, t.r., Forstner, M.r.
J., McHenry, d.J., Williams, J.
(2006): taxonomic status of Acris gryllus paludicola: In search of the pink frog.
J. Herpetol.
40: 428-434. rowe, L., Ludwig, d. (1991): Size and timing of metamorphosis in complex life cycles: time constraints and variation.
Ecology 72: 413-427.
Shine, r. (1988): The evolution of large body size in females: a critique of darwin’s “Fecundity Advantage” Model.
Am.
nat.
131: 121-131.
Silvert, W. (1997): Ecological impact classification with fuzzy sets.
Ecol.
Model.
96: 1-10.
Smith, d.C. (1987): Adult recruitment in chorus frogs: effects of size and date at metamorphosis.
Ecology 68: 344-350.
Soule, M.E., Mills, L.S.
(1998): no need to isolate genetics.
Science 282: 1658-1659.
Stenseth, n.C., Mysterud, A.
(2002): Climate, changing phenologies, and other life history traits: nonlinearity and match-mismatch to the environment.
Proc.
natl.
Acad.
Sci.
U.S.A. 99: 13379-13381.
Stewart, M.M.
(1995): Climate drives population fluctuations in rainforest frogs.
J. Herpetol.
29: 437-446.
Stuart, S.n., Chanson, J.S., Cox, n.A., Young, B.E., rodrigues, A.S.L., Fischman, d.L., Waller, r.W.
(2004): Status and trends of amphibian declines and extinctions worldwide.
Science 306: 1783-1786.
Sullivan, B.K.
(1982): Significance of size, temperature and call attributes to sexual selection.
J. Herpetol.
16: 103-106. taheri, S.M.
(2003): trends in Fuzzy Statistics.
Aus.
J. Stat.
32: 239-257. trauth, S.E.
(2006): A personal glimpse into natural history and a revisit of a classic paper by Fred r. Cagle.
Herpetol.
Conserv.
Biol.
1: 68-70. trauth, J.B., trauth, S.E., Johnson, r.L.
(2006): Best management practices and drought combine to silence the Illinois Chorus Frog in Arkansas.
Wildl.
Soc.
Bull.
34: 514-518. trauth, S.E., robison, H.W., Plummer, M.V.
(2004): The Amphibians and reptiles of Arkansas.
University of Arkansas Press.
Fayetteville.
travis, J.M.J.
(2000): Climate change and habitat destruction: a deadly anthropogenic cocktail.
Proc.
r. Soc.
Ser.
B 270: 467-473.
U.S. EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency (1998): Climate change and Arkansas.
office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation.
EPA 236-F-98-007d.
Werner, E.E.
(1986): Amphibian metamorphosis: Growth rate, predation risk, and the optimal size at transformation.
Am.
nat.
128: 319-341.
Wilcox, C., Possingham, H. (2002): do life history traits affect the accuracy of diffusion approximations for mean time to extinction?
Ecol.
Appl.
12: 1163-1179.
Wilson, E.o.
(1992): The diversity of Life.
norton & Company, new York, new York.
Winkler, d.W, dunn, P.o., McCulloch, C.E.
(2002): Predicting the effects of climate change on avian life-history traits.
Proc.
natl.
Acad.
Sci.
U.S.A. 99: 13595-13599.
Wheeler, B.A., McCallum, M.L., trauth, S.E.
(2002): Abnormalities in the ozark hellbender, Cryptobranchus alleganiensis bishop.
J. Ark.
Acad.
Sci.
56: 250-252.
Orapuh Journal 1 OPEN ACCESS SPECIAL EDITORIAL ISSN: 2644-3740 Orapuh | https://orapuh.org/orapj https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/orapj.v3i1.3 COP27 Climate Change Conference: Urgent action needed for Africa and the world Atwoli, L.1, Erhabor, G. E.2, Gbakima, A. A.3, Haileamlak, A.4, Ntumba, J. K.5, Kigera, J.6, Laybourn-Langton, L.7, Mash, B.8, Muhia, J.9, Mulaudzi, F. M.10, Ofori-Adjei, D.11, Okonofua, F.12, Rashidian, A.13, El-Adawy, M.14, Sidibé, S.15, Snouber, A.16, Tumwine, J.17, Yassien, M. S.18, Yonga, P.19, Zakhama, L.20, & Zielinski, C.21 1 Editor-in-Chief, East African Medical Journal 2 Editor-in-Chief, West African Journal of Medicine 3 Editor-in-Chief, Sierra Leone Journal of Biomedical Research 4 Editor-in-Chief, Ethiopian Journal of Health Sciences 5 Chief Editor, Annales Africaines de Medecine 6 Editor-in-Chief, Annals of African Surgery 7 University of Exeter 8 Editor-in-Chief, African Journal of Primary Health Care & Family Medicine 9 London School of Medicine and Tropical Hygiene 10 Editor-in-Chief, Curationis 11 Editor-in-Chief, Ghana Medical Journal 12 Editor-in-Chief, African Journal of Reproductive Health 13 Executive Editor, Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 14 Director of Health Promotion, Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 15 Director of Publication, Mali Médical 16 Managing Editor, Journal de la Faculté de Médecine d’Oran 17 Editor-in-Chief, African Health Sciences 18 Editor-in-Chief, Evidence-Based Nursing Research 19 Managing Editor, East African Medical Journal 20 Editor-in-Chief, La Tunisie Médicale 21 University of Winchester Correspondence: chris.zielinski@ukhealthalliance.org Wealthy nations must step up support for Africa and vulnerable countries in addressing past, present and future impacts of climate change The 2022 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) paints a dark picture of the future of life on earth, characterised by ecosystem collapse, species extinction, and climate hazards such as heatwaves and floods (1).
These are all linked to physical and mental health problems, with direct and indirect consequences of increased morbidity and mortality.
To avoid these catastrophic health effects across all regions of the globe, there is broad agreement—as 231 health journals argued together in 2021—that the rise in global temperature must be limited to less than 1.5oC compared with pre-industrial levels.
While the Paris Agreement of 2015 outlines a global action framework that incorporates providing climate finance to developing countries, this support has yet to materialise (2).
COP27 is the fifth Conference of the Parties (COP) to be organised in Africa since its inception in 1995.
Ahead of this meeting, we—as health journal editors from across the continent—call for urgent action to ensure it is the COP that finally delivers climate justice for Africa and vulnerable countries.
This is essential not just for the health of those countries, but for the health of the whole world.
AFRICA HAS SUFFERED DISPROPORTIONATELY ALTHOUGH IT HAS DONE LITTLE TO CAUSE THE CRISIS The climate crisis has had an impact on the environmental and social determinants of health across Africa, leading to devastating health effects (3).
Impacts on health can result directly from environmental shocks and indirectly through socially mediated effects (4).
Climate change-related risks in Africa include flooding, drought, heatwaves, reduced food production, and reduced labour productivity (5).
Droughts in sub-Saharan Africa have tripled between 197079 and 2010-2019 (6).
In 2018, devastating cyclones impacted three million people in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (6).
In west and central Africa, severe flooding resulted in mortality and forced migration from loss of shelter, cultivated land, and livestock (7).
Changes in vector ecology brought about by floods and damage to environmental hygiene have led to increases in diseases across sub-Saharan Africa, with rises in malaria, dengue fever, Lassa fever, Rift Valley fever, Lyme disease, Ebola virus, West Nile virus and other infections (8, 9).
Rising sea levels reduce water quality, leading to water-borne diseases, including diarrhoeal diseases, a leading cause of mortality in Africa (8).
Extreme weather damages water and food supply, increasing food insecurity and malnutrition, which causes 1.7 million deaths annually in Africa (10).
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, malnutrition has increased by almost 50% since 2012, owing to the central role agriculture plays in African economies (11).
Environmental shocks and their knock-on effects also cause severe harm to mental health (12).
In all, it is estimated that the climate crisis has destroyed a fifth of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the countries most vulnerable to climate shocks (13).
The damage to Africa should be of supreme concern to all nations.
This is partly for moral reasons.
It is highly unjust that the most impacted nations have contributed the least to global cumulative emissions, which are driving the climate crisis and its increasingly severe effects.
North America and mailto:chris.zielinski@ukhealthalliance.org Special Editorial, Orapuh Journal 2022, 3(1), e903 2 COP27 Climate Change Conference: urgent action needed for Africa and the world Orapuh | https://orapuh.org/orapj https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/orapj.v3i1.3 Europe have contributed 62% of carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial Revolution, whereas Africa has contributed only 3% (14).
THE FIGHT AGAINST THE CLIMATE CRISIS NEEDS ALL HANDS ON DECK Yet it is not just for moral reasons that all nations should be concerned for Africa.
The acute and chronic impacts of the climate crisis create problems like poverty, infectious disease, forced migration, and conflict that spread through globalised systems (6, 15).
These knock-on impacts affect all nations.
COVID-19 served as a wake-up call to these global dynamics and it is no coincidence that health professionals have been active in identifying and responding to the consequences of growing systemic risks to health.
But the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic should not be limited to pandemic risk (16, 17).
Instead, it is imperative that the suffering of frontline nations, including those in Africa, be the core consideration at COP27: in an interconnected world, leaving countries to the mercy of environmental shocks creates instability that has severe consequences for all nations.
The primary focus of climate summits remains to rapidly reduce emissions so that global temperature rises are kept to below 1.5 °C.
This will limit the harm.
But, for Africa and other vulnerable regions, this harm is already severe.
Achieving the promised target of providing $100bn of climate finance a year is now globally critical if we are to forestall the systemic risks of leaving societies in crisis.
This can be done by ensuring these resources focus on increasing resilience to the existing and inevitable future impacts of the climate crisis, as well as on supporting vulnerable nations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions: a parity of esteem between adaptation and mitigation.
These resources should come through grants not loans, and be urgently scaled up before the current review period of 2025.
They must put health system resilience at the forefront, as the compounding crises caused by the climate crisis often manifest in acute health problems.
Financing adaptation will be more cost-effective than relying on disaster relief.
Some progress has been made on adaptation in Africa and around the world, including early warning systems and infrastructure to defend against extremes.
But frontline nations are not compensated for impacts from a crisis they did not cause.
This is not only unfair, but also drives the spiral of global destabilisation, as nations pour money into responding to disasters, but can no longer afford to pay for greater resilience or to reduce the root problem through emissions reductions.
A financing facility for loss and damage must now be introduced, providing additional resources beyond those given for mitigation and adaptation.
This must go beyond the failures of COP26 where the suggestion of such a facility was downgraded to “a dialogue” (18).
The climate crisis is a product of global inaction, and comes at great cost not only to disproportionately impacted African countries, but to the whole world.
Africa is united with other frontline regions in urging wealthy nations to finally step up, if for no other reason than that the crises in Africa will sooner rather than later spread and engulf all corners of the globe, by which time it may be too late to effectively respond.
If so far they have failed to be persuaded by moral arguments, then hopefully their selfinterest will now prevail.
This Comment is being published simultaneously in multiple journals.
For the full list of journals see: https://www.bmj.com/content/full-listauthors-and-signatories-climate-emergency-editorial-october-2022 To cite: Atwoli, L., Erhabor, G. E., Gbakima, A.
A., Haileamlak, A., Ntumba, J. K., Kigera, J., Laybourn-Langton, L., Mash, B., Muhia, J., Mulaudzi, F. M., Ofori-Adjei, D., Okonofua, F., Rashidian, A., El-Adawy, M., Sidibé, S., Snouber, A., Tumwine, J., Yassien, M. S., Yonga, P., Zakhama, L., & Zielinski, C. (2022).
COP27 Climate Change Conference: Urgent action needed for Africa and the world.
Orapuh Journal, 3(1), e903.
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/orapj.v3i1.3 Authors’ ORCID iDs: Atwoli, L.1 0000-0001-7710-9723 Erhabor, G. E.2 0000-0001-6084-2726 Gbakima, A. A.3 0000-0002-8478-9189 Haileamlak, A.4 Nil identified Ntumba, J. K.5 0000-0002-3095-9074 Kigera, J.6 0000-0002-18375156 Laybourn-Langton, L.7 0000-0001-5312-9156 Mash, B.8 0000-0002-6605-0794 Muhia, J.9 0000-0001-5144-0266 Mulaudzi, F. M.10 0000-0001-7373-0774 Ofori-Adjei, D.11 0000-0001-8788-6956 Okonofua, F.12 0000-0003-1912-4188 Rashidian, A.13 0000-0002-8777-2606 El-Adawy, M.14 0000-0002-4005-5183 Sidibé, S.15 0000-0003-3261-5002 Snouber, A.16 No ORCID Tumwine, J.17 0000-0003-1544-0001 Yassien, M. S.18 0000-0002-3422-7460 Yonga, P.19 0000-0003-1991-9992 Zakhama, L.20 0000-0001-6026-8592 Zielinski, C.21 0000-0001-6596-698X Conflicts of Interest: In the interest of transparency the authors wish to declare the following roles and relationships: James Kigera is the ExOfficio, President and Secretary of the Kenya Orthopedic Association; Paul Yonga been paid to speak or participate at events by Novartis, bioMerieux and Pfizer; Chris Zielinski is a paid consultant for the UK Health Alliance on Climate Change; Joy Muhia is an unpaid board member of the International Working Group for Health systems strengthening; David https://www.bmj.com/content/full-list-authors-and-signatories-climate-emergency-editorial-october-2022 https://www.bmj.com/content/full-list-authors-and-signatories-climate-emergency-editorial-october-2022 https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/orapj.v3i1.3 Special Editorial, Orapuh Journal 2022, 3(1), e903 3 COP27 Climate Change Conference: urgent action needed for Africa and the world Orapuh | https://orapuh.org/orapj https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/orapj.v3i1.3 Ofori-Adjei has a relationship with GLICO Healthcare Ltd.
The authors declare no further conflicts of interest beyond those inherent in the editorial roles listed above.
Open access: This special editorial is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial (CC BYNC 4.0) license.
Anyone can distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work and license the product of their efforts on different terms provided the original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made are indicated and the use is non-commercial (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/bync/4.
0/).
REFERENCES 1.
IPCC.
Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Working Group II Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report; 2022.
2.
UN.
The Paris Agreement: United Nations; 2022 [Available from: https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/parisagreement (accessed 12/9/2022)].
3.
Climate change and Health in Sub-saharan Africa: The Case of Uganda.
Climate Investment Funds; 2020.
4. WHO.
Strengthening Health Resilience to Climate Change 2016.
5.
Trisos CH, I.O.
Adelekan, E. Totin, A. Ayanlade, J. Efitre, A. Gemeda, et al.
Africa.
In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
2022 [Available from: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/ (accessed 26/9/2022)].
6.
Climate Change Adaptation and Economic Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa.
World Bank; 2021.
7.
Opoku SK, Leal Filho W, Hubert F, Adejumo O.
Climate Change and Health Preparedness in Africa: Analysing Trends in Six African Countries.
Int J Environ Res Public Health.
2021;18(9):4672.
8.
Evans M, Munslow B.
Climate change, health, and conflict in Africa’s arc of instability.
Perspectives in Public Health.
2021;141(6):338-41.
9.
S. P. Stawicki, T. J. Papadimos, S. C. Galwankar, A. C. Miller, Firstenberg MS. Reflections on Climate Change and Public Health in Africa in an Era of Global Pandemic.
Contemporary Developments and Perspectives in International Health Security.
2: Intechopen; 2021.
10.
Climate change and Health in Africa: Issues and Options: African Climate Policy Centre 2013 [Available from: https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/Publica tionFiles/policy_brief_12_climate_change_and_health _in_africa_issues_and_options.pdf (accessed 12/9/2022)].
11.
Climate change is an increasing threat to Africa2020.
Available from: https://unfccc.int/news/climatechange-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa (accessed 12/9/2022).
12.
Atwoli L, Muhia J, Merali Z.
Mental health and climate change in Africa.
BJPsych International.
2022:1-4 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/bjpsychinternational/article/mental-health-and-climatechange-inafrica/65A414598BA1D620F4208A9177EED94B (accessed 26/9/22022).
13.
Climate Vulnerable Economies Loss report.
Switzerland: Vulnerable twenty group; 2020.
14.
Ritchie H. Who has contributed most to global CO2 emissions?
Our World in Data.
https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-globalco2 (accessed 12/9/2022).
15.
Bilotta N, Botti F. Paving the Way for Greener Central Banks.
Current Trends and Future Developments around the Globe.
Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura for Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); 2022.
16. WHO.
COP26 special report on climate change and health: the health argument for climate action.
.
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021.
17.
Al-Mandhari A; Al-Yousfi A; Malkawi M; El-Adawy M. “Our planet, our health”: saving lives, promoting health and attaining well-being by protecting the planet – the Eastern Mediterranean perspectives.
East Mediterr Health J.
2022;28(4):247−248.
https://doi.org/10.26719/2022.28.4.247 (accessed 26/9/2022) 18.
Simon Evans, Josh Gabbatiss, Robert McSweeney, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Ayesha Tandon, Giuliana Viglione, et al.
COP26: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Glasgow.
Carbon Brief [Internet].
2021.
Available from: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop26key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-inglasgow/ (accessed 12/9/2022).
© 2022.
The Authors.
Published on 17 November 2022 by Orapuh, Inc. (info@orapuh.org) Editor-in-Chief: V. E. Adamu Professor (Associate), Engelhardt School of Global Health & Bioethics, Euclid University (Pôle Universitaire Euclide) – www.euclid.int https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/ https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/policy_brief_12_climate_change_and_health_in_africa_issues_and_options.pdf https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/policy_brief_12_climate_change_and_health_in_africa_issues_and_options.pdf https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/policy_brief_12_climate_change_and_health_in_africa_issues_and_options.pdf https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/policy_brief_12_climate_change_and_health_in_africa_issues_and_options.pdf https://unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa https://unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/bjpsych-international/article/mental-health-and-climate-change-in-africa/65A414598BA1D620F4208A9177EED94B https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/bjpsych-international/article/mental-health-and-climate-change-in-africa/65A414598BA1D620F4208A9177EED94B https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/bjpsych-international/article/mental-health-and-climate-change-in-africa/65A414598BA1D620F4208A9177EED94B https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/bjpsych-international/article/mental-health-and-climate-change-in-africa/65A414598BA1D620F4208A9177EED94B https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2 https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2 https://doi.org/10.26719/2022.28.4.247 https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop26-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-glasgow/ https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop26-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-glasgow/ https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop26-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-glasgow/ mailto:info@orapuh.org http://www.euclid.int/
La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 1 | 19 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A cross-sectional study Giuseppe La Torre1, Alice De Paula Baer2, Cristina Sestili1, Rosario Andrea Cocchiara1, Domenico Barbato1, Alice Mannocci1, Angela Del Cimmuto1 1 Department of Public health and Infectious Diseases, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy; 2 Faculty of Medicine, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Corresponding author: Giuseppe La Torre; Address: Piazzale Aldo Moro 5 – 00161, Rome, Italy; Telephone: +39(0)649694308; E-mail: giuseppe.latorre@uniroma1.it La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 2 | 19 Abstract Aim: The aim of this study was to assess knowledge on Climate Change (CC) and related consequences among students and professionals of healthcare setting.
Methods: A cross-sectional study involving 364 people was conducted.
The survey was performed at Sapienza University (Rome) using questionnaire previously developed and validated by the same research group.
Results: Findings indicate awareness about CC and its effects and correct identification of practices that could help to mitigate its repercussions.
The majority of the participants believed that CC had an impact on the health of humans (96.7%), animals (99.5%) and on the environment (99.7%).
Results from the multivariate analysis regarding overall knowledge, show an increased odd in professionals (OR=2.08; 95%CI=1.02-4.26), individuals from the North (OR=3.34; 95%CI=1.37-8.15) and from the Center (OR=2.07; 95%CI=1.17-3.66).
Regarding factors able to modify Earth's climate, correct answer had higher odds of being chosen by professionals (OR=2.83; 95%CI=1.41–5.70), and from individuals from South/Islands than by the ones from the Center (OR=0.65; 95%CI=0.40-1.06).
The main sources of information resulted to be TV and school/university.
Conclusions: These new evidences could guide policymakers on increasing the awareness of the population about this fundamental subject.
Keywords: climate change, cross sectional, health professionals, Italy, students, survey.
Funding: This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Author contributions: Conceptualization, G.L.T.
and A.D.C..; Methodology, G.L.T.
and A.M..; Formal Analysis, A.D.P.B., C.S., R.A.C., D.B.
; Investigation, A.D.P.B., C.S., R.A.C., D.B.
; Data Curation, A.D.P.B., C.S.
; Writing – Original Draft Preparation, R.A.C., D.B.
; Writing – Review & Editing, R.A.C., D.B., A.M..; Supervision, G.L.T..; Project Administration, G.L.T.
Conflicts of interest: None declared.
La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 3 | 19 Introduction In 2009, the first Lancet Commission for Global Health identified Climate Change (CC) as “the biggest global health threat of the 21st century” (1).
Ten years later, the World Meteorological Organization registered that the global mean surface temperature in 2018 was about 1.0 °C higher than pre-industrial levels (1850-1900) (2).
Seventeen out of the 18 warmest years in the 136-year record conducted by NASA have all occurred since 2001, except for 1998 (3).
This observed pattern of warming is known to be related to anthropogenic activity, and particularly to the use of fossil fuels.
That is correlated to the increase of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide (CO2).
As consequence, sea levels are rising, glaciers are melting, weather-related natural disasters are becoming more frequent and precipitation patterns are changing.
CC is strongly impacting on humans’ health: reduction in air quality; threatened food production and safety; increased water-related illnesses; increased morbidity and mortality from extreme temperatures; increased and new infectious disease exposures; negative consequences for mental health (e.g.
anxiety, depression and substance abuse) (4,5).
The best forecast for a low gas emission scenario, a world that takes sustainable energy use as a priority, is an air warming of 1.8°C.
However, in a world that mainly uses fossil fuels and has rapid economic and global population growth, the best estimation is that temperatures will rise by 4.0°C (2.4°C to 6.4°C) (6).
In order to mitigate the rising of Earth temperature, it is essential that the population is aware of CC, its consequences and the actions that could be taken into account to avoid it.
For this reason, an effective communication is fundamental.
They need information in order to have an attitude of constructive engagement (7).
In particular, health professionals could deeply contribute in making recommendations and supporting favorable policies as they have the expertise to recognize the health consequences related to CC and they have a strong impact on the public opinion (8).
The scientific literature was investigated in order to assess the presence of studies addressing knowledge on CC of health professionals and students.
A review was performed in June 2019 searching PubMed database.
The following search string was used: “(Climate Change) AND Education AND University students AND (Nurses OR Medicine)”.
Out of 59 studies, that were firstly retrieved, 14 were recognized as relevant for our purposes (9-22).
The topic appears widespread all over the continents: four studies were performed in Europe; four were conducted in Asia; three were from Oceania; two from America; one was performed in Africa.
These researches were published from 2009 on, with a peak that was recorded in 2018.
The aim of the studies was to measure the knowledge and perceptions of health professionals and students about CC and its consequences.
In this regard, surveying the population's knowledge on this topic becomes necessary, because these data could show what is already known, what are people's sources of information on CC and what are the knowledge gaps that need to be filled for allowing a proper adaptation of the society.
The studies included in the review applied validate questionnaire: Children’s Environmental Health Knowledge Questionnaire (9); Children’s Environmental Health Skills Questionnaire (9); Sustainability Attitudes in Nursing Survey (SANS-2) (11,18,20).
According to the scientific evidences from the literature, the potential of communication and social marketing as means to influence population health and environmental outcomes is clear, but it has to be put into practice (23).
It has been found, for example, that mass media could be an important source of information (13,24), but the issue has not gained much attention from it.
A literature review concluded that most residents of developed countries have little knowledge about the health relevance of CC (7) and, according to other researches, this awareness could be related to level of education, country of residence and living environment (13,25).
Although surveys have been conducted in that matter, to our knowledge none has included the Italian population.
Thus, the aim of this study was to collect data from Italy to verify knowledge on CC within a population of students and professionals from the healthcare settings.
Methods Study design A cross-sectional study, according to the STROBE statement (26) was performed during the period February 2018-March 2019.
Participants and Setting A total of 569 individuals were invited to take part to the survey.
Respondents were contacted through a mailing list of students of medical area (medicine, La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 4 | 19 nursing, prevention technicians) of Sapienza University of Rome and health professionals (nurses, doctors, technicians of the prevention).
The link to access the anonymous online questionnaire, which also contained the informed consent form, was shared via mail with the audience.
Questionnaire An Italian questionnaire previously developed and validated by the same research group on a sample of 64 individuals was used (27).
The questionnaire contained a sociodemographic section on age, sex, marital status and educational level.
The subsequent section contained 19 questions about CC.
To complete the survey respondents were required to choose specific answers or enter free text in specific box.
Questions could include more than one correct answer.
The survey covered different categories of questions: definition of CC and greenhouse gases; knowledge about the effects of global warming; respondents’ awareness about the argument and options to fight CC and pollution.
Annex 1 reports the administered questionnaire.
Approval by Ethical Committee was not required for this study, since this was an observational study.
Statistical analysis The statistical analysis was performed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25.
Descriptive analysis was performed using frequencies, mean and SD.
Bivariate analysis was computed using Chi-square test in order to assess the possible associations between the answers to the questionnaire and above listed socio-demographic variables.
A scoring system was created by assigning one point for each correct answer to questions that evaluated CC knowledge.
The highest achievable punctuation was 13.
In the question about the possible implications of CC, in which more than one answer was possible, the assigned score went from 0 to 1, according to the number of chosen alternatives; the score 1 was given to those who pointed out all the correct options.
Furthermore, multivariate analysis including logistic regression and linear regression were performed.
For logistic regression model, in order to verify the relationship between participants’ answers and gender, age, occupation and civil status, all the variables were dichotomized including the sum of the correct answer.
Zero was attributed to the ones who achieved less than mean score (9.2) and 1 to the ones who achieved 9.2 or more.
A multiple linear regression analysis with stepwise using the backward wald selection was used to confirm the relationship between score and socio-demographic variables.
The goodness of fit of linear regression model was assessed using the R2.
A statistically significant difference was accepted at a p-value of less than 5%.
Results Sample demographic characteristics A total of 364 people completed the questionnaire (Chronbach alpha = 0.74), with a global response rate of 64.2%%.
Among students, the highest response rate was observed for medical students (77%) and the lowest for nursing students (23.5%).
Conversely, among professionals, no substantial differences between these two groups were observed (nurses 68.7% vs. doctors 68.9%).
The mean age was 23.7 (SD: 6.6).
All respondents lived in Italy, mostly in the centre (56.3%).
Most of the respondents were female (65.1%).
Regarding civil status, 77.1% were single.
As to professional situation, most of participants were medical students (63.7%), followed by nurse professionals (15.7%) (Table 1).
Table 1.
Sample’s Socio-demographic information Variables N(%) or mean (SD) Gender Females 237 (65.1) Males 127 (34.9) Total 364 Age 23.7 (6.587) Civil Status Married 31 (8.5) Cohabitant 47 (12.9) La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 5 | 19 Separated 3 (0.8) Single 281 (77.1) Widow(er) 2 (0.5) Professional status Other 2 (0.5) PhD Student 1 (0.3) Nurse 57 (15.7) Doctor 20 (5.5) Nursing student 24 (6.6) Medical student 232 (63.7) Prevention and Environmental technician student 23 (6.3) Prevention and Environmental technician 5 (1.4) Region of residence (Macroarea) North 35 (9.6) Center 205 (56.3) South and islands 66 (18.1) Missing 58 (15.9) Participants' source of information about climate change Most respondents (98.1%) had already heard about CC, 72.3% of them in TV, the most common source, followed by school/university (33%) and internet (22.2%).
Statistically significant associations were found between having heard about CC and being under 24 years old (p=0.002) and from center (p=0.002).
Having school as a source of information was related with being under 24 (p< 0.001), single (p< 0.001), student (p< 0.001) and from the center of Italy (p= 0.011).
Being female (p= 0.01) was also related with having newspaper as a source.
Being single was statistically associated with having the scientific literature as source of information (p=0.037).
Students and subjects younger than 24 showed statistically significant association with having heard about CC at home (p=0.007; p=0.012).
Lastly, hearing it from congresses was statistically associated with being male (p= 0.004).
Only 25.8% affirmed that university courses addressed global warming, mainly females (p= 0.010), people younger than 24 (p<0.001), single (p=0.003) and students (p< 0.001) (Table 2).
Table 2.
Participants’ knowledge and source of information Question Yes/True Gender N(%) Age N(%) Civil Status N(%) Professional Status N(%) Macro Area N(%) N(%) female male <=24 >24 single cohabitant /married student profession al North Center South/ islands Have you heard of Climate Change before?
357 (98.1) 292(64.7) 141(35.3) 261 (73.1) 96 (26.9) 280(78.4) 77(21.6) 278(77.9) 79(22.1) 35(11.5) 203(67) 65(21.5) 0.429a 0.002 a 0.642 a 0.192 a 0.002 a Where did you hear about it?
TV 263(72.3) 166(63.1) 97(36.9) 189(71.9) 74(28.1) 203(77.2) 60(22.8) 200(76.9) 63(23.1) 27(12.3) 146(66.1) 48(21.6) 0.129 a 0.144 a 0.994 a 0.582 a 0.838 a Where did you hear about it?
School/Unive 120 (33) 73(60.8) 47(39.2) 104 (86.7) 16 (13.3) 105 (87.5) 15 (12.5) 107 (89.2) 13 (10.8) 11 (9.9) 84 (75.7) 16 (14.4) 0.090 a <0.001 <0.001 a <0.001 a 0.011 a La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 6 | 19 rsity Where did you hear about it?
Internet 81 (22.2) 54(66.7) 27(33.3) 54(66.7) 27(33.3) 58(71.6) 23(28.4) 59 (72.8) 22 (27.2) 8(11.4) 47(67.1) 15(21.4) 0.896 a 0.716 a 0.484 a 0.722 a 0.781 a Where did you hear about it?
Newspaper 83(22.8) 46 (55.4) 37 (44.6) 52 (62.7) 31 (37.3) 59 (71.1) 24 (28.9) 61 (73.5) 22 (26.5) 13 (18.3) 40 (56.3) 18 (25.4) 0.015 a 0.773 a 0.540 a 0.507 a 0.249 a Where did you hear about it?
Scientific Literature 23 (6.3) 16(69.6) 7(30.4) 18(78.3) 5(21.7) 21(91.3) 2(8.7) 19(82.6) 4(17.4) 3(16.7) 9(50) 6(33.3) 0.819a 0.087 a 0.037 a 0.129 a 0.448 a Where did you hear about it?
Home 15 (4.1) 8(53.3) 7(46.7) 14(93.3) 1(6.7) 14(93.3) 1(6.7) 15(100) 0(0) 2(14.3) 12(85.7) 0 (0) 0.260 a 0.012 a 0.071 a 0.007 a 0.114 a Where did you hear about it?
Conventions 5 (1.4) 0 (0) 5 (100) 3 (60) 2 (40) 3 (60) 2 (40) 2 (28.6) 5 (71.4) 0 (0) 4(100) 0 (0) 0.004 a 0.516 a 0.516 a 0.676 a 0.296 a Where did you hear about it?
Associations/ ONGS 6 (1.6) 2 (33.3) 4 (66.7) 4 (66.7) 2 (33.3) 5(83.3) 1 (16.7) 6(100) 0(0) 1(16.7) 3(50) 2(33.3) 0.075a 0.800 a 0.557 a 0.093 a 0.796 a Where did you hear about it?
Radio 4 (1.1) 2(50) 2 (50) 4(100) 0(0) 3(75) 1 (25) 4(100) 0 (0) 0(0) 4(100) 0(0) 0.469 a 0.301 a 0.914 a 0.175 a 0.302 a During the course of your university studies was the subject of global warming addressed?
94 (25.8) 51 (54.3) 43 (45.7) 82 (87.2) 12 (12.8) 84 (89.4) 10 (10.6) 87 (92.6) 7 (7.4) 5(5.5) 65(71.4) 19(20.9) 0.010 a <0.001 a 0.003 a <0.001 a 0.094 a a p-value of chi-square test Bold: p<0.05 Participants' knowledge on CC and its consequences The majority of the participants believed that CC had an impact on human (96.7%), animal (99.5%) and on the environment (99.7%) health.
Concerning greenhouse gases, 92.6% of respondents were aware of human responsibility in emissions; 62.6% of participants answered correctly that CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) were all responsible for rising Earth's temperature.
Still, concerning causes of CC, 54.4% of participants recognized changes that occur in solar radiation, variations of the albedo and the introduction of gases as factors that could modify the chemical composition of the atmosphere.
Answering this correctly was related to be over 24 (p= 0.001).
Respondents (93.4%) mostly agreed that a healthcare professional could contribute in reducing the impact of CC, and this was associated with being younger.
When asked in what way, most of them marked all alternatives as correct in the questions regarding transportation (67.3%), energy use (86.5%) and waste disposal (81.6%).
Correct answers regarding transports were associated with being over 24 years old (p=0.020) and student (p=0.018); regarding waste disposal, with being single (p=0.005) and from the center (p=0.012) (Table 3 and Table 4).
La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 7 | 19 Table 3.
Knowledge on the consequences of CC Question Yes/True Gender N(%) Age N(%) Civil Status N(%) Professional Status N(%) Macro Area N(%) female male <=24 >24 Single cohabitant / married student professi onal North Center South and islands Most scientists agree that the warming is due to the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, which imprison the heat in the atmosphere, a process determined by human activities and not just by natural causes?
337 (92.6) 215(63.8) 122(36.2) 245(72.7) 92(27.3) 265(78.6) 72(21.4) 262(77.7) 75(22.3) 33(11.7) 193(68.4) 56(19.9) 0.123 a 0.541 a 0.927 a 0.751 a 0.238 a Do you think global warming can have an impact in the environment’s health?
363 (99.7) 236(65) 127(35) 262(72.2) 101 (27.8) 286(78.8) 77(21.2) 282(77.7) 81(22.3) 35(11.4) 205(67) 66(21.6) 0.464 a 0.109 a 0.214 a 0.063 a 0.917 a Do you think global warming can have an impact in animals’ health?
362 (99.5) 237(66.5) 125(34.5) 262(72.4) 100(27.6) 285(78.7) 77(21.3) 281(77.6) 81 (22.4) 35(11.5) 204(66.9) 66(21.6) 0.053 a 0.023 a 0.323 a 0.351 a 0.802 a Do you think global warming can have an impact in humans’ health?
352 (96.7) 229(65.1) 123(34.9) 255(72.4) 97(27.6) 276(78.4) 76(21.6) 272(77.3) 80(22.7) 35(11.7) 200(67.1) 63(21.2) 0.908 a 0.285 a 0.683 a 0.621 a 0.009 a Do you think a health professional can contribute to reduce the impact of climate change?
340 (93.4) 222(65.3) 118(34.7) 250(73.5) 90(26.5) 268(78.8) 72(21.2) 267(78.5) 73(21.5) 34(11.8) 193(67) 61(21.2) 0.781 a 0.013 a 0.659 a 0.069 a 0.190a a p-value of chi-square test Bold: p<0.05 Table 4.
Results of the bivariate analysis concerning Causes, Consequences and Actions towards CC N (%) Gender N(%) Age N(%) Civil Status N(%) Professional Status N(%) Macro Area N(%) female male <=24 >24 single cohabitan t/ married student professional North Center South/ islands In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change by transport?
All are correct 245(67.3) 163(66.5) 82 (33.5) 167 (68.2) 78(31.8) 189 (77.1) 56 (22.9) 181 (73.9) 64 (26.1) 25 (12.3) 142 (70) 36 (17.7) Error 119(32.7) 74 (62.2) 45(37.8) 95 (79.8) 24(20.2) 97 (81.5) 22(18.5) 101 (84.9) 18 (15.1) 10 (9.7) 64 (61.5) 30 (28.8) p-valuea 0.414 0.020 0.341 0.018 0.081 In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change by energy use?
All are correct 315 (86.5) 203 (64.4) 112 (35.6) 223(70.8) 92(29.2) 245 (77.8) 70 (22.2) 240 (76.2) 75 (23.8) 33 (12.4) 180 (67.7) 53 (19.9) Error 49 (13.5) 34 (69.4) 15 (30.6) 39(79.6) 10(20.4) 41 (83.7) 8 (16.3) 42 (85.7) 7 (14.3) 2 (5) 25(62.5) 13 (32.5) p-valuea 0.525 0.202 0.454 0.197 0.147 La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 8 | 19 In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change regarding waste disposal?
All of the above are correct 297 (81.6) 198 (66.7) 99 (33.3) 209(70.4) 88(29.6) 225 (75.8) 72(24.2) 224(75.4) 73(24.6) 31(12.3) 174(68.8) 48(18.9) Error 67 (18.4) 39(58.2) 28(41.8) 53(79.1) 14(20.9) 61 (91) 6 (9) 58(86.6) 9(13.4) 4(7.5) 31(58.5) 18(34) p-valuea 0.203 0.150 0.005 0.052 0.012 What are the main factors able to modify the climate on the Earth?
All are correct 198(54.4) 136 (68.7) 62(31.3) 111(63.1) 65(36.9) 156(78.8) 42(21.2) 150 (75.8) 48 (24.2) 22(13.1) 109(64.9) 37(22) Error 166(45.6) 101(60.8) 65(39.2) 151(80.3) 37(19.7) 130(78.3) 36(21.7) 132(79.5) 34(20.5) 13(9.4) 96(69.6) 29(21) p-valuea 0.118 <0.001 0.912 0.392 0.718 Which gases that are rising in the atmosphere as a consequence of human activities cause an increase in Earth's temperature?
All of the above 228(62.6) 150 (65.8) 78 (34.2) 142(71.7) 56(28.3) 168(73.7) 60(26.3) 160(70.2) 68(29.8) 29 (15.8) 117(63.5) 38(20.7) Error 32(37.4) 25(78.1) 7(21.9) 120(72.3) 46(27.7) 21(65.6) 11(34.4) 18(56.3) 14(43.8) 2(9.5) 11(52.4) 8(38.1) p-valuea 0.164 0.904 0.338 0.112 0.181 Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
(More than one answer was possible to this question) Rising of Earth’s temperature 328 (90.1) 209 (63.7) 119 (36.3) 244 (7.4) 84 (25.6) 261(79.6) 67(20.4) 260 (79.3) 68 (20.7) 33 (11.7) 193 (68.7) 55 (19.6) p-valuea 0.993 0.002 0.160 0.013 0.017 Melting of ice caps 313 (86) 203(64.9) 110(35.1) 231(73.8) 82(26.2) 249(79.6) 64(20.4) 243(77.6) 70(22.4) 31 (11.6) 186 (69.7) 50 (18.7) p-valuea 0.801 0.055 0.258 0.853 0.006 Ice retraction 262 (72) 160(61.1) 102(38.9) 191(72.9) 71(27.1) 210(80.2) 52(19.8) 210(80.2) 52(19.8) 28 (12.4) 161 (71.2) 37(16.4) p-valuea 0.010 0.530 0.239 0.050 0.001 Rising of sea level 254 (69.8) 149 (58.7) 105 (41.3) 188(74) 66(26) 201(79.1) 53(20.9) 205(80.7) 49(19.3) 25 (11.5) 153 (70.5) 39 (18) p-valuea <0.001 0.188 0.691 0.025 0.054 Biodiversity will be reduced 236 (64.8) 150(63.6) 86(36.4) 172(72.9) 64(27.1) 188(79.7) 48(20.3) 185(78.4) 51(21.6) 20(9.8) 141(68.4) 45(21.8) p-valuea 0.399 0.602 0.492 0.569 0.393 The food production will be at risk 176 (48.4) 105 (59.7) 71 (40.3) 129(73.3) 47(26.7) 135(76.7) 41(23.3) 141(80.1) 35(19.9) 14(9.3) 106(70.2) 31(20.5) p-valuea 0.035 0.588 0.401 0.243 0.401 Increased water shortage 163 (44.8) 93 (57.1) 70 (42.9) 117(71.8) 46(28.2) 126(77.3) 37(22.7) 130(79.8) 33(20.2) 17(12) 98(69) 27(19) p-valuea 0.004 0.939 0.595 0.348 0.598 Weatherrelated natural disasters will occur more frequently: storms, droughts.
floods and heat waves 307(84.3) 200(65.1) 107(34.9) 221(72) 86(28) 245(79.8) 62(20.2) 238(77.5) 69(22.5) 29(11) 176(66.9) 58(22.1) p-valuea 0.973 0.993 0.183 0.956 0.786 The economy will suffer 126 (34.6) 74(58.7) 52(41.3) 89(70.6) 37(29.4) 99(78.6) 27(21.4) 98(77.8) 28(22.2) 9(8.6) 75(71.4) 21(20) p-valuea 0.063 0.678 1.000 0.919 0.407 Population will face 200 (54.9) 123(61.5) 77(38.5) 153(76.5) 47(23.5) 160(80) 40(20) 163(81.5) 37(18.5) 19(11.1) 120(70.2) 32(18.7) La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 9 | 19 food and water shortages.
leading to conflicts and migration p-valuea 0.111 0.034 0.463 0.042 0.352 Catastrophic transformati ons can occur 210 (57.7) 132(62.9) 78(37.1) 162(77.1) 48(22.9) 167(79.5) 43(20.5) 168 (80) 42 (20) 16(9.1) 126(71.6) 34(19.3) p-valuea 0.292 0.010 0.605 0.178 0.118 Diseases will spread 153 (42) 91(59.5) 62(40.5) 114(74.5) 39(25.5) 119(77.8) 34(22.2) 122(79.7) 31(20.3) 14(10.7) 91(69.5) 26(19.8) p-valuea 0.055 0.360 0.753 0.378 0.727 a p-value of chi-square test Bold: p<0.05 Regarding the consequences of CC, the rising of Earth temperature was selected by 90.1% of participants.
Being female was associated with marking ice retraction (p=0.010), rising of the sea level (p<0.001), risks for food production (p=0.035) and increased water shortage (p=0.004) as consequences.
Being younger resulted associated with considering that higher Earth temperature (p=0.002), conflicts/migrations (p=0.034) and catastrophic transformations (p=0.010) could occur.
Other important associations are shown in Table 4.
A sum of all correct answers per participant was calculated, being 13 the highest achieved value, with all answers correct, and 4.42 the lowest; only 0.8% of participants reached the highest score.
However, the mean sum was 9.2 (SD 1.76), which shows a high level of knowledge (Figure 1).
Multivariate analysis Results from the multivariate analysis regarding the dichotomous score show an increased odd for good knowledge in professionals (OR=2.08; 95%CI=1.02-4.26), individuals from North (OR= 3.34; 95%CI= 1.37-8.15) and Center (OR=2.07; 95%CI=1.17-3.66).
Regarding factors able to modify Earth's climate, correct answers had higher odds of being chosen by professionals (OR=2.83; 95%CI=1.41–5.70), and individuals from South/Islands than from Center (OR=0.65; 95%CI= 0.40-1.06).
The correct predicted increase in temperature for 2100 was associated with males (OR=0.47; 95%CI=0.27–0.81) and cohabitant/ married participants (OR=2.38; 95%CI=1.22–4.64).
Rising of Earth’s temperature was recognized as possible repercussion for CC with higher odd by cohabitant/married individuals (OR=2.38; 95%CI=1.22-4.64), and with lower odd from females (OR=0.47; 95%CI= 0.27-0.81).
Females were associated with reductions in odds of having knowledge about CC repercussions, such as ice-retraction (OR=0.48; 95%CI=0.27-0.86), rising of sea level (OR= 0.35; 95%CI=0.19–0.64), risks to food production (OR=0.66; 95%CI=0.41–1.06), increased water shortage (OR= 0.52; 95%CI=0.32– 0.83) and conflicts and migration due to lack of resources (OR=0.63; 95%CI=0.39–1.02).
Twentyfour year-old participants or older had a reduction on odds of choosing conflicts/migration (OR=0.50; 95%CI=0.29–0.88) and catastrophic transformations (OR= 0.44; 95%CI= 0.25–0.77) as consequence of CC.
Participants from Center Italy were associated with choosing ice retraction, rising of sea level, melting of ice caps and catastrophic transformations (respectively OR= 2.97; 95%CI=1.63–5.41; OR=2.06; 95%CI= 1.12–3.78; OR=2.42; 95%CI=1.22–4.77; OR=1.55; 95%CI=0.95-2.52).
Conversely, participants from the North of Italy showed a higher odd of choosing ice retraction (OR=3.50; 95%CI=1.32-9.27) and rising of sea level (OR=2.34; 95%CI=0.92-5.97).
Students had higher odds of choosing rising of sea level as repercussion of CC (OR= 0.47; 95%CI=0.24–0.95).
On the questions about possible contributions that they could give to diminish these effects, choosing the correct answer regarding means of transportation had an increase in the odds for participants belonging to the professional category (OR= 2.07; 95%CI=0.97–4.44) and from the Center (OR=1.6; 95%CI=0.96-2.66).
On the subject of waste disposal, higher odds of giving the correct answer were found for participants from the North (OR=2.77; 95%CI=0.84–9.15) and Center (OR= 2.41; 95%CI= 1.22–4.76), and also married/cohabitants people (OR=6.47; 95%CI=1.50–27.9) (Table 5).
La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 10 | 19 Figure 1.
Knowledge score's distribution Table 5.
Multivariate analysis: Logistic Regression with “backward wald” elimination procedure Question Gender Age Civil Status Professional Status Macro Area OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) female male* <=24* >24 Single* cohabitant/ married student * professional North Center South/ islands * Binary codification of knowledge score 1 2.08 (1.02-4.26) 3.34 (1.378.15) 2.07 (1.17-3.66) 1 In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change by transport?
All are correct 1 2.07 (0.97-4.44) 1.6 (0.96-2.66) 1 In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change regarding waste disposal?
1 6.47 (1.50-27.9) 2.77 (0.849.15) 2.41 (1.22-4.76) 1 La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 11 | 19 All are correct What are the main factors able to modify the climate on the Earth?
All are correct 1 2.83 (1.41-5.70) 0.65 (0.40-1.06) 1 Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
Rising of Earth’s temperature 0.47 (0.27-0.81) 1 1 2.38 (1.22-4.64) Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
Ice retraction 0.48 (0.27-0.86) 1 3.50 (1.329.27) 2.97 (1.63-5.41) 1 Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
Rising of sea level 0.35 (0.19-0.64) 1 1 0.47 (0.24-0.95) 2.34 (0.925.97) 2.06 (1.12-3.78) 1 Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
Melting of ice caps 2.42 (1.22-4.77) 1 Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
The food production will be at risk 0.66 (0.41-1.06) 1 Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
Increased water shortage 0.52 (0.32-0.83) 1 Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
Population will face food and water shortages.
leading to conflicts and migration 0.63 (0.39-1.02) 1 1 0.50 (0.29-0.88) Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
Catastrophic transformations can occur 1 0.44 (0.25-0.77) 1.55 (0.95-2.52) 1 La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 12 | 19 Do you think a health professional can contribute to reduce the impact of climate change?
Yes 1 0.31 (0.12-0.83) What temperature increase do UN climate experts predict by 2100?
1.4°–5.8°C 0.47 (0.27-0.81) 1 1 2.38 (1.22-4.64) *reference group White cells indicate p-value>0.05 Linear regression showed that being older is predictor for having higher knowledge scores (β=0.124; p=0.030).
Discussion Results show that participants were sufficiently aware of CC and its effects, and mostly could identify individual practices that could help to mitigate its repercussions.
Significant differences on the amount of information regarding the consequences of global warming were found mainly related to the region of residence and to gender, with females having lower odds of giving the correct answers.
Most of participants had already heard about CC, with the main sources of information being TV and school/university.
The results from this study show to be similar to the ones from a previous study conducted in China with health professionals (28), in which TV also appeared as main source.
The importance of mass media is also highlighted in a survey conducted in Bangladesh (29), while the key role of school as a source of information appears in a study made with Iranian students, in which school was the main source, with 38, 5% of answers (30).
However we cannot deny the role of social media in this field.
Lewandowsky et al.
(31) underline the role of Internet blogs that became a very useful tool for discussing scientific issues, and CC is now one of the most chosen in the discussions.
These authors believe that the use of blogs, and particularly the comment sections of blogs, can play a very important role in disseminating different positions around this issue.
It is possible to conclude that mass media have a fundamental role on the dialogue with the Italian population about CC, and therefore should be used to disseminate information to the public.
However, television coverage of public health issues has problems, such as individual selection of information of viewers, journalists’ unfamiliarity with the topics and spread of misinformation (32).
Taking this into account, television should be used carefully, and it should be as well important to valorize the key role that educational institutions play, being a more reliable information disseminator.
Also, it is worth paying attention that, although the question “Where have you heard about Climate Change?” was open answered, no participant cited doctors or other health professionals.
A research conducted at Yale University showed that, for information about CC-related health problems, Americans mostly trust their primary-care doctor (33).
Another study done in the USA concluded that the public health community has an important perspective about CC that, if shared, could help the public to better understand CC issues.
Their findings also suggest that the communication should not be focused on the problem of CC, but on solutions and co-benefits: a healthier future offers environmental benefits (34).
The potential of health professionals as disseminators of information on global warming, according to these results, seems to be underused.
Concerning the causes of global warming, more than 50% of participants understood that greenhouse gases were CO2, N2O and CH4, although a significantly amount choose only CO2.
Still, on the matter of greenhouse gases, most of respondents (92.5%) were aware of human’s responsibility on their emissions and on scientists’ agreement on the subject, showing a positive consonance between Italian population's knowledge and scientific consensus.
Also, in the USA research (35), more than one third of participants from 2009 mentioned mainly anthropogenic causes as "things that could cause global warming", such as cars and industries, and 26% specifically mentioned fossil fuel use.
Similar reasons were mentioned by the China participants (28).
However, in the USA 18% affirmed that natural causes were also primary drivers of global warming and also in the study made with nursing students in Arab countries respondents La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 13 | 19 believed CC was due to a balance between nature and human causes (13).
In the Arab region, most of respondents said that all presented health‐related effects had already increased due to CC; similar findings were presented by a study conducted in Montana with nursing students (36).
Although this research did not specifically focus on the consequences of CC for health, options such as the spread of diseases, water shortage and risks to food production were chosen by less than 50% of participants, with the exception of the one related to conflicts and migration (54.2%).
Being this a cohort of mostly health professionals and students, the found results disagree with the existing literature.
This should be seen as an aspect worthy of improvement: past experiences with smoking cessation, HIV prevention, physical activity promotion and other health issues have proved that health professionals can have an important and effective role on educating and empowering people about health.
However, little of this understanding on effective health communication has been applied to CC (37).
The proportion of male students that recognized possible consequences of CC was significantly higher compared to women.
This gender difference was also found in the studies conducted in the Arab region.
It is known that some population groups are more vulnerable to the health effects of CC, and among these there are women, children and elderly, people with previous health problems or disabilities, and poor and marginalized communities (38).
A study from 2016 in the USA showed that approaching CC as a health issue is an effective way of communicating with vulnerable audiences, specially addressing individual, immediate-term health effects and practical advices for protective behaviors (39).
Regarding the level of education, significant differences were found between students and professionals, related to source of information – students, younger and single had higher odds of having heard of it in school and during university studies.
This evidence suggests the importance that education should have in informing new generations.
The implementation of courses and conferences will help to increase the awareness among both students and professionals of the healthcare setting and this could also contribute to widespread correct information about CC within the society.
In the multivariate analysis, professionals had higher odds of having a sum of correct answers above the mean.
In other studies, dose-response associations were found between CC knowledge and the educational level (29).
In this survey, associations were also related to age, with younger participants having bigger odds of having heard of CC and higher accuracy odds on the question about the related causes.
Regarding region of residence, South and Islands were associated with lower odds of having a higher score.
This might be related to socio-economic and cultural differences among different areas within the Country, although no scientific evidence about this data was found.
The limitations of this study include a small sample size and the recruitment of participants.
The population was made of individuals specifically belonging to the university setting, which makes it difficult to generalize the results for the entire Italian population.
More important, the participants were professionally related to the health area and this even more limits the potential of this study to make generalizations.
Also, it must be underlined that the study design does not allow to derive inference from the results, since cross-sectional studies refer to punctual evidences in time and space.
Strengths of this study concern the geographic distribution of the sample size that offers a wide description of the Italian scenery and gives robustness to the evidences.
Secondly, this study fills the gap in the scientific literature furnishing an innovative focus on this emerging issue.
Furthermore, it will be possible to replicate this investigation in order to assess changes in knowledge over time.
Conclusions It is possible to conclude that, although the Italian students and professionals included in the study have a good knowledge on CC, it is essential to invest in informing the most vulnerable population groups and also to potentialize the role that health professionals can have on disseminating information on the subject.
The results presented on this study will allow improvements in communication and in creating policies related to CC in this country and elsewhere, with the final objective of avoiding the rapid progression of CC and its consequences.
Finally, we must recognize the concept of “one world, one health”.
We cannot forget the deep link between animal diseases, public health, and the environment (40).
The use of the One Health approach can be very important to increase the awareness of the usefulness of cooperation activities in this field.
On the basis of these considerations, at Sapienza University of Rome a didactic project has started for implementing a thematic course on planetary health.
Future research should recruit more participants La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 14 | 19 with more diverse levels of education and occupation.
References 1.
Costello A, Abbas M, Allen A, Ball S, Bell S, Bellamy R, et al.
Managing the health effects of climate change.
Lancet 2009;373:1693-733.
2.
World Meteorological Organization, 2019.
WMO confirms past 4 years were warmest on record.
Available from: https://public.wmo.int/en/media/pressrelease/wmo-confirms-past-4-years-werewarmest-record (accessed: February 12, 2019).
3.
NASA’s Goddard Institute for space studies (GISS).
Global Temperature, 2019.
Available from: https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/globaltemperature/ (accessed: January 31, 2019).
4.
Melillo JM, Richmond T, Yohe GW.
Climate change impacts in the United States: the third national climate assessment.
Government Printing Office 2014:220-56.
5.
Berry HL, Bowen K, Kjellstrom T. Climate change and mental health: a causal pathways framework.
Int J Public Health 2010;55:123-32.
6.
Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis M, Averyt KB, et al.
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds.
; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA; 2007.
7.
Frumkin H, McMichael AJ.
Climate Change and Public Health.
Am J Prev Med 2008;35:403-10.
8.
Xie E, De Barros EF, Abelsohn A, Stein AT, Haines A.
Challenges and opportunities in planetary health for primary care providers.
Lancet Planet Health 2018;2:e185-7.
9.
Álvarez-García C, Álvarez-Nieto C, Pancorbo-Hidalgo PL, Sanz-Martos S, López-Medina IM.
Student nurses' knowledge and skills of children's environmental health: Instrument development and psychometric analysis using item response theory.
Nurse Educ Today 2018;69:113-9.
10.
Bell EJ.
Climate change: what competencies and which medical education and training approaches?
BMC Med Educ 2010;10:31.
11.
Cruz JP, Felicilda‐Reynaldo RFD, Alshammari F, Alquwez N, Alicante JG, Obaid KB, et al.
Factors Influencing Arab Nursing Students' Attitudes toward Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability and their Inclusion in Nursing Curricula.
Public Health Nurs 2018;35:598-605.
12.
D'Abundo ML, Fugate-Whitlock EI, Fiala KA.
Recycling mentors: An intergenerational, service-learning program to promote recycling and environmental awareness.
J Public Health Manag Pract 2011;17:373-5.
13.
Felicilda‐Reynaldo RFD, Cruz JP, Alshammari F, Obaid KD, Rady HE, Qtait M, et al.
Knowledge of and attitudes toward climate change and its effects on health among nursing students: A multi‐ Arab country study.
Nurs Forum 2018;53:179-89.
14.
Hamel Green EI, Blashki G, Berry HL, Harley D, Horton G, Hall G. Preparing Australian medical students for climate change.
Aust Fam Physician 2009;38:726.
15.
Liao W, Yang L, Zhong S, Hess JJ, Wang Q, Bao J, et al.
Preparing the next generation of health professionals to tackle climate change: Are China's medical students ready?
Environ Res 2019;168:270-7.
16.
McDermott-Levy R, Jackman-Murphy KP, Leffers JM, Jordan L. Integrating climate change into nursing curricula.
Nurse Educ 2019;44:43-7.
17.
Nigatu AS, Asamoah BO, Kloos H. Knowledge and perceptions about the health impact of climate change among health sciences students in Ethiopia: a cross-sectional study.
BMC Public Health 2014;14:587.
18.
Richardson J, Grose J, Bradbury M, Kelsey J.
Developing awareness of sustainability in nursing and midwifery https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/global-temperature/ https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/global-temperature/ http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/view/creators/718a9661ddb1e1f4cf8e4d60d9c0cdab.html La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 15 | 19 using a scenario-based approach: Evidence from a pre and post educational intervention study.
Nurse Educ Today 2017;54:51-5.
19.
Richardson J, Grose J, Nelmes P, Parra G, Linares M. Tweet if you want to be sustainable: a thematic analysis of a Twitter chat to discuss sustainability in nurse education.
J Adv Nurs 2016;72:1086-96.
20.
Richardson J, Heidenreich T, ÁlvarezNieto C, Fasseur F, Grose J, Huss N, et al.
Including sustainability issues in nurse education: A comparative study of first year student nurses' attitudes in four European countries.
Nurse Educ Today 2016;37:15-20.
21.
Schwerdtle PN, Maxwell J, Horton G, Bonnamy J.
12 tips for teaching environmental sustainability to health professionals.
Med Teach 2018;1-6.
22.
Yang L, Liao W, Liu C, Zhang N, Zhong S, Huang C. Associations between Knowledge of the Causes and Perceived Impacts of Climate Change: A CrossSectional Survey of Medical, Public Health and Nursing Students in Universities in China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health 2018;15:2650.
23.
Maibach E, Roser-Renouf C, Leiserowitz A. Communication and Marketing as Climate Change-Intervention Assets: A Public Health Perspective.
Am J Prev Med 2008;35:488-500.
24.
Hathaway J, Maibach EW.
Health Implications of Climate Change: a Review of the Literature About the Perception of the Public and Health Professionals.
Curr Environ Health Rep 2018;5:197-204.
25.
Toan TT, Kien VD, Giang KB, Minh HV, Wright P. Perceptions of climate change and its impact on human health: an integrated quantitative and qualitative approach.
Glob Health Action 2014;7:23025.
26.
Vandenbroucke JP, Von Elm E, Altman DG, Gotzsche PC, Mulrow CD, Pocock SJ, et al.
Strengthening the reporting of observational studies in epidemiology (STROBE): explanation and elaboration.
PLoS Med 2007;4:e297.
27.
Baer AD, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Del Cimmuto A, La Torre G. Perception of Climate Change: validation of a questionnaire in Italy.
Clin Ter 2019;170:e184-91.
28.
Wei J, Hansen A, Zhang Y, Li H, Liu Q, Sun Y, et al.
Perception, attitude and behavior in relation to climate change: A survey among CDC health professionals in Shanxi province, China.
Environ Res 2014;134:301-8.
29.
Kabir MI, Rahman MB, Smith W, Lusha MA, Azim S, Milton AH.
Knowledge and perception about climate change and human health: findings from a baseline survey among vulnerable communities in Bangladesh.
BMC Public Health 2016;16:266.
30.
Yazdanparast T, Salehpour S, Masjedi MR, Seyedmehdi SM, Boyes E, Stanisstreet M, et al.
Global warming: knowledge and views of Iranian students.
Acta Med Iran 2013;51:178-84.
31.
Lewandowsky S, Cook J, Fay N, Gignac GE.
Science by social media: Attitudes towards climate change are mediated by perceived social consensus.
Mem Cognit 2019;47:1445-56.
32.
Gollust SE, Fowler EF, Niederdeppe J.
Television News Coverage of Public Health Issues and Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice.
Annu Rev Public Health 2019;40:167-85.
33.
Leiserowitz A, Maibach E, Roser-Renouf C, Feinberg G, Rosenthal S, Marlon J.
Public Perceptions of the Health Consequences of Global Warming 2014.Yale Project on Climate Change Communication: New Haven, CT, USA; 2014.
34.
Maibach EW, Nisbet M, Baldwin P, Akerlof K, Diao G. Reframing climate change as a public health issue: an exploratory study of public reactions.
BMC Public Health 2010;10:299.
35.
Reynolds TW, Bostrom A, Read D, Morgan MG. Now what do people know about global climate change?
Survey studies of educated laypeople.
Risk Anal 2010;30:1520-38.
36.
Streich JL.
Nursing Faculty's Knowledge on Health Impacts due to Climate Change.
Doctoral thesis.
Bozeman, MT: Montana State University‐Bozeman, College of Nursing; 2014.
Available from: http://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/ha ndle/1/9140 (accessed: February 12, 2019).
http://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/9140 http://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/9140 La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 16 | 19 37.
Frumkin H, Hess J, Luber G, Malilay J, McGeehin M. Climate change: the public health response.
Am J Public Health 2008;98:435-45.
38.
Watts N, Adger WN, Agnolucci P, Blackstock J, Byass P, Cai W, et al.
Health and climate change: policy responses to protect public health.
Lancet 2015;386:1861-914.
39.
Kreslake JM, Price KM, Sarfaty M. Developing effective communication materials on the health effects of climate change for vulnerable groups: a mixed methods study.
BMC Public Health 2016;16:946.
40.
De Giusti M, Barbato D, Lia L, Colamesta V, Lombardi AM, Cacchio D, et al.
Collaboration between human and veterinary medicine as a tool to solve public health problems.
Lancet Planet Health 2019;3:e64-5.
______________________________________________________________ © 2020 La Torre et al; This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 17 | 19 ANNEX 1: Climate change and health Dear participant, Sapienza University of Rome, a member of the Planetary Health Alliance, is conducting a survey on the perception of the climate change issue.
Please answer with the most sincerity, thank you.
Socio-demographic 1.
Age: … 2.
Gender: o Male o Female 3.
Marital status: o Single o Married o Divorced o Widower o Cohabitant 4.
Where do you live?
Specify the Italian Region… 5.
Occupation: o Medical Doctor o Nurse o Preventative health experts o Scientist (biological, natural, environmental, chemical, physical and mathematical) o Medical student o Nursing student o Student of preventative health o Science student (biological, natural, environmental, chemical, physical and i. mathematical) o High school student o Middle school student o Other: ____ Climate Change 1.
Have you heard of Climate Change before?
o Yes o No 2.
Where did you hear about it?
….
3.
During the course of your university studies was the subject of global warming addressed?
o Yes o No 4.
Most scientists agree that the warming is due to the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, which imprison the heat in the atmosphere, a process determined by human activities and not just by natural causes?
o Yes o No 5.
What is the average temperature of the Earth today?
o 22°C o 18°C La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 18 | 19 o 15°C o 12°C o I don't know 6.
What temperature increase do UN climate experts predict by 2100?
o 1°–3,8°C o 1,4°–5,8°C o 1,9°–6,8°C o I don't know 7.
Do you think global warming can have an impact in the environment’s health?
o Yes o No 8.
Do you think global warming can have an impact in animals’ health?
o Yes o No 9.
Do you think global warming can have an impact in humans’ health?
o Yes o No 10.
Do you think a health professional can contribute to reduce the impact of climate change?
o Yes o No 11.
In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change by transport?
o Going on foot o Taking public transports o Taking the bus o Moving by driving their own cars o Taking the bike o Using car pooling o Taking flights o All previous answers are correct o None of the answers are correct o I don’t know 12.
In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change by energy use?
o Reducing the consumption of home appliances o Lowering the temperature of the heating systems o Keeping chargers always plugged in o Using devices with reduced consumption o Keeping lights always on o Turning off the lights that are not needed o All previous answers are correct o None of the answers are correct o I don’t know 13.
In what way can a health professional contribute to diminish the impacts of climate change regarding waste disposal?
o Differentiating waste o Using single-use devices o Reusing the packaging o Using plastic objects o Reducing waste La Torre G, De Paula Baer A, Sestili C, Cocchiara RA, Barbato D, Mannocci A, et al.
Knowledge and perception about climate change among healthcare professionals and students: A crosssectional study (Original research).
SEEJPH 2020, posted: 02 March 2020.
DOI: 10.4119/seejph-3347 P a g e 19 | 19 o All previous answers are correct o None of the answers are correct o I don’t know 14.
What are the main factors able to modify the climate on the Earth?
o Changes that occur in solar radiation o Variations of the albedo: the fraction of solar radiation that is reflected in various parts of the Earth o The introduction of gases that modify the chemical composition of the atmosphere o All of these answers are correct o None of the answers are correct o I don't know o All of these answers are correct 15.
Which gases that are rising in the atmosphere as a consequence of human activities cause an increase in Earth's temperature?
o Carbon dioxide o Methane o Nitrogen oxides o All previous answers are correct o None of the answers are correct o I don’t know 16.
Which are the main repercussions of climate change?
(More than one answer was possible) o Rising of Earth’s temperature o Melting of ice caps o Ice retraction o Rising of sea level o Biodiversity will be reduced o The food production will be at risk o Increased water shortage o Weather-related natural disasters will occur more frequently: storms.
droughts.
floods and heat waves o The economy will suffer o Population will face food and water shortages.
leading to conflicts and migration o Catastrophic transformations can occur o Diseases will spread
My title https://doi.org/10.14311/APP.2022.36.0006 Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings 36:6–14, 2022 © 2022 The Author(s).
Licensed under a CC-BY 4.0 licence Published by the Czech Technical University in Prague ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING STRUCTURES UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE Johan V. Retief Stellenbosch University, Department of Civil Engineering, Private Bag X1, Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa correspondence: jvr@sun.ac.za Abstract.
Assessment of the influence of human activities on recent, current, and future global and regional climate conditions and extremes has advanced sufficiently to provide a reasonable measure of its impact across the globe.
The lack of concurrent adaptation of the design base for load bearing structures results mainly from the absence of a clear signal that climate change will have a significant effect on the climate actions that are accounted for in the structural design basis.
The recent IPCC assessment of the physical science basis of climate change reports significant advances in observing and projecting changes in weather and climate extremes due to human influences.
This provides an opportunity to reassess projections of future climate action conditions.
Whilst the IPCC assessment confirms previous indications that, for example extreme wind will respond moderately globally, improvements in understanding and projecting changes show that trends will be overshadowed by uncertainties.
The implication is that the design base will need to account for increasing uncertainties as climate actions are projected into the future, over the service life of existing structures, as well as those designed to current standards.
The design base consequently in advance need to reflect continuous changes of existing structures.
Keywords: Climate actions, climate change, design base, existing structures, projection skills, structures, uncertainties.
1.
Introduction Since early hypotheses that the use of fossil fuels will lead to global warming due to increased atmospheric concentration of CO2 as a greenhouse gas, the more general version of global warming due to changes in various greenhouse gases caused by human activities is now considered to be proven [1], [2].
Furthermore, the subsequent impact of the additional heat load on global systems is now investigated extensively, with an emphasis on the climate, because of the wide exposure of both human and natural systems, although related systems such as the ocean and the cryosphere also play an integral role in the response to human caused warming [3].
The extensive body of information on climate change compiled by the IPCC Series of assessment reports on climate change [3] provides an opportunity to consider the potential impact of anthropogenic climate change on any system or activity exposed to climate and weather conditions.
One such case, considered in this review, is the role of extreme climate actions, such as wind and snow loads, or thermal actions, in the design base for load bearing structures, such as buildings, industrial structures, and civil engineering infrastructure.
Although this class of human systems have a low profile in the assessment of the impact of climate change, it represents vast capital investment and play a fundamental role in the socioeconomic environment.
The low profile could be ascribed to the level of specification of climate actions with return periods of the order of millennia for levels of reliability associated with safety, depending on the reliability class of the structure.
Such specifications are much more severe than the level of event likelihoods considered in climate change investigations.
There is nevertheless a realisation that extreme events represent an important component of the impact of human induced climate change on the natural and socioeconomic environment [4, 5].
This has led to extensive consideration of climate and weather extremes in climate change [6–8].
The design base for load bearing structures evolved concurrently with the growing attention being paid to human induced climate change, running in parallel since around the mid-twentieth century.
Notably the inherent variability of climate actions on structures made a significant contribution to the application of risk and reliability in deriving operational semiprobabilistic design, expressed in limit states format.
Ironically, the potential impact of climate change has yet to be implemented in general standardized design practice, as reflected for instance as an explicit class of risk [9] or as a prominent design situation [10].
This situation could be the result of climate actions that are specified at several standard deviations from annual extremes.
Furthermore, pioneering efforts to account for climate change observe limited trends from either historic data or projected values, even under severe scenarios of human caused radiative forcing of global warming [11, 12].
When the difficulties of extracting reliable extreme value models from historic data is considered, such as for wind load in South Africa [13–15], the opportunity to benefit from the extended 6 https://doi.org/10.14311/APP.2022.36.0006 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://www.cvut.cz/en vol.
36/2022 ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING STRUCTURES UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE assessment of climate extremes [7] should be utilised.
Less obvious in the somewhat surprising state of matters is the acceptance that climate change will have a relatively mild effect on structural loads, given the growing body of information on substantial changes in future conditions coming out of the IPCC assessment of climate change.
Some scrutiny of the relevance of climate change to structural loads indicate a lack of credible information on future extreme climate and weather conditions [16].
The objective of this paper is to review the advances in developing the physical sciences basis of climate change as reflected in the latest IPCC assessment [1] as source of information on climate actions on structures, specifically considering climate extremes [7].
Assessment of climate extremes rests on information from observations and paleoclimatic histories, which is applied to the identification of human drivers of changes, within processes of natural variability, towards sufficient understanding for attribution to human influences, to changes in the climate and in extremes [6, 16], observed changes, and the application of change indicators and uncertainties [17], projection of future conditions, and their various sources of uncertainty [18], finally input required for risk assessment [8].
The review is done at three levels: Firstly, confirmation of climate change, its attribution to human origins, and the current rate of change, provide the background information for decision-making on the necessity, even urgency to implement adaptation measures for the climate action design basis.
At the second level the state of knowledge on changing of climate extremes relevant to structural actions provides the background to what information could be extracted from the climate change knowledge base currently available for possible decisions on immediate implementation.
Thirdly the ultimate check is to review the available skills for projection of climate actions to determine the required resolution of projecting future trends, and the relative dominance of natural variability and projection uncertainties, as determined by projection model resolution.
Each of these objectives could require an exposition on its own, so this review can only be done at strategic level within the scope of this paper.
A secondary objective is to raise the issue of the impact of climate change on the design base for structures and provide an overview of the state of information.
The perspective taken in this review is significantly biased towards extracting information to be used in decision-making, see for example [19–21].
2.
Climate State And Pathways Towards Extreme Climate Based on robust understanding of climate system fundamentals, the systematic scientific assessment of climate change has evolved from theory since the 1970s, to now be regarded as an established fact.
Recent advancements are based on the integration of multiple lines of evidence consisting of observations that include the emergence of a climate change signal, paleoclimatic evidence, the identification of natural and human drivers of the climate, understanding and attributing climate change, and implementation of this information in model development [1].
This provides the platform for projecting possible future climate conditions for representative pathways that depend on mitigation measures taken on a global scale.
Characterization of the current state of the climate, representative climate futures, with specific reference to climate and weather extremes, serve as background information currently available to inform decisions on future trajectories for climate actions on structures.
2.1.
Current Climate State Whilst the complexity of climate change emerges from each successive version of the IPCC series of Assessment Reports, the progression of the process is concisely represented by the metric of global warming since preindustrial conditions: The observed temperature increase ∆T of 1.09 [0.95 to 1.20] ◦C above the 1850-1900 baseline for the decade ending 2020 can be related to CO2 atmospheric concentration, as most important greenhouse gas, reaching 410 ppm, compared to the 270 ppm baseline, with changes over land of 1.59 [1.34 to 1.83] ◦C and the ocean of 0.88 [0.68 to 1.01] ◦C respectively [1].
The trend since 1850 is displayed graphically in Figure 1, reflecting significant achievements in simulation of the climate change [1], [3].
The range of natural variability of about 0.5 ◦C is evident, including episodic perturbations due to natural causes.
The overall trend is to show a steep incline starting at around the 1970’s towards the ∆T -region of 1 ◦C.
Climate simulation including natural and human drivers follow the trend remarkably well, though with some lag in the initial increase.
The smoother simulated average (brown line) can be ascribed to the multi-model averaging process, however the uncertainty range (shading) that exceeds natural variability, suggests that the observation is just one ’worldline’ of many possible outcomes of a highly complex system.
Simulation of a counterfactual world without human influence provides a clear indication of emergence of climate change above natural variability at around the 1970s and attribution of the global temperature rise to human causes as indicated by the differences between simulations.
Attribution is resolved further to indicate the contribution of all greenhouse gases [+1.5 ◦C] and other human causes [−0.4 ◦C], with CO2 as the dominant gas [+0.8 ◦C] and SO2 as the dominant other cause [−0.5 ◦C].
Scaling global temperature change across the global climate and down to its regional impact due to climate extremes is demonstrated by Figure 2, confirming human influences on extremes in temperature and precipitation, as representation of different modes of climate extremes.
This overview of pervasive impact of human 7 Johan V. Retief Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings Figure 1.
Observed and simulated history of global surface temperature changes (annual average) and causes of recent warming, demonstrating model skills [1].
activities on the environment is based on the systematic implementation of methodologies that apply also to resolving the climate extremes central to this paper, consisting of (i) understanding the climatological processes and drivers of change, (ii) to be able to observe historic trends, (iii) which are applied to validate simulation models, (iv) using the identification of emergence and attribution of the phenomenon under investigation, (v) as basis for establishing confidence in projection of future changes and conditions.
This methodology is also used to assess climate extremes [7] and applied here to take measure of extremes relevant to climate actions on structures.
2.2.
Future Climate Pathways The main future climate drivers caused by human activities are represented by five scenarios of combined shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP) that is combined with the level of radiative forcing by the end of the century (in W/m2) with trajectories for CO2 as the most significant greenhouse gas.
Global warming scales almost linearly with accumulated atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Figure 3(a)), resulting in alternative projections of observed warming up to the year 2100 (Figure 3(b)).
The range of outcomes depending on mitigation policies [SSP1-1.9 to SSP5-8.5] can be compared to the very likely range for simulated pathways (coloured shading) shown for SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7.0.
A significant implication of the relationship between accumulated carbon release and temperature rise is that every tonne of carbon released contributes to global warming.
An indication of the geographic distribution of these changes is provided in Figure 4, showing the comparison between observed and simulated changes in surface temperature at 1 ◦C, and for projected ∆T -values of {1.5, 2.0.4.0} ◦C.
An indication of the regional distribution of climate change extremes is compiled in Figure 5, indicating the number of regions for which climate impact drivers (CID) for the set of climate extremes are relevant, where a CID is a measure of a physical climate system condition (mean, event, extreme) that will affect society or an ecosystem, by either increasing or decreasing.
Confidence levels are indicated by shading.
Mixed signals and low confidence levels are notable for severe wind and snowstorms.
3.
Changing Weather And Climate Extremes The occurrence of climate and weather extreme events have a high profile in public interest: it is often connected with climate change and its attribution to human activities.
Information on such a relationship is therefore of interest to policy decision-making, as a prime objective of IPCC assessment of human induced climate change [1].
Differentiation of human related radiative forcing of changes from natural variability, however, poses stringent challenges to climate science skills, particularly to determine attribution for individual events.
Successful simulation of climate extremes provides confidence in its projection skills.
Furthermore, extreme weather and climate events evidently make a significant contribution to the impact of climate change.
Against this background, recent 8 vol.
36/2022 ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING STRUCTURES UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE Figure 2.
Synthesis of assessed observed and attributable regional changes for hot extremes and heavy precipitation, demonstrating the diversity of regional and modal changes [1].
advancement in the assessment of changes in extremes is regarded as one of the significant achievements of climate sciences [3].
Climate extremes provide a logical point of entry for climate actions on structures.
This could be done in two steps: Projection of climate extremes in general, and extreme classes associated with extreme wind as assessed in [7] and [8] are reviewed in this section.
The mode of presentation of the assessment is to aggregate results to inform general observations on the relevance of extremes to climate change.
Application of this information to the adaptation of the design base for wind load is discussed in the next section, based on extracted information on trends in climate actions as it is demonstrated by considering wind load from [7, 8].
This section explores the challenges in observing and modelling of climate extremes, with the intrinsic properties of being rare, short-lived, dependent on local conditions, and inherently highly variable.
This is aggravated by the extensive extrapolation into the future from an uncertain observation base, particularly for more extreme events.
3.1.
Assessment Methodology for Extremes A systematic methodology is employed to relate human influences to changes in extreme weather and climate from historic observation to the prediction of future conditions through validated models [7].
The first step consists of the identification of mechanisms and drivers of extreme events, to reflect the knowledge base of the process.
Observed trends provide the baseline against which changes are measured.
Model evaluation considers both the match between models and observation, and an assessment of projection uncertainties.
Detection of human influences beyond natural variability is used as measure of the level of attribution; considered across the dimensions of the situation under investigation, such as extreme class, global, regional, or local scale; demonstrated for the class of extreme climate.
Projections ultimately provide trends and uncertainties in changes to extremes as climate change progresses.
Assessment of the results is expressed in the customary levels of confidence and likelihood { low, medium, high }; in case of high confidence, a likelihood may be assigned as { likely, very likely, extremely likely, virtually certain }; based on skills to simulate observed trends, a measure of model uncertainty based on inter-model comparisons, and judgement on the scientific basis for dominating processes [6].
Detection and attribution of human influences are applied at global warming of ∆T of 2 ◦C; with projected changes at {1.5, 2.0, 4.0} ◦C [7].
The success of the process is confirmed by the finding that changes in extremes for temperature, precipitation, droughts, tropical cyclones, and compound fire 9 Johan V. Retief Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings (a) (b) Figure 3.
Pathway dependent global climate futures: (a) Near-linear linear relationship between cumulative emissions and global surface temperature (b) Global surface temperature changes in ◦C relative to 1850-1900 [1].
weather, would have been extremely unlikely without human causes [1].
Recent advances include resolving human influences on individual extreme events, regional scales, and at different warming levels.
This is based on improved knowledge, complementary sources of evidence, improved models, and accumulating historic data.
3.2.
Extreme Climate Classes The assessment is concerned with occurrence over land, consisting broadly of temperature related extremes, the water cycle, storms, and compound events that are classified as low-likelihood high-impact (LLHI) situations.
Temperature extremes provide the yardstick for observing changes in extremes and their sensitivity to human influences.
This results from the good standing of the state of knowledge, observation, modelling, attribution, and projection skills.
Heavy precipitation, generally and as associated with extreme storms, demonstrates the implications of more complex extremes with interacting and feedback processes, yet advancing in projection and attribution skills.
Extreme storms, subdivided into tropical cyclones (TC), extratropical cyclones (ETC), and severe convective storms (SCS), include extreme wind as a component.
An extreme climate class dedicated to extreme wind was introduced recently [7, 8], allowing for the aggregation of common characteristics from storm classes; providing for better alignment between climatology and wind engineering application.
Extension of climate change assessment to extreme climate provides an additional line of scientific proof of the process: It is regarded as an integral component of climate change, manifested by the increased frequency of climate extremes, particularly hot extremes, on global and regional scales, on most continents, even 10 vol.
36/2022 ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING STRUCTURES UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE Figure 4.
Geographical distribution of the global climate (a) comparing observation with simulation (b) for simulated changes in global warming at representative levels [1].
for individual events based on case studies [1], [7].
Observations made on extreme storms range from high confidence of increases in precipitation rates, average and peak wind for tropical cyclones globally and severe convective storms regionally, but low confidence in past changes of maximum wind speed for extratropical cyclones [7].
Low-likelihood high-impact events are assessed primarily from the perspective of concurrent events.
Notably high likelihood is assigned to the generic observation that historically unprecedented events and surprises can be caused by the rate of global warming.
As a general observation on the outcome of the IPCC review, extreme weather and climate events are predominantly characterised by precipitation extremes, (occasionally complemented by wind) as a measure of frequency, intensity, or by implication by the impact of human origins on changing conditions.
This approach is used extensively for assessing tropical cyclones.
A significant deviation is the conclusion that an increase in the proportion of high intensity tropical cyclones will very likely lead to an increase in average peak wind speed, as well as an increase in rain-rates, despite a decrease in global frequencies of such events [7].
A similar low profile for strong wind can be observed for SCS, as opposed to using precipitation as indicator.
It is concluded for example with high confidence that average and maximum rain rates associated with such storms will increase with global warming in some regions [7].
Yet, wind and tornadoes are included as an outcome of projecting an increase in frequency and intensity of severe thunderstorms with high confidence.
An exception to the subdued role of severe wind in extreme storms is the use of near-surface wind speed, together with precipitation, as extreme value indicator of the severity of ETCs.
Still, extreme precipitation events are well established in the identification of extratropical storm conditions.
Indication of past changes in maximum wind speed associated with ETCs is regarded to be observed with low confidence, with medium confidence that projected changes will be small, and with high confidence that precipitation rates will increase with warming.
Notably, there is medium confidence that the projection of wind speed and precipitation associated with ETCs depend on the resolution and formulation of climate models.
The aggregated conclusion, made with low confidence, is that the intensity of observed extreme winds is becoming less severe in the lower to mid-latitudes, while becoming more severe in poleward latitudes beyond 60 degrees.
There is medium confidence that the frequency and intensity of extreme winds will be associated with the projected changes in the frequency and intensity of associated tropical and extratropical cyclones.
Although no explicit mention is made of SCSs in the summary, high confidence is indicated that convective available potential energy increases in response to global warming in the tropics and subtropics, suggesting more favourable environment for SCSs; though with high confidence that limited application of convection-permitting models lead to significant uncertainty about projected regional changes.
11 Johan V. Retief Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings Figure 5.
Synthesis of the number of regions where climate impact drivers (CID) are projected to change, increasing (top) and decreasing (bottom) with high/medium confidence levels (shading) [1].
4.
Adaptation Of Design Base For Wind Actions The difference between the scientific approach followed in the IPCC assessment of climate change to provide best estimates of the process, even including climate extremes, and the information required for risk-based decision-making that includes the consequences of tailend events, is appreciated by assessors and researchers [22, 23].
Conversion of the information on extreme wind, as summarised above, to information serving as background to the adaptation of the design base for wind load, requires best estimates of both trends and their uncertainties.
4.1.
Assessment of Projected Wind Actions In the absence of any reported observation related to extreme wind changes in [7], expressed at likelihood levels as indicated in the previous section, confidence levels are applied in an inverse manner to reflect uncertainty in the projection qualitatively, as opposed to its intended scientific qualifier, as applied in [7].
Climate systems associated with extreme wind for South Africa are synoptic scale frontal systems and mesoscale convective storms [24], which are related to ETCs and SCSs respectively.
Confidence levels for the components of assessment (see Section 3.1) for these two extreme storm classes are therefore utilised as basis for qualifying changes in trend and uncertainty of wind load projections.
Significantly, there is no review of the mechanisms and drivers used for the identification, modelling, and projection of changes due to human causes for ETC’s (compare Section 2.1).
Accordingly, it is not surprising that there is low confidence in observed changes recently, and over the past century.
This is due to large interannual and decadal variability.
Ironically, high confidence is assigned to model underestimation of dynamical intensity of events (related to surface wind speed), similarly for linking systematic bias between ETC events and rainfall intensity to model limitations.
Furthermore, there is low confidence in attribution of events to human influence resulting from limited observations.
Projections of dynamic intensity depend, with medium confidence, to the resolution and formulation of the representation of convection in climate models.
Given the limited information on trends in ETC intensity, also for extreme wind projections, the poor rating obtained for all components of the assessment methodology leads to the conclusion that the current state of information does not provide any 12 vol.
36/2022 ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING STRUCTURES UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE guidance on future changes, rather than to indicate small changes.
This situation arises from limitations in observation, attribution to human influences, and modelling that reflects drivers of change in ETC wind extremes.
A rather complex situation emerges from the assessment of SCS, or mesoscale convective systems (MCS), with highly skewed information provided across all elements of the assessment steps, ranging from noticeable advances in mesoscale observation networks, complemented by high resolution modelling, mainly in the USA, versus low confidence in resolving regional scale impacts across the balance of regions due to limits in observation and simulation modelling.
The specific advances in resolving mesoscale extremes could therefore serve as benchmark to estimate uncertainties in other regions, mostly outside the USA.
Such comparisons should include the identification of regional climate impact drivers, limits to observed trends due to insufficient coverage and long-term records, model deficiencies of resolution and provision for convection processes, the influence of the fine balance between opposing environmental factors that affect severe storm development.
4.2.
Integrated Basis for Design and Assessment The adaptation of the design base for wind load on structures is evidently dominated by uncertainties of the changes to the extreme wind climate caused by future climate conditions.
An expedient use of the current design base to enhance the robustness of structures against such uncertainties, consists of applying the stipulated wind load in a sensitivity analysis as an accidental design situation for climate change [25].
The extension of such an approach to incorporate methodologies for the assessment of existing structures [26] provides the opportunity to reflect the trajectory of changing wind loads over the service life of the structure.
At the fundamental level, such an approach explicitly accounts for the significant conversion from treating climate actions under assumptions of stationarity to transitionary.
At an operational level, the progression of assessment methodologies from design value, through reliabilityand risk-based approaches, enables more advanced estimates of reserve capacity of the structure to changing wind loads.
Strategically, planning for future assessments of the structure as the changing climate pathways evolve can be incorporated into the design process.
In addition, performing the first assessment upon completion of the structure would not only ensure that pertinent information for subsequent assessments is captured, but should contribute to proper integration of the bases for design and assessment of structures in general.
5.
Observations And Conclusions The paper reviews the latest set of assessments on the physical science basis for climate change due to human influences from the perspective of its relevance to climate actions on load bearing structures.
Of particular interest is the advances made in determining the impact of changing climate extremes on human and ecological systems.
Characterisation of climate change in general provides the context for decisions on timing of any adaptation of the design base, whilst climate extremes inform decisions on climate actions, which are specified at extreme value fractiles to achieve required levels of reliability for structures.
Both topics are therefore reviewed in the paper.
It is notable that initial suppositions and pioneering observations on both climate and extreme changes are substantiated with advancement of its scientific bases, with growth of the information base, arguably over orders of magnitude, predominantly realised as confirmation, but with an appreciation of the complexity of the process, if not its pervasive nature.
This is demonstrated by the observation that the initial identification of human caused global warming has progressed not only to measurable global and regional warming, but also to the attribution of human influences on an increasing set of extreme events, and an extension of the set of human influences.
The main conclusions of this review are thus related to both the changing climate and extremes.
Human induced climate change has demonstrably advanced to such an extent that any system that would be impacted over multidecadal scales, need to implement adaptation measures, irrespective of the outcomes of mitigation scenarios.
On the question of whether this includes structures exposed to climate actions, the conclusion is that such exposure results not so much from the mild trends observed and projected for climate actions, but predominantly from uncertainties of future changes which might be several standard deviations from expected trend conditions.
Two main lines of action follows: Whilst advances in climate extreme projections should be followed up, sufficient robustness and adaptability should in the meantime (now) be incorporated in design decisions.
The methodologies for the assessment and adaptation of existing structures provide useful instruments for the transition from the context of stationarity of the current design base.
As a final disclaimer, the review considers an issue which evidently falls within the domain of climate sciences, rather than engineering sciences.
However, it is essential for engineering considerations to appreciate the impending conversion of climate actions on structures from an empirical base under stationary conditions, to one requiring at least a reflection of the transient future climate and its impact on an adapted design base that is intimately related to climate sciences.
The review therefore also demonstrates an engineer’s perspective of climate change, in preparing to engage with climatologists in divining the future.
13 Johan V. Retief Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings List of symbols CID Climate Impact Driver ETC Extratropical cyclons IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change LL-HI Low-Likelihood High-Impact situations MCS Mesoscale convective systems SCS Severe convective storms SSP Share Socioeconomic Pathways TC Tropical cyclones References [1] IPCC.
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S. L. et al.
(eds.)].
Cambridge University Press.
In Press, 2021.
[2] M. Hulme.
Concept of Climate Change.
The International Encyclopaedia of Geography.
Wiley-Blackwell/Association of American Geographers (AAG), 2016.
[3] P. A. Arias, N. Bellouin, E. Coppola et al.
Technical Summary.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Cambridge University Press.
In Press, 2021.
[4] IPCC.
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation.
A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of IPCC.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, p. 582, 2012.
[5] D. L. Swain, D. Singh, D. Touma, et al.
Attributing Extreme Events to Climate Change: A New Frontier in a Warming World.
One Earth 2(6):522-7, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.05.011.
[6] D. Chen, M. Rojas, B. H. Samset, K. Cobb et al.
Framing, Context, and Methods.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Cambridge University Press.
In Press, 2021.
[7] S. I. Seneviratne, X. Zhang, M. Adnan et al.
Weather and Climate Extreme Events in a Changing Climate.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Cambridge University Press.
In Press, 2021.
[8] R. Ranasinghe, A. C. Ruane, R. Vautard et al.
Climate Change Information for Regional Impact and for Risk Assessment.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Cambridge University Press.
In Press, 2021.
[9] ISO 2394:2015.
General principles on reliability for structures.
International Organisation for Standardization, 2015.
[10] ISO 22111:2019.
Basis for design of structures General requirements.
International Organisation for Standardization, 2019.
[11] P. Croce, P. Formichi, F. Landi.
Climate Change: Impacts on Climatic Actions and Structural Reliability.
Applied Sciences 9(24), 2019. https://doi.org/10.3390/app9245416.
[12] H. P. Hong, Q. Tang, S. C. Yang, et al.
Calibration of the design wind load and snow load considering the historical climate statistics and climate change effects.
Structural Safety 93, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strusafe.2021.102135.
[13] J. V. Retief, A. M. Goliger.
Development of an updated fundamental basic wind speed map for SANS 10160-3.
Journal of the South African Institution of Civil Engineering 59(4):12-25, 2017. https: //doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2017/v59n4a2.
[14] J. Botha, J. V. Retief, C. Viljoen.
Uncertainties in the South African wind load design formulation.
Journal of the South African Institution of Civil Engineering 60(3), 2018. https: //doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2018/v60n3a2.
[15] F. P. Bakker.
Characterisation of the South African Extreme Wind Environment Relevant to Standardisation.
PhD Dissertation, Stellenbosch University.
2021.
[16] V. Eyring, N. P. Gillett, K. M. Achuta et al.
Human Influence on the Climate System.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Cambridge University Press.
In Press, 2021.
[17] S. K. Gulev, P. W. Thorne, J. Ahn J et al.
Changing State of the Climate System.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Cambridge University Press.
In Press, 2021.
[18] J. Y. Lee, J. Marotzke, G. Bala, et al.
Future Global Climate: Scenario-Based Projections and Near-Term Information.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, 2021.
[19] H. E. Auld.
Adaptation by design: The impact of changing climate on infrastructure.
J Public Works & Infrastructure.
1(3), 276-288, 2008.
[20] S. Hallegatte.
Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change.
Global Environmental Change 19(2):240-7, 2009. https: //doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.12.003.
[21] C. Helgeson.
Structuring Decisions Under Deep Uncertainty.
Topoi 39(2):257-69, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9584-y.
[22] R. T. Sutton.
Climate Science Needs to Take Risk Assessment Much More Seriously.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 100(9):1637-42, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1175/bams-d-18-0280.1.
[23] C. P. Weaver, R. H. Moss, K. L. Ebi, et al.
Reframing climate change assessments around risk: recommendations for the US National Climate Assessment.
Environmental Research Letters 12(8), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7494.
[24] A. C. Kruger, A. M. Goliger, J. V. Retief et al.
Strong wind climatic zones in South Africa.
Wind and Structures Journal 13(1):37-55, 2010.
[25] J. Retief, C. Viljoen.
Provisions for Climate Change in Structural Design Standards.
In Engineering for Extremes, Springer Tracts in Civil Engineering, p. 429-46.
2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85018-0_21.
[26] M. Holický, J. V. Retief, C. Viljoen.
Reliability basis for assessment of existing building structures with reference to SANS 10160.
Journal of the South African Institution of Civil Engineering 63(1), 2021. https: //doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2021/v63n1a1.
14 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.05.011 https://doi.org/10.3390/app9245416 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strusafe.2021.102135 https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2017/v59n4a2 https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2017/v59n4a2 https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2018/v60n3a2 https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2018/v60n3a2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.12.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.12.003 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9584-y https://doi.org/10.1175/bams-d-18-0280.1 https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa7494 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85018-0_21 https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2021/v63n1a1 https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8775/2021/v63n1a1 Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings 36:6–14, 2022 1 Introduction 2 Climate State And Pathways Towards Extreme Climate 2.1 Current Climate State 2.2 Future Climate Pathways 3 Changing Weather And Climate Extremes 3.1 Assessment Methodology for Extremes 3.2 Extreme Climate Classes 4 Adaptation Of Design Base For Wind Actions 4.1 Assessment of Projected Wind Actions 4.2 Integrated Basis for Design and Assessment 5 Observations And Conclusions List of symbols References
PERFORMANCE OF SWEET PEPPER UNDER PROTECTIVE STRUCTURE International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 62 | P a g e INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT Volume-4, Issue-4, Sep-Nov 2015 ISSN 2091-2854 Received:13 August Revised:8 September Accepted:2 November PERCEPTION, TRENDS AND IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN KAILALI DISTRICT, FAR WEST NEPAL Lal B Thapa 1* , Himanchal Thapa 2 , Bimala Gharti Magar 3 1,2 Central Department of Botany, Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur, Kathmandu, Nepal 3 Central Department of Anthropology, Tribhuvan Univeristy, Kirtipur, Kathmandu, Nepal *Corresponding author: lal_thapa25@yahoo.com Abstract Perception and place-based studies give useful information on climate change in context of Nepal due to having its wide geographical, climatic, biological and cultural diversity.
A household survey and focus group discussions were carried out in this study to document local people’s perceptions on climate change in Kailali district of Nepal.
Most of respondents in the study area have perceived that temperature and fog are increased; and rainfall and hail are decreased with severe fluctuation.
Trend of temperature supports local people’s perception.
People have noticed impacts of these changes in vegetation, plant phenology and agriculture.
Fundamentally, they have observed that certain plant species are decreasing, increasing and showing changes in flowering and fruiting time.
This information could have significance for future research to identify climate change sensitive or indicator plants.
Keywords: climate change, peoples’ perception, temperature, rainfall, vegetation International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 63 | P a g e Introduction Climate change has become a global challenging issue since few decades.
There are several consequences of climate change such as floods, droughts, storms, spreading of infectious diseases and extinction of species (Parry et al., 2005).
Global trend of surface temperature is consistently increasing since about 1950 (Solomon et al., 2007) and in the high mountain areas the changes are likely to increase more (Shrestha et al., 1999).
Along with temperature, precipitation is another climatic factor showing changes in amount and pattern.
Global land precipitation has increased by about 9 mm over the twentieth century (New et al., 2001).
The trend of temperature in Nepal are similar to the global trend but concerning precipitation, a significant variability have been observed in the country (Shrestha et al., 1999, 2000; Tiwari et al., 2010).
Most of perception based studies show that local peoples’ perception matches with these trends of temperature and precipitation (eg.
Timilsina-Parajuli et al., 2013; Devkota, 2014).
However; change in climatic factors, its impacts and perception at different regions are still remained to be documented (Shrestha et al., 2012) which are fundamental to identify local and global contexts, and for constructing generalized theory around how people response towards changing environment and associated risks (Crona et al., 2013).
Inhabitants of rural areas are still not known about climate change and its impacts on various aspects but they perceive unexpected events to their surroundings (Chaudhary and Bawa, 2011).
People are good observers of their local environment who can identify and interpret changes occurring in their surroundings, which can play a key role in shaping collective response to climate change (Byg and Salick, 2009).
As there is much to learn from community-based approaches in different geographical locations about climate change, we have carried out this study to document local people’s perception, trend of temperature and rainfall and changing events in vegetation, phenology and agriculture in Kailali district of Far West Nepal.
Methods Study Area The study was carried in Kailali district of Far Western Development Region, Nepal.
It is part of tropical Tarai and Churiya region having warm climate throughout the year except short winter.
The district lies between 28°34'N and 80°34'E and covers an area of 2742 square kilometers with population 142480 (CBS Nepal, 2012).
The landscape altitude ranges from 179 m to 1957 m above sea level.
This study was concentrated in two VDCs (Shahajpur and Pandoun) located at subtropical Churiya range and two municipalities (Dhangadhi and Tikapur) located at tropical Tarai region (Fig.
1).
International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 64 | P a g e Fig.
1 Study sites; (a) Nepal, (b) Kailali district and VDCs Household survey and interview A purposive sampling method was used to capture experienced local people’s knowledge and their views on climate change.
Respondents were selected from a total of 120 households (30 from each study VDC and municipality).
The survey focused Koltadi, Khimadi and Kunthapaani villages in Paundaun VDC; Bayala, Belghari and Lakhi villages in Sahajpur VDC; Badhara and Chatakpur villages in Dhangadhi municipality and Bangaun and Kerabari villages in Tikapur municipality.
Among the total respondents majority of them were farmers (59.16%) and others were businesspersons (22.50%) and jobholders (18.33%).
The people of age forty years and above were included in interview.
A questionnaire for interview was prepared prior to the fieldwork.
In each study site focus group (5-10 people) discussions were conducted.
The participants were asked to enumerate all the information, which they have International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 65 | P a g e perceived mainly to identify changes in climate and impacts of such changes particularly on vegetation, agriculture and livelihood.
Direct observation and transect walk survey was also done to observe and identify vegetation types, individual plants and agricultural fields.
The plant species (recently appearing/increasing or decreasing) as noticed by local people were collected and identified in the field.
The survey was carried out during October 2012 to February 2013.
Temperature data recorded by Tikapur and Godawari stations and rainfall data recorded by Tikapur, Sadepani and Godawari stations of Kailali district were obtained from Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM), Government of Nepal, Ministry of Science, Technology & Environment, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Results People’s perception on climatic factors Four options viz.
increasing, decreasing, same and don’t know were given to the respondents to express their perception on climatic factors (temperature, rainfall, fog, storm and hail).
Opinion of 83% respondents was on ‘increasing’ for temperature while 9% said that there is no change in temperature (Fig 2A).
Concerning rainfall, 77.50% had opinion towards decreasing rainfall and 11% noticed that there is no decrease in rainfall (Fig 2B).
Fig.
2 Respondent’s perception on temperature (A) and rainfall (B) Local people have experienced irregular pattern of rainfall different from previous rainfalls in the area.
Seventy six percent respondents said that the rainfall occurs lately in present days (Fig 3A).
Similarly, majority of the respondents (58%) gave opinion that fog is increasing and opinion of 24% respondents was it is decreasing (Fig 3B).
Based on people’s experience, the fog moves from low land (Tarai) to uplands (Subtropical range) in winter.
The people of uplands had no experience of such event about 15-20 years ago.
Variation in percentage of respondents about perception on hail was low i.e.
49% gave opinion of decreasing hail and 32% had agreement with there is no change in hail.
(Fig 3C).
In case of storm, majority of respondents (48%) perceived that storm is increasing whereas 28% respondents had experience of decreasing storm.
Nearly to the second opinion, 21% respondents said that pattern of storm is same (Fig 3D).
International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 66 | P a g e Fig.
3 Respondent’s perception on pattern of rainfall (A), fog (B), hail (C) and storm (D) Climate change impact on vegetation and phenology Most of the respondents (85%) had opinion towards changing vegetation (Fig.
4A).
The people’s argument was that there is important role of community people to destroy natural vegetation due to population pressure and lack of awareness, but the people have noticed changes in composition of vegetation by appearance and increasing of certain new species or decreasing of certain native species population in the nature.
The respondents enumerated a total of 13 plant species decreased in surrounding and 9 plant species increased surprisingly around natural habitats since 2-3 decades (Table 1 and Table 2).
The decreasing species are classified according to respondents’ opinion into rare (R) and extremely rare (ER) (Table 1).
Local people’s important notice was on plant phenology i.e.
flowering and fruiting time has been changed according to 56% respondents.
The plants showing phonological changes enumerated by them were Myrica esculenta Buch.-Ham ex D.Don (Kafal, Myricaceae), Rhododendron (Gurans, Ericaceae), Ficus hispida L.f. (Tote, Moraceae), Psidium guajava L. (Amba, Myrtaceae), Mangifera indica Wall (Anp, Anacardiaceae), Punica granatum L. (Darim, Punicaceae), Ficus auriculata Lour.
(Timila, Moraceae), Berberis (Chutro, Berberidaceae) and Prunus persica (L.) Batsch (Aru, Rosaceae).
They have noticed that the flowering time of Rhododendron, P. guajava, and M. indica has been shifted 15 days to 1 month before than 20-30 years ago.
Similarly, fruit-ripening time of P. persica, M. esculenta, International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 67 | P a g e F. hispida, P. guajava, M. indica and Berberis also has been shifted by same pattern.
They also have shown that the flowers of P. granatum and fruits of F. auriculata in off seasons and sometimes throughout year since recent 5-7 years.
Other respondents (36%) said that they have not noticed phenological changes in these plants (Fig 4B).
Fig.
4 Respondent’s perception on vegetation (A) and phonological changes in plants listed by respondents (B) Table 1: List of plants decreased in natural habitat SN Name of Plants Local Name Family Remarks 1 Calotropis gigantea (L.) Dryand.
Ank Asclepiadaceae ER 2 Artemisia indica Willd.
Titepati Asteraceae R 3 Anaphalis busua (Buch.-Ham.
ex D. Don) DC Buki Asteraceae ER 4 Cannabis sativa L. Bhang Cannabaceae ER 5 Cuscuta reflexa Roxb.
Akas Beli Convolvulaceae ER 6 Asparagus racemosus Willd.
Kurilo Asparagaceae R 7 Smilax sp.
Kukurdaino Smilacaceae ER 8 Viscum album L. Hadchur Loranthaceae ER 9 Thysanolaena maxima (Roxb.)
O. Kuntze Amriso Poaceae R 10 Cynodon dactylon (L.) Pers Dubo Poaceae R 11 Imperata cylindrica (L.) P. Beauv Siru Poaceae R 12 Urtica dioica L. Sisnoo Urticaceae R 13 Tinospora cordifolia (Willd.)
Miers.
Gurgo Menispermaceae R Note: R; rare, ER; extremely rare International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 68 | P a g e Table 2: List of plants increased in natural habitat SN Name of Plants Local Name Family Problematic area 1 Ageratum conyzoides L. Gandhe Asteraceae OA, F, CL 2 Ageratina adenophora (Sprengel) King and Rob.
Banmara Asteraceae OA, F 3 Spilanthes calva DC.
Marathi Asteraceae OA, CL 4 Parthenium hysterophorus L. Badmas jhar Asteraceae OA, F 5 Cyperus rotundus L. Mothe Cyperaceae OA, F, CL 6 Cyperus iria L. Chhatare Cyperaceae OA, F, CL 7 Cassia tora L Chhinchhine Fabaceae OA, F 8 Argemone mexicana L. Thakalikada Papaveraceae OA, CL 9 Lantana camara L Kuri Verbenaceae OA, F Note: OA; open area, F; forest, CL; crop land Climate change impacts on agriculture According to 72% respondents the agricultural practices are different from earlier practices as they know (Fig.
5A).
Fluctuation of planting time, unexpected drought and rainfall since last 15 to 20 years is becoming major problem in agriculture.
This has been affecting sometimes positive and frequently negative in crop production.
All the respondents of both municipalities said that they have been using chemical fertilizers and pesticides since many years.
The respondents of both VDCs also said that they have started using chemical fertilizers due to less production of compost fertilizer with decreasing number of cattle and also pesticides has become common since last 10 to 15 years.
Respondents (63%) have perceived that pests and pathogens are increased and the people have no option of using pesticides to control crop diseases.
Some respondents (22%) said that there is no increase of crop diseases because they have started using modern pesticides (Fig.
5B).
Common crops of study areas are cereals (maize, wheat and rice), pulses (gram and lentil) and oil crop (mustard).
Regarding productivity of these crops, the perception difference did not vary greatly, only 42% respondents agreed in ‘decreasing’ for all crops and 37% said ‘increasing’ while no change was perceived in productivity by 17% respondents (Fig.
6).
Nowdays productivity depends on fertilizers and pesticides used and irrigation from local Kulo or tube well water.
Respondents said that they also have started changing crop varieties due to frequent impacts of changing environment on agriculture.
Local cereal crops (maize, wheat, rice) and vegetables (potato, brinjal, tomato, chilly, gourds) are replaced by hybrid ones in both VDCs and Municipalities.
In addition, the local people have abandoned traditional seed storage practice because hybrid varieties are available in local market from where they can buy when needed but the local people of Pandaun VDC still have not changed traditional practices.
International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 69 | P a g e Fig.
5 Respondents’ perception on changing agriculture practice (A) and crop diseases (B) Fig.
6 People’s perception on productivity (cereal crops, pulses and mustard) Trend of changing rainfall and temperature Observed trend of yearly rainfall in different parts of Kailali district of last 30 years was fluctuating between 967.1 mm to 2313 mm (total rainfall per year).
The trend was decreasing from 1982 to 1997 in all three parts (Tikapur, Sadepani and Godawari) and after that each five years mean of total annual rainfall/year shows either increasing or decreasing trends (Table 3).
Fig.
7 shows the trend of rainfall of all three stations (Tikapur, Sadepani and Godawari) of Kailali district.
International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 70 | P a g e Table 3.
Difference in rainfall amount (5 years mean of total rainfall/year from 1982 to 2011) Year Total rainfall/year (mm) Tikapur station Difference Sadepani station Difference Godawari station Difference 1982-1986 1896.16 … 2099.2 … 2405.46 … 1987-1991 1706.52 -189.64 1974.1 -125.1 2306.36 -99.1 1992-1997 1377.7 -328.82 1663.38 -310.72 2229.06 -77.3 1997-2001 1863.1 485.4 2117.28 453.9 2537.4 308.34 2002-2006 1481.56 -381.54 1669.38 -447.9 1910.46 -626.94 2007-2011 1776.18 294.62 2244.66 575.28 2550.74 640.28 Note: Raw data obtained from Tikapur, Sadepani and Godawari stations ( Source: DHM) Fig.
7.
Trend of rainfall in Kailali district (total rainfall/year, Source: DHM) Regarding temperature, Tikapur had experienced annual maximum temperature fluctuating between 28.75°C to 31.69 °C and minimum temperature between 12.17°C to 18.88°C during the period of last 30 years (1982 – 2011).
Whereas the record of Godawari station near to Dhangadhi and Sahajpur shows that, the average annual maximum temperature was fluctuated between 27.8°C to 32.4 °C and minimum temperature between 16.5°C to 20.7°C.
Trend of average annual temperature of both stations showed increasing pattern from 1982 to 2001 while it was opposite since 2002 to 2011.
Five years mean temperature of 1987-1991 was greatly differed from the mean of 1982-1986 (1.11⁰C) in Tikapur while decreasing differences are lesser than the increased difference (Table 4).
Similarly, record of Godawari station shows greater differences in five years mean between 1997-2001 and 1992-1996 International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 71 | P a g e (0.34⁰C) while decreasing difference was higher than the increased difference in 2002-2006 (Table 4, Fig.
8).
Comparison between the mean of 1982-1986 and 2007-2011 confirms that the temperature had been increased by 1.5⁰C in Tikapur and 0.21⁰C in Godawari.
Fig.
8 shows the trend of both maximum and minimum temperature in two stations (Godawari and Tikapur) of Kailali district.
Table 4.
Difference in temperature (5 years mean of average temperature/year from 1982 to 2011) Year Tikapur station (temperature ⁰C) Godawari station (temperature ⁰C) Max Min Mean Difference Max Min Mean Difference 1982-1986 29.80 15.46 22.63 … 29.59 19.80 24.70 … 1987-1991 30.24 17.25 23.74 1.11 30.01 19.59 24.80 0.11 1992-1996 30.52 17.46 23.99 0.25 30.48 19.72 25.10 0.29 1997-2001 30.28 18.02 24.15 0.16 30.89 19.98 25.44 0.34 2002-2006 30.54 17.77 24.15 0.00 30.20 19.67 24.94 -0.50 2007-2011 31.12 17.14 24.13 -0.02 30.87 18.95 24.91 -0.03 Note: temperature (⁰ C); raw data obtained from Tikapur and Godawari stations (Source: DHM) Fig.
7.
Trend of temperature in Kailali district (average temperature/year, Max = maximum; Min = minimum; Source: DHM) file:///D:/LBT/Nepal/RESEARCH/NAST%20Final%20Report/Final%20Report%20Submitted/Kaiali%20Data%20(Autosaved).xlsx%23Sheet4!A50 file:///D:/LBT/Nepal/RESEARCH/NAST%20Final%20Report/Final%20Report%20Submitted/Kaiali%20Data%20(Autosaved).xlsx%23Sheet4!A50 International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 72 | P a g e Discussion According to the results, most of respondents in the study area have noticed changes in climatic factors in comparison to past 2-3 decades.
Meteorological data of temperature before 2001 supports opinion of local people.
Still people perceived increasing trend of temperature might be due to access of modern facilities with extension of electricity in the villages.
The data shows that rainfall was decreased since 1982 to 1997, which can coincide with respondents’ perception, but the fluctuating trend is shown from 1998-2011 which differ from peoples’ perception.
Similar trends of temperature and rainfall, and perceptions of local people were observed in various districts of Nepal eg.
in Chitawan, Rampur (Paudel et al.
2014), Banke and Dang (Devkota, 2014), Kaski (Timilsina-Parajuli et al., 2014), Doti and Surkhet (Bhandari, 2013), Rupandehi (Dahal et al., 2015); Shankarpur VDC of Kanchanpur and Gadariya VDC of Kailali (Maharjan et al., 2011).
The trend of temperature in whole country was increasing from 1975 to 2006 by 1.8⁰C and rainfall pattern was more erratic in the Nepal (Malla, 2008).
In addition, peoples’ perception on other factors such as fog, hail and storm was not much conflicting.
Peoples’ perception and the trend of both temperature and rainfall in Kailali district indicate that the district is also one of the vulnerable districts of Nepal to climate change and climate change impacts on various sectors.
Peoples are wondering on decreasing natural vegetation, change in vegetation composition with decreasing or increasing certain plant species in their surrounding and natural habitats (Table 1 and 2).
The people accept that anthropogenic disturbances could be one important causes of decreasing vegetation but the disturbances have been controlled since 10-15 years before and they have conserved forests as community forest with strict rules and regulations, however, they have not noticed reformation of vegetation with composition as it was in the past.
It confirms that the changing climatic factors have influenced and altered vegetation composition.
Invasive alien species can be introduced intentionally or unintentionally and they have wide range of capabilities to spread and colonize novel habitats, which includes fast growth, self-compatibility, many seeds, and general habitat requirements etc (Baker and Stebbins, 1965; Bates et al., 2013).
The relationship of alien invasion and climate change is complex; even though, increased CO2, temperature, and precipitation pattern help alien species to introduce to exotic range (Dukes and Mooney, 1999; Bradley et al., 2010).
Invasive alien species, then affect native biota, genetic diversity, ecosystem process, crops and human health (Didham et al., 2005; Charles and Dukes, 2007).
The report of certain alien species such as A. adenophora, P. hysterophorus, L. camara, A. mexicana in the study area may create various problems in local environment and ecosystems.
Further studies are necessary to confirm the relationship of increasing alien species (Table 2) or decreasing native species (Table 1) with climate change.
People’s perception on plant phenology could have great significance for future research and provide basis to find out climate change sensitive plant species through scientific investigations.
Local people observe closely the local environment, they can identify and interpret changes occurring in their surroundings as well as this knowledge can play a key role in shaping collective response to climate change (Byg and Salick, 2009).
Use of wild International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 73 | P a g e fruits by local people is common practices in the villages (Cunningham, 2001; Shrestha and Dhillion, 2006; Thapa et al.
2014) and therefore the people every year get chance to observe flowering and fruiting events.
It cannot be neglected that the introduced hybrid fruits might have changed peoples’ perception on phenology in comparison to local varieties but respondents claim that the local varieties have been showing changed phenological behavior since few decades.
They suspect that the unexpected trend of climatic factors might have brought these changes in vegetation pattern and composition including plant phenology, and usually they discuss together in community level and conclude that these are common events of ‘Kaliyug (Age of Demon)’.
Some previous studies also have reported similar shifting phenology in plants due to climate change around the world (Hughes, 2000; Hulme, 2005; Parmesan, 2006; Cleland et al., 2007; Walther, 2010).
The yield of cereal crops is correlated with the seasonal rainfall (Bhandari, 2014).
The people’s agreement on changing agricultural practice in the study area such as fluctuation of planting time of crops due to unexpected drought and rainfall indicates that the farmers have achieved frequently negative and rarely positive benefits on crop production.
Similar to our study Dahal et al.
(2015) also reported that climate change decreases agricultural production in Rupandehi district of Nepal.
In spite of peoples’ awareness on effect of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, they have no alternate of using chemical fertilizers and pesticides in agricultural lands as they have felt that the soil quality is reduced and, pests and diseases are increased.
Local people, especially indigenous communities have adopted indigenous knowledge and traditional means to cope with climate change impacts but this study shows people’s dependency on modern practices in the study sites.
Use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides without proper knowledge and awareness would increase risk of changing soil quality and health hazards.
The governmental bodies should implement programs such as training, awareness and education as well as monitoring and control pesticide trade, use and practice (Tilahun and Hussen, 2014).
In conclusion, most of respondents in the study area have perceived increasing temperature, fog and storm as well as reduced and fluctuating rainfall and hail.
The temperature has been increased by 0.21 to 1.5⁰C in comparison to past 25 year’s data which supports local people’s perception.
Changes in climatic factors have impacts on local vegetation, agriculture and people’s livelihood.
Increasing or decreasing certain plant species has increased risk of alien species invasion and endangerment or extinction of native species.
Peoples’ opinion indicates that there is relationship of increasing alien species and decreasing native species with climate change.
In addition, change in phenology of some fruit plants is important sign of climate change.
These findings have significance for future research and provide basis to find out climate change sensitive plant species through scientific investigations.
Acknowledgement Nepal Academy of Science & Technology (NAST), Khumaltar, Lalitpur, Nepal is acknowledged for financial support and we are grateful to Prof. Dr. P. K. Jha, Head, Central Department of Botany, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal for encouragement.
International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 74 | P a g e References Baker, H.G.
and Stebbins, G.L., 1965.
The genetics of colonizing species: Proceedings of the First International Union of Biological Sciences Symposia on General Biology.
Academic Press.
588 pp.
Bates, A.E., McKelvie, C.M., Sorte, C.J., Morley, S.A., Jones, N.A., Mondon, J.A, Bird, T.J. and Quinn, G., 2013.
Geographical range, heat tolerance and invasion success in aquatic species.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 280(1772), 20131958. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2013.1958 Bhandari, G., 2013.
Trends in seasonal precipitation and temperature-A review in Doti and Surkhet districts of Nepal.
International Journal of Environment, 2(1), 269-279. doi: 10.3126/ije.v2i1.9227 Bhandari, G., 2014.
Effect of rainfall on the yield of major cereals in Darchula District of Nepal.
International Journal of Environment, 3(1), 205-213.
Bradley, B.A., Blumenthal, D.M., Wilcove, D.S.
and Ziska, L.H., 2010.
Predicting plant invasions in an era of global change.
Trends in ecology & evolution, 25(5), 310-318. doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2009.12.003.
Byg, A. and Salick, J., 2009.
Local perspectives on a global phenomenon-climate change in Eastern Tibetan villages.
Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 156-166. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.01.010.
CBS, Nepal, 2012.
National population and housing census 2011.
National Report.
Thapathali, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Vol.
01, 262 pp.
Chaudhary, P. and Bawa, K.S., 2011.
Local perceptions of climate change validated by scientific evidence in the Himalayas.
Biology Letters, rsbl20110269.
Cleland, E.E., Chuine, I., Menzel, A., Mooney, H.A.
and Schwartz, M.D., 2007.
Shifting plant phenology in response to global change.
Trends in ecology & evolution, 22(7), 357-365. doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2007.04.003.
Crona, B., Wutich, A., Brewis, A. and Gartin, M., 2013.
Perceptions of climate change: Linking local and global perceptions through a cultural knowledge approach.
Climatic change, 119(2), 519-531. doi: 10.1007/s10584-013-0708-5.
Cunningham, A.B., 2001.
Applied Ethnobotany: People, Wild Plant Use and Conservation.
Earthscan Publications Ltd, London and Sterling, Verginia, USA.
xviii + 300 pp.
Dahal, K.R., Manandhar, M. and Sharma, C.M., 2015.
People’s perception on impact of climate change in Paschim Amawa and Tikuligadh village development committee (VDC) of Rupandehi district, Nepal.
International Journal of Environment, 4(1), 141160. doi: 10.3126/ije.v4i1.12185 Devkota, R.P., 2014.
Climate change: trends and people’s perception in Nepal.
Journal of Environmental Protection, 5(4), 255-265. doi: 10.4236/jep.2014.54029.
Didham, R.K., Tylianakis, J.M., Hutchison, M.A., Ewers, R.M.
and Gemmell, N.J., 2005.
Are invasive species the drivers of ecological change?
Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 20(9), 470-474. doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2005.07.006.
Dukes, J.S.
and Mooney, H.A., 1999.
Does global change increase the success of biological invaders?.
Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 14(4), 135-139. doi: 10.1016/S01695347(98)01554-7. International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 75 | P a g e Hughes, L., 2000.
Biological consequences of global warming: is the signal already apparent?.
Trends in ecology & evolution, 15(2), 56-61. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0169-5347(99)01764-4.
Hulme, P.E., 2005.
Adapting to climate change: is there scope for ecological management in the face of a global threat?.
Journal of Applied ecology, 42(5), 784-794. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2664.2005.01082.x.
Maharjan, S.K., Sigdel, E.R., Sthapit, B.R.
and Regmi, B.R., 2011.
Tharu community's perception on climate changes and their adaptive initiations to withstand its impacts in Western Terai of Nepal.
International NGO Journal 6(2), 035-042. doi: 10.5897/NGO10.003.
Malla, G., 2009.
Climate change and its impact on Nepalese agriculture.
Journal of Agriculture and Environment, 9, 62-71. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/aej.v9i0.2119 New, M., Todd, M., Hulme, M. and Jones, P., 2001.
Precipitation measurements and trends in the twentieth century.
International Journal of Climatology, 21(15), 1889-1922. doi: 10.1002/joc.680.
Parmesan, C., 2006.
Ecological and evolutionary responses to recent climate change.
Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, 637-669.
Paudel, B., Acharya, B.S., Ghimire, R., Dahal, K.R., and Bista, P., 2014.
Adapting agriculture to climate change and variability in Chitwan: long-term trends and farmers’ perceptions.
Agricultural Research, 3(2), 165-174. doi: 10.1007/s40003-014-0103-0.
Perry, A.L., Low, P.J., Ellis, J.R. and Reynolds, J.D., 2005.
Climate change and distribution shifts in marine fishes.
Science, 308(5730), 1912-1915. doi: 10.1126/science.1111322.
Shrestha, A.B., Wake, C.P., Mayewski, P.A.
and Dibb, J.E., 1999.
Maximum temperature trends in the Himalaya and its vicinity: An analysis based on temperature records from Nepal for the period 1971-94.
Journal of climate, 12(9), 2775-2786. doi: 10.1175/15200442(1999)012 Shrestha, P. M. & Dhillion, S. S. 2006.
Diversity and traditional knowledge concerning wild food species in a locally managed forest in Nepal.
Agroforestry Systems, 66(1), 55-63. doi: 10.1007/s10457-005-6642-4.
Shrestha, U.B., Gautam, S. and Bawa, K.S., 2012.
Widespread climate change in the Himalayas and associated changes in local ecosystems.
PLoS One, 7(5), e36741.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0036741.
Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K.B., Tignor, M. and Miller, H.L., 2007.
Climate change 2007: Working group I: The physical science basis.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
996 pp.
Thapa, L.B., Dhakal, T.M.
and Chaudhary, R., 2014.
Wild Edible Plants Used by Endangered & Indigenous Raji Tribe in Western Nepal.
International Journal of Applied Sciences and Biotechnology, 2(3), 243-252. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/ijasbt.v2i3.10969.
Tilahun, B. and Hussen, A., 2014.
Assessment of Pesticide Use, Practice and Risk in Gedeo and Borena Zones; Ethiopia.
International Journal of Environment, 3(3), 201-209.
Timilsina-Parajuli, L., Timilsina, Y. and Parajuli, R., 2014.
Climate change and community forestry in Nepal: local people’s perception.
American Journal of Environmental Protection, 2(1), 1-6. doi: 10.12691/env-2-1-1.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0169-5347(99)01764-4 http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/ijasbt.v2i3.10969 International Journal of Environment ISSN 2091-2854 76 | P a g e Tiwari, K.R., Awasthi, K.D., Balla, M.K.
and Sitaula, B.K., 2010.
Local people’s perception on climate change, its impact and adaptation practices in Himalaya to Terai regions of Nepal.
Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Nepal Study Center, The University of Mexico, US 5: pp 56-63.
Walther, G.R., 2010.
Community and ecosystem responses to recent climate change.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 365(1549): 2019-2024. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0021.
Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 146 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE CASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION ADEL M. AL TAWEEL1*, V. ISMET UGURSAL1 AND DONNIE BOODLAL2 1 Dalhousie University, Halifax NS, CANADA 2 The University of Trinidad and Tobago, Point Lisas Campus, Trinidad and Tobago WI, * Corresponding author: al.taweel@dal.ca Abstract Climate change is one of the major environmental challenges facing the world.
Particularly vulnerable are arid and low-laying coastal areas, conditions that prevail through most of the Middle East and North Africa [MENA].
This region is an economically diverse one, including both the oilrich economies in the Gulf and countries that are resource-scarce in relation to their population.
However, with about 23 percent of MENA’s population living on less than $2 a day, it is imperative that the climate change management strategies adopted be cost-effective and emphasize economic, social and human development while addressing the concerns arising from anthropogenic climate change.
Over the past decades several national and international mechanisms were developed in an attempt to reduce the emissions considered to be mainly responsible for climate change, and to assist in coping with the adverse effects that are beginning to occur as a result of climate change.
Unfortunately, many of these approaches are presently associated with economic penalties that often adversely affect the socio-economic welfare of the populace, particularly in low-, and medium-income countries.
In this regard, it is informative to note the experience recently gained by Trinidad and Tobago [T&T] in its attempt to reduce GHG emissions without affecting the competitiveness of the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Using appropriate decision making tools and a policy environment based on a combination of regulations and incentives, the environmental challenges can be turned into a vehicle for sustainable development.
This paper discusses the factors that need to be considered while developing a sustainable climate change management approach for the MENA region and develops some recommendations that may be essential for achieving the desired climate change mitigation/adaptation actions while minimizing social disruption.Greenhouse gas emissions Keywords Climate change, MENA region, Global and regional energy production/consumption trends, Energy and wealth, Need for adaptation, Managing GHG emissions, Sustainable development, Building local capacity.
Nomenclature – CEBC Clean Energy Business Council of the Middle East and North Africa CER Certified Emission Reductions CNG Compressed natural gas EU European Union GCC Gulf cooperation council GDP Gross national product GNI Gross National Income HDI Human development index LED Low emission strategies LNG Liquefied natural gas MAPS Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios PCGDPI Per Capita Gross GDP PPP Purchasing power parity tpa Tonne per annum T&T Trinidad and Tobago UN United Nations I.
INTRODUCTION Energy is one of the key commodities required to sustain human existence and advancement and is one of the largest components of the world economy.
Consequently, global energy consumption has been rapidly increasing over the past two centuries but the pace of change has recently accelerated due to the increase in the total world’s population and the rapid improvement in the standard of living in a large segment of the world’s populace.
However, the negative environmental aspects associated with the increasing consumption of energy necessitate that such trends be properly managed for the overall benefits of humanity (Brundtland et al.
2010).
Climate change is a multi-faceted problem that requires the numerous stakeholders to contribute knowledge, skills and energy to plan for the impacts of a warmer planet and to take action to mitigate rising GHG http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 147 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu emissions.
Such actions must however be based on meeting the socio-economic challenges faced in any particular country/region yet help in achieving the overall objectives of protecting the global environment.
Nowhere are the climate change and sustainability issues more acute than in the MENA countries which are likely to be severely affected by climate change.
The predicted rise in temperature and sea level may affect coastal areas, while the current severe water stress is likely to be exacerbated (Cherfane 2010, Ghaddar 2010).
Water supply sources in MENA – two-thirds of which originate outside the region— are being stretched to their limits threatening to lead to national confrontations over this vital resource.
Adapting to climate change is not a new phenomenon for the NEMA region.
For thousands of years, the people in this region have coped with the challenges of climate variability by adapting their survival strategies to changes in rainfall and temperature.
But over the next century global climatic variability is predicted to increase, and NEMA countries may experience unprecedented extremes in climate (World Bank MENA Region, 2007).
This paper discusses the factors that need to be considered while developing a sustainable climate change management approach for the MENA region.
Some of the recommendations developed in this paper may be essential for achieving the desired climate change mitigation/adaptation actions while minimizing social disruption particularly in low-income countries.
II.
THE IMPACT OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION ON THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN MENA COUNTRIES The evolution of population, prosperity, and energy consumption has been substantially different in different parts of the world, resulting in large disparities amongst nations and regions in terms of wealth and the state of human development.
This is particularly evident in the Middle East and North Africa, a region which includes both the energy-rich economies in the Gulf as well as countries that are amongst the poorest in the world.
Figure 1 clearly illustrates this phenomenon where the 22 MENA countries considered in this investigation (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen) were organized in ascending order in accordance with their economic wealth using the World Bank data for the annual per capita gross domestic product (PCGDP).
Although the cost of living variation between the different countries is already taken into consideration through the purchasing power parity [PPP] factor, the value of the per capita GDP was found to vary between these countries by a factor of up to about 150, thus creating a very difficult situation in which it is virtually impossible to develop a singular strategy that meets the needs of the whole region.
Conversely, the presence of countries depicting a wide spectrum of developmental stages can create an opportunity for complementary/synergistic action that can benefit the population of both the wealthy and poor countries.
Appropriate strategies and frameworks are however needed in order to achieve such goals.
The discrepancy between the various countries in the MENA region becomes less sever when one utilizes more comprehensive indicators of the socio-economic development stage for any particular country.
The Human Development Index [HDI] used in Figure 2 is a composite indicator introduced by the UN in 1990 and provides a better measure of the socio-economic state of development of the populace by combining three basic dimensions: life expectancy, educational attainment (through literacy index and registration combined index) and economic performance (through per capita PPP GNI in international dollars) (UNDP, 2010).
The use of this more appropriate indicator reduced the inter-country discrepancy within the MENA region to about 3-fold.
Fig .1.
– Intra-region variation of the Per capita GDP http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 148 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu (Source of data: World Bank Databank, PPP 2011) However, it is worthwhile to note that whereas only three countries in the region have achieved a high stage of human development (HDI ≥ 0.8), five countries can be considered as still being in a low stage of human development (HDI < 0.5), with the remaining 14 countries being in the moderate stage of human development (0.5 ≤ HDI < 0.8).
Fig .2.
– Regional Variation in the Human Development Index (2011) The scale used for labeling the countries in Fig.
2 resulted in half of the countries being omitted in the formatted version A significant part of the GDP generated by prosperous MENA countries can be attributed to the production and utilization of non-renewable energy resources (energy-related revenues can be as high as 55% of the GDP for countries that are primarily oil exporters).
Two-thirds of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are thus located in the MENA region, which has 57% of the world’s proven conventional oil reserves and 41% of proven conventional natural gas resources.
These reserves generated an estimated US$ 785 billion in revenues in 2011 (Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012) and sovereign investment funds are being increasingly considered as means for ensuring the prosperity of future generations in countries presently endowed with large non-renewable natural resources.
The importance to the energy sector in determining the state of prosperity in MENA countries becomes very clear when one considers the per capita level of GHG emissions and its variation amongst the different countries of the region (Figure 3).
With the exception of Israel, the most prosperous MENA countries are those with abundant energy resources and energy-based industries (e.g.
the processing of petroleum and natural gas as well as petrochemicals).However, the activities associated with the extraction, processing and export of the oil and gas resources, and the rapidly-expanding energy-based industrial sector, are large GHG emitters.
Continued development of these energy resources along historic lines is therefore expected to result in exasperating the level of GHG emissions unless certain measures are taken to reduce the overall environmental impact of such development.
On the other hand, any viable GHG emission reduction strategy will have to consider the fact that the near-term demand for fossil fuels is predicted to increase as a result of the increase in the world’s population, and the increased per capita demand particularly in the rapidly expanding economies such as China, India, and Indonesia.
Policies and procedures aimed at implementing cleaner energy extraction/production/utilization are therefore urgently needed, particularly in the wealthy energy-rich countries.
Such measures can strongly reduce the environmental impacts of present and future development of energy resources in the region.
Fig .3.
– Regional variation in GHG emissions (Source of data: World Bank Databank) Previous studies confirmed the existence of strong correlation between the wealth of the citizens of a country and their energy consumption pattern (Sütterlin 2012, Floyd 2012, Estiri et al.
2013), a situation that applies to all countries regardless of their state of human development.
Prosperous and developed countries thus have a high level of energy consumption that is used for the production of goods and services, to support the transport and telecommunications sectors, and to achieve a high level of comfort for the citizens.
A large part of their 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Human Development Index 2010 http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 149 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu energy demand is presently supplied (directly and indirectly) by fossil fuels whereas a significant part of the energy demand in low-income countries is supplied by traditional biomass (wood and charcoal).
Unfortunately, The increasing use of biomass for energy purposes in middle and low-income MENA countries is one of the major forces driving the desertification process and is driven by the local availability of relatively inexpensive biomass in a world where the price of fossil fuels is relatively high.
As shown in Figure 3, the same qualitative relationship exists in the MENA region.
The average fossil fuel energy consumption in the major oil and gas producers (Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) are more than 300-fold higher than that in the low-income countries in the region.
Unfortunately, these emission levels are also manyfold higher than the present day world-average emission levels (4.6 tpa CO2 Equivalent) as well as the emission levels in developed countries that are strongly dependent on the exploitation of natural resources (Canada = 15.2 tpa CO2 equivalent; Australia = 18.2 tpa CO2 equivalent).
Amongst the factors contributing to this state of affairs are: the heavy dependence of affluent MENA countries on energy-intensive industries, the export of raw materials with limited local value-added (e.g.
crude oil and LNG), and the limited contribution of the agricultural and service sectors to the overall prosperity of the citizens.
Concerted efforts have been ongoing to change this situation, but is recommended that special attention be given to the use of low-emission-development routes (e.g.
energy efficiency and waste minimization) in order to ensure that the increase in the level of local value added does not result in further exasperating the environmental problems.
The heavy dependence of a country’s prosperity and the level of energy resource utilization is reflected in the essentially linear relationship between the per capita GDP and the level of GHG emissions in MENA countries (Figure 4).
This is mainly caused by the heavy dependence of affluent MENA countries on energy-intensive industries, the export of raw materials with limited value-added processing, and the limited contribution of the agricultural and service sectors to the welfare of the citizens.
III.
ENERGY CONSUMPTION, POWER GENERATION AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING Accepting that most countries do not want to suffer a reduction in their prosperity level while attempting to address the climate change challenge, the question becomes how the level of Fig .4.
The relationship between PCGDP and the GHG emissions level (Source of data: World Bank Databank, MENA region) GHG emissions can be reduced while maintaining the prosperity at its present level or even higher.
An indication the efficiency by which energy is utilized to generate wealth can be obtained by calculating the amount of GHG emissions associated with every $ 1,000 PPP GDP produced.
This indicator which is frequently used for benchmarking purposes is based on the fact that most of the world’s large consumers of energy still rely heavily on fossil fuel for power generation.
The large intra-regional variation in the energy use per unit GDP is clearly evident from the results depicted in Figure 5.
An in-depth investigation of the factors contributing to this phenomenon (e.g.
internal strife, the contribution of the service sector, the emphasis on high-value added production, the role of the agricultural sector, the role of hydro power) is needed to develop better understanding of the factors hindering the accelerated development of this region as a whole, and to identify novel means by which the prosperity of the region can be enhanced.
It is however noteworthy that the prosperous MENA countries are about 3-7 fold less efficient in converting their energy resources into national wealth than it is the case in the USA and EU (Figure 6).
Thus, whereas the generation of a $1,000 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 20 40 60 80 P e r ca p it a G H G E m is si o n s (t p a C O 2 ) Per Capita GDP ($ 1,000 http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 150 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu of GDP in the former group is associated with the emission of 700-1000 kg of CO2 equ., the same is achieved while emitting 100-180 kg of CO2 equ.
in more developed societies.
This suggests that there is a substantial potential for improving the efficiency by which energy resources are converted into revenuegenerating economic activities in the prosperous, hydrocarbon-rich MENA countries.
On the other hand, the high energy utilization efficiencies exhibited by the poorest three MENA countries are not indicative of high energy utilization efficiencies but are typical of their developmental stage (HDI < 0.5) where energy (fossil fuels in particular) plays a less significant role in determining the GDP.
The very low energy utilization efficiency observed in the case of Iraq in 2009 could most probably be attributed to the internal strife in the country and its negative impact on the GDP.
In that regard, it is important to note that although China has been rapidly increasing its power generation capacity to cope with the escalating demand, it has been able to achieve a remarkable increase in the energy use efficiency of energy utilization over the past 30 years.
This is largely due to the use of better manufacturing technologies and the gradual shift towards the production of high-value added products and services.
Fig .5.
Regional variation in energy utilization efficiency Fig .6.
Evolution of energy use per unit of GDP (Source of data: World Bank Databank) IV.
ENERGY CONSUMPTION, POWER GENERATION AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING In order to develop sustainable MENA-focused strategies for coping with the problem of climate change it is important that, in a fashion similar to other rapidly-developing regions of the world, the MENA region assumes its responsibility with respect to reducing its GHG emissions while undertaking unquestionably necessary adaptation projects (Verner, 2012).
In the meantime, it should also attempt to achieve two important socioeconomic objectives:  Avoid socially disruptive situations by reducing the large discrepancy in prosperity levels of the citizens within the MENA region.
 Address the need for securing long-term prosperity for the citizens of the countries whose present prosperity levels depend on exhaustible non-renewable energy resources.
The question is how these apparently contradictory demands can concurrently be met particularly by governments that have limited funds and need to spend them in a fashion that addresses urgently needed socio-economic challenges while trying to reduce emissions?.
Considering the fact that about 23% of the population in MENA lives below the poverty level of less than $2 a day, a concerted effort aimed at improving the standard of living in the region as a whole is desperately needed if social turmoil is to be minimized.
It is however imperative that the strategies adopted emphasize economic, social and human development objectives while addressing the concerns arising from climate change.
However, the financial and human resources needed for such an effort can be limiting factors considering the multifaceted needs in the region in a period of budgetary constraints throughout much of the world.
In a recent study based on data from 112 countries (Ugursal, 2013), it was noted that the relationship between the HDI and energy consumption depends very much on the country’s developmental stage (Figure 7).
Thus, for example, a substantial increase in the per capita energy consumption is needed before any significant improvement can be noted in the human development level can be noted for countries with HDI < 0.5.
On the other hand, http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 151 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu significant reductions in the energy consumption levels can be achieved without substantial reduction in the standard of living in countries with HDI ≥ 0.8; while, small increases in energy consumption result in substantial increases in the HDI of countries within the moderate HDI range (0.5-0.8).
Fig .7.
Relationship between a country’s HDI and its per capita energy consumption rate (Ugursal, 2013).
It is therefore projected that substantial investment in power generation and utilization will be needed in most of the 19 countries having HDI less than 0.8.
Such a massive undertaking will adversely affect climate change with the impact being mitigated if low emission development [LED] strategies are adopted in the new projects and measures for improving the efficiency of existing operations are adopted (Clapp et al., 2010).
Considering the fact that the population of the region is in excess of 330 million with an average per-capita GHG emission of 5.85 tpa CO2 equivalent per year, the full impact of unplanned development is equivalent to adding a GHG emitter that is equivalent to 2/3 that of the USA (until recently, the world’s largest emitter).
Innovative means for the planning, financing, execution, and managing of such a major undertaking are therefore needed in order to avoid the adverse impact of combined social, economic, and environmental upheavals.
The concept of “Sustainable Development” with its emphasis on balancing the needs of the society with those of the environment in an economically viable fashion represents one of the most promising avenues for achieving the aforementioned balanced objectives.
However, the challenge of managing this global problem in a sustainable fashion is quite daunting particularly considering the conflicting interests of the various regions and countries, particularly those at radically different stages of development.
The increase in GHG emissions associated with the accelerated development of low-, and mediumincome MENA countries can be partially compensated by improving the environmental efficiency of the enormous oil and gas sector operating in various MENA countries.
Many such countries (e.g.
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) have very large oil and gas operations, a situation that offers the opportunity for achieving significant reductions in GHG emissions at little, or even negative, costs.
A review of the GHG mitigation efforts in most of the MENA countries was recently given by Abdel Gelil (2009).
Once identified, the private sector may be interested in profitable emission reduction schemes but some additional incentives may be needed for high-risk border line cases.
Typical examples are:  Reducing the wasteful release of undesired energy by-products (e.g.
flares).
 Replacing high-carbon fuels with low-cost lowemission alternatives.
 Enhancing the efficiency of power generation plants and power transmission systems,  Enhancing the efficiency of energy utilization in large industrial operations, and  Identifying opportunities for reusing some of the CO2 captured in the many petrochemical plants present in the region for enhancing oil recovery in nearby fields.
It is hard to overemphasize the importance of energy efficiency as an economically-viable tool for mitigating GHG emissions.
The experience in many European countries, combined with the recent financial crunch, resulted in the recent adoption by the EU of “Directive 2012/27/EU” on energy efficiency.
This Directive establishes a common framework of the promotion of energy efficiency within the EU in order to ensure the achievement of its 2020 target on energy efficiency, and to pave the way for further energy efficiency improvements beyond that date.
It also lays down rules designed to remove barriers in the energy market and overcome market failures that impede http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 152 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu efficiency in the supply and use of energy, and provides for the establishment of indicative national energy efficiency targets for 2020 Marginal MENA cases may be eligible for financial support through various international programs, such as the Clean Development Mechanism [CDM] program and the Global Environment Facility fund.
It is however imperative that such border-line project meet the sustainability criteria and urgently addresses the socio-economic needs of the population.
The potential for significantly reducing GHG emissions at little or no cost is not a situation that is unique to MENA and was identified to exist in several countries.
For example, it is estimated that a significant reduction in Australian GHG emissions can be achieved (30% below 1999 levels by 2020) can be achieved without major technological breakthroughs or lifestyle changes.
These reductions can be achieved by using existing approaches and by deploying mature or rapidly developing technologies to improve the carbon efficiency of the Australian economy (Gomer and Lewis, 2008) It is, however, essential to redress the imbalance presently existing in the various methodologies used to estimate GHG emissions.
For example, equitable mechanisms may have to be developed by which the GHG emissions associated with the production, export, and transport of natural gas (10-12% of the carbon content in the case of LNG) can be split between the exporting counties and those which use it to replace coal in power generating plants.
V. AN EXAMPLE OF A SUSTAINABLE CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION EFFORT Over the past few years, several national and international mechanisms were developed in an attempt to reduce GHG emissions and to assist in coping with the adverse effects that are beginning to occur as a result of climate change.
Unfortunately, many of these approaches are presently associated with economic penalties that often adversely affect the socio-economic welfare of the populace particularly in low-, and medium-income countries.
In this regard, it is informative to note the experience recently gained by Trinidad and Tobago [T&T] in its attempt to reduce GHG emissions without affecting the competitiveness of its industrial and agricultural sectors.
Although the GHG emissions of Trinidad and Tobago are not very large when compared to larger countries (estimated at 53 M tonne CO2 Equivalent per year in ), it is one of the world’s largest GHG emitters per capita (40 tpa CO2 Equivalent in 2009).
Initial attempts were made to meet its international obligations, focused on policies/measures similar to those used in developed economies (energy efficient cars, replacing incandescent bulbs etc.).
However, a recent inventory of the sources of GHG emissions clearly showed the inability of such simple measures to achieve substantial reductions in GHG emissions (Figure 8), since more than 80% of the GHG emissions are generated by industrial activities.
Fig .8.
Sources of GHG emissions in T&T, 2010 (adapted from Boodlal and Al Taweel, 2013) Conventional environmental management concepts were applied to identify means by which GHG emissions can be reduced without significantly affecting the value of the welfare of the country (Figure 9).
Based on the results of an inventory of GHG emissions in T&T, and the costs associated with each GHG reduction option, an indigenous action plan was proposed (Boodlal and Al Taweel, 2013) which includes identification of the optimal carbon reduction opportunities in the country (Figure 10).
Fig .
9.
Identifying the most sustainable GHG reduction strategies http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 153 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu Fig .
10.
Cost associated with the various options for reducing GHG emissions in T&T (adapted from Boodlal and Al Taweel, 2013) Very conservative cost estimates were used in this study since its primary purpose is to serve as a policy development tool rather than for profitability analysis; yet several negative-cost opportunities were identified (Figure 10).
This suggests that the implementation of such measures will be beneficial for the country’s economy while, simultaneously, reducing its GHG emissions.
A policy environment based on a combination of regulations and incentives was also recommended to attract investment to cost-effective emission reduction measures.
In this way, environmental challenges can be turned into economic opportunities and a vehicle for sustainable development.
To achieve this goal it is, however, necessary to use appropriate decision-making tools and adopt innovative site-specific solutions that take into consideration the socio-economic welfare of the disadvantaged segment of the population.
The most financially attractive option for reducing GHG emission in T&T is the replacement of liquid fuels (diesel and gasoline) by compressed or liquefied natural gas.
For the past several decades, diesel and gasoline have been heavily subsidized in T&T in order to facilitate the transport of individuals and goods, particularly for the low-income citizens.
The price of liquid fuels has been fixed for many years at the fixed prices of: TT$ 1.50/liter of diesel, TT$ 2.60/liter of regular gasoline, and TT$ 4.20/liter of premium gasoline (6.5 TT$ = 1 US$).
In addition to encouraging energy-wasteful behaviour, the annual subsidy for these fuels was about US$ 500 per person with large quantities of the subsidized diesel fuel being illegally exported.
Significant savings can therefore be achieved by converting cars and trucks so that they can use natural gas instead of the aforementioned liquid fuels.
In addition to the financial benefits accrued by such conversions, the air quality is expected to improve as a result of using the cleanburning fuel and the GHG emissions are lower than those achieved when using the conventional heavier fuels.
The need for promoting such a conversion has been recognized many years before and both CNG and LNG are easily available as a by-product of the existing LNG production facility (used to export 58% of all the natural gas produced in T&T).
However, the progress achieved on that front has been slow because of the lack of a concerted effort to promote such conversion and the limited number of re-fueling stations equipped to handle CNG.
Following the drop in the price of natural gas and its impact on the country’s royalties, this issue is being more seriously addressed.
The price of premium gasoline was recently raised to TT$ 5.75 and a plan for increasing the number of stations equipped to handle CNG is being implemented.
A growing number of public transport buses are being converted to CNG while the Environmental Management Authority has launched a programme to convert its vehicle fleet to CNG.
This approach is not a novel one since natural gas is a commonly used alternative fuel used by trucks and transit bus fleet operators interested in reducing the cost and environmental impact of their operations.
Many factory-built natural gas vehicles are available, which incorporate engine technologies that have been designed specifically for natural gas with power, torque, and fuel efficiency similar to diesel engines.
Warranty coverage is also comparable to what is available on diesel engines.
Natural gas presently powers more than 15 million vehicles around the world and the number of natural gas fueled vehicles has been increasing by more than 15% a year over the past decade (NGV Global, 2012).
There are more than 20,000 refueling stations in use globally, with the majority of these stations dispensing CNG, although LNG projects have been announced in several countries for both on-road truck and marine use.
The trend of using CNG/LNG to power vehicles is expected to grow as the price differential between natural gas and liquid fuels increases as a result of the abundant availability of natural gas in the market place (Figure 11).
The development of a cost-effective natural-gas http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 154 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu based alternate to LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gases that are extensively used in the region for cooking and heating purposes) could similarly benefit NEMA countries that are heavily dependent on the use of this type of fuel for domestic purposes.
Fig .
11.
Price ratio of crude oil to natural gas (U.S. Energy Information Administration) VI.
BALANCING CLIMATE CHANGE ABATEMENT MEASURES AGAINST DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS Global climate change is projected to result in a set of diverse and regionally-specific impacts on natural ecosystems and human societies.
A growing literature suggests that while mitigation strategies are necessary, those alone are unlikely to be sufficient to cope with these changes.
Therefore, pursuing a complementary strategy of enabling countries to adapt to global change and negate many of the expected adverse impacts is equally, if not more, urgent (Burton et al., 2002; Verner, 2012).
However, with about 23% of MENA’s population living on less than $2 a day, it is imperative that the climate change management strategies adopted be cost-effective and emphasize economic, social and human development, while addressing the environmental concerns arising from anthropogenic climate change.
Poverty alleviation is often linked to economic development resulting in job creation, increased energy production and consumption, GDP growth, energy security, and reducing all of inequality, which usually translates into increased emissions levels.
Policy makers in low-income countries are therefore faced with the dilemma of having to allocate limited resources in an attempt to alleviate poverty while, at the same time, try to slow down GHG emissions.
The need for integrating the environment in development planning has been strongly promoted for many years (Tolba M. K., 2008) and it may be now necessary to emphasize the need for integrating development into environmental planning particularly for lowand middle-income countries Over the past few years, several tools have been developed to facilitate rational decision making and achieving a balance between development needs and protecting the environment.
(e.g.
Low-Emission Development Strategies [LEDS], and Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios [MAPS]).
A detailed discussion of these tools is beyond the scope of this investigation but a quick introduction to their recent application to developing countries was given by Clapp et al.
(2010) and Boyd (2013).
Though no formally agreed definition exists, LEDS are generally used to describe forward-looking national economic development plans and strategies that encompass low-emission and/or climate-resilient economic growth.
LEDS can serve multiple purposes but are primarily intended to help advance national climate change and development policy in a more coordinated, coherent and strategic manner.
By providing integrated economic development and climate change planning, an LEDS can provide valueadded to the myriad of existing climate change and development related strategies and reports that already exist.
Because of its benefits, the Copenhagen Accord recognised that a LEDS is indispensable to sustainable development.
VII.
FINANCING SUSTAINABLE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WITH CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION/ ADAPTATION COMPONENTS Achieving sustainable development goals that integrate climate change adaptation/mitigation measures within a holistic framework requires that announced commitments be translated into strategies, policies and actions.
The scale of such anticipated efforts in the MENA region requires massive multi-billion dollar financing that needs to be secured from internal and external sources.
The financial aspects of climate change issues in the MENA region has recently received much attention from a large number of investigators (Abaza, 2008; Babiker and M. Fehaid, 2011; Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012; Nakhooda et al., 2012; Saidi, 2012) whose findings provide valuable insight into the real state of affairs.
A high level of investment in climate change related projects by resource-rich MENA countries is http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 155 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu already underway, largely supported with domestic and private sector financing.
Many large-scale wind and solar energy projects are also investing in for both domestic use and export, while significant investments are being planned in energy efficiency and carbon reduction projects.
However, the financing of similar projects in resource-limited MENA countries faces many challenges.
Climate change funding by international agencies has been rather limited in the MENA region.
Although about US$ 1 Billion in finance has been dedicated since 2004, less than US$ 200 million was approved as grants in support of a large number of relatively small-scale projects, which are concentrated in 12 MENA countries (Nakhooda et al., 2012).
Similarly, the region’s share of the CDM funding is less than 2% of the global CER market in spite of the multitude of oil, gas, and petrochemical operations that are spread throughout the region and usually offer good opportunities for CDM support.
To further complicate matters, prices for CERs collapsed from about US$20 a tonne in 2008 to less than US$ 1 by the end of 2012.
This is mainly driven by the Eurozone debt crisis reducing the industrial activity and the over-allocation of emission allowances under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme” .
Furthermore, some of the projects contemplated for support can hardly be considered as being “sustainable” when, for example, the citizens of a developing country end up supporting the development of a promising technology by substantially subsidizing the cost of the power generated over the project’s life span (typically 20-30 years in this case).
On the other hand, there exists excellent opportunity for drawing upon the substantial financial resources that are generated within the MENA region itself.
These can be utilized to accelerate the development of equitable, holistic, and sustainable climate change projects in the region, provided that a proper framework is developed that secures the equity, longterm viability, and security of such financing efforts.
A similar example is presently being considered for the case of the five major emerging national economies of: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa [BRICS], where the need for financial cooperation in the five-nation bloc has led to a recent agreement to establish a BRICS development bank, which could properly utilize the huge savings pool of the bloc countries.
In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that the high oil and gas prices have generated an extraordinary level of international assets and liquidity in the hydrocarbon exporting countries of the MENA region, with gross foreign assets forecast to reach some USD 2.3 trillion by end-2012 (Saidi, 2012).
Consequently, governments and corporations in such countries have traditionally been cash rich and not reliant on market financing.
However, the global financial crisis, the contagion effects of the Eurozone's continuing crisis and retrenchment of EU banks, along with growing financial sophistication of both the public sector and private businesses in the GCC countries, changed their financial strategy, particularly since the GCC countries are keen to lead in innovative finance as they develop financial centers and diversify their economies (Saidi, 2012).
In this context, Sukuk (Tradable financial instruments that comply with the Islamic law and its investment principles, which prohibit the charging of and/or paying interest) may be a suitable investment instrument for the MENA region, as it would meet the investment requirements of investors from the GCC, Asia and other Shariah-compliant global institutional investors.
Several organizations, such as the Green Sukuk Working Group, the Clean Energy Business Council of the MENA Region and the Gulf Bond and Sukuk Association, were formed to address this need (Climatebonds, 2015).
In light of the above, the Clean Energy Business Council of the Middle East and North Africa (CEBC), the Climate Bonds Initiative and the Gulf Bond and Sukuk Association have launched a Green Sukuk Working Group.
The group aims to channel market expertise to develop best practices and promote the issuance of sukuk for climate change solutions investments, such as renewable energy and clean tech projects (Saidi, 2012).
Green Sukuk are Shariah securities and investments that use criteria for climate solutions developed by the International Climate Bond Standards scheme.
The CEBC plans to help investors more easily identify Shariah-compliant opportunities while assisting in providing the investment capital for clean energy and other climatefriendly projects in the region.
Another financing option to be considered is based on the development of a framework by which MENA http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 156 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu countries with high per capita GHG emissions can gain credit in exchange for financing climate change mitigation/adaptation projects within lowand intermediate-income countries in the region.
VIII.
BUILDING THE CAPACITY TO MANAGE CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN MENA The development of sustainable solutions to the multitude of climate change issues facing the MENA region requires in-depth knowledge of site-specific conditions prevalent in the various countries and the ability to identify/develop appropriate solutions that can meet the socio-economic needs of the local population.
Much of the expertise needed is already available in the region but is scattered amongst many countries, ministries, universities and NGOs.
It is therefore necessary to develop a regional network of institutions that have the knowledge and ability to accomplish such goals, and equip it with a project management team that can coordinate the efforts of the various individuals.
This network should encourage flexibility in problem-solving, the development of cost-effective innovative approaches, and emphasize the importance of addressing the needs of the various stakeholders and the balance of power among the various interest groups.
Such a network can also draw upon the world-wide pool of expertise, but the translation of the experience of others into a MENA-specific plan of action could best be handled on the local level where the active participation by the various stakeholders (particularly the most vulnerable sectors of the population) is a necessary condition for the success of any sustainable development program.
IX.
CONCLUSION Based on the analysis presented in this investigation it can be concluded that:  Socioeconomic analysis of the MENA countries and their GHG emissions shows that they can be split into three categories: the affluent resourcerich countries, the middle-income countries, and a few low-income countries.
The former group of countries has the world’s highest level of per capita GHG emissions while the latter has almost negligible emissions.
Although the variation in per capita GDP amongst these countries is very high, this does not reflect in a similar disparity of human development level.
 Massive investments are needed to accelerate the pace of economic development in lower-and middle income countries in order to improve the standard of living and minimize social disruption.
Such efforts will be accompanied by an increase in the emission levels that can be minimized by adopting low emission development strategies and by implementing cost effective means for reducing the emissions associated with the development of the oil/natural gas/petrochemical sectors.
 With about 23% of MENA’s population living on less than $2 a day, it is imperative that the climate change management strategies adopted be cost-effective and emphasize economic, social and human development while addressing the concerns arising from anthropogenic climate change.
This will avoid duplicating efforts, minimize the capital requirements, and facilitate the acceptance of such measures by the population at large.
 The carbon reduction experience of T&T clearly identified several negative-cost opportunities for reducing carbon emissions.
The savings accrued by implementing such measures can be used for adaptation or economic development purposes.
In this fashion, environmental challenges can be turned into economic opportunities and a vehicle for sustainable development.
 Converting cars and trucks so that they can use natural gas instead of gasoline or diesel reduces the GHG emissions and improves the air quality in urban centres.
Significant financial benefits can also be accrued by such conversions due to the large difference in the cost per unit energy of the two fuels and the elimination of the subsidies needed to make transportation more affordable.
It is, however, essential that such conversion plans be carefully implemented in a fashion that renders it the natural choice of the consumer rather than the socially disruptive price hikes.
 The extent of financial support received from international agencies by MENA countries for http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 157 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu mitigation/adaptation measures is relatively low.
This is most probably driven by the financial difficulties through which some of the world’s leading economies are presently going through, a situation, which is not predicted to change in the near future.
The region should therefore rely primarily on internally-generated financing driven by intelligent self-motivated interests.
 There apparently is a growing interest in developing Shariah-compliant financing istruments that can be used for climate change solutions investments.
This is driven by the high liquidity levels prevalent in the public and private sectors in many resources-rich MENA countries and the desire of the GCC countries to diversify their economies and develop financial centers that lead in innovative finance.
This approach is similar to that recently adopted the recent agreement by the BRICS countries to establish their own development bank, which could utilize their huge savings pool to enhance their collective interests.
 An alternate financing scheme may be achieved by having large GHG emitters gain credit for financing climate change mitigation/adaptation projects within lowand intermediate-income countries in the region.
Although no single formula can apply to a collection of countries as diverse as those in the NEMA region, it is recommended that the various MENA countries undertake the initial four steps needed to create a Low-Emission Development strategy [LEDS] which entail:  Development of vision/goal: An over-arching vision or goal is needed to help guide in the development of long-term policy decisions related to economic development and climate change priorities.
 Assessment of current situation: A clear understanding of major GHG emitting sectors and the socio-economic indicators is fundamental to determining the path forward.
 Emission projections, mitigation potential and costs: Planned pathways for business-asusual emissions can help provide a sense of the national emission trajectory, while mitigation potential and costs associated with the various emission reduction options are needed as a first step towards identifying promising mitigation actions.
 Vulnerability assessment: Indications of how a country or region may be impacted by climate change can help engage stakeholders, including the general public, and can help identify adaptation needs and the range of possible cost-effective adaptation outcomes.
Much of this information is already available in the many MENA-related studies conducted by several local and international agencies.
What is needed is to collect and update the information and ensure its correctness, fill in any gaps, and analyse the findings in a fashion that allows for the identification of costeffective projects that emphasize economic, social and human development while addressing the environmental concerns arising from anthropogenic climate change.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The financial support of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
The stimulating intellectual input and contribution of all the members of the Trinidad and Tobago Carbon Reduction Strategy Task Force is greatly appreciated.
REFERENCES [1] Abaza H., 2008, Financing of Environment Programmes: Private-Public Partnership, in Arab Environment: Future Challenges, M. K. and N. W. Saab Edit., Report of The Arab Forum For Environment And Development, 2008.
[2] Abdel Gelil I., 2009.
GHG Emissions: Mitigation Efforts in the Arab Countries, in Arab Environment: Climate Change, M. K. Tolba and N. W. Saab Edit., Report of The Arab Forum For Environment And Development, 2008.
[3] Babiker M. and M. Fehaid, 2011, Climate Change Policy in the MENA Region: Prospects, Challenges, and the implication of Market Instruments, Economic Research Forum paper # 588. http://apc.aast.edu/ Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 158 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu [4] Boodlal, D. and A. M. Al Taweel.
2015.
Sustainable Reduction of GHG Emissions: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago, Submitted for publication in “Process Safety and Environmental Protection”.
Institution of Chemical Engineers (UK).
[5] Boyd A., 2013. http://www.mapsprogramme.org/normalisingapples-and-oranges-comparing-trade-offs-forpro-pooritigation-options/ (last accessed March 16th, 2013).
[6] Brundtland G.H.
et al., 2012, Environment and Development Challenges: The Imperative to Act, Final summary report of the “The Blue Planet Prize laureates" promoted by the Asahi Glass Foundation.
[7] Burton I., S. Huq, B. Lim, O. Pilifosova, and E.L. Schipper.
2002, From impacts assessment to adaptation to adaptation priorities: the shaping of adaptation policy, Climate Policy 2: 145-159.
[8] Cherfane C.C., 2010, Regional Initiatives to Assess the impact of Climate Change on Water Resources, Paper presented at the Arab Water Forum.
[9] Clapp, C., G. Briner, and K. Karousakis, 2010, Low-emission development Strategies (LEDS): Technical, Institutional and policy lessons, Report # JT03292873, OECD/IEA.
[10] Climatebonds, 2015, http://www.climatebonds.net/tags/green-sukukworking-group (last accessed on May 20, 2015) [11] Estiri H., R. Gabriel, E. Howard, L. Wang, 2013, Different Regions, Differences in Energy ConsumptionWorking Paper no.
134, Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences, University of Washington.
[12] Floyd J.
2012, Beyond this Brief AnomalyA systemic inquiry into energy and society, (http://beyondthisbriefanomaly.org/; last accessed on May 25th, 2015) [13] Fattouh, B. and L. El-Katiri, 2012.
Energy Subsidies in the Arab World.
Arab Human Development Report, Research Paper Series.
United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States.
[14] Ghaddar N., 2010, Climate Change Research on Energy Efficiency in the Arab Region, Report submitted to the UNDP, Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS), [15] Gomer S. and Lewis A., 2008.
An Australian Cost Curve for Greenhouse Gas Reduction.
Mckinsey and Company.
[16] Klawitter J., 2011, Implications of Climate Change on Energy and Security in the MENA Region http://www.mei.edu/ , (last accessed March 15th, 2013) [17] ngv.
2012, http://www.ngv2012.com/ (last accessed March 24th, 2013).
[18] Nakhooda S., A. Caravani, P. Seth and L. Schalatek, 2012.
Climate Finance for the Middle East and North Africa: Confronting the challenges of climate change, Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America.
[19] Saidi N. H., 2012, http://hawkamah.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/Harnessing-GreenSukuk-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf (last accessed, May 20th, 2015).
[20] Sütterlin B.S., 2012, Segmentation and Characterization of Energy Consumers: Consumer Differences in Energy-Related Behaviours and Commonalities in Perceptions of "Others" Behaviours, Ph.D. Thesis, ETH Zurich Switzerland.
[21] Tolba M. K., 2008, Integrating Environment in Development Planning, in Arab Environment: Future Challenges, M. K. and N. W. Saab Edit., Report of the Arab Forum for Environment And Development, 2008.
[22] Tolba M.K.
and N.W.
Saab, 2010, Impact of Climate Change on Arab Countries, REPORT OF THE Arab Forum for Environment and Development.
[23] UNDP, 2010, http://hdr.undp.org/en (last accessed May 20th, 2015) http://apc.aast.edu/ http://www.mapsprogramme.org/normalising-apples-and-oranges-comparing-trade-offs-for-pro-poorhttp://www.mapsprogramme.org/normalising-apples-and-oranges-comparing-trade-offs-for-pro-poorhttp://www.mapsprogramme.org/normalising-apples-and-oranges-comparing-trade-offs-for-pro-poorhttp://www.mapsprogramme.org/normalising-apples-and-oranges-comparing-trade-offs-for-pro-poorhttp://www.climatebonds.net/tags/green-sukuk-working-group http://www.climatebonds.net/tags/green-sukuk-working-group http://hawkamah.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Harnessing-Green-Sukuk-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf http://hawkamah.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Harnessing-Green-Sukuk-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf http://hawkamah.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Harnessing-Green-Sukuk-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf Journal of Renewable Energy and Sustainable Development (RESD) June 2015 ISSN 2356-8569 159 RESD © 2015 http://apc.aast.edu [24] Ugursal V. I., 2013, Energy Use and Energy Conservation.
Chapter 21 in The World Scientific [25] Handbook of Energy, edited by Gerard M Crawley, World Scientific Publishing Co., 2013.
[26] Verner D. ed.
2012.
Adaptation to a Changing Climate in the Arab Countries.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9458-8.
[27] Wingqvist G. Ö. and O. Drakenberg, 2010, Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief MENA1 [28] World Bank Databank, 2013. http://databank.worldbank.org/ (Last accessed March 18, 2013).
[29] World Bank MENA Region, 2007, Sustainable Development Sector Department (MNSSD) Regional Business Strategy to Address Climate Change Preliminary draft for consultation and feedback.
http://apc.aast.edu/
Iberica 13 Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 ISSN: 1139-7241 / e-ISSN: 2340-2784 Abstract This article discusses the use of metaphors and metonyms in texts about climate change in different registers, with a particular focus on the information given to young people, and what they understand about the topic.
It begins by considering the role of metaphorical thinking and language in science, and reviews some of the work on scientific metaphor in expert and popular genres.
The article analyses the different functions of metaphors in two texts about anthropogenic climate change from different genres, arguing that in the popular text analysed metaphors tend to have the function of entertaining and dramatizing, and introducing and concluding (interpersonal and textual), as opposed to their informational (ideational) function in the research article that was analysed.
I then discuss a corpus and discourse analysis of young people’s talk about climate change.
The young people’s use of figurative language is compared with that of researchers and educationalists.
The analysis finds that, consistent with work on scientific popularisations, written texts for non-specialists tend to “open up” in Knudsen’s (2003) terms experts’ metaphors, extending them creatively.
I found that on occasion this seems to lead to, or reflect, misunderstandings of the underlying science.
I also find that young people reference Arctic and Antarctic animals as symbols of the problem of climate change.
Keywords: metaphor, science, climate change, education, schools.
Resumen Las metá foras en lo s t exto s sobr e e l cambio c l imáti co Este artículo discute el uso de las metáforas y metonimias en los textos sobre el cambio climático en diferentes registros, con un interés especial en la información proporcionada a la gente joven, y en lo que ellos entienden sobre el tema.
El artículo comienza considerando el papel del razonamiento metafórico y del lenguaje en la ciencia y revisa el trabajo de las metáforas científicas en los géneros Metaphors in texts about climate change Alice Deignan University of Leeds (UK) a.h.deignan@education.leeds.ac.uk 45 Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 ALICE DEIGNAN expertos y populares.
El artículo analiza las diferentes funciones de las metáforas en dos texos sobre el cambio climático antropogénico en diferentes géneros y defiende que en los textos populares analizados las metáforas tienden a realizar la función de entretenimiento y dramatización así como de introducción y conclusión (interpersonal y textual), en contraposición con la función informacional (ideacional) del artículo de investigación que se analizó.
A continuación llevo a cabo el examen de un análisis de corpus y del discurso de la gente joven sobre el cambio climático.
La comparación del lenguaje figurativo de estos con el de los investigadores y de los expertos en educación demuestra que, como se recoge en la investigación sobre la popularización del discurso científico, los textos escritos para los no especialistas tienden a "abrir", en términos de Knudsen (2003), las metáforas de los expertos, extendiéndolas de forma creativa.
Descubrí que en ocasiones esto parece conducir a, o reflejar, interpretaciones erróneas de la ciencia subyacente.
También observo que la gente joven se refiere a los animales árticos y antárticos como símbolos del problema del cambio climático.
Palabras clave: metáfora, ciencia, cambio climático, educación, escuelas.
1.
Introduction This article describes a set of corpus and discourse analytic studies of figurative language used in writing and talk about climate change.
Climate change is a current and urgent issue; 2015 and 2016 were the two warmest years on record (Met Office press release, 2017), and large numbers of animal and bird species are already negatively affected (Pacifici et al., 2017).
Levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were below 300 parts per million (ppm) for over 400,000 years, until 1950.
In 2013 the figure passed 400 ppm, and at the time of writing the figure is 406 ppm (NASA website, 2017).
Within the scientific community, there is widespread agreement that climate change is happening, and is due to human activity (Boykoff, 2011).
Climate change can only be slowed, if at all, by dramatic modifications to lifestyle and consumption.
Young people born in the 1990s and in this century will probably live to see some major impacts of climate change, yet this same group of people are under an unprecedented pressure to consume, from the media, their peers and advertisers.
This is a behaviour which is directly in conflict with the need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, but young people are unlikely to draw this conclusion without targeted information about climate change and its causes.
Non-scientists generally, and perhaps especially young people, do not usually read specialist scientific writing on climate change, but rather get 46 information through school and educational materials, and from popular science writing.
As Boykoff writes, People typically do not start their day with a morning cup of coffee and the latest peer-reviewed journal article.
Instead, citizens turn to mass media— television, newspapers, radio, internet and blogs— to link formal science and policy with their everyday lives.
(2011: 53) The research described in this article looks at how metaphors frame climate science in non-specialist pedagogic and popular texts.
I also examine some of the metaphors used by school students in interviews about climate change.
This is intended as a contribution to finding out what nonspecialists, especially young people, are told about climate change, how this is framed through metaphor, and, in turn, how they express their understanding of it.
I begin with a discussion of previous research on how metaphors are used in texts written for scientists and in texts written for the non-scientific public.
2.
Metaphor and doing science Metaphor use in science has much in common with what we know about metaphor in language and thought generally.
Metaphorical language pervades the discourse of science, and, like metaphors in non-technical genres, scientific metaphors often “highlight and hide” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 13) aspects of their topic.
A few metaphors in science “frame our way of thinking” (Cuddington, 2001: 464); that is, they form a backdrop to scientific thought and discussion and thus are more powerful than highly visible metaphors.
An example of this is the BALANCE metaphor, which is also frequent in other specialised registers such as Law and Politics (Sanchez, 2011).
In the natural sciences, the metaphor could be phrased as (GOOD) NATURAL SYSTEMS ARE IN BALANCE.
In everyday language, the metaphor is realised in brand names of products such as pet foods and vitamin tablets, which claim to restore the body’s balance.
The metaphor is seen in educational materials where it is claimed that predators and their prey live in balance, and it also underlies some specialist scientific discourse.
Cooper (2001) traces the origins of the BALANCE metaphor back to Greek thought.
Cuddington notes that the metaphor frames nature as “a beneficent force” (2001: 463), and before Darwin, an order that was believed to have METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 47 been designed by God.
She argues that the metaphor suggests an unscientific idea, which has now been superseded by the more sophisticated mathematical concept of “equilibrium”, also, of course, metaphorical.
In the discipline of ecology, equilibrium is a way of describing species numbers, where predators, food supply and other influences are such that the numbers of a species are stable over time.
This mathematical notion has no intrinsic evaluative quality, but it can become blurred with the older BALANCE metaphor, whose positive connotations often seep into it.
Both Cooper and Cuddington note that the BALANCE metaphor has suggested a constancy that does not, in reality, exist.
Species numbers have always fluctuated, often to extreme degrees.
Ladle and Gillson (2009) claim that for some ecologists, a FLUX OF NATURE metaphor is replacing the BALANCE OF NATURE one, but that this is not seen more widely in texts accessed by the general public.
In one of the best known discussions of the framing function of metaphors, Lakoff (1991) argued that mappings such as A NATION IS A PERSON justified, and in some cases, directly led to, specific actions in a war context.
Cuddington (2001) and Ladle and Gillson (2009) make the same claim of the BALANCE OF NATURE metaphor.
Cooper (2001) argues that the natural world is always undergoing change, albeit often very slowly; the BALANCE metaphor hides this, and is used to argue for conservation activities that preserve a perceived ideal state.
Ladle and Gillson (2009) show, through corpus and document analysis, that the BALANCE metaphor is associated with conservation of nature and prevention of change.
One example is in the US, where this approach led to attempts to prevent all forest fires “in order to prevent disturbance and thereby maintain a perceived balance” (2009: 230).
Ladle and Gillson note that, over time, the result of this policy was larger, more severe fires, which caused much more serious damage than would have resulted from the smaller fires that had been prevented.
As well as framing, metaphors are often ways of developing new hypotheses in science, as described by Boyd (1993: 482).
The importance of metaphor to developing scientific thought is well documented, including by scientists themselves, such as Brown (2003) and Cuddington (2001).
Brown writes of metaphor: It is at the very core of what scientists do when they design experiments, make discoveries, formulate theories and models, and describe their results to others – in short, when they do science and communicate about it.
(2003: 14) ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6648 This author traces in scientific detail the metaphors used by scientists in their developing understanding of topics such as the atom, protein folding, and the cell, arguing that metaphors shape the direction of scientific enquiry.
He also argues that the metaphors that dominate and shape thought are as much a product of culture and embodiment as metaphors in other domains of life.
Scientists have also analysed how metaphors can hinder understandings of science.
In an account of the history of cancer treatment written for nonscientists, Mukherjee (2010), an oncologist, writes that medical researchers’ use of the war metaphor to talk and think about their research seriously slowed down advances in understanding and developing treatments.
The war metaphor was politically apposite at the time and place he describes: the Cold War period in the US.
Mukherjee argues that the war metaphor portrays cancer as a homogenous, identifiable enemy, leading to the mistaken conceptualisation of it as a single disease, for which a single treatment could be found.
Some doctors and researchers believed, he argues, that if only the weapon – early versions of powerful chemotherapy, administered in the absence of the drugs that are now available to alleviate its terrible side effects – was delivered in high enough doses, the enemy could be conquered, over the battleground of the patient’s body.
It is now known that cancer takes a wide variety of forms, which have a range of different causes, and the treatments that are available and being developed differ accordingly.
He argues that the misguided search for a single “magic bullet” (page 86) delayed progress on some cancers, possibly by decades.
3.
Science communicated through metaphor to nonscientists Explorations of metaphors in science communication have divided their use into, broadly, metaphors used to communicate between peers, and metaphors used to explain science to the non-scientific public, that is, for a pedagogical purpose (for example, Boyd, 1993).
A repeated finding is that linguistic metaphors very quickly lose any sense of metaphoricity to scientists.
Knudsen (2003) asked scientists their views about metaphorical terms in the field of DNA, and reports: A number of the molecular biologists I have consulted argue that, since they know exactly which chemical relations and substances are being referred to, the metaphors in question have lost any figurative quality they might have METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 49 had.
In the opinion of these scientists, no definitive difference exists between these metaphorical concepts and concepts with a mere non-figurative origin.
(2003: 1252-1253) When the same topics are written about for non-scientists, in popularisations for example, the metaphors tend to be, in Knudsen’s terms, “opened up”.
She compared the metaphors used to talk about DNA by scientists in peer to peer communication and in popularisations.
In communication between scientists in the research journal Science, linguistic metaphors such as translation, code and message quickly became established and were used “just like any other scientific concept” (2003: 1254).
Knudsen shows how this TEXT metaphor was “opened up”, that is, extended, explored and re-lexicalised in popularised accounts, some of which were written by the same scientists.
She cites linguistic metaphors such as read off, dictionary, and spell out from Scientific American, as well as re-uses of the established scientific terms message, translate and code.
Semino (2008) found the same process in her analysis of a scientific article about ageing, and a popularised version, which was published in the New Scientist.
The scientists put forward the hypothesis that as an organism ages, cells become less effective at removing toxins; this is described using what Semino terms a metaphor of WASTE DISPOSAL.
In the scientists’ texts, the use is fairly limited, while in contrast, the popular version exploits the mapping creatively and humorously, beginning with a long description of the writer’s attic, and the junk it contains (2008: 143).
Deignan et al.
(2013) analysed a New Scientist article which presented findings about glaciers alongside the two research articles that it was based on.
The terms equilibrium and balance were used in the research articles, in the expressions equilibrium line altitude and surface mass balance.
These have technical meanings related to the relationship between ice melting in the summer and re-accumulating in the winter, and the point on the glacier at which these occur.
The terms tend to be abbreviated to “ELA” and “SMB”, which suggests that their figurative origin is lost (ibid.).
The terms were used frequently in the research articles, but there were no exploitations or developments of a balance metaphor.
In the New Scientist popularisation, the terms ELA and SMB were not used, either in full or abbreviated form.
However, the writer used derived terms such as out of equilibrium, in (1) glaciers are about 25 percent out of equilibrium (Anathaswamy 2011: 8).
ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6650 This expression is not used at all in the research articles that were analysed, nor in a wider corpus search of academic articles.
It appears to have been creatively coined by the New Scientist writer.
The writer also used the balancerelated linguistic metaphor tipping point, in citations such as (2) Greenland will reach a tipping point in about 30 years (ibid, p. 8) an expression which again is not used at all in the source research texts.
As was the case for the “junk” metaphors described by Semino, above, the metaphors used by scientists communicating with each other seem to have lost any figurative dimension they may have had, while the popular text treats them creatively.
Another difference in metaphor use between research and popular texts is function, which I illustrate with an example of two topically-related texts about climate change.
In 2017, an article was published in the peer reviewed journal Anthropocene Review, entitled “The Anthropocene equation” (Gaffney & Steffen, 2017).
The article proposed an equation to represent the rate of change to the Earth’s system.
The first author, Gaffney, is a science journalist, while Steffen is a chemist who has published in some of the leading scientific journals.
Gaffney also published a version of the article in the New Scientist, entitled “Simple equation shows how humanity is trashing the planet”.
There are differences between the two articles in the functions that metaphors are used for.
The articles contain a number of shared metaphors that denote scientific and technical concepts; these include drive, driver (an abstract force that leads to change), baseline (as in baseline data) and instability.
The research article also includes more specialised technical uses of metaphor, such as feedback(s), interaction, and forcing, which have a denotational, or referential, function.
These include the figurative expression saw-tooth in the following: (3) …the Earth System of the Quaternary is typified by saw-tooth oscillations of glacial-interglacial cycling.
which refers to a strong up-and-down pattern of a line on a graph, to denote the same phenomenon.
This use of saw-tooth is found in a number of texts in the Oxford English Corpus, either referring to a graph, real or imaginary, or to the screens on medical instruments to measure heart rates etc.
It is common in scientific texts to find figuratively-used expressions which refer METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 51 to the appearance of a line on a graph, or representation on a diagram to stand for a trend or distribution, such as curve, steep, climb, falling, peak and trajectory, as in the following citations, all from specialist academic texts: (4) At low levels of adoption, the supply curve for adopters is steeper than it is at higher levels of adoption (Expert corpus; see below) (5) Each site’s yearly hydrograph was categorized into one of four types (Simple, Complex, Semi-Complex I or Semi-Complex II) based upon the visual characteristics of the climbing limb, the peak flow times and the falling limb.
(Expert corpus; see below) (6) The graph traces the deterministic trajectory from an initial state when the allele is rare in both populations to when the allele has reached global fixation.
(Genetics online, 10.06.2005) I regard this as a metonymy from metaphor.
The description of aspects of a graph using terms from the concrete semantic field of rising, falling, and in the case of trajectory, flying through the air, is metaphorical.
The association of these features of a graph with the changing phenomenon that they represent is then metonymical.
The related popular article published in the New Scientist contains some metaphors that denote, in common with the research article, but also metaphors that appear to have other functions.
An analysis of the following paragraph illustrates this.
Metaphors identified using the Metaphor Identification Procedure (Pragglejaz, 2007) have been underlined: (7) For the last 2.5 million years, Earth settled into a rather unusual period of potential instability as we rocked back and forth between ice ages and intervening warm periods, or interglacials.
Far from living on a deeply resilient planet, we live on a planet with hair triggers.
Industrialised societies are fumbling around with the controls, lulled into a false sense of security by the deceptive stability of the Holocene, the last 11,700 years.
Remarkably and accidentally, we have ejected the Earth system from the interglacial envelope and are heading into unchartered waters.
(page 2) The Oxford English Corpus was used as a reference corpus to examine citations of the underlined metaphors.
As expected, a number of them, such as settled into, resilient and lulled [into a false sense of security] are in very general use with the same denotational meanings as in this text, and do not appear ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6652 to have additional functions in the article.
Of interest here, and in contrast to the metaphors identified in the research article, are the following: Rocked back and forth Hair triggers Fumbling around with the controls Ejected… envelope Heading into unchartered waters These seem to have functions beyond denoting, the first of which is explanatory, or pedagogical.
Rock back and forth in: “We rocked back and forth between ice ages…” conveys the proposition expressed in the research article in the sentence discussed above: (3) the Earth System of the Quaternary is typified by saw-tooth oscillations of glacial-interglacial cycling.
The metaphor rock back and forth draws on our everyday, bodily experience to make this accessible to a non-scientific readership (in interesting contrast with the research article use of saw-tooth) and therefore seems to have a pedagogical function as well as a denotational one.
The paragraph as a whole summarises material that is covered over several pages and is supported by detailed references to other research studies in the research article.
However, each of the other metaphors listed above both explains but also adds additional meaning to the points made in the research article.
The point that human activity is having a major effect on climate, introduced in the paragraph cited above with “Far from living on a deeply resilient planet…” is introduced in the research article with the sentence: (8) However, an entirely new forcing is now driving change in the Earth System: human activity (H).
Although H is a subset of I (internal dynamics), here we argue that the magnitude, the unique nature of the forcing in the history of the planet, and the rate have now become so profound that H deserves to be considered in its own right in the context of Earth System dynamics.
This text presents an outsider standpoint to human activity, while the popular article repeatedly writes of we.
The human race is talked of metonymically as taking actions that a single person would: fumbling around, ejecting, heading to unchartered waters.
Each of these actions is also metaphorical, writing of the changes wrought to the environment and other species by an METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 53 industrialised lifestyle as if they were the physical actions of an individual or small group of people.
As noted above, the research article also uses metonymy, but from a graph to a phenomenon – that is, using a scientific artefact to explain a scientific phenomenon, rather than bringing the discussion into the immediate realm of the human body and human action.
The popular article also uses metaphor to move blame for the crisis away from humanity; the metaphor hair trigger is used, as part of a claim that the Earth is a very fragile system.
This claim is not made in the research article, which instead writes of the magnitude of the changes produced by human activity.
In the title of the popular article: “Simple equation shows how humanity is trashing the planet”, and the penultimate sentence: “The stakes could not be higher, yet critical knowledge and action needed for stability is in danger of becoming collateral damage in today’s war on facts”, the tendency for metaphors to have a function that encompasses entertaining, dramatizing and, sometimes, exaggerating, is seen, in expressions such as stakes… high, collateral damage and war.
In my analysis, this has overlapped with the pedagogic function in some expressions, discussed above.
Unsurprisingly, neither the pedagogic nor the entertaining function was found in the research article.
4.
Science metaphors in school education Having discussed the form and function of scientific metaphors across genres, and briefly described a number of studies, I return to the issue raised in the introduction: the communication of climate change to young people.
In order to investigate this issue, a project team from Leeds and Lancaster Universities, UK, compiled three corpora, as follows: ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6654 Corpus Contents Tokens Expert Journal articles and policy documents.
509,772 Materials Texts accessed by young people and their teachers relating to climate change.
260, 679 Interviews Transcribed interviews with school students aged 11-16.
87,929 Table 1.
Climate change corpora from different genres.
T The Expert corpus has two sub-corpora of roughly equal sizes.
The academic section consists of articles published in three prestigious journals in the field: Climate Change, Global Environmental Change and Nature.
The team took advice from climate experts at Leeds and Lancaster Universities on the choice of these journals.
The policy documents section consists of policy documents from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the UK Department for Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs, Oxfam and other bodies that comment at a national or international level on climate change.
The Materials corpus consists of texts such as curriculum materials, science textbooks, revision websites, popular science websites for young people, and teacher information packs.
This was the last corpus to be built, and also the most complex, as many of the texts are from the internet, or from textbooks, and are multi-modal.
For this project we only analysed text formally, but we noted that the use of images and sound were also often metaphorical.
The Interviews corpus consists of transcriptions of 41 focus group-style discussions between one of the project teams and groups of school students.
The students all attended one of the four collaborating secondary schools in the Yorkshire region (north-east England).
The schools are in different socio-economic areas; and ranged in location from Leeds city centre, through suburban to rural.
All are non-selective, state (i.e.
not feepaying) schools, who have links with Leeds University through the latter’s teacher training work.
Students were nominated by their science teachers to take part, and were interviewed in year groups, that is, each group consisted of children from the same school year and science class.
Ethical approval was granted through the relevant University of Leeds committee; all participants gave informed consent, and data were anonymised and stored securely.
We analysed the data in a variety of ways, for different purposes.
To conduct metaphor research, I used the corpus software Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff et al., 2014) to perform word counts, generate concordances and identify frequent and significant collocates, cross-checking a sample of my analysis with other team members.
This enabled us to compare the three corpora against each other, and also against two reference corpora, the British National Corpus and the Oxford English Corpus.
I started by using the Word List function of Sketch Engine to obtain a list of the most frequent words in each of the three corpora.
Our focus was on lexical words rather than grammatical words such as prepositions.
While we acknowledge that prepositions are often metaphorically used, my initial analyses showed that this is rarely, if METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 55 ever, with meanings specific to the domain of climate science.
Having obtained a word list, in order of frequency, for each of the three corpora, I concordanced each of the lexical words, or, more precisely, lemmas (i.e.
all inflections of a word), starting with the most frequent.
For the two larger corpora, I analysed concordances down to words that occurred 200 times per million words, that is, of mid-range frequency.
In this way I analysed the concordance data for several hundred words.
I then analysed concordances for all lexical words in the Interviews corpus down to a raw frequency of 5.
This analysis sought to establish whether words were used with a figurative meaning or literally.
To do this, I used a version of the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) (Pragglejaz, 2007).
MIP stipulates reading entire texts to determine context, which is clearly not practical for a corpus of this size, and not possible in any case from the starting point of the concordance line.
However, the subject matter was known, and the genre of the texts was predictable, so I found that in almost all cases the 80 characters of context of a concordance line was sufficient to determine whether a word was being used literally or figuratively, and in the few remaining unclear cases, a slightly expanded window was enough.
The MIP analysis showed that the majority of frequent lexical words were used literally.
The most time-consuming part of the analysis was where words were used both literally and metaphorically.
This was the case especially for a set of words describing level, including level itself, high, low, rise, fall and similar words.
These are used in the usual scientific sense, to describe and compare quantities of abstract entities, including the use described above, related metonymically to graphical representations of data.
Members of this lexical set are also used literally in climate science, to talk about the sea level.
For words such as these, citations of each meaning were counted carefully.
A smaller number of words were always used metaphorically in the corpora: frequent examples included impact, scenario, approach and balance.
The findings from previous studies, discussed above, indicated a tendency for specialist scientific metaphors to be “opened up” (Knudsen, 2003) in popularisations.
Our findings were consistent with this.
Our comparative analysis of the Expert and Materials corpora showed a broad picture in which, in the Expert corpus, metaphors tended to be found in technical terms or semi-technical descriptions, while in the Materials corpus they were used for overtly pedagogic purposes, often being turned into similes, and/or with the grounds for the metaphor explained.
Further details about the Expert and Materials corpora are discussed in Deignan et al.
(2017).
I now discuss the examples of ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6656 figurative language that we identified in the corpus of interviews, comparing these, where relevant, with the other two corpora.
The Interviews corpus was analysed using corpus tools and also thematically.
During the manual thematic analysis, metaphors were again marked up using the MIP procedure, and I marked up metonyms following Littlemore and Tagg’s procedure (2016), which is a variant on MIP, based on work by Biernacka (2013).
I found that in the Interview corpus, metaphors were sometimes used in a similar way to the other corpora.
In other citations, however, they were “opened up” and extended.
As shown in Table 2 below, students tended to favour metaphors whose vehicles are likely to be familiar objects in the world of an older child or young adult, such as trap, bounce and blanket.
There was some evidence that their understandings of the target domain were inaccurate as a result of their bringing their own real-world knowledge to the interpretation of metaphors.
I now discuss some specific examples of this.
Table 2 gives the most frequent metaphors in the Interviews corpus.
In a few cases, the same words were also used as similes; this is shown in column 4.
Some of these words were also used literally, but for clarity, the figures for literal use are not given here.
METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 57 Rank Lemma Frequency as metaphor Frequency as simile Figurative uses per millon words 1 go 388 4410.1 2 greenhouse 161 30 2172.2 3 way 130 1478.4 4 cap (in ice-cap) 94 1069 5 release 89 1012.1 5 trap 89 1012.1 7 lead (/li:d/) 38 432.1 8 slow 36 409.4 9 bounce 33 375.3 10 point 32 363.9 11 chain 30 341.1 12 blanket 30 5 341.1 13 rise 27 307 14 level 23 261.5 15 escape 21 238.8 15 impact 21 238.8 15 link 21 238.8 18 contribute 18 204.7 19 balance 13 147.8 20 save 11 122.3 21 low 10 111.2 21 footprint 10 111.2 22 band 5 3 90.9 23 play 7 77.8 24 barrier 4 1 66.7 24 scenario 5 66.7 Table 2.
Most frequent metaphors (with similes) in the Interviews corpus.
The most frequent metaphor in the Interviews corpus was go, which is accounted for by citations such as the following: (9) I think that erm, like the way we’re going and the way the earth’s changing, it’s possible that like in many years’ time, it might, like… (10) …because you’re burning trees which err, because of their burning, err, releases CO2 and then those trees are gone.
(11) Bees are supposed to, erm they were talking about a bit of a problem with bees, and if bees go, then no plants will get pollinated.
(12) …some animals are going extinct, like polar bears, because they’re losing where they live.
Despite its frequency, for a number of reasons, go is not the most salient metaphor in the corpus.
Firstly, the use of going to to talk about the future was included in the figurative counts, but this is clearly not domain-specific, and might be better considered to be a grammatical use rather than lexical.
Only slightly more domain specific was the frequent use of go up/go down to refer to temperature.
Also, like many frequent words, go is highly polysemous, the high number of citations in fact reflecting smaller numbers of many different meanings, each of which, if counted as a separate group, would appear much lower in the frequency rankings.
Nonetheless, there are points of interest in the concordance data for go.
Citation (9) seems a realisation of a journey mapping, a use that was found a number of times.
With the exception of going to to talk about the future and go up/go down, the most frequent metaphorical use of go was to talk about disappearance or extinction, in 24 citations, as exemplified in citations (10) and (11) above.
In addition, there were 16 citations of the collocation go extinct, as in citation (12).
A search of the British National Corpus showed 4 citations of this collocation, compared with 430 for the lemma become with extinct.
In the Interviews corpus there were only 20 citations of the lemma become with extinct, i.e.
in contrast with the BNC, it was slightly less frequent than go extinct.
This is consistent with my perception that go extinct is a regional and relatively informal use that is over-represented in the speech of these young people.
The second most frequent metaphor in the Interviews corpus, and most frequent in the Materials corpus, is greenhouse.
This is also used as a simile in 30 citations.
As discussed in more detail by Deignan et al.
(2017), greenhouse ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6658 is used in a highly technical sense in the Expert corpus in collocations such as greenhouse gases, and almost certainly has no metaphorical meaning for the readers and writers of the texts in the corpus.
In contrast, in the Materials corpus, attention is drawn to the literal meaning, in citations such as (13) In a greenhouse, shorter wavelength radiation from the Sun can pass through the glass.
However, longer wavelength thermal radiation is trapped inside by the glass.
So the greenhouse stays warm.
Gases in the atmosphere, such as water vapour, methane and carbon dioxide, act like the glass.
In the Interviews corpus, there are a number of references to literal greenhouses, as well as metaphorical, such as: (14) So the greenhouse effect is like a greenhouse when you walk in, it’s warm isn’t it cos it, other heat is trapped inside by the sun and then it like warms it up, and greenhouse gases are like, it’s hard to explain like, the gases, I can’t really explain it but I know like a greenhouse, it’s almost like the same as a greenhouse.
There is some evidence that this leads to misunderstandings; for instance, the Interviews corpus also contains references to glass: (15) at certain heights the sun is able to get into like the glass, then when it’s inside it can’t get out cos there’s no, cos there’s no sun to let it get through from inside.
So then when you walk in it’s really warm and because of that, and it’s like, the earth is covered in like lots of glass panels but we just can’t see them, because the sun’s projecting into them.
It doesn’t, it won’t come out, it’ll just keep coming in and when it tries to get out, it’ll just bounce off the roof and down in a continuous loop.
There are a number of such references in a number of different interviews.
These, and other passages in the corpus, show that some of the students interviewed are under the erroneous impression that greenhouse gases form a thin, hard layer round the Earth analogous to panes of glass.
Another very frequent metaphor in the Interviews corpus is trap.
This is an example of a group of metaphors that work by comparing scientific processes and entities to concrete objects and actions that would be very familiar in the everyday world of the young people interviewed, like release (discussed in Deignan et al., 2017) and blanket, discussed below.
As shown METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 59 in Table 2, trap was the joint 5th most frequent metaphorically-used lemma in the Interviews corpus.
It occurred in the Expert corpus 10 times with a metaphorical meaning.
7 of these refer to CO2 being trapped inside fossil fuels or similar scientific states, while the remaining 3 citations are found in expressions such as trapped in poverty.
In the Expert corpus, the frequency is just 19.6 per million words, contrasted with 1012.1 in the Interviews corpus.
In the Materials corpus, trap is mostly used to talk about heat being trapped by greenhouse gases.
Occasionally it is used to describe bubbles trapped in ice, which are then used to analyse the composition of air historically.
In the Materials corpus, metaphorical trap occurs in 406 citations per million words, far more frequent than in the Expert corpus, but less than in the Interviews corpus, where it occurs 1,012.1 times per million words.
The following citations from the interviews are typical.
All four of the schools used are represented.
(16) it’s like the world like trapped in a giant greenhouse and it’s just getting hotter and hotter.
(17) when the sun rays shine upon us, they get trapped in the atmosphere cos those gases trap them, and that heats the atmosphere up (18) it’s almost having tinfoil on the whole entire planet because it’s keeping the heat in and it’s not letting any other heat erm, out, so we’re completely trapped in our own eco-system, and it’s really hard to change because of all these greenhouse gases, it’s trapping us slowly and slowly, it’s making us more hot and more humid, and it’s trapping us in.
(19) The earth is like the plant, and the CO2 is making like a glass shelter around it, and it’s trapping heat in.
It can be seen that while the metaphor is used in all three corpora, albeit with different frequency levels, it is used to talk about different entities.
In the Interviews corpus, the entity which traps is the atmosphere, CO2, or, occasionally, the ozone layer (several students confused what they had learned about the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect).
The object of trap was variously the planet, heat or sunrays.
Despite minor variations, there seems to be a consistent scenario in which an outer shell around the planet keeps something in, preventing escape.
This is more or less consistent with the use in the Materials corpus, but the students both over-simplify the meaning and extend it.
As a result, the Interviews use contains some slight ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6660 scientific inaccuracies, as seen in the above citations, for example, that the planet is trapped, rather than heat.
The students’ use of blanket shows the same tendencies.
Figurative blanket is not found in the Expert corpus.
It is found in the Materials corpus 31 times, equivalent to 118.9 times per million words, in contrast with a frequency of 341 times per million words in the Interviews corpus.
In the Materials corpus, only 6 citations are metaphorical, with the remaining 26 citations being similes, in citations such as: (20) Methane, together with other greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide contribute to global warming by acting like a blanket surrounding the whole planet.
The proportion of similes to metaphors is almost the exact reverse in the Interviews corpus, with 30 metaphors and 5 similes.
Examples of each are: (21) When the weather’s getting warmer and it’s like a blanket of carbon dioxide around the earth.
And it’s caused by carbon dioxide from cars and methane, and factories.
(22) …some gases like are stopping the erm heat, sun from bouncing, because when it shines in onto the earth, it comes down, but then the blanket of pollution and greenhouse gases would just stop the heat from coming back through so then it’ll get really hot.
(In the Interviews data, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish simile from metaphor because of a tendency for the students to use like as a very frequent discourse marker, and not necessarily a marker of simile.
I relied on my experience of working with this age group to help me disambiguate these uses).
In a number of citations in the Interviews corpus, there is some extension of the metaphor, as in the following citation, where a student talks about not being able to take off the blanket.
(23) …a giant blanket around the earth, keeping it warm and even too warm, and we can’t take that blanket off.
Here, as for greenhouse, the students have brought extended meaning to a metaphor that they have encountered in pedagogical materials.
The students seemed to have noted a metaphor that resonated with their everyday experience, and that they used it with much greater frequency than it is found METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 61 in the other corpora, perhaps because of this resonance.
Further, they tend to reinterpret the metaphorical use, bringing their experience to it and extending it creatively, thus bringing in slight inaccuracies.
Some of the metaphors used by the students did not occur in the other two corpora, or not with the same meaning.
This was the case for bounce, band and barrier, as used in the following citations from the Interviews corpus.
(24) …there’s lots of CO2 coming like out of cars and things, and it’s bounced its erm, some of the warmth is bouncing back onto the earth, it’s like erm, it’s warming up places that erm, like places like Antarctica where like polar bears live and things.
(25) …there’s like a band around the world and it like lets some of the CO2 out.
(26) It’s like bad air that we create, it’s getting trapped, erm, and it’s like a barrier for the sun so things are heating up a lot quicker, especially the earth.
As for the examples previously discussed, the literal referents of all of these metaphors would be familiar to students from their everyday lives.
They may represent the students’ attempts to make sense of the diagrams that feature in many websites and textbooks, in which greenhouse gases are represented as a discrete layer around the planet (a band or barrier), deflecting heat (which bounces back to earth).
As for the previous metaphors, this leads to some over-simplification of the science.
5.
Symbols of climate change for students In my manual analysis of the Interviews corpus, I also attempted to identify the central images and entities that students use to refer to the wider problem of climate change.
As would be expected, the image of the polar bear is highly salient to the school students, and they referred to this animal in 35 of the 41 interviews.
Polar bears were referred to especially when students were asked what climate change is and what the main effects are.
Responses to these questions included: (27) Err, climate change, it’s mostly happening in the ice-caps and it’s destroying all the habitats of the polar bears, and they’re running out of space to hunt the food and look after the cubs.
ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6662 (28) Erm like in the Arctic, with polar bears all the ice-caps are all melting so they’re like migrating a bit South to different countries and erm, it’s causing like havoc in little villages around.
(29) It’s erm, it can cause the ice-caps to melt I think and erm, which can cause sea-levels to rise.
Erm, flooding in areas, erm, some animals are going extinct, like polar bears, because they’re losing where they live.
Students in three of the four schools also mentioned penguins, the second most frequent animal to be mentioned after polar bears.
[Polar] bears is the most significant collocate of penguin, because they are often mentioned together, as in the following point about the effect of climate change, made by a 14 year old student: (30) It can affect like anything that is adapted to that environment sort of thing.
Like polar bears and penguins.
When asked to say how she would explain climate change and its effects to a younger pupil, one 12-year-old female student said the following: (31) imagine you got a penguin and that penguin lives on Antarctica on a like massive sheet of ice which can melt easily as the temperatures go up… because it’s getting warm and the ice is melting, and let’s say it’s getting warm, the ice is melting and there’s a seal over here trying to eat the penguin but can’t go on land, well can’t move from land that well, but then the ice is gradually getting shorter and shorter, and then the seal has more water to move in, and then because of us, the ice is gone, and the penguin has to swim, but it can’t swim forever, it can’t hold its breath forever, and then the seal eats the penguin.
Students produced various narratives of this kind, describing how the habitats and lives of polar bears, penguins and seals were threatened, and the food chain was disrupted.
In general, animals tended to be mentioned before people as victims of climate change, and seem to act as symbols of the problem.
6.
Conclusion In this article, I have argued that scientific metaphors are never neutral.
Like metaphors in other genres and register, they have entailments which can be METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 63 ideological and influence behaviour.
This was the case for example, for the “balance of nature” metaphor.
Scientific metaphors have different functions in different text types, popularisations tending to use metaphor for explanatory, dramatization and entertainment purposes.
Educational materials for young people use metaphor as a pedagogic device, and often spell this out with simile.
The findings of this study were consistent with work by writers such as Knudsen (2003) and Semino (2008) in showing that texts written for non-specialists tended to open up scientific metaphors.
This study also attempted to find out how the users of such texts, young people, reproduced these metaphors.
It has found that they further extended and opened them up, bringing their own concrete experience to their interpretation, and that they brought their own metaphors to their attempts to explain their understandings.
Acknowledgements The research into young people’s understandings of climate change described here is part of a larger project called “Translating Science for Young People”, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK (grant number AH/M003809/1).
I am grateful to the other investigators Elena Semino (Lancaster University) and Indira Banner (Leeds University), to the Research Fellow, Shirley-Anne Paul (Leeds University), who conducted the interviews, to the young people who took part in the interviews, and to their science teachers.
Article history: Received 16 May 2017 Received in revised form 17 September 2017 Accepted 17 September 2017 References ALICE DEIGNAN Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-6664 Anathaswamy, A.
(2011).
“Last chance to hold Greenland back from tipping Point.” New Scientist 2794: 8-9.
Biernacka, E. (2013).
The Role of Metonymy in Political Discourse.
PhD thesis, The Open University.
Boykoff, M.T.
(2011).
Who Speaks for the Climate?
Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, R. (1993).
“Metaphor and theory change: What’s ‘metaphor’ a metaphor for?” in A. Ortony (ed.
), Metaphor and Thought, 481-532.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, T. (2003).
Making Truth: Metaphor in Science.
Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Cooper, G. (2001).
“Must there be a balance of nature?” Biology and Philosophy 16: 481-506.
Alice Deignan is a Professor of Applied Linguistics in the School of Education, University of Leeds, UK.
She works with corpora to investigate lexical meaning, especially focussing on metaphor and metonymy.
She is interested in cross-register variation, and its implications for non-expert language users such as young people and language learners.
She is author of Metaphor and Corpus Linguistics (2005, John Benjamins) and co-author of Figurative Language, Genre and Register (2013, CUP with Jeannette Littlemore and Elena Semino).
METAPHORS IN TEXTS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE Ibérica 34 (2017): 45-66 65 Cuddington, K. (2001).
“The ‘balance of nature’ metaphor and equilibrium in population ecology”.
Biology and Philosophy 16: 463-479.
Deignan, A., J. Littlemore & E. Semino (2013).
Figurative Language, Genre and Register.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Deignan, A., E. Semino, & S-A.
S. Paul.
(2017).
“Metaphors of climate science in three genres: Research articles, educational texts, and secondary school student talk”.
Applied Linguistics.
Gaffney, O.
& W. Steffen (2017).
“The anthropocene equation”.
The Anthropocene Review: 1-9.
Kilgarriff, A., V. Baisa, J. Bŭsta, M. Jacubček, V. Kovř, J. Michelfeit, P. Rychly ́ & V. Suchomel (2014).
“The Sketchengine, ten years on”.
Lexicography 1: 7-36.
URL: www.thesketchengine.
co.uk [05/06/2017] Ladle, R. & L. Gillson (2009).
“The (im)balance of nature: A public perception time-lag”.
Public Understanding of Science 18: 229-242.
Lakoff, G. (1991).
“Metaphor and War: The metaphorical system used to justify war in the gulf”.
URL: https://georgelakoff.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ metaphor-and-war-the-metaphor-system-used-tojustify-war-in-the-gulf-lakoff-1991.pdf [05/06/2017] Littlemore, J.
& C. Tagg (2016).
“Metonymy and text messaging: A framework for understanding creative uses of metonymy”.
Applied Linguistics 16:1-28.
The Met Office (2017).
“2016: One of the warmest two years on record”.
Web blog post.
URL: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/releases/2017/2 016-record-breaking-year-for-global-temperature [05/06/2017] Mukherjee, S. (2010).
The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer.
New York, HarperCollins.
NASA (2017).
“Climate change: How do we know?” Web blog post.
Global Climate Change.
Vital Signs of the Planet.
URL: https://climate.
nasa.gov/evidence/ [05/06/2017] Pacifici, M., P., Visconti, S. H. M., Butchart, J. E. M., Watson, F. M. Cassola & C. Rondinini (2017).
“Species’ traits influenced their response to recent climate change”.
Nature Climate Change 7: 205208 Pragglejaz Group (2007).
“MIP: A method for identifying metaphorically used words in discourse”.
Metaphor and Symbol 22: 1-39.
Sanchez, J.
(2011).
“The trouble with ‘balance’ metaphors”.
Web blog post.
URL: http://www.juliansanchez.com/2011/02/04/thetrouble-with-balance-metaphors/ [05/06/2017] Semino, E. (2008) Metaphor in Discourse.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Bio -based and A ppl ied Economics BAE Copyright: © 2021 E. Lamonaca, F.G. Santeramo, A. Seccia.
Open access, article published by Firenze University Press under CC-BY-4.0 License.
Firenze University Press | www.fupress.com/bae Citation: E. Lamonaca, F.G. Santeramo, A. Seccia (2021).
Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector.
Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135. doi: 10.36253/bae-9676 Received: September 5, 2020 Accepted: December 16, 2020 Published: October 28, 2021 Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest.
ORCID EL: 0000-0002-9242-9001 FGS: 0000-0002-9450-4618 AS: 0000-0003-4549-6479 Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Emilia Lamonaca*, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia University of Foggia, Italy * Corresponding author.
E-mail: emilia.lamonaca@unifg.it Abstract.
Climate change has the potential to impact the agricultural sector and the wine sector in particular.
The impacts of climate change are likely to differ across producing regions of wine.
Future climate scenarios may push some regions into climatic regimes favourable to grape growing and wine production, with potential changes in areas planted with vines.
We examine which is the linkage between climate change and productivity levels in the global wine sector.
Within the framework of agricultural supply response, we assume that grapevines acreage and yield are a function of climate change.
We find that grapevines yield suffers from higher temperatures during summer, whereas precipitations have a varying impact on grapevines depending on the cycle of grapevines.
Differently, acreage share of grapevines tends to be favoured by higher annual temperatures, whereas greater annual precipitations tend to be detrimental.
The impacts vary between Old World Producers and New World Producers, also due to heterogeneity in climate between them.
Keyword: climate change, acreage response, yield response, Old World producers, New World producers.
JEL code: F18, Q11, Q54.
1.
INTRODUCTION In both academic research and policymaking agenda there is growing awareness that climate change and the agri-food sector are closely related, and that those links deserve investigation and understanding to analyse the evolution of global agriculture, and to anticipate future challenges such as climate change adaption and mitigation (Falco et al., 2019; Santeramo et al., 2021).
Agriculture, on which human welfare depends, is severely affected by climate change.
Some adverse effects, already observed, are likely to intensify in the future, contributing to declines in agricultural production in many regions of the world, fluctuations in world market prices, growing levels of food insecurity (Reilly and Hohmann, 1993; Meressa and Navrud, 2020).
Adaptation potential and adaptation capability to climate change may exacerbate differences between regions.
In a globalised world, the macro-level impacts of climate change are driven by comparative advantage between regions (Bozzola et al., 2021).
If impacts of climate change on productivity http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode 124 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Emilia Lamonaca, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia differ between regions, then adjustments through production patterns may dampen the adverse effects of climate change (Costinot et al., 2016; Gouel and Laborde, 2021).
Although the agricultural sector is identified as the most sensitive and vulnerable sector to climate change (e.g., Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007), the effects of climate change on the wine sector and on different producing regions (i.e., Old World Producers, New World Producers) is still an open question.
How do productivity levels react to changes in climate?
Do climate change impacts on production patterns differ between Old World Producers and New World Producers?
As suggested by Mozell and Thach (2014), the narrow climatic zones for growing grapes may be severely affected both by short-term climate variability and longterm climate change.
A vast majority of earlier studies on the impacts of climate change have analysed the effects on domestic markets, leaving underinvestigated the effects on world production (Reilly and Hohmann, 1993).
In the wine-related literature, previous studies reveal that the impacts of climate change are likely to differ across producing regions of wine.
Jones et al.
(2005) suggest that, currently, Old World Producers (i.e., European regions) benefit of better growing season temperatures than New World Producers.
However, future climate scenarios may push some regions into climatic regimes favourable to grape growing and wine production (Lamonaca and Santeramo, 2021).
All in all, there is the potential for relevant changes in areas planted with vines due to changes in climate (Moriondo et al., 2013; Seccia and Santeramo, 2018).
Projected scenarios of future climate change at the global and wine region scale are likely to impact the wine market.
In particular, spatial changes in viable grape growing regions, and opening new regions to viticulture would determine new productive scenarios in the wine sector at the global level.
Given this background, our contribution aims at understanding how productive patterns allow different producing regions (e.g., Old World Producers, New World Producers) to respond to changes in climate.
Specifically, we examine the linkage between climate change and productivity levels in the global wine sector.
In this regard, Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) argue that doubling of the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration would lead to only a small decrease in global agricultural production.
In addition, Reilly and Hohmann (1993) suggest that interregional adjustments in production buffer the severity of climate change impacts both at global and domestic level.
From a methodological perspective, the study of agricultural supply response has traditionally decomposed it in terms of acreage and yield responses (e.g., Haile et al., 2016; Kim and Moschini, 2018).
Our contribution examines how climate change affects acreage and yield response for grapevines.
To this aim, we assume that land allocations are consistent with the choices of a representative farmer who maximises expected profit.
We posit that cropland can be allocated between grapevines and all other crops.
Because these two allocation choices exhaust the set of possible land allocations, total county cropland is assumed to be fixed.
Thus, the decision problem can be stated as that of choosing acreage.
We assume that the acreage shares are a function of expected per acre revenue, given by the product between the output price and expected yield, and of climate change.
Investigating both the responsiveness of grapevine acreage and yield to climate change allows us to conclude on the global supply response.
While our cross-countries analysis is informative on the production patterns in the wine sector at a global scale, it cannot conclude on the effects of climate change at the micro-level (e.g., grape growers, wine producers).
Indeed, a country-level analysis does not capture differences within countries in terms of both grapevine yield and climate variability, particularly in geographically heterogeneous countries such as the United States, Canada, Russia, China (Kahn et al., 2019).
2.
ESTIMATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND GRAPEVINES PRODUCTION 2.1 Yield response equation Following Kim and Moschini (2018), we postulate a simple linear equation for yield response.
In detail, the expected grapevines yield of county i at time t(yit) is modelled as: yit = α + αi + βTt + γ’Xit,s + εit (1) where αi are country-specific intercepts; Tt is a linear trend variable and β the related parameter; the vector Xit,s includes climate variables specific for county i, time t, and season s (i.e.
30-years rolling average seasonal temperatures and precipitations, Tempit,s and Precit,s), we also posit a quadratic relationship between climate and yields (i.e.
Temp2it,s and Prec2it,s); γ’ is the vector of parameter of interest1; α and εit are a constant and the error term.
Following the climate literature (e.g., 1 It is worth noting that the parameter captures the climate sensitivity of grapevine yield without considering the implicit adaptation to climate change, differently from analyses based on the Ricardian model of climate change (e.g., Mendelsohn et al., 1994).
125Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Kurukulasuriya et al., 2011; Massetti et al., 2016), we use a four-season model, assuming that seasonal differences in temperatures and precipitations are likely to impact grapevines productivity.
However, we exclude climate normals of the winter season which is characterised by the dormancy of grapevines; in fact, the annual growth cycle of grapevines begins with bud break in the spring season and culminate in leaf fall in the autumn season.
We explore the relationship between grapevines yield and climate variables to estimate the potential effects of climate change using either ordinary least squares (OLS) or quantile regression (QR).
The model in equation (1) is estimated in an OLS fashion on the whole sample and on subsamples of Old World Producers and New World Producers.
The properties of QR have motivated its application in the context of agriculture and weather, mostly focusing on the impact of climate change on various crop yield distributions (Conradt et a., 2015).
The QR facilitates a thorough analysis of the differential impact of climate change across the yield distribution; a QR approach is useful in such situations and for considering asymmetry and heterogeneity in climatic impacts (Barnwal and Kotani, 2013).
2.2 Acreage response equation Total county cropland (A) is assumed to be fixed and land allocations are presumed to be consistent with the choices of a representative farmer who maximises expected profit.
We posit that agricultural land can be devoted to two alternative uses, grapevines and all other crops.
The decision problem can be stated as that of choosing acreage shares sk ≡ Ak ⁄ A, where Ak is the acreage allocated to the k-th use (k = 1 for grapevines and k = 2 for all other crops).
Because A is fixed, increased land allocation to any one crop is equivalent to an increase in its share sk, maintaining the land constraint s1 + s2 = 12.
Empirically, observed acreage share of grapevines in county i at time t(sit) is modelled as: sit = λ + λi + θTt + φsit-1 + ψrit + ω’Zit + νit (2) 2 Due to a land constraint, a representative farmer may decide to allocate more (less) acreage to grapevine reducing (increasing) the share of acreage devoted to other crops to maximise expected profits.
This may be a sort of implicit adaptation to climate conditions.
For instance, due to warmer temperatures, acreages devoted to grapevine in Italy may increase to the detriment of acreage intended to other production (e.g., apple tree, pear tree).
As suggested in Ricardian literature in climate change economics (e.g., Timmins, 2006; Kurukulasuriya et al., 2011; Bozzola et al., 2018).
where the set of conditioning variables includes country-specific trend effects, λi; a time trend, Tt, capturing exogenous technological progress; expected per acre revenue, rit; past acreage shares, sit-1, climate variables, Zit, which may directly affect planting decisions (i.e.
30-years rolling average annual temperatures and precipitations, Tempit and Precit, and their squares, Temp2it and Prec2it).
The term λ is a set constant terms; θ, φ, and ψ are parameters to be estimated, ω’ is the vector of climate-specific parameters; νit is the error term.
The term sit-1 allows us to account for the behaviour of producers that adjust their acreage when they realise that the desired acreage differs from the acreage realised in the previous year; it captures the dynamic effects on acreage allocation (Santeramo, 2014).
Following Kim and Moschini (2018), we interact own output price and expected yields estimated in equation (1), to obtain the expected per acre revenue (i.e., rit = pit ∙ yit).
Since our study is a country-level analysis, consistent with Hendricks et al.
(2014) we assume that the country-level expected prices are exogenous: this assumption allows us to deal with potential endogeneity of prices.
In order to compute the expected per acre revenue variables for the acreage response equations, we rely on the OLS estimate of equation (1).
We follow an approach similar to Haile et al.
(2016) and Kim and Moschini (2018) and estimate the model in equation (2) using a system generalised method-ofmoments (GMM) estimator, based on a one-step estimation with robust standard errors.
In fact, applying OLS estimation to a dynamic panel data regression model, such as in equation (2), results in a dynamic panel bias because of the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the country-fixed effects (Nickell, 1981).
Since current acreage is a function of the fixed effects (λi), lagged acreage is also a function of these country-fixed effects.
This violates the strict exogeneity assumption, thus the OLS estimator is upward biased and inconsistent.
A solution to this issue consists in transforming the data and removing the fixed effects.
However, under the within-group transformation, the lagged dependent variable remains correlated with the error term, and therefore the fixed-effects estimator is downward biased and inconsistent.
To overcome these problems, the GMM is a more efficient estimator that allows the estimate of a dynamic panel difference model using lagged endogenous and other exogenous variables as instruments.
In particular, the system GMM technique transforms the instruments themselves in order to make them exogenous to the fixed effects (Roodman, 2009).
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 126 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Emilia Lamonaca, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia 3.
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION The empirical analysis relies on a rich dataset of historical temperature and precipitation data (from 1961 to 2015) and historical trade flows data (from 1996 to 20153) for 14 countries.
The selected countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States.
They account for more than two-third of the volume of wine production (70% in 2016, Global Wine Markets, 1860 to 2016 database).
This group of countries includes both Old Works Producers and New World Producers and countries belonging to Northern or Southern Hemisphere4.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for key variables, also distinguishing between Old World Producers and New World Producers.
Historical country-specific monthly average temperature and precipitation data have been collected from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal World Bank (World Bank, 2018).
Annual and seasonal climatologies (i.e., rolling 30-years averages5) of temperature (in °C) and precipitations (mm) have been constructed using historical weather data.
As for seasonal climatologies, monthly data have been clustered into three-month seasons: December (of the previous year) through February as winter, March 3 The longer time period used for climate data allows to build climatologies (i.e.
30-years averages) of temperature and precipitations: in 1996 (the starting point of the final dataset) climate normal is based on a real 30-years average.
4 The list of countries by group is presented in Appendix A.1.
5 Differently from other studies that aggregated to data by weighting each information at the grid level by the amount of agricultural area the grid contains (e.g., Gammans et al., 2017), we use simple average of climate data aggregated at the country level.
through May as spring, June through August as summer, and September through November as autumn.
These seasonal definitions have been adjusted for the fact that seasons in the Southern and Northern Hemispheres occur at exactly the opposite months of the year.
The annual 30-years average temperature is 10.37 ºC (table 1).
Within this group, annual average temperatures are about 1 ºC higher for Old World Producers than for New World Producers, reflecting the fact that New World Producers are mostly located to lower latitudes (figure 1).
The difference in average temperatures between Old World Producers and New World Producers tends to be higher during winter (3.97 °C of Old World Producers and 0.77 °C of New World Producers; table 1).
The annual 30-years average precipitation is 68.55 mm and is about 5 mm greater in Old World Producers Figure 1.
List of countries.
Source: elaboration on Anderson and Nelgen (2015).
Notes: Old World Producers in blue, New World Producers in red.
Table 1.
Descriptive statistics for key variables.
Variable Unit All producers Old World Producers New World Producers Acreage ha 303,640 (±347,791) 560,850 (±435,259) 160,745 (±162,051) Share of acreage 0.01 (±0.02) 0.02 (±0.00) 0.001 (±0.001) Yield t/ha 10.50 (±4.59) 3.96 (±1.22) 12.09 (±1.13) Price USD/t 779.27 (±448.80) 528.60 (±40.70) 708.32 (±396.59) 30-years average temperature (annual) °C 10.37 (±8.51) 10.86 (±1.87) 10.10 (±10.52) 30-years average temperature (spring) °C 9.90 (±9.08) 9.70 (±1.54) 10.01 (±11.28) 30-years average temperature (summer) °C 18.76 (±4.76) 18.26 (±2.54) 19.04 (±5.61) 30-years average temperature (autumn) °C 10.92 (±8.21) 11.57 (±2.03) 10.55 (±10.12) 30-years average precipitation (annual) mm 68.55 (±36.13) 71.89 (±17.46) 66.69 (±43.09) 30-years average precipitation (spring) mm 62.35 (±34.87) 67.18 (±11.14) 59.66 (±42.50) 30-years average precipitation (summer) mm 82.17 (±44.21) 61.95 (±19.52) 93.40 (±49.81) 30-years average precipitation (autumn) mm 74.56 (±44.14) 82.93 (±24.25) 69.91 (±51.47) Note: Average values and standard deviation in parentheses.
127Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 than in New World Producers.
However, seasonal differences are observed: during summer, the level of precipitations is much lower in Old World Producers than in New World Producers (table 1).
In our sample, we observe a 6% increase in median values of 30-years average temperature over twenty years (figure 2).
As suggested in Jones et al.
(2005), Old World Producers benefit of better growing seasons as compared to New World Producers.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the strength of seasonality varies significantly across the globe, with seasons being more homogenous around the Equator.
Country-specific annual data on areas planted with vines (in ha) and yields of areas planted with vines (in t/ha), collected from the FAOSTAT database, are described in table 1.
The FAOSTAT database also provides country-level annual acres for agricultural land.
Total agricultural land includes two components: i.e., cropland (arable land and land under permanent crops) and land under permanent meadows and pastures.
In the methodological framework, we assume that agricultural land can be devoted to two alternative uses, grapevines and all other crops.
The latter category should capture all acres that could have been not planted to grapevines.
Hence, we obtain the category all other uses as the difference between total agricultural land and acres planted with vines.
In our model, we also use countryspecific annual price data for grapes (USD/t), collected from the FAOSTAT database.
In order to obtain the reduced per acre revenue, we interact own output price and expected yields estimated in equation (1).
Within our sample, despite the expansion of areas planted with vines in New World Producers during the last decades, acres intended to grape growing are, on average, more than three times larger in Old World Producers (561 thousands ha with respect to 161 thousands ha, table 1).
However, grapevines yields are much larger for New World Producers (12.09 t/ha) than for Old World Producers (3.96 t/ha).
Yields are often not normally distributed but are negatively skewed (e.g., Swinton and King, 1991).
This is also what we find in the distribution of grapevines yield in our sample (figure 3).
A distribution of yield different from a normal distribution may be associated with the frequent occurrence of outliers; for instance, yield realisations may not follow the pattern described by the majority of yield observations (Conradt et al., 2015).
It is worth noting that countries with grapevines yields within 25th percentile are Canada, Spain, France, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Russian Federation, whereas countries with yields of grape within 75th percentile are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, United States, South Africa.
4.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4.1 Yield response The estimation results for the yield response, based on equation (1), are reported in tables 2 (OLS estimates)6 and 3 (QR estimates).
The results in table 2 show that the higher the average temperatures in producing countries during summer, the lower the grapevines yield.
Greater precipitations are beneficial for yield during the early growing season (i.e., spring), but detrimental during the 6 In a sensitivity analysis, we analyse the effects of annual climatic variables on grapevine yields.
The results, reported in table A.2 in the Appendix, highlight differences between Old World Producers and New World Producers.
While higher annual average temperatures are detrimental (up a certain threshold) for Old World Producers, New World Producers benefit of greater annual average temperatures and precipitations.
55.0 55.2 55.4 55.6 55.8 56.0 56.2 56.4 56.6 56.8 57.0 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 20 15 Pr ec ip ita tio n (m m ) T em pe ra tu re ( °C ) Temperature Precipitation Figure 2.
Median 30-years temperatures and precipitations in 19972015.
Source: elaboration on data from CRU of University of East Anglia.
Note: data refer to the sample of 14 major producers of wine.
Figure 3.
Distribution and descriptive statistics for grapevines yield.
Min: 1.22 Max: 19.50 Median: 10.57 Mean: 10.50 Std.
Dev.
: 4.59 Skewness: -0.15 Kurtosis: 2.25 128 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Emilia Lamonaca, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia late growing season and the harvest time (i.e.
summer and autumn).
The relationship between summer climate and yields is nonlinear7.
The overall effects are mostly driven by the impacts of climate change on grapevines yields of New World Producers.
Differently, grapevines yield of Old World Producers seem not affected by climate change.
The results are consistent with evidence from vine-related literature.
In fact, Merloni et al.
(2018) report that higher temperatures can have a negative impact on grapevines yield and quality.
An increase in extreme high temperatures in summer may have adverse consequences on grapevines phenology (Briche et al., 2014).
In addition, Ramos et al.
(2008) suggest that seasonal distribution of precipitation matter, with larger rainfall levels being crucial for grapevines at the beginning of the growing season (i.e., spring) whereas more stable precipitations are desirable from flowering to ripening (i.e., summer and autumn).
The OLS approach is applied when the dependent variable is normally distributed, whereas QR is employed when the variable is not normally distributed (see figure 3).
The QR (median) is more robust to outliers than mean regression (OLS)8.
Furthermore, QR provides a clearer understanding of the data by assessing the effects of explanatory variables on the location and the scale parameters of the model (Conradt et a., 2015).
The results of the QR reported in table 3 mostly confirm the non-linear relationship between grapevines yields and average temperatures in producing countries during summer.
No substantial differences are observed across different quantiles of the distribution of grape7 The results are robust also controlling for different combinations of fixed effects: the results are reported in tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix.
We further detect a non-linear relationship between grapevine yield and summer precipitation controlling for time fixed effects (common to all countries) and country-specific fixed effects.
Differently, we cannot conclude on the relationship between grapevine yield and detrended climate variables obtained from the yearly weather deviation from the long-run climate (30-year rolling average), as recently proposed by Khan et al.
(2019).
The result is not surprising: while detrended climate variables capture short-run changes in climate conditions (i.e., weather shocks), 30-year rolling average temperatures and precipitations inform on long-run changes in climate conditions: It is unlikely that weather shocks on a year-by-year basis affect the responsiveness of the viticultural sector, but long-run changes in climate capture structural changes in the sector and are more likely to influence production decisions of a multi-year crop.
A comparison between shortand longrun analyses is reported in table A.5 in the Appendix.
8 We conduct a multidimensional outlier detection analysis based on the ‘bacon’ algorithm, which identifies outliers based on the Mahalanobis distances (Billor et al., 2000, Weber, 2010).
The algorithm allows the identification and removal of observations characterised by implausibly large or low entries of key variables.
The results of the model estimated without outliers, reported in tables A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix, confirm the main results, although the effect of temperatures and precipitations on grapevine yields tend to be lower.
vines yields.
Differently, the results reveal that lower yield realisations (i.e., within 25th percentile) tend to be most affected by greater precipitations during the harvest time (i.e., autumn).
It is worth noting that countries with grapevines yields within 25th percentile are mostly cool climate wine regions such as Canada and Russian Federation.
Cool regions tend to have also higher rainfall levels and yields tend to be lower on average, rising production costs (Anderson, 2017).
Table 2.
Estimation results for grapevines yields, OLS.
Variables Dependent variable: yield All producers Old World Producers New World Producers Temperature (spring) 1.4440 -9.5441 -1.4800 (1.7044) (12.7571) (2.1761) Temperaturesquared (spring) -0.3044*** 0.3965 -0.2577** (0.0747) (0.5755) (0.1209) Temperature (summer) -16.3650** -22.5187 -1.8786 (7.1026) (14.6183) (11.2236) Temperaturesquared (summer) 0.4258** 0.4752 0.3047 (0.1955) (0.3634) (0.3264) Temperature (autumn) 0.6543 -0.6787 -0.5129 (1.9410) (12.3068) (2.3252) Temperaturesquared (autumn) 0.0761 -0.0685 0.1321 (0.0888) (0.4882) (0.1181) Precipitation (spring) 0.5227* 0.4326 0.8057* (0.2795) (0.7043) (0.4339) Precipitationsquared (spring) -0.0041*** -0.0035 -0.0052*** (0.0015) (0.0048) (0.0019) Precipitation (summer) -0.3230* -0.0678 -0.0427 (0.1906) (0.3849) (0.3922) Precipitationsquared (summer) 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0013) Precipitation (autumn) -0.3507** -0.3838 -0.4272 (0.1601) (0.4282) (0.3758) Precipitationsquared (autumn) 0.0019** 0.0019 0.0019 (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0017) Time trend 0.1392*** 0.3459* 0.0109 (0.0477) (0.1756) (0.1007) Observations 280 100 180 R-squared 0.9314 0.9656 0.8930 Notes: OLS estimate of equation (1) on the whole sample (All producers) and subsamples of Old World Producers and New World Producers.
All specifications include country-specific constants.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
129Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 4.2 Acreage response Table 4 presents the estimation results under the acreage models.
All dynamic models (All Producers, Old World Producers and New World Producers) are based on a one-step GMM estimator.
The ArellanoBond test for autocorrelation is used to test for serial correlation in levels.
The test results indicate that the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in residuals cannot be rejected, indicating the consistency of the system GMM estimators.
According to the Sargan test results, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity: the system GMM estimators are robust but weakened by many instruments.
We fail to find a significant acres-price relationship, which could imply that many grapevines’ producers do not form their price expectations on the basis of information on expected per acre revenues.
More importantly, the estimation results reveal that higher annual temperatures in producing countries are beneficial for grapevines acreage share.
This is true for both Old and New World Producers, despite the effects are much larger in Old World Producers.
As suggested in Ruml et al.
(2012), among the many climatic factors affecting wine production, temperature appears to be most important.
Differently, severe rainfall levels is significantly associated with less grapevines share.
The negative effects of greater annual precipitations is entirely associated with New World Producers, whereas the Old World Producers seem not affected by changes in the rainfall levels.
Table 3.
Estimation results for grapevines yields, quantile regression.
Variables Dependent variable: yield 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile Temperature (spring) 0.8721 0.7711 1.3070 (1.9059) (1.8734) (2.3574) Temperaturesquared (spring) -0.1418* -0.2405*** -0.3368*** (0.0756) (0.0812) (0.1073) Temperature (summer) -22.4737*** -27.0681*** -23.1306*** (4.5501) (7.0368) (7.0902) Temperaturesquared (summer) 0.5454*** 0.7064*** 0.6102*** (0.1219) (0.1864) (0.1763) Temperature (autumn) 3.0239 1.9043 2.2129 (2.1210) (1.2873) (2.4223) Temperaturesquared (autumn) -0.1279 -0.0515 0.0525 (0.0813) (0.0611) (0.0998) Precipitation (spring) 0.2402 0.6707** 0.4740 (0.2974) (0.2899) (0.2913) Precipitationsquared (spring) -0.0024 -0.0048*** -0.0035* (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) Precipitation (summer) -0.2866 -0.0272 -0.1956 (0.2024) (0.1155) (0.1925) Precipitationsquared (summer) 0.0014 -0.0001 0.0011 (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0011) Precipitation (autumn) -0.3157* -0.1921 -0.1535 (0.1691) (0.1477) (0.1627) Precipitationsquared (autumn) 0.0019** 0.0011* 0.0010 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) Time trend 0.1523*** 0.1796*** 0.1024* (0.0574) (0.0534) (0.0545) Observations 280 280 280 Notes: QR estimate of equation (1) on the whole sample.
All specifications include country-specific constants.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4.
Estimation results for grapevines acreage, Old World Producers and New World Producers.
Variables Dependent variable: acreage share All Producers Old World Producers New World Producers Lagged acreage share 0.995*** 0.795*** 0.953*** (0.001) (0.046) (0.012) Expected per acre revenue -0.00003 -0.163 -0.0003 (0.00003) (0.109) (0.001) Temperature (annual) 0.107*** 38.983* 0.131*** (0.019) (22.496) (0.020) Temperature-squared (annual) -0.006*** -0.134 -0.008*** (0.001) (1.574) (0.001) Precipitation (annual) -0.107*** 18.447 -0.122*** (0.033) (11.384) (0.028) Precipitation-squared (annual) 0.001*** -0.120 0.001*** (0.0002) (0.081) (0.0001) Test for AR(1): p-value 0.096 0.106 0.239 Test for AR(2): p-value 0.238 0.326 0.266 Sargan test: p-value 0.134 0.592 0.926 Number of instruments 149 47 123 Notes: One-step generalised method-of-moments (GMM) estimate of equation (2) on the whole sample and on subsamples of Old World Producers and New World Producers.
All specifications include a constant and a time trend.
Coefficients and standard errors estimated are of the order of 10-6 for ‘expected per acre revenue’ and of 10-4 for climate variable.
Observations are 198 for all producers, 47 for Old World Producers and 151 for New World Producers.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
130 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Emilia Lamonaca, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia 5.
CONCLUDING REMARKS Climate change has the potential to impact the agricultural sector and the wine sector in particular (Mozell and Thach, 2014).
Most of the previous studies analysing the impact of climate change on agriculture do not consider the effects of climate change on world production, markets and trade patterns (Reilly and Hohmann, 1993).
Our analysis allowed us to understand if climate change is able to affect productivity levels of grapevines.
Overall, we found that grapevines yield suffers from higher temperatures during summer, whereas precipitations have a varying impact on grapevines depending on the cycle of grapevines.
In particular, we observed that greater precipitations are beneficial during the early growing season (spring), but detrimental during the late growing season and the harvest time (summer and autumn).
Differently, acreage share of grapevines tends to be favoured by higher annual temperatures, whereas greater annual precipitations tend to be detrimental.
The impacts however vary between Old World Producers and New World Producers, also due to heterogeneity in climate between them: the effects of temperatures are less pronounced for New World Producers, whereas precipitations have no effects for Old World Producers.
As suggested in previous studies (e.g., Jones et al., 2005), Old World Producers benefit of better growing season, but climate change may push New World Producers into more favourable climatic regimes.
The opening of new regions, benefiting of better climatic regimes, to viticulture would determine new productive scenarios and, as a result, new trade dynamics (Macedo et al., 2019).
New productive scenarios are likely to favour the production of varietal wines from autochthonous grapes whose quality is strongly related to microclimatic and pedological conditions (Seccia et al., 2017).
In addition, changes in trade regulations, that have largely influenced the agri-food market, are modifying also global trade of wine (Santeramo et al., 2019; Seccia et al., 2019).
Such dynamics should not be neglected.
Future research should be intended to examine how climate change could affect global trade of wine and to understand how importers and exporters could react to new trade dynamics, due to climate change, in terms of trade regulations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The research has been supported by a Research Grant funded by the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV).
The authors are grateful to Dr. Martina Bozzola for collection and organisation of climate data, to Tatiana Svinartchuk, Tony Battaglene, and to the seminar audiences at the 9th AIEAA Conference and the EGU General Assembly 2021 for helpful comments.
REFERENCES Anderson, K. (2017).
How might climate changes and preference changes affect the competitiveness of the world’s wine regions?
Wine Economics and Policy 6(1): 23-27.
Anderson, K., and Nelgen, S. (2015).
Global Wine Markets, 1961 to 2009: A Statistical Compendium.
University of Adelaide Press.
Barnwal, P., and Kotani, K. (2013).
Climatic impacts across agricultural crop yield distributions: An application of quantile regression on rice crops in Andhra Pradesh, India.
Ecological Economics 87: 95-109.
Billor, N., Hadi, A.S. and Velleman, P.F.
(2000).
BACON: Blocked adaptive computationally efficient outlier nominators.
Computational Statistics & Data Analysis 34: 279-298.
Bozzola, M., Lamonaca, E., and Santeramo, F.G., (2021).
On the impact of climate change on global agri-food trade.
Working Paper.
Bozzola, M., Massetti, E., Mendelsohn, R., and Capitanio, F. (2018).
A Ricardian analysis of the impact of climate change on Italian agriculture.
European Review of Agricultural Economics 45(1): 57-79.
Briche, E., Beltrando, G., Somot, S., and Quénol, H. (2014).
Critical analysis of simulated daily temperature data from the ARPEGE-climate model: application to climate change in the Champagne wine-producing region.
Climatic Change 123(2): 241-254.
Conradt, S., Finger, R., and Bokusheva, R. (2015).
Tailored to the extremes: Quantile regression for index‐ based insurance contract design.
Agricultural Economics 46(4): 537-547.
Costinot, A., Donaldson, D., and Smith, C. (2016).
Evolving comparative advantage and the impact of climate change in agricultural markets: Evidence from 1.7 million fields around the world.
Journal of Political Economy 124(1): 205-248.
Deschenes, O., and Greenstone, M. (2007).
The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations in Weather.
The American Economic Review 97(1): 354–85 Falco, C., Galeotti, M., and Olper, A.
(2019).
Climate change and migration: Is agriculture the main channel?
Global Environmental Change 59: 101995.
Gammans, M., Mérel, P., and Ortiz-Bobea, A.
(2017).
Negative impacts of climate change on cereal yields: 131Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 statistical evidence from France.
Environmental Research Letters 12(5): 054007.
Gouel, C., and Laborde, D. (2021).
The crucial role of domestic and international market-mediated adaptation to climate change.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 106: 102408.
Haile, M.G., Kalkuhl, M., and von Braun, J.
(2016).
Worldwide acreage and yield response to international price change and volatility: a dynamic panel data analysis for wheat, rice, corn, and soybeans.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 98(1), 172-190.
Hendricks, N.P., Smith, A., and Sumner, D.A.
(2014).
Crop supply dynamics and the illusion of partial adjustment.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(5): 1469-1491.
Jones, G.V., White, M.A., Cooper, O.R., and Storchmann, K. (2005).
Climate change and global wine quality.
Climatic Change 73(3): 319-343.
Kahn, M.E., Mohaddes, K., Ng, R.N.C., Pesaran, M.H., Raissi, M., and Yang, J-C. (2019).
Long-term macroeconomic effects of climate change: A cross-country analysis.
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper.
Kim, H., and Moschini, G. (2018).
The dynamics of supply: US corn and soybeans in the biofuel era.
Land Economics 94(4): 593-613.
Kurukulasuriya, P., Kala, N., and Mendelsohn, R. (2011).
Adaptation and climate change impacts: a structural Ricardian model of irrigation and farm income in Africa.
Climate Change Economics 2(2): 149-174.
Lamonaca, E., and Santeramo, F.G. (2021).
Climate changes and Dynamics of the Agricultural Productions in the Mediterranean Region.
EGU General Assembly 2021, online, 19–30 Apr 2021, EGU211104, https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-egu21-1104, 2021.
Macedo, A., Rebelo, J., and Gouveia, S. (2019).
Export propensity and intensity in the wine industry: a fractional econometric approach.
Bio-based and Applied Economics 8(3): 261-277.
Massetti, E., Mendelsohn, R., and Chonabayashi, S. (2016).
How well do degree days over the growing season capture the effect of climate on farmland values?
Energy Economics 60: 144-150.
Meressa, A.M., and Navrud, S. (2020).
Not my cup of coffee: Farmers’ preferences for coffee variety traits–Lessons for crop breeding in the age of climate change.
Bio-based and Applied Economics 9(3): 263-282.
Merloni, E., Camanzi, L., Mulazzani, L., and Malorgio, G. (2018).
Adaptive capacity to climate change in the wine industry: A Bayesian Network approach.
Wine Economics and Policy 7(2): 165-177.
Mendelsohn, R., Nordhaus, W., and Shaw, D. (1994).
The impact of global warming on agriculture: a Ricardian analysis.
American Economic Review 84: 753–771.
Moriondo, M., Jones, G.V., Bois, B., Dibari, C., Ferrise, R., Trombi, G., and Bindi, M. (2013).
Projected shifts of wine regions in response to climate change.
Climatic Change 119(3-4): 825-839.
Mozell, M.R., and Thach, L. (2014).
The impact of climate change on the global wine industry: Challenges & solutions.
Wine Economics and Policy 3(2): 81-89.
Nickell, S. (1981).
Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects.
Econometrica 1417-1426.
Ramos, M.C., Jones, G.V., and Martínez-Casasnovas, J.A.
(2008).
Structure and trends in climate parameters affecting winegrape production in northeast Spain.
Climate Research 38(1): 1-15.
Reilly, J., Hohmann, N. (1993).
Climate change and agriculture: the role of international trade.
The American Economic Review 83(2): 306-312.
Roodman, D. (2009).
How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata.
The Stata Journal 9(1): 86-136.
Rosenzweig, C., Parry, M.L.
(1994).
Potential impact of climate change on world food supply.
Nature 367(6459): 133-138.
Ruml, M., Vuković, A., Vujadinović, M., Djurdjević, V., Ranković-Vasić, Z., Atanacković, Z., Sivčev, B., Marković, N., Matijašević, S., and Petrović, N. (2012).
On the use of regional climate models: implications of climate change for viticulture in Serbia.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 158: 53-62.
Santeramo, F.G. (2014).
On the estimation of supply and demand elasticities of agricultural commodites.
Intl Food Policy Res Inst.
Santeramo, F.G., Miljkovic, D., and Lamonaca, E. (2021).
Agri-food trade and climate change.
Economia agroalimentare/Food Economy 23(1), [In press].
Santeramo, F.G., Lamonaca, E., Nardone, G., and Seccia, A.
(2019).
The benefits of country-specific non-tariff measures in world wine trade.
Wine Economics and Policy 8(1): 28-37.
Seccia, A., and Santeramo, F.G. (2018).
Impacts of climate change on the wine sector in Italy and mitigation and adaptation strategies.
In R. Compés López, V. Sotés Ruiz: El sector vitivinícola frente al desafío del cambio climático.
Estrategias públicas y privadas de mitigación y adaptación en el Mediterráneo.
Cajamar Caja Rural, pp.
91-115.
ISBN-13: 978-84-95531-92-6.
Seccia, A., Carlucci, D., Santeramo, F.G., Sarnari, T., and Nardone, G. (2017).
On the effects of search attributes on price variability: An empirical investigation on quality wines.
BIO Web of Conferences 9, 03014.
132 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Emilia Lamonaca, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia Seccia, A., Santeramo, F.G., Lamonaca, E., and Nardone, G. (2019).
On the effects of bilateral agreements in world wine trade.
BIO Web of Conferences 12, 03009.
Swinton, S.M., and King, R.P.
(1991).
Evaluating robust regression techniques for detrending crop yield data with nonnormal errors.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73: 446-451.
Timmins, C. (2006).
Endogenous land use and the Ricardian valuation of climate change.
Environmental and Resource Economics 33: 119–142.
Weber, S. (2010).
Bacon: An effective way to detect outliers in multivariate data using Stata (and Mata).
The Stata Journal 10(3): 331-338.
World Bank (2018).
Metadata of the Climate Change Knowledge Portal.
APPENDIX Table A.1.
List and description of countries in the sample.
Country ISO 3 Wine producer Hemisphere 30-years annual average temperature (°C) 30-years annual average precipitation (mm) Argentina ARG New World Producer Southern 14.44 49.16 Australia AUS New World Producer Southern 21.76 40.47 Brazil BRA New World Producer Southern 25.14 148.20 Canada CAN New World Producer Northern -6.47 38.77 China CHN New World Producer Northern 6.94 48.29 Germany DEU Old World Producer Northern 9.28 61.12 Spain ESP Old World Producer Northern 13.84 50.92 France FRA Old World Producer Northern 11.41 71.61 United Kingdom GBR Old World Producer Northern 8.94 103.42 Italy ITA Old World Producer Northern 12.51 78.70 New Zealand NZL New World Producer Southern 10.06 145.83 Russia RUS New World Producer Northern -5.43 36.64 United Stated USA New World Producer Northern 7.50 55.57 South Africa ZAF New World Producer Southern 18.13 40.89 Source: Wine producer classification follows Anderson and Nelgen (2015).
133Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Table A.2.
Estimation results for grapevines yields, OLS.
Variables Dependent variable: yield All producers Old World Producers New World Producers Temperature (annual) 1.3078 -22.4180*** 5.2902*** (1.4604) (7.5813) (1.8500) Temperaturesquared (annual) -0.0215 0.6741*** 0.0892** (0.0344) (0.1969) (0.0423) Precipitation (annual) 0.1755 0.3731 1.1522** (0.4226) (0.9870) (0.4877) Precipitationsquared (annual) -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0058** (0.0022) (0.0052) (0.0026) Time trend 0.0400 0.2498 -0.0490 (0.0479) (0.1578) (0.0593) Observations 280 100 180 R-squared 0.9148 0.9626 0.8758 Notes: OLS estimate of equation (1) on the whole sample (All producers) and subsamples of Old World Producers and New World Producers.
All specifications include country-specific constants.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Table A.3.
Estimation results for grapevines yield: controlling for different combinations of fixed effects.
Variables Our results Sensitivity analysis Temperature (spring) 1.4440 2.2203 (1.7044) (1.8717) Temperature-squared (spring) -0.3044*** -0.3176*** (0.0747) (0.0794) Temperature (summer) -16.3650** -16.1260** (7.1026) (7.4473) Temperature-squared (summer) 0.4258** 0.4022** (0.1955) (0.2013) Temperature (autumn) 0.6543 0.0276 (1.9410) (2.3118) Temperature-squared (autumn) 0.0761 0.1007 (0.0888) (0.0948) Precipitation (spring) 0.5227* 0.5692** (0.2795) (0.2844) Precipitation-squared (spring) -0.0041*** -0.0041*** (0.0015) (0.0015) Precipitation (summer) -0.3230* -0.3870* (0.1906) (0.2034) Precipitation-squared (summer) 0.0013 0.0015* (0.0009) (0.0009) Precipitation (autumn) -0.3507** -0.3009* (0.1601) (0.1607) Precipitation-squared (autumn) 0.0019** 0.0017** (0.0008) (0.0008) Country fixed effects Yes Yes Time trend Yes No Time fixed effects No Yes Country-time fixed effects No No R-squared 0.9314 0.9386 Notes: OLS estimate of yield response equation.
Observations are 280.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
134 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Emilia Lamonaca, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia Table A.4.
Estimation results for grapevines acreage: controlling for different combinations of fixed effects.
Variables Our results Sensitivity analysis Lagged acreage share 0.995*** 0.995*** (0.001) (0.002) Expected per acre revenue -0.00003 0.002 (0.00003) (0.003) Temperature (annual) 0.107*** 0.095*** (0.019) (0.021) Temperature-squared (annual) -0.006*** -0.006*** (0.001) (0.001) Precipitation (annual) -0.107*** -0.133*** (0.033) (0.047) Precipitation-squared (annual) 0.001*** 0.001*** Country fixed effects Yes Yes Time trend Yes No Time fixed effects No Yes Notes: One-step generalised method-of-moments (GMM) estimate of acreage response equation.
Coefficients and standard errors estimated are of the order of 10-6 for ‘expected per acre revenue’ and of 10-4 for climate variable.
Observations are 198.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table A.5.
Estimation results for grapevines yield: controlling for detrended climate variables.
Variables Our results (Long-run analysis) Sensitivity analysis (Short-run analysis) Temperature (spring) 1.4440 0.1500 (1.7044) (0.1418) Temperature-squared (spring) -0.3044*** 0.0164 (0.0747) (0.0900) Temperature (summer) -16.3650** 0.1692 (7.1026) (0.2820) Temperature-squared (summer) 0.4258** -0.2140 (0.1955) (0.1384) Temperature (autumn) 0.6543 0.2483 (1.9410) (0.1584) Temperature-squared (autumn) 0.0761 -0.1644** (0.0888) (0.0820) Precipitation (spring) 0.5227* -0.0050 (0.2795) (0.0088) Precipitation-squared (spring) -0.0041*** -0.0002 (0.0015) (0.0005) Precipitation (summer) -0.3230* 0.0039 (0.1906) (0.0093) Precipitation-squared (summer) 0.0013 -0.0005 (0.0009) (0.0003) Precipitation (autumn) -0.3507** 0.0071 (0.1601) (0.0056) Precipitation-squared (autumn) 0.0019** 0.0002 (0.0008) (0.0002) R-squared 0.9314 0.9177 Notes: OLS estimate of yield response equation.
Observations are 280.
Detrended climate variables in the sensitivity analysis are obtained from the yearly weather deviation from the long-run climate (30-year rolling average).
All specifications include countryspecific constants and the time trend.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table A.6.
Multidimensional outlier detection analysis.
5th percentile 10th percentile 15th percentile Total number of observations 280 280 280 BACON outliers 0 0 20 Non-outliers remaining 208 208 260 135Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 123-135, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9676 Table A.7.
Estimation results for grapevines yields: OLS with and without outliers and QR.
Variables OLS QR All observations (A) Observations w/out outliers (B) 25th percentile (C) 50th percentile (D) 75th percentile (E) Temperature (spring) 1.4440 1.6527 0.8721 0.7711 1.3070 (1.7044) (1.7917) (1.9059) (1.8734) (2.3574) Temperature-squared (spring) -0.3044*** -0.3114*** -0.1418* -0.2405*** -0.3368*** (0.0747) (0.0765) (0.0756) (0.0812) (0.1073) Temperature (summer) -16.3650** -14.7502* -22.4737*** -27.0681*** -23.1306*** (7.1026) (7.7445) (4.5501) (7.0368) (7.0902) Temperature-squared (summer) 0.4258** 0.3653* 0.5454*** 0.7064*** 0.6102*** (0.1955) (0.2163) (0.1219) (0.1864) (0.1763) Temperature (autumn) 0.6543 0.2605 3.0239 1.9043 2.2129 (1.9410) (2.1218) (2.1210) (1.2873) (2.4223) Temperature-squared (autumn) 0.0761 0.1037 -0.1279 -0.0515 0.0525 (0.0888) (0.0967) (0.0813) (0.0611) (0.0998) Precipitation (spring) 0.5227* 0.5162* 0.2402 0.6707** 0.4740 (0.2795) (0.2777) (0.2974) (0.2899) (0.2913) Precipitation-squared (spring) -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0024 -0.0048*** -0.0035* (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) Precipitation (summer) -0.3230* -0.3643 -0.2866 -0.0272 -0.1956 (0.1906) (0.2388) (0.2024) (0.1155) (0.1925) Precipitation-squared (summer) 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 -0.0001 0.0011 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0011) Precipitation (autumn) -0.3507** -0.3302** -0.3157* -0.1921 -0.1535 (0.1601) (0.1629) (0.1691) (0.1477) (0.1627) Precipitation-squared (autumn) 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0011* 0.0010 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) Observations 280 260 280 280 280 R-squared 0.9314 0.9037 Notes: OLS and QR estimate of yield response equation.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Volume 10, Issue 2 2021 Firenze University Press Mediterranean agriculture facing climate change: Challenges and policies Filippo Arfini The long-term fortunes of territories as a route for agri-food policies: evidence from Geographical Indications Cristina Vaquero-Piñeiro Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Raffaella Zucaro, Veronica Manganiello, Romina Lorenzetti*, Marianna Ferrigno Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Emilia Lamonaca*, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia A systematic review of attributes used in choice experiments for agri-environmental contracts Nidhi Raina*, Matteo Zavalloni, Stefano Targetti, Riccardo D’Alberto, Meri Raggi, Davide Viaggi The effect of farmer attitudes on openness to land transactions: evidence for Ireland Cathal Geoghegan*, Anne Kinsella, Cathal O’Donoghue
Microsoft Word 9-Manuscript-221-6-11-20200213.docx Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development Volume 1, Issue 1, 2020 agdevresearch.org 1.
Md Kamruzzaman, Assistant Professor, Sylhet Agricultural University/ PhD Fellow, Australian National University Sylhet-3100, Bangladesh/ ACT 2601, Australia kamruzzamanmd.aext@sau.ac.bd or md.kamruzzaman@anu.edu.au; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4980-4125 2.
Katherine A. Daniell, Associate Professor, Australian National University ANU College of Science, Linnaeus Way, The Australian National University, Acton, ACT 2601, Australia katherine.daniell@anu.edu.au, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8433-1012 3.
Ataharul Chowdhury, Assistant Professor, University of Guelph 50 Stone Road East, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada ataharul.chowdhury@uoguelph.ca, https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2432-0933 4.
Steven Crimp, Research Fellow, Australian National University ANU College of Science, Building 141, Linnaeus Way, The Australian National University, Acton, ACT 2601, Australia steven.crimp@anu.edu.au, https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4068-573X 5.
Helen James, Interim Director, Institute for Integrated Research on Disaster Risk Science, Australian National University ANU Research School of Earth Sciences, 142 Mills Road, The Australian National University, Acton, ACT 2601, Australia helen.james@anu.edu.au, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7169-7691 48 How Can Agricultural Extension and Rural Advisory Services Support Innovation to Adapt to Climate Change in the Agriculture Sector?
M. Kamruzzaman1, K.A.
Daniell2, A. Chowdhury3, S. Crimp4, H. James5 Abstract Because the climate has been rapidly changing and undermining the sustainability of the agriculture sector, Agricultural Extension and Rural Advisory Services (AERAS) need to rethink their contemporary roles and initiatives.
Although enhancing agricultural innovation is considered a key process to increase farm income and ensure sustainability under complex climate-affected development conditions, little is known how AERAS can support the process in the said context.
A broad range of literature was reviewed and a deductive coding approach was followed to analyze the literature.
The findings suggested numerous transformative roles of AERAS providers supporting agricultural innovation.
AERAS providers should extend their mandates and broaden their scopes by connecting and working with multiple actors and groups within and beyond the agriculture sector.
They need to support interactions and learning among diversified actors to develop complementary understanding and approaches for collective action for climate change adaptation.
The findings highlight the importance of enhancing innovation by AERAS providers for climate change adaptation in the agriculture sector.
Keywords Agricultural extension service, agricultural innovation, climate change, extension organization, transformational roles Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 49 Introduction and Problem Statement The agriculture sector has been considered extremely vulnerable to climate change with impacts felt across a large number of agricultural land uses (Anita, Dominic, & Neil, 2010).
The primary roles of agricultural extension and rural advisory services (AERAS) have long been recognized as enhancing agricultural development and improving rural livelihoods for both high and low-income countries (Anderson, 2007).
In most literature, the terms extension service and advisory service have been used interchangeably, although some literature has used advisory service to highlight the tasks associated with the facilitation of joint learning and action (Faure, Desjeux, & Gasselin, 2012; Faure et al., 2013).
In this article, the term AERAS was used to capture a more comprehensive understanding of roles of service providers and conceptualized as “all the institutions from different sectors that facilitate farmers’ access to knowledge, information, and technologies; their interaction with markets, research, and education; and the development of technical, organisational, and management skills and practices” (Davis & Sulaiman, 2016, p. 1).
The traditional AERAS methods and tools have achieved limited success in tackling the climaterelated challenges in farming (Christoplos, 2010; Selvaraju, 2012).
AERAS agencies often do not consider fundamental changes to their conventional strategies and initiatives, and focus on production efficiency, which has been shown to have limited effectiveness in increasing incomes and improving livelihoods (Stål & Bonnedahl, 2015).
As a consequence, a call has emerged to re-think and revise the current AERAS agendas and strategies (Mustapha, Undiandeye, & Gwary, 2012; Ozor & Cynthia, 2011).
In the context of climate change, enhancing agricultural innovation is likely to be a way to ensure profitable farming and develop the agriculture sector in sustainable ways (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2018; World Bank, 2012).
Although AERAS providers serving as intermediaries and knowledge brokers might fill a significant support role for agricultural innovations to deal with complex issues in general (Rajalahti, Janssen, & Pehu, 2008), little or only anecdotal evidence exists on how AERAS providers can enhance agricultural innovation for adapting to climate change.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework Climate change is considered a complex problem, having several interrelated drivers and issues (Mahmoudi & Knierim, 2015).
It directly affects certain related sectors, such as agriculture, fishery, and forestry (FAO, 2007).
Increasingly, debates are occurring among academic scholars, practitioners, and policymakers about the speed and scale of climate change effects in the agriculture sector (Sala, Rossi, & David, 2016).
It is evident that technical inventions or improvements in practice efficiencies do not suffice as adaptations to climate change in the spheres of natural resource management, cropping, livestock, and forestry.
Instead, climate change adaptation should be considered in the light of adjustments of the policy process and institutional systems, which administer crop production, value chains, and consumption strategies (Neufeldt et al., 2015).
Successful adaptation to climate change seeks comprehensible sets of technical and institutional initiatives (Leeuwis, Hall, van Weperen, & Preissing, 2013).
In essence, climate change adaptation in the agriculture sector calls to Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 50 support the process of enhancing agricultural innovation (Aase, Chapagain, & Tiwari, 2013), which is the process whereby: “Individuals or organizations bring existing or new products, processes, and forms of organization into social and economic use to increase effectiveness, competitiveness, resilience to shocks or environmental sustainability, thereby contributing to food and nutritional security, economic development, and sustainable natural resource management” (Tropical Agriculture Platform, 2016, p. x).
The sources of innovative practices and new ideas are often invisible and primarily contained by a particular actor (Rajalahti et al., 2008).
Every actor in a system has both discursive and tacit knowledge (Spielman, Davis, Negash, & Ayele, 2011).
An individual is conscious about discursive knowledge any idea that can be evaluated and expressed in language.
Nevertheless, individuals are usually unaware of their tacit knowledge, which is embedded in their practical activities, skills, practices, and experiences (Leeuwis, 2004).
The building blocks of innovation are often not accessible because they are the part of individuals’ tacit knowledge, and those individuals may not be part of the innovation network (Sharma, Peshin, Khar, & Ishar, 2014).
Initiating new ideas, which draw on both discursive and tacit knowledge, is a process of bringing together the perspectives of multiple actors who have their individual theories of knowing (Ngwenya & Hagmann, 2011).
For enhancing agricultural innovation, therefore, ideas, knowledge, experiences, and creativity from a variety of actors should be connected, integrated, as well as mobilized to ensure collective cognition (World Bank, 2006).
To support agricultural innovation, AERAS providers need to facilitate network building, social learning, and negotiation among relevant actors and groups (Leeuwis & Aarts, 2011).
Network building is critical to establish new relationships among people, technical devices, and natural phenomena.
Social learning is required to support individual as well as collective cognitive changes, which may result in conflicts among stakeholders.
Therefore, they have to be involved in negotiation to resolve conflicts (Leeuwis, 2004).
AERAS agencies have been considered the engine for enhancing agricultural innovation.
Given the emerging issues, including climate change, AERAS agencies need to revisit their structures, such as managerial and operational strategies, roles, regulations and cultures and mandates so they can play relevant facilitation and leadership roles in supporting agricultural innovation (Rivera & Sulaiman, 2009).
In the sections that follow, the establishment of a rationale for the roles of AERAS in enhancing agricultural innovation is explored, particularly in the context of climate change adaptation.
Purpose Enhancing agricultural innovation can help individuals and organizations in the agriculture sector to adapt to climate change.
But no systematic research exists on what new roles, agendas, and strategies AERAS agencies could undertake to support agricultural innovation.
Only a limited number of recent studies have discussed and recommended the roles and Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 51 strategies of AERAS in supporting climate change adaptation.
These recommendations are mainly general in nature and based on experts’ opinions.
In this study, a systematic review of the current literature was undertaken aimed at exploring the mandates and roles of AERAS in supporting agricultural innovation for climate change adaptation.
Methods Secondary data was collected by searching in different digital databases, such as Google Scholar, CAB abstract, and Scopus, during the period of March 2018 to August 2019.
The searching was bound as only publications in English from 1980 to the present were used.
Different keywords were used both separately and in combination to determine relevant literature for analysis.
The keywords included adaptation, advisory (rural) services, agricultural extension, agricultural innovation, agricultural practices, climate change, drought, and flood.
Articles discussing agricultural practices and the roles of AERAS in adapting to climate change were the focus and principal criteria for inclusion.
Peer-reviewed journals, organizational reports, project reports, as well as published and unpublished theses, were selected initially.
In addition, national agricultural plans and AERAS strategies of different countries were also included.
A deductive coding of the text was performed using keywords of relevance to agricultural innovation, such as collaboration, connecting, coordination, interaction, learning, linking, negotiation, and networking (Bernard, 2017).
Informed by Gough, Oliver and Thomas (2017), the findings were synthesized and presented in a thematic summary.
The coded descriptive texts were read through, and specific tasks for AERAS were identified.
Those tasks were integrated and interpreted by themes, such as broadening the scope, capacity development, interaction and learning, lobbying policy process and negotiation, performing intermediary roles, and working with multiple actors (Yami, Vogl, & Hauser, 2009).
These themes ultimately supported understanding the processes of enhancing agricultural innovation to adapt to climate change.
In the review process, a total of 72 articles were included of which 22 were organizational reports, and 32 were based on empirical research in different countries.
In this study, the cases and examples were used according to their significance and relevancy with the themes of agricultural innovation.
Findings Broadening the Scope and Working with Multiple Actors International organizations (see Table 1) and empirical case studies (see Table 2) reported that the current functions, operational frameworks and strategies of AERAS should be reconsidered and revisited to ensure that agricultural activities are responsive, adaptive, and profitable in the current and future context of climate change.
As a consequence, AERAS providers should broaden their scopes and embrace a larger, comprehensive mandate that comprises technical and managerial support, as well as social, gender and institutional governance (Leeuwis et al., 2013; Sala et al., 2016; Simpson & Burpee, 2014; Sulaiman, Chuluunbaatar, & Vishnu, 2018).
Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 52 The Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) recommended that AERAS providers should move from a strategy of working with few actors, such as farmers, researchers, to working with multiple and diverse actors and groups from different backgrounds with different knowledge and interests (Sala et al., 2016; Simpson & Burpee, 2014).
Research in Ethiopia found that gaps and missing linkages existed between AERAS providers and other relevant actors while attempting to support adaptation to climate change.
Moreover, the policymakers of some AERAS agencies, working at different scales, were in disagreement about the degree of urgency and priority of climate change and adaptation (Abegaz & Wims, 2015).
The Cooperative Extension Services of Land Grant institutions in the United States (US) failed to coordinate efforts to identify priority investment for climate change and agricultural activities at regional and state levels.
AERAS providers, therefore, faced challenges of dealing with diverse and often conflicting priorities of stakeholders (Wright Morton et al., 2016).
AERAS providers of Cameroon had very negligible contact and limited connection with the farmers, which ultimately led to farmers reaching out to other farmers to seek support and guidance for climate change adaptation (Julie, Amungwa, & Manu, 2017).
Infrequent and limited contact with stakeholders also resulted in disputed relationships between farmers and policymakers in Zimbabwe (Huyer & Nyasimi, 2017).
The Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA) suggested that all public AERAS providers, serving in a particular region, should be well connected.
They need to serve collaboratively for better alignment and synchronization of climate change adaptation activities and programs (Sala et al., 2016).
AERAS agencies should link and work in partnership with other relevant actors and groups within and beyond the agriculture sector at different scales to allow free flow of climate change adaptation information, knowledge, understanding, and strategies (Abegaz & Wims, 2015; Simpson & Burpee, 2014; Sulaiman et al., 2018).
A study in Zimbabwe reported a lack of connection and linkage between two sister organizations, i.e.
the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation, Development and the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate who were the key players for supporting climate change adaptation.
This study highlighted the importance of institutional collaboration and coordination among agricultural and climate-related institutions, both public and private, including development agencies at the local, national, regional, and international levels (Huyer & Nyasimi, 2017).
This review identified that emphasis had been placed on polices, roles, and regulations at institutional levels to facilitate a supportive environment for AERAS providers, but they lacked access to different resources.
For instance, about 80% of AERAS providers in Ethiopia claimed that they did not have adequate access to climate change adaptation resources, such as readily available and user-friendly data, policies and strategies, scientific publications, up to date information, as well as reading materials and manuals (Abegaz & Wims, 2015).
AERAS providers in Cameroon identified lack of access to information from the Ministry related to Environment and Disaster Mitigation, leading to a deficiency in climate change engagement activities (Julie et al., 2017).
Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 53 Table 1 The Roles of AERAS Providers to Enhance Agricultural Innovation to Adapt to Climate Change: Insights from International Organizations Broad Roles Specific Tasks Number of Cases Organizations Example of Key Sources Broadening the scope, working with multiple and diverse actors Reconsidering the operational frameworks, strategies, broadening the mandates, and functions 7 FAO, GACSA & USAID (Sala et al., 2016; Simpson & Burpee, 2014; Suleiman et al., 2018) Creating alignment and developing collaboration among public AERAS providers 1 GACSA (Sala et al., 2016) Partnering with relevant actors and groups of the agriculture sector at appropriate scales 2 USAID & FAO (Simpson & Burpee, 2014; Sulaiman et al., 2018) Dealing with multiple and diverse actors beyond the agriculture sector 2 FAO & GACSA (Leeuwis et al., 2013; Sala et al., 2016) Implementing policies, programs, including both agricultural and fund, policy-related stakeholders 1 IFPRI (Davis, 2009) Performing intermediary roles and supporting learning Connecting domestic and international markets 1 GACSA (Sala et al., 2016) Linking farmers with diverse actors 1 GACSA (Sala et al., 2016) Organizing participation and facilitating interaction and social learning among diverse actors and communities 2 FAO (Leeuwis et al., 2013) Practicing technological management (e.g.
interactive design & experimentation; trying out new practices & adaptive measures) 7 FAO, GFRAS, IFPRI, USAID (Hachigonta, 2016; Sala et al., 2016; Simpson, 2016) Lobbying policy processes Performing lobby and advocacy communication 2 FAO & GACSA (Sala et al., 2016) Seeking out influencing the enabling environment and developing supportive policies 2 FAO & USAID (Simpson & Burpee, 2014; Sulaiman et al., 2018) Capacity development of AERAS providers Deepening and broadening knowledge on soft skills related to co-learning, communication, facilitation, networking, and dealing with diverse groups; revising training curricula 4 FAO, GACSA, IFPRI, & USAID (Davis, 2009; Sala et al., 2016; Simpson & Burpee, 2014; Sulaiman, 2017) Note.
FAO=Food and Agriculture Organization, GACSA=Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture, GFRAS=Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services, IFPRI= International Food Policy Research Institute, USAID= United States Agency for International Development Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 54 Performing Intermediary Roles and Supporting Interactions The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) identified that AERAS agencies should provide a broader sense of intermediary roles and support participation and interaction among multiple actors (Leeuwis et al., 2013).
AERAS providers need to link domestic market products with international trading markets and consumers (Sala et al., 2016).
They should connect farmers with diverse actors, including markets, as well as communities, agencies, and institutions to maximize the benefits of information and knowledge (Hachigonta, 2016; Huyer & Nyasimi, 2017; Sala et al., 2016).
AERAS providers need to facilitate diversified stakeholders to interact and share their knowledge and priorities and negotiate to learn from one another to achieve a better and complementary understanding of climate change impacts and adaptation options (Mahmoudi & Knierim, 2015; Sala et al., 2016).
The USAID recommended that AERAS providers should take advantage of modern and advanced Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to link different actors, to support communication and interaction, and to develop a feeling of interdependence and synergy in collective action (Simpson & Burpee, 2014).
Table 2 The Roles of AERAS Providers to Enhance Agricultural Innovation to Adapt to Climate Change: Insights from Empirical Studies in Different Countries Broad Roles Specific Tasks Countries Example of Key Sources Networking, collaboration and co-learning Networking & partnership development, collaboration & coordination of AERAS activities, information & knowledge sharing, collaborative research, colearning with multiple & diverse actors Ethiopia, India, Malawi , Namibia, South Africa, US, Zimbabwe (Abegaz & Wims, 2015; Huyer & Nyasimi, 2017; Mkisi, 2014) Access of AERAS providers to resources (e.g.
funding, policies & strategies, reading materials, scientific publications, updated information & user friendly data) Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, US (Abegaz & Wims, 2015; Ifejika Speranza, Kiteme, & Opondo, 2009; Julie et al., 2017) Lobbying/ Advocating Providing feedback & supporting policy processes Nigeria, Zimbabwe (Huyer & Nyasimi, 2017; Ozor & Cynthia, 2011) Capacity development of AERAS providers Capacity development of AERAS providers on technical & functional knowledge (e.g.
arranging training, seminars, and workshops; financial investments; updating course curricula) Cameroon, Ethiopia, India, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, US, Zimbabwe (Afful, 2016; Diehl et al., 2015; Mkisi, 2014; Ogunbameru, Mustapha & Idrisa, 2013) To formulate adaptation strategies and develop technological innovation, GACSA, Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS), and USAID recommended setting out interactive design Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 55 principles and co-designed experimentation, as well as promotion of farmer-to-farmer extension (Davis, 2009; Hachigonta, 2016; Sala et al., 2016; Simpson, 2016).
AERAS providers of South Africa promoted conservation agriculture as a technological innovation but failed to achieve desired outcomes in terms of increasing yields and ensuring sustainability.
Therefore, AERAS providers were suggested to participate in adaptive research on conservation agriculture management packages with farmers and scientists (Afful, 2016).
Smallholder farmers of Malawi identified that AERAS providers should strengthen farmers’ linkage with research institutions to draw support for on-farm adaptive research and develop the best risk management practices in different farming systems (Mkisi, 2014).
Lobbying and Negotiation This literature review highlighted that AERAS providers should have strong linkage and effective communication with the policy process to positively influence the enabling environment and develop supportive policies, as well as funding opportunities for climate change adaptation (Leeuwis et al., 2013, Simpson & Burpee, 2014; Sulaiman et al., 2018).
Farmers in Nigeria perceived that AERAS providers were knowledgeable about the local effects of climate change on the agriculture sector because they lived and worked with farmers in the rural areas.
AERAS providers, therefore, could more effectively communicate on local climate change effects to their higher authorities during regular official meetings.
Thus, the government and other agencies were aware and could develop plans and policies, allocate funding, and implement programs to address the risks and challenges of climate change (Ozor & Cynthia, 2011).
Likewise, the GACSA suggested that AERAS providers should advocate and raise awareness with decision-makers about the importance of funding for climate change adaptation in the agriculture sector (Sala et al., 2016).
AERAS providers need to invite and engage with fundingand policy-related stakeholders while implementing different agricultural policies and programs in the field (Davis, 2009).
Capacity Development of AERAS Providers as an Underlying Condition AERAS providers should develop new capacities to explicitly support innovation in the agriculture sector to adapt to climate change (Sala et al., 2016).
Researchers in Malawi recommended that AERAS agencies should obtain sufficient investment for human resource development and capacity building (Mkisi, 2014).
Evidence from Nigeria highlighted the need to develop teaching and training materials addressing the risks and challenges of climate change for AERAS students and providers, respectively (Ogunbameru et al., 2013).
A case study in the US recommended that AERAS providers should receive training to understand both managementand technology-related adaptation strategies, engage in conversations with stakeholders, and participate in co-production of climate change adaptation-related knowledge and strategy (Diehl et al., 2015).
In this vein, the Cameroon case reported that AERAS providers need to be provided with seminars and workshops (Julie et al., 2017).
According to the FAO, the current knowledge and efficiencies of AERAS providers should be deepened and broadened mostly on soft skills, such as co-learning, communication, facilitation, and networking with diverse groups at different scales (Davis, 2009; Sulaiman, 2017).
Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 56 Conclusions, Discussion, and Recommendations To enhance innovation for adapting to climate change in the agriculture sector, AERAS providers need to embrace new organizational mandates, agendas, roles, and strategies.
They should broaden their scopes by working with multiple actors and groups both within and beyond the agriculture sector.
AERAS providers need to perform intermediary roles and support interaction and learning among the stakeholders to develop complementary understanding of climate change adaptation and approaches for collective action.
Seeking support in terms of favorable rules, regulations, and required financial resources from the policy processes are other important tasks on which AERAS providers should focus.
AERAS agencies will likely face challenges in embracing the transformational roles to support innovation for climate change adaptation in the agriculture sector.
In this vein, the political context, and the organizational structure and worldviews of AERAS providers are among the many challenges that may need consideration.
The plans and priorities of governments often influence the focus and ways of implementing AERAS programs (Berhanu & Poulton, 2014).
Governments require support from the AERAS providers to execute different public policies and interests (Mahon, Farrell, & McDonagh, 2010), which ultimately might deviate AERAS agencies from their principal modes of action (Diesel & Miná Dias, 2016).
Conducting organizational reforms of AERAS agencies to embrace agricultural innovation approaches is challenging, especially in developing countries (Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Rivera & Sulaiman, 2009).
The administration and policy-making system of AERAS agencies might be unwilling to reconsider their long-term roles and practices to embrace agricultural innovation approaches (Chowdhury, Odame, & Leeuwis, 2014).
AERAS agencies have shown resistance to consider deep-rooted reform (Islam, Gray, Reid, & Kemp, 2011).
Change in organizational strategies faces political, social, and contextual complexities (Islam et al., 2011).
Moreover, gaps often exist between the organizational mandates or vision and the AERAS providers’ worldviews (Landini, 2015).
In addition, intraand inter-organizational differences of innovation perception and mindsets are found among AERAS providers.
In the same AERAS agency, some individuals might have mindsets largely dominated by top-down approaches emphasizing specialists’ knowledge dissemination whereas others might prefer to adopt dialogical approaches and horizontal interaction of knowledge sharing and learning (Landini, 2016).
Overall, a lack of evidence exists from the reviewed literature on how to develop the capacities of AERAS providers to enhance agricultural innovation in the context of climate change.
The Tropical Agriculture Platform (2016) proposes four aspects of capacity development, capacity to navigate complexity, collaborate, reflect and learn, engage in strategic and political processes to ensure actors’ effective involvement in enhancing agricultural innovation in general.
These capacities might provide insight on formulating ways to develop functional capacities of AERAS providers to support agricultural innovation for climate change adaptation.
However, further research is needed to better understand the means and strategies for developing the capacities of AERAS providers.
Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 57 The AERAS professionals, providers, and agencies serving in regions more prone to climate change and working at different scales, could utilize these research insights to better develop strategies for ensuring sustainability in the agriculture sector.
However, these findings should not be used as a one-size-fits-all approach.
Depending on the local, national, and political contexts, as well as financial and organizational support, AERAS providers are encouraged to reconsider their roles and formulate new ways to enhance agricultural innovation for climate change adaptation in their localities.
Acknowledgements The Higher Degree by Research (HDR) fee merit scholarship and HDR research scholarship of the Australian National University are acknowledged for supporting the Doctor of Philosophy study of the first author.
References Aase, T. H., Chapagain, P. S., & Tiwari, P. C. (2013).
Innovation as an expression of adaptive capacity to change in Himalayan farming.
Mountain Research and Development, 33(1), 4-11. https://doi.org/10.1659/MRD-JOURNAL-D-12-00025.1 Abegaz, D. M., & Wims, P. (2015).
Extension agents' awareness of climate change in Ethiopia.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 21(5), 479-495. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2014.946936 Afful, D. B.
(2016).
Public extension agents’ need for new competencies: Evidence from a climate variability study in Limpopo province, South Africa.
South African Journal of Agricultural Extension, 44(2), 59-70.
Retrieved from https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sajae/article/view/149127 Anderson, J. R. (2007).
Agricultural advisory services: Background paper for the world development report 2008.
Retrieved from the World Bank website: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/490981468338348743/pdf/413540Anders on1AdvisoryServices01PUBLIC1.pdf Anita, W., Dominic, M., & Neil, A.
(2010).
Climate change and agriculture: Impacts, adaptation and mitigation.
Paris, France: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publishing.
Berhanu, K., & Poulton, C. (2014).
The political economy of agricultural extension policy in Ethiopia: Economic growth and political control.
Development Policy Review, 32(s2), s197-s213.
https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12082 Bernard, H. R. (2017).
Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches (6th ed.).
Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 58 Chowdhury, A. H., Odame, H. H., Leeuwis, C. (2014).
Transforming the roles of a public extension agency to strengthen innovation: Lessons from the national agricultural extension project in Bangladesh.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 20(1), 7-25. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2013.803990 Christoplos, I.
(2010).
Mobilizing the potential of rural and agricultural extension.
Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations website: http://www.fao.org/3/i1444e/i1444e00.htm Davis, K. E. (2009).
Agriculture and climate change: An agenda for negotiation in Copenhagen.
The important role of extension systems (IFPRI Focus 16 Brief 11).
Retrieved from Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) website: http://www.asb.cgiar.org/PDFwebdocs/focus16_11.pdf Davis, K., & Sulaiman, V. R. (2016).
Note 0: Overview of extension philosophies and methods.
GFRAS good practice notes for extension and advisory services.
Retrieved from Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS) website: https://www.g-fras.org/en/goodpractice-notes/0-overview-of-extension-philosophies-and-methods.html Diehl, D. C., Galindo-Gonzalez, S., Dourte, D. R., Sloan, N. L., Bartels, W. L., Furman, C., & Fraisse, C. W. (2015).
Toward engagement in climate training: Findings from interviews with agricultural extension professionals.
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, 30(1), 25-50.
Retrieved from http://journalofruralsocialsciences.org/pages/Articles/JRSS%202015%2030/1/JRSS%202 015%2030%201%2025-50.pdf Diesel, V., & Miná Dias, M. (2016).
The Brazilian experience with agroecological extension: A critical analysis of reform in a pluralistic extension system.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 22(5), 415-433. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2016.1227058 Faure, G., Desjeux, Y., & Gasselin, P. (2012).
New challenges in agricultural advisory services from a research perspective: A literature review, synthesis and research agenda.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 18(5), 461-492. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2012.707063 Faure, G., Penot, E., Rakotondravelo, J. C., Ramahatoraka, H. A., Dugué, P., & Toillier, A.
(2013).
Which advisory system to support innovation in conservation agriculture?
The case of Madagascar's Lake Alaotra.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 19(3), 257-270. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2013.782169 Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 59 Food and Agriculture Organization.
(2007).
Adaptation to climate change in agriculture, forestry and fisheries: perspective, framework and priorities.
Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/3/a-au030e.pdf Food and Agriculture Organization.
(2018).
FAO’s work on agricultural innovation: Sowing the seeds of transformation to achieve the SDGs.
Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/3/CA2460EN/ca2460en.pdf Gough, D., Oliver, S., & Thomas, J.
(2017).
An introduction to systematic reviews (2nd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hachigonta, S. (2016).
Module 13: Risk mitigation and adaptation in extension.
The new extensionist learning kit.
Retrieved from Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS) website: https://www.g-fras.org/en/knowledge/new-extensionist-learning-kitnelk.html Hounkonnou, D., Kossou, D., Kuyper, T. W., Leeuwis, C., Nederlof, E. S., Röling, N., & van Huis, A.
(2012).
An innovation systems approach to institutional change: Smallholder development in West Africa.
Agricultural Systems, 108, 74-83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2012.01.007 Huyer, S., & Nyasimi, M. (2017).
Climate-smart agriculture manual for agriculture education in Zimbabwe.
Retrieved from Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) website: https://ccafs.cgiar.org/publications/climate-smart-agriculture-manualagriculture-education-zimbabwe Ifejika Speranza, C., Kiteme, B., & Opondo, M. (2009).
Adapting public agricultural extension services to climate change: Insights from Kenya.
Retrieved from BORIS database: https://boris.unibe.ch/69717/1/AC2009-0149.pdf Islam, M. M., Gray, D., Reid, J., & Kemp, P. (2011).
Developing sustainable farmer-led extension groups: Lessons from a Bangladeshi case study.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 17(5), 425-443. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2011.596658 Julie, D. T., Amungwa, F. A., & Manu, I.
(2017).
Role of agricultural extension in climate change adaptation in Cameroon.
International Journal of Horticulture, Agriculture and Food science (IJHAF), 1(3), 21-26. https://doi.org/10.22161/ijhaf.1.3.5 Landini, F. (2015).
Different Argentine rural extensionists' mindsets and their practical implications.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 21(3), 219-234. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2014.927375 Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 60 Landini, F. (2016).
Unfolding the knowledge and power dynamics of the ‘farmers–rural extensionists’ interface in north-eastern Argentina.
The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 22(5), 399-413. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2016.1227050 Leeuwis, C. (2004).
Communication for rural innovation: Rethinking agricultural extension.
Oxford, England: Blackwell Science Incorporation.
Leeuwis, C., & Aarts, N. (2011).
Rethinking communication in innovation processes: Creating space for change in complex systems.
Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 17(1), 21-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2011.536344 Leeuwis, C., Hall, A., van Weperen, W., & Preissing, J.
(2013).
Facing the challenges of climate change and food security: The role of research, extension and communication for development.
Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations website: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3334e.pdf Mahmoudi, H., & Knierim, A.
(2015).
Risk communication for farmers' adaptation to climate change: A new task for agricultural advisory services.
International Journal of Performability Engineering, 11(6), 533-547.
Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/476f/5d01a3b9b822327b26eca9b0b0502a3d4234.pdf Mahon, M., Farrell, M., & McDonagh, J.
(2010).
Power, positionality and the view from within: Agricultural advisers' roles in implementing participatory extension programmes in the Republic of Ireland.
Sociologia Ruralis, 50(2), 104-120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679523.2010.00505.x Mkisi, R. B.
(2014).
The role of agricultural extension in smallholder farmer adaptation to climate change in Blantyre district, Malawi (MS dissertation, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana).
Retrieved from https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/dissertations/AAI1585361/ Mustapha, S., Undiandeye, U., & Gwary, M. (2012).
The role of extension in agricultural adaptation to climate change in the Sahelian zone of Nigeria.
Journal of Environment and Earth Science, 2(6), 48-58.
Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.933.5124&rep=rep1&type=pdf Neufeldt, H., Negra, C., Hancock, J., Foster, K., Nayak, D., & Singh, P. (2015).
Scaling up climatesmart agriculture: Lessons learned from South Asia and pathways for success.
Retrieved from World Agroforestry Centre website: http://www.worldagroforestry.org/downloads/Publications/PDFS/WP15720.pdf Ngwenya, H., & Hagmann, J.
(2011).
Making innovation systems work in practice: Experiences in integrating innovation, social learning and knowledge in innovation platforms.
Knowledge Management for Development Journal, 7(1), 109-124. https://doi.org/10.1080/19474199.2011.593867 Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 61 Ogunbameru, B., Mustapha, S., & Idrisa, Y.
(2013).
Capacity building for climate change adaptation: Modules for agricultural extension curriculum development.
Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, 14(2), 61-66.
Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2d1d/94b53e9cf4f5d8ce9df5d8db2936cd4dedd3.pdf Ozor, N., & Cynthia, N. (2011).
The role of extension in agricultural adaptation to climate change in Enugu state, Nigeria.
Journal of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, 3(3), 42-50.
Retrieved from http://www.academicjournals.org/app/webroot/article/article1379426712_Ozor%20an d%20Nnaji.pdf Rajalahti, R., Janssen, W., & Pehu, E. (2008).
Agricultural innovation systems: From diagnostics toward operational practices.
Retrieved from the World Bank website: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/05/02/000334 955_20080502052523/Rendered/PDF/434350NWP0ARDD1Box0327368B01PUBLIC1.pdf Rivera, W. M., & Sulaiman, V. R. (2009).
Extension: Object of reform, engine for innovation.
Outlook on Agriculture, 38(3), 267-273. https://doi.org/10.5367/000000009789396810 Sala, S., Rossi, F., & David, S. (2016).
Supporting agricultural extension towards climate-smart agriculture: An overview of existing tools.
Compendium climate-smart agriculture & extension.
Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations website: http://www.fao.org/3/a-bl361e.pdf Selvaraju, R. (2012).
Climate risk assessment and management in agriculture.
In A. Meybeck, J. Lankoski, S. Redfern, N. Azzu, & V. Gitz (Eds.
), Building resilience for adaptation to climate change in the agriculture sector.
Proceedings of a Joint FAO/OECD Workshop (pp.
71-90).
Rome, Italy.
Sharma, R., Peshin, R., Khar, S., & Ishar, A. K. (2014).
Agriculture innovation system approach for sustainable agriculture development: A review.
Agro Economist, 1(1), 1-7.
Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/30b4/4d1c33f708645452e6615e21ba6c01da1802.pdf Simpson, B. M. (2016).
Pocket guide 1: Extension practice for agricultural adaptation.
Preparing smallholder farm families to adapt to climate change.
Retrieved from: https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/pocket-guide-1.pdf Simpson, B. M., & Burpee, C. G. (2014).
Adaptation under the “new normal” of climate change: The future of agricultural extension and advisory services.
Retrieved from: https://agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/MEAS%20Discussion%20Paper%2 03%20-%20Climate%20Change%20and%20EAS%20-%202014_01_31.pdf Kamruzzaman et al.
Advancements in Agricultural Development https://doi.org/10.37433/aad.v1i1.9 62 Spielman, D. J., Davis, K., Negash, M., & Ayele, G. (2011).
Rural innovation systems and networks: Findings from a study of Ethiopian smallholders.
Agriculture and Human Values, 28(2), 195-212.
Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10460-010-9273-y Stål, H. I., & Bonnedahl, K. J.
(2015).
Provision of climate advice as a mechanism for environmental governance in Swedish agriculture.
Environmental Policy and Governance, 25(5), 356-371. https://doi.org10.1002/eet.1677 Sulaiman, R. V. (2017).
Enabling advisory services for climate-smart agriculture: Key elements to foster farmers' adoption of CSA practices.
Policy brief enabling advisory services for CSA.
Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations website: http://www.fao.org/3/a-bs940e.pdf Sulaiman, R. V., Chuluunbaatar, D., & Vishnu, S. (2018).
Upscaling climate smart agriculture: Lessons for extension and advisory services.
Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations website: http://www.fao.org/uploads/media/Climate_Smart_Agriculture_draft08.pdf Tropical Agriculture Platform.
(2016).
Common framework on capacity development for agricultural innovation systems: Guidance note on operationalization.
Wallingford, England: Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International (CABI).
World Bank.
(2006).
Enhancing agricultural innovation: How to go beyond the strengthening of research systems.
Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/864351468325269468/pdf/379000Enhan cin101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf World Bank.
(2012).
Agricultural innovation systems: An investment sourcebook.
Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2247 Wright Morton, L., Prokopy, L. S., Arbuckle, J. G., Ingels, C., Thelen, M., Bellm, R., … Widhalm, M. (2016).
Climate change and agricultural extension: Building capacity for land grant extension services to address the agricultural impacts of climate change and the adaptive management needs of agricultural stakeholders.
Retrieved from the Extension Store, Extension and Outreach, Iowa State University website: https://store.extension.iastate.edu/product/14504 Yami, M., Vogl, C., & Hausera, M. (2009).
Comparing the effectiveness of informal and formal institutions in sustainable common pool resources management in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Conservation and Society 7(3), 153-164. https://doi.org/10.4103/0972-4923.64731 © 2020 by authors.
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
www.gi.sanu.ac.rs, www.doiserbia.nb.rs J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 43 Original scientific paper UDC: 911.2:551.58 https://doi.org/10.2298/IJGI2101043C Received: November 10, 2020 Reviewed: February 28, 2021 Accepted: March 15, 2021 PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATURAL DISASTERS Vladimir M. Cvetković1*, Lazar Grbić2 1University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, Serbia; e-mail: vmc@fb.bg.ac.rs 2Scientific-Professional Society for Disaster Risk Management, Belgrade, Serbia; e-mail: grbicbee2@gmail.com Abstract: The aim of the research is the examination of the factors influencing the public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters.
This paper presents the results of quantitative research regarding testing the central hypothesis where education is the predicting variable of public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters.
A multivariate regression analysis was used, identifying the extent of the total scores of the main dependent variables (perception of vulnerability to climate change, perception of the climate change impact on natural disasters, knowledge and fear scores) were associated with five demographic and socio-economic variables: gender, age, marital status, education level, and employment status.
A series of 208 face-to-face interviews were conducted during the beginning of 2020 on the central squares in the selected cities in Serbia, Belgrade (76.92%) and Sremska Mitrovica (23.08%).
The results showed that education level was the most effective predictor of the mentioned research variables.
Besides, employment status has been found to affect perceptions of vulnerability, while age affects the perceptions of climate change.
Based on the obtained results, policies and strategies to improve people's awareness of climate change must take into account a comprehensive understanding of behavioral dispositions.
Keywords: climate change; natural disaster; public; perception Introduction Public perception of climate change and its impact on the distribution of the frequency and severity of the consequences of natural disasters greatly influence the implementation of climate policies, the design of educational programs, and the undertaking of preventive measures (Allan et al., 2020; Cuthbertson, Rodriguez-Llanes, Robertson, & Archer, 2019; Seara, Pollnac, & Jakubowski, 2020; Ruiz, Faria, & Neumann, 2020).
The majority of the population views climate change as an area that is important for humanity, but when it comes to their daily lives, the issue of climate change is something that is far and less important (Capstick et al., 2015).
This perception of the problem of climate change changes after a personal confrontation with the consequences of climate change in the form of extreme weather conditions, which increases the desire to participate in solving the problem (Capstick et al., 2015).
According to Adamo, Al-Ansari, and Sissakian (2020), climate change as a phenomenon is nothing new for scientists because geological evidence shows that the climate *Corresponding author, e-mail: vmc@fb.bg.ac.rs https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/rs/deed.sr_LATN Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 44 system has had periods of stability and variability throughout the planet's history.
Global climatic conditions in the last 10 millennia have created favorable and optimal conditions for the development and expansion of both humans and flora and fauna (Arora et al., 2018).
Climate change is a phenomenon that is an integral part of the functioning of the planet, caused by natural processes and anthropogenic influences, i.e., greenhouse gas emissions, which worsen the negative effects of climate change on the functioning of human communities (AghaKouchak et al., 2020; Hoogendoorn, Sütterlin, & Siegrist, 2020; Hussain et al., 2020).
Intense and devastating natural disasters, caused by climate changes, weaken the resilience of communities (Cvetković, Nikolić, Nenadić, Öcal, & Zečević, 2020; Cvetković, Öcal, & Ivanov, 2019; Cvetković et al., 2019), due to the lack of time and resources for recovery (O'Brien, O'Keefe, Rose, & Wisner, 2006).
The negative effects of natural disasters on communities are evident, and an increase in their frequency and intensity is noticeable (Cvetković & Dragicević, 2014; Öcal, 2019; Semenza et al., 2008; Shi, Visschers, & Siegrist, 2015; Yu, Wang, Zhang, Wang, & Wei, 2013).
Floods, severe storms, earthquakes, and droughts result in lower mortality rates than socio-political phenomena such as armed conflicts, but still occur more frequently and affect a higher percentage of the population (Fujita & Shaw, 2019; Hunter, 2005).
It is estimated that between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's population was threatened by a natural disaster during the 1970s and 1980s (Hunter, 2005).
In the last few decades, there have been serious debates and discussions, both at the local and international level, about the existence of climate change impact on the occurrence and destructive effect of increasingly present natural disasters (Banholzer, Kossin, & Donner, 2014; Bouwer, 2011; Davies, Oswald, & Mitchell, 2009; Kumiko & Shaw, 2019; Mano, Kirshcenbaum, & Rapaport, 2019; O’Brien et al., 2006).
Global warming has a direct impact on the increase in the amount and change of the established precipitation patterns (Chakma, Hossain, Islam, Hasnat, & Kabir, 2021; Kilpeläinen, Kellomäki, Strandman, & Venäläinen 2010).
The increased temperature causes greater evaporation and faster drying of the soil, which increases the intensity and duration of drought.
With each degree of temperature increase, the capacity of water absorption in the air increases by 7%, as well as the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere (Emanuel, 2017; Hatfield & Dold, 2019).
Higher precipitation means a higher percentage of rain instead of snowfall, earlier snow melting, then the risk of floods in early spring increases, as well as droughts during the summer period, especially in the continental parts (Trenberth, Cheng, Jacobs, Zhang, & Fasullo, 2018).
Natural disasters in Sri Lanka have intensified and become more frequent, as a result of anthropogenic activities and climate change (Ratnayake & Herath, 2005).
A study of the impact of climate change on the increase in fire risk at 17 locations in the Southeast Australia region, showed that the number of days when the risk of fire is higher, will increase by 4–25% by 2020 (Lucas, Hennessy, Mills, & Bathols, 2007).
The rise in global temperature, caused by anthropogenic impact and greenhouse gas emissions, is exacerbating the situation in many regions, increasing the potential for droughts, or their intensification (Cook, Smerdon, Seager, & Coats, 2014).
Gleick (2014) found that between 1988 and 2006 there was increased evaporation in the eastern Mediterranean, indicating an evident increase in the average sea temperature.
Adding to the rise in temperature, all the factors together provoke the rising of sea levels, more frequent sandstorms, and the disappearance of groundwater.
Climate change is a reality, and this is evidenced by many studies that have confirmed temperature changes and changes in precipitation patterns (Burić, Ducić, & Mihajlović, 2018; Mahmoudi, Mohammadi, & Daneshmand, 2019; Ruml et al., 2017).
In Serbia, it was determined that the frequency of precipitation is at the intensity above the extreme occurrence level (1961–2015) and the frequency of precipitation is at or above the absolute daily maximum during the reference Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 45 period (1961–1990) (Anđelković et al., 2018).
Besides that, Malinović-Milićević et al.
(2018) determined that the climate of the northern and central parts of Vojvodina is getting wetter in terms of the precipitation magnitude and frequency, reflecting the characteristics of the central European regime.
Besides that, it was found that a determined increase in air temperature and the reduction of precipitation in the examined period has a significant influence on the possibility of fire occurrence (Živanović, Ivanović, Nikolić, Đokić, & Tošić, 2020).
Having in mind the importance of disaster risk perception for the adoption of the appropriate policies and programs for climate change reduction and its impact on natural disasters, the aim of this paper is to investigate the public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters through the following dimensions: (a) perception of vulnerability to climate change; (b) perception of the climate change impact on natural disasters; (c) assessment of knowledge about climate change, and (d) perception of fear of climate change and natural disasters.
Literature review Many papers in the literature examine citizens' perceptions of climate change (Semenza et al., 2008; Shi, Visschers, & Siegrist, 2015; Xie, Huang, Lin, & Chen, 2020; Yu et al., 2013) and its impact on increasing disaster risk (Anderson et al., 2018; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012a).
In some papers, the influence of education, awareness, and knowledge (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Leiserowitz, 2007), print and electronic media (Kahan et al., 2012; O’Neill, Williams, Kurz, Wiersma, & Boykoff, 2015), gender and age (Shi, Visschers, Siegrist, & Arvai, 2016; Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014), previous experiences (Moyano, Paniagua, & Lafuente, 2009), perception of individual health (Hamilton, Hartter, Lemcke-Stampone, Moore, & Safford, 2015; Scruggs & Benegal, 2012), etc.
are examined.
Cvetković, Tomašević, and Milašinović (2019) determined that educational institutions, after the electronic media, are the most common way of informing the citizens of Belgrade about the security risks of climate change.
Chou (2013) determined that the poor public confidence in the government's ability to fight climate change and the public has called for more risk coordination, transparency, and engagement in climate change policy-making.
Lewis (2016) found that the measured temperature patterns are incompatible with the subjective viewpoint interpretation of extremes as objects only of climatic variability.
Ruiz et al.
(2020) found that attitudes are directly affected by the exchange of values and beliefs within the culture and the direct impact of climate change.
They also found that implicit factors are related to the degree of community growth and the distribution of knowledge on climate change.
Echavarren, Balžekienė, and Telešienė (2019) came to know that the variation of the concern about climate change is not clarified by political governmental circumstances, and education and political preference are critical mediators.
Lewis (2016) discovered that the properties of temperature recorded are incompatible with the private perception-based understanding of extremes as manifestations of natural climate variability alone.
A survey on risk perception, understandings, and responses to climate change (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012b) in Australia, found that 74% of the respondents believe that the world's climate is changing, 50% already feel the effects of climate change, and more than half of them express their personal and immediate concern for their undoubted influence.
In the same research, it was found that more than 76% of the respondents believe that it is necessary to take certain measures as soon as possible to mitigate the effects of climate change.
Capstick, Pidgeon, and Whitehead (2013) show that most citizens in Wales (88%) believe that climate change is happening.
Also, they point out that a little more than half of the respondents (52%) state that the Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 46 cause of climate change is in the equal relationship between human activities and natural processes, more than a third of the respondents (35%) believe that change is solely due to human activities, while the least number of respondents (11%) think that the causes of climate change are exclusively certain natural processes.
According to them, with concerns about climate change, more than a third (36%) of the respondents are very concerned, and a slightly higher percentage (48%) think they are quite concerned, while a few of them (7%) are not concerned at all.
In another study, in the United Kingdom, Capstick et al.
(2015) found that more than half (68%) of the respondents are very concerned about climate change, while a very high number of the respondents (88%) believe that climate is changing.
Also, for the causes of climate change, less than half (48%) of the surveyed population believe that natural processes and human activities are equally responsible for them, and more than a third (37%) believe that human activities cause climate change.
Only 12% believe that nature itself regulates climate change.
More than half of those surveyed (55%) think that the effects of climate change are already being felt in the UK, while just over a fifth (23%) of those surveyed think the effects will be felt in 10–25 years.
Methodology The subject of the research is a scientific explanation of the manner of influence of certain predictors (gender, age, marital status, education, and employment status) on the public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters (Figure 1).
A series of 208 face-to-face interviews were conducted during the beginning of 2020 on the central squares in the selected cities in Serbia, Belgrade (160 participants, i.e.
76.92%) and Sremska Mitrovica (48 participants, i.e.
23.08%).
Beginning with the population of all the people living in the city's area of Belgrade and Sremska Mitrovica, every fourth passer-by was interviewed near the central square of the city.
In situations where it was known that the touch passer-by did not reside in the city's territory of Belgrade, he/she was not included in the survey and the next fourth passer-by was chosen in the manner referred to above.
Figure 1.
Research design.
Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 47 Questionnaire Design The structured questionnaire was developed using close-ended and five-point Likert scale questions (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).
The first part of the questionnaire contained the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respondents and the sections in the second part included issue questions related to (a) perception of vulnerability to climate change; (b) perception of the climate change impact on natural disaster; (c) assessment of knowledge about climate change; (d) perception of fear of climate change and natural disasters.
Several published survey approaches were consulted (Capstick et al., 2015; Cook et al., 2014; Hamilton et al., 2015; Scruggs & Benegal, 2012; Semenza et al., 2008; Shi et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2013) and adapted to the conditions of the Serbian socio-economic status.
In Belgrade (Central Serbia), a pilot pre-test of the questionnaire was performed in March 2020 with 25 people to test the comprehensibility and efficiency of the questionnaire.
Our quantitative analysis was compatible with the Helsinki Declaration (Tyebkhan, 2003) defining the standards for socio-medical research concerning human subjects.
Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents Of the total of 208 participants, 48.1% were women and 51.9% were men (women 51.3% and men 48.7% of the total country population—Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2020).
The mean age of the participants was 34 years of age and perhaps the most represented group was 30–50 years of age (47.6%) while the smallest group was of the participants aged 50+ (19.2%) (average population age 42.6 years—Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2020) (men 41.2 and women 43.9).
It emerges from the study that the largest number (43.7%) finished university studies and only a small number finished primary school (5.3%) (secondary school: 26%, high school: 14.4%, undergraduate: 7.69%, and graduate: 36.01%).
In the household sample, individuals in a relationship account for 33.7%, the widows/widowers for 3.84%, the divorced for 8.66%, and the married people rate for 38%.
The respondents selected also represented the different status of jobs, with 75.5% employed.
In comparison, the largest number (60.1%) of the participants had children (Table 1).
Statistical analysis In this study, descriptive statistics were calculated for the basic socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the participants.
T-test (Kim, 2015), one-way Table 1 Basic socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents (n = 208) Variable Category f % Gender Male 108 51.9 Female 100 48.1 Age 18-30 69 33.2 30-50 99 47.6 50+ 40 19.2 Marital status Single 33 15.9 In relationship 70 33.7 Married 79 38 Divorced 18 8.66 Widow/widower 8 3.84 Education Primary school (grade 1‒8) 11 5.3 Secondary degree—4 years 54 26 High school diploma 30 14.4 Undergraduate 16 7.69 Graduate 75 36.01 Master/doctorate 22 10.6 Children Yes 125 60.1 No 83 39.9 Employment status Employed 157 75.5 Unemployed 26 12.5 Retiree 25 12 TOTAL 208 100 Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 48 ANOVA (Heiberger & Neuwirth, 2009), and multivariate linear regression (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Ullman, 2007; Yuan, Ekici, Lu, & Monteiro, 2007) were used to examine the relationship between the predictors and public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters.
Bearing in mind that the preliminary analysis of the homogeneity of variance (Test of Homogeneity of Variances) have shown that there is a violation of the assumption of homogenous variance, used the results of the two tests—Welsh and Brown-Forsythe, which are resistant to the violation of the assumption.
All the tests were two-tailed, with a significance level of p < .05.
Statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics (Version 26).
The internal consistency of Likert scales for Perception of Vulnerability Subscale (six items) is good with a Cronbach’s alpha of .85, for Perception of the climate change impact on natural disasters Subscale (five items) .84, Assessment of Knowledge Subscale (four items) .82, and Perception of Fear Subscale (five items) .85.
To examine the factors associated with the overall scale, we performed regression analyses, with the four dependent variables (Table 2).
We tested the central hypothesis where education is the predicting variable of public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters.
A multivariate regression analysis was used, identifying the extent to total scores of the main dependent variables (perception of vulnerability to climate change, perception of the climate change impact to natural disasters, knowledge and fear scores) were associated with five demographic and socio-economic variables: gender, age, marital status, education level, and employment status.
Previous analyses checked on the residual scattering diagram (Tabachnick et al., 2007), showed that the assumptions of normality (Normal Probability Plot P-P and Scatterplot), linearity, multicollinearity (r = .8), and homogeneity of variance had not been violated.
Results Starting from the abovementioned methodological framework and research design, the results were divided into two categories: • The predictors of perception of vulnerability to climate change, perception of the climate change impact to natural disasters, assessment of knowledge and perception of fear scores related to the public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters; • Results of descriptive statistics and the relations between the variables and perception of vulnerability to climate change, perception of the climate change impact to natural disaster, assessment of knowledge and perception of fear scores related to the public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters.
The predictors of public perception of climate change The multivariate regression analysis showed that education level was the most effective predictor of perception of vulnerability to climate change.
Further analysis showed that the most important predictor for vulnerability is education level (β = .503), and it explains a 21.3% variance in the score of perception of vulnerability, followed by the employment status (β = .134, 1.1%).
The remaining variables did not have significant effects on the perception of vulnerability.
This model (R2 = .349, Adj.
R2 = .333, F = 21.68, t = 7.63, p = .000) with all the mentioned independent variables explains the 33.3% variance of perception of vulnerability to climate change.
Also, the results of the multivariate regressions of perception climate change impact on natural disasters showed that the most important predictor is education level (β = .577), and it explains a 28.9% variance in perception, followed by age (β = –.123, 1%).
The remaining variables did not have significant effects Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 49 on the perception of the impact of climate change on natural disasters.
This model (R2 = .416, Adj.
R2 = .401, F = 28.73, t = 10.73, p = .000) with all the mentioned independent variables explains the 40.1% variance of perception of vulnerability to climate change (Table 2 and Figure 2).
Table 2 Results of a multivariate regression analysis concerning the perception of vulnerability, perception of climate change impact, assessment of the knowledge, and perception of fear scores (n = 208) Predictor variables Perception of vulnerability Perception of climate change impact Assessment of knowledge Perception of fear B SE β B SE β B SE β B SE Β Gender –.056 .095 –.034 –.089 .083 –.058 –.055 .073 –.041 .047 .096 .027 Age –.081 .078 –.069 –.133 .068 –.123* –.017 .060 –.019 –.115 .079 –.095 Marital status –.014 .057 –.016 .028 .050 .035 –.029 .044 –.043 –.050 .058 –.056 Education level .292 .036 .503** .308 .031 .577** .286 .027 .617** .338 .036 .565** Employment status –.162 .080 –.134* –.097 .070 –.087 –.023 .061 –.024 –.052 .081 –.042 Note.
Males, the youngest, married, secondary educated respondents, coded as 0; 1 has been assigned otherwise.
B = unstandardized (B) coefficients; SE = Standard error; β = standardized (β) coefficients.
*p ≤ .05.
**p ≤ .01.
Figure 2.
The predictors for the public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters.
Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 50 On the other side, the results of the multivariate regressions of assessment of knowledge about climate change showed that the most important predictor is education level (β = .617) and it explains 31.36% variance in the assessment of knowledge.
The remaining variables did not have significant effects on the assessment of knowledge on climate change.
This model (R2 = .406, Adj.
R2 = .391, F = 27.58, t = 10.33, p = .000) with all the mentioned independent variables explains the 40.6% variance of assessment of knowledge on climate change (Table 3 and Figure 2).
Concerning to perception of fear of climate change, analyses showed that the most important predictor is education level (β = .565) and it explains 26.01% variance in knowledge.
The remaining variables did not have significant effects on the assessment of knowledge about climate change.
This model (R2 = .378, Adj.
R2 = .363, F = 24.56, t = 5.95, p = .000) with all the mentioned independent variables explains the 36.3% variance of climate change fear (Table 3 and Figure 2).
Results of descriptive statistics and the relations between the variables and public perception of climate change The results of the research show that the largest number of the respondents (56.7%) points out that, to a certain extent, they know about climate change, observed on a scale from 1 (absolutely know) to 4 (absolutely don't know).
Only 1.3% of the respondents point out that they know absolutely nothing about climate change, while 13.5% believe that they are familiar with such a phenomenon.
Over 91.8% of respondents believe that the climate is changing globally, while 14% of respondents believe that the issue of climate change is not important to them at all on a personal level.
On the other hand, 36.1% of the respondents believe that the issue of climate change is important in the perspective of everyday life.
To a question related to concerns about the potential effects of climate change that they could have on them, most respondents believe they are partially concerned (31.7%), while 13.9% are not concerned at all.
With the perceptions of the impact of climate change on society, the results are slightly different and 25% are not concerned at all.
Regarding the sources of information they trust the most when reporting on climate change, 51.9% of the respondents opted for scientists, 39.9% for the media, while 7.7% of the respondents said they trusted the authorities the most.
When it comes to the perception of the causes that lead to climate change, the highest (46.6%) opinion is that the roots are in human activities, while 6.3% of respondents believe that these are natural processes, while 4% believe that these are mutual interactions of the mentioned factors.
When asked whether climate change will cause a more serious problem in Serbia if certain proactive measures are not taken shortly, 51.9% have a positive attitude on this issue, while a very small number of 6.3% of the respondents believe that not taking such measures will not harm.
On the other hand, 62.5% of the respondents believe that the impact of climate change is already being felt in Serbia, while 9.6% think that it will happen in the next 25 years, and 2.4% in the next 50, and 1.4% point out that this will happen in the next 100 years.
When asked to assess the level of vulnerability of the region to climate change, 8.2% of the respondents point out that it is not endangered, while 47.6% claim that it is partly endangered, and 13.9% believe that it is endangered.
About the perception of weather change due to climate change, 36.5% of the respondents point out that there is more frequent heavy rainfall, 30.3% that the temperature has risen, 18.3% that winters are warmer, 4.8% that summers are warmer, 1.9% say that the weather is extremely unstable, and 0.5% of the respondents point out that the winters are colder and the air is more polluted.
Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 51 Bearing in mind that the increase in the average temperature is an integral part of global warming and climate change (Burić et al., 2018; Jacob et al., 2018; Malinović-Milićević et al., 2018), the respondents were asked what caused the increase in temperature.
More than half of the respondents stated that the main cause is human activity, 32.7% of the respondents pointed out that human activities and natural cycles have an equal share in it, 9.6% of the respondents stated the cause were natural cycles, while 4.8% of respondents share neutral attitude.
Related to the perception of vulnerability to climate change, we also examined the attitudes of the respondents regarding the percentage of their friends who believe that the increased carbon dioxide emissions caused by human activities affect climate change.
The obtained results show that 28.8% of the respondents think it is up to 30% of their friends, while 63% of respondents think it is up to some 60%, and 8.2% of respondents think it is over 60% of their friends.
In terms of the assessment of an activity which would best contribute to reducing carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere, 37% of the respondents preferred the use of renewable energy sources, 21.6% of the respondents chose the use of fossil fuels, 14.4% of respondents preferred to buy an electric car, 13.9% preferred recycling, 10.1% of the respondents opted for saving electricity, 1.4% of the respondents chose reducing air traffic, 1% of respondents were for using public transport, while 0.5% of respondents preferred growing organic food.
Also, related to the perception of climate change vulnerability, we asked the question of the state of the natural environment in the place where they live, and most respondents, 74.5%, rated it as good, 21.6% of the respondents rated it as bad, 2.4% of respondents said it was very good, while, in contrast, 1.4% pointed out that the situation was very bad.
Then, it was found that 91.8% of the respondents believe that the average temperature has increased in the last 100 years.
Examining the perception of the impact of climate change on the frequency and intensity of natural disasters (floods, droughts, stormy winds, etc.
), 59% of the respondents believe that they have a significant impact, while 6.3% say that they do not affect at all.
Then, 33.2% of the respondents believe that concerning the type of natural disaster that could befall them in the near or distant future because of climate change, floods are expected, 32.7% believe that these are heat waves, 24% that stormy winds can be expected, 7.2% expect landslides, and 2.9% expect droughts.
Concerning the assessment of the level of vulnerability to natural disasters caused by climate change, 87.5% believe that they are endangered, while 1.4% believe that they are not endangered.
When asked whether the frequency of natural disasters increased during their lives, the respondents mostly (83.7%) answered affirmatively, while the remaining 34 respondents (16.3%) answered that this was not the case.
When asked about the distance of the respondents from the region where natural disasters can be expected, 100 respondents (48.1%) answered that the distance is 51–100 km, 46 respondents (22.1%) answered that it was 0–25 km, 44 respondents (21.2%) answered 101–250 km, while 18 respondents (8.7%) stated that their distance from the potential focus of the disaster is 26–50 km.
About 91.8% of respondents believe that the floods that hit our region in 2014 were caused by extreme rainfall because of climate change.
The results of the t-test show that there is no statistically significant difference in the results between men and women in terms of knowledge about climate change (p = .506), assessment of vulnerability to climate change (.507), and perception of the climate change impact on natural disaster intensity (.341) (Table 3).
Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 52 Table 3 T-test results between gender and assessment of the knowledge, perception of vulnerability, and perception of the climate change impact on natural disaster (n = 208) F Sig.
t df Sig.
(two-tailed) Male Female Assessment of knowledge about climate change 2.531 .113 .666 206 .506 2.85 2.79 Perception of vulnerability .018 .894 .665 206 .507 2.53 2.46 Perception of climate change impact on natural disaster .046 .829 .954 206 .341 3.10 3.00 The analysis of the obtained results (one-way ANOVA) shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean values in the assessment of knowledge about climate change (F = 31.38, p = .000), the perception of vulnerability (F = 22.36, p = .000), and the perception of the climate change impact on natural disasters (F = 23.68, p = .000).
In further analysis, it was found that the respondents who have completed higher education (M = 3.03, SD = .383) assess their knowledge about climate change to a greater extent than the respondents with completed primary school (M = 1.81, SD = .404).
The respondents who have completed doctoral studies (M = 3.18, SD = .795) assess the vulnerability due to climate change to a greater extent than the respondents with completed primary school (M = 1.45, SD = .522).
Also, it was found that respondents who have completed master's studies (M = 3.52, SD = .506) responded that climate change affects the intensity of natural disasters to a greater extent than it is believed by the respondents who have completed high school (M = 2.61, SD = .656).
It was found that there is no statistically significant difference between the mean values of these groups of marital status and knowledge about climate change (F = 2.76, p = .029), but there is a statistically significant correlation with climate change vulnerability assessment and the perception of climate change impact on natural disaster intensity (F = 5.24, p = .06).
In further analysis, it was found that married respondents (M = 2.56, SD = .88) assess the level of vulnerability due to climate change to a greater extent than those who are not in a relationship (M = 2.51, SD = .90).
Also, it was stated that the respondents who are not in a relationship (M = 2.95, SD = .83) believe that climate change affects the intensity of natural disasters to a greater extent than it is believed by the respondents who are divorced (M = 2.73, SD = .76) (Table 4).
Table 4 ANOVA results between education and assessment of the knowledge, perception of vulnerability, and perception of the climate change impact on natural disaster (n = 208) Education Marital status df F p ηp2 df F p ηp2 Assessment of knowledge about climate change 3 28.36 .000 7.71 4 2.21 .112 2.71 Perception of vulnerability 3 19.995 .000 19.99 4 5.24 .006 2.48 Perception of climate change impact on natural disaster 4 30.156 .000 30.15 4 5.21 .007 3.24 Discussion Scientists around the world have examined the effects of many factors on the perception of climate change and come up with consistent and inconsistent results (Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2015; Nisbet & Myers, 2007).
Examining the factors influencing public perception of climate change and its impact on natural disasters, the results of multivariate regression analysis Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 53 showed that education level was the most effective predictor of the perception of vulnerability to climate change, perception of the impact on natural disaster, knowledge about climate change and fear scores.
The obtained research results are consistent with the results of the research in which it was determined that education is the factor most closely associated with the awareness of the impacts of climate change (Knight, 2016; Linnekamp, Koedam, & Baud, 2011; Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Monroe, Plate, Oxarart, Bowers, & Chaves, 2019; Owusu, Nursey-Bray, & Rudd, 2019).
Namely, it was determined that faculty-educated respondents assess their knowledge about climate change to a greater extent than the respondents with completed primary school.
Also, it has been found that with the increase in the level of education, the perception of the threat of climate change grows.
Married respondents assess the level of their vulnerability to a greater extent than those who are not in a relationship.
It can be assumed that they think more about their family or get more informed because of the fears of the mentioned (Lee et al., 2015; Nisbet & Myers, 2007).
Also, it was found that respondents who are not in a relationship emphasize to a greater extent that the consequences caused by climate change affects the intensity of natural disasters.
It can be assumed that the mentioned respondents have a higher level of knowledge, bearing in mind that Cvetković (2016) showed that the respondents who are not in a relationship know better what to do after an official warning about the flood.
Also, it was found that the respondents who are divorced have not been prepared yet, but intend to get prepared in the next 6 months.
Certainly, the results of many studies have identified significant influences of socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, gender and wealth, access to information, or civic engagement on the perception of climate change (Semenza et al., 2008; Shi et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2013).
In the results of our research, besides the level of education, it was found that employment status affects the perception of vulnerability to climate change, while age affects the perception of climate change.
We did not find that gender affects none of the examined dimensions of the perception of climate change, which is similar to the results of the research by Bollettino et al.
(2020).
Ballew, Pearson, Goldberg, Rosenthal, and Leiserowitz (2020) showed that political polarization in climate change views increases with higher education and income and positive employment status.
In some other research, age has been found to have a weak influence on climate change perception (Hesed & Paolisso, 2015; Howe, Mildenberger, Marlon, & Leiserowitz, 2015).
Our research has not shown a link between gender and perceptions of climate change, as certain studies point out that women and ethnic minorities are more likely to accept that climate change is taking place and that it is a significant threat (Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016; Macias, 2016).
To understand climate change research, governance, and decision-making, adults get most of their news from radio, television, and print media and rely on the interpretations of scientific results (Ruiz et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2016).
In our research, we found that most of the respondents trust scientists, followed by the media, while the least trust government officials when they report on climate change.
The obtained results showed that most respondents assess to know about climate change.
Hoffmann and Muttarak (2017) found that non-formal education, like disaster training and drills, is positively linked with increased resilience and perception.
In very interesting research, Bollettino et al.
(2020) asked respondents about the links between climate change and their experience with natural disasters.
Their results showed that almost half of the total number of the respondents agreed that the natural disasters they had experienced were due to climate change.
Also, we have found that most respondents believe they are at risk from natural disasters caused by climate change.
Concerning the causes that lead to climate change, most respondents point out that human activities are the main cause of climate change, which is consistent with the results of Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 54 research conducted in other countries (Alvi, Nawaz, & Khayyam, 2020; Doloisio & Vanderlinden, 2020; Singh, 2020).
It was also determined that most respondents would use renewable energy sources to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, which is expected given that producing energy from renewable sources in Serbia is in its initial phase (Golusin, Tesic, & Ostojic, 2010).
Conclusion Understanding people's perceptions of climate change is not mere research but a necessary and obligatory precondition in creating and devising adaptation strategies to climate change.
In our study, it was found that respondents are aware of climate change, but the dimension of objective knowledge of the processes, causes, and consequences of climate change is insufficiently examined.
Most respondents are well acquainted with the connection between climate change and natural disasters, but it remains to examine several dimensions that can provide a clearer understanding of such impacts.
All the strategies to mitigate the causes and consequences of climate change are rooted primarily in a comprehensive understanding of behavioral dispositions.
Policies and strategies to improve people's awareness of climate change, and campaigns to reduce the causes that lead to the negative consequences of these phenomena must very precisely consider the different demographic and socio-economic characteristics of people in the areas where they are implemented, or their success will be insufficiently guaranteed.
In the following research, it is necessary to conduct comprehensive multi-method research, which should include a larger number of respondents from different parts of the country.
Acknowledgements The authors express their gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for their comments, and the Scientific-Professional Society for Disaster Risk Management (http://upravljanje-rizicima.com/) in Belgrade, Serbia for its scientific and funding support.
References Adamo, N., Al-Ansari, N., & Sissakian, V. K. (2020).
Global Climate Change Impacts on Tigris-Euphrates Rivers Basins.
Journal of Earth Sciences and Geotechnical Engineering, 10(1), 49–98.
Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/ resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-77199 AghaKouchak, A., Chiang, F., Huning, L. S., Love, C. A., Mallakpour, I., Mazdiyasni, O., .
.
.
Sadegh, M. (2020).
Climate Extremes and Compound Hazards in a Warming World.
Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 48, 519–548.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-earth-071719-055228 Allan, J. N., Ripberger, J. T., Wehde, W., Krocak, M., Silva, C. L., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (2020).
Geographic Distributions of Extreme Weather Risk Perceptions in the United States.
Risk Analysis, 40(12), 2498–2508.
https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13569 Alvi, S., Nawaz, S. M. N., & Khayyam, U.
(2020).
How does one motivate climate mitigation?
Examining energy conservation, climate change, and personal perceptions in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Energy Research & Social Science, 70, 101645. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101645 Anderson, S. E., Bart, R. R., Kennedy, M. C., MacDonald, A. J., Moritz, M. A., Plantinga, A. J., .
.
.
Wibbenmeyer, M. (2018).
The dangers of disaster-driven responses to climate change.
Nature Climate Change, 8(8), 651–653.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0208-8 Anđelković, G., Jovanović, S., Manojlović, S., Samardžić, I., Živković, Lj., Šabić, D., .
.
.
Džinović, M. (2018) Extreme Precipitation Events in Serbia: Defining the Threshold Criteria for Emergency Preparedness.
Atmosphere, 9(5), 188. https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos9050188 http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-77199 http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-77199 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-earth-071719-055228 https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13569 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101645 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0208-8 https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos9050188 Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 55 Arora, N. K., Fatima, T., Mishra, I., Verma, M., Mishra, J., & Mishra, V. (2018).
Environmental sustainability: challenges and viable solutions.
Environmental Sustainability, 1(4), 309–340.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42398018-00038-w Ballew, M. T., Pearson, A. R., Goldberg, M. H., Rosenthal, S. A., & Leiserowitz, A.
(2020).
Does socioeconomic status moderate the political divide on climate change?
The roles of education, income, and individualism.
Global Environmental Change, 60, 102024. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.102024 Banholzer, S., Kossin, J., & Donner, S. (2014).
The Impact of Climate Change on Natural Disasters.
In A. Singh & Z. Zommers (Eds.
), Reducing Disaster: Early Warning Systems For Climate Change (pp.
21–49).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8598-3_2 Bollettino, V., Alcayna-Stevens, T., Sharma, M., Dy, P., Pham, P., & Vinck, P. (2020).
Public perception of climate change and disaster preparedness: Evidence from the Philippines.
Climate Risk Management, 30, 100250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2020.100250 Bouwer, L. M. (2011).
Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate Change?
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 92(1), 39–46.
https://doi.org/10.1175/2010BAMS3092.1 Burić, D., Ducić, V., & Mihajlović, J.
(2018).
Relationship between mean annual temperatures and precipitation sums in Montenegro between 1951-1980 and 1981-2010 periods.
Bulletin of the Serbian Geographical Society, 98(1), 31–48.
https://doi.org/10.2298/GSGD180325004B Capstick, S. B., Demski, C. C., Sposato, R. G., Pidgeon, N. F., Spence, A., & Corner, A.
(2015).
Public perceptions of climate change in Britain following the winter 2013/2014 flooding.
Understanding Risk Research Group Working Paper 15-01.
Cardiff, UK: Cardiff University.
Capstick, S. B., Pidgeon, N., & Whitehead, M. (2013).
Public perceptions of climate change in Wales: Summary findings of a survey of the Welsh public conducted during November and December 2012.
Retrieved from http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/45931 Chakma, U., Hossain, A., Islam, K., Hasnat, G. T., & Kabir, M. H. (2021).
Water crisis and adaptation strategies by tribal community: A case study in Baghaichari Upazila of Rangamati District in Bangladesh.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management, 2(2), 37–46.
https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2020.2.2.3 Chou, K. T. (2013).
The public perception of climate change in Taiwan and its paradigm shift.
Energy Policy, 61, 1252–1260.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.016 Cook, B. I., Smerdon, J. E., Seager, R., & Coats, S. (2014).
Global warming and 21st century drying.
Climate Dynamics, 43(9), 2607–2627.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-014-2075-y Cuthbertson, J., Rodriguez-Llanes, J. M., Robertson, A., & Archer, F. (2019).
Current and Emerging Disaster Risks Perceptions in Oceania: Key Stakeholders Recommendations for Disaster Management and Resilience Building.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16(3), 460. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16030460 Cvetković, V. M. (2016).
Marital Status of Citizens and Floods: Citizen Preparedness for Response to Natural Disasters.
Vojno delo, 68(8), 89–116.
https://doi.org/10.5937/vojdelo1608089C Cvetković, V. M., & Dragicević, S. (2014).
Spatial and temporal distribution of natural disasters.
Journal of the Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijić” SASA, 64(3), 293–309.
https://doi.org/10.2298/IJGI1403293C Cvetković, V. M., Nikolić, N., Radovanović Nenadić, U., Öcal A. K., Noji, E., & Zečević, M. (2020).
Preparedness and Preventive Behaviors for a Pandemic Disaster Caused by COVID-19 in Serbia.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(11), 4124. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17114124 Cvetković, V. M., Öcal, A., & Ivanov, A.
(2019).
Young adults’ fear of natural disasters: A case study of residents from Turkey, Serbia and Macedonia.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 35, 101095. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101095 Cvetković, V. M., Ronan, K., Shaw, R., Filipović, M., Mano, R., Gačić, J., & Jakovljević, V. (2019).
Household earthquake preparedness in Serbia: A study of selected municipalities.
Acta Geographica Slovenica, 59(2), 27–42.
https://doi.org/10.3986/AGS.5445 Cvetković, V. M., Tomašević, K. S., & Milašinović, S. M. (2019).
Security risks of climate change: case study of Belgrade.
Sociological Review, 53(2), 596–626.
https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg53-22371 Davies, M., Oswald, K., & Mitchell, T. (2009).
Climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and social protection.
In Promoting pro-poor growth: Employment and social protection (pp.
201–217).
Paris: OECD.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42398-018-00038-w https://doi.org/10.1007/s42398-018-00038-w https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.102024 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8598-3_2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2020.100250 https://doi.org/10.1175/2010BAMS3092.1 https://doi.org/10.2298/GSGD180325004B http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/45931 https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2020.2.2.3 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.016 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-014-2075-y https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16030460 https://doi.org/10.5937/vojdelo1608089C https://doi.org/10.2298/IJGI1403293C https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17114124 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101095 https://doi.org/10.3986/AGS.5445 https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg53-22371 Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 56 Doloisio, N., & Vanderlinden, J. P. (2020).
The perception of permafrost thaw in the Sakha Republic (Russia): Narratives, culture and risk in the face of climate change.
Polar Science, 26, 100589. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.polar.2020.100589 Drummond, C., & Fischhoff, B.
(2017).
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(36), 9587–9592.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1704882114 Echavarren, J. M., Balžekienė, A., & Telešienė, A.
(2019).
Multilevel analysis of climate change risk perception in Europe: Natural hazards, political contexts and mediating individual effects.
Safety Science, 120, 813–823.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.08.024 Emanuel, K. (2017).
Assessing the present and future probability of Hurricane Harvey’s rainfall.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(48), 12681–12684.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1716222114 Fujita, K., & Shaw, R. (2019).
Preparing International Joint Project: use of Japanese flood hazard map in Bangladesh.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management, 1(1), 62–80.
https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.1.4 Gleick, P. H. (2014).
Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria.
Weather, Climate and Society, 6(3), 331–340.
https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 Golusin, M., Tesic, Z., & Ostojic, A.
(2010).
The analysis of the renewable energy production sector in Serbia.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 14(5), 1477–1483.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2010.01.012 Hamilton, L. C., Hartter, J., Lemcke-Stampone, M., Moore, D. W., & Safford, T. G. (2015).
Tracking Public Beliefs About Anthropogenic Climate Change.
PloS one, 10(9), e0138208.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0138208 Hatfield, J. L., & Dold, C. (2019).
Water-Use Efficiency: Advances and Challenges in a Changing Climate.
Frontiers in Plant Science, 10, 103. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpls.2019.00103 Heiberger, R. M., & Neuwirth, E. (2009).
One-Way ANOVA.
In M. Richard & E. N. Heiberger (Eds.
), R through excel (pp.
165–191).
New York, NY: Springer.
Hesed, C. D. M., & Paolisso, M. (2015).
Cultural knowledge and local vulnerability in African American communities.
Nature Climate Change, 5(7), 683–687 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2668 Hoffmann, R., & Muttarak, R. (2017).
Learn from the Past, Prepare for the Future: Impacts of Education and Experience on Disaster Preparedness in the Philippines and Thailand.
World Development, 96, 32–51.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.02.016 Hoogendoorn, G., Sütterlin, B., & Siegrist, M. (2020).
The climate change beliefs fallacy: The influence of climate change beliefs on the perceived consequences of climate change.
Journal of Risk Research, 23(12), 1577– 1589. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1749114 Hornsey, M. J., Harris, E. A., Bain, P. G., & Fielding, K. S. (2016).
Meta-analyses of the determinants and outcomes of belief in climate change.
Nature Climate Change, 6(6), 622–626.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2943 Howe, P. D., Mildenberger, M., Marlon, J. R., & Leiserowitz, A.
(2015).
Geographic variation in opinions on climate change at state and local scales in the USA.
Nature Climate Change, 5(6), 596–603.
https://doi.org/ 10.1038/nclimate2583 Hunter, L. M. (2005).
Migration and environmental hazards.
Population and Environment, 26(4), 273–302.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-005-3343-x Hussain, M., Butt, A. R., Uzma, F., Ahmed, R., Irshad, S., Rehman, A., & Yousaf, B.
(2020).
A comprehensive review of climate change impacts, adaptation, and mitigation on environmental and natural calamities in Pakistan.
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 192(1), 48. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-019-7956-4 Jacob, D., Kotova, L., Teichmann, C., Sobolowski, S. P., Vautard, R., Donnelly, C., .
.
.
van Vliet, M. T. (2018).
Climate Impacts in Europe Under +1.5°C Global Warming.
Earth's Future, 6(2), 264–285.
https://doi.org/ 10.1002/2017EF000710 Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L. L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2012).
The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks.
Nature Climate Change, 2(10), 732–735.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1547 Kilpeläinen, A., Kellomäki, S., Strandman, H., & Venäläinen, A.
(2010).
Climate change impacts on forest fire potential in boreal conditions in Finland.
Climatic Change, 103(3), 383–398.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584009-9788-7 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polar.2020.100589 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polar.2020.100589 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1704882114 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.08.024 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1716222114 https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.1.4 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2010.01.012 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0138208 https://doi.org/10.3389/fpls.2019.00103 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2668 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.02.016 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1749114 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2943 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2583 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2583 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11111-005-3343-x https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-019-7956-4 https://doi.org/10.1002/2017EF000710 https://doi.org/10.1002/2017EF000710 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1547 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9788-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9788-7 Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 57 Kim, T. K. (2015).
T test as a parametric statistic.
Korean Journal of Anesthesiology, 68(6), 540–546.
https://doi.org/ 10.4097/kjae.2015.68.6.540 Knight, K. W. (2016).
Public awareness and perception of climate change: a quantitative cross-national study.
Environmental Sociology, 2(1), 101–113.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2015.1128055 Kumiko, F., & Shaw, R. (2019).
Preparing International Joint Project: use of Japanese Flood Hazard Map in Bangladesh.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management, 1(1), 62–80.
https://doi.org/10.18485/ ijdrm.2019.1.1.4 Lee, T. M., Markowitz, E. M., Howe, P. D., Ko, C.-Y., & Leiserowitz, A.
A.
(2015).
Predictors of public climate change awareness and risk perception around the world.
Nature Climate Change, 5(11), 1014–1020.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2728 Leiserowitz, A.
(2007).
International Public Opinion, Perception, and Understanding of Global Climate Change (Human Development Report 2007/2008).
Retrieved from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6248846.pdf Lewis, S. C. (2016).
Can public perceptions of Australian climate extremes be reconciled with the statistics of climate change?.
Weather and Climate Extremes, 12, 33–42.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2015.11.008 Linnekamp, F., Koedam, A., & Baud, I. S. A.
(2011).
Household vulnerability to climate change: Examining perceptions of households of flood risks in Georgetown and Paramaribo.
Habitat International, 35(3), 447– 456. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.12.003 Lucas, C., Hennessy, K. J., Mills, G., & Bathols, J.
(2007).
Bushfire Weather in Southeast Australia: Recent Trends and Projected Climate Change Impacts.
https://doi.org/10.25919/5e31c82ee0a4c Macias, T. (2016).
Environmental risk perception among race and ethnic groups in the United States.
Ethnicities, 16(1), 111–129.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796815575382 Mahmoudi, P., Mohammadi, M., & Daneshmand, H. (2019).
Investigating the trend of average changes of annual temperatures in Iran.
International Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, 16(2), 1079–1092.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13762-018-1664-4 Malinović-Milićević, S., Mihailović, D. T., Radovanović, M. M., & Drešković, N. (2018).
Extreme Precipitation Indices in Vojvodina Region (Serbia).
Journal of the Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijić” SASA, 68(1), 1–15.
https://doi.org/10.2298/IJGI1801001M Mano, R., Kirshcenbaum, A., & Rapaport, C. (2019).
Earthquake preparedness: A Social Media Fit perspective to accessing and disseminating earthquake information.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management, 1(2), 19–31.
https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.2.2 Monroe, M. C., Plate, R. R., Oxarart, A., Bowers, A., & Chaves, W. A.
(2019).
Identifying effective climate change education strategies: a systematic review of the research.
Environmental Education Research, 25(6), 791–812.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2017.1360842 Moyano, E., Paniagua, Á., & Lafuente, R. (2009).
Políticas ambientales, cambio climático y opinión pública en escenarios regionals.
El caso de Andalucía [Environmental Policy, Climate Change and Public Opinion.
The Case of Andalusia].
Revista Internacional de Sociologija, 67(3), 681–699.
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2008.01.23 Nisbet, M. C., & Myers, T. (2007).
The Polls—Trends: Twenty Years of Public Opinion about Global Warming.
Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(3), 444–470.
https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfm031 O’Brien, G., O'Keefe, P., Rose, J., & Wisner, B.
(2006).
Climate change and disaster management.
Natural Disasters, 30(1), 64–80.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00307.x O’Neill, S., Williams, H. T. P, Kurz, T., Wiersma, B., & Boykoff, M. (2015).
Dominant frames in legacy and social media coverage of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report.
Nature Climate Change, 5(4), 380–385.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2535 Öcal, A.
(2019).
Natural Disasters in Turkey: Social and Economic Perspective.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Management, 1(1), 51–61.
https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.1.3 Owusu, M., Nursey-Bray, M., & Rudd, D. (2019).
Gendered perception and vulnerability to climate change in urban slum communities in Accra, Ghana.
Regional Environmental Change, 19(1), 13–25.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1357-z Ratnayake, U., & Herath, S. (2005).
Changing rainfall and its impact on landslides in Sri Lanka.
Journal of Mountain Science, 2(3), 218–224.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02973195 https://doi.org/10.4097/kjae.2015.68.6.540 https://doi.org/10.4097/kjae.2015.68.6.540 https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2015.1128055 https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.1.4 https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.1.4 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2728 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6248846.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2015.11.008 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.12.003 https://doi.org/10.25919/5e31c82ee0a4c https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796815575382 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13762-018-1664-4 https://doi.org/10.2298/IJGI1801001M https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.2.2 https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2017.1360842 https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2008.01.23 https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfm031 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00307.x https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2535 https://doi.org/10.18485/ijdrm.2019.1.1.3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1357-z https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02973195 Cvetković, V. M. & Grbić, L.: Public Perception of Climate Change and its Impact on Natural Disasters J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(1), pp.
43–58 58 Reser, J. P., Bradley, G. L., Glendon, A. I., Ellul, M. C., & Callaghan, R. (2012a).
Public risk perceptions, understandings and responses to climate change and natural disasters in Australia, 2010 and 2011.
Gold Coast, Australia: National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility.
Reser, J. P., Bradley, G. L., Glendon, A. I., Ellul, M. C., & Callaghan, R. (2012b).
Public Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses to Climate Change and Natural Disasters in Australia and Great Britain.
Gold Coast, Australia: National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility.
Ruiz, I., Faria, S. H., & Neumann, M. B.
(2020).
Climate change perception: Driving forces and its interactions.
Environmental Science & Policy, 108, 112–120.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.03.020 Ruml, M., Gregorić, E., Vujadinović, M., Radovanović, S., Matović, G., Vuković, A., & Stojičić, Dj.
(2017).
Observed changes of temperature extremes in Serbia over the period 1961−2010.
Atmospheric Research, 183, 26–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2016.08.013 Scruggs, L., & Benegal, S. (2012).
Declining public concern about climate change: Can we blame the great recession?
Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 505–515.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.01.002 Seara, T., Pollnac, R., & Jakubowski, K. (2020).
Impacts of Natural Disasters on Subjective Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Study of Puerto Rican Fishers’ Perceptions after Hurricanes Irma & Maria.
Coastal Management, 48(5), 418–435.
https://doi.org/10.1080/08920753.2020.1795969 Semenza, J. C., Hall, D. E., Wilson, D. J., Bontempo, B. D., Sailor, D. J., & George, L. A.
(2008).
Public Perception of Climate Change Voluntary Mitigation and Barriers to Behavior Change.
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 35(5), 479–487.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2008.08.020 Shi, J., Visschers, V. H. M., & Siegrist, M. (2015).
Public Perception of Climate Change: The Importance of Knowledge and Cultural Worldviews.
Risk Analysis, 35(12), 2183–2201.
https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12406 Shi, J., Visschers, V. H. M., Siegrist, M., & Arvai, J.
(2016).
Knowledge as a driver of public perceptions about climate change reassessed.
Nature Climate Change, 6(8), 759–762.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2997 Singh, S. (2020).
Farmers’ perception of climate change and adaptation decisions: A micro-level evidence from Bundelkhand Region, India.
Ecological Indicators, 116, 106475. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2020.106475 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia.
(2020).
Demografska statistika 2019 [Demographic Yearbook 2019].
Retrieved from https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2020/PdfE/G202014017.pdf Tabachnick, B. G., Fidell, L. S., & Ullman, J.
B.
(2007).
Using Multivariate Statistics (5th ed.).
Boston, MA: Pearson.
Trenberth, K. E., Cheng, L., Jacobs, P., Zhang, Y., & Fasullo, J.
(2018).
Hurricane Harvey links to ocean heat content and climate change adaptation.
Earth's Future, 6(5), 730–744.
https://doi.org/10.1029/2018EF000825 Tyebkhan, G. (2003).
Declaration of Helsinki: The ethical cornerstone of human clinical research.
Indian Journal of Dermatology, Venereology, and Leprology, 69(3), 245–247.
Retrieved from https://www.ijdvl.com/text.asp?2003/ 69/3/245/1013 Xie, C., Huang, Q., Lin, Z., & Chen, Y.
(2020).
Destination risk perception, image and satisfaction: The moderating effects of public opinion climate of risk.
Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Management, 44, 122–130.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhtm.2020.03.007 Yu, H., Wang, B., Zhang, Y.-J., Wang, S., & Wei, Y.-M. (2013).
Public perception of climate change in China: results from the questionnaire survey.
Natural Hazards, 69(1), 459–472.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-013-0711-1 Yuan, M., Ekici, A., Lu, Z., & Monteiro, R. (2007).
Dimension reduction and coefficient estimation in multivariate linear regression.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology), 69(3), 329–346.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9868.2007.00591.x Zaval, L., Keenan, E. A., Johnson, E. J., & Weber, E. U.
(2014).
How warm days increase belief in global warming.
Nature Climate Change, 4(2), 143–147.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2093 Živanović, S., Ivanović, R., Nikolić, M., Đokić, M., & Tošić, I.
(2020).
Influence of air temperature and precipitation on the risk of forest fires in Serbia.
Meteorology and Atmospheric Physics, 132(6), 869–883.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00703-020-00725-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.03.020 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosres.2016.08.013 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.01.002 https://doi.org/10.1080/08920753.2020.1795969 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2008.08.020 https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12406 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2997 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2997 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2020.106475 https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2020/PdfE/G202014017.pdf https://doi.org/10.1029/2018EF000825 https://www.ijdvl.com/text.asp?2003/69/3/245/1013 https://www.ijdvl.com/text.asp?2003/69/3/245/1013 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhtm.2020.03.007 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-013-0711-1 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9868.2007.00591.x https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2093 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00703-020-00725-6 public perception of climate change and ITS impact on natural disasters Introduction Literature review Methodology Questionnaire Design Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents Statistical analysis Results The predictors of public perception of climate change Results of descriptive statistics and the relations between the variables and public perception of climate change Discussion Conclusion Acknowledgements
JGIJCSASA www.gi.sanu.ac.rs, www.doiserbia.nb.rs J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 115 Original scientific paper UDC: 911.2:551.58(914) https://doi.org/10.2298/IJGI2102115P Received: February 18, 2021 Reviewed: March 25, 2021 Accepted: May 24, 2021 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: THE CASE OF COASTAL COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES Ericson H. Peñalba1, Albert Patrick J. David 2*, Michael John D. Mabanta 2, Chaddlyn Rose C. Samaniego1, Sheryl D. S. Ellamil 2 1Bulacan State University, Education Department, Meneses Campus, Bulacan, Philippines; e-mails: ericson.penalba@bulsu.edu.ph; chaddlynrose.samaniego@bulsu.edu.ph 2Bulacan State University, Information Technology Department, Meneses Campus, Bulacan, Philippines; e-mails: albertpatrick.david@bulsu.edu.ph; michaeljohn.mabanta@bulsu.edu.ph; sheryl.ellamil@bulsu.edu.ph Abstract: Climate change poses challenges and risks to coastal communities, and the adaptation of local residents is a critically relevant issue that needs to be addressed in the policymaking process.
The main purpose of this paper is to determine the perceptions and experiences of climate change among coastal community residents in the Philippines.
This study used a combination of methods, such as participatory mapping exercises, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and document analyses.
The data, which were primarily collected from three coastal villages in the province of Bulacan, were subjected to a thematic network analysis.
The findings revealed four dominant themes pertaining to climate change adaptation in a coastal community setting: vulnerability conditions, risk awareness, risk perceptions, and climate change awareness and perceptions.
In particular, it was found out that the communities were exposed to the threats of natural hazards like flood and storm surge.
Such exposure highlighted the residents' concerns over the risks of hazards on their livelihoods and properties.
The residents also observed the unpredictability and the worsening effects of climate change.
With their direct experiences of the natural hazards' impacts and awareness of the presence of risks, residents had undertaken actions to build their adaptive capacity.
This study then highlights the value of integrating local knowledge into the mapping exercises, revealing crucial information regarding vulnerabilities, risks, and adaptation practices.
Keywords: climate change adaptation; coastal communities; local knowledge; thematic network analysis; participatory GIS Introduction Geographic variation in climate change causes and impacts exists, and the extent by which this difference is encountered in different parts of the world is shaped mainly by context-specific conditions (Reichel & Frömming, 2014).
In the Philippines, where a series of devastating natural disasters annually occur, the rapid population growth and economic development have serious implications on risk reduction and management efforts (Lagmay, Racoma, Aracan, Alconis-Ayco, & Saddi, 2017).
Moreover, the Philippines has been consistently identified as one of the countries most affected by disasters.
The Global Climate Risk Index emphasized how the country has remained in the list of the affected countries *Corresponding author, e-mail: albertpatrick.david@bulsu.edu.ph https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/rs/deed.sr_LATN Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 116 that are frequently exposed to catastrophes, such as those resulting from typhoons (Eckstein, Künzel, Schäfer, & Winges, 2020).
Projections also suggest that extreme weather conditions in the country are likely to occur more frequently.
The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (2011) projects that between 2020 and 2060, increased temperatures, extreme rainfall, and dry days are to be the most climatic conditions expected to happen locally.
The frequency of extreme weather events in recent years has called for a more proactive and integrated approach to responding to adverse climate change impacts on lives, livelihood, and properties (Raza, 2018).
However, in developing countries, the provision for cost-effective, reliable, and suitable interventions geared toward reducing vulnerability levels remains a challenging task (Osti, Tanaka, & Tokioka, 2008).
Addressing efforts aimed at vulnerability reduction requires the effective formulation and implementation of climate change adaptation interventions specific to the needs of the people at a local level (Khadka et al., 2018).
The crafting of adaptation plans becomes more locally relevant when climate-related information is readily available to the public (Minano, Johnson, & Wandel, 2018).
This bottom-up approach entails the local people to actively partake in developing such plans through the integration of their knowledge.
However, when the bottom-up nature of planning is merged with a top-down approach, achieving a more substantial level of adaptive capacity is likely to happen (Minano et al., 2018).
The integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches can then be realized through the use of Participatory Geographic Information Systems (PGIS).
As a geospatial approach to participatory action research, PGIS is characterized by the visualization of spatial information communicated by community residents, which then influences the decision-making processes involved in utilizing geographic information for planning (Dunn, 2007).
Throughout the years, PGIS has evolved into an indispensable tool for tapping the potential of local spatial knowledge, which allows for a more detailed and datadriven visualization (Ahmed et al., 2019).
Because of its cost-effectiveness, PGIS has become an emerging alternative to the traditional yet costly means of mapping that experts usually carry out (Cheung et al., 2016).
Through PGIS, access to scientific data becomes even more relevant when residents merge their indigenous knowledge with science-based knowledge and actively participate in the mapping process (Levine & Feinholz, 2015).
The inputs that people can offer concerning the changes that exist in their natural environment, specifically how the occurrence of disasters has transformed it, are vital to creating maps in a participatory manner (Klonner, Usón, Marx, Mocnik, & Höfle, 2018).
A practical case in point is how mapping serves as a tool for encouraging them to identify hazard-prone areas and document environmental risks (Cadag & Gaillard, 2012; Meyer et al., 2018).
Given their familiarity with the geographic features of their village, residents can quickly mark areas on their map that are vulnerable to hazards such as flooding and storm surge.
In the context of vulnerability assessment, local knowledge becomes a necessary means to uncover vulnerabilities in natural and social environments where multiple hazards commonly occur (Sullivan-Wiley, Short Gianotti, & Casellas Connors, 2019).
On the part of the local planners, utilizing vulnerability-based maps would make it easier for them to implement interventions that minimize people’s exposure to risks and increase their adaptive capacity (Preston, Yuen, & Westaway, 2011).
Although science-based knowledge remains an indispensable tool in understanding climate-related hazards, reliance on not only expert knowledge but also on local knowledge has become a critical component of developing maps because local knowledge reflects how community residents utilize strategies to cope with the changing climate conditions (Onencan, Meesters, & Van De Walle, 2018).
Bridging the gap between the lay public knowledge, which relevance cannot be taken for granted, and Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 117 the experts knowledge, thus emerges as a primary concern in minimizing disaster risks (Cadag & Gaillard, 2012).
Hence, a significant consideration of PGIS is how the process of mapping is carried out in a manner that provides equal representation among stakeholders who contribute to the process regardless of their profile, background, and expertise (Burdon et al., 2019).
After all, the primary concern of PGIS is to examine the structure and extent of an area, but in other respects, PGIS is bound to stimulate human empowerment on account of inclusivity (Merschdorf & Blaschke, 2018).
Giving equal value to expert and non-expert opinions creates a venue for a more inclusive decision-making.
Within a participatory setting, non-experts are empowered to voice out their opinions without being influenced or dominated by experts (Cinderby, 1999; McCall & Minang, 2005).
Since both experts and non-experts are expected to contribute to a shared decision-making, assessing the relevance and quality of data also becomes a collaborative undertaking.
Although conflicting views are likely to arise, the discussion between the two groups can still be geared towards consensus building (Giuffrida, Le Pira, Inturri, & Ignaccolo, 2019).
It is in this context that even non-experts can be involved in scientific research, in which they can conduct the gathering, evaluation, and analysis of data (Kar, Sieber, Haklay, & Ghose, 2016).
Furthermore, while incompatibility exists between expert knowledge and experiential knowledge of non-experts, meaningful conversations are still possible especially when mapping exercises are used as a platform for dialogue (Cinderby, Snell, & Forrester, 2008).
Such conversations allow both parties to deal with the challenges in using local knowledge (Brown & Kyttä, 2018; Haworth, Bruce, Whittaker, & Read, 2018).
Previous studies on the applications based on geographic information system (GIS) have focused on landscape and urban planning (Bijker & Sijstma, 2017; Brown, Schebella, & Weber, 2014), ecosystem services assessment (Damastuti & de Groot, 2019; Lopes & Videria, 2015), land use planning (Hessel et al., 2009; Ioki et al., 2019), analysis of land use perceptions (Mapedza, Wright, & Fawcett, 2003), integrated coastal management (Käyhkö et al., 2019), and natural resource management in indigenous settlements (Smith, 2003).
Moreover, the applications of either GIS technology or GIS in the Philippines context have mostly focused on assessing and monitoring land use (Endo et al., 2017; Mialhe et al., 2015) and landslide hazard (Alejandrino, Lagmay, & Eco, 2016; Oh & Lee, 2011; Opiso, Puno, Alburo, & Detalla, 2016).
In this regard, the potential of PGIS in mapping flood and storm surge has not been sufficiently addressed.
Hence, this study aims to integrate both community mapping and open-source GIS to maximize people’s knowledge in determining hazards and reducing their vulnerabilities as a coastal municipality.
Reliable findings can be obtained by ensuring that the data collected through PGIS represent the technical knowledge of carefully selected research participants from the community (Akbar, Flacke, Martinez, Aguilar, & van Maarseveen, 2020; Haklay & Francis, 2018).
Moreover, the reliability of local spatial knowledge as basis for generating rich and valuable information cannot be put into question since this type of knowledge “embodies generations of practical essential knowledge, and it operates in interactive, holistic systems” (McCall & Minang, 2005, p. 343).
As the study considers the preceding statements, objectives were laid out to explore the coastal village residents’ perceptions of climate change impacts and integrate these perceptions to GIS-based information.
The information includes qualitative data such as participatory mapping data and interview responses concerning the residents' perceptions and experiences of natural hazards.
These data are then incorporated into a GIS.
Specifically, this study seeks to describe the climate-related hazards experienced by the residents, identify how they perceive their vulnerabilities toward climate-related hazards, identify the adaptation strategies they use in responding to climatic impacts, and map each village based on their experiences and perceptions of their PGIS facilitates equitable participation and engagement of local people in the conduct of scientific research.
It also contributes to the limited body Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 118 of literature concerning the qualitative study of climate change adaptation by employing both participatory GIS and thematic network analysis.
Moreover, the maps that will be generated from this study will further facilitate appropriate actions from the residents to address their vulnerabilities and exposures to natural hazards.
These maps can also help local government units and even the private sector and non-government organizations in terms of enhancing their operations as regards the provision of services during and immediately after the occurrences of hazards.
Study area This study was carried out in three coastal barangays or villages, namely, Taliptip, Bambang, and Perez, in the municipality of Bulakan (Figure 1a), province of Bulacan, Philippines (Figure 1b).
The villages are situated in the southern part of the Central Luzon region, comprising a total land area of 43 km2, i.e., 27 km2 in Taliptip (Office of the Barangay Council of Taliptip, 2016), 15 km2 in Bambang (Office of the Barangay Council of Bambang, 2016), and 1 km2 in Perez (Office of the Barangay Council of Perez, 2019).
These coastal areas border the northeastern coast of Manila Bay.
Each village is subdivided into purok or sitio, which are small administrative units or districts.
Majority of the land areas are devoted to agriculture, livestock, and aquaculture.
The villages’ total population was 21,475 in 2015, accounting for about 28% of the municipality’s population (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2015).
Figure 1.
Map of the study area (a).
From “Road Network Map: Municipality of Bulakan,” by Municipal Planning and Development Office, Province of Bulacan, 2019.
Copyright 2019 by the Municipal Planning and Development Office.
Map of the provinces of the Philippines (b).
From “Blank Map Philippines,” by M. Gonzalez, 2009 (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BlankMap-Philippines.png).
In the public domain.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 119 According to the Provincial Government of Bulacan (2014), the villages experience extended periods of tidal flooding caused by an estimated 7 mm rise in sea level annually.
The villages are also identified as the coastal areas in the province that are most prone to the high level of susceptibility to flooding and storm surges.
Furthermore, the report states that seasonal temperature in the villages and throughout the province is likely to increase by 0.9 °C – 1.0 °C by 2020 and 1.7 °C – 2.1 °C by 2050.
Seasonal rainfall change is also likely to increase by 12.8% in 2020 and 23.6% in 2050 during the rainfall during the southwest monsoon (June–July–August) season.
Within the last two decades, the villages have been hit by extreme weather events.
The coastal communities were severely affected by the onsets of typhoons Ketsana (locally known as Ondoy) in 2009, Nesat (Pedring) in 2011, Haiyan (Yolanda) in 2013, and Rammasun (Glenda) in 2014 (Catane et al., 2019; Office of the Barangay Council of Bambang, 2016; Office of the Barangay Council of Perez, 2019; Office of the Barangay Council of Taliptip, 2016).
The typhoons caused massive flooding and storm surge, damaging housing and agricultural properties.
The reports also stated the occurrence of torrential rainfall brought by the southwest monsoon in 2012, which also resulted in severe flooding and even storm surge in the villages.
Materials and methods This study utilized a combination of methods to explore the residents’ perceptions of climaterelated risks (Figure 2).
Results drawn from the participatory mapping exercises were triangulated with those from focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews, and document analyses.
Purposive sampling was utilized in selecting the participants for both participatory mapping exercises and FGDs.
A total of 33 participants were recruited, and they were composed of village council leaders, women health workers, parent leaders, disaster risk reduction and management members, agriculture group leaders, farmers, and elderly members of the community.
Figure 2.
Flow chart of methodology.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 120 For each mapping exercise, the participants were tasked to work on an enlarged copy of the village map (i.e., base map) generated from Google Earth.
Moreover, an image of the map was projected on the wall and zoomed in so that the participants would have a more accurate and detailed view of the villages’ geographic features.
Each of the participants was given coloring materials, which they utilized for marking specific climate-related hazards that occur in their village.
In this regard, they were asked to put markings on a tracing paper overlaid on top of a base map.
Three overlays were each assigned a hazard, namely, flood, storm surge, and other natural hazards (a combination of hazards).
These hazards were initially identified by the Municipal Planning and Development Office of Bulakan as the foremost risks experienced by the residents.
Immediately after conducting the mapping activity, an FGD was carried out with the participants from each village.
Two researchers facilitated the discussion.
One served as the FGD facilitator, and the other one acted as the assistant facilitator.
The FGD started with a brief discussion of the objectives and setting of expectations.
The whole discussion, which was recorded using a smartphone, was organized around a semi-structured interview guide consisting of open-ended questions that focused on the following: (1) climate-related hazards they commonly experience, (2) specific populations in their village that are most vulnerable to climate change, (3) adaptation practices that should be carried out by the village’s residents, and (4) observations and perceptions of climate change and its effects.
The whole discussion was recorded using a smartphone and took approximately one hour.
Key informant interviews were also conducted with village, municipal, and provincial officers.
These included interviews with village council members, municipal agriculturists, planning and development heads, and provincial environment and natural resources officers.
Each interview was facilitated using a semi-structured interview guide consisting of the same open-ended questions used in the FGD.
This was done to triangulate the collected information from the participatory mapping exercises and FGDs.
Prior to the study's formal conduct, permission was sought and obtained from the municipal and village authorities.
Participation in every phase of this study was voluntary.
All participants gave their written and verbal consent after the details of the research objectives, data gathering procedures, and ethical issues had been explained to them.
This study employed document analyses of the Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (BDRRM) plans of the three villages to supplement the qualitative data obtained from the FGDs.
Among the crucial information included in the plans were the identified natural hazards in the community, major issues concerning vulnerable sectors of the community (e.g., children, elderly, persons with disabilities), and the village’s risk reduction and management plan (Office of the Barangay Council of Bambang, 2016; Office of the Barangay Council of Perez, 2019; Office of the Barangay Council of Taliptip, 2016).
The village’s administrative council formulated the plans after undergoing series of trainings organized by the Municipal DRRM Council of Bulakan.
The digital recordings of the FGDs and key informant interviews were transcribed.
As a preliminary phase in the analysis of the research participants’ responses, transcripts were imported into NVivo software.
Excerpts obtained from the BDRRM plans were also imported directly into NVivo.
The qualitative data obtained from the responses and documents were subjected to coding and thematic network analysis.
Following the analytic steps proposed by Attride-Stirling (2001), the construction of a thematic network begins with the organization of themes to determine a specific global theme.
A direct outcome of this arrangement is the selection of basic themes that are extracted from the text.
Reorganizing the basic themes would then result in the formulation of organizing themes.
When organizing themes are clustered together, a global theme finally emerges.
All together, these themes can be illustrated as a thematic network.
After further exploring Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 121 the resulting thematic network, the patterns established through the emerging themes were then interpreted.
In conducting the GIS analysis, the tracing paper overlays were photographed, digitized, and loaded into the open-source software QGIS.
Information regarding the locations and the extent of the occurrences of hazards, which were drawn from the thematic network analysis of qualitative data, were also integrated into QGIS.
The aim was to triangulate the data obtained from different sources and translate them into hazard-related values that can be georeferenced to the maps.
Results Participatory GIS for climate change adaptation: a thematic network As a final thematic network, the global theme comprises seven basic themes and four organizing themes, as illustrated in Figure 3.
The dominant organizing themes, which will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, are the following: vulnerability conditions, climate change awareness and perceptions, risk awareness, and risk perceptions.
Figure 3.
The thematic network of participatory geographic information system for climate change adaptation.
The analysis of vulnerability conditions revealed three basic themes, namely exposure to natural hazards, sensitivity to natural hazards, and adaptive capacities.
Exposure to natural hazards All participants reported that they were exposed to natural hazards such as flooding caused by typhoon, storm surge, and high tide.
They mentioned that when typhoon-driven flooding coincided with high tide, flooding became severe in most areas in their villages.
Floods would usually last from days to weeks.
They recall that during the onset of typhoons Ketsana in 2009 and Haiyan in 2013, low-lying areas in their villages were inundated by floodwater that lasted two weeks.
One participant recalled: “Our house was included among those that were submerged in floodwater.
Inside our house, floodwater reached knee-depth during typhoons Ondoy and Yolanda” (Participant 3, Bambang).
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 122 During the typhoon season (June to November), residents would typically expect flooding after heavy rainfall, with water levels reaching neck-depth.
In the mapping activity, the villages’ low-lying areas were colored with a darker shade by the participants to indicate the worst flooding level.
A case in point is shared by the participants who reside in Umbuyan, a zone located in Perez.
They noted that the torrential flooding that came from the nearby fish ponds and river reached the residential areas and forced people to leave their houses.
As echoed by the key informants, flooding was a commonly occurring hazard in the three villages.
High tide flooding was particularly perceived as the primary cause of inconvenience for the residents for a short period.
Another source of frustration was high-level flooding, which resulted from heavy rains spawned by typhoons and combined with high tide flooding.
The connection of the municipality to the river channel also inundated villages lying in highelevation areas.
Hence, flooding outcomes could become even worse in areas located in flood plains.
The municipal planning and development head explained that flooding could occur in 10 of Bulakan’s 14 villages because of the proximity to the river network.
He added that floodwater could also originate from nearby towns.
An informant from the provincial environment and natural resources office also identified the opening of dams’ spillway gates when having to release excess water as another key reason for extreme flooding: “Excessive flooding contributes to the release of water from Angat Dam or Ipo Dam, which causes the spillover of flooding in lowland areas.” An examination of the maps shows differences in identifying hazard-prone areas as perceived by each group of participants.
The mapping activities revealed that almost all areas of Bambang and Taliptip were perceived to be exposed to flood risk (Figure 4).
This observation was expected because the two villages are the only coastal areas in the municipality that border the Manila Bay.
Hence, the mapping activities indicated that the high-risk, flood-prone zones were mostly located in both villages’ southernmost and northernmost parts.
However, the participants from Perez perceived that only the northernmost part of their village, where the residential areas are mostly located, was prone to flood.
In terms of the areas highly affected by the storm surge (Figure 5), the participants from Bambang and Taliptip recognized their storm surge exposure.
The map for Taliptip indicated that a vast majority of the areas were at high risk of storm surge.
However, the participants from Perez did not indicate actual risks associated with storm surge.
During the participatory mapping activity, they mentioned that their village did not experience the storm surge reaching far inland from the coast.
They added that they had already elevated the roads and upgraded fishpond dikes in order to reduce the storm surge and tidal flooding risks.
The mapping activities also revealed the threats caused by the combination of flooding brought by typhoons and high tide (Figure 6).
This observation was further reiterated in the FGDs, where the participants from Bambang and Taliptip indicated the high risk of experiencing such a combined form of natural hazard.
Moreover, the participants from Perez consistently stressed the exposure of the northernmost areas of their village to the said hazards’ threats.
The participants’ observations were aligned to those identified in the BDRRM plans.
The natural hazards were categorized in extreme weather events, flooding, and storm surge.
The plans also recorded typhoons Nesat in 2011 and Rammasun in 2014 as among the most destructive natural events to hit the villages in the past decade (Office of the Barangay Council of Bambang, 2016; Office of the Barangay Council of Taliptip, 2016).
The southwest monsoon that occurred in 2012 was also identified as a prominent disastrous event.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 123 Sensitivity to natural hazards The majority of the participants cited that the natural hazards they experienced in their villages had disproportionately affected children, daily wage earners, and the elderly.
In particular, children were perceived as the most vulnerable segment of the villages’ population that were most likely to suffer from adverse impacts such as getting infected with water-borne diseases and experiencing the disruption of their schooling.
As shared by a participant: “Sometimes, we experience prolonged flooding.
This situation is frightening, especially knowing that children are prone to water-borne diseases like leptospirosis” (Participant 8, Perez).
Natural hazards were perceived to have a detrimental impact on the livelihood of daily wage earners.
The participants noted that individuals who work in the agriculture, construction, and transport sectors could not provide for their families because of their inability to go to work when faced with natural hazards.
The well-being of the elderly during the onset of disasters was also highlighted by a few participants, who noted that they should be prioritized during rescue operations.
The participants identified the proximity to water bodies and housing quality as factors affecting the vulnerability of specific population segments in their villages, with some participants admitting that their families belong to such groups.
Most of the hazard-sensitive residents live in low-lying areas located near water bodies.
Poor-quality housing, coupled with the house’s low-lying elevation, also contributed to hazard sensitivity.
Dwellings, particularly those located in the coastal wetlands, were made with either lightweight construction materials or concrete bricks.
Figure 4.
Exposure of Taliptip (a), Perez (b), and Bambang (c) to flood hazards according to the mapping exercise.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 124 Figure 5.
Exposure of Taliptip (a) and Bambang (b) to storm surge hazards according to the mapping exercise.
Figure 6.
Exposure of Taliptip (a), Perez (b), and Bambang (c) to combination of flooding due to typhoons and high tide according to the mapping exercise.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 125 The informants also highlighted the contribution of the villages’ low elevation and their proximity to water bodies to resident vulnerability.
They noted that the villages’ geographic features created vulnerability to flooding, which mainly affects families who are dependent on farming and fishing practices for subsistence.
These families had been living near hazard-prone areas for a long period and, thus, were left with no choice but to bear the adverse impacts of the hazards on their livelihood.
A village official from Bambang shared: “Residents who live a hand-to-mouth existence, especially those who live in the coastal area and till land near the river, are mostly affected.
These are the only places they know where they could reside because they could not afford rent.” The proximity to water bodies, particularly to the bay, river, or ponds, was perceived to be a significant factor for the villages’ sensitivity to natural hazards.
For instance, Taliptip’s participants pointed out in the mapping exercises that most of the residential areas were near water bodies that turned out to be sources of floodwater (Figure 4, 5, and 6).
In their mapping outputs, the participants from Bambang highlighted the proximity of their village to coastal and inland water bodies as the foremost contributing factor to their vulnerability (Figure 4, 5, and 6).
Based on the maps they produced, the participants from Perez still recognized the negative consequence of residing near the river and fish ponds despite acknowledging that only the northern portion of their village was vulnerable to natural hazards (Figure 4, 5, and 6).
Similarly, as identified in the BDRRM plans, sensitivity to natural hazards could be attributed to the vulnerable population, proximity to water bodies, and low-lying areas in the village.
Aside from the children and elderly, persons with disabilities and agricultural households were specified as high risk to natural hazards.
The plans also marked shallow river channels, drainage canals, and poor soil quality (i.e., loose and saturated soil) as the villages’ key vulnerable geographic features (Office of the Barangay Council of Bambang, 2016; Office of the Barangay Council of Perez, 2019; Office of the Barangay Council of Taliptip, 2016).
Adaptive capacities Several adaptive capacity measures were highlighted by the participants as preparation and response to climate-related hazards.
Each village has a well-organized DRRM unit composed of local officials and volunteers.
The participants noted that the DRRM unit had been responsive to natural hazards’ impacts, from alerting the village of evacuation and disaster preparedness orders to providing relief assistance.
A sense of preparedness was perceived to have been created among the residents with the implementation of a disaster risk reduction plan.
As illustrated in this narrative: “As a volunteer and member of the village council, we really stay alert whenever we hear news about a typhoon.
Even with just a few drops of rain, the village councilor, chairman, and volunteers do the village rounds to prepare the residents.
We then must raise the first alarm.
We also evacuate them from their houses and bring them to the school (which serves as the village’s evacuation center).
The volunteers also serve as guards in the evacuation area.
We are responsible for getting the list of evacuated families” (Participant 5, Perez).
At the household level, some participants reported that there were families who had their houses elevated.
This was a common adaptation strategy among families living in areas that are prone to seasonal flooding.
It had become an inevitable response after road elevation projects were implemented to address the rise of flood levels.
Houses which were once above the road level became inundated by water overflowing from the elevated roadways.
To protect their properties from being damaged by floods, some households had no choice but to spend for the elevation of their houses, making sure that the lowest floor would be above the flood level.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 126 The informants confirmed the local village councils’ measures in responding to community needs during and after the occurrence of hazards.
Concrete measures ranged from implementing an evacuation plan to delivering immediate relief assistance.
As shared by a village official from Bambang: “When our area is placed under typhoon signal no.
1 (weather disturbance expected in 36 hours) or 2 (weather disturbance expected in 24 hours), we immediately call for a meeting that would also include our front liners, like mother leaders, health workers, and village-based police officers.
We determine the need for relief goods and evacuate the residents to our elementary school.” Most of the strategies indicated in the BDRMM plans and implemented by the villages in responding to the impacts of climate-related hazards were highlighted by the participants and key informants.
These village-based measures included the implementation of disaster risk reduction plans, a sense of preparedness among residents, clean-up drives, access to local authorities’ services, implementation of a community evacuation plan, availability of a team of volunteers, and provision for relief assistance.
Risk awareness The mapping activity served as an avenue for the participants to be more familiar with their villages’ geographical features.
A common observation of each focus group during the activity was that each of their villages covers an area much more significant than expected.
This observation was reiterated by five participants who noted that it was their first time to see where particular areas in their village were located, specifically those near the coast.
One of them shared: “We were able to learn about the extent of flooding in each area of our village.
We were also able to see that fish ponds and farmlands occupy a larger portion than the residential areas” (Participant 11, Bambang).
Six participants acknowledged that the mapping exercise contributed to raising awareness of the present and future risks, and they suggested prioritizing the coastal areas, which were mostly affected by hazards in their villages.
They highlighted the importance of prioritizing the welfare of vulnerable populations living in such areas and explicitly noted the provision of help from the local government.
According to five participants, hazard maps are beneficial in planning for risk reduction.
They agreed that village officials and residents could quickly determine safe areas for evacuation and prioritize specific areas for rescue operations by utilizing the maps.
As one participant said: “The importance of mapping is that we saw the particular areas in our village that should be given priority, especially those households that should be given help and evacuated when flooding occurs” (Participant 1, Bambang).
When asked about the significance of carrying out a mapping activity in each village, the informants shared most of the participants’ views.
They perceived the production of maps as a tool to determine hazard-prone areas that residents should avoid.
Maps were also perceived to be beneficial for emergency evacuation planning.
An informant said the following: “In doing each map, we can determine the area that poses a danger.
We can identify that a particular area is low-lying.
We can then give precautionary measures to residents living there to evacuate to higher ground, especially during the onset of heavy rainfall and flooding” (Municipal agriculture officer).
Risk perceptions The participants’ exposure to natural hazards such as floods and storm surges brought serious concerns to their livelihoods.
Significant reasons for concern revolved around the probability of losing their properties and livelihood, contracting infectious diseases, and experiencing injuries and deaths following such hazards.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 127 More than half of them reported that earning a livelihood was difficult and most often impossible during hazards, especially among families that rely on members who were daily wage earners.
Nine of them were aware of how natural disasters could result in outbreaks of water-borne diseases.
Seventeen participants answered that they were concerned about their well-being, noting that lives and properties could be put at risk during increased flooding.
These concerns were evident in the following statements: “I fear that my husband would lose his job.
He is a construction worker.
Whenever there is a typhoon, he could not go to work, and we would not be able to eat.
I also worry about my children getting sick.
I am also unable to work as a seamstress because my sewing machine is submerged in floodwater.
There is no source of income” (Participant 3, Bambang).
The informants also stressed the risks experienced by vulnerable community segments.
They noted that families who merely relied on agriculture-based activities experience lost productivity and financial losses during disasters.
For instance, some fisherfolk would attempt to brave the typhoon.
However, the risk of the impending danger would force them to stop their fishing activities.
Meanwhile, fish pond or farmland owners and workers had to endure the losses arising from the washing out of agricultural resources during massive flooding.
Another concern is centered around the predicament of public transport workers who had to halt their operations because of flooded streets.
For tricycle and jeepney drivers, who serve as the only transport service providers in the villages, this would only mean that they could not provide for their families’ daily needs.
As explained by a village official from Bambang, flooded and impassable roads caused by typhoons would already have a detrimental effect on their only livelihood source.
Natural hazards were also perceived to pose a danger to families residing near water bodies.
The informants specified that children and the elderly were most likely to contract diseases such as dengue, cholera, and skin infections.
Two informants mentioned that residents were also at high risk of drowning and snake bites, and they noted that such incidents had already been recorded.
Climate change awareness and perceptions Most of the participants shared that they had been observing and experiencing the worsening effects of climate change.
They noted that the severe flooding occurring in their coastal villages had been caused by climate change.
They also believed that increased occurrences of extreme weather events are likely to exist in the future.
Such adverse effects were perceived to be of great concern, especially for participants who were living in low-lying areas: “In the past, we did not experience severe flooding.
When we were still kids, we would usually play in dried fish ponds.
Now, children could no longer play there because the fish ponds are always submerged.
The river is also overflowing with water, and that is because of climate change.” (Participant 8, Perez).
The participants also observed the occurrence of shifting seasons.
The unusual increase in rainfall during the dry season and less rainfall during the wet season were the significant changes that they believed to have been caused by climate change.
This observation was captured in these verbalizations: “For the longest time, we have been aware of the changes happening in our climate.
The wet season becomes dry season.
The dry season becomes wet season.
We no longer know when rainfall would occur.
Even if it is the dry season, there are still typhoons” (Participant 7, Bambang).
The informants had the same observations as those of the participants.
The unpredictability and uncertainty of climate conditions were their critical perceptions of climate change.
Increased temperature, sudden rainfall, grass fires, high-level flooding, and the frequency of severe typhoons were what they recognized as climate change manifestations.
Hence, a municipal agriculture officer Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 128 remarked: “We cannot prevent climate change.
What we can only do is to take actions to slow it down.
Extreme heat is affecting animals and humans.
Crops are also affected.
Due to the uncontrollable rise of sea levels caused by climate change, our communities are slowly being submerged, causing damages to our properties and livelihood.” Less than half of the participants also pointed out that open-waste burning is to be blamed for exacerbating the effects of climate change.
Because of improper waste disposal, this household practice had become widespread in every village.
Three participants even identified open-waste burning as responsible for the depletion of the ozone layer.
Hence, one of them argued: “We have to stop burning our waste because it is a factor of the depletion of the ozone layer” (Participant 8, Perez).
For the informants, human activities such as improper waste disposal and deforestation should also be blamed for climate change.
As remarked by an environmental officer: “Our lack of compassion for the environment prevented us from seeing the effects of our actions, which have resulted in the increased amount of gases or what we call the ‘greenhouse effect’.” Discussion The results of this study indicate that residents are vulnerable to climate-related hazards.
Their exposure to natural hazards was inevitable because of the proximity of the villages to water bodies.
In particular, the findings show that residents from Bambang and Taliptip were mostly affected by natural hazards.
Consistent with Catane et al.
(2019) hazard assessment of the coastal communities of Bulakan, locals from both villages were found to be prone to repeated exposure to flooding and storm surges.
Moreover, historical occurrences of typhoons and the southwest monsoon are parallel with the hazard assessment findings, in which these extreme weather events further exacerbated the occurrence of hazards (e.g., the southwest monsoon in 2011, Nesat in 2011, and Haiyan in 2013).
As previously found out by Esteban et al.
(2017), residents in coastal settlements are exposed to high incidents of hazards such as coastal flooding and flash flood, which caused areas to be submerged in meters of floodwater.
Evidently, the residents’ coastal location directly contributes to a higher chance of encountering hazard-related events, which have become common (Kellens, Zaalberg, Neutens, Vanneuville, & De Maeyer, 2011; Mukhopadhyay, Dasgupta, Hazra, & Mitra, 2012).
The sensitivity of specific populations to natural hazards was also well recognized by the participants within the context of social vulnerability.
In this study, children and elderly residents comprised the villages’ vulnerable population mainly because of health risks.
As a result of their exposure to flooding, they had to live in unsafe conditions that adversely affected their livelihood and living conditions.
As observed by Tauzer et al.
(2019), sensitive populations are most likely to suffer from increased risk of infectious diseases caused by mobility limitations and lower immunity levels.
Low-wage income earners were also perceived to be socially vulnerable because of limited opportunities for labor during disasters.
Mavhura (2019) noted that these earners further encounter problems in accessing basic needs and services because of the threats of natural hazards.
As they had recognized their exposure and sensitivity to natural hazards, the residents undertook measures to strengthen their adaptive capacity.
The village council, particularly its BDRRM unit, played an integral role in providing disaster response services and mobilizing community volunteers.
The implementation of a local ordinance was another indication of a local-level ability to improve adaptation.
These measures identified in the study reveal that adaptive capacity can be shaped by an enabling environment facilitated by institutions and governance (Adger et al., 2007; Bukvic, Rohat, Apotsos, & de Sherbinin, 2020; Engle & Lemos, 2010).
They highlight the role of community-level Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 129 governance in influencing adaptation actions.
As argued by Tauzer et al.
(2019), the empowerment of both the coastal community leaders and the residents to utilize their knowledge and skills is crucial in enhancing their local capacities to respond to natural hazards.
With the generation of hazard maps by the participants themselves, it becomes apparent that they acknowledged the presence of risks in their immediate environment.
This finding indicates that personal experience can be a basis of risk perception.
As revealed in their accounts, the participants associated risk with concerns about the negative consequences of hazards.
Fear and anxiety were likely to be exhibited after they considered themselves as vulnerable to the uncertainties of being exposed to hazards, like contracting infectious diseases and losing their lives, properties, and livelihood.
Hence, the participants were aware and not in denial of the risks.
Despite their proximity to areas prone to natural hazards, the participants seemed to be accustomed to braving adverse consequences.
As Bankoff (2003) explained, because of constant exposure to the threats of disasters, the Filipino culture has embraced the “normalization of threat” through indigenous coping mechanisms adopted at the community level.
Undoubtedly, such experiences and perceptions of risks and uncertainties could be linked to how participants view climate change.
As advanced by Granderson (2014), communities frame climate change based on their lived experiences, which could largely depend on their localized exposure to risks.
In the three coastal villages, the residents associated their encounters with flooding, extreme weather events, and extreme seasonal patterns to the increasing impacts of climate change.
These direct experiences allowed them to make sense of climate change as a current and future threat.
It should also be pointed out how their understanding of climate change leaned toward its conceptualization as a human-induced phenomenon.
The participants specifically identified open waste burning, which they directly linked to poor waste disposal practices, as the principal anthropogenic activity that largely contributed to climate change.
Similarly, Codjoe, Owusu, and Burkett (2013) found that burning of waste materials and firewood as well as deforestation were perceived by community members to be the dominant factors affecting climate change.
Cogut (2016) and Reyna-Bensusan (2018) maintained that the uncontrolled yet common practice of open waste burning in rural communities contributes to air pollutant emissions.
Conclusion This research set out to explore community-level perceptions and experiences of climate change impacts and adaptation.
Using PGIS as a tool for facilitating the production of in-depth data from residents living in coastal villages, this study has generated dominant themes on climate change adaptation.
It has shown that coastal residents are exposed to recurrent phenomena of natural hazards.
Exposure to such hazards has revealed major sensitivities, which are driven mainly by the presence of vulnerable population groups and associated with the villages’ geographic features.
Coastal residents have undertaken concrete measures to enhance adaptive capacities because of their awareness and understanding of their vulnerabilities.
Such measures are mostly anchored on the disaster risk reduction management plans formulated at the local level.
Through their active engagement in the mapping exercises, they have become more aware of the risks associated with the occurrence of natural hazards.
The resulting hazard maps also reveal the uncertainties in the context of what they perceive as risks posed by natural hazards.
Overall, the residents’ perceptions and experiences are framed within their conceptualization of climate change as an on-going and future threat.
Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 130 This study has demonstrated the value of integrating local knowledge into the mapping process, which offers relevant data on natural hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities at the community level.
It has also reinforced the idea that utilizing local knowledge in climate change adaptation can empower community members to visualize their knowledge.
It is in this context that PGIS has the potential to stimulate discussions, especially within a setting where participants fully understand the risks they face and the actions they need to undertake to adapt to the changing climate conditions.
The findings offer policymakers opportunities to consider how participatory mapping can complement local adaptation efforts.
After all, the community members are in the best position to communicate climate-related information crucial for identifying the most appropriate actions toward adaptation.
Thus, their active involvement in the decision-making process becomes an opportunity to build their capacity to adapt to the changing climate conditions.
In adopting participatory methods for entirely utilizing a bottom-up planning process, the need to closely coordinate and work with the different village-based sectors should be underscored.
Acknowledgement This work was funded by the BSU Research Grant System.
Authors are grateful to the assistance extended by the village council officials and residents.
They also acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their valuable and constructive suggestions.
References Adger, W. N., Agrawala, S., Mirza, M. M. Q., Conde, C., O’Brien, K., Pulhin, J., Pulwarty, R., .
.
.
Takahashi, K. (2007).
Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity.
In M. L. Parry, O. F. Canziani, J. P. Palutikof, P. J. van der Linden, & C. E. Hanson (Eds.
), Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (pp.
717–743).
Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2chapter17-1.pdf Ahmed, S., Haklay, M., Tacoli, C., Githiri, G., Dávila, J. D., Allen, A., & Fèvre, E. M. (2019).
Participatory mapping and food centred justice in informal settlements in Nairobi, Kenya.
Geo: Geography and Environment, 6(1), e00077.
https://doi.org/10.1002/geo2.77 Akbar, A., Flacke, J., Martinez, J., Aguilar, R., & van Maarseveen, M. F. A. M. (2020).
Knowing my village from the sky: A collaborative spatial learning framework to integrate spatial knowledge of stakeholders in achieving sustainable development goals.
ISPRS International Journal of GeoInformation, 9(9), 515. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi9090515 Alejandrino, I. K., Lagmay, A. M., & Eco, R. N. (2016).
Shallow landslide Hazard Mapping for Davao Oriental, Philippines, Using a Deterministic GIS Model.
In J. L. Drake, Y. Y. Kontar, J. C. Eichelberger, T. S. Rupp, & K. M. Taylor (Eds.
), Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research: Vol.
48.
Communicating ClimateChange and Natural Hazard Risk and Cultivating Resilience (pp.
131–147).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-20161-0 Attride-Stirling, J.
(2001).
Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research.
Qualitative Research, 1(3), 385–405.
https://doi.org/10.1177/146879410100100307 Bankoff, G. (2003).
Cultures of Disaster: Society and Natural Hazard in the Philippines.
London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
Bijker, R. A., & Sijtsma, F. J.
(2017).
A portfolio of natural places: Using a participatory GIS tool to compare the appreciation and use of green spaces inside and outside urban areas by urban residents.
Landscape and Urban Planning, 158, 155–165.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2016.10.004 Brown, G., & Kyttä, M. (2018).
Key issues and priorities in participatory mapping: Toward integration or increased specialization?
Applied Geography, 95, 1–8.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2018.04.002 https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2-chapter17-1.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2-chapter17-1.pdf https://doi.org/10.1002/geo2.77 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi9090515 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20161-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20161-0 https://doi.org/10.1177/146879410100100307 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2016.10.004 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2018.04.002 Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 131 Brown, G., Schebella, M. F., & Weber, D. (2014).
Using participatory GIS to measure physical activity and urban park benefits.
Landscape and Urban Planning, 121, 34–44.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2013.09.006 Bukvic, A., Rohat, G., Apotsos, A., & de Sherbinin, A.
(2020).
A systematic review of coastal vulnerability mapping.
Sustainability, 12(7), 2822. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12072822 Burdon, D., Potts, T., McKinley, E., Lew, S., Shilland, R., Gormley, K., .
.
.
Forster, R. (2019).
Expanding the role of participatory mapping to assess ecosystem service provision in local coastal environments.
Ecosystem Services, 39, 101009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2019.101009 Cadag, J. R. D., & Gaillard, J. C. (2012).
Integrating knowledge and actions in disaster risk reduction: The contribution of participatory mapping.
Area, 44(1), 100–109.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2011.01065.x Catane, S. G., Carag, J. W. M., Flora, J. R. R., Go, C. M. M., Capino, J.
B., Cesista, I. Y.
A., .
.
.
Jajalla, M. A.
B.
(2019).
Articulating geomorphology and geohazards in the coastal development issues of communities along the northern coasts of Manila Bay, Philippines.
Retrieved from https://thrivingearthexchange.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/UP-OVCRD-Geohazards-and-coastal-development-issues-Manila-Bay-Philippines.pdf Cheung, W., Houston, D., Schubert, J. E., Basolo, V., Feldman, D., Matthew, R., .
.
.
Luke, A.
(2016).
Integrating resident digital sketch maps with expert knowledge to assess spatial knowledge of flood risk : A case study of participatory mapping in Newport Beach, California.
Applied Geography, 74, 56–64.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2016.07.006 Cinderby, S. (1999).
Geographic information systems (GIS) for participation: the future of environmental GIS?
International Journal of Environment and Pollution, 11(3), 304–315.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJEP.1999.002263 Cinderby, S., Snell, C., & Forrester, J.
(2008).
Participatory GIS and its application in governance: The example of air quality and the implications for noise pollution.
Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, 13(4), 309–320.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13549830701803265 Codjoe, S. N. A., Owusu, G., & Burkett, V. (2013).
Perception, experience, and indigenous knowledge of climate change and variability: The case of Accra, a sub-Saharan African city.
Regional Environmental Change, 14, 369–383.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-013-0500-0 Cogut, A.
(2016).
Open Burning of Waste: A Global Health Disaster.
Retrieved from https://regions20.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/OPEN-BURNING-OF-WASTE-A-GLOBAL-HEALTH-DISASTER_R20-Research-Paper _Final_29.05.2017.pdf Damastuti, E., & de Groot, R. (2019).
Participatory ecosystem service mapping to enhance community-based mangrove rehabilitation and management in Demak, Indonesia.
Regional Environmental Change, 19, 65–78.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1378-7 Dunn, C. E. (2007).
Participatory GIS — a people's GIS?
Progress in Human Geography, 31(5), 616–637.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132507081493 Eckstein, D., Künzel, V., Schäfer, L., & Winges, M. (2020).
Global Climate Risk Index 2020: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events?
Weather-Related Loss Events in 2018 and 1999 to 2018.
Retrieved from https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/20-2-01e Global Climate Risk Index 2020_14.pdf Endo, I., Magcale-Macandog, D. B., Kojima, S., Johnson, B.
A., Bragais, M. A., Macandog, P. B. M., & Scheyvens, H. (2017).
Participatory land-use approach for integrating climate change adaptation and mitigation into basinscale local planning.
Sustainable Cities and Society, 35, 47–56.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2017.07.014 Engle, N. L., & Lemos, M. C. (2010).
Unpacking governance: Building adaptive capacity to climate change of river basins in Brazil.
Global Environmental Change, 20(1), 4–13.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.07.001 Esteban, M., Takagi, H., Mikami, T., Aprilia, A., Fujii, D., Kurobe, S., & Utama, N. A.
(2017).
Awareness of coastal floods in impoverished subsiding coastal communities in Jakarta : Tsunamis, typhoon storm surges and dyke-induced tsunamis.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 23, 70–79.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.04.007 Giuffrida, N., Le Pira, M., Inturri, G., & Ignaccolo, M. (2019).
Mapping with stakeholders: An overview of public participatory GIS and VGI in transport decision-making.
ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information, 8(4), 198. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi8040198 Gonzalez, M. (2009).
Blank map – Philippines.
Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BlankMapPhilippines.png Granderson, A.
A.
(2014).
Making sense of climate change risks and responses at the community level: A culturalpolitical lens.
Climate Risk Management, 3, 55–64.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2014.05.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2013.09.006 https://doi.org/10.3390/su12072822 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2019.101009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2011.01065.x https://thrivingearthexchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/UP-OVCRD-Geohazards-and-coastal-development-issues-Manila-Bay-Philippines.pdf https://thrivingearthexchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/UP-OVCRD-Geohazards-and-coastal-development-issues-Manila-Bay-Philippines.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2016.07.006 http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJEP.1999.002263 https://doi.org/10.1080/13549830701803265 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-013-0500-0 https://regions20.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/OPEN-BURNING-OF-WASTE-A-GLOBAL-HEALTH-DISASTER_R20-Research-Paper_Final_29.05.2017.pdf https://regions20.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/OPEN-BURNING-OF-WASTE-A-GLOBAL-HEALTH-DISASTER_R20-Research-Paper_Final_29.05.2017.pdf https://regions20.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/OPEN-BURNING-OF-WASTE-A-GLOBAL-HEALTH-DISASTER_R20-Research-Paper_Final_29.05.2017.pdf https://regions20.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/OPEN-BURNING-OF-WASTE-A-GLOBAL-HEALTH-DISASTER_R20-Research-Paper_Final_29.05.2017.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1378-7 https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132507081493 https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/20-2-01e%20Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202020_14.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2017.07.014 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.07.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.04.007 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi8040198 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BlankMap-Philippines.png https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BlankMap-Philippines.png https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2014.05.003 Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 132 Haklay, M., & Francis, L. (2018).
Participatory GIS and community-based citizen science for environmental justice action.
In J. Chakraborty, G. Walker, & R. Holifield (Eds.
), The Routledge Handbook of Environmental Justice (pp.
297–308).
Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge.
Haworth, B. T., Bruce, E., Whittaker, J., & Read, R. (2018).
The Good, the Bad, and the Uncertain: Contributions of Volunteered Geographic Information to Community Disaster Resilience.
Frontiers in Earth Science, 6, 183. https://doi.org/10.3389/feart.2018.00183 Hessel, R., van den Berg, J., Kaboré, O., van Kekem, A., Verzandvoort, S., Dipama, J.-M., & Diallo, B.
(2009).
Linking participatory and GIS-based land use planning methods: A case study from Burkina Faso.
Land Use Policy, 26(4), 1162–1172.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2009.02.008 Ioki, K., Din, N. M., Ludwig, R., James, D., Hue, S. W., Johari, S. A., .
.
.
Phua, M. (2019).
Supporting forest conservation through community-based land use planning and participatory GIS – lessons from Crocker Range Park, Malaysian Borneo.
Journal for Nature Conservation, 52, 1–11.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2019.125740 Kar, B., Sieber, R., Haklay, M., & Ghose, R. (2016).
Public participation GIS and participatory GIS in the era of GeoWeb.
The Cartographic Journal, 53(4), 296–299.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00087041.2016.1256963 Käyhkö, N., Khamis, Z.
A., Eilola, S., Virtanen, E., Muhammad, M. J., Viitasalo, M., & Fagerholm, N. (2019).
The role of place-based local knowledge in supporting integrated coastal and marine spatial planning in Zanzibar, Tanzania.
Ocean & Coastal Management, 177, 64–75.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2019.04.016 Kellens, W., Zaalberg, R., Neutens, T., Vanneuville, W., & De Maeyer, P. (2011).
An analysis of the public perception of flood risk on the Belgian Coast.
Risk Analysis, 31(7), 1055–1068.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15396924.2010.01571.x Khadka, C., Aryal, K. P., Edwards-Jonášová, M., Upadhyaya, A., Dhungana, N., Cudlin, P., & Vacik, H. (2018).
Evaluating participatory techniques for adaptation to climate change: Nepal case study.
Forest Policy and Economics, 97, 73–82.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.017 Klonner, C., Usón, T. J., Marx, S., Mocnik, F.-B., & Höfle, B.
(2018).
Capturing flood risk perception via sketch maps.
ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information, 7(9), 359. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi7090359 Lagmay, A. M. F. A., Racoma, B.
A., Aracan, K. A., Alconis-Ayco, J., & Saddi, I. L. (2017).
Disseminating near-realtime hazards information and flood maps in the Philippines through Web-GIS.
Journal of Environmental Sciences, 59, 13–23.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jes.2017.03.014 Levine, A. S., & Feinholz, C. L. (2015).
Participatory GIS to inform coral reef ecosystem management: Mapping human coastal and ocean uses in Hawaii.
Applied Geography, 59, 60–69.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2014.12.004 Lopes, R., & Videira, N. (2015).
Conceptualizing stakeholders’ perceptions of ecosystem services: A Participatory systems mapping approach.
Environmental and Climate Technologies, 16, 36–53.
https://doi.org/10.1515/rtuect-2015-0011 Mapedza, E., Wright, J., & Fawcett, R. (2003).
An investigation of land cover change in Mafungautsi Forest, Zimbabwe, using GIS and participatory mapping.
Applied Geography, 23(1), 1–21.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0143 6228(02)00070-X Mavhura, E. (2019).
Systems analysis of vulnerability to hydrometeorological threats: An exploratory study of vulnerability drivers in Northern Zimbabwe.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 10(2), 204–219.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-019-0217-x McCall, M. K., & Minang, P. A.
(2005).
Assessing participatory GIS for community-based natural resource management: claiming community forests in Cameroon.
The Geographical Journal, 171(4), 340–356.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4959.2005.00173.x Merschdorf, H., & Blaschke, T. (2018).
Revisiting the role of place in geographic information science.
ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information, 7(9), 364. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi7090364 Meyer, M. A., Hendricks, M., Newman, G. D., Masterson, J. H., Cooper, J. T., Sansom, G., .
.
.
Cousins, T. (2018).
Participatory action research: Tools for disaster resilience education.
International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment, 9(4/5), 402–419.
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJDRBE-02-2017-0015 Mialhe, F., Gunnell, Y., Ignacio, J.
A. F., Delbart, N., Ogania, J. L., & Henry, S. (2015).
Monitoring land-use change by combining participatory land-use maps with standard remote sensing techniques: Showcase from a remote forest catchment on Mindanao, Philippines.
International Journal of Applied Earth Observation and Geoinformation, 36, 69–82.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jag.2014.11.007 https://doi.org/10.3389/feart.2018.00183 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2009.02.008 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2019.125740 https://doi.org/10.1080/00087041.2016.1256963 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2019.04.016 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01571.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01571.x https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.017 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijgi7090359 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jes.2017.03.014 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2014.12.004 https://doi.org/10.1515/rtuect-2015-0011 https://doi.org/10.1016/S01436228(02)00070-X https://doi.org/10.1016/S01436228(02)00070-X https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-019-0217-x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4959.2005.00173.x https://doi:10.3390/ijgi7090364 https://doi:10.3390/ijgi7090364 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJDRBE-02-2017-0015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jag.2014.11.007 Peñalba, E. H., et al.
: Climate Change Adaptation: The Case of Coastal Communities in the Philippines J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
2021, 71(2), pp.
115–133 133 Minano, A., Johnson, P. A., & Wandel, J.
(2018).
Visualizing flood risk, enabling participation and supporting climate change adaptation using the Geoweb: The case of coastal communities in Nova Scotia, Canada.
GeoJournal, 83(3), 413–425.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-017-9777-8 Mukhopadhyay, A., Dasgupta, R., Hazra, S., & Mitra, D. (2012).
Coastal hazards and vulnerability: A review.
International Journal of Geology, Earth and Environmental Sciences, 2(1), 57–69.
Retrieved from https://www.cibtech.org/J-GEOLOGY-EARTH-ENVIRONMENT/PUBLICATIONS/2012/Vol%202%20No%201/7JGEE-11-Anirban%20M.pdf Municipal Planning and Development Office, Province of Bulacan.
(2019).
Road network map: Municipality of Bulakan.
Bulakan, Philippines: Author.
Office of the Barangay Council of Bambang.
(2016).
Barangay disaster risk reduction and management plan (2016-2019).
Bulakan, Philippines: Author.
Office of the Barangay Council of Perez.
(2019).
Barangay disaster risk reduction and management plan (20192021).
Bulakan, Philippines: Author.
Office of the Barangay Council of Taliptip.
(2016).
Barangay disaster risk reduction and management plan (20162019).
Bulakan, Philippines: Author.
Oh, H.-J., & Lee, S. (2011).
Landslide susceptibility mapping on Panaon Island, Philippines using a geographic information system.
Environmental Earth Sciences, 62, 935–951.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12665-010-0579-2 Onencan, A. M., Meesters, K., & Van de Walle, B.
(2018).
Methodology for participatory GIS risk mapping and citizen science for Solotvyno Salt Mines.
Remote Sensing, 10(11), 1828. https://doi.org/10.3390/rs10111828 Opiso, E. M., Puno, G. R., Alburo, J. L. P., & Detalla, A. L. (2016).
Landslide susceptibility mapping using GIS and FR method along the Cagayan de Oro-Bukidnon-Davao City Route Corridor, Philippines.
KSCE Journal of Civil Engineering, 20, 2506–2512.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12205-015-0182-x Osti, R., Tanaka, S., & Tokioka, T. (2008).
Flood hazard mapping in developing countries: Problems and prospects.
Disaster Prevention and Management, 17(1), 104–113.
https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560810855919 Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration.
(2011).
Climate change in the Philippines.
Retrieved from https://dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/reports_resources/DILG-Resources-2012130-2ef223f591.pdf Philippine Statistics Authority.
(2015).
Barangays in the municipality of Bulacan.
Retrieved from https://psa.gov.ph/ classification/psgc/?q=psgc/barangays/031405000&regcode=03&provcode=14 Preston, B. L., Yuen, E. J., & Westaway, R. M. (2011).
Putting vulnerability to climate change on the map: A review of approaches, benefits, and risks.
Sustainability Science, 6, 177–202.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-011-0129-1 Provincial Government of Bulacan.
(2014).
DRR-CCA Enhanced Provincial Development and Physical Framework Plan 2010-2030.
Retrieved from https://www.bulacan.gov.ph/government/ProvincialDevelopmentAnd PhysicalFrameworkPlan(June2014).pdf Raza, T. (2018).
Localizing disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in planners’ and decision makers’ agenda: Technical comprehensive model, Quezon City, Philippines.
Procedia Engineering, 212, 1311– 1318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2018.01.169 Reichel, C., & Frömming, U. U.
(2014).
Participatory mapping of local disaster risk reduction knowledge: An Example from Switzerland.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 5, 41–54.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-014-0013-6 Reyna-Bensusan, N., Wilson, D. C., & Smith, S. R. (2018).
Uncontrolled burning of solid waste by households in Mexico is a significant contributor to climate change in the country.
Environmental Research, 163, 280–288.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2018.01.042 Smith, D. A.
(2003).
Participatory mapping of community lands and hunting yields among the Buglé of Western Panama.
Human Organization, 62(4), 332–343.
https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.62.4.cye51kbmmjkc168k Sullivan-Wiley, K. A., Short Gianotti, A. G., & Casellas Connors, J. P. (2019).
Mapping vulnerability: Opportunities and limitations of participatory community mapping.
Applied Geography, 105, 47–57.
https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.apgeog.2019.02.008 Tauzer, E., Borbor-Cordova, M. J., Mendoza, J., De La Cuadra, T., Cunalata, J., & Stewart-Ibarra, A. M. (2019).
A participatory community case study of periurban coastal flood vulnerability in southern Ecuador.
PLoS ONE, 14(10), e0224171.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224171 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-017-9777-8 https://www.cibtech.org/J-GEOLOGY-EARTH-ENVIRONMENT/PUBLICATIONS/2012/Vol%202%20No%201/7-JGEE-11-Anirban%20M.pdf https://www.cibtech.org/J-GEOLOGY-EARTH-ENVIRONMENT/PUBLICATIONS/2012/Vol%202%20No%201/7-JGEE-11-Anirban%20M.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s12665-010-0579-2 https://doi.org/10.3390/rs10111828 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12205-015-0182-x https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560810855919 https://dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/reports_resources/DILG-Resources-2012130-2ef223f591.pdf https://psa.gov.ph/classification/psgc/?q=psgc/barangays/031405000&regcode=03&provcode=14 https://psa.gov.ph/classification/psgc/?q=psgc/barangays/031405000&regcode=03&provcode=14 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-011-0129-1 https://www.bulacan.gov.ph/government/ProvincialDevelopmentAndPhysicalFrameworkPlan(June2014).pdf https://www.bulacan.gov.ph/government/ProvincialDevelopmentAndPhysicalFrameworkPlan(June2014).pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2018.01.169 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-014-0013-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2018.01.042 https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.62.4.cye51kbmmjkc168k https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2019.02.008 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2019.02.008 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224171 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: THE CASE OF COASTAL COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES Introduction Study area Materials and methods Results Participatory GIS for climate change adaptation: a thematic network Exposure to natural hazards Sensitivity to natural hazards Adaptive capacities Risk awareness Risk perceptions Climate change awareness and perceptions Discussion Conclusion
Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) Research Colloquium, University of Cardiff, 11-13 March 2011 RESEARCH and EVALUATION Public Sector Responses to Climate Change: Evaluating the Role of Scottish Local Government in Implementing the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance Issue 8/9: May-November 2011 http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg Abstract Effective climate change actions demand collaborative action from public bodies at all levels, placing local governance at the forefront of delivery.
Scottish legislation imposes some of the most demanding legally-binding requirements for reducing greenhouse gas emissions currently to be found anywhere in the world.
The new climate change obligations on Scottish local government are reviewed in the context of current Scottish emissions and UK energy policies.
Analysis indicates that the pattern of carbon consumption rather than its production must be targeted, and that local government is well-placed to deliver many of the policies to this end.
Case studies of Fife and Highland Councils show how Scottish local authorities (SLAs) are planning to discharge their climate change mitigation and adaptation responsibilities.
Energy efficiency is driving the mitigation of carbon consumption, while new techniques for measuring carbon footprints are being used to adapt the development process to a low carbon mode.
SLAs must pursue low-cost local climate change solutions not just to enhance the resilience of Scottish communities but also to demonstrate the feasibility of such approaches for local Tony Jackson School of the Environment University of Dundee William Lynch School of the Environment University of Dundee JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 113 governance systems elsewhere in the face of growing financial constraints.
Recent changes in Scottish waste management practices indicate the potential in this respect.
Keywords Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, Scottish local government, climate change mitigation and adaptation policies 1.
Introduction: Climate Change and the Role of Local Governance Climate change driven by anthropogenic actions cannot be constrained solely through the operation of market forces.
Sustainable management of global common-pool resources such as the atmosphere requires multilateral environmental agreement between sovereign States to provide a framework for concerted actions to supplement the workings of the market (Mabey et al, 1997).
Local councils must then assume responsibility for delivering their share of any State’s international commitments on climate change, serving as arbiters of competing demands from their own inhabitants for access to these shared resources.
In practice, this places systems of local governance at the forefront of efforts to tackle global warming.
Local public services (such as land use controls, local transport systems, social housing, water supplies, education, health, local welfare and recreational facilities, sewerage and waste management, libraries and information systems, protective services and emergency planning operations) play a major role in shaping the demands placed by local communities on the atmosphere and in determining their resilience to climate change.
This paper reviews the implications of climate change for one jurisdiction’s local government sector.
It considers how Scottish local authorities (SLAs) are responding to some of the world’s most demanding statutory obligations for delivering a low carbon economy, set out in the Climate Change (Scotland) Act (CCSA) 2009 (SP, 2009), and identifies some of the lessons that can be drawn from Scottish experiences for local government practitioners in other jurisdictions.
The argument of the paper is delivered in five parts.
The next section provides a brief overview of Scottish greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the measures being taken at UK level to stimulate a low carbon energy market.
This allows the main policy implications of addressing climate change to be identified, and the statutory powers taken by the Scottish Government for this purpose, including the climate change duties now JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 114 imposed on SLAs, to be outlined.
We then examine some initial SLA responses to these new duties, focusing on two sets of policy interventions.
The primary set consists of mitigation actions, targeted at substantial reductions in GHG emissions.
The secondary set involves adaptation measures, which ameliorate the inescapable impacts of ongoing climate change.
A concluding section evaluates the opportunities and threats climate change presents for SLAs.
2.
The Current State of Play: Trends in Scottish GHG Emissions and Reform of the UK Energy Market Current trends in Scottish GHG emissions Table 1 indicates recent trends in the level of GHG emissions attributable to Scottish sectors of production.
Total emissions calculated on this basis are shown to have fallen by 18.7% between the baseline average over 1990-95 and 2007. Business and industry, followed by waste management, made the largest absolute reductions, together accounting for 60% of the total fall.
Energy supply’s smaller reduction was counterbalanced by an increase in emissions from transport, allowing the total share of Scottish emissions generated by these two sectors to rise from a baseline contribution of just over 50% to 62% in 2007.
Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities serve as a carbon sink, and their offsets rose appreciably over this period.
In 2007 Scottish LULUCF offsets were far larger than those for the UK as a whole, reflecting the importance of the Scottish forestry sector.
The data in Table 1 require a small adjustment to take account of the effects of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) over this period.
Introduced in 2005, this sets a cap on the emissions of major energy intensive undertakings within the European Union (EU).
In Scotland nearly one hundred large industrial installations, including electricity generators, refineries and heavy industry, which account for around 40% of total Scottish GHG emissions, are allocated allowances under the ETS which can be traded to make up shortfalls or realise surpluses.
Over the past few years, Scotland has been a small net purchaser of ETS allowances, and this has slightly reduced its net attributable GHG emissions below the actual ones reported.
JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 115 Table 1.
Scottish GHG emissions, change from base (1990-95 annual average) to 2007 (not adjusted for trading in the EU ETS).
Sector Baseline annual average (1990-95) Mt CO2e 2007 Mt CO2e Change (baseline to 2007) Mt CO2e Change (baseline to 2007) % % of Scottish net emissions 2007 % of UK net emissions 2007 Energy supply 22.35 20.59 -1.76 -7.9 36.2 9 Transport (including international aviation & shipping) 13.21 14.73 1.52 11.5 25.9 8 Business & Industry 12.46 7.68 -4.78 -38.4 13.5 7 Agriculture 9.72 7.69 -2.03 -20.9 13.5 16 Residential 7.79 7.20 -0.59 -7.6 12.7 9 Waste management 5.77 2.64 -3.13 -54.2 4.6 12 Public 1.24 0.81 -0.43 -34.7 1.4 8 Land use, land use change & forestry* -2.52 -4.44 -1.92 76.2 -7.8 249 Total Scottish net emissions 70.01 56.90 -13.11 -18.7 100.0 8 *negative.
Source: SG, 2010d A more fundamental issue confronting policy-makers relying on these statistics as a management tool for monitoring Scottish climate change performance is that they only record the GHG emissions attributable to a jurisdiction’s production of goods and services.
They do not indicate what contribution its consumption of goods and services makes to GHG emissions, since a proportion of Scotland’s domestic needs are met by imports while part of its output is exported.
To convert the data from a production to a consumption base, GHG emissions attributable to imports must be added, those attributable to exports deducted, and LULUCF offsets disregarded (Helm et al, 2007).
When these adjustments are made using one of the growing number of multi-regional input-output (MRIO) packages being developed to model global GHG emissions (see, for example, Dawkins et al, 2010), Scotland’s GHG emissions measured in terms of consumption are shown to have risen by 14% between 1992 and 2006 (SG, 2010d: para.5.5).
The difference in these two trends over the fifteen year period, which has seen an 18.7% fall in GHG emissions generated physically within Scotland converted into a 14% rise after taking into account domestic consumption of goods and services obtained from all sources, provides a clear indication of the significance of the problem of carbon leakage in addressing climate change.
JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 116 This phenomenon first came to prominence during multi-lateral negotiations over proposals for binding agreements on GHG emissions embodied in the Kyoto Protocol (Barker & Johnstone, 1998).
A number of parties to the negotiations raised concerns that an agreement restricting the GHG emissions of developed countries might lead to a loss of business to jurisdictions without emissions controls.
If such effects became widespread after the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the net change in global GHG emissions might prove far smaller than the gross reductions in developed countries.
Businesses would be tempted simply to switch the location of their production to uncontrolled jurisdictions, continuing to sell the same products to their consumers as imports rather than as domestic output, creating what came to be termed carbon leakage.
As the Scottish situation demonstrates, carbon leakage exists without the assistance of asymmetrical international GHG emission controls.
Divergent trends in the production and consumption metrics of GHG emissions are an integral aspect of mature open economies (Brinkley & Less, 2010).
They arise from structural changes within these economies as their product mix is modified in response to long-term shifts in global market parameters.
Rising energy costs and widespread improvements in energy efficiency have been accompanied by ongoing de-industrialisation and a switch to service sector activities, with many previously domestically manufactured goods now being imported.
Globalisation of trade allows the level of GHG emissions generated by productive activities within a mature economy such as Scotland to be decoupled from the carbon footprint created by its consumers.
This footprint continues to rise in line with the higher living standards that stimulate increasing domestic consumption of goods and services, the sourcing of which is not confined to Scotland but met from the most competitive location.
The ease with which a mature economy is capable of decoupling the linkages between the emissions generated by its pattern of consumption from those generated by its production base indicates that strategies for delivering a low carbon economy must modify the behaviour of consumers as well as producers.
Furthermore, the scale of carbon leakage that international trade already facilitates, far from serving to discourage international climate change agreements, should instead confirm the need to address the problem on a global basis rather than through an uncoordinated set of individual initiatives.
In this respect, the EU Single Market provides a helpful halfway house, setting broadly comparable climate change policy parameters for businesses operating JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 117 within its Member States and in return allowing them free access to its 501 million consumers (Schreurs et al, 2009).
Reform of the UK energy market In choosing an optimal mitigation pathway, the policy-maker’s initial task is to estimate under conditions of uncertainty the basic shape of two critical functions: the benefit function that measures the damage avoided by mitigating anthropogenic GHGs; and the cost function which measures the amount of resources required to deliver various levels of abatement.
The sensitivity of either function to different mitigation targets should condition the type of strategy favoured (Helm, 2010a).
If policy-makers envisage that the marginal damage function is liable to rise steeply in the absence of effective abatement measures whilst the marginal costs of policies to this end remain relatively insensitive to the scale of mitigation required, they should favour quantitative GHG targets delivered by policy instruments such as the emissions caps embodied in the EU ETS, and accept the implicit carbon prices resulting.
Conversely, if they consider that marginal costs are liable to rise precipitately as the scale of mitigation increases, whereas the marginal damage function appears fairly flat over feasible target ranges, it makes more sense to select an acceptable price for carbon externalities which can then determine the affordable level of abatement and identify the mitigation options that remain viable.
Recent UK and Scottish Government policy choices in this respect have been driven by the Stern Review (2006), commissioned by the UK Treasury to consider the economics of climate change.
Stern’s findings have convinced British policy-makers of the need for early and substantial climate change interventions based on quantitative targets.
Arguing in favour of such an approach, the previous UK Labour government stated: if left unchecked, climate change presents an increasing threat to our security and prosperity.
Lord Stern has shown that if we do not take action, the longer term costs of climate change will vastly outweigh the costs of early movement to a low-carbon, climate resilient economy (DECC, 2010a:10).
Stern’s analysis has been challenged (for example by Helm, 2008), but the current UK and Scottish administrations still favour the use of statutory emissions targets rather than explicit carbon prices for their mitigation strategies.
The UK fiscal instruments supporting a shift towards a low carbon energy market reflect this emphasis on quantitative goals rather than cost-effective options.
Table 2 ranks them JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 118 in terms of their marginal cost per tonne of carbon savings.
The range of implicit carbon prices so calculated lends weight to claims that this approach to mitigation facilitates rentseeking behaviour on the part of generators (Helm, 2010b).
The costs of saving carbon range from £3.26 per tonne of CO2 equivalent for the Climate Change Levy on Fuel Oil up to £460 for Feed-in Tariffs for Microgeneration and possibly more for the Renewable Heat Obligation.
These huge differences are compounded by the fact that some of the more expensive measures serve as potential substitutes for much cheaper alternatives.
Thus, the carbon savings delivered by the Renewables Obligation and the Feed-in Tariffs for Microgeneration “may result in cheaper carbon reductions elsewhere in the EU not happening, since all emissions are under the ETS cap” (McIlveen, 2010: 47).
Table 2.
Implied Carbon Prices of UK Fiscal Instruments Used for Carbon Mitigation Policy Price (£tCO2e) Who pays & how?
Climate Change Levy: Fuel Oil 3.26 Business customers through energy bills Climate Change Levy: Coal 5.03 Business customers through energy bills Climate Change Levy: Gas 8.63 Business customers through energy bills Climate Change Levy: Electricity 10.93 Business customers through energy bills Carbon Reduction Commitment 12 (fixed for 3 yrs) Non-energy-intensive large businesses EU Emissions Trading Scheme 14 approx.
(variable) Power companies and other energy-intensive industries, passed through to all customers Air Passenger Duty 25-320 All passengers, on ticket Fuel Duty Red Diesel 41.79 Agricultural businesses Renewables Obligation 130.25 Power companies, passed to all customers Fuel Duty Diesel 217.45 All drivers, at pump Fuel Duty Petrol 248.65 All drivers, at pump Feed-in Tariffs for Microgeneration 460 Consumers through bills Renewable Heat Incentive Not clear: very high Consumers through bills Carbon Capture and Storage Levy Not clear Consumers through bills Source: McIlveen, 2010 Some rationalisation of these arrangements is underway (DECC, 2010b).
A floor price for carbon is being introduced, offering power utilities greater incentives to switch from carbon-intensive forms of generation than provided by the current ETS traded price.
Other measures include employing a ‘contract for difference’ system for feed-in tariffs that should offer a more cost-effective way of stimulating low carbon capacity from generating sources of widely differing scale; further incentives to encourage the additional capacity needed to ensure security of supply as the National Grid becomes more dependent on intermittent power sources such as wind farms; and the use of an emissions performance standard to limit the amount of carbon that coal-fired generating JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 119 stations can emit.
Even with these measures, the UK Government still expects the price of electricity to rise in real terms by 52% over the next twenty years, from £118 per megawatt hour to £179 (Lea, 2011).
3.
Implications for SLAs of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 Policy implications for SLAs of adopting a low carbon strategy The analysis in the previous section offers some pointers on how SLAs should discharge their climate change responsibilities.
Firstly, it must be apparent that mitigation at any price cannot be an end in itself.
Use of atmospheric resources is characterised by the allocative problem of global commons.
Individual States cannot be excluded from accessing such resources, while their actions impose consequences for all users.
This creates a free-rider hazard.
Irresponsible States cannot be prevented from sharing the benefits delivered by the actions of responsible States, nor can the costs of selfish behaviour be confined to the perpetrators (Barkin & Shambaugh, 1996).
This means that Scottish efforts to reduce its GHG emissions will do little to ameliorate the effects of global warming for Scotland or for the rest of the world, unless the strategies deployed are sufficiently cost-effective to make similar abatement measures attractive to others (Mabey et al, 1997).
A jurisdiction pioneering a path-breaking mitigation strategy must justify this in terms of the effect its successful implementation would create, by demonstrating to others that a low carbon economy is feasible and worthwhile (rather than expensive and difficult).
Uncommitted jurisdictions need to be convinced of the logic of Scotland’s approach in order to create the momentum favouring collective actions to realise mutual benefits.
Failure to deliver a viable strategy would simply reinforce free-rider arguments.
Secondly, the key variable for measuring the performance of a mitigation strategy should be its impact on the consumption of goods and services generating GHG emissions, not their production.
Delivering zero carbon outcomes for a jurisdiction’s productive activities would do little to reduce global warming if its consumers respond to any resulting domestic price hikes simply by meeting their needs through additional imports from unconstrained cheaper sources.
Mitigation policies should instead be focused on modifying the choices made by a jurisdiction’s commercial, industrial, voluntary and public sectors and by its individual households in their capacity as consumers of carbonJACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 120 emitting goods and services rather than as their producers.
Such policies already apply to energy and fuel usage, which as Table 1 indicates currently account for 62% of Scottish GHG emissions.
Table 2 confirms that consumers ultimately bear the cost of reducing the carbon profile of these sectors.
There is evidence that extending such an approach to the rest of the economy would prove cost-effective.
In their MRIO modelling of the UK economy which considers all the linkages between resource flows and usages, Dawkins et al (2010) review alternative production and consumption strategies offering quick-win carbon savings up to 2020.
They conclude that “overall, the consumption or resource sufficiency strategies delivered a much greater decrease in GHG emissions than the production based strategies” (Dawkins et al, 2010, para.5.2).
Research commissioned by the Scottish Government (AEA, 2008) identifies carbon capture and storage (CCS) and improved vehicle technologies as offering potentially the largest carbon savings for Scotland, followed by banning biodegradable waste from landfills and promoting further afforestation.
Only CCS amongst these preferred options counts as a production strategy and this was not considered by the Dawkins et al (2010) study because the technology supporting it remains unproven.
Statutory climate change duties for SLAs Scotland retained its own legal, religious and education system following the 1707 Act of Union, and the past century has seen increasing administrative devolution of other areas of governance.
This culminated in 1999 in the creation of an elected Scottish Parliament and Government able to exercise a wide range of devolved legislative and executive powers.
Although energy policy is one of the reserved powers retained by the United Kingdom (UK) Government, Scottish Ministers exercise devolved authority over statutory land use policy and share authority over transport policy with their UK counterparts.
They also have full responsibility for funding and overseeing Scottish local government services, meeting 80% of their cost through grants to SLAs.
In practice this means that the Scottish Government can use its legislative powers, as demonstrated by the CCSA, to inform, guide and regulate most public sector activities relating to climate change within its boundaries, even where certain governmental powers are technically exercised either at a UK or a European Union (EU) level.
JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 121 Part 1 of the CCSA creates a statutory obligation to reduce Scottish GHG emissions by 80% in 2050, with an interim reduction target of 42% by 2020 (SP, 2009).
To enable these goals to be realised, Scottish Ministers are required to use secondary legislation to set annual targets from 2010 until 2050.
They are also obliged to take advice on how to set carbon budgets to hit such targets, initially from the UK Committee on Climate Change set up as part of the UK Climate Change Act 2008 (UK Parliament, 2008).
Part 2 of the Scottish Act allows Scottish Ministers to establish their own expert committee or to designate an existing body to fulfil this function.
Part 3 of the CCSA obliges Scottish Ministers to report to the Scottish Parliament on Scottish GHG emissions and on the progress being made towards the targets set out in the legislation (SG, 2009a).
Part 4 places climate change duties on Scottish public bodies, and enables Scottish Ministers to issue statutory instruments placing further duties on such bodies in relation to climate change.
Part 5 contains further statutory provisions on climate change which address adaptation, forestry, energy efficiency and waste reduction.
Part 6 sets out provisions for public engagement with the implementation of climate change legislation, and makes provisions for carbon assessment, including accounting for carbon trading.
The parallel UK legislation sets a slightly less ambitious interim 2020 reduction target of 34%.
It also excludes aviation and shipping from its targets, and sets them on a quinquennial rather than annual basis.
Whereas the UK framework allows borrowing of up to 1% from the following carbon budget period, no such facility is available under the Scottish one.
The UK framework also allows the purchase of credits to meet its carbon budgets, subject to advice from its Committee on Climate Change, but the Scottish one sets a prior limit of 20% of the emissions reduction effort on the purchase of such credits.
The climate change duties placed on Scottish public bodies by Part 4 of the CCSA came into effect at the start of 2011.
These require that the public sector in Scotland, in exercising its functions, must act in the way: • best calculated to contribute to the delivery of the mitigation targets set in or under Part 1; • best calculated to help deliver any programme laid before the Scottish Parliament under section 53 (which requires Scottish Ministers to produce adaptation programmes); and that they consider most sustainable.
JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 122 Guidance in relation to these duties (SG, 2011) stresses the importance of undertaking these duties effectively.
It emphasises the need for changes in existing processes and procedures to allow pro-active responses that set targets and milestones and integrate climate change into their business practice.
SLAs and other Scottish public bodies are expected to draw on their corporate skills to meet these statutory obligations, utilising their expertise in business planning, staff management, estate management and procurement.
As well as ensuring that efforts to address climate change are mainstreamed within their own organisations, SLAs are expected to ensure that these aims are endorsed within the communities they serve.
To this end, they must take action to strengthen their governance, leadership and commitment in regard to climate change, so that suitable community strategies and action plans can be put into effect, including partnership arrangements with other public bodies and local organisations in their area.
The guidance also expects public bodies to incorporate appropriate techniques into their decisionmaking, so that they can undertake effective assessment of the carbon impacts of policy options, adopt pathways capable of realising their climate change plans, and provide an audit trail of their actions for compliance reporting purposes.
4.
Policy Instruments for Discharging SLA Climate Change Duties SLA mitigation measures Since 2007, all SLAs have been signed up to the Scottish Climate Change Declaration (SCCD, 2011).
Launched in 2000, this voluntary initiative requires signatories to acknowledge the consequences of climate change and to co-operate with others in undertaking many of the climate change actions subsequently set out as statutory duties in the CCSA, including the production of annual reports on the performance of their carbon management activities.
SLAs now have to build on these reports by publishing action plans for mitigation and adaptation demonstrating how they will discharge their CCSA responsibilities.
The research capacity available to SLAs to meet the technical requirements for these voluntary Scottish Climate Change Declaration reports, as well as for the new statutory plans and compliance statements meeting their CCSA duties, has been steadily enhanced over the past decade.
Sources of expertise now include the Scottish Climate Change JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 123 Impacts Partnership (SCCIP, 2011) and the Scottish and Northern Ireland Forum for Environmental Research (SNIFFER, 2011).
Additional capacity is provided by the Scottish Government’s own environmental agencies, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, as well as through the UK’s Hadley and Tyndall climate research centres.
Fife Council has a population of 360,000, making it Scotland’s third largest local authority.
It illustrates the range of corporate climate change mitigation activities undertaken by SLAs.
The council’s most recent Annual Progress Report published as part of its commitments under the Scottish Climate Change Declaration (FC, 2010) sets out its current climate change activities.
Those restricted to Fife Council’s own in-house operations are channelled through its Council Plan.
Supplementing these internal management mechanisms, the council is engaged in various community-wide low carbon initiatives across Fife.
Most of these draw on existing Community Plan provisions, through which a Fife Environmental Partnership has been established.
The council’s system for monitoring and controlling its own carbon footprint has received Carbon Trust Standard approval.
A Carbon Emissions Reduction Plan was launched in 2009, and this now drives the majority of the council’s in-house mitigation efforts, taking on board the findings of carbon emission audits of individual council services.
Council procurement services have begun to trial a Whole Life Costing tool for estimating the impact of its procurement options on GHG emissions, and council officers are developing a Carbon Emissions Impact Assessment toolkit to quantify the climate change implications of council proposals (FC, 2010).
Recent audits indicate that Fife Council’s annual carbon footprint is around 110,000 tonnes CO2 equivalent (FC, 2010).
The energy demands of the council’s buildings account for 70% of this footprint, the two other main contributors being energy needs of its other infrastructure (12%) and fuel requirements for its vehicle fleet (13%).
This represents a typical footprint for the direct emissions of SLAs, helping explain the emphasis placed on public sector schemes in Scotland’s Energy Efficiency Action Plan (SG, 2009c).
The EU Directive on Energy Performance of Buildings (CEC, 2002) was transposed into Scottish law through amendments to Scottish building regulations (SP, 2008).
Since JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 124 January 2009, all large public buildings (covering an area over 1,000m2) are required to display an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC).
A revised EU Directive on the energy performance of buildings has recently been issued (CEC, 2010), and Scottish Ministers are due to implement the necessary further changes to Scottish building regulations.
Data from the current EPC system highlights the poor energy efficiency of Scottish public sector buildings, the majority of which are operated by SLAs.
A recent audit report observes that this: illustrates the scale of the challenge in reducing emissions from the existing public sector estate.
Over 70% of large public sector buildings have an EPC rating of E to G [poor to very poor], with only 4% rated at A or B [very good or excellent](Audit Scotland, 2010: para.
57).
The problem of poor energy efficiency in the face of rising energy costs is not confined to the public sector.
Evidence of the scale of the problem amongst large UK organisations not covered by the ETS or by existing Climate Change Agreements (which are targeted at energy-intensive undertakings) has prompted the UK Government to introduce a new Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) Energy Efficiency Scheme.
This is aimed at less energy-intensive businesses and public sector organisations that use over 6,000 megawatt hours of metered energy per annum.
The CRC will apply to 27 of the 32 SLAs.
Initial proposals for the scheme involved a cap-and-trade arrangement similar to the ETS that would have allowed participants to trade their allowances and retain any profits.
Fife Council was the only SLA that participated in a trial carbon trading scheme covering 34 local authorities across the UK (Bradshaw & Johnston, 2009) in order to test out the opportunities this presented.
The CRC has since been amended (DECC, 2010c) so that only its penalty elements remain.
Organisations subject to the CRC will be required to audit all their GHG emissions.
This information will be used to allocate allowances that must be purchased at an initial price of £12 per tonne of CO2 equivalent (broadly in line with the current cost of acquiring allowances under the ETS).
The audited data will also be used to compile and publish an overall performance table, ranking each of the participants.
Audit Scotland (2010: para.68) estimates that Scottish public bodies face an initial overall financial cost of buying allowances amounting to £20 million, ranging from £25,000 for a small SLA to over £3 million for Scottish Water.
The publicity given to their relative performance JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 125 under the CRC is intended to reinforce the effects of financial sanctions in promoting increased energy efficiency.
Domestic energy demands for space and water heating and power account for 29% of all Scottish energy consumption (SG, 2009c: 3).
In addition to raising their in-house energy efficiency, SLAs will also be expected to take strategic ownership of a new domestic housing energy efficiency scheme, termed Green Deal, which is part of the Energy Security and Green Economy Bill (DECC, 2010d).
The Green Deal is targeted at housing in the public and private rented sector, as well as owner-occupied homes, suffering low energy-efficiency.
It allows energy improvements of up to £7,000 per dwelling to be implemented without upfront payments: part of the subsequent energy savings by households is diverted to meet the cost of these improvements.
The Green Deal (which has also been extended to small businesses) is targeted towards funding energy efficiency measures that generate more savings than they cost, based on an independent assessment by an accredited adviser.
Only accredited installers may participate in the scheme.
Although Scottish households in owner-occupied dwellings currently already have access to a range of incentives to improve the energy efficiency of their properties (SG, 2009c), the situation for tenants of local authority and private rented accommodation is less clear-cut, since landlords may have little incentive to undertake energy efficiency improvements if tenants are responsible for meeting their own energy bills.
The scheme includes powers to require landlords to honour reasonable requests from their tenants for such improvements, where they qualify for Green Deal assistance.
A recent survey indicated that 21% of private sector rented accommodation in England had EPC ratings in the lowest categories, ‘F’ or ‘G’ (Hayman, 2010: 11).
Under the new Bill, all UK local authorities will be empowered to require landlords owning properties that fall into the worst performing categories to undertake all energy efficiency improvements for which financial support is available.
SLAs remain important providers of affordable rented accommodation, even though their stock of social housing has been significantly reduced in recent decades by right-to-buy legislation.
Some of their housing stock also suffers from poor energy efficiency, and part of the intention of this new scheme is to make local authorities promote area-wide initiatives to raise the energy efficiency of all housing stock eligible for assistance, including their own.
JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 126 Measures such as the Green Deal ease the problem of fuel poverty, which continues to be a major obstacle to implementing climate change mitigation through measures that drive energy costs up for domestic consumers (Dresner & Ekins, 2006).
The most recent estimates put the number of households in Scotland who are considered to suffer from fuel poverty at 618,000 (SG, 2009c: 11).
Powers included in the new Energy Security and Green Economy Bill would give local authorities access to an Energy Company Obligation (ECO) designed to help such households.
The UK Minister in charge of the Bill is reported as saying that councils would have a key role in ensuring that the ECO was effectively spent for this purpose through new forms of engagement with the private sector, “with councils selecting a few preferred partners, who would deliver the Green Deal in their area according to street-by-street plans drawn up by councils prioritising the most vulnerable and the low-quality housing in their area” (Hayman, 2010: 11).
SLA adaptation measures Highland Council was the first SLA to publish an adaptation action plan in anticipation of its new CCSA climate change duties (HC, 2010).
Applying the guidance contained in the Scottish Climate Change Adaptation Framework (SG, 2009b), the plan focuses on increasing the resilience of Highland communities to climate change.
Highland Council is easily the largest SLA by area, with many of its 220,000 residents located in isolated settlements.
Some of its montane, riverine and coastal communities already have an exposure to natural hazards that exceeds other parts of the UK.
The adaptation action plan starts by assessing past climate trends and possible future climate scenarios for these communities.
Changes in temperature and precipitation over recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in the area’s growing season (HC, 2010: 19), but one of the major future climatic imponderables is the impact of climate change on the Meridional Overturning Circulation.
This ensures that much of the west coast of the Highlands enjoys a much milder (and wetter) climate than its latitude (parallel to northern Labrador on the other side of the North Atlantic) would indicate.
Research suggests that the warm North Atlantic Drift it produces might be weakened by ongoing climate change (HC, 2010: 42).
This counter-intuitive possibility of much colder waters poses a significant risk for the western Highlands, in terms of its impact on landand sea-based activities.
JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 127 As part of its preparations for an adaptation plan, the council organised a series of workshops for its own service divisions and for community representatives.
These provided information on what might be the potential effects of climate change on the Scottish Highlands, and also allowed the council to receive feedback on what participants felt were the main local threats and opportunities arising from these effects.
The results of such consultations are listed in section 4 of the action plan (HC, 2010: 50-68).
They display a wide range of views on possible impacts, confirming the need for ongoing research on climatic change, particularly in an area with large variations in climate and habitat which is occupied by many isolated communities heavily reliant on local public services.
Section 5 of the action plan (HC, 2010: 70-79) is arranged around five commitments.
These require the council to: • demonstrate leadership; • build on its knowledge base; • embed climate change issues into existing policy structures and processes; • inform and communicate the need for action, targeting those at greatest risk; and • co-operate with relevant stakeholders to identify the most appropriate forms of adaptation.
These commitments are supported by a set of 24 action statements, which identify the responsible service and provide a review date.
These are graded accorded to current status: completed or on target; progress with some slippage; no significant progress; or to be programmed.
Each is also provided with a brief explanatory comment.
The final section dealing with monitoring and evaluation notes that actions within the plan “will be refined through the consultation process and will be SMART: Specific, Measurable, Agreed, Realistic and Time-Bound” (HC, 2010: 77).
Although the Scottish Highlands presents some adaptation challenges that are unique to the area, the general issues identified echo points made in a recent House of Commons committee report on climate change adaptation arrangements.
This acknowledged that climate change impacts would vary considerably from location to location, warranting reliance on local decision making organised and co-ordinated through systems of local governance.
It also stressed the role of the planning system, recommending that all local authorities should be encouraged “to use planning obligations to require developers to JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 128 take adaptation measures that benefit their new developments and the wider community” (EAC, 2010: para.42).
The role of the statutory planning system in promoting effective climate change mitigation and adaptation extends well beyond concerns about planning obligations.
By modifying the shape of the built environment, planning processes can promote sustainable growth designed to minimise resource use and carbon emissions and increase resilience to climate change (Wilson & Piper, 2010).
A recently formed UK pressure group offers local planning authorities guidance and model policies on climate change, stating that spatial planning can make a major contribution “by shaping new and existing developments in ways that reduce carbon dioxide emissions and positively build community resilience to problems such as extreme heat or flood risk” (PCCC, 2010: 2).
The Scottish approach to spatial planning exemplifies this philosophy.
The Planning etc.
(Scotland) Act (SP, 2006) created a statutory obligation to produce a National Planning Framework (NPF) embodying the precepts of sustainable development.
The NPF now provides the spatial context for the Scottish Government’s own development priorities, articulating the statements of national planning policy set out in Scottish Planning Policy (SPP) (SG, 2010a).
Scottish planning legislation places a statutory obligation on SLAs in their capacity as planning authorities to take the NPF and SPP into account in preparing development plans, with the contents of these documents forming a material consideration in determining planning applications.
In parallel with legislation to update the Scottish planning system to enable it to promote sustainable development, the Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act (EASA) 2005 (SP, 2005) has extended the EU Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive (CEC, 2001) to virtually all Scottish public sector policies, programmes and strategies (PPSs).
Scottish Ministers promoted this legislation to make Scotland ‘a world leader’ in using such techniques to mainstream the environment in public sector policy-making (Jackson & Illsley, 2006).
Before any Scottish PPS can now be implemented, it must be subject to an environmental assessment process that is open to public scrutiny and comment.
A Scottish SEA Gateway has been created to facilitate these statutory assessment requirements.
JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 129 EASA requires consideration of climatic factors when applying SEA to Scottish PPSs, including all Scottish development plans (SG, 2010b).
Recently issued guidance on the use of the technique to this end identifies opportunities to: • explore the potential contribution a PPS makes to GHG emissions, with the aim of avoiding or reducing such emissions where possible; • consider whether future Scottish PPSs are resilient to the effects of climate change; • identify measures to address any adverse effects a PPS may have on climate; and • help the public sector to make informed decisions about how to reduce the GHG emissions of PPSs and ensure they are resilient to the future climate (SG, 2010c: para.1.4).
Scottish Ministers are currently actively reviewing how Scottish SEA procedures might be further extended to meet the statutory obligations of the CCSA.
The potential of environmental modelling software packages is being evaluated (Savills, AEA Technology & MVA Consultancy, 2011).
If such approaches are adopted, they would generate quantitative data to supplement the qualitative procedures recommended in current guidance, enabling different development scenarios to be tested for their environmental and carbon footprints.
Initiatives drawing on these techniques to model the resource and carbon implications of SLA operations are already being pursued.
The Local Footprint Project, managed by WWF Scotland and the Sustainable Scotland Network, is currently working in partnership with Eco-Schools Scotland, the Improvement Service and Scottish Power, to promote the use of the Resources and Energy Analysis Programme (REAP) interactive resource and carbon accounting software package developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute (Paul et al, 2008).
Such software packages are capable of utilising datasets based on environmental input-output data that can be configured for local circumstances.
Such tools can be used to enhance SLA capacity to identify and implement low energy strategies for meeting their new CRC obligations, and help them manage other aspects of their carbon plans more effectively.
They can also be used to run alternative scenarios for new development strategies, allowing the strategic options within a development plan to be tested for their ecological and carbon footprints.
This makes the climate change JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 130 implications of SLA policy choices much more explicit and subject to detailed examination.
South Lanarkshire Council (2010) has undertaken a pathfinder project which applies these carbon footprinting techniques to the masterplans being developed in three of its Community Growth Areas: East Kilbride, Hamilton and Newton.
5.
Conclusions: SLA Opportunities and Threats Posed by Climate Change Climate change poses a major challenge for systems of local governance.
Local authorities across the world must justify the confidence shown by central governments in their capacity to deliver crucial components of the solution to this problem.
Scotland offers a test-bed for judging whether local governance can respond to this challenge, since SLAs have been given a central role in implementing what the Scottish Government considers “world-leading legislation which can act as an example of best practice to other countries” (SG, 2010d: para.4.1).
The common-pool characteristics of climate change management ensure that affordability will remain a crucial determinant of the demonstration effect of this legislation.
Assuming central government continues to set the parameters for national energy and transport policies, many of the remaining elements of a cost-effective strategy can be delivered through a decentralised approach, allowing local governance to identify the mitigation and adaptation measures that best suit their own communities.
Domestic energy efficiency is an obvious example, as the Local Government Association for England and Wales recognises: through their land-use powers, local development frameworks, regeneration and area action plans, councils are already setting out how their communities will develop and improve over the next few decades.
They are uniquely placed to understand when and where improvements are going to be made – and as such, they are best placed to identify opportunities to integrate the installation of energy efficiency measures into these improvements (LGA, 2009: 6).
Compared with the UK average, Scotland has a colder climate, more housing in rural locations without access to gas mains, and more households living in dwellings with nonstandard construction that is difficult to insulate.
Its domestic energy efficiency schemes need to be carefully tailored to local circumstances, with SLA housing officers focusing on households likely to be exposed to fuel poverty from rising energy costs (Stewart, 2010).
Many climate change adaptation measures also require local responses shaped to specific types of area-based hazards.
SLA spatial planners and emergency planning services provide the local expertise to identify which communities exposed to climate JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 131 change risks are capable of reinforcing their current defences at reasonable cost, and which might need to relocate or modify some of their activities.
Reliance on local governance to deliver the bulk of community-based mitigation and adaptation measures also accords with the argument made in the paper that policies must address the consumption determinants of carbon emissions rather than their production.
Unless individual jurisdictions or trading blocs are prepared to place border taxes on imports of high carbon goods and services a measure advocated by Helm (2010a) but unlikely to find widespread political support amongst the electorates that bear the costs of such actions mitigation strategies must ultimately be focused on changing patterns of consumption so that producers, wherever located, will be obliged to adjust their product mixes accordingly.
A low carbon world in a global economy which continues to enjoy the benefits of free trade is only possible if this also becomes a low carbon-consumption world, in which the location of production for meeting consumer needs is determined by where carbon inputs are lowest.
Local governance helps provide a suitable framework for promoting such a low carbonconsumption world.
A large part of consumer expenditure in any country is directed towards local public services such as education, public health and water supplies, social housing, environmental health and waste management, all of which are susceptible to low carbon modifications.
Most of these services are also non-competitive in nature, with local authorities acting as the sole providers to those who live and work in their area.
This means that actions SLAs take to promote low carbon-consumption practices cannot readily be undermined by carbon leakages to domestic competitors, as might well occur if private sector businesses such as supermarkets attempted to emulate them.
SLAs that succeed in transforming their service delivery from high to low carbon will not lose business to other SLAs who fail to emulate them.
A good example of the ability of local governance to deliver low carbon-consumption strategies is to be found in waste management.
In 2010 the Scottish Government published its zero-waste strategy (SG, 2010e).
Of the 20 million tonnes of waste produced in Scotland in 2008, domestic households accounted for 14.5%, the construction industry for 43% and other commercial and industrial sources for 40%.
Much of this is capable of being re-used, recycled or used for energy generation rather than be disposed of via landfill, allowing Scotland to reduce both its ecological and its JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 132 carbon footprint.
In the 1990s, Scotland used to send over 80% of its municipal waste to landfill.
Under its new zero-waste strategy, a maximum of 5% is designated for landfill (SG, 2010e).
In recent years, EU Directives transposed into Scottish legislation have had a major impact on Scottish municipal, commercial and industrial waste management practices (Brady & Jackson, 2003).
Most private sector waste is now managed on a low carbon basis.
SLAs are responsible for collecting household waste, and their municipal waste operations also serve a wide range of commercial and industrial undertakings.
Following changes in SLA waste collection practices, Scottish households now sort their waste into different bins for kerbside collection and make use of SLA recycling centres.
As Table 3 demonstrates, this has triggered a significant low carbon behavioural change by Scottish households over a relatively short time-span.
Table 3.
Percentage in Scottish Housing Survey who reported recycling waste items in past month Item Adult respondents Households 2000 2002 2003 2007 2008 2009 Newspapers/magazines/paper/card Glass bottles and jars Plastic bottles Metal cans 30 29 6 9 33 31 8 10 45 35 12 14 81 67 58 59 83 70 65 65 84 73 71 69 One or more of the above items 43 45 55 84 87 88 Source: Natural Scotland, 2010 Despite these opportunities, a shortage of finance is likely to prove the main constraint on the ability of SLAs to deliver their climate change duties over the next decade.
The introduction of the CRC will highlight ongoing disparities in SLA in-house energy efficiency.
The CRC levy should make win-win outcomes from increased in-house energy efficiency even more apparent in an era of rising energy costs.
However, SLAs will still need to find the funds to invest in new estate and to recruit and train staff capable of identifying low carbon options (Richens, 2010).
In straightened financial circumstances it is tempting to cut back on training and to accept the lowest upfront construction price for new estate, overlooking options that offer much lower life-cycle outlays.
As Audit Scotland (2010: para.69) observes: “public bodies are facing difficult decisions due to increasing financial pressures in the public JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 133 sector and this may make it more difficult to secure the investment needed to continually reduce emissions from energy sources”.
The challenge facing SLAs such as the Fife and Highland Councils is to find the means to fulfil their statutory obligations with regard to climate change while restructuring to cope with sharp reductions in funding.
It will be a good test of the resilience of Scottish local governance.
References AEA (2008) Mitigating Against Climate Change in Scotland: Identification and Initial Assessment of Policy Options, Ayrshire, Atomic Energy Authority Audit Scotland (2010) Improving Energy Efficiency: a Follow-up Report, Edinburgh, Audit Scotland Barker T & Johnstone N (1998) “International competitiveness and carbon taxation”, in Barker T & Köhler J eds.
(1998) International Competitiveness and Environmental Policies, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 71-142 Barkin J S & Shambaugh G E (1996) “Common-pool resources and international environmental politics”, Environmental Politics, 5(3), 429-447 Bradshaw G & Johnston A (2009) Carbon Trading Council Taking Stock, London, Local Government Information Unit Brady S & Jackson T (2003) “Waste recovery using Packaging Waste Recovery Notes: a costeffective way of meeting targets?” Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 46(4), 605-619 Brinkley A & Less S (2010) Carbon Omissions: Consumption-based Accounting for International Carbon Emissions, London, Policy Exchange CEC (2001) Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Assessment of the effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities CEC (2002) Directive 2002/91/EC on the Energy Performance of Buildings, Brussels, Commission of the European Community CEC (2010) Directive 2010/31/EU on the Energy Performance of Buildings (recast), Brussels, Commission of the European Community Dawkins E, Roelich K, Barrett J & Baiocchi G (2010) Securing the Future – the Role of Resource Efficiency, Banbury, Oxon, Waste & Resources Action Programme (WRAP) DECC (2010a) Beyond Copenhagen: the UK Government’s International Climate Change Action Plan, Cm 7850, London, Department of Energy and Climate Change DECC (2010b) Electricity Market Reform: Consultation Document, Cm 7983, London, Department of Energy and Climate Change DECC (2010c) Consultations on Amendments to the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2010, London, Department of Energy and Climate Change DECC (2010d) The Green Deal: a Summary of the Government’s Proposals, London, Department of Energy and Climate Change Dresner S & Ekins P (2006) “Economic instruments to improve UK home energy efficiency without negative social impacts”, Fiscal Studies, 27(1), 47-74 Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) (2010) Adapting to Climate Change: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10, London, House of Commons FC (2010) 2009/10 Progress Report on Scotland’s Climate Change Declaration, Glenrothes, Fife Council JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 134 Hayman A (2010) “Minister outlines council role in delivering energy saving scheme”, Local Government Chronicle, 25 November, 10-12 HC (2010) Adapting to Climate Change 2010, Inverness, Highland Council Helm D (2008) “Climate-change policy: why has so little been achieved?”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(2), 211-238 Helm D (2010a) “The case for carbon taxes”, in Less S ed.
Greener, Cheaper, London, Policy Exchange, 53-78 Helm D (2010b) “Government failure, rent-seeking, and capture: the design of climate change policy”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 26(2), 182-196 Helm D R, Phillips J & Smale R (2007) Too Good to be True: the UK’s Climate Change Record, http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk, accessed 5 January 2011 Jackson T & Illsley B M (2006) “Strategic environmental assessment as a tool of environmental governance: Scotland’s extension of the European Union SEA Directive”, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 49(3), 361-383 Lea R (2011) “Energy shake-up will lift electricity bills to £1,000 in 20 years”, The Times, 3 January, 35 LGA (2009) From Kyoto to Kettering, Copenhagen to Croydon: Local Government’s Manifesto for Building Low-carbon Communities, London, Local Government Association Mabey N, Hall S, Smith C & Gupta S (1997) Argument in the Greenhouse: The International Economics of Controlling Global Warming, London, Routledge McIlveen R (2010) “Cutting the cost of carbon”, in Less S ed Greener, Cheaper, London, Policy Exchange, 14-51 Natural Scotland (2010) Key Scottish Environmental Statistics 2010, Edinburgh, Scottish Government Paul A, Minx J, Owen A, Barrett J & Wiedman T (2008) Right Climate for Change: Carbon Footprinting for Scottish Local Authorities, Stirling, Local Footprints: Footprinting Support for Local Authorities PCCC (2010) Planning for Climate Change – Guidance and Model Policies for Local Authorities, London, Planning and Climate Change Coalition Richens J (2010) “What does the future hold for the CRC?”, ENDS Report, 431, 4-9 Savills, AEA Technology & MVA Consultancy (2011) Quantitative Greenhouse Gas Impact Assessment: a Tool for Spatial Planning Policy Development.
Phase 1: Feasibility Report, Edinburgh, Scottish Government Social Research SCCD (2011) Scottish Climate Change Declaration, http://climatechange.sustainablescotalnd.net , accessed 14 January SCCIP (2011) Scottish Climate Change Impacts Partnership, http://www.sccip.org.uk , accessed 14 January Schreurs M A, Selin H & VanDeveer S D eds (2009) Transatlantic Environment and Energy Politics: Comparative and International Perspectives, Farnham Surrey, Ashgate SG (2009a) Climate Change Delivery Plan: Meeting Scotland’s Statutory Climate Change Targets, Edinburgh, Scottish Government SG (2009b) Scotland’s Climate Change Adaptation Framework, Edinburgh, Scottish Government SG (2009c) Conserve and Save: the Energy Efficiency Action Plan for Scotland, Edinburgh, Scottish Government SG (2010a) Scottish Planning Policy, Edinburgh, Scottish Government SG (2010b) Strategic Environmental Assessment of Development Plans: Planning Advice Note (PAN) 1/2010, Edinburgh, Scottish Government SG (2010c) Consideration of Climatic Factors Within Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), Edinburgh, Scottish Government Environmental Assessment Team http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/� http://climatechange.sustainablescotalnd.net/� http://www.sccip.org.uk/� JACKSON & LYNCH: Public sector responses to climate change in Scotland CJLG May-November 2011 135 SG (2010d) Climate Change in Scotland Annual Report 2009-2010, Edinburgh, Scottish Government.
SG (2010e) Scotland’s Zero Waste Plan, Edinburgh, Scottish Government.
SG (2011) Public Bodies Climate Change Duties: Putting Them into Practice: Guidance Required by Part 4 of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, Edinburgh, Scottish Government.
SNIFFER (2011) Scotland and Northern Ireland Forum for Environmental Research, http://www.sniffer.org.uk , accessed 14 January South Lanarkshire Council (2010) Ecological Footprinting for South Lanarkshire Community Growth Areas, Hamilton, South Lanarkshire Planning and Building Standards Services SP (2005) The Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005, Edinburgh, Scottish Parliament SP (2006) The Planning etc.
(Scotland) Act 2006, Edinburgh, Scottish Parliament SP (2008) The Energy Performance of Buildings (Scotland) Regulations 2008, Edinburgh, Scottish Parliament SP (2009) Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, Edinburgh, Scottish Parliament Stern S N (2006) The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, London, H M Treasury Stewart D (2010) The Issues and Challenges in Delivering More Energy Efficient Housing in Scotland, Glasgow, Scottish Centre for Regeneration Briefing Paper 19 UK Parliament (2008) UK Climate Change Act 2008: Chapter 27 – Climate Targets and Budgeting, the Committee on Climate Change, Trading Schemes, Impact of and Adaptation to Climate Change, etc., London, Palace of Westminster Wilson E & Piper J (2010) Spatial Planning and Climate Change, Abingdon, Routledge.
http://www.sniffer.org.uk/�
URN:NBN:fi:tsv-oa6813 The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, Kenya: assessing potential impacts of agricultural expansion and climate change EDUARDO EIJI MAEDA Maeda, Eduardo Eiji (2012).
The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, Kenya: assessing potential impacts of agricultural expansion and climate change.
Fennia 190: 1, pp.
41–59.
ISSN 1798-5617.
The indigenous cloud forests in the Taita Hills have suffered substantial degradation for several centuries due to agricultural expansion.
Currently, only 1% of the original forested area remains preserved.
Furthermore, climate change imposes an imminent threat for local economy and environmental sustainability.
In such circumstances, elaborating tools to conciliate socioeconomic growth and natural resources conservation is an enormous challenge.
This article tackles essential aspects for understanding the ongoing agricultural activities in the Taita Hills and their potential environmental consequences in the future.
Initially, an alternative method is proposed to reduce uncertainties and costs for estimating agricultural water demand.
The main characteristic of the approach proposed in this study is the use of satellite data to overcome data availability limitations.
Furthermore, a modelling framework was designed to delineate agricultural expansion projections and evaluate the future impacts of agriculture on soil erosion and irrigation water demand.
The results indicate that if current trends persist, agricultural areas will occupy roughly 60% of the study area by 2030.
Rainfall erosivity is likely to increase during April and November due to climate change and slight decrease during March and May.
Although the simulations indicate that climate change will likely increase total annual rainfall volumes during the following decades, irrigation requirements will continue to increase due to agricultural expansion.
By 2030, new cropland areas may cause an increase of approximately 40% in the annual volume of water necessary for irrigation.
Keywords: Land changes, climate change, simulation models, water resources, soil erosion Eduardo Eiji Maeda, Department of Geosciences and Geography, University of Helsinki, Gustaf Hällströmin katu 2, 00014, Helsinki, Finland.
E-mail address: eduardo.maeda@helsinki.fi.
Introduction The world population has grown from 2.5 billion people in the 1950s to approximately 6.9 billion people in 2010 (UN 2010).
The ability of mankind to cultivate crops and raise livestock, together with recent advances in agricultural techniques, is perhaps the main factor that allowed this fast population increase.
Nevertheless, agriculture has changed the face of the planet’s surface and continues to expand at alarming rates.
Currently, almost one-third of the world’s land surface is under agricultural use and millions of hectares of natural ecosystems are converted to croplands or pastures every year (Foley et al.
2005).
If current trends persist, it is expected that by 2050 around 10 billion hectares of natural ecosystems will be converted to agriculture (Tilman et al.
2001).
The development of the agricultural sector is essential to provide food for the population and combat food insecurity in poor countries.
However, the expansion of croplands without logistical and technological planning is a severe threat to the environment.
Hence, the dilemma of integrat42 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda ing economic and population growth with environmental sustainability is an undeniable issue that needs to be addressed.
Fresh water is perhaps the natural resource mostly affected by agricultural activities.
Currently, roughly 70% of freshwater withdraws are used for agriculture (FAO 2005).
Although global withdrawals of water resources are still below the critical limit, more than two billion people live in highly water-stressed areas due to the uneven distribution of this resource in time and space (Oki & Kanae 2006).
In Kenya, currently over 55% of the rural population do not have access to quality drinkable water (FAO 2005).
Another major environmental problem associated with the expansion of agriculture is soil erosion.
Although soil erosion is a natural process, changes in the landscape structure caused by the replacement of natural vegetation are likely to result in accelerated rates of soil loss.
Increased erosion rates are directly associated with nutrient loss, which may reduce agricultural productivity (Bakker et al.
2007) and cause water bodies’ eutrophication (Istvánovics 2009).
In some cases, advanced stages of soil erosion, such as rill and gully erosions, can devastate entire areas, turning them unsuitable for agricultural purposes (Kirkby & Bracken 2009).
Furthermore, variations in precipitation and temperature patterns associated with climate change also have important impacts on the sustainability of agricultural systems.
For instance, changes in precipitation volume and intensity may increase the energy available in rainfall for detaching and carrying sediments, accelerating soil erosion.
According to Yang et al.
(2003), the global average soil erosion is projected to increase approximately 9% by 2090 due to climate change.
The climate also exerts great influence on water needs for agriculture.
Projections indicate that, without proper investments in water management, climate change may increase global irrigation water needs by roughly 20% by 2080 (Fischer et al.
2007).
Currently, science is facing new challenges to advance in the direction of environmental sustainability.
One major challenge lies in the need for understanding the interactions and feedbacks between human activities and the environment (Fig.
1).
Hence, interdisciplinary studies are essential to improve our knowledge on the relationships between different components of environmental systems.
Another important challenge is the acquisition of reliable and appropriate data for environmental modelling.
For instance, solar radiation, relative Fig.
1.
Flow chart showing a simplified illustration of interactions between agricultural expansion, climate and environment addressed in this article.
FENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 43The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … humidity and wind speed are some of the variables usually necessary to estimate evapotranspiration (ET).
However, assembling and maintaining meteorological stations capable of measuring such variables is, in general, expensive.
In many poor regions, meteorological stations are insufficient to acquire the information necessary to represent the spatial-temporal variation of ET.
As a result, the irrigation management in such areas is usually inappropriate, increasing the risks of water scarcity and water conflicts.
Therefore, in order to conciliate agricultural systems productivity and environmental sustainability it is imperative to create appropriate tools for monitoring current activities and delineating appropriate strategies for coping with expected changes in the future.
This study addresses important elements of this challenge, focusing on environmental issues and methodological drawbacks currently faced in the Taita Hills region, Kenya.
The Taita Hills is home for an outstanding diversity of flora and fauna, with a high level of endemism (Burgess et al.
2007).
Despite the huge importance of this region from environmental and biological conservation perspectives, the Taita Hills have suffered substantial degradation for several centuries due to agricultural expansion.
Hence, the area is considered to have high scientific interest, and there is an urgent need for tools and information that are able to assist the sustainable management of agricultural systems and natural resources.
This article presents a series of interdisciplinary studies, which integrate different technologies and modelling techniques aiming to understand specific environmental aspects and delineate future environmental scenarios for the Taita Hills.
The specific research problems and objectives are delineated below.
Research problems and objectives I.
The availability of ground meteorological data is extremely limited in the Taita Hills.
This limitation is a serious bottleneck for the management of water resources used for irrigation, given that it prevents an accurate assessment of evapotranspiration (ET).
To overcome this drawback, the combination of ET models with remote sensing data is considered a promising alternative to obtaining temporally and spatially continuous variables necessary for ET calculation.
This study evaluates three empirical ET models using as input land surface temperature data acquired by the MODIS/Terra sensor, aiming to delineate an alternative approach for estimating ET in the Taita Hills.
II.
Despite the large importance of agricultural activities for the economy and food security in the Taita Hills, the expansion of croplands imposes serious threats for the environment.
Understanding the driving forces, tendencies and patterns of land changes is an essential step for elaborating policies that can conciliate land use allocation and natural resources conservation.
This article investigates the role of landscape attributes and infrastructure components as driving forces of agricultural expansion in the Taita Hills and simulates future landscape scenarios up to the year 2030.
III.
Land use and soil erosion are closely linked with each other and with local climate.
The expansion of agricultural areas in the Taita Hills and changes in precipitation patterns associated with climate change are imminent threats for soil conservation.
In this context mathematical models and scenario exercises are useful tools to assist stakeholders in delineating soil conservation practices that are consistent with plausible environmental changes in the future.
One of the objectives of this study is to investigate the potential impacts of future agricultural expansion and climate change on soil erosion in the Taita Hills.
IV.
In Africa, as well as in most parts of the world, the agricultural sector is the main consumer of water resources.
As agricultural areas increase in the Taita Hills, there is an escalating concern regarding the sustainable use of water resources.
Furthermore, future changes in temperature and rainfall patterns may affect the water requirements for agricultural activities.
Understanding the relations between these components is crucial to identify potential risks of water resources depletion and delineate appropriate public policies to deal with the problem.
This study evaluates prospective changes on irrigation water requirements caused by future agricultural expansion and climate change.
Study area The Taita Hills are the northernmost part of the Eastern Arc Mountains of Kenya and Tanzania, situated in the middle of the Tsavo plains in the Coast Province, Kenya (Fig.
2).
The Eastern Arc 44 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda Mountains sustain some of the richest concentrations of endemic animals and plants on Earth, and thus it is considered one of the world’s 25 biodiversity hotspots (Myers et al.
2000).
The Taita Hills cover an area of approximately 850 km2.
The population of the whole Taita-Taveta county has grown from 90,146 persons in 1962 to approximately 280,000 in the year 2009 (KNBS 2010).
According to Clark (2010), population growth has been a central driving factor behind rising environmental pressure.
The indigenous cloud forests have suffered substantial loss and degradation for several centuries as abundant rainfall and rich soils have created good conditions for agriculture.
Between 1955 and 2004, approximately half of the cloud forests in the hills have been cleared for agricultural lands (Pellikka et al.
2009).
Population growth and increasing areas under cultivation for subsistence farming have caused scarcity of available land in the hills and contributed to the clearance of new agricultural land in the lowlands (Clark 2010).
Currently, it is estimated that only 1% of the original forested area remains preserved (Pellikka et al.
2009).
The agriculture in the hills is characterised by intensive small-scale subsistence farming.
In the lower highland zone and in upper midland zone, the typical crops are maize, beans, peas, potatoes, cabbages, tomatoes, cassava and banana (Jaetzold & Schmidt 1983; Soini 2005).
In the slopes and lower parts of the hills with average annual rainfall between 600 and 900 mm, early maturing maize, sorghum and millet species are cultivated.
In the lower midland zones with average rainfall between 500 and 700 mm, dryland maize varieties and onions are cultivated, among others.
Supplementary irrigation practice is common, especially in the highlands, and profitable production is highly dependent on the availability of water resources (Jaetzold & Schmidt 1983).
Despite the small average farm size, the income of many families in the Taita Hills relies solely on agricultural production.
Although the technological level of farmers is not high, many carry out basic soil conservation practices, such as terraces.
Methods Alternative methods for estimating reference evapotranspiration In order to identify feasible approaches for estimating reference ET (ETo) in the Taita Hills, three Fig.
2.
Geographical location of the study area shown in a TM-Landsat image from April 3, 2001.
FENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 45The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … empirical ETo models that require only air temperature data were evaluated, namely the Hargreaves (Hargreaves & Samani 1985), the Thornthwaite (Thornthwaite 1948) and the Blaney-Criddle (Blaney & Criddle 1962) methods.
To overcome the low data availability from ground meteorological stations, this study made use of land surface temperature (LST) data obtained from the MODIS sensor, on board of Terra and Aqua satellites (Wang et al.
2005).
In order to clearly distinguish this approach, when LST data is used in replacement of air temperature data from ground stations, the Hargreaves, the Thornthwaite and the Blaney-Criddle models will be hereafter denominated as Hargreaves-LST, ThornthwaiteLST, and Blaney-Criddle-LST, respectively.
The empirical equations were calibrated using as a reference the FAO Penman–Monteith (FAOPM) method.
The FAO-PM method is recommended as the standard ETo method and has been accepted by the scientific community as the most precise, this is because of its good results when compared with other equations in different regions worldwide (Cai et al.
2007; Jabloun & Sahli 2008).
Although the FAO-PM method also carries intrinsic uncertainties and errors, it has behaved well under a variety of climatic conditions, and for this reason the use of such methods to calibrate or validate empirical equations has been widely recommended (Allen et al.
1998; Gavilán et al.
2006).
The meteorological data necessary for the FAOPM equations were obtained from a synoptic station placed at Voi town and operated by the Kenya meteorological department.
ETo values were also calculated for this exact point using the empirical models and MODIS LST data.
The calibration parameters were defined using the following equation (Allen et al.
1998): ETo cal = a + b · ETo LST (1) where ETo cal represents the calibrated ETo values, in which the calibration parameters a and b are determined by regression analysis using as a reference the FAO-PM method; ETo lst is the ETo values estimated using the empirical models and MODIS LST as input.
The estimates obtained by each model were compared using standard statistics and linear regression analysis (Douglas et al.
2009).
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error (MAE) were calculated using the equations described below: RMSE = (1n n ∑ 1 (ETo cal – ETo R )2)0.5 (2) MAE = 1 n n ∑ 1 |ETo cal – ETo R | (3) Agricultural expansion modelling in the Taita Hills This study integrated remote sensing, GIS techniques and a spatially explicit simulation model of landscape dynamics, DINAMICA-EGO (SoaresFilho et al.
2007), to assess the agricultural expansion driving forces in the study area and simulate future scenarios of land use.
A general description of the applied method is illustrated in Figure 3.
The Land Use-Cover Change (LUCC) model receives as inputs land use transition rates, landscape variables and landscape parameters.
The landscape parameters are intrinsic spatially distributed features, such as soil type and slope, which are kept constant during the simulation process.
The landscape variables are spatial-temporal dynamic features that are subjected to changes by decision makers, for instance roads and protected areas.
Ten landscape attributes (variables/parameters) were used as inputs for the model.
Land use global transition rates refer to the total amount of changes for each type of land use/land cover transition given in the simulation period, without taking into account the spatial distribution of such changes.
The transition rates were calculated by cross-tabulation, which produced as output a transition matrix between the land cover maps from 1987 and 2003.
The dates of the land cover maps were chosen based on two criteria.
The first criterion was that the landscape changes between the initial and final landscape should accurately represent the ongoing land change activities in the study area.
That is to say, the agricultural expansion rates between 1987 and 2003 were assumed to retrieve a consistent figure of the current trends.
The second criterion relied on the availability of cloud free satellite images to assemble the land cover maps.
According to a study carried out by Clark (2010), between 1987 and 2003 cropland has expanded by 10,478 ha, reflecting an expansion rate of approximately 650 ha year–1.
The local transition probabilities, different from the global transition rates, are calculated for each grid cell considering the natural and anthropogenic characteristics of the site.
The transition proba46 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda bility of each cell was calculated in DINAMICAEGO using the weights of evidence (WoE) method (Soares-Filho et al.
2002; Almeida et al.
2008).
The WoE is a Bayesian method in which the effect of each landscape variable on a transition is calculated independently of a combined solution (Soares-Filho et al.
2002).
The spatial probability of a transition is given by the following equation (Bonham-Carter 1994): O{T } × e n i= ∑ 1 W + x,y P x,y {T/V 1 ∩ V 2 ∩ … ∩ V n } = ,(4) 1 + O{T } × t j= ∑ 1 e n i= ∑ 1 W + x,y where P x,y is the probability of transition in a cell with coordinates x,y; T represents the land use/ land cover transition; V n accounts for all possible landscape variables i selected to explain transition T; O{T} is the odd of a transition, represented by the ratio between a determined transition probability and the complementary probability of nonoccurrence, described by equation 5: O{T} = P P { { T T̄ } } , (5) where P{T} is the probability of occurrence of transition T, given by the number of cells where the concerned land use/land cover transition occurred divided by the total number of cells in the study area; P{T̄} is the probability of non-occurrence of transition T, given by the number of cells where the concerned land use/land cover transition is absent divided by the total number of cells in the study area, and W+ x,y is the weight of evidence for a determined landscape variable range, defined by the following equation: W+ = log e P P { { V V i i / / T T̄ } } , (6) where P{V i /T} is the probability of occurring variable V i in face of the previous presence of transition T, given by the number of cells where both V i and T are found divided by the total number of cells where T is found and P{V i / T̄} accounts for the probability of occurring variable V i in face of the previous absence of transition T, given by the number of cells where both V i and are found divided by the total number of cells where T is not found.
The W+ values represent the attraction between a determined landscape transition and a certain variable.
The higher the W+ value is, the greater is the probability of a certain transition to take place.
On the other hand, negative W+ values indicate Fig.
3.
General description of the modeling framework, in which landscape attributes obtained using remote sensing and GIS techniques are used as inputs for a LUCC model.
The model evaluates the role of each attribute in the land changes and simulates future landscape scenarios (adapted from Maeda et al.
2011a).
FENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 47The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … lower probability of a determined transition occurring in the presence of the respective variable range.
Based on the W+ values of each range for every considered variable, DINAMICA-EGO generates a spatially explicit probability map, in which the cell receives as attributes the probability for a determined transition.
After defining the weight of each landscape variable, transition probability maps are created for every simulated year.
Based on spatial probabilities, new agricultural patches are stochastically allocated using two algorithms: ‘expander’ and ‘patcher’.
The expander function performs the expansion of previously existing patches of a certain class.
The patcher function, in turn, is designed to generate new patches through a seed formation mechanism (Soares-Filho et al.
2002).
Assessment of potential impacts on soil erosion Future agricultural expansion and climate change scenarios were used to evaluate their potential impacts on soil erosion in the Taita Hills.
To achieve this objective a modelling framework was assembled by coupling a landscape dynamic simulation model, an erosion model and synthetic precipitation datasets generated through a stochastic weather generator.
This approach aimed to evaluate how agricultural expansion, together with climate change, can modify the variables of a widely used soil erosion model, allowing a qualitative assessment of the impacts of these changes for soil conservation.
The soil erosion model used was the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) (Wischmeier & Smith 1978).
Remote sensing and GIS techniques were combined to provide the necessary inputs for the modelling framework.
A flow chart illustrating the components of the modelling framework is presented in Figure 4.
The USLE and its revised version, RUSLE (Renard et al.
1997), have been extensively used worldwide during the last decades (Kinnell 2010).
Even though these models are known for their simplicity, their effectiveness has been demonstrated in many recent studies (e.g.
Beskow et al.
2009; Nigel & Rughooputh 2010), including several studies in Kenya (e.g.
Angima et al.
2003; Mutua et al.
2006).
The USLE is given as: A = R × K × LS × C × P (7) where A is the annual average soil loss [t ha–1 ano–1], R is the rainfall erosivity factor [MJ mm ha–1 Fig.
4.
Flow chart illustrating the integrated modelling framework concept used to estimate the impacts of agricultural expansion and climate change on soil erosion (adapted from Maeda et al.
2010b).
48 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda h–1], K is soil erodibility [t ha h MJ–1 mm–1], L and S are the topographical factor [–], C is the vegetation cover factor [–], and P represents erosion control practices [–].
Provided the fact that the K and LS factors are intrinsic characteristics of the landscape, they can be kept constant in all simulated scenarios.
On the other hand, land changes directly affect the C factor.
These changes were analysed by evaluating the average C factor value in the study area during 1987, 2003 and in the simulated scenario for 2030.
The potential impacts of agricultural expansion for soil conservation were also assessed by analysing the spatial distribution of croplands in relation to the K and LS factors.
Possible changes on the P factor were not addressed in the present study.
The rainfall erosivity factor (R) is a numerical index that expresses the capacity of the rain to erode a soil (Wischmeier & Smith 1978).
Hence, the R factor is directly affected by changes in precipitation pattern.
These changes were evaluated at monthly and yearly time steps.
Additionally, the soil erosion potential was calculated by excluding the anthropogenic variables from the USLE equation (C and P).
This approach is needed to clearly understand the role of external factors in the system without the influence of the changes in the landscape cause by human activities.
Although the USLE provides a simple and useful tool for soil conservation, studies commonly neglect the calibration and validation of this model.
Given the absence of reliable data for calibration, the presented study did not attempt to provide soil loss estimation figures.
Instead, the evaluation of the soil erosion potential among the different scenarios was based mainly on a comparative analysis of changes, following the procedure proposed by Kepner et al.
(2004) and Miller et al.
(2002).
Such procedure assumes that, using percent change observations, the parameters incorporated in an eventual calibration would be partially or totally cancelled, providing more realistic figures than absolute values of soil loss.
The absolute changes in soil erosion potential were analysed only qualitatively, taking into account the spatiotemporal distribution of changes.
The R factor was calculated using the method proposed by Renard and Freimund (1994), and recently applied by Beskow et al.
(2009).
The method is based on an empirical relationship between rainfall erosivity and the Fournier Index (FI).
The FI indicates climatic aggressiveness, which has a high correlation with the amount of sediment washed into the stream by surface runoff.
Future climatic conditions were simulated using a stochastic weather generator.
Three greenhousegas emission scenarios were considered (SRES, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios): SRA1B, SRA2 and SRB1 (Nakicenovic et al.
2000).
For each scenario, a respective synthetic precipitation datasets was created: SyA1B, SyA2 and SyB1.
The data necessary for this procedure were obtained from the IPCC data distribution centre (http:// www.ipcc-data.org).
A detailed description of the procedures used to generate the synthetic climate datasets are described in Maeda et al.
(2010b).
The K factor was calculated using the method proposed by Williams & Renard (1983).
This approach was chosen for being broadly used in recent studies (e.g.
Xiaodan et al.
2004; Rahman et al.
2009) and for requiring input variables that are commonly available worldwide.
The data necessary for calculating the K factor were obtained from the Soil and Terrain Database for Kenya (KENSOTER), which provides a harmonized set of soil parameter estimates for Kenya (Batjes & Gicheru 2004).
The topographical factor (LS) was calculated in the software USLE2D (Van Oost et al.
2000), using the algorithm proposed by Wischmeier and Smith (1978).
This calculation was performed based on a 20 m spatial resolution DEM.
Assessment of potential impacts on irrigation water requirement In this last assessment, agricultural expansion and climate change scenarios were used to evaluate their potential impacts on Irrigation Water Requirements (IWR).
Remote sensing and GIS techniques were combined to provide the necessary inputs for the modelling framework described in Figure 5.
Crop water requirement (CWR) is defined as the amount of water required to compensate the ET loss from a cropped field (Allen et al.
1998).
In cases where all the water needed for optimal growth of the crop is provided by rainfall, irrigation is not required and the IWR is zero.
In cases where all water has to be supplied by irrigation the IWR is equal to the crop ET (ETc).
However, when part of the CWR is supplied by rainfall and the remaining part by irrigation, the IWR is equal to the difference between the ETc and the Effective PreFENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 49The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … cipitation (Peff).
In such cases, the IWR was computed using the following equation (FAO 1997): IWR m = (Kc m × ETo m × 30) – Peff m (8) where: IWR m = monthly average crop water requirement in month m, [mm]; Kc m = crop coefficient in month m, [–]; ETo m = mean daily reference evapotranspiration in month m, [mm day–1]; Peff m = average effective precipitation in month m, [mm].
The Peff is defined as the fraction of rainfall retained in the root zone, which can be effectively used by the plants.
That is, the portion of precipitation that is not lost by runoff, evaporation or deep percolation.
The monthly total rainfall was converted to Peff using a simplified method proposed by Brouwer and Heibloem (1986), which is based on empirical observations and requires only the total monthly volume of precipitation.
The Hargreaves model was chosen to estimate the ETo in the study area.
The Kc values were obtained from tables recommended by FAO (Allen et al.
1998).
Nevertheless, to assign the appropriate Kc values it is essential to identify the agriculture calendar in the study area, that is, the period of the year when crops are planted, grown and harvested.
For this, monthly Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) obtained from MODIS satellite imagery were used to identify the phenological stages of croplands during the year.
A stochastic weather generator was used to estimate future precipitation and temperature conditions.
Three SRES greenhouse-gas emission scenarios were considered: SRA1B, SRA2 and SRB1 (Nakicenovic et al.
2000).
For each scenario, a respective synthetic precipitation and temperature datasets were created: SyA1B, SyA2 and SyB1.
For a detailed description of this method, please refer to Maeda et al.
(2011b).
Results Remote sensing based methods for estimating evapotranspiration The results obtained in the evaluation of the ETo models are summarized in Table 1.
The global average RMSE and MAE are fairly homogeneous for each of the evaluated models.
The RMSE ranged from 0.47 mm day–1, with the Hargreaves-LST Fig.
5.
Flow chart illustrating the integrated modelling framework concept used in assessing the potential impacts of agricultural expansion and climate change on irrigation water requirements (adapted from Maeda et al.
2011b).
50 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda model, to 0.53 mm day–1, with the Blaney-CriddleLST model.
The MAE achieved similar figures, ranging from 0.39 mm day–1, with the HargreavesLST model, to 0.46 mm day–1, with the BlaneyCriddle-LST model.
The monthly errors obtained by the tested models, in comparison with the reference method, are presented in Figure 6.
Although the monthly performance of the models is uniform between March and July, important differences are observed in January, February and between August and December (Fig.
6).
In particular for the Blaney-Criddle-LST model, it is possible to notice a clear increase of the RMSE and MAE in January, November and December.
The Blaney-Criddle-LST model performed better in months when air temperature was closely related to LST, but had its performance reduced in months when air temperature and LST are less correlated.
However, the Hargreaves-LST model was more efficient in minimizing the effects of the differences observed between air temperature and LST during November, December and January.
The model performed well during these months, retrieving RMSEs of 0.51, 0.61 and 0.51 mm day–1, respectively.
Considering the results achieved in this study and comparisons with previous research, it is concluded that the Blaney-Criddle-LST model is not appropriated for this region when using the proposed methodology.
However, the HargreavesLST model achieved the best results in the linear regression and in the analysis of errors.
The results obtained using the Hargreaves-LST are compatible with the errors observed by Gavilán et al.
(2006), which evaluated the Hargreaves equation under semiarid conditions in southern Spain, finding RMSE ranging from 0.46 to 1.65 mm d–1.
Furthermore, the correlation coefficients obtained by the Hargreaves-LST and Thornthwaite-LST models are consistent with the results reported by Narongrit Table 1.
Summary of the results obtained from the models’ error analysis and linear regression analysis Hargreaves-LST Thornthwaite-LST Blaney-Criddle-LST Correlation coefficient (R) 0.67 0.66 0.55 RMSE (mm day–1) 0.47 0.49 0.53 MAE (mm day–1) 0.39 0.42 0.46 Calibration parameter (a) 3.221 3.507 –1.980 Calibration parameter (b) 0.497 0.543 1.379 Fig.
6.
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error (MAE).
The errors are used to quantify the differences between the ETo estimated using the reference method (FAO-PM) and the estimates obtained using the empirical models parameterized using MODIS LST data (adapted from Maeda et al.
2011a).
FENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 51The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … and Yasuoka (2003), which achieved R2 of 0.57 and 0.60 when comparing these respective models with the FAO-PM method.
The driving forces of agricultural expansion and scenarios for 2030 The highest conversion rates were observed in the transition from woodlands to agriculture.
However, considering absolute numbers, shrubland areas are the most affected, given that currently they represent the predominant vegetation type in the region.
The small regions covered with broadleaved forests were nearly untouched, presenting low conversion rates, the total area decreased from 7.7 to 6.9 km2 during the observed period.
The most relevant W+ values obtained during the model calibration are shown in Fig.
7.
This information represents the attraction between a determined landscape transition and a certain landFig.
7.
W+ values attributed for each range of six landscape attributes most related to the ‘shrublands to croplands’ transition (adapted from Maeda et al.
2010a).
52 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda scape attribute.
Distance to rivers, insolation, distance to croplands, DEM, distance to roads and distant to markets were particularly associated with the land-use transitions.
The distance to croplands is an important driving factor for all transitions indicating that the proximity to previously established croplands is a key factor for agricultural expansion in this region.
Although areas close to rivers did not retrieve high positive W+ values, the importance of water bodies for croplands is clearly reflected in regions distant from rivers, where high negative W+ values are observed.
Hence, the results indicate that patches further than 1 km from water bodies have lower probability of being converted to cropland.
Distance to roads also presents a clear pattern in influencing the transition from shrublands to croplands.
Nevertheless, this attribute did not retrieve very high W+ values, possibly due to the fact that the Taita Hills comprise a relatively dense road network, diminishing the contrast between areas nearby and away from roads.
The distance to markets, here represented by the Euclidean distance to the main villages, was the most representative driving force for the agricultural expansion.
After the model is calibrated and the role of each landscape variable is defined, transition probability maps are created for each simulated year.
The spatial probabilities are used to guide the distribution of new simulated agricultural patches, which are stochastically allocated by the ‘expander’ and ‘patcher’ algorithms.
In Figure 8, the land use maps for 1987 and 2003 are displayed (upper left and upper right) together with the land use maps for 2030 resulted from the simulation.
It is observed that, in 1987, croplands were already clearly established along highlands (central area in the maps).
This is explained by the favourable climatic and edaphic conditions for agricultural activities (e.g.
high precipitation rates), which resulted in the clearance of large areas of forest during the last century.
Cropland areas expanded to Fig.
8.
Land use maps for 1987 and 2003 (upper left and upper right) and simulated scenario for 2030 (lower left) (adapted from Maeda et al.
2010b).
FENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 53The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … around 515 km2 in 2030, corresponding to about 60% of the study area.
This represents an increase of 40% in comparison to the year 2003, when croplands occupied around 365 km2.
Potential impacts on soil erosion by 2030 The results show that agricultural patches established during the last decades were carefully settled in areas with favourable topography from the soil conservation perspective, i.e.
lower LS factor.
This pattern was reinforced after 1987, when the availability of space in the hills was scarce and the agriculture started expanding to flat areas along the foothills.
In the agricultural expansion simulated for 2030, a slight increase is noted in cropland patches settled in areas with LS factor between 1 and 10, whereas the most significant increase was again in areas with a topographic factor between 0 and 1.
The soil erodibility factor in the study area varied from 0.0139 to 0.0307, allowing the distinction of eight different erodibility classes.
Because soil erodibility figures may vary according to the method used for calculation, the results were analysed only in a comparative base, taking into account the soil erodibility range found in the study area.
In 1987 and 2003 agricultural areas were established mainly in soils with medium erodibility (0.0205−0.0255).
The simulated agricultural expansion for 2030 was also higher in these soils.
The low occurrence of agricultural activities in soils with higher erosivity is explained firstly by the low area occupied by these soils in the study area and secondly by the fact that such soils, together with climatic variables, create unfavourable conditions for agricultural practices.
Therefore, the results indicate that agricultural activities are unlikely to expand into areas with higher soil erodibility.
The average R factor for the study area was approximately 3040 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 year–1 when considering current climate conditions.
This result is consistent with figures obtained in other semiarid regions.
Da Silva (2004) found that erosivity varied from 2000 to 4000 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 year–1 in semi-arid regions in the north-east of Brazil.
However, in regions with high topographic heterogeneity, such as the Taita Hills, it is crucial to consider local variations at detailed spatial scales.
The erosivity values obtained in the SyA2 scenario resulted in the most evident differences in comparison with current conditions.
In January, March, May and December the changes in precipitation resulted in a clear but slight decrease in rainfall erosivity.
The erosivity reduction during these months varied from 4 to 120 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 month–1.
However, still for the SyA2 scenario, a large increase was observed in April (280 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 month–1) and November (260 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 month–1).
For the SyB1 scenario, the increases in rainfall erosivity during April and November were lower, approximately 217 and 40 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 month–1, respectively.
A slight decrease was also observed during March, May and December, but in contrast with the SyA2 scenario, the erosivity during January was almost constant, with a minor increase of 27 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 month–1.
The SyA1B was the most conservative scenario, although clear changes are still present.
Namely, it showed the highest erosivity increases during January and December, while it confirmed the tendency of a decrease in erosivity during March and May.
In general, it is plausible to assert that the climate changes simulated for the study area are likely to decrease rainfall erosivity during March and May due to a slight reduction in precipitation rates in these months.
However, the model indicates the possibility of an increase, of much higher magnitudes during April and November.
The disagreements between the simulated scenarios in January and December indicate higher uncertainties during these months.
For June, July, August and September rainfall erosivity values are likely to continue to be very low.
For all scenarios it is noted that low or no change occurs in the lowlands (roughly 500 m above sea level).
The changes, however, start to be more evident along areas higher than 1000 m a.s.l., where average precipitation rates are higher.
In particular for the SyA2 scenario, changes are very high above 1500 m, reaching absolute differences up to 1500 MJ mm ha–1 h–1 year–1 when compared with current conditions.
Potential impacts on irrigation water requirement by 2030 Spatial and temporal variations on ETo are strong both in the lowlands and in the hills.
In general ETo is higher in the months of September and October, and reaches the lowest values between April and June.
The correlation between ETo and altitude varies according to season and altitude range.
ETo follows more closely the changes in the alti54 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda tude in October than in May.
In May, the variation ranges from 4.5 to 5.4 mm day–1 while in October the variation is from 5.3 to 6.9 mm day–1.
From 1987 to 2003, a large number of cropland patches were created in areas with ETo between 5.7 and 5.9 mm day–1, while few new patches were implemented in areas with lower ETo (<5 mm day–1).
This tendency was strongly sustained during the scenario simulated for 2030.
Hence, it is feasible to assert that by 2030 new croplands are likely to take place in areas where ETo values are historically higher.
Considering an invariable climate condition, the agricultural expansion observed between 1987 and 2003 resulted in an IWR increase of 42%.
An integrated analysis of this result with the historical precipitation volumes in the study area indicates that the agricultural expansion has likely reached unsustainable levels from the water resources point of view.
That is to say, by 2003 the annual average precipitation volume in the entire study area (~390 million m3 year–1) was already insufficient to meet the water resource requirements necessary to achieve optimal crop production in every agricultural property.
Among the scenarios simulated for 2030, the scenario considering current climate conditions resulted in the highest annual IWR volume, reaching approximately 610 million m3 year–1.
All the climate change scenarios (SyA1B, SyA2 and SyB1) caused a slight reduction in the IWR when compared with current conditions.
Therefore, the results indicate that the climate change tendencies up to 2030 are likely to decrease the total annual volume of IWR in this study area.
A comparison between the annual IWR maps for 1987, 2003 and 2030, considering they Sy scenario, is presented in Figure 9.
Figure 10 shows the monthly IWR values for all simulated scenarios.
The increase in IWR caused by the agricultural expansion component is clearly identified in an offset of the curves among different years.
Considering only the curves for the year 2030, the climate changes simulated in the SyA1B, SyB1 and SyA2 datasets indicate a tendency of increase in the IWR during March and May when compared with a scenario with unchanged climate conditions (Sy2030).
This tendency is inverted in April and November, when a slight decrease is observed in the IWR.
During the other months, the IWR is kept relatively constant among the different climate scenarios.
In these cases, eventual increases in the temperature were likely to be compensated by increases in rainfall volume, keeping the IWR constant.
From the practical point of view, the results indicate a higher water demand during the seeding season, in February/ March, and during the period of maximum development of the crops, in May.
Climate changes are likely to decrease the water demand for irrigation during both crop growing seasons in April and November.
Fig.
9.
Annual irrigation water requirement maps for 1987, 2003 and 2030.
The black areas in the map represent regions where no agricultural activities are taking place (adapted from Maeda et al.
2011b).
FENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 55The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … Discussion The Taita Hills are among the most degraded areas in the Eastern Arc Mountains, having lost approximately 99% of their original forest during the last few centuries (Pellikka et al.
2009).
Although this number may sound discouraging, it also makes the Taita Hills a unique learning environment for the protection of more preserved areas in the Eastern Arc, such as Udzungwas, East Usambaras and Ulugurus.
Therefore, the causes behind this massive forest loss must not be ignored.
In particular, the fact that these highlands have significant importance for providing food and income to local population should be acknowledged.
Previous studies have shown that agriculture was the main cause of forest conversion in the Taita Hills (e.g.
Clark 2010).
Consequently, it is already known that agricultural activities are actively present in the Taita Hills, and continues to expand.
Nevertheless, the answers for other important questions remain unclear or unsolved.
To better understand the degradation process in the Eastern Arc it is essential to determine what type of agricultural activities are taking place, to where it may expand in the future and what impacts it will cause.
The combined results of this study provide initial arguments to deal with these important questions.
Public policies need to take into consideration the areas where agriculture is more likely to expand in the future.
The answer for this question can only be achieved through a detailed assessment of the forces driving the land changes.
In this context, this study presents a pioneer assessment of the driving forces of agricultural expansion in the Taita Hills.
The results obtained in this analysis closely agree with previous studies carried out in other locations in Kenya.
For instance, studying the Narok District in Kenya, Serneels and Lambin (2001) found that the expansion of small-holder agriculture is mainly controlled by proximity to permanent water, land suitability and vicinity to villages.
In addition to delineating agricultural expansion scenarios for the year 2030, this article also addressed potential environmental impacts caused by land changes.
The highlands of Kenya and Tanzania are considered natural water towers, given that the higher precipitation rates in these areas historically provide water resources for large regions along the lowlands throughout the year (Aeschbacher et al.
2005; Viviroli & Weingartner 2008).
However, the results presented in this study, Fig.
10.
Monthly irrigation water requirements volume for the entire study area during the years 1987, 2003 and 2030.
For the year 2030, four climate scenarios are considered (adapted from Maeda et al.
2011b).
56 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda and confirmed by field work observations, indicate that the average precipitation rates in the Taita Hills are no longer able to provide water resources for the lowlands during the entire year.
It is plausible to consider that the changes observed in water resources availability in the Taita Hills are likely to be caused by two main factors.
Firstly, the increasing use of water resources for irrigation in the hills might be causing a decrease in rivers’ flow, diminishing or in some case depleting the volume of water in the downstream portion of the rivers.
The second, but not less important, factor contributing to this issue is likely to be related to changes in the hydrological response of the rivers’ basins caused by the replacement of natural vegetation in favour of croplands.
Previous studies have shown that land changes may increase surface runoff (e.g.
Germer et al.
2010) and have direct impacts on water balance (e.g.
Li et al.
2009).
These factors can potentially reduce water retention in the watershed, decreasing the flow during the dry seasons.
The replacement of natural vegetation cover will also contribute for accelerated soil erosion.
Therefore, the undertaken soil conservations practices must be set as a priority action in the Taita Hills.
Although changes in erosion control practices (P factor) were not considered in this study, previous investigations have shown that appropriate land management can significantly decrease soil erosion.
For instance, studying soil erosion risk scenarios in Calabria, southern Italy, Terranova et al.
(2009) show that erosion control practices can cause a significant reduction of the erosive rate, decreasing from roughly 30 to 12.3 Mg ha–1 year–1.
Feng et al.
(2010) demonstrated that soil conservation measures taken by the Chinese government (Grain-for-Green project) significantly decreased soil erosion in the Loess Plateau between the years 1990 and 2005.
Finally, it is important to mention that the issues involving water resources and soil conservation can and should be tackled in an integrated manner.
For instance, the adoption of practices to reduce surface runoff, such as terraces, is an important step to avoid soil erosion, and at the same time it enhances water infiltration into the soil, allowing a better recharge of groundwater reservoirs.
Furthermore, opting for cultivars capable of maintaining some vegetation protection over the soil for longer periods can contribute to avoiding the direct impact of rainfall in the soil and improve soil structure.
These factors not only reduce soil erosion, but also contribute to lower soil evaporation rates and a better water infiltration.
In this context, the consolidation of agroforestry systems using native plant species may be highly beneficial to the local agriculture, and an excellent alternative for replacing the eucalyptus plantation forests in the Taita Hills.
Conclusions and further studies Two general contributions can be highlighted from the results obtained in this study.
The first contribution lies in the development and assessment of alternative approaches to improve the acquisition of data related to key aspects of agricultural activities in the Taita Hills.
The second relates to the establishment of novel knowledge by delineating unprecedented insights on future environmental scenarios for the region.
Considering the above contributions, the results of this study have a large potential to attain researchers, policy makers and local population.
An alternative method for estimating ETo was evaluated by integrating remote sensing data and empirical models.
The combined use of the Hargreaves ETo model and MODIS LST data retrieved an average RMSE close to 0.5 mm d–1.
This outcome is consistent with results obtained by previous studies reported in the literature using weather data collected by ground stations.
Moreover, the errors and uncertainties identified in the use of remote sensing LST can be tolerated considering the reduced weather data collection network in this region.
Further studies are necessary to expand this method for other regions in East-Africa.
In particular, the spatial variability of the calibration parameters for different climate conditions over EastAfrica needs to be identified.
Moreover, the method can be significantly improved by using low cost direct methods (e.g.
lysimeters) to calibrate the empirical equations.
In relation to the agricultural expansion modelling in the Taita Hills, a connected relation between villages and roads is evident in the definition of new cropland patches.
The proximity to already established crop fields is also one of the key factors driving the agricultural expansion.
If current trends persist, it is expected that agricultural areas will occupy 60% of the study area by 2030.
LUCC simulations indicate that agricultural expansion is likely to take place predominantly in lowlands and foothills throughout the next 20 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 57The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … years.
Current trends indicate that the small residual areas of tropical cloud forest, home to a great part of the biodiversity in the Taita Hills, is likely to remain intact throughout the coming years.
Nevertheless, the impact of the increasing habitat fragmentation in such biodiversity is a relevant issue that must be addressed in further studies.
The replacement of shrublands and woodlands in favour of croplands expected for the next decades is very likely to reduce the vegetation cover protecting the soil against the direct impact of rainfall, resulting in accelerated soil erosion.
By the year 2030, rainfall erosivity is likely to increase during April and November.
All scenarios converge to a slight erosivity decrease tendency during March and May.
The highest uncertainties were observed in January and December, when some scenarios indicate a small reduction in erosivity while some indicate an increase.
Accounting for land changes and climate changes in an integrated manner, it is plausible to conclude that the highlands of the Taita Hills must be prioritized for soil conservation policies during the next 20 years.
Although new croplands are likely to be settled in lowlands over the next decades, increases in precipitation volumes are expected to be higher in highlands.
Moreover, it was demonstrated that in areas with elevated LS factor, typically in the highlands, increasing rainfall will have significantly higher impacts on soil erosion potential.
Due to the limited availability of non-agricultural land in the highlands, new cropland areas are being settled in areas with low precipitation and higher temperatures.
The continuity of this trend is likely to drive agricultural lands to areas with a higher IWR, increasing the spatial dependence on distance to rivers and other water bodies.
Although the simulated scenarios indicate that climate change will likely increase annual volumes of rainfall during the following decades, IWR will continue to increase due to agricultural expansion.
By 2030, new cropland areas may cause an increase of approximately 40% in the annual volume of water necessary for irrigation.
NOTES This article is a reduced version of the synopsis of the academic dissertation “Agricultural expansion and climate change in the Taita Hills, Kenya: an assessment of potential environmental impacts”, University of Helsinki, 2011.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Prof Petri Pellikka for providing scientific supervision during this study.
Part of the dataset used in the land-change assessments was provided by Dr Barnaby Clark and Dr Mika Siljander.
REFERENCES Aeschbacher J, Liniger H & Weingartner R 2005.
River water shortage in a highland–lowland system.
Mountain Research and Development 25: 2, 155– 162.
Allen RG, Pereira LS, Raes D & Smith M 1998.
Crop evapotranspiration − Guidelines for computing crop water requirements.
FAO Irrigation and drainage paper 56.
FAO, Rome.
Almeida CM, Gleriani JM, Castejon EF & Soares-Filho BS 2008.
Using neural networks and cellular au-tomata for modeling intra-urban land use dynamics.
International Journal of Geographical Information Science 22: 9, 943−963.
Angima SD, Scott DE, O’Neill MK, Ong CK & Weesies GK 2003.
Soil erosion using RUSLE for central Kenyan highlands conditions.
Agricultural Ecosystems and Environment 97: 1−3, 295–308.
Bakker MM, Govers G, Jones RA & Rounsevell MDA 2007.
The effect of soil erosion on Europe’s crop yields.
Ecosystems 10: 7, 1209−1219.
Batjes NH & Gicheru P 2004.
Soil data derived from SOTER for studies of carbon stocks and change in Kenya (ver.
1.0; GEFSOC Project).
Report 2004/01.
ISRIC – World Soil Information, Wageningen.
Beskow S, Mello CR, Norton LD, Curi N, Viola MR & Avanzi JC 2009.
Soil erosion prediction in the Grande River Basin, Brazil using distributed modelling.
Catena 79: 1, 49−59.
Blaney HF & Criddle WD 1962.
Determining consumptive use and irrigation water requirements.
USDA Technical Bulletin 1275.
US Department of Agriculture, Beltsville.
Bonham-Carter G 1994.
Geographic information systems for geoscientists: Modelling with GIS.
Elsevier Science, Pergamon, Kidlington.
Brouwer C & Heibloem M 1986.
Irrigation water management.
Training Manual 3.
FAO, Rome.
Burgess ND, Butynski TM, Cordeiro NJ, Doggart NH, Fjeldså J, Howell KM, Kilahama FB, Loader SP, Lovett JC, Mbilinyi B, Menegon M, Moyer DC, Nashanda E, Perkin A, Rovero F, Stanley WT & Stuart SN 2007.
The biological importance of the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania and Kenya.
Biological Conservation 134: 2, 209−231.
Cai J, Liu Y, Lei T & Pereira LS 2007.
Estimating refer-ence evapotranspiration with the FAO PenmanMonteith equation using daily weather forecast 58 FENNIA 190: 1 (2012)Eduardo Eiji Maeda messages.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 145: 1−2, 22−35.
Clark B 2010.
Enhanced processing of SPOT multispectral satellite imagery for environmental monitoring and modelling.
Doctoral dissertation.
University of Helsinki, Faculty of Science.
Da Silva AM 2004.
Rainfall erosivity map for Brazil.
Catena 57, 251–259.
Douglas EM, Jacobs JM, Sumner DM & Ray RL 2009.
A comparison of models for estimating potential evapotranspiration for Florida land cover types.
Journal of Hydrology 373: 3−4, 366−376.
Frenken K 1997.
Irrigation potential in Africa: A basin approach.
(FAO Land and Water Bulletin 4) Land and Water Development Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.
Italy.
FAO 2005.
AQUASTAT information system on water and agriculture.
<http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm> 10.09.2012.
Feng X, Wang Y, Chen L, Fu B & Bai G 2010.
Modeling soil erosion and its response to land-use change in hilly catchments of the Chinese Loess Plateau.
Geomorphology 118: 3−4, 239−248.
Fischer G, Tubiello FN, van Velthuizen H & Wiberg DA 2007.
Climate change impacts on irrigation water requirements: Effects of mitigation, 1990−2080.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74: 7, 1083−1107.
Foley J, de Fries R, Asner GP, Barford C, Bonan G & Carpenter SR 2005.
Global consequences of land use.
Science 309, 570−574.
Gavilán P, Lorite IJ, Tornero S & Berengena J 2006.
Regional calibration of Hargreaves equation for estimating reference ET in a semiarid environment.
Agriculture Water Management 81, 257–281.
Germer S, Neill C, Krusche AV & Elsenbeer H 2010.
Influence of land-use change on near-surface hydrological processes: Undisturbed forest to pasture.
Journal of Hydrology 380: 3−4, 473−480.
Hargreaves GH & Samani ZA 1985.
Reference crop evapotranspiration from temperature.
Applied Engineering in Agriculture 1: 2, 96–99.
Istvánovics V 2009.
Eutrophication of lakes and reservoirs.
Encyclopedia of Inland Waters, 157−165.
Jabloun M & Sahli A 2008.
Evaluation of FAO-56 methodology for estimating reference evapotranspiration using limited climatic data.
Application to Tunisia.
Agricultural Water Management 95: 6, 707−715.
Jaetzold R & Schmidt H 1983.
Farm Management Handbook of Kenya, vol.
II.
East Kenya.
Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, Kenya.
Kepner WG, Semmens DJ, Bassett SD, Mouat DA & Goodrich DC 2004.
Scenario analysis for the San Pedro River, analysing hydrological consequences of a future environment.
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 94, 115–127.
Kinnell PIA 2010.
Event soil loss, runoff and the universal soil loss equation family of models: A review.
Journal of Hydrology 385: 1−4, 384−397.
Kirkby MJ & Bracken LJ 2009.
Gully processes and gully dynamics.
Earth Surface Processes and Landforms 34: 14, 1841−1851.
KNBS (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics) 2010.
2009 Population and Housing Census.
<http:// www.knbs.or.ke/> 10.09.2012 Li Z, Liu W, Zhang X & Zheng F 2009.
Impacts of land use change and climate variability on hydrology in an agricultural catchment on the Loess Plateau of China.
Journal of Hydrology 377: 1−2, 35−42.
Maeda EE, Clark BJF, Pellikka PKE & Siljander M 2010a.
Modelling agricultural expansion in Kenya’s eastern arc mountains biodiversity hotspot.
Agricultural Systems 103: 9, 609−620.
Maeda EE, Pellikka P, Siljander M & Clark BJF 2010b.
Potential impacts of agricultural expansion and climate change on soil erosion in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Kenya.
Geomorphology 123: 3−4, 279−289.
Maeda EE, Wiberg DA & Pellikka PKE 2011a.
Estimating reference evapotranspiration using remote sensing and empirical models in a region with limited ground data availability in Kenya.
Applied Geography 31: 1, 251−258.
Maeda EE, Pellikka PKE, Clark BJF & Siljander M 2011b.
Prospective changes in irrigation water requirements caused by agricultural expansion and climate changes in the eastern arc mountains of Kenya.
Journal of Environmental Management 92: 3, 982−993.
Miller SN, Kepner WG, Mehaffey MH, Hernandez H, Miller RC, Goodrich DC, Devonald KK, Heggem DT & Miller WP 2002.
Integrating landscape assessment and hydrologic modeling for land cover change analysis.
Journal of the American Water Resources Association 38, 915−929.
Mutua BM, Klik A & Loiskandl W 2006.
Modelling soil erosion and sediment yield at a catchment scale: the case of Masinga catchment, Kenya.
Land Degradation & Development 17, 557– 570.
Myers N, Mittermeier RA, Mittermeier CG, Fonseca GAB & Kent J 2000.
Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities.
Nature 403: 6772, 853−858.
Nakicenovic N, Alcamo J, Davis G, de Vries B, Fenhann J, Gaffin S, Gregory K, Grübler A, Jung TY, Kram T, Lebre la Rovere E, Michaelis L, Mori S, Morita T, Pepper W, Pitcher H, Price L, Riahi K, Roehrl A, Rogner HH, Sankovski A, Schlesinger M, Shukla P, Smith S, Swart R, van Rooijen S, Victor N & Dadi Z 2000.
Emissions scenarios: A special report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Narongrit C & Yasuoka Y 2003.
The use of TerraMODIS data for estimating evapotranspiration and its change caused by global warming.
Environmental Informatics Archives 1, 505−511.
Nigel R & Rughooputh S 2010.
Mapping of monthly soil erosion risk of mainland Mauritius and its agFENNIA 190: 1 (2012) 59The future of environmental sustainability in the Taita Hills, … gregation with delineated basins.
Geomorphology 114: 3, 101−114.
Oki T & Kanae S 2006.
Global hydrological cycles and world water resources.
Science 313: 1068, 1068−1072.
Pellikka PKE, Lötjönen M, Siljander M & Lens L 2009.
Airborne remote sensing of spatiotemporal change (1955−2004) in indigenous and exotic forest cover in the Taita Hills, Kenya.
International Journal of Applied Earth Observations and Geoinformation 11: 4, 221−232.
Rahman MR, Shi ZH & Chongfa C 2009.
Soil erosion hazard evaluation − An integrated use of remote sensing, GIS and statistical approaches with biophysical parameters towards management strategies.
Ecological Modelling 220: 13−14, 1724−1734.
Renard KG & Freimund JR 1994.
Using monthly precipitation data to estimate the Rfactor in the revised USLE.
Journal of Hydrology 157, 287–306.
Renard KG, Foster GR, Weesies GA, McCool DK & Yoder DC 1997.
Predicting Soil Erosion by Water: A Guide to Conservation Planning with the Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE).
USDA Agriculture Handbook 703.
USDA-ARS, Tucson, USA.
Serneels S & Lambin EF 2001.
Proximate causes of land-use change in Narok district, Kenya: A spatial statistical model.
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 85: 1−3, 65−81.
Soares-Filho BS, Pennachin CL & Cerqueira G 2002.
DINAMICA – a stochastic cellular automata model designed to simulate the landscape dynamics in an Amazonian colonization frontier.
Ecological Modelling 154: 3, 217−235.
Soares-Filho BS, Garcia RA & Rodrigues HO 2007.
Coupling socio economic and demographic dimensions to a spatial simulation model of deforestation for the Brazilian Amazon.
Paper presented at the LBAECO 11th Science Team Meeting.
Soini E 2005.
Livelihood capital, strategies and outcomes in the Taita hills of Kenya.
ICRAF Working Paper no.
8.
World Agroforestry Centre, Nairobi.
Terranova O, Antronico L, Coscarelli R & Iaquinta P 2009.
Soil erosion risk scenarios in the Mediter-ranean environment using RUSLE and GIS: An application model for Calabria (southern Italy).
Geomorphology 112: 3−4, 228−245.
Thornthwaite CW 1948.
An approach toward a rational classification of climate.
Geographical Review 38, 55–94.
Tilman D, Fargione J, Wolff B, D’Antonio C, Dobson A, Howarth R, Schindler D, Schlesinger WH, Simberloff D & Swackhamer D 2001.
Forecasting agriculturally driven global environmental change.
Science 292, 281–284.
UN (United Nations) 2010.
World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision Population Database.
<http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_population.
htm> 10.09.2012.
Van Oost K, Govers G & Desmet P 2000.
Evaluating the effects of changes in landscape structure on soil erosion by water and tillage.
Landscape Ecology 15: 6, 577−589.
Viviroli D & Weingartner R 2008.
“Water Towers” − A global view of the hydrological importance of mountains.
In Wiegandt E (ed).
Mountains: Sources of water, Sources of Knowledge.
Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Wang K, Wan Z, Wang P, Sparrow M, Liu J, Zhou X & Haginoya S 2005.
Estimation of surface long wave radiation and broadband emissivity using moderate resolution imaging spectroradiometer (MODIS) land surface temperature/emissivity products.
Journal of Geophysical Research 110, D11109.
Williams JR & Renard KG 1983.
EPIC: a new method for assessing erosion’s effects on soil productivity.
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 38, 381– 383 Wischmeier WH & Smith DD 1978.
Predicting rainfall erosion losses.
A guide to conservation planning.
Agricultural Handbook 537.
United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.
Xiaodan W, Xianghao Z & Jianrong F 2004.
Assessment and spatial distribution of sensitivity of soil erosion in Tibet.
Journal of Geographical Sciences 14: 1, 41−46.
Yang D, Kanae S, Oki T, Koike T & Musiake K 2003.
Global potential soil erosion with reference to land use and climate changes.
Hydrological Processes 17: 14, 2913−2928.
Microsoft Word Sulis-Fafa_edit01.edited.docx Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 29 Review Article CLIMATE CHANGE and DENGUE in INDONESIA: a SYSTEMATIC REVIEW Fajar Fatmawati 1 and Sulistyawati Sulistyawati 1* 1 Faculty of Public Health, Universitas Ahmad Dahlan, Yogyakarta, Indonesia * Correspondence: Email: sulistyawatisuyanto@gmail.com.
Tel: +628170402693 Received 07 August 2019; Accepted 09 September 2019; Published 09 September 2019 ABSTRACT Background: Climate change is a global issue because of its impact on environmental and human health.
No exception for Indonesia, an archipelago state with a tropical climate.
Climate change potentially influences the mosquitos borne disease, including dengue fever, which poses a vulnerability to the Indonesian populations.
This article aims to review the association and the impact of climate change to dengue fever, particularly in Indonesia and to inform the policymaker on directing the adaptation option.
Methods: Of thirteen peer review articles were included in this review sourced from google scholar database.
Results: Climate change affects dengue incidence in Indonesia due to climate variability.
Conclusions: It is essential to Strengthen the surveillance system and provide an early warning system (EWS) based on climate information.
Keywords: Climate change, dengue, Indonesia INTRODUCTION Climate change which is a global phenomenon received attention from many countries due to its impact on human and environment.
Global temperature surface during the decade of 2006-2015 was 0.870C, and between 2030 and 2052 it has been predicted that temperature will be 1.5°C.
Consequently, the risk of climate change to health is expected to be growing (1).
Temperature plays a vital role in the development, longevity, reproduction and virus transmission of mosquito (2).
Climate change is suspected to aggravate the risk of mosquito-borne disease, including dengue fever.
This situation is a global threat, particularly for countries in South Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa (3).
Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 30 Indonesia is a tropical climate country and archipelagic state.
Accordingly, this country is easily affected by climate change such as temperature rising and climate shifting that carries some impacts such as drought and failure of harvesting.
Climate change in Indonesia can be seen from the increasing of the temperature above average every year and the decreasing of annual rainfall in some regions.
The South part of Indonesia tends to have less rain while the north has more rainfall, even it is always increasing (4).
The temperature average in Indonesia during 1981-2010 was 27oC.
However, in May 2019, it was detected that it was increasing up to 0,9oC (5).
Dengue is a disease that is closely associated with the environmental condition.
As a result, the changing of environment will lead to a dengue transmission pattern.
Dengue case in Indonesia in the last 45 years is increasing dramatically with intermitted hyperendemic pattern (6) which affected the health of the large population.
This occurrence predicted the interplay between the disease and climate variable.
For example, the changing of temperature, humidity and wind speed affects the changing of the number of vector population not only for dengue but also for some other diseases such as malaria, leptospirosis and filariasis (7).
In 2017, the number of dengue case in Indonesia was decreasing significantly from the previous period by having 204.171 cases (8).
However, this situation could be different in the next coming year due to the changing the environment, such as climate changes.
Accordingly, a study to summarise the Indonesian situation regarding dengue and climate change is essential as a part to prepare adaptation strategy to anticipate the worst situation.
This review aims to summarize the previous research that elaborate on the relationship between climate change phenomenon and dengue incidence in Indonesia.
The goal of this review is to develop an idea on an adaptation strategy to reduce dengue disease in the future.
METHODS Search Strategy Google and Google scholar were used as the main source of database accessed in June-July 2019 to extract studies published both in English and Bahasa Indonesia that discussed Indonesia context.
A set of combination keywords: “Dengue haemorrhagic fever”, “dengue fever & climate”, “weather”, “climate change”, “climate variability”, “climatic factors”, “temperature”, “rainfall”, “humidity”, “indonesia" were used to search the article.
We observed research paper published during 2014-2019.
Title, keyword and abstracts were screened for the first step for the relevant article and the full paper that met our criteria inclusion, were included in our analysis.
Inclusion criteria 1.
Articles must appraise the impact of climate change on dengue transmission and spread by discussing climate variables such as temperature, rainfall and humidity and disease variables such as incidence and case.
2.
The article should employ epidemiology design such as actual analysis, Spatio-temporal and descriptive study for identifying the relationship between climate variable versus dengue transmission and spreading 3.
The article should discuss Indonesia and published in 2014-2019 Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 31 Figure 1.
Flow chart of article review Results Literature search Two hundred and sixty-one articles were collected from Google scholar in the first step.
Among them, 240 articles were excluded since they did not meet the title and keyword, while 21 articles were included.
In terms of the full paper, 16 articles were included, and at the final stage, 13 articles met our inclusion criteria.
Methodology and main finding of the 13 articles are summarised in Table 1.
The study took place in Sleman (n=2), North Minahasa District, Ternate City, Limboto subdistrict, Jakarta City, Sulawesi Tenggara Province, Surabaya City, Medan City, Banjarmasin City, Cirebon District, Kolaka District and Indonesia.
All of the included articles were studying the association between climate variable and dengue incidence.
Some methods were used to determine the relationship between the climate variable and dengue incidence.
Three of them employed a descriptive study through ecologic approach (9),(13),(18).
Correlation and multiple regressions (Poisson), path analysis which is an extension from linear regression also used as an approach 18.
Three articles used time series (12),(16),(21), one article employed time series decomposition analysis with Loess (STL) model and one article used smoothing (19).
Only one article used ecology proxy indicators such as Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), Moran's I analysis, and LISA Studies were selected for more detailed evaluation (fulltext articles were retrieved, and abstracts were read) (n=16) 3 articles did not meet inclusion criteria: Discussing climate change and dengue fever Discussing Indonesia Research paper Published in 2014-2019 240 articles were excluded because the title and keywords were not relevant Potentially relevant studies were identified by searching in Google Scholar database (n=261).
Studies were selected by title and keywords (n=21) Potentially relevant studies (n=13) Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 32 analysis (19).
Some research elaborated the determinants such as attitude and behaviour, environmental, land cover type, and altitude (11), (14), (15).
GAM model was used to express the non-linear relationship and non-monotonic between the response variable and predictor (17).
Four articles reviewed the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) to create a risk map based on vector distribution (12),(17),(19),(21).
DISCUSSION Association between climate variable and dengue incidence In most of the endemic research location studied, climate variable was significantly correlated to dengue cases.
Temperature, humidity, and rainfall were the standard variables associated with dengue incidence.
To identify climate risk factor to dengue incidence in Indonesia, research had been done to seek the relationship between meteorological variable and dengue (9-21).
According to the analysis, almost all of the article reported that temperature had a correlation to dengue transmission from low to medium power.
In Ternate, monthly temperature average is 24.8oC-29.0oC.
The highest temperature occurred in 2009 (29oC).
At that moment, dengue incidence was increasing from January, and the peak occurred in March (10).
This occurrence was probably associated with mosquito longevity which is at 27oC, so the increase of the temperature influences the dengue virus.
In other areas, the temperature did not have a correlation with dengue incidence, possibly due to the low temperature in that location.
Such as in Sleman-Yogyakarta, the monthly temperature average is 22,8oC-27,2oC, meaning that it tends to be cold for the maturation of mosquito egg.
Low temperature shortens the incubation period and prolongs the mosquito reproduction cycle as well as reduces mosquito biting (22).
Large differentiating temperature influences the number of female mosquitos, meaning that the number of blood-sucking mosquitoes for transmitting the virus is decreasing (11).
Meanwhile, in Gamping subdistrict-Godean-Sleman District, Medan City and Kolaka District, the differences of maximum-minimum of the temperature were associated with dengue incidence (11), (17), (20).
The high disparity of minimum and maximum temperature impacts on the low of dengue incidence (11).
Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 33 Table 1.
Studies characteristic discussed the association between climatic variables and dengue Study & Language Study area & period Data Collection Statistical Methods Main findings Comments Risk factors Disease/ vector Lasut et al.
(2017) Indonesian (9) North Minasaha District 20142016 Temperature, humidity, wind speed, rainfall and number of days with rain Case counts Quantitative by using an ecology study design Correlation test Linear regression A positive correlation was found between temperature, humidity, wind speed and dengue incidence Rainfall and number of day rain were not associated with dengue incidence A three-year short study period Tomia et al.
(2016) Bahasa Indonesian (10) Ternate City 2007-2014 Rainfall, temperature and humidity The monthly incidenc e of dengue -Pearson correlation Temperature and dengue incidence were found correlate Rainfall and humidity were not associated with dengue incidence Employed correlation Added other variables such as habitat characteristic, larvae free number and community participation on breeding site habitat cleaning movement (PSN) Lag times of climatic factors were analysed Kesetyanin gsih et al.
(2017) English (11) Sleman District 2008-2013 Monthly minimummaximum temperature Monthly incidenc e of dengue -Linear regression Temperature variability was found to be associated with dengue incidence The only temperature included Explaining other factor such as host factors and the environmental factors Pakaya, Ririn (2015) English (12) Limboto, Gorontalo 20122015 Precipitation, temperature, humidity and wind speed Case counts -Cross sectional -Spearman correlation Poisson regression -GIS The association between humidity and dengue incidence was found to be significantly negative A four-years short study period Hasannah Jakarta 2008Temperature, Case Descriptive with Strong correlation was found Relative long study period Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 34 & Dewi Susanna (2019) English (13) 2016 rainfall, and humidity counts ecology study design -Correlation test between humidity and dengue incidence -Medium correlation was found between temperature and dengue incidence Rainfall had weak correlation to dengue incidence Kesetyanin gsih et al.
(2018) English (14) Sleman District 2008-2013 Humidity, land cover, altitude, rainfall and temperature Monthly incidenc e of dengue -Spatial test -Spearmen correlation test -Pearson correlation Humidity has medium correlation to dengue incidence Land cover, altitude, rainfall had weak correlation with dengue incidence Temperature was not associated with dengue incidence All climate parameter did not influence dengue incidence in sporadic area Case number per month was absence Tosepu et al.
(2018) English (15) Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi 20102015 Temperature, rainfall and humidity Monthly incidenc e of dengue -Spearmen test -Time-series Poisson regression multivariate Temperature has positive association with dengue incidence Rainfall did not associated with dengue incidence Humidity did not associated with dengue incidence Geographical conditions and behaviour were explained Tang et al.
(2019) English (16) Surabaya City 2009-2017 Temperature average, rainfall and humidity Monthly incidenc e of dengue -One-Sample Kolmogorov Smirnov Test Spearman correlation Rainfall and humidity were associated to dengue incidence Temperature average did not associate with dengue incidence One city was included Difficult to observe the influence of temperature because of the lack of seasonal variation of temperature in Surabaya Lack of mosquito data Setiawati, et al.
(2017) Medan 20022016 Average temperature, max-min Case counts -Compile data base -GAM model Rainfall, humidity, rainfall, maximum temperature influenced dengue incidence Several statistical methods were applied Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 35 English (17) temperature, relative humidity, precipitation -Design vulnerability Index & Generate in GIS Climate variability influenced 74.8% of dengue incidence Ishak et al.
(2018) English (18) Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan 2012-2016 Temperature, humidity, wind speed, rainfall Monthly incidenc e of dengue Quantitative descriptive with ecological time trend Path analysis the only variable that shown positive correlation between dengue incidence and rainfall Relative short study period Astuti et al.
(2019) English (19) Cirebon, West Java 2011-2017 Rainfall, temperature, humidity and NDVI Monthly incidenc e of dengue -Spearman correlation -Poisson (GLM) -Spatial analysis -Time series (decomposition analysis with STL) Moran’s I analysis LISA analysis Rainfall, temperature and humidity were associated to dengue incidence One city was included Several statistical methods were applied Ssocioeconomic factors were Considered Spatial-temporal analysis Tosepu et al.
(2018) English (20) Kolaka, Southeast Celebes 20102015 Rainfall, humidity, temperature average, minimummaximum temperature Monthly incidenc e of dengue -Regression linear -Spearman correlation -Poisson distribution All climate variables investigated were associated with dengue incidence Various meteorological variables were considered Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 Haryanto.
Budi (2016) English (21) Indonesia 19802010 Temperature and rainfall Case counts -Ecological time-series study design -Vulnerability Analysis of the IPCC 2001 -Correlation and regression analysis -GIS High intensity of rainfall had weak association in 11 districts in Indonesia Rainfall and temperature in other city were not associated with dengue incidence Long-term data from a thirty years period Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 37 The impact of rainfall to dengue incidence was recognised in most of the analysed research (13-21).
Research in Jakarta by using 9 years of data set (2008-2016) shows dengue incidence was significantly associated with rainfall about 254-667mm then followed by high dengue incidence in 0-3 month in the beginning of the year (13).
Temporal relationship between rainfall and dengue incidence was identified as linear between the increase of 10mm of the rainfall and 1% increase of dengue incidence in three months (23).
In another research, it was mentioned that the increase of the rainfall led to the increase of the mosquito breeding place (9).
While in North Minahasa and Ternate City, rainfall and dengue were not associated (9),(10).
According to PLUM model aimed to evaluate the high rainfall intensity and larva flush from the breeding place, it shows that rainfall and dengue were not associated (24).
High of precipitation makes larvae transported and sometimes dies due to continues water stream and the absence of puddle for the mosquito breeding site (9).
Humidity sometimes caused by high intensity of rainfall, make the environment suitable for Aedes life (11),(13).
The relationship between humidity and dengue incidence occurred in some areas of Indonesia was reported by some researches (9),(12),(13),(14),(16),(17),(19),(20) , while the rest of the research did not involve humidity as research variable.
A research in Jakarta shows that humidity was a meteorological variable that is strongly associated with dengue incidence compared to temperature and rainfall (13).
Likewise, a research in Singapore reported that humidity was the most climate variable that influenced dengue incidence (25).
Humidity is a suitable condition for mosquito reproduction.
High humidity affects the high dengue incidence as occurred in North Minahasa.
In that place, dengue incidence was high in January 2015 in 89% of humidity (9).
When humidity is lower than 60% it will shorten the mosquito age; consequently, mosquito cannot continue its reproduction cycle (18).
In North Minahasa, the relationship between wind speed and dengue transmission was identified.
It could be seen from the increase of dengue case along with the decrease of wind speed 1 knot in May 2015.
Wind speed influences the mosquitos flight range; accordingly, the decrease in wind speed is followed by the dengue incidence (9).
However, research in Limboto Sub-district and Banjarmasin City reported that there was no relationship between wind speed and dengue incidence (12),(18).
CONCLUSIONS The impact of climate change and dengue incidence have been discussed on this review.
Protection and adaptation to this situation are critical to overcoming dengue risk in society.
Early warning system (EWS) development based on climate information can be one alternative solution to inform the community that when climate variables are changing it would potentially influence the dengue transmission.
Holistic work by involving the associated office such as Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysical Agency (BMKG) is recommended.
EWS based on climatic information has been done in Jakarta province and expected to be extended Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 38 in other regions in Indonesia.
This effort aimed to give information to the population according to the present climate situation.
Accordingly, there would be follow up actions such as epidemiological assessment, counselling, environment refinement, selective and mass larvaciding, and fogging (26).
Other efforts such as mosquito’s breeding site elimination or called PSN and health services should be improved and scaled up AUTHORS’ CONTRIBUTION SS Designed the study, writing the manuscript.
FF conducted a literature search and writing the result.
FUNDING This research did not receive external funding Conflict of interest There are no conflicts of interest REFERENCES 1.
IPCC.
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Global warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on The Impacts of Global Warming [Internet].
2018.
32 p. Available from: https://www.ipcc.ch/ 2.
Mordecai EA, Cohen JM, Evans M V., Gudapati P, Johnson LR, Lippi CA, et al.
Detecting the Impact of Temperature on Transmission of Zika, Dengue, and Chikungunya Using Mechanistic Models.
PLoS Negl Trop Dis.
2017;11(4):1– 18.
3.
Ryan SJ, Carlson CJ, Mordecai EA, Johnson LR.
Global Expansion and Redistribution of Aedes-borne Virus Transmission Risk with Climate Change.
PLoS Negl Trop Dis.
2018;13(3):1–20.
4.
Hairiah K, Rahayu S, Suprayogo D, Prayogo C. Perubahan iklim: Sebab dan Dampaknya Terhadap Kehidupan.
2016.
1–40 p. 5.
Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika (BMKG).
Ekstrem Perubahan Iklim [Internet].
BMKG.
2019.
Available from: https://www.bmkg.go.id/iklim/?p=ekstremperubahan-iklim 6.
Karyanti MR, Uiterwaal CSPM, Kusriastuti R, Hadinegoro SR, Rovers MM, Heesterbeek H, et al.
The Changing Incidence of Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever in Indonesia: A 45-year Registry-Based Analysis.
BMC Infect Dis.
2014;14(1):1–7.
7.
Haryanto B.
Climate Change and Human Health Scenario in South and Southeast Asia.
2016;(November).
8.
Kementrian Kesehatan RI.
InfoDatin Situas Demam Berdarah Dengue.
2018.
9.
Lasut RA, Kaunang WPJ, Kalesaran AFC.
Hubungan Variabilitas Iklim Dengan Kejadian Demam Berdarah Dengue (Dbd) Di Kabupaten Minahasa Utara Tahun 2014-2016.
Fak Kesehat Masy Univ Sam Ratulangi Manad.
2016;9(3):1–12.
Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 39 10.
Tomia A, Hadi U, Soviani S, Retnani E. Kejadian Demam Berdarah Dengue (DBD) Berdasarkan Faktor Iklim di Kota Ternate.
Media Kesehat Masy Indones Univ Hasanuddin.
2016;12(4):241–9.
11.
Kesetyaningsih TW, Andarini S, Sudarto S, Pramoedyo H. The MinimumMaximum Weather Temperature Difference Effect on Dengue Incidence in Sleman Regency of Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Walailak J Sci Technol.
2018;15(5):387–96.
12.
Pakaya R. Spatial Analysis and Environmental Factors Associated Against Case of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever ( Dhf ) in Limboto District , Gorontalo.
Public Heal Gorontalo Univ.
2015;45–55.
13.
Hasanah, Susanna D. Weather Implication for Dengue Fever in Jakarta, Indonesia 2008-2016.
KnE Life Sci.
2019;4(10):184.
14.
Kesetyaningsih TW, Andarini S, Sudarto, Pramoedyo H. Determination of Environmental Factors Affecting Dengue Incidence in Sleman District, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
African J Infect Dis.
2018;12(Special Issue 1):13–25.
15.
Tosepu R, Tantrakarnapa K, Nakhapakorn K, Worakhunpiset S. Climate Variability and Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever in Southeast Sulawesi Province, Indonesia.
Environ Sci Pollut Res.
2018;25(15):14944–52.
16.
Tang SCN, Rusli M, Lestari P. Climate Variability and Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever in Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia.
Arlangga Unversity [Internet].
2018;(December).
Available from: https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/201812.0206/v1 17.
Setiawati MDKF.
The Influence of Climate Variables on Dengue in Singapore.
Int J Environ Health Res [Internet].
2011;21(6):415–26.
Available from: http://ovidsp.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi?T=JS&PAGE=reference&D=emed10&NEW S=N&AN=2012050378 18.
Ishak NIK.
The Effect of Climate Factors for Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever in Banjarmasin City, South Kalimantan Province, Indonesia, 2012-2016.
Public Heal Indones.
2018;4(3):121–8.
19.
Astuti EP, Dhewantara PW, Prasetyowati H, Ipa M, Herawati C, Hendrayana K. Paediatric Dengue Infection in Cirebon, Indonesia: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis of Notified Dengue Incidence to Inform Surveillance.
Parasites and Vectors [Internet].
2019;12(1):1–12.
Available from: https://doi.org/10.1186/s13071-019-3446-3 20.
Tosepu R, Tantrakarnapa K, Worakhunpiset S, Nakhapakorn K. Climatic Factors Influencing Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever in Kolaka District, Indonesia.
Environ Nat Resour J.
2018;16(2):1–10.
21.
Haryanto B. Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Vulnerability to Climate in Indonesia : Assessment, Projection, and Mapping.
Univ Indones.
2018;(October 2014).
22.
Goindin D, Delannay C, Ramdini C, Gustave J, Fouque F. Parity and Longevity of Aedes aegypti According to Temperatures in Controlled Conditions and Consequences on Dengue Transmission Risks.
PLoS One.
2015;10(8):1–21.
23.
Silva FD, Santos AM dos, Corrêa R da GCF, Caldas A de JM.
Temporal Epidemiology and Society Health Review| ESHR Vol 1 No1 2019 40 Relationship Between Rainfall, Temperature and Occurrence of Dengue Cases in São Luís, Maranhão, Brazil.
Cien Saude Colet.
2016;21(2):641–6.
24.
Benedum CM, Seidahmed OME, Eltahir EAB, Markuzon N. Statistical Modeling of The Effect of Rainfall Flushing on Dengue Transmission in Singapore.
PLoS Negl Trop Dis.
2018;12(12):1–18.
25.
Xu HY, Fu X, Lee LKH, Ma S, Goh KT, Wong J, et al.
Statistical Modeling Reveals the Effect of Absolute Humidity on Dengue in Singapore.
PLoS Negl Trop Dis.
2014;8(5).
26.
Dewi MK.
Informasi Peringatan Dini DBD Berbasis Iklim.
www.bmkg.go.id.
2018.
Imagining future worlds alongside young activists: a new framework for research URN:NBN:fi:tsv-oa85151 DOI: 10.11143/fennia.85151 Imagining future worlds alongside young climate activists: a new framework for research BENJAMIN BOWMAN Bowman, B.
(2019) Imagining future worlds alongside young climate activists: a new framework for research.
Fennia 197(2) 295–305.
https://doi.org/10.11143/fennia.85151 Young people’s climate activism must stand as one of the most remarkable and important mass movements of our age.
At levels of organization from the local to the global, young climate activists are coming together in massive mobilizations, and particularly school strikes, under the names of Fridays For Future, #FridaysForFuture, Youth for Climate, Youth Strike for (or 4) Climate and School Strike for (or 4) Climate.
This article responds to the most extensive study of young people’s climate action published to date, entitled ‘Protest for a Future: Composition, Mobilization and Motives of the Participants in Fridays For Future Climate Protests on 15 March, 2019 in 13 European Cities’.
In this significant and provocative article, an analysis is provided of the potential – and the need – for empirical work at local and international levels concerning youth climate activism that recognizes the often complex, liminal nature of young political agency and the diverse, intersecting motives that lead young people to demonstrate for action on climate change.
Through this analysis, this article contributes to theoretical innovation to get beyond rigid, top-down understandings of young people’s political engagement, and instead build theory from young people’s visions of social, economic and political change in response to climate emergency.
Keywords: young people, climate change, FridaysForFuture, activism, environmentalism, ecologism, politics, social movements.
Benjamin Bowman, Manchester Centre for Youth Studies, Geoffrey Manton Building 14, Rosamond St. West, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, M15 6LL, UK.
E-mail: b.bowman@mmu.ac.uk.
Introduction In 2019, an international group of natural scientists co-signed a letter to the journal Science stating that ‘the world’s youth have begun to persistently demonstrate for the protection of the climate and other foundations of human well-being’ (Hagedorn et al.
2019, 364) at a time of intersecting crises of climate change, ecological collapse, environmental degradation, climate injustice and mass extinction.
The letter called for scholars to respect young people for their leadership and to offer full support.
Our task, to quote the renowned young climate activist Greta Thunberg, is ‘to act as if the house is on fire, because it is’ (Thunberg 2018).
For young activists and supportive scientists alike, the Fridays for © 2019 by the author.
This open access article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
296 Reviews and Essays FENNIA 197(2) (2019) Future school strikes occur at no less than the end of the world.
A new world is imminent: that is to say, a new world sculpted by anthropogenic changes to the environment, and perhaps restructured by social, political, economic and cultural reform.
In this article I respond to the research paper, and accompanying country-by-country reports, entitled ‘Protest for a Future: Composition, Mobilization and Motives of the Participants in Fridays For Future Climate Protests on 15 March, 2019 in 13 European Cities’ co-authored by an international team of 21 researchers (Wahlström et al.
2019).
This report is, at the time of writing, the most extensive scientific study of young people’s climate action in publication.
It was conducted using an established method developed under the title “Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation” (CCC) (Walgrave et al.
2016), which is a method that uses teams of researchers to provide a probabilistic sample of a public demonstration, whether static or moving.
Notably, the research teams employ a ‘pointer’ who identifies participants to the interviewer, to minimize selection bias on the part of researchers who might otherwise interview participants who appear approachable (Walgrave & Verhulst 2011).
The authors of the ‘Protest for a Future’ report conclude that ‘further research is needed to follow the development of the first massive youth mobilization on climate change’, and they ‘strongly encourage research efforts to continue following this movement as it develops over time’ (Wahlström et al.
2019, 17).
I contextualize the findings of Wahlström and colleagues (2019) within a broader academic literature on young people’s political action in the age of ‘the “precarious generation”… motivated by a strong sense of situated injustice’, by the sense that they are ‘deprived of a decent future and the feeling they had been betrayed by governments’ (Pickard & Bessant 2018a, 100).
I argue that more-or-less binary concepts of political action, such as the framing of instrumental political goals as distinct compared to expressive political goals, are familiar in academic research concerning young people’s politics, but may limit researchers’ ability to understand young people’s complex political subjectivities.
This article makes two challenges.
First, it challenges binary approaches to young people’s political subjectivities, based on an understanding of the young person as a political agent in hybrid, shifting and complex ways.
Second, that specifically in the field of geography, existing work on youth-led climate action establishes the need to challenge ‘top down information flows’ (Tanner 2010) on climate change and, instead, to explore young people’s imaginations of different worlds, different institutions and different ways of doing and thinking.
These challenges, it is argued, should drive the discipline of geography and subfields including political geographies and participatory geographies towards more youth-centred and participatory studies, such as the groundbreaking work of Trajber et al.
(2019) with young people in Brazil.
Climate action is more than protest: it is also a world-building project, and creative methodologies can aid researchers and young climate activists as we imagine, together, worlds of the future.
Background: reflecting on young people’s ‘Protest for a Future’ Young people do not only bear witness to the world’s crisis.
They are agents in constructing the world, and global youth-led direct action – as seen on the 15th of March, 2019 – forms a critical part of the social construction of the crisis humanity faces.
The lion’s share of public discourse about youth-led climate action is taken up by adult-centric calls to ‘listen to science’ (Evensen 2019) and for young people to engage with political institutions in order to push adult policymakers to listen to science and to ‘tell the truth about the facts’ (Boykoff & Yulsman 2013, 363).
Listening to scientists and speaking truth to power-brokers is part of the fire-fighting portion of climate action, but putting the fire out is surely only one part of the task at hand: for young people motivated to protect the foundations of human well-being on the planet, climate action is also about rebuilding the world so that the causes of the crisis are addressed.
Although the ‘Protest for a Future’ project does not explore young people’s perspectives on social, cultural and political changes in great detail, the suggestion that structural change and system change would be among the desires of young climate activists is written between the lines.
The authors note that Fridays For Future activists ‘expressed strong identification with both instrumental goals’ such as putting pressure on politicians, ‘and expressive goals’, expressing personal visions and identities (Wahlström et al.
2019, 14).
297Benjamin BowmanFENNIA 197(2) (2019) The ‘Protest for a Future’ study was conducted by teams of researchers handing out surveys, and carrying out screening interviews, with participants of all ages in Fridays for Future demonstrations across 13 European towns and cities, from Truro in Cornwall to Warsaw in Poland.
Across the study, 9,162 surveys were distributed of which 1,925 responses were returned, accompanied in the corpus of data by 1,561 short, face-to-face interviews (Wahlström et al.
2019, 7).
The project did not survey children younger than 14 (other than to record their age) but found 45% of participants across the sample were aged between 14 and 19, and that ‘the protests were strongly dominated by women’ especially among school students (among whom 66.4% were young women) (ibid., 8).
Other topline findings of the study include the disproportionately high level of education in the sample, including that overall 71.3% of school students surveyed had at least one parent with a university degree (ibid., 9), the characterization of the protests not only including a ‘high number of first-time demonstrators’ but also including demonstrators who had ‘little involvement in conventional politics’ (ibid., 10).
The authors of the Protest for a Future project identify respondents holding ‘a hopeful attitude towards the future’ (Wahlström et al.
2019, 4), that at least some respondents are calling for ‘systemic change’ (ibid., 49) at least according to the researchers from the section of the report from Belgium, and that there were ‘important differences within the movement’ (ibid., 16) which indicates a global conversation among young climate activists about the world they wish to see, rather than a single vision.
These differences are reflected in a wide diversity among the sampled cases, including, for instance, ‘significant age variation with an almost exclusive participation of young activists in the Netherlands and Poland and a more even distribution of age groups in Belgium’.
The ‘Protest for a Future’ study tells the story of a heterogeneous movement with some salient characteristics.
Who are the young climate activists in ‘Protest for a Future’?
In ‘Protest for a Future’, the authors profile the participants in the climate strike as – in general terms, and notwithstanding variation between each country in the country reports – much younger than a typical street demonstration.
They report an overall median age of 21 years, and the largest age group among the demonstrators being participants aged between 14 and 19, constituting 45% of the total group (Wahlström et al.
2019, 8).
They draw attention to the gender distribution.
In comparative projects undertaken in other street demonstrations, researchers found an average result of 47% female participants.
In the Fridays for Future protests, the ‘Protest for a Future’ team report 66.4% of the demonstrators across the sample were women, and that women ‘strongly dominated’ among school students (ibid., 8).
The researchers point out that ‘street demonstrations in general and climate protests in particular tend to be the domain of the well-educated’ and that, for instance, 71.3% of the school students in their dataset had at least one parent with a university degree (ibid., 9).
The Fridays for Future demonstrators were remarkable, in the conclusion of the research team, because so many were taking action for the first time.
38.1% of the overall sample were first-timers (ibid., 10).
The high number of firsttimers, they conclude, is in part ‘a consequence of the young age of the participating population’.
Another remarkable feature of the Fridays for Future demonstrators, commented upon by the ‘Protest for a Future’ study, is that ‘the entire framing of this movement is about young people demanding that adults take responsibility for safeguarding their future’, and that although adults participate, they ‘do so mainly in solidarity with the young’ (Wahlström et al.
2019, 10).
The report suggests a social network of mobilization arising from homophily (McPherson et al.
2001), beginning with ‘young front-runners’ who invite like-minded friends and especially school friends.
32.9% of school students indicated to the researchers that they had been personally asked to participate in the demonstration, and that of those 70.5% were asked by one or more friends (Wahlström et al.
2019, 11).
Significantly more respondents told the researchers they had recruited friends.
72.4% of school students ‘personally asked someone else to join them in demonstrating’.
Of those who had asked someone else to join them, 67.9% had not personally been asked by someone else (ibid., 11).
Considering pathways of recruitment, 81.1% of demonstrators who had asked someone else to join them had targeted their recruitment attempt at a friend, and 64.9% had tried to recruit a schoolmate (the ‘Protest for a Future’ team asked respondents to categorize each invited person to one category only, so ‘schoolmates’ and ‘friends’ are mutually exclusive categories for purposes of the study).
298 Reviews and Essays FENNIA 197(2) (2019) Wahlström and colleagues (2019, 12) conclude that ‘much of the recruiting takes place in the context of schools and shared classes… [creating] a structural environment where social pressure is successfully employed’ by young people announcing they will demonstrate and inviting friends and peers personally to do the same.
Personal connections appear vital.
Despite climate protests (at least in Western Europe) typically being among the type of demonstration where lone protesters are more frequent (Wahlström & Wennerhag 2014), most demonstrators in the Fridays for Future case came with friends.
On average across the study, 87% of school students indicated they demonstrated along with one or more friends.
Wahlström and colleagues (2019, 13) also note the relative infrequency among young protesters of attending with a parent or family member (6.7%), a co-member of an organization (6.4%) or a partner (6%).
The ‘Protest for a Future’ study leaves many opportunities open for studying this remarkable group of young people.
First, and notably, the study focusses on Europe with data generation in the following countries (number of individual sites in brackets): UK (2), Sweden (2), Germany (2), Switzerland (2), Netherlands (1), Belgium (1), Italy (1), Austria (1) and Poland (1), and the follow-up study, yet to be published, included a site in Hungary (Wahlström et al.
2019, 4).
Yet, the movement documented is a global movement (ibid., 5) and this surely requires comparative work from other places.
Second, although the study measures gender (by male/female) and, in an oblique fashion, class (by the gathering of data on parental education, for instance), the study excludes other vital comparative factors in the identity and belonging of the young protesters.
Not least, the study does not mention the ethnic background or racialization of young people in the study.
Indeed, at research sites in the UK, Belgium and Italy (Wahlström et al.
2019, 32, 41, 112) participants in the climate strike are recorded calling for ‘climate justice’, a discursive framing that is historically connected to the relationship between race, poverty, and environmental risk (Schlosberg & Collins 2014).
Third, it is understandable that the study measures emotions such as worry, anxiety, ‘despair’ and hopelessness among climate protesters (Wahlström et al.
2019, 15) but there is no mention of data generation on positive emotions apart from the statement ‘I feel hopeful about policies being able to address climate change’ (ibid., 15).
This is extremely challenging, given that the study concludes participants were ‘more “worried” and “angry” than hopeless’ (ibid., 15).
The participants do not come across in the report expressing sadness or negative emotions but, on the contrary, are documented as very happy.
In Vienna, the study records ‘despite the cloudy weather, the general atmosphere was very joyful and festival-like’ (ibid., 91); in Amsterdam, ‘the atmosphere was very friendly and cheerful… the demonstrators were dancing and enjoying themselves’ (ibid., 54); in Berlin, also ‘cheerful’ (ibid., 69); in Warsaw, ‘the atmosphere was cheerful’ and the rally eventually ‘transformed into a dance party’ (ibid., 81); and in Manchester ‘an excited youthful atmosphere – lots of chanting’ (ibid., 32).
It is important to reflect on the incongruence between the survey, a top-down mode of data collection authored by adult researchers, which seems to have imposed negative emotional frames on political action that, according to the study, appeared to have been cheerful and positive.
It is evident in the study that the protests were places of joy, dancing, excitement and positivity.
The researchers ignore this factor almost entirely, despite a rich existing literature on the role of joy in social movements (Jasper 1998; Shepard 2011; Kutz-Flamenbaum 2014; Ramírez Blanco 2018) and suchlike contemporary work indicating that ‘play, laughter, and fun are important elements in any process of resistance’ (Crossa 2013, 826).
Joy is missing, at least in part, because the study relies on a top-down, adult-led and binary framing of the political action of young people.
Specifically, the ‘Protest for a Future’ study reproduces an either-or framework for young political action that contrasts instrumental goals with self-expression (Wahlström et al.
2019, 14).
It is not argued to be the case that the researchers witnessed the joy of young people at the protests and decided to ignore it in their analysis: rather, the research design and underlying methodology were not prepared for the complexity of young people’s politics.
For this reason, dancing, cheerfulness and ‘youthful atmosphere’, when encountered, were filtered out as incongruous with a pre-existing definition of the political.
In the next section, the processes by which traditional methods for analysis exclude young people’s concerns, sentiments and agency from the realm of the political are examined.
The 299Benjamin BowmanFENNIA 197(2) (2019) complexity of young people’s politics challenges studies like ‘Protest for a Future’ to think differently about what constitutes the political.
Challenging concepts: the complexity of young people’s politics Despite the richness of vision among members of the movement, researchers lack data concerning the ways young people who are leading on global climate action construct and co-construct future worlds.
The public imagination of the climate crisis tends to restrict young people to having a voice, as opposed to having power; society tends to perceive young people as subjects of political engagement more than agents of change.
The profile of young protesters is likely to present a methodological challenge.
For instance, a group of young people who are mostly joined by personal connections between friends and schoolmates, but not, strictly speaking, according to organizational membership, is a challenge to methodological approaches that distinguish between the two – as, indeed, the ‘Protest for a Future’ study does by conceptualizing political goals according to a dichotomy of ‘instrumental goals… and expressive goals’ (Wahlström et al.
2019, 14).
For another example of a major methodological challenge, this group of young people are made up, in a significantly large proportion, of women.
The dominance of women in an activist group must challenge researchers to recognize the gendered politics of defining politics: as Briggs (2008) pointed out, the lifestyles and concerns of young women in particular can be excluded from the realm of the political by traditional approaches.
Traditional concepts of the political struggle to deal with young people’s politics.
In Muthoni Mwaura’s (2018, 66) study of young participants in student environmental clubs in Kenya, she argues that young people developed a hybrid political identity that ‘straddled two seemingly incongruous positions: a commitment to a neoliberal agenda of self-making and a commitment to environmental politics’.
One participant in the study, a fourth year student named Catherine, claiming to have learned new skills through the club, reported: Through [the club], I have been able to gain more skills on issues beyond tree planting.
I have been able to do a lot all over the country.
It also opens me up to learn many new things and new environmental aspects.
It’s not just about planting trees, there are policies and regulations for the conservation of environment, education, green economy; it’s actually how we govern the environment.
(Muthoni Mwaura 2018, 68) Young people, like the activists in Muthoni Mwuara’s work, can be considered ‘political entrepreneurs’ who increasingly operate as Do-It-Ourselves or DIO citizens (Pickard 2019, 375).
The concept of the Do-It-Ourselves citizen has a long history, from the work of Bang (2010) on ‘everyday makers’ to the more institutional political framing of young people as ‘engaged sceptics’ or ‘committed sceptics’ (Wring et al.
1999; O’Toole et al.
2003; Henn & Foard 2014), to the approach to young people as ‘networked citizens’ (Loader et al.
2014).
In brief, this general approach to young politics theorizes that make up one part of young people’s expanded toolbox for political action, which includes everyday making (Bang 2010), lifestyle politics, political consumerism, boycotting/buycotting, issue-based politics and local and global networking.
Non-institutional participation has not always supplanted institutional participation, of course: for instance, in the UK, the influence of young people in electoral politics can be exemplified both by the recent reversal of the historic decline in youth electoral turnout (Sloam & Ehsan 2017; Allsop et al.
2018) and by the remarkable level of influence that young people have had over the Labour Party (Pickard 2018; Young 2018).
The recent history of UK politics perhaps lends itself to examples writ in bold, but the shift of young people’s political activity towards a more issue-oriented, standby citizenship will be familiar in the international context.
This shift is led by socioeconomic change (Harris 2017) that, of course, varies by context but is a generational trend that scholars also address and assess globally (Bessant et al.
2017), and in this context they must be considered alongside a decade of antiausterity and democratic deficit protests around the world (Della Porta 2015).
Returning to the young protesters in ‘Protest for a Future’, there is an echo of Muthoni Mwuara’s (2018) ‘jarring incongruity’ in the ‘instrumental goals… and expressive goals’ (Wahlström et al.
2019, 14) of the Fridays for Future protesters.
This is not a criticism of the project – which is a vital and important 300 Reviews and Essays FENNIA 197(2) (2019) piece of work – but a reflection on a methodological framing concerning young people’s politics in which the two are rendered separately, as they are in protest participation studies more generally (Klandermans 2007).
This binary definition of young politics is durable despite the ways young people ‘take up more individualized and everyday practices in efforts to shape society’ (Harris et al.
2010, 28).
These bridge the public and private, and the institutional political and the everyday political.
The jarring nature of the incongruity between ‘instrumental goals… and expressive goals’ arises from the struggle of traditional, binary definitions of politics to conceptualize the young person as a political agent in hybrid, shifting and complex ways.
Despite the complexity of young people’s political subjectivities, a dis/engagement binary dominates our imaginary of young people’s politics.
In particular, great attention is paid to the question of generational or cohort effects leading young people to ‘disengage’ from formal politics: asking why young people are disengaged from formal politics is so ubiquitous in the literature that it has been described as a ‘mantra’ (Banaji 2008).
When one divides instrumental goals from expressive ones, for instance, one is led by the question of political engagement versus political disengagement, and, accordingly, by epistemologies grounded in binary definitions.
This action over here is political, and this is not; this young person is engaging, and this one is disengaged; this action is instrumental because it is aimed at policymakers, and this one is about expressing one’s identity.
Challenging methods: stepping beyond the binary Methodological tools for studying politics in young people’s lives also tend to follow dichotomies: dividing the political from the not political, the formal from the informal, and participation in adultcentric institutions from non-participation in the same.
Other methods are possible, such as youthled surveys (Fine & Torre 2019), youth participatory action research (Anderson 2017; Trajber et al.
2019), participatory focus groups (Bagnoli & Clark 2010) and place-based creative methods (Wood 2012), as well as youth-centred framings that place young people’s political action into a dedicated youth context (Holmberg & Alvinius 2019).
Binary concepts of the political and the not political, the engaged and the disengaged, struggle when researchers encounter the diaphanous political consciousness of young people and ‘young people’s own uncertainty and ambiguity in describing what “counts” as political action beyond the formal and adult-centric definitions which they are likely to have been exposed to in their life course’ (Wood 2012, 214).
That ambiguity leads, in a general sense, to a well-established literature that attempts to bridge the gap.
As Skelton (2010) writes, researching young people’s politics is both about identifying more formal, public political activity in alignment with adult institutions and practices on the one hand, and less formal, more private, and more everyday young politics on the other.
There are big-P, more institutional, formalized politics and there are little-P, more everyday, less formalized politics.
In this body of work it is, broadly speaking, considered that formal and institutional political action and more everyday political practices are not separate but are rather like two sides of the same coin (e.g.
Skelton & Valentine 1997; O’Toole et al.
2003; Philo & Smith 2003; Bang 2010; Wood 2012; Kallio & Häkli 2013; Ekström 2016; Percy-Smith 2016).
It is also considered that young people ‘play active roles in both public large-scale events as well as more private small-scale matters’ and that ‘[more formal, institutional] “Politics” and [less formal, more everyday] “politics” do not exist apart from each other but are co-constituted in the socio-spatial practices of everyday life and policy-making’ (Kallio & Häkli 2011a, 64).
As a body of work, in epistemological terms, the big-P/little-P approach tends to take ‘young people’s own uncertainty and ambiguity’ (Wood 2012, 214) as an invitation to seek a different sense of the political than, say, literature on electoral engagement (Bhatti et al.
2012; Phelps 2012) or typological approaches that attempt to distinguish the political from the not political (van Deth 2014).
Taxonomizing young people’s activities into typologies of the political (as in Hooghe et al.
2014; van Deth 2014; Rainsford 2017) remains is a vital and important empirical task in its own way, but one which subjects young people – in their ‘uncertainty and ambiguity’ (Wood 2012, 214) – to the interpretative lens of the political scientist.
It is not necessary to distinguish between the political and the not-political, nor is it necessary to distinguish between instrumental motivations and expressive ones.
301Benjamin BowmanFENNIA 197(2) (2019) World-imagining exercises in uncertain times Young people live, as Pickard and Bessant (2018b) put it, in time of crises.
Among these crises, the climate crisis stands out for the dominance of the idea that young people must push adult policymakers to ‘listen to science’ (Evensen 2019) and ‘tell the truth about the facts’ (Boykoff & Yulsman 2013, 363).
This must surely impede our ability, as researchers, to work with young people, encountered in states of ‘uncertainty and ambiguity’ as to what counts as within the political realm (Wood 2012, 214).
It is noteworthy that the ‘Protest for a Future’ project found the ‘majority of respondents’ in every country ‘stated they were “quite” or “very” interested in politics’ (Wahlström et al.
2019, 16), a finding that in itself is worthy of deeper investigation.
This framing of the climate crisis places it in a public arena ‘where common issues are deliberated by [adult] representatives and politicians’ (Kallio & Häkli 2011b, 4).
The relatively young age of the protesters in Fridays for Future demonstrations is likely to be relevant, especially in the case of protesters who are too young to vote in the places where they live (Wahlström et al.
2019, 8).
The relative dominance of young women in the demonstrations is also likely to influence protesters in terms of their relationship to the public arena, according to the gendered nature of political institutions and processes and their particular effect on young women (Briggs 2008, 2016).
These factors contribute to ‘the continued dominance of top-down information flows’ in climate change narratives (Tanner 2010).
Yet, I contend the task of researchers who stand in support of young people as leaders on climate action (Hagedorn et al.
2019, 364) as well as those researchers who hold a more detached scientific interest in young climate activists and their work, is to work beyond that framing.
To explore the sorts of worlds young activists wish to see, it is of critical importance that researchers do not divide instrumental goals from expressive goals, institutional participation from everyday politics, and so on.
Responding to the ‘Protest for a Future’ project, which identified the salience of friendship networks and social pressure in schools, the data simply contraindicate such divisions as they unnecessarily divide practices like expressing yourself from recruiting fellow activists.
Such divisions militate against exploring the political action of many within the age group identified by ‘Protest for a Future’ as most important because, in most of Europe, under-18s are barred by law and/or hindered by hurdles like linguistic norms from many means of instrumental political activity, especially the vote.
Meanwhile, young people are often understood ‘to be special kinds of human’, at once bridging the gap between the present and future, and also being ‘the material from which the future will be made’ (Lee 2013, 1).
They ‘are being positioned as future leaders whom the public expects to overcome the legacies of environmental inaction… [but] currently have limited opportunities to cultivate, voice and express their understandings, concerns and imaginings about climate change within their local environments and communities’ (Rousell & Cutter-Mackenzie-Knowles 2019, 2).
‘Top-down information flows’ about climate change (Tanner 2010) prefigure the young person as something of a societal investment in a commodity future, as they are the raw material from which society will reproduce itself and also the bearers of that society.
For young people who wish to see a different society, who do not wish to bear the current one, or who simply are not sure what to think, the conceptual burden of what is termed political engagement is problematic.
If young people are the material from which future institutions will be made, and if young people will be the leaders of those institutions, what about young activists who neither want to remake nor lead those institutions, but imagine different worlds, different institutions and different ways of doing and thinking?
A dichotomous framework of engagement versus disengagement pushes young people who refuse the burden of reconstituting current political institutions (or who are in states of uncertainty and ambiguity, to paraphrase Wood (2012, 214)) into conceptual boxes marked ‘expressive’, ‘apolitical’, ‘antipolitical’, ‘disengaged’.
The ‘Protest for a Future’ report (Wahlström et al.
2019) identifies young activists standing with one foot in the public arena and one in the private.
They demonstrate as a way to take instrumental political action to influence decision-makers and also to express themselves.
They build organizing networks of issue-oriented social control and also attend the march with friends.
This complexity and in-between-ness is familiar in young people’s politics generally, and in young protest politics specifically.
302 Reviews and Essays FENNIA 197(2) (2019) Conclusion: what current and future worlds do young activists bear?
Writing in part on climate change, Levitas (2013, xi) claims ‘the reconstitution of society in imagination and in reality is a pressing need’.
At least in popular fiction, ‘overwhelmingly, climate change appears… as part of a futuristic dystopian and/or apocalyptic setting’ (Johns-Putra 2016, 269).
For instance, in the sci-fi space exploration game Stellaris, one fictional planet available for discover by the player comes with the message: … Some of the more radical elements within the scientific community suggest that the dramatic climate shift may have been brought on by the unchecked emission of gaseous industrial byproduct into the atmosphere.
This view is confined to the scientific fringe, as it is unlikely that any race intelligent enough to achieve full industrialization would be stupid enough to accidentally wipe themselves out.
(Stellaris 2016) The dystopian imaginary, regarding climate change, can be argued to play a deciding role in the methodology behind the ‘Protest for a Future’ study (Wahlström et al.
2019) in the survey approach to examining anxiety, fear and hopelessness; but also in the way the survey moves cheerfulness, joy and ‘youthful’-ness in the protest site to the margins of the study.
To do so, as this article contends, is part of a general approach to young people’s politics that constrains young agency to dichotomies of political instrumentality versus self-expression.
The dystopian and future-oriented vision of the ‘Protest for a Future’ study, which is evident in its emphasis on affects like anxiety and agency as a process of demanding political elites take a different course, leaves little room for the research to explore young people’s imaginaries concerning the world they live in, nor the future worlds they perceive.
Exploring young people’s climate action requires a more open, more participatory approach to research.
It requires researchers to challenge ‘top-down information flows’ (Tanner 2010) concerning climate change.
Daniels (2011, 182) writes that imagination is somewhere between the realms of fact and fiction, the subjective and objective, the real and representational; and that, in geography, imagination ‘is a way of encompassing the condition of both the known world and the horizons of possible worlds’ (ibid., 183).
Geographers must encounter young activists somewhere between the realms of the big-P and the little-P of politics in order to understand their imagination of the known world and worlds to come.
The ‘Protest for a Future’ study (Wahlström et al.
2019) raises so many questions about the current ‘massive youth mobilization’ and its ‘peculiar characteristics’ (ibid., 17).
I identify a lack of knowledge in academic literature and in public discourse concerning one prominent question in particular.
In what ways do young activists imagine the world today, and in what ways do they imagine worlds to come, both those they wish to bear and worlds they think should not be borne?
As well as calling powerful adults to ‘listen to the science’ (Evensen 2019), where are the remarkable young activists of the Fridays for Future movement headed?
There is much work to be done for scientists who wish to listen.
Acknowledgements The author is grateful to Dr. Chloé Germaine Buckley (Manchester Centre for Youth Studies, Manchester Metropolitan University) for her support in discussing the topic of young people’s climate activism.
This article developed with the support of Dr. Bronwyn Wood (Victoria University of Wellington) and Dr. Catherine Walker (University of Manchester) as reviewers in an open review process: and the author thanks both reviewers for their advice and constructive criticism, and the journal Chief Editor, Dr. Kirsi Pauliina Kallio, for support through the publication process.
The author’s current research project on young activists and the Fridays For Future movement is ongoing, and is funded by a Research Accelerator Grant from the Research and Knowledge Exchange Directorate, Manchester Metropolitan University.
303Benjamin BowmanFENNIA 197(2) (2019) References Allsop, B., Briggs, J.
& Kisby, B.
(2018) Market values and youth political engagement in the UK: towards an agenda for exploring the psychological impacts of neo-liberalism.
Societies 8(4) 95. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc8040095 Anderson, G. (2017) Participatory action research (PAR) as democratic disruption: new public management and educational research in schools and universities.
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 30(5) 432–449.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2017.1303211 Bagnoli, A.
& Clark, A.
(2010) Focus groups with young people: a participatory approach to research planning.
Journal of Youth Studies 13(1) 101–119.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260903173504 Banaji, S. (2008) The trouble with civic: a snapshot of young people’s civic and political engagements in twenty-first century democracies.
Journal of Youth Studies 11(5) 543–561.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260802283008 Bang, H. (2010) Everyday makers and expert citizens: active participants in the search for a new governance.
In Fenwick, J.
& McMillan, J.
(eds.)
Public Management in the Postmodern Era: Challenges and Prospects, 163–191.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Bessant, J., Farthing, R. & Watts, R. (2017) The Precarious Generation: A Political Economy of Young People.
Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315644493 Bhatti, Y., Hansen, K. M. & Wass, H. (2012) The relationship between age and turnout: a roller-coaster ride.
Electoral Studies 31(3) 588–593.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2012.05.007 Boykoff, M. T. & Yulsman, T. (2013) Political economy, media, and climate change: sinews of modern life.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 4(5) 359–371.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.233 Briggs, J.
(2008) Young women and politics: an oxymoron?
Journal of Youth Studies 11(6) 579–592.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260802193132 Briggs, J.
(2016) Young People and Political Participation: Teen Players.
Palgrave Macmillan, London.
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-31385-0 Crossa, V. (2013) Play for protest, protest for play: artisan and vendors’ resistance to displacement in Mexico City.
Antipode 45(4) 826–843.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01043.x Daniels, S. (2011) Geographical imagination: boundary crossings.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36(2) 182–187.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00440.x Della Porta, D. (2015) Social Movements in Times of Austerity: Bringing Capitalism Back into Protest Analysis.
Polity, Bristol.
van Deth, J. W. (2014) A conceptual map of political participation.
Acta Politica 49(3) 349–367.
https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2014.6 Ekström, M. (2016) Young people’s everyday political talk: a social achievement of democratic engagement.
Journal of Youth Studies 19(1) 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2015.1048207 Evensen, D. (2019) The rhetorical limitations of the #FridaysForFuture movement.
Nature Climate Change 9(6) 428–430.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0481-1 Fine, M. & Torre, M. E. (2019) Critical participatory action research: a feminist project for validity and solidarity.
Psychology of Women Quarterly.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0361684319865255 Hagedorn, G., Kalmus, P., Mann, M., Vicca, S., Van den Berge, J., van Ypersele, J.-P., Bourg, D., Rotmans, J., Kaaronen, R., Rahmstorf, S., Kromp-Kolb, H., Kirchengast, G., Knutti, R., Seneviratne, S. I., Thalmann, P., Cretney, R., Green, A., Anderson, K., Hedberg, M., Nilsson, D., Kuttner, A.
& Hayhoe, K. (2019) Concerns of young protesters are justified.
Science 364(6436) 139–140.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax3807 Harris, A.
(2017) Young people, politics and citizenship.
In Furlong, A.
(ed.)
Routledge Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood, 295–300.
Routledge, London.
Harris, A., Wyn, J.
& Younes, S. (2010) Beyond apathetic or activist youth: “ordinary” young people and contemporary forms of participation.
YOUNG 18(1) 9–32.
https://doi.org/10.1177/110330880901800103 Henn, M. & Foard, N. (2014) Social differentiation in young people’s political participation: the impact of social and educational factors on youth political engagement in Britain.
Journal of Youth Studies 17(3) 360–380.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2013.830704 Holmberg, A.
& Alvinius, A.
(2019) Children’s protest in relation to the climate emergency: a qualitative study on a new form of resistance promoting political and social change.
Childhood.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0907568219879970 Hooghe, M., Hosch-Dayican, B.
& van Deth, J. W. (2014) Conceptualizing political participation.
Acta Politica 49(3) 337–348.
https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2014.7 Jasper, J. M. (1998) The emotions of protest: affective and reactive emotions in and around social movements.
Sociological Forum 13(3) 397–424.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022175308081 304 Reviews and Essays FENNIA 197(2) (2019) Johns-Putra, A.
(2016) Climate change in literature and literary studies: from cli-fi, climate change theater and ecopoetry to ecocriticism and climate change criticism.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 7(2) 266–282.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.385 Kallio, K. P. & Häkli, J.
(2011a) Young people’s voiceless politics in the struggle over urban space.
GeoJournal 76(1) 63–75.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-010-9402-6 Kallio, K. P. & Häkli, J.
(2011b) Are there politics in childhood?
Space & Polity 15(1) 21–34.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2011.567897 Kallio, K. P. & Häkli, J.
(2013) Children and young people’s politics in everyday life.
Space and Polity 17(1) 1–16.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2013.780710 Klandermans, B.
(2007) The demand and supply of participation: social-psychological correlates of participation in social movements.
In Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A.
& Kriesi, H.
(eds.)
The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, 360–379.
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK.
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470999103.ch16 Kutz-Flamenbaum, R. V. (2014) Humor and social movements.
Sociology Compass 8(3) 294–304.
https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12138 Lee, N. (2013) Childhood and Biopolitics: Climate Change, Life Processes and Human Futures.
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Levitas, R. (2013) Utopia as Method.
The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society.
Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137314253 Loader, B. D., Vromen, A.
& Xenos, M. A.
(2014) The networked young citizen: social media, political participation and civic engagement.
Information, Communication & Society 17(2) 143–150.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2013.871571 McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. & Cook, J. M. (2001) Birds of a feather: homophily in social networks.
Annual Review of Sociology 27(1) 415–444.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415 Muthoni Mwaura, G. (2018) “Professional students do not play politics”: how Kenyan students professionalise environmental activism and produce neoliberal subjectivities.
In Pickard, S. & Bessant, J.
(eds.)
Young People Re-generating Politics in Times of Crises, 59–76.
Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58250-4_4 O’Toole, T., Lister, M., Marsh, D., Jones, S. & McDonagh, A.
(2003) Tuning out or left out?
Participation and non-participation among young people.
Contemporary Politics 9(1) 45–61.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1356977032000072477 Percy-Smith, B.
(2016) Negotiating active citizenship: young people’s participation in everyday spaces.
In Kallio, K. P.
(ed.)
Politics, Citizenship and Rights, 401–422.
Springer Reference, Heidelberg.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4585-57-6_26 Phelps, E. (2012) Understanding electoral turnout among British young people: a review of the literature.
Parliamentary Affairs 65(1) 281–299.
https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsr056 Philo, C. & Smith, F. M. (2003) Guest editorial: political geographies of children and young people.
Space and Polity 7(2) 99–115.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1356257032000133883 Pickard, S. (2018) Momentum and the movementist “Corbynistas”: young people regenerating the Labour Party in Britain.’ In Pickard, S. & Bessant, J.
(eds.)
Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of Crises, 115–137.
Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58250-4_7 Pickard, S. (2019) Young people and DIO politics: do-it-ourselves political participation.
In Politics, Protest and Young People, 375–405.
Palgrave Macmillan UK, London.
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57788-7_12 Pickard, S. & Bessant, J.
(2018a) France’s #Nuit Debout social movement: young people rising up and moral emotions.
Societies 8(4) 100. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc8040100 Pickard, S. & Bessant, J.
(eds.)
(2018b) Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of Crises.
Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58250-4 Rainsford, E. (2017) Exploring youth political activism in the United Kingdom: what makes young people politically active in different organisations?
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19(4) 790–806.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117728666 Ramírez Blanco, J.
(2018) The reclaim the streets protest parties in London.
In Artistic Utopias of Revolt, 41–63.
Springer International Publishing, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71422-6_3 Rousell, D. & Cutter-Mackenzie-Knowles, A.
(2019) A systematic review of climate change education: giving children and young people a “voice” and a “hand” in redressing climate change.
Children’s Geographies.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14733285.2019.1614532 Schlosberg, D. & Collins, L. B.
(2014) From environmental to climate justice: climate change and the discourse of environmental justice.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 5(3) 359–374.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.275 Shepard, B. H. (2011) Play, Creativity, and Social Movements: If I can’t Dance, It’s Not My Revolution.
Routledge, New York.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203831489 305Benjamin BowmanFENNIA 197(2) (2019) Skelton, T. & Valentine, G. (1997) Cool Places: Geographies of Youth Cultures.
Routledge, London.
Skelton, T. (2010) Taking young people as political actors seriously: opening the borders of political geography.
Area 42(2) 145–151.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2009.00891.x Sloam, J.
& Ehsan, M. R. (2017) Youth quake: young people and the 2017 general election.
Intergenerational Foundation Research Papers.
Intergenerational Foundation, London.
Stellaris (2016) Computer game, version 2.3.
Paradox Interactive, Stockholm.
Tanner, T. (2010) Shifting the narrative: child-led responses to climate change and disasters in El Salvador and the Philippines.
Children & Society 24(4) 339–351.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1099-0860.2010.00316.x Thunberg, G. (2018) Greta Thunberg full speech at UN Climate Change COP24 Conference.
YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VFkQSGyeCWg>.
9.7.2019.
Trajber, R., Walker, C., Marchezini, V., Kraftl, P., Olivato, D., Hadfield-Hill, S., Zara, C. & Fernandes Monteiro, S. (2019) Promoting climate change transformation with young people in Brazil: participatory action research through a looping approach.
Action Research 17(1) 87–107.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1476750319829202 Wahlström, M. & Wennerhag, M. (2014) Alone in the crowd: lone protesters in Western European demonstrations.
International Sociology 29(6) 565–583.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580914554117 Wahlström, M., Kocyba, P., De Vydt, M., de Moor, J., Wouters, R., Wennerhag, M., van Stekelenburg, J., Uba, K., Saunders, C., Rucht, D., Mikecz, D., Zamponi, L., Lorenzini, J., Kołczyńska, M., Haunss, S., Giugni, M., Gaidyte, T., Doherty, B.
& Buzogany, A.
(2019) Protest for a Future: Composition, Mobilization and Motives of the Participants in Fridays For Future Climate Protests on 15 March, 2019 in 13 European Cities.
Keele University e-Prints, Keele, UK.
Walgrave, S. & Verhulst, J.
(2011) Selection and response bias in protest surveys.
Mobilization: An International Quarterly 16(2) 203–222.
Walgrave, S., Wouters, R. & Ketelaars, P. (2016) Response problems in the protest survey design: evidence from fifty-one protest events in seven countries.
Mobilization: An International Quarterly 21(1) 83–104.
https://doi.org/10.17813/1086/671X-21-1-83 Wood, B. E. (2012) Researching the everyday: young people’s experiences and expressions of citizenship.
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 27(2) 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2012.737047 Wring, D., Henn, M. & Weinstein, M. (1999) Young people and contemporary politics: committed scepticism or engaged cynicism?
British Elections and Parties Review 9(1) 200–216.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13689889908413029 Young, L. (2018) Rise: How Jeremy Corbyn Inspired the Young to Create a New Socialism.
Simon & Schuster, London.
29(2)_13+tendenciasCLIMA.indd Recceived for publication: 31 August, 2010.
Accepted for publication: 2 June, 2011.
1 Agroclimatalogy, Centro Nacional de Investigaciones de Café – Cenicafé.
Chinchiná (Colombia).
2 Grazing and Forage Network, Tibaitatá Research Center, Corporación Colombiana de Investigación Agropecuaria (Corpoica).
Mosquera (Colombia).
3 Department of Agronomy, Faculty of Agronomy, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota (Colombia).
4 Applied Stastistics.
Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores.
Bogota (Colombia).
5 Climate Change and Agriculture Network, Tibaitatá Research Center, Corporación Colombiana de Investigación Agropecuaria (Corpoica).
Mosquera (Colombia).
6 Corresponding author.
jfboshellv@unal.edu.co Agronomía Colombiana 29(2), 275-285, 2011 Trend analysis to determine hazards related to climate change in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá Análisis de tendencias para determinar amenazas relacionadas con el cambio del clima en zonas agrícolas altoandinas de Cundinamarca y Boyacá Andrés J. Peña Q.1, Blanca A. Arce B.2, J. Francisco Boshell V.3, 6, María J. Paternina Q.4, Miguel A. Ayarza M.5, and Edwin O. Rojas B.5 ABSTRACT RESUMEN Recognizing the threat from climate change that is facing and will face agroecosystems is the first step in determining adaptation to climate change.
One way is through Global Climate Models (GCMs), but their spatial resolution is not best suited for making decisions locally, further reducing scale, seen as a way to resolve the resolution problem, has not yielded the expected results.
This study puts forth an exercise in which we study the climatic time series of precipitation and temperature to determine if there are effects of climate change on one of the most important national agricultural areas, using the Mann-Kendall analysis to determine the existence of statistically significant trends, i.e.
signs of change in the variables analyzed.
It was found that the variable that presents the most significant trends is the average maximum temperature, while precipitation and average minimum temperature do not.
Reconocer la amenaza climática a la que se enfrentan y se enfrentaran los agroecosistemas es el primer paso para determinar las medidas de adaptación frente al cambio climático.
Una forma de hacerlo es a través de los Modelos Climáticos Globales (MCG), sin embargo la resolución espacial de éstos no es la más indicada para tomar decisiones a escala local; además, la reducción de escala, vista como una forma de mejorar el problema de resolución, no ha dado los resultados esperados.
Se plantea un ejercicio en el que se estudian las series de tiempo climáticas de precipitación y temperatura para determinar si hay efectos del cambio climático en una de las zonas agropecuarias de mayor importancia a nivel nacional.
Se plantea el análisis de Mann-Kendall para determinar la existencia de tendencias estadísticamente significativas, es decir señales de cambio en las variables analizadas.
Se encontró que la variable que presenta tendencias más significativas es la temperatura máxima media, mientras que la precipitación y la temperatura mínima media no.
Key words: mathematical models, climate observations, temperature, mountain farming.
Palabras clave: modelos matemáticos, observaciones del clima, temperatura, agricultura de montaña.
Introduction According to the IPCC (2007), climate change is the variation (statistically significant) in average climatic conditions or in its variability over an extended period, typically decades or longer.
Dry seasons becoming more frequent, higher temperatures than usual, very short rainy season in previous dry periods, droughts, floods, among other consequences, attributed to climate change, are considered the main threat to human development in our generation (UNDP, 2007).
In addition to natural climate change, related to changes in obliquity, eccentricity and precession (Hays et al., 1976; Imbrie et al., 1984; Herbert and Fischer, 1986), more frequent cyclical phenomena (Pavia et al., 2009) and changes in vegetation cover (McGregor and Nieuwolt, 1998), the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), the product of human economic activity and its accumulation in the atmosphere have increased the radiative force (IPCC, 2007) impacting the current climate.
Furthermore, as the atmosphere has no limits or southern zone, GHGs are significant, determinative factors for the global climate and its effects can be modeled at the global level through Global Climate Models (GCMs), which can generate future climate scenarios, based on previously determined emission scenarios (IPCC, 1997).
However, 276 Agron.
Colomb.
29(2) 2011 their low resolution (Molina et al., 2000) combined with methodological and operational difficulties arising from the reduction of scale (and statistics) has led to a need for assessing the presence of trends within the time series of climatic variables to understand what is happening locally and determine the level of threat and future climate risk.
This work takes into account the following five aspects: 1) current climate (2001-2008) measured at some stations located in the Colombian Andes is different to past climae (1970-1980) and the changes could modify the irrigation (Pena et al., 2008; Pena et al., 2010), or accelerate life cycles of poikilothermic organisms, such as insects, weeds and crops, or determine cultivated species altitudinal migration in response to the search for optimal soil and climate (Jarvis and Ramirez, 2009).
2) Because the study area is a region of horticultural and livestock (dairy) importance (Madrid, 2006; ITC, 2009), the effect of climate change on the highlands of Cundinamarca and Boyacá can affect the country’s food security.
3) The MCG have very low resolution and therefore do not detect local variations and/or the regional level.
4) Adaptation strategies to climate change should be prioritized by areas and production systems at regional and local levels.
5) It is important and necessary to review the time series of regional-scale climate variables to determine any trends in them.
Those areas that recorded the most significant trends represent a major threat to agricultural production activities; therefore, there should be prioritized actions and strategies of adaptation.
It is worth noting that, although in this paper we propose a qualitative scenario, as the product of an empirical (statistical) analysis, this does not ensure a reduction in uncertainty regarding the MCG, but because local settings are an important factor for decision makers (Alcamo et al., 2006) and can improve the identification of adaptation measures against these threats primarily by farmers.
Materials and methods Study area We analyzed the time series of the weather elements measured at weather stations located in the Cordillera Oriental, in the departments of Cundinamarca and Boyaca (Fig.
1).
FIgURE 1.
Location of weather stations in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
277Peña Q., Arce B., Boshell V., Paternina Q., Ayarza M., and Rojas B.: Trend analysis to determine hazards related to climate change in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyaca Most of these are in the highlands of Cundinamarca and Boyaca, which comprises a set of high-altitude basins, along with the upper parts of the rivers Chicamocha, Bogota and Suarez (Valencia, 2002).
The plateau of this area is comprised of a set of mesas that are located between 2,500 and 2,600 m a.s.l., surrounded by mountains up to 4,000 m. Climatically, it is considered a dry island, compared with its surroundings; the precipitation has a strong spatial variation, since the annual rainfall ranges from 600 to 1,500 mm.
The temperatures are determined by the height above sea level (Valencia, 2002).
In this region, intra-annual temporal variation in precipitation and temperature is marked by the double pass of intertropical convergence zone (ITCZ).
The first three months of the year are dry (January-March), forming the first dry season of the year (FDSY), the three subsequent months are rainy (April-June), especially in April and May, the first rainy season of the year (FRSY).
July, August and September are dry, but in September, depending on the area can be characterized as a transitional month and comprise the second dry season of the year (SDSY), whereas the last three months of the year are rainy and form the second rainy season (SRS) (Boshell, 2009).
According to Boshell, during the SDSY and FDSY average temperature tends to decrease as the result of radiative loss, associated with clear skies at night, while in the FRSY and SRS it tends to increase for the opposite reason.
Climatic time series Information for average annual maximum temperature (Tmax) and minimum temperature (Tmin) and the cumulative annual rainfall (Prec) was used from 31 meteorological stations located in the Andean highlands in the departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá, for a total of 87 time series (Tab.
1), with a minimum length of 23 years.
TABlE 1.
Time series used in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
No.
Code Municipality Department M a.s.l.
longitude latitude Tmax Tmin Precipitation Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 1 509503 Cuítiva Boyacá 3000 -72.943 5.572 1983 2008 1978 2008 1971 2008 2 403513 Tunja Boyacá 2690 -73.355 5.553 1979 2008 1979 2008 1969 2008 3 401522 Samacá Boyacá 2600 -73.495 5.511 1978 2008 1978 2008 1969 2008 4 508502 Rondón Boyacá 2120 -73.203 5.358 1978 2008 1978 2008 1971 2008 5 508504 Miraflores Boyacá 1640 -73.144 5.192 1984 2008 1984 2008 2008 6 401530 V. de Leyva Boyacá 2215 -73.543 5.655 1980 2008 1980 2008 1978 2008 7 403517 Paipa Boyacá 1470 -73.116 5.745 1978 2008 1980 2008 1969 2008 8 403534 Sogamoso Boyacá 2500 -72.967 5.676 1983 2008 1983 2008 1982 2008 9 523501 Socotá Boyacá 3590 -72.529 6.011 1978 2008 1978 2008 1974 2008 10 703501 Cubará Boyacá 370 -72.115 7.006 1979 2007 1978 2006 1972 2005 11 403501 La Uvita Boyacá 2950 -72.545 6.245 1986 2008 1986 2008 12 403524 Guicán Boyacá 3716 -72.731 6.407 1978 2008 1978 2008 1974 2008 13 403525 Chita Boyacá 2888 -72.466 6.188 1980 2008 1980 2008 1972 2008 14 403531 Chiscas Boyacá 2350 -72.504 6.549 1978 2008 1978 2008 1974 2008 15 403533 Boavita Boyacá 2150 -72.578 6.326 1983 2008 1981 2008 1978 2008 16 403515 Nobsa Boyacá 2530 -72.890 5.778 1977 2008 1969 2008 17 403532 Sativanorte Boyacá 2594 -72.704 6.133 1975 2008 18 507501 Nuevo Colón Boyacá 2438 -73.456 5.353 1978 2008 1978 2008 1971 2008 19 507502 Satatenza Boyacá 1930 -73.449 5.022 1978 2008 1970 2008 20 507504 Macanal Boyacá 1300 -73.316 4.941 1986 2008 1982 2008 21 120567 Anolaima Cundinamarca 1915 -74.437 4.770 1979 2008 1979 2008 1971 2008 22 119507 Pasca Cundinamarca 2256 -74.311 4.310 1980 2008 1979 2008 1969 2008 23 120542 Mosquera Cundinamarca 2543 -74.209 4.691 1978 2008 1978 2008 1970 2008 24 120570 Guasca Cundinamarca 2750 -73.868 4.879 1978 2008 1978 2008 1974 2008 25 120572 Soacha Cundinamarca 2900 -74.189 4.505 1978 2008 1978 2008 1973 2008 26 120574 Chocontá Cundinamarca 2709 -73.701 5.117 1976 2008 1976 2008 1974 2008 27 120579 Bogotá Cundinamarca 2547 -74.150 4.705 1977 2008 1977 2008 1972 2008 28 120598 Tenjo Cundinamarca 2560 -74.200 4.792 1986 2008 1986 2008 1983 2008 29 306512 Pacho Cundinamarca 2000 -74.139 5.141 1978 2008 1978 2008 1974 2008 30 401512 Fúquene Cundinamarca 2580 -73.734 5.467 1978 2008 1978 2008 1970 2008 31 506501 Gachetá Cundinamarca 1752 -73.646 4.830 1980 2008 1980 2008 1972 2008 278 Agron.
Colomb.
29(2) 2011 Each variable was analyzed on a multi-year time scale, for which annual series were satisfi ed with the average values (temperatures) and cumulative values (rain) for each season (FDSY, FRSY, SDSY, SRS).
Trend analysis For the analysis we used the Mann Kendall nonparametric test that is considered one of the most robust for determining the existence of seasonal trends in series (Hamed, 2008) of length equal to or greater than 10 data, even with missing data (Buff oni et al., 1999).
According to Hamed (2008), test results may be erroneous in auto-correlated series, so this study uses annual data and multi-annual seasons.
Th e statistical basis of this test was proposed by Mann in 1945 and as the null hypothesis (H0) proposes that the data series come from a population where the measurements are independent and identically distributed (Hipel and McLeod, 2005).
Th e alternative hypothesis (H1) is that the data follow a trend, “monotonic” in time.
Given H0, the Mann-Kendall statistic (S) is: Where While, j and k are two positions in the time series, where j is antecedent of k for any following position, satisfying j < k, so that the greatest diff erence (k j) is equal to n-1, where n is the size of time series.
In that sense, when the value of S is positive an increasing trend is indicated, meaning that the variable takes on higher values over time, on the contrary, when it has a negative value, negative trends.
For example, assume the following hypothetical series of annual average temperature: 23.8, 23.5, 22.7, 22.9, 22.4, calculation of S (S Mann Kendall) determines whether the trend is incremental or decremental as shown in Tab.
2.
In 1975, Kendall showed that the distribution of S was normal and found a fi x for when there are “ties” (xj = xk) (Hipel and McLeod, 2005), so you can determine if the trend of the series is signifi cant and accept the null hypothesis or the alternative based on the probability of z (Onoz and Bayazit, 2003).
To perform this analysis in the present study, we used the “MannKendall trend test {Kendall}” in the statistical program “R” (R Development Core Team, 2008).
Results Average maximum temperature (Tmax) Most Tmax annual series have a positive trend (Fig.
2), specifi cally, with 95% confi dence we can say that over 65% of these have a positive trend, with 99% confi dence we can say that 55% of the 28 series have an incremental tendency.
About 20% of the annual series analyzed had no trend, TABlE 2.
Example of calculation of the trend of a series using Mann-Kendall.
Year 1 2 3 4 5 + Dates 23.8 23.5 22.7 22.9 22.4 .
.
-0.3 -1.1 -0.9 -1.4 0 4 .
.
.
-0.8 -0.6 -1.1 0 3 .
.
.
.
0.2 -0.5 1 1 .
.
.
.
.
-0.5 0 1 Sum .
.
.
.
.
1 9 Value S -8 FIgURE 2.
Trends in annual maximum temperature (significant P≤0.05) in areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
279Peña Q., Arce B., Boshell V., Paternina Q., Ayarza M., and Rojas B.: Trend analysis to determine hazards related to climate change in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyaca while only 10% of the series under analysis have a negative trend (99% confidence) (Tab.
3).
In this study, unlike that found by Pavia et al.
(2009) in Mexico, usually when there is a significant trend in the annual values of mean maximum temperature, there is a tendency in the same direction (same direction of the slope) and similar degree of significance in the multi-year series of seasons, i.e.
if the annual Tmax values are highly significant negative trends, it is expected that each year, each of the seasons weather (FDSY, FRSY, SDSY, SRS) will have lower Tmax values.
In turn, when there is no significant trend in the annual series of the climate element, multi-year trends in the seasonal series are not expected (Tab.
3).
TABlE 3.
Trend of the average maximum temperature, annual and multi-year in areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
No.
Code Municipality Significance and slope P-Value Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS 1 509503 Cuítiva +++ --+++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 403513 Tunja +++ .
+++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 401522 Samacá ++ .
--+++ + 0.05 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.10 4 508502 Rondón .
.
.
.
+++ 0.21 0.39 0.95 0.18 0.00 5 508504 Miraflores +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6 401530 V. de Leyva .
+++ +++ +++ +++ 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7 403517 Paipa ++ ++ +++ +++ ++++ 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 8 403534 Sogamoso +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 523501 Socotá +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10 703501 Cubará +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11 403501 La Uvita 12 403524 Guicán +++ ++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 13 403525 Chita +++ + +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 14 403531 Chiscas .
.
.
.
.
0.28 0.66 0.56 0.13 0.34 15 403533 Boavita ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16 403515 Nobsa 17 403532 Sativanorte 18 507501 Nuevo Colón .
.
.
.
.
0.28 0.52 0.47 0.20 0.91 19 507502 Satatenza +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 20 507504 Macanal ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 21 120567 Anolaima +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22 119507 Pasca +++ ++ +++ +++ ++ 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 23 120542 Mosquera +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 24 120570 Guasca +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 25 120572 Soacha ++ .
.
+++ +++ 0.00 0.64 0.38 0.00 0.00 26 120574 Chocontá +++ .
+++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 27 120579 Bogotá .
.
.
.
.
0.48 0.32 0.58 0.97 0.37 28 120598 Tenjo +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29 306512 Pacho .
.
.
.
.
0.45 0.33 0.36 0.15 0.59 30 401512 Fúquene ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31 506501 Gachetá ++ .
+++ +++ +++ 0.04 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 FDSY, first dry season of the year; FRSY, first rainy season of the year; SDSY, second dry season of the year; SRS, second rainy season.
+ + + Positive trend (increase) highly significant (99% confidence), + + positive trend (increase) significant (95% confidence), + positive trend (increase) not significant (90% confidence), .
without trend, --negative trend (decrease) highly significant, negative trend (decrease) significant, negative trend (decrease) insignificant.
280 Agron.
Colomb.
29(2) 2011 TABlE 4.
Trend of the average minimum temperature, annual and multi-year in areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
No.
Code Municipality Significance and slope P-Value Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS 1 509503 Cuítiva --------0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 2 403513 Tunja + .
+++ +++ .
0.09 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.10 3 401522 Samacá .
.
------0.95 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 508502 Rondón -.
.
-0.07 0.05 0.50 0.67 0.03 5 508504 Miraflores ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6 401530 V. de Leyva ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7 403517 Paipa --.
------0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 8 403534 Sogamoso +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 523501 Socotá -.
----.
0.03 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.15 10 703501 Cubará +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11 403501 La Uvita +++ ----+++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12 403524 Guicán ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 13 403525 Chita .
-+++ +++ +++ 0.13 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 14 403531 Chiscas .
.
.
.
.
0.32 0.25 0.27 0.77 0.64 15 403533 Boavita ------+++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16 403515 Nobsa .
.
.
.
.
0.31 0.36 0.28 0.14 0.14 17 403532 Sativanorte 18 507501 Nuevo Colón .
.
.
+ + 0.44 0.27 0.81 0.09 0.14 19 507502 Satatenza 20 507504 Macanal 21 120567 Anolaima ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22 119507 Pasca ----------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23 120542 Mosquera +++ .
+++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 24 120570 Guasca --------0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 25 120572 Soacha + .
.
+++ +++ 0.06 0.39 0.22 0.00 0.04 26 120574 Chocontá .
++ .
.
0.18 0.04 0.41 0.07 0.78 27 120579 Bogotá +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 28 120598 Tenjo +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29 306512 Pacho .
.
--0.28 0.43 0.03 0.08 0.02 30 401512 Fúquene .
.
.
.
.
0.31 0.75 0.08 0.31 0.14 31 506501 Gachetá +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.78 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 FDSY, first dry season of the year; FRSY, first rainy season of the year; SDSY, second dry season of the year; SRS, second rainy season.
+ + + Positive trend (increase) highly significant (99% confidence), + + positive trend (increase) significant (95% confidence), + positive trend (increase) not significant (90% confidence), .
without trend, --negative trend (decrease) highly significant, negative trend (decrease) significant, negative trend (decrease) insignificant.
Average minimum temperature (Tmin) Unlike what happens with the Tmax, this variable is not as widespread on the behavior of the trend (Tab.
4, Fig.
3), 28% of the annual series of Tmin under analysis have a significant positive trend (90% confidence) 32% do not have any trend and about 40% a decremental tend (90% confidence).
The temporal multi-year behavior is equal to T max.
Accumulated precipitation (Prec) Over 70% of the analyzed seasons have no trend in annual rainfall accumulated values, however, 29% have a tendency with some degree of significance, predominantly positive (20%), i.e.
sites in which each year it is raining more, as reported by Peña et al.
(2010) for the station of El Espinal, located in the Magdalena valley, meanwhile 281Peña Q., Arce B., Boshell V., Paternina Q., Ayarza M., and Rojas B.: Trend analysis to determine hazards related to climate change in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyaca FIgURE 3.
Trends in annual minimum temperature (significant P≤0.05) in areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
TABlE 5.
Trend of precipitation , annual and multi-year in areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
No.
Code Municipality Significance and slope P-Value Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS 1 509503 Cuítiva .
+ .
.
.
0.52 0.06 0.88 0.17 0.34 2 403513 Tunja .
.
.
.
.
0.81 0.49 0.87 0.68 0.46 3 401522 Samacá .
.
.
.
.
0.84 0.23 0.17 0.48 0.88 4 508502 Rondón .
.
.
.
.
0.73 0.41 0.65 0.70 0.21 5 508504 Miraflores 6 401530 V. de Leyva +++ --+++ .
++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.02 7 403517 Paipa .
.
.
.
.
0.47 0.94 0.38 0.74 0.38 8 403534 Sogamoso +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 523501 Socotá .
.
.
.
0.12 0.27 0.16 0.32 0.91 10 703501 Cubará .
.
.
+ .
0.84 0.25 0.61 0.11 0.99 11 403501 La Uvita ----+++ ----0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12 403524 Guicán .
.
--++ 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.05 0.11 13 403525 Chita .
.
.
++ .
0.31 0.43 0.63 0.04 0.80 14 403531 Chiscas .
+ .
.
.
0.51 0.03 0.58 0.39 0.53 15 403533 Boavita .
.
.
.
0.41 0.23 0.10 0.50 0.50 16 403515 Nobsa .
.
.
.
.
0.22 0.33 0.42 0.41 0.79 17 403532 Sativanorte -.
.
0.02 0.30 0.12 0.13 0.18 18 507501 Nuevo Colón .
.
.
.
.
0.35 0.61 1.00 0.44 0.51 19 507502 Satatenza +++ + ++ ++ .
0.00 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.48 20 507504 Macanal +++ +++ +++ --+++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 21 120567 Anolaima .
.
.
.
.
0.78 0.48 0.25 0.61 0.98 22 119507 Pasca .
.
.
.
.
0.25 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.55 23 120542 Mosquera .
.
.
.
.
0.81 0.50 0.17 0.56 0.68 continues in a few stations there tends to be less rain (Tab.
5 and Fig.
4).
The temporal behavior of rainfall is similar to the annual scale, which means that if there are trends in annual rainfall values, neither in the series will have multi-year periods (Tab.
5).
Discussion Temperatures (Tmax and Tmin) According to the outputs of the GCMs (IPCC, 2007), in the region which is located in the study area, the main effect of climate change is the increase of temperature.
The trends analyzed in this study show a general increase in Tmax, but not in Tmin, because the latter is less sensitive to the overall effect and long term is more related to local conditions and daily cycles.
At the station in the municipality of Bogota (27), annual mean maximum temperatures showed no trend, but a significant increase in the average minimum temperature from year to year is seen, which could be linked to the increased presence of gases like CO2 in the layer closest to the ground, reducing terrestrial radiation (IR) that escapes at night to the upper layers of the 282 Agron.
Colomb.
29(2) 2011 CONTINUES TABlE 5.
Trend of precipitation , annual and multi-year in areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
No.
Code Municipality Significance and slope P-Value Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS Year FDSY FRSY SDSY SRS 24 120570 Guasca .
.
.
.
.
0.30 0.85 0.37 0.30 0.19 25 120572 Soacha .
+ .
.
.
0.82 0.07 0.86 0.18 0.36 26 120574 Chocontá .
.
.
.
+ 0.24 0.23 0.28 0.73 0.15 27 120579 Bogotá .
.
.
.
.
0.20 0.33 0.18 1.00 0.62 28 120598 Tenjo +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29 306512 Pacho .
.
.
.
.
0.86 0.99 0.68 0.79 0.91 30 401512 Fúquene .
.
.
.
+ 0.80 0.21 0.45 0.53 0.13 31 506501 Gachetá ++ + .
.
++ 0.03 0.11 0.33 0.41 0.01 FDSY, first dry season of the year; FRSY, first rainy season of the year; SDSY, second dry season of the year; SRS, second rainy season.
+ + + Positive trend (increase) highly significant (99% confidence), + + positive trend (increase) significant (95% confidence), + positive trend (increase) not significant (90% confidence), .
without trend, --negative trend (decrease) highly significant, negative trend (decrease) significant, negative trend (decrease) insignificant.
FIgURE 4.
Trends in annual precipitation (significant P≤0.05) in areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
atmosphere and thus generates increases in temperature at night.
As raised by Yunling and Yiping (2005), climate change has regional peculiarities that are not consistent with the patterns found on a global scale, especially in mountainous regions, where the topography means greater influence of local circulation.
In fact, as found by Pavia et al.
(2009) in Mexico, very few stations show significant increases in both temperature variables analyzed, which does not mean that this area is outside the global warming effect, but that the threats must be detected locally.
For example, if the GCMs were used to identify the threats of climate change on economic activities in the region, one would think that frost would not be a problem for crops grown in the highlands of Cundinamarca and Boyaca, when indeed, in some places, the decremental trend of Tmin may result in a higher incidence of frost, causing great losses to farmers.
Although some stations have a trend in which Tmax is positive and Tmin is negative, this should not be confused with a compensatory effect to indicate that the average temperature is not growing.
The methodology used in this study determined the threat in a qualitative way, using a nonparametric statistical analysis that determines the existence of trends, so that in these localities, the threat is determined by a higher probability of occurrence of frost at higher altitudes a general increase in evaporation and insect pests, an increase in the number of cohorts (egg-adult cycle) by increasing daytime temperatures.
On the other hand, although several authors have determined that these effects (Tmax increasing and Tmin decreasing) are related to deforestation and land use change (Gross, 1987; Gash et al., 1996; Giambelluca, 1996; McGregor and Nieuwolt, 1998; Adams, 2007), they cannot be attributed solely to this factor, to determine the change, you must think about the wider effect of increasing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and climate variability over long and medium periods (Tourre et al., 2001; Pavia et al., 2009).
Precipitation Most series analyzed showed no rain trend, possibly because in mountainous regions, precipitation is a local type phenomenon, related to circulation systems on a scale of a few kilometers, catalyzed by processes on a larger scale (Montoya and Palomino, 2005), where the main factor involved in rainfall-genesis is the terrain, so the phenomena in these regions induces variability and climate change ap283Peña Q., Arce B., Boshell V., Paternina Q., Ayarza M., and Rojas B.: Trend analysis to determine hazards related to climate change in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyaca pears to have less effect than on sites free of the orographic effect (Peña, 2000).
The stations that show a marked tendency to increased precipitation also show a marked increase in the maximum temperature, however, in those places where positive trends in maximum temperature are found do not always record an incremental annual accumulated rainfall, and which the incremental effect cannot be attributed to increased evaporation and/or evapotranspiration, caused by the increase in maximum temperature.
In addition, station 12 (Guice), where there is a tendency to reduce the amount of annual rainfall, a highly significant increase in Tmax is also present.
These results are consistent with those reported by Poveda et al.
(1998), who noted that even without significant changes in precipitation amounts; the changes that occur in the temperature can affect the water balance.
In this regard, Peña et al.
(2008) found that in the high plains of Colombia, the response of field water to possible climate change depended on the type of soil, showing the importance of the local approach when defining measures for adaptation to climate change.
Conclusions • There is a widespread climate threat in the Andean highlands of Cundinamarca and Boyaca, and in most stations evaporative and evapotranspiration rates of crops are expected to increase annually due to increasing T max.
In turn, this increase in Tmax is widespread throughout the year, i.e., the effect is not concentrated in some seasons, as in other parts of the world, which could result in an increase in the number of insect cohorts (Tab.
6).
TABlE 6.
Related climate threat of climate change in each season in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá (Colombia).
No.
Threat 1 Further increase evaporation Increased risk of frost 2 Further increase evaporation 3 Further increase evaporation 4 Further increase evaporation 5 Further increase evaporation 6 Further increase evaporation Increased risk of frost Further increase humidity 7 Further increase evaporation Increased risk of frost 8 Further increase evaporation Further increase humidity 9 Further increase evaporation Increased risk of frost Further increase humidity 10 Further increase evaporation 11 Further increase evaporation 12 Further increase evaporation Increased risk of frost Less precipitation 13 Further increase evaporation 14 Further increase evaporation 15 Increased risk of frost 16 17 Less precipitation 18 Further increase evaporation 19 Further increase evaporation 20 Further increase humidity 21 Further increase evaporation 22 Further increase evaporation Increased risk of frost 23 Further increase evaporation 24 Further increase evaporation Increased risk of frost 25 Further increase evaporation 26 Further increase evaporation 27 Further increase evaporation 28 Further increase evaporation Further increase humidity 29 Further increase evaporation 30 31 Further increase evaporation Further increase humidity 284 Agron.
Colomb.
29(2) 2011 • Stations with significant trends of increasing Tmax do not necessarily show an increase in Tmin, as opposed to middle and high latitudes, the absolute minimum and average minimum annual temperature in the tropics are more related to the daily cycle, cold nights and warm days, and not with the annual cycle; also local conditions (topography, land cover) have a great influence on minimum temperatures.
Several authors have found that increasing the difference between Tmax and Tmin is related to changes in land use, which must be taken into account, not to mention the overall effects.
This condition is important in higher areas, because this means that even with a warming, we must continue to anticipate frost affecting crops in the driest seasons of the year.
• No significant trend was found in the annual accumulated precipitation data from most stations analyzed.
Some stations have an increasing trend, however, it cannot be assured that the cause of this are the increases in evaporation or evapotranspiration, associated with positive trends in the Tmax.
Also, there are cases in which the precipitation trend is negative, showing that precipitation is a variable difficult to predict.
• Unlike parametric tests for analysis of trends in time series (eg.
Regression analysis), whose effect is reduced when the series comes from data with skewed distribution, statistical tests that do not depend on distribution (nonparametric) have the advantage that their effect and significance are not affected by the current distribution of the data.
Cited literature Adams, J.
2007.
Vegetation-climate interaction: how vegetation makes the global environment.
Springer Praxis Books in Environmental Sciences, Chichester, UK.
Alcamo, J., K. Kok, G. Busch, J. Priess, B. Eickhout, M. Rounsevell, D. Rothman, and M. Heistermann.
2006.
Searching for the future of land: Scenarios from the local to global scale.
pp.
137-155.
In: Lambin, H.G.
(eds).
Land-use and land-cover change Local processes and global impacts.
Springer-Verlag, Berlín.
Boshell, F. 2009.
Condiciones climáticas generales de las zonas productoras de flores en Colombia.
Serie: Manejo del riesgo climático en la floricultura colombiana.
Ceniflores, Bogota.
Buffoni, L., M. Maugeri, and T. Nanni.
1999.
Precipitation in Italy from 1833 to 1996.
Theor.
Appl.
Climatol.
63, 33-40.
CCI, Corporación Colombia Internacional.
2009.
Comportamiento de las verduras y hortalizas durante la última quincena de octubre y la primera quincena de noviembre.
Boletín Quincenal Sipsa.
2, 1-8.
Gash, J., C. Nobre, J. Roberts, and R. Victoria.
1996.
Amazonian deforestation and climate.
John Wiley, Chichester, UK.
Giambelluca, T.W.
1996.
Tropical land cover change: characterizing the post-forest land surface.
pp.
293-318.
In: Giambelluca, A.H.
(eds.).
Climate change: developing southern hemisphere perspectives.
John Wiley, Chichester, UK.
Gross, G. 1987.
Some effects of deforestation on nocturnal drainage flow and local climate – a numerical study.
Boundary-Layer Meteorol.
38, 315-337.
Hamed, K.H.
2008.
Trend detection in hydrologic data: the MannKendall trend test under the scaling hypothesis.
J. Hydr.
349, 350-363.
Hays, J.D., J. Imbrie, and N.J. Shackleton.
1976.
Variations in the Earth’s orbit: pacemaker of the Ice Ages.
Science 194, 11211132.
Herbert, T.D.
and A. Fischer.
1986.
Milankovitch climatic origin of mid-Cretaceous black shale rhythms in central Italy.
Nature 321, 739-743.
Hipel, K. and A. McLeod.
2005.
Time series modelling of water resources and environmental systems.
In: http://www.stats.
uwo.ca/faculty/aim/1994Book/1994-Time-chapter%2023.pdf; consulted: June, 2011.
Imbrie, J., J.D.
Hays, D.G.
Martinson, A. McIntyre, A.C.
Mix, J.J. Morley, N.G.
Pisias, W.L.
Prell, and N.J. Shackleton.
1984.
The orbital theory of Pleistocene climate: support from a revised chronology of the marine δ18 O record.
pp.
269-305.
In: Berger, A., J. Imbrie, H. Hays, G. Kukla, and B. Saltzman (eds.).
Milankovitch and climate: understanding the response to astronomical forcing.
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop.
Reidl Publishing, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
1997.
Introducción a los modelos climáticos simples utilizados en el segundo informe de evaluación del IPCC.
Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, London.
IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2007.
Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Jarvis, A. and J. Ramírez.
2009.
Impactos del cambio climático en Colombia: Modelos y métodos.
pp.
25-66.
In: Memorias Taller: Definición de Herramientas para Enfrentar el Cambio Climático en el Sector Agropecuario.
Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Bogota.
MADR, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural.
2006.
Unidad de seguimiento de precios de la leche Estadísticas mercado lácteo colombiano, periodo enero – junio / 2006.
In: http:// www.agronet.gov.co/www/docs_agronet/20061027163948_ INFORME_Leche_ JUNIO.pdf; consulted: June, 2011.
McGregor, G. and S. Nieuwolt.
1998.
Tropical climatology.
2nd ed.
John Wiley, New York, NY.
Molina, A., N. Bernal, J. Pabón, J. Martínez, and E. Vega.
2000.
Reducción de escala estadístico aplicado a datos del CCM3 para generar datos de temperatura del aire en superficie.
Meteorol.
Colomb.
2, 67-72.
Montoya, G. and R. Palomino.
2005.
Sistemas pluviogenéticos en Colombia: influencia de frentes fríos del hemisferio norte.
Meteorol.
Colomb.
9, 75-82.
Onoz, B. and M. Bayazit.
2003.
The power of statistical tests for trend detection.
Turkish J. Eng.
Env.
Sci.
27, 247-251.
285Peña Q., Arce B., Boshell V., Paternina Q., Ayarza M., and Rojas B.: Trend analysis to determine hazards related to climate change in the Andean agricultural areas of Cundinamarca and Boyaca Pavia, E., F. Graef, and J. Reyes.
2009.
Annual and seasonal surface air temperature trends in Mexico.
Intl.
J. Climatol.
29, 1324-1329.
Peña, A.
2000.
Incidencia de los fenómenos “El Niño” y “La Niña” sobre las condiciones climáticas en el valle del río Cauca.
Undergraduate thesis.
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Palmira, Colombia.
Peña, A., Y. Rubiano, and J. Bernal.
2008.
Estudio de la variabilidad espacial de la capacidad de retención de humedad del suelo como medida de adaptación al cambio climático.
Estudio de caso: Typic Haplustox, Puerto López, Meta (Colombia).
In: XIV Congreso de la Sociedad Colombiana de las Ciencias del Suelo, Villavicencio, Colombia.
Peña, A., B. Arce, M. Ayarza, and C. Lascano.
2010.
Simulación de los requerimientos hídricos de pasturas en un escenario de cambios climáticos generados con análisis espectral singular.
Acta Agron.
59(1), 1-9.
UNDP, United Nations Development Programme.
2007.
Informe sobre desarrollo humano 2007/2008: La lucha contra el cambio climático: Solidaridad frente a un mundo dividido.
MundiPrensa, México.
Poveda, G., C. Perez, O. Mesa, L. Carvajal, and A. Ochoa.
1998.
Evidencias de cambio climático en Colombia: Tendencias y cambios de fase y amplitud de los ciclos anual y semianual.
Bull.
Inst.
Fr.
Etudes Andines 27(3), 537-546.
R Development Core Team.
2008.
R: A language and environment for statistical computing.
R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.
Tourre, Y., B. Rajagopalan, Y. Kushnir, M. Barlow, and W. White.
2001.
Patterns of coherent decadal and interdecadal climate signals in the Pacific Basin during the 20th century.
Geoph.
Res.
Lett.
28, 2069-2072.
Valencia, I.D.
2002.
Modelo de hábitat y distribución geográfica de la alondra Eremophila alpestris peregrina en el Altiplano Cundiboyacense, Colombia.
Undergraduate thesis.
Department of Geography, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
Bogota.
Yunling, H. and Z. Yiping.
2005.
Climate Change from 1960 to 2000 in the Lancang River Valley, China.
Mount.
Res.
Dev.
25, 341-348.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 3 (1): 11–30, January 2020 THEMATIC ESSAY Has Economics Caught Up with Climate Science?
Shreekant Gupta  Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, … But there is neither East nor West, ...
When two strong men stand face to face, tho‘ they come from the ends of the earth!
The Ballad of East and West (Rudyard Kipling, 1889) Abstract: Whereas scientific evidence points towards substantial and urgent reduction in greenhouses gas (GHG) emissions, economic analysis of climate change seems to be out of sync by indicating a more gradual approach.
In particular, economic models that use benefit cost analysis, namely, integrated assessment models (IAMs) have been criticised for being conservative in their recommendations on the speed of reducing GHG emissions and the associated levels of carbon taxes.
This essay focuses on a prototypical IAM, namely, Nordhaus‘ DICE model to argue the schism between science and economics is more apparent than real.
Analysis of the DICE model suggests extreme climate scenarios can be captured through alternative specifications of the damage function (the impact of temperature on the economy).
In particular, damage functions that extend the standard quadratic representation are highly convex (Weitzman 2012).
Thus, they are able to capture climate tipping points as well as ―fat tail‖ risks originating from uncertainty with regard to equilibrium climate sensitivity.
1.
INTRODUCTION A fundamental question in climate policy is by how much should greenhouse gases (GHGs) be reduced and how fast?1 Economists attempt  Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007; sgupta@econdse.org.
Copyright © Gupta 2020.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.86 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.86 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [12] to answer this question using the framework of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) since the cost of reducing GHG emissions has to be incurred now, whereas the benefit of doing so will accrue in future, though perhaps not so distant future.
Put differently, the economic gain from business-as-usual (BAU) is now whereas the pain, that is damages due to climate change, will be down the road.
However, the nature, magnitude and timing of these damages is uncertain and sometimes even unknown.
Further, some of these damages are irreversible.
Thus, economic analysis of climate change is an exercise in intertemporal BCA but with the added dimensions of risk, uncertainty and irreversibility.
The centrality of BCA in economic analysis of climate change was epitomised by the award of the Nobel Prize in economics last year to one of its primary exponents, William Nordhaus.
2 While BCA is the reigning orthodoxy in climate change economics, critics argue it ignores or does not adequately address what climate science is telling us about risk, uncertainty, and irreversibility.
According to them this severely limits policy recommendations emanating from BCA, if not making them downright incorrect and misleading (see for instance Weitzman 2009 and Stern 2014).3 Critics contest the mainstream view among economists (based on BCA models) that mitigation of GHGs must start gradually and then be ramped up.
The so-called ‗policy ramp‘, argues climate policy, should lead to ―modest rates of emissions reductions in the near term, followed by sharp reductions in the medium and long term‖ (Nordhaus 2007).4 Critics argue this does not square with what climate science is telling us about tipping points and other abrupt changes in climate.
According to them economic analysis based on BCA does not find the need for immediate and deep cuts in GHG emissions and this is problematic.
A more fundamental methodological critique of BCA is by Weitzman (2009), who argues climate science poses an existential question for BCA, namely, in the presence of potentially catastrophic and irreversible damages 1 In this essay, I cast the analysis at a global aggregate level and thus abstract from issues of burden sharing across nations.
Issues of inter-generational burden sharing are of course unavoidable.
In fact, intertemporal trade-off is at the heart of the problem being studied.
2 In this essay BCA is used in a broad sense as some overall economic analysis focused on maximizing welfare.
Thus, it overlaps with an integrated assessment model (IAM) such as the celebrated Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model of Nordhaus and we can treat the two terms as interchangeable.
3 These two citations are representative of several papers and one book by these two economists, who have been the most prominent critics from within the profession of BCA as applied to climate change.
4 The climate policy being alluded to is carbon prices which should start low and eventually get ratcheted up to high levels.
By corollary, emissions reductions should be modest in the near term and increase gradually.
[13] Shreekant Gupta BCA is not even meaningful.
According to him uncertainty permeates climate science especially with regard to equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS).5 Despite decades of research, science has not been able to pin down this key parameter and there is a significant downside risk of it being very high.
Thus, ―the main purpose of keeping GHG concentrations down is effectively to buy insurance against catastrophic global warming‖ (Weitzman 2011, 279).
The problem, however, of accepting this argument is that there is ―little role for economics or any analysis of trade-offs or assessing costs and benefits because these don‘t matter when the science is so clear and the future of mankind is at stake‖ (McKibbin 2014, 560).
Unfortunately, in the messy real world one cannot sidestep economics – the scale and pace at which countries and the world as a whole are reducing GHG emissions reflects trade-offs, if not explicitly then implicitly.
While the ―deep structural uncertainty‖ (a la Weitzman) surrounding ECS has an important bearing on climate policy, I argue BCA models of climate change can in principle incorporate such uncertainty.
It does not make them irrelevant.
In particular, I show how BCA can incorporate the possibility of catastrophic climate damages and thus remains a useful framework for climate policy.
The purpose of this essay is not to defend BCA as an end in itself.
Indeed, BCA has several ethical and methodological problems embodied in it (Stern 2014).
Nonetheless, I argue BCA can lead us to the very conclusion, namely, immediate and large reductions in GHG emissions (henceforth ‗urgent action‘) that climate science may suggest.
With this limited purpose in mind, the next section describes economic models of climate change that use the BCA framework, the so-called integrated assessment models (IAMs).
For expository purposes, I consider a simple and highly aggregated IAM, namely, the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model of William Nordhaus.
I identify the key features of this model that are influenced by climate science.
This is followed by a discussion of specific issues in climate science that have a direct bearing on economic analysis, namely, uncertainty regarding equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), nonlinear climate damages and tipping points.
The fourth section shows how these aspects can be captured in IAMs (DICE in particular) and can lead to emissions trajectories consistent with ‗urgent action‘.
The final section concludes the essay.
My basic message is from Kipling‘s poem whose first 5 ―The transient climate response (TCR) is the temperature change at the time of CO2 doubling‖ and the ―equilibrium climate sensitivity‖, T2x, is the temperature change after the system has reached a new equilibrium for doubled CO2, i.e., after the ―additional warming commitment‖ has been realised‖ (Comín, Francisco and MA Rodríguez-Arias 2003, 21).
As I show later, there is a non-negligible probability of ECS being very high.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [14] line is widely cited but whose third and fourth lines, though less well known, are more applicable in the context of this essay.
2.
ECONOMIC MODELING OF CLIMATE CHANGE The standard economic approach to modeling climate change is through integrated assessment models.
As the phrase suggests, these are scientific models that combine knowledge from several domains into one framework in order to better understand a problem that has multiple dimensions.6 This is particularly true for climate change, which is closely connected with geophysical sciences and economic activities.
Thus, IAMs of climate change integrate geophysical stocks and flows, especially of GHGs, with economic stocks and flows so that all key endogenous variables can be analysed simultaneously.
―IAMs generally do not pretend to have the most detailed and complete representation of each included system.
Rather, they aspire to have, at a first level of approximation, a representation that includes all the modules simultaneously and with reasonable accuracy‖ (Gillingham et al.
2018).The first climate-economy IAMs were essentially energy models that included a carbon emissions module and later a small climate model.
There are five key links that map anthropogenic climate change in an IAM: a) from ‗people‘ (producers/consumers) to emissions of GHGs b) from emissions to stocks of GHGs c) from GHG stocks to changes in temperature d) from rising temperature to climate change more broadly e) from climate change to human (economic) impact In this section, I focus on Nordhaus‘ DICE model as a prototypical IAM.
Without going into too much technical detail, I describe heuristically its main features especially how it models climate damages.7 While there are several widely used IAMs (see Gillingham et al.
2018 for a recent comparison), the DICE model is a simple yet elegant construct that goes to the heart of the policy question stated at the beginning of this essay.
The genesis of DICE model can be traced back to Nordhaus‘ papers in 1977 and was first articulated in its current from by Nordhaus in 1992.8 DICE belongs to a class of IAMs known as benefit-cost (BC) IAMs as contrasted to detailed process (DP) IAMs (see Weyant 2017) for details).
While both 6 In effect the term ―integrated assessment‖, of course, is generic and can apply to a range of contexts.
Here it is used explicitly in the context of climate-economy models.
7 The complete DICE model can be found in Nordhaus (2008) and also at http://webdice.rdcep.org/static/docs/Equations_141227.pdf 8 See, Nordhaus (1977 a, b) and Nordhaus (1992 a, b).
For a history of the evolution of the DICE model see Newbold (2010).
http://webdice.rdcep.org/static/docs/Equations_141227.pdf [15] Shreekant Gupta classes of models analyse climate-economy interactions, the former are simpler and present a highly aggregate representation of costs of GHG mitigation and of climate damages.9 The primary motivation for BC IAMs is to ―compute the optimal trajectory of global GHG emissions, and the corresponding prices to charge for those emissions‖ (Weyant 2014, 381).
Together these constitute what is often termed as ‗optimal‘ climate policy.
An ‗optimal‘ emissions trajectory is one that equates the marginal (discounted) benefits of avoided climate damage with the marginal (discounted) costs of GHG mitigation.
Put differently, this time path of GHG emissions maximises the discounted present value of global welfare.10 A benefit-cost IAM such as DICE calculates this time path and also the shadow prices of emissions, namely, the social cost of carbon (SCC).11 2.1.
Overview of the DICE model The DICE model views climate change within the framework of neoclassical economic growth theory.
In the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans (RCK) optimal growth model (Ramsey 1928; Cass 1965; Koopmans 1965) society invests in capital goods by reducing consumption today in order to increase consumption in future.
The main decision in each time period is how much to consume and save.
The DICE model ―extends this approach by including the ‗natural capital‘ of the climate system as an additional kind of capital stock.
In other words, it views concentrations of greenhouse gases as negative natural capital, and emissions reductions as investments that raise the quantity of natural capital (or reduce the negative capital).
By devoting output to emissions reductions, economies reduce consumption today but prevent economically harmful climate change and thereby increase consumption possibilities in the future‖ (Nordhaus 2013, 1080).
An increase in concentration of GHGs has a negative impact on future economic output because of its influence on the global mean surface temperature (GMST or ATT or simply T ).
12 The fraction of output ( Y ) 9 For example, in the DICE model the world is taken as one region.
DICE also has a regionally disaggregated companion model, namely, the Regional Integrated Climate Economy (RICE) model (Nordhaus and Yang 1996).
In its most recent version, the RICE model divides the world into 12 regions of which India is one (Nordhaus 2010).
10 Some readers may find this framing problematic.
Indeed, there are a number of critiques of IAMs some methodological and others more broad ranging (e.g., Ackerman et al.
2009; Pindyck 2013, 2017; Stern 2013).
Again, my objective is not to defend IAMs as an epistemology.
It is to demonstrate that IAMs like DICE with suitable modification can result in a big bang reduction in GHG emissions.
11 The only GHG that is controlled in DICE is emissions of CO2 from industries.
CO2 from land-use change (e.g., deforestation) and other GHGs are treated as exogenous trends.
12 Captured through equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) parameter.
Also note ATT actually refers to a change in temperature from pre-industrial baseline.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [16] Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the DICE model Note: .
The dark blue arrows represent the economic component of the model.
Red arrows show how the economy impacts climate and vice versa.
Green arrows illustrate the effect of climate policy.
Source: Adapted from Wieners (2018) lost in each time period is captured through a Hicks-neutral damage function (  ).
By devoting some portion of economic output to GHG abatement ( )(investment in natural capital), future temperature increases and associated climate damages ( ) can be avoided.
The net output in each period ( Q ) then is divided between consumption and investment in physical capital (figure 1).
Following Nordhaus (2008), net output at time t, )t(Q is gross output )t(Y scaled by climate damages )t( and minus abatement expenditures )t( (percentage of output spent on reducing GHG emissions).
)t(Q is further allocated between consumption )t(C (broadly defined) and investment )t(I .13 13 It should be emphasized that consumption is broadly defined to include marketed goods and services and also non-market goods and services especially environmental amenities.
Similarly, damages reflect ―damages in various economic sectors, notably agriculture, farming, forestry, tourism, water, energy and real estate (human settlements), as well as impacts on human health and ecosystems.
These are due to a number of mechanisms involving an increase in average temperature, sea level rise, and (extreme) weather patterns and events like rainfall, storms, heat waves and hurricanes‖ (Botzen and van den Bergh 2012, 373).
[17] Shreekant Gupta )t(Y)]t()[t()t(Q  1 (1)   1 )t(L)t(K)t(A)t(Y (2) ])t(T)t(T/[)t( ATAT 2 2111  (3) )t(I)t(C)t(Q  (4) Here, the damage function )t( represents one minus the fraction of aggregate output lost due to climate change, i.e., net output.
For T = 0, )t( = 1 (no climate damage) whereas for large temperature changes )t( approaches zero (maximum damage).
14 It is evident then the damage function plays a central role in the DICE model and in BCA more generally.
It maps the impact of increase in temperature due to an increase in GHG concentration into lost output.
As I show below, alternative functional forms of the damage function can lead to very different results.
The climate module in DICE tracks stocks and flows of carbon in 3 reservoirs: lower atmosphere, shallow ocean, and deep ocean.
―The climate equations are a simplified representation that includes an equation for radiative forcing and two equations for the climate system.
The radiative forcing equation calculates the impact of the accumulation of GHGs on the radiation balance of the globe.
The climate equations calculate global mean surface temperature ( ATT ) and the average temperature of the deep oceans for each time-step.
These equations draw upon and are calibrated to largescale general circulation models of the atmosphere and ocean systems‖ (Nordhaus 2008, 36).
DICE generates an optimised path of savings and reduction in GHGs over a planning horizon of several centuries.
The objective function that is maximized is the discounted sum of future utility from consumption.15 The utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form where 14The DICE damage function is calibrated to damages in the range of 2 to 4°C which as we shall see later is problematic.
15 More formally, the objective function is    maxT t )t(R)].t(L),t(c[UW 1 where U is utility, c(t) is consumption in period t and L(t) is the population in period t. t )( )t(R   1 1 is the discount factor determined by the pure rate of time preference  (also known as the utility discount rate).
Optimal policy is the path of emissions reductions that maximizes the objective function and the carbon tax that achieves those reductions.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [18] future utility is discounted at a constant pure rate of time preference  .16 DICE can also be thought of as an optimal control model where GHG emissions are control variables,17 whereas change in global mean surface temperature (T) is a state variable.
T is a key variable that describes the climate system and a change in T depicts (one dimension) climate change.
Through policy instruments, such as carbon taxes, policymakers can influence GHG emissions.
Three key features of the DICE model drive the ‗policy ramp‘ recommendation that was mentioned earlier: (i) the discount rate (not to be confused with the pure rate of time preference or the utility discount rate),18 (ii) ECS and (iii) damage function )t( .
While the choice of discount has profound implications for ‗urgent action‘ (or the lack of it), the latter two are the ones most relevant for this essay.
We focus on them in the next section.
3.
WHAT DOES CLIMATE SCIENCE TELL US?
Recall five key links that map anthropogenic climate change in an IAM: a) from ‗people‘ (producers/consumers) to emissions of GHGs b) from emissions to stocks of GHGs c) from GHG stocks to changes in temperature d) from rising temperature to climate change more broadly e) from climate change to human (economic) impact Climate science is deeply embedded in links (b), (c) and (d).
While there is not much debate about quantification of (b), considerable uncertainty surrounds (c) or ECS.
I discuss this in detail below and the interlinked issue of ―fat tails‖.
The DICE model suffers from two major problems vis-à-vis climate science.
First, it does not handle well the uncertainty vis-à-vis ECS and its implications for catastrophic outcomes.
Second, DICE skips link (d) and goes directly from (c) to (e) via the damage function )t( described 16 Also known as the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility function    1 1 c )c(U which can be represented by logarithmic utility clog)c(U  when  = 1.
17 In DICE this is the emissions control rate, i.e., the fraction of emissions reduced by a climate policy, for example, carbon taxes.
Under business as usual scenario emissions control rate is set to zero.
18 The discount rate gr  (Ramsey Rule) where  is the pure rate of time preference (utility discount rate),  is the parameter of the CRRA/CIES utility function and g is the growth rate of consumption.
[19] Shreekant Gupta earlier in equation (4).
This is a potential problem since it is (d) that links rising temperatures to climate impacts such as sea level rise and a greater frequency of extreme weather events.
It is also here that tipping points and nonlinearities can be captured.19 In the absence of this link, increases in temperature directly enter (e) and the climate damage function in the DICE model gets seriously flawed.
But all is not lost.
In the next section I show how DICE can be modified to address these shortcomings.
Before doing that, it is important to discuss the key uncertainty in climate science, namely, climate sensitivity and its corollary, ―fat tails‖.
3.1.
Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and the problem of “fat tails” ECS and TCR (see, footnote 5) are useful metrics summarising the temperature response of the climate system to an externally imposed radiative forcing (RF).20 While TCR is a short-run concept, ECS is the eventual temperature response to increases in GHG concentrations.
More precisely, ECS is the equilibrium change in GMST following a doubling of the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration (for details see Stocker et al.
2013, TFE.6).
It measures how sensitive global average temperature is to changes in CO2 concentration in the long run.
―It is perhaps the most studied and most frequently quoted summary statistic in all of climate science‖ (Heal and Millner 2014, 121).
The problem, however, as mentioned at the beginning of this essay, is that despite decades of research, science has not been able to pin down this key parameter and there is a significant downside risk of it being very high.
Figure 2 depicts various estimates of the probability distribution for climate sensitivity (Millner, Dietz and Heal, 2013).
Rather than going into technical detail on why they differ, note instead that all of them indicate ―it is very unlikely that climate sensitivity is less than 1°C.
In addition, a lot of the weight in most of the 19 A tipping point is an irreversible change such as the collapse of the Western Antartic or Greenland ice sheets or the melting of the permafrost.
See, Lemoine and Traeger (2016) for a discussion especially in the context of DICE.
Nonlinearities imply climate damage functions do not follow neat quadratic, exponential, or other smooth functional forms.
A very recent paper in Nature shows tipping points are much more imminent than previously believed (Lenton et al.
2019).
20 Radiative forcing or climate forcing is the difference between insolation (sunlight) absorbed by the Earth and energy radiated back to space.
Changes to Earth's radiative equilibrium, that cause temperatures to rise or fall over decadal periods, are called climate forcings.
Positive radiative forcing means Earth receives more incoming energy from sunlight than it radiates to space.
This net gain of energy will cause warming.
Conversely, negative radiative forcing means that Earth loses more energy to space than it receives from the sun, which produces cooling.
A system in thermal equilibrium has zero radiative forcing.
(Wikipedia contributors 2020) Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [20] Figure 2: Estimated probability density functions for climate sensitivity from a variety of published studies collated by Meinshausen et al.
(2009) Source: Millner, Dietz and Heal (2013).
distributions is in the 2 to 4.5°C range, which is the IPCC‘s official ―likely‖ range for climate sensitivity.
The disagreement between the estimates occurs in the upper tails of the distributions, that is, the data do not limit the estimates of the high end of climate change well at all (Allen et al.
2006; Roe and Baker 2007) which means that we understand little about the likelihood of worst case outcomes‖ (Heal and Millner 2014, 123).
In graphical terms, most of the climate sensitivity distributions are right skewed – implying realisations of higher temperatures are more likely than low ones.
In other words, the long right tails of these distributions have non-negligible probability.
Weitzman picturesquely phrases this as ―extreme disaster lurking in the distant tails of distributions‖ (Weitzman 2007, 17).
A revised estimate of ECS, based on different and newer datasets and expert judgement, is found in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (FAR) of 2013.
Using IPCC terminology for uncertainty, it is likely (66% or greater probability) that ECS will be in the 1.5°C to 4.5°C range.
It is extremely unlikely (up to 5% probability) to be less than 1°C and very unlikely (up to 10% probability) that it will be greater than 6°C.
This is shown in figure 3 where a log-normal distribution is fitted around the ―likely‖ range for [21] Shreekant Gupta Figure 3.
Eventual global average warming due to a doubling of carbon dioxide Source: Adapted from Wagner and Weitzman (2015) climate sensitivity in IPCC FAR.
To show why these probabilities are disconcerting we must turn our attention to so-called ―fat tails‖.
3.2.
“Fat tails” and their consequences for climate policy As mentioned earlier, climate sensitivity is a key indicator of the eventual temperature response to greenhouse gas (GHG) changes.
It is likely to be in the range 1.5°C to 4.5°C with a best estimate of 3°C but values substantially higher than 4.5°C cannot be excluded.
This leads us to the issue of fat tailed probability distributions.
Whereas in a thin tailed distribution, such as the normal distribution, the probability of reaching the extremes of the tails converges to zero relatively quickly, for a fat tailed distribution the probability in the extreme ends converges to zero very slowly.
As stated earlier, Weitzman was the most vocal proponent of ―fat tails‖ as applied to climate policy.
Figure 4 shows the difference in probability for each standard deviation (―sigma‖) from the mean between a thin tailed normal and a fat tailed Pareto distribution (Nordhaus 2011).
It is evident that assuming a thin tail distribution when it is fat tailed can lead to a serious underestimate of probabilities in the tails.
As an illustration of fat tails in the context of climate change, consider the following point from Wagner and Weitzman (2015).
Though global average warming of 5 or even 6°C is horrifying and unimaginable, when we combine ECS from IPCC with a likely 700 ppm scenario (IEA 2013) this doomsday scenario has a greater than 10 percent of occurring (figure 5).21 The show the consequences of this scenario with just one fact — the last time global average temperatures were about 2 to 3.5°C above the 21Like figure 3, this one fits a log normal distribution around the IPCC‘s (2013) ―likely‖ range for climate sensitivity.
But in the specific context of GHG concentrations of 700 ppm CO2e.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [22] Figure 4: Illustration of tails for a normal distribution and a Pareto distribution with scale parameter a = 1.5.
Note 1: Sigma = standard deviation from mean Note 2: Each curve shows the probability that the variable will be greater than the sigma shown on the horizontal axis Source: Adapted from Nordhaus (2011) pre-industrial level (3 million years ago) sea levels were up to 20 meters higher than today (IPCC 2013)!22 The implications of fat tails are extremely serious.
Proponents of this view argue against framing climate policy in terms of BCA.
Instead, they view climate change as a risk management problem (Risky Business Project 2014; Wagner and Weitzman 2015).
According to them ―average projections are bad enough, but it‘s the small-probability, high impact events that ought to command particular attention.
That possibility all but calls for a precautionary approach to climate policy‖ (Convery and Wagner 2015, 308).
As mentioned earlier, Weitzman through his numerous papers and a book made the most persuasive case for going beyond BCA.
He argued climate change is among a small list of potentially catastrophic low-probability, high impact events.
Thus, it merits special attention that standard BCA (namely, 22 A 2 to 3.5°C warming above pre-industrial levels must be juxtaposed against the fact 1°C warming has already occurred.
So another 1 to 1.5°C above current levels could potentially tip us over the precipice.
[23] Shreekant Gupta IAMs such as Nordhaus‘ DICE model) cannot offer.
In his view aggressive action on GHG mitigation is like buying insurance against climate catastrophe (which has a non-negligible probability of occurring).
4.
CAN ECONOMIC MODELING OF CLIMATE CHANGE CATCH UP WITH CLIMATE SCIENCE?
How damaging are non-linearities and tipping points in climate change (as captured in fat tails) for BCA?
Like most IAMs, DICE is a deterministic model.
In order to address uncertainties (or surprises) about future costs and benefits, it uses ―best guesses‖ (expected values) over a hypothesized probability distribution.23 In other words, DICE attempts to incorporate abrupt climate change by calculating the expected value of low-probability, high-cost catastrophic damages.
This is done by running Monte Carlo simulations after probability distributions have been assigned to various parameters.
As Ackerman et al.
(2010) put it, ―DICE addresses catastrophic risk in theory, only to turn it into a deterministic guess in practice‖ (Ackerman et al.
2010, 1658).24 Focusing attention on the damage function 23 In particular, it makes the standard assumption that the climate sensitivity parameter is 3 (midpoint of the IPCC range).
24 Cai and Lontzek (2019) develop a stochastic dynamic programming version of the DICE model, namely, DSICE which can, inter alia, model the impact of uncertainty about climate tipping points on economic policy of climate change.
In an earlier paper using DSICE they show the uncertainty associated with the timing of stochastic tipping points indicates carbon taxes have to increase by at least 50% compared to the deterministic DICE model (Lontzek, Cai, Judd and Lenton 2015).
For a rapid, high-impact tipping event, these Figure 5: Eventual global average warming based on passing 700 ppm CO2e Source: Adapted from Wagner and Weitzman (2015) Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [24] and following Ackerman et al.
(2010) the DICE damage function (equation 3) can be rewritten as N N aT aT d   1 (5) where d is climate damages as a fraction of world output and T is the increase in temperature from the base year.
The use of equation (5) prevents climate damages from exceeding the value of world output.25 This would be logical if damages only reduced current income as DICE assumes.
However, more realistically if we assume climate damages also include loss of capital assets, damages can exceed 100% of annual output.
The exponent N measures the speed with which damages increase as temperatures rise.
As can be seen from figure 6 for the quadratic formulation used by Nordhaus (N = 2), damages rise gradually and less than half of global output is lost till T = 19°C — ―far beyond the temperature range that has been considered in even the most catastrophic climate scenarios‖ (Ackerman et al.
2010, 1660).
In contrast, as N increases, half of world output is lost at temperatures of about 7°C for N= 3; 4.5°C for N= 4; or 3.5°C for N= 5, implying a sense of urgency.
As N tends to infinity, Eq.
(5) approaches a vertical line.
―This would be the appropriate shape for the damage function under the hypothesis that there is a threshold for an abrupt world-ending (or at least economy-ending) discontinuity…Thus choosing a larger N (―closer to infinity‖) means moving closer to the view that complete catastrophe sets in at some finite temperature threshold.
Choosing a smaller N means emphasizing a gradual rise of damages rather than the risk of discontinuous, catastrophic change‖ (Ackerman et al.
2010, 1660).
Below I discuss the implications of a highly convex damage function (footnote 27).
It is evident from this illustration that IAMs such as DICE are a tool and do not provide answers independent of the assumptions built into them.
DICE can essentially yield results in line with Weitzman by manipulating the parameter space, modifying the damage function or introducing endogeneity in the model.
For example, Ackerman et al.
(2010) examine the implications of incorporating a fat-tailed probability distribution for ECS and modifying the damage function in the DICE model (see above).
They conclude, taxes should increase by more than 200%.
They conclude the discount rate to delay stochastic tipping points is much lower than that for deterministic climate damages.
In a different line of research, Kelly and Kolstad (1999) show how Bayesian learning can influence policy in a model with uncertainty.
25 Unlike the case where d = aTN.
[25] Shreekant Gupta Figure 6: Damage function exponents: DICE and variants Source: Ackerman et al.
(2010) [I]f either the damage function exponent remains at or near the default value of 2, or climate sensitivity remains at or near the default value of 3, then DICE projects relatively little economic harm.
With plausible changes in both parameters, however, DICE forecasts disastrous economic decline and calls for rapid mitigation.
The bad news is that the optimal policy recommended by a standard IAM such as DICE is completely dependent on the choice of key, uncertain parameters.
The good news is that there is no reason to believe that sound economics, or even the choice of established, orthodox models, creates any grounds for belittling the urgency of the climate crisis.
(Ackerman et al.
2010, 1664; emphasis added) I conclude this section by citing a recent significant paper by Dietz and Stern (2015), whose title says it all.26 They show if DICE takes into account three essential features of the climate problem, namely, endogeneity of economic growth, highly convex damage function and climate risk (i.e., high values of ECS), ―optimal policy‖ of DICE calls for strong controls.
Dietz and Stern (2015) extend earlier work such as Ackerman et al.
(2010) to incorporate endogenous drivers of growth and allow climate change to adversely affect these drivers.
This is in sharp contrast to existing IAMs that are based on the RCK optimal growth model, where the major driver of growth is exogenous improvements in productivity and where climate change only impacts current output.
Next, they assume the damage function is highly convex for a large increase in temperature like 6°C, but 26 ―Endogenous Growth, Convexity of Damage and Climate Risk: How Nordhaus‘ Framework Supports Deep Cuts in Carbon Emissions‖ Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [26] not for smaller increases.
27 Consideration of some of the science, for example, on tipping points, leads them in this direction.
Finally, they allow for explicit and large climate risks by allowing the possibility of high values of climate-sensitivity.
5.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Without exaggeration climate change poses an existential threat to human civilization.
What is worse, this threat is more imminent than previously believed—the phrase ―climate emergency‖ is now part of the discourse.
Climate science almost on a daily basis provides new evidence of this.
Global mean temperatures are already 1.1°C more than pre-industrial levels and business as usual climate scenarios are truly horrifying.
The period 2015–2019 is on track the warmest five-year period ever recorded.
Undoubtedly, deep and immediate cuts in GHG emissions are required.
The question then is whether standard economic analysis that weighs benefits and costs up to the task?
The answer is it is possible.
Economic models are useful analytical tools but what they produce depends on what goes into them.
By incorporating more realistic assumptions and giving up some very limiting ones, and by incorporating science more carefully as they build their models, economists have the potential to be in sync with calls for action.
Economics ‗done right‘ has the potential to catch up with climate science.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and Sujayata Choudhry for her assistance.
Kanchan Chopra provided the encouragement and impetus to write this essay and Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt nudged me along.
Journal office was of immense help with the figures.
I am grateful to all of them.
This is to also acknowledge permission granted by Springer and Elsevier towards construction of figures 2 and 6, and William Nordhaus for figure 4.
27 The damage function taken from Weitzman (2012) captures tipping points better.
Weitzman introduced convexity in the DICE damage function by adding a third term to the quadratic specification by Nordhaus: ])t(T)t(T)t(T/[)t( .ATATAT 7546 3 2 2111  .
The exponent of the third term is chosen such that at T = 6, 50 percent of output is lost.
[27] Shreekant Gupta REFERENCES Ackerman, Frank, Stephen J. DeCanio, Richard B. Howarth, and Kristen Sheeran.
2009.
―Limitations of Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change.‖ Climatic Change 95: 297-315. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9570-x Ackerman, F., Elizabeth A. Stanton, and Ramón Bueno.
2010.
―Fat Tails, Exponents, Extreme Uncertainty: Simulating Catastrophe in DICE.‖ Ecological Economics 69 (8): 1657–1665.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.03.013 Allen, Myles et al.
2006.
―Observational Constraints on Climate Sensitivity.‖ In Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, edited by Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Wolfgang Cramer, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, Tom Wigley, and Gary Yohe.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Botzen, W.J.
Wouter, and Jeroen CJM.
van den Bergh.
2012.
―How Sensitive is Nordhaus to Weitzman?
Climate Policy in DICE with an Alternative Damage Function.‖ Economics Letters 117: 372-374. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.032 Cai, Yongyang, and Thomas S. Lontzek.
2019.
"The Social Cost of Carbon with Economic and Climate Risks," Journal of Political Economy 127 (6): 2684-2734. https://doi.org/10.1086/701890 Cass, David.
1965.
―Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation.‖ The Review of Economic Studies 32 (3): 233-240. https://doi.org/10.2307/2295827 Comín, Francisco A. and Miguel Angel Rodríguez-Arias.
2003.
―What we know about the Climate System?
A brief review of current research,‖ in Global Climate: Current Research and Uncertainties in the Climate System, edited by Xavier Rodö and Francisco A. Comín.
New York: Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05285-3_1 Convery, Frank J., and Gernot Wagner.
2015.
―Reflections–Managing Uncertain Climates: Some Guidance for Policy Makers and Researchers.‖ Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 9 (2): 304-320. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rev003 Dietz, Simon, and Nicholas Stern.
2015.
―Endogenous Growth, Convexity of Damages and Climate Risk: How Nordhaus‘ Framework Supports Deep cuts in Carbon Emissions.‖ The Economic Journal 159 (583): 574–620.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12188 Gillingham, Kenneth, William Nordhaus, David Anthoff, Geoffrey Blanford, Valentina Bosetti, Peter Christensen, Haewon McJeon, and John Reilly.
2018.
―Modeling uncertainty in integrated assessment of climate change: A multimodel comparison.‖ Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 5 (4): 791826. https://doi.org/10.1086/698910 Heal, Geoffrey, and Antony Millner.
2014.
―Uncertainty and decision making in Climate Change Economics.‖ Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 8 (1): 120-137. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/ret023 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9570-x https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.03.013 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.032 https://doi.org/10.1086/701890 https://doi.org/10.2307/2295827 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05285-3_1 https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rev003 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12188 https://doi.org/10.1086/698910 https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/ret023 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [28] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2001.
Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis.
Contribution of Working Group 1 to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2013.
―Summary for Policymakers,‖ in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2014.
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
IPCC, Geneva.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415416 International Energy Agency (IEA).
2013.
World Energy Outlook.
Available at http://www.wec-france.org/DocumentsPDF/Evenements/06-12-13_AIE.pdf Kelly, David L., and Charles Kolstad.
1999.
―Bayesian learning, growth, and pollution.‖ Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23(4): 491–518.Koopmans, Tjalling C. 1965.
―On the Concept of Optimisation Economic Growth‖ in The Economic Approach to Development Planning.
225-287.
Chicago: Rand McNally.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S01651889(98)00034-7 Lemoine, Derek, and Christian P. Traeger.
2016.
―Economics of Tipping the Climate Dominoes.‖ Nature Climate Change 6 (5): 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2902 Lenton, Timothy M., Johan Rockström, Owen Gaffney, Stefan Rahmstorf, Katherine Richardson, Will Steffen, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber.
2019.
―Climate Tipping Points Too Risky to Bet Against.‖ Nature 575: 592-595. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-03595-0 Lontzek, Thomas S., Yongyang Cai, Kenneth L. Judd, and Timothy M. Lenton.
2015.
―Stochastic Integrated Assessment of Climate Tipping Points Indicates the Need for Strict Climate Policy.‖ Nature Climate Change 5: 441–444.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2570 McKibbin, Warwick.
2014.
[Review of the book ―Climate Economics: The State of the Art.‖ by Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth A. Stanton] Journal of Economic Literature 52 (2): 559-562. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.2.535.r14 Meinshausen, Malte, Nicolai Meinshausen, William Hare, Sarah C. B. Raper, Katja Frieler, Reto Knutti, David J. Frame, and Myles R. Allen.
2009.
―Greenhouse-gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C.‖ Nature 458 (7242): 1158-1163. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08017 Millner, Antony, Simon Dietz, and Geoffrey Heal.
2013.
―Scientific Ambiguity and Climate Policy.‖ Environmental and Resource Economics 55 (1): 21-46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9612-0 Newbold, S. C. 2010.
―Summary of the DICE Model.‖ Improving the Assessment and Valuation of Climate Change Impacts for Policy and Regulatory Analysis.
https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0564-114.pdf/$file/ee-0564114.pdf https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415416 http://www.wec-france.org/DocumentsPDF/Evenements/06-12-13_AIE.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00034-7 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00034-7 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2902 https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-03595-0 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2570 https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.2.535.r14 https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08017 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9612-0 https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0564-114.pdf/$file/ee-0564-114.pdf https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0564-114.pdf/$file/ee-0564-114.pdf [29] Shreekant Gupta Nordhaus, William D. 1977a.
―Strategies for the Control of Carbon Dioxide.‖ Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.
443, Yale University.
Nordhaus, William D. 1977b.
―Economic Growth and Climate: The Carbon Dioxide Problem.‖ The American Economic Review 67 (1): 341-346.
Nordhaus, William D. 1992a.
―The ‗DICE‘ Model: Background and Structure of a Dynamic Integrated Climate-economy Model of the Economics of Global Warming.‖ Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.
1009, Yale University.
Nordhaus, William D. 1992b.
―An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse Gases.‖ Science 258 (5086): 1315-1319. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.258.5086.1315 Nordhaus, William D. 2007.
―A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.‖ Journal of Economic Literature 45: 686-702. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.686 Nordhaus, William D. 2008.
A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Nordhaus, William D. 2010.
―Economic Aspects of Global Warming in a postCopenhagen Environment.‖ Proceedings of the National Academic of Sciences 107 (26): 1172111726. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1005985107 Nordhaus, William D. 2011.
―The Economics of Tail Events with an Application to Climate Change.‖ Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5 (2): 240-257. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rer004 Nordhaus, William D. 2013.
―Integrated Economic and Climate Modeling‖ in Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling.
First Edition, 1069-1131.
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59568-3.00016-X Nordhaus, William D., and Zili Yang.
1996.
―A Regional Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate Change Strategies.‖ American Economic Review 86 (4): 741765.
Pindyck, Robert S. 2013.
―Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?‖ Journal of Economic Literature 51 (3): 860-72. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.51.3.860 Pindyck, Robert S. 2017.
―The Use and Misuse of Models for Climate Policy.‖ Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 11 (1): 100-114. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rew012 Ramsey, F. P. 1928.
―A Mathematical Theory of Saving.‖ Economic Journal 38 (152): 543559. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224098 Risky Business Project.
2014.
―Risky Business: The Economic Risks of Climate Change in the United States.‖ https://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_ 09_08_14.pdf Roe, Gerard H., and Marcia B. Baker.
2007.
―Why is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?‖ Science 318 (5850): 629-632. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144735 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.258.5086.1315 https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.686 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1005985107 https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rer004 https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59568-3.00016-X https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.51.3.860 https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rew012 https://doi.org/10.2307/2224098 https://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf https://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144735 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [30] Stanton, Elizabeth A., Frank Ackerman and Sivan Kartha.
2009.
―Inside the Integrated Assessment Models: Four issues in climate economics.‖ Climate and Development 1 (2):166-184. https://doi.org/10.3763/cdev.2009.0015 Stern, David I., Frank Jotzo, and Leo Dobes.
2013.
―The Economics of Global Climate Change: A Historical Literature Review.‖ CCEP Working Paper No.
1307.
Available at https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/249412/files/ccep1307.pdf.
Stern, Nicholas.
2014.
―Ethics, Equity and the Economics of Climate Change Paper 1: Science and Philosophy.‖ Economics and Philosophy 30 (3): 397-444. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000297 Stocker, Thomas F., Qin Dahe, Gian-Kasper Plattner.
2013.
―Technical Summary.‖ In Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K.
Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley.
USA: Cambridge University Press.
Wagner, G., and Martin L. Weitzman.
2015.
Climate Shock.
USA: Princeton University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400865475 Weitzman, Martin L. 2007.
―Role of Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change.‖ AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper 07-11.
Available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9ebd/87c605d31a59545cca2699a584068515522c.pdf.
Weitzman, Martin L. 2009.
―On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change.‖ The Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (1): 1–19.
https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.1.1 Weitzman, Martin L. 2011.
―Fat Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change.‖ Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5 (2): 275-292. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rer006 Weitzman, Martin L. 2012.
―GHG Targets as Insurance Against Catastrophic Climate Damages.‖ Journal of Public Economic Theory 14 (2): 221–44.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01539.x Weyant, John.
2014.
―Integrated Assessment of Climate Change: State of the Literature.‖ Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 5 (3): 377-409. https://doi.org/10.1515/jbca2014-9002 Weyant, John.
2017.
―Some Contributions of Integrated Assessment Models of Global Climate Change.‖ Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 11 (1): 115-137. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rew018 Wieners, Claudia Elisabeth.
2018.
―God does not play DICE – but Bill Nordhaus does!
What can models tell us about the economics of climate change?
‖ Climate: Past, Present & Future (blog) December 3, 2018. https://blogs.egu.eu/divisions/cl/2018/12/03/god-does-not-play-dice-but-billnordhaus-does-what-can-models-tell-us-about-the-economics-of-climate-change/ Wikipedia contributors.
2020.
―Radiative forcing.‖ Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.
Accessed January 26, 2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Radiative_forcing&oldid=936693346 https://doi.org/10.3763/cdev.2009.0015 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/249412/files/ccep1307.pdf https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000297 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400865475 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9ebd/87c605d31a59545cca2699a584068515522c.pdf https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.1.1 https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rer006 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01539.x https://doi.org/10.1515/jbca-2014-9002 https://doi.org/10.1515/jbca-2014-9002 https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rew018 https://blogs.egu.eu/divisions/cl/2018/12/03/god-does-not-play-dice-but-bill-nordhaus-does-what-can-models-tell-us-about-the-economics-of-climate-change/ https://blogs.egu.eu/divisions/cl/2018/12/03/god-does-not-play-dice-but-bill-nordhaus-does-what-can-models-tell-us-about-the-economics-of-climate-change/ https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Radiative_forcing&oldid=936693346
Journal of Contemporary Urban Affairs 2017, Volume 1, Number 3, pages 38– 42 Global Warming and Climate Change: A Critique on International Law and Policy * Dr. Lisa P Lukose 1 1 University School of Law and Legal Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi, India E mail: drlisarobin@ipu.ac.in A B S T R A C T Global warming and climate change, a multidisciplinary topic is a matter of international concern.
There are some international environmental treaties related to global warming and climate change.
The most significant international agreement in this area is UNFCCC the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and ratified by 195 countries.
It mainly deals with greenhouse gases emissions mitigation, adaptation and finance starting in the year 2020.
The Kyoto Protocol which extends the 1992 UNFCC mandates State Parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: its two basic premises are global warming exists, and human-made CO2 emissions caused global warming.
The Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005 and each COP has served as the ‘meeting of parties’ to Kyoto Protocol such as COP13 (Bali, 2007), COP15 (Copenhagen, 2009), COP16 (Cancun, 2010), COP17 (Durban, 2011), COP18 (Doha, 2012), COP19 (Warsaw, 2013), COP21 and (Paris, 2015).There are other international legal instruments such as 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution.
Against this backdrop, this paper will critically examine the existing international legal regime (treaties, conventions, agreements, etc.)
on global warming and climate change.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS (2017) 1(3), 38-42. https://doi.org/10.25034/ijcua.2018.3677 www.ijcua.com Copyright © 2017 Journal Of Contemporary Urban Affairs.
All rights reserved.
1.
Introduction Global warming and climate change is no longer a problem of the future generation, though it continues to affect future generations.
Global warming from carbon dioxide (C02) and other greenhouse gases pose a severe threat to the international community.
The Earth’s atmosphere is dilapidated at an unprecedented rate.
Law plays a critical and important role for the effective and equitable climate change governance.
There is some legal framework adopted to address the issues relating to global warming and climate change.
However, global warming and climate change is not an isolated topic to address independently.
It is connected to all environmental issues.
This paper attempts to examine: 1.
Why is global warming of serious concern?
2.
How does the present international legal regime respond to climate change?
3.
What are the lacunae in the existing international laws?
A R T I C L E I N F O: Article history: Received 2 August 2017 Accepted 28 August 2017 Available online 12 October 2017 Keywords: Solar collector; Thermal storage; Latent heat storage.
*Corresponding Author: University School of Law and Legal Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi, India E-mail address: drlisarobin@ipu.ac.in This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial NoDerivs 4.0.
"CC-BY-NC-ND" http://www.ijcua.com/ mailto:drlisarobin@ipu.ac.in https://doi.org/10.25034/ijcua.2018.3677 www.ijcua.com http://www.ijcua.com/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 1(3), 38-42 / 2017 Dr. Lisa P Lukose 39 4.
How can climate law respond better to the diverse contemporary requirements?
2.
Method and Material The author has adopted a doctrinal and analytical method to develop this paper.
The material is drawn from both primary and secondary sources.
The primary sources are the legal instruments while secondary sources are offline and online resource materials which are cited in this paper at relevant places.
3.
Effect of Global Warming The immediate effect of global warming is climate change.
The impact of global warming is in fact much beyond climate change.
It adversely affects human development, and it does have a long-term impact on the environment.
Temperature increase, extreme weather events, flood, drought, sea level rise, erratic precipitation, melting glaciers, reduced snow cover are few impacts to mention.
Its impact on aquaculture, biological diversity, agriculture, health, and livelihood is dangerous.
It also adversely affects a broad range of other human rights (Workshop in the Context of the UNFCCC COP 20 , 2014), for example, right to food, indigenous peoples right, etc.
A large section of the world population is suffering from the effects of climate change.
In 2009 it was estimated that about 300000 people die annually due to the adverse effect of climate change and 325 million are further seriously affected (Annan, 2009).
Since developing countries have less financial and technological resources, they are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
4.
UNFCCC 1992 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (one among the three adopted at the Rio Earth Summit-1992)1 is described as “first steps to a safer future” which was a global response to climate change.
Because the global community for the first time recognized and accepted that the climate change is a ‘problem’ despite having less scientific evidence than now.
It is adopted on 9 May 1992 and came into force on 21 March 1994.
It is one of the most widely accepted treaties having a near-universal membership.
It 1 The other two sister Rio Earth Summit Conventions are (i) the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and (ii) the Convention to neither has any binding limit on the emission of green gas for member countries nor has enforcement mechanisms.
The basic aim of UNFCCC is to prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system.
By borrowing from the Montreal Protocol 1987, it bounds member states to “act in the interests of human safety even in the face of scientific uncertainty.” UNFCCC is an international framework seeking global cooperation to combat climate change by limiting average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change and coping with impacts that were, by then, inevitable.
It obliges the members to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
It states how specific international treaties/protocols/Agreements may be negotiated to accomplish UNFCCC objectives.
5.
UNFCC to KYOTO By the agreements adopted in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) countries promised to set a goal of maintaining temperature increases below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
It also explored financial options for implementation of REDD-plus actions.
The developed countries committed to mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and private finance for developing countries by 2020.
COP 17 at Durban (2011) recognized that “smart government policy, smart business investment, and the demands of an informed citizenry, all motivated by an understanding of mutual selfinterest, must go hand in hand in pursuit of the common goal.” COP 18 Doha (2012) resulted in an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol establishing a second commitment period from 2013–20.
It also added more item to list of greenhouse gases.
At COP 19 in Warsaw (2013) the governments were encouraged to submit their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) to the Paris Agreement.
INDCs represent member country’s self-defined mitigation goals from 2020.
190 countries accounting for 99 percent of global emissions have already submitted INDCs to the UNFCCC.
At COP 20 in Lima (2014) more than Combat Desertification.
All the three conventions aim to encourage mutual cooperation for developing synergies in their activities.
Now it incorporates Ramsar Convention on Wetlands as well.
http://www.ijcua.com/ JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 1(3), 38-42 / 2017 Dr. Lisa P Lukose 40 190 countries pledged to develop new” urgency towards fast-tracking adaptation and building resilience across the developing world” (Lima Call for Action).
6.
The Kyoto Protocol The Kyoto Protocol which was developed under the UNFCCC's charter was adopted in 1997 subsequent to the negotiations from 1995 launched to strengthen the global response to climate change.
It is a legally binding international instrument with 192 countries’ ratification.
The main aim of the protocol is to provide specific emissions reduction targets to industrialized nations whose activities mainly cause global warming.
It is known as global climate treaty as it extends UNFCCC by requiring countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; based on the fact that global warming exists and human-made CO2 emissions have caused global warming.
It is a binding instrument requiring developed nations (35 industrial nations) to reduce the emission of six major greenhouse gases to 5.2 percent below from their 1990 levels since they are historically responsible for the present levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
The first commitment period was from 2008 to 2012 and the second from 2013 to 2020 (Doha Amendment to the Kyoto protocol; 37 countries have binding targets).
Countries failing to meet the protocol standards are required to pay a carbon tax.
It thus helps the state parties to mitigate global warming.
7.
Criticism The nations are divided over the benefits of the Koyoto protocol.
Some countries have refused to ratify the protocol as they increasingly burn fossil fuels for energy.
Sudan, Afghanistan and United States are the examples for countries which refused to ratify though the US itself emits 35% of the total greenhouse gases in the universe.
When most polluter countries are not participating, the protocol remains an idea.
Japan, New Zealand, Canada, and Russia though have participated in first-round, they have not taken have not taken commitments in the second period.
Countries like China, Brazil, and India may surpass the United States emissions within 25 to 30 years.
Critics opine that in order for the atmosphere to catch up with the greenhouse gases there must be 60 percent reduction of greenhouse gases whereas the treaty demands an average of 5.2 percent reductions.
It is also apprehended that the targets set forth by the treaty cannot be reached by members as CO2 emissions are increasing.
When the protocol mandates reduction of emission most of the countries is ill-equipped to meet the situation with less access to alternative forms of energy.
Further, it is silent about ‘climate change-related threats to state sovereignty (Badrinarayana, 2010).
8.2015 PARIS CLIMATE ACCORD The 2015 Paris Agreement/Climate Accord, which is a separate instrument under the UNFCCC was adopted at the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC (COP 21) on 12 December 2015 in Paris and came into force on November 4, 2016.
195 countries have adopted this agreement.
This is the latest step in the UN climate change regime which charts a new course in the global effort to fight climate change measures to be taken after 2020 when the second Kyoto commitment period ends.
The Paris Agreement seeks to accelerate and intensify the actions required for a sustainable low carbon future.
Its main purpose is to strengthen global action plan to climate change by maintaining/limiting a global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius.
It further aims to limit the increase to 1.5°C.
The Agreement also aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change.
The three main components of the Paris Accord are: (i) the Paris Agreement setting common goals, commitments and expectations, (2) the intended “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs) submitted by more than 180 countries and (3) the thousands of contributions offered by companies, states, cities and civil society organizations.
The agreement envisages that successive NDC of each party will “represent a progression” than its previous NDC and also “reflect its highest possible ambition.” NDC are however not legally binding obligations.
It provides for more transparency and governmental accountability by “reporting to each other and the public on how well they are doing to implement their targets.” Other important aspects of the agreement are: • Parties are committed t to “prepare, communicate and maintain” successive NDCs • Parties have to “pursue domestic mitigation measures” to achieve NDCs; • They have to report on emissions and progress in implementing NDCs regularly.
http://www.ijcua.com/ JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 1(3), 38-42 / 2017 Dr. Lisa P Lukose 41 It has two long-term mitigation goals: (i) a peaking of emissions as soon as possible (Since it will take longer for developing countries, and (ii) net greenhouse gas neutrality in the latter half of the century.
Countries are in the process of negotiating the detailed rules to be adopted in 2018 to implement the Paris Agreement.
9.
Suggestions and Recommendations Countries have to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy actively.
Countries like India, Mexico, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, etc.
have cut fossil fuel subsidies significantly.
The countries have to encourage people to use and convert their energy usage to cleaner energy such as wind power, solar power, hydropower, geothermal power, biomass, etc.
Law and governance improvements must be taken seriously at both national and international levels for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Governments must urge for compensated reduction and compensated conservation wherein carbon can be saved by reducing deforestation and degradation and also carbon is added through conservation, sustainable management of forests and increase in forest cover – afforestation and reforestation (Subramaium, 2016).
Polluting states must have legal and ethical (Mayer, 2013), obligation to compensate – both prospective and retrospective responsibility.
This will also help to address the human right issues in climate change regime (Bouthillier, 2012).
There must be more and more diverse interactions between public and private actors.
The climate laws negations must ensure more effective participation of members.
It is being criticised that out of more than 190 countries only about twenty countries control climate change negations.2 The existing climate law does not cover related environmental issues such as the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) on the environment for instance, the impact of genetically modified organisms on the environment.
The climate law’s reach must be extended to cover topics like IPR.
(Rimmer, 2011).
Global warming and climate change are two sides of the same coin.
However, this is not an isolated issue.
It is interlinked with all environmental issues.
Hence, it is a part of sustainable development.
To reduce the adverse effect of climate change, the countries 2 Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem have to commit themselves to stop deforestation: REDD and REDD Plus envisages that developing countries have to reduce “emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.” They have to consider policy approaches for the “conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.” 9.
Conclusion 150 years of industrialization have rendered the future of the Mother Nature at stake which will drastically change the equation of coming generations.
It is predicted that the average temperature of the atmosphere will raise minimum by 10 degrees in the next century.
Kyoto protocol has encouraged innovators and inventors to streamline their R&D for technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Countries have to accelerate research in alternate forms of energy.
There must be international cooperation taking into consideration the legitimate requirement of developing and least developing countries to develop without compromising their responsibility for sustainable development.
Then only the ultimate objective of UNFCCCto achieve a level “within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” can be achieved.
The other two sisters Rio Earth Summit Conventions are (i) the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and (ii) the Convention to Combat Desertification.
All the three conventions aim to encourage mutual cooperation for developing synergies in their activities.
Now it incorporates Ramsar Convention on Wetlands as well.
References Annan, K. (2009).
Anatomy of silent Crisis.
Global Humanitarian Forum.
Badrinarayana, D. (2010).
Global Warming: A Second Coming for International Law”?
.Washington Law Review, 85, 254-292.
Bouthillier, Y (Ed.).
(2012).
Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Law.
IUCN Academy of Environmental Law series.
Rimmer, M.. (2011).
Intellectual Property and Climate Change: Inventing Clean Technologies.
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. http://www.ijcua.com/ JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 1(3), 38-42 / 2017 Dr. Lisa P Lukose 42 Subramaium, G. (2016).
Climate Change and Reduction of Emission Issues Relating to Deforestation and Environmental degradation in India.
India: Indian Law Institute.
Mayer, B.
(2013).
Climate Change and International Law in the Grim Days.
EJIL, 24, 947–970.
Workshop in the Context of the UNFCCC COP 20.
(2014).
LAW, GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE An International Law and Policy.
Lima, Peru.
Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law.
http://www.ijcua.com/
4_Janko.indd 159Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.67.2.4 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 2018 (2) 159–171.
Introduction Public understanding of climate change in the context of the surrounding public-political discussions has become an essential subject of social science research papers.
Beyond the territory of physical science, several societal aspects of climate change have also been brought into the focus of research, thus, similar activities in the topic have begun in Hungary with varying intensity and scope from the mid’ 2000s.
While extended research on Hungarian climate change futures (e.g.
Bartholy, J. et al.
2014) forms the context, recent scholarship focused on the knowledge of climate change in society (Mosoni-Fried, J. et al.
2007; TÁRKI 2007; Szirmai, V. et al.
2008; Baranyai, N. and Varjú, V. 2015), on adaptation issues and impact on society (Salamin, G. et al.
2011; Bajmóczy, P. et al.
2012; Mesterházy, I. et al.
2014; Antal, Z.L.
2015; Bobvos, J. et al.
2017; Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
2017; Kajner, P. et al.
2017; Király, G. et al.
2017), or on climate discourses and controversies (Jankó, F. et al.
2010, 2011; Bereczki, B.H.
2012; Kőszegi, M. et al.
2015).
However, we do not know enough about climate and climate change.
As Hulme, M. (2008) argues, geography should unfold 1 University of Sopron, Alexandre Lámfalussy Faculty of Economics, H9400 Sopron, Erzsébet u.
9.
E-mails: frk.geo@ gmail.com, bertalan.laura@uni-sopron.hu, hoschek.monika@uni-sopron.hu, nemeth.nikoletta@uni-sopron.hu 2 Elisabeth Educational Hospital of Sopron, H-9400 Sopron, Győri u.
15.
E-mail: komornoki.karolina@upcmail.hu 3 Gyula Roth Technical School of Forestry and Wood Industry, H-9400 Sopron, Szent György u.
9.
E-mail: vancsojudit@gmail.com Perception, understanding, and action: attitudes of climate change in the Hungarian population Ferenc JANKÓ1, Laura BERTALAN1, Mónika HOSCHEK1, Karolina KOMORNOKI2, Nikoletta NÉMETH1 and Judit PAPP-VANCSÓ3 Abstract This study is based on a non-representative, national level survey sample whose main purpose is to interpret the general population’s understanding of climate change.
The study also provides an examination of correlations between climate change concerns and the taking of individual action as well as the relationship between pro-environmental thinking and climate change scepticism.
Our results show a moderate correlation between the general population’s concerns and the professional views on the subject, known in the literature as the New Environmental Paradigm scale and Scepticism scale, but a significantly weaker correlation when it comes to taking action against climate change.
Factors relating to the respondents, such as residence settlement type, education level, gender, age, personal and social values, or casual attributions in relation to climate change heavily influence this weaker correlation.
Most respondents assessed climate change as a current (urgent), but geographically remote phenomenon.
This is a clear indication of problems associated with cognitive conceptualization and the localization of climate change in communication.
The target audience must be taken into account when designing climate change communications because interpretations of climate change can vary widely and cover a broad range attitudes ranging from concern about to issue all the way to climate change scepticism.
This also applies to views concerning responsibility for climate change with some believing it is a political responsibility and others believing it is a scientific responsibility.
Keywords: climate change, perception, responsibility, climate adaptation, climate change denial, Hungary Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.160 the social meanings of climate and the effect of geographical scales i.e.
localization in the understanding of climate change.
Our study aims to develop our knowledge in this direction.
The following questions guided our investigation: What kind of relationships are there between the concerns about and experiences of climate change and green actions?
Which factors tend to influence people’s readiness to act?
Is there any correlation between the place of residence and the experiences and evaluation of climate change?
What kind of role does the proximity or, conversely, the remoteness of the phenomenon in terms of geography and time play in the perception of the problem?
How vital is the topic of climate change?
Who or what is the primary cause of the problem and, in the opinion of the people questioned in our survey, whose responsibility is to find the solution?
In line with the questions we raised, we assumed that concern and experience are strongly correlated to actions; moreover, we assumed that the level of concern is inversely proportionate to the intensity of actions (‘it’s all the same anyhow’ attitude) (Searle, K. and Gow, K. 2010).
Additionally, we hypothesized that opinions on the topic will most probably be divided even though respondents believe climate change to be a significant problem, and that the issue of climate change will be identified as something remote from Hungary from a geographical point of view (contrary to the scientific forecasts).
Literature review A wide range of various social sciences is currently interested in climate change research.
From our study’s point of view, the analyses focusing on the questions of perception, the formation of attitudes and communication have relevance and determine public action, inaction and engagement.
Therefore, we emphasize the fields of sociology and psychology (Lorenzoni, I. and Pidgeon, N.F.
2006; Formádi, K. 2013), working real close to geography here.
In addition, as the result of successful integrating efforts of AngloSaxon social geography, an independent field of research is slowly shaping around the social understanding of climate change (Demeritt, D. 2001; Hulme, M. 2008, 2009), however, this approach is still marginal in Hungary (Jankó, F. et al.
2010).
In the USA, a whole series of studies focus on the opposing views of climate change that exists between the high level of consensus within the scientific community and the balanced or otherwise polarized opinions of the civil society, or of those presented in the media (Farmer, G.T.
and Cook, J.
2013).
The related problems and the reasons for such contradictions are identified, on the one hand, as the cognitive bias towards climate change (Whitmarsh, L. 2011; Stoknes, P.E.
2014), the limits of perception and visibility (Hulme, M. 2014), the processing of risks and direct concern, and the differences between personal values (Weber, E.U.
and Stern, P.C.
2011; Donner, S.D.
2011).
On the other hand, the complex and politicized nature of the topic and the successful operation of well-organized, climate change sceptic ‘denial machine’ are emphasized (Dunlap, R.E.
and McCright, A.M. 2011; Farmer, G.T.
and Cook, J.
2013).
Upon the examination of five factors (extreme weather events, public access to accurate scientific information, media coverage, elite (political) cues and the movement and countermovement advocacy), Brulle, R.J. et al.
(2012) established that changes in concerns about climate change are primarily influenced by elite political cues and related economic factors as well as by the media.
Not surprisingly, climate scepticism and the relations thereof to values and experiences are also in the focus of several studies (Whitmarsh, L. 2011).
The research papers that concentrate on the relationship between personal experience and the reality of climate change clearly indicate the profundity of the experience and perception theme.
The studies of Egan, P.J.
and Mullin, M. (2012), Akerlof, K. et al.
(2013), Hamilton, L.C.
and Stampone, M.D.
(2013) compare the experiences of respondents to actual climate data, while Myers, T.A.
et al.
(2013) demonstrate both learning-by-expe161Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.
rience (where personal exposure leads to an increasing belief in climate change) and motivated reasoning (where the prior, firm conviction manipulates perception and experience).
Several studies emphasize the correlation between personal experience and motivation to act (Lorenzoni, I. and Pidgeon, N.F.
2006; Broomell, S.B.
et al.
2015), while socialgeographic approaches also underscore the role of locality and temporality in this respect (Brace, C. and Georghegan, H. 2010).
Communication must also be emphasized, as various governmental and non-governmental campaigns aspire to influence the engagement towards and actions related to climate change.
The core question of communication is how can attention be raised authentically by transmitting a consistent, valid, and true interpretation of climate change.
(We should only think about the catastrophe-focused language of our colonial attitudes related to developing countries in the communication panels.)
In addition, how can we, through the internet primarily, give precise information and instructions to people concerning the complex problem of climate change (Manzo, K. 2010, 2012; Moser, S.C. 2010; Nerlich, B. et al.
2010; Schäfer, M.S.
2012; Stoknes, P.E.
2014; Jankó, F. 2015).
Methodology Our survey took place between February 2013 and October 2015.
The questionnaires were distributed in hard copies and electronic form via e-mail using the snowball sampling method; as a result, we attained a non-representative ‘convenience’ sample of the national coverage comprising 545 respondents.
Of the respondents, 58 per cent was female, while in the age structure, young adults and persons of tertiary-level education were overrepresented (the questionnaire targeted the 14-year-old and above age group) compared to the Hungarian population.
Due to the geographic origin points of the snowball, the majority of respondents were residents of Western Hungary; however, the sample represented all counties to a greater or lesser extent.
Resident distribution according to settlement size turned out to be statistically adequate as Budapest represented a 16.9 per cent share and the distribution of further population clusters conforms to the national data.
Otherwise, due mainly to sampling through the internet, families with kids, households with above average net incomes, persons of tertiary-level education (nearly 68%, while national data is 15%) and, thereby, people belonging to labour market groups requiring higher education levels were overrepresented in the sample.
Hence, our questionnaire is unsuitable for describing the general approach of the entire country concerning environmental awareness, but it is satisfactory for the examination of correlations between the factors mentioned in the title.
The questionnaire was divided into six parts.
Nine questions in the introductory section focused on the personal data of the respondents (gender, age, level of education, residence, household type and income per capita, labour market position).
In the second block, respondents had decided which one of seven cartoons most fits their perceived conception of climate change (Figure 1).
Some of the pictures are presented in Manzo, K. (2012) and they analyse the geopolitical aspects of climate communication as part of a cartoon competition organized by Ken Sprague Foundation.
In addition, we collected more cartoons from the internet that matched our conception.
Our aim was to examine observations on climate change in the mirror of visuality, to explore which interpretations are most effective at catching the attention of respondents, and to make the questionnaire interesting for respondents.
These cartoons provided a sophisticated reference to the question of the perception, and the understanding of and responsibility for climate change; we positioned them at the beginning of the questionnaire to avoid any biasing of the evaluation through upcoming questions.
Cartoons represented seven different ways of interpretation, and the study enabled the testing of the correctness of these associations.
Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.162 Climate change as a scientific problem (a), a geopolitical issue (b), a climate-catastrophe (c), a conflict of renewable energies (d), wasting (e), a conflict of nature and humanity (f) and sustainable development (g).
The following block of questions are related to problem perception addressing its psychological, geographical and temporal factors: we asked first the respondents to prioritize global problems; after that, they had to do the same with environmental issues.
By using the Likert scale, we formulated a series consisting of six questions focusing on concern (3–3 in positive and negative tone – e.g.
“I am afraid of the future climate catastrophes” or “I do not care what happens to the Earth and mankind after me”), the aggregation of what provided us with a concern-index, the values of which varied on a scale between 5 and 30 (the average score was 23.23).
In further questions, we tested different sectors from the aspect of their level of exposure to climate change; we also raised several questions regarding the evaluation of distance from climate change.
One of these questions concentrates on the subject in terms of time: respondents had to evaluate the effects of climate change in the past, in the present, and in the future.
Two questions were formulated to examine the issue of geographic distances: based on the imagined-believed climate threat, respondents were asked to rank the listed territories of different climatic conditions and continental regions.
The fourth block focuses on the issue of responsibility: through different approaches, the questions targeted the origins of climate change and the identification of those origins as well as who should be primarily responsible for finding a solution.
The fifth block includes two Likert scale-based groups of Fig.
1.
Cartoons in the questionnaire.
– a–g = for explanation see the text.
Sources: http://www.transitionpenwith.
org.uk (a); http://www.sfchronicle.com (b); www.kenspraguefund.org (c, d, e, f); www.caglecartoons.com (g) 163Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.
questions, one comprising 15, the other 17 points.
The former New Ecological Paradigm index (“NEP index”) aimed to evaluate the level of relations between nature and humanity, i.e.
pro-environmentalist thinking (on a scale ranging from 15 and 75, where the average value was 55.59), while the latter (“Scepticism index”) examined the degree of scepticism (on a scale ranging from 17 and 85, where the average was 42.92).
The first group of questions is known in the international scientific literature as New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) and was developed by Dunlap, R.E.
et al.
(2000).
More precisely, Dunlap updated the scale from 1978, replacing the ecologiceconomic termini technici, which were widely known to the public in the USA back then but became obsolete in the meantime, similar to terms like steady-state economics, limits of growth, Spaceship Earth (Dunlap, R.E.
and van Liere, K.D.
1978 – see the lists there).
The scepticism scale was developed by Whitmarsh, L. (2011) and was supplemented by Corner, A. et al.
(2012).
We adapted the Hungarian translation of both scales to the aims of the current research.
According to international precedents, these scales are suitable to serve as the basis of development of a consistent aggregate index, though there are several issues we must acknowledge in connection with the application of the initial version of NEP (Dunlap, R.E.
et al.
2000).
We dedicated the final block to actions intended to measure the level of readiness for action and activity volume.
The scale included twelve partially positive and partially negative statements, from which we developed an index using the aggregation method (on a scale ranging between 12 and 60, where the average was 43.12).
Results and discussion Perception of the problem Among global problems, respondents ranked environmental issues as the most important (regarding the average of ranking points [2.8], and the absolute first place as well).
Here we must mention the Eurobarometer surveys that focus on the same topic and are prepared occasionally in the European Union.
Within the frames of these investigations, members of the European population are requested to rank global problems.
The problems identified as the most important have remained unchanged since the very beginning of these surveys (though their respective scores show a decreasing trend): these issues are poverty, lack of food, and potable water.
With respect to the second and third positions, we notice a bit more motion: after 2009, climate change was forced from second into third place by the global financial crisis while international terrorism climbed into second place in 2015.
The data measured in Hungary fit into this trend more or less; however, climate-related issues are less significant in general (TNS 2009, 2011, 2014, 2017).
Our methodology and the way of we formulated our questions were partially different from that of the Eurobarometer survey as we ‘weighed environmental problems against other global issues’: differences in results may arise partly from this fact and partly from the different sample we used.
On our scale, therefore, poverty, and lack of food and potable water reached second place in the aggregate (av.
ranking points: 3.2), showing a curve sloping downwards to the right; the same applies to the problem of increasing global population (3.9).
The functions of three of the listed global issues – the depletion of fossil fuel dependent energy resources (4.4), armed conflicts (4.7), and the financial crisis (5.1) – form an inverted U curve.
Worldwide epidemics (5.6) and international migration (6.3) show a curve sloping downwards to the left; most probably, results would be completely different if the survey were completed today (Figure 2).
The question aimed at differentiation between environmental problems allowed the specific weighing of climate change – and came up with a surprising result.
First place was divided between the issues of waste (4.4) and climate (4.9), but, on average, the highest Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.164 number of ranking points were awarded to water pollution (3.7).
According to the visual demonstration of results, the problems of waste and water pollution show asymmetric inverted U curves (the former slightly, while the latter significantly sloping to the right); the issue of climate change draws a U curve demonstrating a strongly polarized evaluation of this topic in the sample(Figure 3)4.
Thus, on average, the issue of climate change is surpassed by deforestation and forest degradation (4.5 – inverted U curve) (in this respect, the questionnaire refers to tropical areas and the flora of taiga) by destruction of the ozone layer (4.7 – waving curve) and by the problems of soil contamination and soil destruction (4.9 – inverted U curve) as well.
In this hierarchy, three issues with curves sloping to the left follow climate change: scarcity of natural resources (5.5), biodiversity loss (5.6), and acid rain (6.8 – the latter is practically excluded from environmental discourses today).
We questioned the respondents about the expectable positive and adverse effects of climate change on different sectors by using a Likert scale.
With respect to agriculture, 78.5 per cent of respondents answered that the expected outcome of climate change is rather 4 We should note that no similar result is presented with respect to any of the other problems measured by the survey.
negative; the same answer was given by 78 per cent of respondents in connection with natural environment, and by 74 per cent in connection with the standard of living; however, regarding the industry sector, the most frequent response was „I don’t know”.
Several studies have already demonstrated the high level of perception of signs of climate change within the Hungarian population (TÁRKI 2007; Baranyai, N. and Varjú, V. 2015).
We measured the experiences in and the distance of climate change in terms of time with an absolute multiple-choice question.
Almost 47 per cent of respondents answered that the effects of climate change are already directly perceivable and visible, while 40 per cent chose the following among the possible answers: ‘Climate change has been and is still affecting humanity and this is not expected to change in the future either.’ The number of votes cast for the other options is insignificant: 9 per cent of respondents think the climate change effects will only be perceivable in the lives of their children or grandchildren; 3 per cent voted for the option of ‘perceivable only in the distant future’; and 3 respondents opted for the absolute sceptical answer (there are no, and there will be no significant effects).
These results correspond entirely to the statistics of TÁRKI (2007).
The answers to the questions measuring the geographical distance of the climate change problem justified our preliminary assumptions.
Media influence on the ideas about climate change is clearly demonstrated in the Fig.
2.
Ranking of global problems Fig.
3.
Ranking of environmental problems 165Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.
case of questions approaching the problem from a climate point of view.
In questions like these, respondents ranked polar regions almost unanimously in the first position (average ranking point: 2.1); islands are listed as second (3.8), while coastal countries are in third place (3.8).
When applying the approach to continental regions, the first ranked territories were Australia and Oceania (3.4 – most probably because of the latter), while South and East Asia (3.8), Africa and the Middle East (4.0) were listed as second and third.
Areas of continental climate (6.4) and Eastern Europe (5.7) are ranked last from the aspect of average ranking points (Figures 4 and 5).
The causes of climate change and the responsibility for action The first approach led us to the conclusion that more than half of the respondents (54%) thinks that consumer society is responsible for climate change.
This was followed by globalization (20%), failure of environmental policies, and the progress of science and technology.
From a rather sectoral approach, industry and the industrial revolution were ranked first (34%), followed by the change in the land use and the reduction natural habitat territories (27% ≈agriculture), and fossil fuel based energy production (26%).
Transport and oil-industry were chosen by 6–6 per cent of the respondents.
(Compared to international data we see that industry is over-, transport is underestimated here.)
However, if we create an aggregate score from the votes cast for fossil fuel based energy production and the companies interested in the oil industry, their share in responsibility is almost 33 per cent.
A third approach offered the possibility to choose between developed and developing countries: two-thirds of respondents cited the responsibility of the former, while one-third were for that of the latter.
However, the respondents were presumably unclear about the group to which Hungary belongs.
Our next question was: ‘In your opinion, which entity is primarily responsible for the solving of problems arising from climate change?’ We applied three different approaches here as well.
According to the results, respondents would shift the responsibility to developed countries, economy and politics.
Regarding the latter, international negotiations turned out to be more critical than national governments, but in between the two, there is the opinion considering individuals as key factors.
Baranyai, N. and Varjú, V. (2015) came to a different conclusion: in response to their question, which was similar to ours, science ranked first; however, they included the similar options into one question and used the Liker scale for evaluation.
When we involved the cartoons into the examination, we got a bit more complex view of the problem of perception (Table 1).
Those Fig.
5.
Ranking of continental regions from the point of view of their exposedness to climate change Fig.
4.
Ranking of geographic-climatic regions from the point of view of their exposedness to climate change Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.166 Ta bl e 1.
R el at io ns hi p be tw ee n ca rt oo ns a nd r es po ns es o n th e ca us es a nd r es po ns ib ili ty , % G ro up s C au se s an d r es po ns ib le fa ct or s ‘S ci en ce ’ N = 1 15 ‘P ol it ic s’ N = 1 35 ‘C lim at e ca ta st ro ph e’ N = 5 9 ‘B io -f ue l’ N = 3 5 ‘W as ti ng ’ N = 1 16 ‘N at ur e an d m an ki nd ’N = 62 ‘S us ta in ab le d ev el op m en t’ N = 2 3 W ha t i s th e ca us e of c lim at e ch an ge ?
– In th re e gr ou ps G ro up 1 C on su m er s oc ie ty a nd th e w el lbe in g of th e d ev el op ed , W es te rn w or ld T he p ro ce ss o f g lo ba liz at io n T he fa ilu re o f e nv ir on m en ta l p ol ic y T he p ro gr es s of s ci en ce a nd te ch no lo gy 43 .5 30 .4 14 .8 11 .3 57 .8 13 .3 22 .2 6.
7 47 .5 28 .8 13 .6 10 .2 48 .6 31 .4 8.
6 11 .4 63 .8 17 .2 13 .8 5.
2 56 .5 14 .5 16 .1 12 .9 60 .9 8.
7 21 .7 8.
7 G ro up 2 Fo ss ilfu el d ep en d en t e ne rg y pr od uc ti on L an d u se c ha ng e, n at ur al h ab it at lo ss M ot or iz ed tr affi c In d us tr y an d in d us tr ia l r ev ol ut io n O il in d us tr y co m pa ni es 20 .9 35 .7 9.
6 27 .0 7.
0 31 .1 22 .2 4.
4 37 .8 4.
4 23 .7 27 .1 11 .9 33 .9 3.
4 17 .1 37 .1 11 .4 22 .9 11 .4 35 .3 19 .0 3.
4 36 .2 6.
0 21 .0 25 .8 1.
6 40 .3 11 .3 17 .4 39 .1 13 .0 30 .4 0.
0 G ro up 3 T he d ev el op ed , W es te rn c ou nt ri es T he d ev el op in g co un tr ie s 61 .7 38 .3 73 .3 26 .7 64 .4 35 .6 65 .7 34 .3 69 .8 30 .2 72 .6 27 .4 78 .3 21 .7 W ho a re p ri m ar ily r es po ns ib le fo r th e so lu ti on o f t he p ro bl em ?
– In tw o gr ou ps G ro up 1 N at io na l g ov er nm en ts P ol it ic ia ns in vo lv ed in in te rn at io na l ne go ti at io ns L oc al m un ic ip al it ie s T he in d iv id ua ls 37 .4 39 .1 5.
2 18 .3 25 .2 40 .7 0.
0 34 .1 28 .8 45 .8 6.
8 18 .6 17 .1 60 .0 0.
0 22 .9 21 .6 31 .9 1.
7 44 .8 29 .0 37 .1 1.
6 32 .3 4.
3 60 .9 4.
3 30 .4 G ro up 2 E nv ir on m en ta l o rg an iz at io ns a nd in st itu ti on s M ar ke t m ec ha ni sm s, m ar ke t o pe ra ti on , ec on om y P ol it ic s So ci et y, c iv il m ov em en ts T he p ro gr es s of te ch no lo gy Sc ie nc e 7.
8 20 .9 29 .6 11 .3 14 .8 15 .7 3.
7 23 .7 36 .3 8.
9 16 .3 11 .1 11 .9 20 .3 27 .1 8.
5 18 .6 13 .6 17 .1 37 .1 20 .0 11 .4 2.
9 11 .4 3.
4 27 .6 30 .2 13 .8 16 .4 8.
6 8.
1 25 .8 24 .2 3.
2 22 .6 16 .1 4.
3 21 .7 30 .4 21 .7 8.
7 13 .0 N ot e: C ol um n d at a of g ro up s m ak e 10 0 pe r ce nt , n um be rs in it al ic s in d ic at e ch ar ac te ri zi ng d at a.
167Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.
respondents who chose the picture implying the role and duties of science tended to think that science and technological progress are the reasons behind and are responsible for the solution of climate change.
Nevertheless, even more surprisingly, they were represented in the highest rate among those who identified the developing countries as the cause of the problem.
A considerable proportion of students chose this cartoon.
Those respondents (mainly people of tertiary-level education living in Budapest working as white-collar executives) who decided to select the politics-related picture marked the failure of environmental policy as the reason for the problems and (accordingly) politics as the key to problem solving.
Those who blame industry and traffic for climate change chose the cartoon ‘climate catastrophe in the desert,’ a decision that is traceable to the basic antagonism between the environment and humanity.
On the other hand, a significant number of these respondents marked national governments and local municipalities as key factors to finding a solution for a phenomenon that has no such clean-cut explanation.
Respondents identified technological progress and science, land use changes, traffic, and oil companies as the main causes of climate change in the cartoon concerning the problems associated with biofuels.
This cartoon indirectly visualizes the conflict between developed and developing countries and the choices the respondents made properly fit into the visual and contextual world of this cartoon.
The respondents who chose this cartoon emphasized the role of international politics, environmental organizations, and the market in problem solving.
A higher number of older respondents (those above 60 years) chose this cartoon.
The ‘wasting’ cartoon was the most popular among people who live in Budapest, have relatively lower salaries, and work in offices or in the trade industry.
These respondents identified consumer society and fossil fuel based energy resources as the leading causes of climate change, while, in their opinion, the primary responsibility for solving this problem lies with individuals.
The choice of the cartoon visualizing the battle between nature and humanity involved the determination of scientific and technological progress, industry and oil companies as leading causes, and national governments, science and technology as those responsible for finding a solution to climate change (students were overrepresented in this group).
The cartoon about sustainable development (though it was rarely chosen, was picked mainly by respondents of higher education level) also fits into the idea of consumer society.
The failure of environmental policy, land use change, natural habitat loss, traffic and developed countries were identified as main cause, and international politics and non-governmental, civil movements were identified as key factors of solving the problem of climate change.
In summary, we think cartoons were useful tools in the survey: they gave a proper synthesis of different readings of climate change from which conclusions regarding actions could be drawn as well (see details below).
Concern, environmental awareness, action Hereunder we examine the factors influencing actions, the mode of action and correlations between the level of concern, pro-environmental thinking and climate scepticism.
We used four indicators for these analyses.
After having the indexes correlated, we first received medium and weak correlations: correlation coefficients between index of concern, NEP and scepticism were 0.50, –0.57 and –0.53.
The correlation coefficients between the indicator of actions and the three mentioned factors were 0.24, 0.31 and –0.26 (as for scepticism, correlations were ordinarily negative).
That is to say that there is a medium-level relation among concern about climate change, pro-environmental thinking, and scepticism, but these factors rarely explain the differences of action indicator values.
Paralleled, the respondents who chose Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.168 ‘wasting’ and ‘battle between nature and humanity’ cartoons demonstrated a higher level of concern, pro-environmental thinking, and readiness to act.
As a further approach, we clustered the respondents depending on the rank they gave to climate change among environmental problems as well as on the level of their concern.
In the former case, we observed the same correlations and trends as described hereinabove, while in the latter case the correlation between the higher level of concern and the higher level of willingness to act was more obvious.
Nevertheless, there are no signs that would demonstrate a paralyzed condition (inability to act) at an outstanding level of concern; namely, we could not verify our preliminary assumption in this regard.
What factors influence the actions and the values of other indicators?
With respect to gender, women are more active in the field of actions, and they are more inclined to concern (the same result: TÁRKI 2007; Searle, K. and Gow, K. 2010) than men; in parallel, they have a more developed environmental thinking, and they are less sceptic.
The harmonic change in indicators is also traceable among the values of age groups: the youngest and the oldest respondents are the less concerned, the less active, the less environment-friendly and the most sceptic, which is quite understandable.
Nevertheless, the examined four dimensions are more influenced by the type/size of the settlement and the level of education.
Regarding the former, the NEP index shows a U-shape; while in the latter case, higher education level entrained, to a certain extent, higher average values (the scores were lower regarding scepticism) (Figure 6.
– cf.
Baranyai, N. and Varjú, V. 2015).
Furthermore, we should mention the fact of living in a ‘standard family model’ (parents with kids) also seemed to have determinant power on the above-mentioned indicators.
We could not demonstrate an obvious correlation between the indicators and the income per capita: the respondents in the second and fifth income clusters were the most concerned and the readiest to act.
Neither could we identify a correlation between the indicators and labour market clusters: respondents employed in executive and white collar jobs, the largeand medium-size entrepreneurs, qualified office workers, trade industry employees and service providers were more typified by stronger concerns, a higher level of pro-environmental thinking and readiness to act, and less climate scepticism.
Furthermore, it is a valuable sign that the index of concern and the index of activity was the highest among those respondents, who chose the cartoons ‘waste’ and ‘battle between nature and humanity’, and climate scepticism was the lowest among those who chose the cartoon visualizing the climate catastrophe.
Certain correlations in the fields of experience and responsibility seem to be quite obvious.
Those who have direct knowledge of the problem are more concerned, more aware of environmental issues, less sceptic, and more ready to act; the same applies to those who identified the individual people as responsible for solving climate change.
The midline is more or less represented by those respondents (diverting, however, downwards from the median in each case) who considered climate change as a factor influencing the past and the future as well.
That is to say, the choice of the above answer also showed a certain level of scepticism in the sample.
We also examined the daily logs of extreme weather events to check if those persons who filled out the questionnaire after such an extremity (within a one-week period) are more concerned about climate change or not.
According to the results, there was no sign of any evidence (except that on the level of average values); however, on this scale, at least the direction of the correlation was the expected.
We examined the place of residence of respondents also, both in the relation of experience and the above four indicators.
As for the direct experience of climate change, the average scores of respondents from Northern Hungary (Észak-Magyarország), Rim of the Alps (Alpokalja), and Budapest were the highest (they directly experience climate change).
169Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.
This result contradicts our preliminary assumption: we expected a higher level of sensitivity in the region of the Great Hungarian Plain (Alföld).
This finding suggests that direct experience is a stronger influencing factor in areas where people are unaccustomed to extremities.
However, this is only one segment of correlations within the four examined dimensions.
The index of concern reflects more or less the same results as the above correlation, but concerning the other indicators, Rim of the Alps provides the only outstanding scores while Great Hungarian Plain and Little Plain (Kisalföld) regions are presented more significantly instead of Northern Hungary.
Summary and conclusions A core conclusion of our examinations is that climate change is a very complex issue with several possibilities of interpretation and differentiated understanding: the topic divides people.
This is the reason for the argument that climate change is not the proper issue to activate people (Stoknes, P.E.
2014) We offered several approaches in our study, but some of our questions remained open or were only partially verified.
Our results reflect a moderate correlation between concerns and thoughts about climate change (pro-environmental thinking and climate scepticism), and a significantly weaker one between concerns and the intensity and consciousness of our actions.
This is because the latter are more exposed to the influence of many other factors like settlement type, education level, gender, age, life values, or casual attributions in relation to climate change.
Another valuable result of the study is the demonstration that most of the respondents evaluated climate change as a phenomenon that is near in time, but geographically remote (cf.
Hulme, M. 2008; Stoknes, P.E.
2014).
This is a clear indication of cognitive Fig.
6.
Correlations between the category of settlement size and the four dimensions Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.170 conceptualization and problems with the localization of climate change in communication.
The answers we received to our questionnaire also verified the existence of climate scepticism in Hungarian society, beyond temporality and geography it is also a fact that should be taken into consideration in the course of climate communication planning.
Furthermore, we managed to identify several different clusters of respondents based on visualization of the problem, which verifies the thesis that the target group should always be considered carefully in communication projects.
Acknowledgements: The research was supported by the VKSZ_12-1-2013-0034 Agrárklíma.2 project.
REFERENCES Akerlof, K., Maibach, E.W., Fitzgerald, D., Cedeno, A.Y.
and Neuman, A.
2013.
Do people ‘‘personally experience’’ global warming, and if so how, and does it matter?
Global Environmental Change 23.
81–91.
Antal, Z.L.
2015.
Klímaparadoxonok (Climate paradoxons).
Budapest, L’Harmattan Kiadó.
Bajmóczy, P., Boros, L., Csatári, B., Dudás, R., Farkas, J.Zs., Juray, T., Kovács, Z. and Pál, V. 2012.
Managing the socio-economic consequences of the climate change.
In Review of climate change research program at the University of Szeged.
Eds.
: Rakonczai, J. and Ladányi, Zs., Szeged, University of Szeged, Institute of Geography and Geology, 105–120.
Baranyai, N. and Varjú, V. 2015.
A lakosság klímaváltozással kapcsolatos attitűdjének empirikus vizsgálata (Empirical study of citizens’ attitude towards climate change).
In Klímaváltozás – társadalom – gazdaság.
Hosszú távú területi folyamatok és trendek Magyarországon.
Eds.
: Czirfusz, M., Hoyk, E. and Suvák, A., Pécs, Publikon Kiadó, 257–284.
Bartholy, J., Pongrácz, R. and Pieczka, I.
2014.
How the climate will change in this century?
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63.
(1): 55–67.
Bereczki, B.H.
2012.
A klímaváltozás médiadiskurzusai (Media-discourses of climate change).
Korunk 23.
(2): 14–21.
Bobvos, J., Málnási, T., Rudnai, T., Cserbik, D. and Páldy, A.
2017.
The effect of climate change on heatrelated excess mortality in Hungary at different area levels.
Időjárás 121.
(1): 43–62.
Brace, C. and Georghegan, H. 2010.
Human geographies of climate change: Landscape, temporality and lay knowledges.
Progress in Human Geography 35.
(3): 284–302.
Broomell, S.B., Budescu, D.V.
and Por, H-H. 2015.
Personal experience with climate change predicts intentions to act.
Global Environmental Change 32.
67–73.
Brulle, R.J., Carmichael, J. and Jenkins, J.C. 2012.
Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the U.S., 2002–2010.
Climatic Change 114.
(2): 169–188.
Corner, A., Whitmarsh, L. and Xenias, D. 2012.
Uncertainty, scepticism and attitudes towards climate change: biased assimilation and attitude polarisation.
Climatic Change 114.
(3–4): 463–478.
Demeritt, D. 2001.
Geographical work at the boundaries of climate change.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91.
(2): 307–337.
Donner, S.D.
2011.
Making the climate a part of the human world.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 92.
1297–1302.
Dunlap, R.E.
and McCright, A.M. 2011.
Organized climate change denial.
In Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society.
Eds.
: Schlosberg, D., Dryzek, J. and Norgaard, R., Cambridge, Oxford University Press, 144–160.
Dunlap, R.E.
and van Liere, K.D.
1978.
The „New Environmental Paradigm” A Proposed Measuring Instrument and Preliminary Results.
Journal of Environmental Education 9.
10–19.
Dunlap, R.E., van Liere, K.D., Mertig, A.G. and Jones, R.E.
2000.
Measuring endorsement of the new ecological paradigm: a revised NEP scale.
Journal of Social Issues 56.
(3): 425–442.
Egan, P.J.
and Mullin, M. 2012.
Turning Personal Experience into Political Attitudes: The Effect of Local Weather on Americans’ Perceptions about Global Warming.
Journal of Politics 74.
(3): 796–809.
Farkas, J.Zs., Hoyk, E. and Rakonczai, J.
2017.
Geographical analysis of climate vulnerability at a regional scale: the case of the Southern Great Plain in Hungary.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66.
(2): 129–144.
Farmer, G.T.
and Cook, J.
2013.
Understanding Climate Change Denial.
In Climate Change Science: A Modern Synthesis.
Dordrecht, Springer, 445–466.
Formádi, K. 2013.
A klímaváltozás, mint kockázat érzékelése és a megoldásával kapcsolatos attitűdök szakirodalmi vizsgálata (Literature review of climate change: perception of risk and attitudes of solution).
Iskolakultúra 12.
49–58.
Hamilton, L.C.
and Stampone, M.D.
2013.
Blowin’ in the Wind: Short-Term Weather and Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change.
Weather, Climate and Society 5.
112–119.
Hulme, M. 2008.
Geographical work at the boundaries of climate change.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33.
5–11.
Hulme, M. 2009.
Why we disagree about climate change?
Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
171Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.
Hulme, M. 2014.
Attributing weather extremes to ‘climate change’: A review.
Progress in Physical Geography 38.
(4): 499–511.
Jankó, F. 2015.
Éghajlatváltozással kapcsolatos tudás a világháló magyar részén (Climate change knowledge on the Hungarian web).
Tér és Társadalom 29.
(2): 67–89.
Jankó, F., Móricz, N. and Papp-Vancsó, J.
2010.
Klímaváltozás: tudományos viták és a társadalomföldrajz feladatai (Climate change: controversies in science and the objectives of human geography).
Földrajzi Közlemények 134.
(4): 405–418.
Jankó, F., Móricz, N. and Papp-Vancsó, J.
2011.
Klímaváltozás: diskurzusok a katasztrófától a kételkedésig (Climate change: discourses from catastrophe to scepticism).
Földrajzi Közlemények 135.
(1): 3–16.
Kajner, P., Czira, T., Selmeczi, P. and Sütő, A.
2017.
National Adaptation Geo-information System in climate.
Időjárás 121.
(4): 345–370.
Király, G., Czirfusz, M., Koós, B., Tagai, G. and Uzzoli, A.
2017.
Population projection for Hungary and its relation with climate change.
Europa XXI 32.
5–19.
Kőszegi, M., Bottlik, Zs., Telbisz, T. and Mari, L. 2015.
Human-environment relationships in modern and postmodern geography.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 64.
(2): 87–99.
Lorenzoni, I. and Pidgeon, N.F.
2006.
Public views on climate change: European and USA perspectives.
Climatic Change 77.
73–95.
Manzo, K. 2010.
Imaging vulnerability: the iconography of climate change.
Area 42.
96–107.
Manzo, K. 2012.
Earthworks: The geopolitical visions of climate change cartoons.
Political Geography 31.
481–494.
Mesterházy, I., Mészáros, R. and Pongrácz, R. 2014.
The effects of climate change on grape production in Hungary.
Időjárás 118.
(3): 193–206.
Moser, S.C. 2010.
Communicating climate change: history, challenges, process and future directions.
WIREs Climate Change 1.
31–53.
Mosoni-Fried, J., Pálinkó, É. and Stefán, E. 2008.
Klímaváltozás a közvélemény-kutatások tükrében (Climate change in public opinion polls).
Klíma-21 füzetek 49.
45–58.
Myers, T.A., Maibach, E.W, Roser-Renouf, C., Akerlof, K. and Leiserowitz, A.A. 2013.
The relationship between personal experience and belief in the reality of global warming.
Nature Climate Change 3.
343–347.
Nerlich, B., Koteyko, N. and Brown, B.
2010.
Theory and language of climate change communication.
WIREs Climate Change 1.
(1): 91–110.
Salamin, G., Kohán, Z., Dobozi, E. and Péti, M. 2011.
Climate-friendly cities: a handbook on the tasks and possibilities of European cities in relation to climate change.
Budapest, Ministry of Interior – VÁTI.
Schäfer, M.S.
2012.
Online communication on climate change and climate politics: a literature review.
WIREs Climate Change 3.
(6): 527–543.
Searle, K. and Gow, K. 2010.
Do concerns about climate change lead to distress?
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 2.
(4): 362–379.
Stoknes, P.E.
2014.
Rethinking climate communications and the “psychological climate paradox”.
Energy Research & Social Science 1.
161–170.
Szirmai, V., Molnár, B., Szépvölgyi, Á., Schuchmann, J. and Váradi, Zs.
2008.
A klímaváltozás térbeli hatásai a budapesti társadalomban (Regional effects of climate change in the society of Budapest).
Klíma-21 füzetek 54.
51–71.
TÁRKI 2007.
Klímaváltozás a nyilvánosságban (Climate change in public discourse).
Társadalmi Klíma Riport 1.
Budapest, TÁRKI Image Factory.
http:// www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/b017.pdf.
Accessed: 11.01.
2017.
TNS 2009.
Europeans’ attitudes towards climate change.
Special Eurobarometer 313.
TNS Opinion & Social, European Parliament and European Commission.
https://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ ebs_313_en.pdf.
Accessed: 11.12.
2017.
TNS 2011.
Climate change.
Special Eurobarometer 372.
TNS Opinion & Social, European Commission.
https://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ ebs_372_en.pdf.
Accessed: 11.12.
2017.
TNS 2014.
Climate change.
Special Eurobarometer 409.
TNS Opinion & Social, European Commission.
https://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ ebs_409_en.pdf.
Accessed: 11.12.
2017.
TNS 2017.
Climate change.
Special Eurobarometer 459.
TNS Opinion & Social, European Commission https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/support/ docs/report_2017_en.pdf.
Accessed: 11.12.
2017.
Weber, E.U.
and Stern , P.C.
2011.
Public Understanding of Climate Change in the United States.
American Psychologist 66.
(4): 315–328.
Whitmarsh, L. 2011.
Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: dimensions, determinants and change over time.
Global Environmental Change 21.
690–700.
Jankó, F. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67 (2018) (2) 159–171.172
PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies Vol.
15, No.
1/2 August 2018 © 2018 by the author(s).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license.
Citation: Potts, J.
2018.
Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change: Visions of the Future from 1909 to the Present.
PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, 15:1/2, pp.
99-116. https:// doi.org/10.5130/portal.v15i1-2.5810 ISSN 1449-2490 | Published by UTS ePRESS | http://portal.
epress.lib.uts.edu.au RESEARCH ARTICLE Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change: Visions of the Future from 1909 to the Present John Potts Macquarie University Corresponding author: Professor John Potts, Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies, Faculty of Arts, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia.
john.potts@ mq.edu.au DOI: https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v15i1-2.5810 Article History: Received 24/10/2017; Revised 12/02/2018; Accepted 16/04/2018; Published 23/08/2018 Abstract This essay charts a brief intellectual history of the futures—both utopian and dystopian— conceived in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
It traces perspectives on the future since 1909, when the term ‘futurism’ was coined in the publication of the ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism.’ The essay maps changes in the vision of the future, taking a chronological approach in noting developments in the discourse on the future.
A prominent theme in pronouncements on the future is technological progress, first in relation to industrial technology, later in the context of post-industrial or information technology.
A turning-point in this discourse can be isolated in the early 1970s, when ideas of technological progress begin to be challenged in the public sphere; from that date, environmental concern becomes increasingly significant in discussions of the future.
Keywords Future, futurism, futurology, climate change, environment.
1963/1984/2007/2018 In July and August 1963, a two-part article on the future was published in Playboy magazine.
The article documented the proceedings of a roundtable discussion featuring twelve of the DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTEREST The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
99 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v15i1-2.5810 https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v15i1-2.5810 http://portal.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://portal.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:john.potts@mq.edu.au mailto:john.potts@mq.edu.au https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v15i1-2.5810 eminent science-fiction authors of the day, including Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Robert Heinlein and Ray Bradbury.
The authors, considered experts on the future, were asked to predict what life would be like from 1984 to 2000.
This remarkable text, recording the projections and predictions of famous science-fiction authors, is a document of the futurism of 1963.
Apart from their celebrated ability to imagine the future, several of these writers could claim expert status in technical and scientific fields: Asimov in astronomy and chemistry; Clark in space and sea exploration; Heinlein in space travel and plastics.
These authors, in other words, were superbly qualified as futurists.
The roundtable conversation was a Space Age projection of a technologically advanced future society.
The science fiction experts made the following confident predictions concerning the period 1984–2000: space stations on the moon in the 1970s; the conquest of human diseases; the disappearance of dull jobs; three months’ annual paid vacation by 2000; the elimination of the need for sleep; and a glorious age of ‘social emancipation and scientific revolution’ (Godfrey 2007: 21).
Their vision of the future, as notated in the Playboy article, was optimistic, grandiose, and wildly inaccurate.
But of course, the writers’ earnest predictions can only be deemed wildly inaccurate from a perspective beyond their time-scale: beyond 1984, beyond 2000.
In 2007, the Irish artist Gerard Byrne exhibited a video installation work at the Venice Biennale entitled 1984 and Beyond.
This work, comprising three video channels of 60 minutes’ total duration, and 20 black and white photographs, used the text of the Playboy article to recreate on video the 1963 roundtable discussion.
Byrne’s intriguing artwork plays with temporal disjunction: the writers in 1963 were asked to project to a time beyond 1984; yet we, as viewers of this artwork in 2007, or 2018, are situated in time well beyond that projection-point.
We look back, with amusement and perhaps wonder, to this prediction of the future from 1963.
Their future, imagined with supreme optimism and unmitigated faith in technological progress, has long been incorporated into our past.
The future conceived in 1963 is a Space Age construction; we file it within a history of the future, or of futures that have been imagined, predicted or projected; futures that were never realised.
Byrne’s artful recreation of the 1963 roundtable carefully situates the writers in their historical context.
The actors playing the venerated science fiction authors are dressed in the fashion of 1963: turtlenecks and fitted cardigans, narrow ties and thin suits.
They smoke pipes and cigarettes constantly; they stroll and pontificate against a high Modernist architectural setting, the Sonsbeek Pavilion in the Netherlands, originally built in 1955.
The effect of the re-enactment is to seal off the futurist vision of 1963; even the surrounding buildings suggests the failed utopian vision of internationalist Modernist architecture.
The authors’ pompous pronouncements on space travel and a world of leisure are rendered ridiculous by their failure to become reality.
But the overall effect of this re-staging of the beliefs of 1963 is not one of ridicule.
It is rather a sense of distance: that the optimistic, utopian attitudes of this period are hopelessly lost.
These attitudes are foreign to us, as is the undiluted faith in the future demonstrated by these zealous ‘futurists’ of 1963.
The science fiction writers conceived a utopian future; but for us looking back at their beliefs and hopes, they represent, as Lytle Shaw has observed, a ‘utopian past’ (2007: 121).
This essay proposes a brief intellectual history of the futures—both utopian and dystopian—conceived in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
It traces perspectives on the future since 1909, when the term ‘futurism’ was coined in the publication of the ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism.’ The essay maps changes in the vision of the future, taking a chronological approach in noting developments in the discourse on the future.
Components Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018100 of this discourse, over a span of 108 years, include the published pronouncements of selfproclaimed futurists and futurologists.
Other contributors to the discourse on the future include industrialists, engineers, scientists, economists, architects, artists, writers, film-makers, entrepreneurs, technicians, activists and environmentalists.
The rhetoric of advertising and public relations is also significant in promoting visions of the future, as found in the ‘Futurama’ exhibits—sponsored by energy corporations—at World’s Fairs in the twentieth century.
A prominent theme in pronouncements on the future is technological progress, first in relation to industrial technology, later in the context of post-industrial or information technology.
A turning-point in this discourse can be isolated in the early 1970s, when ideas of technological progress begin to be challenged in the public sphere; from that date, environmental concern becomes increasingly significant in discussions of the future.
The discourse on global warming and climate change becomes highly influential when the future of the environment—and of the planet—is considered in the twenty-first century.
Theorising the future There is a substantial cross-disciplinary scholarship on future studies, drawing on sociology, anthropology, media and cultural studies, literary studies, studies of technology and society, and other disciplines.
Futurologists have made predictions in recent years based on economics, demographics, political theory and developments in information technology.
The future studies scholarship in general adopts a critical sociological perspective, describing the socioeconomic and cultural determinants that shape visions of the future.
As the anthropologist Marc Augé writes in his book The Future: ‘The future, even when it concerns the individual, always has a social dimension: it depends on others’ (Augé 2014: 2).
The anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has considered the theoretical approach to ‘the future as cultural fact,’ taking into account the human preoccupations ‘imagination, anticipation, and aspiration’ (2013: 286).
Augé’s critical anthropology focuses on the political and economic forces shaping social development: ‘change is fundamentally economic and driven by technological development’ (2013: 47).
Globalisation, growing social inequality and environmental damage resulting from ‘the imperatives of development and growth’ (2013: 51) are for Augé the factors determining the near future: ‘we can already see the outlines of a transnational planetary oligarchy and an unequal planetary society’ (2013: 52).
Augé’s vision of the future is a general one, proceeding from a projection of ‘globalization and the extension of the capitalist market to the whole planet’ (2013: 60).
The economist Jacques Attali offers a far more detailed prediction of world societies up to the year 2100 in A Brief History of the Future (2009).
Attali’s vision of the future has an economic base similar to Augé’s: ‘I predict that in the course of the twenty-first century, market forces will take the planet in hand,’ leading to the evolution of ‘super-empire’ (2009: xiii).
Attali makes the general observations that ‘every prediction is first and foremost a meditation on the present,’ and that a work of prediction is ‘also a political work’ (2009: xvii).
More specifically, Attali foresees a political and economic conflict between ‘super-empire’ and ‘hyper-democracy,’ a political system in which the market and globalisation are contained for the benefit of world citizens.
His political hope is that the ‘common good’ and ‘collective intelligence’ of hyper-democracy will prevail by 2100 (2009: 271).
Other recent predictions of the future focus on the social impact of advanced information technology in the near future.
In Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (2017), Yuval Noah Harari concludes his history of Homo sapiens with a prediction of the species’ displacement by Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018101 one of its own inventions: ‘dataism’ or the ‘data religion.’ Harari defines dataism as the view that ‘the universe consists of data flows,’ with the corollary that ‘the value of any phenomenon or entity is determined by its contribution to data processing’ (Harari 2017: 430).
Harari projects a future of data controlled by algorithms and artificial intelligence, finding the possibility that ‘dataism threatens to do to Homo sapiens what Homo sapiens has done to all other animals’ (2017: 460).
A number of scholarly publications have charted a ‘history of the future,’ tracing visions of the future in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the domains of science fiction and architecture.
These texts include Donna Goodman’s A History of the Future (2008), Richard Barbrook’s Imaginary Futures (2007), Oona Strathern’s A Brief History of the Future (2007) and the collection of essays Histories of the Future edited by Daniel Rosenberg and Susan Harding (2005).
For these historical studies, ‘looking backwards is the precondition for moving forwards,’ as Barbrook states in Imaginary Futures (2007: 11).
Previous imaginings of the future are located in their social, economic and political contexts.
Barbrook, for example, focuses on the grand showcases of new technologies as emblems of the future, beginning with the ‘Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations’ in London in 1851, and continuing in the ‘Futurama’ exhibits at the New York World’s Fairs of 1939 and 1964.
In 1851, a futuristic building of iron and glass known as the Crystal Palace was built to house the new industrial products of the British Empire.
The various new machines produced by industrial capitalism were the stars of this ‘great exhibition,’ which offered a ‘public celebration of economic progress’ (Barbrook 2007: 26) and a vision of a new prosperous social order.
Barbrook traces the growth of an international series of Expositions and World’s Fairs modelled on the 1851 Crystal Palace exhibition.
The Paris Universal Exposition in 1900 attracted nearly 48 million spectators: world expositions became international travel destinations and even ‘appeared to be prefiguring world peace’ (2007: 26).
If that hope did not survive long into the twentieth century, the New York World’s Fair later became a showcase for optimistic visions of the future founded on technological progress.
Corporations sponsored exhibits displaying the wonders of the near future: ‘Building a World of Tomorrow’ was the theme of the 1939 World’s Fair.
General Motors’ Futurama exhibit, depicting a high-tech USA twenty years into the future, was enormously popular with spectators.
Barbrook demonstrates the economic and political base of future imaginings in his study of these exhibits.
The World’s Fair, he observes, ‘expressed the productive potential of American industry’ (2007: 28), as did its vision of the future.
The following essay takes a chronological approach, describing visions of the future made public since 1909.
These imaginings of the future have economic, political and technological bases.
For the first six decades of the twentieth century, optimistic visions of the future—such as those of the science fiction authors in 1963—emanated from a base of industrial capitalism, reflecting a faith in technological progress.
However, a significant change to imaginings of the future occurred in the 1970s.
Environmental concerns punctured faith in technological progress, while industrial technology was targeted for the environmental damage it had caused around the world.
New political imperatives—conservation, environmentalism, sustainability, the questioning of economic growth—influenced visions of the future.
From the 1970s on, these imaginings were more likely to be dystopian than utopian, expressing anxiety for the future of the environment and for humanity.
Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018102 1909: The caffeine of Europe F. T. Marinetti invented ‘futurism’ on February 20, 1909.On this date, Marinetti—poet, provocateur, and the self-proclaimed ‘caffeine of Europe’—published ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’ on the front page of the Paris newspaper Le Figaro.
‘We declare that the world’s splendour has been enriched by a new beauty: the beauty of speed,’ proclaimed the manifesto, identifying the motor car as the symbol of this new order.
Marinetti willed the future into being—and the future was built with industrial technology.
He sang the love of racing car danger, of ‘broad-chested locomotives,’ electric light, factories and the tumult of cities.
(Marinetti 1961: 124) Previous writers had predicted the future—Jules Verne, HG Wells, Edward Bellamy in Looking Back, published in 1888 and set in 2000—but these were science fiction authors.
Political theorists had peered into the future with hope of new political orders.
But Marinetti invented the idea of futurism: a world-view perpetually geared to the glories of things yet to come.
He inscribed the future into the core of a new art movement, which proposed a new way of life.
This was the avant-garde: dragging the rest of society onwards into the future.
Marinetti’s new movement gave voice to a love of machines, youth and technological speed— and to a love of the future.
Based in Milan, Marinetti and his fellow Futurists—artists, composers, architects, performers—were inspired by the newly industrialised northern Italian cities, which promised liberation from the dreary agrarian past.
Futurism was proposed as a total art form, incorporating all available means including film and re-invigorating old forms, as Marinetti’s typographically radical ‘words-in-freedom’ revolutionised the printed word.
There was Futurist music (The Art of Noises), Futurist clothing, Futurist sleeping (briefly, standing up) and Futurist food: the Futurist cookbook rejected pasta as too slow and heavy a food for Futurists.
Marinetti’s face was turned only towards the future in his reverence for Progress, which ‘is always right, even when it is wrong, because it is movement, life, struggle, hope’ (Marinetti 1972: 82).
This orientation to the future, this love of Progress, was distinctively Modern, unknown in the ancient world.
Only in the Enlightenment of eighteenth century Europe did the idea of Progress gain currency (Bury 1955).
Reason would drive a continual social progress until the perfect society was achieved; in this way the present could be considered superior to the past, and the future would be better than the present: the definition of progress.
The Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century transformed Progress into technological progress: great railway stations became cathedrals of progress, as technological innovation raised living standards in the ‘age of improvement’.
This was the version of progress—built on the advances of technology—inherited by the futurist Marinetti in the early twentieth century.
He had no doubt that industrial machines were forging a triumphant future: ‘Progress is always right.’ Coupled with this utopian zeal for the technological future was a contempt for the past: the ‘useless administration of the past’ must be let go, Marinetti cried, if Futurists were to hymn the beauty of mechanical speed (Marinetti 1961: 125).
Marinetti not only repudiated tradition: he ridiculed it, insulted it, slapped it in the face.
He challenged it to a duel and then overwhelmed it with modern military machines.
In the founding manifesto, Marinetti declared hostilities against: museums, which cover Italy ‘like so many cemeteries’; libraries—‘set fire to their shelves, good incendiaries!’; academies; and even second-hand markets.
The disdain for all ‘passéists’ extended to any individual cursed with middle age.
This included Futurists, whose time, Marinetti reckoned, is up at forty.
Then ‘let Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018103 other Futurists, younger and more valiant, throw us into the basket like useless manuscripts!’ (1961: 125) The Futurists’ embrace of youth, speed and novelty pre-dated the ‘Hope I Die Before I Get Old’ youth culture of the 1960s by almost six decades.
There was no place in the future for the old, the weary, the traditional—or anything associated with the dead hand of the past.
1913: Assembly line to the future The American industrialist Henry Ford introduced moving assembly belts into his automobile manufacturing plants in 1913.
This innovation yielded a massive increase in production of the Model T Ford, produced at affordable prices.
By 1918, half of all cars in the USA were Model Ts, and Henry Ford was one of the wealthiest and most famous men in the world.
The Ford factory was a model for the new industrial process: efficient, mechanised, the paragon of time-and-motion control of labour.
It was the realisation of Frederick Taylor’s vision, published in his book Principles of Scientific Management in 1911.
Each worker performs a single task, timed to optimum efficiency, and repeated with machine-like monotony.
Every individual worker is in fact a small cog in a gigantic industrial mechanism.
This new form of the workplace was later satirised by Charlie Chaplin in his film Modern Times of 1936: the dehumanising effects of the factory-machine are shown in the hapless worker unable to switch off his mechanical task.
But for Taylor, and Ford, and the other industrialists who pursued the goal of ‘scientific management’ of labour, this was the way of the future.
The assembly line was rationalised movement; it operated a strict control of effort in manufacturing the motor cars so revered by Marinetti and his Futurists.
The industrialist Ford shared the Futurists’ zeal for technological progress, an orientation to the mechanised future.
He also professed a complete disdain for history, which he dismissed as ‘more or less bunk.’ Why look back when you can look forward with optimism?
‘We don’t want tradition,’ Ford said in 1916.
‘We want to live in the present, and the only history that is worth a tinker’s dam is the history we make today’ (Ford 1916: xxv) 1919: Engineers know best The word ‘technocracy’—the management of society by technical experts – was introduced by the American engineer William Henry Smyth in 1919.
Smyth’s article ‘“Technocracy”: Ways and Means to Gain Industrial Democracy’ saw the future of democracy as ‘the rule of the people made effective through the agency of their servants, the scientists and engineers’ (1919: 385).
These were the technical experts who best knew the potential of technological systems to solve social ills.
The Technocracy Movement, founded by Howard Scott in 1932, went further in proposing government by technical decision-making.
Technicians know better than politicians how to benefit society; the experts who run factories and machine systems should be trusted to organise the economy along mechanical lines.
The Technocracy Movement even proposed energy as the new metric of value: money should be replaced by energy certificates measured in joules.
If the politicians would only get out of the way, the technocrats could improve society—by making it run like an enormous benevolent machine.
Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018104 1924: Tomorrow is better than today In 1924, ‘planned obsolescence’ was introduced as a strategy by the Head of General Motors, Alfred Sloan.
The idea was to make changes every year to the cars produced by General Motors, so that car owners could be convinced to buy the new improved model.
Advertising pushed the imperative to upgrade as often as possible: why be stuck with last year’s model, when this year’s is so much better?
And next year’s model will be better still!
Sloan called this production strategy ‘dynamic obsolescence,’ but critics preferred ‘planned obsolescence.’ This term incorporated the planning behind a vision of constant upgrading and purchasing of the new.
The current model is only new for a short period of time; before long it becomes old, inferior, and in need of replacement.
The tactic of planned obsolescence was copied by manufacturers of commodities everywhere.
Henry Ford resisted the idea, seeing no need to tinker with his beloved Model T; General Motors surpassed Ford in car sales in the US in 1931.
1930: Flash forward Clarence Birdseye introduced the flash freezing of food in 1930.
The Birdseye company used new freezing technology to sell frozen vegetables, fruit and meats.
Freezing food makes all foods available at all times: no longer are we dependent on seasonal produce.
This technological innovation was seen as another means of improving on nature, which stubbornly follows a seasonal cycle.
Now summer fruits could be thawed out in winter: the consumer does not need to wait.
Frozen food reached its peak in the 1950s with the frozen TV dinner.
This ‘complete meal’ was designed to be heated up and eaten in front of the TV which, no doubt, screened ads on the modern marvels of the age such as plastics, synthetics and frozen foods.
1932: Cathedrals of the future The ‘International Style’ was the name given to Modernist architecture in 1932 by Philip Johnson and Henry-Russell Hitchcock.
Their exhibition Modern Architecture: International Exhibition celebrated the distinctive style of Modernist design and architecture as it emerged in Europe and spread around the world.
The European master architects—Walter Gropius (director of the Bauhaus design school), Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe—were gurus of minimal, pure, rationalised design style.
Embellishment and decoration were banished, as were any traces of pre-Modernist style.
A house is ‘a machine for living in,’ Le Corbusier declared in Towards a New Architecture, originally published in 1923 (7).
There was a utopian aspect to the Modernist blueprint for architecture and urban design: Gropius called the Bauhaus ‘a cathedral of the future’ ( Jencks 1989: 25).
The purity of design was thought to have a spiritual dimension, which would uplift all those who experienced it.
Social problems would be eradicated in the near future by the sheer presence of Modernist urban development.
Slums would be replaced by Modernist design on a grand scale: high-rise buildings and vast housing projects full of uplifted inhabitants.
In the gospel according to Mies and Le Corbusier, the future would be pure, sleek, and free of the urban decay of the past.
1938: Caffeine of the New World Nescafé launched its instant coffee, based on an advanced refining process, in 1938.
The benefits of this new form of coffee were sold by advertising: convenience and speed of preparation.
It was the modern version of a traditional drink; in the succeeding years, other Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018105 instant foods were successfully marketed, including instant gravy, instant mash potato, and whole pre-prepared meals.
The convenience of these new foods was the key to their market success: they were quicker, easier, an improvement on the old ways.
But surely even Marinetti, the self-confessed caffeine of Europe, must have had his doubts about this manifestation of technological progress?
1939: Futurama The World’s Fair of 1939, held in New York, followed earlier World’s Fairs in showcasing technical innovations and gadgets.
But the 1939 event offered to take visitors into the future.
The theme was ‘The World of Tomorrow’; corporate-sponsored pavilions showed off the homes and cities of the near-future; and visitors were given badges that proudly claimed ‘I have seen the future’ (Turney 2010: 65).
The central exhibit was ‘Futurama,’ sponsored by General Motors.
Futurama was a glimpse of tomorrow: super-cities linked by huge seven-lane highways.
In the vision projected by General Motors, technology is good, highways are good, energy is good, progress is good, and the future is a very happy place indeed.
1943: Futurology In 1943, a German social scientist named Ossip Flechteim coined the term ‘futurology.’ Flechteim proposed a new science of probability, drawing on scientific scholarship to make informed predictions of the future.
Futurology was meant to be systematic and scientific in its workings, enabling educated forecasts in a range of possible directions.
In his 1945 article ‘Teaching the Future,’ Flechteim recommended the study of the future as an academic discipline.
This recommendation was not realised until 1966, when the first university course solely devoted to the future was founded by Alvin Toffler.
‘Futurologist’ was increasingly used with ‘futurist’ to mean any scientist, social scientist or technical expert qualified to predict aspects of the future.
1945: A MAD future A global policy ‘think-tank’ was established in 1945, along the lines laid down by Flechteim’s new social science of futurology.
The RAND corporation was born at the end of World War II, initially formed by Douglas Aircraft to advise the US military on matters of policy and long-range planning.
RAND would provide research, analysis and projections on all things military and geo-political.
In 1948, it was decided that RAND should become independent of Douglas; henceforth it was funded by the US government and various corporations.
RAND became the planner and adviser to the US military through the Cold War period.
RAND offered advice on the Vietnam conflict, on the space race with the USSR, and—most famously—on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.
RAND’s vision of the future during the Cold War was based on the concept of ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD), which would ensure a stand-off between the nuclear-armed superpowers.
At times RAND went further: in 1960 its chief strategist Herman Kahn proposed the idea of a ‘winnable’ nuclear war.
Kahn’s reward for this vision was to serve as one of the models for Dr Strangelove, the deranged military strategist in Stanley Kubrick’s satirical film of 1964.
Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018106 1955: Assembly line food Businessman Ray Kroc opened his first franchised McDonald’s fast food restaurant in 1955.
The McDonald brothers had opened their fast food establishment McDonald’s in 1948, based on an assembly line kitchen for the quick and efficient preparation of hamburgers and fries.
The premises were themselves designed to encourage customers to order, consume their food and leave in quick succession: the idea was not a restaurant where diners can linger for hours over a meal, but a bright, shiny outlet for the rapid production and consumption of simple meals.
It was the rationalisation of food, along the lines of Henry Ford’s rationalisation of the factory.
Kroc saw the vast potential for replication of the McDonald’s-machine, whereas the founders, sceptical of franchising, did not.
By 1959, Kroc had increased the number of McDonald’s restaurants to 102; in 1961 he bought out the brothers and assumed command of a vast franchising empire.
Kroc saw the future of food: produced assembly line-fast, served in outlets everywhere the same, with the same limited range of items.
He knew the value of the McDonald’s model better than did the McDonald’s themselves: by 2017, there were 36, 899 McDonald’s outlets in 120 countries (2016 Annual Report 13).
1957: Into space The space race—and the space age—began in 1957, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, into orbit.
Stung by the demonstration of Soviet superiority in space technology, the United States formed NASA in 1958.
The Soviets sent the first human, Yuri Gagarin, into space in 1961, prompting President Kennedy to publicly announce the Americans’ determination to catch up in the space race.
Kennedy pledged a moon landing by the end of the decade.
The 1960s was the space age.
New feats of architecture, including Eero Saarinen’s TWA Terminal at JFK Airport New York, completed in 1962, suggested the look of space stations.
Popular culture was full of optimistic visions of a future lived in space: The Jetsons, Star Trek.
Family picnic blankets were replaced by ‘space blankets,’ using the materials taken into space by astronauts.
It was assumed that everyday necessities—like food—would increasingly become more like astronauts’ food: processed, squeezed out of tubes.
The upcoming journey into space was the latest chapter in the wondrous story of technological progress.
1962: Silent future An alternative perspective on the future appeared on 27 September 1962, with the publication of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring.
This book, inspired by reports of birds dying as a result of the spraying of insecticide DDT, was a detailed account of the environmental devastation caused by pesticides.
Carson challenged the chemical industry and the narrative of scientific progress, posing instead a future without birds and wildlife as a result of the indiscriminate use of chemicals.
The manufacturers of DDT, along with other proponents of the chemical industry, bitterly attacked Silent Spring.
But the book became a focal point of the budding environmental movement, an inspiration for activists concerned for the future of the environment.
Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018107 1964: A jet-pack future 1964 was a big year for the future.
At the California State Fair, a pilot flew in with a jet-pack.
Imagery of this feat shot around the world, exciting dreams of a near-future when everyone would fly to work or school by jet-pack.
Robert Ettinger, a college physics teacher, published his book The Prospect of Immortality and founded the Cryonics Institute.
Cryonics held up the promise of deep-freezing individuals, to be thawed out in the technologically advanced future.
The first cryo-preserved person underwent this treatment in 1967.
In his 1972 book Man into Superman, Ettinger crystalised the futurist creed: ‘When the future expands, the past shrinks’ (Lepore 2010: 29).
The 1964 World Fair, held in New York, was a joyous space age celebration of the future.
A ‘millennium of progress,’ it was proclaimed, is culminating in the feats of today and tomorrow.
NASA hosted a Space Park where its gigantic rockets were on display.
General Electric’s pavilion ‘Progressland’ claimed to showcase ‘thermonuclear fusion’ in displays of light and noise.
The Ford exhibit situated its cars as the prototype for impending rocket ships.
General Motors once again hosted an exhibit called Futurama, this time promising space travel, undersea holidays, and moving pathways in super-cities – all just around the corner.
Futurama showed the future process of constructing super-highways, as trees were felled by ‘searing laser beams,’ and a monster road-building machine cleared the jungle (Turney 2010: 64).
In the Futurama vision, nature is no match for the powers of progress.
1965: Moore is the law The future will be computer-powered, with processing power increasing exponentially— according to Moore’s Law, expounded in 1965.
Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, published a paper in that year entitled ‘Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits’.
Moore noted the doubling every year of the number of components fitted onto an integrated circuit, and predicted that this yearly doubling of capacity would continue into the future.
Revised by Moore in 1975 to a doubling every two years, Moore’s ‘law’ served as a target for the industry of semiconductor manufacturers.
It was not so much a law as a challenge for technical innovation, a challenge successfully met by the computer industry over decades.
Integrated circuits became smaller and more powerful every year; by 2015 the Intel chip was thought to cram two billion transistors, spaced 14 nanometres apart, onto a tiny surface.
Even Moore by this time doubted that his law could continue, observing the saturation of chips at this infinitesimal scale.
Captains of post-industry, however, continue to aim at proving Moore’s law: ever smaller, ever faster, ever more powerful.
1968: A connected future Computers will not only become faster, they will connect with each other and enable a new form of communication.
This prediction was made in 1968 in the paper ‘The Computer as a Communication Device’ by computer scientists J. C. R. Licklider and Robert Taylor.
Taylor was research director at the Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA); he was frustrated that he needed a different computer terminal for each project.
He and Licklider envisaged a future in which computers would be connected, and users could communicate through that network.
‘In a few years, men will be able to communicate more effectively through a machine than face to face,’ they wrote in 1968 (Licklider & Taylor 1968: 21).
The two computer scientists looked forward to a new world of ‘on-line interactive communities’ Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018108 of ‘geographically separated members.’ These new communities would be founded ‘not of common location, but of common interest’ (Licklider & Taylor 1968: 26).
Their prescience was informed by a Space Age enthusiasm for the technological advances of the future, which would bring a ‘boon to humankind … beyond measure.’ Like the science-fiction authors in 1963, the two scientists were convinced that unemployment ‘would disappear from the face of the earth forever,’ if only due to the magnitude of work in adapting the network’s software ‘to all the new generations of computer’ (Licklider & Taylor 1968: 31).
Their prediction of networked communication was realised to a limited extent in 1969, when ARPANET launched as a network linking four computers.
By the mid-1970s, this network had expanded to a network of networks—an internetwork or internet—for university researchers.
The online interactive communities envisioned by Licklider and Taylor emerged globally after 1991, with the development of the World Wide Web and the opening of the internet to commercial traffic.
1969: First stop the moon In 1969, NASA did its part for the future by landing the first astronauts on the moon.
This feat vindicated Kennedy’s pledge at the beginning of the decade; it secured victory in the space race for the United States.
It was also seemingly the first step in the trajectory of humanity to outer space.
The science-fiction writers of 1963, it seemed, might well have been right in their predictions.
1970: Future shock/On the run A new, discordant, voicing of the future appeared in 1970 with the publication of the book Future Shock by futurologist Alvin Toffler.
This book documented the stress and disorientation occasioned by the ‘information overload’ of modern living (1970: 318).
Technological innovation could provoke negative responses, according to Toffler, including fear of the future.
Future shock arises from ‘too much change in too short a period of time’ (1970: 12), as citizens of a technologically advanced society struggle to deal with the heightened pace of life.
Toffler characterised contemporary Western societies as ‘post-industrial,’ drawing on the term coined in 1969 by sociologist Alan Touraine, and later popularised by Daniel Bell in his 1974 book The Coming of Post-Industrial Society.
A post-industrial society has the majority of its urban workforce engaged in the service sector, dealing with information rather than industry or agriculture.
Toffler warned that future shock is the ‘disease of change’ in a post-industrial society, when individuals fail to adapt to the accelerating pace of this ‘roaring current of change’ (1970: 11).
As a futurologist, Toffler wanted to increase the ‘future-consciousness’ of his readers and to ‘humanise’ the future (1970: 14)—but Future Shock highlighted the adverse social effects for those, especially the elderly, ‘overwhelmed by change’ (1970: 11).
The environment became more prominent in public life in 1970.
In the USA, the Environmental Protection Agency was founded, instituting new regulations on the chemical industry: DDT was banned in the USA two years later.
Popular culture was beginning to reflect concerns for the ecology as a result of pollution and industrial damage to the environment: ‘Look at Mother Nature on the run in the 1970s,’ Neil Young sang in ‘After the Goldrush,’ released in 1970.
The following year, Marvin Gaye’s ‘Mercy Mercy Me (The Ecology)’ documented a range of environmental blights caused by industrial contaminants: pollution, oil spills, radiation, mercury-poisoning of fish and—echoing Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring—‘animals and birds who live nearby are dying …’ Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018109 1972: Coup de grace/Applying the brakes 1972 brought a severe reverse for the ideals of Modernist architecture and urban design.
The architecture historian Charles Jencks dates the death of Modernist architecture to ‘July 15, 1972, at 3.32 pm (or thereabouts).
At this moment, a vast Modernist housing project, ‘the infamous Pruitt-Igoe Scheme’ in St Louis Missouri, was given ‘the final coup de grace by dynamite’ ( Jencks 1987: 9).
Similar demolitions occurred around the world in the next decade.
The utopian vision of a rationally ordered paradise, built with purity of design, had failed dismally.
Inhabitants had not been uplifted by the design; rather they had been alienated.
Faith in progress went into decline in architecture, as designers began using styles and ideas from the past—a practice previously outlawed by the International Style.
Another check to the momentum of technological progress came in 1972, with the publication of the report The Limits to Growth by The Club of Rome.
This club of industrialists, scientists, diplomats and academics had formed in 1968, voicing a concern for the future of humanity.
The Limits to Growth, the Club’s first report, generated computer simulations of five variables—population, food production, industrialisation, pollution, and consumption of natural resources.
The Report’s conclusion was that economic growth could not continue indefinitely due to depletion of resources.
The Limits to Growth was heavily criticised by economists and technologists on publication, largely due to its discounting of the role of technological progress in solving problems of resource depletion.
Yet its warnings have been more favourably received in the twenty-first century, as climate change and environmental damage have been accepted internationally by scientists.
Since 1972, The Limits to Growth has sold 30 million copies in 30 languages, reflecting a major international impact.
1973: Reverse thrusters One more year into the 1970s, and things were turning sour for the future.
The Oil Crisis of 1973 showed the perils of dependency on oil and the energy industry.
Confidence was shaken in the vision of a future as energy-based prosperity without limits.
The space age had evaporated, as the public lost interest in the Apollo program.
The last Apollo was Apollo 17, in December 1972.
It seemed in 1973 that no-one was going any further than the moon, for some time.
Environmental awareness was growing, and with it a linking of industrial progress with ecological damage.
Throughout the 1970s, information emerged on acid rain, air pollution, nuclear contamination, oil spills and other environmental catastrophes.
There was increasing concern that industrial development needed to be checked, for the health of the planet.
1975: A new warning In 1975, Wallace Smith Broecker published a scientific paper in which he coined the phrase ‘global warming’: ‘Climatic Change: Are We on the Brink of a Pronounced Global Warming?’ Broecker warned of the possibility that ‘we are on the brink of a several-decades-long period of rapid warming’ (1975: 460).
Climate change and global warming became more prominent terms as climate science built its case in the next decades.
When surveying the environmental costs of industrial progress, it became increasingly difficult to agree with Marinetti that ‘progress is always right.’ Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018110 1982: A new world awaits Ridley Scott’s science fiction film Blade Runner, released in 1982, was set in 2019.
The world of 2019 has flying cars and other technological marvels—but it also has constant rain and what appears to be a chronically damaged environment.
The wealthy are summoned to start a new life off the planet: ‘A new world awaits you …’ declares the advertisement for outer space living; anyone who can afford it abandons the contaminated Earth.
Blade Runner depicted a dystopian vision of the future, in contrast to the optimism of 1960s films and TV programs.
A spate of science-fiction films in the 1980s and 1990s, dubbed technoir by critics, portrayed a ruined future of environmental catastrophe: Terminator (Cameron 1984), Mad Max (Miller 1979), Escape from New York (Carpenter 1981), Robocop (Verhoeen 1987), Dark City (Proyas 1998), The Matrix (Wachowski L. & L 1999).
In each of these films—and in many others—the future was no longer a world of wonders to be desired.
It was a future to be feared, a future world destroyed by pollution, warfare and industrial damage.
Technology in films such as Terminator and The Matrix leaves humanity imprisoned and degraded.
This trend culminated in the 2008 film Wall-E (Stanton), ostensibly a children’s film, but with a severe environmental message.
The future of the Earth in Wall-E is as a blighted wasteland, destroyed by technology, where no living thing grows.
Humans, overweight and complacent, live off the planet.
Blade Runner 2049 (Villaneuve), released in 2017, depicted a world 30 years later than depicted in Blade Runner: the environment was even more devastated than in the original film.
1988: Slow down/Climate change The International Slow Food Movement, founded in Turin in 1988, valued tradition over progress, the past over the future, and slowness over speed in cooking.
As revealed in its manifesto, it was anti-fast food, anti-industrialism; it was anti-Marinetti.
For Slow Food International, speed has become the ‘shackles’ of culture; the ‘fast life’ is denigrated as a ‘virus’ that fractures customs.
The manifesto advocates instead ‘historical food culture’ and defends ‘old-fashioned food traditions’ (1989: 1).
Slow Food, whose proud symbol is the snail, was one manifestation of a reaction against the dictates of technological progress.
Another was recycling; another was conservation.
The virtues of speed and convenience were considered less valuable than the virtues of quality and traditional techniques of food preparation.
Lovers of food were encouraged to look back, to the lessons and techniques of the past.
Tradition was celebrated as a store-house of knowledge and methods.
The future was less important as an idea than the present, in communion with the past.
Also founded in 1988 was The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, set up within the United Nations to provide an objective, scientific perspective on climate change.
The IPCC’s reports, drawing on all published climate science literature, offer guidelines for policymakers to limit global warming in the future.
Its First Assessment Report, published in 1990, predicted that under a ‘business as usual’ industrial scenario, global mean temperatures will increase by 0.3 degrees Celsius per decade in the twenty-first century.
By the Fifth Assessment Report of 2014, the prediction becomes more alarming: without new policies to restrict climate change, the global mean temperature in 2100 will increase by 3.7 to 4.8 degrees Celsius.
Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018111 1994: Welcome to the virtual In 1994, the web browser Netscape was marketed.
The new hypertext transfer protocol called the World Wide Web was transforming the Internet into a vast web-based commercial entity.
1.3 million personal computers were already connected, and this figure grew exponentially; by 1997 there were 19.5 million.
In 1994, an online store named Amazon was founded.
This new business soon described itself as the biggest store in the world—as a virtual store.
New possibilities for the future, and for progress, emerged in this virtual environment.
If heavy industry had been vilified as the contaminator of the environment, perhaps the online community could generate another, cleaner future.
Progress was quickly re-defined in post-industrial terms.
Technological speed was central, as it was for the Futurists in 1909; now, however, the crucial speed was that of micro-processing, and the speed of connection.
Planned obsolescence re-emerged in the digital context: how can you be happy with last year’s computer when the new model is so much faster?
2006: Truth be told In 2006, the release of An Inconvenient Truth—the book by Al Gore; the documentary by Davis Guggenheim—took climate change and global warming mainstream.
The science was compelling, but more compelling were the images of parched environments, ruined natural worlds, and endangered species.
Heavy industry was portrayed as the villain; ideas of technological progress were refuted.
The science of climate change uses computer models to chart the future.
The documented rise in global temperatures since the advent of industrialism is modelled and projected into the future, showing us the likely increase in air temperature along with other impacts on the environment.
Extreme weather events are predicted to occur with greater frequency as a result of climate change: drought, bushfires, hurricanes, storms, floods.
Polar ice caps will melt, coral reefs will be irreparably damaged, islands will disappear under water.
The future was now something to be feared: it promised global warming, ecological disaster, displacement of millions due to the effects of climate change, the doom of natural species.
Climate change was taught in schools; there were reports of school children frightened to tears by the spectre of a devastated future.
A 2011 study found that 82 percent of US children aged 10 to 12 expressed fear regarding the environment, while a majority of children ‘shared apocalyptic and pessimistic feelings about the future state of the planet.’ A word— ecophobia—was coined to describe this fear of environmental problems (Strife 2012: 37).
2008: Smart takeover 2008 was the year mobile smartphones took over.
The earliest smartphones had been developed in 1997, while their popularity increased from 2004, coinciding with Web 2.0 and the rise of social media.
The turning-point was 2007/2008: in 2007 Apple launched its iPhone, with improved rendition of web pages on a mobile phone; in 2008 Google launched its Android operating system for smartphones.
Internet access was a major feature of smartphones, allowing constant connectivity while on the move.
The smartphone became ubiquitous in the years following 2008: by 2017 there were an estimated 2.6 billion smartphone users worldwide (Lanchester 2017: 22).
The mobile phone is now a customised information-system for each user.
It is a user’s social media base; it provides access to constant information and entertainment; it is used to send Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018112 and receive texts, emails and phone messages; it takes photos and videos and uploads them in an instant; it is always and everywhere in use.
Teenagers sleep with them so that they are always connected, from the moment before they fall asleep and from the moment they wake up.
The iPhone is a sleek, glamorous, sophisticated personal object; each new model is the look of the future, rendering the previous models obsolete – or, at least, old.
Queues of avid users line up outside Apple stores whenever a new iPhone is launched, eager to seize the new model and hold it in their hands.
2011: All future, No past The ephemeral messaging app Snapchat launched in 2011.
This addition to social media was distinguished by its complete focus on the present message, the evacuation of the past.
A ‘snap’ containing photos or text disappears soon after it is opened: the sender selects a time between one and ten seconds, after which the message disappears and is deleted from the server.
In the constant stream of messaging that is social media, the vanished snap will soon be replaced by a new message.
But there is no archive, no store of past message: the past is empty.
The data-stream in other social media privileges the present message: previous messages are swept aside; anticipation rests on the next message about to be received.
Advertisers target social media users on an individual basis: algorithms process a user’s searches, purchases, and ‘likes,’ before sending suggestions for the next purchase.
The future of consumption is designed by the algorithms.
2017/2075: Disrupt or be disrupted In the early twenty-first century, the centre of the Western world is Silicon Valley.
Here the future is devised by Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon and countless start-ups, tech incubators, venture capitalists and angel investors.
These are the Captains of Post-Industry, the prophets of a digital and connected future.
They cannot be blamed for the ills of heavy industry, because they are purveyors of information and connection, not pollution and chemical waste.
Indeed, the new digital products lead the way to a new green world: a Kindle, iPad or iPhone, used in preference to newspapers, magazines, and books, will save trees.
The Silicon Valley leaders are the new technocracy.
They have a vision of the world improved by technology that is just as strong as that of their predecessors in the early twentieth century.
Internet connectivity will find new pathways for democracy, interaction, and prosperity; the most helpful contribution politicians can make is to keep out of the way and let technology perform its wonders.
Futurologists working in many disciplines – economics, sociology, demography, information technology continue to predict the wonders of the future.
A dominant focus remains technological change: driverless cars, networked objects, shops without checkouts.
At the Silicon Valley Comic Con, held in April 2017, futurologists were asked to address the theme of the conference: ‘The Future of Humanity: Where Will We Be in 2075?’ The event’s technology exhibits—for virtual reality, robotics and smart devices—echoed the ‘Futurama’ exhibits, showcasing new technologies, found in the World’s Fairs of 1939 and 1964.
Prominent in media reports of the conference were the pronouncements of Steve Wozniak, co-founder of Apple in 1976.
Wozniak was deemed credible as a futurologist: apart from co-founding Apple, he had predicted in 1982 the emergence of portable laptops.
One of Wozniak’s predictions in 2017 was that Apple, Google and Facebook would continue to shape the future, well beyond 2075, if only due to these corporations’ enormous cash reserves, which Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018113 allowed them to invest in a wide range of futuristic projects.
Wozniak made further predictions of life in 2075: new cities with domed structures built in deserts; special suits to allow people to venture outside the domes; smart walls for shopping and communication; technologyenabled medical self-diagnosis and doctor-free prescriptions; a colony on Mars (Swartz 2017: 12).
Wozniak’s optimistic predictions have a remarkable similarity to the positive vision of the 1963 science-fiction writers: technological advancements will lead us to an exciting future.
The contemporary futurists can dream more expansively than did their predecessors: Wozniak’s vision in 2017 extends to life on Mars, whereas the authors in 1963 saw only as far as a colony on the moon.
In Silicon Valley, everyone dreams of a new app that will disrupt the present and yank the world forcibly into the future.
‘Disruption’ is the new term for progress, for effecting the future, as the historian Jill Lepore (2014) has noted in a critical article on disruption.
It has an apocalyptic tone as a post-industrial incarnation of progress: the new must succeed over the wreckage of the old disrupted business or technology.
Disruption incorporates a contempt for ‘legacy’ industries and the dead weight of the past – a contempt for the world before the Internet and social media.
Legacy forms, including old media, are consigned to the unloved past; the future belongs to the disruptors of networked technology.
2018: Looking backwards/Looking forwards If digital disruption continues the imperative of technological progress, displaced into a post-industrial context, it is not nevertheless the dominant factor in current imaginings of the future.
The most significant ‘disruption’ in the future will not emanate from networked computers, unless the electricity needed to power the servers and computers is taken into account.
Climate change is a projection into the future publicised widely on an international basis, through the agency of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other outlets.
Climate change is now incorporated into many models; insurance and risk management, professions whose business is managing the future, install global warming as a central factor in modelling the future.
Environmentalists demand of government and industry a future based on renewable energy sources rather than on fossil fuels, in a desperate bid to contain carbon emissions and climate change.
Melting permafrost and rising sea levels threaten islands and sea-level cities, with potential displacement of millions due to global warming.
In April 2017, the New York Times asserted that ‘our climate future is actually our climate,’ observing that the future ‘we’ve been warned about is beginning to saturate the present’ (Mooallen 2017: MM36).
Record high temperatures and extreme weather events around the world in 2017 and 2018 provoked the growing fear that we are already living in the future.
Visions of the future now project anxiety for the state of the environment, and for all creatures—including humans—who depend on it.
References Appadurai, A.
2013, The Future as Cultural Fact: Essays on the Global Condition.
Verso, London.
Attali, J.
2009, A Brief History of the Future.
Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
Augé, M. 2014, The Future.
Verso, London.
Barbrook, R. 2007, Imaginary Futures: From Thinking Machines to the Global Village.
Pluto, London.
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18mbdnv Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018114 https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18mbdnv Broecker, W. S. 1975, ‘Climatic Change: Are We On the Brink of a Pronounced Global Warming?,’ Science, vol.
189, no.
4201: 8 August: 460–463.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.189.4201.460 Bury, J.
B.
1955, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth.
Dover, New York.
Cameron, J.
(dir.)
1984, Terminator, feature film, Orion Pictures.
https://doi.org/10.7312/clar16976-003 Carpenter, J.
(dir.)
1981, Escape from New York, feature film, Embassy Pictures.
Carson, R. 1962, Silent Spring.
Houghton Mifflin, New York.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6209-0682_5 Corbusier, L. 1986 [1923], Towards a New Architecture.
Dover, New York.
Flechteim, O.
1945, ‘Teaching the Future,’ Journal for Higher Education, no.
16: 460–465.
https://doi.org/ 10.1080/00221546.1945.11774322 Ford, H. 1916, Chicago Daily Tribune, 25 May.
Cited in M. J. Cohen & J.
Major (eds).
2004, History in Quotations.
Cassell, London: xxv.
Godfrey, M. 2007, The Present Tense Through the Ages—On the Recent Work of Gerard Byrne.
Koenig Books, London.
Goodman, D. 2008, A History of the Future.
Monacelli Press, New York.
Gore.
A.
2006, An Inconvenient Truth.
Rodale Press, Emmaus, PA. Guggenheim, D.
(dir.)
2006, An Inconvenient Truth, documentary, Paramount Vantage.
Harari, Y. N. 2017, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow.
HarperCollins, New York.
Jencks, C. 1987, The Language of Postmodern Architecture.
5 th edition.
Academy Editions, London.
https:// doi.org/10.2307/1424566 ______ 1989, What is Postmodernism?
3rd edition.
St Martin’s Press, London.
Lanchester, J.
2017, ‘Short Cuts,’ London Review of Books, vol.
39, no.
2: 2 February: 22.
Lepore, J.
2010, ‘The Iceman: What the Leader of the Cryonics Movement is Really Preserving,’ The New Yorker, 25 January: 24–30.
______ 2014, ‘The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong,’ The New Yorker, 23 June: 30–36.
Licklider, J. C. R. & Taylor, R. W. 1968, ‘The Computer as a Communication Device,’ Science and Technology, no.
76, April: 21–31.
Marinetti, F. T. 1961, ‘Initial Manifesto of Futurism,’ in J.C. Taylor, (ed.
), Futurism.
Museum of Modern Art, New York: 124–125.
______ 1972, Selected Writings, ed.
R. W. Flint.
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York.
McDonald’s Corporation Annual Report 2016.
2016, US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Online, available: https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/gwscorp/investor-relations-content/annualreports/2016%20Annual%20Report.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2017].
Miller, G.
(dir.)
1979, Mad Max, feature film, Roadshow Film Distributors.
Mooallen, J.
2017, ‘Our Climate Future is Actually Our Climate Present,’ New York Times Sunday Magazine, 23 April: MM36.
Futurism, Futurology, Future Shock, Climate Change PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018115 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.189.4201.460 https://doi.org/10.7312/clar16976-003 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6209-068-2_5 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6209-068-2_5 https://doi.org/10.1080/00221546.1945.11774322 https://doi.org/10.1080/00221546.1945.11774322 https://doi.org/10.2307/1424566 https://doi.org/10.2307/1424566 https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/gwscorp/investor-relations-content/annual-reports/2016 Annual Report.pdf https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/gwscorp/investor-relations-content/annual-reports/2016 Annual Report.pdf Moore, G. E. 1965, ‘Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits,’ Electronics, 19 April: 114–117.
https://doi.org/10.1109/n-ssc.2006.4785860 Proyas, A.
(dir.)
1998, Dark City, feature film, New Line Cinema.
Rosenberg, D. & Harding, S. (eds) 2005, Histories of the Future.
Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Scott, R.
(dir.)
1982, Blade Runner, feature film, Warner Bros. https://doi.org/10.2307/3696992 Shaw, L. 2007, ‘The Utopian Past,’ in The Present Tense Through the Ages—On the Recent Work of Gerard Byrne.
Koenig Books, London.
Slow Food Manifesto.
1989.
Online, available: http://slowfood.com/filemanager/Convivium%20 Leader%20Area/Manifesto_ENG.pdf [Accessed 27 April 2017].
Smyth, W. H. 1919, ‘“Technocracy”—Ways and Means to Gain Industrial Democracy,’ Industrial Management, no.
57, May: 385–389.
Stanton, A.
(dir.)
2008, Wall-E, feature film, Walt Disney Studies Motion Pictures.
Strathern, O.
2007, A Brief History of the Future.
Robinson, London.
Strife, S. J.
2012, ‘Children’s Environmental Concerns: Expressing Ecophobia,’ The Journal of Environmental Education, vol.
43, no.
1: 37–54.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00958964.2011.602131 Swartz, J.
2017, ‘Wozniak Backs “Bigger” Apple, Google, Facebook by 2075,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April: 12.
Toffler, A.
1971 [1970], Future Shock.
Pan, London.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3103025 Turney, J.
2010, The Rough Guide to the Future.
Rough Guides, London.
Verhoeven, P.
(dir.)
1987, Robocop, feature film, Orion Pictures.
Villeneuve, D.
(dir.)
2017, Blade Runner 2049, feature film, Warner Bros. https://doi.org/10.5093/ cc2017a22 Wachowski, L. & L.
(dir.)
1999, The Matrix, feature film, Warner Bros. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1349-92604-6_53 Potts PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol.
15, No.
1/2, August 2018116 https://doi.org/10.1109/n-ssc.2006.4785860 https://doi.org/10.2307/3696992 http://slowfood.com/filemanager/Convivium Leader Area/Manifesto_ENG.pdf http://slowfood.com/filemanager/Convivium Leader Area/Manifesto_ENG.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/00958964.2011.602131 https://doi.org/10.2307/3103025 https://doi.org/10.5093/cc2017a22 https://doi.org/10.5093/cc2017a22 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-92604-6_53 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-92604-6_53
PORTALjamesgoodmanSpecialIssueFINAL PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
Special issue details: Global Climate Change Policy: Post-Copenhagen Discord Special Issue, guest edited by Chris Riedy and Ian McGregor.
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia.
Disorderly Deliberation?
Generative Dynamics of Global Climate Justice James Goodman, University of Technology Sydney Since its inception, official climate governance has hinged on perceptions of climate justice.
Under the rubric of ‘common but differentiated responsibility,’ the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and the ensuing Kyoto Protocol have had their main impact on signatories that are high-emitting industrialized countries.
The thirty-seven ‘Developed Countries’ listed in ‘Annex 1’ of the Convention had a special obligation to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Patterson and Grubb 1992).1 Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol these countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels, and to do this by 2012.With the upcoming expiry of Kyoto commitments, there is an urgent requirement for a new climate governance package deal (Depledge 2006).
As a result, climate justice is firmly back on the agenda, and in new ways, as manifested from the highest elite levels of global climate negotiation to the most grassroots challenges to climate policy.
The configuration of climate governance post-2012, and indeed its effectiveness, centres on these contestations over the meaning of climate justice, and its official re-articulations.
Current climate governance, and its future configuration, thus has to be understood as a reflexive and dynamic process.
As with any form of interstate governance, global climate policy seeks stabilized principles to drive its inter-governmental ‘rules of the game.’ Yet, forced to address the exponential challenges of climate change, and its 1 There are now 40 countries in the Annex 1 group, which includes the European Union; this article refers to the group as ‘Annex 1 Countries.’ Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
2 associated implications for justice, these principles must be subject to disordering challenges, and to reordering.
There is an imperative to move beyond immediate accommodations, with new rules of the game to more effectively apprehend the challenges posed.
Here, the mechanisms of disorderly deliberation become critical.
The approach taken in this paper positions such disorder, centring on a contest over the meaning of climate justice, at the core of global climate governance.
Climate governance, it may be argued, is not qualitatively dissimilar from other forms of global governance.
All forms of official governance respond to some felt need, and as perceptions of that need changes, so the governance framework changes.
But climate change poses special challenges, similar in scale perhaps to Cold War governance.
There, the confrontation between communism and capitalism was a systemic confrontation, reflecting global-scale social contradictions, which posed the possibility of planetary annihilation, in this case through a ‘nuclear winter.’ Climate change likewise expresses a global systemic contradiction, in this case an ecological contradiction between climate stability and accumulation.
Like the nuclear stand-off, climate change is also totalizing, and poses the possibility of making the planet uninhabitable.
The key difference is that under the Cold War the two key players could negotiate with one another, to ward off annihilation: the USA and the Soviet Union could construct governance structures, as expressed in the notion of détente, to manage the confrontation.
In contrast, there is no negotiating with climate change: there is no ‘hot line’ to manage eco-social relations.
Where the Cold War could be managed through the threat of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction,’ every effort at managing climate change, rather than addressing its causes, brings us closer to the possibility of catastrophic change.
In this respect, governance structures that secure managerial ‘sub-paradigmatic’ adaptations to existing arrangements are counterproductive, and serve only to prefigure the required paradigmatic transformations (Sousa Santos 1995).
Here, questions of reflexive governance are both urgent and fundamental.
As the existing carbon-intensive social paradigm reaches its limits we are witnessing various efforts at managing the transition through global carbon markets and the application of technology (Stern 2007; Parry et al.
2007; Lohmann 2006).
While efforts to address the problem prove inadequate, climate change has intensified, forcing new targets and approaches onto the Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
3 table (Christoff 2006; Dorsey 2007).
The resulting disorderly transition marks an interregnum in sociological terms, a period of social and political flux, and potential (Sousa Santos 1995).
Indeed with the advent of climate crisis we see the emergence of a deep-seated challenge to society’s underlying historicity: the crisis literally imperils survival for human society, and insofar as carbon-intensive development underpins social structures, the prospect of de-carbonization challenges the very foundation of prevailing norms and hierarchies.
The systemic ecological challenge posed by climate change, and its intensification, forces the agenda for climate governance.
Models for addressing the crisis from within market capitalism have proved to be woefully inadequate; yet they have persisted.
Weak forms of ‘ecological modernization,’ centred on carbon trading and end-of-pipe technologies, for instance, continue to dominate.
Stronger forms of intervention, through fiscal policy and direct regulation for renewables, posit a ‘second modernity,’ with growth de-carbonized by ‘precautionary’ technologies and institutional practices (Beck 1995; Blowers 1997; Moll 2000).
Yet the decoupling of economic growth from ecological degradation as promoted by ecological modernizers has become more of a fond hope than a present possibility.
On a world scale, emissions continue to rise exponentially, testament to the paradox that every reduction in emissions intensity is more than overwhelmed by the increased scale of activity that it enables, as expressed in global economic growth.
As ecological modernity falters in the face of persistently rising emissions, confronted with questions of growth and accumulation, it has quickly been overtaken by a revived denialism and a reactive securitization of the issue.
There is, as a result, a deepened polarization of the policy field.
Those defending the growth model, whether or not offering the means of emissions reduction, confront those rejecting it.
The latter perspective encompasses a range of positions, from ecological sufficiency to ecological socialism and ecological feminism, and may be linked to ‘post-developmentalist’ and ‘subsistence’ perspectives (Salleh 1997; Bennholdt-Thomsen & Mies 1999; Hornborg 2001; Foster-Carter 2002; Ziai 2007; Kovel 2007).
These psotions share the recognition that climate change requires a post-growth society, and that this necessarily entails the large-scale restructuring of social relations.
As ecological modernization fails to remaster ecology for society, we are left with a clear choice: continued burden-shifting Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
4 and technological optimism, versus an entirely new ecology-society nexus (Harvey 1996).
These policy confrontations play a central role in the intensifying political dynamics of climate justice.
The failure of the current model of climate governance is a key factor legitimizing challenges to its ‘rules of the game.’ Indeed, we may say that we sit on the cusp of a paradigm-shift, one that forces awareness of humanity’s planetary agency, and thus awareness of its role in the face of eco-systemic impacts.
The ‘Anthropocene’ era, in which humankind has had the capacity to reshape the bio-physical character of the planet, is said to have been in place since the invention of the steam engine (Crutzen 2002).
With the documented impacts of human-generated climate change, as expressed in climate science, that capacity translates into an imperative for global reflexivity.
The result is a profound clash between what Chakrabarty characterizes as the history of humanity, the recorded histories of human justice, and the history of the species as expressed in climate science (2008).
As historical time confronts geological time, global climate governance is invoked as the required mediating instrument, bridging human justice and climate impacts.
As a site of global governance, then, climate governance embodies the possibility, and indeed necessity of defining and pursuing global climate reflexivity.
Conceptualizing global climate governance In general terms, climate governance is the structure of authority that encompasses global climate policy: as a mode of governance, rather than simply government, it involves a range of state and non-state players, and is a field of practice rather than simply a set of institutions.
As with any mode of authority, as opposed to coercion, climate governance is grounded in principles of justice.
Climate governance develops through contestations over these principles, between ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ versions: principles emerge and change, from the process of interstate negotiation to civil society mobilization.
Approaches to global governance invariably conceive of it as bringing order to disorder, whether by increasing the ‘density’ of interstate society, or by expressing the leverage of global civil society (Held & McGrew 2002).
By focusing on reflexivity this paper seeks to invert the frame, and foreground the challenges to governance.
Clearly there are multiple structural challenges to climate policy, as much from intended as unintended effects: the focus here is on the process of Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
5 reconceptualizing justice claims, in part to address these effects.
The aim is to address climate governance as both a disordering and ordering process, analyzing the role of contestation in producing justice principles and practices.
Climate change imposes its own pace of policy reform, forcing new imperatives; it also imposes its own remarkable scope, in terms of global reach and all-encompassing depth.
The resulting justice challenges are manifold, and resonate across a range of disciplines.
The focus on reflexive governance most directly engages with critical international relations and globalization studies.
The two dominant traditions in international relations theory—‘realism’ and ‘idealism’—are preoccupied principally with the question of whether state or non-state actors are dominant (Walker 1993).
Critical international relations, instead, addresses the process of exercising power and counterpower at all levels (Halliday 2001).
Related approaches to interpreting global governance have also emerged from other social science disciplines that investigate globalization across national-international divides (McGrew 1997).
Within these fields there is a clear distinction between ‘globalization theory,’ which positions globalization as a cause of the changes it brings, and the ‘theory of globalization’ that seeks to explain globalization itself (Rosenberg 2000).
These latter, more critical approaches to globalization studies, dovetail with approaches in critical international relations, and offer a rich inter-disciplinary frame.
The relationship between global governance discourses and contending social forces is a focus, especially, of the neo-Gramscian international relations tradition, which positions the governance-contestation nexus as the key explanatory site of global politics (Cox 1987; Cox 2001; Gill 2002; Bakker & Gill 2003; Rupert 2003; Carroll 2007).
The aim is for constructive critique, and the generation of alternate principles and guides to action, in order to address climate change and realizing climate justice.
Debates about the extent to which climate change forces a refiguring of hegemonic formations, and the possibilities this offers for counter-hegemonic challengers, are intensifying, especially with the advent of North-South instruments of climate governance (Levy & Egan 2003; Newell 2008; Paterson & Newell 2010).
The attempted monetization of greenhouse gas emissions, and the construction of the carbon commodity, allow new forms of marketization to offset mitigation.
This neoliberalization of climate policy offers new sites for displacement from high emitters Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
6 in the North, and from their Southern counterparts, and thus for new forms of contestation (Okereke 2008).2 In this way, North-South climate policy frameworks create transnational political spaces, which can be used to politicize ecological unevenness.
As such, North-South relations in climate justice are simultaneously positioned alongside fields of postcolonial and critical development studies.
Confronted by global environmental change the development problematic is redefined as a concern for over-consuming industrialized societies as well as for newly industrializing and under-developed societies (Robinson 2002; Biel 2000; McMichael 2003).
This shared development crisis sets the mould for climate justice debates.
Out of the confrontation between developmentalist and post-developmentalist models, where Southern and Northern exemplars are set against each other, has emerged a more explicitly ‘reflexive’ developmental frame, which rests on mutual recognition of shared problems and the pursuit of common targets (Pieterse 1998; 2004).
Rather than looking to the North as a guide for development, or to the South for post-developmentalist scenarios, the ‘reflexive development’ approach finds new pathways at the nexus between North and South for confronting and addressing globalizing pressures.
The reflexive logic was exemplified by the ‘global justice movement’ that emerged in the mid-1990s, in which neoliberal globalism was identified as the shared problem of both North and South (Della Porta 2007).
This allowed the identification of common targets, including interstate agencies charged with implementing those precepts (Starr 2000; Reitan 2007).
Neo-liberal global governance, and its failures, generated a protest cycle expressed in the global justice movement (Cohen & Rai 2000; Smith 2002; Tarrow 2005; Eschle 2005; Juris 2008).
With climate change, as noted, the antagonism is driven by a deeper eco-systemic crisis, signaling the ‘revenge of nature’ on a planetary scale (Anderson 2006).
Consequently, with the associated ‘climate justice movement’ there is a deeper and more existential community of fate.
Again, challenges are articulated in the form of shared problems, aspirations, and targets (Roberts & Parks 2 ‘North’ or ‘Global North,’ and ‘South’ or ‘Global South,’ are used here to simultaneously recognise social and spatial inequalities: most low-income societies are in the Southern Hemisphere, but the ‘South’ is also global, with extreme poverty also in the Northern Hemisphere; likewise for the high-income ‘North’, which is both spatially concentrated and globalized.
As discussed in this article, the ambiguity of these categories is increasingly played-out in the dynamics of inter-state climate policy.
Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
7 2006).
In this context climate justice emerges as a particularly powerful expression of ‘reflexive development’ on a world scale.
Reflexivity rests in movements, and when it comes to questions of political agency, accounts of global social action replicate long-running debates about the relative importance of instrumental as against expressive action (Buechler 2000; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Macdonald 2006).
With climate action movements, research reveals a strong instrumental theme, centring on the rhetoric-reality gap in climate policy (Hall & Taplin 2007).
This affirms a ‘political opportunities’ model of social movement mobilization where movements are interpreted as rational actors responding to institutional failure (Van Der Heijden 2006).
At the same time, there can be strong expressive dimensions to climate action as a form of ethical action: here climate action can be an end in itself, an intrinsic defence of ethical values in the face of climate injustice (Connor et al 2009).
As with other movements, the two dimensions are interwoven and play-out in ways that reflect the history and context of local mobilization (Calhoun 1993).
There is, indeed, a key place-based dimension to the mobilization of climate justice claims, and thus to global climate governance.
In climate governance the contradictions between policy and practice are most evident in particular sites of carbon policy: a geography of carbon policy can be traced from expanding carbon-intensive infrastructure in the North, to carbon trading finance houses, and then to ‘clean development’ offset sites located in the South (Roberts & Tofflon-Weiss 2001; Chatterton 2005; Plows 2008).
Climate action, then, is enacted in specific places, where the concrete instances of climate policy failure are manifested.
Such sites acquire a meaning that is simultaneously local and global, reflecting the spatial politics of climate change (Seel 1997; Griggs & Howarth 2004; Pickerill & Chatterton 2006; Bosso & Guber 2006;).
As generative sites, these can be conceptualized as places where new insights emerge, and new justice claims are produced (Johnston & Goodman 2006; Massey 2007).
Here, the territoriality of climate policy becomes a key dimension of politicization and mobilization (Brenner 2004; Drainville 2004; Harvey 2010).
Official and non-official climate justice The impact of climate change has been likened to that of a third world war, one at least as devastating as its predecessors.
In this war the Global South is in the immediate Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
8 firing line: the impacts of climate change for low-income peoples are now predicted to be disproportionate and catastrophic.
In April 2007 a Report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on impacts and vulnerability stated that in the South, where urbanization and industrialization are already putting pressure on resources and where adaptation capacity is relatively weak, climate change will have its most immediate negative impact (Parry et al.
2007).
The Report predicted major water shortages due to climate change, with a potential halving in agricultural production in some regions of Africa by 2020, and a one-third reduction in yields in Central and South Asia by 2050, as well as inundation of the densely populated megadeltas of South and South-East Asia due to rising sea levels.
In this context, those amongst Northern and Southern elites who continue to benefit from continued accumulation do so at an immediate and measurable cost to Southern peoples.
But there is a sting in the tail: as nature wreaks its revenge a climate breakdown from which even the richest cannot insulate themselves, is now only a generation away.
The UN Human Development Report for 2007, ‘Fighting climate change,’ underlines the point: Climate change is the defining human development challenge of the 21st Century.
Failure to respond to that challenge will stall and then reverse international efforts to reduce poverty.
The poorest countries and most vulnerable citizens will suffer the earliest and most damaging setbacks, even though they have contributed least to the problem.
Looking to the future, no country— however wealthy or powerful—will be immune to the impact of global warming.
(UNDP 2008: 1) The asymmetries of cause and effect in climate change directly reflect global development divides, making the question of how to address climate change unalterably a question of justice.
As noted, the inter-governmental Climate Change Convention and Kyoto process was primarily directed at Northern climate change culprits with the aim of reducing their emissions.
The impact of that effort has been minimal—securing at best a one per cent reduction in overall anticipated global GHG emissions from 1992 levels (Christoff 2006).
The key impact of Kyoto, however, was to create frameworks that enable the displacement of restructuring costs from North to South, through carbon trading.
The UN’s ‘Clean Development Mechanism,’ for instance, certifies development projects that offset for rising greenhouse gas emissions in Annex 1 countries.
All such projects operate to displace Northern costs, re-gearing Southern developmentalism to Northern needs.
Driven by external financial imperatives rather than local ecological or developmental needs, their principal effect is Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
9 to disrupt and distort Southern societies, to support GHG polluters in the North, and to create windfall profits for carbon traders (Lohmann 2006).
In many respects, however, this model is unraveling.
There are two elements: first, the emergence of Southern emitters; and second, the increasing incidence of impacts, especially in Southern settings.
The 1992 Convention rested on a model of climate justice that located the victims in the South and the culprits in the North, with Northern countries bearing historic responsibility and producing about three-quarters of 1992 emissions (Jordan 1994).
That model is now heavily qualified by the fact that since 2007 non-Annex 1 countries responsible for the majority of the world’s current emissions, and thus must be part of any agreement to reduce overall emissions (Barker et al 2007).
At one level the growing importance of non-Annex 1 countries is reflected in a rapid process of bidding-up funding commitments: since the mid-2000s Northern agencies and states have made increasingly generous offers of ‘adaptation’ funding, linked to Southern compliance with Northern mitigation models and priorities.
In 2006, for instance, the World Bank linked the privatization of Southern energy and resources sectors with financial support to enable what it called ‘climate-resilient development,’ estimating Southern annual climate adaptation needs at up to $40 billion (World Bank 2006).
Four years later a major World Bank investigation into adaptation costs recalulated the estimate at between $70 and $100 billion per year (World Bank 2010).
The World Bank estimates compare unfavourably with the $10 billion a year offer under the ‘Copenhagen Accord.’ The Accord was assembled by the USA in the closing days of the 2008 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties held in Copenhagen, and marked a significant attempt to break away from the consensual United Nations negotiating process.
The Accord echoes responses to the New International Economic Order in the early 1970s, which was effectively countered by Northern offers of development aid, and by a breakaway Northern configuration, the ‘Group of Six’ major economies, which began meeting formally in 1975 (Biel 2000).
Unlike the 1970s, however, the breakdown at Copenhagen in 2009 should not be interpreted as the endgame, but rather as the initial skirmish in a major power shift, driven by the geopolitics of emissions.
That geopolitics is now forcing a move beyond the ‘Thirdwordism’ expressed in the division between Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
10 Northern and Southern responsibilities, and towards a new mutual responsibility.
The advent of a reciprocal ecological interdependency between Northern and Southern societies contrasts dramatically with the logic of developmental dependency.
Rather than the South depending on the North, North and South now depend on each other.
The confrontation between capitalist development and ecological survival expressed in advancing climate change is thus creating a new meta-imperative to live differently: the imperative creates a new inter-dependency, where, put simply, all societies depend on each other’s willingness and capacity to shift from carbon-intensive accumulation.
This reflexive dynamic of climate justice has major implications for the governance model.
As long as climate justice was framed mainly in terms of interstate responsibilities and obligations, its political logic could be confined and delimited.
With the North defined as the principal culprit, the bulk of non-official influence on the governance process was North-centred and was deployed under the generic rubric of ‘climate action’, for instance through the ‘Climate Action Network’ which was established in 1988 (Pearce 2010).. With the unraveling of the model established under the Framework Convention, new forms of political engagement and approaches to climate justice have emerged.
Faced by growing disorder in the interstate governance process, climate politics has been forced out of the interstate container and has become subject to wider influences.
Several factors are at play.
Most important is the failure of policy and the first signs of large scale impacts on Southern peoples.
Additionally, with the emergence of Southern elites as key players in the interstate political process, new unofficial counterpoints have emerged, through transnational climate justice politics.
The result, at Muller observes, is that climate justice has increasingly revitalized and subsumed the pre-existing global justice movement (Muller 2008).
Unofficial climate justice Climate Justice was first enunciated as a global set of principles at the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in August 2002 (India Resources Centre 2002).
The twenty-seven Principles of Climate Justice were written by a group of fourteen Northern and Southern NGOs, including CorpWatch, Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace International, the Indigenous Environmental Network, and the Third World Network.
The Principles of Climate Justice foregrounded ecological debt, stating that Northern states and corporations ‘owe Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
11 the rest of the world as a result of their appropriation of the planet’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases’ (India Resources Centre 2002:1).
Stronger involvement from affected peoples in the South was a priority, to allow local control and conservation with ‘clean, renewable, locally controlled and low-impact energy’; commodification and corporate influence were rejected, but market solutions were acceptable provided they conformed to ‘principles of democratic accountability, ecological sustainability and social justice’ (India Resources Centre 2002: 1).
The critique of ‘false solutions,’ in particular emissions trading, was developed more strongly with the Durban Climate Justice Summit held in 2004.
Linked to the Durban group ‘Carbon Trade Watch,’ the Summit gathered twenty organizations from Europe, the USA, Latin America, India and Africa.
The resulting ‘Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading’ outlined the various ways in which emissions trading both undermines existing sustainable practices and contributes to climate change, thus highlighting the irony that ‘the Earth’s ability and capacity to support a climate conducive to life and human societies is [sic] now passing into the same corporate hands that are destroying the climate’ (Carbon Trade Watch 2004).
Subsequently the Declaration attracted support from a further 163 organizations, and given the growing importance of emissions trading, its message had a strong influence.
Drawing these players together, a ‘Climate Justice Now!’ coalition was established in December 2007 at the Bali ‘Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).’ The coalition included a range of Southern and Northernbased NGOs and social movements that had played a central role in global justice, such as Focus on the Global South, the International Forum on Globalization, La Via Campesina, the World Development Movement and Third World Network, as well as signatories of previous climate justice statements.
At the Bali UNFCCC the group issued a simple statement critical of ‘false solutions … such as trade liberalisation, privatisation, forest carbon markets, agrofuels and carbon offsetting,’ stressing instead the need to leave carbon in the ground, reduce elite consumption, entrench resource rights, pursue food sovereignty, and repay climate debts through North-South wealth transfers (Climate Justice Coalition 2007).
The following year, at the UNFCCC in Poznam, the coalition produced a more critical position, asserting ‘we will not be able to stop climate change if we don’t change the neo-liberal and corporate-based economy Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
12 which stops us from achieving sustainable societies’ (Climate Justice Now!
2008).
The UNFCCC process needed to make a break with ‘market ideology’ and instead looked to sustainable practices in the South, as ‘effective and enduring solutions will come from those who have protected the environment’ such as peasants, women and indigenous peoples.
Also at Bali in 2007, a campaign network established a process for the ‘Peoples’ Protocol on Climate Change’ (Asia-Pacific Research Network 2007).
The Protocol defined climate change as ‘a question of social justice … rooted in the current capitalist-dominated global economy which is principally driven by the relentless drive for private profits and accumulation’ (Asia-Pacific Research Network 2007:2).
Accordingly it rejected ‘market mechanisms that impose the cash nexus on ecological priorities,’ and was critical of technological fixes.
The Protocol asserted peoples’ resource sovereignty, and the need for affected peoples to be involved in climate policy, and stated that the ‘climate change crisis is not simply about adaptation and mitigation, but changing the whole economic framework into one of eco-sufficiency and sustainability’ (Asia-Pacific Research Network 2007:3).
The Protocol process and the Climate Justice Now!
Coalition opened several lines of debate in the broader climate justice movement, centring on issues of growth, sufficiency, technology, markets, sovereignty and climate debt.
The debates were defined in relation to emerging climate policy, but in the run-up to Copenhagen in 2009 they began to establish a distinct ideological field.
Mobilizations at Copenhagen through Clima Forum, for instance, saw this emergent movement announce itself as an alternative source of legitimacy on climate governance—a claim that gained traction in the context of a failing interstate process.
In a development not unlike the linkage between global justice protesters and Southern states at the Seattle WTO in 1999, Southern states blocked Northern efforts to dissolve the UNFCCC model of climate justice and staged a walk-out, with many official representations joining unofficial protesters on the ‘outside.’ But perhaps more important for the long-term development of climate justice principles, inside the negotiating hall some 100 states joined with the Alliance of Small Island States in calling for emissions reductions that would prevent average temperatures rising more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, thus breaking with the prevailing consensus that a rise of 2 degrees was acceptable, despite its impacts.
Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
13 With these developments we have seen the centre of gravity for unofficial climate governance passing from a transnational climate advocacy network focused on the interstate process (expressed in the international Climate Action Network), to a heterogeneous climate justice movement that challenges climate governance through a transnational collective consciousness and capacity to mobilize (see Keck & Sikkink 1998).
In what follows this capacity is explored through an exploration of sites of climate justice, North and South.
Generative sites, North and South Generative sites for climate justice, both North and South, are in the first instance sites of climate policy failure.
As sites of failure, they are nonetheless also sites of possibility.
In this respect the disorders of climate governance are themselves generative.
In both North and South the physical manifestations of climate policy failure most dramatically undermine the legitimacy of the official model, and prefigure new approaches.
Northern Sites One of the most powerful Northern examples, originating in the UK in 2006, is the phenomenon of the ‘Camp for Climate Action.’ As a form of strategic direct action the ‘climate camp’ model was taken up in a number of Northern countries, in the USA for instance as ‘climate convergence,’ and became something of a climate justice template (Plows 2008; Saunders & Price 2008).
Climate camps are a form of mass occupation, in the first instance spatial interventions, mounted as close as possible to the physical site of large-scale carbon emissions.
The Camp is often directed at contesting the expansion of carbon-emitting infrastructures, whether by (temporarily) closing them down or by simply posing an alternative.
In this way, the Camp exploits contradictions between the policy and practice of climate governance, and becomes in itself an embodied symbol of climate justice (Roberts & Tofflon-Weiss 2001; Chatterton 2005; Plows 2008).
The UK’s climate camps in the years 2006-2009 centred on preventing the expansion of coal fired power stations at Drax (2006), Kingsnorth (2008) and Ratcliffe on Soar (2009), and on halting the third runway at Heathrow airport (2007).
In two cases— Kingsnorth and Heathrow—planned expansions were shelved, suggesting the mobilizations had their effect on policy, as well as contributing to the process of movement building.
The Kingsnorth mobilization, for instance, was linked to a Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
14 campaign by the World Development Movement, which characterized the power station not simply as a negation of the UK’s Kyoto commitments, but as a violation of global climate justice principles.
On a world scale, the World Development Movement calculated that the additional emissions resulting from the expansion of the power plant would have the following direct impacts: • 100,000 more people losing their dry season water supply • Up to 300 more people dying every year due to malnutrition • Up to 60,000 more people suffering from drought in Africa • 50,000 more people going hungry due to drought and lower crop yields • Up to 40,000 more people exposed to malaria • 20,000 people being forced our of their homes and becoming climate refugees • Around 30,000 more people losing their homes every year due to coastal flooding.
(WDM 2009) More broadly, the Camps were surprisingly successful in constructing counter-sites, designed to unmask and contest plans to expand carbon-intensive infrastructures and industries (Newell 2008).
As such, carbon hotspots become physical manifestations of climate policy failure, their meaning thus transformed: from functional mechanisms they become reconfigured as threats to planetary survival (a similar approach was observed for anti-road protests: Seel 1997).
The low walls and fences that skirt the facilities, protecting people from the heavy machinery, become highly politicized boundaries protecting the facilities from climate justice claims.
As their existence is challenged, the sites acquire intense symbolic meaning, their boundaries acquiring a simultaneously local and global resonance (Bosso & Guber 2006).
These otherwise ordinary places become political places that symbolically ‘lift the veil’ on climate policy.
Participation in such events is in this sense apocalyptic, designed to reveal what is real, through participation in collective action that models eco-centric living, through the creation of public and open spaces for reflection and debate on climate issues and how to address them, and through planning and mounting a series of direct actions against climate change perpetrators.
Conceptualized as a generative site, or as a social laboratory, the Camp is defined as a place where people experience their own power, and where new visions and possibilities are produced (Johnston & Goodman 2006).
What emerges is an embodied and emplaced spatial politics of climate change, a climate micro-politics perhaps, embedded in the macro-politics of globalized climate change.
Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
15 Southern sites Southern climate justice movements are likewise focused on the injustices of climate policy, and are similarly centred on specific sites.
Where Northern unofficial climate justice focuses on the failure to take responsibility for Northern emissions, Southern counterparts focus on the corollary, that is, the effort to displace responsibility for Northern emissions reductions onto Southern societies.
Again, North-South connectivity is central: it is no accident that unofficial climate justice has emerged at the same time as international carbon markets have begun to create offset projects in Southern contexts (Bond 2006).
A direct North-South linkage is created, through climate governance under Kyoto, between expanded emissions in Northern contexts and ‘low cost’ carbon offset projects in the South.
That connection is reflected in the Durban ‘Carbon Trade Watch’ group, which, as already noted, has played a central role in the emergent climate justice movement (Bond & Dada 2007).
Offset projects established under the Kyoto-endorsed ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ (CDM) have played a key role, as has the proposed UN ‘Programme for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries’ (REDD).
With the internationalization of emissions trading, offsetting has enabled a process of bidding-down the cost of emissions reduction in the search for cheapest perton emissions reductions (exactly what carbon markets are designed to achieve).
As demonstrated by the up-take in Southern offsets by EU countries in particular, the cost of emissions reduction under the CDM is considerably lower than the cost of emissions reductions ‘at home.’ Cheaper still are offsets for reduced deforestation, under the proposed REDD regime, which simply seeks to maintain or ‘sustainably manage’ existing forests.
The Stern Report, for instance, pointed to REDD credits as a ‘highly cost-effective way to reduce emissions,’ and, not surprisingly, a number of high emitting countries have since sought to extend recognition to forests under the proposed post-Kyoto framework (Stern 2007: 537).
Indeed, REDD initiatives have spawned more than twenty programs under a variety of funding mechanisms.
Measures to reduce deforestation and degradation are clearly an important aspect of any global response to climate change.
Deforestation and degradation of forests increase global emissions not just by the burning of wood, but also by allowing the decomposition of soil carbon, and reducing the planet’s capacity to absorb CO2 as well.
Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
16 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates the net effect of these forest emissions to be about 17 percent of global emissions, with half of this coming from low-income developing countries in the tropics, such as Indonesia, that retain substantial tracts of forest.
The key issue rests, however, not on whether to prevent the loss of these forests, but on whether programs to achieve this can be used to generate offset credits for continued or expanded emissions in the North (Reality of Aid 2009; Goodman & Roberts 2009, 2011).
North-South offset mechanisms like CDM and REDD have, indeed, been targeted as creating new structures of global dependency, what Carbon Trade Watch calls ‘carbon colonialism’ that reorientates development pathways to cater for the Northern carbon appetite.
Further, both CDM and REDD are criticized for assuming commensurability between present emissions and future increases in sink capacity, or reductions in projected emissions.
There are also concerns about the vulnerability of offset schemes to the carbon market and to carbon speculators.
Offsets are seen as linking emissions reductions to highly volatile carbon prices, empowering a new class of carbon financiers (Friends of the Earth International 2008).
REDD, in particular has enormous scope, as it is potentially applicable to any significant Southern forest.
Not surprisingly, the immediate impact on the peoples who live in forests, exercise ancestral domain over them, and rely on them, has become a major issue.
In empowering carbon traders, REDD is seen to jeopardize the sovereign rights of people who have historically conserved forests, and to serve as a charter for their dispossession (International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change 2008).
There is a growing political revolt against carbon offsets from within countries, such as Indonesia, that are emerging as key sites for such projects (see Indonesian Forum on the Environment, WALHI, 2009).
Contestation of REDD projects, and also of CDMs, centres on local contexts—articulated through transnational networks—with Southern sites politicized in confrontation with official frameworks.
One example is the challenge to REDD projects in Kalimantan, Indonesia, that have been funded by the Australian Government to lay the groundwork for the recognition of carbon credits (see Goodman & Roberts 2010).
The schemes are defined as violating justice principles, form the ‘polluter pays’ principle to issues of historical obligation and resulting ‘carbon debt.’ The world’s current reliance on the sink and carbon storage capacity of the Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
17 world’s remaining forests reflects the logic of global ecological injustice, with those who have benefited from the worldwide release of greenhouse gases arraigned against those who now are required to suffer the consequences.
Offsets, therefore, are seen as compounding these climate injustices.
Conclusions Despite the broad structural context of a newly reciprocal imperative for global development, as imposed by climate change, it must be acknowledged that many of the possibilities for disordering prevailing climate governance remain unrealized.
The barriers to unofficial climate justice, and thus to reflexive global climate governance, should not be underestimated.
The sheer scale of, and system-wide challenge posed by, climate change are themselves demobilizing.
In Northern contexts there is an additional sense of complicity: here, rather than producing a climate movement, the intensifying crisis can produce a form of ‘apocalypse blindness’ (Beck 1995; Depledge 2006).
In many contexts climate consciousness can exist as a latent subjectivity, where publics share an awareness of contradictions but fail to engage in social action (Doherty 2002; Norgaard 2006; Boycoff 2008).
A tension can build up, but remain internalized, with the resulting crisis of belief embedded in everyday subjectivity, but repressed from public policy (Agyeman & Evans 2004; Dorsey 2007).
We witness the deferral of social power to the public authorities, by which climate change is framed as a problem for policy elites and only incidentally for their increasingly anxious constituencies.
In this scenario the constitutive power of social agency, an historical actor capable of remaking society, remains unrealized.
Something of the scale of the problem in the North is reflected, for instance, in concern at the lack of mass mobilization expressed by the UK Energy and Climate Change Minister (and later Shadow Prime Minister), Ed Miliband, in December 2008: When you think about all the big historic movements, from the suffragettes, to anti-apartheid, to sexual equality in the 1960s, all the big political movements had popular mobilization.
Maybe it’s an odd thing for someone in government to say, but I just think there’s a real opportunity and a need here.
(Adam & Jowitt 2008; see also Hinsliff & Vidal 2009) Nevertheless, as suggested in the foregoing examples, the injustices of official climate governance can provide the antidote to passivity.
The injustices of climate change are distanced from everyday experience, embedded in centuries of global uneven Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
18 development as a structural ‘fact of life,’ and normalized as inevitable.
In contrast, the injustices of official climate governance are present, manifest, and concrete.
As climate crisis intensifies there is a sharpened contradiction between official acknowledgement of the growing problem and the inadequate (often self-serving) policy responses.
That contradiction is increasingly salient, especially across the North-South axis.
Indeed, official climate injustice is the product of deliberate decisions: someone gains, someone looses, and both can be identified.
There are clearly definable culprits, with specific installations and projects to be targeted, and disrupted.
Herein, perhaps, lies the potency of unofficial climate justice claims, as a counterpoint to the official script, embedded in concrete social and ecological contradictions of climate policy.
Reference List Adam, D. & Jowitt, J.
2008, ‘People Power Vital to Climate Deal: Miliband Calls for Global Movement to Pressure Governments into Action,’ The Guardian, 8 December.
Agyeman, J.
& Evans, B.
2004, ‘“Just Sustainability”: The Emerging Discourse of Environmental Justice in Britain?,’ The Geographical Journal, vol.
170, no.
2, 155–164.
Anderson, J.
2006, ‘The Environment, “Anti-globalization,” and the Runaway Bicycle,’ in Nature’s Revenge: Reclaiming Sustainability in an Age of Corporate Globalisation, (eds) J. Johnston, M. Gismondi & J. Goodman.
Broadview, Toronto, 280–298.
Asia Pacific Research Network 2007, Peoples’ Protocol on Climate Change, APRN, Manila.
Bakker, I.
& Gill, S. 2003, Power, Production and Social Reproduction.
Palgrave, London.
Barker, T. et al.
(eds) 2007, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Beck, U.
1995, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk.
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Bennholdt-Thomsen, V. & Mies, M. 1999, The Subsistence Perspective.
Zed Press, London.
Biel, R. 2000, The New Imperialism: Crisis and Contradiction in North/South Relations.
Zed Books, London.
Blowers, A.
1997, ‘Environmental Policy: Ecological Modernization or Risk Society?,’ Urban Studies, vol.
34, no.
5–6, 845–871.
Bond, P. 2006, ‘Civil Society on Global Governance: Facing Up to Divergent Analysis, Strategy, and Tactics,’ Voluntas, no.
17, 359–371.
Bond, P. & Dada, R. 2007, Trouble in the Air: Global Warming and the Privatised Atmosphere.
Transnational Institute, Amsterdam.
Bosso, C. and Guber, D. 2006, ‘Maintaining Presence: Environmental Advocacy and the Permanent Campaign,’ in Environmental Policy, (eds) N. Vig, & M. Kraft, CQ Press, Washington, 78–91.
Boykoff, M. 2008, ‘The Cultural Politics of Climate Change Discourse in UK Tabloids,’ Political Geography, no.
27, 549–569.
Brenner, N. 2004, New State Spaces.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Buechler, S. 2000, Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Social Construction of Social Activism.
Oxford University Press, New York Calhoun, C. 1993, ‘“New Social Movements” of the Early Nineteenth Century,’ Social Science History, vol.
17, no.
3, 385–427.
Carbon Trade Watch 2004, Climate Justice Now!
The Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading, CTW, Durban.
Carroll, W. 2007.
‘Hegemony and the Global Field.’ Studies in Social Justice, vol.
1, no.
1, 36–66.
Chakrabarty, D. 2008, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses,’ Critical Inquiry, no.
35, 11–62.
Chatterton, P 2005, ‘“Give Up Activism” and Change the World in Unknown Ways.
Or, Learning to Walk with Others on Uncommon Ground,’ Antipode, vol.
38, no.
2, 259–282.
Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
19 Christoff, P. 2006, ‘Post-Kyoto?
Post-Bush?
Towards an Effective “Climate Ccoalition of the Willing,”’ International Affairs, vol.
85, no.
2, 831–860.
Climate Justice Coalition 2007, Climate Justice Now!
Principles, CJC, Denpasar.
Cohen, R. & Rai, S. 2000, Global Social Movements.
Athlone, London.
Connor, L., Higginbotham, N. and Freeman, S. 2009, ‘Not Just a Coalmine: Shifting Grounds of Community Opposition to Coalmining in Southeastern Australia,’ Ethnos, vol.
74, no.
4, 490–513.
Cox, R. 1987, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History.
Columbia University Press, New York.
_____ 2001, ‘The Way Ahead: Towards a New Ontology of World Order,’ Critical Theory and World Politics, (ed.)
R. Wyn Jones.
Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO. Crutzen, P. 2002, ‘Geology of Mankind,’ Nature, vol.
415, 23.
Della Porta, D.
(ed.)
2007, The Global Justice Movement: Cross-national and Transnational Perspectives.
Paradigm Publishers, Herndon, VA. Della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S. 2005, Transnational Protest and Global Activism.
Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham.
Depledge, J.
2006, ‘The Opposite of Learning: Ossification in the Climate Change Regime,’ Global Environmental Politics, vol.
6, no.
1, 1–22.
Doherty, B.
2002, Ideas and Action in the Green Movement.
Routledge, London & New York.
Dorsey, M. 2007, Climate Knowledge and Power, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, vol.
18, no.
2, 7–21.
Drainville, A.
2004, Contesting Globalisation: Space and Place in the World Economy.
Routledge, London & New York.
Eschle, C. 2005, ‘Constructing “the Anti-Globalisation Movement,”’ Critical Theories, International Relations and the Anti-globalisation Movement, (eds) C. Eschle and B. Maiguashca.
Routledge, London & New York.
Foster-Carter, J.
2002, Ecology Against Capitalism.
Monthly Review Press, New York.
Friends of the Earth International 2008, REDD Myths: A Critical Review of Proposed Mechanisms to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries, FoEI, Amsterdam.
Gill, S. 2002.
Power and Resistance in the New World Order.
Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Goodman, J.
& Roberts, E. 2009, What a Scam!
Australia’s REDD Offsets for Copenhagen.
FoEA and AidWatch, Sydney _____ 2011, ‘Is the United Nations’ REDD Scheme Conservation Colonialism by Default?,’ International Journal of Water, vol.
5. no.
4, 419–428.
Griggs, S. & Howarth, D. 2004, ‘A Transformative Political Campaign?
The New Rhetoric of Protest against Airport Expansion in the UK,’ Journal of Political Ideologies, vol.
9, no.
2, 176–187.
Hall, N. and Taplin, R. 2007, ‘Revolution or Inch-by-inch?
Campaign Approaches on Climate Change by Environmental Groups,’ Environmentalist, vol.
27, no.
1, 1–22.
Halliday, F. 2001, ‘The Romance of Non-state Actors,’ in Non-state Actors in World Politics, (ed.)
W. Wallace.
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 21–38.
Harvey, D. 1996, Justice, Nature and the Politics of Difference.
Blackwell, Cambridge.
_____ 2010, The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism.
Profile Books, London.
Held, D. 2006, ‘Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!’ New Political Economy, vol.
11, no.
2, 58–74.
Held, D., & McGrew, A.
2002, Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance.
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Hinsliff, G. & Vidal, J.
2009, ‘Miliband Calls for Populist Push on Climate Change,’ The Observer, 26 April.
Hornborg, A.
2001, The Power of the Machine: Global Inequalities of Economy, Technology and Environment.
Rowan and Littlefield, Lanham.
India Resources Centre 2002, Bali Principles of Climate Justice, International Climate Justice Network, Denpasar.
Indonesian Forum on the Environment, WALHI 2009, No rights no REDD.
Walhi, Jakarta.
International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change 2008, Statement of the IIPFCC, 14th Session of the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change, December 1, 2008.
Johnston, J.
& Goodman, J.
2006, ‘Hope and Activism in the Ivory Tower: Freirean Lessons for Globalisation Research,’ Globalisations vol.
3, no.
1, 9–30.
Jordan, A.
1994, ‘Financing the UNCED Agenda: The Controversy over Additionality,’ Environment, vol.
36, no.
3, 16–30.
Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
20 Juris, J.
2008, Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization.
Duke University Press, Durham, NC, & London.
Keck, M. & Sikkink, K. 1998, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Kovel, J.
2007, The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World.
Zed Press, London.
Levy, David L. & Daniel Egan 2003, ‘A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy: Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations,’ Journal of Management Studies, vol.
40, no.
4, 803–829.
Lohmann, L.
(ed.)
2006, ‘Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power,’ Development Dialogue, no.
48 (September), 1–362.
Massey, D. 2007, World City.
Polity, Cambridge.
McDonald, K. 2006, Global Movements: Action and Culture.
Blackwell, Malden, MA.
McGrew, A.
2007, ‘Globalization in Hard Times: Contention in the Academy and Beyond,’ in The Blackwell Companion to Globalization, (ed.)
G. Ritzer.
Blackwell, Malden, MA.
McMicheal, P. 2003, Globalisation.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Moll, A.
2000, ‘Ecological Modernization Around the World: An Introduction,’ Environmental Politics, vol.
9, no.
1, 1–16.
Muller, T. 2008, ‘The Movement is Dead, Long Live the Movement,’ Turbulence: Ideas for Movement, July 2008, 48–55.
Newell, P. 2008, ‘Civil Society, Corporate Accountability and the Politics of Climate Change,’ Global Environmental Politics, vol.
8, no.
3, 122–153.
Norgaard, K. 2006, ‘“We Don’t Really Want To Know”: Environmental Justice and Socially Organized Denial of Global Warming in Norway, Organization & Environment, vol.
19, no.
3, 347–370.
Okereke, C. 2008, Global Justice and Neolioberal Environmental Governance.
Routledge, London & New York.
Parry, M, Canziani, O. and Palutikof, J.
(eds) 2007, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Paterson M. & Grub, M. 1992, ‘The International Politics of Climate Change,’ International Affairs, vol.
68, no.
2, 293–310 Paterson, M. & Newell, P. 2010, Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pearce, R. 2010, ‘Making a Market?
Contestation and Climate,’ Journal of Australian Political Economy, no.
66, 166–198.
Pickerill, J.
& Chatterton, P. 2006, ‘Notes Towards Autonomous Geographies.
Creation, Resistance and Self Management as Survival Tactics,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol.
30, no.
6, 730–746.
Pieterse, J.
1998, ‘My Paradigm or Yours?
Alternative Development, Post-development, Reflexive Development,’ Development and Change, no.
29, 243–373.
_____ 2004, Globalization or Empire?
Routledge, London & New York.
Plows, A.
2008, ‘Towards an Analysis of the ‘Success’ of UK Green Protests,’ British Politics, vol.
3, no.
1, 92–109.
Reality of Aid 2009, Financing Climate Change Mitigation: Adaptation and Sustainable Development.
Reality of Aid Asia, Manila.
Reitan, R. 2007, Global Activism.
Routledge, New York & London.
Roberts, J.
& Parks, B.
2006, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy.
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Roberts, T. & Toffolon-Weiss, M. 2001, Chronicles from the Environmental Justice Frontline.
Cambridge University Press, NY.
Robinson, W. 2002, ‘Remapping Development in the Light of Globalisation: From a Territorial to a Social Cartography,’ Third World Quarterly, vol.
23, no.
6, 1047–1073.
Rosenberg, J.
2000, Follies of Globalisation Theory.
Verso, London.
Rupert, M. 2003, ‘Globalising Common Sense: A Marxian-Gramscian (Re-)vision of the Politics of Governance/Resistance,’ Review of International Studies, no.
29, 181–198.
Salleh, A.
1997, Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern.
Zed Press, London.
Saunders, C. 2008, ‘The Stop Climate Chaos Coalition: Climate Change as a Development Issue,’ Third World Quarterly, vol.
29, no.
8, 1509–1526.
Saunders, C. & Price, S. 2009, ‘One Person’s Eu-topia, Another’s Hell: Climate Camp as a Heterotopia,’ Environmental Politics, vol.
18, no.
1, 117–122.
Seel, B.
1997, ‘Strategies of Resistance at the Pollock Free State Road Protest Camp, Environmental Politics, vol.
6, no.
4, 108–139.
Goodman Disorderly Deliberation?
PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
21 Smith, J.
2002, ‘Bridging Global Divides?
Strategic Framing and Solidarity in Transnational Social Movement Organizations,’ International Sociology, vol.
17, no.
4, 505–528.
Sousa-Santos, B.
1995, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition.
Routledge, New York.
Starr, A.
2000, Naming the Enemy: Anti-corporate Movements Confront Globalization.
Zed Press, London.
Stern, N. 2007, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tarrow, S. 2005, The New Transnational Activism.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
UNDP 2008, Fighting Climate Change, Human Development Report 2007, UNDP, New York.
Van Der Heijden, H. 2006, ‘Globalization, Environmental Movements, and International Political Opportunity Structures,’ Organization & Environment, vol.
19, no.
1, 28–45 Walker, R. 1993, Inside/outside International Relations ad Political Theory.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
World Bank 2006, ‘Clean Energy and Development: Towards an Investment Framework,’ World Bank, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development and Infrastructure Vice Presidencies, World Bank, Washington DC.
_____ 2008, ‘Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: Global Cost Estimate,’ World Bank, Washington DC.
World Development Movement 2009, ‘World Development Movement Hails Kingsnorth Victory for People and Campaigners from Developing World and Kent,’ 8 October.
Ziai, A.
(ed.)
2007, Exploring Post-development: Theory and Practice, Problems and Perspectives.
Routledge, London.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 7 GREENPRINT FOR A CLIMATE JUSTICE CLINIC: LAW SCHOOLS’ MOST SIGNIFICANT ACCESS TO JUSTICE CHALLENGE Adrian Evans, Monash Law School, Australia Introduction The obvious existential challenge posed by global warming is also an access to justice challenge.
As natural resource pressures caused by larger populations are exacerbated by climate catastrophes, corruption increases, law and legal systems lose impact and respect for the rule of law heads downhill.
Arguably, as this descent becomes established, more individuals and more groups turn away from law and legitimate enterprise and towards terrorism, organised crime and populist or angry self-interest.
Despite the Paris Accords of 20151, there is little prospect of willing government action in defence of climate, at least in the limited time available.
Global emissions are continuing to rise absolutely and per capita, year by year.2 Australia is among the ‘leaders’ here,3 with no unconditional commitment in either major party to make the necessary and profound cuts to emissions, significantly beyond those agreed to in Paris.4 Populist and conservative forces are still in a position to frustrate and delay and remain unconvinced by or hostile to broad 1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) received its strongest affirmation in the Paris Agreement of 2015.
See https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-theparis-agreement 2 Peter Hannam and Nicole Hasham “‘Next decade critical’ to save a warming planet’, The Age, 9 Oct 2018, p5.
3 Lisa Cox, ‘Australia on track to miss Paris climate targets as emissions hit record highs’, The Guardian Australia, 14 September 2018 at https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/14/australia-on-trackto-miss-paris-climate-targets-as-emissions-hit-record-highs 4 David Crowe, ‘There is no will to find a way’, The Age, 9 Oct 2018, p 5. https://unfccc.int/process/the-convention/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 8 and penetrating concepts of sustainability.
Those who hold these opinions are strong in both centrist Australian parties have a deep-seated confidence in the fundamental neo-liberal passion for unrestricted economic growth; and they may also just be more excited or even thrilled, by the images of expansion, for their own sake.
Nevertheless, resistance to such growth is, or needs to be, a major part of the socially responsible law school’s mission and profile, especially through its clinical programs.
Individuals and communities who are increasingly damaged by steadily rising temperatures, drought and flood have few straightforward means of legal redress.
Even if those who suffer most from our deteoriating climate have some funds, they are often blocked in seeking climate justice because the causes of action are still in embryonic form and the costs involved in developing such actions have been seen as too high.
Seeking climate justice is not straightforward.
Larger private law firm engagement with climate defence is often conflicted out because the short-term profit interests of their large corporate clients often dominate the thinking of both lawyer and client.
Even those few private lawyers who do want to take action are intimidated by the need for considerable funding for disbursements and likely defendant arguments about the supposed need for security for costs.
So far, no one in Australia has been able to locate a wealthy benefactor, foundation or not-for-profit prepared to meet these costs.
Some law schools are nevertheless in a position to fill this access to justice void and assist in the effort to combat climate change by designing and developing a climate defence or climate justice clinic.
There are potential causes of action in the areas of nuisance, negligence and Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 9 public trust, as well as specific statutory and general regulatory arguments that can be developed in some jurisdictions.
This paper discusses and proposes a greenprint for such a clinic, not just to assist access to justice and climate defence, but to play a part in strengthening the political and social consciousness of the law students who pass through it.
The discussion draws on the clinic design principles set out in Australian Clinical Legal Education5 and proposes a specific partnership model that leverages existing private lawyer goodwill and harnesses law school alumni beneficence.
What a law school clinic can do that a private law firm and barristers have not Australia is not a large CO2 emitter by volume, but it is among the largest on a per capita basis.6 In consequence, there is arguably a moral and pragmatic obligation on well-resourced Australian law schools with moral activist clinicians, to contribute to the concept of climate justice,7 just as many already do to address criminal law and numerous conventional, civil access to justice issues.
Law schools with well-developed clinical traditions tend to have access to a steady supply of motivated and skilled student researchers.
Some of these are looking for opportunities to 5 Evans et al, Australian Clinical Legal Education, ANU Press, Canberra, 2017.
Available at https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/australian-clinical-legal-education 6 Information provided by the Climate Council in 2015.
See https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/2015/05/20/new-report-reveals-that-australia-is-among-the-worst-emittersin-the-world/ 7 There is a specific ClientEarth legal practice in the United Kingdom – see https://www.clientearth.org/, a firm which seeks to represent the earth as the client, utilising the concepts popularised in Cormac Cullinan’s Wild Law: A manifesto for earth justice (Green Books, London, 2003).
There is also an Australian Earth Laws Alliance, at https://www.earthlaws.org.au.
https://www.clientearth.org/ Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 10 pursue graduate research and many of these are capable of investigating, under supervision, likely causes of action.
Law schools with sufficient staff depth can also provide the necessary academic and practitioner supervision for those students, linked to now commonplace multidisciplinary sustainability resources of their University.
Finally and most importantly, strong law schools are increasingly able to access high net worth clinical alumni and carefully recruit them to provide the relatively high levels of necessary funding for operating costs, and to meet potential security for costs’ orders.
The key element in such recruitment is an alert attitude to possible sources of limited startup funding and slow, careful engagement with potential long term donors to the ongoing operating costs of law school clinics.
Often, these will be clinical alumni.
Some will be known personally to clinic directors, others to dedicated alumni managers of the University.
Not to put too fine a point on it, these people need to be recruited to a cause, and then sustained in their involvement in clinic priorities and direction, consistent with appropriate governance mechanisms.
Governance and control identifying key partners Governance of a climate defence clinic is an especially important task, something that cannot be fudged or rushed.
The potential for political and financial missteps is real and accordingly, a strong, unified and specialised advisory board is justified, separate from any pre-existing and overarching clinical program advisory group that will lack a close knowledge of climate law and climate networks.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 11 Ideally, this purpose-constructed climate defence advisory group will consist of five people with gender diversity: a managing partner of a significant mid-tier commercial law firm (which will be prepared to support climate litigation and clinical supervision pro bono, and which is unlikely to be conflicted out because of the commercial interests that are almost certain to be a problem with the largest firms), a major relevant NGO from the environmental law sector (which will provide relevant environmental network expertise and advice), a law school environmental law/ climate law academic and fourthly, a representative of the University’s own sustainability network, institute or centre.
The fifth member will be its nominal chair, and ideally, this person will be the overall director of the law school’s clinical programs.
Note that three of the five members of this body, which is advisory not determinative, are University employed, ensuring that effective control rests with the law school,8 in order to protect the educational objective of the clinic and ensure the same is pursued alongside the access to justice objective, and not relegated behind same.
A role for the donor(s), consistent with advice, but not control Major alumni and other donors to the clinic are also likely to want a seat at the management table, consistent with the ownership they may feel that arises from their status as significant donors.
It is essential to be clear with donors that donation does not equate to control, but does come with an expectation to be consulted.
Accordingly, if any particular donor is 8 Note however that universities are not omniscient and can also misstep, particularly if they think their marketing is threatened.
See for example the ANU law case in March 2018, where an ANU law student was removed from marketing publicity by the University because she wanted to include a statement about the plight of refugees.
See Emily Baker, ‘ANU removes law student from marketing booklet in aim for 'political neutrality', Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 2018, at https://www.smh.com.au/education/anu-removes-lawstudent-from-marketing-booklet-in-aim-for-political-neutrality-20180316-h0xklf.html.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 12 insistent on a veto of clinic litigation decisions, their donation ought to be clarified and if necessary, respectfully declined with the above reasons given.
This position is in any event, very likely to be consistent with general University attitudes to donors’ conditions.
But donors’ trust must be respected and they must be regularly consulted and listened to.
And for this reason, it is also important to regularly invite donors to be observers at advisory board meetings, and to make presentations on the issues that they think are important.
It is best practice that each of the clinic’s partners is consulted on and has provided informed agreement with the clinic’s objectives.9 It is not recommended that a donor or donors be formulated into a separate donor advisory group for the clinic, as this can set up structurallyentrenched and competing advisory groups that will tie the hands of the clinic director.
Clinic Design Clinic design if this does not state the obvious must occur before a clinic is in operation and begins with identifying and stating the desired course learning outcomes.10 Such identification is harder than it sounds, but can be begun by simply phrased, high level statements.
In this clinic, learning outcomes might be stated as: • Capacity in each student to understand the scale of climate deterioration and the key human contributions to same • A willingness and capacity to critically analyse the existing law of climate preservation and anticipate areas where it might be extended 9 See Evans et al, Australian Clinical Legal Education, ANU Press, Canberra, 2017, Ch 4 Course Design for Clinical Teaching.
10 Evans et al, Note 7, pp 67-98.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 13 • An ability to describe the different legal approaches to defending the climate and the factors and strategies to be taken into account in judging which approaches are best in what circumstances • Adequate capacity to reflect on their experience in the clinic.
In addition to defining learning outcomes, there will be a range of best practices to take into account, as specified in Australian n Clinical Legal Education.11 These typically include specifying necessary pre-reading and its assessment, in-course materials if any, clinic attendance times and other required activities.
In addition, suitable pre-clinic observation (for example, with prior clinic students showing new students the ropes), is desirable.
Class room components are commonly seen as mandatory, to allow students to share and understand their clinic experience having regard to published documents and cases, while necessary reflection is often also a class room group activity, mediated through individual student journals.
While clinics can be online and remotely delivered to suitable clients, the efficacy of this clinic is likely to depend on meaningful professional relationships that are best developed face to face over a reasonable period.
Clinic length should therefore be at least a semester and ideally, a whole year, to allow consolidation of relationships, reflection and stronger learning outcomes.
Student selection into this clinic will be contested, not always for ideal reasons.
The selection process should be negotiated with key partners and not just left to any default university procedures, even if the latter, should they exist, appear rigid.
It is strongly suggested that: 11 See generally, Evans et al, Note 7.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 14 The selection process is transparent and non-discriminatory.
The prerequisites for selection are clearly articulated.
The reasons for choosing particular methods of selection (which can include ballot, interview, stage of study or completion of a prior clinic) are articulated.
There is no presumption that access to CLE courses and clinical experiences should be limited to later-year students.12 Education and causes of action – strategic litigation against climate change Education and compliance around the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosure There is powerful utility in a clinic design that engages law student-education and research strengths by building on the global Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).13 TCFD is an initiative of the UK Financial Stability Board14 which has signed up many global corporations to a commitment to review their own climate preparedness.
The incentive for corporations to cooperate with the TCFD protocols is financial: if their shareholders understand and can see that they are actively preparing for future climate impacts by disclosing their climate-related financial risk, they are likely to be persuaded to remain as shareholders rather than exit when their balance sheets are affected by recurring major climate shocks.
Agriculture, fishing, superannuation and insurance are among the most directly affected activities, but the TCFD now includes nearly all major production sectors across the world.
Properly supervised, some law students are capable of assisting such 12 Best Practice 10 of Best Practices in Australian Clinical Legal Education, Final Report, Clinic Design, 2012, p 13 at https://cald.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Best-Practices-Australian-Clinical-Legal-Education-Sept2012.pdf.
13 See https://www.fsb-tcfd.org 14 The Financial Stability Board is an international organisation headquartered in the UK, with a global responsibility to build resilience into financial organisations.
Established in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, its mission has since broadened to include the wider and deeper threat posed to financial stability by climate change.
See http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 15 corporations in their preparations for such disclosure.
For example, Monash and the major Asian firm King Wood Mallesons run a specialised climate-preparedness audit for the large corporate clients of that firm, with law students examining each client’s business and developing the details for the audit.15 Superannuation litigation This educative approach does not directly challenge emitters in a litigious way, but there are other related approaches to achieve a similar strategic impact.
Superannuation is particularly fertile ground for climate litigation.
One example concerns a young Australian landscape ecologist who in 2017 ‘…used the Market Forces website to ask his superannuation fund, REST, whether it was considering climate risks when making investment decisions.’16 When the fund repeatedly refused to answer his query, he commenced Federal Court of Australia action with the assistance of the major NGO in the sector, Environmental Justice Australia.
This litigation highlights that corporations which have super fund shareholders and that is virtually every major company will be under increasingly negative public scrutiny if they are not adopting TCFD protocols for disclosure of their preparations for climate adversity.
Negligence and Failure to Act – Civil Law and specific constitutional protections To date, the case launched by environmental rights group Urgenda Foundation in the 15 This concept was the brainchild of a Monash Professorial Fellow, Dr Bruce Dyer who, well before the TCFD emerged in 2016, persuaded his then firm Ashworths, to develop an environmental audit as a pro bono service to its own clients, in the interests of their own corporate social responsibility.
This clinic continues now as an externship partnership with King & Wood Mallesons.
See https://www.monash.edu/law/home/cle/types-of-clinics.
16 Julien Vincent, ‘It’s Time Super Funds Came Clean’, Business, The Age, 2 August 2018, pp23-24.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 16 Netherlands is the most significant example of successful climate action, essentially on the basis of negligence or a deliberate failure to act.
17 In a letter to Urgenda, the Dutch government acknowledged that its actions are insufficient to prevent dangerous climate change.
Urgenda concluded that The Netherlands is knowingly exposing its own citizens to danger.
In legal terms, that is a wrongful act of the State.
The Dutch Supreme Court has consistently upheld the principle that the government can be held legally accountable for not taking sufficient action to prevent foreseeable harm.
Urgenda argues that this is also the case with climate change.18 The Dutch Government was ordered at first instance and affirmed in the Hague Court of Appeals19 to take affective action against climate change by lowering emissions, but may appeal to the Netherlands Supreme Court.
Where a particular legal system allows, similar fundamental approaches are possible.
In the US State of Oregon, 21 teenagers have received US Supreme Court permission to proceed in a case which challenges the Federal government for an alleged failure to protect their constitutional rights.
They allege that the government has failed to take meaningful action 17 Mark Loth, ‘Too Big to Trial?
: Lessons from the Urgenda case,’ Tilburg Private Law Working Paper Series, No.
02/2018, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130614.
18 See Climate Case Explained, at http://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case/climate-case-explained.
19 Arthur Neslen, ‘Dutch appeals court upholds landmark climate change ruling’, The Guardian, 10 October 2018, at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/09/dutch-appeals-court-upholds-landmarkclimate-change-ruling.
See also Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 (24 June 2015), at https://www.elaw.org/nl.urgenda.15 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/09/dutch-appeals-court-upholds-landmark-climate-change-ruling https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/09/dutch-appeals-court-upholds-landmark-climate-change-ruling Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 17 against climate change and in so doing, has challenged their ‘…rights to life, liberty and property.’20 A trial in this case is also pending.
Finding plaintiffs, finding regulatory failure While Urgenda and the Oregon case do not represent obvious precedents for jurisdictions such as Australia because the Netherlands is a civil law system with specific constitutional protections for the environment and the US appears to permit similar direct constitutional approaches both are enabling actions in the sense that they have encouraged and stimulated similar efforts elsewhere.
A sub-page of the foundation (‘Global Climate Litigation’) lists current developments in similar litigation in Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, Belgium and India.21 In countries without specific constitutional or regulatory protections, or obvious causes of action in negligence or nuisance, the challenge to create a convincing skein of argument continues.
Fortunately, the current law in Australia22 accepts that ‘climate science is acceptable in evidentiary terms; that single construction or extraction projects can contribute to global warming; and that emissions are cumulative.’23 So the challenge may be principally about finding the right factual situation and the right plaintiff.
20 Malcolm Sutton, ‘Climate change litigation rising with the seas as victims revert to 'Plan B'’, ABC Radio Adelaide, 10 April 2018, at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-10/climate-change-litigation-rising-with-theseas-plan-b/9627870.
The action is listed for late 2018 and is listed as United States v. U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, 18A65.
21 See http://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case/global-climate-litigation.
22 The state of play of global climate change law is increasingly accessible.
See for example Daniel A. Farber and Marjan Peeters (eds), Climate Change Law, Edward Elgar, 2016.
23 See Adrian Evans, ‘The Climate for Whistle Blowing’, Winter 2017, 27(2) The Australian Corporate Lawyer 34, citing Anita Foerster, Hari Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel, Shaping the Next Generation of Australian Climate Litigation, Report on a Melbourne Law School Workshop, 17 November, 2016 (unpublished).
http://www.abc.net.au/news/5829868 http://www.abc.net.au/adelaide/ http://www.abc.net.au/adelaide/ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-10/climate-change-litigation-rising-with-the-seas-plan-b/9627870 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-10/climate-change-litigation-rising-with-the-seas-plan-b/9627870 Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 18 For example, in the Australian context, a plaintiff such as a Great Barrier Reef tour operator might be able to successfully assert that the concerted failure of government (State and Federal) to sufficiently lower existing national emissions which contribute to destabilising the Reef – already the highest per capita on the planet combined with their positive acts of endorsement of new major coal mine(s), broad scale land clearing and the methane leakages associated with unconventional gas extraction, are all inconsistent with general principles underlying existing environmental protection legislation.
Other possible plaintiffs might be the national farmers’ federation, especially in the major drought years which are becoming more frequent; fisheries organisations concerned with diminished inshore fish stocks due to increased current and temperature variability; and at local community levels, residents groups that experience property losses due to flash flooding from major, sudden climate events.
It is not impossible also, that a major national insurer (supported by their international reinsurers) and cognisant of the worsening effects on their balance sheets of any of these groups and their burgeoning property losses, would fund a test case organised by a prepared and strongly-partnered climate defence clinic, to try out these and other causes of action.
It is of course, not easy to commence climate litigation anywhere and that reality must not be understated.
And it may be suggested that a University clinic is least prepared for such major work; but Universities are one of the lightning conductors for major social change and they can have better antennae for conflicts of interest than private corporations.
They are also adept at collaboration because of their research cultures, and their law schools, especially Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 19 those with strong clinical histories, are experienced in cooperating with significant not-forprofit interest groups.
The ‘right’ law school can seize this opportunity.
The supervising clinician/ clinic director role A small specialised clinic of this nature can be supported administratively through the wider clinical program, but the need to effectively recruit into the key role of supervising clinician cannot be underestimated.24 This is a difficult position, given the governance and remuneration constraints on the role.
However, the open legal recruitment market is now mature enough to contain a number of suitable environmental lawyers with the conventionally necessary characteristics: enough relevant experience, technical competence, enthusiasm, personal skills and judgment.
But the right appointee must fit other more exacting criteria as well: they must be an inherently capable teacher and be tolerant and accepting of university bureaucracy (especially around inflexible assessment rules and cautious academic hierarchies).
Even more constraining is the question of salary and career advancement for this clinician.
Law schools’ budgets are notoriously tight compared to private law firms and their general reluctance to employ a full time clinician for a small single-purpose clinic can be expected.
Australian law schools are perhaps overdue to experience declining enrolments and declining revenues.
It might almost be taken for granted that a law school dean will be reluctant to embark on a climate justice clinic if they must find the necessary supervisor salary solely from law school resources.
Nevertheless, some of these deans will be willing to 24 See Evans et al, Note7, Ch 9 Resourcing live client clinics, pp 203-207.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 20 engage the ‘right person’ on a fractional appointment, say at 2-3 days per week, particularly if that expense is factored into the approach to major donors that ought to precede the establishment of the clinic.
Failing success in securing a direct law school appointment, it is also possible (with some safeguards) and perhaps desirable to ask the mid-tier firm which partners with the law school, to second one of its lawyers to the role of supervising clinician, ideally for a minimum period of two years.
There are many examples of law firms successfully seconding lawyers to community legal services and clinical programs,25 so the concept is hardly novel.
The key safeguard would be the law firm’s agreement to a strong and published conflict of interest protocol, developed in conjunction with the law school’s legal ethicists, which would identify areas where the law firms’ interests could diverge from those of potential clients or the law school, and refer decisions on those issues to an independent third party.
A secondary provision would require that student assessment be decided by a law school academic, in consultation with the clinic director.
Providing such safeguards are in place and such a person is available and willing to be seconded for that period to the role of clinic supervisor/ director, then they can supervise and direct such clinics with confidence.
Such a collaboration helps to tie in the firm to the law school, with numerous relationship benefits that can add to the sustainability of the clinic.
The last major issue with the supervising clinician is their reporting line.
Whether they are a seconded lawyer or employed directly by the law school, they ought to be responsible to the 25 Kingsford Legal Centre-UNSW for example, has a staff solicitor position seconded from Herbert Smith Freehills.
See http://www.klc.unsw.edu.au/about-us/klc-staff.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 21 overall clinical program director, not to the advisory board.
Any other arrangement will blur the governance process and impede clinic progress.
Conclusion the value proposition for university fund raisers and alumni A concluding point is to recognise that climate litigation will be opposed not just by individual defendant corporations and various levels of government, but also by entrenched power groups within some industry sectors.
Some of these groups may apply pressure through University councils.
These cases will be quickly politicised.
But the politicisation is now not so one sided as it would have been even five years ago.
Community frustration with government inaction is intense.
Law schools/ partner law firms and donors are not isolated and need not fear broad longer-term public opposition to their activism in this area, not least because younger people are more concerned than their parents and opponents’ demographic is naturally withering.
The ‘right’ judge or judges, capable of understanding and accepting the science, listening to the ‘right’ advocates and possessed of some courage, will inevitably fit together with the ‘right’ case and the ‘right’ plaintiff, for the era.
This considerable conjugation of positive factors has occurred before,26 and does so every time the law advances.
A climate defence clinic, partnering with appropriate private pro bono lawyers, not-for-profit legal expertise and significant alumni donors, can be alive to suitable plaintiffs and propose representation when approached.
26 As for example (in the Australian context), in the Mabo litigation of the early 1990s, when the then utterly contentious concept of Native Title was developed by the High Court of Australia.
See Mabo and Others v Queensland (1992) HCA 175 CLR 1.
Reviewed Article – Clinic, the University and Society 22 Preparation, engagement and relationship management are the keys, and a lengthy lead time is likely while these players are brought into alignment.
But of all these factors and players, the most pressing is the need to identify a suitable benefactor-funder.
If climate change is among the most profound challenges faced by our species and its affects are fundamentally contributing to the breakdown of justice and the rule of law, then the innovative, socially responsible law school will get on board soon.
They will find an alumni-founded or owned business that already sees climate-sensitive business practices as necessary and appropriate for their own sustainability, and persuade them to connect that sensitivity to the need to for climate justice.
The value proposition for such alumni is their legacy, personal and financial.
CLICHE: Education Games for Climate Change Countermeasures Sisforma vol.4 no.1 Februari 2017 : 17-22 17 CLICHE: Education Games for Climate Change Countermeasures Fajar As’ari Department of Information Systems, Faculty of Computer Science Soegijapranata Catholic University (SCU), Semarang, Indonesia asari.fajar@gmail.com Viena Patrisiane Business Analyst PT.
Visionet Data Internasional, Tangerang, Indonesia tvxq_cho@yahoo.co.id Abstract– Game as an education media can introduce, deliver and teach about knowledge by presenting the information that contains education materials through digital game.
Many subjectshave been adapted game as a tool of media education, like history, arithmetic, etc.
Social and environmental issues can also be adapted into a game to overcome the issues.
Climate change, a globally concerned issue, has been discussed in the aspects of causes and impacts.
Minimizing behavior that can worsen climate change also means minimizing climate change effect.
One of education games has been created to educate people about climate change, and to inform about climate change and the way to minimize the effects.
This paper will discuss about education games: CLICHE, a game which explains concisely the cause and some actions to minimize climate change cause through digital game play that will have impact to lessen the climate change effects.
Keywords: digital game, education games, climate change, simulation game.
I.
INTRODUCTION Many educational subjectshave been adapted into digital game.
History is one of education topics that is already adapted into education games [1].
In addition to history, mathematics also can be adapted into a game for learning[2].
Using game as media makes students easier to understand the information that has been delivered through game.This game can be proved as an alternative to education media[1], [2].Because the benefit can be as education media, health education game can also be created to teach about appropriate health knowledge and good habits in daily life[3].Education about disaster with flood topic that is delivered through computer game was applied in Taiwan which was effectively teaching flood and the impact for young generations[4].
Climate change, which as a matter of fact climate on earth is not constant, could be warmer and cooler for thousands of years.
However, in the past 100 years or so earth’s climate is warmer with the average increase temperature more than one degree Fahrenheit.
The amount that seems small can cause great impacts on Earth[5].
Impacts that cannot be underestimated makes climate change as global issues.
The climate warming that causes temperature has obviously risen since 1950.This brings about impact on atmosphere and ocean, decreasing the amount of ice and snow, and the level of the sea that risen.
Human influences through climate change are really obvious and impacts toward human and nature are widespread [6].From the impacts that appear, of course people should realize about climate change and participate in process to minimize impacts and cause of climate change.
Information about climate change has been delivered through some media to build CLICHE: Education Games for Climate Change Countermeasures Sisforma vol.4 no.1 Februari 2017 : 17-22 18 awareness [7].
Game is one of media that can deliver the information.
Delivering information about what causes climate change and about how to minimize the causes has been summarized into education media: CLICHÉ that will be explained in this paper.
II.
LITERATURE REVIEW 2.
1 Climate Change Climate change occurs at the whole earth’s climate, and causes earth’s temperature increasing [5].
This temperature increase is caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) that accumulates since pre-industrial era, also by population and economic rapidly growth, which is higher than ever had.
GHG consist of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N4O).
Earth’s temperature escalation impacts on ecosystem and people over the world.
However, the impacts worsenthe nature ecosystem.
Change on climate system also melts ice that elevates the sea level that impacts on water ecosystem [6].
To prevent impacts get worse from climate change, action that is supposed to reduce GHG is required, for exampleusing energy as efficient as possible and using energy from the sun, wind, water, or other clean energy.
Using less water, turning off the lamp and TV when leaving the room aresome steps to retrench energy.
Besides that, reforestation and against deforestation to alleviate CO2 trapped in atmosphere are important.
2.
2 Education games The advanced computer technology produces a research to develop education media to improve students learning process.
From several media, digital game has high potential to motivate students[3].
About motivation, education games with disaster theme successfully motivate the student to learn about flood through game-initiatedlearning (GIL)[4].
Content or subject that will be delivered through game is really important part for education process[3].
In education perspectives, game can be used as vehicle to deliver fact, idea, and to help students to reveal new knowledge[8].
III.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Literature review about climate change and education games has been done to strengthen the foundation about the game that will be discussed in this paper.
Analyzing the game and gameplay has been done to explain some actions that will minimize climate change causes and impacts that are delivered through game CLICHÉ.
IV.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION CLICHÉ is an education game with theme about climate change that has purpose to raise awareness about the importance to minimize climate change causes and their impacts.
This game has 5 levels, and in every level gives players different information for climate change countermeasure.
4.1 Game start Fig 4.
1 Main menu game CLICHE On game start, it will appear 3 menu choices: Main menu : go to level menu before play the game.
Keluar : quit from game application game CLICHÉ Informasi : brief information about game CLICHE CLICHE: Education Games for Climate Change Countermeasures Sisforma vol.4 no.1 Februari 2017 : 17-22 19 Fig 4.
2 Menu Level game CLICHE Menu level consists of five levels that are related with climate change.
Level 1 : deforestation.
Level 2 : recycling Level 3 : composting Level 4 : smart shopper Level 5 : CFCs and HFCs In first game, level 2 till 5 are still locked and cannot be opened.
To open level 2 players should complete level 1; to open level 3 players should complete level 2 and so on.
4.2 Level 1 Fig 4.
3 Introduction level 1 Before level 1starts, it will appear information as opening thatis related with forest.
Fig 4.
4 Level 1 Game CLICHÉ Deforestation is the topic that is adapted in this level.
Deforestation which impacts on reducingtrees in forest causes CO2 that cannot be recycled into O2.
In this level, player asked to catch illegal logger before the tree fall.
This level informs to prevent deforestation in order to not worsen the forest state.
Fig 4.
5 Level 1 CLICHE game over Level 1 that has time limits to play, when the time is up picture like Fig 4.5 will appear and give brief information about forest.
Two-menu button is prepared to restart the level with button “coba lagi” or go to next level with button “lanjut” or proceed.
CLICHE: Education Games for Climate Change Countermeasures Sisforma vol.4 no.1 Februari 2017 : 17-22 20 4.3 Level 2 Fig 4.
6 Level 2 instructions Before level 2 is played, instruction will appear to introduce player about waste paper type, and it should be put in grey trashcan or HW/RC waste should be put in blue trashcan.
In this level, two waste types are shown to player in order to choose which one waste paper and HW/RC.
Waste paper comprises newspaper, paper, cupboard, box pizza, tube tissue, cereal box, envelope, and egg board.
Waste HW/RC is battery, log, wheel, brick, and plastic bottle.
Fig 4.
7 Level 2 instructions (2) Level 2 has two stages; every stage in this level has the same gameplay, the differenceon the difficulty level and waste that have various types.
First stage, all the trash can be thrown into trashcan, however in second stage not all trash can be thrown into trashcan.
In this level, it also applies time limit;a player can get points if he/she puts trash in the right trashcan.
Besides points, the player can also collect money and this money can be used in level 4.
Fig 4.
8 Level 2 Game CLICHÉ In level 2,the player learns to choose the trash that makes it easy to recycle or reuse so the trash not contaminate the environment.
4.4 Level 3 Fig 4.
9 Level 3 Game CLICHÉ Composting, players are asked to choose compost materials that match with pictures next to scoreboard.
Level 3 is continuation of level 2 about waste, if in level 2 about inorganic waste, in this level is about organic waste.
Processing organic waste into compost has benefit instead of decreasing amount of CLICHE: Education Games for Climate Change Countermeasures Sisforma vol.4 no.1 Februari 2017 : 17-22 21 waste also trash that has changed into compost that can be used as natural fertilizer.
4.5 Level 4 Fig 4.
10 Level 4 Game CLICHÉ In level 2, in additionto points as feedback, players also get money that can be used in level 4.
In level 4 players are directed to use less energy by turning off the lamp if there is no one in the room.
Moreover, money that players have can be used to buy lamp if one lamp in the rooms is broken.
Players can buy lamps and if player choose energy saving lamp player will get point bonus.
To repair the broken lamp, players need to drag it and direct it into the new lamp.
Saving energy is a step to prevent climate change impacts get worse becausethe energy sourcesare from fossil or coals burnt that produce CO2.
4.6 Level 5 Fig 4.
11 Level 5 Game CLICHÉ Level 5 is still related with level 4, but in this level player should control room temperature with considering the efficiency use of air conditioner (AC) and fan.
This level informs players to use AC and fanwisely; it doesn’t mean to turn off the AC but to arrange the AC temperature and fan to circulate AC cold air.
AC is one of household electronics that produces CFC/HFC part of GHG that cause climate change.
After playing this level, a player is expected to wisely use household electronics that cause GHG to minimize causes of climate change.
V. CONCLUSION Using game as education media can give positive impact for education itself.
Giving motivation is one benefit of education games.
Adapting global issues into a game to inform about the issues is also one of positive sides of education games.
CLICHÉ game adapts global issues as the main theme, climate change.
CLICHÉ gives countermeasure information or prevents climate change from worsening.
Consisting of five levels with each level has purpose to raise awareness that people can participate minimize causes of climate change.
Level 1 is to prevent deforestation.
Level 2 and 3 are about waste and recycling, reusing, and composting.
Level 4 and 5 are about saving energy, informing about using less energy, using less fuel that can cause GHG.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Fajar As’ari and Viena Patrisiane are Game Technology students of Soegijapranata Catholic University.
Based on academic excellent, Fajar As’ari receives scholarship from Ministry of National Education of Republic Indonesia (Excellence Scholarship of Education Ministry of Republic of Indonesia) CLICHE: Education Games for Climate Change Countermeasures Sisforma vol.4 no.1 Februari 2017 : 17-22 22 REFERENCES [1] N. A. Wijaya and R. Sanjaya, “History Lesson using Game as the Tool,” Int.
J. Comput.
Internet Manajement, vol.
19, no.
9, p. 6, 2012.
[2] V. W. Febriani and T. B. Chandrawati, “Shooting Game can be an Education games for Children,” no.
February, pp.
23–24, 2012.
[3] H.-Y.
Sung, G.-J.
Hwang, and Y.-F.
Yen, “Computers & Education Development of a contextual decisionmaking game for improving students ’ learning performance in a health education course,” Comput.
Educ., vol.
82, pp.
179–190, 2015.
[4] M. Tsai, Y. Chang, C. Kao, and S. Kang, “The effectiveness of a flood protection computer game for disaster education,” 2015.
[5] D. Stillman and D. Miller, “What Are Climate and Climate Change?,” www.nasa.gov, 2011.
[Online].
Available: https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstude nts/5-8/features/nasa-knows/what-isclimate-change-58.html.
[Accessed: 11Mar-2017].
[6] IPCC, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary Chapter for Policymakers,” 2014.
[7] V. Patrisiane, “Simulasi dan Penerapan Penanggulangan Perubahan Iklim Dengan Media Game,” Soegijapranata Catholic University, 2016.
[8] L. Botturi and C. S. Loh, Games : Purpose and Potential in Education, 1st ed.
USA, New York: Springer Publishing Company, Inc., 2008.
Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland Bulletin 28, 2013, 33-36 33 Assessing urban groundwater table response to climate change and increased stormwater infiltration Mark T. Randall, Lars Troldborg, Jens Christian Refsgaard and Jacob B. Kidmose The global climate is expected to show continued warming throughout the coming century.
As a direct consequence of higher temperatures, the hydrological cycle will undergo significant changes in the spatial and temporal distribution of precipitation and evapotranspiration.
In addition to more frequent and severe droughts and floods, climate change can affect groundwater recharge rates and groundwater table elevation (Bates et al.
2008).
Some previous studies of climate change impact on groundwater have suggested alarming reductions in groundwater recharge and lowering of water tables.
Other studies, especially those focusing on regions of higher latitudes, have indicated a potential rise in water tables due to increased precipitation and recharge (Scibek & Allen 2006; Woldeamlak et al.
2007).
In addition to changes in precipitation patterns, a shift in stormwater infrastructure design may also alter the hydrologic cycle of urban areas.
In recent years, there has been a growing trend towards adoption of low-impact development practices managing stormwater runoff.
These practices aim to mitigate the impacts of urbanisation such as increased runoff volume, higher peak runoff flows, lowered water tables and reduced water quality (Prince George’s County 1999).
In contrast to conventional stormwater infrastructure, which is designed to rapidly collect and convey runoff, low-impact development practices are designed to slow runoff, remove pollutants and evapotranspirate and infiltrate runoff locally.
In recent years, numerous modelling studies have investigated the potential impact of stormwater infiltration on groundwater levels.
Gobel et al.
(2004) used a combination of models (GwNeu, HYDRUS-2D, SPRING) to demonstrate that the installation of infiltration practices across an urban catchment area in Germany could raise the groundwater surface by up to 2.3 m in some locations.
In another catchment scale study, Maimone et al.
(2011) used the modelling code DYNFLOW to show that the future groundwater table may eventually stabilise up to 1.5 m higher than its current level in parts of Philadelphia, if the city’s plan to alter 40% of its impervious areas into so-called ‘green’ stormwater recharge areas is completed.
Thompson (2010) used HYDRUS-2D to demonstrate that a stormwater infiltration basin could cause up to 1.3 m of localised groundwater mounding.
In yet another study, Endreny & Collins (2009) used MODFLOW to show that rain gardens installed throughout a residential catchment area could raise the steady-state groundwater table by up to 1.1 m. The studies mentioned above have investigated groundwater level response to either changes in climate or stormwater management infrastructure.
However, to the authors’ knowledge no studies have investigated the concurrent effects of both alterations on the urban hydrologic cycle.
In urban areas, it is necessary to determine the potential magnitude of the combined impact, as a steep rise in groundwater level can damage building foundations and subsurface infrastructure due to flooding and buoyancy forces (Gobel et al.
2004; Vázquez-Suñé et al.
2005).
This study aims to assess the potential changes in groundwater response caused by both increased precipitation and widespread instalment of stormwater infiltration infrastructure in the city of Silkeborg, Denmark, using the MIKE SHE model.
Change of groundwater level at the planned location of a new motorway in Silkeborg is the focus of this study as portions of the conFig.
1.
The Silkeborg study area and the proposed course of the motorway.
Inset: the location of Silkeborg in Jylland.
© 2013 GEUS.
Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland Bulletin 28, 33–36.
Open access: www.geus.dk/publications/bull 1 kmEnd of pipe recharge area Pervious area Impervious area Motorway Jylland Silkeborg c. 9°40´E c. 56°11´N 3434 struction are expected to come critically close to the present high groundwater table in that area.
Knowledge of the magnitude of potential groundwater changes is essential because improved drainage measures and increased use of concrete will significantly raise the costs of the new motorway.
Study area The city of Silkeborg has a population of c. 43 000 inhabitants and is located in the central part of Jylland, Denmark (Fig.
1).
The focus of this study is just north of the river Gudenåen, where a portion of the new motorway will be constructed c. 6 m below the present terrain surface.
The surficial geology is dominated by coarse-grained, postglacial, sandy sediments that form an upper unconfined aquifer with a vertical extent of 10–15 m. The average precipitation in Silkeborg during the period 1961–1990 was 903 mm per year, and the average potential evapotranspiration was 546 mm per year.
The average monthly temperature during that period was 15.2°C in July/August and −0.3°C in January/ February (Kidmose et al.
2013).
Methods Hydrological models – MIKE SHE is a deterministic, fullydistributed and physically based model software capable of simulating surface and subsurface hydrological processes.
The Danish National Water Resources Model (DK-model) is based on MIKE SHE and incorporates national data on geology, soil type, land use, topography, river network geometry, water abstraction and climate.
The Silkeborg model is a 100 m grid local model using hydraulic head boundary conditions from the 500 m grid DK-model.
A 9.2 km2 area within the 103 km2 Silkeborg model, which encompasses the new motorway construction and the greater part of the urbanised surroundings, was chosen for the current study (Fig.
1).
Details on the development, calibration and validation of the DK-model and the Silkeborg model are found in Højberg et al.
(2013) and Kidmose et al.
(2013), respectively.
Six different model scenarios have been evaluated (Table 1).
Stormwater infiltration modelling – The Silkeborg study area consists of 65.5% pervious and 34.5% impervious cover.
In the scenarios with conventional drainage stormwater infrastructure (i.e.
the ‘CD’ scenarios), 100% of the precipitation on impervious cells was routed directly to the river system (Fig.
2A).
Precipitation on impervious cells had one time step (i.e.
one day) to infiltrate or evapotranspirate.
At the end of the time step, any water in excess of a detention storage of 4.7 mm (based on calibration results) was routed overland to adjacent cells based on topography.
It is assumed that the CD-2010 scenario is representative of Silkeborg’s current climate and stormwater conditions.
In the end of pipe recharge (EPR) scenarios (Fig.
2B), it was assumed that 10.7% (34 ha) of the city’s pervious area has been turned into end of pipe stormwater infiltration ponds (Figs 1, 2).
Model cells which were assumed to contain inFig.
2.
Three model scenarios for stormwater drainage infrastructure.
Scenario name Climate data input Stormwater infrastructure CD-2010 Recorded 1991–2010 Conventional drainage to river system EPR-2010 Recorded 1991–2010 End of pipe infiltration ponds LAR-2010 Recorded 1991–2010 Local area recharge CD-2100 Projected 2081–2100 Conventional drainage to river system EPR-2100 Projected 2081–2100 End of pipe infiltration ponds LAR-2100 Projected 2081–2100 Local area recharge Table 1.
Summary of model scenarios A B C Conventional drainage End of pipe recharge Local area recharge 35 filtration ponds were assigned detention storage of 500 mm to represent the storage depth of the pond.
In the EPR scenarios, precipitation which would normally be applied to impervious cells was reduced to zero, and the equivalent volume of precipitation was instead evenly distributed over the infiltration pond cells via an increase in precipitation applied to those cells.
In the EPR scenarios there were 9.3 times as much impervious drainage area as infiltration pond area, so the infiltration pond model cells had 1030% (i.e.
100% + 9.3 × 100%) of the actual rainfall applied to them.
This method of manipulating precipitation to simulate the collection of stormwater in specialised infiltration areas on a city-wide scale is similar to the modelling strategy used by HolmanDodds et al.
(2003).
The local area recharge (LAR) scenarios represent a system where stormwater is managed at the level of individual plots through any combination of infiltration practices, each no more than tens of metres across.
It was assumed that infiltration possibilities are numerous and located in close proximity so that at the scale of the model, each cell effectively behaves as a pervious cell.
Therefore, all paved areas were given properties identical to the pervious areas with infiltration rates controlled by the underlying soils.
Climate input – Precipitation, temperature and evapotranspiration data from the Danish Meteorological Institute from 1991 to 2010 were used as input to the ‘2010’ model scenarios.
The input climate data for the ‘2100’ scenarios were generated by applying correction factors based on nine climate model projections from the ENSEMBLES project (Christensen et al.
2009) to present-day climate data.
Further information on the Delta Change downscaling method used can be found in Seaby et al.
(2013).
To generate the results for each of the three ‘2100’ infrastructure scenarios, the model was run nine times (once for each of the nine climate model projections), and the results averaged.
Results Water table elevation – Average groundwater elevations along the area planned for the motorway construction were extracted from the MIKE SHE model results (Fig.
3).
Areas where the solid black line (i.e.
the motorway surface) drops below the water table indicate portions of the motorway which could be flooded by groundwater.
In the CD-2010 scenario, a stretch of 160 m of motorway is below the average water table.
In the CD-2100 scenario, the average groundwater table elevation is raised by 0.08 m, and the length of motorway surface at risk is extended to 180 m. Hundreds of metres of the proposed motorway are potentially flooded in the LAR-2010 and the LAR-2100 scenarios where the average water table rose 0.48 and 0.55 m above CD-2010 levels, respectively.
The highest average water tables of 1.15 and 1.19 m above CD-2010 occur in the EPR-2010 and EPR-2100 scenarios, which would both put a stretch of nearly 1 km of the proposed motorway at risk.
The results indicate that the impact of climate change (i.e.
the difference between the ‘2010’ and the ‘2100’ scenarios) is small compared to the impact of extensive implementation of either local area or end of pipe stormwater infiltration practices.
Only average water tables are presented here to compare the relative impacts of different model scenarios.
However, maximum water tables could put much longer sections of the motorway at risk and will therefore be considered in the final design of the motorway.
Water balance – Average yearly volumes of precipitation, evapotranspiration, recharge and overland flow were calculated for the 1991–2010 time period for each stormwater inFig.
3.
Average modelled groundwater table elevations along the 2000 m of projected motorway at Silkeborg.
The results are relative to CD-2010.
Model scenario Mean (mm/year, 1991–2010) Precipitation Evapotranspiration Recharge Overland flow Baseflow CD 911 319 304 292 8 LAR 911 441 463 11 15 EPR 911 311 588 19 29 Table 2.
Catchment water balances for different stormwater infrastructure scenarios LAR-2010 LAR-2100 EPR-2010 EPR-2100 Motorway surface CD-2100 NW SE –0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 0.0G ro un dw at er t ab le ( m ) 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Distance along subsurface motorway stretch (m) 3636 frastructure scenario using MIKE SHE’s water balance tool (see Table 2).
Evapotranspiration was greater in the LAR scenario, due to the much larger evaporation surface available.
Recharge was much higher in both infiltration scenarios than in the CD scenario.
Overland flow, or the volume of water which flows directly into the river system, was very small in both the infiltration scenarios in comparison to the CD scenario which routed all water from impervious areas into the nearest stream.
Baseflow was highest in the EPR scenario, followed by the LAR scenario and finally the CD scenario, as would be expected based on the relative recharge volumes in these scenarios.
Summary and conclusions Previous studies have reported groundwater level rise due to either climate change (Scibek & Allen 2006; Woldeamlak et al.
2007) or stormwater infiltration practices (Gobel et al.
2004; Maimone et al.
2011).
However, these two changes to the urban hydrologic cycle are typically not assessed in an integrated way as in this study.
The modelling results presented in this paper are within the ranges of the above studies, i.e.
tens of centimetres due to climate change and potentially more than 1 m due to the widespread adoption of stormwater infiltration practices.
However, these results are specific to the Silkeborg motorway and it is expected that the relative magnitude of the impact due to climate change and stormwater infiltration could vary greatly under different climatic and geological regimes.
Stormwater infiltration practices are often regarded as a form of climate change adaptation in the field of stormwater management as they can help to accommodate the higher intensity and larger volume precipitation events expected in the future.
However, as the results of this study indicate, these same practices amplify other problems associated with climate change (i.e.
groundwater table rise).
The study clearly shows the need for integrated research of urban hydrology, and communication between hydrogeologists, stormwater engineers, planners and policy makers.
Acknowledgement We thank the Danish Road Directorate for funding this study.
References Bates, B., Kundzewicz, Z., Wu, S. & Palutikof, J.
2008: Climate change and water.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Technical Paper 6, 200 pp.
Geneva: IPCC.
Christensen, J.H., Rummukainen, M. & Lenderink, G. 2009: Formulation of very-high-resolution regional climate model ensembles for Europe [Research Theme 3].
ENSEMBLES: Climate change and its impacts: summary of research and results from the ENSEMBLES project, 47–58.
Exeter, UK: Meteorological Office Hadley Centre.
Endreny, T. & Collins, V. 2009: Implications of bioretention basin spatial arrangements on stormwater recharge and groundwater mounding.
Ecological Engineering 35, 670–677.
Gobel, P. et al.
2004: Near-natural stormwater management and its effects on the water budget and groundwater surface in urban areas taking account of the hydrogeological conditions.
Journal of Hydrology 299, 267–283.
Højberg, A.L., Troldborg, L., Stiesen, S., Christensen, B.B.S.
& Henriksen H.J.
2013: Stakeholder driven update and improvement of a national water resources model.
Environmental Modelling & Software 40, 202–213.
Holman-Dodds, J.K., Bradley, A.A. & Potter, K.W.
2003: Evaluation of hydrologic benefits of infiltration based urban storm water management.
Journal of the American Water Resources Association 39, 205–215.
Kidmose, J., Refsgaard, J.C., Troldborg, L., Seaby, L.P. & Escrivà, M.M.
2013: Climate change impact on groundwater levels: ensemble modelling of extreme values.
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 17, 1619–1634.
Maimone, M., O’Rourke, D.E., Knighton, J.O.
& Thomas, C.P.
2011: Potential impacts of extensive stormwater infiltration in Philadelphia.
Environmental Engineer 14, 29–39.
Prince George’s County 1999: Low-impact development design strategies: an integrated design approach, 150 pp.
Prince George’s County, MD: Department of Environmental Resources.
http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/green/upload/lidnatl.pdf Scibek, J.
& Allen, D. 2006: Comparing modelled responses of two highpermeability, unconfined aquifers to predicted climate change.
Global and Planetary Change 50, 50–62.
Seaby, L.P., Refsgaard, J.C., Sonnenborg, T.O., Stisen, S., Christensen, J.H.
& Jensen, K.H.
2013: Assessment of robustness and significance of climate change signals for an ensemble of distribution-based scaled climate projections.
Journal of Hydrology, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jhydrol.2013.02.015 Thompson, A., Nimmer, M. & Misra, D. 2010: Effects of variations in hydrogeological parameters on water-table mounding in sandy loam and loamy sand soils beneath stormwater infiltration basins.
Hydrogeology Journal 18, 501–508.
Vázquez-Suñé, E., Sanchez-Vila, X.
& Carrera, J.
2005: Introductory review of specific factors influencing urban groundwater, an emerging branch of hydrogeology, with reference to Barcelona, Spain.
Hydrogeology Journal 13, 522–533.
Woldeamlak, S., Batelaan, O.
& de Smedt, F. 2007: Effects of climate change on the groundwater system in the Grote-Nete catchment, Belgium.
Hydrogeology Journal 15, 891–901.
Authors’ addresses M.T.R., Computational Hydraulics International, 147 Wyndham Street North, Suite 202, Guelph, Ontario, N1H 4E9 Canada.
E-mail: mark@chiwater.com L.T., J.C.R.
& J.B.K., Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, Øster Voldgade 10, DK-1350 Copenhagen K, Denmark.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2013.02.015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2013.02.015
Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics Vol.
7, No.
2, December 2020.
E-ISSN: 2621-9158 P-ISSN:2356-0401 http://ejournal.umm.ac.id/index.php/celtic/index 191 A TRANSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF GRETA THUNBERG’S 2019 CLIMATE ACTION SUMMIT SPEECH 1Ardelia Karisa, 1Stefanny Lauwren* 1Universitas Sanata Dharma, Indonesia *Corresponding Author: liulieie@gmail.com ABSTRACT Climate change has been one of the most significant concerns for the United Nations.
As a result, the United Nations held a summit in 2019, inviting several notable speakers in the field.
One of them is a young teenager from Swedish, Greta Thunberg.
Greta Thunberg is a prominent climate activist who delivered a speech at the United Nations Climate Action Summit 2019, which is about how people and the government need to limit global warming.
Her address became viral and garnered attention from many media, and roused a massive youth-led climate rally.
Thus, this study analyzed her speech as the object of the study and employed a descriptive qualitative method.
The study scrutinized 54 clauses through transitivity analysis from Hallidayan Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) to understand the processes in the address and its function.
This current study has revealed that the speaker’s dominantly used material process (37%) to describe the damage to the environment done by people.
The use of relational process (31.5%) describes climate change's effects on the world and her life.
The mental process used in 16.7% of the data provokes guilt and responsibility, as she pointed the audience as the actors that cause climate change.
The behavioural process (7.4%) shows that Thunberg will not stay quiet on climate crisis when her generation is the one who will suffer from it.
Existential process (3.7%) is used to describe the existing problems, while verbal process (3.7%) is used in quoting the high-profile politician to prove that none of their promises have been fulfilled.
Keywords: Climate Action Summit 2019; Greta Thunberg; Transitivity Analysis; Verb ABSTRAK Perubahan iklim menjadi salah satu perhatian terbesar organisasi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa.
Pada 2019 Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa menggelar KTT dengan mengundang beberapa pembicara terkemuka di bidangnya, salah satunya remaja asal Swedia, Greta Thunberg.
Greta Thunberg terkenal sebagai seorang aktivis iklim yang menyampaikan pidato tentang bagaimana masyarakat dan pemerintah perlu mengambil tindakan untuk membatasi pemanasan global di United Nations Climate Action Summit 2019.
Pidatonya menjadi viral dan menarik perhatian banyak media serta memicu demonstrasi iklim besar-besaran yang dipimpin oleh anak-anak muda.
Studi ini menganalisis pidato Greta Thunberg dengan menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif.
Studi ini meneliti 54 klausul melalui analisis transitivitas dari Hallidayan Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) untuk memahami proses dan fungsinya.
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa pembicara dominan menggunakan proses materi (37%) untuk mendeskripsikan kerusakan lingkungan yang dilakukan oleh manusia.
Penggunaan proses relasional (31.5%) menggambarkan pengaruh perubahan iklim terhadap dunia dan kehidupannya.
Proses mental, yang digunakan di 16.7% data, memancing rasa bersalah dan tanggung jawab, saat ia menunjuk penonton sebagai aktor penyebab perubahan iklim.
Proses perilaku (7.4%), menunjukkan bahwa Thunberg tidak akan tinggal diam menghadapi krisis iklim ketika generasinya yang akan menderita.
Proses eksistensial (3.7%) digunakan untuk mendeskripsikan masalah yang ada, sedangkan proses verbal (3.7%) digunakan dalam mengutip politisi papan untuk membuktikan bahwa janji mereka tidak ada yang dipenuhi.
Karisa, A., & Lauwren, S. (2020).
A Transitivity Analysis of Greta Thunberg’s 2019 Climate Action Summit Speech.Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics, 7(2), 191-198.
192 Kata Kunci: Analisis Transivitas; Climate Action Summit 2019; Greta Thunberg; Kata Kerja INTRODUCTION Greta Thunberg is a prominent youth climate activist.
Thunberg was then only 15 years old when she started a climate strike outside the Swedish Parliament in August 2018.
This was the beginning of the global school strike for climate called Fridays for Future (‘Fridays for Future – How Greta started a global movement’, 2020).
On Monday, September 23rd 2019, she spoke in front of the world leaders at the United Nation Climate Action Summit.
Thunberg said about how people and the government need to take action to limit global warming.
Despite being the youngest speaker, her speech became headlines in many media outlets, rousing a massive youth-led climate rally.
The rally is said to be the most significant environmental protest ever happened.
Following the massive media coverage, the Collins Dictionary's lexicographers even put the word climate strike as the word of the year.
She is also chosen by Time magazine as 2019 Person of the Year (Alter, Haynes, & Worland, 2019).
Nevertheless, it is reported that Thunberg rejects a prestigious environmental award and the prize money in the same year.
She insists that her climate movement needs no more awards, but it needs more politicians and people in power to pay attention to the climate problem and to take action (‘Greta Thunberg: Why has she turned down an award?
CBBC Newsround’, 2019).
As of this article is being written, Thunberg still consistently continues the weekly protest every Friday (Witt, 2020).
Systemic Functional Grammar is a theory devised by Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) to study a language's meaning based on their grammar.
In Systemic Functional Grammar, the meaning is derived from three metafunctions; ideational, interpersonal, and textual.
Each of them treats clauses in the text as representation, exchange, and message.
Analysis employing Systemic Functional Grammar is not uncommon.
Some researchers have used SFG to analyze a speech (Harwiyati & Siagianto, 2016; Zhao & Li, 2018; Zhu & Li, 2018), literary text (Darani, 2014; Nugraha & Mahdi, 2020), and analyze non-political speech (Haq, Indrayani, & Soemantri, 2020).
Zhao and Li (2018) conducted a transitivity analysis study on the inaugural speech of Donald Trump, the American president.
The study was conducted to discover the political motivation and explore the profound social significance via transitivity.
It is discovered that the material process is the process with the most appearance, followed by relational and mental processes.
The material process is employed in transferring power to people, while the relational process is utilized in advocating U.S. interests in international contacts.
The mental process is applied to recover the audience’s confidence and expectation for a better future.
An analysis of the transitivity system in The Lottery by Shirley Jackson was done by Nugraha and Mahdi (2020) to discover Mr. Summers's representation, the main character, from the types of processes in clauses that related to him.
Through a descriptive qualitative research design, the study finds that the verbal process dominates the text to construct Mr. Summers through verbiage.
The high number of the material process shows that he does activities in the domestic and physical domain, while the relational process is used to characterize explicitly.
The mental and behavioural process is used to depict the character’s cognition and everyday activity.
Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics Vol.
7, No.
2, December 2020.
E-ISSN: 2621-9158 P-ISSN:2356-0401 http://ejournal.umm.ac.id/index.php/celtic/index 193 Haq, Indrayani, and Soemantri (2020) employed Hallidayan Systemic Functional Grammar as the framework and J. R. Martin’s appraisal system to analyze the attitudinal meaning in Martin Luther King Jr’s speech.
From the ninety clauses found in the text, the study finds that judgement is the most dominant, followed by appreciation and effect.
The high number of judgements shows racial injustice’s reality to persuade people to reject the condition.
Appreciation is used positively, while Affect is used negatively.
The study finds that the speaker used mixed emotions in his speech.
The negative emotions found in the address can be inferred as a refusal of the condition and can stimulate revenge.
This research on Thunberg’s speech applies transitivity analysis, which is a part of ideational metafunction in Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG).
According to Eggins (2004), in the transitivity system, there are three aspects of the clause; the verbal group, the participant, and the circumstances.
The transitivity process that this study focuses on is the verbal group, which is the grammatical system by which a mode of action or interaction is achieved (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014).
As construed by the transitivity system in the grammar, the different types of processes are divided into ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ experiences.
The outer experience is an experience outside the world of consciousness, including perception, emotion, and imagination.
The inner experience is experience which involves reaction and reflection from the outer experiences.
The experiences about the world from ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ experiences are divided into six ideational processes; material, mental, behavioural, verbal, relational, and existential processes.
The high number of scholars that employ transitivity analysis proves that it is a powerful tool for speech analysis.
However, to the best of the researchers’ knowledge, none of the previous studies has analyzed the transitivity process in this particular speech.
It also provides a new outlook to transitivity analysis in analyzing a nonpolitical speech by a teenage climate activist.
This research aims to discover the transitivity process in Thunberg’s speech at the Climate Action Summit 2019 and its functions in the speech.
METHOD This research employed a descriptive qualitative method to discover the distribution and function of ideational metafunction presented in Thunberg’s speech.
This method describes a phenomenon and reveals the complexity through textual analysis and interpretation.
Transitivity analysis, which is a part of Hallidayan Systemic Functional Grammar (2014), was used to analyze the clauses found in the speech.
Transitivity analysis treats clause as experience, construing the human experience from inner and outer consciousness, thus being utilized as the tool to support this study's aim.
This research studied the ideational metafunction, which focused on the verbs of the clauses.
The object of the study was the clauses taken from the transcription of Greta Thunberg’s speech at the United Nations 2019 Climate Action Summit, which was taken from https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergsspeech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit.
The speech length was 495 words and consisted of 54 clauses, excluding the exclamatory and expression sentences.
Transitivity analysis starts with the classification of different kinds of processes.
Therefore, the study examined the text and categorized the verb based on the transitivity https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit Karisa, A., & Lauwren, S. (2020).
A Transitivity Analysis of Greta Thunberg’s 2019 Climate Action Summit Speech.Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics, 7(2), 191-198.
194 process of the Hallidayan Systemic Functional Grammar, which consisted of six types of processes; material, mental, relational, verbal, behavioural, and existential process.
The findings on the processes were interpreted to reveal the experience of the speaker.
FINDINGS Analysis of the clause as representation deals with exploring transitivity patterns and involves the specification of the choice of a process and the associated participant roles in each clause.
This study is going to focus on the choice of process-related in the clauses.
The figures for the ranking and embedded clauses are shown in Table 1, which summarizes the results of the Transitivity analysis.
Table 1.
Summary of Transitivity Process Type in Thunberg’s Speech Transitivity Process Type Thunberg’s Speech Frequency Percentage Material 20 37% Relational 17 31.5% Mental 9 16.7% Behavioural 4 7.4% Existential 2 3.7% Verbal 2 3.7% Total 54 100% Thunberg’s speech consists of fifty-four clauses.
Through transitivity analysis, the study finds that the material process dominates the data, occurring twenty times and represented through 37% of the data.
The second-highest occurrence of seventeen times is the relational process, represented by 31.5% in the text.
The mental process occurs nine times, presenting 16.7% of the data, while the behavioural process occurs four times out of fifty-four clauses, presented in 7.4% of the data.
Both existential and verbal happens two times, and each is given in 3.7% of the data.
According to Halliday, material, mental, and relational are the main types of processes in the English transitivity system.
Similarly, in Thunberg’s speech, the processes with the highest number are material, relational, and mental processes, which proves that in her speech, she deals more with clauses with processes related to doing and happening, being and having, and sensing.
DISCUSSION Among the six major types of process, the material process occurs the most with total numbers of twenty, and the proportion of the process to the total clauses is 37%.
By using material clause, the speaker focuses more on the actors and action.
Since material clauses construe a quantum of change in the flow of events as taking place through some energy input, they are considered the clauses of doing and happening.
As material clauses discuss the verbs about doing and happening, the clauses cannot be separated from the actors.
The material processes in the speech are described in the clauses below: (1) Yet you all come to us young people for hope.
(2) You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics Vol.
7, No.
2, December 2020.
E-ISSN: 2621-9158 P-ISSN:2356-0401 http://ejournal.umm.ac.id/index.php/celtic/index 195 (3) you continue to look away and come here saying that you're doing enough Based on the clauses, most of the verbs' actors refer to the audience; however, sometimes it refers to the speaker.
Thunberg assumed the audience as “you” and her side as us or we.
By creating an apparent division between the audience and herself, Thunberg intends to show that the audience's role is mostly as the ones who make and let the climate crisis happens.
Zhao and Li (2018) stated that material clauses state actual events, making the speech more objective and persuasive.
Similarly, Thunberg used material clauses to convince, inform, and influence people about the climate crisis and its dangers to the Summit audience.
According to table 1, the relational type occurs seventeen times.
The proportion of the process to the total clauses is 31.5%, making it the second-largest group after the material process.
The fundamental properties of ‘relational’ clauses derive from the nature of a ‘being’ configuration.
It concerns a sense of being, possessing, or becoming, which serves to characterize or to identify.
The clause that is realized as a relational process gives information about the phenomena and the participant's quality.
Thunberg demonstrates the changes through the relational process as in: (1) We are in the beginning of a mass extinction.
(2) With today's emissions levels, that remaining CO2 budget will be entirely gone within less than 8 1/2 years.
(3) The world had 420 gigatons of CO2 left.
According to Downing and Locke (2006), the relational process shows how a participant is characterized or identified.
In the speech, it is seen that Thunberg shows how climate change has been affecting the world and her life.
She identifies the climate crisis, such as the CO2 budget and the world’s condition, which will cause mass extinction.
She also characterizes the audience as both the victims and perpetrators.
The same as material processes, the relational process also offers the state of real events.
Thus, being the two-most frequent processes in Thunberg's speech, both material and relational processes help shape the speech to be objective and persuasive at the same time.
The third-largest clause in the speech is the mental clause.
“Mental” clauses are clauses of sensing.
It occurs nine times (16.7%) in the speech.
While ‘material’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the material world, ‘mental’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the world of our consciousness, such as thoughts, feelings, and perceptions.
A ‘mental’ clause construes a quantum of change in the flow of events in our consciousness.
The speech's mental clauses contain sensing verbs, such as; hear, understand, believe, refuse, pretend, want, and like.
(1) I do not want to believe that (2) …you understand the urgency (3) …I refuse to believe Mental processes are categorized into four types, such as perceptive, emotive, cognitive, and desiderative.
The mental processes that are employed in the speech are desiderative (want, refuse), perceptive (hear), emotive (like), and cognitive (understand, believe, pretend).
Thompson (2013) explained that cognitive mental processes are about deciding and understanding, desiderative ones are about “wanting”, perceptive mental processes are about sensing, while the emotive mental processes involve feelings.
The speaker expressed her perception that the audience was taking climate change too Karisa, A., & Lauwren, S. (2020).
A Transitivity Analysis of Greta Thunberg’s 2019 Climate Action Summit Speech.Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics, 7(2), 191-198.
196 easily.
She also wants to change the audience's perspective, who in her speech is considered ignorant of the changes.
Using clauses with mental processes, she also provoked guilt and responsibility as she pointed the audience as the actor that caused climate change.
Furthermore, Table 1 shows four behavioural processes, and the proportion to the total clauses is 7.4%.
This process places in the borderline of material and mental processes that represent the outer manifestations of inner workings, the acting out of consciousness, and physiological states.
Like the name itself, behavioural process concerns how people behave, consisting of both physiological and psychological experience.
Below is the clauses employing behavioural processes: (1) We'll be watching you.
(2) And if you choose to fail us.
(3) We will never forgive you.
(4) The world is waking up.
According to the clauses found in the speech, it can be proved that in behavioural process, Thunberg as a speaker is conscious of her being and the people that she represents in this speech, which are the children and people in general.
The verbs used in this behavioural process are mostly near mental.
It means that as well as provoking the feeling of guilt and responsibility as she pointed the audience as the actor that causes climate change, it is assumed that she will not stay quiet about people not doing anything to change their lifestyle so that the carbon emission can decrease.
Existential’ clauses constitute a minor type of process and are not very common in a text in general, other than on folktales.
That is why, in the data, there are only two existential clauses (3.7%).
The existential clauses are clauses of existing and happening.
They typically have the verb be.
Existential clauses are on the borderline between relational and material.
Despite resembling ‘relational’ clauses, the other verbs commonly occur are mainly different from either the ‘attributive’ or the ‘identifying’.
The existential clauses in the data were represented by the verb be and live.
Through an existential clause, the audience is informed of the current climate crisis and its causes.
Sharing the same amount of data as the existential, verbal process occurs twice in the data, and the proportion to the total clauses is 3.7%.
The verbal process is placed in the borderline of mental and relational.
However, unlike mental clauses, the verbal clause does not require a conscious participant.
As it is seen in the clause “you say you hear us and that you understand the urgency”; the subject “you” is unidentified.
Thunberg uses this clause to quote someone else that is assumed as the high-profile politician and the world leaders who say they care about climate change and want to change it.
However, in this speech, Thunberg shows that none of the promises has been granted.
CONCLUSION This research on Thunberg’s speech is applying transitivity process analysis and discovers that material processes dominate the text, represented by 37%.
The relational processes occupy 31.5% of the text, followed by mental processes presented by 16.7%.
Behavioural processes are represented through 7.4% of the text, followed by existential and verbal processes; both are represented by 3.7% of the data.
The study finds that the transitivity processes are used to inform the audience of the climate crisis's existing Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics Vol.
7, No.
2, December 2020.
E-ISSN: 2621-9158 P-ISSN:2356-0401 http://ejournal.umm.ac.id/index.php/celtic/index 197 problems, state the cause of climate change, and provoke the feeling of guilt and responsibility of climate crisis.
The material process is employed to describe the damage to people's environment, while the use of relational process describes the effects of climate change on the world and her life.
The mental process provokes guilt and responsibility, as she pointed the audience as the actor that causes climate change.
The behavioural process shows that Thunberg will not stay quiet on climate crisis when her generation is the one who will suffer from it.
The existential process is used to describe the existing problems, while verbal processes are used in quoting the high-profile politician to prove that none of their promises have been fulfilled.
This study undoubtedly has its limitation and still has much room for improvement.
This research does not analyze the circumstantial participant of ideational metafunction, which might add more enlightenment in analyzing the text's transitivity.
This research suggests that future researchers analyze the speech through other metafunctions in Hallidayan SFG, such as interpersonal and textual metafunctions.
REFERENCES Alter, C., Haynes, S., & Worland, J.
(2019).
Greta Thunberg: TIME’s Person of the Year 2019 | Time.
Retrieved 7 November 2020, from https://time.com/personof-the-year-2019-greta-thunberg/ Darani, L. H. (2014).
Persuasive Style and its Realization Through Transitivity Analysis: A SFL Perspective.
Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, 158, 179–186.
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.12.066 Downing, A., & Locke, P. J.
(2006).
English grammar: a university course (2. ed).
London: Routledge.
Retrieved from Gemeinsamer Bibliotheksverbund ISBN Eggins, S. (2004).
An introduction to systemic functional linguistics (2nd ed).
New York: Continuum.
Retrieved from Library of Congress ISBN Fridays for Future – How Greta started a global movement.
(2020).
Retrieved 7 November 2020, from https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/who-we-are/ Greta Thunberg: Why has she turned down an award?
CBBC Newsround.
(2019, October 30).
Retrieved 7 November 2020, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/50231684 Halliday, M. A. K., & Matthiessen, C. M. I. M. (2014).
Halliday’s introduction to functional grammar (Fourth Edition).
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Retrieved from Library of Congress ISBN Haq, A. S., Indrayani, L. M., & Soemantri, Y. S. (2020).
Attitudinal Meaning in Martin Luther King Jr Speech: A Functional Grammar Approach.
Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics, 7(1), 14. doi:10.22219/celtic.v7i1.12126 Harwiyati, R., & Siagianto, B. E. (2016).
Transitivity System on Joko Widodo’s Speech at the APEC CEO Summit on November 10th, 2014, in Beijing, China.
PREMISE JOURNAL:ISSN Online: 2442-482x, ISSN Printed: 2089-3345, 5(1).
doi:10.24127/pj.v5i1.430 Nugraha, I. S., & Mahdi, S. (2020).
Transitivity System on Building Character of Mr. Summers in The Lottery by Shirley Jackson.
Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics, 7(1), 35. doi:10.22219/celtic.v7i1.11980 Karisa, A., & Lauwren, S. (2020).
A Transitivity Analysis of Greta Thunberg’s 2019 Climate Action Summit Speech.Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics, 7(2), 191-198.
198 Thompson, G. (2013).
Introducing functional grammar (Third edition).
London: New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Retrieved from Library of Congress ISBN Witt, E. (2020, April 6).
How Greta Thunberg Transformed Existential Dread Into a Movement.
Retrieved 7 November 2020, from https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/how-greta-thunbergtransformed-existential-dread-into-a-movement Zhao, Y., & Li, F. (2018).
Transitivity Analysis of David Cameron’s Speech in Retaining Scotland.
International Journal of Language and Linguistics, 6(3), 70. doi:10.11648/j.ijll.20180603.13 Zhu, Y., & Li, F. (2018).
Transitivity Analysis of American President Donald Trump’s Inaugural Address.
International Journal of Literature and Arts, 6(2), 28. doi:10.11648/j.ijla.20180602.11
URN:NBN:fi:tsv-oa40867 DOI: 10.11143/40867 Communicating climate change – Learning from business: challenging values, changing economic thinking, innovating the low carbon economy KATHARINA KAESEHAGE, MICHAEL LEYSHON AND CHRIS CASELDINE Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon & Chris Caseldine (2014).
Communicating climate change – Learning from business: challenging values, changing economic thinking, innovating the low carbon economy.
Fennia 192: 2, pp.
81–99.
ISSN 1798-5617.
The risks and opportunities presented by climate change for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) have been largely overlooked by previous research.
The subsequent lack of knowledge in this field makes it difficult for SMEs to engage with climate change in a meaningful, profitable, and sustainable way.
Further, current research cannot explain why SMEs rarely engage with climate change.
We examine critically 30 SMEs, which engage with climate change knowledges and 5 Innovation-Support-Organizations (ISOs) that communicate climate change knowledges.
Over a three-year period we explore why and how these businesses approach the knowledge gap between climate change science and business practice, drawing on a variety of ethnographic research methods: (1) in-depth semi-structured and open interviews; (2) participant observations; and (3) practitioners’ workshops.
The results demonstrate that business’ mitigation and adaptation strategies are lay-knowledge-dependent, derived from personal values, space, and place identity.
To enhance the number of SMEs engaging with climate change, maximize the potential value of climate change for the economy and establish a low carbon economy, climate change communication needs to target personal values of business leaders.
The message should highlight local impacts of climate change, the benefits of engagement to (the local) society and economy, and possible financial benefits for the business.
Climate change communication therefore needs to go beyond thinking about potential financial benefits and scientific evidence and challenge values, cultures, and beliefs to stimulate economic, political, and social frameworks that promote values-based decision-making.
Keywords: United Kingdom, climate change, communication of science, business values, low carbon economy, ethnographic research Katharina Kaesehage, Michael Leyshon & Chris Caseldine, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Treliever Road, Penryn TR10 9EZ, United Kingdom.
E-mail: k.kaesehage@exeter.ac.uk Purpose: learning from businesses The risks and opportunities presented by climate change for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)1 have largely been overlooked by previous research.
Questions of how to communicate climate knowledge to SMEs have remained unanswered and consequently make it difficult for SMEs to engage with climate science in a meaningful, profitable, and sustainable way (cf.
Goodall 2008).
Contemporary research exploring the relationship between SMEs and climate change is very limited and does not adequately explain how businesses understand and interpret climate issues (cf.
Hoffman 2004, 2006; Hart 2007, Williams & Schaefer 2013).
The purpose of this paper therefore is to redress this imbalance by studying how business leaders of SMEs understand climate change and make climate change relevant to their individual decision-making.
Although it is difficult 82 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine to draw a definite distinction between intended and actual engagement as well as between climate change and broader environmental issues, we investigate the intentional engagement of business leaders with climate change only (cf.
Corner et al.
2014).
The study therefore investigates SMEs across sectors that are prepared to engage with the risks and potentials of climate change.
This is an important approach because a lack of innovation is often a result of looking too much to organizations that are wedded to current systems instead of looking to organizations that do things differently (Christensen et al.
2006).
Engagement with climate change refers to any behaviour a business associates with climate change and does not distinguish between mitigation and/ or adaptation, as ”both synergies and trade-offs exist between adaptation and mitigation options” but neither adaptation nor mitigation alone can prevent climate change related impacts (IPCC 2007: 61).
Importantly, this investigation does not seek to evaluate the effectiveness and appropriateness of mitigation and/or adaption actions that individual businesses adopt.
Instead, the sole focus is to understand the ways in which business leaders of SMEs make-sense of, and engage with, climate change within their business.
To unpick this diverse and individual engagement it is the sense-making of climate change, which shapes and is shaped by the actual engagement (Geoghegan & Brace 2011), on which this study focuses.
We only pay attention to (for-profit) SMEs because they are crucial to mitigate and adapt to climate change and initiate behaviour change among society: 99.9% of United Kingdom’s (UK) 4.9 million private sector businesses are SMEs employing 59% of the employed population (BIS 2013).
Businesses are said to be substantially linked to the UK’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; estimates link up to 50% of the UK’s GHG emissions to businesses (Rajgor & Malachowsk 2005).
The purpose of this study is to: (1) Explore how business leaders of SMEs across sectors conceptualize climate change to bring it within the decision-making process.
(2) Discover the factors that trigger business leaders to engage with climate change.
(3) Investigate how these motivations suit the current socio-economic system(s) and influence subsequent decision-making.
We will now outline the climate change and business challenge in respect to the extant literature and then explain the variety of ethnographic research tools we used to explore why and how SMEs approach the knowledge gap between climate change science and business practice.
The findings are structured in three sub-sections: firstly, we will demonstrate that climate change is a future issue, which the majority of ‘engaged SMEs’ have not yet materially been impacted by, making it difficult for business leaders to construct a link between possible future impacts of climate change and current economic activities; secondly, we will show that personal values of participating business leaders trigger engagement with climate change on behalf of their businesses; and thirdly, we will show that climate change is an ethical debate over values and culture (cf.
Hoffman 2012), which does not easily fit with current socio-economic and geopolitical systems.
We conclude that to enhance the number of SMEs engaging with climate change, maximize the potential value of climate change for the economy and establish a low carbon economy, climate change communication needs to target personal values of business leaders.
The message should highlight local impacts of climate change, the benefits of engagement to (the local) society and economy, and possible financial benefits for the business.
Climate change communication therefore needs to go beyond thinking about potential financial benefits and scientific evidence and challenge values, cultures, and beliefs to stimulate economic, political, and social frameworks that promote values-based decision-making.
Committed business leaders provide a valuable way to address such issues.
The climate change and business challenge Even though climate change is primarily a physical phenomenon, most recently defined as ”a change in the state of the climate that can be identified … by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period ….
… due to natural internal processes or external forcings” (IPCC 2013: 1450), it is a highly politicised issue that potentially has significant ramifications for the future lives of individuals (Boykoff et al.
2009).
Individuals ”can’t directly sense” climate change (Sarewitz & Pielke 2000: 56) as it is a FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 83Communicating climate change – Learning from business... scientific episteme to express a wide variety of physical processes.
The effects of climate change though will have material consequences for human systems (IPCC 2013).
Stern (2006: vi) estimates that, based on a variety of formal economic models, “the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5%” and up to 20% “of global GDP each year”.
The potential impact of climate change on the economy is considered by Porter and Reinhardt (2001: 3) who state: ”Periodically, major new forces dramatically reshape the business world – as globalization and the information technology revolution have been doing for the past several decades.
Climate change, in its complexity and potential impact, may rival them both.” Hoffman (2004) suggests these developments will force companies to reassess their overall strategy from capital resources to business culture so that they are in a position to mitigate climate-related costs and risks of ”shifting temperature and weather patterns, and … regulations that increase the cost of emissions” (Porter & Reinhardt 2007: 3).
The social nature of businesses combined with their fiscal resources means they are often better positioned than governments or societies to mitigate and adapt to climate change (Hart 2007).
The risks and opportunities posed by climate change to businesses, as well as their responsibilities as major greenhouse gas emitters and potential changemakers, have been a focus of recent research (cf.
Reinhardt & O’Neill Packard 2001; Hoffman 2004; Hart 2007; Porter & Reinhardt 2007; Patenaude 2011; Koomey 2012).
However, businesses rarely concern themselves with these issues (Hart 2007; Goodall 2008; Global Compact 2010; Patenaude 2011).
For example, more than 70% of global executives do not have emission targets (Enkvist & Vanthournout 2008) yet a survey by AXA showed that 50% of businesses view a move towards a low carbon economy as important (Carbon Neutral 2013).
These businesses however often fail to take action (Rajgor & Malachowski 2005).
SMEs are estimated to have a greater carbon saving potential than larger businesses, and could collectively save up to 2.5 million tons of CO2 per year in the UK (Eco-Monitor 2013).
Yet many SMEs do not recognize this potential (Carbon Neutral 2013).
Research on business engagement has demonstrated how companies find it difficult to engage with environmental issues (cf.
Tilley 1999; Vernon et al.
2003; Jenkins 2006; Revell & Blackburn 2007; Battisti & Perry 2011; Cassells & Lewis 2011).
Tilley (1999) for example identified poor eco-literacy and environmental awareness as major obstacles to pro-environmental practices.
Parker et al.
(2009) as well as Cassells and Lewis (2011) suggest that SMEs are unable to engage with long-term environmental concerns because they have to be present-oriented.
Hillary (2004) identified internal barriers, such as resources, understanding, and company culture, as well as external barriers, such as lack of support and guidance, as factors that hinder engagement with environmental issues.
A study conducted by Vernon et al.
(2003) on the tourism industry in Cornwall showed that small businesses feel that their environmental impact is negligible due to their size (cf.
also Cassells & Lewis 2011; Wilson et al.
2012), indeed SMEs are largely unaffected by environmental regulation (cf.
Carter 2007; Visser & Adey 2007).
Additionally, owner-managers of SMEs often pass their environmental responsibility on to the government (Cassells & Lewis 2011).
Revell and Blackburn (2007) and Tilley (1999) describe this as a value-action-gap in which owner-managers of SMEs believe that the environment is important, but choose not to act.
Actions around wider Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) are often associated with individual executives, and their personal values, beliefs, and attitudes (Aragón-Correa et al.
2004; Kerr 2006; Visser & Crane 2010).
These findings are not particularly surprising as shareholder, management, and ownership are closely related in SMEs, and business operations can therefore reflect the characteristics of the owner-manager (Vives 2006).
Williams & Schaefer (2013) most recently showed that managers of SMEs are driven by personal values and beliefs to engage with environmental and climate change related issues.
Although SMEs struggle to engage with environmental issues, it is however important to note that it is widely accepted that businesses are dependent on a healthy society, while society is dependent on well-functioning businesses to contribute to a prosperous economy through identifying ”the particular set of societal problems that it is best equipped to help resolve and from which it can gain the greatest competitive benefit” (Porter & Kramer 2006: 14).
84 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine Although the precise reasons for the lack of business engagement with climate change are currently poorly understood, we can infer three general trends in the climate change literature that point to a value-(in)action-gap.
First, climate change is a difficult concept to understand, indeed scientific interpretations and terminology are perceived as complex.
Climate change knowledges produce time-space temporalities that position the issue as a problem of somewhere else (Geoghegan & Brace 2011).
Second, climate change knowledge is perceived as a political project rather than a scientific discourse and thereby lacks credibility (Hoffman 2012).
Finally, business scholars are unaware of the nature and extent of potential climate change (Reinhardt & O’Neill Packard 2001; Goodall 2008; Patenaude 2011).
These broader issues influence business leaders’ perceptions of climate change.
Conceptualisations of climate change appear to instil an intellectual doubt about the purpose of individual action (Patenaude 2011: 267), as timescales of climate change projections are too distant for people to perceive it as an issue of individual importance (Houghton 2009; Geoghegan & Brace 2011).
The void between the impact of an individual’s actions and the issue of climate change can invoke feelings of being overwhelmed and helpless (Norgaard 2003).
To resolve this, Curtis and Schneider (2001) suggest that spatially specific information is needed on the vulnerability of specific population groups to allow them to think more specifically about climate change.
Yet as Hoffman (2012: 37) explains, even though a scientific consensus may exist – for example on the health risks associated with smoking – it is ”through a process of political, economic, social, and legal debate over values and beliefs, a social consensus” will arise.
Knowledge of an issue alone does not lead to behaviour change (cf.
Hulme 2009).
Instead climate change understanding is shaped by lay knowledge, ”by the associations of the climate in everyday lives …” and are ”circulated – modified by a perhaps tangential, infrequent, incomplete, partial encounter with ‘science’” (Geoghegan & Brace 2011: 294).
Geoghegan and Brace (2011: 295−96) call for a more open understanding of climate change, to set ”aside the relatively deterministic understandings of climate and the ways it might change offered by the natural sciences” allowing an understanding of ”how it might be grounded and localized through the concept of familiar – embodied, practised and lived”.
As individuals ”do not have a set of socially accepted beliefs on climate change” (Hoffman 2012: 32), any attempt to understand and interpret climate change knowledge requires a thorough ”political, economic, social, and legal debate over values and beliefs” through which social consensus emerges (Hoffman 2012: 37).
Social consensus is contingent upon shared mutually constituted understandings around an event or series of issues.
Hoffman (ibid.)
suggests that individuals are rationally bounded through their own personal experiential ideology, which is formed by their personal belief systems.
Debates surrounding climate change are therefore not based solely on the reception, interpretation, and understanding of scientific evidence, but also on the production of personal values, ideologies, and culture.
Values are often considered a ”guiding principle in the life of a person” or presenting an ”abstract set of moral principles” to only show some of the “multiple conceptions of human values that exist across these multiple literatures” (Corner et al.
2014: 412-413).
Corner et al.
(2014: 418) conclude that clusters of values around self-transcendent and altruistic ideas ”are strongly predictive of positive engagement with climate change”.
Hoffman and Jennings (2012) state that such ‘ideological filters’ are being ignored in climate change debates, and Hoffman (2010) further suggests that climate change-related policies should target the way business leaders think and how their values could be changed.
He thinks that there needs to be a shift in the values that guide our decision-making more widely in society and not just in businesses.
Critiques of personal value systems are evident in the work of both Rorty (1989) and Glass (1993).
Hekman’s (1999: 19) interpretation of Rorty’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity suggests that ”embracing a non-essentialist position need not cause any problems for the coherency of individual actions”.
More specifically, Rorty (1989) argues that beliefs – referents of an individual’s ideological position – are the organising foundations of regulatory regimes that determine actions, “even if those who hold them are aware that they are caused by nothing deeper than contingent circumstances” (Hekman 1999: 19).
Individuals therefore formulate belief systems they believe to be stable, solid, and truthful to themselves, which can be affirmed by everyday actions and not necessarily founded on contingent scientific interpretations of future climate scenarios.
Individuals act on the basis that they know a deep self, which in turn is FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 85Communicating climate change – Learning from business... predicated on firm and believable interpretations of the world around them.
It is for some of these reasons, where underlying “culturally embedded assumptions, imaginations, and practices” occur, that climate change communication can never be ”effective communication per se” but only offer an opportunity for someone’s “own logic of participation” (Nerlich et al.
2010: 106−107).
Patenaude (2011) and Goodall (2008) suggest that the business community is not treated as an audience of interest, while climate change equally is neglected by business schools.
Patenaude (2011) found that climate change issues are not addressed in business schools, which create future business leaders who are climate illiterate.
Goodall (2008) discovered that leading business journals fail to address climate change in their articles: only three out of the top-30 management journals listed in ISI Web of Knowledge addressed climate change or global warming in article titles during the 1992– 2008 period inclusively.
Businesses replace climate change with environmental issues that are directly experienced and, consequently, perceived as more important (Reinhardt & O’Neill Packard 2001: 3; Goodall 2008; Patenaude 2011; Wolf & Moser 2011): ”While many companies may still think of global warming as a corporate social responsibility issue, business leaders need to approach it in the same hard-headed manner as any other strategic threat or opportunity.” Instead, engagement with climate change is considered by many businesses as a matter of CSR.
The idea of CSR is to enable businesses to meet the expectations and needs of a society whilst making a profit (Carroll 1991; Loew et al.
2004).
However, Porter and Reinhardt (2001: 1-2) point out that climate change is too ”tangible and certain” to be addressed by such a philanthropic approach.
They suggest a strategic approach, allowing mitigating climate change-related costs and reducing vulnerability to the effects of climate change, is needed.
Method This study examines critically over a 3-year time period 30 SMEs across sectors in Cornwall, UK, which engage with climate change knowledge and 5 Innovation-Support-Organizations (ISOs)2 which communicate climate change knowledge.
Cornwall, a county in the South West of the UK (Fig.
1) with a population of about 537,400 (SQW 2012), was together with the Isles of Scilly classified as an ‘Objective One’ region by the European Union (EU) in 2000 (Cornwall Council 2013).
Cornwall therefore received significant support through EU Convergence funding until 2013, which led to the current 2014 EU Growth Programme.
25,495 of the 25,540 Value-Added Tax (VAT) and/or Pay As You Earn (PAYE) based enterprises in Cornwall were classified as SMEs in 2012, of which 84% had four or less employees3 (Office of National Statistics 2012).
The majority of Cornish businesses are active in agriculture, forestry and fishing, retail, construction as well as accommodation and food services, sectors, which are closely linked to the natural environment.
This can be explained by the county’s natural resources and attractions: Cornwall has a coastline of 697 km and the majority of its landscape is classified as an ”Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty” (AONB) (Cornwall Council 2011).
Cornwall is expected to experience an increased frequency of changes in temperature and precipitation (Murphy et al.
2009).
Under a medium emissions scenario, the central estimate of increase in winter mean temperature in the South West by 2050 is 2.1 °C; it is very unlikely to be less than 1.1 °C and is very unlikely to be more than 3.2 °C (ibid.).
Under the same scenario, the central estimate of increase in summer mean temperature in the South West by 2050 is 2.7 °C; it is very unlikely to be less than 1.3 °C and is very unlikely to be more than 4.6 °C.
Relative sea-level at Newlyn (Cornwall) is expected to increase with respect to 1990 by 24.5 cm by 2050 according to the medium emissions scenario (UKCP 2009).
To identify SMEs in Cornwall that engage with climate change, an actor-network approach was taken.
The researchers therefore took part in a variety of formal and informal business networks and climate change related business events.
We also conducted open interviews with key informants on the general business infrastructure and climate change activities of businesses and ISOs in Cornwall.
This actor-network approach served as a tool to gather an overview of the local climate change and business community identifying key issues and knowledge, therefore establishing ”a preliminary research net” (Crang & Cook 2007: 17).
Knowing to whom we would gain access was therefore unpredictable and scheduling the data collection in advance was very difficult.
This ”controlled opportunism” allowed evolving research where research is non-linear and data collection and 86 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine theory are not separate (Eisenhardt 1989: 539).
A few selected SMEs were also contacted directly due to their known reputation to be engaging with climate change.
The participating SMEs are therefore from across sectors and vary in size, from one-person micro businesses to businesses with up to 250 employees.
30 business leaders and 29 representatives from government and ISOs participated in the study.
This allowed us to: (1) explore climate change knowledge from the communication and business side alike; and (2) uncover the complex construct around climate change formed by individual experiences and social processes (see also Eisenhardt 1989; Winchester & Rofe 2010; Hulme 2011; Hoffman 2012).
This approach revealed norms, power structures, and expectations in this societal context (Dowling 2010), and emphasized the relational reality of business decision-making in SMEs through looking at the ”own logic of participation” of businesses (Nerlich et al.
2010: 107).
To answer the research questions we draw on empirical evidence derived through qualitative research methods of: (1) in-depth semi-structured and open interviews; (2) participant observations; and (3) practitioners’ workshops.
This paper mainly draws on the qualitative research data derived from the semi-structured interviews and open interviews.
We explore why and how SMEs approach the gap that exists between climate change science and business engagement grounded in the diverse literature of climate change science communication and business studies.
The semi-structured and open interviews focused on: (1) the understanding of business leaders of climate change knowledge; (2) sense-making of this knowledge to allow decision-making; and (3) the reasons for the engagement with climate change.
We used open Fig.
1.
Location of Cornwall.
FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 87Communicating climate change – Learning from business... questions to allow participants to speak about issues not necessarily addressed by the interview questions and to emphasize issues that they perceived as important.
The semi-structured interviews therefore allowed us to understand the reality of climate change and business as perceived by the participants.
Transcripts and field notes were initially sorted into different themes according not only to the research questions but also according to themes the participants and observations had identified.
The themes were then analysed in respect to the business characteristics and the business environment.
After the data were coded within their respective themes, we used content analysis to look into the research questions in more detail.
After having received a first impression of the data through mapping the answers into different themes and subthemes in Excel, we established a detailed content analysis.
Climate change as a future issue Our qualitative research undertaken identified that the physical impacts of climate change are a future concern for SMEs.
The majority of ‘engaged SMEs’ have not yet materially/physically been impacted by climate change; however, the business leaders construct a current link between possible future impacts of climate change, economic activities and well-being.
Only two from 30 interviewed SMEs state that their businesses have experienced physical climate change impacts.
One of the business leaders of these two businesses explains that her hotel is located at the edge of a beach on the north coast of Cornwall, and experienced severe flooding to one of their main buildings during a storm event.
She explains: " … because of where we are on this beach we are completely at the mercy of the weather.
It impacts us so much that we can’t escape climate change.
….
Our … restaurant on the beach got washed away a few years ago in a massive storm.
We had just finished refurbishing it and then had a really big storm with a really high tide and it took it out completely.
It was devastating.
We lost that and a big chunk of our business and then had to rebuild it.
Obviously the insurance for that is now very different to what it was.
If that would happen again we couldn't afford to rebuild it.” (AY.H., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) This business leader makes sense out of climate change through interpreting what she believes climate change could be whether or not it might just be natural climate variability.
Extreme storm events are attributed to climate change and enable the business leader to develop an understanding of what this climate change would mean for their future business activities.
What this business leader describes here as engaging with climate change is often understood as being able to cope with e.g.
environmental external stresses and thus becoming resilient to future stresses (Gallopín 2006).
The quote also displays that the SME experienced financial costs such as the expense of rebuilding flooded property or having to pay higher insurance premiums, but also experience the ‘un-situated’ climate change risks (Hulme et al.
2009: 201) in a very specific, local, and individual shape.
Physical climate change impacts give SMEs a specific way of knowing this “messy, non-linear and diffuse” (Boykoff et al.
2009: 1) issue and at the same time triggering specific future fears.
A storm event gives business leaders an idea of how this “critical yet unexamined” (Geoghegan & Brace 2011: 291) future might look as not only policies, intermediaries or scientists ”beat a path through events still to come” (Fish 2009: 2−3).
Although the other 28 interviewed SMEs indicate that they had not materially experienced climate change, they explain that they can see climate change as being relevant to them in the future through impacting socio-economic systems: ”Climate change may affect us where the wheat crops are growing because we need it for our process.
If we can’t get it, that will affect us.
Our head brewer definitely looks at these things.
Prices get affected.
They have to buy years ahead.” (RN.F., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) Most participants go on to explain the links they can see between their business and the natural environment.
This business leader for example understands climate change through his business practices and how these are placed in the environment: ”Our business is very aware of climate change and the impact it can have on our local environment and on the things that so many of our customers come to visit us; the beaches, the green grass for walking, enjoying the area around.
There was an article on BBC today that people love being by the seaside and that it improves wellbeing.
That's one of the reasons people come to us; be88 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine cause we can give this experience.
If we don't take care of our environments then people won’t come back for it.
It keeps us a business and we are very linked with our environments, our surroundings and the impacts of climate change whether it’s drought or rise in sea level.” (CE.B., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) It is clear that even businesses that have not materially experienced climate change can still make the link between possible impacts of climate change and business continuity.
Whether or not a storm event or change in crop growth is actually connected to climate change is irrelevant for these decision makers.
Business leaders create their own understanding of what climate change is and could be, where the exact definition of this largely physical phenomenon does not play much of a role.
The actual sense-making processes create a form of life for climate change.
This is a description that stems from Wittgenstein (1958), who explains that words find their meanings through use within a societal setting and are not in need of a precise definition.
These businesses reassess their business operations regardless of specific known impacts and instead treat climate change similar to an innovation that is important to take without knowing specific outcomes, an ability many businesses lack, as Hoffman (2004) suggests.
These findings also show that for these SMEs mitigation and adaptation strategies on climate change shape and are shaped by lay knowledge, which go ”beyond science as a community of practice and scientists as the producers and arbiters of a particular kind of knowledge” (Geoghegan & Brace 2011: 293), and that the actual encounters with climate change are very context-dependent, complex, and diverse.
It also confirms Geoghegan and Brace ’s (2011: 297) assumption that climate change is ”a relational phenomenon that needs to be understood on a local level, attending to its distinctive spatialities and temporalities” (Geoghegan & Brace 2011: 297).
Our findings suggest that knowing climate change goes beyond knowing scientific facts and is instead ”constructed through memory, observation and conversation” (Leyson & Geoghegan 2012: 64).
Most businesses view climate change more as an opportunity to prepare for the unknown than a risk, while placing climate change in the wider complexity of socio-economic system(s).
The data also suggest that especially businesses that do not fear the direct material force of climate change have more opportunistic and positive associations with climate change.
Businesses in our study view climate change as a futurity that might impact the business indirectly through growing energy prices, changing supply, and demand conditions.
The participants refer to how they have adapted their business models to the possible future implications of climate change.
This business leader explains how he envisions the future: ”When we made this place, we designed it to be used in a number of ways.
We might have refugees and not tourists in the future.” (CS.J., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) He also explained how he deals with these ”distant futures” (Geoghegan & Brace 2011: 292): “There is a massive gap between understanding the world for what it is and what you would like it to be.
We don't have a crystal ball.
The things that we would really like to know, nobody can ever tell us.
When will we have a good summer, or from where can we import things in the future?
So it’s more about enforcing the things that we know about – reduced availability of resources and working around that.
That should make you more resilient to impacts of climate change.” (CS.J., Business Leader 2012) We can see here that businesses confront climate change and make it their ‘own’ to fit decision-making processes, business strategies, and worldviews.
Climate change engagement it about how making the change in the climate relevant to someone’s everyday decisions.
Lewontin (1992: 86) describes such approaches as having a “constructionist view of life”; business leaders and their organizations “construct their environment out of bits and pieces” (ibid.)
as organisms do in order to be able to cope with the complex, ever-changing, and uncertain nature of climate change.
Business leaders act similarly to this to be able to adapt to the changing environment through imagining futures while accepting that the science is incomplete.
Another business leader explicitly expresses that even though they have not been materially impacted by climate change he still engages with it.
”Climate change hasn't impacted us.
….
Scientists can measure it but as normal human beings we would have to experience climate change.
It requires a certain leap of faith and insight to actually be able to say that this is how the world is going to be in 50 years time.
But it’s difficult for us.
The simple thing for us to understand is that if you keep using stuff, it will run out.” (SN.T., Business Leader & Government Worker, interviewed in 2012) FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 89Communicating climate change – Learning from business...
He continues to express what some other business leaders have expressed in the interviews: business leaders whose businesses are not directly dependent on the natural environment believe that often the market with its customers does not yet demand a business to mitigate, and/or adapt to, climate change, but should do and soon will do.
“Customers do not demand the green agenda in tourism.
It doesn't really make a difference to customers.
….
We think we should and put resources into it.
There is no demand now, but we think it is an investment in the future.
After customers have been to one of our houses they might be more aware next time.
….
Then there is a commercial driver in the future.” (SN.T., Business Leader & Government Worker, interviewed in 2012) This shows that even though climate change has not “manifested itself physically yet” (Leyson & Geoghegan 2012: 57) for most business leaders climate change can encompass high current relevance.
The above data show business leaders connect diverse issues with climate change not commonly understood as climate change related: crop growth, insurance premiums, electricity costs, environmental assets.
They link these to (risk) planning, profitability, and economic costs but perceive climate change as a future issue, less of a current concern, more as an opportunity than a threat.
These results contradict Norgaard’s (2006) findings, which suggest that people avoid thinking about climate change as it makes them feel helpless, guilty, and threatened.
Wilson (1997) links information behaviour to social cognitive theory, where selfefficacy determines behaviour, derived from the field of psychology.
He refers to Bandura (1977: 193) who states that ”the strength of people's convictions in their own effectiveness is likely to affect whether they will even try to cope with given situations”.
He therefore hypothesizes “that one of the motives for information-seeking is to gain information to improve one's self-efficacy in coping with problems of whatever kind”.
The businesses examined in the study might feel that they have enough self-efficacy to engage with climate change.
Placing this in relation to their personal values on climate change means then that their situation and identity do not negatively relate to their ”standard of living.
….
To recognize greenhouse gases as a problem requires us to change a great deal about how we view the world and ourselves within it” (Hoffman 2012: 33).
It also shows that they create lay knowledge on climate change through their imagination of how reality ought to be.
The findings emphasise that having the capability to mitigate and/or adapt to climate change, in this case through the engagement of the businesses, creates a positive and opportunistic outlook on climate change.
This confirms Rogan et al.’s (2005) findings that people feel satisfied, encouraged, and experience positive self-esteem about themselves and climate change when having been involved in environmental conservation or restoration experiences.
Climate change is primarily a future issue, the importance of which can already be understood and lead to engagement in the present.
Engagement due to personal values 97% of the participating business leaders indicate that their initial trigger to make climate change relevant to the business is related to their personal values.
The following business leader explains why he started engaging with climate change: ”I guess it was personal interest and personal conviction which kind of span out to have business benefits as well.
….
Initially it was my personal interest but the more you get into it the more you see the business benefit.” (MK.P., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) His personal interest in climate change triggered his initial engagement and then created a business benefit.
Most other business leaders show very similar links between their initial engagement and their personal values.
These findings show that personal values determine decision-making in SMEs and that engaged business leaders fulfil their role as leaders, which Dunphy et al.
(2007: 322) describe as being a “…source of influence in a complex changing reality.
Nevertheless let us not underestimate the potential; transformative power that we represent”.
This supports recent research that too often business literature and current climate change communication assume self-interested, profit-maximizing individuals lead businesses (cf.
Hoffmann & Jennings 2012; Corner 2014).
Instead, decision making on climate change is strongly linked to individuals.
The following business leader explains the closeness between personal values and decision-making in SMEs: 90 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine “There are more and more personal convictions (driving business decisions).
Smaller businesses have that flexibility.
A director of a small business can take that business with him, whereas a bigger business finds that difficult.” (TY.S., Representative from an ISO, interviewed in 2012) These findings provide evidence that some people invest in supporting pre-existing beliefs (Hoffman 2012) when engaging with climate change.
However, personal convictions of participating businesses leaders are only the initial trigger and financial aspects do play a role.
One of the business leaders explains this.
He believes that engaging with climate change requires a business leader to be opportunistic and can only be driven by personal values: ”I think it’s one of those issues that, to make it part of your core business, you have to be very passionate about it.
Unless people find that passion they won’t see the relevance.
It is really down to personal passion for such an issue.
Making that bolt move to have it part of your business…can be quite difficult.
People don't see the relevance and care for it.
….
I think it’s personal interest and financial sense.
.... We would not have built our hotel in the way it is if sustainability had not been a key passion for the directors and a vision to future proof ourselves.” (AY.H., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) Another business leader explains that often engagement with climate change does not immediately create benefits for the business, but that through his engagement driven by his personal interest business benefits were created: “In terms of how that works with our business is that, in some respects, it doesn't.
It’s something that I was just really interested in – looking at how we can become more sustainable as a company.
But from that, it actually created business opportunities for us.
….
It was something that we wanted to do because we felt like we should be doing it.
It’s given us business benefits at the same time.
So to begin with it was my own conviction, ….
I guess it was personal interest and personal conviction which kind of span out to have business benefits as well.” (MK.P., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) Personal convictions allow business leaders to be opportunistic/innovate beyond what they would normally practise.
Only later does this behaviour yield financial benefits.
Kotter (2001) however suggests leaders often fail to cope with change because they feel powerless.
Norgaard (2006) similarly suggests that people avoid thinking about climate change as it makes them feel helpless, guilty, and threaten their individual and collective sense of identity.
The helplessness expressed in our study is less related to the personal level, but more to problems of understanding climate change science, accessing, and translating information.
There is here no evidence for a value-action-gap between engagement of SMEs and the values of business leaders.
One of the few studies on the motivations of SME leaders to engage with climate change has also shown that the decision to engage with climate change through business practices is due to personal values (Williams & Schaefer 2013).
Business leaders often derive their personal interest in climate change related issues through personal experiences.
This business leader explains: ”When I grew up, there were hardly any trees around here.
It really would not grow.
It was so windy, and so much salt in the air.
The climate has certainly changed.
The predominant winds are no longer so much from the South West.
They are much more variable and it is amazing for me to see what is growing around here where there wasn't very much at all.
I think that is quite noticeable.
We all know that we are getting much more weather extremes as well.
Some of the rainstorms.
You get so much rain.” (IN.D., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) In the family-run SMEs of our study the business leaders are able to ‘experience’ climate change, which ”is difficult to grasp” due to “… an accumulation of data over a timeframe that is perhaps a generation in length” (Geoghegan & Brace 2011: 291).
This is due to the fact that through running a business over several generations business leaders are able to ‘experience’ climate variability as it has perhaps impacted the business in the past.
Experiences and knowledge passed down through generations, enable businesses to overcome the immediate timescales of human behaviour to grasp climate change as an issue of individual importance (cf.
Hulme et al.
2009; Geoghegan & Brace 2011).
The business leader continues: ”I guess I’ve been interested in energy, insulation, and climate change since I was a student.
My dad started this business, now I run it and even my son works here.” (IN.D., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 91Communicating climate change – Learning from business...
This business leader describes here what Leyshon and Geoghegan (2012: 58) term a ”familiarity with place” that results from ”a daily encounter with” climate change.
To construct climate change through remembering and imagining the past in relation to a particular place is similar to Rogan et al.’s (2005) findings that people use places as reference points to the past to understand the environment.
Business leaders from family-run SMEs feel very attached to the business and their local community.
It is part of their identity to take care of the environment and society around them.
These SMEs have the ability/advantage to conceptualize climate change as a potential threat to their business activities, self and space overcoming the disproportion of ”scale between climate change and individual actions” (Patenaude 2011: 267) and the much discussed feeling of helplessness.
For these ‘engaged SMEs’ imagining the future poses less of a problem as they are able to overcome the ”inability to conceptualize time beyond the periodic frame of our own lifetimes, or even a generation, and to imagine distant futures in which the climate might be altered” (Geoghegan & Brace 2011: 292) via imagining an infinite lifetime for the business.
These suggestions are confirmed by similar statements from other business leaders: ”I fell into it because I was a corporate finance lawyer and one client was one of these climate change businesses.
Suddenly it clicked.
I was always fairly aware.
…..
But then I had small children and suddenly I was doing something for which I could use my discipline and expertise and actually believe in it.
It made more sense.
….
I have a more generic interest in sustainability that comes from me living down here for 30 years, amongst a community where I bring up the next generation of two daughters who might want to do the same job.” (KE.A., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) Some other business leaders draw a link between business engagement, education and intergenerationality.
This business leader for example describes how his peer-businesses are driven by the personal values and education of individuals: ”… it's the responsibility of the owner of the business.
It comes down to if the owner believes climate change is an important part.
I think in Cornwall there are many of those because they see it.
Somebody like Tom for example has a strong belief in being involved in lots of different things.
He enters it at the strategic level and then tells his staff.
So rather than taking his staff of the core business he’ll do it and then rely on his core business to be run by staff.
If Tom is concerned about climate change, then how does he influence change?
….
Personal choice and personal decision play a major part!
If you change the structure of a business then education is probably as important.
How important is climate change?
That’s based on education.” (AW.W., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) The business leader explains that engagement with climate change is linked to individual businesses leaders and their values.
Additionally, their personal interest is linked to previous education on climate change.
For another business leader it is however the changes in the environment that he perceives and experiencing with those changes that allow engagement: ”I see the changes and I respond to them on a small level but also through my own experience.
Trying plants in certain areas.
In a way I’m doing my own primary research.
I’m an environmental business.” (ME.W., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) Our findings therefore support Hulme et al.’s (2009: 197) belief that climate change finds its form through experiences, social learning, and cultural interpretation, and emphasises that its actual meaning is ”informed by emotion, memory and a sense of place that comes in part from familial ties” (Leyson & Geoghegan 2012).
Such business leaders have lay knowledge on climate change accumulated over generations and enabling development of a personal and individual understanding of climate change, not just in terms of time but also local space.
This allows business leaders to imagine this social, unexperiencable construct of climate change over ”past, present and future” (Leyson & Geoghegan 2012: 59).
The data show that personal values and experiences are important to understand climate change while also constructing determinants on whether or not to let climate change play a role in decision-making processes.
Interestingly, several studies have previously shown that people struggle to follow up personal values on climate change (cf.
Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002; Whitmarsh et al.
2011).
Tilley (1999) demonstrates that owner-managers of small firms struggle to follow up environmental attitudes with environmental practices.
She suggests that it is difficult for businesses to associate business practice with environmental damage, but that more importantly a conflicting message on envi92 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine ronmental solutions causes this gap.
For our research however participant’s values lead to action.
Our continuous interaction with the business leaders over a three-year period showed that the majority of business leaders demonstrate true commitment to, and action on, these values.
The business leaders regularly take part in climate change related business meetings, attend climate change related events by ISOs, and actively develop mitigation and adaptation actions within their businesses.
Of the 30 participating businesses, 86% mitigate climate change through, for example, using renewable energies, waste management, and/ or giving employees incentives to reduce their work related carbon footprint.
97% of the businesses adapt to climate change by adjusting, and/ or developing new products and services, and 90% of the businesses also communicate the need for mitigation and adaptation strategies to the local communities, other businesses and their employees.
This importance of personal values for climate change engagement is emphasized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) latest integration of philosophers within its panel.
The philosopher Broome (BBC 2013; see Broome 2012) stated recently in a BBC Radio 4 interview that integrating values in the climate change debate challenges the basis on which to argue as it raises moral questions.
For some SMEs the choice between profit and climate change starts with a moral one.
Why do some SMEs decide to ignore climate change?
One could suggest that they simply have the wrong values, because values, according to Broome, see that there might be a disadvantage to someone or something else through e.g.
emitting carbon (cf.
BBC 2013).
Personal values and experiences in respect to the communication and engagement of climate change have rarely been considered in studies of business engagement with climate change.
Hoffmann and Jennings (2012) point out that the main route to engage businesses with climate change is through pricing carbon, based on the principle of ‘homo economicus’ ignoring issues on decision-making or values.
Our findings presented here criticize this type of climate change communication, which traditionally presents climate change on premises that: first, SMEs understand climate change in absolute terms instead of through individual and very personal narratives; second, SMEs are institutions mainly driven by pure profit maximization; and third, lessons learned from other disciplines on behaviour change or climate change communication are irrelevant.
The findings further confirm existing criticism that ideas on business engagement with climate change are too scientific (Hoffman 2004; Goodall 2008).
We suggest that climate change must be brought to businesses through creative ideas and addressing values and beliefs.
The background of the business leader can therefore explain this personal conviction as many of the interviewed business leaders show the following characteristics: (1) a strong feeling of identity to a specific location/region; (2) being educated about and aware of the relevance of climate change; (3) the ability to experience and conceptualize climate change beyond our own lifetime through the lifespan of the business.
Business engagement with climate change within current socio-economic systems While the above findings show that personal values of businesses leaders can trigger engagement with climate change on behalf of businesses, business leaders struggle to manifest those values within the current socio-economic system(s).
More than half of the interviewed business leaders discuss greater societal concerns when being questioned on climate change engagement.
This business leader explains that his company aims to create a better world: “My business has a very strong social objective and that is to make the world a better place.
… And the environment is a very important part of that.
… it’s not just about dealing with the issue as a global warming issue, it’s about looking at things like the motivations in people’s lives.” (RT.W., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) Climate change is seen as connected to other societal and economic choices people make.
The business leader explains that he views climate change as an issue interconnected to how he sees himself and his interests: ”I’ve been interested in climate change for years; actually about 10 years.
I’m very interested in W. F. Schumacher.
So that got me thinking many years ago about choosing more for less and that we are living on an unsustainable path.
I’m very interested in environmental issues.
I tend to see it as a social issue.” (RT.W., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 93Communicating climate change – Learning from business...
Most of the other business leaders also stress their awareness of the link between business success, society, and the environment.
Another business leader explains that he aims to create social change through his climate change engagement.
He tries to stimulate adaptation and mitigation activities in the wider business community and society (cf.
Hoffman 2012).
”The main idea with our company is our passive activism.
The way we engage with climate change allows our clients to open their eyes a bit more to the idea that they could make a difference.
….
We talk about climate change but actually it’s about social change as well.
Understanding what you are part of.” (MT.H., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) These two business leaders emphasised an understanding of the embeddedness of businesses within both society and the natural environment.
This fits with the growing belief that businesses are responsible for, and dependent on, a healthy society.
Participating SMEs show that they want to create physical, social, as well as mental well-being (Sangmeister 2009), while aiming to create profits that simultaneously raise the quality of life (Brundtland 1987; Hart 2007).
The quotes also express the desire of the business leaders to be responsible citizens.
Engagement with climate change allows them to do so and endorse their personal identity.
Most of the participating business leaders express a need for change in the UK’s culture on consumption and tackling climate change.
This participant expresses: ”I think we are uneducated.
We don't seem to approach things.
I had quite a lot to do with Germany – friends, skiing, etc..
I did pick up a feel for the way younger people were thinking about climate change.
It’s sad that our society is not at all interested in this.” (IN.D., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) The data indicate that business leaders believe climate change is not accepted/integrated in the current political and economic system(s) due to the UK’s culture and society.
This business leader sees an important responsibility for changing political and economic system(s) coming from society through changing values: ”I think, it’s culture.
….
We want more and buy more and actually the way our society functions is fuelled by credit.
… We’ve got this culture to work really hard for reward and then we spend all of it; play hard.
That is not sustainable.
It’s not the key to happiness.
The key to happiness is probably to be more resourceful.
….
But we don't get that in our country.
….
What needs to happen is for communities and businesses driving it forward.
….
We are talking about businesses and communities.
Everyone.
….
Climate change is exactly the same.” (RT.W., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) While he explains that society has an important framing role for political and economic framework(s), some business leaders go on to request a shift in the country’s culture.
This business leader explains the urgent need for a culture change which should be driven by businesses and governments alike: ”I think there are a lot of small businesses who want to be more responsible and when those companies grow that will bring a culture change.
We have to change how we are doing business.
It will be ripples from bottom to top, top to bottom, until it’s all mainstream.” (CE.R., Business Leader, interviewed in 2012) The above show that engagement with climate change is difficult for SMEs due to the current way businesses are thought to behave and the political and economic system(s) in which they are embedded, despite their desire to protect the economy and society.
For these business leaders climate change has entered their belief system, something Hoffman (2012) raises in his article ‘Climate science as culture war’, where he (ibid.
: 33) points out that climate change really is a debate over “values, worldviews, and ideology” and suggests (ibid.
: 32) that people adopt a view on issues, that ”reflect their identity, worldview, and belief systems” to reinforce the connection with their referent groups and to strengthen their definition of self.
The evidence from our interviews presented here suggests that the wider belief system of individual business leaders reinforces the engagement with climate change.
In the case of Cornwall where economic actors emphasise the importance of personal relationships and where, according to this business leader, “a sense of place …” exists and, “… businesses go into things naturally”, the informal and formal networks of personal relationships encourage such a climate change belief system.
These ‘engaged SMEs’ have managed to establish “a set of socially accepted beliefs on climate change; beliefs that emerge, not from individual preferences, but from societal norms” (Hoffman 2012: 32) around them.
Climate change en94 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine gagement and the associated communication should be connected with a sense of place and the wider (business) community.
Rogan et al.
(2005) support this claim through their study on the relationship between sense of place and a changing natural environment.
They found that there is a growing sense of responsibility towards the local environment especially when people can link the place to family experiences.
This sense of belonging brings a sense of responsibility leading to engagement with the environment, which then fulfils people’s own goals (Rogan et al.
2005).
Our findings deliver new insights that climate change is an ethical debate over values and culture, something that must be learned, not only for the communication of climate change, but also the modelling of climate scenarios and scientific debates about geoengineering.
This shows signs of a long needed change to realize more long-term and meaningful mitigation and adaptation to climate change, something Jackson (2009) describes as ”prosperity without growth”, criticizing the current model of economic success based on ”relentless consumption growth” (Jackson 2009: 489) making combating climate change impossible, while calling for a more “sophisticated form of capitalism” (Porter & Kramer 2011: 12).
Business leaders that engage with climate change have a high responsibility for the environment and society due to being in a leadership position wanting to “do business while doing good”.
Conclusion and recommendations This paper has addressed the lacuna of work on how business leaders of SMEs conceptualize climate change and how their understanding of climate science influences their decision-making and business practice.
This research approached the topic from the perspectives of SMEs and in particular focused on how they understand and make sense of climate change.
Methodologically this enabled us to gather context-dependent insights into why some businesses manage to engage with climate change.
Through this we examined critically Geoghegan and Brace's (2011: 297) request for a more relational approach towards climate change “that needs to be understood on a local level, attending to its distinctive spatialities and temporalities”.
The study illustrates that business leaders’ mitigation and adaptation strategies are shaped through their personal lay knowledge on climate change and do not appear to be formulated through interpreting specific scientific knowledge and/or business reasoning.
This occurs for two main reasons, first, climate change decision-making is often predicated upon an individual’s identity and value systems (these are often elided in the business studies literature), and second, decision-making is focused on wealth creation for the business.
In this paper we have demonstrated that climate change is a(n) (un)known futurity for SMEs.
Business leaders conceptualize climate change through both imaginative and experiential lenses positioning their businesses in relation to past and future existence(s) (Geoghegan & Brace 2011).
Those business leaders who believed they had the capability to make a difference to climate change had a more positive and opportunistic outlook towards adapting to potential change.
In this way, climate change is a very individual, sense-making process for businesses.
Business leaders understand and situate climate change within personal values and belief systems to produce their own personal lay knowledge of climate change, which in turn influence their decision-making.
Glass (1993) provides perhaps the single most important critique of the way value systems are constructed.
He argues that they are not fragmented, ruptured, fluid or forever in the process of becoming, as this is predicated on disorientation, disembeddedness, rootlessness, and sense of being incomplete.
Instead, Glass makes a strong case for the unity of self-knowledge as a necessary requirement for leading any version of a good and satisfying life.
A stable value system for Glass (1993: 48) is necessary because it enables individuals to locate themselves in the world: ”it defines emotional and interpersonal knowledge; it frames the self in a historical and situational context”.
Glass’s research usefully draws attention to the idea that individuals must necessarily experience themselves as a coherent entity, historically located, and contingent, but enduring through time.
This coherent self allows them to place themselves in context, to cope with the contingencies of existence, such as climate change.
Importantly, we argue that the production of climate change knowledge is in itself not radically contingent, but rather a referential frame within a contingent world.
This understanding of how climate change science is understood by business leaders is fundamentally at odds with deficit models of knowledge exchange, i.e.
without changing individuals’ value systems we should not expect climate knowledge to be absorbed and enacted upon.
Hence causal reasons for FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 95Communicating climate change – Learning from business... business engagement with climate change are lay knowledge dependent and these knowledges are derived from personal values, space, and place identity.
We introduced the concept of an ‘engaged SME’ to represent those organisations which voluntarily foster and encourage further engagement with climate change issues.
Our findings suggest that business engagement with climate change is primarily a function of company directors pursuing their own personal value systems rather than a response to climate change science per se.
SMEs do not need to consistently hear about the latest climate change science.
To enhance the number of SMEs engaging with climate change, to maximize the potential value of climate change for the economy and establish a low carbon economy, climate change communication instead needs to target the personal values of individuals.
Business leaders in our study suggest that this can be achieved in four interrelated ways: first, by focusing attention on climate change impacts at a regional level, second, drawing attention to potential “feel good factors”, meaning the benefits to (the local) society and economy, third, raising awareness of the potential financial benefits that might accrue to the business if they mitigate or adapt to climate change, and finally, improving the facilitation of knowledge sharing activities amongst SMEs.
It could be argued that the relatively small research sample of 30 business leaders limits the wider relevance of these research findings, but due to the lack of literature on business decision-making and climate the study does deliver interesting and important insights into this unexplored field.
The use of a qualitative research approach may involve researcher subjectivity; this was addressed through a continuous interaction with the business leaders by monitoring business meetings, conducting interviews with communicators that work with the participating businesses, and by triangulating various different research tools.
This has allowed a much deeper engagement with individuals actively involved in the business community.
The lack of prior studies in this research field means that direct comparison to previous findings is absent and hence there is a possibility that the specific conditions that apply to Cornwall preclude wider applicability of the findings.
However, there appear to be no obvious reasons why similar businesses elsewhere in the UK or indeed Europe should have radically different characteristics.
By concentrating on engaged businesses it has been possible to establish just what it is that drives these businesses to take an active interest in climate change, and by doing so we have shown that attempts to involve a wider range of businesses is very unlikely to be successful by concentrating on trying to communicate the science per se, or improving the ‘quality’ of the science that is available.
The research reported here demonstrates that business understanding of climate change emerges around transient understandings and knowledge exchanges.
Climate change scientists as well as climate change intermediaries do not need to communicate climate change science to SMEs but instead need to comprehend the value-driven audience of SMEs.
In our study, SME business leaders interviewed here pursue strategies to safeguard economic, ethical, and philanthropic expectations of themselves and their organisations, something largely unrecognized and consequently ignored despite reflecting the true cultural characteristics of this business audience.
Climate change communication therefore needs to go beyond thinking about potential financial benefits for SMEs and pursue Hoffman’s (2012: 32) sense that ”we must acknowledge that the debate over climate change, like almost all environmental issues, is a debate over culture, worldviews, and ideology”.
To create formal and informal knowledge making by SMEs requires a shift in emphasis in scientific communication strategies by marrying ”governmental topdown frameworks and goals” ”with local geographies and ‘bottom-up’ local desires and aspirations” (Moir & Leyshon 2013: 1020).
Climate change communication needs to be more aware of individual audiences (cf.
O’Neill & Hulme 2009) and acknowledge that climate change science is as much a discussion about values, cultures, and beliefs as it is about modelling climate variability.
To inculcate climate change communication into popular culture and belief systems requires, Hoffman (2012: 6) argues, “a violent debate among cultural communities on one side who perceive their values to be threatened by change, and cultural communities on the other side who perceive their values to be threatened by the status quo”.
Too often climate change is still seen purely as a scientific debate, where climate science is being misappropriated as an economic and political instrument (Cook et al.
2013).
Instead a progressive space for discussion and dialogue on climate change needs to be opened up in which socially informed and value96 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine laden knowledge can be exchanged, because ultimately political regulation does not depend on governments alone but rather on consensual agreement (Hulme 2009).
The examination of SME business leaders carried out here demonstrates that this is possible and that such leaders could have an important role to play over the next few years.
NOTES 1SMEs are defined as “enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million”’ (EU Commission 2003: 39).
2 ‘Innovation-Support-Organizations’ are seen as intermediaries who are crucial for the development and innovation of businesses and can be especially designed to communicate climate change knowledge “or organizations which perform this function in addition to other activities” (Kaufmann & Tödtling 2001: 801).
3 According to the EU Commission (2003: 39) ”an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million” is defined as a microenterprise.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was supported by the European Union through the European Social Fund.
We acknowledge with thanks the participating Cornish businesses and all other study participants, especially Business Leaders for Low Carbon, Cornwall Council, and Cornwall Sustainable Tourism Project.
The authors would also like to thank Professor Catherine Leyshon, Dr. Kirsten Abernethy, and Philipp Grunewald for early discussions leading to the publication of this manuscript.
REFERENCES Aragón-Correa JA, Matias-Reche F & Senise-Barrio ME 2004.
Managerial discretion and corporate commitment to the natural environment.
Journal of Business Research 57: 9, 964–975.
http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/s0148-2963(02)00500-3 .
Bandura A 1977.
Self efficacy: towards a unifying theory of behavioural change.
Psychological Review 84: 2, 191−215.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.84.2.191.
Battisti M & Perry M 2011.
Walking the talk?
Environmental responsibility from the perspective of small-business owners.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 18: 3, 172−85.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/csr.266.
BBC 2013.
PM.
Coverage and analysis of the day's news.
BBC Radio 4.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b039q5fc> 13.09.2013.
BIS (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) 2013.
Statistical Release.
Business population estimates for the UK and regions 2013.
BIS, London.
Boykoff M, Goodman M & Curtis I 2009.
Cultural politics of climate change: interactions in the spaces of the everyday, environment, politics and development.
Working Paper Series.
Department of Geography, King’s College, London.
Broome J 2012.
Climate matters: ethics in a warming world.
W.W. Norton & Company, London.
Brundtland GH 1987.
Our common future.
Report of the world commission on environment and development.
To the General Assembly as an annex to document A/42/427, Development and International Co-Operation, Environment.
United Nations, New York.
Carbon Neutral 2013.
SMEs can quickly achieve business benefits from carbon management, The CarbonNeutral Company.
<http://www.carbonneutral.com/knowledge-centre/company-blog/ smes-can-quickly-achieve-business-benefits-fromcarbon management/> 22.09.2013.
Carroll AB 1991.
The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders.
Business Horizons 34: 4, 39−48.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0007-6813(91)90005-g. Carter N 2007.
The politics of the environment: ideas, activism, policy.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cassells S & Lewis K 2011.
SMEs and environmental responsibility: do actions reflect attitudes?
Corp. Soc.
Responsible and Environmental Management 18: 3, 186−199.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ csr.269.
Christensen CM, Baumann H, Ruggles R & Sadtler TM 2006.
Disruptive innovation for social change.
Harvard Business Review 84: 12, 94-101.
Cook J, Nuccitelli D, Green SA, Richardson M, Winkler B, Painting R, Way R, Jacobs P & Skuce A 2013.
Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature.
Environmental Research Letters 8: 2, 1–7.
http:// dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/2/024024.
Corner A, Markowitz E & Pidgeon N 2014.
Public engagement with climate change: the role of human values.
WIREs Climate Change 5: 3, 411422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcc.269.
Cornwall Council 2011.
Connecting Cornwall: 2030.
Moving towards a green peninsula.
Evidence Base.
Cornwall Council, Truro.
Cornwall Council 2013.
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LEP looks forward to next round of European funding.
Cornwall Council.
<http://www.cornwall.gov.
uk/default.aspx?Page=34230> 15.02.2014.
FENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 97Communicating climate change – Learning from business... Crang MA & Cook I 2009.
Doing ethnographies.
Sage, London.
Curtis K & Schneider A 2001.
Understanding the demographic implications of climate change, estimates of localized population predictions under future scenarios of sea-level Rise.
Population and Environment 33: 1, 28-54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11111-011-0136-2.
Dowling R 2010.
Power, subjectivity, and ethics in qualitative research.
In Hay I (ed).
Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography, 26−39.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Dunphy DC, Griffiths AB & Benn SH 2007.
Organizational change for corporate sustainability.
Routledge, London.
Eco-Monitor 2013.
UK SMEs can save £400 million a year through carbon footprint reduction and certification.
Eco-Monitor.
<http://www.ecomonitor.
com/uk-smes-can-save-400-mill ion-a-yearthrough-carbon-footprint-reduction-and-certification/> 17.02.2014.
Eisenhardt KM 1989.
Building theories from case study research.
Academy of Management Review 14: 4, 532−550.
Enkvist PA & Vanthournout H 2008.
How companies think about climate change.
McKinsey Quarterly 2: 46−51.
EU Commission 2003.
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.
Official Journal L 124 of 20.05.2003.
Fish R 2009.
Minimal futures: narrating space-time determinacy in the public policy domain.
Working paper.
Omni Consulting, Davis, CA.
Gallopín GC 2006.
Linkages between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity.
Global Environmental Change 16: 3, 293–303.
http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.02.004.
Brace C & Geoghegan H 2011.
On climate change and cultural geography: farming on the Lizard Peninsula, Cornwall, UK.
Climatic Change 113: 1, 55−66.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-0120417-5.
Glass JM 1993.
Shattered Selves: multiple personality in a Postmodern World.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Global Compact 2010.
Global Compact – International Yearbook 2010.
Macondo Media Group, Muenster.
Goodall AH 2008.
Why Have the Leading Journals in Management (and Other Social Sciences) Failed to Respond to Climate Change?
Journal of Management Inquiry 17: 4, 408-420. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/1056492607311930.
Hart S 2007.
Capitalism at the crossroads.
Aligning business, earth, and humanity.
Pearson Education, New Jersey.
Hekman S 1999.
Feminism, identity and difference.
Frank Cass Publishers, Ilford.
Hillary (ed.)
R 2004.
Environmental management systems and the smaller enterprise.
Journal of Cleaner Production 12: 6, 561−569.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2003.08.006.
Hoffman A 2004.
Climate change strategy, the business logic behind voluntary greenhouse gas reductions.
Working Paper No.
905.
University of Michigan, Michigan.
Hoffman A 2006.
Getting ahead of the curve: Corporate Strategies that address climate change.
The Pew Centre On Global Climate Change, Arlington.
Hoffman A 2010.
Climate change as a cultural and behavioural issue: Addressing barriers and implementing solutions.
Organizational Dynamics 39: 4, 295−305.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2010.07.005.
Hoffman A 2012.
Climate science as culture war.
Stanford Social Innovation Review 10: 4, 30−37.
Hoffman A & Jennings P 2012.
The social and psychological foundations of climate change.
Solutions 4: 3, 58−65.
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.
com/node/1130.
Houghton J 2009.
Global Warming.
The Complete Briefing.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hulme M 2009.
Why we disagree about climate change.
Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hulme M 2011.
Meet the humanities.
Nature Climate Change 1: 4, 177−179.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ nclimate1150.
Hulme M, Dessai S, Lorenzoni I & Nelson DR 2009.
Unstable climates: exploring the statistical and social constructions of normal science.
Geoforum 40: 2, 197−206.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.09.010.
IPCC 2007.
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
IPCC 2013.
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Jackson T 2009.
Industrial ecology in Europe beyond the growth economy.
Journal of Industrial Ecology 13: 4, 487–490.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2009.00151.x.
Jenkins H 2006.
Small business champions for corporate social responsibility.
Journal of Business Ethics 67: 3, 241−256.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551006-9182-6.
Kaufmann A & Tödtling F 2001.
Science-industry interaction in the process of innovation: the importance of boundary-crossing between systems.
Research Policy 30: 5, 791−804.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0048-7333(00)00118-9.
98 FENNIA 192: 2 (2014)Kaesehage, Katharina, Michael Leyshon and Chris Caseldine Kerr IR 2006.
Leadership strategies for sustainable SME operation.
Business Strategy and the Environment 15: 1, 30−39.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bse.451.
Kollmuss A & Agyeman J 2002.
Mind the gap: Why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behavior?
Environmental Education Research 8: 3, 239−260.
http:// dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504620220145401.
Koomey JG 2012.
Cold cash, cool climate: Sciencebased advice for ecological entrepreneurs.
Analytics Press, Burlingame, CA.
Kotter JP 2001.
What leaders really do.
Harvard Business Review 79: 11, 85-96.
Lewontin RC 1992.
Biology as ideology: the doctrine of DNA.
Harperperennial, New York.
Leyson C & Geoghegan H 2012.
Human geographies of climate change, landscape, temporality, and lay knowledges.
Progress in Human Geography 35: 3, 284−302.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0309132510376259.
Loew T, Ankele K, Braun S & Clausen C 2004.
Significance of the CSR debate for sustainability and the requirements for companies.
Institute For Ecological Economy Research Hmbh IOW, Berlin.
Moir E & Leyshon M 2013.
The design of decisionmaking: Participatory budgeting and the production of localism.
Local Environment 18: 9, 1002−1023.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839 .2012.752798.
Murphy JM, Sexton DMH, Jenkins GJ, Booth BBB, Brown CC, Clark RT, Collins M, Harris GR, Kendon EJ, Betts RA, Brown SJ, Humphrey KA, McCarthy MP, McDonald RE, Stephens A, Wallace C, Warren R, Wilby R & Wood RA 2009.
UK climate projections science report: Climate change projections.
Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter.
Nerlich B, Koteyko N & Brown B 2010.
Theory and language of climate change communication.
WIREs Climate Change 1: 1, 97–110.
http://dx.
doi.org/10.1002/wcc.2.
Norgaard KM 2006.
We don’t really want to know; environmental justice and socially organized denial of global warming in Norway.
Organization and Environment 19: 3, 347−370.
http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/1086026606292571.
Norgaard KM 2003.
Denial, privilege and global environmental justice, the case of climate change.
Centre for Development and the Environment, Oslo.
O’Neill SJ & Hulme M 2009.
An iconic approach for representing climate change.
Global Environmental Change 19: 4, 402−410.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.07.004.
Office of National Statistics 2012.
Regional Statistics.
Office of National Statistics (2012).
<http:// www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/regional-statistics/ index.html> 02.02.2013.
Reinhardt F & O’Neill Packard KO 2001.
A business managers’ approach to climate change.
In Claussen E, Cochran VA & Davis DP (eds).
Climate change, science, strategies, and solutions, 269−279.
Brill Academic Publishers, Leiden.
Parker CM, Redmond J & Simpson M 2009.
A review of interventions to encourage SMEs to make environmental improvements.
Environment and Planning C 27: 2, 279−301.
http:// dx.doi.org/10.1068/c0859b.
Patenaude G 2011.
Climate change diffusion: while the world tips, business schools lag.
Global Environmental Change 21: 1, 259−271.
h t t p : / / d x .
d o i .
o r g / 1 0 .
1 0 1 6 / j .
g l o e n v cha.2010.07.010.
Porter ME & Kramer MR 2006.
Strategy and society.
The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility.
Harvard Business Review 84: 12, 78−92.
Porter ME & Kramer MR 2011.
The big idea.
Creating shared value.
How to reinvent capitalism − and unleash a wave of innovation and growth.
Harvard Business Review 89, 1, 1−17.
Porter ME & Reinhardt FL 2007.
Grist: a strategic approach to climate.
Forethought.
Harvard Business Review 85: 10, 22–26.
Rajgor G & Malachowsk L 2005.
Climate Change.
How UK businesses can benefit by reducing carbon emissions.
Director Publications Ltd, London.
Revell A & Blackburn R 2007.
The business case for sustainability?
An examination of small firms in the UKs construction and restaurant sectors.
Business Strategy and the Environment 16: 6, 404−420.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bse.499.
Rogan R, O’Connor M & Horwitz P 2005.
Nowhere to hide: awareness and perceptions of environmental change, and their influence on relationships with place.
Journal of Environmental Psychology 25: 2, 147−158.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2005.03.001.
Rorty R 1989.
Contingency, irony and solidarity.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Sangmeister H 2009.
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Im 21.
Jahrhundert.
Ein Überblick (In German).
Nomos, Baden-Baden.
Sarewitz D & Pielke RA Jr 2000.
Breaking the global warming gridlock.
[Electronic version].
The Atlantic Monthly, July, 54−64.
Stern N 2006.
The economics of climate change: the Stern review.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
SQW 2012.
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LEP: Strategy and business plan evidence base papers: 1 – Headline Economic Indicators.
SQW, London.
Tilley F 1999.
The gap between the environmental attitudes and the environmental behaviour of small firms.
Business Strategy and the Environment 8: 4 238−248.
UKCP 2009.
UK climate projections user interface.
UKCP09.
<http://ukclimateprojections-ui.metoffice.
gov.uk/ui/admin/login.php> 18.02.2014.
Vernon J, Essex S, Pinder D & Curry K 2003.
The greening of tourism micro-businesses: outcomes of focus group investigations in South East CornFENNIA 192: 2 (2014) 99Communicating climate change – Learning from business... wall.
Business Strategy and the Environment 12: 1, 49−69.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bse.348.
Visser W & Adey M 2007.
Policy dialogue on sustainability: a new model – the case of the corporate leaders group on climate change.
Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership Paper Series 3.
Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Visser W & Crane A 2010.
Corporate sustainability and the individual: Understanding what drives sustainability professionals as change agents.
< h t t p : / / s s r n .
c o m / a b s t r a c t = 1 5 5 9 0 8 7 > 17.02.2014.
Vives A 2006.
Social and environmental responsibility in small and medium enterprises in Latin America.
The Journal of Corporate Citizenship 2006: 21, 39−50.
http://dx.doi.org/10.9774/gleaf.4700.2006.sp.00006.
Williams S & Schaefer A 2013.
Small and medium sized enterprises and sustainability: managers’ values and engagement with environmental and climate change issues.
Business Strategy and the Environment 22: 3, 173–186.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ bse.1740.
Wilson CDH, Williams ID & Kemp S 2012.
An evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of environmental legislation in small and medium-sized enterprises: experiences from the UK.
Business Strategy and the Environment 21: 3 141−156.
http:// dx.doi.org/10.1002/bse.720.
Wilson TD 1997.
Information behaviour: an interdisciplinary perspective.
Information Processing & Management 33: 4, 551−572.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0306-4573(97)00028-9.
Winchester HPM & Rofe MW 2010.
Qualitative research and its place in human geography.
In Hay I (ed).
Qualitative research methods in human geography, 1−25.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Wittgenstein L 1958.
Philosophical investigations.
Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Whitmarsh L, Seyfang G & O'Neill S 2011.
Public engagement with carbon and climate change: to what extent is the public 'carbon capable'?
Global Environmental Change 21: 1, 56−65.
http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.011.
Wolf J & Moser SC 2011.
Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change: insights from in‐depth studies across the world.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews – Climate Change 2: 4, 547-569. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ wcc.120.
113 © Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp Town and Regional Planning 2022 (81):113-123 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: Gasu, M., Gasu, G., Olanrewaju, S. & Yakubu, S. 2022. International and national policy responses to combating global warming and climate change in Nigeria.
Town and Regional Planning, no.
81, pp.
113-123.
Prof. Martin Gasu, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Osun State University, Osogso Osun State, Nigeria.
Phone: +2348033816133, email: Martin.gasu@uniosun.edu.ng Dr Gideon Gasu, Faculty of Law, Redeemers University, Ede, Osun State, Nigeria.
Phone: +2348038771987, email: drgasuesq@gmail.com Dr Samson Olanrewaju,* Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Osun State University, Osogso Osun State, Nigeria.
Phone: +2347038540456, email: olanrewajusamson9@gmail.com Dr Samuel Yakubu, Department of Geography, Osun State University, Osogso Osun State, Nigeria.
Phone: +2348032775853, email: syakubu@ gmail.com International and national policy responses to combating global warming and climate change in Nigeria Martin Gasu, Gideon Gasu, Samson Olanrewaju & Samuel Yakubu Review article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.9 Received: August 2022 Peer reviewed and revised: September-October 2022 Published: December 2022 *The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article Abstract Oil and gas exploration in Nigeria has contributed to global warming and climate change.
The growing global impact of climate change and the need for resilience demand action to reform the impact thereof.
This article reviews policy responses to reform climate change and global warming in Nigeria in light of oil exploration and gas flaring in the Niger Delta region.
A desktop study of related literature, drawn from repositories such as SCOPUS, Google Scholar, and Web of Science, provided policy responses such as the Climate Change Act 2021, the implementation of the Nigeria Gas Flare Commercialisation Programme, and other gas utilisation programmes by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, the Petroleum Industry Act 2021, and other global commitments to end gas flaring by 2030.
The article reviews the provisions of climate change mitigation in these policy responses and how it was implemented in Nigeria.
The review revealed the need for more commitment from Nigeria to various international agreements on climate change.
It, therefore, recommends, among others, a better utilisation of gas from its oil-rich regions to meet the nation’s power-generation need and other needs.
Keywords: Climate change, gas flaring, global warming, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement, COP 26, COP 27, Nigeria INTERNASIONALE EN NASIONALE BELEIDSREAKSIES OM AARDVERWARMING EN KLIMAATSVERANDERING IN NIGERIË TE BEKAMP Olieen gaseksplorasie in Nigerië het bygedra tot aardverwarming en klimaatsverandering.
Die groeiende globale impak van klimaatsverandering en die behoefte aan veerkragtigheid vereis optrede om die impak daarvan te hervorm.
Hierdie artikel hersien beleidsreaksies op die hervorming van klimaatsverandering en aardverwarming in Nigerië in die lig van olie-eksplorasie en gasopvlamming in die Niger Deltastreek.
’n Lessenaarstudie van verwante literatuur verkry uit databasisse soos SCOPUS, Google Scholar en Web of Science het beleidsreaksies verskaf soos die Wet op Klimaatsverandering 2021, die implementering van die Nigerië Gas Vlamming Kommersialiseringsprogram en ander gasbenuttingsprogramme deur die Nigeriese Nasionale Petroleum Maatskappy, die Petroleum Industry Act 2021, en ander wêreldwye verbintenisse om gasvlamming teen 2030 te beëindig.
Die artikel hersien die bepalings van die versagting van klimaatsverandering in hierdie beleidsreaksies en hoe dit in Nigerië geïmplementeer is.
Die hersiening het die behoefte aan meer verbintenis van Nigerië tot verskeie internasionale ooreenkomste oor klimaatsverandering aan die lig gebring.
’n Beter benutting van gas uit Nigerië se olieryke streke om in die land se kragopwekkingsbehoefte en ander behoeftes te voorsien, word aanbeveel.
MAANO A MACHABA LE A NAHA HO LOANTS’A HO FUTHUMALA HA LEFATŠE LE PHETOHO EA MAEMO A LEHOLIMO NIGERIA Sengoliloeng sena se entse tlhahlobo e hlophisitsoeng ea lingoliloeng mabapi le maano a Nigeria a phetoho ea boemo ba leholimo le ho futhumala ha lefatše, khahlanong le semelo sa tšusumetso e ntseng e eketseha ea lefats’e ke phetoho ena, ‘moho le tlhokahalo ea botsitso.
Haholo-holo, e seka-seka kamahano ea Nigeria litumellanong http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:drgasuesq@gmail.com mailto:olanrewajusamson9@gmail.com mailto:syakubu@gmail.com mailto:syakubu@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.9 114 Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 le maanong a machaba amanang le phetoho ea maemo a leholimo ho ikamahantsoe le tlhahlobo ea oli le ho phatloha ha khase sebakeng sa Nigerdelta.
Tlhahlobo ea komporo ea likopi tse amanang le lingoliloeng tse joalo ka SCOPUS, Google Scholar, le Web of Science e ile ea etsoa.
Hape, likoranta tsa moo tsa letsatsi le letsatsi li ile tsa hlahlojoa.
Tsena li ile tsa eketsoa ka lingoliloeng tse fumanoeng setsing sa libuka le lirekoto sa Lefapha la Meralo ea Litoropo le Libaka, Profinseng ea Osun Nigeria.
Tlhahlobo e senotse hore Nigeria e hloka ho eketsa boitlamo litumellanong tse fapaneng tsa machaba mabapi le phetoho ea boemo ba leholimo.
Ka hona, har’a tse ling sengoliloeng se khothaletsa tšebeliso e betere ea khase ho tsoa libakeng tsa Nigeria tse nang le oli e ngata.
1.
INTRODUCTION The environment is where we live and development is what we do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode (Brundtland, 1987: 14).
Various environmental challenges such as food shortages, climate change threat, loss of biodiversity, depletion of the ozone layer, endemic poverty, contamination and pollution by hazardous waste, as well as the problem of marine and atmospheric pollution have continued to manifest (Ismail & Umukoro, 2012; Olajide, 2022; Olujobi et al., 2022).
The impact of these challenges has led to a global appreciation of the vital nexus between the environment and the survival of humanity, as well as the need for the sustainable protection of this interaction.
In 1968, the UN General Assembly, by Resolution 2398 (XXIII), noted that there was “an urgent need for intensified action at national and international level to limit and, where possible, eliminate the impairment of the human environment” (Homer, 1971: 511).
Although twenty years apart, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration (Sand, 2007: 33) and the 1992 Rio Declaration (Sand, 2007: 35) are outputs of the first and second global environmental conferences held by the United Nations.
The Stockholm Declaration indicated the following: “A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences” (UN, 2022: 1).
Both declarations undeniably represent major milestones in the evolution of international environmental law (Sand, 2007: 33-35).
Based on the 2022 Environmental Performance Index, Nigeria is ranked 162 out of 180 countries.
This shows that Nigeria scores far below the average of all countries, especially in the categories ‘Environmental Health’ and ‘Climate Change Policy Objective’ (Wolf et al., 2022: online).
To combat climate change, several international and local policies have been formulated by different governments, including Nigeria.
Yet, the country, like others in the Global South, is faced with activities that pose a climate change threat – including oil exploration.
In 2019, the oil and gas sector in Nigeria accounted for 5.8% of real GDP and 95% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings and contributes to 80% of its annual budget revenues (Nwuke, 2021).
The country is the highest oil-producing country in Africa, with oil reserves estimated at 36,972 million barrels (PWC, 2019; Olujobi et al., 2022; Olajide, 2022).
Similarly, in 2018, Nigeria had the largest gas reserves in Africa and the 9th largest in the world with 5,675 billion cubic meters of natural gas (PWC, 2022).
OPEC (2018) noted further that, globally, Nigeria accounts for 2.7% of proven gas reserves and produced 49.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2018, which excludes gas flared or recycled.
In oil-production activities, gas flaring is an unavoidable feature from the oil rigs, refineries, chemical and coal plants, where excess amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, and volatile organic compounds are released into the atmosphere, leading to the depletion of the ozone layer, acid rain, and global warming (PWC, 2019; Olajide, 2022; Olujobi et al., 2022).
According to the World Bank, “gas flaring cost the global economy US$20 billion in 2018 while in Nigeria estimates show that the Nigerian economy lost N233 billion (US$761.6 million) to gas flaring which translates to 3.8% of global total costs in 2018” (PWC, 2019: 3).
The National Environmental Economic and Development Study (NEEDS) estimated the cost for gas flaring for climate change in Nigeria to amount to roughly N28.8 billion (US$94 million) (PWC, 2019: 3).
Achieving a zero-carbon environment and sustainable societies in Nigeria requires that policies directed at attaining them be optimised.
However, the optimality cannot be determined unless there is a thorough evaluation of existing policies, how they have been implemented, and the factors/challenges associated with their implementation.
It is thus important to appraise both national and international policies on oil and gas exploration with a view to emphasising gas commercialisation and utilisation as a means to reduce gas flaring and combat climate change in Nigeria.
The study reviews how these policies and agreements have been implemented in Nigeria, particularly in light of oil exploration and its associated gas flaring in the southern part of the country.
This is done with a view to determining their effectiveness and suggest recommendations to strengthen the achievement of sustainable cities in Nigeria.
2.
METHODS AND REVIEW APPROACH The review provides an insight into policy responses to climate change and global warming, as it appraises the laws and regulations governing oil and gas exploration in Nigeria from the first legislation on gas flaring, the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 to the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021, and their inherent challenges as it affects the environment.
First, the review summarises climate change and global warming and the implications thereof for the environment, human beings, and the economy in the global context.
Secondly, the review introduces the contribution of gas flaring to global warming and climate change in Nigeria.
Thirdly, global policies for abating climate change and global warming were reviewed as interventions that could help Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 115 developing countries understand climate change governance.
In the discussion section, policy responses such as the provisions of the PIA Act 2021 and the Climate Change Act 2021 are highlighted in terms of the reforms embarked upon in Nigeria in light of oil exploration and gas flaring in the Niger-Delta.
The implementation of the Nigeria Gas Flare Commercialisation Programme (NGFCP) and other gas utilisation programmes by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) as well as other global commitments to end gas flaring by 2030 are evaluated to determine how they have been able to address the issues relating to gas flaring in the Niger-Delta.
Qualitative research methods were employed for this study, primarily through the application of desktop research.
Relevant materials used in this review consisted mainly of policies, strategies, legislation, and other documentation, obtained from online databases such as SCOPUS, Google Scholar, and Web of Science.
A keyword search related to oil and gas exploration and its impact on climate change and global warming in Nigeria was performed between August 2021 and February 2022.
Extracted documents that did not relate to policy responses were first excluded; thereafter, those that did not focus on issues relating to either Africa or Nigeria, were given less priority.
Government sources were also prioritised to get statutes, laws, and other relevant legislations from the official Nigerian websites.
3.
KEY ISSUES 3.1 Climate change and global warming Climate change is “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time period” (UN, 1992: 3; UNEP, 2007: 517; UN, 2022).
Global warming refers to an increase in average temperature of the earth’s near-surface air and oceans in recent decades and its prospected continuation (IPCC, 2018: 51).
Climate change is mainly caused by human activities that cause the presence of carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and nitrous oxides in the atmosphere.
These pollutants trap long wave radiation emitted by the earth’s surface and prevent it from escaping, causing the earth to warm (the greenhouse effect) (Mushtaq, Bandh & Shafi, 2021: 89).
According to Oseni (2016), scientists from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted that the emission of greenhouse gases will alter the atmospheric temperature between 1.50C and 4.50C by the year 2030.
It is predicted that very warm seasons would become more frequent, and that rainfall would increase and become more intense.
Due to climate change, the global sea level in 2021 rose to 97mm above the 1993-2003 levels of 1.6-3.1mm per year.
Between 1993 and 2021, the mean sea level rose in some ocean basins with 15-20cm (Lindsey, 2022: online).
Such a rise would permanently submerge wetlands and lowlands, accelerate coastal erosion, exacerbate coastal flooding, and increase the salinity of underground water (OkoroduduFubara, 2007; Lindsey, 2022: online).
A changing global climate threatens species and ecosystems, and scientists fear that, by the end of the 21st century, 25% of existing species will be lost (UNEP, 2007).
Increased numbers of hurricanes and cyclones, drought and desertification were predicted, resulting in expanded grassland and desert areas and shrinking forests (OECD, 2021).
Vulnerable communities are already suffering from climate change variability, including the increasing drought in Africa (UNEP, 2002), the effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 in USA, the European heat wave of 2003 (UNEP, 2007).
In the flood in May 2008, over 70,000 people were killed by an earthquake in southwest Sichuan province of China (Taylor, 2018).
Climate change has an impact on human health because an increase in temperature could result in higher latitudes and altitudes, leading to the spread of tropical diseases such as malaria and other transmitting vectors disease organisms (Nel & Richards, 2022; Wu et.al., 2016: 14) with new diseases emerging in regions where they were previously not present.
The impact of climate change and global warming has been reported in different parts of Africa, especially for food security (WMO, 2022: 27).
In Nigeria, decreasing fisheries resources in large lakes such as Lake Chad, attributed to the shrinking size and rising water temperatures, has been projected (Ogboi, 2012).
It has been observed that a rise in temperature of 2°C has led to the shrinkage of land for the growing of Robusta coffee in Uganda (Adhikari, Nejadhashemi & Woznicki., 2015).
In 2021, the hot and dry weather contributed to wildfires that burned thousands of hectares of land, damaging orchards, and affecting livestock in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (WMO, 2022: 28).
Persistent drought conditions of varying severity affect water availability and force communities to be displaced, in search of food, water, pastures, and humanitarian services (WMO, 2022: 29).
While a consensus exists that there will be some form of climate change if polluting emission is not reduced, there remains scientific uncertainty about the precise nature and extent of its effects, and this presents a problem for policymakers (OECD, 2021).
3.2 Climate change, global warming, and gas flaring in Nigeria Gas flaring occurs when natural gas is brought to the surface but cannot easily be used; it is burned for disposal or “flared” (Thurber, 2019: online).
Flaring releases black carbon and methane emissions and these emissions increase the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere, which, in turn, contribute to global warming (Ismail & Umukoro, 2012).
According to the IPCC, (2018), methane is over 80 times more powerful than carbon dioxide as a warming gas, thus contributing significantly to global 116 Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 warming.
Black carbon may have the second-largest warming effect on the atmosphere, after carbon dioxide.
Scientists believe that it increases the rate at which snow and ice are melting (Stohl et al., 2013: 8833).
Flaring is associated with acid rain, which is the incineration of sour gas that produces sulphur oxides that are released into the atmosphere (Ismail & Umukoro, 2012).
Acid rain results in environmental degradation, including soil and water contamination, and have an impact on agriculture and forests (Odjugo & Osemwenkhae, 2009: 408).
In Nigeria, the acid rain caused by gas flaring has altered the vegetation of the Niger Delta area (Clinton-Ezekwe et al., 2022: 62).
In some cases, there is no vegetation in the areas surrounding the flare, due partly to the tremendous heat that is produced and the acid nature of the soil pH.
Gas flaring has health implications for human beings (Ismail & Umukoro, 2012).
Communities near gas-flaring areas suffer from increased health risks, including premature deaths, respiratory illnesses, asthma, and cancer (Clinton-Ezekwe et al., 2022: 62).
In Nigeria, local people near gas-flaring areas complain of respiratory problems such as asthma and bronchitis.
Gas flaring also severely impacts on the economics of a nation, in terms of the loss of funds and revenue, which it could have realised if it had conserved gas instead of flaring it (Ismail & Umukoro, 2012).
Nigeria has the 9th largest non-associated and associated gas (produced during oil extraction) resource in the world, and this natural gas resource outnumbers its oil reserves (Olujobi et al., 2022).
Despite this, Nigeria has consistently fallen short of satisfying its domestic gas obligations (PWC, 2022).
Prior to 1999, flared natural gas that was produced alongside crude oil left the domestic gas market mostly undeveloped.
With the country’s growing population, natural gas is viewed as essential to the country’s long-term economic development.
The Federal Government established the Nigerian Gas Master Plan (NGMP) and other initiatives to make it possible to use rather than flare natural gas (NNPC, 2013).
The NGMP enables private sectors (both local and foreign) to invest in the gas industry and build the infrastructure (such as pipelines) needed to capture, store, and transport the associated gas to market and thus address the gas-flaring problem.
The first component of the infrastructure required the construction of Central Processing Facilities (CPFs) in the Niger Delta region to process wet gas supply to onshore gas-transportation networks and industrial plants (Boise, 2019.
According to the NGMP, about 590km of gas pipelines have been completed and put into service.
The NGMP developed the domestic gas supply to solve issues in the domestic market and offer a pricing mechanism for wholesale gas supply.
The domestic supply obligation is divided into an annual delivery requirement on all gas producers (i.e., delivery to the closest gas-transmission infrastructure), with total obligations equalling the anticipated domestic gas demand (IEA, 2017).
Different gas prices were suggested by the National Domestic Gas Supply and Pricing Regulations of 2008 for various consumer groups.
While being a strategic aggregator, the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria (GACN) was founded to oversee the implementation of the domestic supply requirement and aggregate pricing (IEA, 2017).
To fulfil the main goal of the NGMP, namely to completely use the massive gas reserves, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and other significant Exploration and Production (E&P) operators have started several gas utilisation and commercialisation projects.
The Escravos Gas-toLiquid project is a Chevron initiative created to utilise the Fischer-Troph Process to process the abundant gas supplies of the Escravos field (Olujobi et al., 2022).
The Escravos Gasto-Liquid facility, constructed with a $1.7 billion total investment cost, has a daily capacity of 34,000 barrels and it is targeted for the export of Liquefied Petroleum Gas.
Another gas commercialisation initiative is the West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP), a joint venture with different percentage shareholders involving Chevron (36.7%), NNPC (25%), Shell Overseas Holdings Limited (18%), Société Togolaise de Gaz and Société Ben Gas, 2% each) (Ubani & Ani, 2016: 533).
The WAGP is responsible for delivering gas from Nigeria to Ghana, Benin, and Togo, all in Africa.
Other natural pas Projects are the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline and the Domestic Gas Distribution Network (Olujobi et al., 2022).
A joint venture between NNPC and Shell is working on the Belema Gas Injection Project (IEA, 2022).
3.3 Policies for abating climate change Several policy interventions have been directed towards abating both the incidence and the impact of climate change.
Except for international policies, national policies have been formulated differently, depending on the technical know-how, financial and technological capacity, as well as political will in countries.
The level of commitment to international policies by constituent nations also varies.
Usually, highly influential nations are more prepared for climate change realities than their counterparts (IMF, 2019; OECD, 2021).
Nonetheless, global cooperation is needed to help developing countries understand climate-change governance.
To do that, responsibility for GHG emissions over time and across countries should be differentiated, and policies that are effective enough should be implemented (Luomi, 2020: 1).
Global policy responses to climate-change interventions include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ([UNFCCC], 1992), the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Paris Agreement (2015), COP 26, and COP 27.
Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 117 3.3.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992) The UNFCCC is a framework convention which includes that developed countries must strive to reduce their overall emission of greenhouse gases to the 1990 level (49% less annual greenhouse gas effect in 2021) (NOAA, 2022).
Roughly 154 countries signed the Framework Convention and agreed to set up a procedure for monitoring scientific advances in climate change, so that modifications could be undertaken, if necessary.
Although the developed countries have a general commitment to make financial and technological transfer to developing countries, all parties are expected to keep inventories of GHGs as well as develop national mitigation and adaptation programmes to combat climate change.
The objective of the Convention is to stabilise GHGs levels in the atmosphere within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
The developed countries are to develop a leadership role in reducing GHGs emissions in line with the ‘common but, differentiated responsibility principles’ epitomised by the Berlin Mandate of 1995.
All the nations of the world were to assume responsibility in combating the threat of climate change.
Following the first report of the IPCC, formed in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1990, two years after its formation, the IPCC stated that it had reason to believe two matters: that the world was warming, and that man was responsible.
In line with the earlier resolution of the Stockholm Conference to be meeting every decade, another world environmental conference was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 as the Second Earth Summit.
As the name of the treaty implies, it was not a full-blown action plan to combat climate change but simply a framework that was later filled by other meetings such as the Conference of Parties (COP) and Members of Parties (MOP).
During the COP1 meeting in Berlin in 1995, the Berlin Mandate committed developed nations to the elaboration of national policies and measures to limit and reduce GHGs emissions.
The COP2 meeting in Geneva, in 1996, adopted the Ministerial Declaration which firmly stated that the science of climate change was compelling and that legally binding commitment was warranted.
3.3.2 The Kyoto Protocol 1997 The Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement linked to the UNFCCC, sets binding targets for 37 industrialised countries and the European community for reducing GHGs emissions.
The Protocol, using the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle, places a heavier burden on developed nations who, in roughly 15 years of industrial activity, are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emission in the atmosphere.
The signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 is viewed as an important first step towards a truly global emission reduction regime that will stabilise GHG emissions and provide the essential architecture for any future international agreement on climate change (UNFCC, 2016).
Effective from 2005, the Kyoto Protocol is rated as the highest international measure, its targets and timetables or qualified emissions limitation and reduction activities for industrialised parties (specified in the agreement) to reduce their net emission of GHGs.
The implications of the Kyoto Protocol demanded legal commitments by the parties regarding emission trading, joint implementation projects, clean development mechanism, voluntary assumption of commitments, targets and time frame for emission reduction, as well as financial resources, policies, and measures (UNFCC, 2016).
After intense negotiation in Kyoto Japan, the developed countries agreed to reduce GHGs to 5% below their 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.
3.3.3 The Paris Agreement 2015 The Paris Agreement is COP 21 of the UNFCCC and a watershed point in the global climate change negotiations to limit GHGs by mapping out an entirely new climate agenda (UNFCC, 2016).
It is the first legally binding international treaty committing 195 parties (developed and developing countries) to kick-start climate change action and investment towards the goal of limiting global temperature increase to “well below 20C” (UNFCC, 2016: online).
Parties equally had to perceive the possibility of increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low GHGs emission development in a manner that does not threaten food production (UNFCC, 2016).
In line with the goal of sustainable development, in the agreement, the developed countries were poised to making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHGs emission and climate-resilient development (UNFCC, 2016).
The IPCC was mandated to develop a report by 2018 on how to reach this goal.
Finally, the Paris Agreement builds upon a history of international agreements.
The 1992 UNFCCC set priority to “[s]tabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UN, 1992: 3).
Based on the Kyoto agreements (1997), industries saw GHGs reductions and, in 2009, the COP15 in Copenhagen produced the Copenhagen Accord which was expanded and formally adopted in 2010 as the Cancun Agreement, where dozens of countries including the United States, China, the European Union, and India committed to reducing their emissions by 2020.
Countries also agreed to a new set of mechanisms to help developing countries reduce emissions and adapt to climate change, as well as a new system to track countries’ progress on their commitment.
In 118 Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 2011, the climate negotiation in Durban, South Africa, set 2015 as the deadline for a new international agreement that is ‘applicable to all’.
The Agreement in Paris was built on the foundation laid earlier by the UNFCCC, the Copenhagen and Cancun Agreements.
This informed the Paris Agreement to set minimum obligations for countries, implementing mechanisms to spur additional action in developing countries, supporting the most vulnerable countries in addressing climate change, and establishing systems to hold countries to their respective commitments.
The climate objectives and measures contained in the countries’ climate action plan is their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and shows what they intend to achieve.
Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures to achieve NDC.
The NDCs are voluntary in nature, but legal requirements are contained in the plans, whereby countries publicly report on their progress in curbing emission compared to their plans every five years, starting from 2023 (UNFCC, 2016).
The year 2023 will mark the year for the first global review to assess and provide suggestions to each country on their collective achievements towards the 20C goal, with subsequent reviews every five years.
Although countries are legally required to monitor and report on their emission levels and reduction, using a universal accounting system (UNFCC, 2016), no enforcement mechanism or infringement procedure is foreseen.
The Paris Agreement is based on a system of global peer pressure.
It can be said that the Paris Agreement has comparatively strong procedural obligations, as it specifically requires countries to individually prepare, communicate, and maintain successive NDCs that they intend to achieve; provide information necessary for clarity, transparency, and understanding, when communicating their NDCs; communicate a successive NDC every five years which will represent a progression beyond the party’s current NDC; account for its NDC so as to promote environmental integrity and avoid double counting, and regularly provide a national GHG inventory and the information necessary to track progress in implementing and achieving its NDC (UNFCC, 2016).
3.3.4 COP 26 and COP 27 During the COP 26 meeting of the UNFCCC in Scotland in 2021, stakeholders reiterated their commitments to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement by reducing gas flaring, which is a major source of GHGs emissions (UN, 2016; UN, 2021).
COP 26 adopted the Glasgow Climate Pact, when participating countries unanimously agreed to either update or formulate new NDC emissions targets to cover about 80% of the world’s emissions (Moller & Muhammed, 2021: 2).
In 2022, the COP 27 meeting of the UNFCCC in Egypt built on COP 26 to act in mitigating the global climate emergency.
COP 27 renewed solidarity between countries to deliver on the Paris Agreement.
COP 27 was concluded with a historic decision to establish and operationalise a loss and damage fund.
Members were poised to rekindle the fight for climate justice and climate ambition to win the battle against fossil fuels.
During the conference, the nexus between the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and key areas of climate action and solutions being advanced included renewable energy and the need for a just and green transition.
The new climate deal saw a universal commitment of all countries to decarbonise their economies, which is expected to result in strong energy deployment on a global scale.
This can drive down technology costs and create new market opportunities.
Developed countries have already included renewable energy in their plans to meet their mitigation targets.
Japan, for example, aims to derive 22%-24% of its electricity production from renewable sources by the year 2030, and the European Union plans to achieve 27% of renewable energy in its energy consumption.
Over 160 countries now have renewable energy targets and policies (REN21, 2015).
By 2025, the USA planned to cut economy-wide emissions of GHG emission by 26%-28% below its 2005 level.
By 2030, China aims to increase the use of non-fossil fuels to 20% and reduce carbon emission per unit Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 65% from 2005 level.
By 2030, India is to reduce emissions intensity by 35% down to the 2005 levels, increase cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel energy resources to 40%, and create additional carbon sequestration of 2.5 to 3 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.
Developing countries are also setting targets to cut down the use of fossil fuels to power their economies.
Cote d’Ivoire, for example, aims to use 16% less fossil fuels by 2030.
Many countries with forest reserves are working towards halting deforestation trends.
Forests are very important in this battle against greenhouse gases, as they serve as “carbon sinks” that are beneficial for adaptation and the preservation of biodiversity.
The Democratic Republic of Congo intends to plant eoughly 3 million hectares of forest by 2050, while Mexico aims to halt deforestation by 2030.
4.
DISCUSSION Based on the review, as signatories to different international agreements, countries across the globe have been readjusting to commit themselves to put these agreements into action.
Countries responsible for over 80% of global GHG emissions made specific commitments to reduce their emission by 2020 as part of the Copenhagen and Cancun agreements.
The Paris Agreement includes commitments that go beyond 2020, reflecting a greater level of ambition than in the previous commitments (UNFCC, 2014).
Countries’ emission reduction commitments reflect their different levels of development and capabilities.
Whereas developing countries and emerging economies have committed to targets that reflect their level of development and historic contribution to climate change (e.g., GHG intensity targets).
Nigeria acceded to the Kyoto Protocol on the 10 December 2004 Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 119 and, by virtue of Article 25(3), the Protocol shall enter into force for each state that ratifies, accepts, or approves it on the 90th day following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.
Nigeria harbours a peculiar and uncertain environmental situation, taking into consideration the desert encroachment in the north and the rise in sea level leading to flooding in the south, which calls for well-articulated, accelerated, and organised remedial action plan on global warming.
According to a World Bank Report on the environmental effects of gas flaring in Nigeria, it is estimated that the total emission of CO2 from gas flaring in Nigeria amounts to 35 million tons/year, with methane from Delta and Rivers States expected to contribute to roughly 12 million tons per year (UNDP, 2005; Olajide, 2022).
Evidence of glaring adverse environmental and health effects in the Niger Delta vicinity of gas flaring includes asthma, bronchitis, skin problems, and respiratory illnesses, due to atmospheric pollution, acid rain, and acidic deposition of air pollutants harming the ecosystem (Olajide, 2022).
The vulnerability of Nigeria to climate change is influenced by the country’s population distribution and population concentrations in large centres.
The outcomes include the devastating experience of acute soil erosion in Anambra State, flooding in coastal states of Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Lagos, as well as desertification in states such as Katsina, Borno, Kano, Sokoto, Kebbi, and Yobe.
Lake Chad, which supports a population of over 20 million people and covers approximately 25,000km2 in the 1960s, has dwindled to less than 2,500km2 at present and is still receding, hence posing a serious threat to life sustenance and environment of the subregion (Suleiman, 2009).
The first legislation on gas flaring, the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation of 1969 Reg.
42, as recorded by Olujobi et al.
(2022) states the following: “Not later than five years after the commencement of production from the relevant area, the licensee or lessee shall submit to the Minister any feasibility program proposal that he may have for the utilization of any natural gas, whether associated with oil or not, which has been discovered in a relevant area”.
This ‘grandfather’ statutory clause on gas flaring clearly did not prohibit gas flaring nor did it prescribe a penalty for breach of express statutory requirement.
Oil operators were thus much at liberty with the choice to flare or not and the regulator/government often turned a blind eye or looked in the opposite direction, sometimes dealing the blows at the protesting local victims, not the violator of the law.
The next important but shortlived legislation was the Associated Gas Re-Injection Decree 1979 promulgated by the military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration, which specifically required oil companies to submit a preliminary programme for gas re-injection; ceased gas flaring, and prescribed a penalty for contravention of the Decree (Olujobi et al., 2022).
The target date of submission of the programme and implementation plan was 1 April 1980, with the target date of cessation of gas flaring fixed for the 1 January 1984.
As the above regime was no longer in power to implement the policy in 1985, the Associated Gas Re-Injection (Amendment) Decree promulgated by Major General Buhari’s administration amended the 1979 Decree to permit companies engaged in the production of oil and gas to continue to flare on payment of a prescribed fee.
The Government has failed to show the will to legislate an outright ban on gas flaring.
The flare for fee legislation is not in the spirit of sustainable development.
Despite the legislative naivety, the Federal Government in the budget set a target date of 2010 for all oilproducing companies to pull out of all gas flaring in their operational areas (Tattersall, 2010).
Equally SPDC, the largest oil company in the country, announced that it was committed to ‘flare down’, by adapting the following policy options: developing new local and international markets; backing out non-associated gas supplies with gas currently being flared, and accelerating where possible the injection of flared gas.
SPDC declared that it is on course to meeting its target of eliminating all routine flaring of gas by 2008, subject to funding, executive capacity, and conducive operating environment (SPDC, 2003).
The Parliament has addressed bills such as the Gas Flaring Bill 2009 to stop the environmental hazards in the Niger Delta region (Olujobi et al., 2022).
The Proposed National Desertification Control Commission Bill, which is presently at the committee stage and subject to scrutiny by the Senate Committee on establishment matters as a leading committee on Environment and Ecology, is intended to deal with the desert encroachment in the north.
The Proposed Commission Bill has the responsibility and mandate of coming up with implementable policies to combat desertification not by planting trees only because that is only one part, but by coming up with strategies that will ensure sustainability in the implementation and strategies that will also help in one way or the other alleviate poverty (PWC, 2021).
The Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill 2020 was proposed in Nigeria to prohibit gas flaring and to imposAco the UN in 2021, pledged to end gas flaring by 2030 and has signed up to the Global Methane Pledge promising to cut emissions by 30%, along with 110 countries.
Agencies whose mandate has to do with the Act include the Nigerian Institute of Geological and Mining Research; the Nigeria Institute of Oceanography; the Nigeria Meteorological Agency (NIMET); the Nigeria Communication Commission, and the Nigerian Regulatory Commission (NERC).
Others are the Nigerian Atomic Energy Commission; the Nigerian Academy of Sciences; the National Planning Commission; the Power Holding Company of Nigeria; the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria; the Energy Commission of Nigeria; the Nigerian Society of Engineers, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Olajide, 2022).
120 Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 to show more commitment and seriousness into the drive to combat global warming.
Nigeria, for instance, would find it difficult to mitigate the adverse effect of hurricanes, flooding, and desertification alone; they should, along with other developing countries, come forward in the fight against climate change rather than keep on shifting the goal post.
The involvement of the private sector such as banks and other financial institutions, governmental and non-governmental organisations such as ICUN, GEF, UNEP, UNDP, the Earth Council, the Green Peace, and NGOs can contribute significantly to the campaign against global warming.
It is noteworthy to mention the singular contributions of Prof. Wangari Mathai of Kenya who started the Green Revolution Movement in her country in the 1970s.
Its aim was to encourage individuals to plant at least one tree.
Today, in Kenya, to her credit, over three million trees have been planted.
Other mitigating strategies may include: 1.
Creating environmental awareness and education pursued by governments, NGOs, educational institutions, religious bodies, social clubs, industries, and cooperative societies.
2.
Recognise and emphasise the fact that we all live in a global village and need to facilitate mutual cooperation and concerted actions to preserve the environment and exploit it for sustainable development.
3.
Afforestation and preservation of forests, by planting trees on vast land and the preservation of existing forests to serve as a sink to contain the CO2 in the atmosphere.
4.
Better utilisation of flared gas.
If gas that is predominantly flared in some oil-producing countries is utilised, it will reduce the level of GHGs emission into the atmosphere, as gas contains less carbon than fossil fuels.
The Federal Government of Nigeria’s commitment on flaring down directives is a positive step in the right direction.
5.
Diversification or use of alternative energy sources in Nigeria such as solar energy, wind energy, and ethanol look Another step to combat the gasflaring challenge in Nigeria has been the recent promulgation to law of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021, which, in sections 102(1) (a)(b), (2), (3)(a)(b)(4)(5)(6) of the Act requires a licensee or lessee who engages in upstream and midstream petroleum operations to, within one year of the effective date or six months after the grant of the applicable license or lease, submit for approval an environmental management plan regarding projects that require an environmental impact assessment (EIA) to the authority.
This EIA must correspond with the extant laws on environmental standards.
Section 103(1) (2) of the Act requires financial contributions to an environmental remediation fund set up by the authority for the restoration of the environment (PIA, 2021; Nwuke, 2022).
Section 104 (1)(2)(3)(4) of the PIA 2021 provides that the licensee or lessee or a marginal field operator can only flare or vent gas in case of emergency and final Section 107 of the Act provides that gas can only be flared for testing of gas equipment or plant, and failure would occasion a fine as prescribed by the commission (Olujobi et al., 2022; Nwuke, 2021).
The fees received from gas-flaring penalties are utilised for environmental remediation and relief of the host communities of the settlers on which the fines are imposed.
Therefore, the innovations in the PIA 2021 including, among others, the Host Community Development Trust Fund (HCDTF), with the objective to foster sustainability, and provide direct economic benefits to the host communities who will own the projects in their host communities, will ensure a cordial relationship between the host community and the licensees or lessees.
Similarly, PIA 2021 also makes provision for two commissions, the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Authority (NUPRC) and the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Authority (NMDPRA) with the responsibility for technical and commercial regulations of the petroleum operations in their respective domains (Nwuke, 2021; Moller & Mohammed, 2021).
Another major innovation with PIA 2021 is the commercialisation of the epileptic NNPC refineries that have swallowed huge sums of monies over the years in turn-around maintenance without producing a single drop of fuel (Nwuke, 2021).
The Nigerian Government has embarked on a series of reforms in the gas-flaring sector, in order to diversify its economy, reduce wastage of natural resources, reduce environmental degradation, ensure a safe and healthy living environment, and combat the glooming challenges of climate change, by signing into law the Climate Change Act in 2021, the implementation of the Nigeria Gas Flare Commercialisation Programme (NGFCP) and other gas utilisation programmes by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), the signing into law of the PIA 2021, and other global commitments to end gas flaring by 2030.
There has been poor enforcement, due to lack of strong political will of the government to enforce its antigas-flaring laws and regulations which has been the challenge working against its efficiency.
5.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION The study appraised both national and international policies and reforms governing oil and gas exploration, with the emphasis on gas commercialisation and utilisation as a mitigation measure to reduce gas flaring in the Niger Delta region to combating climate change in Nigeria.
The study indicates that global warming is a threat, hence the need for international cooperation and commitment for managing the phenomenon.
All governments developed or developing, rich or poor, democratic or undemocratic have to adapt a more proactive international role in safeguarding planet earth through innovative multilateral agreements, practices, and national control with honest and effective monitoring and implementation mechanisms.
Developing countries are vulnerable to climate change and thus need Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 121 MOLLER, L. & MOHAMMED, J.I.
2021.
The problem of gas flaring: A review of current legal and policy efforts in the UK and Nigeria.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.ogel.org/journal-advancepublication-article.asp?key=700> [Accessed: 23 November 2022].
NEL, J.
& RICHARDS, J.
2022.
Climate change and impact on infectious diseases.
Wits Journal of Clinical Medicine, 4(3), pp.
129-134. https://hdl.
handle.net/10520/ejc-wjcm_v4_n3_a2 MUSHTAQ, B., BANDH, S. & SHAFI, S. 2021.
Environmental management: Environmental issues, awareness and abatement.
Singapore: Springer.
https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3813-1 NDDC (Niger Delta Development Commission).
2022.
The Niger Delta Development Commission Act 2000 CAP N86 LFN 2004.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.chr.up.ac.
za/images/researchunits/bhr/files/ extractive_industries_database/nigeria/ laws/Niger-Delta%20Development%20 Commission.pdf> [Accessed: 15 June 2022].
NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation).
2013.
Nigerian gas master plan.
[Online].
Available at: <https://aldg.org.ng/wp-content/ uploads/2021/05/NIGERIA-GASMASTER-PLAN.pdf> [Accessed: 2 July 2019].
NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration).
2022.
Greenhouse gas pollution trapped 49% more heat in 2021 than in 1990.
[Online].
Available at: <https://research.
noaa.gov/> [Accessed: 15 October 2022].
NWOKIKE, L.I.
2020.
Nigeria law and policy issues in gas flaring: A standard for gas utilization or sacrificial interest?
Sapientia Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Development Studies 3(4), pp.
125-140.
NWUKE, K. 2021.
Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act: Addressing old problems, creating new ones.
Africa in Focus, 24 November.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africain-focus> [Accessed: 22 November 2022].
ODJUGO, P. & OSEMWENKHAE, E. 2009.
Natural gas flaring affects microclimate and reduces maize (Zea mays) yield.
International Journal of Agriculture & Biology, 11(4), pp.
408-412. beyond crude oil exploitation and shift to more aggressively tapping alternative sustainable energy resources.
For instance, the development of solar energy as a source of energy, as it is used in other thirdworld countries such as India, Botswana, and China, where millions of homes get energy from solar cells, should be encouraged.
The implementation of solar energy can solve the electricity supply in Nigeria without emitting carbon dioxide.
6.
Gas commercialisation also has great potential to create industries particularly for domestic gas bottles production, job creation, chain value addition that will equally reduce flaring, mitigate on climate change, and sustain the environment.
7.
The Host Community Development Trust Fund (HCDTF), with the objective to foster sustainability, and to provide direct economic benefits to the host communities, is a welcome development, as it will go a long way to ensure a harmonious relationship between the host community and the licensees or lessees.
HCDTF ensures that community projects are transferred to the host communities who will own these projects, thereby ensuring a sustainable, healthy living environment for human habitation.
8.
One of the major challenges with the poor environmental management in Nigeria has to do with poor implementation of the regulations.
Nigeria is a signatory to environmental treaties or regulations but it does not ensure their implementation.
The PIA 2021 is monitored by two commissions, the upstream and downstream regulatory commissions which will monitor the implementation of the operations within their respective domains, acquire and dispose of property, and can sue and be sued, thereby ensuring its justiciable nature.
REFERENCES ADHIKARI, U., NEJADHASHEMI, P. & WOZNICKI, P.A.
2015.
Climate change and eastern Africa: A review of impact on major crops.
Food and Energy Security, 4(2), pp.
110-132. doi: 10.1002/fes3.61 BOISE, H. 2019.
Gas production and utilization in Nigeria: A long term perspective.
International Journal of Engineering Technology and Management Research, 5(6), article number 372.
DOI: 10.29121/ijetmr.
v6.i5.2019.372 BRUNDTLAND (World Commission on Environment and Development).
1987.
Our common future.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
CLINTON-EZEKWE, I., IKENNA, C., EZEKWE, I.
& RAIMI, M. 2022.
Slow death from pollution: Potential health hazards from air quality in the Mgbede oil fields of Nigeria.
Journal of Science, 5(1), pp.
61-69.
HOMER, G.A.
1971.
Protection of the human environment: First steps toward regional cooperation in Europe.
The International Lawyer, 5(3), pp.
511-526.
IEA (International Energy Agency).
2017.
Nigerian National Gas Policy.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.iea.
org/policies/8678-national-gas-policy> [Accessed: 27 October 2022].
IMF (International Monetary Fund).
2019.
The economics of climate.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/ fd1219.pdf> [Accessed: 14 June 2022].
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
2018.
Framing and context.
In: Masson-Delmotte, V.
(Ed.).
An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.
49-92.
ISMAIL, O.
& UMUKORO, G. 2012.
Global impact of gas flaring.
Energy and Power Engineering, 4(4), article number 20231, pp.
1-13.
DOI: 10.4236/ epe.2012.44039 LINDSEY, R. 2022.
Climate change: Global sea level.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/understanding-climate/climatechange-global-sea-level> [Accessed: 13 October 2022].
LUOMI, M. 2020.
Global climate change governance.
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Brief 6, pp.
1-11. https://www.ogel.org/journal-advance-publication-article.asp?key=700 https://www.ogel.org/journal-advance-publication-article.asp?key=700 https://hdl.handle.net/10520/ejc-wjcm_v4_n3_a2 https://hdl.handle.net/10520/ejc-wjcm_v4_n3_a2 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3813-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3813-1 https://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/researchunits/bhr/files/extractive_industries_database/nigeria/laws/Niger-Delta%20Development%20Commission.pdf https://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/researchunits/bhr/files/extractive_industries_database/nigeria/laws/Niger-Delta%20Development%20Commission.pdf https://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/researchunits/bhr/files/extractive_industries_database/nigeria/laws/Niger-Delta%20Development%20Commission.pdf https://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/researchunits/bhr/files/extractive_industries_database/nigeria/laws/Niger-Delta%20Development%20Commission.pdf https://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/researchunits/bhr/files/extractive_industries_database/nigeria/laws/Niger-Delta%20Development%20Commission.pdf https://aldg.org.ng/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/NIGERIA-GAS-MASTER-PLAN.pdf https://aldg.org.ng/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/NIGERIA-GAS-MASTER-PLAN.pdf https://aldg.org.ng/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/NIGERIA-GAS-MASTER-PLAN.pdf https://research.noaa.gov/ https://research.noaa.gov/ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus https://www.iea.org/policies/8678-national-gas-policy https://www.iea.org/policies/8678-national-gas-policy https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/fd1219.pdf https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/fd1219.pdf https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/fd1219.pdf https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level 122 Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 THURBER, M. 2019.
Gas flaring: Why does it happen and what can stop it?
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.
energyforgrowth.org/memo/gas-flaringwhy-does-it-happen-and-what-canstop-it/> [Accessed: 18 October 2022].
UBANI, C.E.
& ANI, G.O.
2016.
Natural gas utilization and its effect on Nigeria’s economy.
International Journal of Scientific Engineering and Technology, 5(12), pp.
532-536.
UN (United Nations).
1992.
United nations framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC).
FCCC/ INFORMAL/84 GE.05-62220 (E) 200705.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/ conveng.pdf> [Accessed: 10 April 2020].
UN (United Nations).
2016.
The sustainable development goals report.
[Online].
Available at: <https://unstats.
un.org/> [Accessed: 2 July 2021].
UN (United Nations).
2021.
COP 26 Glasgow climate change conference.
31 October 12 November, Scotland.
[Online].
Available at: <https://unfccc.
int/conference/glasgow-climate-changeconference-october-november-2021> [Accessed: 14 June 2022].
UN (United Nations).
2022.
The impact of the Stockholm Conference on the UN System: Reflections of 50 years of environmental action.
Report by the Environmental Management Group.
[Online].
Available at: <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/ handle/20.500.11822/39963/Final_ Impact> [Accessed: 12 October 2022].
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).
2005.
One planet, many people: Atlas of our changing environment programme.
World Bank Report, World Bank Headquarters, Nairobi.
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme).
2002.
Handbook of environmental law.
Hartfordshire, UK: UNEP Publication, pp.
80-84.
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme).
2007.
Global environment outlook GEO4 environment for development.
Valetta, Malta: Progress Press Limited, pp.
6-9, 38-45, 115-125.
UNFCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
2016.
The Paris Agreement.
[Online].
Available at: <https://unfccc.int/processand-meetings/the-paris-agreement/ the-paris-agreement> [Accessed: 12 November 2022].
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).
2021.
Climate change and long-term fiscal sustainability.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/ scoping-paper-on-fiscal-sustainabilityand-climate-change.pdf> [Accessed: 22 May 2022].
OGBOI, K.C.
2012.
An overview of climate change: Causes, processes, and manifestations.
In: 14th edition of the NITP/TOPREC MCPDP course papers, theme: Climate change: Challenges for physical planning in Nigeria.
Abuja, Nigeria: NIPT, pp.
6-34.
OKORODUDU-FUBARA, M.T.
2007.
Option CC/G-77 and China inventing a South-South Techno-fiscal policy to douse global warming.
Paper presented at the 8th Global Conference on Environmental Taxation, 18-20 October, Munich, Germany, pp.
1-15.
OLAJIDE, A.
2022.
Will Nigeria’s climate change law put the brakes on gas flaring?
[Online].
Available at: <https://climatechangenews.
com/2022/03/11> [Accessed: 23 November 2022].
OLUJOBI, O.J., YEBISI, T.E., OYINKEPREYE, P.P.
& ARIREMAKO, A.I.
2022.
The legal framework for combating gas flaring in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry: Can it promote sustainable energy security?
Sustainability, 14, article number 7626, pp.
1-20. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su14137626 OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries).
2018.
Nigeria facts and figures.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ about_us/167.htm> [Accessed: 2 June 2019].
OSENI, A.
2016.
Climate change.
In: Egunjobi, L.
(Ed.).
Contemporary concepts in physical planning.
Vol.
2, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Ibadan, Ibadan: Layi Publishers, pp.
15-20.
PIA 2021.
Petroleum Industry Act, Act 2021.
Lagos, Nigeria: Government Printer.
PWC (PricewaterhouseCoopers).
2019.
Fuel for thought.
[Online].
Available at: https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/ pdf/africa-oil-and-gas-review-2019.pdf [Accessed: 2 June 2021].
PWC (PricewaterhouseCoopers).
2021.Evaluating Nigeria’s gas value chain.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/ evaluating-nigeria-gas-value-chain.pdf> [Accessed: 2 June 2021].
PWC (PricewaterhouseCoopers).
2022.
Accessing the impact of gas flaring on Nigeria economy.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/ pdf/gas-flaring-impact1.pdf> [Accessed: 21 May 2022].
REN21.
2015.
Renewables global status report.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/ uploads/2019/05/GSR2015_FullReport_English.pdf> [Accessed: 15 May 2021].
SAND, P.H.
2007.
The evolution of international environmental law.
In: Bodansky, D., Brunnée, J.
& Hey, E. (Eds).
The Oxford handbook of international environmental law.
London, UK: Oxford University Press, pp.
30-43. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780199552153.013.0002 SPDC (Shell Petroleum Development Company).
2003.
People and environment annual report.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.shell.com> [5 February 2021].
STOHL, A., KLIMONT, Z., ECKHARDT, S., KUPIAINEN, K. & SHEVCHENKO, V.P., et al.
2013.
Black carbon in the Arctic: The underestimated role of gas flaring and residential combustion emissions.
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 13, 8833-8855. https://doi.
org/10.5194/acp-13-8833-2013 SULEIMAN, S. 2009.
As the Sahara engulfs Nigeria.
[Online].
Available at: <https://allafrica.
com/stories/200903240507.html> [Accessed: 18 October 2022].
TATTERSALL, N. 2010.
Shell to spend $2 billion reducing Nigeria gas flaring.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeriashell-idUSTRE64I2XD20100519> [Accessed: 15 July 2021].
TAYLOR, M. 2018.
10 years after Sichuan, China transforms quake preparedness, but Asia lags.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-asia-quake-resilienceidUSKBN1IC11R> [Accessed: 2 May 2021].
https://www.energyforgrowth.org/memo/gas-flaring-why-does-it-happen-and-what-can-stop-it/ https://www.energyforgrowth.org/memo/gas-flaring-why-does-it-happen-and-what-can-stop-it/ https://www.energyforgrowth.org/memo/gas-flaring-why-does-it-happen-and-what-can-stop-it/ https://www.energyforgrowth.org/memo/gas-flaring-why-does-it-happen-and-what-can-stop-it/ https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf https://unstats.un.org/ https://unstats.un.org/ https://unfccc.int/conference/glasgow-climate-change-conference-october-november-2021 https://unfccc.int/conference/glasgow-climate-change-conference-october-november-2021 https://unfccc.int/conference/glasgow-climate-change-conference-october-november-2021 https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/39963/Final_Impact https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/39963/Final_Impact https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/39963/Final_Impact https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/scoping-paper-on-fiscal-sustainability-and-climate-change.pdf https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/scoping-paper-on-fiscal-sustainability-and-climate-change.pdf https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/scoping-paper-on-fiscal-sustainability-and-climate-change.pdf https://climatechangenews.com/2022/03/11 https://climatechangenews.com/2022/03/11 https://doi.org/10.3390/su14137626 https://doi.org/10.3390/su14137626 https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/africa-oil-and-gas-review-2019.pdf https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/africa-oil-and-gas-review-2019.pdf https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/evaluating-nigeria-gas-value-chain.pdf https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/evaluating-nigeria-gas-value-chain.pdf https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/evaluating-nigeria-gas-value-chain.pdf https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/gas-flaring-impact1.pdf https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/gas-flaring-impact1.pdf https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GSR2015_Full-Report_English.pdf https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GSR2015_Full-Report_English.pdf https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GSR2015_Full-Report_English.pdf https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552153.013.0002 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552153.013.0002 http://www.shell.com https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-13-8833-2013 https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-13-8833-2013 https://allafrica.com/stories/200903240507.html https://allafrica.com/stories/200903240507.html https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-shell-idUSTRE64I2XD20100519 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-shell-idUSTRE64I2XD20100519 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-shell-idUSTRE64I2XD20100519 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-quake-resilience-idUSKBN1IC11R https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-quake-resilience-idUSKBN1IC11R https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-quake-resilience-idUSKBN1IC11R Gasu, Gasu, Olanrewaju & Yakubu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):113-123 123 WMO (World Meteorological Organization).
2022.
State of the climate in Africa 2021.
WMO-No.
1300.
Geneva, Switzerland: WMO.
WOLF, M.J., EMERSON, J.W., ESTY, D.C., DE SHERBININ, A., WENDLING, Z.A., et al.
2022.
Environmental Performance Index.
New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// global-reports.23degrees.eu/epi2022/ climate-change-policy-objective0a25562b319224> [Accessed: 12 October 2022].
WU, X., LU, Y., ZHOU, S. CHEN, L. & XU, B.
2016.
Impact of climate change on human infectious diseases: Empirical evidence and human adaptation.
Environment International, 86, pp.
14-23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
envint.2015.09.007 http://degrees.eu/epi2022/climate-change-policy-objective-0a25562b319224 http://degrees.eu/epi2022/climate-change-policy-objective-0a25562b319224 http://degrees.eu/epi2022/climate-change-policy-objective-0a25562b319224 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2015.09.007 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2015.09.007 _Hlk121466094 ref2
7_Book Reviews.indd 303Book review section – Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (3) 303–312.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.68.3.7 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 2019 (3) The problem of climate change has turned from a topic of some experts and some environmentalists to a leading issue in public debates, calling global attention in the past years.
As researchers concerned about the environment, we might be satisfied with that, but it also lays a charge and responsibility on the relevant experts.
Information spread and opinions expressed in public discussions should be based on the proper understanding of the natural and social science background of climate change and its underlying subprocesses.
This is even more relevant knowing the complexity and interdependencies in the climate system of the Earth.
The new contribution of Kerry Emanuel excellently fulfils the above requirements.
As the comprehensive presentation of the issue needs the use of the most recent datasets and policy documents, the short summarising book has reached its third edition last year.
Emanuel is one of the leading and most influential experts of the topic, who provided a factual, perceptive and readable presentation of the scientific basis of climate change as well as its possible consequences and related socio-political issues.
Though the target audience of the book is the wider public, its added value of giving a short summary of this complex problem makes it usable for environmental and geoscientists, university lecturers and policy experts as well.
In Chapter 1 (entitled Natural Stability) the author gives an overview of the past changes (and variability) of the climate of the Earth.
He describes the astronomical-geographical background, as well as the positive and negative feedback processes (including the theoretical possibility of super greenhouse inferno or ice catastrophe), together with the possible role of biota in the latter.
The characteristics of these past changes help the reader evaluate the magnitude of estimated future climate change effects.
The second chapter (Greenhouse Physics) may contribute to the more precise understanding of the related physical processes.
Though a simplified presentation of radiation processes is quite a challenging task, the author leads the reader clearly to the understanding of the interdependencies between radiation circumstances, the presence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and the documented effects of climate change.
The author helps fix the connection between rising carbon-dioxide levels and the rising surface temperature of the Earth by emphasising the significance of this connection in the history of science (the discovery by Svante Arrhenius in 1897).
Similar processes are discussed in Chapter 3 (Why the Climate Problem is Difficult), but here the emphasis is on presenting the chaotic character of the climate system.
Besides mentioning well-known atmospheric phenomena, the author quite expressively describes the attributes of chaotic systems employing the example of the movement of a leaf in a brook.
The central role of relative humidity in global warming is discussed from different aspects.
The water vapour takes part in the positive feedback process, and the forming and movement of clouds make the modelling efforts much more difficult.
The details of the presence and role of airborne particles in the atmosphere are also presented briefly.
As the author underlines, it is not only difficult to predict chaotic systems but, beyond a certain time frame, it is even impossible.
The same goes for meteorological forecasts, and especially for Emanuel, K.: What We Know about Climate Change.
Updated Edition.
Cambridge, MIT Press.
2018.
88 p. BOOK REVIEW SECTION 304 Book review section – Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 303–312.
climate projections, where several additional factors have to be taken into consideration.
The important term ‘forcing’ is introduced in this chapter.
The factors embraced by this term have an influence on climate to a varying extent.
But it is important to know that many of them are natural ones, which can be summarised as “climate noise”.
Some of them are easy to predict (e.g.
variations in the Earth’s orbit, collision with an already known comet or asteroid), but others have a chaotic character (e.g.
volcanic eruptions).
Modelling results show that the current trend of climate change is distinguishable from that background variability.
The complexity and forecasting difficulties are in the focus of the fourth chapter as well (Determining Humanity’s Influence).
The main subjects are the difficulties of modelling and forecasting the effects of climate change.
We can find a very didactic presentation of the basics of climate modelling, which highlights the importance of parameterisation.
This refers to tuneable values in the complicated system of equations in a model.
They are hard to estimate precisely, but they have a great effect on the outputs.
Of course, there is no need and no way to provide a big number of figures with the results of different models in such a type of work.
Professor Emanuel chooses to include the results of two sets of simulations in a figure to demonstrate and delineate the effects of anthropogenic emissions from natural, time-varying forces (volcanic and solar).
Seeing the curves in comparison with the observed average temperatures, we can say that there is no more need for proving that there have been unprecedented changes in the Earth’s climate system in the last decades.
In Chapter 5 (The Consequences) the author clarifies that the magnitude of the present warming process is smaller than some events in the history of Earth.
But this does not decrease the risks caused by sea level rise, droughts or more intense precipitation events, which are presented very impressively and unambiguously.
Emanuel does not deny, either, that there could also be winners of the predicted changes (e.g.
previously infertile lands on high latitudes).
Meanwhile, it becomes clear to the reader from the description of the possible negative effects that these consequences must not be overlooked.
The agriculture in huge parts of the world is finely tuned to the present climate, so, in other words, cannot be considered resilient to climate change.
Nor is the sea level rise itself bigger than several ones in the history of Earth.
But, as many of the large cities of the world are located on coastal estuaries, it may cause catastrophic events and national or even international political conflicts.
There are direct pieces of evidence for the growing intensity of tropical storms: the hurricanes and typhoons of the recent years have broken records in terms of economic damages as well.
Chapter 6 (Communicating Climate Science) is brief but quite important, as it contains a summary of our present knowledge on the effects of climate change in a shortlisted format, mainly based on the findings of the 5th IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Report.
The short overview of the requirements and process of scientific publishing at the beginning of the chapter may seem out of place at first sight.
But when we see the author’s explanation about some problematic characteristics of contemporary journalism, which can obstruct the dissemination of even consensual opinion in scientific communities about climate issues, we have to admit that it is an important factor, if not the most important one, if we want to tackle climate change.
This was an important motive for establishing the IPCC and publishing its reports.
Chapter 7 (Our Options) summarises the possibilities of intervention.
After presenting the terms of adaptation, mitigation and geoengineering, the author names concrete possibilities and compares them with each other.
It is also huge merit of this part that it points at some important facts, like that the costs of mitigation are theoretically paid mostly by the largest emitters, while the need for adaptation actions concerns many other parts of the world, too.
Perhaps it is not widely known, either, that market disturbing subsidies are present in many national economies with regard to the economic sectors closely connected with climate policy, e.g.
coal, oil and natural gas industries.
The last, eighth chapter takes over an important, but not an easy task to present The Politics of Climate Change.
The author’s politically unbiased standpoint is obvious from the parallel presentation of the sometimes problematic attitude or exact political actions of both political sides in the US.
In an interesting part of the chapter the author calls attention to the possible loss of industrial and market positions if no actions are taken or even the direct denial of global warming gets dominate a country’s climate policy.
This is especially relevant for the USA, which can be considered the leading technological superpower yet.
The chapter finishes with an impressive demonstration of the effects of discrediting scientific results on climate change and other related phenomena, which is a widespread phenomenon in political and public discourses.
The Further readings part helps the reader get a line on every subtopic presented in the book.
In summary, the author describes a quite complex issue with brilliant simplicity and good examples.
There are some subprocesses and consequences of climate change that are often mentioned in books or teaching materials, but their exact background may remain there unclear for many readers – not like in the current volume.
A great example in Chapter 5 is the explanation of thermodynamic reasons for the increasing intensity of precipitation events as a result of increasing temperature.
Professor Emanuel does not abstain from handling some not too easy topics, and carries it out with outstanding proficiency and sincerity, e.g.
the clear expression of his support 305Book review section – Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (3) 303–312.
for the use of nuclear energy, or dedicating a whole chapter to political issues.
The author’s knowledge and wide experience can be seen in the excellent collection, conclusion and clear presentation of the most important information about climate change.
I only find some minor shortcomings in the volume.
The author provides remarkably few information about some subtopics, which are also somehow in the focus of attention, and may provide co-benefits to climate adaptation or mitigation activities.
One example are the effects of land use (and possibilities of land-use changes) on greenhouse gas exchange in general, and the magnitude of forest carbon sequestration in mitigation efforts in particular.
In addition, some more details would be welcome about the possible economic gains to achieve through energy efficiency investments.
Apart from the above remarks, the book will, hopefully, attract the attention of readers from East Central Europe as well.
According to research results, some effects of climate change will be stronger in this region than on the global average.
Besides, as it is a global problem which calls for the involvement of every people concerned, there will be increasing need for similar books and other relevant sources of information.
We can just fully agree with former U.S. Representative Bob Inglis, the writer of the “Foreword” of the book: “The risks of climate change carry with them the offer of nobility for the generation that rises to the challenge.” (p. viii).
As Emanuel points out, “[T]here are few, if any, historical examples of civilizations consciously making sacrifices on behalf of descendants two or more generations removed.
We have the opportunity to be the stunning exception to that rule.” (p.
51.).
Márton Kiss1 1 Department of Climatology and Landscape Ecology, University of Szeged, Hungary & Lendület Ecosystem Services Research Group, Centre for Ecological Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Vácrátót, Hungary.
E-mail: kiss.marton@geo.u-szeged.hu
The Illomata International Journal of Management Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting P-ISSN: 2714-9838; E-ISSN: 2714-9846 Volume 3, Issue 1 January 2022 Page No.
35-45 35 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Ryan Nugraha1, Paul Bologun2 Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Manajemen STIAMI, Indonesia1 Nigeria2 Correspondent: ryand.nugraha@gmail.com1 Received : August 26, 2021 Accepted : January 15, 2022 Published : January 31, 2022 Citation: Nugraha, R., Bologun, P (2022).
Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax.
Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting.3(1), 35-45. https://doi.org/10.52728/ijtc.v4i1.420 ABSTRACT: One of the crucial issues in Indonesia is climate change.
It can jeopardize Indonesia's sustainable development.
This article investigates a carbon tax as a climate policy option in Indonesia and the Directorate General of Taxes readiness in imposing the new carbon tax bill in April 2022.
This research analyzes the early stage of carbon tax implementation in Indonesia.
The author conducted a qualitative questionnaire to a small and unrepresentative sample of 32 tax officers in the DGT's head office, regional office, and small tax office in Jakarta.
The data collecting process took place in January 2022.
The results suggest that most DGT's employees in this study are already familiar with the term "climate change", its causes, and its effects as a worldwide global catastrophe.
Furthermore, most respondents understand what a carbon tax is but in terms of preparedness to implement the new carbon tax, only 21 of 32 employees (65.6 percent) believe Indonesia is prepared to impose the new tax.
At the same time, 11 employees doubt the implementation due to lack of human resources, derived rules, and regulation dissemination.
Keywords: Carbon tax, tax, climate change, Indonesia.
.
This is an open access article under the CC-BY 4.0 license.
INTRODUCTION Indonesia’s geographic positioning makes it highly vulnerable to climate change.
As the largest archipelagic country consists of 17,508 islands straddling the equator, its archipelago is at a crossroads between two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and bridges two continents, Australia and Asia.
From 1981-2018, Indonesia experienced a trend of rising temperature around 0.03 °C per year (Selvi et al., 2020).
While from 2010-2018, greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) nationally experienced an upward trend of about 4.3 percent per year lead to an increased sea level of 0.8-1.2 cm/year, while about 65 percent of the population lives in coastal areas (Ministry of Finance Republic Indonesia, 2021).
Rising sea surface temperatures are causing the extinction of coral reefs, seaweed, mangroves, some biodiversity and marine ecosystems (Ratnawati, 2016).
It also raises the levels of severe floods and droughts that will exacerbate the scarcity of clean water.
According to the NDC (2016), climate change can increase disaster risk hydrometeorology, which reaches 80 percent of the total disaster in Indonesia (Ministry of Environment and Forestry of https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc mailto:ryand.nugraha@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.52728/ijtc.v4i1.420 Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 36 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Indonesia, 2016).
Overall, potential economic loss Indonesia can achieve 0.66 percent to 3.45 percent of GDP by 2030 (Ministry of Environment and Forestry of Indonesia, 2020).
Thus, Indonesia needs to prioritize climate issues and introduce its carbon tax policy to restrain energy sector emission growth, including shifting to develop lower-carbon energy markets and improving energy efficiency policy.
Therefore, through the Directorate General of Taxes (DGT), the government has been enacting policies to decrease the growth of greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector, including transitioning to lower-carbon energy markets (Septiani et al., 2017).
On October 7th, 2021, Indonesia passed a carbon tax of IDR30 (USD0.002) per kilogram of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) or USD2.13 per ton of CO2 emission above the stipulated cap under the Law No.
7 the Year 2021 on the Harmonization of Tax Regulations (UU HPP) (Simatupang et al., 2021).
The carbon tax itself is based on a cap and tax system, which puts a fee on carbon emissions that exceed a predetermined cap .
Beginning in April 2022, the Directorate General of Taxes intends to trial the coal-fired power generation industry tax.
While In 2025, Indonesia wants to develop a carbon trading market and broaden the carbon tax to industries other than coal-fired power generating to reduce more CO2 emissions.
However, most Indonesians, including DGT’s employees themselves, may be unaware of climate change and its carbon tax implications.
Climate change is not a significant concern in this developing economy (Dinesh et al., 2021; Nugroho, 2020).
The majority of public debates in Indonesia are centered on economic development and poverty eradication.
According to a study conducted by Bohensky (2013), 81.9 percent of interviewed families in Indonesia are concerned about climate change.
Nonetheless, reactive activities are taken in 38.9 percent of those individuals, while proactive steps are taken in 28.2 percent (Bohensky et al., 2013).
These findings imply that the Indonesians has not correctly understood the idea of climate change.
Thus, promoting adequate climate change information may be one way to enhance awareness about climate change in Indonesia (Selvi et al., 2020).
As the apparatus responsible for enacting the new carbon tax law, DGT's employee's growing environmental consciousness would affect public awareness.
Therefore, it is critical to improving conversations and discourses regarding climate change and its effects on DGT's employees.
As a consequence, it would strengthen the government's ability to enact policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions.
This led us to our primary questions: How far is Indonesia's new carbon tax implementation?
How do DGT employees perceive climate change?
How is Indonesia's readiness, in this case, the DGT, in implementing the carbon tax?
The paper applies two qualitative analyses.
First, we identify the early stage implementation in Indonesia's carbon tax policy (Ratnawati, 2016).
The article also discusses carbon policy reforms applied in Japan.
This is because Japan is the first country in Asia to run the carbon tax law and make carbon emissions reduction a state’s priority (Fairbrother et al., 2019; McLaughlin et al., 2019).
In the second part, the author discovers DGT employee’s perspectives of climate change and their preparedness to implement the new law in April 2022. https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 37 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc The author administers a qualitative questionnaire to a small and unrepresentative sample of 32 tax officers in the DGT's head office, regional office, and small tax office in Jakarta.
The data collecting process took place on January 5th, 2022.
The paper concludes that Indonesia needs to accelerate climate change and carbon tax awareness in the DGT's employee to promote the new policy.
Indonesia passed a carbon tax on October 7th, 2021, at a rate of IDR30 (USD0.002) per kilogram of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) similar to USD2.13 per ton of CO2e emission above the threshold cap.
Law No.
7 of the Year 2021 on Tax Harmonization (UU HPP) revised numerous existing tax statutes and established the new carbon tax.
For the first time, Indonesia has put a price on carbon emissions, following the lead of 26 other nations.
This plan is part of Indonesia's larger strategy to fulfill its 2030 aim of reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 29 percent on its own or 41 percent with international support (Saputra, 2021; Simatupang et al., 2021).
The goal of the new carbon tax is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from production processes and individual consumption systematically and sustainably.
The policy may also cause changes in behavior toward fossil fuels and encourage the use of renewable energy and also rise government revenue.
Individuals and entities who purchase carbon-containing goods and engage in carbonemitting activities will face a tax.
The carbon tax rate is set to be higher than or equal to the market price, with a minimum rate of IDR 30 (USD0.002) per kilogram of CO2 equivalent (CO2e).
This rate is equivalent to USD2.13 per ton of CO2e emission (cap and tax).
CO2e is a symbol for greenhouse gas emissions, including CO2, methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) (Simatupang et al., 2021).
Figure 1 Indonesia Carbon Policy Road Map Source: Simatupang, et.al.
(2021) The revenue generated by the carbon tax can be used to fund climate change campaign.
Furthermore, individuals and corporates who participate in carbon emission trading governed by environmental law may be eligible for a carbon tax deduction on their carbon tax liability.
The government will https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 38 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc implement the carbon tax under the Roadmap for Carbon Tax, which the House of Representatives approved (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia, 2021).
However, according to Simatupang (2021), the new carbon tax could affect electricity affordability, jeopardizing Indonesia's goal of ensuring universal energy access by 2030.
The potential uptrend in electricity prices would be detrimental to low-income households, many of which are considered energy poor.
Because electricity costs account for up to 80 percent of production costs in some industries, rising electricity costs due to the carbon tax would raise consumer prices and make products less competitive.
Figure 2 Indonesia Carbon Policy Road Map Source: Simatupang, et.al.
(2021) The IMF and World Bank recommend a carbon tax rate of USD30 up to USD100 per ton CO2e for developing countries, resulting in a revenue of 1.5 percent of GDP.
In this respect, the Indonesian Taxation Analysis (CITA) estimated that the power plant sector alone could generate IDR 6.5 trillion (US$ 462 million).
Currently, Indonesia's carbon tax rate of IDR30 per kg CO2e (USD2.13 per ton CO2e) is one of the lowest in the world.
Bahana Sekuritas (an Indonesian security firm) predicted potential income of IDR 29 trillion – 57 trillion (US$ 2.0 billion – 4.05 billion), equivalent to 0.2-0.3 percent of GDP, if tax rates are set at US$ 5-10 per ton CO2e and applied to 60 percent of emissions (Simatupang et al., 2021).
Japan is a vital partner for Indonesia.
Despite various global challenges, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, relations between Indonesia and Japan remain strong, and there is still room for strengthening ties that can be explored.
In 2020, the bilateral trade value between Indonesia and Japan will be USD 24.3 billion.
Japan consistently ranks third as Indonesia's leading export destination from 2018 to 2020, with export values reaching USD 13.6 billion in 2020.
This trend is expected to continue, with the value of Indonesian exports to Japan reaching USD7.9 billion in semester 1 – 2021.
In terms of investment, Japan's Foreign Investment (PMA) in Indonesia reached 12.9 billion USD from 2018 to Semester I 2021.
During that time, Japan surpassed the United States as the thirdlargest foreign investor in Indonesia.
Meanwhile, the total number of PMA projects from Japan during that period exceeded 19 thousand.
FDI from Japan into Indonesia has reached USD 1.04 billion until the first half of 2021.
The Indonesian government hopes that foreign direct investment from Japan entering in 2021 will exceed the 2.6 billion USD realized in 2020 2021 (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, 2021).
This fact demonstrates that Indonesia remains appealing to foreign investors, including Japan.
https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 39 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Japan is a country with limited energy resources.
The government is highly reliant on imported energy to cover its energy needs based on Agency for Natural resources and energy.
Japan is the world's fifth-largest oil consumer and fourth-largest crude oil importer (US Energy Information (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020).
It is also the world's largest importer of liquefied natural gas and the third-largest coal importer.
Japan's low carbon policy mix includes a carbon tax (integrated through an energy tax), two regional emission trading systems, the Tokyo Emission Trading System and the Saitama Emission Trading System (Kojima & Asakawa, 2021), and a voluntary emissions trading scheme based on subsidies, namely the “Advanced Technologies Promotion Subsidy Scheme with Emission Reduction Targets” (ASSET).” Currently, there are two environmental taxes in Japan: the vehicle tax and the energy tax: Japan's carbon tax, called the 'Tax on Climate Change Mitigation” falls within the category of energy taxes (Gokhale, 2021).
Moreover, Japan has a three-tiered energy tax (1) Customs duties on imported and extracted fossil fuels; (2) Transportation fuel taxes (Oil delivery tax, Gasoline tax, Diesel and Aviation Fuel tax); (3) Electric power generation taxes (Ministry of The Environment of Japan, 2017).
The carbon tax in Japan applies to fossil fuels such as petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and coal.
Japan became the first Asian country to introduce a carbon tax of JPY 2,89/t-Co2 (YSD2.65) in October 2012 (Ministry of The Environment of Japan, 2017).
By 2050, the tax intends to eliminate 80 percent of Japan's greenhouse gas emissions.
Carbon taxes on covered items vary according to their carbon emissions content and are in addition to the existing petroleum and coal taxes.
The tax rate is a fixed per-unit amount so that the total carbon tax on each product equals JPY 2,89/t-Co2 (USD2.65) (Gokhale, 2021).
Japan has made significant progress in decreasing its carbon emissions since the carbon tax was implemented in 2012.
However, Japan's existing carbon tax policy impedes solving the urgent climate problem.
A study from (Kawakatsu et al., 2017) found that a small or positive financial benefit is possible with appropriate tax revenue treatment.
Kawakatsu et al.
analyzed East Asia's low carbon policies.
They concluded that Japan's current carbon tax rate of JPY2,89/t-Co2 ($2.65) has resulted in modest emissions reductions and had a negligible influence on its economic growth.
When evaluating a more significant carbon tax, the authors believe that a higher tax combined with suitable revenue recycling methods results in a positive double dividend for the Japanese economy (Lee et al., 2012).
Japan's experience can be applied in Indonesia as a best practice in implementing carbon tax in 2022, especially in the government readiness.
METHOD The author utilizes a constructivism approach to qualitative data analysis in this study.
The essence of constructivism is an understanding formed from several perspectives that solve a problem (Bungin, 2017).
The answers to all situations being studied are sourced from various social perspectives or points of view.
In this understanding, the researcher is tasked with narrowing down different comprehensive perspectives and interpreting the findings according to their experience and expertise (Creswell, 2017).
https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 40 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc The author examined three DGT positions: account representative, tax auditor, and staff analyst.
The questionnaires were completed by 32 participants in January 2022.
Each question is composed of five open-ended questions and five closed-ended question.The sample size is determined by the research design.
Typically, the sample size for qualitative methods is between twenty and thirty people.
Position Number Respondents Percentage Account Representative 5 15.6% Tax Auditor 17 53.1% Staff Analyst 10 31.3% In addition, Cohen et al.
(2017) argued that when using purposive sampling, it is more important to obtain information from those with extensive knowledge of a particular subject and to achieve data saturation than it is to maximize the number of participants (Cohen et al., 2017).
Participants are chosen on the basis of their knowledge, expertise, and experience within their respective organizations and fields (Jamali, 2018).
The respondents come from a variety of job descriptions and involved in the carbon tax's implementation process.
The open questions are intended to give employees the freedom to express their opinions and responses to the questions.
Meanwhile, closed questions are used to confirm previous questions, allowing for the verification of the questionnaire response’s consistency.
The questionnaires contain five pairs of questions.
Employees are asked to respond "yes" or "no" to closed questions, whereas open questions require employees to respond with some explanations, reasons, and opinions.
Consistency in responding to each pair of questions is measured in this study to ensure that employees provide accurate responses.
Employees provide consistent responses when they respond "yes" to close questions, followed by a correct response to open questions.
The correct responses are highlighted in this section if they contain certain keywords, such as global warming, deforestation, and changes in season pattern.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION Climate Change: A General Overview When asked if the DGT employee’s had ever heard of climate change and could explain what it is, 31 of 32 employees (97 per cent) responded that they had.
Additionally, 27 of 31 employees provide consistent responses.
The respondents who responded consistently used terms such as global warming, deforestation, greenhouse gases, and long-term climate variability.
This means that the majority of DGT’s employees in this study are already familiar with the term "climate change."
Meanwhile, only one employee stated in this study that he or she was unfamiliar with the term "climate change."
On the other hand, an employee who provides an inconsistent response to the first question primarily explains that climate change is a “transition from one state to another”, “weather changes”, or “temperature changes”.
They may have heard about climate change, but they were unable to provide accurate responses to the questions.
https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 41 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change's Primary Causes When asked about their knowledge of the primary causes of climate change and their ability to explain the primary causes of climate change, 28 of 32 (87.5 per cent) DGT employees stated that they were aware of the primary causes of climate change.
However, only 21 employees (67 percent of the 87.5 percent) were able to consistently provide responses.
This demonstrates that not all DGT employees are capable of accurately explaining the primary causes of climate change.
Employees who provide inconsistent responses to the fourth question primarily provide reversal responses by referring to climate change impacts as primary causes of climate change, such as “weather changes”.
Other reasons why employee give inconsistent responses to the second question in this study are incorrect responses, such as a “sea tidal wave”, “a change in the earth's orbit”, “a change in the atmosphere”, and “a change in the amount of rain falling”, “warmer earth”, and “human and natural habits”.
As a result, there is misinformation about the causes and effects of climate change among the employees in this study.
Additionally, 2 of 32 employees stated that they were unaware of the primary causes of climate change when responding to the third question.
Climate Change as a worldwide global catastrophe Employee responses to the fifth and sixth questions about whether climate change is a global threat and why climate change is a global threat indicate that as many as 31 of 32 (97 percent) employees believe climate change is a global catastrophe, with a percentage of consistent responses of 64 percent.
This shows that the majority of employees in this study believe climate change is a serious issue.
In this regard, employees who consistently respond positively to the fifth question believe that climate change can cause diseases, and also disasters, such as “sea-level rise”, “flooding”, “storms”, “heat waves”, “drought”, “animal extinction”, “food scarcity”, “forest fires”, “poor harvests”, “rising temperatures”, or “the melting of the North Pole”.
On the other hand, inconsistent responses to the fifth question provided at the sixth question are primarily the result of incorrect responses to the subsequent question of why climate change is considered as a global catastrophe.
"Air pollution," "global warming," "temperature change," and "illegal logging" are among the responses.
According to one respondent, "Earth is our only home."
The other is unclear when the phrase "Ecosystem shifting on Earth" is used.
The Carbon Tax Following that, the employee responses to the seventh question about whether the employee understands what a carbon tax is and the eighth question about whether the employee understands what a carbon tax is and if they are able to explain how the carbon tax works, 29 of 32 employees (90.6 percent) understand what it is.
However, there are only 25 employees (86 percent) who consistently respond.
Employees who consistently responded positively to the seventh question mentioned the carbon tax definition as “a tax imposed on carbon emissions that have a negative impact on the environment”.
Inconsistent responses to the eighth question, on the other hand, are generally the result of incorrect responses, such as "cap and tax mechanism," and a lengthy response that contradicts the sentence "Carbon tax is one strategy to limit climate change."
And a response stated “Entrepreneur’s behavior is projected to change as a result of the carbon price, causing them to shift to low-carbon, green economic activity."
https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 42 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc The DGT's Preparedness to Implement the New Carbon Tax Finally, employee responses to the 9th question, "Do you believe Indonesia is prepared to impose a carbon tax in April 2022?"
and the 10th question, "Can you describe how Indonesia is preparing to impose a new carbon tax in April 2022?"
indicate that only 21 of 32 employees (65.6 percent) believe Indonesia is prepared to impose the tax, while 11 employees (34.4 percent) do not.
Employees who consistently answer correctly to the ninth question are 20 officers.
The majority of them cited a newly enacted “Carbon Tax law” as evidence of the DGT's readiness.
On the other hand, 11 employees who believe DGT is not prepared to implement the policy cited various reasons, including "the need for derived rules," "it is too early to prepare the human resource in DGT", "opposition and difficulties from vertical units that implement it", and "a lack of regulation dissemination."
One respondent who responses DGT's preparedness stated, "There are too many elements that affect the poorest members of society, who are indirectly impacted by price increases linked with the carbon tax, so there will definitely be additional benefits and drawbacks to consider.
Furthermore, Indonesia has only recently recovered from the pandemic".
CONCLUSION As a global environmental issue, climate change must be communicated to citizens.
On the other hand, climate change may not be a significant issue for society in several countries worldwide, including Indonesia (Levi, 2021; Onyimadu & Uche, 2021).
When it comes to fighting climate change using carbon tax policy, the DGT's employees are responsible for enhancing public awareness (Costello, 2019).
The author provides a qualitative analysis to understand awareness about climate change, carbon tax, and tax authority's readiness in enacting the new carbon tax law in April 2022.
The paper also provides a best practice lesson in implementing a carbon tax in Japan.
The author found a slight lack of awareness about climate change among DGT employees, which may occur in other positions within the DGT on a national level.
Nonetheless, the DGT has made some efforts to combat climate change, including establishing a carbon tax road map and preparing the derived rule .
Based on these conclusions, the researcher advises policymakers, namely DGT, to increase employee’s awareness of climate change.
First, we advise an increase of learning process through attendance at climate change courses that improve understanding of climate change.
These environment courses are currently available through Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs).
Additionally, the DGT could enhance its digital learning program, Studia, by including climate change curricula.
Second, the DGT can promote media literacy.
Media literacy can help increase public awareness and acceptance of climate change (Jürkenbeck et al., 2021; Phan et al., 2021).
The DGT may organize an art festival, essay competition, and poster competition to raise awareness about climate change and the carbon tax.
A study by Jacobson et al.
(2016) proposes a climate change exhibition that combines art and science (Jacobson et al., 2016).
https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 43 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Finally, the DGT may achieve a high level of support from citizens by using a prominent spokesperson to campaign for climate change awareness.
An effective policy reform needs interministerial strategic cooperation, non-governmental organizations, and legislative members.
The DGT should communicate continuously with these stakeholders.
The proposed policy incorporates the necessary precondition for resolving the issue.
Yet, a wellexecuted implementation is critical to achieving a positive outcome.
REFERENCE Bohensky, E. L., Smajgl, A., & Brewer, T. (2013).
Patterns in household-level engagement with climate change in Indonesia.
Nature Climate Change, 3(4), 348–351.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1762 Bungin, B.
(2017).
Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif (B. Bungin (ed.
); 3rd ed.).
RajaGrafindo Persada.
https://www.rajagrafindo.co.id/produk/metodologi-penelitian-kualitatif-burhan-bungin/ Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2017).
Research Methods in Education.
In London: Routledge.
(8th ed.).
Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315456539 Costello, K. W. (2019).
Essay on climate apocalypse and a carbon tax.
The Electricity Journal, 32(10), 106669. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.106669 Creswell, J. W. (2017).
Research Design Pendekatan Kualitatif, Kuantitatif, dan Mixed (S. Z. Qudsy (ed.
); 3rd ed.).
Pustaka Pelajar.
https://opac.perpusnas.go.id/DetailOpac.aspx?id=1213690 Dinesh, D., Hegger, D. L. T., Klerkx, L., Vervoort, J., Campbell, B. M., & Driessen, P. P. J.
(2021).
Enacting theories of change for food systems transformation under climate change.
Global Food Security, 31, 100583. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2021.100583 Fairbrother, M., Johansson Sevä, I., & Kulin, J.
(2019).
Political trust and the relationship between climate change beliefs and support for fossil fuel taxes: Evidence from a survey of 23 European countries.
Global Environmental Change, 59, 102003. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.102003 Gokhale, H. (2021).
Japan’s carbon tax policy: Limitations and policy suggestions.
Current Research in Environmental Sustainability, 3, 100082. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crsust.2021.100082 Jacobson, S. K., Seavey, J. R., & Mueller, R. C. (2016).
Integrated science and art education for creative climate change communication.
Ecology and Society, 21(3), art30.
https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-08626-210330 Jamali, H. R. (2018).
Does research using qualitative methods (grounded theory, ethnography, and phenomenology) have more impact?
Library & Information Science Research, 40(3–4), 201– 207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lisr.2018.09.002 Jürkenbeck, K., Spiller, A., & Schulze, M. (2021).
Climate change awareness of the young generation and its impact on their diet.
Cleaner and Responsible Consumption, 3, 100041. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clrc.2021.100041 Kawakatsu, T., Lee, S., & Rudolph, S. (2017).
The Japanese Carbon Tax And The Challenges To LowCarbon Policy Cooperation In East Asia (No.
9; 17).
https://ideas.repec.org/p/kue/epaper/e17-009.html Kojima, S., & Asakawa, K. (2021).
Expectations for Carbon Pricing in Japan in the Global https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 44 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Policy Context.
In T. H. Arimura & S. Matsumoto (Eds.
), Economics, Law, and Institutions in Asia Pacific (1st ed., pp.
1–21).
Springer International Publishing.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6964-7_1 Lee, S., Pollitt, H., & Ueta, K. (2012).
An Assessment of Japanese Carbon Tax Reform Using the E3MG Econometric Model.
The Scientific World Journal, 2012, 1–9.
https://doi.org/10.1100/2012/835917 Levi, S. (2021).
Why hate carbon taxes?
Machine learning evidence on the roles of personal responsibility, trust, revenue recycling, and other factors across 23 European countries.
Energy Research & Social Science, 73, 101883. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101883 McLaughlin, C., Elamer, A.
A., Glen, T., AlHares, A., & Gaber, H. R. (2019).
Accounting society’s acceptability of carbon taxes: Expectations and reality.
Energy Policy, 131, 302–311.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.05.008 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia.
(2021).
Energy Minister Explain Carbon Tax Scheme.
https://www.esdm.go.id/en/media-center/news-archives/energy-ministerexplains-carbon-tax-schemes Ministry of Environment and Forestry of Indonesia.
(2016).
1st Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) Indonesia.
http://ditjenppi.menlhk.go.id/reddplus/images/resources/ndc/First_NDC.pdf Ministry of Environment and Forestry of Indonesia.
(2020).
Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Indonesia First/Updated NDC Indonesia 2021 corrected version.pdf Ministry of Finance Republic Indonesia.
(2021).
Indonesia’s Commitment on Climate Change Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic.
https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/nda_gcf/en/publications/indonesia-s-commitment-onclimate-change-amidst-the-covid-19-pandemic Ministry of The Environment of Japan.
(2017).
Greening of Whole Tax System and Carbon Tax in Japan.
Environment and Economy Division.
In Environment-related Tax in Japan.
https://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/20170130_greening.pdf Nugroho, A. W. (2020).
What students know about climate change?
a case study of high school students in Samboja, Indonesia.
IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, 487(1), 012001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/487/1/012001 Onyimadu, C. O., & Uche, D. S. (2021).
Evaluating the Nigerian Government’s financial obligations to climate change adaptation strategies.
Climate Services, 24, 100261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cliser.2021.100261 Phan, T. D., Bertone, E., Pham, T. D., & Pham, T. V. (2021).
Perceptions and willingness to pay for water management on a highly developed tourism island under climate change: A Bayesian network approach.
Environmental Challenges, 5, 100333. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envc.2021.100333 Ratnawati, D. (2016).
Carbon Tax Sebagai Alternatif Kebijakan Untuk Mengatasi Eksternalitas Negatif Emisi Karbon di Indonesia.
Indonesian Treasury Review Jurnal Perbendaharaan Keuangan Negara Dan Kebijakan Publik, 1(2), 53–67.
https://doi.org/10.33105/itrev.v1i2.51 Saputra, A. I.
(2021).
Pajak Karbon Sebagai Sumber Penerimaan Negara dan Sistem Pemungutannya.
Jurnal Anggaran Dan Keuangan Negara Indonesia (AKURASI), 3(1), 56–71.
https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc Climate Change, Carbon Tax, and the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxes Preparedness in Implementing the New Carbon Tax Nugraha and Bologun 45 | Ilomata International Journal of Tax & Accounting https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc https://doi.org/10.33827/akurasi2021.vol3.iss1.art96 Selvi, Rahmi, N., & Rachmatulloh, I.
(2020).
Urgensi Penerapan Pajak Karbon di Indonesia.
Jurnal Reformasi Administrasi, 7(1), 29–34.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31334/reformasi.v7i1.845 Septiani, M., Istislam, & Anshari, T. (2017).
Urgensi Pengaturan Penetapan Pajak Karbon (Carbon Tax) Dalam Upaya Peningkatan Pengendalian Pencemaran Udara di Indonesia.
Jurnal Hukum Universitas Brawijaya, 4(1), 1–13.
http://hukum.studentjournal.ub.ac.id/index.php/hukum/article/view/2343 Simatupang, R., Pineda, J., & Murdjijanto, T. (2021).
On Indonesia’s new carbon tax and its effectiveness at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
https://devtechsys.com/insights/2021/11/24/onindonesias-new-carbon-tax-and-its-effectiveness-at-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions/ U.S. Energy Information Administration.
(2020).
Country Analysis Executive Summary: Japan.
In World Country Energy Analysis.
https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Japan/japan.pdf https://www.ilomata.org/index.php/ijtc
42 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77):42-56 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: Mthembu, A.
& Hlophe, S. 2020.
Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities: A case study of uMkhanyakude district municipality.
Town and Regional Planning, no.77, pp.
42-56.
© Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp Miss Anele Mthembu, eThekwini Municipality, Candidate Planner, P.O.
Box 680, Durban, 4001.
Phone: 0837756749, email: <anelemthembu@gmail.
com>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0622-1907.
Miss Syathokoza Portia Hlophe, KZN EDTEA, Environmental Officer, Private Bag X2055, Dundee, 3000.
Phone: 0730831599, email: <syathokozahlophe@gmail.com>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3182-833X.
Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities: A case study of uMkhanyakude district municipality Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.4 Peer reviewed and revised October 2020 Published December 2020 *The authors declared no conflict of interest for this title or article Abstract Climate change in South Africa remains an issue of socio-economic and environmental concern.
An increase in frequency and intensity of climatic events pose significant threats to biophysical and socio-economic aspects, namely food security, water resources, agriculture, biodiversity, tourism, and poverty.
In order to counteract the socio-economic and environmental concerns pertaining to issues of climate change, emergent insights on climate change strategies suggest that building resilience in human and environmental systems is an ideal way of combating dynamic environmental conditions and future uncertainties.
Using the qualitative secondary data approach, this article evaluates whether vulnerable communities in uMkhanyakude District Municipality can become resilient to the implications of climate change.
UMkhanyakude District Municipality is predominantly rural and one of the most impoverished districts in KwaZulu-Natal, with the majority of socially and economically marginalised individuals and households experiencing more severe impacts as a result of climate change compared to those in urban areas.
Data was analysed using content analysis and a concise summary of the biophysical and socio-economic aspects is presented.
This research suggests that building resilience to climate change is possible when bottom-up, proactive and systematic measures are taken to manage vulnerable areas such as those in uMkhanyakude District Municipality.
It recommends that social impact assessments (SIA) be conducted to assist in terms of assessing social consequences that are likely to follow from policy actions.
Keywords: Adaptation, climate change, resilience, vulnerability BOU VEERKRAGTIGHEID TEEN KLIMAATSVERANDERING IN KWESBARE GEMEENSKAPPE: ‘N GEVALLESTUDIE VAN UMKHANYAKUDE-DISTRIKSMUNISIPALITEIT Klimaatsverandering in Suid-Afrika bly ’n kwessie van maatskaplike ekonomiese en omgewingsbelang.
Terwyl daar ’n toename is in frekwensie en intensiteit van klimaatsgebeurtenisse, is daar steeds beduidende bedreigings vir biofisiese en sosio-ekonomiese aspekte, naamlik voedselsekerheid, waterbronne, landbou, biodiversiteit, toerisme en armoede.
Ten einde die sosio-ekonomiese en omgewingskwessies rakende klimaatsverandering teë te werk, dui opkomende insigte oor klimaatsveranderingstrategieë daarop dat veerkragtigheid in menslike en omgewingstelsels ’n ideale manier is om dinamiese omgewingstoestande en toekomstige onsekerhede te bekamp.
Met behulp van die kwalitatiewe sekondêre databenadering, evalueer hierdie artikel of kwesbare gemeenskappe in uMkhanyakude-distriksmunisipaliteit veerkragtig kan raak teen die gevolge van klimaatsverandering.
UMkhanyakudedistriksmunisipaliteit is oorwegend landelik en een van die armste distrikte in KwaZulu-Natal, met ’n meerderheid sosiale en ekonomies gemarginaliseerde individue en huishoudings wat baie erger gevolge ervaar as gevolg van klimaatsverandering in vergelyking met dié in stedelike gebiede.
Data is met behulp van inhoudsanalise geanaliseer en ’n bondige opsomming van die biofisiese en sosio-ekonomiese aspekte is aangebied.
Hierdie navorsing dui daarop dat die bou van veerkragtigheid teenoor klimaatsverandering moontlik is as gevolg van onder, proaktiewe en stelselmatige maatreëls om kwesbare gebiede soos dié in uMkhanyakudedistriksmunisipaliteit te bestuur.
Die artikel beveel aan dat maatskaplike impakstudies (SIA) gedoen word om te help met die beoordeling van maatskaplike gevolge wat waarskynlik uit beleidsaksies kan volg.
Sleutelwoorde: Aanpassing, klimaats veran dering, kwesbaarheid, veerkrag tigheid HO AHA MAMELLO EA PHETOHO EA MAEMO A LEHOLIMO METSENG E TLOKOTSING: PHUPUTSO EA MASEPALA OA SETEREKE SA UMKHANYAKUDE Phetoho ea maemo a leholimo Afrika Boroa e ntse e le taba ea ngongoreho ea sechaba, moruo le tikoloho.
Ho nyoloha hoa maqhubu le matla a liketsahalo tsa maemo a leholimo li tlisa tlokotsi likarolong tsa tikoloho, sechaba le moruo, e leng ts’ireletso ea lijo, lisebelisoa tsa metsi, temo, mefuta-futa ea bochaba, bohahlauli le bofuma.
Bakeng sa ho loants’a mathata a sechaba, moruo le tikoloho mabapi le litaba tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo, leseli le hlahang mabapi le maano a phetoho ea maemo a leholimo le fana ka maikutlo a hore, ho aha botsitso litsing tsa batho le tsa tikoloho ke tsela e nepahetseng ea ho loants’a maemo a tikoloho le phapang e ka tlisoang ke bokamoso.
Ka ts’ebeliso ea mokhoa oa boleng bo holimo oa lipatlisiso, sengoloa sena se lekola hore na sechaba se tlokotsing seterekeng sa Mmasepala sa uMkhanyakude se ka khona ho mamella http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:anelemthembu@gmail.com mailto:anelemthembu@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0622-1907 mailto:syathokozahlophe@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3182-833X http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.4 Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe • Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities 43 litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo.
Masepala oa Setereke oa UMkhanyakude o mahaeng haholo ‘me setereke sena ke seseng sa litereke tse futsanehileng ka ho fetisisa KwaZuluNatal, ka bongata ba batho le malapa a sotlehileng sechabeng le moruong, moo ho bileng ho nang le litlamorao tse mpe ka lebaka la phetoho ea maemo a leholimo ha a bapisoa le a libakeng tsa litoropo.
Linthla Ii ile tsa hlahlojoa ho sebelisoa tlhaiso-leseling le kakaretso ea likarolo tsa tlhaho ea bophelo le moruo.
Phuputso ena e fana ka maikutlo a hore ho aha boits’oaro ba phetoho ea maemo a leholimo ho a khonahala ha mehato e nkuoang ho laola libaka tse tlokotsing joalo ka tse Masepaleng oa Setereke sa uMkhanyakude, ele e hlophisehileng e bile e kenyeletsa maikutlo a sechaba.
E khothaletsa hore litekolo tsa sekhahla sa kahisano (SIA) di etsoe ho thusa mabapi le ho lekola litlamorao tsa kahisano tse ka bang teng ho latela liketso tsa maano.
1.
INTRODUCTION Climate change is defined as any changes in climate over time, due to natural variability or human activities (IPCC, 2007: 6).
Although climate naturally changes, there is a growing concern about the changes in climate due to anthropogenic activities (Henderson, Storeygard & Deichmann, 2017: 60).
Climate change is now a scientifically proven issue and poses life-threatening impacts on human beings and ecosystems.
While the impacts of climate change in Africa are more severe, the continent continues to be more vulnerable to climate change as a result of high exposure and low adaptive capacity (Conway, 2009: 11; Gbetibouo, Ringler & Hassan, 2010: 177).
According to Schilling, Hertig, Tramblay & Scheffran (2020: 3), South Africa is more implicated with climate change, due to the high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, coupled with poor technical, financial and institutional capacity.
Agriculture is considered one of the main economic activities in South Africa, with over 60% of the population in this field, and it contributes approximately 50% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Although climate change is regarded as a global issue, its implications are not anticipated to be homogeneous, but different across generations, classes, regions, income groups, and gender (Mbow, Rosenzweig, Barioni, Benton, Herrero & Krishnapilla et al., 2019: 464).
Climate change has been considered the most prevalent environmental concern in South Africa, as the country’s mean annual temperatures have increased at least 1.5 time compared to the observed global average of 0.65ºC over the past fifty years, with an increase in frequency and intensity, due to extreme climatic events (Ziervogel, New, Archer Van Garderen, Midgley, Taylor & Hamann et al., 2014: 605).
Catastrophic events such as droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, and urban heat islands pose a significant threat to food security, water resources, infrastructure, tourism, ecosystem services, and biodiversity (Huq, Hugè, Boon & Gain, 2015: 8438; Ziervogel et al., 2014: 606).
The threat of climate change on food security, water resources, tourism, ecosystem services and biodiversity challenges national development, due to South Africa’s high levels of poverty and inequality (Ziervogel et al., 2014: 606).
Climate change projections in South Africa suggest a substantial warming of 5ºC-8ºC in the interior, wetter conditions along the eastern portion of the country, and drier conditions to the west and south of the country (DoEA, 2013).
As an outcome, south-western parts of the country are projected to become drier, especially during the winter months, and a shortened winter rainfall is expected.
The northern and eastern parts of the country are expected to experience an increase in rainfall during the summer months that may potentially cause flooding.
Furthermore, drought incidents are also expected to proliferate throughout the country.
Studies show that South Africa is susceptible to droughts and El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which sometimes causes extreme droughts (Baudoin, Vogel, Nortje & Naik, 2017: 128).
In 2015 and 2016, the country experienced an El Nino-induced drought, the severity of which resulted in the implementation of water restrictions in several cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town (Enqvist & Ziervogel, 2019: 7).
Following these mitigation plans, South Africa experienced a massive reduction in crop production as a result of these droughts.
The drought severity in the country has been increasing to a point where, on 4 March 2020, the Minister of CoOperative Governance and Traditional Affairs declared a state of drought disaster in the country (De Wet, 2020).
According to Adams, Álvarez-Romero, Capon, Crowley, Dale, Kennard, Douglas & Pressey (2017: 57), to counteract the country’s vulnerability to climate change, emergent insights on climate change strategies suggest that building resilience in human and environmental systems is an ideal way of dealing with dynamic environmental conditions and future uncertainties.
Therefore, this article evaluates whether communities in uMkhanyakude District Municipality could become resilient to climate change implications, given their vulnerability.
The purpose of using uMkhanyakude District Municipality as a case study is due to the geoeconomic setting of the area being predominantly rural and regarded as the poorest district municipality in KwaZulu-Natal.
Studies have noted that such communities are vulnerable and lack the ability to adapt to climate change impacts, due to poor technical, financial and institutional capacity (Schilling et al., 2020: 3).
As a result, this article focuses on climate change impacts, and its cascading consequences and the livelihood impacts on vulnerable communities especially in rural areas, in order to inform a bottom-up, systematic and proactive way of becoming resilient.
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Climate change policies and programmes South Africa is committed to addressing climate change issues, as it is a signatory to both the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol in terms of its efforts in reducing greenhouse gases.
In addition, South Africa has also adopted the Sustainable 44 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) Development Goals (SDGs), with Goal 1 seeking, to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere”.
Target 1.5 states that by 2030, the world must “build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate related extreme events and other economic, social, and environmental shocks and disasters”.
Furthermore, Goal 13 focuses purely on climate change, calling on “urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”.
Target 13.1 states that we must “strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries” (UN, 2016).
Nationally, the overall policy framework for climate change is the National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP), which was set out in the National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCRWP) enacted in 2011.
The NCCRWP is informed by the South African Constitution 1996, Section 241, the Bill of Rights, the National Environmental Management Act (No.
107 of 1998), the agreements made at the UNFCCC, and the Millennium Agreement.
During June 2018, there was a public participation process on a draft Climate Change Bill that would have specific objectives and laws for climate change (Averchenkova, Gannon & Curran, 2019: 12).
The Disaster Management Amended Act (No.
16 of 2015) aims to provide measures for the disaster risk reduction through adaptation to climate change and development of early warning systems.
In addition, a draft National Climate Change Adaptation (NCCA) strategy was released in 2017, but Cabinet has not adopted it.
While South Africa has progressive climate change policies, implementation has been hindered by various issues such as the lack of policy alignment, coherence and coordination; policy complexity and continuity; issues with public-private engagement and consultation; gaps and constraints in information and data, and limited staff capacity at the 1 “Everyone has a right to a healthy and safe environment”.
municipal level (Averchenkova et al., 2019: 2).
Studies suggest that, even if South Africa is committed to implementing those climate change policies, the country is still grappling with development issues such as poverty, lack of access to basic services, and the high unemployment rate (Segal & Cloete, 2012: Greenpeace Africa, 2015).
Chapter 5 of the National Development Plan (NDP) details the transition to a low-carbon economy as a response to climate change.
The NDP acknowledges that the country is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with additional threats to livelihoods, health, water, and food, especially for the poor, women and children (NDP, 2012: 33).
While this is the case, there is an inherent vulnerability of poor communities to environmental threats and pressures of a resourcebased economy (NDP, 2012: 198).2 Unfortunately, South Africa’s capacity to effectively respond to climate change is compromised by factors such as social vulnerability, dispersed and poorly planned development, as well as lack of infrastructure, instead of systematic climate-specific interventions (NDP, 2012: 200).
This has resulted in the NDP having limited success in terms of addressing climate change.
The KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS) is a notable response document to climate change for the Province.
The PGDS (2016: 30) argues that the environmental sustainability of the Province is challenged, due to erratic and severe weather conditions such as droughts, flooding, severe storms, and poor land-use practices.
This requires a great deal of attention to enhance the resilience of ecosystem services, expand the application of green technologies, as well as adapt and respond to climate change (PGDS, 1016: 37).
However, one would argue that the expansion of green technologies is ignorant of the varying realities of communities.
2 This includes coal mining, which challenges mitigation strategies to reduce the implications of climate change.
2.2.
Vulnerability Vulnerability is a concept that has a wide range of research contexts.
Its roots are found in natural hazards and geographic research, but a number of researchers use the concept in disaster management, climate change, adaptation, and development (Füssel, 2005: 1; Zarafashani, Sharafi, Azadi & Van Passel, 2016: 3).
The cross-cutting nature of the climate change problem requires collaboration from various disciplines such as disaster management, economics, policy, and risk assessment.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) links climate change with vulnerability and mentions that the vulnerability of a specific area is reliant on its economic resources, and it is based on the idea that poverty limits an area’s coping capacity (Niang, Osman-Elasha, Githeko, Yanda, Medany & Vogel, 2008: 6; Patnaik & Narayanan, 2009: 3).
Using Raemaekers and Sowman’s (2015: 5) vulnerability components, Figure 1 represents vulnerability, which is the function of the character, magnitude, rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity (Brooks, 2003: 3; Cuevas, 2011: 35; Giordano, 2014).
Vulnerability consists of three elements, namely exposure,3 sensitivity,4 and adaptive capacity5 (see Figure 1).
3 Exposure denotes the “presence of species, ecosystems, environmental functions, livelihoods, resources, social, economic or cultural assets that could be adversely affected by a climate-induced hazard” (IPCC, 2018: 5).
4 Sensitivity refers to the degree to which a system or species is affected either beneficially or adversely by climate change or variability (IPCC, 2007: 6).
5 Adaptive capacity is defined as the “potential, capability, or ability of a system to adapt to climate change stimuli or their effects of impacts (IPCC, 2001a: 6).
It is the capacity of communities using resources, skills, information technology, services and institutions to cope with climate-related hazards and adapt to climate change, in order to anticipate, cope with, prepare and recover from climatic hazards (Smit & Pilifosova, 2001: 893; Grothmann, Grecksch, Winges & Siebenhüner, 2013: 3371; Shah, Dulal & Awojobi, 2020: 221).
Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe • Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities 45 Vulnerability is categorised into biophysical and socio-economic categories.
The biophysical is rooted in the physical state of people and in those categories that are at risk; these include infrastructure, proximity, and location (Salami, Von Meding & Giggins, 2017: 3; Mavhura, 2019: 73).
The socio-economic is based on the specific population that will be affected by climate change and variability (Esperón-Rodríguez, Bonifacio-Bautista & Barradas, 2016: 147).
The socio-economic status of people determines the intensity of the impact.
The following vulnerable sectors have been evaluated to determine the impacts of climate change.
These will be discussed in terms of the biophysical and socio-economic aspects.
The biophysical aspects will evaluate climate change impacts and vulnerability in four sectors, namely biodiversity, water, agriculture, and food security.
Changes in temperature, rising carbon dioxide levels, and the changing rainfall patterns result in a shift of the country’s biomes, and this has implications for species diversity, ecosystem processes, and services (Ziervogel et al., 2014: 608; NCCRWP, 2011: 20).
This includes shifting habitat ranges and species distribution, altering life cycles, changes in migration patterns, changes in abundance, changes in frequency, and severity of pests and diseases outbreaks (Hoffman, Rymer, Byrne, Ruthrof, Whinam & McGeoch et al., 2019: 5).
Consequently, the grassland biome is under severe threat of significant structural change, and could face significant encroachment by woody vegetation, due to the increase in temperature and rising atmospheric carbon dioxide (Hoffman et al., 2019:5).
In addition, climate change significantly threatens the Nama Karoo, Forest and Fynbos biome as well as the Indian Ocean coastal belt.
Water availability is a key climate change-related vulnerability that negatively affects people, the economy, and ecosystems.
As an outcome, climate change has considerable additional risks for water security, with adverse effects on sectors that are highly dependent on water sources such as agriculture (NCCRWP, 2011: 17).
The decline in rainfall and the increase in temperature result in the increase of droughts, which contribute to the decline in ground and surface water and reduce the water table levels for dams that serve as sources of water supply, irrigation, and hydropower generation.
Agriculture remains one of the largest consumer of water (through irrigation) and it is highly vulnerable to changes in water availability and soil erosion from the intense rainfall events and the increased evapotranspiration (Gitz, Meybeck, Lipper, Young & Braatz, 2016: 4).
This is coupled with a change in their distribution, spatial shift in ideal growing regions and reduced yield (DoEA, 2013).
The under-resourced, small-scale and subsistence farmers are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, which leads to food insecurity and higher levels of poverty.
Maize, a major subsistence crop, could see the yields being reduced as much as 10% to 20% and most of the areas will become unsuitable for maize production (DoEA, 2013).
The socio-economic aspects will evaluate climate change impacts and vulnerability in two sectors, namely tourism and poverty.
Climate change is expected to have significant implications on tourism that will have associated impacts on livelihoods in terms of employment, incomes, and an increase in the cost of living (SDF, 2019: 48).
This is a concern, especially in areas such as uMkhanyakude that are dependent on the tourism sector to economically uplift communities.
The impoverished would become more vulnerable as they would require making means to survive below the poverty line.
South Africa’s adaptive capacity is predisposed by social factors such as unemployment, and poverty and by housing typology such as informal settlements, which are highly susceptible to extreme weather events.
Vulnerability is, therefore, not static, as institutions, individuals and communities including economic sectors are affected differently, irrespective of previously mentioned social factors (Mambo, 2017: 2).
Hence, vulnerability is content and location specific and should be assessed, taking account of the natural and socio-economic factors of that specific location.
2.3 Adaptation Adaptation refers to the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.
Various types of adaptation can be distinguished, including anticipatory and reactive adaptation, private daptive capacity7 (see Figure 1).
7 Adaptive capacity is defined as the “potential, capability, or ability of a system to adapt to climate change stimuli or their effects of impacts (IPCC, 2001a: 6).
It is the capacity of communities using resources, skills, information technology, services and institutions to cope with climate-related hazards and adapt to climate change, in order to anticipate, cope with, prepare and recover from climatic hazards (Smit & Pilifosova, 2001: 893; Grothmann, Grecksch, Winges & Siebenhüner, 2013: 3371; Shah, Dulal & Awojobi, 2020: 221).
Exposure Sensitivity Potential Impact Adaptive capacity Vulnerability Figure 1: Vulnerability components Source: Author’s own, 2020 46 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) and public adaptation, as well as autonomous and planned adaptation (IPCC, 2001b: 6).
Further, it also refers to actions that countries and communities implement to adjust to social and environmental impacts such as climate change.
Adaptation has three objectives, namely to reduce exposure to the risk of damage; to develop the capacity to cope with unavoidable damage, and to take advantage of new opportunities (Akinnagbe & Irohibe, 2014: 408).
Although there are noted efforts to create an adaptation planning framework by IPCC, there is no internationally agreed methodology for creating adaptation strategies.
Most of the adaptation strategies that have been created and characterised by adjustments have been done by communities (Ziervogel & Zermoglio, 2009: 134; Antwi-Agyei, Dougill & Stringer, 2013: 12).
This has been due to the fact that the impacts of climate change are localised, due to variances in demographics and economic complexities (Kihila, 2018: 3).
In addition, this indicates geographical limits in the pertinence of some of these strategies.
Consequently, the adaptation strategies created in relation to climate change impacts are defined in their own contexts (see Table 1).
3.
STUDY AREA UMkhanyakude District Municipality is the northernmost of the 11 district municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal (see Figure 2).
At 12,818km2 and with a population of 689,090, uMkhanyakude District Municipality is the second largest district in the Province, in terms of size after its neighbouring district, Zululand District Municipality (IDP, 2018/2019: 18).
It is located around latitude -27.622S and longitude 32.014E (IDP, 2018/2019: 18).
It is a peri-urban and predominantly rural district with a dependency ratio of 81.2%.
This municipality is regarded as the poorest municipality in KwaZulu-Natal and one of the poorest district municipalities in South Africa (Patrick, 2020: 4).
According to Patrick (2020: 4), the district is one of the most socio-economically deprived district municipality in South Africa, ranking 51 of the 55 most deprived.
UMkhanyakude District Municipality is characterised by poor economic development, limited infrastructure, and experiences of poor service delivery (Dlamini, 2018: 51; Mulopo, Kalinda & Chimbari, 2020: 2).
Most of the services in this district are located and distributed in the district’s urban areas and this contributes to the inability of the local municipalities6 to provide the economic stimuli for the district municipality, in order to break the poverty cycle that is affecting its economic growth and prosperity (Dlamini, 2018: 51).
Poverty has been exacerbated by high illiteracy and lack of growth opportunities within uMkhanyakude.
The poverty rate for the district municipality ranges between 72.1% and 88.6% of the total population.
According to Patrick (2020: 5), over 70% of the population in uMkhanyakude survives on less than R800 per month and over 83% of the total households live below the poverty line.
Approximately 14% of the unemployed population within the district has not received formal schooling and a further 17% only has an elementary level of education (Patrick, 2020: 5).
It is noted that the largest percentage of the unemployed population has completed Grade 12 education and a further 30% have some form of secondary education (IDP, 2018/2019: 76).
Only a small percentage of the unemployed population has completed any form of tertiary education.
The extent of poverty in the rural areas in uMkhanyakude has forced 95% of the inhabitants to survive through subsistence farming, grants from the 6 UMhlabuyalingana Municipality (KZ 271), Jozini Municipality (KZ 272), Mtubatuba Municipality (KZ 275) and the Big Five Hlabisa Municipality (KZ 276).
Table 1: Adaptation responses to climate change Sector Adaptation strategies Biodiversity Strengthen institutional arrangements to further develop expanded public works programmes (EPWP) for building ecosystem and community resilience through the restoration of wetlands, controlling wildfires, removing alien plants and other sustainability programmes.
These approaches can be included at local government (DoEA, 2016: 58) Water Adopt a low or no-regrets approach concerning decisions about water infrastructure, in the context of climate change, to balance socio-economic considerations with ecological considerations (DoEA, 2016: 50) Agriculture Crop management Crop diversification, intercropping, crop rotation, increase of farm size, use of organic/chemical fertiliser, drought-tolerant/early maturing varieties, change timing of land preparation/planting, crop irrigation, grain storage, sharecropping.
Climatesmart agriculture, extension support (Kihila, 2018: 4-5; Wiederkehr, Beckmann & Hermans, 2018: 7) Soil and water management Erosion control, terracing, drainage ditches, ridges, micro-catchments, ploughing, stone bunds, mulching, digging of boreholes and wells, construction of small dams, water storage, drinking water treatment (Wiederkehr et al., 2018: 7) Early warning system Provision of seasonal forecast or community weather monitoring station (DoEA, 2018: 24) Human health Ensure provision of clean sanitation and freshwater services to reduce waterborne diseases.
Continuous water quality tests should be done frequently to monitor and manage the spread of water-borne diseases.
Manage the incidence and spread of climate-related water-borne disease vectors (DoEA, 2016: 61) Indigenous knowledge Encourage the local people to practise and share their indigenous knowledge information (Kihila, 2018: 2) Other adaptation strategies Social networks Rely on support from friends or relatives, receive remittances (Wiederkehr et al., 2018: 7) Income diversification Trading, pottery, tourism, local wage labour, sell bush plants (Wiederkehr et al., 2018: 7) Food provision Work for food, eat wild fruits, change diet, reduce food consumption, seek food aid, buy food, sell assets to buy food, harvest to obtain food, plant food trees, store food (Wiederkehr et al., 2018: 7) Source: DoEA (2016; 2018; 2019); Kihila (2018); Wiederkehr et al.
(2018) Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe • Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities 47 government as well as remittances from family members working outside the municipality (Dlamini, 2018: 53; SDF, 2019/2020: 45).
The main economic sectors in uMkhanyakude are agriculture, tourism, and trade.
However, all these sectors have experienced adverse effects, due to the impacts of climate change.
4.
METHODOLOGY A qualitative secondary data approach was used to evaluate whether vulnerable communities in uMkhanyakude District Municipality could become resilient to the implications of climate change (Ruggiano & Perry, 2019: 83).
The gathered data included the strategic framework, integrated development plan and related climate change plans from uMkhanyakude District Municipality, as well as relevant journal articles that were accessed through Google Scholar, Scopus and Science Direct.
The search criteria included “climate change”, “vulnerability”, “adaptation”, “food security”, “agriculture”, “water”, “biodiversity”, “tourism”, “poverty” in the topic field of literature, in order to determine the impacts of climate change and their cascading consequences on the biophysical and socio-economic aspects.
The gathered data used content analysis, whereby related climate change data was evaluated to reflect on key aspects such as the biophysical and socio-economic that have been used to determine whether uMkhanyakude could become resilient (Bengtsson, 2016: 8).
Therefore, a concise summary of key findings, categorised according to the biophysical and socio-economic aspects (agriculture, water, food security, biodiversity, tourism and poverty) evaluates whether vulnerable communities within the District Municipality could become resilient.
5.
FINDINGS 5.1 Biophysical aspects 5.1.1 Biodiversity According to Hoffman et al.
(2019: 5), the main implication of climate change on biodiversity is the decrease in the availability and quantity of suitable habitats, and some ecosystems may expand into new areas, while others may decrease.
Consistent with biophysical conditions in uMkhanyakude District Municipality, there has been a loss of high-priority biomes such as Figure 2: Locality map of uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source Figure 2: Locality map of uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source: Author’s own (2020) 48 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) grasslands and coastal belts.
There has also been an increase in the proliferation of invasive alien species, which outcompete indigenous plants (see Table 2) (IDP, 2018/2019: 44).
Table 2: Invasive alien species contained in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Invasive alien species Condensed hectares (Ha) Chromolaena odorata 31,522 Eucalyptus spp.
4,314 Lantana camara 1,538 Psidium guajava 872 Pinus spp.
315 Melia azedarach 176 Solanum mauritianum 149 Source: IDP, 2018/2019: 44 It is worth noting that a total of 19 invasive alien species were singled out for eradication, of which five were identified as priority species for immediate attention and eradication, namely Ipomoea carnea subsp., Fistulosa, Pereskia aculeate, Chromolaena odorata, and the Lantana camara (IDP, 2018/2019: 44).
According to the IDP (2018/2019: 44), some work is done within the District regarding alien plant control through programmes by the Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, Ezemvelo KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife, iSimangaliso Wetland Park, and the Department of Water and Sanitation.
5.1.2 Water According to the IDP (2018/2019: 82), access to basic water infrastructure remains one of the key challenges within the District.
This is supported by the proportion of households that have access to water through regional and local water schemes, being 42% compared to the provincial figure of 72% (IDP, 2018/2019: 82).
Approximately 30% of the households utilise untreated sources of water directly from dams, springs or rivers, and this is alarming as the provincial total is only 13%.
According to Dlamini (2018: 58), the District falls within the Mfolozi/ Pongolo primary catchment area, one of the District’s main catchment area that is shared with neighbouring countries Swaziland and Mozambique, and the bordering municipalities.
The transboundary nature of the catchment area and the diverse aquatic and wetland inhabitants of the water system rely on sustainable management of the system’s resources (Dlamini, 2018: 57).
These features have contributed significantly towards the main economic sectors; however, the unstable supply of water has compromised most if not all of these sectors.
Jozini Local Municipality is home to one of the largest dams in KwaZuluNatal, the Jozini Dam, which was recognised, near the town of Jozini in 1973, as part of the PongolapoortMakhathini flats Government Water Scheme (GWS) (Dlamini, 2018: 58).
The Jozini Dam was primarily built for controlling flooding and storing water for irrigation of agriculture.
While this is one of the largest dams in the country, it also has the potential to assist in terms of supplying water to the District (see Figure 3).
Unfortunately, due to the historical development of this dam and private ownership rights, it has contributed less to the inhabitants who need water for subsistence farming and consumption (Dlamini, 2018: 58).
Over the years, other water sources within the District have experienced a considerable decline in water quality, as a result of sugarcane farming and the seepage of sulphate from adjacent mines (Dlamini, 2018: 61).
Other factors include the Mfolozi River which has less water during Figure 3: Pongolapoort/Jozini Dam Source: Dlamini, 2018: 59 Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe • Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities 49 dry seasons.
This has contributed to the high silt abstraction levels.
Furthermore, the deterioration of water quality has led to a lack of drinkable water and water cleanliness in the District, as per the waterquality standards.
The increase in water-related natural disasters means that less water is available to dilute wastewater discharges and irrigation return flows to rivers, and the uMfolozi and Phongolo rivers are dry (SDF, 2019: 48).
In terms of availability, less water is available for drinking and irrigation, and the increase in drought events results in less water being available for domestic use.
The Jozini, Hluhluwe and uMfolozi rivers have low water levels (Gwala, 2018: 48).
Figure 4 highlights the average rainfall over a period of time in uMkhanyakude, in accordance with 4 water features, using the Standardised Precipitation Index (SPI) measured in millimetres.
According to Gwala (2018: 48), the Mbhuzana river experienced the highest rainfall in 1996 with 1 millimetre and the lowest rainfall in 2015 with -2.5 millimetres.
The Riverview river experienced its highest rainfall in 2000 with 2 millimetres and the lowest in 2016 with -3 millimetres.
The Pongolapoort Dam experienced its highest rainfall in 2000 with 2 millimetres and the lowest in 2003 with 1.5 millimetres.
The Ingwavuma Manguzi river experienced its highest rainfall in 2000 with 1.5 millimetres and its lowest in 2016 with -4 millimetres (Gwala, 2018: 49).
SPI drought categories indicate that between 0 to -0.99 of the drought category is mild drought; -1 to -1.49 is moderate drought; -1.5 to -1.99 is severe drought, and -2.00 or less is extreme drought.
Figure 4 shows that the extreme drought years were between 2015 and 2016 for Mbhuzana and Ingwavuma Manguzi, respectively.
To address water quality, waterrelated infrastructure and climate change, uMkhanyakude developed a Water Master Plan that was adopted by the Council in 2017.
It revealed that most of the existing infrastructure is in a state of disrepair, due to years of poor maintenance and negligence (IDP, 2018/2019: 125).
The lack of maintenance of the existing infrastructure has given rise to high maintenance backlogs, resulting in limited water supplies for most of the communities.
The Plan identifies the maintenance and upgrade requirements for the district, which compete for limited fiscal resources with new infrastructure meant for first time access to water resources.
5.1.3 Agriculture Agriculture is considered to be one of the cornerstones of the District’s economic development.
A substantial portion of land in the District, which is predominantly located on the eastern part of uMkhanyakude consists of high agricultural potential (see Figure 5).
Approximately 20% of the District is considered to have high potential agricultural activities, with 52% considered as having medium low water levels (Gwala, 2018: 48).
Figure 4: The severity of drought for Mbhuzana river, Riverview river, Pongolapoort Dam and Ingwavuma Manguzi river using the Standardised Precipitation Index (Gwala, 2018: 50) Figure 4: The severity of drought for Mbhuzana river, Riverview river, Pongolapoort Dam and Ingwavuma Manguzi river using the Standardised Precipitation Index (Gwala, 2018: 50) 50 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) potential (IDP, 2018/2019: 67).
It is noted that land with high agricultural potential is under threat from unsustainable land uses, poor agricultural practices, and land reform.
This land requires suitable protection for potential commercial agricultural uses in the future.
According to the IDP (2018/2019: 41), nearly 95% of the uMkhanyakude’s population are rural dwellers, of whom most of the households rely at least partly on subsistence agriculture to meet their food requirements.
Big Five Hlabisa is characterised by commercial and subsistence agriculture, which is most widespread in the old Hlabisa municipal side covering most of the area.
The Big Five False Bay Municipality is characterised by both commercial and subsistence agriculture around Hluhluwe (SDF, 2019: 45).
UMhlabuyalingana is bordered by the Pongola River in the west, which incorporates the Pongola Floodplains and the Makhathini Flats that contain Figure 5: Agricultural potential in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source: IDP, 2018/2019: 70 Figure 5: Agricultural potential in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source: IDP, 2018/2019: 70 Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe • Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities 51 formal and irrigated croplands (IDP, 2018/2019: 68).
Irregular subsistence agriculture occurs within the central and eastern areas, and this is partially due to the general lack of water resources, which compromises permanent water for irrigation of crops.
Another contributing factor is the poorly drained area.
The reason why the area is mainly unsuitable for agriculture is due to the great extent to which the municipality is situated in a near natural ecological state (IDP, 2018/2019: 68).
Mtubatuba has a very high agricultural potential, and it is the least rural municipal area of uMkhanyakude.
According to the IDP (2018/2019: 68), the expansion of the iSimangaliso Wetland Park has meant that there is competition for land resources in Mtubatuba, especially in the southern regions.
To protect commercial agricultural activities and forestry, the municipality has endorsed its urban edge development strategy to promote sustainable development.
Sugarcane is the dominant commercial crop in the District and has had an impact on the local watercourses.
Further, sugarcane farming practices tend to encroach on the riparian parts of rivers which has a negative impact.
The high volumes of irrigation water needed means that the watercourses only receive a substantial amount of agricultural runoff (IDP, 2018/2019: 68).
5.1.4 Food security Climate change projections suggest that rain-fed agriculture in uMkhanyakude is likely to be negatively affected, due to lower annual rainfall, high temperatures, increased hydrological risk, increased rainfall variability, drying of top soils, less water in the soil for irrigating plants, and increased irrigation needs.
For that reason, this forms the basis for small-holder agriculture.
UMkhanyakude has approximately 20% of land that has high agricultural potential.
Unfortunately, infrastructural backlogs, climaterelated impacts on water resources as well as agricultural practices that are unsustainable and have negative impacts have adverse impacts on food security and livelihoods (IDP, 2018/2019: 41).
There are no statistics to indicate how many households are at risk of food insecurity or findings to depict future trends in terms of food security.
5.2 Socio-economic aspects 5.2.1 Tourism According to the IDP (2018/2019: 145), uMkhanyakude District Municipality has one of the best climatic conditions in KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa and contributes significantly towards tourism.
This entails warm weather, which is conducive for renewable energy generation.
However, climate change is projected to have a significant impact on the tourism sector, with resultant impacts on livelihoods in uMkhanyakude.
A rise in sea level and loss of biodiversity are projected to impact on the tourism sector, since uMkhanyakude has some of the most pristine dune environments in the world, and their erosion would be a significant loss in terms of tourism and livelihoods.
Consequently, it is worth noting that it is not possible to quantify the impacts on tourism and livelihoods, as an outcome of the loss of biodiversity and changes in sea level (SDF, 2019: 48).
5.2.2 Poverty Social inequalities such as lack of access to basic services, income, urban-bias, spatial and poverty are most prevalent in the rural areas, and increase the individuals’ exposure to climate hazards, increase the susceptibility to damage caused by climatic hazards, and decrease the ability to cope with and recover from the damage (UNICEF, 2011; Cardona, Van Aalyst, Birkmann, Fordham, McGregor & Perez et al., 2012; Islam & Winkel, 2017; Hallegatte, Voqt-Schilb, Rozenberg, Bangalore & Baudet, 2020).
According to Patrick (2020: 5), the poverty rate of the District is extremely high and ranges between 72.1% and 88.6% of the total population; high illiteracy rates have been identified to increase levels of poverty.
According to the IDP (2018/2019: 76), the completion of secondary school education does not guarantee any form of formal employment, as 35% of the unemployed population has a secondary school qualification (see Figure 6).
Figure 6 highlights that a tertiary education or a skills-based qualification guarantees, to some extent, employment to contribute towards transforming the District.
In uMkhanyakude, approximately 70% of the unemployed population is younger than 35 years of age, of whom 35.2% is younger than 25 years of age, and 34.9% is aged between 25 and 34 years (IDP, 2018/2019: 75).
The vast majority of the unemployed population younger than 25 years was under the Hlabisa Local Municipality during the 2011 STATS census; this local municipality has since been merged with Big Five False Bay Municipality.
This means that the Big Five Hlabisa Municipality has the highest rate of unemployment of individuals under the age of 25 years.
Table 3 highlights that uMkhanyakude District Municipality has a low adaptive capacity to the implications of climate change.
This is projected to result in poor and rural communities being increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
6.
CONCLUSION This article evaluated whether vulnerable communities in uMkhanyakude District Municipality, which is predominantly rural and regarded as the poorest district municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, could become resilient to the implications of climate change.
The focus was on the implications of climate change in uMkhanyakude District Municipality, using the vulnerability categories of biophysical and socio-economic.
Climate change remains one of the biggest environmental challenges in South Africa, with severe implications for socio-economic livelihoods of the rural people.
It is evident 52 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) transforming the District.
Figure 6: Level of education of unemployed population in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source: IDP, 2018/2019: 77 Figure 6: Level of education of unemployed population in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source: IDP, 2018/2019: 77 highest rate of unemployment of individuals under the age of 25 years.
Figure 7: Employment status of economically active population in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source: IDP, 2018/2019: 75 Figure 7: Employment status of economically active population in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Source: IDP, 2018/2019: 75 Table 3: Vulnerable sectors in uMkhanyakude District Municipality Sector Sector description Exposure Sensitivity Adaptive capacity Water resources Less water available for irrigation and drinking.
Yes High Low Biodiversity Loss of priority wetlands and river ecosystems.
Yes High Low Agriculture and food security Increased exposure to pests such as eldana, chilo and codling moth Change in grain (maize, wheat and barley) Yes High Low Human health Increased water-borne and communicable diseases (typhoid, fever, cholera, and hepatitis) Yes High Low Source: uMkhanyakude Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment and Response Plan, 2019: 7-8 that climate change is a natural phenomenon.
However, the climate is changing at abnormal rates, due to the interference of human activities on climatic variables.
The findings revealed that, in terms of the biophysical aspects of uMkhanyakude, the District’s invasive alien species compromise water security and ecosystem services since they compete with crops.
This impacts on food security.
Findings further revealed that, although climate change mainly impacts on water resources within the District, infrastructural backlogs due to poor maintenance and negligence also impact on the communities’ access to water resources.
Although agriculture is considered one of the cornerstones of the District’s economic development, tourism and trade industries contribute significantly towards the overall functioning of the Municipality.
Climate change impacts on agriculture, while unsustainable land management causes a decline in food security, poor agricultural yields and crop production as well as the loss of income for small-holder farmers.
This compromises the livelihoods of communities that are dependent on rain-fed agriculture.
Vulnerable communities in uMkhanyakude District Municipality have a low adaptive capacity, which limits their ability to become resilient to the implications of climate change.
Further, due to their disaster management unit operating in a silo and lacking bottom-up participation of vulnerable communities, the importance of indigenous knowledge has been overlooked when it comes to drafting plans to address climate change and natural disasters.
Until there is a shift in terms of paradigms, uMkhanyakude will continue to face the impacts of climate change and their cascading consequences, unless there is a systematic, bottom-up and proactive initiative that will consider grassroot participation, in order to become resilient.
This research thus shows that uMkhanyakude District Municipality is not resilient to the implications of climate change, due Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe • Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities 53 to top-down approaches and reactive strategies to climate change.
7.
RECOMMENDATIONS The use of indigenous knowledge is significant in climate change adaptation and building resilience, and this is recognised through enabling indigenous knowledge in the design and implementation of projects sustainably (Kihila, 2018: 2).
Although indigenous communities are localised, they have emancipatory knowledge that could be considered and used to improve the resilience to climate change.
Participatory governance could also assist in finding solutions that consider the environmental characteristics of a region, which could make the solutions manageable and meaningful.
Due to their comprehension on complex social-ecological systems, they make it easier for the development of useful and effective coping and adaptation strategies (Adams et al., 2017: 57).
One of the management priorities for combating climate change is to create awareness (SDF, 2019/2020: 45); however, one may argue that creating awareness is not sufficient to building resilience and addressing the implications of climate change.
Hence, it is recommended that improving resilience to climate change could implement sustainable development and improve coping capacity.
Planning for adaptation must begin with an assessment of the vulnerable communities including their coping capacities and the realisation that adaptation strategies are susceptible to change, and they are not universal.
This may be more beneficial than solely creating awareness to climate change.
A climate change strategy was recommended in the uMkhanyakude District Municipality (IDP Review 2018/2019).
However, Ziervogel et al.
(2014: 613) argue that there are institutional barriers in addressing climate change.
These institutional barriers include a lack of capacity both in terms of communities and technical rationality, high turnover of staff in government departments, limited comprehension of, and expertise in tackling climate-related issues, climate change being regarded as a development challenge instead of an environmental challenge that affects livelihoods.
These barriers may take some time to resolve.
The implications of climate change continue to affect communities.
Therefore, in the case of uMkhanyakude District Municipality, while institutional barriers are considered, an implementation-oriented process that will take place in a systematic, proactive and bottom-up manner, needs to commence to ensure that vulnerable communities have access to bulk infrastructure.
Lastly, conducting social impact assessments (SIAs) would be beneficial when systematic, bottomup and proactive measures are in place within the district municipality.
This would assist in terms of assessing social consequences that are likely to follow from specific policy actions or project development, especially in the context of appropriate national or provincial environmental policy legislation (Esteves, Franks & Vanclay, 2012).
Conducting social impact assessments would prevent unnecessary environmental consequences of development to the most vulnerable social groups and play a significant role towards sustainable development.
REFERENCES ADAMS, V.M., ÁLVAREZ-ROMERO, J.G., CAPON, S.J., CROWLEY, G.M., DALE, A.P., KENNARD, M.J., DOUGLAS, M.M.
& PRESSEY, R.L.
2017.
Making time for space: The critical role of spatial planning in adapting natural resource management to climate change.
Environmental Science & Policy, 74(C), pp.
57-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
envsci.2017.05.003 AKINNAGBE, O.M.
& IROHIBE, I.J.
2014.
Agricultural adaptation strategies to climate change impacts in Africa: A review.
Bangladesh Journal of Agricultural Research, 39(3), pp.
407418. https://doi.org/10.3329/bjar.
v39i3.21984 ANTWI-AGYEI, P., DOUGILL, A.J.
& STRINGER, L.C.
2013.
Barriers to climate change adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from northeast Ghana and systematic literature review.
Climate and Development, 7(4), pp.
297-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2014 .951013 AVERCHENKOVA, A., GANNON, K.E.
& CURRAN, P. 2019.
Governance of climate change policy: A case study of South Africa.
London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science.
BAUDOIN, M.A., VOGEL, C., NORTJE, K. & NAIK, M. 2017.
Living with drought in South Africa: Lessons learnt from the recent El Niño drought period.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, vol.
23, pp.
128-137. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.005 BENGTSSON, M. 2016.
How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis.
Nursing Plus Open, vol.
2, pp.
8-14. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.npls.2016.01.001 BROOKS, N. 2003.
Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: A conceptual framework.
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper, 38(38), pp.
1-16.
CARDONA, O.D., VAN AALST, M.K., BIRKMANN, J., FORDHAM, M., MCGREGOR, G. & PEREZ, R. et al.
2012.
Determinants of risk: Exposure and vulnerability.
In: Field, C.B., Barros, V., Stocker, T.F.
et al.
(Eds).
Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation.
A special report of working groups i and ii of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.
65-108.
CONWAY, G. 2009.
The science of climate change in Africa: Impacts and adaptation.
Discussion Paper No.
1.
London: Grantham Institute for Climate Change.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.05.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.05.003 https://doi.org/10.3329/bjar.v39i3.21984 https://doi.org/10.3329/bjar.v39i3.21984 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2014.951013 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2014.951013 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.npls.2016.01.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.npls.2016.01.001 54 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) CUEVAS, S.C. 2011.
Climate change, vulnerability, and risk linkages.
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 3(1), pp.
29-60. https://doi.
org/10.1108/17568691111107934 DoEA (DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS).
2013.
Long-term adaptation scenarios flagship research programme (LTAS) for South Africa.
Pretoria: Department of Environmental Affairs.
DoEA (DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS).
2016.
South Africa National Adaptation Strategy Draft for Comments.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.environment.
gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/nas2016.
pdf> [Accessed: 29 June 2020].
DoEA (DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS).
2018.
South Africa’s low emission development strategy 2050.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.environment.
gov.za/sites/default/files/strategic_ plans/southafricans_lowemission_ developmentstrategy_dec2018draft.
pdf> [Accessed: 13 June 2020].
DoEA (DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS).
2019.
Draft National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy.
[Online].
Available at: <https://cer.org.za/wp-content/ uploads/2019/05/DEA-Draft-climatechange-adaptation-strategy.pdf> [Accessed: 30 June 2020].
DE WET, P. 2020.
Two years later, SA’s drought has just been declared a national emergency – again.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.
businessinsider.co.za/south-africasdrought-was-just-declared-a-nationalemergency-2020-3> [Accessed: 1 June 2020].
DLAMINI, S.H.
2018.
Assessing the capacity of municipalities for water provision within a rural context: A case study of uMkhanyakude District Municipality, KwaZuluNatal, South Africa.
Unpublished Masters dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal.
ENQVIST, J.P. & ZIERVOGEL, G. 2019.
Water governance and justice in Cape Town: An overview.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water, 6(4), p.e1354.
doi: 10.1002/wat2.1354 ESPERÓN-RODRÍGUEZ, M., BONIFACIO-BAUTISTA, M. & BARRADAS, V.L.
2016.
Socioeconomic vulnerability to climate change in the central mountainous region of eastern Mexico.
Ambio, 45(2), pp.
146-160. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s13280-015-0690-4 ESTEVES, A.M., FRANKS, D. & VANCLAY, F. 2012.
Social impact assessment: The state of the art.
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 30(1), pp.
34-42. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14615517.2012.660356 FÜSSEL, H.M. 2005.
Vulnerability in climate change research: A comprehensive conceptual framework.
Stanford University Paper 6.
Breslauer Symposium, University of California.
GBETIBOUO, G.A., RINGLER, C. & HASSAN, R. 2010.
Vulnerability of the South African farming sector to climate change and variability: An indicator approach.
Natural Resources Forum, 34(3), pp.
175-187. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.2010.01302.x GIORDANO, F. 2014.
Climate change vulnerability and risk: Key concepts.
Roma: Instituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale.
GITZ, V., MEYBECK, A., LIPPER, L., YOUNG, C.D.
& BRAATZ, S. 2016.
Climate change and food security: Risks and responses.
Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Report, 110.
GREENPEACE AFRICA.
2015.
South Africa’s intended nationally determined contribution [Presentation].
Cape Town: Greenpeace Africa.
GROTHMANN, T., GRECKSCH, K., WINGES, M. & SIEBENHÜNER, B.
2013.
Assessing institutional capacities to adapt to climate change: Integrating psychological dimensions in the Adaptive Capacity Wheel.
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 13(12), pp.
3369-3384. https://doi.
org/10.5194/nhess-13-3369-2013 GWALA, N. 2018.
Mapping and monitoring of agricultural drought across different land uses and land cover in the North-Eastern KwaZulu Natal.
Unpublished Masters dissertation, Wits University.
HALLEGATTE, S., VOGT-SCHILB, A., ROZENBERG, J., BANGALORE, M. & BEAUDET, C. 2020.
From poverty to disaster and back: A review of the literature.
Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, 4(5), pp.
1-25. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s41885-020-00060-5 HENDERSON, J.V., STOREYGARD, A.
& DEICHMANN, U.
2017.
Has climate change driven urbanization in Africa?
Journal of Development Economics, vol.
124(C), pp.
60-82. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.09.001 HOFFMANN, A.A., RYMER, P.D., BYRNE, M., RUTHROF, K.X., WHINAM, J.
& MCGEOCH, M. et al.
2019.
Impacts of recent climate change on terrestrial flora and fauna: Some emerging Australian examples.
Austral Ecology, 44(1), pp.
3-27. https://doi.
org/10.1111/aec.12674 HUQ, N., HUGÉ, J., BOON, E. & GAIN, A.K.
2015.
Climate change impacts in agricultural communities in rural areas of coastal Bangladesh: A tale of many stories.
Sustainability, 7(7), pp.
8437-8460. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su7078437 IDP (INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLAN).
UMkhanyakude district municipality review, 2018/2019.
[Online].
Available at: <http:// www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/ uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip> [Accessed: 22 May 2020].
IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2001a.
Climate change.
The scientific basis.
London: Cambridge University Press.
IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2001b.
Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report.
A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Watson, R.T. & the Core Writing Team (Eds)].
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 398 pp.
IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2007.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: Working group II contributing to the fourth assessment report.
[Parry, M., Parry, M.L., Canziani, O., Palutikof, J., Van der Linden, P. & Hanson, C. (Eds)].
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1108/17568691111107934 https://doi.org/10.1108/17568691111107934 http://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/nas2016.pdf http://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/nas2016.pdf http://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/nas2016.pdf https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/strategic_plans/southafricans_lowemission_developmentstrategy_dec2018draft.pdf https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/strategic_plans/southafricans_lowemission_developmentstrategy_dec2018draft.pdf https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/strategic_plans/southafricans_lowemission_developmentstrategy_dec2018draft.pdf https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/strategic_plans/southafricans_lowemission_developmentstrategy_dec2018draft.pdf https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/strategic_plans/southafricans_lowemission_developmentstrategy_dec2018draft.pdf https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/DEA-Draft-climate-change-adaptation-strategy.pdf https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/DEA-Draft-climate-change-adaptation-strategy.pdf https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/DEA-Draft-climate-change-adaptation-strategy.pdf https://www.businessinsider.co.za/south-africas-drought-was-just-declared-a-national-emergency-2020-3 https://www.businessinsider.co.za/south-africas-drought-was-just-declared-a-national-emergency-2020-3 https://www.businessinsider.co.za/south-africas-drought-was-just-declared-a-national-emergency-2020-3 https://www.businessinsider.co.za/south-africas-drought-was-just-declared-a-national-emergency-2020-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-015-0690-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-015-0690-4 https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2012.660356 https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2012.660356 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.2010.01302.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.2010.01302.x https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-13-3369-2013 https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-13-3369-2013 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41885-020-00060-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41885-020-00060-5 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.09.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.09.001 https://doi.org/10.1111/aec.12674 https://doi.org/10.1111/aec.12674 https://doi.org/10.3390/su7078437 https://doi.org/10.3390/su7078437 http://www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip http://www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip http://www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip Anele Mthembu & Syathokoza Hlophe • Building resilience to climate change in vulnerable communities 55 IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2018.
Global warming of 1.5°C.
Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.
ISLAM, N. & WINKEL, J.
2017.
Climate change and social inequality.
DESA Working Paper No.
152.
ST/ESA/2017/ DWP/152, October.
Paper prepared for the World Economic and Social Survey, Department of Economic & Social Affairs.
KIHILA, J.M.
2018.
Indigenous coping and adaptation strategies to climate change of local communities in Tanzania: A review.
Climate and Development, 10(5), pp.
406-416. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017 .1318739 MAMBO, J.
2017.
Risk and vulnerability to global and climate change in South Africa.
In: Mambo, J.
& Faccer, K. (Eds).
South African risk and vulnerability atlas: Understanding the social and environmental implications of global change.
2nd edition.
Pretoria: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), pp.
1-6.
MAVHURA, E. 2019.
Analysing drivers of vulnerability to flooding: A systems approach.
South African Geographical Journal, 101(1), pp.
72-90. https://doi.or g/10.1080/03736245.2018.1541020 MBOW, C., ROSENZWEIG, C., BARIONI, L.G., BENTON, T.G., HERRERO, M. & KRISHNAPILLAI, M. et al.
2019.
Chapter 5: Food security.
In: Shukla, P.R., Skea, J.
& Calvo Buendia, E. et al.
(Eds).
Climate change and land: An IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems.
USA: IPCC, pp.
437-550.
MULOPO, C., KALINDA, C. & CHIMBARI, M.J. 2020.
Contextual and psychosocial factors influencing the use of safe water sources: A case of Madeya Village, uMkhanyakude District, South Africa.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(4), article 1349, pp.
1-11. https://doi.org/10.3390/ ijerph17041349 NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE WHITE PAPER.
2011.
[Online].
Available at: <environment.
gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/ national_climatechange_response_ whitepaper.pdf> [Accessed: 1 June 2020].
NDP (NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN).
2012.
Our future – Make it work.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.gov.za/issues/nationaldevelopment-plan-2030> [Accessed: 25 May 2020].
NIANG, I., OSMAN-ELASHA, B., GITHEKO, A., YANDA, P.Z., MEDANY, M. & VOGEL, A. et al.
2008.
Africa climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
London: Cambridge University Press.
PATNAIK, U.
& NARAYANAN, K. 2009.
Vulnerability and climate change: An analysis of the eastern coastal districts of India.
Munich, Germany: MPRA.
PATRICK, H.O.
2020.
Climate change, water security, and conflict potentials in South Africa: Assessing conflict and coping strategies in rural South Africa.
In: Filho, W.L., Luetz, L.M.
& Ayal, D. (Eds).
Handbook of climate change management: Research, leadership, transformation.
Switzerland: Springer, pp.
1-18. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-22759-3_84-1 PGDS (PROVINCIAL GROWTH DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY).
2016.
KwaZulu-Natal: Moving KZN towards achieving vision 2035.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.cesa.co.za/ sites/default/files/20161107_CESA%20 Indaba_Implementation%20SIPDM_ Rob%20Kempen.pptx.pdf> [Accessed: 22 May 2020].
RAEMAEKERS, S. & SOWMAN, M. 2015.
Community-level socioecological vulnerability assessments in the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem.
Rome: FAO.
RSA (REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA).
1996.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.gov.za/documents/ constitution-republic-south-africa-1996> [Accessed: 13 November 2020].
RSA (REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA).
1998.
National Environmental Management Act, No.
107 of 1998.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.
kruger2canyons.org/029%20 -%20NEMA.pdf> [Accessed: 13 November 2020].
RSA (REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA).
2015.
Disaster Management Amended Act, No.
16 of 2015.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.gov.za/sites/default/ files/gcis_document/201512/39520ac t16of2015disastermanamendact.pdf> [Accessed: 13 November 2020].
RUGGIANO, N. & PERRY, T.E.
2019.
Conducting secondary analysis of qualitative data: Should we, can we, and how?
Qualitative Social Work, 18(1), pp.
81-97. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1473325017700701 SALAMI, R.O., VON MEDING, J.K. & GIGGINS, H. 2017.
Vulnerability of human settlements to flood risk in the core area of Ibadan metropolis, Nigeria.
Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 9(1), pp.
1-14. https://doi.
org/10.4102/jamba.v9i1.371 SCHILLING, J., HERTIG, E., TRAMBLAY, Y.
& SCHEFFRAN, J.
2020.
Climate change vulnerability, water resources and social implications in North Africa.
Regional Environmental Change, 20(1), article number 15, pp.
1-12. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10113-020-01597-7 SDF (UMKHANYAKUDE DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK).
2019.
[Online].
Available at: <http:// www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/ uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip> [Accessed: 22 May 2020].
SEGAL, N. & CLOETE, B.
2012.
Combating climate change: How might “green” growth facilitate or hinder SA’s developmental objectives?
Pretoria: DNA Economics.
SHAH, K.U., DULAL, H.B.
& AWOJOBI, M.T.
2020.
Food security and livelihood vulnerability to climate change in Trinidad and Tobago.
In: Connell, J.
& Lewitt, K. (Eds).
Food security in small island states.
Singapore: Springer, pp.
219-237. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-981-13-8256-7_12 SMIT, B.
& PILIFOSOVA, O.
2001.
Adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equity.
In: McCarthy, J.J., Canziani, O.F.
& Leary, N.A.
(Eds).
Climate change 2001: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, Chapter 18, pp.
879-906. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1318739 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1318739 https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2018.1541020 https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2018.1541020 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17041349 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17041349 environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030 https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030 https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22759-3_84-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22759-3_84-1 http://www.cesa.co.za/sites/default/files/20161107_CESA%2520Indaba_Implementation%2520SIPDM_Rob%2520Kempen.pptx.pdf http://www.cesa.co.za/sites/default/files/20161107_CESA%2520Indaba_Implementation%2520SIPDM_Rob%2520Kempen.pptx.pdf http://www.cesa.co.za/sites/default/files/20161107_CESA%2520Indaba_Implementation%2520SIPDM_Rob%2520Kempen.pptx.pdf http://www.cesa.co.za/sites/default/files/20161107_CESA%2520Indaba_Implementation%2520SIPDM_Rob%2520Kempen.pptx.pdf https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 http://www.kruger2canyons.org/029%2520-%2520NEMA.pdf http://www.kruger2canyons.org/029%2520-%2520NEMA.pdf http://www.kruger2canyons.org/029%2520-%2520NEMA.pdf https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201512/39520act16of2015disastermanamendact.pdf https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201512/39520act16of2015disastermanamendact.pdf https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201512/39520act16of2015disastermanamendact.pdf https://doi.org/10.1177/1473325017700701 https://doi.org/10.1177/1473325017700701 https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v9i1.371 https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v9i1.371 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-020-01597-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-020-01597-7 http://www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip http://www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip http://www.kzncogta.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Umkhanyakude.zip https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8256-7_12 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8256-7_12 56 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) UMKHANYAKUDE DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE PLAN.
2019.
Available at: http://www.letsrespondtoolkit.
org/project-info/project-updates/ kzn-workshops/umkhanyakude-districtmunicipality-climate-change-reviewworkshop> [Accessed: 22 May 2020].
UN (UNITED NATIONS).
2016.
Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
New York: United Nations.
[Online].
Available at: <www.
sustainabledevelopment.un.org> [Accessed: 15 June 2020].
UNICEF.
2011.
Exploring the impact of climate change on children in South Africa.
Pretoria: United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
WIEDERKEHR, C., BECKMANN, M. & HERMANS, K. 2018.
Environmental change, adaptation strategies and the relevance of migration in subSaharan drylands.
Environmental Research Letter, 13(11), article number 113003, pp.
1-18. https://doi.
org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae6de ZARAFSHANI, K., SHARAFI, L., AZADI, H. & VAN PASSEL, S. 2016.
Vulnerability assessment models to drought: Toward a conceptual framework.
Sustainability, 8(6), article number 588, pp.1-21.
doi:10.3390/ su8060588 ZIERVOGEL, G. & ZERMOGLIO, F. 2009.
Climate change scenarios and the development of adaptation strategies in Africa: Challenges and opportunities.
Climate Research, 40(2-3), pp.
133-146. https://doi.
org/10.3354/cr00804 ZIERVOGEL, G., NEW, M., ARCHER VAN GARDEREN, E., MIDGLEY, G., TAYLOR, A.
& HAMANN, R. et al.
2014.
Climate change impacts and adaptation in South Africa.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(5), pp.
605-620. https://doi.org/10.1002/ wcc.295 http://www.letsrespondtoolkit.org/project-info/project-updates/kzn-workshops/umkhanyakude-district-municipality-climate-change-review-workshop http://www.letsrespondtoolkit.org/project-info/project-updates/kzn-workshops/umkhanyakude-district-municipality-climate-change-review-workshop http://www.letsrespondtoolkit.org/project-info/project-updates/kzn-workshops/umkhanyakude-district-municipality-climate-change-review-workshop http://www.letsrespondtoolkit.org/project-info/project-updates/kzn-workshops/umkhanyakude-district-municipality-climate-change-review-workshop http://www.letsrespondtoolkit.org/project-info/project-updates/kzn-workshops/umkhanyakude-district-municipality-climate-change-review-workshop www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae6de https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aae6de https://doi.org/10.3354/cr00804 https://doi.org/10.3354/cr00804 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.295 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.295 _Hlk56635881 _Hlk46935575 _Hlk56636041 _Hlk56642975
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy Vol.
2, No.
1, 2012, pp.
21-33 ISSN: 2146-4553 www.econjournals.com The Contribution of Energy Consumption to Climate Change: A Feasible Policy Direction Usenobong F. Akpan Department of Economics, University of Uyo, Nigeria.
Tel: +2348034130046.
Email: uakpan@yahoo.co.uk Godwin E. Akpan Department of Economics, University of Uyo, Nigeria.
Tel: +2348066801277.
Email: goddyakpan@yahoo.com ABSTARCT: Mitigating climate change is one of the biggest challenges that confront mankind in the present millennium.
The problem has continued to dominate public debates in terms of its origin, sources, potential impacts and possibly adaptation strategies.
In this paper, the contributions of energy to the climate change debate are explored.
The analysis shows that since about 1850, the global use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) has increased and dominated world energy consumption and supply.
The rapid rise in fossil fuel combustion has produced a corresponding rapid growth in CO2 emissions and accounts for over 80% of global anthropogenic green house gas emissions (GHGs) in 2008.
It was shown that a substantial amount of CO2 emissions still emanates from the increased use of heavy polluting fuel like coal by industrializing countries like the United States, Japan and China.
Historically, the developed countries have contributed the most to cumulative global CO2 emissions and still have the highest total historical emission.
A disaggregated analysis indicates that two sectors of the economy, electricity and heat as well as the transport sector (majorly road transport), emit greater amounts of GHGs.
Some mitigation mechanisms have been suggested including improved energy efficiency, energy pricing reforms, imposition of carbon emission taxes, promoting investment in renewable energy technologies and creating public environmental awareness.
Keywords: Climate change; Fossil fuel; CO2 emissions JEL Classifications: Q40, Q20, Q32 1.
Introduction Energy is and will continue to be a primary engine for economic development.
It is central to achieving the goals of sustainable development.
Socio-economic development requires energy for improved living standards, enhanced productivity, effective transportation of goods to the point of need, and as inputs to a wide range of economic production activities.
Energy represents material comfort to industrialized countries, but the way to alleviation of poverty in developing countries.
The three last centuries have seen mankind’s substantial dependence upon an ever-growing use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) for industrialization and urbanization (Cao, 2003; Reddish and Rand, 1996).
However, the exploitation of energy to drive the growth process of many nations comes with increasing costs of environmental pollution.
Potentially, the most important environmental concern in the last decade relates to its impact on global change in weather, also known as global warming or the greenhouse effect.
Climate change is the long-term, significant change in the patterns, glaciations and related aspects of the global climate system.
Thousands of researchers and policy makers across the world have been piecing together an increasingly irrefutable case that climate change is an immediate threat to mankind’s survival and sustainable development.
Mitigating the impact of climate change has dominated most public discourse not only by environmental economists but also by other environmental experts and scientists.
Many experts attributed the root cause of climate change to human activities that comes with the rapid growth of the global economy including human consumption of different sources of energy, rapid rate of International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Vol.2, No.
1, 2012, pp.21-33 22 deforestation and bush burning.
The effects of energy consumption combustion are evaluated as greenhouse effects resulting from emissions of environmental pollutants such as carbon monoxide, hydrocarbon compounds, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, methane and the particulates.
Amongst several pollutants causing climate change, a great deal of attention has been given to CO2 emission as the major factor in the climate change.
While the impact of other forms of air pollutants is primarily local or regional, CO2 emissions are, above all else, global in scale.
Sources of CO2 emission often cited in the literature include the energy related component, especially, the combustion of fossil fuels.
Others include the non-fuel use of energy inputs, and emissions from electricity generation using nonbiogenic municipal solid waste and geothermal energy, emissions from industrial processes, such as cement and limestone production, etc.
This paper is concerned with the contribution of energy to the climate change debate.
In this connection, some useful questions could be raised: To what extent is energy responsible for CO2 emission?
Which form of energy is chiefly responsible for the energy-related climate change?
What sectors of the economy drives these energy-related CO2 emissions?
What are the viable options for mitigating energy-related climate change?
These and other similar questions are addressed in this paper.
The structure of this paper is the following.
In the next section, we undertake a brief review of the origin of the climate change debacle.
Next, we examine the role of energy to climate change.
Thereafter, we outline some policy options for mitigating climate change.
The last section provides the conclusion to the paper.
2.
Climate Change in Historical Perspective: How Did We Get Here?
The phrase “climate change” and “global warming” and more recently “global cooling” is increasingly assuming a topical dimension in global climatic and environmental discourse.
Rarely does a day go by without a mention in the press or on the radio of the possible causes of climate change and its consequences.
The threat of climate change has come upon mankind in a relatively short space of time and is accelerating with an alarming speed.
It is one of the most challenging problems with which our contemporary world has been faced.
It has become a subject of major international co-operation through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme.
Unfortunately, most climate change debate often lack historical perspective.
To get a better sense of the problem, it might be instructive to pose the question: how did the world get to where they are today?
According to Girardet and Mendonca (2009:26), the origin of climate change can be traced to the impact of human activities that started about 300 years ago.
The authors argued that in 1709, the first blast furnace was built in Coalbrookdale, Shropshire, Britain which used coke, derived from coal, rather than charcoal derived from wood, for smelting iron ore.
The new coke-smelted iron proved to be superior in energy production as well as cheaper financial outlay, making coke-furnace melting process preferable to the charcoal-furnace process.
Crucially, it is argued that the inexpensive cast iron helped to trigger the start of the industrial revolution in Britain – a self accelerating chain reaction of industrial and urban growth based on ever greater refinements in fossil-fuel-based technologies.
The potential catastrophic environmental consequences of the ever-increasing use of coal were largely ignored.
In 1711, the first steam engines, made with cast iron, started to pump water out of British mines that were up to 50 meters deep (Girardet & Mendonca, 2009:26).
These pumping engines enable miners to dig ever deeper to extract minerals from the earth’s crust.
Furthermore, Girardet and Mendonca (2009:27) revealed that sixty years later: The firm of Boulton & Watt introduced the next generation of steam engines and by 1800 over 500 were in use, first in mines and then to drive machinery in factories.
In 1830 steam locomotives were used to pull passenger trains for the first time, and in 1845 the first steampowered ship, the SS Great Britain, triggered a revolution in the mass transportation of goods and people across the oceans.
The Contribution of Energy Consumption to Climate Change: A Feasible Policy Direction 23 It must be noted that until the early 18th century, muscles (human power), firewood and charcoal were the dominant sources of energy, augmented by the limited use of water and windmills, with human lifestyles dependent on living within nature’s productive capacity.
But as the industrial revolution unfolded, the dramatic increase in the use of coal, and then oil and gas, not only massively increased human productive power and mobility but was also a major contributor to the ten-fold growth in human population, from some 700 million in 1709 to nearly 7 billion today (Girardet and Mendonca, 2009:27).
The industrial revolution powered by an increased coal production in Britain transformed the human presence on earth.
It gave humanity unprecedented powers to exploit the riches of nature – cutting down forests, clearing new farmlands, accelerating industrial production, extending transportation systems, building new cities and expanding existing ones.
By 1890s, the U.S. overtakes Britain as the world’s leading industrial nation and has continued to spread across the world.
Today, Japan, Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, China, India and South Africa are on their path to becoming major industrial nations in their own right.
China’s industrial boom, for instance, is linked to a rapid increase in domestic energy consumption with millions of cars manufactured yearly.
Cars run on oil based fuels: by 2020 China is expected to import much of its oil.
China’s coal consumption, mainly in power station, is going up in similar rate.
According to the 1992 World Bank projections, world population will more than double by 2150, with two thirds of the increase projected to occur by 2050 (World Bank, 1992:70).
High population growth and increased urbanization invariably will lead to increased demand for energy, implying increased expected environmental damage as well.
3.
The Role Energy in the Climate Change Debate Worldwide economic growth and development require energy.
The increased concentrations of key greenhouse gases (GHGs) are direct consequences of human activities.
Since anthropogenic GHGs accumulate in the atmosphere, they produce net warming by strengthening the natural “greenhouse effect”.
Specifically, energy production and consumption have various environmental implications, one of which is climate change.
Among the many human activities that produce GHGs, the use of energy represents by far the largest source of emissions as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Shares of Anthropogenic Greenhouse-Gas Emissions in Annex 1 countries, 20081.
Source: Captured by Authors from UNFCCC cited in IEA (2010a) 1 Annex I Countries include Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco (included with France), the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The countries that are listed above are included in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as amended on 11 December 1997 by the 12th Plenary meeting of the Third Conference of the Parties in Decision 4/CP.3.
This includes the countries that were members of the OECD at the time of the signing of the Convention, the EEC, and fourteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union that are undergoing the process of transition to market economies.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Vol.2, No.
1, 2012, pp.21-33 24 As shown above, energy accounts for over 80% of the global anthropogenic GHGs, with emissions resulting from the production, transformation, handling and consumption of all kinds of energy commodities.
The key information in Fig.
1 is the fact that energy use emissions are predominantly responsible for CO2 emissions.
Smaller shares correspond to agriculture, producing mainly CH4 and N2O from industrial processes not related to energy, producing mainly fluorinated gases and N2O.
GHG emissions from the energy sector are dominated by the direct combustion of fuels, a process leading to large emissions of CO2.
A by-product of fuel combustion, CO2 results from the oxidation of carbon in fuels (IEA, 2010a)2.
Responsible for about 94% of the energy-related emissions, CO2 from energy represents about 83% of anthropogenic GHG emissions for the Annex 1 countries (Fig.
1) and about 65% of global emissions (IEA, 2010a).
This percentage varies greatly by country because of diverse national energy structures and policies.
A key factor responsible for the higher energy-related emissions cum climate change challenge is the increased global reliance on primary energy supply to drive economic growth and development.
As illustrated in Fig.
II, global total primary supply (TPES) doubled between 1971 and 2008, primarily relying on fossil fuels.
In other words, fossil fuels still account for most of the world energy supply.
The figure shows that in-spite of the growth of non-fossil energy (such as nuclear and hydropower) which are usually considered as non-polluting, fossil fuels have continue to maintain their dominance in TPES for the past 37 years under review.
In 2008, it accounted for 81% of the TPES in the world.
Figure II: World Primary Energy Supply3 Source: Compiled by Authors from IEA (2010a).
The high global dependence upon fossil fuels clearly is responsible for the observed upward trends in the global CO2 emissions, as illustrated in Fig.
III.
Since the industrial revolution, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion have witnessed a dramatic increase from its near zero level in the 1870s (See Quadrelli and Peterson, 2007, IEA, 2010a) to about 29.4 million tons by 2008 (Fig.
III).
The figure shows that CO2 emissions from fossil fuels combustion in 2008 were roughly twice its level in 1971.
Depending, upon one’s forecast of the growth of fossil fuel combustion, one can project a doubling of the CO2 concentration in the next 50 to 300 years.
2 In perfect combustion conditions, the total carbon content of fuels would be converted to Co2 (See Quadrelli & Peterson, 2007).
3 Figures include International bunkers.
The Contribution of Energy Consumption to Climate Change: A Feasible Policy Direction 25 Source: compiled by Authors from IEA (2010b).
Meanwhile, total global energy supply is projected to rise by 52% between 2008 and 2030 (IEA, 2010a) and with fossil fuels remaining at 81% of TPES, CO2 emissions are consequently expected to continue their growth unabated (unless some drastic measures are taken) and will reach 40.4 Gt CO2 by 2030 (Ibid).
The trend is expected to be intensified due to the projected high increase in world energy consumption demand by industrializing country like China (see Fig.
IV).
Presently, the figure shows that the United States still dominates world energy consumption followed by China and India and doubtless the higher emitters of CO2 energy-related emissions (see Fig.
VI).
It is projected that the shares of China in world energy consumption would outstrip that of the United States by the year 2020.
Whether the projections will be a possibility or not, it is obvious that the socio-economic and technological characteristics of development paths of the industrializing countries will strongly affects energy-related emissions and hence, the rate and magnitude of climate change, climate change impacts, the capability for adaptation and mitigation of climate change emissions.
Source: IEA, International Energy Statistics database (as of November 2009), available at: www.eia.gov/emeu/international.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Vol.2, No.
1, 2012, pp.21-33 26 4.
Energy Contribution to Climate Change: A Further Disaggregated Analysis It may be important to further disaggregate the sources of energy-related CO2 emissions.
Available data on the contribution of fuel to global CO2 emissions as at 2008 is shown in Fig.
V. It can be seen that although coal represents only one-quarter of the world TPES in 2008, it accounted for 43% of the global CO2 emissions due to its heavy carbon content per unit of energy released.
Compared to gas, coal is on the average nearly as twice emission intensive4.
Without additional measures the supply of coal is projected to grow from 2775 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2004 to 4441 Mtoe in 2030 (Quadrelli and Peterson, 2007).
In the future, coal is therefore expected to satisfy much of the growing energy demand of emerging developed countries like China and India, where energyintensive industrial production is growing rapidly and large coal reserves exist with limited reserves of other energy sources (Quadrelli and Peterson, 2007).
In addition, in spite of the deplorable environmental consequences, coal’s appeal may rise as prices of oil and natural gas increase, consequent to growing demand and pressure on the reserves of these two fuels.
This will further worsen the environmental pollution.
Figure V: World Primary Energy Supply and CO2 Emissions: Shares by fuel type in 2008.
Source: Compiled by Authors from IEA (2010a).
Note: Others include nuclear, hydro, geothermal, solar, tide, wind, combustible renewable and waste.
Figure VI shows the contributions of the four largest carbon emitters in the world between 1971 and 2008.
Although the United States remained the largest CO2 emitter up to 2007, its contribution is relatively stable over time.
However, the rate at which it grows in India and in particular China is worrisome.
In fact, China overtook the United States in 2007 as the world’s largest annual emitter of energy-related CO2, although as shown by IEA (2010a) the United States will still remains the largest in many years to come in terms of cumulative and per capita terms (see further evidence in Table1).
In other words, it has been argued that China’s emission rate of CO2 is important to significantly affect world indicators.
Quadrelli and Peterson (2007) have shown that the rise in China’s per capita emissions (+17%) causes global emissions to rise by 4%.
It is important to note that fossil fuels represents more than 80% of China’s energy mix; the country draws more than 60% of its energy supply from coal alone (IEA, 2010a).
Fig.
VII which presents the historical trends in the energy mix and their consequent contribution to the present global change debacle is very illuminating on this.
Some points are clear from the figure.
First, The United States, through the use of coal in the early 19th century, contributed the largest emission to the current problem.
During the 20th century, it is also evident that a substantial amount of CO2 emissions still emanates from the increased use of coal by the United States, Japan and China.
It is also confirmed that China’s heavy reliance on coal is 4 See further evidence in IEA (2010a) for the IPCC default carbon emissions factors from the 1996 IPCC Guidelines which are 15.3 t C/TJ for gas, 16.8 to 27.5 t C/TJ for oil products and 25.8 to 29.1 t C/TJ for primary products.
The Contribution of Energy Consumption to Climate Change: A Feasible Policy Direction 27 responsible for most of the observed CO2 emissions in the world (see evidence in Table 1).
The contribution of gas to global CO2 emission is shown to be minimal.
However, the same cannot be said about oil, especially from the 1950s with more of it coming from the United States followed by Japan.
Figure VI: World’s Major emitters of CO2 emissions, 1971-20085.
Source: Compiled by Authors from IEA (2010b).
Figure VII: Historical Trends in fossil fuel emission in the World, United State, China and Japan.
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory and British Petroleum available at http://www.columbia.edu/~mhs119/UpdatedFigures/ 5 The ten top CO2 emitting countries in the world as at 2008 were China, United States, Russian Federation, India, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, Islamic Republic of Iran and Korea, in that order.
These ten countries account for 19.1 Gt CO2 out of the world’s 29.3 Gt CO2 in 2008 (see Fig.
A1 at Appendix).
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Vol.2, No.
1, 2012, pp.21-33 28 As shown also in Table 1, the percentage shares of the developed countries in global world emissions are unambiguously larger than the corresponding shares in Africa, the Middle East and nonOECD countries.
For instance in 2008, OECD North America alone constitutes over 17% of global CO2 emissions from Coal, 26% from oil and 26% from Gas combustion.
These contrast remarkably from the shares of world emissions by Africa which stood at about 2%, 4% and 3% respectively for coal, oil and gas combustions.
Table 1.
CO2 Emissions (in million metric tons) by World Regions and Fuel Types (1971-2008) COAL OIL GAS million tonnes of CO2 1971 % Share 2008 % Share 1971 % Share 2008 % Share 1971 % Share 2008 % Share World 5 199 100 12 595 100 6 838 100 10 821 100 2 058 100 5 862 100 United States 1 078.7 20.7 2 085.7 16.6 2 023.0 29.6 2 227.3 20.6 1 189.5 57.8 1 257.5 21.45 OECD North America 1 145.6 22 2 228.7 17.7 2 304.6 33.7 2 755.2 25.5 1 277.6 62.1 1 545.1 26.4 OECD Pacific 292.7 5.6 880.5 7 663.2 9.7 840.7 7.8 12.9 0.63 348.0 5.9 OECD Europe 1 690.1 32.5 1 214.5 9.6 1 756.2 25.7 1 676.0 15.5 191.1 9.3 1 055.5 18 Middle East 0.8 0.02 33.8 0.3 102.5 1.5 850.2 7.9 25.8 1.25 608.2 10.4 Non-OECD Europe 101.4 1.95 130.1 1 91.1 1.3 90.6 0.8 54.8 1.3 47.1 0.8 Latin America 22.7 0.44 92.9 0.74 302.2 4.4 714.4 6.6 41.6 2 260.9 4.5 Asia 231.9 4.5 1 548.5 12.3 192.0 2.8 1 026.8 9.5 10.2 0.5 445.3 7.6 China 678.0 13 5 460.8 43.4 124.2 1.8 934.8 8.6 7.3 0.35 154.9 2.6 Africa 160.7 3.1 304.3 2.4 99.7 1.5 407.8 3.8 5.2 0.25 177.8 3 Source: Authors’ Computation from IEA (2010b).
In terms of emissions by sector, Fig VIII presents a very informative picture.
Three sectors, electricity and heat generation, industry and transport are chiefly responsible for the global CO2 emissions.
Between the two periods under review, whereas the shares of the emissions from the industrial and residential sectors decline, there was growth in emissions from the electricity and heat sector as well as the transport sector.
The decline in the emissions from the other two key sectors may be an indication of significant improvements in energy efficiency and other fuel switching efforts in most developed countries over the years.
Generation of electricity and heat was by far the largest producer of CO2 emissions and was responsible for 39% of the world CO2 emissions in 2008.
Globally, evidence (from IEA, 2010a) indicates that this sector is noted for its heavy reliance on coal, the most carbon-intensive of fossil fuels and thus amplifying its share in worldwide emissions of CO2.
For instance, countries such as Australia, China, India, Poland and South Africa are estimated to generate between 69% and 94% of their electricity and heat through the combustion of coal (see IEA, 2010a).
The transport sector on the other hand, relies heavily on oil and over 80% of the emissions from the transport sector in 2008 are driven by road transportation (see Appendix, Table A1)6.
Clearly, this end-use sector is the strongest driver of world dependence on oil.
Global demand for transport is forecast to grow by 58% by 2030 (IEA, 2004) and hence bears significant implication for worldwide oil related emissions.
6 A key factor in this development could be attributed to the effect of economic growth on increasing demand for road transportation, both for personal mobility and for transportation of goods.
Car ownerships in most developing countries tend to grow with increasing income per capita following growth.
The Contribution of Energy Consumption to Climate Change: A Feasible Policy Direction 29 Figure VIII: World’s CO2 emissions by sector, 1971 & 2008.
Source: Quadrelli & Peterson (2007) and Author’s compilation from IEA (2010b), available at www.iea.org/statistics/ Note: *Others include commercial public services, agriculture/forestry, fishing, energy industries other than electricity and heat generation, and other emissions not specified elsewhere.
5.
The Energy-Climate Change Challenge: Options for Mitigation It has been clear from the preceding sections that the link between energy and climate change is very strong and thus constitutes a significant challenge for sustainable development.
The negative impacts of climate change on crop production, higher average world temperature, rising sea levels, reduced rainfall, amongst others are largely indisputable in the literature.
However, efforts to combat the disaster both at the international, regional or national level could at best be describe as less than successful.
For instance, at the global level, implementing the various mitigation measures under the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC has yielded limited results in its potential to address global CO2 emissions.
For one, not all the major emitters were included (see IEA, 2010a for details on this)7.
On the other hand, developing countries, though most signed the protocol are less committed to CO2 emission reductions.
A key policy dilemma faced by most developing countries is in balancing the tradeoff between sustained economic growth and reducing CO2 energy-related emissions.
The thinking in many quarters is that CO2 emissions is a global pollutant and thus curtailing it by one country is practically proving difficult and inefficient to do since elements of market failure are predominant.
If one country cuts its rate of fuel combustion, it bears the full cost in terms of reduction in its economic activity level, while the benefits of its action are shared with the entire world.
This has lead some analysts to suggest that the effort towards CO2 mitigation should be pioneered and borne by the industrialized countries who are not only responsible for the initial emissions of CO2 during the 7 For instance a major CO2 emitter country like the United States has expressed the intention not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Vol.2, No.
1, 2012, pp.21-33 30 industrial revolution but also for the increased level of emission as a result of growing consumption of fossil fuel.
However, irrespective of whatever divide, effective mitigation of climate change will require the effort of all countries.
An optimal strategy for mitigating the consequences of climate change that arise from energy –related activities would not only need to be highly comprehensive and global in scale, but such policies would have to be flexible and adaptable to national and local conditions of the given nation.
Box 1 presents an overview of some available policy instruments.
Box 1: Climate Change Mitigation Policy Instruments It is important to note that irrespective of any policy choice, mitigating the impact of energyrelated climate change will require four key considerations: (i) Environmental effectiveness – the extent to which the policy meets its intended environmental objectives or realizes positive environmental outcomes (ii) Cost effectiveness – the extent to which the policy can achieve its objectives at minimum cost to the society (iii) Distributional considerations – the incidence or distributional consequences of the policy.
Fairness and equity are dimensions of this though there are other dimensions to distribution.
(iv) Institutional feasibilitythe extent to which a policy instrument is likely to be viewed as legitimate, gain acceptance, adopted and implemented (IPCC, 2007).
This means that there is no one-size-fit-all policy prescription to climate change mitigation.
A combination of policy options is needed.
In line with this, the following options are proffered: (a) Energy Pricing Reform In most developing countries, energy pricing are still based upon social and political justification rather than efficient market pricing principles.
The World Bank estimates for 1993 Box 1: An Overview of Climate Change Policy Instruments Regulations And Standards: Specify abatement technologies (technological standards) or minimum requirements for pollution output (performance standards) to reduce emissions.
Taxes and Charges : A levy imposed on each unit of undesirable activity by a source Tradable Permits : Also know as marketable permits or cap-and-trade systems, this instrument establishes a limit on aggregate emissions by specified sources, requires each source to hold permits equal to its actual emissions, and allows permits to be traded among sources.
Voluntary Agreements : An agreement between a government authority and one or more private parties to achieve environmental objectives or to improve environmental performance beyond compliance to regulated obligations.
Not all voluntary agreements are truly voluntary; some include rewards and/or penalties associated with joining or achieving commitments.
Subsidies and Incentives: Direct payments, tax reductions, price supports, or the equivalent from a government to an entity for implementing a practice or performing a specified action.
Information Instruments: Required public disclosure of environmentally related information, generally by industry to consumers.
Include labeling programs and rating and certification.
Research and Development: Direct government spending and investment to generate innovation on mitigation, or physical and social infrastructure to reduce emissions.
Include prizes and incentives for technological advances.
Non-climate Policies: Other policies not specifically directed at emissions reduction but that may have significant climate-related effects The Contribution of Energy Consumption to Climate Change: A Feasible Policy Direction 31 showed that developing countries and transition economies spent more than $230 billion per year on subsiding energy (Cao, 2003).
Energy products like coal in China, India, Poland and Turkey have been heavily subsidized (World Bank, 2000:25), just as Nigeria spends billions on petroleum subsidy.
The implication of this has been inefficient use of energy as well as serving as a disincentive for controlling energy-related emissions.
Efficient energy pricing will not only remove these price distortions but would sharply reduce the growth in energy consumption and could also cut world carbon emissions by 10% (see World Bank, 2000:41)8.
(b) Emission Taxes It is obvious that efficient pricing reforms that results in energy prices reflecting production may still be far from reflecting social cost.
Emission taxes could prove useful in adjusting market prices to reflect externalities.
A high taxes on carbon-intensive fuels like coal could reduce their consumption and hence carbon emissions.
In Mexico, an application of gasoline tax, among other measures, has helped to dramatically reduced GHG emissions coming from transportation (World Bank, 1992:74).
Given the high level of energy-related emissions that comes from transportation, a policy of congestion pricing or taxes may be necessary.
Motorists driving through city rush-hours traffic should be required to pay more than those driving in the rural settings or in off-peak hours9.
The problem associated with minimization of CO2 and other green house gas emissions through tax controls is that it has not fully appreciated, or given answer to, the question of final resting place of the incidence.
The final bearers of such taxes may not be the industrial and transportation entrepreneurs; it may be the poor consumers who thus would end up with worse living conditions.
(c) Promotion of Energy Efficiency Climate change mitigation via CO2 reduction can be attained through more efficient energy use.
Energy efficiency implies using less energy to provide the same services.
For instance, replacing an old appliances such as a refrigerator or office equipments such as an old computer or printer with a more energy-efficient model provides the same services, but with less energy.
This serves two purposes: a reduced energy bill and most importantly, a reduced amount of greenhouse gases emissions.
It should be noted that “energy efficiency” is not the same as “energy conservation”.
Energy conservation is reducing or going without a service to save energy.
For example turning off a light is energy conservation.
Replacing an incandescent lamp with a compact fluorescent lamp (which uses much less energy to produce the same amount of light) is energy efficiency.
The success of the promotion of energy efficiency largely depends on the adoption of energy efficient and low-emission technologies.
(d) Promotion of Investment in Renewable Energy Ultimately, the mitigation of energy-related climate change rest upon the use of renewable energy including hydro, solar, wind, biomass and other forms of renewable , which are more environmentally friendly than conventional fuels (Cao, 2003).
In many developing countries, there is a huge untapped and inefficiently utilized renewable energy resource which need specific national policy initiatives and international support, including finance, capacity building and technology transfer to be exploited.
Environmental taxes on fossil fuels may be required to stimulate reactions in favor of renewable energy.
Increased funding of R&D in renewable energy should also be pursued.
(e) Improve Public Environmental Awareness Ignorance of the serious impact of their collective actions on climate change by the general public is an important cause of environmental damage and a serious impediment to finding solutions.
8 It is important to note that the removal of energy subsidies has always faced the problem of trade-off between worsening the level of poverty for the majority of the population and improving the environmental quality.
Again, it is usually reasoned that one-stop removal of such subsidies may worsen the environmental problems because the affected poor may substitute poorer quality fuels for the cleaner but now (with removal of subsidies) dearer fuels.
9 The problem with this is how cost effective it will be especially for developing countries with poor institutional capacities.
A success story of such policy could be found in London where it has been applied to deal with its notorious traffic problem.
In 2003, the city began levying a fee of £5 (about $9) for the privilege of driving into the center of the city during peak hours.
Compliance is monitored by video cameras that identify the license plates of drivers who fail to pay the fee.
Such drivers are then charged a substantial fine.
The policy has help to reduce the number of vehicles on the streets of London by approximately 16% (Transport for London, 2007 cited in Rosen & Gayer, 2010:91).
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Vol.2, No.
1, 2012, pp.21-33 32 Adequate environmental information is required to enlighten the public on the seriousness of the worsening environment they are living in, the costs to their health and quality of life.
Such enlightenment would help to raise peoples’ consciousness and enlist public support for environmental protection laws or policies.
This could help to facilitate and augment official enforcement of environmental policies.
6.
Conclusion One of the major problems facing humanity in terms of achieving sustainable development is climate change.
Many economic activities release greenhouse gasses – such as carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane – that trap solar energy within the earth’s atmosphere.
The extra heat warms the climate, creating diverse economic, health, and ecological impacts.
The paper explored the role of energy in the climate change disaster.
Evidence has revealed that fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) constitute the single largest human influence on the climate change debate, accounting for over 80% of the anthropogenic greenhouse emissions.
It was shown that a substantial amount of CO2 emissions still emanates from the increased use of coal use by industrializing countries like the United States, Japan and China.
Historically, the developed countries have contributed the most to cumulative global CO2 emissions and still have the highest total historical emission.
Two sectors of the economy, electricity and heat as well as the transport sector (especially road transport) emit greater amounts of GHGs.
Given the fact that primary energy still dominates the world energy mix, the potential goal conflicts between economic growth and environmental protection are rather obvious.
Reducing energy-related carbon emissions may require reducing the amount of fossil fuel consumption and hence economic growth.
This dilemma has tended to contribute to the slow global, regional and national actions in addressing the danger of climate change.
However, the problem of climate change associated with increased fossil fuel combustion is serious and requires concerted and comprehensive solutions.
Improving energy efficiency, reforms of inefficient energy pricing, imposition of carbon emission taxes, promoting investment in renewable energy and creating public environmental awareness are some of the mitigation strategies suggested in the paper.
Acknowledgement The Authors would like to thank Prof. Adeola Adenikinju for his comments and Itoro J. Akpan for her research assistance.
References Cao, X.
(2003), Climate change and energy development: Implications for developing countries, Resources Policy, 29, 61–67.
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (2010), Oak Ridge National Laboratory and British Petroleum, available at http://www.columbia.edu/~mhs119/UpdatedFigures/ Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) (2009), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Available at http://www.esd.ornl.gov/iab/iab2-15.htm Girardet, H. & M. Mendonca (2009), A renewable world: energy, ecology, equality, Green Books ltd: World future council, U.K. International Energy Agency(IEA)(2004), Biofuels for Transport.
OECD/IEA, Paris, France.
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2009), International Energy Statistics database available at www.eia.gov/emeu/international.
International Energy Agency (IEA)(2010a), Co2 Emissions from fuel combustions, Highlights, OECD/IEA, Paris, France.
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010b), Co2 Emissions from fuel combustions, Annual Historical Series (1971-2008) available at www.iea.org/statistics/ IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, 9780521 88011-4, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Quadrelli, R. & S. Peterson (2007), The energy-climate challenge: Recent trends in Co2 emissions from fuel combustion, Energy Policy, 35, 5938–5952.
The Contribution of Energy Consumption to Climate Change: A Feasible Policy Direction 33 Reddish, A.
& M. Rand (1996), The environmental effects of present energy policies.
In: Blunden, J.
& A. Reddish (Eds.
), Energy Resources and Environment.
Hodder and Stoughton & the Open University, Pp.
43-91.
Rosen, H. S. & T. Gayer (2010), Public Finance, (9th edition), Singapore: McGraw-Hill International World Bank (1992), World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment.
Oxford University Press World Bank (2000), Fuel for Thought: An Environmental Strategy for the Energy Sector.
World Bank.
Appendix Table A1: CO2 emissions from fuel combustion by Sector in 2008. million tonnes of CO2 Total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion Electricity and heat production Other energy industries** Manuf.
industries and construction Transport of which: road Other sectors of which: residential World 29 381.4 11 987.9 1 491.9 5 943.6 6 604.7 4 848.4 3 353.4 1 905.1 Annex I Parties 13 903.8 5 785.4 684.4 2 035.6 3 479.4 2 977.0 1 919.1 1 117.6 Annex II Parties 10 951.8 4 295.2 563.4 1 549.1 3 023.9 2 656.4 1 520.2 843.2 North America 6 146.8 2 522.7 333.5 730.9 1 853.5 1 582.7 706.2 373.6 Europe 3 222.9 1 063.9 164.4 514.3 850.5 790.6 629.8 402.8 Pacific 1 582.0 708.7 65.5 303.8 319.9 283.1 184.2 66.8 Annex I EIT 2 688.5 1 386.0 112.6 448.0 410.3 281.1 331.5 234.8 Non-Annex I Parties 14 444.6 6 202.5 807.4 3 908.1 2 092.3 1 871.4 1 434.3 787.6 Annex I Kyoto Parties 7 980.1 3 245.4 406.2 1 351.2 1 736.1 1 477.3 1 241.2 737.7 OECD Total 12 629.6 4 992.0 672.3 1 819.1 3 386.5 2 999.4 1 759.8 984.4 Non-OECD Total 15 718.8 6 995.8 819.6 4 124.6 2 185.1 1 849.0 1 593.6 920.7 Source: IEA (2010b), available at www.iea.org/statistics/ Note Annex II Parties include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco (included with France), the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States Annex I Kyoto Parties include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco (included with France), the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
Membership in the Kyoto Protocol is almost identical to that of Annex I (see page 6), except for Turkey and Belarus which did not agree to a target under the Protocol and the United States which has expressed the intention not to ratify the Protocol.
Economies in Transition (EITs) are those countries in Annex I that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
This includes Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine.
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change The International Indigenous Policy Journal Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 2 May 2010 Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Shelton H. Davis Georgetown University, Washington DC Recommended Citation Davis, S. H. (2010).
Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 1(1) .
DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 his Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western.
It has been accepted for inclusion in he International Indigenous Policy Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western.
For more information, please contact nspence@uwo.ca.
Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Abstract There has been a growing attention on the need to take into account the effects of global climate change.
This is particularly so with respect to the increasing amount of green house gas emissions from the Untied States and Europe affecting poor peoples, especially those in developing countries.
In 2003, for example, the experts of several international development agencies, including the World Bank, prepared a special report titled “Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through Adaptation” (OECD 2003).
This report followed the Eighth Session of the Conference of Parties (COP8) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in New Delhi, India in October 2002.
It showed that poverty reduction is not only one of the major challenges of the 21st century, but also that climate change is taking place in many developing countries and is increasingly affecting, in a negative fashion, both the economic conditions and the health of poor people and their communities.
Keywords Indigenous populations, climate change, green house gas emissions Acknowledgments This paper is based on a presentation given at the Naimun conference on February 15, 2008 Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Introduction There has been a growing attention on the need to take into account the effects of global climate change.
This is particularly so with respect to the increasing amount of green house gas emissions from the Untied States and Europe affecting poor peoples, especially those in developing countries.
In 2003, for example, the experts of several international development agencies, including the World Bank, prepared a special report titled “Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through Adaptation” (OECD 2003).
This report followed the Eighth Session of the Conference of Parties (COP8) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in New Delhi, India in October 2002.
It showed that poverty reduction is not only one of the major challenges of the 21st century, but also that climate change is taking place in many developing countries and is increasingly affecting, in a negative fashion, both the economic conditions and the health of poor people and their communities.
The “Poverty and Climate Change” report by the OECD (2003) notes that, in order to deal with the effects of climate change on poor people and their communities, it is necessary to create and strengthen several climate change adaptation efforts that have a significant and concurrent effect on both poverty reduction and sustainable development.
Further, this report also suggests that progress in such adaptation efforts necessarily requires provision of “improved governance” and “empowerment of communities” so “they can participate in assessments and feed in their knowledge to provide useful climate poverty information” (2003, XI).
Finally, the report also states that to empower such poor communities “they will also need full access to climate relevant information systems” (2003, XI).
1 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 It is also interesting to note that along with this report on “Poverty and Climate Change,” there was also a very important statement by Indigenous peoples from around the world, who held a special Indigenous Peoples Caucus at the COP8.
This “Indigenous Peoples Statement” stated that “We consider that our Mother Earth is sacred…[and] it must be honored, protected, and loved” (UN 2002, 1).
It also affirmed that “this special relationship to Mother Earth binds us to conserve the biodiversity for the survival of the present and future generations” (UN 2002, 1).
[Furthermore, O]ur duty as indigenous peoples to Mother Earth impels us to demand that we be provided adequate opportunity to participate fully and actively at all levels of local, national, regional and international decision-making processes and mechanisms on climate change…[And that w]e, Indigenous Peoples, live in sensitive zones where effects of climate change are most devastating.
Traditional ways of life are disproportionately affected by climate change particularly in polar and arid zones, forests, wetlands, rivers and costal areas (UN 2002, 1).
Based upon these and other noted reasons, the “Indigenous Peoples Statement” called upon the members of the UNFCCC to recognize the fundamental role of Indigenous Peoples in tackling climate change and environmental degradation [and to] approve the creation of a Working Group of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change to meet the objectives to study and propose timely, effective and adequate solutions in response to the urgent situation caused by climate change (UN 2002, 2).
Despite this attempt by several of the world’s Indigenous peoples in 2002 to get greater international focus on the role that climate change was having on their lifestyles, environments, 2 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 and cultures as well as their capacity to assist in the protection against and control of climate change, there was little formal attention to the concerns of Indigenous peoples relating to climate change until five years later.
In 2007, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
In that same year we note a growing amount of attention on the part of the United Nations and other international agencies on the need to take into account the rights, needs, and knowledge of Indigenous peoples in projects dealing with climate change.
In the remainder of this paper, I will focus on what we have learned in the last two years about the rights, needs, and knowledge of Indigenous peoples in relation to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change.
I would also like to discuss not only how some of the members of the United Nations have focused upon the rights, needs, and knowledge of Indigenous peoples in relation to climate change, but also how there have been some difficulties in introducing these rights, needs, and knowledge of Indigenous peoples into the recommendations that resulted from the UN Conference on Climate Change held in Bali, Indonesia in December of 2007.
Recent Studies: Universities and non-Governmental Organizations on Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples I would like remind us that there are estimated to be over 350 million Indigenous persons, comprising 5,000 different Aboriginal tribes, who live in more than 70 countries throughout the world, including here in the Untied States, Canada, and all of the countries of Latin America, as well as within the continents of Africa, Asia, and most of the islands of the Pacific.
In May 2007, a very important report entitled “Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change,” was published as a result of a symposium held at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at the University of Oxford in England in April of 2007.
This report indicated that 3 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 several actions need to be taken to respond to the situation of climate change faced by Indigenous peoples in numerous regions and countries throughout the world.
Along with the effects of global climate change on Indigenous peoples of the Polar regions of Alaska and northern Canada, who have been affected by the melting of ice shields and permafrost, the report also focused upon the threats that increased droughts and fires pose for Indigenous and other local peoples who occupy tropical rainforests in such areas as Asia, the Pacific, and the Amazon region of South America.
With respect to the Amazon region of South America, the Oxford University report notes that if climate change continues at its current pace, there may be an overall decrease in rainfall of 20 percent or more in this region.
Additionally, the report also observes that “the effects of climate change on the Amazon forest are exacerbated by deforestation and forest fragmentation which in turn releases more carbon into the atmosphere and creates yet more climate change” (Salick and Byg 2007, 9).
Hope for the future in this region “lies with the indigenous peoples themselves, who are very successful in preventing deforestation and managing natural rainforests” (Salick and Byg 2007, 9).
The Oxford University report also focuses upon the effects of climate change on high mountain cultures or what are termed Alpine regions, such as the Mount Kilimanjaro region of Tanzania in East Africa, the Tibetan Mountain Region in Central Asia, and the Andean Region in South America.
In all of these highly mountainous countries, which have large populations of culturally unique Indigenous or tribal peoples, the report notes that there are threats posed by retreating glaciers and changing resources bases: “Alpine ecosystems around the world are warming up at a disproportionate rate (predicted to increase by as much as 5-6 degrees centigrade in the 21st century under present conditions)” (Salick and Byg 2007, 7).
4 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 Iconic peaks, such as those in the Mount Kilimanjaro Region of Tanzania in East Africa, will have no more snows, if such climate change continues.
At the same time, the Oxford University report remarks that some studies have discovered that there has been an upward movement on some of these mountains of tree lines and Alpine plants.
It is suggested that Alpine warming and deforestation will further threaten endangered animals such as snow leopards and mountain sheep.
Further, the report states that little attention is paid to the importance of these floras and faunas to Indigenous Peoples.
For example, Tibetan and Andean highlanders are dependent upon Alpine floras for medicines, food, grazing and hunting: “In the future, when trees cover the high mountains, these people will be deprived of important traditional resources central to their livelihoods” (Salick and Byg 2007, 7).
This same report also highlights the effects of climate change on tribal peoples who occupy desert regions such as Kalahari which is predicted to double in size and wind speeds are expected to increase dramatically.
Thousands of inhabitants will struggle to survive with cattle and goat farming becoming less feasible coupled with their traditional resource base for hunting and gathering severely affected.
According to the report, in the present day “indigenous groups which have been forced to become sedentary, huddle around government drilled boreholes for water, and many are dependent on government handouts for survival…Without doubt, indigenous peoples of the deserts are on the frontline of global climate change” (Salick and Byg 2007, 9).
Based upon these conditions of Indigenous and tribal peoples in tropical rainforests, alpine areas, and deserts, as well as in other areas such as Polar Regions, islands, and temperate ecosystems, the Oxford University report calls for support of the world’s Indigenous peoples, especially in terms of their capacity to maintain biodiversity as a buffer against climate change 5 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 (Salick and Byg 2007).
It is also remarked that Indigenous peoples can play an important role in observing, interpreting, and adapting to climate change.
The report concludes by outlining a “Proposal with Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change.” Among other things, the Oxford University report states in this Proposal that “From the data and perspectives on Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change, it becomes evident that indigenous knowledge and perceptions must be incorporated into the Climate Change forum” (Salick and Byg 2007, 25).
It also states that “Indigenous peoples offer local observations and techniques for adapting to and mitigating climate change [and that] Indigenous Peoples must exercise self-determination and be empowered to deal with climate change which threatens their livelihoods, indeed their very existence” (Salick and Byg 2007, 25).
In addition, the report remarks that “Integration and feedback loops between climate change science and indigenous peoples must be established and employed.
Both parties – that is climate change scientists and indigenous peoples – can gain knowledge from each other and support each other in action” (Salick and Byg 2007, 25).
The National Museum of the American Indian: Recognition of Protection and the Control of Global Climate Change It is worth mentioning that, along with the report by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at Oxford University in England, the National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI), established in the year 2004 as part of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington DC, also began to focus on a similar issue.
The NMAI is interested specifically in issues relating to both the needs of America’s Indigenous peoples but also in how the contemporary existence and positive effects of Indigenous people’s traditional knowledge can be taken into account in the mitigation of climate change.
This is to say that among other things, the NMAI has a focus on 6 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 the role of traditional knowledge in the protection of the environment and the potential control of global climate change in the United States, Canada, and other countries throughout the Americas and the world.
On July 7, 2007, for example, the NMAI organized an event on the National Mall in Washington DC for the inauguration of the so-called “Live Earth Concerts,” which were introduced to rally global action on climate change both here in the United States and in several other countries throughout the world.
This event at the NMAI was titled “Mother Earth” and was a “Special Indian Summer Showcase Event in the Spirit of the Live Earth Concerts” (Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian 2007a).
At the opening of the NMAI “Mother Earth” event, a speech was given by Al Gore, the former Vice-President of the United States, producer of the Academy Award-winning documentary film titled “An Inconvenient Truth” on the threat of global warming, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient for work on global climate change (Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian 2007b).
I attended this event and what follows is based on notes I took during the speeches at the “Mother Earth” event, starting with Gore’s address.
In his opening speech, former Vice President Al Gore (2007) stated that “The American Indian people and the elders of Native cultures here and around the world, have been very eloquent in their warnings about what we are doing to the earth.” He also remarked that the Indigenous Peoples in the Untied States and throughout the world “remind us that solving the climate crisis will require not only new laws and new technology, but also new understanding that we are connected to the natural world” (2007).
A number of other persons, many of Native American background in the United States, also spoke and highlighted the role of Indigenous peoples in protecting the environment, 7 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 promoting sustainable development and having the potential to counter climate change.
Tim Johnson (2007), who at the time was the Acting Director of the National Museum of the American Indian, for example, is quoted as saying at the “Mother Earth” event that “There is no more important matter before us than the question of how to live sustainably on the Earth.” Similarly, there were two other persons, both Native American women, who also made statements at the “Mother Earth” event in July of 2007.
One of these persons was Ms. Katsi Cook Barreiro, who is of Mohawk background and is a maternal child-health coordinator for the United South and East Oklahoma Tribes as well as the field coordinator for an organization called Running Strong for American Indian Youth in Alexandria, Virginia.
In her presentation at the “Mother Earth” event, she stated “My message to all the world’s leaders is simple and clear: Think not only of today, [but] think of your grandchildren.
Think [also] of your greatgrandchildren…[and] think of the impact of your decision on the seventh generation yet to come” (Cook Barreiro 2007).
She also said the following: We human beings who walk about on Mother Earth must remember that our survival depends on our humility, depends on our ability to express our love for Her, and to do everything in our power so that our future generations will enjoy the benefits of this wonderful Earth.
(Cook Barreiro 2007) And, in her conclusion, she stated, “Our mother the earth, it must be that we defend her” (2007).
A second Native American woman who spoke at the 2007 NMAI Mother Earth event was Henrietta Mann.
Mann is Cheyenne and a professor emeritus as well as special assistant to the President of Montana State University, while also serving as an interim President of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribal College at Southwestern Oklahoma State University.
She stated in her presentation that: 8 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 We agree with the broad consensus of our most respected international climate scientists that global warming is upon us, and it is destabilizing the natural rhythms of Mother Earth.
We also agree with the broad scientific consensus that human activity, including deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions, is a primary cause.
For these reasons, we call upon all the peoples of the world to awaken and respond to our collective human responsibility to the seventh generation.
Ours is a call for consciousness.
Each of us is part of the sacred service of life, [and the] Earth is our mother and we must care for her.
(Mann 2007) UN Reponses to the Rights, Needs, and Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples in Response to Climate Change It is interesting to note that a few weeks after the NMAI “Mother Earth” event in Washington DC, Mr. Ahmed Djoghlaf, the Executive Secretary of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, in a statement at the Occasion of the International Day of the World’s Indigenous People on August 9, 2007, noted that: The celebration of the International Day of the World’s Indigenous People presents an opportunity to draw attention to the contribution of indigenous and local communities to the conservation and sustainable use of the world’s biological diversity.
It also provides opportunity to highlight how these communities, as environmental managers with immense ecological knowledge, are crucial partners in our efforts to address the two most serious environmental threats facing mankind today: the loss of biodiversity and climate change (Djoghlaf 2007).
9 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 It is also interesting to note that on the same day as the United Nations “International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples,” August 9, 2007, Mr. Ban ki-Moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations, was quoted as saying the following: Recently, the international community has grown increasingly aware of the need to support indigenous people – by establishing and promoting international standards, vigilantly upholding respect for their human rights, integrating them in the international development agenda, including the projects, and reinforcing indigenous peoples’ special stewardship on issues relating to the environment and climate change (ki-Moon 2007).
Just one month following this “International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples,” the UN General Assembly approved a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
This Declaration not only called for the recognition of the land and territorial rights of Indigenous peoples throughout the world, it also presented the idea that indigenous peoples should be provided with a degree of self-determination that would enable them to have prior and informed consent before any outside activities could be carried out on the land and territories that they occupy in order to respond to climate change (United Nations 2007).
Although the UN government representatives for the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand voted against this comprehensive Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in September of 2007, all of the members of the UN Human Rights Council and 143 other country representatives voted in favor of the Declaration.
It was also hoped that the adoption of the Declaration would result in more emphasis and focus upon the rights, needs, and knowledge of Indigenous peoples in the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference, held in Bali, Indonesia in December of 2007.
10 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 As we shall see in the final part of this paper, there were some problems posed in the consideration of the views of Indigenous peoples at the Bali conference on climate change.
Moreover, these problems continue to face Indigenous peoples both in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as well as in the developing countries throughout the world in terms of how governments and various international development agencies, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, consider the rights, needs and knowledge of Indigenous peoples in dealing with climate change.
The Position of Indigenous Peoples at the UN Conference on Climate Change in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007 I would like to conclude with a brief statement on the position of Indigenous Peoples at the UN Conference on Climate Change in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007.
One of the major points of focus for several of the government and international agency representatives attending the UNFCCC in Bali was the idea of focusing future carbon credits on the preservation of tropical forests in developing countries.
This was seen as a means of controlling greenhouse gas emissions and reducing climate change in developing countries.
It was also seen as a future mode of trade agreements between commercial forestry and agricultural companies in both developed and developing countries (UN 2008b).
Despite the fact that a special delegation of Indigenous peoples was invited to attend the Bali Conference, this delegation was forcibly barred from entering a meeting between the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer, and various civil society representatives invited to the conference (New Consumer 2007; Peterman 2008).
It is also important to note that Indigenous peoples were not only marginalized from the discussions at the Bali conference, but also there was no mention of the rights, needs, and 11 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 knowledge of Indigenous peoples in the large number of UNFCCC documents prepared on climate change prior to the conference.
This latter point is particularly problematic given the fact, as mentioned above, that Indigenous peoples, especially in developing countries but also in the Arctic regions of the United States, Canada, Greenland, and parts of northern Europe, are suffering most from climate change.
Many Indigenous peoples, including those who formed part of the Indigenous delegation at the Bali Conference, were concerned that some of the climate mitigation projects being promoted by the UNFCCC might negatively affect the traditional lands and territories where they live.
In fact, by shutting the Indigenous peoples out of the climate change negotiations, the Indigenous delegates at the Bali Conference felt that some of the modes of reducing carbon emissions from deforestation in developing countries could lead to the involuntary relocation of Indigenous peoples and some of them could even be killed (Peterman 2008).
This point was made by Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, who is an Indigenous woman from the Philippines and has served as the Chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues for several years.
She made a statement at the Bali Conference on December 11, 2007, in which Tauli-Corpuz presented some of her views and the concerns of Indigenous peoples in relation to a special Forest Carbon Partnership Facility being prepared in a number of developing countries by economists and climate change specialists at the World Bank in Washington.
In her statement, she said that “Those of us who live and depend on forests, are pleased that there is growing international consensus that policies to address climate change must include measures to combat deforestation and forest degradation in tropical and sub-tropical forests” (Tauli-Corpuz 2007, 1).
She also said that the members of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues “welcome the 12 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 Stern Review which urges the actions to prevent deforestation on a large-scale must be taken as soon as possible” (Tauli-Corpuz 2007, 1).
However, Tauli-Corpuz (2007) also noted that the tropical and sub-tropical forests, which are the focus of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank and several other international development agencies, including some of them in the UN, are the home to about 160 million Indigenous persons, the custodians and managers of forest diversity.
These same Indigenous persons, she also noted, “remain in very vulnerable situations because most States do not recognize their rights to these forests and the resources found, therein” (Tauli-Corpuz 2007, 1).
As the Chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Tauli-Corpuz recommended that the representatives of the Foreign Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank and the various governments, corporations and NGOs attending the Bali Conference should unequivocally state that they recognize and respect indigenous peoples rights as contained in the UN Declaration of the rights of Indigenous Peoples and that should be the starting framework for any discussion of negotiations related to access and use of resources by the Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank and other international development institutions (Tauli-Corpuz 2007, 2).
She also stated that “Indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent should be obtained before any initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries (REDD) that is pursued in their territories and forests” (Tauli-Corpuz 2007, 2).
Unfortunately, despite these concerns, the government representatives at the Bali Conference did not take into account Indigenous people’s rights, needs and knowledge in the final agreements they proposed at the end of the conference (New Consumer 2007).
13 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 Based upon the lack of focus on the rights, needs, and knowledge of Indigenous peoples, especially in relation to the lands and territories in which they live and the future of their existence, in the resource and project recommendations resulting from the Bali Conference, there remains a significant need for both international development agencies and state governments to take into account the role of Indigenous peoples in climate change.
These needs are being considered at various fora; for example, the “Social Development and Climate Change Conference,” held by the World Bank in March 2008; a conference held by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in April/May 2008, which had as a special theme “Climate Change, Bio-Cultural Diversity and Livelihoods: The Stewardship Role of Indigenous Peoples and New Challenges” (United Nations 2008a); and, the Student Working Group on Indigenous Peoples of the Georgetown University Center for Latin American Studies also held a seminar in the spring semester of 2008 on “Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change in Bolivia and Peru”.
Despite these efforts, there remains much to be done in supporting Indigenous peoples in the face of climate change.
14 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 References Cook Barreiro, Katsi.
2007.
“International Day brings recognition of indigenous peoples’ contribution to environmental protection, combating climate change.” Indigenous People Indigenous Voice.
Press release, 19 April 2007.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://www.un.org/esa/ socdev/unpfii/documents/int_day_press_release07.pdf).
Djoghlaf, Ahmed.
2007.
“Message from the Executive Secretary, Ahmed Djoghlaf, On the Occasion of the International Day of the World’s Indigenous People.” 9 August 2007.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 ( http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/news_ internationalday2007.html).
Gore, Al, 2007.
“Remarks at the opening of the Mother Earth event for climate change.” Remarks, Mother Earth Event for Climate Change, Washington, DC, 7 July 2007.
Johnson, Tim.
2007.
““Remarks at the opening of the Mother Earth event for climate change.” Remarks, Mother Earth Event for Climate Change, Washington, DC, 7 July 2007.
Ki-Moon, Ban.
2007.
“International Day brings recognition of indigenous peoples’ contribution to environmental protection, combating climate change.” Indigenous People Indigenous Voice.
Press release, 19 April 2007.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://www.un.org/esa/ socdev/unpfii/documents/int_day_press_release07.pdf).
Mann, Henrietta.
2007.
“Remarks at the opening of the Mother Earth event for climate change.” Remarks, Mother Earth Event for Climate Change, Washington, DC, 7 July 2007.
New Consumer.
2007.
“Indigenous People Protest at Bali Conference.” Retrieved August 15, 2009 (http://www.newconsumer.com/news/item/indigenous_peoples_protest_at_bali_ conference/).
OECD.
2003.
“Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor through 15 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 Adaptation.” 2003 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/27/2502872.pdf).
Peterman, Anne.
2008.
“Climate change negotiations.
Bali: the official roadmap to disaster.” ZMagazine.
February, 21:2.
Retrieved August 15, 2009 (http://www.zcommunications.org/zmag/viewArticle/16304).
Salick, Jan and Anja Byg (eds.).
2007.
“Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change.” A Tyndall Centre Publication.
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Oxford.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/Indigenouspeoples.pdf).
Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian.
2007a.
“The Smithsonian’s National Museum of the American Indian Announces “Mother Earth” Performances: A special Indian Summer Showcase concert in the spirit of the Live Earth concerts.” Smithsonian News Brief.
June 28, 2007.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://americanindian.si.edu/press/releases/ 20070628_MotherEarth.pdf).
______.
2007b.
“Smithsonian’s National Museum of the American Indian Hosts ‘Mother Earth’ Event for Climate Change in the Spirit of Live Earth Project — The Event Features Former U.S. Vice President Al Gore”.
Smithsonian News Brief.
July 6, 2007.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://americanindian.si.edu/press/releases/20070706_MotherEarth.pdf).
Tauli-Corpuz, Victoria.
2007.
“Statement on the Announcement of the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility.” Indigenous People Indigenous Voice.
Press release, 11 December 2007.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/.../ statement_vtc_toWB11dec.2007.doc).
16 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
1, Iss.
1 [2010], Art.
2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/2 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.2 United Nations.
2002.
“Indigenous Peoples Statement.” Presented by the Indigenous Peoples Caucus at the Eight Session of the Conference of the Parties.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
New Delhi, India (23 October to 1 November 2002).
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2002/cop8/stmt/ngo/005.pdf).
______.
2007.
“United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Resolution 61/295.” Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://www.un.org/esa/ socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html).
______.
2008a.
Seventh Session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
Special theme: Climate change, bio-cultural diversity and livelihoods: the stewardship role of indigenous peoples and new challenges.
New York: 21 April 2 May.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/session_seventh.html).
______.
2008b.
“Report on the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007.
Addendum Part 2 Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its thirteenth session.” FCCC/CP/2007/add1*.
Retrieved August 13, 2009 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf).
17 Davis: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010 The International Indigenous Policy Journal May 2010 Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Shelton H. Davis Recommended Citation Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Abstract Keywords Acknowledgments Creative Commons License Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change
1 1543 Version -4 Mar_15.pmd Journal of Extension Education Vol.
26 No.
4, 2014 Assessing Attitude of Tank Irrigated Farmers Towards Climate Change K. Mohanraj1 and C. Karthikeyan2 ABSTRACT The present study was conducted in ten districts of five Agro Climatic Zones of Tamil Nadu to assess the attitude of tank irrigated farmers towards climate change.
In order to measure the attitude of tank user farmers, the scale was constructed by following ‘Equal Appearing Interval’ scaling technique developed by Thurstone and Chave (1929).
The study revealed that majority of the farmers had moderately favourable attitude towards climate change.
1Ph.D Scholar, Department of Agricultural Extension & Rural Sociology and 2Professor, Directorate of Extension Education, TNAU, Coimbatore-3.
Tank irrigation is one of the oldest and significant sources of irrigation in India and is particularly in South India (Palanisami and Balasubramanian, 1998).
Nearly 39,000 tanks exist in Tamil Nadu State as natural surface water harvesting structures since the olden king regimes for the purpose of irrigation and other water usage (Palanisami et al., 2006).
The majority of small and marginal farmers in the region depend on tanks for their livelihood since small and marginal farmers are mostly poor, could not afford costintensive irrigation sources like groundwater.
Hence, tank irrigation continues to play a crucial role for them.
Although irrigation tanks can be found in major parts of India, they accounted for more than one-third of the area irrigated in the South Indian states viz., Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh (Karthikeyan, 2010).
Among the states, Tamil Nadu has experienced a gradual decline in tank-irrigated area over the years.
The highest decline was observed in Tamil Nadu (34.00 per cent) and the lowest for Maharashtra (6.00 per cent).
Most of the irrigation tanks (90 per cent) in the state are non-system tanks that depend on the rainfall in their own catchment area and are not connected to major streams, or reservoirs.
So, they are more vulnerable to climate change due to the fact, tanks mostly depend upon local rainfall than other sources of irrigation.
Hence, the present study aimed to assess the attitude of farmers towards climate change.
METHODOLOGY Tamil Nadu is classified into seven agro climatic zones namely North East, North West, Western, Cauvery Delta, Southern, High rainfall and Hilly and tribal zone.
Considering the objectives of the study and the zone-wise availability of tanks, it was decided to select five Agroclimatic zones leaving high rainfall and Hilly and tribal zone.
Keeping the intensity of tanks at district level with each of selected zones, two districts in each of these five zones were selected.
Accordingly, 10 districts were selected from the five agro-climatic zones for this study.
In each of the selected 10 districts, two blocks were selected considering the total net area irrigated by the tanks.
Tank user Research Note Journal of Extension Education5370 farmers were interviewed in correspondence with the objective set forth.
In order to measure the attitude of tank user farmers towards climate change, a scale was constructed by following ‘Equal Appearing Interval’ scaling technique developed by Thurstone and Chave (1929).
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION Computation of attitude scale Possible statements concerning the psychological object i.e., ‘climate change’ was collected based on review of literature and discussion with social scientists and agro meteorologists.
Totally 75 statements were collected which were organised and structured in the form of attitude items.
The items were screened by following the informal criteria.
Based on the screening, 60 items were selected which formed the universe of content.
The 60 statements were then subjected to judges opinion on a five-point continuum, ranging from, most unfavourable to most favourable.
The list of statements was sent to 60 judges who comprised of extenionists of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Universities, Kerala Agricultural University and Annamalai University.
Of the 60 judges, 40 judges responded by sending their judgements.
By applying the formula as suggested by Thurstone and Chave (1929), the scale values and Q values were computed for the 60 statements.
Finally the nine statements having high scale values and low Q values 1.
2 4.080 0.701 The climate change influences agriculture negatively.
Unfavourable 2.
41 4.031 0.658 Climate changes aggravated out-migration in tank command areas.
Unfavourable 3.
18 2.005 1.245 Climate change increased number of rainy days in tank command areas Favourable 4.
11 3.635 0.657 Climate change reduced water availability in irrigation tanks.
Unfavourable 5.
19 1.514 0.642 Climate change increased the propensity of farmers to take up agriculture.
Favourable 6.
25 3.492 1.017 Climate change led to yield decline of tank irrigated crops.
Unfavourable 7.
34 2.036 1.316 Climate change often results in crop failure/crop crash.
Unfavourable 8.
54 1.755 0.082 Climate change provided conducive environment for agriculture.
Favourable 9.
28 1.020 0.136 Climate change increased the crop yield in tank command area Favourable Table 1.
Final Set of Attitude Items Selected with Corresponding S and Q Values and the Nature of Statement Nature of the statement Sl.
No.
Statement No.
S Value Q Value Statement 5371Assessing Attitude of Tank Irrigated Farmers Towards Climate Change were selected.
Final set of attitude items selected with corresponding S and Q values and the nature of statement is presented in Table 1.
Attitude of farmers towards climate change It could be observed from the Table 2 that majority (66.33 %) of the farmers were found to possess moderately favourable attitude towards climate change followed by 19.67 per cent had less favourable and 14.00 per cent had highly favourable attitude respectively.
CONCLUSION The present study revealed that tank user farmers possessed moderately favourable attitude towards climate change.
Thus, it could be inferred that climate change possesses a threat to tank irrigation.
The policy makers should take care of attitude of farmers towards climate change when designing adaptation options to climate change as it is important to consider the attitude of local communities towards climate change.
REFERENCES Karthikeyan, C. 2010.
Competition and Conflicts among Multiple Users of Tank Irrigation Systems.
Fourteenth International Water Technology Conference, IWTC 14 2010, Cairo, Palanisami, K and R. Balasubramanian.
1998.
Common Property and Private Prosperity: Tank vs.
Private Wells in Tamil Nadu, Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 53: 600-613.
Palanisami, K., Senthilvel, S., Ranganathan, C. R and Ramesh, T. 2006.
Water Productivity at Different Scales under Canal, Tank and Well Irrigation Systems.
Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development Studies (CARDS), Tamil Nadu Agricultural University.
Thurstone, L.L.
and E.J.
Chave.
1929.
The Measurement of Attitude, Chicago University, Chicago Press.
Sl.
No.
Attitude towards climate change Score Total (n=300) Range No % 1.
Less favourable <17 59 19.67 2.
Moderately favourable 18-23 199 66.33 3.
Highly favourable >23 42 14.00 Total 300 100 Mean 20.13 Standard deviation 2.94 Table.2.
Attitude of Tank User Farmers Towards Climate Change
Articles in vol.
21(2) and later of this journal are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 United States License.
This journal is published by the University Library System, University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press.
JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH Book Review Extreme Cities: The Peril and Promise of Urban Life in the Age of Climate Change.
Ashley Dawson.
2019.
London, UK: Verso.
378 pages, ISBN 978-17847-8039-5.
Paper ($19.95) Reviewed by Jacob F. Northcutt and Brett Clark University of Utah jabcobfnorthcutt@gmail.com brett.clark@soc.utah.edu An “extreme city,” Ashley Dawson explains, is “not a city of a certain size, like the megacity or metacity,” but rather “an urban space of stark economic inequality, the defining urban characteristic of our time, and one of the greatest threats to the sustainability of urban existence” (6).
He contends that the successes and/or failures to address “race, class, and gender” inequalities within cities will determine how society will contend with “the storms that are bearing down upon humanity” (6-7).
Thus, cities, and everything that transpires in relation to them, remain at the center of “the coming climate chaos” (5).
Dawson, a professor of English at the CUNY Graduate Center, has conducted extensive research in relation to postcolonialism, environmental humanities, and the political economy of the global system.
In his previous book, Extinction: A Radical History, he examined how the restless expansion of the capitalist system is decimating the global commons and driving the sixth extinction.
In Extreme Cities: The Peril and Promise of Urban Life in the Age of Climate Change, Dawson assesses the critical intersection between cities and ecological crisis in the Anthropocene.
He stresses that too often cities receive little attention in regard to climate assessments and environmental discussions.
He points out that cities are a defining aspect of the twenty-first century, as the majority of humanity resides within them, the anthropogenic activities within urban ISSN: 1076-156X | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.937 | jwsr.pitt.edu http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://upress.pitt.edu/ http://upress.pitt.edu/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ mailto:jabcobfnorthcutt@gmail.com mailto:jabcobfnorthcutt@gmail.com mailto:brett.clark@soc.utah.edu mailto:brett.clark@soc.utah.edu Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Jacob F. Northcutt and Brett Clark jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.937 497 centers generate massive amounts of carbon dioxide, they are sites of extreme ecological transformations, and many cities--especially those along coasts--are extremely vulnerable to the consequences of climate change.
Modern cities, and urban growth and development in particular, are intimately driven by capitalism, as sites of production and consumption, as well as reinvestment of surplus—all of which intensify the demands placed upon the larger biophysical world.
Thus, cities are “dependent upon nature, but they also structure our increasingly chaotic world” (9).
From this point of tension, Dawson investigates the current state and the future of the “extreme city” in the face of climate change.
To a large extent, he focuses his analysis on cities located near seas, oceans, or rivers, locations where large human populations will be most affected by rising water levels as a result of climate change.
Surveying the various proposals and projects from different cities, Dawson notes that these urban spaces contain divergent social, political, economic, and environmental realities.
Nevertheless, these centers are shaped by a global economic system predicated on constant growth and expansion, which creates vast social inequalities.
These conditions and those who benefit from the system influence mitigation and adaptation strategies.
‘Smart’ urbanism and good infrastructure are frequently proposed as so-called solutions to create more resilient cities.
Some of these plans involve relocating specific populations out of high-risk zones, but there is often a hitch as far as how this is done and who benefits.
Dawson indicates that these approaches, under current conditions, generally fail to address equity and justice concerns.
In fact, many of the projects exacerbate rather than diminish social inequalities.
Dawson draws upon Mike Davis (2006, 2010), who explains that urbanization under capitalism generates unsustainable practices.
Speculators and developers in general dictate urban plans, prioritizing economic growth, and contributing to the polarization that characterizes extreme cities.
For example, former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg and real estate developers-who are heavily invested in the current (and future) physical space of these extreme cities-emphasize the need for more infrastructure that will create defensive space around their cities (and properties).
They are more interested in creating walls and barriers--hard, inflexible borders--to shield against rising water levels.
Dawson argues that these plans are under-scoped, haphazardly designed, and do not consider the social injustices that will result from such projects.
As part of the “city [as] a growth machine,” “speculative real estate development” serves as “a sink for surplus capital,” in order to further private accumulation (35).
Under these conditions, relocation projects and community buyout plans, proposed to address climate concerns, are suspect.
Developers and government leaders often use these agreements to further their own private interests.
Developers raze neighborhoods in flood prone areas, displacing poor people, only to develop luxury, high-end living accommodations.
Dawson effectively highlights that these projects for creating defensive infrastructure are often not real solutions for addressing climate change.
Instead, they entrench class and racial divisions within society, creating the conditions for devastating social disasters associated with flooding and other climate events.
The elite care more about their return on investment than they do about the people who call these cities their homes.
This misanthropic, elitist view, Dawson reveals, is deeply embedded in Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Book Review jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.937 498 current plans to ‘green’ major cities worldwide.
Therefore, he encourages readers to be more discerning and skeptical of urban planning ‘solutions’ that seek to solve the problem of climate change simply through design and engineering, while supporting the existing socioeconomic system.
This commitment to endless growth, Henri Lefèbvre (1974: 256) contended, creates “a crisis of civilisation, a crisis of society, a crisis of space, what I call the urban crisis.” During this dangerous historical moment, capitalists exploit the crisis to usher in even more draconian neoliberal policies, to increase profit margins, and to intensify the robbery of earth (Klein 2007, 2014).
To counter this “age of disaster,” Dawson argues that “disaster communism” is needed, as “there is no green exit from the extreme city” given that “capitalism is founded on the principle of ‘grow or die’” (9, 237-238).
A radical, revolutionary change in the system of production and in political power can increase the chances of mitigating climate chaos in a humane manner.
He notes that navigating the challenges ahead requires social planning, which involves social and community-oriented solutions, and large-scale redistribution of human populations, away from regions that will be inundated.
Such a retreat must be organized and done through public participation.
These actions also serve as the means to address social inequalities to facilitate further systemic change.
Such social planning, of course, runs counter to the existing socioeconomic system and is not what contemporary city, regional, and national leaders desire.
For Dawson, such actions and social change are necessary given the reality of the historical moment.
He states, “It is becoming increasingly clear that nations such as the United States may have to consider retreat not just from portions of the coastline but from entire cities and regions” (280).
Furthermore, “[t]he question the world faces is not whether partial or even total retreat from coastal and riverine zones threatened with inundation will take place.
It is under what conditions this retreat will unfold: Will we plan now for socially just policies of adaptation and retreat, when climate chaos is still in an incipient phase and our collective resources to cope are relatively great, or will such changes take place under conditions in which the most powerful save themselves alone and exploit the vulnerable?” (285).
In contrast to the social and ecological irrationality that governs business-as-usual policies and the techno-fixes that fail to address the root of these problems, Dawson strives to offer practical and realistic approaches, which include a coordinated retreat and community solidarity.
Historically marginalized populations cannot be ignored and left behind.
They must be part of planning and creating urban spaces that are focused on ensuring that human needs are met while protecting the conditions of life.
Such actions and approaches must be fostered now, accompanied by forethought and planning, instead of following the established pattern of reacting later after the next ‘natural’ disaster.
Dawson stresses that grassroots movements must facilitate the changes needed.
He presents several historical instances where movements were extremely effective at providing services to citizens, particularly following ‘natural’ disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy.
By focusing attention on these groups that were built out of such movements as Occupy Wall Street, Dawson shifts attention away from governmental legislation and other elite-managed approaches.
He explains that small groups and efforts have been very effective at addressing the Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Jacob F. Northcutt and Brett Clark jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.937 499 specific needs of people in diverse settings.
Dawson’s intent, it seems, is to show how strong community networks already exist within extreme cities and to suggest that these smaller, bureaucratic organizations can empower citizens.
These community groups may also be more responsive in times of need, especially under the current power structure.
While much of the future of extreme cities currently rests in the hands of governments and the elites, Dawson insists that community groups are an important part of challenging capital and facing climate chaos and disaster.
In concluding Extreme Cities, Dawson states, “Human survival—and the survival of many of our fellow creatures on Earth—demands that we imagine new forms of collective flourishing.
The ideal of the good city in a time of climate crisis offers a paradigm for the kinds of human connection upon which our collective survival depends.
Liberated from the imperative of incessant economic growth and the bankrupt culture of consumption that it fosters, denizens of the good cities of the future may discover new forms of human plentitude while helping one another weather the coming storms” (306).
Moving away from carbon capitalism is of utmost importance for the diversity of plant and animal species to survive and persist in the future.
To do this, we must forge a new productive relationship with each other and the larger world, which prioritizes sustaining life in the long run, rather than the needs of capital.
With Extreme Cities, Dawson makes an important contribution to critical scholarship, assessing the human dimensions of environmental change.
He insightfully presents how the organization of cities and their operation remain a major part of this history, which has contributed to ongoing ecological crisis.
The extreme city is a product of a distinct history, comprised of concrete decisions and policies, operating within the influence of the capitalist system.
While the future is in the balance, it is open.
Thus, it is possible to forge a new productive system, social relations, and urban conditions, in order to ensure a more just, equitable, and healthy world for all life to flourish.
The stakes are extremely high, and the need for action is urgent.
References Davis, Mike.
2006.
Planet of Slums.
London, UK: Verso.
______.
2010.
“Who Will Build the Ark?” New Left Review 61: 29-46.
Dawson, Ashley.
2016.
Extinction: A Radical History.
New York, NY: OR Books.
Klein, Naomi.
2007.
The Shock Doctrine.
New York, NY: Henry Holt.
______.
2014.
This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate.
New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Lefèbvre, Henri.
1974.
“Leszek Kolakowski and Henri Lefèbvre: Evolution or Revolution.” Pp.
201-267 in Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind, Fons Elder, ed.
London, UK: Souvenir Press.
Journal of World-Systems Research Journal of World-Systems Research Journal of World-Systems Research Book Review Book Review Extreme Cities: The Peril and Promise of Urban Life in the Age of Climate Change.
Ashley Dawson.
2019.
London, UK: Verso.
378 pages, ISBN 978-1-7847-8039-5.
Paper ($19.95) Extreme Cities: The Peril and Promise of Urban Life in the Age of Climate Change.
Ashley Dawson.
2019.
London, UK: Verso.
378 pages, ISBN 978-1-7847-8039-5.
Paper ($19.95) Vol.
1 | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1 Vol.
1 | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1
24 Ecosystem-based climate change adaptation for Essenvelt, Middelburg, The Netherlands Wim Timmermans, Cor Jacobs, Tim van Hattum, Louis Lategan & Juaneé Cilliers http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp71i1.3 Peer reviewed and revised October 2017 Abstract Climate change is an internationally recognised phenomenon generally held accountable for the increasing magnitude of extremes in both climatic events and temperature.
With increasing urbanization and the concentration of socio-economic activities in urban areas, the challenge to contend with climate change is particularly pertinent in cities.
In response to climate-change impacts, a range of climateadaptation strategies have been developed to make cities increasingly ‘climate proof’.
A qualitative research approach is employed to review climate change, its impacts and some adaptation strategies, focusing on ecosystem-based adaptation strategies from Belgium and The Netherlands and Water-Sensitive Urban Design approaches developed in Australia.
The article engages a case study of Essenvelt, Middelburg, The Netherlands, where unanticipated warmer night-time temperatures are a primary concern, related to natural variability, the urban heat island effect and climate change.
The article proposes certain adaptation measures for Essenvelt, based on the adaptation strategies reviewed.
Keywords: Adaptation, climate change, ecosystem-based, water-sensitive urban design, WSUD ’N OORWEGING VAN KLIMAATSVERANDERING: EKOSISTEEMGEBASEERDE AANPASSING EN WATERSENSITIEWE STEDELIKE ONTWERPAANBEVELINGS VIR ESSENVELT, MIDDELBURG, NEDERLAND Klimaatsverandering is ’n verskynsel wat internasionale erkenning geniet en algemeen aanspreeklik gehou word vir die toenemende omvang van uiterste klimaats toestande en gebeure.
Met verstedeliking wat toeneem en die konsentrasie van sosio-ekonomiese aktiwiteite in stedelike gebiede, word stede veral geraak deur die uitdaging om klimaatsverandering aan te spreek.
In reaksie tot die impak van klimaatsverandering is ’n verskeidenheid klimaataanpassingstrategieë ontwikkel om stede meer ‘klimaatbestand’ te maak.
’n Kwalitatiewe navorsingsbenadering word gevolg om klimaatsverandering, impakte en sekere aanpassings tra te gieë te ondersoek met ’n fokus op ekosisteemgebaseerde aanpassingstrategieë uit België en Nederland, en Water-Sensitiewe Stedelike Ontwerp uit Australië.
Die artikel betrek ’n gevallestudie van Essenvelt, Middelburg, Nederland, waar onverwagte warmer nagtemperature, in verband met natuurlike veranderlikheid, die stedelike hitte eilandeffek en klimaatsverandering, geïdentifiseer word.
Die artikel stel sekere klimaataanpassingstrategieë voor vir Essenvelt, gebaseer op die aanpassingstrategieë wat bespreek is.
Sleutelwoorde: Aanpassing, ekosisteemgebaseer, klimaatsverandering, WaterSensitiewe Stedelike Ontwerp, WSUD Tlwaelo bakeng sa phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo e itshetlehileng hodima tikoloho mabapi le Essenvelt, Middelburg, Netherlands Phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo ke ketsahalo e tsejwang ke matjhaba, eo ka kakaretso e nkilweng e ikarabella bakeng sa boholo bo eketsehileng ba diketsahalo tse fetelletseng tsa phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo le ho motjheso o fetelletseng.
Ka lebaka la ho eketseha ha ditoropo le tsepamiso ya maikutlo ho diketsahalo moruong wa setjhaba ditoropong, phepetso ya ho sokola ka phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo e tlwaelehile ditoropong.
Bakeng sa ho arabela ho ditshusumetso tsa phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo, ho hlahisitswe maano a ho itlwaetsa a itseng; ho etsa hore ditoropo di dule di sirelletsehile phetohong ya boemo ba lehodimo.
Mokgwa wa diphuputso tsa boleng o sebediswa ho lekodisisa phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo, ditshusumetso tsa yona le maano a ho itlwaetsa a itseng a tsepamisang maikutlo hodima maano a boitlwaetso a itshetlehileng hodima tikoloho; a tswang Belgium, Netherlands le ho mekgwa ya moralo wa setoropong wa tlhokomelo ya metsi e tswang Australia.
Atikele ena e kenyelletsa thuto ya mehlala ya Essenvelt, Middelburg le Netherlands moo teng motjheso o eketsehileng nakong tsa bosiu, e leng kgathatso e ka sehloohong e amanang le diphapang tsa tlholeho, tshusumetso ya urban heat island le phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo.
Atikele ena e sisinya/hlahisa mekgwa ya ho itlwaetsa e itseng bakeng sa Essenvelt, e itshetlehileng hodima maano a boitlwaetso a hlahlobilweng.
Mantswe a sehlooho: Boitlwaetso, phetoho ya boemo ba lehodimo, se itshetlehileng tikolohong, Moralo wa motse setoropo wa tlhokomelo ya metsi, WSUD 1.
INTRODUCTION Climate change may result in environmental changes that extend beyond existing and historical natural variability (Gibbs, 2015: 207).
There is a growing recognition of Dr. Wim Timmermans, Researcher Climate adaptation, Wageningen Environmental Research Team Climate Change, Post Box 47 6700AA, Wageningen.
Netherlands.
Phone: +31 (0)317486405, email: <wim.timmermans@wur.nl> Dr. Cor Jacobs, Researcher on micrometeorology and gas exchange, Wageningen Environmental Research Team Climate Change, Post Box 47 6700AA Wageningen.
Netherlands.
Phone: +31 (0)317486460, email: <cor.jacobs@wur.nl> T. van Hattum, Researcher Climate change, Wageningen Environmental Research Team Climate Change, Post Box 47, 6700AA Wageningen, Netherlands.
Phone: +31 (0)317483441, email: <tim.vanhattum@wur.nl> Dr. Louis (L.G.)
Lategan, Unit for Environmental Sciences and Management, North-West University, Private Bag X6001, Potchefstroom, 2520.
Phone: 018 299 2486, email: <latlou.info@gmail.com> Prof. Juaneé (EJ) Cilliers, Urban and Regional Planning, School for Geo and Spatial Sciences, Potchefstroom Campus, North-West University, Private Bag X6001, Potchefstroom, 2520, South Africa.
Phone: 083 414 3939, email: <juanee.cilliers@nwu.ac.za> http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp71i1.3 Wim Timmermans, Cor Jacobs, Tim van Hattum, Louis Lategan & Juaneé Cilliers • Ecosystem-based climate change adaptation for Essenvelt 25 global climate change, including an increasing cognisance of extreme climatic events with more intense storms, longer droughts (Muller, 2007: 103), and extreme temperatures.
The resultant enhanced risks expressed at local level include threats to human health and safety, property, agriculture, infrastructure, services, and the local environment (Fussel, 2008: 45; Kennedy, Stocker & Burke, 2010: 805; Claes, Vandenbussche, Versele, Klein & Verbist, 2012: 15; Bizikova, Crawford, Nijniik & Swart, 2014: 412; Ziervogel, Midgley, Myers, New, Taylor, Van Garderen, Hamann, Warburton & Stuart-Hill, 2014: 606; IPCC, 2014: 6; Gibbs, 2015: 207; Hu, Hall, Shi & Lim, 2016: 1083; EEA, 2017: 105-310).
With increasing urbanization and an ongoing concentration of socioeconomic activities in urban areas, the challenge to cope with climate change is particularly pertinent in cities (EEA, 2012: 6).
This article focuses on climate adap tation strategies in cities.
It is important to review climate change impacts with examples of related disasters to underscore the urgency for climate adaptation strategies.
By discussing basic concepts related to climate adaptation, three categories of adaptation strategies can be identified, from which planning and management instruments can be selected; this article focuses on ecosystem-based adaptation approaches.
Accordingly, ecosystembased adaptation strategies from Belgium and The Netherlands and the Water-Sensitive Urban Design (WSUD) approach pioneered in Australia have been summarised to exemplify how adaptation strategies may be formulated and implemented.
A case study of Essenvelt, Middelburg, The Netherlands, where unexpected warmer night-time temperatures are a result of natural variability, in all probability intensified by the urban heat island effect and climate change, was used to apply the adaptation proposals discussed, in order to recommend certain adaptation strategies for Essenvelt utilising wind, building design, and blue-green infrastructure possibilities.
The case study was examined following a desktop analysis on the basis of ongoing research on temperature variations and climatic conditions in Middelburg.
2.
CLIMATE CHANGE 2.1 Climate change impacts Europe will undergo significant hydro-climatic changes in the future, with the north predicted to become wetter (Gudmundsson & Seneviratne, 2016: 1-6) as yearly precipitation increases as a result of climate change (EEA, 2017: 12).
Heavy rainfalls, cloudbursts and resulting floods have already and will increasingly wreak havoc across much of Europe (Van Hattum, Blaauw, Bergen Jensen & De Bruin, 2016: 4), placing people and infrastructure in crisis (EEA, 2017: 12).
Examples include flooding across Europe in August 2002, causing 232 fatalities and billions of euros in damage (Kundzewicz, 2015: 189); downpours in 2011, amounting to over 120mm of rainfall, causing floods in Copenhagen, Denmark, resulting in more than one billion euros in damage, and extreme rainfall and hail in The Netherlands’ south-eastern region in 2016, causing damage amounting to over 550 million euros.
Gudmundsson & Seneviratne (2016: 1) provide evidence that, although drought is a significant natural hazard in Europe, affecting 37% of the European Union over the past decade, southern Europe presents an increased risk of drought, whilst the probability of dry years has decreased in the north.
Droughts may cause water shortfalls, famines, natural fires, degraded soil and water quality, as well as increased health risks to the population (Samaniego, Thober, Kumar, Rakovec, Wood, Sheffield, Pan, Wanders & Prudhomme, 2017: 1).
Drought and temperatures spikes are often interconnected.
Heat waves may have significant consequences.
Europe has suffered from several heatwaves, among which the infamous European heatwave in the summer of 2003 that claimed an additional 70,000 lives, with a great number of victims residing in urban areas (Robine, Cheung, Leroy, Vanoyen, Griffiths, Michel & Herrmann, 2008: 171).
According to a recent analysis, heat extremes caused over 90% of the casualties related to extreme weather events between 1991 and 2015 (EEA, 2017: 203).
The Netherlands is located in north-western Europe and belongs to a group of countries and regions with a marine West coast climate (Köppen-Geiger classification Cfb).
The annual average rainfall amounts to 851 mm (reference period 1981-2010).
Since average annual evaporation is estimated at 561 mm, this results in a surplus of precipitation on an annual basis.
However, strong seasonal variations may lead to dry spells during the summer season, in particular, and an average maximum precipitation deficit in the growing season (AprilSeptember) of 140 mm (Noordhof Atlasproducties/KNMI, 2011).
Whereas climate change is expected to result in more extreme precipitation events, in particular in the strongly urbanised coastal areas, more extended periods of drought may also be expected (Van Den Hurk, Siegmund & Klein Tank, 2014).
While the average annual rainfall may increase by up to 6%, summer precipitation may increase slightly by 1%-2% or decrease strongly by 11%-13% in 2050, depending on possible changes in large-scale circulation patterns and the global temperature increase.
With an expected increase in evaporation of up to 11% in summer, this could lead to an increase in growingseason precipitation deficits of up to 30%.
Along with an expected rise in sea levels (1.0 mm-7.5 mm per year), this may result in problematic salt intrusion in coastal areas (Klimaat, 2017: online).
The average annual temperature (reference period 1981-2010) varies from about 10.5°C in the south-west to about 9.5°C in the north-east.
The two warmest months are July and August, with average maximum temperatures of about 23°C and minima of around 13°C.
Days with 26 SSB/TRP/MDM 2017 (71) maximum temperatures exceeding 25° (so-called ‘summer days’) typically occur from 10 to 20 times in most of the coastal areas to 30 to 40 times per year in more inland parts in the south-east (Noordhof Atlasproducties/KNMI, 2011).
According to recent climate scenarios generated by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, average annual and summer season temperatures may have increased by 1.0%-2.3°C in 2050, again depending on possible changes in large-scale circulation patterns and the global temperature increase (Van den Hurk et al., 2014).
Moreover, the number of ‘summer days’ may increase by 22%-70%.
Given the generally mild conditions experienced in The Netherlands, the problem of heat stress has long been ignored.
However, heat-related casualties during the heatwaves of 2003 and 2006 have underlined the issue more (Van Hove, Steeneveld, Jacobs, Ter Maat, Heusinkveld, Elbers, Moors & Holtslag, 2010).
Increased recognition is warranted, as temperature extremes are likely to be affected more than the average, leading to more intense heatwaves (Van Den Hurk et al., 2014) and, therefore, more casualties in the future.
Figure 1 (adapted from Huynen, Maartens, Schram, Weijenberg & Kunst, 2001: 463) illustrates the relationship between average daily temperature and mortality.
The figure shows the ratio of the observed number of deaths and the long-term average number of deaths on a particular day versus observed temperature.
It can be noted that a minimum in the number of casualties occurs at about 16.5°C and that both cold and hot conditions lead to enhanced mortality.
The curve predicts that a typical heatwave in The Netherlands could cause 40 additional deaths daily.
On average, the higher number of heat-related deaths in a warmer future climate will not be balanced by a lower number of cold-related casualties (Rovers, Bosch & Albers, 2015: 37).
Urbanization may exacerbate these numbers in Dutch cities.
Figure 2 schematically illustrates the effect of a possible combination of regional climate change and urbanization.
The column on the left shows the present-day situation in rural areas.
Research has shown that critical heat thresholds are at present approached in both large and small cities and villages in The Netherlands, partly due to the urban heat island effect (Steeneveld, Koopmans, Heusinkveld, Van Hove & Holtslag, 2011).
This is illustrated in the second column of Figure 2.
The third and fourth columns, respectively, show how urbanization leads to increased urban heat island intensity, which may result in exceedance of the critical threshold along with the aforementioned regional climate change.
The urban heat island effect is known to be a night-time phenomenon, leading to higher minimum temperatures in cities (Oke, 1981; Fang, 2015: 2195; Milojevic, Armstrong, Gasparrini, Bohnenstengel, Barratt & Wilkinson, 2016: 1016).
This is important due to the aforementioned sensitivity of human beings to night-time temperature.
The number of so-called tropical nights (minimum temperature over 20°C) presently averages about 5 per year in the centre of larger cities in The Netherlands, but may increase to several tens per year around 2050 (Klimaat, 2017), partly related to the urban heat island.
It is important to note that regional climate change is, to a large extent, driven by global change, but that, in principle, local planning measures can reduce urban heat island intensity.
Whereas the immediate effects of storms and floods may be more e future, lead to critical values being exceeded more often (see Figure 2).
2.2 Climate adaptation Figure 1: Relation between temperature and excess mortality.
See main text for further explanation.
Figure 2: Influence of climate change and urbanisation on heat stress.
Urbanisation affects the urban heat island (UHI).
See main text for further explanation.
Figure 1: Relation between temperature and excess mortality.
See main text for further explanation.
After Huynen et al., 2001. e future, lead to critical values being exceeded more often (see Figure 2).
2.2 Climate adaptation Figure 1: Relation between temperature and excess mortality.
See main text for further explanation.
Figure 2: Influence of climate change and urbanisation on heat stress.
Urbanisation affects the urban heat island (UHI).
See main text for further explanation.
Figure 2: Influence of climate change and urbanisation on heat stress.
Urbanisation affects the urban heat island (UHI).
See main text for further explanation.
Figure design: Bert van Hove, Wageningen University Wim Timmermans, Cor Jacobs, Tim van Hattum, Louis Lategan & Juaneé Cilliers • Ecosystem-based climate change adaptation for Essenvelt 27 obvious, droughts and heatwaves can also have other significant impacts beyond loss of life in several sectors (for a comprehensive discussion on impacts of extreme heat in cities, see Klok & Kluck, 2017).
A wellknown example is demonstrated by a decrease in productivity: a temperature rise of about two degrees may halve productivity, once a critical value has been exceeded (Smith, Woodward, Campbell-Lendrum, Chadee, Honda, Liu, Olwoch, Revich & Sauerborn, 2014: 732).
An initial analysis of The Netherlands indicates that loss of productivity would constitute the bulk of additional cost levied by global warming, given the impacts of reduced thermal comfort and increased heat stress, further exacerbated by the urban heat island effect (Daanen, Jonkhoff, Bosch & ten Broeke, 2013: 16).
The impacts of climate change are expected to increase the occurrence of naturally occurring heatwaves and droughts.
Combined with the urban heat island effect and more intense urbanization, this may, in the future, lead to critical values being exceeded more often (see Figure 2).
2.2 Climate adaptation The severe consequences of climate change have resulted in more arduous discussions on climate adaptation in policy and practice (Kennedy et al., 2010: 805), following fairly weak past attempts at mitigation to reduce climate change impacts (Laukkonen, Blanco, Lenhart, Keiner, Cavric & Kinuthia-Njenga, 2009: 288; Gibbs, 2015: 206).
In 2014, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defined adaptation as: The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects.
In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.
In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects…in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (IPCC, 2014: 118).
Fussel (2008: 37) contends that such adjustments are usually the result of ‘action by individuals, social groups, or institutions’.
As the adaptation agenda has gained momentum, cities and communities have developed their own intervention strategies to address climate change adaptation (Bulkeley & Tuts, 2013: 647).
Whereas most human societies are inherently adaptive, climate change may test coping capacities to their limits (Muller, 2007: 102) and may demand increasingly creative planning, development and management solutions.
As such, climate change intervention frameworks are being developed at a rapid pace worldwide, increasingly providing opportunities for multi-level and transnational communication that allows local authorities to draw from international experience and new developments (Bulkeley & Tuts, 2013: 657).
Whereas it is important to recognise and learn from international ‘best practice’, individual place-based responses (Wamsler, Niven, Beery, Bramryd, Ekelund, Jönsson, Adelina Osmani, Palo & Stålhammar, 2016: 1) at local level are crucial.
Climate change impacts are expressed particularly in specific regions and places and on specific communities and ecosystems (Kennedy et al., 2010: 805) that present a myriad of unique pressures that influence the ability to respond to climate vulnerability and adaptation.
A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach will likely be unsuccessful (Bulkeley & Tuts, 2013: 650).
In considering existing approaches, urban planning, through land-use planning, spatial strategies and water management, provides a range of instruments capable of addressing climate change through long-term development decisions that may incorporate disaster preparedness and response efforts (EEA, 2012: 76; Bulkeley & Tuts, 2013: 658).
Climate adaptation planning and management instruments are typified by hard and soft approaches (Muller, 2007: 102).
Hard approaches refer to engineered structures such as flood walls, dykes and polders, whereas soft approaches encompass issues such as raising awareness and institutional capacity-building.
Green-based, ecosystem-oriented adaptation, defined as “the use of biodiversity and ecosystem services as part of an overall adaptation strategy” (CBD 2009: 41), is included either under soft approaches or may represent a third approach altogether (Wamsler et al., 2016: 3).
Ecosystem-based adaptations are becoming more commonplace, gradually evolving to replace a previous focus on green infrastructure (Colding, 2007: 50; Tzoulas, Korpela, Venn, Yli-Pelkonen, Kazmierczak, Niemele & James, 2007: 170; Cilliers, Diemont, Stobbelaar & Timmermans, 2011: 583; Biotope-city, 2017) to embrace approaches that combine blue-green infrastructure (Wamsler et al., 2016: 9), in connected, multiscale networks (Cilliers & Cilliers, 2016: 20).
The increasing focus on water is fitting, not only considering water as a critical issue in both global wetting and warming and the ecosystem services provided by water bodies and systems, but also considering that the useful life of water infrastructure is commonly measured in hundreds of years, requiring that contemporary infrastructure investments meet the requirements and challenges of the twenty-second century (Muller, 2007: 100).
In ecosystem-based adaptation approaches, ecological structures, their functions, and services are utilised to increase the capacity of areas and inhabitants to reduce risks as a result of climatic extremes and variability (Timmermans, Woestemburg, Annema, Jonkhof, Shllaku & Yano, 2015; Wamsler et al., 2016: 3).
Ecosystem-based adaptations thus rely on a multitude of ecosystem management activities made up of a range of blue-green infrastructure components, including parks and gardens, street trees, permeable surfaces, urban wetlands, watercourses, ponds, lakes and green roofs that are directly or indirectly intended to reduce climate risk (Wamsler et al., 2016: 3).
2.3 Urban adaptation strategies A range of urban strategies have been devised to address the consequences of climate change and related extreme weather conditions.
These strategies are increasingly being incorporated 28 SSB/TRP/MDM 2017 (71) into spatial planning strategies with specific spatial design principles incorporated to make the city ‘climate proof’.
The strategies devised for Belgium, The Netherlands and Australia were selected based on the comprehensive nature of the proposals they contain, that address several climatic challenges within the scope of urban development, based mainly on ecosystem-based approaches.
2.3.1 Belgium: Six spatial strategies proposed by the Flemish government In being aware of climate change impacts and the need to address them, the Flemish government devised six spatial strategies based on the report ‘Climate adaptation and qualitative and quantitative guidelines for the spatial development of regions’ (Koen Couderé, Van Gassen, Nagels, Dhondt & Debuysere, 2015).
Table 1 captures these six spatial strategies.
These six spatial strategies focus mainly on approaches to adaptation that work with the natural environment and introduce more greenery to improve thermal performance.
The following subsection captures proposals for Belgium’s neighbour, The Netherlands.
2.3.2 The Netherlands: Design principles from a multiinstitute collaboration In The Netherlands, several knowledge institutes jointly published the report ‘Designing green and blue infrastructure to support healthy urban living’ in 2016 (Gehrels et al.
2016: 11-109), describing multiple green and blue measures at city and street level to make a city healthier for its inhabitants.
The report steps beyond climate issues and describes many specific measures for urban climate adaptation.
It shows how green and blue measures at city and street level can be used to tackle heat stress; decrease noise pollution; encourage physical activity; regulate water quality; decrease feelings of stress; increase social interaction, and improve air quality.
The report pays much attention to a proper methodology and specific design principles (see Table 2).
Table 1: Six spatial strategies for climate adaptation from Belgium Spatial strategy Explanation Examples Softening hardened surfaces Develop permeable surfaces or replace with greens.
Reduce building footprints; greening semi-private gardens and parks; introducing infiltrating infrastructure; develop new green spaces; preserve existing soft spaces; limit hardening of infrastructure.
Afforestation Plant trees and shrubs.
Introduce green elements along existing infrastructure networks; increase greenery in parks; increase greenery in private green spaces; introduce urban forests; develop green squares and large green open spaces.
Ventilation Take advantage of existing dominant wind directions to optimise cooling and improve air quality.
Channel wind and breezes; remove blockages; develop areas where cooling winds may originate.
Control heat retention Wall and roofing adaptations.
Introduce more reflective hard surfaces; green roofs; use building materials with reflective or absorption qualities; green facades; create more shadows.
Provide space for water Allow areas for waterbodies and watercourses.
Space for rivers; capture rainwater; increase accessibility to water; introduce water misting in public spaces; combine the cooling effects of water and greenery; develop water buffer and infiltration spaces.
Shielding Provide protection against hard wind or excessive solar radiation.
Shield public spaces; develop dikes and other shielding structures; develop on, and with water, for example, floating buildings and/or buildings on pillars.
Source: Own construction based on Vlaanderen (2015) Table 2: Design principles for climate adaptation from The Netherlands Design principles Explanation Examples Water regulation Reduce storm-water runoff.
Canopy interception and evaporation; infiltration; root water uptake and transpiration; green roofs.
Air-temperature regulation Regulate the urban heat island effect and heat stress Maintain and increase percentage of trees; add trees with large crowns in streets, parks and squares; consider vegetation maintenance; apply infiltration to guarantee sufficient soil-moisture content.
Air-quality regulation Increase the deposition of pollutants; alter wind flow; emit biogenic volatile compounds and pollen.
Consider residence time of air and possible blocking of air exchange by trees and structures; consider fitting green infrastructure for specific context and conditions; structural maintenance of green infrastructure to regulate size and density.
Noise reduction Address noise pollution.
Locate vegetation buffers close to source of noise; favour evergreen species; mix trees and shrubs to densify buffers; select plants tolerant to air pollution and de-icing; natural buffers are less effective than planned buffers; consider topography and existing landforms.
Mental health Capitalise on potential for improved mental health.
Good-quality urban waters facilitate leisure activities that relieve stress and contribute to quality of life.
Maximise visual contact with green elements; offer high-quality, immersive and restorative experiences in green space; limit algae growth and prevent floating layers of duckweed or algae; limit resuspension.
Impact of green infrastructure on social interaction and physical exercise Promote and accommodate social interaction and physical exercise.
Green spaces should accommodate diverse attributes and facilities; accessible green spaces located in proximity (range of 2.5km) of where people live, linked with affordable public transport; green infrastructure designed around motives of green infrastructure users.
Urban waters and medical health Water quality in terms of pollution and exposure to pathogens, toxic chemicals and algal toxins.
Keep water clean by minimising sewer overflows, surface runoff and creating a flow from better to worse; decrease water flow rate to separate sediment; purify by maintaining water temperature and introduce certain plants.
Impact of blue infrastructure on healthy living Stimulate healthy living by providing opportunities for activities.
Connect waterways to other urban and rural systems via cycle and walkways along water systems.
Source: Own construction based on Gehrels et al.
2016: 25-56 Wim Timmermans, Cor Jacobs, Tim van Hattum, Louis Lategan & Juaneé Cilliers • Ecosystem-based climate change adaptation for Essenvelt 29 The first two urban adaptation strategy examples provide generic principles and tools that can be used for climate-adaptive urban design.
It is important to note the emphasis on water and blue infrastructure in both the Belgian and the Dutch strategies.
The last example, a strategic design approach, is taken from Australia, as a country with experience of severe climates and innovative policy and design responses.
Subsection 2.3.3 focuses on the Water-Sensitive Urban Design approach.
2.3.3 Australia: Water-Sensitive Urban Design Australia pioneered the concept of ‘the Water-Sensitive City’ (Wong, 2006: 1), introducing the paradigm of Water-Sensitive Urban Design (WSUD).
The WSUD approach is a visionary approach to integrate sustainable urban planning and water management that aims to minimise the hydrological impacts of urban development on the surrounding environment.
Figure 3 provides a schematic representation of the natural water balance, as the natural state; urban water balance, showing the impacts of urban development on features such as evapotranspiration, runoff and infiltration, and the WSUD approach, in adapting the urban water cycle for a Water-Sensitive City.
Wong & Brown (2009: 676) describe three pillars to integrate urban development and water management in pursuit of the Water-Sensitive City, through WSUD, reiterated in Van Hattum et al.
(2016: 9) under descriptions of the Water Smart City.
The three pillars are captured in Table 3.
The design principles and considerations on climate-adapted development and WSUD placespecific emphasis on placeappropriate adaptation.
The following section examines the case study of Essenvelt, Middelburg in The Netherlands and provides some adaptation recommendations based on the literature and three strategies summarised above.
3.
METHODS The case study of Essenvelt, Middelburg, is examined following a desktop analysis in keeping with the qualitative research tradition.
The case study was identified, motivated and further informed by ongoing research on temperature variations and climatic conditions in Middelburg (Caljouw, 2017: online), supplemented by core publications, scholarly articles and online resources sourced from electronic databases and academic search engines.
3.1 Case study: Essenvelt, Middleburg Middelburg was selected as a fitting case study to apply ecosystem-based adaptations utilising some of the principles of blue-green planning previously explored and presents application possibilities in a new district to be developed in the future in Essenvelt (Figure 4).
The city of Middelburg is located in southwestern Netherlands, in the province of Zeeland’s central peninsula.
Essenvelt is an undeveloped parcel of land located on Middelburg’s southern border towards the harbour city of Vlissingen, located 7.5km from Middelburg (Figure 4).
Considering the potential for urban expansion in the Essenvelt district, this section offers customised design recommendations to address climate change at both district and building levels.
Main challenges addressed in this regard include night-time heat and issues related to a gradual increase in the salinity of deeper groundwater under the peninsula.
Figure 3: The urban water management cycle Source: Hoban & Wong, 2006 30 SSB/TRP/MDM 2017 (71) Figure 4: Middelburg and Essenvelt Source: Opentopo, 2017 Middelburg Essenvelt Figure 4: Middelburg and Essenvelt Source: Opentopo, 2017 Table 3: Integrating urban development and water management based on three pillars for WSUD Pillar of WSUD Explanation Example Cities as water-supply catchments Cities need to draw on a range of water resources delivered via a diverse and integrated network of centralised and decentralised infrastructure at different scales.
Thus, establishing a portfolio of water sources to draw on that may demand the least environmental, social and economic costs.
Groundwater, urban storm water, rainwater, recycled waste water and desalinated water.
Cities providing ecosystem services and increasing liveability The integration of urban landscape design and green infrastructure/nature-based solutions that may mitigate the urban heat island effect, contribute to local food production, support biodiversity, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by promoting biking and outdoor recreation.
With nature-based solutions for water management, it is possible to: Protect and enhance natural water systems in urban developments; Integrate storm water treatment into the landscape by incorporating multiple use corridors that maximise visual and recreational amenity; Protect water quality draining from urban development; Reduce runoff and peak flows from urban developments by introducing local detention measures and minimising impervious areas; Integrate solutions for flood reduction, drought and heat mitigation; Add value while minimising drainage infrastructure development costs.
Storm water treatment technologies such as constructed wetlands and bio-retention systems (rain gardens) and the rehabilitation of degraded urban waterways.
Cities comprising water-smart communities and institutions Sociopolitical capital is needed for sustainability and water-sensitive decision-making from communities, developers and institutions that have the capacity to get involved in the ‘urban water problem’ and develop water-sensitive strategies.
Mandatory water-quality targets; using public art to communicate objectives; profiling community attitudes and receptivity to water reuse and pollution prevention activities; community participatory action models, including scenario workshops and community-based deliberative forums.
Source: Own construction adapted from Wong & Brown, 2009: 676-679 It has long been assumed that heat stress is not a problem in this area because of the proximity of the sea.
Whereas it is commonly held that proximity to large water bodies, such as the ocean, will provide a cooling effect over land, such impacts are not guaranteed.
This is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the minimum temperature measured on 24 August 2016, during a relatively hot late summer period in The Netherlands.
Figure 5A shows that the area near Vlissingen presents the highest minimum temperature in the country, despite its location in proximity to the sea in the western part of the province of Zeeland.
This illustrates that, even in coastal areas, under certain meteorological circumstances, high night-time temperatures can be observed, with known impacts on human health and productivity (Rovers et al., 2015: 3), as introduced in section 2.1.
In Western Europe, minimum temperatures higher than 20°C are considered critical (Fischer & Schär, 2010: 399).
It is expected that the number of hot nights with a temperature above 20°C in an average summer will increase to over 20 by 2050 (Klimaat, 2017).
Wim Timmermans, Cor Jacobs, Tim van Hattum, Louis Lategan & Juaneé Cilliers • Ecosystem-based climate change adaptation for Essenvelt 31 Further research on the causes of western Zeeland’s relatively high night-time temperatures is currently underway.
It suffices to mention that the phenomenon illustrated above conforms to observations and model calculations indicating that water may contribute to heating instead of cooling, in particular during late summer nights (Steeneveld et al., 2014: 92; Jacobs La Rivière & Goosen, 2014: 136; Gunawardena, Wells & Kershaw, 2017: 1040).
By autumn, the seawater tends to display relatively high temperatures.
As a result, and given the delayed cooling effect of the sea and Westerschelde estuary, nocturnal cooling above water might be less than expected and less in comparison to cooling above land.
Adaptation recommendations should be provided accordingly.
3.2 Adaptation recommendations for Essenvelt, Middelburg Given the issue of high night-time temperatures raised above and the impacts of increased temperatures introduced in section 2.1 of this article, it is pertinent to provide a few key design guidelines for Middelburg’s Essenvelt district.
In this regard, limiting night-time temperatures, specifically in aid of vulnerable groups, is considered a priority.
Such considerations should also be extended when planning for industrial and commercial uses.
These guidelines by no means present a complete list of recommendations to fully address all adaptation possibilities, especially towards flood-based adaptation, but provide important principles in respect of temperature regulation and general blue-green infrastructure considerations.
The first recommendation focuses on windbased adaptations.
3.2.1 Wind: Ensuring natural cooling Wind may improve thermal comfort in the city during hot periods (Van Hove, Jacobs, Heusinkveld, Elbers, Van Driel & Holtslag, 2015: 102) in the summer and during heatwaves when both dayand night-time temperatures may be elevated.
As such, it seems pertinent that newly built structures be planned not to block cooling winds in the summer.
It follows that natural ventilation be prioritised with consideration for local wind climate, wind direction and varied regional and coastal impacts.
In the Essenvelt case, consideration should be given to areas where cooling winds may originate, for example over certain water bodies, with air flow channelled accordingly.
Furthermore, design approaches should facilitate air exchange with consideration for the blockages potentially presented by trees and structures to allow warm air to escape throughout the day.
In the same vein, it is also important to guard against the potential nuisance effects of wind in hot periods and diminished thermal comfort in other periods when temperatures may already be very low.
Wind is considered in both the Belgian and the Dutch strategies provided.
The second set of recommendations examines building-design adaptations.
3.2.2 Building design: Designing and constructing with the climate in mind In placing building structures, layout designs should consider shielding public spaces and private residences from excessive solar radiation.
Reducing building footprints in exchange for greater green area cover will reduce the impacts of the urban heat island effect.
Building smaller or higher structures could be of benefit.
Measures should be taken in designing and fitting buildings to prevent daytime heating and encourage cooling at night, reducing the need for artificially cooled air.
As examples, south-facing windows may be screened in summer when the sun is high, whereas windows orientated to the east or west should be avoided.
Figure 5: Temperature map of The Netherlands Source: Klimaat, 2017 Minimum temperature Wednesday 24 August 2016 Figure 5: Temperature map of The Netherlands Source: Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI), www.knmi.nl www.knmi.nl 32 SSB/TRP/MDM 2017 (71) In relation to the aforementioned use of wind, shutter systems may be introduced to allow cooling at day and night and to block direct exposure to sunlight.
In pursuit of more shadows, awnings and roof overhangs may be introduced to provide shade during the day.
It will also be important to utilise reflective or absorbent hard surfaces and building materials.
Adaptation strategies already developed for The Netherlands (see Table 2) reference building design especially.
The following recommendations focus on the use of vegetation, echoing the green infrastructure approach.
3.2.3 Vegetation: Greener infrastructure for cooler environments Owing to the nature of ecosystembased adaptation strategies, greening the urban environment is considered a key adaptation strategy for Essenvelt.
Linking with the aforementioned focus on building design and building materials, green roofs and fronts should be introduced as standard practice, with ventilation and insulation capacities designed in accordance with needs.
The greenfield nature of future development in Essenvelt provides the opportunity to develop ample new green space and promote the cultivation of private green spaces.
Introducing minimum guidelines on greening public and private spaces such as public open spaces and gardens may prove fruitful in regulating temperatures.
Indigenous trees should be introduced to regulate climate in public spaces, streets, homes and industries in a manner of afforestation.
Hardened infrastructure networks should be avoided in favour of softer, green alternatives.
Green infrastructure should be designed in a network that incorporates and connects with blue infrastructure.
Blue infrastructure adaptation recommendations are provided accordingly.
3.2.4 Water: Considering blue infrastructure recommendations and WSUD The role of water surfaces in improving ventilation should not be discounted (Van Hove et al., 2015: 102).
New development in Essenvelt should draw on any nearby surface water to provide additional cooling, the temperature of which may be regulated using shadows to ensure that the water remains cooler than the air, linking with the focus on shadows, cool waterbodies and wind provided in subsection 3.2.1.
It is further recommended that a blue infrastructure network be introduced that works with the natural environment, incorporates existing provisions, and provides space for water.
Middelburg is situated on the coast in the Rhine-MeuseScheldt delta and its water system is traditionally a polder system.
In fulfilling the need for a new water system for Essenvelt, existing polders could be used as the basis of the new network.
The system should be arranged to ensure that surface water flows from clean to black to maintain water quality, following strategies in Table 2 (Figure 6).
Added to this, mandatory water-quality targets could be set and upheld, as per the WSUD approach, in an attempt to keep water clean and of high quality.
Furthermore, the soil map (Figure 7) shows that the area contains both lower lying clay soil and sandy cove ridges.
The ridges offer the opportunity to store collected fresh (rain) water, ensuring sufficient supply of drinking water in periods of drought Nature Drinking water Residence Agriculture Industry Figure 6: Waterflow from clean to black Source: Author’s own construction, 2017 Figure 7: Essenvelt soil map showing lower lying clay soil (dark colours) and sandy cove ridges (light colours) Source: WUR, 2017 Wim Timmermans, Cor Jacobs, Tim van Hattum, Louis Lategan & Juaneé Cilliers • Ecosystem-based climate change adaptation for Essenvelt 33 and increasing the area’s watercatchment capacity.
In recognition of a gradual increase in the salinity of deeper groundwater under the peninsula, where groundwater is extracted for use, desalination should be considered to improve water quality and usability.
Water should further be used as a central design element in public spaces, developing waterbodies and features and actively regulating temperature through water misting, for example.
In accordance with the WSUD approach, community members should also be included in participatory workshops to educate residents on water use and pollution prevention, in order to entrench WSUD within the community.
Such workshops should make residents aware of the causes of increased night-time temperatures and provide them with information on coping with the phenomenon.
4.
CONCLUSION This article provided a review of key considerations with regard to climate adaptation as an increasingly important component of urban planning strategies in the modern age.
Research shows that climate adaptation strategies should consider a range of diverse impacts.
For example, increased night-time temperatures alongside an increased likelihood of precipitation, flooding and other extreme weather events.
Proactive adaptation strategies are required to meet the challenge of climate change head on and advance the sustainability and resilience of human settlements.
In pursuing the climate-proof city, urban planners and managers, as part of a multidisciplinary approach, may draw on a range of adaptation initiatives already established across the globe, of which the key principles are represented in the Belgian, Dutch and Australian examples provided.
Such ecosystem-based and watersensitive approaches hold the benefit of targeting key concerns (e.g., high night-time temperatures as in the Middelburg and Essenvelt case), whilst simultaneously addressing multiple other climate-related issues.
Such strategies hold substantial value to improve urban quality of life and citizen health and to protect urban infrastructure and assets from damage and stress.
The task no longer lies in merely recognising the impacts of climate change or mitigating effects, but in drawing on the growing literature on adaptation strategies and learning from practical examples of implementation.
Whilst retrofitting urban areas to be greener and more adaptive is an essential part of establishing climate-proof cities, new urban extensions and greenfield developments present the opportunity to do things right from the start.
In this regard, Essenvelt, Middelburg, may present excellent adaptation possibilities that may draw on established ‘best practice’ and the Dutch tradition of planning with water.
The opportunity should be seized to pilot-adaptation strategies developed on the back of public participation initiatives and publicprivate partnerships that deliver community-driven outcomes to tackle climate change directly.
The task lies in ultimately incorporating adaptation strategies as part of routine development practice and not as an exception to the norm.
REFERENCES BIOTOPE-CITY.
2017.
Biotope-city journal.
[Online].
Available at: <http:// www.biotope-city.net.> [Accessed: 20 September 2017].
BIZIKOVA, L., CRAWFORD, E., NIJNIIK, M. & SWART, R. 2014.
Climate change adaptation planning in agriculture: Processes, experiences and lessons learned from early adapters.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 19(4), pp.
411-430. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11027-012-9440-0 BULKELEY, H. & TUTS, R. 2013.
Understanding urban vulnerability, adaptation and resilience in the context of climate change.
Local Environment, 18(6), pp.
646–662, http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/13549839.2013.788479.
CALJOUW, L. 2017.
Impactproject ontwikkelinginstrument hittestress voor steden en dorpen in het landelijk gebied.
[Online].
Available at: <https://ruimtelijkeadaptatie.
nl/voorbeelden/@168824/ hittestress-zeeland/>.
[Accessed: 20 September 2017].
CBD (CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY).
2009.
Connecting biodiversity and climate change mitigation and adaptation: report of the Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change.
Technical Series No.
41.
CBD, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
CILLIERS, E.J.
& CILLIERS, S. 2016.
Planning for green infrastructure: Options for South African cities.
Johannesburg: South African Cities Network.
CILLIERS, E.J., DIEMONT, E., STOBBELAAR, D.J.
& TIMMERMANS, W. 2011.
Enhancing sustainable development by means of the workbench method.
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 38(4), pp.
579-584. https://doi.
org/10.1068/b37111 CLAES, K., VANDENBUSSCHE, L., VERSELE, A., KLEIN, R. & VERBIST, B.
2012.
Sustainable urban planning and construction in the South.
KLIMOS working paper, pp.
1-42.
COLDING J.
2011.
The role of ecosystem services in contemporary urban planning.
In: Niemelä, J., Breuste, J.H., Elmqvist, T., Guntenspergen, G., James, P., McIntyre, N. (Eds).
Urban ecology: Patterns, processes and applications.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
228-237. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof: oso/9780199563562.003.0028 DAANEN, H.A., JONKHOFF, P., BOSCH, H. & TEN BROEKE, H. 2013.
The effect of global warming and urban heat islands on mortality, morbidity and productivity in The Netherlands.
In: Cotter, J.D., Lucas, S.J.E.
& Mündel, T.
(Eds.).
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Environmental Ergonomics, 11-15 February 2013, Queenstown, New Zealand.
University of Otago: International Society of Environmental Ergonomics, pp.
16-19.
EEA (EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY).
2012.
Urban adaptation to climate change in Europe Challenges and opportunities for cities together with supportive national and European policies.
EEA Report No 2/2012, pp.
5-143.
ISSN 1725-9177.
EEA (EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY).
2017.
Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016.
An indicator-based report.
EEA Report No 1/2017, pp.
8-334.
ISSN 1977-8449.
34 SSB/TRP/MDM 2017 (71) FANG, G. 2015.
Prediction and analysis of urban heat island effect in Dangshan by remote sensing.
International Journal on Smart Sensing and Intelligent Systems, 8(4), pp.
2195-2211.
FISCHER, E.M. & SCHÄR, C. 2010.
Consistent geographical patterns of changes in high-impact European heatwaves.
Nature Geoscience, vol.
3, pp.
398-403. https://doi.org/10.1038/ ngeo866 FUSSEL, H.M. 2008.
Assessing adaptation to the health risks of climate change: What guidance can existing frameworks provide?
International Journal of Environmental Health Research, 18(1), pp.
37-63. https://doi.
org/10.1080/09603120701358416 GEHRELS, H., VAN DER MEULEN, S., SCHASFOORT, F., BOSCH, P., BROLSMA, R., VAN DINTHER, D., GEERLING, G., GOOSSENS, M., JACOBS, C., DE JONG, M., KOK, S., MASSOP, H., OSTÉ, L., PÉREZ-SOBA, M., ROVERS, V., SMIT, A., VERWEIJ, P., DE VRIES, B.
& WEIJERS, E. 2016.
Designing green and blue infrastructure to support healthy urban living.
Research report, TO2 federatie, The Netherlands: Energy research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN).
GIBBS, M. 2015.
Guiding principles for infrastructure climate change risk and adaptation studies.
Civil Engineering and Environmental Systems, 32(3), pp.206-215.
https://doi.org/10.1080/102 86608.2015.1025385 GUDMUNDSSON, L. & SENEVIRATNE, S.I.
2016.
Anthropogenic climate change affects meteorological drought risk in Europe.
Environmental Research Letters, 11(4), pp.
1-9. https://doi.
org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/044005 GUNAWARDENA, K.R., WELLS, M.J. & KERSHAW, T. 2017.
Utilising green and blue space to mitigate urban heat island intensity.
Science of the Total Environment, 584–585, pp.
1040-1055. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
scitotenv.2017.01.158 HOBAN, A.
& WONG, T. 2006.
Water sensitive urban design for resilience to climate change.
In: Proceedings of the 1st Australian National Hydropolis Conference, Perth, Western Australia, 8-11 October 2006.
HU, X., HALL, J.W., SHI, P. & LIM, W.H.
2016.
The spatial exposure of the Chinese infrastructure system to flooding and drought hazards.
Natural Hazards, 80(2), pp.
10831118, DOI 10.1007/s11069-0152012-3. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11069-015-2012-3 HUYNEN, M.M.T.E., MAARTENS, P., SCHRAM, D., WEIJENBERG, M.P.
& KUNST, A.E.
2001.
The impact of heatwaves and cold spells on mortality rates in the Dutch population.
Environ Health Perspect, 109(5), pp.
463-470. https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.01109463 IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2014.
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds).
Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC.
JACOBS, C.M.J., LA RIVIÈRE, I.
& GOOSEN, H. 2014.
Cool water tool.
Landschap: Tijdschrift voor Landschapsecologie en Milieukunde, 31(3), pp.
132-138.
KENNEDY, D., STOCKER, L. & BURKE, G. 2010.
Australian local government action on climate change adaptation: Some critical reflections to assist decision-making.
Local Environment, 15(9-10), pp.
805-816. https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2010 .514602 KLIMAAT.
2017.
Klimaateffectatlas.
[Online].
Available at: <www.
klimaateffectatlas.
nl.> [Accessed: 2 April 2017].
KLOK, E.J.
& KLUCK, J.
2017.
Reasons to adapt to urban heat (in The Netherlands).
Urban Climate, 2017 (In press forthcoming).
KOEN COUDERÉ, K., VAN GASSEN, B., NAGELS, M., DHONDT, A.
& DEBUYSERE, F. 2015.
Klimaatadaptatie en kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve richtlijnen voor de ruimtelijke inrichting van gebieden.
Study conducted for Ruimte Vlaanderen.
KUNDZEWICZ, Z.W.
2015.
Climate change track in river floods in Europe.
In: Cudennec, C., Eicker, A., Pilon, P., Stoffel, M., Viglione, A.
& Xu, Z.
(Eds).
Proceedings of IAHS-IACS-IAG Joint Symposium JH1, 26th General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, 22 June-2 July 2015, Prague, Czech Republic, vol.
369, pp.
189-194, 201. https://doi.
org/10.5194/piahs-369-189-2015 LAUKKONEN, J., BLANCO, K.P., LENHART, J., KEINER, M., CAVRIC, B.
& KINUTHIA-NJENGA, C. 2009.
Combining climate change adaptation and mitigation measures at the local level.
Habitat International, 33(2009), pp.
287-292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
habitatint.2008.10.003 MILOJEVIC, I., ARMSTRONG, B.G., GASPARRINI, A., BOHNENSTENGEL, S.I., BARRATT, B.
& WILKINSON, P. 2016.
Methods to estimate acclimatization to urban heat island effects on heatand cold-related mortality.
Environmental Health Perspectives, 14(7), pp.
1016-1022. https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1510109 MULLER, M. 2007.
Adapting to climate change: Water management for urban resilience.
Environment & Urbanization, 19(1), pp.
99-113. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0956247807076726 NOORDHOF ATLASPRODUCTIES/ KNMI 2011.
De Bosatlas van het klimaat.
Groningen: Noordhof Uitgevers.
OKE, T.R.
1981.
Canyon geometry and the nocturnal urban heat island: Comparison of scale model and field observations.
Journal of Climatology, 1(3), pp: 237-254. doi:10.1002/ joc.3370010304.
https://doi.
org/10.1002/joc.3370010304 OPENTOPO.
2017.
Opentopo.
[Online].
Available at: <https://data.nlextract.nl/ opentopo/400pixkm/jpg/2017-R09/40048W.jpg> [Accessed: 3 April 2017].
ROBINE, J., CHEUNG, S., LEROY, S., VANOYEN, H., GRIFFITHS, C., MICHEL, J.
& HERRMANN, F. 2008.
Death toll exceeded 70,000 in Europe during the summer of 2003.
Comptes Rendus Biologies, 331(2), pp.
171-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
crvi.2007.12.001 ROVERS, V., BOSCH, P. & ALBERS, R. (Eds).
2015.
Climate-proof cities 2010-2014 Final report.
Knowledge for Climate, Report 129/2014, Climate-proof cities consortium.
www.
knowledgeforclimate.nl.
SAMANIEGO, L., THOBER, S., KUMAR, R., RAKOVEC, O., WOOD, E., SHEFFIELD, J., PAN, M., WANDERS, N. & PRUDHOMME, C. 2017.
Drought and heatwaves in Europe: Historical reconstruction and future projections.
Geophysical Research Abstracts, 19, p. 2.
Wim Timmermans, Cor Jacobs, Tim van Hattum, Louis Lategan & Juaneé Cilliers • Ecosystem-based climate change adaptation for Essenvelt 35 SMITH, K.R., WOODWARD, A., CAMPBELL-LENDRUM, D., CHADEE, D.D., HONDA, Y., LIU, Q., OLWOCH, J.M., REVICH, B.
& SAUERBORN, R. 2014.
Human health: Impacts, adaptation, and co-benefits.
In: Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., Chatterjee, M., Ebi, K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, A.N., MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R.
& White, L.L.
(Eds), Climate change 2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability.
Part A: Global and sectoral aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
709-754.
STEENEVELD, G.J., KOOPMANS, S., HEUSINKVELD, B.G., VAN HOVE, L.W.A.
& HOLTSLAG, A.A.M.
2011.
Quantifying urban heat island effects and human comfort for cities of variable size and urban morphology in The Netherlands.
Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 116(D20129).
doi: 10.1029/2011JD015988.
https:// doi.org/10.1029/2011JD015988 STEENEVELD, G.J., KOOPMANS, S., HEUSINKVELD, B.G.
& THEEUWES, N.E.
2014.
Refreshing the role of open water surfaces on mitigating the maximum urban heat island effect.
Landscape Urban Plan, 121, pp.
92-96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
landurbplan.2013.09.001 TIMMERMANS, W., WOESTENBURG, M., ANNEMA, H., JONKHOF, J., SHLLAKU, M. & YANO, S. 2015.
The rooted city, European capitals and their connection to the landscape.
Wageningen, The Netherlands: Blauwdruk.
TZOULAS, K., KORPELA, K., VENN, S., YLI-PELKONEN, V., KAZMIERCZAK, A., NIEMELÄ, J.
& JAMES, P. 2007.
Promoting ecosystem and human health in urban areas using green infrastructure: A literature review.
Landscape and Urban Planning, 81(3), pp.
167-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
landurbplan.2007.02.001 VAN DEN HURK, B.J.J.M., SIEGMUND, P. & KLEIN TANK, A.
(Eds).
2014.
KNMI’14: Climate change scenarios for the 21st century – A Netherlands perspective.
Scientific Report WR2014-01, KNMI, De Bilt, The Netherlands.
VAN HATTUM, T., BLAUW, M., BERGEN JANSEN, M. & DE BRUIN, K. 2016.
Towards water-smart cities climate adaptation is a huge opportunity to improve the quality of life in cities.
Report no.
2787 of Wageningen Environmental Research (Alterra), pp.
1-60.
VAN HOVE, L.W.A., JACOBS, C.M.J., HEUSINKVELD, B.G., ELBERS, J.A., VAN DRIEL B.
& HOLTSLAG, A.A.M.
2015.
Temporal and spatial variability of urban heat island and thermal comfort within the Rotterdam agglomeration.
Building and Environment, 83, pp.
91-103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
buildenv.2014.08.029 VAN HOVE, L.W.A., STEENEVELD, G.-J., JACOBS, C.M.J., TER MAAT, H.W., HEUSINKVELD, B.G., ELBERS, J.A., MOORS, E.J.
& HOLTSLAG, A.A.M.
2010.
Modelling and observing urban climate in The Netherlands.
Report KvR 020/10, National Research programme Climate Changes Spatial Planning Foundation.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.
klimaatvoorruimte.nl/onderzoekthemas/ communicatie/COM29> [Accessed: 22July 2017].
VLAANDEREN.
2015.
Ruimtelijke strategieën.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.klimaatenruimte.be/ ruimtelijke-strategie%C3%ABn> [Accessed: 2 April 2017].
WAMSLER, C., NIVEN, L., BEERY, T.H., BRAMRYD, T., EKELUND, N., JÖNSSON, K.I, ADELINA OSMANI, A., PALO, T. & STÅLHAMMAR, S. 2016.
Operationalizing ecosystem-based adaptation: Harnessing ecosystem services to buffer communities against climate change.
Ecology and Society, 21(1), article 31.
[Online].
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ ES-08266-210131 [Accessed: 1 August 2017].
https://doi.org/10.5751/ ES-08266-210131 WONG, T.H.F.
2006.
Water-sensitive urban design, the journey thus far.
Australasian Journal of Water Resources, 10(3), pp.
213-222.
WONG, T.H.
& BROWN, R.R.
2009.
The water-sensitive city: Principles for practice.
Water Science and Technology, 60(3), pp.
673-682. doi:10.2166/wst.2009.436.
https://doi.
org/10.2166/wst.2009.436 WUR.
2017.
Wagenigen University Soil Archive, Department of Soil Quality, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands.
ZIERVOGEL, G., MIDGLEY, G., MYERS, J., NEW, M., TAYLOR, A., VAN GARDEREN, E.A., HAMANN, R., WARBURTON, M. & STUART-HILL, S. 2014.
Climate change impacts and adaptation in South Africa.
WIREs Climate Change, 5(5), pp.
605–620.
doi: 10.1002/wcc.295.
https://doi.
org/10.1002/wcc.295 http://www.klimaatvoorruimte.nl/onderzoekthemas/communicatie/COM29 http://www.klimaatvoorruimte.nl/onderzoekthemas/communicatie/COM29 http://www.klimaatvoorruimte.nl/onderzoekthemas/communicatie/COM29 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Wong TH%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=19657162
Original Research Collective Risk Social Dilemma: Role of information availability in achieving cooperation against climate change Medha Kumar and Varun Dutt Indian Institute of Technology Mandi, India Behaviour change via monetary investments is a way to fighting climate change.
Prior research has investigated the role of climate-change investments using a CollectiveRisk-Social-Dilemma (CRSD) game, where players have to collectively reach a target by contributing to a climate fund; failing which they lose their investments with a probability.
However, little is known on how variability in the availability of information about players’ investments influences investment decisions in CRSD.
In an experiment involving CRSD, 480 participants were randomly assigned to different conditions that differed in the availability of investment information among players.
Half of the players possessed a higher starting endowment (rich) compared to other players (poor).
Results revealed that investments against climate change were higher when investment information was available to all players compared to when this information was available only to a few players or to no one.
Similarly, investments were higher among rich players compared to poor players when information was available among all players compared to when it was available only to a few players or to no one.
Again, the average investment was significantly greater compared to the Nash investment when investment information was available to all players compared to when this information was available only to a few players or to no one.
We highlight some implications of our laboratory experiment for human decision-making against climate change.
Keywords: Collective Risk Social Dilemma, climate fund, information availability, investments, Nash equilibrium Climate change has been a topic of growing concern forthe entire world (Roberts, 2015).
Earth’s average surface temperature has already risen about 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit (1.0 degree Celsius) since the late 19th century, a change that is largely driven by increased Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions into the atmosphere (IPCC, 2015).
Amidst increasing temperatures, real-world evidence shows that people continue to show a waiting approach towards climate change (Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012a; Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012b; Ricke & Caldeira, 2014).
Monetary investments against climate change, which are one of the indicators of behaviour change, provide important ways for our society to fight climate change (Webb, 2012).
Climate negotiations are a way for deciding monetary investments against climate change and they enable us to reduce society’s impact on climate change (Doulton & Brown, 2009; Sterman & Sweeney, 2007; Sterman, 2008).
During negotiation process, there may be lower investments among negotiators.
A likely reason for the lower investments could be socio-political or geo-political motivations (Barnett, 2007).
For example, the United States pulled out of the recent Paris Agreement and the Green Climate Fund due to certain political motivations (Zhang, Chao, Zheng, & Huang, 2017).
However, another reason for lower investments could be the information asymmetries present among negotiators.
Due to information asymmetries, some negotiators may possess untrue or imprecise information about investments of other negotiators; whereas, some negotiators may possess accurate investment information.
An extreme form of information asymmetry may be where it becomes difficult to obtain information on one’s climate actions.
For example, in the recent Paris agreement, there was quite some debate over China’s stance to not let international inspectors access their information about carbon-dioxide emissions (Zhang et al., 2017).
An investigation of this extreme form of information asymmetry, where information may be withheld and not known to certain negotiators, is the primary focus of this paper.
Prior research has investigated climate negotiations in the laboratory using a Collective-Risk-Social-Dilemma (CRSD) game (Milinski, Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Reed, & Marotzke, 2008; Tavoni, Dannenberg, Kallis, & Löschel, 2011).
In CRSD, negotiating players are provided initial endowments and they need to contribute money from their endowments to reach a pre-defined collective goal over several rounds of negotiations.
If players fail to reach the collective goal, then climate change could occur with a known probability and negotiating players lose their leftover endowments completely (Milinski et al., 2008).
Understanding negotiations in the CRSD game has been an active area of research (Burton, May, & West, 2013; Tavoni et al., 2011; Milinski, Röhl, & Marotzke, 2011).
However, existing literature involving CRSD has assumed negotiating players to possess complete information about investments made by opponents (i.e., no information asymmetry was assumed to exist among players), which may not be true in the real world.
As discussed above, nations may withhold information about their investments against climate change in the real world (Zhang et al., 2017).
Motivated by this observation, we investigate the influence of such information asymmetries among players on decisionmaking in the CRSD game in the laboratory.
Corresponding author: Medha Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology Mandi, Mandi, India, e-mail: medha751@gmail.com 10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 1 mailto:medha751@gmail.com https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments Furthermore, in real world climate change negotiations, it is likely that income inequalities may exist between negotiators (UNO, 2018).
For example, some negotiators may belong to low-income nations and others may belong to high-income nations (UNO, 2018).
These income-level differences may likely influence the decision-making during negotiations (Burton et al., 2013; Milinski et al., 2011; Dennig, Budolfson, Fleurbaey, Siebert, & Socolow, 2015).
Motivated from this literature, in this paper, we also investigate how income-level differences among players influence their decision in CRSD.
In what follows, initially we discuss prior research involving the CRSD framework.
Then, we discuss certain theories of decision-making that help motivate our hypotheses concerning information asymmetries and income-level differences.
Next, we detail an experiment where we test our hypotheses in the CRSD game.
In the end, we detail our results, discuss their theoretical underpinnings, and derive implications of our findings for the real world.
Collective Risk Social Dilemma (CRSD) Game Prior research involving the Collective Risk Social Dilemma (CRSD) game has tested the effects of probability of climate change on investments made by negotiators (Milinski et al., 2008; Tavoni et al., 2011).
These studies have revealed that people invest more against climate change when they are convinced that failure to invest will cause grave financial losses (Milinski et al., 2008).
Furthermore, people invest more against climate change in the CRSD game when probability of experiencing a climate catastrophe is high compared to low (Hagel, Milinski, & Marotzke, 2017; Milinski et al., 2008).
Studies have investigated how individuals behave if a collective target is missed under different risk situations.
Results revealed that the assessment of risk arising from missing a collective target caused reduced contributions.
However, risk reduction caused players to maximize their individual contributions (Hagel et al., 2017).
Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) showed that when players are provided with a dangerous scenario of rise in global temperature in the CRSD game, climate negotiations turned into a coordination game.
Research has also revealed that the presence of small groups can help achieve collective goals under stringent conditions (Santos, Vasconcelos, Santos, Neves, & Pacheco, 2012).
In addition, prior research has evaluated the effects of inequalities in initial endowments and players’ pledges on investments against climate change in the CRSD game (Tavoni et al., 2011).
Results showed that the initial endowment inequality made it harder to succeed in the CRSD game; however, players’ pledges increased success dramatically (Tavoni et al., 2011).
In this paper, we build upon this literature to investigate the effects of information asymmetries and income-level differences among players in CRSD.
Thus, in some conditions in the CRSD game, all players possess investment information about other players.
However, in other conditions in the CRSD game, either none of the players or only a subset of players possess investment information about other players.
In addition, we create income-level differences between players by making some players invest against climate change in the initial rounds in CRSD (poor players), where other players do not invest against climate change (rich players).
We believe that both information asymmetries and income-level differences are likely to influence people’s investment decisions in the CRSD game.
Theoretical underpinnings of decision-making in CRSD A number of theories in decision-making literature may provide the theoretical underpinnings to understand the resulting behaviour in CRSD in the presence of information asymmetries (Gonzalez, Ben-Asher, Martin, & Dutt, 2015; Kumar & Dutt, 2015; Mitchell, 1995; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007; Voulevi & Van Lange, 2012) and income-level differences (Burton et al., 2013; Dennig et al., 2015; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Milinski et al., 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
These theories may be connected at the cognitive level; however, they may also provide non-overlapping explanations about the resulting behaviour.
The influence of information asymmetries on climate change investments may be explained based upon certain cognitive theories (Gonzalez et al., 2015; Kumar & Dutt, 2015).
For example, on account of instance-based learning theory (IBLT; Gonzalez et al., 2015; Kumar & Dutt, 2015), a cognitive theory of decisions from experience, we expect to find lower investments when information asymmetries are present among negotiators compared to when information asymmetries are absent.
That is because, in classical games like prisoner’s dilemma, cognitive models of decision-making based upon IBLT exhibit lower investments when information asymmetries are present compared to when information asymmetries are absent (Gonzalez et al., 2015).
Such models combine not only personal investments; but, also investments of other negotiating partners (Gonzalez et al., 2015).
When information asymmetries are present, model players may not be able to systematically combine their investments with those of their opponents and they may be able to maximize only their personal savings and not their public investments.
Furthermore, the influence of information asymmetries on climate change investments may be explained based upon theory of social norms (TSN; Schultz et al., 2007; Voulevi & Van Lange, 2012).
According to TSN, social norms are a double-edged sword (Schultz et al., 2007; Voulevi & Van Lange, 2012; Dutt, 2011): investments could be higher or lower when players possess information about investments of others in their group compared to when they lack this information.
For example, if opponents invest against climate change, then one expects this investment information’s availability among players to increase the overall investments of the group.
However, if opponents do not invest against climate change, then one expects this investment information’s availability among players to decrease the overall investments of the group.
That is because, according to TSN, people tend to follow others while deciding their own actions (Schultz et al., 2007; Voulevi & Van Lange, 2012).
The influence of information asymmetries on climate change investments may also be explained based upon picture theory (Mitchell, 1995) and that people are conscious about their public image (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
According to picture theory (Mitchell, 1995), visuals are believed to have a great power to influence people’s decisions.
Also, public image of oneself may cause people to act differently compared to their private self (Fenigstein et al., 1975).
Overall, on account of the theories of cognition and social norms, and the 10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 2 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments picture theory, people are likely to become consistent investors when investment information about others is made available to them.
Thus, we expect H1: Higher investments when information about investments of other players in a group is present compared to when this information is absent.
Furthermore, certain theories may explain the influence of income-level differences between rich and poor players on decision-making during negotiations (Burton et al., 2013; Milinski et al., 2011; Dennig et al., 2015).
For example, using laboratory experiments, Milinski et al.
(2011) showed that rich players are willing to substitute for missing contributions by the poor, provided the players collectively face intermediate climate targets.
Also, Dennig et al.
(2015) have demonstrated that poor people are more vulnerable to climate change impacts compared to rich people.
Furthermore, a number of economic theories (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1992) and ethical theories (IPCC, 2015; Fleurbaey, 2008; Brown, 2013) may also help explain the effects of income-inequality on people’s decision-making during negotiations.
Due to economic theories on differences in reference levels of low and high income negotiators (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1992) as well as ethical theories of responsibility and fairness (IPCC, 2015; Fleurbaey, 2008; Brown, 2013), one expects: H2: Higher investments from high-income (rich) negotiators compared to low-income (poor) negotiators in the CRSD game.
In addition, when investment information is known to all players, then we expect rich negotiators to contribute more compared to poor negotiators on account of the phenomena of reference dependence in prospect theory (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1992).
According to reference dependence (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1992), in the presence of investment information, those with higher reference levels (or higher incomes) will likely invest more compared to those with lower reference levels (or lower incomes).
In the presence of investment information, higher-income negotiators may also contribute more compared to lower-income negotiators due to a feeling of responsibility towards society as well as a societal perception of fairness (Brown, 2013).
Overall, we also expect: H3: Higher investments from rich players compared to poor players when information about investments of other players in a group is present compared to when this information is absent.
Finally, players possessing pro-environmental dispositions have been shown to contribute more against climate change (Burton et al., 2013).
Pro-environmental dispositions may measure people’s agreement or disagreement to different statements about the environment.
Overall, we expect: H4: Players with greater pro-environmental dispositions to likely invest higher amounts against climate change compared to players with smaller pro-environmental dispositions.
In the next section, we detail an experiment involving CRSD where we evaluated different hypotheses stated above.
Method Participants Students were recruited through an email advertisement for a climate change study at the Indian Institute of Technology Mandi, India.
There were 480 participants (54 females; 426 males), who were divided into 80 groups per condition with 6 participants per group.
Participants comprised of undergraduate and graduate students in computer engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, basic sciences, and humanities and social sciences.
Ages ranged from 18 to 30 years (M = 20 years; SD = 1.56 years).
The groups took 45-50 minutes to finish the study.
Participants were paid INR 30 (∼ USD 0.5) as the base payment for participation.
In addition, participants could get a performance incentive based upon the units left in their private account at the end of 13th round.
The performance incentive was calculated as 1 unit in the private account = INR 0.5 in real money.
On average across all conditions, participants earned 27 units (INR 13) as payment.
Procedure The experiment comprised of the following three sequential sections: Questionnaire; Instruction and Demographic Information; and Game Play.
In the Questionnaire section, which preceded the Game Play section, participants were given survey questionnaires that tested their pro-environmental predisposition (New Ecological Paradigm; Dunlap et al., 2000).
In the Instructions and Demographics section, participants were asked to self-report their basic demographic information (like age, gender, and major) and then asked to read instructions concerning the study.
The instructions were adapted from (Tavoni et al., 2011), which formed the basis for our study.
In the Game Play section, participants were asked to play the CRSD game within their group for 13 repeated rounds.
Experimental Design Four hundred and eighty participants were randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects conditions that differed in the amount of information possessed by negotiating players (20 groups per condition): Info-all, No-info, Info-rich, and Info-poor.
In each condition, a group of 6 randomly-matched players made monetary investments in a climate fund to avert climate change across 13 repeated rounds.
All players in a group started with an equal payoff of 52 units in their private account.
In each round, participants decided an investment between 0, 2, and 4 units to put in a climate fund with a goal of reaching 156 units by the end of 13th round.
10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 3 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments Collective Risk Social Dilemma (CRSD) game In CRSD, negotiating players are provided initial endowments.
Players need to contribute money from their endowments to reach a pre-defined collective goal over several rounds of negotiations.
If players fail to reach the collective goal, then climate change could occur with a known probability and negotiating players may lose their leftover endowments completely.
In order to reach the collective target, players need to make individual sacrifice, with benefits to all but no guarantee that others will also contribute.
From the point of view of players, it seems tempting to contribute less so as to save money to induce others to contribute more.
Hence, there is a dilemma and the risk of failure (Milinski et al., 2008).
Figure 1 shows the investment screen used across all conditions.
As shown in Figure 1, the investment screen displayed the current trial number, total endowment left with the player, a timer, and different investment options.
The timer indicated the time left for players to make their investment decisions.
The timer lasted for 30 seconds but the screen did not switch after the timer expired until players made their decisions.
Players had to select one out of the three options to indicate the amount they wanted to invest into climate protection.
Once players had selected the amount, they pressed the NEXT button to proceed to the next round.
The first three rounds were automated, where the computer randomly made 3 players to contribute 4 units (poor) and made the remaining 3 players contribute 0 units (rich).
The description about different conditions is presented in the next section.
Information availability In Info-all (No-info) condition, at the end of each round, all players (none of the players) in the group got feedback about other players’ individual investments to the climate fund from the start of the game and in the preceding round.
In the Info-rich (Info-poor) condition, at the end of each round, only the 3 rich (poor) players got feedback about other players’ individual investments to the climate fund from the start of the game and in the preceding round.
Figure 2 and 3 show the feedback screen presented to players in different conditions in the CRSD game.
For example, as shown in Figure 2, in Info-all condition, at the end of a round, all players in the group got feedback about other players’ individual investments to the climate fund from the start of the game and in the preceding round.
Also, players were given information about the total investment made by their group to the climate fund in the preceding round along with the total cumulative investment made by their group since the start of the game.
In the Info-rich condition, the rich players could see the investments made by all other players (see Figure 2), but the poor players could not see the investments made by other players (see Figure 3).
Similarly, in the Info-poor condition, the poor players could see the investments made by all other players (see Figure 2), but the rich players could not see the investments made by other players (see Figure 3).
Across all conditions, if the collective investment of a group to the climate fund remained less than 156 units, then the group failed to reach the collective goal and climate change occurred with a 50% chance.
If climate change occurred, then it made everyone lose their incomes that they had not invested in the climate fund till the last round.
NEP-R questionnaire Before performing in the CRSD game, participants were given the New Ecological ParadigmRevised (NEP-R) questionnaire that tested their proenvironmental predisposition (Dunlap et al., 2000).
The NEP-R consists of 15 statements, which tests people’s environmental pre-deposition on different issues.
Among the 15 statements, agreement on eight statements reflect endorsement of the paradigm and agreement of the remaining seven statements reflect the endorsement of the popular world view.
In addition to NEP-R questionnaire, participants were given questions that tested their reasoning for making decisions.
For more information on these questions, please refer to the supplementary material.
Nash Investment Nash equilibrium is a term used in game theory to describe an equilibrium where each player’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other players (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994).
Thus, Nash equilibrium is a proposed solution of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994).
In the CRSD game, given 13 rounds, 6 players, and a target of 156 units, a number of Nash equilibria are possible as the contributions from players in a group could be unequal – some may put 0s, some may put 2s, while others may put 4s.
However, a fair Nash equilibrium in CRSD could be one that is symmetric, i.e., where all players are assumed to contribute equally and optimally to reach the target investment.
The symmetric Nash investment in the CRSD game is assumed to be 2 units per player per round.
That is because, when each of the 6 players in a group contributes 2 units per round across 13 rounds, the cumulative investment results in 156 units.
Dependent Variables and Statistical Analyses We used the average cumulative investments across groups in different information conditions as one of the dependent variables.
For each group, the average cumulative investment after a certain round was computed by averaging of the cumulative investments made by all players in a group up to the chosen round.
10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 4 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments Figure 1.
Investment screen across different information conditions in the CRSD game.
The investment screen displayed the endowment from which players had to invest between 0, 2 or 4 units into climate protection.
Figure 2.
Feedback screen presented to all players in Info-all condition, rich players in Info-rich condition, and poor players in Info-poor condition, respectively.
Figure 3.
Feedback screen presented to all players in No-info condition, rich players in Info-poor condition, and poor players in Info-rich condition, respectively.
10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 5 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments Figure 4.
Success rates and average cumulative investments across different information conditions.
Success rate and average cumulative investment over 13 rounds by successful and failure groups in avoiding dangerous climate change.
The blue section indicates success rates of successful groups; whereas, the red section indicates success rates of failure groups.
The numbers within each section indicates average cumulative investments.
Numbers after the “±” symbol indicate the standard deviation (the N/A value in Info-all condition is because only one failure group existed in this condition).
For example, if the first, second, and third players in a group contributed 0, 2, and 4 units, respectively, in the first two rounds in CRSD, then after 2 rounds, the cumulative investment of these players would be 0, 4 and 8 units, respectively.
Thus, the average cumulative investment would be 4 units [= (0 + 4 + 8) / 3).
If a group’s cumulative investment was greater than or equal to 156 units at the end of the 13th round, then the group was termed as successful; otherwise, the group was termed as failure.
Success rate was defined as the proportion of groups out of all groups in a condition where the groups’ cumulative investments were greater than or equal to 156 units at the end of the 13th round.
For example, if there were 10 groups out of a total of 20 groups in the Info-all condition where the groups’ cumulative investments were greater than or equal to 156 units at the end of the 13th round, then the success rate would be 0.50 (= 10 / 20).
Results In order to test our expectations regarding the investments across different conditions and rounds, we performed one-way and mixed-factorial ANOVAs with different dependent measures, and conditions and rounds as the independent measures.
We also compared the average investment per player (found by averaging the investments of all players) against Nash investment per player.
To test the expectations regarding rich and poor players, we performed one-way ANOVAs with different dependent measures, and rich and poor groups as the independent measure.
Furthermore, we also performed correlation analyses where we correlated NEP-R scores with cumulative investments.
All statistical analyses were performed at an alpha level of .05 and a power threshold of 0.8.
Success rates and average cumulative investments across successful and failure groups In order to test hypothesis H1, we performed a oneway ANOVA to evaluate whether success rates were influenced by the different information conditions.
Information availability had a significant effect on success rates (F(3, 32) = 9.52, p < .05, ηp2 = .47).
Figure 4 shows the success rates by successful and failure groups in avoiding dangerous climate change.
Table 1.
Post-hoc tests for success rates across different information conditions.
Success rate in one condition versus the other condition (Mean, Standard Deviation) p Info-all (0.95, 0.22) > No-info (0.20, 0.41) < .05 Info-all (0.95, 0.22) > Info-rich (0.40, 0.50) < .05 Info-all (0.95, 0.22) > Info-poor (0.25, 0.44) < .05 No-info (0.20, 0.41) ∼ Info-rich (0.40, 0.50) ∼ 0.18 No-info (0.20, 0.41) ∼ Info-poor (0.25, 0.44) ∼ 0.71 Info-rich (0.40, 0.50) ∼ Info-poor (0.25, 0.44) ∼ 0.32 Table 1 shows the post-hoc tests for comparing success rates in different conditions.
Post-hoc tests revealed that success rates were significantly higher in Info-all condition compared to No-info, Info-rich, and Info-poor conditions.
There was no significant difference in success rates between Info-rich and Info-poor conditions and between Info-rich and No-info conditions.
Similarly, success rates were similar in No-info and Info-poor conditions.
As per our expectation in H1, these results show that groups had higher success rates when all players possessed investment information about others’ investments compared to when either this information was partially present with only some players in the group or completely absent from all players in the group.
Success rates were similar when 10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 6 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments Figure 5.
Average cumulative investments over rounds across different information conditions.
Average cumulative investment across 13 rounds by successful groups (A) and failure groups (B) in avoiding dangerous climate change.
The horizontal line shows the collective goal of 156 units to be achieved by the end of 13th round in the task.
10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 7 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments Figure 6.
Average cumulative investments by rich and poor players.
Average cumulative investments were calculated across 10 rounds (round 4th to round 13th).
the investment information was possessed by only the rich or only the poor players.
Furthermore, we performed a one-way ANOVA to check whether the average cumulative investments were influenced by the different information conditions.
Figure 4 shows the average cumulative investments by successful and failure groups.
Information availability had a significant effect on the average cumulative investments for successful groups (F(3, 32) = 9.52, p < .05, ηp2 = .47); however, not for failure groups (F(3, 40) = 1.80, p = .16, ηp2 = .12).
Table 2 shows the post-hoc tests for average cumulative investments among successful groups.
Post-hoc tests revealed that the average investment in Info-all condition was significantly higher compared to Info-rich, Info-poor, and No-info conditions.
Furthermore, average cumulative investment in No-info condition was similar to that in Info-rich and Info-poor conditions.
There was no significant difference in average cumulative investments between Info-rich and Info-poor conditions.
As per our expectation in H1, these results show that average cumulative investments were higher when all players possessed information about others’ investments compared to when this information was partially available to some players.
Furthermore, average cumulative investments were similar when investment information was available to only the rich or only the poor players.
Table 2.
Post-hoc test for average cumulative investments for successful groups across different information conditions.
Average cumulative investment in one condition versus the other condition (Mean, Standard Deviation) p Info-all (186.21, 19.10) > No-info (171.00, 8.72) < .05 Info-all (186.21, 19.10) > Info-rich (163.75, 9.59) < .05 Info-all (186.21, 19.10) > Info-poor (166.00, 6.16) < .05 No-info (171.00, 8.72) ∼ Info-rich (163.75, 9.59) ∼ 0.40 No-info (171.00, 8.72) ∼ Info-poor (166.00, 6.16) ∼ 0.55 Info-rich (163.75, 9.59) ∼ Info-poor (166.00, 6.16) ∼ 1.00 Average cumulative investments across rounds among successful and failure groups We wanted to investigate the average cumulative investments across rounds among successful and failure groups.
We analysed the pattern of average cumulative investments across rounds among successful and failure groups using one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs (see Figure 5A and 5B).
Average cumulative investments increased over rounds for both successful groups (F(3, 12) = 1461.96, p < .05, ηp2 =.98) and failure groups (F(3, 12) = 204.13, p < .05, ηp2 =.84).
Furthermore, we performed mixed-factorial ANOVAs to evaluate whether the average cumulative investments across rounds among both successful and failure groups were different in different information conditions.
ANOVA results revealed that the average cumulative investments across rounds were indeed different in different information conditions among both successful groups (F(36, 384) = 6.97, p < .05, ηp2 =.40) and failure groups (F(36, 480) = 2.15, p < .05, ηp 2 =.14).
As seen in Fig 5(A), among successful groups, although there was an overall increase in investments across all conditions, yet the rate of increase was more in Info-all condition compared to all other conditions.
On average, participants reached the goal in 10 rounds in Info-all condition compared to a higher number of rounds in other conditions.
Furthermore, as seen in Fig 5(B), among failure groups, the rate of increase of average cumulative investment was similar in Info-all, No-info, and Info-rich conditions.
However, average cumulative investments were lower in Info-poor condition compared to that in other conditions.
Thus, in agreement with H1, the best case for achieving the collective goal was when investment information was present among all players.
However, when groups failed, then the worst case was when investment information was available to only the poor players.
10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 8 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments Average cumulative investments among poor and rich players We expected rich players to invest more against climate change compared to poor players (H2).
We analysed average cumulative investments between round 4th and round 13th by poor and rich players (see Figure 6).
In agreement with H2, average cumulative investments for rich players were significantly higher than those for poor players (58.4 > 51.2; F(1, 156) = 7.26, p < .05, ηp2 = .04).
Average cumulative investments among poor and rich players across different information conditions We expected information availability to influence the investments of rich and poor players (H3).
We performed one-way ANOVAs to investigate whether information availability influenced the average cumulative investments among rich and poor players, respectively, in different information conditions.
Figure 7 shows the average cumulative investments between 4th round and 13th round by poor players (blue) and rich players (red) across different information conditions.
Average cumulative investment was significantly higher among rich players compared to poor players in Infoall condition (79.20 > 68.50; F(1, 39) = 4.70, p < .05, ηp 2 = 0.11).
However, average cumulative investment for rich and poor players was similar in all other conditions: No-info (49.20 ∼ 47.20; F(1, 39) = 0.17, p = .68, ηp 2 = 0.00), Info-rich (57.70 ∼ 49.90; F(1, 39) = 2.79, p = .10, ηp2 = 0.07), and Info-poor (47.50 ∼ 39.10; F(1, 39) = 1.65, p = .21, ηp2 = 0.04).
Thus, overall, these results agree with our expectation H3 about rich players contributing more compared to poor players when information was available among all players.
Figure 7.
Average cumulative investments by poor (blue) and rich (red) players across different information conditions.
Average cumulative investment was calculated between the 4th round and the 13th round in the game.
Average cumulative investment and NEP-R across different information conditions We expected players’ pro-environmental attitudes to influence their investments against climate change (H4).
We analysed players’ pro-environmental attitudes by using the New Ecological Paradigm-Revised (NEP-R) scale (Dunlap et al., 2000).
Overall, in agreement with H4, the NEP-R score was significantly and positively correlated to cumulative investments across 13 rounds (r(78) = .42, p < .001).
Correlations between NEP-R and cumulative investments were not significant in Info-all condition (r(18) = .30, p = .19); No-info condition (r(18) = .22, p = .36); and, Info-rich condition (r(18) = .42, p = .06).
However, this correlation was significant for Info-poor condition (r(18) = .50, p = .03).
Correlation between NEP-R and cumulative investments was positive and significant for both poor players (r(78) = .31, p = .01) and rich players (r(78) = .27, p = .02).
Overall, these results agree with our expectation in H4.
Deviations of average investment per player from Nash predictions We analysed the deviations in players’ investments from their Nash predictions between rounds 4 and 13.
In the Info-all condition, the average investment per player was significantly greater compared to the symmetric Nash investment per player (2.35 > 2.00; t(119) = 5.73, p < .05, r = .46).
However, in other conditions, the average investment per player was significantly lower compared to the symmetric Nash prediction: No-info (1.70 < 2.00; t(119) = −4.66, p < .05, r = .39), Info-rich (1.84 < 2.00; t(119) = −2.31, p < .05, r = .21) and Info-poor (1.57 < 2.00; t(119) = 5.73, p < .05, r = .46).
The average investment per player was significantly lower compared to the symmetric Nash investment per player for both rich players (1.95 < 2.00; t(239) = −.91, p < .05, r = .06) and poor players (1.70 < 2.00; t(239) = −5.14, p < .05, r = .31).
Discussion and Conclusion In today’s world, climate change is a pressing problem and behaviour change is critically needed for fighting climate change (Webb, 2012).
Monetary investments against climate change are important indicators of the needed behaviour change (Doulton & Brown, 2009; Sterman & Sweeney, 2007; Sterman, 2008).
Our results revealed that possessing information about investments of other players produced higher investments against climate change and higher success rates among successful groups (H1).
Investments and success rates were similar when the investment information was possessed by only a subset of players (either rich or either poor only).
Also, the contributions by rich players were more compared to poor players when investment information was present among players (H2).
Also, the NEP-R scores were positively correlated with people’s investments against climate change (H4).
A likely reason for higher investments when information was present among all players is due to the Theory of Social Norms (TSN; Schultz et al., 2007).
As per TSN, peer pressure plays a significant role in 10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 9 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments driving monetary investments towards climate change: people are willing to contribute when they are able to see others contribute.
The influence of information asymmetries on climate change investments may also be explained based upon picture theory (Mitchell, 1995) and that people are conscious about their public image (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
According to picture theory (Mitchell, 1995), visuals are believed to have a great power to influence people’s decisions.
Thus, when people are able to visualize the investment information about other players during feedback, then this visualization causes them to invest more against climate change.
Also, public image of oneself may cause people to act differently compared to their private self (Fenigstein et al., 1975).
In general, players may not want to be portrayed publicly as those contributing less as that is likely to hurt their public image.
Overall, players may tend to invest in ways that reduce the possibility of hurting their public image.
Still, another reason for higher investments in the presence of information could be due to the learning from investment outcomes of other players (Gonzalez et al., 2015; Kumar & Dutt, 2015).
As per instancebased learning theory (IBLT), players maximize investments when they are able to combine their investment outcomes with investment outcomes of other players (Gonzalez et al., 2015).
Players are likely able to activate investment instances in their memory when they observe contributions of other players.
When information is present among all players, the activation of instances is relatively easy and this activation may likely cause people to invest significantly higher in the presence of information.
Interestingly, almost all groups were successful when investment information was available to all players.
This result is in contrast to that found by Tavoni et al.
(2011) and Milinski et al.
(2008) where only 20% and 10% of the groups were successful when information was present among all players.
Although we can only speculate about the reasons for the differences, one likely reason for this difference could be the fact that this study was run in India compared to those of Tavoni et al.
(2011) and Milinski et al.
(2008), where the latter studies were run in European Union (EU) with a different population.
Recent research has shown that people in developing countries (like India) perceive climate change a much greater threat to themselves and to their families compared to respondents in the developed countries (in EU; Lee et al., 2015).
Perhaps, the feeling of threat from climate change made our participants contribute more against climate change.
Furthermore, we found that the rich players’ investments were higher compared to the poor players’ investments.
This result can be explained on the basis of reference-level dependence as part of prospect theory (PT; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1979).
On account of PT, poor players’ smaller incomes likely pushed their reference-levels lower compared to rich players’ reference-levels.
A higher reference-level of rich players compared to poor players causes rich players to invest more compared to the poor players.
Another likely reason for rich players to contribute more compared to poor players is due to ethical theories of responsibility and fairness (IPCC, 2015; Fleurbaey, 2008; Brown, 2013).
The higher income-levels of rich players gives them a feeling of responsibility towards reducing climate change.
Also, societal perception of rich players contributing more portrays them to be fair (Fleurbaey, 2008; Brown, 2013).
In this paper, we used the Collective-Risk-SocialDilemma (CRSD) framework (Burton et al., 2013; Dannenberg et al., 2015; Hagel et al., 2017; Jacquet et al., 2013; Milinski, Hilbe, Semmann, Sommerfeld, & Marotzke, 2016; Milinski et al., 2008; Tavoni et al., 2011) in a laboratory setting and our results regarding negotiations against climate change should be seen with this limitation in mind.
Our experimental design in this preliminary study was canonical and the situation, where investment information may be withheld from other players, may be less common in the realworld.
In real-world negotiations, information sharing about investments may likely be present among negotiators; however, this information may not be true.
Thus, we plan to undertake future studies, where we vary the level of truth of investment information while people invest against climate change.
From our lab-based findings in this paper, our results are promising for negotiations against climate change.
Overall, investments are likely to be higher when investment information is shared amongst all negotiating players.
In the real-world, people are most likely to possess investment information about their opponents.
In such situations, based upon our results, we expect investments against climate change to be maximized.
In addition, real-world negotiations are likely to have negotiators from both nations with higher and lower income levels.
Based upon our findings, again, the news is promising: We expect that in a mixed income-level environment, the higher-income negotiators will contribute more compared to the lower-income negotiators.
In fact, the higher-income negotiators are expected to be closer to their optimal Nash investment levels.
Also, we found that pro-environmental attitudes were positively correlated with investments.
Thus, for real-world negotiations, investments are likely to be higher if negotiators possess pro-environmental attitudes towards our environment.
Thus, choosing negotiators with proenvironmental attitudes may be a key for success of climate negotiations.
Overall, our results revealed that information asymmetry is an important factor impacting investments against climate change.
However, there are several other factors that are also likely to influence investments and negotiations against climate change.
For example, penalties for those contributing less are likely to increase people’s investments.
One way to increase investments could be by making this activity damaging to players, i.e., by giving players, who invest lit10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 10 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments tle, monetary penalties compared to those who do not show this behaviour.
However, another way to increase investments could be by rewarding people’s contributory behaviours (i.e., rewarding those who do invest more).
Still, a third way could be to reward those who do invest against climate change and penalize those who do not invest against climate change.
We plan to undertake some of these ideas as part of our future work involving CRSD.
Another factor that is likely to influence investments against climate change is the presence or absence of income disparity among players.
In this paper, we did not vary this factor as all players possessed income disparity across all information conditions.
However, as part of our future research, we plan to systematically vary income disparity among different information conditions to understand the interaction of these factors.
In this paper, we adapted instructions from Tavoni et al.
(2011) and used them across all information conditions.
However, instructions provided to participants may influence their investment decisions in certain ways (Zizzo, 2010).
Thus, as part of our future research, we plan to frame instructions in different ways to evaluate their influence on investments against climate change in conditions involving information asymmetry.
Some of these ideas form the immediate next steps in our research program involving negotiations against climate change.
Acknowledgements: This research is partially supported by Indian Institute of Technology Mandi and seed grant (IITM/SG/VD/32) which provided necessary computational and financial resources for this work.
Declaration of conflicting interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be constructed as a potential conflict of interest.
Author contributions: Medha Kumar was the research lead who designed the experiment and carried out data collection for this work.
Varun Dutt was the principal investigator who served as a constant guiding light for this work.
Supplementary material: Supplementary material available online.
Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Citation: Kumar, M. & Dutt, V. (2019).
Collective Risk Social Dilemma: Role of information availability in achieving cooperation against climate change.
Journal of Dynamic Decision Making, 5, 2. doi:10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 Received: 03 Dec 2018 Accepted: 03 May 2019 Published: 18 May 2019 References Barnett, J.
(2007).
The geopolitics of climate change.
Geography Compass, 1(6), 1361–1375.
doi:10.1111/j.17498198.2007.00066.x Barrett, S., & Dannenberg, A.
(2012).
Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(43), 17372–17376.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1208417109 Brown, D. A.
(2013).
Climate change ethics.
London: Routledge.
Burton-Chellew, M. N., May, R. M., & West, S. A.
(2013).
Combined inequality in wealth and risk leads to disaster in the climate change game.
Climatic Change, 120(4), 815–830.
doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0856-7 Dannenberg, A., Löschel, A., Paolacci, G., Reif, C., & Tavoni, A.
(2015).
On the provision of public goods with probabilistic and ambiguous thresholds.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 61(3), 365–383.
doi:10.1007/s10640-014-9796-6 Dennig, F., Budolfson, M. B., Fleurbaey, M., Siebert, A., & Socolow, R. H. (2015).
Inequality, climate impacts on the future poor, and carbon prices.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(52), 15827–15832.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1513967112 Doulton, H., & Brown, K. (2009).
Ten years to prevent catastrophe?
: Discourses of climate change and international development in the UK press.
Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 191–202.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.10.004 Dunlap, R.E., Van Liere, K.D., Mertig, A.G., & Jones, R.E.
(2000).
New trends in measuring environmental attitudes: measuring endorsement of the new ecological paradigm: a revised NEP scale.
Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 425–442.
doi:10.1111/00224537.00176 Dutt, V. (2011).
Why do we want to defer actions on climate change?
A psychological perspective (Doctoral dissertation), Carnegie Mellon University.
Retrieved from https:// kilthub.cmu.edu/articles/Why_do_we_want_to_defer_actions _on_climate_change_A_psychological_perspective/6724268/1 Dutt, V., & Gonzalez, C. (2012a).
Decisions from experience reduce misconceptions about climate change.
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 32(1), 19–29.
doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2011.10.003 Dutt, V., & Gonzalez, C. (2012b).
Human control of climate change.
Climatic Change, 111(3–4), 497–518.
doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0202-x Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975).
Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43(4), 522–527.
doi:10.1037/h0076760 Fleurbaey, M. (2008).
Fairness, responsibility, and welfare.
Oxford University Press.
Gonzalez, C., Ben-Asher, N., Martin, J. M., & Dutt, V. (2015).
A cognitive model of dynamic cooperation with varied interdependency information.
Cognitive Science, 39(3), 457–495.
doi:10.1111/cogs.12170 Hagel, K., Milinski, M., & Marotzke, J.
(2017).
The level of climate-change mitigation depends on how humans assess the risk arising from missing the 2◦ C Target.
Palgrave Communications, 3, 17027. doi:10.1057/palcomms.2017.27 10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 11 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2007.00066.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2007.00066.x https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208417109 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0856-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9796-6 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1513967112 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.10.004 https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00176 https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00176 https://kilthub.cmu.edu/articles/Why_do_we_want_to_defer_actions_on_climate_change_A_psychological_perspective/6724268/1 https://kilthub.cmu.edu/articles/Why_do_we_want_to_defer_actions_on_climate_change_A_psychological_perspective/6724268/1 https://kilthub.cmu.edu/articles/Why_do_we_want_to_defer_actions_on_climate_change_A_psychological_perspective/6724268/1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2011.10.003 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0202-x https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076760 https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12170 https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.27 https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360 Kumar & Dutt: Climate cooperation via monetary investments IPCC Climate Change.
(2015).
Climate change 2014: Mitigation of climate change (Vol.
3).
Cambridge University Press.
Jacquet, J., Hagel, K., Hauert, C., Marotzke, J., Röhl, T., & Milinski, M. (2013).
Intra-and intergenerational discounting in the climate game.
Nature Climate Change, 3(12), 1025–1028.
doi:10.1038/nclimate2024 Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A.
(1979).
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 263–291.
doi:10.2307/1914185 Kumar, M., & Dutt, V. (2015).
Understanding Cooperative Behavior against Climate Change through a Public Goods Game.
Climate Change, 1(2), 68–71.
Lee, T. M., Markowitz, E. M., Howe, P. D., Ko, C. Y., & Leiserowitz, A.
A.
(2015).
Predictors of public climate change awareness and risk perception around the world.
Nature Climate Change, 5(11), 1014–1020.
doi:10.1038/nclimate2728 Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J.
(2016).
Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion.
Nature Communications, 7, 10915. doi:10.1038/ncomms10915 Milinski, M., Röhl, T., & Marotzke, J.
(2011).
Cooperative interaction of rich and poor can be catalyzed by intermediate climate targets.
Climatic Change, 109(3–4), 807–814.
doi:10.1007/s10584011-0319-y Milinski, M., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H. J., Reed, F. A., & Marotzke, J.
(2008).
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(7), 2291–2294.
doi:10.1073/pnas.0709546105 Mitchell, W. T. (1995).
Picture theory: Essays on verbal and visual representation.
University of Chicago Press.
Nash, J.
(2016).
The Essential John Nash.
Princeton University Press.
Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A.
(1994).A course in game theory (p. 15).
Cambridge, Mass.
: MIT Press.
Ricke, K. L., & Caldeira, K. (2014).
Natural climate variability and future climate policy.
Nature Climate Change, 4(5), 333–338.
doi:10.1038/nclimate2186 Roberts, D. (2015, May 15).
The awful truth about climate change no one wants to admit.
Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/ 2015/5/15/8612113/truth-climate-change Santos, F. C., Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, M. D., Neves, P. N. B., & Pacheco, J. M. (2012).
Evolutionary dynamics of climate change under collective-risk dilemmas.
Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences, 22(supp01), 1140004. doi:10.1142/s0218202511400045 Schultz, P. W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., & Griskevicius, V. (2007).
The constructive, destructive and reconstructive power of social norms.
Psychological Science, 18(5), 429–434.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x Sterman, J. D. (2008).
Risk communication on climate: mental models and mass balance.
Science, 322(5901), 532–533.
doi:10.1126/science.1162574 Sterman, J. D., & Sweeney, L. B.
(2007).
Understanding public complacency about climate change: Adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter.
Climatic Change, 80(3–4), 213–238.
doi:10.1007/s10584-006-9107-5 Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979).
An integrative theory of intergroup conflict.
Organizational identity: A reader, 56–65.
Tavoni, A., Dannenberg, A., Kallis, G., & Löschel, A.
(2011).
Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(29), 11825–11829.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1102493108 Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992).
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323.
doi:10.1007/bf00122574 UNO (2018, September 26).
Climate Change, Economic Inequality, Systemic Bias among Issues Underlined by World Leaders as General Assembly Continues Debate.
Retrieved from https:// www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12064.doc.html Vuolevi, J. H., & Van Lange, P. A.
(2012).
Boundaries of reciprocity: Incompleteness of information undermines cooperation.
Acta Psychologica, 141(1), 67–72.
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.07.004 Webb, J.
(2012).
Climate change and society: The chimera of behaviour change technologies.
Sociology, 46(1), 109–125.
doi:10.1177/0038038511419196 Zhang, Y. X., Chao, Q. C., Zheng, Q. H., & Huang, L. (2017).
The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and its impact on global climate change governance.
Advances in Climate Change Research, 8(4), 213–219.
doi:10.1016/j.accre.2017.08.005 Zizzo, D. J.
(2010).
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments.
Experimental Economics, 13(1), 75–98.
doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z 10.11588/jddm.2019.1.57360 JDDM | 2019 | Volume 5 | Article 2 | 12 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2024 https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2728 https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0319-y https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0319-y https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0709546105 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2186 https://www.vox.com/2015/5/15/8612113/truth-climate-change https://www.vox.com/2015/5/15/8612113/truth-climate-change https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218202511400045 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1162574 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9107-5 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1102493108 https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574 https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12064.doc.html https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12064.doc.html https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.07.004 https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038511419196 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.08.005 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jddm/article/view/57360
The “Super-Network”: Fostering Interaction Between Human Rights and Climate Change Institutions 32 University of Bamberg Press The “Super-Network”: Fostering Interaction Between Human Rights and Climate Change Institutions Author: Andrea Schapper University of Stirling, Division of History, Heritage, and Politics, United Kingdom Email: andrea.schapper@stir.ac.uk This paper contributes to understanding unique forms of actor constellations and their tactics in fostering institutional interaction.
It explores interaction processes between the human rights and the climate regime, and more specifically, the incorporation of human rights in the 2015 Paris climate agreement.
During the Paris negotiations, an interconstituency alliance comprised of environmental movements, human rights organizations, gender activists, indigenous peoples’ representatives, trade unions, youth groups, and faith-based organizations successfully lobbied for the incorporation of rights principles into the new climate instrument.
I argue that this alliance can be grasped as a “super-network”, a network above several individual transnational advocacy networks (TANs), that works across policy fields and uses information, symbols, stories, and accountability and leverage politics to foster interaction between a source institution (human rights regime) and a target institution (climate regime).
By employing a package approach, which reiterates a core message of common principles that individual networks have agreed on, the “super-network” changed the practices of governments in international negotiations and fostered inter-institutional interaction.
Empirically, my research is mainly based on expert interviews and participatory observations at the strategic meetings of TANs at three different climate negotiations in Warsaw (2013), Paris (2015), and Bonn (2017), including follow-up Skype interviews with key experts between 2013 and 2020.
Keywords: transnational advocacy networks; institutional interaction; human rights; climate change; Paris Agreement Introduction In today’s complex world, emerging institutional arrangements are never isolated but embedded in a web of already existing institutions originating in different policy fields.
Thus, overlap, conflict, and cooperation between institutions are at the heart of many studies in international relations.
The research programme of institutional interaction analyses how the development or effectiveness of one institution (source institution) affects another institution (target institution) (Gehring & Oberthür, 2006, 6; Oberthür & Prozarowska, 2013).
It explores connections between policy fields and the causal mechanisms explaining regime interaction.
But who are the agents behind interinstitutional relations?
Who fosters interlinkages between regimes from different policy arenas?
And what are the politics and dynamics behind these interaction processes?
So far, our knowledge of actors and actor constellations initiating interaction between source and target institution is still limited.
In previous studies, the focus has clearly been on analyzing overlap, conflict, and cooperation between governmental institutions (e.g.
Kent, 2014, Keohane & Victor, 2010; Oberthür & Gehring, 2006).
Even though non-governmental actors play an important part in shaping international institutions, there is still a gap in understanding their role in institutional interaction.
Therefore, I address the following research question in this paper: which forms of nongovernmental actor constellations initiate institutional interaction and how do they foster interaction processes?
In line with earlier studies by Orsini (2013, 2016), who investigates the influence of “multiforum” non-state actors on regime complexes, this article will reveal new insights in this strand of research by shedding light on the tactics employed by Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) fostering institutional interaction through commitment (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009).
I argue that new forms of collaborative TANs, so-called “super-networks”, build a network above several individual networks, combine their strengths and work across policy fields, exchange crucial information, and use symbols, stories, and accountability and leverage politics towards state governments.
By employing a package approach, which repeats a core message of common principles and values that are shared across all individual networks, such a super-network can foster institutional Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 mailto:andrea.schapper@stir.ac.uk 33 University of Bamberg Press interaction.
The term “super-network” reflects new empirical insights from novel forms of TANs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) that are emerging in and across various policy fields, including climate change, human rights, biodiversity politics, and nuclear disarmament.
The objective of this paper is to explore these actor constellations, as well as the politics and dynamics behind institutional interaction, focusing on the specific interlinkages between the human rights and the climate regime.
This paper contributes to the special issue on institutional complexity by adding a social constructivist actor perspective to the rational choice-oriented study of institutional interaction and by exploring new forms of non-state actor constellations fostering these interaction processes.
It also reveals the tactics of actor networks transporting norms from one regime (human rights) into another (climate policy), creating a regime complex, i.e.
a loosely coupled set of institutions (Raustiala & Victor 2004).
TANs can be grasped as communicative structures, in which a range of activists guided by principled ideas and values interact.
These ideas and values are central to the networks and they determine criteria for evaluating whether particular actions and their outcomes are just or unjust (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 1).
TANs create new linkages, multiply access channels to the international system, make resources available to new actors, and help to transform practices of national sovereignty by changing governmental policies.
Within these networks, international and local civil society organizations (CSOs), foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, academics, and even members of regional or international organizations collaborate.
This means several CSOs build a TAN and several TANs collaborate in a “super-network”.
The overall objective of TANs and super-networks is to change the policies of states and international organizations (ibid: 9).
In order to do so, they revert to a range of tactics, i.e.
their ideational power (Orsini, 2013), including information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 16-25).
My paper focuses on institutional interaction between the human rights and the climate change regime.
The case study I investigate comprises the advocacy activities of the inter-constituency alliance for incorporating human rights in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
I have selected to investigate this as a unique, politically relevant, and significant case to study.
It is unique because it demonstrates how a new form of transnational advocacy network, a super-network – operating above individual networks and comprised of human rights organizations, including civil society and international organizations (IOs), like the OHCHR and UNICEF, environmental movements, religious actors, representatives of indigenous peoples, youth activists, gender groups, trade unions, and land rights organizations – is built.
It is politically relevant because the super-network has influenced governmental decision-making at the 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) where member states of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiated a new climate agreement.
It is significant because the super-network has initiated and fostered further institutional interaction between the human rights and climate change, resulting in the incorporation of human rights in the preamble of the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Empirically, the research for this paper is based on 20 expert interviews and participatory observations at the strategic meetings of the inter-constituency alliance, the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group (HRCCWG), and other TANs at three different COPs, i.e.
COP 19 in Warsaw, COP 21 in Paris, and COP 23 in Bonn (hosted by the Fiji Islands), including follow-up Skype interviews with key experts between 2013 and 2020.
These key experts are representatives of the interconstituency alliance, and I interviewed at least two experts from each constituency, the two initiators/coordinators of the inter-constituency alliance and its OHCHR and UNICEF representatives.
The interviews conducted were semi-structured in-depth expert interviews (Witzel & Reiter, 2012), and I evaluated them using a qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2014).
I also draw on a content analysis of primary documents and data, comprising policy documents of member organizations of the interconstituency alliance, strategy papers of the HRCCWG, UNFCCC outcome agreements, twitter campaigns relating to #Stand4Rights used by the inter-constituency alliance during the Paris negotiations, information circulated via the email lists of the inter-constituency alliance and the HRCCWG, and conference calls.
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 34 University of Bamberg Press This paper is structured in the following way: I will first elucidate my analytical framework integrating insights on institutional interaction and on transnational advocacy networks.
Second, I will introduce the case study on the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group as the main initiator of the inter-constituency alliance fostering the incorporation of human rights in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
I will then move on to explain how exactly TANs foster institutional interaction between the human rights and the climate change regime.
Finally, I will reflect on how the inter-constituency alliance built in Paris is different from other networks and why understanding these new forms TANs is relevant for the study of institutional interaction and institutional complexity, before I conclude.
Analytical Framework For developing a better understanding of institutional interaction, the micro-macro link (Buzan, Jones & Little, 1993), i.e.
the mechanisms at play between the micro level of actors and the macro level of institutions, needs to be further established.
Here, constructivist scholarship highlighting the mutually constitutive character of actors and structures might be able to enrich rational choice-oriented institutionalist theories, that is scholarship on institutional interaction.
In this piece, I aim to combine these two approaches, which have previously remained disconnected from each other, to build an analytical framework that helps to understand the underlying dynamics and politics of interaction between the human rights and the climate regime.
Institutionalization, Institutional Interaction, and Interplay In International Relations (IR) scholarship, institutions are grasped as rules and practices prescribing behavioral roles, constraining activity, and shaping expectations (Keohane 1989: 3), and as functional entities managing complex issues (Zürn & Faude, 2013, 123).
Institutionalization can be understood as the process toward establishing sets of rules and practices to guide the behavior of state and non-state actors.
Increased institutionalization processes have, in the past, led to “material and functional overlaps between international institutions” resulting in fragmentation (Zelli & van Asselt, 2013, 1).
An arrangement of overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing an issue area can develop into a regime complex, i.e.
a loosely coupled set of institutions (Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Keohane & Victor, 2010, 3-4; Abbott, 2014).
Decision-making in fragmented regime complexes can be a challenge as certain institutional arrangements often are initially made for a single sector only but then turn out to be relevant for others as well.
Those who make decisions, however, are often only trained in one sector and are solely familiar with structures, processes, and actors in their own policy field.
Institutionalization of human rights in the climate regime can best be explained with insights from scholarship on institutional interaction (Young, 2002; Oberthür & Stokke, 2011).
Institutional interaction means that the institutional development or effectiveness of one institution becomes affected by another institution (Gehring & Oberthür, 2006, 6; Oberthür & Prozarowska, 2013).
Interaction between source and target institution can be understood as the cause and the consequence of political decisions within respective institutions (Oberthür & Gehring, 2009).
Interplay management is a key term grasping intentional efforts by actors and actor constellations addressing or improving institutional interaction (Oberthür & Pozarowska, 2013, 103).
This involves governance decisions on institutional complexes, in which structural elements and agency are interlinked (Oberthür & Pozarowska, 2013, 13).
One focus in the literature on institutional interaction is the identification of causal mechanisms of influence exerted from one source institution to a specific target institution (Gehring & Oberthür, 2006, 6-7).
These first comprise cognitive interaction, or learning.
Here, the source institution has insights that it feeds into the decision-making process of the target institution (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, 133).
Second, interaction through commitment means that the member states of a source institution have agreed on commitments that might be relevant for the members of the target institution as well.
If there is an overlap of membership and issues to be dealt with, the commitments made in the source institution can lead to differing decision-making in the target institution (Gehring Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 35 University of Bamberg Press & Oberthür, 2009, 136).
With increasing institutionalization processes, norms and standards in one policy field might also affect another, leading to overlaps and fragmentation (Zelli & van Asselt, 2013).
Interaction through commitment is particularly important for understanding interaction processes between the human rights and the climate regime.
Third, behavioral interaction comes into play if the source institution has obtained an output initiating behavioral changes that is meaningful for the target institution.
In cases like this, the initiated changes in behavior can foster further behavioral changes (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, 141144).
And fourth, impact-level interaction is based on a situation of interdependence, in which a “functional linkage” (Young, 2002) between the governance objectives of the institutions can be observed.
If the source institution obtains an output that affects the objectives of the source institution, this impact can also influence the objectives (and effectiveness) of the target institution (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, 143-144).
Actors, Actor Constellations and Transnational Advocacy Networks So far, our knowledge on actors and actor constellations initiating and/or fostering institutional interaction is still limited.
I argue that research on transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) provides useful insights that help us understand how unique actor constellations use established norms in one policy field to motivate (more powerful) IOs and their member states in a different policy field to change their policies accordingly.
TANs are usually comprised of civil society actors, including, but not limited to, nongovernmental organizations, media actors, representatives of churches and faith-based groups, foundations, and trade unions.
Individual state actors and international organizations can also organize in TANs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 9).
TANs mobilize around common objectives.
Based on certain ideas and values, such as human rights or environmental standards, they evaluate whether policies are just or unjust – and consequently lobby for change.
TANs create new linkages, multiply access channels to the international system, make resources available to new actors, and help to transform practices of national sovereignty by changing inter-governmental decisions and policies.
In order to do so, they revert to a range of tactics, i.e.
their ideational power (Orsini, 2013).
Keck and Sikkink (1998, 16-25) have developed a typology of tactics TANs use in order to initiate policy change.
In this context, they highlight (1) information politics understood as strategically using information, (2) symbolic politics as drawing on symbols and stories to highlight a situation to a target audience that might be geographically distant, (3) leverage politics as network actors being able to gain moral or material leverage over state actors and IOs, and (4) accountability politics referring to formerly adopted norms and policies of governmental actors and obligations to comply with them (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 16-25).
In this article, I use established insights on the politics of transnational advocacy to explain important dynamics of institutional interaction between two different regimes.
Figure 1 illustrates the analytical framework highlighting the role of TANs in the interaction between institutions.
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 36 University of Bamberg Press Figure 1 Analytical Framework (Source: Own compilation based on Gehring & Oberthür, 2009) Case Study: Transnational Human Rights Advocacy in the Climate Arena My empirical research departs from the work of one particular TAN, the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group (HRCCWG), that aims at institutionalizing human rights in the climate regime.
The HRCCWG initiated collaboration between seven different constituencies building the inter-constituency alliance in Paris 2015.
The activities of the working group are inspired by two main links between human rights and climate change.
First, climate change impacts, like droughts, flooding, changes in precipitation, and extreme weather events can adversely affect social rights, like the rights to health, food, water and sanitation, adequate shelter or, in extreme cases, the right to selfdetermination and the right to life.
Second, international climate policies, like projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) scheme, have previously led to human rights infringements on the ground.
When, under the roof of these policies, local population groups cannot enter their ancestral lands anymore or are relocated, territories are flooded, and communities loose access to the river they need for fishing and agricultural purposes, social, cultural, and indigenous peoples’ rights are at risk (Schapper & Lederer, 2014).
The HRCCWG can be described as a hybrid link of predominantly civil society and some state actors operating at various scales – from the local to the global (Interview Indigenous Rights Organization, COP 19 in Warsaw, 16 November 2013).
Among the network’s members are prominent international CSOs, such as the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Earthjustice, Friends of the Earth and Carbon Market Watch, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, local CSOs from various developing countries, gender advocates, indigenous peoples’ representatives, academics, and representatives from IOs, as well as single actors from state delegations (Interview Human Rights Watch, COP 21 in Paris, 8 December 2015).
IOs operating within the HRCCWG (and within the entire inter-constituency alliance) were the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNICEF.
Membership in the network is rather informal: participants can be present at one negotiation meeting but miss the next one (Interview Coordinator HRCCWG, COP 19 in Warsaw, 17 November 2013).
source institution target institution cognitive interaction interaction through commitment behavioral interaction impact-level interaction transnational actor constellations Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 37 University of Bamberg Press Since 2010, the HRCCWG has initiated and contributed to several rights institutionalization processes in the climate regime, including adding rights references in the Cancun Agreement demanding that all climate action should be in accordance with human rights (UNFCCC, 2010) and reviewing the modalities and procedures of the CDM with a focus on procedural rights for those affected by CDM policies, like access to information, transparency, participation in decision-making and access to justice (Kuchler, 2017).
Demands for strengthening procedural rights in projects under the framework of the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) are brought forward by the HRCCWG in the negotiations as well.
More broadly speaking, the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group has also made important contributions to the 16 Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment published by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment in 2018 (OHCHR, 2018).
Specifically referring to climate change, the framework principles formulate states’ human rights obligations in the face of environmental challenges and have been understood as a precursor to adopting an international human right to a healthy environment (Atapattu & Schapper, 2019).
In this article, I will particularly focus on the incorporation of the commitment to respect, protect and consider human rights in the preamble of the Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015).
Even though the HRCCWG as part of the entire inter-constituency alliance had unsuccessfully advocated for including rights in article 2 of the Paris climate agreement determining the objective of the accord, rights references in the preamble are still meaningful due to two main reasons.
First, this is the first time human rights have been incorporated in a binding environmental instrument (Knox, 2015; Atapattu & Schapper, 2019) and this is considered to be an important step in institutionalizing human rights in the climate regime (Interview Quaker United Nations Office, 16 March 2020, via Skype).
Second, there is now increasing evidence that the Paris Agreement, including its human rights reference, is used for climate litigation (Adelman, 2020; Wegener, 2020), e.g.
in the “The People’s Climate Case”, in which ten families tried to compel the European Union to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Climate Case, 2020).
The “Super-Network” In preparation for the negotiations of a new climate instrument, two key actors within CIEL, the leading coordinating CSO within the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group, brought together different constituencies to discuss ideas for a common advocacy strategy.
As both had personal ties to other constituencies and previous experiences with cross-constituency coordination, they had the idea of bringing most constituencies together to discuss their advocacy plans in light of the prospect that a new climate agreement would be passed in Paris (Interview Initiator Interconstituency Alliance, 26 March 2020, via Skype).
The constituencies at the UNFCCC negotiations are clustered groups of officially registered CSOs sharing certain interests and acting as observers in the process.
As of 2014, the UNFCCC Secretariat reported more than 1,600 admitted CSOs organized into nine constituencies, including environmental CSOs (ENGO), business and industry (BINGO), indigenous peoples’ representatives (IPO), youth groups (YOUNGO), women and gender (WOMEN AND GENDER), and trade unions (TUNGO,) as well as research and independent organizations (RINGO).
Participation in a constituency comes with several advantages: it allows observers to make interventions at certain points in the course of the state negotiation process, it facilitates the use of focal points for better coordination with the UNFCCC Secretariat, and it enhances flexible information-sharing (UNFCCC, 2014).
Opportunities for civil society to engage through constituencies and be granted official speaking time demonstrates that environmental and climate politics can be regarded as unique policy fields facilitating advanced institutional mechanisms for access and participation (Bäckstrand, 2012).
At the initial meeting discussing a common CSO strategy prior to the start of the Paris negotiations, some officially registered constituencies, including ENGO, IPO, YOUNGO, WOMEN and GENDER, and TUNGO, as well as other organized networks that are not officially registered constituencies but are observers to the UNFCCC process, like faith-based organizations and the lands working group (climate land ambition and rights alliance, CLARA), decided to establish the new interComplexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 38 University of Bamberg Press constituency alliance.
The alliance comprises different layers of organization ranging from the individual initiators who are representatives of one civil society organization (CIEL), which is organized in a transnational advocacy network (the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group) and encourages several networked constituencies (ENGO, IPO, YOUNGO, WOMEN and GENDER, TUNGO, CLARA, and faith-based groups) to collaborate and speak with one voice.
One of the key initiators of the inter-constituency alliance described its emergence highlighting the idea of formulating a common message: “We tried to see if we could do some collective planning; like identify what are the next steps and who wants to do what […] but what people seemed really interested in was the idea of having, first of hearing each other, and then having one unified message that we could all use.” (Interview Initiator Inter-constituency Alliance, 26 March 2020, via Skype.)
This means representatives of the constituencies themselves came up with the idea of aligning their advocacy strategy and formulating one key message; this was not planned or encouraged by the initiators.
Communicating one key message across such a diverse range of networks is unprecedented and unusual.
Previously, human rights groups would, for example, rather focus on protecting human beings (anthropocentric perspective), whereas environmental actors would prioritize ecosystem integrity (ecocentric perspective).
Nevertheless, the alliance managed to draft one key message with seven principles – reflecting the priorities of the seven participating constituencies and their overlapping interests – using a broad human rights framework (Interview Representative of Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus, 8 April 2020, via Skype).
These principles included human rights (HRCCWG), indigenous peoples’ rights (IPO), gender equality (WOMEN and GENDER), intergenerational equity (YOUNGO), just transition of the workforce (TUNGO), food security (CLARA), and ecosystem integrity (ENGO).
One main reason for this unity among otherwise often diverse networks was the unique opportunity to shape the next climate agreement and integrate crucial civil society concerns (Interview Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University UN Representative, 20 March 2020, via Skype).
Focusing on one key message did not necessarily mean that the abovementioned contradictions were overcome but that there was a consensus on what to focus on during the 2015 Paris negotiations.
During the Intersessionals (pre-negotiations) in Bonn in June 2015, the alliance managed to lobby for all seven principles to be placed in the operative part of the negotiation text in Article 2.
This was quite meaningful because Article 2 was to determine the objective of the Paris Agreement.
Including human rights in this Article would have required states to acknowledge that the agreement’s purpose is the protection of basic rights in the face of a changing climate (Interview CARE, WOMEN and GENDER, COP 23 in Bonn, 8 November 2017).
Two days before the final text was adopted, state representatives moved human rights to the preamble of the agreement.
On 12 December 2015, the states unanimously adopted the Paris Agreement including human rights as part of its preamble, although a number of states, including the USA, Saudi Arabia, Norway, the African states, and others, opposed this over longer periods of the negotiation process.
Thus, the Paris Agreement is the first legally binding climate instrument containing human rights (Carazo, 2017: 114).
The key sentence of the preamble of the 2015 Paris Agreement now reads: “[…] Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity” (UNFCCC, 2015).
The remaining principles the inter-constituency alliance advocated for, i.e.
just transition of the workforce, ecosystem integrity and food security, became part of the agreement’s preamble as well.
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 39 University of Bamberg Press Tactics of the Inter-constituency Alliance During the Paris negotiations, the super-network met once a week to refine their collective strategy and to share information across the constituencies.
They exchanged insights on which state actors were receptive to human rights arguments and could introduce relevant key passages into the negotiating text or which governmental delegation was opposed to the use of rights language.
The alliance then decided what network or individual CSO had established good personal relations and could approach the respective state delegation to advocate for human rights in the new climate instrument.
What was new in Paris was the package approach.
Whoever engaged in any advocacy meetings with state delegates, reiterated the entire message including all seven principles.
An interviewee from the WOMEN and GENDER constituency described this as an approach uniting civil society at the negotiations: “We were telling the parties: ‘you can’t just pick which right to push forward; it’s either all or none’.
It was also a way to say: ‘don’t try to divide us, because we are united’.
(Interview CARE, WOMEN and GENDER, COP 23 in Bonn, 8 November 2017).
Besides these weekly meetings with all participating constituencies, the alliance heavily relied on the advocacy activities of each individual network or CSO and their relationships with key governmental actors, which they had established over a period of many years.
National ties also played a role here: French observers had often established meaningful personal relationships with French negotiators or observers from Chad had good chances to address representatives from the Republic of Chad.
Awareness-raising in relation to human rights and bringing local concerns regarding climate change and climate policies to the international negotiation table constituted an important part of the lobbying activities.
This proved to be crucial because climate negotiators often were not aware of the fact that many climate policies have adverse consequences for human rights and indigenous peoples’ rights at the local level.
And as the negotiators are not necessarily trained in the field of human rights, they are also often uninformed about the rights commitments their own government has made.
“A negotiator on CDM [Clean Development Mechanism] is very likely to have absolutely no idea what we’re speaking about when you raise the human rights issue.
It is just not his field, he might come from the wrong department.
[…] People have no idea what the human rights obligations of their countries are.
[…]” (Interview CIEL, COP 19 in Warsaw, 17 November 2013).
More awareness on adverse human rights impacts of climate policies has been created over the last years, and especially in Paris, but highlighting the link between both policy fields remains one of the most important advocacy activities.
CSOs and networks frequently work with case studies emphasizing the adverse effects of climate change and climate policies on local people from Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Interview Environmental Think Tank, COP 19 in Warsaw, 16 November 2013).
At the negotiations, representatives from civil society present case studies during so-called side events (Interview Indigenous Rights Organization, COP 19 in Warsaw, 16 November 2013) that run parallel to the closed meetings of state parties and are accessible to all governmental delegations and non-state observers.
Locally affected people themselves sometimes present cases on problematic rights situations.
International civil society partners sponsor some of them so that they are able to join international meetings and articulate their experiences and corresponding demands.
In this way, relevant networks in cooperation with their partners – affected civil society – feed local claims into the international negotiation process.
A Human Rights Watch representative summarizes the objective of transporting local claims to the international negotiation table: “[…] these won’t be the most disadvantaged people that will make it to these international negotiations.
So I think this is also what we are trying to do with our work generally but also in Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 40 University of Bamberg Press this context is bringing the voices of those that are not usually being heard to the international negotiations” (Interview Human Rights Watch, COP 21 in Paris, 8 December 2015).
To understand adverse local rights impacts of climate policies is crucially important as it creates moral leverage for those countries that have ratified these human rights and are now funding these policies, like European states engaged in CDM or REDD+ projects (Interview Environmental Think Tank, COP 19 in Warsaw, 16 November 2013).
Raising awareness on local human rights implications of climate change and climate policies, informing state delegates of already existing rights commitments, and exchanging information about relevant actions of state delegations and their receptiveness to rights arguments, as well as formulating one priority human rights message were the most important tactics employed by the super-network.
Transnational Advocacy Networks Fostering Institutional Interaction The interplay between the human rights and the climate regime we can observe in this case study is institutional interaction through commitment (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, 136).
Standards agreed to in the source institution, the human rights regime, become relevant in the target institution, the climate regime, as well.
Commitments made in the human rights arena led to different decisions in the climate regime and affected the outcome of the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Even though states agreed to comply with human rights standards in a different policy field, they are still obliged to adhere to these norms when it comes to establishing and implementing climate policies as highlighted by an OHCHR representative: “We think this is an issue of consistency and policy coherence that it is important that these two legal frameworks are brought together and in fact should complement each other.
So the international human rights framework is a legally binding commitment made by the states and we think that commitment should be recognized in the context of environmental laws and we’re pushing hard to see that be the case.” (Interview OHCHR, COP 21 in Paris, 10 December 2015).
Keck and Sikkink’s typology of tactics helps us to understand how institutional interaction between the human rights and the climate regime was initiated even though many state representatives and climate negotiators were not aware of the link and/or opposed to incorporating human rights in a climate instrument.
The tactics of transnational advocacy networks, in particular of the super-network, help explain the politics behind this regime interaction: at the climate negotiations, different TANs use information on adverse local rights impacts of climate change and climate policies to criticize existing state practices and to highlight the need to institutionalize human rights in climate instruments.
The inter-constituency alliance exchanged information on states that are receptive to rights arguments to refine their advocacy and lobbying strategy (information politics).
At the side events, TANs encouraged local actors to share their cases and stories from home countries to raise awareness of the situation of the target group of climate instruments (symbolic politics).
These cases are presented as instances of climate injustice in which local population groups who have contributed little to greenhouse gas emissions and have few resources to adapt cannot fully enjoy their human rights due to climate impacts or experience rights infringements as a consequence of climate policy implementation.
This creates moral leverage over states that have historically contributed to emissions and that are financing climate policies in developing countries (leverage politics).
Moreover, TANs persuade states to vote for an incorporation of human rights into climate agreements and procedural rights into climate policies.
Mechanisms of persuasion (and discourse) function according to a logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998, 951) (or a logic of arguing) and are particularly successful with (often liberal democratic) state governments (Risse & Ropp, 2013, 16) that have already legally committed to human rights, understanding them as part of their state identity, e.g.
European states like France, Sweden, and Ireland (accountability politics).
Actively engaged and in favor of rights institutionalization are also those states that are pressured from above through TANs and from below through domestic civil society organizations.
These often are Latin American countries with strong CSO movements representing Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 41 University of Bamberg Press local communities’ and indigenous peoples’ concerns.
Among them are Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Uruguay.
Also in favor of rights institutionalization are small island states, such as the Maldives, Kiribati, or Samoa, that fear severe climate change consequences for the citizens living in their territory.
Some states (together with CSOs, IOs and other actors of the human rights regime) also try to pressure less democratic states to vote in favor of rights institutionalization.
Another mechanism applied is naming and shaming, e.g.
through a joint Amnesty International and Human Rights press release widely circulated on social media labeling Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Norway “human rights deniers” in addressing climate change (Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch, 2015).
Another example is Annex I countries claiming that they will not fund climate policies with adverse right affects anymore, such as REDD+ and CDM programs.
Thus, they use negative incentives or sanction mechanisms that function according to a logic of consequences (March & Olsen, 1998, 949; Risse & Ropp, 2013, 14).
The package approach used by the inter-constituency alliance has not yet been discussed in IR scholarship and can enhance our current knowledge of transnational advocacy.
Employing a broad human rights framework, the alliance managed to integrate seven different networks with seven corresponding principles.
Trade union networks, for instance, in the past often voiced concerns about jobs being at risk in the face of green economy transition and therefore demanded just transition processes.
Indigenous peoples, in contrast, prioritized the protection of natural resources and heritage sites over the creation of new jobs.
This new form of cooperation across constituencies empowered civil society towards state governments: “[…] the fact that a trade unionist who is coming from Illinois to a climate conference and suddenly hearing the indigenous peoples’ representative saying: ‘Oh remember, indigenous peoples’ rights only make sense in the context of just transition for workers’.
That is something that was incredibly empowering and motivating and feeling that no matter what the UNFCCC does, we have already reached a degree of solidarity that is unusual and is powerful.” (Interview Initiator Inter-constituency Alliance, 26 March 2020, via Skype.)
By repeating the entire message package consistently throughout the negotiations and as a united super-network, civil society gained strengths, changed decision-making in the context of the Paris Agreement and fostered institutional interaction between the human rights and the climate regime (package approach politics).
Figure two displays TAN’s tactics in fostering institutional interaction between the human rights and the climate regime.
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 42 University of Bamberg Press Figure 2 Institutional Interaction between the Human Rights and the Climate Regime (Source: Own compilation) What Is New – And Why Is This Relevant For The Study Of Institutional Complexity?
This case study demonstrates how transnational advocacy networks built and mobilized the inter-constituency alliance as a super-network with a view to incorporate various principles under the umbrella of a human rights framework into the new 2015 climate instrument.
This leads to the creation of a new regime complex, in which the norms of one source regime (human rights) become relevant for a target regime (climate policy).
The super-network described in the empirical case study is unique and different from Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) definition of TANs as it works across a number of issue areas, including organizations concerned with intergenerational equity, land issues, environmental problems, the situation of indigenous peoples, workers’ concerns, gender aspects, and human rights.
In contrast to Keck and Sikkink’s original work on TANs, where networks center their work around either values, e.g.
human rights, women’s rights, or environmental protection (1998), the super-network operates across constituencies and integrates a number of issues.
Although objectives and methods of the individual TANs participating in the 2015 interconstituency alliance are usually quite diverse, and sometimes even contradictory, network members understood the context of the Paris negotiations as an opportunity to advocate for common core principles they had agreed on.
The unique mobilization structure of seven TANs in the super-network meant that different networks could combine their strengths and expertise, exchange valuable information, agree on overlapping objectives and refine their tactics.
Then they could go back into their individual networks to lobby and interact with the respective state representatives they had built relationships with over many years.
As the entire alliance spoke with one voice and promoted common rights principles, their influence was much stronger than in previous negotiations and changed the decision-making of states, in particular of those who were opposed to include rights in the agreement, like the USA, Saudi Arabia, or several African states (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
Rights protection was highlighted as important by raising awareness to the adverse local impacts and unintended consequences that international governmental climate policies, like the CDM human rights regime transnational advocacy networks human rights agreements climate regime state parties climate agreements incl.
human rights interaction through commitment information symbols/stories leverage accountability package approach unanimously adopt Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 43 University of Bamberg Press or REDD+, can have.
At the same time, the alliance made governmental negotiators who are usually only trained in their own field aware of already existing human rights obligations of the international community that respective countries had ratified.
By doing this, and by making concrete suggestions for the negotiation text, including references to existing human rights commitments, the supernetwork fostered institutional interaction through commitment.
By advocating for an incorporation of human rights in the preamble of the Paris agreement, the alliance also advanced further institutionalization processes between the human rights and the climate change regime, creating a new regime complex.
They urged states to take human rights, as a part of the new climate instrument, seriously in the following negotiations of the implementation guidelines, the so-called Paris rulebook (CIEL et al., 2017).
With the postponed COP 26 in Glasgow to be held only at the end of 2021, there will be delayed negotiations on the San Jose principles, also known as article 6 principles, defining standards for the creation of carbon markets.
After COP 25, human rights have not yet been included in article 6, but amendments are still to be negotiated and the alliance is trying to influence governments to incorporate human rights safeguards into these principles (HRCCWG, 2018).
Developing a better understanding of these new forms of TANs helps to explain the dynamics behind institutional interaction.
This means there are not only causal mechanisms of interaction between a source and a target institution, such as interaction through commitment1, as elaborated bv Gehring and Oberthür (2006, 2009), but there are also politics (i.e.
information, symbols/stories, accountability, leverage, and package approach) behind the interaction link.
This adds to the study of institutional complexity as it contributes a multi-level perspective on adverse local rights impacts of climate policies and how they are used by transnational actors in the global climate arena to advocate for change.
The unique interaction patterns between civil society has fostered institutional interaction between two different regimes.
This brings a micro-perspective of actors (and local impacts) into play that is yet missing in many studies on institutional interaction and connects it with the macroperspective of structures (and regime overlap).
It also links rational choice-oriented regime studies with social constructivist work on norm-guided actors, actor constellations, and networks.
This study contributes to Orsini’s (2013, 2015) work on “multi-forum” non-state actors and helps close a research gap by illuminating the role of non-state actors and transnational advocacy networks in the statefocused study of institutional interaction.
The inter-constituency alliance investigated for this paper is not the only “super-network” active in international negotiations.
Other examples are the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Alliance bringing together different TANs active from various policy fields for common objectives in the CBD negotiations or the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) uniting youth groups, peace organizations, trade unions, women’s networks, health advocates, and others behind the common aim of eliminating nuclear weapons.
Their role in institutionalization processes and institutional interaction needs to be further investigated.
Critical Discussion and Conclusion In this paper, I have argued that we learn more about the dynamics of institutional interaction by understanding new forms of Transnational Advocacy Networks that foster interaction (through commitment) and further institutionalization processes.
Empirically, this paper focuses on examining interactions between the human rights and the climate change regime, and the activities of a new form of alliance, a so-called “super-network”, for incorporating rights principles in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Making use of the political context and opportunities to participate in the negotiations of a new climate instrument, various TANs, including indigenous, environmental, youth, religious, trade union, land rights, and human rights groups, organized themselves in the inter-constituency alliance.
Combining strengths and expertise and sharing valuable information, the alliance agreed on a package 1 In this case study, we mainly learn about interaction through commitment (as the inter-constituency alliance refers to human rights agreements that have already been ratified by member stated of the UNFCCC).
Behavioral and impact-level interaction will only become relevant after the Paris agreement is implemented.
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 44 University of Bamberg Press approach with core principles to advocate for and influenced governmental decision-making.
By making use of tactics, such as information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics, the inter-constituency alliance persuaded and pressured states to incorporate human rights in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
This case demonstrates how local impacts and experiences play a role in institutional interaction and thus adds a multi-level actor perspective to the study of institutional complexity.
It also contributes to understanding the role of non-state actors and actor constellations in influencing governmental decision-making to advance further institutionalization processes at the intersection of two regimes.
Two aspects concerning the formation of TANs at the COP in general, and the interconstituency alliance in specific, have to be viewed critically.
First, the hybridity of TANs makes them dynamic and flexible but also comes with a major disadvantage.
Many CSOs are crucial in one negotiation but cannot participate in the next one.
This means, in every new negotiation the respective network may miss out on expertise or relationships with state representatives that individual CSOs had established during previous years (Interview Representative of the HRCCWG, COP 19 in Warsaw, 17 November 2013).
Lacking continuity and consistency hamper the success of these alliances.
Second, for the formation of the inter-constituency alliance, TANs have used the unique political context around the 2015 Paris negotiations, in particular the opportunity to contribute to a new climate instrument, to advocate for commonly agreed principles.
They were able to mobilize and successfully build a strong alliance among very diverse CSOs that usually pursue different, sometimes even competing, objectives.
Different network representatives emphasize that with the Paris negotiations, unprecedented forms of civil society cooperation have been initiated that remain to be relevant in the future (Interview Representative of Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus, Saami Council, 12 March 2020 via Skype).
But even though the different constituencies continue a dialogue, the supernetwork lost its momentum, unique mobilization structure, and unity behind a common aim after the Paris negotiations.
Thus, the text for the implementation guidelines, which was subject to the following negotiations, has so far remained relatively weak from a human rights perspective – although negotiations on amendments are still ongoing (Interview Initiator Inter-constituency Alliance, 26 March 2020, via Skype.)
This demonstrates that strong mobilization and successful network-building to foster institutional interaction, as we could observe in the case of the inter-constituency alliance, only work under unique political opportunity structures.
References Abbott, K. (2014).
Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change.
Transnational Environmental Law, 3(1), 57-88.
Adelman, S. (2020).
Human Rights in Pursuit of Climate Justice.
Wisconsin International Law Journal (forthcoming).
Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch (2015).
Human Rights in Climate Pact Under Fire.
Retrieved June 17, 2016, from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/07/human-rights-climate-pact-under-fire.
Atapattu, S. & Schapper, A.
(2019).
Human Rights and the Environment: Key Issues.
New York: Routledge.
Bäckstrand, K. (2012).
Democracy and Global Environmental Politics.
In.
P. Dauvergne (Ed.)
(pp.507-519).
Handbook of Global Environmental Politics.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Buzan, B., Jones, C. & Little, R. (1993).
The Logic of Anarchy: From Neorealism to Structural Realism.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Carazo, M. (2017).
Contextual Provisions (Preamble and Article 1).
In.
J. Bulmer, M. Carazo, M. Doelle, A. Higham, & D. Klein (Eds.)
(pp.
107–122).
The Paris Climate Agreement.
Analysis and Commentary.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CIEL et al.
(2017).
Delivering on the Paris Promises: Combating Climate Change While Protecting Rights.
Recommendations for the Negotiations of the Paris Rule Book.
Retrieved April 17, 2020, from: https://www.deliveringonparis.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Delivering-On-Paris-Web.pdf.
Climate Case (2020).
Armando Ferrão Carvalho and Others v. The European Parliament and the Council, “The People’s Climate Case”.
Retrieved August 25, 2020, from: http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/armando-ferrao-carvalho-andothers-v-the-european-parliament-and-the-council/.
Gehring, T. & Oberthür, S. (2006).
Introduction.
In.
Oberthür, S. & Gehring, T.
(Eds.)
(pp.
1-18).
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gehring, T. & Oberthür, S. (2009).
The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions.
European Journal of International Relations, 15(1), 125–156.
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45 https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/07/human-rights-climate-pact-under-fire http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/armando-ferrao-carvalho-and-others-v-the-european-parliament-and-the-council/ http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/armando-ferrao-carvalho-and-others-v-the-european-parliament-and-the-council/ 45 University of Bamberg Press HRCCWG (2018).
Briefing Note: May 2018 Bonn Climate Negotiations.
Retrieved August 26, 2020, from: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/BN_May2018_BonnClimateNegotiations.pdf.
Human Rights Watch.
(2015).
Human Rights in Climate Pact Under Fire.
Retrieved February 1, 2017, from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/07/human-rights-climate-pact-under-fire.
Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998).
Activists Beyond Borders.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Keohane, R.O.
(1989).
International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Keohane, R. & Victor, D. (2010).
The Regime Complex for Climate Change.
The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements: Discussion Paper 10-33.
Knox, J.
(2015).
Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/HRC/22/43.
Geneva: Human Rights Council.
Kuchler, M. (2017).
The human rights turn: ENGOs’ changing tactics in the quest for a more transparent, participatory and accountable CDM.
Environmental Politics, 26, 648–668.
March, J., and Olsen, J.
(1998).
The institutional dynamics of international political orders.
International Organization, 52:4, 943–969.
Mayring, P. (2014).
Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution.
Klagenfurt.
Retrieved December 17, 2019, from: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-395173.
Oberthür, S. & Gehring, T. eds.
(2006).
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Oberthür, S. & Stokke, O.
(Eds.).
(2011).
Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Oberthür, S. & Pozarowska, J.
(2013).
Managing Institutional Complexity and Fragmentation: The Nagoya Protocol and the Global Governance of Genetic Resources.
Global Environmental Politics, 13, 100-118.
OHCHR.
(2018).
Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.
Retrieved December 5, 2019, from: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/FrameworkPrinciplesUserFriendlyV ersion.pdf.
Orsini, A.
(2013).
Multi-Forum Non-State Actors: Navigating the Regime Complexes for Forestry and Genetic Resources.
Global Environmental Politics, 13, 34-55.
Orsini, A.
(2016).
The negotiation burden of institutional interactions: Non-state organizations and the international negotiations on forests.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29, 1421–1440.
Raustiala, K. & Victor, D. (2004).
The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources.
International Organization, 58, 277-309.
Risse, T., Ropp, S. & Sikkink, K.
(Eds.).
(1999).
The Power of Human Rights.
International Norms and Domestic Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Risse, T. & Ropp, S. (2013).
Introduction and Overview.
In T. Risse, S. Ropp & K. Sikkink (Eds.)
The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (pp.
3-25).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schapper, A.
& Lederer, M. (2014).
Introduction.
Climate Change and Human Rights: Mapping Institutional Inter-linkages.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 27, 666–679.
UNFCCC.
(2010).
The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention.
Cancun: UNFCCC.
UNFCCC.
(2014).
Nongovernmental Organization Constituencies.
Retrieved June 24, 2016, from: https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_2011_english.pdf.
UNFCCC (2015).
Paris Agreement, Adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP).
12 December 2015, Paris.
Wegener, Lennart (2020).
Can the Paris Agreement Help Climate Litigation and Vice Versa?
Transnational Environmental Law, 9, 17-36.
Witzel, A.
& Reiter, H. (2012).
The problem-centered interview.
London: SAGE.
Young, O.R.
(2002).
The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Zelli, F. & van Asselt, H. (2013).
The Institutional Fragmentation of Global Environmental Governance: Causes, Consequences and Responses.
Global Environmental Politics, 13, 1-13.
Zürn, M. & Faude, B.
(2013).
On Fragmentation, Differentiation, and Coordination.
Global Environmental Politics, 13, 119130.
Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
6, No 1 (2020) Special Issue: Global Governance in Complex Times: Exploring New Concepts and Theories on Institutional Complexity, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-102 p. 32-45
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Environmental Migration: Social Work at the Nexus of Climate Change and Global Migration Meredith C. F. Powers Cathryne L. Schmitz Christian Z. Nsonwu Manju T. Mathew Abstract: Environmental migrants are caught at the nexus of the climate crisis and the global migrant crisis.
The problems of the migrant crisis are recognized globally as they are linked to the complex issues being addressed by the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.
The complexity of the issues makes it difficult to grasp the breadth and depth of this crisis.
As a result, it can be understood as one of the “wicked problems” requiring us to respond through a lens that recognizes the interconnections of humans and the broader ecosystems within the physical surroundings.
When approaching the migrant crisis from this perspective, professionals are challenged to create transdisciplinary, community-based response systems which are holistic, multi-pronged, and inclusive of migrants’ voices and strengths.
Storytelling provides a venue for highlighting migrants' voices, engaging in change, and creating the space for individual and collective healing.
Social workers are increasingly being called upon to become trained in this practice and to engage in complex change systems alongside other disciplines and community members.
As they provide prevention, mitigation, resettlement, and relief efforts, social workers become a part of a global community of leaders engaged in transformative change.
By working to address these challenges, they are securing a better world not only for environmental migrants, but also for our planet as a whole.
Keywords: Environmental migrants; climate crisis; indigenous biophilia framework Climate change and environmental degradation, significant factors of the climate crisis, precipitate deteriorating environmental, political, and economic systems that are creating a global migrant crisis (Besthorn & Meyer, 2010; Black et al., 2011; Brown, 2008; Drolet, 2017; United Nations High Commission on Refugees [UNHCR], 2009).
In fact, climate change has been acknowledged as the most significant threat to present and future generations of the global community, creating unprecedented migration (UNHCR, 2009; UN Environment, 2016; UN Trust Fund for Human Security, n.d.).
Such threats from natural occurrences include the slow onset of environmental degradation, as well as extreme weather patterns and correlating droughts, desertification, storms, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and rising sea levels.
These threats are exacerbated by human behaviors in two ways: (a) in our contribution to global warming and toxic environments, and (b) in the way we create built environments in areas that are at risk for such threats and yet are unequipped for and/or biased in the way we address the devastation of such crises when they occur.
Thus, the problem of the global migrant crisis lacks _________________ Meredith C. F. Powers PhD, MSW is an Assistant Professor, School of Social Work, University of North Carolina Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402.
Cathryne L. Schmitz, PhD, MSW is a Professor Emerita, School of Social Work, University of North Carolina Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402.
Christian Z. Nsonwu, BA, is a MSW student, School of Social Work, University of North Carolina Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402.
Manju T. Mathew, MA, Women and Gender Studies, University of North Carolina Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402.
Copyright © 2018 Authors, Vol.
18 No.
3 (Spring 2018), 1023-1040, DOI: 10.18060/21678 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1024 recognition of the interconnections of humans and the broader ecosystems.
Approaching the migrant crisis in its complexity, challenges social workers and other professionals to create response systems which are inclusive of migrant voices, vulnerabilities, and strengths while validating the environmental crisis that precipitates this migration crisis.
This requires tackling climate change and the resulting migration crisis simultaneously.
Estimates of the number of environmental migrants vary widely; ranging from 25 million to 1 billion, with the most widely accepted estimate of 200 million (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2015; International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2018b).
As defined by the IOM, environmental migrants are those displaced and/or migrating as a result of natural and human-made disaster events, as well as ongoing, deteriorating environments that create conditions that are not sustainable for life (IOM, 2018a).
They experience significant loss and trauma, but in many instances, are resilient and make remarkable recoveries (Weng & Lee, 2016).
Although all persons moving for environmental reasons are protected by international human rights law, these rights are often not easily upheld, in transit or in relocation.
Persons displaced within their country of origin due to natural or human made disasters, are covered by provisions laid out in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (IOM, 2015).
Environmental migrants are further recognized officially by the IOM as: ...persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad.
(IOM, 2018a, para.
1) This definition acknowledges that environmental migrants are forced to leave, or decide by choice to migrate, due to deteriorating environmental conditions and extreme environmental events; this may occur within and/or across international borders for brief, prolonged, or permanent periods of time (IOM, 2015).
Thus, while the term environmental refugee continues to be a matter of debate, for purposes of this article, we will use the term environmental migrants to refer to those who migrate due to environmental perils, regardless of their legal status as refugees.
Environmental migrants are a diverse group and some are eligible to receive legal refugee status due to other displacement criteria.
Current international policies, however, do not include climate change and environmental hazards as the basis of becoming a refugee, and the term environmental refugee is not a legal term or status (UNHCR, 2016).
The way in which some migrants’ hardships are legally recognized and thus provided with aid and resources, while others are excluded (e.g., environmental hardships), is one aspect of the complexity.
Social workers play instrumental roles in helping environmental migrants overcome the challenges faced at each stage of their journeys, from working to mitigate climate change issues that cause displacement, to helping rebuild and reestablish people in their homes of origin, to assisting with resettlement and building new lives, and to being advocates to change the policies and laws to include environmental refugees (Powers & Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1025 Nsonwu, in press; Drolet, 2017).
While addressing issues faced by environmental migrants, social workers not only collaborate with professionals in the social and natural sciences, but also with communities around the globe to address the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (IFSW, 2017).
According to the Global Agenda for Social Work and Social Development, professional social workers are to promote community and environmental sustainability while also advocating for social and economic equality, the dignity and worth of all peoples, and attending to the importance of human relationships (International Association of Schools of Social Work, International Council on Social Welfare, and International Federation of Social Workers [IASSW, ICSW, & IFSW], 2012).
Social workers, as interdisciplinary partners, are able to address these four interwoven agenda items in addition to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals through providing leadership on climate advocacy and action, and by working with environmental migrants to rebuild their lives.
The Interwoven Complexity of the Global Climate and Migrant Crises Environmental migration occurs at the nexus of complex and interwoven concerns: the global climate crisis and the global migrant crisis.
These problems are so large, complex, and interconnected that they cannot be solved, but due to their nature we have to intervene; these crises therefore fit Kolko's (2012) definition of a wicked problem.
They have many causes, ongoing processes of spiraling change, complex social interactions, multiple interpretations, conflicting goals, and an interdependency further complicated by the transnational nature of the issues.
In attempting change, it is necessary to recognize that there is no one solution and there is great potential for unforeseen consequences (Brown, 2010).
Although the climate crisis and the migrant crisis are interwoven, environmental migrants have little recognition globally of their status as migrants with legitimate human rights claims for permanent resettlement because the intersection is not validated.
This century, the world is facing a global climate crisis with issues of sustainability due to overpopulation, overcrowded cities, the depletion of environmental resources, limited food supplies, and pollution of air, water, and land (Brown, Deane, Harris, & Russell, 2010).
Climate science has established the contributing role of human behavior in global warming; 97% of climate scientists are in agreement (Cook et al., 2016).
Further, humans have been frustrated as they have struggled to increase food and energy production (Brown et al., 2010).
“It is the sum of the local issues that has generated the global issues in the first place.
Thus, we can appear to be locked in an endless spiral from which there is no escape” (Brown et al., 2010, p. 3).
These social-environmental problems cannot be solved with the tools of the last century These are not individual issues, but rather have implications inclusive of communities, regions, and countries devastated by environmental change.
While there are no final solutions, transformative change will require validation of the degradation and an understanding of the collective impact and context for change.
Experts warn that the climate crisis will exacerbate environmental migration well beyond what we have previously seen (Taylor, 2017).
The migrant crisis as enmeshed with the climate crisis is further aggravated by conflicts that erupt due to depleted resources ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1026 along with related economic, social, and environmental injustices (IPCC, 2015).
“Environmental justice occurs when all people equally experience high levels of environmental protection and no group or community is excluded from the environmental policy decision-making process, nor is affected by a disproportionate impact from environmental hazards” (Council on Social Work Education [CSWE], 2015, p. 20).
The impact of the climate crisis is further intertwined with issues of violent conflict; cultural, economic, and environmental injustice; and displacement.
In a study conducted in 2015, evidence showed that the effects of global climate change have sparked armed conflict; it has significantly contributed to the armed conflict and eventual civil war in Syria (Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, & Kushnir, 2015; Welch, 2015).
This evidence points to the spiraling nature of the issues and to the concepts many scholars have theorized for years, that the scarcity of resources (i.e., food, shelter, water) lead to major violent conflicts as the effects of climate change worsened.
Environmental migrants often flee their homes of origin due to violent conflict and/or because they face hardships (e.g., starvation) that result from climate change and prolonged conflict.
Their experience of loss is multi-layered, including the loss of family, friends, and home as well as the general comfort of the familiar, including culture and language, which impact whole communities.
The sights, sounds, relationship patterns, interactions, structures, language, and communication patterns of their new surroundings are unfamiliar (Deepak, 2018; Powers & Nsonwu, in press).
Demographic factors influence the need for and path of migration.
“It is incumbent upon professionals committed to social and economic justice, to comprehensively understand the range of obstacles facing immigrants and refugees and empower them in their struggle to make a healthy adjustment” (Schmitz, Vazquez Jacobus, Stakeman, Valenzuela, & Sprankel, 2003, p. 135).
Vulnerable populations are more burdened by environmental degradation and climate change; as a consequence, these influences are more prevalent in the migrant crisis.
An expanded analysis thus considers how demographics not only influence who migrates, but also explores more deeply why they are at higher risk and consequently more likely to migrate.
Populations at highest risk and most heavily impacted include populations of color, those in the Global South, low economic status, and women and children (Alston, 2013; Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, Linden, & Hanson, 2007; United Nations Women Watch, 2009).
Gender, race, economic status, and religion are closely linked to the discrimination faced by migrants before, during, and after migration (Soylu & Buchanon, 2013).
The history of displacements and fear that compound the transitions faced by migrants (Devore & Schlesinger, 1998; Schmitz et al., 2003) is further aggravated for women and girls, especially women and girls of color (Lie & Lowery, 2003).
In order to address the complexity, the analysis needs to be expanded to include the multiple, intersecting issues.
As migrant communities share their stories, our understanding of their experience of loss and trauma takes shape; the claiming of collective agency has a role in framing the healing process.
Environmental migrants have too often been subjected to chronic injustices, which are then exacerbated by environmental disasters.
For example, in Sri Lanka people who were fighting against waste being dumped in their communities then endured a massive landslide, which wiped out over 100 homes in the area and resulted Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1027 in many losing their lives (Reuters and The Associated Press, 2017).
Another tragic example includes the hurricanes that devastated families’ homes and livelihoods in Puerto Rico creating displacements and environmental migrations.
These communities were already vulnerable socially, politically, and economically due to extreme environmental injustices from the hazards of 23 Superfund sites, former US military bomb test sites, and local corporate waste of coal ash; these hazards were exacerbated by the hurricane damage (Atkin, 2017).
Kenya is a country that has faced significant hardships including climate change, environmental migration, political violence, and loss of the ecology for supporting food production and a clean water supply (Opido, Odwe, Oulu, & Omollo, 2017).
Because wicked problems, as they overlap, have no single answer, we must therefore embrace multi-pronged processes and systems for change that are inclusive of the local community (Balint, Stewart, Desai, & Walters, 2011).
Wangari Maathai modeled the multi-pronged approach to change as she addressed the interconnection of environmental, social, and political problems.
It was in her community that she began her path as an activist and change agent to rebuild the ecosystem, repair the fundamental connections of people to their environment, and overcome political violence.
She began the process by working locally on very practical issues and building community and collective change in the process.
This served to mitigate the need to migrate.
She was able to see beyond the immediate presenting problems in the community to address them holistically, taking into account all of their complexity.
As the ecosystem healed, so did the community.
She poignantly stated, Recognizing that sustainable development, democracy and peace are indivisible is an idea whose time has come… Today we are faced with a challenge that calls for a shift in our thinking, so that humanity stops threatening its life-support system.
We are called to assist the Earth to heal her wounds and in the process heal our own indeed to embrace the whole of creation in all its diversity, beauty and wonder.
(Maathai, 2004, para.
7, 22) Wangari Maathai grew up in a village in Kenya that had a vibrant and self-sustaining ecosystem.
When she returned home after completing bachelor's and master's degrees in biology in the United States, she found an ecosystem that had collapsed.
In Kenya, she completed her Ph.D., becoming the first woman in East Africa to earn a doctorate.
She engaged the women of the community in germinating, growing, and planting trees.
Because she was only organizing women, she was ignored by the repressive, patriarchal government.
This project blossomed into the very successful Green Belt Movement (Maathai, 2003; Merton & Dater, 2008); at the point that it was apparent that an effective movement was taking root, she (and the movement) became a threat, engendering a violent response.
The movement occurred at the nexus of multiple struggles, including climate change, environmental degradation, gender oppression, and violent conflict with governmental oppression (Strides in Development, 2010).
The women stood boldly in the face of violence, and engaged the community to challenge the repression; through her work, Maathai was the first woman in Africa to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004.
Maathai created a movement with multiple threads that promoted processes engaging civic ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1028 dialogue, critical assessment, and mechanisms that facilitated the empowerment of the community toward transformative change (Strides in Development, 2010).
Lens for Critical Exploration and Engagement The migrant crisis, approached as a communal problem, can be more deeply understood by including the broader social, political, and biophysical context into our analysis.
Like all such complex struggles, intervention failures often result because the nature of the problem is not understood and therefore responses are off target (Watkins & Wilber, 2015).
Problems cannot be solved “with the same level of thinking that created the problems—we need a new level of thinking.
The first step to bringing a new level of understanding to the nature of these complex issues is to dissect the features of extremely complex, difficult, or ‘wicked problems’” (Watkins & Wilber, 2015, p. 4).
Engaging holistic, collective, and complex frameworks for action supports the potential for creating systems and processes for change within communities.
Life on earth is not just composed of interactions between humans, but also includes the interconnectedness of humans, entire ecosystems, and the physical environment.
Life here denotes countless species of flora and fauna that live on the planet; all things, living and non-living, human and other than human, are connected in the large matrix of life on earth (Canty, 2017).
It is this interactive relationship of life within a physical space/place that forms the backdrop for the development of the biophilia framework.
The term “biophilia” was first used by Harvard Zoologist E. O. Wilson (1984) to describe "the innate human urge to affiliate with other forms of life" (p. 85).
Use of the biophilia framework expands the depth of analysis for the migrant crisis by helping us to recognize the interconnectedness of species with each other and with the ecosystem/environment (Lysack, 2010; Rabb, 2017).
Destruction of the ecological environment, negatively impacts the quality of human life materially, psychologically, and spiritually (Kellert & Wilson, 1995).
Biophilia involves an awareness of the interconnectedness of nature and understands the role of humans as only one aspect in nature.
Dr. Maathai's work exemplifies the application of this framework.
Analytic assessment with a biophilia framework involves not just accounting for a physical place inclusive of sun, wind, rain, land, lakes, rivers, and oceans, but also the components of spiritual relationship to a place, a sense of belonging to the local components of nature and understanding their importance and striving to respect these aspects (Lysack, 2010; Rabb, 2017).
It is the well-being of these relationships that creates and sustains life on this planet.
Environmental degradation and climate change is resulting in a loss of a species and altered landscapes, and thus is a pivotal, precipitating factor in the migrant crisis.
Understanding these connections and trying to address aspects of the biophysical context through a biophilia framework allows us to more critically analyze and mitigate the migrant crisis.
As a prime example, water is often referred to biologically as an inanimate aspect, yet, water is life.
Humans rely on water for our personal consumption, and without it would surely die within a few days (Packer, 2002).
Communities rely on water for our agriculture, household needs, and countless other purposes.
In addition, water provides a context for life for many species, and water in many forms of weather slowly and dramatically shapes Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1029 and reshapes landscapes.
Global changes to the environment severely affect seawater and air temperatures, creating glacial melting and creating a significant sea level rise over the past century (Garner, 2015).
Shifts in ocean currents and large weather events off continental coastlines have major impacts including hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons.
These storms can have a dramatic impact from heavy rainfall, flooding, storm water surges, and high winds, even if they do not make landfall.
Such events not only harm human and other forms of life, but also alter the entire ecosystem and physical space, many times creating the need for environmental migration.
Humans have always oriented themselves by establishing a direct, personal, and communal relationships to places in the landscapes with which they have interacted (Cajete, 1999).
It is the well-being of these relationships that can sustain or denigrate life on this planet.
While the biophilia framework embraces the connection of people to place and the nature, inclusive of all life (Besthorn & Saleeby, 2003), indigenous biophilia, further explicates and emphasizes these links while also adding the additional layers of oppression and power dynamics across culture, place, and nature (Cajete, 1999).
Through an indigenous biophilia lens, complex change systems can be embraced.
For example, indigenous biophilia knowledge is increasingly acknowledged “as valuable for adaptation to climate change” (Williams & Hardison, 2013, p. 531); there is some concern, however, about humankind’s ability to adapt are strained given how rapid the changes are occurring (McLean, 2010).
Indigenous biophilia knowledge, in recognizing the link of people with place, nature, community, and tradition (Cajete, 1999), promotes respect for human and other than human and mindfulness when creating change, even small changes, as they can have drastic consequences for the entire ecosystem.
The cultural activities, traditions, and stories of one’s own community reflect the context for social and environmental relationships (Cajete, 1999).
The specifics are understood in relation to the whole, and the principles are experienced within everyday circumstances (Kawagley & Barnhart, 1999).
Indigenous biophilia sets the framework for ecological transformation (Cajete, 1999) as well as a context for exploring tribal oppression and engaging resistance (Norgaard & Reed, 2017).
Decline in the natural world is related to social and political disruptions (Colomeda, 1999; Norgaard & Reed, 2017), in turn creating more environmental migrants.
Engaging Complex Change Systems Approaching environmental migration, and the overarching global migrant crisis as a wicked problem highlights the complexity of the issues, challenging us to think beyond simplistic uni-dimensional interventions.
Without embracing a holistic overview, the need to engage in complex, transformative processes and systems of change can be glanced over (Bradshaw, 2009).
Vulnerable and marginalized prior to migration, individuals, families, and communities seeking refuge too often face additional struggles as their safety and status is further marginalized on the journey.
Thus, the global migrant crisis requires multipronged systems of response that are inclusive of the collective and individual voice of the migrants.
While environmental migrants confront unique risks as historically marginalized groups, they also present individual and collective strengths such as agency, resilience, and the potential for healing (Weng & Lee, 2016).
ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1030 The power for collective healing should not be overlooked in developing systems of response to the migrant crisis.
Social healing and resilience can be built in communities experiencing sustained violence (Lederach & Lederach, 2010).
The building of resilience is linked to strengths, temperament, and environmental context (Hutchinson, Stuart, & Pretorius, 2010) with studies highlighting the importance of social connection for building community resilience (Ellis & Abdi, 2017).
The agency and power of environmental migrants is recognized and becomes a base for empowerment thru policy action: "The meaningful participation of immigrants and refugees in challenging immigration and labor policies is in itself a path toward healing" (Deepak, 2018, p. 120).
Gendered risk factors and the promotion of healing through the empowering quality of collective resistance can be analyzed through the lens of postcolonial feminism (Deepak, 2018), which is inclusive of the voices of indigenous women and critical reflection of racial domination (Spurlin, 2010).
The postcolonial feminist perspective provides a framework for rethinking “the risk factors for poor mental health as embedded in oppressive structural, historical, and political factors rather than solely in individual experiences" (Deepak, 2018, p. 120).
Response processes and systems with environmental migrants that focus on deficits, dependency, and models of helplessness negate the potential impact of collective agency in the change process (Weng & Lee, 2016).
The experiences and transnational context facing immigrants impact health and mental health promoting or compromising mental health (Deepak, 2018).
These factors impact the individual and collective resilience reinforcing the need for community leadership.
Community Embedded Healing Communities are sites for collective action, holding the potential to function as spaces for transformative change.
Through collaborative community development, individual and communal issues can be interconnected creating the potential to support holistic models of sustainable change (Orr, 2004).
While the meaning of community varies widely at the local and global levels, community remains the context for organizing, developing, and changing social, economic, and political systems (Gamble & Weil, 2010).
"Neighborhood and community organizing takes place when people have face-to-face contact with each other, allowing them to feel connected to a place" (Gamble & Weil, 2010, p. 122).
Communities are rich in the resources necessary for healing and recreating home, offering with the possibility for supporting sustainable development and addressing climate change.
The impact of the Greenbelt Movement (Merton & Dater, 2008) as the beginning process for community development provides lessons on community and environmental healing.
Within the indigenous biophilia framework, it is understood that community and environmental healing and sustainability, at the local and global levels, depends on respect for and maintenance of the Earth’s ecosystems, which forms the basis for the wellbeing of current and future generations (Cajete, 1999; Kellert & Wilson, 1995; Lysack, 2010; Rabb, 2017; Sustainable Human, 2014).
Healing is facilitated when collective narratives are explored and respected.
Storytelling can be used at the community level to develop and redevelop narrative.
The voice of environmental migrants can be recognized and empowered through storytelling and narrative.
Through storytelling, processes of change are envisioned and supported Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1031 (Senehi, 2002).
With the rise in nationalism across the globe, engaging the narrative becomes even more important.
Anti-immigrant sentiments set the stage for the development of a negative context, increasing the risk of trauma in adjustment.
Through story and empowering, strength-focused narrative can be highlighted while negative messages are contextualized and deflated.
Connecting with our own or others' stories of strength and resilience in the face of social upheaval, war, and trauma can be an antidote to what might otherwise be the internalization of a sense of powerlessness, depression, fear, or even shame.
(Senehi et al., 2009, p. 90) Storytelling gives voice to the unique experience of intergroup and cross group conflict.
It can also give voice to processes and pathways to change toward a place of peace (Senehi, 2002), and transformative change based in community narrative.
The transformative change required to create sustainable communities that engage social, economic, political, and environmental justice requires a shift.
Remediation and the building of resilience requires identifying strengths in individuals, families, and communities and mobilizing collective action through policy, advocacy, and/or community organizing.
The intersection of human systems, the ecology and physical space, and other wildlife creates a juncture for healing.
As bell hooks (2008) reminds us through her storytelling, there is healing power through connection to the earth.
In Belonging: A Culture of Place, hooks (2008) visualizes the mountains as the context of a sustainable and lush ecology, creating a love and warmth for deep connection to natural surroundings.
She highlights a sense of belonging embedded in the natural ecology, and a deep connection with place-the “culture of place”.
hooks (2008) demonstrates a biophilia framework as she points out how nature becomes a teacher and healer if we listen.
Through such a biophilia framework, we reconnect to the true position of human life within the context of nature, and thus are able to explore and engage in related healing processes that have been lost in modern life.
For example, when Muslim refugees from Somalia came to Lewiston, Maine in 2001, they were welcomed by some residents and feared by others because of their race and religion (Ellison, 2009).
Lewiston was a decaying former mill town with large homes, low crime, and decent schools.
Initially the level of hostility toward this new population rose.
The new members of the community along with their allies stood non-violently in the face of violence.
Over the years, they have built community businesses, rejuvenated the economy and the community, and connected to the land through farming.
Their connection to the land and skills for farming have been shared as they build a new community embedded in place highlighting the link across community, biophilia, and identity.
Similarly, Litfin (2014) underscores the link between community and sustainability as she explores the power of ecovillages across the globe.
These communities create healing and sustainability as they operate at the juncture of the economic, ecological, and political context, particularly accounting for the significance of local control.
The value of regaining the lost connection with nature has the potential to help create a better life (hooks, 2008).
We are challenged by hooks to consider the ways it is possible to live in a sustainable manner.
ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1032 Making peace with the earth we make the world a place where we can be one with nature.
We create and sustain environments where we can come back to ourselves, where we can return home, stand on solid ground, and be a true witness.
(hooks, 2008, pp.
25-26) When she gives voice to a type of healing and peace that stops the exploitation of our earth, she pays tribute to the flora and fauna and the way all our lives are interconnected.
Social Work: Interdisciplinary Partner As social work looks to address the global migrant crisis and mitigate environmental migration, we can be leaders in addressing the root problems of climate change and environmental degradation.
If we are to promote sustainable communities and environments and support the resettlement of environmental migrants who have no hope of returning to their home, then it is critical that social workers who have not yet joined the professional agenda, be trained to work alongside those social workers who have taken up the fight to address the climate crisis.
Social workers seeking to address the migrant crisis, by working as partners who engage in response systems alongside other professional disciplines and community members can help highlight the interconnections to the climate crisis.
Social work is a profession that operates in the nexus of multiple systems and disciplines, making it particularly well poised to address environmental migration as one piece of the complex migrant crisis.
Social workers, trained to work across disciplines and within a collaboratively global context, bring a unique lens to practice in communities struggling with climate change and inadequate resources, such as those touched by the migrant crisis.
These response systems can range from prevention and mitigation to resettlement and relief efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation.
Social workers can also bring critical questions to the dialogue, such as: How does climate change and environmental degradation compound factors faced by vulnerable/marginalized people and communities?
What ripple effects have been created by environmental migrants on their families, communities of origin, communities of resettlement, the ecosystem as a whole?
Social workers also have the knowledge and training for building the relationships needed to support environmental migrants in the building of capacity for empowerment, action, the forging of new links, and the establishing of working within relationships with a respect for differences.
The profession has a rich history of working with communities as they form and re-form.
Social work professionals can be a part of the capacity building that develops as groups move beyond intergroup and intragroup conflict to dialogue that explores multiple perspectives.
As part of a multi-pronged response system for the migrant crisis and the related climate crisis, university-community collaborations can enrich the development by bringing together resources for the benefit of all.
In addition, social workers enrich community/university coalitions (Schmitz, Matyók, Sloan, & James, 2012), bringing resources to the work in community.
The biological and physical sciences have an extensive base of knowledge in the environmental sciences that focus on climate change; the social and human sciences have Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1033 tended to lag behind (Schmitz, Stinson, & James, 2010).
This is shifting as the need for integrated responses to address the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on human communities and their social, economic, and political systems is being recognized.
Besthorn and Saleeby (2003) underscore the alignment of social work with the biophilia framework.
The indigenous biophilic framework is even more closely aligned with social work as it incorporates not only nature and place, but also community, oppression, and power dynamics (Cajete, 1999).
Social workers and social work education are increasingly turning a focus toward recognizing climate change and environmental degradation and the related environmental injustices as having a major impact on human communities.
Expanding to take an ecosystems perspective provides a framework for students to engage in practice the recognizes the adverse impact of climate change and environmental degradation (Schmitz et al., 2010) and the connections to the migrant crisis.
Further complicating the issues is the tendency for professional disciplines to educate students in silos, poorly prepared for interdisciplinary responses (Orr, 2011).
New methods are called for as we delve into problems which are multi-faceted by definition (Brown et al., 2010) The complex and multilayered concerns of the migrant crisis cut across disciplines requiring education inclusive of the social and natural sciences, as well as indigenous knowledge.
While Western science and education tend to emphasize compartmentalized, decontextualized knowledge, indigenous peoples have traditionally acquired knowledge through direct experience with the natural environment (Kawagley & Barnhart, 1999).
Williams and Hardison (2013) call for bringing scientists and indigenous peoples together to collaborate and exchange knowledge" (p. 531).
“Our incapacity to deal with wicked problems...is related to their complexity, to the compartmentalization of scientific and professional knowledge” (Lawrence, 2010, p, 16).
In addressing this shortcoming, it is important to integrate “the work of the academic disciplines with other forms of knowledge” (Lawrence, 2010, p. 17) through transdisciplinary inquiry and response, which we will use here as synonymous with interdisciplinary.
Trandisciplinarity "is taken here to be the collective understanding of an issue; it is created by including the personal, the local and the strategic; as well as specialized contributions to knowledge" (Brown et al., 2010, p. 4).
Thus, social workers operating with interdisciplinary partners have the experience and knowledge to be leaders in addressing the push toward and consequences of environmental migration at home, in transition, and upon resettlement.
Conclusion As a profession, social work is mandated by our Global Agenda to promote community and environmental sustainability while also advocating for social and economic equality, the dignity and worth of all peoples, and attending to the importance of human relationships (IASSW, ICSW, & IFSW, 2012).
We are increasingly recognizing our interdisciplinary partnership role to become leaders in addressing the wicked problems of the climate crisis and the migrant crisis.
Although we acknowledge that social work is addressing these issues of the migrant crisis, it is often done separately from addressing the intersecting issues of the climate crisis.
Caught at the nexus of climate change and environmental deterioration, environmental migrants lack adequate support because the intersection is not ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1034 recognized and validated.
There are increasing numbers of social workers who do embrace the urgent need to address the climate crisis in their work, we are calling attention to the need to further train and encourage social workers to highlight the voices and needs of environmental migrants experiencing the impact of the climate crisis (Powers, 2016); climate change is the precipitating and compounding factor for the migration crisis.
In addition to working to mitigate climate change issues that cause displacement, helping rebuild and reestablish people in their homes of origin, promoting individual and community healing, and assisting with resettlement and building new lives, social workers can also be advocates to change the policies and laws to include environmental issues as justification for refugee status and thus increased aid.
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals provides a framework through which we can increase our interdisciplinary responses as we work on climate advocacy and action, and address environmental migration.
For example, social workers can help to mitigate environmental degradation and climate change by working to reduce toxins and promote clean water and sanitation, or working with urban planners to mitigate risks for vulnerable populations in case of disaster.
In order to address environmental migration, social workers must engage in complex change systems which are holistic, multi-pronged, and inclusive of the biophysical environment and an indigenous biophilia framework and environmental migrants’ voices and strengths.
Understanding these connections and trying to address aspects of the biophysical context through an indigenous biophilia framework allows us to more critically analyze and mitigate the migrant crisis.
Only then, can we hope to move forward, and address environmental migration.
References Alston, M. (2013).
Environmental social work: Accounting for gender in climate disasters.
Australian Social Work, 66(2), 218-233. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/0312407X.2012.738366 Atkin, E. (2017, September 20).
Even before Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico was already in environmental despair: A public health crisis looms.
Retrieved October 07, 2017, from https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2017/09/climatedesk-nowhammered-by-hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-was-already-in-environmental-despair/ Balint, P. J., Stewart, R. E., Desai, A., & Walters, L.C.
(2011).
Wicked environmental problems: Managing uncertainty and conflict.
DC: Island Press.
doi: https://doi.org/10.5822/978-1-61091-047-7 Besthorn, F. H., & Meyer, E. (2010).
Environmentally displaced persons: Broadening social work’s helping imperative.
Critical Social Work, 11(3), 123-138.
Retrieved from http://www1.uwindsor.ca/criticalsocialwork/sites/uwindsor.ca.criticalsocialwork/files /coates_8_pdf.pdf Besthorn, F. H., & Saleeby, D. (2003).
Nature, genetics, and the biophilia connection: Exploring linkages with social work values and practice.
Advances in Social Work, 4(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/0312407X.2012.738366 https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2017/09/climatedesk-now-hammered-by-hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-was-already-in-environmental-despair/ https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2017/09/climatedesk-now-hammered-by-hurricane-maria-puerto-rico-was-already-in-environmental-despair/ https://doi.org/10.5822/978-1-61091-047-7 http://www1.uwindsor.ca/criticalsocialwork/sites/uwindsor.ca.criticalsocialwork/files/coates_8_pdf.pdf http://www1.uwindsor.ca/criticalsocialwork/sites/uwindsor.ca.criticalsocialwork/files/coates_8_pdf.pdf Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1035 Black, R., Adger, W., Arnell, N. W., Dercon, S., Geddes, A., & Thomas, D. (2011).
The effect of environmental change on human migration.
Global Environmental Change, 21(1), S3-S11.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.10.001 Bradshaw, T. K. (2009).
Theories of poverty and anti-poverty programs in community development.
Community Development, 38(1), 7-25. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/15575330709490182 Brown, O.
(2008).
Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications.
Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world.
Retrieved October 22, 2016, from https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/climate_forced_migration.pdf Brown, V. A.
(2010).
Collective inquiry and its wicked problems.
In V. A.
Brown, J.
A. Harris, & J. Y. Russell (Eds.
), Tackling wicked problems: Through the transdisciplinary imagination (pp.
61-83).
New York: Earthscan.
Brown, V. A., Deane, P. M., Harris, J.
A., & Russell, J. Y.
(2010).
In V. A.
Brown, J.
A. Harris, & J. Y. Russell (Eds.
), Tackling wicked problems: Through the transdisciplinary imagination (pp.
3-15).
New York: Earthscan.
Cajete, G. (1999).
Reclaiming biophilia: Lessons from Indigenous people.
In G. A. Smith & D. R. Williams (Eds.
), Ecological education in action: On weaving education, culture, and the environment (pp.
189-206).
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Canty, J. M.
(Ed.).
(2017).
Ecological and social healing: Multicultural women's voices.
New York: Routledge.
Colomeda, L.A.L.
(1999).
Keepers of the central fire: Issues of ecology for Indigenous people.
Sudsbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett.
Cook, J., Oreskes, N., Doran, P. T., Anderegg, W. R. L., Verheggen, B., Maibach, E. W….Rice, K. (2016).
Consensus on consensus: A synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming.
Environmental Research Letters, 11(4), 1-7. doi: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002 Council on Social Work Education [CSWE].
(2015).
Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards and Glossary.
Alexandria, VA: Author.
Retrieved from https://www.cswe.org/getattachment/Accreditation/Standards-and-Policies/2015EPAS/2015EPASandGlossary.pdf.aspx Deepak, A. C. (2018).
Postcolonial feminist social work perspective: Additional considerations for immigrant and refugee populations.
In A. Hilado & M. Lundy (Eds.
), Models for practice with immigrants and refugees: Collaboration, cultural awareness, and integrative theory (pp.
113-124).
Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Devore, W., & Schlesinger, E. G. (1998).
Ethnic-sensitive social work practice (5th ed.).
Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.10.001 https://doi.org/10.1080/15575330709490182 https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/climate_forced_migration.pdf https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002 https://www.cswe.org/getattachment/Accreditation/Standards-and-Policies/2015-EPAS/2015EPASandGlossary.pdf.aspx https://www.cswe.org/getattachment/Accreditation/Standards-and-Policies/2015-EPAS/2015EPASandGlossary.pdf.aspx ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1036 Drolet, J.
(2017).
Forced migration and the lived experiences of refugees.
In M. Rinkel & M. Powers (Eds.
), Social work promoting community and environmental sustainability: A workbook for social work practitioners and educators (pp.192-201).
Switzerland: International Federation of Social Work [IFSW].
Retrieved from http://ifsw.org/product/books/social-work-promoting-community-and-environmentalsustainability-free-pdf/ Ellis, H. B., & Abdi, S. (2017).
Building community resilience to violent extremism through genuine partnerships.
American Psychologist, 72(3), 289-300. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000065 Ellison, J.
(2009, January 16).
The refugees who saved Lewiston.
Newsweek Magazine.
Retrieved from https://www.newsweek.com/lewiston-maine-revived-somaliimmigrants-78475.
Gamble, D. N., & Weil, M. (2010).
Community practice skills: Local to global.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Garner, R. (2015, August 26).
Warming seas, melting ice sheets.
Retrieved October 04, 2017, from https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/warming-seas-and-melting-icesheets hooks, b.
(2008).
Belonging: A culture of place.
Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.
Hutchinson, A-M. K., Stuart, A. D., & Pretorius, H. G. (2010).
Biological contributions to well-being: The relationships amongst temperament, character strengths and resilience.
South African Journal of Industrial Psychology, 36(2), 1-10. doi: https://doi.org/10.4102/sajip.v36i2.844 International Association of Schools of Social Work, International Council on Social Welfare, and International Federation of Social Workers [IASSW, ICSW, & IFSW].
(2012).
The global agenda for social work and social development: Commitment to action.
Retrieved November 17, 2015, http://cdn.ifsw.org/assets/globalagenda2012.pdf IFSW.
(2017).
High level political forum 2017, United Nations, New York Workshop to promote Social Workers Role for reaching the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Retrieved September 4, 2017, from http://ifsw.org/news/high-level-politicalforum-2017-united-nations-new-york-workshop-to-promote-social-workers-role-forreaching-the-sustainable-development-goals-sdgs/ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].
(2015).
Climate change 2014: Mitigation of climate change: Summary for policymakers.
Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg3/WGIIIAR5_SPM_TS_Volume.pdf International Organization for Migration [IOM].
(2015).
Terminology on migration, environment and climate change.
In IOM outlook on migration, environment and climate change (pp.
21-24).
NY: UN Publications.
doi: https://doi.org/10.18356/14b2ac9d-en http://ifsw.org/product/books/social-work-promoting-community-and-environmental-sustainability-free-pdf/ http://ifsw.org/product/books/social-work-promoting-community-and-environmental-sustainability-free-pdf/ https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000065 https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/warming-seas-and-melting-ice-sheets https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/warming-seas-and-melting-ice-sheets https://doi.org/10.4102/sajip.v36i2.844 http://cdn.ifsw.org/assets/globalagenda2012.pdf http://ifsw.org/news/high-level-political-forum-2017-united-nations-new-york-workshop-to-promote-social-workers-role-for-reaching-the-sustainable-development-goals-sdgs/ http://ifsw.org/news/high-level-political-forum-2017-united-nations-new-york-workshop-to-promote-social-workers-role-for-reaching-the-sustainable-development-goals-sdgs/ http://ifsw.org/news/high-level-political-forum-2017-united-nations-new-york-workshop-to-promote-social-workers-role-for-reaching-the-sustainable-development-goals-sdgs/ https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/WGIIIAR5_SPM_TS_Volume.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/WGIIIAR5_SPM_TS_Volume.pdf https://doi.org/10.18356/14b2ac9d-en Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1037 IOM.
(2018a).
Definitional issues.
Retrieved June 15, 2017, from https://www.iom.int/definitional-issues IOM.
(2018b.).
Migration and climate change: What are the estimates?
Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change-0 Kawagley, A., & Barnhart, R. (1999).
Education indigenous to place: Western science meets Native reality.
In G. A. Smith & R. W. Dilafruz (Eds.
), Ecological education in action: On weaving education, culture, and the environment (pp.
117-140).
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Kellert, S. R., & Wilson, E. O.
(Eds.).
(1995).
The biophilia hypothesis (reissue ed.).
DC: Shearwater/Island Press.
Kelley, C. P., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M. A., Seager, R., & Kushnir, Y.
(2015).
Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(11), 3241-3246. doi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1421533112 Kolko, J.
(2012).
Wicked problems: Problems worth solving.
Austin, TX: Austin Center for Design.
Lawrence, R. J.
(2010).
Beyond disciplinary confinement to imaginative transdisciplinarity.
In V.A.
Brown, J.A.
Harris, & J.Y.
Russell.
Tackling wicked problems: Through the transdisciplinary imagination (pp.
16-30).
New York: Earthscan.
Lederach, J. P., & Lederach, A. J.
(2010).
When blood and bones cry out: Journeys through the soundscape of healing and reconciliation.
Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Lie, G.-Y., & Lowery, C. T. (2003).
Cultural competence with women of color.
In D. Lum (Ed.
), Culturally competent practice: A framework for understanding diverse groups and justice issues (2nd ed., pp.
282-309).
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Litfin, K. T. (2014).
Ecovillages: Lessons for sustainable community.
United Kingdom: Polity Press.
Lysack, M. (2010).
Environmental decline, loss, and biophilia: Fostering commitment in environmental citizenship.
Critical Social Work, 11(3), 48-66.
Maathai, W. (2003).
The Green belt movement: Sharing the approach and the experience.
New York, NY: Lantern Books.
Maathai, W. (2004).
Wangari Maathai Nobel Lecture.
Retrieved from www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2004/maathai-lecture-text.html McLean, K. G. (2010).
Advance guard: Climate change impacts, adaptation.
Mitigation and Indigenous Peoples.
NY: United Nations University.
Merton, L., & Dater, A.
(Producers and Directors).
(2008).
Taking root: The vision of Wangari Maathai [DVD].
United States: Marlboro Productions.
https://www.iom.int/definitional-issues https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change-0 https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change-0 https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change-0 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=5593 https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_1?ie=UTF8&text=Stephen+R.+Kellert&search-alias=books&field-author=Stephen+R.+Kellert&sort=relevancerank https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_2?ie=UTF8&text=Edward+O.+Wilson&search-alias=books&field-author=Edward+O.+Wilson&sort=relevancerank https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1421533112 https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/1202703 https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/1202703 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2004/maathai-lecture-text.html ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1038 Norgaard, K.M., & Reed, R. (2017).
Emotional impacts of environmental decline: What can Native cosmologies teach sociology about emotions and environmental justice.
Theory and Society, 46, 463-495. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9302-6 Opido, G., Odwe, G., Oulu, M., & Omollo, E. (2017).
Migration as adaptation to environmental and climate change: The case of Kenya.
Kenya: IOM.
Orr, D. W. (2004).
Earth in mind: On education, environment, and the human prospect.
DC: Island Press.
Orr, D. W. (2011).
Down to the wire: Confronting climate collapse.
Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Packer, R. K. (2002).
How long can the average person survive without water?
Retrieved October 04, 2017, from https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-long-canthe-average/ Parry, M., Canziani, O., Palutikof, J., Linden, P. V., & Hanson, C. (2007).
Climate change 2007 impacts, adaptations and vulnerability.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf Powers, M. C. F. (2016).
Transforming the profession: Social workers’ expanding response to the environmental crisis.
In A.-L. Matthies & K. Narhi (Eds.
), Ecosocial transition of societies: Contribution of social work and social policy.
New York: Routledge.
Powers, M. C. F., & Nsonwu, C. (in press).
Environmental injustices faced by resettled refugees: Housing policies and community development.
In R. Hugman, J. R. Drolet, J.
& S. Todd (Eds.)
Community practice and social development in social work: Major research works.
NSW, AUS: Springer Nature.
Rabb, H. (2017).
Sustainable wellbeing and social work with children: Promoting our connectedness with nature through NatureAssisted interventions.
In M. Rinkel & M. Powers (Eds.
), Social work promoting community and environmental sustainability: A workbook for social work practitioners and educators (pp.
133145).
Switzerland: IFSW.
Retrieved from http://ifsw.org/product/books/social-workpromoting-community-and-environmental-sustainability-free-pdf/ Reuters and The Associated Press.
(2017, April 16).
Hundreds feared buried in Sri Lanka rubbish dump landslide.
Retrieved October 06, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/16/hundreds-feared-buried-in-srilanka-rubbish-dump-landslide Schmitz, C. L., Matyók, T., Sloan, L., & James, C. D. (2012).
The relationship between social work and environmental sustainability: Implications for interdisciplinary practice.
International Journal of Social Work, 21(3), 278-286. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2397.2011.00855.x https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9302-6 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-long-can-the-average/ https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-long-can-the-average/ https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf http://ifsw.org/product/books/social-work-promoting-community-and-environmental-sustainability-free-pdf/ http://ifsw.org/product/books/social-work-promoting-community-and-environmental-sustainability-free-pdf/ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/16/hundreds-feared-buried-in-sri-lanka-rubbish-dump-landslide https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/16/hundreds-feared-buried-in-sri-lanka-rubbish-dump-landslide https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2397.2011.00855.x Powers et al./ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 1039 Schmitz, C. L., Stinson, C. H., & James, C. D. (2010).
Community and environmental sustainability: Collaboration and interdisciplinary education.
Critical Social Work, 11(3), 83-100.
Schmitz, C. L., Vazquez Jacobus, M., Stakeman, C., Valenzuela, G., & Sprankel, J.
(2003).
Immigrant and refugee communities: Resiliency, trauma, and social work practice.
Social Thought, 22(2/3), 135-158. doi: https://doi.org/10.1300/J131v22n02_10 Senehi, J.
(2002).
Constructive storytelling: A peace process.
Peace and Conflict Studies, 9(2), 41-63.
Senehi, J., Flaherty, M., Kirupakaran, C. S., Kornelsen, L., Matenge, M., & Skarlato, O.
(2009).
Dreams of our grandmothers: Discovering the call for social justice through storytelling.
Storytelling, self, society: An interdisciplinary journal of storytelling studies, 5(2), 90-106.
Soylu, A., & Buchanon, T. A.
(2013).
Ethnic and racial discrimination against immigrants.
Journal of Business and Economics, 4(9), 8548-858l.
Spurlin, W. J.
(2010).
Resisting heteronormativity/resisting recolonisation: Affective bonds between indigenous women in southern Africa and the difference(s) of postcolonial feminist history.
Feminist Review, 95(95), 10-26. doi: https://doi.org/10.1057/fr.2009.56 Strides in Development.
(2010, July 9).
Wangari Maathai & the green belt movement.
[Video file].
Retrieved from https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=BQU7JoxkGvo Sustainable Human.
(2014, February 13).
How wolves change rivers.
Retrieved October 07, 2017, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysa5OBhXz-Q Taylor, M. (2017, November 2).
Climate change 'will create world's biggest refugee crisis.
The Guardian.
Retrieved February 1, 2018, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-createworlds-biggest-refugee-crisis UN Environment.
(2016).
Annual report 2016: Engaging people to protect the planet.
Retrieved from https://www.unenvironment.org/annualreport/2016/?page=0&lang=en United Nations High Commission on Refugees [UNHCR].
(2009).
Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective.
Retrieved from www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html UNHCR.
(2016, November 6).
Frequently asked questions on climate change and disaster displacement.
Retrieved June 15, 2017, from http://www.unhcr.org/enus/news/latest/2016/11/581f52dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-changedisaster-displacement.html) UN Trust Fund for Human Security.
(n.d.).
Human security: Building resilience to climate threats.
Retrieved October 4, 2017, from https://doi.org/10.1300/J131v22n02_10 https://doi.org/10.1057/fr.2009.56 https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=BQU7JoxkGvo%20%20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysa5OBhXz-Q https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis https://www.unenvironment.org/annualreport/2016/?page=0&lang=en http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/11/581f52dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-change-disaster-displacement.html http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/11/581f52dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-change-disaster-displacement.html http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/11/581f52dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-change-disaster-displacement.html ADVANCES IN SOCIAL WORK, Spring 2018, 18(3) 1040 https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Human-Securityand-Climate-Change-Policy-Brief-1.pdf United Nations Women Watch.
(2009).
Women, gender equality and climate change.
Retrieved October 4, 2017, from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/downloads/Women_and_Cli mate_Change_Factsheet.pdf Watkins, A., & Wilber, K. (2015).
Wicken & wise: How to solve the world’s toughest problems.
Great Britain: Urbane Publications.
Welch, C. (2015, March 02).
Climate change helped spark Syrian War, study says.
Retrieved September 28, 2017, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/03/150302-syria-war-climatechange-drought/ Weng, S. S., & Lee, J. S. (2016).
Why do immigrants and refugees give back to their communities and what can we learn from their civic engagement?
VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(2), 509-524. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9636-5 Williams, T., & Hardison, P. (2013).
Culture, law, risk and governance: Contexts of traditional knowledge in climate change, 120(3), 531-544.
Wilson, E. O.
(1984).
Biophilia.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Author note: Address correspondence to: Meredith C.F.
Powers, PhD, Department of Social Work, School of Health and Human Sciences, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 259 Stone Building, Greensboro, NC 27402-6170.
MCFPowers@uncg.edu https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Human-Security-and-Climate-Change-Policy-Brief-1.pdf https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Human-Security-and-Climate-Change-Policy-Brief-1.pdf http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/downloads/Women_and_Climate_Change_Factsheet.pdf http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/downloads/Women_and_Climate_Change_Factsheet.pdf http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/03/150302-syria-war-climate-change-drought/ http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/03/150302-syria-war-climate-change-drought/ https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9636-5 mailto:MCFPowers@uncg.edu
Microsoft Word PDF_Issue_15_1_Genovese_77-95.docx Italian Political Science, VOLUME 15 ISSUE 1, MAY 2020 © 2020 Italian Political Science.
ISSN 2420-8434.
Volume 15, Issue 1, 77-95.
Contact Author: Federica Genovese, University of Essex.
E-mail address: fgenov@essex.ac.uk Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation: Italy and global climate policy Federica Genovese UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX Abstract This paper investigates Italy's position on global climate change politics in order to explore the larger question of why this country, like similar middle powers, may adopt ambiguous positions on global public policy issues.
I start from the observation that in recent history Italy has taken a rather mild position on international climate cooperation and climate policy more broadly.
To explain this, I propose an argument in divergence with those who claim Italy has low salience in the issue or lack of interest in international climate leadership.
I put forward a political economy perspective and claim that different salient concerns motivate the domestic actors that shape the country’s international position.
I maintain that these different concerns offset each other, resulting in overall mild preferences.
I present support for my theory, zooming in on the motivations of two domestic sources of international positions: economic sectors and public opinion.
The empirical data largely corroborates the theory.
1.
Introduction he international relations literature classically studies the global policy preferences of very powerful nations (Krasner 1991) or, alternately, of states with extreme policy positions (Keohane 1971).
However, international cooperation is rarely dictated only by hegemons or outliers.
International policy is commonly centered on the preferences of middle powers (Milner 1997; Alesina, Angeloni and Etro 2005), especially when the debate pivots on public good issues where the benefits of action are diffused.
Yet, the positions of these countries remain largely understudied.
This is presumably because they are assumed to have relatively low salience for the issues at hand, and, therefore, little motivation behind the matter of discussion at international organizations.
But is it true that middle power countries – i.e.
sovereign states that are neither negligible nor a superpower – tend to adopt mild positions on global public policy issues?
If so, why?
This paper argues that the international positions of such middle powers are indeed often modest.
However, and in contrast with other views, I claim that this is not necessarily due to the low salience of international issues.
Rather, I argue that these positions are more likely due to the way salient drivers of national positions neutralize each other.
I focus my argument on one specific issue of international cooperation, climate change, which is an increasingly major focus of foreign affairs.
I maintain that international positions on climate change mitigation and adaptation are drawn on important factors at the foundations of states’ domestic political economy.
In the case of certain countries, these factors tend to offset each other and hence lead to ‘mild’ international positions.
T Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 78 I look at Italy as an example of such positioning on international climate cooperation.
Italy is an interesting geographical case, for it is a clear example of mid-sized power in the modern international world.
It is currently neither too influential nor too trivial in most international organizations, and it is generally important though not crucial in institutions such as the European Union.
With respect to international climate politics, the Italian case is relevant because the country is in the middle of the global spectrum of environmental progress.
In 2015, 16% of the country’s total energy consumption came from renewable energy1, just one percentage less than the EU average.
However, fossil fuel demand and subsidies are still significant.2 Along these lines, Italian politicians have been on the fence in terms of embracing UNFCCC targets and proposals (De Blasio, Hibberd and Sorice 2013).
So, altogether, Italy is a country with a climate action position which is neither too bleak nor too ambitious.
I empirically show how domestic motivations in Italy have offset each other and therefore diluted the country’s international positions on issues related to climate change.
For practical reasons, I concentrate on two domestic factors of climate policy largely discussed in the political economy literature: industrial sectors and public opinion.
I present evidence that, for both industries and the public opinion realm, political ambition and economic constraints counterbalance a predisposition for deep climate cooperation.
This, I argue, explains why countries like Italy have only taken ‘mild’ positions on climate change action.
The findings have implications that go beyond the study of Italy or climate change per se.
The paper’s main insight into international politics is that, for mid-sized countries that have domestic contentions (like Italy), positions on pressing global issues can be lukewarm due to the fact that opportunities and costs nullify each other.
This suggests that it is not lack of salience, but rather the neutralization of multidimensional domestic concerns that explains foreign affairs in middle powers.
More generally, the paper contributes to the knowledge on international organizations and cooperation.
Middle powers’ positions are often close to decision-making outcomes in bargaining contexts with a unanimity vote, which is the rule adopted by the United Nations and other bodies of international governance (e.g.
the Council of the European Union).
By shedding light on the motivations of middle powers and the mixed forms of salience they attach to international issues in these institutions, the paper provides food for thought for understanding the often-neglected driving forces (and hurdles) of international cooperation.
2.
Theory: the roots of mild positions on climate action and Italy’s international climate policy The global climate is a collective public good that requires coordinated international efforts.
A growing literature discusses the external reasons why countries take positions on international climate policy.
Some point to competitive peer pressure and 1 Legambiente.
2016.
‘Rapporto Comuni Rinnovabili 2015’ http://www.comunirinnovabili.it/il-rapporto-comuni-rinnovabili-2015/ 2 Support for fossil fuel consumption is slightly below the median OECD rate, although it has risen sharply since 2012.
See Climate Transparency.
2017.
‘Brown to Green.
The G20 Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy: Italy’.
https://www.climate-transparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/B2G2017-Italy.pdf.
FEDERICA GENOVESE 79 transnational norm diffusion (Dechezleprêtre, Neumayer and Perkins 2015; Fankhauser, Gennaioli and Collins 2016).
Others mention the role of alliances and joint membership in international clubs (Keohane and Victor 2011; Hovi et al.
2019).
Much of this literature finds a vital role played by countries with high salience in the focal issue of international discussion.
Often, these countries are equated to major economies (Johnson and Urpelainen 2019) or issue-relevant coalitions (Genovese 2020).
This literature, however, tends to ignore the role of internal contentions and the way governments need to balance domestic disagreements.
Differently from structural perspectives in the international relations literature, this paper takes a political economy view to explore the domestic politics behind international climate positions (Bayer and Urpelainen 2016; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Newell 2019).
A domestic political economy perspective is relevant, for it can shed more light on the distributive concerns that motivate climate positions in countries that are neither materially nor morally indispensable to international cooperation.
In other words, a domestic political economy analysis can provide insights into the motivations of countries that are otherwise assumed to have medium salience in international cooperation.3 Evidently, there are many moving elements in the domestic political economy of any country.
Here I focus on two specific factors: industries (as in, economic sectors and their respective businesses) and public opinion.
Many studies show that these both shape preferences for international policy (for a comprehensive review, see Bernauer 2013).
Recent climate politics research has also shown their complementarity (Mahlotra, Monin and Tomz 2019).
I argue that in most countries both of these sources of national positions attach salience to international climate policy.
However, in many countries each of them is respectively pulled by different motivations.
If the motivations are contradictory, business and public opinion will not have a coherent effect on national positions on the climate.
Consequently, under mixed internal incentives national governments will more likely settle on timid international positions on climate policy.
I claim these dynamics are observable in the Italian case, as per below.
With respect to industries, I expect that economic businesses are confronted with a basic ‘trade-environment’ friction, according to which unconstrained trade is a propeller of profits and innovation, while the environment is a source of costs (Aklin 2014).
Along these lines, two fundamental dimensions in which businesses contend their power are environmental effectiveness and economic constraints (the latter intended here through the lenses of free trade).
Depending on how these two dimensions intersect, businesses may win or lose from international climate regulations, and therefore keep their governments accountable to a particular international position.
Companies that are both environmentally efficient (i.e., clean) and economically unconstrained (i.e., exposed to international trade) tend to be the winners of climate regulations (Meckling 2015; Genovese 2019).
These businesses have incentives to lobby for meaningful climate cooperation because they are more likely to profit from it.
3 To be sure, it is plausible that the domestic political economy of a country is shaped by international phenomena and institutions.
In the case of Italy, it is equally plausible that the nation’s economic and political preferences are the result of coordination among other European countries.
While I do not exclude the EU influence on Italian climate policy stands, I remain agnostic of this effect in this paper.
Instead, to avoid measuring on EU-level positions, I try to trace data that is as nationally focused, i.e.
notEU dependent, as far as possible.
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 80 Consequently, countries with a high density of these ‘climate champions’ should have rather uncontroversial, clear-cut positive attitudes towards deep climate cooperation.
Vice versa, if an economic sector is both environmentally inefficient and economically profiting from unconstrained free trade, businesses regard international climate policy as a hurdle, because of the scale of adjustment this requires.
Consequently, countries with a high density of these ‘climate laggards’ should be clearly resentful of climate cooperation (Genovese 2019).
Evidently, these two types of businesses may not be the most common ones.
If environmental ambition and economic constraints are somewhat mixed, the country’s position would also fall in between.
In the case of Italy, I expect to observe several industrial sectors and businesses with such mixed motivations: some globally trading industries that are inefficient in terms of greenhouse gas contribution and, vice versa, some industrial sectors that are environmentally sustainable but not fully scaled up on international trade.
This contention is one possible way to reconcile the country’s willingness to be both an economic leader and an environmentally responsible actor at international organizations (Padovani 2010).4 With respect to public opinion, a similar environment-economics nexus can be expected to be at work and, thus, put similar pressure on the national government.
On the one hand, the average citizen in virtually any country should appreciate environmental sustainability – either because of its intrinsic value or its relevance for economic livelihood (Kolstad 2014).
On the other hand, economic constraints due to the easiness of diverting material resources and investing funds in the environment should affect citizens’ positions on climate.
Amongst financially resourceful people that place a lot of value on the environment, ambitious climate policy should be a clear, positive opinion.
Vice versa, amongst poor people with little attachment to the environment, climate policy would be a second-order consideration at best.
But if these two considerations are mixed, public opinion should also be torn.
This mixed opinion on international climate policy is what I expect to observe amongst the Italian public.
Italy is a country with many natural resources and several nature-dependent industries (agriculture, but also tourism, which in 2019 corresponded to 13 percent of the Italian GDP).
Also, one third of Italians in 2018 lived outside of cities, in direct contact with natural land (Romano et al 2017).
Also, a large number of jobs are sensitive to a functional natural environment, either because of their vulnerability to the integrity of the ecosystem (Egan and Mullin 2011) or because of the direct link between job concerns and preferences for climate policy (Bechtel, Genovese and Scheve 2019).
In light of these considerations, it is reasonable to expect the average Italian to attach significant saliency to the issue of climate policy.
At the same time, Italy is a financially constrained country with little wiggle room for investments outside of core economic areas.
Especially since the recent financial crisis, a great deal of climate policy discussion in Italy – and other Southern European countries – has focused on the (in)capacity to ramp up current standards of climate action (McCrigh, Dunlap and Marquatt-Pyatt 2016).
We know from other public opinion research that this 4 In the paper I exchange the use of words ‘businesses’ and ‘sectors’, assuming that the latter are an aggregation of the former (Genovese 2019).
In the interest of space, I limit my attention to some selected sectors.
As I show later in the empirics, I focus on agriculture and mining.
FEDERICA GENOVESE 81 type of material consideration is very effective in taming preferences for climate cooperation (Bechtel and Scheve 2013).
Along these lines, Italy’s austerity-minded technocratic governments in 2011-12 contributed to people believing that the EU should not increase its emissions reduction target for 2020 beyond the existing 20% (Skovgaard 2014).
This insight suggests that Italy’s public opinion should be split between the political interest to act on climate and economic concerns related to the capacity to act on climate.
I expect these considerations to co-exist and to be equally meaningful, hence justifying why countries like Italy remain mildly interested in pushing for bold international climate positions and cooperation.
3.
Empirical evidence In broad terms, my theoretical argument suggests that competing political economy motivations can drive climate policy preferences in directions, diluting each other and essentially settling countries on ‘mild’ international different climate positions.
In what follows I show empirical evidence in support of this mixed incentives argument.
First, I focus on the interests of some selected Italian economic sectors.
Combining descriptive and comparative data, I show how the burden of pollution abatement and the benefit of trade openness offset their respective effect on the country’s international climate positions.
Second, I concentrate on the mixed interests in Italy’s public opinion; employing a regression analysis, I show how interests in climate politics and concerns with economic capacity have counterbalancing effects on individuals’ preferences for climate policy.
Inevitably, the observational data underlying these analyses is imperfect.
For example, the first empirical analysis of sectors is based on data covering the years between 2001 and 2011, while the second analysis on public opinion covers more recent years (2017 and 2019).
Despite the limitations due to data availability, I maintain that the evidence offered below indicates patterns that go in the direction of my theoretical argument.
3.1 Mixed motivations in industrial sectors With respect to industrial sectors (i.e.
businesses), the testable hypothesis derived from my theory is that ambition for environmental leadership pulls companies in one direction while economic opportunities (or constraints) dictated by free trade pull in the other direction.
Only if an economic sector is both environmentally efficient and oriented towards free trade can it then be considered a winner of international climate coordination.
Vice versa, if a sector is both environmentally inefficient (i.e., pollution intensive) and oriented towards free trade, then it would suffer the most from credible climate regulation.
If an economic sector falls in between these categories, then it sits in between climate leadership and opposition, and so the governments they lobby.
To evaluate the validity of this hypothesis for Italy, I require specific measures.
For the outcome variable, I need a systematic estimate of its international climate positions.
For the explanatory variables, I need measurements of sectors’ trade openness and environmental performance.
For both I use here a dataset presented in Genovese (2019).
The data was constructed to compare the causes and consequences of countries’ positions at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
In the interest of space, I focus on two sectors: agriculture and mining.
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 82 With regards to the outcome variable, I rely on the aggregated scores of countries’ positions in Genovese (2014; 2019).
These are based on the National Communications that national governments periodically submit to the UNFCCC.
The issue-specific positions from the National Communications were collected with a careful qualitative coding exercise for two periods of the climate negotiations, namely the meetings before the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force (2001–2004) and the post-Kyoto Protocol negotiations (2008– 2011).
The data coding followed a measurement procedure in which governments’ positions were coded for most national governments (115 countries).
Although the data are originally coded at the issue level, I estimate preferences for a broadly defined measure of global climate cooperation using an aggregated score calculated with a factor analysis.
Table 1.
Comparison of national positions on climate cooperation at the UNFCCC, 2001-2004 and 2009-2011.
Notes: the dot plots illustrate the distribution of the country scores calculated with the factor analysis of the National Communications coded in Genovese (2019).
The country scores go from less cooperative on the left to more cooperative on the right.
Dots closer to the zero empirical mean (on the x-axis) are interpreted as scores for more moderate positions.
The Italian score is highlighted in red for each of the two respective UNFCCC periods.
Figure 1 reports the country means of the main factor scores for each of the two periods covered in the dataset.
The red line highlights the relevant estimates for Italy.
The figure clearly shows what I assumed at the beginning of this paper: Italy has historically maintained a relatively modest position at UNFCCC negotiations.
One could say it is ‘spatially’ located in the middle of the cross-national distribution.
A close look indicates that Italy’s score is in the neighborhood of other developed countries.
These cluster at the top right of the scale, which can be interpreted as the more ‘cooperative’ side of the FEDERICA GENOVESE 83 distribution.
Still, Italy is next to well-known hawkish countries like the United States.
Also, if one were to account for confidence intervals (not reported here for simplicity), these would show that Italy’s position is indistinguishable from zero.
Following the theory, one way to think about the roots of Italy’s UNFCCC position is by looking at how its industrial lobbies -i.e., its sectors -score in terms of pollution costs and trade openness.
Presumably, I would find a mixed scenario to explain the mild UNFCCC positions.
For example, some of Italy’s more trade-exposed sectors are only partially sustainable, and vice versa where the more environmentally efficient sectors are not necessarily very trade dependent.
To elucidate how Italian sectors score on these two dimensions, I follow Genovese (2019) and I employ two indicators.
To capture pollution costs, I resort to sector-specific GHG volumes, which are million tons of CO2-equivalent emissions divided by the total CO2-equivalent emissions of the country.
Contrastingly, to capture trade opportunities, I use trade openness, which is calculated as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP generated by each sector.5 Figures 2 and 3 show how two main sectors – namely, agriculture and mining – fare with respect to these two measurements.
The specific measurements for Italy are highlighted with the red arrow.
With respect to agriculture (Figure 2), it is evident that Italy is relatively efficient: this sector contributes to less than a tenth of the national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (around 7%).
However, this sector is only partly involved in international trade compared to major European traders like the Netherlands and Denmark and a large number of developing countries (in Italy in 2016, agriculture accounted for 6% of all exports, contrarily to the average European agricultural sector that accounts for 10% export).
The snapshot in Figure 2 provides some illustrative support to the intuition of my argument: the efficiency of Italian farming can enjoy the benefits of stricter international climate regulation, but it is not maximized by trade.
This mixed scenario is in line with the narrative that Italy has been supportive of cooperation in some farming-related UNFCCC issues (e.g., accounting efforts of mitigation through land and forestry projects in developing countries), but has not made this a priority either within European Union talks or at international climate negotiations (Padovani 2010).
The data regarding the mining sector (Figure 3) are flipped, but essentially lead to a similar conclusion on how pollution concerns and trade opportunities can generate mixed policy positions.
On the one hand, Italy’s extraction and refining industries are among the more polluting ones in the developed world.
At the same time, this sector has relatively little exposure to the international market, mostly because it is internally sufficient, featuring small imports from foreign companies.
This low trade exposure dilutes the otherwise presumably harsh opposition that high-CO2 Italian industries would have against international climate policy.
5 See the Appendix for a more systematic definition of the variables.
See also Genovese (2014; 2019) for more details on the data sources.
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 84 Figure 2.
GHG Volume and Trade Openness of Agricultural Sectors.
Note: The dot plots illustrate the cross-national distribution of (a) relative pollution burden (measured via sectoral GHG emissions/total GHG emissions) and (b) log of trade openness (import and export exposure/GDP) for the agricultural sector (ISIC category A).
The calculations for Italy are highlighted with the red arrow.
FEDERICA GENOVESE 85 Figure 3.
GHG Volume and Trade Openness of Mining and Extraction Sectors.
Notes: The plots are equivalent to the ones in Figure 2 but for the mining and extraction sectors (ISIC category B).
The calculations for Italy are highlighted with the red arrow.
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 86 This interpretation is corroborated by the historical position that Enel has taken on climate action.
Italy’s most powerful natural gas lobby has played lip service to the climate cause, but has also been a significant user of coal, failing to set out an explicit plan for ending coal use.
That said, Enel’s concern with international climate regulation seems small because much of its market is internal, so – given its historically monopolistic role in Italy – it fears little competition in the domestic market.6 Consequently, lobbying against international policy has not been a priority.
The evidence presented here is obviously descriptive.
Other factors may be at play: for example, the leadership of institutions (e.g.
the EU) and the strategic preferences of parties involved in government may also affect the equilibrium of UNFCCC positions.
That said, and in light of the critical role of economic actors expressed in the literature, the sector-level analysis at least suggests why Italy has not shown either noteworthy support or utter refusal of some of the mining-related decisions at the UNFCCC.
Hence, the configuration of the environmental and trade dimensions for these crucial economic sectors seem to reasonably account for the neutral positions that Italy has regularly taken on international climate policy.
3.2 Mixed preferences among the public The previous section showed evidence of how environmental ambition and economic (i.e., trade) opportunities can offset each other and therefore explain neutral preferences for international climate action.
But I have also argued that these dynamics apply to other domestic drivers of international climate positions, in particular public opinion.
In this section I investigate this with an analysis of climate policy preferences among the Italian public.
The data I rely on here come straight from the Eurobarometer surveys.
The Eurobarometer provides representative, individual-level responses to questions related to environmental policy, including preferences for climate policies in line with UNFCCC targets.
To this end, the Eurobarometer has also fielded climate changespecific questionnaires across Europe.
For my purposes I focus specifically on the last two of these climate change surveys: the Special Eurobarometer 459 Wave EB87.1 (from 2017) and the Special Eurobarometer 490 Wave EB91.3 (from 2019).
These surveys ask a number of specific, forward-looking questions about climate action.
They also include other questions, including – and relevant here – responses on political interest in the issue and information on individuals’ economic resources.
Following my argument, the expectation is that, while political interest can increase interest in climate policy action, economic constraints would reduce it – hence resulting in conflicting pressures on opinion.
I proceed with testing this conjecture on the Italian battery of the Eurobarometer data.
Before moving to the test, however, it is worth demonstrating that, like the Italian government’s position at the UNFCCC, public opinion in Italy is indeed situated in a rather neutral position on climate policy.
I show this by comparing the Italian and aggregate European responses to two specific questions highlighted in the surveys: one on the importance of the growth of renewables (‘How important do you think it is that the 6 Fisher, LittleCott and Skillings.
2017.
‘Italy’s National Energy Strategy’.
E3G Consultation Response.
https://www.e3g.org/docs/Italian_Energy_Strategy_v3_EN_website.docx.pdf FEDERICA GENOVESE 87 [nationality] government sets targets to increase the amount of renewable energy used, such as wind or solar power, by 2030?’) and another question on household energy efficiency (‘How important do you think it is that the [nationality] government provides support for improving efficiency by 2030 (e.g.
by encouraging people to insulate their homes or buy electric cars)?’).
For both sets of answers, the outcome is spread over four categories, from ‘Not at all important’ to ‘Very important’.7 Figure 4 shows that the Italian responses (averaged across the 2017 and 2019 samples) are very close to the mean European response.
To put the data in perspective, the majority of respondents in the Netherlands (>75%) and a minor part of respondents in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (<35%) think these issues are ‘very important’ for their governments to prioritize.
Contrastingly, roughly one in two Italians consider these important.
At the same time, more than one in ten Italians are either indifferent (‘Don’t Know’) or deem the issue not relevant.
While the questions are by construction inducing a positive reaction (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003), the Italian position seems rather average -i.e., mild -by European standards.
Do mixed concerns at the individual level help explain why the Italian public is moderate on climate policy issues?
To get at the core of this hypothesis, I resort to a regression analysis in which I correlate the individual-level responses to the two questions above with two proxies.
To get at environmental concern, I rely on a response to political interest, and use the Eurobarometer index that goes from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested).
To get at economic concern, I rely on the response to the question ‘Have you had difficulties paying your bills at the end of the month?’, which goes from 1 (almost never/never) to 3 (often).8 In addition to these two variables, I enter in the regression equation a number of standard control variables, namely age, gender and education (measured in education years).
I also add the individual’s type of occupation to control for motivations derived from the job (Bechtel, Genovese and Scheve 2019).
The results are qualitatively equivalent if I use these models or more parsimonious specifications.
The results are also robust to other specifications, e.g.
a logit model (see Appendix).
Table 1 reports the results of linear (OLS) models for each of the two responses.
As expected, I find that the coefficients of the two relevant covariates are significant and go in opposite directions.
Political interest is positively correlated with the importance that people give to increasing targets for clean energy and incentivizing environmental efficiency.
At the same time and basically by the same magnitude, Italians who have greater financial difficulties are less likely to deem climate policy very important.
7 In secondary analyses reported in the Appendix, I also explore to what extent respondents agree with the statements ‘Fighting climate change and using energy more efficiently can boost the economy and jobs in the EU’ [present only in EBS 459]; and ‘More public financial support should be given to the transition to clean energies even it means subsidies to fossil fuels should be reduced’ [present only in EBS 490].
The results are consistent with the main analysis.
8 I prefer the answer to the bills question rather than the classic ‘household income’ item, because household income is systematically underreported or missing.
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 88 Figure 4.
Public opinion on climate policy issues: Italy versus Europe.
Notes: The bar plots show the aggregate distribution of public positions on two issues related to climate policy: (a) renewable energy, and (b) energy efficiency.
Data are averages from Eurobarometer surveys 87.1 (2017) and 91.3 (2019).
FEDERICA GENOVESE 89 The results are externally relevant because Italy has a high rate of political mobilization, with electoral turnout historically well above 70%, but also substantial levels of poverty vis-à-vis other OECD countries.
The direct implication is that the public in politically interested but financially constrained nations like Italy is substantially torn between political imaginary and economic incapabilities, and both seem to generate mild governmental positions on climate policy.
More generally, the findings imply that it may not be a lack of salience but rather the offsetting effect of multidimensional concerns that explains mild positions on global affairs.
As for domestic economic sectors, mixed pressures in national public opinion seem to explain ‘mild’ positions in international political issues.
Table 1.
The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate policies.
Notes: Linear (OLS) estimation.
The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed.
4.
Conclusions It is often assumed that few countries attach high relevance to issues discussed in international politics.
Consequently, negotiations and decision-making in contemporary international relations are often depicted as a result of hegemony or key alliances, i.e.
of actors assumed to attach more salience to their international issues.
This thinking assumes that other countries do not have salience for these international issues, thereby often leaving a number of mid-sized countries like Italy understudied.
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 90 In contrast with this view, in this paper I argue that these understudied countries do, in fact, give importance to international issues; however, they may be driven to mild positions by mixed domestic incentives.
Consequently, it is not the lack of intrinsic salience but the offsetting role of counterbalancing sources of national interest that dilute the international position of countries like Italy on issues such as international climate change action.
To explore this argument, the paper investigates the domestic drivers of Italy’s position on international climate policy.
I specifically focus on two political economy actors: industrial lobbies and public opinion.
I maintain that ambition for environmental leadership and economic constraints due to limited financial resources have systematically counteracted each other for both these two fundamental sources of national positions.
Observational data are put forward in support of the argument.
Evidently, the research has limitations.
The design is exploratory and the results are only correlational.
The observations on industries’ concerns are novel yet constrained across time and only updated to 2011.
The public opinion data, which is pertinent to more recent years and therefore does not overlap with the industry data, uses imperfect proxies to capture the variables of interest.
Nonetheless, conditional on these caveats, the evidence suggests how Italy compares to other countries on international climate policy, and how lukewarm the Italian position has been in the past few years.
The data also indicates that, in line with the argument, Italian businesses and voters are torn between the awareness and willingness to act on climate and the material burdens the issue imposes.
Altogether, the paper offers some lessons on how to think about countries in international politics that are often assumed to pay little attention to global issues or to ‘bandwagon’.
The paper also gives some predictions on how positions on global public good issues may vary as some of the offsetting domestic concerns may relax or intensify.
For example, Italy’s cooperation on climate change may strengthen if Italians become wealthier or if they suffer more from climate change-induced natural disasters.
At the same time, and importantly for the post-COVID19 world, Italy may become less cooperative on international issues where its businesses face harsh terms from trade partners following a national recession.
Future work may want to explore the merit of this argument on the false dichotomy between economic and environmental concerns in other fields.
For example, at the onset of the COVID19 pandemic, similar dynamics may affect how governments position themselves between health protection and economic growth.
References Aklin, Michael.
2014.
‘Re-exploring the Trade and Environment Nexus Through the Diffusion of Pollution’.
Environmental and Resource Economics: 1–20.
Alesina, Alberto, Ignazio Angeloni, and Federico Etro.
2005.
‘International Unions’.
American Economic Review, 95 (3): 602-615.
Bayer, Patrick, and Johannes Urpelainen.
2016.
‘It is all about political incentives: democracy and the renewable feed-in tariff’.
Journal of Politics, 78(2), 603-619.
Bechtel, Michael M. and Kenneth Scheve.
2013.
‘Mass support for global climate agreements depends on institutional design’.
PNAS, 110 (34) 13763-13768.
FEDERICA GENOVESE 91 Bechtel, Michael M., Federica Genovese and Kenneth Scheve.
2019.
‘Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Cooperation’.
British Journal of Political Science, 49(4), 1333-1355.
Bernauer, Thomas.
2013.
‘Climate Change Politics’.
Annual Review of Political Science, 16:421-448.
De Blasio, Emiliana, Matthew Hibberd, Michele Sorice.
2013.
‘Popular politics, populism and the leaders: Access without participation?
The cases of Italy and UK’.
LUISS Working Paper Dechezleprêtre, Antoine, Eric Neumayer, Richard Perkins.
2015.
‘Environmental regulation and the cross-border diffusion of new technology: Evidence from automobile patents’.
Research Policy, 44(1), 244-257.
Egan, Patrick and Megan Mullin.
2011.
‘Climate Change: US Public Opinion’.
Annual Review of Political Science, 20:209-227.
Fankhauser, Samuel, Caterina Gennaioli, Murray Collins.
2016.
‘Do international factors influence the passage of climate change legislation?’.
Climate Policy, 16 (3), 318-331.
Genovese, Federica.
2014.
‘States’ interests at international climate negotiations: new measures of bargaining positions’.
Environmental Politics 23 (4), 610-631.
Genovese, Federica.
2019.
‘Sectors, Pollution, and Trade: How Industrial Interests Shape Domestic Positions on Global Climate Agreements’.
International Studies Quarterly, 63(4): 819-836.
Genovese, Federica.
2020.
Weak States at Global Climate Negotiations.
Cambridge University Press, Elements Series.
Holbrook, Allyson, Green, Melanie Krosnick, Jon A.
2003.
‘Telephone versus face-to-face interviewing of national probability samples with long questionnaires: Comparisons of respondent satisficing and social desirability response bias’.
Public Opinion Quarterly, 67(1), 79–125.
Hovi, Jon, Detlef F. Sprinz, Hakon Saelen, and Arild Underdal.
2019.
‘The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-operation?’ British Journal of Political Science, 49(3):1071-1096.
Johnson, Tana and Urpelainen, Johannes.
2019.
‘The more things change, the more they stay the same: Developing countries’ unity at the nexus of trade and environmental policy’.
Review of International Organizations, forthcoming Krasner, Stephen.
1991.
‘Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier’.
World Politics, 43(3), 336-366 Keohane, Robert.
1971.
‘The big influence of small allies’.
Foreign Policy, 2: 161-182.
Keohane, Robert O., and David G. Victor.
2011.
“The Regime Complex for Climate Change.” Perspectives on Politics 9 (1): 7–23.
Kolstad, C. D. 2014.
‘Who Pays for Climate Regulation?’ Technical report.
Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
Lachapelle, Erick and Matthew Paterson.
2013.
‘Drivers of National Climate Policy’, Climate policy, 13:547-571.
Malhotra, Neil, Benoît Monin, Michael Tomz.
2019.
‘Does private regulation preempt public regulation?’ American Political Science Review 113 (1), 19-37.
McCrigh, Aaron, Riley Dunlap and Sandra Marquatt-Pyatt.
2016.
‘Political ideology and views about climate change in the European Union’.
Environmental Politics, 25(2): 1-21.
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 92 Meckling, Jonas.
2015.
‘Oppose, Support, or Hedge?
Distributional Effects, Regulatory Pressure, and Business Strategy in Environmental Politics’.
Global Environmental Politics 15 (2): 19–37.
Milner, Helen.
1997.
Interests, Institutions, and Information.
Princeton University Press Newell, Peter.
2019.
‘Trasformismo or transformation?
The global political economy of energy transitions’.
Review of International Political Economy, 26:25-48.
Padovani, Cinzia.
2010.
‘Citizens’ communication and the 2009 G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy’.
International Journal of Communication 4(24).
Romano, B., F. Zullo, L. Fiorini, A. Marucci and S. Ciabò.
2017.
‘Land transformation of Italy due to half a century of urbanization’.
Land Use Policy, 67(67):387-400.
Skovgaard, Jakob.
2014.
‘EU climate policy after the crisis’.
Environmental Politics, 23(1), 1-17.
FEDERICA GENOVESE 93 Appendix Table A1.
Variables definition and sources.
Variable Source Definition 1.
Cross country industry analysis UNFCCC national positions (Figure 1) Genovese 2014 (see also Genovese 2019), based on UNFCCC National Communications.
Empirical means calculated with a latent Bayesian factor analysis of manually coded national positions over 43 UNFCCC issues.
The distribution spans between -2 and +2 circa.
GHG emissions of each sector (Figure 2 & 3) UNFCCC yearly country data averaged for 20014 and 2009-11 (see also Genovese 2019) Greenhouse gas emission profiles summarized in million tons of CO2equivalent emissions for each UNFCCC member across six main IPCC sector groups (the paper focuses specifically on the agriculture and mining/extraction sector, but Genovese 2019 presents also the figures for manufacturing).
The standardized value of sectoral emissions was calculated by the author by weighing (i.e.
dividing) each sector’s emission by the total CO2-equivalent emissions of the country.
The distribution is between 0 and 100.
Trade openness for each sector (Figure 2 & 3) Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), database 6 for 2001-04 and database 7 for 2009-11.
The sum of exports and imports in USD prices divided by sectoral GDP (as coded in the value added of the World Development Indicators database).
The data is logged (distribution between 1 and 5) 2.
Public opinion analysis Salience of issues related to (a) renewable energy, and (b) energy efficiency (Figure 4; see exact question wording in the main text).
Eurobarometer 459 Wave EB87.1 (2017) and the Eurobarometer 490 Wave EB91.3 (2019).
Four-category ordinal response, from 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important).
‘Don’t Know’ coded as missing.
Political interest (Table 1) Eurobarometer surveys above Four-category ordinal response, from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested).
Difficulty in Paying Bills (Table 1) Eurobarometer surveys above Three-category ordinal response, from 1 (almost never/never) to 3 (often).
Notes: the empirical material presented in the paper is drawn from different sources.
In the table I clarify the definition and sources for the main variables in cross-country industry analysis (part 1), and then for those in the public opinion analysis (part 2).
Domestic sources of ‘mild’ positions on international cooperation 94 Table A2.
The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate policies: wave-specific regressions of responses to renewables growth question.
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation.
The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed.
Table A3.
The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate policies: wave-specific regressions of responses to household efficiency question.
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation.
The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed.
FEDERICA GENOVESE 95 Table A4.
The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate policies: alternative question (EB87.1).
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation.
The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed.
Table A5.
The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate policies: alternative question (EB91.3).
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation.
The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed.
29 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Climate and Energy Politics in Canada and Germany: Dealing with Fossil Fuel Legacies 1 Stephan Schott2, Carleton University Miranda Schreurs3, Technical University of Munich Abstract Canada and Germany are both pursuing major energy transitions and far-reaching climate programs and targets, but they differ in terms of policies towards some energy sources and their preferred policy instruments.
Both countries have committed to large scale emission reductions despite the challenge of regional divestment from fossil fuels: hard coal in North Rhine Westphalia and the Saarland; lignite in the Rhineland, in the Lusatsia (Lausitz) region, and in central Germany; coal in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia; and oil and natural gas in Western Canada.
This article compares the current Pan-Canadian Framework (PCF) on Clean Growth and Climate Change with the German Climate Law and the European Green Deal.
Relying on these measures, Canada and Germany set out policies and targets to become climate neutral by 2050.
The article identifies critical challenges in the transition away from fossil fuels in both countries and provides insights on the possibility and likelihood of linking policies and regulatory measures across the Atlantic.
1 The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and critiques and Anita Grace for her excellent editorial work.
The article was updated on April 22, 2021.
2 Stephan Schott is an Associate Professor in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University.
3 Prof. Miranda Schreurs is Chair of Climate and Environmental Policy at the Bavarian School of Public Policy, Technical University of Munich.
30 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Introduction Canada and Germany are two of the largest economies among the top ten greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters globally.
In 2020, Canada accounted for 1.6 percent and Germany for 1.8 percent of global GHG emissions.
The two countries, however, have quite different historical experiences with fossil-based energy.
While Canada started with a relatively clean energy system based to a large extent on hydropower, it became a fossil fuel giant as a result of oil and natural gas discoveries in the West.
Canada, as a colonial nation, was built on the exploitation of natural resources and Indigenous lands through a staples approach (Watkins 1963) that has been characterized by sequential periods when specific export commodities were dominant (fish, fur, timber, grain, oil), and associated with wider economic, social, and political consequences.
The latest natural resource staples to be developed are oil and gas, with Canadian reserves of oil and gas, the vast majority of which are located in Alberta, accounting for 10 percent of known global reserves (Natural Resources Canada 2019).
In comparison, Germany fueled its industrial development with domestic coal and lignite.
German coal reserves are significant.
Of known global reserves of coal, Germany accounts for 3.5 percent, Poland 2.5 percent, and the European Union (EU) as a whole about seven percent (Worldometers 2020).
During its period of rapid economic growth from the 1960s into the 1980s, Germany also invested heavily in nuclear energy (Brauers, Herpich, and Oei 2018; von Hirschhausen et al.
2018), and so did Canada.
While both countries’ economies have been heavily dependent on fossil fuels and had a similar number of nuclear reactors into the 1990s, in the last decades Germany has embarked on an energy transition away from nuclear energy and towards renewable energy sources (onshore and offshore wind, solar photovoltaics, geothermal, and green hydrogen).
Germany plans to shut down the last of its nuclear reactors by 2022.
More recently, it has laid out plans to phase out coal no later than 2038.
These plans have been complemented by the controversial plan to bridge the transition from coal to renewables, with imports of Russian natural gas.
Canada has also invested in expanding renewable energy and plans to phase out coal by 2030.
But Canada remains heavily invested in western oil and gas and maintains its nuclear power facilities in Ontario and New Brunswick.
The impacts of Canada’s and Germany’s shifting energy paths are visible in their greenhouse gas emissions trajectories, which have moved in opposite directions.
Canada’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rose from 453.40 metric tonnes (hereafter m tonnes) in 1990 to 584.85 m tonnes in 2019.
In contrast, German emissions declined in this same period from 1018.22 m tonnes to 702.60 m tonnes (Crippa et al.
2020).
Indeed, although Canada started out relying on cleaner energy than Germany and in 1990 its per capita CO2 emissions were only somewhat higher than in Germany (respectively, 16.37 versus 12.87 tonnes CO2/cap), in 2019 they were substantially higher: 15.69 versus 8.52 tonnes CO2/cap (Crippa et al.
2020).
This difference suggests that Canada’s status as an increasingly major oil and gas producer in the past decades has worsened its climate balance despite the phase out of coal in Ontario and expansion of renewables in some provinces.
In comparison, in Germany there have been major industrial shifts which include the shutting down of highly polluting plants and the modernization of infrastructure (particularly in eastern parts of the country after reunification in 1990), a strong expansion of renewable energies, and a move away from highly polluting coal to growing reliance on natural gas which has a lower CO2 content.
Germany has more consistently pursued climate policies than has Canada, where changes in party control of the federal government have resulted in swings in the degree of intensity with which Canada has addressed climate change.
31 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 This article examines factors that help explain Canada’s and Germany’s efforts to transition away from their historic energy paths towards cleaner, more climate-responsible energy systems, with attention to their differing experiences in dealing with powerful fossil fuel interests and carbonintensive industrial actors.
As German climate and energy policy cannot be understood without reference to the EU, the article also brings in relevant dimensions of EU climate laws and programs.
Canada, Germany, and the EU have all signed on to the Paris Climate Agreement.
Canada has committed to reducing its GHG emissions by 30 percent of 2005 levels by 2030 and to working towards achieving net emissions neutrality by 2050.
Germany is pursuing a 55 percent reduction of 1990 emission levels by 2030, has indicated its intentions to be climate neutral by 2050, and has supported the European Green Deal, which calls for climate neutrality for the entire EU by 2050 as well.
To follow along with European and U.S. pledges to pursue more aggressive emission reduction plans, Canada announced on Earth Day 2021 (April 22nd) a more ambitious target of 4045 % carbon emission reductions by 2030.
The article begins with a brief comparison of the energy structures in Canada and Germany.
It then examines the German energy transition, the German Climate Protection Act, and the European Green Deal, before turning to the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change.
Next, the article examines the significant challenges that both countries face in pursuing their ambitious climate policies, particularly the need to address the resistance of powerful fossil fuels lobbies, carbon-intensive industrial/financial interests, and impacted regions.
Also considered is the extent to which and why these alliances may be shifting in Germany and Canada.
The article concludes with discussion of areas where the two countries can cooperate to make progress toward their respective goals in transitioning energy sources and combatting climate change.
German Climate Policy and the German Energiewende Germany plays a particularly important role within international and EU climate and energy policy-making, at times acting as a driver, and at other times acting as a brake.
Germany was among the first states to introduce a voluntary climate target in 1990, and in 1995 it hosted the Bonn Conference which lay the groundwork for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
Then Environment Minister and later German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, helped negotiate the Kyoto Protocol, and later pushed to assure its international ratification.
It was under the German presidency of the European Council in 2007 that the groundwork was realized for an integrated European Climate and Energy program and at the onset of Ursula von der Leyen’s (a German) term as European Commission President that the European Green Deal was launched in 2019.
Over the years, Germany has set out numerous ambitious climate and energy plans as well as voluntary domestic GHG emission reduction targets.
These include the Climate Protection Program of 2000, the Integrated Energy and Climate Program of 2007, the Climate Protection Concept of 2010, and the Climate Protection Plan 2050 set in 2016.
Hundreds of policy measures have been introduced to shift industry, society, and energy producers in cleaner directions, to tighten building efficiency standards, to address excessive consumption and waste, to expand recycling, to further public transport opportunities, and to digitalize the economy to enhance efficiencies.
32 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 With these goals and actions, Germany seeks to spur new industries and become a global climate leader.
Between 1990 and 2020, Germany reduced GHG emissions by 42.3 percent and expanded renewable energy in the electricity sector from three to 45 percent (Agora Energiewende 2021).4 An initial drop in emissions was tied to unification as many industries in the former East Germany could not compete in the new system or meet its higher pollution standards.
The German Federal Environmental Agency reports that between 1989 and 1994, CO2 emissions in the former East Germany dropped by about 43 percent while in the former West Germany they remained largely stable.
The “wall fall profit” in terms of CO2 emission reductions has been estimated to be about 105 million tonnes or about 10 percent of the emission reductions from 1990 levels (Eichhammer et al.
2001, 7-11).
Often overlooked in discussions about the wall fall profit are the tremendous financial and social costs associated with the industrial restructuring of the East; while these were perhaps easy emission reductions, they were certainly very costly.
After about the mid-1990s, further emission drops are associated with climate policy measures.
More recently, the COVID-19 crisis has played a role in the sharp greenhouse gas emissions reductions and in the strong performance of renewable energies.
Agora Energiewende (2021) estimates that without the economic slowdown induced by the pandemic, emissions would have only been about 38 percent below 1990 levels.
Prior to the pandemic, Germany’s climate actions were increasingly criticized, especially by environmentalists, as being too lopsided.
While much was being done to build up renewables, too little was being done to address emissions in the hardto-abate sectors due to resistance from some of the country’s most powerful industries, including the coal and automobile sectors.
Germany’s energy transition (Energiewende) and its climate policies have been pushed forward by environmental movements and the Green Party, public opinion, and the search for new areas of industrial development.
Public pressure began with calls for a nuclear phase out, transitioned to focus on renewable energy, and more recently to demands for still more far-reaching climate action.
For many years, deeper changes to the status quo were challenged by conventional fossil fuel dependent industries and regions (Hey 2010; Stefes 2016).
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), with its strong ties to big business interests, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with its support from the labour unions, initially resisted the demands for a more rapid transition in the country’s energy structure and transport system.
This resistance has more recently weakened as public demand for climate action has strengthened.
Over time, fossil fuel industries have felt compelled to begin investing more actively in the renewable energy sector.
Phasing Out Nuclear Energy and Phasing in Renewables The Energiewende envisions a shift away from nuclear and fossil fuel dependency, enhanced resource and energy efficiency, and the expansion of renewable energy capacity.
The Energiewende has its roots in decades of contention over nuclear energy policies.
Anti-nuclear protests galvanized Germany in the 1970s and 1980s.
These protests led to the birth of the Green Party, which over the course of the next decades pressed other political parties to develop more assertive programs for sustainable development (Hager 2016).
Today, German political parties 4 See also the Frauenhofer Institute’s energy charts: https://www.energy-charts.de/index.htm 33 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 (with the exception of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland)) vie with each other to convince voters that they are the true representatives of green interests.
The Chernobyl nuclear crisis in 1986 weakened public and political support for nuclear energy; the nuclear crisis in Japan in 2011 basically ended support altogether.
Germany, which once had more than a quarter of its electricity supplied from nuclear energy, will soon be nuclear free.
Related to the phase out of nuclear energy have been the efforts to promote renewable energy.
The growth of renewables began with the 1990 Electricity Feed-in Law requiring grid operators to take renewable energy into the grid, including from small producers, and the expansion of feed-intariffs as a result of the Renewable Energy Law of 2000 (von Hirschhausen 2018; Clausen 2019).
This law was negotiated under a Social Democratic Party – Green Party coalition (Morris and Jungjohann 2016).
Phasing Out Coal and Transport-related Emissions Despite progress on renewables, Germany’s GHG emissions were dropping more slowly than planned before the COVID-19 pandemic struck; in fact, it appeared that the country would fail to meet its 2020 greenhouse gas reduction target.
Progress was stifled by the country’s continued heavy reliance on coal, both hard coal and lignite, in the heating and electricity sectors.
Hard coal and lignite combined accounted for over 39 percent of electricity generation in 2017.
While working to develop the image of a clean manufacturing economy, Germany was spewing pollution from its 42.6 gigawatts (GW) worth of coal-fired power generation capacity.
Transport-related emissions tied to oil and gas use were another problem area.
A plan to have one million electric vehicles on the road by 2020 had to be pushed back by two years as neither the industry nor the government prioritized the transition (Reuters 2018) and because the industry focused on the internal combustion engine and energy-intensive luxury vehicles (Miller and Campbell 2019).
The slow pace of change in the automobile sector is certainly linked to the power of this industry, which employs over 800,000 people directly and many more indirectly.
The pace of improvements in the energy efficiency of the housing stock has also been slow.
Without a climate law making the realisation of targets mandatory, progress was uneven.
Germany Moves to Phase Out Coal Starting in the midto late 2010s, pressure grew internally and externally for Germany to do more to address emissions from coal-fired power plants, its single largest source of emissions (Stefes 2016; Oei 2018).
An external source of pressure was the launch by the United Kingdom and Canada of the Powering Past Coal Alliance at the 23rd Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Bonn, Germany in 2017 (Power Past Coal Alliance 2017).
The formation of an international alliance to phase out of coal in Bonn was an embarrassment for Germany as it was seeking to portray itself as a climate leader but had yet to really tackle its own coal-based emissions.
It certainly added to the pressure being created by large public protests.
Domestic protests have taken many forms, and some are still on-going.
In 2018, in North Rhine Westphalia, protesters built camps in the Hambach Forest to protect this old growth forest scheduled to be cut down by the energy giant, RWE, in order to get at the lignite below.
In 2019, activists broke through police lines to prevent mining equipment from being used in the Garzweiler lignite mine, and the following year they broke in and occupied the mine.
In parallel actions, in 34 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Brandenburg, protesters blocked the train tracks leading to one of the country’s dirtiest coal-fired power plants, Jänschwalde.
The confrontations between police and activists are reminiscent of the conflicts which had taken place decades earlier against nuclear power plants.
In this increasingly tense environment, in 2018 the coalition government formed the Commission for Growth, Structural Change, and Employment (more commonly known as the Coal Commission).
Germany often makes use of such commissions to develop consensus among divergent interests on deeply divisive issues.
Commission members discuss and debate for weeks, months, or in this case over a year until a compromise solution can be found.
The commission’s final report was released in February 2019.
With just one negative vote, the report called for a total phase out of coal by 2038, with a possible earlier phase out by 2035 (Schulz 2020).
One year later, the German parliament agreed on a “coal phase out” law.
The capacity of power plants using hard coal (anthracite) (22.7 GW in 2017) and those using lignite (19.9 GW in 2017) are to be reduced to around 15 GW each by 2022, with a further reduction to 8 GW capacity for hard coal and 9 GW capacity for lignite-fired power plants by 2030.
Support of up to 40 billion Euro for structural transitions and compensation to power plants in the impacted regions is expected (Bundesrat 2020).
Under pressure from youth activists (especially Fridays for Future) and fearing loss of voter support in the face of its failure to meet set targets, the ruling CDU/CSU SPD coalition began work on a climate protection law.
The Federal Climate Change Act, a major framework law, entered into force on December 18, 2019.
In discussing the need for the law, the coalition partners noted the heavy financial burden the country would face if it failed to fulfill its GHG emission reduction targets under the EU’s Effort Sharing Decision (Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD 2019).
The act mandates a minimum 55 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 (relative to 1990 levels); sets annual emission budgets for the energy, industry, transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste sectors; and legislates climate neutrality as a goal for 2050.
The government is itself to become climate neutral in all of its activities and investments by 2030.
The act requires annual performance evaluations and transparency in emissions data provided by an independent evaluation committee.
The ministries responsible for under-performing sectors will be required within a three-month period to present an immediate action program (Sofortprogramm) with measures for how to address shortcomings.
Parliament will determine if further regulatory measures are needed (Deutscher Bundestag 2019).
The Climate Action Programme 2030 specifies measures to reach targets.
Starting in 2020, air flight taxes were increased, a CO2 price was established which raised the price of fossil fuels for transport and heating, a new tax incentive for building renovations was introduced, and the value added tax on train tickets was reduced.
To address concerns about consumer backlash, electricity prices for residential consumers are to be reduced by cutting the feed-in tariff for renewables, a controversial idea intended to offset the higher prices on oil, gas, and kerosene.
Amid growing concern about foreign competition in electric vehicle development, the automobile sector has also been targeted.
The Climate Action Programme establishes several targets: 40 to 42 percent emissions reductions for the transport sector compared to 1990 levels, seven to 10 million electric vehicles on the road, and a target of one million charging stations for electric vehicles by 2030.
As in Canada, various purchase incentives for e-vehicles have been introduced.
35 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 There will, of course, be obstacles to acceptance of some of these measures (Schreurs and Ohlhorst 2015; Bues 2020).
The expansion of wind parks, large solar installations, biomass facilities, and electricity storage systems are facing opposition from affected communities and some nature conservation interests.
There is also opposition to the phase-out in affected communities.
To integrate the public into the implementation process, participatory decision-making initiatives are becoming increasingly common at both the Länder (state) and federal levels.
An additional problem relates to the possible lock-in effect caused by infrastructure being developed for natural gas, which is being turned to to replace coal.
The controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is to bring natural gas directly from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, is a case in point.
EU Climate Policy and the European Green Deal EU climate and energy policies set general directions, targets, and expectations for Member States, which then have the responsibility for implementation (Lederer,2020).
German climate and energy policy must be viewed in this context.
The EU has managed to maintain a surprising degree of consensus on the importance of climate action despite the diversity of its Member States and their rather different energy structures (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2010; Jordan et al.
2012; Wurzel, Connelly, and Liefferink 2017).
It uses a variety of means ranging from advice to directives and regulations to encourage, cajole, or require Member States to do more to protect the environment.
This has been the case, for example, in relation to Germany’s automobile sector, which historically has lobbied the federal government to oppose more stringent emission regulations.
Once tighter emission regulations are nevertheless decided upon at the EU level, as has occurred on numerous occasions, the German industry must comply (Oki 2020).
Member States also take their own priorities and interests and elevate them onto the EU’s agenda in an effort to create a level playing field within the EU or to enhance progress on an issue of normative concern, like climate change.
Germany played a critical part in early efforts to elevate renewable energy to the EU agenda.
In the meantime, the EU has issued a series of directives aimed at expanding renewable energy capacity and improving energy efficiency.
As a consequence, the growth of renewable energy across the EU has been striking.
In 2005, renewable energy in gross final energy consumption for the EU28 stood at nine percent; at the end of 2019 it was 18.9 percent (and 19.7 percent for the EU27) (European Environment Agency 2019; Eurostat 2021).
The EU has also managed to keep climate action a Union priority despite some ups and downs in Member State enthusiasm for stricter action.
In 2014, in the lead up to the Paris Climate Agreement, the Clean Energy for All Package was adopted setting GHG emission reduction targets for 2030.
These targets were amended upwards in December 2018 to 40 percent GHG emissions reduction (compared to 1990 levels), 32 percent for renewable energy and 32.5 percent for energy efficiency (compared to 2005 levels) (European Commission 2019).
The European Commission (n.d.) reported in 2020 that, between 1990 and 2018, the EU reduced GHG emissions by 23 percent while the economy grew by 61 percent over the same time period, meaning the EU had exceeded its 2020 target to reduce emissions by 20 percent of 1990 levels ahead of schedule.
A decoupling from energy use and GHG emissions is occurring (European Commission 2020a).
36 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 With increasing concern in the EU about global warming, pollution, inefficient material use, natural resource depletion, and import dependency for energy and natural resources, in 2019, the European Commission proposed a European Green Deal.
It addresses the areas of clean energy, sustainable industry, building renovation, sustainable mobility, food production and consumption, and biodiversity protection.
The European Green Deal aims at climate neutrality and zero pollution by 2050.
The EU has set a plan to cut emissions by 55 percent of 1990 levels by 2030 (on the debate behind these targets see Abnett 2020; European Commission 2020d).
Part of the EU’s COVID-19 recovery package that was spearheaded by Germany and France calls for a tax on non-recycled plastics and the introduction of carbon border taxes starting in 2023 on products being produced in countries with lower carbon emission standards than the EU.
Thirty percent of the total €1.8 trillion package, combining the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and Next Generation EU, is to target climate-related projects (European Council 2020).
The European Green Deal bases its climate change targets and goals on ecological modernization discourses, reflecting debates in Germany about the economic opportunities for climate change action (Machin 2019).
A key policy instrument for achieving Germany’s climate goals has been the EU emissions trading system (ETS), which was launched in 2005 and covers thousands of industries.
Sectors covered by the ETS have to cut emissions by 43 percent compared to 2005 and non-ETS sectors by 30 percent (Bayer and Aklin 2020).
Early design flaws, and especially the allocation of too many pollution allowances to major industries – a problem that ensued in significant part due to the demands of German industries – limited the effectiveness of the system.
Subsequent corrections to the ETS’ design have improved its functioning to some degree.
Despite the low prices on carbon resulting from initial design flaws, according to one assessment (Bayer and Aklin 2020), the ETS saved the EU about 1.2 billion tonnes of CO2 between 2008 and 2016, equating to reductions of 3.8 percent of total EU-wide emissions compared to a scenario without an ETS.
With the reforms, the price of carbon has risen from a low of just under three Euros per tonne of carbon in April 2013 to over 43 Euros per tonne in April 2021.5 Under the EU post-COVID-19 stimulus package, the ETS is to be expanded to the aviation and maritime sectors as well as to the transportation and heating sectors.
This pricing of carbon is critical for Germany in its efforts to meet its domestic targets as it incentivizes the shift away from fossil fuels.
The European Commission (2020b) reported an 8.7 percent drop in GHG emissions in 2019 compared to 2018 levels, largely a result of a decline in emissions from stationary sources (with coal being replaced by renewables and gasfired power production), and a significant jump in the carbon price after the fourth EU ETS reform.
Canadian energy and climate change politics Canada is among the most decentralized of all federal countries.
In 1982, The Constitution Act (section 92a) strengthened provincial powers over natural resources.
Each province has exclusive jurisdiction over the development, conservation, and management of its non-renewable resources, which includes energy resources, forests, and hydroelectric power facilities.
The federal 5 See the EMBER EU ETS carbon pricing tracking system: https://ember-climate.org/data/carbon-price-viewer/.
37 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 government has authority over transboundary emissions and interprovincial matters, and has considerable authority to regulate GHG emissions.
While the federal government takes the lead in signing international agreements such as the Kyoto Accord and the Paris Accord (2015), the effective implementation of such agreements depends heavily on the cooperation of the provinces and territories.
Due to wavering levels of commitment at both the federal and provincial levels, Canada generally has a weak record of following through on international climate change commitments.
Furthermore, Canada is the only G7 nation without a national energy strategy (Schott and Campbell 2013).
The lack of such a strategy makes it difficult to coordinate energy and climate policy and to set specific timelines and targets (Benz and Broschek, 2020).
Adding to the complexity is the legacy of the colonial state system.
The current Liberal government is committed to truth and reconciliation with 94 calls to action (Truth and Reconciliation Committee 2015) and reversing the colonial path in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, UN 2007).
There are large areas of Canada that are either unceded territories or have treaties or modern land claims that provide considerable power and autonomy for Indigenous Peoples.
Recently, Indigenous leaders and activists have openly demonstrated against large energy projects, such as natural gas and oil pipelines going through British Columbia (BC) as well as oil exploration in the Arctic (e.g., Clyde River vs. Petroleum Geo-Services).
A shift to a more meaningful nation-to nation dialogue will require more Indigenous representation in decision-making and an enhanced role of the federal government as a power broker and mediator between Indigenous Peoples and provincial and territorial governments when it comes to overlapping energy and environmental policies (Gramiak and Schott 2018).
Energy and climate change policies differ quite significantly within Canada.
There are important regional differences in terms of provincial efforts to reduce energy-related carbon emissions (decarbonization) and decouple economic activities and energy demand.
Canada has a relatively clean electricity grid, with 67 percent of electricity coming from renewable sources and 82 percent from non-GHG emitting sources.
Some provinces are very advanced in terms of their clean electricity grids (e.g., Manitoba, Québec, BC, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Ontario).
Five provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, and Québec) and all three territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) have achieved some degree of decoupling and decarbonization.
However, provinces with resource-dependent economies (Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, and BC) are failing to decouple and only BC has managed to make some gains in decarbonization (Hughes 2020).
In aggregate, Canada’s economic growth is still fuelled by increases in energy demand and weak decarbonization efforts due to a split between the post-industrial East and the industrialized fossil fuel dependent West (Hughes 2020).
Since Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s National Energy Program, there have been five attempts in Canada to coordinate energy and climate change policy that have so far failed to offset increasing emissions from oil and gas development in the western provinces (Macdonald 2020; Winfield and Macdonald 2020).
A continuation of this attempt is the recent acquisition of the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion by the federal government to bring Albertan oil to a port near Vancouver.
This project will enable a tripling in the pipeline’s capacity to 890,000 barrels of oil per day but increases Alberta’s challenge in meeting its GHG emission reduction targets and sends a mixed message on future industry and energy transition directions.
The oil and gas sector has maintained a strong influence on Canadian politics for several decades and managed until 2016 to limit any serious climate regulations for the sector.
A strong alliance 38 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 of vested interests linking oil companies, natural gas companies, utilities in the US and Canada, and the Canadian financial oligopoly (Toronto Dominion Bank, Bank of Montreal, Scotiabank, CIBC, and Royal Bank) successfully counteracted calls for stricter environmental legislation in most provinces and by the federal government.
There was also surprising public support and media coverage of climate skeptics, who were falsely perceived as providing a balanced view on climate science.
The Struggle to Develop and Implement a Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change The election of a Liberal government under the leadership of Justin Trudeau in 2015 indicated a shift in the approach to energy policy, and a more climate-friendly direction compared to the previous approach of the Conservative government led by Stephan Harper.
An important step was the development of a more coordinated plan to tackle GHG emissions while enabling clean growth, which was introduced by the Liberal government in 2016 in the form of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change (PCF).
As noted above, implementation of effective climate and energy policy requires coordination between the federal and provincial governments.
For this reason, the PCF was developed after the Declaration of the Premiers adopted at the Québec Summit on Climate Change in 2015 where it was agreed to take ambitious action in support of meeting or exceeding Canada’s 2030 target of a 30 percent reduction below 2005 levels of GHG emissions.
This involves a commitment to pursue a collaborative approach between provincial, territorial, and federal governments to reduce GHG emissions, and to enable sustainable economic growth.
The PCF explicitly acknowledges the rights of Indigenous Peoples and their leadership in the adoption of the Paris Agreement (Canada 2016).
At that point, Saskatchewan was the only province not to sign on to the PCF.
The PCF tries to ensure that the provinces and territories have the flexibility to design their own policies and programs to meet emission-reductions targets, with federal support for infrastructure, specific emission-reduction opportunities, and clean technologies.
The PCF focusses on carbon pricing with complementary measures by sector, adaptation and resilience, and industrial policy and economic development.
To achieve these objectives, the Liberal government proposed a clean growth direction with aggressive carbon price targets.
A federal levy of 20 dollars per tonne of carbon came into effect April 1, 2019 and applies to provinces that did not adopt their own carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems or other plans for carbon pricing.
The levy will rise by 10 dollars per year until it reaches 50 dollars in 2022.
An announcement by the Liberal government in December 2020 committed to a further increase of the carbon price beyond 2022.
Starting in 2023, the price will go up by 15 dollars per tonne a year from the current 30 dollars until it hits 170 dollars in 2030.
A major commitment in the Liberal’s climate plan is the phase out of traditional coal units across Canada by 2030.
This will only affect Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Alberta, and Saskatchewan but is a major step towards a cleaning of the country’s electricity grids.
Important highlighted measures are new and enhanced transmission lines between and within provinces and territories, deployment of smart-grid technologies, and the reduction of diesel-powered generation for Indigenous Peoples and northern and remote communities.
In the building sector, new energy efficient measures focus on the goal of adopting a ‘net-zero energy ready’ model building code by 2030 and retrofitting existing buildings through energy efficiency improvements and fuel 39 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 switching, including in Indigenous communities and in social housing initiatives.
For the transportation sector, the federal government merely commits to continue implementing increasingly stringent standards for emissions from light duty vehicles and to taking action to improve efficiency and to support fuel switching in the rail, aviation, marine, and off-road sectors.
Although the PCF committed to develop a Canada-wide strategy for zero-emission vehicles (ZEV) by 2018, and to boost zero emission infrastructure, no specific strategy has been developed.
The government has set rather non-ambitious targets for sales of ZEVs compared to other OECD countries (10 percent of new light-duty vehicle by 2025, 30 percent by 2030, and 100 percent by 2040 (Transport Canada 2020)), and a 5,000-dollar incentive for the purchase or lease of an eligible battery electric, hydrogen fuel cell, or longer-range plug-in hybrid vehicle, and a 2,500-dollar incentive for a shorter-range plug-in hybrid vehicle.
These incentives are topped up with additional subsidies only in Québec and BC.
Canada aims to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector, including offshore activities by 40 to 45 percent by 2025, and to phase down use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) to support Canada's commitment to the Montreal Protocol’s Kigali amendment.
The enhancement of carbon sinks is stressed, as are the increased use of wood products in construction, the production of renewable fuels and bioproducts, and enhanced innovation to advance GHG efficient management practices in forestry and agriculture.
Canada will provide infrastructure investment to deal with and prepare for climate risks like floods, wildfires, droughts, and changes in temperature, including thawing permafrost, and extreme weather events (Bush and Lemmen 2019).
The government will support new approaches and ‘mission-oriented’ research approaches to accelerate innovation, to support clean technology, to enhance export potential, to strengthen financing, and to create jobs and a new clean energy sector.
A recent announcement committed to net zero emission by 2050 (ECCC 2020) with legallybinding, five-year emissions-reduction milestones, support for clean electricity generation, greener buildings and communities, and the electrification of transportation and nature-based climate solutions, such as a commitment to plant two billion trees in a decade.
The PCF provides the first guiding framework of its kind which directly affects the provinces’ energy investments and electricity generation.
It is overly optimistic, however.
The complementary measures do not go far enough, as they mostly focus on carrots and lack timelines and concrete suggestions on how to push emission reductions further in key sectors.
Oil and gas, and heavy industry are responsible for 37 percent of GHG emissions.
Without serious advancements in those sectors, Canada will not be able to achieve its targeted 511 metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent cut by 2030 (see figure 1).
40 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Figure 1: Canadian GHG Emissions by Economic Sector in 2018.
Source: (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2020) with percentage calculations and illustration by authors.
The most recent progress report by Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) indicates that contributions to emission reductions by sector are not sufficient.
Canada is projected to overshoot its target by about 105 metric tonnes of CO2.
To close that gap, Canada counts on credits from the Western Climate Initiative (WCI 2020) (trade of carbon credits between California and Québec), contributions from the land use change and forestry sector, and uncertain advances in clean electricity, greener buildings, electrification of transportation, nature-based climate solutions (mostly planting trees), and greater than anticipated clean technology adoption (see figure 2).
Oil and gas 26% Transportation 25% Buildings 13% Electricity 9% Heavy industry 11% Agriculture 10% Waste and others 6% 41 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Figure 2: Contributions to emissions reductions in 2030.
Source: (Government of Canada 2019), figure 2: Contribution to Emissions reductions.
The experience to date with the PCF has been mixed.
The 2021 Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) ranked the effectiveness of Canadian climate change policy 58th (in comparison, Germany’s ranks 19th) (Burck et al.
2020) with the spread between the countries increasing relative to the previous year when Canada was ranked 55th and Germany 23rd (Burck et al.
2019).
The CCPI report gives Canada: very low ratings in the categories GHG Emissions, Renewable Energy and Energy Use.
In all three categories, the country is not on track for a well below 2°C compatible pathway.
While the country is rated high for its proactive role at international level, experts continue to observe a discrepancy between international climate leadership and national implementation (2019, 23).
There are a number of reasons for Canada’s mediocre to poor performance.
The transportation sector is not advancing at the speed necessary to realize these reductions.
There are hardly any regional electric trains or buses.
A high-speed train in the most densely populated corridor from Windsor, Ontario to Ville de Québec, Québec has been discussed for decades but there is no progress in site (Railway Technology 2020).
The electric vehicle and hybrid vehicles targets are not aggressive enough, critical infrastructure is missing, and incentives vary widely across the country.
Large scale dairy and beef farmers that contribute significantly to GHG emissions, and that command some of the largest dairy prices in the world, are not anticipated to contribute to meeting the 2030 emission reduction goals in the proposed plan.
Provinces have their own building codes and are slow to adopt new national guidelines.
Due to the fact that provinces have more control and power over energy policy, building codes, environmental policy and transport infrastructure than in most other countries, it is difficult for Canada to coordinate its policies and implement a federal strategy like the PCF.
The PCF is, however, the closest Canada has come to coordinated action on climate change and future energy 42 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 developments.
The reason for failures in coordination goes back to the first serious attempt in the 1980s under Pierre Elliot Trudeau (the father of Canada’s current Prime Minister), which fueled Western alienation and entrenched opposing regional political agendas in federal politics.
Western Resistance, Indigenous Rights and a New Direction for Canadian Industry The resistance in Canada to coordinating energy policies and climate change policies goes back to the failure of the National Energy Programme (NEP) in the 1980s, which contributed to the alienation of the West (perhaps with the exception of BC) from trusting a centralized government acting mostly in what it perceived to be the interests of eastern Canada’s service and manufacturing sectors.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is in a precarious situation as his Liberal Party is committed to implementing and reaching ambitious climate targets while making up with alienated western provinces.
In the 2019 federal election, the Liberal Party did not acquire a single seat in Alberta, Saskatchewan, or Manitoba, and Trudeau returned to office with a minority government.
For the first time in Canadian history, climate change action and policies were a serious election issue.
The clear majority of voters cared about climate change action even if it was not necessarily centre stage (Clarke and Pammett, 2020).
Andrew Scheer’s Conservative Party did not have a serious stand on climate change policies, which some political analysts claim cost them the election in key Conservative ridings in the Greater Toronto metropolitan area (Ibbitson 2019).
The last Canadian election, therefore, created a new era in climate change policy that could favour climate change policy implementation in the future (The Economist 2019).
For the time being, however, Trudeau’s Liberal government needs opposition party support to put through polices, and it faces fierce criticism and resistance from western provinces and Conservative provincial governments (e.g., the Ford government in Ontario; the Kenney Government in Alberta).
The federal government had to use the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act to impose a carbon tax on five provinces (Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Alberta) that did not have an equivalent system in place.
They objected to this imposition (Harrison 2020) and launched constitutional court challenges.
These five provinces make up half of all provinces and 59.3 percent of the Canadian population (Canada, n.d.).
This does not, however, coincide with public opinion on carbon pricing and climate change action.
Almost the same percentage of Canadians (58 percent) indicated in a poll by Nanos for the Globe and Mail that it would be unacceptable for a province to opt out of the national climate change plan (Keller 2019).
In addition, imposed carbon taxes are redistributed as tax credits to households in affected provinces, so that there is an incentive to switch to less carbon intensive products and behaviour without affecting household incomes.
A larger hurdle will be achieving climate targets without a more direct-action plan for the future of the oil and gas sector.
The federal acquisition of the Trans Mountain expansion pipeline in August 2018 for 4.5 billion dollars was a serious blow to the federal government’s credibility in terms of climate change action and international commitments.
The federal government proclaimed that the pipeline would not undermine the government’s commitment to meet or exceed the 2030 Paris targets (MacLean 2018), but they did not provide estimates on how the project would affect emissions projections.
Energy economist Marc Jaccard estimated that the expansion of the pipeline would add 8.8 metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent upstream annually, which over a 50-year lifespan could consume 83 percent of Canada’s share of the Paris Agreement (Maclean 2018; Donner 2016).
The federal government seems to some to be pursuing policies with conflicting objections: on the one hand, it supports aggressive cuts to GHG emissions in order to satisfy the Paris commitments, while on the other hand it is spending precious public resources 43 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 that lock in the traditional fossil fuel sector.
In order to meet the Paris Agreement’s two-degree target, McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimated that it will be necessary to leave roughly 80 percent of all known fossil fuel deposits in the ground.
Pearce estimated that Canada must resist extracting about 75 percent of its oil reserves and 25 percent of its natural gas reserves (Pidcock 2015).
The government is committed to limit warming to 1.5 degrees, which would imply even more reserves be left in the ground.
At the same time, the oil and gas sector is having an uncertain future, since oil sands extraction cannot compete with other world supplies of lower-priced oil, and is more vulnerable to fluctuation in global oil prices and uncertainty over pipeline expansion (IEA 2021).
Furthermore, since Alberta is landlocked, it relies on refineries in the United States and receives a discounted oil price.
In early 2020, the Alberta Government bought a share in the Keystone XL pipeline’s extension at a time of major budget deficits.
One of the first actions of President Biden was to revoke the permit for the pipeline (The White House 2021), killing the project.
Oil markets have become increasingly volatile with battles over market share in a progressively contested resource sector that is still adding reserves (e.g., off the coast of Guyana (Baddour 2020)); the sector is also challenged by sharply declining prices of renewable energy and is threatened by rapidly increasing carbon prices.
Another dilemma is the BC government’s plan to expand its liquid natural gas (LNG) export sector to Asian markets.
Despite an early and aggressive carbon tax, the province will not be able to meet its own provincial climate targets (Eco Justice 2020).
The LNG expansion requires new pipelines that have divided communities between proponents and opponents.
Decisions were recently challenged by Indigenous hereditary chiefs who questioned the legitimacy of the colonially imposed system of First Nation Band Councils that make decisions on behalf of Indigenous groups.
This led to demonstrations about the Coastal Gas Link project in BC and nationwide solidarity demonstrations that were only halted by the pandemic lockdown (Rastello 2020).
The oil and gas industries are recognizing that the current downturn is no exception and that they can no longer rely on conventional markets to sell their products because market prices are too low and unpredictable, and products will be increasingly subject to regulation and carbon pricing.
In the oil sands sector, Suncor has developed a partnership with Enerkem, which turns household garbage into biofuels at a renewable production scale (Corporate Knights 2020).
The oil sector industry and Alberta Innovates are focusing on innovation and value added to the oil sands resources.
Bitumen Beyond Combustion (BBC) is considering opportunities to produce carbon fiber at large scale to produce lighter, more energy efficient vehicles, including electric vehicles, which could potentially quadruple the revenue from Alberta’s current bitumen output with an added economic potential of carbon fibre, activated carbon and asphalt binder in the range of 84 billion dollars annually (Corporate Knights 2020).
Industry is looking at the development of green hydrogen (from renewable energy) and blue hydrogen (from natural gas with steam methane reforming) as zero carbon fuel solutions.
These new directions overlap with German and EU policy directions and interests and suggest some possible areas for future collaboration.
These movements, along with a shift in public opinion that acknowledges the climate emergency, suggest that a decline in vested interests is emerging and that alliances are shifting.
44 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Comparing German and Canadian Experiences with Clean Energy Transitions Recent developments in Canada, Germany, and the EU suggest that policy makers increasingly recognize that they can no longer avoid addressing climate change.
Climate change, and the accompanying need for a low-carbon energy transition, has been given greater priority on the policy agenda.
With the European Green Deal and the strength of the Green party in German and EU politics, climate change is high on Germany’s political agenda.
Political forces are also shifting in Canada where climate change for the first time became a serious federal election issue in 2019, and a national framework is now in place with the PCF.
Despite political pushback by certain provinces, public opinion is on the side of more aggressive climate change policy, and even the fossil fuel industry is realizing that they need to be creative in pursuing newer and greener directions.
Industry is starting to understand that Canada must advance passed its old staples approach based on the export of its abundant natural resources.
Industry and provinces such as Alberta are realizing that diversification of the economy and a longer vision based on value-added and innovative cleaner technologies are more important than volatile and unpredictable fossil fuel markets and trade partners.
Still, as much as Germany needs to find ways to transition coal regions into regions pursuing cleaner technologies, Canada needs to transition its oil and gas sector into cleaner technologies and more value-added processes.
Certainly, neither Canada, Germany, nor the EU have done enough to date to mitigate against climate change, yet there are signs of a growing willingness on the part of their governments, industry, and society to support innovative plans and programs that shift energy and economic structures in new directions (Balthasar, Schreurs, and Varone 2019).
While all three have at times slid back into entrenched behaviors, more recent climate plans, programs, and targets give some hope that economically difficult choices are possible even in the face of strong industrial or local opposition to sectoral and regional transformations.
The comparison shows that overcoming opposition from legacy industries has been and remains challenging.
In the case of Germany, this can be seen from the lack of progress in reducing emissions from the transport sector despite the efforts of the EU to introduce more stringent emission limits.
The difficulty of phasing out legacy industries is also evident in the relatively late phase-out of coal.
As a point of reference, the phase-out of nuclear energy began in the 1970s and was legislated first in 1990 and again in 2011; demands for a phase out of coal, on the other hand, took hold much later, only in the 2010s, with legislation only implemented in 2019.
The lack of action addressing emissions from the coal and transport sectors has challenged Germany’s claims to be a climate leader based on its successes with renewable energy development.
Although renewable energy has been rapidly expanding for many years, emissions have shown little improvement because of the country’s inability to wean itself of its dependence on coal and conventional automobiles.
Reaching an agreement to phase out coal was only possible with promises of large compensation programs to the affected industry and regions and increasingly strong demands from the public.
Certainly, it was also important that the long-term outlook for the coal industry is bleak given global shifts towards introducing prices on carbon emissions as well as the declining costs of renewables.
In the case of the transport sector, it may take international competition and top-down EU directives to bring about a faster transition.
In the case of Canada, a significant hydropower base, the expansion of renewable energy, the North American shale gas revolution, and continued dependence on nuclear energy have made coal redundant, both economically and environmentally.
The same has not been true for oil and gas.
45 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 These industries remain politically extremely powerful in western provinces, but face growing opposition from environmentalists, Indigenous groups, the general public, and increasingly the financial sector.
Still, while oil and gas interests in western provinces remain substantial, developments south of the border are changing the economics of oil and gas.
The cancellation of the Keystone Pipeline sends a powerful message and changes calculations both for Alberta and the federal government.
The federal government’s plan to overcome western Canadian resistance to an energy transition by owning the Transmountain Pipeline is a political hurdle and puts in doubt the seriousness of their climate change targets and commitments.
Public opinion in both countries is also increasingly demanding stronger government action to combat climate change.
Fridays for Future has been a powerful force calling for change in Germany and has also established a presence in Canada.
Transatlantic energy and climate linkages and low carbon transitions Achieving climate neutrality will require action on all fronts.
Germany and Canada have a number of opportunities to work more closely together in achieving their targets and goals while advancing innovative new economic sectors and more socially and environmentally responsible supply chains.
The recently ratified free trade agreement (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) that removed most of the tariffs between Canada and the EU sets the stage for further cooperation for climate and energy.
In both Germany and Canada, industry is recognizing that change is in the air.
Canadian oil provinces are more desperate than before to diversify their economies and invest into innovative processes.
Germany, like other EU states, is similarly eager to be a leader in clean energy technologies.
This provides an opportunity to innovate and invest in the clean tech sector, not only in renewable technologies but also in clean fuels, alternative aviation fuels, and new supply chains to extract and process transition minerals and metals (World Bank 2017; 2020) and to advance the circular economy.
A closer partnership between Germany and Canada is also of strategic importance.
Both Germany and Canada depend on trade and energy relations with partners that are increasingly acting in their own single national interests.
For Germany (and the EU), energy relations with both Russia and the US are complicated.
For Canada energy relations with the US have changed recently since the US has become an energy superpower in its own right and is now less dependent on Canada’s oil and gas sector.
The US has also restricted trade and foreign imports (e.g., at the expense of the Canadian automotive and aluminum sector) with their ‘Buy American’ program that is continued under the Biden Administration.
Many materials and metals that are required to enable clean energy development and a green transition are sourced from countries with unstable governments and are extracted with unsustainable and unethical methods (for example cobalt extraction in Congo) or are controlled by powerful countries like China.
Since Canada has all of the metals and minerals and some infrastructure and know-how in automotive and energy sectors, and Germany has expertise in advancing clean technologies and processes, there are a number of opportunities that could be further explored.
Four areas for potential transatlantic collaboration are highlighted here.
46 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Clean Energy Innovation Mission Innovation is a global initiative between 24 countries (including Canada) and the European Commission to accelerate clean energy innovation.
The initiative has set eight specific innovation challenges (ICs) (IC1: Smart grids, IC2: Off-grid access to electricity, IC3: Carbon capture, IC4: Sustainable biofuels, IC5: Converting sunlight, IC6: Clean energy material, IC7: Affordable heating and cooling of building, and IC8: Renewable and clean hydrogen).
Canada and the EU are participating in all of the eight challenges.
Canada is one of the co-leads on IC4 and IC6, while the EU is one of the co-leads on IC5, IC7, and IC8.
Germany is a co-lead on IC5 and IC8 as well, but is not participating in IC4.
There is, therefore, already a strong partnership between the EU, Germany, and Canada on clean technology innovation.
Linking of Carbon Markets Through the PCF, Canada is committed to carbon pricing or equivalent emissions reductions with an incremental rise of the carbon price by 10 dollars per tonne of carbon equivalent until it hits 50 dollars in 2022.
Québec has a cap-and-trade program with California that also involved Ontario for a short period of time.
That system is similar to the EU ETS and could potentially be linked.
A larger emissions trading system would reduce the emission reduction cost for some provinces and Member States through trade with jurisdictions that have lower abatement costs.
A combined system would also ensure the same carbon price, eliminate carbon leakage and would advance trade links and further implementation of CETA.
An expanded EU ETS would allow for growing emission trading opportunities and a reduced increase in the anticipated EU ETS price.
Development of a Just and Sustainable Energy Transition Supply Chain There is a unique opportunity for Canadian-German cooperation on renewable energy and battery technology advancement as well as on establishing socially responsible electric vehicle manufacturing hubs.
Canada has a crucial supply of nickel, cobalt, and some of the largest known reserves and resources for rare earth metals (NR Can 2020), as well as many other vital energy transition minerals.
Both Germany and Canada have strong auto-supply chains.
Canada has promising start-ups in EV buses and trucks (Torrie, Bak and Heaps 2020) and low speed EV passenger vehicles.
A natural collaboration between German auto manufacturers, Canadian mining companies and auto-supply centres in Ontario and Québec is sensible especially as US auto manufacturers are withdrawing from Canadian production centres.
Furthermore, corporate finance as well as consumers are demanding more sustainable, just and ethical supply chains, from mineral extraction to material recycling.
Partnering on Advancement of the Circular Economy An important component of a just and sustainable clean energy supply chain is the development of a circular economy.
Here, Germany and the EU have been leaders.
Canada could learn from the EU’s initiatives and experiences in developing new collaborative production processes with blue and green hydrogen, battery and EV production, biofuel development (particularly sustainable aviation fuels), and low carbon materials.
Insights from these innovative production processes could then be used to reform other existing sectors of the economy in order to transition to a large scale (across sectors) circular economy approach.
47 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Germany and Canada can more easily meet their own climate change and energy security objectives if they work together on linking emissions trading and carbon pricing mechanisms, furthering clean energy innovation, advancing circular economy concepts, and developing new supply chains from mining exploration to recycling of crucial metals and minerals.
Pursuing such transatlantic partnerships will provide opportunities for a more just green transition that reduces inequalities through redistribution of carbon pricing proceeds, the retraining of employees in hard hit sectors, and a meaningful and respectful inclusion of Indigenous Peoples.
The colonial expropriation of the lands of Indigenous Peoples has had serious environmental consequences and negative social impacts; it has also presented obstacles to the ability of Indigenous people to partake in the benefits deriving from energy sector production.
As major greenhouse gas emitters, Europe and Canada have had significant impacts on Indigenous Peoples and developing countries., and, therefore, share a responsibility to change this situation and find a sustainable path together with the leadership and advice of Indigenous Peoples and impacted communities.
The opportunity of alliances between new industrial branches, environmentalists and Indigenous interests to enable a just transition to a low or no carbon economy that is circular and inclusive is on the horizon.
Governments need to support this direction and make sure it will be realized.
48 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 REFERENCES Abnett, Kate.
2020.
“European Lawmakers to Consider Tougher Climate Law: Draft,” Reuters, May 8, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-eu-law-idINKBN22K10P.
Agora Energiewende.
2021.
“Corona-Jahr 2020: Rekordrückgänge bei CO2-Emissionen und Kohleverstromung,” January 5, 2021. https://www.agora-energiewende.de/presse/neuigkeiten-archiv/corona-jahr-2020rekordrueckgaenge-bei-co2-emissionen-und-kohleverstromung/ .
Baddour, Dylan.
2020.
“Massive Guyana Oil Find Continues To Grow With Fresh Exxon Discovery.” Forbes, January 27, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/dylanbaddour/2020/01/27/massive-guyana-oil-findcontinues-to-grow-with-fresh-exxon-discovery/#8fc3c1527814.
Balthasar, Andreas, Miranda A. Schreurs, and Frédéric Varone.
2020.
“Energy Transition in Europe and the United States: Policy Entrepreneurs and Veto Players in Federalist Systems.” The Journal of Environment and Development (29) 1: 3-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496519887489.
Bayer, Patrick, and Michaël Aklin.
2020.
“The European Union Emissions Trading System Reduced CO2 Emissions Despite Low Prices.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) 117 (16): 8804-8812. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918128117.
Benz, Arthur and Jörg Broschek.
2020.
“Transformative Energy Policy in Federal Systems: Canada and Germany Compared.” Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies 14 (2):56-78.
Brauers, Hanna, Philipp Herpich, and Pao-Yu Oei.
2018.
“The Transformation of the German Coal Sector from 1950 to 2017: An Historical Overview.” In Energiewende “Made in Germany”: Low Carbon Electricity Sector Reform in the European Context, edited by Christian von Hirschhausen, Clemens Gerbaulet, Claudia Kemfert, Casimir Lorenz, and Pao-Yu Oei, 4580.
Cham: Springer.
Bues, Andreas.
2020.
Social Movements Against Wind Power in Canada and Germany: Energy Policy and Contention.
New York: Springer.
Bush, Elizabeth, and Donald S. Lemmen, eds.
2019.
Canada’s Changing Climate Report.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Bundestag.
2020.
“Gesetzesbeschluss des Deutschen Bundestages.
Gesetz zur Reduzierung und zur Beendigung der Kohleverstromung und zur Änderung weiterer Gesetze (Kohleausstiegsgesetz).” Drucksache 392/20.
July 3, 2020.
Burck, Jan, Ursula Hagen, Niklas Höhne, Leonardo Nascimento, and Christoph Bals, 2019.
“Climate Change Performance Index 2020: Results.” Bonn: Germanwatch e.V.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-eu-law-idINKBN22K10P https://www.agora-energiewende.de/presse/neuigkeiten-archiv/corona-jahr-2020-rekordrueckgaenge-bei-co2-emissionen-und-kohleverstromung/ https://www.agora-energiewende.de/presse/neuigkeiten-archiv/corona-jahr-2020-rekordrueckgaenge-bei-co2-emissionen-und-kohleverstromung/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/dylanbaddour/2020/01/27/massive-guyana-oil-find-continues-to-grow-with-fresh-exxon-discovery/%238fc3c1527814.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dylanbaddour/2020/01/27/massive-guyana-oil-find-continues-to-grow-with-fresh-exxon-discovery/%238fc3c1527814.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496519887489 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918128117 49 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Burk, Jan, Ursula Hagen, Niklas Höhne, Leonardo Nascimento, Tasneem Essop, Sophia Binz, Violeta Helling, and Björk Lucas, 2020.
“Climate Change Performance Index 2021: Results.” Bonn: Germanwatch e.V.
Clarke, Harold, and Jon H. Pammett.
2020.
“Environmental Issues in Recent British and Canadian Elections.” Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies 14 (2): 102-128.
Clausen, Jens.
2019.
Verbreitung radikaler Systeminnovationen.
Fallbeispiel Stromversorgung Deutschland.
Berlin: Borderstep Institut.
Climate Watch.
2018.
Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
https://www.climatewatchdata.org.
Crippa, Monica, Diego Guizzardi, Marilena Muntean, Edwin Schaaf, Efisio Solazzo, Fabio Monforti-Ferrario, Jos Olivier, and Elisabetta Vignati.
2020.
Fossil CO2 emissions of all world countries: 2020 Report.
Luxembourg: European Union.
Deutscher Bundestag.
2019.
“Gesetze zur Einführung eines Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetzes und zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften.” Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang, December 12, 2019.
Teil I Nr.
48, Bonn.
2513-2520.
Donner, Simon.
2016.
“Statement on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Associated with the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion,” Maribo, August 17, 2016. https://blogs.ubc.ca/maribo/2016/08/17/statement-on-greenhouse-gas-emissionsassociated-with-the-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/.
Eco Justice.
2020.
“B.C.
government breaks promise on key climate deadline.” December 7, 2020. https://ecojustice.ca/pressrelease/b-c-government-breaks-promise-on-key-climatedeadline/.
Eichhammer, Wolfgang, Ulla Boede, Frank Gagelmann, Eberhard Jochem, Nicola Kling, Joachim Schleich, Barbara Schlomann, Joch Chesshire, and Hans-Joachim Ziesing.
2001.
“Greenhouse Gas Reductions in Germany and the UK – Coincidence or Policy Induced?
An Analysis for International Climate Policy.” Environmental Research of the Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Research Report 201 41 133, UBA-FB 000193. https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/publikation/long/1987.pdf.
European Commission.
2019.
“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal.” COM(2019)640 final.
Brussels.
_____.
2020a.
“Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 2019 assessment of the progress made by Member States towards the national energy efficiency targets for 2030 and towards the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive as required by Article 24(3) of the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/2/EU, 20.7.” Brussels.
https://www.climatewatchdata.org./ https://blogs.ubc.ca/maribo/2016/08/17/statement-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-associated-with-the-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/ https://blogs.ubc.ca/maribo/2016/08/17/statement-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-associated-with-the-trans-mountain-pipeline-expansion/ https://ecojustice.ca/pressrelease/b-c-government-breaks-promise-on-key-climate-deadline/ https://ecojustice.ca/pressrelease/b-c-government-breaks-promise-on-key-climate-deadline/ https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/publikation/long/1987.pdf 50 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 _____.
2020b.
“Emissions Trading: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduced by 8.7% in 2019.” May 4, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-greenhouse-gas-emissionsreduced-87-2019_en.
_____.
2020c.
“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A New Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and more competitive Europe.” COM(2020) 98 final.
Brussels.
_____.
2020d.
“Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate law).
COM/2020/80 final.
Brussels.
_____.
N.d. “Progress made in cutting emissions.” https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress_en.
European Council.
2020.
“Special European Council.” July 17-21, 2020. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/17-21/.
European Environment Agency.
2019.
“Share of Renewable Energy in Gross Final Energy Consumption in Europe.” https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewablegross-final-energy-consumption-4/assessment-4.
Eurostat.
2021.
“Share of energy consumption from renewable sources.” March 30, 2021. https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energyconsumption-5/assessment.
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD, Deutscher Bundestag.
2019.
“Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung eines Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetzes und zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften.” Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 19/14337.
October 22, 2019.
Frauenhofer ISE.
2020.
“German Net Electricity Generation in First Half of 2020: Renewables Reach Record Share of 55.8 Percent.” July 1, 2020. https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/en/pressmedia/press-releases/2020/net-energy-production-first-half-of-2020.html.
Government of Canada.
2019.
“Progress towards Canada’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Target.” Greenhouse Gas Projections 14. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climatechange/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gasemissions-reduction-target.html.
_____.
2016.
Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
_____.
1990.
Canada’s Green Plan: Canada’s Green Plan for a Healthy Environment.
Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduced-87-2019_en.
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduced-87-2019_en.
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress_en https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/12-21/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/07/12-21/ https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-4/assessment-4 https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-4/assessment-4 https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-5/assessment https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/renewable-gross-final-energy-consumption-5/assessment https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-target.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-target.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/progress-towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-target.html 51 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Gramiak, Mary, and Stephan Schott.
2018.
“Amplifying Indigenous Voices in National Energy Governance and the Sustainable Development Strategy.” In How Ottawa Spends, 20182019: Next?, edited by Katherine Graham and Allan M. Maslove, 53-67.
Ottawa: Carleton University, School of Public Policy and Administration.
Gtschow, Johannes, Louise Jeffery, Robert Gieseke, and Ronja Gebel.
2017.
“The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850-2014).” V. 1.1.
GFZ Data Services.
http://doi.org/10.5880/PIK.2017.001.
Hager, Carol.
2016.
“The Grassroots Origins of the German Energy Transition.” In Germany’s Energy Transition: A Comparative Perspective, edited by Carol Hager and Christoph H. Stefes, 1-26.
New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Harrison, Kathryn.
2020.
“The Fleeting Canadian Harmony on Carbon Pricing.” Policy Options, July 8, 2020.
Hey, Christian.
2010.
“The German Paradox: Climate Leader and Green Car Laggard.” In The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy, edited by Sebastian Oberthür, Marc Pallemaerts, and Claire Roche Kelly, 211-230.
Brussels: Institute for European Studies.
Howlett, Michael, and Keith Brownsey.
2005.
“The Post-Staples State: The Political Economy of Canada’s Primary Industries.” Policy and Society 26 (1): 1–7.
Hughes, Larry.
2020.
“Provinces Are Meeting Their Climate Targets ?” Policy Options, March 11, 2020.
Ibbitson, John.
2019.
“The Conservative Party Has Lost Its Way.
It Can’t Go Back It’s Time to Forge a New Path,” The Globe and Mail, October 31, 2019. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-the-conservative-party-has-lost-its-wayit-cant-go-back-its-time/.
International Energy Agency (IEA).
2021.
“Oil 2021Analysis and forecast to 2026.” March 20, 2021. https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/resources/oil-2021-analysis-and-forecast-to-2026/.
Jordan, Andrews, Harro van Asselt, Frans Berkhout, Dave Huitema, and Tim Rayner.
2012.
“Understanding the Paradoxes of Multi-level Governing: Climate Change Policy in the European Union.” Global Environmental Politics 12 (2): 43-66.
Lederer, Markus.
2020.
“Climate Change Politics in Canada and the EU: From Carbon Democracy to a Green Deal.” Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies 14 (2): 9-28.
Machin, Amanda.
2019.
“Changing the Story?
The Discourse of Ecological Modernisation in the European Union.” Environmental Politics 28 (2): 208-27.
Macdonald, Douglas.
2020.
Carbon Province, Hydro Province: The Challenge of Canadian Energy and Climate Federalism.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
http://doi.org/10.5880/PIK.2017.001.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-the-conservative-party-has-lost-its-way-it-cant-go-back-its-time/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-the-conservative-party-has-lost-its-way-it-cant-go-back-its-time/ https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/resources/oil-2021-analysis-and-forecast-to-2026/ 52 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 MacLean, Jason.
2018.
“Paris and Pipelines?
Canada’s Climate Policy Puzzle.” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 32 (1): 47–74.
Manulak, Michael W. 2016.
“Explaining Canada’s Foreign Environmental Policies during the Harper Era.” In The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics, and Canada’s Global Posture, edited by Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha, 121-134.
Vancouver: UBC Press.
McGlade, Christoph, and Paul Ekins.
2015.
“The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C.” Nature 517: 187–90.
Miller, Joe, and Peter Campbell.
2019.
“German Car Industry Faces ‘Day of Reckoning’.” Financial Times, December 1, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/5c304e72-120a-11eaa7e6-62bf4f9e548a.
Natural Resources Canada.
2019.
“Oil Resources.” Last updated December 16, 2019. https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/energy-sources-distribution/crude-oil/oil-resources/18085.
Oei, Pao-Yu.
2018.
“Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions and the Phasing-out of Coal in Germany.” In Energiewende “Made in Germany”: Low Carbon Electricity Sector Reform in the European Context, edited by Christian von Hirschhausen, Clemens Gerbaulet, Claudia Kemfert, Casimir Lorenz, and Pao-Yu Oei, 81-116.
Cham: Springer.
Oki, Takahiro.
2020.
“European Fuel Economy Policy for New Passenger Cars: A Historical Comparative Analysis of Discourses and Change Factors.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-020-09510-7.
Pidcock, Roz.
2015.
“Meeting Two Degree Climate Target Means 80 Per Cent of World’s Coal Is ‘Unburnable’, Study Says.” https://www.carbonbrief.org/meeting-two-degree-climatetarget-means-80-per-cent-of-worlds-coal-is-unburnable-study-says.
Powering Past Coal Alliance.
2019.
“Climate Change Minsiter Claire Perry Launches Powering Past Coal Alliance at COP23,” November 16, 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/climate-change-minister-claire-perry-launchespowering-past-coal-alliance-at-cop23.
Railway Technology.COM 2020.
“Québec-Windsor Corridor,” Online Railway Technology Forum.
https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/quebec/.
Rastello, Sandrine.
2020.
“Canadian Pipeline Segment Faces Delay amid Indigenous Protests,” Bloomberg, February 22, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0222/canadian-pipeline-segment-faces-delay-amid-indigenous-protests.
Reuters.
2018.
“Germany to Reach Target of 1 Million Electric Cars Later than Planned.” September 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-autos-idUSKCN1LZ29E.
https://www.ft.com/content/5c304e72-120a-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a.
https://www.ft.com/content/5c304e72-120a-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a.
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/energy-sources-distribution/crude-oil/oil-resources/18085.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-020-09510-7 https://www.carbonbrief.org/meeting-two-degree-climate-target-means-80-per-cent-of-worlds-coal-is-unburnable-study-says.
https://www.carbonbrief.org/meeting-two-degree-climate-target-means-80-per-cent-of-worlds-coal-is-unburnable-study-says.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/climate-change-minister-claire-perry-launches-powering-past-coal-alliance-at-cop23 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/climate-change-minister-claire-perry-launches-powering-past-coal-alliance-at-cop23 https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/quebec/ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-22/canadian-pipeline-segment-faces-delay-amid-indigenous-protests https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-22/canadian-pipeline-segment-faces-delay-amid-indigenous-protests https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-autos-idUSKCN1LZ29E 53 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Schott, Stephan, and Graham Campbell.
2013.
“National Energy Strategies of Major Industrialized Countries.” In International Handbook of Energy Security,” edited by Hugh Dyer and Maria Julia Trombetta.
Edward Elgar Publishing; Elgaronline.
pp.
174–205.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007907.00019.
Schreurs, Miranda A.
2011.
“Federalism and the Climate: Canada and the European Union.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 66 (1): 91-108.
Schreurs, Miranda A., and Dörte Ohlhorst.
2015.
“NIMBY and YIMBY: Movements For and Against Renewable Energy in Germany and the United States.” In NIMBY is Beautiful: Local Activism and Environmental Activism in Germany and Beyond, edited by Carol Hager and Mary Alice Haddad, 60-86.
New York: Berghahn Books.
Schreurs, Miranda, and Yves Tiberghien.
2010.
“European Union Leadership in Climate Change: Mitigation through Multilevel Reinforcement.” In Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change, edited by Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, 23-66.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
_____.
2007.
“Multi-level Reinforcement: Explaining EU Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation.” Global Environmental Politics 7 (4): 19-46.
Schulz, Florence.
2020.
“German Cabinet Approves Final ‘Coal Phase-Out Act,’” Euractiv, June 25, 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/german-cabinet-finally-approvesthe-coal-phase-out/.
Statistics Canada.
2021.
“Population Estimates, Quarterly, Table 17-10-0009-01.” https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000901.
Stefes, Christoph H. 2016.
“Critical Junctures and the German Energiewende.” In Germany’s Energy Transition: A Comparative Perspective, edited by Carol Hager and Christoph H. Stefes, 63-90.
New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
The Economist.
2019.
“Pocketbooks and the Planet: Climate Change Dominates Canada’s Election.” October 10, 2019. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/10/10/climate-change-dominates-canadaselection.
The White House 2021.
Executive Order on Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, section 6, January 20, 2021.
Tiberghien, Yves, ed.
2013.
Minerva’s Rule.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Torrie, Ralph, Céline Bak, and Toby Heaps.
2020.
“Building Back Better: A Roadmap to the Canada We Want.” Corporate Knights, June 3, 2020. https://www.corporateknights.com/channels/leadership/investing-quality-jobs-build-backbetter-15911930/.
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007907.00019 https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/german-cabinet-finally-approves-the-coal-phase-out/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/german-cabinet-finally-approves-the-coal-phase-out/ https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000901.
https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/10/10/climate-change-dominates-canadas-election https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/10/10/climate-change-dominates-canadas-election https://www.corporateknights.com/channels/leadership/investing-quality-jobs-build-back-better-15911930/ https://www.corporateknights.com/channels/leadership/investing-quality-jobs-build-back-better-15911930/ 54 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Transport Canada.
2020.
“Zero-emission vehicles.” Accessed June 9, 2020, https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/road/innovative-technologies/zero-emissionvehicles.html.
Von Hirschhausen, Christian.
2018.
“German Energy and Climate Policies: A Historical Overview”.
In Energiewende “Made in Germany”: Low Carbon Electricity Sector Reform in the European Context, edited by Christian von Hirschhausen, Clemens Gerbaulet, Claudia Kemfert, Casimir Lorenz, and Pao-Yu Oei, 17-44.
Cham: Springer.
Von Hirschhausen, Christian, Clemens Gerbaulet, Claudia Kemfert, Casimir Lorenz and Pao-Yu Oei, eds.
2016.
Energiewende “Made in Germany”: Low Carbon Electricity Sector Reform in the European Context.
Cham: Springer.
Watkins, Melville H. 1963.
“A Staple Theory of Economic Growth.” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 29 (2): 141-158.. https://doi.org/10.2307/139461.
Winfield, Mark and Douglas Macdonald 2020.
“Federalism and Canadian Climate Policy.” In Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy, edited by Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, 4th edition.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Worldometers.
2020.
Coal Reserves by Country.
https://www.worldometers.info/coal/coalreserves-by-country/.
Wurzel, Rüdiger K. W., James Connelly, and Duncan Liefferink, eds.
2017.
The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead?
New York: Routledge.
https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/road/innovative-technologies/zero-emission-vehicles.html.
https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/road/innovative-technologies/zero-emission-vehicles.html.
https://doi.org/10.2307/139461 https://www.worldometers.info/coal/coal-reserves-by-country/ https://www.worldometers.info/coal/coal-reserves-by-country/ 55 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 29-55 ISSN 2562-8429 Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index The Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies (CJERS – formerly Review of European and Russian Affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review.
Topics relate to the European Union, its Member States, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe.
The journal is published by the Centre for European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University.
CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship.
Contact: Carleton University The Centre for European Studies 1103 Dunton Tower 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada Tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext.
3117; E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca Creative Commons License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This Working Paper is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-CommercialNo Derivs 4.0 Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged.
No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes.
ISSN: 2562-8429 © 2019 The Author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index mailto:CJERS@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting e-ISSN 2300-3065 p-ISSN 2300-12402013, volume 2, issue 1 Data wpłynięcia: 21.05.2013; data zaakceptowania: 18.06.2013.
* Dane kontaktowe: marcw@doktorant.umk.pl.
Marcelina WięckoWska* Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu the role bonds in financing cliMate resilient econoMy Keywords: climate bond, environmental finance, low-carbon economy.
JEL Classification: Q54.
Abstract: Climate bonds are a new category of climate-related financial products in environmental finance.
The validity of the emergence of climate bond market seems reasonable to attract private capital to finance climate-resilient economy and to make the recognition of green investment easier for potential investors.
Investments in low-carbon assets and technology to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets or investments to adopt to extreme weather conditions are just examples of sources of the capital needed.
Developing the potential of green bond market has not been fully exploited so far.
In the future, the most important determinants to stimulate the growth of the market will be green standardizations that are currently under construction.
Positive outlook also results from existence of institutional investors represents tens of trillion USD and intends to incorporate climate change into investment strategies.
Not without significance is the fact that green sukuk will enlarge the spectrum of climate-related financial products.
Translated by Marcelina Więckowska Rola obligacji w finansowaniu gospodarki odpornej na zmiany klimatyczne Słowa kluczowe: finansowanie ochrony środowiska, gospodarka niskoemisyjna, obligacje klimatyczne.
Klasyfikacja JEL: Q54.
http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/CJFA.2013.011 Marcelina Więckowska154 Abstrakt: Obligacje klimatyczne są nową kategorią instrumentów finansowych powiązanych z finansowaniem ochrony środowiska naturalnego.
Zasadność wyłonienia takiego segmentu rynku z jednej strony wynika z konieczności akceleracji inwestycji sektora prywatnego w celu finansowania gospodarki odpornej na zmiany klimatu, z drugiej strony daje możliwość szybszej identyfikacji zielonych inwestycji przez stronę popytową tego rynku.
Inwestycje w technologie niskoemisyjne w celu sprostania wytycznym ustanowionym w Protokole z Kioto czy inwestycje dostosowawcze będące konsekwencją nasilających się ekstremalnych zjawisk pogodowych są jedynie przykładami źródeł potrzeb kapitałowych.
Jak dotąd, potencjał rozwoju rynku zielonych obligacji nie został w pełni wykorzystany.
W przyszłości najważniejszym bodźcem w rozwoju tego rynku będą obecnie tworzone zielone standardy emisji.
Szansą dla rozwoju rynku zielonych obligacji jest także potencjał inwestorów instytucjonalnych (niejednokrotnie zrzeszonych w organizacjach klimatycznych) reprezentujących dziesiątki bilionów dolarów i chcących uwzględniać kwestie klimatyczne w strategiach inwestycyjnych.
Nie bez znaczenia jest także poszerzenie spektrum instrumentów powiązanych z ochroną klimatu o zielone sukuk.
Introduction Preventing environmental degradation is not only intergenerational obligation but also a factor that impacts doing business and even affects the quality of human live.
Climate risk awareness and access to capital are fundamental issues to build low-carbon and climate resilient economy.
Financial market provides some solutions in this area through the offer of climate change-related financial products such as green or climate bond.
The idea of using securities to finance environmental protection is not new (see Dziawgo 1997), but only in recent times there started separation of climate or green bond category on global scale.
Standard definition of climate finance are currently under construction.
“Green bond” and “climate bond” are the most commonly used designations for bonds that finance environmental protections and climate resilient economy.
The Climate Bond Initiative (CBI 2011) working definitions focus on projects or assets that directly contribute to development of low carbon industries, technologies and practices to build low carbon economy.
Definition also includes bond issuances to finance essential adaptation to the consequences of climate change.
For the time being, definitions of green bond and climate bond essentially do not differ and purposes of the issuances are consistent.
In the future, however there are expected greater segmentations of green debt market.
The purpose of this paper is to explain why emergence and extension of climate bond market is reasonable and systematize determinants of the marThe role bonds in financing climaTe resilienT economy 155 ket development.
Paper also describes main features and specific categories of green bonds.
1.
Research methodology and research process The paper contains descriptive research studies.
To achieve the objectives were analyzed reports and surveys conducted by financial and international research institutions.
The analysis of green bond issuances allowed to systematizations this relatively new part of financial market.
The observations process of financial market trends and logical connections cause and effect relationship, made it possible to conclude on the determinants of climate bond market development.
2.
Climate bond as a tool of ecological risk management Ecological risk has many dimensions and affects to a certain extent all people, businesses and economies.
The effects of climate change and extreme events in nature are particularly acute for developing countries (disasters pose risks for agriculture, food, and water supplies).
Green bond is a tool that engages capital to be invested into sustainable projects.
The World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) raises capital to help affected people to climate change.
This securities help implementations of the Banks’ statutory duties.
The bank clearly defined ecological targets of bond issuance and coined a term of “green bond” (The World Bank 2012).
Not only the Word Bank Group, but also other multilateral development institutions helped to establish green bond market in 2007/2008 (but naturally single climate-theme bond issuance another issuers took place earlier).
The European Investment Bank was precursor to financing tied to climate change solutions project.
Since 2007 the EIB there have been launched Climate Awareness Bonds to support lending renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Subsequently other multilateral development banks started to issue environmental bonds (the Nordic Investment Bank) or clean energy bonds (the African Investment Bank and the Asian Investment Bank) to highlight pro-environmental bond issuance targets.
Environmental issues are not completely inert for businesses.
Research shows that companies are aware of potential risk from future climate changes but do not recon that their businesses are vulnerable to them.
However compaMarcelina Więckowska156 nies perceive more risks from extreme weather events which increase physical risks to business operations.
They are more interested in current climate variability rather than in the future climate change despite that the level of their awareness in both aspects is high.
In this case interaction is very simple: the more uncertainties around climate impacts the more companies’ investments are spent on adaptation (Agrawala et al.
2011).
However ecological risk management is not only voluntary process.
Countries must reach some environmental goals in the field of greenhouse gas emissions.
Requirements result from international provisions (initiated by the Kyoto Protocol).
This resulted that increasing number of companies are subject to carbon market regulations.
Investment in low carbon technology as well as possibility implementations of carbon offset policies cause the increase of capital requirements (Więckowska 2013).
Moreover worth noting that climate policy also affects return on investment in renewable energy sector.
Transformations to low carbon economy will require enormous investments.
Today in order to decarbonize the world’s energy system the amount of 1 trillion USD is invested annually.
Additional trillion per year is needed.
The cumulative investment in green growth should reach the amount of 36–42 trillion USD between 2012 and 2030 (Kaminker, Stewart 2012: 7).
Bond market is becoming more and more attractive as a source of financing renewable energy project.
However the business is still very risky and uncertain.
Interesting example of green debt is issuance of financing photovoltaic power project in California.
Topaz Solar Farm offered bond for 850 million USD.
Demand shows that this kind of investment may be very attractive to investors.
The oversubscribed was more than 400 million USD.
The securities obtain only BBB-rating, but it was the largest issuance for a renewable-energy project without a U.S. government guarantee.
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co is planning more issuance of solar bonds (Doom, Buhayar 2012).
3.
Key characteristics of the climate bonds market Chart 1 show the most important climate bond issuers.
Analysis of the bond supply allow describing first characteristic of the market.
Climate bonds financing green growth projects are generally related to: ■ renewable energy (e.g.
breeze bond, solar bond or broader: clean energy bond), Ch ar t 1 .
M aj or g re en b on d is su er s si nc e 20 06 C ha rt 1 .
M aj or g re en b on d is su er s si nc e 20 06 So ur ce : C ro ce e t a l. 20 11 : 3 9 (u pd at e ba se d on w eb si te s el ec te d in st itu tio ns ).
3, 5 0, 7 0, 3 0, 2 2, 2 0, 2 0, 7 0, 6 3, 2 2, 4 0, 4 0, 85 0 0, 51 1, 52 2, 53 3, 54 4, 5 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 billions USD S & P c re di t r at in g A nd ro m ed a So la r U SA – Q EC B U SA – CR EB Île d e Fr an ce W or ld B an k Eu ro pe an In ve st m en t B an k A si an D ev el op m en t B an k A fr ic an D ev el op m en t B an k In te rn at io na l Fi na nc e Co rp or at io n A lta W in d CR C Br ee ze To pa z So la r Fa rm BB B A A A A A A pr iv at e co m pa ni es n at io na l a nd lo ca l g ov er nm en ts m ul til at er al in st itu tio ns N or di c In ve st m en t B an k S o u r c e : C ro ce e t a l. 20 11 : 3 9 (u pd at e ba se d on w eb si te s el ec te d in st it ut io ns ).
Marcelina Więckowska158 ■ energy efficiency projects (transport efficiency, building efficiency, industrial efficiency), ■ projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions (e.g.
low carbon technologies), ■ waste management, ■ project that help countries adapt to effects of climate change (e.g.
flood protections or reforestations).
According to chart 1, all issuances of the multilateral development institutions have the highest credit quality.
Green bond with triple-A rating denote exposure to green investment without project risk.
Since 2008 the World Bank has issued green bonds of total value of 3,5 billion USD through 55 transactions in 17 currencies.
But latest issuance of the International Finance Corporations (IFC – total 2,2 billion USD) corresponding to the amount of 1 billion USD is the largest green bond issued to this date.
The IFC is also a member of the World Bank Group however is focused exclusively on the private sector.
Most of green bonds have the plain vanilla profile but there are also structured or covered bonds which become more and more popular.
Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative carried by the European Investment Bank is an example.
The idea of this new initiative is to attract private capital by providing credit enhancement to project companies and improve credit quality of the bonds.
In this case the EIB support investment involves inter alia transport and energy sector.
However basic instruments of expansion to sustainable energy efficiency project applied by the EIB are still in Climate Awareness Bonds program.
Since 2007 the European Investment Bank through climate bond has raised over 1,7 billion EUR (about 2,2 billion USD) equivalent.
Bonds supported by government incentives are another class of climate bonds.
The bigger bond issuance was driven by US government programs Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds (QECB) and Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREB).
QECBs may be issued by state, local and tribal governments.
Examples of qualified energy project include: investment in public buildings, green communities, renewable energy production or even energy efficiency educational campaigns.
CREBs may be issued by public power utilities, electric cooperatives, government entities (states, cities) to finance renewable energy projects.
QECBs and CREBs were initially constructed as tax credit bonds.
But in march 2010 rules were changed from tax credit bonds to direct subsidy bonds.
Green bonds can be also asset backed securities (ABS).
This type of debt is tied to specific green projects.
For example CRC Breeze II bonds based on secuThe role bonds in financing climaTe resilienT economy 159 ritization were issued by a hedge fund through a Special Purpose Vehicle.
This type of bonds is important innovation but very risky – returns depend largely on wind blows.
In 2010 due to low wind levels over the past four years breeze bonds were downgraded (Croce et al.
2011: 49).
In 2008 financial market participations started to create more sophisticated green structured product.
The first synthetic green bonds (called the Environment Optimizer/Top Green Bond 1) were offered by Société Générale.
This product was linked to the performance of the Lyxor Dynamic Environment Fund, which offered exposure to the SGI Global Environment Index.
Investors in the worst case received nominal return of 0% (get back face value), but also maximum return was capped at 8% (Croce et al.
2011: 48).
Global financial crisis interrupted development of trend of green structured finance.
To sum up, the typical categories of climate bonds include (see also Inderst et al.
2012: 28): ■ bonds issued by multilateral development institutions (IBRD, EIB, IFC etc.
), ■ corporate bonds (issued by a green company), ■ sovereign or municipal bonds (e.g.
CREBs, Île de France), ■ asset backed (tied to specific green project).
At this point, analysis should be completed about bond issuances by banks defined as ecological.
This kind of bank works as typically commercial bank but specializes in financing pro-ecological economic undertakings.
The eco-banks connect ecological and economic criteria in making investment decisions.
There are not many institutions of this kind.
The Bank Ochrony Środowiska SA in Poland and UmweltBank AG in Germany are examples (Dziawgo 2003: 72–81).
4.
The state of the climate bond market in 2012 First estimations about outstanding global climate-theme bond issuances were conducted for HSBC and the Climate Bond Initiative (see Robins, Knight 2012).
Research disclosed size and structure of climate bond market.
Outstanding value of climate bond was estimated for 174 billion USD (from 207 issuers, comprising over 1000 bonds).
82% of total issuance constituted corporate issuers, 13% from development banks and financial institutions, 3% concerned project bonds and 2% municipal bonds.
Table 1 shows precise structure of the climate bond market by low-carbon sectors.
According to presented data, dominate issuance (119 billion USD) constituted bond finance low-carbon transport (notably rail).
Moreover, the issuance Marcelina Więckowska160 of Eurofima (which is rail financing institution) reached further 15 billion USD.
Geographically, largest source of outstanding bonds came from Europe (67% of the global market).
UK institutions have issued 23% climate bond, France 17% of the total.
USA climate bond market constituted also 17%.
In turn Russia, Canada and China all at 3% each.
The amount of 175 billion concerns fully-aligned climate bond issuance.
This means that issuers are 100% exposed to climate themes.
Authors of the study introduce additional classifications.
If revenue exposure is more than 50% bonds are classified as strongly-aligned while those between 10–50% are weakly-aligned.
HSBC and CBI estimated that further 210 billion USD are strongly-aligned.
In addition, there have been identified 369 billion USD of conditionally-aligned bond.
These issuances come from sectors or technologies that are important to the climate economy (including biofuels, hydro, waste and water), but issuers have not revealed information for classifications bond as climate-theme.
This mean, that extra-financial disclosure and reporting referred to environmental effect still has not become common practice.
Table 1.
The global climate-themed bond universe by theme 2012 Specification Size of issuance Details bn USD % Transport 120,6 68,6% 119 bn USD linked to low carbon transport modes, vehicles, technologies and fuels Energy 29,4 12,7% 29 bn USD linked to low carbon energy: wind (38%), solar (28%), hydro (21%) Finance 22,4 12,7% 7,2 bn USD from multilateral development banks, 15 bn USD from Eurofima Buildings and Industry 1,5 0,9% energy efficiency of buildings and industry (including QECB) Waste and Pollution Control 1,2 0,7% recycling services or recycled products Agriculture and Forestry 0,7 0,4% sustainable paper and wood manufacturers, forest management companies S o u r c e s : Bloomberg, Climate Bond Initiative, HSBC; Robins, Knight 2012.
Presented estimations show that climate bond segment is very small comparing to global bond market (21 trillion USD according to BIS data).
What is more, according to OECD survey the bonds are dominant assets class in portfolio of institutional investors in most countries (see Kaminker, Stewart The role bonds in financing climaTe resilienT economy 161 2012: 34).
Climate bond market is young, but opportunities to develop the market are not fully exploited.
5.
Development of the climate bond market The determinants of development of climate bond market can be divided into following group: ■ climate bond supply factors (connected with issuers), ■ climate bond demand factors (connected with investors), ■ regulatory and institutional determinants of market development, ■ factors associated with risk of ecological investment, ■ factors related to the standardizations and functioning of the market.
Determinant of increasing climate bonds market brought about new multilateral development institutions which support sustainable development.
The United Kingdom formed the Green Investment Bank in 2012 to speed up the transition to green economy.
Australia in turn established the Clean Energy Finance Corporation.
These institutions are potential green bond issuers.
Another issue increasing climate bond market is perspective of some kind of industry, for example clean energy.
Finance renewable energy through green debt issuance becomes more important.
An example of that is bond issuance by Topaz Solar Farm (project MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co controlled by Berkshire Hathaway).
Huge potential lies also in issuance of corporates and municipalities.
Raise capital by climate bond issuance to finance pro-ecological undertakings may entail positive effect is financial results (remain competitive, cost saving).
From the institutional investor’s point of view, investment in green bond contribute to implementations of ESG (environmental, social and governance) policy.
Especially some institutions (such as assets management company or ecological investment funds) are profiled in the ecological and ethical investments.
The insurance industry has also created Principles for Sustainable Insurance (UNEP FI 2012).
Interest of institutional investor exposed to green investment is noticeable.
Institutional investors from all continents have formed groups to represent their interests e.g.
the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change or the Investor Network on Climate Risk (Kaminker, Stewart 2012: 19).
Furthermore, sovereign wealth funds and pensions funds from some countries (e.g.
Norway, Sweden, New Zealand) are obliged by low to ecological and ethical investments (Richardson 2011).
Also for individual investors Marcelina Więckowska162 (which becomes more and more aware of ecological risk) green bonds are perfect way for Social Responsible Investing.
These are the steps leading in the right directions.
Predictable and stable regulations and policy support are key factors to rise climate bond market.
The best proof of that is Global Investors Statement on Climate Change (2011) supported by 285 investors that represent 20 trillion USD asset under management.
In the statements investors postulate comprehensive and transparent policies with clear objective and targets to provide appropriate incentives to invest.
An important example of regulatory incentives is feed-in tariffs.
Many climate bond issuers based business on this policy mechanism (e.g.
Andromeda Solar, CRC Breeze Finance).
Another instance of eligible regulatory policy are tax incentives (e.g.
to create tax credit bonds) or credit enhancement tools (e.g.
to create covered bonds).
Finally, corporates can adapt for government climate policy in the field of emission reduction and renewable energy.
It requires capital for low-carbon investments.
Regulatory uncertainty and political unpredictably are not the only risks associated with green infrastructure.
The risk profile mostly depends on constructions of climate bond.
The risk associated with bond market include inter alia: price risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, currency risk.
In this case worth nothing, that green bond market still is too small for institutional investor.
Scarcity and not very large issuance cause low liquidity and high transaction costs.
In turn, risk resulting from the nature of project funding include high technological and operational risk.
Barriers to the development of climate bond markets are lack of quality data which makes it difficult to assess the risk green investment and correlation with investment from other sectors.
Lack of expertise and track records in new technologies also cause some problems.
Specific risks related to clean energy projects (particular concern for securitisation of clean energy assets such as onshore wind and solar plants) is volumetric risk.
This kind of risk is tied to productions volatility and, in fact depends on weather conditions.
(Kaminker, Stewart 2012: 31–44).
And finally, it should be noted that, important issue is also investors’ confidence that their money in practice contributes to low-carbon economy.
Last group of factors of green bond market development are connected with standardizations and functioning of the market.
It is worth recalling that the green bond concept was developed in 2007/2008.
Institutions cooperating with the World Bank in this area is Nordic bank SEB (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken).
SEB started to create green bond market as a response to increased The role bonds in financing climaTe resilienT economy 163 investor demand for climate-related fixed income product.
This was the beginning of market sharing of climate bond categories.
Now the SEB’s mission is “to make the green bond available across the credit and yield curves with various types of issuers (supranationals, corporates, governments) and risk class”.
These are a promising forecast to develop green bond market.
The Climate Bond Initiative (CBI) is another important organization contributing to growing climate bond market.
The organizations promoting investment that will contribute to build low-carbon economy.
CBI is currently developing the Climate Bond International Standards and Certification Scheme.
The Certification Scheme allows investors to recognize low-carbon investments with confidence that their funds are being used to finance ecological undertakings.
The Certification Scheme will include mechanisms for verification and monitoring of standard compliance.
Moreover, process of verifications “greenness” of the bond will be support appropriate standard in terms of accounting and reporting.
The Climate Bond International Standards is not financial but environmental standarization for bond’ issuer to encourage investors to increase their exposure to green projects.
6.
Green sukuk under the climate bond standard Interesting part of the global financial market constitute Islamic finance.
In 2012 there arose the concept of eco-friendly Islamic securities such as green sukuk.
In order to implement the idea, the Climate Bonds Initiative, the Clean Energy Business Council of the Middle East and North Africa and The Gulf Bond & Sukuk Association established Green Sukuk Working Group.
Experts will promote best practices of issuance of sukuks for financing climate resilient economy (Kidney 2012).
Sukuks are Shari`ah compliant investments to give right to receive a share of profits generated by an underlying asset base.
This financial products are commonly known as Islamic bonds and may have a form of interest-bearing investment certificates or fixed income securities (DIFC 2009).
Sukuks conform to Islam’s prohibition of usury and raised money cannot be invested in alcohol, gambling, tobacco, weapons or pork (OnIslam & Newspapers 2012).
Climate Bond Standards additionally will profile this instruments as environment friendly.
Green sukuk should be used to finance growing number of projects, for example renewable energy in the Middle East.
There is also urgent need to attract Marcelina Więckowska164 finance in developing Muslim countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan.
On the other hand the Climate Bond Standard will help investors identify Shari’ah compliant low-carbon investment (Kidney 2012).
Ethical nature of Islamic finance and growing number of SRI investor suggest using sukuk as a development tool.
In this context, it is worth to mention that in 2005 the World Bank issued first (so far the only one) sukuk (200 million USD) in Malaysia market.
Similarly International Finance Corporations issued sukuk (500 million RM) in Malaysia and in 2009 issued sukuk (100 million USD) that was listed on Nasdaq Dubai and the Bahrain Stock Exchange (Bennett, Iqbal 2011).
7.
Green uridashi bonds as an example of retail market investors Alongside with institutional investors the huge potential is involved in individual investors to finance low carbon economy.
In the field of green bond issuance, the retail Japanese market seems to be particularly attractive.
Chart 2 illustrates that individual investors decide about investment directions of the Japanese funds.
Daiwa Securities estimates that in 2009 total financial assets in the Japanese household reached 15,5 billion USD (in comparison, in UK and Germany about 6,7 billion USD and France 5,4 billion USD).
Chart 2.
Comparison the structure of savings by region in 2009 investors decide about investment directions of the Japanese funds.
Daiwa Securities estimates that in 2009 total financial assets in the Japanese household reached 15,5 billion USD (in comparison, in UK and Germany about 6,7 billion USD and France 5,4 billion USD).
Chart 2.
Comparison the structure of savings by region in 2009 Source: Daiwa Securities 2010.
Eurobond issuance directed to retail Japanese investors and denominated in foreign currency are called “uridashi”.
So far, green bonds designed for the Japanese investors have been issued mostly by the multilateral development institutions.
First the World Bank green uridashi bond was issued in 2010 (150 million NZD).
In turn the European Investment Bank issued Climate Awareness Bonds in Japan denominated in Australian dollars and South African rand (these two tranches was worth around 300 million EUR equivalent).
The Nordic Investment Bank and the African Development Bank also recognized the potential of uridashi market.
Nikko Asset management through SMBC Nikko World Bank Green Bond Fund (SMBC is the Japanese distributor) raised 624 million USD from the Japanese market.
This green credentials investment fund approximately 80 per cent invested in the World Bank green bond (Boyde 2012).
Disparity in global interest rates and substantial savings of Japanese retail investors caused that uridashi bonds are an example of curious category in green bond market.
Conclusions Engaging a private sector investment is necessary to climate-resilient future.
Huge capital of institutional investors connected with fixed income products preferences are promising (but insufficient) determinants of climate bond market development.
88% 27% 7% 4% 12% 73% 93% 96% 0% 50% 100% Japan EU 13 US Canada Individual investors Institutional investors S o u r c e : Daiwa Securities 2010.
Eurobond issuance directed to retail Japanese investors and denominated in foreign currency are called “uridashi”.
So far, green bonds designed for The role bonds in financing climaTe resilienT economy 165 the Japanese investors have been issued mostly by the multilateral development institutions.
First the World Bank green uridashi bond was issued in 2010 (150 million NZD).
In turn the European Investment Bank issued Climate Awareness Bonds in Japan denominated in Australian dollars and South African rand (these two tranches was worth around 300 million EUR equivalent).
The Nordic Investment Bank and the African Development Bank also recognized the potential of uridashi market.
Nikko Asset management through SMBC Nikko World Bank Green Bond Fund (SMBC is the Japanese distributor) raised 624 million USD from the Japanese market.
This green credentials investment fund approximately 80 per cent invested in the World Bank green bond (Boyde 2012).
Disparity in global interest rates and substantial savings of Japanese retail investors caused that uridashi bonds are an example of curious category in green bond market.
Conclusions Engaging a private sector investment is necessary to climate-resilient future.
Huge capital of institutional investors connected with fixed income products preferences are promising (but insufficient) determinants of climate bond market development.
Growing interest of the climate and environmental issues cause that more and more institutions want to offer environment related financial products or recognize themselves as eco-friendly and socially responsible through investments by the ESG rules.
Green bond is the way to green involvement for institutions which by the regulatory restrictions cannot have direct exposure to green investment.
Multilateral development institutions played a positive role in the establishment of green bond market.
These institutions also contribute to create covered bond by providing credit enhancement to project companies.
Whereas the governments support the private sector in raising capital can use tax credit bonds or direct subsidy bonds.
However optimal leverage mechanism to support green investment should be the subject of further research.
At this moment climate bond market requires standards of verifying “greenness”.
This conceptions are also of interest of representatives of Islamic finance.
Standardizations and specifications may be crucial solutions to growing climate bond market and its selected segments.
And finally, it should be kept in mind that eco-friendly securities though laudable purpose of issuance still remain financial instruments connected with multidimensional financial risk.
Marcelina Więckowska166  Bibliography 2011 Global Investor Statement on Climate Change (2013), http://www.iigcc.org/iigcc-investor-statement (access: 12.05.2013).
Agrawala S. et al.
(2011), Private Sector Engagement in Adaptation to Climate Change: Approaches to Managing Climate Risks, OECD Environment Working Papers, no.
39, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg221jkf1g7-en.
Bennett M., Iqbal Z.
(2011), The role of Sukuk in meeting global development challenges, [in:] Global Growth, Opportunities and Challenges in the Sukuk Market, S. Jaffer (ed.
), http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/Euromoney_2011_The_role_of_Sukuk_in_ meeting_global_developement_challenges.pdf.
BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (2013), https://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm (access: 12.05.2013).
Boyde E. (2012), Nikko AM World Bank green bond funds raise $650m, “Financial Times”, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/432836bc-4fe3-11e0-a37e-00144feab49a.html#axzz2DFYRSQBf.
CBI (Climate Bond Initiative) (2011), Climate Bond Standard, version 1.0 – prototype.
The Climate Bonds Initiative, http://standards.climatebonds.net/ (access: 14.05.2013).
Croce R. D., Kaminker R. C., Stewart F. (2011), The Role of Pension Funds in Financing Green Growth Initiatives, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg58j1lwdjd-en.
Daiwa Securities (2010), Yamamoto S., Emerging investment category capturing retail investors.
Impact Investing in Japan (presentation).
DIFC (Dubai International Financial Centre) (2009), Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook, http://www.difc.ae/sites/default/files/attached/5712/6707/6429/ islamic.pdf.
Doom J., Buhayar N. (2012), Buffett Plans More Solar Bonds After Oversubscribed Deal, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-29/buffett-plans-moresolar-bonds-after-oversubscribed-topaz-deal.html.
Dziawgo L. (1997), Papiery wartościowe w ochronie środowiska, Dom Organizatora, Toruń.
Dziawgo L. (2003), Eco-Offers of Banks and Investment Funds.
Poland and International Trends, UMK, Toruń.
The Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative – Innovative infrastructure financing (2012), http://www.eib.org/about/news/the-europe-2020-project-bond-initiative.htm.
Green Investment Bank (2013), http://www.greeninvestmentbank.com/ (access: 13.05.
2013).
IFC thematic bonds (2013), http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/40d57a004851 d833b735fffc046daa89/Green+Bond+April+2013.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
Inderst G., Kaminker Ch., Stewart F. (2012), Defining and Measuring Green Investments: Implications for Institutional Investors’ Asset Allocations, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, no.
24, OECD Publishing.
The role bonds in financing climaTe resilienT economy 167 Kaminker C., Stewart F. (2012), The Role of Institutional Investors in Financing Clean Energy, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, no.
23, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9312v21l6f-en.
Kidney S. (2012), Green Sukuk Working Group launched to support finance for climate change investment projects, Climate Bonds Initiative, http://climatebonds.net/2012/03/green-sukuk-working-group-launched-to-support-finance-for-climate-change-investmentprojects/.
OnIslam & Newspapers (2012), Green sukuk, http://www.onislam.net/english/news/ middle-east/456109-middle-east-gets-green-sukuk.html (access: 16.05.2013).
Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds (“QECBs”) & New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (“New CREBs”), U.S. Department of Energy, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/ pdfs/qecb_creb_primer.pdf.
Richardson B. J.
(2011), Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Quest for Sustainability: Insights from Norway and New Zealand, Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1972382.
Robins N., Knight Z.
(2012), Bonds and climate change: the state of the market in 2012, HSBC Global Research.
SEB (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken) (2013), http://merchantbanking.sebgroup.com/ our-services/markets/fixed-income-and-dcm/green-bonds/ (access: 14.05.2013).
UNEP FI (2012), Principles for Sustainable Insurance, http://www.unepfi.org/psi/.
Więckowska M. (2013), Zarządzanie ryzykiem ekologicznym determinowanym działalnością antropogeniczną w zakresie emisji dwutlenku węgla do atmosfery, “Ekonomia i Środowisko”, nr 1 (44).
The World Bank (2012), The World Bank Green Bond.
Fact sheet, http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/WorldBankGreenBondFactSheet.pdf.
The urban climate of Budapest: past, present and future 69 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63 (1) (2014) 69–79.
DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.63.1.6 The urban climate of Budapest: past, present and future Ferenc PROBÁLD1 Abstract Since the groundbreaking survey of Budapest’s urban climate in 1974, litt le has been done to reveal how the summer heat island of the city has changed.
During the last couple of decades, the impact of the anthropogenic heat release due to the spectacular expansion of automobile traffi c and the widespread use of air conditioners may have added an estimated 1–1.5 °C to the temperature surplus of the city.
As an evidence of the large-scale climate change, the homogenized temperature record of Budapest shows a strongly growing frequency and persistence of severe heat waves plaguing city dwellers.
Regional models predict rising temperatures with more pronounced summer warming until 2100 in the Carpathian Basin.
Therefore, the cooler local climates of the Danube islands and the Budai Hills should be appreciated as valuable environmental assets to be saved by more reasonable land use policies and stricter property development regulations.
Keywords: Budapest, urban climate, heat island, climate change, urban land use The background: physiography and structure of the city Budapest with its more than 1.7 million inhabitants is one of the largest and economically most dynamic cities in East Central Europe and stands out as the indisputable political, administrative and cultural centre of Hungary.
It is situated on the banks of the Danube River, which crosses the city in a northsouth direction, and divides it into a western (Buda) and eastern (Pest) part.
The eastern side is fl at, and the unimpeded spread of the built-up area has resulted in a quite regular morphological patt ern, which can easily be described by the well-known urban model of concentric zones.
The city centre (CBD) is surrounded by a densely built-up inner residential belt consisting of mostly dilapidated housing stock from the late 19th and early 20th centuries interspersed with neighbourhoods at diff erent stages of renewal.
The transi1 Professor emeritus, Department.
of Regional Science, Eötvös Loránd University, H-1112 Budapest, Pázmány P. sétány 1.
E-mail: probald@caesar.elte.hu 70 tional zone embraces large derelict industrial areas: a rust belt at various stages of transition toward tertiary and residential functions, as well as some huge, monotonous housing estates with prefabricated high-rise buildings from the socialist era.
In the outer residential belt of former suburbs, joined to the capital in 1950 giant housing estates also appear.
This belt is dominated by detached family houses surrounded with small gardens.
On the west (Buda) side of the Danube River the somewhat delayed development and the emerging irregular patt ern of the city have been due to the complicated orography.
The Budai Hills rise to an altitude of more than 500 m (that is about 400 m above the level of the Danube River).
The hilltops and the upper parts of the slopes are still covered by recreational forests forming a protected area, while most of the slopes were built up during the last century with good quality 4–5-storey houses surrounded by more or less green areas.
High-density residential areas and large housing estates barely appear on the slopes; they are mostly restricted to the foothills and the minor plains adjacent to the Danube River.
Despite the heavy loss of vegetation due to extensive housing construction, the slopes of the Budai Hills are still sources of a frequently occurring night-time mountain breeze, which can mitigate the summer heat of the city by conveying cleaner and cooler air towards the densely built up areas.
The tectonically preformed, NW–SE directed valleys are in good accordance with the prevailing wind direction and they serve, together with the Danube valley, as natural ventilation channels.
The relief and the morphology of the city result in a great complexity of local climates, where the characteristic features of an urban temperature regime can be best detected and studied on the fl at, densely built up eastern part of Budapest.
Climatological data: sources and constraints Systematic meteorological measurements started in 1779 in Buda which was the southeastern outpost of the observatory network organised by the Palatine Meteorological Society of Mannheim.
Thus, by now we have air temperature measurement records embracing more than 230 years with reliable data, which were homogenised by the scientists of the National Meteorological Service in order to eliminate errors and minor alterations that could be ascribed to repeated relocations and changes in the instrumentation of the station, as well as to the growth of the surrounding city that had taken place in the meantime.
These data were fi rst thoroughly evaluated by Réthly, A.
(1947) in a pioneering work, which provided a fi ne assessment of all major macro-climatic features of the capital city of Hungary.
The fi rst network for the purpose of measuring air pollution in Budapest was established by the National Institute for Public Health in 1958.
The scope of its programme has been steadily broadened and its instrumentation improved sev71 eral times accordingly.
At present the National Air Pollution Monitoring Network operates stations equipped with automatic instruments at 12 points of Budapest, complemented by manual sampling at regular intervals on 15 additional sites.
The task of the network comprises monitoring the concentration of SO2, NO2, NOX, CO, ozone and particulate matt er, thus providing an overall perspective on the actual and average state of ambient air quality in diff erent parts of the city.
In the 20th century regular meteorological observations and instrumental measurements were started and continued for a shorter or longer period at 24 diff erent sites within the present borders of Budapest.
The data obtained at these stations could be used to throw light on local diff erences in the climate of the city.
However, among these stations only one was located in the proper core of the city, within the large, grass-covered courtyard of the City Council Building (Madách Square).
Measurements at this site were performed between 1965 and 1969, thus providing a database appropriate to reveal the properties of urban climate and to compare these with the natural background climate represented by the Pestlőrinc Observatory of the Hungarian Meteorological Service, located at the remote South-Eastern rim of the old suburban belt.
By taking advantage of all the available, mostly unpublished datasets of the Hungarian Meteorological Service, the local diff erences and the particular urban features of the climate were fi rst described and analysed in Budapest by Probáld, F. (1974).
Owing to fi nancial diffi culties the scope of meteorological measurements in Budapest has witnessed a sharp reduction since 1970 with only four stations remaining from the former network, none in the city centre.
Hence, urban climate research has practically been abandoned in Budapest except for some att empts to utilise satellite imagery for studying the heat island (Bartholy, J. et al.
2005).
Satellite measurements, however, cannot produce continuous data records and they provide information merely about the temperature of the surface instead of the ambient air at a height of 2 m. Since these fi gures can be quite diff erent from each other, remote sensing is not a feasible substitute for fi eld observations.
Therefore, in describing the intensity and temporal changes of the urban heat island in the next section, we have to rely on the hourly breakdown of thermograph records taken in the 1960s at the station located in the city centre and from the Pestlőrinc Observatory.
Nevertheless, recent changes in the macro-scale climate of Budapest allow us to draw some conclusions concerning the actual state and the future of the urban environment, too.
The heat island of Budapest in retrospect Ever since its fi rst scientifi c demonstration by L. Howard in London in the early 19th century, the urban heat island has received keen att ention from cli72 matologists realising the signifi cance of this phenomenon from both theoretical and practical points of view.
The spatial patt ern and temporal changes of the heat island are determined by a great variety of factors, such as location, background climate and weather conditions, size of the city, the fabric of roads, buildings, parks, and their geographical distribution over the urbanized area.
Consequently, the thermal regime of each city is more or less unique, thus it deserves careful study.
In Budapest, key features of the heat island, represented by the temperature surplus of the urban core compared to surrounding areas, can be summarised as follows.
The annual mean temperature in Budapest downtown is 1.2 °C higher than outside the city.
The annual cycle of urban-rural temperature diff erence reaches a peak in January (1.5 °C) and a second one in July (1.3 °C).
March, which is usually quite windy and cloudy, is characterised by a minimum in the temperature surplus of the city (1.0 °C).
By establishing the monthly means of its components, early enquiries about the surface energy balance in Budapest revealed the physical background of the urban heat island (Probáld, F. 1971).
The summer warming of the city can be explained mainly by a higher direct turbulent heat transfer to the air, which is due to the decrease in evaporation and, consequently, in latent heat transfer as well.
In winter the heat released by human activities can be regarded as the key factor shaping the temperature diff erence between the city and its surroundings.
While city dwellers are certainly not displeased with a warmer environment in winter, they may feel quite diff erent in the hot season when human comfort is adversely infl uenced by the diurnal variation of heat island intensity.
The rugged urban surface made up of massive concrete and stone structures is able to absorb large amounts of solar radiation during the day, store this energy and release it to the atmosphere at night.
This process leads to a substantial delay of the diurnal temperature cycle and results in a characteristic variation in the intensity of the urban heat island: the minimum diff erence in urban-rural temperatures is observed late in the morning and the peak of about 2 °C in the evening, a diff erence that remains for most of the night (Figure 1).
For the same reasons, similar daily temperature regimes were detected by measurements performed in other cities, too.
Fig.
1.
Diurnal cycle of the diff erence in temperature between the downtown (City Council) and suburban outskirts (Pestlőrinc) in July (1965– 1967).
Source: Probáld, F. 1974.
73 Cloudy and windy weather conditions slightly weaken the urban heat island, whereas on clear, sunny days it gets stronger and the urban-rural temperature diff erence may exceed the average fi gures by several tenths of a degree with a tendency of further growth during periods of lasting heat waves.
There are also remarkable micro-climatic diff erences within the densely built up area of the city.
This has been demonstrated for example by measurements which were performed on three consecutive clear and hot days in July 1966 at a height of 2 metres above a safety island in the middle of Madách Square, located in downtown Budapest.
The air of the large square lacking any greens and permanently exposed to sunshine was found to be warmer by roughly 1 °C than the nearby grassy courtyard of the City Council throughout the aft ernoon and the evening.
In comparison with rural areas the diff erence amounted to 3 °C.
The human comfort in such urban spaces is adversely aff ected, and the stress is increased also by thermal radiation emitt ed by the pavement and the walls of the buildings, which are even warmer than the adjacent air.
The calm and clear anticyclonic weather, characteristic for lasting heat periods, is oft en coupled with the accumulation of various pollutants in the ambient air of the city.
The bulk of these pollutants, such as NO2, the wellknown precursor of ozone, as well as CO and particulate matt er of various sizes come from heavy car traffi c. Concentration of ozone exceeding the alert level in summer, similarly to dangerous levels of fi ne particulate matt er in winter, occurred several times during the last couple of years.
Heat alerts became even more frequent.
The prospect: rising heat stress in the city Aft er a steady decline for more than two decades, the population of Budapest today is not larger than it was fi ft y years ago.
During its last period of growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, however, large housing estates were built in the former industrial and suburban belts of the city.
These constructions certainly had some impact on the microclimate of their surroundings, but they could hardly bring about signifi cant changes in the intensity and meso-scale patt ern of the heat island.
Meanwhile, the city witnessed the emergence of at least three new factors that are likely to aff ect the present and future features of the urban climate: the spread of vehicle traffi c, the use of air conditioners and the impact of changes in the regional climate.
Tremendous changes have taken place in the quality of the fuel used in the city, too.
Until the early 1960s the heating of the dwellings were largely based on coal, which caused frequent winter smog due to the accumulation of sulphur dioxide and soot particles in the air.
In the subsequent decade, however, coal burning was quickly and almost totally replaced by natural gas.
74 This was done for pure economic reasons, but as a favourable side eff ect, air quality greatly improved.
Nevertheless, this success was largely off set by the spectacular expansion of automobile traffi c over the last decades that probably peaked recently, at least in the inner city, where more measures have been implemented to reduce traffi c congestion.
Thus, transportation as a whole has become the major source of air pollution and it is heavily contributing to anthropogenic heat release concentrated along the main traffi c routes.
The last one or two decades have also witnessed the increased use of air conditioners in Budapest, responsible for a new summer peak of electricity consumption.
This process is mainly due to technical development and higher living standards, but the urge to mitigate the indoor impact of the more frequently occurring heat waves cannot be disregarded either.
At the same time, air conditioning systems produce a positive feedback that may strengthen the heat stress of outdoor urban climate, particularly on the hott est summer days and in the most densely built up areas.
During the last couple of decades numerous att empts were made to quantify the anthropogenic heat emission of transportation and of the buildings in several cities (e.g.
in Tokyo and Philadelphia).
The methods and conclusions of these surveys have recently been reviewed by Sailor, D.J.
(2011).
According to the building model calculations of Seprődi-Egeresi, M. and Zöld, A.
(2011), the summer daily heat output of the houses in the densely built up inner city of Budapest would amount to a territorial average of 45 W/m2.
Another starting point is off ered by the electricity consumption data of the utility company MAVIR.
The national consumption fi gures for the heat wave in June 2013 were higher by 20,000 MWh/day than on an average weekday in May.
The diff erence can largely be att ributed to the use of air conditioners.
Since about 10% of the increase may appear in the inner city of Budapest (30 km2), our estimate suggests a heat output amounting there to 25–30 W/m2 from this source alone.
Both of the above estimates ignore, however, the heat emission of the traffi c which falls in most cities considerably behind the energy consumption of the buildings (Sailor, D.J.
2011).
Based on the inquiries in cities with a climate more or less similar to Budapest, we can assume that the combined meso-scale impact of the vehicle traffi c and the air conditioning systems have resulted in an additional urban summer air temperature rise of 1.0–1.5 °C since the 1960s.
Though this diff erence itself is certainly not negligible, the threat coming from recent changes in macro-scale climate and weather conditions put the issue of urban heat stress in an even more sinister perspective (Stone, B.
2012).
These changes have manifested themselves in the growing frequency (Figure 2) and longer persistence (Figure 3) of heat waves (Vincze, E. et al.
2013).
The fi gures reveal rather worrying trends in the homogenised temperature record of Budapest.
However, the station of the Hungarian Meteorological Service, which is located on the Buda side in a densely built up neighbour75 hood, shows about 0.5 °C lower temperature than the city centre.
The daily mean exceeding here 27 °C on three consecutive days indicates the threshold of the most serious 3rd grade heat alert in the city.
According to the most likely scenarios of regional model estimates, temperatures in the Carpathian Basin are bound to rise in accordance with the medium projection of the IPCC (2007).
However, warming will be more distinct in the summer with an expected temperature increase of at least 4 °C until 2071–2100 against the reference period at the end of the 20th century (Bartholy, J. et al.
2007, 2011).
This change will be coupled with a dramatic increase in the Fig.
2.
Annual number of days in heat periods (daily mean temperatures higher than 27 °C on three consecutive days).
Source: Vincze E., Lakatos, M. and Tóth Z.
2013.
Fig.
3.
Persistence (in days) of the most lasting heat waves in the given years (daily mean above 27 °C) Source: Vincze, E., Lakatos , M. and Tóth, Z.
2013.
76 frequency of heat waves.
The annual number of hot days (tmax≥30 °C) will triple during the 21st century, thus gett ing 34-38 days higher than the average of 18 days registered in the last 30 years of the millennium.
(Bartholy, J. et al.
2011; Vincze, E. and Szépszó, G. 2012).
These are merely average fi gures, which do not take into account the additional warming eff ect of the city.
Climatic assets to be saved It is hard to admit, but except for some measures with micro-scale impacts only, in a city with an inherited rigid structure like Budapest, precious litt le can be done to change the general characteristics of urban climate in order to cope with the trend of global warming and to relieve the growing thermal stress that people will suff er from in summer.
Therefore, one has to pay special att ention to those areas where natural conditions are more or less able to counterbalance the discomfort caused by the typical urban climate.
Within the confi nes of Budapest one can fi nd two areas with particularly favourable atmospheric conditions, namely the banks and small islands of the Danube River and the Budai Hills with their great variety of microclimates.
The remarkable diff erences compared to the downtown were refl ected even by monthly mean temperatures in the 1960s (Table 1) and they must have substantially grown since that time.
In calm, sunny anticyclonic weather one can measure aft ernoon and evening temperature diff erences between Margaret Island and large downtown squares more than 2 times higher than monthly means (Figure 4).
Table 1.
Deviations of the monthly mean temperatures between 1954 and 1968 on Szabadság Hill* and Margaret Island** from those of the city centre/City Council*** in 0C Site April May June July August September Year Margaret Island Szabadság Hill -1.0 -2.9 -1.3 -3.2 -1.6 -3.2 -1.7 -3.1 -1.6 -2.8 -1.7 -2.7 -1.2 -2.9 Height: *470 m a.s.l., **103 m a.s.l., ***105 m a.s.l.
Source: Probáld, F. 1974.
Fig.
4.
Diurnal change of the air temperature on the safety island of Madách Square (1), and the park of Margaret Island (2); average of fi eld measurements on three consecutive summer days in 1966.
Source: Probáld, F. 1974.
77 Under similar conditions surface temperature diff erences reaching 8–10 °C between the downtown and Margaret Island as well as between the downtown and the Budai Hills are quite usual as it has been demonstrated by satellite measurements (Bartholy, J. et al.
2005).
This is of course also linked with less frequency and shorter persistence of heat periods when daily peaks exceed 30 °C and night-time lows are higher than 20 °C.
Thus, the population dwelling in the hilly districts of Buda suff ers much less from summer heat, while it can enjoy more sunshine and snow in winter.
Due to prevailing west winds, the air is much cleaner on the Buda side, and severe air pollution is restricted to the key traffi c routes that follow the main valleys.
There is abundant evidence provided by recent polls and actual real estate prices that districts in Buda have the highest prestige and stand out among the favourite target locations of those intending to move, while there are only few people willing to leave Buda for the sake of a new dwelling in Pest.
The equally easy access to nature and to the city centre, the various amenities provided by the Budai Hills are remarkable assets for the Hungarian capital even in the international competition of cities, since supply of quality dwellings and environmental issues rank high among the priorities of postmodern societies.
Regrett ably enough, the development of land use during the second half of the 20th century largely disregarded the limited extent and particular value of the natural endowment of this area.
The orchards, vineyards and nice gardens of the 19th century have receded and the rest of the forests have been encroached upon by construction with functions that simply do not fi t to this environment, but are now diffi cult to remove.
In the 1970s and 1980s large prefabricated housing estates appeared and high-rise buildings were erected on the slopes.
As most obvious examples of the misuse of environmental assets, military barracks, institutions of higher education and training of the police and the army, as well as nuclear research facilities still occupy considerable areas in the Budai Hills, which should have been saved for more reasonable purposes.
From the islands of the Danube River, Margaret Island with an area of 96.5 hectares is the closest to the city centre.
The whole island is a beautiful park suitable for walking, jogging, and other leisure time activities.
Beyond several sports facilities one can also fi nd a wellness hotel there taking advantage of the thermal water from local wells for medical purposes.
Thus, the island has become a favourite public place and its amenities are properly utilised, sometimes even crowded with a great number of visitors.
While Margaret Island is threatened by eventual overuse, the advantages off ered by two similar islands situated a bit further northwards (Óbuda Island, Nép Island) seem to be located almost idle in lack of reasonable management and development strategies which would serve public interests.
This can be most 78 clearly exemplifi ed by the southern half of Óbuda Island, which has been sold to a foreign-owned development company wanting to build there a high-rise hotel, casinos and a large-scale entertainment centre.
This highly controversial project, however, has been pending for about ten years already.
The banks of the main branch of the Danube River have a total length of 58 km within the confi nes of Budapest.
In a survey conducted in 2007 by using both fi eld trips and aerial photos we have found that the total length of densely built up areas amounted to 18.6 km (Izsák, É., Probáld, F. and Uzzoli, A.
2008).
The embankments serve here as the main N–S directed arterial traffi c roads and they are bordered by a dense row of tall buildings that blocks any air exchange between the water surface and the nearby streets.
Opening direct access to the cool and nice riverside for pedestrians has been envisaged several times, but the problem is still to be solved.
Derelict and entirely abandoned industrial establishments of the brownfi eld belt occupy 16 km (27.6%) of the banks, while sections of altogether 12.4 km (21.4%) length seem to be void of any reasonable human use, though even here the willow and poplar groves of the fl oodplain fulfi l a valuable ecological function as wildlife corridors.
At some places on Csepel Island the potential use of the riverside is restricted because of the vicinity of wells providing piped water for the city.
In most cases, however, the key obstacle of utilisation is the lack of fl ood control levees or the heavy pollution of the soil.
To overcome these diffi culties considerable investments would be required from property developers.
Nevertheless, the brownfi eld belt and other idle sections of the riverside still off er great perspectives for future development.
At the turn of the century the opportunities of profi table investments also aroused the interest of some large foreign-owned real estate companies, which started to construct gated communities with luxury apartment houses at the river, taking advantage of the favourable environment and the magnifi cent vista to be enjoyed at the sites selected for development.
However, the drive to make as much profi t as possible is manifested in the extreme density of buildings, the shortage of greens, and sometimes the quite dull architecture of these projects (Kauko, T. 2012).
The realization of further grandiose development plans were brought to a temporary halt in 2008 by the economic crisis and its disastrous impact on the real estate market.
Conclusion Metropolitan growth and climate change have brought about new global ecologic conditions (Sassen, S. 2013).
Thus, monitoring future changes in urban climate and adaptation to the trends has become more necessary than ever.
79 REFERENCES Bartholy, J., Bozó, L. and Haszpra, L. eds.
2011.
Klímaváltozás.
Klímaszcenáriók a Kárpátmedence térségére (Climate change.
Scenarios for the Carpathian Basin).
Budapest, MTA–ELTE Meteorológiai Tanszék, 281 p. Bartholy, J., Dezső, Zs.
and Pongrácz, R. 2005.
Satellite-based analysis of the urban heat island eff ect.
Időjárás 109.
217–232.
Bartholy, J., Pongrácz, R. and Gelybó, Gy.
2007.
Regional Climate Change expected in Hungary for 2071–2100.
Applied Ecology and Environmental Research 5.
(1): 1–17.
IPCC 2007: Climate Change 2007.
Synthesis Report.
Geneva, IPCC.
Izsák, É., Probáld, F. and Uzzoli, A.
2008.
Természeti adott ságok és életminőség Budapesten (Natural endowments and quality of life in Budapest).
Debrecen, IV.
Magyar Földrajzi Konferencia, 265–270.
Kauko, T. 2012.
An Institutional Analysis of Property Development, Good Governance and Urban Sustainability.
European Planning Studies 20.
(12): 1–19.
MAVIR 2013: www.mavir.hu/web/mavir/adatpublikacio.
Retrieved on the 30.
7.
2013.
Probáld, F. 1971.
The Energy Balance as the Basis of the Urban Climate of Budapest.
Annales U. Sc.
Eötvös Sectio Geographica VII.
51–68.
Probáld, F. 1974.
Budapest városklímája (The urban climate of Budapest).
Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 127 p. Réthly, A.
1947.
Budapest éghajlata (The climate of Budapest).
Budapest, Rheumaés Fürdőkutató Intézet, 147 p. Sailor, D.J.
2011.
A review of methods for estimating anthropogenic heat and moisture emissions in the urban environment.
International Journal of Climatology 31.
189–199.
Sassen, S. 2013.
Bridging the ecologies of cities and nature.
htt p://portal.unesco.org/en/fi les46764.
Retrieved on 7.
7.
2013.
Seprődi-Egeresi, M. and Zöld, A.
2011.
Buildings’ heat output and urban climate.
Acta Climatologica and Chorologica Univ.
Szegediensis 44–45.
103–110.
Stone, B.
2012.
The City and the Coming Climate.
Climate Change in the Cities we Live.
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.
Press, 198 p. Vincze, E. and Szépszó, G. 2012.
Az elmúlt nyár értékelése a mérési adatok és a jövőben várható változások tükrében (Evaluation of the measurement records of this summer and the changes expected to come in the future).
htt p://klimabarat.hu/node/489.
Retrieved on 11.
11.
2012.
Vincze, E., Lakatos, M. and Tóth, Z.
2013.
2013 nyarának éghajlati átt ekintése (Climatological overview of the summer 2013).
htt p:// klimabarat.hu/node/591.
Retrieved on 3.
11.
2013.
Much more responsibility would be required also in preparing decisions with regard to the values of environment.
In Budapest the ultra-liberal mayor and council leading the city between 1990 and 2010 adopted a laissez-faire att itude, thus allowing private development companies to get through their interests at the expense of those of the whole urban community.
In order to save the environmental assets of Budapest and to achieve a turn toward sustainability, reasonable property development, bett er governance, comprehensive planning, appropriate regulation measures as well as their rigorous implementation are needed.
80 Since the disintegration of the USSR, the Western world has shown an ever-growing interest in Ukraine, its people and its economy.
As the second-largest country in Europe, Ukraine has a strategic geographical position at the crossroads between Europe and Asia.
It is a key country for the transit of energy resources from Russia and Central Asia to the European Union, which is one reason why Ukraine has become a priority partner in the neighbourhood policy of the EU.
Ukraine has pursued a path towards the democratic consolidation of statehood, which encompasses vigorous economic changes, the development of institutions and integration into European and global political and economic structures.
In a complex and controversial world, Ukraine is building collaboration with other countries upon the principles of mutual understanding and trust, and is establishing initiatives aimed at the creation of a system that bestows international security.
This recognition has prompted the Institute of Geography of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv) and the Geographical Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest) to initiate cooperation, and the volume entitled “Ukraine in Maps” is the outcome of their joint eff ort.
The intention of this publication is to make available the results of research conducted by Ukrainian and Hungarian geographers, to the English-speaking public.
This atlas follows in the footsteps of previous publications from the Geographical Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Similar to the work entitled South Eastern Europe in Maps (2005, 2007), it includes 64 maps, dozens of fi gures and tables accompanied by an explanatory text, writt en in a popular, scientifi c manner.
The book is an att empt to outline the geographical sett ing and geopolitical context of Ukraine, as well as its history, natural environment, population, sett lements and economy.
The authors greatly hope that this joint venture will bring Ukraine closer to the reader and make this neighbouring country to the European Union more familiar, and consequently, more appealing.
Ukraine in Maps Edited by: Kocsis, K., Rudenko, L. and Schweitzer, F. Institute of Geography National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Geographical Research Institute Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Kyiv–Budapest, 2008, 148 p. -----------------------------------------Price: EUR 35.00 Order: Geographical Institute RCAES HAS Library H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45.
E-mail: magyar.arpad@csfk .mta.hu << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S.
Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.3 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize false /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments true /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Apply /UCRandBGInfo /Preserve /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 300 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None) /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /CreateJDFFile false /Description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> /CHS <FEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065876863900275284e8e9ad88d2891cf76845370524d53705237300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002> /CHT <FEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef69069752865bc9ad854c18cea76845370524d5370523786557406300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002> /CZE <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> /DAN <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> /DEU <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> /ESP <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> /ETI <FEFF004b00610073007500740061006700650020006e0065006900640020007300e4007400740065006900640020006b00760061006c006900740065006500740073006500200074007200fc006b006900650065006c007300650020007000720069006e00740069006d0069007300650020006a0061006f006b007300200073006f00620069006c0069006b0065002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740069006400650020006c006f006f006d006900730065006b0073002e00200020004c006f006f0064007500640020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740065002000730061006100740065002000610076006100640061002000700072006f006700720061006d006d006900640065006700610020004100630072006f0062006100740020006e0069006e0067002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020006a00610020007500750065006d006100740065002000760065007200730069006f006f006e00690064006500670061002e000d000a> /FRA <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> /GRE <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a stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke.
Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 5.0 i kasnijim verzijama.)
/ITA <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> /JPN <FEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002> /KOR <FEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /LTH <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> /LVI <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> /NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit.
De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
/NOR <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> /POL <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> /PTB <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> /RUM <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> /RUS <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> /SKY <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> /SLV <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> /SUO <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> /SVE <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> /TUR <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> /UKR <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> /ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing.
Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 5.0 and later.)
/HUN <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> >> /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ << /AsReaderSpreads false /CropImagesToFrames true /ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue /FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false /IncludeGuidesGrids false /IncludeNonPrinting false /IncludeSlug false /Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (4.0) ] /OmitPlacedBitmaps false /OmitPlacedEPS false /OmitPlacedPDF false /SimulateOverprint /Legacy >> << /AddBleedMarks false /AddColorBars false /AddCropMarks false /AddPageInfo false /AddRegMarks false /ConvertColors /ConvertToCMYK /DestinationProfileName () /DestinationProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /Downsample16BitImages true /FlattenerPreset << /PresetSelector /MediumResolution >> /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [2400 2400] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice
DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTEREST The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
FUNDING This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No.
(SES-1540314).
Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Science Foundation.
Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement Vol.
12, No.
1 January 2019 © 2019 by the author(s).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license.
Citation: Kirby C., Haruo, C., Whyte, K., Libarkin, J., Caldwell, C. and Edler, R. 2019.
Ethical collaboration and the need for training: Partnerships between Native American Tribes and climate science organizations.
Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, 12:1, Article ID 5894. http:dx.doi.org/10.5130/ ijcre.v12i1.5894 ISSN 1836-3393 | Published by UTS ePRESS | http://ijcre.
epress.lib.uts.edu.au RESEARCH ARTICLE (PEER-REVIEWED) Ethical collaboration and the need for training: Partnerships between Native American Tribes and climate science organizations Caitlin K Kirby1*, Citralina Haruo2, Kyle P Whyte3, Julie C Libarkin1, Chris Caldwell2 and Rebecca Edler2 1Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Michigan State University, 288 Farm Lane, Room 207, East Lansing, MI, USA 2Sustainable Development Institute, College of Menominee Nation, PO Box 1179, Keshena, WI, USA 3Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, 503 S. Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI, USA *Corresponding author: Caitlin K. Kirby; kirbycai@msu.edu DOI: http:dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v12i1.5894 Article history: Received 18/01/2018; Revised 15/08/2018; Accepted 31/08/2018; Published 15/01/2019 Abstract Indigenous peoples develop and utilise climate science resources to address climate change impacts, and climate scientists often collaborate on such projects.
Little is known about whether climate science organisations (CSOs) adequately train their staff to work ethically with Indigenous peoples, promoting benefits for Tribes while reducing harms.
To research this training, we conducted interviews with CSO employees (n=9) and Native American Tribal citizens (n=7).
Thematic content analysis revealed that many challenges, benefits and common goals exist for both groups.
Tribes were more likely to discuss challenges, focusing on trust and capacity building.
CSOs were more likely to discuss benefits, focusing on information exchange.
Both CSOs and Tribes provide training activities for CSO employees, but training programs are not mandated or consistent across employees and organisations, and they are typically not evaluated.
Our research indicates a need for co-created and evaluated training programs which take into account the challenges faced in cross-cultural partnerships.
1 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http:dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v12i1.5894 http:dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v12i1.5894 http://ijcre.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://ijcre.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:kirbycai@msu.edu http:dx.doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v12i1.5894 Keywords climate change, Indigenous peoples, community engagement, tribally driven participatory research, ethics, STEM education Introduction Indigenous peoples in North America and beyond are among the populations most active in planning for climate change (Bennett et al.
2014; Whyte 2017).
For example, the Quileute Tribe in northern Washington has relocated some village homes in the face of increased flooding and winter storms, and challenges experienced in obtaining sufficient food due to shifting fish populations in the Pacific Northwest (Papiez 2009).
Policies at national and international levels require or recommend that climate science organisations (CSOs) work with Indigenous peoples with the goal of providing scientific climate change expertise and/ or advice to support Indigenous planning (Exec.
Order 2013; UNFCCC 2015).
These calls for collaboration are consistent with broader movements to enshrine free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples (UNGA 2008), where all affected parties in a collaborative project are able to influence the design of the work and be made aware of any risks and opportunities.
Yet, recent events such as the struggle with the Dakota Access Pipeline, where the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe was insufficiently consulted about the installation of a crude oil pipeline that posed risks to their cultural and natural resources, call to question whether those who seek to collaborate with Indigenous peoples are doing so ethically (Grijalva 2017; Whyte 2017).
Research methodologies that incorporate community-based, Indigenous-centric, and Tribal participatory research approaches offer extensive guidelines for ethical research collaborations between scientists and communities.
At the outset of a collaboration, scientist and Indigenous partners must consider who will benefit from research projects and in what ways (Israel et al.
1998; Thomas et al.
2011).
Research collaborations between Indigenous peoples and science organisations also require navigation of the complex social, historical and legal networks in which scientific and Indigenous institutions are embedded.
Historic subjugation and coercion of Indigenous peoples has led to a legacy of power imbalance between Indigenous peoples and scientific research organisations (Bohensky & Maru 2011; Fisher & Ball 2003) and mistrust towards researchers (Harding et al.
2012).
Thus, it is incumbent upon researchers who wish to engage with Indigenous peoples to take responsibility for ensuring that their research will minimise harms and maximise benefits for all partners involved.
The mere existence of ethical research guidelines does not ensure their implementation, and there is a need to understand if and how these guidelines are utilised by researchers on the ground.
This need is not exclusive to climate scientists; it applies to researchers from all fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).
We propose the use of ‘ethical STEM’ as a description of scientific training and research that provides scientists and engineers with tools to critically evaluate their relationships with the communities in which they conduct research, and to do so in a way that maintains respect for and provides valid scientific research for those communities.
Scientific career preparation should include discourse about ethical STEM, and must be expanded to acknowledge the cultural, social and political contexts in which science operates (Kimmerer 1998; Sadler, Barab & Scott 2007; Tanner & Allen 2007).
Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 2 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES We present an exploration of what content is needed in ethical STEM training and how it might be effectively disseminated to researchers who wish to work with Indigenous peoples, based on interviews with experts working at the nexus of United States Indigenous peoples (Tribes) and climate science organisations (CSOs).
This article outlines the context of climate change adaptation, Indigenous peoples, and their relationships with scientific research organisations in the following literature review section.
Our focus is on Indigenous peoples in the United States, but we utilise global examples to illustrate the need to engage in these practices throughout the world.
We then further characterise and define our sample of research participants.
Our results section focuses on the current state of ethical STEM training that climate science researchers receive to work with Indigenous peoples, and highlights emergent themes from our interviews that demonstrate the need for further training and potential training content.
We provide summarising and concluding thoughts on how this work can be applied in fostering scientists and Indigenous peoples to engage in climate adaptation partnerships.
Literature Review Indigenous peoples’ conceptions of climate change and their efforts in adaptation have been well studied.
Indigenous peoples in East Africa and the Arctic track weather and climate events through specialised and contextual understandings based on how they interact with their environments, integrating such information into cultural and social aspects of life (Callison 2014; Herman-Mercer et al.
2016; Leclerc et al.
2013).
Documented Indigenous responses to climate change include Indigenous Saami reindeer herders’ pastoral practices in Nordic countries (Reinert et al.
2008) and the use of different varieties of crops, water maximisation techniques and shortened growing seasons among Indigenous farmers in Nigeria (Ishaya & Abaje 2008).
Records of Indigenous peoples’ response to climate change are also documented in multiple contexts outside of scholarly spaces (e.g.
CSKT 2013; Kettle, Martin & Sloan 2017; SRMT 2013; Tebtebba 2011).
Even with this considerable body of work, more research on Indigenous climate adaptation is called for, such as with Māori populations in New Zealand who are grappling with challenges of adapting to changes in the natural resources they rely on (Fitzharris 2007).
In addition, much of the literature examining Indigenous adaptation to climate change focuses on aspects of Indigenous life that are considered to be ‘traditional’, ignoring the many other contemporary resources that are also impacted by climate change, such as the use of diesel fuel by Indigenous peoples in the Arctic (Cameron 2012).
Indigenous peoples who engage in efforts to increase their resiliency amidst a changing climate do so within larger socio-political structures that create barriers to this engagement.
In our discussion of these efforts, we use the term natural resources while recognising that it may not adequately express Indigenous cultural, spiritual and moral relationships with the environment.
Prior governmental interventions into Indigenous spaces via colonialism have caused many of the social, economic and cultural issues that Indigenous peoples face today (Cameron 2012).
Despite this, many Indigenous peoples continue to engage with colonial governments, asserting their interest in and right to be involved in all levels of policy and decision making related to natural resources (Davis 2010; Leclerc et al.
2013).
For example, Inuit hunter–trapper communities in Canada work to communicate across multiple scales of governance to integrate local knowledge and national monitoring in government-mandated management of natural resources (O’Brien, Hayward & Berkes 2009).
However, Indigenous peoples can also be ignored or mistreated in discussions about climate change and natural Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 3 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES resource management.
During the UN Conference on Climate Change in Indonesia in 2007, Indigenous peoples were excluded from important discussions about climate change, and their particular needs were excluded from documents resulting from that conference (Davis 2010).
Indigenous Saami reindeer herders in the tundra face differing regulations across the nations of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, with Norwegian regulations from the Ministry of Agriculture limiting how the reindeer herders are able to adapt to long-term climate change.
These regulations stem from a misunderstanding on the Ministry’s part of the cyclical nature of the Arctic ecosystem, which Saami herders have long recognised and utilised (Reinert et al.
2008).
A willing collaboration between the Indigenous Saami and the Ministry of Agriculture prior to the implementation of new policies might have avoided this restriction on the Saami people.
Collaborations between government agencies and Indigenous peoples are increasingly recognised on the part of governments, particularly with the adoption of the United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Davis 2010; UNGA 2008).
Historical relationships between Indigenous peoples and researchers parallel those between Indigenous peoples and governments in their lack of ethical treatment.
One topic that illustrates these relationships is the concept of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK).
TEK refers to the body of knowledge held by an Indigenous community based on their history, values and beliefs, and can also encompass ‘systems of responsibilities that arise from particular cosmological beliefs about the relationships between living beings and non-living things or humans and the natural world’ (Whyte 2013, p. 5).
TEK has historically been considered auxiliary or inferior to Western scientific knowledge in many scenarios.
Although some scientists now place more value upon TEK, this generally occurs in a context in which TEK is used to supplement Western scientific understanding for the benefit of Western science (Latulippe 2015).
TEK has also been improperly shared with the public, leading to harm of sacred sites and tribal resources (Harding et al.
2012; Williams & Hardison 2013).
When properly carried out, partnerships between Indigenous peoples and researchers can benefit both groups.
For example, prior partnerships have increased Tribal social capital (Arnold & Fernandez-Gimenez 2007; Kellert et al.
2000), improved management of natural resources (Cronin & Ostergren 2007; Kellert et al.
2000) and integrated TEK with scientific understandings to bolster and contextualise each way of knowing (Kellert et al.
2000; Leclerc et al.
2013).
These benefits are often reported by researchers without documented agreement from Indigenous partners.
An explicit understanding of the benefits that Indigenous peoples receive or expect to receive from research partnerships is needed so that researchers are equipped to ensure those benefits are available.
While the nature of ethical practice within the context of scientific collaborations is well documented (Minkler 2004), little is known about ethical STEM training and implementation programs.
Ethical STEM is a mechanism for developing cultural competence, which is the ability for individuals and organisations to work effectively in cross-cultural situations (Cross et al.
1989).
Whereas cultural competence is most often discussed in healthcare contexts (Beach et al.
2005), the term ‘ethical STEM’ intentionally situates both concepts within the broader scientific community.
All research scientists who work with community members should be prepared to engage in ethical STEM.
In regard to climate change specifically, ethical guidelines need to be included in collaborative agreements between multiple levels of governments, natural resource management agencies and Indigenous peoples.
These ethical guidelines need to explicitly consider past transgressions against Indigenous peoples and the threats they are facing due to climate change (O’Brien, Hayward & Berkes 2009).
Our Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 4 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES research is situated here in an effort to integrate what we know about partnerships between Indigenous peoples and scientists, and to invite equal voice from all partners.
Research Questions The current work is framed by research questions that seek to unpack how ethical STEM is communicated within the context of CSO–Tribe collaborations in the United States: 1.
What is the current state of ethical STEM training that CSOs provide their staff?
a.
How effective is this training?
2.
What is the current state of partnerships between Tribes and CSOs?
b.
What are the benefits and challenges in these relationships for Tribes and CSOs?
This research question was developed based on themes that emerged from our interview analysis and can guide the development of training content and format.
Methods PARTNERSHIP CONTEXTS The research sample consisted of both Indigenous peoples and scientists employed by climate science organisations, with each interviewee having experience working in partnerships across these groups.
Indigenous peoples in this context refer to groups who exercised political and cultural self-determination prior to a period of invasion and colonialism and who continue to exercise self-determination as non-dominant populations in territories in which nation states are recognised as the primary sovereigns (Anaya 2004).
For the purposes of this article, Indigenous peoples and Tribes will be used interchangeably given that in the US context Indigenous peoples often refer to themselves as Tribes.
In the US, the federal government recognises 567 Tribes as sovereigns, individual states recognise over 50 additional Tribes (Salazar 2016) and there are many unrecognised Indigenous peoples; all of these are encapsulated in our use of the term Tribe.
CSOs refer to both federally and privately funded organisations whose goal is to provide communities with scientifically valid research, expertise and advice related to climate change impacts.
To protect the anonymity of participants, the specific structure of these partnerships will not be shared; however, these partnerships occur across many contexts.
Both Tribe and CSO respondents might be based at federal agencies, higher education institutions, or other organisations.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS The research team pre-identified individuals from across the US with Tribal or CSO affiliations and well-documented experience collaborating on Tribe–CSO climate projects.
Tribe and CSO interviewees were from the Arctic, Mountain, California, Southwest, Oklahoma, Great Lakes, and East/Southeast regions of the United States.
CSO interviews also included individuals from the Pacific and Pacific Northwest regions.
One semi-structured interview protocol was designed for Tribal citizens and employees (Supplement A), with another designed for scientists within a CSO (Supplement B).
Sixteen interviews were completed (CSOs=9 and Tribes=7) via online video calls.
The audio for each interview was recorded and transcribed.
The driving questions for this work specified predetermined themes to examine in the resulting transcripts, focusing on three Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 5 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES broad categories of reasons for establishing partnerships, ethical STEM training activities, and evaluation of ethical STEM training (Research Question 1).
In order to acknowledge the emergence of additional themes not foreseen in the interview protocol (Research Question 2), we conducted thematic content analysis (Burnard 1991).
Interviews were coded using a technique based on grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss 1990) where additional themes were created based on the language used by interviewees.
Two authors, one with a Tribal perspective from the College of Menominee Nation (CH) and the other with a science perspective from Michigan State University (CK) developed a coding scheme through analysis of one Tribe and one CSO interview.
Codes were added and discussed during subsequent interview analysis, with interviews being re-coded as new themes emerged.
The entire team reviewed the resulting codebook for clarity and completeness, ensuring that it would accurately represent emergent themes at the Tribe–CSO nexus.
Following codebook development, an additional interview from each perspective was coded separately by CK and CH to establish inter-rater reliability.
The average measure of intraclass correlation across the two raters was 0.89 (min=0.85 and max=0.92).
Intraclass correlations close to 1 indicate near perfect agreement, with values above 0.75 suggesting strong agreement across coders (Cicchetti 1994).
CH coded five of the remaining CSO interviews and CK coded two CSO interviews and the five remaining Tribe interviews.
Results INTERVIEW ANALYSIS The 16 completed interviews (CSOs=9 and Tribes=7) had an average duration of 43 minutes, with a standard deviation of 17 minutes.
Interview lengths did not differ for Tribe and CSO participants.
Upon reviewing our analysis, we found that our interviews reached saturation according to criteria in Francis et al.
(2010).
We set a minimum sample size of 12 interviews based on guidelines in Guest, Bunce & Johnson (2006) and four interviews beyond those 12 were coded with no additional themes added (Francis et al.
2010).
PREDETERMINED THEMES Predetermined themes from the interview protocol were reasons for establishing partnerships, ethical STEM training activities and ethical STEM training evaluation (Research Question 1).
Each predetermined theme contained at least one subtheme that was discussed by both Tribe and CSO participants (Table 1).
Overall, analysis of the predetermined themes demonstrated multiple types of training activities that CSOs can engage in to learn how to work ethically with Tribes.
However, engagement in these training activities varied and none of the trainings were evaluated.
Each predetermined theme is discussed below to explore the current state of ethical STEM training for CSOs who work with Tribes.
Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 6 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES Table 1 Predetermined overarching themes with example subthemes from both perspsectives Predetermined Theme Subthemes Reasons for Establishing Partnerships Federal Government Mandate Trust Responsibilities and Treaty Rights Ethical STEM Training Activities: Discussions Consult Tribes Tribes & CSOs liaison Consult other CSOs Ethical STEM Training Activities: Documents Written Materials Organisational Protocol Ethical STEM Training Activities: Conferences Attend Tribal Workshops and Conferences Organise Tribes Conferences Invite Tribes to Conferences Ethical STEM Training Evaluation Relationship Quality Tribal Authorship Lack of Complaints REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS The most commonly discussed motivations for collaboration were mandates from the United States federal government.
Federal CSO interviewees often initiated partnerships because of Secretarial Order Number 3289, which requires federal climate science agencies to work with Tribes (DOI 2009).
Trust responsibilities and treaty rights, which refer to the legal duties and moral obligations of federal agencies to uphold treaty contracts with Tribes to ensure consultation in natural resource management, were also mentioned as important motivators for building collaboration.
ETHICAL STEM TRAINING ACTIVITIES The CSOs and Tribes suggested a variety of avenues for CSOs to receive ethical STEM training.
The main types of activities suggested were discussions, documents and conferences (Figure 1).
The lack of specificity about the need for ethical STEM training within federal and organisational policies has resulted in inconsistencies in training across CSOs.
Training generally occurs in an ad hoc and experiential manner, with employees learning how to work with Tribes as they begin research partnerships.
Because the CSOs did not typically have established training programs, both Tribes and CSOs were responsible for providing ethical STEM training independently.
Many interviews revealed that individual researchers were responsible for training themselves: When I first get a new researcher, I’m going to send them some links, websites, some different things…They do their homework, then I might want to work with them.
[T] Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 7 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES In this case, although the researcher was responsible for completing the training, the materials were being provided by the Tribe, which was often the case (Figure 1).
In addition, little oversight on the part of Tribes or CSOs was evident.
Figure 1 Ethical STEM training activities that are facilitated by Tribes (n=7) and CSOs (n=9).
Each activity is shown, along with the percentage of respondents who suggested that their organisation or Tribe facilitated such activities, either directly or by coordinating them for other parties.
Discussions Some CSOs encouraged their employees to engage in discussions or informal consultations with Tribes, a Tribe–CSO liaison, or other CSOs, to gain an ethical understanding of these complex partnerships (Figure 1).
Many Tribe interviewees frequently engaged in these discussions themselves or connected CSOs with other consultants.
Interviewees suggested that CSOs should engage in discussions with Tribes to learn about the Tribe’s culture, research needs and project goals.
Typically, interviewees considered CSOs responsible for initiating these discussions.
Some respondents’ organisations featured a Tribe–CSO liaison position for coordinating research projects between CSOs and Tribes.
Other respondents expressed the need for establishing this specific position within their own organisation, where the liaison would provide training for CSOs.
Some CSOs consulted other researchers at CSOs who had prior experience working with Tribes.
Occasionally, multiple CSOs and Tribes would participate in discussions, as one Tribe interviewee described: Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 8 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES One aspect of the work that we do is … promoting a coordination and communication among the scientists and Tribal representatives.
So part of what we’re doing is trying to create the forum for that kind of meeting to happen and then to help be the facilitator for the exchange of information.
[T] Documents Publicly or privately available documents that described best practices were a particularly popular training aid for establishing ethical STEM behaviour in CSO collaborations with Tribes (Figure 1).
These included written guides from a variety of sources as well as organisational protocols and documents that were used specifically within a particular CSO or Tribe.
One CSO participant described their development of written materials for ethical STEM training: We are in the process of developing a…guidebook for our researchers…to help them understand what sovereignty is, what traditional knowledge is, things to be aware of with respect to cultural practice…Not all Native Americans are the same.
[CSO] This quote emphasised the content of the guidebook and the multi-cultural nature of these partnerships.
Many CSOs were also interested in using their experience gained in prior work with Tribes to develop a comprehensive training curriculum.
One Tribe and one CSO were each working independently to create ethical STEM training curricula, and additional CSOs suggested it as a future step.
Conferences Conferences, workshops and group meetings were suggested as other platforms for ethical STEM training (Figure 1).
These events were perceived as accessible and common, with one respondent commenting that there was ‘always some type of training that is highlighting [Tribal] issues’ [T].
About half of the Tribes’ interviewees and a few CSOs organised and attended Tribally focused conferences.
The explicit focus of conferences and meetings was not ethical STEM itself, but rather the gathering provided a venue where CSOs could ‘learn about Tribes and learn about their issues and how to interact with them’ [CSO].
CSOs were more likely to invite Tribes to CSO-hosted conferences than organise Tribally focused conferences, which sometimes resulted in a larger burden on Tribes to acquire funding to send Tribal employees to these meetings.
ETHICAL STEM TRAINING EVALUATION None of the training programs for CSOs were intentional, and thus no evaluation of ethical STEM training was conducted by any interviewees.
A variety of evaluation methods were suggested, although most evaluated the research relationship rather than the training itself.
Each perspective stressed the importance of Tribal involvement in the evaluation process: To me it would be feedback from the Tribes, Tribal council, or the environmental professionals you’re working with.
If they could provide some commentary of the experience…would be the key way of evaluating it.
[CSO] This quote features the overall relationship quality between CSO and Tribal partners as a suggested evaluation metric.
Tribal authorship of research publications and a lack of Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 9 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES complaints about the partnership were two additional suggested metrics.
Typical quantifiable evaluative tools, such as the number of Tribal citizens involved in a project, were not regarded as particularly effective in these relationships.
EMERGENT THEMES When coding interviews, thematic content analysis was utilised to reveal themes that were not anticipated in the interview protocol about the relationships between CSOs and Tribes.
This resulted in four emergent themes: partnership goals, benefits for Tribes, benefits for CSOs, and challenges.
The emergent themes describe the need, potential content and goals for ethical STEM training in facilitating Tribe–CSO partnerships (Research Question 2).
As with the predetermined themes, each emergent theme contained multiple subthemes (Figure 2).
Overall, emergent themes revealed that Tribe interviewees were more likely to discuss many challenges, while CSO interviewees were more likely to discuss a variety of benefits.
Subthemes that described challenges were the most plentiful overall, indicating that the relationships between CSOs and Tribes are complex and challenging to navigate.
We explore each of the four emergent themes below.
Partnership goals, benefits for Tribes and benefits for CSOs demonstrate what a successful relationship between CSOs and Tribes might look like and may help guide ethical STEM training evaluation.
Challenges demonstrate potential focus areas for ethical STEM training content.
Figure 2 Emergent themes and their relative importance for Tribes and CSOs.
Partnership goals, benefits for Tribes, benefits for CSOs, and challenges Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 10 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES were four main themes identified via thematic content analysis.
Levels of importance indicate the percentage of interviewees who discussed a subtheme.
Items of low importance were <15% of interviewees, moderate between 15–60%, and high importance subthemes were discussed by >60% of interviewees.
Partnership goals The presence of certain relational characteristics between Tribes and CSOs was critical to successful partnerships.
Each interviewee suggested at least one of the following partnership goals: relationship building, encouraging Tribal sovereignty and empowerment, and equal collaboration.
A focus on relationship building between researchers and Tribal citizens was considered a necessary partnership component, with emphasis on the need for individual researchers to focus on personal relationships in order to earn trust.
For example, one Tribe interviewee articulated their experience: The scientist wants to come in and do their research and leave and don’t see it as a relationship…A Tribe…wants this relationship with the researchers long-term.
[T] This quote described the motive of the CSOs as research-based and short term, which misaligns with the Tribe’s goals of a longer research relationship.
A focus on building and sustaining personal relationships was often considered the responsibility of the CSO: I think scientists…that are looking to work with Indigenous communities really need to take it upon themselves to build those strong relationships within the communities.
[T] The promotion of Tribal sovereignty and empowerment through working relationships was another desired characteristic of collaborations.
One CSO stressed the importance of Tribal sovereignty: [Tribally-led science] moves this idea of Tribes being a ward of the federal government… and it empowers Tribes as sovereign nations to understand and react to their own impacts and understanding of climate change.
[CSO] Here, empowerment included scientific capacity and a broader understanding of Tribes as sovereign nations.
Finally, a sense of equal collaboration, often via Tribal input throughout all stages of a research project, was a key characteristic of successful partnerships.
Benefits for Tribes Benefits for Tribes generally highlighted the desire for Tribes to maintain control over their resources and the focus of climate change research.
The ability for Tribes to 1) build capacity and 2) have input in the formation of research projects was most frequently mentioned (Figure 2).
CSOs were more likely to discuss these potential benefits than were Tribes.
A Tribe interviewee commented on building capacity: One of the things I promote in my Tribal engagement strategy is that the ultimate goal is that the Tribe can do their own climate science, their own planning, their own projects… Having the groups collaborating is building the Tribe’s capacity [T] Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 11 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES Capacity building was discussed in a scientific sense: through interaction with CSOs, Tribes could expand or begin their own climate science research.
Being absent from collaborations with CSOs, Tribes might not have access to resources to build this scientific capacity.
Tribal input into research formation was related to the power difference between Tribes and CSOs in regard to their scientific backgrounds.
Both Tribes and CSOs were interested in proceeding with research projects that have Tribally relevant outcomes.
While highlighting this benefit, Tribe respondents discussed the challenge of conflicting research interests between CSOs and Tribes.
When these conflicts occurred, Tribes would also highlight their lack of capacity to carry out their own research.
Other benefits specific to Tribes included networking with scientists, development of climate adaptation plans, promoting intergenerational learning, receiving funding, and access to scientific data.
Benefits for CSOs The primary benefit to CSOs was access to Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) and adaptation methods.
TEK is not a typical component of formal education for scientists and is generally only available to CSOs through the cultural exchange of working closely with Tribes.
Lack of trust and knowledge ownership concerns were often highlighted regarding TEK, suggesting that CSO access to TEK should not be considered a given in partnerships.
One CSO described their views on TEK: [Tribes] have a long history and they’ve seen a lot of change and they know how to adapt to change…and so we can learn a lot from what they know and from their adaptation tools.
[CSO] Other benefits for CSOs included access to Tribal data and the ability to receive funding because of their engagement in projects with Tribal partners.
Tribe participants suggested that CSO researchers benefit from career advancement by completing research projects.
A desire for career enhancement on the part of a researcher was sometimes considered motivation to engage in unethical partnerships: My experience is that researchers, you know, often are seeking a knowledge and a credential.
And those are…their highest priorities and they often assume that they can enter Tribal lands and do work without getting the approval by Tribal leaders.
[T] Challenges: Cultural The most commonly identified challenges dealt with the cultural aspects of Tribe–CSO partnerships (Figure 2).
Cross-cultural difficulties were described in general, such as: We don’t come with the same set of values, teachings, and understandings.
[T] Interviewees also discussed specific cultural differences, such as perceptions of TEK: The hardest thing to teach is kind of the reverence for other people, for other cultures.
People talk about TEK like a thing and you need to gather it and we need to put it in a GIS database or something.
And it’s not.
It’s…a way of life.
It’s not a thing.
[CSO] The cross-cultural nature of these partnerships was most apparent when dealing with the different knowledge and bureaucratic systems of the scientific and Tribal communities.
Two narratives emerged surrounding different knowledge systems.
One narrative considered Western science as complicated and technical, requiring communication to Tribes in a Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 12 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES different way from how scientists generally communicate their findings.
The second was a concern over the cultural understanding of TEK.
The two quotes below exemplify this contrast: We come as agency scientists with a bunch of jargon, and ecosystems, goods and services, and scenarios, and pathways of stressors and thresholds.
You’re going to have to simplify that, or at least retranslate that into understanding, having done your background on…the Tribe and their community.
[CSO] In a collaboration with people who have other ways of knowing, it’s not about verifying the other ways of knowing with the scientific knowledge…Each puzzle piece is verified against its own metrics, its own criteria, experiences.
It’s considered accurate by the knowledge holders.
[CSO] The first quote signified the need for CSOs to be prepared to translate their scientific understanding into accessible information.
The second quote emphasised the importance of understanding and respecting the Tribes’ process for creating knowledge, which may include their own language, methods and evaluation criteria.
Tribe interviewees often pointed out the bureaucratic differences between the structure of a Tribe and a CSO, describing CSOs as unaware of how to work with a Tribe’s decision makers.
Tribe and CSO interviewees also discussed the multicultural landscape of Tribes as a barrier to successful collaboration.
When working with multiple Tribes, CSOs should take note that: All Tribes…don’t have the same cultural beliefs.
They’re different.
They’re unique.
[T] Challenges: Resources The primary resources that presented challenges were knowledge, trust, funding and time.
A concern for all interviewees was ownership of knowledge, where knowledge was a broad concept encompassing scientific data and TEK.
CSOs often discussed ownership of knowledge as a concern related to their organisation’s protocol.
Interviewees stressed the need to inform Tribes of what information they planned or were required to publish.
Proper handling of Tribal knowledge and data was linked to a lack of trust based on past transgressions by researchers.
Trust here refers to the moral concept that different peoples should create conditions where each is certain that the other takes their best interests to heart (Wolfensberger 2016), and not to government trust responsibilities.
Lack of trust was mentioned by most Tribe interviewees, but only some CSO interviewees (Figure 2).
Issues caused by this lack of trust varied and included a reluctance to start partnerships, a lack of information sharing, and slowing down the research process.
Attaining funding for research expenses was of great importance to Tribes and of moderate importance to CSOs (Figure 2).
Tribes faced barriers in dealing with scientific research protocols, including navigating federal funding agencies.
Concerns were also expressed over the fairness of funding allocations to Tribes, and regulations that limited an open exchange of funds.
Interviewees also encountered a lack of time and resources to dedicate to projects and ethical STEM training.
Challenges: Engagement The challenges related to engagement in partnerships were least commonly discussed, but highlighted disparities in concern over certain partnership characteristics.
Tribes and CSOs Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 13 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES mentioned difficulty engaging Tribal citizens and Tribes, as groups, in research.
One Tribe participant described Tribes’ lack of engagement as related to feeling uninvolved in the project and having other priorities: I think a lot of times the Indians themselves don’t feel like they’re part of the project so their interest is very low.
You know, they have other issues to worry about, mostly social issues.
[T] This quote also demonstrates an example of an unequal partnership where Tribes are not given project control and voice in the project.
Many Tribe participants were concerned about unequal partnerships, while only one CSO participant identified a similar theme (Figure 2).
In addition to a lack of sufficient involvement in the project, Tribes were somewhat concerned about conflicting research needs where the goals of CSO and Tribal partners were misaligned.
CSOs did not mention this as a challenge (Figure 2).
Two challenges were mentioned only by CSOs (Figure 2), and they were related to the structure of their organisations.
Many CSOs are under a federal mandate to work with Tribes, and as such CSOs develop Tribal engagement strategies.
However, documentation detailing these strategies is insufficient to provide adequate guidance for real-world engagement.
Another challenge unique to CSOs was engaging their climate scientists in Tribal issues and ethical STEM training.
Even though ethical STEM training opportunities exist, few CSO employees seek them out independently of a specific project.
Discussion This study analysed the current state of relationships between climate science organizations (CSOs) and Tribes in order to understand the need for, prevalence of, and potential avenues for ethical STEM training in these partnerships.
The abundance of emergent themes from the interviews indicates that interactions between Tribes and CSOs are complex.
While guidelines for engaging in these types of relationships exist (e.g.
CTKW 2014; NIH 2011), our research has shown that even among scientific organisations and Tribes that commonly work across these cultural boundaries, there are no consistent efforts to connect researchers or Tribes with ethical STEM training.
Tribes and CSOs shared many perceptions about their partnerships, with some key differences that indicate there is a need for CSOs to engage in ethical STEM training.
First, there appears to be an unequal burden on Tribes in providing ethical STEM training for researchers who begin partnerships unprepared.
While most respondents suggested that CSOs should be responsible for training their researchers to work with Tribes, Tribes often provided this training through documents or discussions.
Second, CSOs tended to focus on the potential benefits that they hoped Tribes received from their interactions, while Tribe interviewees named a wider variety of challenges in these relationships.
However, while CSO and Tribe respondents framed issues differently, they identified similar themes across partnership goals, benefits and challenges.
For example, ‘unequal partnerships’ was a challenge that Tribes identified, while CSOs and Tribes also spoke to a partnership goal of ‘equal partnerships’.
In order to produce more ethical relationships given our findings, we make three recommendations for researchers and organisations.
First, any organisation or Indigenous community seeking research partners must be prepared to engage in partnership-building conversations during project development.
Engaging in this process in an explicit manner, for example through written data-sharing agreements that emphasise relationship building, equal Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 14 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES collaboration and Tribal sovereignty, can help facilitate a smooth partnership (Harding et al.
2012).
Tribes and CSOs should each be prepared to discuss their own norms and expectations at the outset of a partnership.
Rather than approaching an Indigenous community with a predefined project and goal, researchers must seek out Indigenous partners early on in project development to engage Tribal members and to begin building personal relationships.
This process should be undertaken before attaining grant funding for a project because of the concerns over funding that inadequately compensates Indigenous partners.
Partnership-building conversations must consider how to produce accessible results and foster other desired benefits (Emanuel et al.
2004; Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga 2015; NIH 2011).
For Indigenous peoples, potential benefits include having input in the research process and building scientific capacity (Arnold & Fernandez-Gimenez 2007; Holmes, Lickers & Barkley 2002; Huntington et al.
2011).
Researchers should evaluate the usefulness, relevance and accessibility of project results according to Indigenous partners as a measure of how well they are facilitating these benefits (Lemos & Morehouse 2005).
Because Tribe respondents also emphasised a lack of trust towards researchers, we propose trust as an important partnership outcome.
The benefit that CSO participants most often discussed was the integration of TEK into their research, which has the potential to produce novel ecological insights (Huntington et al.
2011; Kimmerer 1998; Porter 2007).
Partners should recognise that some Indigenous cultural norms involve respect for privacy, and that partnerships do not guarantee access to TEK.
Researchers must also understand the cultural context surrounding TEK and recognise inherent differences in the production of each type of knowledge (Latulippe 2015; Reo et al.
2017; Smith & Sharp 2012).
Second, further research is needed at the Tribe–CSO nexus to develop ethical STEM training and evaluation.
Literature on training scientists to engage with diverse communities is sparse and often related to medical research (Beach et al.
2005; Minkler 2005; Wong et al.
2017), thus not addressing the specific challenges that climate change researchers might encounter when working with Indigenous peoples.
Several training activities were identified by our interviewees, with most CSOs engaging in some training activities.
However, the currently ad hoc nature of such training is unlikely to: 1) engage all applicable researchers; and 2) capture the diverse set of challenges surrounding Tribe–CSO collaborations.
While interviewees most often placed the context of this training within their current organisations, there have also been calls to incorporate this knowledge into training for scientists via their more formal university education (Kimmerer 2002).
Regardless of the venue of training, intentional programs are necessary to ensure that CSOs and other scientific researchers can ethically partner with Indigenous peoples.
In order to develop stronger ethical STEM training opportunities for scientists, further research should develop a wider and more representative sample of potential goals, benefits and challenges of such partnerships.
Upon reviewing the results of this study, some interviewees expressed that individuals’ roles in engagements might change their perspective and thus the study results.
While gathering more perspectives from scientists and Indigenous peoples, researchers should also seek out developed trainings at this nexus to build an understanding of current best practices.
Formalising and publicising best practices in preparing and facilitating these partnerships is especially important (Lazrus & Gough 2013).
Educational programs and training interventions are most likely to be effective when they are based on clearly articulated theories of behaviour change (Townsend et al.
2003), and when they provide knowledge and skills that fill a perceived need by their audience (Suarez-Balcazar et al.
2008).
Using a theoretically grounded program may allow for creation of a basic ethical Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 15 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES STEM training program that can be implemented – with appropriate cultural revision – in many research contexts.
Basing that program on the needs identified in this research, related contexts and any further research that occurs at this nexus will ensure that it is most relevant to the scientific community that it is targeting.
Third, CSOs and similar organisations should systematically utilise this training for their employees who will be working with Indigenous peoples.
Distinct power differentials exist in the relationships between research organisations and Indigenous peoples, with organisations often having more access to the resources needed to carry out scientific research (Bohensky & Maru 2011; Fisher & Ball 2003; Kimmerer 1998; Smith & Sharp 2012) and challenges burdening Tribes more than CSOs.
This is true even within relationships featuring CSOs experienced in working with Indigenous peoples, as shown by Tribe interviewees discussing challenges relatively more than CSOs.
It is incumbent upon scientific organisations to engage in ethical STEM training and proactively address these power imbalances.
For example, researchers should understand project funding sources and how funding can be shared with the Indigenous partners before seeking out a partnership with an Indigenous community.
The training and evaluation process itself is likely to encounter many of the same challenges as any research partnership, but may be exacerbated by the cultural differences and contrasting worldviews of Indigenous peoples and Western scientists.
Both training and evaluation need to take into account Indigenous and researcher perspectives, and the development of a training program should be approached in a similar manner as the start of a partnership.
Tribes and CSOs should include ethical STEM training for researchers in organisational protocols in order to provide this training consistently.
Dedicated commitment by these organisations is necessary, not only in achieving the goals of, in this case, promoting ethical STEM, but also in ensuring that these training programs are sustained over time (Suarez-Balcazar et al.
2008).
Conclusion The consideration of ethical relationships between US Tribes and scientists has broad implications for similar collaborations internationally.
The co-creation of ethical STEM training programs has the potential to ease the burden of challenges experienced by Indigenous peoples in future research partnerships and to rebuild trust that has been lost between Indigenous peoples and research scientists; this is particularly true when ethical STEM training is conducted in line with the guidelines suggested here and elsewhere in community-based research literature.
More ethical and equitable partnerships that respond to the need of Indigenous peoples to build scientific capacity can only serve to improve society’s understanding of climate change’s impacts and potential for adaptation.
These ethical STEM training efforts can be applied not only within the US, but also more broadly, as nations work to develop climate change adaptation plans in accordance with the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015).
Such efforts would respond to the literature that documents Indigenous peoples’ interest in responding to climate change threats (e.g.
O’Brien, Hayward & Berkes 2009) and the need to consider contextual and historic factors in relationships between Indigenous peoples and researchers (Cameron 2012).
Maintaining ethical STEM principles of research will enhance the ability of climate adaptation researchers and programs, such as the Green Climate Fund (Schalatek, Nakhooda & Watson 2015), to adequately address the needs of Indigenous peoples participating in partnerships that reduce the harms they experience and promote maximum benefits for Indigenous peoples worldwide.
Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 16 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES References Anaya, J 2004, Indigenous peoples in international law, Oxford University Press, New York.
Arnold, J & Fernandez-Gimenez, M 2007, ‘Building social capital through participatory research: An analysis of collaboration on Tohano O’odham Tribal rangelands in Arizona’, Society & Natural Resources, vol.
20, no.
6, p. 481. doi:10.1080/08941920701337887 Beach, M, Price, E, Gary, T, Robinson, K, Gozu, A, Palacio, A, Smarth, C, Jenckes, M, Feuerstein, C, Bass, E, Powe, N & Cooper, L 2005, ‘Cultural competencey: A systematic review of health care provider educational interventions’, Medical Care, vol.
43, no.
4, p. 356. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.
mlr.0000156861.58905.96 Bennett, T, Maynard, N, Cochran, P, Gough, R, Lynn, K, Maldonado, J, Voggesser, G, Wotkyns, S & Cozzetto, K 2014, ‘Indigenous peoples, land, and resources’, in J Melillo, T Richmond & G Yohe (eds), Climate change impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment, U.S.
Global Change Research Program, p. 297–317.
Bohensky, E & Maru, Y 2011, ‘Indigenous knowledge, science, and resilience: What have we learned from a decade of international literature on “integration”?’, Ecology and Society, vol.
16, no.
4, p. 6. doi:10.5751/ES-04342-160406 Burnard, P 1991, ‘A method of analysing interview transcripts in qualitative research’, Nurse Education Today, vol.
11. https://doi.org/10.1016/0260-6917(91)90009-y Cameron, E 2012, ‘Securing Indigenous politics: A critique of the vulnerability and adaptation approach to the human dimensions of climate change in the Canadian Arctic’, Global Environmental Change, vol.
22, p. 103. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.11.004 Callison, C 2014, How climate change comes to matter: The communal life of facts, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Cicchetti, D 1994, ‘Guidelines, criteria, and rules of thumb for evaluating normed and standardized assessment instruments in psychology’, Psychological Assessment, vol.
6, no.
4, p. 284. https://doi.
org/10.1037//1040-3590.6.4.284 Climate and Traditional Knowledges Workgroup (CTKW) 2014, ‘Guidelines for considering traditional knowledges in climate change initiatives’, viewed 6 December 2017, https://climatetkw.wordpress.com.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation (CSKT) 2013, ‘Climate Change Strategic Plan’, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Pablo, MT.
Corbin, J & Strauss, A 1990, Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, CA.
Cronin, A & Ostergren, D 2007, ‘Democracy, participation, and Native American Tribes in collaborative watershed management’, Society & Natural Resources, vol.
20 no.
6, p. 527. doi:10.1080/08941920701338059 Cross, T, Bazron, B, Dennis, K & Isaacs, M 1989, ‘The cultural competence continuum’, in Towards a culturally competent system of care: A monograph on effective services for minority children who are severely emotionally disabled, Georgetown University Child Development Center, Washington, DC.
Davis, S 2010, ‘Indigenous peoples and climate change’, International Indigenous Policy Journal, vol.
1, no.
1, pp.
1–17.
Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 17 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08941920701337887 https://doi.org/10.1097/01.mlr.0000156861.58905.96 https://doi.org/10.1097/01.mlr.0000156861.58905.96 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss4/art6/ https://doi.org/10.1016/0260-6917(91)90009-y https://www.infona.pl/resource/bwmeta1.element.elsevier-46a8e4ab-d9f2-3a79-853e-e8f00187f712 https://doi.org/10.1037//1040-3590.6.4.284 https://doi.org/10.1037//1040-3590.6.4.284 https://climatetkw.wordpress.com/ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08941920701338059 Department of the Interior (DOI) 2009, ‘Addressing the impacts of climate change on America’s water, land, and other natural and cultural resources (Order No.
3289)’, Washington, DC.
Emanuel, E, Wendler, D, Killen, J & Grady, C 2004, ‘What makes clinical research in developing countries ethical?
The benchmarks of ethical research’, The Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol.
189, no.
5, p. 930. doi:10.1086/381709 Executive Order No.
13653, 3 C.F.R., 2013, Washington, D.C. Fisher, P & Ball, T 2003, ‘Tribal participatory research: Mechanisms of a collaborative model’, American Journal of Community Psychology, vol.
32, no.
3–4, p. 207. doi:10.1023/B:AJCP.0000004742.39858.c5 Fitzharris, B 2007, ‘How vulnerable is New Zealand to the impacts of climate change?’, New Zealand Geographer, vol.
63, p. 160. doi:10.1111/j.1745-7939.2007.00119.x Francis, J, Johnston, M, Robertson, C, Glidewell, L, Entwistle, V, Eccles, M, Grimshaw, J, 2010, ‘What is an adequate sample size?
Operationalizing data saturation for theory-based interview studies’, Psychology and Health, vol.
25, no.
10, p. 1229. doi:10.1080/08870440903194015 Guest, G, Bunce, A & Johnson, L 2006, ‘How many interviews are enough?
An experiment with data saturation and variability’, Field Methods, vol.
18, no.
1, p. 59. doi:10.1177/1525822X05279903 Grijalva, J 2017, ‘Resistance, resilience and reconciliation: Indigenous human rights to environmental protection in a fossil fuel frenzy’, JURIST Commentary, 12 April.
Harding, A, Harper, B, Stone, D, O’Neill, C, Berger, P, Harris, S & Donatuto, J 2012, ‘Conducting research with Tribal communities: Sovereignty, ethics, and data-sharing issues’, Environmental Health Perspectives, vol.
120, no.
1, p. 6. doi:10.1289/ehp.1103904 Herman-Mercer, N, Matkin, E, Laituri, M, Toohey, R, Massey, M, Elder, K, Schuster, P, Mutter, E 2016, ‘Changing times, changing stories: Generational differences in climate change perspectives from four remote indigenous communities in Subarctic Alaska’, Ecology and Society, vol.
21, no.
3, p. 28. doi:10.5751/ES-08463-210328 Holmes, E, Lickers, H & Barkley, B 2002, ‘A critical assessment of ten years of on-the-ground sustainable forestry in Eastern Ontario’s settled landscape’, The Forestry Chronicle, vol.
78, no.
5, p. 643. doi:10.5558/tfc78643-5 Huntington, H, Gearheard, S, Mahoney, A & Salomon, A 2011, ‘Integrating traditional and scientific knowledge through collaborative natural science field research: Identifying elements for success’, ARCTIC, vol.
64, no.
4, p. 437. doi:10.14430/arctic4143 Ishaya, S & Abaje, I 2008, ‘Indigenous people’s perception on climate change and adaptation strategies in Jema’a local government area of Kaduna state, Nigeria’, Journal of Geography and Regional Planning, vol.
1, no.
8, p. 138.
Israel, B, Schulz, A, Parker, E & Becker, A 1998, ‘Review of community-based research: Assessing partnership approaches to improve public health’, Annual Review of Public Health, vol.
19, p. 173. doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.19.1.173 Kellert, S, Mehta, J, Ebbin, S & Lichtenfeld, L 2000, ‘Community natural resource management: Promise, rhetoric, and reality’, Society & Natural Resources, vol.
13, no.
8, p. 705. doi:10.1080/089419200750035575 Kettle, N, Martin, J & Sloan, M 2017, ‘Climate adaptation plan for the Nome-based tribes’, Nome Eskimo Community and The Alaska Center for Climate Assessment and Policy, Fairbanks, AK.
Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 18 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES https://academic.oup.com/jid/article/189/5/930/810459 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1023/B%3AAJCP.0000004742.39858.c5 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1745-7939.2007.00119.x https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20204937 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1525822X05279903?journalCode=fmxd https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21890450 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss3/art28/ http://pubs.cif-ifc.org/doi/10.5558/tfc78643-5 https://arctic.journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/arctic/index.php/arctic/article/view/4143 https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.publhealth.19.1.173 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/089419200750035575 Kimmerer, R 1998, ‘Intellectual diversity – Bringing the Native perspective into natural resources education’, Winds of Change, vol.
13, no.
3, p. 14.
Kimmerer, R 2002, ‘Weaving traditional ecological knowledge into biological education: A call to action’, BioScience, vol.
52, no.
5, p. 432. https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568(2002)052[0432:wtekib]2.0.co;2 Latulippe, N 2015, ‘Situating the work: A typology of traditional knowledge literature’, AlterNative, vol.
11, no.
2, p. 118. https://doi.org/10.1177/117718011501100203 Lazrus, H & Gough, R 2013, ‘“We’re all in the same canoe”: The rising voices of Indigenous peoples in weather and climate science and policy’, National Center for Atmospheric Research Diversity Workshop, Boulder, CO, 1–3 July.
Leclerc, C, Mwongera, C, Camberlin, P & Boyard-Micheau, J 2013, ‘Indigenous past climate knowledge as cultural built-in object and its accuracy’, Ecology and Society, vol.
18, no.
4, p. 22. doi:10.5751/ ES05896-180422 Lemos, M & Morehouse, B 2005, ‘The co-production of science and policy in integrated climate assessments’, Global Environmental Change, vol.
15, no.
1, p. 57. doi:10.1016/J.
GLOENVCHA.2004.09.004 Minkler, M, 2004, ‘Ethical challenges for the “outside” researcher in community-based participatory research’, Health Education & Behavior, vol.
31, no.
6, p. 684. doi:10.1177/1090198104269566 Minkler, M, 2005, ‘Community-based research partnerships: Challenges and opportunities’, Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, vol.
82, no.
2, suppl.
2. doi:10.1093/jurban/ jti034 National Institute of Health (NIH) 2011, ‘Principles of community engagement’, in Principles of Community Engagement, UCDavis Health, Sacramento, CA.
Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga 2015, ‘2015 Annual Report Pūrongo Ā-Tau’, New Zealand’s Māori Center of Research Excellence, Auckland, NZ.
O’Brien, K, Hayward, B & Berkes, F 2009, ‘Rethinking social contracts: Building resilience in a changing climate’, Ecology and Society, vol.
14, no.
2, p. 12. https://doi.org/10.5751/es-03027-140212 Papiez, C 2009, ‘Climate change implications for the Quileute and Hoh Tribes of Washington: A multidisciplinary approach to assessing climatic disruptions to coastal Indigenous communities’, Master of Environmental Studies Thesis, The Evergreen State College, Olympia, WA.
Porter, K, 2007, ‘Good alliances make good neighbors: The case for Tribal-state-federal watershed partnerships’, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol.
16, no.
3, p. 495.
Reinert, E, Aslaksen J, Eira, M, Mathiesen S, Reinert, H & Inga Turi, E 2008, ‘Adapting to climate change in reindeer herding: The nation-state as problem and solution’, The Other Canon Foundation and Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics, vol.
16.
Reo, N, Whyte, K, McGregor, D, Smith, M & Jenkins, J 2017, ‘Factors that support Indigenous involvement in multi-actor environmental stewardship’, AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples, vol.
13, no.
2, p. 58. doi:10.1177/1177180117701028 Sadler, T, Barab, S & Scott, B 2007, ‘What do students gain by engaging in socioscientific inquiry?’, Research in Science Education, vol.
37, no.
4, p. 371. doi:10.1007/s11165-006-9030-9 Ethical collaboration and the need for training Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 19 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568(2002)052[0432:wtekib]2.0.co;2 https://doi.org/10.1177/117718011501100203 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss4/art22/ https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss4/art22/ https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959378004000652 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959378004000652 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1090198104269566 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1093/jurban/jti034 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1093/jurban/jti034 https://doi.org/10.5751/es-03027-140212 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1177180117701028 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11165-006-9030-9 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (SRMT) 2013, ‘Climate Change Adaptation Plan for Akwesasne’, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Akwesasne, NY.
Salazar, M 2016, Federal and State Recognized Tribes, National Conference of State Legislatures, Washington DC, viewed 19 July 2018, www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-andstate-recognized-tribes.aspx.
Schalatek, L, Nakhooda, S & Watson, C 2015, ‘The green climate fund’, Climate Funds Update, Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America, viewed 6 December 2017, https://us.boell.org/sites/default/files/ uploads/2015/11/cff11_2015_gcf.pdf.
Smith, H & Sharp, K 2012, ‘Indigenous climate knowledges’, WIREs Climate Change, vol.
3, p. 467. doi:10.1002/wcc.185 Suarez-Balcazar, Y, Balcazar, F, Iriarte, E & Taylor-Ritzler, T 2008, ‘Capacity building and empowerment: A panacea and a challenge for agency-university engagement’, Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, vol.
1, p. 179. doi:10.5130/ijcre.v1i0.626 Tanner, K & Allen, D 2007, ‘Cultural competence in the college biology classroom’, CBE Life Sciences Education, vol.
6, p. 251. doi:10.1187/cbe.07-09-0086 Tebtebba 2011, Indigenous women, climate change, & forests, Baguio City, Philippines.
Thomas, L, Rosa, C, Forcehimes, A & Donovan, D 2011, ‘Research partnerships between academic institutions and American Indian and Alaska Native Tribes and organizations: Effective strategies and lessons learned in a multisite CTN study’, The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, vol.
37, no.
5, p. 333. doi:10.3109/00952990.2011.596976 Townsend, M, Contento, I, Nitzke, S, McClelland, J, Keenan, D & Brown, G 2003, ‘Using a theorydriven approach to design: A professional development workshop’, Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior, vol.
35, no.
6, p. 312. doi:10.1016/S1499-4046(06)60346-1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2015, ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’, United Nations, Paris.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 2008, ‘61/295 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’.
Whyte, K 2013, ‘On the role of traditional ecological knowledge as a collaborative concept: A philosophical study’, Ecological Processes, vol.
2, p. 7. https://doi.org/10.1186/2192-1709-2-7 Whyte, K 2017, ‘The Dakota Access Pipeline, environmental injustice and U.S. colonialism’, Red Ink: An International Journal of Indigenous Literature, Arts and Humanities, vol.
19 no.
1, p. 154. doi:10.1007/ s10584-013-0743-2 Williams, T & Hardison, P 2013, ‘Culture, law, risk and governance: Contexts of traditional knowledge in climate change adaptation’, Climatic Change, vol.
120, no.
3, p. 531. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584013-0850-0 Wolfensberger, M 2016, ‘Defining trust’, in A conceptual analysis of trust in medicine: Its definition, decline, and significance, thesis, Keele University, pp.
25–92.
Wong, C, Chen, L, Koh, K, Chua, S, Jong, D, Mohd Fauzi, N & Lim, S 2017, ‘Serving an Indigenous community: Exploring the cultural competence of medical students in a rural setting’, Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, vol.
10, p. 97. doi:10.5130/ijcre.v10i1.5427 Kirby, Haruo, Whyte, Libarkin, Caldwell and Edler Gateways: International Journal of Community Research and Engagement, Vol.
12, No.
1, January 2019 20 PAGE NUMBER NOT FOR CITATION PURPOSES www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized-tribes.aspx www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized-tribes.aspx https://us.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2015/11/cff11_2015_gcf.pdf https://us.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2015/11/cff11_2015_gcf.pdf https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.185 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/ijcre/article/view/626 https://www.lifescied.org/doi/10.1187/cbe.07-09-0086 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21854275 doi:10.1016/S1499-4046(06)60346-1 https://doi.org/10.1186/2192-1709-2-7 doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0743-2 doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0743-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0850-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0850-0 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/ijcre/article/view/5427
Chazan & Baldwin FINAL Feb 19 20 Correspondence Address: May Chazan, Gender & Women’s Studies, Trent University, Peterborough, ON, K9L 0G2; Email: maychazan@trentu.ca ISSN: 1911-4788 Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 Granny Solidarity: Understanding Age and Generational Dynamics in Climate Justice Movements MAY CHAZAN Trent University, Canada MELISSA BALDWIN Trent University, Canada ABSTRACT Since the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, a global shift in consciousness has taken place around the urgency of the Earth’s climate crisis.
Amidst growing panic, teenagers are emerging as key leaders and mobilizers, demanding intergenerational justice and immediate action.
They are, however, often depicted as lone revolutionaries or as pawns of adult organizations.
These representations obscure the complex and important ways in which climate justice movements are operating, and particularly the ways in which dynamics of age intersect with other axes of power within solidarity efforts in specific contexts.
This article explores these dynamics, building on analyses of intersectional and intergenerational solidarity practices.
Specifically, it delves into detailed analysis of how the Seattle group of the Raging Grannies, a network of older activists, engaged in Seattle’s ShellNo Action Coalition, mobilizing their age, whiteness, and gender to support racialized and youth activists involved in the coalition, and thus to block Shell Oil’s rigs from travelling through the Seattle harbour en route to the Arctic.
Drawing from a pivotal group discussion between Grannies and other coalition members, as well as participant observation and media analysis, it examines the Grannies’ practices of solidarity during frontline protests and well beyond.
The article thus offers an analysis of solidarity that is both intergenerational and intersectional in approach, while contributing to ongoing work to extend understandings of the temporal, spatial, cognitive, and relational dimensions of solidarity praxis.
KEYWORDS climate justice; climate change; intergenerational; age; aging; solidarity; gender; race Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 245 Introduction In October of 2018, signalling a shift in global consciousness, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a group of the world’s leading climate scientists, reported that humans have 12 years to reduce carbon emissions by 45% in order to avoid triggering a series of feedback loops that would make future life on Earth untenable (Brake, 2018).
This declaration of climate crisis amplifies widespread messages of urgency by scientists, land and water protectors, Indigenous Elders, public figures, and activists (Brake, 2018; Water Docs, 2019b).
Amidst this growing panic, teenage activists, like Greta Thunberg, Autumn Peltier, and Jamie Margolin, are emerging as world leaders, raising their voices at global summits and inciting mass mobilizations (Burton, 2019; Water Docs, 2019a).1 Post 2018, youth leaders are capturing media attention with sophisticated analyses and complex demands.
They are calling for deep transformation of global economic systems, away from capitalist-colonial extraction, toward different ways of organizing societies, economies, and lives (Margolin, 2019; Peltier, 2018; Tait, 2019).
Ultimately, they are demanding intergenerational justice: calling on older generations, particularly those who have reaped the benefits of wealth accumulation and technological advancement over their lifetimes and who now hold the balance of global power, to radically change their actions, beliefs, and lifestyles now in order to prevent the mass suffering and extinction of generations to come (Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, 2018; Winter, 2017).
They are repeatedly questioning how older people in positions of power – many of them parents and grandparents – can continue to protect their own comforts knowing that they are putting future life at risk.
While these youth leaders are truly remarkable, dominant media representations of youth-led climate justice uprisings depict them as lone revolutionaries within a global movement replete with generational divisions (e.g., Cohen, 2019; Tait, 2019).2,3 Such representations are, however, not 1 There are many critiques of how media representations centre white activists, like Greta, as leaders, while erasing Indigenous, Black, and brown activists (Frazer-Carroll, 2019).
Indeed, there are many prominent youth activists of colour in the climate justice movement, including Tokota Iron Eyes, Mari Copeny, Artemisa Xakriabá, Ridhima Pandey, Alexandria Villaseñor, Ayakha Melithafa, Xiuhtezcatl Martinez, Isra Hirshi, and others (Burton, 2019).
Further, while the current visibility, media prominence, and vast numbers of youth mobilizing for climate justice might be new, youth mobilization around climate change far predates 2018 (e.g., Winona LaDuke and Severn Suzuki addressing the UN in 1977 and 1992, respectively (Honor the Earth, 2019; United Nations, 2017)).
2 Climate justice is “a broad and unsettled concept” and framework for global resistance that exposes the unequal and inequitable impacts of climate change (Black, Milligan & Heynen, 2016, p. 286).
Diverse climate justice movements centre social injustice rooted in inequality between groups who have most benefited from global extractive development, and those who are and will be most impacted.
They also expose how those in positions to make immediate and material changes towards radically reducing carbon emissions are also those who profit from extractivism.
Climate justice discourses link “environmentalism” to intersecting analyses of May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 246 based on grounded analysis of intergenerational and age dynamics within climate justice organizing, and thus they fall short.
The complex age dynamics at play are obscured amidst this global imaginary, as are the particularities of how intergenerational solidarities are understood and practiced in different contexts.4 Meanwhile, the ways in which intergenerational politics and relationships are practiced in response to the climate crisis hold enormous repercussions for future life on Earth (Winter, 2017).
A number of key questions thus emerge: What roles are older people playing in climate justice mobilizations and coalitions?
How are intergenerational solidarities understood and practiced within different contexts?
How are dynamics of age and generation intersecting with other axes of difference – race, gender, geography, ancestry – within these climate justice efforts?
This article explores these questions, drawing from the authors’ longstanding research with older women activists across North America.
We investigate the ways in which one group of older women, the Seattle chapter of the Raging Grannies,5 worked in solidarity as part of a multifaceted anti-oil campaign – specifically through their actions at protests, roles in organizing spaces, and commitments to personal (un)learning.
Our analysis builds from five years of research with a network called the Raging Grannies.
Elsewhere we have written about how some Raging Grannies groups, as groups of predominantly older (60s through 80s, and hence of the early baby global wealth disparity, ongoing (settler) colonialism, capitalist extraction and profiteering, border imperialism, racism, patriarchy, and more (Mersha, 2018; Margolin, 2019).
3 In widespread media representations, these teen activists are often depicted alone, speaking to immense audiences of adults who hold power (e.g., Tait, 2019; Water Docs, 2019a).
Moreover, youth leaders are frequently described as the “solution” or the “hope,” while older people are represented in opposition as the “problem.” This divisive rhetoric further erases intergenerational dynamics and obscures the roles and relationships of younger and older people within this movement (see Winter, 2017).
This centering of youth as inspiring revolutionaries in the post2018 climate response has been critiqued as polarizing young environmentalists in opposition to a homogenous generation of environmentally destructive Boomers (e.g., Cohen, 2019).
4 “Solidarity,” a hopeful political concept with roots in labour movement organizing, is frequently deployed as a model of political engagement that holds possibilities for working across differences in power toward common goals for social change (Gaztambide-Fernández, 2012; Featherstone, 2012).
“Solidarity” has been critiqued and reimagined, particularly by transnational feminist and Indigenous scholars, who challenge assumptions of similarity among “women” or across Indigenous/settler positions, paying explicit attention to solidarities across differences in power and privilege (Mohanty, 2003) and offering compelling re-imaginings of relational and interdependent solidarities (Snelgrove, Dahmoon & Corntassel, 2014).
5 The Raging Grannies are a network of older women activists who mobilize for a variety of social and environmental causes.
The Raging Grannies first organized in 1987 in Victoria (Canada), as peace activists imaginatively and humorously protesting the appearance of U.S. submarines carrying nuclear warheads in the Victoria harbor.
Their humour captured the imaginations of other older women across Turtle Island: now, over 100 groups span the continent, and some even exist abroad (see www.raginggrannies.org).
These groups, though selfdirected and distinct, share the tactic of mobilizing ageist stereotypes of “little old ladies” in parodic performances, with colourful shawls, large hats, aprons, and other props (Roy, 2004; Sawchuk, 2009; Goldman, Chazan, & Baldwin, 2018).
Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 247 boomer cohort) white settler women, are practicing solidarity-building with Indigenous-led movements in the Canadian context (Chazan, 2016); about assumptions of older women’s feminist politics, specifically presumptions of their limited intersectional analysis or awareness (Chazan & Baldwin, 2016); and about motivations for engaging in activisms in later life more broadly (Chazan, Baldwin, & Whattam, 2018).. We focus here on the Seattle Raging Grannies’ roles in the ShellNo Action Coalition, which in 2015 organized a series of sophisticated and impactful land and water actions, protesting Arctic oil extraction and the presence of Shell Oil’s drilling rigs in the port of Seattle, on Coast Salish, xwmǝƟkwǝy̓ǝm (Musqueam), and Skwxwú7mesh (Squamish) territories.
Specifically, we explore some of the complex age dynamics within this climate justice coalition,6 in which over 15 groups explicitly organized around a logic of intersectional and intergenerational solidarity.
By this logic, those most impacted by climate change (youth, Indigenous communities, people of colour) were intended to lead, while those occupying relative positions of privilege (white, middle class, and so on, including the Raging Grannies) were meant to offer tactical support.
Drawing closely from research at the Raging Grannies biannual international “Unconvention” held in Seattle in 2016, we consider what we can learn from the Raging Grannies’ practices, as well as from their coalitional partners’ reflections and feedback.
In so doing, we extend analysis of age and intergenerational dynamics (as they intersect with other systems of power and difference) within climate justice mobilizations specifically (Greenfield, 2019), and within relationships of solidarity more generally (Binnie & Klesse, 2012).
We argue that, during the 2015 ShellNo actions, the Raging Grannies mobilized their age together with their gender and whiteness to confer protection from the police, for themselves and for more targeted coalition members.
We also explore how dynamics of age, gender, and race informed their roles and relationships in other organizing spaces beyond frontline protests.
Context and Methodology The Seattle Raging Grannies Unconvention opened with a panel of predominantly younger, Indigenous and/or racialized activists: eight nonGranny activists from the ShellNo Action Coalition, with whom the Grannies had been nurturing relationships since before the 2015 actions.
Rather than open their gathering with presentations from Grannies themselves – many of whom are seasoned older activists who continue to work tirelessly in many 6 This is one of many protests against oil extraction, profiteering, and pipelines, as part of the climate justice movement, and as intertwined with Indigenous land protection and sovereignty, and and anticapitalist challenges to extreme wealth (e.g., challenges to the Dakota Access Pipeline at Standing Rock and by the Unist’ot’en people; see Rowe & Simpson, 2017; Noisecat & Spice, 2016).
May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 248 movements – these older, mostly white settler women chose to position themselves as listeners first.
We take this observation as our starting point for this article.
Our analysis focuses on this panel discussion, in which the Grannies posed a critical question to themselves as a movement: how could they (i.e., Raging Grannies) do solidarity better?
The panel was moderated by a member of Seattle Raging Grannies, who we call “Granny X” to maintain her privacy, and included the following coalition members (listed in speaking order): Panelist 1, a younger woman of colour and founder of Women of Colour Speak Out; Panelist 2, an Indigenous (Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian) woman who identified as a spiritual activist and has directed both Idle No More Washington and Native Women Rising; Panelist 3, a young Black woman who was organizing with Got Green, a racial and climate justice organization; Panelist 4, a young man of colour who organized with Rising Tide Seattle; Panelist 5, a younger white woman activist, writer, and co-founder of 350 Seattle; Panelist 6, an older white woman who was part of the Red Noses Affinity group, which offered legal and frontline action support and police liaison; and Panelist 7, a white woman who identified as a spiritual activist and engaged in direct action.
The discussion centred the perspectives of the first three panelists, which Granny X explained was to recognize that racialized, Indigenous and youth activists are often the most impacted, hardest working, and least recognized within activist coalitions.
Panelists reflected thoughtfully on what they had learned through their experiences, to an audience of approximately 100 Grannies from over 12 geographically diverse groups.
The ShellNo Action Coalition was organized with an understanding of intergenerational and racial equity and justice, and a recognition that the impacts of climate change are uneven (Kaijser & Kronsell, 2014; Margolin, 2019; Mersha, 2018).
Though this mobilization took place before the pivotal 2018 IPCC report, this coalition (like others globally) already centred the needs, perspectives, and voices of young, Indigenous, and racialized activists.
The actions to block the passage of Arctic drilling rigs took place on land, in water, and in mid-air.
Coalition members organized through varied tactics: confident swimmers took to kayaks; Tlingit and Haida singers and drummers shared music, dance, and prayer on the deck of a renewable energy barge; artists created massive banners to close off a train terminal and elaborate lanterns to move through the water; and Raging Grannies locked themselves and their rocking chairs to train tracks.7 We base our analysis on several sources of information.
First, at the UnConvention we recorded the two-hour opening panel discussion (with permission), offering the recording and transcript back to the organizers and 7 For coverage of these actions, see Democracy Now, 2015; Kaplan, 2015; and Ryan, 2015.
Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 249 panelists.8 Most directly, our analysis draws on our close thematic readings of this transcript, including the moderator’s comments and the question and answer period that followed.
Second, we texture this analysis with close readings of media coverage of the ShellNo actions, including pieces from large news outlets as well as movement-generated social media.
Third, we contextualize our analysis with our participant observation undertaken at other gatherings and actions.
We are aware that our focus on the Raging Grannies within the ShellNo mobilization lends itself to a critique of how this could reinforce the prominence of white activists in a movement that is seeking to instead shift this power dynamic.
Yet, we also believe that in the context of existing climate coalitions there is value in understanding how older white women are practicing solidarities across all forms of difference – including instances in which their coalitional partners experience this as both meaningful and insufficient.
We seek to understand the operations of whiteness in combination with age, gender, and so on within the ShellNo effort.
Our example concerns “older” white women in solidarity with “younger” racialized and Indigenous activists, but we also recognize the important work of older Indigenous and racialized activists within climate justice struggles broadly and the need for more attention to their contributions (Meadows, Thurston & Lagendyk, 2009; Water Docs, 2019b).
Though ShellNo predated the 2018-2019 youth uprisings, the dynamics and lessons learned remain as relevant as ever.
Doing Intergenerational and Intersectional Solidarities We turn now to our conceptual framework.
We draw on a growing body of critical scholarship on “intersectional solidarities” – that is, political/social struggles carried out collaboratively by those who hold different privileges, oppressions, and positions vis-à-vis these struggles, and who explicitly seek to account for how these multiple intersecting axes of power inform their relationships and efforts (Bilge, 2011; Mohanty, 2003; Tormos, 2017).
This work thus attends to difference – without erasing it or requiring “innocence and sameness as prerequisites” (Olwan, 2015, p. 90; Mohanty, 2003) – while also exposing the potential for epistemic violence and other nuanced workings of power within coalitional politics (e.g., Boudreau Morris, 2017; Snelgrove, Dhamoon & Corntassel, 2014; Walia, 2012).
While dynamics of gender, race, geography, ancestry, are class are centred within much of this intersectional solidarity work, power relations associated with age and generation are rarely incorporated into these analyses.
At the same time, there exists a small body of scholarship on intergenerational solidarity, but much of this work is less engaged with critical decolonial and antiracist analyses 8 This panel was a closed meeting as part of the Raging Grannies gathering, intended as a space for internal discussions of their practices and ongoing learning.
May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 250 (Binnie & Klesse 2012; Cooper, 2014).
This article’s core conceptual contribution is therefore to offer one grounded analysis of solidarity practices that is both intersectional and intergenerational in approach (Chazan, 2016; Bilge, 2011).
We draw on scholarship that conceptualizes solidarity as praxis, understanding solidarity as a doing – as contingent and ongoing practices of forging relations through political struggle to challenge forms of oppression (Chazan, 2016; Gaztambide-Fernández, 2012).
Attending to how age intersects with race, gender, and ancestry, we consider how a praxis of solidarity in the ShellNo coalition comprised not only one-off, frontline actions taken during protest, but also ongoing relationship-building behind the scenes, thus conceptualizing solidarity as a “long-term commitment to structural change” (Arvin, Tuck & Morill, p. 19, cited in Flowers 2015, p. 35).
Further, we consider how the Grannies’ solidarity practices involved the internal work of grappling with dominant white settler epistemologies and destabilizing their own certainty (Boudreau Morris, 2017; Langley, 2018; Regan, 2010).
We draw on Flowers, who argues that “solidarity means decentring ourselves… confronting the impulse to claim to know or have authority over a struggle” (2015, p. 35), and on Adele Sholock (2012), who explores how white settler activists might practice epistemic “uncertainty” to unbound their solidarities from colonial and white-centric logics.
As we consider how age shapes solidarity as praxis, we bring our analysis into dialogue with emerging scholarship on aging and social movements, and specifically on older women’s roles in working for social change (e.g.
Meadows et al., 2009; Chazan, Baldwin & Whattam, 2018).
Scholars in this area note how sexism and ageism (among other systems of power) shape older women’s ways of organizing and experiences of discrimination, and they debunk dominant discourses of social movements as the domain of youth (Chazan, Baldwin & Evans, 2018).
Moreover, where other critical movements across North America are concerned (including intersectional feminist, anti-racist, anti-colonial, and anti-poverty movements), older white women are frequently assumed to dominate organizing processes with little awareness of their own privilege and limitations (e.g., Chazan & Baldwin, 2016).
Critiques of white-centric and racist “white feminism” are often specifically linked to age and applied unilaterally to older white women, even though this kind of “feminism” can certainly exist among younger white women as well (Chazan & Baldwin, 2016; Cargle, 2018; Frazer-Carroll, 2019).
By attending to dynamics of gender, race, and age concurrently, we engage with and intervene in some of these assumptions.
Most pertinently, we bring this conceptual frame – a critical intersectional and intergenerational analysis of solidarity – to scholarship on climate justice organizing: while there is widespread understanding that youth and future generations will be inequitably impacted, here too there has been little attention to how age operates and is mobilized within coalitional politics (Winter, 2017).
In popular discourse, older generations (”Boomers”) tend to Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 251 be depicted as either helplessly vulnerable to the environmental crisis (e.g., Paterson-Cohen, 2017), or as apolitical, frail, indifferent, or “the problem” (e.g., Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, 2018).
Tropes of the old handing the responsibility of a burning future over to the young pervade (e.g., Council of Canadians, 2019).
As Nicole Greenfield (2019) suggests, we urgently need further analysis of how intergenerational dynamics intersect with other systems of power within climate justice movements (see also Shell, 2019; Eisen, Mykitiuk & Scott, 2018).
Grannies on the Front Lines: Mobilizing Gender, Age, and Race When the Seattle Raging Grannies joined activists of all ages to protest at the frontlines of the 2015 ShellNo actions, they contested narratives of all Boomers as “the problem” in the climate crisis, and of older people as apolitical and frail (Patersen-Cohen, 2017; Sawchuk, 2009).
In several actions, they mobilized their privilege as older white women along with ageist assumptions about their bodies in two strategic ways.
First, the Grannies practiced intergenerational solidarity by deploying their well-known “little old ladies” parody (their satirical protest performance of ageist and sexist stereotypes, intended to draw attention and subvert such assumptions) to divert media and police attention, allowing younger activists to carry on with other key organizing.
In one prominent action, several Grannies locked themselves down on rocking chairs over train tracks in order to block oil trains from passing through to the port of Seattle.
The Grannies dressed in feather boas, bright hats, aprons, and shawls, and hung photos of their grandchildren and great-grandchildren around their necks; they sat chained to their rocking chairs, knitting and drinking tea.
One media account described the Grannies’ rocker lockdown as a “visual victory,” specifically describing how the eldest Granny “[wore] her standard granny uniform of sunhat and flowing skirt, wielding every one of her 92 years like a weapon.
Being a Raging Granny is all about making the most of an older woman’s moral clout” (Kaplan, 2015).
This visual victory was also a tactical victory: panelists at the 2016 Unconvention explained that by holding the line in their rockers for many hours, the Grannies kept the police busy and freed up the younger activists to carry on with other organizing.
As one panelist explained, the lock-down began with a larger group of younger activists chained to oil drums alongside the Grannies.
As the police arrived, the Grannies insisted that they would stay to the end, which allowed the younger activists to carry out the next set of actions and avoid one more direct encounter with police.
At the same time, the “how” of this diversion reveals important dynamics of age: the Grannies were making strategic choices of where, when, and how to resist based on their bodies (i.e., their bodily needs as older people as well as their white privilege and assumed frailty).
Many Grannies would not have been able to participate in actions in kayaks, for May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 252 instance, because of mobility challenges.
Staying on land, being seated moreor-less comfortably in rockers for the five-hour protest (which ended in their arrest) best suited their bodily abilities and coincided with effective political strategy for the broader coalition.
Their little old lady parody was thus more than just attention-grabbing; it linked to the needs, assumptions, and privileges that accompany their bodies, and made space for younger activists to carry out other coalitional work.
Second, the Grannies’ mobilized their social positions not only to divert attention but also to confer protection to younger activists of colour specifically.
Mobilizing ageist assumptions of older women (as frail, apolitical, and innocent), and recognizing that their whiteness protected them from disproportionate police brutality, the Grannies were the ones to stay on the tracks and be arrested.
As Granny X explained, the Grannies anticipated that police would be relatively gentle with their old, white bodies, and that in their rocking chairs and aprons they would be deemed a very low threat.
Knowing they would be treated better than any others in the coalition, which proved true, they stayed to relieve younger racialized activists from this police encounter.
As the five Grannies held their ground, the police took their time to cut them free as delicately as possible.
Unlike other younger and racialized organizers who were arrested and held during the course of the ShellNo actions, the five Grannies who were arrested were released immediately after processing.
Panelist 6, also an older white woman, explained: [This] never happened before in my experience of doing anything.
The Grannies were so gingerly treated when they were arrested.
I was one of the police liaisons and I was told that we could send a couple of ‘support’ people with them in the van – they weren’t going to be cuffed – to the police station!
Granny X further explained that their gentle treatment was in stark contrast to the police brutality inflicted upon young racialized people by the same officers: It is one of the most important things Grannies can do, is to show up to these actions and protect younger activists of colour.
If the Seattle Grannies have learned nothing else, we have learned that.
We have terrible racist police in Seattle, terrible, racist, violent police.
[…] They always treat the Grannies really nicely.
So, if we are there, it’s some protection for our friends.
Panelists and the Seattle Grannies alike felt this way of conferring protection was a most tangible expression of frontline solidarity and support to people of colour’s organizing in general, and this sentiment was widely supported by the Raging Grannies in the audience.
Indeed, when Panelist 1 responded to Granny X’s assertion with the statement, “we need the white allies and our white elders to come and stand in front, to be that shield,” the Granny audience cheered, many nodding eagerly.
The Seattle Grannies knew that the Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 253 combination of ageist assumptions and white privilege would likely protect them from serious danger, and they wielded these assumptions to act as a barrier.
What emerges, then, is that on the front lines, youth were not resisting alone.
The ways in which panelists discussed the Raging Grannies’ contributions suggest that the strategic roles these older women took on supported and bolstered the work of younger coalition members.
As well, age, and its intersections with gender and race, was operating in many crucial ways to inform solidarity practices – ways that both subverted and mobilized ageist assumptions and aging bodies.
Grannies mobilized their privilege as white women, a tactic often discussed in writings about solidarity across difference (e.g., Mohanty, 2003; Sholock, 2012), but they also deployed marginalizing age-based stereotypes, to ultimately divert attention from and confer protection to other coalition members.
Moreover, the intergenerational nature of this coalition augmented the creativity and inventiveness of its tactics – tactics tailored to differing bodily abilities.
What might have been assumed to be limiting about older age became a valuable tool to the intergenerational resistance.
Grannies Behind-the-Scenes: Deepening Understandings and Practices of Solidarity The ShellNo coalition’s frontline protests were successful at stopping the passage of Shell’s oil rigs to the Arctic, in part because of intergenerationality and diversity of tactics.
Yet, as the Unconvention panel explored, the coalition’s workings were far from perfect.
Our research revealed three aspects of how the Grannies’ solidarity practices extended or could have extended beyond the frontlines: first, how the Grannies could have mobilized their intersecting age, race, and gender in behind-the-scenes organizing to confront racism and sexism within the coalition; second, how the Grannies did extend their solidarity through continuing relationships and by taking a posture of uncertain learning in the ShellNo panel; and third, how panelists also invited the Grannies to build solidarity with ancestors and generations unborn.
We highlight how each of these temporal and spatial extensions of conceptualizing solidarity challenge assumptions of solidarity as confined to impermanent, strategic frontline actions.
These shifts require deconstructing white settler certainties with continued attention to dynamics of age, gender, and race.
Panelists at the Seattle Unconvention’s opening suggested that the Grannies could have further mobilized their positions and perceived moral authority to confront sexism and racism playing out behind the scenes within the coalition – but reflected that the Grannies did not fully take this on.
For instance, these panelists noted that in organizing meetings there were a few “Toxic White Males” who manipulated their power and authority to try to May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 254 control the actions of Indigenous and racialized organizers, and that these dynamics were not meaningfully confronted: No one ever confronts the toxic white male, and because of that, the people of colour in the room, who are marginalized to begin with, they don’t feel like they have the support to also confront the toxic white male….
We need our white allies, all our white allies, but particularly our elder white allies, to step up … Do it strongly and do it so everyone else sees it, and do it so that the people of colour and the marginalized people in the room know that they have back up.
That is, in many ways, what we didn’t have during ShellNo.
(Panelist 1) Several panelists noted that the Grannies were well positioned to stand up to this behaviour (by deploying their white privilege and age-related moral authority) and that, by not intervening, they gave up opportunities to make space for racialized, Indigenous, and youth voices.
Though this discussion unveiled some of the ways Grannies might have mis-stepped in their solidarity efforts, we observed a predominant sense of gratitude for the learning emerging from this conversation, among the Seattle Grannies and the wider audience.
Panelist 1’s remarks about needing white allies to step up to toxic white men in organizing spaces were repeatedly met with applause from the audience, including from the Seattle Grannies.
In conversations following this panel, the Seattle Grannies expressed their commitment to keep working to do better in all the organizing spaces, and their new understanding of the specific roles they can play behind the scenes as older white women.
With the exception of one comment in the Q & A (from a Granny from elsewhere in the USA, defending the actions of racist police in protest spaces), all of the responses we witnessed from Grannies were rooted in their commitment to still learning.
This call on the Grannies to confront racism was also a call to confront how white knowledges (and the privileging of white knowledge's dominance and effectiveness) tend to scaffold organizing spaces in racist ways that go unchecked by white organizers like the Grannies (in line with Hunt & Holmes, 2015).
Panelist 2, for instance, explained that the presence and dominance of such toxic white males betray not only a difference in privilege and power, but also a friction in the very values and ideas that underpin activism.
She explained that the Grannies have a responsibility to confront toxic white males, but also to confront how an implicit privileging of white ways of knowing seeps into organizing structures.
Through this discussion, it became evident that the Grannies’ positions did not render them inconsequential to climate justice organizing, but rather conferred specific roles for them as co-conspirators in all of the spaces and moments of the coalition.
We also observed how the Grannies’ missteps gave way to this important panel, which offered knowledges and relationship-building not only to the Seattle Grannies, but to the international network of Raging Grannies – a reminder of the importance of persisting relationships of solidarity through messiness and uncertainty.
The Grannies’ willingness to Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 255 listen and learn from their mistakes catalyzed the panel’s critical discussion about how intergenerational solidarity could be practiced within climate justice organizing widely, and about how age might be further mobilized by older activists to support youth leadership.
While this specific dialogue offered learning about the missed opportunities, the 2016 panel is also an example of how Grannies’ solidarity practices extended into longer-standing relationship-building, learning, and listening outside of frontline action.
That is, the Grannies were clearly still building relationships with coalition members at this Unconvention, one year after the ShellNo actions.
And, in organizing this panel, they centred the knowledge of younger women of colour and Indigenous women while positioning themselves as learners and listeners.
By design, the panel asked the Grannies in the audience to step back.
Granny X introduced the panel as a way to extend her own learning from the coalition and to share this learning with Grannies around the continent, recognizing it as an unending process.
As part of this process, the Grannies encouraged each other to sit with the discomfort of having their whiteness exposed and confronted: We ask you, our Grannies in the audience, to do a few things.
You may hear some things that make you uncomfortable.
So, we ask you to be willing to experience discomfort; it’s not always a bad thing.
It can be a good thing to challenge and stretch ourselves….
If you do experience discomfort, do your best to be present and keep listening, rather than, for example, trying to think of responses.
(Granny X) The Grannies prioritized women of colour and Indigenous women on the panel, structuring it so that they would always speak first.
This practice of prioritizing those whose voices are often less heard was also a broader approach to solidarity, modelling “some of the things that we Seattle Grannies learned through the whole ShellNo process” (Granny X).
The panel itself, then, flipped age expectations of who is the knower/speaker and who is the learner/listener, while also challenging white-dominant assumptions about whose knowledge is most valid, authoritative, and legitimate (Margolin, 2019).
Several panelists, particularly the first three, reinforced the idea that doing solidarity, for the Grannies, should involve this kind of ongoing cognitive work to unsettle their own epistemic certainty.
In fact, Panelists 1 and 3 explicitly encouraged the Grannies to extend their solidarity into organizing spaces and through adopting daily lived practices of uncertainty – that is, to ask themselves regularly why they believe they know, and how their knowledges might uphold colonial and white supremacist systems (Sholock, 2012).
Panelist 1’s impact on Grannies became clear in the weeks following the Unconvention, which speaks to the Grannies’ openness to learning to practice uncertainty, listen, and challenge their own epistemic dominance.
This was evident through various email communications and Facebook posts from different Granny groups.
Several Grannies stayed on in Seattle, for instance, May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 256 to take a separate workshop from this panelist to learn more about decolonizing their own activist and solidarity practices.
One Granny later shared with the network her own learning about the powerful effects of practicing solidarities that bring together while respecting political, cultural, epistemic, and experiential differences, beckoning other Grannies to draw on their learning to support Standing Rock mobilizations against the Dakota Access oil pipeline.
Throughout these email exchanges, the tone was not to assume that there would be a role for the Grannies, or what that role should be, but to ask whether and how their presence or resources might be wanted – always referring this approach back to the panelists’ reflections.
This deepening conversation challenged assumptions that all older white women are uncritical white feminists (Chazan & Baldwin, 2016) with no role in intersectional climate justice organizing, while further extending ways of doing solidarities into these internal processes of unsettling.
Observing younger racialized activists taking this time with the Grannies also confounded popular presumptions that there is futility to investing in educating older people (Winter, 2017).
Thus, we witnessed the Grannies extending their solidarity into nurturing relationships, continuing their learning, and embracing uncertainty.
We also note how they entered into an even deeper process of rejecting expectations that they, as older white women, necessarily have expertise, by learning from younger Indigenous and racialized activists.
Lastly, Panelist 2’s reflections (drawing on Indigenous epistemologies) further rupture the temporal and spatial limits typically imposed on understandings of activism and solidarity, even beyond organizing spaces and internal unsettling work, while extending intergenerational solidarity out to future generations: What would I say to these people walking by who know nothing about what was going on?
I would ask them, “What did you do when Shell Oil was here?
What are you going to tell your grandkids 50 years from now?
What part did you play in this?” So, I just want people to know that this work, it’s ourIt’s not even about activism… It’s my responsibility, it’s my duty to do this work for the next seven generations.
(Panelist 2) Noting that dominant colonial knowledges inhibit this kind of cross-temporal solidarity, she called on audience members to instead enter into solidarities rooted not only in friendship and responsibility to one another, but also to ancestors past, generations to come, and to non-human relations.
Extending thinking about intergenerational solidarities back and forward through time, she explained to the Grannies that taking on their responsibilities as the ancestors to generations to come would require them to shift their timeframe and goals well beyond immediate action and winnable coalition work.
As she reflected, solidarity is not time-limited, it is not about one-off actions, nor is it about short-term goals.
Instead, it is about caring for past, current, and future life, for human and non-human entities, for ancestors and those yet unborn, Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 257 which all require expanding the goals, strategies, and assumptions that are often considered to be constitutive of solidarity.
This idea also challenges old-versus-young polarizing age rhetoric to instead understand that we are all ancestors to future life, and we are all in relation to our own ancestors, with responsibilities to act accordingly (Flowers, 2015; Snelgrove, Dhamoon & Corntassel, 2014).
And, critically, her example illuminates how sometimes the motives behind acting in solidarity are conditioned by capitalist and colonial defaults that privilege products and outcomes over processes and relationships.
This panelist asked the Grannies to consider how Indigenous knowledges might offer other ways of thinking about solidarities, expanding even further beyond tactical considerations and one-off actions.
Overall, then, the solidarity practices revealed in this research suggest that Grannies engaged in a temporally and spatially extended praxis of intersectional and intergenerational solidarity – on the frontlines, in organizing spaces, through transforming their thinking, and into the ancestral realm.
Indeed, this multifaceted solidarity-building also requires unsettling the dominant epistemologies that tend to frame solidarity in such a temporally and spatially bounded way in the first place.
What becomes important is that an isolated action or protest is not the only way of practicing solidarity; practicing being in meaningful relationships, making spaces for others, (un)learning, and listening are all also significant tactics (Sholock, 2012).
And, critically, the Raging Grannies been invited into this work specifically from their positions as older white women.
Conclusions While youth are leading climate justice uprisings around the world – and indeed have been engaged in this work for some time – dominant perceptions of them acting alone amid stark generational divides depict a far too simplistic version of these mobilizations.
Yet, as noted, there exists limited analysis of how age and generation interweave dynamics of race, gender, class, ancestry, and geography within climate justice efforts or elsewhere in solidarity movements.
As the Earth continues to heat up, it is crucial to better understand how intergenerational dynamics are, and could be better, practiced in climate justice mobilizing, and how age and aging can shape and strengthen solidarity building.
This article offers the example of the Raging Grannies and the ShellNo coalition as one entry point into this much-needed intergenerational and intersectional analysis – an example that illuminates grounded successes, missteps, practices, intentions, and lessons learned.
In the ShellNo coalition, the Raging Grannies were invited into very specific roles related to their age, gender, and whiteness – roles that did not compromise, but rather honoured, the brilliance, energy, knowledges, and leadership of younger activists.
On the frontlines, the Grannies deployed both their parody of ageist and sexist May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 258 stereotypes and their white privilege to divert attention and confer protection to younger Indigenous and racialized activists.
This frontline work was an example of meaningful tactical solidarity in action, and its practice was clearly infused with age dynamics.
Beyond the frontlines, in other organizing spaces, younger coalition members suggested that the Grannies could have more proactively confronted sexism and racism by similarly drawing on the moral authority they hold as older white women.
Such solidarity practices might have created space for racialized, Indigenous, and youth activists to offer even more behind-the-scenes leadership.
Where the Grannies were extending their solidarity practices beyond the frontlines was in their ongoing relationship-building with coalition members, as evident in the organizing of the panel discussion that opened their 2016 Unconvention.
By situating themselves as learners/listeners and younger panelists as speakers/educators, they demonstrated a humbleness, or even a desire for humbleness, in their own knowing.
The importance of this humbleness, particularly given their age and whiteness, was also reinforced by panelists.
Panelists called on the Grannies to deepen their work toward unlearning the assumption that, as older white people, they have more experience and know best, and to learn from youth knowledges, racialized knowledges, and Indigenous knowledges.
These reflections also indicated the panelists’ investment in meaningful exchange with this network of older women, challenging assumptions of older white feminists as uncritical of their own privilege, assumptions that youth and racialized activists do not want or need support from older white people, and assumptions that older white women do not have a role in confronting racism (e.g., Chazan, 2016).
Through these continued relationships, moreover, panelists invited the Grannies to carry their solidarities into an ever more temporally and generationally expansive practice; they challenged Grannies to reorient their activism, taking on ancestral responsibilities, and acting for all future life.
Our research contributes conceptually to scholarship on solidarity by bringing intersectional and intergenerational analyses together to offer insight into how age, race, and gender shape grounded solidarity practices (e.g., Brown & Yaffe, 2014; Gaztambide-Fernández, 2012).
It also extends conceptions of solidarity as praxis to include the internal work of unlearning white settler certainty (Sholock, 2012; Boudreau Morris, 2017).
Importantly, we offer an example of how older people – attending to dynamics of age – can be and are integral to critical, intersectional climate justice organizing.
This kind of analysis is crucial to counteract rhetoric of generational divides.
In this pivotal moment, generationally polarizing discourses are far too simplistic, and their tendency to incite and reify the divisions they portray is potentially dangerous to the kind of intergenerational and intersectional movement-building needed to protect life on this planet.
Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 259 References Arvin, M,, Tuck, E., & Morill, A.
(2013).
Decolonizing feminism: Challenging connection between settler colonialism and heteropatriarchy.
Feminist Formations, 25(1), 8-34 Bilge, S. (2011, Oct.).
Developing intersectional solidarities: A plea for queer intersectionality.
Equity Matters.
Ottawa, ON: SSHRC.
Retrieved from http://www.ideasidees.ca/blog/developing-intersectional-solidarities-plea-queer-intersectionality Binnie, J., & Klesse, C. (2012).
The politics of age, temporality, and intergenerationality in transnational lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer activist networks.
Sociology, 47(3), 580-595.
Black, S. T., Milligan, R. A., & Heynen, N. (2016).
Solidarity in climate/immigrant justice direct action: Lessons from movements in the US South.
International Journal of Urban & Regional Research, 40(2), 284-298.
Boudreau Morris, K. (2017).
Decolonizing solidarity: Cultivating relationships of discomfort.
Settler Colonial Studies, 7(4), 456-473.
Brake, J.
(2018, Oct.).
‘Literally life and death’: Indigenous climate leaders critical of Canada’s response to climate change report.
APTN National News.
Retrieved from https://aptnnews.ca/2018/10/17/literally-life-and-death-indigenous-climate-leaders-criticalof-canadas-response-to-climate-change-report/ Brown, G., & Yaffe, H. (2014).
Practices of solidarity: Opposing Apartheid in the centre of London.
Antipode, 46, 34-52.
Burton, N. (2019, Oct. 11).
Meet the young activists of color who are leading the charge against climate disaster.
Vox.
Retrieved from www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/11/20904791/young-climate-activists-of-color Cargle, R. (2018, Aug. 16).
When feminism is white supremacy in heels.
Harpers Bazaar.
Retrieved from www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/politics/a22717725/what-is-toxic-whitefeminism/ Chazan, M. (2016).
Settler solidarities as praxis: Understanding ‘granny activism’ beyond the highly visible.
Social Movement Studies, 15(5), 457-470.
Chazan, M., & Baldwin, M. (2016).
Understanding the complexities of contemporary feminist activism: How the lives of older women activists contest the waves narrative.
Feminist Formations, 28(3), 70-94.
Chazan, M., Baldwin, M., & Evans, P. (2018).
Unsettling activisms: Critical interventions on aging, gender, and social change.
Toronto, ON: Women’s Press.
Chazan, M., Baldwin, M., & Whattam, J.
(2018).
Rethinking the politics of (grand)mothering: Activisms and the lifecourse.
In M. Chazan, M. Baldwin & P. Evans (Eds.
), Unsettling Activisms (pp.
28-45).
Toronto, ON: Women’s Press.
Cohen, S. (2019, Feb.).
The age gap in environmental politics.
State of the planet.
Retrieved from https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2019/02/04/age-gap-environmental-politics/ Cooper, D. (2014, Jan. 22).
Generations of activism and queer time.
JOTWELL.
Retrieved from https://equality.jotwell.com/generations-of-activism-and-queer-time/ Council of Canadians.
(2019, Apr.
30).
Will you support the climate strike for the next generation?
Council of Canadians [Weblog].
Retrieved from https://canadians.org/blog/will-you-support-climate-strike-next-generation Democracy Now.
(2015, June 16).
‘Battling the Death Star’: Seattle ‘Kayaktivists’ slow arcticbound Shell Oil rig as fight goes on.
Democracy Now.
Retrieved from www.democracynow.org/2015/6/16/battling_the_death_star_seattle_kayaktivists Eisen, J., Mykitiuk, T., & Scott, D. (2018).
Constituting bodies into the future: Toward a relational theory of intergenerational justice.
UBC Law Review, 51, n.p.
Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/2694 Featherstone, D. (2012).
Solidarity: hidden histories and geographies of internationalism.
London: Zed Books.
Flowers, R. (2015).
Refusal to forgive: Indigenous women’s love and rage.
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 4(2), 32-49.
May Chazan & Melissa Baldwin Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 260 Frazer-Carroll, M. (2019, Sept.).
On environmentalism, whiteness, and activist superstars.
Galdem.
Retrieved from http://gal-dem.com/on-individualism-whiteness-and-activistsuperstars/ Gaztambide-Fernández, R. A.
(2012).
Decolonization and the pedagogy of solidarity.
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 41-67.
Goldman, M., Chazan, M., & Baldwin, M. (2018).
The Raging Grannies versus the sexperts: Performing humour to resist compulsory (hetero)sexuality.
In M. Chazan, M. Baldwin, & P. Evans (Eds.
), Unsettling Activisms (pp.
153-169).
Toronto, ON: Women’s Press.
Greenfield, N. (2019).
The path to climate justice is intergenerational.
NRDC (National Resources Defense Council).
Retrieved from https://www.nrdc.org/stories/path-climatejustice-intergenerational Honor the Earth.
(2019).
Speaking engagements: Winona LaDuke.
Retrieved from www.honorearth.org/speaking_engagements Hunt, S., & Holmes, C. (2015).
Everyday decolonization: Living a decolonizing queer politics.
Journal of Lesbian Studies, 19, 154-172.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
(2018, Oct. 8).
Special report: Global warming of 1.5° C. Retrieved from www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ Kaijser, A., & Kronsell, A.
(2014).
Climate change through the lens of intersectionality.
Environmental Politics, 23(3), 417-433 Kaplan, S. (2015, June 10).
Meet the 92-year-old ‘raging granny’ who just got arrested for protesting Arctic oil drilling.
The Washington Post.
Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/06/10/meet-the-92-year-oldraging-granny-who-just-got-arrested-for-protesting-arctic-oil-drilling Langley, E. (2018).
I will not use the word reconciliation – Exploring settler (un)certainty, Indigenous refusal, and decolonization through a life history project with Jean Koning [Unpublished masters thesis].
Trent University, Peterborough, ON.
Margolin, J.
(2019, June 14).
Patriarchy, racism, and colonialism caused the climate crisis [Video file].
Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?v=amGyIqIBzEk Meadows, L. M., Thurston, S. E., & Lagendyk, L. E. (2009).
Aboriginal women at midlife: Grandmothers as agents of change.
In P. A. Monture & P. D. McGuire (Eds.
), First voices: An Aboriginal women’s reader (pp.
188-199).
Toronto, ON: INANNA Publications & Education Inc. Mersha, S. (2018).
Black lives and climate justice: Courage and power in defending communities and Mother Earth.
Third World Quarterly, 39(7), 1421-1434.
Mohanty, C. T. (2003).
Feminism without borders: Decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Noisecat, J.
B., & Spice, A.
(2016, Aug. 9).
The history and future of resistance.
Jacobin Magazine.
Retrieved from www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/standing-rock-dakota-accesspipeline-protest/ Olwan, D. M. 2015.
On assumptive solidarities in comparative settler colonialisms.
feral feminisms, 4, 89-102.
Paterson-Cohen, M. (2017, Nov. 10).
The intersection of resilience, climate change, and aging.
Critical Gerontology Blog.
Retrieved from https://criticalgerontology.com/climate-changeaging/ Peltier, A.
(2018, Mar.
22).
Wikwemikong First Nation representative Autumn Peltier spoke to UN General Assembly.
CBC News.
Retrieved from www.cbc.ca/player/play/1192177731983/ Regan, P. (2010).
Unsettling the settler within.
Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Rowe, J., & Simpson, M. (2017, Oct. 9).
Lessons from the frontlines of anti-colonial pipeline resistance.
Waging NonViolence.
Retrieved from https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/lessons-front-lines-anti-colonial-unistoten-pipelineresistance/ Roy, C. (2004).
The Raging Grannies: Wild hats, cheeky songs, and witty actions for a better world.
Montreal, QC: Black Rose Books.
Granny Solidarity Studies in Social Justice, Volume 13, Issue 2, 244-261, 2019 261 Ryan, J.
(2015, May 18).
Hundreds of ‘kayaktivists’ in Seattle protest Shell’s arctic drilling.
NPR.
Retrieved from www.npr.org/2015/05/18/407619645/hundreds-of-kayaktivists-inseattle-protest-shells-arctic-drilling Sawchuk, D. (2009).
The Raging Grannies: Defying stereotypes and embracing aging through activism.
Journal of Women & Aging 19, 171-185.
Shell, L. 2019.
Intergenerational activism: Achieving environmental justice.
The Bubble.
Retrieved from www.thebubble.org.uk/current-affairs/intergenerational-activismachieving-environmental-justice/ Sholock, A.
(2012).
Methodology of the privileged: White anti‐racist feminism, systematic ignorance, and epistemic uncertainty.
Hypatia, 27(4), 701-714.
Snelgrove, C., Dhamoon, R. K., & Corntassel, J.
(2014).
Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations.
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, 3, 1-32.
Tait, A.
(2019, June 6).
Greta Thunberg: How one teenager became the voice of the planet.
WIRED.
Retrieved from www.wired.co.uk/article/greta-thunberg-climate-crisis Tormos, F. (2017).
Intersectional solidarity.
Politics, Groups & Identities, 5(4), 707-720.
United Nations.
(2017, Oct. 27).
Listen to the Children – Severn Cullis-Suzuki's famous speech on the environment (1992) [Video file].
Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGdS8ts63Ck Walia, H. (2012).
Moving beyond a politics of solidarity towards a practice of decolonization.
In A. Choudry, J. Hanley & E. Shragge (Eds.
), Organize!
Building from the local for global justice (pp.
240-253).
Toronto, ON: Between the Lines.
Water Docs.
(2019a, Mar.
15).
How one girl from Sweden sparked a global youth-led climate movement.
Water Docs.
Retrieved from www.waterdocs.ca/water-talk/2019/3/15/how-onegirl-sparked-a-global-climate-movement Water Docs.
(2019b, Mar.
8).
The women who walk for the water: Grandmother Josephine Mandamin's legacy.
Water Docs.
Retrieved from www.waterdocs.ca/news/2019/3/8/thewomen-who-walk-for-the-water-grandmother-josephines-legacy Winter, C. J.
(2017).
The paralysis of intergenerational justice: Decolonizing entangled futures [Unpublished doctoral dissertation].
University of Sydney, Sydney, AU.
Retrieved from https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/18009/winter_cj_thesis.pdf?sequence =1&isAllowed=y
Substantia.
An International Journal of the History of Chemistry 3(2) Suppl.
2: 17-26, 2019 Firenze University Press www.fupress.com/substantia Citation: S. Fuzzi (2019) Energy in a changing climate.
Substantia 3(2) Suppl.
2: 17-26. doi: 10.13128/Substantia-213 Copyright: © 2019 S. Fuzzi.
This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http://www.fupress.com/substantia) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest.
ISSN 1827-9643 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/Substantia-213 Energy in a changing climate Sandro Fuzzi Istituto di Scienze dell’Atmosfera e del Clima,Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Bologna, Italy E-mail: s.fuzzi@isac.cnr.it Abstract.
Warming of the Earth’s climate represents the “great challenge” of our times that may even undermine the subsistence of humankind on the planet.
This paper reviews the causes and effects of climate change due to the anthropogenic activities.
Since energy production constitutes the main source of climate-forcing anthropogenic emissions, a particular emphasis is given in the paper to the energy system transition to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement, the international treaty signed in 2015 under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, aimed at reducing the risks and effects of climate change on the global society.
Keywords.
Climate change, anthropogenic emissions, energy system transition, IPCC, Paris agreement.
1.
THE EARTH’S CLIMATE SYSTEM The term “climate” (from the ancient Greek word klima: inclination) refers to the meteorological and environmental conditions in a given geographical area averaged over a long period of time, typically 30 years or more, as defined by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO).
The Earth’s climate system includes different components, sometimes referred to as “compartments”, which interact dynamically with each other: atmosphere, ocean, Earth surface, cryosphere and biosphere, the life on the planet, including mankind.
The system evolves with time, influenced both by an internal dynamics and by external factors called climate forcings.
Climate forcing can either be due to natural phenomena (natural forcing) or to anthropogenic activities, in the latter case defined as anthropogenic forcing.
The “engine” of the Earth’s climate is the Sun.
The Earth’s surface, in fact, receives energy from the Sun, 50% of which in the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Part of the incident radiation is reflected back to space by the Earth’s surface and by the clouds.
The fraction of reflected energy is defined “albedo”.
The Earth’s albedo is on average approximately 0.3 (30% of the solar energy is reflected back to space), but varies considerably in different areas of the globe depending on the nature of the surface: snow and ice, sea surface, vegetation, desert, urban areas, etc.
To balance the absorbed incoming energy, the Earth must radiate the same amount of energy back to 18 Sandro Fuzzi space.
Because the Earth is much colder than the Sun, it radiates at much longer wavelengths, primarily in the infrared part of the spectrum.
The Earth reaches therefore an equilibrium temperature where absorption and emission are balanced (Fig.
1).
But in the atmosphere are naturally present certain atmospheric constituents such as water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) nitrous oxide (N2O) and other compounds that absorb a significant fraction of the infrared radiation emitted by the Earth.
The absorbed energy is then re-emitted in all directions thus contributing to the warming of the lower levels of the atmosphere causing the so-called (natural) greenhouse effect, in analogy with the heat trapping effect of the glass walls in a greenhouse illuminated by the Sun that increases the temperature of the air inside (Fig.
1).
These absorbing species are therefore cumulatively called greenhouse gases (GHGs).
In the absence of an atmosphere the radiative equilibrium temperature of the Earth would be purely a function of the distance of the Earth from the Sun and of the surface albedo that is -18°C.
But, as a consequence of the natural greenhouse effect, the average surface temperature of the Earth is ca.
15°C, 33°C higher than the radiative equilibrium temperature.
It is easy to understand that, in the absence of the natural greenhouse effect, the life on the planet would not have developed, at least not in the way we now experience.
2.
THE ANTHROPOCENE After the end of the last glaciation, ca.
12.000 years ago, the warmer temperatures caused by the natural greenhouse effect favoured, with the development of agriculture, the emergence of our civilization.
Since the onset of civilisation, man has modified the natural environment to make it more suitable to his needs, e.g.
clearing large forested areas transformed into agricultural land.
Until recent times, however, the world population was quite limited in number and the technologies available were relatively primitive, therefore the impact of humans on the environment had been quite limited both quantitatively and spatially.
But for the past two centuries or so the effects of humans on the global environment have increased dramatically.
During the past two centuries, the human population has increased tenfold to more than 7 billion and is expected to reach 10 billions in this century.
Humans exploit about 30 to 50% of the planet’s land surface and use more than half of all accessible fresh water.
Energy use has grown 16-fold during the twentieth century, causing 160 million tonnes of atmospheric sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions per year, more than twice the sum of its natural emissions.
More nitrogen fertilizer is applied in agriculture than is fixed naturally in all terrestrial ecosystems; nitric oxide (NO) production by the burning of fossil fuel and biomass also overrides natural emissions.
Fossil fuel burning and agriculture have caused substantial increases in the concentrations of GHG, CO2 by 40% and CH4 by more than 150%, reaching their highest levels over the past 800 millennia (Crutzen, 2002).
For all these reasons the Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen and the biologist Eugene Stoermer suggested that the Holocene, the geologic epoch initiated with the end of the last glaciation has come to an end and that it seems appropriate to assign the term Anthropocene to the present geological epoch in many ways dominated by human activities (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000).
There are different views concerning the beginning of the Anthropocene.
While Crutzen and Stoermer had dated the beginning of the Anthropocene with the beginning of the industrial revolution in mid-18th century, Ruddimann (2013) has put forward the idea that mankind has started modifying the natural environment at least 9,000 years ago with the large deforestations to get cultivable land.
Finally, more recent discussions have determined that the beginning of the Anthropocene as a geological epoch should be dated to the early 1950s, corresponding to the “Great Acceleration” after the 2nd World War, marked by a major expansion in human population, large changes in natural processes, the development of new materials and of the international trade (Lewis and Maslin, 2015).
Figure 1.
Schematic representation of the Earth’s climate system and the greenhouse effect (from Le Treut et al., 2007).
19Energy in a changing climate 3.
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE Human activities contribute to climate change by causing changes in the atmosphere of the amounts of greenhouse gases and other gaseous and particulate components, with the largest contribution deriving from the burning of fossil fuels.
Since the beginning of the industrial era, the overall effect of human activities on climate has been a warming influence and the human impact now greatly exceeds that due to natural processes, such as solar changes and volcanic eruptions (Forster et al., 2007).
The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 2014, reports that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in GHG concentrations and other anthropogenic forcing agents together.
In fact, the best estimate of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming over the same period (Fig.
2).
The observed surface temperature change in Fig.
2 is shown in black; the attributed warming ranges (colours) are based on observations combined with climate model simulations, in order to estimate the contribution of an individual external forcing to the observed warming.
The 5 to 95% uncertainty range is superimposed to the bars.
Human-induced warming has now reached on average 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2017, increasing at a rate of 0.2°C per decade, but warming greater than the global average has already been experienced in many regions and seasons (Allen et al., 2018).
3.1.
Anthropogenic GHG emission The main GHGs deriving from human activities are the above-mentioned CO2, CH4 and N2O.
These gases accumulate in the atmosphere, causing concentrations to increase with time.
Significant increases of all these components have occurred in the industrial era (Fig.
3), with an even higher increase staring from the 1950s (the Great Acceleration).
All of these increases are attributable to human activities (IPCC 2014).
Between 1750 and 2011, the cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions to the atmosphere were 2040 ± 310 GtCO2.
About 40% of these emissions have remained in the atmosphere (880 ± 35 GtCO2), the rest was removed from the atmosphere and stored on land (in plants and soils) and in the ocean that has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic CO2.
What is more important, about half of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2011 have occurred over the last 40 years.
CO2 is not, as previously mentioned, the only GHG emitted by human activities, and Fig.
4 reports the globFigure 2.
Comparison between the observed increase of global mean temperature (GMST) over the period 1951-2010 and the estimated anthropogenic contribution.
The black bar is the observed GMST over the period, while the green and yellow bars represent the modelled contribution of GHGs and other climate forcers (mainly atmospheric aerosols that exert a cooling effect on climate; Fuzzi et al., 2015), respectively.
The orange bar is the sum of the two (green + yellow) representing the total modelled temperature increase due to anthropogenic emissions.
As can easily be seen, the modelled and observed GMST increase are very close to each other, taking into account the uncertainty ranges of the different quantities (the 5 to 95% uncertainty range is reported on top of each bar).
The natural contributions to GMST increase and the internal variability of the Earth’s climate system are minimal, if not negligible (from IPCC 2014).
Figure 3.
Atmospheric concentrations of the most important GHGs over the last 2,000 years.
Increases since about 1750 are attributed to human activities in the industrial era.
Concentration units are parts per million (ppm) or parts per billion (ppb) (from Forster et al., 2007).
Present GHG concentrations (2017) are: CO2 = 406 ppm, CH4 = 1859 ppb, N2O = 330 ppb (WMO, 2018).
20 Sandro Fuzzi al annual anthropogenic GHG emissions expressed as CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq).
The global GHG emission in 2010 amounted to 49 Gt CO2-eq.
The main drivers of anthropogenic GHG emissions are the population increase and the increasing energy needs of our society.
Some figures illustrate the combined effects of the evolution of these two parameters.
At the time when agriculture emerged, about 10,000 B.C., the population of the world was estimated a few millions, growing to a couple of hundred millions by year 1 A.D.. Around 1800 the world population had reached one billion, with the second billion achieved in only 130 years (1930), the third billion in 30 years (1960), the fourth billion in 15 years (1974), and the fifth billion in only 13 years (1987).
During the 20th century alone, the population in the world has grown from 1.65 billion to over 6 billions.
On the other hand, the world per-capita energy consumption, that amounted to some 20 GJ per year at the beginning of the 19th century has now reached ca.
80 GJ per year (Tverberg, 2012).
3.2.
Anthropogenic GHG emissions by economic sector All human activities cause the emission in the atmosphere of GHGs, and Fig.
5 reports the global anthropogenic GHG emissions from different economic sectors in 2010 (IPCC, 2014).
As can be seen from the figure, energy production constitutes the anthropogenic activity with the highest share of GHG emission (35%).
4.
THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE WARMING In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans.
The 5th IPCC Assessment Report has described in great detail the observed effects on the basis of some main climatic parameters (IPCC, 2014).
4.1.
Temperature increase Global warming (presently +1°C GMST with respect to the preindustrial period) is already negatively influencing the agricultural yields, thus affecting food security (Zhao et al., 2017).
At the same time, the increase of seawater temperature is influencing the marine ecosystems and biodiversity.
At present, the worldwide effect on human health of climate warming has been relatively small, although an increased heat-related mortality has been reported (e.g.
the 2003 heat wave in central-southern Europe).
Climate warming is also altering the precipitation regimes of several regions with effects on water availability and agricultural yields (Steffen et al., 2015).
4.2.
Sea level rise Over the period 1901–2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 m (0.17 to 0.21).
This is mainly due to glaFigure 4.
Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO2-equivalent per year (GtCO2-eq/yr) for the period 1970 to 2010 by gases: CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO2 from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); CH4; N2O; gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases) (from IPCC, 2014).
Figure 5.
Total anthropogenic GHG emissions in GtCO2-eq/ yr) from different economic sectors in 2010.
The circle shows the shares of direct GHG emissions in percentage of total emissions form the five main economic sectors.
The pullout shows how shares of indirect CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production are attributed to sectors of final energy use (IPCC, 2014).
21Energy in a changing climate cier mass loss and ocean thermal expansion (IPCC, 2014).
The rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia.
Sea level rise is threatening all coastal areas with risk of flooding and the need of relocating the affected population (Nicholls et al., 2011).
4.3.
Melting of glaciers Over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been loosing mass and glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide, contributing on the one side to sea level rise, and on the other threatening freshwater availability in many regions of the world (IPCC, 2014).
4.4.
Extreme events The impact of recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones and wildfires reveal significant vulnerability of some ecosystems and many human systems to current climate variability.
Impacts of such climate-related extremes include alteration of ecosystems, disruption of food production and water supply, damage to infrastructures and other consequences for human wellbeing (IPCC, 2014).
5.
THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND THE MEANS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION The policy actions to be implemented in order to limit the effects on the human society of the climate warming that is already happening fall under two broad categories: • mitigation – measures aimed at reducing the emission of GHGs and other climate forcers (energy efficiency, decarbonisation, more efficient agricultural practices, etc.
); • adaptation – technological and infrastructural measures that allow contrasting the effects of climate change in progress.
Since more than 25 years the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been working on a global treaty that could reduce the GHGs emissions to contrast climate change.
Finally, on December 12, 2015, within the 21st UNFCCC Session, 196 Countries, responsible for 95% of global GHG emission, approved the so called “Paris Agreement” that deals with GHG emissions mitigation, adaptation, and finance and that will formally start in the year 2020.
The long-term overall goal of the Paris Agreement is to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below 2  °C above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, since this would substantially reduce the risks and effects of climate change.
IPCC was then invited by the UNFCCC to provide a Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways contained in the Paris Agreement.
This Report was actually prepared and presented in October 2018 (IPCC, 2018).
The headline statements reported below from the Summary for Policymakers highlight some of the main conclusions of the report (IPCC, 2018).
For a guide to the treatment of uncertainty within the IPCC reports, reference is made to Mastrandrea et al., (2010).
5.1.
Understanding global warming of 1.5°C Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C.
Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate.
(high confidence).
Warming from anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present will persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise, with associated impacts (high confidence), but these emissions alone are unlikely to cause global warming of 1.5°C (medium confidence).
Figure 6.
Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C above pre-industrial levels in 2017.
At the present rate, global temperatures would reach 1.5°C around 2040.
Stylized 1.5°C pathway shown here involves emission reductions beginning immediately, and CO2 emissions reaching zero by 2055 (from Allen et al., 2018).
22 Sandro Fuzzi Climate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C (high confidence).
These risks depend on the magnitude and rate of warming, geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, and on the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options (high confidence).
5.2.
Projected climate change, potential impacts and associated risks Climate models project robust differences in regional climate characteristics between present-day and global warming of 1.5°C, and between 1.5°C and 2°C.
These differences include increases in: mean temperature in most land and ocean regions (high confidence), hot extremes in most inhabited regions (high confidence), heavy precipitation in several regions (medium confidence), and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions (medium confidence).
By 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to be around 0.1 metre lower with global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium confidence).
Sea level will continue to rise well beyond 2100 (high confidence), and the magnitude and rate of this rise depend on future emission pathways.
A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation in the human and ecological systems of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas (medium confidence).
On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are projected to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C.
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans (high confidence).
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to reduce increases in ocean temperature as well as associated increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean oxygen levels (high confidence).
Consequently, limiting global warming to 1.5°C is projected Figure 7.
The dependence of risks and/or impacts associated with selected elements of human and natural systems on the level of climate change, highlighting the nature of this dependence between 0°C and 2°C warming above pre-industrial level (from Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018).
23Energy in a changing climate to reduce risks to marine biodiversity, fisheries, and ecosystems, and their functions and services to humans, as illustrated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice and warmwater coral reef ecosystems (high confidence).
Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase further with 2°C.
Most adaptation needs will be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (high confidence).
There is a wide range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate change (high confidence).
There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (medium confidence).
The number and availability of adaptation options vary by sector (medium confidence).
5.3.
Emission pathways and system transitions consistent with 1.5°C global warming Two main pathways can be followed for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels: i) stabilizing global temperature at 1.5°C or ii) global temperature temporarily exceeding 1.5°C before coming back down later in the century.
In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range).
For limiting global warming to below 2°C, CO2 emissions are projected to decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range).
NonCO2 emissions in pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C show deep reductions that are similar to those in pathways limiting warming to 2°C (high confidence).
Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high confidence).
These systems transitions are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant up-scaling of investments in those options (medium confidence).
All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO2 over the 21st century.
CDR would be used to compensate for residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (high confidence).
CDR deployment of several hundreds of GtCO2 is subject to multiple feasibility and sustainability constraints (high confidence).
Significant near-term emissions reductions and measures to lower energy and land demand can limit CDR deployment to a few hundred GtCO2 without reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (high confidence).
6.
ENERGY SYSTEM TRANSITION TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS Realizing a 1.5°C-consistent pathway would require rapid and systemic changes on unprecedented scales in: i) the energy system, ii) land and ecosystem management, iii) urban and infrastructure planning, iv) the industrial system.
As previously stated, the energy system constitutes the anthropogenic activity with the highest share of GHG emission and in this section mitigation and adaptation options related to the energy system transition will be reported, derived from the IPCC 1.5°C Report (de Coninck et al., 2018).
To limit warming to 1.5°C, mitigation would have to be large-scale and rapid.
Transformative change can arise from growth in demand for a new product or market, such that it displaces an existing one.
This is sometimes called “disruptive innovation”.
For example, high demand for LED lighting is now making more energy-intensive, incandescent lighting near obsolete, with the support of policy action that spurred rapid industry innovation.
Similarly, smart phones have become global in use within ten years.
But electric cars, which were released around the same time, have not been adopted so quickly because the bigger, more connected transport and energy systems are harder to change.
Renewable energy, especially solar and wind, is considered to be disruptive by some as it is rapidly being adopted and is transitioning faster than predicted.
But its demand is not yet uniform.
Urban systems that are moving towards transformation are coupling solar and wind with battery storage and electric vehicles in a more incremental transition, though this would still require changes in regulations, tax incentives, new standards, demonstration projects and education programmes to enable markets for this system to work (de Coninck et al., 2018).
Different types of transitions carry with them different associated costs and requirements for institutional or governmental support.
Some are also easier to scale up than others, and some need more government support than others.
The feasibility of adaptation and mitigation 24 Sandro Fuzzi options requires careful consideration of multiple different factors.
These factors include: • whether sufficient natural systems and resources are available to support the various options (environmental feasibility); • the degree to which the required technologies are developed and available (technological feasibility); • the economic conditions and implications (economic feasibility); • what are the implications for human behaviour and health (social/cultural feasibility); • what type of institutional support would be needed, such as governance, institutional capacity and political support (institutional feasibility).
An additional factor (geophysical feasibility) addresses the capacity of physical systems to carry the option, for example, whether it is geophysically possible to implement large-scale afforestation consistent with the 1.5°C requirements (de Coninck et al., 2018).
6.1.
Renewable energy The largest growth driver for renewable energy has been the dramatic reduction in the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV).
Solar PV with batteries has been cost effective in many rural and developing areas and smallscale distributed energy projects are being implemented in developed and developing cities where residential and commercial rooftops offer potential for consumers becoming producers (prosumers).
The feasibility of renewable energy options depends to a large extent on geophysical characteristics of the area considered.
However, technological advances and policy instruments make renewable energy options increasingly attractive in most regions of the globe.
Another important factor affecting feasibility is public acceptance, in particular for wind energy and other large-scale renewable facilities that raise landscape management challenges, but financial participation and community engagement can be effective in mitigating resistance (de Coninck et al., 2018).
6.2.
Bioenergy and biofuels Bioenergy is renewable energy from biomass, while biofuel is biomass-based energy used in transport.
There is high agreement that the sustainable bioenergy potential in 2050 would be restricted to around 100 EJ/yr.
Sustainable deployment at higher levels, in fact, may put significant pressure on available land, food production and prices, preservation of ecosystems and biodiversity, and potential water and nutrient constraints.
Some of the disagreement on the sustainable capacity for bioenergy stems from global versus local assessments.
Global assessments may mask local dynamics that exacerbate negative impacts and shortages while, at the same time, niche contexts for deployment may avoid trade-offs and exploit co-benefits more effectively.
The carbon intensity of bioenergy is still a matter of debate and depends on several factors such as management, direct and indirect land-use change emissions, feedstock considered and time frame, as well as the availability of coordinated policies and management to minimize negative side effects and trade-offs, particularly those around food security (de Coninck et al., 2018).
6.3.
Nuclear Energy The current deployment pace of nuclear energy is constrained by social acceptability in many countries due to concerns over risks of accidents and radioactive waste management.
Though comparative risk assessment shows health risks are low per unit of electricity production and land requirement is lower than that of other power sources, the political processes triggered by societal concerns depend on the country-specific means of managing the political debates around technological choices and their environmental impacts.
On the other hand, costs of nuclear power have increased over time and the current time lag between the decision date and the commissioning of plants is presently between 10 and 19 years (de Coninck et al., 2018).
6.4.
Energy storage The growth in electricity storage for renewables has been around grid flexibility resources.
Battery storage has been the main growth feature in energy storage over the last few years mainly as a result of significant cost reductions due to mass production for electric vehicles.
Although costs and technical maturity look increasingly positive, the feasibility of battery storage is challenged by concerns over the availability of resources and the environmental impacts of its production.
Research and demonstration of energy storage in the form of thermal and chemical systems continues, but large-scale commercial systems are still rare.
Renewably derived synthetic liquid (like methanol and ammonia) and gas (like methane and hydrogen) are increasingly seen as a feasible storage options for renewable energy, producing fuel for use in industry during times when solar and wind are abundant.
The use of electric vehicles as a form of storage has 25Energy in a changing climate also been evaluated as an opportunity, and demonstrations are emerging, but challenges to up-scaling remain (de Coninck et al., 2018).
7.
CONCLUSION Warming of the Earth’s climate is a scientifically proven reality and represents the “great challenge” of our times that may even undermine the subsistence of our specie on the planet.
Scientists have proven unequivocally that climate warming is already taking place and that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century (IPCC 2014).
It is then up to the policy makers to undertake the appropriate and timely actions for the mitigation of and the adaptation to climate warming that is already underway.
In addition to political actions, citizen’s behavioural attitudes are also important for mitigation of global warming: mobility choices, dietary habits, waste management, household management, etc..
It is also certain that several aspects of climate change will persist for centuries and that an effective endeavour for contrasting this phenomenon involves a commitment for many generations to come: higher emissions today imply the need of a higher decrease tomorrow, with higher economic and social costs.
Today, the global society has already available the scientific knowledge and most of the technologies needed to effectively contrast climate change, and the strategies to be put in place depend solely on political and economic choices.
In any case, it should be considered that the social and economic costs of inaction towards climate change mitigation and adaptation are definitely higher than those for implementing the necessary mitigation and adaptation measures (Stern, 2007; Ricke et al., 2018).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This review paper builds largely on various Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change, to some of which I have contributed.
These Reports have analysed and assessed several tens of thousands peerreviewed papers on the different aspects of climate change.
The use of statements and figures from these Reports is acknowledged since it has made possible the drafting of this paper.
REFERENCES Allen, M.R., O.P.
Dube, W. Solecki, F. Aragon-Durand, W. Cramer, S. Humphreys, M. Kainuma, J. Kala, N. Mahowald, Y. Mulugetta, R. Perez, M. Wairiu, and K. Zickfeld (2018) Framing and Context.
In: Global Warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O.
Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R.
Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. P.an, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R.
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I.
Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield, eds.).
(available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/ SR15_Chapter1_Low_Res.pdf) Crutzen, P.J.
and E.F. Stoermer (2000) IGBP Newsletter 41.
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden.
Crutzen, P.J., (2002) Geology of mankind.
Nature, 415, 23. de Coninck, H., A. Revi, M. Babiker, P. Bertoldi, M. Buckeridge, A. Cartwright, W. Dong, J. Ford, S. Fuss, J.-C. Hourcade, D. Ley, R. Mechler, P. Newman, A. Revokatova, S. Schultz, L. Steg, and T. Sugiyama, 2018: Strengthening and Implementing the Global Response.
In: Global Warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O.
Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R.
Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. P.an, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R.
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I.
Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield, eds.
); available online.
Forster, P., V. Ramaswamy, P. Artaxo, T. Berntsen, R. Betts, D.W. Fahey, J. Haywood, J.
Lean, D.C. Lowe, G. Myhre, J. Nganga, R. Prinn, G. Raga, M. Schulz and R. Van Dorland (2007) Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing.
In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B.
Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L.
Miller, eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_Chapter4_Low_Res.pdf 26 Sandro Fuzzi Fuzzi, S., U. Baltensperger, K. Carslaw, S. Decesari, H. Denier van der Gon, M.C.
Facchini, D. Fowler, I. Koren, B. Langford, U. Lohmann, E. Nemitz, S. Pandis, I. Riipinen, Y. Rudich, M. Schaap, J. Slowik, D.V.
Spracklen, E. Vignati, M. Wild, M. Williams, S. Gilardoni (2015) Particulate matter, air quality and climate: lessons learned and future needs.
Atmos.
Chem.
Phys., 15, 8217-8299.
Hoegh-Guldberg, O., D. Jacob, M. Taylor, M. Bindi, S. Brown, I. Camilloni, A. Diedhiou, R. Djalante, K.L.
Ebi, F. Engelbrecht, J. Guiot, Y. Hijioka, S. Mehrotra, A. Payne, S.I.
Seneviratne, A. Thomas, R. Warren, and G. Zhou, 2018: Impacts of 1.5 °C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems.
In: Global Warming of 1.5 °C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O.
Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R.
Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. P.an, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R.
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I.
Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield, eds.).
In Press.
(available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/ sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Chapter3_Low_Res.pdf) IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer, eds.).
IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers.
In: Global Warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts ofglobal warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O.
Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R.
Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. P.an, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R.
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I.
Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield, eds.).
World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Le Treut, H., R. Somerville, U. Cubasch, Y. Ding, C. Mauritzen, A. Mokssit, T. Peterson and M. Prather (2007): Historical Overview of Climate Change.
In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B.
Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L.
Miller, eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Lewis, S.L.
and M.A.
Maslin (2015) Defining the Anthropocene.
Nature, 519, 171-180.
Mastrandrea, M.D., C.B.
Field, T.F.
Stocker, O. Edenhofer, K.L.
Ebi, D.J.
Frame, H. Held, E. Kriegler, K.J.
Mach, P.R.
Matschoss, G.-K. Plattner, G.W.
Yohe, and F.W.
Zwiers (2010) Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); available online.
Nicholls R.J., Marinova N., Lowe J.A., Brown S., Vellinga P., De Gusmão D., Hinkel J., Tol R.S.J., 2011.
Sea-level rise and its possible impacts given a ‘beyond 4 °C world’ in the twenty-first century.
Phil.
Trans.
R. Soc.
A, 369, 161-181.
Ricke, K., L. Drouet, K. Caldeira and M. Tavoni (2018) Country-level social cost of carbon.
Nature Clim.
Change, 8, 895–900.
Ruddiman, W.F., 2013.
The Anthropocene.
Annu.
Rev.
Earth Planet Sci., 41, 45-68.
Steffen, W., K. Richardson, J. Rockstroem, S.E.
Cornell, I. Fetzer, E.M. Bennett, R. Biggs, S.R.
Carpenter, W. de Vries, C.A.
de Witt, C. Folke, D. Gerten, J. Heinke, G.M.
Mace, L.M.
Persson, V. Ramanathan, B. Reyers, and S. Soerlin (2015) Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing climate.
Science, 347, 1259855.
Stern N. H., 2007.
The economics of climate change: the Stern review.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Tverberg, G., 2012.
Our Finite World; available online.
WMO, 2018.
Greenhouse Gas Bulletin.
The State of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere Based on Global Observations through 2017; available online.
Zhao C., Liu B., Piao S., Wanga X., Lobelli D.B., Huangj Y., Huanga M., Yaoa Y., Bassuk S., Ciais P., Durand J-L., Elliott J., Ewert F., Janssens I.A., Lis T., Lint E., Liu Q., Martreu P., Müller C., Penga S., Peñuelas J., Ruaney A.C., Wallachz D., Wang T., Wu D., Liu Z., Zhu Y., Zhua Z., Asseng S., 2017.
Temperature increase reduces global yields of major crops in four independent estimates.
PNAS, 114, 9623-9631. http://www.ipcc.ch https://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/12/world-energy-consumption-since-1820-in-charts/ https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=5455 Substantia An International Journal of the History of Chemistry Vol.
3, n. 1 Suppl.
2019 Firenze University Press
The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy Approaches to Climate Change Ardhi Arsala Rahmani Universitas Indonesia Email: ardhiarsala@gmail.com Abstract As the devastating impacts of climate change continue to loom across the world, it comes to a surprise then why responses by nation-states have been too slow and lacking for a supposed destructive, debilitating and critical-to-survival threat.
This then negates the rationalist perspectives of the states which assume that playing games of survival are what nationstates do on a day-to-day basis.
To that end, this paper proposes an alternative explanation, which uses a political-economy approach to conclude disconnect between the zero-sum understandings of political security perspectives within a liberal-capitalistic world order that thrives of positive-sum narratives.
This paper shall exclusively use the case of a possible universal carbon taxation and the typologies thereof to conclude how a political-economy approach should be appropriate for a politicalsecurity end with regards to climate change.
Keywords: zero-sum game, capitalism, carbon tax, liberal institutionalism 1.
Introduction By the time of writing this piece, the world held in its hands these grim facts.
Global fossil fuel emissions as measured in GtCo2 (Gigatonnes of CO2) have approximately increased by 20-percent in the past recorded decade with The People’s Republic of China (henceforth referred to as the PRC) having had the most dramatic increase of approximately twice its 2005 fossil fuel emissions by 2016 (see table 1 for details).
Another additional grim fact is Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 ISSN: 2614-0535 E-ISSN: 2655-1330 284 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 the apparent rising temperatures of which along the 136-year data gathered, 17 out of 18 world’s warmest year records have been occurring since 2001 (NASA, 2017).
Conveniently then, Greenland and the Antartic Ice sheets, which accounts for more than 99-percent of the world’s freshwater (NSIDC, 2018), are continuously losing mass at 127 Gt/yr and 286 Gt/yr rate (Gigatonnes/year) respectively (NASA, 2017).
This then easily translates to the rise of sea levels which, conveniently again, have risen by more than a 100-percent between 2005 and 2017 (NASA, 2017).
Moreover, the previous grim facts have then been calculably defined to have caused 4.9 million yearly deaths in 2010 according to the latest Climate Vulnerability Monitor report (DARA & CVF, 2012).
The report also predicts, that if current patterns of carbon use and climate changes continue, the deaths could go as far as 6 million yearly by 2030.
Deaths of which are caused by the direct consequences of carbon emissions and indirect ones through the damaging climate change effects (such as disasters, drought, and diseases) (DARA & CVF, 2012).
Table 1: Author’s compilation from the Global Carbon Atlas interactive time series (Global Carbon Project, 2017) Conclusively, should the science remain infallible, the grim facts that have been presented above are all interconnected as man-made climate change.
Yet, this then begs the question as to why the world of nation-states have made insignificant progress in addressing the issue of climate change (as evident by the continuous increase of emissions globally) despite the overwhelmingly evident scientific consensus on the devastations man-made climate change can and have brought (NASA, 2017) (Klein, 2014, p. 12)(Klein, 2014:12).
In fact, looking all the way back to the first transnational environmental cause that have produced a successful multilateral pledge, i.e.
the Montreal Protocol which have to this date been deemed a success in restoring ozone concentrations (Barett, 2009:67), the current failings from Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 285 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy the Kyoto Protocol onwards shall put us on a trajectory as predicted by the Climate Vulnerability Monitor.
Furthermore, being conducted within the tenets of the international relations (IR) discipline, this paper shall question also the supposed rationality of the states’ actions and responses to the destructive, debilitating and critical-to-survival threat of climate change.
This paper shall also establish a priori the following premises: a) although the main questioning argument of this paper begins from a politicalsecurity perspective of which the approaches later discussed are to be traditional security oriented, this paper shall transcend the subdisciplines of IR by bringing the concept of interests as the lead bridging variable to the politicaleconomy approach, hence b) the research of this paper shall for the most part use the term (neo)liberal as a description of the current state of world market-based economic affairs (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005:239) , not the dominant IR neoliberalism and or liberal institutionalism of Keohane, Nye and others (Lamy, 2011:114), unless otherwise stated.
In other words, this paper contends that climate change is not the same kind of force within the political-security structures that shape state action/inaction to insecurities (caused by critical -tosurvival threats).
It is actually the role of political-economic activities that fuel the continuous increase in threat of climate change impacts (therefore fueling insecurities to some, as will be explained later), not power imbalances or disruptions in state affairs.
2.
Rationalists Approach within IR Realism and its offshoots.
Built upon the ashes of the Great European Wars (i.e.
WWI and WWII), the realist IR approaches are credited to the ideas of Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:84).
The approaches of the early realists are based upon the assumptions of people’s motives at the individual level which then translates into state action, and as Morgenthau has put it in his wellknown Six Principles of Political Realism, the motives of individuals are based upon human nature borne objective laws which then translates into rational human action/ inaction (Morgenthau, 1985).
The arguments of the classical realists were then brought upon a higher order of analysis by the new realists (neorealists), who posits that it was not the individual human nature that 286 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 causes state action/inaction, but the international structure of constant power and security struggles that shape state behavior (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:96).
Writing in terms of a chronological order, what followed was the advent of the new classical realists (neoclassical realists) started by Gideon Rose (1998).
The neoclassical realist approach brings back the individual unit factor as a variable of state conduct but at the same time acknowledging the power struggle structures put forth by neorealists.
In other words, their approach ‘places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behaviour’ (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:90).
Yet, with the understanding of a natural state of affairs, be it the individual, the structures surrounding the state or both at the same time, all approaches within the realist tradition continues upon the path of explaining state action/inaction through the theory of rational choice.
The idea of rational choice, which draws upon behavioural economic studies, presupposes a political actor as utility maximizers, wherein self-interests dictates said actors to accrue as much gains with minimal losses (Brown & Ainley, 2005:31).
In effect, as stated by Dunne (2011), there is a significant degree of continuity along the evolution of realist thoughts wherein three core elements, known as the 3S (Statism, Self-help & Survival) persists amongst the various realist offshoots.
Statism is understood as a given due to the anarchic conditions of the world, hence the highest order of exercised authority is only done by states.
Self-help is the only principle action states adhere to in an anarchical world, due to the fact that there is no higher order to assist their conducts.
This is contrasted to how states are responsible for the individual populations within them.
Survival is what shapes rational action according to realists, the most basic instinct of human nature is that of staying alive, hence any conducts thereof is to satisfy said instinct (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:94).
Liberalism and its offshoots.
An understanding of liberalism can go all the way back to the mid-19th century ideas of Richard Cobden, who contends that the causes of conflict are extensive interventions to the idea of individual liberties which causes disturbances to the natural order of the freedom of human conduct.
Moreover, the ideas of liberalism founded by Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 287 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy Woodrow Wilson and J.A.
Hobson then bring in the democratic nature and power balances as variables that, if disturbed, shall cause conflict (Dunne, 2011:103).
It is also convenient that the liberal approach is in agreement with the realist camp that the world state of affairs is anarchic with the highest order of exercised authority only being done by states (Dunne, 2011:103).
Unlike, the Realist’s perspective with its chronologically ordered birth of offshoots, the new liberalism (neoliberalism) grew out of the pluralistic critiques of the realist theories (Brown & Ainley, 2005:45).
The neoliberals or otherwise dubbed as liberal institutionalists suggest that the way towards peace is for states to surrender a portion of their sovereignty as evidenced by the development of the European Union (Lamy, 2011:121).
As complex processes of development continued and the technological processes brought along with it, what became of interdependences, wherein state conduct are increasingly bind together, became the backdrop of further neoliberal theories.
The neoliberals, do accept that anarchy exists as well as self-serving interests of the states, but due to the complex interdependences structured, state conduct can be done, if not more beneficial, in cooperation (Brown & Ainley, 2005:47).
One method of cooperative conduct is through international regimes, which is defined as ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner, 1982:185).
International institutions therefore, serve as a platform for said international regimes.
However, in effect, even though the leading variables perceived more important by liberals differ to those of realists, the two are in accordance when both their explanation of state action/ inaction is based upon rational choice conduct (Brown & Ainley, 2005:47).
3.
Rationalist Attempt at Climate Change Considering the proclaimed dominance of the rationalist approaches as supposed explanatory devices to state action/inaction within international relations conduct (Brown & Ainley, 2005:32), it is then stressed again the apparent disconnect between the overwhelming evidence of criticalto-survival climate change and states’ continuous insignificant action towards addressing it.
Both 288 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 the realists and liberalists as rational theories agree that actions of state mainly serve survival instincts.
That being said, for a realist, an increase of perceived threat from another party towards a state shall create insecurity which then provides an impetus for state actions of minimizing said threat (in the realist camp, through activities such as bandwagoning or balancing) (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:84).
Even the proclaimed realist argument of Morgenthau assumes states behave to the point of, for better or for worse, immorality which is driven by that survivalist instinct (Tickner, 2009:15).
As for the liberalist, a method of averting conflict, or the fear of conflict is done through cooperative conduct (Dunne, 2011:106).
Therefore, a formed threat engenders a rational response.
Rationality, of course, is the instinctual guide to ensuring survival.
However, as evident by the continuous process of climate change, and in addition to that, the severely lacking prescriptions borne out of multilateral arrangements and state action (Klein, 2014:123), the question in mind is then, either the states are not rational at all or the theories brought forth trying to explain that states are rational are inappropriate for this issue.
Despite the already negated rational survival-instinct premise of realism vis-à-vis climate change, Heffron (2015) make further attempts at fitting the realist theoretical lens upon climate change action/inaction.
In Heffron (2015), climate change is defined as a global threat that is indiscriminate of states and state borders.
Yet, despite being indiscriminate and very real, the various strands of realism only continue to analize ‘war, conflict, geopolitics, alliances and balancing behaviours, and the way states operate in the international system’ and hence ‘realism has very little or nothing to say about possible solutions to climate change’ (Heffron, 2015:8).
A significant argument put forth in Heffron (2015) is the idea of carbon bandwagoning as a signifier of states action/inaction to climate change.
The argument follows the idea that as state A pursues rational conduct of reducing carbon emissions through lowering reliance on fossil fuels, another state B may ‘bandwagon off the back of these efforts and burn more fossil fuels’ hence rendering the efforts by state A irrelevant in addition to the relative losses to state A (Heffron, 2015:10).
Heffron (2015) argues that the relative losses become important climate Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 289 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy mitigation efforts by state A may not bring much immediate benefits that would counteract the losses ceded to state B—he explains this in terms of resource allocations of military capabilities wherein, state A may reduce resources allocated towards the military to increase climate mitigation efforts, and the resulting behaviour of state B would be taking advantage of state A’s dwindling down military capability hence creating traditional spiral of insecurity (security dilemma, see Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:95).
The argument of carbon bandwagoning posited by Heffron (2015), in effect, concludes that state inaction towards climate change is due to fears that climate change action be taken advantage by other states hence stimulating a spiral of insecurity which then averts all attention to the climate issue at the beginning.
The problem with the carbon bandwagoning assumption of state inaction is that the realities presented do not follow the same logic.
As presented in Table 1, there are actors who have seen reductions in fossil fuel emissions amid increases by other actors.
At the same time, the increase of fossil fuel emissions by India and the PRC for instance is way more than the reductions introduced by other top emitters.
Additionally, Kreft et.
al (2017) and Verisk Maplecroft (2016) reports that the PRC and India is significantly more at risk to the effects of climate change than other top emitters.
In other words, the facts presented at hand further disproves the rational arguments claim from the realist bandwagoning assumption as posited by Heffron (2015) because, the PRC and India stands to lose much more, and to that end is more threatened survivalwise by climate change (Verisk Maplecroft, 2016) (Kreft, et al., 2017).
Moreover, India has actually made considerable losses in the year 2015 due to extreme weathers and disasters attributable to climate change (Kreft, et al., 2017) in the run-up to the Paris Climate Accords, which it committed to only slightly by the pledge of greenhouse gases reductions given (Mizo, 2016:376).
Another realist-originated argument have also been proposed by Purdon (2017), wherein he specifically addresses the action/ inaction towards climate change by states through the lens of the neoclassical realist perspective.
In Purdon (2017), the neoclassical realist thought presented, explains that there are ‘systemic concerns on climate change cooperation’ due to 290 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 ‘relative-gains concerns associated with international resource transfers implicit in climate change policy’.
The resource transfers which this paper, in agreement with Purdon (2017) and Klein (2014), also contends as the most significant mode of climate change mitigation, pending significant scientific breakthrough, then becomes a signifier into understanding the political forces that shape state behaviour.
In other words, there are conflicting forces domestically in addition to the international structured forces that compels state to act or not to act upon climate change (Purdon, 2017:267).
Purdon (2017), goes further by testing his perspective upon the two forms of international climate finance: carbon markets and climate funds.
In short, the two, supposedly forms of resource transfers and trading mechanism are built upon the bedrock of the neoliberal economic order (Purdon, 2017:269).
The international structures then shape state behaviour by tapping the relative gains concerns as balance and or security have been disturbed by the significant resource transfers, similar to the argument made in Heffron (2015).
This is evident in Canada’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol which gave birth to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the initial multilateral carbon market, due to the notable systematic wealth transfers away from Canada the mechanism entails (Purdon, 2017:281).
As for climate funds being, straightforwardly, a form of wealth transfers, the realities presented has been selfevident with financing pledges not always materialized into deposits and the number of countries actually engaging in climate funds is much lower than those active in the carbon markets (Purdon, 2017:282).
In addition to that, as domestic politics also shape state behaviour, the neoclassical realist perspective contends that the popularity of carbon markets is due to the perceived ability of continued gains from taking advantage of the CDM and others (such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme) by domestic actors, and that disengagement is a path taken once the carbon markets appeal no-longer to the self-interested actors within the state.
The example of disengagement is evident by Canada again, in its critique towards the carbon market as essentially a potential waste taxpayers’ money, which is a domestic actor concern, Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 291 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy particularly political constituencies (Purdon, 2017:281).
Yet, despite the compelling case presented with carbon markets and climate funds by Purdon (2017) that can be analyzed through the neoclassical realist lens, the relative gains concern from disturbances within international structures have been presented before by Heffron (2015), and hence can still be dispelled using the same arguments proposed previously with continuous reductions of emissions by specific emitters and the vulnerability positions that other specific emitters are in.
Should attention be given then, to the domestic politics, which constitutes of various overlapping and conflicting self-interests, which shape state behaviour, the simple rationalist survival-instinct premise already negates this argument as overwhelming evidence of threat continuously presents itself amid significant state inaction at the same time.
This paper shall also concur that the neoclassical realist approach in itself is inherently problematic as, Quinn (2013) concludes.
As the approach, in its attempt to develop a law-like explanation of state behaviour actually goes beyond the limits of the rational aspect of the realist paradigm as well as sidelining, though not completely, the systemic imperatives of structural realism (Quinn, 2013:160).
What then, can be made of the liberalist approach to explaining significant state inaction towards climate change is just as straight forward.
As the rational argument have been completely dispelled, we can also consider how states have yet made significant action, even cooperatively, in that manner to mitigate climate change and hence maintain survivalist security (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005:249).
Hence, even as liberal institutionalists make an attempt to justify states tendency to push for cooperation based on so called ‘absolute-gains’ and that they shall stand to lose to the impacts of climate change if they do not do so (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005:252), the facts of current cooperative arrangements are considerably lacking in both progress and effect (Klein, 2014:123).
For the most part, explanations given by institutionalists, according to Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) only refer to the symptoms of state action/ inaction and that improving institutional mechanisms, coordinating platforms and regimes will give birth to climate change mitigating solutions.
The criticism then, is how strong the institutions, 292 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 regimes or coordinating platform must become is a neverending goalpost shifting by the institutionalists, as the current state of institutions should be enough for coordinating measures to act against climate change (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005:241).
To further argue against the institutionalist approach, one can look at declaration at the Copenhagen Climate Change 2009 conference wherein, the scientific consensus of the dangers of a 2-degree Celsius average temperature rise, which was determined all the way back prior to the Kyoto Protocol, was formally recognized.
Yet, despite the scientific warning of the temperature rise, it was only by the Paris Agreement of 2015 that the 2degree Celsius global temperature target gained legal recognition in the form of an adhered to international treaty (Gao, et.
al., 2017:274).
Of course, the 2 -degree Celsius target was never a considerably sufficient target to revert or at least fight back climate change as evident by the death-sentence still given to significant coastline populations across the world with sealevel rises (Gao, et.
al., 2017:273) (Jex, 2015) .
Which then is the reason, that a more scientifically safe level of 1.5-degree Celsius average temperature rise is thrown into the mix within the Paris Agreement of 2015 albeit the 2-degree Celsius target, which is more politically convenient, gaining the spotlight (Gao, et.
al., 2017:274).
So in effect, the international realm is not necessarily lacking in comprehensive institutional structures, it is just that the states which cede power to them is signi-ficantly not acting enough on purpose despite the scientific consensus (Klein, 2014:20).
4.
Climate Change and the Dualistic Ideologues To wrap up the rationalist camp attempts at climate change, the theories they’ve proposed only go as far as explain how and what of state action/inaction towards climate change, rather than why.
So, even if one presupposes the preordained games of survival that the rationalists claim states are primed to go about naturally (Brown & Ainley, 2005:91), the presented facts and realities show that there remains significant inaction that would otherwise prove rationality.
The explanation this paper proposes then, is through the constructivist paradigm, where one point of critique is towards said assumptions of a preordained rationality within a conditioned system that prompt Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 293 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy survivalist instincts.
In short, states are not inherently primed towards survival, as rationalists may claim.
On the contrary, the ideas that define them are what determine their subjective perception of rationality (Brown & Ainley, 2005:112).
The constructivist approach, being postpositivist in method, goes beyond the stringent empirical methods of positivists, which, within the realm of IR is embraced by the rationalists who establish law-like generalizations based on quantifiable material capabilities of the states (Parsons, 2015:510) Following upon Cho (2012) who states that ‘insecurities themselves are not pregiven and natural things which exist separately, but are produced in a mutually constitutive process’, the idea of climate change acting as a threat to survival depends much upon the ideologues who perceive them.
What is perceived as insecurity in one state, may not be perceived as so in another state.
The stressing point being the constructed perception which is shaped by context and ideas (Cho, 2012:309).
In other words, the perception of security completely differs to objective rational action towards security.
To analogize, it is a scientific human condition for a flight or fight and adrenaline-induced response to a direct physical threat.
Yet, whatever built perceptions or unawareness, could cover said response from ever being catalyzed.
This is because to an individual never knowing the constructs of a gun, being held at gunpoint would most probably translate to an irresponsive action unlike the individual who knows best the killing capability of a gun who would probably have their survivalist instincts triggered.
According to Klein (2014), the driving issue that created the rift of differing perceptions is the advent of neoliberal capitalism, specifically the continuously deregulated one within an international anarchic system.
Connecting the aforementioned arguments to the political-economy sphere then brings up a dualistic rationality construct wherein particular states adherent to rational security concerns may engage in climate change mitigation (that is, through fossil fuel emissions reductions as done by EU 28, see Tabel 1).
Whereas other states such as the PRC and India remain adherents to the purview of the political-economic sphere enhancement (Pan, et.
al., 2009:150) (Joshi & Patel, 2009:171).
Moreover, it must be pointed out again that, what is meant 294 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 by rational security concerns of countries such as the EU 28 or the US is not the same as assumptions of the rational realists who presumed inaction towards climate change by state A is due to fears of carbon bandwagoning by state B, because as figured by Pan et.
al (2009), the emissions of the PRC is a substitute for the decreases of emissions in the developed world.
In short, the reductions of emissions by the EU 28 and the US is done under a constructed influence of survivalist concerns which then primes climate mitigation effort narratives (Cass, 2007:237) not the rationalist claims of inherent survivalist -instincts.
This is because, as argued previously, current state actions still does not compute towards effectively trying to actually survive (Helm, 2009:16).
Going back to the previous analogy then, there is an obvious difference between a triggered survivalist instinct by fighting then trying to pull then gun away, and turning ones back and running away.
The latter, of course, results in being gunned down anyway, though the slightest seconds of survival was maintained, this is not dissimilar to minimal efforts by the EU 28 and the US who have built the perception amongst themselves to maintain slight seconds of survival instead of putting a permanent end to the threat.
Actions of the PRC and India on the other hand is that of bargaining with the one holding the gun whose naturally preconditioned to always shoot, in other words a futile attempt.
The naturally occurring fact is that once emissions are up, the carbons stay for a lengthy period (Klein, 2014:204), hence subscribing to notions that development comes first through theories like environmental Kuznets Curve presented by neoliberals and liberal institutionalists alike (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005:91) amounts to the analogy presented above and shows the apparent disconnect.
In retrospect, the context that brought us here is a set of historical antecedents which shifted our idea of a global commons into a commodified private property as explained by Max Koch (2012), and a societal-value shift that disrupted the notions of the collective good as explained by Klein (2014).
So then, to follow upon the argument Riviere (2015) who states the contestable environmentalist norms that are slowly being constructed, this paper contends that what is being contested is the reigning hegemonic construct of blind capitalism.
The environmentalist norms which evidently is gaining ground (Cass, Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 295 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy 2007:238), is currently still subject to perversions of materialistic reasons hence the continued lack of significant action (Riviere, 2014).
In addition to that, considering how constructed ideas within IR is a collective manifestation of the citizens within, the varying degree of climate change mitigation then makes sense as the worship of blind capitalism differs from state to state (Riviere, 2014:92).
Moreover, the continuous positive-sum promises demonstrated by capitalistic expansion fuelling rise of CO 2 emissions, is not followed by the scientific evidence of equal availability of carbon-sinks, hence zero-sum (as the loss is towards a collective global common ownership) in reality because there can only be so much CO2 emissions until a breaking point is reached (Koch, 2012:31).
In other words, the current societal constructs fuels the process of accumulation by dispossession (Koch, 2012:109).
5.
Constructing Prescriptions: Carbon Tax dissemination As significant objective action is then required to tackle climate change which is perceived as a threat in varying degrees due to contextual ideologue constructs, this paper proposes the idea of constructing a specific politicaleconomic idea: i.e.
carbon taxation.
The carbon taxation proposed here is not exactly an economic step-bystep policy prescription, but rather a constructed social idea of exchange and behaviour shaping that goes beyond the bounds of the synthesizing capitalist and environmentalist norms.
The reason being that, current prescriptions are still bound to the compromises of privatization and commodification of the global commons, hence ideas remain restricted to climate funds and carbon markets of which the results to this day provide no significant cheer as to effect in reverting climate change (Hepburn, 2009:377).
In fact, the current market-based constructed approach, rather than social-approaches to climate change is so perverted that once the carbon markets were introduced, accumulative behaviour took place more significantly as speculations and price manipulations became the norm of the carbon market instead of fulfilling an environmentally clean end (Koch, 2012:104).
In terms of effect, by introducing a social-policy like carbon tax, there will be a reshaping of consumption patterns on the household side and a limitation on negative externalities 296 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 of productions, both of which would then translate to a reduction of overall emissions (Mankiw, 2009:373).
Yet, at the same time, in no way shape or form does this paper try to propose the introduction of carbon taxes as a compromising tool that would be politically salient as to promise and or maintain economic growth.
On the contrary, as established throughout the entirety of this paper, what needs to be introduced are mechanisms that would completely revert the damage that has been done by irrational ideologues towards the global commons, i.e.
carbon sinks (Klein, 2014:18).
Needless to say, the proposed carbon taxes is a radical-free alternative approach to extreme environmentalists who would otherwise promote revolutions or taking down current structures instantaneously so as to save the environment (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005:252).
The premise of this social carbon tax approach for a security end, i.e.
survival is that taxation is a method that stays within the tenets of current constructed politicaleconomic ideologies but is also contesting it at the same time.
In effect, through carbon taxes, the idea of profit accumulation and endless growth supported by positive-sum narratives must be slowly hold back enough to level with the scientific consensus of carbon sink capacities (Klein, 2014:18).
That being said, this paper presents three main types of carbon taxes that could be employed domestically, best suited to the context of country resource utilization as well as patterns of emission.
 Sectoral Carbon Tax.
This type of carbon tax, shall place the burden of emissions negativities particularly on those sectors that most produce emissions, provided that there would be no significant factored leakages (Baylis, et al., 2013).
Leakages, according to Baylis et.
al (2013) is when reductions of emissions in one sector shall trigger a shift of the emissions elsewhere.
The example to this is the taxation done to the electricity, cement and some manufacturing sectors within the EU, the resulting end of which do not increase emissions elsewhere (Baylis, et.
al., 2013:337).   Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA).
Otherwise termed Border Tax Adjustments, is a taxation method that assures ‘emissions reductions achieved within a country through a tax (production tax) are not totally offset by the increase Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 297 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy in emissions that occurs in partner countries by virtue of expanded trade’ (Matoo, et.
al., 2013:588).
In short, BCAs ensure that the conditions of emission freeriding do not occur (as explained with the PRC offsetting emissions reductions of the developed world in part three).
 Fossil Fuel Tax (Energy Tax).
This tax, as the name suggests, aims at one of the core of emissions itself.
Countries would tax the fossil fuel use and production within their borders (McLure Jr., 2014:553).
The general application of this goes by targeting content rather than simply usage and or production.
Which means that the more harmful substance would have its usage reduced (OECD, 2016:15). 5.
Conclusions Supposing that there are states A and B living in an anarchic international system.
State A decides to increase its material capability (be it economic or military) so it becomes twice that of state B.
Not long after, state B increases its material capability to level.
What the rational realists see is insecurity of state B and the need to ensure its survival prompting it to buildup.
The liberalist on the other hand, firstly blames the lack of coordination between the states because state B’s increase of material capability to level is due to unavailable assurances by state A through bridging institutions that the increase of material capability was not for harms use.
The constructivist paradigm, subscribed by this paper, would question what other states C, D and E are doing, which presumable are not generalized as state B’s action, provided that the context of ideas shaping action within these states differ.
Yet what if state A is changed into a global common and its increase in material capabilities is climate change?
Well, the logic of the rationalists then dictates that there are no two-ways to go about it, and changing behaviour (through patterns of emissions) is the only way to go about reducing climate change’s potential harm.
But that is not what has happened.
The arguments brought forth in this paper, however, is not an attempt to completely dismiss the rationalist arguments.
In fact, had we live in a rationalist world, there would have been many significant progress towards climate change mitigation right now, or 298 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 perhaps none of its harms have come forth.
Instead, the current world constructs is populated by irrational ideologues, and a shift of ideas is needed more than ever if we are to survive.
Perhaps best if policies, prescriptions and the likes subscribe to the ideas of a global commons under tragedy (Hardin, 1968:1247).
Yet, subscribing to the constructivist paradigm means accepting a pluralistic realm of the IR discipline because even ideas are shaped by ideas, hence any further discussions on this paper’s outcome is most welcome.
Bibliography Alvesson, M. & Skoldberg, K., 2009.
Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research.
London: SAGE Publications.
Barnett, M., 2011.
Social Constructivism.
In: J. Baylis, S. Smith & P. Owens, eds.
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
150 164.
Barrett, S., 2009.
Climate Treaties and the Imperative of Enforcement.
In: D. Helm & C. Hepburn, eds.
The Economics and Politics of Climate Change.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
58 80.
Baylis, K., Fullerton, D. & Karney, D. H., 2013.
Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy.
The American Economic Review, May, 103(3), pp.
332 337.
Brekke, K. A.
& Johansson-Stenman, O., 2009.
The Behavioural Economics of Climate Change.
In: The Economics and Politics of Climate Change.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
107 124.
Brown, C. & Ainley, K., 2005.
Understanding International Relations.
3rd ed.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Carl, J.
& Fedor, D., 2016.
Tracking Global Carbon Revenues: A Survey of Carbon Taxes versus Cap-and-Trade in the Real World.
Energy Policy, Volume 96, pp.
50 77.
Cass, L. R., 2007.
Measuring the Domestic Salience of International Environmental Norms: Climate Change Norms in American, German, and British Climate Policy Debates.
In: The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses.
Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.
23 50.
Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 299 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy Cass, L. R. & Pettenger, M. E., 2007.
Conclusion: The Constructions of Climate Change.
In: The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses.
Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.
235 246.
Cho, Y. C., 2012.
State Identity Formation in Constructivist Security Studies: A Suggestive Essay.
Japanese Journal of Political Science, September, 13(3), pp.
299 316.
Clapp, J.
& Dauvergne, P., 2005.
Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment.
1st ed.
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
DARA & CVF, 2012.
Climate Vulnerability Monitor, Madrid: DARA.
Depledge, J.
& Yamin, F., 2009.
The Global Climate-change Regime: A Defence.
In: The Economics and Politics of Climate Change.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
433 453.
Dunne, T., 2011.
Liberalism.
In: J. Baylis, S. Smith & P. Owens, eds.
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
102 111.
Dunne, T. & Schmidt, B. C., 2011.
Realism.
In: J. Baylis, S. Smith & P. Owens, eds.
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
86 96.
Gao, Y., Gao, X.
& Zhang, X., 2017.
The 2 °C Global Temperature Target and the Evolution of the Long-Term Goal of Addressing Climate Change: From the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Paris Agreement.
Engineering, 3(2), pp.
272 278.
Global Carbon Project, 2017.
CO2 Emissions.
[Online] Available at: http://www.
globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2emissions Hardin, G., 1968.
The Tragedy of the Commons.
Science, 13 December, 162(3859), pp.
1243 1248.
Heffron, D., 2015.
What do realists think about climate change?.
Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, pp.
2 21.
Helm, D., 2009.
Climate-change Policy: Why has so Little been Achieved?.
In: The Economics and Politics of Climate Change.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
1 22.
300 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 Hepburn, C., 2009.
Carbon Taxes, Emissions Trading, and Hybrid Schemes.
In: The Economics and Politics of Climate Change.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
365 384.
Jex, C., 2015.
COP21: What does two degrees Celsius global warming look like?.
[Online] Available at: http:// sciencenordic.com/cop21-w hat do es t wo deg re es celsius-global-warming-look Joshi, V. & Patel, U. R., 2009.
India and Climate-change Mitigation.
In: The Economics and Politics of Climate Change.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
167 196.
Kegley Jr., C. W. & Blanton, S. L., 2011.
World Politics: Trend and Transformation.
Boston: Wadsworth Publishing.
Klein, N., 2014.
This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs.
The Climate.
Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada.
Koch, M., 2012.
Capitalism and Climate Change: Theoretical D i s cu ssion, Hi stor ical Development and Policy Responses.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Krasner, S. D., 1982.
Structural C aus es and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables.
International Organization, 36(2), pp.
185 205.
Kreft, S., Eckstein, D. & Melchior, I., 2017.
Global Climate Risk Index 2017, Berlin: Germanwatch.
Lamy, S. L., 2011.
Contemporary mainstream approaches: neorealism and neo-liberalism.
In: J. Baylis, S. Smith & P. Owens, eds.
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
114 129.
LO, A., 2013.
The Political Economy of Carbon Tax: International Practice and the Australian Model.
Chinese Journal of Urban and Environmental Studies, 1(1), pp.
1 15.
Mankiw, N. G., 2009.
One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax.
In: International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues .
New York: Pearson, pp.
372 374.
Mattoo, A., Subramanian, A., Mensbrugghe, D. v. d. & He, J., 2013.
Trade effects of alternative carbon border-tax schemes.
Review of World Economics, September, 149(3), pp.
587 609.
Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 301 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy McLure Jr., C. E., 2014.
Selected International Aspects of Carbon Taxation.
The American Economic Review, May, 104(5), pp.
552 556.
Mizo, R., 2016.
India, China and Climate Cooperation.
India Quarterly, 72(4), pp.
375 394.
Morgenthau, H. J., 1985.
Politics Among Nation.
s.l.
:Alfred A. Knopf.
NASA, 2017.
NASA Global Climate Change Vital Signs of the Planet.
[Online] Available at: https:// c l i m a t e .
n a s a .
g o v / v i t a l signs/global-temperature/ [Accessed 20 March 2018].
NSIDC, 2018.
State of the Cr y o s p h e re .
[ O n l i n e ] Available at: https:// n s i d c .
o r g / c r y o s p h e r e / s o t c / i c e _ s h e e t s .
h t m l [Accessed 20 March 2018].
OECD, 2016.
Effective Carbon Rates: Pricing CO2 through Taxes and Emissions Trading Systems, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Otaki, M., 2013.
Emission Trading or Proportional Carbon Tax: A Quest for More Efficacious Emission Control, Tokyo: DBJ Research Center on Global Warming.
Pan, J., Phillips, J.
& Chen, Y., 2009.
China’s Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade: Approaches to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility.
In: The Economics and Politics of Climate Change.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
142 166.
Parsons, C., 2015.
Before eclecticism: competing alternatives in constructivist research.
International Theory, November, 7(3), pp.
501 538.
Pettenger, M. E., 2007.
Introduction: Power, Knowledge, and the Social Construction of Climate Change.
In: The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses.
Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.
1 22.
Purdon, M., 2017.
Neoclassical realism and international climate change politics: moral imperative and political constraint in international climate finance.
International Relations and Development, 20(2), pp.
263 300.
Quinn, A., 2013.
Kenneth Waltz, Adam Smith and the Limits of Science: Hard choices for neoclassical realism.
International Politics, 50(2), pp.
159 182.
302 Islamic World and Politics Vol.2.
No.2 July-December 2018 Riviere, L. L., 2014.
Towards a Constructivist International Political Economy of Climate Change.
Issues in Political Economy, Volume 23, pp.
90 101.
Tickner, J.
A., 2009.
A Critique of Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism.
In: International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues.
New York: Pearson , pp.
15 28.
Verisk Maplecroft, 2016.
Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2017, s.l.
: Verisk Maplecroft.
COMMENTARY Local governance for local governments: A framework for addressing climate change Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance Issue 7: November 2010 http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 1.
Introduction Climate science has established that climate change and associated global warming will impact the world.
Already the global temperature has risen by between 0.2 and 0.6 degrees centigrade since the late 19th century, and in Australia, average temperatures have increased by 0.8 degrees centigrade (Pillora 2010).
Furthermore, the last IPCC report concluded for the first time not only that climate change was real but reported a 90% certainty that it was also human induced (IPCC 2007).
Moreover, Australia is predicted by 2030 to experience the following: (i) a further 1ºC of warming; (ii) up to 20% more months of drought; (iii) up to 25% increase in days of very high or extreme fire danger; (iv) increases in storm surges and severe weather events; and (v) a rise in mean sea level, with the anticipated range of sea level rise to be between 18 to 76 cm by 2100 (Pillora 2010: 4; IPCC 2007).
1 I would like to thank all local governments in Tasmania that I worked with and all individuals from the Northern regions.
I would also like to thank Scott Schilg and Emma Williams of NRM North, Launceston for offering me the opportunity and funds to conduct the workshops.
I would also like to thank Christine Matiera, of the Local Government Association of Tasmania, in her good advice to me throughout this project.
Finally, I would like to thank staff at the National Centre for Marine Conservation and Resource Sustainability, Australian Maritime College, UTAS, especially Dr.
Troy Gaston, for their support while doing this project.
Melissa Nursey-Bray1 Geography, Environment and Population University of Adelaide, South Australia NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 169 2.
Implications for Local Government Local governments perhaps face the most daunting challenge in relation to climate change as they are the arbiters of day-to-day policy implementation.
What then will be some of the implications for local government of these predictions, and why does it matter?
Firstly changes will be felt at both policy and practical levels.
For example, planning policy and development assessments will be affected as will decision making about the location of urban expansion areas.
Increased uncertainty in land use planning and pressure to respond to these changes from rate payers, as well as the projected increased pressure on resources (i.e.
emergency services) are additional concerns (Pillora 2010).
The loss of private property and community assets also begs questions about how insurance will be handled into the future.
For coastal local governments, erosion, inundation, and subsequent impacts on infrastructure will potentially cost millions and require forward planning.
Responding to these challenges will require shifts in how economic development and tourism programs are navigated into the future, as will changes in social mobility, community structure and migration of people in and out of cities (Pillora 2010).
Community health issues, bio security risks, water management and environmental management – whether along the coast or bio-diversity protection generally – are all likely to be the planning challenges of the 21st century.
These implications also raise the possibility of litigation or claims, a prospect that should motivate further action from local governments concerning climate change.
3.
The Law, Climate Change and Local Government Local governments are under intense pressure in relation to liability.
Council decisions can theoretically be challenged on the basis that (i) they may contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, i.e.
development approvals for power or other polluting activities, or (ii) that they unreasonably fail to take into account the likely effects of climate change when exercising a wide range of their service, planning and development activities.
Climate change is an activity that could be used as the basis of testing what is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ (England 2006).
As England notes, types of decisions may include: those questioning the appropriateness of development approvals in flood prone, coastal zone or at risk areas; the adequacy of building standards to withstand extreme weather events which can lead to erosion and landslides; the adequacy of emergency procedures (when put to the test more frequently); failure to undertake disease prevention programmes, NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 170 and; failure to preserve ‘public’ natural assets in the face of climate change – if and when the technology becomes available (England 2006).
Moreover, in relation to negligence, courts could award damages if the following can be shown: • a reasonable person in the defendant’s position could have avoided the damage by exercising reasonable care; and • the defendant was in such a relationship to the plaintiff that he or she ought to have acted with that degree of reasonable care.
Already, a number of legal precedents have been set in relation to the issue of climate change and local government (Edgar 2010).
For example, in 2007 the Land and Environment Court of NSW ruled against a $250 million housing and aged care development due to the possible impact of coastal flooding caused by climate change.
In August 2008, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal handed down a landmark decision where it quashed a proposal for a development at the coastal town of Toora (in Victoria's Gippsland region) because of the impact of climate change.
It cited ‘potential sea level rises due to the effects of climate change’ as the basis for its decision.
Similarly, in Gippsland Coastal Board v South Gippsland Shire Council [2008] (VCAT 1545), development consent for six residences along the coast was overturned by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal on climate change grounds (Bartley 2009).
The New South Wales Court of Appeal (Court of Appeal) in Minister for Planning v Walker (2008) 161 LGERA 423; [2008] NSWCA 224 acknowledged that if decision makers do not adequately account for long-term environmental risk factors, including climate change, there is the potential for future challenges to planning and development approvals under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EP&A Act).
In South Australia, the Supreme Court, in Northcape Properties Pty Ltd v District Council of Yorke Peninsula [2008] SASC 57, upheld the decision by the Environment, Resources and Development Court to refuse a subdivision of a large parcel of coastal land on the basis that sea level rises and associated flood patterns caused by global warming would cause erosion to a buffer zone (Briggs and Taberner 2010).
Finally, in Queensland, the Planning and Environment Court dismissed an appeal against decisions taken by Redland Shire Council to construct a building pad on the basis that it was NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 171 relocated to an area less prone to tidal inundation (Charles & Howard Pty Ltd v Redland Shire Council [2007] QPEC 95).2 4.
Case study: Tasmania and Climate Change The Tasmanian case study documented the risks caused by climate change identified by local governments in the northern region of Tasmania.
Results from initial desk-survey work found that a wide spectrum of environmental, social, health and economic impacts were pertinent to local government (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Estimated impacts of climate change to Tasmania Extreme Events • Tasmania is likely to experience moderate rises in temperatures with evaporation likely to increase in all areas except the west coast and associated highlands where small decreases are indicated.
• Rainfall is likely to increase by 7 to 11 per cent in the west and central areas, and decrease by around 8 per cent in the north-east by 2040.
• Sea level rises and frequent and severe storm surges are likely to result in inundation and erosion to Tasmania's coast.
• Warmer temperatures and changing rainfall patterns would impact on water availability.
Industry losses: Agriculture • Tasmania's primary industries are under threat by climate change; however some industries, such as wine growing, could benefit from the projected changes in climate.
• Climate change impacts will likely lead to a decline relative to what would otherwise have been in Tasmanian farm output.
Dairy output is projected to decrease by around 8 per cent by 2030 and by 12.5 per cent by 2050.
Aquaculture • Increased sea surface temperatures may present challenges for the production of cool-water farmed aquaculture species, such as Atlantic salmon.
The value of Tasmanian salmon aquaculture was $221 million in 2005-06.
However, there is potential for adaptation by the industry.
Infrastructure • Increases in extreme storm events are expected to cause more flash flooding, affecting industry and infrastructure, including water, sewerage and stormwater, transport and communications, and may challenge emergency services.
In low-lying coastal areas infrastructure is vulnerable to sea level rise and inundation.
2 A building pad exists on properties subject to flooding.
It raises the natural ground level to around 300mm above Q50 (the flow of a river which is exceeded on average for 50% of the time) so that the house built on the pad with a minimum 150mm slab will be the required 450mm above the Q50 <www.ccbuildingapproval.com.au/Building%20Glossary.doc> http://www.google.com.au/url?q=http://www.ccbuildingapproval.com.au/Building%2520Glossary.doc&sa=X&ei=NJsOTabCFIzuvQOQo43IDQ&ved=0CAQQpAMoAA&usg=AFQjCNEgAYoyTxSegsYld4Pl_9HifKhZ2w� NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 172 Tourism • Impacts on the natural environment and the region's wine industry could directly affect the tourism industry.
Biodiversity • Natural habitats, especially alpine environments and coastal systems, are likely to be impacted.
The Southwest region of Tasmania is densely forested and holds some of the last temperate rainforests and oldest trees in the world.
• The Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area (TWWHA) includes most of these forests and also alpine environments.
Increased temperatures from climate change will diminish the extent of Tasmania's alpine area and reduce the habitats available for native species.
• A 10-40 per cent reduction in snow cover projected by 2030 would result in a change in the dynamics of alpine communities and may lead to serious population declines of some species and loss of ecosystems.
Marine Biodiversity • The warming of sea surface temperatures, which is projected to be greatest off south-east Australia, is likely to affect the distribution of species with flow on effects to the broader marine ecosystem.
Waters off the east coast of Tasmania have recorded an increase in temperature of more than 1°C since the 1940s.
• In the last decade, around 36 species of marine fish have shown noticeable changes in distribution, including range shifts further south and new species not previously recorded in Tasmania.
• The long-spined sea urchin migrated south from NSW with the southerly extension of the East Australian Current.
It has spread along the east coast of Tasmania and is believed to be impacting kelp communities, with potential implications for the sustainability of rock lobster and abalone fisheries in the absence of control measures.
The value of Tasmanian rock lobster and abalone production in 2004-05 was approximately $150 million.
Coastal zones • Over 20 per cent of the Tasmanian coastline will be a risk from sea level rise and more severe storm surges associated with climate change.
• Within in the next 50-100 years, 21 per cent of Tasmania's coast is at risk of erosion and recession from sea-level rise, potentially affecting 17,000 coastal buildings.
(Based on information from the Hydro Tasmania (2006), State of Tasmania (2006), DPIWE (2004) and CSIRO Reports (2002).
The brief for the case study project was to also conduct workshops in each municipal coastal council in the Natural Resource Management (NRM) North Region of Tasmania.
Workshops were designed to document the risks local governments in the northern region of Tasmania identified in relation to climate change, and inform the councils on current projects and tools in the climate change field.
Project outcomes documented each council’s priorities, the perceived risks that climate change presented to them, and a gap NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 173 analysis on what other tools are needed to help councils deal with climate change impacts on their natural and man-made assets.
Eight councils were involved in the study: Georgetown Council, West Tamar, Launceston, Northern Midlands, Dorset, Flinders Island, Break O’ Day, and Meander Valley.
In each case, the NRM Facilitator assisted in setting up workshop dates and meeting spaces, and undertook follow up work with the researcher to ensure project completion.
Ongoing liaison occurred with NRM north staff.
Launceston Council is the only council that chose not to participate, largely because funding had been previously secured to undertake a detailed risk assessment.
5.
Findings Developing adaptation-focused responses to climate change at a local government scale is challenging.
The case study began with the intent of documenting the climate change risks that local governments in the northern region of Tasmania that have been so far been recognised.
As the work progressed it became clear that the overwhelming need, as expressed by local government, was better access to climate change information.
Without this, all councils felt they could not identify the scale and scope of the risks and as a result, communicate to rate payers and others the issues associated with climate change.
Other shared concerns across the case-study councils were how to deal with the uncertainty surrounding climate change impacts and how to incorporate climate change into day-to-day management or ‘governance structures’.
The next section outlines the above areas of shared concern and weaknesses in more detail.
Issue 1: Institutional arrangements Workshops highlighted that local governments were aware of climate change as an issue but face a number of significant constraints including: the demands of ‘sea changers’; climate change scepticism; a lack of funding; and, a lack of clarity about respective institutional obligations at local, State and Federal levels.
The uncertainty of the actual impacts of climate change predictions inhibits the potential for institutional action or application of precautionary engineering solutions to effect change.
This is consistent with other studies across Australia (Strengers 2004, Burton and Dregde 2007, AGO 2007, Gurran 2008) that identify similar barriers faced by local government.
These include: • Inappropriate policy scope NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 174 • Inadequate or inappropriate public participation and involvement • Lack of resources for policy making and implementation • Information base is either inadequate or drawn from a narrow range of sources • Lack of appropriate capacity and skills • Lack of political and community support • Institutional and leadership inertia • Lack of adequate monitoring of policy implementation and policy review • A shift in emphasis by key agencies from local to regional scale • Unreasonable demands by funding agencies • Lack of trust in the key decision-making agencies • Some of the key agencies are perceived to have conflicting roles as both a regulator and a facilitator of policy making.
In the Tasmania study, these issues crystallised into an overarching practical concern about how councils can incorporate climate change management into existing day-to-day management.
This question was raised time and again and it was clear from the research that until councils have the means to properly face the issue and deal with it directly, there is a preference to camouflage the problem within mainstream council business and local governance arrangements.
Indeed, some respondents were of the view that climate change management should always be incorporated within existing governance structures as they felt this would ensure it was actually dealt with over time.
This was due to a perception that climate change was the current ‘big ticket, big funds’ issue, but one that would fade over time, along with its funding and hence needed incorporating within governance regimes in more permanent and sustainable ways.
Issue 2: Communicating the issue to rate payers and other stakeholders Effective communication between stakeholders and policy makers is important to the success of any program, and essential to forging links between local government and the community on climate change (Demerritt and Langdon 2004).
This was a theme collectively articulated in all workshops by a diversity of staff, from engineers, to planners, to elected councillors about the ways in which the issue might be communicated.
Some findings under this theme were: • While coming from different directions, staff and councillors nonetheless faced a dilemma between the need to deal with the issue and the perception of it.
NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 175 • Staff particularly felt they were ‘between a rock and a hard place’, where any decision made could be uncomfortable or unpopular.
• In all workshops there was a high level of dissatisfaction within local government as to the style, substance and depth of information they had about climate change.
• Many participants noted they did not have the level of geographical detail about the predicted impacts for their own regions, and argued that this inhibited them from engaging fully with management of the issue.
• Community scepticism was also cited as a reason for the ambivalence about dealing with the issue, as was the fact that most staff, already overworked, indicated they did not have the time to ‘get climate change under my belt as well...’.
Again, these results are consistent with experiences elsewhere.
For example, a similar case study of local authorities within the UK in 2003 found that over three quarters of respondents felt they did not have access to the best information about the impacts of climate change on their areas.
3 The survey also recorded high levels of stress, cynicism, and a sense of futility amongst these officials.
The UK workshops also highlighted that there are a number of barriers to effectively communicating climate change at local levels, the first being the scale of the problem per se.
Getting stakeholders to forge the conceptual link between the global and local scale is difficult.
A risk perception study undertaken in the US showed that while Americans perceived that climate change was a risk, they did not perceive that it was a risk to them personally (Lieserowitz 2006).
The US research highlights the need to build the link between the issue and people, and the need to do so on a scale that resonates locally.
Moreover, when the scale of the problem is seen as too large, it effectively creates inertia, as amply highlighted in research undertaken by the UK Tyndall Centre for Climate Change on the societal response to the film The Day after Tomorrow.4 3 A survey of environmental officers in every Local Authority in England and Wales to assess the reception and response of local government to the information being provided through the UK Climate Change Program.
4 Interestingly, findings highlighted that while the film raised awareness of the issue, it also increased people’s sense of helplessness and reinforced the notion that there was little to be done about the problem, thus effectively enforcing inaction (Lowe 2006).
NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 176 As confirmed in the Tasmanian research, many staff and councillors raised the fact that communicating climate change was bedevilled by uncertainty.
Will the sea level rise be 20 or 80 cm?
What will be the frequency of extreme weather events?
How can planning decisions be made when the science itself is unclear?
Thus the issue lacks immediacy for people, amplified by the disjuncture between people’s experience of the ‘weather’ and the discourse about climate change.
People cannot ‘see’ climate change, and additionally, reconcile it as being simply an ‘unusual weather pattern’.
Convincing them that climate change is real and that something really needs to be done about it is that much harder.5 The complicated nature of scientific and management ‘speak’ about climate change makes it very hard for people to understand the problem in the first place.
It becomes challenging for policy makers to respond to the issue when having to interpret a multitude of documents across different disciplines.
Staff at the workshops asked how they could make climate change language accessible to the general public.
It was observed that: • This is a key governance issue because unless rate payers of the local government community understand what is meant by climate change terminology, the uptake of climate change action(s) will not only be impeded, but may lead to instances of mal-adaptation.
• Access to climate change information is often constrained too often there is a lack of knowledgeable, credible and local people who could champion effective communication about climate change.
• There is also a lack of presented alternatives, which increases the levels of disenfranchisement that individuals and communities may feel.
In Tasmania these communication issues are further hampered by the pressure caused by the migration of individuals to coastal regions popularly known as ‘sea changers’ (Burnley and Murphy 2004).
While retirees were the original drivers of the sea change phenomenon (Gurran et al.
2008), new residents within high growth coastal areas are generally of a younger age (in some cases significantly so) than the existing profile of 5 There are a number of studies that focus on the importance of effective communication in dealing with uncertainty (Moss 2007, Lorenzoni et al.
2007, Marx et al.
2007, Patt 2007).
Marx et al.
(2007) argue that people process 'uncertainty information' in different ways, particularly in relation to ‘hard’ scientific information.
They conclude that ‘retranslation of statistical information into concrete experience will facilitate intuitive understanding of probabilistic information and motivate contingency plans’ (Marx et al.
2007).
Moss (2007) agrees with this theme noting that in order to improve decision making about climate change, scientists must improve how they communicate uncertainty to the public and decision makers.
NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 177 communities affected by sea change.6 Issue 3: Uncertainty While it is the baby-boomer generation who will start retiring within the decade thus increasing the number of retirees moving to the coast ‘sea-changers’ are now individuals and families of all ages.
How to communicate climate change to these different stakeholders in a way that is cost effective and has impact was another issue raised at all workshops.
Uncertainty is a key difficulty for policy makers in assessing how to deal with pinpointing how climate change will manifest, and the extent, diversity, regularity, distribution and magnitude of its impacts (Ha-Duong et al.
2007, Petit 2005).
Uncertainty is a key theme in the discourse about climate change, and debate continues on how fast change will occur, at what scale, how catastrophic it will be, and on the accuracy of climate predictions (Carter et al.
1999).
Uncertainty arises from insufficient, inaccurate or unavailable data, external developments and cross-boundary issues, and the unpredictability of human behaviour (Westmacott 2001).
As Jones (2001) notes on the importance of uncertainty within policy planning: Uncertainty management is the raison d’etre of risk assessment, extreme care must be exercised throughout an assessment, so that uncertainties are identified, the nature of their propagation throughout the assessment is understood and that they are communicated as part of the results.’ (Jones, 2001) In this context, there are a number of practitioners trying to address and find ways of developing planning frameworks that address uncertainty.
For example, Fankhauser et al.
(1999) suggests that the solution to dealing with uncertainty lies in ensuring that adaptation policy is robust, and anticipates future impacts based on a wide array of predictions.
By building social and economic capacity to respond to diverse sets of circumstances, it is possible to factor in uncertainty within planning frameworks (Fankhauser & Tol 1997).
Dessai and Hulme (2007) design an assessment framework that identifies robust adaptation strategies.
Using a sensitivity analysis to a case study of water resource planning in the east of England, they find that water resources are sensitive to uncertainties in regional climate response and impacts.
During the workshops, local government staff frequently talked about the difficulty of getting ahead with climate change science and how to develop strategies to assess or address uncertainty.
There are a number of governance questions for local government to consider: 6 The National Sea Change Task Force Report states that 79% of new residents in coastal areas are younger than 50, compared with 71% of Australia overall.
NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 178 • How much climate change uncertainty do we want to adapt to?
• How can we trade-off robustness with increasing cost?
• Are robust adaptation options socially, environmentally and economically acceptable?
• How do climate change uncertainties compare with other uncertainties (e.g.
changes in demand for housing or natural resources)?
• How much public money should be invested to research the largest scientific (tractable) uncertainty to try to reduce it?
(Dessai and Hulme 2007).
The Tasmanian case study highlights some of the problems facing local governments in their governance of climate change, including how to deal with the uncertainty of climate change predictions, how to communicate with rate payers, and how to build appropriate and resources institutional arrangements.
6.
Discussion: Implications for Governance This paper started with an overview of the pressures faced by some Tasmanian local governments in instituting climate change adaptation measures.
The case study further highlights that there is a time lag between identification of the problem in the public arena, and the ability of professionals to respond to it.
These results have some key implications on governance.
Climate change is indubitably a difficult or ‘wicked’ problem.
As Crowley (2008) observes in relation to the development of mitigation strategies, part of the way forward requires addressing local level governance structures.
Indeed she describes good governance as ‘well considered, well embedded, effective policy, made in the absence of pressure by special interests or electoral cycles’ (Crowley 2008).
I suggest that governance arrangements at local government levels incorporate and emphasise three dimensions that might underpin a ‘local adaptive climate change governance framework’: (i) adaptive management, (ii) communications and (iii) reflexive practice into local governance structures.
These are outlined in further detail.
Building Local Adaptive Climate Change Governance A Framework Dimension 1: Adaptive Management Incorporating ‘adaptive management’ principles into governance is one way of building ‘key stones’ for governance at local and domestic policy levels.
Adaptive management is based on the assumption that circumstances change (Leach 2006).
It is a technique that NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 179 provides a framework for continually improving managerial practices.
Adaptive management can also build on environmental assessment techniques to deal with uncertainty, making it ideal for climate change management (Holling 1986).
Thus, adaptive management can embed greater fluidity and flexibility within conventional environmental management systems, one that is based on the principle of continuous improvement.
The fluid nature of adaptive management also suits the dynamics of working with the changing quality of coastal areas – of great interest to a majority of Australian local governments.
Implementing adaptive management takes place in two phases: (i) the institutionalisation of a framework in which intentional and varied policies may be implemented, and (ii) learning over time by monitoring the responses of the system on which the varied experimental policy systems have been implemented (Arvai et al.
2006).
Employing adaptive management techniques can enable policy makers to focus on variation over time within policy, and local government planners could deal with this by reviewing their planning schemes periodically.
Another strategy could be to ‘mainstream’ climate change into existing strategies and day-to-day business, otherwise known as ‘climate proofing’.
As such, adaptive management enables the synchronous treatment of different options across periods of time and place.
Moreover, local governments would benefit from building more strategic alliances with their rate payers and other local/community groups to build greater acceptance of, and willingness to trial different mitigation and adaptation options.7 As part of a local governance framework, an adaptive management dimension could guide planners at the evaluation stage of coastal management programs.
Such a framework could have five elements: (i) information collation, (ii) systems analysis and vision, (iii) plan making, (iv) implementing actions, and (v) monitoring and reviewing (adapted from Leach 2006).
Embedding adaptive management then as a key feature of local governance will in turn encourage development of good climate policy.
Dimension 2: Communications International experience shows that there are a number of ways in which climate change can be communicated effectively (Moser 2005).
A local climate change governance 7 The idea of trial and error is an overlooked one, but one that is supported within the idea of continuous improvement embodied within adaptive management.
NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 180 framework needs to have a communications component so the need both to develop and then implement climate change management can be accepted.
Within this there are two key principles: 1.
Local governments need to be transparent about communicating the issue by: communicating the existence of increasing climate change and variability using the science to explain current climate events and possible future ramifications, communicating the need to take proactive action to ameliorate negative impacts, and create the conditions for discussing positive adaptation strategies and shared experiences and lessons.
2.
Employing other strategies to ensure communication about climate change is appropriate, by: choosing language that is appropriate to the audience (a good first step); concentrating on what is feasible for different groups (important); and maximising opportunities by aligning climate change as an issue with other contemporary issues that resonate with local interests and local agendas (NurseyBray and Ferrier 2009).
What does this mean for local governments that have, or are already developing responses to climate change?
A number of suggestions are made: 1.
Communicating the idea of climate change management so it is culturally palatable.
Communication materials and strategies need to work within the culturally accepted discourse at local government level about how this issue is run and implemented.
These may need to be varied depending on whether the audience is ratepayers, internal staff or elected councillors.
Important but often overlooked is the requirement to employ, or get advice from, communications professionals on how to do this – good content or knowledge is sometimes not enough to translate and convey information so it can be understood and accepted.
Ultimately, communication strategies must also be based on solid guidelines.8 8 While these principles are commonly understood by communication practitioners, they bear repeating: (i) carefully define communication goals, (ii) identify and characterize the intended audiences, (iii) have those working on the front lines well informed and committed, (iv) ensure that communication is not just one-way and (v) don’t reinvent the wheel; learn from other fields and from retrospective/evaluative studies of climate change communication efforts.
There are many resources on communication and climate change that might be adapted.
See for instance the centre for the Communication of Climate Change, based at Mason University: <http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/>.
Another good source is the proceedings of a conference on communicating climate change, a 657 page document that can be downloaded and/or viewed at <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/En56-157-2000E.pdf> http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/� http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/En56-157-2000E.pdf� NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 181 2.
Consistent communications Building communication strategies that are in line with existing branding and messages about the place or locale makes good sense.
For example, Tasmania is branded as ‘clean and green’, a message that its local governments could use to build their profiles and to market climate change projects and schemes.
This would be especially persuasive to many ‘sea changers’ and would reflect back to this demographic some of their original motivations in moving to Tasmania.
3.
All interests need to be involved Involving all groups (from the smallest Landcare group to the Mayor) will not only build trust in the project, but will build momentum as the network of each party becomes employed.
This creates a ripple effect and maximises the effectiveness of the message.
The role of and power of social networks could be better harnessed or considered in this space as could the role of interdisciplinary collaboration (Nursey-Bray 2008, 2009).
4.
‘Mainstreaming’ climate change into existing processes Most local governments already have strong emergency management or occupational health and safety departments therefore, adding climate change into existing processes is a very useful mechanism.
For example, climate change could be incorporated into policies regarding flood management without too much difficulty.
In such ways, climate change management and impacts can be subtly communicated and disseminated through the community.
Dimension 3: Reflexive practice This concerns putting practice into policy and embedding reflective practice as a guiding principle within climate change for local level governance.
There is an enormous amount of work currently underway in Australia and internationally on the topic (see figure 2 for a snapshot).
This scope is a reminder that local governments do not have to reinvent the wheel but build upon what has already been done.
Figure 2: Review of climate change programs in local government International • Cities for Climate Protection: International program launched in Australia 1997 that encourages councils to reduce greenhouse gases and undertake other climate change management activities.
• 40 Cities Project: The 40 Cities project gives advice and real case study examples of how local governments across the world are navigating successful adaptation to change and achievements in environmental sustainability in the areas of housing, energy, renewals, ports, transport, water, waste etc (see http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices).
http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices� NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 182 • The Beacon Scheme: UK schemes designed to develop and share best practice in service delivery across local government.
• City of London Adaptation Strategy: The City of London has developed Rising to the Challenge The City of London Corporation’s Climate Adaptation Strategy 2007.
• East Riding of Yorkshire Council Coastline ‘Rollback’: East Riding of Yorkshire Council is implementing a coastal ‘rollback’ strategy to manage high rates of coastal erosion as part of its Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan.
• City of Keene Climate Adaptation Plan: US based city Keene, developed Adapting to Climate Change: Planning a Climate Resilient Community.
• 2007 King County Climate Plan: US based, in King County, Washington, has a climate plan that incorporates climate change mitigation and adaptation into agency activities, plans, policies and major investments.
• California Climate Change adaptation plan: Has developed comprehensive Climate Change Adaptation Plan, with a detailed action plan, with timelines for each objective.
National • The Local Government and Planning Ministers' Council (LGPMC): One of 40 Commonwealth‐State Ministerial Councils that in 2009 agreed to develop national framework and tools for local government to help them in planning for climate change.
• Australian Local Government Association: Runs many climate change initiatives, and is base for information about how to conduct climate change actions.
State based local government associations • Local Government Response, South Australia: Some initiatives include the (i) LGA Climate Change Strategy 2008-2012, (ii) Climate Change Sector Agreement with the SA Government, (iii) Climate Change Risk Management and Adaptation Program, (iv) Beyond Carbon Local Government Climate Change Summit, (v) provision of Information Papers, (vi) a Climate Change Questionnaire Survey, and (vii) the LGA Climate Change Strategy 2008-2012.9 • Victorian Local Government and Climate Change: Provides information on how to undertake climate change actions with examples Victoria Local Government and Climate Change: Case Studies.
10 • NSW Local Government association: Amongst other support and initiatives exists a Climate Change Action Pack – An online resource for NSW Local Government on the NSW LGA web site.
This action pack includes information on Tools, templates and techniques for addressing climate change, case studies, news, media releases, upcoming events and funding opportunities, and links to other useful websites (see http://www.lgsa.org.au/www/html/1899-climate-change.asp).
• Western Australia Local Government Association: WALGA has developed a detailed web site / toolkit that provides needed information to councils in relation to climate change management.11 • Municipal Association of Victoria: The Local Government Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation program has been operating for four years to help councils address the significant challenge that climate change presents.
• Local Government Association of Tasmania: Also has a good climate change toolkit and a suite of suggestions for local government on how to deal with this issue.12 9 For more information on these projects see < http://www.lga.sa.gov.au> 10 See: <http://www.climatechange.vic.gov.au/summit/Resources/Vic+Local+Gov+Climate+Change+Case+Studies %5B1%5D.pdf> 11 See <http://www.walgaclimatechange.com.au/planning-case-studies.htm> http://www.lgsa.org.au/www/html/1899-climate-change.asp� http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/� http://www.climatechange.vic.gov.au/summit/Resources/Vic+Local+Gov+Climate+Change+Case+Studies%5B1%5D.pdf� http://www.climatechange.vic.gov.au/summit/Resources/Vic+Local+Gov+Climate+Change+Case+Studies%5B1%5D.pdf� http://www.walgaclimatechange.com.au/planning-case-studies.htm� NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 183 Regional initiatives • The Western Port Greenhouse Alliance: The WPGA carries out projects to help councils and the community respond to climate change.
• Sydney Coastal Councils: The SCCG has, with CSIRO's Climate Change Adaptation Flagship and University of the Sunshine Coast, developed a Systems Approach to Regional Climate Change Adaptation Strategies in Metropolises.
The aim is to work with the 15 SCCG Member Councils to determine key vulnerabilities and their capacity to adapt to manage climate change issues at a regional scale.
Some examples of local initiatives • Climate Change and Coastal Risk Assessment Project, Tasmania: The project takes a risk management approach to produce a range of tools to assist with the development and implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies.
It will identify the probabilities relating to various sea-level rise scenarios that will need to become a foundation of future risk assessments in the coastal zone.
• Clarence Council Foreshores Project: Integrated Assessment and Response to Climate Change Impacts on Clarence Foreshores (CCC).
This project has determined what climate change impacts will be and what to do about them in the Clarence Foreshores.
• Kingborough Council Risk Assessment for Climate Change Decision Making Tool: Kingborough has conducted and built a risk assessment tool to enable staff to assess risks in relation to climate change impacts (Nursey-Bray and Ferrier 2009).
The risk assessment tool is based on a 800mm rise over 100 years.
• West Tamar Council: The West Tamar Planning Scheme (2007) has formal sections addressing climate change that mean that all building location and design must ensure that (a) it will not cumulatively increase the risk of flood to other land, and (b) takes into account potential sea level rise due to global warming.
Other examples • Peel Harvey Climate Change Adaptation Project; Ku-ring-gai Council Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Model; Western Port Human Settlements Impacts and Adaptation Project; Hunter and Central Coast Regional Environmental Management Strategy Climate Change Adaptation Project; Ku-ring-gai Council Water Conservation Projects; Port Adelaide-Enfield Council Flood Risk Study; Byron Shire Council Climate Change Planning; Manly Council Ocean Beach Coastline Management Plan.
What is a challenge for local government professionals is finding the time to invest in a review of other initiatives and practices and how then to adapt them to suit individual needs or locales.
For example, local governance reform could be as simple as appointing someone within Council with the responsibility of (a) developing a data base of information relevant to the municipality, (b) updating it in relation to the current science, and (c) communicating key ideas.
Another option is to dedicate a web link within the Council web site to this action.
Councils could also collate a database of experts in the region and invite these experts to give regular briefings within Council sessions over the 12 See <http://www.lgat.tas.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=542> http://www.lgat.tas.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=542� NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 184 yearly cycle.
Councils also may pursue funds to enable specific scientific work and social / economic assessment in their region.
This form of reflexive practice as part of a local governance framework for climate change will also cut costs, and facilitate innovation on existing ideas.
Introducing policy makers to existing initiatives in this manner also lessens the pressure caused by the sheer psychological weight of climate change, and can help organisations build regional to international alliances and networks that may offer future opportunities to adapt to change.
7.
Conclusions This study highlights that at time of writing, with a few exceptions, the case-study councils were only just beginning the conversation about climate change and climate change management.
Thus the project, while not fulfilling its anticipated objective, revealed some core vulnerabilities within local governance arrangements about climate change.
Local governments face increasing challenges in developing responses to climate change and need to work on both mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Effective governance regimes (that operate at domestic policy levels) will be the cornerstone of the successful implementation of climate change programs.
Using the results of a Tasmanian case study, this paper has presented a model of adaptive climate change governance based on the three dimensions of adaptive governance, communication and reflexive practice.
I argue that for local governments to enact good governance, these elements need to be built into domestic policy detail.
Also highlighted is the opportunity inherent in looking to and working with other projects and initiatives, saving both time and costs.
In Tasmania, local governments need to consider how (both separately and together) they can continue this conversation, and build programs and locally responsive governance arrangements which will insure councils against, and assist them to adapt to, the impacts of climate change in the future.
Climate change is more than making locally specific information about climate change impacts available.
Motivation and appropriate action on the ground will only occur when confidence is built up at local level.
References Arvai, J., Bridge, G., Dolsak, N., Franzese, R., Koontz, T., Luginbuhl, A., Robbins, P., Richards, K., Korfmacher, K., Sohngen, B., Tansey, J., and A. Thompson.
(2006) ‘Adaptive NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 185 Management of Global Climate Problem: Bridging the Gap between climate research and climate policy’, Climatic Change, 78, pp.
217 – 225 Australian Greenhouse Office (2007) Climate Change Adaptation Actions for Local Government, Australian Government Publishing Service.
Bartley, M (2009) Coastal developments and climate change impacts – recent policy and case law, DLA Phillips Fox Briggs, P and Taberner, J (2010) Climate change litigation to flood planning and development in coastal areas .
at http://www.freehills.com.au/5789.aspx , viewed December 12 2010.
Burnley, I. and Murphy, P. (2004) Sea change : movement from metropolitan to arcadian Australia, UNSW press, Sydney Burton, D. and Dredge, D. (2007) Framing Climate: Implications for Local Government Policy Response Capacity, Griffith University, accessed on 7 December, 2010 < http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/file/0004/29821/burton-dredge-implicationslocalgovernment.pdf Carter, T., Hulme, M., and Viner, D.
(Eds.)
(1999) ‘Representing uncertainty in climate change scenarios and impact studies,’ Proceedings of the ECLAT-2 Helsinki Workshop, 14–16 April 1999, Climatic Research Unit, Norwich, UK, 128pp CSIRO (2002) Climate Change and Coastal Communities, CSIRO, Victoria, Australia.
Crowley, K (2009) ‘The devil is in the detail: The Governance Challenge of Climate Change’, refereed paper presented to the National Public Policy Network Conference 2009 Research School of Social Sciences, ANU 29-30 January 2009 Demeritt, D. and Langdon, D. ( 2004) ‘The UK Climate Change Programme and Communication with Local Authorities, Global Environmental Change, 14, pp 325 – 336 Dessai, S, and Hulme, M. (2007).
‘Assessing the robustness of adaptation decisions to climate change uncertainties: a case-study on water resources management in the East of England’, Global Environmental Change 17 (1) DPIWE.
(2004).
Sea level Change Around Tasmania, Hobart Edgar, A.
(2010) ‘Participation and Responsiveness in Merits Review of Polycentric Decisions: A Comparison of Development Assessment Appeals (July 28, 2010)’.
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol.
27, No.
1, pp.
36-52, 2010; Sydney Law School Research Paper No.
10/68.
England, P. (2006) Climate Change: What Are Local Governments Liable for?
Urban Research Program Issues Paper 6, Griffith University Fankhauser, S. and Tol, R. (1997) ‘The social costs of climate change: the IPCC second assessment report and beyond’, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 1, pp.
385-403 Fankhauser, S., Smith, J., and Tol, R. (1999) ‘Weathering climate change: some simple rules to guide adaptation decisions’, Ecological Economics, 30(1), pp.
67-78 Gurran, N., Hamin., E., and Norman, B.
(2008) Planning for climate change: Leading Practice Principles and Models for Sea Change Communities in Coastal Australia, National Sea Change Task Force Ha-Duong, M., Swart, R, Bernstein, L., Petersen, A., (2007) ‘Uncertainty management in the IPCC: agreeing to disagree’, Global Environmental Change 17 (1) Holling, CS.
(1986) ‘Resilience of ecosystems: local surprise and global change’, Clark, WC, Munn, RE.
(Eds.
), Sustainable Development and the Biosphere, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hydro Tasmania.
(2006) Tasmanian Climate Change: Fact Sheet April 2006.
A Hydro Tasmania, CSIRO, UTAS and TPAC Project, Published by Hydro Tasmania NURSEY-BRAY: A framework for addressing climate change CJLG November 2010 186 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
(2007) Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Geneva: UNEP/WMO Jones, R. (2001).
‘An Environmental Risk Assessment/Management Framework for Climate Change Impacts Assessments’, Natural Hazards, 23, pp.
197 – 230 Leach, G. (2006) Enabling Adaptive Management for Regional Natural Resource Management, CRC Coastal Zone Estuary and Waterway Management Leiserowitz, A.
(2006).
‘Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The role of Affect, Imagery and Values’, Climatic Change (2006) 77, pp.
45–72 Lorenzoni, I., Jordan, A., Hulme, M., Turner, K., and O’Riordan, T. (2000) ‘A Co-Evolutionary Approach to Climate Change Impact Assessment,’ Global Environmental Change 10, pp.
57 – 68.
Lowe, T. (2006) ‘Does tomorrow ever come?
Disaster narratives ad public perceptions of climate change’, Public Understanding of Science, 15: 435 – 457.
Marx, S., Weber, E.U., Orove, B.S., Leiserowitz, A., Krantz, D.H., Roncoli, C., Phillips, J., (2007) ‘Communication and mental processes: experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate information’, Global Environmental Change 17 (1).
Moser, S. (2005) ‘Impact assessments and policy responses to sea-level rise in three US states: An exploration of human-dimension uncertainties’, Global Environmental Change, 15, (4) pp.
353-369.
Moss, RH.
(2007).
‘Improving information for managing and uncertain future climate’, Global Environmental Change, 17 (1).
Nursey-Bray, M. (2008) ‘Inter-disciplinarity as a tool for action on climate change: Applying social science methodology to climate change initiatives within local government, Australia’, in The International Journal of Inter-disciplinary Social Sciences, Vol 2, pp112.
Nursey-Bray, M. (2009) ‘Climate Change, Coastal Communities and Governance: Developing solutions for change, Australia ‘, in Dahl, E, Moksness, E and Stottrup, J (Eds) Integrated Coastal Zone Management, Wiley-Blackwells press, Australia.
Nursey-Bray, M. and Ferrier, T. (2009) Risk assessment and local government, Tasmania: Applying an inter-disciplinary approach to climate change adaptation, for book Eds Mannke, Franziska Inter-disciplinary Aspects of Climate Change, Peter Lang Scientific Publishers.
Patt, A.
(2007) ‘Assessing model-based and conflict-based uncertainty’, Global Environmental Change, 17 (1), pp.
37 – 46.
Petit, M. (2005).
‘Scientific uncertainties and climate risks’, Comptes Rendus Geoscience 337, pp.393–398.
Pillora, S. (2010) Australian local government and Climate Change, Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government.
State of Tasmania.
(2006) State of Environment Report, Recommendation 7.6: Adapting Coastal Settlements to Climate Change <http://www.rpdc.tas.gov.au/soer/index/contents.php> Strengers, Y.
(2004) Environmental culture change in local government: a practiced perspective from the International Council for Local Environmental InitiativesAustralia/New Zealand, Local Environment, 9(6), pp.
621-628.
Westmacott, S. (2001) ‘Developing Decision Support Systems for Integrated Coastal Management in the Tropics: Is the ICM Decision-Making Environment Too Complex for the Development of a Useable and Useful DSS?’ Journal of Environmental Management, 62(1), pp.
55-74. http://www.rpdc.tas.gov.au/soer/index/contents.php� 1.
Introduction 2.
Implications for Local Government 3.
The Law, Climate Change and Local Government 4.
Case study: Tasmania and Climate Change The Tasmanian case study documented the risks caused by climate change identified by local governments in the northern region of Tasmania.
Results from initial desk-survey work found that a wide spectrum of environmental, social, health and economic i...
Figure 1: Estimated impacts of climate change to Tasmania The brief for the case study project was to also conduct workshops in each municipal coastal council in the Natural Resource Management (NRM) North Region of Tasmania.
Workshops were designed to document the risks local governments in the northern reg... 5.
Findings Issue 1: Institutional arrangements In the Tasmania study, these issues crystallised into an overarching practical concern about how councils can incorporate climate change management into existing day-to-day management.
This question was raised time and again and it was clear from the ... Issue 2: Communicating the issue to rate payers and other stakeholders Issue 3: Uncertainty 6.
Discussion: Implications for Governance
5996 1.
PG Scholar, Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Sociology, TNAU, Coimbatore 641 003 and 2.
Director of Extension Education (DEE), Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore-641 003 Received : 23-04-2018; Accepted : 02-06-2018 Research Article Journal of Extension Education Vol.
30 No.
1, 2018 DOI:https://doi.org/10.26725/JEE.2018.1.30.5996-5999 Adaptation Strategies followed by the Rice Growers to Mitigate the Impact of Climate Change P. Suganthkumar1 & H. Philip2 ABSTRACT The study was conducted in Orathanadu block of Thanjavur district in Tamil Nadu.
Proportionate random sampling was employed to select the sample.
It was observed that the variables viz., educational status and fatalism showed positive significant correlation at one per cent level of probability whereas awareness on climate change showed negative correlation.
Variables like annual income, extension agency contact and awareness on crop insurance showed negative correlation at five per cent level of probability Keywords : Climate change; Adaptation strategy; Livelihood; Food security; Tamil Nadu INTRODUCTION Climate change is any significant long-term change in the expected patterns of average weather of a region (or the whole Earth) over a significant period of time, that may have influence on adequate stock and flow of food and cash to meet the basic needs (livelihood), the ability of an individual to have all time physical and economical access to sufficient and safe food for a healthy life (food security).
Agriculture has been adversely affected by climate change.
To sustain their livelihood in this changing climate, farmers are taking many alternative adaptive measures to manage its ill effects.
According to UNDP (2005), adaptation is a process by which strategies to moderate, cope with and take advantage of the consequences of climatic events are enhanced, developed and implemented.
Conversely, the greater the degree of preparatory adaptation, the less may be the impacts associated with any given degree of climate change.
Adaptation at farm-level involves two stages: perceiving the change in climate, and deciding whether to adapt or not, or which adaptation strategy to choose (Maddison, 2007).
In this study, the farmers had taken many adaptive measures with respect to crop diversification, cropping intensity, farm operations, soil and water conservation measures and animal husbandry.
The correlation and regression tests were applied to ascertain the relationship of profile of the farmers with the adaptation strategy and the results are discussed.
5997 METHODOLOGY The selected study area was Thanjavur district of Tamil Nadu.
The study area was selected purposively for this study.
Among 14 agricultural blocks in Thanjavur district, Orathanadu block was selected for study as it had highest area of rice cultivation and more number of farmers.
Based on the number of farmers in the villages, the villages namely, Thirumangalakkottai (East), Poyyundarkottai, Vadakkurnorth and Vellur from Orathanadu block were selected to represent the rice growers of the district.
Proportionate random sampling was used to select 120 respondents from the selected four villages.
Fifteen independent variables were selected to study the profile of the farmers.
The scores obtained for each item by an individual respondent were summed up to obtain total score for adaptive behaviour towards climate variability.
The correlation and regression tests were applied to ascertain the relationship of independent variable with the adaptation strategy followed by the farmers to ensure livelihood and food security.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION Profile of the respondents The profile of the respondents were analyzed using percentage analysis and it was found that the majority (60.00 %) of the respondents in the study area belonged to old age category with middle and high school level of education.
And majority (72.50 %) of the farmers was found to have medium sized family of four to six members with majority (65.00 %) of the respondents having medium level of annual income.
Majority of the farmers in the study area had diversified their crop (68.30 %) and enterprise (80.00 %).
They cultivated other crops like pulses, oilseeds etc.
The respondents were found to have high level of awareness on climate change and crop insurance with high level of decision making behavior.
Table 1.
Relationship of Profile of Farmers with Adaptation to climate change Variable No.
Variables Correlation coefficient Regression coefficient Standard error ‘t’ Constant 57.188 4.939 11.579 X1 Age 0.110 0.862 0.423 2.038* X2 Educational status 0.705** 1.098 0.159 6.901** X3 Annual Income -0.231* 0.001 0.123 0.010 X4 Family Size -0.069 0.420 0.322 1.304 X5 Occupational Status -0.008 0.220 0.408 0.539 X6 Farming experience 0.118 0.259 0.325 0.796 X7 Crop diversification 0.167 0.295 0.131 2.254* X8 Enterprise diversification 0.522** 0.394 0.169 2.330* Adaptation Stratagies followed by the Rice Growers to Mitigate the Impact of Climate Change 5998 Variable No.
Variables Correlation coefficient Regression coefficient Standard error ‘t’ X9 Fatalism -0.168 -0.164 0.127 -1.292 X10 Extension agency contact -0.202* -0.012 0.127 -0.097 X11 Exposure to weather advisory -0.207* -0.113 0.133 -0.853 X12 Utility of weather based agro advisory services -0.086 -0.161 0.215 -0.748 X13 Awareness on climate change -0.267** -0.312 0.212 -1.475 X14 Awareness on crop insurance -0.227* -0.646 0.393 -1.647 X15 Decision making on climate change 0.159 0.070 0.192 0.362 * Significance at 0.05 level R2 = 0.605 ** Significance at 0.01 level Relationship of Profile Characteristics of Farmers with Adaptation to climate change From Table 1, it is observed that the variables viz., educational status and fatalism showed positive significant correlation at one per cent level of probability whereas awareness on climate change showed negative correlation at one per cent level.
Variables like annual income, extension agency contact and awareness on crop insurance showed negative correlation at five per cent level of probability.
Multiple regression analysis was taken up to find out the contribution of independent variable with adaptation to climate change.
The R2 value was 0.60.
The R2 value has shown that all the variables contributed 60.50 per cent variation in the adaptation level of the respondents.
The regression coefficient values were found to be positive and significant.
Therefore the equation was worked out.
Y1 = 57.188 +0.862 (X1) + 1.908 (X2) + 0.001 (X3) + 0.420 (X4) + 0.220 (X5) + 0.259 (X6) + 0.295 (X7) + 0.394 (X8) – 0.164 (X9) – 0.012 (X10) – 0.113 (X11) – 0.161 (X12) – 0.312 (X13) – 0.646 (X14) + 0.070 (X15).
The results indicated that the variables viz., age, crop diversification and enterprise diversification showed positive significant contribution at five per cent level of probability.
Educational status alone showed positive contribution at one per cent level of probability.
Results revealed that one unit increase in the following independent variables viz., age (X1), educational status (X2), crop diversification (X7) and enterprise diversification (X8) would increase the adaptation to climate change by 0.862, 1.098, 0.295, 0.394 units respectively.
Journal of Extension Education 5999 As the farmers grow older, their experience in farming get increased which may increase their exposure on farming.
Increase in exposure to farming may make the farmers aware of the measures to cope up with the adverse situation of climate change.
This might be the reason for positive contribution of age towards adaptation strategy.
The farmers were well educated and their education status was primary, secondary level to collegiate level.
It is an accepted fact that educated farmers always understood the changes in the climate and it influences farming very quickly than illiterate farmers and were able to take alternate measures to cope with the situation.
The study is in accordance with the findings of Dhaka et al., (2010) who revealed that education had increased the level of adaptation of improved technologies to mitigate the climate change.
CONCLUSION Diversification of enterprises and crops helped the farmers to mitigate the ill effects of climate change.
Hence, higher the diversification of crops and enterprise, higher will be the adaptation.
The results are in line with findings of Rubina (2014) who revealed that enterprise diversification increases the level of adoption of technologies to climate change.
REFERENCES Dhaka, B.L., Chayal, K., & Poonia, M.K.
(2010).
Analysis of farmers perception and adaptation strategies to climate change.
Libyan Agriculture Research Center Journal International, 1(6), 388-390.
Maddison, D. (2007).
The perception and adaptation to climate change in Africa.
CEEPA.
Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa.
Discussion Paper No.
10, University of Pretoria , Pretoria, South Africa Rubina, S. M. (2014).
Impact of climate change on adaptation and mitigation strategies of Ponnaniyar and Kalingarayan basin farmers A Gender analysis.
Unpublished Master’s Thesis, AC&RI, TNAU, Coimbatore.
Sivaraj, P., & Philip, H. (2014).
Climate change impact on paddy farming in Erode and Tiruchirappalli District of Tamil Nadu.
Journal of Extension Education 27(4) UNDP.
(2005).
Adaptation policy frameworks for climate change.
Developing Strategies, Policies and Measures.
UNDP, New York.
Adaptation Stratagies followed by the Rice Growers to Mitigate the Impact of Climate Change
18 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77):18-30 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: Hosea, P. & Khalema, E. 2020.
Scoping the nexus between climate change and watersecurity realities in rural South Africa.
Town and Regional Planning, no.77, pp.
18-30.
© Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp Dr Patrick Hosea (corresponding author), Post-Doctoral Fellow (Global Migration and Community Development), School of Built Environment & Development Studies, College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
Phone: 27312601449, email: <PatrickH@ukzn.ac.za>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8022-9099.
Prof. Ernest Nene Khalema, Dean and Head of the School of Built Environment & Development Studies, College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, C872 Denis Shepstone Building (Howard College), Mazisi Kunene Road, Glenwood, Durban, 4041, South Africa.
Phone: +2731 260 1759, email: <khalema@ukzn.ac.za>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6353-46897.
Scoping the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in rural South Africa Patrick Hosea & Ernest Khalema DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.2 Peer reviewed and revised October 2020 Published December 2020 *The authors declared no conflict of interest for this title or article Abstract While the global response to climate change has been scant and uncoordinated, especially with regard to providing adequate water resources for the most improvised, water scarcity has become an increasingly neglected phenomenon in rural areas.
The long-term imbalance resulting from the water demand exceeding the available water resources has been identified in the literature, with the majority of rural dwellers negatively affected by water scarcity.
Using a scoping review technique to explore the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in view of coping and planning mechanisms in the South African context, 246,443 articles published between 2010 and 2019 were collated and reviewed in a bid to ascertain the state of knowledge, study, and focus on the coping and planning strategies adopted by rural communities in the face of climate change-induced water insecurity in South Africa.
The identified gaps in the literature indicate the omission of spatial planning principles in responding to water-scarcity issues.
This review concludes that, although policy research that links the impacts of climate change in rural communities exists, stronger focus on the quality and quantity issues in the implementation of watersecurity matters is critical.
Hence, the impact of climate change on climate-sensitive supplies available in these rural areas as well as the consequent coping and planning alternatives for rural communities require a more robust policy and spatial research.
Thus, as rural communities deal with the impacts of climate change, implementation cycles of water-security measures need to be ensured along with further integration of spatial planning issues in rural areas.
Hence, a deeper engagement with spatial planning issues is needed, in order to further mitigate and address the impacts of climate change on water security in rural areas.
Keywords: Climate change, coping strategies, rural communities, spatial planning, water security OMVANGSBEPALING TUSSEN KLIMAATSVERANDERING EN WATERVEILIGHEIDSWERKLIKHEID OP DIE PLATTELAND VAN SUID-AFRIKA Alhoewel die wêreldwye reaksie op klimaatsverandering maar skraps en ongekoördineerd is, veral met betrekking tot die verskaffing van voldoende waterbronne vir die mees geïmproviseerde, het waterskaarste ’n toenemend verwaarloosde verskynsel in landelike gebiede geword.
Die langtermynwanbalans as gevolg van waterbehoefte wat die beskikbare waterbronne oorskry, is in die literatuur geïdentifiseer, terwyl die meeste landelike inwoners negatief geraak is deur waterskaarste.
Met behulp van ’n bestekopname-hersieningstegniek om die verband tussen klimaatsverandering en waterveiligheidsrealiteite te ondersoek in die lig van die hanteringsen beplanningsmeganisme in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks, is 246,443 artikels wat tussen 2010 en 2019 verskyn het, saamgevat en hersien in ’n poging om die stand van kennis, studie en fokus op die hanteringsen beplanning strategieë wat deur landelike gemeenskappe aangeneem is, vas te stel in die lig van klimaatsverandering wat wateronsekerheid in Suid-Afrika veroorsaak.
Die geïdentifiseerde leemtes in die literatuur verwys na die weglating van beginsels vir ruimtelike beplanning om te reageer op kwessies oor waterskaarste.
Hierdie oorsig kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, hoewel daar beleidsnavorsing bestaan wat die gevolge van klimaatsverandering in landelike gemeen skappe verbind, is ’n sterk fokus op die kwaliteiten kwantiteitskwessies by die implementering van watersekerheidsaangeleenthede van kritieke belang.
Die impak van klimaatsverandering op klimaatsensitiewe voorrade wat beskikbaar is in hierdie landelike gebiede, sowel as die gevolglike alternatiewe vir die hantering en beplanning van landelike gemeenskappe vereis dus kragtiger beleid en ruimtelike navorsing.
Aangesien landelike gemeenskappe die gevolge van klimaatsverandering hanteer, moet die implementeringssiklusse van watersekuriteitsmaatreëls verseker word, tesame met verdere integrasie van ruimtelike beplanningskwessies in landelike gebiede.
Daarom is ’n dieper betrokkenheid by kwessies oor ruimtelike beplanning nodig om die gevolge van klimaatsverandering op die watersekuriteit in landelike gebiede verder te verminder en aan te spreek.
Sleutelwoorde: Hanterings strategieë, klimaats verandering, landelike gemeen skappe, ruimtelike beplanning, water veiligheid http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:PatrickH@ukzn.ac.za https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8022-9099 mailto:khalema@ukzn.ac.za https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6353-46897 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.2 Patrick Hosea & Ernest Khalema • Scoping the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in rural South Africa 19 HO LEKOLA KHOKAHANO LIPAKENG TSA PHETOHO EA MAEMO A LEHOLIMO LE MAEMO A TS’IRELETSO EA METSI MAHAENG A AFRIKA BOROA Le ha mehato ea lefats’e mabapi le phetoho ea maemo a leholimo e le nyane ebile e sa hokahanngoa, haholoholo mabapi le ho fana ka metsi a lekaneng ho karolo ea sechaba e futsanehileng ka ho fetesisa, khaello ea metsi e se e le ntho e hlokomolohuoang haholo libakeng tsa mahaeng.
Ho se lekalekane ha nako e telele ho bakoang ke tlhokeho ea metsi ho feta mehloli ea metsi e fumanehang, ho fumanoe lingoliloeng, mme boholo ba baahi ba mahaeng ba anngoe hampe ke khaello ea metsi.
Ho sebelisa mokhoa oa ho lekola khokahano lipakeng tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo le maemo a polokeho ea metsi ka khokahanyo le mekhoa ea ho sebetsana le ho rala maemong a Afrika Boroa, lingoloa tse 246,443 tse phatlalalitsoeng lipakeng tsa 2010 le 2019 li ile tsa bokelloa le ho hlahlojoa ka sepheo sa ho netefatsa boemo ba tsebo , ho ithuta, le ho tsepamisa maikutlo mokhoeng oa ho sebetsana le merero e amoheloang ke sechaba sa mahaeng ha ba tobane le ts’ireletso ea metsi e bakoang ke phetoho ea maemo a leholimo Afrika Boroa.
Likheo tse khethiloeng ka har’a lingoliloeng li supa ho siuoa hoa metheo ea moralo oa sebaka ho arabela litaba tsa khaello ea metsi.
Tlhatlhobo ena e phethela ka hore, leha patlisiso ea maano e hokahanyang litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo metseng ea mahaeng e le teng, ho tsepamisoa maikutlo ho matla ho boleng le bongata ba ts’ebetsong ts’ebetsong ea litaba tsa ts’ireletso ea metsi ho bohlokoa.
Kahoo, tshutshumetso ea phetoho ea maemo a leholimo holima lisebelisoa tse amanang le maemo a leholimo, tse fumanehang libakeng tsena tsa mahaeng hammoho le mekhoa e meng e sebetsanang le maemo le meralo bakeng sa sechaba sa mahaeng e hloka leano le matla le lipatlisiso tse lekolang libaka ka kotloloho.
Kahoo, ha sechaba sa mahaeng se sebetsana le litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo, methati ea ts’ireletso ea metsi e hloka ho netefatsoa hammoho le kopanyo e tsoelang pele ea litaba tsa moralo oa libaka libakeng tsa mahaeng.
Kahoo, ho hlokahala hore ho be le puisano e tebileng le litaba tsa moralo oa libaka, molemong oa ho fokotsa le ho sebetsana le litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo ho ts’ireletso ea metsi libakeng tsa mahaeng.
1.
INTRODUCTION Water is essential for life, livelihood, and livelihood support.
The right to water is enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa (Edokpayi, EnitanFolami, Adeeyo, Durowoju, Jegede & Odiyo, 2020: 187; Eman & Meško, 2020).
However, ensuring the enforcement of such rights in the face of the impact of climate change requires systematic thinking in terms of water security (Edokpayi et al., 2020: 187; Millington & Scheba, 2020: 5).
There is global scientific consensus on the significant hydrological alteration that climate change will evoke (Honkonen, 2017: 7; Babel, Shinde, Sharma & Dang, 2020: 1).
However, the direction, magnitude, and impact of climate change on the global, regional, and local communities is largely unclear (Liuzzo & Freni, 2019: 2, 13; Haile, Tang, Hosseini‐ Moghari, Liu, Gebremicae, Leng et al., 2020: 5).
Cisneros (2015: 12-13), among others, asserted that the impact of climate change will predominantly be water related.
Despite the continuous efforts by actors on the global, regional, national, and local levels on mitigation and adaptation to climate impacts especially on water, the situation of water (in)security seems to increase rather than diminish.
The response in terms of coping mechanisms and strategies1 of individuals and societies alike to these uncertainties in Africa and other developing communities, especially in the global south, are, in most instances, blurred.
The case of South Africa’s water security and the impending impact of climate change have become a policy, socio-economic and research concern.
The need for spatial planning targeted at coordinating or “integration of the spatial dimension of sectoral policies through a territorially based 1 George et al.
(2016) conceptualised a coping strategy as specific behavioural and/ or psychological actions undertaken by people as responses in an effort to reduce, minimize or endure a stressful event.
Within this discourse, we imply the spatial planning principles and strategies in responding to water-scarcity issues.
strategy” (Cameron & Katzschner, 2017: 200), and coping mechanism especially in rural communities in the face of these climate-change realities are enormous.
This follows Rohr, Cilliers and Fourie’s (2017: 13) postulation that work on spatial planning that focuses on sustainable water management is considerably limited.
It becomes imperative to ascertain the state of knowledge, study, and focus on the coping and planning strategies adopted by rural communities in the face of climate change-induced water insecurity in South Africa.
It is pertinent to note that, while South Africa’s approach to climate change has been to establish governance frameworks such as the National Planning Commission Medium Term Strategic Framework, 2009-2014; the National Development Plan, 2011; the Department of Environmental Affairs National Climate Change Response, 2012, and the Carbon Tax Policy, 2013, among others, studies show that these policies are yet to be translated into everyday practice among the South African populace, especially in the rural communities (Ziervogel, New, Archer van Garderen, Midgley, Taylor, Hamann et al., 2014: 614; Patrick, 2020: 2).
It has also been observed that water shortages have already been experienced in five of the 19 watermanagement areas in South Africa, with over 6,500 rural communities facing acute water shortages (VonBormann, 2014: 8-9; Patrick, 2019: 50).
Action Aid (2016: 5) projects a 17% gap in water supply and demand by 2030, with cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban experiencing the greatest challenge in water management.
Ziervogel et al.
(2014: 610) argued that, in a bid to reconcile the water supply-and-demand gap in South Africa, it is imperative to increase the available water supply by about 2.5km3 and decrease water withdrawal by 0.57km3 by 2030.
Although this intervention may slow the imminent water stress, it is, however, argued that water demand will exceed supply annually through 20 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) to 2035 (Mander, Jewitt, Dini, Glenday, Blignaut, Hughes et al., 2017: 263; Nieuwoudt, Grundling, Du Toit & Tererai, 2018: 27; Mabhaudhi, Nhamo, Mpandeli, Nhemachena, Senzanje, Sobratee et al., 2019: 2).
Similarly, Du Plessis (2017: 67) posited that, while the country is experiencing a multifaceted water crisis, it will experience a doubling of its total requirement for water in three decades, due to continuous demographic growth, economic development, and urbanisation.
Eman and Meško (2020); Millington and Scheba (2020: 1-3); Haile et al.
(2020: 18-19), and Zubaidi, OrtegaMartorell, Al-Bugharbee, Olier, Hashim, Gharghan et al.
(2020: 2, 3), among others, also argue that water security is a function of population growth, resources depletion, and structural factors.
The above situation portrays a looming sociopolitical and economic challenge, especially in terms of the water security of rural communities in South Africa.
This article reviews the impact of climate change and water security in South Africa, with a focus on the response mechanism for rural communities in view of the dynamic and historical configuration of the South African state.
The essence is not to proffer solutions to water insecurity and the climate change nexus, but rather to provoke responses as well as set a background for contextualizing the nature and rationale for coping mechanisms in the face of the impact of climate change on water security in South Africa.
2.
METHODS AND REVIEW APPROACH The article adopts a scoping review technique to explore the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in view of the coping and planning mechanism adopted in the South African context.
In this sense, a scoping review is regarded as a technique in mapping and summarizing evidence-based research targeted at identifying the priorities and gaps of a research phenomenon, in order to inform a policy review and future research (Munn, Peters, Stern, Tufanaru, McArthur & Aromataris, 2018: 2-3; Ienca, Ferretti, Hurst, Puhan, Lovis & Vayena, 2018: 3).
The approach involves the identification of the central research question for the study.
In this case, the study seeks to answer the question: What is the state of knowledge, study, and focus on the coping and planning strategies adopted by rural communities in the face of climate change-induced water insecurity in South Africa?
To do this, there was the need to identify and select relevant studies, data charting, and the collation of summaries and reports using a bibliometric analysis (Ienca et al., 2018: 3-5).
The process led to the gathering and critical review of studies, grey literature, and online information between 2010 and 2019.
The study used Google Scholar, ISI, ProQuest, and Scopus search engines to locate these studies, using keywords such as ‘climate change’, ‘water security’, ‘planning’, and ‘coping strategies’, in general.
These keywords were then merged to include ‘Africa’ and ‘South Africa’, in particular.
Table 1 shows that, from the 246,443 articles that were recorded for climate change, 66,106 articles dwelt on climate change and water, in general.
The review was narrowed down to 3,161 articles that dealt with climate change and water security, and further to 472 articles that discussed climate change, water security, and planning.
In addition, from the search, only 38 articles dwelt on all the keywords in relation to Africa.
It is interesting to note that of the 105 articles on climate change, water, and planning in South Africa, only 10 studies discussed climate change and water security per se in relation to planning in South Africa (Ziervogel, Shale & Du, 2010: 94-110; Mander et al., 2017: 261-271; Nieuwoudt et al., 2018: 26; Papadouris & Thopil, 2018: 1767-1780; Mabhaudhi et al., 2019: 14; Rodina, 2019: 10-16).
Only eight articles discussed adaptation in South Africa (Kahinda, Taigbenu & Boroto, 2010: 742-750; Ziervogel et al., 2010: 97-105; Myers, Gaffikin, Golden, Ostfeld, Redford, Ricketts et al., 2013: 18753-18760; Mabhaudhi, Chimonyo & Modi, 2017: 2-17; Mabhaudhi et al., 2019: 2-16; Rodina, 2019: 11-15).
The review adopted convenience sampling to analyse and discuss n=472 articles that focused on climate change, water security, and planning.
The data were triangulated with document reviews and organisational documents and analysed for meaning and relevance to the research question, using thematic content analysis.
The guiding theme was the use of keywords such as ‘climate change’, ‘water security’, ‘planning’, and ‘adaptation’ as guiding themes.
This provided a contextual background that explored the coping and planning mechanisms available for rural communities in South Africa in view of the climate change and water security nexus.
3.
KEY ISSUES To provide a context for the review, a brief conceptualization of climate change is imperative at this stage.
Climate change refers to all forms of changes in climatic consistency, regardless of their statistical nature or physical cause, over a long period (Patrick, 2019: 17).
It is viewed as what we experience when there is an upward or downward permanent shift Table 1: Summary of articles search Keywords combination Number of articles Climate change 246,443 Climate change + Water 66,106 Climate change + Water security 3,161 Climate change + Water security + Planning 472 Climate change + Water security + Planning + Africa 38 Climate change + Water + Planning + South Africa 105 Climate change + Water security + Planning + South Africa 10 Climate change + Water security + Planning + Adaptation + South Africa 8 Patrick Hosea & Ernest Khalema • Scoping the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in rural South Africa 21 of the average weather conditions in geographical space and time.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014: 120) defines climate change as “…a change in the state of the climate which can be identified by the changes in the mean and/ or the variability of its properties, that persist for an extended period of time, typically decades or longer.
It refers to any change in climate over time whether due to natural variability or a result of human activity.” From this definition, climate change is viewed as a long-term, gradual, but continuous change in the mean average weather conditions of the earth’s surface, and as a significant alteration in climate patterns over a long period of time, which may be due to human and natural causes (Liuzzo & Freni, 2019: 2).
Climate change thus manifests itself through changes in climatic variables such as the increase in average global temperature, rise in sea level, changes in precipitation patterns, and extreme events (Patrick, 2019: 17; Zubaidi et al., 2020: 2).
3.1 The impact of climate change on South Africa Millions of people have already experienced the impact of climate change on South Africa (Ziervogel et al., 2014: 606; Mander et al., 2017: 262).
Kusangaya, Warburton, Van Garderen and Jewitt (2014: 47-48) argued that these impacts are expected to affect all spheres of life within the country and region as a whole.
Zubaidi et al.
(2020: 2) assert that climate changes in Southern Africa are already causing a shift in rainfall patterns, droughts, increase in health hazards, declining biodiversity, and wildlife extinction, as well as a general decline in ecosystem services.
In discussing the climate change trends in South Africa, Jury’s (2013: 2) study observed a declining rainfall trend in Eastern South Africa, a wet Northern South Africa, and a dry Southern South Africa pattern.
Kusangaya et al.
(2014: 47) argued that climate change in South Africa will affect energy use and agricultural productivity, flood control, wildlife management as well as industrial and domestic water supply.
Action Aid (2016: 15) observed that 2015 was the driest year on record for South Africa.
It argued that the country is already experiencing the worst drought since 1982, which has affected roughly 173 of the 1,628 water supply schemes serving 2.7 million households in South Africa.
Using the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ (CRED) data, Pharoach et al (2016), cited in Patrick (2019: 31) argued that, within the past 20 years, South Africa has experienced roughly 65 natural and industrial disasters, with floods, storms, and droughts being the most common.
The study asserted that the country experienced 23 floods, leading to 473 deaths and 483,965 people affected, as well as 19 storm events, leading to 154 deaths and 140,945 people affected.
Although the study recorded only two drought events, it asserted that over 15.3 million people were affected.
In terms of flood events, Gosling (2015: 1) observed an increase in the number of flood events in South Africa from 200 flood events between 1971 and 1980 to approximately 1,900 flood events between 2001 and 2010.
This indicates that the impact of climate change-induced disasters will have an enormous impact on the country, as it will add yet another dimension to the existing challenges facing the country.
Nyam, Kotir, Jordaan, Ogundeji and Turton (2020: 62) argue that the vulnerability of South Africa is largely due to its low adaptive capacity, low technological uptake, and widespread poverty, especially in the rural areas.
This is also combined with a high dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods.
Hence, the impact of climate change especially on water will have both a direct and indirect effect on the socio-economic and biophysical environments in South Africa.
Mastrorillo, Licker, Bohra-Mishra, Fagiolo, Estes and Oppenheimer (2016: 156) observed that poverty and racial inequalities, which are partially the legacies of apartheid, thus make a specific subgroup within the population more vulnerable to the impact of climate change.
Dlamini and Kaya (2016: 139) argue that the environmental insecurity facing South Africa as a whole is largely due to environmental mismanagement or inequality or both.
Ziervogel et al.
(2014: 606) advance that the impact of climate change will pose an acute challenge in South Africa in view of the level of poverty and inequality evident within the society.
Ziervogel et al.
(2014: 606-607) argue that the areas most sensitive to the impact of climate change in South Africa will be those characterized by subsistence food production and economic poverty, especially in the rural areas.
This assertion motivates Kusangaya et al.’s (2014: 47), Mabhaudhi et al.’s (2019: 2,6), and Millington and Scheba’s (2020: 6) arguments that mostly the poor will feel the hardship, due to the impact of climate change in South Africa.
Turpie and Visser (2013: 67) argue that the rural areas account for approximately 40% of South Africa’s population.
These areas are directly and indirectly dependent on natural resources (land and water) for their livelihood.
It can, therefore, be expected that the impact of climate change on water and, by extension, agricultural output will have a direct effect on South Africa’s rural communities in terms of reduced income and employment.
This will have a knock-on effect for the rural community as a whole and, by extension, put a strain on the rural local government.
The study argues that climate change affects the net revenue of the already vulnerable and has the potential to destabilize the whole region.
Hence, climate change is expected to exacerbate rural poverty in South Africa.
Hitayezu, Zegeye and Ortmann (2014: 555) adopt a systemic review method in assessing the extent of vulnerability to climate change in the Midlands region of KwaZulu-Natal.
The study observes that vulnerability is compounded by high population density and over-dependence on rain-fed agriculture, among others.
In line with this assertion, the DWA (2013: 121) contends that roughly 22 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) 8.5 million people in South Africa are directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and employment.
Hitayezu et al.
(2014: 567-571) argue that the adaptive capacity of the populace is negatively affected by inadequate access to infrastructure, low literacy rate, high HIV prevalence rate, and low-income prospects.
While Mastrorillo (2016: 161), citing World Bank (2014: 2), asserts that 58.3% of South Africa’s population are below the national poverty line, Stats SA (2014: 34), however, asserts that KwaZulu-Natal accounts for over 26% of poverty in South Africa, with over 56.3% of the population in the province living in poverty.
Poverty in this sense is contextualized in terms of the United Nations’ definition of absolute poverty to imply a situation of deprivation of basic human needs, due not only to limited income, but also to the capacity for access (Hagenaars, 2017: 149).
Hence, the impact of climate change on the rural poor will be adverse.
3.2 The climate change and water security nexus It is pertinent to note that, while climate change and water are intricately interwoven, unprecedented social and environmental impacts due to climate change are mostly inevitable (Babel et al.
2020: 1-2).
These effects pose an enormous challenge to the sustainability of water security, as Africa is projected to experience an even greater impact (Zadawa & Omran, 2018: 129-130).
According to the United States Geological Survey (nd), freshwater accounts for less than 3% of global water.
Of this amount, 2.5% is frozen in glaciers, while the percentage amount readily available to meet the world’s water demands is approximately 0.6%.
With climate change in the picture, the situation of water security becomes a global challenge capable of leading to water scarcity in different regions of the world.
In view of this, Green, Vörösmarty, Harrison, Farrell, Sáenz and Fekete (2015) argue that freshwater provision for roughly 82% of the global population is exposed to varying degrees of threat.
Honkonen (2017: 3) argues that the impact of the water crisis poses the largest global risk in view of its potential impact.
Green et al.
(2015) argue that roughly 80% of the world’s population face a moderate to high level of threat relating to freshwater.
Based on the above, water scarcity is conceptualized as the situation where the volume of water withdrawn from lakes, rivers, or groundwater becomes inadequate to meet human or ecosystem requirements, thus resulting in increased competition between users and demand.
Cook and Bakker (2012: 97-98) argued that there are three dimensions of water security in relation to different disciplines and viewpoints.
These dimensions revolve around water-related hazards and vulnerability; human needs in terms of access, food security and human development-related concerns, and water sustainability.
In terms of water-related hazards and vulnerability, water security involves the protection of vulnerable water systems, sustainable development of water resources, protection against water-related hazards, and safeguarding access to water.
In line with the human needs dimension, on the other hand, water security is regarded as a condition in which water is available in sufficient quantity and quality as well as at an affordable price, in order to protect the safety, welfare, health, and productive capacity of households and communities in both the short and the long term.
The third dimension of water security revolves around water sustainability.
In modifying this conceptualization of water security, the United Nations’ (UN-Water, 2013) analytical brief on water security added “sustainability” to the discourse on access to water.
It also broadened the definition by adding sustainable livelihood and socioeconomic development, preservation of the ecosystem, as well as the issue of peace and political stability.
Hence, UN-Water (2003: 1) defined water security as the “capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantity of acceptable quality of water for sustaining livelihoods, human being and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water borne pollution and water related disasters, and for preserving the ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability.” UN-Water (2013: 1) and Xia, Duan, Luo, Xie, Liu and Mo (2017: 64) argued that the continuous changes in spatiotemporal patterns and precipitation variability affect the capacity for restoring natural water resources.
Hence, a decrease in freshwater as greenhouse gases (GHG) emission increases, leading to climate change.
The UN-Water (2013: 2) study projected a 40% decline in global freshwater supply by 2030 and a 55% increase in water demand by 2050.
Thus, one in every 10 people globally will experience lack of access to water.
Cisneros (2015: 14-15) projected an increase in global water demand of 50% and 18% in developing and developed countries, respectively.
The study also argued that over 60% of people who have access to water do not receive water supply in a proper and reliable way.
Adding to this line of argument, Schewe, Heinke, Gerten, Haddeland, Arnell, Clark et al.
(2014: 3245) asserted that “a 20C increase in global temperature above present level, which approximately will be 2.70C more than the pre-industrial level, will lead to drastic water shortage for 15% of global population.
This will also increase by approximately 40% the number of individuals experiencing absolute water shortage at less than 500m3 per year.” Ziervogel et al.’s (2010: 95-97) study on Cape Town water supply and climate-change adaptation argued that developing countries’ commitment and adaptation capacity of government in the management of water supply is, in most cases, lacking.
Thus, climate change will exacerbate water stress in areas that are already pressurised by water scarcity or near water stress.
In support of this claim, the UNFCCC (2011: 4, 5), Zadawa and Omran (2018: 130), and Patrick Patrick Hosea & Ernest Khalema • Scoping the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in rural South Africa 23 (2020: 2) projected that Africa will face increased water stress and conflict, as average temperatures across the continent continue to rise and rainfall declines.
By 2020, 75 to 200 million people in Africa will face severe water shortages.
In line with this position, over 35% of the population in Africa already have no access to safe drinking water at varying degrees (Martínez-Santos, 2017: 522; Edokpayi et al., 2020: 190).
Action Aid (2016: 10) asserted that over 50% of the 663 million people who continue to use unsafe drinking water globally reside in Africa.
Similarly, while over 600 million people have had no access to water since 2010, roughly 240 million (approximately 40% of the total) are in Africa (Cisneros, 2015: 13).
In light of this, the effect of water security will be determined by the geographical location and characteristics of an area; the condition of water availability and use; the resilience of the ecosystem to climate variability; demographic changes; prevailing management and allocation system, as well as the existing institution and governance structure.
3.3 Climate change and water resources in South Africa Papadouris and Thopil (2018: 1768) and Nyam et al.
(2020: 62) argue that South Africa’s vulnerability to the impact of climate change on water is largely due to its general aridity.
The changes in water supply vis-à-vis the impact of climate change will thus have adverse implications for several sectors of the economy.
Hence, Hannah, Roehrdanz, Ikegami, Shepard, Shaw, Tabor et al.
(2013: 6907) argue that the potential damage of climate change on freshwater supply will be severe and felt mostly in areas already experiencing water scarcity.
It is, therefore, pertinent to note that the South African water sector faces the challenge of limited water resources, due to the water-stressed nature of the country and the need to ensure an equitable distribution of this scarce water resource.
In view of this, Hedden and Cilliers (2014: 2), Rodina (2019: 11-12) and Nyam et al.
(2020: 62) argue that the unpredictability of water supply, coupled with high demand and poor use of existing resources, makes the country water constrained.
Zhu and Ringler’s (2010) study on the impact of climate change on water resources in the Limpopo River Basin argues that climate change will impact severely on the hydrological resources in South Africa and add pressure on future adaptation.
Hence, the depletion in water resources will lead to an increase in the cost of water and water rationing, among others.
Ziervogel et al.
(2010: 105) argue that the country is facing the dilemma of creating an equilibrium between social, economic, and environmental priorities, as it addresses the impact of climate change especially on water supply and demand.
Lucas (2015: 20) argues that, with roughly 98% of South Africa’s water already being used, over half of the country’s water supply comes from 14% of the country’s rivers located mainly along the Eastern coastal region.
As at 2015, water storage in South Africa was at 64.3% of the normal supply compared to 74.6% storage level in 2014.
It is projected that the country is likely to exceed its economically useable land water resources by 2050.
This situation was observed by the DWA (2013: 37) report which argues that South Africa is at the brim of full utilisation of its available surface water.
Lucas (2015: 20) projects a 1.7% shortage in water supply by 2025, with a higher decline in water security in relatively dry catchment areas.
Von-Bormann (2014: 24) observes a continuous decline in the quality of available freshwater, with approximately 40% of South Africa’s freshwater system in critical condition and 80% threatened.
The study projects a 17% gap in water supply and demand by 2030, with Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban experiencing the greatest challenge for water management.
DWA (2013: 20) asserts that domestic water consumption over the past decade in South Africa increased from 22% to approximately 27%.
Hence, the demand for water over the next decade is projected to increase by 1.2%.
In view of this contention, Hedden and Cilliers (2014: 2) assert that South Africa’s average per person/per day water consumption level of 235 litres is above the global average of 173 litres per person/per day.
Hence, using the international future global forecasting system model that produces atmospheric simulations in providing numerical predictions based on a wide range of atmospheric and land-soil variables (Powers Klemp, Skamarock, Davis, Dudhia, Gill et al., 2017: 1720), the study asserts that the gap between water demand and supply is steadily increasing.
This was simulated using associated forecast to 2030 and 2035 (the time frames for the SA National Development Plan and the National Water Strategy).
It, therefore, argues that measures undertaken by the DWA in bridging the demand and supply gap needs to be more aggressive to stand a chance of succeeding.
In view of this assertion, Zhuwakinyu (2012: 2) posits that this gap in water supply and demand will equate a water shortfall of approximately 2.7 billion cubic metres.
More recent studies by, among others, Rodina (2019: 11-15) of Cape Town, Zubaidi et al.
(2020: 3-13) of Gauteng province, and Nyam et al.
(2020: 62), all support thecontention that the water supply and demand gap is no longer a future challenge, but a present issue in South Africa.
In view of this, Oxfam (2010:2) argue that water scarcity in South Africa is aggravated by maladministration of irrigation schemes as well as the improper maintenance of the irrigation canals and extension services.
Von-Bormann and Gulati (2014: 21-25) argue that the declining quality and quantity of water resources in the country pose a serious challenge for South Africa.
Oxfam (2010: 21) argued that water-resource management in South Africa is a time bomb waiting to explode.
This is motivated by the continuous decline in access to water by millions of South Africans, due to the decrease in water availability 24 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) and poor resource management or privatization of water management.
The World Bank (2014: 4) asserts that, due to the challenges of water in the country, over 3 million people in South Africa have no access to water.
Government’s basic water services are mainly in the urban areas, while the rural areas are mostly dependant on climatesensitive natural resources such as groundwater, springs and rivers, which are vulnerable to droughts and flooding.
Ntsaluba (2014: 1) asserts that roughly 14% of the country’s population have no access to clean water.
In their study on governance’s adaptation to climate change in the water sector, Huntjens Lebel, Pahl-Wostl, Camkin, Schulze and Kranz (2012: 75-80) argue that the institutions in the Southern African region lack the ability to manage the challenges related to water security such as, among others, drought, floods, rise in sea level, watersupply shortages, increase in water pollution, and water-related diseases.
Ziervogel et al.
(2010: 95-97) explore the institutional context of actors’ response to water-supply management in Cape Town and the extent to which climate change is considered.
The study found that the capacity of government to respond to water supply is often inadequate and that there is a significant gap between policy and practice in developing countries.
The study further argues that South Africa’s water-management policy and planning are characterised by complex sociocultural, economic, and political challenges that need to be addressed.
Exemplifying this assertion, the study observes that the informal settlements in Cape Town, with poor access to water, live alongside wealthy neighbourhoods with cheap and reliable access to water supply.
In addition, the adaptation strategies in cities such as Durban are often disrupted, due to resource shortages and the need to channel resources to other priority areas.
Knopges (2016: 45) asserts that the decrease in water availability in South Africa, either due to natural causes or as a result of infrastructural mismanagement, poses grave consequences for industries, agriculture, and the economy as a whole.
In this vein, Gain and Gupponi (2012: 126) argue that the impact of climate change on water will create not only a deficiency in water availability and demand, but also higher order effects for other sectors.
Hence, the impact of climate change on water security in South Africa has a direct effect on the agricultural output of rural communities, thereby increasing the poverty and vulnerability of the rural poor.
Hughes and Mather (2014: 31) support this claim and argue that several poor people are heavily dependent on ecosystem services that are specifically vulnerable to the impact of climate change.
Von-Bormann (2014: 15-17) argues that approximately 8.5 million people in South Africa rely directly or indirectly on agriculture for employment and income.
Action Aid (2016: 22) asserts that a decrease in water quality and usability could result in the loss of over 200,000 jobs across South Africa and a drop in disposable income by 5.7% per person.
Hence, although the South African economy is dominated by the tertiary sector, agriculture is still relevant for its development and stability.
This supports Nel, Maitre, Roux, Colvin, Smith, Smith-Adao et al.’s (2017: 252-254) argument that development is constrained in South Africa as a result of the difficulty in ensuring the availability of water.
This is an effect of the knock-on effects of water shortage on other water-reliant sectors.
Ntsaluba (2014: 1) and SAHRC (2014: 15) observe that the hardest hit water-stressed provinces are also the country’s most important foodproduction areas.
Kings (2015: 1) asserts that over 400,000 head of cattle have died and that roughly 150,000 people receive disaster aid in the form of water and food.
The SAHRC report (2014: 19) argues that 99 municipalities (roughly 38% of the total), which are predominantly in rural communities in KwaZulu-Natal, North West, and Eastern Cape, are experiencing a water crisis.
An average of 22.2% (Eastern Cape), 14.1% (KwaZulu-Natal), 14% (Limpopo), 12.6% (Mpumalanga) of the population have no access to piped water.
As of 2011, less than 80% of the population in KwaZuluNatal had access to water.
Ntsaluba (2014: 1) argues that systemic failure in governance and implementation, especially in terms of project implementation, is a contributory factor to this plight.
This situation has the potential to degenerate into a crisis (SAHRC, 2014).
Addressing the water issue is, therefore, central to the adaptation to climate change.
3.4 Climate change water resources and coping/ planning strategies In the discourse on the impact of climate change on human security, coping strategies are largely conditioned by the degree of vulnerability of individuals and/or groups to climate change-induced impact on human and environmental resources.
This corresponds with the idea of response and survival from a real or perceived form of threats to survival.
This study conceptualizes coping strategies as the short-term immediate cognitive and behavioural responses by individuals, households and/or communities to declining natural resources.
Dari, Aboagye and Koomson (2013: 1) conceptualized coping strategies as an erosive or non-erosive response of individuals and/or groups to a perceived or actual stressful event.
Hence, coping strategies are curative and reformative actions by individuals and/or groups whose survival is compromised or threatened.
For Vincent, Cull, Chanika, Hamazakaza, Joubert and Macome (2013: 194), coping connotes short-term strategies conceived by individuals and/or groups to maintain survival.
The higher the degree of vulnerability, the lower the capacity to cope and the higher the tendency to adopt a mechanism for coping.
Dari et al.
(2013: 5-11) assert that vulnerability and capacity to cope are linked Patrick Hosea & Ernest Khalema • Scoping the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in rural South Africa 25 to structural, infrastructural and superstructural elements of the community.
While the structural factors imply the socio-economic conditions as well as the extent and availability of service delivery in the community, the infrastructural element refers to the demographic, biological, and environmental characteristics of the community.
The superstructure, on the other hand, speaks to the literacy, culture, values, and belief system of the community.
In view of this, coping strategies are relative and conditioned by the combination of structural, infrastructural and superstructural elements of society, in addition to previous historical experiences.
Hence, coping strategies are culturally specific.
The choice of one coping strategy over another depends on the magnitude of the event as well as the characteristics of the individuals and/or households.
This invariably suggests that the peculiarities of society in terms of, among others, education, wealth, and ethnic configuration form potentially relevant cleavage lines for the coping mechanism adopted.
In line with this, Zheng and Byg (2014: 226) assert that vulnerability and coping strategies are largely characterised by varied socio-economic features of individuals and/or households.
Hence, hydro-climatic variability and socio-economic alterations interact and reinforce society’s coping strategy.
These coping mechanisms could be adaptive, behavioural, defence, self-harm and/or aggressive in nature.
They include, among many others, migration, sales of household assets, income diversification, collection of loans, violence, theft, child labour, remodelling of daily routine and practices, rationing and resources management, cooperation, and so on.
Mavhura, Manyena, Collins and Manatsa (2013: 38-45) explore variation in household coping ability and survival strategies adopted in terms of flooding situations in Muzarabani, Zimbabwe.
The study argues that the degree of climate change-induced water insecurity on households is a function of not only the magnitude of the flood and/ or drought, but also the function of variables such as income, education, and occupation, among others.
Using the theory of planned behaviour, the various coping mechanisms will be determined by the relativity of the households’ structural, infrastructural and superstructural elements.
From these assertions, Maystadt, Calderone and You (2014: 651-652) argue that the depletion in natural resources, particularly water resources, is the main driver for competition and conflict in North and South Sudan.
Mukuhlani and Nyamupingidza’s (2014: 145-157) study of coping strategies during water-scarcity situations in Bulawayo itemised positive and negative coping strategies adopted by government, communities, and households.
These include ‘water shedding’ to stabilize the shrinking dam-water levels, water trucking, walking long distances to fetch water, buying water from other communities and water vendors, buying water containers to store water, as well as conflict, vandalism and abuse, among others.
Their study asserted that conflict as a negative coping strategy occurs because of the inconsistency of water supply, especially during the peak of water shortage and rationing.
Patrick (2020: 8) also argued that conflict as a coping mechanism occurs in situations where the opportunity cost for aggression outweighs the adoption of other response mechanisms.
In his study of rural South Africa, Patrick (2020) posits that residents are more likely to be involved in violence as a means of communicating their grievances when resources are limited or nonexistent.
In the same vein, AdenijiOloukoi, Urmilla and Vadi (2013: 29-35) explored coping strategies among households with regard to climate-induced water shortages in Nigeria.
They observed that, while behavioural coping options were adopted in traditional households, technical coping options were embraced in urban neighbourhoods.
However, most of the households adopted multiple coping mechanisms for water shortages.
The study findings posited that the socioeconomic characteristics of households exerted an influence on the coping strategy options adapted.
Similarly, while discussing climate change and water stress peculiarities in South Africa in view of the coping mechanism adopted, Gandure, Walker and Botha’s (2013: 39-50) study in Gladstone, Free State province, argued that inherent historical land access imbalances as well as the policies introduced by the government on free access to water and social grants have over time discouraged the need for adaptation, thus creating household dependency.
Hence, the study argued that socio-economic peculiarities as well as political and historical factors underpin household coping strategies.
Supporting this claim, Saul and Bond (2014: 64) argued that the country’s access to and use of water is shaped by conditions rooted in the history of colonialism, segregation and apartheid as well as the political struggles it bred.
Wilk, Andersson and Warburton (2013: 85-86) concluded that response to climatechange stress among households is a function of the households’ construction of their reality as well as their ability to act and adapt in terms of their socio-economic characteristics.
These assertions showed in many respects that the peculiarities of a sociopolitical and cultural setting influence, to a large extent, the coping strategies adopted by individuals and societies in response to the impact of climate change on water security.
Hellberg (2017: 74,76) posits that the country’s access to and use of water are still shaped by conditions rooted in its historical legacies.
The underlining peculiarities of South Africa vis-à-vis its historicity thus influence the nature of the response to water insecurity among households and communities.
These coping mechanisms adopted across quarters in rural communities are diverse.
In view of this, Adewumi, Ilemobade and Van Zyl (2010: 222, 224) posited that the trend for water reuse for ‘non-drinking’ necessities is 26 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) becoming an increasing phenomenon across all quarters in South Africa, due to the impact of climate change on the country’s already stressed water resources.
The use of containers for irrigation purposes instead of pipes in a bid to avoid water wastage as well as the use of water-storage facilities in coping with the below average precipitation level for South Africa are identified as a strategy for water conservation in rural South Africa (UN-Water, 2013: 7; Knopges, 2016: 48).
In rare instances where there is rainfall, the use of rainwater harvesting is also indicated as another viable option available for most of the households in rural communities in securing water for household use.
Kahinda et al.
(2010: 743-744) and Biazin, Sterk, Temesgen, Abdulkedir and Stroosnijder (2012: 139-142) corroborate this strategy as a means for household water security.
They argue that rainwater harvesting serves as a pivotal channel for securing water for rural households in South Africa.
While Biazin et al.
(2012: 139) argued that the tactic cut across sub-Saharan Africa, Kahinda et al.
(2010: 743) argued that it is an important source of water for rural communities in South Africa.
In other instances where residents are left with hardly any or no option, the buying and selling of water is considered another coping mechanism.
In this scenario, residents are left with hardly any or no alternative but to buy water from water vendors, who, in most cases, sell water at ridiculous prices, due to the scarcity of water caused by the impact of climate change (Magubane, 2015: 1).
The rise in protest action is also observed as a reoccurring response to water insecurity in South Africa.
Studies by Chigwata, O’Donovan and Powell (2017: 1), Chambers (2018: 1), and Patrick (2020: 10-11) corroborate the assertion of increased protest actions as a communication mechanism used by the citizens to express their displeasure to the authority.
This increases conflict situations in the face of dissatisfaction with resource-management processes in society.
This is supported by Gleick’s (2014: 338) studies which argue that the ability of governance institutions to manage waterrelated grievances determines the tendency for conflict in society.
In reviewing government’s response to the impact of climate change on water, Saul and Bond (2014: 162) as well as Hellberg (2017: 75), among others, observed the lopsided responsibility of the state in addressing issues of access to water and service delivery in South Africa, especially in rural areas.
Ziervogel et al.
(2014: 612) observed a major lacuna between policy and practice in South Africa.
This is largely due to systemic failure in governance and implementation capacity as a result of the weak institutional capability on the part of the government.
The vulnerability of households to water extremes leading to water scarcity is, therefore, rooted in the institutional incapacity of the state to provide such resources.
This situation for South Africa is embedded in poor management and planning for sustainable development.
In several instances where state institutions did intervene or carry out their assigned responsibility, many believe that it is always reactionary (Patrick, 2020: 14).
Patrick (2020: 12) further argued that the primacy of providing a minimum daily water requirement, especially for rural communities, is often neglected until a crisis erupts.
Similarly, Theisen, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2011: 614-615) as well as Patrick (2019: 30, 67) argued that conflict over water, reflected as a negative response to water scarcity situations, is a result of negligence and abuse felt by a group of people over time.
4.
CONCLUDING REMARKS The aim of this article was to review the impact of climate change and water security in South Africa, with a focus on the response mechanisms for rural communities in view of the dynamic and historical configuration of the South African state.
The rationale was to provoke responses as well as set a background for the discourse of coping mechanisms in the face of climate change and water security in South Africa.
The studies reviewed summarily showed that climate-change realities and its impact in South Africa cannot be over-emphasised.
The vulnerability of South Africa to climate changeinduced water insecurity is informed by its general aridity, increasing population, and economic growth as well as its infrastructural and management inadequacies.
South Africa, therefore, faces a dilemma of creating an equilibrium between social, economic, and environmental priorities in addressing climate change-induced water security challenges.
The vulnerability of rural communities in South Africa to these climate-change realities, especially water, is intensified by its weak coping capacity in terms of poverty, lack of infrastructure as well as overdependence on climate-sensitive resources.
This has a negative effect on the livelihood of residents, especially in rural communities in South Africa.
This vulnerability is also intensified by inadequacies in government’s response to water insecurities, especially in rural areas, as well as the non-availability of basic water services mostly in these areas.
The situation is further complicated by government postresilience strategies rather than pre-emptive pre-resilience strategies, making government’s response reactionary rather than proactive.
Hence, there is a need for more proactive measures by individuals, communities, and the government in managing climate change-induced water vulnerabilities in these areas.
This review concludes that, although policy research that links the impacts of climate change to water security in rural communities exists, a stronger focus on issues of quality and quantity in the implementation of water-security matters is critical.
The review noted the dearth of studies focusing on adaptations, coping, and planning alternatives available for rural communities in South Africa to the impact of climate changeinduced water insecurity.
There are no spatial planning principles Patrick Hosea & Ernest Khalema • Scoping the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in rural South Africa 27 to respond to water scarcity issues in South Africa, in general, and in rural communities, in particular.
The historical peculiarities of South Africa, in terms of its socioeconomic and spatial configuration, place the rural communities in the rainbow nation in a somewhat disadvantageous position in terms of the supply of water.
The impact of climate change on climatesensitive supplies available in these rural areas as well as the consequent coping and planning alternatives for rural communities require more robust policy and spatial research.
Thus, as rural communities deal with the impacts of climate change, implementation cycles of water-security measures need to be ensured along with further integration of spatial planning issues in rural areas.
There is also a need for a deeper engagement with spatial planning research and issues, in order to further mitigate and address the impacts of climate change on water security in rural areas, especially within the context of South Africa.
REFERENCES ACTION AID SOUTH AFRICA.
2016.
Running on empty: What business, government and citizens must do to confront South Africa’s water crisis.
Water Interrupted Campaign.
South Africa.
ADENIJI-OLOUKOI, G., URMILLA, B.
& VADI, M. 2013.
Households’ coping strategies for climate variability related water shortages in Oke-Ogun region, Nigeria.
Environmental Development, 5(1), pp.
23-38. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2012.11.005 ADEWUMI, J.R., ILEMOBADE, A.A. & VAN ZYL, J.E.
2010.
Treated wastewater reuse in South Africa: Overview, potential and challenges.
Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 55(2), pp.
221-231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
resconrec.2010.09.012 BABEL, M.S., SHINDE, V.R., SHARMA, D. & DANG, N.M. 2020.
Measuring water security: A vital step for climate change adaptation.
Environmental Research, vol.185, article no.
109400, pp.
1-12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
envres.2020.109400 BIAZIN, B., STERK, G., TEMESGEN, M., ABDULKEDIR, A.
& STROOSNIJDER, L. 2012.
Rainwater harvesting and management in rainfed agricultural systems in sub-Saharan Africa – A review.
Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, vol.
47-48, pp.139-151.
https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.pce.2011.08.015 CAMERON, R. & KATZSCHNER, T. 2017.
Every last drop: The role of spatial planning in enhancing integrated urban water management in the City of Cape Town.
South African Geographical Journal, 99(2), pp.196-216.
CHAMBERS, D. 2018.
Fight in water queue forces Cape Town to crack down.
Sunday Times newspaper.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.
timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/201801-31-fight-in-water-queue-forcescape-town-to-crack-down/> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
CHIGWATA, T., O’DONOVAN, M. & POWELL, D. 2017.
Civic protests and local government in South Africa.
Working Paper Series No.
2.
The Civic Protests Barometer 20072016, Technical Note, 2017, Cape Town: ACSL, Dullah Omar Institute.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.
dullahomarinstitute.org.za> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
CISNEROS, J.
2015.
Responding to the challenges of water security: The eight phases of the international hydrological program 2014-2021.
In: Cudennec, C., Demuth, S., Mishra, A.
& Young, G. (Eds).
Proceedings of the International Association of Hydrological Sciences (PIAHS), 16-17 June 2014, Paris, France, Hydrological Sciences and Water Security: Past, Present and Future, vol.
366, pp.10-19.
https://doi.org/10.5194/ piahs-366-10-2015, 2015. https://doi.
org/10.5194/piahs-366-10-2015 COOK, C. & BAKKER, K. 2012.
Water security: Debating an emerging paradigm.
Global Environmental Change, 22(1), pp.
94-102. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.10.011 DARI, T. ABOAGYE, A.
& KOOMSON, J.
2013.
Coping with floods in the savannah region of Ghana.
Arts and Social Sciences Journal, 61, pp.
1-12. https://doi.
org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000061 DLAMINI, N. & KAYA, H. 2016.
Environmental security, indigenous knowledge systems and implication for food security in South Africa.
Journal of Human Ecology, 53(2), pp.135-140.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2016 .11906965 DU PLESSIS, A.
2017.
South Africa water availability and use.
In: Du Plessis, A.
(Ed.).
Fresh water challenges of SA and its upper Vaal River.
New York: Springer International, pp.
65-76. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-49502-6_4 DWA (DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS).
2013.
Annual national state of water report for the hydrological year 2012/2013.
Department of Water Affairs.
EDOKPAYI, J.N, ENITAN-FOLAMI, A.M., ADEEYO, A.O., DUROWOJU, O.S., JEGEDE, A.O.
& ODIYO, J.O.
2020.
Recent trends and national policies for water provision and wastewater treatment in South Africa.
In: Singh, P., Milshina, Y., Tian, K., Gusain, D. & Bassin, J.P. (Eds).
Water conservation and wastewater treatment in BRICS nations.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, pp.
187-211. https://doi.org/10.1016/ B978-0-12-818339-7.00009-6 EMAN, K. & MEŠKO, G. 2020.
Access to safe and affordable drinking water as a fundamental human right: The case of the Republic of Slovenia.
In: Blaustein, J., Fitz-Gibbon, K., Pino, N.W.
& White, R. (Eds).
The Emerald handbook of crime, justice and sustainable development.
West Yorkshire: Emerald Publishing Limited, pp.
465-484. https:// doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78769-355520201025 GAIN, A.
& GUPPONI, C. 2015.
A dynamic assessment of water scarcity risk in the lower Brahmaputra river basin: An integrated approach.
Ecological Indicators, 48, pp.
120-131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ecolind.2014.07.034 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2012.11.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2012.11.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2010.09.012 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2010.09.012 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2020.109400 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2020.109400 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2011.08.015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2011.08.015 https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-01-31-fight-in-water-queue-forces-cape-town-to-crack-down/ https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-01-31-fight-in-water-queue-forces-cape-town-to-crack-down/ https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-01-31-fight-in-water-queue-forces-cape-town-to-crack-down/ https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-01-31-fight-in-water-queue-forces-cape-town-to-crack-down/ http://www.dullahomarinstitute.org.za http://www.dullahomarinstitute.org.za https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-366-10-2015%2C%202015.%20https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-366-10-2015 https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-366-10-2015%2C%202015.%20https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-366-10-2015 https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-366-10-2015%2C%202015.%20https://doi.org/10.5194/piahs-366-10-2015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.10.011 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.10.011 https://doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000061 https://doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000061 https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2016.11906965 https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2016.11906965 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49502-6_4 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49502-6_4 https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818339-7.00009-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818339-7.00009-6 https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78769-355-520201025 https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78769-355-520201025 https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78769-355-520201025 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2014.07.034 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2014.07.034 28 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) GANDURE, S., WALKER, S. & BOTHA, J.
2013.
Farmers’ perception of adaptation to climate change and water stress in a South African rural community.
Environmental Development, 5(1), pp.
39-53. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2012.11.004 GLEICK, P. 2014.
Water, drought, climate change and conflict in Syria.
American Metrological Society, 6(3), pp.
331-340. https://doi.org/10.1175/ WCAS-D-13-00059.1 GOSLING, M. 2015.
SA’s water security in peril.
Sunday Independent newspaper.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.iol.co.za/ sundayindependent/sas-water-securityin-peril-1901410.> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
GREEN, P., VÖRÖSMARTY, C., HARRISON, I., FARRELL, T., SÁENZ, L. & FEKETE, B.
2015.
Freshwater ecosystem services supporting humans: Pivoting from water crisis to water solutions.
Global Environmental Change, 34, pp.
108-118. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.06.007 HAGENAARS, A.J.
2017.
The definition and measurement of poverty.
In: Osberg, L.
(Ed.).
Economic inequality and poverty: International perspectives.
London, UK: Routledge, pp.
148-170.
HAILE, G.G., TANG, Q., HOSSEINIMOGHARI, S.M., LIU, X., GEBREMICAEL, T.G., LENG, G. et al.
2020.
Projected impacts of climate change on drought patterns over East Africa.
Earth’s Future, 8(7), article no, e2020EF001502, pp.
1-23. https://doi.
org/10.1029/2020EF001502 HANNAH, L., ROEHRDANZ, P., IKEGAMI, M., SHEPARD, A.V., SHAW, M., TABOR, A. et al.
2013.
Climate change, wine, and conservation.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(17), pp.
6907-6912. https://doi.org/10.1073/ pnas.1210127110 HEDDEN, S. & CILLIERS, J.
2014.
Parched prospects – The emerging water crisis in South Africa.
Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2014(11), p. 16. https://doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.2690124 HELLBERG, S. 2017.
Water for survival, water for pleasure – A biopolitical perspective on the social sustainability of the basic water agenda.
Water Alternatives, 10(1), p. 65.
HITAYEZU, P., ZEGEYE, E. & ORTMANN, G. 2014.
Some aspects of agricultural vulnerability to climate change in KwaZulu-Natal Midlands, South Africa: A systematic review.
Journal of Human Ecology, 48(3), pp.
347-356. https://doi.org/10.1080/09709 274.2014.11906804 HONKONEN, T. 2017.
Water security and climate change: The need for adaptive governance.
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/ Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 20(1), 1-26.
DOI: 10.17159/1727-3781/2016/v19i0a1651 HUGHES, C. & MATHER, A., 2014.
Durban climate change strategy water theme report: Draft for Public Comment.
[Online].
Available at: <http:// www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/ energyoffice/Documents/DCCS%20 Water%20Theme%20Report.pdf>.
[Accessed: 28 April 2020].
HUNTJENS, P., LEBEL, L., PAHLWOSTL, C., CAMKIN, J., SCHULZE, R. & KRANZ, N. 2012.
Institutional design prepositions for the governance of adaptation to climate change in the water sector.
Global Environmental Change, 22(1), pp.
67-81. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.015 IENCA, M., FERRETTI, A., HURST, S., PUHAN, M., LOVIS, C. & VAYENA, E. 2018.
Considerations for ethics review of big data health research: A scoping review.
PloS one, 13(10), article no.
p.e0204937, pp.1-15.
https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204937 IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2014.
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part B: Regional Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
V. R. Barros, C. B.
Field, D. J. Dokken, et al.
(editors).
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA JURY, M.R.
2013.
Climate trends in southern Africa.
South African Journal of Science, 109(1-2), pp.
1-11. https:// doi.org/10.1590/sajs.2013/980 KAHINDA, J.M., TAIGBENU, A.E.
& BOROTO, R.J. 2010.
Domestic rainwater harvesting as an adaptation measure to climate change in South Africa.
Physics and Chemistry of the Earth.
Parts A/B/C, 35(13-14), pp.
742-751. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
pce.2010.07.004 KINGS, S. 2015.
Too late to avert water disaster.
Environment – Mail and Guardian.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.mg.co.za> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
KNOPGES, B.
2016.
Holding water.
Dams and water storage.
Institute of Municipal Engineering of Southern Africa, 41(1), pp.
46-50.
KUSANGAYA, S., WARBURTON, M., VAN GARDEREN, E. & JEWITT, G. 2014.
Impacts of climate change on water resources in southern Africa: A review.
Physics and Chemistry of the Earth.
Parts A/B/C, 67, pp.
47-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
pce.2013.09.014 LIUZZO, L. & FRENI, G. 2019.
Quantifying the uncertainty related to climate change in the assessment of urban flooding – A case study.
Water, 11(10), article no.
2072, pp.
1-15. doi:10.3390/w11102072 LUCAS, M. 2015.
Waterwise: How climate will affect our water supply.
Quest: Science for South Africa, 11(4), pp.
20-23.
MABHAUDHI, T., CHIMONYO, V.G.
& MODI, A.T. 2017.
Status of underutilised crops in South Africa: Opportunities for developing research capacity.
Sustainability, vol.
9, article no.1569, pp.
1-22. https://doi.
org/10.3390/su9091569 MABHAUDHI, T., NHAMO, L., MPANDELI, S., NHEMACHENA, C., SENZANJE, A., SOBRATEE, N. et al.
2019.
The water-energy-food nexus as a tool to transform rural livelihoods and well-being in Southern Africa.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, vol.
16, article no.
2970, pp.
1-20. doi:10.3390/ ijerph16162970 MAGUBANE, T. 2015.
KwaZulu-Natal drought sparks violence.
Crime and courts.
[Online].
Available at: <http:// www.iol.co.za/news/crime-court/kzndrought-sparks.violence-1940963> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
MANDER, M., JEWITT, G., DINI, J., GLENDAY, J., BLIGNAUT, J., HUGHES, C. et al.
2017.
Modelling potential hydrological returns from investing in ecological infrastructure: Case studies from the BaviaanskloofTsitsikamma and uMngeni catchments, South Africa.
Ecosystem Services, 27(Part B), pp.
261-271. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.03.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2012.11.004 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2012.11.004 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/sas-water-security-in-peril-1901410 http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/sas-water-security-in-peril-1901410 http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/sas-water-security-in-peril-1901410 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.06.007 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.06.007 https://doi.org/10.1029/2020EF001502 https://doi.org/10.1029/2020EF001502 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210127110 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210127110 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690124 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690124 https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2014.11906804 https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2014.11906804 http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/energyoffice/Documents/DCCS%2520Water%2520Theme%2520Report.pdf http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/energyoffice/Documents/DCCS%2520Water%2520Theme%2520Report.pdf http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/energyoffice/Documents/DCCS%2520Water%2520Theme%2520Report.pdf http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/energyoffice/Documents/DCCS%2520Water%2520Theme%2520Report.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.015 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204937 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204937 https://doi.org/10.1590/sajs.2013/980 https://doi.org/10.1590/sajs.2013/980 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2010.07.004 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2010.07.004 https://www.mg.co.za https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2013.09.014 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2013.09.014 https://doi.org/10.3390/su9091569 https://doi.org/10.3390/su9091569 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-court/kzn-drought-sparks.violence-1940963 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-court/kzn-drought-sparks.violence-1940963 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-court/kzn-drought-sparks.violence-1940963 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.03.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.03.003 Patrick Hosea & Ernest Khalema • Scoping the nexus between climate change and water-security realities in rural South Africa 29 MARTÍNEZ-SANTOS, P. 2017.
Does 91% of the world’s population really have “sustainable access to safe drinking water”?
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 33(4), pp.
514-533. https://doi.org/10.1080/07 900627.2017.1298517 MASTRORILLO, M., LICKER, R., BOHRA-MISHRA, P., FAGIOLO, G., ESTES, L.D.
& OPPENHEIMER, M. 2016.
The influence of climate variability on internal migration flows in South Africa.
Global Environmental Change, 39, pp.
155-169. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.04.014 MAVHURA, E., MANYENA, S.B., COLLINS, A.E.
& MANATSA, D. 2013.
Indigenous knowledge, coping strategies and resilience to floods in Muzarabani, Zimbabwe.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 5, pp.
38-48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijdrr.2013.07.001 MAYSTADT, J., CALDERONE, M. & YOU, L. 2014.
Local warming and violent conflict in North and South Sudan.
Journal of Economic Geography, 15(3), pp.
649-671. https:// doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu033 MILLINGTON, N. & SCHEBA, S. 2020.
Day Zero and the infrastructures of climate change: Water governance, inequality, and infrastructural politics in Cape Town’s water crisis.
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research.
Forthcoming.
https://doi.
org/10.1111/1468-2427.12899 MUKUHLANI, T. & NYAMUPINGIDZA, M. 2014.
Water scarcity in communities, coping strategies and mitigation measures: The case of Bulawayo.
Journal of Sustainable Development, 7(1), pp.
144-160. https://doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v7n1p144 MUNN, Z., PETERS, M.D., STERN, C., TUFANARU, C., MCARTHUR, A.
& AROMATARIS, E. 2018.
Systematic review or scoping review?
Guidance for authors when choosing between a systematic or scoping review approach.
BMC Medical Research Methodology, 18(1), p.143.
https://doi.org/10.1186/ s12874-018-0611-x MYERS, S.S., GAFFIKIN, L., GOLDEN, C.D., OSTFELD, R.S, REDFORD, K.H, RICKETTS, T.H.
et al.
2013.
Human health impacts of ecosystem alteration.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(47), pp.1875318760. https://doi.org/10.1073/ pnas.1218656110 NEL, J.L., LE MAITRE, D.C., ROUX, D.J., COLVIN, C., SMITH, J.S., SMITHADAO, L.B.
et al.
2017.
Strategic water source areas for urban water security: Making the connection between protecting ecosystems and benefiting from their services.
Ecosystem Services, 28, pp.
251-259. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.07.013 NIEUWOUDT, H., GRUNDLING, P.L., DU TOIT, L. & TERERAI, F. 2018.
Pietersieliekloof wetland rehabilitation project – Investing in the future: Wetland rehabilitaion.
Water Wheel, 17(2), pp.
26-28.
NTSALUBA, G. 2014.
KwaZuluNatal water crisis: Too little too late.
Corruption Watch.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.corruptionwatch.org.
za/kzn-water-crisis-too-little-too-late/> [Accessed: 27 March 2014].
NYAM, Y.S., KOTIR, J.H., JORDAAN, A.J., OGUNDEJI, A.A. & TURTON, A.R.
2020.
Drivers of change in sustainable water management and agricultural development in South Africa: A participatory approach.
Sustainable Water Resources Management, 6(4), pp.1-20.
https://doi.org/10.1007/ s40899-020-00420-9 OXFAM.
2010.
Climate change, development and energy problems in South Africa: Another world is possible.
Melbourne, Australia: Earthlife Africa & Oxfam International.
PAPADOURIS, A.
& THOPIL, G.A.
2018.
Scenario analysis of renewable energy desalination integration in South Africa.
In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Operations Management, 29 October-1 November, Pretoria, South Africa, pp.
1767-1780.
PATRICK, H.O.
2019.
Climate change and water security in South Africa: Assessing conflict and coping strategies in KwaZulu-Natal province.
Unpublished PhD.
thesis.
Department of Political Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa.
PATRICK, H.O.
2020.
Climate change, water security, and conflict potentials in South Africa: Assessing conflict and coping strategies in rural South Africa.
In: Filho, W.L., Luetz, J.
& Ayal, D. (Eds).
Handbook of climate change management.
Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp.1-18.
https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-22759-3_84-1 PHAROACH, R., HOLLOWAY, A.J., FORTUNE, G., CHAPMAN, A., ZWEIG, P. & SCHABER, E. 2016.
Off the radarsynthesis report: High impact weather events in the Western Cape, South Africa.
Research Alliance for Disaster and Risk Reduction (RADAR).
POWERS, J.G., KLEMP, J.B., SKAMAROCK, W.C., DAVIS, C.A., DUDHIA, J., GILL, D.O.
et al.
2017.
The weather research and forecasting model: Overview, system efforts, and future directions.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 98(8), pp.
1717-1737. https://doi.
org/10.1175/BAMS-D-15-00308.1 RODINA, L. 2019.
Planning for water resilience: Competing agendas among Cape Town’s planners and water managers.
Environmental Science & Policy, 99, pp.
10-16. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.05.016 ROHR, H., CILLIERS, J.
& FOURIE, W. 2017.
Spatial planning and land-use management tools in aid of securing water sustainability: The case study of Mogalakwena Local Municipality in South Africa.
Town and Regional Planning.
71(1), pp.11-23.
https://doi.
org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp71i1.2 SAHRC (SOUTH AFRICA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION).
2014.
Report on the right to access sufficient water and decent sanitation in South Africa.
South Africa Human Rights Commission.
SAUL, J.S.
& BOND, P. 2014.
South Africa – The present as history: From Mrs Ples to Mandela and Marikana.
New York, USA: Boydell and Brewer Ltd. SCHEWE, J., HEINKE, J., GERTEN, D., HADDELAND, I., ARNELL, N., CLARK, D. et al.
2014.
Multimodel assessment of water scarcity under climate change.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(9), pp.
3245-3250. https://doi.org/10.1073/ pnas.1222460110 STATS SA (STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA).
2014.
Annual report.
[Online].
Available at: <www.statssa.gov.za.> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
THEISEN, O., GLEDITSCH, N. & BUHAUG, H. 2013.
Is climate change a driver of armed conflict?
Climate Change, 117(3), pp.
613-625. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0649-4 https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2017.1298517 https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2017.1298517 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.04.014 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.04.014 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.07.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.07.001 https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu033 https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbu033 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12899 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12899 https://doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v7n1p144 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12874-018-0611-x https://doi.org/10.1186/s12874-018-0611-x https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1218656110 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1218656110 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.07.013 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.07.013 https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/kzn-water-crisis-too-little-too-late/ https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/kzn-water-crisis-too-little-too-late/ https://doi.org/10.1007/s40899-020-00420-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40899-020-00420-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22759-3_84-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22759-3_84-1 https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-15-00308.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-15-00308.1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.05.016 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.05.016 https://doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp71i1.2 https://doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp71i1.2 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1222460110 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1222460110 www.statssa.gov.za https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0649-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0649-4 30 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) TURPIE, J.
& VISSER, M. 2013.
The impact of climate change on South Africa’s rural areas.
In: Financial and fiscal commission (ed.).
Submission for 2013/2014.
Division of Revenue.
Johannesburg, South Africa, RP: 148/2012, pp.
65-72.
UNFCCC (UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2011.
Fact sheet: Climate change – The status of climate change science today.
[Online].
Available at: <https://unfccc.int/files/ press/backgrounders/application/pdf/ press_factsh_science.pdf.> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
UN-WATER (UNITED NATIONS WATER).
2013.
Water security and the global water agenda.
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada: United Nations University, Institute for Water, Environment & Health.
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY.
nd.
Where is earth’s water?
U.S. Department of the Interior.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.
usgs.gov/special-topic/water-scienceschool/science/where-earths-water?qtscience_center_objects=0#qt-science_ center_objects>.
[Accessed: 13 June 2020].
VINCENT, K., CULL, T., CHANIKA, D., HAMAZAKAZA, P., JOUBERT, A., MACOME, E. et al.
2013.
Farmers’ responses to climate variability and change in Southern Africa – Is it coping or adaptation?
Climate and Development, 5(3), pp.194-205.
https:// doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2013.8210 52 VON-BORMANN, T. 2014.
Understanding the food energy water nexus: Through the water and food lens.
Cape Town, South Africa: Worldwide Fund for Nature.
VON-BORMANN, T. & GULATI, M. 2014.
Understanding South Africa’s most urgent sustainability challenge.
Cape Town, South Africa: Worldwide Fund for Nature.
WILK, J., ANDERSSON, L. & WARBURTON, M. 2013.
Adaptation to climate change and other stressors among commercial and small-scale South African farmers.
Regional Environmental Change, 13(2), pp.
273-286. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10113-012-0323-4 WORLD BANK.
2014.
Water resources management: Sector result profile.
The World Bank Group.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.worldbank.
org/en/results/2013/04/15/waterresources-management-results-profile> [Accessed: 20 April 2020].
XIA, J., DUAN, Q.Y., LUO, Y., XIE, Z.H., LIU, Z.Y.
& MO, X.G.
2017.
Climate change and water resources: Case study of Eastern Monsoon Region of China.
Advances in Climate Change Research, 8(2), pp.
63-67. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.03.007 ZADAWA, A.N.
& OMRAN, A.
2018.
Climate change and water security issues in Africa: Introducing partnership procurement for sustainable water projects in Nigeria.
In: Omran, A.
& Schwarz-Herion, O.
(Eds).
The impact of climate change on our life.
Singapore: Springer, pp.127-134.
https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-981-10-7748-7_6 ZHENG, Y.
& BYG, A.
2014.
Coping with climate change: Households’ response strategies to drought and hailstorm in Lijiang, China.
Environmental Hazards, 13(3), pp.
211-228. https://doi.org/10.1080/17477 891.2014.902799 ZHU, T. & RINGLER, C. 2010.
Climate change implications for water resources in the Limpopo River Basin (No.
961).
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
ZHUWAKINYU, M. 2012.
Water 2012.
A review of South Africa’s water sector.
Report.
Creamer Research.
Johannesburg, South Africa.
ZIERVOGEL, G., SHALE, M. & DU, M. 2010.
Climate change adaptation in a developing country context: The case of urban water supply in Cape Town.
Climate and Development, 2(2), pp.
94-110. https://doi.org/10.3763/ cdev.2010.0036 ZIERVOGEL, G., NEW, M., ARCHER VAN GARDEREN, E., MIDGLEY, G., TAYLOR, A., HAMANN, R. et al.
2014.
The impact of climate change and adaptation in South Africa.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(5), pp.
605-620. https://doi.
org/10.1002/wcc.295 ZUBAIDI, S.L, ORTEGA-MARTORELL, S., AL-BUGHARBEE, H., OLIER, I., HASHIM, K.S., GHARGHAN, S.K.
et al.
2020.
Urban water demand prediction for a city that suffers from climate change and population growth: Gauteng province case study.
Water, 12(7), p. 1885. https://doi.org/10.3390/ w12071885 https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_science.pdf https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/where-earths-water%3Fqt-science_center_objects%3D0%23qt-science_center_objects https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/where-earths-water%3Fqt-science_center_objects%3D0%23qt-science_center_objects https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/where-earths-water%3Fqt-science_center_objects%3D0%23qt-science_center_objects https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/where-earths-water%3Fqt-science_center_objects%3D0%23qt-science_center_objects https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/where-earths-water%3Fqt-science_center_objects%3D0%23qt-science_center_objects https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2013.821052 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2013.821052 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2013.821052 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-012-0323-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-012-0323-4 https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/15/water-resources-management-results-profile https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/15/water-resources-management-results-profile https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/15/water-resources-management-results-profile https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.03.007 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.03.007 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7748-7_6 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7748-7_6 https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2014.902799 https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2014.902799 https://doi.org/10.3763/cdev.2010.0036 https://doi.org/10.3763/cdev.2010.0036 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.295 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.295 https://doi.org/10.3390/w12071885 https://doi.org/10.3390/w12071885 _Hlk58229173 _Hlk56271649 _Hlk56270898 _Hlk56271862 _Hlk56274399 _Hlk56268888 _Hlk36718140 _Hlk56273287 _Hlk56241524 _Hlk56164223 _Hlk56164251 _Hlk56165379 _Hlk56150415 _Hlk56272822 _Hlk46570513 _Hlk46570563 _Hlk46570591 _Hlk46570621 _Hlk56245218 _Hlk46570639 _Hlk46570666 _Hlk46570715 _Hlk46570784 _Hlk56245994 _Hlk46570862 _Hlk56266148 _Hlk56265969 _Hlk56265909 _Hlk56267129 _Hlk56588462
JEE Journal of Extension Education Vol.
27 No.
4, 2015 Climate Change Impact on Paddy Farming in Erode and Tiruchirapalli Districts of Tamil Nadu P. Sivaraj1 and H. Philip2 ABSTRACT Climate change implies both direct and indirect impact on the general well-being of the people in the rural community such as agriculture and allied sectors for their livelihood security.
A study was conducted on the small and marginal paddy farmers of Tamil Nadu.
A sample of 200 paddy farmers was selected from the districts of Erode and Tiruchirappalli, Tamil Nadu.
Findings revealed that paddy farmers perceived climate change impacts include five major components viz.
crop nature, pest incidence, disease menace, water crisis and agro climatic status.
It was found that farmers were much aware of the variations in rainfall pattern and its distribution followed by variability in temperature and changes in wind speed and direction.
Receipt of low rainfall was found to be the most pertinent issue.
1Ph.D scholar, Department of Agricultural Extension and 2-Director of Extension Education, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore.
India is a large country with 15 agroclimatic zones, with diverse seasons, crops and farming systems.
For a majority of people in India, to this day, agriculture is the main stay of livelihood.
Agriculture is the most vulnerable sector to climate change as it is inherently sensitive to climate variability and climate change is going to impact on Indian agriculture in different ways both directly and indirectly Agriculture is inherently sensitive to climate conditions and is the most vulnerable sector to the risks and impacts of climate change (Sagun, 2009).
Climate change is the long term conspicuous deviation from usual prevailing climate bringing variations in normal temperature, rainfall and atmospheric parameters.
There is an urgent need to understand the effects of climate change on agricultural sector both at global and as well as at regional levels, especially from the point of view of providing food to vulnerable section of the population.
Developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change than developed countries because of the predominance of agriculture in their economies and scarcity of capital for adaptation measures (Fischer, 2005).
Sinha and Swaminathan (1991) have showed that an increase of 2o C in temperature would decrease rice yield by about 0.75 ton/ha.
In this regard climate change impact especially among the small and marginal paddy farmers with limited resources is of great concern.
Mohanraj and Karthikeyan (2014) reported that 92.72% perceived change in long term temperature in selected districts of Tamil Nadu.
The study was conducted in the Received : 02 Jan, 2016; Accepted : 08 Apr, 2016 Journal of Extension Education5540 Vaiyampatty block of Tiruchirapalli district (Ponnaniyar basin) and Erode block of Erode district (Kalingarayan basin) in Tamil Nadu.
They were selected based on the water availability for farming situation.
Seven villages in Ponnaniyar basin and eleven villages in Kalingarayan basins were selected for the study.
METHODOLOGY Paddy is the staple food crop of Tamil Nadu and is heavily exposed to the extreme and extraneous events of climate change.
Erode and Tiruchirapalli districts were purposively selected for the study as the district has high range of variability in both rainfall and temperature.
Kalingarayan (Erode) and Ponnaniyar (Tiruchirapalli) basins were then chosen as they have maximum acreage under paddy with majority of the farmers being small (2.5 to 5 acres) and marginal (< 2.5 acres).
Canal irrigation was also found to be prominent in these basins resulting in farmers becoming more vulnerable to climate change events.
Based on the discussions with the officials and subject matter specialists of the agricultural department one block was selected from each basin.
For the selection of villages, an inventory of revenue villages in each block was collected.
Then ten villages from each block were randomly chosen.
The total sample size was 200 with randomly selecting 100 paddy farmers (comprising 50 male farmers and 50 female farmers) from each of the blocks.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION A.
Impact of Climate Change on Crop Nature Climate change is clearly recognized as a major threat to agricultural system.
The expected increase in temperature, atmospheric CO2, heavy and unseasonal rainfall, increased humidity, drought and Table 1.
Impact of Climate Change on Crop Nature (n=200) Mean score Mean score 1.
Changes in cropping system 1.980 1.970 2.
Changes in harvesting time 1.990 1.950 3.
Changes in crop growing season 1.900 1.790 4.
Crop destruction 1.910 1.770 5.
Scorching of crops in direct sown paddy 1.800 1.580 6.
Scorching of crops in transplanted paddy 1.390 1.510 Average mean score 1.828 1.761 Sl.No.
Crop nature Kalingarayan basin n=100 Ponnaniyar basin n=100 5541Climate Change Impact on Paddy Farming in Erode and Tiruchirapalli Districts of Tamil Nadu cyclones are likely to affect paddy crop.
Hence, an attempt was made to assess the perceived impact of climate change on crop nature.
It is referred from Table 1 that the average mean score of impact of climate change on crop nature in Kalingarayan basin was worked out to 1.828 where the sub items like changes in cropping system, changes in harvesting time, changes in crop growing season and crop destruction as identified with higher mean score of 1.980, 1.990,1.900 and 1.910 respectively.
The mean score of other sub items fell below the average mean score.
The average mean score of Ponnaniyar basin worked out for the impact of climate change on crop nature was 1.761 where the sub items like changes in cropping system, changes in Table 2.
Impact of Climate Change on Pest Incidence (n=200) Mean score Mean score 1.
Pest outbreak 1.310 1.190 2.
Arrival of new pests 1.480 1.430 3.
Stem borer infestation 1.940 1.900 4.
Leaf folder infestation 1.920 1.860 5.
Rice mite infestation 1.340 1.280 6.
Gall midge infestation 1.120 1.100 7.
Thrips infestation 1.180 1.120 8.
Plant hopper infestation 1.260 1.270 9.
Leaf hopper infestation 1.400 1.420 10.
Ear bug infestation 1.690 1.800 Average mean score 1.474 1.432 Sl.No.
Pest incidence Kalingarayan basin n=100 Ponnaniyar basin n=100 harvesting time, changes in crop growing season and crop destruction were identified with higher mean score of 1.970, 1.950,1.790 and 1.770 respectively.
Study area of Kalingarayan and Ponnaniyar basin is extremely vulnerable to the vagaries.
Moreover due to the erratic rainfall in quantity and distribution, the area is often subjected to drought which results in crop damage and low yield.
Monsoon failure and shifting of monsoon may adversely affect the crop growing season.
B.
Impact on Climate Change on Pest Incidence The data presented in Table 2 reveal that Journal of Extension Education5542 the average mean score worked out for the impact of climate change on pest incidence in Kalingarayan basin was found to be with1.474 and the stem borer infestation, leaf folder infestation, ear bug infestation and arrival of new pest secured higher mean score of 1.940, 1.920, 1.690 and 1.480 respectively.
In Ponnaniyar basin the average mean score Table 3.
Impact of Climate Change on Disease Menace (n=200) Mean score Mean score 1.
Disease outbreak 1.330 1.300 2.
Occurrence of new diseases 1.500 1.450 3.
Blast occurrence 1.820 1.880 4.
Leaf spot occurrence 1.770 1.800 5.
Bacterial blight occurrence 1.640 1.760 6.
Sheath blight occurrence 1.280 1.260 7.
Sheath rot occurrence 1.240 1.160 8.
Rice thungro disease 1.200 1.150 9.
False smut occurrence 1.010 1.180 Average mean score 1.422 1.438 Sl.No.
Disease menace Kalingarayan basin n=100 Ponnaniyar basin n=100 worked out for the impact of climate change on pest incidence was 1.432 and the stem borer infestation, leaf folder infestation and ear bug infestation secured higher mean score of 1.900, 1.860and 1.800 respectively.
In other sub items the mean scores were found to be below the average mean score.
Climate change influences the ecology and biology of insects.
Table 4.
Impact of Climate Change on Water Crisis (n=200) Mean score Mean score 1.
Increased water salinity 1.300 1.100 2.
Deterioration of water nutrients 1.300 0.990 3.
Irrigation water shortage 1.820 1.770 4.
Damaged agro wells 1.740 1.670 Average mean score 1.540 1.380 Sl.No.
Water crisis Kalingarayan basin n=100 Ponnaniyar basin n=100 5543Climate Change Impact on Paddy Farming in Erode and Tiruchirapalli Districts of Tamil Nadu Increased temperature and moisture might adversely affect specific pest species and could result in proliferation of destructive pest population.
C. Impact of Climate Change on Disease Menace The average mean score of disease menace in Kalingarayan basin was found to be 1.422 (Tables 3).
Blast occurrence (1.820), leaf spot occurrence (1.770), bacterial blight occurrence (1.640) and occurrence of new diseases (1.500) were the major impacts of climatic variation in paddy crop.
Whereas in Ponnaniyar basin the average mean score was found to be 1.438 and the blast occurrence (1.880), leaf spot occurrence (1.800), bacterial blight occurrence (1.760) and occurrence of new diseases (1.450) were the major impact of climatic variation in paddy crop.
Impact of climate change like rise in temperature affects the pollination in paddy crop which resulted in poor grain setting.
Further the fungal diseases are common and can spread via spores carried by wind.
D. Impact of Climate Change on Water Crisis The average mean score (Table 4) worked out for the impact of climate change on water crisis in Kalingarayan basin was found to be with 1.540 and the irrigation water shortage and damaged agro wells secured higher mean score of 1.820 and 1.740 respectively.
Similarly in Ponnaniyar basin the average mean score was worked out with 1.380 and the irrigation water shortage and damage agro wells secured higher mean score of 1.770 and 1.670 respectively.
Prolonged drought, variation in the temperature and less ground water potential lead to water scarcity.
More amount of salinity in irrigation water source is one of the major problems that affect crop cultivation.
In Ponnaniyar basin due to severe water scarcity, they changed from food crops to fodder, flower, vegetable and perennial crops.
The perennial crops like guava, coconut etc., flower crops like jasmine, vegetables like beans, bitter guard, ridge guard, tomato, fodder crop like fodder sorghum were grown.
In case of Kalingarayan basin water availability was decreasing, but not like Ponnaniyar basin.
So they had followed only summer ploughing and some of them had livestock.
E. Impact of Climate Change on Agro Climatic Status Kalingarayan basin the average mean score (Table 5 ) of impact of climate change on agro climatic status was 1.422 where rise in temperature (1.970), reduction in number of rainy days (1.910) and monsoon shifting (1.900) are observed.
Likewise in Ponnaniyar basin the average mean score of agro climatic status was 1.440 and had mean scores of 1.950, 1.940 and 1.950 respectively.
The mean score of others fell below the average mean score.
Due to impact of climate change the climate variability is increased and this would lead to increase the risk of drought.
Severe drought has led to hardening of the land in worst-affected provinces, which would Journal of Extension Education5544 Table 5.
Impact of Climate Change on Agro Climatic Status (n=200) Mean score Mean score 1.
Monsoon shifting 1.900 1.950 2.
Reduction of number of rainy days 1.910 1.940 3.
Rise in temperature 1.970 1.950 4.
Increased wind speed 1.090 1.020 5.
Increased humidity 1.120 0.970 6.
Severe drought 1.450 1.400 7.
Flash flooding 0.920 0.850 Average mean score 1.422 1.440 Sl.No.
Agro climatic status Kalingarayan basin n=100 Ponnaniyar basin n=100 increase the chance of rain or even light rain turning into flash flood.
Majority of the Kalingarayan basin respondents were shifted from growing long duration varieties to short duration varieties from paddy crops to vegetable crops and fruit crops.
Most of the farmers changed their cropping pattern from paddypaddyturmeric to paddy turmeric banana.
They were not interested to raise community nursery mainly to avoid conflict among farmers.
Ponnaniyar basin farmers also had changed their cropping pattern to flower crops and vegetable crops.
All of them were not willing to grow community nursery because it would create problem among the farmers.
Most of them quit growing paddy crop and not cultivated intercrops due to water scarcity.
CONCLUSION Adverse effects of climate change in the study area had made farmers to leave farming activities and migrate to urban areas as daily wage earners.
This is a lightning call for policy makers and development departments to implement suitable programmes to reverse the scenario so as to build confidence and to improve status of farmers by making farming a profitable occupation.
The action needed for farmers to mitigate ill effects of climate change were, early warning has to be given about environmental changes and creating awareness about appropriate adaptation measures against climate change.
Departments need to ....reasonable support price, insurance to all crops and subsidies has to be given to paddy farmers in order to sustain their livelihood security under adverse climatic change.
These supportive measures taken by the government through respected and line department people will help the farmers to develop and adopt themselves from the climate change impacts.
5545Climate Change Impact on Paddy Farming in Erode and Tiruchirapalli Districts of Tamil Nadu REFERENCES Fischer, G., Shah, M., Francesco, N. and Van Velhuizen, H. 2005.
Socio-Economic and Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture: An Integrated Assessment, 1990-2080.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B 2005, p360.
Mohanraj, K. and Karthikeyan, C. 2014.
Perception of Tank Irrigated Farmers Towards Climate Change.
Journal of Extension Education.
Vol.
26.
No.
3 : PP 5311 5314.
Sagun, C. N. 2009.
Climate Change Impacts on Livelihood of Poor and Vulnerable Communities and Bio Diversity Conversation: A Case Study in Banke, Bardia, Dhanding andRasuwa Districts of Nepal, USAID, CARE, Nepal.
Sinha, A.K.
and Swaminathan, M.S, 1991.
Longterm Climate Variability and Changes, Journal of Indian Geographical Union, Vol.
7(3): pp.125-134.
Wine Economics and Policy 9(2): 99-112, 2020 Firenze University Press www.fupress.com/wep ISSN 2212-9774 (online) | ISSN 2213-3968 (print) | DOI: 10.36253/web-9823 Wine Economics and Policy Citation: Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham (2020) Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards: A Discrete Choice Experiment to Prioritize Trade-Offs Perceived by Citizens.
Wine Economics and Policy 9(2): 99-112. doi: 10.36253/web-9823 Copyright: © 2020 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham.
This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (http:// www.fupress.com/wep) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest.
Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards: A Discrete Choice Experiment to Prioritize Trade-Offs Perceived by Citizens Verónica Farreras1,2, Laura Abraham3,* 1 Instituto Argentino de Nivología, Glaciología y Ciencias Ambientales (CCT-CONICETMendoza).
Av.
Ruiz Leal s/n Parque General San Martín.Mendoza Argentina.
CP 5500.
Email: vfarreras@mendoza-conicet.gob.ar 2 Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, M5502JMA Mendoza, Argentina 3 Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Facultad de Ciencias Agrarias, Almirante Brown 500, Chacras de Coria, Luján de Cuyo, CPA M5528AHB Mendoza, Argentina.
Email: labraham@fca.uncu.edu.ar *Corresponding author Abstract.
On a climate change scenario, a discrete choice experiment was applied to elicit the trade-off values for three environmental impacts of current viticultural management practices in vineyards of Mendoza, Argentina.
Water availability for other uses was found to be the most concerning topic for the population, followed by use of chemical fertilizers and then by use and conservation of biodiversity.
An increase of one percentage point in water availability was estimated to add each citizen on average 13.05 Argentinean pesos – 0.74 US dollars – per year in terms of increased welfare, a figure equivalent to the welfare drop a citizen would experience after an increase of 1.45 percentage points in the use of chemical fertilizers annually per hectare, or a decrease of 2.69 percentage points in the use and conservation of biodiversity.
These trade-off values may help policy makers, planners, regional managers, and ecologists to take social preferences into account in setting resource allocation priorities intended to support viticulture.
This study approach provides a framework that could guide similar assessments in other regions.
Keywords: viticultural management practices, climate change, discrete choice experiment, human welfare effects of environmental-impact choices.
1.
INTRODUCTION Viticulture is one of the most important agricultural activities in the central west region of Argentina.
At the foot of the Central Andes, the Mendocinian vineyards cover a total crop area of 155,900 ha, the largest 100 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham in Argentina (INV, 2018).1 In Mendoza, viticulture has been developed, like in many other viticultural zones of the region, since the end of the XIX Century, initiated by European immigrants (Lacoste, 2003).
Its green and vast vineyards are well known not only because of its productive economic value, but also because of its cultural and identifying values (Montaña, 2007).
The region is characterized by its arid and semiarid climate, with an annual average rainfall of 220 mm.
Due to the dry weather, water availability in Mendoza is a determining factor, most of the Mendocinian agricultural and urban areas are reduced to small portions of its territory (Figure 1. a: Oases and non-irrigated land).
These oases were built upon an irrigation system of ditches and canals which strictly takes into account the topography of the place.
This system makes the most of the water coming from the mountain rivers, whose 1 One hectare contains approximately 2.47 acres.
streamflow is a result of the fusion between the snow and the Andean glaciers (Morábito et al., 2007).
Vineyards, on average, use 45% of the water available in the oases of the province.
About 53% is available for industrial use, public use –green spaces and urban trees– and watering of crops other than vineyards.
The percentage of water supply for the population, currently estimated at 2%, completes 100% of the water availability in the oases.2 The exploitation of irrigation water depends mainly on the irrigation system adopted.
Almost 90% of the Mendocinian vineyards use the traditional surface irrigation system with an estimated irrigation efficiency of 39% for a furrow system with drain and 67% for a furrow system without drain.
Whilst in 2 However, to the effects of the empirical application developed below, the percentage of water supply for the population is not contemplated within the 53% of water available in the oases after using it for the vineyards, given that Mendoza Water Law 1884, still applicable, prioritizes population´s supply against any other uses (DGI, 2016).
Figure 1.
Farm units with grape cultivation (a) in the oases of Mendoza province and (b) in the Mendocinian Northern Oasis (source: Own elaboration based on data obtained from National Sanitary Registry  of Agricultural Products (RENSPA) and cartography of the Territorial Environmental Information System (SIAT) and National Geographic Institute (IGN)).
The darkened areas are farm units with grape cultivation.
101Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards the rest of the vineyards, the estimated efficiency varies between 82% and 90% as a result of the implementation of water-saving technologies such as the drip irrigation system (Morábito et al., 2007; Schilardi et al., 2015).
In the last seven years, there has been a substantial deficit in the water balance of the mountain rivers in Mendoza (Castex et al., 2015).
This hydrological deficit is the result of a decrease in the snowfall and the retreat of the glaciers caused by an average global warming between 0.6 and 0.7°C (IPCC, 2013; Boninsegna, 2014; Poblete and Minetti, 2017).
In the upcoming decades, this phenomenon is expected to aggravate as a consequence of a predictable increase in the average temperatures of the Central Andes (Cabré et al., 2016).
This increase in temperature will drastically raise the regional evapotranspiration, it will alter the relations between rainfall and snowfall and it will modify the seasonal distribution of the runoff of the mountain rivers (Villalba, 2009; Lauro et al., 2019).
Global warming and the current and future hydrological deficit will, undoubtedly, have important consequences on the availability of this resource unless there is a more efficient use of the water coming from the mountain rivers (Castex et al., 2015).
A decrease in the availability of water will probably lead to an increased competition in the oases, compromising the current vineyard surface.
That is, unless vineyards can make use of the water destined for other purposes (industrial use, public use – green spaces and urban trees – and the watering of crops other than vineyards; hereinafter, water availability for other uses).
In line with global warming, weather simulations indicate that by the end of the present century there will be changes in the rainfall patterns on the plains located at the foot of the Andes (Boninsegna, 2014; Deis et al., 2015).
An important increase in the frequency of summer precipitations is expected, mostly associated with severe convective storms (Castex et al., 2015; Cabré et al., 2016).
The effect of rainfall is complex since crops respond differently depending on the type of precipitation and the soil management practices.
Practices like applying manure and compost and the use of cover crops provide nutrients and organic matter, improving the structure and fertility of the soil (Miglécz et al., 2015).
Experimental studies in the vineyards of Mendoza have reported benefits in the conservation of the soil as a result of cover crops used as green manure (Uliarte et al., 2013; Martínez et al., 2018; among others).
However, the vast majority of the vineyards in Mendoza keeps their soils without vegetation cover throughout most of the year.
More intense rainfall, as predicted for the upcoming years, can contribute to soil loss, reducing its nutrient content and organic matter.
This reduction decreases the size and stability of the soil aggregates and, together with the lack of vegetation cover, reduces water infiltration and increases superficial runoff (Powlson et al., 2011).
All of this leads to soil erosion and an increase use of fertilizers in an attempt to keep the same crop yield (Pérez Vázquez and Landeros Sánchez, 2009).
Currently in Mendoza, it is estimated that per year per hectare, an average of 80% of nutrients replenishment in the vineyards is achieved with the use of chemical fertilizers (van den Bosch, 2017).
In the upcoming years, an increase in the use of chemical fertilizers in order to avoid a decrease in crop yield is expected as a result of the current soil management practices and the predictable changes in the frequency and intensity of the precipitations on the plains.
However, the overuse of fertilizers can cause groundwater contamination from infiltration of fertilizers or carry-over contamination of fertilizers to surface water course (Meier et al., 2015).
There have been reports of cases of water contamination caused by nitrates associated with excessive use of fertilizers in crops on the Central Oasis (Morábito et al., 2011; Salatino et al., 2017; among others).
Field studies show that global warming and global CO2 concentration have an effect on the population dynamics of the organisms that attack the crops as well as on their natural enemies (Hamada and Ghini, 2011; Karuppaiah and Sujayanad, 2012; among others).
Vázquez (2011) has reported an alteration on the population dynamics of common pests as well as changes in their period of emergence, appearance of new pests and a reduction of natural enemies.
This shows that global warming together with concentration of CO2 can cause phytosanitary problems and reduce the efficiency of the chemical control methods.
In Mendoza, this phenomenon can be aggravated as a consequence of a raise in summer precipitations.
Traditional crops such as vineyards can be affected by a higher occurrence of cryptogamic diseases (Villalba, 2009; Deis et al., 2015).
The use and conservation of biodiversity in crops not only make them less vulnerable to weather variations, but also can contribute to an effective control of pests and diseases through its natural or biological management (Nicholls Estrada, 2008).
A diverse and complex crop system facilitates the necessary environmental conditions for the development of pests’ natural enemies, making the agroecosystem generate its own natural protection (Rolando et al., 2017).
It is estimated that, in Mendoza, only 2% of vineyards cultivated area utilizes and conserves biodiversity with cover crops and patches of native vegetation, which are maintained to provide habitat for natural enemies and local fauna (SENASA, 2017).
This indicates that pesticides employed 102 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham for the control of pests and diseases are more widely used than biological management practices.
It is foreseen that in the next few years there will not be any significant changes in the use and conservation of biodiversity on the vineyards cultivated area of Mendoza, despite being widely well documented in the literature that the massive use of pesticides may reduce environmental quality (Turgut, 2007; Di Lorenzo et al., 2018; among others) and decrease the species diversity in the agroecosystems, modifying their stability and resilience (see, among others, Moonen and Bàrberi, 2008; Kremen and Miles, 2012).
Consequently, and in line with the above-mentioned literature, viticulture in the region faces new challenges due to global warming that must be considered in the design of its agricultural practices.
Lower water availability for other uses, increased use of chemical fertilizers, and a non-significant change in the use and conservation of biodiversity are three of the most pronounced and environmentally concerning consequences of nonadaptive management practices to climate change in the vineyards of Mendoza.
According to the aforementioned results conducted on the vineyards of Mendoza (Uliarte et al., 2013; Castex et al., 2015; Martinez et al., 2018) and the current knowledge on the efficiency of the irrigation methods (Morábito et al., 2007; Schilardi, 2015), on changes in the precipitation patterns (Boninsegna, 2014; Deis et al., 2015), and on population dynamics of pests, diseases and natural enemies (Hamada and Ghini, 2011; Vázquez, 2011; Deis et al., 2015), we hypothesised a possible temperature-change scenario by 2050, which we will refer to as the ‘‘do-nothing’’ or ‘‘business-as-usual’’ (BAU) situation.
Considering the three mentioned variables – water availability for other uses, use of chemical fertilizers, and use and conservation of biodiversity – the changes from current average values to new values in 30 years’ time were estimated subject to: (i) an increase in annual mean temperature by 2°C, (ii) a rise in precipitations on the plains from 200mm to 250mm per year, and (iii) a 10% decrease in snow accumulation in the Andes per year –figures in the medium range of the predicted change reported by multiple general circulation models for the region over the period of 20712100 (IPCC 2013; Boninsegna, 2014; Cabré et al., 2016; Poblete and Minetti, 2017).
Based on moderate interpretation of the above-mentioned literature and on expert opinions on viticulture and agricultural economics, the BAU situation assumed the following changes: the percentage of water availability for other uses, currently averaging about 53% in the Mendocinian oases, will drop to approximately 41%; chemical fertilizers, currently representing every year on average 80% of nutrients replenishment per hectare of vineyard, will raise to 95%; and finally the percentage of vineyards cultivated area that utilizes and conserves biodiversity, currently estimated on 2%, will not register any significant changes, only reaching 3%.3 Nowadays, however, the human-welfare effects of these possible environmental changes are unknown.
The information on the social significance of these possible changes can be useful for those involved in making decisions and may be considered in setting resource allocation priorities intended to support viticultural practices for climate change adaptation.
In order to explore this, a discrete choice experiment valuation exercise was conducted to elicit the trade-offs perceived by Mendocinian citizens for changes in water availability for other uses, use of chemical fertilizers, use and conservation of biodiversity, and the willingness to pay for the adaptation of viticultural management practices to climate change.
With this method the importance of these environmental changes can be expressed in monetary units and the extent to which citizens are willing to consent one change for another can be elicited (Hanley et al., 2002; Hensher et al., 2005; among others).
2.
DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENT The label “discrete choice experiment” concerns to a survey-based valuation method consistent with welfare economic theory (Jones and Pease, 1997; Bennett and Blamey, 2001).
This method, which belongs to the family of stated preference methods, describes a hypothetical market with details of the good to be considered (Carson and Louviere, 2011).
The good details encompass some of its characteristics, known as attributes.
Depending on the proposed action, the attributes can differ in their quantity or quality level.
Different level combinations of attributes, alongside with a suggested payment, set up an alternative.
In a discrete choice experiment, respondents are presented with a series of alternatives –usually called choice set, comprising BAU and two or more alternatives.
Then they are asked to choose their most preferred alter3 The decrease in the availability of water for other uses was estimated by considering that both current cultivated vineyard area and actual average percentage of irrigation efficiency will not register any significant changes during the next 30 years (Morábito et al., 2007; Schilardi et al., 2015; DGI, 2016).
The increase in chemical fertilizers was estimated according to experts’ opinions based on grape production models generated by the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (van den Bosch, 2017).
The change in the use and conservation of biodiversity was estimated using the local trend in organic viticulture certification in Mendoza (SENASA, 2017).
103Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards native (Hanley et al., 2002).
A respondent can confront several successive choice sets throughout interview.
In order to interpret the results in welfare economics terms, the BAU alternative must be included in each choice sets.
The discrete choice experiment is based on Random Utility Maximization (RUM) models (McFadden, 1973).
A succinct methodological description is provided below, whilst a more comprehensive one can be found in Farreras et al.
(2017).
Under the RUM framework, the utility function for each respondent has the form: Uij=Vij+εij (1) Where Uij is individual i’s utility from choosing alternative j, Vij is the deterministic component of utility, and εij is a stochastic element that denotes unobservable motivates on individual choice (Manski, 1977).
Usually, ε is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid) across alternatives and individuals.
The condition for individual i choosing a given alternative j over any alternative option k belonging to the set of alternatives A, can be expressed in probability terms, P, as: Pij=P{Vij+εij>Vik+εik; ∀k≠j∈A} (2) The choice probabilities can be predicted using different models.
Most often, choice probabilities are estimated using the Mixed Logit (ML) model.
The most straightforward derivation, and most widely used in recent applications, is based on random coefficients (Train, 2009).
Given that choice probabilities cannot be calculated accurately, they are approximated through simulation (Hensher and Greene, 2003).
3.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 3.1 Choice Sets Alternatives were defined by three non-monetary attributes – water availability for other uses, use of chemical fertilizers, and use and conservation of biodiversity –, and a monetary attribute in the form of an annuity to finance the adaptation of viticultural management practices to climate change.
Each attribute displayed four levels as shown on Table 1.
The levels of water availability for other uses were described as an average percentage of water available in the oases for industrial use, public use – green spaces and urban trees – and the watering of crops other than vineyards.
Likewise, the levels of use and conservation of biodiversity were also expressed in percentages and were defined as the average percentage of the vineyards cultivated area with native vegetation strips and cover crops that promote the biological control of pests and diseases.
The levels of both attributes were distributed between the expected values in the BAU situation and the values above the BAU levels.
The levels of use of chemical fertilizers were also expressed in percentages and were defined as the average percentage of nutrients Table 1.
Attributes and levels used in the choice questionnaire.
Attribute Description Levels Water availability for other uses The average percentage of water that is available in oases for industrial use, public use –green spaces and urban trees– and other irrigated crops other than vineyards in 30 years’ time.
· 41% (business-as-usual) · 53% (current level) · 65% · 76% Use of chemical fertilizers The average percentage of nutrients replaced with chemical fertilizers in the vineyards, per year per hectare in 30 years’ time.
· 95% (business-as-usual) · 80% (current level) · 50% · 25% Use and conservation of biodiversity The average percentage of vineyards cultivated area with native vegetation strips and cover crops that promote the biological control of pests and diseases in 30 years’ time.
· 3% (business-as-usual) · 10% · 25% · 50% Annual payment subject to adjustment for inflation† The annual payment required per household over the next 30 years to finance the adaptation of viticultural management practices to climate change.
· 600 Argentinean pesos · 400 Argentinean pesos · 200 Argentinean pesos · 0 Argentinean pesos (businessas-usual and current level) †Average exchange rate in spring 2017: 1 US dollar equals 17.54 Argentinean pesos.
104 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham that are replenished in the vineyards, each year per hectare, with chemical fertilizers.
The levels of use of chemical fertilizers for scenarios different to BAU were defined below 95%.
The levels of BAU for the non-monetary attributes reflected the estimated situation in 30 years’ time as a result of the use of non-adaptive management practices to climate change in Mendocinian vineyards, whilst the rest of the levels could be reached through the adaptation of viticultural practices to climate change.
Focus groups confirmed that the temporal horizon of 30 years was perceived as reasonable and did not show any credibility problems.
The levels of payment were determined based on different focus groups in which the participants stated the maximum quantity of money they would be willing to pay for the different scenarios.
The extra cost for “donothing” was zero.
The monetary levels were expressed in Argentinean pesos subject to adjustment for inflation, to be paid per household each year, during the next 30 years.
There were 81 (34) possible combinations of attribute levels or different alternatives, excluding the BAU levels, given that this situation does not vary.
Since this universe was large, a statistically efficient choice design combining the attribute levels into alternatives and choice sets was constructed using NGENE (ChoiceMetrics, 2014), (Table 1).
A D-optimal fractional factorial design consisting of 27 alternatives was identified.
The alternatives were randomly grouped into 9 blocks of three alternatives plus BAU.
Each block of four alternatives corresponds to a choice set.
The efficiency for the final design expressed as the Bayesian D-error was 0.00148.
A pilot exercise, used to complete the design process, confirmed that random combinations of the attribute levels posed no problems to participants and ensured the choice task adequacy.
The final version of the questionnaire included three different choice sets, which were randomly presented to each individual.
Respondents were asked to pick within the choice set the alternative they preferred the most.
Figure 2 reproduces a typical choice set.4 3.2 Questionnaire The first part of the questionnaire focused on the presentation of the attributes.
It described the current average level of each non-monetary attribute –water availability for other uses, use of chemical fertilizers, and use and conservation of biodiversity– in the Mendocinian oases and the most reliable prediction of the average levels of each attribute in 30 years’ time (based on the working hypothesis that predicts a raise in temperature and annual precipitations of 2°C and 50mm, respectively and a 10% snowfall reduction) (Table 1).
Hence, the questionnaire showed, in the first place, the expected change in the three non-monetary attributes under the “do-nothing” or BAU situation.
Afterwards, respondents were explained that with the adaptation of viticultural practices to climate change, the BAU situation could be modified.
These practices included the sustainable agricultural management of water, soil and biodiversity such as the implementation of water-saving technologies, the substitution of chemical fertilizers for organic manure and cover crops used as green manure that additionally would allow, together with the conservation of native vegetation strips, the vineyards to generate its own protection against pests and diseases.
Three alternative levels to BAU levels were presented for each non-monetary attribute indicating that the level each one of them would finally reach would depend on the quantity of money destined to finance the adaptation of the viticultural practices to climate change.
In order to further familiarize individuals with possible levels of change, and check for satiation within the levels segment, participants were then asked to indicate the preferred attribute level, regardless of the cost.
After the introduction of non-monetary attributes, the monetary compensation was described.
It was stated that the local government was considering the possibility of financing the adaptation of viticulture to climate change.
It was explained that the degree of adaptation would depend on the quantity of resources allocated to this end, which in turn would depend on the answers to the questionnaire.
If, on average, the answers indi4 Given the sample size, each alternative was seen by an average of 70 respondents in the whole survey.
Figure 2.
Example of a choice set presented to respondents.
105Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards cated that people were willing to pay some money for the adaptation of the viticultural practices to climate change, then the payments would be obligatory and would be charged annually to the citizens through a council tax.
Some possible alternatives on the payment vehicles were tested on different focus groups.
It was confirmed that the obligatory payment gathered by the council city through its tax was reasonable, credible and easily accepted by the interviewees; whilst other alternatives on payment vehicles such as direct payment to an organization created to this end caused rejection for its lack of credibility.
The central part of the questionnaire focused on the choice tasks and a set of debriefing questions.
The third and last part of the questionnaire was designed to gather socioeconomic data, such as income, gender, age, and level of formal education, among others.
The survey was carried out in spring 2017.
A representative sample of the residents of the Northern Mendocinian Oasis – which concentrates 58.20% of the total Mendocinian farm units with grape cultivation and in which more than half the total population of the province lives – was interviewed face to face in the respondents’ households (Figure 1. b).
According to the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC, 2010), the Northern Oasis has a population close to one million people.
The total number of interviewees between the age of 24 and 80 was 226.
The sample included residents in cities of more than 10,000 people randomly drawn – after weighting cities according to their population size – and were interviewed in blocks of 6.
The selection of individuals within a block was conducted through a random-route procedure to find a household and then, within the household, a particular individual to fulfil a specific quota for age and gender.
Around 90% of the people chosen accepted to be interviewed.
All of them completed the choice tasks, which resulted in 678 valid observations –three sets of choice per person.
From a social economic point of view, the sample and composition of the population were relatively similar (Table 2).
The questionnaire was handed out in paper format and read by the interviewer.
Each questionnaire came along with a set of coloured cards, which showed the attributes being valued.
Each interview took approximately 30 minutes and no signs of fatigue or other obvious problems were detected.
4.
RESULTS An ML model was determined to detect the relation between the levels of the attributes and the probability of the interviewees choosing certain alternatives.
The specification of the ML model requires certain characteristics such as the selection of the parameters –attributes– that are going to be considered random and the distribution supposed to them.
In this way, it was considered, in the first place, that the preferences of the interviewees for the three non-monetary attributes were heterogeneous and followed a triangular distribution whilst the preferences for the monetary attribute were considered homogeneous.5 However, the standard deviations of the non-monetary attribute distributions were not statistically significant, which shows that the preferences for these variables were homogeneous among the individuals of the sample (Table 3).
The three non-monetary and monetary variables entered the regression expressed in the units of the respective attributes as they were described in Table 1.
The coefficient signs were as expected and most of the variables were statistically significant with a 95% lev5 Due to the higher probability of occurrence that some of the levels showed in relation to others considered.
For the attributes water availability for other uses and use and conservation of biodiversity, the higher levels were the most selected ones within the range considered.
Whilst for the attribute use of chemical fertilizers, the lower levels were the most chosen ones.
Table 2.
Sample and population composition in the Northern Oasis.
Gender and age groups Northern Oasis † (%) Sample (%) Women Age 52.63% 54.21% 24–35 16.59% 16.82% 36–49 14.71% 13.55% 50–65 13.85% 14.49% 66–75 5.47% 6.54% 76–80 2.01% 2.80% Men Age 47.37% 45.79% 24–35 16.34% 18.22% 36–49 13.54% 10.75% 50–65 11.99% 12.15% 66–75 4.18% 2.34% 76–80 1.32% 2.34% Income ‡ Argentinean pesos (at 2017 prices) Argentinean pesos (at 2017 prices) 27,019 § 24,030 † INDEC 2010 ‡ Brackets were used in the survey, making the comparison less accurate between the average monthly income of the Argentinean urban agglomerations and that of the sample.
§ Average monthly household income in the fourth quarter of 2017, according to INDEC 2017.
106 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham el of confidence.
The positive sign of the coefficients of water availability for other uses and of use and conservation of biodiversity shows that Mendocinian citizens tend to prefer higher levels of these attributes to lower levels.
This implies that the alternatives with higher percentages of water availability for other uses and of use and conservation of biodiversity are more likely to be chosen.
On the contrary, the coefficient signs of use of chemical fertilizers and of payment were negative, which shows that higher levels of these attributes decrease the population welfare.
Since the socioeconomic variables of the respondent do not vary over alternatives, they can only enter the model if they are specified in ways that create differences in utility over alternatives (Train, 2009).
With 4 alternatives per choice set, one alternative-specific coefficient of income, gender and age variables entered the model, where three of the coefficients were normalized to zero (i.e., the three non-BAU alternatives were left out).
The income data were collected in the survey using nine categories: no direct income; <8,060 Argentinean pesos; 8,060–12,000; 12,001–17,000; 17,001–22,000; 22,001– 30,000; 30,001–40,000; 40,001–50,000, and >50,001 Argentinean pesos.
Thus, income entered the regression as a categorical variable reflecting the monthly earnings of the respondent’s household, with A being the alternative-specific.
While, the gender entered the regression as a dummy variable, we coded females to be 0 and males to be 1; with A being the specific alternative.
Finally, the age entered the regression as a continuous variable reflecting the age in years of the individual, with A being the alternative-specific.
The negative sign of the coefficient of the variable income indicates that the interviewees with higher incomes are less likely of choosing option BAU, i.e., they are more likely to pay for the adaptation of the viticultural practices to climate change.
On the other hand, the negative sign of the coefficient of the variable gender indicates that women are more prone to choose an alternative other than BAU.
Conversely, the positive sign of the coefficient of the variable age denotes that the older the interviewees, the more likely they would choose option BAU.
This suggests that, on average, women, younger respondents, and respondents with higher income obtain greater utility from the adaptation of viticulture to climate change.
Once estimated the parameters, the marginal values for each attribute can be inferred from the following relation of regression coefficient, –βn/ βm, where βn is the coefficient of the attribute to be considered and βm represents the coefficient of the attribute in which units one wishes to express the value of the attribute of interest (Hensher et al., 2005).
These values show the mean of the marginal values of the population, in the units of the variable in which change wants to be expressed – percentage points or Argentinian pesos at 2017 price subject to adjustment for inflation.
The marginal values for each attribute are illustrated in Figure 3.
According to the respondents’ perception, for example, in order to obtain an increase of one percentage point in the water availability for other uses, a representative Mendocinian citizen would, on average, be willing to consent (at most) an increase of 1.45 percentage points Table 3.
Results of the mixed logit regression analysis.† Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) Random parameters in utility functions Water availability for other uses 0.02062496*** (0.00586975) Use of chemical fertilizers –0.01422602*** (0.00289968) Use and conservation of biodiversity 0.00767425* (0.00451211) Non-random parameters in utility functions Annual payment –0.00158077*** (0.00042721) Income A –0.50662382** (0.23111555) Gender A –0.48969585** (0.24946993) Age A 0.02142159*** (0.00694294) Derived standard deviations of parameter distributions Water availability for other uses 0.06695391 (0.04430034) Use of chemical fertilizers 0.620393D-04 (0.02512014) Use and conservation of biodiversity 0.00016680 (0.03114923) Log likelihood function –798.5422 Pseudo-R2 .131664 Observation 642 NB: 6% of respondents chose the BAU situation (annual payment of 0 pesos) quoting reasons other than lack of value for the adaptation of viticulture to climate change, which could be considered as protests.
After removing those observations, the quantitative analysis was performed on a subset of 214 respondents.
† Estimates were obtained using 1,000 random draws to simulate the sample likelihood.
***Significant at 1% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
*Significant at 10% level.
107Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards in the use of chemical fertilizers, or a decrease of 2.69 percentage points in the use and conservation of biodiversity, or to pay per household (at most) 13.05 Argentinean pesos – 0.74 US dollars – annually during the next 30 years.
The confidence intervals for the marginal value of each attribute were calculated using the Krinsky and Robb procedure (1986) with 3,000 repetitions.
Likewise, these marginal values can also be useful to elicit the trade-offs, as perceived by Mendocinian citizens, for expected changes if none or only some viticultural practices are adapted to climate change.
Assuming a unitary price elasticity of demand, for example, the increased welfare that a citizen would experience, on average, as a result of an increase from 3% to 25% in the use and conservation of biodiversity is equivalent to the welfare drop he or she would experience after an increase from 80% to 91.85% in the use of chemical fertilizers.
These social-welfare changes are inferred from Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Marginal values for each non-monetary attribute (equivalent to a one percentage point change).
Values in relative units of attributes with their respective confidence intervals for (a) an increase of one percentage point in the water availability for other uses, (b) a decrease of one percentage point in the use of chemical fertilizers, and (c) an increase of one percentage point in the use and conservation of biodiversity.
Non-monetary attributes are expressed as percentage points on the left-hand vertical axis, while the monetary attribute is expressed in Argentinean pesos (at 2017 prices subject to adjustment for inflation) on the right-hand vertical axis.
(a) An increase in the water availability for other uses of one percentage point– e.g., from 41% to 42% – offsets (1) an increase, on average, in the use of chemical fertilizers of 1.45 (0.55, 3.02 ) percentage points, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 95% CI; (2) a decrease, on average, in the use and conservation of biodiversity of 2.69 (1.05, 10.05) percentage points, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 90% CI; and (3) the equivalent, in terms of welfare, of an annual expenditure per household, on average, of 13.05 (6.24, 27.28) Argentinean pesos [0.74 (0.35, 1.55) US dollars] over the next 30 years, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 95% CI.
(b) A decrease in the use of chemical fertilizers of one percentage point – e.g., from 95% to 94% – offsets (1) a decrease, on average, in the water availability for other uses of 0.68 (0.33, 1.80 ) percentage points, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 95% CI; (2) a decrease, on average, in the use and conservation of biodiversity of 1.85 (0.55, 9.07) percentage points, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 90% CI; and (3) the equivalent, in terms of welfare, of an annual expenditure per household, on average, of 9.00 (4.22, 22.09) Argentinean pesos [0.51 (0.24, 1.26) US dollars] over the next 30 years, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 95% CI.
(c) An increase in the use and conservation of biodiversity of one percentage point – e.g., from 3% to 4% – offsets (1) a decrease, on average, in the water availability for other uses of 0.37 (0.03, 0.73) percentage points, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 90% CI; (2) an increase, on average, in the use of chemical fertilizers of 0.54 (0.03, 1.30) percentage points, the figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 90% CI; and (3) the equivalent, in terms of welfare, of an annual expenditure per household, on average, of 4.85 (0.39, 8.27) Argentinean pesos [0.28 (0.02, 0.47) US dollars] over the next 30 years, figures in parentheses denoting the limits of the 90% CI.
** 95% confidence interval.
* 90% confidence interval.
108 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham 5.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS This research intends to contribute to a deeper and further discussion on the way of managing the relation between agriculture and the conservation of the environment and natural resources.
On a climate change scenario, the monetary value of sustainable agricultural management practices in Mendocinian vineyards was estimated.
The valuation exercise results show that Mendocinian citizens are willing to pay for the adaptation of viticultural management practices to climate change.
This result is in line with the findings of Riera et al.
(2007), a study that elicited the trade-off values for three climatesensitive attributes – plant cover, fire risk, and soil erosion – of Mediterranean shrubland.
They found that Catalan citizens were willing to finance programs that might mitigate climate-change impacts on shrublands.
Arora et al.
(2017) also reached similar findings for rice cultivation in India.
Using the discrete choice experiment, they found that farmers were willing to pay a significant premium for reducing the abiotic stresses, such as droughts and flood, induced by climate change.
Similar conclusions from climate change adaptation in cultivated areas were found by Waldman and Richardson (2018).
They looked into the Malian farmers’ valuation of hybrid-perennial sorghum technologies that might facilitate adaptation to climate change.
Although not specifically dealing with climate change adaptation, SellersRubio and Nicolau Gonzalbez (2016) and Lanfranchi et al.
(2019) found that individuals were willing to pay for implementation of sustainable wine production methods.
Using a contingent valuation method, Sellers-Rubio and Nicolau Gonzalbez (2016) looked at the non-market value of these production methods in Spain, while Lanfranchi et al.
(2019) estimated the willingness to pay of Sicilian consumers for a sustainable wine.
Our findings also suggest that, on average, women, younger respondents, and respondents with higher income are more prone to choose an alternative other than BAU.
That is, they are more likely to be willing to pay for the viticultural adaptation to climate change, a result consistent with welfare economic theory and expectations.
These findings have also been reported in several other studies which show consumer’s general interest towards environmental-friendly wine production methods (see, among others, Sellers-Rubio and Nicolau Gonzalbez, 2016; Pomarici et al., 2018; Lanfranchi et al., 2019).
As well, our research provides results not only in monetary units, but also in the units of the other attributes considered (Figure 3).
These trade-off values provide useful information for both private sector and policy makers.
For instance, those involved in making decisions may wish to set resource allocation destined to finance viticultural practices prioritizing the balance among water availability for other uses, use of chemical fertilizers, and use and conservation of biodiversity, as expressed by citizens.
Moreover, these social values expressed in monetary units can be useful for planners and regional managements to evaluate whether the benefits of a given policy outweigh its costs.
Likewise, the results suggest that citizens are prepared to invest on sustainable agricultural management on private land, a result also found in Yao and Kaval (2010).
Thus, the estimated values of the environmental impact reduction of viticulture may be useful not only for future government policy decision making, but also to be incorporated in the market goods price.
For instance, the estimated value of an additional percentage point in the water availability for other uses could indicate the price premium that a citizen would, on average, be willing to pay (at most) for each wine glass produced with watersaving technologies.
In this context indeed, an analysis of young consumers’ preferences for wines labelled with a water saving claim was conducted by Pomarici et al.
(2018).
This study revealed that on average consumers are willing to pay an extra of half a dollar or more for water saving labelled wines.
Others studies have also shown that consumers are willing to pay a premium price for wines with sustainable production characteristics (Barreiro-Hurlé et al., 2008; Mueller and Remaud, 2010; Schäufele and Hamm, 2017; among others).
Water availability for other uses was found to be the most concerning attribute for the population considering the expected changes under the “do-nothing” situation.
This finding is consistent with the answers to an explicit question on the relative significance of the attributes.
As show in Table 4, water availability for other uses was the attribute that three quarters of all respondents had in mind when deciding on the contingent choices.
This information denotes a certain consistency with the results followed from marginal rate of substitution (Figure 3).
Even though there was not an explicit question that discloses the reason of this preference, the province of Mendoza has been on hydrological emergency for the last seven years.
Hydrological emergency is an issue frequently mentioned on the news and the population is constantly being asked to make a rational and careful use of water.
This result is also in line with the findings of Farreras and Lauro (2016), a study that dealt with the valuation of possible environmental waste landfills impacts in Mendoza.
They used a discrete choice experiment to value different attributes – water quality, air quality, and vector-borne diseases –.
Water quality was defined as the resource aptitude to be used in the fol109Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards lowing possible uses: (i) domestic, (ii) agricultural, (iii) industrial, and (iv) recreational.
An attribute in common between their paper and ours is that related to water availability, which was found to be the most valuable attribute.
Concerning biodiversity valuation, there is some disconcert reflected in the relatively modest statistical significance of this attribute.
This seems to reflect a lack of a priori well-formed preferences of some respondents.
Whereas some people were sure about the implications of changes in biodiversity to themselves, other respondents were not so sure.
A similar conclusion has been reached by Lienhoop and MacMillan (2007), Szabó (2011), among others, who have reported the prevalence of unformed or ill-formed preferences for non-marketed public goods, such as biodiversity which is often complex and unfamiliar.
In short, this study displays that the welfare of Mendocinian citizens is expected to drop in line with the environmental impacts predicted to occur as a result of the non-adaptive viticultural management practices to climate change.
The most socially concerning topic is water availability for other uses, followed by use of chemical fertilizers and then by use and conservation of biodiversity.
From a social point of view, this result implies that agricultural practices that are more focused on sustainable water management are the ones that increase welfare to citizens the most.
This information can be useful for policy makers, planners, regional managers, and ecologists in order to take social preferences into account in setting resource allocation priorities intended to support viticulture.
Finally, this study approach provides a framework that could guide similar assessments in other regions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was supported by the Secretaría de Investigación, Internacionales y Posgrado, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (Grant numbers 01/A039).
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, and Emilce Vaccarino for her help in drafting the map.
REFERENCES Arora, A., Bansal, S., Ward, P.S., 2018.
Do farmers value rice varieties tolerant to droughts and floods?
Evidence from a discrete choice experiment in Odisha, India.
Water Resour.
Econ.
1–15.
https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.wre.2018.03.001 Barreiro-Hurlé, J., Colombo, S., Cantos-Villar, E., 2008.
Is there a market for functional wines?
Consumer preferences and willingness to pay for resveratrolenriched red wine.
Food Quality and Preference 19, 360–371.
Bennett, J., Blamey, R., (eds.).
2001.
The choice modelling approach to environmental valuation.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Boninsegna, J.A., 2014.
Impacto del cambio climático en los oasis del oeste argentino.
Ciencia e Investigación 64, 45–58.
Cabré, M.F., Quénol, H., Nuñez, M., 2016.
Regional climate change scenarios applied to viticultural zoning in Mendoza, Argentina.
Int.
J. Biometeorol.
60, 1325– 1340. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00484-015-1126-3 Carson, R.T., Louviere, J.J., 2011.
A common nomenclature for stated preference elicitation approaches.
Environmental and Resource Economics 49, 539–559.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9450-x Castex, V., Morán, E., Beniston, M., 2015.
Water availability, use and governance in the wine producing region of Mendoza, Argentina.
Environmental Science & Policy 48, 1–8.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2014.12.008.
ChoiceMetrics.
2014.
Ngene 1.1.2.
User Manual & Reference Guide, Australia.
Deis, L., Rosas, M.I.
De, Malovini, E., Cavagnaro, M., 2015.
Climate change impact in Mendoza.
Climate variation on the last 50 years.
A view to grapevine physiology.
Rev.
FCA UNCuyo 47, 67–92.
DGI, 2016.
Departamento General de Irrigación.
Aquabook.
Available from: http://aquabook.agua.gob.ar/ Accessed March 18, 2019.
Di Lorenzo, T., Cifoni, M., Fiasca, B., Di Cioccio, A., Galassi, D.M.P., 2018.
Science of the Total EnvironTable 4.
Percentage of respondents that took into account this variable more than any other when deciding on the contingent choices.
Variable Respondent consideration (%) Water Availability for other uses 75.59% Use of chemical fertilizers 53.52% Use and conservation of biodiversity 50.23% Annual payment 49.07% Years † 21.30% NB: Percentages do not add to 100% because respondents could select more than one answer.
† The temporal horizon of 30 years for viticultural adaptation to climate change.
110 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham ment Ecological risk assessment of pesticide mixtures in the alluvial aquifers of central Italy: Toward more realistic scenarios for risk mitigation.
Sci.
Total Environ.
644, 161–172.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.06.345 Farreras, V., Lauro, C., 2016.
Valoración económica de los efectos de la contaminación por vertido de residuos sólidos urbanos.
El caso del aglomerado urbano del Gran Mendoza, Argentina.
Gestión y Ambiente 19, 211–227.
http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ga.v19n2.54755.
Farreras, V., Riera, P., Salvador, P.F., 2017.
Environmental valuation with periodical payments in high-inflation economies.
An Argentinean case study.
Ecological Economics 138, 56–63.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2017.03.028.
Hamada, E., Gini, R., 2011.
Impacts of climate change on plant diseases and pests in Brazil.
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Agrícolas 2, 195–205.
Hanley, N., Mourato, S., Wright, R.E., 2002.
Choice Modelling Approaches: A Superior Alternative for Environmental Valuatioin?
J. Econ.
Surv.
15, 435–462.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00145 Hensher, D., Greene, W.H., 2003.
The mixed logit model: the state of practice and Warnings for the Unwary.
Transportation (Amst).
30, 133–176.
https://doi.
org/10.1.1.195.1039 Hensher, D.A., Rose, J.M., Greene, W.H., 2005.
Applied choice analysis: A primer.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
INDEC, 2010.
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo.
Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Vivienda en Argentina.
Available from: https://www.indec.
gob.ar/ftp/cuadros/poblacion/censo2010_tomo1.pdf Accessed November 28, 2018.
INDEC, 2017.
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo.
Evolución de la distribución del ingreso.
Cuarto trimestre de 2017.
Available from: https://www.indec.
gob.ar/uploads/informesdeprensa/ingresos_4trim17.
pdf Accessed November 12, 2018.
INV, 2018.
Instituto Nacional de Vitivinicultura.
Informe anual de superficie 2017.
Available from: https://www.
argentina.gob.ar/inv/vinos/estadisticas/superficie/ anuarios Accessed January 29, 2019.
IPCC, 2013.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Climate change 2013: The physical science basis.
Contribution of working group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Stocker, T., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., Allen, S., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V., Midgley, P. (eds).
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press https://doi.org/10.1017/ CBO9781107415324.001 Jones, C., Pease, K., 1997.
Restoration-based compensation measures in natural resource liability statutes.
Contemporary Economic Policy 15, 111–122.
https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1997.tb00494.x Karuppaiah, V., Sujayanad, G., 2012.
Impact of climate change on population dynamics of insect pests.
World J. Agric.
Sci.
8, 240–246.
Kremen, C., Miles, A., 2012.
Ecosystem Services in Biologically Diversified versus Conventional Farming Systems: Benefits, Externalities, and Trade-Offs.
Ecology and Society 17(4), 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ ES-05035-170440 Krinsky, I., Robb, A.L., 1986.
On Approximating the Statistical Properties of Elasticities.
The Review of Economics and Statistics 68, 715–719.
http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/1924536 Lacoste, P., 2003.
El vino del inmigrante: los inmigrantes europeos y la industria vitivinícola argentina: su incidencia en la incorporación, difusión y estandarización del uso de topónimos europeos 1852-1980.
Mendoza, Argentina: Consejo Empresario Mendocino.
Lanfranchi, M., Schimmenti, E., Campolo, M.G., Giannetto, C., 2019.
The willingness to pay of Sicilian consumers for a wine obtained with sustainable production method: An estimate through an ordered probit sample-selection model.
Wine Econ.
Policy 8, 203–215.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wep.2019.11.001 Lauro, C., Vich, A., Moreiras, S., 2019.
Streamflow variability and its relationship with climate indices in western rivers of Argentina.
Hydrological Sciences Journal 64, 607–619.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0262666 7.2019.1594820 Lienhoop, N., MacMillan, D., 2007.
Valuing wilderness in Iceland: Estimation of WTA and WTP using the market stall approach to contingent valuation.
Land Use Policy 24, 289–295.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2005.07.001 Manski, C., 1977.
The structure of random utility models.
Theory and Decision 8, 229–254.
https://doi.
org/10.1007/BF00133443 Martínez, L.E., Vallone, R.C., Piccoli, P.N., Ratto, S.E., 2018.
Assessment of soil properties, plant yield and composition, after different type and applications mode of organic amendment in a vineyard of Mendoza, Argentina.
Rev.
la Fac.
Ciencias Agrar.
50, 17–32.
McFadden, D., 1973.
Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior.
In P. Zarembka.
(ed.
), Frontiers in Econometrics, 105–142.
New York, USA: Academic Press.
Meier, M.S., Stoessel, F., Jungbluth, N., Juraske, R., Schader, C., Stolze, M., 2015.
Environmental impacts of 111Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards organic and conventional agricultural products e Are the differences captured by life cycle assessment?
J. Environ.
Manage.
149, 193–208.
https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.10.006 Miglécz, T., Valkó, O., Török, P., Deák, B., Kelemen, A., Donkó, Á., Drexler, D., Tóthmérész, B., 2015.
Establishment of three cover crop mixtures in vineyards.
Sci.
Hortic.
(Amsterdam) 197, 117–123.
https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.scienta.2015.09.017 Montaña, E., 2007.
Identidad regional y construcción del territorio en Mendoza (Argentina): memorias y olvidos estratégicos.
Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Études Andines 36, 277–297.
https://doi.
org/10.4000/bifea.3908 Moonen, A.C., Bàrberi, P., 2008.
Functional biodiversity: An agroecosystem approach.
Agric.
Ecosyst.
Environ.
127, 7–21.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agee.2008.02.013 Morábito, J., Mirábile, C., Salatino, S., 2007.
Eficiencia del riego superficial, actual y potencial, en el área de regadío del río Mendoza (Argentina).
Ingeniería del Agua 14, 199–214.
https://doi.org/10.4995/ ia.2007.2912 Morábito, J., Salatino, S., Bermejillo, A., Filippini, M., Campos, S., Nacif, N., Dediol, C., Medina, R., Maffei, J., Mastrantonio, L., Genovese, D, Stocco, A., September 2011.
Contaminación antrópica en el río Tunuyán, Mendoza Argentina: tendencias y escenarios futuros.
In La Agricultura de Riego ante el Cambio Climático Global.
Symposium held at the XVI Congreso Nacional de Irrigación, Culiacán, Sinaloa, México.
Available from: https://www.ina.gov.
ar/legacy/pdf/CRA-ryd-contaminacion-antropica.pdf Accessed November 28, 2018.
Mueller, S., Remaud, H. 2010.
Are Australian wine consumers becoming more environmentally conscious?
robustness of latent preference segments over time.
In: Proceedings of the 5th International Academy of Wine Business Research Conference.
Auckland, New Zealand.
Nicholls Estrada, C.I., 2008.
Control biológico de insectos: un enfoque agroecológico.
Medellín, Colombia: Universidad de Antioquia.
Pérez Vázquez, A., Landeros Sánchez.
C., 2009.
Agricultura y deterioro ambiental.
Elementos 73, 19–25.
Available from: http://www.elementos.buap.mx/ num73/pdf/19.pdf Poblete, A., Minetti, J., 2017.
¿Influye el calentamiento global en la disminución de las nevadas en los Andes Áridos?
Revista Universitaria de Geografía 26, 11–29.
Available from: http://bibliotecadigital.
uns.edu.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S185242652017001100002&lng=es&nrm=iso Pomarici, E., Asioli, D., Vecchio, R., Næs, T., 2018.
Young consumers’ preferences for water-saving wines: An experimental study.
Wine Econ.
Policy 7, 65–76.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wep.2018.02.002 Powlson, D.S., Gregory, P.J., Whalley, W.R., Quinton, J.N., Hopkins, D.W., Whitmore, A.P., Hirsch, P.R., Goulding, K.W.T., 2011.
Soil management in relation to sustainable agriculture and ecosystem services.
Food Policy 36, S72–S87.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2010.11.025 Riera, P., Peñuelas, J., Farreras, V., Estiarte, M., 2007.
Valuation of climate-change effects on Mediterranean shrublands.
Ecological Applications 17, 91–100.
https://doi.org/10.1890/1051-0761(2007)017[0091:VOC EOM]2.0.CO;2 Rolando, J.L., Turin, C., Ramírez, D.A., Mares, V., Monerris, J., Quiroz, R., 2017.
Key ecosystem services and ecological intensification of agriculture in the tropical high-Andean Puna as affected by land-use and climate changes.
Agric.
Ecosyst.
Environ.
236, 221–233.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agee.2016.12.010 Salatino, S., Morábito, J., Bermejillo, A., Dediol, C., Stocco, A., Tapia, O., Miralles, S., Hernández, R., Mastrantonio, L., Genovese, D., Ortiz, N., 2017.
Calidad de aguas y análisis de la contaminación en el Río Tunuyán Superior (Mendoza, Argentina) en el periodo 2007-2014.
AUGMDOMUS 9, 67-82.
Available from: https://revistas.unlp.edu.ar/domus/article/view/2410 Schäufele, I., Hamm, U., 2017.
Consumers’ perceptions, preferences and willingness-to-pay for wine with sustainability characteristics: a review.
J.
Clean.
Prod.
147 (20), 379-394.
Schilardi, C., Rearte, E., Martín, L., Morábito, J., June 2015.
Uniformidad de distribución del riego por goteo en vid: su impacto sobre los índices de vegetación, la cantidad y calidad de la producción.
Caso de estudio en Mendoza, Argentina.
In Agua, como Política de Estado.
Symposium held at the XXV Congreso Nacional del Agua CONAGUA 2015 -, Paraná, Entre Ríos, Argentina.
Available from: https:// www.ina.gov.ar/legacy/pdf/Cra_7_Schilardi_Diagnostico.pdf Accessed January 29, 2019.
SENASA, 2017.
Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria.
Situación de la producción orgánica en la Argentina durante el año 2016.
Available from: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/5_situacin_de_la_po_en_la_argentina_2016.pdf Accessed November 15, 2018.
Sellers-Rubio, R., Nicolau-Gonzalbez, J.L., 2016.
Estimating the willingness to pay for a sustain able wine using a Heckit model.
Wine Economics and Policy 5 (2), 96-104.
112 Verónica Farreras, Laura Abraham Szabó, Z., 2011.
Reducing protest responses by deliberative monetary valuation: improving the validity of biodiversity valuation.
Ecological Economics 72, 37–44.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.09.025 Train, K., 2009.
Discrete choice methods with simulation (2nd ed.).
Available from: https://eml.berkeley.edu/ books/choice2.html Turgut, C., 2007.
The impact of pesticides toward parrotfeather when applied at the predicted environmental concentration 66, 469–473.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
chemosphere.2006.05.073 Uliarte, E., Ferrari, F., Montoya, M., Bonada, M., Ambrogetti, A.O., 2013.
Viticultura orgánica.
Aportes tecnológicos para el manejo ecológico de viñedos.
In J.A.
Ullé (ed.
), Bases tecnológicas de sistemas de producción agroecológicos.
Nodos Agrícola Ganadero, Agricultura Orgánica y Cultivos Perennes, 12-31.
Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones INTA.
van den Bosch, M. E., 2017.
Márgenes Brutos de referencia de la producción de uvas en espalderos bajo con variedades de uva con destino enológico y reconocimiento varietal (finas).
Ediciones INTA (Instituto Nacional de tecnología Agropecuaria) 1–8.
Vázquez, L., 2011.
Cambio climático, incidencia de plagas y prácticas agroecológicas resilientes.
In H. Ríos, D. Vargas and F. Funes-Monzote.
(eds.
), Innovación agroecológica, adaptación y mitigación del cambio climático, 75–101.
Mayabeque, Cuba: INCA.
Villalba, R., 2009.
Cambios climáticos regionales en el contexto del calentamiento global.
(IANIGLA).
CONICET Internal Publication (1), 11–14.
Argentina, Mendoza.
Waldman, K.B., Richardson, R.B., 2018.
Confronting Tradeoffs Between Agricultural Ecosystem Services and Adaptation to Climate Change in Mali.
Ecol.
Econ.
150, 184–193.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2018.04.003 Yao, R.T., Kaval, P., 2010.
Valuing biodiversity enhancement in New Zealand.
International Journal of Ecological Economics and Statistics 16, 26–42.
Wine Economics and Policy Volume 9, Issue 2 2020 Firenze University Press The Influence of Alcohol Warning Labels on Consumers’ Choices of Wine and Beer Azzurra Annunziata1,*, Lara Agnoli2, Riccardo Vecchio3, Steve Charters4, Angela Mariani5 A Bad Year?
Climate Variability and the Wine Industry in Chile Eduardo Haddad1,*, Patricio Aroca2, Pilar Jano3, Ademir Rocha4, Bruno Pimenta5 Sparkling Wine International Market Structure and Competitiveness Karim Marini Thome*, Vitoria A. Leal Paiva The Role of Context Definition in Choice Experiments: a Methodological Proposal Based on Customized Scenarios Fabio Boncinelli*, Caterina Contini, Francesca Gerini, Caterina Romano, Gabriele Scozzafava, Leonardo Casini The Impact of Country of Origin on Brand Equity: An Analysis of The Wine Sector Nádia Passagem1, Cátia Fernandes Crespo2,*, Nuno Almeida3 Competitive Strategies for Wine Cooperatives in the German Wine Industry Barbara Richter1,*, Jon Hanf2 Valuation of Viticultural Adaptation to Climate Change in Vineyards: A Discrete Choice Experiment to Prioritize Trade-Offs Perceived by Citizens Verónica Farreras1,2, Laura Abraham3,* Does the Institutional Quality Affect Labor Productivity in Italian Vineyard Farms?
Maria Raimondo1,*, Concetta Nazzaro4, Annamaria Nifo3, Giuseppe Marotta2 The Role, Scope and Management of R&D and Innovation in the Wine Sector: an Interview with Antonio Graca Peter Hayes AM
Climate Change and Media Representation: 198 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 Climate Change and Media Representation: A Multimodal Discourse Analysis of Clean Green Pakistan Policy from Eco-linguistic perspective Dr. Muhammad Haseeb Nasir Assistant Professor, Department of English, NUML, Islamabad mhnasir@numl.edu.pk Dr. Azhar Habib Lecturer, Department of English, NUML, Islamabad.
ahabib@numl.edu.pk Dr. Muhammad Yousaf Lecturer, Department of English, NUML, Islamabad.
myousaf@numl.edu.pk Abstract The study aims to explore the constructive/destructive role of print media advertisements in disseminating ecological discourse.
There has been a great threat to climate and it has become imperative to understand the philosophy behind (re)production of text where language plays central role advocating such ecological narratives that protect/destroy our environment at large.
Media, due to vast readership/viewership, (re)frames the ideology of people and paves the way for environmental balance/imbalance without much effort.
This study also highlights as to how linguistic features such as: salience, metaphor and framing are materialized to make the discourses appear natural and persuasive.
The data is comprised of 5 print media advertisements being published in popular English newspapers.
The sampling technique is purposive and selection of the advertisement timeframe is from 2019 to 2021.
The conceptual underpinning of the study is Stibbe’s (2015) and Kress & Leeuwan (2006) model which helps the readers critically analyze the text.
The study finds that these advertisements present layers of meanings metaphorically and highlight the importance of ecologically constructive discourse to bring about climate/environment sustainability.
Keywords: print/electronic media, advertisements, climate, discourse, ecosophy, multimodality.
Introduction In the 21st century, climate change has become one of the most emerging apprehensive topics in the world.
The topic of climate change and its impact have been addressed at different platforms.
In a last few decades, climate change received a lingering scepticism; however, scientists gradually understand that earth’s climate has always been changed.
Undoubtedly, global climate change is affected by myriad of factors, such as; ranging from solar winds from the sun to emission of greenhouse gases especially carbon dioxide.
Amid the impact of sudden alarming, many countries are of the view that climate change is inevitable.
Dramatic increases have been mailto:mhnasir@numl.edu.pk mailto:ahabib@numl.edu.pk mailto:myousaf@numl.edu.pk Climate Change and Media Representation: 199 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 observed in terms of sea level, melting of glaciers, ice poles, and an increase in surface air temperature.
To address the entire cyclic process of how the Sun’s radiation absorbed by Earth’s surface eventually becomes heat energy; and the heat trapping gases in the atmosphere behave like the glass of a greenhouses, language plays an inexorable role.
In this regard, Hulme (2007) argues that it is important to communicate about upper climate change.
This upper-class phenomenon is considered a series of complex and constantly evolving cultural discourse.
Correspondingly, when we talk about language and ecology also known as ecolinguistics, a dimension to study language in co-relation to its significant environment.
Hulme (2007) again regarding an ecological perspective in a linguistic esteem and depicting climate change awareness says, We next need to embark on the much more challenging activity of revealing and articulating the very many reasons why there is no one solution, not even one set of solutions, to (lower-case) climate change.
The role of Climate Change I suggest is not as a lower-case physical phenomenon to be solved.
We need to use the idea of Climate Change the matrix of power relationships, social meanings and cultural discourses that it reveals and spawns to rethink how we take forward our political, social and economic projects over the decades to come.
(Hulme, 2007, p.20) Thus in this paper the researchers explain as to how Pakistan is combating against climate change and what strategies are employed to make nation aware of climate change a Background of the Study The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa launched the project "Green Growth Initiative" in order to paint the economy Green.
The Task Force on Green Growth Initiative has been set up.
Six center zones i.e.
Forestry, Protected Areas, Clean Energy, Climate Resilience, Water/Sanitation and Waste Management for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are recognized by the Task Force on Green Growth.
The "Green Growth Initiative" of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is a banner carrier of the perfect and green upheaval in Pakistan.
It bears guarantee that the Government will attempt its best to give a superior personal satisfaction to the residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, make tolerable and clean working environment for the young and furthermore give a way to social elevation and poverty elimination in the region.
In order to aware the masses regarding these massive governmental projects, information was distributed through different channels.
Climate Change and Media Representation: 200 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 Advertisements were published in newspapers.
In short, language played an instrumental role in pushing the common public to join hands with the government in turning this idea into reality.
The present research focuses on the salience feature utilized by the government in doing so.
Statement of the Problem Climate change has become a global issue and Pakistan lags far behind to sensitize people regarding this alarming threat.
There is a dire need to propagate such positive eco-friendly narratives through our social agencies that have wider reach to people at large.
The study is also an attempt to highlight as to how and to what extent Pakistani media is successful/failure in disseminating the said ideology.
Research Objectives The objectives of the current study are: ➢ To investigate the representation of climate change discourse in Pakistani print media advertisements ➢ To analyze several semiotic resource systems employed in the advertisements for projection of environment friendly narrative Research Questions ➢ What semiotic resource systems are employed for projection of eco-friendly narrative in Print media advertisements?
➢ How is climate change discourse represented in Pakistani print advertisements?
Significance of the Study As Climate Justice aims at acknowledging third world countries as a formidable solution to the climate change crisis, it is important that its discourse must be analyzed.
This study adds to the overall understanding of the climate discourse and the possible dimensions it covers.
The study provides important insights into the overall representation of climate change in Pakistani media discourse.
Climate change is a reality which we are currently living in until and unless we recognize the need and importance of climate justice discourse, this issue of climate change cannot be resolved or mitigated in an equitable manner.
Literature Review Climate Change and Media Representation: 201 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 An Eco-linguistics approach is a new field within Applied Linguistics that emerged in 1990s.
It is an integrated approach to study language from different theoretical perspectives of geography, biology, economy, sociology, psychology, political science etc.
In general, Ecolinguistics is defined as the paradigm that investigates the (inter) relationships between language and the environment in which it is being used.
By ‘environment' of language we mean three kinds of environment as well as levels of language study i.e., natural environment of language (biologic), social environment (sociologic) and mental environment (ideologic).
According to Stibbe (2015), the physical environment is an overall geographical structure of any area that includes plains, mountains, oceans, plants, winds, rainfall, agriculture etc.
It also includes all those natural factors that provide suitable modes of life to any community belonging to a certain geographical area.
The behaviour of humans rely largely on the elements present in the physical surroundings.
Additionally, geographical criteria are of a significant value where linguistic enquiries are concerned.
The social forces are of more important because language itself is a social phenomenon.
The linguists engaged in the enquiry of fields of sociolinguistics or in the sociology of language often refer to the social environment or forces as demographic or social factors.
The factors are generally related to the speaker’s age, his sex, social class, profession, network, region of origin, and place of residence.
Psychological dimension is another important aspect of language which advocates that language is determined primarily by the persons who learn and use language, and pass it on from one generation to another (Stibbe, 2015).
Historically, language has been explored through ideologic and sociologic perspectives but biological aspect has been neglected.
In 20th century, structuralists specifically genetativists considered only the ‘mental' or ‘ideologic’ aspect of language.
Later on, sociolinguists added the social aspect in addition to the mental or cognitive.
However, it is the Eco-linguistic paradigm that provided the platform to study language in holistic manner including the role of biological diversity in linguistic choices and also the economic and social viewpoints.
Developed in the 1990s, Eco linguistics attempts to establish a link between the language used by a community and the (natural and cultural) ecosystem within which said community lives and thrives.
As the name suggests that it is about language and environment.
Eco-linguists Climate Change and Media Representation: 202 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 investigate as to how language has an impact on our environment; how language contributes to preservation of nature and environment; and, how language is responsible for ecological construction/destructions.
It explores general patterns of language that influence how people both think about, and treat, the world.
It can investigate the stories we live by – mental models that influence behaviour and lie at the heart of the ecological challenges we are facing.
Glasser (1995) is of the view that philosophy of ecology (ecosophy) does not mean that there is only one ecosophy working for whole environment.
There are different subsystems working under a whole ecological system.
Therefore, ecolinguists have their own philosophy behind the selection of a particular framework.
Ecosophy is based on already existing assumptions, norms and rules of the society.
The use of language is also in the form of texts on environment as advertisements, stories, scientific reports, newspapers, magazines etc.
The ecolinguist needs a framework to analyze questionable texts on environment.
Ecosophy works as an assessment criterion for whether the text is for protection or destruction of the environment.
Through this framework, the ecolinguist deciphers hidden meanings behind such texts.
Linguistics provides many tools such as critical discourse analysis, framing theory, cognitive theory and systemic functional grammar etc for analyzing environmental texts.
The ecolinguist tries to uncover the purpose of these texts as how they are used to encourage people for protection of their environment and how they are created in such a way to make people destroy their surroundings.
Linguistic ecology also identified as ecolinguitics is the novel branch which comes under the heading of applied linguistics.
Haugen (1972) is the pioneer of this branch of applied linguistics.
In his book The Ecology of Language he identified language ecology as, "the study of interactions between any given language and its environment."
The term ecology was used as metaphor to describe and study linguistic variations with reference to physical environment, social phenomenon, biodiversity and an entire ecosystem where the life depends on.
It is a comprehensive way to analyze and communicate environmental, social and bio-diversification issues in the domain of linguistics reverence, of which climate change is a substantial topic in ecolinguistics.
Carvalho (2018) in the article talked about how the discursive strategies are used in the British media and political speeches to re-construct the climate change and greenhouse effect.
As a methodology, traditional critical discourse analysis has been applied creating a both diachronic Climate Change and Media Representation: 203 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 and synchronic axes for study analysis.
Furthermore, the study aimed at exploring power discourse and looked towards the representation of greenhouse effect as a public issue in different domains.
On the other hand, three British ‘quality’ newspapers –The Guardian, The Independent, and The Times were systematically compared and analyzed to find out ways the problems have been constructed through discursive strategies.
In another study, Sedlaczek (2015) from the department of linguistics; University of Vienna, Austria studied media representations of climate change in the context of documentary television.
Multimodal critical discourse analysis as theoretical framework combined CDA with approaches to semiotics and multimodality.
The paper discussed two means of integrating insight views established from ecolinguistics and ecosemiotics into a collective framework.
Nonetheless, the first part dealt with analyzing discursive strategies used by the media in projecting climate change, whereas, second part comprised of an epistemological position.
Knowingly, communicating climate change is a paramount contribution to fight against greenhouse gases and largely global warming for the well-being of our planet and its habitats.
Foremost, in Pakistan, Prime Minister Imran Khan launched the Clean Green Pakistan Movement on 13th October 2018.
However, the movement has been adapted recently on 25th March 2021 by the Ministry of Climate Change Pakistan.
This national campaign underpins behavioral change and institutional strengthening while envisaging the need to address five components: plantation, solid waste management, liquid waste management/ hygiene, total sanitation, and safe drinking water.
The CGPM has a specific focus on empowering the citizens to seek access to basic services but also making themselves equally accountable and responsible for Clean Green Pakistan.
Research Methodology The current study follows qualitative research design and seeks to analyse the data in depth in order to highlight climate change issues represented in media narrative.
Moreover, the study is exploratory in nature, since it tends to explore climate change narrative from different dimensions.
Method of Data Collection The data comprises newspaper advertisements published in English newspapers, such as: Dawn and The News.
Moreover, the time frame for the data collection is from January 2019 to July 2021.
The most repeated advertisements have been purposively selected for the analysis.
Climate Change and Media Representation: 204 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 Conceptual Framework The researchers conceptualized a model from Kress & Leeuwan’s (2006) theory of multimodality and Stibbe’s (2015) theory of Ecolinguics (The Stories We Live By).
Since the advertisements carry layers of meanings and the text is replete with several signs connoting certain underlying ideologies; therefore, the researchers have tried to analyse such multimodal text by bring along a nexus between these signifiers and what they signify from ecological perspective.
To analyse these semiotic resources such as, color, posture, words and shapes etc., Kress and Leewan (2006) has been utilized; whereas, the implications of such modes have been interpreted in the light of Stibbe’s (2015) concept of Salience, metaphor and framing from ecological perspective.
Data Analysis and Discussion Advertisement 1 It is an official poster presented by PTI government and Minister of Climate Change Pakistan.
After the climate change policy adaptation made on 25th March 2021, PTI government has come up with different ideas to make people aware of climate change policy.
The purpose of Clean Green Pakistan’s main five pillars and incumbent objectives is to spread socialenvironmental wakefulness.
On the basis of Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) visual communication theory, we can witness different symbolic, pictorial and written modes emerged together in the process of making such advertisements for a reason to generate social meaning.
Climate Change and Media Representation: 205 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 Notwithstanding, these social semiotic resources have been utilized to deploy particular meaning to the text.
The placard has used both visual and verbal structures to express meaning drawn from common cultural and ecological sources.
In reference to multimodality; the placard consists a prominent tagline at above, MY CITY.
MY RESPONSIBILITY.
This tagline, undoubtedly, intended with a deeper social, environmental and cultural meanings.
Your city, country and homeland is mother to you and it is your sheer responsibility to keep it clean.
Moreover, we can see a flower shape like picture, within which five main agendas have been presented symbolically.
Besides, symbolic representation, those main points have been mentioned in a written form with numberings such as: 1.
Plantation 2.
Safe water 3.
Safe sanitation 4.
Hygiene and liquid waste management 5.
Solid waste management Through this placard language, vocabulary and visual-graphic modes have played vital role to communicate social awareness regarding ecological issues in Pakistan.
Beneath, this large flower epitome, it is written PM Imran Khan’s Clean Green Champion Program.
The word champion over here can signify to multiple meanings.
Firstly, the term champion is taken as a winwin game towards the elimination of global warming and dire climate change situation in order to lead a path full of greenery and forestry.
Secondly, it could be signified to the championship of eradicating health issues in Pakistan.
Bad atmosphere and climate lead to many diseases such as skin diseases, breathing problem and so on.
Lastly, the word may also ideologically refer back and forth to Imran Khan’s captaincy.
The champion and legendry captain of Pakistan cricket who won the world cup in 1992 match.
Therefore, under his leadership tis very champion program of making Pakistan clean and green has been inaugurated.
Discussing signs and their colors, it is viewed that they depict one schema related to plantation, vegetation and cleansing air pollution.
The color blue represents water therefore it is written safe water along with symbolic image.
Same is with solid waste management associated with brown color representing filth.
Liquid waste mostly from industries are extremely toxic.
Thus they not only pollute seas but also affect marine life.
Hands Climate Change and Media Representation: 206 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 are symbolic illustration of safe sanitation and convey a deeper message to fight against Covid-19 and to follow SOPs.
Last but not the least a graphic scenery illustrates vision of green Pakistan.
Green hills along with trees undoubtedly portray the national adaptation plan for building resilience to climate change.
4.1.2 Advertisement 2 In the above placard, we can see that it has been bifurcate into two parts.
On the right side the picture of PM Imran Khan has been incorporated.
He is addressing to the nation regarding the Clean Green Pakistan movement, its objectives and significance.
The background color is also green indicating the nature and color of solace.
Under his picture we can see the caption PAKISTAN CLEAN GREEN INDEX.
The caption or we can say the official logo or icon of the CGPM.
Along with written text; the map of Pakistan has also been infused.
Two colors have been used green and orange.
The words Pakistan and Green are in green color while the words Clean and Index are in orange color.
Similarly, we can scrutinize the map sign.
It is also made with the fusion of green and orange insignia.
On the left part, the placard consists pertinent message which states that Prime Minister Imran Khan’s address at the launch of clean green Pakistan.
Different color schemes and font size have been used to highlight the conveying message.
Additionally, at the top four flowers are representing visual and symbolic communication of clean green concept.
The background color at the right part of the placard is white.
The color white is mostly associated with peace and prosperity.
Indeed, the green color represents planation, orange may represents the trunk of trees, and white signifies progress towards clean green Pakistan.
Furthermore, if we view Climate Change and Media Representation: 207 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 the ideological significance of these social semiotic resources, they can be linked with the national flag of Pakistan.
It consists of two colors white and green.
Green signifies majority Muslims while white stands for minority non-Muslims.
Yet both together live in peace and harmony.
Secondly, Pakistan’s diversity extends to its climatic, socioeconomic, and environmental characteristics, which differ significantly from region to region.
Though Pakistan produce less than 1% of the global greenhouse gas emission, yet according to the long-term German Watch index Pakistan is constantly among top 10 climate vulnerable countries.
4.1.3 Advertisement 3 Above is a very carefully crafted advertisement where the technique of salience is creatively employed.
It is unconsciously compelling the addresses to plant trees by asking them in bold to JOIN the movement.
Red colour font is used for the invitation because it is of higher frequency and anyone who looks at the advertisement will read the words without even having any such intentions.
Similarly, a slogan is used in the advertisement which is further signifying the importance of the project.
The slogan ONE CHILD, ONE TREE is also printed in bold and red.
The picture of two children explains the meaning of this slogan where children are planting trees so it points towards the government initiative where the school children are asked to plant one tree each.
As children are our future so in order to give a better environment to our future generation, the masses need to support the government in making the project of billion tree tsunami successful.
Climate Change and Media Representation: 208 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 Furthermore, the badge in the advertisement is having a graphic design of a tree but if one looks at it from a little closer, the trunk of the tree is actually the image of a child so it also indicates the one child, one tree policy of the government and the importance of trees for our future generations.
Thus, salience patterns are observed in the form of typography, slogan and pictorial representation 4.1.4 Advertisement 4 In the above advertisement, metaphor is used in order to show the salience of the Billion Tree Afforestation Drive by the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Tree plantation is called as charity in order to convince more and more people to plant trees and contribute to the project of tree plantation initiated by the government.
Similarly, the words Tree are written in bold fonts in order to address the targeted audience which is also an evidence of the use of salience and due to such typography, the reader is able to read the advertisement randomly instead of reading the whole information.
Moreover, the salience feature can be seen in the above advertisement from the fact that a hadith is used in order to show the importance of planting a tree.
So the salience features of metaphor, religion and typography are used in the advertisement given above.
4.1.5 Advertisement 5 Climate Change and Media Representation: 209 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 In the above printed advertisement, the image of a tree is focused.
It is fore grounded whereas in the background, a dry desert can be identified.
It suggests that trees or greenery is more important and significant.
Similarly, a large numbers of trees that have been cut down are depicted in the background which gives a look of a graveyard as if some dead bodies are buried.
It shows that in order to make life possible on this planet, more and more trees should be planted.
Moreover, the words ‘The Last Chance’ also indicate the use of salience patterns that signifies the importance of afforestation and protecting the environment.
Typography is used in order to warn the addresses and compel them to save the environment.
Therefore, human beings need to avail this last chance and plant trees in order to save earth from turning into a graveyard of trees and eventually human life.
Conclusion In order to restore ecosystem, Pakistan has used nature-based solutions and national ecosystem-based adaptation to achieve climate change resilience.
The National Adaptation Plan or The Clean Green Pakistan Movement is an initiative taken by the government to manage environmental and health issues.
Under this adapted climate change policy, the inauguration of Climate Change and Media Representation: 210 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 "Ten Billion Tree Tsunami Programme" is the foremost objective.
Studies have shown that it has become a dire need to communicate climate alteration for the well-being our planet, humans, and non-human inhabitants.
Therefore, the researchers have stepped into the new millennium, the field of ecolinguistics in order to communicate and aware people regarding the issues related to environment with the help of linguistic properties.
In order to safeguard the environment and spread awareness among the masses regarding the wellbeing of environment, salience can be used as an important tool.
There are different ways for making a message salient, some of these methods include, the use of metaphors, bold prints, sharp colours, highlighting text, specific lexemes, typography and pictorial orientations etc.
These methods make the message salient and unconsciously persuade the public to contribute towards the project launched by the government and thus protect the environment for the future generations.
References Carvalho, A.
(2005).
Representing the politics of the greenhouse effect: Discursive strategies in the British media.
Critical discourse studies, 2(1), 1-29.
Glasser, H. (2011).
Naess's deep ecology: Implications for the human prospect and challenges for the future.
Inquiry, 54(1), 52-77. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2011.542943 Haugen, E. (1972).
The Ecology of Language.
In: Alwin Fill and Peter Mühlhäusler (ed) The Eco-linguistic Reader: Language, Ecology, and Environment.
London: Continuum.
Haugen, E. (2006).
THE ECOLOGY.
Ecolinguistics reader: Language, ecology and environment, 57. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2011.542943 Climate Change and Media Representation: 211 UNIVERSITY OF CHITRAL JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE VOL.
6 | ISSUE I | JAN – JUNE | 2022 ISSN (E): 2663-1512, ISSN (P): 2617-3611 https://doi.org/10.33195/jll.v6iI.374 Hulme, M. (2007).
Climate conflict.
New Scientist, 196(2629), 26. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0262-4079(07)62834-6 Kress, G. R., & Leeuwen, T. V. (2006).
Reading images: The grammar of visual design.
Psychology Press.
Sedlaczek, A. S. (2017).
The field-specific representation of climate change in factual television: A multimodal critical discourse analysis.
Critical Discourse Studies, 14(5), 480-496. doi:10.1080/17405904.2017.1352003 Stibbe, A.
(2015).
Ecolinguistics: Language, ecology and the stories we live by.
Routledge.
@ 2022 by the author.
Licensee University of Chitral, Journal of Linguistics & Literature, Pakistan.
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0262-4079(07)62834-6
19Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.70.1.2 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 2021 (1) 19–33.
Introduction In our days, the most important environmental phenomenon is climate change.
At a global scale, the temperature change is already observable, and by the end of the 21st century it is projected to likely exceed 1.5 °C (Stocker, T.F.
et al.
2013).
The temperature increase has complex environmental effects in global, regional and local (urban) scales, too.
The local consequences of these are at least as fundamental as those of a global scale, as the majority of the population is already concentrated in cities.
The heat load in cities is supposed to get intensified as global temperature increase will be superimposed on urban temperature modification.
Namely, owing to urban heat island (UHI) development the urban nocturnal temperature is usually higher than the rural one (Oke, T.R.
et al.
2017).
Overall, this can have far-reaching health effects (Baccini, M. et al.
2008; Bartholy, J. and Pongrácz, R. 2018).
Therefore, the studies concerning the impact of global changes on local climate of cities are of a high significance for the urban inhabitants’ health and well-being.
Therefore, in order to plan and undertake the mitigation actions in particular cities, it is necessary to recognize the possible range of heat load increase there, in terms of both its magnitude and spatial extent.
1 Department of Climatology and Landscape Ecology, University of Szeged.
H-6722 Szeged, Egyetem u.
2.
E-mails: tgal@geo.u-szeged.hu, skarbitn@geo.u-szeged.hu, molnarge@geo.u-szeged, unger@geo.u-szeged.hu Projections of the urban and intra-urban scale thermal effects of climate change in the 21st century for cities in the Carpathian Basin Tamás GÁL , Nóra SKARBIT, Gergely MOLNÁR and János UNGER 1 Abstract This study evaluates the pattern of a night-time climate index, namely the tropical nights (Tmin ≥ 20 °C) during the 21st century in several different sized cities in the Carpathian Basin.
For the modelling, MUKLIMO_3 microclimatic model and the cuboid statistical method were applied.
In order to ensure the proper representation of the thermal characteristics of an urban landscape, the Local Climate Zone (LCZ) system was used as landuse information.
For this work, LCZ maps were produced using WUDAPT methodology.
The climatic input of the model was the Carpatclim dataset for the reference period (1981–2010) and EURO-CORDEX regional model outputs for the future time periods (2021–2050, 2071–2100) and emission scenarios (RCP4.5, RCP8.5).
As results show, there would be a remarkable increase in the number of tropical nights along the century, and there is a clearly recognizable increase owing to urban landform.
In the near past, the number of the index was 6–10 nights higher in the city core than the rural area where the number of this index was negligible.
In the near future this urban-rural trend is the same, however, there is a slight increase (2–5 nights) in the index in city cores.
At the end of the century, the results of the two emission scenarios become distinct.
In the case of RCP4.5 the urban values are about 15–25 nights, what is less stressful compared to the 30–50 nights according to RCP8.5.
The results clearly highlight that the effect of urban climate and climate change would cause serious risk for urban dwellers, therefore it is crucial to perform climate mitigation and adaptation actions on both global and urban scales.
Keywords: climate change, urban climate, Local Climate Zones, urban climate modelling Received November 2020; Accepted January 2021.
Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.20 In the last few years, local authorities and urban planners in Hungary have begun to pay growing attention to the latest climate change projections.
Their interest, of course, focuses on urban-scale features and phenomena, but there are few basic research results for urban areas.
Based on these trends, new basic research results are needed to produce climate projections at the local level in order to provide basic information to urban planners on urban climate mitigation strategies or applied research in this field.
The effect of climate change on temperature is presented in IPCC reports (e.g.
IPCC 2018).
Recent climate model projections apply the Representative Concentration Pathways (Van Vuuren, D.P.
et al.
2011), and the most commonly used scenarios are RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.
These scenarios represent a global temperature increase of 2 °C and 4 °C by the end of the century, but at the regional level, the temperature change is highly variable.
Considering the Carpathian Basin, it is essential to evaluate climate projections for temperature and temperature-related climate indices, as no further climate change mitigation and adaptation plans can be implemented without this information.
In case of temperature change there are numerous regional model results (e.g.
Jacob, D. et al.
2014; Pieczka, I. et al.
2018).
Based on these results, the temperature changes in this region are 1.5–2 °C (RCP4.5) and 3–4 °C (RCP8.5) by the end of this century.
In order to help the evaluation of the future climate trends it is very suitable to utilize a climate index projection, such as the number of tropical nights (TN, when the daily Tmin ≥ 20 °C).
This particular index is a good indicator of the annual duration of adverse hot weather conditions, as a high minimum temperature also means a high daily temperature, taking into account the daily temperature cycle (Pieczka, I. et al.
2018).
For TNs, the projected trends in the Carpathian Basin are as follows: In the period 2021–2040, their numbers are 10–15 (RCP4.5) and 10–20 (RCP8.5), and in the period 2081–2100 they are 20–30 (RCP4.5) and 40–60 (RCP8.5) (Pieczka, I. et al.
2018).
It is important to highlight that these results are derived from regional climate models and the urban impact does not appear within these model outputs, so an evaluation of a detailed model experiment for urban areas in the Carpathian Basin would provide vital information for climate change related decisions.
It is essential to use an urban climate model to predict the climate in urban areas.
Recently, these models have evolved rapidly (Kusaka, H. et al.
2001; Martilli, A. et al.
2002; Lemonsu, A. et al.
2012; Lee, S.-H. et al.
2016; Ryu, Y.H.
et al.
2016).
Most of these model development initiatives are related to the Weather Research and Forecasting Model (WRF), Molnár, G. et al.
(2020) briefly discusses these models.
There are only a few other smaller-scale modelling options, e.g.
ENVI-met (Bruse, M. and Fleer, H. 1998), Town Energy Balance (Masson, V. 2000) and MUKLIMO_3 models (Sievers, U.
1995).
MUKLIMO_3 offers a great possibility for climate projection for urban areas, since combined with the statistical cuboidmethod it is capable for time effective simulation.
The other advantage of this model is the representation of building arrays.
In the urban parametrizations related to WRF the built-up is modelled with the urban canyon concept, however, in MUKLIMO_3 the built-up is regarded as a porous volume.
This concept is more close to reality in open urban built-up zones, where urban canyons cannot be defined properly.
The computational time efficiency and the replacement of urban canyon concept were the main reasons for using this model.
In the case of local-scale climate modelling, the selection of land cover data is crucial.
There are a number of possible data sources for this, such as the CORINE land cover, the USGS land use dataset, and the Open Street Map.
These databases have their advantages, however, none of them have been designed to represent urban thermal reactions.
In the field of urban climatology, the Local Climate Zone (LCZ) classification (Stewart, I.D.
and Oke, T.R.
2012) is widely accepted as a representation of urban land use (Table 1) and is used to characterize the environment of the measurement sites (e.g.
Siu, L.W.
and Hart, M.A.
2013; Stewart, I.D.
et al.
2014; Lehnert, M. et al.
2015) or to map 21Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.
different urban neighbourhoods (e.g.
Lelovics, E. et al.
2014; Zheng, Y. et al.
2018).
Therefore, this scheme can also be used as surface input for numerical modelling (Žuvela-Aloise, M. 2017; Kwok, Y.T.
et al.
2019).
The application of this scheme is advantageous because it is based on the thermal characteristics of the urban areas, i.e.
it can be linked to the UHI phenomenon, which is the most important climate modification in these areas.
Appropriate application of LCZ in local-scale climate modelling provides a good basis for global comparisons or validation, and the trends obtained from the results can be generalized.
In this study the c l i m a t e p r o j e c tion outputs of the EURO-CORDEX regional models, the MUKLIMO_3 microclimatic numerical model, and the cuboid method (Früh, B. et al.
2011) were used to explore the combined effects of regional climate change and urban climate.
The modelling process is based on LCZs as appropriate urban parameterization.
Our previous studies of the thermal indices draw attention to the importance of this topic: in case of Szeged there is a remarkable increase in different thermal indices by the end of the century, namely, a strong warming trend can be expected (Skarbit, N. and Gál, T. 2016; Bokwa, A. et al.
2018).
The purpose of this study is twofold: (i) Analysis and comparison of the patterns of the annual values of tropical nights (TNs) quantifying the thermal load of the cities in the Carpathian Basin in the current (1981–2010) and future climate change periods based on two different future emission scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5).
(ii) Determining the overall additional thermal load in urban areas relative to their natural surroundings for each scenario during these periods.
Study areas The investigation focuses on different sized cities with different geographical background in the Carpathian Basin, mainly on low-lying areas with moderate relief (Figure 1).
The population of the selected 26 cities is between 20,000 and 1,675,000 (Table 2).
Table 1.
Built and land cover LCZ classes* Built types Land cover types LCZ 1 – Compact high-rise LCZ 2 – Compact midrise LCZ 3 – Compact low-rise LCZ 4 – Open high-rise LCZ 5 – Open midrise LCZ 6 – Open low-rise LCZ 7 – Lightweight low-rise LCZ 8 – Large low-rise LCZ 9 – Sparsely built LCZ 10 – Heavy industry LCZ A – Dense trees LCZ B – Scattered trees LCZ C – Bush, scrub LCZ D – Low plants LCZ E – Bare rock / paved LCZ F – Bare soil / sand LCZ G – Water *After Stewart, I.D.
and Oke, T.R.
2012.
Fig.
1.
Locations of the studied cities in the Carpathian Basin (modelling domains marked by black frames) Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.22 An analysis of the current and future thermal situation of all 26 cities would go beyond the scope of this paper because of the length limitation.
Therefore, we illustrate our results by selecting five city size categories, and we analyse the thermal situation of one city per category in detail (marked by italics in Table 2).
Methods In order to get detailed information about the local scale future changes of thermal effects the MUKLIMO_3 model (Sievers, U.
1995) and cuboid method (Früh, B. et al.
2011) were applied to achieve high spatial resolution results inside the cities.
The model is nonhydrostatic and calculates atmospheric temperature, relative humidity and wind field in a 3D grid by solving the Reynolds-averaged Navier-Stokes equations.
Parametrizations are used for unresolved buildings, short-wave and long-wave radiation, balanced heat and moisture budgets in the soil (Sievers, U. and Zdunkowski, W. 1985).
The initial meteorology conditions were ensured by a 1D profile from a reference station within the study area.
To run the model, high-resolution orography and land use distribution data were needed.
The horizontal resolution of 100 m was adjusted, while the vertical resolution changes in height and more accurate near to the surface, where the essential processes occur.
The vertical resolution near to the surface is 10 m and increases by several steps to the top of the model domain where it is 100 m. For most cities 25 vertical layers were enough, however, in some cases, where the topography was more variable we applied more layers (in Budapest 35, Eger 36, Miskolc 38, Novi Sad 33, Pécs 36, Salgótarján 40, Tatabánya 35 and Veszprém 30 layers).
For our analysis, the orography data was provided by EU-DEM.
The MUKLIMO_3 applies custom land use categories, thus, any land use classification system is usable if the necessary surface, vegetation and built-up parameters are provided.
This property of the model allows applying any urban land use classification as an input for urban landforms.
Using this advantage, we could apply the LCZ system to describe the land use.
We used Bechtel-method for LCZ mapping of the selected cities (see Figure 1), which applies free-access data and software (Bechtel, B. et al.
2015, 2019).
This method is the basis of World Urban Database and Access Portal Tools (WUDAPT) which is a scientific initiative aiming to develop a global database for urban climate modelling.
For this study, we used several Landsat images from different dates, in order to achieve more reliable LCZ Table 2.
Population of the studied cities* City size category by range of population in 1,000 inhabitants City Population, 1,000 inhabitants 1 (over 1,000) Budapest 1,675 2 (between 200 and 400) Timisoara (RO) Novi Sad (SRB) Oradea (RO) Debrecen 315 215 207 201 3 (between 100 and 199) Arad (RO) Szeged Miskolc Pécs Nyíregyháza Kecskemét Subotica (SRB) 169 162 158 147 120 110 100 4 (between 50 and 99) Székesfehérvár Zrenjanin (SRB) Szolnok Tatabánya Kaposvár Békéscsaba Veszprém Eger 96 80 70 68 63 59 55 52 5 (between 20 and 49) Hódmezővásárhely Baja Salgótarján Szekszárd Siófok Makó 44 36 35 32 25 23 *Results of the cities written in italics are presented in details in this paper.
Source: For Hungarian cities: https://nyilvantarto.hu, for other cities: https://worldpopulationreview.com/ 23Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.
classification.
This approach ensures that the yearly changes of agricultural processes or vegetation cycle do not affect the final LCZ maps.
The process was verified with field surveys in order to avoid misclassifications.
To represent the thermal effects of climate change several climate indices were calculated and to obtain these climate indices the so-called cuboid method was used, which is a statistical dynamical downscaling method (Früh, B. et al.
2011; Žuvela-Aloise, M. et al.
2014).
This process is basically a tri-linear interpolation of air temperature, relative humidity and wind fields derived by MUKLIMO_3 simulations and produces 30 year mean of annual number of 6 different climate indices.
The method assumes that heat load situations can occur in case of specified weather situations, which can be described by the mentioned variables.
The necessary inputs for the calculation of these climate indices are a 30-year daily climate dataset from a reference station and 8 singleday MUKLIMO_3 simulations for two prevailing wind direction (16 simulations).
In this study the model outputs related to the tropical nights (TNs) are presented.
The process of climate change was examined through two future periods, 2021‒2050 and 2071‒2100 as well as period 1981‒2010 was considered as reference.
To obtain input climate data for the cuboid method, the Carpatclim database (Szalai, S. et al.
2013) was applied for the reference period.
It provides meteorological daily data for the Carpathian Region in spatial resolution of 0.1°.
The database does not cover the entire area of Hungary, thus, cities in the western part of the country were excluded from the research.
For the 21st century, data of EUROCORDEX model simulations with resolution 0.11° were used (Jacob, D. et al.
2014).
The selection of the simulations was based on whether they include the necessary biascorrected variables for the cuboid method e.g.
air temperature, relative humidity wind speed and direction.
Accordingly, 12 simulations were selected, which apply scenarios RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 also.
The cuboid method was executed for all model simulations and the results were averaged by the scenarios.
Results and discussion Examples of urban TN patterns by city categories Due to its dense built-up and large spatial extent, the number of TNs is relatively high in Budapest in the period of 1981–2010, and the maximum value in the city centre exceeds 20 (Figure 2, b).
The number of TNs exceeds 10 in the remarkable part of the urban area and 15 in the interior.
The pattern of higher values extends to the northeast due to the compact structure of this area (LCZ 3).
Relatively high values also appear in the south-eastern part of the city, which may be caused by the prevailing wind direction.
The high values of the southern city centre are the results of the LCZ 8, as this type of zone contains large impervious surfaces.
This LCZ also appears scattered outside the urban area, with values above 5, especially in the south.
In both scenarios, there are clear changes in the period 2021–2050 compared to the reference period, but there is no considerable difference between them (Figure 2, c-d).
TNmax values are 31 and 35, respectively, according to RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.
In most parts of the city, the value of TN in both cases exceeds 15.
There are differences between the scenarios in the patterns of the values of 20 and 25, which are more extended into the North, South, and downtown areas for RCP8.5.
At the end of the century, there will be strong changes compared to the period 2021–2050, and the differences between the scenarios will become more remarkable (Figure 2, e-f).
According to RCP4.5 the number of TNs is over 20 in almost the whole city and the area of TNs over 25 is also expanded (TNmax is 42).
At the centre, the typical value exceeds 30, but even values above 40 appear in a smaller area.
For RCP8.5, TNmax is 71 and the number of TNs is over 40 almost throughout the city.
The extension of values above 50 is also noteworthy, while in the city centre the number exceeds 60.
Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.24 Fig.
2.
LCZ map (a) and patterns of the tropical nights in Budapest (Hungary) in 1981‒2010 (b), in 2021‒2050 by RCP4.5 (c), in 2021‒2050 by RCP8.5 (d), in 2071‒2100 by RCP4.5 (e) and in 2071‒2100 by RCP8.5 (f).
The prevailing wind direction are NW and E. 25Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.
In the case of Debrecen, the smaller population and areal extent compared to the capital is reflected in the number of TNs.
Its value exceeds 5 in the more densely built-up western part of the city and in the LCZ 8 between 1981 and 2010 (Figure 3, b).
In the city centre, values above 10 occur mostly in the area of compact LCZs, but values above 15 can also be observed in a relatively small area (with a maximum of 16).
The effect of the second dominant wind direction (north-east) also appears in the pattern.
There will be minimal changes in the period 2021–2050, the scenarios show similar results, and the change between them is negligible (Figure 3, c-d).
The only considerable change is the increased area of TNs over 10 and 15, which appear with slightly different magnitudes by scenarios.
The maximum values are 17 and 19 according to the different RCPs.
Remarkable changes is observed in the period of 2071–2100 and the differences between the scenario values are relatively large (Figure 3, e-f).
According to RCP4.5, in most parts of the city the values are over 10 and the number of TNs in the interior exceeds 15, while in LCZ 2 it exceeds 20 (TNmax is 25).
For RCP8.5, the values are more than twice as high: in most parts of the city, the number of TNs exceeds 30, while in the centre it is greater even 40 (TNmax is 51).
Considering Arad, which represents the next category of cities, the magnitude of TNs is similar, but slightly lower than in Debrecen.
During the reference period, the number of TNs exceeds 5 in densely builtup areas and 10 in the small area of LCZ 8 (TNmax is 11) (Figure 4, b).
The effect of the prevailing wind directions is reflected in the north-west extent of the pattern.
In the case of this city, too, the near future will not bring major changes and the difference between the scenarios is minimal, the maximum values are 13 and 14 (Figure 4, c-d).
The change compared to the reference period is the increase in areas above 5 and 10.
This increase occurs especially around the green area in the south-east and in the north-western parts of the city.
In 2071–2100, the changes according to RCP4.5 are noticeable, but not salient (Figure 4, e).
The pattern is similar to the previous period, but the values are higher of about 5 (TNmax is 21).
The other change is the appearance of values above 5 in the western part of the study area, which may be the result of the prevailing wind directions and the dense tree zone (LCZ A).
For RCP8.5, the changes are twice as high (Figure 4, f) in almost the entire city and in densely built-up areas the number of TNs exceeds 30 and 40, respectively (TNmax is 50).
Although the population of Zrenjanin is lower than that of the previous two cities, the number of TNs in the reference period is higher due to its location at a lower latitude (Figure 5, b).
In almost the entire area of the city the value exceeds 5, except for the southern part.
In the LCZ 8 and LCZ 5 it is over 10, while LCZ3 it has more than 15 (TNmax is 23).
In the period 2021–2050 the pattern values exceed 5 and 10, especially according to RCP8.5 (Figure 5, c-d).
In addition, values above 15 appear scattered across the western and southeastern areas.
The TNmax is 21 and 24 for the different RCPs.
The lack of increase of the maximum values in case of RCP4.5 is the result of the application of different climate input for the reference and future periods (Carpatclim and EURO-CORDEX).
Considering the results between 2071 and 2100, the changes are of a similar magnitude as in previous cities (Figure 5, e-f).
At RCP4.5, the number of TNs is over 15 throughout the city.
Besides, values above 20 appear scattered throughout the pattern, especially in LCZ 8 and LCZ 5.
In the core (dominated by LCZ 3), the values exceed 25 and even 30 in a small area (TNmax is 31).
The outcomes of RCP8.5 during this period show far high values, which are slightly more than twice as high as those of RCP4.5: almost the entire area of the city has more than 40 TNs and values above 50 appear in the previously mentioned zones and are above 60 in the city core (TNmax is 62).
Hódmezővásárhely is the smallest among the example cities, however, this is not reflected in the number of TNs (Figure 6, b).
Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.26 Fig.
3.
LCZ map (a) and patterns of the tropical nights in Debrecen (Hungary) in 1981‒2010 (b), in 2021‒2050 by RCP4.5 (c), in 2021‒2050 by RCP8.5 (d), in 2071‒2100 by RCP4.5 (e) and in 2071‒2100 by RCP8.5 (f).
The prevailing wind directions are S and NE.
27Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.
Fig.
4.
LCZ map (a) and patterns of the tropical nights in Arad (Romania) in 1981‒2010 (b), in 2021‒2050 by RCP4.5 (c), in 2021‒2050 by RCP8.5 (d), in 2071‒2100 by RCP4.5 (e) and in 2071‒2100 by RCP8.5 (f).
The prevailing wind directions are S and SE.
Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.28 Fig.
5.
LCZ map (a) and patterns of the tropical nights in Zrenjanin (Serbia) in 1981‒2010 (b), in 2021‒2050 by RCP4.5 (c), in 2021‒2050 by RCP8.5 (d), in 2071‒2100 by RCP4.5 (e) and in 2071‒2100 by RCP8.5 (f).
The prevailing wind directions are SE and NW.
29Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.
In the reference period, the city boundary almost coincides with line 5, while in LCZ 8 the numbers exceed 10 (TNmax is 11).
In the near future, minor changes will take place, which is reflected in the expansion of value areas above 5 and 10 (Figure 6, c-d).
The main difference between the scenarios is the increased area of values above 10, which is even greater for RCP8.5: not only LCZ 5 and LCZ 8 are affected, but also the N-NE part of the city.
The maximum values according to RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 are 12 and 13, respectively.
For 2071–2100, the change in RCP4.5 is not outstanding: the number of TNs exceeds 10 in the entire urban area and is greater than 15 in most of the city, which means the densely built-up south-west, the south-east LCZ 8 and the aforementioned north-northeast (Figure 6, e).
The TNmax does not exceed 20, which is exceptional among the presented cities.
For RCP8.5, the values in the whole urban area exceed 30 and are higher than 40 in the previously mentioned areas, and exceed 45 in the south-west and south-east (TNmax is 48) (Figure 6, f).
Urban-rural heat load differences According to Table 3, the number of TNs in the reference period does not exceed 5 in the rural areas.
In the urban areas the dispersion is high: the values are between 5 and 10 in most cities, while they exceed 10 in larger cities and 15 only in the southernmost ones (Novi Sad and Zrenjanin).
In the period 2021–2050, there will be minimal changes compared to 1981–2010, and the difference between the scenarios is also minimal.
For RCP4.5, rural values are still below 5 with the exception of 3 cities, while urban values are between 10 and 15.
The deviation of the TNs of RCP8.5 from RCP4.5 during this period is only 1–2 nights.
Remarkable changes appear in 2071–2100 especially in case of RCP8.5 and the difference between the scenarios is enormous.
While the rural TNs of RCP4.5 are below 5 in most cases and do not exceed 15, RCP8.5 values are basically between 15 and 25 (except extreme cases).
The urban TNs of RCP4.5 are usually between 15 and 25, however, for RCP8.5 there are very few cities where this number does not exceed 30.
Typical TN values are between 40 and 50, but in four cases the number exceeds even 50 (e.g.
Budapest).
The differences among the cities are mostly determined by the location, size, topography and built-up (LCZ) types.
The highest values appear for larger and/or southern cities such as Budapest, Novi Sad and Zrenjanin.
For smaller cities and/or cities with higher altitudes and latitudes (e.g.
Salgótarján), the TN values are generally lower.
The results – particularly the rural values in Table 3 – can be compared to Pieczka, I. et al.
(2018), which is the only example of tropical night extrapolation in the Carpathian Basin.
According to Pieczka, I. et al.
(2018), in case of period 2021–2040 and 2081–2100 the values are 10 and 15–30 days higher, respectively.
There are some possible explanations of these differences.
Firstly, the time periods are different, and in case of 2081–2100 it could cause major differences since in theory the first 10 years should be less warm than the last 20 within the period of 2071–2100.
Secondly, in our study the outputs of 12 different regional models were applied meanwhile and Pieczka, I. et al.
(2018) presented the results only of a single model.
As the temperature extrapolation of the models are also different, it could also explain partly of the above mentioned differences.
Finally, the values presented in Table 3 are the spatial mean of LCZ D areas within the domains, therefore several local and micro-scale climate effects (nearby water surfaces or forest areas, small scale terrain forms) occur, which are not implemented in regional scale models.
Consequently, the comparison of these values is not entirely correct.
The built-up environment causes remarkable differences in the number of TNs between the rural and urban area.
Table 3 clearly shows that the maximum difference in each city depends on the size and location of the city and the time period and scenario.
These results clearly support the motivation for local-scale climate modelling, as regional-scale Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.30 Fig.
6.
LCZ map (a) and patterns of the tropical nights in Hódmezővásárhely (Hungary) in 1981‒2010 (b), in 2021‒2050 by RCP4.5 (c), in 2021‒2050 by RCP8.5 (d), in 2071‒2100 by RCP4.5 (e) and in 2071‒2100 by RCP8.5 (f).
The prevailing wind directions are S and NW.
modelling can only determine rural conditions, whereas at the local scale, urban and intra-urban conditions can also be explored.
The knowledge gained in this way is very valuable, as this type of projection of the increasing heat load in cities varying from district to district during the century, allows the authorities and partly the individuals to take appropriate preventive measures to mitigate the expected negative effects.
31Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.
Conclusions In this study the future changes in the number of TNs were examined through three time periods in several cities in the Carpathian Basin.
The results reveal that both the size and latitude of cities affect the values that are higher in southern and larger cities.
Inside the cities the built-up types, the location and prevailing wind directions are determinative factors.
In general, the change in the number of TNs and the difference between the scenarios are not remarkable in 2021–2050, the substantial change will occur in 2071–2100, especially for RCP8.5.
Our results show the extent to which different built-up types modify (actually amplify) differently the effects of climate change.
In this way, they provide detailed information on future processes not only for the regions (rural areas), but also for the cities, which are already, but will continue to be, the primary sites of human activity.
Therefore, these results can serve as a guide for urban planners and local authorities to create neighbourhoods that are more liveable and better adapted to future changes.
Table 3.
General information on the urban-rural difference in the mean number of tropical nights during the 21st century by cities* City category Period 1981–2010 2021–2050 2071–2100 Scenario RCP4.5 RCP8.5 RCP4.5 RCP8.5 R U R U R U R U R U 1 Budapest 3 13 8 20 8 22 12 29 31 54 2 Timisoara (RO) Novi Sad (SRB) Oradea (RO) Debrecen 3 5 2 2 13 18 6 12 2 6 2 1 12 17 6 13 2 7 2 2 13 19 7 15 4 11 4 3 20 26 11 21 20 32 18 15 50 53 34 46 3 Arad (RO) Szeged Miskolc Pécs Nyíregyháza Kecskemét Subotica (SRB) 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 5 11 3 6 9 10 10 2 2 1 5 1 1 1 6 15 6 13 10 14 10 2 2 1 5 1 2 1 7 16 7 14 12 15 11 3 3 3 9 2 3 2 11 22 14 21 17 22 16 18 15 14 28 11 16 12 35 47 35 48 40 47 38 4 Székesfehérvár Zrenjanin (SRB) Szolnok Tatabánya Kaposvár Békéscsaba Veszprém Eger 2 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 7 17 9 0 2 10 1 0 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 10 16 14 3 4 11 4 3 4 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 11 18 15 4 5 12 5 3 6 5 3 4 4 2 4 2 17 26 21 7 8 18 8 5 24 23 17 17 19 13 17 10 41 56 46 24 29 43 28 19 5 Hódmezővásárhely Baja Salgótarján Szekszárd Siófok Makó 3 2 0 2 3 2 8 6 0 6 9 5 3 3 1 3 6 2 11 11 2 10 13 7 3 3 1 3 6 2 12 12 3 10 14 8 5 5 2 6 11 4 18 18 4 16 22 13 22 24 11 20 36 19 44 46 17 36 54 37 *Values are spatial means of different LCZs: R = LCZ D, U = the warmest LCZ in the given city.
City categories and cities written in italics are explained in Table 2.
Acknowledgements: This research was supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office, Hungary (NKFI K-120346) and Ministry of Human Capacities, Hungary grant 20391-3/2018/FEKUSTRAT and TUDFO/47138-1/2019-ITM.
We acknowledge the CORDEX project for producing and making available their model output and the Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD) for making available the MUKLIMO_3 model.’ Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.32 REFERENCES Baccini, M., Biggeri, A., Accetta, G., Kosatsky, T., Katsouyanni, K., Analitis, A., Anderson, H.R., Bisanti, L., D’Ippoliti, D., Danova, J., Forsberg, B., Medina, S., Paldy, A., Rabczenko, D., Schindler, C. and Michelozzi, P. 2008.
Heat effects on mortality in 15 European cities.
Epidemiology 19.
711–719.
Doi: 10.1097/EDE.0b013e318176bfcd Bartholy, J. and Pongrácz, R. 2018.
A brief review of health-related issues occurring in urban areas related to global warming of 1.5 °C.
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 30.
123–132.
Bechtel, B., Alexander, P.J., Böhner, J., Ching, J., Conrad, O., Feddema, J., Mills, G., See, L. and Stewart, I.
2015.
Mapping local climate zones for a worldwide database of the form and function of cities.
ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information 4.
199–219.
Bechtel, B., Alexander, P.J., Beck, C., Böhner, J., Broussed, O., Ching, J., Demuzere, M., Fonteg, C., Gál, T., Hidalgo, J., Hoffmann, P., Middel, A., Mills, G., Ren, C., See, L., Sismanidis, P., See, L. Verdonck, M-L., Xu, G. and Xu, Y.
2019.
Generating WUDAPT Level 0 data – Current status of production and evaluation.
Urban Climate 27.
24–45.
Doi: 10.1016/j.uclim.2018.10.001 Bokwa, A., Dobrovolný, P., Gál, T., Geletič, J., Gulyás, Á., Hajto, M.J., Holec, J., Hollósi, B., Kielar, R., Lehnert, M., Skarbit, N., Šťastný, P., Švec, M., Unger, J., Walawender, J.P. and ŽuvelaAloise, M. 2018.
Urban climate in Central European cities and global climate change.
Acta Climatologica 51–52.
7–35.
Doi: 10.14232/acta.clim.2018.52.1 Bruse, M. and Fleer, H. 1998.
Simulating surface– plant–air interactions inside urban environments with a three dimensional numerical model.
Environmental Modelling & Software 13.
373−384.
Doi: 10.1016/S1364-8152(98)00042-5 Früh, B., Becker, P., Deutschländer, T., Hessel, J.D., Kossmann, M., Mieskes, I., Namyslo, J., Roos, M., Sievers, U., Steigerwald, T., Turau, H. and Wienert, U.
2011.
Estimation of climate-change impacts on the urban heat load using an urban climate model and regional climate projections.
Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 50.
167–184.
Doi: 10.1175/2010JAMC2377.1 IPCC 2018.
Global Warming of 1.5 °C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
Eds.
: Masson-Delmotte, V., Zhai, P., Pörtner, H.-O., Roberts, D., Skea, J., Shukla, P.R., Pirani, A., Moufouma-Okia, W., Péan, C., Pidcock, R., Connors, S., Matthews, J.B.R., Chen, Y., Zhou, X., Gomis, M.I., Lonnoy, E., Maycock, T., Tignor, M. and Waterfield, T. Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ Jacob, D., Petersen, J., Eggert, B., Alias, A., Christensen, O.
B., Bouwer, L., Braun, A., Colette, A., Déqué, M., Georgievski, G., Georgopoulou, E., Gobiet, A., Menut, L., Nikulin, G., Haensler, A., Hempelmann, N., Jones, C., Keuler, K., Kovats, S., Kröner, N., Kotlarski, S., Kriegsmann, A., Martin, E., Meijgaard, E., Moseley, C., Pfeifer, S., Preuschmann, S., Radermacher, C., Radtke, K., Rechid, D., Rounsevell, M., Samuelsson, P., Somot, S., Soussana, J.-F., Teichmann, C., Valentini, R., Vautard, R., Weber, B. and Yiou, P. 2014.
EURO-CORDEX: new high-resolution climate change projections for European impact research.
Regional Environmental Change 14.
563–578.
Doi: 10.1007/s10113-013-0499-2 Kusaka, H., Kondo, H., Kikegawa, Y. and Kimura, F. 2001.
A simple single-layer urban canopy model for atmospheric models: comparison with multi-layer and slab models.
Boundary-Layer Meteorology 101.
329–358.
Doi: 10.1023/A:1019207923078 Kwok, Y.T., Schoetter, R., Lau, K.K-L., Hidalgo, J., Ren, C., Pigeon, G. and Masson, V. 2019.
How well does the local climate zone scheme discern the thermal environment of Toulouse (France)?
An analysis using numerical simulation data.
International Journal of Climatology 39.
5292–5315.
Doi: 10.1002/joc.6140 Lee, S.-H., Lee, H., Park, S.B., Woo, J.W., Lee, D.I.
and Baik, J.J. 2016.
Impacts of in-canyon vegetation and canyon aspect ratio on the thermal environment of street canyons: numerical investigation using a coupled WRF-VUCM model.
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 142.
2562–2578.
Doi: 10.1002/qj.2847 Lehnert, M., Geletič, J., Husák, J. and Vysoudil, M. 2015.
Urban field classification by “local climate zones” in a medium-sized Central European city: the case of Olomouc (Czech Republic).
Theoretical and Applied Climatology 122.
531–541.
Doi: 10.1007/ s00704-014-1309-6 Lelovics, E., Unger, J., Gál, T. and Gál, C.V. 2014.
Design of an urban monitoring network based on Local Climate Zone mapping and temperature pattern modelling.
Climate Research 61.
51–62.
Doi: 10.3354/cr01220 Lemonsu, A., Masson, V., Shashua-Bar, L., Erell, E. and Pearlmutter, D. 2012.
Inclusion of vegetation in the Town Energy Balance model for modelling urban green areas.
Geoscientific Model Development 5.
1377–1393.
Doi: 10.5194/gmd-5-1377-2012 Martilli, A., Clappier, A. and Rotach, M.W.
2002.
An urban surface exchange parameterisation for mesoscale models.
Boundary-Layer Meteorology 104.
261–304.
Doi: 10.1023/A:1016099921195 33Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.
Masson, V. 2000.
A physically-based scheme for the urban energy budget in atmospheric models.
Boundary-Layer Meteorology 94.
357−397.
Ministry of the Interior of Hungary.
Available at https://nyilvantarto.hu (last accessed: 16.11.2020) Molnár, G., Kovács, A. and Gál, T. 2020.
How does anthropogenic heating affect the thermal environment in a medium-sized Central European city?
A case study in Szeged, Hungary.
Urban Climate 34.100673.
Doi: 10.1016/j.uclim.2020.100673 Oke, T.R., Mills, G., Christen, A. and Voogt, J.A.
2017.
Urban Climates.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Pieczka, I., Pongrácz, R. and Bartholy, J.
2018.
Future temperature projections for Hungary based on RegCM4.3 simulations using new Representative Concentration Pathways scenarios.
International Journal of Global Warming 15.
277–292.
Ryu, Y.H., Bou-Zeid, E., Wang, Z.-H. and Smith, J.A.
2016.
Realistic representation of urban trees in an urban canopy model.
Boundary-Layer Meteorology 159.
193–220.
Doi: 10.1007/s10546-015-0120-y Sievers, U. and Zdunkowski, W. 1985.
A numerical simulation scheme for the albedo of city street canyons.
Boundary-Layer Meteorology 33.
245–257.
Sievers , U.
1995 .
Veral lgemeinerung der Stromfunktionsmethode auf drei Dimensionen.
Meteorologische Zeitschrift 4.
3–15.
Siu, L.W.
and Hart, M.A.
2013.
Quantifying urban heat island intensity in Hong Kong SAR, China.
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 185.
4383–4398.
Doi: 10.1007/s10661-012-2876-6 Skarbit, N. and Gál, T. 2016.
Projection of intra-urban modification of nighttime climate indices during the 21st century.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65.
(2): 181–193.
Doi: 10.15201/hungeobull.65.2.8 Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.K., Tignor, M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. and Midgley, P.M. 2013.
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate.
Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press.
Stewart, I.D.
and Oke, T.R.
2012.
Local Climate Zones for urban temperature studies.
Bulletin of American Meteorological Society 93.
1879–1900.
Doi: 10.1175/ BAMS-D-11-00019.1 Stewart, I.D., Oke, T.R.
and Krayenhoff, E.S.
2014.
Evaluation of the ‘local climate zone’ scheme using temperature observations and model simulations.
International Journal of Climatology 34.
1062–1080.
Doi: 10.1002/joc.3746 Szalai, S., Auer, I., Hiebl, J., Milkovich, J., Radim, T., Stepanek, P., Zahradnicek, P., Bihari, Z., Lakatos, M., Szentimrey, T., Limanowka, D., Kilar, P., Cheval, S., Deak, Gy., Mihic, D., Antolovic, I., Mihajlovic, V., Nejedlik, P., Stastny, P., Mikulova, K., Nabyvanets, I., Skyryk, O., Krakovskaya, S., Vogt, J., Antofie, T. and Spinoni, J.
2013.
Climate of the Greater Carpathian Region.
Final Technical Report.
Available at www.
carpatclim-eu.org/pages/download/ Van Vuuren, D.P., Edmonds, J., Kainuma, M., Riahi, K., Thomson, A., Hibbard, K., Hurtt, G.C., Kram, T., Krey, V., Lamarque, J-F., Masui, T., Meinshausen, M., Nakicenovic, N., Smith, S.J.
and Rose, S.K.
2011.
The representative concentration pathways: an overview.
Climatic Change 109.
5–31.
Doi: 10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z World Population Review.
Available at https://worldpopulationreview.com/ (last accessed: 06.11.2020) Zheng, Y., Ren, C., Xu, Y., Wang, R., Ho, J., Lau, K. and Ng, E. 2018.
GIS-based mapping of Local Climate Zone in the high-density city of Hong Kong.
Urban Climate 24.
419–448.
Doi: 10.1007/ s10661-020-08608-4 Žuvela-Aloise, M., Koch, R., Neureiter, A., Böhm, R. and Buchholz, S. 2014.
Reconstructing urban climate of Vienna based on historical maps dating to the early instrumental period.
Urban Climate 10.
490–508.
Doi: 10.1016/j.uclim.2014.04.002 Žuvela-Aloise, M. 2017.
Enhancement of urban heat load through social inequalities on an example of a fictional city King’s Landing.
International Journal of Biometeorology 61.
527–539.
Doi: 10.1007/s00484016-1230-z Gál, T. et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (1) 19–33.34
CARBON EMISSIONS EMBODIED IN RUSSIA’S TRADE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY Review of European and Russian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 ISSN 1718-4835 CARBON EMISSIONS EMBODIED IN RUSSIA’S TRADE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY1 Igor A. Makarov2 and Anna K. Sokolova3 National Research University Higher School of Economics Abstract According to the current international climate change regime, countries are responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that result from economic activities within their national borders, including emissions from producing goods for export.
At the same time, imports of carbonintensive goods are not addressed by international agreements, including the Paris Agreement that was adopted in 2015.
This paper examines emissions embodied in Russia’s exports and imports based on the results of an input-output analysis.
Russia is the second largest exporter of emissions embodied in trade and the large portion of these emissions is directed to developed countries.
Because of the large amount of net exports of carbon-intensive goods, the current approach to emissions accounting does not suit Russia’s interests.
On the one hand, Russia, as well as other large net emissions exporters, is interested in the revision of allocation of responsibility between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive products.
On the other hand, both the commodity exports structure and relatively carbon inefficient technologies make Russia vulnerable to the policy of “carbon protectionism,” which can be implemented by its trade partners.
1 Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Igor A. Makarov is Associate Professor at the Department of World Economy, Head of World Economy Education Programme, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.
3 Anna K. Sokolova is Junior Research Fellow at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.
2 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Introduction Climate change is one of the acute global issues extensively damaging the world economy.
According to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), anthropogenic GHG emissions, primarily CO2, are the main cause of climate change (IPCC 2013).
International climate cooperation that started in the 1990s made it necessary to account for emissions associated with separate countries.
The key issue is how to define which country is responsible for emissions.
In order to fulfill obligations under international agreements (the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement), countries prepare national inventories containing information about the emissions that take place “within national territory and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdiction” (IPCC 2006).
This approach is the most transparent and feasible but has some drawbacks because it does not address international trade flows.
Meanwhile, around 30% of global CO2 emissions are released during the production of internationally traded goods (Sato 2014).
Therefore, an increase in the consumption of carbon-intensive goods in one country may not lead to an increase in its emissions, but will contribute to an increase in emissions in other countries who are suppliers of carbonintensive products.
This situation is aggravated by the fact that most of the carbon-intensive trade flows are directed from developing to developed countries.
Developing countries are not listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and therefore have not taken quantitative commitments for emissions reduction under the Kyoto Protocol.
This means that the growth in carbon intensive product consumption in developed countries, which is related to imports from developing countries, is not regulated within the international climate change regime.
Moreover, it induces “emission (carbon) leakage,” that is, the increase in emissions outside developed countries due to rising imports of carbon-intensive products from developing countries (as a result of the policy to cap emissions).
There is an alternative approach to emission accounting based on the consumption, not the production of a particular country.
According to this approach, emissions that have occurred abroad due to production of imported goods are accounted along with emissions from domestic final consumption.
In this case, preconditions for “emission leakage” disappear and additional incentives for reducing consumption (but not production and exports) of carbon-intensive products arise.
According to Peters et al.
(2011), net embodied emissions exports from developing to developed countries increased from 0.4 Gt CO2 in 1990 to 1.6 Gt CO2 in 2008, which exceeds the Kyoto Protocol emission reductions.
Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) calculated that Kyoto commitments had led to growth in embodied carbon imports of committed countries from noncommitted ones by around 8%.
Global production-based and consumption-based emissions are equal.
However, they vary in different countries.
According to Peters and Hertwich (2008), in 2001 total consumption-based emissions of Annex I countries were 5% higher than their production-based emissions.
In particular, in 2001 the USA’s consumption-based emissions exceeded its production-based emissions by 7.3%.
Unlike the USA, the production-based emissions of China and Russia were 17.8% and 21.6% higher than consumption-based emissions.
3 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 The difference between production-based and consumption-based emissions is their net emissions exports4.
The gaps between national production-based and consumption-based emissions are defined by international trade flows of intermediate and final goods.
The generally used assessment method for carbon content of trade (“virtual carbon”5) is input-output analysis (IOA), which allows us to take the whole supply chain into account.
Emissions embodied in trade constitute a significant part of global emissions and estimating them is necessary to assess the actual carbon footprint of countries (consumption-based, not productionbased).
This paper discusses the results of analysis of inter-country input-output tables aimed at calculating emissions embodied in exports and imports of major countries and Russia in particular.
In this paper, we estimate the volume of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports and imports.
The main hypothesis is that due to Russia’s large ‘virtual carbon’ exports, the international climate change regime based on production-based emissions accounting doesn’t suit Russia’s interests.
This paper is organized as follows.
The second section contains the description of main approaches to the estimation of emissions embodied in international trade along with the related literature review.
The third section focuses on the estimates of volumes and the structure of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports and imports, as well as a comparison of Russia’s numbers with estimates for other countries.
This section also explains reasons for the large carbon intensity of Russia’s exports.
The fourth section addresses a question about the implications of the study’s results for Russia’s position in international climate change negotiations.
Specifically, it is argued that Russia has reasons to claim for sharing responsibility for emissions from the production of carbon-intensive goods between their exporters and importers.
At the same time, taking virtual carbon into consideration can make Russia vulnerable to “carbon protectionism” measures, which can be taken by developed countries.
The final section concludes the paper and summarizes its main results.
Methodology and literature review Currently, there are two main approaches to embodied emissions assessment: environmentally extended bilateral trade (EEBT) and multi-regional input-output analysis (MRIO) (Peters 2007).
These approaches not only differ in data source (national input-output (IO) tables for EEBT and MRIO tables for MRIO), but also in the manner they account for emissions embodied in trade during the different stages of final goods production.
The difference between the two approaches can be illustrated with the following example.
Assume country A imports a car from country B.
Using the EEBT approach, emissions embodied in imports include only emissions related to production of a car itself, whereas emissions from mining of iron ore in country C and smelting of the steel in country D would be imports of country B from countries C and D (The Carbon Trust 2011).
Using the MRIO approach, CO2 emissions associated with the production of the car – mining of iron ore for the steel, smelting of the steel, and the assembly of the car – would be considered 4 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 = 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝐸𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝐸𝑖𝑚𝑝, where E_prod – production-based emissions, E_cons – consumption-based emissions, E_exp – emissions embodied in exports, E_imp – emissions embodied in imports.
5 The term originated from “virtual water” (Atkinson et al., 2011), the amount of water used for production of a particular good.
4 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 imports of country A from countries B, C, and D. The MRIO approach therefore allows for analyzing the whole life cycle of a good and most completely assesses “virtual carbon” volumes.
There are more and more studies using IO analysis for accounting emissions embodied in exports of a particular country (primarily for China – the largest emitter and exporter of CO2 emissions (Peters et al.
2007; Xu, Allenby, and Chen 2009; Liu et al.
2010; Lin and Sun 2010; Dietzenbacher, Pei, and Oosterhaven 2012; Su, Ang, and Low 2013; Winchester, Karplus, and Zhang 2014; Liu, Peng, and Xianqiang 2016) and emissions embodied in global exports6.
Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) found that total CO2 emissions embodied in exports were comparable with (and in many cases exceed) total emissions of particular countries.
Most developed countries are net importers of emissions, whereas developing countries are primarily net exporters of emissions.
In 1995, the net exports of China and Russia were almost equal to the net imports of the OECD region (Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003).
Nevertheless, some studies reveal some developed countries with energy-intensive exports to be net exporters of emissions: Australia (Lenzen 1998), Norway (Peters and Hertwich 2006), Sweden (Kander and Lindmark 2006) and Canada (The Government of Canada 2002).
Peters and Hertwich (2008) estimated the trade-related CO2 emissions of 87 countries in 2001.
Global emissions embodied in exports accounted for 5.3 GtСО2.
The authors point out that the current international climate change regime is inefficient because it is mainly net importers of emissions who have taken quantitative commitments under the Kyoto protocol.
They suggest including trade effects in national emission inventories and allocating responsibility in accordance with regional groups, not countries, which could lessen the influence of trade on CO2 increases (Peters and Hertwich 2008).
Davis and Caldeira (2010) calculated CO2 emissions embodied in exports for 113 countries and 57 industries.
In 2004 they were around 6.2 GtСО2 (later the result was corrected to 6.4 GtСО2 (Davis, Caldeira and Peters 2011)), and most of the emissions embodied in trade occurred as exports from China and other developing countries to OECD countries.
In Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, the United Kingdom, and France more than 30% of consumption-based emissions were embodied in imports, and in China 22.5% production-based emissions were embodied in exports.
The authors conclude that the allocation of responsibility between producers and consumers of emissions is important for developing an effective climate agreement (Davis and Caldeira 2010).
Boitier (2012) used the MRIO method in order to calculate emissions embodied in trade for 40 countries and 35 industries based on World Input-Output Database (WIOD) data from 1995 to 2009.
The author distinguished “CO2-consumers” (OECD countries, especially EU-15, where consumption-based emissions exceed production-based emissions) and “CO2-producers” (developing countries – BRIC and “Rest of the World”).
The author suggests implementing not only production-based but also consumption-based CO2 accounting, which would allow for the elaboration of more objective targets for climate change mitigation policy.
Moreover, it is assumed that for most countries that didn’t sign Annex I of UNFCCC, using consumption-based CO2 accounting for determining national reduction targets would be preferable and probably stimulated taking quantitative commitments for emission reductions (Boitier 2012).
6 For an overview see: Wiedmann (2009), Sato (2014), Lininger (2015).
5 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Most studies devoted to calculation of emissions embodied in trade include assessment of emissions embedded in exports and imports of Russia (Boitier 2012; Peters and Hertwich 2008; Davis, Caldeira, and Peters 2011).
However, there are few studies discussing the carbon content of Russia’s trade in depth (i.e.
apart from indicating total values).
Emissions embodied in Russia’s exports and imports were estimated in 2011 by a Russian-Indian research group that used the EEBT method and the IO tables of Rosstat (2002), trade statistics, and carbon intensities of industries.
Emissions embodied in exports in 2002 accounted for 373 Mt; emissions embodied in imports were about 203 Mt.
The authors concluded that the largest importers of emissions from Russia are European countries and China, which is related to the high value of exports of mineral resources (Mehra et al.
2011).
It was assumed that the technology (and hence carbon intensity) of Russian exports is equal to the imports technology, which leads to some bias.
Piskulova, Kostyunina and Abramova (2013) analyzed exports of Russian regions concerning possible changes in Russian trade partners’ climate policies.
The authors showed that carbon intensity of a large number of Russian regions is quite high and the implementation of border carbon adjustment (BCA) by Russian trade partners could be damaging.
This study did not include quantitative assessment of emissions embodied in Russian exports.
To estimate emissions embodied in exports, we use the World Input-Output Database (WIOD, 2015), which contains national and world IO tables.
World IO tables are constructed using national IO tables and/or supply-and-use tables, UN COMTRADE trade statistics, OECD, Eurostat, IMF and WTO for services trade data, and others (Timmer 2012).
The methodology is explained in detail in Makarov and Sokolova (2014).
The analysis conducted in this paper is based on emissions data from 2000-2011 due to the availability of extended input-output data in the WIOD database.
We may expect that beginning in 2014 the volume of emissions embodied both in exports and imports decreased due to the drop in Russia’s foreign trade.
However, exact estimates may only be done when all the necessary data for 2014 is published.
Main findings Emissions embodied in Russia’s exports and imports Currently, Russia ranks fourth in the world (after China, the United States and India7) in the production of carbon emissions, and if taking into account land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF), it is probably behind Brazil and Indonesia.
The Soviet industrialization of the 1930s1980s was accompanied by rapid growth in GHG emissions.
For 70 years, the Soviet Union has increased annual CO2 emissions more than 100-fold (from 11.2 Mt in 1922 to 1.1 Gt in 1988), and before its collapse, the volume of its emissions was very close to that in the United States (Marland et al.
2011).
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia experienced a painful transitional crisis that resulted in a sharp, 42.5%, GDP fall8, and many enterprises were dissolved.
One of the external effects of the crisis was the reduction of CO2 emissions (see Figure 1).
By 1998, CO2 emissions (not including LULUCF) decreased by 42.5% in comparison to 1990.
Economic recovery since 1999 has not returned Russia to its previous level of emissions, as it has been accompanied by 7 According to UNFCCC.
8 According to World Development Indicators.
6 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 industry restructuring; the carbon-intensive industries that dominated in the Soviet era have been replaced by the service sector (Grigoryev, Makarov, and Salmina 2013).
During the first decade of 21st century, carbon emissions slightly increased, and in 2014 they were 33.3% lower than in 19909.
Figure 1 СО2 emissions (left axis) and GDP (right axis) in Russia in 1990-2014 Source: Based on data obtained from UNFCCC (2016) and World Bank (2016).
It could be expected that dynamics of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports coincide with dynamics of total emissions.
However, it has been revealed that this is not true.
In 2011, Russia exported 541 Mt of СО2 (Figure 2).
This is the highest value since 2007, but it is still 18% lower than in 2000.
In 2000, Russia exported 45% of total emissions, in 2011 – only 32%.
This tendency might seem odd because the export value (US dollar, current prices) rose 5-fold from 2000 to 2011 and production-based emissions (according to UNFCCC national inventories) increased by 11%10.
However, the export volume index11, reflecting real export volumes, reached only 140% by 2011 (base year 2000)12.
A 40% increase of commodity exports was compensated, on the one hand, by technological improvement, and on the other hand by simplification of export structure (production of final goods, which requires burning large volumes of domestic fossil fuel, is associated with higher emissions volumes than selling raw mineral fuels).
Emissions embodied in Russia’s imports increased 4.4-fold from 2000 to 2011 (see Figure 2).
The reasons were rising commodity import volume and substitution of imports of European goods by more carbon-intensive Chinese goods.
However, emissions embodied in imports in 2011 accounted for only 161 MtCO2 – 3.4 times less than emissions embodied in exports.
9 According to UNFCCC.
10 According to UNFCCC.
11 The ratio of export value index and national currency value index.
12 According to World Development Indicators.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 СО2 emissions (Mt) GDP (billion US$, 2010 prices) 7 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Figure 2 Production and consumption-based emissions, СО2 exports and imports, Mt, 2000-2011 Source: Authors’ calculations, based on UNFCCC (2015) and WIOD (2015).
Emissions embodied in exports are represented primarily by the category “Electricity, Gas and Water Supply” (42% of emissions embodied in exports).
This category includes emissions for generating electricity that is further used for either producing exported manufacturing goods, or for direct exports.
Emissions from burning exported fuels are not included in emissions embodied in exports, but emissions from their extraction do fall into the category “Mining and Quarrying” (14% of emissions embodied in exports) that also includes emissions from associated gas flaring.
Despite significant reductions in recent years, Russia is still the world’s leader in gas flaring – the amount of gas flared in Russia was 35 bcm in 2012 (World Bank 2014).
The industrial structure of emissions embodied in imports is more differentiated than that of emissions embodied in exports, which is determined by the more complicated structure of Russian imports in comparison to exports.
Analysis of the geographical structure of emissions embodied in Russian exports and imports reveals interesting patterns.
A large part of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports in 2011 was directed to the USA (see Figure 3).
This might seem odd because of the low volume of exports from Russia to the United States, but the reason lies in methodological features.
The MRIO method considers emissions embodied in exports from Russia to the USA as not only emissions associated with the manufacturing of exported final products, but also emissions associated with mining of resources exported to China, the EU and other countries and then used there for the production of goods exported to the USA.
Therefore, directions of Russian emission exports using the MRIO method are defined not by directions of Russian commodity exports, but by global trade flows.
Comparing emissions export data in 2000 and 2011, China’s share significantly increased (from 4% to 10%) and Germany’s share declined (from 16% to 6%).
The share of the EU countries decreased from 59% to 40%.
As for the geographical structure of imports, it changed drastically over 10 years.
In 2000, China represented only 10% of emissions embodied in Russian imports; in 2011, its share had reached 39%.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Exports Imports Production-based Consumption-based 8 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Figure 3 Structure of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports in 2000 (top) and 2011 (bottom), by partner13 Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UNFCCC (2015) and WIOD (2015).
13 Due to lack of data we had to include a range of Russia’s large trade partners in the category “Rest of the world” (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan).
Germany 16% United States of America 10% Italy 8% France 6% Developed AsiaPacific (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) 6% Poland 4% China 4% United Kingdom 4% Turkey 3% Developing AsiaPacific (India, Indonesia) 1% Brazil 1% Canada 1% Mexico 1% Australia 0% Rest of the EU 21% Rest of the World 15% United States of America 11% China 10% Italy 8% Germany 6% France 5% Developed AsiaPacific (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) 8% United Kingdom 3% Spain 3% Developing AsiaPacific (India, Indonesia) 2% Turkey 2% Brazil 2% Canada 1% Australia 1% Mexico 1% Rest of the EU 15% Rest of the World 23% 9 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Comparison of emissions embodied in trade in Russia and other countries The accounting of production-based and consumption-based СО2 emissions reveals different results.
For example, China’s share of global production-based СО2 emissions in 2011 was 30%, whereas its share of global consumption-based СО2 emissions was only 25%.
The USA demonstrates the opposite tendency: its share of global production-based СО2 emissions was 19%, while its share of consumption-based СО2 emissions accounted for 21% (see Table 1).
Table 1 Emissions embodied in exports and imports of the main СО2 emitters in 2000 and 2011 № Country P ro d u c ti o n -b a se d e m is si o n s, M t C o n su m p ti o n b a se d e m is si o n s, M t E m is si o n s e m b o d ie d i n e x p o rt s, M t E m is si o n s e m b o d ie d i n im p o rt s, M t N e t e m is si o n e x p o rt s, M t S h a re i n p ro d u c ti o n -b a se d e m is si o n s, % S h a re i n c o n su m p ti o n -b a se d e m is si o n s, % 2000 1 USA 5962.7 6643.2 486.6 1167.1 -680.5 24% 27% 2 China 3607.5 3093.2 696.7 182.3 514.3 15% 13% 3 Russia 1471.3 848.6 659.4 36.7 622.8 6% 3% 4 Japan 1251.5 1496.1 190.5 435.1 -244.6 5% 6% 5 India 1023.8 922.3 174.9 73.4 101.6 4% 4% 6 Germany 891.4 1101.5 212.4 422.5 -210.1 4% 4% 7 Canada 564.6 503.5 208.6 147.5 61.1 2% 2% 8 UK 555.2 685.6 126.8 257.2 -130.4 2% 3% 9 South Korea 463.3 434.3 147.5 118.6 29 2% 2% 10 Italy 462.3 577.5 103.9 219.1 -115.2 2% 2% 2011 1 China 9034.7 7503.4 2116.4 585 1531.4 27% 23% 2 USA 5603.8 6303.6 522.5 1222.3 -699.8 17% 19% 3 India 1860.9 1782.2 319 240.3 78.7 6% 5% 4 Russia 1684.4 1304.9 540.7 161.2 379.6 5% 4% 5 Japan 1240.7 1475.1 249.9 484.3 -234.4 4% 4% 6 Germany 798.1 981.3 243.4 426.7 -183.3 2% 3% 7 South Korea 611.7 555.8 236.8 181 55.9 2% 2% 8 Canada 555.6 593.2 180.3 217.8 -37.6 2% 2% 9 UK 464.6 604.4 118.5 258.3 -139.8 1% 2% 10 Mexico 458.1 505 87.5 134.4 -46.9 1% 2% Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from UNFCCC (2015) and WIOD (2015).
In Russia, production-based and consumption-based СО2 emissions also differ significantly.
Russia is the fourth largest СО2 emitter and its share of global production-based emissions is 6%.
10 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Under the consumption-based approach, Russia is responsible for only 4% of global emissions and cedes the fourth place to Japan.
The gap between production-based and consumption-based СО2 emissions is determined by large Russian emission exports (even larger than US exports, despite the huge difference in commodity export volumes) and by extremely low emission imports (Russia isn’t even listed among top 10 countries).
Russia was the global leader in net emissions exports as far back as in 2000.
However, its net emissions exports have declined by 40%, whereas the numbers for China have increased almost threefold.
As a result, currently, Russia is the second largest exporter of СО2 emissions after China.
The gap between Russia and China is fourfold.
However, Russia’s net emissions exports are 4.8 times higher than that of the third largest emitter – India.
Russia is one of the leaders in export share in production-based emissions.
32.3% of emissions within national borders are exported, which is much higher than in China (23.4%) and the USA (9.3%).
On the contrary, Russia’s imports share of consumption-based emissions (4.3%) is low in comparison to other large economies – China (7.8%), India (13.5%), and the USA (19.4%).
For leading European countries – Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy – this figure exceeds 40% (see Table 1).
Reasons for large volumes of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports On the one hand, the large volumes of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports are explained by the commodity structure of its exports, which is primarily represented by fuels and energyintensive industries.
Countries with a high export share in production-based emissions are South Korea, Canada, Russia, and Germany.
In the case of South Korea and Germany, this is explained by a high export quota, and in the case of Russia and Canada, the only explanation is a distortion of the structure of exports towards energy-intensive products.
On the other hand, net exporters of emissions are mainly Asian and Eastern European countries.
These countries have a high carbon intensity of exports (and Russia is the leader), which is defined as the ratio of emissions embodied in exports to the value of commodity exports (see Figure 4).
This allows us to presume that large volumes of emissions embodied in exports are determined by relatively low carbon efficiency associated with general technological “backwardness” that is typical for developing countries and economies undergoing a transition from a command-andcontrol to a market economy.
In order to assess the influence of technological factors on Russia’s emission exports, it is possible to calculate CO2 emissions embodied in Russia’s exports with the use of input-output tables, making the assumption that for the given volumes and structure of exports it uses “world average” technologies14.
Calculation results are shown in Figure 5.
Under the assumption that Russia uses “world average” technologies, Russia’s emissions exports in 2011 would decline 1.65-fold (from 541 to 327 MtCO2) (Figure 5).
Therefore, approximately 60% of emissions embodied in Russia’s 14 For this purpose, we substitute technological coefficients in input-output tables by GDP-weighted average volume of resources pet unit of output.
The data on national output and final consumption of goods and services remains unchanged.
We also assume that carbon intensity coefficient of an industry is equal to a corresponding world average coefficient weighted by the countries’ shares in global output of that industry.
11 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 exports are determined by the volume and the trade structure of its exports, and 40% is determined by its lagging behind global average technology.
Using the assumption that global weighted average technology is used in all Russia’s trade partners, Russia’s emission imports would increase 1.09-fold (from 161 to 176 MtCO2 in 2011).
This means that Russia imports production mainly from countries with more carbon efficient technologies in comparison to the world average.
Figure 4 Carbon intensity of exports in 2011, tCO2/thousand US$ Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from UNFCCC (2015) and WIOD (2015).
Figure 5 СО2 emissions embodied in Russia’s exports and imports in 2011: Actual values and those under the assumption that weighted average technologies are used all over the world Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from UNFCCC (2015) and WIOD (2015).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 W o rl d A u st ri a L u x e m b o u rg Ir e la n d S w e d e n F ra n c e B e lg iu m N e th e rl a n d s G e rm a n y M a lt a It a ly U n it e d K in g d o m H u n g a ry D e n m a rk C y p ru s S p a in F in la n d S lo v e n ia B ra z il P o rt u g a l L a tv ia M e x ic o L it h u a n ia A u st ra li a It a ly U n it e d S ta te s o f… C z e c h R e p u b li c G re e c e S lo v a k ia C a n a d a R o m a n ia S o u th K o re a T u rk e y T a iw a n R e st o f th e W o rl d P o la n d In d o n e si a E st o n ia In d ia B u lg a ri a C h in a R u ss ia n F e d e ra ti o n 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Emission exports under the assumption that average technology is used in all countries Emission imports under the assumption that average technology is used in all countries Actual emissions embodied in exports Actual emissions embodied in imports 12 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Illustrative here is the comparison of the countries’ net exports under the assumption of weighted world average technology in all countries.
This allows us to exclude the effect of technologies and determine how countries vary in exports of emissions due to the volume of their commodity exports and foreign trade specialization.
If the whole world switches to weighted world average technology, Russia would still take the second place in net emissions exports, following China (Figure 6).
This is evidenced by the fact that the dominating factor of large net emission exports in Russia is not carbon inefficient technologies, but trade surplus and the existing foreign trade structure.
Figure 6 Net СО2 emissions exports in 2011 under the assumption that all countries use weighted world average technology Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from UNFCCC (2015) and WIOD (2015).
Discussion The features of methodology and the structure of the data used in this study impose some constraints on the accuracy of the estimates.
However, the main point is that analysis conducted in this paper, as well as preceding research (Peters and Hertwich 2008; Peters 2011; Davis, Caldeira and Peters 2011; Boitier 2012; Aichele and Felbermayr 2015) show that flows of emissions embodied in trade are too large to ignore them within the international climate change regime.
Most of the emissions embodied in trade are directed from emerging economies (including Russia) to developed countries.
Emissions embodied in trade and the new climate agreement The Kyoto Protocol put on countries the responsibility to reduce production-based, not consumption-based carbon emissions.
At the same time, according to the principle of common but -800 -600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 China Russian Federation South Korea Netherlands Germany Denmark Taiwan Austria Spain Japan Ireland Brazil Canada Indonesia Turkey Australia Mexico France India United Kingdom Rest of the World United States of America 13 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 differentiated responsibilities, this responsibility was imposed only on developed countries and those with economies in transition (in other words, UNFCCC Annex I countries).
As a result, taking into account that most emissions were exported from developing to developed countries, neither exporters (leading developing countries, non-Annex I) nor importers (developed countries, obliged to reduce domestic emissions only within national borders) undertook obligations to reduce these emissions.
Nowadays, the described regulation failure does not have much importance simply because the Kyoto Protocol is not the central element of the international climate regime anymore.
Though it is still in effect (the second commitment period will finish in 2020), the Paris Agreement that was adopted in 2015 and came into force on November 2016 is much more important for the future of international cooperation for coping with climate change.
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement transforms the principle of common but differentiated responsibility: developing and developed countries participate on equal terms.
In order to guarantee compromise between actors who often have opposite interests, the agreement provides a framework for further actions rather than defining them.
The word “commitments” in the text of the agreement is replaced by “contributions” (intended nationally determined contributions, INDC).
These contributions are defined by nations themselves, and contain emission reduction targets that are non-binding.
Although the Paris Agreement sets an ambitious goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” (and even pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C) (United Nations 2015), the implementation of INDCs provided by December 2015 will not be sufficient to limit the temperature increase to less than 3°C by 2100 (UNEP 2016).
The form of INDCs is not strictly standardized, and in theory, parties could include into submitted contribution the intended reduction of either production-based or consumption-based emissions.
However, the intended national contributions submitted so far refer to the reduction of productionbased emissions only, either in absolute terms or as a ratio to GDP.
This means that the new agreement does not change the situation when the national reduction targets (binding or nonbinding) can be completed due to the substitution of domestic production of carbon-intensive products by imports.
The allocation of responsibility between exporters and importers Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries, concentrating an increasing share of carbonintensive production, did not have any quantitative commitments to reduce emissions, thus no one took responsibility for the emissions embodied in developed countries’ imports.
Since production in developing countries is on average more carbon intensive than in developed countries, this failure of climate regulation contributed to the increase of global emissions.
Under the Paris Agreement, all the major emitters are pledged to reduce or limit their emissions in accordance with their INDCs that would mitigate the situation.
Now the key issue is not the lack of responsibility for emissions embodied in trade, but the fairness of allocation of this responsibility between exporters and importers.
Placing all the responsibility for emissions embodied in trade on the exporter is not fair: an importer should be responsible because its demand predetermines emissions.
At the same time, shifting all the responsibility to the importer is not correct, because an exporter, releasing emissions by producing an exported good, receives a 14 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 payment from an importer (Sato 2014).
There can be different forms of joint responsibility.
For example, contributions under the new agreement could be recalculated considering emissions embodiment in trade (net exporters could submit smaller contributions and net importers larger contributions compared to those based on production-based emissions only).
The main issue is how to allocate the responsibility for emissions reduction between an importer and an exporter of carbon-intensive products.
The simplest approach is to divide responsibility proportionally – for instance, to calculate arithmetic mean between reductions under production-based and consumption-based accounting.
Shared responsibility can also be defined on the basis of the best available technologies.
Such an approach “allocates the responsibility between the producers and the final consumers based on the real capacity of each agent to reduce emissions” (Berzosa et al.
2014).
More complex approaches rely on game theory (Granot et al.
2014).
The Paris Agreement introduces a new mechanism applied at international level – the Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) (United Nations 2015).
To some extent, it is a re-launch of the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development mechanism (CDM), which assumed that Annex I countries could implement clean projects in developing countries on account of their commitments.
However, CDM was not effective enough, primarily because of difficulties in assessing the environmental effects of investment projects under a business-as-usual scenario.
It was revealed that many of CDM projects would be accomplished without any climate finance, just in the process of equipment modernization.
In these cases, CDM was only a transfer of financial resources from developed to developing countries and did not result in climate change mitigation (Wara 2007).
Under the new circumstances, SDM could be implemented as a mechanism of financing (on account of the net importers’ contributions) of projects aimed at reducing emissions embodied in exports.
In order to avoid imperfections of the initial implementation, SDM could be limited by the framework of a value chain.
For example, it could be applied only to enterprises oriented to exports to the country that provides SDM investment.
One more instrument that can allocate responsibility between an exporter and an importer is border carbon adjustment, which assumes imposing an additional tax on imported carbon intensive products (Ismer and Neuhoff 2007).
In theory, the volume of this tax should be calculated as a difference in volumes of emissions released during the production of one unit of imported product and its domestic analog, multiplied by the carbon price (for example, defined by national emissions trading scheme).
In fact, it is often suggested that carbon taxes should be imposed on products imported from countries without an emissions regulation system.
A result of imposing border carbon adjustment is that part of the costs associated with its implementation falls on consumers of the importing country, who have to pay higher prices for imported goods, on which a carbon tax is imposed.
Another part of the costs falls on exporters because of declining competitiveness of their products in importing country.
Border carbon adjustment is a powerful tool to prevent “carbon leakage” and to stimulate emission reduction in developing countries (Branger and Quirion 2014), which also can fix distortion in responsibility allocation between importers and exporters of carbon-intensive products.
At the same time, border carbon adjustment has obvious drawbacks, including welfare losses in both exporting and importing countries and possible initial conflict of such measures (they are often called “carbon protectionism”).
Finding a compromise while allocating responsibility for emissions reductions, which implies mutual consideration of interests by net exporters and net importers, and elaboration of cooperative mechanisms to reduce emissions embodied in exports 15 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 (as technology transfer or as economic flexibility mechanisms) are more appropriate measures for enhancement of the international climate change regime in the future.
Consumption-based emissions and Russia’s interests The current approach to emissions accounting based on calculating emissions from production corresponds to Russia’s interests to a lesser extent than to the interests of other countries.
A substantial part of Russia’s emissions is associated with consumption by developed countries, but according to the climate agreements, Russia is solely responsible for these emissions.
Hence, Russia is interested in the re-allocation of responsibility for СО2 emissions between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive products.
Other major net exporters of emissions – China and India – could also support this idea.
None of the three countries is interested in the complete substitution of production-based emission accounting by a consumption-based one.
The shift to 100% consumption-based accounting would assume regulation of individual consumer behavior instead of industrial emissions.
This would only be possible through imposing consumption taxes or implementing border carbon adjustment, which would have a negative impact on imports and therefore national welfare.
At present, the key issue is not to substitute but to supplement production-based emissions accounting with accounting that is consumption-based during the UN negotiations, with the possible implementation of responsibility allocation schemes.
The expert community has long been aware of the importance of accounting for emissions embodied in trade.
However, the rules of emissions accounting have been based entirely on production-based emissions for too long and are resistant to such fundamental changes.
Though in Canada and in the EU some elements of consumption-based emissions accounting are used on the national and local levels15, in general, developed countries have little incentive to promote this idea globally as it would undermine their last decade of success in reducing emissions.
Developing countries, most importantly China and India, hadn’t previously considered the implementation of consumption-based accounting because before Paris they didn’t have any commitments under international agreements.
But since these two countries are now being involved actively in international climate cooperation, one can expect that the issue will be addressed more carefully.
For Russia, a change of accounting approach from production-based to consumption-based would lead to the following re-allocations: first, emissions from fossil fuels burned in order to produce non-energy exports would be attributed to their importers; secondly, the same would be true for emissions from the extraction of exported fossil fuels; thirdly, emissions from Russian electricity production directed to exports would be also attributed to importing countries.
At the same time, some emissions originating from Russian imports would be attributed to Russia.
However, as the volume of emissions imports to Russia is much smaller than that of emissions exports, the ideas of consumption-based emissions accounting and sharing responsibility for emissions embodied in trade between exporters and importers of carbon-intensive goods could bring substantial benefits to the country.
First, these ideas may represent an important argument in climate negotiations, the argument being that Russia releases emissions not only for itself but also for developed countries, providing opportunities to reduce their emissions.
At present, Russia does 15 For Canada see McKewn, Bristow and Caouette (2016) and for the EU see Barrett et al.
(2013) and Carbon-CAP Project publications, http://www.carboncap.eu/index.php.
16 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 not use this argument at all.
Instead, it prefers to rely on another argument concerning the recordhigh emissions reductions achieved by Russia since 1990 (Kokorin and Korppoo 2013).
However, this argument can hardly strengthen Russia’s negotiating position as these reductions resulted mainly from the economic slowdown and natural restructuring of the Russian economy rather than from climate policy.
Second, consumption-based emissions accounting may generate some green investment to Russia from importers of Russian products that would be interested in reducing emissions along the whole value chain.
Consumption-based emissions accounting would also bring Russia some risks.
It is important to remember that allocation of responsibility for exported emissions between exporters and importers is justified only in relation to the part of emissions that is determined by large volumes and/or peculiarities of commodity structure of exports, and not by application of carbon inefficient technologies.
The conducted analysis shows that this share of Russian emissions exports accounts for about 60% if global average technologies ae taken as a benchmark.
The other 40% of emissions embodied in Russian exports results from technological lagging, and the responsibility for these emissions lies with Russia.
This part of the emissions makes Russia especially vulnerable to border carbon adjustments, which can be introduced by its counterparts.
This risk should be interpreted as an incentive to implement green technologies (including renewables), to reduce the carbon intensity of production and to activate a national climate policy in Russia.
In this realm, Russia has not achieved any significant success as of yet (Makarov 2016; Kokorin and Korppoo 2013; Boute 2013).
Conclusion Results of the study confirm the main hypotheses of the research: 1) Russia is the second largest exporter of emissions embodied in trade, following China.
On the other hand, emissions imports by Russia are relatively low.
Therefore, the production-based approach to emissions accounting used within international climate agreements does not suit the interests of Russia.
2) The high level of emissions embodied in Russia’s exports is partly determined by the large volumes and commodity structure of its exports.
Russia may claim for partial re-allocation of responsibility for these emissions to the importers of the corresponding production.
However, a significant part of the emissions embodied in exports is explained by relatively carbon-inefficient technologies, and this fraction of emissions would remain the responsibility of Russia alone.
3) Consumption-based accounting and partial sharing responsibility for emissions embodied in trade can provide some benefits to Russia.
First, large volumes of emissions embodied in exports represent an important argument in climate negotiations, because currently, consuming Russian exports allows its trade partners to reduce their production-based emissions.
Secondly, consumption-based emissions accounting may create some incentives for importers of Russian products to make green investments into Russia in order to reduce emissions within a value chain.
On the other hand, it may also become a strong argument for “carbon protectionism” measures.
Given the large carbon footprint of Russian exports and the country’s carbon-inefficient technologies, Russia would be very vulnerable to this policy.
17 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 REFERENCES Aichele, Rahel and Gabriel J. Felbermayr, 2015.
“Kyoto and Carbon Leakage: An Empirical Analysis of the Carbon Content of Bilateral Trade.” Review of Economics and Statistics 97 (1): 104-115.
Ahmad, Nadim and Andrew Wyckoff.
2003.
“Carbon dioxide emissions embodied in international trade of goods.” OECD Publishing No.2003/15, 2003.
Atkinson, Giles, Kirk Hamilton, Giovanni Ruta, and Dominique Van Der Mensbrugghe.
2011.
“Trade in ‘virtual carbon’: Empirical results and implications for policy.” Global Environmental Change 21: 563-574.
Barrett, John, Glen Peters, Thomas Wiedmann, Kate Scott, Manfred Lenzen, Katy Roelich, and Corinne Le Quéré.
2013.
"Consumption-based GHG emission accounting: a UK case study."
Climate Policy 13 (4):451-470.
Berzosa, Á., J. M.Barandica, and G. Fernández-Sánchez.
2014.
“A new proposal for greenhouse gas emissions responsibility allocation: best available technologies approach”.
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, 10: 95–101.
Boitier, Baptiste.
2012 Apr.
“CO2 emissions production-based accounting vs consumption: Insights from the WIOD databases.” In WIOD Conference Paper http://www.wiod.org/conferences/groningen/paper_Boitier.pdf Boute, Anatole.
2013.
“Russia’s New Capacity-based Renewable Energy Support Scheme: An analysis of Decree No.
449.” IFC Russia Renewable Energy Program.
The Carbon Trust.
2011 May.
International Carbon Flows.
The Carbon Trust.
Davis, Steven J. and Ken Caldeira.
2010.
“Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107: 5687-5692.
Davis, Steven J., Glen P. Peters, and Ken Caldeira.
2011.
"The supply chain of CO2 emissions."
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108: 18554-18559.
Dietzenbacher, Erik, Pei Jiansuo, and Jan Oosterhaven.
2012.
“How much do exports contribute to China's income growth?” Economic Systems Research 24: 275-297.
Eggleston, Simon, Leandro Buendia, Kyoko Miwa, Todd Ngara, and Kiyoto Tanabe.
2006 “IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas inventories.” Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Hayama, Japan.
The Government of Canada.
2002.
Cleaner Energy Exports and Global Environmental Benefits: Canada’s Position.
UNFCCC workshop on cleaner or less greenhouse gas-emitting energy: Exchange of information and views.
Whistler, British Columbia, Canada.
7 – 8 May 2002. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/workshops/other_meetings/application/pdf/cee.pdf http://www.wiod.org/conferences/groningen/paper_Boitier.pdf http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/workshops/other_meetings/application/pdf/cee.pdf 18 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Granot, Daniel, Frieda Granot, Sošic Greys, and Cui Hailong.
2014.
"Allocation of greenhouse gas emissions in supply chains."
University of Southern California Working Paper 2014.
Grigoryev, Leonid, Igor Makarov, and Alla Salmina.
2013.
“Domestic Debates on Climate Change in Russia.” In Climate change, Sustainable Development, and Human Security: A Comparative Analysis.
Plymouth: Lexington Books.
IPCC.
2013.
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Ismer, Roland and Karsten Neuhoff.
2007.
“Border tax adjustment: a feasible way to support stringent emission trading.” European Journal of Law and Economics 24 (2): 137-164.
Kander, Astrid, and Magnus Lindmark.
2006.
“Foreign trade and declining pollution in Sweden: a decomposition analysis of long-term structural and technological effects.” Energy Policy 34: 1590-1599.
Kokorin, Alexey and Anna Korppoo.
2013.
Russia’s Post-Kyoto Climate Policy: Real Action or Merely Window-Dressing?
FNI Climate Policy Perspectives, 10 May 2013.
Available at: http://www.wwf.ru/data/fni-climate-policy-perspectives-10.pdf Lenzen, Manfred.
1998.
“Primary energy and greenhouse gases embodied in Australian final consumption: an input–output analysis.” Energy Policy 26: 495-506.
Lin, Boqiang, and Chuanwang Sun.
2010.
“Evaluating carbon dioxide emissions in international trade of China.” Energy Policy 38 (1): 613-621.
Lininger, Christian.
2015.
Consumption-Based Approaches in International Climate Policy, Springer International Publishing.
Liu, Xianbing, Masanobu Ishikawa, Can Wang, and Yanli Dong.
2010.
“Analyses of CO2 emissions embodied in Japan – China trade.” Energy Policy 38 (3):1510-1518.
Liu, Zhengyan, Peng Song, and Xianqiang Mao.
2016.
“Accounting the effects of WTO accession on trade-embodied emissions: Evidence from China.” Journal of Cleaner Production 139: 1383-1390.
Makarov, Igor A.
2016.
“Russia’s Participation in International Environmental Cooperation.” Strategic Analysis 40 (6):536-546.
Makarov, Igor, and Anna Sokolova.
2014.
“Otsenka uglerodoyemkosti vneshney torgovli Rossii [Carbon emissions embodied in Russia’s trade].” Higher School of Economics Economic Journal 18: 477-507. http://www.wwf.ru/data/fni-climate-policy-perspectives-10.pdf 19 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Marland, Gregg, Tom A. Boden, and Robert J. Andres, 2011.
“Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions.” Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center.
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/overview.html McKeown, Lawrence, Corben Bristow and Anthony Caouette.
2016.
“Canada’s shifting sands: Oil production, distribution and implications, 2005 to 2014.” Environment, Energy and Transportation Statistics Division (EnviroStats).
Available at: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/16-002-x/2016002/article/14629-eng.pdf Mehra, Meeta, Aparna Sawhney, Natalia Piskulova, and Anna Abramova.
2011.“International Trade and Carbon Leakage: An Analytical Framework for India and Russia.” UNCTAD Virtual Institute.
– Geneva.
Peters, Glen P. 2007.
Opportunities and challenges for environmental MRIO modeling: Illustrations with the GTAP database.
Paper presented at the 16th International InputOutput Conference (2007), Istanbul, Turkey, 2-6 July, 2007.
Peters, Glen P. and Edgar G.Hertwich 2006.
“Pollution embodied in trade: The Norwegian case.” Global Environmental Change 16 (4): 379-387.
———.
2008.
“CO2 embodied in international trade with implications for global climate policy.” Environmental Science & Technology 42 (5): 1401-1407.
Peters, Glen P., Jan C. Minx, Christopher L. Weber, and Ottmar Edenhofer.
2011.
“Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 108 (21): 8903–8908.
Peters, Glen P., Christopher L.Weber, Dabo Guan, and Klaus Hubacek.
2007.
“China's growing CO2 emissions: a race between increasing consumption and efficiency gains.” Environmental Science and Technology 41 (17): 5939-5944.
Piskulova, Natalia, Galina Kostyunina, and Anna Abramova.
2013.
Klimaticheskaya politika osnovnykh torgovykh partnyorov Rossii i eyo vliyanie na eksport ryada rossiyskikh regionov.
Moscow: WWF-Russia.
Sato, Misato.
2014.
“Embodied carbon in trade: a survey of the empirical literature” Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (5): 831-861.
Su, Bin, Ang Beng Wah, and Melissa Low.
2013.
“Input–output analysis of CO2 emissions embodied in trade and the driving forces: Processing and normal exports.” Ecological Economics.
88: 119-125.
Timmer, Marcel.
2012.
The World Input-Output Database (WIOD): Contents, Sources and Methods.
United Nations.
2015.
Paris Agreement.
United Nations Treaty Collection.
Paris, 12 December 2015. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/overview.html http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/16-002-x/2016002/article/14629-eng.pdf 20 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Wara, Michael.
2007.
“Is the global carbon market working?” Nature 445 (8): 595-597.
Wiedmann, Thomas.
2009.
“A review of recent multi-region input – output models used for consumption-based emission and resource accounting.” Ecological Economics 69 (2): 211–222.
Winchester, Tianyu Niven, Valerie J. Karplus and Xiliang Zhang.
2014.
"Will economic restructuring in China reduce trade-embodied CO2 emissions?"
Energy Economics 42: 204-212.
The World Bank.
2014.
Time to End Routine Gas Flaring.
Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/15/gas-flaring-reduction-takescenter-stage-at-global-event The World Bank, World Development Indicators.
2016.
GDP constant 2010 US$.
Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org Xu, Ming, Braden Allenby, and Weiqiang Chen.
2009.
“Energy and air emissions embodied in China– US trade: eastbound assessment using adjusted bilateral trade data.” Environmental Science & Technology 43 (9): 3378-3384. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/15/gas-flaring-reduction-takes-center-stage-at-global-event http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/15/gas-flaring-reduction-takes-center-stage-at-global-event http://data.worldbank.org/ 21 Review of European and Eurasian Affairs 11 (2), 2017 Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Available online at: journals.carleton.ca/rera/ RERA is an electronic academic peer-reviewed journal.
Topics relate to the European Union, its Member States, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe.
The journal is a joint project supported by the Canada-Europe Transatlantic Dialogue—a cross-Canada research network supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)—along with the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (Carleton University) and its associated research unit, the Centre for European Studies.
RERA aims to provide an accessible forum for research, to promote high standards of research and scholarship, and to foster communication among young scholars.
Contact: Carleton University The Centre for European Studies 1103 Dunton Tower 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada Tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext.
3117; E-mail: rera-journal@carleton.ca Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged.
No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes.
ISSN: 1718-4835 © 2017 The Author(s) https://journals.carleton.ca/rera/ mailto:rera-journal@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
41 European Integrat ion Studies 2022/16 Abstract Main Priorities for A Green Deal Towards A Climate Neutral Europe http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.1.16.31331 Inese Pelsa, Signe Balina University of Latvia, The Faculty of Business, Management and Economics, Latvia European Integration Studies No.
16 / 2022, pp.
41-51 doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.16.31331 Submitted 04/2022 Accepted for publication 06/2022 Main Priorities for A Green Deal Towards A Climate Neutral Europe EIS 16/2022 In 2019, the European Commission (EC) issued a communication on the European Green Deal (EGD), which marked a major transformation of the national economy to ensure a Europe neutral in 2050.
One of the biggest challenges today is climate change, which is leading to environmental problems.
To reduce these threats and risks to the world and humanity, the UN adopted 2015 the Paris Agreement, the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change, which sets out actions to reduce the effects of climate change.
In 2019, the EC issued a statement stating that the European Union (EU) would be the first climate-neutral part of the world in 2050.
To achieve this goal, activities, and goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 are set within the framework of the EGD.
Transformation processes will be a comprehensive change in all sectors of the tangible economy, making the EU’s economy competitive, and innovative, promoting resource efficiency, moving to a clean, circular economy and halting climate change, preventing biodiversity loss, and reducing pollution.
The article analyzes the goals and significance of the EGD toward a climate-neutral Europe.
The aim of the article is to analyze the planned activities of the EGD, to evaluate the involvement of the state and society in achieving these goals.
KEYWORDS: green deal, climate-neutral Europe, priorities.
Introduction Historically, the 17th-19th centuries marked a large increase in production, leading to an increasing increase in the use of non-renewable resources.
With the significant increase in the period of industrialization, the development of science, and the emergence of new opportunities, the level of human comfort and the desire to live better have increased.
Human needs have become increasingly important and environmental considerations have been less and less taken into account in the production of goods in a way that ensures the comfort of life.
In the middle of the 20th century, scientists increasingly pointed out that the most important consideration for the existence of society and economic growth are man-made consequences, risks wars, uneven economy, limited natural resources, and ecological problems.
And in light of these considerations, another very important aspect is overcrowding.
According to UN data, until the 21st century.
by the end of the year, the number of people will reach 11 billion.
and given these aspects of the consumer society, the increasing use of non-renewable resources, the exchange of goods, and the creation of large mountains of waste make it necessary to talk about environmental problems.
Our planet can’t observe our wastes.
For us to function properly and exist in society, environmental and ecological issues have become part of our daily lives, as we increasingly need to think about access to water, quality, food security through sustainable energy, and waste reduction (Sikora, 2021).
European Integrat ion Studies2022/16 42 The Russell Einstein Manifesto, published in 1955, is the beginning of the concept of sustainable development.
It highlighted the dangers of nuclear weapons and, with the help of this Manifesto, issued in London during the Cold War, called on world leaders to find peaceful solutions to conflicts.
From now on, the term “sustainable development” has been increasingly used to denote the importance of ensuring a level playing field for future generations and the need to take political responsibility for decisions made or not made (Butcher, 2005).
The concept of sustainable development attracted public attention in 1972 when the scientists of the Club of Rome published the book “Limits to Growth”, in which possible world development scenarios were programmed with the help of a computer.
Although this book was published in 1972, its position is still valid today: modern civilization has limits to growth determined by nature itself, and people, if they want to survive, have to think of a border beyond which unintended consequences begin (Meadows, D.M., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., Behrens, W.W., 1972).
2100 was marked as the year of the crisis when the world will no longer be able to ensure the survival of civilization without changing its habits.
1973 was marked by the global energy crisis, and this year the German-born British scientist E.F. Schumacher published a collection of essays “Small is beautiful”, which analyzed and emphasized low-tech policy as a very suitable solution to the principle of “bigger is better” (Schumacher, 1973).
In 1972, world leaders reaffirmed scientists’ concerns about the environment, and in 1972, the first UN Environment Conference was held in Stockholm.
This conference marks a turning point, as several principles were adopted to ensure that environmental issues are properly managed and that solutions are sought between economic growth, water, air pollution, and the role and existence of man in the world.
The concept of “sustainable development” was first published in Gru Harlem Bruntland’s 1987 report ” Our common future, also known as the Bruntland Commission’s report.
Definition of sustainable development” is as follows: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (United Nations, 1987).
The concept of sustainable development is described by the Venn diagram, which includes the three “E” (environment, economy, and equality).
For society to be able to adhere to the basic principles of sustainable development, there is more and more talk about the inclusion of the fourth “E”, which is education.
Sustainable management reduces natural disasters, food insecurity, mass migration, etc.
risks that would require an extraordinary response, as well as significant costs.
Thus, the issue of sustainability is relevant for economic policymakers.
Aware of the consequences and challenges of climate change, the European Union unveiled a comprehensive European Green Plan in 2019 to ensure economic transformation and facilitate the European Union’s transition to a climate-neutral economy.
The goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2035 and to be a climate-neutral part of the world by 2050 (European Commission, 2019).
Although the EU’s target of reducing GHGs by 55% by 2030 initially seems sufficient to mitigate the negative effects of climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment is not sufficient to reduce GHG trends and meet the target 1,5 degrees to reduce the temperature.
Consequently, to meet these commitments, the EU must reduce GHGs by at least 65% by 2030 compared to 1990 to comply with the principle of fairness of the Paris Agreement.
To comply with the principle of justice in the Paris Agreement, the signatory countries must commit themselves to being leaders in promoting climate neutrality in the Member States with greater emissions responsibilities and greater financial resources.
Over the last 15 years, green economies have become increasingly important and have been given an increasing role by policy makers.
The green economy encompasses many different concepts, such as the green growth, the circular economy, cleaner production approaches, the bioeconomy, dematerialisation and tools such as life cycle assessment (Loiseau, et.al., 2016).
The key elements of green growth consist of the synergies between economic activities and Literature review 43 European Integrat ion Studies 2022/16 environmental challenges (Wanner, 2015).
Green growth aims to make capitalism greener by incorporating technology innovation, green investment and green consumption (Ossewaarde et.al., 2020).
The key concept of green growth is that economic growth can be “decoupled” from negative environmental impacts, thus arguing that economic growth is possible without the excessive, reckless use of “natural resources” (Machin, 2019).
Given the fundamentals of green growth, new solutions can create new jobs, new, innovative technologies, increase production and change consumption patterns.
One of the key aspects that Osserwaarde considers is that external factors, such as biodiversity loss and pollution, which economists call climate change, are leading to new investment.
For example, to reduce the use of non-renewable resources, solar and wind energy are offered as alternatives to energy production.
As a result, new solutions, innovations, new jobs are created, which significantly affect economic development and promote GDP growth.
By defining the symbiosis of environmental protection with economic development in this way, it does not raise concerns about the possibility of regression and massive job losses, which would affect the decline in living standards.
According to Machin, the creation of green growth does not affect the structures of oligarchic power (Machin, 2019).
Prior to the endorsement of Green Growth in the EU, the concept of Green Growth began in documents of international organizations OECD, UN and World Bank.
One of the milestones was in 2005 with the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Seoul, and fifty-two governments in Asia-Pacific agreed to “Green growth” (D’Souza, 2017).
After this conference, green growth was the most widely accepted decision and solution to address environmental problems and halt the degradation of the natural environment (Sandberg, et.al., 2019).
In Europe 2020, the EC made it clear that it is possible to combine environmental protection with GDP growth, so the environmental friendliness of the economy was also seen as a favorable factor for growth and growth.
In December 2019, the EU introduced its EGD, arguing that “tackling climate and environmental-related challenges (…) is this generation’s defining task”.
EC presented EGD as’ a new growth strategy to make the EU a fair country and a prosperous society” (European Commission, 2019 a).
One of the aims of the EGD is to tackle the ecological crisis and tackle climate change and its consequences, with a view to making the EU the world’s first climate-neutral part by 2050.
The EGD program aims to pursue two strands: to ensure the well-being of all and to overcome the anthropogenic state, which is indicated as the reduction of floods, droughts, heat waves.
The EU is therefore adopting major transformation measures aimed at reconfiguration.
The European economy is undergoing a major process of economic transformation, giving priority to environmental issues.
It can therefore be pointed out that the EU is making a revolutionary choice towards a new EU that is in harmony with the biosphere (Slatin, 2019).
The concept of green growth includes the harmonization of the economy and ecology, replacing the existence of an ecologically degrading industrial economy.
(Loiseau, et.
al., 2016) Consequently, evaluating from this perspective, environmental protection is not an expensive constraint, but a high-return investment opportunity (Rosenbaum, 2017).
Research methodQualitative analysis methods were used in the development of the article.
Initially, a literature review was performed, evaluating the scientific literature scientific articles, books on sustainable development, green growth, green economy.
Subsequently, the UN, EC documents on sustainable development, the green course were evaluated, evaluating the set goals and the planned measures to achieve them.
Quantitative methods were used to analyze the secondary data.
Hypothesis: In order to achieve the goals of the EGD, it is necessary to develop a model for the assessment of environmental problems in order to promote the full involvement of government and society in achieving the goals.
European Integrat ion Studies2022/16 44 Results The aim of the article is to analyze the planned activities of the EGD, to evaluate the involvement of the state and society in achieving these goals.
Climate changes and causes.
All these aspects: rapid industrialization, energy use, agricultural practices, transport, pollution are made rising temperatures, an increase in extreme weather events, loss of wildlife and biodiversity.
Figure 1 shows the total GHGs in the EU from 1990 to 2019, where GHG reductions were observed during this period.
Significant GHG reduction in 2009 was affected by the global financial and economic crisis, which significantly reduced industrial activity.
If we compare the changes caused by GHGs, then in 2019. there is a 24% reduction in GHG compared to 1990 and in absolute terms, it is 1182 million tonnes.
Figure 1 Greenhouse gas emissions (including international aviation, excluding LULUCF), trend, EU, 1990-2019 Source: European Environment Agency (online data), Eurostat Picture 1 The overall volume of GHG emissions (kg/ per capita per year) in European countries in 2019 Source: Eurostat data 100 90 80 70 60 50 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Index (1990-100) 45 European Integrat ion Studies 2022/16 Comparing the data with the European Union member states, GHG emissions per capita can be concluded that the largest share is caused by emissions from agriculture, transport, and energy.
Iceland, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Denmark have the largest share of stare in the EU Member States.
GHG emissions from transport as well as GHG emissions from production account for the largest share in these Member States.
The Agenda 2030 Circular economyA circular economy is an innovative approach to eliminating emerging environmental problems caused by increasing resource depletion, accumulation of non-recycled waste, growing environmental pollution, and climate change.
The concept of the circular economy is an increasingly attractive approach to tackling current sustainability challenges and facilitating a shift away from the linear “take-make-use-dispose” model of production and consumption (Klein, Ramos, et al., 2020).
The development of this new paradigm started nearly half a century ago in the minds of innovative designers, promoted by think tanks such as the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (Webster, MacArthur, 2016) the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (Ministry of Environment, Japan, 2019) and injected in policies and strategies of different countries in the world.
Thus, CE is on the rise in the European Union, Japan, Canada, the USA, China, etc.
The concept of the circular economy is increasingly being used to address sustainable development issues and to transform the linear economy into a resource-efficient economy model (Esposito et al., 2018).
It is clear that modern farming, in line with the principles of the linear economy, destroys the ecosystem, causing ecological problems.
Thus, one of the solutions is the circular economy, which offers more sustainable solutions ensuring a longer product life cycle and materials are reused, thus extending their life cycle and are used in the production of new products.
There are many definitions of circular economy, and the authors would like to forward the definition by Geissdoerfer and co-authors that are based on a thorough literature review, defining circular economy “as a regenerative system in which resource input and waste, emission, and energy leakage are minimized by slowing, closing, and narrowing material and energy loops.
This can be achieved through long-lasting design, maintenance, repair, reuse, remanufacturing, refurbishing, and recycling (Geissdoerfer et al., 2017).
“Circular economy is seen as one of the approaches to reach Sustainable Development Goals defined by the United Nations.
The European Union In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution Transforming Our World: A Sustainable Development Agenda for 2030, or Agenda 2030 (United Nations, 2015 a).
It sets out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 sub-targets to reduce global poverty and poverty.
global development is sustainable.
SDG is balanced in three dimensions: economy, social aspects, and the environment.
The SDGs are relevant to all countries and can only be achieved by joint efforts, at the same time part of the SDGs is largely in line with the challenges and goals of the national level.
Given the relatively wide range of topics covered by the SDGs, countries choose the most relevant goals for them to focus on by 2030, according to the priority goals to be achieved at the national level, thus adapting the SDGs to their needs and incorporating national and societal SDGs into national development planning.
Higher-performing countries take the initiative to promote the development of other countries, reduce poverty and play a key role in promoting sustainable development.
To build a success the concept of sustainable development of the concept is important to involve scientists, leaders, and entrepreneurs, and that is why conferences and forums are held to look for the best, most appropriate solutions.
The Agenda 2030 envisages that the whole society, incl.
citizens, businesses, politicians, national associations, the United Nations, and other institutions.
The European Union has already begun work on the next programming period, with Agenda 2030 as the framework (United Nations, 2015 a).
The 13th aim is “Climate action”, which includes Taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
European Integrat ion Studies2022/16 46 launched its first circular economy action plan in 2015 (European Commission, 2015), and further on embanked CE as one of the basic stones in the new strategy document for reaching a more sustainable economy i.e.
“The Green Deal” (European Commission, 2019).
The European Green Deal activities In the light of the Paris Agreement to reduce air temperatures by 1.5 degrees, the EC launched a comprehensive European Green Deal (EDG) in late 2019, setting outsmart and comprehensive, horizontal measures to ensure that by 2030.
EU GHG reductions by 55% compared to 1990.
The overarching goal is to make the European Union the world’s first climate-neutral part by 2050.
An important document adopted by the European Parliament in April 2021 is the European Climate Act, which aims to transpose GHG emission reductions into law (European Parliament, 2021).
Achieving this ambitious climate goal requires a transformation of the EU industry, thus stimulating sustainable economic growth, fostering technological innovation, creating new jobs, and improving the environmental and social performance of citizens.
EGD promises to protect citizens from environmental harms and impacts, and to be just and inclusive.
Wellbeing is to be put at the centre of economic policy.
By assessing the sectors with the highest GHG emissions, the EC has developed policies and targets to transform and adapt these sectors to meet climate neutrality goals.
The key sectors are clean and secure energy at an affordable price, industry based on the principles of the circular economy, smart mobility with an emphasis on the transition to the electric car, agriculture (using organic products), etc., and the European Climate Pact integration (European Commission, 2019 b).
Although the EU is responsible for only 9% of global GHG emissions, according to Eurostat, the EU’s commitment to lead by example is to encourage other parts of the world to take significant steps to accelerate climate neutrality.
The transformation of the economy, as envisaged in the EGD, requires changes to include environmental protection and climate issues as a horizontal principle in other legislation, which would also provide financial benefits in both the short and long term (Miccinilli, 2020).
The integration of these criteria into legislation must derive from international law, such as the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015 b), the UN Agenda 2030 (UN 2015 a), and the Sustainable Development Goals.
The EGD aims to improve the well-being and health of citizens and future generations by promoting waste-free production, smart mobility, the construction of low-emission buildings, biodiversity, clean air and water, renewable energy production and use, and a circular and collaborative economy, greenhouse gas emissions and removals by sinks.
The EU has already started to modernize and transform the economy with the aim of climate neutrality.
Much remains to be done, starting with more ambitious climate action in the coming decade.
EDG activities can be divided into 3 blocks: 1 Climate change targets to reduce GHG emissions (through transformation processes in sectors such as energy efficiency, mobility, construction, energy) 2 Environmental aspects, ensuring biodiversity, reduction of pollution; 3 A healthy and sustainable food system, ensuring an increase in organic food production through short supply chains, to ensure environmental and health aspects.
(European Commission, 2019 a).
Cleaning our energy system.
According to the European Environment Agency, the EU’s largest source of energy comes from non-renewable oil and natural gas.
According to Eurostat, energy production accounts for 75% 47 European Integrat ion Studies 2022/16 Picture 2 The European Green Deal activities of total EU GHG emissions.
This is therefore one of the key elements in contributing to the EU’s goal of climate neutrality.
According to the EC, it will take about 25 years to bring about change, and for the EU to be ready in 2050, significant changes are needed now.
To ensure the transition to clean energy, the EGD includes the following principles: 1 A secure and affordable EU energy supply; 2 Creating a digital EU energy market 3 Improving energy efficiency and maximizing the use of renewable energy sources.
To achieve the set goals, it is necessary to increase the share of renewable energy consumption, which in 2020 accounted for about 22.1% of the energy consumed in the EU.
Compared to the EU target of 20% in 2020, + 2% is met (Eurostat data).
In the EU in 2020, Sweden (60%), Finland (44%), and Latvia (42%) use the most renewable energy.
Malta (11%), Luxembourg (12%), and Belgium (13%) have the lowest share of renewable energy.
According to the EGD, the increase in renewable energy can also have a positive effect on employment.
The goal is to reach an EU average of 40% for renewable energy.
The proposals promote the use of renewable fuels, such as hydrogen, in industry and transport.
One of the goals is for 2030 to reduce the reduction of final and primary energy by 36% 39%.
Green Deal – mobility Whereas the transport sector accounts for 25% of total GHG emissions, of which 75% is accounted for by road transport.
Within the EGD, a change in the mobility of activities is planned.
Mobility change includes the goal of identifying clean vehicles, and electric cars, and providing the necessary infrastructure to ensure charging.
The EGD aims to reduce GHG emissions from the transport sector by 90% by 2050.
To achieve this goal, activities are needed that will promote the development of sustainable and intelligent transport.
To ensure the planned GHG reduction by 2030 and reduce dependence on Source: European Commission The European Green Deal (2019) European Integrat ion Studies2022/16 48 fossil fuels, then according to EC estimates by 2030 will be more than 30 mln.
emission-free cars (For comparison, in 2018 there were 292 million registered cars in Europe (Statista, 2018)) and more than 80 thousand emission-free trucks.
Consequently, such changes are projected to reduce the impact of fossil fuels.
Another important aspect of this change is the provision of charging points and sufficient capacity for electric vehicles.
By 2025, around 1 million public charging and refueling stations will require 13 million zero and low emission vehicles.
Green Deal – construction and building renovation In the European Union, buildings account for around 36% of total GHG emissions and are the largest consumer of energy, consuming around 40% of total energy.
One of the challenges facing the EU is that most buildings are not energy efficient and use most fossil fuels.
Thus, one of the activities is the renovation of buildings, where the main goal is to at least double or even triple the volume of renovated buildings, which is currently only 1%.
The renovation of buildings must reduce both GHG and maintenance costs for heating and cooling.
The EGD stipulates the construction of new buildings by 2030. must be done to ensure zero emissions to the building.
The public sector must meet these requirements by 2027.
To achieve zero-emission building construction, new buildings must use very little energy and make maximum use of renewable energy sources, and must not cause emissions to ensure the full functioning of the building.
Farm to fork To promote the production of quality food, one of the activities under the EGD is the EU’s “Farm to fork” Strategy, which aims to assess and reflect on all stages of the food supply chain to improve the sustainability of the food supply chain.
It is important to implement this strategy, it is necessary to analyze it together with the Biodiversity Strategy because sustainable agriculture must take nature protection into account.
Farm to fork strategy sets out the following objectives: » To reduce the total use and risks of chemical pesticides by 50% by 2030 and to reduce the use of more dangerous pesticides by 5030 by 2030.
» Return at least 10% of agricultural land with very diverse landscape features.
» By 2030, 25% of the EU’s agricultural land must be organic (European Commission, 2020).
EU industrial strategy One of the goals to achieve the goals of the EGD is to make changes in industrial processes towards climate neutrality.
The EU’s industrial strategy aims to encourage and support the industry to move towards innovation, growth and global competitiveness.
It is important to make Economy transformation process changes in industrial processes to reduce dependence on others that provide critical materials.
It would also boost the production of new products and boost competitiveness in the EU.
(European Commission, 2021).
The EU is facing major changes to meet the goals set out in the EGD.
Any significant change requires the involvement and understanding of all parties involved in the ongoing processes.
As pointed out Sica (2019), the EGD is a transition that will encourage criticism of ecologically harmful cultures and provide solutions to go beyond green capitalism.
As stated in the EGD, “transformational change” must be achieved by investing in large companies, with an emphasis on large technology companies that can contribute to and have a significant impact on “digital transformation”.
In order to promote and implement the activities set out in the EGD, changes are needed both in the setting of priorities at the national level, in the changing aspects of production 49 European Integrat ion Studies 2022/16 in business, and in the changing way of thinking and attitudes in society.
In order to promote the process of economic transformation for the development of green industries, it is necessary to develop information and green technologies.
Given the need for specific knowledge here, the state must carefully target subsidies for individual training as well as research.
Therefore, the priority is research and knowledge that contributes to green growth and the achievement of the goals of the green course.
New solutions are needed a new approach.
As indicated above, public support and subsidies are also needed to ensure sustainable energy systems.
By making such subsidies and supporting specific sectors, it is a political choice, which means redistributing funding between sectors and contributing to the greater development of a sector.
Which, in turn, significantly affects the composition of the economy, as well as changes in the composition of society.
In the case of the transformation process, it is also necessary to talk about institutional changes and changes in the field of taxation, because non-environmentally friendly solutions will be subject to a higher tax burden and green investments will be supported and subsidized.
To promote green growth, change involves a very wide range of policy instruments, including increased support for research, differentiated tax treatment, green public procurement, investment in green technologies.
An important aspect is the setting of emission standards in sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing, transport and energy (Rosenbaum, 2017).
The requirements set by the EGD will also significantly affect the change of society’s debts in ensuring their quality of life.
and it should be emphasized here that the richer the consumer is, the more he can afford it, and therefore the higher the GHG (transport, housing, clothing).
And that is why, like the richer Member States, the wealthiest consumers should lead by example in achieving the goals of the EGD.
In order to change the habits of the society, it is essential to involve the state closely, subsidizing, for example, the purchase of an electric car, thus promoting the purchase of emission-free transport.
But the question is whether the amount of the grant will be able to provide full support to the middle-income person to buy this environmentally friendly vehicle.
The commitment and involvement of all stakeholders is crucial to achieving the goals of the EGD.
In the current situation, people are very concerned about work, livelihoods, housing and bills, and the EU institutions (including the Member States) should work with people to bring about lasting change.
Because, as the EGD points out, citizens are and should remain the driving force.
ConclusionTo promote green growth, change involves a very wide range of policy instruments, including increased support for research, differentiated tax treatment, green public procurement, investment in green technologies.
The EU aims to become the world’s first climate-neutral part by 2050.
This means that EU countries must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
Consequently, changes in climate, energy, transport, and tax policies are expected.
The EGD will bring about change in all sectors of the economy, introducing principles such as sustainable development and the circular economy.
The EGD sets out a set of goals, strategies to be implemented over the next 10 years to promote Europe as the first climate-neutral part of the world and to facilitate the process of economic transformation.
The EGD ensures a comprehensive transition of the economy to green growth.
It is not only about reducing GHG emissions, it is about transforming the economy and society.
The European Green Deal is the EU’s flagship initiative.
Achieving the objectives of the EGD requires promoting industrial change, ensuring clean energy, changes in transport, food, agriculture, construction, and changes in taxes and social benefits.
It is essential to add value to the protection and restoration of the natural ecosystem by promoting more sustainable use of resources.
Change must take into account the environmental, economic, and social aspects that are integrated into the concept of sustainable development.
For these processes to be more successful, it is necessary to invest European Integrat ion Studies2022/16 50 Bowen, A.; Frankhauser, S. The green growth narrative: Paradigm shift or just spin?
Global Environ.
Chang.
2011, 21, 1157-1159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.07.007 Butcher, S. I.
(2005).
The Origins of the Russel Einstein „Manifesto“.
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.
D‘Souza, R. Green growth: Ideology, political economy and the alternatives.
Strateg.
Anal.
2017, 41, 204-206. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2017.1278881 Esposito M, Tse T, Soufani K. (2018).
Introducing a Circular Economy: New Thinking with New Managerial and Policy Implications.
California Management Review., 60(3), 5-19. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0008125618764691 European Commission.
(2015).
Closing the loop An EU action plan for the Circular Economy, COM/2015/0614 final URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0614 European Commission.
(2019 a).
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic, and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final, URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640 European Commission (2019 b) COM(2019) 640 final, annex: (1) Climate ambition (2) Clean, affordable, and secure energy (3) Industrial strategy for a clean and circular economy (4) Sustainable and smart mobility (5) Greening the Common Agricultural Policy/ „Farm to Fork strategy“ (6) Preserving and protecting biodiversity (7) Towards a zero pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment (8) Mainstreaming sustainability in all EU policies (9) The EU as a global leader (10) Working together-a European Climate Pact.
URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&from=ET European Commission (2020) COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy, and environmentally-friendly food system, COM/2020/381 final.
URL: https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0381 References European Commission (2021) COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe‘s recovery, COM/2021/350 final.
URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2021:350:FIN European Parliament (2021) REGULATION (EU) 2021/1119 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‚European Climate Law‘).
URL: https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R1119 Klein, N., Ramos, T. B., & Deutz, P. (2020).
Circular economy practices and strategies in public sector organizations: An integrative review.
Sustainability, 12(10), URL: https://hull-repository.worktribe.com/ output/3510997, https://doi.org/10.3390/su12104181 Loiseau, E.; Saikku, L.; Antikainen, R.; Droste, N.; Hansjürgens, B.; Pitkanen, K.; Leskinen, P.; Kuikman, P.; Thomsen, M. Green economy and related concepts: An overview.
J.
Clean.
Prod.
2016, 139, 361-371. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.024 Machin, A.
Changing the story?
The discourse of ecological modernisation in the European Union.
Environ.
Politics 2019, 28, 208-227 https://doi.org/10.1080/09 644016.2019.1549780 Meadows, D.M., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., Behrens, W.W. .
(1972).
The limits to growth.
.
New York: UniverseBook.
URL: https://www.donellameadows.
org/wp-content/userfiles/Limits-to-Growth-digitalscan-version.pdf Miccinilli, M. (2020).
Europe‘s green deal needs to effectively handle rising distributional effects.
European Energy & Climate Journal, 9(1), 15-17.
DOI: https:// doi.org/10.4337/eecj.2020.01.02 Ministry of Environment, Japan.
(2019).
Our Actions for a resource-efficient future: Following up G7 Progress on Toyama Framework on Material Cycles and 5-year Bologna Roadmap, A synthesis report as a follow-up activity of the G7 Alliance on Resource Efficiency.
Edited and compiled by Aoki-Suzuki, C., Miyazawa, I., Kato, M., and Fusin digital transformation, which is a very important driver of transformation.
The EGD defines the way to change institutional and societal habits.
Only a comprehensive approach can ensure an effective response to the ecological crisis and achieve the goals of the EGD.
The commitment and involvement of all stakeholders is crucial to achieving the goals of the EGD.
51 European Integrat ion Studies 2022/16 himi, E. of the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES).
Ossewaarde, M., & Ossewaarde-Lowtoo, R. (2020).
The EU‘s green deal: a third alternative to green growth and degrowth?.
Sustainability, 12(23), 9825. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12239825 Rosenbaum, E. Green growth-Magic bullet or damp squib?
Sustainability 2017, 9, 1092. https://doi.
org/10.3390/su9071092 Sandberg, M.; Klockars, K.; Wilén, K. Green growth or degrowth?
Assessing the normative justifications for environmental sustainability and economic growth through critical social theory.
J.
Clean.
Prod.
2019, 206, 133-141 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.09.175 Sica, C.E.
For a radical green new deal: Energy, the means of production, and the capitalist state.
Capital.
Nature Soc.
2019 https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.
2019.1692049 Sikora, A. European Green Deal legal and financial challenges of the climate change.
ERA Forum 21, 681-697 (2021).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027020-00637-3 Schumacher, E F. (1973) Small is beautiful.
The United States.URL: https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_5110/small_is_beautiful.pdf Slatin, C. The green new deal-A revolutionary concept.
New solutions: J. Environ.
Occup.
Health Policy 2019, 29, 133-137 https://doi.
org/10.1177/1048291119855671 Statista.
(n.d.).
Europe: Passenger car parc 2018.
Statista.
Retrieved 3 June 2022, from https://www.
statista.com/statistics/452449/european-countries-number-of-registered-passenger-cars/ United Nations.
(1987).
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future Transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to document A/42/427.
URL: https:// sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf United Nations.
(2015 a).
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
URL: https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda United Nations (2015 b) Paris Agreement (Dec. 13, 2015), in UNFCCC, COP Report No.
21, Addendum, at 21, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add, 1 (Jan. 29, 2016) (Paris Agreement).
The EU adhered to the Paris Agreement, see Decision 2016/1841on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (OJ 2016, L 282, p. 1).
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf Wanner, T. The new „passive revolution“ of the green economy and growth discourse: Maintaining the „sustainable development“ of neoliberal capitalism.
New Political Econ.
2015, 20, 21-41 https://doi.org/1 0.1080/13563467.2013.866081 Webster, K., MacArthur, E. (2016).
The Circular Economy: A Wealth of Flows: 2nd Edition.
About the authors This article is an Open Access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
INESE PELSA Mg. oec.
The University of Latvia, The Faculty of Business, Management, and Economics Fields of interests Economy Address Aspazijas boulevard 5, Riga, Latvia Inese.Pelsha@gmail.com SIGNE BALINA Dr.
oec., Professor The University of Latvia, The Faculty of Business, Management, and Economics Fields of interests ICT, econometry, sustainable development Address Aspazijas Boulevard 5, Riga, Latvia Signe.Balina@lu.lv
Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada The International Indigenous Policy Journal Volume 9 Issue 3 Special Issue: Indigenous Peoples, Climate Change, and Environmental Stewardship Article 1 July 2018 Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada Robert J. Patrick University of Saskatchewan, robert.patrick@usask.ca Recommended Citation Patrick, R. J.
(2018).
Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 9(3).
DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada Abstract The protection of drinking water sources continues to gain momentum in First Nation communities on the Canadian Prairie.
Through the identification of potential threats to drinking water sources communities are taking action to mitigate those threats.
This article explores the extent to which climate change has been taken into consideration in recent source water protection planning community exercises.
In addition, this article describes how source water protection planning has potential to enhance community adaptation strategies to reduce the impacts of climate change on source water and drinking water systems.
Results are based on six case studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan.
Keywords climate change, Saskatchewan, Alberta, source water protection, First Nations, Canada Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank the working committee participants in each of the case study communities who contributed to their respective source water protection plans.
Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection in First Nation Communities: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada In Canada, access to safe drinking water in many First Nation communities remains a challenge (Bradford, Bharadwaj, Okpalauwaekwe, & Waldner, 2016; Galway, 2016;).
Today, approximately 1 in 5 First Nation communities is on a boil water advisory, with some advisories lasting a decade or longer (Bharadwaj, 2014; Patrick, Machial, Quinney, & Quinney, 2017).
There are many factors contributing to this problem, including poor raw water quality, insufficient water treatment technology, inadequate water distribution systems, as well as local and regional water contamination by land users.
Institutional factors also contribute to the drinking water quality problem, such as inadequate design standards for wastewater disposal, difficulty with retention of qualified water treatment plant operators, as well as insufficient federal funding for water system upgrades (Patrick et al., 2017).
Notwithstanding these challenges, First Nation communities are dedicated to overcome these and other contributing factors to unsafe drinking water through the sustained efforts of water treatment plant operators, environmental health officers, circuit riders, and First Nation leadership.
However, a further challenge is now at play.
Climate change is poised to exacerbate the current drinking water quality challenges in many First Nation communities within the Prairie region (Bharadwaj, 2014; Patrick et al., 2017).
The prevalence of extreme weather, unpredictable weather patterns, as well as fluctuation in climate trends is now contributing to unanticipated levels of community risk, including both flood and drought with variable impacts on water quality and quantity (Bonsal, Cuell, Wheaton, Sauchyn, & Barrow, 2017; Pomeroy, Stewart, & Whitfield, 2016; Shook, 2016).
Research has shown that extreme weather will continue to produce not only seasonal fluctuations but also annual extremes in weather cycles that include rain-onsnow events, higher than normal summer rainfall, as well as prolonged periods of drought with variable, yet significant, impacts on the hydrological regime (Buttle et al., 2016; Dumanski, Pomeroy, & Westbrook, 2015; Pomeroy et al., 2016).
This article explores the impact of climate change on drinking water quality within First Nation communities in the Canadian Prairie region and the role of source water protection planning as a means toward community adaptation.
While climate change poses very real threats to the quantity of water supply across the Prairie region, the focus of this article is on the quality of that supply.
The principle of source water protection is prevention of contamination at the source of a drinking water supply, either groundwater or surface water.
Source water protection is operationalized through a planning process that first identifies land use activities, human practices, and natural processes that pose some level of risk to a drinking water source.
Next, specific management actions are assigned to each identified risk with the intent of reducing, or eliminating, each risk.
Implementation of the management actions and periodic review of the full source water protection plan complete the plan-making process.
This article undertakes an assessment of management actions to determine the utility of source water protection planning as a form of community adaptation to climate change.
Data for this article has emerged from a cross-sectional analysis of six recently completed First Nations source water protection plans in the Canadian Prairie region.
The case study communities are all located in Alberta and Saskatchewan across Treaty 4, 5, 6, and 7 territories (see Figure 1).
The names of the individual communities will not be identified in this article for privacy reasons.
1 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Figure 1.
Numbered treaties and case study locations, Canadian Prairie Extensive academic literature is dedicated to the impacts of climate change on Indigenous communities in the Canadian Arctic where rates of global warming are most pronounced.
Less extensive literature exists for southern Canada, and includes work describing climate change interplay between Western science and traditional knowledge (Sanderson et al., 2015), climate change adaptation planning (Reid et al., 2014), water vulnerability assessment in First Nations (Plummer, de Grosbois, Armitage, & de Loë, 2013), as well as methodological approaches to community health impacts (Bradford et al., 2016).
With the exception of work by Bharadwaj (2014), there is limited attention to climate change impacts on drinking water quality in the Prairie region.
Specific water-related human health impacts caused by climate change include adverse skin conditions and intestinal illness from consumption of contaminated drinking water (Bharadwaj, 2014).
In other regions of North America, the spread of wildfire caused by drought has resulted in the disruption of water service and negatively impacted source water quality.
In a post-wildfire watershed, increased levels of turbidity in surface water may compromise disinfection treatment while also producing trihalomethanes, a disinfection by-product and proven carcinogen (Emelko, Silins, Bladon, & Stone, 2011; Hohner, Cawley, Oropeza, Summers, & Rosario-Ortiz, 2016; Murphy, Writer, McCleskey, & Martin, 2015).
Under a drier Canadian Prairie-region climate the potential for similar impacts to surface water reservoirs is a concern.
This article focuses on the nexus of climate change and source water protection planning in First Nation communities with emphasis on the identification of adaptation strategies to protect sources of drinking water.
Under a changing climate, source water protection planning provides both a practical means of managing land use activities as well as a potentially useful tool for community-based climate change Case study location Alberta Saskatchewan Manitoba 2 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
1 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/1 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 adaptation.
The focus of this research is at the local scale to answer calls for “a more nuanced understanding of factors contributing to vulnerability, as well as sources of capacity for adaptation” (Plummer et al., 2013, p. 761).
The term vulnerability to describe First Nation communities with respect to climate change and access to safe water will not be used in this article.
The vulnerability label presents a negative messaging of weakness, frailty, and inability to adapt (Haalboom & Natcher, 2012).
To the contrary, First Nation communities have survived myriad impositions over time—culturally and ecologically—resulting in a continued display of resilience, strength, and the ability to thrive (Golden, Audet, & Smith, 2015; Howitt et al., 2013; McGregor, 2012).
Instead, opportunities for community adaptation will be explored.
The article begins with an overview of the challenges facing First Nation communities regarding the provision of safe drinking water followed by a description of source water protection planning and the multi-barrier approach to safe drinking water.
A range of perceived threats to source water from six completed source water protection plans are discussed followed by a description of how these existing threats may be exacerbated by climate change.
The article concludes by identifying a range of climate change adaptation strategies to help protect source water in First Nation communities.
First Nations Water Progress In the Prairie region, the protection of drinking water has moved beyond words and into action with the completion of source water protection plans in numerous First Nation communities (Patrick, 2017).
These plans, and the planning process that guides them, have produced tangible action on the ground while empowering individuals and communities to take greater control over past and present land use practices that have compromised source water quality.
Source water protection planning, while a modern tool of Western science, is consistent with Indigenous traditional knowledge and value systems pertaining to water (Lavalley, 2006).
While source water protection introduces a “formal” planning activity, it is certainly not the first planning activity ever practiced by Indigenous Peoples.
First Nations have long been planners on the land, both pragmatically for decision-making around food gathering, settlement, and migration, and as long-term visionary planners represented by the Seven Generation model (Jojola, 2008; Porter, 2010).
Present day source water protection planning often plays a corrective role, identifying past and present land use activities that may pose a threat to a drinking water source.
Source water protection planning also has potential to re-connect community members, particularly youth, to the importance of clean water, Indigenous values and beliefs, as well as Elder knowledge (Lavalley, 2006).
The Multi-Barrier Approach and Source Water Protection The multi-barrier approach (MBA) to safe drinking water gained attention in the water resources literature in the aftermath of the water contamination events in Walkerton and North Battleford (Laing, 2004; O’Connor, 2002).
Within the water industry, the MBA is an effective means of safeguarding potable water delivery (Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment [CCME], 2004).
The MBA is a series of operational redundancies, or barriers, that protects against full system failure should a single barrier fail.
Source water protection, often referred to as the first barrier in the MBA, is vital to the protection of a water supply.
The other key barriers include drinking water treatment such as chlorination and filtration, maintenance of the water distribution system, testing and monitoring, as well 3 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 as emergency planning (CCME, 2004).
However, there are two limitations to the multi-barrier approach.
First, the MBA concept is designed around municipal water service systems with a central water treatment plant, piped distribution system, and coordinated monitoring oversight.
The water distribution system in most First Nation communities is unlike municipal water service systems, and instead features a mix of piped water, trucked water, private wells, or no household water service.
Second, the impacts of climate change on a drinking water system were never envisioned within the MBA concept.
This omission enables communities to develop source water protection plans without due consideration of climate change impacts on their water system.
Arguably, the most appropriate place for climate change consideration is within the first barrier of the multi-barrier approach, source water protection.
This article will identify climate change adaptation measures that may be applied at the time of source water protection planning.
Methods Data for this article were extrapolated from six source water protection plans completed by First Nation communities in the Canadian Prairie region between 2013 and 2017.
Selection of the communities was based on a combination of existing relationships between a community member and the author, willingness of the communities to participate, and emerging water quality problems.
Each of the source water protection plans followed the planning process as shown in Figure 2 based on a planning template developed for the federal government (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada [AANDC], 2013).
Each source water protection plan was developed by a working committee from each community.
The author assisted each working committee in the form of group work facilitation as well as administrative and technical support.
The planning process in each community began with an introductory meeting, or meetings, between the plan facilitator, in this case the author, and representatives from the community, including leadership, management, and staff.
The introductory meeting was at the invitation of the community to explain the source water protection planning purpose and process.
After the introductory meeting(s), and with expression to proceed from leadership in the community, the first task was to establish a working committee of key individuals from the community (Stage 1).
Working committee make-up was reasonably consistent across all communities, normally consisting of an Elder, water treatment plan operator, Band Councillor, land manager, health representative, other staff, and any interested community members.
The size of each working committee was relatively consistent across all the communities, ranging from 6 to 10 persons.
Approximately eight meetings, each lasting five to six hours, enabled completion of each plan.
Protocol in each community was respected for all working committee meetings, often with an opening and closing prayer from the Elder, a mid-day meal, and other protocols as deemed appropriate including gifting tobacco and other items.
4 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
1 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/1 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 Figure 2.
Source water protection planning process (AANDC 2013) Stage 2 in the planning process saw completion of a source water assessment to inventory the water source (surface or groundwater), water treatment methods, type of water distribution system (piped or trucked), number of water cisterns, type of water users (residential, commercial, industrial), and number of piped connections to households.
The source of information for the water system assessment was taken from technical reports or previously completed engineering reports on file in each community.
Next, the working committee listed all potential threats to the water source using a brainstorming exercise or small group discussions.
The location of each potential threat was noted on a map for future reference.
Following threat identification, a risk matrix assessment was applied to each of the identified threats as a means of ranking each of the threats on a scale of 1 (low threat) to 25 (high threat).
The risk matrix uses two indices: likelihood of a contamination event and human health consequence of a contamination event.
Each water contamination threat previously identified by the working committee is tested against the risk rank matrix (see Figure 3) to produce a relative risk ranking score.
Stage 3 of the planning process matches management actions to each of the identified risks.
Management actions include structural and non-structural activities aimed at reducing the identified threat.
A structural activity includes the relocation of a landfill or fencing to provide well-head protection.
A non-structural activity includes information posters or household newsletters and education programming in the local school.
Stage 4 of the planning process focuses on plan implementation.
The estimated time to completion of each management action, associated costs and funding sources, and required partnerships and stakeholders were recorded in Stage 4.
Stage 5 is a procedural stage requiring an annual review of the source water protection plan.
This annual review process provides the opportunity to celebrate plan implementation success, but also a time to adjust the plan in light of any new information.
5 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Figure 3.
Risk assessment score analysis matrix (based on AANDC, 2013) Results An aggregated list of threats to source water from the six communities is shown in Table 1.
All recorded data represents the direct input of the working committee from each of the plans.
For the purpose of this study, only those threats reported consistently across four or more communities are reported in Table 1.
The risk ranking for each threat is listed.
The highest risk reported across all six communities was evenly tied between sewage lagoons and illegal dump sites.
Past construction of sewage lagoons in First Nation communities lacked impermeable liners.
Instead, sewage lagoons were dug into the ground and, depending upon local soil conditions, there remains potential for groundwater contamination.
Sewage lagoon capacity was reported to be a major concern in all six case study communities.
Unauthorized on-reserve dump sites were also consistently reported as a very high risk to source water.
Unknown solid waste materials and their potential cumulative effects on water sources were consistently reported across all six communities.
Uncapped private wells and agricultural runoff of fertilizer and pesticides were another source of concern for a majority of First Nation communities.
Uncapped and therefore unsecured large diameter wells pose both a human safety risk from drowning as well as a human health risk from water contamination.
Small bore diameter wells are commonly reported as scattered throughout all six communities, a legacy of early farms and abandoned household wells after conversion to community piped water or trucked water systems.
6 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
1 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/1 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 Table 1.
Local Source Water Threats and Concerns Threat (Average Risk Ranking)a Number of First Nations Reportingb Concern Sewage lagoons (25) 6 Threat of overcapacity lagoons; aging facilities; some lagoons failing; few with industrial liners; potential groundwater contamination; susceptible to overflow; flooding from rivers, lake bodies.
Illegal dump sites (25) 6 Aesthetic concerns; threat of unknown contaminants to surface and groundwater sources; potential impacts on drinking water and ecosystem; cumulative impacts from dump sites.
Uncapped private wells (abandoned) 5 Threat of groundwater contamination.
Agriculture pesticides, fertilizer 5 Threat of pesticide contamination; excess fertilizer increasing nitrogen and algae blooms of surface water sources; downstream or downslope impacts; biomagnification.
Household septic “shoot-outs” 5 Threat of raw sewage deposition of ground surface outside residential homes; land and wetland areas becoming saturated; dangerous to health; potential for infiltration to water cistern or to groundwater, surface water supply sources.
Cattle and livestock encroaching 5 Threat of nutrient and E. coli contamination to source water.
Lack of riparian protection, free range of livestock into surface water source, groundwater contamination.
Contaminated industrial land, fuel, & material wastes 5 Threat of petroleum product spills, contaminated soils, leaching to source water supply.
Legacy of railroad activity, in-ground fuel tanks, work yards.
Solid waste landfills 5 Threat of groundwater contamination in unlined landfill, unregulated landfill, lack of waste separation, unknown landfill products, cumulative impacts.
Poorly constructed landfills waste materials.
Groundwater contamination.
Well-head exposure 4 Main water wells unprotected; land contour slopes to well-head; no fencing or barriers around wells; aging well-head and well casing.
Hazardous goods transport 4 Threat of railway or highway accident; toxic spills (petroleum, etc.)
with surface and groundwater contamination.
Potable water cisterns 4 Cistern damage is caused by both human and climate-related impacts.
Freeze–thaw cycles impart damage to the concrete shell of a cistern.
Frost heave and uneven ground temperature adds potential damage.
Note.
a 25 = highest; 1 = lowest risk ranking.
b N = 6 7 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Agricultural fertilizers and pesticides were another identified threat in many communities.
While farm lease agreements often state that responsible fertilizer and herbicide practices would be followed, there was little or no means of confirming lease-holder practices.
Septic shoot-outs, or the discharge of liquid waste directly onto the ground adjacent to a home, were consistently reported as a major concern across all case studies.
The combined problem of groundwater or surface water contamination and the immediate human health issue of untreated sewage discharge outside a home is a common concern in all case study communities.
Solid waste landfills, most at full capacity, with no waste separation, recycling, or monitoring programs in place was also voiced as a concern.
Other high risk concerns included contaminated former industrial lands, damaged water cisterns, hazardous goods transport, and livestock encroachment into surface water sources.
Exacerbated Threats Threats to drinking water sources with potential to be exacerbated by climate change are described in Table 2 along with adaptation strategies.
The exacerbated threats represent an extension of the concerns previously listed by each working committee in all six communities.
Community members reported an increase in sudden and violent rainfall events.
In late winter, these events may be rain-on-snow events.
More frequent flooding or extreme high water was reported to have a negative impact on existing water management infrastructure.
For example, sewage lagoons were reported to be at or near capacity.
The addition of flood waters from sudden storm events, either as rainfall or as rain-on-snow events, will only exacerbate the current sewage lagoon capacity problem.
Other climate change impacts that will exacerbate existing threats include the mobilization of land-based contaminants such as landfill leachate and other industrial wastes caused by localized flooding.
Climate warming is driving increased incidence of freeze–thaw cycles, exacerbating threats to drinking water sources.
For example, concrete manufactured water cisterns were reported to be suffering internal cracks and breakage from more frequent cycles of freeze-thaw events.
This situation is allowing surface water drainage and organic contaminants to contaminate household cisterns.
Adaptation Strategies The source water protection planning process enabled the working committee to match adaptation strategies, identified as management actions in the planning framework (Figure 2), to each of the identified risks.
During this process, the working committee focused discussion on specific adaptation strategies.
8 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
1 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/1 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 Table 2.
Climate Change Adaptation Strategies Threat (Number of First Nations Reporting)a Accelerated Climate Change Impacts Adaptation Strategies Sewage lagoons (6) Increased rainfall; rain-on-snow; seasonal storms all may cause flooding; river and lake flooding into lagoons; pothole region of poor drainage.
Develop new lagoons under current regulations; develop new lined lagoons to protect groundwater.
Illegal dump sites (6) Mobilization of potential contaminants from flooding, increased summer rainstorm events; rain-on-snow events, poor land drainage.
Written notification to all contractors; community education, schools, radio, newsletters, website; coordinate with community clean up; community clean-up initiative; educational campaigns; community hazardous waste pick-up days; develop regular schedule for pick up; education signage; repair road access to main landfill; investigate transfer station; enforce Land Management Act.
Uncapped private wells (abandoned) (5) Uncapped wells allow direct pathway for groundwater contaminants; rain and flood events increase likelihood of contaminant entry.
Map and identify all uncapped wells; decommission all abandoned wells.
Agriculture pesticides, fertilizer (5) Overland flow from heavy seasonal rain events, mobilization of pesticides and fertilizers.
Make use of lease agreements to enforce better management practices; obtain full information about chemical usage; restrict fertilizer and pesticide use near the community; as buffer encourage crop cover that does not need fertilizers or community gardens; talk to farmers; hold community workshops on proper product application.
Household septic shoot-outs (5) High water tables, flooding, violent summer storms, increased incidence of dry periods followed by large rain events have potential to mobilize shoot-out sewage waste, or cause localized (backyard flooding).
Extend pipe further from house; upgrade to inground septic system; extend community sewer system; education; bylaws requiring regular tank pump out.
Note.
a N = 6 9 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Table 2.
Climate Change Adaptation Strategies (continued) Threat (Number of First Nations Reporting) Accelerated Climate Change Impacts Adaptation Strategies Cattle and livestock encroaching (5) Increased frequency of extreme dry and wet periods, flooding of land mobilizing manure waste.
Confine livestock at the farm property; keep horses and cattle away from village centre and well-head areas; fence to protect wells-heads; keep livestock and domestic animals out of drinking water sources; talk to farmers working Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) lands, educational brochures; fencing; dugouts; bylaws.
Contaminated industrial land, fuel & material wastes (5) Flooding, mobilization of contaminants, soluble soils, percolation of contaminants in flood events.
Collect all fuel tanks no longer in use; site remediation by professionals; decommission former industrial sites.
Solid waste landfills (5) Old and abandoned sites (legacy issues).
Rainfall, rain on snow, saturation of landfill waste material, mobilization of waste materials.
Groundwater contamination.
Decommission old and abandoned landfill sites.
Initiate waste separation of main landfill.
Repair road access to landfill.
Fence landfill, hire a landfill operator, waste separation.
Longer term, consider conversion of landfill to a transfer station.
Well-head exposure (4) Flooding, rain on snow; Ponding of water in area of well-heads; long, dry periods broken by sudden large summer rain events.
Protect well-head from flooding, contamination, by extending well casing 1 metre above ground; mound fill and gravel material around casing, slope away from casing.
Fence around well-head to keep people, livestock, and domestic animals away.
Hazardous goods transport, oil pipelines (4) Climate change impacts on roads, railways, reduced stability of land surface; road potholes, railway washouts.
Subsurface land subsidence causing pipeline fractures.
Railway and highways not in First Nation jurisdiction.
Need for communication, partnership, collaboration with rail company and highways to maintain, repair; response plan for hazardous spills.
Pipeline mapping on First Nations, greater awareness.
Potable water cisterns (4) Increased incidence of local flood conditions (spring runoff and summer rains) adds to threat of water contamination; increased freeze– thaw with climate change damaging to concrete cisterns; damage by truck haulers with thawing ground.
Annual cleaning and repair program; cistern replacement program; install distribution system; grading and landscaping around cistern; testing schedule; improve, repair cistern collars, caps, and covers; move to a low pressure system.
Note.
a N = 6 10 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
1 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/1 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 In the case of sewage lagoons, noted as high risk in all communities, there was little evidence of adaptation.
In one Alberta First Nation, a large sewage lagoon was re-built on the same site as the previous lagoon, which was destroyed in the 2013 Bow River flood, despite calls from the community directed at Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to re-build the lagoon on higher ground.
The 2013 Bow River flood is well documented as a flood event typical of a changing climate (Pomeroy et al., 2016).
Given that many lagoons are gravity fed, moving existing lagoons to higher ground away from rivers and lakes initiates a long-term cost for pumping and hauling.
Additionally, to control lagoon overflow conditions the operation of these lagoons requires a release of liquid waste into an adjacent water body during late spring.
Relocating sewage lagoons to higher ground would not only add an additional cost to pipe wastewater over a greater distance for storage in the lagoon and discharge back into a waterbody.
In several communities, overcapacity lagoons were leading to localized flooding within the community.
Unauthorized community solid waste sites were targeted with specific adaptation strategies in all six communities ranging from education regarding appropriate waste disposal, scheduling regular garbage pick-up, site reclamation, and establishing a waste transfer station.
Uncapped wells were identified in all but one community as posing a high risk to groundwater contamination.
Adaptation measures to help reduce risk of contamination included mapping uncapped or abandoned groundwater wells to be followed by well decommissioning.
Federal and provincial funding sources are available for well decommissioning in First Nation communities.
Several case study communities have already taken advantage of these funding opportunities.
Mobilization of fertilizer as the result of more frequent summer rainstorm events has the potential to elevate nitrate levels in groundwater sources.
Adaptation measures include information sharing with the farm community, lease agreement restrictions on fertilizer application, as well as establishing buffer strips adjacent to community water sources.
Household sewage shoot-outs were identified as a threat with potential risk to source water and human health.
Shoot-outs consist of piped raw sewage from a home into a backyard area.
Adaptation strategies includes emergency repair of shoot-outs.
Longer term adaptation strategies include extension of the community sewer system and local area bylaws requiring regular septic tank pump-outs.
Livestock enclosures and other means of restricting both domestic and farm animals away from surface water sources, well-head areas, and water treatment facilities will help protect water quality.
These adaptation strategies will be new to many communities where free-range livestock is a more common practice.
Well-head protection will increasingly be an effective, low cost solution to protect well-water supplies that are increasingly subject to seasonal flooding, which is common in many communities.
The legacy of former industrial sites including gas stations, in-ground fuel tanks, and other hazardous material has potential to contaminate water sources under a changing climate.
Adaptation strategies include commercial and industrial site remediation.
In addition, landfills are a concern in most communities.
In all but one community, the active landfills were open to the public with no attendant, no community recycling, and no waste separation program in place.
Recent increases in localized flooding have raised concerns over groundwater and surface water contamination.
As a result, all case study communities voiced concern for the long-term viability of existing unmanaged landfill operations.
11 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 In all case study communities, landfills consisted of large, unlined excavations to be filled with all forms of domestic, commercial, and industrial waste.
In a wetter climate, these landfill pits are at risk of filling with water thus mobilizing potentially toxic materials.
Climate change is currently impacting the integrity of water cisterns in First Nations.
Flooding and more frequent freeze–thaw events will continue to threaten water quality and quantity in cisterns.
Adaptation will require more frequent cistern cleaning and repair programs.
Cistern replacement programs have begun in several case study communities.
Moving toward a low pressure water system to replace cisterns is an additional adaptation strategy that requires serious consideration and funding from the federal government.
Discussion Source water protection planning serves as an effective tool to identify climate change adaptation strategies respecting safe drinking water in First Nation communities.
Source water protection aids in the protection of drinking water sources through a deliberate, focused planning process (Patrick, 2011; Patrick et al., 2017).
Through identification of threats to a water supply, it is possible to produce a risk ranking followed by management actions to reduce those risks (AANDC, 2013).
In the Prairie region, First Nation communities are now engaged in source water protection planning to produce plans that have led to the implementation of management actions.
The source water protection planning process has traditionally provided a means by which threats to source water may be identified, ranked in terms of risk, and mitigated through appropriate management actions.
The impacts of climate change add another dimension to source water protection by introducing new threats (spread of wildfire) and by exacerbating existing threats (sewage lagoon flooding).
Policy Recommendations It is recommended that the practice of source water protection be modified to include greater consideration of climate change impacts.
With greater focus on climate change, source water protection planning will be more responsive to local conditions.
The federal government, through agencies such as INAC, is encouraged to fund source protection planning in First Nation communities, particularly the implementation of completed source water protection plans.
It is recognized that single-purpose planning, such as source water protection planning, must become multi-dimensional to include climate change impacts and adaptation strategies.
To that end, a more robust source water protection planning framework that includes climate change impacts will provide a higher degree of relevant information to First Nations.
Source water protection planning may be the best means of responding to climate change impacts affecting drinking water sources in First Nation communities.
12 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
1 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/1 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 References Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC).
(2013).
First Nations onreserve source water protection plan: Guide and template.
Retrieved from http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-ENR/STAGING/textetext/source_1398366907537_eng.pdf Bharadwaj, L. (2014).
Vulnerability of First Nations communities in Canada to environmental degradation.
In V. Grover (Ed.
), Impact of climate change on water and health (pp.
173-199).
Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis Group Bonsal, B. R., Cuell, C., Wheaton, E., Sauchyn, D. J., & Barrow, E. (2017).
An assessment of historical and projected future hydro-climatic variability and extremes over southern watersheds in the Canadian Prairies.
International Journal of Climatology, 37(10), 3934-3948. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.4967 Bradford, L. E. A., Bharadwaj, L. A., Okpalauwaekwe, U., & Waldner, C. L. (2016).
Drinking water quality in Indigenous communities in Canada and health outcomes: A scoping review.
International Journal of Circumpolar Health, 75(1).
doi: https://doi.org/10.3402/ijch.v75.32336 Buttle, J. M., Allen, D. M., Caissie, D., Davison, B., Hayashi, M., Peters, D. L., .
.
.
Whitfield, P. H. (2016).
Flood processes in Canada: Regional and special aspects.
Canadian Water Resources Journal, 41(1-2), 7-30. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/07011784.2015.1131629 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME).
(2004).
From source to tap.
Guidance on the multi-barrier approach to safe drinking water.
Retrieved from www.ccme.ca/files/Resources/water/source_tap/mba_guidance_doc_e.pdf Dumanski, S., Pomeroy, J. W., Westbrook, C. J.
(2015).
Hydrological regime changes in a Canadian Prairie basin.
Hydrological Processes, 29(18), 3893-3904. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/hyp.10567 Emelko, M. B., Silins, U., Bladon, K. D., & Stone, M. (2011).
Implications of land disturbance on drinking water treatability in a changing climate: Demonstrating the need for "source water supply and protection" strategies.
Water Research, 45(2), 461-472.
Galway, L. P. (2016).
Boiling over: A descriptive analysis of drinking water advisories in First Nations communities in Ontario, Canada.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 13(5), 505. doi: https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph13050505 Golden, D. M., Audet, C., & Smith, M. A.
(2015).
"Blue-ice": Framing climate change and reframing climate change adaptation from the Indigenous Peoples' perspective in the northern boreal forest of Ontario, Canada.
Climate and Development, 7(5), 401-413. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2014.966048 13 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Haalboom, B., & Natcher, D. C. (2012).
The power and peril of "vulnerability": Approaching community labels with caution in climate change research.
Arctic, 65(3), 319-327. doi: https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic4219 Hohner, A. K., Cawley, K., Oropeza, J., Summers, R. S., & Rosario-Ortiz, F. L. (2016).
Drinking water treatment response following a Colorado wildfire.
Water Research, 105, 187-198. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.watres.2016.08.034 Howitt, R., Doohan, K., Suchet-Peasron, S., Lunkapis, G., Muller, S., Lawrence, R., .
.
.
Cross, S. (2013).
Capacity deficits and cultural interfaces of land and sea governance.
In R. Walker, T. Jojola, & D. Natcher (Eds.
), Reclaiming Indigenous planning (pp.
313-338).
Kingston, ON: McGill-Queens University Press.
Jojola, T. (2008).
Indigenous planning—an emerging context.
Canadian Journal of Urban Research,17(1), 37-47.
Laing, R. D. (2002).
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into matters relating to the safety of the public drinking water in the City of North Battleford, Saskatchewan.
Retrieved from http://www.publications.gov.sk.ca/details.cfm?p=77712 Lavalley, G. (2006).
Aboriginal traditional knowledge and source water protection: First Nations’ views on taking care of water.
Toronto, ON: Chiefs of Ontario and Environment Canada.
McGregor, D. (2012).
Traditional knowledge: Considerations for protecting water in Ontario.
International Indigenous Policy Journal,3(3).
doi: https://doi.org/10.18584/iipj.2012.3.3.11 Murphy, S. F., Writer, J. H., McCleskey, R. B., & Martin, D. A.
(2015).
The role of precipitation type, intensity, and spatial distribution in source water quality after wildfire.
Environmental Research Letters, 10 (8).
doi: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/8/084007 O’Connor, D. R. (2002).
Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: Part 2, a strategy for safe drinking water.
Toronto, ON: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Queen’s Printer for Ontario.
Patrick, R. J.
(2011).
Uneven access to safe drinking water for First Nations in Canada: Connecting health and place through source water protection.
Health Place,17(1), 386–389.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2010.10.005 Patrick, R. J., Machial, L., Quinney, K., & Quinney, L. (2017).
Lessons learned through communityengaged planning.
International Indigenous Policy Journal, 8(2).
doi: https://doi.org/10.18584/iipj.2017.8.2.7 Plummer, R., de Grosbois, D., Armitage, D., & de Loë, R. (2013).
An integrative assessment of water vulnerability in First Nation communities in Southern Ontario, Canada.
Global Environmental Change,23(4), 749-763. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.03.005 14 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
1 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/1 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.1 Pomeroy, J. W., Stewart, R. E., & Whitfield, P. H. (2016).
The 2013 flood event in the South Saskatchewan and Elk River basins: Causes, assessment and damages.
Canadian Water Resources Journal, 41(1-2), 105-117. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/07011784.2015.1089190 Porter, L. (2010).
Unlearning the colonial cultures of planning.
Farnham: Ashgate.
Reid, M. G., Hamilton, C., Reid, S. K., Trousdale, W., Hill, C., Turner, N., .
.
.
Matthews, H. D. (2014).
Indigenous climate change adaptation planning using a values-focused approach: A case study with the Gitga’at Nation.
Journal of Ethnobiology, 34(3), 401–424.
Sanderson, D., Picketts, I. M., Dery, S. J., Fell, B., Baker, S., Lee‐Johnson, E., & Auger, M. (2015).
Climate change and water at Stellat'en First Nation, British Columbia, Canada: Insights from Western science and traditional knowledge.
Canadian Geographer, 59(2), 136-150. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/cag.12142 Shook, K. (2016).
The 2005 flood events in the Saskatchewan River Basin: Causes, assessment and damages.
Canadian Water Resources Journal, 41(1-2), 94-104. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/07011784.2014.1001439 15 Patrick: Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 The International Indigenous Policy Journal July 2018 Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada Robert J. Patrick Recommended Citation Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada Abstract Keywords Acknowledgments Creative Commons License Adapting to Climate Change Through Source Water Protection: Case Studies from Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 6(1): 0-0, January 2023 RESEARCH PAPER Measurement of Vulnerability to Climate Change in Char Areas: A Survey Mrinal Saikia* and Ratul Mahanta** Abstract: Threats caused to the environment and human life by climate change have become an urgent issue.
Climate change often aggravates hazards in a given area and has harmful effects on the people residing there.
Affected by massive floods, land erosion, and the destruction of agricultural lands, char people live a risky life.
Char dwellers are among the communities that suffer the most as a result of the effects of climate change.
Few studies discuss the vulnerabilities of communities living in char areas to climate change.
This paper attempts to summarize the existing research.
It also discusses data-related issues in the measurement of vulnerability to climate change.
It ends by raising some policyrelated considerations.
Keywords: Char, LVI, LVI-IPCC, CVI, vulnerability index Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification Code: Q540, Q560 1.
INTRODUCTION Vulnerabilities induced by floods and soil erosion render it difficult for char dwellers to make a living1 and cohabitate with the river (Lahiri-Dutt 2014).
Floods and sand deposition on cultivable land impact char livelihoods and vulnerability (Ashley et al.
2000).
Char land erosion is highly unpredictable, leading to traumatic shocks to the livelihoods of char dwellers and causing households to lose their land, assets, and shelter (EGIS 2000; Kamal 2011; * PhD Research Scholar, Department of Economics, Gauhati University.
mrinalsaikia872@gmail.com.
** Professor, Department of Economics, Gauhati University.
rmeco@gauhati.ac.in.
Copyright © Saikia and Mahanta 2023.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution © NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581–6152 (print); 2581–6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v6i1.679 1 Char areas are “the new riverine lands and islands created by the continual shifting of the rivers, and emerge from the deposition of sand and silt from upstream.
Chars are found along all the major river systems, both lining the banks of rivers and as mid-river islands” (DFID 2000, 3).
mailto:mrinalsaikia872@gmail.com mailto:rmeco@gauhati.ac.in https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v6i1.679 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal Rakiba et al.
2019).
In the Indian subcontinent, char areas are located in the Ganga–Brahmaputra–Meghna plains (Lahiri-Dutt 2014).
According to Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta (2013), char areas are vastly different from other wetlands; the closest geographical structures to char areas are the mouths of deltas.
In North-East India, char areas are spread across the Brahmaputra valley of Assam, across four agro-climatic zones: the upper Brahmaputra valley, north-bank plain zone, middle Brahmaputra valley, and lower Brahmaputra valley (GOA 2002–2003).
These unique landforms in Assam are affected by several types of natural disasters, making char dwellers one of the poorest and most vulnerable groups in Assam (Kamal 2011).
The intensity of soil formation in the river, and hence, the survival and formation of chars, is influenced by several factors such as riverbank erosion, river flow patterns, soil loss, and floods (Goswami 2014; Chakraborty 2012/2014).
In addition to floods, chars are highly impacted by erosion, which makes the lives and livelihoods of char dwellers uncertain and highly prone to vulnerability (HDR 2014).
In the char areas of Assam, income opportunities, health and educational facilities, and so on are limited and are further hindered by floods and other climate-driven factors (Kumar and Das 2019).
Following the views of Birkmann (2013, 29), “Environment is the shaper where natural hazards and climate variability originated; it is at the same time an important resource for many people who are highly exposed to these hazards.” Natural hazards have detrimental effects on communities and hinder their socio-economic development.
Climate change, through its effects on natural and human systems, plays a significant role in determining the intensity and frequency of these natural hazards and the risks associated with them (Islam et al.
2015a; Panthi et al.
2016; Simotwo et al.
2018; Azam et al.
2019; IPCC 2014).
These climate-induced hazards and risks can cause considerable damage to human life and property globally (Rakiba et al.
2019).
A huge section of the world population lives in earthquake zones, floodplains, riverine islands, and low-lying coastal areas that are inherently risky (Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta 2007).
A population’s vulnerability to climate impacts is influenced by local factors that vary with time and space (Alam 2017).
The study of vulnerability to climate change is important in the context of risk assessment; this need has also been emphasized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014).
Climate vulnerability can be studied using two approaches: qualitative and quantitative.
Measurement or assessment of vulnerability is a quantitative approach to studying vulnerability.
Assessment of vulnerability is important as it helps identify suitable adaptation techniques (O’Brien et al.
2009).
Quantitative approaches to vulnerability may be either indicatorSaikia and Mahanta based or econometric.
In indicator-based approaches, an index representing vulnerability is constructed, while in econometric approaches, econometric tools are used.
Econometric methods are useful for understanding the factors that influence the extent of which climate hazards impact people’s lives and livelihoods and the economic impacts of vulnerability (Noy and Yonson 2016).
A vulnerability index is important for making comparisons across different contexts, monitoring vulnerabilities over space and time, and allocating resources to undertake mitigation and adaptation strategies (Preston et al.
2011).
It can also be used to evaluate the effectiveness of development policy frameworks (Eriksen and Kelly 2007).
As vulnerability is influenced by local factors, several researchers have argued in favour of contextand place-specific assessments of vulnerability (Cutter et al.
2003; Füssel 2010; Fraser et al.
2011; Wood et al.
2014; Alam 2016; Alam 2017).
To estimate the extent of vulnerability of char areas, researchers have used a variety of indicator-based methods such as the Livelihood Vulnerability Index (LVI), LVI-IPCC, and Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CVI).
Although several methods have been used to measure vulnerability, there is no consensus on which tool is best to measure vulnerability, specifically in char areas.
Hence, this paper briefly describes the methods available to measure vulnerability in char areas, discusses various issues related to those methods, and identifies the most suitable method of vulnerability measurement.
The paper is divided into six sections.
In Section 2, a discussion is presented on char areas and how the idea of vulnerability is linked with them.
Section 3 includes a detailed discussion on the methods used to measure vulnerability to climate change in char areas.
Section 4 examines the data and the measurement-related issues associated with these methods.
Section 5 summarizes the results of various quantitative studies on vulnerability in char areas.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.
CHAR AND VULNERABILITY There are two types of char areas (Figure 1): island chars, or mid-river islands, and attached chars, which are connected to riverbanks (GOA 1983; Lahiri-Dutt 2014).
The formation of a char at a particular time and in a specific area is highly dependent on varied factors such as the river’s flow pattern, the occurrence of floods, discharge of sediment due to soil loss, and erosion of sand material from the riverbanks (Lahiri-Dutt 2014).
Rivers like the Ganga and Brahmaputra change their courses frequently (LahiriDutt 2014); this leads to erosion and the emergence of char lands (Sarker et al.
2015).
Changes in the course of the river, its flow pattern, and the distance of the river from the char all significantly influence the Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal permanence of a char (Khandakar 2016).
Changes in the size and location of chars could adversely affect the habitations of char dwellers and the availability of land for agriculture and animal rearing (Mondal et al.
2016; Das et al.
2020).
In Assam, char areas result from sedimentation by the river Brahmaputra.
The Brahmaputra is considered the second-most sediment-charged river in the world (Chakraborty 2009; Hoque 2015).
As the river flows, its velocity reduces, as does its capacity to carry sediment (Chakraborty 2009).
As a result, it deposits silt, which eventually gets covered by vegetation.
A socioeconomic survey of char areas in Assam estimates that there are 36,092 hectares of char land in Assam, occupying approximately 5% of the state’s total geographical area (GOA 2002–2003).
Figure 1: Island Char and Attached Char Source: Lahiri-Dutt (2014) The morphology of rivers, the physical characteristics of their geographic locations, and the climate during the monsoons make char areas vulnerable to natural disasters (Coleman 1969; Baqee 1998; Islam et al.
2015a).
Char dwellers are extremely vulnerable to hazards caused by climate change, such as storm surges, rising salinity, riverbank erosion, floods, irregular rainfall, droughts, hailstorms, water logging, and pest infestations.
As water levels rise, saline water enters cultivable land, which drastically reduces fertility.
Char dwellers live in extreme conditions during floods, which adversely affect their crops, livestock, houses, and other property.
Char dwellers consider normal floods—which are short, predictable, and low in intensity—as a blessing as they benefit them environmentally and Saikia and Mahanta economically by making their land more fertile and suitable for cultivation.
Moreover, researchers describe char areas as lands ripe with possibility for their dwellers (Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta 2013; Hoque 2015; Lafaye de Micheaux et al.
2018).
Though these lands are risky, unstable, and fragile, they attract the attention of some people, mainly those belonging to marginal communities, since these lands are fertile and suitable for cultivation (Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta 2013).
3.
MEASURING VULNERABILITY IN CHAR AREAS Two methods are used to measure vulnerability to climate change in char areas: the econometric approach and the index-based approach.
The econometric approach considers factors such as vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP), vulnerability as low expected utility (VEU), and vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER).
Under the indicator-based approach, a number of indices have been developed and used by various researchers.
These include the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) by Cutter et al.
(2003), another Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) by Vincent (2004), the Vulnerability Index by Deressa et al.
(2008), LVI and LVI-IPCC by Hahn et al.
(2009), the Livelihood Effect Index (LEI) by Urothody and Larsen (2010), the Climate Vulnerability Index (CVI) by Pandey and Jha (2012), the Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) by Ge et al.
(2013), the Index of Social Vulnerability by Lee (2014), the Socio-economic Vulnerability Index (SeVI) by Ahsan and Warner (2014), and the Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index (PVCCI) by Feindouno et al.
(2020).
A considerable number of researchers have studied vulnerability to climate change in char areas.
Some of these studies are qualitative in nature (EGIS 2000; Ashley et al.
2000; Kamal 2011; Lahiri-Dutt and Samanta 2013; Chakraborty 2009/2012/2014; Islam and Hussain 2014; Islam et al.
2015b; Rakiba et al.
2019); other researchers use quantitative approaches (Toufique and Yunus 2013; Alam et al.
2017; Azam et al.
2019; Sarker et al.
2019; Das et al.
2020; Ahmed et al.
2021).
Econometric methods are widely used to study vulnerability to climate change.
However, few studies on char areas use these methods.
Most studies are qualitative in nature.
These researchers draw on descriptive studies, ethnographic research, focus group discussions (FGD), participatory rural appraisals (PRA), and rapid rural appraisals (RRA), and generate descriptive statistics.
A limited number of studies have used indices for quantitative analyses of vulnerability to climate change in char areas (Toufique and Yunus 2013; Alam et al.
2017; Azam et al.
2019; Sarker et al.
2019; Das et al.
2020; Ahmed et al.
2021).
There are three main indices Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal used by researchers: LVI, CVI, and LVI-IPCC.
The LVI and LVI-IPCC were developed by Hahn et al.
(2009) and the CVI is the updated version of the LVI, developed by Pandey and Jha (2012).
This section discusses all three methods.
The three indices are based on the IPCC (2001) definition of vulnerability; that is, vulnerability is considered a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity.
Therefore, Vulnerability = f (exposure, sensitivity, adaptive capacity) However, it is to be noted that in the IPCC’s (2014) definition on vulnerability, it has removed exposure component from the idea and expressed vulnerability as a function of sensitivity and adaptive capacity only.
The LVI aims to quantify the strength of communities’ livelihoods; people’s access to healthcare and water sources; and the capacity of communities to adjust to the threats posed by climate change (Hahn et al.
2009).
The balanced weight approach is used under the LVI approach to calculate vulnerability; that is, even though each major component includes various subcomponents, each subcomponent contributes equally to the overall LVI.
Hahn et al.
(2009) consider seven major components—social networks, livelihood strategy, socio-demographic profile, access to food, healthcare, and water, and the impact of climate variability and natural disasters.
Again, each major component has a number of subcomponents.
This method is useful in that it allows the addition or subtraction of indicators on the basis of the need and scope for research in any particular area (Hahn et al.
2009; Pandey and Jha 2011; Alam et al.
2017).
Since the subcomponents are measured at different scales, it is important to standardize them using an index.
Standardization is done as follows: Index Ya = Where Ya is the original subcomponent of area ‘a’.
Ymax and Ymin are the maximum and minimum values of each subcomponent, respectively.
For variables measuring frequencies, like the percentage of households having access to clean water, the maximum value is considered as 100 and the minimum as 0.
After converting the values of the subcomponents into indices, one can derive the value of the major component by taking the average of the subcomponents.
Saikia and Mahanta Xa = Here, Xa is one of the seven major components of area ‘a’.
is the ith standardized subcomponent of the respective major component.
And ‘n’ represents the number of subcomponents present under the major component.
Once the seven major components are calculated, LVI can be calculated using the given formula: LVIa = Where LVIa is the Livelihood Vulnerability Index for area ‘a’, a weighted average of all the seven major components, and indicates the number of subcomponents under the Zth major component.
Weights are assigned so that all subcomponents contribute to the overall LVI.
The LVI-IPCC is an alternative to the LVI approach.
It was developed to calculate the LVI by incorporating the IPCC (2001) definition of vulnerability; in the LVI-IPCC, the seven major components are organized into three dimensions of vulnerability, and the index value of these three dimensions are calculated separately.
Hence, the LVI-IPCC approach comes one step closer to the IPCC (2001) definition of vulnerability to climate change.
In the calculation of LVI-IPCC, the adaptive capacity dimension includes components such as households’ socio-demographic profile, livelihood strategies, and social networks.
Sensitivity includes access to health, food, and water; and exposure refers to the occurrence of natural disasters and climate variability in the district.
The LVI-IPCC differs from the LVI in its method of calculation.
The LVI-IPCC presents the overall index as the difference between the exposure value and the value of adaptive capacity multiplied by the sensitivity index.
Now, let’s have a look at how the LVI-IPCC is calculated for a district, say ‘a’.
Da = Where Da is a dimension of the LVI-IPCC for district ‘a’.
are the main components of the ath district indexed by ‘i’.
Each major component’s weight is defined by and the number of main components under each dimension is defined by ‘n’.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal Now, LVI-IPCC can be calculated using the following formula: LVI-IPCCa = (Ea – Ad.Ca) * Sa Where Ea is the estimated exposure score of district ‘a’, Ad.Ca represents the index value of the adaptive capacity of the respective district, and the sensitivity score of the district ‘a’ is denoted by Sa.
The value of LVI-IPCC varies from −1 to 1.
A value closer to 1 indicates a higher state of vulnerability, whereas −1 denotes less vulnerability.
The LVI and LVIIPCC both consider the same major components and use the same method to measure the index value of each major component.
The dimensions of the CVI are the same as those of the LVI.
Each component has relevant subcomponents under it.
A conceptual improvement of the CVI over the LVI is that despite measuring vulnerability, the CVI aims to define a society’s capacity to attain a ‘no vulnerability’ status.
Therefore, methodologically, according to Pandey and Jha (2011, 497), “The inverse relationship for sensitivity has been considered keeping in view of analysing the per unit strength of the system bearing capability on absolute performance under the climate threats.” Based on the three dimensions of vulnerability, the major components have been segregated—adaptive capability includes socio-demographic profile, livelihood strategies, and social networks.
The dimension of sensitivity contains the health, food, and water components; and exposure captures the occurrence of natural disasters and climate variability (Pandey and Jha 2011).
The subcomponents can be standardized using the same formula used in the LVI.
The index values for exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity are calculated separately, as follows: Exp = Where Exp is the index of exposure.
and are considered weights of the indicators, which are the number of subcomponents under the indicators ND and CV, respectively.
Where Sen stands for the index of sensitivity; are the weights; and the number of subcomponents are H, F, and W. The index of adaptive capacity (Ada.Cap) is calculated as follows: Ada.Cap = Saikia and Mahanta Where are the weights, which are the number of subcomponents of SD, LS, and SN respectively.
The CVI considers an inverse relationship between sensitivity and the ability of a system to perform under climate threats.
It explains the capability of a society to attain the status of no vulnerability.
The CVI is calculated as follows: CVI = 1 – [{ }]* Ni is the number of major components under the ith dimension of the CVI.
No number has been assigned to the sensitivity dimension, because its components cancel out each other.
The value of the CVI falls within the range of 0 to 1.
As it reflects the capability of people to reduce their vulnerability, the higher the value of the CVI, the lower the level of vulnerability, and the smaller the value of the CVI, the greater the level of vulnerability.
4.
CHALLANGES IN MEASURING VULNERABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF RIVERINE ISLANDS Various methods have been used in the literature to measure vulnerability.
Some indices are more inclined towards the socio-economic dimension while others emphasize the physical or biophysical aspects of vulnerability.
The biophysical aspect covers the sensitivity components of vulnerability, while adaptive capacity covers the socio-economic.
However, adaptive capacity and sensitivity are interlinked, and it would not be appropriate to calculate one without mentioning the other (Deressa et al.
2008).
All three indices, LVI, LVI-IPCC, and CVI, cover both the socio-economic and biophysical aspects of vulnerability.
Researchers use primary data on social networks, livelihood strategies, socio-demographic profiles; access to food, healthcare, and water; and climate variability and natural disasters to calculate vulnerability indices (Toufique and Yunus 2013; Alam et al.
2017; Azam et al.
2019; Sarker et al.
2019; Das et al.
2020; Ahmed et al.
2021).
5.
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS FROM EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON RIVERINE ISLANDS India and Bangladesh share about 54 transboundary rivers that extensively support the livelihoods of a large number of riverine communities.
However, various climate change associated factors, such as the increased frequency of floods, unpredictable changes in the courses of rivers, and a continuous increase in the width of these rivers, are having significant Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal adverse effects on the lives and livelihoods of communities (Sentinel 2022).
Sumanta Biswas, Senior Programme Officer, CUTS International, in an interview, said that along with climate change, deforestation, rising urbanization, and more intensive agricultural practices have adversely affected many rivers in South Asia by altering their courses and changing their flow rate (Suri 2021).
As a result, increased erosion, siltation, and unexpected floods have become common in riverine communities.
Transboundary river systems* are also under serious stress due to various factors, including the overuse of resources such as newly emerged sandbars for cultivation and sand mining, overfishing, and so on, thus increasing the variability of resources.
Disruptions in the livelihoods of transboundary riverine communities can be clearly observed at the national and subnational levels; flooding severely affects these regions and excessive rain leads to devastating conditions (Suri 2021).
Alam et al.
(2018), in their study on the vulnerability of people living in the char lands of the Brahmaputra– Jamuna river system of Bangladesh, argue that the livelihood strategies of those living on char lands are considerably different from those of people residing on the mainland.
The majority of the population is engaged in agriculture, and during the off season, char dwellers also take up non-farm activities.
Thus, their lives are severely affected by floods and land erosion compared to the people residing in the mainland.
The main challenges include seasonal flooding, geographic isolation, and anthropogenic as well as climatic stressors.
Though riverine communities have adjusted their livelihoods and cropping patterns to observed flooding patterns, due to climate variability, the occurrence of early floods has become a common issue linked to the washing away of crops.
Bhuiyan et al.
(2017) found that massive land erosion is the most significant vulnerability factor among char communities in Bangladesh.
A study by Salam et al.
(2019), on char lands in Bangladesh, showed that flooding is the main contributor to vulnerability among char dwellers.
Floods in char lands affect various aspects, including people’s health and habitation, agriculture, economic activities, the availability of clean water sources, and sanitation status.
To quantitatively analyse the livelihood vulnerabilities of char communities, three indices—the LVI, LVI-IPCC, and CVI—have been used by different researchers.
Researchers study vulnerability to climate change in the char areas to compare it to the mainland (Toufique and Yunus 3013) and to compare island and riverbank chars (Alam et al.
2017; Das et al.
2020).
* The Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra are known as the major transboundary river systems of South Asia.
By providing energy, food, water, and ecosystem services, these river systems across the subcontinent support about 700 crore people (Suri 2014).
Saikia and Mahanta Studies have also analysed vulnerability to climate change in terms of the distance of the char villages from the administrative headquarters (Sarker et al.
2019).
This section summarizes the major findings of the research on vulnerability to climate change in char areas using quantitative techniques.
Many studies report the high vulnerability of char areas.
River erosion, floods, and droughts are the major climate-driven risks facing char dwellers, and these events have significant negative effects on char livelihoods, which are primarily based on agriculture (Ahmed et al.
2021).
Char dwellers are highly sensitive and exposed to natural disasters and have a low level of adaptive capacity (Azam et al.
2019; Ahmed et al.
2021).
Char communities with a large number of marginalized households are more vulnerable (Azam et al.
2019).
Char dwellers are more vulnerable to climate change compared to inhabitants on the mainland.
The major components influencing this difference are social networks, food, and access to water (Toufique and Yunus 2013).
Differences in vulnerability are also evident between the island chars and attached chars.
Alam et al.
(2017) found that the inhabitants of island chars are more vulnerable compared to attached ones due to relatively less access to educational, health, and financial institutions, greater exposure to natural disasters, and more limited crop diversification.
Limited availability of food and water further exacerbate the vulnerability of char areas.
Healthcare, education, and government services are less available to island char dwellers, making them more vulnerable.
Again, island chars are more exposed to frequent floods and riverbank erosion compared to attached chars.
Vulnerability to climate change is also determined by the distance of the char villages from the district headquarters.
Char villages that are nearer the district administrative headquarters are comparatively less vulnerable than those char villages that are further away due to the latter’s lower access to education, basic public services, healthcare, and financial assets.
The latter have comparatively low social capital, making inhabitants of further away chars financially more vulnerable (Sarker et al.
2019).
6.
CONCLUSION Both socio-economic and environmental factors determine social groups’ vulnerability to climate change (Deressa et al.
2008).
In the discussion on the socio-economic impacts of climate change, vulnerability and adaptive capacity have been gaining importance over the last few years, more specifically, after the IPCC (2001) report on climate change, indicating a growing prioritization of the field of vulnerability research (Ahsan and Warner, 2014).
According to Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003), VEP and Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal VEU determine a benchmark of welfare (poverty or utility).
The VER model studies both biophysical and socio-economic factors and the impact of these factors on loss of welfare in the form of a reduction in consumption (Narayanan and Sahu 2016).
Researchers have used only indicator-based approaches to quantitatively study vulnerability to climate change in char areas.
Three indices are used: the LVI, LVI-IPCC, and CVI.
It is important to note that all the three vulnerability indices are based on the IPCC (2001) definition, where vulnerability to climate change is a function of sensitivity, exposure, and adaptive capacity.
However, the IPCC (2014) report separates the exposure component from the idea of vulnerability and expresses it as a function of sensitivity and adaptive capacity only.
However, even after the reformulation of the concept of vulnerability in the report, later studies on vulnerability to climate change in char areas have continued to use the exposure component as part of the measurement (Alam et al.
2017; Azam et al.
2019; Sarker et al.
2019; Das et al.
2020; Ahmed et al.
2021) Therefore, some adjustments to these indices may be necessary to incorporate the updated idea of vulnerability to climate change.
As discussed earlier, the research on vulnerability to climate change in char areas using quantitative approaches employs indicator-based methods; an econometric approach has not yet been applied.
However, since both the econometric and indicator-based approaches have advantages, using both in tandem may lead to a better understanding of vulnerability.
For instance, an indicator-based approach will facilitate an understanding of the extent of vulnerability to climate change, while an econometric-based approach would help to study the economic impact.
Declaration: The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.
Data sharing not applicable—no new data generated: Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data was created or analysed in this study.
Saikia and Mahanta REFERENCES Ahmed, Zobaer, Gauri S Guha, Aaron M Shew, and Monirul GM Alam.
2021.
“Climate Change Risk Perceptions and Agricultural Adaptation Strategies in Vulnerable Riverine Char Islands of Bangladesh.” Land Use Policy 103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105295.
Ahsan, Nasif, and Jeroen Warner.
2014.
“The Socioeconomic Vulnerability Index: A Pragmatic Approach for Assessing Climate Change Led Risks – A Case Study in the South-western Coastal Bangladesh.” International Journal for Disaster Risk Reduction 8: 32–49.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.12.009.
Alam, Monirul GM.
2016.
“An Assessment of the Livelihood Vulnerability of the Riverbank Erosion Hazard and its Impact on Food Security for Rural Households in Bangladesh.” PhD diss., School of Commerce, University of Southern Queensland, Australia.
—.
2017.
“Livelihood Cycle and Vulnerability of Rural Households to Climate Change and Hazards in Bangladesh.” Environmental Management 59: 777–791.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-017-0826-3.
Alam, Monirul GM, Khorshed Alam, Shahbaz Mushtaq, and Michele L Clarke.
2017.
“Vulnerability to Climate Change in Riparian Char and River-bank Households in Bangladesh: Implication for Policy, Livelihoods and Social Development.” Ecological Indicators 72: 23–32.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2016.06.045.
Alam, Md Rakibul, Md Abdul Malak, and Quader Mohammad.
2018.
“Livelihood Vulnerability of Char Land People in Brahmaputra–Jamuna River System.” Journal of Life and Earth Sciences 4 (1): 54–64.
Ashley, Steve, Kamal Kar, Abul Hossain, and Shibabrata Nandi.
2000.
“The Chars Livelihood Assistance Scoping Study.” DFID Department for International Development.
Azam, Gausal, Mohammad Emadul Huda, Mohammad Amit Hossain Bhuyan, Mohammad Mohinuzzaman, Md Bodrud-Doza, and SM Didar-Ul Islam.
2019.
“Climate Change and Natural Hazards Vulnerability of Char Land (Bar Land) Communities of Bangladesh: Application of the Livelihood Vulnerability Index (LVI).” Global Social Welfare 8 (1): 93–105.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40609-01900148-1.
Baqee, MA.
1998.
Peopling in the Land of Allah Jaane: Power, Peopling and Environment: The Case of Char-lands of Bangladesh.
Dhaka: University Press Limited.
Bhuiyan, Mohammad Amir Hossain, SM Didar-Ul Islam, and Gausal Azam.
2017.
“Exploring Impacts and Livelihood Vulnerability of Riverbank Erosion Hazard Among Rural Household Along the River Padma of Bangladesh.” Environmental System Research 6 (25).
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40068-017-0102-9.
Birkmann, Jörn.
2013.
“Measuring Vulnerability to Promote Disaster-Resilient Societies and to Enhance Adaptation: Conceptual Frameworks and Definitions.” https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105295 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.12.009 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-017-0826-3 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2016.06.045 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40609-019-00148-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40609-019-00148-1 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40068-017-0102-9 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal In Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Towards Disaster Resilient Societies (second edition), edited by Jörn Birkmann, p 29.
New York: United Nations University Press.
Chakraborty, Gorky.
2009.
Assam’s Hinterland: Society and Economy in the Char Areas.
New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House.
—.
2012.
“The ‘Ubiquitous’ Bangladeshis.” Economic & Political Weekly 47 (38): 21–23.
—.
2014.
“The Demographic Question in the Char Areas of Assam.” Review of Char Settlers of Assam: A Demographic Study, by Goswami, M. Social Change and Development 11 (2).
Coleman, James M. 1969.
“Brahmaputra River Channel Processes and Sedimentation.” Sedimentary Geology 3 (2–3): 129–239.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0037-0738(69)90010-4.
Cutter, Susan L, Bryan J Boruff, and W Lynn Shirley.
2003.
“Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards.” Social Science Quarterly 84: 242–261.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6237.8402002.
Das, Manob, Arijit Das, Sahil Momina, and Rajiv Pandey.
2020.
“Mapping the Effect of Climate Change on Community Livelihood Vulnerability in the Riparian Region of Gangatic Plain, India.” Ecological Indicators 119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2020.106815.
Deressa, Temesgen, Rashid M Hassan, and Claudia Ringler.
2008.
“Measuring Ethiopian farmers’ Vulnerability to Climate Change across Regional States.” Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy Research Institute.
DFID.
2000.
“The Chars Livelihood Assistance Scoping Study.” DFID Department for International Development.
EGIS.
2000.
“Riverine Chars in Bangladesh: Environmental Dynamics and Management Issues.
Environment and GIS Support Project for Water Sector Planning (EGIS).” University Press.
Eriksen, S, and P Kelly.
2007.
“Developing Credible Vulnerability Indicators for Climate Adaptation Policy Assessment.” Mitigation and Adaption Strategies for Global Change 12 (4): 495–524.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-006-3460-6.
Feindouno, Sosso, Patrick Guillaumont, and Catherine Simonet, C. 2020.
“The Physical Vulnerability to Climate Change Index: An Index to be Used for International Policy.” Ecological Economics 176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106752.
Fraser, Evan DG, Andrew J Dougill, Klaus Hubacek, Claire H Quinn, Jan Sendzimir, and Mette Termansen.
2011.
“Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change in Dryland Livelihood Systems: Conceptual Challenges and Interdisciplinary Solutions.” Ecology and Society 16: 33–42.
https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-03402-160303.
Füssel, HM.
2010.
“How Inequitable is the Global Distribution of Responsibility, Capability, and Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Comprehensive Indicator-based https://doi.org/10.1016/0037-0738(69)90010-4 https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6237.8402002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2020.106815 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-006-3460-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106752 https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-03402-160303 Saikia and Mahanta Assessment.” Global Environmental Change 20: 597–611.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.009.
Ge, Yi, Wen Dou, Zhihui Gu, Xin Qian, Jinfei Wang, Xu Wei, Peijun Shi, et al.
2013.
“Assessment of Social Vulnerability to Natural Hazards in the Yangtze River Delta, China.” Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment 27: 1899–1908.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00477-013-0725-y.
GOA.
1983.
Char Area Development Department.
Government of Assam.
GOA.
2002–2003.
Socio-economic Survey (2002–2003).
Directorate of Char Areas Development Assam, Dispur, Guwahati.
Goswamy, Manoj.
2014.
Char Settlers of Assam: A Demographic Study.
Guwahati: MRB Publishers.
Hahn, Micah B, Anne M Riederer, and Stanley O Foster.
2009.
“The Livelihood Vulnerability Index: A Pragmatic Approach to Assessing Risks from Climate Variability and Change – A Case Study in Mozambique.” Global Environmental Change 19 (1): 74–88.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.11.002.
HDR.
2014.
Assam Human Development Report 2014.
Government of Assam.
Hoddinott, John, and Agnes Quisumbing.
2003.
“Methods for Microeconometric Risk and Vulnerability Assessment.” Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, The World Bank.
Hoque, Md Deluwar.
2015.
“A Study of Livelihood Pattern in the Socio-economic Milieu of Char Areas in Assam.” PhD diss., Gauhati University.
International Collective in Support of Fishworkers.
2022.
“India and Bangladesh: Transboundary Rivers Support Millions of Riverine Communities.” https://www.icsf.net/newss/india-and-bangladesh-transboundary-rivers-supportmillions-of-riverine-communities/.
IPCC.
2001.
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
IPCC.
2014.
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, RK Pachauri and LA Meyer (eds)].
Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC.
Islam, M Rezaul, and Delwar Hossain.
2014.
“Island Char Resource Mobilization (ICRM): Changes of Livelihoods of Vulnerable People in Bangladesh.” Social Indicators Research 117: 1033–1054.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-013-0375-y.
Islam, Md Sirajul, Md Solaiman, MS Islam, TR Tusher, and MH Kabir.
2015a.
“Impacts of Flood on Char Livelihoods and Its Adaptation Techniques by the Local People.” Bangladesh Journal of Scientific Research 28 (2): 123–135.
https://doi.org/10.3329/bjsr.v28i2.26783.
Islam, Didar-Ul Islam, Mohammad AH Bhuiyan, and AL Ramanathan.
2015b.
“Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability Assessment in Coastal Region of Bangladesh: A https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.009 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00477-013-0725-y https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.11.002 https://www.icsf.net/newss/india-and-bangladesh-transboundary-rivers-support-millions-of-riverine-communities/ https://www.icsf.net/newss/india-and-bangladesh-transboundary-rivers-support-millions-of-riverine-communities/ https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-013-0375-y https://doi.org/10.3329/bjsr.v28i2.26783 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal Case Study on Shyamnagar Upazila of Satkhira District.” Journal of Climate Change 1 (1–2): 37–45.
https://doi.org/10.3233/JCC-150003.
Kamal, Sabkat.
2011.
Livelihood Dynamics and Disaster Vulnerabilities of Char Land Areas.
Department of Urban and Regional Planning Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology Dhaka.
Khandakar, Abdullah.
2016.
Social Exclusion of Inhabitants of Chars: A Study of Dhubri District in Assam.
Department of Sociology School of Social Sciences, Sikkim University.
Kumar, Balram, and Debarshi Das.
2019.
“Livelihood of the Char Dwellers of Western Assam.” Indian Journal of Human Development 13 (1): 90–101.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0973703019839808.
Lafaye de Micheaux, Flore, Jenia Mukherjee, and Christian A Kull.
2018.
“When Hydrosociality Encounters Sediments: Transformed Lives and Livelihoods in the Lower Basin of the Ganges River.” Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 1 (4): 641–663.
https://doi.org/10.1177/2514848618813768.
Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala.
2014.
“Chars, Islands that Float Within Rivers.” Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures 8 (2).
Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala, and Gopa Samanta.
2007.
“Like the Drifting Grains of Sand.
Vulnerability, Security and Adjustment by Communities in the Charlands of the Damodar River, India, South Asia.” Journal of South Asian Studies 30 (2): 327–350.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400701499268.
—.
2013.
Dancing with the River: People and Life on the Chars of South Asia.
Yale University Press.
https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300188301.001.0001.
Lee, Yung-Jaan.
2014.
“Social Vulnerability Indicators as a Sustainable Planning Tool.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 44: 31–42.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2013.08.002.
Mondal, Jayanta, Sandipta Debanshi, and Sujit Mandal.
2016.
“Dynamicity of the River Ganga and Bank Erosion Induced Land Loss in Manikchak Diara of Malda District of West Bengal, India: A RS and GIS based Geo-spatial Approach.” International Journal of Applied Remote Sensing and GIS 3 (1): 1316–1323.
Narayanan, K, and Santosh Kumar Sahu.
2016.
“Effects of Climate Change on Household Economy and Adaptive Responses among Agricultural Households in Eastern Coast of India.” Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation 110 (7): 1240–1250.
Noy, Ilan, and Rio Yonson.
2018.
“Economic Vulnerability and Resilience to Natural Hazards: A Survey of Concepts and Measurements.” Sustainability 10: 2850. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082850.
O’Brien, Karen, Siri Hallstrom Eriksen, Ane Schjolden, and Lynn Nygaard.
2009.
“What’s in a Word?
Conflicting Interpretations of Vulnerability in Climate Change Research.” Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242171299_What's_in_a_word_Confli cting_interpretations_of_vulnerability_in_climate_change_research https://doi.org/10.3233/JCC-150003 https://doi.org/10.1177/0973703019839808 https://doi.org/10.1177/2514848618813768 https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400701499268 https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300188301.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2013.08.002 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082850 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242171299_What's_in_a_word_Conflicting_interpretations_of_vulnerability_in_climate_change_research https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242171299_What's_in_a_word_Conflicting_interpretations_of_vulnerability_in_climate_change_research Saikia and Mahanta Pandey, Rajiv, and Shashidar Kumar Jha.
2012.
“Climate Vulnerability Index – Measure of Climate Change Vulnerability to Communities: A Case of Rural Lower Himalaya, India.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 17 (5): 487– 506. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-011-9338-2.
Panthi, Jeeban, Suman Aryal, Piyush Dahal, Parashuram Bhandari, Nir Y Krakauer, and Vishnu Prasad Pandey.
2016.
“Livelihood Vulnerability Approach to Assessing Climate Change Impacts on Mixed Agro-livestock Smallholders around the Gandaki River Basin in Nepal.” Regional Environmental Change 16 (4): 1121–1132.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0833-y.
Preston, Benjamin L, Emma J Yuen, and Richard M Westaway.
2011.
“Putting Vulnerability to Climate Change on the Map: A Review of Approaches, Benefits, and Risks.” Sustainability Science 6: 177–202.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-011-0129-1.
Rahman, Saydur, Md Touhiduzzaman, and Irteja Hasan.
2017.
“Coastal Livelihood Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Case Study of Char Montaz in Patuakhali District of Bangladesh.” American Journal of Modern Energy 3 (4): 58–64.
https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajme.20170304.11.
Rakiba, MA, Jun Sasaki, Sosimohan Pal, Md Asif Newaz, Md Bodrud-Doza, and Md AH Bhuiyan.
2019.
“An Investigation of Coastal Vulnerability and Internal Consistency of Local Perceptions under Climate Change Risk in the South West Part of Bangladesh.” Journal of Environmental Management 231: 419–428.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2018.10.054.
Salam, Md Abdus, Md Shohel Khan, and Md Abu Hena Sarker.
2019.
“Impacts and Coping Techniques of Flood: The Case Study of Two Adjacent Char Lands of Jamuna River in Sirajgonj District, Bangladesh.” International Research Journal of Environmental Science 8 (3): 53–61.
Sarker, Md Nazirul Islam, Md Arshad Ali, and Md Shahidul Islam.
2015.
“Causes and Possible Solutions of Poverty Perceived by Char Dwellers in Bangladesh.” International Journal of Natural and Social Sciences 2 (1): 37–41.
Sarker, Md Nazirul Islam, Min Wu, GM Monirul Alam, and Roger C Shouse.
2019.
“Livelihood Vulnerability of Riverine-island Dwellers in the Face of Natural Disasters in Bangladesh.” Sustainability 11: 1623. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11061623.
Sentinel Digital Desk.
2022.
“Livelihoods Along India–Bangladesh Transboundary Rivers in Peril.” The Sentinel, March 28, 2022. https://www.sentinelassam.com/topheadlines/livelihoods-along-india-bangladeshtrans-boundary-rivers-in-peril-584771.
Simotwo, Harrison K, Stella M Mikalitsa, and Boniface N Wambua.
2018.
“Climate Change Adaptive Capacity and Smallholder Farming in Trans-Mara East Subcounty, Kenya.” Geoenvironmental Disasters 5 (5).
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40677018-0096-2.
Surie, Mandakini Devasher.
2014.
“Desecuritizing Transboundary Water in South Asia.” The Asian Foundation, September 17, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-011-9338-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0833-y https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-011-0129-1 https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajme.20170304.11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2018.10.054 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11061623 https://www.sentinelassam.com/topheadlines/livelihoods-along-india-bangladesh-trans-boundary-rivers-in-peril-584771 https://www.sentinelassam.com/topheadlines/livelihoods-along-india-bangladesh-trans-boundary-rivers-in-peril-584771 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40677-018-0096-2 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40677-018-0096-2 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal https://asiafoundation.org/2014/09/17/desecuritizing-transboundary-water-insouth-asia/.
Surie, Mandakini Devasher.
2021.
“Valuing Water from a Transboundary Perspective in South Asia.” South Asia Nadi Sambad, April 7, 2021. https://soanas.org/valuing-water-from-a-transboundary-perspective-in-southasia/#:~:text=South%20Asia%E2%80%99s%20major%20transboundary%20rive r%20systems%20%E2%80%94%20the,subcontinent%2C%20providing%20water%2C%20food%2C%20energy%2C%20and %20ecosystem%20services.
Toufique, Kazi Ali, and Mohammad Yunus.
2013.
“Vulnerability of Livelihoods in the Coastal Districts of Bangladesh.” The Bangladesh Development Studies 36 (1): 95– 120.
Urothody, Ashique and Helle Overgard Larsen.
2010.
“Measuring Climate Change Vulnerability: A Comparison of Two Indexes.” Banko Janakari 20: 9–16.
https://doi.org/10.3126/banko.v20i1.3503.
Vincent, Katharine.
2004.
“Creating an Index of Social Vulnerability to Climate Change for Africa.” Working paper.
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research.
Wood, Stephen A, Amir S Jina, Meha Jain, Patti Kristjanson, and Ruth S DeFries.
2014.
“Smallholder Farmer Cropping Decisions Related to Climate Variability across Multiple Regions.” Global Environmental Change 25: 163–172.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.12.011.
https://asiafoundation.org/2014/09/17/desecuritizing-transboundary-water-in-south-asia/ https://asiafoundation.org/2014/09/17/desecuritizing-transboundary-water-in-south-asia/ https://soanas.org/valuing-water-from-a-transboundary-perspective-in-south-asia/#:~:text=South%20Asia%E2%80%99s%20major%20transboundary%20river%20systems%20%E2%80%94%20the,sub-continent%2C%20providing%20water%2C%20food%2C%20energy%2C%20and%20ecosystem%20services https://soanas.org/valuing-water-from-a-transboundary-perspective-in-south-asia/#:~:text=South%20Asia%E2%80%99s%20major%20transboundary%20river%20systems%20%E2%80%94%20the,sub-continent%2C%20providing%20water%2C%20food%2C%20energy%2C%20and%20ecosystem%20services https://soanas.org/valuing-water-from-a-transboundary-perspective-in-south-asia/#:~:text=South%20Asia%E2%80%99s%20major%20transboundary%20river%20systems%20%E2%80%94%20the,sub-continent%2C%20providing%20water%2C%20food%2C%20energy%2C%20and%20ecosystem%20services https://soanas.org/valuing-water-from-a-transboundary-perspective-in-south-asia/#:~:text=South%20Asia%E2%80%99s%20major%20transboundary%20river%20systems%20%E2%80%94%20the,sub-continent%2C%20providing%20water%2C%20food%2C%20energy%2C%20and%20ecosystem%20services https://soanas.org/valuing-water-from-a-transboundary-perspective-in-south-asia/#:~:text=South%20Asia%E2%80%99s%20major%20transboundary%20river%20systems%20%E2%80%94%20the,sub-continent%2C%20providing%20water%2C%20food%2C%20energy%2C%20and%20ecosystem%20services https://doi.org/10.3126/banko.v20i1.3503 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.12.011
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 4 (1): 89–112, January 2021 SPECIAL SECTION: The Commons: A Revisit Understanding How Local-level Environment Stewardship Initiatives Increase Livelihood Resilience to Climate Change: Insights from Rajasthan, India Tenzin Chorran,  Bhavana Rao Kuchimanchi,  Shreya Karmakar,  Himani Sharma,  Debarupa Ghosh,  Pratiti Priyadarshini  Abstract: Common property resources (CPR) are central for the sustenance of biodiversity and rural communities in India.
Weak institutional governance and the lack of tenure rights for local communities over CPRs is resulting in degradation and over-exploitation of resources making rural communities vulnerable across India.
Climatic variabilities further exacerbate existing socio-ecological imbalances multifold.
Within the broader area of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, this paper explores how restoration of CPRs through local environment stewardship initiatives contributes to the resilience of rural livelihoods in the face of climate change.
A mixed-methods approach was employed to study this aspect in six villages in two districts in Rajasthan.
It was found that secure property rights and collective management of CPRs enhances household resilience and improves ecological health.
It concludes that processes supporting local self-governance need to be central to local adaptation to climate change, as they naturally create resilient and sustainable rural livelihoods.
 Foundation for Ecological Security (FES), PB No.
29, Anand 388001, Guajrat, India (Anand); tenzinchorran@gmail.com.
 FES, Anand; bhavanarln@gmail.com.
  Block EB, Plot 44, 1811b Rajdanga Main Road, East Kolkata Township, Kolkata 700 107, India; shreya.karmakar1996@gmail.com.
 FES, Anand; himani@fes.org.in.
 FES, A-160, Near S Bhilwara, Rajasthan 311 001, India; debarupahghosh96@gmail.com.
 FES, Anand; pratiti@fes.org.in.
Copyright © Chorran, Kuchimanchi, Karmakar, Sharma, Ghosh and Priyadarshini 2021.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v4i1.376 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v4i1.376 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [90] Keywords: Common Property Resources; Local Governance; Vulnerability to Climate Change; Collective Management of Natural Resources; Secure Property Rights.
1.
INTRODUCTION India is particularly vulnerable to climate change, as around two-thirds of its population is rural and depend on climate-sensitive natural resources (Chatterjee et al.
2005).
The increasing need to secure the livelihoods of these communities has therefore set the stage for climate change adaptation through social, institutional, physical, and structural alterations (Carabine and Lemma 2014; Hijioka et al.
2014).
However, these adaptation strategies do not necessarily translate into reduced vulnerability of human systems, and, therefore, it is highly important to engage with people with different knowledge, experiences, and backgrounds to jointly address the challenges in framing adaptation approaches (Preston and Stafford-Smith 2009; Tompkins et al.
2010; Eakin et al.
2012).
Rajasthan shows the highest climate sensitivity among all regions in India due to more severe and frequent spells of drought (Rathore and Verma 2013).
This adds another layer of vulnerability to existing rural developmental challenges, as 75% of the state’s population is dependent on climate-sensitive sectors for its livelihood.
Further, the state has only 1.2% of India’s water and cultivable land resources, and over 20% of rural Rajasthan is landless (Rathore 2005).
These conditions limit crop production, making livestock rearing and dependence on common property resources (CPRs) such as forests, pastures, waste lands, and natural water bodies, critical.
Access to CPRs is an important determinant of economic well-being in rural communities across India (Jodha 1986; Jodha 1992; Beck and Ghosh 2000; Beck and Nesmith 2001; Lesorogol 2008; Wolford et al.
2013; Thapliyal et al.
2019).
CPRs are non-exclusive resources whose usage rights and obligations are shared by all members of the community (Ostrom et al.
1988; Ostrom 1990; Bromley and Cernea 1989; Janssen and Anderies 2013).
CPRs therefore constitute an important component of the rural landscape in India, especially in Rajasthan, where they have socio-cultural, economic, and ecological significance.
The commons-livestock-agricultural complex provides stability and security to rural households in an unpredictable environment (Rao et al.
2015).
Studies conducted at the village level estimate that CPRs contribute 12–23% to the incomes of rural households (Jodha 1990).
[91] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini In spite of the poverty-alleviating nature of CPRs (Jodha 1992; Reddy and Chakravarty 1999; Agarwal 2001, Ibisch et al.
2010), they continue to record declines in land quality and size (Jodha 1985; Mwangi and Wardell 2012).
Although there is a risk of large-scale resource exploitation in case control of CPRs is transferred to communities, one must acknowledge that these communities used to have traditions of shared norms and mutual trust, and their behaviour in the experiments shows that communities still tend to be non-exploitative, non-commercial, and cooperative when prioritizing, planning, and managing resource sustainably (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014).
While literature on rural communities and climate change adaptation exists in the Indian context, studies on rural communities, CPRs, and adaptation to climate change are limited (Bantilan et al.
2012; Aryal et al.
2020).
In view of this, in our paper, we study how the restoration of CPRs through environment stewardship initiatives at the local level can contribute to climate-resilient rural livelihoods.
We studied six villages in Udaipur and Bhilwara districts, Rajasthan.
We applied Ostrom’s socio-ecological systems (SES) framework (Ostrom 2009) to understand how the complex social and ecological components of a system interact against the backdrop of a changing climate and resource usage.
2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 2.1 Study area and sample We conducted this study in the state of Rajasthan, which is located in the north-western region of India (Figure 1).
The Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) has been working in seven districts in Rajasthan since 1988, covering a total of 5,590 habitations, undertaking work towards conservation of natural resources, particularly CPRs, through the collective action of local communities.
Hence, for this paper, we deliberately chose six villages across two districts—Udaipur and Bhilwara—based on the following criteria: i) over ten years of conservation work and ii) the availability of two-point data on ecological and socio-economic indicators over a period of five years.
We present the characteristics of the villages in Table 1.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [92] Figure 1: Location of the study [A) India map showing the state of Rajasthan; B) location of the study districts in Rajasthan state; C) location of the study talukas within each district] Source: Adapted from Administrative Atlas of India, Census of India, 2011, and local government directory, 2015–16.
[93] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini Table 1: The characteristics of the districts and chosen villages Udaipur district: agro-ecological region: Northern Plains (and Central Highlands), including the Aravallis, hot semi-arid eco-region; average rainfall: 624.9 mm; temperature range: 0o–48o; soil type: red gravelly soil and red sandy soil.
Village name Demographic profile Types of CPR and area Sultanji ka Kherwara, Jhadol Block* o Population: 150 HHs.
o Caste composition: OBC (75%); ST (24%): FC (1%).
o Farmer composition: landless (7%); marginal (55%); small (37%); medium (1%).
o Livestock profile: cattle(17%); buffalo (2%); sheep (1%); goat (80%).
o Livelihood profile: agriculture and livestock rearing (75%); wage employment (20%); off– farm employment (5%) Forest land: 140 ha.
Cheetarawas, Sayara Block o Population: 150 HHs.
o Caste composition: ST (100%).
o Farmer composition: marginal (98%); small (2%).
o Livestock profile: cattle (32%); buffalo (2%); sheep (2%); goat (64%).
o Livelihood profile: agriculture and livestock rearing (100%), Forest land: 190 ha.
Dheemri, Phalasiya Block o Population: 185 HHs.
o Caste composition: ST (100%).
o Farmer composition: marginal (3%); small (97%).
o Livestock profile: cattle (53%); sheep (1%); goat (46%).
o Livelihood profile: agriculture and livestock rearing (75%); wage employment (10%); off– farm employment (15%).
Forest land: 88 ha.
contd... Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [94] Bhilwara district: agro-ecological region: Northern Plains (and Central Highlands), including the Aravallis, hot semi-arid eco-region; average rainfall: 597.2 mm; temperature range: 7.3o–46o; soil type: shallow black soil, mixed red and black soils Village name Demographic profile Types of CPR and area Mala ka Kheda, Mandalgarh Block o Population: 40 HHs.
o Caste composition: OBC (90.8%); ST (9.2%).
o Farmer composition: landless (0%); marginal (50%); small (25%); medium (25%).
o Livestock profile: cattle (14%); buffalo (14%); sheep (29%); goat (43%).
o Livelihood profile: agriculture and livestock rearing (86%); wage employment (9%); off– farm employment (6%).
Two managed grazing land: 30 ha and 15 ha.
Mukan Garh , Mandalgarh Block o Population: 230 HHs.
o Caste composition: SC (57 %); OBC (37%); FC (6%).
o Farmer composition: landless (1%); marginal (52%); small (26%); medium (17%).
o Livestock profile: cattle (21%); buffalo (19%); sheep (9%); goat (60%).
o Livelihood profile: agriculture and livestock rearing (85%); wage employment (14%); off– farm employment (1%).
Forest land: 50 ha.
Managed grazing land: 30 ha.
Unmanaged revenue waste land: 18 ha.
Kekariya , Mandalgarh Block o Population: 110 HHs.
o Caste composition: OBC (85%); ST (5 %); SC (5%); FC (5%).
o Farmer composition: landless (4%); marginal (89%); small (5%); medium (2%).
o Livestock profile: cattle (35%); buffalo (25%); sheep (6%); goat (33%).
o Livelihood profile: agriculture and livestock rearing (82%); wage employment (12%); off– farm employment (6%).
Forest land: 100 ha.
Managed revenue wasteland: 30 ha.
Unmanaged revenue waste land: 150 ha.
Sources of Data: IMD (2019); FES Data Platform (2019); FES internal database 2013–2019; Hydrogeological Atlas of Rajasthan 2013 (GoR 2013); Agriculture Contingency Plans for Bhilwara and Udaipur districts (GoI 2012a, 2012b).
Notes: 1.
Major crops, i.e.
maize, pulses, sorghum, barley, wheat, and mustard, are the same for all sites.
2.
* Block is the lowest administrative division in India.
3.
List of acronyms: OBC – Other Backward Castes; ST – Scheduled Tribes; SC – Scheduled Castes; FC – Forward Castes or General category; HHs – Households.
[95] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini 2.2.
Data collection process FES uses a range of scientific survey formats to monitor ecological, social, and economic changes in its project areas over time.
From among these, we selected three data sources for the time period 2013–2019 to build a comprehensive narrative on various aspects of the study.
The data sources we used include: i) Socio-ecological monitoring: FES uses International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) survey instruments to obtain socio-ecological data at the village level.
IFRI facilitates multi-country, multi-year data collection and analyses data about forests, people, and institutions using a combination of research methods (IFRI 2013).
ii) Annual ecological monitoring: FES uses a comprehensive ecological monitoring approach to assess changes in the ecological condition of CPRs under community protection.
It conducts regular annual ecological assessments through geographic information system (GIS) and community participatory methods on several parameters to track changes in community-managed CPRs and unmanaged CPRs.
However, we restrict our study to biomass, vegetation density, and biodiversity aspects.
iii) Secondary data and independent studies on climate change adaptation: To link various climate change adaptation perspectives, we gathered data from two studies we had conducted in Rajasthan, covering aspects of the communities’ perception of climate risks, the impacts they faced, and their adaptation responses.
2.3 Theory Our study’s aim stems from Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework (Ostrom 2007; 2009), which suggests that socio-ecological outcomes are a function of the complex interactions among the diverse social and ecological components of that system.
Building on the same stream of thought, in this paper, we apply a modified version of Ostrom’s SES framework to analyse our findings (see Figure 2) on how local stewardship initiatives help systems adapt to extreme climatic events.
To summarize, Ostrom’s framework consists of four major subsystems— resource systems, resource units, governance systems, and actors.
The interplay between these separate subsystems is mediated by complex interactions that produce outcomes that again feed back into the system to improve its functioning, robustness, and resilience.
The focal SES interacts with social, economic, and political systems—and related ecosystems— considering them external variables that affect the system’s vulnerability and adaptability in the long term.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [96] Figure 2: Application of adapted version of Ostrom’s SES framework Source: Adapated from Ostrom (2007; 2009) [97] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini We therefore considered the six study villages to be six different SESs.
We studied the socioeconomic and political context of each SES using the variables of livelihood and economic development, demographic trends, and market linkages, which gave insights into the socioeconomic status of households (HHs), their cultural background, and societal evolution.
To understand the related ecosystems, we integrated climate variabilities and the impacts faced by communities living in the SES, as climatic variations have an effect on both, the social and ecological components of a system.
The resource systems within each SES were the CPRs used by the communities, i.e., forests in the case of Udaipur district and grazing lands, revenue waste lands, and forests in the case of Bhilwara district.
Here, we studied both biophysical aspects, i.e., location, size, productivity, and storage characteristics, along with social aspects, such as humanconstructed facilities, as factors that determine the access rights and dependency patterns of HHs on the CPRs in the SES.
For resource units, we mapped the types of products and changes in dependency patterns over time.
We also mapped the characteristics of the products (mostly vegetation) in each location, by paying attention to their growth, as it affects the region’s micro-climate.
Under governance systems and actors, we looked at local relevant actors, community leadership, knowledge systems, and dependency on the resource, as they influence local stewardship initiatives that work to conserve CPRs.
In governance systems, we also look at administrative systems, local rules and systems, and the role of associated stakeholders.
To understand interactions, we looked at patterns of resource use and dependency on CPRs; forest–livelihood interactions; community perceptions about the condition of resource systems; use of technology; deliberation processes; conflict points; self-organizing activities; and networking activities, as they are important indicators of local stewardship.
And lastly, for outcomes, we analysed social, ecological, and climate adaptation performance measures, based on which we elaborated how crucial actors and governance systems are maintaining the SES’s equilibrium to absorb and respond to shocks.
3.
RESULTS 3.1 The socio-cultural and economic setting in the study sites In Udaipur district, the three study sites we focused on were Cheetarawas, located in Sayara block, Dheemri located in Phalasiya block and Sultanji ka Kherwara, located in Jhadol block.
Cheetarawas and Dheemri are predominately tribal habitations, while Sultanji ka Kherwara has a predominantly OBC population.
The main sources of livelihood for households (HHs) in these sites are agriculture, livestock rearing, sale of Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [98] forest produce, and wage labour.
They also see a high rate of rural–urban migration, mostly for off-farm employment.
As Udaipur district falls in the southern Aravalli hill region, which is predominantly forested, the forests hold great social and cultural significance for the inhabitants.
All three study sites are located around 50–70 km away from Udaipur city, while the nearest town markets are around 10 km away.
Though remotely located, Udaipur city stills plays a significant role in accessibility to larger markets and other urban services.
In Bhilwara, the study sites, Mala ka Kheda, Mukan Garh, and Kekariya, are all located in Mandalgarh block.
Here also, agriculture and livestock rearing are the main livelihood sources for HHs.
These sites have access to various marketplaces within their gram panchayats (8–12 km), Mandalgarh town (20–35 km), and Bhilwara city (40–65 km).
Good road connectivity provides ample opportunity for HHs in the region for marketing dairy products and employment in the large–scale textile industries in Bhilwara.
In addition to this, high mineral availability, such as limestone deposits, is also attracting attention from the cement mining and marble industries.
Due to these factors, the status of migration is quite low in the study sites in Bhilwara as compared to Udaipur.
3.2 CPRs: use and vulnerability to climate change In Udaipur, the reserve forest area was the main CPR.
Cheetarawas, Dheemri, and Sultanji ka Kherwara have access to about 190 ha, 88 ha, and 140 ha of reserve forest lands respectively; these fall under the forest department’s jurisdiction, but a village forest protection and management committee (VFPMC), constituted under the Joint Forest Management arrangement, manages them.
These forest areas are shared by other habitations, making them a highly contested resource.
The forest tract in Cheetarawas, located on the fringes of Kumbhalgarh wildlife sanctuary, is dense and mature, with abundant wild flora and fauna.
Meanwhile, the forests of Dheemri and Sultan ji ka Kherwara have more shrub-like vegetation.
In all three sites, the forests hold important cultural and social significance and act as an important source of several forest products, fodder, fuel wood, and water for the inhabitants.
All three sites have a history of massive deforestation by various actors and are further impacted by frequent droughts and reduced rainfall over the years.
However, local environment stewardship initiatives (which we discuss further in Section 3.3) have helped restore these forest resources, considerably stabilizing the livelihoods of tribal and other poor HHs in the region.
The inhabitants of the region harvest and sell a range of forest produce, namely custard apple (Annona squamosa), tendu leaves (Diospyros melanoxylon), java plum (Syzygium cumini), Indian jujube (Ziziphus mauritiana), date (Phoenix dactylifera), goose [99] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini berry (Phyllanthus emblica), khair (Acacia catechu), baheda or myrobalan (Terminalia bellirica), Dyer’s oleander (Wrightia tinctoria), ratanjot (Jatropha curcas), umbiya (Miliusa tomentosa), flame of the forest (Butea monosperma), bamboo (Dendrocalamus strictus), and a variety of fodder grasses.
In the Bhilwara study sites, there were three different types of CPRs: the reserve forest managed by the village forest protection management committee (VFPMC); grazing land managed by the village pastureland development committee (VPDC); and unmanaged revenue waste land under the jurisdiction of the revenue department.
All the HHs in the study sites are dependent on all the CPRs; however, the availability of products from each CPR varies considerably, influencing their dependency patterns.
Forest lands, spanning across 50–100 ha, were once a good source of fuel wood and fodder for the community, but due to strict governance and restrictions, imposed by the Forest Department, the communities are unable to access these lands and have a higher dependence on other types CPRs for fuel wood and fodder.
Revenue waste lands, which are mostly unmanaged, have been neglected, and are used indiscriminately for fuel wood, fodder, forest produce, and timber.
Continuous degradation over the years has depleted these resources, reducing their availability considerably.
The village pasture lands and revenue waste lands span across 30 ha, 35 ha, and 40 ha in the villages of Mukan Garh, Mala Ka Khera, and Kekariya, respectively.
Over the past five years, the dependence of communities on managed grazing lands has increased, especially for fodder consumption; their dependence on CPRs for timber has reduced but has remained the same for fuel wood and intangible benefits.
Our interaction with HHs at both sites revealed that their dependency on the sale of forest produce has increased over time.
In the Udaipur sites, we found increased dependency on certain forest produce, such as custard apple, bamboo, baheda, and palash, due to a higher market value, particularly in Cheetrawas.
Although in recent years migration has increased in the region, the forests continue to be a good source of income for a certain section of HHs.
In Bhilwara, the greatest dependency across all the study sites was on managed grazing lands compared to other CPRs.
This can be attributed to the higher availability of fodder due to better management practices.
From the forests, tendu leaves, amla (goose berry), ber (jujube), and certain species of fodder have become economically significant for the socioeconomically weaker HHs, as they help meet their subsistence needs.
Dependence on CPRs for fodder in both the Udaipur and Bhilwara sites have increased manifold between 2013 and 2019, while dependence on CPRs for timber and fuel wood species have somewhat reduced in the Bhilwara study villages, specifically with the introduction of several Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [100] government schemes that propose cleaner and greener alternatives to timber for house construction and fuel wood for cooking.
In this context, already marked by several issues, changes in rainfall and temperature and the occurrence of extreme events not only have an ecological impact on the CPRs—they also influence how communities may use or manage resources, exacerbating already existing vulnerabilities.
Independent studies on climate change adaptation in both sites indicated that communities identified a range of climate risks in the region (see Table 2).
In the Udaipur sites, the major climate risks they perceived were erratic rainfall patterns, dry spells, and cyclonic storms.
In Bhilwara, HHs reported erratic rainfall patterns, high-intensity rainfall, and a rise in temperature.
Based on participant perceptions, the sites in Udaipur were more affected by changes in climate phenomena than the sites in Bhilwara.
However, in both sites, HHs reported that climate risks have intensified over the last five years.
Table 2: Climate risk perceptions of communities in the study sites Climate risks identified Impacts perceived Udaipur Bhilwara Reduced overall precipitation M L Dry spells H M Erratic rainfall patterns H H High-intensity rainfall L H Rising temperature M H Rising winters temperatures L L Increase in drought situations M L Delayed onset of the monsoons L L Cyclonic storms in monsoons H L Note: Acronyms: Scale: H = high impact, M = medium impact, L = low impact In terms of impacts (see Table 3), in the Udaipur sites, the major impacts reported by the HHs seemed to have a direct bearing on their natural resources, as cyclonic storms uprooted trees, destroyed forest conditions, and increased the incidence of forest fires.
This impacted the availability of forest produce, fuel wood, and fodder.
With regard to livestock, they reported an increase in disease incidence and a reduction in crop residues due to crop loss.
Regarding agriculture-related impacts, they reported crop loss in the germination and harvest stages, an increase in pest attacks and diseases in crops, and a reduction in crop yields.
The impacts of climate risks on agriculture and livestock were similar across all sites in Bhilwara.
However, high-intensity rainfall caused the breakage of watershed structures, leading to flash floods and waterlogging.
HHs also [101] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini reported that reductions in fodder and fuel wood were more predominant in the unmanaged CPRs.
Further, HHs in both the districts felt that increasing temperatures during the summer months caused heat stress, which prevented HH members from working outdoors for longer hours.
Workers, especially women, lacked the physical strength required to work in government wage programmes or agricultural fields in the heat, depriving them of their daily wage and livelihood.
3.3 Local environment stewardship and common property resources conservation In all the study sites, separate committees were present to govern the different CPRs.
In case of forest lands, VFPMCs were organized under the Joint Forest Management arrangement; VPDC was formed for managed pasture lands as per the rules of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act; and Tree Grower’s Cooperative Society was constituted for managing revenue waste lands.
The committees in all study sites consisted of locally relevant actors, such as community resource persons, village representatives, or members of the executive body of the village institution.
They had specific bye-laws that defined the rules for accessing, using, withdrawing, and managing the CPRs.
These committees also developed annual regeneration plans, taking into consideration the diverse needs of different social groups in the village, including women, which encouraged the participation of multiple stakeholders in the conservation and management of CPRs.
However, there were cases of both strong and weak institutional governance in the study sites as the evolution of institutions is non-linear in nature (see Table 3).For example, the VFPMC in Cheetarawas was very strong and had been managing the forest land for about fifteen years.
However in the last five years conflicts among the communities have become frequent, and the rules are poorly enforced due to internal and external factors.
This has impacted the conservation and management efforts.
While efforts are being made by the institution to reduce conflicts, encroachments still exist and the regeneration rate of forest resources is also comparatively low.
Contrary to this, the forests of Dheemri and Sultanji ka Kherwara reflected the positive results of consistent CPR co-management practices by communities, resulting in improved vegetation density and green cover.
The forest in Dheemri was deteriorating with the rampant felling of trees in the 1960s and 70s.
The community soon realized the importance of a healthy ecosystem and decided to protect their forests.
In an effort to prevent people from cutting trees, a few of the community members went to a nearby temple called Kesariya Jiand performed the Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [102] Table 3: Household responses to climate change adaptation Climate change impacts Adaptation responses by communities U B CPR related Decrease in availability of certain tree and fodder species Damage to trees through uprooting/ breakage Increased collective action in CPR management Increased plantation activity in forests Implementation of harvesting rules P P P P P P Reduced surface water bodies SMC work in private lands SMC work in CPRs P P P P Breakage of watershed structures causing flash flooding Repair of structures Increased SMC works in CPRs and other areas A A P P Reduced fodder in grazing/revenue waste lands Rules and regulations to protect and regenerate lands A P Livestock related Increased disease incidence in livestock Shift in species composition or breeds Increased veterinary care P P P P Sudden disease outbreaks in poultry Reduced poultry rearing Shift in species composition A P P A Reduction in crop residues due to crop loss Agroforestry Shift to livestock or mixed farming Conservation of common lands P P P A P P Agriculture related Crop loss in the germination and harvest stages Double sowing Crop diversification Increased dependency on forest products P P P P P P Increase in pest and disease attacks in crops Increased usage of chemical pesticides Look at weather forecasts P A P A Reduction in crop yields New crop alternatives Increased dependency on forest products Higher dependence on wage work Increased dependence on PDS Increase livestock production P P P P P P A P P P Reduced groundwater Use of water-efficient systems Water budgeting initiatives at the village level Well deepening P P P P P P Sources: Independent studies on climate change adaptation by FES, 2015–16.
Note: Acronyms: P – present; A – absent; CPR – common property resources; SCM – soil and moisture conservation; U – Udaipur; B – Bhilwara.
sacred ritual of kesarchidkaav (throwing saffron along the forest boundary).
Since then, there has been no felling of trees, and the community believes [103] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini that if anyone causes harm to the forest, they will be punished by God.
Today, the forest is divided into various management units, wherein each habitation has user rights over a separate forest patch.
The management units, demarcated by streams, are in proportion to the population of each habitation, such that the benefits are equitably shared.
Similarly, in Kekariya, a patch of revenue waste land was leased to the community by the revenue department.
With proper management and strong governance practices, the degraded land was finally revived and converted into grazing land.
Today, it provides myriad benefits to the community.
In Kekariya and Mukan Garh, the rules governing the management of grazing lands allow villagers to collect only dry twigs that fall from trees for use as firewood.
The grazing land is closed for four to five months during the monsoons to allow grass and new regenerating plants to grow.
The cutting of branches and grazing of animals is strictly prohibited during this period.
In Mala Ka Khera, the committee closes access to grazing lands for two years after plantation activity.
In case the rule is broken, the village institution imposes graduated sanctions.
Across all the villages, the penalty for breaking rules depends on the extent of damage done and also on the economic background of the offender.
The fine is usually fixed at INR 2,000 for vulnerable people (socially excluded, landless, marginal, small landholding farmers), while it may shoot to as high as INR 15,000 for offenders from comparatively privileged backgrounds.
After the payment of the fine, the lower and poorer castes are allowed to take the branches that they have chopped off the trees.
3.4 CPRs and adaptation to climate change In this section, we elaborate on the interactions between HHs and CPRs, examining outcomes in terms of social and ecological returns and how they have helped these communities adapt to climate change (see Table 3).
We found that the results of the local stewardship initiatives for CPR conservation differed significantly in the two study sites, depending on differential governance systems, resource conditions, and other local factors.
In Cheetarawas, in spite of the high incidence of conflicts and low regeneration rate of forest products, there has been a significant improvement in the availability of forest resources, since the VFPMC was formed, thus providing benefits to communities, particularly buffering them from losses in agriculture and livestock production.
The increased sale of certain forest produce in the past five years provided poorer HHs an average annual income of INR 5,000–40,000 per household, depending on the kind of forest produce they sold and its availability.
One such example is the collective marketing of custard apple, which earned people in Cheetarawas INR 3,75,000 in 2019, benefitting several HHs.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [104] In Bhilwara, all study sites showed increased vegetation density in the managed grazing lands, thus leading to an increase in the availability of fodder and water resources.
This resulted in increased livestock holding capacity per HH, and large farmers in particular showed a greater preference for rearing buffaloes.
Therefore, there is a strong presence of dairy cooperatives, either within the village or in the nearby gram panchayat.
The average quantity of dairy sales per HH in these villages was around 200–350 litres per month, which generated an average household income of INR 1,25,00–2,00,000 annually.
Also, they generate various dairy products, including curd, ghee, paneer, and butter, for self-consumption.
The availability of more fodder in the managed CPRs helped the HHs continue dairy production, thereby helping them cope with crop loss and the reduced availability of crop residues and manage disease incidence in dairy animals better.
Other responses that we observed in both sites with regard to CPRs and efforts by the local community to reduce the impacts of climate risks in the region involved increased plantation, soil and moisture conservation activities, further tightening of the management, and new harvesting rules to enhance regeneration efforts.
In Bhilwara, as high-intensity rainfall was an issue, the management undertook the repair of damaged watershed structures and the construction of new ones.
This not only helped reduce general water scarcity and flash flooding, but it also helped in further regeneration of vegetation in the grazing lands.
Further, this increase in community-led collective action to manage CPRs helped in checking water run-off and in improving the soil and moisture regime in the region.
For instance, in Mukan Garh, the construction of water harvesting structures has contributed to groundwater recharge and an increase in the water column in wells by about 15–20 feet.
This has had a cascading effect on agriculture and livestock-based livelihoods, as is reflected in the increased productivity of wheat and maize over the past few years.
The use of water-efficient systems and water-budgeting initiatives in both the districts further helped offset losses in crop production.
As their incomes became stable, HHs managed other losses in agriculture by increasing their use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers, diversifying their crop (i.e., a shift from maize to wheat, and from chilli to mustard), double sowing, and selling forest produce.
When it came to livestock, regeneration of CPRs helped in securing dairybased livelihoods, particularly in Bhilwara, despite drought-like conditions and erratic rainfall patterns that caused losses in crops, both in terms of [105] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini income and crop residues.
Further, though the communities reported high disease incidence in livestock, the availability of abundant fodder helped keep the incidence low and manageable through better nutrition.
Bhilwara also saw an increase in livestock keeping.
From the ecological perspective (see Table 4), in the Udaipur sites, our data revealed that there was a 35.8% increase in the above ground biomass in Dheemri and Sultanji ka Kherwara, whereas there was a 14.6% decrease in Cheetrawas.
We saw a similar trend in the species diversity index and number of species.
In the former, the community’s efforts to protect CPRs were visible both ecologically and in its subsequent returns towards enhancing livelihoods, while weak local management and governance led to lower regeneration in Cheetrawas.
Table 4: Ecological outcomes of local stewardship initiatives in the study sites Particulars Udaipur Bhilwara Type of resource systems Forest land* Forest land** Grazing land Forest land RWL Study year ’14 ’19 ’14 ’19 ’14 ’19 ’14 ’19 ’14 ’19 Number of species 25 22 21 32 12 12 11.5 15 10 9 Shannon Diversity Index 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.7 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 Above ground tree biomass (tons/ha) 140.9 120.2 24.8 33.7 10.2 11.8 21.8 30.7 4.2 5.2 No.
of trees (0–5 cm DBH class) 212 333 629 784 391 546 741 1063 173 184 No.
of Trees (> 10 cm DBH class) 454 451 49 82 42 49 62 151 24 30 Sources: IFRI dataset 2013 and 2019.
Note: Acronyms: DBH – diameter at breast height; * Cheetrawas, ** Dheemri and Sultanji ka Kherwara In Bhilwara, however, we saw an improvement in natural resources in all CPRs in 2013–2019.
We found a 21–54% increase in standing biomass in both forests and community-managed grazing lands in all three sites.
There was also an increase in tree density, but a decrease in the diversity index, which revealed an increase in only dominant species.
The waste lands, however, showed different results—there was an increase in standing biomass, but it mainly consisted of the invasive species, Prosopis juliflora; Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [106] there was otherwise a reduction in species diversity, density, and fodder availability.
4.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The communities in the study sites in both districts are located in varied geographical regions and landscapes.
Though agriculture and livestock production are their primary occupations, we found that they showed a high dependence on CPRs to maintain their basic needs, as a supplementary source of income (particularly poorer HHs), and for profitable livestock rearing.
Our findings showed that goods and services obtained from CPRs, such as fuel wood, fodder, and forest produce met both, the income and daily subsistence needs of the poor and marginalized.
Thus, by undertaking various restoration activities on CPRs, which were once stressed and degraded, they improved groundwater levels, biomass production, and biodiversity, which led to overall stabilization in farm-based livelihoods.
This was more evident in Bhilwara compared to Udaipur.
Further, productive CPRs and their regeneration efforts supported livestock rearing by smallholders (Ali 2007) in Bhilwara, which helped buffer against crop losses and helped them continue dairy production even under drought-like conditions.
In addition to this, we can consider the shift to buffalo rearing in the region as a sustainable and lucrative adaptation to climate change.
This is because buffaloes can be reared on fodder from CPRs and do not require high-quality green feed like crossbred/exotic cows, whose fodder is otherwise produced with precious ground water.
While CPRs, when managed properly, can transform and improve rural livelihoods, extreme climatic events, coupled with mismanagement practices and lack of collective effort at the community level, can have negative impacts on them, thus affecting food security and increasing poverty and social inequality—as we have seen in Cheetrawas, even though it is a densely forested area.
Further, we also observed that the condition of the CPRs (see Table 4) also influenced the rate of migration—less productive CPRs in the Udaipur sites can be linked to higher migration (despite their remoteness) than Bhilwara.
In such a situation, climate risks in the region add an additional layer of risks, increasing the existing vulnerability of socio-economically weaker sections, as they are most dependent on CPRs (Bantilan et al.
2012).
We thus conclude that CPRs act both as a stable source of livelihood as well as a safety net against risks arising from climate change.
[107] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini In order to ensure that the benefits from CPRs are sustainable in the long term, it is important to govern and manage them judiciously.
We find that when local communities have secure property rights over CPRs and manage them collectively through self-governing local institutions, the result is enhanced household resilience through the reduction of poverty and social inequalities as well as improved ecological health (Dupar and Badenoch 2002).
We conclude that processes that support local self-governance need to be strengthened and are central to local adaptation to climate change — as we have seen in many instances where CPRs have buffered the impacts of climate change.
In other words, our paper emphasizes the need for integrating climate vulnerability and related adaptation strategies at the local level by means of collective action to boost local institutions to improve their planning and implementation of developmental activities (Agarwal 2008).
For centuries, CPRs, except forests, have been considered to be of no economic value, while the traditional use of these lands has supported the livelihoods of economically and socially backward rural communities for decades (Jodha 2000).
Further, CPRs in any form are storehouses of biodiversity that have contributed significantly to water and nutrient flow, and hence have enhanced the resilience of farming systems and livestock breeding for generations.
These have been further strengthened through local tenurial arrangements (Gaur et al.
2018).
Although mostly unmanaged, there are village-specific bye-laws to govern CRP management and use, and these need to be strengthened through linking institutions and by coordinating responses across the government, the private sector, and civil society to enhance the inherent adaptive capacities of these communities.
Therefore, we have highlighted the need for viewing forests, pastures, and waste lands as durable community assets, which when managed collectively, aid local-level climate change adaptation processes.
These adaptation strategies are strengthened by aligning the objectives of meeting livelihood security while maintaining the access and availability of natural resources.
The decentralized governance of shared resources, therefore, aids collective decision-making, and the principles of inclusion and equity, sharing of responsibilities, and access to benefits have acted as a common denominator across all existing village institutions in both the districts.
Lastly, the application of the SES framework in analysing the interactions and outcomes of social and ecological systems provides valuable insights into the nature of governance systems across the study sites and the degree of local environment stewardship practised.
In Bhilwara, for instance, different rules exist for the management of various CPRs.
In the Udaipur villages, on the other hand, the inability to address local-level conflicts in Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [108] resource use and the lack of proper monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms have created stark differences across the forest conditions in the two blocks.
The extent of collective action, strength of village institutions, and variations in rules and sanctions determine the state of vegetation cover and product availability for each CPR, and consequently, its capacity for livelihood resilience.
In fragile systems, as we saw in the case of Cheetarawas village, institutions for reducing climate risk and promoting adaptation may be too weak to empower communities in complex decisionmaking, particularly in instances of resource conflict.
Hence, resolving institutional challenges in the management of natural resources—including lack of coordination, monitoring, and enforcement—would be a big step towards more effective climate governance (Hijioka et al.
2012).
The need now is therefore to advocate a pro-active stance (Jodha, 2000) to community-led climate change adaptation, particularly in the context of CPRs, which would lead to a genuine devolution in the domain of development.
REFERENCES Ali, J.
2007.
―Commentary: Livestock, Common Property Resources and Rural Smallholders in India.‖ International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 5 (4): 265–268.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14735903.2007.9684826.
Agarwal, A.
2000.
―Conceptualizing Environmental Collective Action: Why Gender Matters.‖ Cambridge Journal of Economics 24 (3): 283–310.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/24.3.283.
———.
2001.
―Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources.‖ World Development 29 (10): 1649–1672.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305750X(01)00063-8.
———.
2008.
―The Role of Local Institutions in Adaptation to Climate Change.‖ Michigan: School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan.
IFRI Working Paper W081-3: 8–29.
Aguilar, B. and T. D. Sisk.
2009.
―A Framework to Evaluate Ecological and Social Outcomes of Collaborative Management: Lessons from Implementation with a Northern Arizona Collaborative Group.‖ Environmental Management 45: 132–44.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-009-9400-y.
Aryal, J. P., T. B. Sapkota, R. Khurana, et al.
2020.
―Climate Change and Agriculture in South Asia: Adaptation Options in Smallholder Production Systems.‖ Environment, Development and Sustainability 22: 5045–5075.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-019-00414-4.
Balasubramanian, M., and V. Birundha.
2012.
―Climate Change and its Impact on India.‖ The IUP Journal of Environmental Sciences VI (1): 31–46.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14735903.2007.9684826 https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/24.3.283 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00063-8 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00063-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-009-9400-y https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-019-00414-4 [109] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini Bantilan, C. S., N. P. Singh, and N. S. Jodha.
2012.
―The Commons, Communities and Climate Change.‖ Economic & Political Weekly 47(13): 31.
Beck, T. and C. Nesmith.
2001.
―Building on Poor People’s Capacities: The Case of Common Property Resources in India and West Africa.‖ World Development 29 (1): 119–133.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00089-9.
Beck, T. and M. G. Ghosh.
2000.
―Common Property Resources and the Poor: Findings from West Bengal.‖ Economic & Political Weekly 65 (3): 147–153.
Binder, C. R., J. Hinkel, P. W. G. Bots, C. Pahl-Wostl.
2013.
―Comparison of Frameworks for Analyzing Social-ecological systems.‖ Ecology and Society 18 (4): 26. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-05551-180426 Bromley, D. and M. Cernea.
1989.
―The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies.‖ World Bank Discussion Paper 57.
Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Carabine, E. and A. Lemma (principle authors).
2014.
―The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report: What’s in it for South Asia.‖ London and Cape Town: Overseas Development Institute and Climate and Development Knowledge Network.
Chatterjee, K., A. Chatterjee, and S. Das.
2005.
―Case Study 2: India Community Adaptation to Drought in Rajasthan.‖ Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Bulletin 36 (4): 33–52.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2005.tb00233.x Dupar, M. and N. Badenoch.
2002.
―Environment, Livelihoods and Local Institutions: Decentralization in mainland Southeast Asia.‖ Washington DC: World Resources Institute.
Eakin, H., E. L. Tompkins, D. R. Nelson, and J. M. Anderies.
2012.
―Hidden Costs and Disparate Uncertainties: Trade-Offs in Approaches to Climate Policy.‖ In Adapting to Climate Change: Thresholds, Values, Governance, edited by W. N. Adger, I. Lorenzoni, and K. L. O’Brien, 212–226.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596667.014.
Gaur, M. K., R. K. Goyal, S. Kalappurakkal, and C. B. Pandey.
2018.
Common Property Resources in Drylands of India.
International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 25 (6): 491–499.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504509.2018.1423646.
GoI.
2012a.
Agriculture Contingency Plan for Bhilwara.
2012.
New Delhi: Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Welfare, Government of India.
http://agricoop.nic.in/sites/default/files/RAJ18-Bhilwara-9.3.2012.pdf GoI.
2012b.
Agriculture Contingency Plan for Udaipur.
2012.
New Delhi: Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Welfare, Government of India.
http://agricoop.nic.in/sites/default/files/RAJ22-Udaipur-9.3.2012.pdf.
GoR.
2013.
Hydrogeological Atlas of Rajasthan.
2013.
Ground Water Department, Government of Rajasthan.
https://energy.rajasthan.gov.in/content/dam/doitassets/water/Ground%20Water https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00089-9 https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-05551-180426 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2005.tb00233.x https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596667.014 https://doi.org/10.1080/13504509.2018.1423646 http://agricoop.nic.in/sites/default/files/RAJ18-Bhilwara-9.3.2012.pdf http://agricoop.nic.in/sites/default/files/RAJ22-Udaipur-9.3.2012.pdf https://energy.rajasthan.gov.in/content/dam/doitassets/water/Ground%20Water/Pdf/PublicReports/Groundwater_Atlas/State/Rajasthan%20State%20Ground%20Water%20Atlas%202013%20V10.pdf Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [110] /Pdf/PublicReports/Groundwater_Atlas/State/Rajasthan%20State%20Ground% 20Water%20Atlas%202013%20V10.pdf Hall, R., I. Scoones, and B.
White.
2013.
―Governing Global Land Deals: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land.‖ Development and Change 44(2): 189–210.
https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12017.
Hijioka, Y., E. Lin, J. J. Pereira, R. T. Corlett, X. Cui, G. E. Insarov, R. D. Lasco, E. Lindgren, and A. Surjan.
2014.
―Asia.‖ In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part B: Regional Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by V. R. Barros, C. B.
Field, D. J. Dokken, et al, 1327– 1370.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ibisch, P. L., A. Vega E., and T. M. Herrmann, eds.
2010.
―Interdependence of Biodiversity and Development Under Global Change.‖ Second corrected edition.
Technical Series No.
54.
Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
India Meteorological Department (n.d.) ―Realized Weather‖.
Pune: Ministry of Earth Sciences.
https://mausam.imd.gov.in/imd_latest/contents/realized.php.
International Forestry Resources and Institutions.
2013.
―Instruments/Forms Short Versions‖.
http://ifri.forgov.org/ifri-instrumentsforms-short-version.
Janssen, M. and J. Anderies.
2013.
―Sustaining the Commons.‖ Arizona, US: Centre for the Study of Institutional Diversity.
Jodha, N. S. 1985.
―Common Property Resources and Dynamics of Rural Poverty (Field Evidences from Dry Regions of India).‖ Nepal: International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).
http://www.fao.org/3/v3960e/v3960e05.htm.
———.
1986.
―Common Property Resources and Rural Poor in Dry Regions of India.‖ Economic and Political Weekly 21 (27): 1169–1181.
———.
1990.
―Rural Common Property Resources: Contributions and Crisis.‖ Economic and Political Weekly 25 (26): A65–A78.
———.
1992.
―Common Property Resources: a Missing Dimension of Development Strategies.‖ World Bank Discussion Paper 169, Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
———.
2000.
―Waste Lands Management in India: Myths, Motives and Mechanisms.‖ Economic and Political Weekly 35 (6): 466–473.
Kaushik, G. and K. C. Sharma.
2015.
―Climate Change and Rural Livelihoods: Adaptation and Vulnerability in Rajasthan.‖ Global NEST Journal 17: 41–47.
https://doi.org/10.30955/gnj.001376.
Kumar, V. 2014.
―Changing Agricultural Scenario and Food Prospects in India: A Study with Special Reference to Rajasthan.‖ Rohtak: M. D. University.
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/107021.
https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12017 https://mausam.imd.gov.in/imd_latest/contents/realized.php http://ifri.forgov.org/ifri-instrumentsforms-short-version http://www.fao.org/3/v3960e/v3960e05.htm https://doi.org/10.30955/gnj.001376 http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/107021 [111] T. Chorran, B. R. Kuchimanchi, S. Karmakar, H. Sharma, D. Ghosh, P. Priyadarshini Lesorogol, C. K. 2008.
―Land Privatization and Pastoralist Well-Being in Kenya.‖ Development and Change 39 (2): 309–331.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14677660.2007.00481.x.
Magrath, W. 1986.
―The Challenge of the Commons: the Allocation of NonExclusive Resources.‖ Working Paper 14.
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Policy, Planning and Research Staff, Environment Department, World Resource Institute, 32–39.
Meinzen-Dick, R., H. Markelova and K. Moore.
―The Role of Collective Action and Property Rights in Climate Change Strategies.‖ CGIAR CAPRi Policy Brief 7, Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Mwagi, Esther and A. Wardell.
2012.
―Multi-level Governance of Forest Resources‖.
International Journal of the Commons 6 (2): 79–103.
https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.374.
McGinnis, M. D. and E. Ostrom.
2014.
―Social-Ecological System Framework: Initial Changes and Continuing Challenges.‖ Ecology and Society 19 (2): 30. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-06387-190230 Ostrom, E. 1988.
―Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis‖.
In Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices edited by V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and H. Picht.
San Francisco: ICS Press, 103–139.
———.
2007.
―A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas.‖ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104 (39): 15181–15187.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702288104.
——— 2009.
―A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of SocialEcological Systems.‖ Science 325: 419–422.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1172133.
Preston, B. L. and M. Stafford-Smith.
2009.
―Framing Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity Assessment: Discussion Paper.‖ Canberra: The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.
Climate Adaptation Flagship Working Paper No.
2. http://www.csiro.au/org/ClimateAdaptationFlagship.html.
Rao, J., R. Chaturvedi, P. Priyadarshini, and K. Kumari.
2015.
―Commoning the Commons: Mediating for Spaces in Public Policy.‖ 2015 World Bank Conference On Land And Poverty, Washington D.C., March 23–27.
Gujarat: Foundation for Ecological Security.
Rathore, M. S. 2005.
―State Level Analysis of Drought Policies And Impacts in Rajasthan, India.‖ Working paper 93, Drought Series Paper No.
6, Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute ( IWMI).
Rathore, N. S. and N. Verma.
2013.
―Impact of Climate Change in Southern Rajasthan, India.‖ International Journal of Water Resources and Arid Environments 2 (1): 45–50.
Reddy, S. R. C. and S. P. Chakravarty.
1999.
―Forest Dependence and Income Distribution in a Subsistence Economy: Evidence from India.‖ World Development 27 (7): 1141–1149.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00057-1. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00481.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00481.x https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.374 https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-06387-190230 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702288104 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1172133 http://www.csiro.au/org/ClimateAdaptationFlagship.html https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00057-1 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [112] Thapliyal, S., A. Mukherji, and D. Malghan.
2019.
―Economic Inequality and Loss of Commons: Evidence from India.‖ World Development 122: 693–712.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.06.012 Tompkins, E. L., W. N. Adger, E. Boyd, S. Nicholson-cole, K. Weatherhead, N. Arnell.
2010.
―Observed Adaptation to Climate Change: UK Evidence of Transition to a Well-Adapted Society.‖ Global Environmental Change 20: 627–635.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.05.001.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.06.012 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.05.001
COVER VOL 7 copy International Peer Reviewed Journal 15 Education for Sustainable Development as Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: A Literature Review DONNA LOU E. NERI donnaevasco@yahoo.com University College Sedaya International Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Abstract The World Health Organization (2003) stated that there is growing evidence that changes in the global climate will have profound effects on the well-being of citizens in countries throughout the world.
The “business as usual” frame of mind in dealing with this phenomenon is no longer feasible.
Rather, there is a great need for a “sense of urgency” to empower and actively involve every individual to adapt and to mitigate the worsening of climate change.
A great number of studies show that the leadership of the educational system in developed countries for more than 2 decades has been successful in promoting environmental sustainability.
Some of these studies are reviewed and documented in this paper so that vulnerable countries may learn and benchmark from their experiences.
Keywords Education, sustainable development, climate change Vol.
7 · January 2012 Print ISSN 20123981 • Electronic ISSN 2244-0445 International Peer Reviewed Journal doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v7i1.151 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Journal JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 16 INTRODUCTION Climate change refers to any significant change in measures of climate (such as temperature, pre cipitation, or wind) lasting for an extended period (decades or longer).
Climate change might result from natural factors and processes or from human activities.
The term “climate change” is often used inter changeably with the term global warming.
Global warming refers to an average increase in the temperature of the atmosphere near the Earth’s surface, which can contribute to changes in global climate patterns.
However, rising temperatures are just one aspect of climate change (US EPA, 2010).
Climate change is real.
One can easily see and feel its impact all around the globe.
For instance, flooding is becoming a more common occurrence.
Birds are nesting earlier, animals are moving territories, the duration and range of seasons is changing.
Every day, the reporting on climate change highlights the risks and alerts people to measures they can take to both mitigate and adapt.
Some countries have a choice of media, a choice of funding and a choice of strategies to cope with climate change.
However, other countries are less fortunate.
For the vast majority of people, the impact of climate change means an increased risk of losing their homes and livelihoods, more disease, less security and sometimes death.
Children in the world’s poorest communities are the most vulnerable.
They are already seeing the impacts of climate change through malnutrition, disease, poverty, inequality and increasing risk of conflict – and ultimately an increase in child mortality rates.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2008), it will be the young and the poor in developing countries that will suffer the earliest and the hardest.
Another fact is that climate change is a global issue.
Hence, addressing it is a shared responsibility.
CARE International (2009) reported that the world’s poorest countries and the most vulnerable people will bear the brunt of climate change.
Failure to act will render the environments of millions of children and their families even more hazardous.
Many poor people already live in fragile climates, where food and clean water are scarce and shelter inadequate – climate change will exacerbate this fragility.
The children – particularly those in Africa and Asia – are already facing a future in which it appears likely that International Peer Reviewed Journal 17 disasters will increase in number and become more intense, where economic growth will falter and incomes fall, where disease outbreaks will be more frequent, clean water and good sanitation harder to secure, and habitats and communities less stable (Confalonieri, et al., 2007).
Moreover, many developing countries have poor infrastructure and lack the technologies that could help them cope with a changing climate, such as flood defences and early warning systems.
Thus, they are more vulnerable to the impact of climate change and their children are the most vulnerable of all.
The potential impact on children has been a critical missing element from the debate about climate change.
While there is a growing body of literature on the links between climate change and vulnerability, particularly in relation to the impact of natural disasters, research and advocacy activity on climate change and children specifically is less developed (UNICEF for UK Committee, 2008).
The examples of the currently unfolding environmental and human impacts of climate change outlined above are striking enough.
However, projections of future climate change suggest that the worse is yet to come.
The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC, 2008) scenarios indicate that a warming of 2–3 degrees across the globe is likely within the next 50 years – largely the result of greenhouse gases already in the Earth’s atmosphere.
Thereafter, levels of potential warming are likely to be significantly influenced by the levels of greenhouse gas over the coming years.
Such scenarios predict rising sea levels to threaten large cities in Africa and the densely populated river deltas of the Ganges and Mekong.
More so, the glacier melting is likely to disrupt water supplies in Asia and Latin America.
In the 2006 United States Climate Action Report, it was stated that health impacts will be disproportionately greater in vulnerable populations.
Globally, people at greatest risk include the very young, the elderly, and the medically infirm.
Low-income countries and areas where undernutrition is widespread, education is poor, and infrastructures are weak will have the most difficulty adapting to climate change and related health hazards.
JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 18 FRAMEWORK In answer to this pressing need to adapt, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2007) proposed that more can be done to limit human contributions to further climate change.
More can also be done to support the poorest and most vulnerable to cope with the likely increase in global temperature and its effects.
The likely impacts of climate change compel each individual to act, both to minimize the projected increase in global temperature and to build the resilience of nations and communities to withstand its effects.
One very significant strategy is to mainstream climate changerelated lessons in education from pre-school to tertiary level of education (Selby, 2008 and Namsouk, 2008).
A concrete example of this is the United States’ “Climate Change Education Program” headed by the National Science Foundation (NSF).
The vision of the Climate Change Education (CCE) program is a society that can effectively weigh the scientific evidence as it confronts the challenges ahead, while developing an innovative scientific and technical workforce that can advance the knowledge of human-climate interactions and develop solutions for a sustainable, prosperous future.
To achieve this vision, the NSF supports activities to develop more effective models and resources for formal and informal climate change education and training that integrate interdisciplinary climate research and current understanding of how people learn.
NSF also supports efforts to establish or enhance mechanisms that help to disseminate, scaleup, or increase utilization of effective practices for climate change education.
Protecting human health is the “bottom line” of climate change strategies.
Climate change can no longer be considered simply an environmental or developmental issue.
More importantly, it puts at risk the protection and improvement of human health and well-being.
A greater appreciation of the human health dimensions of climate change is necessary for both the development of effective policy and the mobilization of public engagement.
Strengthening of public health services needs to be a central component of adaptation to climate change.
The international health International Peer Reviewed Journal 19 community already has a wealth of experience in protecting people from climate-sensitive hazards, and proven, cost-effective health interventions are already available to counter the most urgent of these.
Broadening the coverage of available interventions would greatly improve health now.
Coupled with forward planning, it would also reduce vulnerability to climate changes as they unfold in the future (WHO, 2008).
Some degree of future climate change will occur regardless of future greenhouse gas emissions.
Adapting to or coping with climate change will therefore become necessary in certain regions and for certain socioeconomic and environmental systems.
The need for adaptation may be increased by growing populations in areas vulnerable to extreme events.
However, according to the IPCC, “adaptation alone is not expected to cope with all the projected effects of climate change, and especially not over the long term as most impacts increase in magnitude”(UNDP, 2008).
Hence, education is now considered a vital means of reducing vulnerability and increasing adaptive capacity to climate change.
A vast majority of studies and literature already talked about strategies to combat climate change health impacts through legislative and technical programmes.
However, there is a dearth of data venturing on utilizing education as an effective strategy for empowering every individual to cope with and prevent potential health effects of climate change (Selby, 2008; Namsuk, 2008).
It is in this light that this study is conducted.
This research will try to look into the possibility of tapping the educational system, from the pre-school to the basic education, to the secondary and tertiary levels, as well as post-graduate and graduate studies, in the capacity-building to combat the ill-effects of climate change.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY This paper explored the various educational strategies on climate change adaptation and mitigation from the pre-school up to the graduate school.
In particular, this described the experiences, as well as, the best practices on environmental education and education for sustainable development among educational institutions in developed countries.
JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 20 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Journal MATERIALS AND METHODS This study utilized the descriptive-analytic research design aided by content analysis of the reviewed literature.
Educational strategies related to combating climate change, whether adaptation or mitigation strategies, are documented in this paper.
Both online and printed literatures were explored and organized.
Data gathered were then analyzed according to the different themes identified.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Environmental Education (EE) versus Education Sustainable Development (ESD) The world movement for environmental education (EE) first started in the early 1960’s after several experiences of environmental problems.
Ten years later (1972), during the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, governments of member countries issued a declaration.
The declaration highlighted that education in environmental matters, for the younger generation as well as adults, is essential for an enlightened opinion and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities in protecting and improving the environment in its full human dimension (as cited by Venkataraman, 2008).
In 1975, 3 years after the declaration, the United Nations held an International Workshop on Environmental Education in Belgrade.
Its culminating document, called the Belgrade Charter, contained the global framework for EE, asserting that it is an active process which will ultimately lead to a society that has the knowledge, skills, attitudes, motivations and commitment to work individually and collectively toward solutions of current problems and the prevention of new ones.
For 20 years after the Stockholm Conference, EE programs developed slowly due to the lack of teachers and professors trained in ecology and multidisciplinary teaching styles.
Fortunately, at present, there is already an explosion in EE programs.
While EE programs initially focused on environmental cleanup and good waste management practices, schools, colleges and universities are beginning to embrace elements of EE with increasing numbers, emphasizing environmentalism as a core principle of their education.
International Peer Reviewed Journal 21 In United Kingdom, for example, the national curriculum for primary and secondary levels includes education for sustainable development.
In India, organizations such as the Indian Environmental Society are actively involved in establishing public and school EE programs and a National Green Corps.
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Environmental Education and organizations like the National Environmental Education Foundation have accelerated curriculum development and professional development for teachers.
As a result, primary, secondary, and higher education have been increasing efforts to integrate environmental topics across curricula and as real-world applications of scientific principles.
However, in 2002, the United Nations promoted another framework called Education for Sustainable Development (ESD).
It further declared 2005-2014 as the Decade for Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and highlighted the difference between EE and ESD.
As defined, EE is a well-established discipline focusing on humankind’s relationship with the natural environment and on ways to conserved and preserve it and properly steward its resources.
ESD, on the other hand, encompasses EE but sets it in a broader context of socio-cultural factors and the socio-political issues of equity, poverty, democracy, and quality of life.
According to the United Nations, ESD equally addresses all three pillars of sustainable developmentsociety, environment, and economywith culture as an essential additional and underlying dimension.
By embracing these elements in a holistic and integrated manner, ESD enables individuals to fully develop the knowledge, perspectives, values, and skills necessary to take part in decisions to improve the quality of life.
The question now facing the educational community is how can ESD be translated into practice so that it can be effective in transforming society to a more sustainable future?
The UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) in 2006 pointed out that the traditional educational structure acts as an obstacle to ESD.
They argued that sustainability is not just another issue to be added to an over-crowded curriculum.
Instead, sustainability must be viewed as a gateway to a different view of curriculum, of pedagogy, of organizational change, of policy and particularly of ethos.
At the same time, the effect of patterns of unJPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 22 sustainability on the current and future prospects is so pressing that the response of higher education should not be predicated only on the integration of sustainability into higher education because this invites a limited, adaptive response.
According to Venkataraman (2009), people needed to see the relationship the other way aroundthat is, the necessary transformation of higher education towards the integrative and more whole state implied by a systemic view of sustainability in education and society.
The problem on nature-deficit disorder and videophilia among children Author and child psychologist, Richard Louv (2005) was the first to coin the term and to diagnose America’s children as having “naturedeficit disorder”.
The term refers to a child’s alienation from the natural environment.
Louv was not alone in this assessment.
In 2006, Pergams and Zaradic added the concept of “videophilia”, which is defined as the human tendency to focus on sedentary activities involving electronic media (entertainment options such as television, video games and the internet).
This was concurred by many educators who have witnessed firsthand the difference between children nowadays and children 30 years ago (Bartels, 2008; Stevenson 2010; Lougheed, 2008; and Blum, 2008).
According to these authors, not long ago, kids commonly spent after-school hours and summer vacations playing carefree in the woods, fields, hills and water.
Today, however, most children are busy with electronic games and demanding schedules of structured activities.
Per observation, this circumstance is not only happening in the Americas and Europe, but all around the globe.
Even in developing and poor countries, this is a common everyday scenario, for as long as people can afford to have televisions, video games and the internet.
Thus, there is a pervasive and fundamental shift away from nature-based recreation.
Nature Conservancy chief scientist, Peter Kareiva (as cited in Lougheed, 2008), suggested that this shift could well be the most serious environmental threat facing the world today.
If a substantial proportion of the population has little or no direct interaction with pristine natural environments as children, how will that affect their lifelong attitude toward such places?
How will they come to regard the value of environmental science or policy?
International Peer Reviewed Journal 23 Kareiva wrote further that the fate of biodiversity and ecosystems depends on political and individual choices.
If people never experience nature and have negligible understanding of the services that nature provides, it is unlikely that people will choose a sustainable future.
Cornell University psychologists, Wells and Lekies (2006) found out that when children become truly engaged with the natural world at a young age, the experience is likely to stay with them in a powerful wayshaping their subsequent environmental path.
Moreover, they noted that the lifelong impact was more profound when the engagement with nature was spontaneous and unstructured, as characterized by the general unpredictability of pursuits such as huntings, fishing, or simply wandering around a forest.
Wallace (2008) added that by helping children experience the natural world, they are also moulded as future stewards of the Earth.
Starting young: the children and the environment There are a number of ways to teach children about nature conservation and to increase their environmental awareness as it relates to home and school.
Integrating nature appreciation in the daily school and home activities is a good start (Cline and Leuvan, 2009).
Pre-school teachers may simply take the kids outside for a walk in the park, let them play in the stream or appreciate animals in a farm.
These kids may also be involved in tree planting and gardening.
Any activity done “outside with nature” may do as long as these children appreciated and enjoyed communing with nature (Clarke, 2010; Stevenson, 2010).
Elementary teachers, on the other hand, can show the older children how others have assumed responsibility to claim a role as an environmental advocate.
There are many true stories of young heroes who made serious commitments to saving the environment (Lange, 2009; Cole 2009; Slater 2007; Blum 2008; Henderson, 2007).
Driven by internal passions, these “earth angels” (children guardians of the earth), “enviropreneurs” (children who raise money for environmental causes), and “green kids” (children who think of new ways to save resources, promote environmental education and innovative applications) are unstoppable in their determination to make a difference in their communities, regions, and in some cases, globally.
JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 24 Behind many of the “green kids” are teachers who have inspired grades 4-12 students to turn anxiousness about an uncertain future into understanding and finally to transfer knowledge into positive actions than can have small or large scale results.
These stories provide actual examples that can be read in class, which demonstrates that environmental stewardship is not just something an adult should be concerned about.
In fact, an 11-year old child was quoted saying, “you don’t have to be an adult to make a difference!” From the true stories shared, the kids were able to figure out the need to save the environment, brain-stormed ideas for solutions to the problem, found creative ways to raise money and to increase public awareness on climate change.
Environmental issues also offer a good opportunity to begin discussions in science, current events, economics, politics, geography, and research.
Freitag (as cited by Blum, 2008), another conservationist, aptly stated that there may be some direct, short term benefit in the money raised or some land saved because children learned to love the environment, but the real payoff may come 50 years later.
Investing in kidsintroducing them to the beauty of natureis investing in the people who will be making the decisions about how the environment will look in the future.
A model Middle School In September 2006, Sidwell’s middle school in Washington DC, where the 2 daughters of President Obama are enrolled, received a Platinum rating from the US Green Building Council (USGBC).
It is the first K-12 school in the United States to have a LEED Platinum rating and the first LEED Platinum building in the District of Columbia (Goffman, 2009).
Primarily, the building was constructed following the LEED standards.
The LEED (Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design) Rating System is a voluntary standards & certification program created in 1993 by the US Green Building Council.
It is the industry standard for rating high-performance green buildings.
LEED awards credits for green building attributes including strategies for sustainable site development, water savings, energy efficiency, materials selection, & indoor environmental quality.
There are four levels of certification; the certified, silver, gold, & platinum.
International Peer Reviewed Journal 25 According to the school head, Sidwell wanted to integrate environmental stewardship into teaching and life, keeping with its Quaker philosophy.
The construction of the LEED Platinum Middle School Building has sparked a renewed interest in integrating environmental stewardship into their curriculum.
Below are some examples of how the building has impacted what goes on in and out of the classroom.
SIDWELL FRIENDS SCHOOL Environmental Sustainability Student Activities 1.
Middle School Student Advisory Projects During the 20072008 academic year, several advisories explored how Sidwell Friends treats its stormwater run-off, how drinking water is treated, and where the trash goes.
2.
DC Environmental Inventory For the past several years, 8th graders have worked to find out how healthy Washington, DC’s environment is.
Students interviewed scientists, regulators, and enforcers, visited city facilities, took photographs, and wrote up their research.
3.
AP Environmental Science Students conduct labs including comparing water quality in the on-campus biology pond to water in a nearby tributary, studying the invertebrate biodiversity in the soil on the green roof, and comparing stormwater runoff from the green roof with runoff from the conventional roof.
4.
8th Grade Environmental Science Students participate in labs in which they measure and compare nitrogen and phosphorus levels in various levels of the wetland and in the basement holding tank, and learn the valuable role that wetlands play in purifying water.
5.
8th Grade English Students engage in reading, writing and thinking about a variety of environmental texts which have sparked communal social action and make connections between the building’s systems and the world outside the building.
6.
Middle School Environmental Challenges invite students to reduce their carbon footprint.
Several challenges are posted JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 26 each trimester and students of all ages are encouraged to participate.
At the end of the year, the pounds of carbon saved are calculated.
7.
Green Housekeeping The goal of the housekeeping program is to maintain a healthy learning environment.
The focus is on cleaning for health, not just appearance.
All contracted cleaning staff receive training on green cleaning prior to and during their employment.
They use energy-efficient equipment with less environmental impact—low moisture processes, quieter operation, higher filtration, and lower emissions.
Their cleaning service provider uses Green Seal Certified cleaning products, 100% recycled paper towels and tissues.
8.
Recycling allows them to reduce the burdens on the environment as a result of both solid waste disposal and the extraction of the natural raw materials.
They recycle mixed paper, cardboard, cans, glass, and type 1 (PETE) and 2 (HDPE) plastics.
9.
Additionally, they use a solar-powered trash compactor on their Wisconsin Avenue campus that operates on 100% solar energy.
While its footprint is the same as an ordinary trash receptacle, its capacity is five times greater.
This increased capacity reduces collection trips and can cut fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions.
10.
Green Food Service Sidwell Friends' commitment to environmental stewardship extends to their cafeterias.
The food service provider is dedicated to reducing food waste and selecting regional vendors as much as possible to reduce the impact of long distance deliveries on natural resources and promote food safety and integrity.
Figure 1.
Examples of school-related environmental sustainability activities.
Sidwell Friends School has become a model institution which schools around the world can emulate.
It just illustrated how an academic institution may teach and involve children in sustaining the environment, at the same time ensuring their future.
Even at young International Peer Reviewed Journal 27 ages, the way children and young people view the environment, and themselves in relation to it, will play a vital role in fighting climate change.
Towards “cool” colleges and universities All across North America, colleges and universities are taking steps to green their campuses (Chiras, 2010).
Green is not a new color in college campuses.
For the past 2 decades, many colleges and universities have started environmental sustainability initiatives such as recycling waste and other measures to reduce their impact on the environment.
Today’s green movement is much deeper and greener, aimed at creating a sustainable future.
Over 600 colleges in the United States have joined the Campus Climate Challenge which was started to reduce their contribution to global warming.
They are buying renewable energy and implementing energy-efficiency measures that lower their carbon emissions as part of their university policy.
They are also building new classrooms and other facilities to much higher, more energy-efficient standards using green building materialsoften thanks to student insistence (Hattam, 2007; Underwood, 2007; Whittelsey, 2009).
So, although the United States government did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, most of its citizens, through colleges and universities have taken big steps toward saving the environment.
Noteworthy to mention is its annual search for top 10 “Cool Schools” which started in 2007 (Hartog, 2008).
The top schools earned points in ten categories, namely; policies for building, energy, food, investment, procurement, and transportation, curriculum, environmental activism, waste management, and overall commitment to sustainability.
A perfect score in every area would give a school 100 points.
The Eco League schools prided themselves on integrating experiential learning into the curriculum from backpacking trips to analyses of “leave no trace” ethics and how education can affect avalanche safety.
They are also actively pursuing environmental studies, of which a great number of scholarships are offered.
College of the Atlantic has started paying to offset all its greenhouse-gas emissions.
Green Mountain College now gets more than half its JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 28 electricity from generators powered by methane from dairy cow waste.
The Northland College students voted to tax themselves $20 per semester to fund clean-energy projects (ecoleague.org).
Also in a league of their own are the 10 University of California campuses.
With 220,000 students and 170,000 faculty and staff, the UC system has the ecological footprint of a large city.
Efforts to reduce that footprint one campus at a time mean the system now leads the higher education pack in making big green changes.
At UC Berkeley, for example, campus dining options are 65 percent vegetarian, reducing the use of resource-intensive meat-based meals.
(Pound for pound, more energy, water, and land go into producing meat than vegetables.)
Harvests from UC Davis’ olive trees that once left oil slicks on bike paths have been put to better use in a line of award-winning olive oils.
Meanwhile, UC Santa Cruz has offset 100 percent of its carbon dioxide emissions since, and four of UCLA’s high-rise dorms now have solarpowered water heaters.
Farther south, UC San Diego generates 7.4 megawatts of its electricity (10 to 15 percent of its total energy) using renewable sources including methane-powered fuel cells, solar, and wind (universityofcalifornia.edu).
Another environmental-friendly action is the development of “ECO-DORMS”.
Schools around the globe have taken to greening campus housing with innovations such as renewable energy, recycled building materials, and composting facilities.
In 2008, 318 students at California’s Pitter College moved into a new residence hall that has rooftop gardens, solar panels, and low-flow showers and toilets.
Most building materials, including lumber and metal, came from within 200 miles of the campus.
At Kentucky’s Berea College, 50 to 100 students live in the Ecovillage, a group of apartments and learning facilities built around a perm culture food forest (where food grows among trees instead of on a cleared swath of land), vegetable gardens, and a wastewater-recycling system.
International Peer Reviewed Journal 29 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADOBOULDER Environmental Policy Purpose: In keeping with its mission, CU-Boulder is committed to providing an educational model for fiscally sound, environmentally responsible stewardship of the campus and its resources.
The institution intends to maintain its reputation as a proactive leader in the environmental sciences and campus sustainability.
The campus values choices and decisions that reduce the environmental impacts of its actions.
Compliance with the law is required.
Environmental education and participation in campus environmental programs are encouraged.
Policy Statement: CU-Boulder strives to proactively manage how it impacts the environment, while responsibly managing the resources provided to the campus.
As a leader in environmental issues, UCB’s policy is to be responsible in protecting the environment and natural resources.
We are committed to: • Complying with sound environmental practices, including the commitment to meet or exceed applicable legal and other requirements.
• Properly managing wastes and pollution.
• Managing our processes, our materials and our people in a way that considers the environmental impacts associated with our actions.
• Striving for continual improvement in our environmental management system.
Date: August 18, 2004 Approved by: Richard L. Byyny, Chancellor Author: Director of Environmental Health & Safety Figure 2.
Sample of a university environmental sustainability policy.
JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 30 In 2000, the University of Colorado (CU) became the first U.S. university to buy renewable energy credits.
Today the mile-high school supports local offset projects.
CU does more than buy its way out of carbon guilt, however.
The Buffaloes have also made strides in reducing emissions produced in the first place.
Eighty percent of students commuted car free since 2007.
Another highlight is on transportation wherein the tuition covers city bus passes and loaner bikes.
Most campus shuttles, or Buff Buses, run on biodiesel.
Implications to Education The United Nations recognizes education as a tool for addressing human development, health care, environmental sustainability, human values and human rights issues.
Anghay and Japos (2009) concluded in their study on Worldwide Patterns of Education across Human Development Indicators that education is a major component of wellbeing and is used to measure economic development and quality of life.
Given this vital role in global development, it is very important to explore the implications of education in reducing vulnerability to climate change impacts.
Based on the literature, management of the impacts of climate change should be two-pronged: adaptation and mitigation.
However, many scientists recommended that adaptation should be prioritized first, but must go hand in hand with mitigation measures (Bo, 2010).
Both require political will and technological know-how.
Therefore, whatever actions will be planned in the educational system for the management of impacts of climate change, they should be enforced from top management up to the bottom.
If there is no political support by the educational leaders, these plans may be bound to fail.
Prior to planning, a review of existing adaptive mechanisms is necessary.
The adaptation plan is intended to increase the resilience or the capacity to cope with current and future climate change.
Adaptation may be anticipatory or reactive, the former being preventive and the latter spontaneous.
Hence, for a comprehensive plan, it may be important to develop both anticipatory and reactive adaptation plans.
According to Lacanilao (2009), there is hardly anything the people can do to prevent climate change, but people can increase chances of survival through a paradigm shift in education and research.
It International Peer Reviewed Journal 31 means, a “transition from a crisis/symptom mode to a prevention/cure mode” of problem solving.
Moreover, Lucido (2009) emphasized that education must now take a radical turn.
Education must no longer be confined to teaching the basic and specialized disciplines, but it has to integrate values and lifestyle changes among all its stakeholders.
It must not relate only to personal and professional development, but it has to relate as to how people should live to make their present and future sustainable.
This is what encompasses Education for Sustainable Development (ESD).
ESD was already endorsed at the highest political levels during the World Summit in 2002.
The landmark declaration at Johannesburg states that sustainable development is built on 3 interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars.
These are economic development, social development and environmental protection, which must be established at the local, national, regional and global levels.
Given the established relationship among socio-economic, health and environment in this study, it may be imperative to shift from the traditional education framework and adopt the ESD framework.
As aptly expressed by Lucido (2009), only a visionary approach to education, like ESD, can reorient mankind to better understand their present roles in addressing the complex and interdependent problems that threatened the future.
ESD seeks to empower people to assume responsibility for creating a sustainable future.
The goal of UNESCO, being the lead agency for ESD, is to integrate the principles, values, and practices of sustainable development into all aspects of education and training.
As a catalytic process for social change, ESD seeks to fosterthrough education, training, and public awarenessthe values, behaviour and lifestyles required for a sustainable future.
This means that ESD involves learning how to make decisions that balance and integrate the long term future of the economy/ natural environment/ peoples’ wellbeing now and in the future.
As a visionary approach, ESD seeks to help people to better understand the world in which they live, and to face the future with hope and confidence.
In particular, ESD established linkages across poverty alleviation, human rights, peace and security, cultural diversity, biodiversity, food security, clean water and sanitation, renewable energy, preservation of JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 32 the environment and sustainable use of natural resources.
Foremost, t view seeks a better quality of life for everyone now and for the generations to come (ESD Primer).
Given this framework for “meaningful learning”, educational systems around the world may opt to start necessary transformations towards achieving environmental sustainability.
Only after this shift of pedagogy, of curriculum, of organizational structure, of policy and of ethos, will “meaningful learning” may occur.
This important shift must happen immediately, no matter how difficult it will be.
Cruz (as cited by Bo, 2010), emphasized the need to act and be decisive as “inaction now will be costlier and indecision now will mean harder decisions in the future”.
CONCLUSIONS Data revealed that many educational institutions (low, middle, and tertiary schools) in highly developed countries such as the USA and European countries have started their “GO GREEN” campaigns for a decade or more.
Their environmental sustainability initiatives are reflected in the institutions’ policies, programs and student activities in and out of the classroom.
Led by the school administrators, faculty, personnel and students have been actively involved in these environmental initiatives.
Clearly, they have been successful in arousing the interests of the stakeholders in loving and caring for the environment.
From the experiences of these educational institutions in developed countries, it can be deduced that the educational sector at any level (international, regional, national, and local) is an excellent avenue for the promotion of environmental sustainability among its stakeholders and even to others.
The Education for Sustainability Development (ESD) framework promoted by UNESCO may be an appropriate means to the urgent need of paradigm shift and the integration of environmental sustainability in the educational system.
International Peer Reviewed Journal 33 RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the conclusions, the following are recommended: 1.
Heads/managers of the educational sector must lead in the fight against climate change.
A “pro-active” stance must be initiated more than a “reactive” stance.
The ESD model of the UNESCO may be the guiding framework of the educational institutions in initiating steps towards a sustainable future.
The educational institutions’ plan (short-term or long-term) for environmental sustainability must be reflected in the school or university policies and may even be integrated in the vision, mission, goals, and objectives (VMGOs) for better grounding.
These policies will then be the basis for the integration of ecology lessons/ activities in and out of the classroom.
Aside from curriculum and instruction integration, related activities on exposure and risk reduction as well as development of coping capacity may also be integrated in student services and curriculum extension.
Integration of environmental education may start from the earliest time a child enters school (preschool) up to graduate school.
The earlier a child understands the relationship between man and environment, the better.
2.
Both teaching and non-teaching personnel must undergo seminars and trainings related to environmental sustainability and climate change issues to better understand the problem and to facilitate change.
The transformation process may not be as easy as it seems, therefore, advocacy and capability building are very essential.
These education personnel have vital roles to influence both the students and community members.
3.
School facilities (canteens, dorms, farms, gardens, etc.)
and teaching laboratories may be renovated following the standards of energy and environment conservation, that is, if the school can afford.
However, these standards for energy and environment conservation may be utilized for building of future teaching facilities.
4.
Research is another significant area for the implementation of the environmental sustainability plan.
First, the research unit of the school or university must adopt an ecology-friendly agenda JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 34 or must prioritized climate change issues in the research agenda.
Secondly, research findings related to the environment should then be disseminated to the community and to the concern groups to facilitate utilization of research findings.
5.
The academic institutions must partner, work hand in hand and collaborate with the local and national government in the fight for climate change.
It is also essential to build partnership across sectors (civil society, media, business and industry, tourism, etc.).
The educational sector has the potential to influence political leaders through lobbying in policy-making and decision-making regarding environmental issues.
LITERATURE CITED CARE International.
2009 Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis Handbook.
1st Edition.
May 2009. www.careclimatechange.org Clarke, Kevin.
2010 Go outside and play.
U S Catholic Journal.
75(4):39, April 2010.
Confalonieri, U., B. Menne, R. Akhtar, K.L.
Ebi, M. Hauengue, R.S.
Kovats, B. Revich and A. Woodward, 2007 Human health.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L.
Parry, O.F.
Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J.
van der Linden and C.E.
Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 391-431.
Hartog, Lea.
2008 Cool Crowd: 10 that get it.
Sierra.
Vol.
93.
No.
5.
Pages 28-35.
September-October.
Henry, C. 2002 Impacts of climate change on human health.
Retrieved April 8, 2010 from the Legislative Assembly of Alberta homepage:http:// International Peer Reviewed Journal 35 www.assembly.ab.ca/lao/library/egovdocs/alccc/2002/141760.
pdf Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change.
2001 Climate Change and its Impact to Health and the Environment.
Date retrieved: May 10, 2010. www.ipcc.org.
Kirby, Rachel T. 2008 The polluter should pay: adapting to a changing climate.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy.
Vol.
8.
No.
266.
Mastrandrea, Michael D. And Stephen H. Schneider.
2008 The Rising Tide: Time to adapt to climate change.
Boston Review.
Vol.
33.
No.
67.
November-December 2008.
Namsuk, Kim.
2008 Impact of Extreme Climate Events on Educational Attainment: Evidence from Cross Section Data and Welfare Projection .United Nations Development Programme Office of Development Studies.
IUNDP/ODS Working Paper : New York .
September 11, 2008.
NationMaster.
2003-2010.
Health statistics by country.
Retrieved April 8, 2010 from the NationMaster homepage: http://www.nationmaster.com/ cat/hea-health Padua, Roberto.
2007 Graduate education policy framework for developing countries: survey and cluster analysis of worldwide patterns in advanced education.
Proceedings of the International Research Conference in Higher Education.
Commission on Higher Education.
Quezon City.
Pruneau, Diane, Andre Doyon, Joane Langis, Liette Vassar, Eileen 2006 Quellet, Elizabeth McLaughlin, Gaston Boudreau, and Gilles Martin.
JPAIR: Multidisciplinary Journal 36 When Teachers Adopt Environmental Behaviors in the Aim of Protecting the Climate.
The Journal of Environmental Education.
37(30) December.
Selby, David.
2008 The Need for Climate Change in Education.
Centre for Sustainable Futures, University of Plymouth, United Kingdom.
david.selby@plymouth.ac.uk.
SifyNews.
2010 India raised only 1 percent spending on climate change: Study.
Retrieved April 8, 2010 from the SifyNews Homepage: http://sify.com/news/india-raised-only-1-percent-spendingon-climate-change-study-news-national-kcxrucageba.html Stevenson, Jason.
2010 Last Child on the Couch.
Backpacker.
ISSN: 0277-867X.
Active Interest Media.
California: USA.
Vol.
38 No.6 Aug. 2010 p. 8386.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
2007 Climate Change and Human Development in Africa: Assessing the Risks and Vulnerability of Climate Change.
Human Development Report 2007/2008.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
2007 Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries.
Information Services of the UNFCCC Secretariat.
U.S.
Climate Action Report 2006 Vulnerability Assessment, Climate Change Impacts, and Adaptation Measures.
www.climatescience.gov UNICEF for UK Committee.
2008 Our climate, our children, our responsibility .
The implications of climate change for the world’s children.
International Peer Reviewed Journal 37 UNICEF UK Climate Change Report 2008.www.unicef.org.
uk/climatechange.
United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA).
2010 Climate Change Indicators in the United States.
April 2010. www.epa.gov/climatechange/indicators.html World Health Organization.
2010 Data and statistics.
Retrieved April 8, 2010 from the WHO homepage: http://www.who.int/research/en/ World Health Organization.
2008 Climate change and health Report by the Secretariat.
16 January 2008.
World Health Organization.
2003 New book demonstrates how climate change impacts on health.
News release retrieved April 8, 2010 from the WHO homepage: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ releases/2003/pr91/en/ Pursuant to the international character of this publication, the journal is indexed by the following agencies: (1)Public Knowledge Project, a consortium of Simon Fraser University Library, the School of Education of Stanford University, and the British Columbia University, Canada; (2) E-International Scientific Research Journal Consortium; (3) Philippine E-Journals; and (4) Google Scholar.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 3 (1): 141–146, January 2020 BOOK REVIEW Interdisciplinarity and the Challenges of Environmental Sensemaking Ramya K Tella  A Elliott, J Cullis and V Damodaran, eds.
2017.
Climate Change and the Humanities: Historical, Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Contemporary Environmental Crisis.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
ISBN: 978-1137-55123-8, pp.
271 + XII, INR 7602 (Hardbound).
Climate change has been described as the archetypal ―wicked problem‖ — as one that ―does not lend itself to a solution‖ (Hulme 2009, 334, 359).
In several ways, the phenomenon of climate change, in fact, reflects in an intense and unprecedented manner the socio-cultural (Hulme 2015) and moral (Gardiner 2006) dilemmas of the present.
Climate Change and the Humanities: Historical, Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Contemporary Environmental Crisis published subsequent to a momentous event — the signing of the Paris Agreement (2016) — makes a powerful case for recantering the criticality of the humanities in the debates over climate change and global warming.
 PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, King‘s College London, Bush House, 30 Aldwych, London, UK, WC2B 4BG; ramya.tella@kcl.ac.uk Copyright © Tella 2020.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.100 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.100 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [142] The organisation of the chapters in this volume reinforces the significance of knowing the environment through the overlapping frames of the past, present and future: the discussions presented by the contributors emphasise the plurality of human experience while drawing attention to the contradictions and perils of the homogenous discourses on climate change.
Through its investigations into the historical, moral, cultural, political and philosophical underpinnings of knowing climate, the volume consciously sets itself apart from the echo chamber of solution-oriented discourses of ―‗actionable‘ knowledge‖ (p. 9).
The volume illustrates that there is ample evidence from history that situates the environment within the realm of the literary and philosophical imaginations, among other fields.
For example, this is borne out in accounts of the relationships that are forged between nature and culture in literature and in the political tensions these denote, as Groom convincingly argues in a chapter titled, ‗Plastic Daffodils: The Pastoral, the Picturesque, and Cultural Environmentalism‘.
By referring to the specific cases of William Wordsworth‘s poem, ‗I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud‘, and James Thomson‘s ‗The Seasons‘, the author offers an illustrative account of the cultural construction of environments and the weather.
Groom even shows that these poems were designed to bring about a shift in the type of literary pleasure that readers derived — from a vicarious experiencing of landscapes to a search for physical immersion.
Yet, as the author suggests, a critical examination of the literature is incomplete without an acknowledgment of the prevalent socio-economic and political forces of the time — the landed class in 18th century England — that shaped how landscapes were ultimately represented in both the pastoral and picturesque strands of English poetry.
Notably, processes of enclosure for instance, were neglected by the poets, who instead leaned towards a romanticisation of the ―deserted landscape‖ as the poetic norm (p. 125).
While the appeal of idyllic desertion occupied the imaginations of literary figures past, the contemporary genre of cli-fi (short for climate fiction), as Ryle shows in ‗Cli-Fi?
Literature, Ecocriticism, History‘, relies on methods of socio-cultural and historical distantiation to interesting effects — of a sense of awe and rapture that is similar to what might be experienced in evocations of a sublime nature.
Ryle‘s critique of the cli-fi genre is located in a consideration of environmental history and the global politics of development, where the author indicates that the framing of climate change as a future event obscures the marginalised geographies of the global present.
Through a strong sub-thematic emphasis on the temporal politics of environmental citizenship, the author offers insights on Margaret [143] Ramya K Tella Atwood‘s ‗Oryx and Crake‘ (2004), a notable work of speculative fiction, and Ian McEwan‘s fictional work, ‗Solar‘ (2010).
Literature, as an arena for creative conversation on climate change, is closely interlinked with questions of ethics and philosophy.
Atwood‘s work, as Ryle shows, engages with this through a problematisation of consumerism and the capitalist mode of production.
This chapter is complemented by Calder‘s investigation of the philosophies of climate, Davies‘ work on futures, and Mulgan‘s evaluation of the ‗Broken World‘ scenario through a Rawlsian framework.
Calder makes a central ―distinction between philosophy applied to the environment and environmental philosophy‖ (p. 170), and provides a direction for further research in the area by revisiting some key scholarly contributions to questions of nature and culture.
Viewed in relation to the need for ―situatedness‖ in understandings of environment (Bäckstrand 2004, 706), the foundations for comprehensive climate philosophies may be expanded by revisiting critiques of modernity and institutionalised discourses through the frameworks of non-western norms, philosophical traditions and imaginations.
These areas of philosophy and ethics in climate discourses also intersect with conversations on aesthetics — a point that Brady persuasively makes in ‗Climate Change and Future Aesthetics‘, in order to draw attention to the temporal implications of climate change and its linkages to perceptions of diverse landscapes.
Most pertinently, the author argues that climate change need not result in a devaluation of aesthetics, but could rather be viewed as ushering in a shift in the aesthetic calculus of societies, in ways that support ideas of both loss and gain.
Formulations of loss and gain, as too of environmental aesthetics, are informed by broader historical narratives which prompt an examination of the epistemic politics of climate change.
In ‗The Importance of the Humanities to the Climate Change Debate‘, Elliott and Cullis observe that the emergence of interest in climate is not a recent phenomenon — on the contrary, they show that accounts of it are found distributed across the annals of history.
Early philosophical writings, designs for colonial expansion and narratives of environmental determinism are all part of a historical corpus of imaginings about the climate.
The authors illustrate that the dominant discourse of climate change, with its focus on the universality and objectivity of scientific knowledge, has led to the erasure of other situated, and equally legitimate, epistemic domains.
They show that the persistence of a dichotomous categorisation of knowledge into ―utilitarian‖ and ―esoteric‖ strands (p. 21), as pertaining to science and the humanities respectively, impacts on any project for the diversification of climate change Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [144] discourse, and as this chapter shows, reflects the hegemonic undertow of global politics.
The chapters in this volume offer nuanced and detailed perspectives on the challenges of knowing and representing climate change.
They reveal that a far more complex rendering of climate can be achieved by engaging with the humanities than any story that is exclusively generated by science.
In ‗Understanding Climate Change Historically‘, Staley shows how a critical approach to the politics of knowledge production is germane to a wider discussion on the relevance of historical analysis in scientific research.
The Anthropocene constitutes an important frame within this debate, where the historian of science occupies a unique position — as a narrator who is able to address ―scientists‘ histories‖ while contributing to ―historians‘ histories‖ (p.46).
What this chapter, and the others in the volume collectively emphasize, are questions of who, what, where, when, how and why, in the languages of climate change.
These questions also pervade the sphere of climate change communication, where Happer, in ‗Belief in Change: The Role of Media and Communications in Driving Action on Climate Change‘, explains how climate skepticism is given monetary encouragement by American and British corporations with vested interests.
A considerable part of the current discourse on climate change in the western media points to the complexities of navigating campaigns of disinformation.
Happer‘s chapter, in particular, captures the subtleties of these discourses through primary data.
In a striking exploration of the why aspect of skepticism, the author shows, through the accounts of a set of research respondents, that their stances have more to do with a lack of faith in political actors and democratic procedure, than with a repudiation of the phenomenon of climate change itself.
The core arguments made by the author about the ―circuit of communication‖ (p. 191) on climate change, may also be useful to revisit in the light of recent global civic mobilisation against climate change inaction and the need for a historical contextualisation of environmental concern.
One important example of the history of environmental concern (and alarm) is to be found in Grove‘s account of early environmental legislation on the island of St. Vincent in the Caribbean.
In ‗The Culture of Islands and the History of Environmental Concern‘, the author shows how the passage of the Kings Hill Forest Act (1791) was situated in a climatic theory of sustainability, which subsequently shaped colonial era legislations particularly in island states through an emphasis on ―desiccationism‖ (p. 72).
This form of environmentalism was supported by a tripartite structure of knowledge production and circulation that comprised: the [145] Ramya K Tella ―professionalisation of science‖ through the identification of experts; the formation of global information networks, such as in the field of botany; and, the collection of experiential information on degradation in the island states (p. 72).
In critical ways, the contributions to this volume collectively emphasise the need for the humanities to engage with the idea of climate across scales in a historical context.
Imaginings of climate gain ―persuasive power‖ (Jasanoff 2010, 236) from their ability to attend to the discursive and material particularities of heterogeneous locales.
In ‗The Locality in the Anthropocene: Perspectives on the Environmental History of Eastern India‘, Damodaran articulates this idea in a compelling way through an investigation of locality and indigenous subjectivity in eastern India.
The key sites in this chapter —Jharkhand and Orissa, both states marked by high levels of poverty — contain natural resources and minerals that have been the focus of extractive multi-national corporations.
These are also sites that continue to bear witness to state violence against Adivasi and peasant communities, alongside the intensification of armed struggle by Naxalites.
Damodaran‘s account of the environmental history of this region raises important questions about the construction of indigenous identities in the present, historical claims to space, state responsibility and the institutionalisation of violence.
By travelling between the concepts of locality and landscape, the author also implicitly offers a distinctive theoretical direction to negotiations of space and place in environmental history, with possibilities for creative theorisation in future research.
Climate Change and the Humanities has come at a crucial global moment that appears increasingly to be folding into a lexicon of ―deadline-ism‖ (Hulme 2019, 2).
The contributions to this volume reassert the centrality of viewing climate change historically, of engaging the humanities in accounts of representative knowledge, and of situating peoples and socio-economic and political undercurrents in narratives of past, present and future.
Together, they provide an extensive overview of a set of cross-temporal environmental themes and make a forceful case for interdisciplinary conversations on climate change.
REFERENCES Bäckstrand, K. 2004.
―Scientisation vs. civic expertise in environmental governance: Eco-feminist, eco-modern and post-modern responses.‖ Environmental Politics 13 (4): 695-714. https://doi.org/10.1080/0964401042000274322 https://doi.org/10.1080/0964401042000274322 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [146] Gardiner, S.M.
2006.
―A perfect moral storm: Climate change, intergenerational ethics and the problem of moral corruption.‖ Environmental Values 15 (3): 397-413. https://doi.org/10.3197/096327106778226293 Hulme, M. 2009.
Why we disagree about climate change: Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511841200 Hulme, M. 2015.
―Climate and its changes: a cultural appraisal.‖ Geo: Geography and Environment 2 (1): 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1002/geo2.5 Hulme, M. 2019.
Is it too late (to stop dangerous climate change)?
An editorial.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.619 Jasanoff, S. 2010.
―A new climate for society.‖ Theory, Culture & Society 27 (2-3): 233-253. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409361497 https://doi.org/10.3197/096327106778226293 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511841200 https://doi.org/10.1002/geo2.5 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.619 https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409361497
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 3 (1): 69–98, January 2020 RESEARCH PAPER Adaptation Measures to Combat Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture: An Empirical Investigation in the Chambal Basin Ganesh Kawadia  and Era Tiwari  Abstract: This study is based on the empirical investigation of the climate change adaptation measures adopted by the farmers in the Chambal basin.
The adaptation measures were analysed after investigating the nature and impact of climate change in the region.
Four representative districts were selected using control sampling.
A representative sample of farmers was selected through stratified snowball sampling technique.
Descriptive statistics and case study methods were used for results and analysis.
Detailed irrigation profiles of the farmers were traced.
The moisture index was calculated based on secondary data.
A sampling survey method of investigation was used in the study.
This paper also presents the context of maladaptation of monoculture in the region and severe groundwater depletion associated with this practice.
The study directs policy to strengthen water-harvesting measures in the region to facilitate the adaptation measures for coping with the effects of climate change on agriculture.
Keywords: Climate Change, Agriculture, Adaptation, Water Harvesting, Maladaptation 1.
INTRODUCTION A consistent shift in the weather of a region over a long period is termed as climate change.
It includes many variables like temperature, rainfall, rate of  Former Professor and Head; School of Economics Devi Ahilya University, Indore; Former Professor; School of Data Science and Forecasting; Devi Ahilya University, Indore, M.P.
452010; ganesh.kawadia@gmail.com  Assistant Professor (Economics) in Department of Banking, Economics and Finance; Bundelkhand University, Jhansi, U.P.
284128; tough.era@gmail.com  Copyright © Kawadia and Tiwari 2020.
Released under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.89 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.89 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [70] evaporation, wet day frequency, etc.
The Bruntland Report states that climate change was identified as a crucial problem bearing on our survival long back (WCED 1987).
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), large scale variations in average temperatures and precipitation in the coming decades will have a significant impact on ecosystems, related livelihood options, and overall human well-being.
Agriculture as a managed ecosystem gets affected by climate change most significantly.
Productivity, crop-duration and even selection of crops to be grown in a region depend upon temperature coupled with duration and spatial distribution of rainfall.
Hence, changes in average climatic conditions along with the occurrence of extreme climatic events will have a significant impact on the agricultural sector, which, in turn, may have critical implications for food security.
However, the effects in different regions around the globe will differ significantly.
Consequently, region-based research on the interactions between climate change and agricultural performance has gained momentum.
Climate change adaptation and mitigation, therefore, is now an important area of research in social sciences as well as physical sciences.
The real challenge of climate change is to minimize its risks through adaptations, which is a process of adjustment to actual or expected climate change and its effects.
In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harmful activities and exploit beneficial opportunities.
These adaptations have to take place at all levels from changes in global systems to changes at national and regional levels through adaptations made by local communities and individuals.
The development of adaptation strategies needs to recognise the appropriate mix of actions at different levels.
Agriculture is one of the most important sectors to be severely impacted by climate change and thus an inquiry into the adaptation measures in this sector in relation to climate change is a must.
It is all the more significant to be carried out on a regional basis as the regional climate has peculiarities that govern crop selection and irrigation management at the most basic level.
This study is an attempt to fulfil this objective in the Chambal basin, which has faced significant changes in climatic and cropping patterns in the decades following the construction of Gandhi Sagar Dam on the Chambal river.
[71] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari 2.
NATURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, ITS IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE, PERCEIVING THE CHANGE, AND ADAPTATIONS MADE: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 2.1.
An Assessment of Risk and Vulnerability due to Climate Change In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to the expected climate and its effects (IPCC 1996).
In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harmful activities and exploit beneficial opportunities.
Adaptations take place at all levels from changes in global systems to changes at national and regional levels through changed practices of local communities and individuals.
The development of adaptation strategies needs to recognise the appropriate mix of actions at different levels.
Agriculture is inherently sensitive to climatic conditions and is among the most vulnerable sectors to the risks and impacts of global climate change (Parry and Carter 1989; Reilly and Schimmelpfenning 1999).
Studies show that without adaptation, climate change is generally problematic for agricultural production and agricultural economies and communities; but with adaptation, the vulnerability can be reduced and there are numerous opportunities to be realised (Rosenzweig and Hillel 1995; Mendelsohn 1998).
Studies on climate change trends have already shown that climate variation is a reality for India but its impact on society as well as its social and economic consequences are yet to be fully understood.
Also, there is neither a consensus on the definition of vulnerability to climate change nor a full, regionally nuanced mapping of impacts of variables available.
It is only when we have a better understanding of what constitutes vulnerability to climate change and what are its region-specific impact, that we can determine proper adaptation strategies.
In this context, one study has found that the states of Bihar, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Punjab, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka have the lowest adaptive capacity (O'Brien et al.
2004).
The areas of greatest climatesensitivity are Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh using current climatological data.
To identify and assess crop adaptation, there is a pressing requirement for more observational field studies to achieve detailed knowledge about how crops respond to climate change.
In another study, it was found that a 2°C temperature rise and 7 per centages increase in rainfall would lead to an almost 8 per cent loss in farm net revenue (Kumar and Parikh 2001).
The regional differences are significantly large with northern and central Indian districts along with coastal districts bearing a relatively large impact.
It has been observed that during the past 25 years, significant changes in climate are observed over different regions Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [72] of the country (Sinha, Singh and Rai 1998).
For example, many parts of northern India show an increase in minimum temperature by about 1°C in the rabi cropping season.
However, mean temperatures are misleading as some of the individual regions could exhibit a large variation with a larger impact on rabi production.
2.2 Exploring Perceptions about Climate Change in Agricultural Systems As the impacts of climate change on agriculture are severe, it is important to take appropriate actions to minimise the losses.
The foremost requirement for taking an action is to accurately assess the nature of change in the climatic events.
In this context, existing research suggests that the formation of environmental perceptions is most of the time a local phenomenon rather than a global phenomenon (Magistro and Roncoli 2001).
It is usually associated with personal experiences about changes in temperature, precipitation and observation of crop-responses to the environment.
In developing countries ‗farm surveys‘ and ‗focus group discussions‘ are the preferred mode of research in identifying farmers‘ perceptions of climate change and the factors that shape them.
A study on climate change in the Western Himalayas of India (Vedwan and Rhoades 2001) compared farmers‘ perceptions with ‗locally idealised traditional weather cycles‘.
Several studies indicate that socio-economic and demographic factors are most important in determining farmers‘ perceptions.
In a survey-based study of the Sekyedumase district in the Ashanti region in Ghana, 180 farmers were queried about their perceptions of changing climate in terms of changes in temperature, rainfall and area covered by vegetation in the past 20 years (Fosu-Mensah, Vlek and MacCarthy 2012).
They were also queried about their major adaptations to climate change and the barriers they faced.
Household characteristics, years of farming experience, size of landholdings and their access to extension services along with credit services were major explanatory variables.
Age of the head of the farming household, which is usually a proxy for the farmer‘s experience, was found to be one of the most important factors in shaping the perceptions about climate change (Diggs 1991).
Extensive field-based studies of African small-holding farming systems have shown that the level of formal education of farmers is positively associated with their ability to perceive correctly climate-related changes (Mustapha, Sanda and Shehu 2012).
Access to banking services and information about climate change through extension-services plays an important role in enhancing farmers‘ understanding of climate change and appropriate adaptation measures (Maddison 2007).
Farmers with a higher level of income were also found to be more perceptive of changes in climate (Semenza et al.
2008).
Finally, a [73] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari cross-sectional analysis of farmers in Kyuso district in Kenya, Africa, found that joint family households were less perceptive of climate change as such families are more inclined to engage in non-farm activities as well (Ndambiri et al.
2012).
A comprehensive strategy that seeks to improve food security in the context of climate change may include a set of coordinated measures related to agricultural extension, crop diversification, integrated water and pest management, and agricultural information services.
Some of these measures may have to do with climatic changes and others with economic development.
Indeed, studies indicate that farmers perceive that the climate is changing and also adapt to reduce the negative impacts of climate change (Thomas et al.
2007; Ishaya and Abaje 2008; Mertz et al.
2009).
Studies further show that the perception or awareness of climate change (Semenza et al.
2008; Akter and Bennett 2011) and taking adaptive measures (Maddison 2007; Hassan and Nhemachena 2008) are influenced by different socio-economic and environmental factors.
Adaptation to climate change is a two-step process; the first step requires the farmers to perceive a change in climate and the second step requires them to act through adaptation (Maddison 2007).
Studies of perceptions of climate change, both in developing (Vedwan and Rhoades 2001; Hegeback et al.
2005; Thomas et al.
2007; Ishaya and Abaje 2008; Gbetibouo 2009; Mertz et al.
2009) and developed (Diggs 1991; Leiserowitz 2006; Semenza et al.
2008; Akter and Bennett 2011) nations show that the majority of population have already perceived climate change and they are adapting to it in various manners (Falco, Veronesi and Yesuf 2011).
There are different ways of adapting to climate change in agriculture (Bradshaw, Dolan and Smit 2004; Kurukulasuriya et al.
2004; Mertz et al.
2009) and different factors affect the use of any of these adaptation methods (Deressa et al.
2009).
For instance, it has been shown that better access to markets, extension and credit services, technology, farm assets (labour, land and capital) and information about adaptation to climate change, including technological and institutional methods, affect adaptation to climate change (Hassan and Nhemachena 2008).
Changing cropping calendars and pattern will be the immediate best available option with available crop varieties to adapt to the climate change impact (Rathore and Stigler 2007).
The options like introducing new cropping sequences, late or early maturing crop varieties depending on the available growing season, conserving soil moisture through appropriate tillage practices and efficient water harvesting techniques are also important.
Developing heat and drought-tolerant crop varieties, by utilizing genetic resources that may be better adapted to new climatic and atmospheric conditions, should be the long-term strategy.
Genetic manipulation may also help to exploit the beneficial effects of Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [74] increased CO2 on crop growth and water use (Rosenzweig and Hillel 1995).
One of the promising approaches would be gene pyramiding to enhance the adaptation capacity of plants to climate change inputs (Mangala 2007).
2.3.
Adaptation Strategies Adaptations to climate change impacts are not new phenomena.
Natural and socio-economic systems have been continuously and autonomously adapting to a changing environment throughout history.
Adaptation to climate change and variability (including extreme events) at national and local levels is regarded as a pragmatic strategy to strengthen capacity to lessen the magnitude of climate change impacts that are already occurring and could increase gradually (or suddenly) and may be irreversible.
Adaptation can be anticipatory, where systems adjust before the initial impacts take place, or it can be reactive, where change is introduced in response to the onset of the impacts.
Climate change adaptations in agricultural practices often have synergy with sustainable development policies and may explicitly influence social, economic and environmental aspects of sustainability.
Many adaptations have co-benefits (improved efficiency, reduced costs, environmental co-benefits) as well as trade-offs (e.g.
increasing other forms of pollution) and balancing these effects will be necessary for successful implementation of climate change adaptation and mitigation in the agricultural sector (IPCC 2014).
Farmers generally adapt swiftly to avert their agricultural production losses.
In India, adaptations in farm practices (changing the sowing dates, adopting different crop varieties and improving water supply) have been seen to reduce the adverse impacts of climate change (Kumar and Parikh 2001).
Adaptation measures could be simple ones like shifting planting calendars or changing crops, or more costly ones like investing in protective infrastructures such as damming rivers to provide assured water supply for irrigation.
Farm-level resource management innovations such as the development of irrigated drainage systems, land contouring, reservoirs and recharge areas, and alternative tillage systems are also used to minimise the impact of climate change on agriculture (Easterling 1996).
A comprehensive strategy that seeks to improve food security in the context of climate change may include a set of coordinated measures related to agricultural extension, crop diversification, integrated water and pest management, and agricultural information services.
Some of these measures may have to do with climatic changes and others with economic development.
Studies have indeed indicated that farmers perceive that the climate is changing and also adapt to reduce the negative impacts of climate change (Thomas et al.
2007; Ishaya and Abaje 2008; Mertz et al.
2009).
From United Nations Framework [75] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC 1992) to India‘s National Communications (MoEF 2004) river basin specific impacts of various climate change scenarios and vulnerability to droughts and floods have been estimated at the catchment, sub-catchment and watershed levels, as well as for administrative units such as districts.
While such exercises are useful given the multiple pressures that act on water resources, integrated watershed modelling might be more appropriate.
A pathbreaking study examined the current adaptation strategies of stakeholders in the Cauvery delta of Tamil Nadu and argued that the responses to climatic and non-climatic pressures have largely been ad hoc and hence could be inadequate and unsustainable in the long term (Janakarajan 2010).
Finally, in context to efficient natural resource management, conservation agriculture offers resource-poor farmers a set of possible options to cope with and adapt to climate change (Thomas et al.
2007).
Improved water management will represent the key adaptation strategy in both irrigated and dryland agriculture.
Emphasis will also be given to crop production systems located in delta regions to sustain high production potential under sea-level rise (Wassmann and Dobermann 2007).
Based on fieldwork in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, effective ways to make farmers more adaptive to climate change were suggested (MSSRF 2008).
The recommendations include specific changes in traditional water management practices such as harren in Rajasthan, establishing small farm networks that enable farmers to share knowledge on-farm management practices, utilising weather data from simple meteorological stations operated by farmers and use of some new farming techniques such as systems of rice-intensification.
2.4.
Costs and Limits of Adaptation There is an array of factors that limit adaptations by ecosystems, communities and individuals.
There are cost considerations and threshold limits that may primarily be categorised in four sets – ecological, physical, economic and technological (Adger et al.
2009).
A farmer may practically abandon farming due to limits to adaptation with respect to water resources.
It is, thus, especially important to understand social limits to adaptation because this may put the responsibility on governance to work proactively for mitigation strategies.
If the capacity to adapt is considered unlimited, a key rationale for reducing greenhouse gases is weakened (Dow et al.
2013).
A linked consideration, where adaptation is well within the limit, is ‗willingness to adapt‘, which is influenced by individual characteristics and perceptions about climate change impacts (Pannell et al.
2006).
Finally, the barriers to adaptations are the obstacles which can be overcome by Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [76] concerted effort, creative management or changed thinking (Moser and Ekstrom 2010).
However, adaptation is not an easy process.
Any failed decision in adaptation, with respect to objective, results in ‗maladaptation‘.
The problem of increasing vulnerability from action taken for adaptation is termed as ‗maladaptation‘ (Barnett and O‘Neill 2010).
Maladaptation also occurs when the negative impacts caused by adaptation are as serious as the climate change adaptation being avoided (Scheraga and Grambsch 1998).
This may put whole systems at risk and may lead to its breakdown, and thus needs to be analysed in every adaptation situation.
3.
ABOUT THE STUDY AREA The study area considered here is the catchment area of Chambal river in the state of Madhya Pradesh – the entire geographical area drained by the river and its tributaries and characterized by all run-off being conveyed to the same outlet.
It is also known as catchment basin, drainage area or drainage basin.
Chambal river, a principal tributary of Yamuna, originates in the Vindhyan ranges near Mhow in Indore district of Madhya Pradesh.
The river flows through the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
The basin is roughly rectangular, with a maximum length of 560 km in the northeast-southwest direction.
Broadly, its catchment area is termed as Malwa Region.
It is located in the south-western part of the Madhya Pradesh and generally slopes towards the North.
It is spread across 45,628 square km.
The catchment mainly covers the districts of Indore, Dewas, Ujjain, Dhar, Mandsaur, Ratlam, Neemuch and Shajapur.
Rainfed farming of grains, pulses (moong, black gram and pigeon pea) and groundnut is a traditional practice.
In the rabi season, wheat and gram are cultivated mostly under irrigated condition.
The natural vegetation comprises of tropical dry and moist deciduous forests.
However, rich farmers grow rice, wheat and gram and, sometimes cotton using irrigation facilities.
The catchment area of the Chambal river shows severe effects of climate change.
This area was once known for its good climate and abundant food, water and employment opportunities (in the folk idiom it is defined as pag roti dag neer).
It is now facing severe water shortage and extreme weather conditions (Gupta and Kawadia 2003).
Agriculture is primarily rainfed and the region does not have adequate mechanism to use surface water for agriculture.
As a result, farmers are forced to exploit ground water for the domestic as well as for agricultural purposes.
No proper facilities to recharge groundwater are developed.
As water withdrawal from the ground is much more than the recharge (Gupta, Kawadia and Attari 2007), it has [77] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari created conditions of deforestation and desertification in the area.
The area thus presents a good case study for climate change adaptation practices.
4.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 1) To understand the nature of climate change and its impact on agriculture in the Chambal river catchment area.
2) To present an overview of the adaptation measures in the area.
3) To discuss maladaptations and its implications for the region.
4) To direct policy for strengthening specific adaptations.
5.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The study has followed the sample survey method of investigation.
Of the eight districts in the Chambal catchment, Indore, Dewas, Mandsaur and Neemuch districts were selected in controlled sampling following expert advice.
These four districts provided adequate representation of different agro-climatic and farming systems in the study region.
A representative sample of 470 farmers was finally selected from 28 villages of these districts through stratified snowball sampling techniques in the agricultural year 2014-2015.
The farm household survey was conducted in two steps, a field pre-test and actual data collection.
As indicated above, the study made use of controlled sampling — only those agricultural households were surveyed that got subsidy from the Government for rainwater harvesting specifically to overcome the shortage of water due to climate change.
Enumerators conversant with local language and traditions in the study area were engaged to conduct the field survey.
Each survey schedule had 70 questions.
A farm household was the unit of analysis.
Moisture index was calculated based on centurial data of precipitation and potential evapotranspiration (India Water Portal 2016) to determine the ‗aridity‘ status of all the districts in the study area.
A seven-year moving average was used to smoothen the fluctuations.
Linear regression was used to find the equation and trend line.
The study also made use of descriptive statistics and case study method for analysis and presentation of results.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [78] 6.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 6.1.
Nature of Climate Change in the Chambal Basin 6.1.1.
Precipitation and Moisture Index Agriculture in Madhya Pradesh has remained rainfed and will continue to be so for the next few decades.
The state is dependent on rainfall for its water requirements.
The total rainfall in the state varies from 60 cms, over the extreme north and western parts, to 120 cms over the central, eastern and southern parts of the state.
Therefore, significant climatic aberrations or changes will have a certain impact on the agricultural output of the state.
Global warming and shift in precipitation zones would cause drought, exposing the vulnerability of the countries affected.
Monitoring the occurrence of droughts is helpful in various disciplines like administration, planning, agriculture and hydrology to take remedial measures.
Drought is a period of drier than normal conditions that result in water-related problems.
Agricultural drought occurs when soil moisture and rainfall are inadequate during the growing season to support healthy crop maturity and cause extreme crop stress and wilt.
The drylands of the world are increasingly subject to desertification due to climate change and recurrent droughts.
It is thus extremely important to analyse the trend of climate change in the Malwa region of Madhya Pradesh and to know whether it is being significantly encroached by desert from the neighbouring state of Rajasthan.
For this, the study makes use of Moisture Index/ Drought Index/ Aridity Index (Thornthwaite and Mather 1955).
The aim is to analyse the phenomenon of drought occurrence, or gradual desertification, in the catchment area of Chambal river basin, that is, the eight districts of Indore, Dewas, Dhar, Shajapur, Ujjain, Mandsaur, Ratlam and Neemuch.
The study further attempts to empirically investigate whether these districts have experienced climate change over a century.
Then a time-series based linkage was tried to be established between climate change pattern and drought occurrence.
For climate change analysis, moisture index was calculated based on the centurial data of precipitation and potential evapotranspiration (India Water Portal 2016).
Computation of Moisture Index or MI (Thornthwaite and Mather 1955) was simplified using annual average data (Krishnan 1992) as MI = [(P-PE)/PE]*100 where; P = Precipitation; PE = Potential Evapotranspiration [79] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari Table 2: District categorisation as per moisture index District Value of average moisture index Climate zone Nature of trend Indore -67.61 Arid No Change Dewas -61.18 Arid No Change Dhar -68.45 Arid Increasing Trend* Mandsaur -59.97 Semi-arid No Change Neemuch -63.05 Arid No Change Ratlam -61.29 Arid No Change Shajapur -58.26 Semi-arid No Change Ujjain -60.73 Arid No Change Source: Authors Note: * denotes that results are significant at 5% level of significance Table 1: Moisture index value per zone Value of moisture index Climate zone < 66.7 Arid 66.7 to 33.3 Semi-arid 33.3 to 0 Dry sub-humid 0 to +20 Moist sub-humid + 20.1 to 99.9 Humid 100 and More Per-humid Source: Thornthwaite and Mather (1955) The values of the index correspond to the humidity or aridity in an area.
If value of the index is positive, it indicates humid atmospheric conditions; negative index value represents dry climate conditions.
Table 1 depicts corresponding moisture index and the climate zone of the eight districts.
Moisture is thus most inadequate in arid zones followed by semiarid and dry sub-humid regions.
From moist and sub-humid zones onwards, the moisture is adequate for normal crop production.
The eight districts of Chambal basin have been categorised into their prevailing climate zone on the basis of average moisture index obtained from the climate data spanning almost over a century (table 2).
The trend is also identified with the help of regression equation and trend line (figure 1).
As per Thornthwaite moisture index calculation six of the eight districts fall in the arid zone, the remaining two are semi-arid.
There has been no significant change in the moisture index trend for the districts as per the centurial climate data.
Only the Dhar district is depicting a significant increasing trend in the moisture index.
This means that currently the district is under ‗arid‘ zone but gradually it will move in the ‗semi-arid‘ zone.
Apart from Dhar, there are two more districts in the semi-arid zone, namely Mandsaur and Shajapur.
One can conclude that no efforts have been made to shift the area from arid to semi-arid or humid zones.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [80] Figure 1: Moisture index of all districts Dewas Indore Dhar Mandsaur Neemuch Ratlam Shazapur Ujjain Source: Authors Note: — Moisture index; Linear Trend (moisture) index [81] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari 6.1.2.
Comment on Special Characteristics of Dhar District As per moisture index, only Dhar district has shown a significant increasing trend.
This means that currently the district is under ‗arid‘ zone but gradually it will move in the ‗semi-arid‘ zone.
This can be well understood in the backdrop of special focus Dhar has received in the past as a droughtprone district.
Integrated Mission for Sustainable Development (IMSD) study was initiated in the year 1987 (Rao, et al.
1995) with specific reference to find scientific and lasting solution to mitigate droughts.
Droughts have been a recurring feature in Indian agriculture from 1991 to 2000, and also earlier.
Thus, some special districts were selected for systematic investigation.
A specific study was carried out in the districts of Jhabua and Dhar, in Madhya Pradesh, using Composite Land Development Sites (CLDS) approach for forest and wasteland development and soil and water conservation in 1995 (IMSD 1995).
This was followed by specific suggestions and treatments.
Further, monitoring was done by Space Application Centre, ISRO, Ahmedabad (Dasgupta, Dhinwa and Rajawat 2015).
This was done through visual interpretation and analysis of temporal images of the region from 1991 to 2013.
The study had revealed that there is a substantial increase in the area of irrigated agricultural land with increase in number of check dams along with the stream channels.
This has helped Dhar district‘s transition from arid zone towards semi-arid zone.
It, thus, becomes clear that for non-arable soil conservation, rainwater harvesting and management of lands for fodder, fruit and fuel-wood production in the watershed perspective are the core strategies for fighting drought in the arid zones of India.
As various water harvesting measures were adopted in Dhar district, the result came out in the form increased agricultural productivity.
Thus, watershed development programmes were seen to have a positive impact in combating desertification.
We, therefore, need to employ more of such techniques in the remaining arid zones to prevent them from getting gradually converted into deserts and to ensure food-security.
6.1.3.
Temperature and Pattern of Precipitation If sufficient water is available, then the temperature is the most important factor determining farm productivity in a region.
The higher temperature eventually reduces crop yields, while encouraging weed and pest proliferation.
Farmers‘ responses about a general change in temperature over time were traced.
This reflected the change in seasonality, distribution, amount and intensity of temperature over time.
As can be seen in table 3, around 78 per cent of farmers in the survey reported an increase in temperature of the study region.
Changes in the precipitation patterns Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [82] Table 4: The sample distribution of farmers based on their observations about changes in precipitation Response about average precipitation Number of farmers (i) Increase 10 (2.13) (ii) Decrease 50 (10.64) (iii) No change 328 (69.77) (iv) No response on temperature 82 (17.45) Total 470 (100.00) Note: Figures in the parentheses show percentages.
Table 3: The sample distribution of farmers based on their observations about changes in temperature Response about change in temperature Number of farmers (i) Increase 364 (77.47) (ii) Decrease 62 (13.18) (iii) No change 29 (6.17) (iv) No response on temperature 15 (3.18) Total 470 (100.00) Note: Figures in the parentheses show percentages.
increase the likelihood of crop failures in the short term and production decline in the long term.
Agriculture will be adversely affected not only by an increase or decrease in the overall amounts of rainfall but also by shifts in the timing of rainfall.
It is thus extremely important that farmers‘ reporting about the changing trends of precipitation are analysed.
In the sample, close to 70 per cent of farmers did not see a major change in precipitation, however, 11 per cent observed a clear decrease (table 4).
6.1.4.
Extreme Events With climate change, extreme weather occurrences have become more common and frequent.
Longer and hotter heat waves, greater incidence of droughts, intense precipitation, heavy rains and floods have now become usual occurrences.
It is important to know how farmers perceive the occurrence of such events in their regions.
They were asked to give their observations of whether the occurrence of a particular climateevent has increased, decreased or has remained constant in terms of its frequency and intensity in their region.
The events on which their responses were gathered were drought, flood, hailstorm, heat-waves, cold-waves and frost.
As can be seen in table 5, more than 70 per cent of the surveyed farmers observed that heat waves, frost and cold wave occurrences have increased.
About 56 per cent surveyed farmers observed increase in hailstorms.
About 47 per cent of the farmers observed increase in droughts.
About 70 per cent farmers there had been no significant change in the incidence of floods.
Factors affecting farmers‘ perceptions were also explored.
Farmers with a higher educational level, a higher income level and joint family mode of living were able to perceive climatic changes more correctly (Kawadia and Tiwari 2017).
[83] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari Table 6: The sample distribution of farmers based on their observations about change in crop yield Change in crop yield Number of farmers (i) No change 10 (2.13) (ii) Significant increase 50 (10.64) (iii) Significant decrease 328 (69.78) (iv) Minor variation 82 (17.45) Total 470 (100.00) Note: Figures in the parentheses show percentages.
Table 5: The sample distribution of farmers based on their observations about occurrence of extreme events Major contingency Number of farmers Increased Constant Decreased Drought 220 (46.81) 95 (20.21) 115 (32.98) Flood 13 (2.77) 328 (69.78) 129 (27.45) Hailstorm 264 (56.17) 178 (37.87) 28 (05.96) Heat waves 350 (74.47) 109 (23.19) 11 (02.34) Cold waves 330 (70.21) 117 (24.89) 23 (04.89) Frost 335 (71.28) 104 (22.13) 31 (06.59) Any other outbreaks 184 (39.15) 284 (60.42) 02 (00.43) Note: Figures in the parentheses show percentages.
6.2.
Impact of Climate Change on the Agricultural System of the Chambal Basin Crop growth simulation assessments in dryland or rainfed agriculture in tropical stations indicate yield reduction of some crops even with a minimal increase in temperature.
If there is also a significant decrease in rainfall, tropical crop yields would be even more adversely affected.
Some studies indicate that climate change would lower incomes of the vulnerable populations and increase the absolute number of people at risk of hunger.
Climate change, mainly through increased extremes and temporal/spatial shifts, would worsen food security in some parts of the globe.
This study attempts to analyse how farmers of the Malwa region respond to the change in their crop yield due to change in climatic conditions.
Our survey found that 70 per cent of farmers reported a significant decrease in farm yield (table 6).
The greatest impact of climate change was observed in case of availability of water, which affects the entire farming community — irrigation systems are affected and so also are the crops dependent on irrigation, while at the same time global warming increases the demand for water in irrigation.
As it is important to trace whether farmers have perceived the change in climate correctly or not, farmers were queried on the change in frequency of irrigation required for their crops.
As can be seen in table 7, around 60 per Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [84] Table 7: Sample distribution of farmers based on their observations about the extent of change in their irrigation frequency Extent of change in irrigation-frequency Number of farmers (i) No change 55 (11.70) (ii) Marginal 137 (29.14) (iii) One and a half times 78 (16.60) (iv) Double 175 (37.23) (v) More than double 25 (5.32) Note: Figures in the parentheses show percentages.
Table 8: Sample distribution of farmers on the basis of their observations about increase in pest attack and diseases in crops Response about increase in pest attack and diseases in crops Number of farmers No 129 (27.45) Yes 341 (72.55) Total 470 (100) Note: Figures in the parentheses show percentages.
cent of farmers reported greater than marginal increase in the irrigation frequency.
Close to 40 per cent farmers in the sample reported 100 per cent increase in irrigation frequency over previous values.
Climate change also encourages the spread of pests and invasive species and has already increased the geographical range of some diseases.
In essence, it is altering the distribution pattern of animal and plant pests and diseases.
The change in temperature, moisture and atmospheric gases accelerate growth rates of plants, fungi and insects, which alters the interaction between pests, their natural predators and hosts.
In this regard, it is important to trace the farmers‘ response on whether there is an increase in pest attack and disease outbreak in crops in recent years.
The survey found that 73 per cent of farmers confirmed the increase in pest attacks and occurrence of crop diseases due to climate change (table 8).
6.3.
Adaptation Strategies in the Chambal Basin Chambal basin primarily has rain-fed agriculture and groundwater level in the region has been continually on decline.
As a result, climate change pressure of increased irrigation requirements on the available water resources has increased manifold.
Improved water management is thus one of the most important long-term adaptation as well as protection options that region must pursue.
A wide range of adaptation measures have been highlighted in this regard like improving water distribution strategies; changing crop and irrigation schedules; using rainwater more effectively; water recycling and the conjunctive use of groundwater.
In this respect some major strategies were identified from the literature.
These are: (i) planting trees (ii) soil conservation (iii) different crop varieties (iv) early and [85] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari Table 9: The sample distribution of farmers based on their adaptation strategies to fight climate change Adaptation strategies Number of farmers Water harvesting 395(84.02) Irrigation management 272(57.87) Early and late planting 205(43.62) Planting trees 119(25.32) Different crop varieties 114(24.25) Soil conservation 61(12.98) No Adaptation 16(3.40) Note: Figures in the parentheses show per centages.
late planting / changing plant dates (v) water harvesting / improved water management.
The farmers were thus queried about their chosen adaptation strategy to protect crop against climate change.
Table 9 explains the various adaptation practices used by the farmers of the region.
They are not mutually exclusive as farmers are practicing multiple adaptation techniques simultaneously as per their need and suitability.
6.3.1.
Water Harvesting / Improved Water Management Water harvesting was found to be the most popular adaptation strategy followed by the farmers of the Chambal basin.
It is adopted by 84 per cent of the sampled farmers.
It has specifically become popular since the launch of ambitious schemes like Khet Talab Yojana and Balram Taal Yojana.
Water harvesting can be defined as a range of techniques for collecting rainwater.
Water harvesting is economically beneficial for local farmers as it is the only feasible method of farming on degraded land devoid of other means of water for irrigation.
It is also significant as a sustained source of irrigation for Rabi crops.
Furthermore, it helps significantly in the recharge of groundwater resources of the region, adds greenery and in this way acts as a positive externality towards the overall ecology.
6.3.2.
Irrigation Management Improving the use of irrigation is generally perceived as an effective means of smoothing out yield volatility in rainfed systems.
It has the potential to improve agricultural productivity through supplementing rainwater during dry spells and lengthening the growing season (Orindi and Eriksen 2005).
Overall, improving the use of irrigation aids in averting the crop losses in areas subjected to recurrent cycle of drought.
Around 58 per cent of the sample farmers used this method to fight climate change (Table 9).
The farmers use plastic pipes for transporting water from the reserve to the farm.
They also use sprinklers for efficient use of the available water.
The government subsidy for proper water management has Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [86] played a major role in the adaptation of water harvesting and conservation measures (Orindi and Eriksen 2005).
6.3.3.
Early and Late Planting / Changing Plant Dates Altering the length of the growing period and varying planting and harvesting dates are among the crop management practices used in agriculture (Orindi and Eriksen 2005).
This includes early and late planting options as a strategy to fight harmful effects of changing climate.
The strategy helps to protect sensitive growth stages of crops by ensuring that these critical stages do not coincide with very harsh climatic conditions such as mid-season droughts.
Early and late planting comes third in the sequence of importance among major adaptation strategies.
This adaptation is followed by 44 per cent of the farmers surveyed (table 9).
The Malwa region is now strictly following soybean-wheat annual crop cycle.
As soybean is a Kharif crop and its growth cycle is strictly regulated by rainfall, changes in precipitation cycle certainly change its sowing and harvesting dates for the farmers.
For example, many farmers have started opting now for the 95-60 soybean varieties instead of the regular variety of soybean planted earlier.
Wheat can be sown only after the harvesting of soybean in Rabi season; therefore, wheat planting dates also change accordingly.
Farmers are practicing early sowing date and quicker maturing variety of soybean so that they can use soil moisture following the rainy season for the next crop like wheat, gram, mustard and other crops of Rabi sessions.
The monsoon season in the region normally extends up to the end of September or some time to the early October.
This provides enough moisture for the cultivation of the next crop.
This has not only increased the cropping intensity but made the Malwa the bowl of wheat and soybean.
6.3.4.
Plantation Planting trees or afforestation, in general, provides a particular example of a set of adaptation practices that are intended to enhance productivity in a way that often contributes to climate change mitigation through enhanced carbon sequestration.
It also has a role to play in strengthening the system‘s ability to cope with adverse impacts of changing climate conditions.
It also contributes to temperature stabilization in the region.
The farmers of the region thus follow tree plantation, particularly along the water harvesting structures.
Almost 25 per cent of the sampled farmers undertake tree plantation as a method to avert climate change impact (table 9).
This has increased the vegetation cover in the region.
[87] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari 6.3.5.
Crop Diversification Varieties Switching over to varieties that are early maturing and drought tolerant and/or resistant to temperature stresses, the farmers save their crops from rainfall fluctuations as well as add variety (Orindi and Eriksen 2005).
There is evidence that growing different crop varieties on the same plot or on different plots reduces the risk of complete crop failure as different crops are affected differently by climate events, and this in turn gives some minimum assured returns for livelihood security.
The pattern of crop diversification and its emerging trends in the Malwa region have already been discussed in detail in a previous chapter.
In the survey, approximately 24 per cent of the farmers favoured adoption of different crop varieties and 25 per cent support planting of trees on their fields as an essential strategy to ward-off negative impacts of climate change (table 9).
Nihaal Singh Tomar from Harnawada village in Dewas district succinctly mentioned that the only way to ensure sustained production in the wake of climate change was to make a pond in the field to capture rainwater and to plant trees in the field.
6.3.6.
Soil Conservation The adoption of practices and technologies that enhance vegetative soil coverage and control soil erosion are crucial to ensuring greater resilience of production systems to increased rainfall events, extended intervals between rainfall events, and potential soil loss from extreme climate events.
Improving soil management and conservation techniques assist in restoring the soil while also capturing soil carbon and limiting the oxidation of organic matter in the soil.
Soil conservation automatically gets ensured by following all the above-mentioned strategies; however, soil conservation issue was highlighted by only around 13 per cent of the sampled farmers (table 9).
Only a minuscule 3 per cent of the farmers said that they were not going for any specific adaptation strategy (table 9).
This makes it clear that almost all the farmers of the Chambal basin are aware of the negative impact climate change has on the production trends and taking appropriate mitigative steps.
6.4.
Irrigation Profile of the Farmers The beneficial adaptation in the fight against these problems is to work on optimum irrigation and better rainwater harvesting facilities.
In this study, the emphasis was laid on knowing the irrigation profile of the surveyed farmers, that is the sources used for irrigation, for example, tube-well, pond, well, etc.
This has been shown in table 10.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [88] Table 10: Representation of Irrigation Profile of Farmers Source of irrigation Tube-well Pond Well Number of farmers 177 307 219 Total number of source 347 357 317 Average number of source per farmer 1.96 1.16 1.45 Average investment per source (in Rs.)
220288.18 263674.35 385063.09 Average investment per farmer (in Rs.)
441849.71 299003.27 610325 Average water withdrawal/ hour per source 6.81 6.74 4.42 Average water withdrawal/ hour per farmer 13.74 6.81 6.48 Source: Authors A majority of the farmers in the survey sample use pond as their major source of irrigation (65 per cent), followed by well (47 per cent) and tubewell (25 per cent).
This shows that importance and usage of ponds has greatly accelerated in recent times and has reduced farmers‘ dependence on groundwater resources.
Thus, rainwater harvesting as an adaptation has lived up to the expectations of the farmer.
Farmers from Harnawada village in Dewas district emphasise that since the ponds have been constructed in the village on the fields of the farmers, it is symbolic death of the tube-well.
Villagers testify decline in the use of tube-wells since the adoption of rainwater harvesting techniques, which, according to the farmers, has helped them significantly in retaining the soil moisture after the rains.
This indicates that rainwater harvesting is not only ecologically beneficial but also cost-effective in terms of per unit water consumption.
6.5.
Tracing Farmers’ Responses on Effectiveness of Varied Adaptations (Case Studies) The farmers of Indore district are the main beneficiaries of recently launched Balram Taal Yojana.
Semaliya Raimal and Kampel villages are good examples of excellent work in water harvesting.
Yashwant Patel from Semaliya Raimal underlined the importance of the Yojana and its benefits to people when he said that it has helped the villagers in maintaining the stock of water in their fields, enhanced profits significantly, and fulfilled their irrigation needs.
Krishnapal Singh Daangi from the same village added that rainwater harvesting has made him self-reliant as it improved his farm production by leaps and bounds.
Vishnu Daangi, another farmer, said that as the area sub-soil is full of stones, tubewell-recharge is not good even when the region has abundant rains.
In such situations, rainwater harvesting is a blessing.
Dilip Patel states that because of water harvesting he has stopped borrowing for agricultural needs as it has made taking two-three [89] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari crops in year possible and is thus increasing his total income.
Kansingh Daangi, also a farmer, said water harvesting brought him an overall better life as it made it possible for him to make a pakka house and send his kids to good schools for education.
In Shadadev, a village adjacent to Semaliya Raimal, farmer Pawan Singh describes the advantages of water harvesting.
He says that before they began water harvesting, they were compelled to do irrigation by drawing water directly from Shipra.
As it was an illegal practice, farmers were fined Rs.
20,000 to Rs.
25,000.
But after farmers started rainwater harvesting, irrigation difficulties are sorted.
The farmers‘ experiences from Kampel village have also been on similar lines.
Sunil Nimadia states that rainwater harvesting ensures available water is conserved and it also helps recharge water table.
Other villages of Indore district where water harvesting has been carried out substantially are Paaliya, Faraspur, Rawad, Balodatakun, Atawada, Nevary, Matabarodi and Kadwaali Bujurg.
Farmers responses from these villages have been on similar lines.
They have also reported increased water level, tubewell recharge, less dependence on rainfall, a greater area for crop production, sustained irrigation facility for Rabi crops and last but not the least enhanced socio-economic status with better educational facilities for education for their children.
Arjun Singh from Pedmi village, Indore district, explains that in his area Kumbi, Beed are big Naalas but there is no dam on them.
If stop dams are made on them, wastage of water can be minimised.
Mahendra Singh Chouhan from Mhowgoan village gives an overview of different adaptation measures by saying that adaptation, in essence, is a long-term process with many benefits.
It includes a wide range of measures like those of plantation, construction of ponds, soil conservation, soil testing, save water campaign, etc.
These contribute to farming as well as to the environment.
Dewas district is a pioneer in water harvesting activities in the Chambal basin.
Tonk Khurd Tehseel is world-famous for the ponds being constructed here under the ambitious Khet Talab or Rewa Sagar Yojana.
Jujhaar Singh Tomar from Harnawada village says that there has been a great increase in the yield of wheat and gram in the area along with a substantial increase in green cover since the practice of rainwater harvesting began.
He suggests more investment in water harvesting and tree plantations.
Forak Singh Tomar from the same village urges that the Government increase subsidy on the construction of pond in the field from Rs.
80,000 to Rs.
200,000.
Mansingh Tomar says that there has been a 200 per cent increase in production from his field due to rainwater harvesting.
All the farmers say that tree plantation in their fields was the next best Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [90] adaptation measure after rainwater harvesting.
Sheshnarayan Patel from Gorwa village also stated his production got doubled.
Water harvesting is extremely important for water conservation and ecology.
Varied types of animals and plants are now noted in the village.
Deers are now easily visible in the area.
Vishnu from the same village drew attention to soil conservation as a result of water harvesting activities.
Uday Singh Khiswi, also from Gorwa, said improved situation encourages him for hard work as water harvesting has made it possible to expect sure returns from farming.
He further says that the Government should ban deep tube-wells in the area and encourage construction of ponds instead.
The districts of Mandsaur and Neemuch are in the vicinity of Gandhi Sagar Dam and Retam Barrage.
These two districts have seen substantial work in water harvesting and well-recharge activities.
Villages of Kachnara, Borkhedi and Haripura were covered in Mandsaur district.
Gobar Singh from Kachnara says that rainwater harvested is also used to recharge wells.. Kishan Singh says that well-recharge has helped him get additional income from production of fruits like mangoes, papaya and pomegranate in his fields.
Madho Singh Borona from the same village emphasises improved crop yield due to water harvesting.
He suggested that water can be transferred from one dam to another by linking them with canals.
Earlier the region was continuously under drought.
Now, the farmers are prosperous, while earlier they used to work as daily wage labourers.
The farmers from Borkhedi also told a similar story.
Kamal Singh Shamsawat from the village says his farm production has increased to a great extent as he now gets three crops in a year.
Under Kapildhara scheme, 28 wells have been constructed and all farmers have been provided with Kisan Credit Cards.
The construction of Retam Barrage in the year 2000 has benefitted the farmers.
The water supply is now ensured for a fee charged based on irrigated land in hectare.
He also emphasised soil conservation as a major adaptation measure in saving agriculture from the harmful impacts of climate change.
Hiralal Ojha and Deepsingh Sattawat also cited the advantage of building dam; they said, they have started sugarcane farming because of it.
They have also started cultivating coriander.
They also supported soil conservation and plantation of trees.
Ramcharan Rewari from Haripura said that water harvesting has considerably increased his basket of production, which now includes wheat, coriander, gram, isabgol, flaxseed, mustard, fenugreek etc.
He supported soil conservation and proper soil testing as the major method of adaptation apart from water harvesting and implementation of new and improved methods of irrigation.
Finally, concerning efficacy of various adaptation measures, this study examines the farmers‘ response in Neemuch district.
The villages covered [91] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari here included Barlai, Hatunia, and Pipliya Ghota.
Rahul Patidar from Barlai says that he has now an orange orchard of his own due to water harvesting.
He also favoured plantation of trees as an adaptation measure.
Vishnu Prasad Patidarhas says that he could grow a variety of crops like orange, garlic, wheat, coriander and fenugreek only because of water harvesting.
Shambhulal Patidaar said that water harvesting is giving him an annual return of at least four lakh rupees through improved farm productivity.
He emphasised organic farming and plantation of trees as an adaptation measure.
In the village of Hatunia, there are around 280 to 300 ponds.
Here, tubewells and hand-pumps are not successful.
Farmers are engaged in agricultural activities only because of water harvesting.
Satyanarayan from this village supports construction of more ponds as well as plantation of trees as the main adaptation measure to sustain in the face of climate change.
Villagers from Pipliya Ghota also mainly follow water harvesting, seek enhancement of subsidy for that, plantation of trees and soil conservation as adaptation measures for changing climate.
6.6.
Maladaptation: Soybean and Wheat based Monoculture A ‗maladaptation‘ is a trait that is (or has become) more harmful than helpful, in contrast to an adaptation, which is more helpful than harmful.
So, farming practices that though have increased farmers‘ production and income in the short run but become a severe danger in the long run, if continued unabated, can be effectively called maladaptation.
One such maladaptation in the Malwa region is ‗monoculture‘.
Monoculture is the practice of producing a single crop over a long period in a certain area.
The practice of monoculture gets usually stimulated by political and economic incentives.
Specialisation brings obvious benefits to the economy of scale in terms of higher yields and easier mechanisation techniques; however, there are disadvantages associated with monocultures.
Monocultures lead to easier spread of diseases and pests, thereby decreasing resilience to climate change variability that often induces additional stress on plants.
Additionally, when the produced crop is negatively affected by changing weather or biophysical conditions, farm income may be severely affected.
For these reasons, moving towards diversification reduces the risks of maladaptation (Lin 2011).
The Malwa region is a classic text-book example of such kind of monoculture.
The area, since 1980s, has become a specialised zone of soybean-wheat annual cycle-based production.
Soybean plants usually grow at ambient temperatures between 15°C and 27°C, although temperature below 21°C and above 32 °C may reduce flowering.
Temperatures exceeding 40°C (104°F) are detrimental to seed production.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [92] Soybean is adapted to grow in a wide range of soils and climates but requires adequate soil moisture for germination and seedling establishment.
Soybean has flourished well in the Malwa region with many growth conditions getting satisfied simultaneously.
The soybean success story caught headlines not only regionally but also at the national level.
The Malwa has practically given up on production of crops like maize, sugarcane and especially cotton after soybean success.
However, this specialisation has reduced crop-diversification in the region.
Also, this monoculture has been sustained by continuous groundwater exploitation.
Since the 1980‘s the Malwa region has become increasingly tube-well dependent to sustain its crop-cycle.
During the survey, it was found that villages like Jalodiya-Panth in Depalpur Tehsil of Indore district had as many as 500-600 tube wells with a depth ranging from 250 to 500 feet.
The whole region is sustained on irrigation from groundwater resources and in recent times hit severe water shortages, not only for irrigation but also for drinking purposes in the wake of its fast depletion.
Hence, such a crop-cycle suffers a serious threat.
The maladaptation thus needs to be balanced by a suitable adaptation that may ensure sustained water supply for irrigation.
Besides, soybean-wheat crop cycle has high risks of infestation by widespread pests.
Many farmers from the survey corroborated to such incidences.
A farmer from Dhaturiya Village in Dewas district said that soybean crop in the district in recent times suffered from severe caterpillar attack and fungal attack.
Soybean crop also suffered severely due to the acute shortage of rainfall during the growing stage.
This was coupled with a rise in temperatures beyond 32°C, many a time crossing 40°C, severely affecting the crop.
Warm temperatures and high humidity are conducive for the fungus that leads to the development of soybean rust.
Soybean gets totally destroyed in case of untimely torrential rains; this is known as jal jaana in the local language.
Thus, both extreme drought conditions with high temperatures as well as torrential excessive rains are harmful to the crop.
7.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS As per moisture index, six out of eight districts in the study region lie in the arid zone, clearly indicating a movement towards desertification of the region.
Nature of climate change in the Chambal basin was also explored through farmers‘ observations about change in temperature, precipitation and occurrence of extreme events.
Farmers reported an increase in temperature with a clear majority of around 73 per cent.
They reported an [93] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari increase in the occurrence of heatwaves, cold waves, frost and droughts in the region.
The decrease in precipitation was, however, noted by only a few farmers.
There were thus indications of increasing aridity in the studyregion.
The impact of the climatic change was analysed through farmers‘ responses about changes in crop-yields, the extent of change in irrigation frequency as well as the spread of pest-infestation and disease occurrence in plants.
Around 70 per cent of farmers reported a decrease in crop yield, while close to 60 per cent of farmers reported greater than a marginal increase in irrigation-frequency.
As much as 40 per cent of the total sampled farmers reported a 100 per cent increase in irrigation frequency.
About three-quarters of the total sampled farmers reported an increase in pest attack and disease occurrence in crops.
From the survey responses, the study considers crop diversification, changing plant dates, soil conservation and soil testing, increasing rainwater capture, construction of stop dams on nalaas, and tree plantations as the major adaptation strategies farmers perceive as appropriate for rain-fed agriculture.
Water harvesting was found to be the most important adaptation measure followed by crop diversification.
The case for water harvesting got established by the transition of Dhar district from the arid to the semi-arid zone as per moisture index-based analysis.
It also became clear from the survey of the farmers that adaptation measures to climate change cannot be considered in isolation, but relative to the impacts of other exogenous sectoral changes.
The issue of ‗maladaptation‘ of soybeanwheat monoculture has accentuated the crisis in the region.
This has severely resulted in groundwater depletion in the region and there has been thus overall damage to the ecosystem.
Therefore, there are social costs as well as ecological limits to crop-based adaptations in the region.
Hence, gross market and institutional failures that make farmers very vulnerable come at the forefront.
In short, the key lesson to emerge is that the prioritisation of appropriate adaptation measures needs to be contextual and fit the capacity of local institutional and legal frameworks.
Water harvesting measures should be specially strengthened by the policy in the study region to cope with changing climate and its effects on the agricultural sector.
Mainstreaming adaptation strategies is thus to be considered as the most important policy intervention.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study is a part of a Major Research Project entitled ―A Study of Climate Change and Agriculture in the Catchment Area of Chambal River‖ funded by Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [94] under Project Director Ganesh Kawadia.
Era Tiwari was involved with the project in the capacity of Research Associate at School of Economics, Devi Ahilya University, Indore.
Authors are thankful to ICSSR, New Delhi for their financial support [grant number 02/302/2011RP].
REFERENCES Adger, W. N., S. Dessai, M. Goulden, M. Hulme, I. Lorenzoni, D. R. Nelson, L. O. Naess, J. Wolf, and A. Wreford.
2009.
―Are there Social Limits to Adaptation to Climate Change.‖ Climatic Change (93): 335-354. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584008-9520-z Akter, S., and J. Bennett.
2011.
―Household Perceptions of Climate Change and Preferences for Mitigation Actions: The Case of Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme in Australia.‖ Climatic Change 109 (3-4): 417-436. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0034-8 Barnett, J., and S. O'Neill.
2010.
―Maladaptation.‖ Global Environmental Change 2 (20): 211-213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.004 Bradshaw, B., H. Dolan, and B. Smit.
2004.
―Farm Level Adaptation to Climatic Variability and Change: Crop Diversification in the Canadian Prairies.‖ Climatic Change 67 (1): 119-141. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-004-0710-z Dasgupta, A., P. S. Dhinwa, and A. S. Rajawat.
2015.
―Monitoring Implementation of Desertification Combating Plan Using Geomatics A Case Study, Districts Dhar and Jhabua, Madhya-Pradesh.‖ Journal of Earth System Science 124 (1): 87-99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12040-014-0525-x Deressa, T. T., R. M. Hassan, C. Ringler, T. Alemu, and M. Yesuf.
2009.
―Determinants of Farmers' Choice of Adaptation Methods to Climate Change in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia.‖ Global Environmental Change 19: 248-255. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.01.002 Diggs, D. M. 1991.
―Drought Experience and Perception of Climate Change Among Great Plains Farmers.‖ Great Plains Research: A Journal of Natural and Social Sciences 1 (1): 114-132. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsresearch/1 Dow, Kirstin, France Berkhout, Benjamin L. Preston, Richard J.T.
Klein, Guy Midgley, and M Rebecca Shaw.
2013.
―Limits to Adaptation.‖ Nature Climate Change 3: 305-307. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1847 Easterling, William E. 1996.
―Adapting North American Agriculture to Climate Change in Review.‖ Agriculture and Forest Meteorology 80 (1): 1-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1923(95)02315-1 Falco, D., M. Veronesi, and M. Yesuf.
2011.
―Does Adaptation to Climate Change Provide Food Security.‖ American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93 (3): 829-846. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aar006 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-008-9520-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-008-9520-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0034-8 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.004 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-004-0710-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s12040-014-0525-x https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.01.002 http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsresearch/1 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1847 https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1923(95)02315-1 https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aar006 [95] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari Fosu-Mensah, B. Y., P. L. Vlek, and D. S. MacCarthy.
2012.
―Farmers' Perception and Adaptation to Climate Change Among Great Plains Farmers.‖ Environment, Development and Sustainability (14): 495-505. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-0129339-7 Gbetibouo, G. A.
2009.
―Understanding Farmers' Perceptions and Adaptations to Climate Change and Variability The Case of Limpopo Basin, South Africa."
International Discussion Paper.
New Delhi: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Gupta, R. P., and Ganesh Kawadia.
2003.
―Rainfall and Runoff: Changing Trends in Gandhi Sagar Dam.‖ Economic and Political Weekly 38 (33): 3457-3459.
Accessed September 22, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4413905.
Gupta, R. P., Ganesh Kawadia, and Sara Attari.
2007.
―Chambal Valley Development Project: Unequal Distribution of Gains.‖ Economic and Political Weekly 42 (5): 397-402.
Hassan, R., and C. Nhemachena.
2008.
―Adaptation to Climate Change in Africa: Multinomial Choice Analysis of Determinants of Farm Strategies.‖ African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2 (1): 83-104.
Hegeback, J., J. Sundberg, M. Ostwald, D. Chen, X. Yun, and P. Knutsson.
2005.
―Climate Variability and Land Use Change in Danangou Watershed, China Examples of Small Scale Farmers' Adaptations.‖ Climatic Change 72: 189-212. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-005-5384-7 IMSD.
1995.
―Integrated Mission for Sustainable Development Technical Guidelines.‖ Balangar, Hyderabad: National Remote Sensing Agency, Department of Space; Govt.
of India.
India Water Portal.
2016.
Met-Data.
Accessed 2016. http://www.indiawaterportal.org/met_data/ IPCC.
1996.
Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change Contribution of Working Group I to the Second assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
IPCC.
2007.
Climate change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Edited by S. Solomon.
Cambridge University Press.
IPCC.
2014.
Climate Change.
2014: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ishaya, S., and I.
B. Abaje.
2008.
―Indigenous Peoples' Perception on Climate Change and Adaptation Strategies in Jema'a Local Government Area of Kaduna State, Nigeria.‖ Journal of Geography and Regional Planning 1 (8): 138-143. http://www.academicjournals.org/JGRP.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-012-9339-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-012-9339-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-005-5384-7 http://www.indiawaterportal.org/met_data/ http://www.academicjournals.org/JGRP Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [96] Janakarajan, S. 2010.
―Understanding the Impacts of Climate Change in the Context of Coastal Tamil Nadu.‖ Economics of Climate Change Adaptation.
Chennai: Madras School of Economics.
12-13.
Kawadia, Ganesh, and Era Tiwari.
2017.
―Farmers' Perception of Climate Change in Madhya Pradesh.‖ Area, Development and Policy 2 (2): 192-207. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2017.1309985 Krishnan, A.
1992.
―Climate Classification and Agricultural Drought.‖ In Crops and Weather, edited by S. Venkatraman and A. Krishnan, 458-508.
New Delhi: Publication and Information Division, Indian Council of Agricultural Research.
Kumar, K. K., and J. Parikh.
2001.
―Indian Agriculture and Climate Sensitivity.‖ Global Environmental Change 11 (2): 147-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/S09593780(01)00004-8 Kurukulasuriya, P., R. Mendelsohn, A.
Dinar, R. Hassan, J. Benhim, G. Gbetibouo, H. Eid, et al.
2004.
A Regional Analysis of the impact of Climate Change on African Agriculture.
Yale University: Mimeo School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
Leiserowitz, A.
2006.
―Climate change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery and Values.‖ Climatic Change 77 (1-2): 45-72. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9059-9 Lin, B.
B.
2011.
―Resilience in Agriculture Through Crop Diversification: Adaptive Management for Environmental Change.‖ Bioscience 61 (3): 183-193. https://doi.org/10.1525/bio.2011.61.3.4 Maddison, D. 2007.
―The Perception of and Adaptation to Climate Change in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4308.
The World Bank Development Research Group – Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team.
doi:10.1596/18139450-4308. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4308 Magistro, J., and C. Roncoli.
2001.
―Anthropological Perspectives and Policy Implications of Climate Change Research.‖ Climate Research 19: 91-96. doi:10.3354/cr019091.
https://doi.org/10.3354/cr019091 Mangala, R. 2007.
―Presidential Address at the National Conference on Climate Change and Indian Agriculture.‖ NASC Complex, New Delhi, December 11.
Mendelsohn, R. O.
1998.
―Climate Change Damages.‖ In Economics and Policy Issues in Climate Change, edited by W. D. Nordhaus, 219-236.
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future Mertz, O., K. Halsnaes, J. E. Olesen, and K. Rasmussen.
2009.
―Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries.‖ Environmental Management 43 (5): 743752. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-008-9259-3 Moser, S. C., and J.
A. Ekstrom.
2010.
―A Framework to Diagnose Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation.‖ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
2202622031. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1007887107 https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2017.1309985 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-3780(01)00004-8 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-3780(01)00004-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9059-9 https://doi.org/10.1525/bio.2011.61.3.4 https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4308 https://doi.org/10.3354/cr019091 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-008-9259-3 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1007887107 [97] Ganesh Kawadia and Era Tiwari MSSRF.
2008.
A Roadmap for Policy Development: Community Level Adaptation to Climate Change and its Relevance to National Action Plan.
M.S.
Swaminathan Research Foundation.
Mustapha, S. B., A. H. Sanda, and H Shehu.
2012.
―Farmers' Perception of Climate Change in Central Agricultural zone of Borno State, Nigeria.‖ Journal of Environment and Earth Science 2 (11): 21-27.
MoEF.
2004.
―India‘s Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.‖ New Delhi: Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India.
Ndambiri, H. K., C. Ritho, S. G. Mbogoh, S. I. Ng'ang'a, E. J. Muirui, P. M. Nyagweso, and F. H. Cherotwo.
2012.
―Analysis of Farmers' Perception of the Effects of Climate Change in Kenya: The Case of Kyuso District.‖ Journal of Environment and Earth Sciences 2 (10): 74-83.
O'Brien, Karen, Robin M. Leichenko, Ulka Kelkar, Henry David Venema, Guro Aandhal, Heather Tompkins, Akram Javed, et al.
2004.
―Mapping Vulnerability to Multiple Stressors: Climate Change and Globalization in India.‖ Global Environmental Change 14: 303-313. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2004.01.001 Orindi, V. A., and S. Eriksen.
2005.
―Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change in the Development Process in Uganda.‖ Eco Policy Series 15.
Nairobi, Kenya: African Centre for Technology Studies.
Pannell, D. J., G. R. Marshall, N. Barr, A. Curtis, F. Vanclay, and R. Wilkinson.
2006.
―Understanding, Promoting Adoption of Construction Practices by Rural Landlords.‖ Australian Journal of Experimental Agriculture 46: 1407-1424. https://doi.org/10.1071/EA05037 Parry, M. L. and T. R. Carter.
1989.
―An Assessment of the Effects of Climatic Change on Agriculture.‖ Climate Change 15: 95-116. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138848 Rao, D. P., Radhakrishnan, K., Perumal, A., Subramaniah, S. K., Chenniah, G. C., Murthy, Y. V., .
.
.
Bhaskar, U. N. (1995).
Integrated Mission for Sustainable DevelopmentA Synergystic Approach towards Management of Land and Water Resources.
Balangar, Hyderabad: National Remote Sending Agency, Department of Space, Govt.
of India.
Rathore, L. S., and C. J. Stigler.
2007.
―Challenges to Coping Strategies with Agrometeorological Risks and Uncertainities in Asian Regions.‖ In Managing Weather and Climate Risks in Agriculture, edited by M.V.K.
Shivakumar and R. P. Motha, 53-70.
New York: Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72746-0_4 Reilly, J., and P. Schimmelpfenning.
1999.
―Agricultural Impact Assessment, Vulnerability, and the Scope for Adaptation.‖ Climate Change 43: 745-788. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005553518621 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2004.01.001 https://doi.org/10.1071/EA05037 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138848 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72746-0_4 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005553518621 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [98] Rosenzweig, C., and D. Hillel.
1995.
―Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Agriculture and Food Supply.‖ Consequences 1 (2): 23-32.
Rosenzweig, C., and M. L. Parry.
1994.
―Potential Impact of Climate Change on World Food Supply.‖ Nature 367: 133-138. https://doi.org/10.1038/367133a0 Scheraga, J. D., and A. E. Grambsch.
1998.
―Risks, Opportunities and Adaptation to Climate Change.‖ Climate Research 11: 85-95. https://doi.org/10.3354/cr011085 Semenza, J. C., D. E. Hall, D. J. Wilson, B. D. Bontempo, D. J.
Sailor, and L. A. George.
2008.
―Public Perception of Climate Change – Voluntary Migration and Barriers to Behavior Change.‖ American Journal of Preventive Medicine 35 (5): 479-487. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2008.08.020.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2008.08.020 Sinha, S. K., G. B. Singh, and M Rai.
1998.
Decline in Crop Productivity in Haryana and Punjab: Myth or Reality.
New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research.
Thomas, D. S., C. Twyman, H. Osbahr, and B. Hewitson.
2007.
―Adaptation to Climate Change and Variability: Farmer Responses to Intra-seasonal Precipitation Trends in South Africa.‖ Climatic Change 83 (3): 301-322. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9205-4 Thornthwaite, C. W., and J. R. Mather.
1955.
―The Water Balance.‖ Publications in Climatology 8 (1): 1-104.
UNFCC.
1992.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Accessed July 16, 2017. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
Vedwan, N., and R. E. Rhoades.
2001.
―Climate Change in the Western Himalayas of India: A Study of Local Perception and Response.‖ Climate Research 19: 109-117. https://doi.org/10.3354/cr019109 Wassmann , R., and A. Dobermann.
2007.
―Climate Change Adaptation Through Rice Production in Regions with High Poverty Levels.‖ SAT eJournal 4 (1): 1-24.
Accessed July 16, 2017. http://ejournal.icrisat.org/SpecialProject/sp8.pdf WCED.
1987.
Our Common Future.
World Commission on Environment and Development.
New York: Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1038/367133a0 https://doi.org/10.3354/cr011085 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2008.08.020 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9205-4 https://doi.org/10.3354/cr019109 http://ejournal.icrisat.org/SpecialProject/sp8.pdf
ASEAS 11(1) | 117 Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines William N. Holden ► Holden, W. N. (2018).
Typhoons, climate change, and climate injustice in the Philippines.
Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 11(1), 117-139.
This article discusses how climate change causes an intensification of Western North Pacific typhoons and how the effects of such amplified typhoons upon the Philippines exemplify the concept of climate injustice.
Using a political ecology approach, the article begins with an examination of the concepts of climate change, climate injustice, background injustice, and compound injustice.
This is followed by an examination of the causes of typhoons, the vulnerability of the Philippines to typhoons, and how climate change may generate stronger typhoons.
These stronger typhoons that may be produced by climate change, and the risks that they pose to the Philippines, are an example of climate injustice, while the legacy of colonial exploitation in the Philippines is an example of background injustice.
The struggles faced by the Philippines in coping with climate change augmented typhoons are an example of compound injustice.
The article concludes with a discussion of the reluctance of developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions notwithstanding the consequences these emissions have on countries such as the Philippines.
Keywords: Climate Change; Climate Injustice; Philippines; Political Ecology; Typhoons  INTRODUCTION: SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN 8 NOVEMBER 2013 In the early morning hours of 8 November 2013 Super Typhoon Haiyan (referred to in the Philippines as Super Typhoon Yolanda) battered the Philippines (Figure 1).
Haiyan was an extraordinary storm, bringing precipitation in some places of up to 615 mm, having an air pressure at its center of only 895 millibars, generating sustained one-minute wind gusts of up to 315 km/h (with wind gusts of up to 375 km/h), and was the strongest typhoon to ever make landfall in the entire Western North Pacific (Esteban et al., 2016; Primavera et al., 2016; Takagi et al., 2015; Takagi & Esteban, 2016).
When Haiyan came ashore on the island of Panay, near Concepcion, Iloilo, it still had sustained wind speeds of 215 km/h (with gusts up to 250 km/h) and this was its fifth landfall (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, 2014).
Perhaps the most destructive aspect of Haiyan was its storm surge of 7.4 meters, which inundated 98 km2 of the island of Leyte and 93 km2 of the island of Samar with the same force as a tsunami (Cardenas et al., 2015; Lander, Guard, & Camargo, 2014).
Dr. Wei Mei, a climate scientist at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, stated (when interviewed in La Jolla, California on 4 November 2015) that he was “shocked” by the strength of Haiyan.
Außerhalb des Schwerpunktes  Out of Focus w w w .s ea s. at d o i 10 .1 47 64 /1 0.
A SE A S20 18 .1 -7 118 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines Amalie Obusan, the Greenpeace Southeast Asia Country Director, indicated (interview, Quezon City, Philippines on 26 April 2017) that she had never seen devastation of this magnitude and, even though more than three years have passed, she still gets emotional thinking about it.
While climate scientists and climate change activists may have wondered in amazement at the sheer power of Haiyan, its consequences for the people of the Philippines were catastrophic.
Eight of the 17 regions of the Philippines were affected by Haiyan, it generated 28,626 injuries, caused 1,039 people to be reported missing, and officially caused 6,293 deaths – although some say the death toll could have been as high as 18,000 (IBON, 2015; Takagi & Esteban, 2016).
The storm caused between USD 12 to 15 billion worth of damages and resulted in the destruction of one million homes (Primavera et al., 2016).
Six months after Haiyan, two million people remained homeless (Rodgers, 2016).
The City of Tacloban, on the island of Leyte in the Eastern Visayas, bore the brunt of the winds and storm surge, and some estimate that up to 10,000 Tacloban residents were killed, mostly by the storm surge (IBON, 2015).
San Pedro Bay’s funnel shape (Figure 1), combined with its shallow bathymetry, stacked the water up and forced the storm surge into Tacloban (Soria et al., 2016).
In the storm’s aftermath the Philippine Army gathered dead bodies and buried them, unidentified, in a mass grave at the Archdiocese of Palo.
For weeks after the storm, dead bodies lined the streets of Tacloban and over three years after the storm, human bones continue to wash up on its beaches.
Although many residents of Tacloban had experienced typhoons, they were unprepared for its storm surge, warnings of which were issued beforehand but many of the Waray-Waray speaking residents of Tacloban had never heard the English term ‘storm surge’ before and did not understand its meaning.
When local authorities relayed information to the communities they described the storm surge as dagko nga balod (huge waves), which was not considered serious by many people (Esteban et al., 2016).
During the storm, two ships broke loose from their moorings and ran aground, crushing homes and people in Barangay Anibong, the bow of one of which, the MV Jocelyn (Figure 2), was left as a remembrance of the thousands of lives that were lost.
In the immediate aftermath of Haiyan, someone painted “CLIMATE JUSTICE NOW!” on the side of the MV Jocelyn and, in doing so, raised the issues which this article seeks to address: First, does climate change cause an amplification of Western North Pacific typhoons; and second (assuming an affirmative answer to the first question), how do such amplified typhoons, and their effects upon the Philippines, exemplify the concept of climate injustice?
Climate injustice is the situation where some people enjoy the benefits of energy use and other emissionsgenerating activities while those activities cause other people to suffer the burdens of climate change (Bell, 2013).
This investigation of climate injustice is based upon an extensive review of the climate change and typhoons literature and was augmented by 40 fieldwork interviews conducted in California (in 2015) and in the Philippines (in 2016 and 2017).
Informants were selected for their knowledge of the topic under study and they included climate scientists, government officials (from both national and local governments), environmental activists, and members of the Roman Catholic Church (a highly influential institution in Philippine society).
ASEAS 11(1) | 119 William N. Holden Figure 1.
The path of Super Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.
(figure by author).
120 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Political Ecology This article approaches the issue of climate injustice by using political ecology, an epistemologically plural field of inquiry (Tetreault, 2017).
Specifically, two subsets of political ecology are used: the study of ecological distribution conflicts and the political ecology of hazards.
“Ecological distribution,” is defined by Martinez-Alier (2002) as “the social, spatial, and intertemporal patterns of access to the benefits obtainable from natural resources and from the environment as a life support system” (p. 73).
The capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases can be thought of as a natural resource.
The developed nations of the world, with their historic emissions of greenhouse gases, have used up much of this resource leaving substantially less of it for the developing nations.
In this respect, climate change is, essentially, an ecological distribution conflict because, as argued here, it has been caused by the developed countries.
Yet, as this article argues, its consequences will be disproportionately borne by the developing nations.
The political ecology of hazards is a concept developed by Clark, Chhotray, and Few (2013), which relates natural hazards and environmental injustice.
The authors discuss that disasters are not just a combination of natural hazards with vulnerable populations and that it is now necessary to examine the precipitating events that cause these hazards.
“This is most obviously the case,” Clark, Chhotray, and Few (2013, p. 106) wrote “in hydrometeorological calamities – storms, floods, drought – which are predicted to intensify and become more frequent as global warming proceeds.” Since this article examines the impact of typhoons on the Philippines and the extent to which these are augmented by climate change, the political ecology of hazards deserves further discussion herein.
Figure 2.
The MV Jocelyn.
(figure by author).
ASEAS 11(1) | 121 William N. Holden Climate Change Climate change is occurring due to the increasing concentration of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), methane, and nitrogen oxides, released into the atmosphere from human activity.
Once these gases are concentrated in the atmosphere, they intercept terrestrial radiation and prevent some of this from escaping to space, trapping the energy within the lower atmosphere and re-radiating some of this back to the surface.
Many climate change activists (such as those at 350.org) hold out a benchmark maximum safe level of CO 2 in the atmosphere as being 350 parts per million (PPM).
In 2016, atmospheric CO 2 crossed 400 PPM, is rising by approximately 2 PPM every year, and (as of 1 April 2018) stands at 410.03 PPM (Scripps Institution of Oceanography, 2018).
Much of the atmosphere’s CO 2 has been emitted in recent decades because of modern industrialization, with 75% of all anthropogenic CO 2 emitted from 1950 to 2010 and 50% having been emitted from 1980 to 2010 (Nixon, 2011).
Although CO 2 concentrations have risen and fallen and do not display a linear upward trend the CO 2 levels currently present in the atmosphere are higher than they have been at any time in the last 800,000 years and they will have a warming effect for years to come (Motesharrei et al., 2016).
Research conducted by Gillett, Arora, Zickfeld, Marshall, and Merryfield (2011) found that even if there was to be a complete cessation of all CO 2 emissions in 2100 the impact of emissions up to then would continue beyond the year 3000.
While the media, particularly in North America, may give people the impression that there is strong controversy about the existence of anthropogenic climate change, there is no debate about this amongst climate scientists (Text Box 1).
The United States Global Change Research Program (2017), holds that it is extremely likely that human emissions of greenhouse gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century and there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observed evidence.
Although there will always be anomalies and some uncertainty will always exist, the case for a warming climate is about as solid as any scientific case can ever be (De Buys, 2011).
While economists, journalists, politicians, and others may have the impression of confusion, disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, this impression is incorrect and there is a robust scientific consensus on climate change (Oreskes, 2004), As Alley (2000, p. xii) declared, “scientifically there is not another ‘side’ that deserves equal time.” Climate Injustice: The Disproportionate Causes of Climate Change Climate change is an uneven process when it comes to the contribution of individual countries and the impact that climate change has, and will have, on individual countries (Hariharan et al., 2017).
The developed countries of the world have contributed to what Hariharan, Kareem, Tandon, and Ziesemer (2017) describe as “a disproportionate amount of harmful anthropogenic emissions over the past couple of centuries and still contribute disproportionately more in per capita terms to global warming” (p. 19).
The developed world is responsible for over 75% of all emissions from 1850 to 2000 (Motesharrei et al., 2016).
It is not just the wealthier countries that have emitted more CO 2 , but resource consumption within countries is skewed towards higher 122 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines income groups and the richest 10% of the world’s population are responsible for 46% of all CO 2 emissions; this is eight times as much CO 2 per capita as the remaining 90% of the world’s population (Motesharrei et al., 2016).
Although the poor of the world have done disproportionately less to cause the problem of climate change they stand to suffer disproportionately more from its effects.
The unequal burdens of causation and consequence is the essence of climate injustice; as Yamada and Galat (2014) wrote, “those who suffer climate change are not responsible for producing it” (p. 432).
Background Injustice Much (but by no means all) of the poverty experienced by developing countries can be attributed to what Shue (2014) calls “background injustice” (p. 39), namely exploitation by their former colonial masters, which is the core argument of dependency theorists.
Many developing countries experience varying degrees of poverty as a legacy of having been colonies of (what are now) the developed countries, i.e.
they have found themselves in dependency relationships.
These background inequalities are, according to Shue (2014), “the bitter fruit of centuries of colonialism, imperialism, unequal development, war, greed, stupidity, or whatever exactly one thinks are the main features of the history of the international political economy” (p. 128).
The former colonial powers of today’s developing countries became affluent through exploiting their colonial subjects and through their rampant use of fossil fuels.
Today, these developed countries emit large amounts of greenhouse gases while their citizens maintain their affluent lifestyles.
Differences in the levels of development resulting from exploitation by colonialism, and the differing emissions of greenhouse gases, created the differences in affluence between the industrialized world and the developing world (IBON, 2008).
When discussing climate change, the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb CO2 exemplifies an ecological distribution conflict because it can be thought of as a finite resource, capable of being used up by the countries of the world.
According to Agarwal and Narain (1991) a distinction must be made “between those countries which have eaten up this ecological capital by exceeding the world’s absorptive capacity and those countries which have emitted gases well within the world’s cleansing capacity” (p. 6).
The developed countries fit into the former category and the developing countries fit into the latter category.
Indeed, Agarwal and Narain (1991) go so far as to state that an expression by the developed countries that the developing countries “must share the blame for heating up the Earth and destabilizing its climate” is an example of “environmental colonialism” (p. 1).
The developed countries, through their historic emissions, have created climate change; for them to expect the developing countries to allocate part of their share of the atmosphere’s ability to absorb CO2 is tantamount to coming and taking a resource (such as minerals or timber) from the developing countries just as was done during the colonial period.
Compound Injustice Intimately related to the concept of background injustice is compound injustice – the difficulty experienced by the developing countries of the world in coping with ASEAS 11(1) | 123 William N. Holden climate change.
The poor countries of the world are starting out in a weaker position when they confront climate change, largely because of their exploitation by their former colonial masters (background injustice), and the poverty that exacerbates their ability to cope with climate change thus creating what Shue (2014) refers to as “compound injustice” (p. 39).
As IBON (2008) stated, “The environmental consequences of the policies of industrialized nations have also had a detrimental and costly effect on developing countries – especially the poor in those countries – that are already burdened with debt and poverty” (p. 25).
TYPHOONS, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE PHILIPPINES What Causes Typhoons?
Globally, tropical cyclones are the deadliest and most expensive natural hazard and “typhoon”, originating from the Chinese ta (big) and feng (wind), is the term used to describe a tropical cyclone in the northwestern Pacific Ocean (Collett, McDougall, & Thomas, 2017).
Tropical cyclones develop in the northern hemisphere during the months of July to November in an area ranging from 130°-180° East and 5°-15° North (Mei, Xie, Premeau, McWilliams, & Pasquero, 2015).
To develop their rotation, tropical cyclones need to be located at a latitude where the relative speed of the earth’s rotation differs sufficiently between their northern and southern sides; consequently, they usually do not develop or strike within 10° latitude of the equator (Sheppard, Davy, & Pilling, 2009).
Tropical cyclones generally occur over the oceans in regions where sea surface temperatures exceed 26 °C.
Such sea surface temperatures are found mainly in the tropics because solar energy per unit area of the ocean surface is greatest there and declines substantially as one moves away from the equator (Sheppard et al., 2009; Trenberth, 2005).
Tropical cyclones develop when strong clusters of thunderstorms drift over a warm ocean and warm air from these thunderstorms combines with warm air and water vapor from the ocean's surface and rises.
As these clusters of thunderstorms consolidate into one large storm, convergent winds blowing towards the area of low pressure on the ocean surface, along with rotation due to the Coriolis effect, cause the storm to begin spinning (counterclockwise in the northern hemisphere), while rising warm air creates divergence aloft, eventually, the storm will have a low-pressure center (the eye) with no clouds and calm winds, while winds in the eyewall and the outer part of the storm can be extremely strong.
All typhoons have five characteristics: low air pressure, strong winds, cyclonic rotation, heavy rains, and storm surge.
The air pressure reduction associated with a typhoon can cause the sea level to rise by up to 1 cm for every one millibar reduction in air pressure, and instances have been documented where sea levels have risen by 1.5 m due to air pressure reductions alone (Wang, Lee, & Wang, 2005).
This means that when a typhoon strikes land the local sea level will be higher due to the reduction of the atmospheric pressure.
Onshore winds add to the strength of the storm surge and the greatest storm surges, those over 5 m, occur when a typhoon makes landfall during a high tide.
Storm surges are one of the most destructive aspects of a tropical cyclone and are feared by people living in coastal regions (Loy, Sinha, Liew, Tangang, & Husain, 2014).
Since 2009, tropical cyclones have been divided into six categories, 124 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines which are presented in Table 1, and the Western North Pacific basin experiences, on average, 26 named tropical cyclones each year, accounting for about 33% of the global total (Wu & Wang, 2004).
TYPE OF STORM WIND SPEEDS Tropical Depression 63 km/h or lower Tropical Storm Between 63 to 89 km/h Severe Tropical Storm Between 90 to 119 km/h Typhoon Between 120 to 149 km/h Severe Typhoon Between 150 to 190 km/h Super Typhoon Greater than 190 km/h Table 1.
The six categories of tropical storms.
(Abdullah et al., 2015).
Typhoons and the Philippines The Philippines (Figure 1) are an archipelago of 7,100 islands located in Southeast Asia.
In 2017, the population of the archipelago was approximately 105 million people spread over roughly 300,000 km2 of land area generating a population density of 352 people per km2 (Worldometers, 2018).
The Philippines are a country firmly ensconced in the developing world and approximately 26% of all Filipinos live in poverty (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016).
The seas, and life near it, are integral components of life in the archipelago and it has approximately 36,289 km of coastline and 25,000 km2 of coral reefs (Sheppard et al., 2009).
More than 80% of its population live within 50 km of the coast, and much food is grown on land marginally above sea level (Broad & Cavanagh, 2011; Magdaong et al., 2014).
Bagtasa (2017) regards tropical cyclones as “the most destructive hydrometeorological hazards in the Philippines” (p. 3622) and Table 2 lists the ten deadliest tropical cyclones in Philippine history.
Much of the Philippines is at risk from typhoons and each year about 20 of them, equivalent to 25% of the total number of such events in the world, enter Philippine waters with between seven to nine of these making landfall (Cruz et al., 2016).
From 1970 to 2013, 856 tropical cyclones entered Philippine waters and 322 of these were destructive (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, 2014).
Approximately 95% of these typhoons originated in the Pacific Ocean, south and east of the archipelago, between the months of July to November, and they travel in a northwesterly direction mainly affecting the eastern half of the country with the most heavily affected portions of the Philippines being Northern Luzon, the Bicol Peninsula, and Samar.
Although the moisture provided by these storms has a somewhat positive effect (providing between 38 to 47% of the archipelago’s average annual rainfall), their overall effects are profoundly negative setting off landslides, causing severe flooding, and being responsible for more loss of life and property than any other natural hazard.
ASEAS 11(1) | 125 William N. Holden TYPHOON YEAR FATALITIES Haiphong 1881 20,000 Haiyan 2013 6,300 Thelma 1991 5,000 Washi 2011 1,901 Angela 1867 1,800 Winnie 2004 1,600 Fengshen 2008 1,501 1897 Typhoon 1897 1,500 Ike 1984 1,492 Durian 2006 1,399 Bopha 2012 1,268 Table 2.
The eleven deadliest tropical cyclones in Philippine history.
(Bankoff, 2003; Gaillard et al., 2007; Ribera et al., 2008; Soria et al., 2016; Takagi and Esteban, 2016; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2017).
Climate Change and Stronger Typhoons The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is cautious as to whether climate change will cause stronger tropical cyclones stating, “confidence remains low for long-term (centennial) changes in tropical cyclone activity” (Stocker et al., 2013, p. 50) and that globally, “there is low confidence in attribution of changes in tropical cyclone activity to human influence” (Stocker et al., 2013, p.
73.)
The IPCC declared that it has “low confidence” in any basin-scale projections of tropical cyclone intensity (Stocker et al., 2013, p. 88) and gave the tepid prediction that “the frequency of the most intense storms will more likely than not increase in some basins” (Stocker et al., 2013, p. 107).
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the conservative predictions of the IPCC (Text Box 2) a substantial body of scientific literature indicates that climate change is contributing to stronger tropical cyclones and this trend can be expected to continue due to the thermodynamics driving them (Bagtasa, 2017; Camargo, Ting, & Kushnir, 2013; Combest-Friedman, Christie, & Miles, 2012; Elsner, Kossin, & Jagger, 2008; Emanuel, 2005, 2013; Mei et al., 2015; Mei & Xie, 2016; Peduzzi et al., 2012; Rozynski, Hung, & Ostrowski, 2009; Takagi & Esteban, 2016; Takayabu et al., 2015; Trenberth, 2005; Webster, Holland, Curry, & Chang, 2005).
Kerry Emanuel, an atmospheric scientist at Harvard University has written extensively on the impact of climate change on tropical cyclones and has found that stronger tropical cyclones “cannot be written off as mere climate perturbations to which we easily adjust” (Emanuel, 2007, p. 51).
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine are composed of some of the best scientists, engineers, and medical doctors in the United States.
According to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2016), maximum potential tropical cyclone intensities are projected to rise, and future observations of tropical cyclones with intensities substantially higher than those observed in the past are consistent with what is expected in a warming climate.
As the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2016) wrote: 126 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines Tropical Cyclones are projected to become more intense as the climate warms.
There is considerable confidence in this conclusion, as it is found in a wide range of numerical models and also justified by theoretical understanding, particularly because there is a well-established body of theory for the maximum potential intensity of tropical cyclones.
(p. 110) The principal mechanism by which climate change generates stronger typhoons is the higher temperature of the world’s oceans (Bagtasa, 2017).
Emanuel (2007, p. 50) states that tropical cyclones are “responding to warming sea surface temperatures faster than we originally expected.” As the surface of the oceans warms, the oceans provide more energy to convert into tropical cyclones (Elsner et al., 2008).
The higher sea surface temperatures, and increased water vapor, act to increase the energy available for tropical cyclone formation (Trenberth, 2005).
During 2013, for example, sea surface temperatures in the genesis location for North Pacific tropical cyclones exceeded 29 °C, providing ample energy for the formation of Super Typhoon Haiyan (Takagi & Esteban, 2016).
The increase in subsurface sea temperatures occurring over the last 30 years are an important component of how climate change leads to stronger tropical cyclones.
Normally, during a tropical cyclone, the disturbance of the ocean’s surface has an ameliorative effect because it causes an upwelling of cold water from below the surface.
As this cold water upwells, sea surface temperatures decline thus acting as a natural break on tropical cyclone strength.
Such upwelling of cold water can reduce surface temperatures by as much as 9 °C, which is enough to reduce surface water temperatures below that needed for tropical cyclone maintenance (Subrahmanyam, 2015).
One of the first to suggest that climate change may lead to stronger tropical cyclones was Emanuel (1987) who raised this possibility but then discounted it due to “the tendency for strong cyclonic circulations to induce upwelling of cold water” (p. 485).
However, research conducted by Mei et al.
(2015) shows that over the period from 1985 to 2015 there has been a 0.75 °C rise in the temperature of the world’s oceans at a depth of 75 m. Similarly, research conducted by Ortiz et al.
(2016) has shown that by 2100, ocean temperatures will increase by up to 2 °C in the top 100 m of the world’s oceans.
These higher subsurface sea temperatures remove a natural buffer on the strength of tropical cyclones, favor rapid tropical cyclone intensification, and go a long way towards explaining why typhoon intensity from 2005 to 2015 has been, on average, the strongest over the period from 1955 to 2015 (Mei et al., 2015).
According to Mei et al.
(2015), by the end of the 21st century the average tropical storm will increase from being a severe tropical storm to a typhoon, and even typhoons of moderate intensity will increase by 14%.
Takagi and Esteban (2016) predict an increase in the mean maximum tropical cyclone wind speed of between 2 to 11% by the end of the century, in association with deeper low pressures in the core of these systems.
“The strengthened typhoon intensity,” Mei et al., (2015) wrote, “poses heightened threats to human society” (p. 4).
In the opinion of Dr. Wei Mei (interview in La Jolla, California on 4 November 2015), people in the Philippines must be concerned about the intensity of tropical cyclones in the coming future; if he lived in the Philippines he would be very worried about tropical cyclones.
The inhabitants of the archipelago are aware of the risks posed by climate change and typhoons.
Research conducted by ASEAS 11(1) | 127 William N. Holden Combest-Friedman et al.
(2012) shows that Filipinos have perceived that there has been an increase in storm intensity over the 40 years from 1970 to 2010.
The government of the Philippines is also cognizant of the risks posed by amplified tropical cyclones.
In 2010, the Philippine Congress enacted the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (Republic Act 10121), which emphasizes disaster preparedness and mitigation and created the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC) to reduce disaster risks.
Republic Act 10121 mandates all Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities, to have their own Disaster Risk Reduction Management Councils to reduce disaster risks locally.
Amalie Obusan, from Greenpeace Southeast Asia stated (interview in Quezon City on 26 April 2017) she reacts to these predictions “with trepidation” because she has seen what these typhoons can do and the idea of more extreme, and more intense, weather events is very frightening.
When these predictions of stronger typhoons are combined with predictions of sea level rise of between 0.9 to 2.9 m that are expected by the year 2100 their severity increases as a higher sea level generates an even higher storm surge (Brauch, 2012; Church et al., 2013; IBON, 2008).
Indeed, these concerns of rising sea levels appear quite justified in a Philippine context as the islands of the archipelago have experienced above-average increases in sea-level.
Since 1970 mean sea-level readings taken at Legazpi, in the Bicol Peninsula of Luzon (Figure 1), indicate an increase of 200 mm per year (Lander et al., 2014).
While such rates of sea level rise exceed those predicted by climate change and must owe part of their rapid rates to geophysical forces such as land subsidence (or even a tectonic sinking of the Philippine Plate), their consequences are serious.
They could cause the Philippines to lose up to 17% of its land area.
The Philippines, along with the Caribbean and Sundaland, is one of the three places in the world most vulnerable to land loss due to sea-level rise (Bellard, Leclerc, & Courchamp, 2014).
DISCUSSION: CLIMATE INJUSTICE IN THE PHILIPPINES This article argues that the stronger typhoons affecting the Philippines are a manifestation of climate change.
While the IPCC is reluctant to declare that climate change causes stronger typhoons, other authors, such as Bagtasa (2017), Camargo et al.
(2013), Combest-Friedman et al.
(2012), Elsner et al.
(2008), Emanuel (2005, 2007, 2013), Mei et al.
(2015), Mei and Xie (2016), National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2016), Peduzzi et al.
(2012), Rozynski et al.
(2009), Takagi and Esteban (2016), Takayabu et al.
(2015), Trenberth (2005), and Webster et al.
(2005), regard climate change as augmenting typhoon intensity.
If it is assumed that climate change is indeed amplifying typhoon intensity the discussion can proceed to the climate injustice aspects of stronger typhoons.
Enhanced tropical cyclones, wrote Flannery (2005), “have the potential to kill many more people than the largest terrorist attack” (p. 314).
Eight years later, Flannery was (sadly) proven correct when Super Typhoon Haiyan killed more people than were killed on 11 September 2001 (and arguably killed many more people than officially acknowledged).
Climate change amplified typhoons are a departure from the gradually unfolding destruction (slow violence), inherent in climate change.
Climate change usually has consequences, such as gradually receding glaciers, occurring slowly in “unspectacular time” (Nixon, 2011, p. 6).
Spectacularly 128 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines violent tropical storms, however, transcend this slow violence; unlike a gradually retreating glacier, Super Typhoon Haiyan needed no montage of images taken over several decades to reveal the effects of climate changea comparison of pictures from Tacloban taken on 7 and 8 November 2013 would have been enough.
Climate change amplified typhoons move the discussion of climate change from unspectacular time to “spectacular time” (Nixon, 2011, p. 6).
As Flannery (2005, p. 314) wrote, tropical cyclones “focus attention on climate change in a way that few other natural phenomena do”.
At the 19th yearly session of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP 19), held in Warsaw, in the days immediately after Super Typhoon Haiyan, Yeb Sano, the lead negotiator of the Philippine delegation (and a Tacloban resident), called for urgent action on climate change.
Sano then announced that he would commence a fast during COP 19 to be in solidarity with the people of Tacloban (Vidal, 2014).
COUNTRY CO 2 EMISSIONS PER CAPITA Australia 16.3 Canada 13.5 United States of America 16.4 Philippines 1.01 Table 3.
CO 2 emissions per capita, 2013.
(World Bank, 2017).
1 Vanuatu 2 Tonga 3 Philippines 4 Guatemala 5 Bangladesh 6 Solomon Islands 7 Brunei Darussalam 8 Costa Rica 9 Cambodia 10 Papua New Guinea 11 El Salvador 12 Timor-Leste 13 Mauritius 14 Nicaragua 15 Guinea-Bissau … … 121 Australia … … 127 United States of America … … 145 Canada The Philippines have contributed disproportionately less to cause climate change, yet the archipelago is also disproportionately more vulnerable to its effects.
According to Albert Magalang, Head of the Philippine Government’s Department of the Environment and Natural Resources Climate Change Office, and the Designated National Authority for the UNFCCC (interview in Quezon City on 20 April 2017), the Table 4.
The 15 Countries Most at Risk to Climate Change.
(Alliance Development Works, 2016).
ASEAS 11(1) | 129 William N. Holden top three obstacles to negotiating climate change are the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Table 3 displays the 2013 per capita CO 2 emissions in these three countries along with those of the Philippines, demonstrating that Filipinos are responsible for substantially less emissions than the residents of these countries.1 Indeed, to some extent, this data understates the difference in per capita CO 2 emissions between these countries and the Philippines.
This data compares the emissions of all Filipinos with these countries and does not make it clear that the poorest Filipinos have extremely low emissions.
Indeed, it has been estimated that there are 54 million Filipinos who each emit less than 0.42 metric tons of CO 2 per year (Oxfam, 2015).
Table 4 displays the 15 countries most at risk to climate change and the Philippines is behind only Vanuatu and Tonga while Australia, Canada, and the United States are substantially less vulnerable to climate change.
While damage caused by climate change will be more expensive to repair in these countries, they are substantially more affluent and thus are better able to afford repairing such damage.
To Magalang, climate injustice means that climate change impacts are more pronounced in poor communities and in poor countries and those who have done the least to cause the problem bear most of its costs; as Gaspar (2014) wrote: The irony of the world today is in the reality of climate injustice: those most responsible for climate change – owing to affluent lifestyles and wasteful consumption patterns that involve the burning of fossil fuels – are the least affected when climate disasters occur.
When a Yolanda [Haiyan] unleashes its fury, the poor are far more battered and have the least capacity to recover.
(p. 45) The archipelago’s poor are vulnerable because they lack the capacity to absorb and recover (Gaillard et al., 2007; Morin, Ahmad, & Warnitchai, 2016).
“Vulnerability”, Huigen and Jens (2006) state, “is the opposite of resilience, where resilience is low, vulnerability is high and vice versa” (p. 2117).
The vulnerability of a community, such as a coastal Barangay in Tacloban, is determined by class, gender, education levels, and access to resources (Huigen & Jens, 2006).
Bankoff (2003) aptly described the vulnerability of the poor writing: “Vulnerable populations are those at risk, not simply because they are exposed to hazard, but as a result of a marginality that makes their life a ‘permanent emergency’” (p. 12).
The vulnerability of the residents of Samar and Leyte, combined with the ferocity of Haiyan, created a perfect storm of hazard meeting vulnerability – essentially an irresistible force meeting a movable object!
The “socioeconomic vulnerability” of the Eastern Visayas was, wrote IBON (2015), “the single biggest circumstance that caused the damage wrought to be so vast” (p. 12).
In 2012, the last poverty estimates prior to Haiyan, the poverty rate for the Eastern Visayas Region (where Leyte and Samar are located) was 45.2% while the poverty rate for the Philippines was 25.2% (National Statistical Coordination Board, 2013).
The economy of these two islands is based largely on subsistence aquaculture and agriculture.
From 2013 to 2014 this region’s rice production fell by 1.62%, while 1 Other data sources, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018), give substantially higher emissions numbers for Australia, Canada, and the United States but do not provide an emissions estimate for the Philippines.
World Bank data has been used because it provides an estimate for all four countries.
130 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines corn production fell by 5.19%, and inland municipal fish production fell by 2.30% (IBON, 2015).
In 2013, the Eastern Visayas was responsible for 5.40% of all rice produced in the Philippines, 1.20% of all corn, and 3.20% of all inland municipal fish production; by 2014, these shares had fallen to 5.18%, 1.13%, and 2.70% respectively (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2014, 2015).
The affected areas had poor, backward, agrarian economies and were profoundly challenged by Haiyan.
In the words of Gaspar (2014): The Warays have constantly faced hunger, deprivation and powerlessness owing to various factorsslave raiders from the south, oppressive colonization, the vagaries of a tropical climate, the difficulties of producing bountiful harvests despite available fertile lands, the prevalence of schistosomiasis and the tight grip of political dynasties.
Migrants from Samar have flooded Tacloban through the years, hoping to improve their lot, only to find themselves barely able to eke out a living.
(p. 14) Background injustice exists in the Philippines as the archipelago was colonized by Spain (1565 to 1898) and by the United States (1898 to 1946).
The Spanish used the islands as a source of agricultural commodities and to facilitate the trade of precious metals from their New World colonies for Chinese goods on the Manila Galleons, which were built using Filipino forced labor (Francia, 2010).
By the 1890s, much of the archipelago was in what Linn (2000) described as “severe distress, plagued by social tension, disease, hunger, banditry, and rebellion” (p. 16).
In 1898, the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain, as an unintended consequence of the SpanishAmerican War, and ruthlessly repressed an insurgency led by Filipino nationalists during the Philippine-American War of 1899 to 1902 (Linn, 2000).
During this war, the Americans killed more Filipinos in three years than the Spanish killed in 300 (Nadeau, 2008).
American businesses were given an import monopoly in the archipelago while Filipino commodities were given tariff-free access to the United States (Karnow, 1989).
Allowing American manufactured goods tariff-free access to the Philippines stunted the growth of Philippine manufacturing and locked the islands into being an agricultural society dependent on the American market According to Father Edwin Gariguez, the Executive Secretary of the National Secretariat for Social Action, Caritas-Philippines (interview in Tagaytay, Cavite on 26 April 2017), “the Philippines were colonized and exploited and now we need to cope with climate change, which was not caused by us but by our former colonizer”.
Father Meliton Oso, the Social Action Director of the Archdiocese of Jaro stated (interview in Tagaytay, Cavite on 26 April 2017) that climate injustice is: the destruction caused by capitalism and imperialism that cause those who did not cause the problem to suffer the most; the concept of background injustice is very true.
We are ill-prepared and we lack the capacity to cope.
We suffer because of the evil done to the environment by other countries, which compounds our suffering.
ASEAS 11(1) | 131 William N. Holden The opinion of Suyin Jamoralin, the Executive Director of the Citizens Disaster Response Center (interview in Quezon City on 21 April 2017), is that the entire Philippines suffered during American colonization as resources were extracted.
To Jamoralin it seems that, “the Philippines should not be punished for something it did not contribute to.
The industrialized countries should do more to address the problem.
This is very sad and disappointing”.
To Denise Fontanilla, the Climate Policy Coordinator for the Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities (interview in Quezon City on 23 April 2017), one cannot talk about historical responsibility without acknowledging the history of the colonization of the Philippines.
However, one must not overemphasize background injustice when discussing the vulnerability of the archipelago to climate change.
The Philippines has been a sovereign country since 1946 and not all its problems emanate from colonialism; as Amalie Obusan, from Greenpeace Southeast Asia, stated (interview in Quezon City on 26 April 2017): The poverty experienced by the Philippines is not totally the responsibility of the former colonial masters of Spain and the United States.
As a people, we have never managed becoming a prosperous country.
There are just too many political players, there is such a fertile ground for things to be done poorly.
As a people, we have not arrived at a place where there is enough political maturity.
The high levels of inequality in the Philippines are an impediment to widespread prosperity in the archipelago.
“The Philippines,” wrote Yamada and Galat (2014, p. 433), is a nation with severe economic inequalities: the assets of the 25 richest people equal the income of the 73,808,000 poorest.” “If your vision of capitalism is one in which a genetically predestined elite runs everything”, wrote Mason (2012, p. 201), “then the Philippines is the ideal embodiment of it”.
There has been a historical pattern of development in the Philippines known as a “plunder economy” (Broad & Cavanagh, 1993, p. 51).
The archipelago is ruled by an oligarchy “far more concerned about their intertwining networks of family and friends rather than the needs of a people in distress” (Kirk, 2005, p. 20).
This predatory oligarchy has taken control of the state and uses it as a vehicle for furthering its own interests; it has consistently managed natural resources for the benefit of those who control the state.
As Broad (1995, p. 331) wrote about natural resources management in the Philippines: [The] problem in … the Philippines is not a lack of political will but a political will that represents elite … interests.
Policy failure on environmental grounds needs to be grasped for what it isnot an oversight, nor as a faulty judgment.
The direction of public policy … is too often shaped, both directly and indirectly, by those with a vested interest in the continued mismanagement of natural resources.
In other words, one cannot accurately label these as general policy failures or as mismanaged resources.
Rather, they are political successes in managing natural resources for the benefit of the controllers.
The archipelago also suffers from compound injustice because it is a developing country, yet it must now cope with the challenge of climate change.
To Albert 132 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines Magalang (interview in Quezon City on 20 April 2017), those who have done the emitting should support the developing countries with finance, technology transfer, and adaptation.
Historical emissions should always be converted into concrete support that should be given to developing countries to assist them in coping with climate change.
One aspect that has contributed to compound injustice in the islands has been the embrace of neoliberalism by various Philippine governments.
Neoliberalism can be defined as “a theory of political economic practices [proposing] that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2).
From 1992 to 2016, governments have adopted neoliberal policies promoting large-scale mining, industrial shrimp farming, timber harvesting, and agribusiness plantations (Holden, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015).
The environmental degradation caused by these activities (such as the removal of mangrove forests for shrimp farms, run-off from deforested hillsides that covers coral reefs, or the chemical wastes from mining that also kills corals) all reduce resilience to the amplified typhoons expected with climate change (Broad & Cavanagh, 1993; Holden, 2015; Primavera et al., 2016).
To Father Edwin Gariguez (interview in Tagaytay, Cavite on 26 April 2017), the most glaring localized environmental degradation is the prolific expansion of large-scale mining.
Mining causes deforestation, gives off chemical poisons, removes overburden, and has a tremendous impact on indigenous peoples and farmers.
Much mining occurs within critical watersheds and causes flooding.
When mining is combined with climate change it increases the destruction caused by climate change.
Suyin Jamoralin stated (interview in Quezon City on 21 April 2017) that illegal logging is a substantial contributor to a lack of resilience, there have been a lot of disasters because of illegal logging; the effects of mining are also not insignificant.
Big companies, who are only interested in profit, are conducting the mining.
Amalie Obusan, from Greenpeace Southeast Asia, indicated (interview in Quezon City, Philippines on 26 April 2017) that she regards the types of localized environmental degradation that can weaken resilience to climate change more than deforestation and mining.
Paul Yang-Ed, a member of Agham Youth, articulated his view (interview in Quezon City on 22 April 2017) that logging, mining, and plantation agriculture for exports reduce resilience to climate change – the latter does so by creating monocultures and reducing genetic diversity.
One may ask why developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States (cited as the top three obstacles to negotiating climate change by Albert Magalang) are so reluctant to reduce their emissions?
Canada, as recently as 2015, had a government that openly disregarded the significance of climate change (Dearden & Mitchell, 2016).
Canada has been reluctant to make the transition to a low carbon economy because it is among the few countries that might conceivably (at least in the short term) benefit from a warming climate as crops may be grown further north and the loss of Arctic sea ice opens new fuel and mineral resources for exploitation; Canada also has large supplies of oil in its tar sands, which themselves require large amounts of energy to extract, and thus generate large CO 2 emissions (Rodgers, 2016).
The undue attention given by the media in these countries to climate change skeptics, and the media’s discussion of climate change as a theory (as if it is not scientifically proven), manufactures uncertainty about climate change (Vanderheiden, 2008).
ASEAS 11(1) | 133 William N. Holden Owen Migraso, an environmental activist with the Center for Environmental Concerns (interview in Quezon City on 25 April 2017) expressed familiarity with the concept of manufacturing consent, developed by Herman and Chomsky (1988/ 2002), and believes that people in developed countries do not want to reduce fossil fuel use because their consent for high emission activities has been manufactured.
According to Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002, p. xi) “the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them”.
These interests include coal and oil companies who have substantial control over what is said on media outlets by purchasing advertisements.
The media in Australia, Canada, and the United States are reluctant to discuss climate change, and earn the displeasure of fossil-fuel interests, and will accord climate change skeptics equal air time with mainstream climate scientists without assessing the qualifications of these skeptics (Dearden & Mitchell, 2016).
This exemplifies how the media not only allows these disinformation sources to prevail but also protects them against disclosures revealing their dubious credentials (Herman & Chomsky, 1988/2002).
Residents in Australia, Canada, and the United States also benefit from an ability to distance themselves from the simple facts of their own existence (Goodell, 2006).
Residents in these developed countries tend to enjoy a prosperous life based upon the extensive use of fossil fuels.
Indeed, the idea that fossil fuels are an indispensable condition for prosperity has become so well entrenched in these countries that Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony may be used to describe this attitude.
To Gramsci (1971), when a concept becomes unequivocally accepted it can be said to be hegemonic.
Once this occurs, the concept will never be challenged, and it will operate as guiding principle controlling all thought processes.
These fossil fuels impart CO 2 emissions into the atmosphere, which have their impact upon those in distant places (such as Tacloban) who may be thrust into the media spotlight for a week or so after events (such as Super Typhoon Haiyan) and are then forgotten as attention returns to ensuring the prosperity of these developed countries.
In this regard, it may be thoughtful to consider the words of Othelia Versoza, a survivor of Super Typhoon Haiyan who stated (interview in Tacloban City on 21 December 2016), “The capitalists of the developed countries only think about the rich people of the world who can buy their products while the rest of the world are only their slaves”.
Versoza feels that she is one of the “slaves of the developed world” and developed countries are getting rich by emitting greenhouse gases when they should be providing funds to help people affected by climate change.
CONCLUSION This article has approached the issue of climate injustice by using political ecology, a field that facilitates a study of ecological distribution conflicts and the political ecology of hazards.
Ecological distribution conflicts are conflicts about accessing the benefits obtainable from natural resources and the environment.
The ability of the atmosphere to absorb CO 2 is a natural resource and much of this absorptive capacity has been taken up by the developed countries of the world and, consequently, they are disproportionately more responsible for climate change.
The political ecology of hazards is applicable as this article has argued that the stronger typhoons affecting 134 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines the Philippines are a manifestation of climate change.
The IPCC is unenthusiastic about such a conclusion, but other authors, as discussed in this article, regard stronger typhoons to be a corollary of climate change.
The relevance of this article can be shown by the discussion at the Decarbonizing South East Asia Forum attended by the author on 25 April 2017 at the University of the Philippines Diliman, in Quezon City.
This was a forum attended by members of civil society organizations from across Southeast Asia who were gathering simultaneously with an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Manila.
At this forum the participants called on their respective governments to challenge the governments of the developed world to reduce their CO 2 emissions.
The participants were mindful of the threats that climate change poses to Southeast Asia, as demonstrated by Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013.
They called for their governments to put pressure on developed countries to reduce their emissions as soon as possible, as well as for the developed world to provide mitigation and adaptation.
The main argument that emerged was that the nations of Southeast Asia did not cause the problem of climate change but, as the world progresses further into the 21st Century, they will disproportionately bear its consequences.
As humanity progresses further into a world affected by climate change, what happened in Tacloban in 2013 shows how those who have caused climate change must assist those who have not caused the problem and stand only to be hurt by it.
Ultimately, as humans we only have one planet and all of humanity must share this planet.
In the words of Pope Francis (2015, p. 125), “reducing greenhouse gases requires honesty, courage, and responsibility, above all on the part of those countries which are more powerful and pollute the most”.
Text Box 1.
Increased Solar Radiance as a Cause of Climate Change An explanation of climate change frequently cited by climate change sceptics is the claim that solar radiation is increasingessentially a claim that the sun is getting more powerful.
This is relevant to tropical cyclones as the principal impetus for their formation are the high levels of solar energy received by the ocean’s surface in tropical latitudes.
Demonstrating that solar radiance is increasing requires evidence that Earth is receiving fewer cosmic rays from space.
When cosmic rays enter the atmosphere, they interact with it and create new types of atoms including beryllium-10.
When the sun is more active, solar radiation protects Earth from cosmic rays and less beryllium-10 falls on Earth; conversely, a less active sun allows more beryllium-10 to fall on Earth.
During the current warm period, ice cores taken from Antarctica and Greenland show little, if any, change in beryllium-10 over thousands of years and they do not show the marked decrease in beryllium-10 indicative of increased solar radiance (Alley, 2000).
Indeed, the number of cosmic rays reaching Earth’s atmosphere are now at near record high levels thus indicating that Earth is currently experiencing historically low levels of solar activity (Lean, 2010; Lockwood, 2010).
Lockwood (2010) argues that “the popular idea that solar changes are some kind of alternative to greenhouse gas forcing in explaining the rise in surface temperatures has no credibility with almost all climate scientists” (p. 323).
Text Box 1.
Increased Solar Radiance as a Cause of Climate Change ASEAS 11(1) | 135 William N. Holden  REFERENCES Abdullah K., Anukklarmphai, A., Kawasaki, T., & Neopmuceno, D. (2015).
A tale of three cities: Water disaster policy responses in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Metro Manila.
Water Policy, 17(S1), 89-113.
Agarwal, A., & Narain, S. (1991).
Global warming in an unequal world.
New Delhi: Center for Science and Environment.
Alley, R. (2000).
The two-mile time machine: Ice cores, abrupt climate change, and our future.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Alliance Development Works (2016).
World risk report 2016.
Berlin: Alliance Development Works.
Bagtasa, G. (2017).
Contribution of tropical cyclones to rainfall in the Philippines.
Journal of Climate, 30(10), 3621-3633.
Bankoff, G. (2003).
Cultures of disaster: Society and natural hazard in the Philippines.
London: Routledge.
Bell, D. (2013).
How should we think about climate justice?
Environmental Ethics, 35(2), 189-208.
Bellard, C., Leclerc, C., & Courchamp, F. (2014).
Impact of sea level rise on the 10 insular biodiversity hotspots.
Global Ecology and Biogeography, 23(2), 203-212.
Brauch, H. G. (2012).
Policy responses to climate change in the Mediterranean and MENA Region during the Anthropocene.
In Scheffran et al.
(Eds.
), Climate change, human security and violent conflict (pp.
719794).
Berlin: Springer.
Broad, R. (1995).
The political economy of natural resources: Case studies of the Indonesian and Philippine forest sectors.
The Journal of Developing Areas, 29(3): 317-340.
Broad, R., & Cavanagh, J.
(1993).
Plundering paradise: The struggle for the environment in the Philippines.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Broad, R., & Cavanagh, J.
(2011).
Reframing development in the age of vulnerability: From case studies of the Philippines and Trinidad to new Measures of rootedness.
Third World Quarterly, 32(6), 1127-1145.
Camargo, S.J., Ting, M.F., & Kushnir, Y.
(2013).
Influence of local and remote SST on North Atlantic tropical cyclone potential intensity.
Climate Dynamics, 40(5-6), 1515-1529.
Text Box 2.
Lowest Common Denominator Science at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) The lack of confidence expressed by the IPCC with respect to whether climate change will generate stronger typhoons is an example of what Flannery (2005) describes as its tendency to engage in “lowest common denominator science” (p. 246).
The operations of the IPCC demonstrate how the fossil fuel industry uses proxies to tone down, and slow down, its work.
Although the fossil fuel industry is not directly represented at the IPCC it acquires a voice through the government appointees of fossil fuel dependent nations, such as those in the Middle East and the United States.
When the IPCC issues any form of statement the world’s largest oil exporter (Saudi Arabia), the world’s largest oil user (the United States), and the world’s largest coal burner (China) are eager to water down wording and slow progress.
This imparts a tendency into the IPCC to always avoid any alarming or overly dramatic declarations.
According to Flannery (2005), “the pronouncements of the IPCC do not represent main stream science, nor even good science, but lowest common denominator science” (p. 246).
Shue (2014) echoes Flannery and regards “the conservative estimates made by the IPCC” to be a result of “the need to reach consensus on its reports” (p. 288).
Text Box 2.
Lowest Common Denominator Science at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 136 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines Cardenas, M.B., Bennett, P.C., Zamora, P.B., Befus, K.M., Rodolfo, R.S., Cabria, H.B., & Lapus, M.R.
(2015).
Devastation of aquifers from tsunami-like storm surge by super typhoon Haiyan.
Geophysical Research Letters, 42(8), 2844-2851.
Church, J.A.
et al.
(2013).
Sea level change.
In T.F.
Stocker et al.
(Eds.
), Climate change 2013: The physical science basis (pp.
1137-1216).
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, N., Chhotray, V., & Few, R. (2013).
Global justice and disasters.
The Geographical Journal, 179(2), 105-113.
Collett, A., McDougall, R., & Thomas S. (2017).
Tracking the literature of tropical weather.
In A. Collett, R. McDougall, & S. Thomas (Eds.
), Tracking the literature of tropical weather: Typhoons, hurricanes, and cyclones (pp.
1-25).
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Combest-Friedman, C., Christie, P., & Miles E. (2012).
Household perceptions of coastal hazards and climate change in the central Philippines.
Journal of Environmental Management, 112(1), 137-148.
Cruz, et al.
(2016).
The Philippine climate.
In Villarin, J. T. et al.
(Eds.
), 2016 Philippine climate assessment: The physical science basis (pp.
19-28).
Quezon City: The Oscar M. Lopez Center of Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management Foundation.
Dearden P., & Mitchell, B.
(2016).
Environmental change and challenge: A Canadian perspective (5th ed.).
Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press.
De Buys, W. (2011).
A great aridness: Climate change and the future of the American Southwest.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Elsner, J.
B., Kossin, J.P., & Jagger, T. H. (2008).
The increasing intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones.
Nature, 455(7209), 92-95.
Emanuel, K. A.
(1987).
The dependence of hurricane intensity on climate.
Nature, 326(6112), 483-485.
Emanuel, K. A.
(2005).
Increasing destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years.
Nature, 436(4), 686-688.
Emanuel, K. (2007).
What we know about climate change.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Emanuel, K. A.
(2013).
Downscaling CMIP5 climate models shows increased tropical cyclone activity over the 21st century.
Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Sciences 110 (30), 12219-12224.
Esteban, M., Valenzuela, V. P., Matsumaru, R., Mikami, T., Shibayama, T., Takagi, H., ... & De Leon, M. (2016).
Storm surge awareness in the Philippines prior to typhoon Haiyan: A Comparative analysis with Tsunami awareness in recent times.
Coastal Engineering Journal, 58(1), 1-28.
Flannery, T. (2005).
The weathermakers: How we are changing the climate and what it means for life on Earth.
Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers.
Francia, L. H. (2010).
A history of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos.
New York: Overlook Press.
Gaillard, J. C., Liamzon, C.C., & Villanueva, J.D.
(2007).
Natural disaster.
A retrospect into the causes of the late-2004 typhoon disaster in Eastern Luzon, Philippines.
Environmental Hazards, 7(4), 257-270.
Gaspar, K. (2014).
Desperately seeking God’s saving action: Yolanda survivors’ hope beyond heartbreaking lamentations.
Manila: The Institute of Spirituality in Asia.
Gillett, N. P., Arora, V. K., Zickfeld, K., Marshall, S. J.
& Merryfield, W. J.
(2011).
Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions.
Nature Geoscience 4(1), 83-87.
Goodell, J.
(2006).
Big coal: The dirty secret behind America’s energy future.
New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Gramsci, A.
(1971).
Selections from the prison notebooks.
New York: International Publishers.
Hariharan, S.V., Kareem, P.A., Tandon, R., & Ziesemer, T. (2017).
Climate justice and policy.
Delhi: B.R.
Publishing Corporation.
Harvey, D. (2005).
A brief history of neoliberalism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herman, E.S.
& Chomsky, N. (1988/2002).
Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media.
New York: Pantheon Books.
Holden, W. N. (2012).
Ecclesial opposition to large-scale mining on Samar: Neoliberalism meets the church of the poor in a wounded land.
Religions, 3(3), 833-861.
ASEAS 11(1) | 137 William N. Holden Holden, W. N. (2013).
Neoliberal mining amid El Niño induced drought in the Philippines.
Journal of Geography and Geology, 5(1), 58-77.
Holden, W. N. (2014).
The New People's Army and neoliberal mining in the Philippines: A struggle against primitive accumulation.
Capitalism Nature Socialism, 25(3), 61-83.
Holden, W. N. (2015).
Mining amid typhoons: Large-scale mining and typhoon vulnerability in the Philippines.
The Extractive Industries and Society, 2 (3),445-461.
Huigen, M. G. A., & Jens, I.C.
(2006).
Socio-economic impact of Super Typhoon Harurot in San Mariano, Isabela, the Philippines.
World Development, 34(12), 2116-2136.
IBON (2008).
IBON primer on climate change.
Quezon City: IBON.
IBON (2015).
Disaster upon disaster: Lessons beyond Yolanda.
Quezon City: IBON.
Karnow, S. (1989).
In our image: America’s empire in the Philippines.
New York: Ballantine Books.
Kirk, D. (2005).
Philippines in crisis: US power versus local revolt.
Manila: Anvil Publishing.
Lander, M., Guard, C., & Camargo, S.J.
(2014).
Super typhoon Haiyan.
In state of the climate in 2013.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 95(7), S112-S114.
Lean, J.L.
(2010).
Cycles and trends in solar irradiance and climate.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(1), 111-122.
Linn, B. M. (2000).
The Philippine war: 1899-1902.
Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press.
Lockwood, M. (2009).
Solar change and climate: An update in the light of the current exceptional solar minimum.
Proceedings of the Royal Society A, 466 (2114), 303-329.
Loy, K. C., Sinha, P. C., Liew, J., Tangang, F., & Husain, M. L. (2014).
Modeling storm surge associated with super typhoon Durian in South China Sea.
Natural Hazards, 70(1), 23-37.
Magdaong, E. T., et al.
(2014).
Long-term change in coral cover and the effectiveness of marine protected areas in the Philippines: A meta-analysis.
Hydrobiologia, 733(1), 5-17.
Mason, P. (2012).
Why it’s kicking off everywhere: The New Global Revolutions.
London: Verso.
Martinez-Alier, J.
(2002).
The environmentalism of the poor: A study of ecological conflicts and valuation.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Mei, W., Xie, S. P., Premeau, F., McWilliams, J. C., & Pasquero, C. (2015).
Northwestern Pacific typhoon intensity controlled by changes in ocean temperatures.
Science Advances, 4(1), 1-8.
Mei, W. & S. P. Xie.
(2016).
Intensification of landfalling typhoons over the northwest Pacific since the late 1970s.
Nature Geoscience, 9(10), 753-757.
Morin, V. M., Ahmad, M. M., Warnitchai, P. (2016).
Vulnerability to typhoon hazards in the coastal informal settlements of Metro Manila, the Philippines.
Disasters, 40 (4), 693-719.
Motesharrei, S., Rivas, J., Kalnay, E., Asrar, G. R., Busalacchi, A. J., Cahalan, R. F., ... & Hubacek, K (2016).
Modeling sustainability: Population, inequality, consumption, and bidirectional coupling of the Earth and human systems.
National Science Review, 3, 470-494.
Nadeau, K. M. (2008).
The history of the Philippines.
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2016).
Attribution of extreme weather events in the context of climate change.
Washington: The National Academies Press.
National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (2014).
It happened: Learning from Typhoon Yolanda.
Quezon City: National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council.
National Statistical Coordination Board (2013).
2012 Full year official poverty statistics Quezon City: National Statistical Coordination Board.
Nixon, R. (2011).
Slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor.
London: Harvard University Press.
Oreskes, N. (2004).
The scientific consensus on climate change.
Science, 306(5702), 1686.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2018).
Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AIR_GHG Accessed 1 April 2018 Ortiz, A. M., et al.
(2016).
Global changes in climate.
In Villarin, J. T. et al.
(Eds.
), 2016 Philippine climate assessment: The physical science basis (pp.
4-17).
Quezon City: The Oscar M. Lopez Center of Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management Foundation.
138 | ASEAS 11(1) Typhoons, Climate Change, and Climate Injustice in the Philippines Oxfam, (2015).
Extreme carbon inequality: Why the Paris climate deal must put the poorest, lowest emitting and most vulnerable people first.
Retrieved from https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/extreme-carboninequality Accessed 18 September 2017 Peduzzi, P., Chatenoux, B., Dao, H., De Bono, A., Herold, C., Kossin, J., Mouton, F., & Nordbeck, O.
(2012).
Global trends in tropical cyclone risk.
Nature Climate Change, 2 (4), 289-294.
Philippine Statistics Authority (2014).
Selected statistics on agriculture 2013.
Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority.
Philippine Statistics Authority (2015).
Selected statistics on agriculture 2014.
Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority.
Philippine Statistics Authority (2016).
Official poverty statistics of the Philippines: Full year 2015.
Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority.
Pope Francis.
(2015).
Laudato Si: On care for our common home.
Vatican City: Vatican.
Retrieved from http:// w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclicalaudato-si.html Primavera, J. H., de la Cruz, M., Montilijao, C., Consunji, H., de la Paz, M., Rollon, R. N., Maranan, K., Samson, M. S., & Blanco, A.
(2016).
Preliminary assessment of post-Haiyan mangrove damage and short-term recovery in Eastern Samar, central Philippines.
Marine Pollution Bulletin, 109(2), 744-750.
Ribera, P., Garcia-Herrera, & Gimeno, L. (2008).
Historical deadly typhoons in the Philippines.
Weather, 63(7), 1-6.
Rodgers, P. (2016).
Irregular war: ISIS and the new threat from the margins.
London: IB Tauris.
Rozynski, G., Hung, N. M., & Ostrowski, R. (2009).
Climate change related rise of extreme typhoon power and duration over South-East Asia seas.
Coastal Engineering Journal, 51(3), 205-222.
Scripps Institution of Oceanography (2018).
The keeling curve.
Retrieved from https://scripps.ucsd.edu/ programs/keelingcurve/ Sheppard, C. R., Davy, S. K., & Pilling, G. M. (2009).
The biology of coral reefs.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shue, H. (2014).
Climate justice: Vulnerability and protection.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soria, J. L. A., Switzer, A. D., Villanoy, C. L., Fritz, H. M., Bilgera, P. H. T., Cabrera, O. C., ... & Fernandez, I. Q.
(2016).
Repeat storm surge disasters of Typhoon Haiyan and its 1897 predecessor in the Philippines.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, January 2016, 31-48.
Stocker, T.F., Q. Dahe, & G.K. Plattner.
(2013).
Sum mary.
In: Climate Change 2013: The physical science basis.
Contribution of working group I to the fifth assess ment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (pp.
33-115), In T. F. Stocker et al.
(Eds.
), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Subrahmanyam, M. V. (2015).
Impact of typhoon on the north-west Pacific sea surface temperature: A case study of Typhoon Kaemi (2006).
Natural Hazards, 78(1), 569-582.
Takagi, H., Esteban, M., Shibayama, T., Mikami, T., Matsumaru, R., De Leon, M., Thao, N. D., Oyama, T., & Nakamura, R. (2015).
Track analysis, simulation, and field survey of the 2013 typhoon Haiyan storm surge.
Journal of Flood Risk Management, 8(4), 1-11.
Takagi, H., & Esteban, M. (2016).
Statistics of tropical cyclone landfalls in the Philippines: Unusual characteristics of 2013 typhoon Haiyan.
Natural Hazards, 80(1), 211-222.
Takayabu, I. et al.
(2015).
Climate change effects on the worst-case storm surge: A case study of typhoon Haiyan.
Environmental Research Letters, 10(6), 1-9.
Tetreault, D. (2017).
Three forms of political ecology.
Ethics and the Environment, 22(2), 1-23.
Trenberth, K. (2005).
Uncertainty in hurricanes and global warming.
Science, 308(5729), 1753-1754.
Vanderheiden, S. (2008).
Atmospheric justice: A political theory of climate change.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vidal, J.
(2014).
Yeb Sano: Unlikely climate justice star.
The Guardian.
Retrieved from https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/01/yeb-sano-typhoon-haiyan-un-climate-talks Accessed 21 October 2016.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2017).
Retrieved from https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_phl_destructive_typhoons_2006_to_2016.pdf ASEAS 11(1) | 139 William N. Holden United States Global Change Research Program.
(2017).
2017 Climate science special report: Fourth national climate assessment, Volume I. Washington: U.S.
Global Change Research Program.
Wang, Y. H., Lee, I. H. & Wang, D.P.
(2005).
Typhoon induced extreme coastal surge: A case study at northeast Taiwan in 1994.
Journal of Coastal Research 21 (3), 548-552.
Webster, P. J., Holland, G. J., Curry, J.
A., & Chang, H. R. (2005).
Changes in tropical cyclone number, duration, and intensity in a warming environment.
Science, 309(5742), 1844-1846.
World Bank (2017).
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC.
Worldometers (2018).
Population of the Philippines.
Retrieved from http://www.worldometers.info/ world-population/population-by-country.
Wu, L. & Wang, B.
(2004).
Assessing impacts of global warming on tropical cyclone tracks.
Journal of Climate, 17(8), 1686-1698.
Yamada, S. & Galat, A.
(2014).
Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan and climate justice.
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 8(5), 432-435.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR William Holden is an Associate Professor in the Department of Geography/Program of Environmental Science at the University of Calgary, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
His research interests include: the Philippines, the meteorological hazards of anthropogenic climate change, the efficacy of mining as a development strategy, insurgency/counterinsurgency warfare, state terrorism, and the roles played by liberation theology and Maoism as counter hegemonic discourses in the 21st century.
► Contact: wnholden@ucalgary.ca ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank the University of Calgary’s Faculty of Arts and the Philippine government’s Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for their financial assistance that made researching this article possible.
The author would also like to thank all of those who so generously provided their time to be interviewed.
Lastly, the author would like to thank Regina “Gina” Lopez for all her assistance during her time as DENR Secretary.
116 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Climate Change Awareness of the Community Officials in the Municipality of Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte: Gear towards Vulnerability and Adaption GARY C. GARCIA garychmich@yahoo.com.ph ORCID No.
0000-0001-6528-2967 Southern Leyte State University-San Juan Campus, 6611 San Juan, Southern Leyte, Philippines ABSTRACT Eastern Visayas is constantly experiencing a series of calamities since the tragic mudslide in the community of Guinsaugon Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte in 2006.
As a result, the state of calamity declared in almost every part the country due to heavy rains that devastated agriculture, livestock and properties.
This study was conducted to assess the level of the community officials’ related awareness on climate change, more particular on its cause and effect, thought and belief, and the course of action through community ordinances related to climate change.
The study utilizes the descriptive survey method of research.
Data was analyzed and interpreted using weighted mean and percentages to describe the level of awareness of the elected officials towards climate change.
Majority agreed that climate change is happening and presently affecting the people in the community.
Thought of respondents towards climate change is highly coupled with religious thinking.
Actual state of affairs (situation) is the priority of the community officials leading to the inaccurate expectation of the long term effect of climate change.
Community officials’ awareness Vol.
12 · March 2013 Print ISSN 2012-3981 • Online ISSN 2244-0445 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v12i1.217 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research is produced by PAIR, an ISO 9001:2008 QMS certified by AJA Registrars, Inc. 117 International Peer Reviewed Journal on the causes and effect of climate change is observable but limited on vulnerability and adaptation.
Thus, additional exposure and depth understanding on climate change is recommended.
Keywords Climate change, awareness, political and social responsibilities, descriptive-survey, Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte, Philippines INTRODUCTION Climate change is an area that is currently in dire need of a wide range of publicity and other measures in order to mitigate its effect on the society (Ekpho, Ekpho, 2011).
The Philippines has experienced temperature spikes brought about by climate change.
It has been observed that warming is experienced most in the northern and southern regions of the country while Metro Manila has warmed less than most parts.
Hot days and hot nights have become more frequent than before.
Extreme weather events have also occurred more frequently since 1980.
These include deadly and damaging typhoons, floods, landslides, severe El Niño and La Niña events, drought, and forest fires.
Adversely affected sectors include agriculture, freshwater, coastal and marine resources and health (The Eastern Visayas Climate Project Forum, 2012).
Eastern Visayas is constantly experiencing a series of calamity since the tragic mudslide in the community of Guinsaugon, Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte in 2006.
First quarter of 2012, the state of calamity once again was declared in the municipality due to heavy rains that devastated agriculture, livestock and properties.
For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the Community Chieftain, Youth Council Members and members of Peace and Order Committee in each Barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions (The Local Government Code of the Philippines, Section 38).
Servant-leadership incorporates the ideals of empowerment, total quality, team building, and participatory management, and the service ethic into a leadership philosophy.
In the words of the Greenleaf Center for Servant-Leadership (1997, p. 4), this model of leadership emphasizes “increased service to others; a holistic approach to work; promoting a sense of community; and the sharing of power in decision making.” Servant-leaders must be valueand character-driven people who are performance and process oriented.
A servant-leader may be defined as a leader whose primary purpose for leading is to serve others by investing in their development and well being for the benefit of accomplishing tasks and goals for the common good.
118 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Good leaders know how to protect the community in times of disaster, with the ability to guide his people to overcome problems.
For this, community officials are expected to be aware more of the recent events and issues that have implication in the life of its people.
FRAMEWORK Vulnerability = degree to which a system or species is susceptible or unable to cope with adverse effect of climate change.
Climate Change Adaptation = an adjustment in natural or human system in response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects which moderate harm or exploits benefit opportunities.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY This study intends to assess the level of awareness of the community officials’ related awareness on climate change, more particular on its cause and effect, thought and belief, and the course of action through community ordinances related to climate change.
Result will be utilized as baseline information for vulnerability and adaptation.
119 International Peer Reviewed Journal METHODOLOGY The study utilized the descriptive survey method of research.
The proponents personally administered the conduct of the survey with elected officials of the selective coastal and upland communities in the municipality of Saint Bernard as respondents.
Data was analyzed and interpreted using weighted mean, percentages, to describe the level of awareness of the elected officials towards climate change.
The researcher presents the proposal before the municipal council meeting and secured permissions from the Local Government Unit through the municipal mayor.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Demographic Profile of the Community Officials As observed in Table 1, more than half of the respondents are male, 72% are married.
As to their educational background, 32 are able to attend/finished Secondary course, 23 in college, and 12 in elementary.
The respondents are composed of 8 community captains, 43 community officials, 6 youth council chairman, and 10 youth councilors.
Majority are in less than one year experience in terms of service.
Table 1.
The Demographic profile of the community officials Sex Male Female 43 24 Civil Status Single Married Separated Widow 14 48 2 3 Age 15-17 18-33 34-49 50-65 Over 65 3 13 29 22 1 Highest level of education No formal Elementary Secondary College 0 12 32 23 Number of years in the community Less than one year 1-19 years 20-39 years Over 40 years 10 25 32 Current position Brgy.
Chairman Brgy.
Councilor SK Chairman SK Councilor 8 43 6 10 Number of years in service Less than one year 1-19 years 20-39 years Over 40 years 37 17 5 8 120 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Community Officials Level of Awareness on Climate Change As reflected in item 2, all of the community officials have heard about climate change.
Most (33%) signifies that they learned climate change through watching Television, 19% from school, 13% from news paper, 12% through conversation with family members, 9% from internet, 8% from a book and another 6% from word of mouth.
Kapoor (2011) in his study entitled “Awareness of the Rural People about Environment Protection through Mass Media” exposed that television and radio were the most preferred information tools in environmental awareness, utilized by 39.5% and 26 % of the respondents respectively.
Table 2.
The community official awareness on climate change.
1.
Had you heard about climate change?
Frequency Percentage 1.1 yes 67 100% 1.2 no 0 0% 2.
How did you hear about climate change?
2.1 searching the internet 6 9% 2.2 at school 13 19% 2.3 at home (through conversations with family members) 8 12% 2.4 from a TV program 22 33% 2.5 from a book 5 7% 2.6 from a newspaper 9 13% 2.7 word of mouth 4 6% 2.8 I have never heard about it 67 100% Thought on Climate Change Table 3 shows respondents thought on climate change.
As shown in item 1, 97 % agreed that the government has already consulted community officials in identifying areas of concern about climate change.
More than 80 % are of the same mind in items 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 that climate change is happening, presently affecting the people in the community, and every individual can do something to adopt climate change.
The majority of the respondents agreed that living for today is more important than worrying about the effects of climate change in 50 years.
121 International Peer Reviewed Journal The last decade has been marked by growing public concern and widespread media coverage surrounding the possibility of Global Warming due to an increased green house effect.
To a significant degree, the effectiveness with which society responds to this possibility depends on how well it is understood by the individual citizen (Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, Read, 1994).
Despite of, majority are in favor in item 2.5 that climate change will reduce the quality of life of children in the future.
Responses in items 2.6 and 2.7 reflect strong religious implication.
Hence, 42% of the respondents agree in the statements; there is religious significance to climate change and climate change is a natural occurrence.
Captivatingly, respondents’ responses on item 5.2 of table 3 suggest that they need more information/knowledge on how to stop climate change.
Table 3.
Community officials thought on climate change Thought on Climate Change A D N 1.
The local government has already consulted us to enable us to identify our areas of concern about Climate Change.
65 0 2 2.
What are your thoughts about the following statements about Climate Change?
2.1 Climate Change is happening 59 3 5 2.2 Climate Change is affecting the people of this community already 60 2 5 2.3 Every individual can do something to adapt to climate change 55 2 10 2.4 Living for today is more important than worrying about the effects of Climate Change in 50 years time 39 17 11 2.5 Climate Change will reduce the quality of life of my children & grandchildren in the future 57 6 4 2.6 There is religious significance to Climate Change 28 19 20 2.7 climate change is a natural occurrence 28 28 11 2.8 I am seriously concerned with what Climate Change may bring 50 6 1 3.
What do you think are the causes of climate change f % rank 3.1 Burning Fossils eg Coal, Gas, Oil, Petrol 46 69% 2 3.2 Deforestation (Kaingin, Logging) 54 81% 1 3.3 Don’t Know 0 0% 4 3.4 Other (please note all ideas) 3.4.1 Improper disposal of garbage and waste materials 6 9% 3 122 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research 4.
How is global climate change negatively impacting your quality of life?
f % rank 4.1 High fuel prices 19 28% 4 4.2 High energy costs 24 36% 3 4.3 High commodity cost 28 42% 2 4.4 Drought conditions affect crop yield (rice, camote, etc.)
38 57% 1 4.5 Fires threaten home and/or business 9 13% 6 4.6 Family pressure to alter lifestyle 5 7% 7 4.7 Job loss due to low crop yield 15 22% 5 5.
Which statement describes your position best f % rank 5.1 I am well-informed what I personally can do to stop climate change 22 33% 2 5.2 I am not very well-informed but I would like to learn how I can help to stop climate change 44 66% 1 5.3 I believe that climate change problem is exaggerated and it doesn’t need urgent solution (at least my personal participation is not needed at all) 1 1% 3 Community Ordinances Related to Climate Change Table 4 shows the distribution of existing community ordinances related to climate change ranked according to the number of times reflected in the questionnaire.
Rank 1 is the ordinance on solid waste management; total log band, reforestation, and illegal fishing tied in rank 2; followed by (rank 3) the ordinance regulating rice farmers not to burn rice straws, panicles and the like; next is rank 4, coastal resource management; rank 5 anti smoking; rank 6 illegal quarrying; and the last are the clean and green ordinance.
“Massive land conversion, long-term deforestation, mining in island ecosystems and forests and lack of solid waste management are just some of the culprits,” TCRP disaster risk reduction and management expert Miguel Magalang said.
Climate change and Philippine forests are directly linked to each other.
Changes in climate are affecting the forests and its ability to deliver its environmental services.
In the same manner, degradation of the forest resources results to emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere which contributes to climate change (The Journal of Environmental Science and Management, 2010).
123 International Peer Reviewed Journal Table 4.
The list of existing local ordinances on climate change Ordinances frequency rank 1.
Solid Waste Management / RA 9003 38 1 2.
Total Log Band and Reforestation 27 2 3.
Protection of Fish Sanctuary, Illegal Fishing 27 2 4.
Regulating the rice farmers not to burn rice straws, panicles and others 13 3 5. coastal resource management 10 4 6.
Anti Smoking /RA 8749 8 5 7. illegal quarrying 7 6 8.
Clean and Green 5 7 Most respondents signify that they learned climate change through watching television.
Result shows that the government has already consulted community officials in identifying areas of concern about climate change.
Majority agreed that climate change is happening and presently affecting the people in the community.
They believed that every individual can do something to adopt climate change.
However, equivalent to 58% agreed that living for today is more important than worrying about the effects of climate change in 50 years.
Despite of, majority are in favor that climate change will reduce the quality of life of children in the future.
Many of them agreed that there is religious significance to climate change and climate change is a natural occurrence.
Rank 1 in the list of existing community ordinances related to climate change is the ordinance on solid waste management followed by total log band, reforestation, and illegal fishing.
CONCLUSIONS Community officials’ awareness on the causes and effect of climate change is observable but limited on vulnerability and adaptation.
Their thought towards climate change is highly coupled with religious thinking.
Actual state of affairs (situation) is the priority of the community officials leading to the inaccurate expectation of the long term effect of climate change.
Related ordinances such as solid waste management, total log band, reforestation, and illegal fishing are in accord with the concept of climate change.
Generally, results established baseline information on community officials’ appreciation and approaches on Climate Change in relation to the concept vulnerability is equal to exposure plus adaptability.
124 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research RECOMMENDATIONS Climate change is a worldwide fear international leader should initiate appropriate action to prevent catastrophe that would be brought by this circumstance.
Thus, the need of community officials on additional exposure and depth understanding on the vulnerability and adaptation specifically, on how to stop or to minimize the effect of climate change was very obvious.
It is recommended that there should be a series of orientation seminar on climate change vulnerability and adaptation for community officials.
Institutionalization of the process of greenhouse inventory, particularly among the government agencies concerned and greater involvement of the academe through related studies on adaptation and vulnerability under climate change conditions are suggested.
At the institutional level, the Philippines were one of the earliest countries to recognize the importance of a systematic institutional response to the problem of climate change (La Viña, 2008).
The national government has adopted a National Framework on Climate Change and is about (as of 15 June 2011) to adopt a new National Climate Change Action Plan, policy issuances that take into account both domestic law as well as the recent developments in the UNFCCC.
This illustrates that the Philippines does not see the emerging international regime on climate change as an imposition but as a welcome development (La Viña, Dulce, Sano, 2011).
LITERATURE CITED Bostrom, A., E. Roth, M. G. Morgan, B. Fischhoff and L. Lave 1994 Risk Analysis, Volume 14, No.
6, 1994.
Retrieved on August 2012 from http://goo.gl/7Ry04 Ekpho, I.J.
and U.I.
Ekpho 2011 Assessing the Level of Climate Change Awareness among Secondary School Teachers in Calabar Municipality, Nigeria: Implication for Management Effectiveness.
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Volume 1.
No.
3 La Viña, A.
2008 Addressing Climate Change in the Philippines: An Integrated AdaptationMitigation Approach, Philippine Climate Change Policy: Mitigation and Adaptation Measures.
Experts Dialogue, The University of the Philippines Law Center, U.P.
Diliman.
125 International Peer Reviewed Journal La Viña, A., J. C. Dulce and N. Saño 2011 National and Global Energy Governance: Issues, Linkages and Challenges in the Philippines.
Retrieved on June 2012 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com /doi/10.1111/j.1758 5899.2011.00134.x/full Kapoor, N. 2011 Awareness of the Rural People about Environment Protection through Mass Media, International Conference on Chemical, Biological and Environment Sciences (ICCEBS’2011) Bangkok.
Retrieved on August 2012 from http:// psrcentre.org/images/extraimages/1211545.pdf Section 38 2000 The Local Government Code of the Philippines.
Retrieved on May 2012 from www.doe.gov.ph/cc/ccp.htm.
2010 Science and Society: Understanding Global Climate Change and Setting Local Actions in Eastern Visayas.
Retrieved on May 2012 from https://sites.
google.com/site/evclimateforum/project-definition The Journal of Environmental Science and Management 2010 Retrieved on August 2012 from www.journals.uplb.edu.ph/index.php/ JESAM Pursuant to the international character of this publication, the journal is indexed by the following agencies: (1) Public Knowledge Project, a consortium of Simon Fraser University Library, the School of Education of Stanford University, and the British Columbia University, Canada; (2) E-International Scientific Research Journal Consortium; (3) Philippine E-Journals; (4) Google Scholar; (5) Index Copernicus; (6) Scholastica; (7) Researchgate; (8) Lacriee of France; and, (9) University Library of Leipzig, Germany.
84 Town and Regional Planning 2022 (81):84-96 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: O’Donoghue, S., Morgan, D., Leck, H., Moodley, P. & Haydvogl, K. 2022.
The Durban Climate Change Strategy: Lessons learnt from the 2021 strategy review and implementation plan.
Town and Regional Planning, no.
81, pp.
84-96.
© Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp Dr Sean O’Donoghue,* Research Associate, School of Life Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, and Senior Manager: Climate Change Adaptation, Climate Change Department, Room 200, City Engineers Complex, 166 KE Masinga Road, EThekwini Municipality, Durban.
Phone: +27 31 322 4304, 079 511 2631, email: dogbiteod@gmail.com, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1571-6541 Mr Derek Morgan, Director: Urban Earth Pty Ltd.21 Benzelia, 276 Helen Joseph Rd, Durban.
Phone: 07834190240, email: morgan.derek@gmail.
com, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6001-1604 Dr Hayley Leck, Independent Consultant, United Kingdom.
Phone: 0797815570, email: Hayley.leck@kcl.ac.uk, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-00019229-0305 Kathryn Haydvogl, Senior Environmental Technician, EThekwini Municipality, Room 200, City Engineers Complex, 166 KE Masinga Road, Durban, 4001.
Phone: 0738800200, email: Kathryn.Haydvogl@durban.gov.za The Durban Climate Change Strategy: Lessons learnt from the 2021 strategy review and implementation plan Sean O’Donoghue, Derek Morgan, Hayley Leck & Kathryn Haydvogl Review article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.7 Received: August 2022 Peer reviewed and revised: September-October 2022 Published: December 2022 *The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article Abstract Urban local governments are increasingly developing climate change adaptation plans.
However, there is limited literature on climate change adaptation experiences of African cities, particularly with regard to moving from strategy development to implementation.
This continues to hamper efforts to understand and guide city climate change actions on the continent.
This article helps address this gap by providing critical insights into the opportunities and challenges experienced, and the solutions found in the process of developing and implementing the Durban Climate Change Strategy (DCCS) in the City of Durban, South Africa.
The initial 2015 DCCS was reviewed in 2020/2021, and an analysis of the process and its outcomes provide useful focus areas that could guide other cities across the Global South and beyond for implementing climate change strategies.
Based on these focus areas, the article demonstrates that there are considerable governance and other barriers to this process that span multiple scales, but also many opportunities such as good organisation, ongoing support across multiple departments and scales, and perseverance that can be harnessed.
The findings have significant practical and policy implications for developing and implementing urban climate strategies and provide important conceptual insights for building transformative resilience in challenging governance contexts.
Keywords: Climate change adaptation, climate change strategy, implementation, lessons, local government, Global South DIE DURBAN KLIMAATSVERANDERINGSTRATEGIE: LESSE GELEER UIT DIE 2021-STRATEGIEHERSIENING EN IMPLEMENTERINGSPLAN Plaaslike regerings in stede ontwikkel toenemend klimaatsveranderingaanpassingsplanne.
Daar is egter beperkte literatuur oor klimaatsveranderingaanpassingservarings vanuit Afrikastede, veral oor die oorgang van strategieontwikkeling na implementering.
Dit belemmer steeds pogings om stadsklimaatveranderingsaksies op die vasteland te verstaan en rigting te gee.
Hierdie artikel help om hierdie leemte aan te spreek deur kritiese insigte te verskaf oor die geleenthede en uitdagings wat ervaar word, en die oplossings wat gevind word in die proses van ontwikkeling en implementering van die Durbanse klimaatsveranderingstrategie (DCCS) in die stad Durban, SuidAfrika.
Die aanvanklike 2015 DCCS is in 2020/2021 hersien en ontleding van die proses en die uitkomste daarvan bied nuttige fokusareas wat ander stede regoor die globale Suide kan rigting gee vir die implementering van klimaatsveranderingstrategieë.
Op grond van hierdie fokusareas, demonstreer die artikel dat daar aansienlike bestuur en ander hindernisse tot hierdie proses is wat oor veelvuldige skale strek, maar ook baie geleenthede soos goeie organisasie, deurlopende ondersteuning regoor verskeie departemente en skale en deursettingsvermoë wat ingespan kan word.
Die bevindinge het beduidende praktiese en beleidsimplikasies vir die ontwikkeling en implementering van stedelike klimaatstrategieë en verskaf belangrike konseptuele insigte vir die bou van transformerende veerkragtigheid in uitdagende bestuurskontekste.
http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:dogbiteod@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1571-6541 mailto:morgan.derek@gmail.com mailto:morgan.derek@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6001-1604 mailto:Hayley.leck@kcl.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9229-0305 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9229-0305 mailto:Kathryn.Haydvogl@durban.gov.za http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.7 O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 85 MORALO OA PHETOHO EA BOEMO BA LEHOLIMO OA DURBAN: BOITHUTO BO TLISITSOENG KE TEKOLO-BOTJA EA LEANO LE MORALO OA TS’EBETSO TSA 2021 Mebuso ea litoropo e ntse e tsoela pele ho theha merero ea ho ikamahanya le phetoho ea maemo a leholimo.
Leha ho le joalo, ho na le lingoliloeng tse fokolang mabapi le liphihlelo tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo metseng ea Afrika, haholo-holo mabapi le qalo, nts’etsopele le ho kena ts’ebetsong ha maano ao.
Sena se ntse se tsoela pele ho sitisa matsapa a ho utloisisa le ho tataisa liketso tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo a litoropo ka hara kontinente.
Sengoliloeng sena se thusa ho sebetsana le lekhalo lena ka ho fana ka temohisiso ea bohlokoa mabapi le menyetla le liqholotso tse fihletsoeng, le litharollo tse fumanoang tšebetsong ea ho theha le ho kenya tšebetsong Leano la Phetoho ea Maemo a Leholimo la Durban (DCCS) toropong ea Durban, Afrika Boroa.
DCCS ea pele ea 2015 e ile ea shejoa ka 2020/21 mme tlhahlobo ea ts’ebetso le liphetho tsa eona e fana ka libaka tsa bohlokoa tse ka tataisang litoropo tse ling ho phatlalla le Global South le ho feta bakeng sa ho kenya tšebetsong maano a phetoho ea maemo a leholimo.
Ho ipapisitsoe le libaka tsena tse tsepamisisang maikutlo, sengoloa se bontša hore ho na le litšitiso tse ngata, tse kenyeletsang le tse pusong, tšebetsong ena e akaretsang litekanyo tse ngata.
Hape le menyetla e mengata e kang tlhophiso e ntle, tšehetso e tsoelang pele ho kenyeletsa le mafapha a mangata le methati e ka sebelisoang.
Liphuputso tse entsoeng li na le litlamorao tse kholo tsa nts’etsapele le ho kenya ts’ebetsong maano a phetoho ea boemo ba leholimo litoropong le ho fana ka maikutlo a bohlokoa a ho aha matla a phetoho maemong a thata a puso.
1.
INTRODUCTION Cities are faced with complex shocks and stresses from climate change and other challenges such as rapid urbanization, particularly in developing contexts, with vulnerable communities becoming increasingly exposed to multiple interacting shocks and stresses (Pelling et al., 2018; Borie et al., 2019).
Cities are critical locations for climate adaptation and mitigation, with urban local governments playing a pivotal role in implementing plans and creating enabling environments for supporting transformative climate action.
Against this backdrop, it is imperative that cities globally shift from planning to actual implementation of climate change interventions by pursuing climate-resilient and just development pathways (Pelling et al., 2018, IPCC,2022).
Since the year 2000, urban local governments have become increasingly concerned with developing climate change adaptation plans.
Indeed, there is now well-established literature on the challenges and opportunities to successful climate adaptation in cities across diverse contexts in the Global North and the Global South (Bulkeley & Broto, 2013; Ziervogel, Cowen & Ziniades, 2016; Sareen & Waagsaether, 2022; BerrangFord & Paterson, 2011).
Despite this burgeoning literature, there is a lack of empirical studies that assess how local climate strategies and actions emerge in practice in the Global South, with consequent limited systematic knowledge on the evolution of urban climate agendas.
In particular, there is limited information, for African contexts, related to climate change adaptation experiences, particularly in respect of moving from strategy development to implementation.
This continues to hamper efforts to understand and guide city actions on the continent (Bindoff et al., 2019; IPCC, 2022: 1243).
This article addresses this gap by analysing the opportunities and challenges experienced, and the solutions found in the process of developing and implementing a climate change response strategy (DCCS) in the City of Durban (eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality), South Africa.
The aim was to gain insights on climate change adaptation and mitigation from a review of the initial 2015 DCCS during its first fiveyear review period in 2020/2021.
The 2015 DCCS review was important, as its outcomes were thematically analysed to provide useful climate change insights and focus areas that also underpinned the development of the detailed implementation plan to guide the City’s comprehensive climate change response in the short to medium term.
The DCCS revision process and development of the 2022 DCCS implementation plan provide key learning outcomes for guiding transformative urban resilience building relevant to other cities across the Global South.
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Transformative resilience, climate change approach, and urban governance The concept of building resilience to climate change impacts has received major attention in academic and policy realms for several decades.
Resilience is increasingly drawn on as a lens to shape urban governance and has informed the development of many climate change agendas and responses across all levels globally, including Durban.
There are multiple diverse definitions and applications of resilience within the burgeoning literature (see Bahadur & Tanner, 2021).
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2018a: 557), resilience can be understood as “[t]he capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganising in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning and transformation.” Technocratic and uncritical interpretations of resilience tend to focus strongly on recoverability and functional persistence rather than transformative elements, thereby risking the reinforcement of unsustainable and unjust systems (Pelling, 2010; Roberts et al., 2020; Leck & Simon, 2018).
Recognising the above resilience critiques and based on mounting evidence and experience of climate change impacts, increasing inequalities, and other factors, eThekwini municipality has increasingly focused on creating new opportunities for building on existing efforts to support urban resilience towards more 86 O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 transformative action (Roberts et al., 2020).
Based on their experience of driving Durban’s climate agenda, Roberts and O’Donoghue (2013: 314) note that, rather than ‘bouncing back’ (technocratic) approaches to resilience, “[m]ore useful and practical in the long run is the idea of ‘bouncing forward’ or ‘transformation’, which implies a more radical shift to a new mode of urban planning, management and governance”.
Roberts et al.’s (2020) critical reflections on Durban’s resilience journey through participating in the 100 Resilience Cities (100RC) programme has significant implications for the City’s approach to building transformative resilience through initiatives such as the DCCS.
Their experience paints two contrasting approaches to developing urban resilience – one that represents the governing of resilience as transferred to cities ‘from a distance’ such as the dominant approach used by 100RC, and the other ‘from within’ that is tailored to local contexts, which Durban has prioritised (Roberts et al., 2020).
(Roberts et al., 2020: 20) explain that the City’s resilience journey has shown that “locally contextualized, participatory, negotiated and endogenous forms of urban resilience need to be developed if the practice of resilience building is to be transformative in complex urban contexts”.
These learnings have important implications for resilience and transformation theory and practice, including the development of the DCCS strategy.
Based on their study of Cape Town and Nairobi, Borie et al.
(2019) explain that the way in which concepts such as ‘transformative resilience’ are understood has particular implications for the way in which risk and climate change impacts are governed.
While the concept of ‘transformation’ also has diverse theoretical and practical origins, core aspects of transformational climate action include moving beyond incremental and ad hoc interventions to focus on systemic change and addressing root causes of vulnerability (Ziervogel et al., 2016; Leck & Simon, 2018).
This system-wide transformative approach challenges the status quo in recognition of the complex multilayered challenges presented by climate change (Pelling, 2010).
In Durban and other developmental contexts of the Global South, where social and environmental injustices prevail, transformation requires a reconfiguration of existing systems, governance structures, and state-society relations (Friend et al., 2016; Douwes, 2018).
This approach to transformative resilience building highlights the systemic and relational nature of resilience and the need for it to be predicated upon the particular historical and geographical context of a city.
2.2 Multilevel governance for transformative urban resilience Developing and implementing an effective climate change strategy to build transformative resilience requires meaningful multilevel governance and multi-stakeholder approaches.
Urban climate governance can be understood as the ways in which multiple state and non-state actors and institutions interact to develop and implement climate change goals, exert authority, and manage climate planning and implementation processes (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Ziervogel et al., 2022: 608).
Governance also embodies institutional structures and mechanisms, “including the division of authority and underlying norms involved in determining a course of action” (Moser, 2009: 315).
As such, governance incorporates diverse actors in decision-making, and recognises the multi-scalar dynamism between decision-makers, the contextual factors and power relations that influence decisionmaking (Leck & Simon, 2018; UN-Habitat, 2022).
Implicit in the notion of multilevel governance is the notion of collaborative decisionmaking.
Indeed, a defining feature of Durban’s climate change journey has been its openness to participation and co-productive governance methods (Roberts et al., 2020).
Van der Heijden’s (2019) large-scale review of urban climate governance studies identifies several ‘best practice’-enabling factors for effective governance of local climate action: supportive political and legal context; autonomy to make decisions and act upon them; access to funding; vertical and horizontal co-ordination; participation in capacity-building and learning networks; collaboration with, and participation of diverse stakeholders, and the presence of a local climate champion.
Most of the studies were based in the Global North, where a great deal of research has focused and is by no means all-inclusive or sufficient (Van der Heijden, 2019).
As evident from Table 2 and Section 5, these factors resonate closely with Durban’s experience.
However, in reality, they are often interlinked, and their boundaries blurred, with additional context-specific factors emerging.
Local authorities globally employ varied governance strategies for initiating institutional change for climate action.
Based on their study of several Spanish cities, Sareen and Waagsaether (2022: online) conclude that to move from resilience to more transformative and systemic change, it is important for climate plans and processes to shift from being disparate and ad hoc – “tinkering around the edges” to become more strategically integrated into overall city planning and functioning.
Relatedly, drawing on Hodson and Marvin’s (2010) work, (Bulkeley, 2012: 83) argues that an increasingly dominant form of climate governance is “strategic urbanism”, which represents “the growing alignment between addressing climate change and core municipal concerns and the more direct, political approach that municipal authorities and other urban actors have begun to take to the issue”.
Alongside strategic urbanism and reflecting the changing nature of urban governance, a focus on ‘enabling’ as a mode of governing is becoming an increasingly significant part of municipal climate change responses in the Global South (Bulkeley, 2012; Bulkeley & Broto, 2013).
Cities in the Global South are faced with challenges related O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 87 to political opposition and limited powers and capacity to provide infrastructure and services for adapting to climate change (Pelling et al., 2018).
As a result, they are increasingly turning towards the “enabling mode” as “one through which they can facilitate, co-ordinate and encourage the action of others through forms of partnership and engagement” (Bulkeley, 2012: 97).
The formation of partnerships and networks, particularly with local consultants has been a hallmark of Durban’s climate change approach, including the development of the DCCS.
Local ‘climate change champions’ often play a key role in establishing and driving such partnerships (Leck & Roberts, 2015; Ziervogel et al., 2016) (see Section 5.2).
Central to the enabling mode of governing is having a wider enabling environment, where supportive policy, legislative and other frameworks are in place.
2.3 Political, economic, and institutional impacts, and transformative urban resilience The extent to which the governance and transformative resilience approaches described above are deployed in a city and their levels of success are dependent on political, economic, and institutional factors.
As a result of extensive post-1994 policy and legislative revision, environmental and developmental issues in South Africa are now regulated by an advanced legal framework.
The South African National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) White Paper (South Africa, 2011) provides policy guidance for development and implementation of climate change initiatives from the short to the long term (up to 2050).
The South African National Adaptation Strategy was approved in 2020, with the overall aim to help reduce the vulnerability of society, the economy and the environment to the impacts of climate change.
Under the Disaster Management Amendment Act (Act no.
16 of 2015), all spheres of government are assigned responsibility to develop and invest in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation interventions for their respective jurisdictions.
Despite these legislative and policy advancements, considerable implementational and budget deficits remain.
When legislated, the National Climate Change Bill (B9 2022) may help address such deficits, as it will provide a legal framework to respond to climate change impacts.
Post-apartheid local government is an autonomous government sphere that has been assigned extensive roles and responsibilities for driving the country’s development.
Several local governments across the country such as Bergrivier and Johannesburg are addressing climate change, without specific national funds or instruction.
Durban has included its Municipal Climate Response Plan in the City’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP)1 since 2006, demonstrating an early and ongoing commitment to mainstreaming climate response in the City.
Durban has made considerable developmental gains since the advent of democracy in 1994.
However, these are at risk of being reversed, as the city is facing substantial socio-economic, environmental, and governance challenges.
Furthermore, apartheid spatial planning that relegated historically disadvantaged communities to the outskirts of the City continues to compound inequalities with high levels of poverty and unemployment persisting in these areas.
Climate change will compound and exacerbate these challenges.
Sutherland et al.
(2018) explain that, as with many cities in the Global South, Durban is characterised by many juxtapositions, being both highly informal and formal, traditional yet also modern, encompassing many injustices but also social transformation, together with environmental challenges buttressed with resilience building.
1 Integrated Development Plans are a comprehensive planning tool to facilitate developmental local government.
2.4 Transformative resilience building in Durban Over the past 20 years, the City of Durban has focused on setting up the appropriate policy, institutional, and governance structures to respond to climate change.
Durban’s climate agenda and resilience journey has been well documented (Ziervogel et al., 2016; Douwes, 2018; Roberts et al., 2020).
Durban was the first African city to approve its 1.5°C-compliant Climate Action Plan.
The City is also well known for its mayoral leadership of international organisations such as ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, and C40 Cities Climate Leadership group.
Durban’s ongoing progress and innovation in transformative resilience building through both adaptation and mitigation are underpinned by the willingness to address climate change among City officials and increasingly the municipality more widely.
Broadly, adaptation refers to (in human systems) “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities”, while mitigation refers to human interventions aimed at the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) that drive climate change (IPCC, 2018a: 542, 554).
Durban’s hosting of the United Nations 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) raised awareness of climate change among residents, sector leaders, and municipal officials in the City, and secured political champions to lead the further development of Durban’s climate change work programmes such as the Durban Adaptation Charter (DAC) and the Durban Climate Change Strategy (DCCS).
The DCCS was jointly developed by the (then) Climate Protection Branch and the Energy Office and approved by the eThekwini Municipality Council in June 2015.
The strategy outlines a municipal-wide approach to integrating climate change mitigation and adaptation responses into municipal functions and operations, viewed as a first for Africa.
The 2015 DCCS was developed in consultation with stakeholders from various sectors, including organisations 88 O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 representing informal settlement communities, parastatals and others.
During 2020/21, it was subjected to its first five-year review.
This review is also in support of the South African government’s nationally determined contributions toward the Paris Agreement; the international treaty on climate change adopted at the 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21), and alignment with the impending South African National Climate Change Act.
Based on the outcomes of the review, the 2022 DCCS was developed to move on from ‘strategy’ to ‘implementation’.
3.
STUDY AREA Durban is situated on the east coast of South Africa in the KwaZulu Natal province and has the busiest port on the African continent (Figure 1).
The City is governed by eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality and has a population of 3.9 million residents.
The Municipality’s 98km of coastline contains 18 major river catchments with 7,400km of streams falling within the 89,834 hectares Durban Metropolitan Open Space System (DMOSS) (see Figure 1).
Annually, DMOSS provides residents with ecosystem services valued at R4.1 billion (Turpie et al., 2017: 6), including protection from climate change impacts.
Figure 1: EThekwini Municipality showing municipal boundary, major river courses, and extent of the Durban Metropolitan Open Space System Source: Author’s own EThekwini Municipality and its diverse communities are vulnerable to multiple environmental changes such as flooding, heatwaves, and extreme events such as storm surges.
Durban experienced two extreme rainfall events in April and May 2022 that caused widespread flooding, resulting in serious loss of life and extensive damage to infrastructure and residential properties across the municipal landscape.
These events further exemplify the key challenges the City faces in reducing climate change risks and the need for a transformative climate change strategy and supporting policies.
4.
METHODOLOGY Making use of qualitative participatory action research, this article reviews climate change focus areas from the 2015 Climate Change Strategy (DCCS) in the City of Durban, South Africa.
Participatory action research allows for action by members of communities affected by that research to participate as co-researchers (Du Toit, Boshoff & Mariette 2017: 480).
It also allows for content analysis (Farthing, 2016: 136; MacCallum, Babb & Curtis, 2019: 188) to identify and address gaps in the literature (Farthing, 2016: 66).
In this article, ten climate change focus areas from the 2015 DCCS were reviewed during DCCS stakeholder consultation over five events (see Table 1).
Using content analysis, the outcomes of these events were thematically analysed and grouped in four main themes including governance, partnerships, challenges, and funding, as the lessons learned that informed the development of the draft revised DCCS and a set of actions that underpin the 2022 DCCS Integrated Implementation Plan, the DCCS Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the DCCS Communication Framework.
4.1 Reviewing the 2015 DCCS As noted, the 2015 DCCS underwent its first five-year review during 2020/2021.
This review2 and development of the 2022 DCCS Implementation Plan and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (hereafter termed ‘the work package’) was led by a local consultant appointed through a competitive bid process, working with municipal staff within existing DCCS governance structures.
Between August 2019 and June 2022, the authors did detailed documentation of each stage of the 2015 DCCS revision process and development of the DCCS Implementation Strategy.
The authors were core members of the DCCS team and actively involved at each stage of the process, in their roles as key municipal officials and consultants contracted to facilitate the process as a service provider.
The 2015 DCCS review process entailed three steps: review documents, stakeholder events, and critical analysis.
2 A more detailed account of the methodology for reviewing the 2015 DCCS and developing the implementation plan and monitoring and evaluation framework can be found on the eThekwini Municipal website https://www.
durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climatechange-strategy [Accessed: 22 September 2022].
https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climate-change-strategy https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climate-change-strategy https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climate-change-strategy O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 89 4.1.1 Documents The first step was to review the latest climate change science (e.g., IPCC, 2018b; Bindoff et al., 2019) and literature, with a view to understanding global climate risks for South Africa, and particularly Durban, and for this to guide the development of the revised DCCS and its key focus areas.
Other key guiding documents were the South African National Government’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement,3 national climate change policy, and the draft Climate Change Bill.4 Furthermore, to raise local ambition in line with the target of 1.5°C average global temperature increase – the internationally recognised upper limit after which climate change risk escalates extremely dangerously (IPCC, 2018b) – eThekwini Municipality’s Council adopted the Climate Action Plan (CAP) in 2019.
The adaptation and mitigation actions set out in the CAP provide a pathway for Durban to achieve climate resilience and carbon neutrality by 2050.
The DCCS and CAP are complementary and have been integrated into the DCCS Implementation Plan.
Therefore, a key additional component of the review was to assess how to incorporate the CAP targets and actions into the revised DCCS and Implementation Plan.
4.1.2 Stakeholder events A series of public and internal stakeholder engagement events were conducted in step two.
Initially, an in-person workshop was held with municipal officials to present the methodology for the work package and identify key officials for participation.
This was followed by a public in-person workshop in February 2020, where stakeholders were invited to comment on the methodology being proposed to revise the DCCS as well as provide initial suggestions on new or revised climate change interventions.
3 https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/creecy_ indc2021draftlaunch_climatechangecop26 [Accessed: 22 September 2022].
4 https://www.parliament.gov.za/bill/2300773 [Accessed: 22 September 2022].
This public engagement used a ‘marketplace facilitation approach’5 to facilitate inclusive input into the revised strategy.
Due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, all subsequent meetings were hosted virtually.
Five public stakeholder events were then held online grouped into thematic areas.
Participation was noted from a wide range of sectors, including non-government organisations representing different communities, including informal settlement dwellers, faith-based organisations and rubbish pickers, academia, state-owned entities, residents of Durban, and municipal officials.
During a February 2020 workshop, participants6 (Table 1) reviewed the interrelated themes from the 2015 DCCS, including five adaptation themes (Biodiversity, Water, Health, Food Security, and Sea-Level Rise); three mitigation themes (Energy, Waste and Pollution, and Transport), and two cross-cutting themes (Economic Development and Knowledge Generation and Awareness).
Key thematic outcomes from the workshop about targets, actions or sub-actions informed revision of the DCCS, drafted in April 2020.
Following the February workshop, five themed stakeholder 5 In this instance, a station was established for each theme and ‘shoppers’ were invited to go from station to provide comments related to that theme, facilitated by a project member.
6 A list of participating organisations can be found at https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/ residents/climate-change-strategy.
events (Table 1) were held to refine the updated list of actions and sub-actions and to begin drafting the DCCS Implementation Plan.
The focus was on identifying relevant stakeholders for each theme and the status of each project.
A prioritisation exercise was conducted in each session, where participants prioritised three projects per sector.
The outcomes of these events informed the development of the draft revised DCCS and a set of actions that underpin the DCCS Integrated Implementation Plan.
By contrast to the 2015 version, the revised DCCS includes CAP targets and emphasises ‘implementation’.
A major change in the revised strategy is the inclusion of an ‘enabling theme’ consisting of the policy, legislation, governance, and finance sectors.
4.1.3 Analysis Step three was to analyse and critically reflect on the 2015 DCCS process.
The authors’ critical documentation of the 2015 DCCS process, as well as qualitative data such as minutes and relevant documents from stakeholder events were analysed and critically reflected upon in a series of monthly project steering committee meetings, and in a writing workshop to identify key thematic areas of lessons learnt.
Through content analysis (Farthing, 2016: 136), key themes were broadly grouped into different learning areas, including governance, partnerships, challenges, and Table 1: Structure of the DCCS stakeholder consultation event process Session Sectors Stakeholders Frequency Total Initial Internal Stakeholder Workshop All 74 74 Initial Public Stakeholder Workshop All 65 65 Event 1: Enabling theme Policy, legislation, and planning 14 42 Governance (stakeholder structures, research and communication) 14 Financing (climate finance) 14 Event 2: Cross-cutting theme Economic development 10 28 Vulnerable communities 18 Event 3: Adaptation theme (1) Biodiversity 13 31Food security 6 Health 12 Event 4: Adaptation theme (2) Sea level rise and coastal protection 7 30 Water and sanitation 23 Event 5: Mitigation Energy 17 37Transport 10 Waste 10 Total 307 https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/creecy_indc2021draftlaunch_climatechangecop26 https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/creecy_indc2021draftlaunch_climatechangecop26 https://www.parliament.gov.za/bill/2300773 https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climate-change-strategy https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climate-change-strategy 90 O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 funding, from the project initiation phase through to developing the monitoring and evaluation system for the implementation plan and further divided into subthemes as presented in Table 2.
Arguments presented in this article are based on inputs and knowledge from diverse key stakeholders who were engaged in the process.
This reflexive and novel approach is critical for adding empirical and grounded insights to contribute to the body of empirical studies being produced on urban resilience globally (Roberts et al., 2020).
4.2 Development of the 2022 DCCS As part of the review process, a detailed 2022 DCCS Implementation Plan, monitoring and evaluation framework, and communication framework were also developed to guide the City’s comprehensive climate change response in the short to medium term.
Principal focus for implementation is on risk reduction and improving adaptive capacity and transformative resilience across the City, particularly for marginalised and vulnerable communities.
4.2.1 DCCS Integrated Implementation Plan The 2022 DCCS Integrated Implementation Plan is ‘integrative’, because it combines the four themes outlined in Table 1 and draws on the targets and actions from the Durban CAP, thereby streamlining the plans.
As detailed below, the DCCS Implementation Plan includes a number of components such as a monitoring and evaluation framework and associated reporting tool, as well as a climate change communication framework and portal.
The initial draft DCCS Implementation Plan consisted of over 300 projects; yet there was some duplication and others were beyond the scope of the municipal strategy.
A process to refine, combine, and prioritise projects was undertaken, leading to a consolidation of projects for the 2022 DCCS Implementation Plan into 122 projects.
This process was done through online engagements, where municipal officials undertook prioritisation processes through scoring projects according to impact, budget, urgency, and effort.
Effort refers to the level of complexity and time to implement a particular project.
The result was a list of prioritised projects7 for each sector based on a pragmatic approach that is robust enough to mitigate against the loss of key projects, but also able to identify gaps in ability to implement such as lack of ownership of particular projects.
The final steps entailed collecting specific details for the projects across priority categories.
This information provided the substance of the implementation plan and included data such as time frames, budgets, and ownership of the project.
For each sector, between two and ten officials participated in the process to refine projects, but one municipal official was chosen for each project to represent that project in reporting.
To support streamlining, one of these officials was identified for each project according to their roles and expertise, and they populated each project with the required information.
This process was time intensive, and many officials did not respond to the data-collection request.
To overcome this, follow-up email correspondence was sent, and 18 individual interviews (meetings) were convened with project contacts.
Material was also collected electronically outside of meetings.
The outcome from this process was a draft detailed Integrated Implementation Plan for the DCCS and CAP.
4.2.2 DCCS monitoring and evaluation framework A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework was developed to establish a baseline from which to track progress of projects, programmes, and targets in the DCCS Implementation Plan.
Several key principles were adopted for designing the DCCS M&E framework.
These principles are based on best practice examples drawn from a review of key literature (McKenzie & Morgan, 2020).
These include 7 A list of prioritised projects can be found at https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/ climate-change-strategy.
using Microsoft Excel, already used by the municipality as a default for data management and developing the reporting tool explicitly for the DCCS, but in a way that also meets broader institutional reporting requirements.
Additional principles included selecting indicators to match specific actions and sub-actions of the DCCS for tracking inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts; conducting a capacity assessment and training to support reporting, and designing an annual review of the tool.
When implemented, collection of key data was hampered by the low level of response by officials driven by reporting fatigue and the punitive nature of existing reporting processes required by the South African Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) (see Table 2).
To overcome this barrier, the DCCS reporting tool was further revised to align with current municipal reporting processes, using the City’s Enterprise Performance Monitoring Application (EPMA), but with the key differentiation of adding the 2022 DCCS outside of the core Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP).
The benefit of this approach is that officials are familiar with the EPMA, instead of having to learn a new reporting system, which helped secure their buy-in to this process.
4.2.3 DCCS communication framework Education and awareness are integral components of supporting climate action among local communities.
To address the dearth of easily accessible climate change information on the municipal website, a dedicated communication portal was created to help build the capacity of Durban’s diverse communities and enable them to better respond to climate change.
The portal, which is currently being uploaded onto the Municipal website, is part of the 2022 DCCS communication framework, which includes a detailed communication plan.
The DCCS communication framework is supported by a dedicated communications officer https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climate-change-strategy https://www.durban.gov.za/pages/residents/climate-change-strategy O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 91 for climate champions to have sustained impact, including in their absence, there is a need for a broader enabling policy and political environment to support ongoing traction in advancing transformative resilience in the City.
Taylor, Siame and Mwalukanga’s (2021) study similarly highlights the centrality of an enabling environment as a basis for integrating climate risks into strategic urban planning in Lusaka, Zambia.
A key aim in developing the DCCS and its governance framework has been to coordinate and integrate climate change work across line functions, avoid duplication, and better manage funding for related projects.
As similar studies such as Sareen and Waagsaether’s (2022: 2) analysis of governance transitions to sustainability in two Spanish cities have shown, progress towards more systemic transformative resilience can be supported by shifting climate plans and processes from being fragmented and ad hoc to being more integrated into overall city planning and functioning.
The DCCS ultimately required political approval through committees and a meeting of the full Council.
This demonstrates a considerable level of leadership and strategic political support for an integrative and meaningful response to climate change across governance scales (Douwes, 2018).
This, in itself, was not deemed to provide sufficient topdown momentum for implementation but having political champions in internationally recognised positions (e.g., Mayor Kaunda was, during this period of review, C40 Regional Chair representing Africa) gave the DCCS the political support needed to get all administrative leaders behind the DCCS.
The City is increasingly engaging with strategic urbanism as a form of climate action with growing alignment between addressing climate change and core municipal concerns and direct interventions and support by political leaders (Bulkeley, 2012).
in the Energy Office, and the City’s Communications Unit.
5.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Climate change planning at the municipal level is a complex and difficult undertaking.
Municipalities have many competing priorities with often limited budgets and resources.
These challenges are exacerbated in the Global South, where often pressing social and economic issues force governments to prioritise short-term and immediate problems with climate change response, often perceived as a future concern.
Through the lens of strategic urbanism (Bulkeley, 2012), eThekwini’s experience with the DCCS has revealed the criticality of having a clear strategy in place outlining the municipality’s climate change response and mainstreamed into other municipal planning processes.
However, Durban’s experience has shown that simply having a climate change strategy in place is not enough.
It is equally important to ensure that the steps to achieve climate change response outcomes are clearly defined in a detailed implementation plan underpinning the strategy.
The success of the implementation plan, in turn, depends on the level of buy-in by municipal leadership and those stakeholders that are ultimately responsible for implementing the various actions and thus need to be identified at the outset and committed to ensuring their achievement.
Table 2 provides a summary of the key barriers and drivers, and lessons learnt from the process of revising the 2015 Durban Climate Change Strategy and developing a detailed implementation plan, and monitoring and evaluation framework.
Based on this table, four thematic areas (governance, partnerships, challenges, funding) are identified and critically considered in the ensuing discussion as the key learning outcomes in resilience building that could guide transformative urban resilience.
5.1 Governance as a risk and strength Much focus has been on ensuring that the appropriate multilevel governance structures are in place for the DCCS.
Because of the silobased organisation of line functions in eThekwini Municipality, there has historically been poor coordination of the implementation of climate change response in the City.
A key governance lesson in revising the 2015 DCCS relates to creating systems for collaboration between different sectors, in order to support effective multilevel governance both vertically and horizontally, as described in Section 2.2.
The message that the impacts of climate change affect all sectors and the need for coordinated responses across these sectors emerged as common theme in discussions with various municipal line departments during the development and revision of the 2015 DCSS.
This outcome highlights the increasing recognition of the need for cross-departmental and cross-sector collaboration under a multilevel and strategic governance framework (Bulkeley, 2012).
Since the establishment of the Municipal Climate Protection Programme, much effort has been made to support capacity development of the City’s professional staff for addressing climate change through training and other measures (Roberts et al., 2015).
This resulted in a set of professionals embedded within the various environmental functions of the City who had become climate change leaders and champions in their own respective fields.
This dedicated and broad-based set of champions underpinned Durban’s early opportunistic and experimental climate change adaptation work.
These champions were the main driver for the development of the 2015 DCCS, formed the core of the DCCS Subcommittee, and supported the recent strategy revisions.
A key lesson that resonates closely with related studies (e.g., Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Van der Heijden, 2019) and a main additional reason for including the enabling theme in the revised DCCS is that, in order 92 O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 Table 2: A summary of the key barriers and drivers, and lessons learnt from the process of revising the Durban Climate Change Strategy, developing a detailed implementation plan, and monitoring and evaluation framework.
DCC phase Focus area Observations Lessons learnt on barriers and drivers P ro je ct in iti at io n Role of intermediaries for climate change interventions Using local external consultants to manage the process required a substantial investment by Durban City, but resulted in a dedicated team driving the process to completion The municipality has benefited from using local consultants with in-depth local knowledge and ongoing presence in the City to support the development of the DCCS.
Skilled and experienced municipal staff facilitate the successful collaboration with competent service providers D C C S re vi si on Creating an enabling environment Including an “Enabling” theme in the DCCS has enhanced the strategic nature of this document To enhance implementation of the DCCS, it has been necessary to prioritise enabling actions such as policy development, strengthening capacity, and transdisciplinary research to guide implementation Public stakeholder engagement process: a) Stakeholder expertise Stakeholders typically had narrow interest areas during public engagement processes Stakeholder consultation processes need to be designed to facilitate broad participation levels b) Cost of consultation There is a trade-off between the need for more widespread consultation and its associated high costs Creative solutions are required to overcome barriers to participation of marginalised communities in stakeholder processes.
For the DCCS, a key facilitative driver was ensuring community representation through engaging with civil society groups c) Stakeholder ownership A lack of ownership emerged in Durban residents and the private sector concerning DCCS actions Greater effort is required on communicating with, and developing participatory structures so that the responsibility for implementing climate action is taken up beyond the municipality G ov er na nc e fra m ew or k re vi ew Institutional coordination Silo-based organisation for service delivery has led to weak coordination in adaptation and mitigation response Effective leadership of a city’s climate change function requires a diverse and multi-sector knowledge base that accounts for diverse perspectives in a common purpose Climate change champions Municipal climate change champions have emerged over the past decade and form the core of the Subcommittee implementing the DCCS Fostering a set of “embedded” climate change champions is a key enabler in mainstreaming climate change into municipal operations and breaking down silos Transdisciplinary research A dedicated climate change transdisciplinary research programme alongside the DCCS is essential for providing information to guide implementation and for developing capacity to implement To facilitate effective and appropriate climate change research, it will be necessary to overcome funding barriers and embrace opportunities such as pursuing innovative approaches (e.g., EPIC) Institutional support Strong commitment by senior municipal leadership within appropriate governance structures is important for coordinated support for climate change implementation.
Senior political and administrative leadership plays an active role in driving the City’s climate change response.
Interactive platforms with the public are required to drive decision-making across sectors and break down municipal silos Engaging with international organisations Durban has received significant support from diverse international organisations, who have helped drive the City’s climate agenda Pursuing partnerships with international organisations helps drive the implementation of the DCCS by alleviating capacity and funding constraints Im pl em en ta tio n pl an d ev el op m en t Trade-off between science and reality Many proposed climate change response targets were viewed as unrealistic, despite being required by science Committed senior leadership for addressing high-level targets is needed to transcend “business as usual” Municipal mandates Municipal officials noted that specific required interventions would need national level implementation rather than at a municipal level A vertically and horizontally coordinated response between spheres of government and other mandated bodies is required for the implementation of climate actions Additional responsibilities Climate change response was typically viewed as a new and additional responsibility Current roles and responsibilities require revision to support mainstreaming of climate change into municipal functions; senior leadership should acknowledge the extra responsibility of implementing climate change, and respond accordingly Project custodianship It was difficult to identify the appropriate project owners for some projects, in particular those with a crosssectoral nature It was necessary to identify climate change response areas without ‘owners’ for allocation to existing roles or new positions to assume these responsibilities.
If there are no resources to create new positions, then existing roles require adjustment to also prioritise emerging climate change roles D ev el op in g th e D C C S m on ito rin g an d ev al ua tio n sy st em Baseline data collection There was often a lack of climate change baseline data available for projects There is a need for additional resources to set up a support system to work with individual climate change project managers to develop realistic and accurate baseline information Reporting fatigue Concerns were raised that the DCCS implementation plan would add to municipal officials’ existing significant reporting requirements Integrating reporting for the DCCS into existing reporting systems is a key driver that helped alleviate concerns about reporting burden Reporting fear Existing reporting processes are punitive in nature.
Officials were concerned that DCCS reporting would create issues when reporting failures, particularly when implementing complex projects across multiple sectors Using the existing municipal reporting system, but adding DCCS projects outside of the core scoring system has alleviated this concern, allowing for failure and learning sometimes associated with climate change adaptation Fi na nc e su pp or t National funding opportunities There are limited opportunities for financing climate change interventions through national conditional and non-conditional grants Introducing a dedicated resource in the municipality to track, coordinate, and apply to funding grants for climate change projects can help overcome funding barriers International funding opportunities International financing presents opportunities through climate change project-preparation support There is a need for a dedicated resource in the municipality to track, coordinate, and apply to international grants for climate change projects Climate finance capacity building Climate finance training courses and ongoing support help develop project ideas into detailed project concepts that can be applied to financing opportunities as they emerge Hosting regular climate finance training workshops with climate change project managers can address capacity barriers by supporting the conceptualisation and financing of projects O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 93 5.2 Developing partnerships for climate change responses Section 2.2 reflected on the increasingly deployed enabling mode of multilevel governance, which describes how cities globally are increasingly forming partnerships and collaborations to address climate change (Bulkeley, 2012: 97).
The formation of partnerships and networks has been a hallmark of Durban’s climate change approach.
Since 2000, municipal officials have increasingly joined local to international formal partnerships and social networks supporting climate agendas.
For example, the Durban Research Action Partnership (DRAP), which was established in 2011 by eThekwini Municipality and the University of KwaZuluNatal, promotes local capacity and knowledge generation that supports implementation of the DCCS.
Such initiatives have been key drivers of the municipal climate agenda.
At the core of DRAP is the Cityfunded Global Environmental Change (GEC) transdisciplinary research programme.
Funding is provided for postgraduate students and early career researchers to undertake transdisciplinary research with a focus on climate change.
To date, the City has invested R7.5 million in the programme and a further R3 million in the Community Reforestation Research Programme.
GEC funds also support capacity building through work-experience opportunities for students and early career researchers.
Furthermore, implementing novel approaches such as Educational Partnerships for Innovation in Communities (EPIC)8 has supported the efficient use of limited resources and strengthened City-community relations.
Beyond DRAP, Durban has developed numerous partnerships across scales that have been major drivers of its climate change work, particularly through the City’s role as the Durban Adaptation Charter (DAC) Secretariat, which has seen Durban engaging in peer-to-peer learning exchanges with dozens of African 8 https://www.epicn.org/ [Accessed: 22 September 2022].
cities (O’Donoghue et al., in prep-b).
This has resulted in rapid growth in capacity and institutional readiness of participating cities in addressing climate change adaptation.
Other significant partnerships include the Central KwaZulu-Natal Climate Change Compact (CKZNCCC) (Municipality, 2021a), the KZN Sustainable Energy Forum (KSEF), and the Durban Climate Change Partnership (DCCP).
Enabling modes of governing and strategic urbanism characteristic of Durban’s climate response and development of the DCCS often demonstrate innovative governance and partnering to support transformation in addressing the increasing impacts of climate change (Bulkeley, 2012).
However, Durban’s experience has shown that the establishment and maintenance of partnerships are challenged by weak commitment and governance structures and a lack of effective leadership and access to funding (Roberts et al., 2015).
Section 4 highlighted that a significant change in the revised DCCS was the introduction of an enabling theme.
This includes sub-themes of policy, legislation and planning, finance and governance that facilitate enabling modes of governing and help support collaboration and establishment of partnership arrangements.
These were introduced with the recognition of their centrality to the overall success of the DCCS and to overcome the challenges experienced with partnership arrangements in the City.
5.3 Meeting the challenge of moving from strategy to implementation Based on the Durban climate change team’s experience as the DAC Secretariat and participation in international partnerships (O’Donoghue et al., in prep-a), the two main challenges frequently articulated by officials at the frontline in responding to climate change are skills and capacity constraints, as well as limited access to finance.
As shown in Anguelovski and Carmin’ (2011) and Van der Heijden’s (2019) papers, these two key issues are also commonly highlighted in urban climate change studies in both the Global South and the Global North.
During the initial phases of the DCCS review and development of the implementation plan, it became evident that the municipality lacked the staff capacity (in terms of time available and skills) to drive the process internally.
EThekwini Municipality committed R3.6 million towards securing a local consulting company to lead the process of reviewing the 2015 DCCS, integrating the DCCS and CAP, and developing an implementation plan.
Durban has a well-established network of local, committed, skilled, and knowledgeable environment and climate change service providers.
As a result, and in contrast to international consultants, the local contractor assigned through the competitive procurement process had a deep understanding of, and was able to operate effectively within the local context and be present across the three-year period of the contract.
A DCCS Project Steering Committee (PSC) was established consisting of the consulting team and municipal officials from the Climate Change Department.
The PSC was the main driver for reviewing the 2015 DCCS and developing the subsequent detailed implementation plan.
Without the support from the external consulting team, it is unlikely that the level of detail in the implementation plan and buy-in from key stakeholders would have been achieved.
Developing and implementing a municipal-wide strategic response to climate change is beyond the means of many, if not most of the line functions responsible for climate change in African cities (Roberts et al., 2013).
The high costs of extensive consultation processes also present a considerable barrier.
As a result, local authorities have often relied on international funding for external consultants to undertake climate change planning and develop resilience agendas (Chu, 2018).
In this case, Durban had the internal budget available to procure the services of local consultants to assist with this process.
This helped ensure that the DCCS process https://www.epicn.org/ 94 O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 underpinning Durban’s pathway to transformative climate resilience was locally grounded and informed, while the municipality directly shaped and drove the process from within, rather than being externally directed.
A further key message is that this helps ensure that paths to transformative resilience are locally led and appropriate (see also Roberts et al., 2020).
While such internal funding is not widely available to local governments across the Global South, the lessons apply more broadly to engaging with transnational actors and the local management of international funding.
As Chu (2018) explains, based on the experience of three Indian cities, while international funding and actors remain critical to advancing urban climate agendas in the Global South, it is important to ensure local ownership and authority to avoid dependency and constraints on local governance.
Once the strategy-revision process was underway, a significant issue that emerged was how best to ensure the engagement of City officials and Durban residents in driving the strategy in the long term.
During the public consultation events, it became evident that participating Durban residents often have very specific areas of interest and thus were less engaged with the wider strategy and its interlinkages across sectors.
Stakeholders were also often more willing to provide comments than assume responsibility for implementing actions.
To overcome these barriers, participants were encouraged to think beyond their own areas of interest, by engaging with wider areas of the strategy and the implementation plan, by encouraging them to move to other stations in the marketplace methodology employed.
To move beyond simply commenting on issues, stakeholders were requested to identify specific entities or individuals who could take on responsibilities for certain activities listed in the implementation plan.
These were then discussed further and verified to ensure approval by key stakeholders.
The municipal project prioritisation exercise outlined in Section 4 was an important tool for ensuring inclusivity and openness in stakeholder engagement for revising the DCCS.
A further key enabler for implementation was the transition of key stakeholders’ attitudes to the plan, once implementation commenced.
When baseline data for the different projects listed in the implementation plan was requested, the plan transitioned from being viewed as a theoretical plan on paper to the need for action by stakeholders.
This drove project leads to provide practical and relevant feedback on the different projects.
Prior to this baseline data-collection step, the municipal climate change team drafted many of the detailed data points in the implementation plan.
However, once the implementation plan was initiated, the buy-in of relevant project stakeholders noticeably increased.
Tailoring the projects to be more relevant to the daily work of responsible officials, but highlighting linkages across programmes and sectors, helped the process of buy-in.
Thus, a key overall lesson learnt, which was also highlighted in related literature (e.g., Castan Broto & Westman, 2019), is rather than being viewed in isolation, it is critical to focus on the multifaceted interlinkages between strategies and outcomes and the opportunities to address them simultaneously.
5.4 Securing funds for implementation Securing funds for developing climate change strategies and actions is particularly challenging for many resourceand capacity-constrained municipalities of the Global South.
This presents a major barrier to advancing urban resilience agendas (Bahadur & Tanner, 2021).
A final key learning area resulting from the DCCS is the importance of prioritising efforts to source funding for the implementation plan and the role of intermediaries (appointed consultants) in supporting this.
One of the core responsibilities of the consulting team was to identify potential local and international funding sources for DCCS activities.
This proved to be a key driver for implementation, as the consultants were able to assist the municipality to source significant additional funding, particularly through various international climate financing streams.
It clearly highlighted the importance of dedicating resources to identify and support applications for additional climate finance.
As a result, securing capacity for this role is one of the core projects in the DCCS Implementation Plan.
Municipal officials from the DCCS Subcommittee were supported in developing funding concept notes through the climate finance training course9 developed by the consultant (McKenzie et al., in prep).
Several project concepts have already successfully acquired financing, with others in the process of securing further funding.
6.
CONCLUSION This article focused on understanding lessons learnt in the process of reviewing the Durban Climate Change Strategy and developing a detailed implementation plan that are relevant to municipal authorities, climate change practitioners, and other stakeholders in the Global South.
The article provided a summary of the methods used during the strategy review process, followed by a critical discussion of the principal lessons learnt through this process in terms of enablers and barriers, with a view to adding insight into the complexity of municipal climate change planning in the Global South.
The process of reviewing the DCCS and developing the Integrated Implementation Plan has faced significant barriers such as the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and consequent budget restrictions.
However, by partnering with excellent service providers, a committed climate change secretariat and the engagement of City-wide champions underpinned by an enabling environment and 9 The training course is accredited for continuous professional development within the South African Council for Applied and Natural Science Professionals.
A Climate Emergency Training Course was also developed and similarly accredited, including with the Engineering Council of South Africa.
O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 95 strategic urbanism, the journey was successfully completed with Council approval of the DCCS on 23 June 2022.
The DCCS is highly significant for supporting Durban’s journey towards transformative resilience, as it provides a roadmap for the Municipality of appropriate adaptation and mitigation responses for addressing climate change and clearly specifies the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholder groups for implementation.
Following council approval, the next phase is implementation, which entails multiple levels of complexity beyond those experienced with strategy development.
However, the DCCS and the lessons learnt and key messages through its development provide important foundational principles for supporting implementation.
The findings presented in this article have significant practical and policy implications and provide important conceptual insights for building transformative resilience in challenging governance contexts.
These key messages and lessons learnt provide a unique and critical contribution to the literature, as they have been gained primarily through practical experience by key authors positioned within the relevant institutions and process of developing the DCCS rather than as external observers.
This article contributes to the literature in the Global South and globally about how the development of climate agendas and conceptual ideas concerning urban transformative resilience emerge in practice through complex configurations and processes.
REFERENCES ANGUELOVSKI, I.
& CARMIN, J.A.
2011.
Something borrowed, everything new: Innovation and institutionalization in urban climate governance.
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 3(3), pp.
169-175.
DOI: 10.1016/j.
cosust.2010.12.017 BAHADUR, A.
& TANNER, T. 2021.
Resilience reset: Creating resilient cities in the global South.
London, UK: Routledge.
https://doi.
org/10.4324/9780429355066 BERRANG-FORD, J.D.
& PATERSON, J.
2011.
Are we adapting to climate change?
Global Environmental Change, 21, pp.
25-33. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.09.012 BINDOFF, N.L., CHEUNG, W.W.L., KAIRO, J.G., ARÍSTEGUI, J., GUINDER, V.A., et al.
2019.
Changing ocean, marine ecosystems, and dependent communities.
In: Pörtner, H.-O., et al.
(Eds).
IPCC special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate.
New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.
447-588.
BORIE, M., PELLING, M., ZIERVOGEL, G. & HYAMS, K. 2019.
Mapping narratives of urban resilience in the global south.
Global Environmental Change, 54, pp.
203-213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2019.01.001 BULKELEY, H. 2012.
Cities and climate change.
London, UK: Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203077207 BULKELEY, H. & BROTO, C. 2013.
Government by experiment?
Global cities and the governing of climate change.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 38(3), pp.
361-375. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00535.x CASTAN BROTO, V. & WESTMAN, L. 2019.
Urban sustainability and justice: Just sustainabilities and environmental planning.
London, UK: Bloomsbury.
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350223776 CHU, E. 2018.
Transnational support for urban climate adaptation: Emerging forms of agency and dependency.
Global Environmental Politics, 18(3), pp.
25-46. https://doi.org/10.1162/ glep_a_00467 DOUWES, J.
2018.
Exploring transformation in local government in a time of environmental change and thresholds: A case study of eThekwini Municipality.
Unpublished Masters dissertation (Social Science), University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
DU TOIT, J., BOSHOFF, N. & MARIETTE, N. 2017.
Normative versus actual methodologies in Planning research: A hybrid picture.
Journal of Planning Education and Research, 37(4), pp.
477-487. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0739456X16658095 FARTHING, S.M.
2016.
Research design in urban planning: A student’s guide.
London: Sage.
https://doi.
org/10.4135/9781473921375 FRIEND, R.M., ANWAR, N.H., DIXIT, A., HUTANUWATR, K., JAYARAMAN, T. et al.
2016.
Re-imagining inclusive urban futures for transformation.
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 20, pp.
67-72. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.cosust.2016.06.001 HODSON, M. & MARVIN, S. 2010.
World cities and climate change: Producing urban ecological security.
Maidenhead, UK: McGraw-Hill.
IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2018a.
Annex I: Glossary.
In: MassonDelmotte, V. et al.
(Eds).
Assessment report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.
541-562. https:// doi.org/10.1017/9781009157940.008 IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2018b.
Summary for policymakers.
In: Masson-Delmotte, V. et al.
(Eds).
Assessment report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.
3-26.
IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2022.
Summary for policymakers.
In: Portner, H.-O.
et al.
(Eds.)
Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.
3-33.
DOI: 10.1017/9781009325844.001 LECK, H. & ROBERTS, D.C. 2015.
What lies beneath: Understanding the invisible aspects of municipal climate change governance.
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 13, pp.
61-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cosust.2015.02.004 LECK, H. & SIMON, D. 2018.
Local authority responses to climate change in South Africa: The challenges of transboundary governance.
Sustainability, 10, pp.
1-18. https://doi.
org/10.3390/su10072542 MACCALLUM, D., BABB, C. & CURTIS, C. 2019.
Doing research in urban and regional planning: Lessons in practical methods.
New York: Routledge.
https://doi.
org/10.4324/9781315818894 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429355066 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429355066 96 O’Donoghue, Morgan, Leck & Haydvogl 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):84-96 MCKENZIE, M.M.
& MORGAN, D. 2020.
Developing the Durban climate change strategy integrated implementation plans: A review of international best practices of M&E framework and reporting tools for climate change monitoring.
Durban: Urban Earth.
MCKENZIE, M.M., O’DONOGHUE, S.H., MORGAN, D., PRESTON, I.
& HAYDVOGL, K. [in prep].
Securing funding for climate change response in Durban.
Financing a just transition to climate neutrality and increased resilience in cities (or human settlements).
MOSER, S. 2009.
Whether our levers are long enough and the fulcrum strong?
Exploring the soft underbelly of adaptation decisions and actions.
In: Adger, W.N., Lorenzoni, I.
& O’Brien, K. (Eds).
Living with climate change: Are there limits to adaptation?
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.
313-343. https://doi.org/10.1017/ CBO9780511596667.021 MUNICIPALITY, E. 2021a.
Durban Adaptation Charter 2021 Annual Report.
Durban: EThekwini Municipality.
MUNICIPALITY, E. 2021b.
Durban State of Biodiversity Report.
Durban: EThekwini Municipality.
O’DONOGHUE, S.H., SOCCI, A.
& ROBERTS, D.C. [in prep-a].
Pathways through adaptation: Lessons from the Durban Adaptation Charter.
O’DONOGHUE, S. H., SOCCI, A., ROBERTS, D. C., KITHIIA, J.
& WANYONI, I.
[in prep-b].
The Durban Adaptation Charter peer-to-peer learning framework.
PELLING, M. 2010.
Adaptation to climate change: From resilience to transformation.
London, UK: Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203889046 PELLING, M., LECK, H., PASQUINI, L., AJIBADE, I., OSUTEYE, E. et al.
2018.
Africa’s urban adaptation transition under a 1.5 degree climate.
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 31, pp.
10-15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cosust.2017.11.005 ROBERTS, D.C. & O’DONOGHUE, S.H.
2013.
Urban environmental challenges and climate change action in Durban, South Africa.
Environment and Urbanisation, 25, pp.
299-319. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0956247813500904 ROBERTS, D.C., DOUWES, J., SUTHERLAND, C. & SIM, V. 2020.
Durban’s 100 resilient cities journey: Governing resilience from within.
Environment and Urbanisation, 32, pp.
1-22. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0956247820946555 ROBERTS, D.C., MORGAN, D., O’DONOGHUE, S.H., GUASTELLA, L., HLONGWA, N. & PRICE, P. 2015.
Durban, South Africa: Working towards transformative adaptation in an African city.
In: Bartlett, S. & Satterthwaite, D. (Eds).
Cities in a finite planet.
London: Routledge, pp.
96-115.
SAREEN, S. & WAAGSAETHER, K.L.
2022.
New municipalism and the governance of urban transitions to sustainability.
Urban Studies Journal, (online first – article published 5 September).
https://doi.
org/10.1177/00420980221114968 SOUTH AFRICA.
2011.
White paper on the national climate change response.
Government Gazette No.
334695, Notice No.
757 of 19 October 2011.
Pretoria: Government Printer.
SUTHERLAND, C., SCOTT, D., NEL, E. & NEL, A.
2018.
Conceptualizing ‘the urban’ through the lens of Durban, South Africa.
Urban Forum, 39, pp.
333-350. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s12132-018-9353-4 TAYLOR, A., SIAME, G. & MWALUKANGA, B.
2021.
Integrating climate risks into strategic urban planning in Lusaka, Zambia.
In: Conway, D. & Vincent, K. (Eds).
Climate risk in Africa.
Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.
1-16. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-61160-6_7 TURPIE, J., LETLEY, G., CHYRSTAL, R., CORBELLA, S. & STRETCH, D. 2017.
Part I: A spatial valuation of the natural and semi-natural open space areas in eThekwini Municipality.
Promoting green urban development in Africa: Enhancing the relationship between urbanization, environmental assets and ecosystem services.
Durban: AECOM on behalf of The World Bank by Anchor Environmental, with support from The Nature Conservancy.
https://doi.
org/10.1596/26765 UN-HABITAT.
2022.
Multi-level governance for effective urban climate action in the Global South.
HS Number: HS/046/21E.
Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT.
VAN DER HEIJDEN, J.
2019.
Studying urban climate governance: Where to begin, what to look for, and how to make a meaningful contribution to scholarship and practice.
Earth System Governance, 1, article number 100005, pp.
1-10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
esg.2019.100005 ZIERVOGEL, G., COWEN, A.
& ZINIADES, J.
2016.
Moving from adaptive to transformative capacity: Building foundations for inclusive, thriving, and regenerative urban settlements.
Sustainability, 8, article number 955. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su8090955 ZIERVOGEL, G., ENQVIST, J., METELERKAMP, J.
& VAN BREDA, J.
2022.
Supporting transformative climate adaptation: Community-level capacity building and knowledge cocreation in South Africa.
Climate Policy, 22(5), pp.
607-622.
DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2020.1863180 _Hlk120625614 _3znysh7 _2et92p0 _tyjcwt _3dy6vkm _1t3h5sf _4d34og8 _2s8eyo1 _17dp8vu _3rdcrjn _26in1rg _lnxbz9 _35nkun2 _1ksv4uv _44sinio _2jxsxqh _z337ya _3j2qqm3 _1y810tw _4i7ojhp _2xcytpi _1ci93xb _3whwml4 _2bn6wsx _qsh70q _3as4poj _1pxezwc _49x2ik5 _Hlk119836992
Youth-led climate strikes: fresh opportunities and enduring challenges for youth research commentary to Bowman URN:NBN:fi:tsv-oa91089 DOI: 10.11143/fennia.91089 Reflections Youth-led climate strikes: fresh opportunities and enduring challenges for youth research – commentary to Bowman BRONWYN ELISABETH WOOD Wood, B. E. (2020) Youth-led climate strikes: fresh opportunities and enduring challenges for youth research – commentary to Bowman.
Fennia 198(1–2) 217–222.
https://doi.org/10.11143/fennia.91089 In this commentary I respond to Benjamin Bowman’s Fennia paper by extending upon his central thesis that argues that the prevailing methodological tools and framings used to research youth political participation perpetuate unhelpful and inadequate dichotomies about youth.
Advancing upon this, I suggest that the youth climate strikes in 2019 highlight three prevalent discourses in youth research relating to climate change: (i) the tendency to view youth as isolated individuals, neglecting the role of adults and communities; (ii) the tendency to focus on individual behavioural change rather than recognise the need for systemic and societal responses to climate change, and (iii) the tendency to overlook structural characteristics of youth such as race, gender and social class.
The resulting discourses of youth autonomy, individualism and homogeneity lead to a distorted picture of young activists and perpetuate harmful narratives which lead to stigma, despair and cynicism.
The paper concludes by advocating for greater care in the research methodologies and critical frameworks we use to report on youth at public events, such as climate strikes, in order to allow for the complexity of the young political agent, the ambiguity of some of their actions and for opportunities that enable young people themselves to articulate their own participation.
Keywords: climate strikes, youth, methodology, climate change, individualism Bronwyn Elisabeth Wood (https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3560-2194), Victoria University of Wellington, Te Herenga Waka, Faculty of Education, P.O.
Box 600, Wellington 6140, New Zealand.
E-mail: Bronwyn.Wood@vuw.ac.nz.
Introduction The scale of youth-led and youth participation in the protests for climate action in 2019 (variously known as StudentStrike4Climate (SS4C), FridaysForFuture or Youth Strike4Climate) warranted considerable attention with the final global strike amassing more than six million people in countries as diverse as Ghana, Brazil, Samoa and the Philippines (Taylor et al.
2019).
In my country of New Zealand, I joined more than 3.5% of the population taking to the streets on September 27 to demand urgent action on the escalating ecological crisis (Taylor et al.
2019).
Yet what does this wide-scale youth activism mean for climate action and for researchers?
And what insights can we glean from © 2020 by the author.
This open access article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
218 Reflections FENNIA 198(1–2) (2020) the 2019 climate strikes about how young people are represented, researched and discussed?
In this commentary I take a lead from Bowman’s (2019) paper recently published in Fennia to examine the 2019 climate strikes and consider some of the opportunities and challenges they present to researchers of children and young people.
As researchers, we have been left somewhat on the backfoot in capturing the youth-led climate strike social movement.
Bowman’s (2019) paper makes an important early contribution to this emerging field of research.
His paper responds to Wahlstrom and colleagues’ (2019) report on the March 15, 2019 climate strikes in 13 countries in Europe which is, to-date, the most extensive survey of protest participants in Europe.
Whilst recognising the significant contribution of this report, Bowman critiques the adult-led and binary framing of the political action of young people used in the report arguing that it overlooks the complexity of youth politics.
For example, he argues that the focus on emotions of ‘worry’ and ‘anger’ overlook the joy and sense of fun that characterised many of the protests.
In addition, the construction of binaries such as ‘instrumental’ or ‘expressive’ motivations for protesting perpetuate a false dichotomy that centres on older and more traditional notions of politics.
Bowman (2019) proposes that such narratives overlook the significant work by researchers in youth politics which have pointed to the importance of understanding Do-It-Ourselves forms of political participation (Pickard 2019) and the lived, ‘everyday politics’ of young people how these inform our understanding of young citizens (O'Toole et al.
2003; Bang 2004; Harris et al.
2010; Wood 2012, 2014; Kallio & Häkli 2013).
A key argument Bowman makes is that the prevailing methodological tools and framings used to research youth political participation perpetuate unhelpful and inadequate dichotomies (active/non-active; formal/informal) about youth.
In response, he suggests that we need methodological approaches and theoretical frames that are better equipped to deal with the complexity of the young political agent, the ambiguity of some of their actions and opportunities that enable young people themselves to articulate their own participation.
Three research challenges Research into the climate strikes does present some unique challenges to researchers – not least because of the scale, the spontaneity and the short-term nature of the protest action itself which allows little time for preparation and follow up – but also because of the immediate attention it demanded due to the intense media and adult scrutiny on young people.
In my commentary I take up Bowman’s challenge and use the climate strikes as a starting point to consider three ongoing challenges for research in this emerging field.
These challenges sit at the intersection of our responses to issues of environmental degradation and climate change and how we research youth in general, as well as their involvement in the strikes.
From my perspective, these are closely related and as I will argue, deeper understandings of both are required.
Youth – isolated, alone and angry: where are the adults?
One of the most significant elements of the 2019 climate protests is that they were youth-led.
This generated considerable interest in how young people, who had no experience of political organising, managed to co-ordinate national and global level protests of such scale (Thomas et al.
2019).
The novelty of this youth-led focus merited much attention and indeed more research is needed into how this movement was mobilised by young people within and across nations.
This focus on youth as political agents is part of a wider growing interest in the past two decades on children and young people as young social agents and political actors (Holloway et al.
2010).
Yet, this attention has at times come at the detriment of a wider awareness of young people’s broader connections in communities and their relationships with others.
The focus on youth alone has led to a tendency to celebrate agency and view youth as isolated, bounded, individual subjects.
I agree with others who suggest that at times this has had “too sharp and too exclusive a focus on the standpoints of young people” (Fielding 2007, 304).
This attention has at times overstated the autonomy of youth participation and understated the powerful roles that adults play – especially in the context of families and regulated spaces such as schools (Wyness 2013; Bartos 2015; Wood et al.
2018).
219FENNIA 198(1–2) (2020) Bronwyn Elisabeth Wood This focus on youth alone was notable in some of the media reporting of youth climate protests.
Such reporting often used a generational analysis to conclude that the strikes represented an angry young generation – isolated and alone (The Guardian 2019) and often in opposition to adults who had created the environmental mess.
This was a feature of much media where students were pitted against adults in an oppositional response, such as Jemima Grimmer, 13, in Sydney who stated: “Adults are, like, ‘Respect your elders.’ And we’re, like, ‘Respect our futures.
You know, it’s a two-way street, respect, and I’m angry that I have to be here.” (Sengupta 2019).
Such reporting overlooked the intergenerational responses which did exist in all of the protests (Carrington 2019) and is essential if issues of climate justice are to be addressed.
Youth are not isolated individuals and nor does their knowledge, skills and actions stem from a world removed from adults.
Instead, it is more useful to see the strikes are part of a wider inter-generational globally-connected form of political organising (Thomas et al.
2019) that has had a much longer presence than the events of 2019.
This is challenging for researchers who struggle to adequately capture the community and intergenerational elements of young people’s lives as this requires a more wholistic vision and significantly more time in the field than a one-off interview with a protesting individual.
However, this is more important than it might appear, because the complexity of climate change and its solutions require many people, diverse communities and multiple-pronged approaches.
In the same way, we as researchers require a bigger vision to explore the inter-related, networked and relational elements of young people’s lives more accurately (Mannion 2007; Bartos 2012, 2013; Holloway et al.
2019; Wood & Kallio 2019).
In addition, we need to remember the significance that everyday interactions and familiar spatial and social practices hold in creating environmental awareness and a desire to care, protect and nurture places of belonging that may be under threat, and not merely focus on one-off high profile events (Bartos & Wood 2017).
Focus on Individual Behavioural Change Closely linked to the first challenge is a prevailing tendency in discourses of climate change to focus on the individual and their associated actions to address environmental damage and climate change.
Known as Individual Behavioural Change (IBC) (or sometimes ABC (Attitude-BehaviourChoice), the responsibility for responding to climate change is thought to lie with individuals whose behavioural change will make the difference (Shove 2010).
This common approach focuses on an individual’s own actions to reduce environmental and climate impacts – such as recycling, using reusable bags, reducing carbon footprint, eating less meat and so on.
While this has some merits, it has been found to be closely associated with growing levels of ‘eco-anxiety’, guilt and despair amongst children, young people and climate activists (Christensen 2019; Lawton 2019; Nairn 2019; Thomas et al.
2019).
These prevailing and individualising anxieties make their way into how we research, with a good example being the Wahlström and colleagues (2019) report which overlooked the joyful and hopeful aspects of the climate strikes, focusing instead on anxiety, fear and hopelessness due to the narrow framing of the methodology (Bowman 2019).
In the same way, discourses about individual behavioural change heighten feelings of guilt and normalise eco-anxiety as a constant state of inadequacy by placing far too much weight on the individual’s own responses.
IBC is highly problematic as a solution as it ignores the structural and systemic political and economic systems responsible for thousands of years of environmental degradation and exploitation and suggests that an individual can address this through their carbon-reducing behavioural change (Shove 2010; Rice et al.
2015; Christensen 2019).
As Maniates (2001, 33) explains: When responsibility for environmental problems is individualized, there is little room to ponder institutions, the nature and exercise of political power, or ways of collectively changing the distribution of power and influence in society — to, in other words, “think institutionally.”  Christensen’s (2019) study of climate activists in Auckland, New Zealand confirms this pattern.
She showed that an IBC approach detracted young people from deeper engagement with the difficult 220 Reflections FENNIA 198(1–2) (2020) work of thinking about the underlying causes of climate change, including the emotional work involved in imagining different and new alternatives to current socio-economic and socio-political realities.
Another New Zealand-based study of climate activists also reported high levels of despair, burnout and eco-anxiety, but found hope through recognising the strength that collective, rather than individual, responses that climate change could bring (Nairn 2019).
These studies suggest that researchers need to pay far more attention to the imaginations of young activists themselves and allow possibilities to see collective hope and solidarity, not only despair and the need to embed this in theoretical and methodological frameworks.
This brings us to a third challenge for researchers engaged in climate change politics – the need to consider the collective rather than individual identities of young protesters.
Focus on structural and identity politics Bowman (2019) highlights the importance of knowing more about the classed, raced and gendered characteristics of climate strike participants.
While there was no data on race from the protests in Europe (Wahlström et al.
2019), the report identified a higher number of female protesters than male and some indication that they were from middle class or well-educated backgrounds with 73% with a parent with at least one university degree (Wahlström et al.
2019).
This pattern confirms earlier studies of young people interested in environmental issues, which report similar high female and middleclass representation (Chawla 2007; Kraus et al.
2012; Eom et al.
2018).
For example, a survey of members of Generation Zero, a youth-led environmental activist group in New Zealand, found a largely homogenous membership made up of middle-class, European-origin young people with Green Party political affiliations (Dodson & Papoutsaki 2017).
The authors of this study conclude that a wider adoption of pro-environmental attitudes, beliefs and engagement will remain rather limited unless it can expand from this rather narrow and homogenous support base.
In addition, while studies suggest climate change holds more interest to higher socio-economic groups, questions are raised about whether this apparent lack of interest may reflect deeper structural barriers – such as limited time and resources – for lower SES people who therefore do not have the luxury (or sense of control over external forces) to act on beliefs (Kraus et al.
2012).
Whilst information about structural forces, social groups, gender, race and class are invaluable, in recent times, youth studies have frequently limited a focus on these variables (France et al.
2018).
In fact, some have gone so far as to say that ‘class is dead’ (Pakulski & Waters 1996) – a ‘zombie category’ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002) that holds little relevance to youth today, with some advocating for a much greater focus on social generation (Woodman 2009).
These debates highlight the importance of gathering thorough and careful data about climate strike participants in ways that provide deeper insights into the communities that young people represent and the extent to which they are shaped by broad structural forces which characterise gender, class and race.
This may reveal further the limitations of narrow individualist characteristics in explaining why and how young people are involved in environmental climate strikes.
Conclusion In sum, some incredible opportunities are available for researchers to engage with the climate strikes and the role young citizens played in these.
However, building on Bowman’s (2019) argument, I have also identified some of the prevailing discourses of youth autonomy, individualism and weak notions of community, social groups and structural forces that were present in the representation of young participants in the climate strikes.
Such approaches can lead to a distorted picture of young activists and perpetuate harmful narratives which lead to despair and cynicism.
These narrow frameworks also give rise to limited notions of youth themselves and the ways they are understood as young citizens.
Paying attention to the research methodologies we choose, the critical frameworks we use and the unintended consequences of how we report (such as those heightening feelings of helplessness and despair (see Thomas et al.
2019 for more on this argument)), is one contribution we can make to 221FENNIA 198(1–2) (2020) Bronwyn Elisabeth Wood provide more nuanced and accurate representation of youth and climate change justice.
As Christensen (2019, 85) states: Future research in this area should focus on what methods of engagement are useful and productive for channelling young people’s fears and anxieties into resilience and motivation about creating new ways of thinking, operating, organizing and feeling in this time of climate transformation.
References Bang, H. (2004) Everyday makers and expert citizens: building political not social capital.
Australia National University, School of Social Science, Australia.
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/ bitstream/1885/42117/2/Henrik.pdf Bartos, A. E. (2012) Children caring for their worlds: the politics of care and childhood.
Political Geography 31(3) 157–166.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.12.003 Bartos, A. E. (2013) Friendship and environmental politics in childhood.
Space and Polity 17(1) 17–32.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2013.780711 Bartos, A. E. (2015) Children and young people’s political participation: a critical analysis.
In Kallio, K. P., Mills, S. & Skelton, T.
(eds.)
Politics, Citizenship and Rights, 1–15.
Springer Singapore, Singapore.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4585-94-1_1-1 Bartos, A. E. & Wood, B. E. (2017) Ecological wellbeing, childhood, and climate change In Ergler, C., Kearns, R. & Witten, K.
(eds.)
Children’s Health and Wellbeing in Urban Environments, 234–246.
Routledge, Oxon and New York.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315571560-17 Beck, U.
& Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) Individualization.
Sage, London.
Bowman, B.
(2019) Imagining future worlds alongside young climate activists: a new framework for research.
Fennia 197(2) 295–305.
https://doi.org/10.11143/fennia.85151 Carrington, D. (2019) Parents around the world mobilise behind youth climate strikes.
The Guardian 3.4.2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/03/parents-around-the-worldmobilise-behind-youth-climate-strikes>.
5.3.2020.
Chawla, L. (2007) Childhood experiences associated with care for the natural world: a theoretical framework for empirical results.
Children, Youth and Environments 17(4) 144–170.
Christensen, E. (2019) Fearful of the future and paranoid about the present: the emotional geographies of young climate activists in Auckland, New Zealand.
Master thesis.
University of Auckland, Auckland.
Dodson, G. & Papoutsaki, E. (2017) Youth-led activism and political engagement in New Zealand: a survey of Generation Zero.
Communication Research and Practice 3(2) 194–211.
https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2016.1228994 Eom, K., Kim, H. S. & Sherman, D. K. (2018) Social class, control, and action: socioeconomic status differences in antecedents of support for pro-environmental action.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 77 60–75.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.009 Fielding, M. (2007) 'Beyond voice': new roles, relations and contexts in researching with young people.
Discourse: Studies in the cultural politics of education 28(3) 301–310.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01596300701458780 France, A., Roberts, S. & Wood, B.
(2018) Youth, social class and privilege in the antipodes: towards a new research agenda for youth sociology.
Journal of Sociology 54(3) 362–380.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783318786580 Harris, A., Wyn, J.
& Younes, S. (2010) Beyond apathetic or activist youth: 'ordinary' young people and contemporary forms of participation.
Young 18(1) 9–32.
https://doi.org/10.1177/110330880901800103 Holloway, S. L., Holt, L. & Mills, S. (2019) Questions of agency: capacity, subjectivity, spatiality and temporality.
Progress in Human Geography 43(3) 458–477.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132518757654 Kallio, K. P. & Häkli, J.
(2013) Children and young people's politics in everyday life.
Space and Polity 17(1) 1–16.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2013.780710 Kraus, M. W., Piff, P. K., Mendoza-Denton, R., Rheinschmidt, M. L. & Keltner, D. (2012) Social class, solipsism, and contextualism: how the rich are different from the poor.
Psychological Review 119(3) 546–572.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028756 Lawton, G. (2019) I have eco-anxiety but that's normal.
New Scientist 244(3251) 22–22.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(19)31914-1 Maniates, M. (2001) Individualization: plant a tree, ride a bike, save the world?
Global Environmental Politics 1(3) 31–52.
https://doi.org/10.1162/152638001316881395 222 Reflections FENNIA 198(1–2) (2020) Mannion, G. (2007) Going spatial, going relational: why 'listening to children' and children's participation needs reframing.
Discourse: Studies in the cultural politics of education 28(3) 405–420.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01596300701458970 Nairn, K. (2019) Learning from young people engaged in climate activism: the potential of collectivizing despair and hope.
Young 27(5) 435–450.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1103308818817603 O'Toole, T., Lister, M., Marsh, D., Jones, S. & McDonagh, A.
(2003) Turning out or left out?
: participation and non-participation among young people.
Contemporary Politics 9(1) 45–61.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1356977032000072477 Pakulski, J.
& Waters, M. (1996) The Death of Class.
Sage, London.
Pickard, S. (2019) Politics, Protest and Young People: Political Participation and Dissent in 21st Century Britain.
Palgrave MacMillan, London.
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57788-7 Rice, J. L., Burke, B. J.
& Heynen, N. (2015) Knowing climate change, embodying climate praxis: experiential knowledge in Southern Appalachia.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 105(2) 253–262.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2014.985628 Sengupta, S. (2019) Protesting climate change, young people take to the streets in a global strike.
The New York Times 20.9.2019 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/climate/global-climate-strike.html>.
6.3.2020.
Shove, E. (2010) Beyond the ABC: climate change policy and theories of social change.
Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 42(6) 1273–1285.
https://doi.org/10.1068/a42282 Taylor, M., Watts, J.
& Bartlett, J.
(2019) Climate crisis: 6 million people join in latest wave of global protests.
The Guardian 27.9.2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/27/climatecrisis-6-million-people-join-latest-wave-of-worldwide-protests>.
6.3.2020.
The Guardian (2019) Climate change and a betrayed generation 1.3.2019 <https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2019/mar/01/youth-climate-change-strikers-open-letter-to-world-leaders>.
3.2.2019.
Thomas, A., Cretney, R. & Hayward, B.
(2019) Student Strike 4 Climate: justice, emergency and citizenship.
New Zealand Geographer 75(2) 96–100.
https://doi.org/10.1111/nzg.12229 Wahlström, M., Kocyba, P., De Vydt, M. & De Moor, J.
(2019) Protest for a future: composition, mobilization and motives of the participants in Fridays For Future climate protests on 15 March, 2019 in 13 European cities.
<http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/6571/7/20190709_Protest%20for%20a%20 future_GCS%20Descriptive%20Report.pdf> Wood, B. E. (2012) Crafted within liminal places: young people's everyday politics.
Political Geography 31(6) 337–346.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.05.003 Wood, B. E. (2014) Researching the everyday: young people’s experiences and expressions of citizenship.
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 27(2) 214–232.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2012.737047 Wood, B. E. & Kallio, K. P. (2019) Green citizenship: towards spatial and lived perspectives.
In Divoudi, S., Cowell, R., White, I.
& Blanco, H.
(eds.)
The Routledge Companion to Environmental Planning.
Routledge, London and New York.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315179780-18 Wood, B. E., Taylor, R. & Atkins, R. (2018) Student voice, citizenship and regulated Spaces.
In Bourke, R. & Loveridge, J.
(eds.)
Radical Collegiality Through Student Voice: Educational Experience, Policy and Practice, 179–196.
Springer Singapore, Singapore.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1858-0_11 Woodman, D. (2009) The mysterious case of the pervasive choice biography: Ulrich Beck, structure/ agency, and the middling state of theory in the sociology of youth.
Journal of Youth Studies 12(3) 243–256.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260902807227 Wyness, M. (2013) Children’s participation and intergenerational dialogue: bringing adults back into the analysis.
Childhood 20(4) 429–442.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0907568212459775
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 1 (1): 73–75, April 2018 CONVERSATIONS 1: Climate Change Reflections on International Climate Diplomacy Nitin Desai  The origins of climate diplomacy lie in the alarm bells rung by climate scientists at Villach in 1985.
This led to the convening of two influential climate conferences and to the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988 and the call for a climate convention (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC).
Negotiations for the UNFCCC ran parallel to the preparatory process for the Rio Earth Summit and the Convention was opened for signature at Rio.
It was merely a framework that did not impose any binding obligations on emission reductions on the parties, except for the indicative goal of holding emissions at 1990 levels by 2000.
The negotiations were a battle between Europe, which wanted mandatory commitments, and the US—led at that time by a president beholden to oil and coal interests—which resisted this.
Within the G-77, interests were widely divided— small islands argued for immediate and strong action; oil producers resisted action, to protect their economic prospects; and large emerging economies, led by India, did not want constraints on their development ambitions.
The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ was enshrined in the UNFCCC, and has now become central to the negotiating stance of China, India, and other developing countries.
When it became clear that the indicative targets would not be met, the pressure for stronger action led finally to the Kyoto Protocol, in which industrial countries accepted binding obligations on emission reductions by 2008–2012.
That also brought developing countries indirectly into the mitigation effort through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
The Kyoto Protocol was not a mitigation plan worked out on the basis of goals for allowable temperature increase and related emission targets—it was a bazaar bargain, with the distribution of mitigation effort  (former) Under Secretary General, Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, B63 Defence Colony,1st floor, New Delhi 110024; desaind@gmail.com Copyright © Desai 2018.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v1i1.17 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v1i1.17 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [74] between industrial countries reflecting negotiating skills and nerves rather than objective criteria.
Towards the end of the Kyoto period, a fresh round of negotiations was launched at Bali in December 2007.
But by this time, the dynamics of climate diplomacy had changed substantially.
The focus had shifted to China, where the combination of rapid growth and coal dependence has led to a rapid increase in emissions.
The pressure on India is a consequence of this concern over the growth in China’s emissions.
The basic argument is that any reasonable goal for allowable temperature increase is unattainable unless the large emerging economies join in the mitigation effort.
Concerns about global competitiveness reinforced this pressure from the West.
Climate diplomacy is now dominated by what could be called a 40:40:20 power structure, the unit of measure being each country’s contribution to GHG emissions.
The first 40 per cent includes the two largest emitters, the US and China, who have de facto veto power, because any mitigation agreement would become pointless if both of them stay out.
The second 40 per cent consists of the EU, a 10 per cent power; Russia, Japan and India, each of them a 5 per cent power; and a string of 2 per cent powers like Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, etc.
The last 20 per cent covers the smaller states, whose influence comes from their membership in some larger group, like the Association of Small Island States or the African Group.
Ratifying governments welcomed the Paris Climate Summit of December 2015 as pathbreaking, and the media and lay opinion found it reasonably good, but activists considered it inadequate.
Now with Trump in power in Washington, the elation that greeted the agreement is perhaps seen as premature.
An effective agreement on climate change should include a goal for the acceptable limit for the increase in temperature.
The Paris Agreement does that, with its 2 °C goal and 1.5 °C aspiration.
It should include a greenhouse gas (GHG) budget for the distribution of allowable global emissions between countries and a time profile of GHG emissions consistent with the accepted goal.
That the Paris Agreement does not do, as it leaves mitigation effort to the voluntary pledges of each country.
As a corollary, the agreement has moved away from the flexibility mechanisms that existed earlier.
But it does have some of the other ingredients required, like the treatment of forestry and land use changes, support adaptation actions, and financial and technology transfer commitments.
In terms of outcomes, do the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) meet the tests of effectiveness and equity?
The Emissions Gap Report (UNEP 2016) suggests that the INDCs do present a significant reduction compared to a projection of current policies, but the proposed mitigation contributions are far from enough to keep us on the 2 °C pathway.
The estimated gap between the unconditional promises and the 2 °C path is 14 gigatons of carbon-dioxide-equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2030 and 7 GtCO2e in 2025.
[75] Nitin Desai The INDCs are meant to be fair and adequate.
There is no agreed metric for INDCs, and evaluation has been left to non-governmental organizations (NGO).
According to one such report (Climate Equity Reference Project 2015), the pledges from poorer countries amount to 10.1 GtCO2e, well in excess of their estimated fair share of 6.6 GtCO2e, while rich country pledges amount to only 5.5 GtCO2e, against their fair share of 24.2 GtCO2e.
This assessment is based on production emissions; the gap would widen if the assessment were based on consumption emissions.
The INDCs that have been submitted are basically energy policy plans.
The key to averting the worst consequences of climate change lies in incentivizing a shift to low-carbon strategies for energy use through technology development, pricing reforms that reflect the social cost of carbon reform, and a reconsideration of regulatory policies from a carbon perspective.
The future will belong to those who move most rapidly to this reorientation of development.
REFERENCES Climate Equity Reference Project.
2015.
“Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs.” November.
Accessed online at http://civilsocietyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CSO_FullReport.pdf UNEP.
2016.
“Emissions Gap Report.” November.
Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme.
Accessed online at http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10016/emission_gap_re port_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Adaptive Governance and Sub-national Climate Change Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa and Punjab Provinces in Pakistan Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 81 University of Bamberg Press Adaptive Governance and Sub-national Climate Change Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Khyber Pukhtunkhawa and Punjab Provinces in Pakistan Authors: Muhammad Mumtaz1 and Saleem H. Ali2 1 PhD Research Fellow, São Paulo School of Management, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil 2 Professor, Energy and the Environment, University of Delaware, USA E-mail: mumtaz86@hotmail.com This study explores the adaptive governance and effective implementation of climate policies at the subnational level in a developing country context.
We focused on Pakistan as our central case as it is considered one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change and has also gone through a recent governance devolution process.
This study is conducted to investigate climate governance at subnational level in Pakistan by looking at the province of Punjab and Khyber Pukhtunkhawah (KPK).
We employ the Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework for this study.
The framework as methodology is important to uncover the complexity of adaptive governance at subnational level after devolution and transformation of environmental institutions in Pakistan.
Different aspects of governance such as engagement of local actors, activism of political leadership, awareness campaigns, and capacity building are the notable initiatives in the provinces.
The study identifies the differences of initiatives in these provinces are manifest in subnational climate change policy differentiation, research capacity and institutional maturity.
The study finds that the provincial government of the KPK follows more participatory and decentralized approach while Punjab is more centralized.
The IAD framework provided an effective means of understanding these complex differences in outcome and scale.
Keywords: Framework, climate change, institutions, governance, Pakistan Introduction Climate change poses serious existential threats to Pakistan’s wellbeing and is considered one of the most serious national crises in Pakistan (Salik et al.
2015).
Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate change stems from its diverse geographical and climatic conditions (Rasul et al.
2012) .
Climate change has caused various disasters in the form of floods, droughts, and other natural calamities in the country over the past two decades (Banuri et al.
2012) Climate change is particularly a real challenge for the agrarian economy of Pakistan which comprises the most significant economic and livelihood sector (Rasul et al.
2012).
Food security of millions of Pakistanis is dependent on climate, which is highly sensitive to changes, keeping in view the important role of the agriculture sector which provides 45% of total employment in the country (Muhammad Abid et al.
2011; Pervin et al.
2013) To manage the potentially fatal consequences of climate change, Pakistani national government responded with various national policy initiatives.
These major initiatives are in the form of National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) of Pakistan and Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy.
Both these documents mainly focused on adaptation measures.
The NCCP clearly states that “Adaptation effort is the focus of this document” (NCCP 2012: P6) Pakistan is ranked in the list of the countries that have the least adaptive capacity due to extreme poverty and lack of physical and financial resources (Muhammad Abid et al.
2011; Adger et al.
2007; http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 mailto:mumtaz86@hotmail.com Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 82 University of Bamberg Press Weber and Khademian 2008).
The subnational governments in Pakistan are principally responsible for implementation of climate change adaptation strategies.
Subnational governments are key and more effective in curbing climate change due to their proximity to the consequences of climate change ( Puppim de Oliveira 2019) Pakistan recognizes the important role of subnational governments/provinces for effective response to climate change.
After the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010, the responsibility of implementing climate change policies rests with respective provinces/subnational governments in the country.
The objective of this study is to investigate adaptive governance by studying the case of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhawa in the agricultural sector.
This study focuses to identify the key adaptive governance initiatives in agriculture sector in both provinces.
The following sections present, background of climate adaptive governance, Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework, research methodology, analysis of our study cases, and conclusion.
Background of Climate Adaptation Governance Historical evidence from a wide variety of sources informs us that there is a strong linkage between the social and ecological systems (SESs) in the context of climate change; sustainable outcomes require an integrative approach to understanding ecosystem governance (Folke et al.
2005).
Global warming and increased rates of biodiversity loss tell us that the SESs do not and cannot exist in isolation; they are highly interconnected (Berkes 2002).
This complexity of the system is further complicated by human decisions for not taking proactive scientific decisions.
These complications emerged as results of not properly managing the SESs while promoting free market capitalism and dealing with the global economic, ecological and social capitals (Zia 2013).
The field of Environmental Governance (EG) emerged as a means of understanding sustainable natural resource use patterns and managing the complexity of the SESs.
The EG literature is considered as a link between the social and the ecological, and a mechanism to influence the trajectory of the SESs (Folke et al.
2005).
The EG is a “set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” (Folke et al.
2005).
Other scholars define EG differently.
For instance, Kay et al.
(2001) define it as the process of resolving trade-offs and to provide a vision and direction toward sustainability (Chaffin et al.
2014) consider that “…EG is the system of institutions, including rules, laws, regulations, policies, and social norms, and organizations involved in governing environmental resource use and/or protection, and there are a variety of different approaches”.
Adaptive governance (AG) emerged an important approach to deal with uncertainty and complexity of SESs.
The AG literature emerged from the EG research.
The AG deals with different form of resource management and confronts the complexity and uncertainty associated with rapid environmental change (Chaffin et al.
2014).
The AG is a form of governance which emerged from the theoretical search for modes of managing uncertainty and complexity in SESs (Folke et al.
2005).
The concept of AG gained prominent attention in the scientific community as an alternative form of governance during the last decade (Rijke et al.
2012).
Dietz (2007) first formally coined the term “adaptive governance.” Folke et al.
(2005).described the AG as a strategy to resolve the social conflicts of complex ecosystems while (Chaffin et al.
2014) defines “adaptive governance as a range of interactions between actors, networks, organizations, and institutions emerging in pursuit of a desired state for the SESs”.
Governance systems, especially the top-down or centralized systems, rarely match ecological complexity, especially in the face of rapid environmental change (Chaffin et al.
2014).
Centralized http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 83 University of Bamberg Press governance via top-down directives and centralized policies often fails to generate concrete solutions for highly contextualized situations (Lemos and Agrawal 2006).
More succinctly, (Lemos and Agrawal 2006) argued that the centralized decisions are often falls short in efforts due to largescale ecosystems that cross multiple jurisdictional boundaries.
Due to the governance challenges of a top-down approach, a number of bottom-up governance approaches emerged.
These bottom-up approaches are framed by different groups of local actors, social networks, and as a result of collaboration among community leaders (Lemos and Agrawal 2006).
The bottom-up approaches seem quite effective but these approaches also suffer in coordination due to complex geographies (Cosens et al.
2014).
There are other challenges for bottom-up approaches of governance.
Local governance is not always evidently representative of all stakeholders’ especially marginalized communities, like indigenous communities, who are deprived of rightful access to resources (Cosens et al.
2014).
To fix these challenges, there is a need to bring new approaches of governance which are capable to handle the governance hurdles and the complexity between the SESs components.
The AG is increasingly recognized as a right form of governance to address these challenges and uncertainties (T. Dietz et al.
2003; Folke et al.
2002; Lebel et al.
2006).
The AG addresses uncertainty through continuous learning, involving multiple stakeholders in decision making process and self-organization of governance systems (Rijke et al.
2012).
The learning process is an important component to understand and deal with the complex dynamics and uncertainty associated with such systems (Folke et al.
2005).
This learning process happens due to the interaction among individuals, organizations, institutions and agencies at multiple levels (Olsson et al.
2006).
Such learning facilitates the replication of successful practices from each other and coordination of effective resource utilization.
Various international efforts are taking place to utilize different knowledge system and learning environments for enhancing the capacity building which is dealing with the complex adaptive system (Armitage 2005).
The AG is essentially involved in devolution of management rights and power sharing to ensure the participation of relevant stakeholders in decision making (Folke et al.
2005).
This devolution of rights, delegation of power and responsibilities, and access to heterogeneous local bodies can essentially contribute to the AG (E Ostrom 2005).
The presence of multiple communities contributes to accumulate diverse knowledge by interaction which ultimately enhances the adaptive capacity of the community (E Ostrom 2005).
Decentralized networks have been proven to be effective to confront local problems at local levels (Bodin et al.
2006).
Leadership plays an important role in organizational effectiveness and for the effective governance at local scales.
Leadership is instrumental for collaboration and interaction among different actors at different levels of governance structure.
Such leadership is important to frame change and reorganize to incorporate innovation and keep flexibility to deal with the complex dynamics of the system (Folke et al.
2005).
Further, leaders are important for performing the key functions for the AG like trust building, linking actors, compiling and generating knowledge, establishing links among the networks.
The lack of leadership can lead to inertia in the SESs, while visionary leadership gives directions for positive change and transforming governance.
Along with proactive leadership, transformability is a key aspect of the AG.
Transformability is the capacity to produce a new system when the existing system of social, political, and economic impact remains untenable.
Transformability produces novel components and ways of life from various existing sub-systems to define a new system (Walker et al.
2004).
This transformation has four phases: (1) to prepare the system for change (2) to open an opportunity, (3) http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 84 University of Bamberg Press to navigate and transition and (4) to chart/establish new direction for management to build resilient of the new governance regime.
To evaluate the innovative governance or AG, multiple frameworks and theories can be utilized.
For instance, Zia et al.
(2014) suggest that the generalized autocatalytic set theory can be applied to understand the SESs.
In the developing world where the AG is in nascent stages and not fully evolved, to apply generalized autocatalytic set theory appears too early.
Therefore, in this study we employ the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (E Ostrom 2005) to understand and analyze the AG in two provinces of Pakistan.
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework The IAD framework was originally established in the 1980s by Elinor Ostrom (Cole 2014).
The framework was refined by Ostrom and other scholars in the following decades.
The IAD framework is one of the most distinguished and tested frameworks in the field of policy sciences (Gibson et al.
2005).
The IAD framework is widely used as research methodology to study local management practices (Benson et al.
2013) The IAD framework is presented in figure 1.
It consists of exogenous variables, an action arena, composed of actors located within action situations and affected by a set of external variables.
Actors’ interaction within action situations leads to outcomes, which feedback into the external variables and the action arena.
Figure 1: The IAD framework Source (E Ostrom 2005) Some researchers selected parts of the framework to focus on the action situations leading to interactions and outcomes (McGinnis 2011).
It is a tested and most distinguished framework in the field of policy sciences (Gibson et al.
2005).
The IAD framework is applied in many research disciplines.
For instance, (Abel et al.
2014) applied the IAD framework to study polycentric governance and climate change.
Figure 2 shows how Abel and his colleagues operatized the framework.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 85 University of Bamberg Press Figure 2: State climate policy action situations.
Source (Abel et al.
2014) The core aspect of this framework is the “action arena,” which is composed of action situations and actors.
“Action situation” means social space where actors act, resolve the problems, and exchange the good and services (Elinor Ostrom 2007).
Actors are those who interact in the action situation to address a common problem.
In our study, the action situation is to promote adaptive governance at subnational level to address the issue of climate change.
In the action arena the interests of various stakeholders are discussed and produced or (re)shaped initiatives are presented to tackle the common challenge.
Therefore, in our case, we are examining the actions of two provinces to address adaptive challenges to climate change; the drivers behind these initiatives; and how these initiatives have produced differential outcomes between the provinces.
Methodology A comparative case study approach is employed for this study which is effective in providing a nuanced analysis of differentiated outcomes in organizational studies (De Vaus 2002).
In the initial phase of this study, we collected information from reports, policy documents, internet news archives, physical newspapers, and scientific & academic articles.
A field study is conducted from November 2016 to April 2017.
During this phase, 30 in-depth semi-structured interviews including six initial exploratory interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders in both provinces.
The respondents included policy experts, government officials, think tanks working in the area, nongovernmental organizations, academics, ministry of climate change, and environmental protection agencies in the respective provinces, farmer community, civil society, and climate change activists.
These respondents were chosen because they are directly linked with climate governance in Pakistan.
The list of our respondents is attached in Appendix A.
The provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Punjab were chosen as the sites of the case studies due to three major reasons.
Firstly, both the provinces are highly dependent on the agriculture sector.
Secondly, the provinces shared some common agro-ecological zone.
Therefore, it is expected that both the provincial governments might have taken same kind of initiatives and it http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 86 University of Bamberg Press is easy to compare these two provinces.
Thirdly, it was easy to collect data for from these provinces and they have comparatively better climate governance structure in Pakistan.
The Case Study Areas KPK is the 3rd largest province in the country.
KPK accounts for 11.9% of Pakistan's total population and it contributes to 10% of Pakistan's gross domestic product (GDP).
It has approximately 27.5 million inhabitants (70% rural) and a GDP per capita of USD 1,037.
Agriculture is the major livelihood of the people in the province.
The agriculture sector contributes to 48 percent of the total labor force and 40 percent to the GDP of the province (Khan 2012; Nomman and Schmitz 2011).
Climate change threatens to have adverse impacts on agricultural productivity throughout KPK.
The province is one of the most affected regions due to mega floods back in 2010 in Pakistan.
To deal with the issue of climate change, KPK is set to establish multiple initiatives in compliance with federal policies and plans.
Punjab is the most populous and second largest province of Pakistan.
Punjab is a fertile agricultural region which holds an extensive irrigation network and plays a leading role in the development of the economy (Muhammad Abid et al.
2015).
The province accounts for 56.2% of the total cultivated area, 53% of the total agricultural gross domestic product and 74% of the total cereal production in the country (Badar et al.
2007; PBS n.d.).
Punjab mainly contributes for agricultural sector in the percentage of land (57.2%) in agricultural sector and the percentage share (53% percent) of Pakistan’s agricultural gross domestic product (Hanif et.
al, 2010).
Agriculture sector in Punjab is facing the impacts of climate change (Ahmed et al.
2018).
Adaptation strategies are an important response to climate change.
It has been pointed out that agriculture adaptation measures can reduce losses (Fleischhauer and Bornefeld 2006; Hansen and Jones 2000; Nawaz Khan 2010).
The subnational government of Punjab is taking adaptation steps to tackle climate change.
Findings of the Study In this section the findings of the study will be discussed in the context of the IAD framework in each province.
Action arena In the “action arena” of the IAD, the involvement of relevant stakeholders is vital in our study.
The major stakeholders are provincial governments, farmers’ communities, civil society organizations working in area of climate change, academics, and the federal government.
Provincial Governments Both provinces took steps to tackle the impacts of climate change, especially towards agriculture adaptation.
Climate change policies play an important role in handling the impacts of climate change.
KPK province has established and operationalized its provincial climate change policy whereas Punjab is still in the process of framing its policy.
The main driver behind why KPK has established a provincial climate change policy, but not in Punjab, is identified in this study as the political-will prioritization and sequencing of development tasks.
The political leadership of http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Pakistani_provinces_by_gross_domestic_product Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 87 University of Bamberg Press KPK is actively involved to addresses climate change in the province because it sees this as a means of differentiating itself through self-reliance on its agrarian economy, whereas Punjab sees external economic investment as its key differentiator.
The sharing of knowledge is equally important for climate adaptation.
It is noted that in both the provinces, autonomous adaptation is transferred from one place to another place or from one farmer’s community of one area to another farmer’s community of another area.
There is a need to channel this transformation and the subnational governments have to play their role in order to fully incorporate such autonomous measures in actually government action plans.
Capacity building is important to adapt to climate change.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognizes and highlights the significance of capacity building for effective adaptation and mitigation to climate change.
In the climate change adaptation process, capacity building plays a key role.
This study identified that the importance of capacity building is well recognized in both the provinces, although Punjab is ahead of the KPK in this arena due to its economic development ascendancy.
Both provinces especially the KPK need to enhance capacity building for effective adaptation policies.
Some international governmental organizations like the United Nations Development Programme, the International Union for Conservation of Nature and others are involved in both provinces for climate change adaptation training, policy advocacy, and capacity building.
In parallel with governmental initiatives, the farmers’ community is also taking steps for climate change adaptation in agriculture sector in both the subnational governments.
Farmers’ Community It is important to point out that local farmers are actively involved in autonomous adaptation in both provinces.
The subnational governments encourage the engagement of farmers in climate adaptation policies.
This research study noted that in both the provinces the farmers have changed their planting dates because their crops were badly affected due to heat/rise in temperature or unpredictable rainfall patterns.
Some others have changed their variety of crops as the farmers opt for the crops which are heat tolerant and have fewer damages in case of floods, droughts or heat waves.
Changing fertilizers and planting shade trees are other strategies that have been adopted by the farmers’ community.
The overall textures of the autonomous initiatives in both provinces are fairly similar.
Four important autonomous adaptation initiatives have been identified in this regard: changing planting dates, changing crops types, changing fertilizers, and planting shade trees.
All of these initiatives complemented organizational efforts from the provincial authorities.
Agriculture Extension Departments Agriculture extension departments which work closely with the farmers at local levels collect data from the fields and gives training to the farmers at local levels.
Based on these initiatives, the farmers are able to execute what they learned in their farming practices.
For instance, they are advised that they should plant seeds which have been tested in scientific labs and shown to have the capabilities to survive severe weather conditions.
It is noted that many trained farmers approached the agriculture extension departments to obtain suitable seeds with respect to weather conditions.
We were told by the agriculture extension department in Faisalabad that after attending the training, the farmers’ community is encouraged to approach the department for more information about climate change, suitable seeds, and solutions for damages due to pests etc.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 88 University of Bamberg Press Coordination among relevant line departments is important for the implementation of any policy.
The subnational government of Punjab has established a link among the 26 agriculture institutes throughout the province in order to set up comprehension strategies for climate change and the agriculture sector.
They regularly arrange meetings among these institutes to discuss the new challenges and the existing strategies to manage the negative impacts of climate change.
For instance, Ayub Agricultural Research Institute (AARI), which manages climate change related activities, is well familiar with what is happening in the agriculture extension departments at various levels and vice versa.
By being aware of the activities of agriculture extension departments and others, AARI can disseminate the positive activities among other institutions and set new targets accordingly.
This study identified that agriculture extension departments in Punjab province are active and more established as compared to the province of KPK.
The KPK is behind due to lack of human resources, weak intuitional arrangements, and scarcity of financial resources.
Civil Society Organizations Civil society organizations are playing an important role in both the provinces.
Some international and local non-government organizations are also working in the area of climate change adaptation.
For instance, the climate change research center at Agriculture University Peshawar is a notable research institution in the KPK province.
It is coordinating research activities for climate change, creating linkages with national and international research institutions and to actually train local farmers.
One of the important works of this center is to develop district-wise climate scenarios which are very important for establishment of local adaptation action plans.
Some other international organizations are also providing assistance for policy research and advocacy for climate change adaptations for agriculture sector in the provinces.
These organizations are one of the major pressure groups who push the provincial governments to take concreate action for managing climate change.
Academics Academics are also major stakeholders in both provinces.
People from academia were involved in establishing provincial climate change policies in Punjab and KPK.
Academics play a vital role in handling climate change by producing scientific and academic studies.
These scientific and empirical studies help the respective governments to establish action plans that are adaptive to empirical findings.
Furthermore, these academic institutions are a mean of promoting awareness about climate change through teaching courses on climate change.
For instance, a professor at department of environmental sciences at the University of Peshawar told us that many students have started working on climate change and agriculture sector in recent years due to the course offerings provided.
The professor further highlighted that we are devising curriculum with provincial government so that new courses related to climate change can be offered in academic institutions throughout the province in alignment with skill sets needed by policy makers.
Likewise, in Punjab, the Agricultural University Faisalabad is a leading academic institution that produced many studies on climate change, agriculture and related areas.
These studies contribute to understand the impact of climate change and tell us the future projection of climate change and its likely impacts.
These findings are quite helpful to proactively act against the negative consequences of climate change.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 89 University of Bamberg Press Federal Government-Ministry of Climate Change The Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC) at the federal level is also a stakeholder with provinces to deal with climate change.
The ministry is responsible for dealing with all the climate related material at the international level.
The ministry arranged quarterly meetings with all the provinces and federal units so as to assess the overall progress of Pakistan to address climate change.
The ministry is not directly involved in implementation of climate change policies and action plans.
However, it can give guidance and support to the provinces for effective governance.
After 18th constitutional amendment, provinces are responsible for implementation of climate change and other related policies.
Bureaucratic Interaction A detailed organizational analysis of the bureaucracy for addressing climate change in both provinces allows us to understand the interactions, patterns, and outcomes in the form of governance.
The AG in both provinces is still in a new phase of absorbing and understanding the responsibilities and functions of decentralization.
The provinces got more autonomy in 2010 when the 18th constitutional amendment was promulgated in Pakistan.
To some extent participation from different actors are seen in decision making, establishing a policy, or framing an action plan as a result of the constitutional amendment.
We have seen in this study that local institutions are emerging and are in line to perform more effectively and better interaction is observed among different departments.
Figure 3, presents climate change related institutions in KPK.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 90 University of Bamberg Press Figure 3: Organizational Chart of KPK Climate Change Bureaucracy Note: The lists of members of Advisory Committee and implementation committee are given in Appendix B and Appendix C Environmental Protection Agency Climate Change Cell On Provincial Level Secretary FE&WD Provincial Climate Change Policy Climate Change Action Plan Advisory Committee on PCCP PCCPIC Implementation Committee 17 members from different line departments and academia, technical experts 17 members from different line departments Administration Secretaries Forestry Wildlife Environment http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 91 University of Bamberg Press The figure shows the interactions among various organizational units in KPK while devising provincial climate change policy and dealing with other climate change related matters.
An official at the climate change cell responded that the concerns of all the related departments and stakeholders were fully addressed before sending the policy to cabinet – a point which has been validated by stakeholders as well.
The involvement of related stakeholders clearly shows that the local institutions are getting space in decision making, policy formulation and policy action that allows for more effective adaptive governance in case of climate change shocks Another salient aspect of the KPK’s approach is to involve and incorporate local knowledge and practices in action plans to deal with climate change.
The government is exploring the adaptation strategies of farmers at local level so that their traditional knowledge and effective local practices can be well utilized for upcoming action plans.
Likewise, in Punjab, an official at AARI informed us that they arrange regular meetings of 26 agriculture related research institutions and other relevant stakeholders to discuss and establish common agenda.
To him, each and every department has opportunity to explain its point of view and every view point of every stakeholder is discussed before taking any decision.
For instance, agriculture extension departments bring the challenges and best practices of local farmers, these things are discussed and evaluated within the meeting so that implementable and sustainable strategies can be established.
Figure 4 presents climate change related institutions in Punjab province.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 92 University of Bamberg Press Figure 4: Structure of climate governance in Punjab province.
Source: Punjab Climate Change Policy Draft.
The MoCC at the federal level is also partially involved in the interaction process.
Although, it is not the responsibility of the federal government to formulate and implement aspects of climate change policies and action plans but it oversees the international obligation and legally binding elements of provisions in national laws.
A committee composed of all provinces and federal units’ representation arranges a quarterly meeting at the ministry to discuss the overall achievements to curb climate change in the country.
So far 15 meetings have been arranged at the ministry since its establishment.
Evaluation The IAD framework does not give us a detailed criterion for the evaluation of policies; instead it provides some metrics such as efficiency, equity, finance, accountability, confirmation to the value and sustainability (Nigussie et al.
2018).
To establish the evaluation criteria for this study, the following key dependent variables associated with AG are focused: learning and knowledge sharing mechanism; stakeholder involvement; role of leadership; capacity building, inter-governmental relations; and monitoring evaluation efficacy.
Learning and Knowledge Sharing In our case study, both provincial governments are responsible for formulation and implementation of climate change strategies.
Therefore, both the governments have to promote and share information about climate change in their respective provinces.
Public awareness about climate change is an important factor for climate adaptation.
Public awareness aims to ensure that all relevant regional and sub-regional bodies understand the impacts of, and take action to respond to, certain climate impacts (Awareness Campaigns for Behavioral Change, 2015).
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 93 University of Bamberg Press It has been observed that both the subnational governments have launched public awareness campaigns about climate change in their respective spheres.
Both provinces have achieved success of public awareness up to a certain level.
However, there is still a need to extend the public awareness campaign even further, perhaps even to the union council levels.
The major drivers for promotion of awareness among the masses are to promote knowledge of climate change, to educate farmers and to tackle climate change more effectively.
The sharing of knowledge is important for effective governance.
It is noted that in both the provinces, autonomous adaptation is transferred from one place to another place or from one farmer’s community of one area to another farmer’s community of another area.
However, there is a need to channel this transformation and the subnational governments have to play their role in order to fully incorporate such autonomous measures in actually government action plans.
Stakeholder Involvement The involvement of relevant stakeholders is key for the implementation of effective adaptation strategies.
In this study, the involvement of farmers in establishing actions and plans is highly important.
Adaptation to climate change requires the joint efforts of individuals, businesses, industries, governments and other actors who are confronted by the impacts of climate change (Corfee-Morlot et al.
2009).
Both subnational governments have shown that they are keen to involve the farmers’ community for the establishment of adaptation action plans for the agriculture sector.
The governments are monitoring autonomous adaptation initiatives so that effective initiatives can be incorporated in upcoming action plans.
Role of Leadership Leadership plays a key role in success of climate governance, particularly in hierarchical societies such as Pakistan.
One of the most important factors which influenced the success of climate change governance is the involvement and active interest of the top political leadership (Meadowcroft 2009).
When the political leadership takes a keen interest then things can move forward smoothly.
Imran Khancurrent Prime Minister of Pakistan, with a following among the youth due to his erstwhile role as a famous sportsman, is very concerned about the impacts of climate change and has galvanized major interest to address climate change.
The KPK province is governed by his party and it is considered the most vulnerable to climate change province in Pakistan.
In 2010, KPK was the major victim of the flooding in the country.
It was historical the worst flood in Pakistan.
He has discussed climate change and its impacts on many occasions in Pakistani society.
Based on his personal interest in this matter the KPK established a climate change policy and launched a reforestation project (Billion Tree Tsunami Project) in 2015.
They successfully achieved the targets in 2017 by planting 1 billion saplings in the province.
Capacity Building Capacity building is important to adapt to climate change and the UNFCCC recognizes and highlights the significance of capacity building for effective adaptation and mitigation to climate change.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 94 University of Bamberg Press In our study, the importance of capacity building is well-recognized in both the provinces, although Punjab is ahead of KPK in this respect as shown in the above section.
Both provinces, especially KPK, need to enhance capacity building for effective adaptation policies.
Some international governmental organizations like the United Nations Development Programme, the International Union for Conservation of Nature and others are involved in both provinces for climate change adaptation training, policy advocacy, and capacity building.
Inter-Governmental Relations In the case of Pakistan which has nascent democratic institutions, intergovernmental relations between the federal and provincial levels are very important to deal with climate change.
Before the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010, the federal government was responsible for all climate related matters including establishing climate policies and action plans.
Presently, it is the responsibility of provinces but it is important to get due help and information about climate change.
Moreover, the federal is responsible to present Pakistan at international level.
The study finds that there is weak coordination among the provinces and at the federal level.
Although, there is an evaluation committee at federal level but it’s role is very limited and it could not bring any substantial results.
Likewise, the coordination among the provinces is very weak.
There is a need to establish a strong links among the provinces so that successful actions can be learnt and transferred to another place in other provinces.
The coordination with ministry of climate change is equally important so the actual success/failure can be shared and presented at international level.
Monitoring and Evaluation Monitoring and evaluation are by definition vital for the AG, as only through such mechanisms adaptation can be operationalized.
Monitoring and evaluation helps to improve management decision-making, increase transparency and accountability, and effective implementation plans (Bellamy et al., 2001; Stem et al., 2005).
In both provinces there is a nascent setup for monitoring and evaluation of climate change policy.
For instance, in Punjab at the ARC, they arrange meetings of all 26 agriculture institutions to know the progress and outcome so that further plans can be established.
However, in KPK, there is no such proper system.
Both the governments need to establish a comprehensive and dedicated evaluation and monitoring mechanism so that weaknesses and strengths of the actions can be monitored properly.
Conclusions To uncover the AG in Pakistan remained complex in nature due to confusion in powers and scope of the institutions between the provincial and federal governments.
The establishment of novel institutions at provincial levels after 18th constitutional amendment in Pakistan and political structure in the country are also creating confusion while uncovering the AG.
Provincial governments are responsible for dealing climate change but there are certain institutional complexities to fully understand the AG in Pakistan.
The IAD framework is important; it can help us to explore those complexities and explain the AG at the subnational level in Pakistan.
The concept of AG is in early stages of implementation in Pakistan.
Effective AG emerges smoothly in politically stable and institutionally balanced societies.
However, there is a case for AG as an enabling mechanism is also fostering such stability and thus proactive investment to foster such mechanisms is important in developing countries like Pakistan as well.
To shape the AG in http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 95 University of Bamberg Press countries like Pakistan requires a highly deliberative process, keeping in view Pakistan’s heterogeneous society and the unstable political atmosphere in the country.
However, the evolution/emergence of the AG in the context of climate change has come about with relative success in both KPK and Punjab provinces – which are ruled by different political parties and have divergent economic development priorities.
On the heels of 18th constitutional amendment, at multiple fronts the political and institutional powers have delegated to the provinces at subnational level.
This devolution of power and decentralization provided a foundation for emergence of the AG in the Pakistan.
By utilizing the IAD framework, the study finds local actors are involved in establishing policies and action plans for addressing climate change challenges.
Multiple stakeholders are being involved in climate change governance at subnational levels.
Political leadership is active especially in KPK to promote sound and sustainable mechanisms to address climate change.
The institutions are newly established and lack the specialty but they are considering their responsibilities in both the provinces for effective governance.
The role of academics and voices of civil society are being properly considered to address the challenge of climate change in both provinces.
The differences of initiatives in these provinces are manifest in subnational climate change policy differentiation, research capacity and institutional maturity.
KPK government has developed and officially launched provincial climate change policy, whereas Punjab government is in the process of formulating its policy.
Punjab, however, is ahead in terms of carrying out research work and developing institutional capacity.
The most important initiative of the Punjab government, inter alia, is launching an awareness campaign about climate change by publishing related literature in local languages, establishing a radio station, arranging farmer day, and writing articles for newspapers.
Moreover, the study finds that the provincial government of KPK follows more participatory and decentralized approach while Punjab is more centralized.
There is a room for improvements in order to overcome the weak aspects of the governance in the provinces.
The reforms especially in the legal system, further delegation of power at community level and ensure proper evaluation and monitoring can enhance the AG and transformation of the AG in Pakistan.
References Abel, T. D., Stephan, M., & Daley, D. (2014).
Climate risk polycentricity and the IAD framework.
Abid, M. et al, Scheffran, J., Schneider, U.
A., & Ashfaq, M. (2015).
Farmers’ perceptions of and adaptation strategies to climate change and their determinants: the case of Punjab province, Pakistan.
Earth System Dynamics, 6(1), 225–243.
Abid, M., Ashfaq, M., Hassan, S., & Fatima, N. (2011).
A resource use efficiency analysis of small Bt cotton farmers in Punjab, Pakistan.
Pak.
J. Agric.
Sci, 48(1), 65–71.
Adger, W. N., Agrawala, S., Mirza, M. M. Q., Conde, C., o’Brien, K., Pulhin, J., et al.
(2007).
Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity.
Climate change, 717–743.
Ahmed, I., ur Rahman, M. H., Ahmed, S., Hussain, J., Ullah, A., & Judge, J.
(2018).
Assessing the impact of climate variability on maize using simulation modeling under semi-arid environment of Punjab, Pakistan.
Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 25(28), 28413–28430.
Armitage, D. (2005).
Adaptive capacity and community-based natural resource management.
Environmental management, 35(6), 703–715.
Badar, H., Ghafoor, A., & Adil, S. A.
(2007).
Factors affecting agricultural production of Punjab (Pakistan).
Pak.
J. Agri.
Sci, 44(3).
Banuri, H., Alam, M., Khan, S., Manzoor, J., Ali, B., Khan, Y., et al.
(2012).
An Android runtime security policy enforcement framework.
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 16(6), 631–641.
Benson, D., Jordan, A., & Smith, L. (2013).
Is environmental management really more collaborative?
A comparative analysis of putative ‘paradigm shifts’ in Europe, Australia, and the United States.
Environment and Planning A, 45(7), 1695–1712.
Berkes, F. (2002).
Back to the future: ecosystem dynamics and local knowledge.
Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 96 University of Bamberg Press Bodin, Ö., Crona, B., & Ernstson, H. (2006).
Social networks in natural resource management: what is there to learn from a structural perspective?
Ecology and Society, 11(2).
Chaffin, B. C., Gosnell, H., & Cosens, B.
A.
(2014).
A decade of adaptive governance scholarship: synthesis and future directions.
Ecology and Society, 19(3).
Cole, D. H. (2014).
Formal Institutions and the IAD Framework: Bringing the Law Back In.
Available at SSRN 2471040.
Corfee-Morlot, J., Kamal-Chaoui, L., Donovan, M. G., Cochran, I., Robert, A., & Teasdale, P.-J.
(2009).
Cities, climate change and multilevel governance.
Cosens, B., Gunderson, L., Allen, C., & Benson, M. (2014).
Identifying legal, ecological and governance obstacles, and opportunities for adapting to climate change.
Sustainability, 6(4), 2338–2356.
De Vaus.
(2002).
Surveys in Social Research (5th ed.).
Routledge.
Dietz, K. (2007).
Vulnerabilität und Anpassung gegenüber Klimawandel Ansatzpunkte für eine Multi-Level-GovernanceAnalyse aus der Perspektive der Problemkonstitution.
In Multi-Level-Governance (pp.
161–188).
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003).
The struggle to govern the commons.
science, 302(5652), 1907–1912.
Fleischhauer, M., & Bornefeld, B.
(2006).
Klimawandel und Raumplanung.
Raumforschung und Raumordnung, 64(3), 161–171.
Folke, C., Carpenter, S., Elmqvist, T., Gunderson, L., Holling, C. S., & Walker, B.
(2002).
Resilience and sustainable development: building adaptive capacity in a world of transformations.
AMBIO: A journal of the human environment, 31(5), 437–440.
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., & Norberg, J.
(2005).
Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.
Annu.
Rev.
Environ.
Resour., 30, 441–473.
Gibson, C. C., Andersson, K., Ostrom, E., & Shivakumar, S. (2005).
The Samaritan’s dilemma: the political economy of development aid.
Oxford University Press on Demand.
Hansen, J. W., & Jones, J. W. (2000).
Scaling-up crop models for climate variability applications.
Agricultural Systems, 65(1), 43–72.
doi:Doi 10.1016/S0308-521x(00)00025-1 Khan, S. A.
(2012).
Binding constraints: the role of the army in Pakistan’s economic under-development.
Lebel, L., Anderies, J. M., Campbell, B., Folke, C., Hatfield-Dodds, S., Hughes, T. P., & Wilson, J.
(2006).
Governance and the capacity to manage resilience in regional social-ecological systems.
Ecology and Society, 11(1).
Lemos, M. C., & Agrawal, A.
(2006).
Environmental governance, governance annual reviews environment resources.
Annual Reviews, School of Natural resources and Environment, University of Michigan, 298–303.
McGinnis, M. D. (2011).
An introduction to IAD and the language of the Ostrom workshop: a simple guide to a complex framework.
Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 169–183.
Meadowcroft, J.
(2009).
Climate change governance.
The World Bank.
Mustafa, Z.
(2011).
Climate change and its impact with special focus in Pakistan.
In Pakistan Engineering Congress, Symposium (Vol.
33, p. 290).
Lahore.
National Climate Change Policy (2012).
National climate change policy.
Policy document, Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan.
Nawaz Khan, A.
(2010).
Chapter 10 Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in Pakistan.
In Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction: An Asian perspective (pp.
197–215).
Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Nigussie, Z., Tsunekawa, A., Haregeweyn, N., Adgo, E., Cochrane, L., Floquet, A., & Abele, S. (2018).
Applying Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development framework to soil and water conservation activities in north-western Ethiopia.
Land use policy, 71, 1–10.
Nomman, A. M., & Schmitz, M. (2011).
Economic assessment of the impact of climate change on the agriculture of Pakistan.
Business and Economic Horizons, 4(1), 1–12.
Olsson, P., Gunderson, L. H., Carpenter, S. R., Ryan, P., Lebel, L., Folke, C., & Holling, C. S. (2006).
Shooting the rapids: navigating transitions to adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.
Ecology and society, 11(1).
Ostrom, E. (2005).
Understanding institutional diversity: Princeton Univ Pr.
Ostrom, E. (2007).
A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas.
Proceedings of the national Academy of sciences, 104(39), 15181–15187.
PBS.
(n.d.).
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics: Agricultural statistics of Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan, statistics division, Pakistan bureau of statistics, available at: http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/ agricultural-statistics-pakistan.
last access: 1 August 2014), 2011.
Pervin, M., Sultana, S., Phirum, A., Camara, I. F., Nzau, V. M., Phonnasane, V., et al.
(2013).
A framework for mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning.
International Institute for Environment and Development: London, UK.
Puppim de Oliveira, Jose A.
(2019).
Intergovernmental relations for environmental governance: Cases of solid waste management and climate change in two Malaysian States.
Journal of Environmental Management, 233, 481–488.
Rasul, G., Mahmood, A., Sadiq, A., & Khan, S. I.
(2012).
Vulnerability of the Indus delta to climate change in Pakistan.
Pakistan journal of meteorology, 8(16).
Rijke, J., Brown, R., Zevenbergen, C., Ashley, R., Farrelly, M., Morison, P., & van Herk, S. (2012).
Fit-for-purpose governance: a framework to make adaptive governance operational.
Environmental Science & Policy, 22, 73–84.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 97 University of Bamberg Press Salik, K. M., Ishfaq, S., Saeed, F., Noel, E., & Syed, Q.
(2015).
Pakistan: country situation assessment.
Sustainable Development Policy Institute.
Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S. R., & Kinzig, A.
(2004).
Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social– ecological systems.
Ecology and society, 9(2).
Weber, E. P., & Khademian, A. M. (2008).
Wicked problems, knowledge challenges, and collaborative capacity builders in network settings.
Public administration review, 68(2), 334–349.
Zia, A.
(2013).
Post-Kyoto climate governance: Confronting the politics of scale, ideology and knowledge.
Routledge.
Zia, A., Kauffman, S., Koliba, C., Beckage, B., Vattay, G., Bomblies, A.
(2014) From the Habit of Control to Institutional Enablement: Re-envisioning the Governance of Social-Ecological Systems from the Perspective of Complexity Sciences.
Complexity, Governance and Networks.
1(1): 79-88.
DOI: 10.7564/14-CGN4 http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 98 University of Bamberg Press Appendix A Respondents’ Profiles Responden t ID Respondents' responsibilities/ roles Respondents’ Organization 1 Inspector General Forests Ministry of Climate Change 2 Director General Environment Ministry of Climate Change 3 Charmain and member of board of governance Sustainable Development Policy Institute 4 Professor of Policy Study and Sustainable Development Center for Policy Study, COMSATS University, Islamabad 5 Head of Department Center for Climate Research and development 6 Senior Researcher for agriculture and climate change Global Chang Impact Studies Center 7 Director Agronomic and an active member for climate negotiation and policies in Punjab Ayub Agriculture Research Institute, Faisalabad 8 PhD research student working on climate adaptation and agriculture sector University of Agriculture, Faisalabad 9 Regional Director for agriculture extension department Agriculture Extension Department in Faisalabad 10 Farmer’s community(8interviews) Farmers in Punjab 11 Director working on climate adaptation strategies Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation organization, Peshawar, Pakistan 12 Professor of Environmental Sciences University of Peshawar 13 Deputy Director and involve in framing climate policy in the KPK Center for Climate Change, Peshawar 14 Professor of agriculture and climate change Agriculture University Peshawar 15 Climate change policy researcher Pakistan Forest Institute, Peshawar 16 Director dealing with floods and rescues Provincial Disaster Management Authority, KPK 17 Farmer’s community(7 interviews) Farmers in the KPK http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 99 University of Bamberg Press Appendix B Members for Advisory Committee Source: Climate Change Cell, KPK http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 Complexity, Governance & Networks – Vol.
5, No 1 (2019) Special Issue: Adaptive Governance of Coupled Social-Ecological Systems, p. 81-100 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68 100 University of Bamberg Press Appendix C Members for Implementation Committee Source: Climate Change Cell, KPK http://dx.doi.org/10.20377/cgn-68
215Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.70.3.2 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 2021 (3) 215–231.
Introduction Tourism is one of the most important and dynamically developing sectors of the global and Hungarian economy.
Weather and climate are key resources for tourism, and in certain cases they serve as tourist attractions (Perry, A.H. 1997; Gómez Martín, B.
2005).
The complex interactions between atmospheric climate elements influence the development of tourism supply, sometimes limiting tourism activities or on occasion encouraging the development of alternative tourism products.
The climatic conditions of a given destination can provide substantial motivation to visit the site (Lohmann, M. and Kaim, E. 1999; Kozak, M. 2002) and play a key role in the decision-making processes of destination selection (Hamilton, J.M.
and Lau, M.A.
2005; Scott, D. and Lemieux, C. 2010).
Observations from recent decades have shown that climate change has an impact on natural and human systems around the world.
Tourism is one of the economic sec1 Department of Climatology and Landscape Ecology, University of Szeged, Egyetem u.
2.
HU-6722 Szeged, Hungary.
E-mail: kovacsattila@geo.u-szeged.hu 2 Modelling Unit, Hungarian Meteorological Service, Kitaibel Pál u.
1.
HU-1024 Budapest, Hungary.
E-mail: andrea.kiraly.elte@gmail.com Assessment of climate change exposure of tourism in Hungary using observations and regional climate model data Attila KOVÁCS 1 and Andrea KIRÁLY2 Abstract Climate constitutes key resources for tourism since it influences the range of tourism activities and the development of tourism supply.
Tourism is highly sensitive to changes in climate elements.
It is extremely important for adaptation strategy-making to explore whether the tourism climate conditions in a given region and at a specific time are appropriate and how they may change in the future.
This is described by the exposure of the tourism sector to climate conditions and climate change.
In this study, we analyse the exposure of tourism for Hungary on a district level and every month (from March to November) with the help of the modified Tourism Climate Index.
First, the present conditions are evaluated based on a gridded observational database CarpatClim-HU, which forms the basis for assessing the future conditions.
Afterwards, the expected future circumstances are analysed using regional climate model outputs.
In order to interpret the uncertainties of the climate projections properly, we use two different model results (HIRHAM5 and RACMO22E) relying on two emission scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5).
The results have demonstrated that the most favourable conditions are found in spring (MAM) and autumn (SON), while in summer (JJA) a decline in climate potential is observed.
According to the future tendencies, generally, a decline is expected between May and September, but the other investigated months usually bring an improvement.
For a given emission scenario, the expected trend is quite similar for the two model experiments, while for a given climate model, the use of RCP8.5 scenario indicates larger changes than RCP4.5.
The results prove that climate change will have an obvious impact on tourism potential in Hungary, and therefore tourism strategy development has to take into account this effect more than before.
Keywords: climate change, climate exposure, tourism, regional climate model, modified Tourism Climate Index, districts of Hungary Received May 2021, accepted August 2021.
Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.216 tors that is most exposed and sensitive to environmental change, including climate change (UNWTO 2008; Scott, D. et al.
2012).
Climate change has direct and indirect impacts on tourist destinations and the tourism industry (UNWTO 2008).
Indirect effects include sea-level rise, changes in biodiversity, an increase in the frequency of extreme weather events, changes in snowfall or heat load, among others.
They have a significant negative impact on several areas, including tourism infrastructure, time of travel, tourism activity, water resources, ecotourism and epidemics.
The direct effects can be identified by the modification of the different climate parameters (averages, extremes) due to climate change.
As a result, climate change can alter the global or regional spatial and temporal distribution of climate resources, resulting in a change in international or domestic tourism flows in space and time (Amelung, B. and Moreno, A.
2012; Rutty, M. and Scott, D. 2014).
As another direct effect, climate change negatively affects many outdoor activities that are important for tourism through extreme weather events.
One of the key factors for sustainable tourism development is to be aware of whether the climate conditions in a given region and at a specific time are appropriate for tourist activities and what can be expected in future decades.
For the development and implementation of targeted adaptation strategies to climate change, it is essential to examine the vulnerability of the tourism sector to climate change and the different components of the vulnerability.
Vulnerability expresses the extent to which the sector is susceptible to or unable to cope with the adverse effects of climate change (Schneider, S.H.
et al.
2007).
Each region is vulnerable to changes in different ways and to different degrees (Pálvölgyi, T. et al.
2010).
The territorial and sectoral strategic integration of adaptation to climate change requires a wide range of information on territorial, environmental, economic and social vulnerability to change.
Several tools have been developed to analyse the complex climate vulnerability of tourism.
The most commonly used tool is the CIVAS (Climate Impact and Vulnerability Assessment Scheme) model, developed by the CLAVIER international climate research project.
The model relies on the approach published in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC (IPCC, 2007).
It provides a uniform conceptual and methodological framework for quantitative climate impact assessments.
The theoretical structure of the CIVAS model is presented in Figure 1.
The model describes climate change vulnerability as a complex indicator that identifies complex natural, economic and social vulnerability caused by climate change by integrating exposure, sensitivity and adaptability indicators (see Figure 1).
The advantage of the model is the quantifiability of the complex vulnerability and its components, which makes it possible to compare different tourism activities, destinations and periods objectively.
One of the initial steps in the CIVAS model is the determination of the exposure of tourism to climate conditions or climate change.
Exposure is based on the climatic elements (conditions) of the given geographical area and their changes (see Figure 1).
Numerical values for exposure are provided by measured or observed meteorological data as well as estimates from global climate models (GCMs) or regional climate models (RCMs).
Therefore, information from observations and from climate models is an important initial element of objective-based exposure or impact assessment and vulnerability studies.
Projections based on climate models are, in all cases, burdened with uncertainties, which result from the natural variability of the climate system and the approximate description of the physical processes included in the models.
In addition, there is no definite information on how socio-economic processes affecting the climate system may develop in the future (Szépszó, G. et al.
2016).
In order to understand future climatic conditions and impacts on different sectors, including tourism, it is necessary to take into account the uncertainties of climate projections, too.
217Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
Results based on a single climate model experiment performed on a single emission scenario do not serve as a reliable forecast of the expected conditions and do not provide the opportunity to quantify the uncertainties in the projections.
A qualitative improvement is the application of a well-selected model ensemble, based on multiple scenarios, implemented with multiple regional models driven by different global models.
This method can ensure a balanced presentation of uncertainties arising from the choice of different scenarios or from the differences in RCMs, or the GCMs that provide the boundary condition for RCMs (Szépszó, G. et al.
2016).
Observational and model data include a wide range of climate data.
The exposure of the tourism sector to climate is usually characterised not by individual meteorological parameters but mostly by special complex tourism climate assessment tools (Endler, C. et al.
2010; Amelung, B. and Nicholls, S. 2014).
These tools integrate several climate data relevant for tourism in various ways.
They range from simple indices that require only a few climatic variables (e.g.
the indices of Mieczkowski, Z.T.
1985; Kovács, A. et al.
2016; Scott, D. et al.
2016) to complex assessment matrices (de Freitas, C.R.
et al.
2008) and to evaluation schemes (Matzarakis, A.
2007).
The number of studies analysing the climate exposure of the tourism sector for the area of Hungary or for some parts of the country is very low, and they have primarily examined the present conditions (e.g.
Németh, Á.
2013; Kovács, A. and Unger, J.
2014a, b; Kovács, A. et al.
2016).
The expected future circumstances based on RCM outputs were only evaluated by Kovács, A.
(2017), Kovács, A. et al.
(2017), and Sütő, A. and Fejes, L. (2019).
In this study, we analyse the exposure of the tourism sector to climate change in Hungary with the help of a tourism climate index.
First, the present conditions are examined based on a gridded observational database, which forms the basis for assessing future circumstances.
Afterwards, the expected future conditions are studied, for which we use regional climate model outputs.
In order to interpret the uncertainties of the climate projections properly, we use two different RCM results relying on two emission scenarios.
Fig.
1.
The theoretical structure of the CIVAS model.
Source: Self-edited scheme based on Pálvölgyi, T. et al.
2010.
Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.218 Data and methods The climate of Hungary is highly varied, as it is affected by the oceanic climate with balanced temperature and precipitation, the continental climate with extreme temperatures and low precipitation, and the Mediterranean climate with aridity in summer and rainy conditions in winter.
Another major determinant of the climate is the topography.
As the country is located in the Carpathian Basin and most of its surface is flat or gently undulating at low elevations, the impact of the Carpathians is of considerable importance.
In most of the country, the annual mean temperature is between 10 and 11 °C, which is determined by the geographical location, the altitude, and the distance from the sea.
Based on the period 1971–2000, the first weeks of January are the coldest, while late July and early August are the warmest periods of the year.
The variability of temperature from year to year is generally smaller in the summer months than in the winter months (https://www.met.hu/en/ eghajlat/magyarorszag_eghajlata/).
In the period 1961–2010, the temperature was found to increase in every season and on an annual basis, particularly in the last three decades, thus, confirming the trends occurring throughout Europe (Spinoni, J. et al.
2015).
In this period, the number of warm nights and warm days was significantly increasing, showing a universal warming trend in the region.
In the annual occurrence of cold nights, a large part of the region experienced a significant decrease (Lakatos, M. et al.
2016).
The long-term average annual precipitation is 500–750 mm in the country, but there are significant differences among the various regions due to the topography and the influences of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.
Based on the period 1971–2000, the wettest parts of the country (more than 700 mm) are the southwestern region as well as the higher areas, while the lowest precipitation (less than 500 mm) is detected in the middle part of the Great Plain.
The average annual precipitation decreases from southwest to northeast.
Precipitation is highest between May and July and lowest between January and March.
Precipitation is fairly variable, with considerable fluctuations from year to year.
There may be a lack of precipitation in any month (https://www.met.hu/en/eghajlat// magyarorszag_eghajlata/).
The risk of aridity and drought is high in Hungary (Spinoni, J. et al.
2013; Gavrilov, M.B.
et al.
2020).
In the period 1961–2010, precipitation showed no significant trend, though it has increased slightly on an annual basis in the last two decades.
The figures, thus, show a small increase relative to the 1980s, which was the driest decade analysed (Spinoni, J. et al.
2015).
For the quantification of the exposure of tourism to climate change, in this study the modified version of the widely used Tourism Climate Index (TCI) of Mieczkowski, Z.T.
(1985) was applied (Kovács, A. et al.
2016, 2017), hereinafter referred to as mTCI.
The TCI and mTCI quantify the impact of climatic conditions on general outdoor tourism activities (e.g.
sightseeing, recreation and other light physical activities outdoors).
The original form of the TCI consists of five sub-indices, which in turn rely on monthly values (monthly means and monthly sums in the case of precipitation) of seven basic climate parameters relevant for tourism: daily maximum air temperature, minimum relative humidity, mean air temperature, mean relative humidity, precipitation sum, sunshine duration and wind speed.
From these parameters, precipitation sum, sunshine duration and wind speed values are rated in itself with special rating score systems, from values zero (unfavourable) to five (optimal), forming sub-indices R, S and W, respectively.
The temperature and humidity data are combined into two sub-indices, the so-called daily comfort index (CIa) and daytime comfort index (CId).
These sub-indices describe the thermal comfort conditions for the whole day (CIa) and at the warmest period of the day (CId).
Correspondingly, CIa is based on the daily mean air temperature and mean relative humidity, while CId rates the effect of the 219Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
daily maximum temperature and minimum relative humidity.
In fact, the rating systems of CId and CIa rely on the combined effect of the corresponding temperature and humidity on thermal comfort, which is expressed in the form of the Effective Temperature (ET).
ET is one of the earliest and simplest empirical thermal indices, and it takes into account the temperature and humidity variables only (Houghten, F.C.
and Yaglou, C.P.
1923).
The rating scores of the ET values in the TCI range from minus three to five.
Finally, the overall TCI value is obtained by calculating the weighted sum of the subindices (CId, CIa, R, S and W) with the use of weight factors that express their relative importance within the overall climate evaluation (Mieczkowski, Z.T.
1985; Kovács, A. et al.
2016, 2017): TCI = 2(4CId + CIa + 2R + 2S + W) (1) The TCI values are classified on a predefined scale of –20 to +100, with higher values indicating a more favourable climatic potential for outdoor tourism activities (Mieczkowski, Z.T.
1985) (Table 1).
The mTCI index has improved the thermal relevance of the original TCI by integrating the most widely used and up-to-date thermal comfort index Physiologically Equivalent Temperature (PET) (Höppe, P. 1999) into the CId and CIa components of the TCI instead of the ET (Kovács, A. et al.
2016, 2017; Kovács, A.
2017).
PET takes into account the combination of four climate parameters (air temperature, air humidity, wind velocity, and thermal radiation) and personal factors, such as clothing and human activity, which both determine the thermophysiological effect of the atmospheric environment on the human body.
In addition to the shortcoming of the thermal aspect, the other disadvantage of the TCI is that the rating schemes of the sub-indices are arbitrary and had never been tested empirically against the perceptions and preferences of humans.
Therefore, in the mTCI, a new PET rating system was developed and integrated into CId and CIa, which reflect the seasonally different thermal perception patterns of Hungarian residents.
This modification improves the credibility of the thermal rating scores of the original TCI, thus enhancing the potential of TCI to evaluate the thermal comfort conditions of the atmospheric environment (Kovács, A. et al.
2016, 2017; Kovács, A.
2017).
To achieve this, data from an extensive thermal comfort survey were used, which were collected from spring to autumn; therefore, the winter period is excluded from the analysis with mTCI for Hungary.
In mTCI, the PET rating scores of CId and CIa range from zero (unfavourable) to five (optimal).
In practice, the CId and CIa sub-indices are derived utilising daily maximum and daily mean PET values, respectively.
The original rating system of R, S and W sub-indices, the calculation formula of the index (Eq.
1) and the overall evaluation system (Table 1) were not modified.
Full details on the construction of TCI are presented in Mieczkowski, Z.T.
(1985), Kovács, A. et al.
(2016, 2017) and Kovács, A.
(2017), while the full conceptual and methodological aspects of the modification of TCI are available in Kovács, A. et al.
(2016, 2017) and Kovács, A.
(2017).
In this study, we present the mTCI results on a monthly basis (from March to November).
To achieve this, we used the monthly values (monthly means and monthly sum in the case of precipitation) of the seven necessary daily climate parameters.
As the calculation of PET in the mTCI requires some kind of thermal radiation data, global radiation or cloud cover Table 1.
The evaluation system of the Tourism Climate Index (TCI) TCI values Descriptive categories 90–100 80– 89 70– 79 60– 69 50– 59 40– 49 30– 39 20– 29 10– 19 -20– 9 ideal excellent very good good acceptable marginal unfavourable very unfavourable extremely unfavourable impossible Source: Mieczkowski, Z.T.
1985.
Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.220 data are also necessary.
The daily maximum PET was calculated from daily maximum temperature, minimum relative humidity, mean wind speed and mean cloud cover, while the daily mean PET values were obtained from daily mean temperature, mean relative humidity, mean wind speed and mean cloud cover data.
The PET values were determined using the RayMan radiation and bioclimate model (Matzarakis, A. et al.
2010).
We present the results for a thirty-year climate period describing the present climate conditions as well as for two climate periods that characterise the possible future conditions.
Thus, we used multi-year mean monthly raw data, and from them, we calculated multi-year mean monthly mTCI values.
The mTCI was first calculated for the reference period 1971–2000, which characterises the current climate conditions.
For performing this calculation, the observational database CarpatClim-HU (Bihari, Z. et al.
2017) developed by the Hungarian Meteorological Service (HMS) was used.
The database contains grid point data with a horizontal spatial resolution of 0.1° × 0.1° (approx.
10 km) for the area of Hungary (covering the grid of 45.8°N–48.5°N and 16.2°E–22.8°E).
This 0.1° resolution database represents 1,104 grid points across Hungary (Figure 2).
These grid point values were generated from controlled, homogenised meteorological measurement data, which were interpolated to the 0.1° resolution grid and harmonised along national borders.
The raw data were provided by the HMS, and we calculated the multi-year monthly mTCI values from them.
The investigated climate models for evaluating future conditions were chosen from the EURO-CORDEX experiments (Jacob, D. et al.
2014).
EURO-CORDEX is the European branch of the international CORDEX initiative (Giorgi, F. et al.
2009) and contains climate change projections for Europe based on an ensemble of RCM simulations (https:// www.euro-cordex.net/).
In EURO-CORDEX, the simulations have been conducted at two different spatial resolutions: the general CORDEX resolution of 0.44° (EUR-44, approx.
50 km) and a finer resolution of 0.11° (EUR11, approx.
12.5 km).
In order to quantify the tourism climate conditions for the area of Hungary, the small-scale EUR-11 experiments were selected.
The data were obtained from the archives published and distributed via the Earth System Grid Federation (ESGF) under the project name CORDEX (Cinquini, L. et al.
2014).
For the analysis, two RCMs driven by the same GCM were selected (Table 2).
The two selected RCMs are the HIRHAM5 (by the Danish Meteorological Institute, DMI) (Christensen, O.B.
et al.
1998) and the RACMO22E (by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, KNMI) (van Meijgaard, E. 2012).
Their driving model was the EC-EARTH (by the Irish Centre for HighEnd Computing, ICHEC, http://www.glisaclimate.org/node/2238) (Hazeleger, W. et al.
2010).
The simulations with the RCP4.5 and Fig.
2.
The 0.1° × 0.1° resolution grid of the homogenised, interpolated observational database CarpatClim-HU and the interpolated regional climate model simulations HIRHAM5 and RACMO22E.
Source: Szépszó, G. et al.
2016.
Table 2.
The climate model experiments used in the analysis Driving global climate model Regional climate model Institute Emission scenario EC-EARTH HIRHAM5 DMI RCP4.5RCP8.5 RACMO22E KNMI RCP4.5RCP8.5 221Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
RCP8.5 emission scenarios (Representative Concentration Pathways, Moss, R.H. et al.
2010) were used in both cases (see Table 2).
These two scenarios are quite different in terms of possible greenhouse gas concentration trajectories.
RCP4.5 is an intermediate stabilisation pathway in which radiative forcing is stabilised at 4.5 Wm–2 in the year 2100.
In RCP8.5, emissions continue to rise throughout the 21st century, with radiative forcing reaching 8.5 Wm–2 for 2100.
In selecting these two models, the first important consideration was that the various data needed to calculate mTCI be available.
The second aspect was to select models with validation results being satisfying in terms of model error when comparing them with observations.
Considering this aspect, we compared the monthly mean air temperature and monthly precipitation sum (which are two important parameters in mTCI) simulated by the two selected models to those based on the observations (CarpatClim-HU) for the reference period (1971–2000) for Hungary.
Comparing the model results to the observed data, reasonable agreement can be observed (Figure 3).
Thirdly, we selected model projections that show representative results (especially for air temperature and precipitation) to display the uncertainties correctly with the models.
This aspect was studied through Taylor diagrams of the mean air temperature and precipitation sum for the reference period again.
We compared 12 GCM-RCM combinations from the EURO-CORDEX experiments to the observations (CarpatClim-HU), and the results demonstrate that the degree of correspondence between the models and observations is one of the highest in the two cases used (HIRHAM5 and RACMO22E) (Figure 4).
During the model selection, we also took into account the results of Torma, Cs.
Zs.
(2019), Kis, A. et al.
(2020) and Torma, Cs.
Zs.
et al.
(2020) who validated several EUROCORDEX experiments (including HIRHAM5 and RACMO22E) against CarpatClim observations for the Carpathian Region.
For the assessment of future conditions, the 2071–2100 period was selected, while the reference period of the model experiments was the same as that of the observational database (1971–2000).
The downloaded data were pre-processed with Climate Data Operator (CDO) in order to interpolate from the EUR-11 grid to the CarpatClim-HU grid (see Figure 2) and to get multi-year monthly averages from the raw data.
When evaluating projections for the future, it should be taken into account that the results of regional (and global) models are necessarily burdened with uncertainties; therefore the systematic model errors need to be eliminated somehow.
Several methods exist to reduce these errors, of which we used the so-called delta method (Hawkins, E. et al.
2013).
This means that the future model results were not in themselves interpreted but relative to the models’ own reference periods Fig.
3.
Annual course of the monthly mean air temperature (left) and precipitation sum (right) of the RCMs HIRHAM5 andRACMO22E and of the observational database CarpatClim-HU for the reference period (1971–2000) for Hungary Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.222 by specifying the change values.
Thus, for each grid point and each variable of the models, we determined the differences between their future values (2071–2100) and their values for the reference period (1971–2000).
We then added these changes to the observed data (CarpatClim-HU) from the reference period (1971–2000) to obtain the corrected future values of the given model.
We present the monthly mTCI results at the district level for Hungary.
The district is a small-scale administrative-territorial unit in Hungary; the analysis on that level can provide effective results for tourists, tourism professionals and decision-makers.
To achieve this, after calculating the monthly values of mTCI for each grid point, district averages were generated from them, and finally, the obtained spatial distribution was displayed on maps for each month.
Results Mapping of mTCI results was performed according to the descriptive category system shown in Table 1.
This categorisation is more straightforward for the users than the raw values of mTCI.
Due to the low number of cases below the value 40, these values were merged into a single category called ‘unfavourable’.
The outputs for the period 1971– 2000 based on the CarpatClim-HU database are presented in Figure 5.
The most unpleasant month during the analysed period is November, with ‘unfavourable’ conditions in almost the whole country except the Southern Great Plain where ‘marginal’ conditions prevail.
November is followed by March with mostly ‘acceptable’ conditions.
In this month, only some mountainous regions remain ‘marginal’, while in some southern parts of the country ‘good’ conditions are already appearing.
In April, there is a significant improvement in the tourism climate potential, reaching ‘very good’ conditions or even ‘excellent’ circumstances in the Great Plain.
The climate potential remains similarly favourable in May, only a slight change in the spatial distribution is displayed.
From June, a gradual decline is observed, which lasts until September.
This means that the ‘excellent’ conditions are replaced with ‘very good’ in June, and even ‘good’ category appears in some places.
For July and August, it can be observed that the Fig.
4.
Taylor diagrams of the mean air temperature (left) and precipitation sum (right) for 12 GCM-RCM combinations from the EURO-CORDEX experiments versus the observations CarpatClim-HU for the reference period (1971–2000) for Hungary 223Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
proportion of areas characterised only as ‘good’ is significantly increasing at the expense of a ‘very good’ evaluation.
It is worth mentioning that these ‘good’ conditions also indicate favourable potential for outdoor activities.
In September, there is a considerable recovery in the climate conditions, and more than half of the country is characterised with the ‘excellent’ category again.
With this improvement, the spatial pattern of mTCI becomes similar to that experienced in May.
In October, a slight decrease in mTCI is starting.
In this period, most parts of the country are characterised by ‘very good’ conditions.
By November, a much more pronounced decline by 3-4 categories can be observed, reaching the ‘unfavourable’ or ‘marginal’ classification for outdoor activities (see Figure 5).
In summary, there is a significant improvement during the spring, but a slight decline from June to September.
During the autumn, an improvement is detected again, while from November, the climate potential is decreasing.
According to the classification of Scott, D. and McBoyle, G. (2001), who examined the potential annual courses of TCI, a bimodal structure emerges, which means that the spring and autumn have more favourable climate conditions than the summer period, which is in agreement with our results.
In relation to future trends in mTCI distribution, we first analyse the output of HIRHAM5 simulation based on RCP4.5 scenario (Figure 6).
According to the results, the pattern of mTCI signals bimodal structure again because we find the most pleasant conFig.
5.
Spatial distribution of mTCI categories by district on a monthly basis for the period 1971–2000 based on CarpatClim-HU database Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.224 ditions in April, May, September and October with ‘very good’ or ‘excellent’ evaluation.
In March and November, a significant improvement will be probable compared to the reference period (1971–2000, CarpatClimHU), which means a one-category change in most of the country (see Figure 5 and 6).
In addition to these months, a similar improvement is expected in October in the Great Plain.
In April, significant differences are not observed.
However, from May to September, large parts of the country may experience a decline in climate potential by a category.
Specifically, in May and September, most of the country will likely be classified as ‘very good’ instead of ‘excellent’.
In all months of the summer, the change in the mTCI pattern also shows an unfavourable trend.
In June, ‘good’ circumstances will be probable at the expense of ‘very good’, while in a few districts ‘acceptable’ conditions are already displayed.
In the Transdanubian areas in July and most of the country in August, only ’acceptable’ conditions may be experienced instead of ’good’ potential (see Figure 5 and 6).
In conclusion, we can expect an increase of mTCI with one category or in some cases, tourism climate conditions will remain unchanged in March, April, October and November.
However, in the period between May and September, which has a significant tourist turnover in Hungary, there is a decline by a category or possibly stagnation in some places.
Bimodal annual structure of mTCI is detected again when analysing the RACMO22E Fig.
6.
Spatial distribution of mTCI categories by district on a monthly basis for the period 2071–2100 based on the EC-EARTH driven HIRHAM5 simulation with RCP4.5 scenario 225Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
outputs based on RCP4.5 scenario (Figure 7).
Considering the future projection, similar tendencies are found, as in the case of the HIRHAM5, RCP4.5 experiment (see Figure 6 and 7).
Between them, only slight differences occur that do not exceed one category.
The largest differences, more precisely category deviation for the largest area, are indicated for March, April, October and November.
In March and November, RACMO22E indicates more pleasant conditions in a large part of Hungary than HIRHAM5.
In April, a slight improvement is detected in the eastern half of the country compared to HIRHAM5 and also to the CarpatClim-HU results, while in October, a smaller area is affected by the most favourable conditions than in the case of the HIRHAM5 experiment.
During the period from May to September, the tourism climate conditions based on the two models are almost identical; only the pattern in July and August indicates a slight deviation for the eastern part of Hungary.
The model experiment HIRHAM5 using the RCP8.5 scenario usually shows an improvement in the climate potential in March, April, October and November compared to the reference period (Figure 5 and 8).
The change in March and November is particularly remarkable, as all areas of the country may experience conditions that are more favorable by one or two categories.
In April and October, the conditions remain unchanged in Transdanubia and are more pleasant by a category in the eastern part of the country.
From May to September, almost Fig.
7.
Spatial distribution of mTCI categories by district on a monthly basis for the period 2071–2100 based on the EC-EARTH driven RACMO22E simulation with RCP4.5 scenario Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.226 all regions of the country may become less favourable typically by a category.
This scenario indicates larger changes or changes affecting larger areas in both (positive and negative) directions compared to the HIRHAM5, RCP4.5 experiment (Figure 6 and 8).
Specifically, ‘very good’ conditions prevail instead of ‘good’ in March, and there are ‘acceptable’ conditions instead of ‘marginal’ in November.
In April and October, the ratio of the ‘excellent’ classification is higher in the RCP8.5 case.
In May and September, when an unfavourable tendency is observed, some parts of the country are characterised with ‘good’ conditions in place of ‘very good’.
During the summer months, ‘acceptable’ became the dominant category in most parts of Hungary at the expense of ‘good’ that was typical for RCP4.5.
The tendencies shown by the RACMO22E, RCP8.5 experiment are consistent with the previous findings (Figure 9).
The output of this model is similar to the HIRHAM5, RCP8.5 results (Figure 8 and 9).
There are at most one-category differences between them.
The projection for the summer period is almost the same, especially for July and August.
The highest differences occur in spring and autumn, though they affect small areas only and never exceed one category.
Similar to the HIRHAM5 case, the future changes are typically larger in RACMO22E with RCP8.5 compared to RACMO22E with RCP4.5 (see Figure 7 and 9).
In particular, the decline between May and September is more significant in RCP8.5; that is, the ratio of districts with only ‘good’ (‘acceptable’) potential is higher in May and September (in June, July Fig.
8.
Spatial distribution of mTCI categories by the district on a monthly basis for the period 2071–2100 based on the EC-EARTH driven HIRHAM5 simulation with RCP8.5 scenario 227Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
and August).
Further, the degree of improvement in March, October and November is also more considerable in the RCP8.5 case.
Summary and concluding remarks According to the current and future spatial patterns of tourism climate conditions in Hungary through observations and regional climate model data, the following outlines can be drawn: – The annual course of the present and future conditions is bimodal in all cases, that is, the most favourable circumstances are found in spring and autumn, while in the summer period, a decline in climate potential is observed.
– According to future projections, the tourism climate potential for March, April, October and November usually brings an improvement, while between May and September, a decline is generally expected.
– For a given RCP emission scenario, the expected trend is quite similar for the HIRHAM5 and RACMO22E experiments, with at most one-category differences between them, mainly during the transition seasons.
– For a given climate model, using the RCP8.5 scenario, the changes in both directions are typically larger or they affect a larger area than in the case of RCP4.5.
The obtained results are consistent with the outcomes of the investigation carried out in the previous CRIGiS-NAGiS project Fig.
9.
Spatial distribution of mTCI categories by district on a monthly basis for the period 2071–2100 based on the EC-EARTH driven RACMO22E simulation with RCP8.5 scenario Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.228 (Bihari, Z. et al.
2015) in which also the current and future tourism climate potential for Hungary was evaluated using the mTCI index (among others) and by almost the same methodology (Bihari, Z. et al.
2015; Kovács, A.
2017; Kovács, A. et al.
2017).
However, that assessment was based on the output of a single RCM simulation and a single emission scenario from the former scenario family (ALADIN-Climate model, A1B scenario).
According to that investigation, March, April, October and November brought an improvement, while the other months a decline, which is similar to the results of this study.
In this study, we used a small multimodel ensemble of simulations chosen from a more up-to-date climate model ensemble, based on multiple and up-to-date scenarios implemented with multiple regional climate models.
This method could be an initial step to ensure a balanced presentation of uncertainties and to interpret the outcomes of exposure and impact studies properly.
Comparing our results with previously published international examples is a difficult task.
On the one hand, the use of the mTCI index is not yet widespread.
This measure has been adapted to the Hungarian climate conditions, though the applied methodology can be effective in any country or region, but this process requires an extended, long-term thermal comfort measurement and questionnaire survey (Kovács, A. et al.
2016).
The credible comparability is also hampered by differences in the baseline databases used to determine the various tourism climatological indicators (basic data, observations, models, study periods) and by the variety of data processing and analysis methods, as well as the different presentation of the results (mapping, scaling, time scale).
In many cases, the lack of basic information in the published articles also makes comparison difficult (Kovács, A.
2017).
Nevertheless, since the mTCI index is similar to TCI in many aspects (structure, calculation) their comparison is reasonable (Kovács, A.
2017).
The bimodal structure of mTCI and the future tendencies in the different periods of the year demonstrated in this study are in reasonable accordance with the international findings using the original TCI (e.g.
Scott, D. et al.
2004; Nicholls, S. and Amelung, B.
2008; Perch-Nielsen, S.L.
et al.
2010; Amelung, B. and Moreno, A.
2012; Kovács, A.
2017).
Our results demonstrate that climate change will have an obvious impact on tourism potential in Hungary, and therefore tourism strategy development has to take into account this effect more than before.
Methods and practices to adapt to climate change should be used in both the demand and supply side of tourism.
The improvement of climatic conditions in spring and autumn has the potential to extend the outdoor tourist season, which is a key element of adaptation to the altered conditions.
The means of diversifying the tourism economy can be the development of different outdoor and partly indoor services usable in extended periods, too.
In Hungary, cultural and gastronomic festivals, health tourism (especially the development of tourism-based medical services) or strengthening business and conference tourism can be feasible tools.
The unfavourable tendency shown in summer, which is mainly due to the increasing frequency of warm (or hot) days and extreme events, may encourage tourism operators to develop non-weather and non-climate sensitive products.
Themed walks, theme or leisure parks, visitor centres, indoor event spaces, indoor baths, spas or water parks can be effective solutions for this purpose.
In each case, the infrastructure for hosting the tourists (accommodation, hospitality) should be adapted in space and time to the altered demand.
When evaluating the results of this study, it should be kept in mind that, in addition to climatic conditions, many social and economic factors and mechanisms (e.g.
accessibility and distance, transport costs, budget) play a decisive role in the dynamics of tourism.
In addition, several natural or cultural elements influence the motivation of tourists and decision-making (e.g.
geology, hydrology, vegetation, historical monuments, celebrations) (Gómez Martín, B.
2005).
Uncertainties could emerge not only from the 229Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
prediction of climate conditions and climate change but also from the estimation of the natural, social and economic factors affecting tourism, and, thus, the same impacts of climate change.
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge the World Climate Research Programme’s Working Group on Regional Climate and the Working Group on Coupled Modelling, the former coordinating body of CORDEX.
We also thank the EURO-CORDEX climate modelling groups (listed in Table 2 of this paper) for producing and making available their model output.
We also acknowledge the Earth System Grid Federation infrastructure, an international effort led by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison.
The first author was supported by the ÚNKP-20-4SZTE-617 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology from the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.
REFERENCES Amelung, B. and Moreno, A.
2012.
Costing the impact of climate change on tourism in Europe: results of the PESETA project.
Climatic Change 112.
(1): 83–100.
Amelung, B. and Nicholls, S. 2014.
Implications of climate change for tourism in Australia.
Tourism Management 41.
228–244.
Bihari, Z., Hoffmann, L., Lakatos, M. et al.
2015.
Vulnerability/Impact studies with a focus on tourism and critical infrastructures.
Summary of the project results.
CRIGiS project, Budapest, Hungarian Meteorological Service.
Available at https://www.
met.hu/KRITeR/en/publikacio/ Bihari, Z., Lakatos, M. and Szentimrey, T. 2017.
Felszíni megfigyelésekből készített rácsponti adatbázisok az Országos Meteorológiai Szolgálatnál (Gridded data series prepared from surface observation at Hungarian Meteorological Service).
Légkör 62.
(4): 148–151.
Christensen, O.B., Christensen, J.H., Machenhauer, B. and Botzet, M. 1998.
Very high-resolution regional climate simulations over Scandinavia – present climate.
Journal of Climate 11.
(12): 3204–3229.
Cinquini, L., Crichton, D., Mattmann et al.
2014.
The Earth System Grid Federation: An open infrastructure for access to distributed geospatial data.
Future Generation Computer Systems 36.
400–417.
de Freitas, C.R., Scott, D. and McBoyle, G. 2008.
A second generation climate index for tourism (CIT): specification and verification.
International Journal of Biometeorology 52.
(5): 399–407.
Endler, C., Oehler, K. and Matzarakis, A.
2010.
Vertical gradient of climate change and climate tourism conditions in the Black Forest.
International Journal of Biometeorology 54.
(1): 45–61.
Gavrilov, M.B., Radaković, M.G., Sipos, Gy.
et al.
2020.
Aridity in the Central and Southern Pannonian Basin.
Atmosphere 11.
(12): 1269.
Giorgi, F., Jones, C. and Asrar, G.R.
2009.
Addressing climate information needs at the regional level: the CORDEX framework.
WMO Bulletin 58.
(3): 175–183.
Gómez Martín, B.
2005.
Weather, climate and tourism.
A geographical perspective.
Annals of Tourism Research 32.
(3): 571–591.
Hamilton, J.M.
and Lau, M.A.
2005.
The role of climate information in tourist destination choice decision-making.
In Tourism and Global Environmental Change.
Eds.
: Gössling, S. and Hall, C.M., London, Routledge, 229–250.
Hawkins, E., Osborne, T.M., Ho, C.K.
and Challinor, A.J.
2013.
Calibration and bias correction of climate projections for crop modelling: An idealised case study over Europe.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 170.
19–31.
Hazeleger, W., Severijns, C., Semmler, T. et al.
2010.
EC-Earth: A seamless Earth-system prediction approach in action.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 91.
(10): 1357‒1364.
Houghten, F.C.
and Yaglou, C.P.
1923.
Determining equal comfort lines.
Journal of the American Society of Heating and Ventilating Engineers 29.
165–176.
Höppe, P. 1999.
The physiological equivalent temperature – an universal index for the biometeorological assessment of the thermal environment.
International Journal of Biometeorology 43.
(2): 71–75.
IPCC 2007.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Eds.
: Parry, M.L.
et al., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Jacob, D., Petersen, J., Eggert, B. et al.
2014.
EUROCORDEX: new high-resolution climate change projections for European impact research.
Regional Environmental Change 14.
(2): 563–578.
Kis, A., Pongrácz, R., Bartholy, J., Gocic, M., Milanovic, M. and Trajkovic, S. 2020.
Multiscenario and multi-model ensemble of regional climate change projections for the plain areas of the Pannonian Basin.
Időjárás 124.
(2): 157–190.
Kovács, A. and Unger, J.
2014a.
Modification of the Tourism Climatic Index to Central European climatic conditions – examples.
Időjárás 118.
(2): 147–166.
Kovács, A. and Unger, J.
2014b.
Analysis of tourism climatic conditions in Hungary considering the subjective thermal sensation characteristics of the south-Hungarian residents.
Acta Climatologica and Chorologica Universitatis Szegediensis 47–48.
77–84.
Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.230 Kovács, A., Unger, J., Gál, C.V. and Kántor, N. 2016.
Adjustment of the thermal component of two tourism climatological assessment tools using thermal perception and preference surveys from Hungary.
Theoretical and Applied Climatology 125.
(1–2): 113–130.
Kovács, A.
2017.
Evaluation of the tourism climate potential based on original and improved methods adapted to Hungarian population (in Hungarian).
PhD Thesis, Doctoral School of Geosciences.
Szeged, University of Szeged.
Available at http://doktori.bibl.u-szeged.
hu/id/eprint/3860/ Kovács, A., Németh, Á., Unger, J. and Kántor, N. 2017.
Tourism climatic conditions of Hungary – present situation and assessment of future changes.
Időjárás 121.
(1): 79–99.
Kozak, M. 2002.
Comparative analysis of tourist motivations by nationality and destinations.
Tourism Management 23.
(3): 221–232.
Lakatos, M., Bihari, Z., Szentimrey, T., Spinoni, J. and Szalai, S. 2016.
Analyses of temperature extremes in the Carpathian Region in the period 1961–2010.
Időjárás 120.
(1): 41–51.
Lohmann, M. and Kaim, E. 1999.
Weather and holiday destination preferences image, attitude and experience.
The Tourist Review 54.
(2): 54–64.
Matzarakis, A.
2007.
Assessment method for climate and tourism based on daily data.
In Developments in Tourism Climatology.
Eds.
: Matzarakis, A., de Freitas, C.R.
and Scott, D., Freiburg, International Society of Biometeorology, Commission on Climate, Tourism and Recreation, 52–58.
Matzarakis, A., Rutz, F. and Mayer, H. 2010.
Modelling radiation fluxes in simple and complex environments: basics of the RayMan model.
International Journal of Biometeorology 54.
(2): 131–139.
Mieczkowski, Z.T.
1985.
The tourism climatic index: a method of evaluating world climates for tourism.
The Canadian Geographer 29.
(3): 220–233.
Moss, R.H., Edmonds, J.A., Hibbard, K.A.
et al.
2010.
The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment.
Nature 463.
747–756.
Németh, Á.
2013.
Estimation of tourism climate in the Lake Balaton Region, Hungary.
Journal of Environmental Geography 6.
(1–2): 49–55.
Nicholls, S. and Amelung, B.
2008.
Climate change and tourism in Northwestern Europe: Impacts and adaptation.
Tourism Analysis 13.
(1): 21–31.
Pálvölgyi, T., Czira, T., Dobozi, E., Rideg, A. and Schneller, K. 2010.
A kistérségi szintű éghajlatváltozási sérülékenység vizsgálat módszere és eredményei (Method and results of the climate change vulnerability investigations at sub-regional level).
KLÍMA-21 Füzetek 62.
88–102.
Perch-Nielsen, S.L., Amelung, B. and Knutti, R. 2010.
Future climate resources for tourism in Europe based on the daily tourism climatic index.
Climatic Change 103.
(3–4): 363–381.
Perry, A.H. 1997.
Recreation and tourism.
In Applied Climatology: Principles and Practice.
Eds.
: Thompson, R.D.
and Perry, A., London, Routledge, 240–248.
Rutty, M. and Scott, D. 2014.
Thermal range of coastal tourism resort microclimates.
Tourism Geographies 16.
(3): 346–363.
Schneider, S.H., Semenov, S., Patwardhan, A. et al.
2007.
Assessing key vulnerabilities and the risk from climate change.
In Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Eds.
: Parry, M.L., Canziani, O.F., Palutikof, J.P., van der Linden, P.J.
and Hanson, C.E., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 779–810.
Scott, D. and McBoyle, G. 2001.
Using a ‘tourism climate index’ to examine the implications of climate change for climate as a tourism resource.
In Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Climate, Tourism and Recreation.
Eds.
: Matzarakis, A. and de Freitas, C.R., Halkidiki, International Society of Biometeorology, Commission on Climate, Tourism and Recreation, 69–88.
Scott, D., McBoyle, G. and Schwartzentruber, M. 2004.
Climate change and the distribution of climatic resources for tourism in North America.
Climate Research 27.
(2): 105–117.
Scott, D. and Lemieux, C. 2010.
Weather and climate information for tourism.
Procedia Environmental Sciences 1.
146–183.
Scott, D., Hall, C.M.
and Gössling, S. 2012.
Tourism and Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation.
Abingdon, Routledge.
Scott, D., Rutty, M., Amelung, B. and Tang, M. 2016.
An inter-comparison of the Holiday Climate Index (HCI) and the Tourism Climate Index (TCI) in Europe.
Atmosphere 7.
80.
Spinoni, J., Antofie, T., Barbosa, P., Bihari, Z., Lakatos, M., Szalai, S., Szentimrey, T. and Vogt, J.
2013.
An overview of drought events in the Carpathian Region in 1961–2010.
Advances in Science and Research 10.
21–32.
Spinoni, J., Szalai, S., Szentimrey, T. et al.
2015.
Climate of the Carpathian Region in the period 1961–2010: climatologies and trends of 10 variables.
International Journal of Climatology 35.
(7): 1322–1341.
Sütő, A. and Fejes, L. 2019.
A turizmus ágazat jelenlegi és potenciális éghajlati sérülékenységének területi különbségei Magyarországon (Territorial differences in existing and potential climate vulnerability of the tourism sector in Hungary).
Tér és Társadalom 33.
(3): 108–126.
Szépszó, G., Illy, T. and Szabó, P. 2016.
A regionális klímamodellek eredményeinek utó-feldolgozása és a NATéR számára szükséges paraméterek előállítása (Postprocessing of regional climate model results to prepare the climate parameters for NAGiS).
RCMGiS project, Budapest, Hungarian Meteorological 231Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.
Service.
Available at https://www.met.hu/RCMTeR/ en/publikacio/ Torma, Cs.Zs.
2019.
Detailed validation of EUROCORDEX and Med-CORDEX regional climate model ensembles over the Carpathian Region.
Időjárás 123.
(2): 217–240.
Torma, Cs.Zs., Kis, A. and Pongrácz, R. 2020.
Evaluation of EURO-CORDEX and Med-CORDEX precipitation simulations for the Carpathian Region: Bias corrected data and projected changes.
Időjárás 124.
(1): 25–46.
UNWTO 2008.
Climate change and tourism – Responding to global challenges.
Madrid, World Tourism Organization and United Nations Environment Programme.
Available at https://www.e-unwto.
org/doi/epdf/10.18111/9789284412341 van Meijgaard, E. 2012.
Refinement and application of a regional atmospheric model for climate scenario calculations of Western Europe.
Nieuwegein, Programme Office Climate Changes Spatial Planning (OCLC: 819640773).
Kovács, A. and Király, A. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 70 (2021) (3) 215–231.232
53 © Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp Town and Regional Planning 2022 (81):53-66 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: Ngcamu, B.
2022.
Climate change and disaster preparedness issues in Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa.
Town and Regional Planning, no.
81, pp.
53-66.
Prof. Bethuel Sibongiseni Ngcamu, Associate Professor: Department of Public Administration and Management, University of South Africa, PO Box 392, Pretoria, 0003.
Phone:012-433 9442, email: ngcamuzaa@gmail.com, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1507-7583 Climate change and disaster preparedness issues in Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa Bethuel Ngcamu Review article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.5 Received: August 2022 Peer reviewed and revised: September-October 2022 Published: December 2022 *The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article Abstract This article sought to review the literature on the effectiveness of the disaster preparedness plans in two provinces that were struck by climate-induced disasters in South Africa in 2022.
Making use of a qualitative desktop study, the effects of urbanisation and infrastructure development on the deadly disasters of April 2022 were examined, using thematic analyses.
The review reveals a complex combination of the causes of disaster in both KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, which included unplanned urbanisation; ineffective warning systems; inadequate infrastructure, and houses being built on floodplains, in wetland, and in coastal areas.
The lack of climate knowledge among government officials and communities prone to climateinduced disasters was considered to have led to the severe devastating effects of the April 2022 disasters.
These challenges were compounded by the failure of municipal officials to harness learnings from the rich indigenous knowledge systems of the vulnerable groups and to reverse impacts of the disasters.
The article summarises the causes, challenges, impacts, and solutions that can be considered to plan for disaster preparedness.
Keywords: Climate change, climate literacy, disasters, disaster preparedness, early warnings, preparedness plans, urban planning, unplanned urbanisation KLIMAATSVERANDERING EN RAMPGEREEDHEIDSKWESSIES IN OOSKAAP EN KWAZULU-NATAL, SUID-AFRIKA Hierdie artikel het gepoog om literatuur oor die doeltreffendheid van die rampgereedheidsplanne in twee provinsies wat in 2022 deur klimaatgeïnduseerde rampe in Suid-Afrika getref is, te hersien.
Deur gebruik te maak van ’n kwalitatiewe lessenaarstudie is die uitwerking van verstedeliking en infrastruktuurontwikkeling op die dodelike rampe van April 2022 deur tematiese ontledings ondersoek.
Die oorsig toon ’n komplekse kombinasie van die oorsake van rampe in beide KwaZuluNatal en die Oos-Kaap, wat onbeplande verstedeliking ingesluit het; ondoeltreffende waarskuwingstelsels; onvoldoende infrastruktuur, en huise wat op vloedvlaktes en in vleilande en kusgebiede gebou word.
Die gebrek aan klimaatskennis onder regeringsamptenare en gemeenskappe wat geneig is tot klimaatgeïnduseerde rampe, is beskou as die faktore wat gelei het tot die ernstige verwoestende gevolge van die April 2022-rampe.
Hierdie uitdagings is vererger deur die versuim van munisipale amptenare om kennis uit die ryk inheemse kennisstelsels van die kwesbare groepe te benut en om die impak van die rampe om te keer.
Die artikel som die oorsake, uitdagings, impakte en oplossings op wat oorweeg kan word om vir rampgereedheid te beplan.
PHETOHO EA MAEMO A LEHOLIMO LE BOITOKISETSO BA LIKOLUOA KAPA BOCHABELA LE KWAZULU-NATAL, AFRIKA BOROA Sengoliloeng sena se ne se ikemiselitse ho hlahloba lingoliloeng tse mabapi le katleho ea meralo ea ho itokisetsa likoluoa liprofinseng tse peli tse anngoeng ke likoluoa tse bakoang ke boemo ba leholimo Afrika Boroa ka 2022.
Likoluoa tsa ‘Mesa 2022 li ile tsa lekoloa ho sebelisoa litlhahlobo ea lintlha tsa sehlooho.
Boithuto bo senola lisosa tse ‘maloa mabapi le likoluaa tsa KwaZulu-Natal le Kapa Botjhabela, tse neng di kenyeletsa ho fallela litoropong ho sa reroang; mekhoa ea temoso e sa sebetseng; meaho e sa lokang, le matlo a ntseng a hahuoa mabaleng a likhohola, libakeng tse mongobo joaloka mekhoabo, le libakeng tse lebōpong la leoatle.
Ho haella ha tsebo ea boemo ba leholimo har’a ba boholong ‘musong le lichabeng tse atisang ho ba le likoluoa tse bakoang ke boemo ba leholimo ho ne ho nkoa e le sesosa sa litla-morao tse bohloko tse bakoang ke likoluoa tsa April 2022.
Liphephetso tsena li ile tsa eketsoa ke ho hloleha ha liofisiri tsa masepala ho sebelisa lithuto tse tsoang mekhoeng e ruileng ea tsebo ea matsoalloa a lihlopha tse tlokotsing le ho khutlisa litlamorao tsa likoluoa.
Sengoliloeng se akaretsa lisosa, liphephetso, litlamorao, le litharollo tse ka nahanoang ho rera ho itokisetsa likoluoa tsa kamoso.
1.
INTRODUCTION The year 2022 is considered to have been a year of great tragedy, with two coastal provinces in South Africa experiencing catastrophic and unprecedented floods and landslides because of abnormal torrential rains.
This left thousands http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:ngcamuzaa@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1507-7583 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.5 54 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 of people displaced and having to live in shelters, with hundreds dead and property damage estimated at R17 billion/US$1.57 billion (IOL, 2022: 1).
Since 2013, South Africa has been prone to a myriad of disasters, including floods, droughts, and storms that are climate change-induced and that have led to water restrictions in the urban agricultural sector (Climate Analysis Group, 2018: 1; Institute for Security Studies, 2018: 2).
Nonjinge (2019: 1) mentions that, since 2018, multiple surveys have been conducted in South Africa to test the views on whether climate-induced disasters such as floods and droughts have worsened over the past decade.
Nearly half of the respondents were semi-literate women and rural areas dwellers who stated that they had never heard of climate change.
This differed from those who had more education, and who cited the adverse consequences of climate change and the urgent need for it to be halted.
The crafting of the National Climate Change Response White Paper in 2011 by the South African Government was the acknowledgement of the climate change realities being regarded as major threats to sustainable development and compromising the country’s development goals (DEA, 2011: 6).
Researchers (Chapungu, 2020; Mavhura, 2020; Phiri, Simwanda and Nyirenda, 2022) conducted an evaluation of the South African Weather Service’s (SAWS) weather information on tropical cyclone Idai.
The cyclone struck three countries (Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique) in 2019, with over 1 500 deaths reported (Bopape et al., 2021: 1).
The authors suggest that the weather systems predicted the events in advance and that warnings were issued, but many people did not respond to warnings or were not aware thereof.
Model simulations relating to the location of the flood events in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) were underestimated, showing that there were shortcomings in the model.
In view of the identified weaknesses in the models, Bopane et al.
(2021) recommended that weather awareness be increased and that disaster risk management systems, including disaster preparedness and risk reduction be developed.
An empirical study by Mthembu and Zwane (2017), which assessed the Ncunjane (Msinga, KZN) farming community’s vulnerability and adaptive capacity in response to the drought disasters of 2010 and 2014, yielded interesting results.
The high cattle mortalities and low crop productivity increased food costs, reduced household income, and increased agricultural input costs (Mthembu & Zwane, 2017: 1).
These authors found that the drought relief provided by the government had hardly any effect on farmers, who had to contend with large herds of cattle, prolonged heat spells, and variability in rainfall.
This adversely affected small-scale farmers, with dire impacts on rural farming communities such as Msinga.
Meanwhile, women have been severely affected by the impacts of climate change in KZN, with a reduction in harvests, due to devastating droughts.
Fishing has also been negatively affected, something that traditionally plays an important role in households’ food security (Masinga, Maharaj & Nzima, 2021: 1002).
Accordingly, in the Eastern Cape (EC) province, the three informal settlements without storm waterdrainage systems were selected to assess the factors influencing the structural flooding in such settlements (Dalu, Shackleton & Dalu, 2018).
The study found that the patterns of land cover, proximity to water bodies, and increasing slope factor had influenced housing structures in the informal settlements of Grahamstown, Port St Johns, and Port Alfred (Dalu, Shackleton & Dalu, 2018: 481).
Chari, Hamandawana and Zhou (2018: 670) studied the Nkonkobe Local Municipality, which is significantly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change (aggravated by high incidences of poverty and inaccessibility to basic services).
A quarter of the villages that were sampled by these authors were found to have limited adaptive capacities in responding to the effects of climate change.
In the devastating floods that occurred in 2022, the vulnerable people – mostly those who are marginalised and living in informal settlements – had limited access to warnings from the eThekwini Municipality and the South African Weather Service.
There was also an indication that these people did not know what to do with the limited information they received (Singh, 2022: 12).
Despite the accurate prediction of the South African Weather Service, Kunguma (2022) opines that this was inadequate.
The impacts of disasters are devastating and necessitate other measures such as research informing town planning and adequate maintenance of underground drainage systems to be in place, in order to prepare for disasters.
Consequently, a report compiled by the Moses Kotane Institute (2022: 2) revealed that the damage caused by the 2022 floods in Durban were exacerbated by poor town planning, inadequate infrastructure, and houses built in mountainous areas.
In a systematic review of literature by Ryan et al.
(2020), the lack of benchmarking exercises for the community to engage in disaster preparedness resulted in the recommendation for face-to-face techniques that support communityled preparedness activities.
This could yield positive results as opposed to using mass media campaigns.
An empirical study conducted by Abunyewah et al.
(2020) in Ghana to examine the role of community participation in improving the effectiveness of disaster preparedness, solicited fascinating findings.
These show that the accessibility of information and comprehensively tailored plans to respond to the needs of the public strongly influenced people to prepare for disasters (Abunyewah et al., 2020: 8).
Against this detailed backdrop of climate-induced disasters and its adverse effects, this article reviews the existing literature on the effects of preparedness strategies in mitigating the impacts of disasters that were experienced in two provinces in South Africa in 2022.
The article also Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 55 analyses the effects of urbanisation and infrastructure development on the climate-induced disasters.
This study, therefore, questions whether the disaster preparedness plans by different actors and the existing infrastructure was effective in mitigating the impacts of the climate-induced disasters.
2.
METHODS AND REVIEW STRATEGY A qualitative desktop study was used to review the phenomenon on climate change and disaster preparedness in two provinces, KZN and the EC in South Africa.
First, the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the study are introduced to the readers.
Secondly, the realities of climate change in South Africa and in two eastern coastal provinces (KZN and EC) are briefly summarised with their impacts on the vulnerable communities mainly residing in rural, peri-urban, and urban townships and informal settlements.
Thirdly, a summary is provided on how climate change-induced disasters across the globe have enhanced the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategies in high-risk and vulnerable areas.
The factors that have been considered to have aggravated the impacts of climate change-induced disasters in vulnerable communities have been identified.
Fourthly, the determinants of disaster preparedness, the role private-public partnership plays, the adverse effects of poor preparedness plans to vulnerable communities, and the role of the stakeholder partnership and Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) in proactively preparing for the climate-induced disasters are reviewed.
Fifthly, the contravention of the Disaster Management Act (DMA), which promotes stakeholder partnership and training of the government officials, and the shortcomings in those programmes in realising the DMA provisions are reviewed.
Sixthly, urbanisation, the apartheid planning model, and its effects on climate change in South Africa are reviewed.
In the discussion section, the causes, challenges, impacts, and solutions to reducing vulnerabilities are grouped and the strategies to counter floods are introduced.
The study was conducted between January 2022 and July 2022 and entailed a desktop review of relevant literature related to the impacts of climate change and flood disasters.
The key focus was to address current realities of climate change and disaster preparedness in two South African provinces.
Secondary data was collected via online searches and from electronic databases.
The initial search retrieved 30 online newspaper articles that were reviewed, in order to discover the underlying meaning of the reported stories mainly on the impacts of climate change and flood disasters in the two South African provinces.
The second search was conducted between 2 May 2022 and 12 July 2022 and retrieved 30 empirical journal articles from Google Scholar, IUP Publications, academic journals, AOSIS, ASCE Library and Emerald Insight, Technium Science, using the phrase ‘climate change and disaster preparedness in the KZN and EC provinces, South Africa’.
The articles that had been published in other provinces with dissimilar climatic and weather conditions were excluded, as they might not have added value.
Research reports, books, and book chapters that were not empirical were excluded.
Articles from the Beall’s List of Predatory Journals were also excluded, in addition to those with extremely low citations.
From the 30 retrieved journal articles, only nine were aligned with the research aims of the study.
Of the nine articles, only two employed a mixed-research method where municipalities were targeted: officials and communities vulnerable to climate-induced disasters and the impacts of these climatic variations on the tourism industry were investigated.
Two articles focused on a reflective analysis in Thailand and the Philippines on the role of education in disaster preparedness and publicprivate partnerships in preparing for disasters.
Only one study used archival data to examine the trends and impacts of coastal flooding in the Western Cape province.
Lastly, two authors used in-depth interviews, in situ interviews, and desktop studies to study floods, specifically in Limpopo province and Ekurhuleni.
A review of the articles provided an understanding of the key issues of climate change and disaster preparedness at the local government level.
Thematic analysis was used to group climate-induced disasters and solutions.
Microsoft Excel (version 16.0-2016) was used to generate the themes and to identify the methods used and major conclusions by scholars.
Existing gaps were identified and a scholarly direction to future research was provided (Paul & Criado, 2020).
3.
KEY ISSUES 3.1 Conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the study Atreya et al.
(2017: 428) define disaster preparedness in terms of residents’ actions to respond to, deal with, and minimise the risks of natural disasters, and reduce losses and risks at the household level (Peng, Xu & Wang, 2019: 469).
Hoffmann and Muttarak (2017: 33) divided the determinants of disaster preparedness into personal/ household, structural/geographical variables, socio-demographic characteristics, and psychosocial factors.
Reininger et al.
(2013: 52) considered married, middle-class groups, households with children, and citizens with disabilities as being associated with high preparedness.
Meanwhile, households with members who have lived in the same house for longer periods were perceived to have enhanced local knowledge, with an increase in disaster awareness of their immediate environment (Tanaka, 2005: 201).
Under psychosocial factors, higher understanding of perceived risks were noted as increased preparedness behaviour (McNeill & Bryden, 2013: 1654).
In the South African context, section 1f of the Disaster Management Amendment Act, 2015 (Act No.
16 of 2015) defines emergency preparedness as: a. a state of readiness which enables organs of state and 56 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 other institutions involved in disaster management, the private sector, communities and individuals to mobilise, organise and provide relief measures to deal with an impending or current disaster or the effects of a disaster; and b. the knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities, and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions” The World Bank (2021: 3) defines climate change as “the significant variation of average weather conditions becoming, for example, warmer, wetter, or drier – over several decades or longer.
It is the longer-term trend that differentiates climate change from natural weather variability.” Cobbinah (2017: 223) and Cobbinah and Darkwah (2017: 1231) refer to urban planning as a process where various stakeholders interact.
The motive is to shape the urban environment in the process of development.
This study explored a plethora of theories such as the Complexity Theory (Kim and Sohn, 2018), the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), and the Political Systems Theory (Easton, 1953).
Kim and Sohn (2018) investigated and provided an understanding of complex and contemporary phenomena such as meteorology, in order to find appropriate countermeasures.
This theory’s lenses are framed, based on contemporary disasters that have shown the characteristics of complex disasters.
These include the 2011 earthquake that struck Japan with 20 000 reported fatalities, and the 2011 devastating flooding in Thailand which resulted in tremendous economic losses.
The Complexity Theory has an important characteristic with “emergency”, which provides an important lesson for people to understand ways to cope with disasters (Pelling, 2003).
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) is applied to assess disaster preparedness, beliefs, and attitudes in shaping accepted and not accepted behaviours.
It can create a particular attitude on why certain individuals’ attitudes towards disaster preparedness are accepted or not (Zaremohzzabich et al., 2021).
However, this overview of the study is underpinned by Easton’s Political Systems Theory (1953), which is centred around stakeholder interactions and is influenced by the members of the system’s behaviour when playing their roles.
This implies that, when the theory is applied, a plethora of risks, crises, and difficulties can be avoided.
This theory’s environmental behaviour pillars are consistent with the current study’s objectives (see Table 1), as they focus on the following constructs: • System: Interaction of people in implementing public policies.
• Environment: Extra: international political, socio-economic, and cultural systems, sociostructural, and demographics.
Intra: social environmentsecological, biological, cultural, and personality.
• Response to its environment to adapt to the crisis.
• Feedback: On the information and understanding the effects.
This study draws insights from the determinants of this theory, as it dissects the effectiveness of vulnerable communities and government and their preparedness for climate-induced disasters, the effects of urbanisation, and infrastructural development in two South African coastal provinces.
3.2 Climate change and vulnerabilities in South Africa In South Africa, the consequences of climate change were predicted to worsen the impacts of natural disasters (floods, droughts, and storms), and contributed to socioeconomic losses, as observed in the January 2013 flooding of the Limpopo River (Twumasi et al., 2017: 308).
In addition, the recurrence of flood disasters has been attributable to heavy rainfall, with 91 fatalities recorded in 2011 owing to the Orange River flooding and causing over US$100 million in damages.
The World Bank (2021: 3) opines that South Africa is considered the best among the great African countries that are resilient to climate change.
This is because of its vast adaptive capacity, despite the fact that the country reported 100 disaster events between 1900 and 2017, with 21 million people affected, 2 200 fatalities, and US$4.5 billion in monetary losses.
The World Bank (2021: 4) reported that South Africa is a drought-prone country with very high temperatures that have resulted in over 50 000 people living below the poverty line.
This has been supported by Hoffman et al.
(2009), who confirmed that recent variations in climate change will increase the frequency of extreme drought events, especially in the winterrainfall region of southern Africa.
In 2022, the propensity and magnitude of the devastating impacts caused by unprecedented weather variations and events in the KZN and EC provinces, in particular, motivated the president of South Africa, on 19 April, to declare a disaster in KZN in accordance with section 27(1) of the Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act No.
57 of 2002).
The deadliest storm occurred in April, when nearly 300 mm of rain fell within 24 hours in KZN.
A total of 435 people lost their lives, and 80 are still missing (Government of South Africa, 2022).
This surpassed the September 1987 floods in Durban (in terms of rainfall and destructions) that brought 900 mm of rainfall recorded over four days and resulted in 506 fatalities (Singleton & Reason, 2007: 2).
Meanwhile, the killer floods in Durban in 2019 with 165 mm rainfall left approximately 80 people dead, with clear warning by the SAWS communicated in advance, according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2022) and the Moses Kotane Institute (2022: 4).
Table 1 shows highlights that emerged from the review which has been thematically presented, showing the impacts of climateinduced disasters and solutions to the vulnerable populations.
Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 57 3.3 Climate change, flood disasters, and resilience strategies It has been consistently observed that the variations in climate change, which have resulted in extreme precipitation and temperatures, have caused considerable threats to low-lying coastal towns, with flood disasters and a rise in sea level (Fitchett, Grant & Hoogendoorn, 2016).
While extreme temperatures adversely affect the socio-economic development of families residing in coastal cities, the latter are exacerbated by a backlash from tropical cyclones, intense rainfall, frequent coastal flooding, storm surges, rise in sea level, and tidal activity (Dube & Nhamo, 2020a; 2020b; Hallegatte et al., 2013).
The unprecedented occurrence of climate-induced disasters in developing countries (for example, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, and typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013) have improved DDR efforts.
This has been done by implementing early warning systems and increasing investment in structural mitigation for large buildings and infrastructure meant to prevent loss of life (Andrews & Quintana, 2015; Birkmann et al., 2008).
Handayani et al.
(2019) suggest that, in order to ensure that coastal areas are sustainable as a result of climate change, building resilience should be a key focus.
Researchers (Amoako & Frimpong Boamah, 2015; Dhiman et al., 2019) have attributed unplanned, rapid, and uncontrolled urbanisation and the construction of infrastructure in coastal areas to have led to extreme costs because of flooding and other hydrological hazards, rise in sea level, and climate change.
Other researchers (Douglas et al., 2008; Price & Vojinovic, 2008) insinuated that, in the Global South, rapid urbanisation and increased development in urban cities have noted the poorest of the poor and the marginalised residing in the most vulnerable and peripheral areas (mostly floodplains), with inadequate infrastructure and poor provision of services.
In South Africa, two regions in different provinces with dissimilar climatic conditions were selected in a research study initiated by the South African National Disaster Management Centre, with George in the Western Cape, being susceptible to flash floods, droughts, and rise in sea level, and the Khara Hais Local Municipality in the Northern Cape, being prone to drought (Faling, Tempelhoff & Van Niekerk, 2012).
The researchers unravelled the most fascinating findings such as, for instance, there is no urgency regarding planning for climate change, despite the regulations which mandate that municipalities must prioritise such plans.
This could be as a result of the backlog of developmental needs, which are taking priority.
Fatti and Patel (2013) conducted a study in Ekurhuleni, testing the perceptions of both municipal officials and communities that are prone to flood risks.
They found that the local communities have a historical distrust of government officials, whereas the officials cited the limited capacity of the municipality to implement policies (Fatti & Patel, 2013).
It is common that, despite the low level of resilience to disasters, developed areas can easily adapt and build resilience through effective decision-making (Vogel et al., 2007).
The underlying issues and priorities such as reducing poverty and creating jobs may increase resilience among vulnerable groups (Koch, Vogel & Patel, 2007).
This latter view is supported by Cities Alliance (2009) and Douglas et al.
(2008) in that floods translate to disasters with severe and adverse Table 1: Climate change and vulnerabilities in South Africa Themes Impacts/Solutions Authors Climate change variations Frequency of extreme drought events, flooding, and rise in sea level.
Dhiman et al., 2019; Hoffman et al.
2009; Twumasi et al., 2017 Socio-economic Losses of families residing in coastal cities and damage to urban environments.
Dube & Nhamo, 2020a; Fitchett, Grant & Hoogendoorn, 2016; Fatti & Patel, 2013; Twumasi et al., 2017 Urbanisation and infrastructure Uncontrolled urbanisation and construction of infrastructure in coastal areas.
Vulnerable groups in high-risk areas.
Cutter et al., 2008; Dhiman et al., 2019; Price & Vojinovic, 2008 Government response No urgency regarding planning for climate change.
Historical distrust of government officials.
Limited capacity of municipalities to implement policies.
Inadequate responses to disasters.
Fatti & Patel, 2013; Faling, Tempelhoff & Van Niekerk, 2012 Private-public partnerships NGOs and government to implement disaster education programmes.
Private-public partnerships are key to disaster management and DRR.
Developing community partnerships and conducting specialized training programmes.
Hagelsteen & Burke, 2016; Mishra & Suar, 2007; Wood et al., 2012 Disaster preparedness and education Insufficient disaster preparedness in designated groups.
Farming experience and the presence of the elderly equate to preparedness.
Education increases preparedness.
Municipal weaknesses Municipalities have limited time to put structures in place.
Lack of implementation of the Act.
Hagelsteen & Burke, 2016; Wentink & Van Niekerk, 2017 Early warning systems and disaster preparedness Improved DDR efforts; early warning systems; investment in structural mitigation for large buildings and infrastructure; adapt and build resilience through effective decision-making; raise awareness and increase household preparedness.
Birkmann et al., 2008; Mishra & Suar, 2007; Andrews & Quintana, 2015; Vogel et al., 2007; Koch, Vogel & Patel, 2007 4IR and disaster preparedness Application of the Digital Government Competency and Capability Readiness.
Application of the Artificial Intelligence tools (GIS, Remote Sensing) Abid et al., 2020 Source: Author 58 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 impacts, predominantly in areas where vulnerable communities and vulnerable areas intersect.
A perception study in two villages in the Limpopo province was conducted by Musyoki, Thifhufhelwi and Murungweni (2016), dissecting communities’ responses to flood disasters.
The findings indicated that local communities are vulnerable to disasters such as floods, with negative impacts on infrastructure and livelihoods.
Respondents perceived the municipality’s response to disasters to be inadequate.
The study recommended that both the communities and the government apply coping mechanisms to better manage flood disasters.
3.4 Insufficient disaster preparedness and vulnerable groups In both developed and developing countries, the level of preparedness varies in terms of the level of education, age, and economic status, with vulnerable groups in high-risk areas always found to be less prepared for disasters.
Goal 13 of the Sustainable Development Goals (2030) encourages countries to take urgent action to combat the impacts of climate change.
However, unprecedented and extreme weather conditions, with negative impacts on the socio-economic development of coastal communities, have threatened the realisation of the 2030 inclusive SDGs of the United Nations.
Private-public partnerships are key to disaster management, with four determinants applied in the international arena, namely disaster preparedness partnerships, awareness and advocacy, partnerships, and social investment partnerships (UNISDR, 2005).
In Tokyo, Japan, gas company initiatives on risk reduction involve the fire departments’ individuals from the local community, the disaster management volunteer groups, and the fire departments.
These groups and volunteers train and educate communities to be involved in household preparedness and mitigation measures, assisting them to reduce risks (UNISDR, 2008: 26; Tokyo Gas Group, n.d.: online).
According to Fatti and Patel (2013), intense and frequent flooding, due to climate change, has caused major damage in the urban environments of the Global South, which has been perpetuated by a lack of disaster preparedness.
The most vulnerable areas, predominantly informal settlements, are overlooked in terms of consistent knowledge.
Budgets that are allocated and spent are already prioritised for developed areas, owing to poor planning and services (Cutter et al., 2008).
In developed countries such as Japan, which is severely prone to earthquakes and tsunamis, disaster preparedness at a community and household level are accentuated.
Miceli, Sotgiu and Settanni (2008) conducted an empirical study, in a provincial city in Japan, to examine the determinants of disaster preparedness among households.
These researchers found insufficient disaster preparedness, with the literate, the elderly, female or married having preparedness plans.
People with farming experience and the presence of the elderly in a household meant that households were more prepared for disasters.
Fascinating themes emerged from another research study that aimed to understand the role of education in promoting disaster preparedness (Hoffmann & Muttarak, 2017).
Education increased preparedness for those families that had been prone to disasters, as education improves abstract reasoning and anticipation skills.
The study clearly concluded that educated households apply preventive measures without first experiencing a disaster (Hoffmann & Muttarak, 2017).
These authors further concluded that stockpiling and having an evacuation plan could minimise loss and damage from hazards, even though levels of household disaster preparedness are not prevalent in disaster-prone areas.
This has been supported by authors such as Adiyoso and Kanegae (2014) and Kohn et al.
(2012) who state that, despite a concerted effort to promote disaster preparedness, the low levels of disaster preparedness reported in highly prone areas and the pertinent questions raised as to how people vulnerable to disasters can be motivated to take precautionary actions and, in particular, those without prior experience being struck by disasters (Van der Keur et al., 2016; Shreve & Kelman, 2014; Harvatt, Petts & Chilvers, 2011).
Other authors such as Wood et al.
(2012) and Mishra and Suar (2007) mentioned that various stakeholders, including NGOs and local and national government, have put a concerted effort into implementing disaster education programmes in disaster-prone areas.
The intention of these programmes is to raise awareness and increase household preparedness so that people become self-reliant.
Muttarak and Pothisiri (2013) suggest that there is a paucity of data that focuses on the dimensions of disaster preparedness in developing countries.
They conclude that there is a dire need to understand the underlying factors explaining the adoption of preparedness measures, in order to promote disaster resilience.
3.5 Capacity development and stakeholders’ partnership as panacea to disaster risk reduction The non-compliance with the Disaster Management Act in South African municipalities has been noticed.
Malfunctioning, underresourced, and poorly trained officials in disaster management centres have significantly contributed to municipalities’ failure to be prepared and to proactively respond to climateinduced disasters.
A mixed-methods study, conducted by Wentink and Van Niekerk (2017), examined whether South African municipalities are aligned with the provisions of the Act.
They found that these municipalities have limited time to put structures in place, in order to proactively respond to disasters, thus showing a clear lack of implementation of the Act.
Botha, Van Niekerk and Wentink (2011), meanwhile, opine that local municipalities play an important role in mitigating disasters, as mandated by the Disaster Management Act.
This is primarily to formulate diverse disaster-management committees (constituted with various role Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 59 players, including volunteers, local businesspeople, and municipal managers).
This is with a view to developing community partnerships and conducting specialised training programmes.
These training programmes should be aligned with municipal disaster plans and should focus on risk and hazard awareness, risk reduction and prevention, and vulnerability assessments.
Hagelsteen and Burke (2016) cite partnerships as being important in capacity development, but they further add elements that are pivotal to capacity development for DDR.
These include ownership, monitoring, evaluation and learning, roles and responsibilities, ownership, understanding the local context, terminology, and a variety of activities.
Although the various authors mentioned earlier regard capacity development as being important in DDR at a local level, they also unravelled some drawbacks to developing programmes.
The duration is short and DDR is considered to be a development issue rather than a humanitarian one (Hagelsteen & Becker, 2013: 11; Van Niekerk & Annandale, 2013: 173).
Secondly, the timeconsuming programmes should be integrated into development policies and planning (UNISDR, 2005).
3.6 Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and disaster management There has been a concerted effort to encourage both public and private sector organisations to specifically deploy 4IR technologies to manage and be prepared for climate-induced disasters across the spectrum.
Mahmud et al.
(2022) suggest that the 4IR readiness in disaster management can be understood by the extent to which these sectors harness the 4IR technologies in managing disasters and advocate for the development of the 4IR readiness model.
This has been exemplified in Malaysia in 2017, for instance, where the Public Service department developed a ‘Digital Government Competency and Capability Readiness (CDGCR) to build government officials’ competency and digital capabilities at all levels and provide services to people through digital tools (MMITI, 2018).
A study by Abid et al.
(2020) provided a highlevel overview of the applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools such as GIS and Remote Sensing in managing disasters that have led to a faster, more concise and equipped response, higher planning, situational analysis, and recovery operations.
Researchers such as Arinta and Andi (2019), and Chen, Wang and Deng (2020) are of the opinion that AI and GIS are important digital tools applied by a plethora of scholars to map the spatial dispersal of flood hazards and susceptibility to flooding.
In disaster preparedness, AI facets are evident with drones, machine learning, robotics, sensors, deep learning, and algorithms applied in the context of catastrophe predictions (Chakraborty et al.
2020; Mosavi, Ozturk & Chau, 2018).
Meanwhile, Kumar and Sud (2020) created DHARA, a floodsupported mobile application to anticipate the likelihood of flooding, in order to implement early warning preparedness and restoration technique before a disaster.
In addition, using remote sensing and satellite imagery to monitor disaster preparedness operations and aerial surveys to determine disaster zones by identifying disaster floodprone areas mitigate the damage caused by disasters (Fara, Fritza and Castellano and Tsai, 2019).
3.7 Urbanisation, apartheid planning model, and its effects on climate change in South Africa The rapid and unplanned urbanisation in the Global South (South Africa is not an exception) has been seen to have perpetuated the impacts of climate changeinduced disasters, with the rippling effects on the poor population observed.
According to Culwick (2019), the urban poor are at the greatest risk, as rapid urbanisation and climate change are likely to increase the propensity and intensity of disasters.
The author argues that South Africa faces a myriad of challenges and an unprecedented increase in climate change and urbanisation-inclined challenges.
This has been exemplified by Mhangara et al.
(2017), who cited the socio-economic and the City of Cape Town foundation inequalities because of the apartheid historical growth which created distinctly unequal human settlements with the affluent suburbs characterised by adequate services and opportunities and the poor residing in the informal settlements with the shortage of access to core urban services.
An empirical study by Busayo, Kalumba and Orimoloye (2019) examined Mdantsane Township’s (the largest in South Africa located in the EC province) spatial planning and climate change adaptation which espoused interesting highlights.
This case study was chosen as the authors suggest that it is reminiscent of apartheid legacies to prepare people to adapt to climate change, while the residents are still prone to urban poverty, environmental challenges, and inadequate access to basic needs and facilities.
The latter has been echoed by Kalumba et al.
(2013) that the government of South Africa is still grappling with redressing the segregated apartheid spatial planning and improving communities’ adaptation to climate change and other hazards which can have negative repercussions on human and environmental health.
In their groundbreaking research study, Rice, Lond and Levenda (2022) coined an interesting construct: climate apartheid which they have considered as emerging globally.
The scholars considered the term as a form of segregation, violence, and discrimination which is evident in terms of class, race, sexuality, and gender.
In addition, Rice et al.
(2022) proposed populations under the ambit of the climate apartheid: climate privileged (those who insulate themselves and make a profit from the threats of climate change) and climate precarious (those with inadequate infrastructure, lack resilience), and their vulnerability exacerbated by the impacts of climate change which can lead to harm and displacement.
Other scholars have used this term to highlight the extent of racialised climate policies and practices (Tuana, 2019).
The extent 60 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 effect, global warming, and extreme weather conditions.
Two predominant disasters have been consistently mentioned – floods and droughts – which led to widespread devastation and subsequent rescue operations.
One of the experts provided this background: “Flooding started when a cut-off low pressure system delivered extremely high rainfall levels of 450 mm in some areas in just 48 hours” (Engelbrecht et al., 2022).
The challenges espoused by media reports were a lack of risk awareness and a lack of education programmes for high-risk communities.
Absent, outdated, and unreliable information as well as a lack of literacy about geography and climate change have perpetuated the impacts of flood disasters, more especially in KZN.
One of the experts, quoted in a media article (Evans, 2022), stated: “Early warning systems on floods are not enough; climate crisis literacy saves lives.” Based on the reviewed literature, South Africa is still perceived as the best country in terms of climate change adaptation, despite the severe human, economic, and infrastructural losses that have been recorded over the past two decades.
Similarly, in developing countries that are severely prone to climate-induced disasters, their DRR initiatives have yielded positive results.
However, the unplanned urbanisation has led to vulnerable of the nature of the effect of climate variations; the vulnerabilities of the displaced persons and refugees (Dawson, 2017); the weak political will and proactive response to the climate crisis have directly affected poor communities (Bond, 2016).
Watson (2009: 151) argued that the majority of the Global South towns, which are heavily urbanised in cities/ towns and peri-urban areas, are compounded by a crisis of rapid population growth with the lack of access to infrastructure, proper shelter, and inadequate provision of services to predominantly poor populations.
The author further alluded to the factors exacerbating the situation, namely weak governments, environmental issues brought by climate change, food insecurity, and the financial crisis.
Watson (2009) hypothesised that urban planning served to exclude the poor, while there is an ongoing application of the older forms of urban planning.
He concluded that there are significant shifts and new ideas without ready-made solutions for the Southern urban contexts.
An overview paper written by Dodman et al.
(2017), reviewing the key features of African urban experiences and the implications associated with such risks, concluded that both urban development and riskreduction actors should engage all the elements of urban development, including urban poverty, provision of services, infrastructure, informality, and local governance management.
A study exploring an association between urbanisation and living conditions in South Africa by Turok and Borel-Sladin (2014) found that the vast majority of people continue to live in informal settlements, as the provision of adequate services has not kept up with household growth.
4.
DISCUSSION Four major focus areas emerged from the reported online articles on the April disasters in the KZN and EC provinces, which encapsulate the causes, challenges, impacts, and solutions (refer to Figures 1 and 2).
During the disasters of 2022, a number of stakeholders, including NPOs (e.g., UNICEF South Africa, Famine Early Warning Systems team, GroundWork); non-governmental organisations (NGOs); academic institutions (e.g., the University of KwaZulu-Natal), and government officials played different roles.
This is in line with Wood et al.
(2012) that various stakeholders including NGOs and local and national government disaster education programmes partake in disaster response.
Concerning the causes of the April 2022 disasters, numerous media commentators and experts have stated that this was attributed to a cut-off low pressure, heavy rainfall, an increased greenhouse 14 4.
DISCUSSION Four major focus areas emerged from the reported online articles on the April disasters in the KZN and EC provinces, which encapsulate the causes, challenges, impacts, and solutions (refer to Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1: Reducing vulnerabilities and strategies to counter floods Source: Author Variations in climate change:  Extreme precipitation Reducing flood control:  Implementing early warning systems  Embarking on structural mitigation capacity development: o Short-term training programmes o Time-consuming training Non-compliance with Disaster Management Act:  Lack of implementation of the Act  Uncontrolled urbanisation and infrastructure development  No urgency to plan for climate change  Distrust of government officials  Municipal response is inadequate Reducing flood control:  Disaster preparedness and literacy rate: o Abstract reasoning and anticipation skills  Community partnerships  Training should be incorporated into policy and planning curricula  Effective decision-making Insufficient disaster preparedness and high vulnerability:  Lack of disaster preparedness in informal settlements  Inconsistent knowledge of climate risk in informal settlements  Low preparedness in riskprone areas Figure 1: Reducing vulnerabilities and strategies to counter floods Source: Author https://issafrica.org/author/francois-engelbrecht Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 61 communities living in high-risk areas with inadequate infrastructure (see Douglas et al., 2008).
What is noteworthy in this study is local government’s failure to plan for climate change and to prioritise other development initiatives; the trust deficit of communities, and government officials’ lack of capacity to implement policies.
There is also a common consensus in the literature that resilience to climate-induced disasters can be increased by eradicating poverty and creating jobs.
What is disturbing in this review are common views regarding the lack of preparedness plans among vulnerable groups and illiterate communities, as well as the lack of intra and extra stakeholder partnerships, without any empirical evidence depicting the opposite.
The inadequacy of disaster preparedness plans goes against the ethos of Easton’s (1993) political systems theory, which is anchored around stakeholder interaction in implementing government policies (refer to Figure 1).
As the service delivery or provision of basic services lies at the local government level, it is disturbing that municipal officials are inadequately trained with inappropriate training programmes provided to them that are not aligned with the demands of climate-induced disasters.
The extent and lack of climate change skills and knowledge among municipal officials have caused them to fail to implement policies and develop partnerships, be unprepared for climate-induced disasters, and failed to introduce effective disaster preparedness programmes for vulnerable communities.
The application of AI and digital tools such as GIS and Remote Sensing has been considered to equip public sector officials to be prepared for climate-induced disasters (Abid et al., 2020; Mahmud, 2022).
Two other themes that were considered to have aggravated the impacts of the 2022 disasters were unplanned urbanisation and the apartheid planning model, which led to poorly constructed cities.
The head of an NPO called Groundwork (which focuses on environmental justice), who is also a member of the Presidential Climate Commission, was cited by Daily Maverick (Evans, 2022) as saying that “Durban was the first apartheid-designed city … and apartheid planning created poorly constructed townships and a division and duality of managing Durban by the Ingonyama Trust and the eThekwini Municipality.” A focal theme linking rapid and unplanned urbanisation to the apartheid model coincides with the conclusions drawn by scholars (Mhangara et al., 2017; Rice, Lond & Levenda, 2022) who have cited the emerging of ‘climate apartheid’ and apartheid historical growth characterised by unequal human settlements in this epoch in urban South African cities.
The unprecedented and unequal human settlements in South African cities have been considered to have exacerbated urban poverty, inadequate access to proper infrastructure and basic services, and continuation of the outdated apartheid spatial urban planning without ready-made solutions.
The nature and extent of unplanned urbanisation have also increased the divide between the rich and the poor, infrastructure and environmental challenges, climate privilege and precarious, weak governance, and food insecurity.
15 Figure 2: EC and KZN 2022 disasters: Causes, challenges, impacts, and solutions Source: Author Disaster causes Challenges Impacts Solutions Cut-off low pressure system Heavy rainfall Increased greenhouse gas Global warming Warming of the atmosphere Extreme weather conditions Awareness and education  Absence of reliable disaster loss and damage data  Inadequate and outdated early warning systems and flood mitigation measures  Communities in informal settlements not informed about climate risks  Communities’ lack of climate change language  Communities’ lack of knowledge or understanding of risk warnings, which make them difficult to respond  Geographical literacy is lacking Urbanisation and apartheid urban planning  Uncontrolled urbanisation  Lack of land-use zoning enforcement  Frequent flooding  Inadequate spatial planning  Apartheid and colonial planning  Apartheid planning and poorly constructed cities Types of disaster Drought Flood Widespread devastation Search-and-rescue operations Infrastructural destruction  Telecommunications, electricity, and water supply and sewerage terminals disconnected  Port terminals and rail disconnected  Damage to roads Socio-economic vulnerability  Highly vulnerable to socio-economic and environmental risks  Children missing  Schools remain closed Agricultural production and infrastructure  Loss of crops and livestock  Farming industry destroyed  Diseases killed livestock  Farming infrastructure: irrigation equipment, machinery destroyed  Piggery-related infrastructure damaged  Feed storerooms damaged  Chickens drowned Effective warning systems and trainings  Early warning system to be improved  Reliable warnings can be advanced through ‘climate science’  Early warnings through disaster preparedness: Communities and officials can proactively respond  Climate hazard literacy  To produce and ownership of knowledge by local communities to address climate challenges  The use of digital tools such as, for example, WhatsApp Identification, adaptation, and mapping  Climate change adaptation to reduce vulnerabilities  Identification of high-risk land exposed to natural hazards  Flood-control mechanisms should be used to identify and protect at-risk infrastructure  Farming communities need conservation plans to adapt  Households residing in high-risk zones should be educated and relocated  Fit-for-purpose for municipal officials: Disaster management capabilities  Build resilient infrastructure  Mapping of floodplains that are prone to flooding  Mapping of key infrastructure  Development of hazard maps  Urban planners to identify and prevent people from building on river banks and floodplains or in areas geographically inadequate for habitation Stakeholder partnership  Strengthen institutional arrangements  Partnerships between communities and government  Municipality to partner with traditional leaders and residents  Unsuitable land for development should be guided and regulations enforced for any future development  Construction of settlements should be guided by municipalities  Valuing community-based knowledge Flood preparedness and disaster response  Monitoring and forecasting data  Flood preparedness plan to inform departments about mitigation measures  Provision of seedlings and fertilisers by government  Disaster response plans Figure 2: EC and KZN 2022 disasters: Causes, challenges, impacts, and solutions Source: Author http://www.ingonyamatrust.org.za/ 62 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 5.
CONCLUSION By critically reviewing the literature, this study sought to investigate the effectiveness of preparedness plans as they relate to the climateinduced disasters that occurred in two South African provinces in 2022.
Furthermore, the study dissected the effects of urbanisation and inadequate infrastructure and how this affects the severity of disasters.
An inference can be drawn in view of the themes that emerged from this study: local government’s ability to prioritise climate change interventions, municipal officials’ incompetency relating to climate change, and a lack of stakeholder partnerships gave rise to the devastating effects of climate-induced disasters in these two regions.
In addition, inappropriate training programmes for municipal officials and a lack of climate change knowledge can be associated with a lack of climate literacy among vulnerable communities that are susceptible to climate change-induced disasters.
A noteworthy finding was a link between the legacy of apartheid urban planning and the catastrophic impacts of flooding in KZN.
However, the literature depicts poverty, the scarcity of land, as well as rapid and unplanned urbanisation as adversely impacting on the designated groups.
In addition, the economic repercussions on agricultural production, livestock, and infrastructure were severe, especially in the EC province.
Finally, the lack of disaster preparedness plans was ascribed to a shortage of staff and resources, preventing municipalities from implementing such programmes.
In view of the above highlights of the study, it is recommended that a holistic investigation by both municipal planners and communities be undertaken to assess the risks, hazards, and effects of each ward and to ascertain what type and extent of disasters may strike these areas.
The municipalities should develop, implement, and enforce by-laws that deal with unplanned urbanisation and influence the provincial and national governments to enact legislation to manage sporadic immigration.
The shortage of safe land should be countered with the benchmarking of the integrated knowledge management systems applied in other developing countries where communities have built houses on floodplains (Douglas et al., 2008; Price & Vojinovic, 2008), in mangroves, on wetlands, and on hilly slopes.
Disasters are synonymous with poverty in developing countries, and in-person consultations and educational programmes on preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters should be prioritised by stakeholders, including municipal officials, academics, and NGOs.
Finally, at the centre of driving preparedness programmes in vulnerable areas, intraand inter-departmental partnerships are encouraged in the form of service-level agreements and partnerships with NPOs and NGOs (Botha et al., 2011).
This study relied on online newspaper articles, empirical articles, and a review of the literature.
Future researchers should conduct surveys to test the communities on their access to effective early warning systems; the value of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) in mitigating the impacts of disasters, and the diverse stakeholders’ effects in the disaster continuum in their areas.
REFERENCES ABID, S.K., SULAIMAN, N., MAHMUD, N.P.N., NAZIR, U.
& ADNAN, N.A.
2020, January.
A review on the application of remote sensing and geographic information system in flood crisis management.
Journal of critical reviews, 7(16), pp.
491-496.
ABUNYEWAH, M., GAJENDRAN, T., MAUND, K. & OKYERE, S.A. 2020.
Strengthening the information deficit model for disaster preparedness: Mediating and moderating effects of community participation.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 46, article number 101492, pp.
1-9. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101492 ADIYOSO, W. & KANEGAE, H. 2014.
The role of Islamic teachings in encouraging people to take tsunami preparedness in Aceh and Yogyakarta Indonesia.
In: Shaw, R.
(Ed.).
Recovery from the Indian Ocean tsunami: A tenyear journey.
Tokyo, Japan: Springer Japan, pp.
259-278. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-4-431-55117-1_18 AJZEN, I.
1985.
From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior.
In: Kuhl, J.
& Beckman, J.
(Eds).
Action-control: From cognition to behavior.
Heidelberg: Springer, pp.
11-39. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3_2 AMOAKO, C. & FRIMPONG BOAMAH, E. 2015.
The three-dimensional causes of flooding in Accra, Ghana.
International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development, 7(1), pp.
109-129. https://doi.org/10.1080/19 463138.2014.984720 ANDREWS, R.J. & QUINTANA, L.M.
2015.
Unpredictable, unpreventable, and impersonal medicine: Global disaster response in the 21st century.
The EPMA Journal, 6(1), article number 2, pp.1-12.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/ s13167-014-0024-9 ARINTA, R.R.
& ANDI, E.A.
2019.
Natural disaster application on big data and machine learning: A review.
In: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Technology, Information Systems and Electrical Engineering (ICITISEE), Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 20-21 November, Volume 6, pp.
249-254. https://doi.org/10.1109/ ICITISEE48480.2019.9003984 ATREYA, A., CZAJKOWSKI, J., BOTZEN, W., BUSTAMANTE, G., CAMPBELL, K. & COLLIER, B. et al.
2017.
Adoption of flood preparedness actions: A household level study in rural communities in Tabasco, Mexico.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 24, pp.
428-438. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.025 BIRKMANN, J., BUCKLE, P., JAEGER, J., PELLING, M., SETIADI, N. & GARSCHAGEN, M. 2008.
Extreme events and disasters: A window of opportunity for change?
Analysis of organizational, institutional and political changes, formal and informal responses after megadisasters.
Natural Hazards, 55(3), pp.
637-655. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/ s11069-008-9319-2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101492 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101492 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55117-1_18 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55117-1_18 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3_2 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-69746-3_2 https://doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2014.984720 https://doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2014.984720 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13167-014-0024-9 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13167-014-0024-9 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICITISEE48480.2019.9003984 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICITISEE48480.2019.9003984 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.025 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.025 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11069-008-9319-2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11069-008-9319-2 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 63 BOND, P. 2016. Who wins from “climate apartheid”?
African climate justice narratives about the Paris COP21.
New Politics 15(4), pp.
83-90.
BOPAPE, M.J.M., SEBEGO, E., NDARANA, T., MASEKO, B., NETSHILEMA, M. & GIJBEN, M. et al.
2021.
Evaluating South African weather service information on Idai tropical cyclone and KwaZulu-Natal flood events.
South African Journal of Science, 117(3-4), pp.
1-13. https://doi.
org/10.17159/sajs.2021/7911 BOTHA, D., VAN NIEKERK, D. & WENTINK, G.J.
2011.
Disaster risk management status assessment at municipalities in South Africa.
Report presented to the South African Local Government Association, North-West University, Potchefstroom.
BUSAYO, E.T., KALUMBA, A.M. & ORIMOLOYE, I.R.
2019.
Spatial planning and climate change adaptation assessment: Perspectives from Mdantsane Township dwellers in South Africa.
Habitat International, 90, article number, pp.
1-9 101978. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2019.04.005 CHAKRABORTY, M., SARKAR, S., MUKHERJEE, A., SHAMSUDDUHA, M., AHMED, K.M., BHATTACHARYA, A.
& MITRA, A.
2020.
Modeling regional-scale groundwater arsenic hazard in the transboundary Ganges River Delta, India and Bangladesh: Infusing physically based model with machine learning.
Science of the Total Environment, 748, article number 141107, pp.
1-14. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.141107 CHAPUNGU, L. 2020.
Mitigating the impact of cyclone disasters: Lessons from Cyclone Idai.
CHARI, M.M., HAMANDAWANA, H. & ZHOU, L. 2018.
Using geostatistical techniques to map adaptive capacities of resource-poor communities to climate change: A case study of Nkonkobe local municipality, Eastern Cape province, South Africa.
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 10(5), pp.
670-688.
DOI: 10.1108/ IJCCSM-03-2017-0071 CHEN, J., LI, Q., WANG, H. & DENG, M. 2020.
A machine learning ensemble approach based on random forest and radial basis function neural network for risk evaluation of regional flood disaster: A case study of the Yangtze River Delta, China.
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(1), p. 49. https://doi.
org/10.3390/ijerph17010049 CITIES ALLIANCE.
2009.
Can adapting to climate change also meet development goals in cities in developing countries?
CIVIS 2.
Human Settlements Group at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/ sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CA_Docs/ CIVIS_09.pdf> [Accessed: 17 February 2010].
CLIMATE SYSTEM ANALYSIS GROUP.
2018.
The “day zero” drought: When and where?
University of Cape Town.
23 July.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.csag.uct.ac.za/2018/07/23/ drought-when-and-where/> [Accessed: 12 June 2022].
COBBINAH, P.B.
2017.
Managing cities and resolving conflicts: Local people’s attitudes towards urban planning in Kumasi, Ghana.
Land Use Policy, 68, pp.
222-231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
landusepol.2017.07.050 COBBINAH, P.B.
& DARKWAH, R.M.
2017.
Urban planning and politics in Ghana.
GeoJournal, 82(6), pp.
1229-1245. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10708-016-9750-y CULWICK, C. 2019.
Disasters and disaster risk management in South Africa.
In: Knight, J.
& Rogerson, C. (Eds).
The geography of South Africa.
World Regional Geography Book Series.
Springer, Cham., pp.
295-304. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-94974-1_32 CUTTER, S.L., BARNES, L., BERRY, M., BURTON, C., EVANS, E. & TATE, E. 2008.
A place-based model for understanding community resilience to natural disasters.
Global Environmental Change, 18, article number 598e606.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2008.07.013 DALU, M.T., SHACKLETON, C.M.
& DALU, T. 2018.
Influence of land cover, proximity to streams and household topographical location on flooding impact in informal settlements in the Eastern Cape, South Africa.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 28, pp.
481-490. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.12.009 DAWSON, A.
2017.
Extreme cities: The peril and promise of urban life in the age of climate change.
Brooklyn: Verso Books.
DEA (DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS).
2011.
National Climate Change Response White Paper.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/ default/files/legislations/national climate change_ response_whitepaper.pdf> [Accessed: 25 May 2022].
DHIMAN, R., VISHNURADHAN, R., ELDHO, T.I.
& INAMDAR, A.
2019.
Flood risk and adaptation in Indian coastal cities: Recent scenarios.
Applied Water Science, 9 article number 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s13201-018-0881-9 DODMAN, D., LECK, H., RUSCA, M. & COLENBRANDER, S. 2017.
African urbanisation and urbanism: Implications for risk accumulation and reduction.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 26, pp.7-15.
https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.029 DOUGLAS, I., ALAM, K., MAGHENDA, M., MCDONNELL, Y., MCLEAN, L. & CAMPBELL, J.
2008.
Unjust waters: Climate change, flooding and the urban poor in Africa.
Environment & Urbanization, 20, article number 187e205.
https://doi.
org/10.1177/0956247808089156 DUBE, K. & NHAMO, G. 2020a.
Evidence and impact of climate change on South African national parks: Potential implications for tourism in the Kruger National Park.
Environmental Development, 33, pp.
1-11. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.envdev.2019.100485 DUBE, K. & NHAMO, G. 2020b.
Vulnerability of nature-based tourism to climate variability and change: Case of Kariba resort town, Zimbabwe.
Journal of Outdoor Recreation and Tourism, 29, article number 100281. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jort.2020.100281 EASTON, D. 1953.
The political system: An inquiry into the state of political science.
New York: Alfred Knoff.
Inc. https://doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2021/7911 https://doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2021/7911 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2019.04.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2019.04.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.141107 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.141107 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17010049 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17010049 http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CA_Docs/CIVIS_09.pdf http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CA_Docs/CIVIS_09.pdf http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CA_Docs/CIVIS_09.pdf http://www.csag.uct.ac.za/2018/07/23/drought-when-and-where/ http://www.csag.uct.ac.za/2018/07/23/drought-when-and-where/ https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.07.050 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.07.050 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-016-9750-y https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-016-9750-y https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94974-1_32 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94974-1_32 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.07.013 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.07.013 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.12.009 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.12.009 https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national climate change_ response_whitepaper.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s13201-018-0881-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13201-018-0881-9 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.029 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.029 https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247808089156 https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247808089156 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2019.100485 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2019.100485 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jort.2020.100281 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jort.2020.100281 64 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 ENGELBRECHT, f., LE ROUX, A., VOGEL, C. & MBIYOZO, A.N.
2022.
With every second city and town projected to suffer increased flooding, South Africa must be better prepared.
Daily Maverick, 12 May.
[Online].
Available at: <https://issafrica.org/ iss-today/is-climate-change-to-blamefor-kwazulu-natals-flood-damage> [Accessed: 29 July 2022].
EVANS, J.
2022.
Early warning systems on floods are not enough; climate crisis literacy saves lives – experts.
Daily Maverick, 7 June.
[Online].
Available at: <dailymaverick.
co.za> [Accessed: 28 November 2022].
FALING, W., TEMPELHOFF, J.W.
& VAN NIEKERK, D. 2012.
Rhetoric or action: Are South African municipalities planning for climate change?
Development Southern Africa, 29(2), pp.
241-257. https://doi.org/10.1080/03 76835X.2012.675695 FATTI, C.E.
& PATEL, Z.
2013.
Perceptions and responses to urban flood risk: Implications for climate governance in the South.
Applied Geography, 36, pp.
13-22. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2012.06.011 FITCHETT, J.M., GRANT, B.
& HOOGENDOORN, G. 2016.
Climate change threats to two low-lying South African coastal towns: Risks and perceptions.
South African Journal of Science, 112(5/6), article number 2015-0262. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/ sajs.2016/20150262 GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA.
2022.
KZN flood victims to get temporary accommodation by weekend.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.sanews.gov.za/southafrica/kzn-flood-victims-get-temporaryaccommodation-weekend> [Accessed: 5 May 2022].
HAGELSTEEN, M. & BECKER, P. 2013.
Challenging disparities in capacity development for disaster risk reduction.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 3, pp.
4-13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijdrr.2012.11.001 HAGELSTEEN, M. & BURKE, J.
2016.
Practical aspects of capacity development in the context of disaster risk reduction.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 16, pp.
43-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijdrr.2016.01.010 HALLEGATTE, S., GREEN, C., NICHOLLS, R.J. & CORFEE-MORLOT, J.
2013.
Future flood losses in major coastal cities.
Nature Climate Change, 3(9), pp.
802-806. https://doi.
org/10.1038/nclimate1979 HANDAYANI, W., FISHER, M.R., RUDIARTO, I., SETYONO, J.S.
& FOLEY, D. 2019.
Operationalizing resilience: A content analysis of flood disaster planning in two coastal cities in Central Java, Indonesia.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 35, article number 101073. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101073 HARVATT, J., PETTS, J.
& CHILVERS, J.
2011.
Understanding householder responses to natural hazards: Flooding and sea-level rise comparisons.
Journal of Risk Research, 14(1), pp.
63-83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ 13669877.2010.503935 HOFFMAN, M.T., CARRICK, P.J., GILLSON, L. & WEST, A.G. 2009.
Drought, climate change and vegetation response in the succulent Karoo, South Africa.
South African Journal of Science, 105(1), pp.
54-60. https://doi.org/10.1590/ S0038-23532009000100021 HOFFMANN, R. & MUTTARAK, R. 2017.
Learn from the past, prepare for the future: Impacts of education and experience on disaster preparedness in the Philippines and Thailand.
World Development, 96, pp.
32-51. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.02.016 IFRC.
2022.
South Africa KwaZuluNatal floods – Emergency appeal no.
MDRZA012 – Operational strategy.
ReliefWeb.
[Online].
Available at: <https://bit.ly/3iROPvr> [Accessed: 19 July 2022].
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES.
2018.
A delicate balance: Water scarcity in South Africa.
[Online].
Available at: <https://issafrica.
s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar132.pdf> [Accessed: 12 June 2022].
IOL.
2022.
Costs related to KZN floods stands at R17 billion.
[Online].
Available at: <https://bit.ly/3WeFCeT> [Accessed: 5 May 2022].
KALUMBA, A.M., OLWOCH, J.M., VAN AARDT, I., BOTAI, O.J., TSELA, P. & NSUBUGA, F.W.N.
et al.
2013.
Trend analysis of climate variability over the west bank-East London area, South Africa (1975-2011).
Journal of Geography and Geology, 5(4), pp.
131-147.
10.5539/jgg.v5n4p131 KIM, Y.K.
& SOHN, H.G.
2018.
Disaster theory.
In: Kim, Y.K.
& Sohn, H.G.
Disaster risk management in the Republic of Korea.
Singapore: Springer, pp.
23-76. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-981-10-4789-3_2 KOCH, I., VOGEL, C.H.
& PATEL, Z.
2007.
Institutional dynamics and climate change adaptation in South Africa.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 12, article number 1323e1339.
https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11027-006-9054-5 KOHN, S., EATON, J.L., FEROZ, S., BAINBRIDGE, A.A., HOOLACHAN, J.
& BARNETT, D.J.
2012.
Personal disaster preparedness: An integrative review of the literature.
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 6(3), pp.
217-231. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1001/dmp.2012.47 KUMAR, T.V.
& SUD, K. (Eds).
2020.
AI and robotics in disaster studies.
Disaster Research and Management Series on the Global South.
Singapore: Springer Nature.
https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-981-15-4291-6 KUNGUMA, O.
2022.
Opinion: KZN floods expose significant socio-economic and environmental vulnerabilities.
University of the Free State.
[Online].
Available at: <https://bit.
ly/3FN7Vfp> [Accessed: 1 May 2022].
MAHMUD, N.P.N., SULAIMAN, N., NAZIR, U., LATIB, S.K.K.A., HAFIDZ, F.M.
& ABID, S.K.
2022.
The readiness level of Sarawak Disaster Management Agencies (SDMAS) in managing disaster in the advent of Fourth Industrial Revolution (IR 4.0).
In: Pinem, M.
(Ed.).
Proceedings of the Conference on Broad Exposure to Science and Technology 2021 (BEST 2021), Atlantis Press, pp.
261-273. https://doi.org/10.2991/ aer.k.220131.042 MASINGA, F.N., MAHARAJ, P. & NZIMA, D. 2021.
Adapting to changing climatic conditions: Perspectives and experiences of women in rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
Development in Practice, 31(8), pp.
1002-1013. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09614524.2021.1937542 MAVHURA, E. 2020.
Learning from the tropical cyclones that ravaged Zimbabwe: Policy implications for effective disaster preparedness.
Natural Hazards, 104(3), pp.
2261-2275. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11069-020-04271-7 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-climate-change-to-blame-for-kwazulu-natals-flood-damage https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-climate-change-to-blame-for-kwazulu-natals-flood-damage https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-climate-change-to-blame-for-kwazulu-natals-flood-damage http://dailymaverick.co.za http://dailymaverick.co.za https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2012.675695 https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2012.675695 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2012.06.011 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2012.06.011 http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2016/20150262 http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2016/20150262 https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/kzn-flood-victims-get-temporary-accommodation-weekend https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/kzn-flood-victims-get-temporary-accommodation-weekend https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/kzn-flood-victims-get-temporary-accommodation-weekend https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.11.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.11.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.01.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.01.010 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1979 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1979 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101073 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101073 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ https://doi.org/10.1590/S0038-23532009000100021 https://doi.org/10.1590/S0038-23532009000100021 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.02.016 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.02.016 https://bit.ly/3iROPvr https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar13-2.pdf https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar13-2.pdf https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar13-2.pdf https://bit.ly/3WeFCeT https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4789-3_2 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4789-3_2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-006-9054-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-006-9054-5 http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/dmp.2012.47 http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/dmp.2012.47 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4291-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4291-6 https://bit.ly/3FN7Vfp https://bit.ly/3FN7Vfp https://doi.org/10.2991/aer.k.220131.042 https://doi.org/10.2991/aer.k.220131.042 https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2021.1937542 https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2021.1937542 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-020-04271-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-020-04271-7 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 65 MCNEILL, G. & BRYDEN, D. 2013.
Do either early warning systems or emergency response teams improve hospital patient survival?
A systematic review.
Resuscitation, 84(12), pp.
1652-1667. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.resuscitation.2013.08.006 MHANGARA, P., MUDAU, N., MBOUP, G. & MWANIKI, D. 2017.
Transforming the City of Cape Town from an apartheid city to an inclusive smart city.
In: Vinod Kumar, T.M.
(Ed.).
Smart economy in smart cities.
Singapore: Springer, pp.
951-983. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-981-10-1610-3_34 MICELI, R., SOTGIU, I.
& SETTANNI, M. 2008.
Disaster preparedness and perception of flood risk: A study in an Alpine valley in Italy.
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28, pp.
164-173. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jenvp.2007.10.006 MISHRA, S. & SUAR, D. 2007.
Do lessons people learn determine disaster cognition and preparedness?
Psychology & Developing Societies, 19(2), pp.
143-159. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/097133360701900201 MMITI (MALAYSIA MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY).
2018.
Industry4WRD: Readiness Assessment.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.miti.gov.
my/index.php/pages/view/4832> [Accessed: 12 June 2022].
MOSAVI, A., OZTURK, P. & CHAU, K.W.
2018.
Flood prediction using machine learning models: Literature review.
Water, 10(11), article number 1536. https://doi.org/10.3390/ w10111536 MOSES KOTANE INSTITUTE.
2022.
The assessment of the effects of floods on KwaZulu-Natal residents.
MUSYOKI, A., THIFHUFHELWI, R. & MURUNGWENI, F.M.
2016.
The impact of and responses to flooding in Thulamela Municipality, Limpopo Province, South Africa.
Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 8(2), article number 166. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/ jamba.v8i2.166 MUTTARAK, R. & POTHISIRI, W. 2013.
The role of education on disaster preparedness: Case study of 2012 Indian Ocean earthquakes on Thailand’s Andaman coast.
Ecology and Society, 18(4), article number 51.
10.5751/ES-06101-180451 NONJINGE, G. 2019.
Are South Africans prepared to confront climate change?
Afrobarometer Dispatch No.
295.
PAUL, J.
& CRIADO, A.R.
2020.
The art of writing literature review: What do we know and what do we need to know?
International Business Review, 29(4), article number 101717. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2020.101717 PELLING, M. 2003.
Natural disaster and development in a globalizing world.
London: Routledge.
https://doi.
org/10.4324/9780203402375 PENG, L., XU, D. & WANG, X.
2019.
Vulnerability of rural household livelihood to climate variability and adaptive strategies in landslidethreatened western mountainous regions of the Three Gorges Reservoir Area, China.
Climate and Development, 11(6), pp.
469-484. https://doi.org/10.10 80/17565529.2018.1445613 PHIRI, D., SIMWANDA, M. & NYIRENDA, V. 2020.
Mapping the impacts of cyclone Idai in Mozambique using Sentinel-2 and OBIA approach.
South African Geographical Journal, 103(2), pp.
237-258. https://doi.org/10.1 080/03736245.2020.1740104 PRICE, R.K. & VOJINOVIC, Z.
2008.
Case study: Urban flood management.
Urban Water Journal, 5(3), article number 259e276.
https://doi.
org/10.1080/15730620802099721 REININGER, B.M., RAHBAR, M.H., LEE, M., CHEN, Z., ALAM, S.R., POPE, J.
& ADAMS, B.
2013.
Social capital and disaster preparedness among low-income Mexican Americans in a disaster prone area.
Social Science & Medicine, 83, pp.
50-60. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.037 RICE, L.J., LONG, J.
& LEVENDA, A.
2022.
Against climate apartheid: Confronting the persistent legacies of expendability for climate justice.
Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space, 5(2), pp.
625-645. https:// doi.org/10.1177/251484862199928 RYAN, B., JOHNSTON, K.A., TAYLOR, M. & MCANDREW, R. 2020.
Community engagement for disaster preparedness: A systematic literature review.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 49, article number 01655. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijdrr.2020.101655 SHREVE, C.M.
& KELMAN, I.
2014.
Does mitigation save?
Reviewing cost-benefit analyses of disaster risk reduction.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 10 (Part A), pp.
213-235. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.08.004 SINGH, J.A.
2022.
Climate change exacerbated rainfall causing devastating flooding in Eastern South Africa.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.worldweatherattribution.org/ wp-content/uploads/WWA-KZN-floodsscientific-report.pdf> [Accessed: 12 June 2022].
SINGLETON, A.T. & REASON, C.J.C.
2007.
Variability in the characteristics of cut-off low pressure systems over subtropical southern Africa.
International Journal of Climatology, 27, pp.
295-310. https://doi.org/10.1002/ joc.1399 SOUTH AFRICA.
2002.
Disaster Management Act, Act 57 of 2002.
Pretoria: Government Printer.
TANAKA, K. 2005.
The impact of disaster education on public preparation and mitigation for earthquakes: A cross-country comparison between Fukui, Japan and the San Francisco Bay Area, California, USA.
Applied Geography, 25(3), pp.
201-225. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
apgeog.2005.07.001 TOKYO GAS GROUP.
n.d. Business risk.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.tokyo-gas.co.jp/en/IR/manage/ risk_j.html> [Accessed: 30 June 2022].
TUANA, N. 2019.
Climate apartheid: The forgetting of race in the anthropocene.
Critical Philosophy of Race, 7(1), pp.
1-31. https://doi.
org/10.5325/critphilrace.7.1.0001 TUROK, I.
& BOREL-SALADIN, J.
2014.
Is urbanisation in South Africa on a sustainable trajectory?
Development Southern Africa, 31(5), pp.
675-691. https://doi.org/10.1080/037683 5X.2014.937524 TWUMASI, Y.A., MEREM, E.C., AYALA-SILVA, T., OSEI, A., PETJA, B.M.
& ALEXANDER, K. 2017.
Techniques of remote sensing and GIS as tools for visualizing impact of climate change-induced flood in the Southern African region.
American Journal of Climate Change, 6(2), pp.
306-327. https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2017.62016 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resuscitation.2013.08.006 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resuscitation.2013.08.006 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1610-3_34 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1610-3_34 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2007.10.006 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2007.10.006 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097133360701900201 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097133360701900201 https://www.miti.gov.my/index.php/pages/view/4832 https://www.miti.gov.my/index.php/pages/view/4832 https://doi.org/10.3390/w10111536 https://doi.org/10.3390/w10111536 http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v8i2.166 http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v8i2.166 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2020.101717 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2020.101717 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203402375 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203402375 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2018.1445613 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2018.1445613 https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2020.1740104 https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2020.1740104 https://doi.org/10.1080/15730620802099721 https://doi.org/10.1080/15730620802099721 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.037 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.037 https://doi.org/10.1177/251484862199928 https://doi.org/10.1177/251484862199928 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101655 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101655 http://dx.doi.org/ https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/wp-content/uploads/WWA-KZN-floods-scientific-report.pdf https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/wp-content/uploads/WWA-KZN-floods-scientific-report.pdf https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/wp-content/uploads/WWA-KZN-floods-scientific-report.pdf https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/wp-content/uploads/WWA-KZN-floods-scientific-report.pdf https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.1399 https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.1399 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2005.07.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2005.07.001 https://www.tokyo-gas.co.jp/en/IR/manage/risk_j.html https://www.tokyo-gas.co.jp/en/IR/manage/risk_j.html https://www.tokyo-gas.co.jp/en/IR/manage/risk_j.html https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.7.1.0001 https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.7.1.0001 https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2014.937524 https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2014.937524 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2017.62016 66 Ngcamu 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):53-66 UNISDR (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION).
2005.
Hyogo framework for action 2005-2015: Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters.
Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations.
UNISDR (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION).
2008.
Private sector activities in disaster risk reduction: Good practices and lessons learned.
Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations.
VAN DER KEUR, P., VAN BERS, C., HENRIKSEN, H.J., NIBANUPUDI, H.K., YADAV, S. & WIJAYA, R. 2016.
Identification and analysis of uncertainty in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in South and Southeast Asia.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 16, pp.
208-214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijdrr.2016.03.002 VAN NIEKERK, D. & ANNANDALE, E. 2013.
Utilising participatory research techniques for community-based disaster risk assessment.
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 31(2), pp.
160-177.
VOGEL, C., MOSER, S.C., KASPERSON, R.E.
& DABELKO, G.D. 2007.
Linking vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience science to practice: Pathways, players and partnerships.
Global Environmental Change, 17, article number 349e364.
https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.05.002 WATSON, V. 2009.
The planned city sweeps the poor away…: Urban planning and 21st century urbanisation.
Progress in Planning, 72(3), pp.
151-193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
progress.2009.06.002 WENTINK, G.J.
& VAN NIEKERK, D. 2017.
The capacity of personnel in disaster risk management in South African municipalities.
The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 13(1), article number a427.
https://doi.org/10.4102/td.v13i1.427 WOOD, M.M., MILETI, D.S., KANO, M., KELLEY, M.M., REGAN, R. & BOURQUE, L.B.
2012.
Communicating actionable risk for terrorism and other hazards.
Risk Analysis, 32(4), pp.
601-615. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01645.x WORLD BANK.
2021.
Climate risk profile: South Africa.
The World Bank Group.
ZAREMOHZZABIEH, Z., SAMAH, A.A., ROSLAN, S., SHAFFRIL, H.A.M., D’SILVA, J.L., KAMARUDIN, S. & AHRARI, S. 2021.
Household preparedness for future earthquake disaster risk using an extended theory of planned behavior.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 65, article number 102533. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102533 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.03.002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.03.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.05.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.05.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.progress.2009.06.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.progress.2009.06.002 https://doi.org/10.4102/td.v13i1.427 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-%206924.2011.01645.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-%206924.2011.01645.x https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102533 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102533 _Hlk110505814 _Hlk118098372 _Hlk118098399 _Hlk118098425 _Hlk118098439
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 3 (1): 147–150, January 2020 BOOK REVIEW Climate Change Adaptation in the Global South Chandni Singh  Anamika Barua, Vishal Narain and Sumit Vij, eds.
2019.
Climate Change Governance and Adaptation: Case studies from South Asia.
Boca Raton: CRC Press, ISBN: 9781138054509, pp.
187, GBP 110 (Hardbound).
In 2019, South Asia experienced severe floods, record-breaking heatwaves, increasing rainfall variability, and the rapid melting of glaciers.
Climate change is undoubtedly exacerbating these extreme events and there are clear signals that such impacts will intensify in the future (IPCC 2018), especially in parts of South Asia.
As the poor and most vulnerable cope with and prepare for such a heightened risk regime, climate change adaptation becomes a critical tool in the suite of actions that governments and exposed populations can undertake.
In Climate Change Governance and Adaptation: Case Studies from South Asia editors Anamika Barua, Vishal Narain, and Sumit Vij offer us a rich set of case studies examining how climate adaptation is implemented and governed across South Asian countries.
They draw on knowledge of researchers and practitioners working across a spectrum of  Indian Institute for Human Settlements, Bangalore.IIHS Bangalore City Campus, 197/36, 2nd Main Road, Sadashivanagar Bangalore 560080.
India; csingh@iihs.ac.in Copyright © Singh 2020.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.101 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.101 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [148] sectors to highlight how climate change is not only ―redefining the roles of different actors in governance processes‖ (p. ix) but also necessitating ―adaptive governance to deal with increased uncertainty and risk associated with future impacts‖ (p. 93).
The book is divided into three sections: 1) climate change governance and societal challenges, 2) adaptation through effective governance, and 3) climate change governance at national/regional scales.
Under each section, individual chapters present case studies, and I will discuss a few illustrative ones to give a sense of the depth and breadth of the topics that are covered in the book.
The literature on perceptions of climate change and variability has burgeoned since 2010 but often stops at recording perceptions of changes in temperature, rainfall, and extreme events.
The more challenging question that seems to be left out is — how these everyday lived perceptions and experiences can enable adaptation for decision-making?
Chapters 2 and 3, in fact, address this gap by drawing on data from Uttarakhand and Nepal respectively, to explore how meanings that people associate with environmental change1 can then turn such bottom-up meaning-making into improved local participation and inclusive adaptation action.
In Chapter 3, Floriane Clement focuses on forms of natural governance in the terai (lowland plains) of Nepal and discusses to what extent deliberative governance can open spaces where local concerns and national priorities around resource governance, risk management, and adaptation can come together.
Using the lenses of ‗fairness‘ and ‗competence‘ to gauge the quality of deliberative processes, Clement examines how and why different actors across scales form coalitions as a way to represent their needs and aspirations.
The initial results from this essay suggest promise, as she finds that ‗even within an unequal public sphere, deliberation can support the opening up of discourses towards…shared understandings of farmers…vulnerabilities‘ (p. 46).
Importantly, the case study demonstrates how current national climate change policies fail to recognise local experiences of climate change and that creating spaces to allow for different ‗storylines‘ of adaptation are critical to inclusive action.
It is posited that a significant outcome of climate change in South Asia will be increased migration (Rigaud et al.
2018).
In an exceptionally well-argued chapter, Anne Wesselink et al.
(Chapter 5) discuss the critical and often contentious issue of climate-induced migration with empirical examples 1 Broader term which encapsulates natural resource degradation and climate variability.
[149] Chnadni Singh from Bangladesh.
They chart the conceptual development of climateinduced migration and highlight the place of Bangladesh in this literature as ‗a laboratory of sorts, in which a series of national-level strategic plans, projects, programmes, trust funds and financing schemes are being designed and tested…‘ (p. 78).
Synthesising the burgeoning empirical literature on climate and migration from Bangladesh, they demonstrate how discourses on migration within the national government and international donor community tend to remain simplistic and blind to the non-climatic drivers of migration such as land grabs and unequal power.
Recognising the multiple drivers of migration is the first step to inclusive adaptation planning and implementation; and the authors end with the concept of ‗phronesis‘ (p. 83) to act as a guiding principle for effective adaptation.
Phronesis, an Aristotelian term, is defined as practical wisdom, can help reorient climate migration discussions from ‗what is true‘ to ‗what is good‘ (p. 83).
Perhaps, this discussion on what good or effective adaptation might look like is an important normative shift for adaptation researchers and practitioners alike.
While the book focuses on climate adaptation, in Chapter 8, Joyashree Roy et al.
turn to governing climate mitigation actions.
A sort of misfit at first glance, the chapter is an important reading for climate researchers examining mitigation and adaptation synergies.
Using the concept of ‗vertical integration‘ (p. 139), the authors explore how national governments are interpreting global mitigation targets (e.g.
reducing global average temperature to well below 2°C) and how interpretations percolate to inform state action plans, industrial emissions norms, and finally, individual behaviours.
Citing examples from India such as incentivising solar erickshaws and diversifying the energy mix to include bioenergy, they find that India‘s strong fiscal federalism does not always translate into effective vertical alignment of climate mitigation actions.
Beyond technology transfer, they argue, transformative changes are required that encompass scientific, social, economic, and institutional realities that national and state governments are often compelled to operate within.
Overall, Climate Change Governance and Adaptation: Case Studies from South Asia is an important book with rich empirical examples of adaptation governance.
I, however, think that an opportunity to provide a concluding chapter has been missed.
A chapter that the authors could have used for tying the different cases together and synthesising the key findings that could then inform a transformative agenda for climate governance.
However, by showing the importance of local dynamics and realities in shaping adaptation processes and outcomes, the book makes an important contribution and will be a valuable reading for students and researchers in Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [150] natural resource management, climate change adaptation, and development studies.
REFERENCES IPCC.
2018.
―Summary for Policymakers‖ In Global Warming of 1.5C.
An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, edited by V. Masson-Delmotte, et.
al.
IPCC (in press).
Accessed on 18 December 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_r eport_LR.pdf Rigaud, K. K., A. de Sherbinin, B. Jones, J. Bergmann, V. Clement, K. Ober, J. Schewe, S. Adamo, B. McCusker, S. Heuser, and A. Midgley.
2018.
Groundswell: preparing for internal climate migration.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
https://doi.org/10.1596/29461 https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf https://doi.org/10.1596/29461
200 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Agencies and Communities Participation in the Climate Change Programs ELLEN V. PATUNGAN https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2819-8261 ellenpatungan@gmail.com Bicol State College of Applied Sciences and Technology Naga City, Philippines DELIE JEAN N. MARTINEZ https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9692-8003 delmartinez0106@gmail.com Bicol State College of Applied Sciences and Technology Naga City, Philippines MARGIE A. NOLASCO https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1708-6720 margieanolasco@gmail.com Bicol State College of Applied Sciences and Technology Naga City, Philippines EBONIE B.
BASE https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8765-9689 eboniebase@gmail.com Bicol State College of Applied Sciences and Technology Naga City, Philippines Originality: 99% • Grammar Check: 100% • Plagiarism: 1% Vol.
37 · July 2019 https://doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v37i1.711 Print ISSN 2012-3981 Online ISSN 2244-0445 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2819-8261 mailto:ellenpatungan@gmail.com https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 201 International Peer Reviewed Journal ABSTRACT Metro Naga is primarily composed of Naga City and its surrounding municipalities in the province of Camarines Sur.
It is located within the heart of Bicol’s largest river basin area and is considered as a flood-prone region.
This provides challenges to the government agencies responsible for implementing climate change programs.
The study utilized the descriptive-evaluative design of mixed method of research to evaluate the community participation in the current programs and campaigns for Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA).
Information was gathered through Structured questionnaires, guided interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs) from the randomly selected respondents of the four (4) Municipalities of Metro Naga.
Based on the findings of the study, community residents only participated “often” on the DRRM and CCA programs ( = 2.94) and the problems encountered in its implementation were no access to effective and applicable disaster risk financing and insurance (90%) and lack of initiative from the community to rebuild and repair the houses/buildings destroyed by the disaster (28%).
As a result, continuous campaigns on community involvement in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation should be established.
The adoption of community-based disaster risk reduction management will give opportunities to the community residents to be equipped with the skills and knowledge needed to be adaptive and disaster resilient.
Keywords — Agencies Culture, Communities participation, Climate Change Programs, Philippines INTRODUCTION Shreds of evidence of climate change was already seen throughout the globe.
Forest fires, melting of glaciers, drying of lands and increasing number of endangered species were just a few pieces of evidences of climate change observed (Levitus et al.
2017).
Scientific evidence revealed that the warming of the Earth’s surface and change of climate is unequivocal (Robinson & Monte, 2014).
Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change (IPCC) is the United Nation’s body for assessing the science related to climate change.
It has been the body that provides regular scientific assessments on climate change to guide policymakers in addressing climate change issues and problems.
IPCC further discussed that the extent of climate change effects on individual regions vary depending on how would the community will mitigate or adapt to change.
(Parry et al.
& Ciais et al.)
202 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Indeed, fighting climate change provide a challenge not only with policymakers but also with the government.
Responding and adapting to climate change should be acted upon by all the stakeholders involved (Bulkeley, 2013).
Climate change adaptation is key to the creation of climate policy.
In the study of the status of climate change adaptation in Africa and Asia, revealed that evidence of adaptation initiatives is limited to country’s receiving fund in adapting to climate change.
(Ford, Berrang-Ford, Bunce, McKay, Irwin & Pearce, 2015).
Cities play an active role in climate change.
High-end industrial machinery and other contributors in polluting the environment were commonly present in the urban areas or cities.
With these city government should formulate and implement policy on climate change adaptation.
But according to the study of Araos et.
Al,(2016) cities that were identified as extremely adaptors to climate change belong to low-income countries.
In the Philippines, climate change is an evident and an alarming subject because the issue is viewed not only as of the cause of property loss and casualties but also as a critical factor that would appraise the survival of the country (De Leon, E. G., & Pittock, J.
2017).
The effects of climate change on agriculture, forestry, marine life, etc.
will further encumber a country already reeling from a host of socioeconomic problems (Mercer, 2010).
To address this issue Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and all allied national government agencies are working together to ensure the Philippines is ready for the future.
The DILG, in particular, sees to it that relevant policies and programs are propagated, instilled and implemented among all local government units in the country.
RA 9729, otherwise known as Climate Change Act of 2009 and RA 10121, or the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction Management Act both aim to instill in the public consciousness that meeting the challenges ahead demands organization, coordination and systematic responses at all levels of governance and community management.
Various DRRM and CCA programs and projects were institutionalized.
One of these is the project NOAH or the Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards of DOST.
The program is the country’s flagship disaster prevention and mitigation program.
Project Noah was launched after the destructive tropical storm Sendong in December 2012 (Mateo, 2017).
On the local front, Metro Naga is composed of Naga City and its surrounding municipalities (Bombon, Calabanga, Camaligan, Canaman, Gainza, Magarao, Milaor, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, Pili and San Fernando) are visited constantly by about 20-22 destructive typhoons annually (MNDC, 2019).
When these disasters strike, Metro Nagueños are highly affected because they heavily rely 203 International Peer Reviewed Journal on the government agencies’ courses of action concerning its active involvement in climate change awareness efforts in Metro Naga and Camarines Sur.
Recently, the National Resilience Council was made to address the issues and concerns regarding the disaster resiliency of the country where Naga City is a part of.
It is the role of the local government to implement the provisions of DRRM and CCA.
In this study, the involvement and compliance of the local government units and government agencies were being evaluated.
Establishing resiliency is one way of mitigating the impacts of disasters with the help of Inter-local government units and agencies’ commitment in the implementation of DRRM and CCA with the active participation of the local community, adverse impacts of natural hazards will be reduced.
In general, the effectiveness of the implementation of DRRM and CCA will depend on the compliance and participation of the LGUs, GAs, and local communities.
This provides challenges to the heads of the communities.
Furthermore, this collaboration will lead to the improvement of people’s adaptation to climate risk.
Through the help of barangay officials, government agencies, employees, and household communities, this study evaluated the level of compliance and participation of the stakeholders in DRRM and CCA in Metro Naga and the problems and issues in its implementation.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY This study evaluated the level of compliance in the implementation of DRRM and CCA programs, campaigns, and activities by the Local Government Units (LGUs) and Government Agencies in the current programs and campaigns in Metro Naga in 2018.
Specifically, the study determined the level of participation of community residents in Climate Change Programs, and the problems encountered regarding its implementation by Government Agencies (GAs) and communities.
METHODOLOGY Research Design The study utilized a descriptive-evaluative design of mixed method of research (Creswell & Creswell, 2013).
Two different methods were utilized to confirm, cross-validated, or corroborate findings in determining the level of compliance and participation of the local government units and government agencies in DRRM and CCA programs.
The data and information of this study were collected from 204 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research the responses of randomly selected community residents, government agencies, and local government units of the selected towns in Metro Naga.
Focus Group Discussion (FGDs) were also administered and selected individuals were chosen to provide inputs during this focus group discussion.
The discussions were guided by the survey instrument to confine deliberations to necessary issues.
Research Site The study was undertaken in four municipalities of Camarines Sur, Philippines namely: Canaman, Camaligan, Milaor and Pili.
These four municipalities were chosen because these were identified as flood-prone areas in Camarines Sur and had high risk in environmental disasters.
Participants The respondents of the study were from Canaman, Camaligan, Milaor and Pili.
It is composed of household heads, community chairman and personnel of government agencies from the different barangays in Canaman, Camaligan, Milaor and Pili.
Instrumentation The research instrument was crafted to answer the problems stated in this study.
A set of the research instrument was prepared for the community residents and the government agencies (GAs).
One hundred and twenty(120) respondents participated in the validation of the questionnaire.
The trial respondents’ responses were analyzed and its measure of reliability was determined.
The validated questionnaire was then used to gather information and data.
The questionnaire 205 International Peer Reviewed Journal was composed of four parts.
It includes the profile of the respondents, level of compliance/participation in the implementation of DRRM and CCA programs, and the problems encountered in the implementation of the program.
The questionnaires were administered and retrieved personally by the researchers.
All targeted respondents were informed about the purpose and importance of the study and that honest answers would serve well for the study.
The validity of the instrument was achieved through pilot testing, institutional peer review and literature review.
On each research questionnaire, respondents were informed of the purpose of the study and were also asked for their consent in answering the questionnaire and using the data gathered.
They were also assured of their anonymity and privacy.
The statistical treatment included tallying, tabular presentation and statistical computations using a five-point Likert scale and average weighted mean.
Weighted mean was used in determining the average of the responses in each of the given questions.
This was used to find a single value out of the different results and in interpreting the data about a given condition (Bluman, 2013).
Table 1.
Likert Scale For Community Participation and Gas Compliance Scale Verbal Description 3.01-4.00 always 2.01-3.00 often 1.01-2.00 sometimes 0.50-1.00 never Table 1 shows the scale to rate the community participation to the DRRM and CCA programs.
The verbal description “always” is rated in between 3.01 and 4.00, “often” is 2.01-3.00, “sometimes” is 1.01 – 2.00 and “never” is 0.50 – 1.00.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Metro Naga is constantly hit by about 20-22 tropical storms/typhoons annually that trigger landslides and widespread flooding in various towns of Metro Naga namely: Camaligan, Canaman, Milaor, and Pili were high-risk areas for flooding.
Typhoons would usually hit the Bicol Region during the latter part of the year, starting in September.
206 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Local Government and Agency Disaster Response Recognizing the huge task of stakeholders of vulnerable the provisions of R.A. 7160 or the “Local Government Code” sections 16 and 24, in which the responsibility of the national government and local governments for disaster planning, must be strengthened.
Hence, the DILG is tasked to “formulate plans, policies and programs which will meet local emergencies arising from natural disasters…,” has embarked different programs to be implemented that aims to create disaster-resilient communities.
(LCCAP, 2014).
In Camarines Sur, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation start with its governor, which is Governor Miguel Villafuerte.
He is the one who directs the Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council (PDRRMC) to immediately convene all the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Management Officers (MDRRMOs) and activate their respective incident management teams.
Figure 1.
Local Disaster Response Framework Every MDRRMO should have a well-prepared safety and emergency plan should a typhoon or any disaster strikes the province of Camarines Sur.
Lowlying and flood-prone areas of the province were given special attention.
The communication protocol was activated in all municipalities, alerting the chief executives and MDRRMOs to plan out the mobilization of its personnel to ensure that disaster protocols are in place.
As part of the disaster protocols, emergency 207 International Peer Reviewed Journal ambulances are on a stand by mode as Camarines Sur PDRRMC preps up for typhoons.
While Environment Disaster Management Response Office (EDMERO) help facilitate contingency activities and check on their barangay’s vulnerabilities and risks so that preventive actions can be implemented.
Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) bear the news about the weather conditions they also provide a warning to municipalities near rivers and streams tributary of the low lying area of municipalities of Camarines Sur which always includes Camaligan, Canaman, Milaor, and Pili.
People living near the mountain slopes and low-lying areas are also advised to be alert for possible flash floods and landslides, and the local disaster risk reduction and management councils concerned are advised to be alert and take appropriate actions.
Compliance of Government Agencies (GAs) Natural disasters strike unexpectedly and the only thing one could do is to alleviate the impact it will bring.
Thus, the government puts an effort in developing a strategic plan to prevent and mitigate the adverse impacts of disasters (Ishiwatari, 2012).
At the national level, the government aims to institutionalize and standardize DRRM measures and processes at the local and community levels; it seeks to empower the most vulnerable municipalities and cities in the country and to enable them to prepare disaster risk reduction and management and climate change adaptation programs, campaigns, and activities.
Table 2.
Level of Compliance of GAs in the implementation of DRRM and CCA programs Programs, Campaigns, and Activities Mean Description Green technology for houses and buildings 1.85 Sometimes Enhance communities’ participation 2.31 Often Collaborate with other community stakeholders 1.75 Sometimes Well-established disaster response operations 3.01 Always Safe and timely evacuation centers 3.52 Always Basic services to affected communities 3 Often Temporary shelters for affected communities 2.9 Often Restore and strengthen economic activities 2.01 Often Construct/reconstruct disaster and CC resilient infrastructure 2.3 Often Programs on safety and rescue after each disaster.
3.7 Always AVERAGE 2.63 Often 208 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Table 2 presents the level of compliance of GAs in the implementation of DRRM and CCA programs.
This gives a picture of how the GAs is implementing the programs on DRRM and CCA.
It could be seen from the table that among the identified programs the following were rated as “always implemented”: programs on safety and rescue after each disaster (3.7); safe and timely evacuation(3.52) ; and well-established disaster response operations (3.01), while the program on green technology for houses and buildings with a mean of 1.85; and collaboration with other community stakeholders (1.75) or “sometimes implemented”.
From the data, it clearly shows that collaboration with the different stakeholders is not yet established and only a few of the community members do.
Overall the GAs compliance in the implementation of DRRM and CCA programs were rated “often” (2.63).
Communities Participation Municipalities of Metro Naga, being one of the vulnerable municipalities in the country, have their own Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council.
These units strategize and integrate the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and Climate Change Adaptation Plans for the community.
Table 3 presents how often these programs are implemented at the community level.
Table 3.
Communities Participation in DRRM and CCA Programs Programs, Campaigns, and Activities Mean Description Awareness on DRRM and CCA 2.31 Often Well-established disaster response operations 3.01 Always Integrated and coordinated Search, Rescue and Retrieval (SRR) capacity 3.25 Always Evacuation of affected communities 3.52 Always Basic social services 3 Often Economic activities restored and strengthened 2.01 Often Safer sites for housing 2.2 Often Monitor for weather announcements/forecast 3.71 Always Survival kits before the disaster strike.
3.5 Always Adequate shelter needs 2.9 Often AVERAGE 2.94 Often 209 International Peer Reviewed Journal From the data, it reveals that of the ten (10) identified programs participated by the communities, five (5) are rated as “always implemented.” Programs on monitoring of weather announcements or forecast (3.71); evacuation of affected communities (3.52); survival kits before the disaster strikes (3.5); integrated and coordinated search, rescue and retrieval capacity (3.25) and program on wellestablished disaster response operations (3.01).
While the other programs such as awareness on DRRM and CCA, basic social services provided, safer sites for housing and economic activities restored and strengthened, and adequate shelter needs are rated as “often participated.” Overall the community participated in CCA and DRRM programs “often” (.
Problems Encountered In the implementation of the program, government agencies encounter some hardship.
Shown in table 4 is the five major problems encountered in implementing projects and programs on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation.
Table 4.
Problems encountered by the Government Agencies (GAs) Problems Percentage Lack of adequate shelter 50% No comprehensive plans coming from LGUs 30% No collaboration with other community stakeholders 80% Basic social services are not provided 60% No access to effective and applicable disaster risk financing and Insurance 90% From the data, it could be seen that the highest problem encountered by the GAs during the implementation of the programs was: no collaboration with other community stakeholders (90%), no access to effective and applicable disaster risk insurance (80%), this is because the government does not provide micro-insurance or household earthquake or flood insurance for financial protection.
Sixty-percent (60%) encountered the problems on basic social services; lack of adequate shelter (50%); and no comprehensive plans coming from LGUs (30%).
No collaboration with other community stakeholders may lead to the unsuccessful implementation of the program.
Social services were also provided but not enough to answer the need of the community; thus, it is perceived as a problem by the government agencies implementing the program.
Bicol is a natural disaster210 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research prone area must have access to effective and applicable disaster risk financing and insurance; however, it is limited to the individual who can afford it.
Table 5.
Problems Encountered by the Communities Problems Percentage Failure to follow policies and procedures 16% Lack of participation in preparedness and response plan 18% Lack of support from the LGUs 21% Lack of initiative to rebuild and repair 28% Lesser level of awareness 17% From the data, it is shown that 28% of the respondents encountered the problem with lack of initiative of the GAs to help and repair the houses, 21% of the respondents identified that there is no support from the LGU, while 18% and 17% encountered the problems on lack of participation on preparedness and response plan and a lesser level of awareness, respectively.
Only 16% encountered the problem of failure to follow policies and procedures.
The community seeks for support from different government agencies; thus they have perceived that one of the problems they have encountered is the lack of initiative from the GAs to help them rebuild the houses that had been destroyed by the typhoon, flooding or earthquakes.
As to the lesser level of awareness, some part of the community was not invited to seminars, trainings, or workshops conducted by the government and other agencies.
CONCLUSIONS Based from findings of the study, the following conclusions/implications are deduced: The community residents are “often” (2.94) participates in the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and Climate Change Adaptation; with the local government efforts on implementing programs, campaigns, and activities.
Twentyeight percent (28%) identified that the community encountered problem in terms of lack of initiative to rebuild and repair properties destroyed by the disasters and 90% have no access to effective and applicable disaster risk financing and insurance.
Thus, it may be implied that: (1) implementation strategies of the Local Government should be revisited to strengthen the community involvement in the programs, campaigns, and activities of DRRM and CCA.
(2) Disaster Risk 211 International Peer Reviewed Journal Reduction and Management (DRRM) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) plans should be anchored from the needs of the community and recognizing the existing coping mechanisms and capacities of the community/people as well as local know-how and resources is important to disaster risk reduction plans and strategies; (3) the adoption of community-based program for enhancing resilience to disaster and climate change.
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH The findings of this study may be best translated to a pamphlet for information dissemination, if not, a further awareness campaign on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.
The pamphlet will have the information about climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction management programs being implemented in Camarines Sur.
These would be disseminated to different communities in the Philippines to give them an initial idea on what the programs are implemented is all about.
The pamphlets can also serve as their initial guide if they want to venture in implementing programs in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and management programs.
LITERATURE CITED Araos, M., Berrang-Ford, L., Ford, J. D., Austin, S. E., Biesbroek, R., & Lesnikowski, A.
(2016).
Climate change adaptation planning in large cities: A systematic global assessment.
Environmental Science & Policy, 66, 375-382.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.06.009 Bluman, A. G. (2013).
Elementary statistics: A step by step approach: A brief version  (No.
519.5 B585E.).
McGraw-Hill.
Retrieved from https://bit.
ly/2FMrO5Q Bulkeley, H. (2013).
Cities and climate change.
Routledge.
Ciais, P., Sabine, C., Bala, G., Bopp, L., Brovkin, V., Canadell, J., ... & Jones, C. (2013).
Climate change 2013: the physical science basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
K., Tignor, M., Allen, SK, Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V., Midgley, PM, Eds.
Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2YDZlI2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.06.009 https://bit.ly/2YDZlI2 212 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2017).
Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches.
Sage publications.
Retrieved from https:// goo.gl/5sHkCz De Leon, E. G., & Pittock, J.
(2017).
Integrating climate change adaptation and climate-related disaster risk-reduction policy in developing countries: A case study in the Philippines.
Climate and Development, 9(5), 471-478.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2016.1174659 Ford, J. D., Berrang-Ford, L., Bunce, A., McKay, C., Irwin, M., & Pearce, T. (2015).
The status of climate change adaptation in Africa and Asia.
Regional Environmental Change,  15(5), 801-814.
Retrieved from https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10113-014-0648-2 Ishiwatari, M. (2014).
Disaster risk management at the national level.
Disaster Risk Management in Asia and the Pacific, 232, 232.
Retrieved from https:// bit.ly/2HTrUfv Levitus, S., Antonov, J. I., Boyer, T. P., Baranova, O. K., Garcia, H. E., Locarnini, R. A., ... & Zweng, M. M. (2012).
World ocean heat content and thermosteric sea level change (0–2000 m), 1955–2010.
Geophysical Research Letters, 39(10).
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1029/2012GL051106 Mateo, Janvic (February 25, 2017).
“UP adopts Project NOAH”.
The Philippine Star..) (“About Project NOAH”.
Official Gazette.
Republic of the Philippines.
Mercer, J.
(2010).
Disaster risk reduction or climate change adaptation: are we reinventing the wheel?.
Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association,  22(2), 247-264.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1677 Metro Naga Development Council.
2019.
Retrieved from: http://www.naga.gov.
ph/mndc/ Parry, M., Parry, M. L., Canziani, O., Palutikof, J., Van der Linden, P., & Hanson, C.
(Eds.).
(2007).
Climate change 2007-impacts, adaptation and vulnerability: Working group II contribution to the fourth assessment report of the IPCC (Vol.
4).
Cambridge University Press.
Retrieved from https://bit.
ly/2WJpVh0 https://goo.gl/5sHkCz https://goo.gl/5sHkCz https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2016.1174659 https://bit.ly/2HTrUfv https://bit.ly/2HTrUfv https://doi.org/10.1029/2012GL051106 http://www.philstar.com/metro/2017/02/25/1675473/adopts-project-noah https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Philippine_Star https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Philippine_Star http://www.gov.ph/programs/about-project-noah/ https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1677 http://www.naga.gov.ph/mndc/ http://www.naga.gov.ph/mndc/ https://bit.ly/2WJpVh0 https://bit.ly/2WJpVh0 213 International Peer Reviewed Journal Republic Act No.
10121 also known as Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction Management Act of 2010.
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/WL3FVr Robinson, D. A., & Mote, T. L. (2014).
MEaSUREs Northern Hemisphere Terrestrial Snow Cover Extent Weekly 100 km EASE-Grid 2.0, Boulder, Colorado USA: NASA DAAC at the National Snow and Ice Data Center.
Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2K2KqE5w https://goo.gl/WL3FVr https://bit.ly/2K2KqE5
24 Town and Regional Planning 2022 (81):24-38 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: Ola, A.B.
2022.
Climate change effects and livelihood-adaptation strategies by the urban poor in Ibadan, Nigeria.
Town and Regional Planning, no.
81, pp.
24-38.
© Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp Dr Akeem Ola, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of Environmental Sciences, University of Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria, Phone: +2348037991615, email: olabayo2080@gmail.com, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8961-8138 Climate change effects and livelihood-adaptation strategies by the urban poor in Ibadan, Nigeria Akeem Ola Research article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.3 Received: August 2022 Peer reviewed and revised: September-October 2022 Published: December 2022 *The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article Abstract As with many developing countries, one of Nigeria’s major challenges to socioeconomic development is climate change.
This article examines the effects of climate change on the livelihood activities of the urban poor in Ibadan, Nigeria.
Adopting a cross-sectional survey design, the research relied essentially on primary data.
A structured questionnaire was used to obtain primary data from 481 purposively selected urban residents engaging in different livelihood activities.
Data collected were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistical techniques.
The Respondents’ Agreement Index was used to measure the respondents’ awareness of climate change and climate change adaptation strategies.
Tobit Regression Model was used to analyse the factors influencing climate change adaptation strategies, while the effects of climate change on residents’ livelihood were measured using Multinomial Logistic Regression.
Findings revealed that respondents were involved in diverse livelihood activities, ranging from trading to civil service.
Long dry seasons, excessive heat, irregular rainfall patterns, and frequent floods make respondents aware of climate change.
Low patronage by buyers, low productivity, and reduction in income were the major effects of climate change on livelihood activities.
Diversifying income sources was the main adaptation strategy.
Strengthening the physical planning system to build the city’s resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related disasters was recommended.
Keywords: Adaptation strategies, climate change, diversification, livelihood, rainfall pattern, sustainable development goals KLIMAATSVERANDERING-EFFEKTE EN LEWENSBESTAANAANPASSINGSTRATEGIEË DEUR DIE STEDELIKE ARMES IN IBADAN, NIGERIË Soos baie ontwikkelende lande, is klimaatsverandering een van Nigerië se grootste uitdagings vir sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling.
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die uitwerking van klimaatsverandering op die lewensbestaanaktiwiteite van die stedelike armes in Ibadan, Nigerië.
Die navorsing het hoofsaaklik op primêre data staatgemaak.
’n Gestruktureerde vraelys is gebruik om primêre data te verkry van 481 doelbewus geselekteerde stedelike inwoners wat betrokke is by verskillende lewensbestaanaktiwiteite.
Data wat ingesamel is, is ontleed deur gebruik te maak van beskrywende en inferensiële statistiese tegnieke.
Die Respondente Ooreenkomsindeks is gebruik om die respondente se bewustheid van klimaatsverandering en klimaatveranderingaanpassingstrategieë te meet.
Tobit-regressiemodel is gebruik om die faktore wat klimaatsveranderingaanpassingstrategieë beïnvloed te ontleed, terwyl die uitwerking van klimaatsverandering op inwoners se bestaan gemeet is met behulp van multinomiale logistiese regressie.
Bevindinge het aan die lig gebring dat respondente betrokke was by diverse bestaansaktiwiteite wat wissel van handel tot staatsdiens.
Lang droë seisoene, oormatige hitte, onreëlmatige reënvalpatrone, en gereelde vloede maak respondente bewus van klimaatsverandering.
Lae frekwensie van kopers, lae produktiwiteit, en vermindering in inkomste was die belangrikste uitwerking van klimaatsverandering op lewensbestaanaktiwiteite.
Die diversifisering van inkomstebronne was die belangrikste aanpassingstrategie.
Die versterking van die fisiese beplanningstelsel om die stad se veerkragtigheid en aanpasbaarheid by klimaatverwante rampe te bou, is aanbeveel.
LITLAMORAO TSA PHETOHO EA MAEMO A LEHOLIMO LE MAANO A HO IKAMAHANYA LE MEKHOA EA BOIPHELISO KE BATHO BA FUTSANEHILENG BA LITOROPONG TSA IBADAN, NIGERIA Joalo ka linaha tse ngata tse ntseng li tsoela pele, e ‘ngoe ea liqholotso tse kholo tsa Nigeria ho nts’etsa pele moruo ke phetoho ea maemo a leholimo.
Sengoliloeng sena se hlahloba litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo mesebetsing ea boipheliso ea mafutsana a litoropong Ibadan, Nigeria.
Ho amohela moralo oa lipatlisiso tse fapaneng, boithuto bona bo itšetlehile haholo ka lintlha tse ka sehlohong.
Lenane la lipotso le hlophisitsoeng le ile la sebelisoa ho fumana lintlha tsa mantlha ho tsoa ho baahi ba 481 ba khethiloeng ho ipapisitsoe le tsebo ea bona ea morero oa litoropo, ‘me http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:olabayo2080@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8961-8138 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.3 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 25 ba etsang mesebetsi e fapaneng ea boipheliso.
Lintlha tse bokelletsoeng li ile tsa hlahlojoa ka ho sebelisa mekhoa e hlalosang le ea lipalo.
Ho ile hoa sebelisoa lenane le hlophisitoseng ho hlahloba kapa ho lekanya tsebo ea ba nkileng karolo ka phetoho ea maemo a leholimo le mekhoa ea ho ikamahanya le maemo a leholimo.
Tobit Regression Model e ile ea sebelisoa ho sekaseka lintlha tse susumetsang maano a ho ikamahanya le maemo a leholimo, athe litlamorao tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo bophelong ba baahi li ile tsa lekanyetsoa ho sebelisoa Multinomial Logistic Regression.
Liphuputso li senotse hore ba nkileng karolo ba ne ba ameha mesebetsing e fapaneng ea boipheliso, ho tloha khoebong ho ea ho basebeletsi ba sechaba.
Linako tse telele tsa komello, mocheso o feteletseng, mekhoa ea lipula tse sa tsitsang le likhohola khafetsa li etsa hore ba arabetseng ba elelloe ka phetoho ea maemo a leholimo.
Tšehetso e fokolang ea bareki, tlhahiso e tlaase, le ho fokotseha ha chelete e kenang e bile litla-morao tse khōlō tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo mesebetsing ea boipheliso.
Mehloli e fapaneng ea chelete e ne e le leano le ka sehloohong la ho ikamahanya le maemo.
Ho ile ha khothaletsoa ho matlafatsa tsamaiso eat hero ea litoropo le maemo a likoluoa a amanang le boemo ba leholimo.
1.
INTRODUCTION The persistent change in climatic elements across the world in recent times has heightened a global concern, as it is increasingly becoming a threat not only to the sustainable development of global communities, but also to the totality of human existence (Rathoure & Pathel, 2020; Zadawa & Omran, 2020).
Climate change generally affects livelihoods, ecosystems, and the socio-economic development of societies, and has been defining the direction of human well-being and development (Otitoju & Enete, 2016: 23; Shiru, 2018: 871).
As argued by Aniah et al.
(2016a: 32), cities in developing countries are especially vulnerable to the impact of climate change, due to their weak capacities to withstand shocks.
In addition, the characteristic poor urban planning, the high rate of urbanisation, and the expansion of slums associated with many thirdworld cities exacerbate the impacts of climate change on city dwellers (Onyenechere, 2010: 137-138; Haider, 2019: 8), particularly the urban poor who are mostly confined to ecologically fragile areas and are less resilient to the consequences of climate change (Ogbuabor & Egwuchukwu, 2017: 221).
In Nigeria, evidence of changing climate and the potentially profound implications for livelihood security abound in literature.
Climate change is reflected in the increases in the country’s temperature; irregular rainfall patterns; rise in sea level and flooding; loss of biodiversity; drought, and desertification between 1941 and 1970 (Elisha, 2017: 2; Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 5; Olaniyi, 2013: 57).
Between 1960 and 2020, annual rainfall decreased by 2-8mm across most of the country; it increased by 2-4mm in a few places (Audu, Ejembi & Igbawua, 2021: 346; Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change [BNRCC], 2011: 7).
This pattern was equally observed in Ibadan during the same period (Figure 1).
Nigeria has also experienced climate extremes since 2002 (Akande, 2017: 2-3; Amanchukwu, 2015: 75).
Floods are the most common recurring disaster in the country (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2013: xix).
The durations and intensities of rainfall have increased since 1990, producing large run-offs and flooding in many places (Enete, 2014: 234).
Rising sea level and ocean surge in Southern Nigeria have submerged villages in Lagos and some places in the Niger Delta region (Anabaraonye, 2019: 1394-1395).
In Northern Nigeria, a flood in 2010 affected 2 million people in Jigawa State (Elisha, 2017: 3).
Severe nationwide floods in 2012 resulted in unprecedented damage and losses to human settlements and livelihood located downstream (Akande, 2017: 6; Federal Government of Nigeria, 2013: 37-39).
Okafor (2021: 2539) reported that the 2012 floods led to destruction of 82,361 and 152,575 hectares of farmlands in Rivers and Kogi States, respectively, with 85% of the affected farmlands located in the downstream area of the States.
In Cross River State, 18 markets and 4,743 shops were destroyed as a result of the 2012 floods (Okafor, 2021: 2539).
Droughts have also been a constant in Nigeria.
In the Nigerian Sahelian region, there has been a 25% decrease in precipitation on average since 1990 (Amanchukwu, 2015: 72; Oladipo, 2010: 76).
The drying up of Lake Chad from roughly 4,000 km2 to approximately 3,000 km2 between 1960 and 2007, respectively, is attributable to the effects of climate change in that part of the country (Dioha & Emodi, 2018: 29; Elisha, 2017: 3).
Other lakes, particularly in Northern Nigeria, are also in danger of disappearing (Elisha, 2017: 4).
Furthermore, temperatures have risen significantly above normal since the 1980s, with relatively higher figures in 1973, 1987, and 4 markets and 4,743 shops were destroyed as a result of the 2012 floods (Okafor, 2021: 2539).
Figure 1: Rainfall of Ibadan, 1960-2020 Source: Nigerian Meteorological Agency, 2022 Droughts have also been a constant in Nigeria.
In the Nigerian Sahelian region, there has been a 25% decrease in precipitation on average since 1990 (Amanchukwu, 2015: 72; Oladipo, 2010: 76).
The drying up of Lake Chad from roughly 4,000 km2 to approximately 3,000 km2 between 1960 and 2007, respectively, is attributable to the effects of climate change in that part of the country (Dioha & Emodi, 2018: 29; Elisha, 2017: 3).
Other lakes, particularly in Northern Nigeria, are also in danger of disappearing (Elisha, 2017: 4).
Furthermore, temperatures have risen significantly above normal since the 1980s, with relatively higher figures in 1973, 1987, and 1998 (Enete, 2014, 234; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 3-4).
Temperature increases of approximately 0.2°C to 0.3°C per decade have been observed in the various ecological zones of the country (Enete, 2014: 234; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 22; BNRCC, 2011: 8; Oladipo, 2010: 19).
Minimum temperature in the country has increased slightly faster than the maximum temperature, resulting in the smaller temperature range.
The temperature of Ibadan has followed the general temperature patterns in Nigeria (Figure 2).
This warming of the environment is most significant between June and November each year (Amanchukwu, 2015: 73; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 5).
This phenomenon presents severe threats and erodes essential needs, capabilities, and rights especially for the poor and marginalised, thereby redesigning their livelihoods (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014: 16).
Livelihood activities are an integration of several activities engaged by an individual household to ensure a living.
It tends to focus on income sources.
Some livelihoods are 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 19 60 19 62 19 64 19 66 19 68 19 70 19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 20 12 20 14 20 16 20 18 20 20 R ai nf al l ( m m ) Years Rainfall of Ibadan Figure 1: Rainfall of Ibadan, 1960-2020 Source: Nigerian Meteorological Agency, 2022 26 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 1998 (Enete, 2014, 234; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 3-4).
Temperature increases of approximately 0.2°C to 0.3°C per decade have been observed in the various ecological zones of the country (Enete, 2014: 234; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 22; BNRCC, 2011: 8; Oladipo, 2010: 19).
Minimum temperature in the country has increased slightly faster than the maximum temperature, resulting in the smaller temperature range.
The temperature of Ibadan has followed the general temperature patterns in Nigeria (Figure 2).
This warming of the environment is most significant between June and November each year (Amanchukwu, 2015: 73; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 5).
This phenomenon presents severe threats and erodes essential needs, capabilities, and rights especially for the poor and marginalised, thereby redesigning their livelihoods (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014: 16).
Livelihood activities are an integration of several activities engaged by an individual household to ensure a living.
It tends to focus on income sources.
Some livelihoods are directly climate sensitive, such as rain-fed agriculture, seasonal employment in agriculture (for example, fishing and pastoralism), and tourism (IPCC, 2014: 16), while other livelihoods are indirectly climate sensitive such as artisanship and trading (Mutangi, 2013: 497-499).
The effects of climate change on livelihood activities, especially agriculture, in Nigeria are well documented.
As observed by Ogbuabor and Egwuchukwu (2017: 220), higher temperatures, lower rainfall, drought, and desertification reduce farmlands, lower agricultural productivity, and affect crop yields, particularly crops cultivated under rain-fed conditions.
Studies conducted in Yobe state, for example, found that dunes and desert encroachment have covered from approximately 25,000 to over 30,000 hectares, undermining food and livestock production (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 6-8).
Prolonged dry spells from climate change affect livestock production, making it difficult for livestock farmers to find water and green pastures, due to reductions in surface-water resources and available pastureland.
The loss of weight for animals can reduce meat and dairy production (Idowu, 2011: 149; Nkechi, 2016: 8).
Warming trends also make the storage of root crops and vegetables challenging for farmers without access to refrigerators (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 9).
The need for this study emanates from the fact that most of the studies on climate change impacts on livelihood strategies in Nigeria have been conducted on rural farming households’ livelihood, from the lens of agricultural production and food security.
A better understanding of how urban households perceive climate change and how that perception affects their reaction is an important input to develop strategies to sustain urban livelihoods.
Thus, the study will examine the effects of changing climate on the livelihood strategies of poor and vulnerable urban dwellers in Ibadan, Nigeria.
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Effects of climate change on livelihood activities Conclusions from various studies indicate that agriculture, small farmers, and food security in developing countries, especially in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, are impacted by changes in climatic elements (Schmidhuber & Tubiello 2007; Brown & Funk 2008; Rautela & Karki, 2015; Aniah et al., 2016b).
Aniah et al.
(2016b) specifically posited that climate change has a negative net effect on the income and yield of crops across sub-Saharan Africa.
For instance, in a study in Ghana, Aniah et al.
(2016a:11) reported that 25.3% of farming households in Soe Kabre (Upper East Region) had their crops withered as a result of drought.
The majority of the inhabitants of Uttarakhand Himalaya (India) indicated a drastic reduction in crop and animal production as a result of climate change (Rautela & Karki, 2015).
Eckstein, Hutfils and Winges (2018) reported that climate events such as floods, cyclones, heavy rainfall, river erosion, and droughts are most frequent in Bangladesh.
In Ethiopia, Deressa and Hassan (2009), using simulation models for the years 2050 and 2100, found that climate change will substantially reduce per hectare net crop revenue by 2050 and 2100.
Li et al.’s (2019) estimates show that the long-term annual GDP loss, due to global warming, is US$1,927.78 billion by the year 2100 for sub-Saharan Africa.
In Nigeria, climate change affects the nature and characteristics of freshwater resources on which many Nigerians depend.
Rise in sea level and extreme weather affect fishing.
The viability of inland fisheries is also threatened by increased salinity and shrinking rivers and lakes (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 11; BNRCC, 2011: 9).
Unpredictable rainfall variation, heat stress, and drought can adversely affect food production and result in 5 directly climate sensitive, such as rain-fed agriculture, seasonal employment in agriculture (for example, fishing and pastoralism), and tourism (IPCC, 2014: 16), while other livelihoods are indirectly climate sensitive such as artisanship and trading (Mutangi, 2013: 497-499).
Figure 2: Temperature of Ibadan, 1960-2020 Source: Nigerian Meteorological Agency, 2022 The effects of climate change on livelihood activities, especially agriculture, in Nigeria are well documented.
As observed by Ogbuabor and Egwuchukwu (2017: 220), higher temperatures, lower rainfall, drought, and desertification reduce farmlands, lower agricultural productivity, and affect crop yields, particularly crops cultivated under rainfed conditions.
Studies conducted in Yobe state, for example, found that dunes and desert encroachment have covered from approximately 25,000 to over 30,000 hectares, undermining food and livestock production (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 6-8).
Prolonged dry spells from climate change affect livestock production, making it difficult for livestock farmers to find water and green pastures, due to reductions in surface-water resources and available pastureland.
The loss of weight for animals can reduce meat and dairy production (Idowu, 2011: 149; Nkechi, 2016: 8).
Warming trends also make the storage of root crops and vegetables challenging for farmers without access to refrigerators (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 9).
The need for this study emanates from the fact that most of the studies on climate change impacts on livelihood strategies in Nigeria have been conducted on rural farming households’ livelihood, from the lens of agricultural production and food security.
A better understanding of how urban households perceive climate change and how that perception affects their reaction is an important input to develop strategies to sustain urban livelihoods.
Thus, the study will examine the effects of changing climate on the livelihood strategies of poor and vulnerable urban dwellers in Ibadan, Nigeria.
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW 24,50 25,00 25,50 26,00 26,50 27,00 27,50 28,00 28,50 19 60 19 62 19 64 19 66 19 68 19 70 19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 20 12 20 14 20 16 20 18 20 20 M ea n Te m pe ra tu re ° C Years Temperature of Ibadan Figure 2: Temperature of Ibadan, 1960-2020 Source: Nigerian Meteorological Agency, 2022 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 27 food shortages (Abdulkadir, 2017: 155; Elum & Momodu, 2017: 73; Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 11; Enete, 2014: 235).
The high vulnerability to climate change of states in the northern part of the country poses a serious threat to food security throughout the country (Madu, 2012: 7-9).
Drought conditions in parts of Northern Nigeria have also resulted in less drinking water (Sayne, 2011: 14-16).
Erosion and excessive wind reduce the number of forestry products such as wood and cane (Ogbuabor & Egwuchukwu, 2017: 219).
Forests are under significant pressure, not only from climate change, but also from increasing populations and greater demand for forest resources (BRNCC, 2011: 9).
Climate change also affects income groups, classes, occupations, age, and gender in varying ways (Amobi & Onyishi, 2015: 204).
Onwutuebe (2019: 4) asserted that the high vulnerability of the agricultural sector to climate change will continue to affect women disproportionately as a larger percentage of women are poor farmers who rely on smallscale and rain-fed agriculture.
It is important to note that women are also more dependent on natural resources, as they are primarily responsible for gathering wood for cooking and heating, collecting the household water supply, and ensuring food security for the family.
It has, however, been projected that there will be a significant increase in temperature over all the ecological zones in the coming decades (Akande, 2017: 12).
It is predicted that there will be a temperature increase of 0.4°C to 1°C for the period 2020-2050, due to climate change, and an increase of up to 3.2°C by 2050, under a high climate change scenario (Oladipo, 2010: 38; Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 8).
Regional variations are expected, with the highest increase (4.5°C by 2081-2100) projected in the Northeast (BNRCC, 2011: ii).
Such heightened temperatures will have negative impacts on agriculture and food security (Akande, 2017: 14).
In Nigeria, inundation is the primary threat for at least 96% of the land at risk (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 7).
A rise in sea level of 1m could result in the loss of roughly three-quarters of the land area of the Niger Delta (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2014: 31; Oladipo, 2010: 38).
It has also been estimated that a rise in sea level by up to 59cm by 2100 will result in the submersion of several Nigerian coastal states.
This includes parts of Lagos and other smaller towns along the coast (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 7).
This will disrupt the life and activities of residents and wreak immense havoc on the ecological balance and consequently livelihood activities (Ebele & Emodi, 2016: 9).
Flooding is expected to occur alongside droughts in northern Nigeria, arising from a decline in precipitation and rise in temperature (Oladipo, 2010: 35).
This will lead to loss of agricultural produce, farmlands, and other livelihood resources.
2.2 Climate change livelihoodadaptation strategies Among the livelihood-adaptation strategies adopted, Ahmed and Haq (2017) reported crop diversification, modification of planting, harvesting periods, and alternative livelihoods as the most commonly used in Bangladesh.
Rautela and Karki (2015) reported engagement in extra income-generating activities (e.g., running a grocery store, tourist guides, handicrafts production), changing grain composition, multiple crop practices, and intensive use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides as common strategies for many communities in India.
Some livelihood-adaptation strategies identified in South Africa and the Ethiopia Nile Basin by Bryan et al.
(2009) were engagement in foodfor-work programmes, migration, reducing consumption, and seeking off-farm employment.
Smallholder farmers in Teso Sub-Region of eastern Uganda have applied some strategies, including begging, saving planting materials (seeds), and involving in casual labour (Egeru, 2012).
In a study in Pakistan, Batool et al.
(2018) found that, in dealing with climate effects in the short term, women reduced their frequency of buying clothes, resorted to buying less expensive food, selling large ruminants, using household savings, and using less costly health services.
3.
STUDY AREA Ibadan, the capital city of Oyo State in southwestern Nigeria (Figure 1) is located between longitudes 7o201E and 7o401E and latitudes 3o351N and 40101N (Oguntoyinbo, 1994: 46).
Ibadan is located at roughly 145km north of Lagos and 345km south-west of Abuja.
Ibadan’s climate is characterized by a tropical wet and dry climate.
The rainy season is between March and October, with the prevalence of the moist maritime south-westerly monsoon from the Atlantic Ocean, and the dry season is from November to February when the city is influenced by the typical West African harmattan from the Sahara Desert (Audu, Isikwue & Eweh, 2015: 72; Adediran, 2020).
The mean annual rainfall in Ibadan was 1,258.9mm between 1911 and 1988, and 1,407.5mm between 1989 and 2018 (Ayeni et al., 2020: 93).
NiMet (2022: online) predicted 1,590mm for 2022.
The mean annual temperature fluctuates around 26.6ºC and 27ºC (measured between 1970-2018) (Egbinola & Amocichukwu, 2013: 37; Durowoju, Samuel & Anibaba, 2021: 175).
The city is drained mainly by the Ogunpa, Ogbere, and Ona rivers with their tributaries.
The Ibadan region is made up of five metropolitan (Ibadan North, Ibadan South, Ibadan Northwest, Ibadan Southwest, and Ibadan Northeast) (Figure 1) and six rural/ peri-urban local government areas (LGAs).
This study focuses on the five metropolitan LGAs.
Ibadan has had rapid growth both spatially and demographically.
The developed land area grew from 3,080km2 in 1996 to 4,684km2 in 2020 (Atlas of Urban Expansion, 2021), while the city’s population increased from 3.1 million in 2015 to 4 million in 2021 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022).
Ibadan, spatially the largest city in Nigeria, is home to diverse ethnic groups and foreigners.
Analysis of the socio-economic structure of the city indicates that most of the inhabitants fall into the lowand 28 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 middle-income categories (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017).
The occupational structure of the city reflects a large proportion of the inhabitants in the informal sector of the city’s economy (mostly artisans and farmers).
In the absence of proactive physical planning strategy, this population outlook has implications for the impact of climate change on people’s livelihoods.
The choice of Ibadan as case study was informed by its size, population, and regional influence, being the capital of the western region of Nigeria and presently the capital of Oyo State.
Ibadan is a major centre for trade that influenced constant migration of people into the city, with diverse innovations and initiatives required for diverse livelihood activities.
4.
METHODOLOGY This study examines how changing climate affects the livelihoods of the urban poor in Ibadan City, Nigeria, and identifies the adaptation strategies that the residents use.
The study used a mixed methods design, in which qualitative and quantitative data are collected in parallel, analysed separately, and then merged (Creswell, 2014).
Quantitative design allows for the use of questionnaires, as well as descriptive and inferential analysis.
Quantitative data for this study were collected through a questionnaire survey that examined the livelihood activities of residents, awareness of climate change among the residents, effects of climate change on residents’ livelihood, and climate change-adaptation strategies of the residents.
Inferential analysis was used to test the effect of climate on residents’ livelihood activities and determine factors that influence adaptation choices.
Qualitative data were collected through observations (Yin, 2018: 33).
The observation checklist collects information on the effects of changing climate on livelihood activities and livelihoodadaptation strategies.
The reason for collecting both quantitative and qualitative data is to elaborate on specific findings from the grouping of the observations, such as the effects of changing climate on livelihood activities suggested from respondents’ groups (Creswell, 2014: 4).
4.1 Sampling method and size The five LGAs (see Table 1) each have 12 wards, except for northwest LGA which has 11 wards (INEC, 2015: 35-38).
Ibadan’s residential density patterns showed a concentration of high-, medium-, and low-density neighbourhoods in each ward.
The city’s high-density wards/ neighbourhoods are characterised by poor moribund sanitation facilities and sewage systems, accumulation and non-collection of refuse, poor access to basic infrastructure, poor transportation facilities, and the absence of adequate drainage facilities, which make the communities vulnerable to climate-induced disasters and consequently affect their livelihoods.
Therefore, the high-density wards which theoretically housed the urban poor were selected in each LGA.
Because the wards are of varying sizes concerning the population (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022: 2), the largest ward was selected from among the high-density wards in each LGA.
Information from the Local Planning Authorities of the five LGAs indicated variation in the concentration of mixed land uses in the neighbourhoods that make up the wards.
Therefore, two neighbourhoods with the largest mixed land uses (i.e., residential/ commercial/industrial) were selected in each ward, resulting in 10 neighbourhoods for the survey (see Table 1).
A list from the National Population Commission (2022: 19-23) shows an average population of 160,000 residents in each neighbourhood with visible livelihood activities (Table 1).
From these, 50 adult residents in each neighbourhood were purposively selected for the survey (Bernard, 2000: 73-75), resulting in a sample of 500 respondents.
The sample size for each neighbourhood was calculated in accordance with the table recommended by Krejcie and Morgan (1970: 608).
The table recommends a sample size of 504 for a population of 1.6 million.
This recommendation validates the sample size of 500 as excellent for the population of 1,601,473.
Purposive selection was done to avoid the incidence of full-time housewives and jobless males who may not supply quality information for the survey.
4.2 Data collection To examine the livelihood activities of residents, awareness of climate change among the residents, effects of climate change on residents’ livelihood, and climate changeadaptation strategies of the residents, a set of pre-tested structured questionnaires was administered Figure 3: Ibadan region in the context of Oyo State and Nigeria Source: Kasim, Agbola and Oweniwe, 2020: 73 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 29 Table 1: Population, sample, and responses LGA Ward no.
Neighbourhood **Population Sample Responses Ibadan South-west 3 Agbokojo, Oke-Aare 180,944 162,307 50 50 48 49 Ibadan South-east 7 Beere Labo 168,149 161,673 50 50 44 50 Ibadan North-west 5 Agbeni Opoyeosa 163,789 150,904 50 50 47 48 Ibadan North-east 1 Oranmiyan Aremo 152,455 148,692 50 50 50 49 Ibadan North 9 Agbadagbudu Yemetu 157,219 155,321 50 50 50 49 Total 1,601,453 500 481 Source: Author’s computation; **National Population Commission, 2022 to the sampled 500 residents in the study area between 8 and 17 January 2022.
The questionnaire included 27 tick-box, 8 open-ended questions, and 3 Likert-scale questions in five parts.
Part one on the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents included questions on gender, age, marital status, education, income, and household sizes.
Part two had questions on the livelihood activities of the respondents and included questions on the types of livelihood activities, frequency of operation, years of practice, location of the activities concerning residences, mode of transport to the activities, income from the activities, access to formal or informal training in the activities, the structure of the activities (sole proprietorship or partnership), and business registration with the government.
Part three sought answers on awareness of climate change among the respondents, including questions on the indicators of climate change such as seasonal rainfall fluctuation, excessive heat, long dry season, frequent floods due to uncontrolled rainfall, and changes in precipitation pattern.
Part four focused on the effects of climate change on residents’ livelihoods.
This includes questions on the economic, social, environmental, and cultural implications of climate change on livelihood activities.
Part five sought answers on the climate change livelihood-adaptation strategies of the respondents and included questions on the effectiveness of the strategies and the factors that influenced the strategies.
Respondents were asked to tick the appropriate answers where options were supplied, while they were given the liberty to provide answers to the open-ended questions.
Furthermore, an observation checklist was designed to collect information on issues such as the effects of changing climate on livelihood activities and livelihoodadaptation strategies.
Information emanating from the observation checklist was recorded in a notebook and thematically analysed following these steps: Preparation of transcripts from the notebook; coding of the transcript (i.e., marking off sections of the transcript in a way that indicates what was observed in each neighbourhood and assigning them to code words); synthesizing codes into themes; after a thorough revision of the themes, each theme was properly defined (i.e., formulating exactly what was meant by each theme and figuring out how it helps understand the data) and named (i.e., coming up with a succinct and easily understandable name for each theme) for easy analysis.
4.3 Data analysis and interpretation of findings The data collected were processed, using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21 software, where two analytical statistics were employed to summarize data and make inferences.
First, univariate descriptive statistics involving frequency and percentages were used to report the socio-economic profile and livelihood activities of the respondents.
Tobit Regression Model was used to analyse the factors influencing climate change-adaptation strategies.
The model is expressed as: Y1 = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + e Where: Y1 = Climate Change Index (CCI).
This takes values from 0.0-0.1 The explanatory or independent variables considered in the study were: X1 = Access to credit X2 = Educational qualification X3 = Household size X4 = Gender X5 = Income X6 = Access to information X7 = Age X8 = Frequency of disasters β0 = Constant e = Error term The effects of climate change on residents’ livelihood were measured using the Multinomial Logistic Regression Model.
As in other forms of linear regression, multinomial logistic regression uses a linear predictor function to predict the probability that observation i has outcome k, of the following form: Y(k,i) = aok + b1kX1i+b2kX2i+-----------+ b5kX5i +e Where: Y = dependent or the criterion variable.
a = the slope-intercept (i.e., the value of Y when X = 0).
b = regression coefficient representing the amount of change in Y that corresponds to a unit change in X. X = independent or the predictor variable.
bk is the set of regression coefficients associated with outcome ki, and Xi (a row vector) is the set of explanatory variables associated with observation i. e = error term of prediction showing the difference between observed y and predicted y in the analysis.
Y = Climate change.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_predictor_function http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_predictor_function 30 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 X1 = Low productivity.
X2 = Reduced income.
X3 = Low crop yield.
X4 = Low patronage by buyers.
X5 = Irregular patronage by buyers.
X6 = Delay in completion of clients’ work.
X7 = Reduction in animal yield.
The Respondents’ Agreement Index (RAI) was used to measure the respondents’ awareness of climate change and climate change-adaptation strategies of the respondents.
Eight variables that could influence climatechange awareness were identified, including irregular rainfall patterns, excessive rainfall, excessive heat, long dry season, heatwave, destructive winds, frequent floods, due to uncontrolled rainfall, and changes in precipitation patterns.
We assume that the respondents’ level of agreement would indicate the magnitude of the occurrence of climate change, as shown by the strengths of these variables in the study area.
To calculate the RAI, the respondents were instructed to rate each variable using one of the five ratings: Strongly Agree (SA) (5), Agree (A) (4), Just Agree (JA) (3), Disagree (DA) (2), and Strongly Disagree (SD) (1).
The summation of weight value (SWV) for each variable was obtained through the addition of the products of responses for each rating of the variable and their respective weight values.
Mathematically, this is expressed as: SWV = ∑5i=1XiYi ………..equation (1) Where: SWV is the summation of weight value.
Xi is the respondents’ rating of a particular variable indicating climate change occurrence.
Yi is the weight value assigned to each variable.
The RAI for each variable is arrived at by dividing the summation of weight value by the addition of the number of respondents to each of the five ratings.
This is expressed as: RAI = SWV ....... equation (2) ∑5i=1 Pi The same procedure was used to measure the climate changeadaptation strategies of the respondents albeit with different variables, including livelihood diversification, non-observance of regular working hours, irrigation, change in planting date and harvesting, crop diversification, mix-cropping, and agroforestry.
4.5 Limitation A small sample size cannot be generalized across Nigeria or other countries.
Therefore, the results of this study are limited to the research area.
5.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 5.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents Table 2 shows that the majority of the respondents (87.5%) were married and within the economically active segment of the population, as 94.8% were aged between 21 and 70 years.
Females constituted the dominant gender group (55.1%), which is a clear departure from a similar study by Lawanson and Oduwaye (2014) in Lagos, Nigeria, where males were dominant.
There was a low literacy level among the respondents, according to UNESCO standards, as only 33.7% had secondary school education.
The vast majority of the respondents (87.1%) had between five and ten people in their households.
This is far above the national average of five as well as the Oyo State average of five people per household (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2022; Oyo State Government, 2021).
Over half of the respondents (55.3%) earn a monthly income below ₦50,000, placing them in the low-income category.
These demographics prove that respondents are from the poor and vulnerable urban dwellers in Ibadan, Nigeria, and have experience to give information that could help make deductions on climate change-adaptation strategies.
Table 2: Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents Socio-demographic variable Category Frequency (n=481) % Age (years) 21-30 127 26.4 31-40 112 23.3 41-50 96 20.0 51-60 64 13.3 61-70 57 11.9 Above 70 25 5.2 Gender Male 216 44.9 Female 265 55.1 Marital status Married 421 87.5 Single 60 12.5 Education Tertiary 3 0.6 Secondary 159 33.1 Basic 134 27.9 Vocational 91 18.9 Religious 61 12.7 Informal 33 6.9 Household size 2-4 62 12.9 5-7 185 38.5 8-10 234 48.6 Income (monthly) Low [<₦50,000 (117$)] 266 55.3 Medium [₦50,000-₦150,000 ($351)] 188 39.1 High [Above ₦150,000 ($351)] 27 5.6 Note: The official rate is ₦427 to $1 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 31 residences (Table 4).
This influenced 36.8% who had their businesses outside their neighbourhoods to reach their locations of livelihood activities either through tricycle/ motorcycle (21.2%) or commercial bus (15.6%), while some (12.0%) who had their businesses within their neighbourhoods trekked to their locations.
A majority of the respondents (68.4%) have been practising their livelihood activity for between 15 and 20 years, with 73.6% having received formal training.
None of the respondents had obtained business registration with the Oyo State Government.
While the non-registration of businesses facilitates tax evasion among this group of workers, it allows them to have more money to take care of their needs because they are poor.
This confirms the argument of Otekhile and Matthew (2017: 12) that self-employed workers in Nigeria prefer informal operations to the cumbersome process of business registration in Nigeria.
Except for civil servants, teachers and night guards, who worked for the government and individuals, 95% were sole proprietors.
This corroborates the earlier assertion of Fields (2019: 5) that most of the workers in developing countries are self-employed and work alone.
5.3 Awareness of the existence of climate change With an average RAI(MS) of 3.89, results in Table 5 show that respondents are aware and agree that climate change exists in the city of Ibadan.
The MD(RAI) scores show the significance of each climate change variable.
The highest RAI was 4.56, while the lowest was 2.80.
Therefore, the deviations around the mean of the highest and lowest RAI were 0.67 and -1.09, respectively.
The variables with positive deviations around the MD(RAI) were the variables considered by the respondents as the dominant indicators of climate change.
Respondents agreed that long dry seasons (0.67), excessive heat (0.65), irregular rainfall patterns (0.39), and frequent floods due to excessive rainfall (0.33) are the main 5.2 Livelihood activities of residents Analysis results in Table 3 show that respondents are involved in varying livelihood activities, with trading (17.9%) and hairstyling (10.6%) being the most frequently engaged activities.
Poor infrastructure development, most importantly poor power, and energy supply, which serve as disincentives for manufacturing and other industrial initiatives appear to be responsible for a large number of respondents in trading.
It should, however, be noted that traded items include both manufactured and agricultural as well as agro-allied produce, all of which are subject to the effects of climate change.
Other important livelihood activities such as commercial cycle transport (9.4%), carpentry/ furniture making (8.9%), and fashion styling (8.1%) were almost equally practised by respondents.
While these activities may be theoretically regarded as indirectly climate sensitive, a more direct climatesensitive livelihood activity, namely urban farming, is engaged by 5.2% of the respondents.
A close look at the structure of livelihood activities, as presented above, gives a semblance of what is obtained in other cities in Nigeria, as revealed by the studies of Jaiyebo (2003: 116) and Ifeanyiobi & Matthews-Njoku (2014: 53).
Half of the respondents (51.2%), mostly hairstylists, traders, fashion stylists, tie and dyeing practitioners, and shoe cobblers had their livelihood activities located in their Table 3: Livelihood activities of residents Livelihood Frequency % Trading 86 17.9 Hairstyling 51 10.6 Commercial tricycle/motorcycle transport 45 9.4 Carpentry/Furniture making 43 8.9 Fashion stylist 39 8.1 Masonry 35 7.3 Auto mechanic 29 6.0 Commercial bus transport 27 5.6 Farming 25 5.2 Shoe cobbling 23 4.8 Rental business 19 4.0 Electrical work 14 2.9 Teaching 12 2.5 Tie and dyeing 11 2.3 Informal waste collection 8 1.7 Night guard 8 1.7 Civil service 4 0.8 Total 481 100.0 Table 4: Characteristics of the livelihood activities of residents Livelihood characteristics Category Frequency (n=481) % Location of livelihood activities Home 246 51.2 Within the neighbourhood 58 12.0 Outside the neighbourhood 177 36.8 Mode of transport Commercial tricycle/motorcycle 102 21.2 Commercial bus 75 15.6 Trekking 58 12.0 Years of practice Less than 5 years 13 2.6 5-10 years 69 14.4 10-15 years 35 7.2 15-20 years 295 61.4 20-25 years 48 10.0 Above 25 years 21 4.4 Mode of training for the job Formal 354 73.6 Informal 127 26.4 Types of business Sole proprietorship 457 95.0 Employees 24 5.0 32 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 indicators of climate change.
The variables with negative deviations around the mean were heat waves (-0.97) and destructive winds (-1.09).
The respondents were not in agreement that these could be considered principal indicators of climate change in the study area.
The high level of awareness of the existence of climate change among the residents of Ibadan, as revealed by this study, is a departure from the findings in the literature.
For instance, Odjugo (2013) reported in his study in two agro-ecological zones of Nigeria that over half of his respondents were unaware of the existence of climate change.
Statista (2022) equally reported that over 60% of Nigerians were not aware of the changing climate.
The awareness in Ibadan may be attributed to the role of mass media in disseminating climate-change information promptly as well as the long history of climateinduced disasters particularly flooding in the city, which has impinged on the residents’ consciousness of climate-change issues.
5.4 The effects of climate change on residents’ livelihood The respondents were asked to state the effects of the changing climate on their livelihood activities.
These expectedly generated diverse responses.
Low patronage of buyers (29.7%) was the major effect indicated by the respondents.
Other important effects include low productivity (22.7%), and a reduction in income (20.0%) (Table 6).
To statistically determine the effects of climate change on residents’ livelihood activities using Multinomial Logistic Regression, climate change (dependent variable) was regressed against its effects on the livelihood activities (independent variables), as indicated by the respondents.
The stated effects are low productivity, reduced income, low crop yield, low patronage of customers, irregular patronage of customers, delay in completion of clients’ work, and reduction in animal yield.
The result of the analysis is presented in Table 7.
The multinomial regression model derived from the analysis is given as Y = 17.025 – 29.217x1 – 27.342x2 – 16.463x3 – 24.755x4 – 23.591x5 – 14.376x6 – 15.173X7.
The 2-log likelihood of the model, which is 17.025, indicates a direct negative relationship between the independent and predictor variables.
The Nagelkerke pseudo r2 of 0.483 shows that the seven independent variables accounted for 48% of the variation in the effects of climate change.
All the predictors in the model relate negatively to climate change.
Low productivity with –29.217 was the most visible effect.
This is followed by a reduction in income with –27.342x2, while low crop yield, low patronage of customers, irregular patronage of customers, delay in completion of clients’ work, and reduction in animal yield with –16.463x3, –24.755x4, –23.591x5, –14.376x6 and –15.173X7, respectively, were found to be moderate negative effects of climate change on livelihood activities.
These results corroborate the earlier literature which identified low income and productivity (Onwuemele, 2015), low animal yield and patronage (Ayanda, 2013), as well as irregular client engagement (Tharkur & Bajagain, 2019) as the effects of climate change on livelihood activities.
The researcher observed low crop yield during the field survey, as some crops had stunted growth and could not yield much, while parts of some farmlands had been washed away by flood, leaving a few crops for harvest.
It was also observed that destruction of power infrastructure and properties, where livelihood activities take place, caused delay in completing clients’ work, and low and irregular patronage by clients.
5.5 Livelihood-adaptation strategies to climate change It is important to note that, of the 481 residents who participated in the survey, 35 (7.3%) did not adopt any livelihood-adaptation strategy to cope with the effects of climate change.
With an average RAI(MS) of 2.68, results in Table 8 show that respondents on average ‘agree’ that all five climate-adaptation strategies provided an effective cushion against the adverse effects of climate change on people’s livelihood activities in the city of Ibadan.
To statistically determine the weight and the magnitude of the use of livelihood-adaptation strategies among the respondents, the RAI was also employed.
The highest RAI was 3.51, while the lowest was 1.12.
Therefore, the deviations around the mean of the highest and lowest RAI were 0.83 and -1.12, respectively.
Table 5: Respondents’ Agreement Index (awareness of the existence of climate change) S/N Awareness of climate change (5) Strongly agree (1) Strongly disagree (n=481) SWV RAI(MS) MD(RAI) 5 4 3 2 1 1 Long dry season 274 203 4 0 0 2194 4.56 0.67 2 Excessive heat 302 148 23 6 2 2185 4.54 0.65 3 Irregular rainfall pattern 197 251 33 0 0 2061 4.28 0.39 4 Frequent floods due to excessive rainfall 122 297 68 11 6 2030 4.22 0.33 5 Heatwave 56 107 125 129 64 1405 2.92 -0.97 6 Destructive winds 7 118 205 72 79 1345 2.80 -1.09 Average RAI(MS) (composite score) 3.89 Table 6: Effects of climate change on residents’ livelihood Livelihood Frequency % Low patronage of buyers 143 29.7 Low productivity 109 22.7 Reduced income 96 20.0 Irregular patronage of customers 65 13.5 Delay in completion of clients’ work 43 8.9 Reduction in animal yield 14 2.9 Low crop yield 11 2.3 Total 481 100.0 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 33 The variables with positive deviations around the mean MD(RAI) were diversifying income sources (0.83), non-observance of regular working hours (0.59), and modifying food habits to cope with food crises (0.32).
The respondents considered these variables to be the dominant livelihood-adaptation strategies.
The variables with negative deviations around the mean were adjusting tasks within households (-0.20) and irrigation (-1.56).
The respondents were not in agreement that these could be viewed as principal livelihood-adaptation strategies in the study area.
Earlier studies have posited that people in various communities in Nigeria tend to evolve and adopt diverse livelihood strategies to cope with the adverse effects of climate change on their livelihood activities based on the prevailing socio-cultural and environmental conditions of their communities (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2011: 29-30; Ifeanyiobi et al., 2011: 27; Okoroh, 2016: 136; Oluwole, 2016: 369).
Various authors point to the importance of diversification as an overarching strategy for the livelihoods of the urban poor (Tharkur & Bajagain, 2019; Edilegnaw, Mmaphuti & Eliaza, 2022).
Income diversification appears to be the easiest and most effective adaptation strategy since switching livelihood, when one has been prevented from practising one’s major livelihood by the changing climate, guarantees a reasonable income flow.
The alternative income sources of the respondents include casual labour, food vending, hawking, urban agriculture, waste picking, and hair plaiting (see Table 4).
The nonobservance of regular working hours by the respondents suggests that the respondents worked for longer hours during unfavourable climatic conditions.
This adaptation strategy was visible during the observations made by the researcher when most of the commercial bus drivers and tricycle/motorcycle operators worked throughout the night during the rainy season because they are usually prevented from operating for the larger part of a day and because there is the availability of passengers at night during this period.
The reduction in consumption of certain food and vegetable items because of their relative scarcity, due to adverse climatic conditions, as an adaptation strategy was largely adopted by the respondents who were farmers and those who traded in agricultural produce.
Because they consume what they produce and sell, a reduction in consumption will keep them in business and ensure survival during a period of unfavourable climate.
While most of these studies have focused on rural communities, this article has reported the adaptation strategies of urban dwellers.
Thus, considering the peculiarities of urban centres concerning climate change, the strategies reported are slightly different from most of those reported by earlier studies.
5.6 Factors influencing the choice of adaptation methods The results of the Tobit Regression Analysis in Table 9 shows seven major factors that influence the residents’ choice of adaptation strategies.
The results indicate that access to credit (t=3.44), at 5% significance level, was positive and statistically significant.
This indicates that the residents’ access to credit influences the effectiveness of their adaptation strategies and relatively mitigates the adverse effects of the changing climate on their livelihood activities.
Adi (2007: 93) identified the availability of funds as a significant variable in determining nonagricultural livelihoods.
The findings of this study agree with Adi’s findings.
Attempts to have access to credit to diversify their livelihood activities influenced the selling of large ruminants and the purchase of less expensive food by some households in Pakistan (Batool et al., 2018).
Educational qualification (t=3.73), at 5% significance level, was also found to be positive and significant.
Thus, the higher the level of education, the more diversified the livelihood activities of the respondents to cope with the impacts of climate change.
Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression result Effects Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests Pseudo R-Square-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept 17.025 .000 0 Cox and Snell .111 Low productivity –29.217b 7.569 11 .721 Nagelkerke .483 Reduced income –27.342b 11.899 16 .938 McFadden .546 Low crop yield –16.463b 49.696 25 .646 Low patronage –24.755b 4.482 2 .851 Irregular patronage –23.591b 19.503 37 765 Delay in completion of clients’ work –14.376b 6.762 65 527 Reduction in animal yield –15.173b 18.453 43 .293 Model Fitting Information Model Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig.
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig.
1.000 b = slope Table 8: Respondents’ agreement index (livelihood-adaptation strategies) S/N Livelihood-adaptation strategies (5) Strongly agree (1) Strongly disagree (n=446) SWV RAI(MS) MD(RAI) 5 4 3 2 1 1 Diversifying income sources 75 204 91 27 49 1567 3.51 0.83 2 Non-observance of regular working hours 59 111 190 65 21 1460 3.27 0.59 3 Modifying food habits to cope with a food crisis 44 83 175 116 28 1337 3.00 0.32 4 Adjusting tasks within households 0 87 125 148 86 1105 2.48 -0.20 5 Irrigation 8 1 2 14 421 499 1.12 -1.56 Average RAI(MS) (composite score) 2.68 34 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 This result concurs with the findings of Adi (2007: 94) in South-Eastern Nigeria, where educational status plays a major role in determining livelihood diversification to ensure uninterrupted income flow that may arise from the effects of climate change and other socioeconomic challenges.
Educational qualification plays a role in seeking off-farm employment as a livelihoodadaptation strategy by respondents in South Africa and Ethiopia Nile Basin (Bryan et al., 2009).
It is important to note that, age (t=1.68), at 5% significance level, was statistically not found to be significant as a predictor for adaptation strategies.
Household size (t=6.31), at 1% significance level, was positive and statistically significant.
This implies that the more a household expands, the more their livelihood activities become expanded and the more they tend to evolve strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change.
This indicates that, as a household increases in size, there will be the need to expand livelihood activities, in order to cater to the number of mouths to be fed, and the multiplicity of these activities will trigger several strategies aimed at mitigating the impacts of climate change.
This agrees with Mutangi (2013: 500) who identified household size as one of the major determinants of livelihood diversification in the peri-urban area of Masvingo (Zimbabwe).
As reported by Bryan et al.
(2009), some livelihood-adaptation strategies that were likely influenced by household size in South Africa and Ethiopia Nile Basin were engagement in food-for-work programmes, migration, and reducing consumption.
The respondents’ income (t=1.05), at 5% significance level, was also found to be positive and statistically significant.
This suggests that growing income from a livelihood activity enables the respondents to create an adequate buffer to withstand the adverse effects of climate change on their livelihood activity.
This result conforms to the earlier assertion of Ifeanyi-Obi and Matthews-Njoku (2014: 54) that income plays a dominant role in livelihood diversification in the South-Eastern region of Nigeria.
The availability of savings from major livelihood activities facilitates the running of a grocery store as an alternative livelihood strategy in India (Rautela & Karki, 2015).
Access to climate change information (t=3.73), at 5% significance level, was positive and statistically significant as a predictor for adaptation strategies in Ibadan.
Thus, the availability of information on weather forecasts detailing months, times, and periods of occurrence of climatic elements such as rainfall, sunlight as well as the intensity of the elements will assist the respondents in adopting adequate and effective strategies to circumvent the impacts of changing climate on their livelihood activities.
Those engaged in urban agriculture and traders involved in agricultural produce mostly fall within this category.
This study amplifies Chete’s (2019: 51-52) assertion that access to information on climate change ensures prompt livelihood diversification to cushion the adverse effects of climate change.
Access to climate change information appears to play a role in the livelihood-adaptation strategies of some households in Bangladesh that engaged in crop diversification, modification of planting, and harvesting periods, as reported by Ahmed and Haq (2017).
However, gender (t=2.24), at 5% significance level, was statistically not found to be significant as a predictor for adaptation strategies.
The frequency of occurrence of climate-induced disasters (t=1.43), at 5% significance level, was positive and significant for predicting adaptation strategies.
This shows that the rate and persistency of a particular climate-induced disaster such as floods would have given the respondents an idea of when, how, and the magnitude of the disaster, thereby enabling them to evolve effective adaptation measures to mitigate the impacts of the disaster.
Thus, the more the occurrence of natural disasters, the more the extent to which residents diversify their livelihood activities.
This explains why farming households in South Africa and Ethiopia’s Nile Basin seek off-farm employment as a livelihood-adaptation strategy (Bryan et al., 2009).
6.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Although the respondents in this study are aware of climate change and the impact this phenomenon has on their livelihoods, they adopted different strategies to cope with the effects of climate change.
Diversifying income sources, adjustment to regular working hours, and modifying food habits are some of the strategies adopted by respondents.
Adopting these strategies was influenced by the respondents’ access to gaining credit, their income, household size, and access to information.
Over half of the respondents were from the low-income category, making them vulnerable urban dwellers in Ibadan, Nigeria.
They indicated that their income was reduced because of climate change on their livelihood activities.
It is pertinent to note that the respondents’ inability to optimally Table 9: Results of Tobit Regression Analysis Variables Co-efficient Standard Error T Access to credit .373496 .0284371 3.44** Educational qualification .095117 .0475326 4.20** Household size .724164 .5382679 6.31*** Gender .054448 .0161742 2.24 Income .072933 .0395860 1.05** Access to information .464558 .0571344 3.73** Age .056262 .0392730 1.68 Frequency of disasters .035242 .0426327 1.43** Constant .047516 .0335281 13.15*** **Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 35 perform their livelihoods, due to variations in climatic elements, has implications for individuals’ efforts to escape poverty and productively engage in decent jobs.
Thus, reaching Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 on ‘Zero Poverty’ and SDG 8 on ‘Decent Work and Economic Growth’ will be a daunting task.
It is also important to note that SDG 13 emphasizes the adoption of policies and measures to address the incidence of climate change by countries of the world.
For Ibadan city to be sustainable, its poor inhabitants must be productively engaged and the changing climate should hinder their economic activities to a minimal extent.
Therefore, there is a need for coordinated and collaborative actions by stakeholders to effectively address the challenges of climate change, in order to ensure seamless livelihood activities and foster poverty reduction and zero hunger in the city of Ibadan and elsewhere.
This can be achieved through the following measures: • The physical planning system of Ibadan City should be strengthened to ensure the planning and management of the city in such a way as to build its resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters.
The current urban planning system in the city is too weak to effectively address the planning deficiencies that permit the devastating effects of climateinduced disasters.
Poor urban planning has been instrumental in the frequent occurrence of floods in the city in recent times.
Therefore, the urban planning authorities will do well if climateresilient planning approaches such as urban ecosystems and green infrastructure are adopted.
These approaches provide solutions to climate change challenges at a lower cost than traditional infrastructure approaches.
• While it is gratifying to note that the master plan and wastemanagement plan for Ibadan City have been prepared, the implementation of the plans has been too slow.
A dedicated implementation of the plans will guarantee effective containment of climate-induced disasters.
• The state and local governments should ensure that the city’s inhabitants have full access to climate-related information at all times.
This can be achieved through effective partnerships with the relevant agencies and organisations involved in climate monitoring such as the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) and Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change (BNRCC).
The agencies and organisations can provide information on climate change detailing months, times, and periods of occurrence of climatic elements such as rainfall, sunlight, as well as the intensity of the elements.
This will assist the people in adopting adequate and effective strategies to circumvent the impacts of changing climate on their livelihood activities.
• Adequate financial assistance in the form of non-interest soft loans should be provided to the people regularly to aid their livelihood diversification occasioned by the changing climate.
To achieve this, governments at the local and state levels should partner with some financial institutions, especially microfinance banks and the Bank of Industry (BOI) as well as philanthropic nongovernmental organisations such as the Rotary Club.
• A comprehensive climate and disaster risk-management plan for Ibadan City requires urgent preparation and faithful implementation, in order to effectively address the general challenges of climate change and its effects on livelihood, in particular.
Such a plan should discourage or regulate livelihood strategies that contribute to climate change.
For instance, the polluters-pay principle should be applied to any rickety (smoky) vehicles used by commercial transport operators.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author appreciates the two anonymous reviewers and the Town and Regional Planning editors for their constructive comments and many helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
REFERENCES ABDULKADIR, A.
2017.
Climate change and its implications on human existence in Nigeria: A review.
Bayero Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences, 10(2), pp.
152-158. https://doi.
org/10.4314/bajopas.v10i2.26 ADEDIRAN, A.
2020.
Spatiotemporal patterns of thunderstorm and disturbance lines induced rainstorms over Ibadan Nigeria.
In: Ecosystem Dynamics and Disaster Risk Management.
Kaduna, Nigeria: M.O.
Press & Publishers, pp.
281-292.
ADI, B.
2007.
Determinants of agricultural and non-agricultural livelihood strategies in rural communities: Evidence from Eastern Nigeria.
The Journal of Developing Areas, 40(2), pp.
93-94. https://doi.
org/10.1353/jda.2007.0012 AHMED, M.N.
& HAQ, S.M.
2017.
Indigenous people’s perceptions about climate change, forest resource management, and coping strategies: A comparative study in Bangladesh.
Environment, Development and Sustainability, 21(2), p. 679-708. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10668-017-0055-1 AKANDE, A.
2017.
Geospatial analysis of extreme weather events in Nigeria (1985-2015) using self-organizing maps.
Advances in Meteorology, 2017, article number 8576150.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// doi.org/10.1155/2017/8576150> [Accessed: 20 July 2022].
AMANCHUKWU, R.N.
2015.
Climate change education in Nigeria: The role of curriculum review.
Education, 5(3), pp.
71-79.
AMOBI, D. & ONYISHI, T. 2015.
Governance and climate change in Nigeria: A public policy perspective.
Journal of Policy and Development Studies, 9(2), pp.
199-210. https://doi.
org/10.12816/0011217 https://doi.org/10.4314/bajopas.v10i2.26 https://doi.org/10.4314/bajopas.v10i2.26 https://doi.org/10.1353/jda.2007.0012 https://doi.org/10.1353/jda.2007.0012 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-017-0055-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-017-0055-1 https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/8576150 https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/8576150 https://doi.org/10.12816/0011217 https://doi.org/10.12816/0011217 36 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 ANABARAONYE, B.
2019.
Educating farmers and fishermen in rural areas in Nigeria on climate change mitigation and adaptation for global sustainability.
International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research, 10(4), pp.
1391-1398.
ANIAH, P., KAUNZA-NU-DEMB, M.K., QUACOUC, I.E., ABUGRED, J.A.
& ABINDAW, B.A.
2016a.
The effects of climate change on livelihoods of smallholder farmers in the Upper East region of Ghana.
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research, 28(2), pp.
1-20.
ANIAH, P., KAUNZA-NU-DEM, M.K., ABINDAW, B.A.
& MILLAR, D. 2016b.
Characterizing and explaining smallholder households’ views and understanding of climate change in the Bongo District of Ghana.
Earth Sciences, 5(2), pp.
30-32. https://doi.
org/10.11648/j.earth.20160502.12 ATLAS OF URBAN EXPANSION.
2021.
Ibadan.
[Online].
Available at: <www.
atlasofurbanexpansion.org/cities/view/ Ibadan> [Accessed: 16 May 2022].
AUDU, M., EJEMBI, E. & IGBAWUA, T. 2021.
Assessment of spatial distribution and temporal trends of precipitation and its extremes over Nigeria.
American Journal of Climate Change, 10, pp.
331-352. https://doi.org/10.4236/ ajcc.2021.103016 AUDU, M.O., ISIKWUE, B.C.
& EWEH, E.J.
2015.
Evaluation of seasonal and annual variations of evapotranspiration with climatic parameters in Ibadan, Nigeria.
Journal of Earth Sciences and Geotechnical Engineering, 5(2), pp.
69-79.
AYANDA, I.F.
2013.
Assessment of effect of climate change on the livelihood of pastoralists in Kwara State, Nigeria.
Global Journal of Agricultural Economics and Econometrics, 1(1), pp.
60-67.
AYENI, O.D., ADEDIRAN, A., OFORDU, C.S., MBA, N.C., AMOOONINDUNDU, O.N., ARABOMEN, O.
& OKUMODI, B.O.
2020.
Analysing the characteristic-sequence of rainfall amounts in Ibadan, Nigeria.
Journal of Meteorology and Climate Science, 18(1), pp.
89-98.
BATOOL, H., ALI, W., MANZOOR, R. & MAHMOOD, N. 2018.
Women’s perception of climate change and coping strategies in Pakistan: An empirical evidence.
Earth Systems and Environment, 2, pp.
609-619. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s41748-018-0073-7 BERNARD, H.R.
2000.
Social research methods: Qualitative and quantities approaches.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. BNRCC (BUILDING NIGERIA’S RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE).
2011.
National adaptation strategy and plan of action on climate change for Nigeria (NASPA-CCN).
Prepared for the Federal Ministry of Environment Special Climate Change Unit.
BROWN, M.E.
& FUNK, C.C.
2008.
Food security under climate change.
Science, 319, pp.
580-581. https://doi.
org/10.1126/science.1154102 BRYAN, E., DERESSA, T., GBETIBOUO, A.
& RINGLER, C. 2009.
Adaptation to climate change in Ethiopia and South Africa: Options and constraints.
Environmental Science and Policy, 12, pp.
413-426. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.envsci.2008.11.002 CHETE, O.B.
2019.
Factors influencing adaptation to climate change among smallholder farming communities in Nigeria.
African Crop Science Journal, 27(1), pp.
45-57. https://doi.
org/10.4314/acsj.v27i1.4 CRESWELL, J.W.
2014.
Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method approaches.
London: Sage Publications.
DERESSA, T. & HASSAN, R.M.
2009.
Economic impact of climate change on crop production in Ethiopia: Evidence from cross-section measures.
Journal of African Economies, 18, pp.
529-554. https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejp002 DIOHA, M.O.
& EMODI, N.V. 2018.
Energy-climate dilemma in Nigeria: Options for the future.
IAEE Energy Forum.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=& esrc=s&source=web&cd=108&ved=2 ahUKEwihv4iA2-> [Accessed: 20 July 2022].
DUROWOJU, O.S., SAMUEL, K.J.
& ANIBABA, B.W.
2021.Temporal analysis of urban heat island in Ibadan Metropolis.
Osun Geographical Review, 4, pp.
170-178.
EBELE, N.E.
& EMODI, N.V. 2016.
Climate change and its impact on Nigerian economy.
Journal of Scientific Research & Reports, 10(6), pp.
1-13. https://doi.org/10.9734/ JSRR/2016/25162 ECKSTEIN, D., HUTFILS, M.L.
& WINGES, M. 2018.
Global climate risk index 2019: Who suffers most from extreme weather events?
Weatherrelated loss events in 2017 and 1998 to 2017.
Bonn: Germanwatch.
EDILEGNAW, W., MMAPHUTI, A.N.
& ELIAZA, M. 2022.
Climate changeinduced livelihood adaptive strategies and perceptions of forest-dependent communities: The case of Inanda, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
Tree, Forests and People, 8, article number 100250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
tfp.2022.100250 EGBINOLA, C.N.
& AMOBICHUKWU, A.E.
2013.
Climate variation assessment based on rainfall and temperature in Ibadan, South-Western Nigeria.
Journal of Environment and Earth Sciences, 3(11), pp.
32-45.
EGERU, A.
2012.
Role of indigenous knowledge in climate change adaptation: A case study of Teso sub-region of Eastern Uganda.
Indian Journal of Traditional Knowledge, 11, pp.
217-224.
ELISHA, I.
2017.
Evidence of climate change and adaptation strategies among grain farmers in Sokoto State, Nigeria.
IOSR Journal of Environmental Science, Toxicology and Food Technology, 11(3), pp.
1-7. https://doi.
org/10.9790/2402-1103020107 ELUM, Z.A.
& MOMODU, A.S. 2017.
Climate change mitigation and renewable energy for sustainable development in Nigeria: A discourse approach.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 76(1), pp.
72-80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
rser.2017.03.040 ENETE I.C.
2014.
Impacts of climate change on agricultural production in Enugu State, Nigeria.
Journal of Earth Science & Climatic Change, 5(9), article number 234.
10.4172/2157-7617.1000234 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA.
2013.
Nigeria Post-Disaster Needs Assessment – 2012 Floods.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.
gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/NIGERIA_ PDNA_PRINT_05_29_2013_WEB.pdf> [Accessed: 20 July 2022].
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT.
2011.
National adaptation strategy and plan of action on climate change for Nigeria (NASPA-CCN).
Abuja: Federal Ministry of Environment Climate Change Department, Government of Nigeria.
https://doi.org/10.11648/j.earth.20160502.12 https://doi.org/10.11648/j.earth.20160502.12 http://www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org/cities/view/Ibadan http://www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org/cities/view/Ibadan http://www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org/cities/view/Ibadan https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2021.103016 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2021.103016 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41748-018-0073-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41748-018-0073-7 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1154102 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1154102 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2008.11.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2008.11.002 https://doi.org/10.4314/acsj.v27i1.4 https://doi.org/10.4314/acsj.v27i1.4 https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejp002 https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=108&ved=2ahUKEwihv4iA2https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=108&ved=2ahUKEwihv4iA2https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=108&ved=2ahUKEwihv4iA2https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=108&ved=2ahUKEwihv4iA2https://doi.org/10.9734/JSRR/2016/25162 https://doi.org/10.9734/JSRR/2016/25162 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tfp.2022.100250 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tfp.2022.100250 https://doi.org/10.9790/2402-1103020107 https://doi.org/10.9790/2402-1103020107 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.03.040 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.03.040 https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/NIGERIA_PDNA_PRINT_05_29_2013_WEB.pdf https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/NIGERIA_PDNA_PRINT_05_29_2013_WEB.pdf https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/NIGERIA_PDNA_PRINT_05_29_2013_WEB.pdf Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 37 FEDERAL MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT.
2014.
United Nations Climate Change Nigeria.
National Communication (NC).
NC 2.
2014.
[Online].
Available at: <https://unfccc.
int/sites/default/files/resource/nganc2.
pdf> [Accessed: 16 July 2022].
FIELDS, G.S.
2019.
Self-employment in the developing world.
Background Research Paper, submitted to the UN High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, May 2013, p. 6.
HAIDER, H. 2019.
Climate change in Nigeria: Impacts and responses.
K4D Helpdesk Report 675.
Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
IDOWU, A.A. 2011.
Impact of climate change in Nigeria.
Iranian Journal of Energy & Environment, 2(2), pp.
145-152.
IFEANYI-OBI, C.C., ASIABAKA, C.C., ADESOPE, O.M.
& ISSA, F.O.
2011.
Inhabitants’ perception of climate change, effects and adaptation strategies in Etche Local Government Area of Rivers state, Nigeria.
Global Journal of Applied Agricultural Research, 1(1), pp.
57-64.
IFEANYI-OBI, C.C.
& MATTHEWSNJOKU, E.C.
2014.
Socio-economic factors affecting choice of livelihood activities among rural dwellers in Southeast Nigeria.
Journal of Agriculture and Veterinary Science, 7(4), pp.
52-56. https://doi.
org/10.9790/2380-07415256 INEC (INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION).
2015.
Directory of polling units Oyo State.
Revised, January 2015.
Ilorin: Independent National Electoral Commission.
IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2014.
Climate variability 2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability.
WGII AR5 Phase I Report.
Geneva: IPCC.
JAIYEBO, O.
2003.
Women and household sustenance: Changing livelihoods and survival strategies in the peri-urban areas of Ibadan.
Environment & Urbanization, 15(1), pp.
111-120. https://doi.
org/10.1177/095624780301500113 KASIM, O., AGBOLA, S. & OWENIWE, M. 2020.
Land use land cover change and land surface emissivity in Ibadan, Nigeria.
Town and Regional Planning, No.
77, pp.
71-88. http://dx.doi.
org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.6 KREJCIE, R.V.
& MORGAN, D.W. 1970.
Determining sample size for research activities.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 30(3), pp.
607-610. https://doi.
org/10.1177/001316447003000308 LAWANSON, T. & ODUWAYE, L. 2014.
Socio-economic adaptation strategies of the urban poor in the Lagos metropolis, Nigeria.
African Review of Economics and Finance, 6(1), pp.
139-160.
LI, L., CAO, R., WEI, K., WANG, W. & CHEN, L. 2019.
Adapting climate change challenge: A new vulnerability assessment framework from the global perspective.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 217, pp.
216-224. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.162 MADU, I.A.
2012.
Spatial vulnerability of rural households to climate change in Nigeria: Implications for internal security.
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The University of Texas in Austin.
https:// doi.org/10.18848/1835-7156/CGP/ v03i04/37134 MUTANGI, G.T.
2013.
Peri-urban livelihoods strategies and survival: River sand extraction in Mucheke river and livelihoods security in Masvingo urban, Zimbabwe.
Greener Journal of Social Sciences, 10(3), pp.
496-503. https://doi.org/10.15580/ GJSS.2013.10.102913938 NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS.
2017.
Demographic Statistics Bulletin.
[Online].
Available at: <https//www.
nigerianstat.gov.ng.> [Accessed: 5 January 2020].
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS.
2022.
Nigerian population.
[Online].
Available at: <www.nigerianstat.gov.n>g [Accessed: 30 June 2022].
NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION.
2022.
Population statistics.
Abuja: National Population Commission, pp.
19-23.
NIMET (NIGERIAN METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY).
2022.
Seasonal rainfall, temperature prediction.
[Online].
Available at: <https://sciencenigeria.com/nimetpresents-2022-seasonal-rainfalltemperature-prediction/> [Accessed: 11 November 2022].
NKECHI, O.
2016.
Mitigating climate change in Nigeria: African traditional religious values in focus.
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 7(6), pp.
299-308.
ODJUGO, A.O.
2013.
Analysis of climate change awareness in Nigeria.
Scientific Research and Essays, 8(26), pp.
1203-1211.
OGBUABOR, J.E.
& EGWUCHUKWU, E.I.
2017.
The impact of climate change on the Nigerian economy.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 7(2), pp.
217-223.
OGUNTOYINTOYINBO, J.S.
1994.
Climatic characteristics.
In: Filani, M.O.
(Ed.).
Ibadan Region.
Ibadan: Rex Charles Publications, pp.
74-75.
OKAFOR, J.C. 2021.
Flood, livelihood displacement, and poverty in Nigeria: Plights of flood victims, 2012-2018.
In: Oguge, N., Ayal, D., Adeleke, L. & da Silva, I.
(Eds).
African handbook of climate change adaptation.
Springer, Cham, pp.
2535-2545. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-45106-6_124 OKOROH, J.P. 2016.
Climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies used by farmers in Imo State, Nigeria.
Journal of Agricultural Extension, 20(2), pp.
130-142. https://doi.org/10.4314/ jae.v20i2.10 OLADIPO, E. 2010.
Towards enhancing the adaptive capacity of Nigeria: A review of the country’s state of preparedness for climate change adaptation.
Heinrich Böll Foundation, Nigeria.
OLANIYI, O.A.
2013. Review of climate change and its effect on Nigeria ecosystem.
International Journal of African and Asian Studies, 1(1), pp.
57-65.
OLUWOLE, J.
2016.
Assessment of level of use of climate change adaptation strategies among arable crop farmers in Oyo and Ekiti States, Nigeria.
Journal of Earth Science & Climatic Change, 7(1), article number 369, pp.
1-7. https://doi.
org/10.4172/2157-7617.1000369 ONWUEMELE, A.
2015.
Livelihood responses to climate change in the Niger-Delta: Implications for food security in Nigeria.
International Journal of Development and Management Review, 10(1), pp.
125-135.
ONWUTUEBE, C.J.
2019.
Patriarchy and women vulnerability to adverse climate change in Nigeria.
[Online].
Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/21 58244019825914SAGE38> [Accessed: 18 March 2022].
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/nganc2.pdf https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/nganc2.pdf https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/nganc2.pdf https://doi.org/10.9790/2380-07415256 https://doi.org/10.9790/2380-07415256 https://doi.org/10.1177/095624780301500113 https://doi.org/10.1177/095624780301500113 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.6 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.6 https://doi.org/10.1177/001316447003000308 https://doi.org/10.1177/001316447003000308 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.162 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.162 https://doi.org/10.18848/1835-7156/CGP/v03i04/37134 https://doi.org/10.18848/1835-7156/CGP/v03i04/37134 https://doi.org/10.18848/1835-7156/CGP/v03i04/37134 https://doi.org/10.15580/GJSS.2013.10.102913938 https://doi.org/10.15580/GJSS.2013.10.102913938 http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng http://www.nigerianstat.gov https://sciencenigeria.com/nimet-presents-2022-seasonal-rainfall-temperature-prediction/ https://sciencenigeria.com/nimet-presents-2022-seasonal-rainfall-temperature-prediction/ https://sciencenigeria.com/nimet-presents-2022-seasonal-rainfall-temperature-prediction/ https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45106-6_124 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45106-6_124 https://doi.org/10.4314/jae.v20i2.10 https://doi.org/10.4314/jae.v20i2.10 https://doi.org/10.4172/2157-7617.1000369 https://doi.org/10.4172/2157-7617.1000369 https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019825914SAGE38 https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019825914SAGE38 38 Ola 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):24-38 ONYENECHERE, E. 2010.
Climate change and spatial planning concerns in Nigeria: Remedial measures for more effective response.
Journal of Human Ecology, 32(3), pp.
137-148. https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2010 .11906333 OTEKHILE, C. & MATTHEW, O.
2017.
An explorative study of the contribution of the informal sector to economic activities in Lagos, Nigeria.
In: Proceedings of the 20th International Scientific Conference “Enterprise and Competitive Environment”, 9-10 March, Brno, Czech Republic, pp.
1-12.
OTITOJU, M.A.
& ENETE, A.A. 2016.
Climate change adaptation: Uncovering constraints to the use of adaptation strategies among food crop farmers in South-west Nigeria, using principal component analysis (PCA).
Cogent Food & Agriculture, 2(1), article number 1178692, pp.
1-11. https://doi.org/10.10 80/23311932.2016.1178692 OYO STATE GOVERNMENT.
2021.
The Pacesetter State.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.oyostate.
gov.ng/about-oyo-state> [Accessed: 5 November 2022].
RATHOURE, A.K.
& PATEL, U.R.
2020.
Climate conditions and biodiversity decline: Impact assessment.
Current State and Future Impacts of Climate Change on Biodiversity, IGI Global, pp.
79-94. https://doi.org/10.4018/9781-7998-1226-5.ch005 RAUTELA, P. & KARKI, B.
2015.
Traditional practices for survival in resource depleted Himalayan region: Challenges put forth by climate change and response of local communities.
International Journal of Science and Technology, 4(8), pp.
395-404.
SAYNE, A.
2011.
Climate change adaptation and conflict in Nigeria.
Washington, DC: USIP.
SCHMIDHUBER, J.
& TUBIELLO, F.N.
2007.
Global food security under climate change.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104, pp.
19703-19708. https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.0701976104 SHIRU, M.S.
2018.
Trend analysis of droughts during crop-growing seasons of Nigeria.
Sustainability, 10(3), article number 871. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su10030871 STATISTA.
2022.
Knowledge of climate change topic in Nigeria 2020, by area.
Published by Statista Research Department, 1 February 2022.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.statista.
com/statistics/1269701/knowledgeof-climate-change-topic-in-nigeria-byarea/> [Accessed: 5 November 2022].
THARKUR, S.B.
& BAJAGAIN, A.
2019.
Impacts of climate change on livelihood and its adaptation needs.
The Journal of Agriculture and Environment, 20, pp.
173-185. https://doi.org/10.3126/ aej.v20i0.25067 YIN, R.K. 2018.
Case study research and applications: Design and methods.
6th edition.
Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
ZADAWA, A.N.
& OMRAN, A.
2020.
Rural development in Africa: Challenges and opportunities.
In: Omran, A.
(Ed.).
Sustaining our environment for better future.
Singapore: Springer, pp.
33-42. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7158-5_3 https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2010.11906333 https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2010.11906333 https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.2016.1178692 https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.2016.1178692 http://www.oyostate.gov.ng/about-oyo-state http://www.oyostate.gov.ng/about-oyo-state https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1226-5.ch005 https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1226-5.ch005 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701976104 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701976104 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10030871 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10030871 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1269701/knowledge-of-climate-change-topic-in-nigeria-by-area/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1269701/knowledge-of-climate-change-topic-in-nigeria-by-area/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1269701/knowledge-of-climate-change-topic-in-nigeria-by-area/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1269701/knowledge-of-climate-change-topic-in-nigeria-by-area/ https://doi.org/10.3126/aej.v20i0.25067 https://doi.org/10.3126/aej.v20i0.25067 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7158-5_3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7158-5_3 _Hlk110243798 _Hlk119415055 _Hlk69227687 bau0001 bau0002 bau0003
Progress and Challenges of Combating Climate Change in Indonesia: An interview with Prof. Rachmat Witoelar, the President’s Special Envoy for Climate Change ASEAS 5(2) 345344 d o i 10 .4 23 2 /1 0.
A SE A S -5 .2 -1 0 Im Dialog / In Dialogue Progress and Challenges of Combating Climate Change in Indonesia: An Interview with Prof. Rachmat Witoelar, the President’s Special Envoy for Climate Change Till Plitschka1 & Irendra Radjawali2 Citation Plitschka, T., & Radjawali, I.
(2012).
Progress and Challenges of Combating Climate Change in Indonesia: An interview with Prof. Rachmat Witoelar, the President’s Special Envoy for Climate Change.
ASEAS Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 5(2), 345-351.
Professor Rachmat Witoelar, former Minister of the Environment in Indonesia, heads the National Council on Climate Change in Indonesia (DNPI) and Indonesia’s delegations to negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
This interview was conducted during the most recent UNFCCC negotiations in Bonn in May 2012 and contains references to specifi c agreements in that process.
As the Kyoto Protocol – which includes binding targets for countries in the Global North (so-called Annex 1 countries) – is drawing to an end, negotiations revolve around a new protocol, but last year’s high level talks in Durban only came up with a fairly vague result – the Durban Platform – without binding emission reduction targets.
In this context, Indonesia’s announcement to pursue its own unilateral reduction target is signifi cant.
The progress and challenges of achieving this target are the focus of the following interview.
Professor Rachmat Witoelar, ehemaliger Umweltminister Indonesiens, leitet sowohl den Nationalen Rat für Klimawandel in Indonesien (DNPI) als auch Indonesiens Delegation zu den Verhandlungen im Rahmen der United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Dieses Interview wurde während der letzten UNFCCC Verhandlungen in Bonn im Mai 2012 durchgeführt und bezieht sich auf spezifi sche Vereinbarungen im Rahmen dieses Verhandlungsprozesses.
Aufgrund des baldigen Auslaufens des Kyoto-Protokolls, welches verpfl ichtende Ziele für die Länder des globalen Nordens (sogenannte Annex 1 Länder) beinhaltet, konzentrieren sich die laufenden Verhandlungen auf ein neues Protokoll.
Die Gespräche auf höchster Ebene, die vergangenes Jahr in Durban geführt wurden brachten mit der Schöpfung der Durban Platform jedoch nur ein vages Ergebnis hervor und legten keine bindenden Emissionsreduktionsziele fest.
In diesem Kontext ist Indonesiens Ankündigung, unilateral eigene Reduktionszieles festzulegen, bedeutend.
Die Fortschritte und Herausforderungen, dieses Ziel zu erreichen, stehen im Fokus des folgenden Interviews.
1 Till Plitschka has a background in engineering and studied South-East Asian Studies at Bonn University, Germany, with a special focus on contemporary Indonesia.
In his Master thesis (2012) he explored the political, social, and environmental controversies surrounding REDD in South-East Asia.
Contact: till.plitschka@hotmail.com (Corresponding author) 2 Irendra Radjawali is trained as a civil engineer, urban and regional planner at the Institute of Technology Bandung, Indonesia and as a geographer at the University of Bremen, Germany.
He is a researcher at the Institute of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of Bonn, Germany with focus on the political-ecology analysis of ecosystem change, especially on water resources.
ASEAS 5(2) 347346 Till PliTSchkA: i would like to start with the famous speech that President Susilo bambang yudhoyono gave in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, uSA, in which he committed indonesia to unilaterally cut greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 26 percent and up to 41 percent with international support.
So what has indonesia done to fulfil this commitment?
RACHMAT WITOELAR: I would like to divide Indonesia’s efforts into two key areas: first, institutional and second, operational.
At the institutional level, there are laws and rules that have been passed to ensure that emissions can be mitigated, like preventing forest degradation through REDD3, and also rules to empower the government to punish those who transgress REDD.
A key piece of legislation is the Presidential Decree No.
61/2011 which outlines who does what and when.
This decree specifies the forestry sector (i.e.
Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry – LULUCF) as responsible for 67 percent of the total emission reduction target of 26 percent.
The coordinating meetings with the governors and the district heads (bupati) are another key initiative at the institutional level.
The central government can give directions but the regional governments are the executors.
Unfortunately, the law which allows the bupati to issue permits (e.g.
for timber, plantation or mining concessions) has been proven to be damaging to the environment.
The central government can ask the heads of regional governments to stop issuing permits, but there has been some ‘resistance’ against this in the name of decentralisation.
There have been constant ‘legal wars’ going on related to this issue in Indonesia.
I’m proud to say that the environmental concerns are winning, and the district heads realise that this is good, so they don’t issue as many permits as they used to.
In Samarinda4 there are 300 permits for mining, I don’t know where they will mine.
Of course, the motivation of these bupati is the money from the concessions, but this is very damaging for the environment.
The Law No.
32 on the Environment says that the punishment for abusing the regulation (on concessions) is not in the form of a fine but is actually imprisonment.
If it’s only a fine, then the punishment might not be effective enough as they will obtain even more money with the permit than what they will be fined.
These are the efforts to move forward and to fulfil the commitment of a 26 percent emission cut.
PliTSchkA: what about the operational level?
WITOELAR: At the operational level, first, the government, through the Ministry of Forestry, is recovering and replanting millions of trees, in fact billions of trees a year.
Second, the private sector is encouraged to use their CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) for greening and planting trees.
A third effort is the initiatives of local organisations and the local population.
For example, the Association of the Ladies of the Ministers has been planting half a million trees per year, a lot of trees.
So the men should do more!
In the past, all these efforts have been surrounded by cynicism, but now we are sure that it has been done as it is checked by 3 The acronym REDD refers to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and is a UN programme that aims to offer incentives for countries in the Global South to reduce emissions from deforestation by creating financial values for the forest carbon stocks.
(ASEAS explanatory note) 4 Samarinda is the capital of East Kalimantan, one of four provinces of the Indonesian part of the island of Borneo.
(ASEAS explanatory note) ASEAS 5(2) 347346 satellite mapping.
However, due to the extent of the damage and the size of the country, it takes time to get everything recovered, so I’m pleased that we’re going to meet the target of a 26 percent GHG emission reduction by 2020, and we’re going to surpass it.
I was part of the decision at that time, and the number we suggested to the President was decided on after careful deliberation.
So the 26 percent are, to my knowledge, feasible and quite easy to achieve because the emissions are due to the carelessness of doing things and because of the waste, so we need to economise more.
So if we just cut down on those two aspects, we would already cut down 7 to 8 percent, and the major part of it is the deforestation and illegal loggers which account for up to 40 percent of everything.
So if we focus on this sector and if we cut down on that we can already achieve 30 to 40 percent, going beyond our commitment of 26 percent.
PliTSchkA: So which sector is indonesia’s main focus to cut emissions?
WITOELAR: Better governance in terms of regulating the forestry sector.
PliTSchkA: So forestry, not power generation like coal-fired power plants?
WITOELAR: No, I’m aware of the bad consequences of using coal for power generation but according to the statistics, the forestry sector has been polluting up to 67 percent of all emissions.
PliTSchkA: That’s why you focus your emission cutting on the forestry sector?
WITOELAR: Yes, but also the other sectors such as traffic, land use, and so forth.
In all, there are 70 concrete projects that are being run under the Presidential Decree mentioned above.
In this sense, the target of 26 percent is not a guess, we are not guessing.
It’s calculated.
PliTSchkA: i ask this because indonesia has a big source of geothermal energy and within the unFccc framework there’s the component of technology transfer, so you are not planning to go down that road of promoting renewable energy instead of cutting the emissions from forestry?
WITOELAR: Of course we are going that way, but it can’t be done in the initial phase.
Our studies say that it takes around six years to start such geothermal installation.
We want to do it from year 1.
Year 1 focuses on stopping logging, year 2 focuses on starting planting, year 3 is to cut down on waste and increase efficiency, and the next year to start developing renewable energies.
Up to 2012, we are keen on converting kerosene to gas, so that people use little gas stoves for cooking instead of kerosene.
So this is year 4 and year 5, in year 6 we will start to exploit geothermal energy.
So if we start in 2012, we are convinced that we’ll pass the target of 26 percent emission reduction as promised.
Till Plitschka & Irendra Radjawali An Interview with Prof. Rachmat Witoelar ASEAS 5(2) 349348 PliTSchkA: but the immediate focus is forestry?
WITOELAR: Yes, because it’s the most significant sector for GHG emissions and we have to catch the actors and put them in jail.
We have our jails full of them.
Also, we promote replanting.
This will be done from year 1 to year 3.
We have a very precise plan to reach the commitment.
iREnDRA RADJAwAli: what about REDD?
WITOELAR: REDD is supplementary and a good approach to compensate our efforts to save the trees, and we are not fighting the livelihood of the people living in the forest.
We appreciate the indigenous people and support them in strengthening their capacity to live there without destroying the environment.
We also have the two years moratorium on logging, and REDD is supporting the moratorium.
Indonesia is in favour of putting REDD into practice, but this meeting’s result is lower than the one in Durban, I don’t know why.
Two Indonesian delegates are fighting to increase the strength of the dictum, but there are some objections from other countries.
PliTSchkA: when we are talking about REDD, what should a working REDD mechanism look like for indonesia?
how could it work?
WITOELAR: First, we have to have a clear map to delineate where it applies.
Second, we have to have a clear indication of who lives in that area.
Third, we are talking about REDD++, where those pluses mean the sustainability of the people who live there, they can plant and cut wood as long as they use the right plot of the land.
We also have the demonstration/pilot projects run by ourselves with support from interested parties like Australia and Norway in certain areas.
We have those parties competing for the best practice of REDD++ implementation.
We also established the so-called ‘green provinces’ – the provinces that are able to successfully implement REDD++.
The winner this year is East Kalimantan province, where those big mining (coal) companies are located.
The governor of East Kalimatan, Awang Faroukh, appreciates this initiative and he totally understands that we have to stop doing things that are detrimental to the environment.
Of course, the economy slows down a bit, but that’s the price of clean air.
RADJAwAli: in the context of REDD and mapping, how do you think it should be connected to the spatial planning process?
WITOELAR: Actually, spatial planning comes after that map.
We have problems with mapping because we have so many different maps.
So Indonesia has the initiative to establish the One Map Project.
It is supported by the US through the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership and executed by LAPAN (Indonesian Space Agency) and BAPPENAS (Indonesian Land Agency) among others.
This map is going to be the base map of Indonesia and is going to be legalised by parliament.
A good spatial system is very important.
ASEAS 5(2) 349348 PliTSchkA: So you have the idea of REDD on one side and on the other side you have the national development strategy that includes for example oil palm plantations.
how can you combine these two?
WITOELAR: If they follow the rules strictly, there won’t be any conflict with the REDD scheme.
By law, a certain amount of oil palm concessions should be employed for the welfare of the region at the provincial level.
Some 20 percent of the concessions should be dedicated to the health of the region.
The second thing is that those plantations have often been responsible for related disasters such as forest fires.
So, if the oil palm plantations want to expand their area, they have to do it appropriately and not by burning as the smoke goes to Singapore and Malaysia.
However, problems exist on the ground, for example that those companies ‘buy’ some local people to burn the forest, as they try to avoid responsibility.
Also, previously, the corrupt government officials accepted some bribes from these companies to insure them against prosecution for their law breaking activities.
However, I hope and am sure that now the high rank government officials won’t easily take such bribes.
First of all, we delineate the land that is going to be allocated for oil palm plantation.
Oil palm has the characteristic of destroying the environment, but it can be offset by doing other things, because there is also a lot of money there.
So they have to make sure that they replant trees and also they don’t go to the area where the forest is protected, it’s very sensitive in Central Kalimantan and Riau province.
The punishment on breaking the law is imprisonment.
So law enforcement is important, the government can’t just forbid doing this or that, we also need to enforce the law.
At present, a combination of both is seen as effective.
The government can’t do it alone, the government also needs to work with NGOs, be it national or international ones.
When I served as Minister of the Environment, I was personally very close with some NGOs like Greenpeace, Conservation International, etc.
Oil palm plantations need to be sustained but with strict regulation, especially on its compliance with the environmental protection and climate change mitigation.
In this context, I suggest the ministries to open the space for discussion with stakeholders and discuss the data to assess the oil palm plantations, it’s data vs. data.
Some data are developed by those who don’t want those industries to prosper.
I’m not pointing fingers but it’s a war for markets.
If we can’t sustain our markets somebody else will get the markets.
So I’m in favour of sustaining our markets and pointing out that those plantations outside Indonesia are way worse than the ones in Indonesia.
To be fair, if there’s an embargo, then embargo everything, that’s fair!
Don’t only embargo Indonesia.
The second thing I want to mention: I take the position that we should forbid foreign nationals to hold permits for plantations.
Many of our plantations are owned by Singaporeans and Malaysians.
I’m not accusing them but don’t blame Indonesia alone, as in Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak) there are also lots of plantations.
When I served as Minister of the Environment, I had access to meteorological maps showing the wind flows and the wind was turbulent, meaning that smoke in Malaysia came from the plantations in Sarawak and not from Indonesia.
This is a technological war.
My point is, don’t point fingers at anyone because maybe you are wrong.
Till Plitschka & Irendra Radjawali An Interview with Prof. Rachmat Witoelar ASEAS 5(2) 351350 RADJAwAli: what is indonesia’s main objective during the current negotiations in bonn?
WITOELAR: Ensuring that the Bali Road Map (BRM) and the Durban Platform will be realised.
BRM has been inspected five times from COP 13 in 2007 to COP 175 in 2011 and was the foundation of all the arguments in the meetings.
The words “to execute BRM” are always there.
However, as it is not a political entity, it is not easy.
1B1 and 1B26 are not accepted by some parties.
Also the CBDR (Common but Differentiated Responsibilities) is refused by the same parties [i.e.
the United States], and the US doesn’t want the Kyoto Protocol and BRM.
I respect that, it shows their position.
In that respect, we also want to ensure that the Durban Platform works, but they [the United States] don’t want that either.
At this moment, I’m unhappy because there’s no real progress, only small progress.
In Durban, I was part of the Ministers’ informal negotiation.
All the countries that were suspected by the US of not complying with the agreement like India or China agreed on cutting back on emissions to a greater degree than the US.
I’m proud because Indonesia did it three years before.
US delegates accused India and China of not wanting to cut their emissions, so I just went to China and India and persuaded them to set a target without obligation.
We should appreciate China as its forests are increasing.
China plants more trees than anyone else cuts down.
Ok, there’s a debate on the CBDR concept as it states that the Annex I countries should do more and the other countries should just do as much as they can, and this point is not ‘good’ for the US-Americans.
However, the Durban Platform recognises that developing countries also contribute to the effort of combating climate change.
But still, the US doesn’t want to commit to anything.
RADJAwAli: what about adaptation to climate change?
WITOELAR: We have lots of vulnerable communities due to the changing climate.
They need help and support to adapt to climate change, so adaptation is very important.
Indonesia is proud to have historically been part of the initiatives of what is now called the Adaptation Fund, which hopefully will be realised in the coming months until the Doha meeting.
Mitigation is intended to fight climate change although I think we cannot fight it, we can only delay it.
Meanwhile, the vulnerable ones need to be taken care of by the system and national policies, so we are aware that adaptation efforts to climate change should not be reactive, they should be pro-active and should be prepared before it happens.
RADJAwAli: what do you think about capacity building, science, and doing research in the context of climate change?
5 COP refers to the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, in this case of the UNFCCC.
The conferences are numbered consecutively.
(ASEAS editorial note) 6 1B1 and 1B2 refer to IPCC Source Categories of greenhouse gasses referred to by the Kyoto Protocol.
1B1 refers to fugitive emissions from solid fuels, i.e.
coal mining, and 1B2 refers to fugitive emissions from oil and gas.
(ASEAS editorial note) ASEAS 5(2) 351350 WITOELAR: It’s important because this is what climate is about, we rely on science, we rely on IPCC reports to formulate actions, otherwise it all remains highly subjective.
As you know, basic research and research in general need lots of money while in Indonesia the allocation is not sufficient at all.
So in the National Council on Climate Change we have our working group which focuses on research led by Dr. Agus Supangat.
PliTSchkA: you mentioned the moratorium [on logging].
i have read a lot about the moratorium, mostly critiques regarding loopholes in the moratorium and so forth.
what’s your opinion on such criticism?
WITOELAR: I accept such criticism with an open mind.
Some of it is correct.
But some of it is wrong, for example the one by Norway7.
And Norway apologised for that.
The idea of the moratorium is to pass a moratorium law on the executable areas – not in all areas.
So it applies to the areas with logging operations.
You have to make sure that you can enforce it.
Where is it?
In the tropical rain forest and in the heart of Borneo, it’s possible to do it there.
If there’s any criticism on the moratorium area that is being planted, it’s a serious problem, please give us the data and I’ll go to the Minister of Forestry to take action.
PliTSchkA: it sounds like you are not too happy with the moratorium?
WITOELAR: No, we should do more, and do it more intensively.
PliTSchkA & RADJAwAli: Thank you for this interview!
7 Norway’s Minister of the Environment, Bard Vegar Solhjell, stated in an interview with Reuters in May 2012 that Indonesia’s progress in reforming its forestry sector would be insufficient to meet its pledge to cut carbon emissions by 26 percent by 2020.
(ASEAS editorial note) Till Plitschka & Irendra Radjawali An Interview with Prof. Rachmat Witoelar
355Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.68.4.3 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 2019 (4) 355–372.
Introduction Last century environmental researches revealed, that the alterations of various landscape factors (e.g., hydrologic conditions, soil, vegetation) are closely related to the changing climate (Ladányi, Z. et al.
2009; IPCC 2014; NORDEN 2015; EEA 2017; Rakonczai, J.
2018).
Thus, to clarify how severely our landscapes with different environmental settings are affected to the climatic changes is crucial (Faragó, T. et al.
2010; USAID 2017; Patron, C. 2018).
Spatial, temporal, thereby joint spatiotemporal scale-related problems in geology as well as “dynamic upand downscaling” in GIS are widely distinguished problems (Wilbanks, T.J. 2002).
In contrast to the well interpretable environmental dynamics at the scale of geological history, where temporary outlying inferences are averaged over time, the explanation of tendencies of the significantly noisier observations of the near past is tricky.
The questioning of the existence of global warming is actually rooted to the interpretation of trends of these noisy datasets (Sterl, A. et al.
2009).
From practical aspect, the separation of the noise from the trend is a regularly returning question, which is ultimately based on the decision of the individual modeller (Thiébaux, H.J.
1997).
Hungarian hydrological science pays special attention to the shallow groundwater, thus, provide more sophisticated analyses, than it can be found in common practice (Kovács, J. et al.
2010; Kohán, B. and Szalai, J.
2014).
Although flow and transport modelling oriAnalysing the sensitivity of Hungarian landscapes based on climate change induced shallow groundwater fluctuation Zoltán Zsolt FEHÉR and János RAKONCZAI 1 Abstract One of the undoubtedly recognizable consequences of the ongoing climate change in Hungary is the permanent change of groundwater depth, and consequently the sustainably reachable local water resources.
These processes trigger remarkable changes in soil and vegetation.
Thus, in research of sensitivity of any specific landscape to the varying climatic factors, monitoring and continuous evaluation of the water resources is inevitable.
The presented spatiotemporal geostatistical cosimulation framework is capable to identify rearrangements of the subsurface water resources through water resource observations.
Application of the Markov 2-type coregionalization model is based on the assumption, that presumably only slight changes have to be handled between two consecutive time instants, hence current parameter set can be estimated based on the spatial structures of prior and current dataset and previously identified parameters.
Moreover, the algorithm is capable to take into consideration the significance of the geomorphologic settings on the subsurface water flow.
Trends in water resource changes are appropriate indicators of certain areas climate sensitivity.
The method is also suitable in determination of the main cause of the extraordinary groundwater discharges, like the one, observed from the beginning of the 1980’s in the Danube–Tisza Interfluve in Hungary.
Keywords: climate change, shallow groundwater, spatiotemporal sequential Gaussian cosimulation, Markov 2-type coregionalization 1 Department of Physical Geography and Geoinformatics, University of Szeged, H-6722 Szeged, Egyetem u.
2–6.
E-mails: zz.feher@geo.u-szeged.hu, j.rakonczai@geo.u-szeged.hu Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.356 ented papers mostly use the “unconfined groundwater” expression for the top subsurface water layer, these articles usually written by researchers who are more focusing on realistic simulations of underground processes.
While for studies, whose perspective from above, the “shallow groundwater” expression sounds much more expressive (Dillon, P. and Simmers, I.
1998; Alkhaier, F. et al.
2012; Wang, X. et al.
2015; Gowing, J. et al.
2016).
In addition, unlike the international literature, the historical Hungarian research distinguish different definitions to the confined and unconfined groundwater (Marton, L. 2009).
The past two decades of the Hungarian climate research inferred that alteration of the shallow groundwater can be a substantial indicator of climate change (Rakonczai, J.
2011).
The temporal pattern of the groundwater smoothly follows the changes of cumulated precipitation (Rétháti, L. 1977).
Furthermore, the significant alterations of the groundwater depth at certain areas has triggered further transformation in the vegetation (Ladányi, Z. et al.
2009; Mezősi, G. et al.
2013; Gulácsi, A. and Kovács, F. 2018).
Based on interactions between different environmental factors (Figure 1), presumably changes of climatic conditions (particularly alteration of amount and temporal distribution of precipitation) triggers the changes and fluctuations of groundwater level.
While less precipitation results less amount of infiltration, during heavy rainfalls large amount of water runs off on the surface, instead of infiltrating into the soil (Margóczi, K. et al.
2007; Pongrácz, R. et al.
2016; Gulácsi, A. and Kovács, F. 2018).
Climate forecasts show that in the Carpathian Basin, the global warming leads to less precipitation averages in the warm half of the year, triggering more extreme rainfalls, along with decreased precipitation volume in the cold season (Van der Linden, P. and Mitchell, J.F.B.
2009; Stábitz, J. et al.
2014).
The generally less Fig.
1.
Schematic relationship between climate change and landscape alterations in Hungary.
Based on Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
2017.
357Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
precipitation would most likely reach the shallow groundwater reservoirs, too.
In areas where surface water is not available for agricultural usage, and during drought periods, farmers are forced to irrigate from subsurface reservoirs, thereby water extraction further amplifies groundwater discharge.
As a consequence of steady groundwater decrease it might happen to reach a critical depth when certain plants cannot obtain sufficient moisture.
Decade-long alteration of the groundwater table might even trigger the change of soils and ultimately vegetation changes can be observed (Rakonczai, J. et al.
2012; Ladányi, Z. et al.
2016).
The alteration of the vegetation as a response to the climatic effects can be often experienced even without the change of the groundwater level or the soil settings (Gulácsi, A. and Kovács, F. 2018).
Climate change might have further impact as well as on fauna.
As a consequence of the milder climate, appearance of new pests in Central Europe is a typical example of that (Laštůvka, Z.
2009; Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
2017).
These briefly described processes may jointly trigger significant landscape changes, in which the depth of water table is a key factor.
Objectives in the light of unanswered questions From the 1980s a regional scale groundwater discharge has been experienced in Hungary.
Due to its severity, the majority of domestic research focused on the Danube–Tisza Interfluve.
The region itself provides an interesting framework for various disciplines due to its topographical and geological settings, hydrological characteristics (lack of major rivers) and the complex human interventions supplemented by the consequences of changing climate.
The area itself is formed by sedimentary deposits from river Danube, which is later covered by windblown sand.
The elevation of the area is between 83–172 metres a.s.l.
First and foremost, experts of the Kiskunság National Park had challenged with the adverse effects of shallow groundwater discharge, when drastic transformations of the wetlands were perceived (Pálfai, I.
1992, 1994).
Nearly 1,000 mm lack of precipitation piled up between 1971 and 1985 (Major, P. 1994), which would infer almost 8.3 km3 water shortage on the surface (Rakonczai, J. and Fehér, Z.
2015).
The rate of mean areal decrease of shallow groundwater exceeded two meters (it would equal to 2 km3 water deficit), while much higher rates occurred at the most elevated regions.
Since then, drier conditions of the highest areas have not been able to recover even after longer wet periods (Margóczi, K. et al.
2007; Ladányi, Z. et al.
2009; Faragó, T. et al.
2010; Rakonczai, J. et al.
2012; Rakonczai, J. and Fehér, Z.
2015).
Various opinions on the background of groundwater depletion After recognition of the problem by the early 1990s, scientists of various disciplines prepared their analyses of the possible reasons (Pálfai, I.
1994; Szilágyi, J. and Vörösmarty, C.J.
1993, 1997; Völgyesi, I.
2006).
These studies clearly pointed out that their authors built in their arguments logically on their own specialized, thus, restricted professional fundaments.
However, the final conclusions are diverse, sometimes even contradictory in several aspects.
It is agreed that one of the main reasons is the decade-long arid period, although afforestation, extraction of underground water, regulation of surface water bodies, (mainly the drainage of periodically occurring excess water) are also enlisted among the attributed reasons.
Changes in land use and consequences of hydrocarbon production may also act as additional factors (Rakonczai, J. and Fehér, Z.
2015).
Surprisingly, even the role of rainfall shortage is very differently judged by certain researchers.
The model study of Szilágyi, J. and Vörösmarty, C.J.
(1993, 1997) recognized only 15 per cent of importance, another researcher team led by Pálfai, I.
(1994) attached an importance of 50 per cent to shortage of precipitation, while the analysis of Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.358 Völgyesi, I.
(2006) considers 80 per cent for the role of weather as a determinate factor for the higher parts of the sand ridge.
We experience nearly similar differences in reference to the assessment of underground water extraction.
It is considered to be the main cause (70%) of groundwater discharge according to Szilágyi, J. and Vörösmarty, C.J.
(1993, 1997).
In the meantime, Pálfai, I.
(1994) calculated a 25 per cent role of that, to which the extraction of groundwater contributes a further 6 per cent.
However, Völgyesi, I.
(2006) considered an almost insignificant 2 per cent for the role of underground water extraction for the analysed 10 years.
The arid period coincided with new constructions of water supply (thus with increased extraction of underground waters), and the intensified hydrocarbon exploration in the area.
On most part of the Danube– Tisza Interfluve, positive hydrodynamic gradient can be experienced, therefore the infiltration from above prevails on the landscape even until 300–400 m depth (Erdélyi, M. 1978).
Hydrological research considers annually 20–40 mm infiltration, thus on 6,000 km2 area.
This means that from the shallow groundwater to the confined water zones approximately 440–660 thousand m3/day infiltration can be estimated.
However, the amount of confined water extraction in the 1970s–1980s was only a third of this volume (Liebe, P. 1994).
Thereby the full amount of extracted confined water would trigger maximum 40–50 cm groundwater discharge (Rakonczai, J. and Fehér, Z.
2015).
The role of confined water extraction on the landscape between 1960 and 2000, at most 2 km3 in total (0.20–0.45–0.70 and ~0.60 km3 by decades correspondingly) (Rakonczai, J. and Fehér, Z.
2015).
However, as it is going to be presented in current paper, the climatic effects are able to cause such volume of change even within a year (in a positive and a negative way alike).
One of the priority objectives of the current paper was to find some “truth” among the very different opinions above.
After the quantitative analysis of changes in groundwater resources, we aimed to evaluate the role of climate change on selected areas with various natural conditions of the Great Hungarian Plain.
Study areas and datasets in the light of the natural background and processing issues Current research was carried out for the area of the Great Hungarian Plain, whereto an adequate number of shallow groundwater time series is available.
The area consists of several mesoregions with significantly different geographic conditions.
Some significant details related to the groundwater dynamics are collected into Table 1.
Previous research has revealed that the official shallow groundwater database of the National Water Directorate of Hungary struggled with numerous errors (Mezősi, G. et al.
2017; Fehér, Z.
2019).
The missing, mistyped or incorrect geographic elevation and reference zero points of observation gauges, as well as data conversion, database integrity and query errors resulted sudden jumps on the hydrographs.
Sometimes these sections cannot be corrected, causing ignorance of decade-long valuable observations.
Sufficient length of the hydrographs (in this case 10 years was chosen as a criteria) is important to discover the temporal pattern and relation to nearby gauges.
The research attempted to minimize effects of obvious, short range anthropogenic and environmental inferences, like irrigations or floods.
Reliably accurate results could be inferred on four regions of the Great Plain (areas of 4,700–8,300 km2), on nearly 25,000 km2 (Figure 2).
Only the areas above the maximum measured flood levels of the major rivers (Danube, Tisza and Körös) were considered in the analysis, thereby their interference could be filtered out.
Since water table trends slowly follow the cumulated precipitation, consideration of the monthly aggregated groundwater level is sufficient, and spares significant computation capacity.
For current research monthly median was considered, which is capable 359Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
to filter outliers and insensitive to the number of observations in any given month.
Thereafter the temporal outliers were filtered out using a 2-year moving box-plot.
Finally, 848 of the 1,131 available time series were considered in the current study.
Weaknesses of conventional groundwater change maps For a long time, changes in groundwater resources were presented on such maps where the depths of groundwater were related to the average of a particular reference period.
While in the late 1960s anthropogenic interventions strived to mitigate with significant water surplus (like inland excess water), the precipitation increasingly reduced from the mid-1970s.
These changed circumstances caused significant question of the proper designation of the widely used “30-year reference-period” in the discipline.
Figure 3. displays the water level changes after three consecutive, extreme dry years in 2003 compared to the mean water depth between 1956–1960.
Three regions with different characteristics can be designated: A significant reduction in water level can be seen in the sand ridge area of the Danube–Tisza Interfluve (Figure 3, site A).
This is an area with higher altitude than its surroundings, thus other surface water recharge cannot be gained, except from precipitation.
Contrarily to this, an increase of water level can be discernible on the Central Tisza Region, which is one of the most arid areas of Hungary (Figure 3, site E).
After the reference period, a considerable number of irrigation canal structures has been established on this site.
Besides conventional irrigation, the flooded rice production means further influence on groundTa bl e 1.
E nv ir on m en ta l c ha ra ct er is ti cs o f t he s tu dy s it es St ud y ar ea T yp ic al r oc ks a nd s oi ls G eo m or ph ol og ic al ch ar ac te ri st ic s W at er co ur se s, th e w at er r es ou rc es a nd th ei r an th ro po ge ni c in fl ue nc es D an ub e– T is za In te rfl uv e – B lo w n sa nd – Sa nd y so ils w it h lo w fe rt ili ty – So ils w it h lo w w at er r et en ti on c ap ac it y – A eo lia n sa nd fo rm s, w hi ch a re s ta bi liz ed by fo re st s (m ai nl y pi ne s w it h sm al l w at er d em an d ) – N or th –S ou th o ri en te d r id ge a re a, s te ep er w es te rn s lo pe s – L ac k of p er m an en t w at er co ur se s – C an al s w it h te m po ra l w at er fl ow – U nc on fi ne d a qu if er s – L oc al w at er w it hd ra w al fr om a qu if er s fo r ir ri ga ti on N yí rs ég – B lo w n sa nd – Sa nd y so ils w it h lo w f er ti lit y, s oi ls w it h lo w w at er r et en ti on c ap ac it y – St ab ili ze d a eo lia n sa nd fo rm s – L ac k of p er m an en t w at er co ur se s – U nc on fi ne d a qu if er s So ut he rn T is zá nt úl – O cc ur re nc e of v er sa ti le fl uv ia l s ed im en ts – A llu vi al p la in w it h ab an d on ed r iv er -b ed s – L ac k of p er m an en t w at er co ur se s – A lt er na te d a p p ea ra nc e of c on fi ne d a nd un co nfi ne d a qu if er s Fo ot hi lls o f t he N or th H un ga ri an M ou nt ai ns – D el uv iu m , b lo w n sa nd – L oe ss y se d im en ts – In cr ea si ng ly s lo p in g p la in t o th e So u th d ir ec ti on , w it h so m e sm al l a llu vi al p la in s – Se ve ra l s m al l w at er co ur se s w it h in si gn ifi ca nt r un off – L ar ge a m ou nt o f s ub su rf ac e w at er e xt ra cti on in o rd er to s up po rt o pe nca st m in in g in tw o ar ea s C en tr al T is za R eg io n – P oo rl y pe rm ea bl e cl ay ey s ur fa ce – Fr eq ue nt o cc ur re nc e of s al in e so ils – Pl ai n w it h lo w r el ie f, w ho se s ig ni fi ca nt pa rt w as re gu la rl y flo od ed b ef or e th e ri ve r re gu la ti on s in th e 19 th c en tu ry – O cc ur re nc e of r ar e na tu ra l w at er c ou rs es – Se pa ra te d b y ir ri ga ti on c ha nn el s – G ro un d w at er -t ab le u nd er s tr on g an th ro po ge ni c im pa ct s Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.360 Fig.
2.
Elevation map of areas involved in evaluation of fluctuation of groundwater table.
Study areas: A = Danube–Tisza Interfluve; B = Nyírség; C = Southern Tiszántúl; D = Foothills of the North Hungarian Mountains; E = Central Tisza Region Fig.
3.
Deviations of the annual average in the extreme dry year 2003 from the average shallow groundwater level 1956–1960.
For study areas A–E: see Fig.
2.
Sources: KSH–VÁTI 2005; original source: VITUKI.
361Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
water.
Thus, supposedly the increase of the groundwater is a consequence of some specific purposive anthropogenic interventions.
Although, the national construction of drinking water networks had been carried out during this period too, which accompanied with intensive extraction of the confined water.
In addition, due to the absence of wastewater network, the amount of wastewater leakage increased the groundwater table as well.
After all, the Central Tisza Region was excluded from the current study, due to the spatially and temporally irregular intensity of significant anthropogenic impacts on the groundwater table.
The presented methodology is not capable to handle such a complex problem.
The biggest issue is to decipher possible reasons for significant differences between Nyírség (Figure 3, site B) and Danube–Tisza Interfluve, in spite of the fact that Nyírség bears similar natural characteristics.
Despite the less amount of precipitation in Nyírség, the question is, that whether Nyírség does not face any shortage in groundwater or the discharge is barely not seen for some reason.
Such maps were created by some traditional, isotropic spatial interpolations, whereas the gravitational flow mechanisms and geological settings were entirely ignored.
The unsystematic river floods in some areas may interfere the assessment of the groundwater resources.
Moreover, maps which has traditionally been prepared to indicate fluctuation of groundwater, are often not proven to be suitable to detect the most important changes.
However, the most important factor was the lack of such an index that allows the comparison of various effects.
Yet another problem is that these kind of maps do not allow the realignments of subsurface water resources.
However, they are capable to highlight the areas face with long-term water shortage.
Methodology Since correlations between the groundwater table and terrain is significant, a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) can improve the water resource estimations (Fehér, Z. and Rakonczai, J.
2012).
However, estimation by means of simple linear regression equation will not give proper results, since the higher (more affected) altitudes significantly diverges from the regression line.
Only single and bivariate kriging techniques (Goovaerts, P. 2000; Fehér, Z.
2007), capable to handle the geographical anisotropy properly.
In most cases the spatial anisotropy is modelled by the so called variogramm models (Pannatier, Y.
1996).
Our experiences confirm that the order of magnitude of groundwater volume changes are fairly similar, if the estimations are performed based on similar spatial data structures (with the same spatial structure of the conditional dataset, identical interpolator and slightly different spatial parameterization) (Fehér, Z. and Rakonczai, J.
2012; Fehér, Z.
2015a).
In case of same estimation method, however, the comparison of estimates between two time instants results miscalculations close to the gauges of non-complete series (Fehér, Z.
2015a).
The different conditioning datasets constitutes differently structured equation systems of the spatial estimation functions.
Since more or less missing sections can be observed on every single hydrograph, thus these missing values have to be handled.
Ultimately, the comparison of pointand volumetric estimations become questionable in the presence of missing data (Fehér, Z.
2015b).
Straightforward solutions to minimize the effect of the noncomplete dataset can be either to ignore them (Kohán, B.
2014), or to apply mathematical estimation of the missing data based on some time series characteristics (Rétháti, L. 1977).
While the former solution results lower level of information content, application of the latter way becomes problematic if unmeasured periods exceed the temporal autocorrelation.
The benchmarks of bivariate kriging interpolators revealed the efficiency and flexibility in parameterization of the versatile cokriging solutions (Fehér, Z. and Rakonczai, J.
2012; Kohán, B.
2014; Rakonczai, J. and Fehér, Z.
2015).
Geiger, J.
(2015) published that the Markov 1 type (De Almeida, A. and Journel, A.G. 1994) variogram construction is mostly Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.362 effective in the case of groundwater depth estimation in temporal sequence, since the variogram estimation is based on the distance of the groundwater from the surface.
These variogram parameters are very variable, and related to the hydrometeorological conditions, thus need to be modelled for each instant separately.
While Fehér, Z. and Rakonczai, J.
(2012) revealed that variogram construction in case of water table elevation is more effective by exploiting the spatial continuity function of the DEM.
Since observed geographical superposition of the groundwater table has a high impact on the subsurface water flow, and the temporal variability of each time series is lesser scale, thus the spatial structure in two extreme states is fairly identical (Fehér, Z.
2015a, 2019).
This revealing led to the application of the Markov 2-type variogram construction.
This approach minimizes the manual parameterization demand and calculates the necessary spatial continuity parameters automatically for each time instant (Shmaryan, L.E.
and Journel, A.G. 1999).
In the past 15 years, two complex, GIS-based approaches have been developed for the evaluation of the shallow groundwater, as a spatiotemporal phenomenon.
The approach of spatially correlated time series undermines the detailed temporal characteristics of the hydrographs, thus capable to estimate groundwater depth changes of any hydrographs over the temporal range and capable to simulate artificial time series at any locations inside spatial range very accurately (Kyriakidis, P.C.
and Journel, A.G. 1999).
However, this approach is less sensitive to the geographic elevation of the area (Fehér, Z.
2015a).
In contrast, the currently applied recursive stochastic method is a straightforward process, which is very robust in the presence of a non-complete dataset for the concerning time instant, while honours the geographic elevation in the same time.
The latter process performs well in processing near real time estimations for the groundwater level, undermining the short-memory dependencies with the previously estimated state of groundwater level (Kyriakidis, P.C.
and Journel, A.G. 1999; Fehér, Z.
2011, 2019).
In contrast to the widely known kriging interpolators, modern geostatistical approaches, like stochastic simulations, account with small-scale spatial variability (Deutsch, C.V. and Journel, A.G. 1998; Szatmári, G. et al.
2015).
The currently applied sequential Gaussian simulation (sGs) enables to mimic the process of the information gathering, by making large number of assumptions to the groundwater level at non-gauged spatial coordinates (Mucsi, L. et al.
2013).
The algorithm designates the order of estimation nodes randomly, and considers the already estimated values as observations (in contrast to any kind of interpolations), until the last unknown spatial coordinate is estimated.
Repeating this random path estimation multiple times, a large number of estimated groundwater grids (realizations, ensembles or stochastic images) are created.
However, none of these images can be considered as the “best one”, but in contrast to the single optimal estimate of any interpolations, it results multiple, equally probable spatial patterns of the groundwater state (Fehér, Z.
2008).
In case of proper parameterization, each of these stochastic images entirely reproduce the statistical distribution of the input dataset, as well as fully honour the variogram model applied (Mucsi, L. et al.
2013).
The sequential Gaussian simulation (sGs) enables to use any kind of kriging interpolator, including the currently applied cokriging with Markov-type variogram constructors (Fehér, Z.
2015a).
By aggregating the estimated grids, different consequences, like the most probable level of groundwater table, can be expressed at each coordinate (Fehér, Z.
2008; Mucsi, L. et al.
2013).
The main goal of the recursive scheme was that the statistical distribution of differences between simulated grids reproduce the statistical distribution of the calculated water change per gauge for any two chosen time instants properly.
This comparison was elaborated by visual cross-validation of percentiles.
This is a straightforward process, if the parameters and the spatial structure doesn’t differ significantly (Figure 4, left col).
363Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
Fig.
4.
Estimation and cross-validation of the groundwater table (A) and change of groundwater level (B) applying three different spatiotemporal schemes.
Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.364 In spatiotemporal case however, the previous state is undermined to estimate both the actual spatial pattern and its parameters, while it has to consider the missing data and the DEM as auxiliary data too.
The previously available recursive algorithms for this task (Kyriakidis, P.C.
and Journel, A.G. 1999; Geiger, J.
2015) are not adaptable properly, since the relation between groundwater and DEM is significantly distorted, as well as the cross validation shows weak results as it is well noticeable already after the 28th consecutive recursive step in our benchmark example (Figure 4, middle col).
However, the disturbance mentioned above can be eliminated by the following steps: 1. estimation of the past spatial pattern of groundwater level, based on a complete dataset, by performing sGs and considering DEM as an auxiliary data; 2. estimation of the current spatial pattern of groundwater level, based on a non-complete dataset, using sGs and considering previous groundwater estimate as auxiliary data; 3. filling out the missing observations of the current dataset with the estimations from step 2; 4. estimation of the current spatial pattern, based on the already completed dataset, using sGs and the DEM as auxiliary data.
The algorithm keeps the spatiotemporal integrity of both the groundwater levels (Fig.
4, A, right col) and correctly reproduces the statistical distribution of the groundwater resource changes expected by mathematical calculations from gauge measurements (Fig 4, B, right col).
Results The groundwater table estimation The quantitative analysis of the temporally varying water resources has been carried out for each month between 1950 and 2017 applying the above introduced recursive sGs, with the Markov 2 type coregionalization model.
A 1,000 m resolution auxiliary dataset has been generated from a 5 m resolution DEM.
The resolution switch was carried out by the means of median-based downscaling, which enables to consider the most typical elevation value from the measured 200 × 200 values over every 1 km2.
In addition, this calculation enables the robustness against outlier values in the elevation database.
For each month, 125 alternative, equiprobable realization of groundwater table elevations were generated, and the most probable (median type estimation) simulated value were chosen for each spatial location and each time instant (median of simulated values, Md-type estimation).
The difference of the Md-type values between two time instants resulted the relative volumetric change.
Since no proper geological map is available, which would honour spatial heterogeneity from geostatistical aspect, the effective porosity was considered as an aggregated 30 per cent, according to Marton, L. (2009).
The results allow the quantitative comparison of the water resources as a “common denominator”.
Analysis of quantitative changes in groundwater resources for natural regions Based on the monthly water table estimations for each of the four designated sites between 1960 and 2017 (Figure 5), the average of the estimations of the whole examined period was chosen as a reference “0 value”.
Generally, the estimated water resources for the four regions closely follow the precipitation patterns (the depicted precipitation is estimated by the following steps: ordinary kriging of monthly precipitation sums for each time instant is divided by the area under study, then half of the sum of the estimated precipitation volumes of the previous 24 months formulates the considered precipitation volume.).
However, it can be seen, that on two of the sites, where the groundwater can be recharged from nearby external (higher areas), only some minor anomalies can be sensed on the estimated resources.
The volume of these irregularities does not exceed 1.5 km3, and reflects the precipitation well.
365Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
In contrast the two sandy areas (Danube– Tisza Interfluve and Nyírség), where the recharge of the groundwater is restricted to the local precipitation, a significant groundwater discharge can be observed over nearly 60 years.
The estimated volume of this discharge is 6–8 km3, compared to the second half of the 1960’s.
However, the impact of rainy and dry periods is pronounced much faster on the Danube–Tisza Interfluve, because even a single dry or wet year can trigger 2–3 km3 alteration in the groundwater resources.
In contrast, the water resources of the Nyírség are rather characterized by slow, trend-like changes.
The different dynamics of the two landscapes will be interpreted later in this study.
Thereby significant resource discharge can be measured on the Nyírség region definitely.
However, it needs to be explained, why this discharge is hidden on the maps above analysed.
It can be detected by detailed areal analyses, that during the 1970–2000 period, which in recent years was considered as reference data, there is a short period (between 1979–1983), when significant rainfall difference was evolved between the Nyírség and the Danube–Tisza Interfluve.
During this 5 years, 400–600 mm more rain fell on the Nyírség.
Because of the significant precipitation surplus, until the middle of the 1980s, the groundwater level raised slightly higher than average, thus the dry period began later and lasted shorter.
In addition, the recharge of the groundwater can be faster, since the water table is closer to the surface.
Connection between relief and changes in groundwater resources The next step was the calculation of specific groundwater resource, namely the groundwater changes by unit area (km2).
These calculations were performed for each study site and evaluated according to the relief (Figures 6–9).
The analysis allows to find relationships between certain reliefs and volume of changes.
In addition, we can compare fluctuations for the different areas mentioned above.
Besides, it allows to infer variations of groundwater resources within certain regions.
Changes have been well identified from the mid-1970s (started from a position well above the average), fully playing its role by the mid1990s, in accordance with the shifting in precipitation patterns.
Indeed, stagnation has been observed until the early 1980s: groundwater tables were practically unchanged–except for the moderate effects of the years 1966, 1967 and 1970, hit by inland excess waters.
Fig.
5.
Deviation of the estimated shallow groundwater compared to the long-term average, on the four study areas (1960–2017).
Study areas: A = Danube–Tisza Interfluve; B = Nyírség; C = Southern Tiszántúl; D = Foothills of the North Hungarian Mountains.
In addition, the annual sum of biannual moving average of the precipitation.
Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.366 Fig.
6.
Estimated specific groundwater resources according to relief, referred to Danube–Tisza Interfluve (reference period: 1961–1965).
Fig.
7.
Estimated specific groundwater resources according to relief, referred to Nyírség (reference period: 1961–1965).
Fig.
8.
Estimated specific groundwater resources according to relief, referred to Southern Tiszántúl (reference period: 1961–1965).
Fig.
9.
Estimated specific groundwater resources according to relief, referred to the Foothills of the North Hungarian Mountains (reference period: 1961–1965).
367Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
Movements of groundwater under the surface is particularly visible in those sand-covered areas which can gain water supply solely from rainfall.
Areas with low relief face less shortage of water even on the course of rather drought years, because of down streaming from higher areas.
The highest decrease depends on the relief, namely the inclination of groundwater (see Darcy’s law).
The most moderate decrease of specific groundwater resources can be observed at the areas with the lowest reliefs; however, the steepest decline did not occur at those areas with the highest relief.
Evaluations revealed that the main reasons are either the deeper levels of groundwater (related to the surface) as deeper groundwater responds less sensitive to external influences, and that, on the other hand, limited inclination of the groundwater table.
The steepest decline of specific groundwater does not occur within the two, particular sandcovered areas (as their surface inclination is not the steepest in their highest parts), but its surroundings with higher relief.
The facts depicted above are confirmed by the figures, displaying sensitivity of groundwater levels to environmental impacts (Figures 10–12).
These maps were generated by averaging the groundwater changes occurred within 3 and 6 months respectively.
Since absolute value of changes is considered, these maps are independent of whether the groundwater table increases or decreases.
The results are not capable to express the expresso of the direction and proportion of the natural and anthropogenic effects): where t means the beginning month of the analysis, T represents the count of monthly estimates considered, p is the selected period of the analysis (3and 6-month periods), and GWLt and GWLt + p means the groundwater estimation for the respective time instant.
The results are the most clearly interpretable for the Southern Tiszántúl region where the decrease of elevation is coupled with decreasing sensitivity, changes are rather balanced.
Fig.
12.
Sensitivity of groundwater table for Southern Tiszántúl to the environmental impacts.
– A = 3-months period; B = 6-months period , Fig.
10.
Sensitivity of groundwater table for Danube– Tisza Interfluve to the environmental impacts.
– A = 3-months period; B = 6-months period Fig.
11.
Sensitivity of groundwater table for Nyírség to the environmental impacts.
– A = 3-months period; B = 6-months period Sensitivity map for Danube–Tisza Interfluve reflects the characteristics of its relief: minor changes occur at the lowest parts; major Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.368 changes take place at those parts surrounded by the higher parts of its neighbouring areas.
Sensitivity of groundwater changes in Nyírség is less characteristic, however, it can be suspected, that sensitivity is more moderate for areas of lower elevation.
Local surface relief of the area is more determining.
Reasons are better understood if we are analysing the relationship between the amount of groundwater discharge and elevation of the area.
As for Nyírség, for most of the periods, there is almost no connection between groundwater discharge and elevation, that is, changes of water surface occur uniformly for the whole area (Figure 13).
Correlation between elevation and changes in groundwater level can be observed only when the precipitation deviates significantly from the typical amount.
As for Danube–Tisza Interfluve, there is a high correlation between elevation and groundwater changes (Figure 14).
Calculations verified that groundwater flows towards the lower areas, as Pálfai, I.
(1992) and Kuti, L. et al.
(1998) confirmed it.
The extremely humid year of 2010 stands a very spectacular example for realignment of groundwater.
Heavy rainfalls on the Eastern part of Danube–Tisza Interfluve made groundwater rising above the surface at the elevation of 92–94 metres and caused extensive inland excess waters.
Fig.
13.
Relationship between discharge of groundwater and altitude at Nyírség (reference period: 1961–1965).
Fig.
14.
Relationship between discharge of groundwater and altitude at Danube–Tisza Interfluve (reference period: 1961–1965.
369Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
Since the Southern Tiszántúl and Foothills of the North Hungarian Mountains areas show the same correlation between discharge and altitude for each analysed time periods (completely parallel correlation lines), these analyses were omitted from the current study.
Discussion The research provided important results from several aspects.
The results given by the presented GIS-based algorithm are accurate enough to allow different elements of the water-flow comparable.
Thereby, real proportions have been assigned to those factors display similar behaviour in the courses of visual analyses.
It substantially facilitates to define cause and effect relationships.
Our research successfully demonstrated the importance of the subsurface water flows in spatial and temporal changes of the groundwater resources.
Moreover, different consequences of the distinct terrestrial and hydrological conditions have been demonstrated.
It can be said, that areas more influenced by subsurface water inflow from neighbouring areas (due to terrestrial and geological conditions), are less sensitive to extreme precipitation fluctuations and consequently to climate change.
As a result of drought, slow groundwater discharge can be detected in case of these areas, contrarily, long lasting rainy periods trigger a rather fast charge of resources (see Figures 5 and 6).
Therefore, while the consequence of the climate change in our environment is the more extreme distribution of precipitation (which can be experienced recently and forecasted by certain climate models for the future as well), effects of climate change on these landscapes cause only less prominent modifications.
Our research revealed the complex effect of terrestrial conditions on changes of water resources, too.
Due to the unique geographical settings of the sand ridge region of Danube– Tisza Interfluve and Nyírség, shallow groundwater of these areas can be replenished from precipitation solely, hence during dry periods significant drop can be observed in their water resources.
However, the environmental background and areal dynamics of the process is substantially differing in these two regions.
The ultimate reason for this is the diverse geometry of the two landscapes.
The dominant geometric form on Danube–Tisza Interfluve is the sand ridge with a long, North–South extension and a remarkable steepness of its western slope).
In contrast, Nyírség is much more proportionate, its higher regions in East–West and North–South directions are approximately similarly extended.
The different geometry triggers difference in the water resource discharge mostly during severe drought periods.
Then almost the whole area of the linearly extending sand ridge of the Danube–Tisza Interfluve is unprotected against the downflow of the groundwater.
The resource change analysis based on elevation zones presents well the close relationship between altitude and groundwater dynamics (see Figure 14).
In contrast the interior area of Nyírség, since the terrain as well as the groundwater table slope is insignificant.
It provides protection against runoff.
Thus, (except years of extreme precipitation), there is no significant relationship between the altitude and the groundwater dynamics.
Ultimately, on the central area, which includes the utmost part of the landscape, groundwater varying almost uniformly.
On the Danube–Tisza Interfluve, besides the increasing volume of water extraction, the similar degree of decrease of the standing level of the shallow groundwater wells and the initial piezometric level of the confined water may correctly arise the casual relationship between the two water bodies.
Based on the measured and calculated data, it can be stated, that the main cause of the shallow groundwater discharge comes not from “below” (from drinking water extraction), but from “above” (decrease of the precipitation infiltration).
The next stage of the research is going to focus on smaller parts of the currently presented sites.
In addition, other landscapes will be involved into the analyses, thus contributing to the establishment of the long-term water management strategy.
Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.370 REFERENCES Alkhaier, F., Flerchinger, G.N.
and Su, Z.
2012.
Shallow groundwater effect on land surface temperature and surface energy balance under bare soil conditions: modelling and description.
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 16.
1817–1831.
De Almeida, A. and Journel, A.G. 1994.
Joint simulation of multiple variables with a Markov-type coregionalization model.
Mathematical Geology 26.
(5): 565–588.
Deutsch, C.V. and Journel, A.G. 1998.
GSLIB: Geostatistical software library and user’s guide.
2nd edition, New York, Oxford University Press.
Dillon, P. and Simmers, I.
(eds.)
1998.
Shallow Groundwater Systems.
IAH – International Contributions to Hydrogeology Series 18.
London, CRC Press.
EEA 2017.
Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016.
– An indicator-based report.
Reports of the European Environmental Agency 1/2017, Luxembourg, European Environmental Agency.
https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climatechange-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016#tab-datavisualisations Erdélyi, M. 1978.
Hydrodynamics of the Hungarian Basin.
In Hydrogeology of Great Sedimentary Basins.
Conference of Budapest, May-June 1976.
Budapest, Műszaki Könyvkiadó, 146–162.
Faragó, T., Láng, I. and Csete, L. 2010.
Climate change and Hungary: mitigating the hazard and preparing for the impacts.
The VAHAVA report.
Budapest, Ministry for the Environment and Water Management – Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/18582_thevahavareport08dec2010.pdf Farkas, J.Zs., Hoyk, E. and Rakonczai, J.
2017.
Geographical analysis of climate vulnerability at a regional scale: The case of the Southern Great Plain in Hungary.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66.
(2): 129–144.
Fehér, Z.
2007.
Analysis on fluctuation of ground water level in the case of Danube–Tisza Interfluve.
Paper for the 14th Hungarian Geomathematical Congress, Mórahalom, Hungary.
Fehér, Z.
2008.
Spatial uncertainty of groundwater-level estimations on the Danube–Tisza Interfluve.
Paper for the 1st Croatian–Hungarian and 15th Hungarian Geomathematical Congress, Mórahalom, Hungary.
Fehér, Z.
2011.
A bizonytalanság szerepe a Duna–Tisza közi talajvíz változásának modellezésében (The role of the estimation uncertainty in the modelling of groundwater changes on the Danube–Tisza Interfluve).
Doctoral thesis.
Szeged, University of Szeged.
Fehér, Z.
2015a.
Talajvízkészletek változásának geostatisztikai alapú elemzése – a rendelkezésre álló információk természete és feldolgozása (Geostatistical analysis of Groundwater resources – the nature and processing of available informations).
Hungarian Journal of Hydrology 85.
(2): 15–31.
Fehér, Z.
2015b.
A spatiotemporal stochastic framework of groundwater fluctuation analysis on the south-eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain.
Journal of Environmental Geography 8.
(3–4): 41–52.
Fehér, Z.
2019.
Large Scale Geostatistical Modelling of the Shallow Groundwater Time Series on the Southern Great Hungarian Plain – Two Approaches for Spatiotemporal Stochastic Simulation of a Non-Complete Monitoring Dataset.
Szeged, University of Szeged.
Available at http://doktori.bibl.u-szeged.hu/10122/ Fehér, Z. and Rakonczai, J.
2012.
Reliability enhancement of groundwater estimations.
In Geomathematics as Geoscience.
4th Croatian–Hungarian and 15th Hungarian Geomathematical Congress, Opatija.
Ed.
: Malvic, T., Zagreb, Croatian Geological Society, 32–40.
Geiger, J.
2015.
Some applications of Markovtype sequential Gaussian co-simulations.
In The Geomathematical Models: The mirrors of geological reality or science fictions?
Eds.
: Horváth, J., Cvetkovic, M. and Hatvani, I.G., 7th Croatian-Hungarian and 18th Hungarian Geomathematical Congress, Mórahalom.
Budapest, Hungarian Geological Society, 58–65.
Goovaerts, P. 2000.
Geostatistical approaches for incorporating elevation into the spatial interpolation of rain-fall.
Journal of Hydrology 228.
113–129.
Gowing, J., Parkin, G., Forsythe, N., Walker, D., Halle, A.T. and Alamirew, D. 2016.
Shallow groundwater in sub-Saharan Africa: neglected opportunity for sustainable intensification of small-scale agriculture?
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 2016.
1–33.
Gulácsi, A. and Kovács, F. 2018.
Drought monitoring of forest vegetation using MODIS-based normalized difference drought index in Hungary.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 67.
(1): 29–42.
IPCC 2014.
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland: Cambridge University Press.
Kohán, B.
2014.
GIS alapú vizsgálat a Duna–Tisza közi homokhátság szárazodásának témakörében (GIS-based analysis of the aridification of the Danube–Tisza Interfluve).
PhD dissertation.
Budapest, Eötvös Loránd University.
Available at https://doktori.
hu/index.php?menuid=193&lang=HU&vid=13979) Kohán, B. and Szalai, J.
2014.
Spatial analysis of groundwater level monitoring network in the Danube–Tisza Interfluve using semivariograms.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63.
(4): 379–400.
Kovács, J., Kiszely-Peres, B., Szalai, J. and Kovácsné Székely, I.
2010.
Periodicity in shallow groundwater level fluctuation time series in the Trans-Tisza Region, Hungary.
Acta Geographica ac Geologica et Meteorologica Debrecina 2010.
(4–5): 65–70.
371Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.
Kuti, L., Vatai, T. and Müller, T. 1998.
A talajvíz felszín alatti mélysége változásának vizsgálata a Duna– Tisza közi hátságon az 1950–1996 között készült térképek alapján (Analysis of the shallow groundwater depth below surface on the sand ridge of the Danube– Tisza Interfluve, based on maps prepared between 1950–1996).
Az MHT XVI.
Országos Vándorgyűlése I.
90–100.
Kyriakidis, P.C.
and Journel, A.G. 1999.
Geostatistical space-time models: a review.
Mathematical Geology 31.
(6): 651–684.
Ladányi, Z., Rakonczai, J., Kovács, F., Geiger, J. and Deák, J.Á.
2009.
The effect of recent climatic change on the Great Hungarian Plain.
Cereal Research Communications 37.
477–480.
Ladányi, Z., Blanka, V., Deák, J.Á., Rakonczai, J. and Mezősi, G. 2016.
Assessment of soil and vegetation changes due to hydrologically driven desalinization process in an alkaline wetland, Hungary.
Ecological Complexity 25.
1–10.
Laštůvka, Z.
2009.
Climate change and its possible influence on the occurrence and importance of insect pests.
Plant Protection Science 45.
53–62.
Liebe, P. 1994.
A rétegvízkészletek és a nyomásszintek változása a Duna–Tisza közi homokhátságon és azok kihatásai a talajvízszintekre (Changes of confined water resources and their piezometric levels and their effects on the shallow groundwater on the sand ridge of the Danube–Tisza Interfluve).
In A Duna–Tisza közi hátság vízgazdálkodási problémái.
A Nagyalföld Alapítvány Kötetei 3.
Ed.
: Pálfai, I., Békéscsaba, 25–29.
Major, P. 1994.
Talajvízszint-süllyedések a Duna– Tisza közén (Groundwater discharges on the Danube–Tisza Interfluve).
In A Duna–Tisza közi hátság vízgazdálkodási problémái.
A Nagyalföld Alapítvány Kötetei 3.
Ed.
: Pálfai, I., Békéscsaba, 17–24.
Margóczi, K., Szanyi, J., Aradi, E. and Busa-Fekete, B.
2007.
Hydrological background of the dune slack vegetation in the Kiskunság.
Annals of Warsaw University of Life Sciences – Land Reclamation 38.
105–114.
Marton, L. 2009.
Alkalmazott hidrogeológia (Applied hydrogeology).
Budapest, Eötvös Kiadó.
Mezősi, G., Meyer, B.C., Loibl, W., Aubrecht, C., Csorba, P. and Bata, T. 2013.
Assessment of regional climate change impacts on Hungarian landscapes.
Regional Environmental Change 13.
(4): 797–811.
Mezősi, G., Sipos, Gy., Rakonczai, J., Fehér, Z. and Szatmári, J.
2017.
Vízrajzi hálózatfejlesztés – Felszínközeli vizek monitoringjának optimalizálása (Hydrographic observation network development – Optimization of the shallow groundwater monitoring).
Research report, Budapest, General Directorate of Water Management.
Mucsi, L., Geiger, J. and Malvic, T. 2013.
The advantages of using sequential stochastic simulations when mapping small-scale heterogeneities of the groundwater level.
Journal of Environmental Geography 6.
(3–4): 39–47.
NORDEN 2015.
Peatlands, Climate Change Mitigation and Biodiversity Conservation.
Copenhagen, Nordic Council of Ministers.
Pálfai, I.
1992.
A Duna–Tisza közi talajvízszint süllyedés okai (The reasons of the groundwater discharge on the Danube–Tisza Interfluve).
In Az MHT X. Vándorgyűlése, IV.
133–146.
Pálfai, I.
1994.
Összefoglaló tanulmány a Duna–Tisza közi talajvízszint-süllyedés okairól és a vízhiányos helyzet javításának lehetőségeiről (The background of the shallow groundwater discharge and the moderation of water scarcity – a summary).
In A Duna–Tisza közi hátság vízgazdálkodási problémái.
A Nagyalföld Alapítvány Kötetei 3.
Ed.
: Pálfai, I. Békéscsaba, 111–126.
Pannatier, Y.
1996.
VARIOWIN: Software for Spatial Data Analysis in 2D.
New York, Springer.
Patron, C. 2018.
China’s Looming Water Crisis.
London, Chinadialogue.
https://chinadialogue-production.
s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/content/file_en/10608/ China_s_looming_water_crisis_v.2__1_.pdf Pongrácz, R., Bartholy, J., Kis, A. and Szabó, J.A.
2016.
Projected changes of extreme runoff characteristics under climate change conditions.
Case study for a Central/Eastern European catchment.
Paper for the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Meteorological Society, New Orleans.
Rakonczai, J.
2011.
Effects and consequences of global climate change in the Carpathian Basin.
In Climate Change – Geophysical Foundations and Ecological Effects.
Eds.
: Blanco, J. and Kheradmand, H., Rijeka, InTech, 297–322.
Rakonczai, J.
2018.
Global and Geopolitical Environmental Challenges.
Budapest, Corvinus University of Budapest.
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/3980/ Rakonczai, J., Ladányi, Z., Deák, J.Á.
and Fehér, Z.
2012.
Indicators of the climate change in the landscape: Investigation on the soil-groundwater-vegetation connection system in the Great Hungarian Plain.
In Review of Climate Change Research Program at the University of Szeged (2010–2012).
Eds.
: Rakonczai, J. and Ladányi, Z., Szeged, University of Szeged, 41–58.
Rakonczai, J. and Fehér, Z.
2015.
A klímaváltozás szerepe az Alföld talajvízkészleteinek időbeli változásaiban (The role of climate change in the temporal tendencies of the groundwater resources of the Great Hungarian Plains).
Hungarian Journal of Hydrology 95.
(1): 1–15.
Rétháti, L. 1977.
Hiányos talajvíz-idősorok kiegészítése (Completion of non-continuous groundwater time series).
Hungarian Journal of Hydrology 57.
(4): 153–162.
Fehér, Z.Zs.
and Rakonczai, J. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (4) 355–372.372 Shmaryan, L.E.
and Journel, A.G. 1999.
Two Markov models and their application.
Mathematical Geology 31.
(8): 965–988.
Stábitz, J., Pongrácz, R. and Bartholy, J.
2014.
Estimated changes of drought tendency in the Carpathian Basin.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63.
(4): 365–378.
Sterl, A., Severijns, C., van Oldenborgh, G.J., Dijkstra, H., Hazeleger, W., van den Broeke, M., Burgers, G., van den Hurk, B., van Leeuwen, P.J.
and van Velthoven, P. 2009.
The ESSENCE project – signal to noise ratio in climate projections.
Geophysical Research Letters.
Available at http://knmi.
nl/sterl/Essence/essence_1_v2.2.pdf Szalai, J.
2011.
Talajvízszint-változások az Alföldön (Groundwater changes on the Hungarian Great Plain).
In Környezeti változások és az Alföld.
A Nagyalföld Alapítvány Kötetei 7.
Ed.
: Rakonczai, J., Békéscsaba, 97–110.
Szatmári, G., Barta, K. and Pásztor, L. 2015.
An application of a spatial simulated annealing sampling optimization algorithm to support digital soil mapping.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 64.
(1): 35–48.
Szilágyi, J. and Vörösmarty, C.J.
1993.
A Duna–Tisza közi talajvízszint-süllyedések okainak vizsgálata (Analysis of the reasons of the groundwater table decreases on the Danube–Tisza Interfluve).
Vízügyi Közlemények 3.
280–294.
Szilágyi, J. and Vörösmarty, C.J.
1997.
Water-balance modelling in a changing environment: Reductions in unconfined aquifer levels in the area between the Danube and Tisza rivers in Hungary.
Journal of Hydrology and Hydromechanics 45.
(5): 348–364.
Thiébaux, H.J.
1997.
The power of duality in spatialtemporal estimation.
Journal of Climate 10.
567–573.
USAID 2017.
US.
Government Global Water Strategy.
Washington D. C. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/1865/Global_Water_ Strategy_2017_final_508v2.pdf Van der Linden, P. and Mitchell, J.F.B.
(eds.)
2009.
ENSEMBLES: Climate Change and its Impacts: Summary of research and results from the ENSEMBLES project.
Exeter, Met Office.
http://ensembles-eu.metoffice.com/docs/Ensembles_final_report_Nov09.pdf Völgyesi, I.
2006.
A Homokhátság felszín alatti vízháztartása – vízpótlási és vízvisszatartási lehetőségek (Subsurface water balance of the Sand Ridge – possibilities for water supply and retention).
In Az MHT XXIV.
Országos Vándorgyűlése, II.
753–762.
Wang, X., Zhang, G., Xu, Y.J.
and Shan, X.
2015.
Defining an ecologically ideal shallow groundwater depth for regional sustainable management: Conceptual development and case study on the Sanjiang Plain, Northeast China.
Water 2015.
(7): 3997–4025.
Wilbanks, T.J. 2002.
Geographic scaling issues in integrated assessments of climate change.
Integrated Assessment 3.
(2–3): 100–114.
05.
2055-7528-1-LE.qxd:1953-6976-1-LE International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 45 ABSTRACT Renewable energy sources are playing a key role in the transition to a low-carbon based economy while maintaining cost and environmental effectiveness.
However, climate change threatens this opportunity especially in countries like Rwanda where more than half of the total supplied electricity in the country comes from hydropower.
This study assesses the evolution of Rwanda’s electricity demand towards 2050 and suggests a power supply scenario that considers impacts of climate change on the country’s hydropower generation.
The study findings indicate that to meet the projected demand under the Business As Usual (BAU), more than 20% of electricity requirements would come from imported more polluting fossil fuels.
Under the suggested alternative scenario, however, no fossil fuels will be needed by 2050.
Furthermore, the average emissions for the 2012-2050 period are estimated at 116 gCO2eq/kWh for the alternative scenario and 203 gCO2eq/kWh for the BAU scenario.
Based on the findings of the study, it is concluded that the developed alternative scenario is resilient since it meets the projected demand when impacts of climate change are accounted for.
Moreover, the scenario ensures the security of the country’s electricity supply because it only relies on domestic energy resources.
Furthermore, the suggested scenario positions the country to a low-carbon development pathway compared to the existing power supply plans.
1.
Introduction Climate change has negatively affected electricity supply systems around the world, and will continue to do so, especially in countries like Rwanda where the share of hydropower in the total electricity supply mix is high.
For such power supply systems, an energy planning approach that considers potential impacts of climate change is necessary.
This study assesses the evolution of Rwanda’s electricity demand towards 2050 and suggested a power supply scenario to meet the projected power demand by considering impacts of climate change on the country’s hydropower generation.
This section provides general information on Rwanda, the country’s electricity demand and supply, and an overview on climate change impacts on hydropower generation on the African Continent in general and in Rwanda in particular.
1.1.
General information on Rwanda Rwanda is one of the countries with the highest population growths and population densities on the African continent.
In 2012, for example, the total population of the country was about 10.5 million inhabitants with an average population growth rate 1 Corresponding author: e-mail: tuhorakeye@yahoo.fr International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 45–60 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda Théoneste Uhorakeye1 and Bernd Möller Department of Energy and Environmental Management (EEM­SESAM), Interdisciplinary Institute for Environmental, Social, and Human Studies, Europa­Universität Flensburg, Munketoft 3b, 24937 Flensburg, Germany Keywords: Bottom up; Climate change; Energy planning; Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning system; Representative Concentration Pathways Top down; URL: dx.doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.2018.17.5 46 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda of 2.6%, and a population density of 415 inhabitants/km2 [1].
Between 2002 and 2012, the life expectancy has risen from 51.2 to 64.4 years while the number of people living under the poverty line has declined from 58.9% to 44.9% over the same period [1].
It is projected that Rwanda’s population will vary between 15.4 and 16.9 million by 2032 [2], and will exceed 21 million by 2050 [3].
Due to the expected rapid increase in the country’s population, it can be expected that more and more energy will be required to meet the growing demand.
In terms of economy, Rwanda’s income is mainly based on services, agriculture, and industry.
The service sector dominates the country’s economy in such a way that for the 2008–2012 period, for example, its share to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) varied between 51.1% and 52.8% [4].
According to the same source, the agricultural sector contributed 32.0% to 33.9%, while the industrial sector contributed 14.4% to 16.3%.
In terms of per capita, the GDP (at current market prices) has increased from US$ 207 in 2000 [5] to US$ 720 in 2016 [6].
The average GDP growth rate (at constant 2011 prices) for the 2010–2015 period was 7% [6]; and existing scenarios predict a GDP growth rate of 8% by 2032, and most of the increase are expected to come from the industrial and service sectors [19, 20].
The expected country’s expansion in economy will likely result in an increased total energy needs, especially electricity.
1.2.
Rwanda’s electricity demand and supply Rwanda is one of the countries with the lowest access to electricity and the lowest per capita power consumption in the world.
In 2014, for example, Rwanda was ranked among 15 least electrified countries with an access rate of 19.8% [7].
By December 2016, the access rate to electricity was 30% [8] while the average per capita power consumption was 42 kWh in 2014 [9].
The reasons of such low electricity access and consumption include the lack of investments in the power generation and considerable technical (transmission and distribution) and non-technical (illegal connection) losses.
An analysis of energy data collected from Rwanda Energy Group (REG) reveals that the total electricity losses for the 2000–2013 period, for example, varied between 17% and 33%.
The minimum power demand has increased from 18.5 MW in 2003 to 42.9 MW in 2013 while the maximum peak power demand has increased from 43.0 MW to 87.9 MW over the same period [10].
The maximum peak demand was projected to reach 470 MW in 2018 [9], however, during a visit to Rwanda Energy Group in February 2018, it was noticed that the installed capacity was 210 MW.
Although the country faces power supply challenges, Rwanda is endowed with different types of energy resources, most of these resources, however, remain untapped.
The country’s electricity (potential and exploited) resources comprise: • Hydropower, where more than 330 potential sites totalling over 350 MW have been identified [11], and only 90 MW were installed by 2016 [12]; • Solar energy, which varies with the country’s topography and increases from the West (3.5 kWh/m2 per day) towards the East (6.0 kWh/m2 per day) [13], and only 8.75 MW were connected to the national grid by 2016 [12]; • Geothermal energy, where estimates predicted between 150 and 320 MW [14], and the assessment of this resource was still underway in 2017; • Peat reserves, where 155 million tons of dry peat were estimated [15], and the first peat fired power plant was still under construction in 2017; • Methane gas, which is dissolved in deep waters of the Kivu Lake where up to 350 MW of electricity (share of Rwanda) can be produced [16], and about 30 MW of methane fired power plants were in operation in 2017 [12]; • Wind energy, where preliminary estimates revealed an annual mean wind speed varying between 2.43 and 5.16 m/s [17]; • Municipal waste, which represents a promising potential given the increasing lifestyle in urban areas, where there are considerable amounts of post-consumption waste such as organic waste, paper, cardboard and wood that can be used to generate electricity.
1.3.
Effects of climate change on hydropower generation Generally, the designs for hydropower generation capacities are based on historical daily and seasonal climatic patterns.
However, due to expected changes in precipitation and temperature, many power generation facilities will operate under climatic conditions different International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 47 Théoneste Uhorakeye and Bernd Möller from those they were designed to operate under.
As demonstrated in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the global mean temperature will continue to rise throughout the 21st century whereas precipitation will increase in some regions, decrease in some others while others will experience no significant change [18].
This may not only compromise the ability of electricity supply systems to meet average and peak demands it might hamper the opportunity of power producers to recover their investments as well as the viability of new investments [19], [20].
In Africa, a number of studies have assessed impacts of climate change on the future hydropower generation on the continent.
Hamududu and Killingtveit [21] analysed the trends in power generation for the central and southern African regions and found that, towards the end of the 21st century, hydropower generation may decrease by 7% to 34% in the southern African and increase by 6% to 18% in the central African regions.
Yamba et al.
[22] assessed implications of climate change and climate variability on hydropower generation in the Zambezi River Basin and concluded that power generation from the existing and planned hydropower plants would increase for the 2010–2016 period, and then decline towards 2070.
Harrison and Whittington [23] assessed the viability of the Batoka Gorge hydropower scheme to climate change.
They found that annual flow levels at Victoria Falls will decline between 10% and 35.5%, which would cause reductions in annual electricity production between 6.1% and 21.4%.
Beyene et al.
[24] assessed the potential impacts of climate change on the hydrology and water resources of the Nile River basin and concluded that stream flow at the Nile River will increase for the 2010-2039 period and decline for the 2040-2099 period; and that the power generation would follow the stream flow’s trends.
In Rwanda, climate change is reported to have disrupted hydropower generation during the last decade.
Until 2003, all the electricity supplied in the country was 100% dependent on hydropower [12].
Since 2004, however, water resources have declined especially in the Burera and Ruhondo lakes (from which about 90% of the total electricity came from) which caused more than 60% losses in hydropower generation [25].
To temporarily respond to this situation, emergency diesel generators have been introduced, and to ensure an affordable tariff, the Government was obliged to subsidise the electricity sector through paying part of the capacity charges for rented generators as well as exempting fossil fuels for power generation from paying import duties.
The costs of running these emergency generators, in 2005 for example, were estimated to be 1.84% of the country’s GDP [26].
Despite these subsidies, however, the electricity tariff has continuously risen where the tariff for the residential sector between 2005 and 2012, for example, has increased by more than 60% [27].
Like in the past, hydropower generation is expected to represent a significant share in the total power supply mix of the country for the mediumand long-term.
It is projected under the “Electricity Master Plan 2008–2025” [28] and the “Rwanda electricity development plan 2013–2032” [29] that more than 50% of the total power supply mix of the country over these two period will come from hydropower.
Although these plans did not consider climate change, Uhorakeye and Möller [30] demonstrated that climate change impacts will negatively affect hydropower generation in Rwanda.
In their study, the authors analysed the future climate of Rwanda under two Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP): RCP4.5 and RCP8.5; and they found that there will be considerable reductions in annual precipitation especially for the period 2030 to 2060.
Their analysis also revealed that changes in temperature relative to the 1961 to 1990 average will range between +2.19 to +3.72°C for RCP4.5, and +5.19 to +5.98°C for RCP8.5.
Relative to the designed power generation, the resulting changes in hydropower generation were estimated to range between –13% and +8% for the 2020 to 2039 period, and –22% and –9% for the 2040–2059 period.
Given these considerable losses and the expected high share of hydropower generation in the future country’s power supply mix, it is necessary to develop power supply plans that incorporate impacts of climate change in order to reduce or mitigate negative impacts on the overall electricity subsector; and this is the aim of the present study.
2.
Methodology This section discusses the methodology used to project the evolution of Rwanda’s electricity demand and the way the demand could be met by considering impacts of climate change on the country’s hydropower generation.
This section starts with describing the energy model 48 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda used in this study, and goes on with the approaches used to analyse the future electricity demand and supply.
The section concludes with highlighting ways in which power generation costs and associated emissions are estimated.
2.1.
Energy modelling tool The complexity of energy systems requires appropriate data management and handling in terms of systematic preparation and aggregation of temporal and spatial energy processes, energy flows, capacity extensions, costs, waste heat recovery, energy storage systems, etc.
Thanks to the advancement in computational technology, energy models allow to represent mathematically these complex energy systems, which facilitates their conceptualization and analysis [31–33].
Highly relevant for most developing economies is the inclusion of growth in population and per capita domestic product, as the future electricity demand is highly sensitive to both.
In this study, the Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning system (LEAP) model is used.
LEAP is not a model for a specific energy system, but a tool that can be used to build simple to complex energy systems.
The model supports a wide range of modelling approaches for both the demand and the supply [34].
On the demand side, LEAP supports bottom up, top down, and hybrid modelling methodologies.
On the supply side, the model provides flexible and transparent accounting, simulation, and optimization methodologies to model power generation and capacity expansion planning.
For calculations, LEAP provides two conceptual levels: the first level comprises LEAP’s built-in expressions while the second level allows modellers to specify multi-variable models or enter spreadsheets and expressions.
Most of LEAP’s calculations occur on an annual time-step, but also seasonal, monthly, daily and hourly time-steps are supported, and the time horizon can extend for an unlimited number of years (typically between 20 and 50).
LEAP has been used for over 70 peer-reviewed journal papers including the modelling sustainable longterm electricity supply-demand in Africa [35], assessment of renewable energy and energy efficiency plans in Thailand’s industrial sector [36], projections of energy use and carbon emissions for Bangkok [37], future scenarios and trends of energy demand in Colombia using Long-range Energy Alternative Planning [38], industrial sector’s energy demand projections and analysis of Nepal for sustainable national energy planning process of the Country [39], energy efficiency and CO2 mitigation potential of the Turkish iron and steel industry using the LEAP (longrange energy alternatives planning) system [40], and implication of CO2 capture technologies options in electricity generation in Korea [41].
2.2.
Electricity demand analysis An analysis of the electricity consumption is assessed by grouping the power demand into two categories: the residential and non-residential sectors.
The residential sector comprises households while the non-residential sector groups together the agricultural, the industrial, and the service sectors.
The sectors comprising the nonresidential sector are grouped together because of the lack of disaggregated information on electricity consumption by each of them.
A bottom up approach is used to analyse the evolution of the power demand by the residential sector.
This method is chosen in order to take into considerations the main drivers of the sector; namely the access to electricity, the effects of equipment saturation, the population growth, and improvements in efficiencies of household appliances.
The year 2012 is used as base year because a national population census, which provided considerable amount of information necessary to undertake this study, was conducted in that year.
The average base year (2012) power consumption per an electrified household is estimated based on Eq.
(1) where EAv represents the average annual electricity consumption of an electrified household (in kWh), Pi is the rated power of appliance i (in kW), ni is the average number of appliance i per household, hi is the usage time of appliance i (hour/day), and 365 is the number of days in a year.
The data used in Eq.
(1) were extracted from the Fourth Population and Housing Census [1], and from the Economic Data Collection and Demand Forecast study [28].
(1) To project the population towards 2050, assumptions used in three existing projection scenarios for the 2013–2032 period by the National Institute of Statistics Rwanda (NISR) are adopted.
According to these projections, the population growth rate by 2032 will be 1.63% for the low scenario, 1.89% for the medium scenario, and 2.18% for the high scenario from 2.31% in E P n h pAv i i n i i e i= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ∑365 1 , International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 49 Théoneste Uhorakeye and Bernd Möller 2013 [2].
For the period beyond 2032, the trends observed in the NISR’s projections are maintained, which leads to growth rates of 1.45% for the low scenario, 1.71% for the medium scenario, and 2.00% for the high scenario.
Similarly, the assumption by NISR that the number of persons per households would decline from 4.3 in 2012 to 3.1 in 2032 is adopted.
For the period beyond 2032, this study assumes that there will be very little decline in the household size so that it will be 3 persons per household in 2050.
The number of households with access to electricity is estimated based on the existing two electrification pathways: the likely and ambitious scenarios.
The likely scenario anticipates that 35% of the country’s households would have access to electricity by the end of 2017 [9] and 71% by 2032 [29].
The ambitious scenario predicts that 48% of the country’s households would have access to electricity by the end of 2017 [9] and 78% by 2032 [29].
Given observed difficulties and challenges in the implementation of different power generation and transmission projects during the last years, only the very likely electrification scenario is considered in this study.
For the period 2033–2050, this study assumes that the remaining non-electrified households will be those located very far away from the national electricity grid so that a 100% electrification would be achieved in 2050.
It is important to mention here that a 100% electrification rate in 2050 does not mean that all households will have access to electricity in 2050.
There are different initiatives whereby households located far away from the national grid are being supported to access electricity through off-grid solutions.
This electrification scheme is not simulated in this study.
The assumed 100% electrification means that all households would be connected to the national grid by 2050.
On the other hand, it is assumed that all household appliances will consume 15% less than the consumption in 2012 thanks to the improvement in energy efficiency.
Furthermore, an assumption that most of these appliances will saturate towards 2050 is adopted.
As for the power consumption by the non-residential sector, the top down approach is chosen because the bottom up approach requires more details on the end use electricity equipment which was not possible to acquire for the whole sector.
To analyse the evolution of the power consumption by the non-residential sector, the relationship between the past electricity consumption and the GDP of this sector is determined using the regression method of ordinary least squares.
This method allows to determine the slope a and intercept b of Eq.
(2) that fits best data [42].
In the context of this study, y represents the non-residential sector’s energy consumption and x is the sector’s GDP.
y = ax + b (2) Eq.
(3) and Eq.
(4) is used to respectively determine coefficients a and b of the line represented by Eq.
(2).
In these two equations, xi is the total GDP for year i while yi is the power consumed by the non-residential sector in producing the total GDP for year i.
The energy data used to determine the relationship was obtained from REG while the GDP data was extracted from Rwanda Statistical Yearbooks 2009 and 2013 [1] [43].
(3) (4) Eq.
(5) represents the determined logarithmic relationship between the non-residential electricity consumption and the national GDP.
To check the goodness of fit, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is determined.
This coefficient is found to be +0.99 which indicates a very high positive correlation between the electricity demand and the GDP.
log(y) = 1.256log(x) –2.78 (5) For the future power consumption of this sector, three electricity demand scenarios are developed based on different GDP growth rates.
These scenarios are (i) the high scenario which envisages Rwanda as a fastdeveloping economy where the GDP growth would slightly decline from 8.0% in 2012 to 6.0% in 2050, (ii) the medium scenario which anticipates a moderate economic development so that the GDP growth rate would decrease from 8.0% in 2012 to 4.5% in 2050, and b n x y x x y n x x i i n i i n i i n i i n i i i n i i n = ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⎛ ⎝ ⎜ = = = = = = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 ⎜⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟⎟ 2 a n x y x y n x x i i i n i i n i i n i i n i i n = ⋅ − ⋅ − ⎛ ⎝ ⎜⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟⎟ = = = = = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 50 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda (iii) the low scenario where the economy would grow slowly so that the GDP growth rate would decrease from 8.0% in 2012 to 3.0% in 2050.
The total national electricity demand is determined by combining the residential and non-residential sectors’ demands, and since this combination leads to nine different scenarios, only three representative scenarios are analysed.
These scenarios are called in this study the “very low scenario” which comprises the low scenarios of each sector, the “very likely scenario” which includes the medium scenarios of the residential and nonresidential sectors, and the “very high scenario” which incorporate the very high scenarios of both sectors.
The peak power requirements, Preq,i (in MW), for each year between 2012 and 2050 are calculated according to Eq.
(6) where Ereq,i is the electricity requirements (in MWh), LF is the load factor while 8764 is the number of hours in a year.
(6) The electricity requirements Ereq,i in Eq.
(6) is the sum of the total simulated electricity demand and the transmission and distribution losses.
In this study, it is assumed that the transmission and distribution losses will decline from their 2012 level of 21% to 10% by 2020 and then be maintained at this level during the rest of the simulation period.
The 2013 load factor used to calculate the peak power requirements was also obtained from REG.
2.3.
Power supply analysis To meet the estimated electricity demand described in the previous section, a Business-As-Usual (BAU) and an alternative power supply scenarios are developed.
Each of these two scenarios includes three sub-scenarios: a sub-scenario which does not consider impacts of climate change on hydropower generation, and scenarios that considers impacts of climate change.
Climate change is assessed under two Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs): RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.
RCP4.5 is a stabilization scenario where the total Radiative Forcing (RF) is stabilized to 4.5 W/m2 after 2100 while RCP8.5 is characterized by increasing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions leading to a RF of 8.5 W/m2 in 2100 [44].
The development of the BAU scenario is based on the country’s existing power generation plans.
Since these plans extend up to 2025 only, the generation capacity beyond this year is gradually increased (within the P E Lreq i req i F , , = ⋅8764 country’s potential limits) to match the demand.
According to these plans, nearly 32% (over 400 MW) of the electricity requirements by 2025 would be covered by imports from Ethiopia and Kenya [45] However, these countries may prioritize to satisfy domestic power demands first before exporting to other countries since electrification rates in these two countries are also low: 45% for Ethiopia and 65% for Kenya [8].
To consider these effects, electricity imports are excluded from the analysis of the future power supply.
For hydropower generation, it is assumed that the installed capacity would increase from the planned 254 MW by 2025 to the national (so far) proven capacity of about 350 MW by 2050.
Similarly, the capacities for methane and geothermal-based power generations are set to increase up to their maximum estimated capacities (350 MW and 340 MW respectively) by 2050.
Based on recent development in solar power generation which envisages 39.75 MW by 2025 [28], it is assumed that a cumulative capacity of 100 MW solar power can be achieved by 2050.
As for peat-based power generation, a capacity of 300 MW is used in the simulation.
It is assumed that the demand that cannot be met by the above power generation technologies will be covered by power generation from imported fossil fuels.
To analyse the evolution of Rwanda’s power supply under climate change (under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5), monthly time series of hydropower generation from the study “Impacts of expected climate change on hydropower generation in Rwanda” by Uhorakeye and Möller [30] (described in the introduction section) are used.
The development of the alternative power supply scenario is guided by principles such us the scenario’s ability to allow the country to terminate its dependency on imported fossil fuels for its power supply and meet the growing demand with domestic resources despite the emerging climatic conditions.
To achieve this, five measures are explored as described below.
• Improvement of efficiency of household appliances: under the BAU scenario, it is assumed that the efficiency of household appliances will increase by 15% by 2050, and that these improvements would be voluntarily achieved by consumers.
Under the alternative scenario, it is assumed that the Government will intervene by introducing import standards so that old and non-efficient appliances would not be allowed to enter into the country.
It is assumed that this measure would lead to 10% consumption reductions compared to the BAU scenario.
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 51 Théoneste Uhorakeye and Bernd Möller • Intensive exploitation of the Nyabarongo River: this river draws its waters from the northern, southern and western parts of Rwanda and then flows over 350 km before it drains into the Akagera River at Lake Rweru in the southeastern Rwanda.
This study suggested cascading more run of river power plants and building reservoir storages on this river which would lead to 140 MW more.
• More use of solar energy: it is assumed under this scenario that the installed capacity of solar power plants would increase from 0.25 MW in 2012 to 8.75 MW in 2015 and 500 MW in 2050 (compared to 100 MW for the case of the BAU scenario).
• Introduction of wind energy: based on the results from an assessment of wind energy resources in Rwanda by De Volder [17], this study assumes that up to 250 MW wind power plants can be installed by 2050.
• Municipal waste: the use of municipal waste as a source of electricity is considered for Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda where data was available.
In 2012, for example, 400 tons of solid waste per day (of which 75% of it were organic and paper matters) were collected [46].
Since the population of Kigali is expected to increase from about one million inhabitants in 2012 [47] to 3.5 million by 2040 [48], available waste for power generation would also increase from 300 tons to about 940 tons per day over the same period.
Given a net heat content of 14 GJ per metric ton [34] and an electrical efficiency of 35% [49], and assuming an availability factor of 80%, the 300 tons would be enough to supply a 21 MW power plant, and the 940 tons of waste in 2040 would be equivalent to about 66 MW capacity.
For the simulation in LEAP, the generating technologies are assigned dispatching priorities according to specified orders.
Once power plants with high priorities achieve their maximum operating capacity, plants with the next order are dispatched until they also reach their capacity limits and so on.
In this study, the first priority is assigned to solar, wind, and run-of-river-based hydroelectric power plants.
The second priority is assigned to dam-based hydropower plants, the third priority to methane and geothermal power plants, the fourth priority to peatbased power plants, and the fifth priority to diesel fired power plants.
2.4.
Estimation of power generation costs and emissions • Capital costs: investment costs per megawatt for all technologies other than solar, wind, and wasteto-power are estimated based on information from two studies: one by the African Development Bank (AfDB) [50], and another by Fichtner and decon [51].
To estimate the capital costs for solarbased power plants in the base year, the unit capital cost for the existing Rwamagana Solar power station (8.5 MW) is used.
For the future development, it is assumed that investment costs would fall by 25% by 2020, 45% by 2030 and 65% by 2050 relative to the costs in 2012 according to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA) [52].
As for wind, since no power plant from this technology had been installed yet in the country by 2017, international average data are used.
To consider factors such as transport of wind power generation components as well as the cost of technology transfer, a factor of 10% is added to the international data.
Consequently, an average of US$ 2,000/kW is taken as the global average investment costs; and for Rwanda the cost would be 10% higher (i.e.
US$ 2,200/kW).
According to IEA [53], the average investment cost of wind energy is projected to decline by 25% on land, and 45% off-shore by 2050.
Being a landlocked country, a reduction of 25% by 2050 is applied for Rwanda.
Concerning municipal waste-topower, its investment cost is estimated based on information from the Confederation of European Waste-to-Energy Plants [54].
• Operation and maintenance costs: the fixed Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs for different technologies are obtained from AfDB [50], Fichtner and decon [51], and IEA [55].
The variable O&M costs for hydropower, geothermal, solar and wind technologies are assumed to be zero according to IEA [55].
The variable O&M costs for waste-to-power are also set to zero since households and institutions pay a fee for waste collection.
It is assumed that the variable O&M costs will be offset by the paid collection fee.
As for diesel fired power plants, the projection of oil prices by IEA [56] are adopted.
As for emissions from the electricity generation, they are calculated internally in LEAP which is achieved by linking the electricity producing technologies to the 52 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda model technology and environmental database.
This database includes default emission factors suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for use in climate change mitigation analyses [34].
In this study three Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitting fuels namely diesel, methane gas and peat are linked to IPCC Tier 1 Default Emission Factors.
Under Tier 1 approach, GHG emissions from stationary combustions are calculated by multiplying the consumed fuel by the default emission factor [57].
3.
Results This section presents the simulation results of the evolution of Rwanda’s electricity demand and supply under both the BAU and the suggested alternative scenarios.
Furthermore, it discusses the estimated generation costs and emissions from power generation.
The section concludes by highlighting required adjustments in policy and institutional frameworks to implement the suggested power supply scenario successfully.
3.1.
Projected electricity demand By 2050, the total annual power consumption in Rwanda is projected to be 6,546 GWh under the very low scenario, 8,100 GWh for the very likely scenario, and 10,240 GWh for the very high scenario, from 380 GWh in 2012.
Like in the past, the residential sector will continue to dominate the national demand for electricity except for the 2041-2050 decade when the nonresidential sector will take a lead.
The projected total power demand as well as the shares of the residential (Res.)
and the Non-residential (Nonres.)
sectors are presented in Table 1.
In terms of power generation requirements (including transmission losses), about 7,270 GWh will be required by 2050 for the very low scenario, 9,000 GWh for the very likely scenario, and 11,380 GWh for the very high scenario, from 480 GWh in 2012.
The evolution of the electricity generation requirements between 2012 and 2050 are shown in Figure 1 (left).
It is important to highlight that these electricity requirements may exceed the simulated power presented in this section if losses are not reduced to the assumed values.
It was, for example, planned to reduce technical losses from 20% in 2007 to 15% by 2012 [58].
On the contrary however, losses have risen over this period and reached 21% in 2012 and 22% in 2013.
As for the installed capacity requirements (assuming a reserve margin of 20%), about 1,480 MW will be needed in 2050 for the very low scenario, 1,830 MW for the very likely scenario, and 2,310 MW for the very high scenario.
The evolution of the requirements in installed peak capacity between 2012 and 2050 is also presented in Figure 1 (right).
3.2.
Projected impacts of climate change on Rwanda’s hydropower Figure 2 shows hydropower generation anomalies for the 2012–2050 period.
This figure is constructed based on hydropower generation time series developed by Uhorakeye and Möller [30] in their study described in the introduction section.
As it can be noticed in Figure 2, there is no significant difference between the designed and the simulated hydropower generations for the period 2012–2021.
Over this period, the cumulative hydropower generation anomalies are about +3 GWh for both RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.
Between 2022 and 2031, deficits equivalent to Table 1: Projected electricity demand per scenario and per sector Very low Very likely Very high________________________________ ________________________________ ________________________________ Total Res.
Nonres.
Total Res.
Nonres.
Total Res.
Nonres.
Year (GWh) (%) (%) (GWh) (%) (%) (GWh) (%) (%) 2012 380 51.32 48.68 380 51.32 48.68 380 51.32 48.68 2015 537 55.26 44.74 538 55.24 44.76 540 55.18 44.82 2020 923 58.19 41.81 934 57.93 42.07 943 57.59 42.41 2025 1,487 60.07 39.93 1,529 59.34 40.66 1,568 58.50 41.50 2030 2,272 61.41 38.59 2,387 59.96 40.04 2,504 58.42 41.58 2035 3,185 61.04 38.96 3,445 58.60 41.40 3,730 56.08 43.92 2040 4,161 59.57 40.43 4,675 55.79 44.21 5,276 51.95 48.05 2045 5,289 58.69 41.31 6,215 53.23 46.77 7,385 47.76 52.24 2050 6,546 58.48 41.52 8,100 51.01 48.99 10,240 43.63 56.37 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 53 Théoneste Uhorakeye and Bernd Möller about 3000 GWh are expected under RCP4.5 while RCP8.5 presents surplus of about 150 GWh.
As for the 2032–2050 period, almost all the years over this period will record deficits in power generation.
For the whole period, more 7,200 GWh deficits are expected for RCP4.5 and 4,659 GWh for RCP8.5.
3.3.
BAU power supply without climate change considerations The analysis of the BAU power supply scenario revealed that the national energy resources will be sufficient to meet the power demand projected under the very low and very likely electricity demand scenarios.
Consequently, the analysis of the power supply concentrated only on electricity supply scenarios that meet the projected demand under the very high scenario.
As described in the methodology section, the BAU power supply under no climate change considerations assumed that hydropower plants will continue to produce their designed energy throughout the simulation period.
Under this assumption, it was found that the share of hydropower to the total power supply mix will increase Very high Very likely Very low 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years Very high Very likely Very low 2,250 2,000 1,750 P o w e r co n su m p tio n ( M W ) 1,500 1,250 1,000 750 500 250 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years Figure 1: Electricity generation (left) and peak power (right) requirements E le ct ri c p o w e r (G W h ) 2015 – 600 – 500 – 400 – 300 – 200 – 100 100 200 RCP4.5 RCP8.5 300 0 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Figure 2: Hydropower generation anomalies between 2012 and 2050 54 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda from 55.6% (of 480 GWh) in 2012 to 77.7% (of 1,740 GWh) in 2025, and then decline to 17% (11,380 GWh) in 2050.
The simulation results reveals that power generations from hydropower, solar, methane, and geothermal will meet the whole demand until 2040.
After this year, power generations from peat and diesel will be needed: peat will represent 18.5% and diesel 16.5% of the total electricity needs in 2050.
The distribution of the generation between different technologies under the BAU scenario are shown in Figure 3 (a) while the total power supply and the percentage shares of the used technologies are presented in Table 2.
As for the alternative power supply scenario without climate change considerations, it is projected that 10,700 GWh will need to be generated in 2050, from 480 GWh in 2012.
The reduction in the power demand of about 6% compared to the BAU scenario is due to the assumed improvements in efficiency of household appliances.
Under this scenario, no electricity generation from diesel power plant will be needed until 2050.
In addition, the share of power generation from peat will decline from 18.5% (under the BAU scenario) to about 9.0%.
The distribution of the power generation between different technologies under the alternative scenario are shown in Figure 3 (b) while the corresponding total power supply requirements and the percentage shares of different technologies are presented in Table 2.
3.3.
Power supply under RCP4.5 For the BAU power supply under the RCP4.5 pathway, the shares of different technologies to the total power supply mix will oscillate following the variations in hydropower generation.
The share of hydropower generation is projected to increase from 55.6% (of 480 GWh) in 2012 to 73.9% (of 1,740 GWh) in 2025 (against 77.7% under no climate change consideration scenario), and then decline to 12.6% (of 11,380 GWh) in 2050 (against 17% under the no climate change consideration scenario).
The power generation distribution between different technologies under the BAU scenario are shown in Figure 4 (a).
In 2050, more power generation from diesel will be required under this power supply scenario (20.9%) compared to the case of no climate change considerations (16.5%).
The total power supply requirements and the percentage shares of different technologies under the BAU power supply scenario evolving under RCP4.5 are presented in Table 3.
Concerning the alternative power supply scenario evolving under the same RCP4.5, no electricity generation from diesel-based power plants will be needed for the whole simulation period.
However, the share of peat in 2050 will represent 16.4% (against 9.0% under no climate change consideration), and this is due to considerable losses in hydropower generation caused by climate change.
The distribution of the power generation between different technologies under this scenario are shown in Figure 4 (b) while the corresponding power supply requirements and the percentage shares are presented in Table 3.
(a) (b) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar 0.0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 P o w e r su p p ly ( T W h ) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Waste Wind 0.0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 P o w e r su p p ly ( T W h ) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Waste Wind 0 0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 P o w e r su p p ly ( T W h ) Figure 3: Electricity supply by resource under no climate change considerations International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 55 Théoneste Uhorakeye and Bernd Möller 3.4.
Power supply under RCP8.5 Under RCP8.5, the contribution of different technologies to the total power supply mix will follow variations in hydropower generations like in the previous section.
For the BAU scenario when the climate evolution follows RC8.5, the share of hydropower will increase from 55.6% (of 480 GWh) in 2012 to 71.3% (of 1,740 GWh) in 2025 (against 77.7% under no climate change considerations), and then decline to 14.8% (of 11,380 GWh) (against 17% under the no climate change consideration) in 2050.
The distribution of the power generation between different technologies under the BAU scenario are shown in Figure 5 (a) while the corresponding total power supply requirements and the percentage shares of different technologies are presented in Table 4.
The performance of the proposed alternative power supply scenario under RCP8.5 differs from that under RCP4.5 regarding the amount of available hydropower production which dictates the shares of the other energy technologies.
Like in the case of RCP4.5, no diesel-based power generation will also be needed under the RCP8.5 Table 2: Shares of different technologies under no climate change considerations Scenario Technology 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 Diesel (%) 42.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.48 Hydropower (%) 55.61 92.30 66.36 32.51 17.01 Geothermal (%) 0.00 0.30 15.20 37.92 25.20 BAU Methane (%) 1.85 3.84 15.84 27.88 21.62 Peat (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.53 Solar (%) 0.06 3.56 2.60 1.69 1.16 Total (TWh) 0.48 1.10 2.78 5.86 11.38 Diesel (%) 42.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Hydropower (%) 55.61 88.59 79.40 44.98 23.70 Geothermal (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.69 26.78 Methane (%) 1.85 0.00 0.00 15.06 26.42 Alternative Peat (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.96 Solar (%) 0.06 11.41 12.51 11.34 8.21 Waste (%) 0.00 0.00 5.02 4.54 3.28 Wind (%) 0.00 0.00 3.07 3.39 2.65 Total (TWh) 0.48 1.08 2.68 5.57 10.70 (a) (b) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar 0.0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 P o w e r su p p ly ( T W h ) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Waste Wind 0.0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 P o w e r su p p ly ( T W h ) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Waste Wind Figure 4: Electricity supply by resource under RCP4.5 56 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda scenario.
The share of peat-based power generation will reach 13.4% in 2050 (against 16.5% under RCP4.5, and 9.0% under no climate change considerations).
The power generation distribution between different technologies under the alternative scenario are shown in Figure 5 (b) while the corresponding total power supply requirements and the percentage shares of different technologies are presented in Table 4.
3.5.
Emissions from power generation and generation costs Under no climate change considerations, the average emissions for the 2012–2050 period are projected to be 101 gCO2eq/kWh for the alternative scenario, and 183 gCO2eq/kWh for the BAU scenario.
Under the RCP4.5 power supply scenario, the average CO2 emissions are 116 gCO2eq/kWh for the alternative scenario, and 203 gCO2eq for the BAU scenario.
In case of RCP8.5, emissions are projected to be 104 gCO2eq/kWh for the alternative scenario, and 192 gCO2eq/kWh for the BAU scenario.
Figure 6 (left) compares the projected average emissions for the 2012–2050 period.
No-CC in this figure refers to “no climate change considerations”.
Regarding power generation costs, the average unit costs between 2012 and 2050 for the BAU scenarios are Table 3: Distribution of the electricity supply by resource type under RCP4.5 Scenario Technology 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 Diesel (%) 42.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.91 Hydropower (%) 55.61 92.69 46.77 26.86 12.59 Geothermal (%) 0.00 0.27 24.80 41.18 25.20 BAU Methane (%) 1.85 3.48 25.83 30.27 21.61 Peat (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.53 Solar (%) 0.06 3.56 2.60 1.69 1.16 Total (TWh) 0.48 1.10 2.78 5.86 11.38 Diesel (%) 42.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Hydropower (%) 55.61 89.18 64.13 37.14 17.51 Geothermal (%) 0.00 0.00 6.04 24.44 26.78 Methane (%) 1.85 0.00 7.24 20.67 26.41 Alternative Peat (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.47 Solar (%) 0.06 10.82 14.36 11.34 8.21 Waste (%) 0.00 0.00 4.71 3.03 1.97 Wind (%) 0.00 0.00 3.52 3.39 2.65 Total (TWh) 0.48 1.08 2.68 5.57 10.70 (a) (b) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar 0.0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 P o w e r su p p ly ( T W h ) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Waste Wind 0.0 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Years 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 P o w e r su p p ly ( T W h ) Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Diesel Hydropower Geothermal Methane Peat Solar Waste Wind Figure 5: Electricity supply by resource under RCP8.5 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 57 Théoneste Uhorakeye and Bernd Möller projected to be 12.71 US¢/kWh under no climate change considerations, 13.13 US¢/kWh under RCP4.5, and 15.76 US¢/kWh under RCP8.5.
As for the alternative scenario, the average unit generation costs are anticipated to be 13.20 US¢/kWh under no climate change considerations, 13.73 US¢/kWh under RCP4.5, and 13.24 US¢/kWh under RCP8.5.
Figure 6 (right) compares the projected average power generation costs per kWh for the 2012–2050 period.
3.6.
Policy and institutional frameworks To successfully implement the suggested alternative power supply scenario, enabling policies as well as institutional frameworks must be in place.
A policy that allows Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to cover the production costs and earn reasonable returns on their investments is required at the first place.
In this regard, a Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) scheme for solar and wind technologies is necessary until these technologies mature.
In addition to the FIT policy, other incentives such as the construction of access roads to the power plant sites and transmission lines connecting new plants to the national grid would also attract private investments.
FIT policy will not only increase the share of renewable energy in the country power supply mix, also through the implementation and operation of solar and wind projects, thousands of jobs will be created, especially in rural areas where more than 80% of the country’s population live.
Table 4: Distribution of the electricity supply by resource type under RCP8.5 Scenario Technology 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 Diesel (%) 42.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.74 Hydropower (%) 55.61 84.61 71.60 28.16 14.75 Geothermal (%) 0.00 0.86 12.64 40.42 25.20 BAU Methane (%) 1.85 10.97 13.16 29.73 21.62 Peat (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.53 Solar (%) 0.06 3.56 2.60 1.69 1.16 Total (TWh) 0.48 1.1 2.78 5.86 11.38 Diesel (%) 42.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Hydropower (%) 55.61 88.26 80.63 38.94 20.54 Geothermal (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.46 26.78 Methane (%) 1.85 0.00 0.00 19.84 26.42 Alternative Peat (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.44 Solar (%) 0.06 11.74 11.78 11.34 8.20 Waste (%) 0.00 0.00 4.71 3.03 1.97 Wind (%) 0.00 0.00 2.88 3.39 2.65 Total (TWh) 0.48 1.08 2.68 5.57 10.7 183 101 116 104 203 192 225 BAU Alternative 200 175 150 125 100g C O 2 e q /k W h 75 50 25 No-CC RCP4.5 RCP8.5 12.71 13.2 13.73 13.2413.13 15.73 17.5 BAU Alternative 15.0 12.5 10.0 U S $ C e n ts /k W h 7.5 5.0 2.5 No-CC RCP4.5 RCP8.5 Figure 6: Average emissions and generation cost per kWh for the 2012–2050 period 58 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda However, to operate these two technologies know how is required.
Therefore, a training component should be given a priority in the deployment of solar and wind technologies in the country.
In the past, the Government, in partnership with its development partners, has organized training courses on hydropower projects development and management.
In the Author’s knowledge this has considerably reduced the number of hydropower projects that failed shortly after their commissioning due to inadequate maintenance and management.
4.
Conclusions This study analysed the evolution of Rwanda’s electricity demand and supply towards 2050.
Since hydropower generation is expected to represent a considerable share in the country’s total power supply mix, and given the expected vulnerability of this technology to the impacts of climate change, a planning approach that incorporates impacts of climate change on Rwanda’s hydropower generation was necessary.
Under the BAU power supply scenario, it was found that there will be deficits in hydropower generation of more 7,200 GWh under RCP4.5 and 4,659 GWh under RCP8.5.
As consequence of these losses, more than 20% of electricity requirements in 2050 are expected to come from imported fossil fuels.
Under the suggested alternative scenario, however, no imported fossil fuels would be needed by 2050.
Also the average CO2 emissions per kWh for the 2012–2050 period is 116.42 gCO2eq for the alternative scenario against 203.24 gCO2eq for the BAU scenario.
The average generation cost per kWh between 2012 and 2050 varies between 12.71 and 15.76 US¢/kWh for the BAU scenario, and between 13.20 and 13.73 US¢/kWh for the alternative scenario.
These findings allow to conclude that the suggested scenario is resilient to climate change impacts as it meets the projected power demand when these impacts are accounted for.
Furthermore, the scenario also ensures the security of the country’s power supply because it re-lies only on domestic energy resources.
Moreover, CO2 emissions per kWh under this scenario are about 40% lower than the emissions under the BAU scenario.
To successfully implement this scenario, FIT scheme for solar and wind technologies are recommended until these technologies mature.
In addition, shortand long-term training courses in these two technologies are also recommended since investors will be interested in investing in areas where they can find manpower with enough skills to operate and maintain installed technologies References [1] National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
2013.
Statistical Yearbook Rwanda 2013.
Kigali: National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
www.statistics.gov.rw/file/3140/download?
token= TPQSGeLv [2] National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
2014.
Fourth Population and Housing Census, Rwanda, 2012: Thematic Report: Population Projections.
Kigali: National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
http://www.statistics.gov.rw/file/2922/ download?token=PRE5k5_G [3] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
2015.
World Population Prospects: Key Findings & Advance Tables.
Washington DC: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf [4] Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
2013.
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II.
Kigali: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
http://www.
minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/ED PRS_2.pdf [5] United Nations Development Program.
2008.
Assessments of Development Results: Evaluation of UNDP contribution.
New York: United Nations Development Program.
http://web.
undp.org/evaluation/documents/ADR/ADR_Reports/Rwanda/A DR_Rwanda_full_report.pdf [6] National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
2016.
Statistical Yearbook Rwanda 2016.
Kigali: National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
http://www.statistics.gov.rw/file/5077/download?
token=KKp3ISIv [7] The World Bank.
2014.
Access to electricity (% of population).
The World Bank Web site.
URL: https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?view=chart&year_high_desc=false (accessed March 6, 2018).
[8] International Energy Agency.
2017.
Energy Access Outlook 2017: From Poverty to Prosperity.
Paris: International Energy Agency.
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/ publication/WEO2017SpecialReport_EnergyAccessOutlook.pdf [9] Ministry of Infrastructure.
2015.
Energy Sector Strategic Plan 2013/14-2017/18.
Kigali: MININFRA.http://www.mininfra.
gov.rw/rw/fileadmin/user_upload/new_tender/ESSP_17th_Mar ch_2015.pdf [10] Uhorakeye T. 2016.
Modelling electricity supply options for Rwanda in the face of climate change.
Flensburg: ZHBFlensburg.
https://www.zhb-flensburg.de/fileadmin/content/ spezial-einrichtungen/zhb/dokumente/dissertationen/uhorakeye/ dissertation-uhorakeye.pdf [11] Ministry of Infrastructure.
2008.
Diagnosis of the present hydropower situation: potential and national programme for its exploitation in Rwanda.
Phase 2: Final report.
Kigali: MININFRA.
www.statistics.gov.rw/file/3140/download?token=TPQSGeLv http://www.statistics.gov.rw/file/2922/download?token=PRE5k5_G https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/EDPRS_2.pdf http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/ADR/ADR_Reports/Rwanda/ADR_Rwanda_full_report.pdf http://www.statistics.gov.rw/file/5077/download?token=KKp3ISIv https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?view=chart&year_high_desc=false http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2017SpecialReport_EnergyAccessOutlook.pdf MININFRA.http://www.mininfra.gov.rw/rw/fileadmin/user_upload/new_tender/ESSP_17th_March_2015.pdf https://www.zhb-flensburg.de/fileadmin/content/spezial-einrichtungen/zhb/dokumente/dissertationen/uhorakeye/dissertation-uhorakeye.pdf International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 59 Théoneste Uhorakeye and Bernd Möller [12] Rwanda Energy Group Ltd. 2017.
Power generation.
Rwanda Energy Group Ltd. http://www.reg.rw/index.php/ourbusiness/generation/624-power-generation-2 (accessed December 7, 2017).
[13] Hammami N. 2010.
Solar Rwanda: Technical, institutional, and financial design of the solar water heater program in Rwanda.
Kigali: MININFRA.
[14] Chevron.
2006.
Preliminary assessment of Rwanda’s Geothermal Energy Development Potential.
Report to the Government of Rwanda.
Kigali: MININFRA.
[15] GTZ/MARGE.
2009.
Biomass Energy Strategy (BEST), Rwanda.
Volume 2-Background and Analysis.
Kigali: MININFRA.
http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/ field_publication_file/EUEI_PDF_BEST_Rwanda_Executive_ Summary_Jun_2009_EN.pdf [16] Rwanda Energy Group.
2015.
Methane Gas in Rwanda.
http://www.reg.rw/index.php/projects/172-methane-gas (accessed May 30, 2017).
[17] De Volder G. 2010.
Wind resource assessment in Rwanda.
Kigali: MININFRA.
[18] IPCC.
2013.
The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Edited by Stocker T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K.
Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
[19] Ebinger J, Vergara W. 2011.
Climate impacts on energy systems : key issues for energy sector adaptation (English).
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/580481468331850839/Climate-impacts-on-energy-systemskey-issues-for-energy-sector-adaptation (accessed March 17, 2018).
[20] Cunha J., Ferreira P. 2014.
“A risk analysis of small-hydro power (SHP) plants investments.” International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management 02: 47–62.
doi:dx.doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.2014.2.5 [21] Hamududu B, Killingtveit A.
2012.
“Assessing Climate Change Impacts on Global Hydropower.” Energies 5: 305–322.
doi:doi:10.3390/en5020305 [22] Yamba F. D., Walimwipi H., Jain S., Zhou P., Cuamba B., Mzezewa C.. 2011.
“Climate change/variability implications on hydroelectricity generation in the Zambezi River Basin.” Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change 16: 617–628.
doi:https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s11027-011-9283-0 [23] Harrison G. P., Whittington H. (Bert) W. 2002.
“Susceptibility of the Batoka Gorge hydroelectric scheme to climate change.” Journal of Hydrology 264: 30-241. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/ S0022-1694(02)00096-3 [24] Beyene T., Lettenmaier D. P., Kabat P. 2010.
“Hydrologic impacts of climate change on the Nile River Basin: implications of the 2007 IPCC scenarios.” Climatic Change 100: 433–461.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9693-0 [25] Ministry of Natural Resources.
2010.
National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change: NAPA Rwanda.
Kigali: Ministry of Natural Resources.
URL: https://www.
preventionweb.net/files/8564_rwa01e.pdf [26] Eberhard A., Foster V., Briceño-Garmendia C., Ouedraogo F., Camos D., Shkaratan M. 2008.
Africa Infrastructure: Country Diagnostic.
Underpowered: The State of the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Background paper 6 48214.
Washington, DC.
: The World Bank.
URL: http://www.eu-africainfrastructure-tf.net/attachments/library/aicd-backgroundpaper-6-power-sect-summary-en.pdf [27] Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency.
2012.
Press Statement in Respect of the Adjustment of Electricity Tariffs.
Kigali: RURA.
http://rura.gov.rw/fileadmin/docs/Press_Statement_ Electricity2.pdf [28] Fichtner and decon.
2009.
Economic Data Collection and Demand Forecast.
Kigali: ELECTROGAZ.
[29] Rwanda Energy Group Ltd. 2015.
Rwanda electricity development plan 2013–2032.
Kigali: Rwanda Energy Group Ltd. [30] Uhorakeye T., Moeller B.
2017.
“Impacts of expected climate change on hydropower generation in Rwanda.” Afr J Eng Res, 5(3): 83–96.
www.netjournals.org/pdf/AJER/2017/3/17-021.pdf [31] Østergaard P., Andersen F., Kwon P. 2015.
“Energy Systems Scenario Modelling and Long Term Forecasting of Hourly Electricity Demand.” Int J Sustainable Energy Planning Management, 99–116.
doi:http://dx.
doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.
2014.1.1 [32] Bhattacharyya S.C., Timilsina G.R.
2009.
Energy Demand Models for Policy Formulation: A comparative study of energy demand models.
Policy research working paper.
Washington, DC.
: The World Bank.
https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/ bitstream/handle/10 [33] Wänn A., Connolly D., Gallachóir B. Ó.
2014.
“Investigating 100% renewable energy supply at regional level using scenario analysis.” International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management 03: 21-32. doi:dx.doi.org/10.5278/ ijsepm.2014.3.3 [34] Heaps, C. G. 2011.
Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning (LEAP) system.
Stockholm Environment Institute.
http://www.
energycommunity.org/WebHelpPro/LEAP.htm [35] Ouedraogo N. S. 2017.
“Modeling sustainable long-term electricity supply-demand in Africa.” Applied Energy, 1047–1067.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.12.162 [36] Chaichaloempreecha A., Winyuchakrit P., Limmeechokchai B.
2017.
“Assessment of renewable energy and energy efficiency plans in Thailand’s industrial sector.” Energy Procedia, 841–846.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.10.105 [37] Phdungsilp A.
2017.
“Projections of Energy Use and Carbon Emissions for Bangkok.” Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, 248–257.
http://lifescienceglobal.com/pms/ index.php/jrge/article/download/4738/2671 http://www.reg.rw/index.php/our-business/generation/624-power-generation-2 http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/EUEI_PDF_BEST_Rwanda_Executive_Summary_Jun_2009_EN.pdf http://www.reg.rw/index.php/projects/172-methane-gas http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/580481468331850839/Climate-impacts-on-energy-systems-key-issues-for-energy-sector-adaptation dx.doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.2014.2.5 doi:10.3390/en5020305 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-011-9283-0 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1694(02)00096-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9693-0 http://www.eu-africa-infrastructure-tf.net/attachments/library/aicd-background-paper-6-power-sect-summary-en.pdf http://rura.gov.rw/fileadmin/docs/Press_Statement_Electricity2.pdf www.netjournals.org/pdf/AJER/2017/3/17-021.pdf http://dx.
doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.2014.1.1 https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10 dx.doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.2014.3.3 http://lifescienceglobal.com/pms/index.php/jrge/article/download/4738/2671 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.10.105 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.12.162 http://www.energycommunity.org/WebHelpPro/LEAP.htm 60 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol.
17 2018 Assessment of a climate-resilient and low-carbon power supply scenario for Rwanda [38] Paez A. F., Maldonado Y. M., Castro A. O.
2017.
“Future Scenarios and Trends of Energy Demand in Colombia using Long-range Energy Alternative Planning.” International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 7(5) 178–190.
https://www.econjournals.com/index.php/ijeep/article/downloa d/5390/3324 [39] Bhattarai N., Bajracharya I.
2015.
“Industrial Sector’s Energy Demand Projections and Analysis of Nepal for Sustainable National Energy Planning Process of the Country.” Journal of the Institute of Engineering, 50-66. https://www.nepjol.info/ index.php/JIE/article/download/14695/11893 [40] Ates S. A.
2015.
“Energy efficiency and CO2 mitigation potential of the Turkish iron and steel industry using the LEAP (long-range energy alternatives planning) system.” Energy, 417–428.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2015.07.059 [41] Lee S., Park J-W., Song H-J., Maken S., Filburn T.. 2008.
“Implication of CO2 capture tech-nologies options in electricity generation in Korea.” Energy Policy, 326–334.
doi:https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.09.018.
[42] Cantrell A. C. 2008.
“Technical Note: Review of methods for linear least-squares fitting of data and application to atmospheric chemistry problems.” Atmos.
Chem.
Phys., 5477–5487.
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/8/5477/2008/ acp8-5477-2008.pdf [43] National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
2009.
Statistical Yearbook 2009 Edition.
Kigali: MINECOFIN.
www.statistics.
gov.rw/file/1313/download?token=6b-fpQWo [44] Wayne G. 2013.
The Beginner’s Guide to Representative Concentration Pathways.
Skeptical Science.
http://www.
skepticalscience.com/docs/RCP_Guide.pdf [45] The New Times.
2014.
“Rwanda to import 430 MW of power to increase energy capacity.” Kigali: The New Times.
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2014-10-28/182408/ (Accessed August 3, 2015).
[46] City of Kigali.
2013.
Terms of reference for waste to energy project in the City of Kigali.
Kigali: City of Kigali.
http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/IMG/ pdf/TOR_Waste_ to_ Energy_final-2.pdf [47] National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.
2012.
Rwanda Fourth Population and Housing Census.
Thematic Report: Characteristics of households and housing.
Kigali: NISR.
http://www.statistics.gov.rw/file/2914/download?token= a74ouDuh [48] City of Kigali.
2013.
Kigali City master plan report.
Kigali: City of Kigali.
http://www.masterplan2013.kigalicity.gov.rw/ downloads/Docs/RWF1101_04_Kigali%20Transportation%2 0Master%20Plan_04062013-s.pdf (accessed March 18, 2018).
[49] The World Bank.
1999.
Municipal Solid Waste Incineration.
Technical guidance report.
Washington DC: The World Bank.
http://www.worldbank.org/urban/solid_wm/erm/CWG% 20folder/Waste%20Incineration.pdf (accessed December 2, 2015).
[50] The African Development Bank.
2013.
Rwanda Energy Sector Review and Action Plan.
Abidjan: AfDB.
https://www.afdb.org/ fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ Rwanda_-_Energy_Sector_Review_ and_Action_Plan.pdf [51] Fichtner and decon.
2010.
Actualization Study of the Electricity Master plan: Section 7: MININFRA-Energy Mix Strategic Plan 2017 – Supply Oriented Scenario.
Kigali: MININFRA.
[52] International Energy Agency.
2014.
Technology Roadmap: Solar Photovoltaic Energy.
Paris: IEA.
International Energy Agency.
Technology Roadmap: Solar.
https://www.iea.org/ publications/freepublications/publication/TechnologyRoadmap SolarPhotovoltaicEnergy_2014edition.pdf [53] International Energy Agency.
2014.
Technology Roadmap: Wind Energy.
Paris: IEA.
https://www.iea.org/publications/ freepublications/publication/Wind_2013_Roadmap.pdf [54] Confederation of European Waste-to-Energy Plants.
2013.
A decade of Waste-to-Energy in Europe (2001-2010/11).
CEWEP.
http://www.cewep.eu/m_1098 (Accessed January 20, 2016).
[55] International Energy Agency.
2013.
Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Utility Scale Electricity Generating Plants.
Paris: IEA.
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/capitalcost/pdf/updated_ capcost.pdf [56] International Energy Agency.
2014.
Energy Technology Perspectives 2012: Pathways to a Clean Energy System.
Paris: IEA.
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/ publication/ETP2012_free.pdf [57] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2006.
2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme.
Bonn: IPCC.
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_ Volume2/V2_0_Cover.pdf [58] Ministry of Infrastructure.
2009.
National Energy Policy and Strategy 2008–2012.
Kigali: MININFRA.
http://www.eueipdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/EUEI_PDF_ R w a n d a _ E n e r g y _ P o l i c y _ 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 2 _ F i n a l _ J a n _ 2009_EN.pdf http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/EUEI_PDF_Rwanda_Energy_Policy_2008-2012_Final_Jan_2009_EN.pdf http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_0_Cover.pdf https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ETP2012_free.pdf https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf http://www.cewep.eu/m_1098 https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Wind_2013_Roadmap.pdf https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/TechnologyRoadmapSolarPhotovoltaicEnergy_2014edition.pdf https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Rwanda_-_Energy_Sector_Review_and_Action_Plan.pdf http://www.worldbank.org/urban/solid_wm/erm/CWG%20folder/Waste%20Incineration.pdf http://www.masterplan2013.kigalicity.gov.rw/downloads/Docs/RWF1101_04_Kigali%20Transportation%20Master%20Plan_04062013-s.pdf http://www.masterplan2013.kigalicity.gov.rw/downloads/Docs/RWF1101_04_Kigali%20Transportation%20Master%20Plan_04062013-s.pdf http://www.statistics.gov.rw/file/2914/download?token=a74ouDuh http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/IMG/ pdf/TOR_Waste_to_Energy_final-2.pdf http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2014-10-28/182408/ http://www.skepticalscience.com/docs/RCP_Guide.pdf www.statistics.gov.rw/file/1313/download?token=6b-fpQWo http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/8/5477/2008/acp8-5477-2008.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.09.018 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2015.07.059 https://www.nepjol.info/index.php/JIE/article/download/14695/11893 https://www.econjournals.com/index.php/ijeep/article/download/5390/3324 192.168.1.1 Captive Portal << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /All /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S.
Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Warning /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJDFFile false /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments false /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Apply /UCRandBGInfo /Preserve /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 300 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile () /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /Description << /CHS <FEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000500044004600206587686353ef901a8fc7684c976262535370673a548c002000700072006f006f00660065007200208fdb884c9ad88d2891cf62535370300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002> /CHT <FEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef653ef5728684c9762537088686a5f548c002000700072006f006f00660065007200204e0a73725f979ad854c18cea7684521753706548679c300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002> /DAN <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> /DEU <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> /ESP <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> /FRA <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> /ITA <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> /JPN <FEFF9ad854c18cea51fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e30593002537052376642306e753b8cea3092670059279650306b4fdd306430533068304c3067304d307e3059300230c730b930af30c830c330d730d730ea30f330bf3067306e53705237307e305f306f30d730eb30fc30d57528306b9069305730663044307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e30593002> /KOR <FEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020b370c2a4d06cd0d10020d504b9b0d1300020bc0f0020ad50c815ae30c5d0c11c0020ace0d488c9c8b85c0020c778c1c4d560002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken voor kwaliteitsafdrukken op desktopprinters en proofers.
De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
/NOR <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> /PTB <FEFF005500740069006c0069007a006500200065007300730061007300200063006f006e00660069006700750072006100e700f50065007300200064006500200066006f0072006d00610020006100200063007200690061007200200064006f00630075006d0065006e0074006f0073002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020007000610072006100200069006d0070007200650073007300f5006500730020006400650020007100750061006c0069006400610064006500200065006d00200069006d00700072006500730073006f0072006100730020006400650073006b0074006f00700020006500200064006900730070006f00730069007400690076006f0073002000640065002000700072006f00760061002e0020004f007300200064006f00630075006d0065006e0074006f00730020005000440046002000630072006900610064006f007300200070006f00640065006d0020007300650072002000610062006500720074006f007300200063006f006d0020006f0020004100630072006f006200610074002000650020006f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002000650020007600650072007300f50065007300200070006f00730074006500720069006f007200650073002e> /SUO <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> /SVE <FEFF0041006e007600e4006e00640020006400650020006800e4007200200069006e0073007400e4006c006c006e0069006e006700610072006e00610020006f006d002000640075002000760069006c006c00200073006b006100700061002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740020006600f600720020006b00760061006c00690074006500740073007500740073006b0072006900660074006500720020007000e5002000760061006e006c00690067006100200073006b0072006900760061007200650020006f006300680020006600f600720020006b006f007200720065006b007400750072002e002000200053006b006100700061006400650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740020006b0061006e002000f600700070006e00610073002000690020004100630072006f0062006100740020006f00630068002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020006f00630068002000730065006e006100720065002e> /ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents for quality printing on desktop printers and proofers.
Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 5.0 and later.)
>> /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ << /AsReaderSpreads false /CropImagesToFrames true /ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue /FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false /IncludeGuidesGrids false /IncludeNonPrinting false /IncludeSlug false /Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (4.0) ] /OmitPlacedBitmaps false /OmitPlacedEPS false /OmitPlacedPDF false /SimulateOverprint /Legacy >> << /AddBleedMarks false /AddColorBars false /AddCropMarks false /AddPageInfo false /AddRegMarks false /ConvertColors /NoConversion /DestinationProfileName () /DestinationProfileSelector /NA /Downsample16BitImages true /FlattenerPreset << /PresetSelector /MediumResolution >> /FormElements false /GenerateStructure true /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles true /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /NA /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /LeaveUntagged /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [2400 2400] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 219 Manuscript received June 2015 Evaluating adaptation and the production development of Finnish agriculture in climate and global change Heikki Lehtonen Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke), Economy and Society, Latokartanonkaari 9, FI-00790 Helsinki, Finland e-mail: heikki.lehtonen@luke.fi Agricultural product prices and policies influence the development of crop yields under climate change through farm level management decisions.
On this basis, five main scenarios were specified for agricultural commodity prices and crop yields.
An economic agricultural sector model was used in order to assess the impacts of the scenarios on production, land use and farm income in Finland.
The results suggest that falling crop yields, if realized due to low prices and restrictive policies, will result in decreasing crop and livestock production and increasing nutrient surplus.
Slowly increasing crop yields could stabilise production and increase farm income.
Significantly higher crop prices and yields are required, however, for any marked increase in production in Finland.
Cereals production would increase relatively more than livestock production, if there were high prices for agricultural products.
This is explained by abundant land resources, a high opportunity cost of labour and policies maintaining current dairy and beef production.
Key words: agricultural sector modelling, economic adjustment, global prices, climate change, Finnish agriculture Introduction There are two main global drivers affecting agriculture in northern latitudes.
One is climate change, i.e.
global warming, leading to a gradually increasing length and temperature sum (accumulated degree days when average daily temperature during the growing period exceeds 5 degrees Celsius) of the growing period in northern Europe (Ruosteenoja et al.
2010), and another is the gradually increasing global demand for food, driven by an increasing global population and higher income levels, implying a possible increase in the real prices of food (FAO 2012, Godfray et al.
2011, Tilman et al.
2011).
Increasing incomes worldwide implies a more inelastic food demand which contributes to higher price volatility on food markets (Martin et al.
2008).
Climate change is expected to increase potential yields in northern Europe (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009, Olesen et al.
2011).
The realisation of higher yields at the farm level is uncertain, however.
Predicted increases in precipitation in the sowing or harvest periods and increased variability of temperatures and precipitation throughout the growing season may considerably inhibit possible yield gains, especially if plant breeding and management practices do not adjust adequately in response to the challenges posed by increasing weather variability (Rötter et al.
2011).
Olesen et al.
(2011) conclude that a wide range of adaptation options exists in most European regions to mitigate many of the negative impacts of climate change on crop production, but these impacts are still mostly negative over large areas across Europe, considering all the effects of climate change and possibilities for adaptation.
If the net effects of climate change were to be at all positive in northern Europe, climate change might then improve the competitive position of northern agriculture.
In some earlier studies, a significant increase in productivity and agricultural production has been anticipated in northern Europe, based on changes in bio-physical production conditions and an abundant land area, potentially available for intensified agricultural production (e.g.
Berry et al.
2006).
However, the high production costs of northern European agriculture may effectively inhibit any increase in agricultural production.
Other agricultural production regions with low (marginal) costs of production are likely to respond more effectively to the increasing demand for food, if not restricted by, for instance, the limited availability of agricultural land and other infrastructures, the low overall productivity in agriculture, a lack of capital, or deficiencies in public or private administration.
Nevertheless, the profitability of investments in agriculture, including those promoting crop yields, is crucially dependent on global price developments.
Agricultural support payments, in the EU largely decoupled from production, cannot provide primary incentives for agricultural investments.
It is important from the farmers’ point of view to evaluate whether it pays off to aim for high yields by using variable inputs, and even investing in, for example, soil improvements which only pay off in the longer run.
Relevant questions for farmers and the whole agricultural sector are: What do the increasing yields contribute in agriculture?
What kind of changes in production, land use, nutrient balance and farm income can be expected?
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 220 The objective of this study is to answer these questions by evaluating the likely production and income development of Finnish agriculture in different plausible future realizations of global agricultural commodity prices, and in the different realizations of future crop yield levels, dependent on future commodity prices.
Since market prices for agricultural commodities, as well as agricultural policies, largely influence farmers’ efforts in adapting to climate and market changes, we specify plausible price-yield scenarios, with specific descriptions of farm management driving agricultural adaptations and crop yields.
The impacts of these future scenarios on agricultural production, land use, use of nutrients and farm income are evaluated using an economic agricultural sector model, simulating the economic rational decision-making in the agricultural sector up to 2050.
The main results and findings are presented and discussed, and conclusions are drawn of the possibilities of Finnish agriculture adapting to future climate and market changes, primarily from the viewpoint of agricultural economics.
Conclusions are also drawn about what kind of market and policy developments are needed in order to increase or maintain existing agricultural production in Finland.
This paper proceeds as follows.
First, recent literature on future crop productivity subject to climate change is briefly reviewed from the point of view of northern Europe and Finland.
Price-yield scenarios are specified based on crop productivity estimates, on studies of global food markets and trade, and on recent studies of farm level management choices and adaptation.
These scenarios include descriptions of the farm level management required to achieve the specific yield levels.
The sector model (DREMFIA) is introduced and used in evaluating the impacts of the price-yield -scenarios on production, land and nutrient use and farm income.
The results are presented and discussed before the main conclusions are given.
Materials and methods Climate change and its impacts on crop productivity in Finland Projected climate change in Finland up to 2100, with a reference period of 1971–2000, has been reported as follows (Jylhä et al 2009, Ruosteenoja et al.
2010).
Annual temperature increases by 2–6 °C on average, in winter 3 –9 °C, and in summer by 1–5 °C.
Annual precipitation increases by 12–22% (in winter 10–40%, in summer by 0 –20%).
Growing season length increases by 30–45 days until 2100.
The temperature sum during the growing period is predicted to increase as follows: Middle Finland, from 1100 to 1600 degree days; Southern Finland, from 1300 to 1900; Northern Finland, from 900 to 1200 degree days.
The increasing frequency of rainy days, heavy rainfalls and dry spells may inhibit the increase in crop yield potential due to the higher temperature sum (Lehtonen et al.
2014b, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009).
The decreased length of the thermal winter, reduced snow cover and permafrost in northern Europe (recently reported by IPCC 2014) are likely to negatively affect the overwintering of grasslands and winter cereals for some decades to come (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009).
Impacts of climate change on crop yields and the profitability of agriculture are highly uncertain.
While non-negligible positive impacts of climate change may be anticipated for northern Europe (ibid), increasing climatic variability with a higher frequency of extreme events, pest pressure and continuous changes in the markets may present very significant challenges to agriculture in the Nordic countries (Hakala et al.
2011).
Rötter et.
al.
(2012) give an overall summary of the impacts of climate change on the agro-meteorological indicators that are most relevant in crop yields.
They conclude that a longer growing season and higher effective temperature sum are likely to increase crop yield potential, while an increasing number of dry days and more frequent adverse weather events are factors that may significantly affect crop yield levels and their inter-annual changes.
Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009) conclude that the realisation of the increased yield potential requires adaptation to: 1) elevated daily mean temperatures that interfere with the development rate of seed crops under long days, 2) relative reductions in water availability at critical phases of yield determination, 3) greater pest and disease pressure, 4) other uncertainties caused by weather extremes, and 5) a generally greater need for inputs such as fertilizers for non-nitrogen fixing crops.
Shifting from current cultivars to slowly maturing new cultivars may reduce vulnerability to (early summer) drought and increase tolerance to heat stress.
Earlier sowing times may imply better utilization of winter and spring time precipitation, provided there is sufficient water retention capacity in the soil.
However, improved or altered crop protection is also needed, due to increasing plant disease and pest pressure.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 221 Currently, the use of fungicides is relatively less common than the use of herbicides in Finnish crop production.
198 tons of the active substances of fungicides and 1224 tons of active substances of herbicides were sold in Finland in 2012) (Tukes, 2013a).
The use of fungicides and other crop protection chemicals, associated with the integrated crop protection scheme (where chemicals are only used in addition to other measures, if needed) can be increased.
However, more diverse crop rotations may relieve disease pressure, and they are likely to be needed in order to improve soil structure affecting water retention capacity and nutrient availability for plants (Hakala et al.
2011).
Higher crop yield potential also implies increased or altered fertilisation levels, possibly through changed timing and split fertilization to more than one occasion per growing period.
Improved soil structure, soil pH and drainage are likely to be needed to improve crop yields and also to avoid an increasing risk of nutrient leaching into watercourses due to more frequent extreme weather events.
Höglind et al.
(2013) simulated grass yields in various locations of northern Europe under A1B climate scenario, representing a ‘median’ climate scenario of a significant (+3 degrees Celsius increase in average global temperature until 2100, from 1980 to1999 average), but not very strong warming of climate (IPCC 2014).
The main result, in the case of Jokioinen, located in southern Finland, was that average dry matter yields of grass increases while the annual volatility of grass yield increases slightly as well.
The increase in yield was mainly because of the increased number of cuts per year rather than increased yield from individual cuts.
The yield response to climate change, up to the mid-21st century, was 11% for grass production per ha in southern Finland and more than 20% in central areas of Finland (the Kuopio region) with the assumption of optimal overwintering conditions and current CO 2 level.
However, possible problems in overwintering may reduce the yield potential.
They can be avoided through partial re-sowing of grassland, which implies higher costs.
Higher mean yields may nevertheless result in cost savings on feed and manure logistics.
Rötter et al.
(2013) estimated the yields of cereal crops in Finland for the 21st century under SRES A2 climate scenario representing a ‘high end’ climate scenario with strongly increasing temperatures especially in the latter half of the 21st century.
SRES A2 is close to the RCP 8.5 scenario (see Rogelj et al.
2012 for the relationship between SRES and more recent RCP scenarios aimed at replacing SRES scenarios).
However, SRES A2 is rather similar to SRES A1B (close to the RCP 6.0 scenario) in terms of temperature increase, up to 2050.
The results of Rötter et al.
(2013) suggest that the yield potential of major crops under climate change will most likely be sustained close to the current level, if new cultivars, better attuned to the longer growing season, are adopted.
On sandy soils, or on other soils prone to drought, yields (especially those of the cultivars currently used) may decrease due to an increased frequency of drought.
Cultivars more suited to a longer growing season may better tolerate drought periods.
Even if the climate change impacts on yields are dependent on location and soil type, the increase of grass yields due to climate change is more likely than the increase in the yield of cereals in Finland.
Socio-economic drivers of crop yields Crop growth is one of the key drivers in the development of agricultural production, land use and nutrient balances.
Nevertheless, in Finland there is already currently a large and widening gap between water-limited potential yields and actual observed average yields (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2015).
This so called “yield gap” is affected by socio-economic factors influencing the profitability of farm level management.
The yield gap at a farm level in Finland can be narrowed by improving farm management such as a proper design of crop plans, applying crop rotation, providing an appropriate level of fertilization, carrying out fungicide and liming treatment (PeltonenSainio et al.
2015).
These farm level measures mean increased or more accurate use of physical inputs (fertilizers, liming, crop protection, labour) or altered production organization, often implying more planning work, labour input or land area (e.g.
crop rotation).
All these imply costs, at least in the short run.
These costs need to be covered by crop prices.
Low real prices of crops and discouraging and restrictive policies may lead to cost minimization rather than to improved management aimed at higher yields and narrowing the yield gap (Lehtonen et al.
2014a, 2015, Palosuo et.
al.
2015).
Lehtonen et al.
(2014a) report that in a period of 10–20 years in south-west Finland 20% higher crop prices from the 2009–2013 average levels may incentivise farm level changes in fertilization, liming, crop protection and crop rotation, leading to a 6–12% increase in the yields of spring cereals and oilseeds.
The long time span of 20–30 years was used in the analysis in order to compare between stabilized yield levels (not short-term yield changes).
On the other hand, cutting crop prices by 20% from the 2009–2013 average level may lead to costminimising behaviour and a resultant decrease in the management actions mentioned above, and eventually in a 2–10% reduction in crop yields over a period of 10–20 years.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 222 Similar management and yield effects were calculated for central areas of Finland, the North Savo region, where yields of spring cereals may increase by up to 7–11% in the case of high prices, but decrease by as much as 12–15% in the case of low crop prices, compared to the 2009–2013 average prices (Lehtonen et al.
2015).
These results were explained by empirically validated yield responses and related management decisions, integrated in a farm level dynamic optimization framework.
Yield changes following management changes can be relatively greater in the longer term than, for instance, immediate yield responses to, for example, altered fertilisation.
In fact, future yields and prices are coupled, since yield-promoting management is not likely to be realized, at least not for very long, if not covered by (expected) market prices.
Some farm-level measures could pay off even in the near future if market prices were high.
Nevertheless, the experienced reality is not that bright.
Yield gaps have increased (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2015).
Farmers trying to improve productivity early on have been impeded by rapidly increasing prices of agricultural inputs, and volatile agricultural commodity prices.
Periods of low prices may significantly delay the pay-off time for the investments in improved crop yields.
Hence, the profitability and viability of farming is greatly dependent on global markets, even if effective solutions are found to local problems.
Nelson et al.
(2014) examined how nine global trade models of agriculture represent endogenous responses to seven standardized climate change scenarios produced by two climate and five crop models.
The main climate change scenario used in the analysis represented a relatively strong global warming, i.e.
a representative concentration pathway with end-of-century radiative forcing of 8.5 Wm-2 (RCP 8.5; corresponding to SRES A2 scenario of strong warming).
The reported responses from the global trade models include adjustments in yields, area, consumption, and international trade.
Based on the consistent comparison of the outcomes, the aggregate agricultural output price index showed changes in real prices of between –5% and +30% until 2050.
Most models produced aggregated price changes of 0–20%, however.
Agricultural production, cropland area, trade, and prices showed a great degree of variability in response to climate change, while consumption, mainly driven by income levels, was relatively less affected by climate change.
The sources of the differences included model structure and specification, and in particular, model assumptions about ease of land use conversion, intensification, and trade (ibid).
In particular, land use conversions and shifts between extensive and intensive land use activities are not easily quantified due to large spatial variations in, for example, soil types.
Thus, there is likely to be a significant uncertainty in the agricultural supply response in the long-term.
According to the various model outcomes reported by Nelson et al.
(2014), however, the most likely increasing or stable real prices of agricultural commodities can be expected up to 2050.
The main reasons for the increasing real prices of food and agricultural products are increasing population, income growth, and shifts in food diets towards livestock products in countries with rapidly increasing incomes and low initial share of livestock products.
This reasoning is also shared by Martin et al.
(2008), showing increasing specialization in agricultural production between different countries and production regions as well.
A strong warming of the global climate is more likely to result in higher prices for agricultural products than mild warming, due to the fact that strong warming is particularly challenging and difficult for many important production regions in Europe and globally, such as Southern Europe, Australia, and Latin America (Olesen & Bindi 2002).
Strong warming also poses challenges to crop production in northern Europe (Rötter et al.
2013).
Low or moderate warming of the global climate, in turn, probably means higher yield potential in northern Europe, while global challenges to food production are then also less severe than in the case of strong warming.
This means that prices of agricultural products increase less in low warming scenarios than in scenarios of strong warming.
For this reason, global prices are driven by climate change itself, future demand, and the supply response of global agriculture.
Agricultural and other policies and societal issues affect agricultural development.
For example, environmental legislation and agricultural policy schemes, and their flexibility in coping with the changing climate and demand conditions, may have a major effect on the ability of agricultural systems to cope with the altered local production conditions and global prices.
Price and crop yields scenarios All these findings described above, suggesting the importance of future prices and flexible policy schemes for agricultural adaptation and crop yield development, give a reason for constructing the future scenarios for prices and crop yields.
A small country perspective is taken here, assuming that global or European prices are not affected by domestic production.
Altered production in small agricultural producer countries such as Finland and other northern countries in Europe cannot influence European or global prices.
In this context, it is reasonable to evaluate agricultural development assuming exogenous EU level prices, which, however, largely determine the agricultural commodity prices in all the EU member states.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 223 A baseline and three socio-economic scenarios of agricultural change have been selected for 2015–2050 (Table 1).
Agricultural commodity prices stay at the baseline level in the little and moderate adaptation scenarios, but increase significantly already by 2030 in the successful adaptation scenario.
Nelson et al.
(2014) compared the recent outcomes of 9 global trade models and found prices of agricultural commodities varying between –5% and +30% from the baseline levels, depending on the model.
Thus, the prices in the different scenarios below are consistent with the price range found in Nelson et al.
(2014).
However, decreasing real prices, though less likely than stable or increasing real prices, are not considered in this study.
This is because less than 10% of the trade model outcomes studied by Nelson et al.
(2014) suggested negative change in the aggregate agricultural price index, and because the modelled impacts of a scenario with a 5% reduction in prices were very similar to the impacts of the scenarios assuming baseline prices.
The Baseline.
In this “business as usual” scenario, the unchanged yields and agricultural policy of 2013–2014 are assumed.
Future prices of agricultural outputs are not assumed to change from the prices of 2008–2013; they are, in fact, very close to the EU prices projected by OECD-FAO agricultural outlook 2013 (www.agri-outlook.org).
Unchanged 2013 policy is assumed in 2014–2050.
90% of CAP pillar 1 payments (approx.
EUR 550 million annually in Finland) are paid on a per hectare basis, fully decoupled from crop choice and production.
Payments for less favoured areas (LFA) are paid on a hectare basis irrespective of crop choice, but include higher payments for livestock farms than for crop farms.
LFA payments provide an implicit incentive for extensive production.
Agrienvironmental payments include explicit elements aimed at water protection and biodiversity conservation, but effectively restricts fertilization levels at the current levels.
In total, CAP pillar 2 payments (LFA and agri-environmental payments combined) amount to approx.
EUR 800 million annually.
Approx.
10% of CAP pillar 1 payments are coupled to production through dairy cow and bull premiums, paid mainly in support regions A and B. Nordic Aid, approx.
EUR 500 million per annum, fully paid from the national state budget, according to the regulations approved at EU level, provides milk and beef payments coupled to production, as well as some minor crop-specific payments in C support regions C1, C2, C2P, C3, and C4.
Milk payments, as part of the Nordic Aid scheme, in support regions A and B are 3 cents/litre and 7–14 cents/litre in the C support regions.
There are separate budgetary constraints for the milk and beef payments, respectively, in support regions A and B, and C regions, respectively.
This means that coupled support does not increase, but the support paid per unit decreases with increasing production.
The aim of the coupled payments is to maintain existing, historical production levels in A and B; and Csupport regions separately, without leading to any expansion of production.
A more detailed presentation of the support payments is easily accessible in Niemi and Ahlstedt (2012).
Domestic demand for agricultural products is kept at the 2012–2013 level.
The following price-yield scenarios are constructed in such a way that increased crop prices and implied increase of feed costs of livestock production are assumed to result in increasing prices of livestock products as well, in order to compensate the increase of marginal costs of production for livestock producers.
This kind of assumption is justified because it represents marginal cost pricing on competitive markets.
Approx.
50% of the production costs of meat production, and 25% of the production costs of dairy milk production in the EU (including main producer countries such as Germany), are feed costs (own calculations; Luke 2015).
It is reasonable to assume that a 10% increase in feed crop prices implies a 5% increase in meat and egg prices.
However, in the case of dairy milk production, a 10% increase in purchased feed prices implies only a 2.5% increase in the producer price of milk.
This assumption is reasonable as well in the case Finland (with 25–30% higher producer prices of milk compared to the EU average), since 45% of the dry matter content of a dairy feed diet is provided by non-roughage feeds (Huhtamäki 2014), such as concentrates and protein supplements, and feed grain, mostly purchased outside the farm.
Roughage feeds are almost always produced using the farmer’s own labour and machinery or purchased from close sub-contractors.
Thus the marginal costs of roughage are little affected by the increased prices of purchased feeds.
Table 1.
Yield and price -scenario specifications for years 2014–2050, compared to the baseline Successful adaptation, very high prices (SuA_ VHP) Moderate adaptation (MoA) Little adaptation (LiA) Little adaptation, high prices (LiA_HP) No adaptation, high prices (NoA_HP) Crop yield, until 2050 +30% +10% –10% –10% –20% Cereals prices, from 2030 +30% 0% 0% +10% +10% Meat prices, from 2030 +15% 0% 0% +5% +5% Dairy product prices, from 2030 +7.5% 0% 0% +2.5% +2.5% AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 224 Overall, the shift of livestock product prices following the increased crop prices is assumed to be compensated to livestock producers through competitive markets, which is a reasonable assumption in the case of competitive markets and long-term economic adjustments.
Domestic food demand, which is relatively stable in high-income countries such as Finland, is assumed to remain unchanged.
Successful adaptation, very high prices (SuA_VHP).
In this optimistic scenario, crop yields increase gradually by 30% from the 2000–2012 average yield levels of cereals and grasslands (annual increment 0.9% of the 2000–2012 average yield) and by 60% from the 2000–2012 average yield levels for oilseeds and winter cereals in 2015–2050.
Prices, policies, research and development imply an effective adaptation, including new cultivars that are suitable for a longer growing season.
Higher crop yield levels are also driven by liming which brings the soil pH up and thus in the context of Finland directly promotes crop yields.
Increased fungicide use for cereals (assumed to be allowed by the agri-environmental policy), and drainage and soil structure investments are assumed to be encouraged by higher crop prices and allowed by the policy.
Drought problems are mitigated by new cultivars that are better suited to the changed climate.
New cultivars and their appropriate management provide relatively high yield gains of oilseeds and winter cereals.
Cereal prices increase by 30%, meat prices by 15% and milk product prices by 10% in this very optimistic scenario.
Nitrogen (N) fertilization increases by almost 30% due to the nutrient needs of plants that increase with the increasing yields.
The costs of grain drying and handling per ha increase by 30% as well, due to 30% higher crop yields.
This is because the current need for grain drying, implying costs of 14 eur ton-1 (or 53.2 eur ha-1 at average 3.8 ton ha-1 crop yield level of barley; ProAgria 2010, p. 142) is not likely to decrease as a result of climate change since increased precipitation during the growing period is predicted by climate models for northern Europe (Lehtonen et al.
2014b).
Prices of N fertilizers, which are in greater demand in this scenario, increase by only 10%.
The great increase in crop yields in this scenario is mainly driven by 30% higher EU level cereals prices even by 2030, compared to the baseline.
High prices are also combined with policies allowing higher fertilization.
Nutrient balances of N and phosphorus (P) per crop decrease slightly and remain close to the baseline level (2007–2013 levels).
Reaching 30% higher crop yields, compared to the baseline with average crop yields for 1995–2012, is challenging but possible, at least in theory.
New cultivars of cereals and grass may provide significant yield gains, but such gains are specific to climate scenario, crop and soil type.
Rötter et al.
(2013) provide some estimates of the contribution of “future cultivars” to the crop yield of barley.
However, in this scenario it is merely assumed that future cultivars facilitate crop yield responses of the specific management options (below) when aiming for the 30% increase in yields up to 2050.
These management options include increased N fertilization, increased liming and crop protection.
It is also assumed that renewed/improved drainage costs, necessary to ensure sufficient water retention of the soil, are largely covered by agricultural support payments.
These, otherwise largely decoupled from production decisions in the EU, require farmland to be kept in “good agricultural condition”, referring to sufficient drainage and other relevant conditions.
Approx.
3–5% higher cereals yields can be attained by 10–20% higher use of N fertilizer (economically optimal increase in N fertilization and the resulting increase in crop yield are crop-specific; Lehtonen 2001).
Increased liming , which brings up soil pH from average levels of 5.5–6.5 up to 6.0–7.0, could provide a 10–15% increase in yields.
Introducing fungicide use for cereals may increase yields by 10–15% compared to non-use of fungicides (Purola 2013).
The costs of these measures can be directly taken into account in this study, but not the possible costs of new cultivars better attuned to future climate, needed to realize the 30% higher yields in 2015–2050.
The direct cost implications of 30% higher yields for a farmer include, at a minimum, the increased costs of fertilization (approx.
50 eur ha-1), grain drying (16 eur ha-1), and increased liming (10 eur ha-1 year-1).
These cost estimates are compatible with ProAgria (2010) calculations on the necessary inputs per ha when aiming to yield levels of 4 and 5 tons per ha.
In total, 76 eur ha-1 higher costs are well covered by the increased value of output per hectare (180 eur ha-1, calculated at a price of 150 eur ton-1) because of 30% higher yields.
While the increased use of liming is allowed by current policy settings, there are upper limits for N fertilization in the Agri-Environmental scheme, which is likely to restrict or at least discourage significant yield gains such as 30% (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2015).
It is uncertain to what extent the increasing N fertilization, even if implying a non-increasing N balance, is compatible with future agri-environmental policies and, for example, the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), reaching up to 2021 (HELCOM 2013).
Nevertheless, this scenario represents a state of the world where agricultural commodity prices are high, and farmers’ attempts to achieve higher yields are allowed by policies.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 225 Moderate adaptation (MoA).
Yields increase linearly by an amount which is 10% of the 2000–2012 yield level up to 2050 (annual increment 0.25% of the 2000–2012 average yield).
Fertilization increases by 10% as well, to safeguard the nutrients needed in plant growth.
Prices are the same as in the baseline, but policies (agri-environmental scheme currently effectively restricts fertilization levels) are adjusted to allow a 10% increase in fertilisation.
Moderate market prospects and the possibility of slightly increased fertilization imply liming (though less than in the successful adaptation scenario) in order to realize increasing yields on specialized cereals farms, which also utilize new cultivars.
The overall policy environment, however, does not encourage a large group of part-time unspecialized farmers in such investments.
Consequently, the crop yields increase by 10%, and the increased value of the crop output covers the implied costs (this can be verified by using the same kind of calculations as in the SuA scenario above) Little adaptation (LiA).
Adaptation is rare due to increased inflexibility in policy rules, for example, an agri-environmental scheme with stricter fertilization limits.
Some individual farms could avoid cereals yield reductions with the help of some adaptations based on new cultivars, fungicide use and liming, despite non-increasing fertilisation.
However, adaptations at the farm and crop level are rare, and yields decrease by 10% on both cereals and grasses, which is the opposite change in yields compared to the “Moderate adaptation” -scenario.
Fertilisation does not, however, decrease, since no change in real prices is expected in this scenario in which agricultural policy does not encourage productivity improvements in crop production.
Thus, crop yields decrease by 10% in this scenario.
For the purposes of covering a pessimistic view of crop yield development, two “worse-case” scenarios were specified, with 10% higher crop prices compared to the baseline but with either small (yields of –10%) or non-existent (yields of –20%) adaptation: Little adaptation, high prices (LiA_HP; yields of –10%, crop prices +10%) No adaptation, high prices (NoA_HP; yields of –20%, crop prices +10%).
In both of these two scenarios, decreasing yields are realized despite slightly increasing commodity prices.
This means a major failure in adaptation to climate and market changes, at least from the point of view of crop yields.
Such a development may be realized, despite the incentives provided by the 10% higher crop prices, in the case of severe difficulties and constraints for adaptation: if policies restrict or discourage maintaining yields for instance through restricting sufficient fertilization and crop protection, or if regional climates in the main production regions in Finland turn out to be more challenging than expected, and if the current cultivars, vulnerable to climate change, are used instead of new ones better suited for future climate conditions.
Some crop modelling results related to current barley cultivars, especially on drought-prone sandy soils (e.g.
Rötter et al., 2013), suggest such negative yield developments.
Economic agricultural sector model DREMFIA Changes in regional level agriculture throughout Finland under these scenarios are evaluated using an economic agricultural sector model DREMFIA.
The model simulates production and foreign trade of agricultural commodities, as well as land use (areas under crops and set aside) and production intensity (fertilization, manure use) annually from 1995 up to 2020 and produces a steady state static equilibrium for 2030, 2040 and 2050.
The model assumes rational economic behaviour and competitive markets, replicates realized production and land use 1995– 2012, and produces consistent future development paths of agriculture (see Lehtonen 2001 and 2013 for details).
Four main areas are included in the model: Southern Finland, Middle Finland, Ostrobothnia (the western part of Finland), and Northern Finland (Fig.
1).
Demand and foreign trade is determined at the level of the main regions.
The products move between the main regions to cover the demand of each main region at a certain transportation cost.
Since the model is very exact in terms of agricultural policy, the main regions are further divided into sub-regions according to regional disaggregation specific to agricultural support payments and related specific conditions.
Production is thus determined at the level of each of the 17 sub-regions (Figure 1 shows 14 regions, 3 small regions not shown).
More details of the model are available in Lehtonen (2001, 2013).
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 226 Demand in each main region is covered by the production in its own sub-regions, by transport from other regions, or by imports from abroad.
The model is solved so as to achieve the most economic outcome, i.e.
the one maximizing producer and consumer surplus.
The underlying hypothesis is that producers engage in profit-maximizing behaviour and consumers engage in utility-maximizing behaviour in competitive markets.
Decreasing marginal utility of consumers and increasing marginal cost lead to the production and foreign trade levels where the marginal cost of supply is equal to market prices.
Each region specializes in products that provide the greatest profitability, taking into account the profitability of production in other regions, import prices, and consumer demand.
The use of different production resources, including farmland, is optimized, taking into account differences in resource quality, technology, and costs of production and transportation.
Domestic and imported products are imperfect substitutes, i.e.
there are differences, even if limited, between the prices of domestic and imported products.
Substitution elasticities and price elasticities of demand are adjusted in the model calibration in order to validate model prices to observed prices.
Prices of N fertilizer and crops affect fertilization levels.
If crop prices increase, farmers in each region increase fertilization as long as the value of increased crop yield is higher than the value of increased fertilizing.
Crop-specific N response functions determine the economically optimal N fertilization and crop yields.
If manure from livestock is available, less commercial fertilizers are needed to reach the economically optimal level of fertilization.
The P content of the manure of different animals is taken into account.
Non-negative P balance is ensured in the model, i.e.
inorganic fertilisers provide additional P if the P balance turns negative in the model.
The yield and price scenarios are given in the model in the form of (1) future crop yields —the model adjusts fertilization according to the needs of plants to reach the specific yield levels; different fertilization response functions are used for different crops (Mitscherlich function for barley, wheat, oats, mixed cereals and peas, and quadratic function for rye, potatoes, sugar beet, hay, silage, green fodder and oilseeds; cf.
Lehtonen 2001); (2) future prices (EU prices), which affect the use of inputs, crop yields and changes in the levels of production and foreign trade.
Increased yields mean increasing the intercept of the response functions while keeping first and second order parameters unchanged, due to lack of published evidence of such parameter changes related to the chosen climate scenarios.
This is also means that nitrogen use efficiency (NUE), i.e.
the share of N utilized by the plants is assumed to be unchanged.
Altered yields and prices imply changes in the regional allocation of both livestock and crop production, to reach competitive production structure and supply (also changing imports and exports) with respect to the food demand which is assumed to stay unchanged from the 2012–2013 level.
The baseline, an important point of comparison for the specified scenarios presented above, is rooted in the model through a multi-phase validation process.
Primarily, known statistical data from official agricultural statistics 1995– 2013 is used extensively, as well as some selected empirical data from research databases for the parameter values in different production functions determining feed use and yield levels of animals, fertilizer use and crop yields.
Fig.1.
Spatial aggregation of the DREMFIA sector model.
The 4 main regions are divided into support-regions (A, B, C1, C2, C2north., C3, C4) based on agricultural policy: Southern Finland —support regions A,B,C1,C2; Middle Finland —support regions B, C1, C2, C2 North; Ostrobothnia —support regions C1 and C2; Northern Finland —C2 North, C3, C4.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 227 Available data on milk quota prices, land rental values, value and quantity of inputs are also used in the model validation.
Some few model-specific behavioural parameters, which have no or few exact estimates or no correspondence in the literature or known data sources, have been adjusted so that the model very closely replicates the historically observed development of production, land use and prices.
Such calibration parameters are (1) substitution elasticities and price elasticities of demand in the demand functions, as well as (2) the farm-type specific savings rates, and (3) the propensity to invest in larger farm size on dairy farms.
Endogenous structural and technical change in the dairy sector can be validated, using a simple unique combination of the savings rate and propensity to invest, to follow the development of the farm structure statistics (Lehtonen 2001, 2013).
Equilibrium properties of the model (increasing marginal costs in terms of production quantity, reducing the marginal utility of consumers) stabilize the overall production very close to the observed production quantities at the whole country level and in the four main regions.
Region-specific budget limits imposed on production support for milk and bovine animals also contribute to the production allocation.
The observed and simulated production levels at the national level are given in Table 2.
The model is validated to replicate known production patters, using data from official agricultural statistics and various technical and farm level data, as well as through calibrating unobserved parameters (i.e.
the propensity to invest, savings rate, substitution elasticities).
However, when comparing the model outcome to the observed production development in 2008–2012, some relatively small deviations still occur (Table 2).
Grassland area in the model is less than the observed area due to the fact that horses, lambs and reindeer are not included in the model.
Beef and milk production are slightly higher in the model solution than in reality mainly because of the stagnation of the milk yields of dairy cows in 2008–2012, not fully explained by the increased prices of concentrate feeds taken into account in the model.
In other words, the increasing milk yield trend is slightly less stagnated in the model outcome than in reality.
Obvious reasons for the observed stagnation of the milk yields per cow have been identified as 1) problems in cow fertility and feed diet optimization on large, newly established large scale-dairy farms; 2) a simultaneous exit of small farms with high milk yield output, and 3) poor quality of silage grass harvests in some individual years.
These factors are difficult to include in the model.
Further examples of the comparisons between the model results and reality are available in Lehtonen (2013).
Results Agricultural production and land use development in Finland The results of the DREMFIA sector models include two main dimensions: 1) changes in production intensity (fertilization, crop yields and nutrient balances) per crop, and 2) overall livestock and crop production, including related land use change of agricultural land.
Both these aspects, sometimes called as “intensive” and “extensive” margins, consistently integrate in the DREMFIA sector model simulating domestic production, exports and imports of agricultural products.
The model was run for all yield and price scenarios presented above.
First, the scenarios enter the crop yield response functions in which crop yields are specified through N use.
At given prices of crop output and N fertilizer, the optimal use of N and crop yield is calculated for each crop.
Let us summarise the crop-specific fertilization and yield changes as follows.
We use barley, the most cultivated cereal crop, as a representative example of the fertilization and crop yield changes.
We present the N fertilization and yield levels of barley in southern Finland (support region B which is the most important region for barley production) in Figure 2, and the resulting yield (Fig.
3) and N balance (Fig.
4).
Table 2.
Production quantities, crop cultivation areas and farm income in the baseline scenario and reality (“observed”: official agricultural statistics, http://www.luke.fi/en/statistics/ ); 5-year average 2008–2012.
The grassland area is smaller in the DREMFIA baseline than in reality, since horses, lambs and reindeer (users of roughage) are not included.
Cereals (1000 ha) Grasslands (1000 ha) Milk yield per cow (litres) Milk production (million litres) Beef (million kg) Pigmeat (million kg) Poultry meat (million kg) Farm income (million eur) DREMFIA 1132.6 605.3 7.867 2258.5 82.4 203.7 95.1 769 Observed 1144.7 656.3 7.850 2200.7 81.6 204.2 100.2 732 Relative difference –1.1% –7.8% +0.2% +2.6% +4.0% –0.3% –5.1% +4.9% AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 228 The increasing yield potential takes place gradually over 2014–2050 in the scenarios, while price changes take place already in 2020–2030.
This implies that N fertilization increases faster than the yields.
Furthermore, the empirically validated N response functions suggest that the relative increase in N fertilization is larger than the resulting increasing crop yields.
This, in turn, results in smaller profits per ha from increased yields than suggested by increased crop yields as such, and increasing N balances.
Fig.
2.
Nitrogen fertilisation for barley (kg N ha-1) in different scenarios, southern Finland, support region B.
Base = Baseline; MoA = Moderate adaptation (yields +10%); LiA = Little adaptation (yields –10%); SuA_VHP = Successful adaptation, very high prices (yields +30%, crop prices+30%); LiA_HP = Little Adaptation, high prices (yields –10%, crop prices +10%); NoA_HP = No adaptation, high prices (yields –20%, crop prices +10%) Fig.
3.
Yield level for barley (kg Nha-1) in different scenarios, southern Finland, support region B. Base=Baseline; MoA=Moderate adaptation (yields +10%); LiA = Little adaptation (yields –10%); SuA_VHP = Successful adaptation, very high prices (yields +30%, crop prices+30%); LiA_HP = Little Adaptation, high prices (yields –10%, crop prices +10%); NoA_HP = No adaptation, high prices (yields –20%, crop prices +10%) 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13 20 15 20 17 20 19 20 21 20 23 20 25 20 27 20 29 20 31 20 33 20 35 20 37 20 39 20 41 20 43 20 45 20 47 20 49 base MoA LiA SuA_VHP LiA_HP NoA_HP 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13 20 15 20 17 20 19 20 21 20 23 20 25 20 27 20 29 20 31 20 33 20 35 20 37 20 39 20 41 20 43 20 45 20 47 20 49 base MoA LiA SuA_VHP LiA_HP NoA_HP AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 229 Next, let us summarise the land use and crop production results.
More land area is allocated to cereals in the scenario of successful adaptation (Fig.
4).
Together with the yield increase by 30%, this means that overall cereals production increases by almost 90% from the average level of 3.8 million tons in 2000–2013 (Fig.
5).
In the moderate adaptation scenario (MoA), crop yields increase by 10% but the area under cereals stays close to 1.2 million hectares (the average in 2002–2013 is a little less than 1.2 million ha).
Overall production of cereals decreases at least slightly in all the other scenarios assuming no increase in crop yields, including baseline.
Low yields, for example, the almost 20% lower yields in scenario NoA_HP, on the other hand, lead to a higher cereals area than in the scenario where crop yields decrease by only 10%.
This is because the higher prices compared to the baseline lead to significantly reduced dairy and beef production (Table 3) but, however, still keep cereals production somewhat profitable.
This means that cereals become relatively more competitive compared to grass.
Since there is land available (there has been approx.
200–300,000 ha under set aside in 2008–2013), more land is allocated under cereals.
Fig.
4.
Land area under cereals (1000 ha).
Base = Baseline; MoA = Moderate adaptation (yields +10%); LiA = Little adaptation (yields –10%); SuA_VHP = Succesful adaptation, very high prices (yields +30%, crop prices +30%); LiA_HP = Little Adaptation, high prices (yields –10%, crop prices +10%); NoA_HP = No adaptation, high prices (yields –20%, crop prices +10%) Fig.
5.
Cereals production (1000 tons).
Base = Baseline; MoA = Moderate adaptation (yields +10%); LiA = Little adaptation (yields –10%); SuA_VHP = Successful adaptation, very high prices (yields +30%, crop prices+30%); LiA_HP = Little Adaptation, high prices (yields –10%, crop prices +10%); NoA_HP = No adaptation, high prices (yields –20%, crop prices +10%) 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13 20 15 20 17 20 19 20 21 20 23 20 25 20 27 20 29 20 31 20 33 20 35 20 37 20 39 20 41 20 43 20 45 20 47 20 49 base MoA LiA SuA_VHP LiA_HP NoA_HP Observed 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13 20 15 20 17 20 19 20 21 20 23 20 25 20 27 20 29 20 31 20 33 20 35 20 37 20 39 20 41 20 43 20 45 20 47 20 49 base MoA LiA SuA_VHP LiA_HP NoA_HP AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 230 Livestock production is relatively stable in all scenarios (Table 3).
This implies a stable demand for feed grain.
Dairy and beef production is stabilised by some national and EU CAP payments coupled to production, and there are budget limits for these specific production linked subsidies.
If the total sum of each category of support payments coupled to production exceeds the budgetary limit, the support level per litre of milk is reduced in order to keep the support payments within the budgetary limits.
Despite this, some expansion of approx.
15% from the 2013 production level takes place however in dairy production in the successful adaptation scenario (Fig.
6).
The 30% higher crop yields lead to a significant reduction in the production costs of roughage (including the logistic costs of manure and grass silage), and imply an approx.
25% reduction in the grassland area.
This also facilitates a significant expansion of milk production in the most competitive dairy regions such as Ostrobothnia and part of Middle Finland.
The increase in the competitiveness of milk production in the SuA scenario is further enhanced by the re-allocation of milk production to the most competitive regions.
While pig and poultry farms are relatively more dependent on purchased feed, dairy becomes relatively more favoured in the successful adaptation scenario.
The reduced need for the overall grassland area, however, frees up some land for increased cereals production, used as feed in pork and poultry production, This is the reason why pork production increases eventually by 12% and replaces a large part of imported pork (more than 20% of pork is imported in the baseline).
Poultry meat production, however, does not increase much in the successful adaptation scenario, since the imports cover only approx.
10% of domestic poultry meat consumption (in 2013 and in the baseline).
Beef production is slightly less in the SuA scenario than in the MoA scenario, despite the higher grass yield level in the SuA scenario, because of the relatively low beef prices, already in the baseline scenario, which do not cover even the feed costs in the baseline.
Table 3.
Simulated livestock production (meat in 1000s tons, milk in mill.
litres) and farm income (eur mill.)
in 2050 [Observed average values for 2008–2012 are given for comparison] Baseline 2050 MoA 2050 LiA 2050 SuA_VHP 2050 LiA_HP 2050 NoA_HP 2050 Beef [2008–2012: 81.6] 80.1 81.9 77.5 81.7 76.7 73.4 Pork [2008–2012: 204.2] 158.2 163.0 153.7 176.5 161.1 153.4 Poultry [2008–2012: 100.2] 82.3 82.8 81.7 84.7 82.8 82.0 Milk [2008–2012: 2200.7] 2011.3 2108.8 1895.7 2565.4 1975.5 1845.8 Farm income [2008–2012: 733.2] 547.1 625.6 478.9 1284.1 573.0 489.1 Fig.
6.
Milk production (million litres) in Finland.
Base = Baseline; MoA = Moderate adaptation (yields +10%); LiA = Little adaptation (yields –10%); SuA_VHP = Successful adaptation, very high prices (yields +30%, crop prices+30%); LiA_HP = Little Adaptation, high prices (yields –10%, crop prices +10%); NoA_HP = No adaptation, high prices (yields –20%, crop prices +10%).
Observed = milk production, according to official statistics 1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 2500 2700 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13 20 15 20 17 20 19 20 21 20 23 20 25 20 27 20 29 20 31 20 33 20 35 20 37 20 39 20 41 20 43 20 45 20 47 20 49 base MoA LiA SuA_VHP LiA_HP NoA_HP observed AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 231 The uncompetitive relative position of beef production relative to dairy, pork and poultry meat production, even after the increased crop yields and prices by 30% in the SuA scenario, leads to a significant reduction in suckler cows.
Thus, the expansion of dairy and reduction of suckler cows leads to only slightly increased beef production on the SuA scenario, compared to the baseline.
Decreasing crop yields imply lower profits for livestock production.
Consequently, dairy and beef production volumes are affected so that 5–10% less beef and milk is produced, and approx.
5–10% less grass forage is needed, if lower yields realize (–10–20% yield changes in the LiA_HP and NoA_HP -scenarios).
Higher crop yields lead to an expansion of the cereals area and a decrease in the grassland area.
Larger cereals areas and reduced areas under grasslands are the likely outcomes of moderate or successful adaptation.
This change is more pronounced in areas where the share of grasslands is currently high, i.e.
middle Finland and Northern Finland, while in Southern Finland and the Ostrobothnia region, where the share of grasslands is lower, the relative change in cereals and grassland areas is minor.
The average N balance over all the cultivated area (excluding set aside land) is slightly increasing in all scenarios, ending up to 8–13% above the baseline level.
This is mainly because of increasing or at least non-decreasing crop prices in the selected scenarios, and partly because of the mechanism in DREMFIA which does not allow a negative N balance even temporarily, in order to safeguard the availability of plant nutrients.
This leads to increasing fertilization per crop, if crop yields increase.
Land use change, i.e.
the increasing cereals areas and the decreasing grassland areas, does not significantly affect this increasing tendency of nutrient balances, since the N balances of cereals and grasslands are rather close to each other, according to the model results.
N balances under little or no adaptation scenarios are clearly higher than in more successful adaptation scenarios, especially if crop prices increase.
Total national level farm income increased more than 90% in the successful adaptation scenario, compared to the baseline.
This is mainly because of high prices and increased production, and secondly because of decreased production costs per unit produced due to higher crop productivity.
Farm income increased by 14% in the moderate adaptation scenario, and decreased by 12% in the little adaptation scenario, until 2050.
Discussion Livestock production seems to be sluggishly responding to different yields and price scenarios given.
This means that livestock production is not easily increased on a market basis, due to high production costs, compensated by the EU and national payments coupled to production.
Their budgetary limits also stabilize dairy and beef production.
Thus, crop yield developments mostly affect cereals production volume, and the land area allocated to cereals.
In the very optimistic, successful adaptation scenario, cereals production expanded as much as 90%.
This is because there is little market or policy (subsidy) regulation which could inhibit the expansion of production at high prices.
There are also abundant farmland resources available, partly freed up from grass, compared to the current level of cereals production.
This scenario also implied a 15% increase in dairy milk production and a 2% increase in beef production, due to relatively uncompetitive, decreasing suckler cow production, compared to dairy, pork and cereals.
Pork production increased by 12% and poultry meat production by 3%.
However, this very successful adaptation scenario can be considered a very optimistic, and most probably rather unrealistic, scenario.
The increase in agricultural production was minor in the moderate adaptation scenario with a 10% increase in crop yields.
Farm income, however, increased by 14% mainly due to decreased production costs per ton, and a reduced need for cultivated area.
Hence, the benefits of any increase in crop yields are likely to realize through a more efficient use of existing resources in agriculture, such as farmland, livestock facilities (animal places available), and labour, rather than through the higher sales value of the increased crop output.
Increased crop yields are likely to have more important economic effects in the livestock sector than in the actual crop sector in Finnish agriculture, since most farmland area is used for feed production and manure-spreading purposes.
Higher crop yields also imply the possibilities of higher manure-spreading per hectare, and thus reduced logistics costs at livestock farms.
Such costs are currently high due to the stringent phosphorous fertilization limits and resulting small volumes of manure that can be spread per hectare.
However it is uncertain whether future agri-environmental schemes and other policy rules allow higher fertilization or greater amount of manure to be spread per hectare.
If not, less economic benefit can be obtained from higher crop yields.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 232 Farm income decreased by 12% in the little adaptation scenario (yields –10%), until 2050.
This was despite the fact that the support payments coupled to production still maintained a large proportion of existing livestock production in this scenario.
More land area was needed for feed production in that scenario, implying higher costs in terms of labour per ton of feed produced, and also increased timeliness costs already high in northern agriculture characterized by short harvesting periods (of silage, in particular).
The role of support payments in farm income increased in that scenario.
This means that decreasing yields make northern agriculture vulnerable and dependent on policy and support payments.
However, Finnish agriculture seems to cope rather well even with slightly decreasing yields, despite some income loss, due to abundant farmland resources and some national and CAP subsidies coupled to production.
Avoiding reductions in crop yields is nevertheless important for maintaining agricultural income in the long-term, even if livestock production is also maintained by national subsidies.
Decreasing yields, if realized despite high prices, lead to high nutrient balances and nutrient leaching during more frequent extreme events such as heavy rains, floods and droughts, which become more common in the future climate.
Conclusions The results suggest that current high crop and feed production costs, including timeliness costs, the high opportunity cost of labour and various indirect costs related to manure logistics and other farm organisation, can be reduced through higher crop yields.
These gains can be higher than the value of increased crop production.
Livestock production, especially dairy milk production, may benefit from increasing crop yields in two ways: 1) through reducing costs per unit of grass silage produced, thus contributing to an improved profit margin in milk production, and 2) through increased production in the most competitive regions, currently inhibited by increased land prices and land availability, facilitated by the higher crop yields relieving the land constraints.
These adjustments were taken into account in the sector model used in this study.
In fact, the relatively higher benefits of higher crop yields for the gross margins in livestock production, as well as the re-allocation of production to the most competitive regions are the main reasons for improved farm income due to increased crop yields.
Cereals production, partly independent of livestock production, may expand significantly as well, but cannot provide as much gains in terms of farm income compared to the livestock production.
However, increased cereals production in Finland might result only if both crop prices and yields increase significantly.
In such a case, there is an abundance of farmland that can be used in increasing the production of cereals, while expansion of production of other crops and livestock will probably be minor.
If higher yields are realized, the relative importance of high labour and machinery costs decreases and leads to improved farm income, but not easily to increased total production.
Nutrient leaching has long been considered to be the most important problem to be addressed by an agri-environmental policy scheme in Finland.
If crop prices are high, fertilization may increase relatively more than crop yield.
The results suggest that yields should be increased especially in the case of increasing agricultural commodity prices.
Higher prices may trigger investments in reaching higher yields, but if such attempts fail, or are inhibited by policies, there will be negative consequences for both farmers and society, due to decreased farm income and increased nutrient surplus.
The results presented are based on assumed non-improving NUE, i.e.
the share of fertilizer N utilized by plants.
Increasing N balances, especially in the case of increasing crop prices, suggests a need to improve NUE.
Improvements in NUE through, for instance, new cultivars or improved soil structure, could in the long run reduce the N balance and nutrient leaching risks.
Based on the results obtained on changed production and farm income, higher crop yields are most likely worth aiming for, if considered at the level of the entire agricultural sector: 10% higher yields lead to 14% higher farm income, on the aggregate.
Higher crop yields probably pay off more than they cost, especially if increasing commodity prices are realized.
All the benefits of higher yields may not become visible if analysed only on crop farms.
It is important to evaluate the contribution of yield development at the sector level, at least in the case of Finnish agriculture with its high production costs, livestock dominance, and some dependence on farm subsidies.
The relatively most competitive regions within a country can increase production due to higher crop yields, and this may result in reduced costs AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 233 per unit produced.
The same kind of situation applies to agriculture in many other countries in Europe, also characterized by highly variable production conditions within a country, relatively high production costs compared to market prices, and a significant value of farm subsidies when compared to farm incomes.
Higher yields are likely to be profitable for farmers and may provide important societal gains, but their realization requires increasing global prices and policy schemes which allow sufficient changes in the use of inputs, necessary for successful adaptations at the farm level.
Increased use of certain inputs, such as fertilizers, may not harm the environment if it leads to higher crop yields and a reduced need for intensive production area.
The results suggest, however, that significantly increasing production in northern Europe is unlikely due to high production costs and budgetary constraints of current agricultural support payments.
Acknowledgements Financial support from ADIOSO (decision number 255954) and MARISPLAN (decision number 140840), funded from the FICCA programme of the Academy of Finland (www.aka.fi/ficca), is gratefully acknowledged.
This work benefitted from participation in FACCE MACSUR www.macsur.eu.
The author’s participation in FACCE MACSUR is funded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Finland.
References Berry, P.M., Rounsevell, M.D.A., Harrison, P.A.
& Audsley, E. 2006.
Assessing the vulnerability of agricultural land use and species to climate change and the role of policy in facilitating adaptation.
Environmental Science and Policy 9: 189–204.
FAO 2012.
World Agriculture Towards 2030/2050.
The 2012 Revision.
ESA Working Paper No.
12-03.
June 2012.
Agricultural Development Economics Division Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
154 p. Godfray H.C.J., Beddington, J.R., Crute, I.R., Haddad, L., Lawrence, D., Muir, J.F., Pretty, J., Robinson, S., Thomas, S.M.
& Toulmin, C. 2010.
Food security: The challenge of feeding 9 billion people.
Science 327: 812–818.
Hakala, K., Hannukkala, A., Huusela-Veistola, E., Jalli, M., & Peltonen-Sainio, P. 2011.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate a major challenge for Finnish crop production.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 3–14.
HELCOM 2013.
Overview of implementation of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP).
Document prepared for the 2013 HELCOM Ministerial meeting.
40 p. http://helcom.fi/Documents/Ministerial2013/Associated%20documents/Supporting/BSAP_Overview_with%20cover.pdf.
Accessed October 13 2015.
Huhtamäki, T. 2014.
ProTuotos-karjojen rehustus vuonna 2013.
Maidonja nurmentuotannon tulosseminaari 2013. http://www.
proagria.fi/sites/default/files/attachment/rehunkulutus_tulosseminaari_240413_huhtamaki.pdf.
Accessed August 26 2015.
(In Finnish).
Höglind, M., Thorsen, S.M.
& Semenov, M, A.
2013.
Assessing uncertainties in impact of climate change on grass production in Northern Europe using ensembles of global climate models.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 170: 103–113.
IPCC 2014.
Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part B: Regional Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
688 p. Jylhä, K., Ruosteenoja, K., Räisänen, J., Venäläinen, A., Tuomenvirta, H., Ruokolainen, L., Saku, S. & Seitola, S. 2009.
Arvioita Suomen muuttuvasta ilmastosta sopeutumis-tutkimuksia varten (The changing climate in Finland: estimates for adaptation studies).
ACCLIM-hankkeen raportti 2009.
Ilmatieteen laitos, Raportteja 2009: 4.
102 p. (Extended abstract and captions for figures and tables also in English).
Lehtonen, H. 2001.
Principles, structure and application of dynamic regional sector model of Finnish agriculture.
Academic dissertation.
Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology.
Publications 98.
Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research (MTTL), Helsinki.
265 p. Lehtonen, H. 2013.
Sector-level economic modeling as a tool in evaluating greenhouse gas mitigation options.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section A – Animal Science 62: 326–335.
Lehtonen, H., Liu, X.
& Purola, T. 2014a.
Endogenising yield development through management and crop rotation decisions in dynamic farm level modeling.
In: 24.
Jahrestagung der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Agrarökonomie, Universität für Bodenkultur Wien 25.–26.
September 2014.
Tagungsband 2014: 13–14.
Lehtonen, H., Liu, X.
& Purola, T. 2015.
Balancing Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation with Socio-Economic Goals at Farms in Northern Europe.
In: Järvelä, M. & Paloviita, A.
(eds).
Climate Change Adaptation and Food Supply Chain Management.
London, UK: Routledge.
p. 132–146.
Lehtonen, I., Ruosteenoja, K. & Jylhä, K. 2014b.
Projected changes in European extreme precipitation indices on the basis of global and regional climate model ensembles.
International Journal of Climatology 34: 1208–1222.
Luke 2015.
Economydoctor —A tool for monitoring the profitability of agricultural enterprices.
https://portal.mtt.fi/portal/page/ portal/economydoctor.
Accessed 13.10.2015.
Martin, W., Ianchovichina, E. & Dimaranan, B.
2008.
Economic Development in emerging Asian markets: Implications for Europe.
European Review of Agricultural Economics 35: 303–330.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE H. Lehtonen (2015) 24: 219–234 234 Nelson, G.A., Valin, H., Sand, R.D., Havlík, P., Ahammadd, H., Derynge, D., Elliott, J.,Fujimori, S., Hasegawah, T., Heyhoed, E., Kylei, P., von Lampe, M., Lotze-Campen, H., Mason d’Croza, D., van Meijl, H., van der Mensbruggh, D., Müller, C., Popp, A., Robertson, S., Schmid, E., Schmitz, C., Tabeau, A.
& Willenbockel, D. 2014.
Climate change effects on agriculture: Economic responses to biophysical shocks.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111: 3274–3279.
Niemi, J.
& Ahlstedt, J.
(eds.)
2012.
Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries 2012.
Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research Finland.
Publications 112a.
100 p. Olesen, J.
& Bindi, M. 2002.
Consequences of climate change for European agricultural productivity, land use and policy.
European Journal of Agronomy 16: 239–262.
Olesen J., Trnka M., Kersebaum K., Skjelvågd, A.O., Seguine, B., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rossig, F., Kozyrah, J.
& Micalei, F. 2011.
Impacts and adaptation of European crop production systems to climate change.
European Journal of Agronomy 34: 96–112.
Palosuo, T., Rötter, P., Salo, T., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Tao, F. & Lehtonen, H. 2015.
Effects of climate and historical adaptation measures on barley yield trends in Finland.
Climate Research 65: 221–236.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L., Hakala, K. & Ojanen, H. 2009.
Climate change and prolongation of growing season: changes in regional potential for field crop production in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 18: 171–190.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Salo, T., Jauhiainen, L., Lehtonen, H. & Sieviläinen, E. 2015.
Static yields and quality issues: Is the agrienvironment program the primary driver?
AMBIO 44: 544-556.
ProAgria 2010.
Maatalouskalenteri 2011.
ProAgria Keskusten liitto.
244 p. (In Finnish).
Purola, T. 2013.
Taudinkestävien ja tautialttiiden ohralajikkeiden taloudellinen vertailu.
Masters’ Thesis.
University of Helsinki.
Department of economics and management.
98 p. (Abstract in English).
Rogelj, J., Meinshausen, M. & Knutti, R. 2012.
Global warming under old and new scenarios using IPCC climate sensitivity range estimates.
Nature Climate Change 2: 248-253.
Ruosteenoja, K., Räisänen, J.
& Pirinen, P. 2010.
Projected changes in thermal seasons and the growing season in Finland.
International Journal of Climatology 30: 1473–1487.
Rötter R.P., Palosuo T., Pirttioja N.K., Dubrovsky, M., Salo, T., Fronzek, S., Aikasalo, R., Tnrka, M., Ristolainen, A.
& Carter, T.C.
2011.
What would happen to barley production in Finland if global warming exceeded 4 °C?
A model-based assessment.
European Journal of Agronomy 35: 205–214.
Rötter, R.P, Höhn, J.G.
& Fronzek, S. 2012.
Projections of climate change impacts on crop production: A global and a Nordic perspective.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section A – Animal Science 62: 166–180.
Rötter, R. P., Höhn, J., Trnka, M., Fronzek, S., Carter, T. R., & Kahiluoto H. 2013.
Modelling shifts in agroclimate and crop cultivar response under climate change.
Ecology and Evolution 3: 4197–4214.
Tilman, D.,Balzerb, C., Hillc, J., & Befort, B.L.
2011.
Global food demand and the sustainable intensification of agriculture.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108: 20260–20264.
Evaluating adaptation and the production development of Finnishagriculture in climate and global change Introduction Materials and methods Climate change and its impacts on crop productivity in Finland Socio-economic drivers of crop yields Price and crop yields scenarios Economic agricultural sector model DREMFIA Results Agricultural production and land use development in Finland Discussion Conclusions Acknowledgements References
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 68 Volume 2 Issue 1 February (2022) DOI: 10.47540/ijias.v2i1.428 Page: 68 – 79 Industrial Development and Climate Change: A Case Study of Bangladesh Shiblee Nomani1, Md.
Rasel2, Md.
Imran Khan Reedoy2 1Department of Development Studies, Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), Bangladesh 2Department of International Relations, Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), Bangladesh Corresponding Author: Shiblee Nomani; Email: shiblee.official@gmail.com A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: Climate Change, Environmental Pollution, Industrialization, Waste Management.
Received : 26 December 2021 Revised : 10 February 2022 Accepted : 12 February 2022 This study attempts to examine the climate change in Bangladesh as a cause of industrialization.
Over the last few decades, pollution of the environment has become a significant concern in the case of Bangladesh.
Both qualitative and quantitative data were utilized to write this article.
Primary and secondary data on the environment, national policy, and technology have been gathered.
Research results show that rapid and unplanned industrialization has turned into the main cause of the endangered environment.
The toxic waste materials of industries are dumped into water and ground, causing air pollution, water pollution, and soil pollution.
As a result, the people of the riverbank are suffering a lot.
Though industrial development is very much required for a country’s development, it is also undermining the environment which will destroy the natural balance and impose a long-term effect on climate in near future.
In Bangladesh, industries are developed in an unplanned and centralized way without following any particular guidelines.
The poor waste management system of industries are polluting rivers and toxic emission is polluting the air as well.
Natural resources are used by the industries, causing an imbalance in nature.
Forests are cut down massively, which increases the chance of various natural disasters.
Industrialization has a long-term effect on climate change which also increases the average temperature of the earth known as global warming.
Climate change also increases the chance of various natural disasters, unemployment, food scarcity, diseases, and extinction of wildlife.
INTRODUCTION Industrialization is considered a very momentous policy of economic development in a country.
In developing as well as in developed countries, industrialization is the primary sector for their development.
The process of industrialization has started in the 18th century through the European Industrial revolution.
The industrialization process has brought major development in the world.
The Least Developing Countries (LDC) are developing at a faster pace in this industrialization era.
But like everything also, industrialization has both positive and negative impacts on the world.
And like other developing countries, Bangladesh is also facing severe environmental pollution.
The slow depletion of natural resources such as soil, air, and water is referred to as environmental degradation.
In another way, environmental degradation causes climate change.
It degrades biological variety and the overall health of the ecosystem, whether as a result of natural causes or as a result of human activity.
It is one of the major threats that the world is facing since human civilization.
Before the independence of Bangladesh, the jute industry was at the forefront of its development.
After independence, the pace of development was stagnant.
At that time, the readymade garment sector has started developing gradually.
Today it has been considered as one of the most successful industries in Bangladesh.
During the 1980s many other industries got importance in the economy of Bangladesh, such as the leather industry, tea manufacturing factories, and food processing factories.
In the period of 1990s, sectors like shipwrecking, steel, and cement factories have developed.
At the beginning of the INDONESIAN JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND APPLIED SCIENCES (IJIAS) Journal Homepage: https://ojs.literacyinstitute.org/index.php/ijias ISSN: 2775-4162 (Online) Research Article mailto:shiblee.official@gmail.com https://ojs.literacyinstitute.org/index.php/ijias http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1587190067&1&&2020 Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 69 21st century, different industries like ceramics, glass, plastic, aluminum, and electronics have developed.
All these industries play a significant role in Bangladesh's economy.
Bangladesh is gradually shifting its sole dependence from agriculture to industrialization.
According to Bangladesh Economy Profile 2018, the contribution of agriculture and industry to the economy is 14.2% and 29.2% respectively.
The industrial growth rate in 2018 is 8.2% than the previous year.
Bangladesh is a populous country.
Though it is developing through industrialization but in an unplanned way.
Bangladesh’s economy is mostly dependent on industrial development rather than agriculture.
And this continuity of unplanned industrialization is causing climate change.
Various types of pollution including soil pollution, air pollution, sound pollution, water pollution, etc.
are causing disaster in the daily human life of Bangladeshi people.
These industries are mostly undermining the environment as well as exploiting the natural resources of Bangladesh.
Besides, industrialization is a hindrance to sustainable development.
Industrialization is the process of developing the world.
At the same time, the environment is also our concern to live in a better world.
But industrialization process is hampering the natural balance of the environment.
The environment is degrading continuously by the process of industrialization and thus causing climate change.
This drawback of industrialization is deteriorating the quality and life expectancy of human beings as well as various animals.
The unplanned rise of various factories in urban areas is not concerned about the environment.
Climate change increases the chances of various natural disasters, global warming, climate change, ecological imbalance, etc.
The chances will be getting higher if we undermine this problem.
Many works have been done previously on climate change for various causes.
But industrialization as a cause is far from being exhausted as a research area.
New studies in this area can bring sustainable development and growth of the environment along with industrial development in the world.
This study aims to project how the industrialization process is hampering the environment.
And how to protect the environment during this industrial development process, as in the perspective of Bangladesh.
This study also recommends the possibilities that how Bangladesh can protect its environment and prevent climate change during industrial development.
The fact is that as a result of industrial development, we have seen the development, but it also pollutes the environment.
The people are not concerned about that.
So we worked on this topic to increase the awareness of the people about industrial development and its impacts.
The objectives of the paper are to see the connectivity between climate change and industrial development; to find out the negative impacts of industrialization on climate; to find the broader dimensions of environmental pollution in Bangladesh; to raise social awareness regarding the importance of the environment on human life, and to develop possible guidelines and suggestions for the government as well as industries to apply.
METHODS Both qualitative and quantitative data were utilized to write this article.
Primary and secondary data on the environment, national policy, and technology have been gathered.
So, to get primary information, it needs interaction with local people and working people who are directly involved with the industries as well as environmental pollution.
It has taken several interviews of local people of Shadarghat as well as Savar Upazila who are victimized by climate change as a result of industrialization.
It has tried to emphasize the causal effect of climate change, the environment, and industrialization.
It has followed step-by-step policy, were discussed the causes and consequences of climate change.
It has also gone through different online documentaries, journal articles, newspapers, TV reports, etc.
All the things have been done for sake of getting information on the environment, national policy support, management of industries, environmental degradation as well as climate change as a result of industrialization, and so on.
Purposive sampling was done for the study.
This sampling method was used to make sure the representation of a different category of people lived in the study area.
Study areas were also purposively selected.
The study is focused on the Shadarghat area and Savar Upazila.
A sample refers to a subset of a population selected to participate in the research.
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 70 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Industrialization is the key pillar of the economic development of a country.
But industrialization is so much connected with our environment that at first, it does not come to our realization until it is polluted.
As getting efficiency through industrialization, we are also losing many things.
Industrialization including vehicle exhaust causing massive air pollution in the world, which is causing global warming (Magsi, 2014).
Habibullah Magsi has brought examples of Pakistan to prove the relation between industrial expansion and environmental hazard.
He has also connected the weak governance system to this.
This industrial pollution is also against human health, causing early death and less life expectancy.
He has also brought some daylight on this issue specifically in the Asian region that it is capable of producing 90% of industrial power using green power projects.
But this region is also in grave danger if not taken necessary measures to protect the environment.
The government of the country has to play a prominent role to protect Mother Nature.
Awareness Campaigns can bring change to our environment.
The author also said that all the economic units of the country should unite together for solving environmental issues (Magsi, 2014; Rozalinna & Azmi, 2020).
Industrialization always brings opportunities in society as well as challenges.
Industrialization not only brings betterment in human life but also affects our environment, ultimately causing climate change.
Extreme weather and high temperatures challenge human living standards.
Industrialization has shifted human civilization from rural to industrial in both social and economic terms.
The technological development and manufacturing process requires the usage of natural resources and energy, which causes environmental pollution on a big scale, gradually turning into global warming and climate change.
Author Chigbo A. Mgbemene's paper looked at the linkages between industrialization and climate change and tried to answer some concerns about how climate change is causing devastating human lives (Mgbbemene, 2011).
Several works of literature have emerged on the theory of the geographical clustering of industries and their assessment of economic contribution as well as negative impact on society.
Author Adejompo in his article has shown how the clustering of industries in regions is causing climate change.
Climate change has become one of the important issues for the world, often called global warming.
Regional agglomeration of similar types of industries in proximity implies enhanced productivity and reduced cost.
Despite various advantages, it also causes overcrowding, various types of pollution, traffic congestion, and a high cost of land.
Air pollution is the most important contribution to climate change among all the effects of the industrial complex.
The author has also shown that this continuation of conglomerating industries on a regional basis can ultimately affect the climate, which will increase the earth’s average temperature.
And the consequences of global warming could lead to large-scale food and water shortages, having catastrophic effects on human life (A. Fagbohunka).
Climate Change The environment is consists of various compounds like air, water, soil, forest, atmosphere, etc.
The slow depletion of natural resources such as soil, air, and water is referred to as environmental degradation.
In another way, environmental degradation is the leads to climate change.
It diminishes biological variety and environmental health, either naturally or as a result of human actions.
Various types of environmental pollution that cause climate change are: 1.
Industrial Development and Air Pollution Air pollution in Bangladesh became a prime concern nowadays.
Dhaka, the capital city, now has the worst level of air pollution of any city on the planet.
According to the Department of Environment (DoE), the density of Airborne particulate Patter (PM) in the city reaches 463 micrograms per cubic meter throughout December and March, which is the highest level in the world.
At the same time, Mumbai and Mexico have 383 and 360 micrograms per cubic meter (Rahman, 2016).
So it is easily understood how dangerous air is polluted here in Bangladesh.
Air pollution is a big environmental threat for the upcoming generation, which is mainly done by industries.
Industries are gradually developed in urban areas without taking into consideration the environment and human safety.
Poor air pollution is blamed for 15000 premature deaths, as well as millions of pulmonary, respiratory, and neurological issues, as per the Air Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 71 Quality Management Project (AQMP), particularly in Dhaka.
Excessive pollution might cause the premature death of a newborn if it is encountered by pregnant mothers.
According to the National Institute of Diseases of the Chest and Hospital (NIDCH), almost 7 million individuals in Bangladesh suffer from asthma, with children accounting for roughly half of the cases.
According to WHO air quality recommendations 2005, a maximum allowable PM level of 20 micrograms per cubic meter is acceptable, whereas cities with more than 70mcm are deemed severely polluted.
Bangladesh has already exceeded the standard and has reached high levels of air pollution.
Air pollution causes neurological and renal illness that is irreversible.
Bangladesh’s industrialization is still in its early stages.
However, this does not imply that air pollution is lower here.
Currently, the country has 30000 industrial units, which may be classified into two groups depending on renewable and nonrenewable local resources.
Renewable local resources are used in the production of jute, paper, tobacco, leather, salt, and other agro-based products.
Natural gas-based businesses, ceramic industries, brickfields, and other sectors rely on non-renewable local resources (Rahman, 2016).
Many businesses in Bangladesh are located in unsuitable areas.
Many dangerous and polluting sites are in proximity to residential areas.
Toxic gases and dust emitted by manufacturers damage the air near them.
All the industries emitted a huge amount of toxic gas, for which the workers of the industries suffered from the different respiratory problems due to long hours’ presence in polluted air.
In almost every town in Bangladesh, oil mills, textile factories, chemical factories are located close to the residential area.
Old Dhaka is a densely populated area of Dhaka city, hundreds of legal and illegal factories growing in this area link an umbrella.
These factories emitted different toxic gas like carbon mono oxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide which pollute the city air very much.
Many small industries have been developed in residential areas such as Sutrapur, Gandaria, Dholaikhal, Narinda, Hazaribagh, and Rokonpur, among others.
Residents have found it difficult to live because of the smoke and stench created by these factories.
In Chittagong, there are 144 polluting businesses scattered throughout several industrial zones.
19 tanneries, 26 textile manufacturers, oil refinery industries, and chemical companies are among those steadily damaging the city's air (Rahman, 2016).
2.
Industrial Development and River Pollution Bangladesh has around 230 small and major rivers, and a substantial portion of the country’s 140 million people rely on them for their livelihood and transportation.
But unfortunately, many of them are dying because of pollution and encroachment.
Water pollution is exceeding the limit in most of the rivers and has become a great threat to the survival of aquatic species.
The rivers of Bangladesh are the worst victim of industrialization, especially in Dhaka city.
Rapid and unplanned industrialization in the urban areas is the main reason for river pollution.
Industries are growing on the bank of the rivers for easy access to water.
The used and untreated wastes are dumped in river water as an extraction process.
The government of Bangladesh has passed a law of using Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP) on industries, but most of the industries are overlooking this technology.
In a survey of the Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies (BCAS), it is found that only 40% of industries use ETP and more than 50% of industries do not have ETP technology, causing serious damage to river water.
The Dissolved Oxygen level has gone down to a lethal state for toxic wastage industries dumped in river water.
A scientific research team of BUET found that the Oxygen level of the River Buriganga has come down to 0%, which means impossible to survive for any aquatic life in the river.
Pollution is so severe that few hydro-organisms can endure it, and many kinds of fish are finally found dead in rivers.
Industrial pollutants including lead, cadmium, iron, copper, and organic wastage accumulate in the river, causing health issues and destroying the river’s food chain.
It also destroys the water aeration system, which means the self-purifying process of rivers is destroyed.
The continuous emission of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide in the atmosphere and river water make which make water more acidic.
River water acidification may cause acid rain in the future.
Ship wrecking activities nearby the river bank also worsen the condition of river water.
The dumping of industrial solid waste like plastic, polythene, fabric into river water causes ecological Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 72 damage to the river water.
When industrial wastes are discharged into the river, water can negatively affect the biodiversity, food, and human health of the nearby area.
3.
Industrial Development and Soil Pollution Human civilization started through agriculture and the cultivation of various foods and grains.
But industrialization process has reduced agriculture by containing cultivable lands as well as polluting them.
Many lands have lost their fertility for toxic wastage of industries, and they are no longer able to use them for cultivation.
Soil pollution is the damage of soil for various toxic materials, which poses an adverse impact on the growth of plants and animal health.
The salinity of soil has increased rapidly for various use of pesticides and chemicals.
The usage of polluted water for irrigation also causes soil pollution.
Industries are the biggest contributor to soil pollution in Bangladesh.
Industrial toxic materials, polythene, plastics are damaging soil fertility very rapidly.
Industrialization growth is inversely proportional to agriculture.
As industries are increasing cultivable lands are decreasing.
People are heading more towards industrial jobs rather than working in the field.
Agricultural production is failing to reach its minimum target for overall climate change.
Chemical utilization has gone up tremendously in technological and industrial development.
Farmers nowadays use a huge amount of fertilizers and pesticides, which negatively affect the structure of the soil (Alfonso, 2021).
The continuous use of chemicals in soil reduces the fertility of soil slowly.
Most of the industries dump their wastes into the soil.
Soil gradually absorbs this waste and becomes unproductive.
Oil spills from oil stations also pollute the soil.
Brickfield, tanneries, garments industries, chemical, gas, electronics factory greatly polluted the soil.
Industrial products like polythene, plastic, aluminum became much popular among Bangladeshi people.
Excessive use of these products is very harmful to soil because the soil can’t absorb this product.
Plants hardly survive in polluted soil.
The agricultural production day bay day reducing because of soil pollution.
Humans, plants, and animals all suffer from soil pollution.
The extensive pollution of soil has an impact on any system's ecological equilibrium.
4.
Industrial Development and Deforestation The forest of Bangladesh has been experiencing a cumbersome degradation of natural resources, which is causing climate change.
For sake of industrial development, forests are cut down vigorously.
The clearing of woodlands for Industries has been the leading cause of deforestation.
Food, shelter, water, air, and other needs are required for living organisms to survive.
These components are required for life to exist.
Forests provide a home for wild animals and birds.
The most serious environmental problem is deforestation, it harms the environment.
Deforestation is the process of systematically destroying forests to use the land or the trees.
Deforestation is typically characterized as the destruction of a substantial number of trees with no plans to replace them.
Harvesting, forest fires, and insect infestations are not considered deforestation because the affected areas will regrow.
All around the world, industrialization is a never-ending addiction.
Our ecology and human health have both suffered greatly as a result of industrialization.
In the name of development, every country is increasing greenhouse gas emissions, exposing hazardous waste to the environment, polluting streams, causing climate change, and destroying wilderness.
Clearing forest trees harm human health as well as animals.
Carbon emissions are the most serious environmental concern, and the primary reason is widespread deforestation.
A survey showed that over 90% of respondents believe that fast industrial expansion in Sal forest regions has a significant detrimental influence on forest cover and degradation.
They also said that it posed a severe danger to their ability to continue living in the woods.
This conclusion is backed up by research, which points to the industry as one of the key causes of Sal forest degradation (Ahmed 2008).
Since Dhaka and Gazipur are near the Sal forest, many companies are constructing plants there, and influential elites have taken land.
New road construction, for example, exacerbates the degradation of forest land (GOB, 2008).
Most of the industries are not environment friendly, causing deforestation.
The toxic materials as wastage are extracted openly in the forest, causing an imbalance in the ecosystem.
This prevents forests to live.
Nuclear power plants radiate harmful radiation, Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 73 causing forest death.
Poor wastage extraction of industries is against the living of forests, causing tremendous damage to the environment.
Case Study 1.
Rampal Power Plant Project Rampal Power Plant is a proposed coal-based power plant in Bangladesh’s Khulna district, located in Rampal Upazila.
It is a joint venture power plant of India and Bangladesh which is known as “Bangladesh-India Friendship Power Company Limited” (Kumar & Chaytannya, 2013).
The Joint Venture Agreement was signed between Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) on 29th January 2012 (Sharda, 2016).
The total equity of the proposed Joint Venture is 30% and there is 50/50 ownership of the equity.
The proposed power plant is located on the Poshur River and the area of the plant is 1834 acres.
It is situated in a high-risk area of the Sundarbans, the world’s biggest mangrove forest and a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
It is very much controversial because of its critical location.
It may hamper the biodiversity of Shundarban as it is based on coal.
Electricity is highly needed for our industrial development.
For the sake of demand for rapid industrial development, the Bangladesh government has taken many initiatives to develop its national power grid.
Among them, Rampal Power Plant is one of them.
But this may harm our environment as well as our mangrove forest.
a.
National Policy This power plant is probably a controversial project which is undertaken by the present government.
From the beginning, the environmentalists are opposing to launch of the plant.
The government of Bangladesh, on the other hand, denies that the coal-based power station would have an unfavorable impact on the world’s biggest mangrove forest, the Sundarban.
According to the energy adviser of the Bangladeshi prime minister Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury, the debate over the power plant and its impact on the Sundarbans was “not based on facts”.
He further stated that the plant will have no detrimental impact on the mangrove forest since greenhouse gas emissions will be kept to a minimum.
The government has also said that there is no possibility of the flow of smoke and harmful gases to the Sundarban because the height of the chimney is 900ft.
And the flow of wind remains opposite of Sundarban for nine months.
Only for three months (November-February) wind flows over Sundarban but will affect a high chimney.
Ujjal Kanti Bhattacharya, MD of the Rampal Power Plant ensured that the advanced Fuel Gas Desulfurization (FGD) technology will be used to control all produced toxic gas from coal-burning that is NOx and SOx.
He also ensured high-quality exported vessels for coal transportation through River Poshur so that coal does not pollute river water.
The government will be using high technology for controlling Fly Ash and Bottom Ash.
b.
Civil society/ NGOs Depiction The Rampal Power Plant is planned on 1834 acre area of Rampal.
Considering the densely populated area of Bangladesh, it is quite fancy to cover such a big area.
In 2014, UNESCO has published a report on coal transportation through the river Poshur which will damage the biodiversity of Sundarban.
A team of UNESCO in 2016 has visited Rampal Power Plant for a survey and projected a report to the government highlighting the negative impact over the area for that power plant.
Some environmentalists like, Dr. Abdullah Harun Chowdhury said that it will be very difficult to monitor all vessels containing coal through the river Poshur.
Coal contains a huge amount of Sulfuric acid.
There is a high probability of mixing those Sulfuric acids with river water.
Coal is anti-environmental fuel energy and very harmful to nature for which many European countries like Malta, Cyprus, Baltic nations came out from coal-based power plants.
Recently, Germany has stopped 30 of its coal-based power plant because of protests by environmentalists.
Professor Badrul Imam of Dhaka University has said that this Power Plant will destroy the Food Chain of Sundarban.
The Power Plant is planned for 30 years, which will gradually damage the Biodiversity of Sundarban.
Fly ash and bottom ash are also prime concerns for saving the environment of Sundarban because no such developed technology is there to control them.
This Ash contains 15 different harmful chemicals like Mercury, Arsenic, Lead, etc.
which are not fully controllable to refrain from damaging the environment.
In Rampal Power Plant it is estimated that almost 1300 metric tons of coal will be burnt per day which will be producing 8 Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 74 million metric tons of Carbon-di Oxide.
And it is equal to the damage of trimming 38 cr.
trees altogether.
Table 1.
Rampal Power Plant 1320 megawatt Rampal Power Plant Sulfur-di Oxide/SOx 52,000 ton Carbon-di Oxide/NOx 8,00,000 ton Carbon monoxide 2,000 ton Mercury 440 pound Though Government ensures the use of highly advanced technology in the Rampal Power Plant to save nature in all possible ways, it is not that much convincing to environmentalists.
For example, in the USA a coal-based Power plant has recently collapsed even using high technology and devastated around environment completely.
c. Case Analysis of Rampal Power Plant A large amount of electricity is produced from coal-based power plants around the world.
It might be the best source of electricity if it would not have been producing toxic ash while burning.
It produces polluted ashes in two ways.
Firstly, when it is ground and secondly while burning.
In the 1320 megawatt power plant, yearly 7.5 lacs ton fly ash and 2 lacs ton bottom ashes are produced.
This ash contains around 15 toxic materials.
Among them mercury, lead and arsenic are the most harmful.
In the Rampal power plant project, this ash management is the biggest challenge.
There are two rivers beside Rampal, one is Posur and another is Moidara River and there are also some small water bodies beside the Rampal Power Plant project.
If the ash of the power plant mixes with the river water and land, it will cause great damage to the Sundarban.
There was a failure of management while the Oil vessel sunk into the River Posur.
So environmentalist says that it will be challenging for the Rampal Power Plant project to prevent such type of incidents.
They also say that manpower is not that efficient in Bangladesh that they can manage everything while transporting coal through the river.
So overall it is very risky for Sundarban.
Though they said that they will use advanced technology, but an accumulation of minimum pollution can destroy the world’s largest Mangrove Forest.
Environmental experts offer the Burishwar River, which is 2.5 times larger than the Posur River, as an alternate proposal for the Rampal power plant.
So ships can easily transport coal.
As well as this place is 30 km far from Sundarban.
The river is very close to the sea, so it will decrease the transportation cost.
Most importantly, coal transportation vessels do not need to go through Sundarban.
Apart from that, some expert suggests that there is a huge opportunity for a solar power plant in Bangladesh.
Through this solar power plant, we can easily produce electricity at a low price, and it is very environmentally friendly.
2.
Pollution of Buriganga River The Buriganga River is one of Dhaka’s most significant waterways.
After losing its connection with the main Ganges River, the Dhaleswari River, a tributary of the Ganges River, spilled into the Bay of Bengal and was renamed Buriganga (Majumdar, 1971).
Unlike many other rivers, the Buringanga River serves a variety of uses, including drinking water, transportation, and flood control.
Dhaka’s economy depends on Buriganga.
When the Mughals declared Dhaka their capital in 1610, the Buriganga bank was an important commerce hub.
The Buriganga River is now dealing with a significant pollution problem.
Mill and factory’s chemical waste, medical waste, home garbage, plastic, and oil-polluted Buriganga.
Thousands of tons of solid trash are discharged daily in Dhaka, with most of it ending up in the Buriganga.
Every day, tanneries emit 22000 cubic liters of hazardous waste into the river, according to the Department of the Environment (DoE).
Waste material from different sources falls into the Buriganga River and destroys the biodiversity of the Buriganga River and also increases the possibility of aid rain, health hazard, etc.
a. River VS Industry The river plays a vital role in domestic agriculture, industrial development, and the development of human civilization.
Bangladesh’s river systems have become contaminated as a result of fast population increase, unregulated construction along river banks, urbanization, and unplanned industrialization.
Industries are major pollutants because they consume a great deal of water and discharge dirty water into rivers.
Tanneries, shipwrecking, electronics, textiles, oil, and gas, as well as other newly developing processing businesses, contribute significantly to river pollution (Islam, 1997).
The discharge of untreated Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 75 wastewater and solid debris into the water system has a substantial impact on the river’s water quality.
In Dhaka, the tanneries, chemical, oil, and textile industries are the biggest pollutants of surface water.
Dhaka, Bangladesh’s capital, is one of the world's most densely populated cities.
The Buriganga River runs through the city, which is also bordered by the Turag, Dhaleshwari, Tongi Canal, Balu, and Shitalakkhya rivers.
The majority of enterprises and factories are located along the banks of these rivers or near the river system.
Along these rivers, there are around 7000 industries, especially in the Hazaribagh, Tejgon, and DhakaNarayanganj-Demra dam districts of Dhaka metropolis (Roy, 2009).
The Burignaga and its connected river absorb around 60000 cubic meters of hazardous waste per day, primarily from businesses in Tongi, Hazaribagh, Tejgoan, Narayanganj, Savar, Gazipur, and DEPZ (RPMC report, 2008).
According to another study, the tanneries in Hazaribagh produce 7.7 million liters of liquid waste and 88 million tons of solid garbage every day (The Daily Star, 2010).
Although the tanneries have already been relocated to Savar, they have mostly destroyed the water supply of the river Buriganga.
According to Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA), 6000 tons of liquid trash are thrown into the Buriganga River every day.
It is also estimated 70% of the Buriganga and other linking rivers of Dhaka city are polluted by industrial waste and toxic material.
b.
Case Analysis of Buriganga River Encroachment and excessive pollution have rendered Buriganga’s water unsuitable and unsustainable for aquatic life during the previous few decades.
The environment expert expresses that, still we have time to protect the Buriganga River from further pollution.
First and foremost, we must halt the constant release of hundreds of tons of industrial trash and junk into the environment.
Second, any enterprises that are next to the river should establish a water purifying facility.
In the past, attempts to clean up waterways failed to owe to polluters’ impunity.
We must take stronger action against these pollutants.
Above all, polluters must be held accountable for their actions.
The industries should follow environment-friendly technology to protect the Buriganga River.
3.
Agricultural land degradation of Savar Upazila Bangladesh is mostly an agricultural nation with a dense population and slow economic progress.
The increase in population and growth of reckless industrialization is creating high pressure on the lands of Bangladesh, especially on agricultural land.
Savar Upazila is a vast agricultural land of Bangladesh.
Most of the people live in agriculture in this area.
But in recent years, the excess growth of industries of different types are contained over agricultural land.
Almost 600 industries are present in Savar Upazila.
As the agricultural land is decreasing side by side, the rest lands are also being polluted by waste materials of those industries.
These solid toxic materials are dumped over the open land, causing both air pollution and land pollution.
The salinity of soil increased such that it is no longer cultivable.
Different pesticides are also responsible for that.
Savar contains a big EPZ that is containing vast agricultural land.
The tannery industry has been shifted to Savar which is causing massive land pollution.
Waste materials have become clogged in Zam city’s drains, sand, and soil, causing the area to stink and creating an environmental threat.
The untreated waters also flow over agricultural land and wetlands, causing an environmental hazard.
The brickfields in Ashulia are discharging waste material that is polluting nearby wetlands and agricultural lands.
It is also covering a big area, which is reducing cultivable lands in Savar.
Almost 300 textile factories in Ashulia is covering huge cultivable lands.
Various cultivable lands are bought from poor farmers to build industries, which on one side decreases cultivable lands, and on the other side, the waste materials of those industries are affecting the rest of cultivable lands.
In Savar Upozilla industries are grown up in an unplanned way.
Industrial toxic materials are polluting the land of Savar very much as well as water and air also.
The local villagers said that they cannot take bath in water because industrial waste materials are dumped on land, which causes water pollution.
Lands are no longer arable and the domestic animals also dying because of heavy toxic chemicals in the soil.
The huge land pollution of Savar is also destroying the nearby Shal forest.
Deforestation is also causing infertile land.
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 76 Environmental exploitation is dangerously happening in this area.
Here, marginalized communities are struggling to survive.
It is very much hard to grow crops from this infertile land, which is causing unemployment in that particular area.
Expert says that all the heavy industries are growing up in Savar region in an unplanned way.
Decentralization is needed to save the area from pollution.
The industries must be aware of their waste management.
If the industry uses highly advanced technology in their plant, it can reduce the pollution of land.
Effect of Climate Change Industrialization is always a key instrument for development, again it is the vital reason for climate change.
This climate change process has started since the beginning of the industrial revolution when industries started burning fossil fuels.
When fossil fuels are burned, they release a variety of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxide, chlorofluorocarbon, and others.
Most of the industries of Bangladesh use coal, gas, and natural petroleum to run.
When these toxic gasses are released into the atmosphere, it depletes the ozone layer, causing the entrance of harmful rays from the sun.
It also causes the greenhouse effect on the earth.
When these gasses are accumulated in the atmosphere from industries, it increases the average temperature of the earth by trapping it.
If the greenhouse effect intensifies, more heat is trapped than is required.
And the world will eventually grow more populated.
In the 21st century, it is the most significant driver of climate change.
The natural process of carbon emission and absorption is controlled by trees.
But due to rapid industrialization, forests are cut down vigorously, which destroys this cycle.
And thus more Carbondioxide is present in the earth’s atmosphere.
Figure 1.
Process of Climate Change Scientists have predicted that, if this continues and remains unaware, the southern part of Bangladesh will sink under the Bay of Bengal by 2050.
The toxic chemicals of industries like Sulphur-dioxide, Nitrous-Oxide are drained in river water which intoxicates the water.
When this water evaporates, it mixes with atmospheric CarbonDioxide and becomes acidic.
This increases the chance of acid rain.
Recently, in Bangladesh, people face difficult weather patterns for this ecological imbalance.
During summer, excessive temperature, and in winter, extreme cold is felt.
The rise of average temperature has increased significantly in past years, which affected the socio-economical life.
The inconsistency in rainfall causes serious damage to agriculture.
Due to rapid industrialization, deforestation is occurring in a massive way, which is also responsible for landslides in hilly areas of Bangladesh.
These accumulative reasons are causing climate change in Bangladesh.
Climate change has a serious impact on human life.
The following are some of the effects:1.
Unemployment Unemployment is the lack of job facilities for an abled person, both for an educated and illiterate person.
Every country faces this problem and Bangladesh is no exception to it.
The people of Bangladesh have a mainly agriculture-based earning system.
Most of the general people used to cultivate their land or fish in the river.
But as industries started raising, cultivable land started decreasing and farmers lost their earnings.
Even they are not skillful to work in the industries.
Advanced technologies started replacing humans in the industries, causing massive unemployment.
In the Rampal Power Plant project, 1834 acres of land were taken from poor people.
Almost 400 houses and their cultivable land has been taken by the government.
This situation made massive unemployment of people and also made forced migration to a new place, especially in cities.
And this coal-based power plant will damage the in around cultivable lands, which will create more unemployment.
Buriganga River was the heart of many people’s earnings.
But nowadays, the river is so polluted that no more aquatic life is present there.
Many fishermen have lost their earnings for that.
River pollution is also causing the death of rivers and polluting the other connecting rivers.
Industrialization on one side is a source of employment, but for skilled Industries N2O, CFC, CH4, CO2 Cluttering the Atmosphere Global Warming Climate Change Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 77 labor.
But most people are unskilled for industrial work.
As well as in many industries, advanced technologies are used for accelerated production rather than human labor.
Industrialization is causing a significant number of unemployed people in Bangladesh.
This unemployment in the rural area is creating force migration towards cities, causing excessive land pressure and a cluttered population.
Ecological balance is damaged for an unequal number of population in the cities, making ineligible to live.
This causes more environmental degradation in society.
2.
Health Hazard Climate change is the prime reason for health hazards in human life as well as various animals.
In developing countries, five children die every minute from malaria or diarrhea.
Every hour, 100 children die as a result of indoor exposure to solid fuel smoke.
Nearly 1,800 people die every day in emerging cities as a result of urban air pollution.
Nearly 19,000 individuals die each month in poor nations as a result of accidental poisoning.
(Remonduo, 2009).
For industrialization, various types of pollution like air pollution, soil pollution, and water pollution is creating hundreds of diseases in human life.
According to World Health Organization (WHO), 24% of total global death is responsible for various types of diseases caused by environmental pollution.
Arsenic poisoning, insufficient solid waste management, and industrial effluent management have all made Bangladesh’s water a severe health threat.
Even workers of various industries are affecting themselves while working with toxic materials, harmful chemicals, and excessive sound pollution.
Most old-aged persons and infants are the main victim of environmental pollution.
Groundwater contamination for various harmful chemicals like Arsenic and Iron creates deadly diseases like Cancer.
And water bodies of Bangladesh are polluted through various industrial waste materials and weak effluent management systems.
Air and noise pollution in cities is at an alarming level, causing various mental and physical disabilities of humans.
This climate change costs human life more.
3.
Food and Resource scarcity Food and resource are very important for human life.
As climate change started in Bangladesh, food and resource scarcity raised to a higher level.
Industrialization is replacing the agroculture business from Bangladesh by containing arable lands and intoxicating the soil.
The quality of food has decreased because of various pesticides and chemicals.
Food production has decreased enormously due to huge losses by the farmers as the food production rate decreased because a large number of lands are contained by more than 30,000 industries.
As the population is increasing, food production is not increasing at that rate, causing food scarcity.
For various pollution in nature, food chain damaged in the society, causing less food production.
Various rivers are polluted by industrial toxic wastage, causing fewer fish in the water.
Foodgrains contain harmful toxic materials through air pollution, causing less harvest even in the seasons.
Many industries use non-renewable resources like gas, oil, coal, etc.
As these natural resources are used enormously by the industries, resource scarcity is prevalent in Bangladesh.
Population and industries are increasing tremendously, but the resources are not increasing because it is fixed in a particular geographical location.
Many resources are used uncontrollably by the industries, so very soon the resource scarcity will target the alarming stage.
4.
Global warming The rise in global temperature is referred to as global warming.
As a result of the melting ice in the poles caused by global warming, the delta countries will be submerged.
In a survey, it is found that, if the global warming for climate change rises at this rate, 70% of the total area of Bangladesh will be under the Bay of Bengal within the next 50 years.
According to the Global Climate Risk Index 2018, Bangladesh is the 6th most vulnerable country to global warming and climate change.
It is very alarming for such a developing country as Bangladesh.
The main reason for rising temperature in the global area is environmental degradation.
Industrial emissions and Green House Gas in the open-air cause the breakdown of the ozone layer in the atmosphere.
As a result, direct harmful rays from the Sun like UV rays are melting the polar ice and increasing harmful diseases in human life.
The natural features of coastal soil and water will be destroyed when the sea level rises.
It would shift the river’s estuary’s position, resulting in significant changes in fish habitat and breeding grounds.
And it has a greater tendency of forced environmental Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 78 migration.
Climate change is a continuous process; changes gradually.
But the effect of environmental pollution has increased the rate much higher.
It affects agriculture and the production of various grains.
It also affects the natural ecosystem of a country.
5.
Natural Disaster Natural catastrophes have a long history in Bangladesh.
From 1997 to 2016, it experienced around 187 natural disasters and around 859 people died in that.
The financial loss of 2, 31,000 cr.
USD has been estimated during this period of disaster.
Bangladesh is very vulnerable to natural disasters due to its geographic position, land features, abundance of rivers, and changing monsoon climate.
Bangladesh is very vulnerable to natural disasters.
And the effect of climate change increases the rate of natural disasters.
Scientists found that in comparison to 2016 to 2017, the rate of natural disasters was more and a possible cause of this is environmental pollution for rapid industrialization.
Rapid industrialization increases the chance of an earthquake.
From 2017 to 2018, Bangladesh has faced several mild earthquakes (Kuddus, 2017).
As ecological imbalance is caused by rapid industrialization, the environment is losing its capacity to prevent a natural disaster.
It is seen that floods are a very common phenomenon in Bangladesh because of ecological imbalance.
It is an alarming threat for Bangladesh that her environment is largely affected by industrialization; Bangladesh has lost its balance, for which natural disaster occurs frequently.
Natural disasters like cyclones, floods, earthquakes, drought, unusual rainfall, landslides, etc.
are frequently happening in Bangladesh.
Because of climate change, the temperature of the sea is increasing which causes cyclones.
Water in the rivers is rising because of ice melting.
The inconsistency increases in nature because of climate change.
6.
Ecological imbalance As industrial development is increasing day by day throughout the country, especially by the riverside, environmental sustainability is declining.
Most of the unplanned tannery industries and oil industries are achieving their goals and interest by deteriorating the environment.
Industries are not following any specific guidelines for waste management.
They just dispose of their industrial waste in the river water.
In the tannery industry, many types of poisonous chemicals are being used for the processing of leather.
All these chemicals come out from the industries as solid and liquid waste and get mixed with the river water.
Then the water of the river is being polluted by the wastage of the industries.
In the polluted water, there are no species of fish; the natural color of water and the smell of water has been changed because of industrial development.
Without the tannery’s waste, the dumping of oil of ship and launch is also responsible for the ecological imbalance of the Buriganga River.
Industrial development has been considered the main culprit of climate change.
Throughout the world, most of the developed countries are emitting the largest amount of carbon dioxide.
Because of carbon dioxide, the temperature of the world is increasing gradually.
So, the developing countries are suffering from many problems, especially the countries of the coastal area like Bangladesh.
Bangladeshi industries are also accountable for that.
As a result, it has been facing many natural disasters like earthquakes, floods, cyclone drought, ozone layer depletion, and so on.
CONCLUSION Industrialization is needed for a country’s economic development, at the same time we have to preserve the environment.
From Bangladesh’s perspective, though industrialization is in the initial stage, it is degrading our environment.
During the last two decades, Bangladesh has faced more natural disasters than before.
The unplanned industries and this industry’s unplanned solid waste management are accountable for climate change such as water pollution, air pollution, soil pollution, and deforestation.
Owing to climate change, people have been suffering from various economic difficulties as well as deadly diseases.
So, the government of Bangladesh should have taken possible measures for sustainable development, in which industrial development and the environment would get the same importance.
The governmental organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, should increase social awareness so that a decentralized policy of industrialization will have taken instead of a centralized policy of industrialization.
The government must have taken strict policy guidelines and must have implemented those during the Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 68-79 79 establishment of an industrial park.
The government also must have ensured the use of high industrial technology to protect the environment as well as bolster the environment-friendly industries.
REFERENCES 1.
Ahmed, A.I.M.U.
(2008).
Underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation in Bangladesh, A report submitted to the Global Forest Coalition (GFC), The Netherlands.
University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
2.
Alfonso, G. P. (2021).
Assessing the Climate Change Adaptations of Upland Farmers: A Case of La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines.
Indonesian Journal of Social and Environmental Issues (IJSEI), 2(2), 129-142.
3.
GOB.
(2008).
Bangladesh Road Network Improvement and Maintenance Project, Ministry of Communication Roads and Highways Department, Dhaka, Bangladesh [Accessed on 15th November 2018] 4.
Goodess, C.M.
Palutikof, J.P. and Davies, T.D.
(1992).
The nature and causes of climate change: assessing the long-term future, Belhaven Press.
5.
Islam, K. and Sato, N. (2012).
Deforestation, land conversion and illegal logging in Bangladesh: the case of the Sal (Shorea robusta) forests, iForest-Biogeosciences, and Forestry, 5(3), 171.
6.
Islam, M.S.
et al.
(2015).
Alteration of water pollution level with the seasonal changes in mean daily discharge in three main rivers around Dhaka City, Bangladesh.
Environments, 2(3), 280-294.
7.
Khan, M.A.I., et al.
(2007).
Physico-chemical and biological aspects of monsoon waters of Ashulia for economic and aesthetic applications: Preliminary studies.
Bangladesh Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research, 42(4), 377-396.
8.
Kumar, C. (2017).
Bangladesh Power Plant Struggle Calls for International Solidarity, Huff Post.
[Accessed 19th December 2018].
9.
Magsi, H. (2014).
Industrialization, Environment and Pollution, The Diplomatic Insight [Accessed on 10th November 2018].
10.
Mgbemene, C.A.. (2016).
Industrialization, and its backlash: focus on climate change and its consequences, J. Environ.
Sci.
Technol, (9), 301-316.
11.
Rahman, M. (2016).
Air pollution by Chemical Industries in Dhaka city, The Daily Observer, http://www.observerbd.com/2016/01/23/13244 8.php.
[Accessed on 19 December 2018].
12.
Roy, M. (2009).
Planning for sustainable urbanization in fast-growing cities: Mitigation and adaptation issues addressed in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Habitat International, 33(3), 276 286.
13.
Rozalinna, G. M., & Aulia Izzah Azmi.
(2020).
Evaluation of Boundary-Spanning on Climate Change ENGO International Greenpeace in Asia.
Indonesian Journal of Social and Environmental Issues (IJSEI), 1(2), 108-121.
14.
The Daily Star.
(2018).
Polluters must pay The Daily Star.
[ONLINE] Available at: http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/newsdetails.php?nid=155050.
[Accessed on 19th December 2018].
15.
Woodwell, G.M.
(1989).
The warming of the industrialized middle latitudes 1985–2050: causes and consequences, Climatic Change, 15(1-2), 31-50. http://www.observerbd.com/2016/01/23/132448.php.%20%5bAccessed http://www.observerbd.com/2016/01/23/132448.php.%20%5bAccessed http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=155050 http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=155050
220 Proper, Weighty and Extremely Weighty Cause to End an Employment Contract in Finland Emma-Lotta Mäkeläinen, Sofia Toivonen, and Tiina Räsänen Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana* Faculty of Law, the University of Sidney, NSW, Australia: and Eco-region Development Management Center for Bali and Nusa Tenggara, Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia 1.
Introduction 1.1.
Background Despite the controversies surrounding the uncertain scientific aspects of climate change in the political arena, climate change and its adverse effects are likely to have appalling consequences for human life if humans do not make significant efforts to deal with this global phenomenon.
Not surprisingly, a variety of catastrophic events such as tropical storm surges, sea level rise, biodiversity loss, floods and droughts are bearing down upon us.
Abstract This article seeks to highlight the existing 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter referred to as Refugee Convention) and the possibilities of the document to encompass climate-induced migration by modifying, reconstructing and establishing a specific legal regime, considering that the concept of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been inadequate and incapable to incorporate the ‘newly introduced’ type of migrant.
The definition of refugee in the Convention explicitly limits the scope of people who are forced to flee their home into migrants due to warfare and civil disturbance.
In fact, there are people who can no longer gain decent livelihood due to environmental and social problems including poverty, drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation, floods and other environmental deterioration.
However, these people have not been legally accepted as ‘refugee’ in the international arena.
The author argues that ‘environmental refugee’ or ‘climate refugee’ is a clear and present issue, as climate change-related disasters are rampant and deteriorating.
Therefore, this article will examine the existing and potential role of international law in effectively responding to climate change and its related humanitarian problems in the future.
The development of a specific legal document on environmental refugee and the global acceptance of the status of the people not only represent a short-term solution for the affected people, but also introduce a long-term commitment of international community to alleviate poverty and guarantee the fulfilment of basic human rights and social justice for everyone.
This article primarily investigates relevant legal documents and discovers some legal and non-legal concepts that are connected to the central topic of this article.
Keywords: Climate Change; Refugee; Displacement; Migration.
How to Cite (chicago-16th): Sarjana, I Gede Eka.
“Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee.” Udayana Journal of Law and Culture 2, no.
2 (2018): 220-248. https://doi.org/110.24843/UJLC.2018.v02.i02.p05 doI: https://doi.org/10.24843/UJLC.2018.v02.i02.p05 Vol.
02 No.
2, JULY 2018, 220 248 1 * E-mail/Corresponding Author: ekasarjana12@gmail.com Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 221 within a national territory, in which case people are known as ‘internally displaced persons’ (hereinafter referred to as IDPs), or beyond national borders, where they are considered ‘migrants’ or ‘refugees’.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter referred to as UNHCR), natural and man-made disasters have forced millions of people to relocate every year since 2008.7 The International Organization of Migration has made a similar prediction: that within a few more decades approximately 200 million people will have to flee their home due to environmental matters.8 In the environmental context, a variety of terms have been used to define people who migrate to other countries due to unliveable environmental conditions.9 One term frequently used in the media or informally accepted among international community is ‘environmental refugees’ or ‘climate refugees’.
This term is used to clarify the link between the adverse effects of climate change and human displacement.10 Regardless of the ongoing controversy on the terminology, in this article, the term ‘climate refugees’11 is used to refer to those who are forced to leave their home as a result of environmental degradation, within and outside their country.
Considering several cases on the application to seek environmental refugee status, this article argues that the existing approaches to and views on ‘climate refugees’ or ‘environmental refugees’ 12 have been too narrow and unfair, compared to the views on the Refugee Convention.
Moreover, the existing Refugee Convention has been, to some extent, disadvantageous and rigid, causing serious impediment in its implementation to the current development of human displacement.
7 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Pledges to Better Protect and Assist People Displaced by Disaster’ (2016)<http:// www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/5/574843f34/unhcr-pledges-better-protect-assist-people-displaceddisaster.html> 8 International Organization for Migration, ‘Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence’, (2009)<http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf> 9 Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, “Defining ‘Environmental Migration,” Forced Migration Review 31 (2008): 10-11. http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2406&context=sspapers 10 See Antonio Guterres, ‘Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective’, (2008) <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.pdf> 11 The term has long been used and accepted by scholars in many international journals and documents.
For example, see Richard Black, “Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?”, UNHCR Working Papers 34 (2001); see also Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World,” Bio Science 43, no.
11 (1993): 752-761.
DOI: 10.2307/1312319; see also Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue”, A paper presented at the Economic Forum (May 2005) https://www.osce.org/ eea/14851?download=true ; see also Essam El Hinnawi, “Environmental Refugees”, UNEP (1985); see also David Keane, “The Environmental Causes and consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of ‘Environmental Refugees’,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 16 (2004).
12 Although the use of the term ‘climate/environmental refugees’ has been considered a legal mistake by some scholars, because it is not in accordance with the definition of refugee set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention, for the purpose of this article, the terms ‘environmental migrants’, ‘climate refugees’, or ‘environmental refugees’ will be used interchangeably to classify people who should and would potentially leave their place of origins due to the insistence of the environment, especially climate change.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana The international community has witnessed the horrendous and widespread impacts of climate change, both on the environment and on humans.1 However, global concern has, to date, focused on how to mitigate and prevent further devastating impacts, with less concern about the people who are seriously affected by these calamities.
People have lost their homes, properties and families due to enormous typhoons in many countries.
They have lost their access to food and clean water due to extreme weather.2 However, it is highly challenging to establish scientific evidence that climate change is the trigger of, and is strongly manipulating, the decision of people to migrate.
This is due to the fact that the roles of contributing factors, such as economic hardship, political strife, poverty, unemployment and armed conflict are mingled and difficult to disentangle.3 Consequently, environmental factors cannot be clearly identified and isolated from the others.4 Human displacement or migration is not a new phenomenon in human history.5 People move from one place to the other due to a wide variety of reasons, including natural and environmental disasters.
The history of human movement caused by natural disasters, such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, for example, started hundreds of years ago as a common effort to survive disaster.6 Regardless the legal definition stipulated in the Refugee Convention, practically, the movement can be 1 See Ben Boer and Alan Boyle, “Human Rights and the Environment.” Background Paper for the 13th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights, Sydney Law School Research Paper, no.
14/14.
(2014): 1-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2393753; See also United Nations Environment Programme, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights.
Report (2015): 1-10; Michael Brzoska and Christiane Fröhlich, “Climate Change, Migration and Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities, Pathways and Adaptation Strategies,” Migration and Development 5, no.2 (2016): 190-210. https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1022973; also the discussion on ‘Climate Change and Atmospheric Pollution’ in Patricia Birne, Alan Boyle, Catherine Ridgwell, ‘International Law and the Environment, (New york: Oxford University Press, 2009): 335-378; also Walter Kalin, ‘The Climate Change-Displacement Nexus’, (Brookings, 2008); <http://www.brookings.edu/ research/speeches/2008/07/16-climate-change-kalin> 2 See UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Backs Increased Protection for People Fleeing Disasters and Climate Change’ (2015)<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/10/561e77f56/unhcr-backs-increased-protection-people-fleeing-disasters-climate-change.html> 3 See the discussion on ‘Conceptualizing Climate Change-Related Movement’ in Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (New york: Oxford University Press, 2012); see also Vikram Kolmannskog and Lisetta Trebbi, “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Displacement: A MultiTrack Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps.” International Review of the Red Cross 92, no.
879 (2010): 713-730. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383110000500 4 Jane McAdam, “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is not the Answer,” International Journal of Refugee Law 23, no.
1 (2011): 13-14.
5 Vikram Odedra Kolmansskog, ‘Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conclict and Forced Migration’, (2008) Norwegian Refugee Council<http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/ resource_guides/Migration_and_Climate_Change/Future_floods_of_refugees.pdf> 6 Alberto Angulo Morales, Oscar Alvarez Gila, ‘Disasters and Migration in Western Early Modern Societies (17th-18th Centuries)’, (2014) Migracionesen 3 Milenio.indd<http://www.academia.edu/6717913/ Disasters_and_Migration_in_Western_Early_Modern_Societies_17th-18th_Centuries>; see also: Carolina Fritz, ‘Climate Change and Migration: Sorting Through Complex Issues Without the Hype’, (2010)<http:// www.migrationpolicy.org/article/climate-change-and-migration-sorting-through-complex-issues-withouthype> 222 within a national territory, in which case people are known as ‘internally displaced persons’ (hereinafter referred to as IDPs), or beyond national borders, where they are considered ‘migrants’ or ‘refugees’.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter referred to as UNHCR), natural and man-made disasters have forced millions of people to relocate every year since 2008.7 The International Organization of Migration has made a similar prediction: that within a few more decades approximately 200 million people will have to flee their home due to environmental matters.8 In the environmental context, a variety of terms have been used to define people who migrate to other countries due to unliveable environmental conditions.9 One term frequently used in the media or informally accepted among international community is ‘environmental refugees’ or ‘climate refugees’.
This term is used to clarify the link between the adverse effects of climate change and human displacement.10 Regardless of the ongoing controversy on the terminology, in this article, the term ‘climate refugees’11 is used to refer to those who are forced to leave their home as a result of environmental degradation, within and outside their country.
Considering several cases on the application to seek environmental refugee status, this article argues that the existing approaches to and views on ‘climate refugees’ or ‘environmental refugees’ 12 have been too narrow and unfair, compared to the views on the Refugee Convention.
Moreover, the existing Refugee Convention has been, to some extent, disadvantageous and rigid, causing serious impediment in its implementation to the current development of human displacement.
7 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Pledges to Better Protect and Assist People Displaced by Disaster’ (2016)<http:// www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/5/574843f34/unhcr-pledges-better-protect-assist-people-displaceddisaster.html> 8 International Organization for Migration, ‘Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence’, (2009)<http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf> 9 Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, “Defining ‘Environmental Migration,” Forced Migration Review 31 (2008): 10-11. http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2406&context=sspapers 10 See Antonio Guterres, ‘Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective’, (2008) <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.pdf> 11 The term has long been used and accepted by scholars in many international journals and documents.
For example, see Richard Black, “Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?”, UNHCR Working Papers 34 (2001); see also Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World,” Bio Science 43, no.
11 (1993): 752-761.
DOI: 10.2307/1312319; see also Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue”, A paper presented at the Economic Forum (May 2005) https://www.osce.org/ eea/14851?download=true ; see also Essam El Hinnawi, “Environmental Refugees”, UNEP (1985); see also David Keane, “The Environmental Causes and consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of ‘Environmental Refugees’,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 16 (2004).
12 Although the use of the term ‘climate/environmental refugees’ has been considered a legal mistake by some scholars, because it is not in accordance with the definition of refugee set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention, for the purpose of this article, the terms ‘environmental migrants’, ‘climate refugees’, or ‘environmental refugees’ will be used interchangeably to classify people who should and would potentially leave their place of origins due to the insistence of the environment, especially climate change.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana The international community has witnessed the horrendous and widespread impacts of climate change, both on the environment and on humans.1 However, global concern has, to date, focused on how to mitigate and prevent further devastating impacts, with less concern about the people who are seriously affected by these calamities.
People have lost their homes, properties and families due to enormous typhoons in many countries.
They have lost their access to food and clean water due to extreme weather.2 However, it is highly challenging to establish scientific evidence that climate change is the trigger of, and is strongly manipulating, the decision of people to migrate.
This is due to the fact that the roles of contributing factors, such as economic hardship, political strife, poverty, unemployment and armed conflict are mingled and difficult to disentangle.3 Consequently, environmental factors cannot be clearly identified and isolated from the others.4 Human displacement or migration is not a new phenomenon in human history.5 People move from one place to the other due to a wide variety of reasons, including natural and environmental disasters.
The history of human movement caused by natural disasters, such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, for example, started hundreds of years ago as a common effort to survive disaster.6 Regardless the legal definition stipulated in the Refugee Convention, practically, the movement can be 1 See Ben Boer and Alan Boyle, “Human Rights and the Environment.” Background Paper for the 13th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights, Sydney Law School Research Paper, no.
14/14.
(2014): 1-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2393753; See also United Nations Environment Programme, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights.
Report (2015): 1-10; Michael Brzoska and Christiane Fröhlich, “Climate Change, Migration and Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities, Pathways and Adaptation Strategies,” Migration and Development 5, no.2 (2016): 190-210. https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1022973; also the discussion on ‘Climate Change and Atmospheric Pollution’ in Patricia Birne, Alan Boyle, Catherine Ridgwell, ‘International Law and the Environment, (New york: Oxford University Press, 2009): 335-378; also Walter Kalin, ‘The Climate Change-Displacement Nexus’, (Brookings, 2008); <http://www.brookings.edu/ research/speeches/2008/07/16-climate-change-kalin> 2 See UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Backs Increased Protection for People Fleeing Disasters and Climate Change’ (2015)<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/10/561e77f56/unhcr-backs-increased-protection-people-fleeing-disasters-climate-change.html> 3 See the discussion on ‘Conceptualizing Climate Change-Related Movement’ in Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (New york: Oxford University Press, 2012); see also Vikram Kolmannskog and Lisetta Trebbi, “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Displacement: A MultiTrack Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps.” International Review of the Red Cross 92, no.
879 (2010): 713-730. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383110000500 4 Jane McAdam, “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is not the Answer,” International Journal of Refugee Law 23, no.
1 (2011): 13-14.
5 Vikram Odedra Kolmansskog, ‘Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conclict and Forced Migration’, (2008) Norwegian Refugee Council<http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/ resource_guides/Migration_and_Climate_Change/Future_floods_of_refugees.pdf> 6 Alberto Angulo Morales, Oscar Alvarez Gila, ‘Disasters and Migration in Western Early Modern Societies (17th-18th Centuries)’, (2014) Migracionesen 3 Milenio.indd<http://www.academia.edu/6717913/ Disasters_and_Migration_in_Western_Early_Modern_Societies_17th-18th_Centuries>; see also: Carolina Fritz, ‘Climate Change and Migration: Sorting Through Complex Issues Without the Hype’, (2010)<http:// www.migrationpolicy.org/article/climate-change-and-migration-sorting-through-complex-issues-withouthype> Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 223 This article will proceed in the following order: (1) describing the introductory part that comprises background, purpose, method, and literature review; (2) explaining the result of research inquiries and the analysis.
This section starts with an intertwining relationship between climate change and human movement.
It also discusses various interpretation to classify environmental migrants as refugee by scrutinizing the meaning of persecution stipulated in the Convention as well as incorporating humanitarian aspects.
Lastly, this article deconstructs the formulation of ‘refugee’ in order to highlight the link between climate changes and human migration.
To do so, the perspectives from both developed and developing countries are compared in establishing an argument that strongly supports environmental migrants to obtain equal protection as currently enjoyed by traditional refugees.
This article is concluded by reiterating and emphasizing that, although environmental refugees or climate refugees are not legally comprehended in the international legal framework, it is morally wrong for states and international organisations to leave them behind for a problem they did little or nothing to cause.
1.4.
Literature Review It has been widely acknowledged that the issue of refugees has received major attention all over the globe.17 Some studies were carried out to monitor the progress of international soft law on refugees.
As an example, Hansen reviews the progress of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF),18 a framework that is based on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution, to be developed and initiated by UNHCR for any situation involving large movements of refugees.19 Another instance is the recent outlook on the establishment of a Global Compact on Refugees,20 a non legally binding document that based on the New york Declaration and builds upon CRRF for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility sharing among UN members.21 Dallal Stevens discusses the implications of state sovereignty over a generous, meaningful and humane approach to asylum by taking a look at the recent situation 17 See for example how media may play a vital role in determining public opinion on refugees crisis in Esther Greussing and Hajo G. Boomgaarden, “Shifting the Refugee Narrative?
An Automated Frame Analysis of Europe’s 2015 Refugee Crisis,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43, No.
11 (2017): 1762-1764, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1282813 18 Randall Hansen, “The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: A Commentary,” Journal of Refugee Studies 31, no.
2(2018): 131, doi:10.1093/jrs/fey020 19 Resolution, United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/71/1 (2016), Annex I, para 2.
20 Meltem Ineli-Ciger, “Will the Global Compact on Refugees Address the Gap in International Refugee Law Concerning Burden Sharing?” European Journal of International Law ( 2018),https://www.ejiltalk.
org/will-the-global-compact-on-refugees-address-the-gap-in-international-refugee-law-concerning-burden-sharing/ 21 The Global Compact on Refugees, the Final Draft (as at 26 June 2018), para 4. http://www.unhcr.org/5b3295167 Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Although climate change has been considered as one of the biggest environmental problems of humankind, not many progresses were achieved over the last few decades on the status of the people affected by this global catastrophe.
Only a few scholars and international human rights bodies advocate the newly introduced term, ‘Environmental refugees’ or ‘climate refugee’ to be accepted in the international legal document.
The term was introduced by Essam El-Hinnawi (UNEP) in 1985, followed by other scholars including Norman Myers13, Diane C. Bates14, Elizabeth Burleson15, Richard Black 16 and others.
1.2.
Purpose This article explores the possibilities of climate-induced migrants to be considered as refugees under the international legal regime.
It discusses the development of a more flexible human rights legal regime to encompass a wider range of displacement.
In doing so, this paper examines the existing Refugee Convention in dealing with human displacement to determine whether the Convention encompasses a wide range of human displacement.
This article does not attempt to look at the fallacies and the weaknesses of the existing Refugee Convention, nor does it challenge the psychological and historical background behind the development of the document.
Rather, it aims to find an adequate space between the legal normative instrument and the reality, where decision makers could consider the necessity of being innovative in interpreting the law to prevent a legal vacum for the sake of humanity.
In other words, dynamic interpretation of the existing instruments should be implemented to provide protection for the affected people, including the implementation of relevant international legal principles to ensure that the rights of the affected people are fully protected.
1.3.
Method This writing reflects a legal research that primarily investigates relevant legal documents and discovers some legal and non-legal concepts that are connected to the central topic of this article.
The analysis is established by contending legal principles and norms as stipulated in international legal instruments as well as facts, concepts, and theories as provided in reports, textbooks, scientific journal and reviews.
In particular, provisions contained in some legal instruments are interpreted beyond the creator’s intention but are construed in a dynamic means by taking into consideration the current context and the development of international community’s common sense.
13 Norman Myers, ‘Environmental Refugees,” Population and Environment 19, no.2 (1997): 167-182. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024623431924 14 Diane C. Bates, “Environmental Refugees?
Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change,” Population and Environment 23, no.
5 (2002): 465-477.
15 Elizabeth Burleson, ‘Climate Change Displacement to Refuge,’ Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 25, no.
19 (2010): 19-36.
16 Richard Black, Op.Cit.
224 This article will proceed in the following order: (1) describing the introductory part that comprises background, purpose, method, and literature review; (2) explaining the result of research inquiries and the analysis.
This section starts with an intertwining relationship between climate change and human movement.
It also discusses various interpretation to classify environmental migrants as refugee by scrutinizing the meaning of persecution stipulated in the Convention as well as incorporating humanitarian aspects.
Lastly, this article deconstructs the formulation of ‘refugee’ in order to highlight the link between climate changes and human migration.
To do so, the perspectives from both developed and developing countries are compared in establishing an argument that strongly supports environmental migrants to obtain equal protection as currently enjoyed by traditional refugees.
This article is concluded by reiterating and emphasizing that, although environmental refugees or climate refugees are not legally comprehended in the international legal framework, it is morally wrong for states and international organisations to leave them behind for a problem they did little or nothing to cause.
1.4.
Literature Review It has been widely acknowledged that the issue of refugees has received major attention all over the globe.17 Some studies were carried out to monitor the progress of international soft law on refugees.
As an example, Hansen reviews the progress of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF),18 a framework that is based on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution, to be developed and initiated by UNHCR for any situation involving large movements of refugees.19 Another instance is the recent outlook on the establishment of a Global Compact on Refugees,20 a non legally binding document that based on the New york Declaration and builds upon CRRF for predictable and equitable burden and responsibility sharing among UN members.21 Dallal Stevens discusses the implications of state sovereignty over a generous, meaningful and humane approach to asylum by taking a look at the recent situation 17 See for example how media may play a vital role in determining public opinion on refugees crisis in Esther Greussing and Hajo G. Boomgaarden, “Shifting the Refugee Narrative?
An Automated Frame Analysis of Europe’s 2015 Refugee Crisis,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43, No.
11 (2017): 1762-1764, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1282813 18 Randall Hansen, “The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: A Commentary,” Journal of Refugee Studies 31, no.
2(2018): 131, doi:10.1093/jrs/fey020 19 Resolution, United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/71/1 (2016), Annex I, para 2.
20 Meltem Ineli-Ciger, “Will the Global Compact on Refugees Address the Gap in International Refugee Law Concerning Burden Sharing?” European Journal of International Law ( 2018),https://www.ejiltalk.
org/will-the-global-compact-on-refugees-address-the-gap-in-international-refugee-law-concerning-burden-sharing/ 21 The Global Compact on Refugees, the Final Draft (as at 26 June 2018), para 4. http://www.unhcr.org/5b3295167 Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Although climate change has been considered as one of the biggest environmental problems of humankind, not many progresses were achieved over the last few decades on the status of the people affected by this global catastrophe.
Only a few scholars and international human rights bodies advocate the newly introduced term, ‘Environmental refugees’ or ‘climate refugee’ to be accepted in the international legal document.
The term was introduced by Essam El-Hinnawi (UNEP) in 1985, followed by other scholars including Norman Myers13, Diane C. Bates14, Elizabeth Burleson15, Richard Black 16 and others.
1.2.
Purpose This article explores the possibilities of climate-induced migrants to be considered as refugees under the international legal regime.
It discusses the development of a more flexible human rights legal regime to encompass a wider range of displacement.
In doing so, this paper examines the existing Refugee Convention in dealing with human displacement to determine whether the Convention encompasses a wide range of human displacement.
This article does not attempt to look at the fallacies and the weaknesses of the existing Refugee Convention, nor does it challenge the psychological and historical background behind the development of the document.
Rather, it aims to find an adequate space between the legal normative instrument and the reality, where decision makers could consider the necessity of being innovative in interpreting the law to prevent a legal vacum for the sake of humanity.
In other words, dynamic interpretation of the existing instruments should be implemented to provide protection for the affected people, including the implementation of relevant international legal principles to ensure that the rights of the affected people are fully protected.
1.3.
Method This writing reflects a legal research that primarily investigates relevant legal documents and discovers some legal and non-legal concepts that are connected to the central topic of this article.
The analysis is established by contending legal principles and norms as stipulated in international legal instruments as well as facts, concepts, and theories as provided in reports, textbooks, scientific journal and reviews.
In particular, provisions contained in some legal instruments are interpreted beyond the creator’s intention but are construed in a dynamic means by taking into consideration the current context and the development of international community’s common sense.
13 Norman Myers, ‘Environmental Refugees,” Population and Environment 19, no.2 (1997): 167-182. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024623431924 14 Diane C. Bates, “Environmental Refugees?
Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change,” Population and Environment 23, no.
5 (2002): 465-477.
15 Elizabeth Burleson, ‘Climate Change Displacement to Refuge,’ Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 25, no.
19 (2010): 19-36.
16 Richard Black, Op.Cit.
Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 225 refugee’ is consistently promoted and elevated.
However, she urges actions from developed countries to assist the affected people by reducing their emission instead of labelling them with ‘environmental refugees’.30 Bayes Ahmad offered critical overview of accommodating the climate refugees by countries and proposed an innovative method by considering the status of climate pollution, resource consumption, economy and human development rankings to address the problem by bringing humanitarian justice to the ultimate climate refugees.31 In addition, Wennersten et.al acknowledges that the concept of climate refugees is a legitimate category without any convincing justification.32 2.
Result and Analysis 2.1.
Climate Change and Human Movement: A Matter of Causalities While the scientific aspects of climate change have become the most common topics of discussion among scholars and the scientific community, the social and humanitarian aspects of this global phenomenon have received little attention.33 Although human displacement has been considered one of the most severe social impacts of climate change, 34 the impact on transboundary human displacement is considered a less appealing issue, and therefore, has not been legally stipulated in international instruments.
In the latest synthesis reports, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has suggested that the adverse impacts of climate change will potentially affect humans in various ways, including human movement, and has suggested that human displacement is one of the most effective adaptation mechanisms35 Scholars and international humanitarian agencies have projected that the number of people who have to migrate as a result of climate change will continue to grow within the 30 Rebecca Hingley, “Climate Refugees: An Oceanic Perspective,” Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 4, no.
1 (2017):158-165.
31 Bayes Ahmed, “Who TakesResponsibility for the ClimateRefugees?,” International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 10,no 1 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1108/ IJCCSM-10-20160149 (2018): 5.
32 Andrew Baldwin,“Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-first Century,” by Wennersten, John, and Robbins, Denise.
book review, International Migration Review 1-3 , 2018.
33 Antonio Guterres, Op.Cit.
34 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ (2007)<https://www.ipcc.
ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf>; While it is also considered by the IPCC as a normal adaptation measure against climate change 35 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report’, (2015), 73 <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf>; Although for one island state in the pacific, human displacement is not supposed to be part of adaptation mechanism in international instrument, because it would give an impression that the complexity of climate change can be easily solved by displacing people, instead of reducing the greenhouse gases emission which have been identified and accepted as the major cause of the phenomenon.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana of Syrian migration to European countries.22 It provides an approach that resulted in a view that the European Union has not fully harmonized asylum policy in order to establish minimum acceptable standards for applicants and ensure the granting of international protection to beneficiaries.23 The study found that membership of, and integration into, a new community, is the meaning of asylum and protection for the refugee.24 Worster conducted a study to discuss the use of human-centered interests in expanding the legal concept of refugees as defined in the Convention under customary international law and the use of state-centered interests in narrowing such definition.25 It suggested that defining refugee under customary international law should include inter alia ‘individuals persecuted on the basis of gender or sexual orientation.26 Another study from Jenny Poon recommends to expand the definition of “persecution” by recognising environmental refugees as members of “a particular social group”, or creating an entirely new treaty.27 Scholars have been discussing the existing formulation of ‘refugee’ and ‘the crisis’ over the last few decades.28 John R. Wennersten and Denise Robbins highlight the catastrophic impact of climate change on human displacement in many countries, specifically in Asia and Africa.
The authors argue that millions of people have been hit by climate-related calamities and compelled to flee their homes as refugee, while the term ‘environmental refugees’ has not been legally accepted.29 A more interesting and contradicting opinion comes from Rebecca Hingley.
While other scholars promote the term ‘environmental refugees’ to be internationally accepted, Hingley demands international community to help the affected people to solve their problem.
The setting of Her argument was in the Pacific region, which consists of many low-lying island states such as Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, Maldives and Kiribati.
She argues that the consistent use of the term ‘environmental refugees’ will only create a negative image such as weak and hopeless to the affected people instead of strong and brave.
She also underlines actors in which the term ‘environmental 22 Dallal Stevens, “Asylum, Refugee Protection and the European Response to Syrian Migration,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 9 (2017): 184, doi: 10.1093/jhuman/hux016 23 Ibid, 186.
24 Ibid, 185.
25 William Thomas Worster, “The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law”, Berkeley Journal of International Law 30, no.
1 (2012): 94. http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.
org/10.15779/Z38ZP90 26 Ibid, 158.
On the issue of persecution, see Section 2.3 of the present article.
27 Jenny Poon, “Addressing the Protection Gap of Environmental Refugees: A Reform of the 1951 Refugee Convention?,” GroningenJournal of International Law, (March2017), https://grojil.org/2017/03/28/ addressing-the-protection-gap-of-environmental-refugees-a-reform-of-the-1951-refugee-convention/ 28 Cigdem Bozdag And Kevin Smets, “Understanding the Images of Alan Kurdi With ‘Small Data’: A Qualitative, Comparative Analysis of Tweets About Refugees in Turkey and Flanders (Belgium)” International Journal of Communication 11 (2017): 4064.
29 John R. Wennersten and Denise Robbins,Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-First Century, (Indiana University Press 2017).
226 refugee’ is consistently promoted and elevated.
However, she urges actions from developed countries to assist the affected people by reducing their emission instead of labelling them with ‘environmental refugees’.30 Bayes Ahmad offered critical overview of accommodating the climate refugees by countries and proposed an innovative method by considering the status of climate pollution, resource consumption, economy and human development rankings to address the problem by bringing humanitarian justice to the ultimate climate refugees.31 In addition, Wennersten et.al acknowledges that the concept of climate refugees is a legitimate category without any convincing justification.32 2.
Result and Analysis 2.1.
Climate Change and Human Movement: A Matter of Causalities While the scientific aspects of climate change have become the most common topics of discussion among scholars and the scientific community, the social and humanitarian aspects of this global phenomenon have received little attention.33 Although human displacement has been considered one of the most severe social impacts of climate change, 34 the impact on transboundary human displacement is considered a less appealing issue, and therefore, has not been legally stipulated in international instruments.
In the latest synthesis reports, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has suggested that the adverse impacts of climate change will potentially affect humans in various ways, including human movement, and has suggested that human displacement is one of the most effective adaptation mechanisms35 Scholars and international humanitarian agencies have projected that the number of people who have to migrate as a result of climate change will continue to grow within the 30 Rebecca Hingley, “Climate Refugees: An Oceanic Perspective,” Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 4, no.
1 (2017):158-165.
31 Bayes Ahmed, “Who TakesResponsibility for the ClimateRefugees?,” International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 10,no 1 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1108/ IJCCSM-10-20160149 (2018): 5.
32 Andrew Baldwin,“Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-first Century,” by Wennersten, John, and Robbins, Denise.
book review, International Migration Review 1-3 , 2018.
33 Antonio Guterres, Op.Cit.
34 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ (2007)<https://www.ipcc.
ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf>; While it is also considered by the IPCC as a normal adaptation measure against climate change 35 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report’, (2015), 73 <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf>; Although for one island state in the pacific, human displacement is not supposed to be part of adaptation mechanism in international instrument, because it would give an impression that the complexity of climate change can be easily solved by displacing people, instead of reducing the greenhouse gases emission which have been identified and accepted as the major cause of the phenomenon.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana of Syrian migration to European countries.22 It provides an approach that resulted in a view that the European Union has not fully harmonized asylum policy in order to establish minimum acceptable standards for applicants and ensure the granting of international protection to beneficiaries.23 The study found that membership of, and integration into, a new community, is the meaning of asylum and protection for the refugee.24 Worster conducted a study to discuss the use of human-centered interests in expanding the legal concept of refugees as defined in the Convention under customary international law and the use of state-centered interests in narrowing such definition.25 It suggested that defining refugee under customary international law should include inter alia ‘individuals persecuted on the basis of gender or sexual orientation.26 Another study from Jenny Poon recommends to expand the definition of “persecution” by recognising environmental refugees as members of “a particular social group”, or creating an entirely new treaty.27 Scholars have been discussing the existing formulation of ‘refugee’ and ‘the crisis’ over the last few decades.28 John R. Wennersten and Denise Robbins highlight the catastrophic impact of climate change on human displacement in many countries, specifically in Asia and Africa.
The authors argue that millions of people have been hit by climate-related calamities and compelled to flee their homes as refugee, while the term ‘environmental refugees’ has not been legally accepted.29 A more interesting and contradicting opinion comes from Rebecca Hingley.
While other scholars promote the term ‘environmental refugees’ to be internationally accepted, Hingley demands international community to help the affected people to solve their problem.
The setting of Her argument was in the Pacific region, which consists of many low-lying island states such as Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, Maldives and Kiribati.
She argues that the consistent use of the term ‘environmental refugees’ will only create a negative image such as weak and hopeless to the affected people instead of strong and brave.
She also underlines actors in which the term ‘environmental 22 Dallal Stevens, “Asylum, Refugee Protection and the European Response to Syrian Migration,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 9 (2017): 184, doi: 10.1093/jhuman/hux016 23 Ibid, 186.
24 Ibid, 185.
25 William Thomas Worster, “The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law”, Berkeley Journal of International Law 30, no.
1 (2012): 94. http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.
org/10.15779/Z38ZP90 26 Ibid, 158.
On the issue of persecution, see Section 2.3 of the present article.
27 Jenny Poon, “Addressing the Protection Gap of Environmental Refugees: A Reform of the 1951 Refugee Convention?,” GroningenJournal of International Law, (March2017), https://grojil.org/2017/03/28/ addressing-the-protection-gap-of-environmental-refugees-a-reform-of-the-1951-refugee-convention/ 28 Cigdem Bozdag And Kevin Smets, “Understanding the Images of Alan Kurdi With ‘Small Data’: A Qualitative, Comparative Analysis of Tweets About Refugees in Turkey and Flanders (Belgium)” International Journal of Communication 11 (2017): 4064.
29 John R. Wennersten and Denise Robbins,Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-First Century, (Indiana University Press 2017).
Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 227 The armed conflict that occurred in Darfur, Sudan, regardless of other pre-existing stressors, can be considered as one example of a conflict that was ignited by one of the climate change-related disasters, drought.43 The Sudanese government claimed that water scarcity, which led to a drastic decline in food production, triggered a prolonged traditional conflict among community members.44 However, it is simplistic to say that climate change will lead to civil strife or armed conflict.
Therefore, further research is needed to show the intertwined between the two and examine the role of other factors.
While the connection between climate change and human displacement has gained international recognition from the majority of scholars and academics, using climate change as the legal basis to seek international protection or specifically refugee status is problematic.
The complexity is obvious from the few cases brought before Australian and New Zealand courts by those who have been severely affected by climate change.
In those cases, the courts have refused to grant international protection status to the applicants because the claims are not in accordance with the definition of refugee stipulated in the existing 1951 Refugee Convention.45 In making their decisions, the courts considered several factors in order to establish a causal link between climate change and the application of refugee status.
The courts took into consideration the existing definition in the Convention and related national legislation of the country, where the application is submitted.
Firstly, the cause of the migration must be determined: whether or not the environmental pressures is the only reason underlying the applicant’s decision to migrate.
This point requires solid scientific evidence, and obtaining a definitive answer takes a long time, given the contribution of other pre-existing economic factors such as poverty, unemployment, and so on.
Secondly, the size or the extent of environmental changes or environmental stress that induced the migration must be determined.
It is difficult for the decision makers to decide whether or not a particular event is severe enough to force the affected communities to flee their home.
Thirdly, the court must determine whether the time span of the environmental stress is sufficient to force the affected people to migrate.
Given that such events can have a long-term impact, or can cause damage after a certain period of time, it is necessary to conduct a thorough scientific analysis to predict the timing and duration of the environmental impact.
43 For more information, see World Food Program USA Report, “Winning the Peace: Hunger and Instability” (December 2017); see also: Chase Sova, “The First Climate Change Conflict”, World Food Program USA (November 2017) https://wfpusa.org/articles/the-first-climate-change-conflict/ 44 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann, “Beyond Scarcity: Rethinking Water, Climate Change and Conflict in the Sudans,” Global Environmental Change 29 (2014): 360-370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2014.01.008; Watch also a video from Al Jazeera, ‘Inside Story: Is Climate Change A Global Security Threat?’, (2011);<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KsegrvRWZQ> 45 N95/09386 [1996] RRTA 3191 (7 November 1996); 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 (10 December 2009); 1004726 [2010] RRTA 845 (30 September 2010).
See also: Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, “[2014] NZIPT 800517-520 <https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/Deportation/ pdf/rem_20140604_501370.pdf> Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana next two or three decades.36 However, does this mean that climate change will necessarily trigger human displacement?
The issue of whether or not environmental degradation, or specifically climate change, is the cause of human displacement has become a highly controversial topic among international scholars over the last two decades.37 While more physical evidence on this matter has been provided by the influx of people affected by environmental degradation,38 the link to climate change is not straightforward.
There have been misconceived or misguided opinions that the adverse effects of climate change, such as droughts and sea level rise, have become an immediate force that have driven the affected people to flee their homes.
Although there is a close relationship between environmental degradation and climate change, climate change is not necessarily the root cause of environmental degradation that leads to human displacement.39 Various other problems that already exist in particular regions, such as over-population, unemployment, poverty, inequality of resources, political instability, lack of education and health problems, may play major roles in triggering human migration.
Numerous international scholars have asserted that extreme events as a result of climate change such as floods, droughts, tropical storm and sea level rise are important factors that aggravate these pre-existing conditions.40 In other words, affected communities, or communities with less ability to cope with the existing conditions are highly vulnerable to environmental changes, especially global warming or climate change-related calamities.
Such events are also indirectly associated with civil strife and armed conflicts in various countries, especially in less developed countries with limited natural resources.41 Droughts and floods in certain parts of Africa and Asia as a result of increased temperature and extreme weather have led to a significant decline in food production.
As a result, famine and competition for basic needs and natural resources amongst community members has increased, which in turn has, in most cases, led to prolonged civil conflicts 42 36 Norman Myers, ‘Environmental refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 2st Century’ (2001) The Royal Society 609<http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/357/1420/609.full.pdf>; see also: UNHCR, ‘2007 Global trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons’ (2008) <http://www.unhcr.org/4852366f2.html> 37 Richard Black, Op.Cit.
38 Myers, Op.Cit.
39 Richard Black, Op.Cit.
40 See Jane Mc Adam, Op.Cit; See also: Steve Lonergan, “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement,” Environmental Change And Security Project Report 4, no.
6 (1998): 5-15.; see also Gaim Kibreab, “Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate,” Disasters 21, no.
1 (1997): 20-38. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00042 41 Vikram Kolmannskog and Lisetta Trebbi, Op.Cit.
42 This situation has forced the UN to issue such Resolution, for example the UNSC Resolution 1376 (2001) regarding Ceasefire Agreement in Congo; and also the UNSC Resolution 1478 (2003) with regard to conflict in Liberia; See also Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no.
1 (2012): 35-50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311426165 228 The armed conflict that occurred in Darfur, Sudan, regardless of other pre-existing stressors, can be considered as one example of a conflict that was ignited by one of the climate change-related disasters, drought.43 The Sudanese government claimed that water scarcity, which led to a drastic decline in food production, triggered a prolonged traditional conflict among community members.44 However, it is simplistic to say that climate change will lead to civil strife or armed conflict.
Therefore, further research is needed to show the intertwined between the two and examine the role of other factors.
While the connection between climate change and human displacement has gained international recognition from the majority of scholars and academics, using climate change as the legal basis to seek international protection or specifically refugee status is problematic.
The complexity is obvious from the few cases brought before Australian and New Zealand courts by those who have been severely affected by climate change.
In those cases, the courts have refused to grant international protection status to the applicants because the claims are not in accordance with the definition of refugee stipulated in the existing 1951 Refugee Convention.45 In making their decisions, the courts considered several factors in order to establish a causal link between climate change and the application of refugee status.
The courts took into consideration the existing definition in the Convention and related national legislation of the country, where the application is submitted.
Firstly, the cause of the migration must be determined: whether or not the environmental pressures is the only reason underlying the applicant’s decision to migrate.
This point requires solid scientific evidence, and obtaining a definitive answer takes a long time, given the contribution of other pre-existing economic factors such as poverty, unemployment, and so on.
Secondly, the size or the extent of environmental changes or environmental stress that induced the migration must be determined.
It is difficult for the decision makers to decide whether or not a particular event is severe enough to force the affected communities to flee their home.
Thirdly, the court must determine whether the time span of the environmental stress is sufficient to force the affected people to migrate.
Given that such events can have a long-term impact, or can cause damage after a certain period of time, it is necessary to conduct a thorough scientific analysis to predict the timing and duration of the environmental impact.
43 For more information, see World Food Program USA Report, “Winning the Peace: Hunger and Instability” (December 2017); see also: Chase Sova, “The First Climate Change Conflict”, World Food Program USA (November 2017) https://wfpusa.org/articles/the-first-climate-change-conflict/ 44 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann, “Beyond Scarcity: Rethinking Water, Climate Change and Conflict in the Sudans,” Global Environmental Change 29 (2014): 360-370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2014.01.008; Watch also a video from Al Jazeera, ‘Inside Story: Is Climate Change A Global Security Threat?’, (2011);<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KsegrvRWZQ> 45 N95/09386 [1996] RRTA 3191 (7 November 1996); 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 (10 December 2009); 1004726 [2010] RRTA 845 (30 September 2010).
See also: Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, “[2014] NZIPT 800517-520 <https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/Deportation/ pdf/rem_20140604_501370.pdf> Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana next two or three decades.36 However, does this mean that climate change will necessarily trigger human displacement?
The issue of whether or not environmental degradation, or specifically climate change, is the cause of human displacement has become a highly controversial topic among international scholars over the last two decades.37 While more physical evidence on this matter has been provided by the influx of people affected by environmental degradation,38 the link to climate change is not straightforward.
There have been misconceived or misguided opinions that the adverse effects of climate change, such as droughts and sea level rise, have become an immediate force that have driven the affected people to flee their homes.
Although there is a close relationship between environmental degradation and climate change, climate change is not necessarily the root cause of environmental degradation that leads to human displacement.39 Various other problems that already exist in particular regions, such as over-population, unemployment, poverty, inequality of resources, political instability, lack of education and health problems, may play major roles in triggering human migration.
Numerous international scholars have asserted that extreme events as a result of climate change such as floods, droughts, tropical storm and sea level rise are important factors that aggravate these pre-existing conditions.40 In other words, affected communities, or communities with less ability to cope with the existing conditions are highly vulnerable to environmental changes, especially global warming or climate change-related calamities.
Such events are also indirectly associated with civil strife and armed conflicts in various countries, especially in less developed countries with limited natural resources.41 Droughts and floods in certain parts of Africa and Asia as a result of increased temperature and extreme weather have led to a significant decline in food production.
As a result, famine and competition for basic needs and natural resources amongst community members has increased, which in turn has, in most cases, led to prolonged civil conflicts 42 36 Norman Myers, ‘Environmental refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 2st Century’ (2001) The Royal Society 609<http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/357/1420/609.full.pdf>; see also: UNHCR, ‘2007 Global trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons’ (2008) <http://www.unhcr.org/4852366f2.html> 37 Richard Black, Op.Cit.
38 Myers, Op.Cit.
39 Richard Black, Op.Cit.
40 See Jane Mc Adam, Op.Cit; See also: Steve Lonergan, “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement,” Environmental Change And Security Project Report 4, no.
6 (1998): 5-15.; see also Gaim Kibreab, “Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate,” Disasters 21, no.
1 (1997): 20-38. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00042 41 Vikram Kolmannskog and Lisetta Trebbi, Op.Cit.
42 This situation has forced the UN to issue such Resolution, for example the UNSC Resolution 1376 (2001) regarding Ceasefire Agreement in Congo; and also the UNSC Resolution 1478 (2003) with regard to conflict in Liberia; See also Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no.
1 (2012): 35-50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311426165 Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 229 …every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
This wide interpretation should become a model for other regions to deal with international humanitarian problems.
Human displacement is considered to be one of the greatest impacts of climate change.49 Within the last decade, millions of people have been uprooted from their initial home as a result of climate change as they attempt to find better places within or beyond their national territories.50 Millions more will potentially move in the future, according to projections made by international environmental and humanitarian bodies including UNHCR and IPCC, as countries continue to release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.51 Various terms are used to describe people who leave their homes due to environmental change,52 including ‘environmental migrants’, ‘environmental refugees’, ‘climate refugees’, and ‘ecological migrants’.
However, until recently there has been no legally acceptable consensus among scholars and international bodies regarding an appropriate term for this group of people.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has defined Environmental migrants as follows: …persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad.53 Although defining environmentally-induced displacement seems to be the best and the most appropriate attempt to provide stronger protection and legal status for the group,54 the situation of an environmental refugee does not clearly fit into the definition of refugee as stipulated in the Refugee Convention.
Therefore, extending 49 IPCC, Op.
Cit.
50 See press release by the United Nations University, As Ranks of “Environmental Refugees” Swell Worldwide, Calls Grow for Better Definition, Recognition, Support, (October 2005);<http://www.ehs.unu.
edu/file/get/3916> 51 Freija Van Duijne, ‘Scientists’s Prediction of Climate Change: Business as Usual Versus Alternative Futures’, (2015); <http://futuristablog.com/scientists-prediction-climate-change-business-usualversus-alternative-futures/> 52 Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, Op.Cit.
53 IOM, ‘Migration, Climate Change and the Environment’, <https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/ iom/home/what-we-do/migration-and-climate-change/definitional-issues.html> 54 Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, Op.Cit.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Although one prominent case, a Kiribati man’s application for environmental refugee status in New Zealand has come to distressing ending in 2015, it has, at least, put an outset for the newly-introduced migration to be considered as a refugee in the future.
The current situation seems to turn around from ‘zero to hero’ when New Zealand Prime Minister has given a sign that New Zealand government will open serious discussion with Pacific Nations over the creation of special refugee visa mechanism for Pacific Island residents who are forced to flee their country due to climate-related disasters.46 2.2.
Are Environmental Migrants Considered Refugees?
To determine whether or not a group of people who are displaced from their original home can be defined as refugees, it is important to understand the definition of refugee based on the existing international law.
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee47 (hereinafter referred to as Refugee Convention) defines a refugee as: “Someone who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.
This definition demonstrates the narrow and stringent scope of the Convention.
In order to be defined as a refugee, a person needs to satisfy four main criteria: 1.
Have an obvious fear or be under threat, or potential threat of persecution; 2.
The persecution is on the grounds of race, nationality, religion, membership of particular social group, or political opinion; 3.
Be outside of his/her home country; 4.
Unable or Unwilling to avail himself of the protection.
These four important points set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention become highly debatable when determining whether or not people migrating due to environmental stress can be categorized as refugees.
A wider interpretation of the term refugee can be seen in regional human rights documents, such as the African Union Convention,48 which describes refugees as: 46 See Jonathan Pearlman, “New Zealand Creates Special Refugee Visa for Pacific Islanders Affected by Climate Change”, the Straits Times (December 2017).
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/ new-zealand-creates-special-refugee-visa-for-pacific-islanders-affected-by-climate 47 Convention relating to the status of Refugee, adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954.
48 NAfrican Union Convention,<http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf> 230 …every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
This wide interpretation should become a model for other regions to deal with international humanitarian problems.
Human displacement is considered to be one of the greatest impacts of climate change.49 Within the last decade, millions of people have been uprooted from their initial home as a result of climate change as they attempt to find better places within or beyond their national territories.50 Millions more will potentially move in the future, according to projections made by international environmental and humanitarian bodies including UNHCR and IPCC, as countries continue to release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.51 Various terms are used to describe people who leave their homes due to environmental change,52 including ‘environmental migrants’, ‘environmental refugees’, ‘climate refugees’, and ‘ecological migrants’.
However, until recently there has been no legally acceptable consensus among scholars and international bodies regarding an appropriate term for this group of people.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has defined Environmental migrants as follows: …persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad.53 Although defining environmentally-induced displacement seems to be the best and the most appropriate attempt to provide stronger protection and legal status for the group,54 the situation of an environmental refugee does not clearly fit into the definition of refugee as stipulated in the Refugee Convention.
Therefore, extending 49 IPCC, Op.
Cit.
50 See press release by the United Nations University, As Ranks of “Environmental Refugees” Swell Worldwide, Calls Grow for Better Definition, Recognition, Support, (October 2005);<http://www.ehs.unu.
edu/file/get/3916> 51 Freija Van Duijne, ‘Scientists’s Prediction of Climate Change: Business as Usual Versus Alternative Futures’, (2015); <http://futuristablog.com/scientists-prediction-climate-change-business-usualversus-alternative-futures/> 52 Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, Op.Cit.
53 IOM, ‘Migration, Climate Change and the Environment’, <https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/ iom/home/what-we-do/migration-and-climate-change/definitional-issues.html> 54 Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, Op.Cit.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Although one prominent case, a Kiribati man’s application for environmental refugee status in New Zealand has come to distressing ending in 2015, it has, at least, put an outset for the newly-introduced migration to be considered as a refugee in the future.
The current situation seems to turn around from ‘zero to hero’ when New Zealand Prime Minister has given a sign that New Zealand government will open serious discussion with Pacific Nations over the creation of special refugee visa mechanism for Pacific Island residents who are forced to flee their country due to climate-related disasters.46 2.2.
Are Environmental Migrants Considered Refugees?
To determine whether or not a group of people who are displaced from their original home can be defined as refugees, it is important to understand the definition of refugee based on the existing international law.
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee47 (hereinafter referred to as Refugee Convention) defines a refugee as: “Someone who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.
This definition demonstrates the narrow and stringent scope of the Convention.
In order to be defined as a refugee, a person needs to satisfy four main criteria: 1.
Have an obvious fear or be under threat, or potential threat of persecution; 2.
The persecution is on the grounds of race, nationality, religion, membership of particular social group, or political opinion; 3.
Be outside of his/her home country; 4.
Unable or Unwilling to avail himself of the protection.
These four important points set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention become highly debatable when determining whether or not people migrating due to environmental stress can be categorized as refugees.
A wider interpretation of the term refugee can be seen in regional human rights documents, such as the African Union Convention,48 which describes refugees as: 46 See Jonathan Pearlman, “New Zealand Creates Special Refugee Visa for Pacific Islanders Affected by Climate Change”, the Straits Times (December 2017).
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/ new-zealand-creates-special-refugee-visa-for-pacific-islanders-affected-by-climate 47 Convention relating to the status of Refugee, adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954.
48 NAfrican Union Convention,<http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf> Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 231 who perform the acts of persecution.
It should be seen as a complex process, including the consequences caused by the actions of the person or group of people and the ability of the government to protect its citizens.
Persecution should be seen as an act that brings negative consequences for people who experience it.
When persecution is narrowly defined based on the actors, it will be understood differently.
Some actions that are not illegal in one country may be considered as persecution by outsiders.
For example, when a legitimate government attempts to implement what is stipulated in domestic law in order to punish a person or group of people who commit acts of treason against the government.
Another example is when a government tries to fight a group of rebels from a particular race or religion, which has obviously created public insecurity and fear in the community.
The major elements of persecution should emphasize the external stresses, fears, and potential threats, experienced by the affected communities, without the element of crime.
Therefore, environmental factors that cause unpleasant conditions and stress may be considered a persecution, regardless of the actors who cause such conditions.
The ability of the government to protect its citizens and to ensure the fulfillment of their basic rights should also be a consideration for decision makers in determining the elements of persecution.
The willingness and the ability of the government could be two different issues.
In certain cases, the government is willing to guarantee and protect the rights of its citizens, but in fact is unable to do so.
When the government is unable to protect its citizens due to economic constraints, the question remains as to whether it can be considered persecution.
In a few cases regarding the application for environmental refugee status in Australia and New Zealand, the interpretation of the term ‘persecution’ became one key element of the court’s decision.
The court/tribunal refused to grant refugee status to the applicants due to the ‘indiscriminate effect’ of climate change.
The court argued that the impacts of climate change, which formed the legal basis of the claim were not deliberately aimed at certain individuals or particular groups of people in Tuvalu and Kiribati.
They argued that climate change happens to everyone in those countries or even in the world without exception.57 This argument seems shallow and ignored the fact that the applicants were actually experiencing an unbearable situation in their home countries.
At the same time, the decision overlooked the extent of damage and the level of difficulty encountered.
The reasoning that the impact of climate change affects all people in both countries is not firm enough and generalized the situation.
In fact, not all people who were living in these countries experienced the same situation, feeling, fear and threat.
People who lived further away from the shore or on the higher ground did not experience the same problem faced by the applicants.
57 The Telegraph, ‘Kiribati Climate Change Refugee Rejected by New Zealand’, (2013); <http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/kiribati/10474602/Kiribati-climate-changerefugee-rejected-by-New-Zealand.html Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana the definition of refugee set out in the Refugee Convention to include other types of migrants, or creating a new treaty or protocol of the existing convention, is considered urgent by many scholars,55 although it may not be an appropriate alternative given the risk of weakening the legal consequences of protection that had been given to the ‘convention refugees’.56 In the context of the responsibility of the state, there are several issues to be raised, especially at the time the affected people are forced to flee their homes, these include: the responsibility or willingness of the states to assist the affected people to cross their national border; the ability of the affected communities to gain access to other countries and to convince them to render their assistance; and the power of international humanitarian agencies to encourage other countries to assist the affected community to seek refuge, and at the same time, to protect them when they are outside of their national territory.
In order to respond to those issues, strong commitment from the states and the support of international bodies, mainly the United Nations, are essential.
2.3.
Converging the Possibilities As described previously, the most widely accepted definition of ‘refugee’ comes from the Refugee Convention.
The first part of the Convention definition is persecution.
This term is closely associated with an act conducted intentionally by humans and/ or the power of one group over others.
From a historical point of view, the state of war and conflicts in many countries during the Second World War was the background and the foundation of the establishment of the Convention in 1951.
Therefore, the protection of people in countries where conflict and physical violence is still a frightening spectre has formed the content and formulation of the document.
However, this does not mean that the term persecution should be construed and interpreted in a rigid way, especially for the sake of humanity.
Moreover, this international document is supposed to be dynamic and open to development.
In general, the term persecution can be defined as pressure and repression carried out by the ruling government over a person or group of people in order to stop activities that, from the government’s standpoint, will potentially lead to horizontal conflict, social unrest or threaten the government position.
The definition of persecution should not be seen narrowly in terms of the actors 55 Biermann and I. Boas, ‘Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees’, (2007) 33 Global Governance Working Paper; see also Angela Williams, “Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees In International Law,” Law & Policy 30, no.
4 (2008): 502-529. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2008.00290.x; also Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini, ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees’, (2009), 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review, 349-350; see also a draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons, (2013) <http://intergenlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ Draft-Convention-on-the-International-Status-on-environmentally-displaced-persons-third-version.pdf> 56 UNHCR, Op.Cit.
232 who perform the acts of persecution.
It should be seen as a complex process, including the consequences caused by the actions of the person or group of people and the ability of the government to protect its citizens.
Persecution should be seen as an act that brings negative consequences for people who experience it.
When persecution is narrowly defined based on the actors, it will be understood differently.
Some actions that are not illegal in one country may be considered as persecution by outsiders.
For example, when a legitimate government attempts to implement what is stipulated in domestic law in order to punish a person or group of people who commit acts of treason against the government.
Another example is when a government tries to fight a group of rebels from a particular race or religion, which has obviously created public insecurity and fear in the community.
The major elements of persecution should emphasize the external stresses, fears, and potential threats, experienced by the affected communities, without the element of crime.
Therefore, environmental factors that cause unpleasant conditions and stress may be considered a persecution, regardless of the actors who cause such conditions.
The ability of the government to protect its citizens and to ensure the fulfillment of their basic rights should also be a consideration for decision makers in determining the elements of persecution.
The willingness and the ability of the government could be two different issues.
In certain cases, the government is willing to guarantee and protect the rights of its citizens, but in fact is unable to do so.
When the government is unable to protect its citizens due to economic constraints, the question remains as to whether it can be considered persecution.
In a few cases regarding the application for environmental refugee status in Australia and New Zealand, the interpretation of the term ‘persecution’ became one key element of the court’s decision.
The court/tribunal refused to grant refugee status to the applicants due to the ‘indiscriminate effect’ of climate change.
The court argued that the impacts of climate change, which formed the legal basis of the claim were not deliberately aimed at certain individuals or particular groups of people in Tuvalu and Kiribati.
They argued that climate change happens to everyone in those countries or even in the world without exception.57 This argument seems shallow and ignored the fact that the applicants were actually experiencing an unbearable situation in their home countries.
At the same time, the decision overlooked the extent of damage and the level of difficulty encountered.
The reasoning that the impact of climate change affects all people in both countries is not firm enough and generalized the situation.
In fact, not all people who were living in these countries experienced the same situation, feeling, fear and threat.
People who lived further away from the shore or on the higher ground did not experience the same problem faced by the applicants.
57 The Telegraph, ‘Kiribati Climate Change Refugee Rejected by New Zealand’, (2013); <http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/kiribati/10474602/Kiribati-climate-changerefugee-rejected-by-New-Zealand.html Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana the definition of refugee set out in the Refugee Convention to include other types of migrants, or creating a new treaty or protocol of the existing convention, is considered urgent by many scholars,55 although it may not be an appropriate alternative given the risk of weakening the legal consequences of protection that had been given to the ‘convention refugees’.56 In the context of the responsibility of the state, there are several issues to be raised, especially at the time the affected people are forced to flee their homes, these include: the responsibility or willingness of the states to assist the affected people to cross their national border; the ability of the affected communities to gain access to other countries and to convince them to render their assistance; and the power of international humanitarian agencies to encourage other countries to assist the affected community to seek refuge, and at the same time, to protect them when they are outside of their national territory.
In order to respond to those issues, strong commitment from the states and the support of international bodies, mainly the United Nations, are essential.
2.3.
Converging the Possibilities As described previously, the most widely accepted definition of ‘refugee’ comes from the Refugee Convention.
The first part of the Convention definition is persecution.
This term is closely associated with an act conducted intentionally by humans and/ or the power of one group over others.
From a historical point of view, the state of war and conflicts in many countries during the Second World War was the background and the foundation of the establishment of the Convention in 1951.
Therefore, the protection of people in countries where conflict and physical violence is still a frightening spectre has formed the content and formulation of the document.
However, this does not mean that the term persecution should be construed and interpreted in a rigid way, especially for the sake of humanity.
Moreover, this international document is supposed to be dynamic and open to development.
In general, the term persecution can be defined as pressure and repression carried out by the ruling government over a person or group of people in order to stop activities that, from the government’s standpoint, will potentially lead to horizontal conflict, social unrest or threaten the government position.
The definition of persecution should not be seen narrowly in terms of the actors 55 Biermann and I. Boas, ‘Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees’, (2007) 33 Global Governance Working Paper; see also Angela Williams, “Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees In International Law,” Law & Policy 30, no.
4 (2008): 502-529. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2008.00290.x; also Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini, ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees’, (2009), 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review, 349-350; see also a draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons, (2013) <http://intergenlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ Draft-Convention-on-the-International-Status-on-environmentally-displaced-persons-third-version.pdf> 56 UNHCR, Op.Cit.
Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 233 From the victim’s standpoint, climate change does not, in fact, have the same effect on everyone in a particular region.
An increase in temperature of 1 degree Celsius, for example, would be perceived as a bearable by those who live in cold climates countries or in the region with better adaptability; however, it would be a catastrophe for those who live in hot climates with low adaptation ability.
Furthermore, if the term persecution is used in the context of ‘indiscriminate’, there will be a gap between the formulation of refugee and the protection they obtain in reality.
Refugees from conflicting countries in parts of the Middle East or Africa, for example, flee their countries and cross-national borders due to continuing fears of the existing armed conflict, as well as the psychological damage to their young children who witness violence around them.58 In this case, the element of persecution is unclear and unsatisfactory, because the threat that they are actually facing is not on an individual basis.
Moreover, the persecution is not on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of particular social group as stipulated in the Refugee Convention.
In fact, they still get international protection from international humanitarian agencies for indefinite lengths of time.
Persecution should also be seen from the point of view of potential effects.
This stand-point defines persecution as encompassing highly likely future circumstance, that will put someone in real danger.
In this context, a predictable danger caused by climate change and its related calamities will put someone, or a group of people, in possible hardship.
In mid 2014 the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as NZIPT) granted protection for a Kiribati family.
The decision of the Tribunal was based on humanitarian and family considerations, rather than environmental aspects.59 The considerations used in this case, for example on the condition of children and family would have been different if the applicant did not have children and was not married; or if the applicant did not have any family members living in the country of destination.
Some experts argued that the decision to grant refugee status, in this case, is not going to literally ‘open the door’ for similar cases 58 For more information, see the 2018 Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Middle East Conflicts Spur Disastrous New Trends for Region’, (January 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/middleeast-conflicts-spur-disastrous-new-trends-region; see also: Phillip Connor, ‘Conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen Lead to Millions of Displaced Migrants in the Middle East Since 2005’, Pew Research Center, (October 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/10/18/conflicts-in-syria-iraq-and-yemen-lead-to-millions-of-displaced-migrants-in-the-middle-east-since-2005/; see also: Wesley Dockery, ‘Which Conflicts are Causing Migration from Africa?’, Info Migrants, (May 2017), http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/3428/whichconflicts-are-causing-migration-from-africa 59 Library of Congress, ‘New Zealand: “Climate Change Refugee” Case Overview’, (2015)<https:// www.loc.gov/law/help/climate-change-refugee/new-zealand.php> See: Alex Randall, ‘Why New Zealand Did not Accept “World’s First Climate 234 in the future.60 However, it will at least, lay a strong foundation for the acknowledgement of environmental refugees.
However, there are certain situations where environmental matters are closely linked to persecution that fits the definition in the Convention; for example, deliberate actions of the government against any person or group of people affected by environmental disasters, such as government refusal to receive international aid or assistance from other countries in the aftermath of an environmental disaster.
Another situation is a deliberate action by the government to poison the water supply, preventing affected people from having adequate access to clean water; or deliberate discrimination against particular persons or a group of people in providing other services during an environmental disaster.
The second point of the Convention definition is that the persecution should be on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group.
These conditions exclude the potential to form a legal basis for the protection of environmental refugees.
The term persecution used in the 1951 Convention is narrowly limited by the conditions following it.
None of the conditions (race, religion, nationality, political opinion and membership of social group) provides the possibility for other circumstances to be included, including environmental matters.
However, if persecution is viewed and defined from a different angle, as the cause of an unpleasant situation which triggers displacement, or if the focus is the result of the persecution, in which people are put in danger, climate change and its related calamities can be considered persecution.
In the case of a sinking state due to sea level rises, the adverse impacts of climate change could be worse than that of traditional persecution, since environmentally displaced people could lose their citizenship as well as culture, that has been preserved for hundreds of years.
The third element of the Convention is that the affected person has to be outside of their home country.
This element seems to be contradictory to what international scholars and organization have suggested: that the adverse effects of climate change will severely affect those who live in developing or poor countries who have less technical and economic ability to deal with the problem.61 In practice, the movement of the affected people who are called refugee, to some extent is unclear, whether it is based on the situation of avoiding persecution as 60 See: Alex Randall, ‘Why New Zealand Did not Accept “World’s First Climate Refugees’, Climate Home, (2014), <http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/08/14/why-new-zealand-did-not-acceptworlds-first-climate-refugees/>; see also: ABC News, ‘Tuvalu Climate Family Granted New Zealand Residency on Appeal’ (2014), <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-05/an-tuvalu-climate-family-grantednz-residency-on-appeal/5650584> 61 UNFCCC, ‘Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries’, 2007; <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf> Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 235 required in the Convention, or due to other factors.
If the reason for the migration is genuinely due to persecution in the home country, one will not migrate to one state for transit, and then move further to another country after a while.
Being outside of the home country is adequate to avoid persecution.62 One will be safe once He or She arrived in another country.
It is no longer His or Her home country’s legal jurisdiction.
Therefore, when the affected person then decides to move further to another country, the reason for such movement becomes indistinct.
Economic reasons to seek a better life seem to be the driving factor, since the threat of persecution no longer exists.
For those who live in developed countries, where the governments are willing and fully capable of looking after their citizens in the aftermath of environmental disasters, cross-border migration will be highly unlikely, compared to internal displacement.
Hurricane Katrina, which hit the US in 2005;63 the earthquake that devastated city of Christchurch, New Zealand in 2011;64 the earth quake in Fukushima, Japan in 201165 which resulted in radioactive radiation; Super Typhoon Maysak in the US in 2015;66 and the floods in Nice and Riviera, France in 201567 are only a few examples of environmental calamities that hit certain countries but did not trigger cross-border migration.
The willingness of the governments to guarantee the rights of their citizens, supported by advanced security systems, kept the affected people inside their national border, waiting for the conditions to improve.
However, it is not always the same story for people who live in developing countries or poor countries.
When natural disasters or environmental changes as a result of climate change swept over the countries, they have to face certain conditions that: First, they have nothing left with which to continue their life.
In most cases, houses, farms, cattle, water resources, and other life-supporting facilities are destroyed; Secondly, the government no longer has the ability to guarantee and protect citizens’ rights due to weak economic conditions.
Thirdly, when the option to flee their home becomes their last resort, they do not have the ability to cross their national border.
In fact, the affected community cannot afford to travel to other 62 If referred to the definition of refugee in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
63 CNN, ‘Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts’, (2016) <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/23/ us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/> 64 The Sydney Morning Herald, ‘”We May be Witnessing New Zealand’s Darkest Day”: PM Says 65 Killed in Quake, (2011)<http://www.smh.com.au/world/we-may-be-witnessing-new-zealands-darkestday-pm-says-65-killed-in-quake-20110222-1b356.html> 65 Becky Oskin, ‘Japan Earthquake & Tsunami of 2011: Facts and Information’, (2015), <http:// www.livescience.com/39110-japan-2011-earthquake-tsunami-facts.html> 66 The Weather Channel, ‘Super Typhoon Maysak (RECAP)’, 2015,<https://weather.com/storms/ typhoon/news/typhoon-maysak-yap-philippines-pacific> 67 BBC News, ‘France Floods: 17 Dead on Riviera After Storms’ (2015)<http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-34437228> 236 countries, due to economic and financial constraints.
Therefore, it is important to understand that in most environmentally-induced displacement cases, the affected people tend to stay inside their national border due to lack of economic ability.
It is completely different from traditional or political refugee, as they can afford to go to other countries to seek refuge.
The last element of the Convention refugee definition is the inability or unwillingness of the affected people to return to their home countries, due to persecution or potential threats they might face.
Continuing fears and trauma in a state of war or conflict, for example, can be a strong legal basis for someone not returning home, especially for women and children, as well as elderly people.
However, the nature of this migration is temporary, since they are expected to return to their initial homes when the situation has improved.
The situation might be quite similar for migration caused by a rapid-onset disaster, such as earthquake, landslide, flash flood, tsunami or typhoon, where most of the affected people will undergo temporary and internal migration.
However, in slow-onset disasters, such as rising sea levels, salinity, droughts, desertification and land subsidence, people are forced to migrate far before the worst of the disaster actually occurs.
In the situation of rising sea levels, for example, people in low-lying states that will potentially be drowned have been forced to make their decision to migrate before the actual inundation occurs.68 In this situation, the nature of the migration is permanent, due to unliveable environmental conditions which prevent them returning.
Therefore, the implementation of the term ‘Unable to return to the initial homes’ as a legal basis in claiming international protection can be quite complicated since environmental migrants, to some extent, have to migrate far before the real impact occurs.
While from a legal definition stand-point the term ‘environmental refugee’ is not legally recognized and regulated in the existing instruments, from a humanitarian point of view, those who are enforced to migrate due to environmental stress have the same rights as traditional refugees.
Therefore, decision-makers should implement a broader interpretation and more creative approaches to deal with global humanitarian development problems.
This may not be the most appropriate solution to the debate on whether or not environmental migrants should be encompassed in the existing international instrument.
However, it can, nevertheless, provide a benchmark for reference and the decision-making process in the future.
2.4.
Environmental Refugees and International Commitment It is widely accepted that the term ‘environmental refugee’ was promulgated and brought to the public debate arena by Essam El Hinnawi, through a promi68 See Saiful Huq, Tim Gaynor (ed), UNHCR, ‘As Sea Levels Rise, Bangladeshis Seek Higher Ground’, (2015) <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/566ff51f6/sea-levels-rise-bangladeshis-seek-higher-ground.html> Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 237 nent report for the United Nations in 1985.69 The term has become a highly debated topic among academics, scholars and international agencies ever since, especially with regard to its controversial legal status and its relation to global environmental problems such as climate change.
In brief, the term is used to define people who flee their home countries and cross-national borders due to environmental stress.
However, while the use of the term ‘environmental refugees’ or ‘climate refugees’ is intended to provide a strong emphasis on the relationship between climate changes and human migration,70 the term ‘environmental refugee’ is a legal fallacy,71 because it is not encompassed in the definition of refugee in the Convention.
Therefore, people who flee their countries due to environmental stresses such as droughts, floods, and sea level rises cannot be categorized as refugees.
From moral and humanitarian perspectives, developed countries in which the economic growth rate has far exceeded those of developing countries should have a higher moral awareness to help the affected communities in fighting for their right to obtain a decent and respectable life.
As set out in international environmental instruments such as the UNFCCC72 and the Kyoto Protocol,73 the obligation to reduce CO2 emissions is compulsory for developed countries.
However, developed countries, due to economic and other considerations, have failed to achieve the goals agreed in the instruments, although international forums have been established to renegotiate the target.74 Based on the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), set forth in the Rio Declaration of 1992, both developed and developing countries have similar obligations to reduce the adverse effects of climate change.75 The principle requires each state to join the fight against global environmental problems, based on two conditions: firstly, that every state has the same concern regarding climate change as a common problem of human life; secondly, the historical background on the existing global environmental problem and socio-economic conditions of each country in relation to its ability to address the problem.76 69 Essam El Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, UNEP, (1985).
70 Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, Op.Cit.
71 Keane, ‘The Environmental cause and Consequences of Migration: a Search for the Meaning of “Environmental Refugees”’, (2004) 16 (209) The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 215.
72 the UNFCCC, adopted on 9 May 1992.
73 Kyoto Protocol, adopted on 11 December 1997.
74 See Duncan Clark, “Has the Kyoto Protocol Made any Difference to Carbon Emissions?”, the Guardian (November 2012)https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions 75 As explicitly stated on article 3 (1) and 4 (1) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
76 CISDL, ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and Scope’, (2002); <http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf> 238 Under the principle of CBDR,77 all countries have the same responsibility to the existing global environmental problems.
Similar provisions are also seen in the 1992 UNFCCC: ... on the basis of equity and in Accordance with Reviews their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Furthermore, the UNFCCC also states that the impact of climate change on the rest of humanity is a “common concern of Humankind”,78 which can be interpreted as an order to every state, without exception, to join the fight against climate change.
This principle regulates not only the legal responsibility for developed countries to take appropriate and foremost efforts to address this global issue, but also implies a moral duty to assist less developed countries to escape from the misfortune.
This moral responsibility has played a vital role in determining the problems, given that international instruments seem to be less likely to enforce robust and specific sanctions, in terms of penalties and punishment for countries that do not meet their obligations.
When a country does not want to be bound by being a party to an international instrument, international law cannot force it to be on board.79 Moreover, there is no legal obligation for the states as parties of the Refugee Convention to recognize and to render protection for the affected people,80 and the question remains as to whether it is possible for millions of migrants to rely on the commitment and willingness of developed countries.
Given this, who should be responsible for this kind of migration?
Do the responsibilities really exist based on international legal instruments?
Looking at the previous experiences on the implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the answer seems to be ‘no’.81 The developed countries’ reluctance and refusal of the concept of environmental/ climate refugees seem to be based on the premise that accepting the concept will implicitly confirm that the current climate problem is due to their contributions, and that therefore they should be fully responsible for addressing the problem.82 Regardless of whether or not the environmental refugee is recognized, developed countries should accept that scientific evidence has demonstrated the close relationship between climate change and industrialization or the use of fossil fuels.
IPCC as an acknowledged international scientific body has provided robust evidence on this matter.
77 Can be seen in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration.
78 As clearly acknowledged in the preamble of the Convention.
79 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (New york: Oxford University Press, 2005).
80 Elizabeth Mc Namara, ‘Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United Nations,’ Population and Environment 29, no.
1 (2007): 12.
81 Angela Williams, Op.Cit, 516-518.
82 Ibid.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 239 In relation to human displacement, the fact that most of the world’s refugee population, which has reached 10 million, are accommodated in developing countries has shown that developed countries have the less political will to address this global humanitarian problem.83 Success in solving the problems of human displacement in relation to climate change will come from all countries, especially developed countries, assisting the affected people to strive to ameliorate their condition and to regain their basic rights, such as the rights to life, adequate food, clean drinking water, proper education for their children, adequate housing and the best attainable health service.
UNEP in its report has asserted that without a vigorous commitment from industrial countries to implement a policy to significantly reduce CO2 emissions released into the atmosphere, within the next decade the problem of climate change and its adverse impacts will worsen.84 It is argued here that there are several reasons why environmental migrants should get the same protection and treatment as other traditional refugees: First, the rights of the affected people have been stipulated in international human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), including the right to life, adequate food, clean water, adequate shelter, health and education.
The right to a decent life as a human being is also set in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which states: “Man has the fundamental rights to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being” Secondly, environmental migrants are the victims of human activities, which have caused severe distress.
These people have been involuntarily forced to flee their homes in order to find a better place to live.
Thirdly, states cannot keep ‘burying their head in the sand’ and ignoring environmental refugees simply because there is no accepted international legal agreement or common institutionalized instrument.
In fact, the numbers of people affected by environmental distress are increasing, and the adverse impacts of climate change are predicted to be worse in the future.
Fourthly, a widely accepted international instrument (UNFCCC) states that the adverse effects of climate change are a common concern of humankind, and therefore urges every country to address this issue, and, in particular, for developed countries to take the lead in assisting developing countries to cope with this problem.
83 UNEP, ‘Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World’, (2007),8.
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf;> Watch also a talk with Dr. Jeff Crisp, 2011 Refugee Conference Prof Jane Mc Adam in conversation with Dr Jeff Crisp, UNSWTV, (2011); <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLGbVgSTXx0&index=3&list=FLiuo-BT1POFP132ee0SIywQ> 84 UNEP, ‘The Emissions Gap Report, 2014, A UNEP Synthesis Report’; <http://www.unep.org/ publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport2014/portals/50268/pdf/EGR2014_LOWRES.pdf;see also: IPCC, Climate Change 2007: synthesis report, (2007); <https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/ syr/ar4_syr.pdf> 240 3.
Conclusion and Recommendation Some have argued that a specific instrument for regulating environmental refugees will not improve the situation on the grounds that, firstly, most of the movements undertaken by the affected people are internal (within their national territories), and secondly, that it will be highly dependent on the political will of governments to acknowledge them.
Notwithstanding this, international instruments are important to safeguard the protection of the affected communities from adverse environmental changes and to allow them to maintain a subsistent standard of living.
This will ensure that crossborder migration resulting from the environmental catastrophe will not take place in a legal vacuum, and such refugees maintain their fundamental legal rights.
There is a very limited number of scholarly articles that present solid argument on narrow interpretation of refugee in the Refugee Convention.
Therefore, further research is needed on the implementation of the convention and how the convention will affect decision-makers in dealing with humanitarian problems.
As climate change has been closely associated with human activities, specifically, industrialization and the use of fossil fuels, developed or industrialized countries bear a moral and historical responsibility to prevent violations of the fundamental rights set forth in international documents due to climate change.
The fact that climate change has played an important role in triggering human displacement, even though it is not entirely the root cause of the migration, means that countries cannot be careless about the fate of the affected community.
Similarly, it means that environmental migrants deserve protection, and global efforts to acknowledge them.
Developed or industrialized countries should have a moral and historical responsibility as contributing parties to greenhouse gases.
The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, which has been regarded as customary international law, clearly imposes a duty on every state to take on their respective roles in the fight against climate change in accordance with their capacity and capability.
This principle should also be seen as putting the same responsibility on each state when the adverse impacts of climate change started affecting other countries, especially countries that contribute the least greenhouse gases.
Another principle, that is important in determining the responsibility of a state for the impacts of climate change is the ‘No harm rule’, which is basically a set of obligations not to cause damage or harm to other countries as a result of activities undertaken.
This principle is closely related to the principle of ‘State Responsibility’, which has been widely accepted as a norm of international law.
Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 241 Regardless of the highly debatable definition of ‘refugee’ and the fact that environmental refugees are not in line with the international legal framework, an international instrument on the status of those who migrate as a result of environmental stress will be necessary and useful as a preventive measure when such event occurs.
However, such an arrangement will be greatly influenced by the commitment and willingness of governments, particularly those of developed countries, which will play a vital role in solving the problem.
In fact, while developing countries have contributed the least to the climate changes crisis, if developed or industrialized countries releasing greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide into the atmosphere at the current pace, developing countries will suffer the most from the crisis.
This means that more environmental migrants will be created every year.
What is the difference if, in the end, the UNHCR asks countries to assist people displaced by climate change?
Instead, the problem can be made straightforward by acknowledging the status of the people as refugees under an international legal document.
Acknowledgement I would like to thank my former PhD Supervisors, Professor Ben Boer and Professor Tim Stephens, from the University of Sydney for their highly valuable comments and support in the completion of this article.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily attributed and represent the views of the institution for which He is affiliated with.
242 BIBLIoGRAPHY Book Birne, Patricia, Alan Boyle, Catherine Ridgwell.
International Law and the Environment.
New york: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner.
The Limits of International Law.
New york: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Kolmansskog, Vikram Odedra.
Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Migration.
Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008.
McAdam, Jane.
Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law.
New york: Oxford University Press, 2012.
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587087.001 .0001 Book Review Baldwin, Andrew.
“Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-first Century,” by John Wennersten and Denise Robbins, book review, International Migration Review 1-3, 2018.
2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918318770161.
Journal Article Ahmad, Bayes.
“Who Takes Responsibility for the Climate Refugees?,” International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 10, no.
1 (2018): 5-26. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-10-2016-0149 Bates, Diane C. “Environmental Refugees?
Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change.” Population and Environment 23, no.
5 (2002): 465-477 Biermann, Frank, and Ingrid Boas.
“Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees.” Global Environmental Politics 10, no.
1 (2010): 60-88. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.60 Boer, Ben and Alan Boyle.
“Human Rights and the Environment.” Background Paper for the 13th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights, Sydney Law School Research Paper, no.
14/14.
(2014): 1-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.2393753 Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 243 Bozdag, Cigdem, and Kevin Smets.
“Understanding the Images of Alan Kurdi With “Small Data”: A Qualitative, Comparative Analysis of Tweets About Refugees in Turkey and Flanders (Belgium).” International Journal of Communication 11 (2017): 4046-4069.
Brzoska, Michael and Christiane Fröhlich.
“Climate Change, Migration and Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities, Pathways and Adaptation Strategies.” Migration and Development 5, no.2 (2016): 190-210. https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.20 15.1022973 Burleson, Elizabeth.
‘Climate Change Displacement to Refuge.’ Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 25, no.
19 (2010): 19-36.
Docherty, Bonnie, and Tyler Giannini.
“Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees.” Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 (2009): 349-403.
Greussing, Esther, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden.
“Shifting the Refugee Narrative?
An Automated Frame Analysis of Europe’s 2015 Refugee Crisis.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43, no.
11 (2017): 1749-1774. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1369183X.2017.1282813 Hansen, Randall.
“The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: A Commentary.” Journal of Refugee Studies 31, no.
2 (2018): 131-151. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jrs/fey020 Hendrix, Cullen S. and Idean Salehyan.
“Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa.” Journal of Peace Research 49, no.
1 (2012): 35-50. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022343311426165 Hingley, Rebecca.
“Climate Refugees: An Oceanic Perspective.” Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 4, no.
1 (2017):158-165.
Keane, David.
“The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of Environmental Refugees.” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 16 (2004): 209-223.
Kibreab, Gaim.
“Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate.” Disasters 21, no.
1 (1997): 20-38. https:// doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00042 Kolmannskog, Vikram, and Lisetta Trebbi.
“Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Displacement: A Multi-Track Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps.” International Review of the Red Cross 92, no.
879 (2010): 713-730. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1816383110000500 244 Lonergan, Steve.
“The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement.” Environmental Change And Security Project Report 4, no.
6 (1998): 5-15.
McAdam, Jane.
“Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is not the Answer.” International Journal of Refugee Law 23, no.
1 (2011): 2-27. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeq045 McNamara, Karen Elizabeth.
“Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United Nations.” Population and Environment 29, no.
1 (2007): 12-24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-007-0058-1 Myers, Norman.
“Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World.” Bio Science 43, no.
11 (1993): 752-761.
DOI: 10.2307/1312319 Myers, Norman.
‘Environmental Refugees,” Population and Environment 19, no.2 (1997): 167-182. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024623431924 Selby, Jan, and Clemens Hoffmann.
“Beyond Scarcity: Rethinking Water, Climate Change and Conflict in the Sudans.” Global Environmental Change 29 (2014): 360-370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.008 Stevens, Dallal.
“Asylum, Refugee Protection and the European Response to Syrian Migration.” Journal of Human Rights Practice 9, no.
2 (2017): 184-189. https:// doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/hux016 Williams, Angela.
“Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees In International Law.” Law & Policy 30, no.
4 (2008): 502-529. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1467-9930.2008.00290.x Worster, William Thomas.
“The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 30 (2012): 94-160. http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38ZP90 Legal documents International Instruments African Union Convention The 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugee Kyoto Protocol Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 245 The Global Compact on Refugees, 3rd Draft (as at 26 June 2018) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/71/1 (2016) Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-Displaced Persons, (2013) other documents/Reports Chase Sova.
“The First Climate Change Conflict”, World Food Program USA (November 2017) https://wfpusa.org/articles/the-first-climate-change-conflict/ IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ (2007)<https:// www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf> IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report’, (2015), <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf The 2018 Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Middle East Conflicts Spur Disastrous New Trends for Region’, (January 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/ middle-east-conflicts-spur-disastrous-new-trends-region UNEP, ‘Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World’, (2007),<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/ hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf;> Phillip Connor, ‘Conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen Lead to Millions of Displaced Migrants in the Middle East Since 2005’, Pew Research Center, (October 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/10/18/conflicts-in-syria-iraq-and-yemenlead-to-millions-of-displaced-migrants-in-the-middle-east-since-2005/; UNEP, ‘The Emissions Gap Report, 2014, A UNEP Synthesis Report’; <http://www.
unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport2014/portals/50268/pdf/ EGR2014_LOWRES.pdf;see also: IPCC, Climate Change 2007: synthesis report, (2007); <https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf> UNHCR, ‘2007 Global trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons’ (2008) <http://www.unhcr.org/4852366f2.
html> Wesley Dockery, ‘Which Conflicts are Causing Migration from Africa?’, Info Migrants, (May 2017) 246 World Food Program USA Report, “Winning the Peace: Hunger and Instability” (December 2017) News or Magazine Article Ineli-Ciger, Meltem.
“Will the Global Compact on Refugees Address the Gap in International Refugee Law Concerning Burden Sharing?,” European Journal of International Law (EJIL) Talk!, June 20, 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/willthe-global-compact-on-refugees-address-the-gap-in-international-refugee-lawconcerning-burden-sharing/ Poon, Jenny.
“Addressing the Protection Gap of Environmental Refugees: A Reform of the 1951 Refugee Convention?,” Groningen Journal of International Law, blog, March 28, 2017, https://grojil.org/2017/03/28/addressing-the-protectiongap-of-environmental-refugees-a-reform-of-the-1951-refugee-convention/ Website Content ABC News, ‘Tuvalu Climate Family Granted New Zealand Residency on Appeal’ (2014), <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-05/an-tuvalu-climate-familygranted-nz-residency-on-appeal/5650584> Al Jazeera, ‘Inside Story: Is Climate Change A Global Security Threat?’, Video, (2011);<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KsegrvRWZQ> Alberto Angulo Morales, Oscar Alvarez Gila, ‘Disasters and Migration in Western Early Modern Societies (17th-18th Centuries)’, (2014) Migracionesen 3 Milenio.indd<http://www.academia.edu/6717913/Disasters_and_Migration_in_ Western_Early_Modern_Societies_17th-18th_Centuries Alex Randall, ‘Why New Zealand Did not Accept “World’s First Climate Refugees’, Climate Home, (2014),<http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/08/14/ why-new-zealand-did-not-accept-worlds-first-climate-refugees/>; Antonio Guterres, ‘Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective’, (2008) <http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.pdf> BBC News, ‘France Floods: 17 Dead on Riviera After Storms’, (2015)<http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-34437228> Becky Oskin, ‘Japan Earthquake & Tsunami of 2011: Facts and Information’, (2015), <http://www.livescience.com/39110-japan-2011-earthquake-tsunami-facts.
html> Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana Udayana Journal of Law and Culture Vol.
02 No.2, JULy 2018 247 Carolina Fritz, ‘Climate Change and Migration: Sorting Through Complex Issues Without the Hype’, (2010)<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/climatechange-and-migration-sorting-through-complex-issues-without-hype CISDL, ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and Scope’, (2002); <http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf> CNN, ‘Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts’, (2016),<http://edition.cnn.
com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/> Jeff Crisp, 2011 Refugee Conference Jane Mc Adam in conversation with Jeff Crisp, UNSWTV, (2011); <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLGbVgSTXx0&index =3&list=FLiuo-BT1POFP132ee0SIywQ> Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, “Defining ‘Environmental Migration,” Forced Migration Review 31 (2008): 10-11. http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ar ticle=2406&context=sspapers Essam El Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, UNEP, (1985) Freija Van Duijne, ‘Scientists’s Prediction of Climate Change: Business as Usual Versus Alternative Futures’, (2015);<http://futuristablog.com/scientists-prediction-climate-change-business-usual-versus-alternative-futures/> Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, “[2014] NZIPT 800517520<https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/Deportation/pdf/ rem_20140604_501370.pdf International Organization for Migration, ‘Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assesing the Evidence’, (2009)<http://publications.iom.int/system/ files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf> IOM, ‘Migration, Climate Change and the Environment’, <https://www.iom.int/ cms/en/sites/iom/home/what-we-do/migration-and-climate-change/definitional-issues.html> Library of Congress, ‘New Zealand: “Climate Change Refugee” Case Overview’, (2015)<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/climate-change-refugee/new-zealand.php> N95/09386 [1996] RRTA 3191 (7 November 1996); 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 (10 December 2009); 1004726 [2010] RRTA 845 (30 September 2010).
Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue”, A paper presented at the Economic Forum (May 2005)https://www.osce.org/ eea/14851?download=true 248 Richard Black, ‘Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?’, (2001); http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0d00.html Saiful Huq, Tim Gaynor (ed), UNHCR, ‘As Sea Levels Rise, Bangladeshis Seek Higher Ground’, (2015)<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/566ff51f6/sealevels-rise-bangladeshis-seek-higher-ground.html> The Sydney Morning Herald, ‘”We May be Witnessing New Zealand’s Darkest Day”: PM Says 65 Killed in Quake, (2011),<http://www.smh.com.au/world/we-may-bewitnessing-new-zealands-darkest-day-pm-says-65-killed-in-quake-201102221b356.html> The Telegraph, ‘Kiribati Climate Change Refugee Rejected by New Zealand’, (2013);<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/kiribati/10474602/Kiribati-climate-change-refugee-rejected-by-New-Zealand.html> The Weather Channel, ‘Super Typhoon Maysak (RECAP)’, 2015,<https://weather.
com/storms/typhoon/news/typhoon-maysak-yap-philippines-pacific> UNFCCC, ‘Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries’, 2007;<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf> UNHCR, ‘Climate Change, Natural Disaster, and Human Displacement: a UNHCR Perspective’, (2009), 3<http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html> UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Backs Increased Protection for People Fleeing Disasters and Climate Change’ (2015)<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/10/561e77f56/unhcr-backs-increased-protection-people-fleeing-disasters-climate-change.html> UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Pledges to Better Protect and Assist People Displaced by Disaster’,(2016)<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/5/574843f34/unhcr-pledges-better-protect-assist-people-displaced-disaster.html> United Nations University, As Ranks of “Environmental Refugees” Swell Worldwide, Calls Grow for Better Definition, Recognition, Support, (October 2005);<http:// www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/3916> Walter Kalin, ‘The Climate Change-Displacement Nexus’, (Brookings, 2008);<http:// www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/07/16-climate-change-kalin> Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards More Humane Interpretation of Refugee I Gede Eka Sarjana
DOI: 10.13102/sociobiology.v65i4.3375Sociobiology 65(4): 630-639 (October, 2018) Special Issue Open access journal: http://periodicos.uefs.br/ojs/index.php/sociobiology ISSN: 0361-6525 Different Responses in Geographic Range Shifts and Increase of Niche Overlap in Future Climate Scenario of the Subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata Lepeletier Introduction Pollination is considered a key element of global biodiversity conservation, because it provides a crucial ecosystem service, as without pollination, many plants would not be able to reproduce (Klein et al., 2007).
Ollerton et al.
(2011) estimated that approximately 87.5% of world’s flowering plants require animal pollination for fruit and seed production.
Pollination is also considered fundamental for food production because one-third of world’s leading food crops depends on animal pollination (Klein et al., 2007).
In Brazil, Giannini et al.
(20015) demonstrated that about 89% of the crop species are pollinated by bees.
Abstract Climate change is suggested to be one of the possible drivers of decline in pollinators.
In this paper, we applied an ecological niche model to modeling distributional responses in face of climate changes for the subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata Lepeletier.
This species is divided into two subspecies based on difference in the yellow tergal stripes, which are continuous in M. q. quadrifasciata and interrupted in M. q. anthidioides.
The geographic distribution of each subspecies is also distinct.
M. q. quadrifasciata is found in colder regions in the Southern states of Brazil, whereas M. q. anthidioides is found in habitats with higher temperatures, suggesting that ecological features, such as adaption to distinct climatic conditions may take place.
Thus, the possibility of having different responses in geographic range shifts to future climate scenario would be expected.
This study aimed to investigate the effects of climate changes on the distribution of the two M. quadrifasciata subspecies in Brazil, using an ecological niche model by the MaxEnt algorithm.
Our results indicate that the subspecies showed clear differences in geographic shift patterns and increased climate niche overlap in the future scenarios.
M. q. anthidioides will have the potential for an increase of suitable climatic conditions in the Atlantic Forest, and towards the Pampa biome, while M. q. quadrifasciata will suffer a reduction of adequate habitats in almost all of its current geographic distribution.
Given the potential adverse effects of climate changes for this subspecies, conservation actions are urgently needed to avoid that it goes extinct.
Sociobiology An international journal on social insects KO Teixeira1, TCL Silveira2, B Harter-Marques1 Article History Edited by Denise Alves, ESALQ-USP, Brazil Received 25 April 2018 Initial acceptance 05 June 2018 Final acceptance 21 August 2018 Publication date 11 October 2018 Keywords Stingless bee, climate niche, habitat suitability, species distribution modeling, hybridization.
Corresponding author Birgit Harter-Marques Universidade do Extremo Sul Catarinense Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Ambientais Avenida Universitária nº 1105 CEP 88806-000, Criciúma-SC, Brasil.
E-Mail: bhm@unesc.net There is evidence of a global decline in pollinators, mainly honey bees (Becher et al., 2013), which points to a more important role of wild bees as providers of this ecological service.
Wild bees, especially social stingless bees, are pollinators of many native plant species (Imperatriz-Fonseca et al., 2012) and effective crop pollinators (Klein et al., 2007).
Among the stingless bees, the Melipona genus has the largest number of species (Moure et al., 2007), and can be found throughout the Neotropical region, from Mexico to Misiones, Argentina, with highest diversity in the Amazon basin (Silveira et al., 2002).
So far, declines of Melipona species in Brazil have gone unnoticed, until three species (Melipona bicolor schenkii Gribodo, Melipona marginata 1 Universidade do Extremo Sul Catarinense, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Ambientais, Criciúma, Santa Catarina, Brazil 2 Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ecologia, Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brazil RESEARCH ARTICLE BEES Sociobiology 65(4): 630-639 (October, 2018) Special Issue 631 obscurior Moure, Melipona quadrifasciata quadrifasciata Lepeletier) were reported to be threatened in the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul (Fontana et al., 2003).
Currently, there are eight Melipona species reported to be threatened at national and/or state level (Tossulino et al., 2006; ICMBio, 2016).
Multiple anthropogenic pressures, including shortage of food sources and nesting sites due to habitat loss, aggressive agricultural practices and the spread of the alien species Apis mellifera L., are the main factors responsible for the observed population declines (Vanbergen et al., 2013).
Climate change also has been considered one of the possible drivers of the pollinators decline, because climatic variables provide general conditions for their occurrence and performance, according to their physiological limits (Dupont et al., 2011).
Mainly temperature and precipitation have been shown to play important roles in plant-pollinator relationships and may provide critical insights to help explain the potential effects of climate change on these interactions (Devoto et al., 2009).
Shifts in phenology induced by climate change have the potential to disrupt the temporal overlap between pollinators and their floral food resources.
As pollinators will experiencing loss of some of their food plants, they are likely to suffer population declines, as relying on fewer plant species will expose them to lower overall densities of flowers and greater temporal and spatial variation in food supply (Memmott et al., 2007).
There are three general expectations for species’ responses to climate change: movement (shift their geographic ranges to environmental conditions within which they are able to maintain populations), adaptation (in terms of evolutionary change or of physiological acclimatization), or face extinction (Holt, 1990).
Ecological niche modeling is an efficient and widely disseminated approach in conservationist studies to predict species’ spatial and evolutionary responses to the effects of global climate change via identification of their environmental requirements (Soberón & Nakamuna, 2009).
In this paper, we apply an ecological niche model by the MaxEnt algorithm to modeling distributional responses in the face of climate for the two subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata Lepeletier.
This species is one of the best-known social bee found in Brazil, acting as a pollinator of several plant species and playing an important ecological role in the ecosystem (Ramalho et al., 2004).
In nature the species constructs the nest inside trees hollows (Michener, 2007), so it is sensitive to forest fragmentation, especially when nesting sites are destroyed and availability of trophic resources is declined, compromising the maintenance of natural colonies.
M. quadrifasciata has been divided into two subspecies: M. q. quadrifasciata and Melipona q. anthidioides Lepeletier (Moure et al., 2007).
The geographic distribution of each subspecies seems to be very distinct.
M. q. quadrifasciata occurs in the Southern states of Brazil, from Rio Grande do Sul to the southern São Paulo state, mainly in cold regions, whereas M. q. anthidioides is found in habitats with higher temperatures from northeastern São Paulo state to the northern part of Bahia, and westwards to the western tip of Minas Gerais and central region of the Goiás state (Kerr, 1976).
The main morphological difference between the two subspecies consists in the presence of continuous tergal stripes from the 2nd to the 5th segment in M. q. quadrifasciata and interrupted stripes in M. q. anthidioides (Schwarz, 1948).
Nonetheless, there is a hybridization zone between the central region of São Paulo state and the southern state of Minas Gerais, where intermediate patterns of tergal stripes can be found (Kerr, 1976).
Furthermore, populations with an abdominal pattern identical to that of M. q. quadrifasciata could be found in the northeastern part of Bahia state in warm regions with altitudes ranging from 500 to 700 m (Batalha-Filho et al., 2009).
Recently, molecular studies have been conducted on these species to identify and substantiate the maintenance of division into subspecies.
While some studies have provided evidence that it is possible to recognize molecular differences between the two M. quadrifasciata subspecies, confirming the usefulness of the yellow metasomal stripes to identify them (Waldschmidt et al., 2000; Moretto & Arias, 2005; Souza et al., 2008; Tavares et al., 2013), Nascimento et al.
(2010) did not reveal genetic structuring of M. quadrifasciata in function of the tergite stripe pattern.
Similar results were reported by BatalhaFilho et al.
(2009) through PCR-RFLP, and in phylogeographic studies of these bees (Batalha-Filho et al., 2010).
The maintenance of distinct tergal strip patterns between M. q. quadrifasciata and M. q. anthidioides at different geographic regions together with the occurrence of a hybridization zone in the central region suggest that ecological features, such as adaption to distinct climatic conditions may take place (Kerr, 1976).
Thus, the possibility of having different responses in geographic range shifts to future climate scenario would be expected.
In view of this scenario, in the present study, we investigated the effects of climate changes on the distribution of the two M. quadrifasciata subspecies in Brazil to answer two main questions: (i) Are there differences in geographic shift patterns of the two subspecies to future climate scenario?
(ii) Is there an overlap of suitable habitats between them and, if so, how much will it be?
Therefore, the present study clarifies questions regarding geographic distribution, and climate niche overlap of M. quadrifasciata subspecies.
Material and Methods Occurrence data of subspecies of M. quadrifasciata were obtained from the following databases: the Global Biodiversity Facility – GBIF (www.gbif.org) and SpeciesLink (www.splink.cria.org.br).
The records that were not previously classified at the subspecies level were identified through available images from the collections and, when this was not possible, were classified according to the distribution map of Batalha-Filho et al.
(2009).
We excluded data that: (i) came from meliponaries (to avoid over-representation of some areas); (ii) were not georeferenced; and (iii) were impossible KO Teixeira, TCL Silveira, B Harter-Marques – Future Climate Scenario of the Subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata632 to classify to subspecies level.
Thus, 137 records were obtained for M. q. anthidioides and 68 records were obtained for M. q. quadrifasciata (Fig 1).
The environmental variables were obtained from the WorldClim database (Fick & Hijmans, 2017) at a resolution of 10 arc-minute grid cells, what corresponds to 0.16 degrees or approximately 18 km in the tropics.
The current climate model was based on the time series produced from 1970– 2000.
Future climate models were developed by the IPCC5AR5 Fifth Assessment Report (Field et al., 2014) in the scenario of greenhouse gases RCP8.5 to 2100.
This scenario is considered the most pessimistic projection, predicting a global temperature rise by about 5 to 6 °C by 2100 and increase of extreme events such as heat waves and very intense rains (Gent et al., 2011).
It was chosen because we are currently on a trajectory closer to the RCP8.5 scenario than to the more moderate scenarios (Peacock, 2012).
Considering the climatic conditions of the current subspecies distribution (tropical and subtropical environments and respective transition zones with seasonal temperature and high humidity (Michener, 2007), 11 climatic variables were pre-selected.
In order to avoid overfitting and reducing the predictive power of the model, variables that were correlated were excluded using Variance Inflation Factor VIF (Dormann et al., 2013).
We used the function vifstep included in the package usdm (Naimi, 2015), using 10 as threshold.
The final dataset of variables selected for the models were: annual average temperature (BIO1), isothermality (BIO3), annual temperature rate (BIO7), precipitation of the wettest month (BIO13), precipitation of the driest month (BIO14), and seasonality of precipitation (BIO15).
A maximal entropy model (MaxEnt) was used to model the current distributions of subspecies of M. quadrifasciata and to design their future habitat suitability.
MaxEnt is a machine learning approach which is based on maximum entropy algorithm (Phillips et al., 2006).
MaxEnt has been show an adequate and widely method for modelling presence-only data (Elith et al., 2006).
This approach uses the presence-only data and background points (pseudoabsences), relating environmental predictors to construct suitability maps ranging from 0 (unsuitable) to 1 (suitable).
In both subspecies we allowed linear, quadratic, product and hinge features between the habitat suitability values and each covariate (Phillips & Dudı´k, 2008).
The projections were repeated 10 times, each selecting a different random sample of 80% when verifying the accuracy of the model in relation to the remaining 20% (Phillips et al., 2006).
The MaxEnt algorithm performs better when the study area for the calibration model does not include areas outside the occurrence of species records (Elith et al., 2011).
Therefore, considering the current distribution of the two subspecies, the obtained models were limited to the Atlantic Forest, Pampa, and Cerrado biomes.
The models’ performances were evaluated by Area Under the receiver-operator curve (AUC).
To reduce sampling bias, a polarization layer was constructed, consisting of a map that incorporates sampling effort, that is, making the model less important for areas with high density of occurrence points and increasing the importance of regions with similar environmental characteristics, but which were not sampled (Kramer-Schadt et al., 2013).
To characterize potential changes in the distributions of the two subspecies, we calculated the proportions of occupied grid cells in actual and projected scenarios in the Atlantic Forest, Pampa, and Cerrado delimitation.
In order to produce the presence/absence maps to calculate the differences in occupied cells we first calculated the threshold which maximized the TSS.
We used the functions included in the Presence Absence package (Freeman & Moisen, 2008).
The niche similarities and overlap between the two subspecies in present and future climatic scenarios was verified using the method proposed by Broennimann et al.
(2012), in a grid-environment space.
This method uses core density functions to calculate the smoothed density of the number of occurrences and the available environments along the environmental axes of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and, based on these values, an occupancy index is estimated.
Afterwards, the Schoener D-index was calculated, Fig 1.
Spatial distribution of records of the two Melipona quadrifasciata subspecies in Brazil.
Grey circles represent the records of M. q. anthidioides, and black squares the M. q. quadrifasciata records.
Sociobiology 65(4): 630-639 (October, 2018) Special Issue 633 quantifying the niche overlap between the two subspecies (Warren et al., 2008; Broennimann et al., 2012).
Finally, two randomization tests were performed to evaluate the equivalence and niche similarity between the two subspecies.
The equivalence test assesses whether niches are indistinguishable (Warren et al., 2008).
For this test, pseudo-replications were created, grouping the geographical areas of occurrences of the two subspecies and randomly dividing them into two groups; however, original sample sizes were maintained.
For each of the pseudo-replications, we calculated the D-index and then contrasted the original D-value observed with a null distribution of 100 pseudoreplicated D-values.
The hypothesis of niche equivalence was rejected if the probability of observed D falling in the null distribution was less than 0.05 (p < 0.05).
The niche similarity test was used to question whether the occupied environmental space in one range is more similar or more different than the occupied environmental space in the other range than would be expected at random.
For this test the distribution of the two subspecies in one interval was overlapped with the distribution in the other interval, randomly assigning a new location to each occurrence in the other range and, for each pseudo-repetition, index-D was calculated.
This procedure was performed 100 times (from M. q. anthidioides to M. q. quadrifasciata and from M. q. quadrifasciata to M. q. anthidioides) to generate two new null distributions of D-values.
The hypothesis of niche similarity was rejected if the probability of observed D falling in the null distribution was less than 0.05 in a two-column test (p < 0.05) (Broennimann et al., 2012).
Results The AUC values obtained for each model exceeded 0.7, with the highest value (0.785) occurring in the future model of M. q. anthidioides, which indicates a good agreement of the models and good predictive performance.
Our distribution model for the future scenarios of M. q. anthidioides suggested a clear trend of reduction in habitat suitability in the Cerrado biome, and a potential increase of suitable climatic conditions in the Atlantic Forest, especially on the eastern coastal line from the state of Santa Catarina to the state of Espírito Santo.
Furthermore, the model predicted a shift from north to south towards the Pampa biome (Fig 2 A, B).
Fig 2.
Potential distribution of Melipona quadrifasciata anthidioides (A. current, B. future) and Melipona quadrifasciata quadrifasciata (C. current, D. future) in the Atlantic Forest, Pampa, and Cerrado biomes in Brazil.
KO Teixeira, TCL Silveira, B Harter-Marques – Future Climate Scenario of the Subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata634 Meanwhile, the resulting distribution of M. q. quadrifasciata in future climatic scenarios showed a potential decrease in habitat suitability in almost all of its current distribution, with an increase of suitable landscapes only in the coastal region of Bahia (Fig 2 C, D).
In addition, it is predicted to be an increase in suitability of M. q. anthidioides towards the potential distribution area of M. q. quadrifasciata (Fig 2 B, D).
The percentage of appropriate area occupation (with threshold of 0.5 for both subspecies) was 30.35% for M. q. anthidioides in the current model and increased to 31.75% in the future model.
For M. q. quadrifasciata, the percentage of suitable area pixels was 16.36% in the current model and decreased to 13.74% in the future model.
The current and future niches of the subspecies in the environmental space are defined by the first two axes of the PCA, which explained 76.7% of the original climatic variation.
The subspecies showed little overlap of the current niche (Schoener’s D = 0.399, Fig 3 D), and an increase in future niche overlap (Schoener’s D = 0.406, Fig 4 D).
The current and future PCAs showed a displacement of the centroid of the M. q. anthidioides niche (area with higher probability density of occurrence in the environmental space) towards BIO3, BIO14, and BIO15 compared to the centroid of the M. q. quadrifasciata niche (Fig 3 A, B, C and Fig 4 A, B, C).
The hypotheses of the current niche equivalence and similarity tests were not rejected (p = 1.00; p = 0.059; p = 0.079, respectively, Fig 3 D, E, F).
Likewise, the hypotheses of future niche equivalence and similarity tests were not rejected (p = 1.00; p = 0.158; p = 0.119, respectively, Fig 4 D, E, F).
Fig 3.
Current climatic niches occupied by the two subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata.
Niche occupied by M. q. anthidioides (A) and M. q. quadrifasciata (B) along the two-first axes of the PCA (see (C) for details).
Grey shading represents the density of the occurrences of the subspecies by cell.
The solid and dashed contour lines illustrate, respectively, 100% and 50% of the available environment.
(C) Contribution of the climate variables to the first-two axes of the PCA (bio1: annual mean temperature, bio3: isothermality, bio7: annual temperature rate, bio13: precipitation of the wettest month, bio14: precipitation of the driest month, and bio15: precipitation seasonality), and contribution of the two-first axes to data variation.
(D) Histogram of the observed niche overlap D (D = 0.399) (bars with a diamond) and simulated niche overlaps (grey bars).
(E) Niche similarity of M. q. quadrifasciata to M. q. anthidioides, and (F) niche similarity of M. q. anthidioides to M. q. quadrifasciata.
Sociobiology 65(4): 630-639 (October, 2018) Special Issue 635 Discussion According to our potential distribution models, temperature and precipitation (from the driest month and seasonality) are determinant factors for changes in distributions of the two subspecies studied.
Several studies on foraging activities of Melipona species showed speciesspecific characteristics of flight in response to the variations in abiotic conditions (e.g.
Teixeira & Campos, 2005), allowing interference on the geographic and ecological distribution of each species (Pereboom & Biesmejer, 2003).
These studies conclude that air temperature and relative humidity directly affect the flight activity of Melipona species with relatively large body sizes.
Scientific models of climate change for future climatic conditions indicate for the Cerrado biome that, although rainfall tends to increase mainly in the form of more intense and extreme rainfall events, periods of drought will be longer and summers will become warmer with an increase in temperature of up to 4 °C by 2100 (Juras, 2008).
According to our models, as a consequence of the temperature increase and drought period predicted for the Cerrado, M. q. anthidioides Fig 4.
Future climatic niches occupied by the two subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata.
Niche occupied by M. q. anthidioides (A) and M. q. quadrifasciata (B) along the two-first axes of the PCA (see (C) for details).
Grey shading represents the density of the occurrences of the subspecies by cell.
The solid and dashed contour lines illustrate, respectively, 100% and 50% of the available (background) environment.
(C) Contribution of the climate variables to the first-two axes of the PCA (bio1: annual mean temperature, bio3: isothermality, bio7: annual temperature rate, bio13: precipitation of the wettest month, bio14: precipitation of the driest month, and bio15: precipitation seasonality), and contribution of the two-first axes to data variation.
(D) Histogram of the observed niche overlap D (D = 0.406) (bars with a diamond) and simulated niche overlaps (grey bars).
(E) Niche similarity of M. q. quadrifasciata to M. q. anthidioides, and (F) niche similarity of M. q. anthidioides to M. q. quadrifasciata.
KO Teixeira, TCL Silveira, B Harter-Marques – Future Climate Scenario of the Subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata636 will undergo a notable reduction in potential habitats in this biome, but will have a potential increase of geographical distribution in the Atlantic Forest, along almost the entire eastern coastline of Brazil, while M. q. quadrifasciata will suffer a reduction of adequate habitats in almost all of its current geographic distribution.
This finding reinforces the evidence of the existence of specific responses to variations in climatic conditions, as proposed by Teixeira and Campos (2005).
Furthermore, our results indicate that the two subspecies showed clear differences in geographic shift patterns, supporting the maintenance and acceptance of the division of M. quadrifasciata into two subspecies.
Regarding the disjunct populations with continuous bands similar to that of M. q. quadrifasciata in the northeast of Brazil, our distribution models showed similar patterns in responses to climatic changes with M. q. anthidioides.
Waldschmidt et al.
(2000) and Batalha-Filho (2010) showed that these northern populations with continuous tergal stripes and colonies of M. q. anthidioides were genetically similar, indicating that the existence of similar tergal band patterns does not determine that this group belongs to the subspecies M. q. quadrifasciata found in the southern part of Brazil.
Furthermore, the similar pattern in responses to climate changes detected in our study, added to the low genetic variability among colonies of the two M. quadrifasciata groups found by these authors, suggests that both belong to the same subspecies, M. q. anthidioides.
Perhaps, the pattern of continuous bands of disjunct populations would be the result of the more recent differentiation within this group, resulting in a group adapted to higher temperatures and lower precipitation that characterizes the region of the northeast occupied by these populations.
According to our distribution models, M. q. anthidioides will show an increase in distribution suitability towards the Pampa biome.
Both subspecies show low current habitat availability in this biome, probably due to lack of adequate nesting sites, since Melipona species build their nests in hollow trunks of trees that are not abundant in this region.
This biome is formed by four main groups of natural field vegetation: Campanha Plateau, Central Depression, Sul-Rio-Grandense Plateau, and Coastal Plain, with herbaceous and shrub vegetation predominating and trees restricted to ‘capões’ and riverbanks (IBGE, 2004).
For this reason, the migration of M. q. anthidioides to this biome is unlikely, although in the future this region presents favorable climatic conditions for the subspecies.
Our distribution models clearly indicated that the future climate scenario will be more favorable to M. q. anthidioides when compared to M. q. quadrifasciata, as the first presented greater potential to expand its distribution through migration.
This migration, according to our results, would lead to a 0.7% increase in the overlap of the potential distribution between the two subspecies.
The increase in overlap, in turn, may lead to an increase in the size of the hybridization area currently existing between the two subspecies (Batalha-Filho et al., 2009).
Hybridization between populations may allow alleles from one genetic background to integrate into another if favored by selection (Riesenberg, 2003).
However, the net outcome of inter-population hybridization can be affected by several factors, such as the level of divergence between the populations and the rate of inbreeding in the populations (Whitlock, 2000).
In the present hybridization zones of the two subspecies of M. quadrifasciata, there are individuals with dorsal bands similar to one subspecies but with genetic markers of the other subspecies (Waldschmidt et al., 2000; Batalha-Filho et al., 2009).
In view of the future scenarios of the potential geographical distribution of the two subspecies (increase of suitable habitats of M. q. anthidioides, potential decrease in distribution for M. q. quadrifasciata, and increased climate niche overlap) it is possible that M. q. quadrifasciata, which is already in the red list of the endangered fauna of the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Fontana et al., 2003), will be at high risk of loss.
Due to the variation of some genetic markers, as RAPD and RFLP in the cytochrome b gene, social bees tend to have a differentiated genetic predisposition between their colonies in relation to their foraging behavior for example (Oldroyd et al., 1992).
The loss of M. q. quadrifasciata may lead to loss of differential responses presented by this subspecies, and, consequently, result in a reduction in the genetic variability of M. quadrifasciata groups.
Araújo et al.
(2000) showed that populations of Melipona are particularly sensitive to high genetic drift due to homozygosity in X0 sex determination locus, which generates diploid males that are either unviable or sterile, putting at risk the maintenance of the species.
In this sense, to avoid that M. q. quadrifasciata goes extinct, conservation actions aiming to increase suitable areas for the expansion of this subspecies are urgently needed.
Acknowledgements Authors thank anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions, Thaise Sutil for her help in preparing the final version of the figures, and the Brazilian Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) for financial support for the first author’s scholarship funding.
Authors’ Contribution B Harter-Marques conceived and designed the study, and wrote the manuscript.
KO Teixeira obtained funding and wrote the manuscript.
KO Teixeira and TCL Silveira assembled and analyzed the data.
References Araújo, E.D., Diniz-Filho, J.A.F.
& Oliveira, F.A.
(2000).
Extinção de populações locais do gênero Melipona (Hymenoptera: Meliponinae): efeito do tamanho populacional e da produção de machos por operárias.
Naturalia, 25: 287-299.
Sociobiology 65(4): 630-639 (October, 2018) Special Issue 637 Batalha-Filho, H., Melo, G.A.R., Waldschmidt, A.M., Campos, L.A.O.
& Fernandes-Salomão, T.M.
(2009).
Geographic distribution and spatial differentiation in the color pattern of abdominal stripes of the Neotropical stingless bee Melipona quadrifasciata (Hymenoptera: Apidae).
Zoologia, 26: 213-219. doi: 10.1590/S1984-46702009000200003 Batalha-Filho, H., Waldschmidt, A.M., Campos, L.A.O., Tavares, M.G.
& Fernandes-Salomão, T.M.
(2010).
Phylogeography and historical demography of the Neotropical stingless bee Melipona quadrifasciata (Hymenoptera, Apidae): incongruence between morphology and mitochondrial DNA.
Apidologie, 41: 534-547. doi: 10.1051/apido/2010001 Becher, M.A., Osborne, J.L., Thorbek, P., Kennedy, P.J.
& Grimm, V. (2013).
Towards a systems approach for understanding honeybee decline: a stocktaking and synthesis of existing models.
Journal of Applied Ecology, 50: 868-880. doi: 10.1111/1365-2664.12112 Broennimann, O., Fitzpatrick, M.C., Pearman, P.B., Petitpierre, B., Pellissier, L., Yoccoz, N.G., Thuiller, W., Fortin, M.J., Randin, C., Zimmermann, N.E., Graham, C.H.
& Guisan, A.
(2012).
Measuring ecological niche overlap from occurrence and spatial environmental data.
Global Ecology and Biogeography, 21: 481-497. doi: 10.1111/j.1466-8238.2011.00698.x Devoto, M., Medan, D., Roig-Alsina, A.
& Montaldo, N.H. (2009).
Patterns of species turnover in plantpollinator communities along a precipitation gradient in Patagonia (Argentina).
Austral Ecology, 34: 848-857. doi: 10.1111/j.1442-9993.2009.01987.x Dormann, C.F., Elith, J., Bacher, S., Buchmann, C., Carl, G., Carré, G., Marquéz, J.R.G., Gruber, B., Lafourcade, B., Leitão, P.J., Münkemüller, T., McClean, C., Osborne, P.E., Reineking, B., Schröder , B., Skidmore, A.K., Zurell, D. & Lautenbach, S. (2013).
Collinearity: a review of methods to deal with it and a simulation study evaluating their performance.
Ecography, 36: 27-46. doi: 10.1111/j.16000587.2012.07348.x Dupont, Y.L., Damgaard, C. & Simonsen, V. (2011).
Quantitative historical change in bumblebee (Bombus spp.)
assemblages of red clover fields.
PLoS One, 6: e25172.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0025172 Elith, J., Graham, C.H., Anderson, R.P., Dudík, M., Ferrier, S., Guisan, A., Hijmans, R.J., Huettmann, F., Leathwick, J.R., Lehmann, A., Li, J., Lohmann, L.G., Loiselle, B.A., Manion, G., Moritz, C., Nakamura, M., Nakazawa, Y., McC M Overton, J., Peterson, A.T., Phillips, S.J., Richardson, K., Scachetti-Pereira, R., Schapire, R.E., Soberón, J., Williams, S., Wisz, M.S.
& Zimmermann, N. (2006).
Novel methods improve prediction of species’ distributions from occurrence data.
Ecography, 29: 129-151. doi: 10.1111/j.2006.0906-7590.04596.x Elith, J. Phillips, S., Hastie, T., Dudík, M., Chee, Y.E.
& Yates, C. (2011).
A statistical explanation of MaxEnt for ecologists.
Diversity and Distributions, 17: 43-57. doi: 10.1111/j.14724642.2010.00725.x Fick, S.E.
& Hijmans, R.J. (2017).
WorldClim 2: New 1-km spatial resolution climate surfaces for global land areas.
International Journal of Climatology, 37: 4302-4315. doi: 10.1002/joc.5086 Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., Chatterjee, M., Ebi, K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, A.N., MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R.
& White, L.L.
(2014).
IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1132 p. Retrieved from: https:// www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/ Fontana, C.S., Bencke, G.A.
& Reis, R.E.
(2003).
Livro vermelho da fauna ameaçada de extinção no Rio Grande do Sul.
Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS.
632p.
Freeman, E.A.
& Moisen, G. (2008).
PresenceAbsence: An R Package for Presence-Absence Model Analysis.
Journal of Statistical Software, 23(11): 1-31. doi: 10.18637/jss.v023.i11 Gent, P.R., Danabasoglu, G., Donner, L.J., Holland, M.M., Hunke, E.C., Jayne, S.R., Lawrence, D.M., Neale, R.B., Rasch, P.J., Vertenstein, M., Worley, P.H., Yang, Z.L.
& Zang, M (2011).
The community climate system model version 4.
Journal of Climate, 24: 4973-4991. doi: 10.1175/2011JCLI4083.1 Giannini, T.C., Tambosi, L.R., Acosta, A.L., Jaffé, R., Saraiva, A.M., Imperatriz-Fonseca, V.L.
& Metzger, J.P. (2015).
Safeguarding ecosystem services: a methodological framework to buffer the joint effect of habitat configuration and climate change.
PLoS One, 10: e0129225.
doi:10.1371/ journal.pone.0129225 Holt, R.D.
(1990).
The microevolutionary consequences of climate change.
Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 5: 311-315. doi: 10.1016/0169-5347(90)90088-U IBGE (2004).
Mapa de biomas do Brasil.
http://www.ibge.
gov.br.
(accessed date: 1 March, 2018).
ICMBio Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade.
(2016).
Livro vermelho da fauna brasileira ameaçada de extinção.
http://www.icmbio.gov.br/portal/ images/stories/comunicacao/publicacoes/publicacoesdiversas/dcom_sumario_executivo_livro_vermelho_ da_fauna_brasileira_ameacada_de_extincao_2016.pdf.
(accessed date: 15 March, 2018).
Imperatriz-Fonseca, V.L., Canhos, D.A.L., Alves, D.A.
& Saraiva, A.M. (2012).
Polinizadores e polinização: um tema global.
In V.L.
Imperatriz-Fonseca, D.A.L.
Canhos, D.A.
Alves & A.M. Saraiva (Eds.
), Polinizadores no Brasil: contribuição e perspectivas para biodiversidade, uso sustentável, conservação e serviços ambientais (pp 23-45).
São Paulo: EDUSP.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2F1365-2664.12112 https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Gent%2C+Peter+R https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Danabasoglu%2C+Gokhan https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Donner%2C+Leo+J https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Holland%2C+Marika+M https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Hunke%2C+Elizabeth+C https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Jayne%2C+Steve+R https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Lawrence%2C+David+M https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Neale%2C+Richard+B https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Rasch%2C+Philip+J https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Vertenstein%2C+Mariana https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Worley%2C+Patrick+H https://journals.ametsoc.org/author/Yang%2C+Zong-Liang KO Teixeira, TCL Silveira, B Harter-Marques – Future Climate Scenario of the Subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata638 Juras, I.A.G.M.
(2008).
Aquecimento global e mudanças climáticas: uma introdução.
Plenarium, 5(5): 34-46.
Retrieved from: bd.camara.leg.br/bd/bitstream/handle/.../641/aquecimento_ global_introducao.pdf?
Kerr, W.E.
(1976).
Population genetic studies in bees.
2.
Sex-limited genes.
Evolution, 30:94-99. doi: 10.1111/j.15585646.1976.tb00885.x Klein, A.M., Vaissière, B.E., Cane, J.H., Steffan-Dewenter, I., Cunningham, S.A., Kremen, C. & Tscharntke, T. (2007).
Importance of pollinators in changing landscapes for world crops.
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 274: 303-313. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2006.3721 Kramer-Schadt, S., Niedballa, J., Pilgrim, J.D., Schröder, B., Lindenborn, J., Reinfelder, V., Stillfried, M., Heckmann, I., Scharf, A.K., Augeri, D.M., Cheyne, S.M., Hearn, A.J., Ross, J., Macdonald, D.W., Eaton, J., Marshall, A.J., Semiadi, G., Rustam, R., Bernard, H., Alfred, R., Samejima, H., Duckworth, J.W., Breitenmoser-Wuersten, C., Belant, J.L.
& Hofer, H. (2013).
The importance of correcting for sampling bias in MaxEnt species distribution models.
Diversity and Distributions, 19: 1366-1379. doi: 10.1111/ddi.12096 Memmott, J., Craze, P.G., Waser, N.M. & Price, M.V.
(2007).
Global warming and the disruption of plantpollinator interactions.
Ecology Letters, 10: 710-717. doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2007.01061.x Michener, C.D.
(2007).
The bees of the world.
Maryland, USA: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
913p Moretto, G. & Arias, M.C.
(2005).
Detection of mitochondrial DNA restriction site differences between the subspecies of Melipona quadrifasciata Lepeletier (Hymenoptera: Apidae: Meliponini).
Neotropical Entomology, 34: 381-385. doi: 10.1590/S1519-566X2005000300004 Moure, J.S., Urban, D. & Melo, G.A.R.
(2007).
Catalogue of bees (Hymenoptera, Apoidea) in the Neotropical Region.
Curitiba: Sociedade Brasileira de Entomologia.
158p Naimi, B.
(2015).
Usdm: uncertainty analysis for species distribution models.
R package version 1.1-15. https:// CRAN.R-project.org/package=usdm Nascimento, M.A., Batalha-Filho, H., Waldschmidt, A.M., Tavares, M.G., Campos, L.A.O.
& Fernandes-Salomão, T.M.
(2010).
Variation and genetic structure of Melipona quadrifasciata Lepeletier (Hymenoptera, Apidae) populations based on ISSR pattern.
Genetics and Molecular Biology, 33: 394-397. doi: 10.1590/S1415-47572010005000052 Oldroyd, B.P., Rinderer, T.E.
& Buco, S.M.
(1992) Intra-colonial foraging specialism by honey bees (Apis mellifera) (Hymenoptera: Apidae).
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 30: 291-295. doi: 10.1007/BF00170594 Ollerton, J.; Winfree, R. & Tarrant, S. (2011).
How many flowering plants are pollinated by animals?
Oikos, 120: 321326. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0706.2010.18644.x Peacock, B.
(2012).
Projected twenty-first-century changes in temperature, precipitation, and snow cover over North America in CCSM4.
Journal of Climate, 25: 4405-4429. doi: 10.1175/JCLI-D-11-00214.1 Pereboom, J.J.M.
& Biesmeijer, J.C. (2003).
Thermal constraints for stingless bee foragers: the importance of body size and coloration.
Oecologia, 137: 42-50. doi: 10.1007/ s00442-003-1324-2 Phillips, S.J., Anderson, R.P.
& Schapire, R.E.
(2006).
Maximum entropy modeling of species geographic distributions.
Ecological Modelling, 190: 231-259. doi: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2005.03.026 Phillips, S.J.
& Dudı´k, M. (2008) Modeling of species distributions with Maxent: new extensions and a comprehensive evaluation.
Ecography, 31, 161-175. doi: 10.1111/j.0906-7590.2008.5203.x Ramalho, M. (2004).
Stingless bees and mass flowering trees in the canopy of Atlantic Forest: a tight relationship.
Acta Botanica Brasílica, 18: 37-47. doi:10.1590/S0102-33062004000100005 Rieseberg, L.H., Raymond, O., Rosenthal, D.M., Lai, Z., Livingstone, K., Nakazato, T., Durphy, J.L., Schwarzbach, A.E., Donovan, L.A. & Lexer, C. (2003).
Major ecological transitions in wild sunflowers facilitated by hybridization.
Science, 301: 1211-1216. doi: 10.1126/science.1086949 Schwarz, H.F. (1948).
Stingless bees of the western hemisphere.
Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural History, 90: 1-546.
Silveira, F.A., Melo, G.A.R.
& Almeida, E.A.B.
(2002).
Abelhas Brasileiras: sistemática e identificação.
Belo Horizonte: Fundação Araucária, 253p Soberón, J.
& Nakamura, M. (2009).
Niches and distributional areas: concepts, methods, and assumptions.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106: 19644-19650. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0901637106 Souza, R.O., Moretto, G., Arias, M.C.
& Del Lama, M.A.
(2008).
Differentiation of Melipona quadrifasciata L. (Hymenoptera, Apidae, Meliponini) subspecies using cytochrome b PCRRFLP patterns.
Genetics and Molecular Biology, 30: 445450. doi: 10.1590/S1415-47572008000300009 Tavares, M.G., Almeida, B.S., Passamani, P.Z., Paiva, S.R., Resende, H.C., Campos, A.O., Alves, R.M.O.
& Waldschmidt, A.M. (2013).
Genetic variability and population structure in Melipona scutellaris (Hymenoptera: Apidae) from Bahia, Brazil, based on molecular markers.
Apidologie, 44: 720-728. doi: 10.1007/s13592-013-0220-y Teixeira, L.V.
& Campos, F.N.M.
(2005).
Início da atividade de vôo em abelhas sem ferrão (Hymenoptera, Apidae): https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.1976.tb00885.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.1976.tb00885.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1461-0248.2007.01061.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0706.2010.18644.x https://doi.org/10.1007/s00442-003-1324-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00442-003-1324-2 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0906-7590.2008.5203.x https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Raymond O%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Rosenthal DM%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Lai Z%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Livingstone K%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Nakazato T%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Durphy JL%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Schwarzbach AE%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Schwarzbach AE%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Donovan LA%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Lexer C%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=12907807 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1086949 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0901637106 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13592-013-0220-y Sociobiology 65(4): 630-639 (October, 2018) Special Issue 639 influência do tamanho da abelha e da temperatura ambiente.
Revista Brasileira de Zoociências, 7: 195-202.
Retrieved from: https://zoociencias.ufjf.emnuvens.com.br/zoociencias/ article/viewFile/156/146 Tossulino, M.G.P., Patrocínio, D.N.M.
& Campos, J.B. (2006).
Fauna do Paraná em extinção.
Curitiba: Instituto Ambiental do Paraná.
244p Vanbergen, A.J.
(2013).
Threats to an ecosystem service: pressures on pollinators.
Frontiers in Ecology Environment, 11: 251-259. doi: 10.1890/120126 Waldschmidt, A.M., Barros, E.G.
& Campos, L.A.O.
(2000).
A molecular marker distinguishes the subspecies Melipona quadrifasciata quadrifasciata and Melipona quadrifasciata anthidioides (Hymenoptera: Apidae, Meliponinae).
Genetics and Molecular Biology, 23: 609-611. doi: 10.1590/S141547572000000300019 Warren, D.L., Glor, R.E.
& Turelli, M. (2008).
Environmental niche equivalency versus conservatism: quantitative approaches to niche evolution.
Evolution, 62: 2868-2883. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2008.00482.x Whitlock, M.C.
(2000).
Fixation of new alleles and the extinction of small populations: Drift load, beneficial alleles, and sexual selection.
Evolution, 54: 1855-1861. doi: 10.1111/ j.0014-3820.2000.tb01232.x https://doi.org/10.1890/120126
Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 87-88, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-12230 Bio -based and A ppl ied Economics BAE Copyright: © 2021 F. Arfini.
Open access, article published by Firenze University Press under CC-BY-4.0 License.
Firenze University Press | www.fupress.com/bae Citation: F. Arfini (2021).
Mediterranean agriculture facing climate change: Challenges and policies.
Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 87-88. doi: 10.36253/bae-12230 Received: October 9, 2021 Accepted: October 11, 2021 Published: October 28, 2021 Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest.
Editor: Fabio Gaetano Santeramo.
ORCID FA: 0000-0002-5179-2541 Mediterranean agriculture facing climate change: Challenges and policies Filippo Arfini Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali, Università di Parma, Italy E-mail: filippo.arfini@unipr.it 1.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES This special issue of Bio-based and Applied Economics (BAE) features a selection of four papers previously presented at the 9th Conference of the Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA) (10-12 June 2020, Valenzano-Bari, Italy), titled “Mediterranean agriculture facing climate change: Challenges and policies”.
Changes in climate conditions consistently point to increasing risks to societies all over the world in uneven and multiple ways.
The increasing average temperatures, frequency and intensity of extreme weather events are expected to severely affect agri-food systems in the next decades.
According to figures, climate change is responsible for around 80-90% of projected changes in water availability and soil loss due to desertification processes and erosion.
In many areas agricultural land and crop suitability is affected by the climate change that modifies the production patterns.
The expected fall in the food production will have important consequences in the gross domestic product in the worst affected regions.
All these phenomena will have important consequences for the global social stability.
The harmful effects of global climate change on agriculture are unequally distributed across regions and countries, both in relation to the physical and environmental conditions, and depending on the sensitivity, exposure and adaptive capacity of local natural and social systems.
The Mediterranean area is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world to the impacts of global warming, according to international reports and projection scenarios.
The European Environmental Agency (2019) states that in the coming decades, the entire Mediterranean region is expected to experience severe climate events with diversified consequences on agriculture, depending on the adaptation capacities of different areas.
The debate on impacts and consequences of climate change on Mediterranean agricultural and food systems is particularly sensitive and controversial, considering historical, socio-economic and political diversities.
The Mediterranean region turns out to be a crucial crossroads for people movements induced by climate change.
Relocation and movement of people will cause an increased pressure on certain areas in terms of production and consumption, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode 88 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 87-88, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-12230 Filippo Arfini while other geographic regions will suffer further erosion and desertification, due to land abandonment and reduced level of land protection.
Such migrations put increasing pressure on the geopolitical role of the region as well as its internal relations and domestic politics.
Mediterranean countries, due to their geographical location, play a central role in the EU international relations.
Programs within Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships often promote initiatives for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Current and future policies for agricultural and sustainable development of Mediterranean countries need to prioritize climate risks considering agriculture multiple objectives such as providing adequate food for growing populations, protecting the environment and ensuring resilience to future climatic change.
Against the above scenarios, the 2018 evaluation report of the EU Adaptation Strategy invites enhancing the knowledge base and encourages new research and development, as well as innovation, in the field of climate change adaptation and mitigation policies.
The purpose of this special issue is to address some of the challenges that agri-food systems in the Mediterranean area are facing due to climate change.
2.
THE PAPERS IN THIS ISSUE The four papers in this issue are very different in scope and methods and provide examples of different and complementary issues in addressing the topic of climate change in the Mediterranean agri-food system.
Vaquero Piñeiro (2021) focuses on GIs and their impact on the economic development of Mediterranean rural areas.
Especially the paper aims at identifying whether territorial features drive the success of GIs, thus affecting their capacity to stimulate the local development.
The findings demonstrate that PDO-food localized in less-developed regions struggle to achieve the highest GIs market shares.
The unique presence of food quality designation does not guarantee the development of the rural area where such food is produced.
The study thus invites European, national and local policymakers to intervene in the areas with weaker socio-economic conditions, by applying more flexible production regulations and creating synergies between producers, associations and regional authorities prior the designation.
Raina, Zavalloni, Targetti, D’Alberto, Raggi and Viaggi (2021) focus the attention on the farmers’ decision to participate and their willingness to accept (WTA) a particular agri-environmental scheme (AES).
According to literature the design of the contracts proposed to farmers influences their choice.
The paper thus investigates which are the most successful attributes of the contracts, as highlighted by the scientific literature that uses choice experiments to test farmers’ preferences.
Results show that monetary attributes, in terms of compensation measures are highly preferred by the farmers and can increase their participation in AES, along with general contract attributes, such as the possibility to include smaller area or a shorter duration, and flexibility attributes, such as higher flexibility of participation, or different kinds of management.
The study thus has the ambition to serve as a repository of possible attributes to be used in other choice experiments at disposition of other researchers and policymakers.
The paper by Lamonaca, Santeramo, and Seccia (2021) highlights the connection between climate change and wine productivity in different regions in the world.
In particular, the paper aims at analyzing the effect of climate change parameters, such as increasing temperature and precipitation on production patterns in different producing regions such as Old-World Producers and New World Producers.
Results seems to suggest that the effect may be different between them: while New World Producers may suffer from precipitation patterns, Old World Producers may suffer from increasing temperature.
The paper thus invites other future research to examine how the entry of new world producers in the global markets may affect the global trade of wine and to understand how importers and exporters could react to new trade dynamics, due to climate change, in terms of trade regulations.
Zucaro, Manganiello, Lorenzetti, and Ferrigno (2021) in their article aims at presenting the feasibility and usefulness of Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) in identifying the most effective project proposals in the field of water management.
The issue is relevant considering the increasing effort of European and national institutions to adequately tackle the environmental effects of climate change by means of funds that follow public calls.
The paper thus demonstrates that MCA can be useful tool for choosing between different investment alternatives, since it allows for the inclusion of different quantitative and qualitative criteria that can be measured in a single evaluation process.
Nevertheless, the methodology is highly complex and there is the high risk of influencing the results of the method, by introducing subjective choices.
For this reason, proper methods should also be applied to make MCA a useful informative support for policy decisions.
Volume 10, Issue 2 2021 Firenze University Press Mediterranean agriculture facing climate change: Challenges and policies Filippo Arfini The long-term fortunes of territories as a route for agri-food policies: evidence from Geographical Indications Cristina Vaquero-Piñeiro Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Raffaella Zucaro, Veronica Manganiello, Romina Lorenzetti*, Marianna Ferrigno Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Emilia Lamonaca*, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia A systematic review of attributes used in choice experiments for agri-environmental contracts Nidhi Raina*, Matteo Zavalloni, Stefano Targetti, Riccardo D’Alberto, Meri Raggi, Davide Viaggi The effect of farmer attitudes on openness to land transactions: evidence for Ireland Cathal Geoghegan*, Anne Kinsella, Cathal O’Donoghue
PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery Vol.
37 no.
2 July – december 2022 PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery Vol.
37 no.
2 July – december 2022 PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery 76 PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery Wealthy nations must step up support for Africa and vulnerable countries in addressing past, present and future impacts of climate change The 2022 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) paints a dark picture of the future of life on earth, characterised by ecosystem collapse, species extinction, and climate hazards such as heatwaves and floods.1 These are all linked to physical and mental health problems, with direct and indirect consequences of increased morbidity and mortality.
To avoid these catastrophic health effects across all regions of the globe, there is broad agreement— as 231 health journals argued together in 2021—that the rise in global temperature must be limited to less than 1.5oC compared with pre-industrial levels.
While the Paris Agreement of 2015 outlines a global action framework that incorporates providing climate finance to developing countries, this support has yet to materialise.2 COP27 is the fifth Conference of the Parties (COP) to be organised in Africa since its inception in 1995.
Ahead of this meeting, we—as health journal editors from across the continent—call for urgent action to ensure it is the COP that finally delivers climate justice for Africa and vulnerable countries.
This is essential not just for the health of those countries, but for the health of the whole world.
Africa has suffered disproportionately although it has done little to cause the crisis The climate crisis has had an impact on the environmental and social determinants of health across Africa, leading to devastating health effects.3 Impacts on health can result directly from environmental shocks and indirectly through socially mediated effects.4 Climate change-related risks in Africa include flooding, drought, heatwaves, reduced food production, and reduced labour productivity.5  Droughts in sub-Saharan Africa have tripled between 1970-79 and 2010-2019.6 In 2018, devastating cyclones impacted 2.2 million people in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.6 In west and central Africa, severe flooding resulted in mortality and forced migration from loss of shelter, cultivated land, and livestock.7 Changes in vector ecology brought about by floods and damage to environmental hygiene has led to increases in diseases across sub-Saharan Africa, with rises in malaria, dengue fever, Lassa fever, Rift Valley fever, Lyme disease, Ebola virus, West Nile virus and other infections.8,9 Rising sea levels reduce water quality, leading to water-borne diseases, including diarrhoeal diseases, a leading cause of mortality in Africa.8 Extreme weather damages water and food supply, increasing food insecurity and malnutrition, which causes 1.7 million deaths annually in Africa.10 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, malnutrition has increased by almost 50% since 2012, owing to the central role agriculture plays in African economies.11 Environmental shocks and their knock-on effects also cause severe harm to mental health.12 In all, it is estimated that the climate crisis has destroyed a fifth of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the countries most vulnerable to climate shocks.13 The damage to Africa should be of supreme concern to all nations.
This is partly for moral reasons.
It is highly unjust that the most impacted nations have contributed the least to global Correspondence: Chris Zielinski Centre for Global Health, University of Winchester Sparkford Road Winchester Hampshire SO22 4NR United Kingdom Phone: +44 (0) 1962 841515 Fax: +44 (0) 1962 842280 Email: chris.zielinski@ukhealthalliance.org Disclosures: The authors signed a disclosure that there are no financial or other (including personal) relationships, intellectual passion, political or religious beliefs, and institutional affiliations that might lead to a conflict of interest.
Disclaimer: This Comment is being published simultaneously in multiple journals.
For the full list of journals see: https://www.bmj.com/content/full-listauthors-and-signatories-climate-emergency-editorialoctober-2022 Lukoye Atwoli,1 Gregory E. Erhabor,2 Aiah A. Gbakima,3 Abraham Haileamlak,4 Jean-Marie Kayembe Ntumba,5 James Kigera,6 Laurie Laybourn-Langton,7 Robert Mash,8 Joy Muhia,9 Fhumulani Mavis Mulaudzi,10 David Ofori-Adjei,11 Friday Okonofua,12 Arash Rashidian,13 Maha El-Adawy,14 Siaka Sidibé,15 Abdelmadjid Snouber,16 James Tumwine,17 Mohammad Sahar Yassien,18 Paul Yonga,19 Lilia Zakhama,20 Chris Zielinski21 1Editor-in-Chief, East African Medical Journal 2Editor-in-Chief, West African Journal of Medicine 3Editor-in-Chief, Sierra Leone Journal of Biomedical Research 4Editor-in-Chief, Ethiopian Journal of Health Sciences 5Chief Editor, Annales Africaines de Medecine 6Editor-in-Chief, Annals of African Surgery 7University of Exeter 8Editor-in-Chief, African Journal of Primary Health Care & Family Medicine 9London School of Medicine and Tropical Hygiene 10Editor-in-Chief, Curationis 11Editor-in-Chief, Ghana Medical Journal 12Editor-in-Chief, African Journal of Reproductive Health 13Executive Editor, and 14Director of Health Promotion, Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 15Director of Publication, Mali Médical 16Managing Editor, Journal de la Faculté de Médecine d’Oran 17Editor-in-Chief, African Health Sciences 18Editor-in-Chief, Evidence-Based Nursing Research 19Managing Editor, East African Medical Journal 20Editor-in-Chief, La Tunisie Médicale 21University of Winchester COP27 Climate Change Conference: Urgent Action Needed for Africa and the World Creative Commons (CC-BY 4.0) Attribution 4.0 International Philipp J Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg 2022; 37 (2): 4-5 GUEST EDITORIAL PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery Vol.
37 no.
2 July – december 2022 PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery Vol.
37 no.
2 July – december 2022 PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery 76 PhiliPPine Journal of otolaryngology-head and neck Surgery cumulative emissions, which are driving the climate crisis and its increasingly severe effects.
North America and Europe have contributed 62% of carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial Revolution, whereas Africa has contributed only 3%.14 The fight against the climate crisis needs all hands on deck Yet it is not just for moral reasons that all nations should be concerned for Africa.
The acute and chronic impacts of the climate crisis create problems like poverty, infectious disease, forced migration, and conflict that spread through globalised systems.6,15 These knock-on impacts affect all nations.
COVID-19 served as a wake-up call to these global dynamics and it is no coincidence that health professionals have been active in identifying and responding to the consequences of growing systemic risks to health.
But the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic should not be limited to pandemic risk.16,17 Instead, it is imperative that the suffering of frontline nations, including those in Africa, be the core consideration at COP27: in an interconnected world, leaving countries to the mercy of environmental shocks creates instability that has severe consequences for all nations.
The primary focus of climate summits remains to rapidly reduce emissions so that global temperature rises are kept to below 1.5 °C.
This will limit the harm.
But, for Africa and other vulnerable regions, this harm is already severe.
Achieving the promised target of providing $100bn of climate finance a year is now globally critical if we are to forestall the systemic risks of leaving societies in crisis.
This can be done by ensuring these resources focus on increasing resilience to the existing and inevitable future impacts of the climate crisis, as well as on supporting vulnerable nations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions: a parity of esteem between adaptation and mitigation.
These resources should come through grants not loans, and be urgently scaled up before the current review period of 2025.
They must put health system resilience at the forefront, as the compounding crises caused by the climate crisis often manifest in acute health problems.
Financing adaptation will be more cost-effective than relying on disaster relief.
Some progress has been made on adaptation in Africa and around the world, including early warning systems and infrastructure to defend against extremes.
But frontline nations are not compensated for impacts from a crisis they did not cause.
This is not only unfair, but also drives the spiral of global destabilisation, as nations pour money into responding to disasters, but can no longer afford to pay for greater resilience or to reduce the root problem through emissions reductions.
A financing facility for loss and damage must now be introduced, providing additional resources beyond those given for mitigation and adaptation.
This must go beyond the failures of COP26 where the suggestion of such a facility was downgraded to “a dialogue”.18  The climate crisis is a product of global inaction, and comes at great cost not only to disproportionately impacted African countries, but to the whole world.
Africa is united with other frontline regions in urging wealthy nations to finally step up, if for no other reason than that the crises in Africa will sooner rather than later spread and engulf all corners of the globe, by which time it may be too late to effectively respond.
If so far they have failed to be persuaded by moral arguments, then hopefully their self-interest will now prevail.
REFERENCES 1.
IPCC.
Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Working Group II Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report; 2022.
Available from: https://www.ipcc.ch/ report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/ 2.
UN.
The Paris Agreement: United Nations; 2022 [cited 2022 Sep 12] Available from: https:// www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement.
3.
Climate change and Health in Sub-saharan Africa: The Case of Uganda.
Climate Investment Funds; 2020.
Available from: https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/ knowledge-documents/final_chasa_report_19may2020.pdf 4. WHO.
Strengthening Health Resilience to Climate Change 2016.
Available from: https://www.
afro.who.int/publications/strengthening-health-resilience-climate-change 5.
Trisos CH, Adelekan IO, Totin E, Ayanlade A, Efitre J, Gemeda A, et al.
Africa.
In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
2022 [cited 2022 Sep 26] Available from: https:// www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/.
6.
Climate Change Adaptation and Economic Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa.
World Bank; 2021.
Available from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/ handle/10986/36332/9781464818059.pdf 7.
Opoku SK, Leal Filho W, Hubert F, Adejumo O.
Climate Change and Health Preparedness in Africa: Analysing Trends in Six African Countries.
Int J Environ Res Public Health.
2021;18(9):4672.
DOI: 10.3390/ijerph18094672 PubMed PMID: 33925753 PubMed Central PMCID: PMC8124714 8.
Evans M, Munslow B.
Climate change, health, and conflict in Africa’s arc of instability.
Perspect Public Health.
2021;141(6):338-41.
DOI: 10.1177/17579139211058299 PubMed PMID: 34787038 PubMed Central PMCID: PMC8649415 9.
Anugwom EE.
Reflections on climate change and public health in Africa in an era of global pandemic.
In: Stawicki SP, Papadimos TJ, Galwankar SC, Miller AC, Firstenberg MS (editors).
Contemporary Developments and Perspectives in International Health Security.
2: Intechopen; 2021.
DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.97201 Available from: https://www.intechopen.com/ chapters/76312 10.
Climate change and Health in Africa: Issues and Options: African Climate Policy Centre 2013 [cited 2022 Sep 12] Available from: https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/ PublicationFiles/policy_brief_12_climate_change_and_health_in_africa_issues_and_options.
pdf.
11.
Climate change is an increasing threat to Africa2020.
[cited 2022 Sep 12] Available from: https:// unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa.
12.
Atwoli L, Muhia J, Merali Z.
Mental health and climate change in Africa.
BJPsych International.
2022:1-4 [cited 2022 Sep 26] Available from: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ bjpsych-international/article/mental-health-and-climate-change-in-africa/65A414598BA1D62 0F4208A9177EED94B .
13.
Climate Vulnerable Economies Loss report.
Switzerland: Vulnerable twenty group; 2020.
Available from: https://www.v-20.org/resources/publications/climate-vulnerable-economiesloss-report 14.
Ritchie H. Who has contributed most to global CO2 emissions?
Our World in Data.
[cited 2022 Sep 12] Available from: https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2.
15.
Bilotta N, Botti F. Paving the Way for Greener Central Banks.
Current Trends and Future Developments around the Globe.
Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura for Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); 2022.
Available from: https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairs_8.pdf 16. WHO.
COP26 special report on climate change and health: the health argument for climate action.
.Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021.
Available from: https://www.who.int/ publications/i/item/9789240036727 17.
Al-Mandhari A; Al-Yousfi A; Malkawi M; El-Adawy M. “Our planet, our health”: saving lives, promoting health and attaining well-being by protecting the planet – the Eastern Mediterranean perspectives.
East Mediterr Health J.
2022;28(4):247−248.
[cited 2022 Sep 26] Available from: https://doi.org/10.26719/2022.28.4.247  DOI: 10.26719/2022.28.4.247 PubMed PMID: 35545904 18.
Evans S, Gabbatiss J, McSweeney R, Chandrasekhar A, Tandon A, Viglione G, et al.
COP26: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Glasgow.
Carbon Brief [Internet].
2021.
[cited 2022 Sep 12] Available from: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop26-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-unclimate-talks-in-glasgow/.
GUEST EDITORIAL
Research Article 1960–2020年陕北气候多尺度变化及影响因素分析 Multi-Scale Climate Change and Its Influencing Factors in Northern Shaanxi during 1960–2020 Si Wen Xue1,2,*, , Zhou Qi1,2 1College of Geography and Environment, Baoji University of Arts and Sciences, Baoji 721013, Shaanxi, China 2Shaanxi Provincial Laboratory of Disaster Monitoring and Mechanism Simulation, Baoji 721013, Shaanxi, China 近几十年全球气候呈现出明显的变暖趋势,全球平均气温在 1971年—2010年间存在每10年上升0.09℃~0.13℃的趋势 [1],部分温度带明显北移,寒温带范围缩小,冰川萎缩[2]。在 气候变暖的宏观背景下,区域气候也发生着一定变化[3]。区 域气候条件变化会直接影响陆-气水循环结构,进而导致区域 水资源问题更加突出[4,5]。中国大部分地区出现变干或变 湿，且降水呈现极端化，夏季城市内涝频繁发生[6,7].以中 国东北、华北、西北和青藏高原为代表的亚洲中高纬度地带 是全球最显著的气候变暖区[8,9]。 在研究内容上，学者们对陕北气候的研究主要集中在与ENSO 事件的关系[10]、多模态分量分解[11]、与植被覆盖动态变 化的相互响应[12]、气候感知[13]、气候区划[14]、气候变 化对农作物的影响[15]以及气候时空变化特征[16]等方面， 而对陕北气候多尺度变化特征及影响因素研究的学者较少。 在研究方法上，多数运用线性回归分析、距平分析、小波分 析、正交分解等方法，对气温或降水变化进行趋势、突变或 周期性分析[17–19],主要分析温室气体、太阳活动、火山 爆发、土地利用变化、SST(NINO3.4区海表温度距平平均值) 、PDO (太平洋年际震荡指数) 以及人类活动对气温和降水的 影响.气候变化具有非线性、非平稳性变化特征[20]。大多数 学者研究发现不同因素周期变化的非线性影响使得运用线性 趋势法拟合区域气候变化存在缺陷[21].而CEEMDAN模型可以 将非平稳、非线性的序列转换为平稳序列[22]。因此，一些 学者运用CEEMDAN模型来对降水量、水文干旱、蒸发及径流时 间序列进行分解[21,23]。 陕北地区位于半湿润区向半干旱区、干旱区的过渡地带， 受西风环流、高原季风和东亚季风环流的共同影响，是中 国典型生态脆弱区和气候敏感区[24,25]。以该地区作为对 象,运用CEEMDAN模型对降水和气温信号进行分解，分析其气 A RT I C L E I N F O Article History Received 02 April 2021 Accepted 26 April 2021 Keywords CEEMDAN method wavelet analysis BP neural network multi-scale Northern Shaanxi climate A B S T R AC T Based on the observed data of precipitation and air temperature in Northern Shaanxi during 1960–2020, the characteristics of precipitation and air temperature at multiple time scales in Northern Shaanxi were analyzed by using CEEMDAN (Adaptive Complete Set Empirical Model) and back propagation neural network time series model.
At the same time, the cross-wavelet and wavelet coherence methods were used to explore the factors affecting climate change in Northern Shaanxi.
The results show that there are certain rules of precipitation and temperature in the decadal, interannual, seasonal and monthly scales in Northern Shaanxi.
The interdecadal fluctuations of precipitation and temperature were dominant, and the periods were about 12–23 years and 13–21.1 years, respectively.
According to the analysis of trend term, in addition to the stable fluctuation of precipitation in Northern Shaanxi, the temperature showed a fluctuating upward trend.
Arctic oscillation index, Pacific decadal oscillation index, Niño 3.4 Region sea surface temperatures index and relative number of sunspots all have a certain influence on the climate change in Northern Shaanxi.
*Corresponding author.
Email: 1213268775@qq.com 国家自然科学基金“区域气候变化风险感知与应对”(41771215)和陕西省科技统筹 计划项目(2016KTCL03-17) 第一作者：薛斯文, 女, 1996-，陕西延安人，硕士研究生，从事全球变化与水资 源利用研究 Email: 1213268775@qq.com 通讯作者:周旗,男,1963-，重庆荣昌人,博士,教授,主要研究全球变化与可持续发 展研究, Email: 2675963235@qq.com 关键词 CEEMDAN法 交叉小波 小波相干 BP神经网络 多尺度 陕北地区 气候 摘要 基于1960年—2020年陕北地区降水和气温观测数据,利用CEEMDAN（自适应完全集合经验模态分解）以及BP神经网络 时间序列模型等方法，分析陕北地区多时间尺度降水和气温特征，同时，运用交叉小波和小波相干法探索了影响陕 北气候变化的因素。结果表明：陕北降水和气温在年代际、年际、季节和月尺度上均存在一定的规律；降水和气温 变化都以年代际波动为主导，周期分别为12a~23 a、13a~21.1a左右；从趋势项分析，陕北除降水平稳波动之外，气 温呈波动上升趋势。AO指数、PDO指数、SST指数以及太阳黑子相对数均对陕北气候变化有一定的影响。 © 2021 The Authors.
Published by Atlantis Press B.V.
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
11(2); June (2021), pp.
75–85 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.210430.001; ISSN 2210-8491; eISSN 2210-8505 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0809-5185 mailto: 1213268775@qq.com mailto:1213268775@qq.com mailto:2675963235@qq.com http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.210430.001 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr 76 S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 候多尺度变化规律，揭示影响该区域气候变化特征的主要因 素，对该区域生态建设和防灾减灾具有重要的理论和现实意 义.本文拟在前人研究的基础上，选取1960年-2020年陕北地 区降水和气温观测数据,利用CEEMDAN、BP神经网络时间序列 模型和交叉小波和小波功率谱等方法，揭示陕北地区多尺度 降水和气温变化规律及影响因素.拟解决以下问题:(1)陕北 气候在年代际、年际、季节以及月尺度上是如何变化的？以 年代际还是年际变化为主导?
(2)陕北地区气候年际变化与 AO、PDO、SST、太阳黑子相对数之间存在怎样的关系？以上 四者是如何影响陕北气候年变化的？ 1.
研究区概况 陕北地区位于黄土高原中部，地理位置35°21¢N~39°34¢N, 107°15¢E~111°14¢E,包括榆林、延安两市，辖25个县区 [26]。受季风活动影响,西北部气温干燥,呈现为半干旱 季风气候类型, 年平均气温和降水量分别为 7℃-9℃和 350mm~500mm; 东南部属暖温带干旱季风气候,年平均气温和 降水量分别为8.5℃~12℃ 和 500mm~650mm [27]。 属于我 国黄土高原的中心地带,地势西北高,东南低,属于干旱半干旱 区,受水汽条件和特殊地形地貌影响,该地区暴雨、干旱、洪 水、水土流失、泥石流等自然灾害频发[3]。 2.
数据来源与研究方法 2.1.
数据来源 1960年-2020年陕北地区9个气象站点日降水量和气温数据， 来源于中国气象数据网http://data.cma.cn.各站点数据质 量相对完整,部分站点缺测数据进行均值插补处理.PDO和AO数 据均来源于NOAA网站(http://www.noaa.gov)；太阳黑子数 据来自太阳影响数据分析中心网站(http://sidc.oma.be)， 以上数据统一采用1960年-2020年的年平均值.SST指数数据 来源于NINO3.4区，5°S~5°N、170°W~120°W区域内，海 表温度距平的区域平均值.DEM数据来源于地理空间数据平台 （http://www.gscloud.cn/sources/)，空间分辨率为30m。 2.2.
研究方法 本文首先整理了陕北 9 个站点（见图1）的日降水量和气温 数据，将日降水量求和，气温取平均值由日数据逐步归并为 月、季和年数据.之后取 9 个站点的年、季、月平均气温数 据的平均值来代替陕北 1960 年-2020 年各个年份的气温数 据，至于陕北近 60 年来各年、季、月的降水数据直接为 9 个站点每年季、月平均降水数据之和。 由于EMD和EEMD模型分别存在模态混淆 (混频)、噪声残留以 及模态个数的均一化分解。Marcelo A.Colominas等人提出了 自适应性噪声的完全集合经验模态分解 (CEEMDAN), 解决了 上述两种模型存在的问题[28]。因此，为了对陕北地区年际 和年代际气候变化规律进行分析，本文运用CEEMDAN模型对陕 北近60年来经上述处理的降水和气温信号进行分解，进而模 拟陕北地区近60年来气候在年代和年际尺度的变化趋势和周 期.具体步骤如下： 令Ek (·) 为通过EMD产生的第k阶模态算子，M (·) 为产生 将要被进行分解的序列的局部均值的算子, w (i) 为均值为 零, 方差为1的白噪声， x (i) = x + w (i).á∙ñ是在实现中求取 平均值的算子，可以看出E 1 (x) = X M (x)[21], 则: (1) 使用EMD计算x (i) = x + b 0 E 1 (w (i)) 的局部均值,以求 得第1个残差[29]: r x i1 = (M ( )) (1) (2) 在第一阶段 (k = 1) 计算第一阶模态: d1 = x – r1[23] (2) (3) 将r 1 +b 2 (w (i)) 的实现的局部均值的平均值作为第2个残 差的估计值, 定义第2阶模态为[21]: 图1 | 陕北气象站点及地形地貌示意图.
http://www.noaa.gov S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 77 d r M r E w i 2 1 2 1 1 1 2= − = − + r r b ( ) ( ) (3) (4) 对于k = 3, … , K, 计算第k个残差[31]: r M r E wk k k k i= + ( ) − − ( )1 1b (4) (5) 计算第k阶模态[21]: d r r r M r E wk k k k k k k i= − = − + ( ) − − − − ( )1 1 1 1b (5) (6) 返回第4步计算下一个k[21]。 时间序列分析基本思想是根据系统有限长度的运行记录，建 立能够比较精确地反映时间序列中所包含的动态依存关系的 数学模型，并借以对系统的行为进行模拟[30]。虽然BP神经 网络在内部验证中表现出出色的预测性能,但它不能很好地预 测系统外部发生的变化[31]。因此，为了较为准确的表征陕 北近60年来的气候变化趋势，我们运用BP神经网络时间序列 模型对陕北近60年来的年际气候变化趋势只做一个简单的模 拟。BP神经网络时间序列模型在误差反向传播过程中,对网络 各层的连接权值和阈值逐层进行修正更新，其拓扑结构主要 由输入层、隐层和输出层构成,各层之间的刺激脉冲强度通过 Sigmoid函数关于(0,1)的连续取值反应[32]。虽然BP神经网 络有多种算法,本文采用Levenberg-Marquardt算法利用梯度求 最大（小）值，这一算法同时具有梯度法和牛顿法的优点， 是使用最广泛的非线性最小二乘算法，主要用模型函数 f 对 待估参数向量p在其领域内做线性近似，利用泰勒展开，忽略 掉二阶以上的导数项，优化目标方程转化为线性最小二乘问 题，具体步骤可参照相应的文献[33]。BP神经网络时间序列 模型的运用为模拟陕北地区近60年来气候年际、季节、月变 化，为分析陕北气候多尺度变化特征提供依据，具体操作时 通过对数据的反复训练确保运用BP神经网络模型得出的近60 年陕北气候年际、季节、月变化趋势拟合优度在0.8以上。 在分析陕北多尺度气候变化影响因素的时主要运用了交叉小 波和小波相干法。交叉小波分析是将交叉谱分析和小波变换 相结合的信号分析方法[10]能够从多时间尺度分析两个具有 一定物理关系的时间序列在时频域中的内在联系。小波分析 可以直观观察气象序列的整体特征和局部变化，交叉小波功 率谱可以揭示它们共同的高能量值区及位相关系，小波相干 谱可以用来度量时-频空间中两个时间序列在低能量值区的局 部相关密切程度[34]。对于任意两个时间序列X和Y之间的交 叉小波功率谱(XWT）定义为[34]: W W Wn XY n x n y= * (6) 式中:Wn y * 小波变换系数的复共轭,交叉小波功率Wn XY 值越 大,两者在不同时频域上的相关性越显著。 小波相干谱定义为： R S S s W s S s W s S s W s n n XY n X n X 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) = − ⋅ ⋅ − − − (7) 式中:S被称为平滑算子,∣平滑算子[35],两个时间序列在某一 频率上波振幅的交叉积与各个振幅乘积之比, S s W sn XY− −( ( ))1 2 为两时间序列在某一频率下波振幅的交叉积; S s W sn X( ( ) )−1 2 为 振动波的振幅。 由于线性相关系数相对较小，仅表明两个变量关系较弱,易忽 略多时间尺度的一致性和相关性[31]。因此,选择小波相干和 交叉小波这两种方法,分别对陕北地区降水、气温和PDO、AO 以及太阳黑子相对数的非线性相关关系进行探讨。小波相干 和交叉小波法的相应公式见参考文献[33]。 3.
结果分析 运用神经网络时间序列模型对陕北地区气温和降水的年、 季、月变化趋势进行模拟,并分析陕北地区近60年来气候多尺 度变化特征。至于陕北气温和降水的年变化趋势中还增加了 CEEMDAN模型去判断陕北年际降水量和气温变化的周期,也对 神经网络时间序列模型的年际变化趋势做了验证。至于陕北 气候的年代变化趋势由于资料缺失我们仅用CEEMDAN模型来模 拟和预测。表1主要反映1960年-2020年陕北地区年降水量和 年平均气温多时间尺度的平均周期和方差解释量,其中IMF1和 IMF2是反映年际尺度变化的分量;IMF3、IMF4和IMF5为反映年 代际尺度变化的分量;RES为趋势项。 3.1.
陕北近60年气候年际变化趋势 对于降水和气温的神经网络时间序列模型,本文对降水和气温 模拟时都设置了神经元数10个,隐含层7个。 最终由降水的拟合结果(见图2)可以发现：陕北的降水自 1960年-2020年都集中在350到550mm之间,个别年份存在极 端降水现象。R = 0.909>0.5,值很高,说明降水的BP神经网 络时间序列模型拟合结果较好[35]。概括起来，陕北1960 年-2020年的降水大致呈四个阶段:1960年-1971年降水呈 波动下降趋势，其中，在1964年陕北地区降水接近750mm， 这与1964年延安地区有131天的降水这一资料符合；1971 年-1996年降水变幅较小，整体呈波动上升趋势，平均降水 量为423mm；1996年-2002年降水呈下降趋势，说明这段时 间陕北有变干趋势；之后的2002年-2020年近20年陕北降水 波动上升，最高可达581mm, 这段时间平均降水量为451mm.
总之，陕北地区近60年降水量整体呈波动上升状态，最高降 水量约为704mm，最低为273mm,平均降水量430mm.对陕北地 区降水进行CEEMDAN降水分解，可将陕北降水分解为5个模态 分量和一个趋势分量，气温的分解结果与降水一致。IMF1IMF2主要反映降水的年际变化特征.存在准2a、4a、6a的变 化周期.其中，IMF1主要反映陕北近60年来降水量准2a的变 化周期，从1960到2013年降水量每2年产生一次震荡，2013 年-2020年有轻微的波动上升.IMF2主要反映4a、6a的变 化周期，1960年-1995年降水量呈4年为周期的变化，1995 年-2013年降水量呈准6a周期的波动上升，2013年以后降水 量略微上升。 至于气温大致与降水的变化趋势一致(图3)。IMF1-IMF2反映 气温的年际变化周期为准2a、4a、6a、7a.其中，气温呈波动 上升趋势的时间段为1971-1975、1988-2001以及2012-2020 这三个阶段；呈波动下降趋势的时间段是1960-1971、19751988以及2001-2012这三个阶段。 总的来说，气温在这60年呈上升趋势，平均气温为9.2摄氏 度。IMF1反映陕北2a、4a准周期的气温变化，从1960年-1978 年主要存在2a准周期的上下震荡,1978-2014年呈4a准周期的 震荡，2014年以后有轻微的上升。IMF2反映陕北6a、7a为准 周期的气温变化.其中，1960年-1996年主要呈6a准周期的上 下震荡，1996年-2014年呈6a周期的上下震荡，2014年以后有 轻微的下降，说明陕北气温近60年来以6-7a为尺度会有稍微 的下降。R = 0.96，接近于1，说明神经网络时间序列模型能 较好反映陕北近60年气温变化规律[10]。 78 S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 图3 | 陕北1960-2020年气温变化趋势拟合结果 (a) 与拟合优度(b).
a b 图2 | 陕北1960-2020 年降水变化趋势拟合结果(a)与拟合优度(b).
a b 3.2.
陕北近60年气候季节变化趋势 如图4所示，春季降水量从1960年-2020年经历了上升-下降上升-下降-上升5各阶段，观点分别在1980年、1990年、2007 年、2013年.降水量最小为21mm，最大为118mm，总体上呈上 升趋势。夏季降水量近60年来变化趋势与春季降水量一致， 但拐点在1984年、1993年、1999年和2008年，说明夏季降水 量拐点时间与春季降水量不同。秋季降水量与春夏季的变化 趋势均有所不同，大致可以分为4个阶段：1960年-1971年降 水量波动上升，1971年-1974年波动下降，1974年-2012年缓 慢波动上升，2012年-2020年的降水量缓慢下降。总体上，陕 北近60年来秋季降水量呈下降趋势。冬季降水量近60年来变 化不大，大致在20mm-130mm附近来回震荡，最大值为130mm， 最小值为40mm。主要呈3个阶段的变化趋势：1960年-1978 年降水量波动上升，1978年-1989年降水量波动下降，1989 年-2020年波动上升，总体上陕北近60年来冬季降雨量呈上升 趋势(图4陕北四季的就是拟合结果都很好，R均大于0.8)。 气温的变化趋势可以由图5大致可以发现在春、夏、秋、冬 四季均呈上升趋势(拟合优度R都大于0.8)。其中，春季的气 温大致有3次峰值，3次谷值。至于夏季气温近60年来变化幅 度较大。最高接近18℃,最低为12℃。大致呈4个阶段的变 化趋势。1960年-1966年夏季气温急剧下降(从16.8℃跌至 13.1℃),1966年-1988年气温缓慢波动上升，1988-1996年气 温急剧下降（从15.2℃跌至12℃），1996年-2020年气温波动 上升，中间2007年又有一次大幅下降，之后均为波动上升趋 势。秋季气温主要呈4个阶段的变化趋势。总体上缓慢上升， 大致在14℃到17.5℃之间变化。1960-1974年波动下降，1974 年-1995年气温缓慢上升，1995年-2012年下降，2012年-2020 年波动上升。至于冬季气温总体上呈波动上升趋势。 3.3.
陕北近60年气候各月份变化趋势 降水月变化趋势可以分为三类，第一类为波动上升，第二类 为上下震荡，第三类为缓慢下降(上升)(图6)。图7各月份降 水变化趋势模拟结果都非常好，拟合优度大于0.8，误差也 较小。其中，1月份、2月份降水量呈波动上升趋势。1月份 降水量最大为29mm，最小为2mm，从1960年-1997年降水波 动上升，1997年-2012年陕北降水波动下降，2012年之后波 动上升；2月份降水量一直呈波动上升趋势，1992年前降水 量从2mm波动上升至19mm，1992年后变化幅度较小，降水量 一直在5mm-28mm之间震荡；第二类上下震荡主要出现在3月 份、4月份、5月份、6月份、8月份、9月份、10-11月份这7 个月。震荡范围大致分别为20mm-52mm、18mm-50mm、20mm60mm、12mm-110mm、40-90mm、25-50mm、5mm-45mm。其中， 振幅较大的月份为6、9月份，振幅都在50mm及以上。至于第 三类为12月份，降水量呈下降趋势。 气温的变化趋势主要可以分为3类，一类是波动上升，另一类 是先下降后上升，最后一类是上下震荡(图7)。图7各月份气 温变化趋势拟合优度R都在0.8及以上。其中，波动上升主要 S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 79 图4 | 陕北1960-2020年降水变化趋势拟合结果 (a) 春季 (b) 夏季 (c) 秋季 (d) 冬季.
a b c d 图5 | 陕北1960-2020年气温变化趋势拟合结果 (a) 春季 (b) 夏季 (c) 秋季 (d) 冬季.
a b c d 80 S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 图6 | 陕北1960-2020年各个月份降水量变化趋势拟合结果(1-12月).
图7 | 陕北1960-2020年各个月份气温变化趋势拟合结果(1-12月).
S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 81 出现在1、3、4、5月份、先下降后上升发生在7月份，其余月 份均为上下震荡。其中，5月份峰值主要发生在1962年、1994 年和2014年，谷值出现在1978和1999年。先下降后上升发 生在7月份，拐点在1972年，最高值出现在1976年，气温为 23.2℃，最低值出现在2006年，最低值为15.1℃.至于6月 份、8-12月份呈上下震荡趋势。8月份的震荡范围为13.9℃17.9℃。9月份的震荡范围集中在11℃-17℃.1960年-2008年 气温变化幅度不大，2008年以后急剧上升.11月份气温的震荡 范围集中于-1℃-6℃.12月份气温主要在-2℃-5℃震荡，主要 在1960年-1992年缓慢上升，1992年-2020年来回震荡。 3.4.
陕北近60年气候年代际变化趋势 图8中 IMF3-IMF5反映陕北降水量的年代际变化特征。主 要有准8a、12a以及23a的变化周期。其中，大致变化规律 为：1960年-1973年呈下降趋势，1973年-1985年上升，1985 年-2000年下降，2000年-2020年上升。IMF3主要指示准8a周 期的变化，主要从1960年持续到1997年，1997年-2016年主 要变化周期为12a，2006年以后缓慢上升。IMF4主要反映准 12a、23a的变化周期，1960年-1972年降水量呈缓慢下降趋 势，1972年-1984年缓慢上升，1984年-2007年呈波动下降 趋势，期间降水量变化周期为23a，2007年-2020年轻微上 升。IMF5主要反映准23a的降水量变化周期，1960年-1975年 呈下降趋势，1975年-1985年缓慢上升，1985年-2000年缓慢 下降，2000年-2020年缓慢上升。 陕北降水的余项 (RES) 反映了该区降水的基本变化趋势。 从1960年-2020年这60年间,陕北降水量呈先下降后上升的趋 势,下降和上升的时间拐点出现在1990年。说明陕北地区先 变干旱后变湿润，这与李双双等研究得出的结论具有一致性 [10]。 气温的变化规律与降水大体一致。由图8可得，IMF3-IMF5指 示了陕北气温的年代变化趋势，主要周期为准8a、12a、20a 以及21.1a，主要趋势为：1960-1971呈下降趋势，1971-1975 上升，1975-1988下降,1988-2001上升,2001-2012下降,20122020年上升；RES反映了近60a气温波动变化规律，1960 年-1975年下降，1975年-2020年呈上升趋势，说明降水滞 后于气温对全球变暖的响应。IMF3反映陕北气温准8a周期 的变化趋势，主要变化趋势为1960年-2015年陕北气温波动 上升，2015-2020年气温缓慢下降。IMF4表征准12a的变化 周期，主要变化趋势为下降-上升-下降-上升，拐点在1973 年、2000年、2007年。IMF5反映陕北气温20a、29a的准周期 变化。其中，1960年-1980年存在20a的变化周期，1980-2009 年存在29a的准周期变化，2009年-2020年呈缓慢上升趋势。 在方差贡献率上，RES对陕北的气温和降水贡献率都较低。其 中，降水量各模态IMF1、IMF2、IMF3、IMF4和IMF5的方差贡 献率分别为为13.11%、19.65%、14.75%、22.84%、29.61%， 降水量的RES（余项）方差贡献率为0.03%，说明陕北降水变 化趋势在年代际上更为显著，主要为准12a-23a的周期；气温 各模态IMF1、IMF2、IMF3、IMF4和IMF5的方差贡献率分别为 26.68%、9.80%、18.96%、24.43%、19.83%、0.30%（表1）， 余项的方差贡献率为0.30%，说明气温变化趋势也在年代际上 更为显著，主要周期为13a-21.1a。 此外，陕北气温1975前有轻微下降，之后持续上升，而降水 呈现高位下降-波动上升-波动下降-阶梯上升的趋势，这与相 关参考文献的结论陕北气候呈冷干化-暖湿化-冷湿化-暖干 化-冷湿化-暖湿化交替变化一致[35]。 4.
影响因素 NINO3.4区海表温度距平平均值(SST)是和PDO（太平洋年际 震荡）都对北半球地区的气温和降水量变化具有一定影响 [36,37];至于北极涛动（AO）是北半球20°N以北地区大气环 流变化的主要模态[37]，它在冬季与我国35°N以北地区(特 别是东北)地表气温异常存在显著的同向变化关系[38]；此 外，一些研究表明：太阳黑子相对数的变化是影响我国北方 地区极端气候事件发生的主要原因之一[39,40].
因此，我们 选取了PDO、AO、SST指数以及太阳黑子相对数作为研究陕北 近60a来气候变化的因子，主要采用交叉小波功率谱和小波凝 聚谱来分析。 图9、图10中小波相干系数越大，表明两者相关性越 高。“→”表示两者关系为同相位变化（正相关），“←” 图8 | 1960-2020年陕北CEEMDAN模型分解结果:(a)降水,(b）气温.
a b 表1 | 降水量和气温序列本征模函数的方差解释量 项 降水模态权重系数w 项 气温模态权重系数w IMF1 13.11% IMF1 26.68% IMF2 19.65% IMF2 9.80% IMF3 14.75% IMF3 18.96% IMF4 22.84% IMF4 24.43% IMF5 29.61% IMF5 19.83% RES 0.03% RES 0.30% 82 S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 表示两者反相位变化（负相关），“↑”表示陕北气候变化 超前相应指数相位90°，“↓”表示陕北气候变化滞后相应 指数相位90°[41]。 4.1.
陕北气候与PDO、AO的关系 交叉小波能量谱中颜色越偏黄色表示能量谱密度值越大。 图8为1960年-2020年陕北地区降水量与PDO的交叉小波谱和小 波凝聚谱，交叉小波谱表明该区的降水量与PDO间存在着显著 的3a～4 a共振周期；小波凝聚谱表明该区的降水量与PDO存 在着10a～16a的强凝聚性共振周期，并且二者之间呈正相关 关系，这与PDO指数的变化周期较为一致。值得一提的是，交 叉小波谱中显示，1985年-2002年陕北地区年降水量与PDO的 相位差箭头竖直向下，说明该区年降水量的变化周期滞后于 PDO约1.5个周期，这一研究结果与刘向培等的降水与PDO指 数间滞后时间为4个月时相关系数最大类似[42]。图9为1960 年-2020年陕北地区气温与太平洋年代际振荡的交叉小波谱和 小波凝聚谱。两者的交叉小波谱表明:该区的年气温与PDO间 在a = 0.01水平上无显著关系，但小波凝聚谱结果显示，该 区1967年-1973年气温与PDO之间存在着3～4 a的强凝聚共振 周期，并且二者呈负相关关系，说明1960年-2020年陕北地区 的年平均气温与PDO间可能存在着某种关联，这与一些学者 对北方黄河流域的研究结果一致性较强[43]。总而言之，陕 北近60年来气温与PDO指数呈负相关关系，降水为正相关，说 明陕北气候变化与PDO指数之间的关系较为复杂，可能用孙 旭光等学者的研究结果PDO位相的变化对厄尔尼诺-南方涛动 的年际变率有明显的调制作用来解释较为合理，PDO在1976 年/1977年从冷相位转为暖相位、1997年/1998年由暖相位转 为冷相位都会对厄尔尼诺-南方涛动产生一定的作用，进而影 响陕北气候变化[44]。 至于AO与降水之间存在着显著的遥相关关系，周期为 2a～4a，小波凝聚谱显示二者在1980年～1990年间有2a～6a 强凝聚共振周期，呈负相关关系；气温与AO间也存在2a～5a 以及8a～9a的共振周期，以2a～5a为主；气温与AO之间的 强凝聚共振关系在2010年～2014年间有所体现，周期约为 3a～4a，且二者呈负相关。这说明AO对陕北地区的气温变化 有一定的影响，具体表现在：北极涛动与黄土高原冬季温度 主要为正相关，在夏季AO指数与中国气温的相关较弱，黄土 高原大部分地区相关系数均未通过显著性检验[45]。同时， 气温与AO指数的共振周期变化与杨含雪等指出北半球降水与 AO之间呈现准3a周期的遥相关关系类似[46]。AO指数对陕北 近60年来降水的影响可以分夏季和冬季来解释：夏季北极涛 图9 | 陕北1960-2020年总降水量与各指数交叉小波和小波相干分析结果:（a）AO指数，（b）PDO,（c）SST指数，（d）太阳黑子相对数.
a b c d S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 83 动在45°N以南为正异常，副高明显偏北，有利于水汽向黄土 高原偏北的地区输送，夏季北极涛动典型负异常中心位于新 地半岛附近，在黄土高原地区主要为偏北风异常，偏南风的 水汽输送较弱，不利于形成大范围的降水过程；冬季AO指数 在黄土高原地区850h Pa以偏南风异常为主，有利于黄土高原 地区增暖和增湿。冬季典型负异常年在华北和东北地区850h Pa存气旋式环流异常, 黄土高原以偏北风异常为主, 不利于 水汽输送[47]。 4.2.
陕北气候与NINO3.4区SST指数的关系 由于NINO3.4区SST指数通过影响大气环流和洋流，从而对次 年全国降水产生影响[48]。因此，我们有必要用NINO3.4区的 SST指数来研究影响陕北气候变化的因素。由图10的小波交叉 谱可以发现陕北1960年-2020年降水量与SST之间存在2a～4a 和5a～6a的共振周期，气温与SST之间也存在2a～7a的共振 周期；至于凝聚小波谱显示降水与SST在1976年～2009年之 间存在7a～16a的强凝聚共振周期，且二者呈负相关，这说 明降水与SST在长时间序列上为存在一定的关联，这与李启芬 1981年以来中国夏季降水变化特征及其与SST和前期环流的联 系的研究结果类似[49]。至于气温与SST之间的强凝聚共振周 期在1966年～1976年间存在2a～5a和7a～8a的强凝聚共振周 期，1995年～2009年间存在3a～4a的强凝聚共振周期，均为 正相关，与一些论文的研究结果较为一致[50]。SST指数指代 NINO3.4海区海表温度距平的平均值，当海温连续三个月正距 平在 0.5℃以上可以视作一次厄尔尼诺事件。据相关学者研 究表明厄尔尼诺事件的发生会导致陕北地区1953年—2009年 的降水减少影响明显, 榆林、绥德、延安地区与正常年份相 比降水量分别减少为61.59mm、76.1mm、73.33 mm[11]；厄尔 尼诺事件对升温影响明显, 榆林、绥德、延安地区与正常年 份相比平均气温分别增加为0.23℃、0.13℃,、 0.11℃，这 说明SST指数的变化与陕北降水变化呈负相关[11]，与气温变 化呈负相关，与本文的研究结果一致。 4.3.
陕北气候与太阳黑子相对数的关系 陕北降水与太阳黑子相对数之间存在8a～12a的共振周期，至 于气温与太阳黑子之间存在8a～14a的共振周期，都在0.05的 水平上显著 （见图9、图10），这与太阳黑子平均变化周期 大约为11 a具有一致性。而小波凝聚谱显示太阳黑子相对数 图10 | 陕北1960-2020年平均气温与各指数交叉小波和小波相干分析结果:（a）AO指数，（b）PDO,（c）SST指数，（d）太阳黑子相对数.
a b c d 84 S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 与降水、气温分别呈一般显著的2a～3a负、3a～4a正相关凝 聚共振周期，这与相关学者的研究结果降水与太阳黑子之间 的关系复杂类似[51]。具体来说，太阳黑子出现极值的年份 与辽宁省夏季降水量距平的极值年份在大多数时段具有较好 的对应关系，两者呈负相关[52]，这与本文的研究太阳黑子 相对数与陕北降水量呈负相关关系一致；此外，从夏季降水 量与太阳黑子相对数量的比较可以看出，相对数量在峰、谷 阶段的降水量都比较大，随着太阳黑子相对数量的减小，降 水量下降趋势明显[53]。太阳黑子峰、谷年对长白山地区冬 季异常偏冷年也有一定的指示意义，这说明太阳黑子相对数 的异常年份也会对我国气温变化造成一定的影响[54]。 5.
结论 运用1960年-2020年陕北地区9个气象站点处理后的逐年总降 水量和平均气温数据，结合CEEMDAN分解法，对陕西气候变化 规律多尺度特征进行分析，选取AO指数、PDO指数、SST指数 以及太阳黑子相对数这四个因素来分析对陕北气候变化的影 响状况，得到结论如下： (1) 陕北气温1975前有轻微下降，之后持续上升，而降水呈 现高位下降-波动上升-波动下降-阶梯上升的趋势.夏季 降水量近60年来变化趋势与春季降水量一致至于秋季降 水量与春夏季的变化趋势均有所不同，大致可以分为4个 阶段冬季降水量近60年来变化不大，大致在20mm-130mm 附近来回震荡；气温在春、夏、秋、冬四季均呈上升趋 势北。 (2) 降水量月变化可以分为3类：1月份、2月份和4月份陕北 近60年来的降水量呈波动上升趋势；8月份降水量有轻微 的上升，12月份降水量呈下降趋势；其余月份均表现为 上下震荡。气温月变化也可以分为3类：一类是波动上 升，另一类是先下降后上升，最后一类是上下震荡。其 中，波动上升主要出现在1-5月份、先下降后上升发生在 7月份，其余月份均为上下震荡。 (3) 利用CEEMDA模型对1960年-2020年气温和降水信号进行分 解，获得5个模态分量，降水和气温变化都以年代波动为 主导，周期分别为12 a～23 a、13 a～21.1 a左右；从 趋势项分析，陕北除降水平稳波动之外，气温呈波动上 升趋势。降水量与PDO、AO间分别存在着显著的3 a～4 a正相关、2 a～4a的负相关共振周期，降水量与SST之间 的正相关共振周期为2 a～4a、5 a～6a，与太阳黑子存 在8 a～12a负相关共振周期；AO、PDO、SST指数以及太 阳黑子相对数与气温分别主要存在2～5a的负相关共振周 期、3 a～4 a的负相关强凝聚共振周期、2 a～7a正相关 共振周期以及8 a～14a正相关共振周期。 (4) AO、PDO、SST指数以及太阳黑子相对数会影响陕北地区 降水量和气温。 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China “Regional Climate Change Risk Perception and Response” (41771215) and Science and Technology Coordinated Plan Project of Shaanxi Province (2016KTCL03-17).
The authors appreciate the time and effort of the editors and reviewers in providing constructive comments which have helped to improve the manuscript.
REFERENCES [1] IPCC Core Writing Team.
Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC; 2014.
[2] Zheng Jy, Yin Yh, Li By.
A new scheme for climate regionalization in China.
Acta Geogr Sin 2010;65:3–12.
[3] Wang Y, Feng Q.
Extreme temperature index in Northern Shaanxi during 1960-2013.
J Desert Res 2016;36:1097–105.
[4] Zhang Q, Zhao Yd, Zhang Cj, Li Yh, Sun Gu, Gao Qz.
Water cycle and water resource problems in arid area of Northwest China.
Arid Meteorol 2008;26:1–8.
[5] Li F, Zhang G, Dong L. A review of the impacts of climate change on water cycle and water resources.
Sci Geogr Sin 2013;33: 457–64.
[6] Hu Y, Wang S, Song X, Wang J. Precipitation changes in the mid-latitudes of the Chinese mainland during 1960–2014.
J Arid Land 2017;9:924–37.
[7] Na Yt, Qin Fy, Jia Gs, Yang J, Bao Yh.
Change trend and regional differentiation of precipitation over the Mongolian Plateau in recent 54 years.
Arid Land Geogr 2019;42:1253–61.
[8] Stocker T, Qin D, Plattner GK.
Climate change 2013: the physical science basis.
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press; 2013.
[9] Jiang DB, Fu YH.
Estimation of future climate change in China under the background of 2℃ global warming.
Chinese J Atmos Sci 2012;36:234–46.
[10] Shen Y, Li S, Yan J, Wu Y, Wang C. Characteristics and influencing factors of climate change in Shaanxi under pole symmetric modal decomposition.
Arid Land Geogr 2021;44:36–46.
[11] Wei J, Zhao J.
Effects of El Nino/La Nina events on climate in northern Shaanxi during the past 57a.
Water Bull Soil Conserv 2012;32:210–14.
[12] Ma L. Spatio-temporal variation of vegetation cover and its response to climate factors in the Loess Plateau of Northern Shaanxi based on ESTARFM model.
Northwestern University; 2019.
[13] Sun LF.
Study on farmers’ perception and adaptation behavior to climate change in the loess hilly region of northern Shaanxi Province.
China: Shaanxi Normal University; 2018.
[14] Liu HM.
ArcGIS based climate regionalization for planting suitability of jujube in northern Shaanxi.
Yulin Meteorological Observatory, Shaanxi Province; 2014.
[15] Yingxia Z, Quanju W, Bin H, Jihong Z, Shuai T. Effects of temperature and CO2 concentration on the yield of winter wheat in northern Shaanxi.
J Soil Water Conserv 2017;31:292–7.
[16] Wang B, Liu Q, Luo L, et al.
Change characteristics of soil surface temperature and air temperature in the mountainous region of southern Sichuan from 1981 to 2011.
Arid Land Geogr 2019;42:1322–9.
[17] Chen Y, Jia Z, Bai S. Annual variation of winter temperature and its causes in Xinjiang.
Arid Land Geogr 2019;42:223–39.
[18] Ma L, Li H, Liu T, Liang L. Abrupt temperature change and a warming hiatus from 1951 to 2014 in Inner Mongolia, China.
J Arid Land 2019;11:192–207.
https://doi.org/10.11821/xb201001002 https://doi.org/10.11821/xb201001002 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40333-017-0105-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40333-017-0105-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40333-017-0105-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40333-019-0100-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s40333-019-0100-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s40333-019-0100-z S.W.
Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(2) 75–85 85 [19] Ding YH, Wang HJ.
Newly acquired knowledge on the scientific issues related to climate change over the recent 100 years in China.
Sci Bull 2016;61:1029–41.
[20] Bai L, Liu ZH, Chen ZS, Xu JH.
Runoff nonlinear variation and responses to climate fluctuation in the headwater region of the Kaidu River.
Resour Sci 2017;39:1511–21.
[21] Wei L, Xu Z, Zhang ZQ.
Multi-scale analysis and prediction of precipitation in flood season in Haihe River Basin.
Water Resour Plan Des 2017;60–63+86.
[22] Cheng C. Study on the driving effect of complexity characteristics of regional water resources system on drought risk and its optimal allocation.
China: Northeast Agricultural University; 2018.
[23] Wang D, Yin S, Wang H, Meng D. Climate change in northern Shaanxi in recent 50 years.
Arid Zone Res 2011;28:262–7.
[24] Wei ZF, Ren ZY, Zhang C, Zhang JQ.
Spatial characteristics of desertification in Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Loess Plateau during 1999-2010.
J Desert Res 2014;34:1230–6.
[25] Zhang H, Pan L, Lu S, G HY.
Changes of precipitation and temperature in Shaanxi Province from 1901 to 2012.
J Desert Res 2015;35:1674–82.
[26] Wei ZF, Wang DG, Zhang C, Liu XF, Zhang H. Response of vegetation cover to climate change and human activities in Northwest China during 1999-2010.
J Desert Res 2014;34:1665–70.
[27] Cao M, Qiu H. Geography in Shaanxi Province.
Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press; 2018.
[28] Colominas MA, Schlotthauer G, Torres ME.
Improved complete ensemble EMD: a suitable tool for biomedical signal processing.
Biomed Signal Process Control 2014;14:19–29.
[29] Ding Z, Zhang J, Zhao Y.
Study on the variation characteristics of annual runoff in the source region of the Yellow River based on CEEMDAN.
Haihe Water Resour 2016;1–6.
[30] Zhao X, Zhang M, Shi Y, Wang K, Wei Y. Denoising analysis of motor bearing vibration signal based on improved CEEMDAN algorithm.
J Electron Measure Instrum 2020;34:159–64.
[31] Deng Y, Zhou X, Shen J, Xiao G, Hong H, Lin H, et al.
New methods based on back propagation (BP) and radial basis function (RBF) artificial neural networks (ANNs) for predicting the occurrence of haloketones in tap water.
Sci Total Environ 2021;772:145534.
[32] Grinsted A, Moore JC, Jevrejeva S. Application of the cross wavelet transform and wavelet coherence to geophysical time series.
Nonlin Processes Geophys 2004;11:561–6.
[33] Ghaderpour E, Vujadinovic T. The potential of the least-squares spectral and cross-wavelet analyses for near-real-time disturbance detection within unequally spaced satellite image time series.
Remote Sens 2020;12:2446.
[34] Wang J, Shi B, Bayanbin.
Evolution characteristics of the sediment flux into the sea from the Yellow River in the past 70 years.
Res Soil Water Conserv 2020;27:57–62.
[35] Wang D, Zhou Y, Wang Y, Wang W, Meng D. Multi-index optimization of typical precipitation forecast by ANN: a case study in the western part of Taihu Lake.
J Hydrol 2020;40:35–9.
[36] Wang Y, Liu Y, Zhang H, Wang H, Guo J, Zhang E, et al.
Temperature variability inferred from tree-ring records in Weichang region, China, and its teleconnection with large-scale climate forcing.
Climate Dyn 2019;52:1533–45.
[37] Gutzler DS, Kann DM, Thornbrugh C. Modulation of ENSObased long-lead outlooks of Southwestern U.S. winter precipitation by the Pacific decadal oscillation.
Weather Forecast 2002;17: 1163–72.
[38] Zuo J.
Relationship between AO/NAO and SST and their impact on climate anomalies in China.
Lanzhou: Lanzhou University; 2010.
[39] Gong DY, Wang SW.
Long-term variability of the Siberian high and the possible influence of global warming.
Acta Geogr Sin 1999;54:125–33.
[40] Wang X, Jiang R, Xie J, Zhao Y.
Study on the characteristics and driving mechanism of precipitation change in flood season in Xi ‘an.
J Nat Disast 2020;29:138–48.
[41] Rong X, Pang J, Han J.
Study on the distribution trend and climate background of droughts and floods in Shanxi Province during 1958-2012.
J Arid Land Resour Environ 2018;32:97–102.
[42] Li S, Kong F, Han L, Yan J, Wang C, Wu Y. Spatio-temporal variation of extreme precipitation and its influencing factors on the Loess Plateau in Northern Shaanxi province.
Geogr Res 2020;39:140–51.
[43] Feng XL, Liu CH, Lin PF, Bai WR, Yu D. Multi-scale characteristics of temperature variation in the source region of the Yellow River from 1953 to 2017.
Clim Environ Res 2020;25:333–44.
[44] Li M, Deng Y, Ge C, Wang G, Chai X. Characteristics of meteorological drought and its relationship with large-scale climatic factors in the Loess Plateau during 1961-2017.
Ecol Environ Sci 2020;29:2231–9.
[45] Xin M, Yu Z, Huilin L, Hua B, Songying G, Lili S. Characteristics of temperature variation and its relationship with AO in Northeast China.
J Arid Meteorol 2017;35:383–90.
[46] Yang H. Relationship between EAP wave train and AO/NAO in summer in the Northern Hemisphere and its impact on persistent precipitation in China.
Chengdu University of Information Technology; 2018.
[47] Zhang Y, Zhang Y.
The influence of the Arctic Oscillation on the temperature and precipitation of the Loess Plateau.
In: The 35th Annual Meeting of the Chinese Meteorological Society S7 East Asian climate, extreme climate event variation mechanism and climate prediction.
China Meteorological Society; 2018, p. 5.
[48] Wang J.
Modern physical geography.
Beijing: Higher Education Press; 2002, pp.
97–101.
[49] Li Q, Wu Z, Wang X, Zhang D, Xiao M. Variation characteristics of summer precipitation in China since 1981 and its relationship with SST and previous circulation.
Plateau Meteorol 2020;39:58–67.
[50] Jing G, Shengnan L, Lihong J, Weiyi M, Lijun J.
Analysis of extreme temperature variation and its influencing factors in Tacheng area, Xinjiang.
Arid Land Geogr 2021;44:346–59.
[51] Lei Z, Jun X, Yin Z, Yunfeng Q. Temporal and spatial evolution of precipitation and its driving forces in Haihe River Basin.
Water Resour Protect 2021;37:53–60.
[52] Liang ZR.
Analysis of the relationship between summer precipitation and relative number of sunspots in Liaoning Province.
Hydrology 2020;40:86–91.
[53] Chen Y, Liu J, Zhang P, Xu M, Hai J.
Climate change and its relationship with related factors in Shandong Province in recent 40 years.
Yellow River 2016;38:81–6.
[54] Zhang L, Cheng K, Zhang L, Ruan W. Analysis on climatic characteristics of winter abnormally cold years in Changbai Mountains.
Meteorol Disast Prev 2019;26:1–5.
https://doi.org/10.1360/N972015-00638 https://doi.org/10.1360/N972015-00638 https://doi.org/10.1360/N972015-00638 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bspc.2014.06.009 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bspc.2014.06.009 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bspc.2014.06.009 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.145534 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.145534 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.145534 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.145534 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.145534 https://doi.org/10.5194/npg-11-561-2004 https://doi.org/10.5194/npg-11-561-2004 https://doi.org/10.5194/npg-11-561-2004 https://doi.org/10.3390/rs12152446 https://doi.org/10.3390/rs12152446 https://doi.org/10.3390/rs12152446 https://doi.org/10.3390/rs12152446 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-018-4213-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-018-4213-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-018-4213-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-018-4213-4 https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0434%282002%29017%3C1163:moebll%3E2.0.co%3B2 https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0434%282002%29017%3C1163:moebll%3E2.0.co%3B2 https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0434%282002%29017%3C1163:moebll%3E2.0.co%3B2 https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0434%282002%29017%3C1163:moebll%3E2.0.co%3B2 https://doi.org/10.11821/dlyj020181067 https://doi.org/10.11821/dlyj020181067 https://doi.org/10.11821/dlyj020181067 https://doi.org/10.11821/dlyj020181067
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 80 Volume 2 Issue 1 February (2022) DOI: 10.47540/ijias.v2i1.439 Page: 80 – 87 Assessment of Awareness on Climate Change among Public and Private Universities of Lahore Ayesha Mohsin1, Abeera Shehzad1, Fatima Bilal1, Fatima Imran1, Sana Akhtar1, Syeda Anna Fatima1 1 Department of Environmental Sciences, Kinnaird College for Women University, Pakistan Corresponding Author: Ayesha Mohsin; Email: ayeshamohsin51@gmail.com A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: Climate Change, Global Crisis, Tertiary Institutions.
Received : 17 January 2022 Revised : 10 February 2022 Accepted : 13 February 2022 As everything in this world evolves or changes, so does our climate.
Scientists have now proved that climate change is happening at a much faster rate than before.
Pakistan is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change impacts.
Pakistan is considered as 7th most vulnerable country to climate change.
Recently in Lahore, many major events occurred due to climate change like the occurrence of smog.
The present study was conducted in 4 different tertiary institutions of Lahore, Pakistan.
A descriptive survey design was specially employed for this study which used a stratified random sampling method for selecting the students.
Moreover, a structured questionnaire titled climate change awareness was developed for collecting data from the students based on their level of awareness.
According to this survey, 49.1% of the students know about the policies government is making regarding climate change.
62.5% of the respondents agreed that they have the necessary information to prepare for the impacts of climate change.
The result of the findings showed a moderate level of awareness about climate change among the students.
Awareness of climate change is an important ingredient for the successful implementation of climate change policy in the country.
By improving the climate services and raising awareness about climate change and once it starts to grow it can be integrated into local, national, and sectoral development plans.
INTRODUCTION The word Climate refers to the condition of the atmosphere that stays for a long time about 11-40 years.
It is a long-term summary of the difference in temperature, atmospheric pressure, wind, humidity, precipitation, etc.
As everything in this world evolves or changes, so does our climate.
Various studies have now proved that climate change is happening at a much faster rate than before (Indrani et al., 2010).
Humans are now exposed to drastic changes of climate change viz.
increase in global temperature, rising in sea level, warming of the sea, shorter and warmer winters, increased incidence of severe cyclones and melting of glaciers and many others most frequent extreme climatic events.
These changes have many negative effects on humans as well as the natural ecosystem (Nisha et al., 2014).
Local and broad knowledge about climate change is required to formulate mitigation strategies.
Many studies have been done on the awareness of climate change among students, educators, farmers, etc.
These studies have shown that an emphasis should be done on the basic understanding of the local community/people to make them aware of climate change (Aymeric et al., 2016; Alfonso, 2021).
Pakistan is one of the most vulnerable countries to climatic impacts.
According to various researchers and also according to the minister of climate change who claimed that Pakistan is also on the list with other countries that are threatened by climate change.
Pakistan is considered as 7th most vulnerable country to climate change, also in some studies, it has been shown that by the end of the 21st-century temperature of most of the Asian INDONESIAN JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND APPLIED SCIENCES (IJIAS) Journal Homepage: https://ojs.literacyinstitute.org/index.php/ijias ISSN: 2775-4162 (Online) Research Article mailto:ayeshamohsin51@gmail.com https://ojs.literacyinstitute.org/index.php/ijias http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1587190067&1&&2020 Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 81 countries will not be suitable or comfortable for the people.
In the past decade, many of the unexpected events in Pakistan like; floods, droughts, heatwaves, etc have affected the majority of the population (Shahid Z, 2012).
According to the experts, Pakistan had faced around 150 severe weather incidents due to climate change.
In the past 20 years, these climatic events include smog in winter, flash floods, landslides, displaced population, forest fires in summer, freaky heat waves, and melting of glaciers.
Climatic literature showed us that global warming will affect the cognitive and physical performance of workers and thereby cause a decrease in effective labor supply.
Extreme weather conditions i.e.
temperature is detrimental to health.
Now there is a debate whether climate change is due to anthropogenic activities or it’s a series of natural events.
About many kinds of research, it can be proved that this change is more due to different human activities (industrial revolution, agricultural practices, and whatnot).
All these activities tend to change the global composition of the atmosphere, disturbing the natural cycles resulting in climate change (Qadir M. et al., 2016).
Climate change is a matter of concern and could be catastrophic in the future if not taken seriously today (Gulam M et al., 2018) The possible effects of climate change are less food production because the crop yield is directly dependent on climatic conditions (particularly rainfall patterns and temperature, chances of more strong tropical cyclones, resulting in the alteration of the wind speeds, due to the melting of the glaciers, floods might become more common, Increase in the disease occurrences and alteration in the biological diversity could also be observed (Stern et al., 2014).
To minimize the climate change effects, it is very important to introduce strategies that can easily tackle the situation and reduce future complications.
One of the strategies would be to create awareness among people that how their agricultural practices and industrial activities are creating a negative impact on the climate and the second is to introduce climate and climate changes issues in the school prospectus.
It is very important to critically analyze the complex global climate changes and the level of awareness among people in this regard.
The next generation must be made aware of the drastic changes in the climate so that they can play their part in minimizing the impact (Whetton et al., 1998).
Recently in Lahore, many major events occurred due to climate change like the occurrence of smog in Lahore.
The winters also here are becoming very short and the summers usually last for a long time as compared to previous years.
In the year 2019, the temperature in summers in Lahore was very high and was recorded at more than 45 degrees on some days.
The agricultural cities of Lahore also faced the issue of climate change regarding the distortion of their crops by the hail storm.
This indicated the melting of ice caps.
Pakistan has also faced the problem of floods in recent years (Khadija et al., 2021).
According to the Pakistan Higher Education Commission report for 2013-14, there are 161 universities in Pakistan, 1,085 degree colleges and over 3 million students are enrolled in grades 13 to 16 in Pakistan (HEC 2013-14).
This youth can help in climate change awareness if they are properly enlightening, hence if we want to understand and adapt the problem of climate change effectively, there is a need to understand the level of youth’s knowledge (in this study we are talking about students enrolled in the tertiary institution) their perception of climate change and what they think are the causes and effects of climate change and what possible adaptations can be made toward climate change.
This can help us in policymaking towards controlling the impacts of climate change in the country (Oruonye et al., 2011).
Progress in the matter of climate perseverance lays heavily on education.
This subject itself put up many complexities and involves some factors to be dealt with.
One such factor is whether the problem of climate crisis and change really exists.
Such a question impacts whether curriculum changes are really required or not.
A problem of this nature takes us back to evaluating the education being imparted regarding the existence of this problem.
In dealing with it, we need to consider geographical and cultural differences.
A survey in which data was gathered from prominent scholars from China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Mexico, Germany, and the United States of America elaborated on how climate change has been perceived differently in light of the social context of it.
The US withdrawal from Paris Climate Change Agreement, political and economic hindrances to climate movement, reforms in this Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 82 field, and the relation between universities and industry were key to determining how climate change was perceived across the globe.
In addition to this, the scholars discussed their views on how climate change should be dealt with.
Their suggested approach included the teaching of all forms of scientific knowledge and facts regarding this topic including all complications and variations; teaching them on how they critically evaluate, engage and blend in their existing knowledge across disciplines and nationalities; working in coordination to reach an effective curriculum; establish a better connection and understanding among the student by revolutionizing the teaching methodologies and make them more efficient.
The consequences for studying this subject have been elaborate on and argued upon by figures from across the globe.
Such perspectives tend to enhance the educational practices to shape a brighter, sustainable future (Krystal et al., 2018).
The atmosphere of disinformation regarding climate could have been mitigated with the right amount of education being imparted among the students about this topic.
A study analyzed and assessed how the subject of climate change is being dealt with in the top 100 universities including liberal art colleges in the United States of America.
The focus is on the kind of curriculum designed and the percentage of students taking up a course of this nature across schools, the probability of which is calculated to be around 0.17.
This record is higher in research institutes, liberal art colleges, social science and science-focused programs, and public universities falling under the legislature designed by Democrats as opposed to Republicans.
It has been agreed from analysis of existing data that if authors of climaterelated literature add to how curriculums and course outlines can be designed to integrate climate studies, including both the science and nature of it, will help improve the prevailing conditions.
The purpose of the study is to enhance the research on existing literature regarding sustainability and use it to make further research on curriculum advancement (David et al., 2018).
Another study focuses on the level of climate education among the livestock farmers belonging to the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa.
It highlighted the factors affecting the adaptation measures and the efficiency of these measures.
Results showed marital status, educational qualifications, formal extensions, and temperatures impacted the degree of awareness regarding climate change.
The study also suggested positively influencing factors regarding adjustments can be integrated into these measures and then be implemented (Mandleni et al., 2011).
This study focuses on the level of climate change awareness among students in tertiary institutions in Lahore.
The main aim of the study is to raise the level of awareness and to educate young people about climate change.
The present study was conducted in 4 different tertiary institutions of Lahore, Pakistan.
Lahore is the capital of the Punjab province of Pakistan.
It is the second-largest city in Pakistan.
Its total population is 10.26 million.
There are much reputable public and private tertiary institutes in Lahore.
The literacy rate of Lahore is sixty-four percent.
Currently, Lahore is facing drastic climate changes.
METHODS The study was conducted to examine the level of climate change awareness among the students in the tertiary institute of Lahore.
A descriptive survey design was specially employed for this study which used a stratified random sampling method for selecting the students.
Moreover, a structured questionnaire titled climate change awareness was developed for collecting data from the students based on their level of awareness.
The structured questionnaire was divided into two sections, the first section includes the demographics and the second section involves transition and more complicated questions related to students’ perception of climate change and its awareness, its causes, effects, and adaptive measures.
The tertiary institutes in Lahore were stratified based on their administrative structure, the government, and private institutes.
Then a total of four institutes was selected, two from the public and two from the government sector for conducting the survey properly and accurately.
A total of 801 students was selected, 200 from every three institutes and 201 from the fourth institute.
The questionnaire scheduled was randomly administrated to ensure that every student had an equal chance of been selected.
The data collected from the questionnaire was through field survey as well as online questionnaire filling.
Descriptive Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 83 statistics and frequency were used for the analysis of the data collected.
Tables, graphs, and pie charts were formulated for the data presented.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Without a doubt, climate change is an existing threat not only to human civilization but to the ecosystem as a whole.
Through a survey across 119 countries, the influence of social and demographic nuances, geography, perceptions, and beliefs of the public was recorded.
It was concluded that education on a massive scale covering the entire global populace is the sole strong determinant of climate change awareness.
Decrypting the ties of culture to the climate change crisis is especially the key predictor of climate change perception.
This is especially the case in Europe and Latin America.
Abnormal temperature changes are key forecasters in other regions like Asia and Africa.
All this delineates how important communication among countries regarding perceptions linked to climate change is important.
This connection can be built by improving fundamental education on this matter, increasing climate literacy, enhancing public awareness and engagement (Tien Ming Lee et al., 2010).
The study surveyed the climate change awareness among the students of public and private universities.
The study disclosed the degree to which the students of universities in Lahore have information about climate change.
The study informed about the level/degree of awareness and curriculum coverage.
Table 1.
Demographic information of the respondents.
Response Frequency Percentage (%) Institute GC 200 25 LUMS 200 25 CMH 200 25 UHE 201 25 Gender Male 347 43.3 Female 454 56.7 Age of respondents <20 205 25.6 20-30 427 53.3 30-40 129 16.1 >40 40 5 Marital Status Single 581 72.5 Married 220 27.5 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/survey The result of the findings shows that 72.3% of the students interviewed have heard about the term ‘climate change’, while 27.7% have not heard about it.
Table 2.
Have you ever heard about climate change?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) Yes 579 72.3 No 222 27.7 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/ survey 36.2% heard the word ‚climate change‛ from TV, 36.6% from the internet, 2.1% from the internet, 16.2% from books, and 7.5% from the word of mouth.
Table 3.
Which source you heard / use to gain information about climate change?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) TV 290 36.2 Internet 293 36.6 Newspaper 17 2.1 Books 130 16.2 Word of mouth 60 7.5 Research paper 7 0.9 Others 3 0.4 Total 800 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/ survey Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 84 When asked what they know about climate change, 27.2% of the students responded that it is a weather condition, 63.8% say it’s a change in weather conditions at a particular time while 9% did not respond to this question.
Of the 72.3% that have heard about climate change, 18.7 % have no idea about what climate change is all about its causes, effects, and possible mitigating measures.
Table 4.
What do you know about climate change?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) It is weather condition 218 27.2 It’s a change of weather at a particular time 511 63.8 Don’t know 72 9.0 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/ survey The students do not associate some of the problems related to the change of climates like increase in temperature, flooding, delay in onset, and early cessation of rainfall to it.
When asked whether they think the problem of climate change can be solved at all 33.2 % responded in negative while 66.8% responded in affirmative.
Table 5.
Do you think that the problem of climate change can be solved at all?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) Yes 535 66.8 No 266 33.2 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/ survey Many of the students could not help their ignorant but asked how climate change could be controlled by human beings.
Their response to the question was clearly demonstrated that seek to know what they think an individual, government, and international organizations can do to solve the problem of climate change.
Different shades of opinion were given, while 1.7 % of the students did not respond to this question.
Table 6.
How do you think an individual can help to overcome the problem of climate change?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) By prayer 223 27.8 Afforestation and enlightenment campaign 456 56.9 Intensify Research Work 54 6.7 Stop Air Pollution 54 6.7 Don’t know 14 1.7 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/ survey When asked whether they think the problem of climate change affects them, 79.5 % responded positively, while 20.5 % of the students believed that the problem of climate change does not affect them in any way.
Table 7.
Do you think the problem of climate change affects you?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) Yes 637 79.5 No 164 20.5 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/ survey When asked how the problem of climate change affects them, 35.1 % believed it leads to the hotness of the body.
38.7 % believed that climate change causes ill health, 5.2% believed it leads to the change in environment, 4.9% believed it causes excessive heating,5.1% believed that climate change leads to the reduction in the amount of rainfall, 5.0% believed that it affects human skin while 6% believed that it causes the pollution in the environment.
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 85 Table 8.
How does the problem of climate change affect you?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) Lead to hotness of body 281 35.1 Lead to changing of the environment 310 38.7 It reduces the amount of rainfall 42 5.2 It causes pollution of the environment 39 4.9 Causes ill health 41 5.1 Excessive heating/high temperature 40 5.0 It affects human skin 48 6.0 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/survey According to the climate change awareness and adaptation by local planning in Punjab (Pakistan), climate change is an additional stress for Pakistan because it imposes threats on the water resources of the country.
Local planning officials in Pakistan should play an important role in the adaptation measures and awareness for climate change (Shahid, 2012).
Most of the students believed that climatic Change is causing a change in weather patterns.
23% believed natural hazards, 7% diseases, 13% deforestation, 5% water pollution, 5% industrial emission, 2% rise in sea level, and 3% do not have any idea about how climate is changing.
According to this survey, 49.1% of the students know about the policies government is making regarding climate change.
Table 9.
How do you feel the climate is changing?
Response Frequency Percentage (%) Changing in weather pattern 340 42.4 Natural Hazard 181 22.6 Rise in sea level 20 2.5 Diseases 60 7.5 Deforestation 100 12.5 Water pollution 40 5.0 Industrial emission 40 5.0 Don’t know 20 2.5 Total 801 100 Source: Respondents response to questionnaire/ survey 62.5% of the respondents agreed that they have the necessary information to prepare for the impacts of climate change.
When the results were compared with other researches that measure the perception of students of universities about climate change, similar results were found in papers (Oruonye et al.
2011) and (Ezeudu et al.
2016).
The survey was done to know the perception of climate change and risks associated with it by the students of public and private universities in Lahore.
The results of the findings showed a moderate level of awareness about climate change among the students.
Awareness of climate change is an important ingredient for the successful implementation of climate change policy in the country.
By improving the climate services and raising awareness about climate change and once it starts to grow it can be integrated into local, national, and sectoral development plans.
It is most important to educate the youth on the impacts of climate change on the country and the importance of adapting to it.
Pakistan is at risk of many disasters related to weather, geophysical, hydrological, and those linked to human activities.
The past three decades have witnessed a surge in hydro-meteorological disasters ranging from floods and extreme temperatures to droughts and storms.
Efforts have been made by the authorities to educate people on this matter and reforms have been underway to alleviate the devastations of natural calamities.
This includes awareness and education on dealing with disaster-prone areas, as discussed in Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015 (Atta-ulrehman et al., 2014).
National Climate Change Policy 2012 has been made to meet the evolving challenges.
This policy emphasizes curricula development that integrates climate-related education in the system all the while making it compulsory.
The government has also sent young science students to reputable universities in other countries for higher education to gain a better prospect of the problem and enhance Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 86 creativity when it comes to deriving solutions.
Educational Institutes have been provided with financial and technical support to encourage education in this sector.
National Disaster Management Plan 2012-2022 highlighted the significance of research in this sector.
The policies and plans, if implemented, can alleviate the crisis many folds.
The chapter will unfold the nuances of climate change and disaster education, Pakistan’s scenario and the situation in this regard, the development of laws and reforms by authorities and institutions, climate change education at secondary and higher education level, technical institutes, National Institute of Disaster Management, Religious Institutes, Community Institutes, State departments and Civil Service Academies (Atta ur Rehman et al., 2014).
CONCLUSION This study reveals that there is a moderate level of climatic awareness among university students in Lahore.
Many students are aware of the major causes and their effects of climate change.
Due to present climatic conditions, it is the need of the hour that universities must establish climate change awareness clubs.
Such university clubs will not only identify the challenges but will also help in finding ways to overcome the problems of climate change mitigation and adaptation in their respective areas.
Such types of clubs will also help in promoting such awareness through awareness campaigns and tutorials.
There is also a need to include studies on the above-mentioned subject as compulsory at educational institutes.
Government must start awareness campaigns for the general public to have an emphasis among the same on the causes and adverse impacts of climate change on human health and various types of socioeconomical activities.
REFERENCES 1.
Alfonso, G. P. (2021).
Assessing the Climate Change Adaptations of Upland Farmers: A Case of La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines.
Indonesian Journal of Social and Environmental Issues (IJSEI), 2(2), 129-142.
2.
Atta-Ur-Rahman, Rajib Shaw.
(2014).
Disaster and Climate Change Education in Pakistan.
Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in Pakistan.
315-335 3.
Aymeric P, Alexandre P, Milena J, Myriam K, Marie LF, and Nicolas G. (2016).
Raising Students Awareness to Climate Change: An Illustration with Binding Communication.
Environment and behavior.
1-15.
4.
B. Mandleni a, F.D.K.
Anim.
(2011).
Climate change awareness and decision on adaptation measures by livestock farmers.
5.
David J. Hess B, M. Collins.
(2018).
Climate change and higher education: Assessing factors that affect curriculum requirements.
170: 14511458.
6.
Ezeudu F, Ezeudu S, Sampson M. (2016).
Climate change awareness and attitude of senior secondary students in Umuahia Education Zone of Abia State.
International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies.
3(3): 7-17.
7.
Ghulam M, Ismail AL, Muhammad KB, Mad NS & Wan MN, Wan D. (2018).
Determinants of farmers' awareness of climate change.
Applied Environmental Education & Communication.
1-15.
8.
Indrani R. H, Purba H. Ra.
(2010).
Does awareness to climate change lead to behavioral change.
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management.
2(1):6-22.
9.
Khadija Gulraiz, Aabgeen Ali.
(2021).
Expressed Willingness and Awareness of Students towards Climate Change in Lahore, Pakistan.
Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 1 (3), 219-22.
10.
Krystal M. Perkins, Nora Munguia, Rafael Moure-Eraso, Bernd Delakowitz, Biagio.
Giannetti, Gengyuan Liu, Mohammad Nurunnabi, Markus Will, Luis Velazquez, (2018).
International perspectives on the pedagogy of climate change.
Journal of Cleaner Production.
(200).
1043-1052.
11.
Nesha K, Rahman AA, Hasan K, Ahmed Z.
(2014).
People’s perception in relation to climate change and its adverse effects in Rural Bangladesh.
Journal of Environment and Human.
1(3):23-33.
12.
Oruonye ED.
(2011).
An assessment of the level of awareness of the effects of climate change among students of tertiary institutions in Jalingo Metropolis, Taraba State Nigeria.
Journal of Geography and Regional Planning.
4(9):513-7. https://www.emerald.com/insight/search?q=Indrani%20R.%20Halady https://www.emerald.com/insight/search?q=Indrani%20R.%20Halady https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/issn/1756-8692 https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/issn/1756-8692 https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/issn/1756-8692 Indonesian Journal of Innovation and Applied Sciences (IJIAS), 2 (1), 80-87 87 13.
Pakistan Higher Education Commission report for 2013-14. https://hec.gov.pk/english/news/HECPublicatio ns/Annual%20Report%202013-14.pdf 14.
Qadir M, Pir W, Adeel M. (2016).
Knowledge, Attitude and Perception about climate change among people of urban area in Attock, Pakistan.
International Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Research.
2(4): 333-338.
15.
Shahid Z.
(2012).
Climate change awareness and adaptation by local planning in Punjab, Pakistan.
2012. https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/isla ndora/object/uws:17611/datastream/PDF 16.
Stern D. I., & Kaufmann, R. K. (2014).
Anthropogenic and natural causes of climate change.
Climatic Change.
122(1), 257-269.
17.
Tien Ming Lee, Ezra M. Markowitz, Peter D. Howe, Chia-Ying Ko, and Anthony A. Leiserowitz.
(2015).
Predictors of public climate change awareness and risk perception around the world.
Journal of Nature Climate Change.
10141020.
18.
Whetton, P. H., Fowler, A. M., Haylock, M. R., & Pittock, A.
B.
(1993).
Implications of climate change due to the enhanced greenhouse effect on floods and droughts in Australia.
Climatic Change.
25(3), 289-317. https://hec.gov.pk/english/news/HECPublications/Annual%20Report%202013-14.pdf https://hec.gov.pk/english/news/HECPublications/Annual%20Report%202013-14.pdf https://www.academia.edu/download/51130050/Paper_D5.pdf https://www.academia.edu/download/51130050/Paper_D5.pdf https://www.academia.edu/download/51130050/Paper_D5.pdf https://www.academia.edu/download/51130050/Paper_D5.pdf https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/islandora/object/uws:17611/datastream/PDF https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/islandora/object/uws:17611/datastream/PDF
Microsoft Word JRACR_Hao_revised_8 Attitudes of Property Owners to Climate Change Considerations Attitudes of Property Owners to Climate Change Considerations and Their Effects on Future Property Values in Coastal Communities Huili Hao* Center for Sustainable Tourism, East Carolina University Greenville, North Carolina, 27858, USA Email:haoh@ecu.edu www.ecu.edu Patrick Long Center for Sustainable Tourism, East Carolina University Greenville, North Carolina, 27858, USA E-mail: longp@ecu.edu www.ecu.edu Scott Curtis Department of Geography, East Carolina University Affiliate Faculty, Center for Sustainable Tourism Greenville, North Carolina, 27858, USA Email: curtisw@ecu.edu www.ecu.edu Abstract The purpose of this study is to examine property owners’ attitudes regarding the impacts of climate and weather on property ownership and future property values in Currituck County, North Carolina, and determine whether their attitudes vary according to property owner groupings.
The study profiles the segments using a factor-cluster grouping approach that identifies three property owner clusters.
These clusters represent various perceptions of property owners toward the effects of climate on property ownership and future property values.
A comparative analysis is then conducted among these three property groups, resulting in significant differences being found between them in terms of both attitudinal and demographical variables.
Group One respondents believe climate and weather affect property ownership and property value, are moderately educated, practice sustainable actions, and there is an equal frequency of second home owners and full time residents in this group.
Group Two respondents believe climate and weather do not affect property ownership but do affect property value, are highly educated, practice sustainable actions, and there is a larger proportion of second home owners.
Finally, Group Three respondents believe climate and weather do not affect property ownership or property value, have very little education, practice sustainable actions to a lesser degree than the other groups, and there is a larger proportion of full time residents.
This information is useful for Currituck County to better communicate with and educate its high-risk and high-end, property owners.
Keywords: coastal property ownership and value, impacts of climate and weather, property owners’ attitude, cluster analysis.
* Huili Hao, Center for Sustainable Tourism, RW208C Rivers Building, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, 27858, United States of America.
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, Vol.
2, No.
4 (December 2012), 285-291 Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 285 Administrateur Texte tapé à la machine Received 26 September 2012 Administrateur Texte tapé à la machine Accepted 18 October 2012 Huili Hao, Patrick Long and Scott Curtis 1.
Introduction The social value of a location ranges from the tacit, including sense of place, to the pragmatic, such as property values (Anthony et al.
2009).
Weather and climate play an important role across this spectrum.
For example, the psychological concept of a place and one’s attachment to it are intimately linked to its climate (Knez 2005).
Thus, climate change has the potential to both affect property values and the appreciation of place.
Coastal areas are highly vulnerable to environmental change, in particular through sea level rise, air and ocean temperatures, precipitation, and hurricanes and nor’easters.
There also exists an underlying tension between long-term residents with their local customs and the often more wealthy part-time residents with second homes.
These environmental and social issues affect sense of place and its management.
Burley et al.
(2007) found that both full-time and temporary coastal residents of Louisiana have a constant and heightened sense of place due to the fragility of their environment, and that “attachment to places, perceiving them as under threat, and perceptions that fellow members are willing to engage in environmentally sustainable behaviors, means that residents are more likely to act and demand a greater say in place management”.
With regards to climate change, the North Carolina lagoon system is vulnerable to barrier island loss and increased salinity from sea level rise and storm surge.
Links between these environmental impacts and the economy of North Carolina (tourism, fisheries, agriculture) has been studied (Bin et al.
2007), but little work has been done in North Carolina or elsewhere relating sense of place to climate change (Adger et al.
2011).
This is problematic as Adger and co-authors contend that cultural impacts of climate change are equal to economic impacts, have growing importance, and can induce action.
Because of this lack of attention and the fact that economic values are easier to quantify, coastal management strategies do not normally include tacit social values (Anthony et al.
2009).
Anthony et al.
conclude that “tools that articulate and quantify tacit values are needed to provide a more balanced data set to coastal managers, and an appeal to tacit values may better engage society as managers strive to develop and implement mitigation or adaptation strategies”.
Second home owners are a substantial stakeholder group in coastal counties.
Their spending is recognized by local officials as important to the economy.
Thus, land use and economic policies often capitalize on this market group.
Understanding the thinking of both the resident and non-resident (second home) property owner groups about climate effects can be used to set the stage for communication and education activities with these groups.
Limited research has been conducted to examine how climate and weather affects property ownership and property values in coastal areas.
This study fills the gap by investigating property owners’ attitudes toward climate change and how it may impact future property ownership and values in a high-risk, high end coastal community with a second home vacation economy.
Specifically, the purpose of this study is: 1) to identify comparatively homogeneous property owner categories using their perceptions of impacts of climate and weather on property ownership and property values; 2) to profile and describe property owner groupings using a factor-cluster approach; and, 3) to examine whether there are any differences between the clusters in terms of their socioeconomic, demographic and other attitudinal characteristics.
2.
Study Area Often, the impacts of tourism and second home development, both positive and negative, dominate decisions regarding the economy, environment and community culture of amenity-rich destinations.
At the forefront of such a tourism-oriented economic structure can be issues relating to land use, real estate prices, cost of living, transportation, business, workforce, housing, water and the general natural environment, among others.
Currituck County, a significant part of North Carolina’s Outer Banks tourism destination region, is just such a place.
It is located in northeastern North Carolina adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean (Figure 1) and is bordered by Virginia to the north and Dare and Camden counties to the south and west respectively.
Currituck County is well known for its beaches, nature and recreational activities including kayaking, fishing and boating.
Almost 50 percent of the total land area of Currituck County is surface water (Currituck County, NC Community Profile 2012).
The County’s population is 23,547 people (Census, 2010), but increases three Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 286 Climate Change and Property Values fold during the summer due the influx of vacationers.
The county has recently experienced substantial growth as indicated by an approximately 30% increase in population between the 2000 and 2010, censuses.
The North Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Tourism, Film and Sports Development, reported that in 2010 domestic tourism generated $117.12 million of economic impact with 1,380 jobs directly attributable to tourism.
Additionally, tourism in Currituck County resulted in $21.84 million in employee payroll and $11.37 million in state and local tax revenue.
Forty-three (43%) percent of the single family housing stock is considered second home property.
Fig.
1.
Currituck County, North Carolina, USA.
3.
Methodology The Geographic Information System (GIS) Tax Records of Currituck County provided a list of the county’s housing stock from which a random sample was selected from both resident and second home property owners.
Members of this sample were then sent a cover letter inviting them to visit the study’s website, insert a participant code number and complete a questionnaire.
Participants were also offered the option of a paper copy or a telephone interview.
The questionnaire sought to assess the attitudes and perceptions of these property owners regarding: 1) the importance of sustainable actions on future economic success; 2) the impacts of climate and weather on their property ownership and property value/use and on recreational choice; and 3) degree of community attachment.
The sample includes 2,350 second home property owners and 2,408 full time / permanent property owners.
Four hundred and fifty-nine (459) useable questionnaires were completed and used for this paper (62% were second home owners and 38% full time / permanent property owners).
The degree to which the response from full time residents from Currituck County is representative of the general resident population was investigated using the census demographic categories of the overall population.
The median age for Currituck County reported by the U.S. Census was 41 years in 2010.
Among the full-time resident respondents, 13.3% fall in the age range of 35-44 and slightly over fifty percent (55.4%) fall within the age range of 45 to 64 years.
Approximately thirteen percent (12.9%) of the population in Currituck County was 65 years and older according to the 2010 US Census while over eighteen percent (18.5%) of the full time respondents for this study in Currituck County are 65 years and over.
Percent male population in Currituck County in 2010 was 49.6%; 55.1% of the full time resident response category for this study is male.
The median household income for Currituck County in 2010 was $55,376 (US Census, 2010).
Twenty-seven (27%) of the full time resident respondents fall within the household income range of $50,000 to $74,999 while 18% fall within the household income range of $75,000 to $99,999.
Approximately seventeen percent (17.2%) of the population in Currituck County has a Bachelor’s or higher degree whereas in this study, thirty-nine percent (39.4%) of the full time resident sample has a Bachelor’s degree or higher.
Although the demographic characteristics of the resident sample are similar to those of the full time resident population in Currituck County, the sample for full time property owners was older, with a higher level of male representation, as well as a higher education and income level than the Currituck County population in general.
It is difficult to investigate the representative level of the sample for second home property owners compared to the general second home property owners’ population in Currituck County due to the lack of demographic information from the U.S. Census or other state and local agencies for this widely geographically distributed group of “residents”.
However, according to the National Association of Realtors’ (NAR) 2011 Investment and Vacation Home Buyers Survey, the typical vacation home buyer in 2010 was 49 years old and had a median household income of $99,500 (National Association of Realtors, 2011, “Vacationand Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 287 Huili Hao, Patrick Long and Scott Curtis Investment-Home Shares Hold Even in 2010,” para.
7 and 8).
Among the second home property owner respondents, approximately 68% fall in the age range of 45-64 years and almost seventy percent (69.7%) of them have household income $75,000 and over.
The NAR’s survey results also showed that nearly half of the vacation-home buyers indicated they were seeking an investment opportunity, while sixty-three percent of the respondents in this study indicated they purchased second home property in Currituck County for investment value.
Study participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement on how climate and weather affects their property ownership in Currituck County using a five point Likert Scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree or disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).
Principal component analysis was performed on the seven items that measure property owners’ perceptions of the impact of climate on their property ownership.
Four out of seven items loaded highly on one factor (loadings range from .591 to .860) named “climate and weather affect property ownership” (Table 1), which explained 38% of the variance.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) statistic was .757 and the Bartlett’s test was significant (p=.000), suggesting that the principal component analysis was necessary and appropriate.
A summed scale was then created for this “climate and weather affect property ownership” factor.
Property owners’ perceptions of the impact of climate change on their future property values were measured by five items using a five point Likert Scale (1 = not at all, 2 = to s small extent, 3 = somewhat, 4 = to a great extent, 5 = to a very great extent).
They were asked to what extent changes in precipitation and temperature, availability of freshwater, number and intensity of coastal storms, as well as sea level rise and coastal flooding affect their future property values.
Principal component analysis was performed on the five items.
All of the five items loaded highly on one factor as shown in Table 1 (loadings range from .756 to .872) named “climate and weather affect property values”, which explained 69% of the variance.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) statistic was .789 and the Bartlett’s test was significant (p=.000), suggesting that the principal component analysis was necessary and appropriate.
A summed scale was then created for this “climate and weather affect property values” factor.
Sustainable tourism development places great emphasis on identifying, analyzing and enhancing the characteristics and processes that give destinations a unique character—a sense of place and attachment.
In this series of questions, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the items regarding their attachment to Currituck County.
Principal component analysis was performed on the five items.
Three out of the five variables had high loading scores (>.5) for one factor named “community sense of place”, which explained 48% of the variance.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) statistic was .716 and the Bartlett’s test was significant (p=.000), suggesting that the principal component analysis was necessary and appropriate.
A summed scale was then created for a “community sense of place” factor (See Table 1).
Knowing the rapidly growing importance of integrating sustainability within the tourism industry as well as the propensity of increasing numbers of individuals to do the same within everyday life, survey participants were asked their opinion of the importance of fifteen sustainable actions to the future economic success of the County’s tourism industry.
Principal component analysis was performed on the 15 sustainable action items.
Fourteen out of fifteen variables had high loading scores (>.5) for one factor named “sustainable actions”, which explained 50% of the variance.
One variable, providing economic benefits from tourism to locals, had a loading score of .43, but this loading score was considered close enough to .5 for this item to be included in the factor.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) statistic was .918 and the Bartlett’s test was significant (p=.000), suggesting that the principal component analysis was necessary and appropriate.
4.
Results and Discussion In order to identify groups of respondents based on similar perceptions of the impacts of climate and weather on property ownership and property values, the summed constructual scores from the factor analyses were used to group the respondents using cluster analysis.
Three clusters were identified and they each contained an adequate number of cases with the most interpretable outcome.
There are 185 respondents in Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 288 Climate Change and Property Values Table 1.
Factor loadings of four dimensions of community living.
Table 2.
Clusters of respondents based on similar perceptions of the impacts of climate and weather on property ownership and property values.
Dimension and Factored Items Factor Loadings Factor: Climate and Weather Affect Property Ownership Weather conditions have changed enough in Currituck County that I would NOT consider buying property here in the future 0.744 Climate change will have a noticeably negative impact on my property values in the next 25 years 0.840 Changing climate conditions will make Currituck County NO longer attractive to new residents 0.860 Impacts of climate change are evident in Currituck County 0.808 Factor: Climate and Weather Affect Property Value Changes in precipitation 0.833 Changes in temperature and/or humidity 0.838 Availability of freshwater 0.756 Number and intensity of coastal storms 0.872 Sea level rise and coastal flooding 0.849 Factor: Community Sense of Place I feel that I can really be myself here 0.777 I really miss it when I am away too long 0.868 This is the best place to do the things I enjoy 0.845 Factor: Sustainable Actions Reducing and managing greenhouse gas emissions 0.758 Managing, reducing and recycling solid waste 0.753 Reducing consumption of freshwater 0.690 Managing wastewater 0.650 Being energy efficient 0.798 Conserving the natural environment 0.738 Protecting our community's natural environment for future generations 0.757 Protecting air quality 0.786 Protecting water quality 0.761 Reducing noise 0.607 Preserving culture and heritage 0.666 Providing economic benefits from tourism to locals 0.430 Purchasing from companies with certified green practices 0.772 Training and educating employees on sustainability practices 0.748 Full access for everyone in the community to participate in tourism development decisions 0.557 Clusters Climate affect on property ownership Climate affect on property value N Mean SD Mean SD 1 (YesPO-YesPV) 3.11 0.467 3.79 0.591 185 2 (NoPO-YesPV 1.93 0.398 3.26 0.553 147 3 (NoPO-NoPV) 1.95 0.762 1.63 0.493 120 Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 289 cluster 1, 147 respondents in cluster 2, and 120 respondents in cluster 3 as shown in Table 2.
People in cluster 1 felt climate and weather affected both their property ownership and property values.
This cluster will be referred to as YesPO-YesPV.
Property owners in cluster 2 responded that climate and weather did not affect their property ownership but still affected their property values.
This cluster will be referred to as NoPO-YesPV.
Respondents in cluster 3 neither believed climate and weather would affect their property ownership nor their property values.
This cluster will be referred to as NoPO-NoPV.
In order to profile the three clusters in terms of their demographic characteristics, cross-tabulation analysis was conducted.
The chi-square statistic in cross-tabulation analysis was employed to assess whether there were statistical differences among the clusters for categorical level measurements and dichotomy variables such as gender, residential status, and if employed in tourism-related organizations.
One-way ANOVA tests were also carried out to evaluate the differences of the respondents in three clusters on continuous variables such as age, education (less than high school = 1; high school or GED = 2; 2-year college/Technical school = 3; Some college but no degree = 4; 4-year college = 5; Post graduate = 6), sustainable actions (1 = not at all important, 2 = not important, 3 = neither important nor unimportant, 4 = important, 5 = very important), and community sense of place.
The chi-square statistics and ANOVA tests revealed that the three clusters were statistically different from each other based on the following variables: residential status, education level, and sustainable action factor as shown in Table 3.
Tables 4 and 5 also illustrate the results of mean difference tests on these three variables.
There were statistically significant differences between the three clusters in terms of their residential status, education level and perceptions on the sustainable action factor.
Table 3.
Statistically significant differences among three clusters based on demographics and sustainable actions and sense of place.
Variables F Sig.
Residential status 13.431 0.001* Education 5.011 0.007* Sustainable actions 40.56 0.000* Table 4.
Numbers and percentages of second home owners and full time residents that fell in 3 clusters.
Residential Status YesPO-Yes PV NoPO-Yes PV NoPO-No PV Second home owners 118 (64%) 104 (71%) 59 (49%) Full time residents 67 (36%) 43 (29%) 61 (51%) Table 5.
Mean score for education and sustainable actions for the three clusters.
Clusters Education (mean) Sustainable actions (mean) YesPO-YesPV 4.33 4.04 NoPO-YesPV 4.99 4.33 NoPO-NoPV 1.02 3.7 YesPO-YesPV has the most second home property owners (118) and full time residents (67).
However, the ratio of second home owners to full time residents (64% to 36%) is lower than NoPO-YesPV (71% to 29%), and higher than NoPO-NoPV (49% to 51%).
Property owners in YesPO-YesPV are more educated than those in NoPO-NoPV but less educated than those in NoPO-YesPV.
They also feel sustainable actions are more important to the success of their county’s tourism economy than people in NoPO-NoPV do.
NoPO-YesPV is dominated by second home property owners.
Respondents in this cluster are more educated and perceive sustainable actions are more important to the success of local economy than those in YesPO-YesPV and NoPO-NoPV.
NoPO-NoPV is made up of equal numbers of second home owners and full time residents.
Property owners in NoPO-NoPV have the lowest level of education among the three clusters.
This group of people did not feel sustainable actions are as important as those in the two other clusters perceived.
5.
Conclusion This study investigated the attitudes of property owners, both full time residents and second home property owners, toward the impact of climate on their property ownership and future property values and determined whether their attitudes vary according to property owner groupings.
Typologies were determined based upon responses to questions related to property ownership, Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 290 Climate Change and Property Values such as whether climate change was evident, whether such change would affect the desirability of the destination, and to what extent it would affect future decisions to retain or purchase property.
Other climate-related considerations explored perceived impact on property values from changes to precipitation and temperature, availability of freshwater, the number and intensity of storms, and sea level rise and coastal flooding.
The study profiled the segments using a factor-cluster grouping approach that identified three property owner clusters.
There were statistically significant differences among the three clusters in terms of their residential status, education level and perceptions on the sustainable action factor.
First, people who perceived that climate and weather affect both their property ownership and property values have a comparatively high level of education and feel sustainable actions are relatively important to the success of the tourism economy in their community.
Forty-two percent (42%) of second home owners and 39% of full time residents surveyed fall into this group.
Second, property owners who perceived climate and weather does not affect their property ownership but still affects their property values are the most educated among three clusters, and also perceive sustainable actions to be very important to the success of the future tourism economy in Currituck County.
Thirty-seven percent (37%) of second home owners and 25% of full time residents surveyed fall into this group.
Finally, respondents who perceived climate and weather neither affect their property ownership nor their future property values has by far the lowest level of education and places the least amount of importance on sustainable actions.
Twenty-one percent (21%) of second home owners and 36% of full time residents surveyed fall into this group.
This information will allow the decision-making entities in Currituck County to adjust their current property ownership practices, recognize their vulnerabilities to the future impacts of climate change, and develop adaptation strategies as necessary, particularly as it relates to investment in home ownership.
Mitigation of climate change is everyone’s responsibility and policies should be adopted to reduce the carbon footprint of second homes and their respective destinations.
There is a pressing need for further discussion among developers, tourism industry leaders, scientists, planners, investors and policy makers on both mitigation and adaptation in second home intensive locations.
Note This paper is an extension of research data initially presented at the 19th International Congress of Biometeorology, Auckland, New Zealand, December 2011 6.
References 1.
Adger, W.N., J. Barnett, F.S.
Chapin III, and H. Ellemor, This must be the place: Underrepresentation of identity and meaning in climate change decision-making.
Global Environmental Politics, (2011), pp.1-25.
2.
Anthony, A., J. Atwood, P. August, et al., Coastal lagoons and climate change: Ecological and social ramifications in U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coast ecosystems.
Ecology and Society (2009), 14, art 8.
3.
Bin, O., C. Dumas, B. Poulter, and J. Whitehead, Measuring the impacts of climate change on North Carolina coastal resources.
Final Report for National Commission on Energy Policy (2007) p.101.
4.
Burley, D., R. Jenkins, S. Laska, and T. Davis, Place attachment and environmental change in coastal Louisiana.
Organization and Environment 20 (2007), pp.
347-366.
5.
Currituck County, NC Community Profile (2012).
Retrieved on September 8, 2012 from <http://www.thinkcurrituck.com/files/doc/communitypro file2012.pdf>.
6.
Knez, I., Attachment and identity as related to a place and its perceived climate.
Journal of En vironmental Psychology 25 (2005), pp.
207-218 7.
U.S. Census Bureau State and County QuickFacts --Currituck County, North Carolina.
Retrieved on April 9, 2012.
<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/37053.html>.
8.
Vacationand Investment-Home Shares Hold Even in 2010.
Retrieved on February 28, 2012.
<http://www.realtor.org/press_room/news_releases/2011/ 03/second_homes>.
Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 291
July 2008.indd Physicians, Climate Change and Human Health The theme of the World Health Organisation (WHO) initiated 2008 World Health Day, held on 7 April 2008, was Protecting Health from Climate Change.1 Communities and organisations around the world hosted activities to establish greater public awareness of the health consequences of the climate changes that we are experiencing.
WHO has specifically put a great effort into increasing awareness of the effects of global warming and other climate related factors that impact on human health.
We, as physicians, also have an important and potentially major role to play in this exercise.
In her World Health Day 2008 address, “The impact of climate change on human health”, 2 WHO Director-General, Dr. Margaret Chan, said, “The core concern is succinctly stated: climate change endangers health in fundamental ways.
The warming of the planet will be gradual, but the effects of extreme weather events – more storms, floods, droughts and heatwaves will be abrupt and acutely felt…….
affecting some of the most fundamental determinants of health: air, water, food, shelter, and freedom from disease”.
She also pointed out that while climate change is a global phenomenon, its consequences will not be evenly distributed.
Certain populations are more susceptible than others e.g.
children, the elderly and the infirm, and more so in developing countries.
She drew attention to the fact that, “last year marked the turning point in the debate of climate change.
The scientific evidence continues to mount that the climate is changing and human activities are the principal cause”.
2,3 The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, in his World Health Day 2008 address,3 stated that “We need to give voice to this often overlooked reality, ensuring that protecting human health is anchored at the heart of the global climate change agenda.” He also pointed out that the impact will be most severe in poor countries e.g.
by the year 2020, up to a quarter of a billion Africans will experience increased water stress and up to 50% drop in crop yields.
Climate-related infectious diseases take their heaviest tolls on the most vulnerable, the children, the elderly and the infirm.
We must do more to prepare for these challenges because climate change is real.
It is accelerating and threatens all of us.
Climate change will erode the foundations of health.
WHO has identified five major health consequences of climate changes:3, 4 (i) The agricultural sector is extremely sensitive to climate variability.
Rising temperatures and more frequent droughts and floods can compromise food security.
5 (ii) More frequent extreme weather events mean more potential deaths and injuries caused by storms and floods.
The most recent Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, 5, 6 with over a hundred thousand deaths, is a typical example for this.
Our own experience in Oman with Cyclone Gonu 7 last year was evidence enough with scores of deaths from flooding wadis and thousands of citizens suffering from a lack of clean fresh water, albeit only temporarily because of prompt government action.8 (iii) Water is essential for hygiene, but in excess it will increase the burden of diarrhoeal diseases which are spread through contaminated water and food.
These diseases are responsible for 1.8 million deaths each year and are the second leading infectious cause of childhood mortality.
2 (iv) Heatwaves increase morbidity and mortality mainly in the elderly with cardiovascular or respiratory disease.
(v) Changing temperatures and patterns of rainfall are expected to alter the geographic distribution of insect vectors that spread infectious diseases such as malaria and dengue fever.
In short, climate change can exacerbate problems that are already huge, largely concentrated in the developing world and already difficult to combat.
What can we, as physicians, do and what role can we play?
As clinicians, we owe it to our patients to explain to them the dangers of extremes of temperatures and exposure.
Estimates suggest that in 2003, during the European summer heat wave, approximately 70,000 more people died than would have been otherwise expected.
It has been demonstrated that weather is associated with changes in birth rates and sperm counts, and with outbreaks M E S S A G E F R O M T H E E D I T O R I N C H I E F 125 126 MESSAGE FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of pneumonia, influenza and bronchitis.9 Decreased humidity in some countries in winter leads to drying of nasal mucosa and respiratory passages with increased respiratory infections.
As family and community physicians, we owe it to the community and the public, to explain the dangers of climate change and to explain that most of the climate change is the result of human activities.
3, 10-12 Global warming is not only made worse by greenhouse gases from industry, but all of us contribute to it by our daily habits.
We also contribute to the change in climate by indiscriminate industrial logging and by cutting trees for fuel as in some communities.
As educator physicians, we owe it to our students to explain the impact of changing climate on human health.
Climate change brings new challenges to the control of infectious diseases.
Seasonal changes in the availability of fresh water, regional drops in food production, and rising sea levels have the potential to force population displacement and increase the risks of civil conflict.
As physician administrators, we owe to our community to ensure proper disposal of all wastes that may impact on the environment.
We have to point out the need for clean air and unpolluted water.
We also have to point out dangers of epidemics related to climate change such as the cholera outbreak in Bangladesh closely linked to flooding and unsafe water.
Changing air and water temperatures and precipitation can also lead to increased infectious diseases among plants and animals through vector-borne and rodents, as well as to outbreaks of disease in coral reefs and trees overgrown with fungus.13 As physician researchers, the possibilities of contributing are only limited by our imagination.
Physician researchers can contribute effectively to understanding the root causes as well as the effects of global warming and changing climate on individual patients and on the community.
As travellers in this space ship called Earth, we need to be very prudent as to how we use the resources vital to our health such as air, clean water and our atmosphere.
We as physicians can play a relatively major role in reducing the negative impact of climate on human health and also have an impact on root causes.
Physicians and researchers in Oman and beyond need to review their resources and evaluate the possible ways that we can contribute.
Let us all join in the spirit of this year’s World Health Day and make a difference in human health.
SQUMJ will help by publishing news of the efforts and results.
Lamk Al-Lamki MD, FRCPC, FACR, FACNM Editor-in-Chief Email: mjournal@squ.edu.om Tel.
number: (+968) 2414 3457 R E F E R E N C E S 1.
World Health Organisation “World Health Day 2008: Protecting Health from Climate Change” From www.who.int/ world-health-day/en/.
Accessed May 2008.
2.
Statement by WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan on World Health Day, 7 April 2008.
From http://un.by/en/who/ news/world/08-04-08-st.html.
Accessed May 2008.
3.
UN Secretary-General, in message for World Health Day, April 7th 2008.
From http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ sgsm11491.doc.htm.
Accessed May 2008.
4.
“Climate Change and Health: Preparing for Unprecedented Challenges” by Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of World Health Organisation.
The 2007 David E. Barmes Global Health Lecture, Bethesda, Maryland, USA, 10 December 127 PHYSICIANS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN HE ALTH 2007: From www.who.int/mediacenter/news/statements/208/s05/en/index.html Accessed May 2008.
5.
Myanmar – Cyclone Nargis.
From http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/response/myanmar-nargis/index.asp?gclid=CMfV mp3mr5MCFQHklAodoxr8ng Accessed May 2008.
6.
Death Toll from Myanmar cyclone nearly doubles, Associated Press 17 May 2008, From http://ap.google.com/article/ ALeqM5iy-MfhLN9Q7MwtQ1VlrvexLjr2dAD90N4S302.
Accessed May 2008.
7.
Thousands evacuated as Cyclone Gonu hits Oman; International Herald Tribune 06 June 2007 From http://www.iht.
com/articles/2007/06/06/africa/storm.4-70547.php Accessed May 2008.
8.
Cyclone Gonu Aftermath: From http://fonzation.com/blog/2007/06/10/cyclone-gonu-aftermath Accessed May 2008.
9.
Kalkstein LS, Valimont KM.
1987.
Climate effects on human health.
In Potential effects of future climate changes on forests and vegetation, agriculture, water resources, and human health.
EPA Science and Advisory Committee Monograph no.
25389, 122-52.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
10.
Climate, Ecology, and Human Health.
From http://www.gcrio.org/consequences/vol3no2/climhealth.html Accessed May 2008.
11.
Climate and Health.
From www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en Accessed May 2008.
12.
Impact of Climate Change on Human Health.
From http://www.climate.org/2002/topics/health/index.shtml Accessed May 2008.
13.
“Climate Future Health threat”.
From http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2055890.stm Accessed May 2008.
DOI: 10.3303/CET2290011 Paper Received: 27 December 2021; Revised: 18 March 2022; Accepted: 10 May 2022 Please cite this article as: da Silva L.B.L., Alencar M.H., de Almeida A.T., 2022, Promoting safety societies with a non-stationary multidimensional model that prioritizes flood risks under climate change effects, Chemical Engineering Transactions, 90, 61-66 DOI:10.3303/CET2290011 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING TRANSACTIONS VOL.
90, 2022 A publication of The Italian Association of Chemical Engineering Online at www.cetjournal.it Guest Editors: Aleš Bernatík, Bruno Fabiano Copyright © 2022, AIDIC Servizi S.r.l.
ISBN 978-88-95608-88-4; ISSN 2283-9216 Promoting Safety Societies with a Non-Stationary Multidimensional Model that Prioritizes Flood Risks under Climate Change Effects Lucas Borges Leal da Silvaa,*, Marcelo Hazin Alencara, Adiel Teixeira de Almeidab aUniversidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), Research Group on Risk Assessment and Modelling in Environment, Assets, Safety, Operations and Nature (REASON), 50.740-550 Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil b Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), Center for Decision Systems and Information Development (CDSID), Cx.
Postal 7462, 50.630-970 Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil.
borgesleal.lucas@gmail.com Managing floods is already a challenging task, but climate change combined with the unprecedented growth of cities aggravates their multiple adverse consequences.
Current papers outlined trends in the intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes over periods, including rainfall patterns.
Thus, interrelations among the society, economic sector, critical infrastructure, and sustainability lead policymakers, public managers, and professionals of different fields to tackle a variety of aspects in order to adopt strategic policies for enhancing life quality in urban societies and then preventing future losses.
In this field, Multi-Criteria Decision Making-Aiding is suitable because it takes into account the DM’s preference structure to assess future risks.
Given this backdrop, this work introduces a novel multicriteria decision model for enhancing future risks under climate change and socioeconomic forecasting.
Our model differs from the current approaches in the literature because it deals with non-stationary probabilities to model the hazard scenarios and their implications to estimate flood damages and prevent its losses.
An in-depth discussion regarding the state-ofthe-art in climate and urban modeling, this work provides a step-by-step procedure that assesses social, human, sanitary, and economic risks with the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory and Decision Analysis.
A numerical application in an urban area in the Northeast of Brazil is conducted with views to accredit the novel approach in which the time dependency is highlighted.
Our results map and evaluate flood risks for 2021 – 2060, exploring then insights for designing long-term adaptation policies that confront the damaging effects of this natural hazard.
Keywords: urban flood risk, multicriteria decision-making, climate change, emerging risks.
1.
Introduction The complex interaction between the atmosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere has shown that climate issues, whether caused by humans or Nature, certainly impact the way natural hazards, especially floods, affect urban functioning, specifically on human infectious diseases, social vulnerability, and water supply, and financial issues.
That is why some researchers, on seeking approaches that aid risk-based problems, have applied Multi-Criteria Decision Making-Aiding (MCDM/A) which takes a DM’s preference structures into account in many contexts (de Almeida et al., 2015).
The benefit of applying this methodology for assessing future flood risks is that multicriteria metrics have the potential to gather multiple risk information of different criteria, as a starting point for basing climate adaptation measures against this disaster.
Given this context, from a critical analysis of the main benefits and limitations of forecasting methods that usually estimates the climate impacts, it should be highlighted that managers usually face a hard task when dealing with time-dependency when assessing future risks.
Particularly in our context, most of the FRMrelated papers assumed the decision-making process to be stationary, simplifying the risk analysis.
For instance, the non-stationary analysis of flooding was deeply discussed by (Khaliq et al., 2006).
From a statistical analysis of hydrological observations, in terms of flood frequency or likelihood estimation of this 61 event, they recommend non-stationarity to be incorporated into new risk assessment frameworks.
In fact, (Hesarkazzazi et al., 2021) affirmed from their findings that the use of non-stationary modeling of flood dynamics serves as an informative climate indicator for decision-making.
Specifically, in the context of MCDM/A, a systematic literature review by (da Silva, Alencar, et al., 2020) evidenced a lack of temporal-based models in the literature.
They found that few papers use forecasting techniques to predict the future CC impacts on flooding.
Additionally, non-stationary modeling of flooding and its potential consequences is still scarce.
The modeling proposal to be presented next covers this gap.
Based on this backdrop, this paper puts forward a new spatiotemporal multidimensional model for ranking urban flood risks under urbanization and CC effects.
This methodology is based on the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) and Decision Analysis, in which axiomatic structure analyzes the flood impacts in a probabilistic manner (da Silva et al., 2022).
Thus, the model estimates risk measures for a set of urban zones considering four criteria: social, human, economic, and health & sanitation.
The temporal analysis is integrated by using forecasting techniques of CC and urbanization.
2.
The modeling proposal for prioritizing urban flood risks with non-stationary probabilities This section presents the spatiotemporal decision model for ranking multidimensional flood risks in urban areas, according to (da Silva et al., 2022).
2.1 Predicting the sources of hazard with General Circulation Models It is worth knowing that the modelling proposal can be applied in any urban space in the world, considering its particular characteristics and obeying the underlying assumptions adopted by the model.
At first, it must be clearly established the role of each actor in the decision-making process (de Almeida et al., 2015); this is essential to guarantee a trustworthy recommendation, what is, the risk ranking of floods.
Here, the DM is responsible to state his/her preferences regarding the risk behavior and relative preferences among criteria.
The urban delimitation should be addressed carefully by the DM.
Then, contour conditions of local flood dynamics are settled by using historical rainfall records and data from climate stations on its surrounding.
Rainfall is the trigger event that is converted into the water flow, and its interaction with the urban system results in floods.
Here, the rainfall works as the uncontrolled event, 𝜃𝜃, that drives the flood disaster.
The relation between rainfall and water depths characterizes, then, the sources of hazard.
The model aims to assess future floods, so that must be specified the time window (𝑇𝑇) of the risk analysis, from 𝑡𝑡0 to 𝑡𝑡0 + 𝑇𝑇.
This is crucial to understand that the risk measures are subject to uncertainty during this period, and it should be treated adequately (Aven, 2019).
Given this context, the model quantifies in terms of probability density functions (PDFs) the future likelihood of the rainfall records.
To do so, GCMs are useful to forecast the precipitation patterns in 𝑇𝑇.
Local conditions allow experts to simulate, under downscaling methods and RCP scenarios, future rainfall indexes.
Then, a performance analysis of the climate simulations can be done by comparing their predictions to historical data.
Broadly speaking, we run GCM in a period in which past events (historical data) are compared to their simulations.
Index measures used by (da Silva et al., 2022) , such as the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE) can support this selection.
Apart from this, the Mann-Kendall trend test can evidence statistically if the rainfall behavior follows a monotonic trend, which means a correlation with the CC effects.
Then, the selected GCM model will simulate in 𝑇𝑇 the flood frequency curve, denoted as the apriori probability function 𝛱𝛱(𝜃𝜃, 𝑡𝑡) under a non-stationary perspective.
As mentioned in (da Silva et al., 2020), the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution is suitable to model hydrological events, so that the model proposes different GEV equations according to the time-dependency of its required parameters.
The GEV PDF uses three parameters, namely (𝜉𝜉,𝜎𝜎, 𝜇𝜇) the shape, scale, and location.
For didactic purposes, the notation 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝜉𝜉,𝜎𝜎, 𝜇𝜇) indicates here the order of the polynomial function over time of each parameter.
Thus, from the maximum likelihood estimation, it can be useful to check if non-stationarity improves flood modeling.
2.2 Estimating flood consequences & stating preferences In this phase, the urban space must be divided into urban zones (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖[1,𝑁𝑁]), strategically delimited according to geopolitical division, homogenous characteristics, or other factors.
After modeling the state of Nature 𝜃𝜃 over time, the model analyzes the impact (𝑐𝑐) of a given flood severity level in four criteria (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡): • Human – fatalities occurred directly from the natural disaster, measured in number of individuals; 62 • Social – people homeless or displaced after being affected by inundations, estimated in number of individuals; • Economic – financial damages to public and private properties, and urban infrastructures, in terms of monetary losses; • Health & Sanitation – environmental impact in water bodies and urban drainage system, in terms of contamination by enteric pathogens such as leptospirosis, rotavirus, E. Coli, etc.
Flood impacts were estimated for each criterion in terms of probabilities.
An underlying assumption adopted by the model is that the consequence behavior follows proportionally the population growth projections.
Then, urban computational simulations and global or local reports can introduce the time-dependency in this estimation.
Hence, the consequence functions 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐|𝜃𝜃, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) are estimated, assuming that probabilities are independent between criteria and urban zones.
In terms of utilities, the model elicits utility functions for each criterion 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐|𝜃𝜃) by using the Utility Theory.
Here, risk behavior when facing flood losses is measured to insert preferential information in risk calculation.
From experimental studies, (da Silva et al., 2020) suggested some utility functions according to the DM’s risk behavior in FRM studies.
2.3 Calculating the multidimensional risk with MAUT and Decision Analysis Altogether, the risk indexes for each criterion represent the combined effect of hazard scenarios, consequence functions, and utilities.
Then, the main task is to gather these information into a multidimensional and valued risk metric.
To do so, the model uses the MAUT approach to quantify the compensatory relationship among the criteria.
The relative importance is taken into account in this modeling.
As a result, scaling constants, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 are used to calculate the average global risk index, in terms of expected utilities, for each urban zone in the time window 𝑇𝑇, as schemed in Equation 1. 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) = − 1 𝑇𝑇 �𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 � � � 𝛱𝛱(𝜃𝜃, 𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐|𝜃𝜃, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐|𝜃𝜃) 𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝜃𝜃 𝑐𝑐0+𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐0 � (1) Da Silva et al., 2022) justified in Equation 1 the negative signal in order to rank the urban zones according to their risk priorities, i.e., the most critical to the lowest ones.
It must be clarified the assumptions of additive and utility independence lead the linear and additive form in Equation 1 to calculate 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖).
As a result, the flood risk ranking, and mapping of urban zones drive policymakers to implement strategic adaptation measures according to the future effects.
Even though (Aven, 2019) states that climate risks lose information when adopting expected values, the modeling proposal tries to overcome this issue by inserting not only preferential information with utilities but also the temporal analysis of the climate and urban effects on flood impacts.
Then, the non-stationary perspective has the potential to detect in risk evaluation “surprising events” that could not be assessed in current models.
Output reports can also include the use of statistical and sensitivity analysis for treating the uncertainty of climate variability, urban growth, and DM’s preference statements.
Next, a numerical application in a Brazilian town validates our proposal, sharing new insights for planning urban adaptation against floods.
3.
Numerical application on Barreiros, Pernambuco: results and discussion The site study encompasses the urban district of Barreiros, Pernambuco.
This urban area faced torrents of floodwater in 2010.
There, the hydrological disaster devastated the town located in north-eastern Brazil.
From local reports, the 2010’s floods killed in the Barreiros and its surroundings at least 38 people and leaving more than 600 missing (The World Bank, 2012).
This numerical application used public and open-access data from institutional organizations to simulate the impact of flooding, in terms of risk, for the next 40 years (2021 – 2060).
This way, the first phase of the model comprises the flood frequency analysis.
From simulation data of maximum daily rainfall in a month (mm), the model analyzes the performance of four GCMs by using the PROJETA platform available by the National Institute for Space Research (CPTEC/INPE, 2021).
To do so, simulated data from 1963 to 2005 were compared to historical rainfall records measured by pluviometric stations in Barreiros.
With the aid of analysts, the GCMs’ performance over time was measured with both MAE and RMSE indexes, as shown in Figure 1.
The boxplot chart schemed below evidenced that the lower median of error indexes and its interquartile interval indicates the BESM climate model as the more adequate to simulate the future rainfall patterns of Barreiros.
It should be noted that the Mann-Kendall trend test was applied in all GCM, thereby showing under 63 95% of confidence level a clear monotonic trend of the rainfall records, which indicates a correlation between the flood frequency and CC effects.
Figure 1.
Boxplot chart of the performance indexes of GCMs On considering the GCM chosen to simulate the future sources of hazard, the BESM climate model uses a downscaling method to regionalize the simulation under local characteristics.
As a result, monthly records of maximum precipitation from 2021 to 2060 were obtained.
Next, our model uses the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure to estimate stationary and non-stationary floods, assuming that the GEV function characterizes well the flood behavior.
Table 1 summarizes three GEV functions, differing from each other according to the degree of time dependency.
As observed there, the a-priori functions 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(0,1,0) and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(0,1,1) provide an improvement in fit over 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(0,0,0).
Under a 99% confidence level, the non-stationary function 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(0,1,1) is worthwhile, evidencing that this function explains substantially more the rainfall data variation than the stationary function.
Table 1.
Summary of the GEV functions with MLE 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮(𝝃𝝃,𝝈𝝈,𝝁𝝁) 𝝃𝝃 𝝁𝝁(𝒕𝒕) = 𝒂𝒂 + 𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕 𝝈𝝈(𝒕𝒕) = 𝒂𝒂 + 𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕 Likelihood-ratio test (p-value) 𝒂𝒂 𝒃𝒃 𝒂𝒂 𝒃𝒃 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(0,0,0) 0.277 19.382 18.090 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(0,1,0) 0.292 17.640 3.147E-3 17.915 0.065 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(0,1,1) 0.245 21.823 -3.998E-3 23.412 -0.010 < 1.0E-5 After characterizing the flood frequency curve in terms of future rainfall patterns, the DM needs to gather the efforts of analysts and experts to estimate, in terms of consequence functions, the flood damages for all criteria: human, social, economic, and health & sanitation.
Public reports by the World Bank (The World Bank, 2012) supported by estimations of flood depth-damage functions were essential to guide the model in modeling PDFs for each 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐|𝜃𝜃, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖).
In this application, the consequence function of human, social, economic and health & sanitation criteria were assigned by Poisson, Lognormal and Beta-Poisson distributions.
It must be clarified that the health & sanitation criterion estimate the potential contamination of water bodies from rotavirus (Vieira et al., 2016).
Under data scarcity of the local population projections of Barreiros, the model introduces the non-stationary perspective by adjusting the key parameters adopted by the consequence functions proportionally with the average rate of population change in Brazil, reported by the United Nations (Gragnolati et al., 2011).
Finally, the DM’s preferences statement should assign utilities to the set of consequences of all criteria.
This application elicits 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐|𝜃𝜃) assuming that the DM is risk-averse in the human and health & sanitation criteria, while he/she is prone to risk in the other ones.
It uses the functions proposed by (da Silva et al., 2020).
The structured protocol by (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), i.e., the MAUT elicitation, leads the DM to establish preferences among criteria.
This is crucial to gather the risk information and provide the results in the next section.
The multidimensional risk is obtained after calculating, under DM’s preferences, the interaction between the hazard scenarios and their potential damages over time.
Then, for each urban zone, a global risk index represents the average magnitude of flood risks for the next 40 years.
Table 2 summarizes the urban flood risk ranking for this time window.
64 Table 2.
Urban Flood Risk Ranking, their incremental risks, and ratios for 2012 – 2060 Urban zone Incremental risk Risk ratio 𝒛𝒛𝟔𝟔 2.954E-03 2.25 𝒛𝒛𝟕𝟕 1.315E-03 0.47 𝒛𝒛𝟓𝟓 2.826E-03 101.93 𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 2.773E-05 0.21 𝒛𝒛𝟐𝟐 1.322E-04 0.16 𝒛𝒛𝟗𝟗 8.207E-04 1.41 𝒛𝒛𝟑𝟑 5.821E-04 0.05 𝒛𝒛𝟏𝟏 1.089E-02 2.30 𝒛𝒛𝟒𝟒 4.730E-03 𝒛𝒛𝟖𝟖 This tabular information focuses on risk prioritization, being the most critical zones allocated to the first positions; the incremental and ratio of risk increase.
The last data is useful to open the DM’s mind to understand the relation regarding the magnitude of adjacent zones in the ranking, while it is hard for him/her to comprehend the scale of the global risk values.
These metrics were used properly in (da Silva et al., 2020).
Additionally, the risk mapping in Figure 2 permits the DM to evaluate how the risk prioritization is spatially distributed.
The results point out that the most critical zone is 𝑧𝑧6, while 𝑧𝑧8 has the fewest priority when planning strategic adaptation measures.
Figure 2.
Urban Flood Risk Mapping of Barreiros for 2021 – 2060 The results provided by the model can aid the DM to base his/her future decisions for flood prevention and mitigation.
At first, incremental risks and their ratios mean valuable information regarding the future risk magnitudes.
For example, the increase in magnitude for 𝑧𝑧10 to 𝑧𝑧5 grows, approximately, 101 times.
In real practice, the DM can use these data as a guideline to define a better resource allocation.
Here, the nonstationary analysis allows the DM to predict, what are the most critical zones in the future if no preventive actions would be implemented for climate adaptation.
Forecasting techniques of CC and urbanization effects contributed to taking into account the time-dependency in the risk modeling.
Even though the final results are shown on average, the DM can disaggregate the risk analysis over time, which generates complementary information to him/her.
Indeed, future researches can assess statistically the time influence on flood prioritization and their magnitudes.
65 4.
Conclusions This paper presented, in the light of the MCDM/A approach, a new spatiotemporal decision model for assessing and ranking flood risks in urban areas due to climate changes and urbanization effects.
A critical analysis of recent papers in the literature regarding the main challenges of FRM practices has shown how the combined effect of CC and population growth can alter patterns of temperature, rainfall, sea-level rise, and other climate indexes.
The new model cover the main gaps pointed out by (da Silva et al., 2020): it takes into account a probabilistic approach to models the flood frequency, impacts, and DM’s preferences; it encompasses forecasting models of the urban growth and climate variability, in order to quantify the time influence in risk modeling; and it uses a non-stationary perspective to calculate the future flood risks, being capable to detect “potential surprises”, even if it based on expected utilities.The risk mapping schemed in Figure 2 can be also disaggregate the analysis into the risks for human, social, economic, and health & sanitation perspectives.
The DM can evaluate the risk ranking for a particular criterion.
Thus, the multiple risk mapping has the potential to add spatial evidence concerning the prominence of a particular risk in certain urban zones.
This information can aid DMs, policymakers, to design innovative structural and non-structural measures that engage many stakeholders for strengthing the urban resilience against floods.
After applying the new model for assessing flood risks, this cross-analysis of the results contributes to base the DM’s risk perception, turning the decision recommendation accreditable.
Consequently, the benefits of mitigation actions to be implemented by the policymakers work in such a way that could prevent future flood damages aggravated by CC and urbanization.
Hence, DMs can improve their local resource allocations, humanitarian logistics, healthcare system planning, shelter location, and other important measures with the potential to reduce flood.
Altogether, these perspectives focus to avoid and/ or mitigate fatalities and injuries to people and economic losses of urban spaces in a changing climate and complex urbanization.
Acknowledgments This paper is part of a research study funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq and the Brazilian Council for Improving Higher Education (CAPES).
References Aven T., 2019, Climate change risk–what is it and how should it be expressed?
Journal of Risk Research, 0(0), 1–18.
CPTEC/INPE, 2021, PROJETA: Projeções de mudança do clima para a América do Sul regionalizadas pelo modelo ETA.
<https://projeta.cptec.inpe.br/> accessed 24.11.2021. da Silva L.B.L., Alencar M.H., de Almeida A.T., 2020, Multidimensional flood risk management under climate changes: Bibliometric analysis, trends and strategic guidelines for decision-making in urban dynamics.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 50, 101865. da Silva L.B.L., Humberto J.S., Alencar M.H., Ferreira R.J.P., de Almeida A.T., 2020, GIS-based multidimensional decision model for enhancing flood risk prioritization in urban areas.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 48. da Silva L.B.L., Alencar M.H., de Almeida A. T., 2022, A novel spatiotemporal multi-attribute method for assessing flood risks in urban spaces under climate change and demographic scenarios.
Sustainable Cities and Society, 76, 103501. de Almeida A.T., Cavalcante C.A.V., Alencar M.H., Ferreira R.J.P., De Almeida-Filho A.T., Garcez T.V., 2015, Multicriteria and Multiobjective Models for Risk, Reliability and Maintenance Decision Analysis.
Springer.
Gragnolati M., Jorgensen O.H., Rocha R., Fruttero A.,2011, Growing old in an older Brazil : implications of population aging on growth, poverty, public finance and service delivery (T. W. Bank (ed.)).
Hesarkazzazi S., Arabzadeh R., Hajibabaei M., Rauch W., Kjeldsen T.R., Prosdocimi I., Castellarin A., Sitzenfrei R., 2021, Stationary vs non-stationary modelling of flood frequency distribution across northwest England.
Hydrological Sciences Journal, 66(4), 729–744.
Keeney R. L., Raiffa H., 1976, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade-Offs.
JohnWiley and Sons.
Khaliq M.N., Ouarda T.B.M.J., Ondo J.-C., Gachon P., Bobée B.,2006, Frequency analysis of a sequence of dependent and/or non-stationary hydro-meteorological observations: A review.
Journal of Hydrology, 329(3), 534–552.
The World Bank, 2012, Avaliação de Perdas e Danos: Inundações Bruscas em Pernambuco Junho de 2010.
66 lp-2022-abstract-222.pdf Promoting Safety Societies with a Non-Stationary Multidimensional Model that Prioritizes Flood Risks under Climate Change Effects
ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research Vol.
7 No.
2 July – December 2021, Pages: 127-141 Article history: Submitted : March 5th, 2021 Revised : May 25th, 2021 Accepted : May 28th, 2021 Ahmad Fawad Entezari, Kelly Wong Kai Seng*, Fazlin Ali Department of Agribusiness and Bioresource Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 43400, UPM Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia *) Correspondence email: kellywong@upm.edu.my Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped and the Impact of Climate Change: Applying and Extending the Theory of Cobb Douglas Production DOI: https://doi.org/10.18196/agraris.v7i2.11274 ABSTRACT Under climate change, Malaysia's agricultural production showed decreasing in recent decades.
This study tries to fill in the gaps to applying and extending the Cobb Douglas production function theory to examine the impact of climate change and economic factors on Malaysia's agricultural production.
Using EngleGranger (EG) test with 37 years of data from 1980 to 2016.
The findings showed that the long-run estimated coefficients for rainfall, temperature, and interest rate were -0.338, -0.024, and -0.029, respectively.
This indicates that each additional percent in rainfall, temperature, and interest rate will be affected the agricultural production, on average, to decrease by 0.338%, 0.024%, and 0.029%, respectively, holding others constant.
Besides that, the long-run elasticity of real GDP per capita, employment, and Trend showed 0.509, 0.513, and 0.119, respectively.
Increase 1% of real GDP per capita will lead to the agricultural production to increase about 0.509%, ceteris paribus.
The elasticity of employment showed that each 10% increase in agricultural employment will increase the agricultural production on average 5.13%, ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, the trend estimated coefficient showed that the agricultural production will have a constant growth rate which is 0.119% per year.
All variables were statistically significant to explain the long-run agricultural production.
The short-run rainfall, temperature, employment, and Trend were statistically significant to determine the short-run production growth.
Therefore, advanced technology and the latest information on climate change are relevant to boost agricultural production growth.
In addition, policymakers also suggested establishing lower interest rate loan facilities and no labor shortage in this industry.
Keywords: agriculture, climate change, global warming, economics, co-integration INTRODUCTION In Malaysia, the agricultural sector contributed 8.6% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 12.1% of the total labor force in 2016.
However, the contribution of this sector in national GDP has declined gradually from 23.03% in 1980 to about 10.09% in 2010.
On the other hand, the employment in this sector has declined from about 1.78 million in 1980 to 1.42 million in 2011.
Even the percentage of agriculture contribution to national http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& mailto:kellywong@upm.edu.my https://doi.org/10.18196/agraris.v7i2.11274 ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 128 AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research income and the percentage share of total employment have declined (Figure 1).
The agriculture sector's contribution remains a crucial sector to the Malaysian GDP (Ahmed et al., 2016; Akhtar, Masud, & Afroz, 2019; Kadir & Tunggal, 2015).
FIGURE 1.
MALAYSIA’S AGRICULTURE EMPLOYMENT AND GDP (% SHARE IN TOTAL GDP), 1980 – 2016 SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS MALAYSIA, (2019A, 2019B) The production system in the agriculture sector is entirely different from other economic sectors such as the manufacturing and services sectors.
Agricultural production growth is strongly related to labor and capital productivity, but the climate variables (rainfall and temperature) also critical to determine production growth.
Hence, climate change will directly harm agricultural production, and this sector is affected biophysically by climate factors such as rainfall and temperature more than other economic sectors.
Biologically speaking, agricultural products such as crops and plantations need sufficient rainfall and appropriate temperature to grow.
Numerous researchers have claimed the negative effects of climate change on the world’s agricultural production (Aydinalp & Cresser, 2008; Calzadilla, Zhu, Rehdanz, Tol, & Ringler, 2014) as well as some non-government organization (NGOs) such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012; IPCC, 2014).
Studies have shown that climate change substantially reduces agricultural production in low latitude (tropical and semitropical) regions (Adams et al., 1998; Fujimori et al., 2018; Nashwan et al., 2019; and Rosenzweig & Parry, 1994).
It mainly a threat to most world developing communities (Huong et al., 2019; and Laux et al., 2010).
Climate change is a general problem and that Malaysia would not be excluded as it is a developing country located in lower latitude.
According to N’zué (2018) and Sinha & Bhatt (2017), greenhouse gases (GHGs) are the main cause of climate change, and it is estimated that more than 60% of climate change is caused by carbon dioxide.
The increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere harms the agricultural sector through temperature rises and changes in rainfall patterns, leading to climate disasters.
Most importantly, it interferes with the crop nutrition system and increases the susceptibility to pests and diseases that ultimately reduce crop productivity.
In Malaysia, the emissions of greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) and 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Ag ric ul tu re G DP (% S ha re ) Ag ri.
E m pl oy m en t (m ill io n pe rs on ) Agriculture Employment (million person) Agriculture GDP % Share http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 129 Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped ….. (Entezari, Seng, and Ali) temperature recorded an increasing trend (Figure 2), indicating that climate change is also happening in Malaysia, thereby warning the risk of shortage in future agricultural production as well as food production.
FIGURE 2.
MALAYSIA'S CO2 EMISSION (KT) AND AVERAGE TEMPERATURE ( OC), 1980 – 2016 SOURCE: THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK INDICATORS (2019) Aside from the climatic factors, Malaysia’s agriculture sector is facing the restriction from the economic side too (Ali et al., 2010).
For instance, agricultural land in Malaysia has increased at a slower growth rate which is about 2.7% from 1980 to 2016 and the agricultural land size remained at 70 thousand km2 from 1990 to 2016 (World Bank Group, 2019).
Furthermore, considering that agriculture is one of the labor-intensive sectors, a decreased in employment poses a major problem faced by the agriculture sector in Malaysia.
The agriculture sector, particularly crop production, is influenced by labor and capital and climatic factors such as temperature and rainfall.
Under climate change, assess the factors that lead to the failure of agricultural production is very important.
Choe (1989) and Adekunle & Ndukwe (2018) found that interest rates have a negative impact on agricultural output.
These authors stated that an increase in interest rate will raise the cost of capital (cost of borrowing the money), which ultimately results in reduced investment and then a decrease in agricultural output.
Besides that, the negative relationship between interest rate and agricultural production was confirmed by (Ali et al.
2010; Baek & Koo, 2010; and Onakoya et al.
2018).
The employment rate is a commonly used representative variable used to represent labor in a production function.
Consistent with the postulation of Okun’s law (Okun, 1962) on the relationship between employment and output, employment has a positive relationship with agricultural output.
Increasing labor productivity or labor quantity will increase total output.
Abbas et al.
(2015), Barrios et al.
(2008), Belloumi (2014), Odhiambo et al.
(2004), Onakoya et al.
(2018), and Udah & Nwachukwu (2015) found employment has a positive related to the agricultural production, an increase in employment in the agriculture sector will able to increase the agricultural output.
Since the agriculture sector is a labor-intensive market, employment will play an important role in this industry.
24 24,5 25 25,5 26 26,5 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 1980198219841986198819901992199419961998200020022004200620082010201220142016 Av er ag e Te m pe ra tu re (o C) CO 2 Em iss io n (1 00 0 kt ) CO2 emissions (1000 kt) Temperature http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 130 AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research Additionally, economic growth or national income is also known as one of the key economic factors that have a significant impact on agricultural production (Baek & Koo, 2010; Brownson et al., 2012).
According to Baek & Koo (2010), national income is positively related to agricultural production.
When the economic growth, producers will intent to produce more of the outputs because they will expect that market demand will increase.
In terms of the impact of agricultural climate change, numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the impact of climate change on agricultural production in various regions across the globe which used temperature and rainfall as climate change factors and found a negative impact of climate change on the agriculture sector (Adams et al., 1998; Laux et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2004; Rosenzweig & Parry, 1994; Tang, 2019).
In Malaysia, there are many studies have investigated the impact of climate change on crop production and showed that climate change negatively influenced agricultural sector (Al-Amin et al., 2011; Alam et al., 2012; Ali et al., 2017; Herath et al., 2020 ; Masud et al., 2014; Siwar et al., 2009; Tang, 2019; Vaghefi et al., 2011).
According to Tang (2019), climate change in Malaysia has harmed the agricultural sector due to rising temperatures and unexpected rainfall variability every year.
Extreme weather may damage agricultural products such as paddy during the flood or drought (Akhtar et al., 2019; Alam et al., 2011).
For instance, Alam et al.
(2017), and Herath et al.
(2020) used mean temperature and rainfall to determine the impact of climate change on paddy production in Malaysia.
They found that both temperature and rainfall harm paddy production.
There are limited studies that combined climate change and economic variables to explain agricultural production.
Cobb Douglas's production function theory widely in the past studies explains the physical output determine by the physical inputs use.
However, agricultural production such as crops and livestock is different than manufacturing production.
The factors used to explain agricultural production should not limit to either climate change variables (rainfall and temperature) or economic variables.
As mentioned before, climate factors are important to justify agricultural production and they should be included in the Cobb Douglas production function.
Therefore, this study tries to fill in the gaps to applying and extending the Cobb Douglas production function theory to examine the impact of climate change and economic factors on Malaysia’s agricultural production.
RESEARCH METHOD Cobb Douglas' production function (Cobb and Douglas, 1928) is a popular economic theory that widely adopted to explain specific physical products that can generate by two or more physical inputs (such as labor and capital) quantity (Equation 1).
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝐿, 𝐾) = ALαKβ (1) where, Y represents the physical output; A, L, and K denotes total input productivity, physical labor, and physical capital, respectively; then α and β implies the constant output elasticity of capital input and labor input.
However, Cobb Douglas' production function http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 131 Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped ….. (Entezari, Seng, and Ali) does not take climate impact as one of the important determinants of agricultural production.
Hence, additional climate change variables are crucial to extending the Cobb Douglas production theory in this study.
Based on the general Equation 1, the long-run agricultural production regression can be written as Equations 2: lnAGRIt = β0 + β1lnINTt+ β2 lnEMPt + β3lnRGDPPCt+ β4 lnTEMPt + β5 lnRAINt + β6 TRENDt + ut (2) where, ln denotes as natural logarithmic and the β0 represents the constant total productivity of Malaysia’s agricultural production.
In addition, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, and β6 have represented the long-run elasticity for interest rate (INT) which is a proxy for the physical capital, employment (EMP) is proxy for labor input, real GDP per capita (RGDPPC) as a proxy for the national economic performances, temperature (TEMP) and rainfall (RAIN) both represents the climate change variables and the technology time trend (TREND), respectively.
The ut denotes the estimated residual of the model and error correction term (ECT).
Regarding the signs of the coefficients in Equation 2, the previous expectations of theoretically determining the signs of the parameters of economic relations are discussed in the literature review section.
It is expected that β1<0 because a rise in interest rates would increase the borrowing costs which will subsequently lead to a decrease in agricultural production as a consequence of reduced investment in physical capital.
As to the effect of employment, it is expected that β2>0, which is consistent with the postulation of Okun’s law that typically in an economy the production of more goods and services would require more labor and employment to promote the output.
Similarly, concerning the impact of real per capita GDP (income), since an increase in real GDP per capita will increase purchasing power, which will lead to a rise in output, it is expected that β3>0.
Finally, it is foreseeable that due to the increase of temperature and rainfall, both β4 and β5<0 will cause climatic disasters such as floods and droughts, which will lead to soil erosion and leaching, and ultimately lead to reduced agricultural production due to depletion of soil nutrients.
Based on the classical linear regression model (CLRM) assumptions, the ECT in longrun regression must be stationary to avoid the spurious regression problem.
Hence, Engle & Granger (1987) proposed a co-integration test and using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to confirm the ECT in the stationary process.
The EG co-integration test obtains the ECT from Equation 2 and re-estimate in the following regression form: Δ�̂�t= (p – 1)�̂�t-1 +∑ 𝜃𝑗 𝑘 𝑗=1 ∆�̂�t-j + et (3) Where, Δ�̂�t is the first difference of the residual (ut) obtained from Equation 2. k denotes the number of lags, θj is the coefficient of the lagged difference of the estimated residuals, �̂�t-j the lag of estimated residual from the long-run regression, and et is the error term for the ADF test.
If the null hypothesis of the p-1 = 0 is rejected in this test, indicating a long-run cointegration relationship and there is no spurious regression problem.
http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 132 AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research If there is a long-term co-integration relationship between the regression variables, the error correction model (ECM) will take the lagged one ECT as a relevant variable to explain the impact of short-term changes.
The short-run ECM will show as the Equation 4: Δyt= α0 +∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑛 𝑖=1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖+∑ 𝛿𝑘 𝑚 𝑘 ∆𝑥𝑗𝑡−𝑘+ λECTt-1+ut (4) Where, 𝛽 and 𝛿 are the short-run dynamic coefficient of the model.
ECTt-1 is the lagged one of the residual from Equation 2 and λ is the coefficient of the error correction term (-1< λ < 0) which represents the speed of adjustment.
If the market has a self-adjustment from disequilibrium back to the equilibrium point, the coefficient of the ECTt-1 is estimated to be negative and statistically significant (Engle & Granger, 1987; Gujarati, 1995).
Based on the general Equation 4, the ECM model for variables in this study can be written as Equation 5: ΔlnAGRI𝑡 = 𝛿0 + θECT𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 𝑃 𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑞 𝑗=0 ∆𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑟 𝑘=0 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚 𝑠 𝑚=0 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑚 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑢 𝑛=0 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑡−𝑛 + ∑ 𝛽𝑓 𝑣 𝑓=0 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−𝑓 + 𝛿1∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (5) Where, δ0 is constant, θ is coefficient for ECT and it is expected to be negative and significant; ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑞 𝑗=0 , ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑟 𝑘=0 , ∑ 𝛽𝑚 𝑠 𝑚=0 , ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑢 𝑛=0 , and ∑ 𝛽𝑓 𝑣 𝑓=0 are the magnitude of the short-run changes for AGRI, INT, EMP, RGDPOC, RAIN, TEMP, and TRND, respectively.
The annual time series data from 1980 to 2016 is used in this study.
Real agricultural GDP (AGRI) and lending interest rate for the capital were collected from World Bank Indicators (www.worldbank.org/indicator).
Annual data on the number of employees in the agricultural sector (EMP) and Malaysia's real GDP per capita (RGDPPC) collected from the Food and Agriculture Organization (www.fao.org) each year, as well as data on climatic factors (rainfall and rainfall) can be accessed from the World Bank Group's Climate Knowledge Portal (https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org).
RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS The findings of Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) tests were summarized in Table 1.
The ADF and PP tests showed that all variables were significant at 1% of significance level which after transformed it into the first difference.
This indicates that these variables were considered as integrated at order one or I (1) variable.
The result of the Engle-Granger co-integration test was presented in Table 2.
It showed that the residual of the estimated co-integration regression (𝑢�̂� = −5.218) was less than the critical value (-4.07) at 1% of the significance level.
Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no co-integration relationship was rejected, indicating that all estimated variables (INT, EMP, RGDPPC, RAIN, and TEMP) had a strong long-term co-integration relationship with agricultural production.
The long-run regression result showed that all the independent variables followed the expected sign in the model.
The lnTEMP was found significant at 5% significance level and other variables were statistically significant at 1% of the significance http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 133 Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped ….. (Entezari, Seng, and Ali) level.
The interest rate (INT), rainfall (RAIN), and temperature (TEMP) had negative relationships with agricultural production, whereas employment (EMP) and real GDP per capita (RGDPPC) had a strong positive relationship with agricultural production in Malaysia.
A linear time trend (TREND) was included in the EG long-run model to take into account the constant technology change effect on agricultural production.
The TREND showed statistically positive significance to explain the agricultural production at 1% significance level.
This indicates that the constant increase in technology in the agricultural sector will able to increase agricultural production.
TABLE 1.
SUMMARY OF STATIONARY TEST RESULTS (ADF AND PP TESTS) Variables ADF PP I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) lnAGRI -1.159 ( 0 ) -5.955*** ( 1 ) -1.172 ( 4 ) -5.792*** ( 6 ) lnINT -0.649 ( 0 ) -5.375*** ( 0 ) -0.480 ( 6 ) -9.114*** ( 21) lnEMP -2.821 ( 0 ) -8.449*** ( 0 ) -2.740 ( 2 ) -8.486*** ( 2 ) lnRGDPC -0.683 ( 0 ) -4.997*** ( 0 ) -0.677 ( 1 ) -4.997*** ( 0 ) lnTEMP -2.616 ( 0 ) -6.486*** ( 1 ) -2.616 ( 0 ) -15.890*** ( 34 ) lnRAIN -2.041 ( 0 ) -6.983*** ( 0 ) -2.079 ( 3 ) -14.021*** ( 24 ) Note: *** and ** denotes the significance level at 1% and 5% respectively.
The value of parenthesis (…) represents the optimum lag selected based on the SIC criteria.
TABLE 2.
FINDING OF ENGLE-GRANGER CO-INTEGRATION TEST AND LONG-RUN REGRESSION lnAGRI C lnINT lnEMP lnRGDPPC lnRAIN lnTEMP TREND β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 β 6 β 7 27.974*** -0.029*** 0.513*** 0.509*** -0.338*** -3.024** 0.119*** (4.034) (0.006) (0.108) (0.060) (0.094) (1.211) (0.035) [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.018] [0.002] Engle-Granger Co-integration test: Δ�̂�t= (p – 1)�̂�t-1 +∑ 𝜃𝑗 𝑘 𝑗=1 ∆�̂�t-j +et -5.218*** Critical Value 1% -4.07 5% -3.37 10% -3.03 R2 0.966 Durbin Watson Stat 1.624 Note: *** and ** indicated the significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively.
The value in the parenthesis (…) denotes standard error while the value in the […] represents the P-value.
The estimated elasticity of INT is -0.029 which indicates that a 1% increase in the interest rate will result in a decline in long-run agricultural production by 0.029%, holding other factors constant.
The finding accords with the result of Adekunle, Wasiu & Ndukwe (2018), Ali et al.
(2010), Baek & Koo (2010), and Odior (2014) where an ascent in the interest rate would lower agricultural production as a consequence of diminishing investment due to the increase in the capital cost and the cost of production.
The long-run coefficient elasticity for EMP is 0.513, indicating that a 10% increase in agricultural employment would increase agricultural production by about 5.13%, ceteris paribus.
The finding corresponds with the results of Abbas et al.
(2015), Onakoya et al.
http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 134 AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research (2018), and Udah & Nwachukwu (2015), stating that the labor force is one of the most important contributors to agricultural production.
Researchers believe that employment and agricultural production have a direct and important relationship.
Also, the estimated coefficient for RGDPPC is 0.509, which implies a direct and significant relationship between national income and agricultural production.
In other words, agricultural growth will increase by 5.09% for every 10% increase in national income.
Similar results were found by Brownson et al.
(2012), Dlamini et al.
(2015), and Baek & Koo (2010) that, an increase in income will increase production by increasing the purchase power demand for production.
However, there is a negative relationship between climate factors (rainfall and temperature) and agricultural production (Chizari et al., 2017 and Herath et al., 2020).
The estimated elasticity for RAIN was -0.34, indicating that at a 1% increase in rainfall, the agricultural production will decline by about 0.34%, holding other factors constant.
This result is consistent with those observed by Alam et al., (2014), Ali et al.
(2017), Chizari et al.
(2017), and Herath et al.
(2020) that, rainfall harms agricultural production.
The long-run elasticity coefficient for TEMP is -3.024, which means that a 1% increase in temperature will lead to a decline in total agricultural output by 3.024% in the long run.
A similar finding is also reported by Alam et al.
(2014) that, 1% increase in temperature would decrease rice production by about 3.4%.
The results of the ECM model for short-run analysis are presented in Table 3.
It shows that all the estimated variables followed the expected sign even in the short run.
The lag one of Error Correction Term (ECTt-1) represents the speed of adjustment, which is -0.456 and significant at 1% of the significance level.
It indicates that the short-run disequilibrium in agricultural production would require a moderate speed of adjustment to recover the state of equilibrium.
TABLE 3.
ESTIMATED RESULT OF ERROR CORRECTION MODEL Coefficient Standard Error P-Value C 0.007 0.009 0.422 ECTt-1 -0.456*** 0.163 0.009 ΔAGRIt-1 0.341** 0.160 0.042 ΔINTt -0.004 0.007 0.576 ΔEMPt 0.427*** 0.103 0.000 ΔRGDPPCt 0.253 0.170 0.149 ΔRAINt -0.179*** 0.057 0.004 ΔTEMPt -2.703*** 0.767 0.002 TRENDt 0.041** 0.018 0.027 Note: *** and ** indicated the significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively.
Based on the estimated result of the ECM model for short-run analysis, the slope coefficient of lag one of the dependent variable (AGRIt-1) was statistically significant at 5% of the significance level.
EMP was the only significant variable from the economic factors, which was statistically significant at 1% of the significance level.
He estimated that the elasticity of short-term employment was within a reasonable range of 0.427, which indicates that the increase in labor demand in this industry will increase labor productivity and then http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 135 Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped ….. (Entezari, Seng, and Ali) increase agricultural production in the short term (Onakoya et al., 2018).
However, INT and RGDPPC had an insignificant positive causal impact on agricultural production.
The estimated elasticity for climate factors of both rainfall and temperature were negative and statistically significant at a 1% level, indicating that climate change has a strong negative relationship with agricultural production even in the short run.
These findings were supported by Talib & Darawi (2002), and rainfall has an important impact on production.
In this study, several keys diagnostic tests were used to confirm that the long-term and short-term estimated models are the Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE).
The results were reported in Table 4.
The R-squared of the long-term model is 0.966, indicating that all independent variables (INT, EMP, RGDPPC, RAIN, and TEMP) in the model explain about 96.6% of the variation in agricultural production.
However, the R2 in the short-term estimation model was 0.606, which indicates that about 60.6% of the changes in agricultural output were explained by the changes in the independent variables, while there was no explanation for about 39.4% in the model.
The F-statistic in the long-run and short-run model were statistically significant at 1% of significance level, which indicates that the models were fit, and all independent variables used in the models jointly affected the agricultural output.
TABLE 4.
DIAGNOSTIC CHECKING TESTS Test Statistics OLS Estimation ECM Estimation R2 0.966 0.606 Adj R2 0.959 0.485 FStatistics 139.241*** [0.000] 4.998*** [0.001] LM test 1.166 [0.558] 0.269 [0.874] Jarque-Bera 0.620 [0.733] 1.414 [0.235] ARCH 0.071 [0.790] 3.746 [0.154] Note: *** and ** indicated the significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively.
The value in the parenthesis […] represents the P-value.
Also, the auto-serial correlation test (LM-test) was employed to confirm the estimated regressions were not suffering from a serial correlation problem.
The result showed that the p-value was insignificant and failed to reject the null hypothesis and that the residual was serially correlated.
In addition, the Jarque-Bera test and ARCH test were insignificant and failed to reject the null hypothesis, thereby confirming that the residuals of the regression models were normally distributed, and the variance of the residual was constant over time.
Hence, the model has fulfilled the homoscedasticity assumption in the Classical Linear Regression Method (CLRM).
Finally, the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) statistical graphs move within the critical range (significantly 5%), indicating that the stability estimates all variables' coefficient and not cause any structural damage (Figure 3).
http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 136 AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research FIGURE 3: CUSUM AND CUSUMSQ TESTS FOR ESTIMATED PARAMETER STABILITY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION Conclusion In recent decades, the agriculture GDP has a lower growth rate, which has drastically fallen since 2010.
This study employed the co-integration method and utilized annual data spanning a period of 37 years (1980 2016).
The co-integration test showed that there is a long-run co-integration between agricultural production and all explanatory variables (TREND, INT, EMP, RGDPPC, TEMP, and RAIN).
The results further showed that all the variables followed the expected signs, both in the long run and short run.
In the long run, interest rate, rainfall, and temperature have negative and significant effects on agricultural production, while national income and employment have positive significant effects.
In the short run, rainfall and temperature have negative and significant effects on agricultural production while employment has a positive and significant effect.
Meanwhile, interest rate and income do not have significant effects on agricultural production in the short run.
Also, the negative and significant ECTt-1 indicated that the short-run disequilibrium in agricultural production would require a moderate speed to recover the state of equilibrium.
Therefore, the findings highlighted that an accurate forecast of the weather changed is important to reduce the farmers’ losses.
The perfect information sharing i.e the changes of rainfall and temperature between the meteorology department and farmers is important.
According to the accurate weather forecast of the meteorological department, farmers can make good agricultural production plans.
Moreover, time to receive the information of weather also an important element especially before the flood and drought happens.
From the economic point of view, policymakers or governments can establish lower interest or special interest loan facilities to encourage farmers to adopt advanced technology or increase their investment in their agricultural production.
Besides that, the local authorities also have to make sure that there is no labor shortage in this industry.
Because when the sector is facing larger excess labor demand, the agricultural sector may face shortage at the end.
Since the upstream sector shortage, the downstream sector such as the food sector may face increasing food import bills or food shortage.
This indicates that the problem of labor shortage may increase the nation's food insecure issues.
-16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 CUSUM 5% Significance -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 137 Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped ….. (Entezari, Seng, and Ali) Recommendation Based on the finding of this study, several relevant policy recommendations are proposed to help better coping with the impact of climate change.
However, some adaptation strategies, such as growing drought-resistant crops, changing the planting date, and managing the irrigation and technology use, are recommended to afford the farmers a cushion against further anticipated adverse climatic conditions.
Nevertheless, the government as an authority for policy and law-making must play the most influential role in ensuring climate mitigation and adaptation at all levels.
First and foremost, climate change factors harm agricultural production.
To overcome the negative effect of climate change, the government and policymakers should provide policies on providing advanced technology to overcome the climate change problem and ensure that the producers receive up-to-date information in anticipation of severe climate change variations.
This is to enable the farmers to make well-informed decisions on their productions.
Another important policy message based on the finding of the study that pertains to the negative influence of interest rate on agricultural production is to offer a special lower interest rate for the farmers to reduce production costs and increase their investment in their physical capital.
Additionally, given the fact that agriculture is a labor-intensive sector and an increase in the number of employments has a significant impact on increasing agricultural production, appropriate authorities have to make sure there is no labor shortage in this industry.
Finally, policymakers and economists need to consider adaptation barriers, namely financial, ecological, technical, and institutional barriers, to define government incentive plans, because agricultural policies need to be more strategic and must respond to possible be fully prepared for the impact.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work was supported by the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE)/Higher Education Development Program (HEDP) of Afghanistan and funded by the World Bank scholarship.
REFERENCE Abbas, M., Barros, C., & Mosca, J.
(2015).
The Macroeconomy and Agricultural Production in Mozambique.
Basic Research Journal of Agricultural Science and Review, 4(August), 247–255.
Adams, R., Hurd, B., Lenhart, S., & Leary, N. (1998).
Effects of Global Climate Change on World Agriculture: An Interpretive Review.
Climate Research, 11, 19–30.
https://doi.org/10.3354/cr011019 Adekunle, W., & Ndukwe, C. I.
(2018).
The Impact of Exchange Rate Dynamics on Agricultural Output Performance in Nigeria.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 87755. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3214757 Ahmed, F., Al-Amin, A. Q., Mohamad, Z. F., & Chenayah, S. (2016).
Agriculture and Food Security Challenge of Climate Change: a Dynamic Analysis for Policy Selection.
http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& https://doi.org/10.3354/cr011019 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3214757 ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 138 AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research Scientia Agricola, 73(4), 311–321.
https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-9016-2015-0141 Akhtar, R., Masud, M. M., & Afroz, R. (2019).
Perception of Climate Change and the Adaptation Strategies and Capacities of the Rice Farmers in Kedah, Malaysia.
Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 10(1), 99–115.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0975425318822338 Al-Amin, A. Q., Filho, W. L., Trinxeria, J. M. de la, Jaafar, A. H., & Ghani, Z.
A.
(2011).
Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change in the Malaysian Agriculture Sector and its Influences in Investment Decision.
Middle East Journal of Scientific Research, 7(2), 225– 234.
Alam, M. M., Siwar, C., bin Toriman, M. E., Molla, R. I., & Talib, B.
(2012).
Climate Change Induced Adaptation by Paddy Farmers in Malaysia.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 17, 173–186.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-011-9319-5 Alam, M. M., Siwar, C., Murad, M. W., & Toriman, M. (2011).
Impacts of Climate Change on Agriculture and Food Security Issues in Malaysia: An Empirical Study on Farm Level Assessment.
World Applied Sciences Journal, 14(3), 431–442.
Alam, M. M., Siwar, C., Talib, B., & Toriman, M. E. (2014).
Impacts of Climatic Changes on Paddy Production in Malaysia: Micro Study on IADA at North West Selangor.
Research Journal of Environmental and Earth Sciences, 6(5), 251–258.
https://doi.org/10.19026/rjees.6.5767 Alexandratos, N. and J. Bruinsma.
(2012).
World Agriculture Towards 2030/2050: The 2012 Revision.
ESA Working paper No.
12-03.
Rome, FAO Ali, R., Ali, A. K., Abd Fatah, F., & Elini Engku Ariff, E. (2010).
Linkages of macroeconomic indicators and agricultural variables in Malaysia.
Economic and Technology Management Review ©Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute, 5, 1-9.
Ali, S., Liu, Y., Ishaq, M., Shah, T., Abdullah, Ilyas, A., & Din, I.
(2017).
Climate Change and Its Impact on the Yield of Major Food Crops: Evidence from Pakistan.
Foods, 6(6), 39. https://doi.org/10.3390/foods6060039 Aydinalp, C., & Cresser, M. S. (2008).
The Effects of Global Climate Change on Agriculture.
American-Eurasian Journal of Agricultural and Environental Science, 3(5), 672–676.
Baek, J., & Koo, W. W. (2010).
The U.S.
Agricultural Sector and The Macroeconomy.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 42(3), 457–465.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1074070800003643 Barrios, S., Ouattara, B., & Strobl, E. (2008).
The Impact of Climatic Change on Agricultural Production: Is it Different for Africa?
Food Policy, 33(4), 287–298.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2008.01.003 Belloumi, M. (2014).
Investigating the Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Production in Eastern and Southern African Countries (No.
0003; AGRODEP Working Paper).
Brownson, S., Vincent, I., Emmanuel, G., & Etim, D. (2012).
Agricultural Productivity and Macro-Economic Variable.
International Journal of Economics and Finance, 4(8), 114– 125. https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v4n8p114 http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-9016-2015-0141 https://doi.org/10.1177/0975425318822338 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-011-9319-5 https://doi.org/10.19026/rjees.6.5767 https://doi.org/10.3390/foods6060039 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1074070800003643 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2008.01.003 https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v4n8p114 ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 139 Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped ….. (Entezari, Seng, and Ali) Calzadilla, A., Zhu, T., Rehdanz, K., Tol, R. S. J., & Ringler, C. (2014).
Climate Change and Agriculture: Impacts and Adaptation Options in South Africa.
Water Resources and Economics, 5, 24–48.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wre.2014.03.001 Chizari, A., Mohamed, Z., Shamsudin, M. N., & Seng, K. W. K. (2017).
Economic Climate Model of the Oil Palm Production in Malaysia.
International Journal of Horticulture, Agriculture and Food Science, 1(3), 27–32.
https://doi.org/10.22161/ijhaf.1.3.6 Choe, Y. C. (1989).
A Survey of Macroeconomics and Agriculture (Master's Thesis).
Available from AgEon Search, Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics database.
Retrieved from https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/11209.
Cobb, C. W., & Douglas, P. H. (1928).
A Theory of Production.
American Economic Review, 18, 139 165.
Department of Statistics Malaysia.
(2019a).
Employment.
Retrieved from, https://dosm.gov.my/v1/uploads/files/3_Time%20Series/Malaysia_Time_Series_20 19/21_Guna_Tenaga.pdf Department of Statistics Malaysia.
(2019b).
National Account.
Retrieved from, https://dosm.gov.my/v1/uploads/files/3_Time%20Series/Malaysia_Time_Series_20 19/01_Akaun_Negara.pdf Dlamini, N. S., Tijani, A.
A., & Masuku, M. B.
(2015).
The Impact of Macroeconomic Policies on Agriculture in Swaziland: An Empirical Analysis (1980-2012).
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 6(15), 140–149.
Engle, R. F., & Granger, C. W. J.
(1987).
Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing.
Econometrica, 55(2), 251–276.
Fujimori, S., Iizumi, T., Hasegawa, T., Takakura, J., Takahashi, K., & Hijioka, Y.
(2018).
Macroeconomic Impacts of Climate Change Driven by Changes in Crop Yields.
Sustainability, 10(10).
https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103673 Gujarati, D. N. (1995).
Basic Economitrics (Third Edit).
Mcgraw-Hill.
Herath, G., Hasanov, A., & Park, J.
(2020).
Impact of Climate Change on Paddy Production in Malaysia: Empirical Analysis at the National and State Level Experience.
Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management.
ICMSEM.
Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, Vol 1001 2019. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21248-3_48 Huong, N. T. L., Bo, Y. S., & Fahad, S. (2019).
Economic Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture Using Ricardian Approach: A Case of Northwest Vietnam.
Journal of the Saudi Society of Agricultural Sciences, 18(4), 449–457.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jssas.2018.02.006 IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)].
IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp Kadir, S. U. S. A., & Tunggal, N. Z.
(2015).
The Impact of Macroeconomic Variables towards Agricultural Productivity in Malaysia.
South East Asia Journal of Contemporary Business, Economics and Law, 8(3), 21–27.
http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wre.2014.03.001 https://doi.org/10.22161/ijhaf.1.3.6 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/11209 https://dosm.gov.my/v1/uploads/files/3_Time%20Series/Malaysia_Time_Series_2019/21_Guna_Tenaga.pdf https://dosm.gov.my/v1/uploads/files/3_Time%20Series/Malaysia_Time_Series_2019/21_Guna_Tenaga.pdf https://dosm.gov.my/v1/uploads/files/3_Time%20Series/Malaysia_Time_Series_2019/01_Akaun_Negara.pdf https://dosm.gov.my/v1/uploads/files/3_Time%20Series/Malaysia_Time_Series_2019/01_Akaun_Negara.pdf https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103673 https://doi.org/https:/doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21248-3_48 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jssas.2018.02.006 ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 140 AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research Laux, P., Jäckel, G., Tingem, R. M., & Kunstmann, H. (2010).
Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Productivity Under Rainfed Conditions in Cameroon—A Method to Improve Attainable Crop Yields by Planting Date Adaptations.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 150(9), 1258–1271.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agrformet.2010.05.008 Liu, H., Li, X., Fischer, G., & Sun, L. (2004).
Study on the Impacts of Climate Change on China’s Agriculture.
Climatic Change, 65, 125–148.
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:CLIM.0000037490.17099.97 Masud, M. M., Rahman, M. S., Al-Amin, A. Q., Kari, F., & Filho, W. L. (2014).
Impact of Climate Change: An Empirical Investigation of Malaysian Rice Production.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 19, 431–444.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-012-9441-z N’zué, F. F. (2018).
Carbon Dioxide (CO2 ) Emissions in Côte d’Ivoire: Should We Worry?
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 9(24), 12–23.
https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#the-long-runhistory-cumulative-co2 Nashwan, M. S., Ismail, T., & Ahmed, K. (2019).
Non-Stationary Analysis of Extreme Rainfall in Peninsular Malaysia.
Journal of Sustainability Science and Management, 14(3), 17–34.
Odhiambo, W., Nyangito, H. O., & Nzuma, J.
(2004).
Sources and Determinants of Agricultural Growth and Productivity in Kenya (No.
34; KIPPRA Discussion Paper).
Odior, E. S. (2014).
The Macroeconomic Policy Effect on Nigerian Agricultural Performance: One-Step Dynamic Forecasting Analysis.
International Journal of Economics and Finance, World Bank, 6(9), 190–198.
https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v6n9p190 Okun, A. M. (1962).
Potential GNP & Its Measurement and Significance.
American Statistical Association, Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section, 98 – 104.
Onakoya, A.
B., Aroyewun-khostly, B., & Johnson, B. S. (2018).
Value Added Agricultural Output and Macroeconomic Dynamics in the Nigerian Economy.
Journal of Humanities, 3(4), 79–91.
Rosenzweig, C., & Parry, M. L. (1994).
Potential Impact of Climate Change on World Food Supply.
Nature, 367, 133–138.
https://doi.org/10.1038/367133a0 Sinha, A., & Bhatt, M. .
(2017).
Environmental Kuznets Curve for CO2 and NOx Emissions: A Case Study of India.
European Journal of Sustainable Development, 6(1), 267–276.
https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2017.v6n1p267 Siwar, C., Alam, M., Murad, W., & Al-Amin, A. Q.
(2009).
A Review of the Linkages between Climate Change, Agricultural Sustainability and Poverty in Malaysia.
International Review of Business Research Papers (ISSN 1832-9543), 5(6), 309–321.
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/28vwc Talib, B.
A., & Darawi, Z.
(2002).
An Economic Analysis of The Malaysian Palm Oil Market.
Oil Palm Industry Economic Journal, 2(1), 19–27.
http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agrformet.2010.05.008 https://doi.org/10.1023/B:CLIM.0000037490.17099.97 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-012-9441-z https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#the-long-run-history-cumulative-co2 https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#the-long-run-history-cumulative-co2 https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v6n9p190 https://doi.org/10.1038/367133a0 https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2017.v6n1p267 https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/28vwc ISSN: 2407-814X (p); 2527-9238 (e) 141 Malaysia’s Agricultural Production Dropped ….. (Entezari, Seng, and Ali) Tang, K. H. D. (2019).
Climate Change in Malaysia: Trends, Contributors, Impacts, Mitigation and Adaptations.
Science of The Total Environment, 650, 1858–1871.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.09.316 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2019).
Climate Change Knowledge Portal [Data file].
Retrieved from https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/download-data Udah, S. C., & Nwachukwu, I. N. (2015).
Determinants of Agricultural GDP Growth in Nigerian.
International Journal of Agricultural Research and Review, 3(3), 184–190.
Vaghefi, N., Shamsudin, M. N., Makmom, A., & Bagheri, M. (2011).
The Economic Impacts of Climate Change on the Rice Production in Malaysia.
International Journal of Agricultural Research, 6(1), 67–74.
https://doi.org/10.3923/ijar.2011.67.74 World Bank Group.
2019.
Agricultural Transformation and Inclusive Growth : The Malaysian Experience.
The Malaysia Development Experience Series;.
World Bank, Washington, DC.
© World Bank.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32642 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.” http://issn.pdii.lipi.go.id/issn.cgi?daftar&1420518152&1&& https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.09.316 https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/download-data https://doi.org/10.3923/ijar.2011.67.74
https://doi.org/10.52131/jcsit.2021.0201.0006 1 iRASD Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology Volume 2, Number 1, 2021, Pages 01 12 Journal Homepage: https://journals.internationalrasd.org/index.php/jcsit Climate Change Forecasting Using Machine Learning SARIMA Model Shanza Zia1 1 MS Scholar, Department of Computer Science, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, Pakistan.
Email: shanzazia45@gmail.com ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Article History: Received: August 14, 2021 Revised: October 25, 2021 Accepted: December 29, 2021 Available Online: December 31, 2021 Every country's population will have to deal with the effects of climate change.
The meteorological department needs to implement effective forecasting methods to deal with climate changes.
Accurate temperature forecasts help in protecting people and property is an essential aspect of government, business, and the general public planning.
Early predictions help farmers and industrialists to make approaches and store crops more effectively.
When the climate continuously changes, it is not easy to make accurate predictions for the meteorological department and government authorities.
Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms have stimulated improvements in various fields.
Machine learning (ML) may find teleconnections where complicated feedbacks make it challenging to determine how proposed work from a straightforward analysis and observations.
Our proposed research uses the machine learning algorithm, SARIMA Model, to comprehend and utilize existing datasets and simulations.
Keywords: Climate Change Forecasting Machine learning SARIMA Model Artificial Intelligence Time series © 2021 The Authors, Published by iRASD.
This is an Open Access article under the Creative Common Attribution Non-Commercial 4.0 Corresponding Author's Email: shanzazia45@gmail.com 1.
Introduction Climate change is one of the most severe challenges to modern society.
It can have an impact on the economy, community, or environment.
Due to the region's dry climate, poor educational level, and individual economic restraints, the sandy portion of the area is hostile to flourish.
Irrigation and residential water shortages are two of the biggest issues, and there's also a significant risk of desertification (Fang & Lahdelma, 2016).
There is a need to find a technical solution to these issues if need them to deteriorate.
As the climate changes, discuss how AI is affecting environmental protection.
The article continues: AI can help us better understand how climate change affects biological systems in the following section.
To better understand how climate change affects biological systems, examine AI's involvement in data collection and classification, decision-making, and enforcement of management policies (Luo, Zhou, & Wei, 2013).
Environmental governance is a common thread that connects all of these issues.
Among the problems raised in this research work is how AI technologies can be utilized ethically and alter control associations, as demonstrated in Figure 1.2 SARIMA Model for forecast climate change.
On the other side, new technology can improve the quality of people's lives.
The artificial intelligence algorithms prominence in recent years, allowing us greater control over the world around us, as shown in Figure 1 Modulating influences for climate change.
Machine learning approaches ' primary uses are predicted and control climate change and environmental processes (Mao, Zhang, Yan, Cheng, & health, 2018).
These sensors are impeccable because of their ability to collect data on climate change's ecological effects.
https://journals.internationalrasd.org/index.php/jcsit iRASD Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology 2(1), 2021 2 Figure 1: Modulating Influences for Climate Change A lot has changed in the last few decades, however.
There are no longer any forests, and animals and plants struggle to survive due to water.
Not only that but also, the quality of water supplies and notable groundwater declined during the previous 30 years (Riley, Ben-Nun, Turtle, Bacon, & Riley, 2020).
These consequences are irreversible and can't be reversed for the most part.
The loss of soil, the inability to replace water, and the destruction of trees are examples, as displayed in Table 1.
Table 1 Surface Coverage Attributes Values (adapted oke, 2006) Surface coverage Attributes Albedo (reflection) Soil Dark & Wet Light & Dry 0.05 0.40 Sand Long 0.15 – 0.48 Agriculture Long 0.16 Grass Short 0.26 Clouds Deciduous Coniferous 0.15 – 0.25 0.03 – 0.10 Snow Old Fresh 0.40 0.95 Water Small Zenith Angle (<45°) Large Zenith Angle (>45°) 0.10 – 0.15 0.25 – 0.13 In general, desertification harms a region's capacity to produce food.
It's been a considerable shift in the last couple of decades.
There are no longer any forests, and animals and plants struggle to survive due to water (Rusyana & Flancia, 2016).
Over the past three decades, the quality of water resources, particularly groundwater, has deteriorated significantly.
Irreversible and unchangeable: It is impossible to recover water resources and forest areas that have been lost due to soil degradation.
Technology can assist farmers in coping with the impact of a changing climate by providing real-time data on where and how sand moves across specific regions.
Some of the subjects covered in this course include environmental education, water conservation, and the responsibilities of provincial governments to stop deforestation (Etuk & Modeling, 2013).
Shanza Zia 3 Figure 2: SARIMA Model for Forecast Climate Change 2.
Objective and Motivation Integrated urban planning approaches and consideration of climate factors are required for early prediction.
Consider how the climate will change and how you can adapt to it.
An all-encompassing AI-based approach to looking at and planning for changes is what this initiative is aiming to achieve (Dikshit, Pradhan, & Alamri, 2020; Mombeni, Rezaei, Nadarajah, Emami, & Assessment, 2013).
Our city's climate is continuously changing, and artificial intelligence helps us keep track of these variations.
There will be models for the extension that can work, scale, and grow.
In light of these new findings, it is also feasible to better understand how intertwined planning methodologies and environmental concerns are.
The results can also be helpful.
It's crucial to pay attention to the following characteristics (thermal and dynamic).
A database including information on topography, land use, and climate is needed to help in analyzing climate factors • Ability to store heat in the form of mass • The sun's rays travel around the world.
• Various ways in which air can flow • Nighttime cold air generation and movement • Discuss the current climate change tendencies (temperature, precipitation, and number of summer days) 3.
Related Work Rolnick et al.
(2022) demonstrated in their research that Machine learning is exploited to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help people cope with a rapidly changing climate.
Essential to explore to investigate are exploration queries and commercial prospects.
Machine learning will contribute to combating climate change around the globe.
Cifuentes, Marulanda, Bello, and Reneses (2020) presented that change has influenced the planet and its inhabitants over the last decade.
Predicted changes in air temperature have played a significant role in climate change research.
Agriculture, ecology, the environment, and industry are examples of this.
According to this survey, an accurate temperature prediction can be made using Machine Learning techniques.
Features included iRASD Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology 2(1), 2021 4 the previous temperature and humidity levels and other weather data such as solar radiation and wind speed.
The review indicated that for one step forward at a regional scale for one measure, Deep Learning techniques made more minor mistakes (Mean Square Error = 0.0017 °K) than typical Artificial Neural Networks architectures.
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are the most often used worldwide because are accurate and straightforward.
Veenadhari, Misra, and Singh (2014) suggested that crops in India have been adversely affected by climate change over the past two decades regarding performance.
Businesses in the same field can use these forecasts to organize their supply chains better.
Crop yields have been predicted and modeled in various methods, but none takes the weather into account and is primarily dependent on conjecture.
Software dubbed "Crop Advisor" has been developed in this study to assist farmers in determining how climate influences crop production.
Farmers in Madhya Pradesh use an algorithm known as C4.5 to determine which climatic element has the most significant impact on agricultural yields across the state.
Temperature such as tree rings can construct time series profiles to illuminate chronological climates by (Abbot & Marohasy, 2017).
An artificial neural network (ANN) trained using the sine waves from the six datasets subjected to signal analysis.
There is a good match in temperature profiles between the late Holocene times and 1830 CE by altering the original shapes' amplitude, frequency, and phase of sine waves.
After that, the ANN models were used to forecast temperature changes over the twentieth century.
In six distinct locations, the ANN predictions differed by an average of 0.2 degrees Celsius from the actual temperatures.
There was an Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) of around 0.06°C as a result of this.
To put it another way, this is a lot less than the IPCC's general circulation models suggest (Hong et al., 2020).
Anaraki, Farzin, Mousavi, and Karami (2021) illustrated that the MARS model tree outperformed the M5 model tree in the tests.
ANN and LSSVM WOA are other machine learning techniques in downscaling.
In Discharge Simulations, the LSSVM WOA WT method outperforms the LSSVM WOA WT algorithm (NSE = 0.911).
Observing all of the scenarios except CanESM2 RCP2.6, the 200-year release is expected to decrease shortly.
In the short and long run, it's evident that hydrological models are a significant source of uncertainty when looking at ANOVA analysis of uncertainty.
Ardabili, Mosavi, Dehghani, and Várkonyi-Kóczy (2019) analyze and anticipate hydrological processes, climate change, and Earth's systems more accurately.
Several strategies improve accuracy, resilience, efficiency, computing cost, and overall model performance.
It also discusses the present state of affairs and possible future developments.
The research into deep understanding is still ongoing, according to the article.
On the other hand, these methods are already for machine learning.
Ensemble and hybrid strategies are to generate newer, more effective ways.
Constructions interpretation for over half of total energy use and a third of global greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries like the United States.
Several factors contribute to the amount of energy a structure consumes, including physically constructed and used.
In addition to physics-based building energy modeling, machine learning techniques can produce faster and more accurate estimations based on the number of previously used energy buildings.
City and community managers can predict how facilities utilize energy to enhance their future energy needs plans.
Fathi, Srinivasan, Fenner, Fathi, and Reviews (2020) demonstrated that Machine learning and future weather scenarios don't examine how much space there is for various urban buildings to climate change.
There is no single method for comparing items worldwide to get the most accurate machine learning-based forecast.
The peculiarities of predicting difficulties have a significant impact on accuracy levels.
The purpose of this study is to highlight how the use of machine learning in urban building energy performance forecasts has evolved over the course of three years.
However, artificial intelligence models can be used to address this issue.
Physical factors can arise as features in these models to predict and evaluate irrigation water quality indexes in aquifer systems; data included Adaptive Boosting, Random Forest, Artificial Neural Network, and Support Vector Regression (SVR) models.
Results reveal that Adaboost and RF models outperform SVR and ANN when predicting the future.
Although these studies claim that ANN and SVR models are Shanza Zia 5 more tolerant of input factors than Adaboost or RF, these models are more sensitive to input variables than the other models (Yuan, San, & Leong, 2020).
The models developed around the world are excellent in predicting irrigation water quality.
Farmers and other stakeholders could benefit from this information.
Using biological data as input variables, the approaches in this study effectively predicted groundwater quality at low costs and in real-time.
Damage to agricultural and water resources can result from droughts, costing much money.
An essential component of drought management is to develop techniques that can predict lack events, which might implement mitigating measures.
Climate change appears to be the primary cause of droughts around the world.
The Australian state of New South Wales (NSW) has experienced numerous shortages in recent years.
A Climate Research Unit (CRU) dataset was employed at various periods (one, three, six, and 12 months) to calculate the drought index by (El Bilali, Taleb, & Brouziyne, 2021).
Eight factors were climatic drivers and sea surface temperature indicators, while the other three were various meteorological variables used to estimate when the lack index would be at its top.
Predictions were made using an artificial neural network (ANN) and support vector regression (SVR) (SVR) by (Dikshit et al., 2020).
Model performance was evaluated using the coefficient of determination (COD), root means square error (RMSE), and represent absolute error (MAE).
After training from 1901 to 2010, the model went through its paces for nine years of testing.
(MAE).
The results show that the ANN technique outperformed the SVR method to predict long-term drought patterns.
In terms of R2 values, the ANN approach had the highest at 0.86, while the SVR method had a value of 0.75.
Sea surface temperatures and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) do not significantly impact the temporal dry period.
As a preliminary phase, this study looks at how droughts in the New South Wales region are affected by climatological variables and patterns.
Rasel, Sultana, and Meesad (2017) proposed in their research that when the weather and climate continuously change, it's difficult to make accurate forecasts for the coming days' weather and climate.
Humidity, wind speed, sea level, and air density are just a few of the many variables that play a role in climate change.
The Bangladesh Meteorological Department provided a six-year rainfall and temperature data archive for the Chittagong metropolitan region to conduct the tests (BMD).
There are several businesses where a sound forecasting system may be quite beneficial.
Industries, agriculture, tourism, transportation, and construction are all included in this list.
Support Vector Regression (SVR) and Artificial Neural Networks can produce more accurate weather predictions (Shen, Valagolam, & McCalla, 2020; Yildiz, Bilbao, Sproul, & Reviews, 2017).
According to this research, the SVR is better at predicting rain than the ANN, and the ANN is better than the SVR (Derbentsev, Datsenko, Stepanenko, & Bezkorovainyi, 2019).
4.
Information About Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Climate Change Adaptation Techniques There has been an evolution in the understanding of climate change over time.
Policymakers have access to an overabundance of data on climate change.
Climate change necessitated an increase in the availability and standardization of local weather data worldwide and the standardization of historical data used to make sense of global climate.
Compiling data across time and space and between physical systems and various data formats can be done using computer models.
That can also be simulated and utilized to predict the future climate (Rizwan, Raj, & Vasudev, 2017).
Recent developments in computing are transforming climate science, and policymakers reviewed what to do about it (Duerr et al., 2018; Rizwan et al., 2017).
To commence, more data and greater processing power are now available for analysis.
Several novel machine learning (AI) approaches have been implemented in the current years.
There have been new understandings into the intricate interconnections of the climate change prediction system, resulting in more realistic climate models.
Extreme weather forecasts have acquired better as a result.
5.
Material and Methods iRASD Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology 2(1), 2021 6 5.1.
Data Collection The quality of the magnitude of the climate change dataset could have influenced the data acquired in each occurrence.
The National Center for Hydro-Meteorological Forecasting (NCHMF), a government institution, meteorological departments, and climate websites dataset utilized.
Prevent variances by climate change, regions in every administrative area considered for presence.
5.2.
SARIMA Model (p, d, q) (P, D, Q, S) SARIMA stands for Seasonal Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average.
Figure 3 Proposed approach for climate change using Machine Learning represents the methodology for the anticipated method.
Figure 3: Proposed approaches for climate change using Machine Learning 5.3.
Non-seasonal ARIMA Split the Arima term into three terms, AR, I, MA: AR (p) stands for the autoregressive model; the p parameter is an integer that confirms how many lagged series is to be used to forecast periods, for example, The average temperature of yesterday correlates with today's temperature, so use AR(1) parameter to predict future temperatures.
The formula for the AR (p) model is: y^t=μ+θ1Yt−1+...+θp Yt−py^t = μ+θ1Yt−1+...+θpYt−p Where μμ is the constant term, the p is the periods to be used in the regression, and θ is the parameter fitted to the data.
I (d) the differencing part and the d parameter show how many differencing orders will be used.
It tries to make the series stationary, for example: If d = 1: yt=Yt−Yt−1yt= Yt− Yt – 1 where type is the differenced series, and Yt−periodic−period is the original series If d = 2: yt = (Yt−Yt−1)−(Yt−1−Yt−2)= Yt−2Yt−1+Yt−2yt = (Yt−Yt−1) − (Yt−1−Yt−2) = Yt – 2 Yt−1+Yt−2 Note that the second difference is a change-in-change, which measures the local "acceleration" rather than the trend.
MA (q) stands for moving average model, the q is the number of lagged forecast errors terms in the prediction equation, example: It's strange, but this MA term takes a percentage of the errors between the predicted value against the real.
It assumes that the past mistakes will be similar in future events.
The formula for the MA (p) model is: y^t= μ−Θ1et−1+ ...+Θqet−qy^t =μ−Θ1et−1+...+Θqet−q Where μμ is the constant term, q is the period to be used on the ee term, and ΘΘ is the parameter fitted to the errors 𝐸𝑇 = 𝑌𝑡 − 1 − 𝑦^𝑡 − 1𝑒 𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 1 − 𝑦^𝑡 − 1 1 5.3.
Seasonal ARIMA The p, d, q parameters differ from the non-seasonal parameters.
SAR (P) is the seasonal autoregression of the series.
The formula for the SAR(P) model Shanza Zia 7 is y^t=μ+θ1Yt−sy^t= μ+θ1 Yt – s Where P is the number of autoregression terms to added, usually, no more than one term, s is how many periods ago to be used as the base, and θθ is the parameter fitted to the data.
Usually, when the subject is weather forecasting, 12 months ago, have some information to contribute to the current period.
Setting P=1 (i.e., SAR (1)) adds a multiple of Yt−sYt−s to the forecast for yet Figure 4 represents Temperature Variation in Rio de Janeiro I(D) the seasonal difference MUST be used when you have a solid and stable pattern.
If d = 0 and D = 1: yt=Yt−Yt−syt=Yt−Yt−s, ytyt is the differenced series, and Yt−Yt−s is the original seasonal interval.
If d =1 and D = 1: yt=(Yt−Yt−1)−(Yt−s−Yt−s−1)= Yt−Yt−1− Yt− s+ Yt –s − 1yt =(Yt−Yt−1)−(Yt−s−Yt−s−1 ) = Yt−Yt−1−Yt−s+Yt−s−1 Figure 4: Temperature Variation in Rio de Janeiro The highest temperatures occur in November and February, while the lowest temperatures occur from July through September.
Averaging the monthly levels of each of these lines, create a single line Figure 5 represents Monthly Variation in Rio de Janeiro Figure 5: Monthly Variation in Rio de Janeiro Here are some stats from this series to see a pattern over the years.
The average temperature rose by 4.25 percent for more than a century, rising from 23.5 to 24.5 degrees Fahrenheit.
First, divide the data into training, validation, and test sets to see how it all works together.
Step ahead Figure 6 displayed Yearly Variation in Rio de Janeiro: a confirmation forward for 48 months, then extrapolate the future for another year to compare to the test set.
iRASD Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology 2(1), 2021 8 Figure 6: Yearly Variation in Rio de Janeiro The baseline's RMSE temperature is 1.3282 Celsius.
An upward trend is displayed in the data, and seasonality appears, with higher temperatures at the commencement and end of each season and lower ones in the middle.
To create a time series forecast (constant mean, variance, and autocorrelation).
The occupied function can determine if the series is static.
It is safe to build your model if the series has less than 5% P-Value.
While there are many ways to manipulate the data, there are many more if the string isn't static.
This graph shows that the entire series Autocorrelation function (ACF) charts the evolution of a set of data across time.
There's a graph here showing how recently this temperature was this high.
Figure 7 demonstrates Autocorrelation, Partial Correlation, and Distributed chart.
The partial autocorrelation function, or PACF, is used to describe this.
Without accounting for the impact of prior lags, it displays the correlation between the current temperature and the covered type.
For example, in the case of temperature, it only indicates the impact of lag three without considering the effect of intervals 1 and 2.
Figure 7: Autocorrelation, Partial Correlation, and Distributed chart Shanza Zia 9 Expect a lower error level in our simulation than this one.
Next month will use the previous month's forecast as a starting point.
A negative autocorrelation begins at lag six and occurs once every 12 months.
Different seasons have a role to play in this phenomenon.
There is a negative autocorrelation if it is winter now and milder in six months.
Figure 8 demonstrates Autocorrelation, Partial Correlation, and Distributed chart.
Two temperatures usually change in different directions.
As a result, a solid positive autocorrelation is evident, starting at lag 12 and continuing for a further 12 lags.
Late intervals exhibit a negative PACF.
Initially, the PACF shows a positive jump and then declines to a negative PACF.
The ACF and PACF charts are identical in this situation.
An AR (1) model and a first seasonal difference can be contingent on this (YtYt12).
SAR (P) or SMA (Q) parameters may be required; therefore, plot the static function again with the first seasonal difference to confirm.
Figure 8: Autocorrelation, Partial Correlation and Distributed chart climate change These are AR (3) models, defined as having three parameters.
The figures above show that the first ACF lags are gradually decreasing.
The PACF falls below the confidence interval after the third interval.
Figure 9 shows the Current, predicted, and error values.
The ACF and PACF both showed significant declines by the 12th interval.
Put another way, this is a SAR (1) with a first difference because the SMA signature includes a parameter of 1 interval.
Orders 3 and 0 in the model; orders 0 and 1 because the series has a clear uptrend, and orders 1 and 2 because the series has a clear downtrend.
First, create a function that uses one-step forecasts from the entire validation set to determine how far off it is.
Figure 9: Current predicted and error values iRASD Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology 2(1), 2021 10 The residuals will be easier to see with the help of a function.
The graphs below show historical data as well as projections for the future.
An example of a scatter plot presents the difference between expected and actual values.
An autocorrelation plot of the residuals can be used to determine whether or not there is still some association.
This page has graphs at the top that the forecasts match the present values pretty well.
The Error vs.
Predicted values has a line in them.
The mistakes increase from -1.5 to +1.5 as the temperature rises, as represented in Figure 5.8 current values compared to the Extrapolated ones.
However, an autocorrelation plot indicates a positive spike just above lag 2 in the confidence interval across some outliers exhibited in the QQ Plot.
The field doesn't need any more tweaks, in my opinion.
To assess how accurate the test set's prediction it's time to look back at 12 months.
Figure 10: Current values compared to the Extrapolated ones The SARIMA parameters appear to be well-fitted from this result.
These are the predicted values, and the seasonal pattern matches the actual values and the SARIMA parameters.
With the test set (baseline vs. extrapolation) in place, RMSE measures the model's standard deviation when it emanates to testing.
6.
Conclusion and Discussion Real-world climate and weather changes are difficult to anticipate.
As a result, climate and weather predictions are based on factors unique to each location and time, making it difficult to predict the future.
According to this study, climate change and excessive sand migration harm some places and provinces around the globe.
The study's main objective was to provide relevant data to the government and the general public about the current level of climate change.
Design, applicability, efficiency, and economy are all terms.
There are three pieces to the system: a web application that lets you control it, sensors that collect data from each node, and linear regression in ML that lets you look at the data.
Initially, a mechanical construction was used to obtain sensor data from a sensor node.
A straightforward machine learning technique was proposed for the analysis to determine early prediction before climate changes.
Multiple linear regressions and the SARIMA Model are used to examine various factors to improve and develop the system.
Efficient governments and farmers can both benefit from the research's outcomes.
Proper estimates of climate changes save costs and increase output in agriculture in the future.
These digital technology applications can predict how the climate will change.
The project's success in the pilot stage allows more people to take advantage of its benefits.
Using SARIMA Model and ML technology, this study could monitor and predict weather conditions.
Reviewing current conditions and forecasting future climate change were two aspects of research.
Extreme weather and climate change are linked using the scientific method.
This paper presents artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) to improve crop yields, human well-being, and economics.
In addition to helping the government, this research could also benefit the public by giving them the right idea about their investment costs.
Problems are overcome through collaborative efforts between the government and the general public.
Shanza Zia 11 References Abbot, J., & Marohasy, J. J. G. (2017).
The application of machine learning for evaluating anthropogenic versus natural climate change.
14, 36-46. doi:10.1016/j.grj.2017.08.001 Anaraki, M. V., Farzin, S., Mousavi, S.-F., & Karami, H. J. W. R. M. (2021).
Uncertainty analysis of climate change impacts on flood frequency by using hybrid machine learning methods.
35(1), 199-223. doi:10.1007/s12040-014-0497-x Ardabili, S., Mosavi, A., Dehghani, M., & Várkonyi-Kóczy, A. R. (2019).
Deep learning and machine learning in hydrological processes climate change and earth systems a systematic review.
Paper presented at the International conference on global research and education.
Cifuentes, J., Marulanda, G., Bello, A., & Reneses, J. J. E. (2020).
Air temperature forecasting using machine learning techniques: a review.
13(16), 4215. doi:10.3390/en13164215 Derbentsev, V., Datsenko, N., Stepanenko, O., & Bezkorovainyi, V. (2019).
Forecasting cryptocurrency prices time series using machine learning approach.
Paper presented at the SHS Web of Conferences.
Dikshit, A., Pradhan, B., & Alamri, A. M. J.
A.
(2020).
Temporal hydrological drought index forecasting for New South Wales, Australia using machine learning approaches.
11(6), 585. doi:10.3390/atmos11060585 Duerr, I., Merrill, H. R., Wang, C., Bai, R., Boyer, M., Dukes, M. D., .
.
.
Software.
(2018).
Forecasting urban household water demand with statistical and machine learning methods using large space-time data: A Comparative study.
102, 29-38. doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2018.01.002 El Bilali, A., Taleb, A., & Brouziyne, Y. J.
A. W. M. (2021).
Groundwater quality forecasting using machine learning algorithms for irrigation purposes.
245, 106625. doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2020.106625 Etuk, E. H. J. M. T., & Modeling.
(2013).
The fitting of a SARIMA model to monthly Naira-Euro Exchange Rates.
3(1), 17-26.
Fang, T., & Lahdelma, R. J.
A. e. (2016).
Evaluation of a multiple linear regression model and SARIMA model in forecasting heat demand for district heating system.
179, 544-552. doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.06.133 Fathi, S., Srinivasan, R., Fenner, A., Fathi, S. J. R., & Reviews, S. E. (2020).
Machine learning applications in urban building energy performance forecasting: A systematic review.
133, 110287. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2020.110287 Hong, J., Lee, S., Bae, J. H., Lee, J., Park, W. J., Lee, D., .
.
.
Lim, K. J. J. W. (2020).
Development and evaluation of the combined machine learning models for the prediction of dam inflow.
12(10), 2927. doi:10.3390/w12102927 Luo, C. S., Zhou, L. Y., & Wei, Q. F. (2013).
Application of SARIMA model in cucumber price forecast.
Paper presented at the Applied Mechanics and Materials.
Mao, Q., Zhang, K., Yan, W., Cheng, C. J. J. o. i., & health, p. (2018).
Forecasting the incidence of tuberculosis in China using the seasonal auto-regressive integrated moving average (SARIMA) model.
11(5), 707-712. doi:10.1016/j.jiph.2018.04.009 Mombeni, H. A., Rezaei, S., Nadarajah, S., Emami, M. J. E. M., & Assessment.
(2013).
Estimation of water demand in Iran based on SARIMA models.
18(5), 559-565. doi:10.1007/s10666-013-9364-4 Rasel, R. I., Sultana, N., & Meesad, P. (2017).
An application of data mining and machine learning for weather forecasting.
Paper presented at the International conference on computing and information technology.
Riley, P., Ben-Nun, M., Turtle, J., Bacon, D., & Riley, S. J. m. (2020).
Sarima forecasts of dengue incidence in brazil, mexico, singapore, sri lanka, and thailand: Model performance and the significance of reporting delays.
doi:10.1101/2020.06.26.20141093 Rizwan, M., Raj, R. J. R., & Vasudev, M. (2017).
A novel approach for time series data forecasting based on ARIMA model for marine fishes.
Paper presented at the 2017 International Conference on Algorithms, Methodology, Models and Applications in Emerging Technologies (ICAMMAET).
Rolnick, D., Donti, P. L., Kaack, L. H., Kochanski, K., Lacoste, A., Sankaran, K., .
.
.
Waldman-Brown, A. J.
A. C. S. (2022).
Tackling climate change with machine learning.
55(2), 1-96.
Rusyana, A., & Flancia, M. (2016).
SARIMA model for forecasting foreign tourists at the Kualanamu International Airport.
Paper presented at the 2016 12th International Conference on Mathematics, Statistics, and Their Applications (ICMSA).
iRASD Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology 2(1), 2021 12 Shen, J., Valagolam, D., & McCalla, S. J. P. (2020).
Prophet forecasting model: a machine learning approach to predict the concentration of air pollutants (PM2.
5, PM10, O3, NO2, SO2, CO) in Seoul, South Korea.
8, e9961.
doi:10.7717/peerj.9961 Veenadhari, S., Misra, B., & Singh, C. (2014).
Machine learning approach for forecasting crop yield based on climatic parameters.
Paper presented at the 2014 International Conference on Computer Communication and Informatics.
Yildiz, B., Bilbao, J. I., Sproul, A.
B. J. R., & Reviews, S. E. (2017).
A review and analysis of regression and machine learning models on commercial building electricity load forecasting.
73, 1104-1122. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2017.02.023 Yuan, C. Z., San, W. W., & Leong, T. W. (2020).
Determining Optimal Lag Time Selection Function with Novel Machine Learning Strategies for Better Agricultural Commodity Prices Forecasting in Malaysia.
Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2020 2nd International Conference on Information Technology and Computer Communications.
THE CHALLENGES OF TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION IN MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED CATASTROPHES IN NIGERIA Titus A. Umoru Kwara State University, Nigeria A.U.
Okeke Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Nigeria Abstract This article focuses on the challenges of technical and vocational education in mitigating climate change induced catastrophes in Nigeria.
The concepts of climate change and related areas were discussed in the paper including the causes and effects of climate, as well as, issues of prevention, preparation and adaptation processes.
The roles that technical and vocational education may play in preparing citizens to prevent, adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change are presented.
These include technical assistance; conducting research with a view to improve the quality of predictions of future changes to regional and environmental conditions; and changing the attitudes of citizens through education and public enlightenment to achieve a balance between ethics and the management of the environment.
In light of these issues, the authors view technical and vocational education as an effective and significant tool in ameliorating the effects of climate change.
It is recommended that technical and vocational education practitioners use their understanding of science and technology to deal with challenges posed by climate change in Nigeria.
2 The Challenges of Technical and Vocational Education in Mitigating Climate Change Induced Catastrophes in Nigeria ____________________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012) Introduction The threat posed by climate change is a global problem.
It is a topical issue, generating heated debate and concerns among governments, scientists, environmentalists, and advocates of a better society.
Indeed, the controversy trailing the debate all over the world is mind boggling and perplexing.
For instance, the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference on climate change was inconclusive due to disagreements on funding commitments by governments.
Whereas the developed countries are at least coming to an agreement on how to confront the challenges posed by climate change and how the effects can be mitigated, countries like Nigeria are having differing perspectives on what really constitute climate change and whether its threat is worth investigating.
Not long ago the issue of economic meltdown swept across the globe with some experts claiming that Nigeria was immune to the shock of such financial crises.
It is important to note that the complexity of this contemporary world is being shaped by the challenges of globalization and Nigeria can no longer afford to be complacent.
The United Nations, of which Nigeria is a member, with other international organizations as partners, are in the forefront to make the world a better place for habitation through several innovative and encompassing projects.
One such example is the Climate Change Knowledge Network (CCKN), a project that tracks the impact of economic change and climate on India’s agricultural sector.
This is pursued jointly by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO) and the Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI).
According to O’Brien and Leichenko (2000), the project is innovative because it uses the concept of “double exposure” which refers to the fact that climate change and globalization are occurring simultaneously, and that regions, sectors, ecosystems and social groups are often confronted by the impact of both processes.
However, in the context of related national issues, overcoming climate change and the adverse conditions that it may precipitate have the inclination to be fractured by many ills tormenting Nigeria today, such as poor planning and implementation, inadequate resource allocation, corruption, outdated curriculum, and poor governance practices.
Technical and vocational education is an inescapable component of the intellectual capital required for any meaningful effort aimed at tackling the climate change issue and its associated problems.
Technical and vocational education, if properly positioned, can provide tools which will support Nigeria in strengthening knowledge, skills, attitudes and the capacity for adaptation to a changing and vulnerable physical environment.
Nigeria is currently faced with increasingly chronic degradation of natural resources, greater prevalence and severity of natural and man-made disasters, such as desertification, oil spillage, flooding, internal social conflicts, and the potential displacement of persons.
In this context, this article focuses on the role of technical and vocational education in mitigating the effects of global warming, including conceptual issues, causes and effects of climate change, prevention and preparation, and adaptation to climate change.
Concept Clarification, Definitions, and Issues Global climate change is a term that refers to the exploration of both the question of whether the climate of the entire planet might be changing and why, and what the impact of those changes might have on investments in companies that may be affected by global changes in climate (Wikinvest, 2010).
“The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” (1997) 3 Titus A. Umoru and A.U.
Okeke ______________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012) indicated that climate change is the change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.
Global environmental change encompasses many issues.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2000), climate change refers to a statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer).
Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forces, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or land use.
Sometime in the middle of the 20 th century the first increase in the earth’s temperature was observed.
Since then global warming has become a major worry for humanity.
Many scientists are predicting that global warming could result in powerful storms, crop failures, rising sea levels, and volcanic eruptions in the foreseeable future.
These apocalyptic predictions are becoming common knowledge.
As a result of the impact of climate change on nations and communities, vulnerability, adaptation and prevention issues are germane to this study.
Similarly, IPCC (2001, p.2) defines vulnerability as “the extent to which climate change may damage or harm a system’s sensitivity, but also on its ability to adapt to new climate conditions.” Furthermore, in the IPCC (2000) report, vulnerability was defined as: The extent to which a natural or a social system is susceptible to sustaining damage from climate change, and is a function of the magnitude of climate change, the sensitivity of the system to changes in climate and the ability to adapt the system to changes in climate.
Hence, a highly vulnerable system is one that is highly sensitive to modest changes in climate and one for which the ability to adapt is severely constrained (p. 3).
Adaptations to climate is the process through which people reduce the adverse effects of climate on their health and well being, and take advantage of the opportunities that their climatic environment provides (Smith, Burton, Klein, & Wandel, 2000).
Furthermore, they explained that adaptation to climate change includes all adjustments in behavior or economic structures that reduce the vulnerability of society to changes in the climate system.
The climate zones can be separated into four, to include: dry lands and desertification, rainforest, highlands, and the flood plains.
It is estimated that half the earth’s surface of about 6.45 billion hectares is composed of dry lands.
The dry lands are comprised of arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas which are very prone to desertification.
Climate factors such as rain, temperature, wind, and evaporation cause aridity of the soil, while soil degradation is human induced.
Good examples of human induced soil degradation are tree felling, pollution, and overgrazing which cause desertification.
On the other end of the continuum, the tropical rainforest is usually hot and humid.
This area witnesses 10-11 months of rain yearly, falling mostly in the afternoons.
The rainforest is very important because it is a major source of the earth’s oxygen through the abundant and diverse plants it supports.
Another benefit of these plants is their use as drugs to fight disease and illness.
The highland climate zones according to Wikinvest (2010) are mountainous areas.
Their altitude help is a determinant to their climate and weather.
Generally, the average temperature of each month is about 5-6 o C for each 1000 meters of elevation above sea-level.
Days are generally warm due to solar irradiation and during nights temperatures drop to very low levels.
Plants and trees are small and are adapted to withstand sub-zero conditions.
Finally, the fourth climate zone 4 The Challenges of Technical and Vocational Education in Mitigating Climate Change Induced Catastrophes in Nigeria ____________________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012) is the flood plains.
These are areas of land over which a river or sea water flows or is stored in times of flood.
As a result of heavy and consistent rain the land is unable to absorb it and flooding occurs which may cause rivers to overflow their banks.
This happens with rivers across Nigeria.
The concept “Technical and Vocational Education” according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2001) is a comprehensive term referring to those aspects of the educational process involving, in addition to general education, the study of technologies and related sciences, and the acquisition of practical skills, attitudes, understanding and knowledge relating to occupations in various sectors of economic and social life.
According to UNESCO’s document, “Revised Recommendation concerning Technical and Vocational Education,” Technical and Vocational Education is further understood to be: a.
An integral part of general education; b.
A means of preparing for occupational fields and for effective participation in the world of work; c. An aspect of lifelong learning and a preparation for a responsive citizenship; d. An instrument for promoting environmentally sound sustainable development; e. A method of facilitating poverty alleviation (p. 1-2).
Causes and Effects of Climate Change According to Wikinvest (2010), since the industrial revolution, average global temperature has risen by one degree Fahrenheit.
Accordingly, the causes of climate change are the increased intensity of solar energy or the cyclicality of earth’s temperatures, volcanism, oceanic circulation cycles, biosphere impact, ultraviolet radiation variability, reflectivity, rotational variation, solar systemic change, galaxy position variability, and human influence.
The impact of change in the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as a result of burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil, gas and other green house emissions are the reasons that the globe is steadily warming even if it is seemingly slow.
There are a number of other human induced climate changes that can be categorized under the following headings of pollution, desertification flood.
The consequential effects of this continued accelerated climate change as predicted by scientists are listed below:  Melting polar ice caps will cause rising sea levels and coastal flooding, melting glaciers and warmer temperatures in mountain regions will lead to decreased snow melts, intensifying water scarcity.
 The influx of cold water from the poles will interact with warming ocean water to cause oceanic temperature fluctuations across the globe, possibly causing global ecological damage as sensitive keystone organisms (plankton, for example) die in their new environments, leading to organism that are higher in the food chain (tuna, for example) increasing in scarcity.
 Warmer air and water would cause more powerful hurricanes as it allows more water to evaporate and creates faster winds, making hurricane season more dangerous.
 Rapidly changing ocean salinity from polar fresh water could interact with the temperature fluctuations in the ocean to disrupt or even shift the Gulf Stream, an underwater current that is responsible for modern climate conditions.
5 Titus A. Umoru and A.U.
Okeke ______________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012) The Nigerian economy is vulnerable to damages caused by these upheavals.
The negative impact of global change particularly in the insurance industry could be monumental.
Insurance companies stand to lose in the case of damages caused by powerful natural disasters by bearing the brunt of the cost of reconstruction.
Agricultural companies and those reliant on agriculture would be affected by reduction in food production and rise in production costs.
Increasing water scarcity occasioned by severe weather changes, i.e., melting glaciers and declining winter precipitation, could impact negatively on the industries that use water as inputs.
Such companies that must contend with the rising cost of water include steel, paper, iron, petroleum, textile and chemical companies.
Also contemplated is the vulnerability of the population to a potential scarcity of potable water.
The clamor to turn away from energy that releases greenhouse gases will mean less use of coal powered production and gas powered vehicles.
Thus, demands will decrease and prices of oil and coal will fall thereby lowering the income of Nigeria that is dependent on oil exports.
Technical and Vocational Education Objectives and the Climate Change Challenge The intellectual framework of this section is built on revealing the objectives of technical and vocational education and creating a prism from which to view those objectives that could impact the challenges of climate change in Nigeria.
In November 2001, UNESCO adopted a recommendation concerning technical and vocational education.
The document directed member states, including Nigeria, to take whatever legislative or other steps necessary to give effect to the principles set forth in their recommendation.
These ambitious goals set by UNESCO and the international community, together with regulatory bodies and academic institutions, were aimed at ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programs.
The various technical and vocational education curricula of tertiary institutions in Nigeria approximate that of UNESCO’s principles and are updated frequently.
The objectives of technical and vocational education were clearly conceived by the planners and stated very expressly to show the direction of change envisioned for all countries of the world.
The document specifies in concrete terms how to create open and flexible educational structures to cater for upward mobility in learning and work.
It also abolishes barriers between levels and areas of education, education and the world of work, and between school and society.
In particular, Section 5 (b) (UNESCO, 2001, p. 2) is noteworthy.
It envisages the objectives to, “lead to an understanding of the scientific and technological aspects of contemporary civilization in such a way that people comprehend their environment and are capable of acting upon it while taking a critical view of the social, political and environmental implications of scientific and technological change.” The implication therefore is that technical and vocational education through these objectives is given the necessary empowerment and mandate to provide quality technical and vocational education and training to effectively help students and workers develop their knowledge in science and technology across occupational areas including those that address climate change related challenges.
The rest of this article is dedicated to exposing the various climate change issues that technical and vocational education may impact.
Those issues are as follows:  Prevention, preparation and adaptation;  Supporting governments, schools and communities;  Technical assistance; 6 The Challenges of Technical and Vocational Education in Mitigating Climate Change Induced Catastrophes in Nigeria ____________________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012)  Research programs;  Changing attitudes and ethics;  Vulnerable populations in Nigeria.
Prevention, Preparation, and Adaptation Though scientists agree that some of the effects of climate change can no longer be stopped, they believe that the process may be harnessed or slowed by stopping global warming.
The way towards this goal is to halt the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
According to Meludu (2010) the most industrialized African countries, such as South Africa, generate 8.44 metric tons of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide per person, and the least developed countries, such as Mali, generate less than a tenth of a metric ton of greenhouse gas carbon dioxide per person.
There is no doubt that technical and vocational education is an integral part of science and also a partner in the global education for all initiatives.
Technical and vocational education is therefore, a tool that can be used in partnership with other agencies to prevent climate change where possible or prepare citizens to adapt to climate change.
The professionals in technical and vocational education are directly involved through effective participation in environmental and climate change induced sectors as forestry, fishery, oil and gas, and mining.
Technical and vocational education can be employed to increase clean energy jobs and to provide professional services in the maintenance of machines, appliances, and vehicles so that reduction in greenhouse gas emissions are achieved.
Technical and vocational education practitioners could play a vital role in public education and citizen engagement to prepare it for climate changes, so that people may adapt to the changes that cannot be avoided.
Areas that need the services of technical and vocational education workers are education and information on good eating habit, i.e.
avoiding prepackaged foods, soft drinks, and fast foods.
Apart from dietary issues of high content of fat, sugar, and calories, resource materials and energy are depleted in producing the packaging for these foods.
Secondly, people could be advised to travel differently, i.e.
walking and riding bicycles to reduce the use of cars and buses that use gasoline.
Thirdly, practitioners could be involved in creating awareness for a “green” culture.
Supporting Governments, Schools, and Communities through an Inclusive Curriculum Technical and Vocational Education practitioners can play a major role in supporting governments, schools and communities through building capacity for the promotion of environmentally sustainable programs.
Such programs will increase public understanding of the interdependence between their environment, their community and country, and their lives.
A child-based, facility-based, and skills-based curriculum could be designed by technical and vocational education experts to empower students’ preparedness in natural disaster risk reduction techniques.
Other ways that technical and vocational education content may be integrated are:  Promotion of specific disciplines, for example, ensuring a skilled and educated workforce in taxonomy and systems, who can competently document the changes and patterns in biodiversity.
 Integrating timely communications, including awareness concerning projects and developments in every area of climate change.
7 Titus A. Umoru and A.U.
Okeke ______________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012)  Including environmental and climate change issues as prominent topics in school curriculums to benefit their communities.
 Establish interdisciplinary studies with technical and vocational education experts who can partner to benefit from methods, background, and overall experiences of professionals in their various fields of specialization.
 Advisory role, as a discipline technical and vocational education, has the capacity to make valuable impact as advisors to improve the services of government agencies like the Nigeria Environmental Standards Regulation and Enforcement Agency.
Technical Assistance Technical and vocational education professionals are well equipped to provide technical assistance to consumers, businesses, and home owners to enable them to make choices that will assist in reducing green house gas emissions.
Specific areas that need technical advice include, consumer purchasing decisions, transportation options, the of refrigerators and air conditioners with programmable thermostats and avoiding the purchase of second-hand refrigerators and air conditioners, the use of smart meters, the use of energy saving lighting options, and the use of solar energy options.
Research Programs The scientific community has embarked on multi-disciplinary projects in global change research.
According to McBean and McCarthy (2007), programs have emerged to answer questions of global significance aimed at reducing scientific uncertainties and improving the quality of predictions of future changes to global and regional environmental conditions, thereby ensuring better management of the earth’s ecological resources.
Technical and vocational education professionals can be partners in this effort.
It is important to collaborate in research so that governments and agencies in Nigeria do not waste resources through the development of incompatible actions or through ineffective policy and development plans that are not effective in achieving climatically sustainable development.
Changing Attitudes and Ethics Humankind is part of nature.
Many planning decisions on how to integrate human activities into the environment for the purposes of culture and aesthetic values need to be clearly understood.
The planning of houses in our cities, building of parks, forest maintenance, farming systems, all are processes that should be influenced by ethics.
How forests are managed depends on how furniture workers go about their work and the same can be said of agricultural workers.
Technical and vocational education professionals can change the attitudes of people through education programs so that a balance between ethics and management of the environment may be achieved.
Vulnerable People and Places in Nigeria According to Watson, Zinyoera, and Moss (2007), Africa is the continent most vulnerable to the impacts of projected changes because widespread poverty limits adaptation capabilities.
For example, Nigeria, particularly the farming sector, relies on the quality of rains during the rainy season.
Thus food security is an important issue as climate change increases the incidence of drought and represents a very serious threat.
According to Downing, Ringius, Hulme, and 8 The Challenges of Technical and Vocational Education in Mitigating Climate Change Induced Catastrophes in Nigeria ____________________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012) Waughray (2007), in Africa drought hazard and vulnerability are likely to be the most damaging locus of impacts of climate change.
In Nigeria, people living in arid or semi-arid areas, coastal areas that are flood-prone, and oil producing states face more challenges and need the services of technical and vocational education professionals to enable them adapt to their environment.
Conclusion and Recommendations The havoc caused by climate change induced catastrophes all over the world has the potential to change the progress of nations and foreclose the hope of future generations for a better life.
When we hear about hurricanes like Katrina; earthquakes in Italy, Japan, Haiti, and China; tsunamis in Japan and Southeast Asia; and oil spillages in the Gulf of Mexico; we are quick to count our blessings and proclaim that such disasters are not our fate.
But now we have devastating erosion menaces across Nigeria with desertification in the north, dumping of toxic waste in Koko, oil spillage and floods in the south, lead gas poisoning in Nasarawa.
This may just be just the beginning.
How prepared are Nigeria’s emergency response related agencies and, in fact, the technical and vocational education professionals?
Technical and vocational education professionals, as part of the scientific and technological community, are well positioned to tackle the challenges of climate change.
Arising from this study, the following recommendations are presented: 1.
Technical and vocational education practitioners should use their understanding of science and technology to deal with challenges posed by climate change.
2.
Governments (national, state, and local) should be assisted by technical and vocational education professionals to make the required legislation that will give effect to the principles set forth by UNESCO.
3.
Technical and vocational education curricula should be reviewed and revised continually to ensure that students are empowered in natural disaster risk reduction techniques.
4.
Continued research aimed at improving predictions of future climate changes should be pursued by technical and vocational education professionals.
References Downing, T., Ringius, L., Hulme, M., & Waughray, D. (2007).
Adapting to climate change in Africa: Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change.
Climate Change, 2(1), 19-44.
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (2000).
Presentation of Robert Watson, Chair, Intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Sixth conference of the parties to the United Nations framework convention on climate change.
The Hague.
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (2001).
Climate change 2001: Impacts, adaptation vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change.
Geneva: UNEP/WMO.
9 Titus A. Umoru and A.U.
Okeke ______________________________________________________________________________ AJOTE Vol.
2.
No.
1 (2012) Meludu, N. T. (2010).
Effect of climate variation on food availability, stability, accessibility and changes in consumption pattern.
Conference Proceedings of the 4 th Annual Conference of the School of Vocational and Technical Education, Federal College of Education, Oyo, Nigeria.
McBean, F. & McCarthy, J.
(1990).
Narrowing the uncertainties: A scientific action plan for improved prediction of climate change.
In J.T.
Houghton, G.J.
Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (Eds.
), Climate change, the IPCC scientific assessment, (pp.
315-328).
Great Britain: Cambridge University Press.
Digitized by the Digitization and Microform Unit, UNOG Library, 2010.
O’Brien, K. & Leichenko, R. (2000).
Double exposure: Assessing the impacts of climate change within the context of globalization.
Global Environmental Change, 10, 221-232.
Smith, B., Burton, B., Klein, R. J. T., & Wandel, J., (2000).
An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and variability.
Climate Change, 45, 223-251.
United Nations Framework on Climate Change, (1997).
Kyoto protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change: Text.
Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Watson, R. T., Zinyoera, M. C., & Moss, R. H. (2007).
The regional impacts of climate change: An assessment of vulnerability.
A special report of IPCC working group II.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wikinvest, (2010).Concepts: Global climate change.
Retrieved from: http://www.wikinvest.com/concept/Global-Climate-Change.
http://www.wikinvest.com/concept/Global-Climate-Change
1015711-POLS-Deja_Vu_Briefing_PRINT.indd www.pol icyschool.ca Volume 6•Issue 34•November 2013 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE TRADING SYSTEM: AFTER DOHA AND DOHA Dan Ciuriak and Natassia Ciuriak† SUMMARY The international trade dispute over Ontario’s “green energy” policies is a harbinger of similar problems to come; an early example of the emerging conflict between industry rules aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and existing trade deals between national governments.
We live in a world without formalized and sweeping multilateral climate change treaties between major economies, but one with many sweeping trade treaties between them.
That discrepancy is setting up the conditions for more trade disputes in the future.
Governments have every incentive to position climate change policies, as Ontario has, as support for new growth industries and the creation of local “green jobs.” But they also have every incentive to want to prevent the leakage of those envisioned economic benefits to outside parties, at the very least when those outside parties come from places that do not share the burden of climate change mitigation.
The current trade-law framework has lent itself to the interpretation, by arbitration panels, that “free riders” — that is, industries and countries that bear little to no responsibility for shouldering the costs of climate change policies — are nevertheless entitled to share in the commercial benefits that may be created by climate policies in jurisdictions that do make efforts to reduce carbon emissions.
In short, if a corporation or state-owned enterprise from a country lacking climate change policies wants to take advantage of the economic benefits of Ontario’s feed-in-tariff program, it would seem there is little Ontario can do to stop it, without running afoul of trade agreements.
The result is a worst-case scenario.
The problem of climate change continues to worsen, while governments — national and sub-national — face disincentives for implementing regulations and subsidies that might help mitigate the problem.
This is because they cannot be sure that they will not be left to shoulder the cost while foreign actors, without similar environmental commitments, take advantage of the attendant economic benefits.
There is also the real possibility that some governments may disguise anti-trade motives by cloaking them under the cover of environmental policy.
These conflicts need not happen and, if we are committed to slowing climate change, it cannot be allowed to happen.
The global trading community must find ways to exempt domestic climate change policies from traditional tariff and trade commitments, while also guarding against the potential abuse of that exemption.
One possibility is exempting from tariff restrictions “border carbon adjustments” (BCAs), which apply varying tariffs to goods moving across borders based on the carbon emitted across the supply chain.
The corporate sector’s increasing sophistication in quantifying supply-chain emissions, as part of corporate competitive efforts, makes BCAs more feasible for governments to implement.
And there is already some evidence to suggest that BCAs can be accommodated within the current WTO rules, although some bending of the rules may be required.
Still, the climate change threat is grave and urgent.
If ever there was a reason to bend global trade rules, accommodating earnest climate-change-mitigation efforts is arguably the best one yet.
† This paper has benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions of three anonymous referees.
Any remaining errors of fact or interpretation are the sole responsibility of the authors.
The support of The School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary is gratefully acknowledged.
www.pol icyschool.ca Volume 6 • numéro 34 • novembre 2013 LES CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES ET LE SYSTÈME COMMERCIAL : APRÈS DOHA ET DOHA Dan Ciuriak et Natassia Ciuriak RÉSUMÉ Le différend commercial international sur les politiques « d’énergie verte » de l’Ontario représente un avant-goût des problèmes qui nous attendent; il constitue un tout premier exemple de la faille qui se creuse entre les règles de l’industrie qui visent à réduire les gaz à effet de serre et les accords commerciaux actuels entre gouvernements nationaux.
Nous vivons dans un monde où il n’existe pas de traité d’envergure en bonne et due forme sur les changements climatiques entre les principales économies, mais où les traités commerciaux généralisés abondent.
Ce déséquilibre crée les conditions susceptibles d’engendrer davantage de conflits commerciaux dans l’avenir.
Les gouvernements ont toutes les raisons de faire comme l’Ontario et de tabler sur des politiques ayant trait aux changements climatiques de manière à soutenir de nouveaux secteurs de croissance et la création d’« emplois verts » locaux.
Mais ils ont aussi toutes les raisons de vouloir empêcher que les avantages économiques ainsi prévus ne leur échappent au profit d’autres parties, surtout quand celles-ci sont issues de pays qui ne partagent pas le fardeau de l’atténuation des changements climatiques.
Dans le cadre juridique commercial actuel fondé sur les tribunaux d’arbitrage, on a fini par interpréter que les « bénéficiaires sans contrepartie » – c’est-à-dire les industries et les pays qui n’assument aucune responsabilité financière, ou si peu, en ce qui a trait au coût des politiques sur les changements climatiques – peuvent malgré tout prendre part aux avantages commerciaux découlant des politiques sur le climat mises en place par des gouvernements déterminés à réduire leurs émissions de carbone.
En somme, si une entreprise ou une société d’État d’un pays où les politiques sur les changements climatiques sont inexistantes veut tirer profit des avantages économiques du Programme de tarifs de rachat de l’Ontario, il semble que la province ne puisse pas faire grand-chose pour l’en empêcher sans enfreindre les accords commerciaux.
Le résultat ne pourrait pas être pire.
Le problème des changements climatiques continue de s’aggraver tandis que les gouvernements – nationaux et régionaux – sont confrontés à des situations qui les dissuadent de mettre en oeuvre une réglementation et des subventions destinées à réduire le problème, parce que rien ne leur garantit qu’ils ne devront pas en éponger seul les coûts tandis qu’à l’étranger, les acteurs qui n’ont pas pris d’engagements similaires profitent des avantages économiques qui en découlent.
Il existe aussi une possibilité très réelle que certains gouvernements camouflent des motivations défavorable au commerce sous le couvert d’une politique de protection de l’environnement.
Ces différends ne sont pas inéluctables, et nous devons à tout prix les éviter si nous sommes déterminés à ralentir les changements climatiques.
Les partenaires du commerce international doivent trouver des moyens d’exempter les politiques nationales sur les changements climatiques des engagements tarifaires et commerciaux traditionnels et se prémunir contre les abus potentiels liés à cette exemption.
Une solution consisterait à exempter des restrictions tarifaires les « ajustements à la frontière pour le carbone », qui appliquent des tarifs variables aux marchandises traversant les frontières, en fonction du carbone émis tout au long de la chaîne d’approvisionnement.
La mise en place par le secteur des entreprises d’un processus de plus en plus précis et détaillé de quantification des émissions de carbone dans la chaîne logistique, processus adopté pour soutenir la concurrence, a pour effet que les gouvernements peuvent plus facilement appliquer ces ajustements.
Et tout semble d’ores et déjà indiquer qu’il est possible d’y parvenir dans le cadre des règles actuelles de l’OMC, même s’il faut pour cela contourner quelque peu ces règles.
Il n’en reste pas moins que la menace des changements climatiques est grave et qu’elle exige des mesures urgentes.
S’il existe un motif valable de contourner les règles internationales du commerce, c’est sans contredit celui de faciliter en toute bonne foi les efforts d’atténuation des changements climatiques.
INTRODUCTION The potential for conflict between trade rules and climate change mitigation policies has long been recognized.
The interactions between trade rules and climate change policy were explored in great depth following the Stern Report in 2006.1 The discussion peaked just as the economic boom of the 2000s was coming to a crashing halt in the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.
The OECD dedicated its 2009 Global Forum on Trade to trade and climate change issues, and the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) and the WTO issued a major joint report on the intersection between trade rules and climate change policy, also in 2009.2 The think tank community, which tends to gravitate towards topical issues, also generated a raft of studies and commentaries.3 Since then, trade and climate change issues have been largely off the political radar screen and confined to the respective professional communities as policymakers turned their attention to grapple with the massive fiscal problems generated by the economic and financial crisis.4 In the meantime, the multilateral process on climate change has sputtered, with a series of Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the 18th COP held at Doha in December 2012, failing to deliver a binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol.
At the same time, the failure of the Doha Round of trade negotiations has stranded the talks to find a multilaterally agreed trade accommodation of climate change mitigation policies.
After Doha and Doha, trade and climate change policies are colliding without agreed rules to sort out the problems inherent in their intersection.
The scale of the underlying problem has not diminished with the passage of time.
Scenarios involving 5°C or more of global warming are now being considered by major international organizations.5 Meanwhile, a recent report published by the World Bank details why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided (implicitly at all costs), observing that “a global mean temperature increase of 4°C approaches the difference between temperatures today and those of the last ice age.”6 It is not likely to be a small deal.
1 For example, Pascal Lamy’s attendance at the 24th Session of UNEP's Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum in Nairobi, Feb. 5–9, 2007, was the first such participation by a WTO director-general in a UNEP Governing Council meeting.
See WTO, “Existing Forms of Cooperation and Information Exchange between UNEP/MEAs and the WTO,” TN/TE/S/2/Rev.2, January 16, 2007.
2 UNEP and WTO, Trade and Climate Change (Switzerland: WTO Secretariat, 2009).
3 See, for example: Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, 2007); Dan Ciuriak and Bob Johnstone, “Climate Change and the Trading System,” Conference Report, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2009; Michael Grubb et al., “Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System,” The German Marshall Fund, Climate & Energy Paper Series 9 (2009); and Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, “The World Trade Organization and Climate Change: Challenges and Options,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Series 9 (2009).
4 A similar surge of interest in sustainability in the context of a boom occurred in APEC circles during the “Asian Miracle” years.
At Osaka in 1995, APEC economic leaders agreed on the need to address the impact of population and economic growth on demand for food and energy and pressures on the environment (the “FEEEP” initiative).
This led to a FEEEP Symposium in 1997 just as the Asian Crisis was getting underway.
Political attention in the Asia-Pacific region immediately switched from environmental sustainability to restoring growth.
See Dan Ciuriak, “The Impact of Expanding Population and Economic Growth on Food, Energy and the Environment (FEEEP): A Progress Report” (paper presented at the conference “Agriculture and Sustainable Development: China and Its Trading Partners,” Texas A&M University, January14–16, 1998).
5 See Fred Harvey, “Waiting on new climate deal 'will set world on a path to 5C warming,’” The Guardian, June 10, 2013.
6 Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, Turn Down The Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2012), xiv.
1 In the absence of a multilateral consensus on climate change, unilateral measures are being implemented, including in systemically important economies, with varying levels of ambition and conditions, and taking shape in differing technical forms.
Disciplines being imposed on business differ in terms of the costs imposed, and subsidies for renewable-energy development are being made both for industrial-policy reasons and to meet sustainability objectives.
There is also widespread bottom-up activism: at the municipal and sub-national state/provincial levels; at the corporate level, driven by activist boards and “green” consumers, as well as supply-chain security concerns; and at the private level, where litigation is being used to prompt action.
However, these efforts are falling well short of what is needed to contain emissions to the agreed acceptable level.
In part, this is due to the counter-productive effect of fossil-fuel subsidization: the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that subsidies for fossil fuels globally, driven by rising energy prices, rose by 27.6 per cent from US$412 billion in 2010 to US$523 billion in 2011, dwarfing the $88 billion in subsidies for the emerging renewableenergy industry.7 The IMF, taking into account the failure of taxes to reflect negative externalities,8 puts the effective support level in 2011 at roughly US$1.9 trillion, equivalent to 2.5 per cent of global GDP or 8 per cent of total government revenues, with 40 per cent of this subsidy provided by the advanced countries.
There is also evidence that trade and trade rules are also working in a counter-productive fashion.
Three negative dynamics have emerged endogenously in the interaction between climate change abatement and the trading system.
First, trade linkages are undermining effective unilateral action due to industrial competitiveness concerns.
Second, activist governments seeking to capture the economic benefits of publicly-funded abatement measures are coming into conflict with trade rules as they seek to prevent leakage through trade.
Third, while funding of climate change measures is public, delivery of solutions is private.
Given the essential role of emerging industries in climate change abatement, industrial policy competition, including through strategic trade policy, has been induced with the resulting rivalries spilling over, not surprisingly, into the trade-dispute settlement system.
7 See, IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012: Executive Summary (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012) 1.
The OECD Inventory of estimated budgetary support and tax expenditures for fossil-fuel production and consumption in 34 OECD countries identified some 550 individual mechanisms that provided support valued at between US$55 billion and US$90 billion a year during 2005–2011.
The OECD report warns that caution is required in interpreting the support amounts, including because not all these mechanisms are clearly inefficient; nonetheless, it concludes that there is ample scope for both saving money and improving the environment through fossil-fuel subsidy reform in the advanced countries as well as in developing countries and the emerging markets.
See OECD, “Inventory of Estimated Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels 2013” (Paris: OECD, 2013), 3.
8 This figure includes a Pigouvian tax set equal to the estimated negative externalities of fossil-fuel use of US$25 per ton of CO2 emissions, following the U.S. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866,” February 2010.
The latter group issued an update in May 2013 that raises the social cost by between 55 per cent and 71 per cent.
See Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis — Under Executive Order 12866,” May 2013.
Taking this into account, the IMF figure would rise to about US$2.75 trillion.
See IMF, “Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications,” International Monetary Fund, January 28, 2013.
2 3 This paper surveys developments bearing on the intersection between the trading system and climate change policies in a post-Doha context.
The next section briefly summarizes the progress in the multilateral process on climate change, the unresolved issues and stumbling blocks to concerted action, and the current understanding of climate change trends and risks.
This is followed by a horizontal scan regarding the various responses that are being taken at various levels in the absence of effective multilateral response and that are shaping the commercial context for trade.
Against this background, a section is devoted to developments at the intersection between climate change policy and the trading system, and documents the conflicts that have emerged.
The paper concludes with discussion and consideration of the scope for changing the dynamic such that, as was proved possible in other important environmental policy areas, trade serves to strengthen climate change mitigation and the trading system is not itself damaged in the process.
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS Progress of the COP Process The multilateral process on climate change has been marked by slow progress and much friction in the attempt to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol.
The 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 18) was no exception.
The world attempted to find “balance and ambition” and ended with neither.
The present cycle of climate change negotiations was launched in Bali, Indonesia, at COP 13 in December 2007.
The “Bali Action Plan” that emerged set out the framework for negotiating a successor to the Kyoto Protocol.
COP 14 in Poznan, Poland in December 2008 launched an adaptation fund, but otherwise cited as its main achievement an “intensified negotiating schedule for 2009”.9 COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark, which took place at the height of political attention to climate change in December 2009, was supposed to “seal the deal” with a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, with concrete economic incentives, technology-transfer mechanisms, and appropriate climate-financing procedures, as well as an agreement to strengthen and broaden the multilateral carbon-trading system.10 Unfortunately, the non-binding Copenhagen Accord provided only pledges of emission reductions and climate financing for the developing world.
The parties essentially once again agreed to put off negotiating binding targets until COP 16 in Cancún, Mexico at the end of 2010.
9 UNFCCC, “Poznań Climate Change Conference – December 2008,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/meetings/poznan_dec_2008/meeting/6314.php.
10 ICTSD, “Climate Change and Trade on the Road to Copenhagen: A Policy Discussion Paper,” ICTSD, December 2008, http://ictsd.org/i/publications/40603/.
COP 16 was more successful, as parties agreed to anchor mitigation pledges and took steps toward strengthening climate financing through the newly created Green Climate Fund.
Progress was also made toward creating a verification system to increase the transparency of climate-action reporting.
However, COP 16 also ended amid much uncertainty regarding whether or not these transparency and funding institutions would go beyond talk and promises to generate actual, concrete mechanisms.
Additionally, Kyoto’s binding successor remained elusive.
In 2011, COP 17 in Durban, South Africa made some headway in answering these questions.
Another phase of the Kyoto Protocol was initiated when the parties adopted a group of decisions.
A successor agreement was to start in 2020 and was to be negotiated in a newlylaunched series of talks with the issue of differentiated responsibilities between developed and developing economies left open.
Steps were taken to formally establish the Green Climate Fund (though the “how” and “when” were left to be determined in Doha in 2012) and to implement stronger reporting requirements.11 Interim climate change negotiations held in Bonn, Germany, from May 14-25, 2012, en route to Doha, broke down over disagreements on the financing of the Green Climate Fund for developing nations and on burden-sharing between developed and developing countries regarding greenhouse gas emission reductions.
In Doha, Qatar, COP 18 extended the Kyoto Protocol through to 2020, when a new global climate deal, which is to be concluded by 2015, is to come into force; however, legally binding commitments in this regard still only cover 37 countries, including the EU and Australia, which collectively account for less than 15 per cent of emissions.12 Moreover, the biggest carbon emitters — the United States, China, and India — remain without legally-binding commitments.
And those parties that did agree to extend the Protocol — most notably the EU — did not deepen their emission-reduction commitments, only promising to consider this in further negotiations.
Perhaps the most important outcome from Doha was that the technical apparatus for a global approach to climate change mitigation was preserved.13 The summit also established a loss-and-damage mechanism that acknowledges that rich nations should move towards compensating poor nations for losses due to climate change — although this agreement was only possible by positioning the loss-and-damage mechanism under the existing pledge to mobilize US$100 billion a year for poor nations to adapt to climate change.14 11 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Outcomes of the U.N.
Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa,” C2ES, 2011.
12 Roger Harrabin, “UN climate talks extend Kyoto Protocol, promise compensation,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018, December 8, 2012.
13 UNEP, “Doha Climate Conference Opens Gateway to Greater Ambition and Action on Climate Change,” UNEP News Centre, http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2700 &ArticleID=9353, December 9, 2012.
14 See note 12 above.
4 Issues and Stumbling Blocks There is a broad consensus regarding the need to limit global temperature rise to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.15 The 2°C scenario (which is considered far from a safe level, as it involves considerable risks of triggering major climate-changing events)16 is based on stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) at around 450 parts per million (ppm).
However, emissions have continued more or less unabated (save for the recessioninduced decline in 2009) and the 400-ppm mark was reached on a weekly average basis in May 2013.17 The feasibility of keeping within the 450-ppm threshold is diminishing rapidly and the commitments on the table in the COP process will not come close to achieving this result.
How seriously the commitments are being taken is also at issue.
A recent assessment suggests that the likelihood that individual countries will meet their existing pledges varies.
The EU is judged as likely to meet its unconditional commitment, which is stronger than the commitment made by the United States, which is judged as unlikely to be met.
China’s commitment, on the other hand, is judged as likely to be met.18 These assessments must be viewed against the background of historical results, which showed that industrialized countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol together with the United States, which did not ratify, collectively reduced their emissions in 2010 by approximately 7.5 per cent compared to 1990, and remained on target to meet the original Kyoto Protocol objective of a 5.2-per-cent reduction.
However, while emissions from the EU and Russia decreased and Japan’s stabilized, U.S. emissions increased.19 To be sure, the combination of a steep recession and the sharp expansion of U.S. 15 Under pressure from island states, among others, governments have agreed to launch a review in 2013 to consider strengthening the long-term goal to 1.5°C, which remains technically feasible.
See Marion Vieweg et al., “2° be or not 2° be,” Climate Action Tracker Update, Climate Analytics, PIK, and Ecofys, November 30, 2012, http://www.climateanalytics.org/news/climate-action-tracker-update-2%C2%B0-be-or-not-2%C2%B0-be.
This makes the margin by which targets will fail to be met all the more significant if there is no strengthening of political will.
Even the G8 goals of reducing global emissions to 50 per cent below 2005 levels by 2050 to limit global warming in 2100 to 2°C (under certain assumptions) would still fall short of stabilizing temperatures.
As the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency notes, “…while the G8 international goals stabilize global GHG emissions at 50% below 2005 levels, CO2 concentrations and temperature are not stabilized … Equilibrium temperature would only be achieved after CO2 concentrations are in equilibrium.
Second, the inertia in ocean temperatures causes the equilibrium global mean surface temperature change to lag behind the observed global mean surface temperature change by as much as 500 years.
Even if CO2 concentrations in 2100 were stabilized, observed temperatures would continue to rise for centuries before the equilibrium were reached.” See: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Economic Impacts of S. 1733: The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, GPO, 2009: 28.
16 IPCC, Working Group II, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, Section 19.4.2.2, “Scenario analysis and analysis of stabilisation targets” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
17 The 400-ppm mark was breached on a daily reading in the week starting May 26, 2013 at Mauna Loa; the daily average for that week is given as 400 ppm and the average for the month as a whole was just under 400 ppm.
See NOAA, “CO2 Weekly MLO,” NOAA, ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_weekly_mlo.txt.
The annual average for 2013 will remain below 400 ppm at about 396.6 ppm and the annualized trend will only breach the 400 mark in early 2015.
18 Vieweg et al., “2° be or not 2° be.” 19 Jos G.J.
Olivier et al., “Long-term trend in global CO2 emissions: 2011 report,” PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2011.
5 natural gas production through the hydraulic-fracturing revolution helped bring U.S. total GHG emissions in 2011 back down to the lowest level since 1995.20 However, this is more a matter of serendipity than a reflection of policy resolve.
Moreover, agriculture remains off the formal agenda.
The agricultural sector is a major source of greenhouses gases (GHGs), such as nitrous oxide and methane, which comprise 13.5 per cent of all emissions, but are comparatively potent in terms of global warming potential.
However, developing countries have lobbied to deal with agriculture under “adaptation” rather than “mitigation” due to the problems this would otherwise create for agricultural societies.
Agriculture remained off the agenda at Doha, being addressed in a subsidiary body.21 Additional tensions in the multilateral process have arisen regarding the allocation of resources between mitigation and adaptation.
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is clearly in favour of strong mitigation measures, since adaptation will do little to prevent its member countries from being in part or wholly submerged below rising seas.
Africa also has a low capacity to adapt.
Similarly, those concerned about the impact of increased emissions on the oceans through lowered pH balances (“ocean acidification”) and the combination of rising sea levels and acidification on coral reefs and the marine ecology generally favour emphasis on mitigation.22 Other countries or interest groups are more interested in adaptation measures.
Financial support to help developing countries adapt to and mitigate climate change faces particular difficulties given the fiscal problems in the advanced countries.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been added to the existing multilateral instruments that include the Global Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Adaptation Fund.
The bid to host the GCF was won by South Korea; an interim secretariat was subsequently established in Bonn, Germany (to be relocated to Songdo, South Korea by year-end 2013), an executive director appointed (Hela Cheikhrouhou, a Tunisian national, formerly with the African Development Bank), and the future business model discussed in detail if not yet hammered out.23 The Fund is on track to become operational in 2014; the question of how developed 20 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990 – 2011,” April 12, 2013.
Based on the steep decline in CO2 emissions from energy use in the first quarter of 2012, the total GHG inventory in 2012 should fall still further.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (“U.S.
energy-related CO2 emissions in early 2012 lowest since 1992,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7350, August 1, 2012) reports that CO2 emissions resulting from energy use during the first quarter of 2012 were the lowest in two decades for any January–March period, the peak quarter for emissions, due to a mild winter that reduced household heating demand and therefore energy use; a decline in coal-fired electricity generation, due largely to historically low natural gas prices; and reduced gasoline demand.
One unresolved concern related to the expansion of natural gas from hydraulic fracturing processes is the leakage of “fugitive” methane.
The review of studies conducted by Bradbury et al.
puts the global warming potential of methane at between 33 times and 105 times that of CO2 over a 20-year time frame, making it particularly important from a short-term mitigation perspective.
See James Bradbury et al., “Clearing the Air: Reducing Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. Natural Gas Systems,” World Resources Institute Working Paper, April 2013, Box 1.
The commonly cited 25 x figure is over a 100-year time frame.
The U.S. EPA uses a 21 x figure for its inventory calculation.
The U.S. pivot to gas has also been accompanied by an expansion of U.S. coal exports, leaving open the question of the net impact on global GHG emissions.
21 Agriculture is being discussed at the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).
22 See, for example, Natassia Ciuriak, “The Quiet Tsunami: The Ecological, Economic, Social, and Political Consequences of Ocean Acidification,” Paterson Review of International Affairs 12 (2012): 123–143, for a discussion on ocean acidification and its effects on tourism.
23 See Liane Schalatek, “Difficult Decisions – Deferred?” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, August 2013, for a report on the fund’s board-level discussions concerning the business model for the fund, including the integration of a privatesector role and the balancing of the pressures to “get on with it” and to “get it right.” 6 countries will fund their long-term commitment to US$100 billion a year in climate financing, however, remains undecided and is to be taken up at the 2013 COP in Warsaw, Poland.
The reported results on “fast start” funding for the 2010-2012 period do not inspire confidence regarding the chances for success.24 An alternative to using fossil-fuel production for development was proposed by Ecuador, which has an estimated 846 million barrels of oil buried under one of the most biologically rich rainforests in the world, the Yasuní national park.
Ecuador suggested that the international community compensate it with half of the reserves’ value in exchange for leaving its oil in the ground.
As of November 2012, $300 million had been promised to this cause, coming from European countries (including Germany, Belgium, and France), Latin American states (including Chile, Colombia, and Brazil), and international corporations, such as Coca-Cola, various airlines, and banks, as well as Brazilian, U.S., and Russian foundations.25 However, despite the pledges, only $13 million had actually been donated and this was not nearly close enough to the $3.6 billion required to provide sufficient incentive to Ecuador to keep it from exploiting its oil reserves for this purpose.
Finally, a major stumbling block towards rapid decarbonization that should not be overlooked is the reflection of proven reserves of oil and gas in company stock values.
Present market capitalization of the oil and gas sector is on the order of US$3 trillion.26 There is built-in market pressure for these reserves to be pumped out and burned.
HSBC recently estimated that the value at risk from unburnable reserves would be equivalent to 40 to 60 per cent of the market capitalization of the six major affected companies.27 The same point applies to oil and gas reserves in developing countries.
For these economies, the revenues are vital for development purposes (for example, Ghana, which joined the oil producing states in 2010, 24 In 2009, developed countries pledged US$30 billion in new and additional “fast start” financing to the GCF.
However, the International Institute for Environment and Development has found that only US$23.6 billion has so far actually been committed and less than half of that sum is in grant form (the rest are being given as loans that must be repaid at varying interest rates of interest attached).
See David Ciplet et al., “The eight unmet promises of faststart climate finance,” IIED Briefing, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2012, http://pubs.iied.org/17141IIED.html?c=climate.
The lack of full transparency makes it difficult to verify that the funds are new, as opposed to coming out of existing aid budgets; Oxfam estimates that only about 33 per cent are new funds (Oxfam International, “The climate ‘fiscal cliff’: An evaluation of Fast Start Finance and lessons for the future,” November 25, 2012, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-media-advisory-climate-fiscalcliff-doha-25nov2012.pdf).
25 John Vidal, “Project to leave oil in ground under Yasuní park reaches $300m,” The Guardian, November 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/23/yasuni-oil-ground-project.
26 The top 33 integrated international and national oil companies (IOCs/NOCs) and exploration and production (E&P) companies alone had a market capitalization at the end of 2012 of US$2.9 trillion.
See: PFC Energy 50, “The Definitive Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Listed Energy Firms,” PFC Energy 50, January 2013.
At the end of 2010, the majors had a market capitalization of US$1.2 trillion and a sample of 70 independents had an additional US$0.4 trillion in market cap.
See Mark J. Kaiser and Yunke Yu, “Part 1: Oil and gas company valuation, reserves, and production,” Oil And Gas Financial Journal (February 1, 2012) http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume9/issue-2/features/part-1-oil-and-gas-company.html.
27 HSBC, “Oil & carbon revisited: Value at risk from ‘unburnable’ reserves,” HSBC Global Research, January 25, 2013.
Note that the main impact of factoring in the “unburnable” share of reserves would fall on coal, followed by oil and to a lesser extent by gas.
The cited impacts were for six majors.
7 plans to leverage oil revenues to accelerate development; large oil and gas discoveries have also been made in Kenya, Mozambique, and Ivory Coast — the latter an extension of the Ghana field — which will undoubtedly play heavily in their development agendas as well).28 The issue is not limited to developing countries: the EU has been held back on deepening its commitments by Poland, which insists on its right to burn its huge reserves of coal.29 The Situation on the Ground If the multilateral process is problematic, the situation on the ground appears to be, if anything, worse.
Going into Doha, various assessments had reached the following conclusions, which Doha did not alter: • The World Bank recently reported that “Scientists agree that countries’ current United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change emission pledges and commitments would most likely result in 3.5 to 4°C warming.”30 • The International Energy Agency now considers 4°C and 6°C scenarios, as well as 2°C, in its analysis.31 • The OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 projects 3°C to 6°C warming under current policies: this degree of warming “would continue to alter precipitation patterns, melt glaciers, cause sea-level rise and intensify extreme weather events to unprecedented levels.
It might also exceed some critical ‘tipping-points’, causing dramatic natural changes that could have catastrophic or irreversible outcomes for natural systems and society.”32 • PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) writes that “Governments’ ambitions to limit warming to 2°C now appear highly unrealistic.”33 PwC estimates that the slow start to decarbonization in the first decade of the 2000s has raised the required annual global carbon intensity reduction to 5.1 per cent a year from now to 2050, compared to the achieved rate of 0.8 per cent since 2000.34 “We have passed a critical threshold — not once since World War 2 has the world achieved that rate of decarbonisation, but the task now confronting us is to achieve it for 39 consecutive years.”35 • Climate Action Tracker reported during the Doha conference that, taking account of rising emissions and existing mitigation commitments, the world is now headed for warming of 2.6°C to 4.1°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.36 28 KPMG, “Oil and Gas in Africa: Africa’s Reserves, Potential and Prospects,” 2013, http://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa.pdf, provides an overview of recent developments in African oil and gas.
29 See note 12 above.
30 Potsdam Institute, Turn Down The Heat, ix.
31 IEA, “Scenarios and Projections,” http://www.iea.org/publications/scenariosandprojections/, under “Energy Technology Perspectives.” 32 OECD, The OECD Environmental Outlook To 2050: The Cost of Inaction (Paris: OECD, November 2012).
33 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “Too late for two degrees?
Low carbon economy index 2012,” November 2012: 2.
34 ibid., 2.
35 ibid., 1.
36 Marion Vieweg et al., “Governments still set on 3°C warming track, some progress, but many playing with numbers,” Climate Action Tracker Update, Climate Analytics, PIK, and Ecofys, September 3, 2012, http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/2012-09-04_Briefing_paper_Bangkok.pff.pdf.
8 To be sure, the complexity of climate change effects and the “noise” in the data due to the overlay of short-term fluctuations and periodic oscillations on longer-term trends complicate the assessment of the steepness of the path of global warming on an annual average basis.
For example, the recent pause in average annual temperature increase has been coupled with a spate of record-breaking summertime heat waves and record ice melt in the Arctic Ocean, which is promising to open up the Northeast Passage from Asia to Europe for several months a year (a development that could fundamentally change the economic geography of trade)37 not to mention the Northwest Passage from North America’s west coast to Europe, traversed by the Nordic Orion in September-October 2013 carrying coking coal from British Columbia to Finland (saving around $80,000 in fuel by taking the Arctic route).38 The ice sheets over Greenland and Antarctic are also losing mass at an accelerating pace.39 Various factors have been identified to explain the difference in the signals.
These include short-term transient factors, such as solar minimums and volcanic activity; medium-term variability of ocean surface temperatures, which affects the rate of heat absorption; and increased air pollution in China.
Kosaka and Xie40 suggest that the plateau in global temperature for the last several years reflects the averaging of more extreme winter and summer temperatures, with the latter having continued their increase, explaining the heat waves and the record summer melts of Arctic sea ice.
Worryingly in this regard, the progress that had been seen in improving carbon intensity of economic activity appears to have flattened out, notwithstanding the recent intensified use of natural gas in the United States.41 There are also concerns about the declining efficiency of carbon sinks (particularly the oceans), which would further raise the bar for required emission reductions.42 This underscores that a “deus ex machina” technological solution is not emerging to allow rising GDP to be squared easily with falling emissions.
37 See Marco Evers, “Northeast Passage: Russia Moves to Boost Arctic Shipping” Der Spiegel, August 22, 2013, for a recent comment.
The Northeast Passage sea route from Hamburg to Shanghai reduces distance travelled from some 20,000 km through the Suez Canal to 14,000 km, or about 30 per cent.
Given the conventional gravity-model estimate of a 1 per-cent increase in trade for each 1 per cent increase in distance, such a reduction, sustained for several months each year, would have a measurable impact on trade between Europe and Asia.
38 See Danny Bradbury, “Climate change opens up Northwest Passage to commercial shipping,” Business Green (October 1, 2013).
39 Andrew Shepherd et al., “A reconciled estimate of ice sheet mass balance,” Science 338, 6111 (November 30, 2012): 1183-1189.
40 Yu Kosaka and Shang-Ping Xie, “Recent global-warming hiatus tied to equatorial Pacific surface cooling,” Nature (August 28, 2013).
41 Joel Makower and the editors of GreenBiz.com, State of Green Business 2012, GreenBiz Group, 2012, 27, http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2012/01/state-green-business-report-2012.
42 S. Khatiwala, F. Primeau, and T. Hall, “Reconstruction of the history of anthropogenic CO2 concentrations in the ocean,” Nature 462 (2009): 346-349.
9 As regards the impacts of climate change, there appears to be a disconnect between the valuations to the cost of climate change in conventional economic terms and the sense of risk conveyed by commentaries on climate change.
Tol43 surveys the relatively thin core literature on the economic costs of climate change.
The surveyed studies suggest that the impacts on GDP are relatively small, a few percentage points of GDP, with some positive estimates in the mix.
No recent estimate in Tol’s survey comes close to the OECD44 estimate of the cost of the 2008-2009 recession as a long-term decline in GDP of 3.1 per cent.
While the term “catastrophe” is often used in commentaries on the global financial crisis, the sense usually is that catastrophe was averted.
One may contrast this with the sense conveyed by assessments of climate change, such as by Wells, that a continuation of recent trends would result in “an utterly catastrophic 6-degree rise over the next 90 years” (emphasis added).45 Nordhaus46 updates his estimate of the loss from waiting to begin reducing CO2 emissions to US$4.1 trillion in terms of current prices and today’s economy (i.e., about US$575 per capita).
While significant and clearly worth acting on, this does not seem commensurate with “utter catastrophe.” There are several inter-related ways to understand this disconnect: non-linearity in the impacts as temperatures rise, coupled with the risk that positive feedbacks make the heating effect selfsustaining, thus “baking in” substantially higher future temperature increases; “fat tails” in the distribution of extreme weather events; and settlement patterns being rendered sub-optimal.
On the first point, Hansen,47 for example, emphasizes the “predominance of positive feedbacks” in Earth’s climatic system, which explains why the climate has historically been “whipsawed between colder and warmer climates, even in response to weak forcings, such as slight changes in the tilt of Earth’s axis.” In Hansen’s view, the system is already close to a tipping point, past which the world is more or less committed to a transition to an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity.
From this perspective, the (relatively marginal) costs of delay evaluated at a (transitory) level of 3°C or under (as in the studies surveyed by Tol48), using valuation parameters based on the current environment, fall 43 For small increases in global temperature (1°C), Richard S. J. Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, 2 (2009): 29-51, finds a significant welfare gain equivalent to 2.3 per cent of GDP.
Katrin Rehdanz and David Maddison, “Climate and happiness.” Ecological Economics 52 (2005): 111-125, evaluating the “amenity value” of climate change on the basis of a 1°C increase in temperature, find a small loss of 0.4 per cent of GDP, but find that populations in higher latitudes gain under warming scenarios because of a decline in extremely cold winters, even though those in lower latitudes are less happy because of a rise in extremely hot summers.
David Maddison and Katrin Rehdanz, “The Impact of Climate on Life Satisfaction,” Kiel Working Paper 1658, November 2010, estimate that welfare losses for some countries will be large but (apart from India) not for the highest emitters of CO2, which, they conclude, does not bode well for prospects of an agreement on emission reductions.
44 OECD, Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth (Paris: OECD, 2010).
45 Katherine Wells, “Recent Climate Change Science, Global Targets and the Global Climate Emergency,” Working Paper, March 30, 2009, http://bravenewclimate.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/recent_climate_change_science_kw.pdf.
46 William D. Nordhaus, “Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong,” The New York Review of Books, March 22, 2012.
47 James Hansen, “Tipping Point: Perspective of a Climatologist,” in State of the Wild 2008–2009: A Global Portrait of Wildlife, Wildlands, and Oceans, ed.
W. Woods, (Washington, D.C.: Wildlife Conservation Society/Island Press, 2008), 6-15.
48 Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” 29-51.
10 11 far short of capturing the full costs.49 Indeed, if 6°C warming were “utterly catastrophic,” in all likelihood the engine of that warming — a global industrialized economy — would have collapsed or, at least, reached a breaking point, causing massive societal change, before enough GHGs have been emitted to deliver that result by human action alone.50 On the second point, it is useful to contrast findings based on different types of analyses.
For example, Maddison and Rehdanz51 find that Russia is a net beneficiary from warmer winters.
By contrast, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics52 focuses on Russia’s extreme heat wave of 2010, which, on the basis of preliminary estimates, resulted in “a death toll at 55,000, annual crop failure at about 25 percent, burned areas at more than 1 million hectares, and economic losses at about US$15 billion (1 per cent gross domestic product (GDP)).” Russia’s infrastructure is geared to defending against extreme cold, not episodes of extreme heat; climate change thus exposed an unprotected flank.
Focusing on average effects versus tail-probability risks thus yields very different perspectives.
To some extent, the issue of extreme events (i.e., tail risks) has been treated formally.
Weitzman53 points out that risk evaluations generally assume truncated thin-tailed probability density functions.
Such evaluations discount heavily the chances of extreme outcomes, which are comparatively much more likely under fat-tailed distributions, such as the power law, which describes well phenomena such as the distribution of earthquake intensities.
Some argue that it is nonetheless justifiable to make these assumptions.54 However, as Nordhaus55 concludes, 49 Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” 43-46, surveys the literature on “missing effects” not taken into account in conventional cost-benefit analyses that could generate “nasty surprises” that justify responses greater than those implied by standard cost-benefit analyses.
50 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada/Random House of Canada Limited, 2006) argues that, due to a number of different stresses, including energy (e.g., peak oil), economic (increasing instability and widening income gaps between the rich and the poor), demographic (runaway population growth and the increasing number of megacities), environmental (natural resource deterioration, destruction, and contamination), and climate (global warming) stresses, global industrial civilization will find a breaking point.
The Council on Foreign Relations concluded on the basis that “sharp reductions [in emissions] in the long run are essential to avoid unmanageable security “problems.” Joshua W. Busby, “Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report 32, November 2007.
51 Maddison and Rehdanz, “The Impact of Climate on Life Satisfaction.” 52 Potsdam Institute, Turn Down the Heat.
53 Martin L. Weitzman, “On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change,” Review of Economics and Statistics 91.1 (2009): 16.
54 Weitzman, “On Modeling and Interpreting,” 1-19, proposes a “dismal theorem” that shows that the possibility of very high temperatures under fat-tailed probability distributions drives expected costs to infinitely or arbitrarily large values.
Since the very high costs in tail events dominate the low probabilities, the theorem implies a high willingness to pay to preclude even a remote possibility of very high temperatures; Weitzman derives a generalized precautionary principle on this basis.
William D. Nordhaus, “The economics of tail events with an application to climate change,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, 2 (2011): 240-57, and Robert S. Pindyck, “Fat tails, thin tails, and climate change policy,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, 2 (2011): 258-74, critique the theorem, arguing that conventional cost-benefit analyses remain valid; and Martin L. Weitzman, “Fat-Tailed uncertainty in the economics of climate change,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, 2 (2011): 275-292, responds.
Kirsten Zickfeld et al., “Expert judgments about transient climate response to alternative future trajectories of radiative forcing,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (2010): 16129-16135, provide a range of estimates of expert opinion on the mass of probability in the tail with respect to climate sensitivity; Martin L. Weitzman, “A Precautionary Tale of Uncertain Tail Fattening,” Environmental Resource Economics 55 (2013): 159173, provides a discussion of the precautionary principle based on these data.
The discussion in this thread serves to crystallize some of the assumptions that generate the divergence between quantified and subjective views on the size of climate change risks and the appropriate level of response.
55 Nordhaus, “The economics of tail events with an application to climate change,” 256.
“In many cases, the data speak softly or not at all about the likelihood of extreme events.
This means that reasonable people may have quite different views about the likelihood of extreme events, such as the catastrophic outcomes of climate change, and that there are no data to adjudicate such disputes.” Finally, there is the issue of location.
Industrialization and urbanization went hand-in-hand over the past two centuries.
A vastly disproportionate share of wealth is concentrated in temperate zones — neither too hot nor too cold.
Plants and animals are shifting pole-ward or to higher elevations as temperatures rise.56 The same is true of pests57 and of marine life.58 However, human settlements are anchored by existing urban infrastructure, which constitute sunk assets, and by existing agglomeration externalities.59 Moreover, urban areas typically straddle rivers (often on flood plains) and/or are located on seacoasts, many in estuaries, and thus face changes in precipitation patterns and sea-level changes.
Accordingly, cities continue to grow in situ and take adaptation measures60 to deal with the issues and risks associated with climate change.
Some very recent work is shedding light on the scale of some of these risks.
Hallegatte et al.,61 drawing on flood-protection data for 136 coastal cities, estimate that average global flood losses would rise from approximately US$6 billion per year in 2005 to US$52 billion by 2050 with projected socio-economic change alone.
Factoring in climate change-induced higher sea levels of 0.2 to 0.4 metres, the estimate rises to US$1 trillion or more per year.
To maintain current levels of flood risk in the face of steeply growing capital at risk, adaptation measures thus would have to reduce flood probabilities below present values.
Given residual tail risk, the magnitude of losses when floods do occur would increase substantially, requiring preparation for larger disasters than those currently being experienced.
Meanwhile, the cost of building up legacy defences is substantial.
New Orleans, for example, has upgraded its storm defences with a US$14.5-billion, 214-km perimeter, plus 112 km of interior levees and a new outer stormsurge levee, 2.9 km long and 8 metres high, designed to withstand what is currently rated as the once-in-a-hundred-year storm.
This is on top of the US$75 billion required to recover the damages of Hurricane Katrina.62 New York is planning a $20-billion upgrade to its defences following Hurricane Sandy, which was recently evaluated as a once-in-a-seven-hundred-year 56 I-Ching Chen et al., “Rapid Range Shifts of Species Associated with High Levels of Climate Warming,” Science 333, 6054 (2011): 1024-1026.
57 Daniel P. Bebber, Mark A. T. Ramotowski, and Sarah J. Gurr, “Crop pests and pathogens move polewards in a warming world,” Nature Climate Change (2013).
58 Elvira S. Poloczanska et al.
“Global imprint of climate change on marine life,” Nature Climate Change 3 (2013): 919-925.
59 Stéphane Hallegatte, “An Exploration of the Link between Development, Economic Growth, and Natural Risk,” Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 29 (2013), argues that development continues notwithstanding natural risk, even in the absence of climate change or counter-productive incentives such as subsidized insurance or post-disaster relief.
In the dynamic this study sets out: (i) protection improves over time and the probability of disaster occurrence decreases; (ii) capital at risk — and thus economic losses in case of disaster — increases faster than economic growth; and (iii) increased risk-taking reinforces economic growth.
Average annual losses from disasters grow with income and, while improved defences reduce the number of disasters, the increased capital at risk results in costlier disasters when they do occur.
60 See, for example, a report on Chicago’s adaptation initiatives: Leslie Kaufman, “A City Prepares for a Warm LongTerm Forecast,” The New York Times, May 22, 2011.
61 Stéphane Hallegatte et al., “Future flood losses in major coastal cities,” Nature Climate Change 3 (2013): 802-806.
62 Simon Veness, “New Orleans heralds recovery from Hurricane Katrina disaster,” The Guardian, February 2, 2013.
12 storm,63 but which is estimated to have a much higher return frequency under global warming.64 A sense of the extent of the requirement for increased levels of defence is provided by Strauss,65 who found that, by 2100, about 1,400 American towns and cities could be flooded, including Sacramento and Virginia Beach, if emissions continue unabated.
Similar observations can be made about the adaptation pressures and costs faced by urban areas dependent on rivers with slowing flows (e.g., communities dependent on the Colorado River),66 or those faced with increased flooding events as warmer, wetter climate in temperate zones increases the frequency of what were once considered once-in-a-hundred-year storms, based on established historical weather patterns,67 and require preparation for still larger events, the probability of which becomes less remote with climate change.
The contrast between the marginal view of climate change costs and the more catastrophic perspective is set in sharpest relief by considering prospects for cities such as Miami, which faces particularly difficult challenges in defending against sea-level rise and extreme storms;68 or Phoenix, which has already reached daunting levels of heat, drought and dust-storms at current levels of warming and appears to have limited scope for adaptation to further warming.69 To summarize, longer-term perspectives premised on tipping points that lock in higher levels of global warming, and that emphasize the impact of large-tail events in the context of limits to adaptation, support subjectively higher levels of concern than would be implied by a global reduction of GDP on the order of magnitude found in the mainstream quantitative studies.
63 Timothy M. Hall and Adam H. Sobel, “On the Impact Angle of Hurricane Sandy’s New Jersey Landfall,” Geophysical Research Letters 40, 10 (2013): 2312-2315.
64 William Sweet et al., “Hurricane Sandy Inundation Probabilities Today and Tomorrow,” Special Supplement to the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 94, 9 (2013): s17-s20.
65 Benjamin H. Strauss, “Rapid accumulation of committed sea level rise from global warming,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2013).
66 The last 14 years have been the driest the Colorado River has seen since record keeping began in the 1800s.
See: Tom Kenworthy, “How Two Reservoirs Have Become Billboards For What Climate Change Is Doing To The American West,” ClimateProgress, August 12, 2013, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/08/12/2439931/reservoirbillboards-southwest/.
The Colorado River is a major source of water for some 40 million people, 4 million acres of crops, 22 Native American tribes, 7 national wildlife refuges, and 11 national parks.
The two main reservoirs, Lake Mead and Lake Powell, are now less than half full due to persistent drought.
Tourism and energy generation are also at risk.
Julie A. Vano et al, “Understanding Uncertainties in Future Colorado River Streamflow,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society (2013), evaluate a range of climatological studies which project a decline in the flow of the Colorado River of between 6 and 43 per cent, with estimates in the middle of that range deemed most probable.
They note “the greatest risk to Colorado River streamflows is a multi-decadal drought, like those observed in paleo reconstructions, exacerbated by a steady reduction in flows due to climate change.
This could result in decades of sustained streamflows much lower than have been observed in the ~100 years of instrumental record.” (Abstract) 67 For example, the U.K. has had four of the five wettest years on record in the past decade (Damian Carrington, “2012 wettest year on record for England,” The Guardian, January 3, 2013).
Similarly, Chicago has had repeated flooding from storms rated at or approaching 100-year levels, by various definitions, in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, and again in 2013, rendering the 1-in-100 standard of little use (Megan Pauly, “Climate change leaves Chicago area in deep water,” Medill Report, Northwestern University, April 18, 2013).
Notably, the 2013 Calgary flood was in the neighborhood of the 1-in-100-year probability level under two separate evaluations (Matt McClure, “2010 study warned of more frequent flooding in Calgary,” Calgary Herald, July 18, 2013).
68 See, for example: Strauss, “Rapid accumulation of committed sea level rise from global warming”; for a popular account, see: Jeff Goodell, “Goodbye, Miami,” Rolling Stone, June 23, 2013.
69 See: William deBuys, “Phoenix's too hot future,” Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2013.
13 Public Perception The experience of policymakers in attempting to move climate change legislation forward has demonstrated that such policy must be firmly rooted in national interests.70 In a global survey conducted by the Pew Center in March 2013, climate change was ranked by a majority of those surveyed (54 per cent on average), and was more frequently ranked, as a major threat than any other suggested risk, including global financial instability, which ranked second.71 Canadian views were in line with the global average, but Americans were less likely to rank global warming as a risk, with only 40 per cent listing it as a major threat, a similar percentage to China (39 per cent).
Public perceptions matter in influencing policy.
Australia is a case in point.
Australia’s close encounters with drought, wildfires, and floods related to global warming contributed to it being one of the few advanced economies to have acted to tax carbon emissions.
However, while it has been an article of faith in Australian politics that a government was unelectable without a climate change policy, and despite a record-breaking “angry summer,”72 the recent election brought to power the Abbott government, which campaigned on the abolition of the carbon tax (albeit with proposed alternatives that were perceived as less threatening to jobs).73 In the United States, a particularly important jurisdiction for global climate change policy, public perceptions appear to be increasingly driven by extreme events.74 Schiffman,75 commenting on the 2012 U.S. election, which took place against the backdrop of Hurricane Sandy and record-breaking Midwest heat and drought, observes that “six of the critical swing states which President Obama won — Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, Virginia, New Mexico, and Wisconsin — all suffered an uptick of extreme weather events, including massive tornados and crop-destroying drought, within the past year.” This cuts both ways: In the United States, concern over climate change was on an upward trend until the dip in early 2013 following an unusually cold winter.76 70 Terry Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation Study (London: Globe International, 2011).
71 Pew Research Center, “Climate Change and Financial Instability Seen as Top Global Threats,” June 24, 2013.
72 See, for example: Will Steffen, The Angry Summer (Canberra: Climate Commission Secretariat, 2013).
73 See: Waleed Aly, “Inside Tony Abbott’s Mind,” The Monthly, July 2013, for a description of the new Australian Prime Minister’s pragmatic political approach to climate change.
74 For example, a Fall 2012 University of Michigan/National Surveys on Energy and Environment (NSEE) poll found that lived experience was most influential in shifting opinion on climate change in the United States; see: EcoAmerica, New Facts, Old Myths: Environmental Polling Trends (San Francisco: EcoAmerica, 2013).
By the same token, the Spring 2013 NSEE poll found that the preceding cold winter had chilled public belief in a warming planet; see: Barry G. Rabe and Christopher Borick, “The Chilling Effect of Winter 2013 on American Acceptance of Global Warming,” NSEE, University of Michigan, 2013.
However, Robert J. Brulle, Jason Carmichael, and J. Craig Jenkins, “Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate change in the U.S., 2002–2010,” Climatic Change (February 3, 2012), examine shifting U.S. public opinion over the period 2002–2010 and find that the key factors shifting public opinion on climate change are elite cues and economic factors; extreme weather had no effect on aggregate public opinion, and promulgation of scientific information to the public on climate change had only a minimal effect.
75 Richard Schiffman, “Election 2012: America's new mandate on climate change,” The Guardian, November 10, 2012.
76 EcoAmerica, New Facts, Old Myths.
14 The role of extreme weather in influencing U.S. politics is not likely to diminish: the White House website, announcing the Obama administration’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan, links extreme weather to climate change and emphasizes the cost of extreme weather events.77 Moreover, a study by reinsurance giant, Munich Re reports “The intensities of certain weather events in North America are among the highest in the world, and the risks associated with them are changing faster than anywhere else.”78 It further reports that North America suffered US$1.06 trillion in extreme weather damage over the period 1980-2011, with a rising trend, and with a steep increase in the share of those costs attributed to events described as “climatological” from a negligible climatological share in the 1980s.79 When the 2012 data are in the books, that figure will have risen to close to US$1.2 trillion.
While individual weather events cannot conclusively be linked to climate change in a deterministic sense (a point almost reflexively made by climate scientists when asked about events like Hurricane Sandy), they can be so linked in a probabilistic sense.
As noted by Hansen et al., with respect to extreme heat waves, “The distribution of seasonal mean temperature anomalies has shifted toward higher temperatures and the range of anomalies has increased.
An important change is the emergence of a category of summertime extremely hot outliers, more than three standard deviations (3σ) warmer than the climatology of the 1951-1980 base period.
This hot extreme, which covered much less than 1 per cent of Earth’s surface during the base period, now typically covers about 10 per cent of the land area.
It follows that we can state, with a high degree of confidence, that extreme anomalies such as those in Texas and Oklahoma in 2011 and Moscow in 2010 were a consequence of global warming because their likelihood in the absence of global warming was exceedingly small.”80 While the level of concern may wax and wane with events, there has been a more pronounced shift in belief that global warming is happening and that human action is contributing to it.
Again, looking at the United States where public opinion has generally been less accepting of climate change, in mid-October 2012, Angus Reid found that 54 per cent of Americans believed in anthropogenic global warming81 (this has remained consistent through early 77 The White House, “President Obama's Plan to Fight Climate Change,” June 25, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/climate-action-plan.
78 Munich Re, “Severe weather in North America: Perils, Risk, Insurance,” Knowledge Series: Natural Hazards (Munich: Munich Re, 2012), preface.
79 ibid.
80 James Hansen, Makiko Sato, and Reto Ruedy, “Perception of climate change” (proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, August 6, 2012, abstract).
81 A. Leiserowitz et al., “Climate change in the American mind: Americans’ global warming beliefs and attitudes in September, 2012,” Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, 2012.
15 2013),82 compared to 42 per cent in June 201283 and 36 per cent in 2009.84 Meanwhile, a spring 2012 Brookings Institution poll found that 65 per cent of American adults believe that there is solid evidence that temperatures have increased during the past four decades, a 13-percentagepoint increase from the low mark recorded in the spring of 2010.85 This number may have increased, since a more-recent Duke University poll suggests that 84 per cent of Americans now believe in global warming, with 50 per cent of those “definitely” believing climate change is occurring.86 To summarize, public belief in the reality of climate change and in anthropogenic causes appears to be firming; the level of concern appears to be linked to extreme weather events, which, in a probabilistic sense, can be linked to global warming; and climate change has political traction.
The populist base is thus developing both for action on climate change and for potential spillovers into the trading system.
This could escalate well beyond a proliferation of trade-remedy cases.
Across-the-board tariff walls have been proposed under comparatively benign circumstances.87 Bhagwati and Mavroidis88 have entertained the possibility of imposing import bans or punitive tariffs on imports from non‐carbon-regulating countries to enforce the Kyoto Protocol.
And countries like China and India have threatened retaliation.89 A FRAGMENTED RESPONSE Given the leadership vacuum at the multilateral level, climate change responses are being driven by a range of players: individual states, sub-national governments (including states/provinces and cities), plurilateral groups and international institutions, the business community (in particular, the insurance industry), and private actors in the courts.
Individual Country Responses Unilateral measures are being taken by many countries, with varying levels of ambition, conditions, and modalities.
A sense of the “waterfront” is provided by the Globe International survey of national legislative actions.90 The 33 countries surveyed account for 85 per cent of emissions; accordingly, the sample is representative of what has happened so far on a unilateral basis.
82 Reported in: Wendy Koch, “More Americans convinced of climate change poll finds,” USA Today, February 7, 2013.
83 Angus Reid, “Global Warming Skepticism Higher in U.S. and Britain than Canada,” June 27, 2012.
84 Pew Research Center, “Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming: Modest Support for ‘Cap and Trade’ Policy,” 2009.
85 Chris Borick and Barry Rabe, “Continued Rebound in American Belief in Climate Change: Spring 2012 NSAPOCC Findings,” Governance Studies at Brookings Institution, 2012.
86 Reported in Koch, “More Americans convinced.” 87 For example, U.S.
Senator Charles Schumer has, in the past, proposed applying across-the-board tariffs of 27 per cent on imports from China to counter the alleged undervaluation of the yuan.
88 Jagdish Bhagwati and Petros C. Mavroidis, “Is action against US exports for failure to sign Kyoto Protocol WTOlegal?” World Trade Review 6, 2 (2007): 299-310.
89 See, for example, Peter Holmes, Jim Rollo, and Tom Reilly, “Border Carbon Adjustments and the Potential for Protectionism,” Sussex Energy Group Policybriefing 8, May 2010, commenting on the Copenhagen COP discussions of border carbon taxes.
90 Terry Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation Study, 3rd Ed.
(London: Globe International, 2013).
16 The general picture is one of considerable heterogeneity in individual approaches.
Key distinctions include the following: • Different legal/policy frameworks: climate-change-specific legislation, regulations adopted within general environmental frameworks, and decarbonization goals embedded in development plans are all represented; • Different technical approaches: policies target variously carbon pricing, energy supply, energy demand, deforestation and land-use change, transportation, carbon sequestration, and research and development (e.g., into carbon scrubbing from point source and the atmosphere); • Different balances between mitigation and adaptation; and • Different institutions/administrative arrangements.
Townshend et al.
characterize the situation as follows: “each country has an individual approach which reflects its unique institutional context, capacities, economic characteristics and current level of political engagement with climate change.”91 The flexibility of individual approaches allows some forward movement; at the same time, it makes it extremely difficult to make international comparisons for purposes of assessing progress or level-playing-field issues.
The EU is the most advanced jurisdiction in terms of climate measures, having established the machinery to manage its carbon emissions and gain operational experience.
A DirectorateGeneral for Climate Action was set up in February 2010 to support climate change negotiations and to manage the Emissions Trading System (ETS), a cap-and-trade system launched in 2005.
In addition, a number of EU Member States have significant levels of carbon taxes.92 As regards the ETS, on the positive side, it has created a large and liquid market that provides a carbon price signal for the EU-28 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
It also provides for trading allowances with non-ETS members, and provides a regulatory mechanism for the EU to adjust the level of ambition as regards the pace of emission reductions.
On the downside, the scheme still covers only 45 per cent of the EU’s GHG emissions,93 and faces a serious and growing glut of allowances.
The glut stems from the global economic crisis in 2008-2009 and has been exacerbated by the availability of international allowances that serve as credits within the system, and by an expansion of the supply of allowances in the transition to the system’s third trading phase, which runs from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2020.
As a result, there has been a steep drop in the EU carbon price, which has limited the contribution 91 Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation, 16.
92 The four Nordic countries all have carbon taxes — with Sweden leading in terms of revenue raised with $3.7 billion — as do the Netherlands, the U.K., and Ireland, among others; see Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Options and Considerations for a Federal Carbon Tax,” February 2013.
The Nordic countries, which have had carbon taxes since the early 1990s, consistently rank amongst the most competitive global economies.
93 The system covers CO2 and some nitrous oxide emissions and is mandatory for power stations, combustion plants, oil refineries, and iron and steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper, and board.
The aviation sector was brought into the system at the start of 2012; application to flights operated to and from countries outside the ETS has been deferred pending a global agreement addressing aviation emissions.
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from aluminum production are also covered.
Petrochemicals, ammonia, and aluminum industries and additional gases are to be added to the scheme in 2013.
17 of the system to actual reductions in emissions.94 Reforms to the ETS, introduced at the beginning of 2013, include a single, EU-wide cap on emissions (as opposed to individual national caps), and a progressive replacement of free allocation of credits by an auction system as the default method of allocating allowances.
Various proposals have been put forward to deal with the glut;95 in particular, Member States are to consider a back-loading proposal that was approved by the European Parliament in July 2013.
The EU currently handles competitiveness concerns raised by the ETS through free allowance allocation,96 although a “carbon equalization system” has been considered to put energyintensive industries on similar footing as those in third countries, in order to minimize carbon leakage.97 The United States presents a complex and fluid picture.
Doha was especially disappointing for the lack of movement by the United States.98 Hurricane Sandy’s US$60-billion-plus worth of damage to the U.S. East Coast in October 201299 had been linked to the record melt of Arctic sea ice in September, which set off a train of events that caused Sandy to veer inland.
At the same time, the worst U.S. drought in over 50 years, which turned the promising crop outlook for 2012 into a disaster, generated costs now estimated in the range between US$50 billion and US$80 billion.100 Nonetheless, the U.S. negotiating position at Doha remained based on the pre-election congressional and administration positions.
In his 2012 presidential acceptance speech, President Obama acknowledged the “destructive power of a warming planet”101 and a carbon tax was subsequently discussed as a way to avoid 94 The December 2013 carbon-futures price bottomed out at 2.46 euros/metric ton on the ICE Futures Europe Exchange on April 17, 2013 following a down vote in the European Parliament on a proposal to backload the issue of new permits.
The price has since rebounded to close at 4.98 euros/mt on Sept. 5, 2013 following a European Commission decision to pare the issue of allowances 5.7 per cent in 2013, rising to 18 per cent in 2020.
This is still well short of the floor price of 15 euros/mt that is under discussion and the 36.43-euro peak prior to the 2008–2009 crisis.
See: Ewa Krukowska and Alessandro Vitelli, “EU Reduces Free Carbon Permit Allocation Requests by 6% in 2013,” Bloomberg, September 5, 2013.
95 European Commission, “The state of the European carbon market in 2012,” Brussels COM(2012) 652 final, November 14, 2012.
96 Kateryna Holzer and Nashina Shariff, “The Inclusion of Border Carbon Adjustments in Preferential Trade Agreements: Policy Implications” (prepared for X ELSNIT, Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and Trade, Milan, Italy, October 19-20, 2012), 5.
97 Ibid., 5.
98 Jörg Schindler, “New Hopes Dashed: US Disappoints at Doha Climate Talks,” Der Spiegel, December 5, 2012.
99 See the 2012 Annual Global Climate and Catastrophe Report, which is put out by the world’s largest reinsurer: Aon Benfield, Annual Global Climate and Catastrophe Report: Impact Forecasting – 2012 (Chicago: Impact Forecasting, 2013).
Interestingly, the report observes that 2012 was the seventh consecutive year (since Katrina) that the United States has not had a major land-falling hurricane, but also that 2010, 2011, and 2012 tied 1887 and 1995 for third place as the busiest hurricane seasons recorded in the United States.
As can be seen, the choice of metrics can colour perceptions quite significantly.
100 “Extreme Weather: The 2012-2013 U.S. Drought,” Science and Impacts.
C2ES, http://www.c2es.org/scienceimpacts/extreme-weather/drought.
In 2012, the USDA designated 2,245 counties in 39 states as disaster areas due to drought, with 42 per cent of the contiguous 48 states under “severe to extraordinary drought.” 101 “President Obama’s acceptance speech (Full transcript),” Washington Post, November 7, 2012.
18 both the fiscal cliff and the climate cliff.102 However, the prospects for any form of cap-andtrade are now generally seen as remote for the foreseeable future,103 and the administration is taking the path of least resistance and using existing regulatory powers under environmental laws,104 combined with budgetary support for research towards mitigation and adaptation.
The latest version of the Obama administration’s climate change policy (the Climate Action Plan, unveiled on June 25, 2013) set a CO2-reduction target of 17 per cent below 2005 levels by 2020, introduced CO2-emission limits for existing power plants (it has already set them for new power plants), stricter CAFE regulations on fuel efficiency for motor vehicles, home energy-efficiency upgrades, and targets for increases in renewable power, among other measures.105 The changed tactics shift the battlegrounds: the House of Representatives slashed the renewables research budget in July 2013 in a spending bill that faces a White House veto;106 the National Environment Policy Act requirements for regulatory approvals for new energy initiatives are now under intense debate;107 and there are signals the Climate Action Plan will be a wedge issue for the 2014 midterm elections, which will see Senate races in many coal-rich states.108 China, whose total GHG emissions now match the United States and the EU combined, and on a per-capita basis are now in the range of the industrialized countries,109 has established quite ambitious targets for emission reductions, driven by concerns about energy security and the 102 Jonathan L. Ramseur, Jane A. Leggett and Molly F. Sherlock, “Carbon Tax: Deficit Reduction and Other Considerations,” Congressional Research Service 7-5700, September 17, 2012, survey revenue estimates under a number of carbon taxes considered or included in deficitand debt-reduction proposals.
The revenue potential was evaluated as high with a Congressional Budget Office estimate indicating that a tax set at US$20 per ton of CO2 would raise a cumulative total of $1.2 trillion over the 2012 to 2021 budget window.
For a commentary, see also Melissa Zhang, “Beyond China: Carbon Tax in the Post-Sandy Economy,” Berkeley Energy & Resources Collaborative, BERC China Focus, November 20, 2012.
103 Becky Bowers, “Americans & Australians on carbon-control politics,” PolitiFact, July 30, 2013.
104 Michael B. Gerrard, “Federal Executive Actions to Combat Climate Change,” Environmental Law 249, 49 (March 14, 2013); Mark Drajem, “Obama Will Use Nixon-Era Law to Fight Climate Change,” Bloomberg, March 15, 2013.
105 See: “Climate Change and President Obama’s Climate Action Plan,” The White House, June 25, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/climate-action-plan.
For a commentary, see, for example: John Miller, “Can Obama’s Climate Change Policy Reduce Carbon Emissions?” The Energy Collective, July 2, 2013.
106 “House Defies Obama Administration In Energy Budget Bill,” CBS DC, July 11, 2013.
107 See, for example, the debate about coal exports: Elizabeth Sheargold and Smita Walavalkar, “NEPA and Downstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions of U.S. Coal Exports,” Columbia Center for Climate Change Law, 2013, and various contributions from the Heritage Foundation.
108 See: Trip Gabriel, “G.O.P.
Sees Opportunity for Election Gains in Obama’s Climate Change Policy,” The New York Times, July 1, 2013.
While many Republicans remain steadfastly in support of more oil and gas drilling on federal land, redefining “clean energy,” and oppose strict environmental regulations on coal, there are acknowledgements regarding the need for more research, new financing models for wind and solar power, energy efficiency, and small modular nuclear reactors.
See, for example, the energy proposals by Alaska’s Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, Energy 20/20: A Vision for America’s Energy Future (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, 2013); also see an oped supporting the Obama administration’s Climate Action Plan by four former Republican Environmental Protection Agency administrators: William D. Ruckelshaus, Lee M. Thomas, William K. Reilly, and Christine Todd Whitman, “A Republican Case for Climate Action,” The New York Times, August 1, 2013.
109 European Commission, “Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR),” latest data are for 2010, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.php.
19 country’s vulnerability to climate change.
China succeeded in meeting its 2010 targets of reducing energy intensity of GDP by 20 per cent and increasing the share of renewables to 10 per cent from 2006 levels.
It has set ambitious new targets for 2015: to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 per cent, to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 17 per cent, and to increase the proportion of non-fossil fuels to 11.4 per cent of the overall primary energy mix.110 China has also shot up the ranks in terms of global leadership in installed renewable energy capacity: “In 2010 China’s annual installations of CSPV solar was just 3 percent of the world total.
But by the end of 2013, analysts expect China’s share to have grown to 21 percent.
The two most significant drivers of domestic demand for solar power in China are feed-in-tariffs, at both the regional and the national levels, and the national Golden Sun program.”111 China’s projected domestic demand growth is sufficiently large that the domestic industry, although presently suffering from over-capacity, will be hard-pressed to meet the needs.
In contrast to the EU, which has formal carbon legislation, and the United States, which uses environmental regulations, China has primarily targeted carbon emissions through its development plans.112 China is, however, developing the basis for carbon regulation.
It has been experimenting with emissions-permits trading since the late 1980s, albeit with poor results.
In 2011, China announced it would launch new pilot emission-trading schemes in a number of cities.
It followed that up in July 2012 with the release of The Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China to govern the carbon-trading schemes.113 And in June 2013, the first such scheme was launched in Shenzhen.
The seven pilot markets are to provide China with operational experience, while draft national legislation is under preparation.
The problems China must overcome include improving the measurement of emissions, developing the legal/regulatory infrastructure for emissions trading, and managing regional disparities.
It is likely that the future national system will be based on a carbon-intensity cap, as opposed to an absolute one, as the former is less controversial for the Chinese.
There is also the possibility of a carbon tax, though the way in which this would fit with the carbon-trading scheme is yet to be determined.114 Insofar as any pattern is evident, other countries (with Canada a notable exception) are following the EU’s lead and adopting cap-and-trade frameworks.115 Apart from several EU 110 National Development and Reform Commission, The People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (published online: Government of China, 2012).
111 ChinaGlobalTrade.com, “China’s Solar Industry and the U.S. Anti-Dumping/Anti-Subsidy Trade Case,” (published online: ChinaGlobalTrade.com, 2012).
112 Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation, 105.
113 For a discussion of the process, see: Xiaotang Wang, “Red China Going Green: The Emergence and Current Development of Carbon Emissions Trading in the World’s Largest Carbon Emitter,” Working Paper, Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law, June 2013.
114 For a full discussion of these issues, see Guoyi Han et al., China’s Carbon Emission Trading: An Overview of Current Development (Stockholm: FORES, 2012).
115 See the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), which provides case studies of individual emissions trading systems in place or in preparation: IETA, “The World’s Carbon Markets,” http://www.ieta.org/worldscarbonmarkets.
20 Member States, Switzerland116 and New Zealand117 have mandatory schemes in place.
Japan has a voluntary ETS in place, while Korea is scheduled to implement one in 2015, albeit in the face of heavy domestic opposition.
Mexico’s law, adopted in 2012, enables, but does not require, implementation of a cap-and-trade ETS.118 Several other countries have or are working towards pilot programs.119 While Australia adopted the Clean Energy Future Package in July 2012, which included a carbon tax and an ETS with broader coverage than the EU ETS and was to be linked to California’s,120 it is now heading in the opposite direction.
Australia’s newly elected prime minister, Tony Abbott, has made it his top priority to do away with the carbon tax entirely.121 Abbott further plans to shut down the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), which was to finance renewable energy, energy efficiency, and low-emissions technologies.122 He does, however, have an alternative plan to help reduce Australia’s GHGs: Direct Action, which aims to dispense AU$3 billion in energy-efficiency grants and subsidies, as well as to support projects such as the “exploration of soil carbon technologies and abatement, putting carbon back in soils and providing for a once in a generation replenishment of our farmlands.”123 Australia’s treasury department found that direct action is significantly less cost-effective than the carbon pricing mechanism.
Furthermore, modelling commissioned by the Climate Institute has also shown that Abbott’s direct action plan will not achieve the 5-per-cent reductions by 2020 that Australia has committed to, but instead will cause emissions to rise a further 9 per cent, barring an additional AU$4 billion in financing.124 116 The Swiss program was adopted in 2008 as a complement to its CO2 tax.
The dual-policy approach allowed companies to bypass carbon levy payments if they voluntarily joined the Swiss ETS.
Beginning in 2013, however, specified companies became subject to mandatory ETS participation.
117 New Zealand implemented an economy-wide cap-and-trade scheme in 2008.
The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (the NZETS) will cover nearly all emissions, including all six GHGs identified by the United Nations, starting Jan. 1, 2015.
The scheme is generally similar to the EU’s, although it differs in a number of respects, not least because the New Zealand emissions profile is very different from the EU’s Greenhouse Policy Coalition.
See Government of New Zealand, “The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme,” http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/.
118 Jayni Foley Hein, “Follow the Sun: Mexico On Target to Pass National Climate Change Law,” The Berkeley Blog, April 16, 2012, http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2012/04/16/follow-the-sun-mexico-on-target-to-pass-national-climatechange-law/.
119 These include Brazil, India, and Kazakhstan.
See IETA, “The World’s Carbon Markets.” 120 Jessica Shankleman, “California and Australia bolster carbon trading ties,” BusinessGreen, July 31, 2013.
The future of this is now up in the air.
121 Rob Wile, “Australia's New Prime Minister Wants To Immediately Dismantle His Country's Fight Against Climate Change,” Business Insider Australia, September 8, 2013.
122 ibid.
123 ibid.
124 Lenore Taylor, “Climate change: Tony Abbott says Direct Action needs no modelling,” The Guardian, September 5, 2013.
21 Canada has no national flagship legislation for climate change, having pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol effective December 2012.
In terms of policy, Canada has frequently been ranked in recent years as among the world’s worst performers.125 The Government of Canada has, however, committed to reaching a new international agreement on GHG mitigation as part of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, established in 2011, and has maintained its commitments to 17-per-cent GHG reductions below 2005 levels by 2020.
Canada’s national policy framework is now comprised of sector-by-sector regulatory approaches to carbon reduction (including heavy-duty vehicle and renewable fuel content in gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil), funding support for R&D into carbon capture and storage, promoting green infrastructure, and financial transfers to provinces.126 That being said, Environment Canada’s own analysis suggests current federal and provincial programs will only get Canada halfway to its target,127 and the spring 2012 audit of the program indicated that the regulatory approach was not supported by an implementation plan designed to meet the 2020 targets.128 Furthermore, the lack of cohesiveness between the provincial and federal governments’ plans militates against effectively co-ordinated efforts to achieve the targets.129 Given that Canada has explicitly indicated that it is aligning its policies with those of the United States, it is noteworthy that Canada’s per-capita emissions have closely tracked those of the United States since 2005.
Indeed, for total GHGs, Canada’s emissions fell from 24.31 metric tons (mt)/per-capita of CO2 equivalent in 2005, which was 1.9 per cent higher than the comparable U.S. figure, to 21.41 mt/per capita in 2010, or 1.0 per cent below the U.S. level.130 This posture and record did not, however, prevent U.S. President Obama from warning that, if Canada does not tackle GHG emissions, he would not approve the Keystone XL pipeline, which would bring oil from Alberta’s oilsands to U.S. refineries.131 Plurilateral and International Institutional Responses The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) community is putting a growing emphasis on green growth.
This model started in Japan’s chairmanship year in 2010, but has remained constant and is a major pillar of the three proposed priorities from Indonesia, the current 125 See, for example, Climate Action Network Canada, “Canada ranked as worst performer in the developed world on climate change,” December 3, 2012, http://climateactionnetwork.ca/2012/12/03/canada-ranked-as-worst-performerin-the-developed-world-on-climate-change/, which placed Canada 58th place out of 61 countries analyzed for their policies and action on climate change; GermanWatch, “The Climate Change Performance Index: Results 2013,” November 2012, 5, lists Canada as “the worst performer of all western countries”; and Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation listed Canada as the only country going backwards on climate legislation.
126 See Environment Canada, “Reducing Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions,” February 15, 2013, http://www.ec.gc.ca/dd-sd/default.asp?lang=En&n=AD1B22FD-1.
127 ibid.
128 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 2—Meeting Canada’s 2020 Climate Change Commitments,” in 2012 Spring Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2012).
129 Douglas Macdonald et al., Allocating Canadian Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions Amongst Sources and Provinces (Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, April 2013).
130 European Commission, “Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR).” 131 Jim Snyder and Margaret Talev, “Keystone XL watchers try to decipher Obama’s intentions,” Financial Post, August 1, 2013.
22 chair.132 The emphasis on green growth, as opposed to sustainability, revolves around the former having easily measurable benchmarks and is seen as an “operational strategy of economic system change, where investments in ecological resources and services can also act as a driver of economic development.”133 APEC seeks the following results from the model: energy-efficiency improvements, tariff-barrier reductions for environmental goods and services, and low-carbon sector promotion in member economies.134 The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) organized the High Level Meeting on National Drought Policy, which was held in March 2013.
Their combined communiqué noted that climate change has played a role in exacerbating drought, but the focus of the discussions was on monitoring, mitigation, and emergency response.135 Activism by Sub-National Governments and Cities Particularly in North America, but also in some other major jurisdictions, sub-national levels of government have been out in front of the national governments.
Individual U.S. states have, for some time now, been much more activist136 than the federal government and several regional initiatives are up and running in the United States, including some that are open to Canadian provinces and Mexican states:137 • North America 2050, which involves 16 U.S. States and 4 Canadian provinces (Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Manitoba), is the successor to the 3-Regions Initiative, which was a collaboration among members of the three North American regional cap-andtrade programs: The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the Western Climate Initiative.
NA2050 is a broader effort, addressing clean energy in addition to climate change.
• The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) includes the four Canadian provinces in NA2050 plus California.
WCI jurisdictions plan to implement cap-and-trade programs, backed up by a compliance-tracking system that tracks both allowances and offset certificates, administers allowance auctions, and conducts market monitoring of allowance auctions and 132 See Lee Poh Onn, “APEC’s Model of Green Growth is a Move Forward,” ISEAS Perspective 10 (2013), 1.
133 ibid., 1-2.
134 ibid., 2.
135 UNCCD, “High Level Meeting on National Drought Policies,” 2012, http://www.unccd.int/en/programmes/Thematic-Priorities/water/Pages/HLMNPD.aspx.
136 See, for example, Cinnamon Carlarne, “Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: EU & US Climate Change Policies Compared,” Penn State Environmental Law Review 14 (2006): 435; and Patrick Parenteau, “Lead, Follow, or Get out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change with Little Help from Washington,” Connecticut Law Review 40 (2007–2008): 1453, for discussions of U.S. state-level activism in the mid-2000s.
137 See: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Multi-State Climate Initiatives,” http://www.c2es.org/us-statesregions/regional-climate-initiatives.
23 the trading of allowances and offset certificates.
California138 and Quebec139 are set to move forward with cap-and-trade in 2013.
• The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which is comprised of 10 northeastern states, has been running since 2008, although several states are withdrawing their participation (including, interestingly, New Jersey, which was savaged by Hurricane Sandy).140 • The Transportation Climate Initiative (TCI), which includes 12 northeast and mid-Atlantic jurisdictions, is a collaborative effort to develop clean energy and reduce GHG emissions in the transportation sector.
A fifth regional initiative, the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA), which was a commitment by the governors of six Midwestern states and the premier of one Canadian province to reduce GHG emissions through a regional cap-and-trade program and other complementary measures, failed to get off the ground after a model cap-and-trade rule was proposed in April 2010.
In Canada, Quebec (in 2007) and British Columbia (in 2008) have implemented carbon taxes.141 B.C.’s revenue-neutral tax (revenues are returned to consumers primarily through income and business tax reductions) is substantially higher than Quebec’s and has resulted in a 17.4-per-cent GHG emission reduction — without impairing the provincial economy, according to a study to be published in Canadian Public Policy.142 In Japan, the Tokyo Prefecture (in 2010) and Saitama Prefecture (in 2011) have recently launched mandatory cap-and-trade systems.
Cities have increasingly taken a leadership role on climate change,143 reflecting the fact that, while the focus of climate change concerns has been agriculture, it is the major cities — most of which are located on the coasts — that are the most vulnerable to extreme weather events.
The C40, which is chaired by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, was established in 2005 as a forum to bring together mayors of the world’s largest cities to discuss urban solutions to the climate crisis.
Their actions range from promoting electric vehicles in Oslo, to banning Styrofoam food containers in New York,144 to introducing a city carbon tax in Boulder, Colorado, and the San Francisco Bay area.
Additionally, they are largely funding their own initiatives: the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) has estimated that about two-thirds of city initiatives are funded through general municipal funds.145 138 See: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “California Cap and Trade,” November 2012, http://www.c2es.org/usstates-regions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade.
139 See: MDDEFP, “The Québec Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances,” 2012, http://www.mddefp.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/Systeme-plafonnement-droits-GES-en.htm.
140 Matthew Wald, “Carbon Trading Initiative a Success, Study Says,” The New York Times, November 15, 2011.
141 Alberta has also implemented a penalty on excess carbon emissions, which has sometimes been described as a carbon tax.
See Mark Jaccard, “Alberta’s (Non)-Carbon Tax and Our Threatened Climate,” Sustainability Solutions, April 26, 2013.
142 Sustainable Prosperity, “BC’s Carbon Tax Shift After Five Years,” July 24, 2013, http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/article3685.
143 See Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., “Cities lead the way in climate-change action,” Nature 467 (October 21, 2010): 909911.
144 See the address delivered by New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, “2013 State of the City Address,” Press Release PR-063-13, February 14, 2013.
145 Derek Top, “How cities are leading the way in climate change fight,” GreenBiz.com, June 20, 2012.
24 Business-Sector Initiatives Assessments of environmental sustainability efforts by mainstream companies suggest that there is a sustained momentum to meet environmental goals, based on longer-term strategic policies, but that the gains being made fall short of what is needed.
The State of Green Business 2012 report observes as follows: “ … companies continue to make, meet, and even exceed ambitious environmental goals related to their use of materials and resources, the emissions of their operations (as well as their suppliers’), the efficiency of their offices and factories, the ingredients of their products, and what happens to those products at the end of their useful lives.
Beyond that, companies continue to innovate, buoyed by ongoing waves of new technologies and emerging business models that emphasize experience and access over ownership and consumption.”146 The report also makes an important point concerning what is driving corporate interest in sustainability.
First, transparency initiatives: “Growing calls for transparency and disclosure of sustainability impacts are requiring more, and more reliable, information about increasingly deeper levels of company operations and supply chains.
Ratings and stock indices, such as those from Newsweek and Dow Jones, are being taken ever more seriously by companies, elevating the collection and dissemination of key data to the C-suite.”147 Secondly, shareholders: “Shareholder resolutions focusing on social and environmental issues made up the largest portion of all shareholder proposals in 2010 and 2011.
That further bonds sustainability with board-level interest.”148 The more recent State of Green Business 2013 discusses some “profound shifts” that occurred in 2012, leading businesses to “link their sustainability strategy to critical business activities” after a series of extreme environmental events impacted supply chains.
For example, flooding in Thailand cut off global supplies of computer disk drives for the better part of a year, recordlow water levels in the Mississippi River seriously impaired shipping,149 and Hurricane Sandy shut down Wall Street for two days and impaired its functioning for weeks.150 146 Makower et al., State of Green Business 2012, 4.
147 ibid., 6.
148 ibid., 6.
149 See American Waterway Operators, “Economic Impacts Revised for Potential Mississippi River Closure to Barge Traffic in January,” Press Release, January 2, 2013.
150 Joel Makower and the editors of GreenBiz.com, State of Green Business 2013, GreenBiz Group, 2013, 7, http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2013/02/state-green-business-report-2013.
25 The report emphasizes 10 key trends for 2013 in the green-business world, of which the following are the most relevant for this paper: • With the signing of the Natural Capital Declaration by 39 global financial institutions (notably, no major U.S. banks) at the Rio+20 United Nations conference, natural capital is becoming a watchword in business circles.
This declaration commits signatories to valuing nature’s role in the global economy,151 a vital step to accounting for the services rendered by, for example, intact swathes of old growth forests and marine sanctuaries.
Natural capital was further emphasized as an important business value when the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (along with 76 global banks) signed on to the Equator Principles, committing to account for the impacts and the dependencies on ecosystem services of potential financing projects.152 • Unsurprisingly, risk and resilience also feature on the report’s list of trends, as these two factors emphasize a company’s (and indeed the trade system’s as a whole) ability to adapt to, and work through, violent and extreme weather events.
Not only does climate impact companies’ production and trade infrastructure, but concerns regarding the availability of energy, water, and other resources, as well as the security of employees and customers, are also very real.153 • The re-localization of the economy (“think global, buy local”) has been gaining ground, especially through such aspects as mobile and web searches, which now emphasize not only the biggest, but also the closest dealers, businesses, etc.
for a search.154 This has led to the rise of community currencies (alternative currencies that can only be spent locally), which is clearly anti-international-trade-minded.
Another broad perspective, regarding what the major corporations are doing to prepare themselves for the various economic shocks that climate change will unleash, is provided by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).155 The CDP invites over 6,000 companies globally to report on their climate change strategies, GHG emissions, and energy use.156 Carbon Action, the CDP’s carbon-related program, has grown from 35 to 92 signatories, who collectively represent US$10 trillion in assets, and respondents reported a reduction of 497 million tonnes of CO2, totaling US$11 billion in 2012.
157 Unfortunately, due to the high uncertainty, subdued 151 ibid., 9.
152 ibid., 9-10.
153 ibid., 12.
154 ibid., 19.
Econometric evidence generally finds that increased trade increases emissions.
See, for example, World Trade Organization and UNEP, Trade and Climate Change (Washington, D.C.: WTO, 2009), 53.
However, since trade allows more efficient producers to capture market share, the carbon savings on transportation can be more than offset by increased carbon production by more energy-intensive local producers.
Anca Cristea et al., “Trade and the greenhouse gas emissions from international freight transport,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 65,1 (2013): 153-173, find that to be the case in one-quarter of the manufacturing sectors they study.
155 The CDP’s 2012 report was based on 279 responses received by July 1, 2012, though it did receive a total of 405 responses (an 81-per-cent response rate).
See: Carbon Disclosure Project, Business resilience in an uncertain, resource-constrained world, 2012, 4, https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP-Global-500-Climate-ChangeReport-2012.pdf.
156 Carbon Disclosure Project, Carbon reductions generate positive ROI: Carbon Action report 2012, 2012, 2, https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP-Carbon-Action-Report-2012.pdf.
157 ibid., 3.
26 growth, and volatile commodity prices faced by businesses in 2012, “few [companies] are setting the necessary targets or making the investments required to ensure their long-term resilience.”158 PwC further finds that, on average, the longer-term targets of CDP respondents are only about 1-per-cent emissions-reduction per year,159 despite the CDP reporting that “investments in reduction projects are generating attractive returns well in excess of cost of capital.”160 In fact, the average return on climate-related investment (ROI) is 33 per cent, with 88 per cent of projects exceeding firm-level return on invested capital (ROIC).161 The CDP demonstrates that those companies who are not investing in reductions are not only setting themselves up for higher climate-related risks later on, as well as economic risks related to the likely pricing of carbon in due time, but are also missing out on “high return opportunities to create financial value for their investors — irrespective of the environmental benefits.”162 One particularly important private sector player is Walmart, given its influence over the distribution of goods at the retail level.
In 2009, Walmart initiated an assessment of companies and products in its supply chain concerning the carbon content embedded in its products.
The initiative involved three phases: a survey of its suppliers based on 15 questions that would also “serve as a tool for Walmart’s suppliers to evaluate their own sustainability efforts”;163 the launch of the Sustainability Consortium, a group of universities “that will collaborate with suppliers, retailers, NGOs and government to develop a global database of information on the lifecycle of products — from raw materials to disposal”;164 and a proposal to translate the Consortium’s data into a rating system that would allow consumers to make purchases based on the sustainability of products.
The Sustainability Consortium, a global multi-stakeholder organization developing science-based tools that advance the measurement and reporting of consumer-product sustainability, was ranked in the top 10 “World Changing Ideas for 2012” by Scientific American.165 There have also been important developments in the progress of measuring the embedded carbon footprint of products.
A research team from Columbia University’s Earth Institute’s Lenfest Center, using a lifecycle-analysis database that covered 1,137 PepsiCo products, has applied data-mining techniques used by Facebook and Netflix to predict consumer preferences to rapidly calculate the carbon footprints of thousands of products simultaneously.
The research team suggests that the software should help companies to accurately label products and design ways to reduce their environmental impacts, while substantially reducing the costs and personnel requirements of making such assessments.166 158 Carbon Disclosure Project, Business resilience, 4.
159 ibid., 4.
160 Carbon Disclosure Project, Carbon reductions generate, 3.
161 ibid., 6.
162 ibid., 6.
163 Walmart, “Walmart Announces Sustainable Product Index,” news release, July 16, 2009, http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2009/07/16/walmart-announces-sustainable-product-index.
164 ibid.
165 Ferris Jabr et al., “World Changing Ideas 2012: 10 innovations that are radical enough to alter our lives,” Scientific American Magazine, November 14, 2012.
166 Christoph J. Meinrenken et al., “Fast Carbon Footprinting for Large Product Portfolios,” Journal of Industrial Ecology 16, 5 (2012): 669-679.
27 Meanwhile, the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC), which has developed the Higg Index to enable clothing companies to identify environmental and societal impact reductions for their products, counts among its members such notables as Walmart, Target, Adidas, Burberry, CocaCola, Columbia, Patagonia, Gap, H&M, Nike, and Levi’s.167 The SAC’s 60 members, which “account for more than a third of the global apparel and footwear industry,”168 aim to produce no “unnecessary environmental harm” and to positively impact the communities and people with which they are associated.169 While shoppers will have to wait awhile until labels with scores appear on products, companies have started using the index to measure energy use, GHG emissions, water consumption, etc.
The shipping and airlines industries, which were both excluded from the Kyoto process because of the trans-boundary nature of their business, have also developed a consensus on what needs to be done in preparation for emissions reductions and higher carbon prices.
In July 2011, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) agreed to a range of technical and operational measures for new and existing vessels to help control emissions through increased fuel efficiency, including an energy-efficiency design index for new vessels and reductions in ship speed.
This will be implemented on new ships in 2015.170 Additionally, ports in northern Europe are switching to liquefied natural gas (LNG) in order to meet their target of 40-per-cent GHG reductions from 2005 levels by 2050, a target set by the EU for the shipping industry.
Two companies, Swedegas (Swedish infrastructure) and Vopak (Dutch oil and gas storage) have announced a $155.3-million investment in LNG in the port of Gothenburg.171 The International Air Transport Association (IATA) meanwhile has launched a global Carbon Offset Program, producing its offset guidelines, which included 19 IATA members in the program.172 At the beginning of 2012, the EU imposed a cap on the aviation industry’s carbon emissions by including commercial flights within and between EU ETS countries (except Croatia, until January 1, 2014) under the ETS.
The inclusion of flights to and from countries outside the ETS was deferred to allow time for an international solution to be reached regarding these emissions.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed, in October 2013, to develop a global market-based mechanism by 2016 to address international aviation emissions and to bring it into force by 2020.173 167 See Sustainable Apparel Coalition, “Current Members,” 2012, http://www.apparelcoalition.org/membership/.
168 Marc Gunther, “Behind the scenes at the Sustainable Apparel Coalition,” GreenBiz.com, July 26, 2012.
169 ibid.
170 European Commission, “Joint statement on emissions from shipping,” October 1, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012100101_en.htm.
171 Joao Peixe, “European Ships Switch to LNG to Cut Emissions and Comply with EU Law,” Oilprice.com, March 5, 2013, http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/European-Ships-Switch-to-LNG-to-Cut-Emissions-andComply-with-EU-Law.html.
172 IATA, “Fact Sheet: Carbon Offset,” updated June 2013, http://www.iata.org/pressroom/facts_figures/fact_sheets/pages/carbon-offsets.aspx.
173 European Commission, “Reducing emissions from the aviation sector,” November 13, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/.
28 The Insurance Sector The insurance industry is particularly involved in both assessing the risks of climate change and in addressing its negative consequences.
Mike Kreidler, insurance commissioner for the state of Washington, has even labeled climate change a “serious financial threat to the insurance industry.”174 Such financial worries have prompted the industry to become “a significant voice in world policy forums addressing [climate change], as well as a market force, investing at least $23 billion in emissions-reduction technologies, securities, and financing, plus $5 billion in funds with environmental screens, seeing risks to investments in polluting industries and opportunities in being part of the clean-tech revolution.”175 In fact, according to a study published in Science, 378 insurance entities in 51 countries are behind 1,148 climate change adaptation and mitigation activities, representing $2 trillion of industry revenue.176 Insurance companies even offer “pay-as-you-drive” car insurance, which calculates premiums based on distance driven.
Proponents of the initiative suggest it may reduce U.S. driving by 8 per cent and oil use by 4 per cent.177 Litigation A development that has potential repercussions for international commerce is action through the courts.
As Klaus Töpfer, then executive director of UNEP, commented in 2002, “Liability is the decisive economical instrument that demands commitment.”178 And, notwithstanding skepticism about the ultimate efficacy of such an approach,179 a growing number of cases has been brought; a sufficient number, in fact, for the British Academy to host a conference on the courts’ emergence as “battlefields in climate fights.”180 For the most part, the cases brought have been under national laws (with the United States leading the way), but some of the cases involve trans-border issues.
174 ibid.
175 ScienceDaily, “Insurance Industry Paying Increasing Attention to Climate Change,” December 13, 2012, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/12/121213142311.htm.
176 ibid.
177 ibid.
178 Klaus Töpfer, general director UNEP, cited in GermanWatch, “Climate Change: Challenges Tuvalu,” 2004.
179 See, for example, the skeptical assessment by Shi-Ling Hsu, “A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit,” University Of Colorado Law Review 79 (July 2008): 101-165.
180 See: Mairi Dupar, “Climate change litigation – a rising tide?” May 3, 2012, http://cdkn.org/2012/05/postcard-fromlondon-rising-tide-of-climate-change-litigation/.
For a recent survey of transnational practice regarding climate change litigation, see Climate Change Liability Transnational Law and Practice, ed.
Richard Lord et al.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
29 For example, in 2009, the Federated States of Micronesia filed suit against the Czech CEZ Corporation regarding the latter’s proposal to extend by 25 years the life of the Prunéřov coalfired power station, Europe’s dirtiest power plant, emitting 11.1 million tons of CO2 annually.
This was the first instance of the international law principle of trans-boundary harm being applied to climate change.181 The Micronesian islands are among the most threatened territories from sea-level rise and they have petitioned for multilateral action to limit global warming to 1.5°C.
In recent years, abnormally high tides have damaged the soil and salted aquifers, making it impossible to grow staple foods and forcing the government to make emergency shipments of rice and drinking water, at a cost of 7 per cent of its budget.182 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found in favour of Micronesia, requiring CEZ to take measures to offset its emissions.
As a result of this precedent, the Inupiat Eskimos of Alaska sued 19 U.S. oil and utility companies based on the fact that the companies’ GHG emissions are melting the sea ice on which the Inupiats’ town is founded, forcing residents to move the community at a cost of $400 million.183 In this case, the original defendant, AES, assigned responsibility for the defence to its insurer, Steadfast, which contested this assignment.
The case generated great interest since it addressed the question of whether an insurance company has to “foot the bill for a company facing damages over climate change.”184 Moreover, it was the first such case to reach an appellate court.185 The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately held that an insurer has no duty to defend or indemnify against climate-change-related injuries under the terms of its general commercial-liability insurance policy.
However, as a number of observers have pointed out, the court’s specific judgment would have little precedential force outside of Virginia, because it was narrowly based on the interpretation of the specific language in the legal contract.186 In a related case, the island of Palau has requested an opinion from the ICJ regarding the responsibilities that GHG-emitting states have for the harm their emissions cause to the small island states.187 Korman and Barcia188 argue that an ICJ advisory opinion could help create a 181 Rachel Morris, “The People v. CO2: The coming tide of international climate lawsuits,” Slate, April 20, 2010.
182 ibid.
183 See Brian A. Bender and Marina Gutman, “A Gathering Storm: New Developments in Climate Change Litigation,” For The Defense (2010): 50-55, for a summary of the case.
184 Lawrence Hurley, “Va.
Court Rules That Insurance Doesn’t Cover Global Warming Claims,” The New York Times, September 16, 2011.
185 Jason Johnston, “Virginia Supreme Court Limits Insurer's Duty to Defend in Climate Change Lawsuits,” The Federalist Society for Law and Policy Studies (January 4, 2013): 4-5, 13-14.
186 See, for example: Cecilia O’Connell Miller, “Climate Change Litigation in the Wake of AEP v. Connecticut and AES v. Steadfast: Out to Pasture, but Not Out of Steam,” Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal 5 (2012): 343-375; and Johnston, “Virginia Supreme Court.” 187 See, for example, Rachel Brown, “The Rising Tide of Climate Change Cases,” The Yale Globalist, March 4, 2013; and Halley Epstein, Climate Change and the International Court of Justice (New Haven CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, 2013).
Note that the small island state of Tuvalu had previously discussed the possibility of bringing suit at the ICJ against the United States and Australia for failure to stabilize GHG emissions, thereby causing sea-level rise that threatens its territory.
However, the application was not made as a result of a change in Tuvalu’s government.
See, for example, GermanWatch, “Climate Change: Challenges Tuvalu.” Note that the choice of targets in Tuvalu’s considerations reflected the fact that the United States and Australia had attained “pariah state” status for forcefully repudiating Kyoto.
See: Hsu, “A Realistic Evaluation,” note 10.
188 Aaron Korman and Giselle Barcia, “Rethinking Climate Change: Towards an International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion,” Yale Journal of International Law 37 (2012): 36-42.
30 new international norm against trans-boundary harm caused by GHG emissions and clarify the principles against which state action could be measured, facilitating negotiations towards an inclusive, binding agreement at the UNFCCC.
Regardless, Matthew Pawa, one of the attorneys that worked on the Inupiat lawsuit, likens these climate cases to the court battles surrounding the tobacco and asbestos companies: “Just by bringing these cases over and over again, the judiciary [and] the public get used to the idea of liability.”189 A third trans-border case involved the unsuccessful challenge to the EU ETS scheme by the U.S. airline industry before the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Of particular note is the combative tone of the industry in response to the judgment and the forum-shopping it signaled in its statement following the decision: “Today’s court decision further isolates the EU from the rest of the world and will keep in place a unilateral scheme that is counterproductive to concerted global action on aviation and climate change.
The court did not fully address legal issues raised and has established a damaging and questionable precedent by ruling that the European Union can ignore the Chicago Convention and other longstanding international provisions that have enabled governments around the world to work cooperatively to make flying safer and more secure, and to reduce aviation’s environmental footprint.
Today’s decision does not mark the end of this case and Airlines for America (A4A) is reviewing options to pursue in the English High Court.
At the same time, the U.S. government and dozens of others around the world are increasing pressure on the EU to come back to the table to consider a global sectoral approach.”190 At the national level, the United States has been the main testing ground for climate change litigation.
While a full survey of this activity is well beyond the scope of the present paper, two key points have emerged: (a) U.S. court decisions have established the right of private parties to require governments to regulate on climate change issues where these fall within the ambit of existing law; and (b) the courts have become a battleground.
189 Morris, “The People v. CO2.” 190 Airlines for America, “A4A Comment on European Court of Justice Decision,” December 21, 2011, http://www.airlines.org/Pages/news_12-21-2011.aspx.
31 As of 2007, at least 35 cases involving climate change arguments had been filed,191 and there have been many more since,192 under various statutes including the Clean Air Act (CO2 as pollution),193 the Clean Water Act (CO2 as contributing to ocean acidification), 194 the Endangered Species Act (climate-change-related destruction of habitat),195 and the Global Change Research Act (failure of the federal government to carry out required research on climate change).196 Most prominent is the 2007 case, Massachusetts et al.
v. EPA et al., in which a group of private petitioners, cities, and agencies joined the State of Massachusetts and 11 other states to sue the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for failure to regulate automobile emissions contributing to climate change, thus endangering public health and safety.
The case went to the Supreme Court, which found that (a) the case was justiciable; (b) the harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized; (c) given the EPA’s failure to dispute the existence of a causal connection between manmade GHG emissions and global warming, its refusal to regulate such emissions, at a minimum, “contributed” to Massachusetts’ injuries; and (d) while regulating motor-vehicle emissions may not by itself reverse global warming, it does not follow that the court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether the EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.
While the Supreme Court decision was controversial on the first point,197 the other aspects of the decision provide a basis for courts to rule on climate-change-related suits.
The court ruled that GHGs are indeed “air pollutants” and should be considered as such under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
It further ordered the EPA to conclude scientifically whether new motor vehicles’ GHG emissions endanger public health and welfare.
In December 2009, the EPA issued an endangerment finding, which concluded that six classes of GHGs cause global climate change and that new motor vehicles contribute to GHG pollution, further endangering public health and welfare.
This led to the imposition in May 2010 (taking effect in January 2011) of the Tailpipe Rule, which established GHG-emission standards for light-duty motor vehicles created between 2012 and 2016.
Various state and industry group petitioners subsequently challenged these actions (as well as its Timing and Tailoring rules, which imposed construction and operating permit requirements on large, stationary GHG producers, such as power plants, refineries, and cement-production facilities), alleging that the CAA does not allow for these regulations and that they are otherwise “arbitrary and capricious.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed on all points.198 191 Michael B. Gerrard, “Survey of Climate Change Litigation,” Environmental Law 238, 63 (September 28, 2007).
192 See the U.S.
Litigation Charts maintained by the Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University.
The center also maintains non-U.S.-litigation charts.
Center for Climate Change Law, “Resources,” 2013, http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources#litigation-charts, under “Litigation Charts.” 193 For example: Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
194 Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA; for a discussion, see Robin Kundis Craig, “Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now What?” Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 1, 1 (2010): 949.
195 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Kempthorne, (E.D.
Cal.
2007).
196 Center for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, (N.D. Cal.
2007).
197 For a discussion, see: David S. Green, “Massachusetts v. EPA Without Massachusetts: Private Party Standing in Climate Change Litigation,” University of California, Davis, Environs 36, 1 (2012): 35-63.
198 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Clean Air Act Cases,” 2012, http://www.c2es.org/federal/courts/clean-airact-cases.
In fact, this finding stated that not only were the endangerment finding and the Tailpipe Rule not arbitrary or capricious, but also that the EPA's CAA interpretation with regards to stationary sources is “unambiguously correct.” 32 A subsequent case that also went to the Supreme Court, Connecticut v. American Electric Power (AEP), is particularly notable in that the Supreme Court ruled that the CAA, and the EPA’s ongoing steps to implement the CAA, displaced a federal common-law public-nuisance claim to limit CO2 emissions.
While this effectively removed this path to a remedy through the federal courts, it did not preclude pursuit of remedies: “… in narrowing its holding to displacement, the Supreme Court in AEP declined to rule on preemption and the viability of state law tort claims, which the plaintiffs also pled.
Rather than forestall the filing of future climate change litigations, the AEP holding simply crystallizes the forum and the likely claim, namely, state-law nuisance.
In several respects, state courts present a more hospitable forum for such litigation.
Thus, by relegating these claims to state courts, hence implicitly authorizing such claims to continue in those forums, the Court’s decision in AEP may effectively increase the number of climate change litigations filed in state courts in the coming years.”199 While the consequences for the trading system are far from clear at this point, the important takeaway point is that this activity is not going away, but apparently building.
Moreover, as it has commercial consequences, there are likely to be knock-on effects for the trading system in due course.
THE INTERSECTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE MEASURES AND TRADE RULES Squaring Climate-Change-Mitigation Measures with Trade Rules There is no inherent incompatibility between environmental and trade rules.200 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both have articles (Arts 3.5 and 2.3 respectively) that provide that “measures taken to combat climate change should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”201 Meanwhile, preservation of the environment is enshrined as a fundamental principle of the WTO,202 199 Miller, “Climate Change Litigation.” 200 This issue was exhaustively studied in the 2000s as the first wave of concern with trade and climate change was building.
See, for example: World Trade Organization, Trade and Environment at the WTO (Geneva: WTO, 2004); Daniel C. Esty, “Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 3 (2001): 113-130; and Duncan Brack and Kevin Gray, “Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, September 2003.
201 World Trade Organization, “Activities of the WTO and the challenge of climate change,” 2013, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_challenge_e.htm.
202 The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO reads in salient part that members’ “relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted … in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so.” See: World Trade Organization, “Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,” 1994, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/wto_agree_e.htm.
33 alongside the objective to reduce barriers and eliminate discriminatory practices in international trade relations.
Discussions among WTO members of the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) indicate a general consensus that a successful outcome of the DohaRound trade negotiations would have delivered a “triple-win” in terms of trade, environment, and development:203 • For the environment, by improving countries’ ability to obtain high-quality environmental goods at low cost or by enhancing the ability to increase production, exports, and trade in environmentally beneficial products; and by encouraging the use of environmental technologies, which can in turn stimulate innovation and technology transfer; • For development, by assisting developing countries in obtaining the tools needed to address key environmental priorities as part of their on-going development strategies; and • For trade, by making environmental goods and services (EG&S) less costly and allowing efficient producers of such technologies to find new markets.204 Unfortunately, the negotiations to reduce barriers to trade in EG&S have stalled with the Doha Round.
There is a general consensus that the ideal way to handle trans-boundary environmental issues is through a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA).205 There are some 200 MEAs in force at present, of which 20 incorporate trade measures.206 The experience in reconciling MEAs with WTO rules has been positive: no formal dispute involving an MEA measure has so 203 WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, “Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Manuel A. J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee,” TN/TE/20, April 21, 2011.
204 The WTO points to a World Bank study finding a 14-per-cent trade gain from eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers on EG&S.
Exactly what trade liberalization in this area might mean commercially is, however, highly uncertain.
Paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Declaration called for reduction/elimination of tariffs and non‐tariff barriers on “environmental goods and services” but provided no definition, leaving this open to negotiation.
A narrow definition focuses on abatement solutions (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries).
A broader definition includes goods produced with environmentally friendly technologies or having environmentally beneficial characteristics, such as biodegradability; see: World Bank, International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal, and Institutional Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007), 12.
The OECD has 164 goods on its environmental-goods list, APEC has 109, and the “Friends of EGs” group of WTO Members has 153; see Fahmida Khatun, Trade Negotiations on Environmental Goods and Services in the LDC Context (New York: UNDP, August 2010).
However, as shown in Ronald Steenblik, “Environmental Goods: A Comparison of the APEC and OECD Lists,” OECD Trade and Environment Working Paper 2005-04 (2005), 11, Table 2, only 27 per cent of the OECD and APEC lists actually overlap and the combined list totals 194 products.
The WTO CTE, meanwhile, compiled a comprehensive list of 408 EGs based on WTO Members’ lists.
Negotiations in the WTO include not only coverage, but also the mapping of EG definitions to HS codes.
The WTO-recognized six-digit HS Code, in many cases, groups EGs with other products that may not necessarily be classified as being environmentally beneficial (to complicate matters further, the comprehensive WTO CTE list was compiled based on the now badly outdated 2002 HS Code).
205 See, for example, Gary P. Sampson, “Effective multilateral environment agreements and why the WTO needs them,” The World Economy: Global Trade Policy 24, 9 (September 2001): 1103-1134.
206 See, World Trade Organization, Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, WT/CTE/W/160, Rev.2, TN/TE/S/5, 25 April 2003.
34 far been brought to the WTO,207 several MEA secretariats are observers in the WTO’s Trade and Environment Committee, and there has been extensive co-operation and information exchange between the WTO and MEA secretariats.208 The Montreal Protocol on ozonedepleting substances is the poster child for successful implementation of an environmental agreement that includes trade restrictions as an incentive for compliance that were accommodated within the GATT/WTO trade rules.209 This experience provides a basis for some optimism concerning the prospects for an eventual similar, seamless integration of multilaterally sanctioned climate change measures with multilateral trade rules.
Armed with a newly-reached multilateral climate change agreement that provides for mitigation measures, and given the guidance of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the legal principles of “lex specialis” (the more specialized agreement prevails over the more general) and of “lex posterior” (the agreement signed later in date prevails over the earlier one), WTO panels and the Appellate Body would likely be able to resolve disputes in a generally satisfactory and widely-accepted manner.
Moreover, the International Standards Organization (ISO) is negotiating standards for climate change (and has already adopted four standards regarding requirements for quantification and reporting of GHG emissions and reductions)210 and the WTO could look to these less political forums for standards that have some legitimacy when addressing technical questions.
That being said, the scale of the problems addressed successfully to date is vastly smaller than that of climate change.
Moreover, a multilateral climate change agreement has yet to materialize and mitigation measures are being implemented outside of a MEA.
207 A number of cases have come before the WTO involving national environmental laws.
These raised concern within the environmental-policy community about trade rules restricting the ability to address environmental issues.
As well, in one instance, a process was initiated that would have tested the relationship between an MEA and GATT rules.
In that case, a WTO panel was established at the request of the European Communities to address a dispute with Chile over swordfish landings by European vessels in Chilean ports, and a separate process was launched by Chile before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2000.
Both proceedings were suspended, however, avoiding the possibility of different rulings emanating from the two tribunals concerning the relationship between GATT rules and rights and obligations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
See: World Trade Organization, Trade and Environment at the WTO.
It should also be borne in mind that, as the WTO’s internal discussion on trade and climate change has emphasized, existing panel and Appellate-Body decisions on trade and environment do not establish precedents.
Moreover, the discussions in the WTO CTE show that no easy consensus was reached on the details of an agreement on trade and climate change, as indicated by debate over the meaning of terms such as “mutual supportiveness,” “no subordination,” “deference,” and “transparency.” 208 See: World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, “Summary Report on the Seventeenth Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, 1-2 March 2007: Note by the Secretariat,” TN/TE/R/17, April 18, 2007.
209 See UNEP, Vital Ozone Graphics: 25th Anniversary of the Montreal Protocol, 3rd ed.
(Geneva: Division of Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE) OzonAction Branch, GRID-Arendal, Zoï Environment Network, and the Ozone Secretariat, 2012).
Because of the incentive for producers in complying parties to shift production to nonparties, trade measures were introduced, banning export to and import from non-parties, not only of the substances but also of the technology to produce the substances.
Accordingly, during the phase-out period, non-party exporters lost markets in the complying states and non-party importers faced supply restrictions.
Alongside the trade restrictions, positive measures were implemented to facilitate compliance by developing countries.
The trade restrictions thus worked to create an incentive to join the Protocol.
Non-compliance by parties could result in trade bans in the controlled substances and suspension of the positive measures.
The Protocol did not include other punitive enforcement mechanisms.
Given the importance of near-total coverage of production of CFCs, the trade measures were an important mechanism for ensuring success of the initiative; at the same time, their accommodation under the GATT agreement precluded any conflict with the multilateral trade rules.
For a discussion, see: Donald M. Goldberg et al., “Effectiveness of Trade & Positive Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Lessons from The Montreal Protocol,” prepared for the United Nations Environment Programme by the Center for International Environmental Law, CIEL, 1997.
210 See World Trade Organization.
“Activities of the WTO.” 35 Trade and Climate Change: Emerging Conflicts CONFLICT SPILLOVER: FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO TRADE Climate change represents, in some sense, the accumulated negative externality associated with the economic gains of two centuries’ worth of industrialization.
The bill is coming due, but no funds have been set aside to cover it.
To carry the metaphor forward, nature is an uncompromising creditor and the debt cannot be rescheduled, there are no tidy records to apportion the necessary haircuts, and there is no bankruptcy court to enforce an orderly settlement.
In a “sauve-qui-peut” scramble, the international community is seizing the non-cooperative lose-lose-lose outcome implied by the failure to reach the co-operative win-win-win outcome described hopefully in official discussions.
What does that scenario look like?
The conflicts and tensions that prevented successful conclusions of trade and climate change talks in the Doha/Doha scenario have not disappeared; rather they are waiting to express themselves in new forms.
Taking as a given that the knowledge and capability is there to arrest climate change, the issue is one of investment.
The amounts required are large and uncertain and it is highly likely that the risk-return metrics are such that the private sector will not step forward to make the funds available.
Rather, the climate change debts will have to be largely socialized and paid for with taxes.
But while the public will be footing the bills, the agents that deliver the solutions will mostly be private companies: manufacturing solar panels, providing mitigation engineering services or energy audits, or introducing new energy-efficient production technologies, for example.
By the same token, governments will have every incentive to (a) position their support for mitigation initiatives as support for “future growth industries” and (b) prevent leakage of economic benefits to third parties in the absence of agreed burden sharing.
And there is no lack of evidence that this is happening.
For example, China reportedly provided $47.5 billion of credit to its solar panel industry “to wrest supremacy from Germany, Japan and the United States.”211 President Obama, meanwhile, in his 2012 State of the Union address, stated the following: “In three years, our partnership with the private sector has already positioned America to be the world’s leading manufacturer of high-tech batteries.
Because of federal investments, renewable energy use has nearly doubled … I will not cede the wind or solar or battery industry to China or Germany because we refuse to make the same commitment here.”212 In Germany, which is breaking solar energy production records from month to month, solar energy producers are going bankrupt.
The dynamic in solar is following the pattern set in the DRAM (digital-storage) wars of the 1980s, (as discussed below).213 211 Bloomberg, “Sun has set on China’s bid to build solar economy,” September 10, 2013.
212 The New York Times, “President Obama’s State of the Union Address,” January 25, 2012.
213 For an account of the DRAM wars, see: Dan Ciuriak, “The Return of Industrial Policy,” working paper, May 7, 2013; and Kenneth Flamm and Peter C. Reiss, “Semiconductor Dependency and Strategic Trade Policy,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics 1 (1993): 249-333.
36 The clash with trade rules, which provide no “green box” for environmental subsidies214 and condemn specific subsidies and local-content requirements, is teed up.
By the same token, the spillover into the trading system of the failure to establish multilaterally-agreed burden sharing in the climate change forums seems pre-ordained.
Thus, as production and trade in biofuels have grown to meet GHG-reduction targets, pressures for trade protection have also grown in that sector.
The WTO reports that, since 2000, 37 measures on biofuels have been notified by 20 WTO members in the context of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.215 More recently, a slew of measures have been taken under anti-dumping and anti-subsidy law with respect to solarand wind-power generation, in some cases in thinly disguised tit-for-tat retaliatory fashion.
• On January 6, 2012, the United States announced it would launch an investigation into subsidization of wind-power equipment from China and Vietnam.216 • On September 6, 2012, the EU announced that it had opened an anti-dumping investigation into imports of Chinese solar panels worth 21 billion euros (US$26.5 billion) in 2011, making this the largest anti-dumping investigation ever.
The complaint was lodged by EU ProSun, an ad hoc association representing more than 20 European companies producing solar panels and their key components.217 • On November 7, 2012, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) affirmed the antidumping and countervailing measures, resulting in combined anti-dumping-duty and countervailing-duty rates of 23.75 per cent to 254.66 per cent.218 • On November 8, 2012, the EU launched an anti-subsidy investigation into the same products.219 • On November 26, 2012, China initiated an investigation into imports, from the U.S., South Korea, and the EU, of polysilicon, the main input into production of solar panels; Chinese authorities indicated that they would also investigate U.S. and EU subsidies for polysilicon makers.220 214 The “green box” for allowable environmental subsidies established in the Uruguay Round was allowed to expire in 2000 and has not been replaced, but environmentally damaging fossil-fuel subsidies have been tolerated within the WTO system.
215 World Trade Organization.
“Activities of the WTO.” 216 U.S. International Trade Commission, Utility Scale Wind Towers from China and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: USITC, 2012).
217 European Commission, “EU initiates anti-dumping investigation on solar panel imports from China,” Memorandum 12/647, September 6, 2012.
218 The original complaint was filed on Oct. 19, 2011 by a number of U.S.-based solar manufacturers.
On March 20, 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce made an affirmative preliminary determination in the countervailing-duty investigation and, on May 17, 2012, in the companion anti-dumping investigation.
Definitive dumping and countervailing-duty finds were announced by the commerce department on Oct. 10, 2012.
See ChinaGlobalTrade.com, China’s Solar Industry and the U.S. Anti-Dumping/Anti-Subsidy Trade Case, May 2012, http://www.chinaglobaltrade.com/sites/default/files/china-global-trade-solar-manufacturing_may2012_0.pdf.
219 European Commission, “EU initiates anti-dumping investigation on solar panel imports from China,” Memorandum 12/844, November 8, 2012.
220 Feifei Shen, “China Starts Dumping Probe Into Polysilicon From U.S., Europe,” Bloomberg, November 26, 2012.
37 • On February 28, 2013, the EU announced it was initiating a new dumping investigation into imports of solar glass from China.
The complainant was ProSun Glass; the EU market in this case is relatively small at less than 200 million euros in annual sales.221 CONFLICT SPILLOVER: FROM TRADE FRICTION TO WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT The inevitable spillover of trade frictions into the WTO’s dispute-settlement system is also underway.
A series of climate-change related trade actions and disputes have been initiated: • On September 13, 2010, Japan requested consultations with Canada regarding the domesticcontent requirements in Ontario’s feed-in tariff program (the “FIT Program”).
• On December 22, 2010, the United States requested consultations with China with respect to measures concerning wind-power equipment.222 • On August 11, 2011, the EU also requested consultations with Canada regarding Ontario’s FIT program.
• On August 23, 2012, Argentina requested consultations with the EU and Spain concerning a Spanish measure that denied eligibility of biofuel imports to meet the EU-mandated biofuel targets.223 • On November 5, 2012, China requested consultations at the WTO with the EU regarding measures that affect the renewable-energy-generation sector.224 The challenge addressed domestic content restrictions related to the feed-in tariff of EU Member States, including, but not limited to, Italy and Greece.
• On February 6, 2013, the United States requested consultations with India over domestic content requirements in its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission program, which is a key part of India’s climate change program.
Japan and Australia joined the consultations.
On August 4, 2013, the consultations concluded without an agreement being reached.225 On 221 European Commission, “EU initiates anti-dumping investigation on solar glass from China,” Memorandum 13/153, February 28, 2013.
222 See: World Trade Organization, “China — Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment,” WT/DS419/1 G/L/950 G/SCM/D86/1, January 6, 2011.
223 World Trade Organization, “European Union And A Member State — Certain Measures Concerning The Importation Of Biodiesels, Request for Consultations by Argentina,” WT/DS443/1 G/TRIMS/D/30 G/L/994, August 23, 2012.
Australia and Indonesia joined the consultations and on Dec. 6, 2012 Argentina requested the establishment of a panel.
This action was suspended after Spain withdrew the measures.
Spain adopted the measure in retaliation for Argentina’s nationalization of the controlling interest held by Spain’s Repsol SA in Argentinian oil company YPF SA, which is also Argentina’s largest employer and second-leading exporter.
While the nationalization of YPF could not be challenged under WTO rules, the Spanish government signaled that it would take “decisive” action against Argentina.
However, the measure it chose could be challenged under WTO rules and Spain was forced to retreat.
This incident is noteworthy in terms of the revealed strength of the WTO rules as far as they go.
224 World Trade Organization, “European Union and certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector,” WT/DS452/5, November 5, 2012.
225 See, World Trade Organization, “India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules,” DS456, March 13, 2013, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm.
38 April 18, 2013, India filed a communication in the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that posed a series of questions to the United States concerning a number of federal and state subsidy programs to promote renewable energy that India indicated had local content requirements.226 • On February 6, 2013, the United States requested consultations with India over domestic content requirements in its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission program, which is a key part of India’s climate change program.
Japan and Australia joined the consultations.
On August 4, 2013, the consultations concluded without an agreement being reached.225 On April 18, 2013, India filed a communication in the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that posed a series of questions to the United States concerning a number of federal and state subsidy programs to promote renewable energy that India indicated had local content requirements.226 • On May 15, 2013, Argentina requested consultations with the EU and its Member States regarding measures affecting importation of biodiesel and measures supporting the biodiesel industry (WTO DS459).
Further, there is an evolving conflict over the EU’s amendments to the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD).
This 2009 amendment, known as the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, requires fuel suppliers to reduce the GHG intensity of fuel for road transport by 6 per cent by 2020.
To do this, the EU is developing a methodology to differentiate the GHG outputs of different types of fuel.
The FQD draft proposal gives diesel produced from oilsands (natural bitumen) an emission value of 108.5 gCO2 eq/MJ (grams of CO2 per Mega Joule), while diesel from conventional crude has a value of 89.1 gCO2 eq/MJ.
227 This would put Canadian oilsands fuel at a significant trade disadvantage with regards to exports to the EU.
The FQD was not developed as a trade measure, but as a GHG-reduction technique to meet the EU’s other international commitments.
Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver has recently backed away from his threats to bring the EU to the WTO for trade relief, as Canada and the EU were in the midst of negotiations for the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).
On solar, while the European Commission accepted a price undertaking from Chinese exporters on August 2 2013, which the Commission indicates removes the harm from dumping, the parallel anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation continue.
The Commission has indicated it is prepared “to include the anti-subsidy investigation into the undertaking at the definitive stage, should such action be warranted.”228 Moreover, provisional duties would be applied if the volume of imports exceeds a volume limit specified in the undertaking agreement.
The risk of a wider EU-China trade spat has not yet been fully resolved.
226 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, “Questions Posed by India to the United States under Article 25.8 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures — State Level Renewable Energy Sector Subsidy Programmes with Local Content Requirements,” G/SCM/Q2/USA/59, April 18, 2013.
For a discussion see Liesbeth Casier and Tom Moerenhout, “WTO Members, Not the Appellate Body, Need to Clarify Boundaries in Renewable Energy Support,” IISD Commentary, July 2013.
227 Ab De Buck et al., Economic and environmental effects of the FQD on crude oil production from tar sands (Delft, Netherlands: CE Delft, May 2013).
228 European Commission, “European Commission continues anti-subsidy investigation on solar panels from China without duties,” Press Release, August 7, 2013.
39 THE CANADA – FIT DISPUTE The challenges by Japan and the EU to measures promoting the renewable-energy-generation sector in Canada229 have gone the distance.230 In light of the preceding discussion, this case is notable for several reasons.
• First, it targets measures implemented by a sub-national government taken under a climate change action plan explicitly for the purposes of meeting Canada’s international obligations to reduce GHG emissions.231 The sub-national government in this case is also out in front of its national government, which has become conspicuous for its lack of action on climate change.232 Recall the shift in leadership on climate change to sub-national levels.
• Second, the Ontario measures notably restrict the local content requirements to withinprovince companies, consistent with the “sauve-qui-peut” hypothesis.
• Third, as the Panel noted, the objectives of the FIT Program include enabling “new green industries through new investment and job creation” and the provision of “incentives for investment in renewable energy technologies.”233 This is consistent with the expectation of a blurring of environmental and industrial policy aims.
• Fourth, in the amicus brief jointly submitted by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA), and Ecojustice Canada, it was suggested that the Panel, in considering the applicability of the subsidies and countervailing measures (SCM) disciplines, give “due consideration to the special character of environmental measures,” which is the “green box” by another name.
• Fifth, the case proved too complex for the established WTO panels to reach a conclusion by the appointed deadlines, resulting in two extensions of the timetable to produce the reports; this is consistent with the concerns regarding lack of policy guidance from the legislative side of international law.
In brief summary, under Ontario’s FIT program, generators of electricity produced from specified forms of renewable energy are paid a guaranteed price per kilowatt-hour of electricity delivered into the Ontario electrical grid.
Eligibility to participate in the program is restricted to 229 World Trade Organization, “Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector,” WT/DS412/R, March 13, 2013; and World Trade Organization, “Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program,” WT/DS426/R, December 19, 2012.
230 See, World Trade Organization, “Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program,” August 8, 2013, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds426_e.htm.
231 See the amicus submission of Blue Green Canada, “WTO Called Upon to Dismiss Japan, EU Challenge to Canadian Renewable Energy Policy,” May 14, 2012, http://bluegreencanada.ca/node/75.
See Daniel Peat, “The Perfect FIT: Lessons for Renewable Energy Subsidies in the World Trade Organization,” LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources 1, 1 (2012): 43-66, for a description of the worldwide prevalence of feed-in tariff programs and their contribution to renewable-energy generation.
232 Climate Action Network, “Canada ranked as worst performer in the developed world on climate change,” ranked Canada as having the worst climate change policy of all wealthy nations, and the fourth-worst of all nations in its Climate Change Performance Index 2013.
233 World Trade Organization, “Canada — Measures Relating,” para.
7.109.
40 Ontario-based generators and depends on the purchase and use of certain types of renewableenergy-generation equipment sourced in Ontario in the design and construction of the facilities.
The complainants argued that the FIT program accorded less favourable treatment to imported equipment than that accorded to like products originating in Ontario, in violation of the national treatment obligation under GATT Article III:4; that the measures imposed domestic content requirements in violation of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), which prohibits requirements for “the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source”; and that the measures constituted a prohibited import-substitution subsidy under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).234 Canada argued that the measures constituted government procurement covered by the exemption in GATT III:8 and thus were not subject to WTO disciplines.235 Notably, Canada declined to incorporate the amicus briefs in its defence, thereby allowing the panels to disregard them.236 On December 19, 2012, the panels rendered a joint verdict, upholding the complainants’ claim that Canada was in violation of its national treatment obligation and the WTO restrictions on local content requirements.237 However, regarding the illegal subsidy claim, there was a divided ruling: the Panel’s majority dismissed the claim, but offered the observation that, if rates of return on the challenged contracts were compared with the average cost of capital in Canada for projects having a comparable risk profile in the same period, it might be possible to demonstrate a “benefit” under the terms of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.238 One member of the Panel, however, found that the complainants had in fact demonstrated a conferred “benefit” since the pricing offered to relatively high-cost and less-efficient suppliers enabled them to enter the wholesale electricity market, which they otherwise would not have been able to do.239 Both sides appealed particular aspects of the panels’ decision.240 The Appellate Body reversed some of the panels’ intermediate rulings, but upheld the main conclusions that the disputed contracts were not covered by the government procurement exclusions and therefore were covered by, and stood in violation of, the national treatment requirement and the prohibition on domestic content requirements.241 However, while the Appellate Body reversed the panels’ determination that the complainants had failed to establish a benefit under the SCM Agreement, it did not complete the analysis, leaving open the question of whether the challenged measures confer a benefit within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement and whether Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
234 ibid., para.
3.1 and 3.4.
235 ibid., paras 7.86 et seq.
236 ibid., paras 1.12–1.13.
237 ibid., paras 8.2–8.3.
238 ibid., para.
7.323.
239 ibid., paras 9.1 et seq.
240 World Trade Organization, “Canada — Certain Measures.” 241 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector; Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program,” WT/DS412/AB/R WT/DS426/AB/R, May 6, 2013, EU-143, 6.1 (a) (vi).
41 This dispute has important systemic implications on a number of counts.
First, the Appellate Body’s confirmation of the panels’ interpretation of the scope of the government procurement carve-out from WTO obligations clarifies that WTO law governing national treatment and local content requirements apply.
In the present case, this imposes the requirement to permit leakage through trade with respect to measures taken to deal with an issue on which there has been a breakdown in international co-operation.
In other words, trade law requires states that shoulder the costs of addressing climate change to give states that are free riders on climate change equal opportunity to the commercial benefits.242 This unsound combination — a breakdown in collective action in one sphere and the enforcement of multilateral rules in a related second sphere — is an instantiation of the classic “second-best” problem243 and is bound to express itself in numerous ways.244 Second, whereas trade law reinforced environmental policy in reducing the use of ozonedepleting substances by creating incentives to be inside the agreement rather than outside, in this case the reverse is true.
This consideration underscores the cost of not having an MEA in place: whereas a multilateral or plurilateral agreement would enable the parties inside the agreement to safely discriminate against non-parties, thereby mitigating the efficiency costs of local content requirements,245 this is not possible in the current circumstances.
Third, while the Appellate Body’s decision leaves residual uncertainty over the interpretation of the SCM for feed-in tariff programs, it provided a very detailed and important discussion.246 In particular, the Appellate Body emphasized the importance of taking into account both supply-side and demand-side structures in identifying the relevant market, making the following key points: • Under current technological circumstances, markets for solar-PVand wind-generated electricity can only come into existence as a matter of government supply-mix regulation and the definition of a certain supply mix by the government cannot in and of itself be considered as conferring a benefit within the meaning of the SCM Agreement;247 242 This is not to imply that the countries bringing the case are free riders themselves; the EU clearly is not, being well ahead of the international community.
Our point is much more fundamental: the Appellate Body requires allowing free ridership to any and all, including, in Ontario’s case, other provinces.
243 The original theory of second best is due to Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best,” Review of Economic Studies 24, 1 (1956): 11-32.
The essential point for the present narrative is that slavish insistence on first-best trade rules results in a politically untenable requirement to allow free ridership on climate change mitigation.
For a recent and interestingly nuanced comment on the theory of second best, see “Making the Second Best of It,” The Economist, August 21, 2007.
244 See, for example, the arguments made by Ellen Gould, “First, Do No Harm: The Doha Round and Climate Change,” CCPA Briefing Paper: Trade and Investment Series, March 2010, 16, on applying GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) rules to climate change measures.
245 See Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, Local Content Requirements and the Renewable Energy Industry – A Good Match?
(Geneva: ICTSD, May 2013) for a discussion of the efficiency costs of local content requirements.
246 Did the Appellate Body punt in not completing the analyses, as both Japan and the EU requested it to do?
The Appellate Body stated that it was “unable” to complete the analysis, implying that the facts in the case record were insufficient to allow a determination.
The EU appears to have anticipated this eventuality, as it further requested: “Should the Appellate Body be unable to complete the analysis,” that it “declare moot and of no legal effect [certain of] the Panel's findings and conclusions.” World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “Canada – Certain Measures,” para.
2.148.
247 ibid., 5.175.
42 • Renewables have very different supply characteristics than conventional energy sources and, therefore, electricity from different generation technologies is not substitutable at the wholesale level;248 • The definition of the energy-supply mix will generally reflect a variety of policy “imperatives,” including to reduce reliance on fossil fuels for sustainability reasons and to address the negative and positive externalities that are associated with conventionaland renewable-electricity production (respectively, one assumes);249 • Benefit benchmarks for solar-PVand wind-generated electricity should be found in the markets for solar-PVand wind-generated electricity that result from the supply-mix definition;250 and • On the demand side, electricity from different sources is not necessarily indistinguishable since consumers may be ready to pay more for electricity that draws on renewable sources.251 These clarifications of the Appellate Body’s views will, arguably, make it difficult for complainants to win a subsidy case on feed-in tariffs in the future.
The Appellate Body’s approach to the issue appears to be in the spirit of the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the German FIT program, the only prior judicial ruling on the subsidy aspects of a feed-in tariff, although it is based on very different grounds.
The ECJ deemed that the German program did not constitute a subsidy since there was no impact on a public budget; WTO rules allow a determination of an illegal subsidy even in the absence of budgetary impacts.252 This element of the Appellate Body’s decision has proved to be controversial — although not so much with regard to FITs: as Casier and Moerenhout,253 point out, some 99 countries now have FITs in place and a FIT without local content requirements is unlikely to be challenged in the first place.
Rather, as they and Lester254 both suggest, this interpretation in effect reopens a carve-out for green subsidies that lapsed with the green box as of January 1, 2000 and raises questions for how it might be applied in other contexts, in particular the potentially expansive reading that could be given to the following elaboration by the Appellate Body: “ … a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, government interventions that create markets that would otherwise not exist and, on the other hand, other types of government interventions in support of certain players in markets that already exist, or to correct market distortions therein.
Where a government creates a market, it cannot be said that the government intervention distorts the market, as there would not be a market if the 248 ibid., 5.176.
249 ibid., 5.177.
250 ibid., 5.190.
251 ibid., 5.177.
252 Marie Wilke, “Getting FIT for the WTO: Canadian green energy support under scrutiny,” BioRes 5, 1 (2011).
253 Casier and Moerenhout, “WTO Members.” 254 Simon Lester, “The AB Carves Out Some Policy Space for Clean Energy Subsidies,” International Economic Law and Policy Blog, May 6, 2013, http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2013/05/the-ab-carves-out-some-policyspace-for-clean-energy-subsidies.html.
43 government had not created it.
While the creation of markets by a government does not in and of itself give rise to subsidies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, government interventions in existing markets may amount to subsidies when they take the form of a financial contribution, or income or price support, and confer a benefit to specific enterprises or industries.” (at 5.188) The issue for the trading system here is that, in the absence of specific legislation dealing with clean energy, the attempt to give “green readings” to general law can cause unanticipated problems elsewhere.
The Appellate Body decision did not address two other key elements of a subsidy case: specificity and adverse effects.
Given the very narrow focus of a FIT, it seems difficult to conceive of a challenged FIT not being found to be specific (although Casier and Moerenhout caution that this is not an open-and-shut question, depending on how the measure is constructed).255 The more important issue, it seems, is adverse effects: since electricity grids are inter-connected, the integration of large amounts of intermittent electric power from solar and wind through export surges can cause trade friction, as has already happened in the case of Germany’s rapid expansion of renewable energy.256 These issues would likely come into play in non-FIT cases.
Finally, Canada’s decision not to mount an Article XX defence of the measures257 likely deprived the Appellate Body of the opportunity to build on its discussion of the use of this measure for climate change exceptions in Brazil – Tyres.258 255 We would note in passing that subsidies that address externalities ought to be specific to be efficient — the more specific the better.
For example, Gene Grossman, “Promoting new industrial activities: a survey of recent arguments and evidence,” OECD Economic Studies 14 (1990): 87-125, 118, commenting on the use of subsidies to promote new industries, observes that “arguments for industrial policy do not apply across the board, nor is there any presumption that the prerequisites for intervention to be beneficial will be satisfied for a majority of high-technology ventures.
The nature of the problem makes case-by-case analysis unavoidable” (emphasis added).
Further, while subsidization of abatement of a negative externality is clearly inferior in economic terms to taxing the cause of the externality, under the polluter-pays principle — see, for example, Alan O. Sykes, “The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,” John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 186 (2d Series), 2003, on this point — in a context where the appropriate remedy to climate change (a carbon tax) has not been widely applied — subsidization of abatement becomes imperative.
There is no obvious reason why, in this context, subsidies should be designed to be horizontal, which might reduce their effectiveness.
This points to an unsound construction in WTO law.
256 The issues so far have been limited to the engineering sphere (Poland and the Czech Republic are building switches to cut off excess green-energy surges) and have not spilled over into trade issues.
See Institute for Energy Research, “Germany’s Green Energy Destabilizing Electric Grids Wind,” January 12, 2013, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/01/23/germanys-green-energy-destabilizing-electric-grids/.
257 Peat, “The Perfect FIT,” 59-61, emphasizes the importance of a construction suitable for Article XX defence in his list of criteria.
258 See: World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,” AB2007-4, adopted December 17, 2007, para.
151.
Gould, “First, Do No Harm,” 5, draws attention to the relevance of the Appellate Body’s ruling in this case for possible climate change exceptions under Article XX.
The Appellate Body used climate change as an example of a problem where latitude needs to be granted to governments, although climate change was not an issue addressed in the case.
44 UNILATERAL MITIGATION AND BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENTS The various unco-ordinated measures to address climate change, coupled with the major differences in energy taxes across jurisdictions, have resulted in the emergence of a “two-speed carbon world.”259 Carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns inevitably arise in those countries that impose a carbon price.
These concerns are ultimately based on the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), which argues that, in a liberalized trade world, industry will move from the country with the more stringent environmental regulations to those with laxer regulations.260 The evidence is mixed on the significance of this phenomenon: the earlier literature261 characterized the effects as modest; more recently, Levinson and Taylor262 provide evidence that they are more significant than previously thought.
While the high degree of international competitiveness of countries that have long-standing carbon taxes in place (e.g., the Nordic countries and the Netherlands), it is clear that competitiveness and carbon-leakage concerns drive governments to considering border carbon adjustments (BCAs).263 BCAs address competitiveness concerns raised by domestic carbonrelated measures by charging an equivalent carbon price on imports and rebating the carbon price on exports.
BCAs also address carbon leakage, by reducing the concern that industry would move to carbon-intensive countries, thereby diluting the carbon reductions aimed for by cap-and-trade.264 There are also costs.
BCAs necessarily generate costs of administration and cost of compliance for firms.
There is a risk — indeed a good likelihood — that they will be abused for protectionist reasons; anti-dumping provides insights into how a BCA regime is likely to unfold in the latter regard, including the extent to which the system has been used for rentseeking protectionism, the recent rise of tit-for-tat retaliation, and the frequency of resorting to dispute settlement.
Use of BCAs is likely to be divisive, as was made clear when this issue was a hot topic at the Copenhagen COP.
BCAs also have been characterized by some analysts as 259 Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn, and Giovanni Ruta, “Trade, climate change and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments,” Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 92 (2012).
260 The early formulations of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis are due to Rüdiger Pethig, “Pollution, welfare, and environmental policy in the theory of comparative advantage," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2, 3 (1976): 160-169; and Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor, “Trade, Growth, and the Environment,” Journal of Economic Literature 42 (1994): 7-71.
Zhong Xiang Zhang, “Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns and Border Carbon Adjustments,” Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Nota di Lavoro 80 (2012), provides a recent survey.
261 See, for example, Adam B. Jaffe, Steven R. Peterson, and Paul R. Portney, “Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?” Journal of Economic Literature 33, 1 (March 1995): 132-163; and Matthew A. Cole, “Trade, the pollution haven hypothesis and the environmental Kuznets curve: examining the linkages,” Ecological Economics 48 (2004): 71-81.
262 Arik Levinson and M. Scott Taylor, “Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect,” International Economic Review 49, 1 (February 2008): 223-254.
263 For example, in the United States, Waxman-Markey included a requirement for importers to purchase emission allowances and a similar requirement is likely to be incorporated in any U.S. action on climate change (Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta, “Trade, climate change.”) 264 For a detailed description, see: Aaron Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned: Guidance on the elaboration and implementation of border carbon adjustment,” Entwined Policy Report 3 (November 2012).
45 generating economic-efficiency costs on grounds that they constitute trade protection.265 On the last issue we would argue that trade protection is only inefficient when markets are efficient; however, when markets are inefficient and fail to internalize significant costs, the corrective measure is efficient.266 Furthermore, even if the BCA is applied at an excessive level and thus provides a certain amount of (inefficient) protection, it remains a tax, which is the most efficient form of protection (i.e., it is a transfer payment rather than a deadweight cost of compliance).
While controversial, the scholarship on BCAs suggests that they can be accommodated within the WTO rules, but much depends on the legal interpretation of particular provisions of the GATT, and there is no existing scheme in place as a proof of concept.
There are daunting practical challenges to implementing such a scheme in a way that is environmentally efficient and non-trade-distorting, while remaining administratively feasible with reasonable levels of compliance costs on firms.
And there are non-trivial diplomatic issues that would arise from unilateral approaches.
That being said, the developments in tracking carbon in the corporate world are making the problems of measurement more tractable, and the Appellate Body’s decision in Canada – FIT signals that BCAs implemented in the context of a credible domestic carbon-mitigation policy could be accommodated within the WTO scheme.
We briefly review these issues below.
Accommodation Under WTO Rules WTO rules provide for internal taxes and charges that are applied to domestically-produced goods to be applied on an equivalent basis to imported goods.
Moreover, as Pauwelyn267 observes, “ … the flip-side of the right to impose a domestic tax also on imports is the right to rebate the same tax on domestic products that get exported.
Under WTO rules, such rebates are not considered to be prohibited export subsidies.” In general, the tax must be applied to the product and not the producer: i.e., it must be structured like an excise or value-added tax, which is levied on the product, but cannot be structured like a payroll tax that applies to the producer.268 The tax on imports can be applied at time of import (GATT Article II:2) or upon re-sale or use inside the border (GATT Article III:2).269 The same general principles would 265 For example: Joost Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO Law,” in Research Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO, ed.
D. Prevost and G. Van Calster (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2012), 5-7.
266 See Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta, “Trade, climate change,” for a discussion.
267 Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy, 17.
268 ibid., 17-18.
269 GATT Article II:2 provides that “Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time on the importation of any product: (a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III with respect to the like domestic product or with respect to an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.” The cross-referenced GATT Article III:2 states: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1 [which forbids measures that afford protection to domestic products].” For recent WTO jurisprudence, which elaborates definitively on the distinction between these two provisions, see WTO Appellate Body, “China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts,” WT/DS339/AB/R, adopted January 12, 2009, paras 158 and 164.
46 likely apply to the border adjustment for domestic measures that are imposed as regulations rather than taxes.270 This provides some leeway in terms of how a BCA might be structured, while remaining compatible with WTO obligations.
Much depends on the specifics of the domestic program and the framing of the corresponding border offsets.
Perhaps the most problematic issue regarding consistency with WTO law would arise if a domestic climate change policy were, for reasons of administrative convenience and compliance-cost efficiency, applied to producers, but the BCA were applied to imported products.
Pauwelyn271 argues that this still might pass WTO muster.
Since the domestic measure would be intended to internalize the social cost of carbon in the price of a product and thus to shift it forward to consumers, there would be a reasonably tight “nexus” between the tax and the products concerned: “Therefore, even if technically the carbon tax or charge were levied on producers based on emissions at the production site, rather than directly on products at the point of sale, such tax or charge could still be regarded as ‘applied … indirectly … to … products’.” The application of domestic process-related taxes to imports also raises issues.
For the most part, WTO law restricts the basis of comparison to characteristics of the product and not the production or process method that created it.
There is nonetheless some experience that border adjustment for production process can be accommodated under GATT rules: for example, in the 1987 GATT dispute US – Superfund, the panel determined that the United States could impose a domestic tax for certain chemicals on imported goods produced using the same chemicals; and the application by the United States of a domestic tax on ozone-depleting chemicals to imports produced with such chemicals was not challenged.272 Accordingly, there is a line of reasoning and some case history that suggests WTO rules can be read so as to accommodate BCAs, if implemented in the context of a credible domestic carbonmitigation program that imposed similar burdens on domestic producers (i.e., where the border measure is clearly an extension of domestic measure), including programs that impose burdens on producers or target production processes.
However, this remains to be tested.
270 See Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures,” 30-34, for a detailed exposition of this issue and a guide to the relevant WTO jurisprudence.
As to the question of whether a cap-and-trade system is a tax or a regulation, see Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures,” 35-41.
The European Court of Justice has ruled that it is a regulation.
Given the general equivalence between taxes and regulations, we pass over this issue, although it is obviously important from an implementation perspective.
271 Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy.
272 See Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures,” for a detailed discussion of these issues, including the issue of adjusting for taxes that are applied to upstream products or processes and are thus “hidden” taxes or, in GATT terminology, “taxes occultes.” 47 Implementation Issues Implementing the BCA on an equitable, non-discriminatory fashion, consistent with the WTO’s most-favoured-nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) principles raises numerous thorny challenges.
First, workable (and broadly accepted) measures would have to be developed to measure carbon content of products, both the import and the domestic like product.
As the BCA would be an extension of a domestic scheme, which imposes reporting requirements on domestic producers, similar documentation would be required for the imported products to enable the administering authority to apply the like tax to the like good.
For relatively non-complex goods this seems do-able, although there are inevitable complications for applying the tax to imports where the exporter could not supply the necessary data.273 However, for complex products, generated by globally fragmented production systems, where input components may be shipped intercontinentally or regionally, and where inputs may be produced with different processes, the problem is far greater.
The early approaches to measuring carbon content were not promising in this regard, as they often yielded widely different results for the same product.
As noted above, data-mining techniques are being developed by corporations to improve their own supply-chain efficiency and for marketing reasons, to attract “green” consumers; such methods promise to dramatically reduce compliance costs for firms and may provide credible carbon-content information for compliance with carbon-tax purposes.
Moreover, international agreements for shipping and air transport, which are progressing, would obviate the need to take differing carbon content, arising from mode and distance of transportation, into account in applying BCAs.
Accordingly, the outlook is not entirely bleak as regards the prospects for being able to construct environmentally-efficient measures of carbon content, even for complex goods produced in global value chains.
That being said, the institutional basis for application of such systems on an economy-wide basis is not in place.
Assuming these challenges can be overcome, the measure would still have to meet the MFN and national treatment obligation and not place a greater burden on imports than on domestic products.
To be environmentally-efficient and non-trade-distorting, a carbon tax paid in the exporting country should be adjusted for to avoid double carbon-taxation (this would parallel the various adjustments provided for under the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy codes).
Adjusting for price-based measures, such as carbon taxes, is conceptually straightforward (e.g., under value-added-tax, or VAT, schemes, VAT paid domestically on exported products is rebated to the exporter, while the importing jurisdiction levies its own VAT at its border).
The issue becomes very murky, however, when dealing with regulatory command/control measures and/or cap-and-trade schemes under which allowances may be obtained for free and may be traded internationally, and where the carbon tax paid by the producer on a given product under any allocation scheme varies continuously as the carbon price fluctuates.274 With 273 For a fuller discussion of this issue and the relevant WTO jurisprudence, see: Jennifer Hillman, “Changing Climate for Carbon Taxes: Who’s Afraid of the WTO?” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Climate and Energy Paper Series, 2013.
274 Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned,” entertain the possibility of giving calibrated credit for national or sectoral price-based regimes but not for non-price-based actions on grounds that the latter are too difficult to administer.
48 the United States adopting a regulatory approach to addressing climate change (with an admixture of sub-national carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes), the EU applying cap-andtrade schemes (with an admixture of sub-Union carbon taxes and regulatory schemes), and China applying regulatory approaches but moving towards a cap-and-trade scheme, there would appear to be a daunting problem of identifying environmentally-efficient and legallysustainable carbon border offsets that give due credit where credit is due.275 Article XX Environmental Exception If the implementation challenges are too difficult to allow the BCA scheme to meet the MFN and NT obligations, the scheme still might be safeguarded under WTO law by GATT Article XX(b) general exceptions for measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life and health; or Article XX(g), which addresses conservation of exhaustible natural resources.276 As an official body that defers to other official bodies on areas outside its expertise, given the UNFCC’s official pronouncements on the link between carbon emissions and climate change and the dangers of climate change, the WTO will in all likelihood accept any plausible scheme to reduce carbon emissions as fitting under either or both of these provisions.
The issues we would argue lie elsewhere.
For an Article XX defence to succeed, a plausible connection must be established between the stated environmental-policy goal (climate change mitigation) and the measure at issue (the BCA), it must satisfy a “least trade-restrictive” test, and it must meet an “even-handedness test” by imposing similar obligations on domestic interests.
In addition, the measure must pass the “smell test” in the chapeau to Article XX, which requires evidence of good faith that the BCA is not a disguised restriction on trade.
Practical guidance as to the type of circumstantial evidence the implementing country must be able to provide for establishing the environmental bona fides of its measures is provided by the WTO.
This includes evidence regarding the implementing country’s efforts in international forums and the flexibility it shows to others to comply with its requirements (which in this case would include providing flexibility to countries that might be assuming significant burdens of climate mitigation or developing countries, which are not responsible for the problems in the first place).
Cosbey et al.277 suggest also that the BCA be exclusively aimed at environmental goals and not competitiveness concerns.
275 We borrow this phrase from Hillman, “Changing Climate for Carbon,” who delves in detail into the issues to be faced in identifying the appropriate level of tax to apply to imports (7-9), and into how to accommodate taxes levied abroad (11).
276 Since international conventions and declarations refer to natural resources as including living species, threats posed by climate change to the extinction of species make carbon mitigation measures relevant to “exhaustible resources.” This point has been made by the World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” WT/DS58/AB/RW, DSR 2001.
277 Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned,” 9.
49 The Outlook for BCAs While the technical challenges are daunting — a major reason why BCAs have seen almost no application to date — the outlook is not entirely bleak.
Pauwelyn278 gives a cautious assessment that BCAs can be structured so as to be WTO-consistent, but warns that the devil is in the details; Hillman279 gives an upbeat conclusion on the possibility of making a BCA work in the U.S. context; Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta280 argue still more forcefully that not only can BCAs be compatible with the WTO rules and that they represent an efficiency-enhancing addition to the climate change toolkit, but they provide “perhaps the only way of making substantial and speedy progress.” Conversely, Cosbey et al.281 characterize a BCA as “at best a fall-back measure in the event of collective failure at the international level to define appropriate levels of national action.
At worst … a coercive, divisive and highly imperfect policy tool with serious methodological challenges.” At the same time, they provide detailed guidance on how to establish a BCA that is likely to pass WTO muster.
BCAs face three interconnected hurdles: overcoming resistance on technical grounds, overcoming trading-partner resistance, and passing WTO review.
A technically-sound BCA that accurately targets the carbon externality in a non-discriminatory fashion would not likely have adverse side-effects.
In turn, this would minimize resistance from trading partners (such as the EU experienced with its attempt to extend cap-and-trade to extra-EU flights landing in and departing from the EU).
Given that there is a way to read the relevant GATT provisions to allow a WTO panel to uphold the regime, it is difficult to see a panel or the Appellate Body not using those degrees of freedom to uphold the measure — if, of course, the defending country gave the panel half a chance.
A discriminatory or technically-challengeable BCA would meet strong pushback from trading partners and would thus have to be able to pass WTO review, probably under Article XX.
This might be a most difficult criterion to meet, if indeed it is necessary that the objectives be limited to environmental goals and not competitiveness concerns given the political imperative for implementing countries to demonstrate that the BCA does in fact address competitiveness concerns.
Ultimately, there is no bottom line on the viability of BCAs and there will not be one until they are seriously tried.
278 Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures.” 279 Hillman, “Changing Climate for Carbon.” 280 Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta.
“Trade, climate change,” 27.
281 Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned.” 50 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS After Doha and Doha, climate change and trade are colliding without agreed rules to sort out the problems.
In the absence of a multilateral consensus on climate change, unilateral measures are being implemented, including in systemically important economies, with varying levels of ambition and conditions, and are taking shape in differing technical forms.
Disciplines being imposed on business differ in terms of the costs imposed, and subsidies for renewable-energy development are being made both for industrial policy reasons and to meet sustainability objectives.
Moreover, in the face of generally weak action at the nation-state level, much of the public-sector action on climate change has moved to sub-national/municipal levels and into the courts.
Of particular concern going forward is that the approaches adopted by the major jurisdictions cannot easily be rendered coherent: the United States is using existing environmental legislation; the EU, a climate-change-specific framework centred on cap-andtrade; and China, a development framework heavy on technological development aimed at reducing the carbon intensity of GDP.
The Climate Action Plan released by the White House in June 2013 signaled the need for flexibility in any future multilateral agreement.
At the same time, the corporate world is placing its bets — as it must — with some companies fighting rear-guard actions to delay climate change measures (and lobbying governments to support them) and others moving to respond to both activist Boards and consumer preferences, and/or to take commercial advantage of the massive public investment that is required to address climate change.
Mainstream business has implemented strategic plans to increase environmental sustainability; although the pace of improvement has been modest, the tracing of carbon footprints in supply chains is likely to reshape market access based on the purchasing decisions of major multinationals.
The situation on the ground in terms of climate change impacts is developing along the lines of worst-case scenarios, with minimal progress in arresting global warming, and a more rapid onset of consequences than had been imagined.
Planning scenarios are now seriously considering double the amount of warming deemed to be “safe.” Such an extent of warming risks triggering natural positive feedbacks that would substantially compound the warming induced by human action.
In this regard, we observe that there is a clear disconnect between the scale of costs attributed to climate change in the core economic literature (a few percentage points of global GDP at most, with some positive estimates in the mix) and what appears likely in view of the scale of costs already being realized at less than 1°C of warming — not to mention the risk of much greater costs that the scientific community perceives in subjective evaluations.
For example, Nordhaus’ estimate of the cost of delaying acting on climate change is US$4 trillion, which is a fraction of the value of daily trading in financial markets or, put alternatively, a loss equivalent to a bad day on global stock markets.
It is hardly catastrophic, even if the loss were permanent.
The disconnect appears to reflect three things: the choice of relatively low stabilization points for global temperatures; the discounting of tail risks; and inadequate consideration of the degree to which existing patterns of urban formation are rendered sub-optimal and the implications for the value of sunk assets.
In the latter regard, while flora, fauna, and marine life are shifting pole-ward and towards higher altitudes, cities remain fixed in place and must adapt legacy infrastructure developed for a bygone climatic era.
The practical consequences include building up flood defences, revising building codes and zoning regulations, and even changing 51 the species of shade trees planted in urban forest programs — with adaptation costs measured in current dollars, not heavily discounted future dollars.
On top of this, the cumulative costs of weather-related disasters that the insurance industry links to climate change is growing rapidly.
Simply put, the reality seems more serious than serious economics has determined.
Popular perceptions are being shaped by very costly extreme weather events that are, in a probabilistic sense, being persuasively linked to global warming.
Moreover, public perception is out in front of governments on climate change.
If the results from the recent Pew global survey are taken at face value, climate change ranks first in the list of concerns; that cannot credibly be said to be the same among the governments of the major economies.
Political postures in the democratic zones will likely follow, however, even if with a lag.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the pressures are building.
Under the current post Doha/Doha circumstances, the trading system is having a decidedly negative impact on climate-change-mitigation efforts.
Competitiveness concerns are increasingly significant in a global economy that has reached an advanced stage of integration, with products increasingly “made in the world” and trade competition reaching ever deeper into production processes (“the great unbundling”).
This concern, together with pushback from trading partners, is clearly constraining unilateral action.
Consider the EU and Australia, which were the leaders at the Doha COP.
The EU has delayed implementing carbon charges on international flights landing in the EU under pressure from trading partners, and Australia is about to abandon its carbon tax — the measure that economists almost universally deem most appropriate — following a political campaign based on competitiveness concerns.
Moreover, the WTO decision in the Canada – FIT case, which ruled out local content requirements, will constrain local-tax-funded unilateral action on climate change since the industrial benefits cannot be captured locally but must be shared globally, including with firms in jurisdictions that may be free-riding on climate mitigation.
Arguably, this goes in the wrong direction.
Consider, for example, the solar-panel field, where climate-change-mitigation efforts in the absence of multilaterally-agreed burden sharing have fuelled industrial wars over new energy technology with the usual results of a battlefield littered with fallen bankrupts, distorted markets and inefficient use of public funds, and recourse to trade measures (including tit-for-tat retaliation) consistent with the predictions of strategic trade theory.
As a thought experiment, suppose that the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Canada – FIT regarding the creation of new industries had been reflected in a WTO carve-out for local content restrictions in situations where – governments support the establishment of a new industry that would otherwise not take root, in a context where – there are significant positive externalities associated with the new industry and significant negative externalities associated with the industry that it would eventually supplant, and where – there is no multilateral agreement in place to support the establishment of the new industry and to appropriately allocate burdens to ensure that all have a fair opportunity to share in the industrial benefits through trade.
52 Such a carve-out would have allowed the EU and U.S. solar-panel industries to develop on the basis of EU and U.S. domestic-consumption subsidies, without risk of leakage to third jurisdictions.
Logically, as the risk of leakage rises, so does the propensity to shift the subsidy from consumption to production, since a consumption subsidy can be exploited by third countries, whereas a producer subsidy cannot.
Accordingly, the local content requirement (a bad thing in and of itself in a first-best world) would encourage a good thing (avoiding producer subsidies, which generally turn out badly).
The pluralization of the local content requirements through WTO-sanctioned preferential agreements would then have allowed trade within the burden-sharing group to enable the usual gains from trade, while excluding non-burden-sharing parties.
In such circumstances, if China were to be considered a non-burden-sharing party, its ambitions on solar panels would have been channeled in the first instance into supporting adoption of solar panels in its own domestic market and secondarily would have led it to seek entry into an agreement with the other major burden-sharing jurisdictions in order to gain access to their markets in a manner analogous to the way the trade restrictions in the Montreal Protocol worked to promote membership in that agreement.
The novel element here is that, in place of an MEA, we hypothesize an approved derogation from an existing WTO restriction on local content requirements.
We offer as a conjecture that this might have largely spared the global community the negative aspects of the rivalry for domination of the solar-panel field.
Going in the other direction, the inevitable spillover of climate-change-motivated actions into dispute settlement, the long-feared result of trade conflict related to climate change, has in fact emerged.
Observers of the WTO have long been concerned about the ability of the dispute settlement system to survive a truly big dispute between the major economies.
Trade and climate change could put that theory to the test, with the single largest anti-dumping case (in terms of face value of trade affected) in the history of the GATT/WTO now underway (the EU’s investigation into solar panels from China), and still not fully resolved.
Both the trading system and the environment provide a public good with very large positive externalities — which is to say that there is a global commons in both spheres.
There has been very little success in managing any global commons outside the framework of effective multilateral instruments.
Thus, notwithstanding the “buzz” of the multiple parallel initiatives described above, the failure of Doha and Doha expose both of these two critical commons to risk.
Nature is sending warning shots over the bow in the form of an increased frequency of extreme weather events.
The trading system is sending warning shots over the bow in the form of a mounting caseload of trade-remedy actions and trade disputes in climate-related areas.
Since the trade conflict is a spillover from the unsettled conflict over who is to foot the bill for the unfunded liability that is climate change, the scale of the former is geared to the scale of the latter and thus may become very large indeed.
To summarize, three negative dynamics have emerged endogenously: trade linkages are inhibiting effective unilateral action due to industrial competitiveness concerns; activist governments are coming into conflict with trade rules, as they seek to prevent leakage of industrial benefits through trade; and industrial policy competition (including through strategic trade policy) has been induced, with the consequences spilling over into the trade-dispute system.
The central thesis of this paper is that failure to reach a co-operative burden-sharing agreement creates a classic “second-best” problem in that a “first-best” outcome on trade, 53 About the Authors Dan Ciuriak is Director and Principal, Ciuriak Consulting Inc. (Ottawa), Research Fellow with the CD Howe Institute (Toronto), and Associate with BKP Development Research & Consulting GmbH (Munich).
Previously, he was Deputy Chief Economist at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) with responsibility for economic analysis in support of trade negotiations and trade litigation, and contributing editor of DFAIT’s Trade Policy Research series.
Natassia Ciuriak is an associate with Ciuriak Consulting Inc. She holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy and Administration from Carleton University and a Bachelor’s in Political Science from McGill University.
given the current trade rules, may have decidedly negative effects in terms of inhibiting action of climate change, because it forbids discrimination against free riders on climate change mitigation.
At the same time, this feeds back onto the trading system in terms of generating trade conflicts.
The solution, we argue, is to bend the trade rules.
54 DISTRIBUTION Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors’ alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT Copyright © 2013 by The School of Public Policy.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief passages quoted in critical articles and reviews.
ISSN 1919-112x SPP Research Papers (Print) 1919-1138 SPP Research Papers (Online) DATE OF ISSUE November 2013 MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-453-0062.
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The School’s events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT For information about contributing to The School of Public Policy, please contact Courtney Murphy by telephone at 403-210-7201 or by e-mail at cdmurphy@ucalgary.ca.
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY The School of Public Policy will become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada.
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance for the betterment of our families, communities and country.
We do this by: • Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and nondegree programs, giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital interests both here and abroad; • Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures; • Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
55 The School of Public Policy University of Calgary, Downtown Campus 906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9 Phone: 403 210 7100 56 RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY ENHANCING THE ALBERTA TAX ADVANTAGE WITH A HARMONIZED SALES TAX http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/enhancing-alberta-tax -advantage-harmonized-sales-tax Philip Bazel and Jack M. Mintz | September 2013 ACCOUNTABILITY BY DESIGN: MOVING PRIMARY CARE REFORM AHEAD IN ALBERTA http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/accountability-design-moving-primary-care-reform-ahead-alberta Dr. Shannon M. Spenceley, Cheryl Andres, Janet Lapins, Dr. Robert Wedel, Dr. Tobias Gelber, L.M.
Halma | September 2013 WIRELESS COMPETITION IN CANADA: AN ASSESSMENT http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/wireless-competition-canada-assessment Jeffrey Church and Andrew Wilkins | September 2013 THE CANADIAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 2002-2008: WHY IS IT CALLED DUTCH DISEASE?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/canadian-manufacturing-sector-2002-2008-why-it-called-dutchdisease Stephen Gordon | September 2013 REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: POLICY DIRECTIONS http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/redistribution-income-policy-directions James Davies | August 2013 INCOME INEQUALITY AND INCOME TAXATION IN CANADA: TRENDS IN THE CENSUS 1980-2005 http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/income-inequality-and-income-taxation-canada-trends-census1980-2005 Kevin Milligan | August 2013 INCOME INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/income-inequality-redistribution-and-economic-growth Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | August 2013 DIPLOMACY, GLOBALIZATION AND HETEROPOLARITY: THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/diplomacy-globalization-and-heteropolarity-challenge-adaptation Daryl Copeland | August 2013 UNHEALTHY PRESSURE: HOW PHYSICIAN PAY DEMANDS PUT THE SQUEEZE ON PROVINCIAL HEALTH-CARE BUDGETS http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/unhealthy-pressure-how-physician-pay-demands-put-squeezeprovincial-health-care-budgets Hugh M. Grant and Jeremiah Hurley | July 2013 TRENDS, PEAKS, AND TROUGHS: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT CYCLES IN CANADA http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/trends-peaks-and-troughs-national-and-regional-employmentcycles-canada Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Gres | July 2013 << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Generic Gray Gamma 2.2 Profile) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (Uncoated FOGRA29 \050ISO 12647-2:2004\051) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /RelativeColorimetric /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /CMYK /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues false /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo true /PreserveOPIComments true /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Preserve /UCRandBGInfo /Remove /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile (None) /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 300 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None) /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /CreateJDFFile false /Description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> /CHS <FEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065876863900275284e8e9ad88d2891cf76845370524d53705237300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002> /CHT <FEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef69069752865bc9ad854c18cea76845370524d5370523786557406300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002> /CZE <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> /DAN <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> /DEU <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> /ESP <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> /ETI <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> /FRA <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> /GRE <FEFF03a703c103b703c303b903bc03bf03c003bf03b903ae03c303c403b5002003b103c503c403ad03c2002003c403b903c2002003c103c503b803bc03af03c303b503b903c2002003b303b903b1002003bd03b1002003b403b703bc03b903bf03c503c103b303ae03c303b503c403b5002003ad03b303b303c103b103c603b1002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002003c003bf03c5002003b503af03bd03b103b9002003ba03b103c42019002003b503be03bf03c703ae03bd002003ba03b103c403ac03bb03bb03b703bb03b1002003b303b903b1002003c003c103bf002d03b503ba03c403c503c003c903c403b903ba03ad03c2002003b503c103b303b103c303af03b503c2002003c503c803b703bb03ae03c2002003c003bf03b903cc03c403b703c403b103c2002e0020002003a403b10020005000440046002003ad03b303b303c103b103c603b1002003c003bf03c5002003ad03c703b503c403b5002003b403b703bc03b903bf03c503c103b303ae03c303b503b9002003bc03c003bf03c103bf03cd03bd002003bd03b1002003b103bd03bf03b903c703c403bf03cd03bd002003bc03b5002003c403bf0020004100630072006f006200610074002c002003c403bf002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002003ba03b103b9002003bc03b503c403b103b303b503bd03ad03c303c403b503c103b503c2002003b503ba03b403cc03c303b503b903c2002e> /HEB <FEFF05D405E905EA05DE05E905D5002005D105D405D205D305E805D505EA002005D005DC05D4002005DB05D305D9002005DC05D905E605D505E8002005DE05E105DE05DB05D9002000410064006F006200650020005000440046002005D405DE05D505EA05D005DE05D905DD002005DC05D405D305E405E105EA002005E705D305DD002D05D305E405D505E1002005D005D905DB05D505EA05D905EA002E002005DE05E105DE05DB05D90020005000440046002005E905E005D505E605E805D5002005E005D905EA05E005D905DD002005DC05E405EA05D905D705D4002005D105D005DE05E605E205D505EA0020004100630072006F006200610074002005D5002D00410064006F00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002E0030002005D505D205E805E105D005D505EA002005DE05EA05E705D305DE05D505EA002005D905D505EA05E8002E05D005DE05D905DD002005DC002D005000440046002F0058002D0033002C002005E205D905D905E005D5002005D105DE05D305E805D905DA002005DC05DE05E905EA05DE05E9002005E905DC0020004100630072006F006200610074002E002005DE05E105DE05DB05D90020005000440046002005E905E005D505E605E805D5002005E005D905EA05E005D905DD002005DC05E405EA05D905D705D4002005D105D005DE05E605E205D505EA0020004100630072006F006200610074002005D5002D00410064006F00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002E0030002005D505D205E805E105D005D505EA002005DE05EA05E705D305DE05D505EA002005D905D505EA05E8002E> /HRV (Za stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke.
Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 5.0 i kasnijim verzijama.)
/HUN <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> /ITA <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> /JPN <FEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002> /KOR <FEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /LTH <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> /LVI <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> /NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit.
De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
/NOR <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> /POL <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> /PTB <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> /RUM <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> /RUS <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> /SKY <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> /SLV <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> /SUO <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> /SVE <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> /TUR <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> /UKR <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> /ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing.
Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 5.0 and later.)
>> /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ << /AsReaderSpreads false /CropImagesToFrames true /ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue /FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false /IncludeGuidesGrids false /IncludeNonPrinting false /IncludeSlug false /Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (4.0) ] /OmitPlacedBitmaps false /OmitPlacedEPS false /OmitPlacedPDF false /SimulateOverprint /Legacy >> << /AddBleedMarks false /AddColorBars false /AddCropMarks false /AddPageInfo false /AddRegMarks false /ConvertColors /ConvertToCMYK /DestinationProfileName () /DestinationProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /Downsample16BitImages true /FlattenerPreset << /PresetSelector /MediumResolution >> /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [600 600] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice
7short comm.pmd A Manifestation of Climate Change?
78 SCIENCE DILIMAN (JULY-DECEMBER 2013) 25:2, 78-85 A Manifestation of Climate Change?
A Look at Typhoon Yolanda in Relation to the Historical Tropical Cyclone Archive Carlos Primo C. David Bernard Alan B. Racoma Jonathan Gonzales and Mark Vincent Clutario Environment Monitoring Laboratory National Institute of Geological Sciences University of the Philippines Diliman ABSTRACT The IBTRACS world database of tropical cyclone(TC) tracks was analysed to determine potential historical trends in TC characteristics for the west Pacif ic basin.
Trends are then related to the characteristics of Typhoon Yolanda to see if this individual event constitutes as a data outlier or is par t of a trend that can be related to climate change.
In terms of TC frequency, it is deduced that there is a decreasing pattern in tropical cyclone formation starting in 1970.
It is also noted that while there is no trend observed in the annual mean maximum wind speed, a decrease in the number of high wind speed TCs is measured for the months of November and December.
The location of TC formation has also been changing towards a higher latitude but closer to the Philippines in terms of longi tude .
Las t ly, t yphoons making landfa l l in the V isayas and Mindanao region have also become slightly more frequent in the last decade.
Except for the last f inding, the 2013 typhoon season does not f it in these general trends.
This year may be the start of a new trend or shift in TC characteristics (which we will only know after a few more years) but is most likely part of the inherent annual variability of typhoon characteristics.
Yolanda goes against perceived trends but its occurrence signif ies that there is still much to learn about tropical cyclones and the impending impacts of climate change in general.
INTRODUCTION On 8 November 2013, Super Typhoon Yolanda (International Name: Haiyan) made landfall in Guiuan, Eastern Samar.
It was, by many accounts, the most powerful tropical cyclone (TC) that made landfall ever recorded in history.
According to the ISSN 0115-7809 Print / ISSN 2012-0818 Online C.P.
David and others 79 Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), the recorded maximum 10-minute sustained winds of Yolanda were 230 kilometers per hour (kph) with gustiness reaching 250kph shortly after landfall.
The Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC) calculated 1-minute maximum sustained windspeed of 315kph with gustiness reaching 380kph.
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) report dated 16 December 2013 stated that 6,069 individuals perished while 1,779 are still missing because of Super Typhoon Yolanda.
More than 5,000 of the casualties came from the province of Leyte and this was mainly due to the storm surge that affected its coastline.
The estimated total worth of damages is pegged at PhP35.5 billion.
One question that often arises during discussions in the aftermath of the disaster is whether this extreme event can be considered to be the “new normal” and therefore attributable to climate change.
Among meteorologists, the consensus is that the warming of ocean waters due to climate change will theoretically influence cyclogenesis, but the high level of uncertainty in results precludes any def initive cause-effect relationship (WMO 2006).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report conceded that the resolution of coupled ocean and atmospheric modelling is still too coarse to completely resolve climate change-related changes to tropical cyclone characteristics (IPCC 2007).
Still, based on various modelling studies, the IPCC report projected a decrease in mid-latitude storms globally per year but an increase in average wind intensity.
This statement was slightly revised in its Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2013) wherein it said that current datasets indicate no signif icant observed trends in global tropical cyclone frequency over the past century.
Conflicting results were provided by McDonald and others (2005): they reported an almost insignif icant decrease in the number of typhoons (6% decrease) but an increase in wind intensity.
Still, Emoriet and others (2005) projected that both the number and intensity of cyclones in the northern Pacif ic basin will decrease but related precipitation will increase.
One of the more recent works on tropical cyclone modelling was done by Knutson and others (2010), who projected that globally, the number of tropical cyclones will decrease by 6-34%, but the number of very intense cyclones will increase by about 20% by 2100.
The same paper suggested a poleward shift in tropical cyclone formation.
Considering the apparent uncertainty of TC frequency and intensity trends from global climate models, the other technique that can be used in f iguring out tropical cyclone trends is to analyze historical archives while looking at a single event, such as Yolanda, in relation to the typhoon database.
This work aims to contribute to this form of analysis by looking at not only annual frequency and intensity trends but A Manifestation of Climate Change?
80 also other typhoon metrics by dissecting typhoon characteristics on a month-bymonth scale.
METHODOLOGY The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) maintains a database that archives all recorded tropical cyclones by various weather agencies.
The International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTRACS) boasts of more than 300,000 tropical cyclone-related entries, one-third of which are western Pacif ic cyclones (Knapp and others 2010).
The dataset covers the years 18842012, and includes TC tracks (6-hourly), calculated wind speed and barometric pressure, among other information.
The IBTRACS has been endorsed by the World Meteorological Organization as an off icial archiving program for tropical cyclone information.
The present analysis primarily uses the IBTRACS data; however, the 2013 TC data from JTWC are included, whenever applicable, for completeness.
The IBTRACS data is parsed using the Python programming language and Microsoft Excel, and plotted using ESRI’s ArcGIS.
In many of the interpreted data, a 10-year moving average is employed to reduce annual variability and highlight the longer term changes in the parameters measured.
Statistical analysis is performed to conf irm any possible trends from the dataset.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Tropical cyclone frequency Figure 1 shows tropical cyclone formation in the west Pacif ic basin on an annual basis.
Evident in this plot is the increase in TCs recorded from the start of the dataset until around the 1970s wherein the highest total number of typhoons recorded was 61 in 1971; the 10-yr moving average in 1971 was 47.7 typhoons per year.
The apparent 300% increase over the 86-year period is partly due to incomplete tropical cyclone reporting in the early years; reports were based on data dependent on the density of shipping vessels reporting such weather disturbances (Knuttson and others 2010).
Higher ship density started in the 1960s and satellite-based reporting only became operational in 1966.
Starting in 1970, a decreasing trend spanning 43 years is recorded in the 10-year moving average.
The current 10-year average stands at 28.4 typhoons per year.
Typhoon Yolanda was the 34th of 35 tropical cyclones that formed in the west Pacif ic basin in 2013.
With seven more typhoons than the 10-year average, 2013 C.P.
David and others 81 Figure 1.
Number of tropical cyclones recorded annually in the west Pacif ic basin.
The black line is the 10-yr moving average.
has the highest recorded number of TCs in the last 12 years and constitutes a 3-year increasing trend starting in 2010.
Tropical cyclone intensity Tropical cyclone intensity is measured via the maximum wind speed each TC system has attained during its lifetime.
The IBTRACS database has a record of historical wind speeds between the years 1977 and 2012.
The measure of wind speed is based on the 10-minute maximum sustained winds, which is similar to PAGASA’s signal system but different from the Storm category system used in the United States.
The latter is based on a 1-minute maximum sustained winds measurement.
Figure 2 shows the annual maximum wind data obtained from the IBTRACS dataset.
Average annual maximum wind speeds do not show any def inite trend; if at all, there is a slight decrease in mean typhoon intensity in the 25th to 75th percentile of annual typhoons since 2007.
Typhoon Yolanda’s 230kph matches 2010’s Typhoon Juan (International Name: Megi) wind speed.
The 2013 maximum wind speed average falls within historical range despite recording f ive typhoons that exceeded 185kph maximum wind speeds (two made landfall in the Philippines: Odette and Yolanda).
A Manifestation of Climate Change?
82 The IBTRACS dataset is further analysed to determine monthly trends for typhoon intensity.
Table 1 shows the average number of signif icant typhoons (>150kph) that formed in the west Pacif ic basin for each month per decade.
August and September record the most number of signif icant typhoons and the number is increasing throughout the decades.
Signif icant typhoons in November and December show a decreasing trend.
Figure 2.Maximum wind speed data.
The dashed line shows the range of wind speeds per year, the box denotes the range of typhoons falling within the 25th to 75th percentile (interquartile range) and the horizontal line inside the box represents the mean of the annual maximum wind speeds.
Table 1.
Average frequency of significant typhoons per decade (>150kph) C.P.
David and others 83 Location of formation The location of tropical cyclone formation will indirectly have a bearing on whether or not typhoons will make landfall in the Philippines.
With a general west-northwest typhoon track, the higher the formation latitude and further east longitude, the lower the chance of the typhoon passing by our country.
The Philippines is located at latitude 5pN to 20pN and longitude 117pE to 127pE.
This latitude range is roughly the same range as the western Pacif ic typhoon formation.
Figure 3a shows a def inite shift in annual mean latitude of formation from about 17pN to as low as 12pN in the mid-1990s.
This is coupled with an increase in annual mean formation longitude (farther east from the Philippines) from 125pE to 145pE (Figure 3b).
Since then, however, a shift back to higher latitudes but closer longitude of formation is recorded in the last 18 years.
This means that on average, typhoons have been more recently forming nearer the Philippines but at a higher latitude equivalent to Metro Manila.
This is despite the fact that signif icant typhoons within the recent past have originated from very near the equator.
Typhoon Sendong (International Name: Washi) became a tropical depression at 6p north; Typhoon Pablo (International Name: Bopha), at 5p north; and Typhoon Yolanda, at 7pN of the equator.
Number and location of landfall Figure 4a shows that annually a range of 8-76% of TCs that form in the west Pacif ic basin make landfall in the Philippines.
The historical average is 30.3% with the highest recorded percentage happening in 1991 and culminating in the highest 10yr average of 37.7% in 1995.
However, since then, this percentage has gone down to 28%, with 2013 recording only 31.4% of the TCs making landfall in the country.
To determine whether typhoon tracks are changing through time, the number of TCs Figures 3a and 3b.
Mean latitude and longitude of typhoon formation per year.
A Manifestation of Climate Change?
84 making landfall in Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon-Bicol, and Visayas-Mindanao are plotted (Figures 4b-d).
Northern Luzon still accounts for most TCs making landfall (20.2% of all TCs formed), followed by Visayas-Mindanao (9.8%) and Southern Luzon-Bicol (8.4%).
However, noticeable in these plots is the slight decrease in TCs entering Luzon and Bicol and increase in the percent of TCs entering VisayasMindanao, which is up by 0.8% to 10.6%.
The peak occurred in the 1990s when 1215% of TCs passed by Visayas-Mindanao.
The 2013 typhoon season recorded 7 of 11 tropical cyclones making landfall in Visayas or Mindanao.
This also constitutes 20% of all TCs that formed in the west Pacif ic basin, double the 10.6% average for the region.
Figures 4a-d.
Percent of tropical cyclones formed that made landfall in the Philippines.
The dark line shows the 10-year moving average for the dataset.
CONCLUSIONS There are evident tropical cyclone trends as shown by the analyses of the IBTRACS database.
These include: the decreasing number of TCs forming in the west Pacif ic basin, the increase in latitude (and decrease in longitude) of mean TC formation, the decrease in the number of signif icant storms in November and December, and the increase in TCs entering Visayas and Mindanao.
Further analyses of the IBTRACS C.P.
David and others 85 database are already underway, including the separation of apparent linear trends relatable to climate change with possible inter annual cyclical occurrences such as the El Nino Southern Oscillation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT This study is funded through a research project of the Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and Development (PCIEERD-DOST) and a professorial chair award from the Oscar M. Lopez (OML) Center for Climate Change.
REFERENCES Emor i S , Hasegawa A , Suzuki T, Dai raku K .
2005 .
Val idat ion , parameter izat ion dependence, and future projection of daily precipitation simulated with a highreso lu t ion a tmospher i c GCM.
Geophys .
Res .
Le t t .
32 L06708 .
DOI : 10 .1029/ 2004GL022306.
[IPCC] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2007.
Climate change 2007: The physical science basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis M, Averyt KB, Tignor M, Miller HL, editors.
Cambridge, UK and New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
[IPCC] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2013.
Climate change 2013: The physical science basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner GK, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM, editors.
Cambridge, UK and New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
In press.
Knapp KR, Kruk MC, Levinson DH, Diamond HJ, Neumann CJ.
2010.
The International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTrACS): Unifying tropical cyclone best track data.
Bull.
Amer.
Meteor.
Soc.
91: 363-376.
Knutson TR, McBride JL, Chan J, Emmanuel K, Holland G, Landsea C, Held I, Kossin JP, Srivastava AK, Sugi M. 2010.
Tropical cyclones and climate change.
Nature Geosci.
3: 157-163.
DOI 10.1038/NGEO779.
[WMO] World Meteorological Organization.
2006.
WMO International Workshop on Tropical Cyclones Statement on Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change.
Available from: http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/arep/tmrp/documents/iwtc_statement.pdf
1 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 Listening to older adults’ perspectives on climate change: Focus group study SPECIAL ISSUE: PLANETARY HEALTH Jordana Salma1, Savera Aziz Ali1, McKenzie H. Tilstra2, Ishwar Tiwari2, Charlene C. Nielsen2, Kyle Whitfield2, Allyson Jones3, Alvaro Osornio Vargas4, Okan Bulut5, Shelby S. Yamamoto2 1Faculty of Nursing, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta; 2School of Public Health, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta; 3Department of Physical Therapy, Faculty of Rehabilitation Medicine, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta; 4Department of Pediatrics, Faculty of Medicine & Dentistry, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta; 5Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta Corresponding author: J. Salma (sjordana@ualberta.ca) ABSTRACT This study explores climate change knowledge, attitudes, and experiences of community-dwelling older adults in Edmonton, Alberta.
A qualitative descriptive methodology was used where thirty-nine older adults participated in one of six focus groups.
A thematic data analysis helped identify three key themes synthesized from participants’ narratives: (a) Making sense of climate change, (b) lack of leadership in managing climate change; and (c) actions to address climate change that include an emphasis on individual responsibility and valuing the contributions of older adults.
Older adults vary in their climate change literacy and levels of concern about climate change but share a commitment to environmental stewardship and community wellbeing.
Expanding opportunities for older Canadians to learn about climate change and engage in climate initiatives will bring multiple benefits to this population and to the climate change movement.
KEYWORDS Ageism, Aging, Climate Change, Equity, Narratives, Urban BACKGROUND Climate change is accelerating with the projected increase of 1.5 °C by 2050 resulting in significant impacts on the natural environment and consequent negative repercussions for human health (InterGovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018).
The number of older adults 60 years of age and older will more than double by 2050 to constitute one out of every five people worldwide (World Health Organization, 2020).
The impact of climate change on the health of older adults is of increasing concern (Benevolenza & DeRigne, 2019).
Older adults can be more vulnerable to climate change than younger people due to lower physiological capacity, multimorbidity, and sensory and mobility deficits that are exacerbated by social and structural barriers within their living environments (Tilstra et al., 2021).
Additionally, the unique needs and vulnerabilities of this population are not prioritized in mitigation efforts and disaster responses (Ayalon et al., 2021).
The ability to be prepared for, withstand, and recover from disasters and extreme weather events is contingent on the availability of tangible and emotional social support within familial and community social structures (Chen at al., 2022).
Evidence continues to suggest that social isolation and loneliness can be alarmingly high in older age (World Health Organization, 2020) which severely limits access to resources for mitigation and adaptation to the impacts of climate change (Rhoades et al., 2019).
Climate change can have exacerbated 2 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 negative impacts on older adults, but so can climate policies when the needs of populations experiencing multiple vulnerabilities fail to be considered (Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019).
Focusing on older adults’ vulnerability to climate change due to age and other intersecting factors (multi-morbidity, poor housing, knowledge deficits, social isolation, lack of access to social and health services) results in a deficit-focused lens and exacerbates ageist attitudes in climate narratives.
Older adults are a diverse group with varying experiences, understandings, and responses to climate change based on their social locations (Ostapchuk et al., 2015).
Older adults have a significant role to play in championing environmental stewardship and are motivated to leave a positive legacy for future generations (Green et al., 2010; Moser, 2016; Zaval et al., 2015).
Furthermore, while the disproportionate risks for older adults due to climate change is often the focus of research (Leyva et al., 2017; Tilstra et al., 2021), older adults have demonstrated high adaptive capacity and resilience when responding to the impacts of climate change (Abrahamson et al., 2008; Miller & Brockie, 2015).
The significant impact that climate change has on older adults’ wellbeing and their capacity for contributing to climate solutions necessitates their engagement in climate change conversations (Ayalon et al., 2021: Tilstra et al., 2021).
Older adults are socially, politically, and economically integrated in their communities but are often excluded from climate planning (Moser, 2016).
Their experiences of climate change and capacity for engagement in climate activism continue to be minimally explored (Pillemer et al., 2021).
This study identifies the climate change perspectives of older adults living in Edmonton, Alberta.
By 2041, 32% of Edmonton’s population is projected to be ≥55 years of age (City of Edmonton, 2010).
Edmonton is the largest northernmost metropolis and the capital of Alberta, Canada.
Future climate change projections point to increasing extreme weather events, warming temperatures, and long-term ecosystem alterations that will require significant human adaptation (City of Edmonton, 2018).
Engaging older adults in climate mitigation and adaptation initiatives is becoming increasingly important.
The current study aims to identify older adults’ knowledge, attitudes, and experiences related to climate change in Edmonton to better locate strategies for engagement and capacity building in this population.
OBJECTIVES The study explores older adults’ knowledge, attitudes, and experiences of climate change as part of a larger project aimed at creating a subpopulationspecific vulnerability index for the City of Edmonton.
Knowledge refers to older adults’ understanding of the presence, causes, impacts, and action strategies related to climate change.
Attitudes is broadly conceptualized as emotions and related values about climate change, while experiences relate to the range of behaviors and responses to climate change in older adults’ daily lives.
Two research questions were identified: 1.
What are older adults’ understandings and experiences of climate change in their communities?
2.
How can older adults be better supported to prevent the negative health impacts of climate change?
METHODS Research Design A qualitative descriptive methodology (Morse, 2012) with focus groups (Morgan, 1997) was used for this study to explore a wide range of perspectives where narratives of climate change could be told, refuted, and negotiated within a naturalistic group setting.
A particular strength of using focus groups is in providing a space for participants to interact around a particular topic of interest, leading to more diverse understandings for both the researcher and participants (Morgan, 1997).
Older adults are rarely invited to engage in climate change conversations (Moser, 2016).
The focus groups resulted in a space for discussion in a familiar social setting which was meaningful for participants (Liamputtong, 2011).
Setting and Study Participants 3 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 Recruitment occurred in the City of Edmonton, Alberta, Canada as the site of the larger study.
Inclusion criteria were community-dwelling older adults who are 55 years of age and older and who identified as residents of Edmonton.
We chose the age 55 and older in recognition that for some communities the definition of being an older adult can be at a younger age, such as within some immigrant communities.
Convenience sampling was utilized where a recruitment email was sent out to seniors-service organizations.
Program coordinators at interested organizations reached out to older adults in their communities to identify interested participants.
Email recruitment posters were shared via email subscription lists across organizations but word-of-mouth, where coordinators reached out personally to older adults within their organizations, was the most effective form of recruitment.
Data Collection Data collection began after ethics approval was received from the University Research Ethics Office (Pro00096160) and all participants provided written informed consent.
An initial interview guide was created using questions identified in previous qualitative published literature on climate change and community experiences with revisions made to focus on relevance to the local context.
Additional questions and probes were added as data collection progressed and important areas for exploration were identified (Table 1).
All older adult participants completed socio-demographic questionnaires.
Two authors (JS, KW) with extensive focus group facilitation experience completed all focus group discussions between November 2019 and November 2021.
Focus group facilitators were researchers with expertise in climate change and healthy aging.
This combination of expertise helped enable a nuanced discussion of climate change within the broader context of healthy aging.
The seven group discussions lasted an average of two hours.
The first two focus groups of 16 participants occurred in-person at community centers where participants were regular program attendees.
The remaining five focus groups of 23 participants occurred virtually via Zoom due to pandemic restrictions on in-person research activities.
Focus group size ranged from three to ten participants.
While variations in the type and quality of data obtained via virtual approaches to data collected have been noted (Davies et al., 2020), focus groups via ZOOM and in-person both yielded rich insights into the research questions.
Difficulties using ZOOM, not owning a microphone or camera for a computer, spotty connectivity, and noise interruptions were noted as challenges with using virtual focus groups in this study.
All discussions were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim by a certified transcriptionist and then subsequently verified by a graduate student.
Data Analysis Two researchers (JS) and (KW) completed thematic data analysis using both inductive and deductive interpretations of the data via an iterative process (Braun & Clarke, 2006), with the aid of NVivo 12 software program (QSR International, 2018).
Initial codes were grouped into preliminary themes which were shared with other members of the research team and discussed in multiple group sessions.
Further refinement of the themes occurred via indepth questioning during subsequent data collection sessions and re-coding as understanding of the data expanded.
Audit trails and reflexive memos were used by facilitators and data analysts to increase the transparency of the research process (Morse, 2012) and data analysis results were discussed via multiple team meetings.
RESULTS In total, 39 older adults were recruited from six seniors service organizations to participate in this study.
All participants were residents of Edmonton and were diverse in terms of gender, age, education, migration status, and length of residence in the City (Table 2).
Three main themes were synthesized from participants’ responses: (a) Making sense of climate change, (b) lack of leadership in managing climate change, and (c) actions to address climate change (Table 3).
Any names used in the results below have been changed to preserve the anonymity of participants.
4 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 Making Sense of Climate Change This theme captures participants’ perspectives of climate change.
Older adults in this study varied in their understanding of the causes and approaches needed to address climate change.
An area of discussion across focus groups was whether climate change was reversible and whether human activity could have an impact on the progression of environmental and climate deterioration.
While some older adults believed that climate change was anthropogenic and reversible, a smaller number disagreed.
The following excerpt illustrates some older adults’ perceptions of uncertainty about the severity and causes of climate change: Participant 8: I can be convinced, but I’d have to listen to a lot of people to convince me.
Where I grew up we’re talking about climate change, and is climate change something new?
No, it’s not.
When I grew up, and I was a kid, it was 40 below… Participant 2: Well, I just have a little thought.
Our dinosaurs, they didn’t have fossil fuels.
They didn’t have all of this.
And yet the climate changed, and buried them, and we started all over again.
So, is it really our climate that’s bad, or is it just part of the process of earth?
Participant 6: Well, in the 50s we were going back to the Ice Age… we weren’t going to be able to grow crops or do anything.
Now we’ve got global warming, and I don’t understand it at all.
I don’t know where we’re going.
(FG5) Most participants were well informed about the impacts of climate change, although some were not always able to articulate the scientific processes causing these changes.
Participants drew from their lived experiences and from the media to describe these impacts.
Increased wildfires, flooding, droughts, and global warming were referenced by older adults pointing to this group generally being well informed about the environmental and weather impacts of climate change.
Lived experiences over the life course were particularly relevant to older adults where participants compared the weather and natural environment of their childhoods to current conditions, with changes over decades noted as evidence of climate change: Not only up North, but I notice that the weather patterns have changed, globally.
It is getting a lot hotter where we live here in Alberta.
And the summer’s a lot hotter, we seem to have more storms than ever before.
(P1-FG4).
If you look at the province of Alberta, I can remember 50 years ago… I was raised on a farm and you could go onto a piece of land and there’d be a small stream, and you’d go in there in the winter and you’d clear all the trees off, and then you’d go, and you’d break your land up, and then within two years you could farm right over where that stream was.
Now all the moss, all your grasses, all your trees, everything that protects your ground is gone, and the water is gone.
So, it’s warming up.
(P2-FGD1).
Participants were asked about the impacts of climate change on health and, especially, on the health of older adults.
They described asthma and breathing difficulties due to wildfires, and heat and cold-related impacts caused by extreme weather variations.
Living in a Northern hemisphere city with long winters, the impacts of snow and ice on mobility and risks for falls in older adults was described.
Recent increases in the length and severity of heat waves were also discussed by older adults leading to wildfires that exacerbated chronic respiratory conditions and heat exposure-related issues: For me, like one of my colleagues here, the smoke and the environmental debris in the air really triggered my asthma bad this summer.
I’ve used more asthma medications this summer and fall than [Laughs] I’ve used in the previous ten years...
The heat, I’m thinking of my 92-year-old in-laws, who live independently still, but they had to call an ambulance one day, because my father-in-law fainted.
And they figured that in the end, that it was just as a result of heat, and he hadn’t been drinking enough.
(P7-FG6) Participants varied, however, in their ability to link health effects caused by weather and environmental changes to climate change.
Some participants immediately identified these impacts on health when 5 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 asked and others required prompting to make the connection between health and climate change: “But the actual change in the world’s temperature I don’t think has affected my health.” (P2-FG1) Participants expressed the need to access reliable information about climate change, its effects, and ways to enhance resilience in mitigating the health impacts.
They identified media, peers, and family as important sources of information on the topic with sometimes conflicting information being received from these sources.
The need for additional information that is reliable and accessible was unanimously called for by this group: I want to add that this climate change thing is a new topic for the past 20 years, or 25 years, so most of the people do not exactly understand what exactly climate change is.
And when we say, “climate change,” what do we understand?
(P7-FG3).
I do find the topic of climate change confusing, and I do get my information probably primarily from the news…you’ll hear different information and sometimes it contradicts each other.
(P5-FGD2).
Overall, older adults who participated in this study were well informed of the climate crisis due to conversations about climate change proliferating in the media, politics, and social spheres.
Not all participants linked climate change to human activity or recognized the impacts of climate change on their personal health.
Most older participants were concerned about climate change and emphasized the need for climate action.
The small number who reported not prioritizing climate change, described competing concerns (e.g., financial stability, health, access to necessities), beliefs that climate change was a naturally occurring phenomenon, or lack of information on the issue.
For those who described feeling concerned, climate change was viewed as requiring human adaptation and collective efforts towards reversal.
Lack of Leadership in Managing Climate Change This theme captures the perceived role of government in managing climate and environmental crises.
Public transit, waste management, affordable housing, urbanization, deforestation, and carbon emissions were some of the areas of concern.
Participants described mismanagement or inaction by government, and distrust of climate change leaders with the needs of older adults not being considered in policy decisions: “Seniors’ issues have always been on the back burner, whether it comes to civic government, provincial government, federal government.
(P4-FG5)” Participants emphasized that policies designed to address climate change should not disadvantage their communities: I’m a believer but I don’t think that we can change it (climate change).
I think we just have to adapt to it.
And it makes me very upset when all our politicians use that as their lever for everything that we do.
(P2-FGD1) The needs of older adults who were low income or had mobility issues were highlighted as particularly relevant due to these groups being more likely to experience the detrimental impacts of both climate change and poor urban planning.
For example, keeping the sidewalks clean from snow and ice and making public transportation easily accessible would decrease the need to use cars in urban settings.
Addressing the need of low-income older adults for accessible housing and air-conditioning in hot weather was another area of discussion: Because a lot of the emphasis these days is that we seniors need to get out and socialize [Yes].
Making transportation more accessible...For low-income people, make sure they have air conditioning when it’s too hot, even if it has to be subsidized by the government.
That would contribute to the seniors’ health.
(P1-FG6) Equity in climate action was also discussed in relation to marginalized populations, such as those experiencing homelessness.
Lack of affordable housing, rising food costs, lack of infrastructure in rural areas to support climate-friendly initiatives, and rising job insecurity for the younger generation were all emphasized by participants which brought to the forefront that older adults in this study favored systemic approaches that prioritized addressing social inequities: 6 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 For a lot of the homeless people.
We’re not doing a lot, enough for those people.
And somehow, we seem to have spent money in strange places.
Like they had this E-bike rebate.
I think it was up to 7000 dollars for people that wanted to buy an E-bike, that they would reimburse them for that so that they would do a – I think some of these things were like 13,000 dollars…if someone can afford 13,000 dollars, they don’t need a rebate for 7000 dollars, when you’ve got homeless people in the city.
We seem to be spending money in the wrong areas.
(P1-FG4) Participants emphasized the need to attend to rural and global inequities in developing climatefriendly policies: I think governments need to really pay attention to more isolated communities, rural communities.
There’re things that we have available in the cities.
Like you can get an electric car…but if you’re in rural Alberta, you’re a long way between small towns that may or may not have plug-ins for your car…So that concerns me, that the focus just always seems to be the bigger urban centers… (P7FG7) Some participants were immigrants to Canada and described the impacts of climate change in countries of origin such as increased occurrences of flooding or droughts.
Other participants reported watching the news and social media which raised awareness of the global impacts of climate change: What I’m finding is that whilst we’re affected quite dramatically by the climate change, I’m finding that lowand middle-income countries are affected even more, and they are experiencing extreme stressors, that’s something that we need to address immediately…there’s no food in certain parts because of the climate change.
The poverty has increased in parts of the world, specifically the lowand middle-income countries, and that really worries me.
(P8-FG3) Across focus groups, participants highlighted the need for more government accountability with regard to climate change while being sensitive to local and global inequities.
The need for more transparent communication and trust-building with communities was evident in participants’ conversations due to reports of policy knowledge gaps and skepticism of government-initiated actions.
Most importantly, the findings highlight older adults’ concerns about climate initiatives that fail to attend to social inequities, including inequities experienced during older age.
Actions to Address Climate Change Participants in this study overwhelmingly agreed on the need for environmental stewardship where individual responsibility was emphasized: “I think there are things that we as individuals can do…So, three years ago, we were going to buy a new car…we bought a Prius, a hybrid, so I could cut my gas consumption in half.” (P4-FG7) More questions were raised around the types of individual activities that could be impactful in addressing climate change.
Many emphasized that small steps can be taken by individuals that can make a difference, while simultaneously questioning the impact of individual action in face of an overwhelming climate crisis on a global scale: If they can communicate how the individual person can help.
Because right now the individual person feels like there’s nothing they can do.
But if they say, ‘This is what you can do to help” …to make them feel like they’re contributing.
(P6-FG5) Until the big countries who are doing all the mess wake up and make changes, I think not much difference will be made.
But any tiny step individuals take can make some difference.
(P1-FGD3) Participants described the need for more education focused on enhancing community agency: As individuals, we could become better informed, educated about climate change, what is it, what can we do as individuals, and groups…That would give us motivation to do more.
(P5-FG6) Most participants were interested and motivated to contribute to the movement for climate action but some described ageist attitudes that created barriers to meaningful engagement.
Older adults in this study evidently wanted to discuss climate change and were aware of many of the social, policy and health 7 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 implications.
Participants, however, reported a lack of engagement with their demographic and societal attitudes that assumed older adults were not sufficiently interested or committed to climate action: Participant 3: Yeah.
The apathy of the politicians towards the seniors… Participant 9: Yeah, that’s very true.
Participant 7: “We’re not going to listen to them.” That’s what you get from the younger kids, “You’re too old.
You don’t know what you’re talking about.” Participant 6: [Laughs] I get the impression that they feel the seniors do absolutely nothing.
(FG5) I find that there were a lot of things that were not orientated towards the seniors but orientated towards younger people…the politicians are all going towards the younger people, because they’re the ones that are going to be the voters down the road.
They’re also the ones that are consumers.
As you get older you consume less.
(P5-FG4) Participants described life experiences that brought awareness of the changing climate over their lifetime and knowledge about the ways to live a more sustainable lifestyle.
While some older adults talked about competing priorities, like their health and financial needs, caring for the environment was still described by the majority as warranting urgent action.
Participants noted that contrary to prevailing assumptions, older adults like themselves were adept at living in a sustainable and environmentally responsible way.
Participants, also, emphasized leaving a positive legacy for their children and grandchildren.
This was a strong motivator for engaging with climate change issues: Listening to other seniors, they are aware of it (climate change) and I’m certain they seem to be concerned…because we’re thinking about our children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
What kind of legacy is this to leave them?
That in itself should be a big motivator for all of us to clean up our act.
(P1-FG6) The potential for older adults to be allies in climate initiatives and the rich experiences older adults bring to climate change conversations were evident from participants’ discussions.
Ageist attitudes, climate literacy knowledge gaps, and lack of concrete guidance for individual action were some of the barriers to action described by this sample of older adults.
While there was consensus in the focus groups that not all older adults were actively engaged in climate action, participants emphasized that the many older adults were engaged in their communities, cared about the wellbeing of the environment, and were concerned about climate change.
DISCUSSION This study provides insights into the climate change perspectives of a sample of older adults living in Edmonton, Alberta.
We discuss two key learnings from older adults’ narratives: (1) the need to tailor climate messaging for older adults and (2) the impacts of ageism on effective climate action.
Climate Messaging and Older Adults The type of knowledge an individual possesses in combination with their value systems has been shown to predict concern about climate change (Shi et al., 2016).
In this study, most participants identified local and global impacts of a changing climate on the environment and the wellbeing of their communities, often from their lived experience and from the media.
Variations were noted in knowledge related to causes of climate change, whether climate change was reversible, impacts on health, and overall sense of concern about climate change.
Lack of knowledge and awareness of personal risks about the health impacts of climate change was highlighted in other studies on older adults (Abrahamson et al., 2009; Haq, 2013; Valois et al., 2020).
Distrust, fear, and uncertainty demonstrated via lack of clarity about approaches to climate action and the possibility of effective change shows the importance of understanding the role of emotion in climate messaging (Chapman et al., 2017) and the role of trust in enhancing people’s willingness to support climate policies (Smith & Mayer, 2018).
The 8 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 need for more public “climate literacy” has been emphasized to increase support for climate policies (Kundzewicz et al., 2020) and was noted in this study, especially as this relates to trust in the commitment to and effectiveness of climate policies.
Many older adults in this study were uncertain about the individual actions required to create change and the effectiveness of collective action in addressing the climate crisis.
Behavior change is more likely to occur when individuals feel a sense of control and agency in handling climate-related problems to both minimize the impacts of climate change and maximize their adaptive capacity (Valois et al., 2020).
Creating spaces where older adults can discuss their worries and ways to approach feelings of hopelessness is important as participants in this study displayed strong emotions in their discussions.
Older adults in this study were concerned about the wellbeing of their communities.
Positive coping strategies that emphasize both personal agency and community collaboration in tackling climate issues are one avenue highlighted in the literature (Ojala et al., 2021; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009) and have the potential to enhance climate resilience in this population (Rhoades et al., 2019).
Tackling Ageism in Climate Action It is evident from participants’ discussions that ageism plays a role in the exclusion of older adults from engagement in climate change action and that older adults are both aware of this and engage in counter-narratives such as labeling “seniors as allies” and emphasizing “individual accountability”.
This study disrupts the negative discourses that paint older adults as victims of climate change, responsible for the climate crisis and/or apathetic to it.
While older adults lag behind younger age groups in their concern about climate change and perceptions of personal accountability for climate change (Andor et al., 2018), evidence suggests that attitudes are changing over time towards a stronger belief in climate change and human agency (Milfont et al., 2021).
Older adults identified their capacity for agency and, despite variations in knowledge and attitudes, shared common values around environmental stewardship and intergenerational legacy building.
Both values can serve as rallying points for this group.
The desire to leave a legacy in the form of a better planet and transmit knowledge to the younger generation are strong motivators for older adults to engage in environmental advocacy (Chen et al., 2022; Miller, 2018; Pillemer et al., 2017).
Addressing inequities is highlighted in older adults’ narratives mirroring current calls by climate justice advocates for justice-oriented policies (Markkanen & Anger-Kraavi, 2019) and intersectional approaches to the syndemic of sexism, ageism, classism, racism and other -isms (Kaijser & Kronsell, 2014).
Older adults’ narratives reveal a tension between values for environmental stewardship and everyday needs such as food, housing, and mobility.
Basic needs in older age to fulfill a “good life” are viewed in comparison to climate policies that might not always incorporate an equity perspective.
This points to the need for intentionality in addressing older adults’ concerns for living well in the final decades of life amidst climate, economic, and social turmoil.
“How can we include older adults in decision-making in meaningful ways?” is a question that needs to be asked and the solutions actively implemented.
Addressing the climate emergency must occur simultaneously via building solidarity and agency within older adults’ communities to foster adaptive capacities and resilience (Sultana, 2021).
Older adults have been shown to participate in environmental stewardship and climate advocacy (Miller, 2018; Pillemer et al., 2017).
This study shows that older adults embody a high sense of responsibility for their communities but that engaging them on the topic of climate change will require listening to their concerns and co-creating solutions with them.
We argue that building more opportunities for environmental volunteerism (Pillemer et al., 2017; Pillemer & Filiberto, 2017) that includes a focus on climate change and builds skills, knowledge, and capacity for older adults to participate has much potential for enhancing the effectiveness of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.
STUDY STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS The findings of this study cannot be generalized due to the small convenience sample, but it provides rich insights into the way one group of older adults 9 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 converse about climate change.
Older adults’ experiences and perceptions of climate change are not well documented in Canada and this study provides a rich case exemplar in an urban setting.
The majority of study participants were educated, women, non-racialized and young-old.
The perspectives of older adults with varying social locations need to be further incorporated into studies on aging and climate change in recognition of the diverse lived experiences of this demographic and the varying biomes that are affected differentially across the country.
CONCLUSION This study provides new insights into the ways older adults discuss climate change, including their knowledge, values, and concerns.
It is evident that the perspectives of older adults on climate change are diverse, but that they share a concern for the wellbeing of their communities and future generations and that they have valuable insights of benefit to our collective efforts towards climate action.
Interventions aimed at engaging older adults in climate change action are needed to decrease the risks for adverse health outcomes in this population and strengthen the equity dimension of climate policies.
REFERENCES Abrahamson, V., Wolf, J., Lorenzoni, I., Fenn, B., Kovats, S., Wilkinson, P., Adger, W. N., & Raine, R. (2009).
Perceptions of heatwave risks to health: Interview-based study of older people in London and Norwich, UK.
Journal of Public Health, 31(1), 119-126. https://doi.org/pubmed/fdn102 Andor, M. A., Schmidt, C. M., & Sommer, S. (2018).
Climate change, population ageing and public spending: Evidence on individual preferences.
Ecological Economics, 151, 173–183.
https://doiorg/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.05.003 Ayalon, L., Keating, N., Pillemer, K., & Rabheru, K. (2021).
Climate change and mental health of older persons: A human rights imperative.
American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 29(10), 1038-1040. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jagp.2021.06.015 Benevolenza, M. A., & DeRigne, L. (2019).
The impact of climate change and natural disasters on vulnerable populations: A systematic review of the literature.
Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 29(2), 266-281. https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2018.15 27739 Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006).
Using thematic analysis in psychology.
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77-101. http://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063o a Chapman, D. A., Lickel, B., & Markowitz, E. M. (2017).
Reassessing emotion in climate change communication.
Nature Climate Change, 7(12), 850-852. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-017-0021-9 Chen, P.-W., Chen, L.-K., Huang, H.-K., & Loh, C.-H. (2022).
Productive aging by environmental volunteerism: A systematic review.
Archives of Gerontology & Geriatrics, 98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.archger.2021.104 563 City of Edmonton.
(2018).
The Climate Resilient Edmonton: Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan.
https://www.edmonton.ca/sites/default/fil es/publicfiles/assets/Climate_Resilient_Edmonton.p df?cb=1643406386 City of Edmonton.
(2010).
Edmonton Seniors: A Portrait.
https://www.seniorscouncil.net/uploads/fil es/Seniors%20Portrait.pdf Davies, L., LeClair, K. L., Bagley, P., Blunt, H., Hinton, L., Ryan, S., & Ziebland, S. (2020).
Face-toface compared with online collected accounts of health and illness experiences: A scoping review.
Qualitative Health Research, 30(13), 2092-2102. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1049732320935 835 Green, D., Billy, J., & Tapim, A.
(2010).
Indigenous Australians’ knowledge of weather and climate.
Climatic Change, 100(2), 337-354. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9803-z https://doi.org/pubmed/fdn102 https://doi-org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.05.003 https://doi-org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.05.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jagp.2021.06.015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.archger.2021.104563 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.archger.2021.104563 https://www.edmonton.ca/sites/default/files/public-files/assets/Climate_Resilient_Edmonton.pdf?cb=1643406386 https://www.edmonton.ca/sites/default/files/public-files/assets/Climate_Resilient_Edmonton.pdf?cb=1643406386 https://www.edmonton.ca/sites/default/files/public-files/assets/Climate_Resilient_Edmonton.pdf?cb=1643406386 https://www.edmonton.ca/sites/default/files/public-files/assets/Climate_Resilient_Edmonton.pdf?cb=1643406386 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1049732320935835 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1049732320935835 10 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 Haq, G., Snell, C., Gutman, G., & Brown, D. (2013).
Global Ageing and Environmental Change.
Stockholm Environment Institute, University of York, York.
https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/ Publications/SEI-ProjectReport-HaqGlobalAgeingAndEnvironmentalChange2013.pdf Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].
(2018).
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Global Warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O.
Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R.
Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R.
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I.
Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)].
Kaijser, A.
& Kronsell, A.
(2014).
Climate change through the lens of intersectionality.
Environmental Politics, 23(3), 417-433. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.83 5203 Kundzewicz, Z. W., Matczak, P., Otto, I. M., Otto, P. E. (2020): From 'atmosfear' to climate action.
Environmental Science and Policy, 105, 7583. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.12.01 2 Leyva, E. W. A., Beaman, A., & Davidson, P. M. (2017).
Health impact of climate change in older people: An integrative review and implications for nursing.
Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 49(6), 670-678. https://doi.org/10.1111/jnu.12346 Liamputtong, P. (2011).
Focus group methodology: Principles and practice.
SAGE Markkanen, S., & Anger-Kraavi, A.
(2019).
Social impacts of climate change mitigation policies and their implications for inequality.
Climate Policy (Earthscan), 19(7), 827–844.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.15 96873 Miller, E., & Brockie, L. (2015).
The disaster flood experience: Older people's poetic voices of resilience.
Journal of Aging Studies, 34, 103112, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ja ging.2015.05.003.
Miller, E. (2018).
“My hobby is global warming and peak oil”: Sustainability as serious leisure.
World Leisure Journal, 60(3), 209-220. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 080/16078055.2018.1496528 Moser, S. C. (2016).
Never too old to care: Reaching an untapped cohort of climate action champions.
Public Policy & Aging Report, 27(1), 33-36. https://doi.org/10.1093/ppar/prw029 Morgan, D. L. (1997).
Focus groups as qualitative research.
[electronic resource] (2nd ed.).
SAGE Morse, J. M. (2012).
Qualitative health research: Creating a new discipline.
Left Coast Press Milfont, T. L., Zubielevitch, E., Milojev, P., & Sibley, C. G. (2021).
Ten-year panel data confirm generation gap but climate beliefs increase at similar rates across ages.
Nature Communications, 12(1).
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-24245y O’Neill, S. & Nicholson-Cole, S. (2009).
“Fear Won’t Do It”: Promoting positive engagement with climate change through visual and iconic representations.
Science Communication, 30(3), 355-379. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1075547008329 201 Ojala, M., Cunsolo, A., Ogunbode, C. A., & Middleton, J.
(2021).
Anxiety, worry, and grief in a time of environmental and climate crisis: A narrative review.
Annual Review of Environment & Resources, 46, 35-58. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ012220-022716 Ostapchuk, J., Harper, S., Willox, A. C., PhD, Edge, V. L., & Rigolet Inuit Community Government.
(2015).
Exploring elders’ and seniors’ perceptions of how climate change is impacting health and well-being in Rigolet, Nunatsiavut.
Journal of Aboriginal Health.
https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-ProjectReport-Haq-GlobalAgeingAndEnvironmentalChange-2013.pdf https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-ProjectReport-Haq-GlobalAgeingAndEnvironmentalChange-2013.pdf https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-ProjectReport-Haq-GlobalAgeingAndEnvironmentalChange-2013.pdf https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-ProjectReport-Haq-GlobalAgeingAndEnvironmentalChange-2013.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.835203 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.835203 https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/cone/persons/resource/zbyszek https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/cone/persons/resource/Ilona.Otto https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.12.012 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.12.012 https://doi.org/10.1111/jnu.12346 https://doi.org/https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.jaging.2015.05.003 https://doi.org/https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.jaging.2015.05.003 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/16078055.2018.1496528 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/16078055.2018.1496528 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-022716 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-022716 11 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijih /article/view/29095/pdf_9 Pillemer, K., Tillema-Cope, M., & Nolte, J.
(2021).
Older People and Action on Climate Change: A Powerful but Underutilized Resource.
Commissioned report for HelpAge International.
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8fi les/event-documents/KPillemer_paper.pdf Pillemer, K., & Filiberto, D. (2017).
Mobilizing older people to address climate change.
Public Policy & Aging Report, 27(1), 18-21. https://doi.org/10.1093/ppar/prw030 Pillemer, K., Wells, N. M., Meador, R. H., Schultz, L., Henderson, C. R., Cope, M. T. (2017).
Engaging older adults in environmental volunteerism: The Retirees in Service to the Environment Program.
Gerontologist, 57(2):367-375. https://doi.org/10.1093/geront/gnv693.
QSR International Pty Ltd. (2018).
NVivo (Version 12).
https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivoqualitative-data-analysis-software/home Rhoades, J., Gruber, J., & Horton, B.
(2019).
Promoting the resilience of older adults through participatory climate change adaptation planning.
Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 16(3).
https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2017-0057 Shi, J., Visschers, V. H., Siegrist, M., & Arvai, J.
(2016).
Knowledge as a driver of public perceptions about climate change reassessed.
Nature Climate Change, 6(8), 759-762.
Smith, E. K. & Mayer, A.
(2018).
A social trap for the climate?
Collective action, trust and climate change risk perception in 35 countries.
Global Environmental Change, 49, 140-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.0 2.014 Sultana, F. (2021).
Climate change, COVID-19, and the co-production of injustices: A Feminist reading of overlapping crises.
Social & Cultural Geography, 22(4), 447-460. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2021.19 10994 Tilstra, M. H., Tiwari, I., Niwa, L., Campbell, S., Nielsen, C. C., Jones, C. A., ... & Yamamoto, S. S. (2021).
Risk and Resilience: How Is the Health of Older Adults and Immigrant People Living in Canada Impacted by Climate-and Air Pollution-Related Exposures?
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(20), 10575.
World Health Organization.
(2020).
UN Decade of Healthy Aging.
https://www.who.int/initiatives/decade-ofhealthy-ageing Zaval, L., Markowitz, E. M., & Weber, E. U.
(2015).
How will I be remembered?
Conserving the environment for the sake of one’s legacy.
Psychological science, 26(2), 231-236. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0956797614561 266 Valois, P., Talbot, D., Bouchard, D., Renaud, J.-S., Caron, M., Canuel, M., & Arrambourg, N. (2020).
Using the theory of planned behavior to identify key beliefs underlying heat adaptation behaviors in elderly populations.
Population & Environment, 41(4), 480–506.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-020-003475 https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/event-documents/KPillemer_paper.pdf https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/event-documents/KPillemer_paper.pdf https://doi.org/10.1093/ppar/prw030 https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2017-0057 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.02.014 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.02.014 13 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 Table 1.
Interview Guide Sample Questions 1 What do you know about climate change?
2 Do you feel that climate change is important?
Why or why not?
3 As the years go by have you noticed changes in the weather?
The environment around you?
What are these changes?
How do they impact you?
4 Do you feel that your health is at risk due to climate change?
5 How confident are you in your ability to adapt to the possible risks and/or problems posed by climate change?
6 What role does government have in addressing climate change?
7 Where do you get your information on climate change?
How reliable are these sources of information?
8 What resources, information, and interventions are needed to help older adults adapt to the impacts of climate change?
14 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 Table 2.
Socio-Demographic Characteristics Characteristics n=39 Age, Years, n (%) 55-65 6(15%) 66-75 17(43%) 76-85 10(26%) 86 and older 3(8%) Not reported 3(8%) Gender, Woman, n (%) 31 (79%) Education, n (%) Elementary 1(2%) Completed High School 14(36%) Received Post-Secondary 21(54%) Not reported 3 (8%) Immigrant Status 5 (13%) Years Lived in Edmonton, n (%) <5 years 2 (5%) 5-10 years 2 (5%) >10 years 35 (90%) 15 IHTP, 2(3), SI: 1-15, 2022 CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 ISSN 2563-9269 Table 3.
Thematic Analysis Findings Themes Related Codes (# references across data) Making Sense of Climate Change • Differing understandings of climate change (43 references) • Perceived impacts of climate change on health (26 references) • Negative impacts of climate change on environment (30 references) • Lack of access to information about climate change (38 references) Lack of Leadership in Managing Climate Change • Mismanagement or inaction by government (31 references) • Balancing needs of older adults and marginalized groups (40 references) Actions to Address Climate Change • Older adults as allies (10 references) • Individual actions matter (29 references)
Research Article 气候变化背景下公共卫生安全风险管理与应急处置对策研究 Research on Public Health Security Risk Management and Emergency Response Measures under Climate Change Xing Kaicheng1,2, Li Hongyu2, Ma Guihong3, Jing Yuanyuan2, Yang Ming2, Huang Dapeng4,5,* 1Hebei Province Key Laboratory of Ecometeorology and Environment, Shijiazhuang 050021, China 2Hebei Climate Center, Shijiazhuang 050021, China 3Meteorological Bureau of Gaoyi County, Shijiazhuang 050081, China 4National Climate Center, Beijing 10008, China 5Collaborative Innovation Center on Forecast and Evaluation of Meteorological Disasters, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing 210044, China A RT I C L E I N F O Article History Received 31 March 2020 Accepted 22 July 2020 Keywords Climate change public health risk management A B S T R AC T Climate change, characterized by global warming, has a wider and deeper impact on society, economy and life.
Climate change is an important cause of human health and the spread of infectious diseases.
The explosiveness and uncertainty of the epidemic of infectious diseases pose a huge threat to human health and become a major challenge for global public health security.
Beginning in January 2020, a new coronavirus-infected pneumonia (COVID-19) was first diagnosed in Wuhan, China, and the epidemic quickly spread across the country, becoming a major event with the fastest spread, widest range of infection, and most difficult prevention and control in New China Public health emergencies have caused far-reaching social impacts and huge economic costs.
This article analyzes the direct impact of climate on human health and the trend of the occurrence and spread of infectious diseases caused by future climate change.
According to the shortcomings and deficiencies exposed in the public health field during the epidemic prevention and control, in the face of new situations, new challenges and new requirements, countermeasures were proposed for national governance and emergency response to public safety.
To solve the current problems in a targeted manner, and actively promote the modernization of the national governance system and the modernization of governance capabilities.
It is not only a scientific issue, but also an economic issue, and it is also a political issue that guarantees social harmony and security and stability.
It has important practical significance and long-term historical significance.
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
10(3); October (2020), pp.
82–90 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.200725.001; ISSN 2210-8491; eISSN 2210-8505 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr *Corresponding author.
Email: dapenghuang@163.com 作者简介：邢开成，硕士，高级工程师，主要研究方向为气候与影响。 E-mail: xkc67@163.com 通信作者：黄大鹏，博士，副研究员，主要研究方向为气候变化。 基金项目：科技部2018年国家重点研发计划（批准号：2018YFA0606304）资助。 关键词 气候变化 公共卫生 风险管理 摘要 气候变化对全球社会经济生活的影响范围越来越大，影响程度也越来越深，气候变化是人体健康和传染病流行的重 要诱因。在各类公共卫生风险中，传染病疫情由于其爆发性和不确定性对人类健康的巨大威胁，成为公共安全的重 大挑战。2020年1月开始，以武汉为最早确诊地的新型冠状病毒感染肺炎（COVID-19）疫情爆发、蔓延，是新中国成 立以来中国境内感染范围最广、传播速度最快、防控难度最大的重大突发公共卫生事件，造成了深远的社会影响， 付出了巨大的社会经济代价。文章分析了气候变化对人体健康的影响机理和导致传染病发生、传播加重的趋势，面 对新形势、新挑战，根据此次疫情防控期间在公共卫生领域暴露出的短板和不足，针对公共安全事件的国家治理和 应急处置提出了对策措施的意见和建议。在中国积极推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的形势下，有的放矢地逐 步加以解决，是事关社会和谐和安全稳定的科学问题、经济问题和政治问题，具有重要的现实意义。 © 2020 The Authors.
Published by Atlantis Press B.V.
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
1.引言 近年来，气候变化成为全世界环境问题研究和关注的重点，传 染病多发频发、分布区扩展受到国际社会的高度重视，积极应 对气候变化对人体健康和传染病流行、传播的影响，是公共卫 生学重要任务。一般来讲，人们往往将传染病流行归因于人类 对抗生素类药品广泛而大量的使用，所导致的抗药性增强， 以及欠发达地区居民生活水平低、营养不良、免疫力低下和经 济全球化导致的大规模人口流动等因素。同时，以全球变暖以 及极端天气气候多发频发也是传染病多发的诱因，气候变化对 病原体的滋生、传播以及人体免疫等方面都直接或间接影响传 染病的爆发和传播,造成对人类健康的巨大威胁。加强传染病 与气候变化关系以及公共卫生安全风险管理与应急处置研究， 对更好地预防和控制传染病的发生与传播具有重要意义。2020 年1月开始，以武汉最早确诊地的新型冠状病毒感染肺炎（以 下简称新冠）席卷中华大地，国内外专家把新冠的“基本传 染数”R0值定在2-4之间（即超强），与1918年造成5千万人死 亡的西班牙流感属于同样级别，形势异常严峻。在全国各地 严防严控的形势下，共发现确诊病例82000多例，累计死亡病 例3300多人，3月底国外感染人数超过60多万。因为疫情期间 https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.200725.001 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr mailto: dapenghuang@163.com mailto:xkc67%40163.com?subject= http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 83 正值春运高峰，尽管武汉2020年1月23日封城，有效限制了病 源的扩散，但之前从武汉返乡过节可能携带病毒的数百万人使 全国防疫形势面临巨大挑战。随即全国启动一级防疫应急响 应，打乱了春节期间广大居民的生活节奏，节后复工也受到了 巨大影响，疫情的蔓延和严格的防控举措给社会经济造成巨大 损失，也对国家公共安全事件的国家治理和应急处置做出了检 验。疫情防控期间，数万名医护人员驰援湖北抗疫一线，19个 省份对口支援迅速到位，各地限行、严防死守、居家隔离等举 措，14亿人宅在家里，出门戴口罩，上演了一场没有旁观者的 全民抗“疫”战。武汉建立“10+10”模式，火神山和雷神山 医院计（2300张床位）和16 家方舱医院（床位 13000 多张， 累计收治12000 多患者）等集中收治医院以 “中国速度”拔 地而起，来自国内外大量的抗疫善款和物资，这一切都为中国 抑制病源扩散和确诊病例的治疗康复起到了重要作用。中国世界卫生组织新冠肺炎联合考察组2020年2月24日在京举行新 闻发布会表示：中国采取的应对措施，减缓了疫情扩散与蔓 延，有效阻断病毒人际传播，避免或至少了数十万新冠肺炎， 避免了一场浩劫，为各国采取积极防控措施提供了值得借鉴的 经验，争取了宝贵时间。联合国秘书长古特雷斯2月24日在世 界卫生组织日内瓦总部表示，中国实施严格了防控措施，全国 人民作出了巨大牺牲，为全人类作出了贡献。世界卫生组织总 干事谭德赛称，因为中国通过自己的努力，99%的病例都留在 中国境内，不仅在保护自己，也是在为保护整个人类，为世界 今天赢来“防疫窗口期”，全球有识之士形成了共识，疫情是 人类共同的灾难，谁也无法独善其身，必须一起努力。 2.
气候变化对传染病爆发传播的影响 古代先贤很早就认识和了解天气变化对疾病的影响，中国传统 的“天人合一”理念揭示了天气条件与健康的密切联系。随着 科技进步，科学界对气象与健康关系研究更加广泛而深入。气 温、湿度、雨、雪、风等气象要素的剧烈变化，直接或间接影 响人体的内分泌、循环系统和神经网络系统，降低人体对疾病 的抵抗能力，不同程度地影响人类健康和流行性疾病的传播。 2.1.
气候变化对人类健康的直接影响 2.1.1.
气候变化机理与趋势 太阳辐射进入地球大气后，约三分之一的短波被反射回太 空，一部分被云、水汽和PM5、PM10等颗粒物吸收，被地表 吸收的太阳能以长波辐射的形式返回大气。大气中的二氧化 碳、甲烷、氮氧化物和氟氯化物等温室气体具有吸收长波射 线的特性，使地球大气保持相对恒温的状态，目前全球地表 平均气温约是15℃，如果大气中没有温室气体，地表面气温 将降至零下18℃以下。 工业革命之前，地球大气中的温室效应气体主要来源于自然 界，如生物、自然环境和自然灾害(如森林大火)以及强度不 高的人类活动。工业化以来，大量的化石能源燃烧和垦荒、 砍伐森林等人类活动导致大气中温室气体的含量从工业革命 前的278mg·m3上升了28.8%至358mg·m3，达到近万年来的最 高值 [1]（图1）。 气象学描述气候变化有两个表征：一是气象要素变化趋势与 幅度，二是极端天气气候事件发生的频次与危害程度。近百 年来，全球变暖得到气象观测资料的证明 [1]（图2），二 十世纪70年代以来，极端天气事件在全世界多地都有增加的 趋势。更多研究证明，全球气候变暖的同时，高温热浪和干 旱、暴雨洪水等极端天气气候不确定性将更加明显。全球气 候模式模拟显示，人类活动产生的温室气体将加速全球变暖 的趋势，到2100年全球平均气温可能上升2℃（不同排放情 境变化幅度为1℃～3.5℃）。对一些地处南纬45°至北纬 45°之间的国家，气温上升还将伴随降水量增加；而非洲北 部一些国家，降雨量却可能减少，风暴、洪水、干旱等极端 天气气候事件将更加频繁而持久。 2.1.2.
气候变化影响人体机能 医疗气象学研究气候变化对人体健康的影响机理、影响程 度，评估方法与技术，以及气候变化对流行病死亡率的影 响，得到前所未有的重视。气候变化对人体健康影响主要是 通过水、气、光、热等气象因素对人体器官产生影响，当气 象条件剧烈变化时，如果超过了人体调节机能的阈值，人就 会出现感觉不适或生病。这些疾病包括心肌梗塞、栓塞、 感冒、风湿病、中风、关节炎和一些传染病等，称为“气象 病”。极端天气气候可能带给人类更多直接伤害和流行性疾 病，以及与社会压力、精神紧张相关的紊乱症风险（兰州大 学，王式功）。气候变化会通过对野生动物、农业生态系统 产生不同程度影响，改变寄生虫和宿主生理机能，由于气候 因素很难与其他环境条件（如带菌媒介控制、疫苗和药物稀 缺性等）区分开来，所以气候变化与人体健康和流行疾病爆 发传播的关系，取决于其位置、生态群落结构及生物生理机 能等（美国乔治亚大学，索尼亚·奥尔蒂泽）。 图1 | 近万年来全球地表气温变化图.
84 X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 图2 | 1850-2018 年全球平均温度距平（与1850-1900 年均值比较）[1].
2.1.3.
气候变化对人体健康的直接影响 干旱、洪水、风暴、寒潮等极端天气事件直接导致人员伤 亡，或使心脏和呼吸系统疾病患者死亡率上升。暴雨洪水可 通过垃圾和污水扩散污染水源，如果土地长时间渍涝浸泡而 得不到及时排泄，易使有害菌和病毒滋生蔓延，成为传播疾 病的鼠类和虫蚁的繁殖场所。高温热浪对人体健康的影响直 接而快速，1995年夏季，从印度到欧洲以及美国很多地区出 现高温热浪，仅美国芝加哥有数百人死于酷热及其引发的疾 病。IPCC（政府间气候变化委员会）第四次评估报告指出， 极端天气气候事件发生频率的增加，可能使未来城市人口因 与酷热有关疾病的死亡率增加一倍。 2.2.
气候变化对常见传染病传播的影响 2.2.1.
气候变化导致生态环境恶化利于流行性 疾病爆发与传播 气候变化和人类活动导致大量土地利用类型改变，物种多样 性因此受到影响，极端干旱天气使有害昆虫和啮齿类动物因 天敌数量的减少而迅速增加。1993年春季美国西南部雨季前 长期干旱，啮齿类动物（天敌如猫头鹰、狼和蛇等）数量锐 减，通过啮齿类动物传播的汉塔病毒肺部综合征（hantaviruspulmonarysyndrome)多发，确诊病例死亡率接近50%。美 国、拉丁美洲各国、南非、印度和欧洲等国的啮齿类动物的 数量增加，不仅祸害田间作物而且传播疾病，防治形势不容 乐观。 近年来传染病学观察和研究证明，气候变化导致的环境改变 使病毒变异的不确定性增强，以动物为宿主直接或间接传染 人类，进而导致人传人的传播传染病的爆发。气候变化加剧 传染病爆发与传播，关键是改变病毒及宿主的分布区域，缩 短病原体的潜伏期并增加其繁殖速度、能力与侵袭力，进而 影响流行性疾病的爆发与流行（图3）。传染病流行趋势是： 新的病毒不断出现（如非典、非洲埃博拉病毒，沙特的中东 呼吸综合症病毒、新冠等），流行区域不断扩大，爆发流行 频率增加。受气候变化影响较大的传染病主要是血吸虫病、 疟疾、登革热和其它新型病毒性传染疾病（中国疾病控制中 心，刘起勇）。 2.2.2.
气候变化对主要传染病的影响 2.2.2.1.
疟疾 疟疾是全球公认流行性、传染性最强的虫媒传染病之一。适 宜的气象条件(如温度和湿度)直接影响疟原虫繁殖，加强蚊 虫的侵袭力和疟疾传播。如夏季高温和充沛的雨水利于疟原 图3 | 气候变化与传染病相互影响关系示意图.
X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 85 虫的生长和蚊虫的滋生繁殖，蚊子在气温低于16℃时难以存 活，20℃开始活跃，25℃以上活动显著增多，所以疟疾分布 有较强的地区和季节性。数值模型预测结果，2100年全世 界受疟疾影响人口的比例可能由目前的45%增至60%，即每年 5000-8000万。 2.2.2.2.
血吸虫病 气温和降雨可直接影响血吸虫和钉螺的繁殖和生长发育速 度。气温在9℃以下时，人体一般不会感染血吸虫；感染率随 气温的升高而增加，当气温在24～27℃时，感染率最高；气 温过39℃时感染率下降。数值模型预测显示，2050年全球因 气候变化直接或间接影响而增加的血吸虫病例将达500万。 2.2.2.3.
霍乱和副霍乱 气候变化(高温，高湿等)和环境恶化导致生态系统失衡与霍 乱和副霍乱（ELTor型霍乱）大流行有关。霍乱弧菌和大多数 病菌适宜温度是16～42℃，水温度上升或富营养化导致浮游 生物大量繁殖为霍乱或副霍乱弧菌提供了有利的滋生和繁殖 场所，益于霍乱的爆发于流行。1991年10月，智利赤潮直接 导致三百多例因贝类海产品中毒而引发霍乱流行的事件。 2.2.2.4.
脑炎 流行性脑炎爆发与30℃以上高温持续时间有关，特别是夏季 干旱之后的湿润季节，脑炎发生更频繁、范围更大。1980年 以来，通过麻雀、乌鸦和鸽子等鸟类传播的圣路易斯脑炎 （SLE）曾在美国南部的密苏里州、佛罗里达州、新奥尔良州 等7个州多次出现。 2.2.2.5.
登革热和其它虫媒传染病 登革热和黄热病是受气候变化影响较大的虫媒病。气温是影 响登革热爆发与传播最重要天气条件因素，较高的气温利于 病原体滋生并增强致病力，蚊子体内登革热病毒繁殖适宜的 温度是20℃以上，26～31℃复制速度显著增加，传染力增 强，病毒的潜伏期缩短，蚊虫叮咬频率加快，最后导致分布 区域扩大。1995年6月，南美洲哥伦比亚和委内瑞拉的高温和 8月50年一遇的大暴雨导致毒藻类大量繁衍，登革热和马类脑 炎因蚊子传播而流行并造成很严重的损失。登革热主要分布 区域在热带，随着全球变暖，其分布范围有扩大趋势。每年 全球大约有25万到50万登革热病例，因得不到治疗的病死率 高达40%～50%。Lambrechts等发现，与昼夜温差小或恒温相 比，昼夜温差大可以阻止登革热病毒感染蚊子中肠，降低传 播风险。登革热病毒传播的强度会受到温度波动平均值和范 围的特定组合的影响 [2]。 2.2.2.6.
严重急性呼吸综合征（SARS） 对中国香港、广州、太原和北京4个城市的研究发现，气温 及其变化与SARS疫情之间存在密切关系，这表明SARS更可 能在春季爆发[3]。对香港SARS疫情的研究发现，气温较低 的日子里，SARS日发病率增加的风险比气温较高的日子高 18.18倍 [4]。 2.2.2.7.
新型冠状病毒感染肺炎（COVID-19） 越来越多的研究表明，气候因素是引发COVID-19传播的重要 因素之一，在新一轮冠状病毒爆发中起重要作用。对全球各 国的COVID-19感染病例数与气候变量关系研究发现，各国平 均气温与COVID-19感染病例数呈负相关，降水量与COVID-19 感染之间呈正相关 [5]。对美国纽约市的新型冠状病毒感染 肺炎与气候指标的研究发现，平均气温、最低气温和空气质 量与COVID-19大流行有显著的相关性 [6]。对伊朗的研究发 现，风速、湿度和太阳辐射较低的地区COVID-19感染率较 高，有利于病毒的存活 [7]。对印度尼西亚雅加达地区气象 与COVID-19大流行的研究发现，平均气温与COVID-19大流行 显著正相关 [8]。对武汉市的研究发现，湿度与COVID-19相 关死亡呈负相关，不良空气质量导致死亡率增加 [9]。对中 国大陆31个省（直辖市、自治区）的研究发现，气温是中国 COVID-19爆发的环境驱动因素，COVID-19的发病率随着气温 的升高而降低 [10]。对中国17个城市的研究发现，当地气温 低、昼夜温差小、湿度低的天气条件可能有利于COVID-19传 播 [11]。 2.2.3.
气候变化对传染病影响的其它方式 痢疾、甲型肝炎等多种传染病病原体均可通过病人、病原携 带者或蚊虫直接污染食品，气温升高增加了食品在制作、运 输、储藏和销售过程被污染的几率，造成食物传播疾病的爆 发或流行。如1982年～1991年，在英国因食物传播的疾病发 病率与日平均气温高于7.5℃天气有很好的相关性，预测到 2050年，此类疾病将增加5%～20%。 气候变暖使多种夏秋季多发的传染病流行季节事件延长，热 带和亚热带流行的虫媒传染病、寄生虫病、肠道传染病向温 带、甚至寒冷扩展。1986年世界卫生组织预测，二十一世纪 初，南半球热带流行的多种疾病可能蔓延到北半球，每年使 5000～8000万人染病。所以，全球变暖的趋势如果得不到有 力控制，人类将面临更多、更频繁传染病威胁。 剧烈天气变化可能在未来较长时间内对传染性疾病产生影 响。2017年-2018年，北半球中纬度人口稠密地区冬季大规模 流感的爆发与前期秋季快速天气变化（RWV）密切相关，已通 过近20年中国、美国和欧洲等地区相关数据得到了验证。可 能的机理是晚秋时节流感病毒已经大量存在，剧烈天气变化 使人群免疫力降低，流感人群增多。当人口稠密地区流感人 群数达到一个关键量级，即形成整个冬季的强流感。二十一 世纪后期北半球中纬度人口稠密地区的流感爆发风险可能增 加20-50%，特别在欧洲地区可能会增加50%（南京大学，谈哲 敏、符淙斌）。 2.3.
气候风险与公共卫生安全风险交织形成的 复合风险对疫情响应的影响 大量的证据表明，气候风险与COVID-19的爆发及公共卫生响 应相关交织，形成复合风险。自从COVID-19开始爆发之后， 全球发生了多起严重的气候灾害，这些灾害与疫情相冲突， 危机公共卫生安全 [12]。2020年4月1日开始，热带气旋“哈 罗德”相继袭击所罗门群岛、瓦努阿图和斐济，引发大风、 暴雨、洪涝等灾害，造成电力通信中断、房屋倒塌及农作物 受灾，政府部门面临了灾害应急响应与防范COVID-19的挑 战，迫使政府暂停对疏散人员的冠状病毒社交距离措施 [13]。 86 X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 在南非，地方当局正在努力解决在非正规住区发生洪水时如 何保持社会距离的问题，而这项政策却极难执行 [12]。 3.
中国气候变化及突发公共卫生安全风险 3.1.
中国气候变化与气候风险 基于格点化气象资料分析表明,中国地表平均气温升高的 趋势与全球基本一致，而且上升幅度明显高于全球平均 值。百年来中国地表平均气温升高0.91℃，近60年平均升 高0.23℃/10a，是全球升温幅度的两倍。其中2015年比 1961-1990年平均高1.46 ℃；1951-2018年，平均气温升高 0.24℃/10a，升温幅度明显高于同期全球平均值 [1]（图4） 。空间上在冬季和北方增温更显著, 极端低温日数减少，极 端高温日数增加明显 [1]（图5）。 1960年以来，中国气候风险指数上升明显，气候风险有明显 增加趋势。1977-2018年平均值为4.19。其中1977-1998年平 均值为3.69，1999-2018年平均值为4.69，增加幅度达27% [1]（图6） IPCC（政府间气候变化专门委员会）预测，到二十一世纪 末，全球平均气温比二十一世纪初升高1.5-5.8℃，干旱、洪 涝等极端天气气候事件发生的几率增加；如果全球气温比工 业化前高1-2℃，气候风险可控；如达到或超过4℃，人类社 会和生态系统将面临更严重的后果 [1]（图7）。 图5 | 中国地表极端高温事件频次/站日变化图.
图6 | 1960-2018 年中国气候风险指数变化图.
图4 | 中国地表平均气温距平变化图.
X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 87 图7 | 未来不同排风情景气温变化与气候变化风险水平.
3.2.
中国公共卫生安全风险管理与应急 处置面临的形势 公共卫生事件管理可以分为“应急管理”和“风险管理”两 部分。“应急管理”指有效预防、及时控制突发公共卫生事 件，消除事件影响，保障公众健康与生命安全，维护正常社 会生活秩序，是相对具体和阶段性的概念。“风险管理”指 为预防、控制和消除公共卫生事件危害，保障公众健康和公 共安全，稳定社会经济生活秩序，采取的制度和能力建设活 动，是相对系统和长期的概念 [14]。其中风险管理可分三个 阶段，即事前、事中和事后。中国《传染病防治法》明确， 事中属于应急管理范畴，《突发公共卫生事件应急条例》规 定，事中阶段主要由各级政府和职能部门负责；事后阶段重 点关注事件对社会、经济，包括社会组织和家庭、个人可能 造成的影响，即后果影响 [15]。落实《传染病防治法》突发 公共卫生事件应急管理和风险管理相关责任，中国正面临着 新形势、新挑战、新要求。 3.2.1.
气候变化使中国公共卫生安全面 临新形势 《中国疫病史鉴》记载，西汉到清末2000多年，中国共发生 321次大的疫病。新中国成立以来在抗击鼠疫、乙脑、甲流、 非典等传染病方面付出了巨大努力。气候变化背景下的温度 升高，在中国作为疾病传播媒介蚊虫的繁殖力和危害性增 强，地理分布区域不断向北、向西扩展。比如传媒登革热的 白纹伊蚊分布主要在平均气温高于11.8℃的区域，现在却不 断突破它的西北边界（如本来没有白纹伊蚊的沈阳以北以及 甘肃等地已经发现这种蚊虫） [16]。极端天气气候事件多发 的传染病爆发流行客观因素，使中国公共卫生安全应急处置 与风险管理面临新形势。 3.2.2.
国情和发展现状使公共卫生安全面临新 挑战 中国人口基数大，中东部人口稠密、聚集性高、流动性强。 区域之间和城乡之间社会经济发展不平衡，使经济欠发达地 区政府对于公共卫生投入严重不足，地方缺乏完备成熟有效 的疫情监控体系和必要的防疫设备及和技术能力，无法保证 及时发现、识别公共卫生事件，对新型病毒导致传染病等突 发公共卫生事件应对能力不强。在经济欠发达地区，尤其是 一些偏远山区，覆盖地域广，地形复杂，交通不便，气候多 样，水旱灾害频繁，虫蚁滋生的环境条件复杂；公共卫生基 础设施和医疗条件简陋，居民生活水平较低，居民健康状况 不佳，饮用水安全得不到根本保障；青壮年大多到外地务 工，家中主要是留守儿童和老人，防疫意识不强，抗风险能 力弱等等，这些国情和特定发展现状使传染病疫情防控形势 复杂严峻，增加了传染病办法和传播以及新增健康危害等潜 在的公共卫生风险，公共卫生应急处置与风险管理面临着新 挑战。 3.2.3.
经济全球化对公共卫生安全提出新要求 2020年1月在中国首先确诊病例新冠病毒肺炎（COVID-19）， 到3月下旬发展成一个全球性公共卫生安全事件。相对于2003 年的SARS，只影响北京、广州、香港等几个大城市和少数与 之联系紧密的国家（地区），尽管有中国政府和全体国民的 严防管控，同时许多国家地区对中国公民或有中国旅行记录 者限制入境，但疫情依然迅速传播到世界各地100多个国家。 除新冠（COVID-19）隐蔽性高、传染性强、防疫挑战大等问 题之外，2020年的世界比2003年经济全球化程度更高，联系 更紧密，人口交流的广度与深度更都显著，使得疫病传播的 风险加大，对中国公共卫生安全乃至全人类疫情应对提出了 新要求。 4.
突发公共卫生安全风险管理与应急处置对策 2020年，突发的新冠导致中国“全民抗疫”，期间没有造成 医疗生活物资短缺，更没有出现社会动荡，中国向世界展示 了强大的动员、组织和协调能力，骨干国企、众多民企、各 基层组织主动作为、不惜代价，14亿人民爆发惊人的凝聚力 和觉悟，投入防控疫情的阻击战和总体战，为赢得抗击新冠 的战争全面胜利发挥了非常重要作用。同时，在新冠疫情防 控工作中，也暴露出公共卫生领域治理体系和治理现代化能 力建设方面存在的短板和不足。 4.1.
中国公共卫生领域存在的短板和问题 4.1.1.
制度设计方面 公共卫生管理和疾病防控体系建设与经济社会发展不协调、 不适应，医疗、防控资源配置等公共卫生总体规划和顶层设 计存在短板和漏洞；政府行政管理部门与作为技术支撑的事 业单位责权不清晰，沟通不顺畅，上下联动、数据公开共享 88 X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 机制不完善；对新冠病毒导致的高传染性疾病定性标准存在 本本主义，疫情判定标准没有形成更科学严谨有效的业务技 术规范和流程。 4.1.2.
人的方面 地方政府和相关部门个别领导有技术官僚风格，被动听取上 面明确具体的指示，组织乏力，能力不强，没有担当，脱离 群众，小圈子利益唯上，地方保护主义严重，甚至以官僚主 义、形式主义的方式来应付；个别专家只讲“术”，不讲实 事求是、人民利益高于一切的“道”，导致采取科学防控措 施的窗口期被拖延、缩小，全社会为之付出惨重生命代价和 高昂的社会经济成本；个别人生态文明理念缺位，公民素质 和科学素养亟待提升，公众的警觉和自我防护意识有待加 强，严守公序良俗的底线思维和道德观念需要强化。 4.1.3.
应急处置方面 疫情初期,识别和应对重大公共卫生安全事件的能力不足， 根据疫情及时启动应急响应，确定和调整响应级别的科学性 不强；防控预案缺乏或组织落实不力，物资分配不力，导致 应急急需物资一度被大量闲置，民怨极大；医疗供给和战略 储备不足，救助场地、应急医疗物资的储备和生产在重大突 发公共卫生事件面前显得不足，疫情初期大量确诊病人得 不到及时治疗，甚至只能在家自我隔离，为后续防控工作带 来困难；向公众披露信息不及时、不充分，舆情应对存在缺 陷，“封、堵、防”为要旨核心的舆情治理与应对理念使得 舆情应对、舆论引导能力不足，使疫情初期没能及时公布实 情、回应公众和舆论关切，并澄清事实、有效解疑释惑。 4.1.4.
风险管理方面 公共卫生安全风险评估基础研究薄弱，科技创新成果导向性 问题突出，数据共享及转化应用渠道不畅，没有形成系统性 整合式确定的全转化链条，大量研究经费支持的多数研究成 果不能对关键技术起到支撑作用；区域之间、城乡之间医疗 资源调配不合理，确保人民健康、维护社会秩序当务之急的 医疗保障体系不均衡。 4.2.
公共卫生安全风险管理与应急处置对策 公共安全是社会组织和公民从事正常工作、学习、生活、交 往所必需的稳定外部环境和秩序[17]。不断“完善疫情防控 体制机制，健全公共卫生应急管理体系”，健全相关法律法 规体系和顶层设计以及标准规范等制度，加强基础研究能 力，完善应急防控体系，强化领导干部“身干净，敢担当” 的主人翁责任和主动作为的为人民服务理念，倡导公民发科 学精神和守底线、讲道德的文明生活方式，提升应对突发公 共卫生事件应急处置和风险管理水平，是推进国家治理体系 和治理能力现代化的必要条件和具体体现。 完善的公共安全保障体系有利于更加精准、高效预测和发布 疫情发生、变化趋势等信息，有效防控传染源与传播渠道， 及时隔离、收治病患、总结与评估[18]。科学高效预警、 突出重点、精准防控、分类分级，有助于节省防控投入成 本，减少疫情对社会经济和人民生活的不利影响。中国公共 安全保障整体性、系统性不强，基础薄弱、短板多，总体上 表现为：“两个不平衡”，即基础设施投入存在城乡之间不 平衡，关注领域存在不平衡（自然灾害关注多，公共卫生相 对不足）。“两个不健全”，即应急系统和预警系统不健 全。“两个不到位”，即风险常态化评估和长效预防机制不 到位。IPCC等权威机构多模式集合气候预测结果显示，全球 气候变化的趋势短时间难以逆转，气候变化对人体健康的影 响以及导致传染病发生、传播加重的趋势有加重的可能，而 且交通的便捷和人口的高流动性为疫病传播提供了更有利的 条件，所以未来气候变化导致公共卫生安全事件风险加剧。 针对上述问题应该加强公共安全保障体系和治理能力以下几 个方面： 4.2.1.
深化体制机制改革 公共卫生是人民政府的首要责任之一。目前国家医疗卫生管 理工作最薄弱环节在公共卫生，尤其是在当前人口大规模流 动条件之下的疾病预防与控制。多部门联防联控机制的建立 不仅可以防范新突发传染病输入所致的公共卫生风险，而且 还可以服务于世界疾病预防控制，共同应对风险，保障人群 健康。2003年非典疫情爆发后，中国政府总结工作经验和教 训，中国疾控中心建立了世界上最好的传染疾病直报系统。 但事实证明在中国政府对新冠疫情采取有力防控措施之前， 传染疾病直报系统没有发挥应有的作用，导致此次重大公共 卫生事件严重影响社会、经济、政治秩序和国家、国民生 存与发展的利益。应该进一步加强公共卫生风险管理的体制 机制建设，建立集疾病预防控制中心、医疗机构、社区等多 部门有机联防联控的协作机制，共同开展风险评估及协同防 控，实现信息实时共享，使沟通更坦诚、更通畅，实现早预 防、早预警、早隔离、早治疗。相对于大规模扩散之后采取 的行动，预防和早控成本低得可以忽略不计，所以采取防控 措施越早，收效越显著，而最有效的措施是预防。 目前依然存在以论文发表的数量和期刊杂志“档次”等指 标，评价技术人才水平甚至科研单位领导政绩观的倾向，使 人才选拔与资金投向偏离实际需求和国家战略，导致科研有 机体普遍“超重”，却形不成人才结构合理的梯队，缺乏创 新活力和工匠精神，甚至形成科研“一言堂”等现象，这些 只有通过深化改革逐步解决。所以应该大力推进科研评价体 制深度变革，在研究方向和资金投向、理念框架、标准、系 统评价形成“中国特色，自主创新”的工作体制机制，构建 以原始创新为核心的科技和技术人才评价标准和评判体系， 推动卫生领域技术成果广泛推广应用 [19]。鼓励科学家追求 真理，忠于科学、忠于国家与人民的“家国情怀”，重塑科 技界为国奉献为荣的价值观，以及兢兢业业、任劳任怨、踏 踏实实的工作精神，树立科学工作者的民族自信心和真诚互 信与精诚合作的高尚道德情操。 4.2.2.
强化风险管理战略定位 深刻理解新形势下公共卫生安全职责和使命，积极融入“健 康中国”和公共安全体系建设全局，立足保障国家安全和人 民健康，确定公共卫生风险管理战略定位，形成具有全局 性、前瞻性的公共卫生风险管理战略规划、政策与制度， 指导地方因地制宜地采取不同策略开展卫生基础设施建设， 完善基础设施和公共卫生系统，优化卫生环境，提升发现、 评估、报告、控制公共卫生事件的核心能力；探索立足于国 家安全角度、与国际接轨的风险评估方法与技术，加强疫情 X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 89 风险评估标准体系建设，精准评估跨境传播疾病公共卫生风 险，对本地流行风险、输入风险以及传染病的病原滋生、爆 发及流行风险，新型传染病爆发及流行风险，传染病导致死 亡病例发生和社会经济风险等进行综合评估，做到早识别、 早预警、早应对，减少疾病或事件损害，最大限度地保障人 民生命健康。 4.2.3.
加速推进智慧城市和智慧社区建设 加速构建以大数据为驱动的智慧城市和智慧社区建设，加强 大数据在疫情应急处置方面的应用加强大数据精准排查传染 源（人员）筛查、追踪、控制和隔离等疫情防控中的应用， 为公共卫生风险防控提供强大的决策支持，切实提升社会治 理的现代化水平、增强城市治理能力。统筹大数据调控，避 免多部门数据的重复采集和多次返工，减轻疫情防控一线基 层干部的负担，提高防疫效率和精准化。以大数据为样本， 结合国内外重大流行病数据和传播规律，发挥机器自主学习 和人工智能技术优势，利用云计算平台，发挥大数据在疫情 态势研判、传播路径分析等工作中的作用。通过大数据打通 医疗卫生领域传统制造企业产业链，使物资供应、原材料运 输、生产、物流配送形成一个系统，真正提高生产和配送效 率。支持、引导卫生医疗机构加快数字化转型升级，实现产 业层面的数字化、网络化、智能化发展，释放数字技术对的 放大、叠加、倍增作用，提升医疗卫生领域经营管理效率。 4.2.4.
弘扬优秀传统振兴中医药 完善中西医结合的工作机制，对中西医结合的切入时机、 合作方式、管理模式、临床方案等进行优化，充分发挥西医 “对症治疗”、“生命支持”和中医理论体系中“既病防变” 、 “未病先防”等优势，实现优势互补。传承弘扬中医治疗 理论体系，以中西医结合综合治疗方案方法，实现观察、疑 似、确诊、治疗各环节中医药的深度参与，共同抗击疾病。 此次新冠防控工作，中央对“坚持中西医结合”第一时间做 出部署，引起社会各界更加高度重视中医药和中西医结合， 为中医药提供了广阔的施展舞台和实践机会。中医药第一时 间参与，中西医协同工作、联合值班、全员会诊、协同治 疗，中西医结合的力度之大、范围之深多年未有，且起到了 意想不到的临床疗效，有力证明中医药在调节人体平衡、改 善症状、提高抗病能力、缩短病程等方面所起到了不可替代 的作用，增强了使用中西医结合治疗病患的信心，为今后战 胜重大传染性疫病积累了经验，为中西医结合提供了深化空 间，开创了弘扬优秀传统、振兴中医药新局面。 4.2.5.
统筹城乡公共卫生资源配置 在新型城镇化和乡村振兴战略背景下，乡村的生产价值、生 态价值、生活价值、生命价值以及文化价值不断凸现，也让 乡村的优势与价值得到了新的展示，应该在统筹城乡公共卫 生资源配置方面积极向乡村倾斜，以提高全体国民的公共卫 生管理水平和应急处置能力。应科学配置城乡公共服务设施 与基础设施，加强乡村公共安全建设，建立覆盖城乡的智慧 预警与应急系统，增加对乡村公共安全资源投入，完善基本 综合防灾设施、公共健康设施、卫生防疫设施、配置快速响 应、医护力量以及防疫物资；从有利于应对公共安全事件需 要出发，建立防控公共安全事件的长效机制，健全乡村基层 公共卫生管理机构，优化乡村国土空间及村庄空间功能布 局，优化应急救援设施、卫生防疫设施、应急疏散通道、公 共避灾场所设置，形成更加紧密互动的城乡融合体，以提高 应对公共安全事件的韧性。 4.2.6.
加强公共卫生领域基础研究方面 加强气候变化影响人体健康的机理及变化规律研究，气候变 化对流行性疫病影响及变化规律研究，加强基于公共卫生安 全风险的极端天气事件影响评估技术，医疗气象风险长期预 测和预报预警技术研究，以及公共卫生风险评估技术指标体 系和预测模型构建等基础研究，以减缓和适应气候变化影 响，最大程度降低气候变化对人类健康的负面效应，以及流 行性疾病对社会经济的冲击。在1997-1998年厄尔尼诺现象 发生时，太平洋ENSO应用中心（Pacific ENSO Application Center）发出“可能会发生严重干旱”的预警，提出加强公 共卫生安全认识和预防措施建议，受到有关各国高度重视并 积极行动，及早预防布控，有效降低了腹泻和疾病传播风 险，取得了很好的效果。通过科技界技术研发和与卫生管理 部门通力合作、和资源数据共享，切实可以最大程度减少气 候变化诱发传染病的爆发、传播导致的风险和社会经济损 失。关注气候风险和传染病相互交织形成的复合风险，制定 详细的复合风险防范计划，同时考虑气候风险的区域差异与 季节演变规律以及疫情发展轨迹。 此次新冠疫情防控工作中，在面临不确定的重大选择面前， 中国政府发挥“无限责任”的“一切为人民”的治理理念， 选择风险零容忍，对新型疫病做最坏准备、尽全力对抗，自 上而下“横到边，纵到底”安排部署防控，支援武汉防疫一 线各项工作，为国际社会承担更多的责任和防疫代价，为全 世界防控疫情赢得了时间和空间，展示了大国担当；中华民 族和全国人民发扬“一方有难八方支援”的优秀传统，中国 共产党践行“人民的利益高于一切”的政治理念，中国人民 以强烈的家国情怀、众志成城、万众一心，中国军队弘扬誓 死卫国、绝不退缩的战斗精神，公立医院数万医护人员星夜 驰援武汉，广大干警、基层值守人员和志愿者奋战各地抗疫 一线，这些都源于中国的国家治理体系焕发出的巨大优势， 帮助中国了解了世界，也帮助世界了解了中国。需要总结经 验教训，进一步提高防范和化解重大公共卫生风险管理和应 急处置能力，不断加强国家治理体制和治理现代化建设水 平，更好地维护国家利益、保障人民群众生命和健康安全。 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST No conflict of interest exits in the submission of this manuscript, and manuscript is approved by all authors for publication.
AUTHORS’ CONTRIBUTION 作者邢开成负责设计构思和提炼关键研究结论，并撰写论 文，作者李宏宇、马贵宏、井元元和杨铭负责论文资料收集 与结果分析，作者黄大鹏负责总结文献和技术把关。 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study was supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (NO.
2018YFA0606302).
90 X. Kaicheng et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(3) 82–90 参考文献 [1] 中国气象局气候变化中心.
中国气候变化蓝皮书.
北京: 气 象出版社; 2019.
Climate change center of China meteorological administration.
Blue book on climate change in China.
Beijing: Meteorological Press; 2019.
[2] Lambrechts L, Paaijmans KP, Fansiri T, Carrington LB, Kramer LD, Thomas MB, et al.
Impact of daily temperature fluctuations on dengue virus transmission by Aedes aegypti.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2011;108:7460–5.
[3] Tan JG, Mu LN, Huang JX, Yu S, Chen B, Yin J.
An initial investigation of the association between the SARS outbreak and weather: with the view of the environmental temperature and its variation.
J Epidemiol Community Health 2005;59:186–92.
[4] Lin K, Yee-Tak Fong D, Zhu B, Karlberg J.
Environmental factors on the SARS epidemic: air temperature, passage of time and multiplicative effect of hospital infection.
Epidemiol Infect 2006;134:223–30.
[5] Sobral MFF, Duarte GB, da Penha Sobral AIG, Marinho MLM, de Souza Melo A.
Association between climate variables and global transmission oF SARS-CoV-2.
Sci Total Environ 2020;729: 138997.
[6] Bashir MF, Ma B, Bilal, Komal B, Bashir MA, Tan D, et al.
Correlation between climate indicators and COVID-19 pandemic in New York, USA.
Sci Total Environ 2020;728:138835.
[7] Ahmadi M, Sharifi A, Dorosti S, Jafarzadeh Ghoushchi S, Ghanbari N. Investigation of effective climatology parameters on COVID-19 outbreak in Iran.
Sci Total Environ 2020;729:138705.
[8] Tosepu R, Gunawan J, Effendy DS, Ahmad LOAI, Lestari H, Bahar H, et al.
Correlation between weather and Covid19 pandemic in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Sci Total Environ 2020; 725:138436.
[9] Fareed Z, Iqbal N, Shahzad F, Shah SGM, Zulfiqar B, Shahzad K, et al.
Co-variance nexus between COVID-19 mortality, humidity, and air quality index in Wuhan, China: new insights from partial and multiple wavelet coherence.
Air Qual Atmos Health 2020;13: 673–82.
[10] Shi P, Dong Y, Yan H, Zhao C, Li X, Liu W, et al.
Impact of temperature on the dynamics of the COVID-19 outbreak in China.
Sci Total Environ 2020;728:138890.
[11] Liu J, Zhou J, Yao J, Zhang X, Li L, Xu X, et al.
Impact of meteorological factors on the COVID-19 transmission: a multi-city study in China.
Sci Total Environ 2020;726:138513.
[12] Phillips CA, Caldas A, Cleetus R, Dahl KA, Declet-Barreto J, Licker R, et al.
Compound climate risks in the COVID-19 pandemic.
Nat Clim Chang 2020;10:586–8.
[13] World Meteorological Organization.
Tropical cyclone Harold challenges disaster and public health management.
Available from: https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/tropical-cyclone-harold-challenges-disaster-and-public-health-management; 2020.
[14] 许树强, 王宇.
突发事件公共卫生风险评估理论与实践.
北 京: 人民卫生出版社; 2017.
Xu S, Wang Y.
The theory and practice of public health risk assessment for emergencies.
Beijing: People’s Medical Publishing House; 2017.
[15] 李立明.公共卫生在健康中国建设中的地位和作用.中华流 行病学杂志 2018;39:867–72.
Li L. Role of public health in building Healthy China.
Chinese Journal of Epidemiology 2018;39:867–72.
[16] 李国栋, 张俊华, 焦耿军, 赵自胜.
气候变化对传染病爆发 流行的影响研究进展.
生态学报 2013;33:6762–73.
Li G, Zhang J, Jiao G, Zhao Z.
Advances in impacts of climate change on infectious diseases outbreak.
Acta Ecol Sin 2013;33: 6762–73.
[17] 盖百东.气候变化对传染病暴发流行的影响研究进展.
世界 最新医学信息文摘 2015;32:31–2.
Gai B.
Progress in research on the impact of climate change on outbreaks of infectious diseases.
Digest World Latest Med Inform 2015;32:31–2.
[18] 王晓中, 孙时, 耿丽梅, 刘洪文, 唐修湖, 宋锋林.
气候 变化对媒介传播传染病影响的区域分析及应对措施.
中国 国境卫生检疫杂志 2011;34:134-8.
Wang X, Sun S, Geng L, Liu H, Tang X, Song F. Regional analysis on influence of climate changes to vector-borne infections and its countermeasures.
Chinese Front Health Quarant 2011;34:134–8.
[19] 丁蕾, 蔡伟, 丁健青, 张欣欣, 蔡泳, 石建伟, 等.
新型 冠状病毒感染疫情下的思考.
中国科学：生命科学 2020;50: 247–57.
Ding L, Cai W, Ding J, Zhang X, Cai Y, Shi J, et al.
An interim review of lessons from the Novel Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) outbreak in China.
Sci Sin Vitae 2020;50:247–57.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1101377108 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1101377108 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1101377108 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1101377108 https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2004.020180 https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2004.020180 https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2004.020180 https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2004.020180 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268805005054 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268805005054 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268805005054 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268805005054 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138997 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138997 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138997 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138997 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138835 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138835 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138835 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138705 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138705 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138705 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138705 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138436 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138436 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138436 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138436 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11869-020-00847-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11869-020-00847-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11869-020-00847-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11869-020-00847-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11869-020-00847-1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138890 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138890 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138890 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138513 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138513 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.138513 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0804-2 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0804-2 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0804-2 https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/tropical-cyclone-harold-challenges-disaster-and-public-health-management https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/tropical-cyclone-harold-challenges-disaster-and-public-health-management https://doi.org/10.3760/cma.j.issn.0254-6450.2018.07.001 https://doi.org/10.3760/cma.j.issn.0254-6450.2018.07.001 https://doi.org/10.3760/cma.j.issn.0254-6450.2018.07.001 https://doi.org/10.3760/cma.j.issn.0254-6450.2018.07.001
132 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 Individualized responsibility and climate change: ‘if climate protection becomes everyone’s responsibility, does it end up being no-one’s?’1 Jennifer Kent Abstract Whereas global compacts, such as the Kyoto Protocol, have yet to consolidate action from governments on climate change, there has been increasing emphasis and acknowledgement of the role of individuals (as citizens and consumers) as contributors to climate change and as responsible agents in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.
Recently, along with the acknowledgement of the threat that anthropogenic climate change presents to the planet, governments and non-government organizations have focused on personal responsibility campaigns targeting individuals and households with a view to stemming the growth of greenhouse gas emissions.
The Australian Government, for example, spent $25 million in 2007 on the climate change information campaign targeted to every Australian household, ‘Be Climate Clever: “I can do that”.
Such measures centre on “personal, private-sphere ….. behaviour” (Stern 2005, p. 10786) that focuses on the “choice of goods, services and lifestyles” (WWF-UK 2008: 10) and imply that global greenhouse gas emission reduction targets can be met through the actions of individuals.
There is growing concern in some quarters about climate change programs that emphasize individual behaviour change strategies that use “simple and painless steps” (WWF-UK 2008) and “small steps add up” (Accountability and Consumers International 2007) approaches.
The emergent fear is that given the urgency of the climate change problem that such approaches will mean important opportunities for citizen-led action will be lost.
This paper will explore how notions of individual responsibility have arisen and what the trend towards individualized responsibility may mean for active citizenship on climate change.
Introduction Concern about human-induced climate change has grown over the last few decades and it is now widely considered to be ‘the greatest threat to humanity’ (Hansen et al.
2008; Hansen 2007; Watkins 2007).
Whilst global compacts, such as the Kyoto Protocol (which Australia ratified in 2008), have yet to produce concerted actions from governments on climate change, there is a growing rhetoric concerning the role of individuals (as both citizens and consumers) in contributing to and, thereby, bearing responsibility for, climate change.
1 The title comes from Bulkeley and Moser 2007, p.8.
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 133 Responses to climate change mitigation within Australia are increasingly relying on individual actions and commitments to behaviour change at the personal and household level.
The Australian Government further entrained the individual responsibility model through its 2007 $25 million Climate Clever campaign, titled, Be Climate Clever: “I can do that” (Daily Telegraph 2007).
This is but one example, however, of how people (on a personal or household level) are being called upon to take on the mantle for greenhouse gas abatement (see Accountability and Consumers International 2007; Bickerstaff & Walker 2002, p. 2189).
Furthermore, personal responsibility based climate change programs are not solely government initiated; there is an ever growing range of individual and community based programs designed to assist Australians at a personal and household level to reduce their carbon footprints.
WWF’s Earth Hour campaign, for example, relies on business and community engagement to undertake climate change action by turning off lights for one hour on one day of the year.
News Limited’s 1 degree program employs a website (www.1degree.com.au ) to encourage individual action on climate change.
A more sophisticated approach is typified by the Australian Conservation Foundation (2007) ‘Consuming Australia’ report which attributes all of the environmental impacts from the production and consumption of goods and services we consume to the level of each Australian household, implying that large scale, complex and “messy” (Garnaut 2008) problems, such as climate change, become solvable through individual consumer choice and action.
Recently, however, it has been proposed that individuals taking responsibility for efforts to reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere through the adoption of “simple and painless steps” (WWF-UK 2008), will not create the essential and very substantial reductions needed to avert dangerous climate change (Accountability and Consumers International 2007; WWF-UK 2008).
WWF-UK (2008 p. 5) uses the term ‘simple and painless steps’ to describe approaches that “encourag[e] individuals to adopt simple and painless behavioural changes” with the presumption that this, in turn, will motivate individuals to “engage in more significant changes”.
Accountability and Consumers International have identified a similar issue in relation to the rapid and profligate rise in consumer-focused climate change abatement programs (2007, p. 41).
These programs generally require individuals and households to take “small steps” towards http://www.1degree.com.au/� 134 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 lower carbon-intensive lifestyles, such as turning off household lights and purchasing energy saving appliances.
They argue that a “small steps add up” approach whereby the expectation is that such actions will lead to more meaningful and extensive behaviour change, will fail to make significant impacts against the “scale and urgency” of emerging climate change.
Climate Change and Individual Responsibility The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s most recent assessment states that the warming of the earth’s climate caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions “is unequivocal” (IPCC 2007a, p. 2).
There has been a 70% increase in GHG emissions between 1970 and 2004 (IPCC 2007b, p. 3).
Observed temperature changes are accelerating increases to global sea levels; causing the melting of glacial ice flows and polar ice sheets; creating changes in the natural cycles of plants and animals; and impacting on the health and welfare of human beings (IPCC 2007a).
Under current mitigation practices and policies, anthropogenic GHG emissions will continue to rise.
The IPCC’s latest assessment projects an increase of 25-90% between 2000 and 2030 (IPCC 2007a, p. 7).
Effectively the current economic, technological and social conditions that underpin energy supply and use globally today create an enormous inertia, resisting effective change.
Prominent climate scientists, such as James Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute, predict that the current level of greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere already commit the planet to 2 degrees of warming (Hansen et al.
2008) the level considered the cut off for ‘dangerous climate change’ ( see DEFRA 2005) irrespective of the mitigation measures taken.
Recent dramatic changes to late summer sea ice in the Arctic provide evidence that the real changes occurring in the Earth’s natural systems are at least at the highest predicted IPCC scenario or beyond (Hansen et al.
2008; WWF 2008).
Hansen (2008) describes the current situation as being critically balanced between a ‘tipping point’ and ‘the point of no return’ and proposes that the window of opportunity for reducing GHG emissions to a level that would offset catastrophic climate change lies within the next two decades.
Hansen et al.
(2008) propose that carbon dioxide levels within the atmosphere would need to be reduced to 350 parts per million (ppm) to avoid dangerous climate change which sits well below the IPCC (2007), Stern Review (2007) and Garnaut Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 135 Climate Change Review (2008) recommendations of 450 – 550 ppm.
Despite the growing evidence that our current carbon-intensive lifestyles place us on a trajectory towards catastrophic climactic change by the end of the 21st century, political reticence towards making deep cuts in GHG emissions remains.
Professor Bob Watson, one of Britain’s leading scientific advisors, has suggested that people should be prepared to adapt to a 4 degree rise in temperature (Randerson 2008), a level considered by Hansen et al.
(2008, p.1), to result in “irreversible catastrophic effects”.
So, whilst the dominant contemporary climate change discourse is couched in rationalist scientific and economic terms, policymakers consistently state that any successful GHG emission mitigation strategy will require significant changes in individual lifestyles and behaviours (IPCC 2007b, p.12; see also Stern 2007; Garnaut 2008).
Jensen (2009, p.216) argues that “lifestyle” is a “concept … commonly used as something that needs to be changed if we want to achieve sustainable development” but which is rarely concretely defined.
For example, whose lifestyles require changing and what aspects of people’s lives are considered to make up “lifestyles”?
Jensen goes on to propose that problems of a global nature suggest that solutions need to engage at the individual level, so that “a global problem means that every single individual is involved” (2009, p. 217).
This implies that every single individual’s life must change in some way in order for us to avoid the most severe consequences of global climate change.
I understand from Jensen’s proposition that everyone on Earth is expected to bear the burden of abating dangerous climate change.
Indeed, social research studies have shown that people want to take pro-environmental action at a personal and household level (Accountability and Consumers International 2007; Accountability and Net Balance Foundation 2008; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon 2006).
Concern about climate change is evident in the community and growing and there is a strong desire to make individual contributions to combating climate change (The Climate Institute 2007; Australian Research Group 2006).
The ‘What Assures Consumers on Climate Change?’ reports (Accountability and Consumers International 2007; Accountability and Net Balance Foundation 2008) list a diverse group of mass awareness raising campaigns and ‘communities of change’ operating in the UK, USA and Australia which focus on individual and household level actions.
136 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 Yet this growing sense of urgency surrounding the effects of global warming is failing to translate into an international groundswell of socially and politically engaged public citizens (Norgaard 2009).
Responsibility To understand the advent of the notion of individual responsibility within contemporary society, and it’s more recent association to climate change mitigation, it is necessary to try to unpack its historical and theoretical roots, which I will briefly attempt here.
Responsibility is an expansive concept, not readily defined.
It communicates ideas of accountability or blame (Bickerstaff & Walker 2002), duty and dependability, ideas that sit comfortably as broad moral principles for human action.
In general, two aspects of responsibility are recognized: 1.
Responsibility as it relates to justice and law.
This implies duties and obligations and is often expressed as complementary to rights so that where rights exist, responsibilities are created (Caney 2006; Singer 2002, 2006; Bickerstaff & Walker 2002).
2.
According to Auhagen and Bierhoff (2000, p.2), responsibility is also a psychological phenomenon which works both at the personal level (as self-control and free will) but also relates at a societal level.
Apart from the creation of obligations or duties as described above, it also implies “ethical and moral values or caring” (2000, p. 3).
Responsibility is, therefore, necessarily socially mediated, i.e.
as responsibility involves duties, obligations or care there is implied some relationship with ‘the other’ (Bickerstaff & Walker 2002, p. 2188).
According to Birnbacher, these two constructions of responsibility can be traced historically with the first derived from early Greek philosophy from where it became systematized for legal purposes (2000, p. 9).
This “post-responsibility” established responsibility for some act after the fact and is aligned with responsibility as a kind of moral or legal obligation (2000, p. 14).
The second, “ante-responsibility”, is a more recent philosophical concern, which is “prospective and Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 137 future-oriented” (Birnbacher 2000, p.10) and often described as akin to a duty.
Responsibilities of this type tend to be “unprescribed”, that is, the “exact nature of the act is left unspecified… which leaves room for discretion and choice” (2000, p. 10).
This more recent conception of responsibility, as described by Birnbacher (2000), has much in common with modern social theories of individualization (explored below).
“Anteresponsibility” is also a potent concept in relation to individualized responsibility for climate change.
The impacts of climate change (as described above) are based on scenarios that predict environmental and social conditions of the future (IPCC climate models predict up to the year 2100) yet according to emerging scientific understanding of climatic change, action to make deep cuts to greenhouse gas emissions needs to be taken now (by, say 2020).
An anteresponsibility for climate change would, therefore, place a duty of care on the current generation for averting dangerous climate change with the aim that future generations would benefit from such action.
Further understandings of why contemporary interest focuses on individual responsibility for climate change remain largely under-theorised.
Principally two threads of argument can be drawn from the politico-economic and social theory literatures: individual responsibility as an attribute of neoliberalism; and as a process of individualization.
Individual responsibility in contemporary society The neoliberalist conception of individual responsibility arose in the 1970s and has since been embraced globally (Harvey, 2006).
Neoliberalism, as defined by Harvey, “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade" (2006, p.145).
The political economic ideologies of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA, characterized by the dismantling of the social security net and “the passing of all responsibility for their well-being to individuals and their families” (2006, p.151) are commonly quoted exemplars of neoliberalism.
138 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 Drawn from the neoliberal, capitalist tradition, individual responsibility now resonates much more widely, becoming a familiar catchcry of politicians, bureaucrats and NGOs, including environmental organizations.
Furthermore, calls for individual responsibility are universally appealing – at least within western democratic societies, where examples are rife.
Governments increasingly call on their citizens to take greater responsibility across a broad spectrum of societal concerns: whether it is to take charge of one’s own obesity, employment and education, safety from crime (O’Malley 2001) and terrorism (Sydney Morning Herald 2008), or harm to the environment.
When Barack Obama called for “individual responsibility and mutual responsibility”, I suggest that he was appealing to a sentiment that already resonates deeply, not only with the American public but also the rest of the democratic world.
Indeed this supports Harvey’s case that “neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse, and had pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way we interpret, live in and understand the world" (Harvey 2006, p.145).
Individualized responsibility for climate change in a neoliberal interpretation therefore infers that this political ideology now extends into individual lifestyle choices and behaviours as it “connects with much in ordinary moral thinking; and it is intuitively plausible that justice has something to do with people getting what they are responsible for and not benefiting or being burdened by good and bad luck” (Matravers 2007, p.73).
In Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?
Maniates (2002) sets forth the idea that the “individualization of responsibility” threatens to seriously undermine effective action to curtail life-threatening environmental concerns by creating a disjunction between “our morals and our practices” (2002, p.51).
He argues that the individualization of responsibility focuses on the person as consumer rather than citizen and that the “ten simple things to save the planet” (2002, p.50) approach positions the individual within the comfort zone of consumerism, diverting people from more important environmental and citizen-led democratic action, and hiding the power disparity between citizens, governments and corporations (2002, pp.57-8).
Maniates proposes that the individualization of responsibility depoliticizes environmental degradation as consumer action replaces political action which strives to change the institutions Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 139 that “drive pervasive consumerism” (2002, p.51).
Maniates considers global negotiations to address environmental problems to represent only the interests of governments and corporations, whilst those same actors suggest that sustainability can be achieved through “private, individual, well-intentioned consumer choice” (2002, p.58).
In his view this reveals the power and institutional barriers to achieving change through individual consumption choices, as these choices are “constrained, shaped and framed by institutions and political forces that can be remade only through collective citizen action, as opposed to individual consumer behaviour” (2002, pp.65-6).
If we are to accept Jensen’s (2009) proposition that global issues require every single individual to contribute to a solution, for Maniates this can only be achieved through collective, democratic action.
Individualization, globalization and risk The risk theorists Bauman, Beck and Giddens, draw on the notion of individualization as a defining feature of postmodern society.
According to Beck, the breakdown in social classes; greater competition for jobs; and the collapse of traditional family structures, contribute to the growing liberation of individuals as the agents of their own life courses (Beck 1992, p.88).
Individualization for Beck then becomes a “double-edged sword” creating “greater choice and autonomy” but also “the burden of continual decision and responsibility” (Mythen 2004, p.119).
Institutions are also playing a role in establishing greater responsibility for individuals as there are now many more expectations placed by governments on their citizenry to take responsibility for areas which previously would have been more acceptably under state control.
This has set in place an acceptance for less state intervention and greater responsibility for individuals on a wide range of social issues, so that: "Many features, functions and activities which were previously assigned to the nation state, the welfare state, hierarchical organization, the nuclear family, the class, the centralized trade union, are now transferred inward and outward: outwards to global or international organizations; inward to the individual" (Beck 2007, p. 682).
140 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 The accelerating processes of globalization and technological change are creating the conditions within society that form two intersecting paths.
On the one hand, “individualized life paths that are increasingly reliant on individual choice and reflexivity” and on the other, the global distribution of risk (Mythen 2004, p.118).
Individualization, which “is imposed on the individual by modern institutions" (Beck 2007, p.681), shares much with the neoliberalist interpretation provided above, except that it formulates around conditions of risk.
So postindustrial society, which held the promise of wealth and wellbeing as a by-product of techno-scientific development, paradoxically has given rise to risks that are pervasive and deadly.
These risks are not limited within state borders, are often invisible and can impact across generations.
Beck commonly draws on global climate change, nuclear contamination, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and toxic chemicals as exemplars of such risks.
In response to the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) what emerges is “‘organised irresponsibility’ …..[where] there are a diversity of humanly created risks for which people and organizations are certainly ‘responsible’ in a sense that they are its authors but where no one is held specifically accountable” (Giddens 1999, p.9).
Thus individualized responsibility shifts from being a reflexive moral imperative to a set of personal practices divorced from their social moorings that neither “sustain [n]or challenge the structuring of criteria for value in society” (Scerri 2009, p.478), “a kind of artificial ethics-lite” (2009, p.477).
In many respects Harvey, Maniates and Beck align on contemporary theories of individualized responsibility: in short, each views the processes of neoliberalism as having grown out of globalization and the distribution of risks and responsibilities from the state to individuals as key forces for individualization.
I propose however that the risk theorists, exemplified by Beck, extend the understanding of individualized responsibility, one which may go some way to explain why the call for individual responsibility finds few social critics.
The seeming paradox of individualization not only creates individual responsibility (for example where the state may withdraw from social interventions) but requires it, as people find themselves set adrift from their traditional supportive social structures.
Whereas the neoliberalist critique provides a rather Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 141 negative understanding of this individualizing process, for Beck, the removal of societal constrictions opens up new possibilities.
As individualization frees agents from structural restraints, so is created the potential for individuals (as social agents) to actively engage with and change the prevailing social structure.
So that “structural change forces social actors to become progressively more free from structure” opening the potential for modernization to advance as “these agents must release themselves from structural constraint and actively shape the modernization process" (Lash & Wynne quoted in Beck 1992, p.2).
Beck infers that individualization is a means to greater democratic control and thereby a precursor to a new social order.
This account of individualization is positive and affirming, and together with the morally desirable characteristics attributed to responsibility (Auhagen & Bierhoff 2000) may go some way to explain why in principle people find the idea of taking individual responsibility for environmental action appealing.
However critics of Beck, such as Mythen, challenge his normative stance asking that: “we might reasonably request the evidence of a linear link between risk, behavioural change and political activity” (2004, p.46) and suggesting Beck’s promise of social transformation is dependent on the “emancipatory capacity which Beck attaches to risk society” which relies “upon the durability of the link between risk consciousness and political action” (2004, p.47).
Empirical psychological and sociological evidence of individual attitudes and behaviours towards global climate risk conditions (considered in the following section) suggest that the processes of transformative social change are yet to emerge.
Just how willing and able are individuals to act on climate change?
A considerable body of social research now exists to deepen our understanding of people’s willingness to undertake actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Accountability and Consumers International (2007) surveyed 2,734 people in the US and UK and found that 66% of consumers agreed that individuals need to take responsibility for their contribution to climate change.
A more recent survey of 1000 Australians found even higher levels – 81% of Australian consumers agreed that everyone needs to take more responsibility for their personal contribution to global warming (Accountability, Net Balance Foundation and LRQA 2008, p.11).
The 142 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 frequently reported types of actions taken are: turning off lights and appliances around the home and buying more energy efficient light bulbs and appliances (Accountability and Consumers International 2007, Accountability, Net Balance Foundation and LRQA 2008).
Actions requiring greater commitments of time and money, for example, buying green energy for the home or using a carbon calculator to measure a household’s greenhouse emissions were the least likely to be adopted (Accountability and Consumers International 2007, Accountability, Net Balance Foundation and LRQA 2008).
In a similar vein, an European study noted that citizens were most likely to state that they had undertaken “passive” actions in relation to the environment that are conducive with the conduct of their daily lives (European Commission 2008: 12) rather than “active” ones: “using their car less (17%) and environmentally sensible consumption in terms of buying environmentally friendly products (17%) or locally produced products (21%).
These “active” actions are also issues that worry Europeans the least (European Commission 2008, p.12).
Pidgeon et al.
argue that despite the increased interest and concern regarding climate change in the UK it “remains a low priority for most people in relation to other personal and social issues” (2008, p. 73).
They note the “discrepancy between individuals’ intentions to mitigate and their actual behaviours; while people indicate frequently that they are willing to recycle and save energy in the home, only a minority of people do take measures to reduce their energy consumption for environmental reasons” (2008, p.73).
The Accountability surveys on what assures consumers on climate change (Accountability and Consumers International 2007, for UK and USA and Accountability, Net Balance Foundation and LRQA 2008, for Australia), when mapping level of concern regarding climate change against level of action identified large discrepancies.
In the US and UK research 75% stated that they were concerned about global warming “but challenged to see how their action could make a difference” and only 9% indicated both concern and willingness to take action (p. 26).
In the Australian research an equal number expressed concern but not willingness to act (75%), whereas a higher number expressed willingness to take action (21%) (p. 20).
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 143 This inconsistency between individuals’ stated intentions and their actions (the “value-action” gap) has been widely described (Blake 1999; Kollmus & Agyeman 2002; Macnaghten 2003; Darnton 2006; Norgaard 2009).
There is a range of barriers proposed that contribute to the gap.
One of the most potent, and key to this discussion, is that people feel that they lack the ability or sense of empowerment to undertake actions that will ‘make the difference’ on climate change.
Why individuals are failing to integrate scientific information regarding climate change into effective forms of social action has recently been explored by Norgaard (2009) and Räthzel and Uzzell (2009).
They point to people’s perception of their fundamental ineffectiveness on global climate change action as they feel less responsible for those matters that are least under their personal control.
Räthzel and Uzzell’s (2009) research focuses on the spatial biasing of individuals’ felt responsibility.
In considering environmental degradation on a scale from the local to the global, their research subjects felt most responsible for local issues and least responsible for global ones.
Concomitantly they perceived that their local environments suffer the least environmental degradation whilst global environments are the worst impacted.
“Ironically, then, although people feel that they are responsible for the environment at the local level this is precisely the level at which they perceive minimal problems.
The areal level which they perceive has the most serious environmental problems is the areal level about which they feel least personally responsible and powerless to influence or act" (2009, p. 328).
These feelings of powerlessness are further entrained as people realize their inability to effect global change through their individual agency, calling on their governments to act (Bickerstaff & Walker 2002; Macnaghten 2003; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon 2006; Pidgeon et al.
2008; Bickerstaff et al.
2008; Norgaard 2009).
However people also understand global degradation as symptomatic of weak political action (Räthzel & Uzzell 2009, p.329), so not only do individuals perceive an unacceptable level of action from governments on climate change mitigation they are also cynical that governments are genuinely serious about climate change as it is understood to be against their economic interests (Darnton 2006, p.24; Accountability and Consumers International 2007).
Therefore, governments and global institutions in demonstrating that they are ill-equipped to deal with complex global problems such as climate change, unveil “the possibility that those political 144 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 and economic structures that have been set in place are inadequate to handle the problem” (Norgaard 2009, p.30).
The global financial crisis and lack of a global agreement for avoiding catastrophic climate change (which Beck encapsulates within “organized responsibility”) support this contention.
These persistent expressions of individuals’ subjection on climate change (drawn from the psycho-social evidence) are inconsistent with Beck’s supposition that actors are freed through the conditions of the risk society to construct their own life courses, as this presupposes that actors possess the authority within their life realms that allow them to influence and overcome the prevailing cultural and structural conditions (Norgaard 2009, Räthzel & Uzzell 2009).
From small steps to big change?
The evidence provided by psycho-social research supports theories of individualization in postmodern society as individualized responsibility for climate change mitigation now resonates deeply within individuals in Australia, Europe, UK and the USA.
Relying on ‘simple and painless steps’ to deliver the world from catastrophic climate change, however, is a flawed prospect as it is clear that the limited range of “passive” actions people are currently willing to make will fail to bring about the deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions required (WWF-UK 2008).
Moreover faced with a global climate crisis, individual actors’ feelings of futility come to the fore.
So whilst comfortable in undertaking “personal, private sphere” behaviours to mitigate climate change, actors are (perhaps, understandably) reticent to broaden their spheres of authority further.
Whilst there may be a compelling case for individual responsibility, not the least being the seriousness of the problem at hand, the very significant reductions in greenhouse gases needed, and the willingness of people to play their part, a reliance on personal contributions to greenhouse gas reductions may hinder the development of effective global policy and action whilst diverting public attention from engaging fully in civil society (Bulkeley & Moser 2007; Accountability and Consumers International 2007; Goldspink & Kay 2007; WWF 2008).
The public desire for institutional accountability for climate change mitigation (whilst governments meanwhile demand individual responsibility) raises issues for the public of institutional trust, Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 145 capability and duty of care (Beck 1992; Bickerstaff & Walker 2002; Bickerstaff et al.
2008; Macnaghten 2003; Pidgeon et al.
2008).
It also alerts the individual to the uneven power relationships that operate between the individual and the state and other institutions (Maniates 2002; Bickerstaff et al.
2008; Scerri 2009) as well as people’s actions being constrained by the structural components of, for example, energy supply (Wilhite et al.
2000).
Successful social movements need to jointly build on individuals’ choice and freewill in order to respond to climate change, as well as deliver the means for linking up personal with societal level action.
Current emphasis on individual responsibility is unhelpful in this regard as it fails to provide a useful framework for local/global linkages on complex global risks and downplays the “social and political relations which are the glue that hold together our understanding and actions on the world” (Räthzel & Uzzell 2009, p.328).
Is the paradox that high levels of concern regarding climate change, unmatched by action, symptomatic that the individualization of responsibility is being created without the ability for actors to effectively engage in societal change?
Scerri (2009) argues that it is the forces of modernization that have promoted individualism as an essential contemporary societal trait but without the reflexivity required to establish effective forms of collective democratic control.
In this assessment people’s failure to act as citizens is as hardwired as the conditions that created the desire to act in the first place, deflected in rampant consumerism.
So whereas people feel individually responsible for environmental degradation, “personal acts of consumption stand-in for citizen’s ethico-political commitments” (2009, p.475).
Individuation rather than enhancing agency alerts individuals to their essential ineffectiveness in tackling complex global environmental issues (Pigeon et al.
2008, p.75).
In essence atomistic agents are created that lack the efficacy and authority to make change (Macnaghten 2003; Bickerstaff & Walker 2002; Bickerstaff et al.
2008; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; Norgaard 2009).
Norms of individualization in contemporary Western culture “make it difficult to politicize ethical commitments because devaluing links between (private) morality and (collective) reasons for acting” (Scerri 2009, p. 469).
A type of “psycho-social dislocation” (Räthzel & Uzzell 2009, p.333) forms under such circumstances rooted in the dichotomies between the individual and the social and the local and the global.
146 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 Two potential scenarios are thus exposed: one where an ambivalence to personal action is created, where people “choose not to choose” as they feel disempowered and ineffective in the face of the global climate challenge (Macnaghten 2003, p.77).
The other sees actors not only as individuals but also as “the sum of their social relations to others and the environment” (Räthzel & Uzzell 2009, p.328) who seek out social and institutional relationships that can expand their individual authority through collective action.
There is a growing range of promising societal projects, such as the Transition Town movement, which can translate “reductionist individualism” into collective alternative low energy futures (Räthzel & Uzzell 2009, p.334).
Within Australia the burgeoning of over a hundred local community climate action groups over recent years provides similar optimism that democratic responses to the climate change crisis can transcend the dominant individualism discourse.
(See www.climatemovement.org.au for an extensive listing.)
As community dissatisfaction grows with continuing international government inaction in the lead up to the Copenhagen conference to negotiate a post Kyoto climate treaty, the emergence of global mobilizing networks that target local-based action, such as 350.org (see www.350.org ), provide further indication that perhaps the social transformation that Beck describes is surfacing.
Conclusion At this juncture of the climate change debate understandings and negotiations over responsibility are becoming critically important – however, there has been little deliberation over how the burdens and responsibilities of global warming mitigation will be shared and linked from personal level action to the global.
Several views on individualized responsibility have been put forward here that contribute to this debate.
Birnbacher (2000) suggests that individual responsibility exists in the form of a duty of care towards future generations.
Could this moral imperative be garnered to overcome political inertia in the face of the impending climate crisis?
Neoliberalism has generated rationalist models of individual responsibility towards environmental problems which rely on freedom of choice and freewill and encouraged through consumerism.
Whilst such prescriptions are hegemonic in current societal approaches to climate change abatement, serious concerns are now being raised on the ability of individuals as consumers to bring about the significant changes in carbon reduction required.
Individualization http://www.climatemovement.org.au/� http://www.350.org/� Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 147 arising from globalization and technology-induced risk society opens the possibility for individuals to extend their spheres of authority as social agents through collective action and to re-balance the power inequities evident in current climate change regimes.
Each of these nuanced insights into responsibility extend our grasp of how human action may be garnered to abate the worst impacts of global climate change: as moral agents willing to take action now on behalf of future generations; as political agents engaging in citizen rather than consumer-based action; and as social agents seeking to influence and construct alternative social and institutional associations.
References Accountability and Consumers International 2007, What Assures Consumers on Climate Change?
Switching on Citizen Power, http://www.accountability21.net/WhatAssures.
Accountability, Net Balance Foundation and LRQA 2008 What Assures Consumers in Australia on Climate Change?
: Switching on Citizen Power.
2008 Update – Australian Survey,’ http://www.accountability21.net/ Auhagen, A.E.
and Bierhoff, H-W. 2000, ‘Responsibility as a fundamental human phenomenon’ in Auhagen, A.E.
& Bierhoff, H-W.
(eds.
), Responsibility: The Many Faces of a Social Phenomenon, Routledge, London.
“Aussies need to be resilient: McClelland”; Sydney Morning Herald, August 21, 2008, http://news.smh.com.au/national/aussies-need-to-be-resilient-mcclelland-20080821-3zjk.html#, accessed 26/8/08.
Australian Conservation Foundation 2007, Consuming Australia, http://acfonline.org.au/uploads /res/res_atlas_main_findings.pdf, accessed 05/09/08.
Australian Research Group 2006, Climate Change Communications Quantitative Research on behalf of the Climate Action Network Australia (CANA) “Be climate clever, families told.” The Daily Telegraph, September 15, 2007. http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22420580-5009760,00.html accessed 29/10/07.
Beck, U.
1992, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans.
M. Ritter, Sage Publications, London.
Beck, U.
2007, 'Beyond class and nation: reframing social inequalities in a globalizing world', The British Journal of Sociology, vol.
58, no.
4, pp.679-705.
Bickerstaff, K. and Walker, G. 2002, ‘Risk, responsibility, and blame: an analysis of vocabularies of motive in air-pollution(ing) discourses’, Environment and Planning A, vol.
34, pp.2175-2192.
Bickerstaff, K.; Simmons, P. and Pidgeon, N. 2008, ‘Constructing responsibilities for risk: negotiating citizen-state relationships’, Environment and Planning A, vol.
40, pp.1312-1330.
Birnbacher, D. 2000, ‘Philosophical foundations of responsibility’, in Auhagen, A.E.
and Bierhoff, H-W., (eds.
), Responsibility: The Many faces of a Social Phenomenon, Routledge, London.
Blake, J.
1999, 'Overcoming the 'Value-Action Gap' in Environmental Policy: tensions between national policy and local experience', Local Environment, vol.
4, no.
3, pp.
257-278. http://www.accountability21.net/WhatAssures� http://www.accountability21.net/� http://news.smh.com.au/national/aussies-need-to-be-resilient-mcclelland-20080821-3zjk.html� http://acfonline.org.au/uploads%20/res/res_atlas_main_findings.pdf� http://acfonline.org.au/uploads%20/res/res_atlas_main_findings.pdf� http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22420580-5009760,00.html� 148 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 Bulkeley, H. and Moser, S.C. 2007,’Responding to Climate Change: Governance and Social Action beyond Kyoto ‘, Global Environmental Politics, vol.
7, no.
2, pp.
1-10.
Caney, S. 2006, 'Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate Change', Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol.
XIX, no.
2, pp.255-278.
Darnton, A.
2004, Driving Public Behaviours for Sustainable Lifestyles, Report 2 of Desk Research commissioned by COI on behalf of Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).
DEFRA 2005, Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change: Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases, February 1st to 3rd, 2005, Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom.
European Commission 2008, Attitudes of European citizens towards the environment, in D.G.
Communication (ed.)
European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives /ebs/ebs_295_sum_en.pdf accessed 30/3/08 Garnaut, R. 2008, The Garnaut Climate Change Review.
Final Report, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne.
Giddens, A.
1999, 'Risk and Responsibility', The Modern Law Review, vol.
62, no.
1, pp.1-10.
Goldspink, C. and Kay, R. 2007, ‘Systems, Structure and Agency: A Contribution to the Theory of Social Emergence and Methods of its Study’, Proceedings of the 13th ANZSYS Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, 2-5 December, 2007.
Hansen, J.
2007, ‘Climate catastrophe’, New Scientist, vol.
195, no.
2614, (July 28), pp.30-34.
Hansen, J.
2008, ‘Tipping Point: Perspectives of a climatologist’ in 2008-2009 State of the Wild: A Global Portrait of Wildlife, Wildlands and Oceans, Wildlife Conservation Society, Island Press, Washington D.C. Hansen, J.; Makiko, S.; Kharecha, P.; Beerling, D.; Berner, R.; Masson-Delmotte, V.; Pagani, M.; Raymo, M.; Royer, D. L.; and Zachros, J. C. 2008, 'Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?'
www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2_20080407.pdf, accessed 09/08/08.
Harvey, D. 2006, 'Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction', Geografiska Annaler, vol.
88B, no.
2, pp.
145-158.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007a, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
Summary for Policymakers, IPCC Plenary XXVII, Valencia, Spain, 12-17 November 2007.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007b, Summary for Policymakers, In B. Metz, O.R.
Davidson, P.R.
Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds.)
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jensen, M. 2009, ‘Lifestyle: suggesting mechanisms and a definition from a cognitive science perspective’, Environment, Development and Sustainability, vol.
11, pp.215-228.
Kollmus, A. and Agyeman, J.
2002, 'Mind the Gap: why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro-environmental behaviour?'
Environmental Education Research, vol.
8, no.
3, pp.239-259.
Lenzen, M. 1997, ‘Individual responsibility and climate change’, Paper presented at the International Academic Conference on Environmental Justice, The University of Melbourne, 1-3 October, 1997.
Lorenzoni, I. and Pidgeon, N.F.
2006, 'Public views on Climate Change: European and USA Perspectives', Climatic Change, vol.
77, no.
1/2, pp.73-95.
Maniates, M.F.
2002, 'Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?'
in Princen, T; Maniates, M and Conca, K (eds.
), Confronting Consumption, MIT, Cambridge, Ma.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives%20/ebs/ebs_295_sum_en.pdf%20accessed%2030/3/08� http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives%20/ebs/ebs_295_sum_en.pdf%20accessed%2030/3/08� http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2_20080407.pdf� Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.3, 2009 149 Matravers, M. 2007, Responsibility and Justice, Polity Press, Cambridge.
Macnaghten, P. 2003, ‘Embodying the environment in everyday life practices’, The Sociological Review, vol.
51, no.
1, pp.63-84.
Mythen, G. 2004, Ulrich Beck: a critical introduction to the risk society, Pluto Press, London.
Norgaard, K.M.
2009, Cognitive and Behavioural Challenges in Responding to Climate Change: Background Paper to the 2010 World Development Report, The World Bank.
Obama, B.
2008, Speech to the Democratic National Convention, August 28, www.demconvention.com/barack-obama/, accessed 31/08/08.
O'Malley, P. 1996, ‘Risk and Responsibility’, in Barry, A., Osborne, T and Rose, N (eds.
), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government, University College London Press, London.
Pidgeon, N. F., Lorenzoni, I. and Poortinga, W. 2008, ‘Climate change or nuclear power – No thanks!
A quantitative study of public perceptions and risk framing in Britain’, Global Environmental Change, vol.
18, pp.69-85.
Randerson, J.
2008, ‘Climate change: Prepare for global temperature rise of 4C, warns top scientist.
Defra's chief adviser says we need strategy to adapt to potential catastrophic increase’, Thursday August 7, The Guardian.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment /2008/aug/06 /climatechange.scienceofclimatechange, accessed 16/08/08.
Räthzel, N. and Uzzell, D. 2009, ‘Changing relations in global environmental change’, Global Environmental Change, vol.
19, no.
3, pp.326-335.
Scerri, A.
2009, ‘Paradoxes of increased individuation and public awareness of environmental issues’, Environmental Politics, vol.
18, no.
4, pp.467-485.
Singer, P. 2002, One World; the Ethics of Globalisation, Text Publishing Company, Melbourne.
Singer, P. 2006, 'Ethics and Climate Change: A Commentary on MacCracken, Toman and Gardiner', Environmental Values, vol.
15, pp.415-422.
Stern, N. & Stern, N.H. 2007, The economics of climate change: the Stern review, Cambridge University Press.
Stern, P. C. 2005, ‘Understanding Individuals’ Environmentally Significant Behaviour’, Environmental Law Reporter, vol.
35, pp.10785-10790.
The Climate Institute 2007, Climate of the Nation: Australian Attitudes to Climate Change and its Solutions, www.climateinstitute.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task =view&id=43&Itemid=41, accessed 21/10/07.
Watkins, K. 2007, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Wilhite, H., Shove, E., Lutzenhiser, L. and Kempton, W. 2000, ‘The Legacy of Twenty Years of Energy Demand Management: we know more about Individual Behaviour but next to Nothing about Demand’, in E. Jochem et al.
(eds.)
Society, Behaviour and Climate Change Mitigation, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp.109-126.
WWF-UK 2008, Weathercocks and Signposts.
The environment movement at a crossroad, www.wwf.org.uk/strategiesforchange accessed 29/05/08.
WWF 2008, Climate change: faster, stronger, sooner.
A European update on climate science, www.panda.org/eu accessed 30/11/08.
http://www.demconvention.com/barack-obama/� http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment%20/2008/aug/06%20/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange� http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment%20/2008/aug/06%20/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange� http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task%20=view&id=43&Itemid=41� http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task%20=view&id=43&Itemid=41� http://www.wwf.org.uk/strategiesforchange� http://www.panda.org/eu�
e2019430102-01 General Circulation Models (GCMs) are the main tools used to assess the impacts of climate change.
Due to their coarse resolution, with cells of 100 km × 100 km, GCMs are dynamically downscaled using Regional Climate Models (RCMs) that better incorporate the local physical features and simulate the climate of a smaller region, e.g.
a country.
However, RCMs tend to have systematic biases when compared with local observations, such as deviations from day-to-day measurements, and from the mean and extreme events.
As a result, confidence in the model projections decreases.
One way to address this is to correct the RCM output using statistical methods that relate the simulations with the observations, producing bias-corrected (BC) projections.
Here, we present the first assessment of a previously published method to bias-correct 21 RCM projections of daily temperature and precipitation for Denmark.
We assess the projected changes and sources of uncertainty.
The study provides an initial assessment of the bias correction procedure applied to this set of model outputs to adjust projections of annual temperature, precipitation and potential evapotranspiration (PET).
This method is expected to provide a foundation for further analysis of climate change impacts in Denmark.
Material and Methods Climate models We analysed 21 RCMs from the Euro-CORDEX initiative (Jacob et al.
2014) driven by GCMs from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 5 (Taylor et al.
2012).
Of these, 16 combinations are driven by the greenhouse gas concentration scenario (Representative Concentration Pathway) RCP 8.5 and five are driven by RCP 4.5 (Table 1).
RCPs are based on a review of existing scientific literature considering different descriptions of future socioeconomic conditions, technological development, the environment, climate and emission of greenhouse gases and aerosols (Moss et al.
2010).
RCP 8.5 represents a rising radiative forcing reaching 8.5 W/m2 by 2100 whereas RCP 4.5 represents a scenario of stabilised radiative forcing at 4.5 W/m2, both relative to preindustrial levels (van Vuuren et al.
2011).
The RCM daily outputs were remapped using the Climate Data Operators – a collection of command line operators to analyse climate model data (Schulzweida 2019) – to match the grids of the observed temperature (20 km) and precipitation (10 km) obtained from the Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI).
We remapped temperature using a bilinear interpolation and a conservative interpolation for precipitation.
Bias-correction Precipitation and temperature data were bias-corrected using a distribution-based scaling method, whereby daily simulations were fitted to daily observations, as described by Seaby et al.
(2013).
We used the double gamma distribution with a cut-off threshold set to the 90th percentile to bias-correct precipitation, and a normal distribution for temperature.
Bias correction has limitations.
For example, the correction depends on the training period used to define the distribution parameters that will be used to bias-correct the simulated precipitation and temperature (Lafon et al.
2013), biases associated with the driving data (Maraun 2016) and any possible alterations in the signal of change in the projection (Maraun 2013).
Bias correction also assumes stationarity in the trained parameters (Chen et al.
2015).
These and other limitations have been discussed in detail by Maraun & Widmann (2018).
In our method, we used gridded observations from 1991 to 2010 as the training dataset.
The parameters obtained during this training period were used to generate BC time series from 1971 to 2100.
The correction method was cross-validated using a five-fold method (Maraun et al.
2015), where five non-overlapping periods of equal length are defined.
Four periods were used to train the parameters and then the parameters were used to bias-correct the remaining Climate change: Sources of uncertainty in precipitation and temperature projections for Denmark Ernesto Pasten-Zapata*1, Torben O. Sonnenborg1, Jens Christian Refsgaard1 GEUS Bulletin is free to individuals and institutions in electronic form.
The author(s) retain copyright over the article contents.
RESEARCH ARTICLE | OPEN ACCESS GEUS Bulletin Vol 43 | e2019430102 | Published online: 24 June 2019 https://doi.org/10.34194/GEUSB-201943-01-02 https://doi.org/10.34194/GEUSB-201943-01-02 e2019430102-02 period.
Following this approach, cross-validated time series were developed for the entire period.
Potential evapotranspiration (PET) PET was estimated using the Oudin formula (Oudin et al.
2005), which uses temperature as the only climate input.
The formula accurately reproduces the annual accumulated PET over Denmark when compared to observations, but they are offset from the observed monthly distributions, and a correction parameter needs to be applied.
Here, we estimated daily PET using the climate model temperature (uncorrected and BC) as the input and applied the correction parameter.
Results and discussion We validated the bias correction method by comparing how well the uncorrected and BC models simulate the observed mean annual temperature and precipitation.
Then, we assessed the projected changes in temperature, precipitation, and PET by the end of this century for the whole ensemble and for each individual combination of GCM and RCM.
We then assessed the contribution of individual sources of uncertainty in the projections.
Finally, we assessed the spatial distribution of the projected change for mean annual precipitation under RCP 8.5 by the end of the century along with a measure of its uncertainty.
Here, we assess the change in precipitation only, as its variation throughout the country is larger than that of temperature and PET.
Bias-corrected results Mean annual temperature biases range from –1.2°C to +1.0°C in the uncorrected models and –0.1°C to +0.3°C in the BC models (data not shown).
The mean annual precipitation (857 mm) biases range from –26% to +39% for the uncorrected models and between –3% and +5% for the BC simulations.
Even though PET is not a direct output of the climate models, we assessed the biases associated with it using uncorrected and BC temperature data as the input to the Oudin formula.
The biases associated with mean annual Changes are for 2071–2100, relative to the 1981–2010 reference period for the uncorrected (raw) and bias-corrected (BC) simulations.
GCM: General Circulation Model.
RCM: Regional Climate Model.
RCP: Representative Concentration Pathway.
NV: natural variability.
Table 1.
Projected change in the mean annual temperature (T), precipitation (P) and potential evapotranspiration (PET) Projected change by 2071–2100 compared to 1981–2010 Raw BC Included in the uncertainty analysis GCM RCM RCP NV GCM RCM Ensemble RCP T P PET T P PET (°C) (mm) (mm) (°C) (mm) (mm) x CanESM2 REMO2015 r1i1p1 8.5 3.5 265 115 5.1 310 173 x EC-EARTH RACMO 2.2 r1i1p1 8.5 3.0 51 97 3.4 126 112 EC-EARTH HIRHAM5 r3i1p1 8.5 3.1 71 100 3.9 113 135 x EC-EARTH RACMO 2.2 r12i1p1 8.5 3.2 92 100 3.7 144 124 x x IPSL-CM5A-MR RCA4 r1i1p1 8.5 3.2 215 98 3.6 241 120 x MIROC5 REMO2015 r1i1p1 8.5 4.1 156 134 4.9 156 167 x x MPI-ESM-LR REMO2009 r1i1p1 8.5 2.5 108 70 3.3 133 104 x MPI-ESM-LR RCA4 r1i1p1 8.5 2.6 150 78 3.0 173 112 x MPI-ESM-LR REMO2009 r12i1p1 8.5 2.4 120 73 3.3 154 107 NorESM1-M HIRHAM5 r1i1p1 8.5 2.8 162 95 3.5 158 129 x HadGEM2-ES CCLM 4.8.17 r1i1p1 8.5 4.3 73 140 4.6 75 150 x HadGEM2-ES HIRHAM5 r1i1p1 8.5 3.8 176 121 4.7 200 159 x x HadGEM2-ES REMO2015 r1i1p1 8.5 4.1 88 130 5.6 110 186 x x HadGEM2-ES RACMO 2.2 r1i1p1 8.5 4.1 133 131 4.6 181 149 x x HadGEM2-ES RCA4 r1i1p1 8.5 3.9 165 120 4.4 219 143 EC-EARTH HIRHAM5 r3i1p1 4.5 1.6 50 55 2.1 70 75 x IPSL-CM5A-MR RCA4 r1i1p1 4.5 2.0 86 39 2.3 106 79 x MPI-ESM-LR REMO2009 r1i1p1 4.5 1.2 –25 38 1.7 –10 58 MPI-ESM-LR REMO2009 r12i1p1 4.5 1.2 43 38 1.7 58 57 x HadGEM2-ES RACMO 2.2 r1i1p1 4.5 2.5 112 77 2.8 147 91 Ensemble mean change 8.5 3.3 133 105 4 165 135 4.5 1.7 53 50 2.1 74 72 Ensemble standard deviation 8.5 0.6 56.8 22.4 0.8 56.9 27.4 4.5 0.5 51.9 16.9 0.5 58.5 14.7 e2019430102-03 PET (564 mm) range from –6% to +8% in the uncorrected models and +2% to +5% in the BC models.
Projected changes The BC simulations project higher temperatures and PET compared to the uncorrected simulations (Fig.
1).
In contrast, the uncorrected models project higher precipitation than the BC models.
The change in temperature and PET by the end of the century is larger when driven by RCP 8.5 compared to RCP 4.5.
The same is true for precipitation, but the difference between the two RCPs is small.
When driven by RCP 4.5, the mean of the uncorrected models projects an increase in temperature of 1.7°C by the end of the century, while the BC simulations project an increase of 2.1°C.
Under RCP 8.5, the uncorrected ensemble mean projects an increase of 3.3°C and the BC models project an increase of 4°C (Table 1).
( ° C ) (m m ) (m m ) (m m ) (m m ) ( ° C ) A.
Temperature, RCP 4.5 B.
Temperature, RCP 8.5 C. Precipitation, RCP 4.5 D. Precipitation, RCP 8.5 E. Potential evapotranspiration, RCP 4.5 F. Potential evapotranspiration, RCP 8.5 Fig 1.
Observations and uncorrected (raw) and bias-corrected (BC) projections under two RCP scenarios.
Mean annual temperature under A: RCP 4.5 and B: RCP 8.5.
Mean annual precipitation under C: RCP 4.5 and D: RCP 8.5.
Mean annual potential evapotranspiration under E: RCP 4.5 and F: RCP 8.5. e2019430102-04 Under RCP 4.5, uncorrected models project an increase in inland precipitation of 53 mm/yr by the end of the century, in contrast to the 76 mm/yr projected by the BC models.
Under RCP 8.5, the uncorrected ensemble projects an increase of 133 mm/yr by the end of the century whilst the BC ensemble projects an increase of 165 mm/yr.
The bias-correction method applied here, clearly changes the climate signal from the combined GCM-RCM.
This contrasts with other bias-correction methods, such as the delta change bias-correction, which has no such effect.
PET projections follow a similar pattern as temperature, with larger increases projected by the BC models compared to the uncorrected projections, and with the largest increase by the end of the century.
Notably, the ensemble change for PET is always lower than the change projected for precipitation.
Table 1 shows the projected changes in mean annual temperature, PET and precipitation for individual models by the end of the century.
Clusters are observed, such as models that project a warmer (e.g.
CanESM2-REMO2015 and all RCMs driven by HadGEM2-ES under RCP 8.5) or a wetter climate (CanESM2-REMO2015, IPSL-CM5A-MR-RCA4, HadGEM2-ES-HIRHAM5 under RCP 8.5) compared to the ensemble mean.
Further clusters emerge among models that project an increase in water stress (where the increase in PET is larger than the increase in precipitation), such as HadGEM2-ES-CCLM and HadGEM2-ES-REMO2015 when driven by RCP 8.5.
These clusters can provide insights into the impacts of climate change on Danish water resources.
Uncertainty of the projections The ensemble spread from the BC simulations is smaller than the spread of the uncorrected models for temperature and PET when driven by RCP 8.5.
For precipitation, the ensemble spread decreases for both RCPs.
The standard deviation of the mean annual precipitation from 2071 to 2100 is reduced by bias-correction from 166 mm to 122 mm for RCP 4.5 and from 211 mm to 139 mm for RCP 8.5.
The spread or ‘uncertainty’ in projections comes from the choice of GCM, RCM or RCP and the natural variability expressed in the models.
To assess the contribution of each source of uncertainty to the overall spread of projections, we analysed the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the precipitation and temperature projections driven by RCP 8.5 for the middle and end of the century (Table 2).
The SNR of an ensemble is defined as the projected mean divided by the standard deviation of the ensemble.
Thus, a low SNR implies that the uncertainty of the projection is high.
Our analysis has some limitations, which we acknowledge here.
First, the full range of all possible combinations of GCMs and RCMs were not available for the uncertainty analysis.
Second, some of the available GCM-RCM combinations were run with different initial conditions and third, not all RCMs are driven by the same GCMs.
Considering these limitations, we used the GCM-RCM combinations driven by HadGEM2-ES to assess RCM uncertainty.
GCM uncertainty was estimated by averaging the output of the REMO2015 and RCA4 RCMs (each one driven by three different GCMs).
RCP uncertainty was evaluated using the GCM-RCM combinations available for both scenarios.
Uncertainty associated with natural variability was assessed using simulations with two different initial conditions (Table 1).
For temperature, the largest source of uncertainty in the uncorrected models is the choice of RCP scenario used.
The uncertainty associated with natural variability is largest by the middle of the century and then reduces.
Finally, the uncertainty associated with the GCM is larger than that of the RCM, which represents the smallest source of uncertainty, overall.
These results are similar to the findings of Hawkins & Sutton (2011) for projections of global mean temperature.
For precipitation, the choice of GCM and RCP provides the largest sources of uncertainty by the middle of the century and the end of the century, respectively.
The next largest source of uncertainty is the RCM followed by natural variability.
Hawkins & Sutton (2011) estimated that the model uncertainty is larger than the uncertainty associated with Table 2.
Signal to noise ratio for temperature (T) and precipitation (P) Uncertainty source 2041–2070 2071–2100 2041–2070 2071–2100 2041–2070 2071–2100 2041–2070 2071–2100 GCM 5.7 5.7 1.2 2.0 6.3 6.3 2.0 2.7 RCM 15.3 19.9 2.4 2.8 9.9 10.1 1.8 2.5 RCP 2.6 2.6 1.7 1.4 3.2 3.0 2.1 1.6 NV 5.0 42.0 12.9 4.5 6.3 16.1 3.7 11.4 Raw BC T (°C) P (mm) T (°C) P (mm) GCM: General Circulation Model.
RCM: Regional Climate Model.
RCP: Representative Concentration Pathway.
NV: natural variability.
e2019430102-05 the emission scenario, with little influence from natural variability.
This agrees with our results, but in Denmark, RCP becomes the largest source of uncertainty by the end of the century.
Bias-correction does not alter the uncertainty associated with the temperature projections.
However, bias correction of the precipitation data causes the choice of RCM to become the largest source of uncertainty by the middle of the century, and the second largest source of uncertainty by 2100.
Spatial distribution of the projections Precipitation is projected to increase throughout Denmark, but the relative magnitude of this change varies according to location.
The projected change in the uncorrected models ranges from +10% to +22% by the end of the century, compared to the 1981–2010 reference period (Fig.
2A), whereas the BC projections range from +12% to +31% (Fig.
2B).
Similarly, the standard deviation of the uncorrected projections varies between +3% and +19% and between +4% and +21% for the BC models.
Bias correction generally leads to even higher projections of precipitation by the end of the century.
The standard deviation is less effected.
The spatial distribution of change is relatively homogeneous over inland Denmark.
Variations in the projections are mostly observed on the coast cells in both the uncorrected and BC models.
However, after bias-correction this variation along the coast increases as indicated by the large standard deviation.
This could be due to the interpolation method in the observation dataset, which lacks point data in the coast cells.
Outlook This study provides an overview of the bias-corrected projections from current state-of-the-art climate models, which were not previously available for Denmark.
By identifying the contribution of each uncertainty source and providing Fig.
2.
RCP 8.5 annual precipitation change (%) by the end of the century (2071–2100) relative to the 1981–2010 reference period for the A: uncorrected and B: bias-corrected ensemble.
Standard deviation for the C: uncorrected and D: bias-corrected ensemble.
Change (%) 0 < 10% 10-12% 12-14% 14-16% 16-18% 18-20% 20-22% > 22% St. Dev.
< 2% 2% -4% 4% -6% 6% -8% 8% -10% 10% -12% 12% -14% 14% -16% 16-18% > 18% A. Uncorrected ensemble, mean change B. Bias-corrected ensemble, mean change C. Uncorrected ensemble, standard deviation d) D. Bias-corrected ensemble, standard deviation e2019430102-06 *Corresponding author: Ernesto Pasten-Zapata | E-mail: epz@geus.dk 1 Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), Øster Voldgade 10, DK-1350, Copenhagen K, Denmark.
the projected change from the ensemble and from each individual model, we provide a basis upon which to plan future assessments of the impacts of climate change on Danish water resources.
The data represent a useful input to the Danish National Water Resources Model (DK-Model) for the analysis of climate change impacts.
However, this initial analysis is aggregated for the whole of Denmark and projections vary across the country.
Further research will focus on assessing monthly and seasonal changes in the projections as well as using these post-processed models to evaluate the projected impacts on Danish hydrology.
Acknowledgements This research was funded by the AquaClew project and the Danish Agency for Data Supply and Efficiency (The Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate).
We thank DMI for providing the gridded observations and the Euro-CORDEX models for the Danish domain.
References Chen, J., Brissette, F.P.
& Lucas-Picher, P. 2015: Assessing the limits of bias-correcting climate model outputs for climate change impact studies.
Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 120, 1123–1136.
https://doi.org/10.1002/2014jd022635 Hawkins, E. & Sutton, R. 2011: The potential to narrow uncertainty in projections of regional precipitation change.
Climate Dynamics 37, 407–418.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-0810-6 Jacob, D. et al.
2014: EUROCORDEX: new high-resolution climate change projections for European impact research.
Regional Environmental Change 14, 563–578.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-0130499-2 Lafon, T., Dadson, S., Buys, G. & Prudhomme, C. 2013: Bias correction of daily precipitation simulated by a regional climate model: a comparison of methods.
International Journal of Climatology 33, 1367–1381.
https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.3518 Maraun, D. 2013: Bias correction, quantile mapping, and downscaling: Revisiting the inflation issue.
Journal of Climate 26, 2137–2143.
https://doi.org/10.1175/jcli-d-12-00821.1 Maraun, D. 2016: Bias correcting climate change simulations – a critical review.
Current Climate Change Reports 2, 211–220.
https://doi.
org/10.1007/s40641-016-0050-x Maraun, D., Widmann, M., Gutiérrez, J.M., Kotlarski, S., Chandler, R.E., Hertig, E., Wibig, J., Huth, R. & Wilcke, R.A. 2015: VALUE: A framework to validate downscaling approaches for climate change studies.
Earth’s Future 3, 1–14.
https://doi.org/10.1002/2014ef000259 Maraun, D. & Widmann, M. 2018: Statistical downscaling and bias correction for climate research.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588783 Moss, R.H. et al.
2010: The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment.
Nature 463, 747–756.
https://doi.
org/10.1038/nature08823 Oudin, L., Hervieu, F., Michel, C., Perrin, C., Andréassian, V., Anctil, F. & Loumagne, C. 2005: Which potential evapotranspiration input for a lumped rainfall-runoff model?
Part 2 – Towards a simple and efficient potential evapotranspiration model for rainfall-runoff modelling.
Journal of Hydrology 303, 290–306.
https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jhydrol.2004.08.026 Schulzweida, U.
2019: CDO User Guide, Version 1.9.6. https://doi.
org/10.5281/zenodo.2558193 Seaby, L.P., Refsgaard, J.C., Sonnenborg, T.O., Stisen, S., Christensen, J.H.
& Jensen, K.H.
2013: Assessment of robustness and significance of climate change signals for an ensemble of distribution-based scaled climate projections.
Journal of hydrology 486, 479–493.
https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2013.02.015 Taylor, K.E., Stouffer, R.J. & Meehl, G.A.
2012: An overview of CMIP5 and the experiment design.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 93, 485–498.
https://doi.org/10.1175/bams-d-11-00094.1 Van Vuuren, D.P.
et al.
2011: The representative concentration pathways: an overview.
Climatic change 109, 5–31.
https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10584-011-0148-z How to cite Pasten-Zapata, E., Sonnenborg, T.O.
& Refsgaard, J.C. 2019: Climate change: Sources of uncertainty in precipitation and temperature projections for Denmark.
Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland Bulletin 43, e2019430102.
https://doi.org/10.34194/GEUSB-201943-01-02 mailto:nsc@geus.dk https://doi.org/10.1002/2014jd022635 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-0810-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-013-0499-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-013-0499-2 https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.3518 https://doi.org/10.1175/jcli-d-12-00821.1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40641-016-0050-x https://doi.org/10.1007/s40641-016-0050-x https://doi.org/10.1002/2014ef000259 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588783 https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08823 https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08823 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.08.026 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2558193 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2558193 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2013.02.015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2013.02.015 https://doi.org/10.1175/bams-d-11-00094.1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z https://doi.org/10.34194/GEUSB-201943-01-02
Microsoft Word Rev-1-25-2392_s Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3668-3672 3668 www.
etasr.
com Nazari-Sharabian et al: Climate Change and Eutrophication: A Short Review Climate Change and Eutrophication: A Short Review Abstract—Water resources are vital not only for human beings but essentially all ecosystems.
Human health is at risk if clean drinking water becomes contaminated.
Water is also essential for agriculture, manufacturing, energy production and other diverse uses.
Therefore, a changing climate and its potential effects put more pressure on water resources.
Climate change may cause increased water demand as a result of rising temperatures and evaporation while decreasing water availability.
On the other hand, extreme events as a result of climate change can increase surface runoff and flooding, deteriorating water quality as well.
One effect is water eutrophication, which occurs when high concentrations of nutrients, such as nitrogen and phosphorus, are present in the water.
Nutrients come from different sources including agriculture, wastewater, stormwater, and fossil fuel combustion.
Algal blooms can cause many problems, such as deoxygenation and water toxicity, ultimately disrupting normal ecosystem functioning.
In this paper, we investigate the potential impacts of climatic factors affecting water eutrophication, how these factors are projected to change in the future, and what their projected potential impacts will be.
Keywords-climate change; water quality; eutrophication I.
INTRODUCTION The planet is getting warmer as an impact of exponentially increasing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2.
According to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the global average surface temperature has undergone a warming of 0.85°C (0.65 to 1.06) from 1880 to 2012, proving that global warming is occurring [1].
A warmer climate will affect the hydrological cycle and change atmospheric and meteorological properties such as precipitation patterns, atmospheric water vapor and evaporation [2-4], and consequently impact water quality by intensifying many forms of water pollution [5-7].
One form of water pollution is water eutrophication, which occurs when high concentrations of nutrients, such as nitrogen and phosphorus, are present in the water.
In recent years, specific concerns about the impacts of climate change on water eutrophication, which causes global environmental challenges regarding the management of water resources, have been raised [8-15].
The Fifth Global Environment Outlook (GEO-5) reports that more than 40% of water bodies all around the world suffer from different levels of eutrophication [16].
The reason for this phenomenon is an important issue of great concern is its potential consequences, threatening the reliable supply of drinking water [17-19].
The terminology and application of trophic development of freshwaters date back to the early twentieth century.
The consequences of anthropogenic-induced eutrophication of freshwaters did not become evident until the 1940s and 1950s as public concern over the severity of surface water deterioration became evident and triggered expanding scientific interest.
Scientists debated which nutrient is primarily responsible for limiting productivity in lakes and rivers, an issue known as limiting nutrient controversy, and they ultimately agreed that phosphorus (P) is the key element in controlling eutrophication.
[20].
Algal blooms in water bodies are a sign of eutrophication that indicates the presence of high concentrations of phosphorus and nitrogen.
Algal blooms can form anoxic environments in the water and consequently deteriorate water quality [10, 15, 21].
Predictions indicate that with rising concentrations of atmospheric CO2, the occurrence of algae blooms will likely increase [22, 23].
Recent anthropogenic changes, such as urban, agricultural, and industrial development, have accelerated the progress of nutrient over-enrichment, leading to eutrophication in water bodies [24-26].
Undesirable symptoms of eutrophication primarily occur during the plant growing season (spring and summer), when low flow, high water residence times, sufficient light levels and high water temperature promote rapid algal growth.
During the growing season, the eutrophication risk mainly originates from point discharges, a major source of high concentrations of dissolved, bioavailable phosphorus fractions.
At times when diffuse agricultural runoff contributions are relatively low, phosphorus concentrations from point sources become even higher in the receiving water bodies, as a result of reduced effluent dilution [27].
The trophic state in flowing waters depends mainly on phosphorus and nitrogen levels.
Hydraulic flushing of nutrients, light limitation, and water velocity are essential in controlling algal growth.
This suggests that rivers or riverine lakes with short retention times (<3 days) will show different effects compared to those with long retention times (>3 days) [28].
Climate change can, directly and indirectly, affect eutrophication, as a result of interactions between meteorological factors and nutrient availability [24, 29].
The Mohammad Nazari-Sharabian Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Construction, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Las Vegas, USA nazarish@unlv.
nevada.
edu Sajjad Ahmad Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Construction, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, USA sajjad.
ahmad@unlv.
edu Moses Karakouzian Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Construction, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, USA mkar@unlv.
nevada.
edu Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3668-3672 3669 www.
etasr.
com Nazari-Sharabian et al: Climate Change and Eutrophication: A Short Review existing literature shows that sensitive factors to climate change such as water temperature, precipitation, wind, and solar radiation can affect trophic conditions in water bodies.
Therefore, to maintain water resources availability and safety, it is crucial to investigate the impacts of climate change on water quality in water resources.
This paper briefly summarizes the potential impacts of climate change on the occurrence of eutrophication in water resources.
II.
CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS A.
Temperature Regarding climate change, many factors are considered in order to predict how future global warming will occur.
In this case, the amount of future greenhouse gas emissions is a key variable.
Two different emissions scenarios, including RCP2.6 (low emissions scenario) and RCP8.5 (high emissions scenario), show that by the end of the 21st century, the global surface temperature is expected to increase by 0.3°C-1.7°C and 2.6°C-4.8°C under RCP2.6, and RCP8.5, respectively [30].
Temperature is an important environmental factor that influences chemical and physical properties in water ecosystems such as pH, salinity, solubility, and diffusion rates, and can consequently affect water eutrophication potential [31, 32].
Air temperature and temperature in water bodies are in close equilibrium.
Hence one of the immediate reactions to climate change is expected to be alterations in river and lake water temperatures [22, 33-35].
When water temperature and nutrient concentrations increase, algae growth is stimulated, leading to water eutrophication and algal blooms.
As concentrations of phosphorous and nitrogen increase in lakes, rivers and estuaries, cyanobacteria become increasingly dominant.
Cyanobacteria are a group of bacteria that grow in any type of water (fresh, brackish, or marine) and use sunlight to create food and survive.
Because of their color, they are commonly known as “blue-green algae”.
They grow quickly and bloom in warm, nutrient-rich environments.
Water bodies experiencing frequent blooms of cyanobacteria show properties that can impact water quality as well as the health of the surrounding environment [36, 37].
Once the water temperature rises above 25°C, the growth of cyanobacteria accelerates [32, 38-40].
Similarly, warmer temperatures could also stimulate earlier and more extended periods of potential algal blooms, as the immediate direct effect of a warmer environment [31, 41, 42].
Moreover, warmer temperatures will affect nutrient loadings from soil and sediment, which can ultimately impact the trophic status of water [43].
As the inflow to a reservoir gets warmer as a result of higher temperature, the water column will stratify more intensely, decreasing nutrient availability in the surface water.
In this case, cyanobacteria will obtain nutrients from deeper depths and accelerate nutrient release in water [44, 45].
Higher temperatures will accelerate microbial activity in sediments at the bottom of lakes and rivers.
In this case, the release rate of internal phosphorus will increase, and will contribute to a significant portion of the total nutrient load in the water [46].
In addition, higher water temperatures will reduce the degradation coefficients of water and decrease its self-purification capacity [10].
Therefore, under climate change conditions, the release of nutrient loadings from internal sources could still make water eutrophic, even if external sources of nutrients, such as waste discharge and non-point pollution are restrained [47].
Moreover, when the surface water gets warmer, water viscosity will decrease, and as a result, nutrient diffusion will increase towards the surface.
In this situation, larger phytoplankton (photosynthesizing microscopic biotic organisms that inhabit the upper sunlit layer of almost all oceans and bodies of fresh water on Earth) will sink, and cyanobacteria will become more abundant [38, 48, 49].
As a summary, increasing air temperature will increase water temperature and deteriorate water quality conditions by accelerating the eutrophication process in water bodies, which can cause environmental and health-related issues [23, 26, 46].
B. Precipitation Besides the temperature effects, the change in hydrological regimes is also a consequence of climate change.
As the temperature is predicted to rise, precipitation will not change uniformly [30].
Under the RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios, climate model mean projections for 2081-2100 compared to 1986-2005 indicate that annual mean precipitation will increase mostly around the equatorial Pacific and some high-latitude areas.
However, projections show that mean precipitation is likely to decrease in certain mid-latitude and subtropical regions, although some increase in mean precipitation in many mid-latitude regions is also likely to occur under the same scenario.
Therefore, in areas with projected higher precipitation, it is possible that intense extreme precipitation events will occur and cause more erosion and resuspension of sediments, ultimately resulting in higher concentrations of sediments and nutrients in receiving water bodies [24, 48].
Furthermore, these extreme events will increase contaminant discharge and affect non-point pollution by mobilizing them over land and increasing nutrient concentrations in receiving water bodies, consequently degrading water quality.
[49, 5153].
Less precipitation can also increase the risk of eutrophication by lowering minimum flows.
In this case, less water volume will be available for dilution of pollutants.
As a result, increased concentration of contaminants can cause deoxygenation, by lowering dissolved oxygen concentration (DO) and increasing biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).
Consequently, the risk of eutrophication, especially in water bodies with limited re-aeration capacity, will be increased [24, 54].
Therefore, under climate change conditions and due to the alteration of regional precipitation patterns, water bodies are exposed to greater nutrient loads, which can ultimately lead to water quality deterioration.
C. Wind The wind will also be affected by climate change, and will have direct and indirect impacts on water resources [39].
Authors in [50] used general circulation models, under the A2 emission scenario, to predict the wind speed in different regions in 2050.
Modeling results showed that across the boreal regions of the northern hemisphere, including Canada, tropical and subtropical regions, northern Europe, and Central and South America, stronger surface wind speeds will occur in 2050, while decreasing wind speeds were predicted for southern Europe, East and South Asia, and much of the west coast of South America.
The direct effects of wind refer to Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3668-3672 3670 www.
etasr.
com Nazari-Sharabian et al: Climate Change and Eutrophication: A Short Review blowing of algae from the water surface to the lakeshore or river banks and influencing these regions by forming algal blooms and changing environmental conditions.
The indirect effect is the disturbance caused by the wind, which can circulate the water and mix different layers of the water column.
This circulation enhances the mixture of nutrients and accelerates the release of nutrients from sediments [55].
Also, as the air temperature rises, wind mixes the warmer upper layers of water with the colder lower layers, which can speed up the volatilization, migration, and transformation of pollutants [9].
Authors in [56] used different sediment resuspension models to simulate nutrient distributions in the wind-dominated Salton Sea in the United States, which is highly eutrophic.
They concluded that sediment resuspension, which induces both particulate and dissolved forms of nutrients, is the critical factor in nutrient cycling of the sea.
Therefore, higher wind speeds will accelerate sediment resuspension, contaminant circulation, and finally exacerbate trophic conditions.
Moreover, authors in [57] studied the Taihu Lake in China, which has experienced periods of severe eutrophication in the past.
Model results, which coupled the biological processes and hydrodynamics in the lake, showed that temporal variations of eutrophication have high dependencies on meteorological forces.
On the other hand, intense and high-speed winds can also restrain the formation of algal blooms by dissipating them and weakening their aggregation [58].
Therefore, the wind will have direct and indirect impacts on water trophic conditions, but it does not act as a single decisive operator, and mostly influences eutrophication along with other meteorological factors.
D. Solar Radiation Global warming and solar radiation have mutual connections [59].
As an important source of energy, solar radiation plays a crucial role in photosynthesis in different ecosystems and is an essential factor for the growth of phytoplankton and other aquatic species.
Therefore, the photosynthesis efficiency is dependent upon the temporal and spatial variations of solar radiation.
Sufficient sunlight increases water temperature and the presence of nutrients altogether provide suitable conditions for the growth of algae and phytoplankton, finally resulting in water eutrophication [22].
Solar radiation affects a wide range of living organisms, by penetrating aquatic systems and acting as the energy source for plant photosynthesis.
If plants do not receive sufficient amounts of sunlight, they take up oxygen from the water, and DO depletion will occur.
Under anaerobic conditions, phosphorus release from sediments can cause water eutrophication [60, 61].
Algae distribution is also dependent on the intensity of solar radiation received at different depths.
However, increased sunlight will not necessarily cause more algae growth.
There is a maximum growth rate for algae, in which beyond this threshold, the growth rate will decrease [62, 63].
Authors in [62] projected UV-B radiation at the Earth’s surface from 1960 to 2100.
Although the global temperature is slated to rise until 2100, results of UV-B predictions showed that radiation change at different latitudes will alter differently.
Projected UV-B radiation compared with 1980 levels, showed increasing trends at 60˝ to 90˝ southern latitude (more than 20% increase), and decreasing trends at 60˝ to 90˝ northern latitude (around 10% decrease).
E. Summary Besides the effects of temperature, precipitation, wind and solar radiation alteration, an increasing population, rapid urban development, and lack of land use planning continually contribute to the degradation of the environment and water resources.
Figure 1 summarizes the impacts of climate change on water eutrophication.
Climate Change Factors Air Temperature Precipitation Wind Speed Solar Radiation Human Activities Direct Effects Indirect Effects Water Temperature, pH, Solubility, Viscosity Growth and Reproduction of Algae Accumulation of Phytoplankton Ecosystem Degredation Self-purification Capacity Microbial Activities Water Viscosity and Nutrient Diffusion Stratification Release and Transport of Internal Nutrients Change of Hydrological regimes Uneven Distribution of Water resources Water Cycle Water Level Water Quality Runoff Degradation Coefficients Extreme Events, Droughts, Flood, etc.
Water Pollution Water Quality Degredation Nutrient Release Water Stability Aggregation of Algae Mixing of Nutrients Formation of Blooms Migration of Pollutants Photosynthesis Sunlight Degradation and Intensity Transparency Light Respiration Phototoxicity Dissolved Oxygen Algae Growth Pollution Discharges External Nutrient Loads Eutrophication Fig.
1.
The interaction among climate change factors and eutrophication.
Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3668-3672 3671 www.
etasr.
com Nazari-Sharabian et al: Climate Change and Eutrophication: A Short Review III.
CONCLUSION In this paper the effects of climate change on meteorological parameters such as temperature, precipitation, wind, and solar radiation were reviewed, and their potential impacts on water quality, especially eutrophication, were investigated.
Based on the available literature and historical, scientific evidence, a changing climate will lead to degradation of water quality.
The recent anthropogenic climate change will also amplify deterioration of trophic conditions in water resources, by changing the internal and external nutrient loadings, as an impact of global temperature rise, changing precipitation patterns, and altering wind speed and solar radiation intensity.
Therefore, maintaining our invaluable water resources in a changing climate is a big and significant challenge for the policymakers today, and deserves considerable attention for the sake of future generations.
REFERENCES [1] IPCC, IPCC Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5): The Physical Science Basis, IPCC, 2013 [2] IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Cambridge University Press, 2007 [3] IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, Cambridge University Press, 2012 [4] T. G. Huntington, “Evidence for intensification of the global water cycle: Review and synthesis”, Journal of Hydrology, Vol.
319, No.
1-4, pp.
83-95, 2006 [5] R. Deus, D. Brito, M. Mateus, I. Kenov, A. Fornaro, R. Neves, C. Alves, “Impact evaluation of a pisciculture in the Tucuruí Reservoir (Para, Brazil) using a two-dimensional water quality model”, Journal of Hydrology, Vol.
487, pp.
1-12, 2013 [6] S. Chung, J. Oh, “Calibration of CE-QUAL-W2 for a monomictic reservoir in a monsoon climate area”, Water Science and Technology, Vol.
54, No.
11-12, pp.
29-37, 2006 [7] Y.
Park, K. H. Cho, J. H. Kang, S. W. Lee, J. H. Kim, “Developing a flow control strategy to reduce nutrient load in a reclaimed multireservoir system using a 2D hydrodynamic and water quality model”, Science of the Total Environment, Vol.
466-467, pp.
871-880, 2014 [8] J. Xia, S. Cheng, X. Hao, R. Xia, X. Liu, “Potential impacts and challenges of climate change on water quality and ecosystem: Case studies in representative rivers in China”, Journal of Resources and Ecology, Vol.
1, No.
1, pp.
31-35, 2010 [9] R. Xia, Z. Chen, Y. Zhou, “Impact Assessment of Climate Change on Algal Blooms by a Parametric Modeling Study in Han River”, Journal of Resources and Ecology, Vol.
3, No.
3, pp.
209-219, 2012 [10] B. Moss, D. McKee, D. Atkinson, S. E. Colliongs, W. J. Eaton, A.
B. Gill, I. Harvey, K. Hatton, T. Heyes, D. Wilson, “How important is climate?
Effects of warming, nutrient addition and fish on phytoplankton in shallow lake microcosms”, Journal of Applied Ecology, Vol.
40, No.
5, pp.
782-792, 2003 [11] IPCC, Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change Technical Report, Cambridge University Press, 1996 [12] K. Hiscock, A. Southward, I. Tittley, S. Hawkins, “Effects of changing temperature on benthic marine life in Britain and Ireland”, Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems, Vol.
14, No.
4, pp.
327-331, 2004 [13] R. L. Wilby, P. G. Whitehead, A. J.
Wade, D. Butterfield, R. J. Davis, G. Watts, “Integrated modelling of climate change impacts on water resources and quality in a lowland catchment: River Kennet, UK”, Journal of Hydrology, Vol.
330, No.
1-2, pp.
204-220, 2006 [14] C. R. Fragoso Jr., D. M. L. Motta Marques, T. F. Ferreira, H. J. Janse, E. H. van Nes, “Potential effects of climate change and eutrophication on a large subtropical shallow lake”, Environmental Modelling & Software, Vol.
26, No.
11, pp.
1337-1348, 2011 [15] B. Moss, S. Kosten, M. Meerhoff, R. Battarbee, N. Mazzeo, K. Havens, G. Lacerot, Z. W. Liu, D. L. Meester, H. Paerl, M. Scheffer, “Allied attack: Climate change and eutrophication”, Inland Waters, Vol.
1, No.
2, pp.
101-105, 2011 [16] United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook Year Book: An Overview of Our Changing Environment, 2012 [17] G. M. Hallegraeff, “A review of harmful algal blooms and their apparent increase”, Phycologia, Vol.
32, No.
2, pp.
79-99, 1993 [18] I.
Chorus, J. Bartram, Toxic Cyanobacteria in Water: A Guide to their Public Health Consequences, Monitoring and Management, World Health Organization, Geneva, 1999 [19] C. Le, Y. Zha, Y. Li, D. Sun, H. Lu, B. Yin, “Eutrophication of Lake Waters in China: Cost, Causes, and Control”, Environmental Management, Vol.
45, No.
4, pp.
662-668, 2010 [20] G. E. Likens, Nutrients and Eutrophication: The Limiting Nutrient Controversy, American Society of Limnology and Oceanography, 1972 [21] C. Huang, X. Wang, H. Yang, Y. Li, Y. Wang, X. Chen, L. Xu, “Satellite data regarding the eutrophication response to human activities in the plateau lake Dianchi in China from 1974 to 2009”, Science of the Total Environment, Vol.
1, No.
11, pp.
485-486, 2014 [22] S. Ihnken, A. Eggert, J. Beardall, “Exposure times in rapid light curves affect photosynthetic parameters in algae”, Aquatic Botany, Vol.
93, No.
3, pp.
185-194, 2010 [23] H. W. Paerl, T. G. Otten, “Blooms Bite the Hand That Feeds Them”, Science, Vol.
342, No.
6157, pp.
433-434, 2013 [24] P. G. Whitehead, R. L. Wilby, R. W. Battarbee, “A review of the potential impacts of climate change on surface water quality” Hydrological Sciences Journal, Vol.
54, No.
1, pp.
101-123, 2009 [25] B. M. Ulen, G. A. Weyhenmeyer, “Adapting regional eutrophication targets for surface waters—Influence of the EU Water Framework Directive, national policy and climate change”, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol.
10, No.
7-8, pp.
734-742, 2007 [26] H. W. Paerl, L. M. Valdes, A. R. Joyner, B. L. Peierls, M. F. Piehler, S. R. Riggs, R. R. Christian, L. A. Eby, L. B. Crowder, J. S. Ramus, E. J. Clesceri, C. P. Buzzelli, R. A. Luettich, “Ecological response to hurricane events in the Pamlico Sound System, NC and implications for assessment and management in a regime of increased frequency”, Estuaries and Coasts, Vol.
29, No.
6, pp.
1033-1045, 2006 [27] H. P. Jarvie, C. Neal, P. J.
A. Withers, “Sewage-effluent phosphorus: A greater risk to river eutrophication than agricultural phosphorus?”, Science of the Total Environment, Vol.
360, No.
1-3, pp.
246-253, 2006 [28] J. Hilton, M. O’Hare, M. J. Bowes, J. I. Jones, “How green is my river?
A new paradigm of eutrophication in rivers”, Science of the Total Environment, Vol.
365, No.
1-3, pp.
66-83, 2006 [29] E. Jeppesen, M. Sondergaard, J. P. Jensen, K. Havens, O. Anneville, L. Carvalho, M. F. Coveney, R. Deneke, M. T. Dokulil, B. Foy, D. Gerdeaux, S. E. Hampton, S. Hilt, K. Kangur, J. Kohler, E. H. H. R. Lammens, T. L. Lauridsen, M. Manca, M. R. Miracle, B. Moss, P. Noges, G. Persson, G. Phillips, R. Portielje, S. Romo, C. L. Schelske, D. Straile, I. Tatrai, E. Willen, M. Winder, “Lake responses to reduced nutrient loading— An analysis of contemporary long-term data from 35 case studies”, Freshwater Biology, Vol.
50, No.
10, pp.
1747-1771, 2005 [30] IPCC.
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC: Geneva, Switzerland, 2014 [31] W. M. Mooij, J. H. Janse, L. N. De Senerpont Domis, S. Hu lsmann, B. W. Ibelings, “Predicting the effect of climate change on temperate shallow lakes with the ecosystem model PCLake”, Hydrobiologia, Vol.
584, No.
1, pp.
443-454, 2007 [32] J. Q. Su, H. Wang, Z. F. Yang, “Lake eutrophication modeling in considering climatic factors change: A review”, Chinese Journal of Applied Ecology, Vol.
23, No.
11, pp.
3197-3206, 2012 (in Chinese) [33] H. Hassan, T. Aramaki, K. Hanaki, T. Matsuo, R. L. Wilby, “Lake stratification and temperature profiles simulated using downscaled GCM output”, Water Science & Technology, Vol.
38, No.
11, pp.
217-226, 1998 Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research Vol.
8, No.
6, 2018, 3668-3672 3672 www.
etasr.
com Nazari-Sharabian et al: Climate Change and Eutrophication: A Short Review [34] D. Hammond, A. R. Pryce, Climate Change Impacts and Water Temperature, Environment Agency Science Report, 2007 [35] A. J. Liu, S. T. Y. Tong, J.
A. Goodrich, “Land use as a mitigation strategy for the water-quality impacts of global warming: A scenario analysis on two watersheds in the Ohio River basin”, Environmental Engineering and Policy, Vol.
2, No.
2, pp.
65-76, 2000 [36] H. K. Hudnell, Cyanobacterial Harmful Algal Blooms: State of the Science and Research Needs, Springer, 2008 [37] K. E. Havens, “Cyanobacteria blooms: effects on aquatic ecosystems”, Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology, Vol.
619, pp.
733747, 2008 [38] L. Peperzak, “Climate change and harmful algal blooms in the North Sea”, Acta Oecologica, Vol.
24, No.
1, pp.
139-144, 2003 [39] C. S. Reynolds, Ecology of Phytoplankton (Ecology, Biodiversity and Conservation), Cambridge University Press, 2006 [40] K. D. Johnk, J. Huisman, J. Sharples, B. Sommeijer, P. M. Visser, J. M. Stroom, “Summer heatwaves promote blooms of harmful cyanobacteria”, Global Change Biology, Vol.
14, pp.
495-512, 2008 [41] D. Trolle, D. P. Hamilton, C. A. Pilditch, I. C. Duggan, E. Jeppesen, “Predicting the effects of climate change on trophic status of three morphologically varying lakes: Implications for lake restoration and management”, Environmental Modelling & Software, Vol.
26, No.
4, pp.
354-370, 2011 [42] R. P. Canale, A. H. Vogel, “Effects of temperature on phytoplankton growth”, Journal of Environmental Engineering, Vol.
100, No.
1, pp.
229-241, 1974 [43] B. Dale, M. Edwards, P. C. Reid, “Climate change and harmful algal blooms”, in: Ecology of Harmful Algae, Ecological Studies (Analysis and Synthesis), Vol.
189, pp.
367-378, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006 [44] J. M. O’Neil, T. W. Davis, M. A. Burford, C. J. Gobler, “The rise of harmful cyanobacteria blooms: The potential roles of eutrophication and climate change”, Harmful Algae, Vol.
14, pp.
313-334, 2012 [45] P. W. Boyd, S. C. Doney, “Modelling regional responses by marine pelagic ecosystems to global climate change”, Geophysical Research Letters, Vol.
29, No.
16, pp.
51-53, 2002 [46] T. Valdemarsen, C. O. Quintana, M. R. Flindt, E. Kristensen, “Organic N and P in eutrophic fjord sediments—Rates of mineralization and consequences for internal nutrient loading”, Biogeosciences, Vol.
12, pp.
1765-1779, 2015 [47] M. A. Donald, M. P. Glibert, M. J. Burkholder, “Harmful algal blooms and eutrophication: Nutrient sources, composition, and consequences”, Estuaries and Coasts, Vol.
25, No.
4b, pp.
704-726, 2002 [48] R. M. Vogel, I. Wilson, C. Daly, “Regional regression models of annual streamflow for the United States”, Journal of Irrigation and Drainage Engineering, Vol.
125, No.
3, pp.
148-157, 1999 [49] E. G. Chung, F. A. Bombardelli, S. G. Schladow, “Modeling linkages between sediment resuspension and water quality in a shallow, eutrophic, wind-exposed lake”, Ecological Modelling, Vol.
220, No.
910, pp.
1251-1265, 2009 [50] S. Eichelberger, J. Mccaa, B. Nijssen, A.
Wood, Climate Change Effects on Wind Speed, North American Wind Power, Zackin Publications, 2011 [51] M. Edwards, A. J. Richardson, “Impact of climate change on marine pelagic phenology and trophic mismatch”, Nature, Vol.
430, pp.
88l884, 2004 [52] L. E. Brown, D. M. Hannah, A. M. Milner, “Vulnerability of alpine stream biodiversity to shrinking glaciers and snowpacks”, Global Change Biology, Vol.
13, No.
5, pp.
958-966, 2007 [53] K. W. King, J. C. Balogh, R. D. Harmel, “Nutrient flux in stormwater runoff and baseflow from managed turf”, Environmental Pollution, Vol.
150, No.
3, pp.
321-328, 2007 [54] K. Kallio, S. Rekolainen, P. Ekholm, K. Granlund, Y. Laine, H. Johnsson, M. Hoffman, “Impacts of climate change on agricultural nutrient losses in Finland”, Boreal Environment Research, Vol.
2, No.
1, pp.
33-52, 1997 [55] G. George, M. Hurley, D. Hewitt, “The impact of climate change on the physical characteristics of the larger lakes in the English Lake District”, Freshwater Biology, Vol.
52, No.
9, pp.
1647-1666, 2007 [56] F. Wu, J. Y. Zhang, X.
Z. Deng, Y.
Z. Ling, “Influencing factors of Lake Eutrophication in China”, Ecology and Environmental Sciences, Vol.
21, pp.
94-100, 2012 [57] J. Q. Mao, Q. Chen, Y. C. Chen, “Three-dimensional eutrophication model and application to Taihu Lake, China”, Journal of Environmental Sciences, Vol.
20, No.
3, pp.
278-284, 2008 [58] S. Stanichny, Y. Ratner, M. Shokurov, R. Stanychina, D. Soloviev, V. Burdyugov, “Wind impact on the black sea ecosystem”, EGU General Assembly, Vienna, Austria, May 2-7, 2010 [59] K. Frey, D. K. Perovich, B.
Light, “The spatial distribution of solar radiation under a melting Arctic sea ice cover”, Geophysical Research Letters, Vol.
38, No.
22, pp.
1-6, 2011 [60] B. Nesa, A. H. Baird, S. Harii, I. Yakovleva, M. Hidaka, “Algal symbionts increase DNA damage in coral planulae exposed to sunlight”, Zoological Studies, Vol.
51, No.
1, pp.
12-17, 2012 [61] NEP, National “12th Five-Year Plan” for Environmental Protection; China Environmental Science Press: Beijing, China, 2012 [62] E. W. Craig, R. G. Zepp, R. M. Lucas, S. Madronich, T. A. Austin, C. L. Ballare, M. Norval, B. Sulzberger, A. F. Bais, R. L. McKenzie, S. A. Robinson, D. P. Hader, N. D. Paul, J. F. Bornman, “Solar ultraviolet radiation in a changing climate”, Nature Climate Change, Vol.
4, pp.
434-441, 2014 [63] D. P. Hader, H. D. Kumar, R. C. Smith, R. C. Worrest, “Effects of solar UV radiation on aquatic ecosystems and interactions with climate change”, Photochemical and Photobiological Sciences, Vol.
6, No.
3, pp.
267-285, 2007
Study on Meteorological Service Policy for Agricultural Insurance in Hebei Province under the Background of Climate Change Kaicheng Xing 1,2 Shujun Guo 3,* 1.
Key Laboratory of Meteorological and Ecological Environment of Hebei Province, Shijiazhuang 05002, China 2.
Hebei Climate Center, Shijiazhuang 050021, China 3.
Hebei Meteorological Bureau, Shijiazhuang 050021,China Received October 23, 2018 Accepted December 22, 2018 Abstract Hebei Province is a region sensitive to global climate change.
Under the background of climate change and frequent extreme climate events, existing agricultural production structure is facing enormous risk of climate disasters.
In order to reduce the risk level of agricultural meteorological disasters, it is imperative to implement effective agro-insurance meteorological services.
This paper analyses the facts of climate change, the trend and influence of extreme weather and climate events in recent years.
Based on the simulation results of climate models under moderate and high emission scenarios, the distribution characteristics of mean annual and seasonal air temperature in Hebei Province in the first 50 years of the 21st century are given, and the main problems in the practice of agricultural insurance in Hebei Province are pointed out.
This paper also puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for optimizing the agricultural insurance policy and improving the meteorological service effect of agricultural insurance.
Key words: Climate change, Insurance, Meteorology, Policy 气候变化背景下河北省农业保险气象服务对策研究 邢开成 1,2 郭树军 3,* 1.河北省气象与生态环境重点实验室，石家庄 050021，中国 2.河北省气候中心，石家庄 050021，中国 3.河北省气象局，石家庄 050021，中国 摘要：河北省是对气候变化非常敏感的区域，在气候变化和极端气候事件频发的背景下，现有农 业生产结构面临着巨大的气象灾害风险，为降低农业气象灾害风险水平，实施有效的农业保险气 象服务已经势在必行。本文在分析近年来河北省气候变化事实、极端天气气候事件趋势及影响的 基础上，基于中等和高排放情景下气候模式模拟结果，给出了河北省 21 世纪前 50 年的年、季平 均气温均变化趋势分布特征，并针对河北省农业保险实践中存在的主要问题，提出了优化农业保 险政策，提高农业保险气象服务效果的对策建议。 关键词：气候变化；保险；气象；对策 *Corresponding author: gsjun888@sina.com.
Post address: Hebei Meteorological Bureau, No.178 Tiyu south Street , Shijiazhuang, China This study is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (NO.
2018YFA0606302).
1.引言 河北作为农业大省，2012-2016 年河北粮 食产量年均增速为 1.65%，高于全国平均水平 0.52 个百分点。2016 年河北粮食产量在全国 排第七位，较 2012 年前移一位，仅低于黑龙 江、河南、山东、吉林、四川、江苏 6 省，高 出第八名安徽 42.7 万吨，比第六名江苏少 5.8 万吨。2016 年，河北人均粮食占有量达到 463.22 千克，比全国平均水平高 17.54 千克， 比世界平均水平高约 65 千克（数据来源于国 家统计局河北调查总队）。在全球变暖气候背 景下，极端天气气候事件多发、频发，现有农 业生产结构所面临的气象灾害风险越来越大 [1]。河北省所在的环渤海地区属于对气候变化 响应非常敏感的区域[2]，2018 年 8 月，受台风 “温比亚”影响，山东部分地区和河北东部沿 海县市因强降水导致内涝严重，许多农户大田 作物绝收、蔬菜大棚损毁，农业保险赔付和灾 后重建等问题受到社会各界的广泛关注，也被 媒体和广大网友热议。河北省农业保险气象服 务方式的针对性、服务内容精细化、服务水平 的专业化与社会需求还有很大的差距[3]。提高 农业大灾保险气象服务保障水平，事关现代农 业健康可持续发展和农民增收、社会和谐稳定， 不仅是技术问题，也是经济问题，更是社会问 题。本文开展河北省气候变化事实和高温干旱 等极端气候事件的分析，并对农业气象灾害、 农业大灾保险气象服务有关政策、措施、技术 等进行研究论述，并提出农业保险优化工作对 策建议。 2.河北省气候变化事实及农业气象灾害极端 性影响 河北省地处温带大陆性季风气候区，地貌 多样，四季分明，寒暑悬殊，雨热集中，农业 气象资源丰富。但年降水量时空分布极不均匀， 降水变率大，多雨年和少雨年降水量相差可达 4~ 5 倍甚至更多，致使境内经常出现旱涝灾 害[2]。河北省干旱、洪涝、风雹、小麦干热风、 冻害、寡照等农业气象灾害类型复杂、发生频 繁、影响范围广、灾害损失重，成为威胁粮食 安全、影响现代农业可持续发展的重要因素。 统计分析显示，在全球气候变暖背景下， 近 50 年河北省各地平均气温上升显著，全省 平均每 10 年升高 0.24℃，是全球地表平均温 度升高速率（0.12℃/10a）的两倍，其中冬季 （12 月-来年 2 月）增温最为显著，高达 0.45℃ /10a（图 1） 1961-2015 年，河北省大部分地区年平均 最高气温为上升趋势，河北省中部、廊坊北部 及以北地区升温速率在 0.20℃/10a 以上，北部 部分地区超过 0.30℃/10a（图 2）。20 世纪 90 年代以来，全省各年代平均高温日数均超过常 年平均值，90 年代末至 2010 年日最高气温突 破历史极值的范围较前期明显增多，其中有 6 年出现 14-43 个县突破历史极值（图 3、图 4）。 图 1 全球、中国及河北历年平均气温及变化趋势图（单位：℃） 36 Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
9(1), March (2019), pp.
36–42 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.b.190328.004; eISSN: 2210-8505, ISSN: 2210-8491 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr © 2019, The Authors.
Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Study on Meteorological Service Policy for Agricultural Insurance in Hebei Province under the Background of Climate Change Kaicheng Xing 1,2 Shujun Guo 3,* 1.
Key Laboratory of Meteorological and Ecological Environment of Hebei Province, Shijiazhuang 05002, China 2.
Hebei Climate Center, Shijiazhuang 050021, China 3.
Hebei Meteorological Bureau, Shijiazhuang 050021,China Received October 23, 2018 Accepted December 22, 2018 Abstract Hebei Province is a region sensitive to global climate change.
Under the background of climate change and frequent extreme climate events, existing agricultural production structure is facing enormous risk of climate disasters.
In order to reduce the risk level of agricultural meteorological disasters, it is imperative to implement effective agro-insurance meteorological services.
This paper analyses the facts of climate change, the trend and influence of extreme weather and climate events in recent years.
Based on the simulation results of climate models under moderate and high emission scenarios, the distribution characteristics of mean annual and seasonal air temperature in Hebei Province in the first 50 years of the 21st century are given, and the main problems in the practice of agricultural insurance in Hebei Province are pointed out.
This paper also puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for optimizing the agricultural insurance policy and improving the meteorological service effect of agricultural insurance.
Key words: Climate change, Insurance, Meteorology, Policy 气候变化背景下河北省农业保险气象服务对策研究 邢开成 1,2 郭树军 3,* 1.河北省气象与生态环境重点实验室，石家庄 050021，中国 2.河北省气候中心，石家庄 050021，中国 3.河北省气象局，石家庄 050021，中国 摘要：河北省是对气候变化非常敏感的区域，在气候变化和极端气候事件频发的背景下，现有农 业生产结构面临着巨大的气象灾害风险，为降低农业气象灾害风险水平，实施有效的农业保险气 象服务已经势在必行。本文在分析近年来河北省气候变化事实、极端天气气候事件趋势及影响的 基础上，基于中等和高排放情景下气候模式模拟结果，给出了河北省 21 世纪前 50 年的年、季平 均气温均变化趋势分布特征，并针对河北省农业保险实践中存在的主要问题，提出了优化农业保 险政策，提高农业保险气象服务效果的对策建议。 关键词：气候变化；保险；气象；对策 *Corresponding author: gsjun888@sina.com.
Post address: Hebei Meteorological Bureau, No.178 Tiyu south Street , Shijiazhuang, China This study is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (NO.
2018YFA0606302).
1.引言 河北作为农业大省，2012-2016 年河北粮 食产量年均增速为 1.65%，高于全国平均水平 0.52 个百分点。2016 年河北粮食产量在全国 排第七位，较 2012 年前移一位，仅低于黑龙 江、河南、山东、吉林、四川、江苏 6 省，高 出第八名安徽 42.7 万吨，比第六名江苏少 5.8 万吨。2016 年，河北人均粮食占有量达到 463.22 千克，比全国平均水平高 17.54 千克， 比世界平均水平高约 65 千克（数据来源于国 家统计局河北调查总队）。在全球变暖气候背 景下，极端天气气候事件多发、频发，现有农 业生产结构所面临的气象灾害风险越来越大 [1]。河北省所在的环渤海地区属于对气候变化 响应非常敏感的区域[2]，2018 年 8 月，受台风 “温比亚”影响，山东部分地区和河北东部沿 海县市因强降水导致内涝严重，许多农户大田 作物绝收、蔬菜大棚损毁，农业保险赔付和灾 后重建等问题受到社会各界的广泛关注，也被 媒体和广大网友热议。河北省农业保险气象服 务方式的针对性、服务内容精细化、服务水平 的专业化与社会需求还有很大的差距[3]。提高 农业大灾保险气象服务保障水平，事关现代农 业健康可持续发展和农民增收、社会和谐稳定， 不仅是技术问题，也是经济问题，更是社会问 题。本文开展河北省气候变化事实和高温干旱 等极端气候事件的分析，并对农业气象灾害、 农业大灾保险气象服务有关政策、措施、技术 等进行研究论述，并提出农业保险优化工作对 策建议。 2.河北省气候变化事实及农业气象灾害极端 性影响 河北省地处温带大陆性季风气候区，地貌 多样，四季分明，寒暑悬殊，雨热集中，农业 气象资源丰富。但年降水量时空分布极不均匀， 降水变率大，多雨年和少雨年降水量相差可达 4~ 5 倍甚至更多，致使境内经常出现旱涝灾 害[2]。河北省干旱、洪涝、风雹、小麦干热风、 冻害、寡照等农业气象灾害类型复杂、发生频 繁、影响范围广、灾害损失重，成为威胁粮食 安全、影响现代农业可持续发展的重要因素。 统计分析显示，在全球气候变暖背景下， 近 50 年河北省各地平均气温上升显著，全省 平均每 10 年升高 0.24℃，是全球地表平均温 度升高速率（0.12℃/10a）的两倍，其中冬季 （12 月-来年 2 月）增温最为显著，高达 0.45℃ /10a（图 1） 1961-2015 年，河北省大部分地区年平均 最高气温为上升趋势，河北省中部、廊坊北部 及以北地区升温速率在 0.20℃/10a 以上，北部 部分地区超过 0.30℃/10a（图 2）。20 世纪 90 年代以来，全省各年代平均高温日数均超过常 年平均值，90 年代末至 2010 年日最高气温突 破历史极值的范围较前期明显增多，其中有 6 年出现 14-43 个县突破历史极值（图 3、图 4）。 图 1 全球、中国及河北历年平均气温及变化趋势图（单位：℃） Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
9, No.
1 (March 2019) 36–42 36 37 20 世纪 80 年代至 90 年代，重旱发生频率明 显增加，干旱化趋势较显著（图 5）。近 55 年 来，部分地区暴雨日数也呈增加趋势（0.010.21d/10a），主要分布在张家口西北部、承德中 部、河北省南部的山前平原等地区（图 6）。 从 20 世纪 80 年代至 2013 年，河北省暴 雨洪涝灾害的人口脆弱性（受灾人口/总人口） 增加，由 80 年代的 1~2%增加至 2000 年以来 的 2~5%；经济脆弱性（直接经济损失/GDP） 表现为先增加后减少的趋势，20 世纪 80 年代 图 2 河北省 1961-2015 年平均最高气温变化趋势空间分布 图 3 河北省历年高温日数变化图（红线为常年（1981-2010 年）高温日数） 图 4 河北省历年日最高气温超过历史极值的站数 经济脆弱性为 0.25~0.5%，90 年代增加至 0.5~1.0%，2000 年以来又降至 0.25%以内；干 旱灾害的人口脆弱性明显持续增加，由 80 年 代脆弱性不足 2%，持续增加至 2000 年以来的 10~15%；干旱灾害的经济脆弱性先增加后减 少（主要得益于良种优化、耕作和灌溉技术水 平的提高），20 世纪 80 年代经济脆弱性仅为 0.05~0.1%，90 年代增至 0.2~0.5%，2000 年以 来又降至 0.10~0.20%；低温冷害的人口脆弱性 和经济脆弱性均表现为持续增加趋势，低温冷 害人口脆弱性在 20 世纪 80 年代的不足 1%， 2000 年以来其脆弱性增加至 2~4%，经济脆弱 性由 80 年代的 0.016~0.05%增加至 2000 年以 来的 0.05~0.07%[1]。 20 世纪 80 年代以来，河北省气温显著上 升、降水减少、水资源匮乏、气候干化突出， 致使气象灾害频繁发生，气候灾害每年给河北 带来巨大经济损失，90 年代后平均每年达上 百亿元，且呈逐年增加趋势。2009 年 6 月 20 日～ 7 月 5 日，石家庄市连续 15 天最高气 温超过 35℃，日平均气温达 38.3℃，比常年偏 高 6.2℃，且其中 3 天超过 40℃，其高温持续 时间之长创石家庄气象站 1955 年建站以来的 最长记录。2015 年 6 月至 8 月，河北省 11 个 地市 133 个县（市）不同程度遭受旱灾，农作 物受灾面积 771000 公顷，直接经济损失达 45.75 亿元。2016 年河北省干旱、风雹、寡照 等农业气象灾害发生总面积 2062.9 万亩，种 植业直接经济损失约 72.6 亿元。其中，2016 年 7 月 19 日特大洪涝灾害受灾面积 1335.5万亩， 图 5 河北省历年平均每站发生的重旱日数及 1980-1999 年重旱日数变化趋势 图 6 河北省 1961-2015 年暴雨日数变化趋势 !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
暴雨日数变化趋势(天/10年) !
-0.32 -0.20 !
-0.19 0 !
0.01 0.10 !
0.11 0.21 Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
9, No.
1 (March 2019) 36–42 38 20 世纪 80 年代至 90 年代，重旱发生频率明 显增加，干旱化趋势较显著（图 5）。近 55 年 来，部分地区暴雨日数也呈增加趋势（0.010.21d/10a），主要分布在张家口西北部、承德中 部、河北省南部的山前平原等地区（图 6）。 从 20 世纪 80 年代至 2013 年，河北省暴 雨洪涝灾害的人口脆弱性（受灾人口/总人口） 增加，由 80 年代的 1~2%增加至 2000 年以来 的 2~5%；经济脆弱性（直接经济损失/GDP） 表现为先增加后减少的趋势，20 世纪 80 年代 图 2 河北省 1961-2015 年平均最高气温变化趋势空间分布 图 3 河北省历年高温日数变化图（红线为常年（1981-2010 年）高温日数） 图 4 河北省历年日最高气温超过历史极值的站数 经济脆弱性为 0.25~0.5%，90 年代增加至 0.5~1.0%，2000 年以来又降至 0.25%以内；干 旱灾害的人口脆弱性明显持续增加，由 80 年 代脆弱性不足 2%，持续增加至 2000 年以来的 10~15%；干旱灾害的经济脆弱性先增加后减 少（主要得益于良种优化、耕作和灌溉技术水 平的提高），20 世纪 80 年代经济脆弱性仅为 0.05~0.1%，90 年代增至 0.2~0.5%，2000 年以 来又降至 0.10~0.20%；低温冷害的人口脆弱性 和经济脆弱性均表现为持续增加趋势，低温冷 害人口脆弱性在 20 世纪 80 年代的不足 1%， 2000 年以来其脆弱性增加至 2~4%，经济脆弱 性由 80 年代的 0.016~0.05%增加至 2000 年以 来的 0.05~0.07%[1]。 20 世纪 80 年代以来，河北省气温显著上 升、降水减少、水资源匮乏、气候干化突出， 致使气象灾害频繁发生，气候灾害每年给河北 带来巨大经济损失，90 年代后平均每年达上 百亿元，且呈逐年增加趋势。2009 年 6 月 20 日～ 7 月 5 日，石家庄市连续 15 天最高气 温超过 35℃，日平均气温达 38.3℃，比常年偏 高 6.2℃，且其中 3 天超过 40℃，其高温持续 时间之长创石家庄气象站 1955 年建站以来的 最长记录。2015 年 6 月至 8 月，河北省 11 个 地市 133 个县（市）不同程度遭受旱灾，农作 物受灾面积 771000 公顷，直接经济损失达 45.75 亿元。2016 年河北省干旱、风雹、寡照 等农业气象灾害发生总面积 2062.9 万亩，种 植业直接经济损失约 72.6 亿元。其中，2016 年 7 月 19 日特大洪涝灾害受灾面积 1335.5万亩， 图 5 河北省历年平均每站发生的重旱日数及 1980-1999 年重旱日数变化趋势 图 6 河北省 1961-2015 年暴雨日数变化趋势 !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
暴雨日数变化趋势(天/10年) !
-0.32 -0.20 !
-0.19 0 !
0.01 0.10 !
0.11 0.21 Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
9, No.
1 (March 2019) 36–42 38 39 直接经济损失 42.2 亿元。 气候模式模拟显示，未来 40 年河北省年 平均气温将继续上升，到 21 世纪末温度将会 大幅增暖，降水可能趋于增加。在中等（RCP4.5： 预计 2100 年辐射强迫稳定在 4.5 W/m2）和高 等（RCP8.5：2100 年辐射强迫上升至 8.5 W/m2） 排放情景下，预估 21 世纪前 50 年河北省年、 季平均气温均呈上升趋势，年平均气温上升速 率为 0.25~0.41℃/10a，与 1986—2005 年平均 相比，21 世纪 20 年代河北省年平均气温可能 变化范围为-0.15~0.65℃，30 年代可能变化范 围为 0.24~1.03℃，40 年代可能变化范围为0.12~0.63℃，21 世纪前 50 年河北省季平均气 温冬季升温速率最大，春季最小（图 7）；降水 量年际波动较大，中等和高等排放情景下，总 体呈增加趋势，增速分别为 1.0%~2.2%/10a， 0.6%~1.7%/10a（图 8）。 综上所述，在全球气候变暖背景下，河北 省农业气象灾害的极端性有显著增强的趋势， 高附加值现代农业的脆弱性和暴露度不同程 度提高[3]，灾害传导链越来越长、越来越复杂， 同等强度农业气象灾害所造成的损失越来越 大[4-8]。在干化加重的情况下，引发大面积的干 旱灾害发生的可能性加大的同时，自然降水更 可能以短历时强降水的方式出现，不但容易造 成局地山洪地质灾害和城市渍涝成灾，而且雨 水的有效利用率低，降水停止后，由于气温高、 土壤蓄积水分少、蒸发快，会很快转变为干旱 灾害。 3.农业保险在抗灾救灾中发挥的作用 图 7 在 RCP4.5（中等）和 RCP8.5（高等）排放情景下，河北省历年地表气温距平（相对于 19862005 年）预估数据图，图中蓝线和红线是区域模式下预估的地表气温；绿线和紫线是全球气候模式预估 的地表气温。 图 8 在 RCP4.5（中等）和 RCP8.5（高等）情景下，河北省历年降水量距平百分比（相对于 19862005 年）预估数据图。 河北省做为主要农作物和养殖业政策性 农业保险重点省份，农业保险规模和覆盖范围 不断扩大，市场主体不断增多，保险密度和深 度不断提高，经济保障功能越来越明显。各级 政府大力推进，相关保险机构及时对受灾农户 基于保险金补偿，充分保障农民利益，对农民 抗灾减灾、生产自救、恢复重建和社会和谐稳 定起到了重要作用。 2012-2016 年，河北省政策性农业保险共 为 5877.60 万户次参保农户提供了 2304.82 亿 元风险保障，实现签单保费收入 91.78 亿元； 已决赔款金额达 49.93 亿元，简单赔付率达 54.40%，受益农户达 866.14 万户次，户均赔款 576.43 元。其中，2015 年，河北全省种植业投 保 7090.68 万亩，其中小麦 2506.78 万亩、玉 米 4223.00 万亩、棉花 166.69 万亩、水稻 51.51 万亩、大豆 3.18 万亩、花生 14.75 万亩、油菜 1.82 万亩、马铃薯 118.18 万亩、甜菜 4.77 万 亩。养殖业投保 1138.38 万头，其中能繁母猪 90.39 万头、奶牛 65.72 万头、育肥猪 982.27 万头。全省森林投保 3404.91 万亩，其中公益 林 2249.49 万亩、商品林 1155.42 万亩。全省 设施农业投保 1.3 万亩，其中蔬菜日光温室 0.18 万亩、蔬菜塑料大棚 0.24 万亩、蔬菜塑料 中小棚 0.88 万亩。综合投保率为 62.88%。农 险经保机构共处理玉米保险理赔案件 3.31 万 件，赔款金额 10.97 亿元，受益农户达 174.19 万户次（数据来源于河北省保监局）。 2016 年全省干旱、风雹、寡照等农业气象 灾害发生总面积 2062.9 万亩，种植业直接经 济损失约 72.6 亿元，尤其是“7·19” 特大洪 涝灾害受灾面积 1335.5 万亩，直接经济损失 42.2 亿元。截至 2016 年底，农险经办机构共 赔付暴雨灾害损失 3.89 亿元，其中种植险赔 付 3.49 亿元，农房保险赔付 0.30 亿元（数据 来源于河北省农业厅），在此巨灾下保险补偿 金也一定程度上解决了部分农户的燃眉之急。 4.农业保险存在的主要问题 河北省地貌独特，气候类型多样，特色农 业种类丰富、分布广泛。另外，环京津的区位 优势，使得设施农业、错季蔬菜等高附加值的 现代农业成为河北省农业产业结构特征重点 发展领域。极端气候事件和频繁的气象灾害加 剧了农业的脆弱和高风险[9-11]。目前河北省农 业保险“高成本、高风险、高赔付和低收费、 低保障、低保额”的特点，使得农业保险的指 数化趋势对特色农业、设施农业大灾农业保险 的现实作用越来越凸显。农业气象指数保险有 利于减少或消除传统农业保险的道德风险和 信息不对称引起的逆选择等问题，可以降低管 理成本，便于转移保险市场风险，特别适合地 域性强、 对气象灾害高度敏感、物化成本和产 业附加值高、对农民增收关系重大、农户投保 热情高的特色农业和设施农业，有助于实现政 府化解系统性风险、激励农户加强生产管理、 推进农业保险的资本化运作和现代化进程、推 动农业保险市场的创新与健康发展等多重政 策目标[12-15]。 但是，目前在河北省农业气象保险产品推 广过程中存在着农户保险意识不强，特色农产 品气象指数保险产品单一，保险范围、保险额 度吸引力不大，市县级地方政府对政策性农业 保险补贴的财政压力大等等问题。现行的政策 性农业保险“低保障、广覆盖”原则，主要针 对国家粮食安全保障，一旦出现重大气象灾害， 目前各保险公司推广的以物化成本为主要标 的物的政策性指数保险和普通灾害险，赔付保 障对于大灾、巨灾后生产自救和恢复重建来讲 却是“杯水车薪”，更不能解决农民致富、特色 农业升级等问题。 5 农业保险优化工作对策建议 5.1 健全大灾农业保险工作体制机制 各级地方政府做好制度性安排，积极参与 保险业务体系建设，进一步加大对气象指数农 业保险的补贴投入力度，在税费等方面对承保 企业给予更多的优惠政策；省金融办组织建立 由多家保险公司共同经营的大灾农业保险 “共保体”制度模式，引进退出机制，健全保 险联席会议和沟通协调长效工作机制，有利于 充分发挥政府和监管部门的职责，落实有关特 色农业保险各项财政补贴和惠民政策；充分发 挥政府、气象部门、保险公司、新型农业经营 主体的积极性，推进更加市场化，更加透明、 多元的农业保险环境，增强农业气象灾害防御 和抗灾自救互救保障能力，促进现代农业保险 服务的健康发展。 5.2 做好大灾农业保险气象服务 气象部门利用双重管理体制的行业特点， 省市县三级上下联动，尤其是农业大市、农业 大县，对地方支柱型特色农业产业在大灾农业 保险气象保障服务工作中，主动与地方政府和 农保经办企业对接，投入更多人才、利用更多 先进技术，结合需求设计更为科学、适用的农 业保险产品，在特色农业气象指数保险产品试 点、推广、运行、评估、认证等环节提供技术 支持以及精细化、针对性强的全程技术支撑。 配合做好基于影响的气象灾害风险区划、灾害 评估、灾害风险预警、气象灾情调查鉴定、气 象防灾减灾科普宣传等全程专业化气象保障 服务。 Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
9, No.
1 (March 2019) 36–42 40 直接经济损失 42.2 亿元。 气候模式模拟显示，未来 40 年河北省年 平均气温将继续上升，到 21 世纪末温度将会 大幅增暖，降水可能趋于增加。在中等（RCP4.5： 预计 2100 年辐射强迫稳定在 4.5 W/m2）和高 等（RCP8.5：2100 年辐射强迫上升至 8.5 W/m2） 排放情景下，预估 21 世纪前 50 年河北省年、 季平均气温均呈上升趋势，年平均气温上升速 率为 0.25~0.41℃/10a，与 1986—2005 年平均 相比，21 世纪 20 年代河北省年平均气温可能 变化范围为-0.15~0.65℃，30 年代可能变化范 围为 0.24~1.03℃，40 年代可能变化范围为0.12~0.63℃，21 世纪前 50 年河北省季平均气 温冬季升温速率最大，春季最小（图 7）；降水 量年际波动较大，中等和高等排放情景下，总 体呈增加趋势，增速分别为 1.0%~2.2%/10a， 0.6%~1.7%/10a（图 8）。 综上所述，在全球气候变暖背景下，河北 省农业气象灾害的极端性有显著增强的趋势， 高附加值现代农业的脆弱性和暴露度不同程 度提高[3]，灾害传导链越来越长、越来越复杂， 同等强度农业气象灾害所造成的损失越来越 大[4-8]。在干化加重的情况下，引发大面积的干 旱灾害发生的可能性加大的同时，自然降水更 可能以短历时强降水的方式出现，不但容易造 成局地山洪地质灾害和城市渍涝成灾，而且雨 水的有效利用率低，降水停止后，由于气温高、 土壤蓄积水分少、蒸发快，会很快转变为干旱 灾害。 3.农业保险在抗灾救灾中发挥的作用 图 7 在 RCP4.5（中等）和 RCP8.5（高等）排放情景下，河北省历年地表气温距平（相对于 19862005 年）预估数据图，图中蓝线和红线是区域模式下预估的地表气温；绿线和紫线是全球气候模式预估 的地表气温。 图 8 在 RCP4.5（中等）和 RCP8.5（高等）情景下，河北省历年降水量距平百分比（相对于 19862005 年）预估数据图。 河北省做为主要农作物和养殖业政策性 农业保险重点省份，农业保险规模和覆盖范围 不断扩大，市场主体不断增多，保险密度和深 度不断提高，经济保障功能越来越明显。各级 政府大力推进，相关保险机构及时对受灾农户 基于保险金补偿，充分保障农民利益，对农民 抗灾减灾、生产自救、恢复重建和社会和谐稳 定起到了重要作用。 2012-2016 年，河北省政策性农业保险共 为 5877.60 万户次参保农户提供了 2304.82 亿 元风险保障，实现签单保费收入 91.78 亿元； 已决赔款金额达 49.93 亿元，简单赔付率达 54.40%，受益农户达 866.14 万户次，户均赔款 576.43 元。其中，2015 年，河北全省种植业投 保 7090.68 万亩，其中小麦 2506.78 万亩、玉 米 4223.00 万亩、棉花 166.69 万亩、水稻 51.51 万亩、大豆 3.18 万亩、花生 14.75 万亩、油菜 1.82 万亩、马铃薯 118.18 万亩、甜菜 4.77 万 亩。养殖业投保 1138.38 万头，其中能繁母猪 90.39 万头、奶牛 65.72 万头、育肥猪 982.27 万头。全省森林投保 3404.91 万亩，其中公益 林 2249.49 万亩、商品林 1155.42 万亩。全省 设施农业投保 1.3 万亩，其中蔬菜日光温室 0.18 万亩、蔬菜塑料大棚 0.24 万亩、蔬菜塑料 中小棚 0.88 万亩。综合投保率为 62.88%。农 险经保机构共处理玉米保险理赔案件 3.31 万 件，赔款金额 10.97 亿元，受益农户达 174.19 万户次（数据来源于河北省保监局）。 2016 年全省干旱、风雹、寡照等农业气象 灾害发生总面积 2062.9 万亩，种植业直接经 济损失约 72.6 亿元，尤其是“7·19” 特大洪 涝灾害受灾面积 1335.5 万亩，直接经济损失 42.2 亿元。截至 2016 年底，农险经办机构共 赔付暴雨灾害损失 3.89 亿元，其中种植险赔 付 3.49 亿元，农房保险赔付 0.30 亿元（数据 来源于河北省农业厅），在此巨灾下保险补偿 金也一定程度上解决了部分农户的燃眉之急。 4.农业保险存在的主要问题 河北省地貌独特，气候类型多样，特色农 业种类丰富、分布广泛。另外，环京津的区位 优势，使得设施农业、错季蔬菜等高附加值的 现代农业成为河北省农业产业结构特征重点 发展领域。极端气候事件和频繁的气象灾害加 剧了农业的脆弱和高风险[9-11]。目前河北省农 业保险“高成本、高风险、高赔付和低收费、 低保障、低保额”的特点，使得农业保险的指 数化趋势对特色农业、设施农业大灾农业保险 的现实作用越来越凸显。农业气象指数保险有 利于减少或消除传统农业保险的道德风险和 信息不对称引起的逆选择等问题，可以降低管 理成本，便于转移保险市场风险，特别适合地 域性强、 对气象灾害高度敏感、物化成本和产 业附加值高、对农民增收关系重大、农户投保 热情高的特色农业和设施农业，有助于实现政 府化解系统性风险、激励农户加强生产管理、 推进农业保险的资本化运作和现代化进程、推 动农业保险市场的创新与健康发展等多重政 策目标[12-15]。 但是，目前在河北省农业气象保险产品推 广过程中存在着农户保险意识不强，特色农产 品气象指数保险产品单一，保险范围、保险额 度吸引力不大，市县级地方政府对政策性农业 保险补贴的财政压力大等等问题。现行的政策 性农业保险“低保障、广覆盖”原则，主要针 对国家粮食安全保障，一旦出现重大气象灾害， 目前各保险公司推广的以物化成本为主要标 的物的政策性指数保险和普通灾害险，赔付保 障对于大灾、巨灾后生产自救和恢复重建来讲 却是“杯水车薪”，更不能解决农民致富、特色 农业升级等问题。 5 农业保险优化工作对策建议 5.1 健全大灾农业保险工作体制机制 各级地方政府做好制度性安排，积极参与 保险业务体系建设，进一步加大对气象指数农 业保险的补贴投入力度，在税费等方面对承保 企业给予更多的优惠政策；省金融办组织建立 由多家保险公司共同经营的大灾农业保险 “共保体”制度模式，引进退出机制，健全保 险联席会议和沟通协调长效工作机制，有利于 充分发挥政府和监管部门的职责，落实有关特 色农业保险各项财政补贴和惠民政策；充分发 挥政府、气象部门、保险公司、新型农业经营 主体的积极性，推进更加市场化，更加透明、 多元的农业保险环境，增强农业气象灾害防御 和抗灾自救互救保障能力，促进现代农业保险 服务的健康发展。 5.2 做好大灾农业保险气象服务 气象部门利用双重管理体制的行业特点， 省市县三级上下联动，尤其是农业大市、农业 大县，对地方支柱型特色农业产业在大灾农业 保险气象保障服务工作中，主动与地方政府和 农保经办企业对接，投入更多人才、利用更多 先进技术，结合需求设计更为科学、适用的农 业保险产品，在特色农业气象指数保险产品试 点、推广、运行、评估、认证等环节提供技术 支持以及精细化、针对性强的全程技术支撑。 配合做好基于影响的气象灾害风险区划、灾害 评估、灾害风险预警、气象灾情调查鉴定、气 象防灾减灾科普宣传等全程专业化气象保障 服务。 Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
9, No.
1 (March 2019) 36–42 40 41 5.3 加强特色农业气象指数保险市场化运作 在政策性农业保险中引入市场机制，通过 财税政策、激励措施鼓励商业保险公司推出不 同档位的保险业务产品，针对各地实际情况因 地制宜推进特色农业气象指数保险商业化和 市场化，实现农业保险的分层布局和多元运作。 积极探索推进农产品价格指数保险、产量保险、 收入保险等农业保险产品，推动气象灾害风险 管理和防灾减灾上新水平[10]，为现代农业保险 提供重大气象灾害保险转移市场支撑，做到承 保机构的保险产品“广覆盖、深介入、高保障”， 相关技术服务单位“全流程、多层次、强支撑”， 农户“买得起、用得上、靠得住”。 “适销对路”的农业保险产品是农民抵御 气象灾害的一道坚固防线，是美丽乡村建设的 重要保障，农保市场广阔、意义重大。做好大 灾农业保险是现代保险服务业的发展方向，不 仅是经济问题，更是事关乡村振兴、精准扶贫、 农业生产安全和农村社会稳定的政治问题。需 要各相关部门和单位共同努力，协同配合，为 提高农业保险服务保障水平，增强农业气象灾 害防御能力作出应有贡献。 参考文献： 1.
秦大河.
中国极端天气气候事件和灾害风险管 理与适应国家评估报告.
2015.
2.
张可慧.
全球气候变暖对京津冀地区极端天气 气候事件的影响及防灾减灾对策.干旱区资源与 环境,2011, 25(10) :122-125.
3.《河北省 2016 年气候变化监测公报》,河北省气候 中心,2017.
4.
Guo J, Zhao S, Huang C. Valid historical data for probabilistic risk analysis in natural disaster.
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal, 2017, 23(3): 474-493.
5.
黄崇福,郭君,艾福利,等.
洪涝灾害风险分析的基 本范式及其应用.
自然灾害学报,2013,(4):13-25.
6.
黄崇福.
综合风险管理的地位、框架设计和多态 灾害链风险分析研究.
应用基础与工程科学学 报，2006, 增刊，29-37.
7.
Huang C, Shi X.
A discrete model of the expected loss for catastrophe insurance in natural disasters.
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, 2011,1(1) :48-58 8.
Guo j, Huang C. Time limit of the probabilistic risk for natural disaster.
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, 2017,7(3): 137–145.
9.
魏瑞江, 姚树然, 王云秀.
河北省主要农作物农 业气象灾害灾损评估方法,中国农业气象,2000, 21(1): 27-31.
10.王炜, 权循刚, 魏华.
从气象灾害防御到气象灾 害风险管理的管理方法转变 ,气象与环境学 报,2011,27(1):7-13.
11.郭丽丽.
农业气象灾害风险评估研究进展与展 望,农业科技与信息,2016, 11:52-53.
12.王春乙, 张继权, 霍治国,等.
农业气象灾害风险 评估研究进展与展望,气象学报,2015, 1:1-19.
13.张强, 韩兰英, 张立阳,等.
论气候变暖背景下干 旱和干旱灾害风险特征与管理策略 ,地球科学 进,2014,29(1) :80-91.
14.祁添垚, 张强, 孙鹏,等.
气候暖化对中国洪旱极 端事件演变趋势影响研究,自然灾害学报,2015,3: 143-152.
15.陈琳, 陈鑫, 陆鹏程,等.
农业气象保险在防御农 业气象灾害中的作用 ,现代农业科技 ,2016,7: 231-232.
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
9, No.
1 (March 2019) 36–42 42
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: an Interdisciplinary Journal Vol.
10, No.
3 2018 © 2018 by the author(s).
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license.
Citation: McGregor, I., Yerbury, H.& Shahid, A.
2018.The Voices of Local NGOs in Climate Change Issues: Examples from Climate Vulnerable Nations.
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: an Interdisciplinary Journal.
10:3, 63-80. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 ISSN 1837-5391 | Published by UTS ePRESS | https://epress.
lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.
php/mcs ARTICLE (REFEREED) The Voices of Local NGOs in Climate Change Issues: Examples from Climate Vulnerable Nations Ian McGregor1*, Hilary Yerbury2, Ahmed Shahid3 1 UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia.
ian.m.mcgregor@uts.edu.au 2 University of Technology Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia.
hilary.yerbury@uts.edu.au 3 Villa College, RahDhebai Hingun, Male’, 20373, Republic of Maldives.
*Corresponding author: Ian McGregor.
ian.m.mcgregor@uts.edu.au DOI: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 Article History: Received 09/04/2018; Revised 05/11/2018; Accepted 06/11/2018; Published 25/11/2018 Abstract The contributions of small local non-government organisations (NGOs) in countries at risk from climate change to knowledge creation and action on climate change are rarely considered.
This study sought to remedy this by focusing on NGOs in member countries of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF).
Analysing data from Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), NGO websites and email correspondence with NGO staff through a knowledge brokering typology, this study examines the ways in which local NGOs in five members of the CVF (Afghanistan, Bhutan, Kiribati, Nepal and Tuvalu) take action, generate new knowledge and understandings and contribute to the plans and actions of their government and the international community.
The study found that local NGOs are involved in the creation of new knowledge both at the scientific and community level and engage in actions to support adaptation to climate change.
However, there are differences in the approaches they take when making contributions to scientific knowledge and climate change debates.
The findings of this study suggest the need to reconceptualise the role of local NGOs in small countries at risk from climate change.
Keywords NGOs; Climate Change; Climate Vulnerable Forum; Knowledge creation DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTIan McGregor and Ahmed Shahid declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Hilary Yerbury, who is a member of the editorial committee of Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, had no part in the review of the submission.
FUNDING This paper was produced without funding.
63 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 64 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 Introduction In 2009, some of the countries most vulnerable to climate change formed a coalition to act together in a South-South partnership, the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), to deal with issues of global climate change.
These countries include small island states, countries with low-lying coastlines and mountainous countries that are particularly vulnerable to rising temperatures.
Five members of this Forum are at the heart of this study: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Kiribati, Nepal and Tuvalu.
The study is based on data gathered from a variety of sources including representatives of local NGOs focussing on climate change and their websites, from the media, from reports compiled by transnational NGOs and personal communication with staff.
It also includes an analysis of documents produced in the context of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015 and of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as well as data from other published studies.
This study seeks to understand how local NGOs in these countries take action and generate new knowledge and understandings.
Many discussions of global climate change tend to be coordinated at the supra-national level, with little place for smaller states and their NGOs to have a voice.
Alliances and groupings of national governments have had considerable influence on the agendas of supra national meetings.
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has given the small states a ‘voice in the political arena’ (Jaschik, 2014, p. 287), so that they ‘box way above their weight’ (Betzold, 2010, p. 142) in ensuring that their concerns are on UN Climate Conference agendas.
AOSIS has been a major force since the initial negotiations on the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) in 1991.
The CVF formed in 2009 is not a formal UNFCCC negotiating group, unlike AOSIS and the LDCs (Least Developed Countries) groups.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by a number of states, including the US, and by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
The IPCC has become the focal point for the process of establishing agreed ways of focussing on scientific knowledge in a global society (Miller 2007, p. 340).
Yet, some of the countries most at risk from climate change have not been fully involved in this organisation and its workings.
It is noteworthy that of the countries in our study, only Nepal has ever participated in the IPCC process as an author (Ho-Lem, Zerrifi and Kandlikar, 2011).
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that scientists and their knowledges have been the only significant players in establishing consensual knowledge or in setting agendas for action on climate change.
NGOs concerned with climate change and with the environment are ‘champions of online climate communication’ (Schäfer, 2012, p. 530 531), active in disseminating information, increasing support for climate change action and mobilising local citizens to take action.
This study explores the ways in which local NGOs in these countries contribute to knowledge flows and debate about climate change.
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 65 Setting the Scene Rising temperatures and their impacts Rising temperatures are impacting these countries in different ways.
Sea level rise is a major issue for the island states and is already having an impact on the everyday lives of their citizens.
The government of Kiribati has bought land in Fiji so that it can relocate its population of around 100,000 in the next 30 – 60 years.
Tuvalu, with its much smaller population of around 10,000, is not focussing on relocation and has decided to leave the decision on relocation to its citizens and has finalised an agreement with New Zealand to take up to 75 Tuvaluan emigrants each year.
In the landlocked, mountainous countries of Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal, major issues include glacial disappearance and retreat and changes in water availability for agriculture due to reduced glacial melt and land degradation.
Afghanistan is facing desertification in some provinces, through land degradation, reduced water availability from glacial sources and drought from changes in rainfall patterns.
The consequence of this destruction of eco-systems is that the predominantly rural population, dependent on subsistence agriculture, faces the threat of no longer being able to produce enough food.
In many cases, subsistence farmers then move to urban areas where they are likely to be unemployed and live in shanty towns, which in turn can lead to disaffection and further contribute to Afghanistan’s severe security issues.
Bhutan, because of its small population and land protection policies, may be seen as less at risk from climate change than the other countries in this study.
However, temperature rise since 2000 has been measured at 1°C in summer and 2°C in winter (Braasch, 2012).
Heavier rains have caused landslides and significant glacial lake floods as glaciers melt at a much increased rate, while at the same time in some areas less water is available for irrigation.
In Nepal, climate change is affecting the country’s ability to feed its population, because of changes in rainfall patterns.
Like Bhutan, Nepal also faces danger from glacial lake flooding, and farmers are reporting hotter days, decreased rain and changes in wind patterns, adversely affecting agricultural productivity.
Globalised Knowledge Studies of knowledge flows in climate change policy and implementation can assume a topdown approach to the flow of information; Kalafatis et al.
(2015) argue that it is important for local networks to be able to inform decision-makers with useful and usable information.
Weichselgartner and Kasperson (2010, p. 267) suggested that ‘research on global environmental change requires a shift towards a more extended notion of scientific knowledge, namely a shift towards socially robust or context-sensitive knowledge’.
Welp et al (2006, p. 174) noted that in UN global environmental change processes, there was no space for local NGOs as initiators of dialogue, but only as stakeholders, where a stakeholder’s role was as a participant in processes driven by the UN, Supra-National (eg European Union, AOSIS, LDCs) and State Actors.
Little attention has been paid to the contributions of local community groups and NGOs to the actions and debates on rising temperatures and its consequences (cf Elwood, 2010, Elwood and Leszcynski, 2013).
Advocates from global NGOs such as Greenpeace can have a significant voice at international forums, however, and for a while, attention was focused on these global players (Jasanoff, 2010).
66 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 Local NGOs and Knowledge Flows The literature offers little guidance on how to understand the variety of ways in which knowledge about climate change is created and flows.
Research studies tend to focus on the bigger picture of the scientisation of politics and the politicisation of science (eg CorfeeMorlot et al., 2007; Hoppe et al.
2013) or on particular organisations and their work, such as the IPCC (Grundmann, 2007) or the problems and issues at a very local level (eg Farbotko and Lazarus, 2012).
Rudiak-Gould (2012) claims the dissemination of the knowledge of climate science is a oneway process, with government statements aimed at foreign audiences, while local NGOs aim messages at their communities, attempting to foster a sense of local empowerment.
Following Jasanoff and Wynne (1998), he favours dialogue and encourages governments to avoid becoming an echo chamber, where they merely repeat arguments from Western scientific literature, instead of engaging with local knowledge (Rudiak-Gould 2012, p. 53).
Szarka (2013), focusing on the work of local NGOs, has proposed a hermeneutic framework setting out both the scope and the means for NGOs to interact with their communities.
The framework includes five key components, some knowledge-centred and some action-centred.
It is based on the assumption that it is possible to go beyond awareness-raising to create links between the worlds of science and the general public and to enable opportunities for citizen actions (Szarka 2014, p. 2).
Some studies (eg Xu and Grumbine, 2014) have drawn attention to the need for more open communication between experts, governments and local people.
They suggest that it is the responsibility of government to support local people in bridging the gap in understanding between themselves and scientific experts and to avoid blanket solutions.
They propose hybrid solutions to create adaptive knowledge by bringing together local knowledges and scientific knowledge.
Other studies (eg Arnall and Kothari, 2015), however, have shown that at the local level, perspectives on everyday phenomena, such as the timescale for change, are so divergent that there is no common ground for scientists and local people to enter into discussion.
The voices involved in climate change are diverse, and their interactions are complex.
Jones, Harvey and Godfrey-Wood, building on previous work by Shaxson et al.
(2012) and Hammill et al.
(2013), identified seven distinct information-focussed roles played by NGOs involved in actions relating to climate change (2016, p. 10).
Using terminology familiar in the context of information access (see Oltmann, 2009), they identify the roles of producer, broker, translator, advocate, intermediary and consumer.
The knowledge producer produces data, information and documents about some aspect of climate change relevant for decisionmaking at all levels and the consumer of climate information incorporates relevant information into everyday life.
To emphasise the distinction between the use of climaterelated information and knowledge at a local level and more broadly, there are two categories of broker, the knowledge broker and the innovation broker.
The knowledge broker enhances the understanding and use of information and knowledge in local decision-making whereas the innovation broker is influential in the wider context, encouraging new ways of producing and using climate change related information.
The policy advocate encourages changes in Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 67 policy and decision-making.
The information intermediary makes information accessible to local communities and potentially more broadly, through establishing libraries or through contributing to online portals.
The knowledge translator plays the very important role of making information and knowledge understandable to people throughout the local community, so that they can take appropriate action.
This is partly about language, but more importantly is about meaning, where the meaning structure of climate science is mediated and transformed into local contexts.
The summary above does little more than touch the surface of the complexity of engagement in knowledge flows related to climate change.
However, one thing that is clear is that local knowledge and local voices may be marginalised because studies do not include them and they are absent from the policy-making processes.
This study seeks to remedy this oversight by focussing on NGOs in five small countries, vulnerable to the effects of rising temperatures.
It explores the ways in which communities and NGOs take action at the local level, generating new knowledge and understandings for themselves and potentially contributing to knowledge-based communities in the wider international context.
Methodology This study uses five cases to demonstrate the variability of approaches local NGOs take as they participate in the creation of new knowledge and the debates and actions about climate change.
Three of the countries have small populations and relatively few NGOs concerned with climate change; the other two face issues which have made coordination of debates and actions challenging.
It was assumed that in places with small populations, the distance between a government and its planning to confront the challenges of rising temperatures on the one hand and its citizens and activists on the other would not necessarily be large.
Thus, there was some possibility of identifying the actions of NGOs in generating local knowledge and supporting local actions on climate change.
A case study approach is the most common in studies related to knowledge creation and information access.
Selection of cases tends to be purposeful (Oltmann 2009) as happened in this study, with cases selected because of their perceived similarity, rather than focussing on their distinctiveness as Yin (1994) or Denzin and Lincoln (2003) might propose.
They also tend to focus on qualitative data, gathered from participants engaged in the knowledge flow process.
In this study, although qualitative data were gathered, following Yin (1994), multiple sources were used, as is shown in the summary table below.
Information gathered through email correspondence with representatives of NGOs engaged in the process and from the websites of these NGOs was supplemented by analysis of UNFCCC documents, IPCC reports and online media reports.
For each country, we used a number of strategies to identify local NGOs involved in climate change and individuals associated with them, as well as documents which might show evidence of inclusion of local sources of knowledge in climate change discussions.
These are shown in summary form in the table below and elaborated on in the following paragraph.
68 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 Country Local NGO INDC IPCC Media Afghanistan AES by email Yes No No Bhutan RSPN by email and website Yes No No Kiribati Kiribati Local Government Association by email KiriCAN by email and website Yes No Yes Nepal Clean Energy Network by email and website WWF by email and website Yes Yes No Tuvalu TuCAN by email and website; Women’s Council of Tuvalu by email and reports; Alofa Tuvalu by email and website Yes No Yes Local NGOs contributing to this study Using personal knowledge, suggestions from activists and the output from internet searches, we identified between one and three NGOs in each of Afghanistan and Bhutan.
In Kiribati, a number of NGOs are linked in KiriCAN, the Kiribati Climate Action Network and we sought advice on which of the partners to contact.
Similarly, in Tuvalu, a number of NGOs are linked in TuCAN, the Tuvalu Climate Action Network.
In Tuvalu we also contacted an overseas-sponsored NGO.
In Nepal, there are many potentially relevant NGOs and we chose to contact three where there was evidence that they play an active role at the local level.
We invited members of the NGOs and other organisations identified to take part in our study by email, using the information provided in websites and Facebook pages of NGOs and followed up with an email questionnaire and with further clarifications.
Email responses were received from one NGO in Afghanistan, the Afghan Environmental Society (AES); the only one in Bhutan, the Royal Society for the Protection of Nature (RSPN); the nominated member of the Climate Action Network in Kiribati, the Kiribati Local Government Association (KiLGA), and another climate change activist, who had been selected to take part in the Pacific Calling Partnership program KATEP in 2017 and who also works in a government department; a member of TuCAN, the Women’s Council of Tuvalu, the overseas-sponsored NGO, Alofa Tuvalu, and another local climate change activist in Tuvalu who had also been selected to take part in the KATEP program for 2017; and two of the three NGOs contacted in Nepal.
In 2017, after ten years in operation, Alofa Tuvalu report that they are no longer active.
The INDC documents prepared for the UN Climate Conference in Paris in 2015, along with national plans and the list of participants for each country, were analysed for mentions of involvement of NGOs.
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 69 From these data, the roles played by local NGOs in the creation and dissemination of knowledge emerged.
The two island countries and the three mountainous countries are linked together not just through the particular problems they face and the associations formed to work on them, such as CVF, but also by engagement in broader communities, yet local circumstances and contexts mean that the possibilities for actions and knowledge creation and engagement by NGOs differ markedly.
NGOs and information-based roles NGOs, knowledge and local involvement Through their email responses and websites and Facebook pages, the NGOs identify a number of key ways in which they support knowledge flows or the generation of new knowledges in their communities and beyond.
They each identify that working to inform and influence local populations about the kind of changes they may have to make to manage their immediate vulnerability to the effects of rising temperatures is a significant purpose of the organisation.
The Afghan Environmental Society (AES), one of the few NGOs with a national focus that have remained active in spite of the challenging political and security situation, has as its main objective raising awareness and training those local people with influence in the community – teachers, local governors, mayors and local government officials.
Their email respondent indicated that people have little information and are happy to take part in programs, but ‘it takes much times to fully have people support but day by day the people are getting much involve in Environmental Protection issues and climate change issues’.
In Kiribati, KiLGA’s main purpose is awareness raising and capacity building at the local government level, and supporting other NGOs, in particular those focussed on young people, in their Climate Change projects.
Similarly, Clean Energy Nepal has a focus on capacity building, and works to bridge the knowledge gap among major stake holders on the one hand and to empower local people, especially youth on the other hand.
The Tuvalu National Council of Women is concerned with the ways in which climate change affects the lives of women, raising awareness of these issues throughout the islands and using its mandatory power to take the issues into the broader national debates.
Yet, this process of awareness-raising is not straightforward.
There is evidence that of opposition to the notion of climate change because of religious beliefs (McGregor and Yerbury, in press) and the young activist from Kiribati noted that ‘we know [about the consequences of rising tides] but it’s not a good topic for us to talk about’.
Some NGOs are responsible for gathering scientific data.
AES reported that in Afghanistan there is no scientific organisation with authority to gather data, so that members of AES gather information directly from local communities, either through anecdotal evidence or through data collection instruments such as questionnaires.
In Bhutan, the Royal Society for the Protection of Nature (RSPN), Bhutan’s only NGO devoted to climate change, reported that there is ‘no scientifically documented database on local knowledge’ available at grassroots level.
Since 2014, in partnership with the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), they have started the assessment of climate change and its impact through an analysis of biodiversity and meteorological data; they have also extended the collection of meteorological data through the installation of automated data 70 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 loggers in pilot study test sites.
They have enlisted the support of local people in tracking patterns of migratory birds.
They note that the lack of scientific data has meant that they have been engaged in conducting pilot studies, ‘a learning process rather than knowledge sharing with partners’.
They believe that a rigorous and continued working relationship is essential to the development of a knowledge sharing mechanism.
In Tuvalu, Alofa Tuvalu has worked with visiting scientists to coordinate local data collection in areas such as the development of biomass.
In Kiribati, the relatively small size of the population means that scientists and technical staff working for the government, for example in the Department of Fisheries, are also involved in climate change activism as volunteers, thus supporting a two-way flow of knowledge.
The young activist from Kiribati involved in KiriCAN notes that they rely on ‘data from outside’.
NGOs are involved in the implementation of climate change projects.
RSPN in Bhutan works at multiple levels within communities, some of which are in the most remote part of the country, on the sustainable management of natural resources, improvement of agricultural practices, mitigation of water resources issues and environmental education programs.
CEN works on ‘strengthening the role of non-state actors in climate change policy formulation’ by bridging the knowledge gap among major stakeholders in Nepal and ‘facilitating a process to inform and empower Nepalese people to take action towards addressing climate change issues’.
It works with local communities to ‘transform villages into ecologically selfsustaining communities’, improving the ecosystem and the lives and livelihoods of the people and trains households in Kathmandu in techniques for urban farming.
WWF Nepal is also active in implementing local actions, working recently with community-based organisations on forestry issues, as well as working to develop local and national policies.
The Tuvalu National Council of Women has run workshops on home gardening to help overcome problems of food security.
They have also been involved in other projects to help villagers develop skills and expertise in growing staple foods such as pulaka (swamp yams) in pots which help to protect them from salination and the effects of inundation from storm surge.
NGOs emphasise their involvement with the wider society.
Some NGOs have a strong local or national focus whereas others take a regional or even international focus.
AES noted that their Board was made up of members of parliament with relevant portfolios or academic staff in local universities.
RSPN works in collaboration with the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and has a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Department of Forest and Park Services, with its Water Management Division being one of the key partners in recent projects.
Both Tuvalu and Kiribati take a broader approach.
TuCAN, the Tuvalu Climate Action Network is the only climate focused NGO in Tuvalu.
Maina Talia, its secretary at the time, said in an interview before the Paris Conference in 2015, that ‘it is better to speak from experience’ and he emphasised his concern was that government representatives and delegates from other countries at the conference need to be made aware of the dangers to their lifestyle faced by sea level rise.
Similarly, in Kiribati, KiriCAN considers that a key focus is to take local knowledge and experiences into a wider societal context.
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 71 As noted already, the Climate Action Networks in Kiribati and Tuvalu are strong, bringing together many sources of expertise in the countries.
KiLGA is a member of the Kiribati National Expert Group (KNEG) on climate change, the key authority on climate change in Kiribati, with links to regional technical bodies such as SPC (Secretariat of the Pacific Community) and the SPREP (Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme), etc.
Through its outward looking focus, KiLGA is able to present local knowledge and experience in wider forums at international meetings and conferences, by contributing to discussions and publishing newspapers and so on; and through responding to academic inquiries.
Similarly, the Tuvalu National Council of Women works with local communities and encourages them to incorporate international community engagement into their discussion, as they believe that this will certainly provide them more understanding when it comes to international issues.
In Nepal, a country with a larger number of NGOs and the active presence of international NGOs, there is scope for both strong inward and outward focus.
CEN reports that it calls on the expertise of many key figures, from other NGOs with local offices such as WWF and Oxfam, from Nepalese universities and government departments in stakeholder consultation workshops and in seminars.
‘Whenever we need any guidance on climate change related issues, we seek help from them [a list of named individuals] and they are always ready to help us’.
It is actively involved in partnerships and networking, including providing the secretariat for a coalition of Nepalese youth and youth groups, known as Nepalese Youth for Climate Action.
Clean Energy Nepal (CEN) has a MoU with the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, supporting them to collect data and information which is then shared in the wider network.
It also has access to information and scholarly data about climate change, not only through these networks but also through the websites of other organisations and on the basis of their own research.
WWF Nepal acknowledges the significance of its own global network of scientists and those with other expertise as well as its relationship with government departments, such as the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology.
WWF Nepal considers information from local communities, ‘based on indigenous knowledge’, to be the primary data source of their work in Nepal.
RSPN in Bhutan collects local knowledge as already noted, for example around the migratory patterns of birds.
AES in Afghanistan documents local knowledge, which they refer to as anecdotal knowledge.
The government of Tuvalu is concerned to ensure that indigenous knowledge is documented and used in actions, and the young activist from Tuvalu notes that the elders have ‘their own knowledge and skills, which they only share when they think something useful might happen’.
NGOs are active in making available their own information as well as information from elsewhere.
The young activist from Kiribati is working to set up libraries so that people can be exposed to a range of ideas on climate change; he wrote ‘I learned a lot of things out of reading and I wanted my people to learn and [be] exposed to the same thing’.
WWF Nepal are active in sharing their information through audio-visual means, including radio, as well as through print.
Although some of the material is produced in English, much of it is aimed at the local communities and is available in Nepalese.
Like WWF Nepal, CEN works in English 72 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 and Nepalese, using the printed word, and audio and video.
In Tuvalu, Alofa Tuvalu report that previously they have widely disseminated their knowledge on climate issues and their local projects over more than ten years ‘via the web, comic books translated in 15 languages, international media articles, conferences, children workshops’ and so on.
Their focus is both on the local community and on the international community.
They note the importance of varying the focus of messages on climate change in order to maintain interest and attention on the issue in local communities.
NGOs and their Engagement in UNFCCC Processes The roles and responsibilities for NGOs in the implementation of the actions of the INDC, however, varied.
Kiribati emphasizes its whole-of-nation approach with its actions including the work of community groups and individual citizens; its INDC goes further, not only stating the need to work closely with NGOs and its citizens, but also with partners elsewhere in the Pacific.
Afghanistan assumes the involvement of NGOs for example working with rural population and the partnership between the government of Bhutan and RSPN is taken for granted.
Nepal states that several governmental, non-governmental and community-based organizations, academic and research institutions have been involved in generating and disseminating data and information on climate change and its impacts in recent years.
Tuvalu stands a little apart from the other countries; while it assumes the importance of involvement of local groups in actions, it places its emphasis on the importance of the involvement of the emitting countries whose actions can have a much greater impact than any actions undertaken by the small population of Tuvalu.
The pattern of NGO involvement in the government delegation to the UN Climate Conference in Paris in 2015 reflected similar relationships on climate change issues as were found documented in the INDCs.
The Kiribati delegation to the UN Climate Change conference in Paris in December 2015, as might be expected from the government’s emphasis on a ‘whole of nation approach’, included representatives of five NGOs, including one regional NGO, Pacific Calling Partnership.
Similarly, there was strong NGO representation from Nepal, including three NGOs, one of which was WWF Nepal; in addition, seven Nepalese NGOs also had observer status, each with two or more representatives.
NGOs from Tuvalu were also well represented, with two NGOs in the official delegation, one of which was the coordinating NGO for climate action, TuCAN; and in addition, one NGO had observer status.
Afghanistan’s preliminary listing for its delegation to the UN Climate Conference in Paris 2016 listed one NGO, the Afghanistan Environmental Society, but this organisation was not on the final list of attendees because it was unable to raise the funds to attend; a representative of the French NGO, GERES, based in Afghanistan, attended as an observer.
Bhutan’s official list of delegates contained a representative of WWF, based in Bhutan.
Establishing groupings in states becomes important (Weiss and Burke, 2011), as ways to demonstrate collective identity and contribute to the debates.
This is clear from the states in our study; all are members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the three island states are members of the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Small Island Developing Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 73 States (SIDS) and the mountainous states are linked through ICIMOD.
All are members of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group.
Through these memberships, they strengthen their individual messages of the effect of climate change and focus on the common threat to their physical environment, livelihoods and societies and potentially similar outcomes of rising tides and temperatures.
Discussion NGOs as Knowledge Producers The descriptions of action taken by local NGOs show that the importance of ways they engage in knowledge creation and interact with climate change debates.
Actions in all countries are focussed both on local communities and, to a greater or lesser extent, on a national or international community.
NGOs in the mountainous states of Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal are all engaged in contributing to scientific knowledge.
AES and RSPN both acknowledge that they are engaged in data collection because a gap exists in the scientific knowledge, but while RSPN is linked into an epistemic community through their engagement with ICIMOD, AES, with its limited capacity in a country which for a number of years has been wracked by military and civilian violence, has fewer options available to it.
In Afghanistan, the country’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) notes that the infrastructure to protect the intellectual property rights in mitigation technologies is weak and the national datasets on agriculture and food security are also inadequate.
AES is doing its best to gather data, but without a strong partnership in an epistemic community, its data which is largely anecdotal is unlikely to contribute to a global scientific system.
Nonetheless, each of these NGOs is acting as a knowledge producer, according to the typology developed by Jones, Harvey and Godfrey-Wood (2016).
There appears to be no concern expressed from the respondents to this study with issues related to the politicisation of science as Corfee-Morlot (2007) expressed, but this may have been because in each of these countries, the links between NGOs, activists and decision-makers are strong, the relationships are positive and the data produced are unique, not being contested by data from other sources.
The small island states see themselves in a different situation from the mountainous countries.
They cast themselves as recipients of the outcomes of the actions of others (Maru et al., 2014), a negotiating position introduced into discussion by Tuvalu and Kiribati.
In Tuvalu, the key message is that people in the developed world over a considerable period of time have created the problems which have led to sea level rise and must take responsibility for this.
In Kiribati, a key message is similarly that the problem faced by the population is not of their making and that actions must come from other countries.
This does not mean that NGOs in these islands are taking no action.
Data is being collected in a variety of ways, with an increasing emphasis on the importance of indigenous knowledge in disaster management (www.pacificdisaster.net) has a section on the topic in its website).
Although there may be a perception that there is little that local knowledge can add to global scientific efforts, nonetheless, as Resture (2009) noted, in Tuvalu, coping strategies for disaster management http://www.pacificdisaster.net/ 74 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 are still largely based on indigenous knowledge, demonstrating a need for integration of this knowledge with western science.
This emphasis on contributing to global scientific efforts which underpin mitigation demonstrates the significance of transnational actions (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 9), where NGOs, even local ones, operate across national boundaries.
Although, as Esguerra (2015) points out, the consensual knowledge of an epistemic community is an important factor in the development of a policy oriented system for managing climate change and its effects, in this study, there is some evidence of transnational actions, where NGOs contribute to scientific data in their countries and beyond.
The examples of the work of NGOs in Bhutan and Nepal for example indicate that the claim that the voices of local NGOs are not heard in climate change discussions requires more detailed consideration.
Not only do some local scientific advisers to NGOs act transnationally and contribute to the knowledge base of an epistemic community, they also encourage local people to add their knowledge, supporting Kalafatis et al.’s (2015) argument that it is important for decisionmaking to be informed by usable local knowledge.
Jasanoff (2004, 2010) and Elwood (2010, Elwood and Leszcynski, 2013), in different contexts, have expressed concern that the voice of the citizen is not included in debates based on scientific knowledge.
Van House notes the scepticism with which those with local knowledge may be viewed in the US, at best as ‘ “expert amateurs”, people with (often considerable) expertise but no professional qualifications or training or institutional affiliation’ (2004, p.4).
However, the engagement of non-scientists in data collection has become an important feature of environmental sciences, with very positive outcomes (Bonney et al., 2009).
In this study, the RSPN in Bhutan and the AES in Afghanistan describe the importance of collecting anecdotal evidence from local people with particular experiences of climate change.
There is no evidence in these cases of a devaluing of locally collected data or local knowledge, and it is not at all clear from the responses that these relationships create the ‘fragile collective’ that Meyer and Molyneux (2010) find in a context where what they refer to as amateur scientists come together with professional scientists.
Indeed, the work of these NGOs would appear to confirm Sarka’s assertion (2014) that NGOs are not just involved in raising awareness at the local level; the NGOs in this study demonstrate how it is possible to create links between the worlds of science and the general public, carrying out important work in gathering data, and thus substantiating larger claims.
Local Voices, Local Processes By using the knowledge brokering typology as an analytical frame, it is clear that the relationships between local NGOs and local communities are complex.
It is not just a matter of taking messages of climate change from the government or from the scientific consensus to the local communities, as studies such as that of Xu and Grumbine (2014) have shown.
Clearly, the local NGOs whose actions are explored here are policy advocates, presenting the views of stakeholders, whether women, farmers or young people in relevant forums, both within the country and in broader arenas, and encouraging sound decision-making based on this knowledge.
The close relationships between activists and decision-makers potentially Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 75 make this process simpler in states with small populations; as noted above, activists and decision-makers may even be one and the same person, a point not necessarily acknowledged in previous studies.
Some of the NGOs in this study also acknowledge the importance of their role in creating knowledge repositories; the efforts by the young activist from Kiribati to establish libraries is a significant example of this, and the emphasis in Afghanistan and Bhutan on the need for databases of locally collected knowledge is also significant.
Regional organisations, such as ICIMOD for the mountainous countries, and the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) for the two island states, are important through their capacity to act as knowledge portals, both collecting local resources and disseminating them to local communities and more broadly, demonstrating the role of information intermediary.
In spite of the significance of repositories and portals and the role of NGOs in developing and maintaining them, little attention has been paid to them outside of the literatures of computing science and information studies, where the emphasis has been rather on the technology than on the content and involvement of local people.
Making available information on climate change issues in languages understood by the local communities, as in Nepal and Tuvalu, and using radio broadcasts as well as printed materials and posters are significant mechanisms for translating climate change knowledge.
Translation here is not only a matter of using a language that local people speak, but also of making the information relevant to the local community.
In this context, these NGOs are meaning brokers, in that wider sense of translation, and their capacity to correlate climate policy with local meanings and agendas, allows them to engage the local community.
Alofa Tuvalu wrote of the need to ensure that people were not bored, hearing the same message over and over again, and the young activist from Kiribati noted that people tended to ‘turn away’ from unpalatable messages, preferring practical information that helped them to ‘enjoy the beauty of [their] ancestors’ home’.
The work of the NGOs in this study would seem to emulate best practice and they would appear to be leaders in the dissemination of material in the languages of their community.
Betzold (2015), in her review of practices in small island developing states, notes that information is often only available in English, which helps to enhance the perception that climate change is alien, not a factor in people’s everyday lives.
The NGOs in this study are clearly knowledge brokers, encouraging learning and knowledge sharing in their local communities and to a large extent encouraging the dissemination of local messages to other groups.
However, their capacity to create links between local communities and scientists and policy-makers is limited.
Alofa Tuvalu noted that they had been able to bring scientists from Europe to work on projects with local people, but this would seem to be something of an exception.
Respondents from Tuvalu and Kiribati note the difficulties of ensuring that people living on outer islands are included in national discussions and are included in programs of workshops, and emphasise the significance of isolation in impeding the sharing of innovations, that is, of new ways of solving long-standing problems.
This has been noted recently as a challenge by Cambers et al.
(2017).
76 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 The typology developed by Jones, Harvey and Godfrey-Wood (2016) also contains the grouping ‘innovation brokers’ drawing on non-specialist knowledge sets, such as indigenous knowledge.
In this study, this label might be more appropriately applied to descriptions of new ways of doing traditional tasks, for example, creating raised garden beds, growing swamp yams in pots or understanding how to manage glacial melt.
Lauer and Aswani (2009), in the context of the Solomon Islands, called for a practice approach to indigenous knowledge, where the ecological knowledge was not separated from the context in which it was used.
Local Voices in UNFCCC Processes Within the UNFCCC processes, the voices of local NGOs also contribute to the policy debates on climate change, through the INDC development process and documentation.
However, differences in the relationships between governments and NGOs are marked.
The findings in this study match Newell’s observation (2000, p. 133) that some governments are more supportive of NGO involvement in policy development than others.
An NGO’s capacity to influence may depend on the relationships staff have with staff employed in government departments (Newell, 2000, p. 134-35).
Responses from the NGOs in the three mountainous countries, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal, all indicated close working relationships with scientists and policy-makers in key government departments and collaborative working relationships with government.
It is also evident that staff turnover in NGOs and among scientists and policy-makers as identified in several cases can disrupt relationships and make it more difficult to maintain collaborations, a finding in many other studies (eg Tadele and Manyena, 2008; UNEP, 2015, p. 43).
Jasanoff (2004) argues for a close link between science and technology and the practice of citizenship, where the very basis of what it means to be a citizen is questioned.
This is not clearly stated as a concern in the context of this study, except in Kiribati, where one can see how the government of Kiribati is engaging its citizens in its processes at the local level and at the same time working with and challenging NGOs and governments of other countries to commit to policy changes which are significant enough to have an impact on sea level rise.
Local NGOs affected by climate change are not easily recognisable as ‘activists’ in a western tradition of opposition, protest and disruption.
They would, however, appear to take a proactive approach to contributing to knowledge and its dissemination in a variety of ways.
If they take a confrontational approach, it is towards decisions made elsewhere; in some cases, both the processes of knowledge-making and decision-making are unlike the processes they would use in their local communities or perhaps even in their national contexts.
Overall, the typology of knowledge production we have applied here is useful because it allows a focus on contextual, situated local knowledge, and on the consensual knowledge of climate change, deriving from the principles of western scholarship, and acknowledges the need for some level of translation and interpretation for mutual understanding between the two sets of knowledge and their practical implementation.
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 77 Conclusion This study has shown that these local NGOs have a voice in climate change discussions at the local level and increasingly in the international community.
Mostly, NGOs contribute to the positions for action espoused by their governments, with their main actions being awarenessraising and educating around issues of adaptation.
However, NGOs may, as in the cases of Bhutan and Nepal, contribute to scientific knowledge, complementing the efforts of scientists employed in research institutions and by government and filling in the gaps in parts of the scientific knowledge base.
Previous studies have not taken account of the roles that those associated with NGOs as volunteers or board members play in the community, and although that was not a focus in this study, nonetheless, the revelations from our correspondents about their own employment or the positions of their board members show that even these local NGOs have a reach beyond their immediate communities.
This study has raised questions about the complexity of knowledge flows in these climate vulnerable countries, extending existing studies.
The focus on the voice of local NGOs has shown that even at this local level, the flows of knowledge and information are not simple, as might be assumed.
NGOs bring many sources of expertise to bear on the work that they do, both from within the country and outside the country.
The relationships between NGOs and governments are diverse, that diversity being closely linked to the specific context of the country.
The links between scientific knowledge, local and indigenous knowledge and policy priorities differ, even though the perception of climate risk may be shared.
The use of indigenous and traditional knowledges may be potentially considered anecdotal or is apparently absent from discussion; exploring these ancient knowledges systematically and sharing solutions would enhance an understanding of the depth and value of knowledge in local communities.
Yet this study has shown that in some places, for example in Tuvalu, it is clear that cultural norms prevent the sharing of local knowledge beyond a restricted local context, potentially minimising the possibility for integrating local indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge in coping with climate change events.
The findings of this study suggest the need to reconsider the role of local NGOs in small countries at risk from climate change.
The label of ‘vulnerable’ suggests that they are at the mercy of decisions made elsewhere, on the basis of information created by someone else, and unable to take meaningful actions.
However, from a perspective of transnational action, our respondents show that these NGOs can have impacts on the climate change debate well beyond their local context.
The external focus may mask difficulties that travelling within a country pose, giving rise to issues of isolation and marginalisation for those in remoter locations, and this should not be overlooked.
This study concludes that there can be no one way of considering local action and no one way of documenting and disseminating knowledge.
The NGOs in the study carry out all the seven distinct roles of information-focussed action as identified by Jones et al.
(2013, p.10), at many levels.
The use of this analytical tool in the study has demonstrated that the seemingly passive process of awareness-raising and policy advocacy within a country produces a complex transformations of climate information.
Climate narratives are developed that 78 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 engage locally and generate new agendas.
These can then themselves influence the wider international climate policy process.
Overall, the study has clarified the important role that local NGOs play in valuing of scientific and local knowledge and in the dissemination and use of this information in their own communities and more broadly.
References Arnall, A. and Kothari, U.
2015, 'Challenging climate change and migration discourse: different understandings of timescale and temporality in Maldives', Global Environmental Change, vol.
31, pp.
199-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.011 Betzold, C. 2010, ' "Borrowing" power to influence international negotiations: AOSIS in the climate change regime, 1990-1997', Politics, vol.
30, no.
3, pp.
131-148. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01377.x Betzold, C. 2015 'Adapting to climate change in small island developing states', Climatic Change, vol.133, no.3, pp.
481-489. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1408-0 Bonney, R., Cooper, C.B., Dickinson, J., Kelling, S., Phillips, T., Rosenberg, K.V.
and Shirk, J.
2009, ‘Citizen science: a developing tool for expanding science knowledge and scientific literacy’, Bioscience, vol.59, pp.
977-984. https://doi.org/10.1525/bio.2009.59.11.9 Braasch, G. 2012, 'Environment and climate change in Bhutan', http://www.worldviewofglobalwarming.org/himalaya_5/index.php Cambers, G., Carruthers, P., Rabuatoka, T., Tubuna, S. and Ungaro, J.
2017, 'Implementing climate change adaptation interventions in remote outer islands of the Pacific Island Region', in Leal Filho W.
(ed.)
Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific Countries, Springer, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_1 Corfee-Morlot, J., Maslin, M. and Burgess, J.
2007, 'Global warming in the public sphere', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, vol.
365, pp.
2741-2776. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2007.2084 Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y.S.
(eds.)
2003, Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (2nd ed.
), Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Elwood, S. 2010, 'Geographic information science: emerging research on the societal implications of the geospatial web', Progress in Human Geography, vol.
34, pp.
349357. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132509340711 Elwood, S. and Leszcynski, A.
2013, 'New spatial media, new knowledge politics', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol.38, pp.
544-559. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00543.x Esguerra, A.
2015, 'Towards two narratives of knowledge', Innovation: the European Journal of Social Science Research, vol.
28, no.1, pp.
3 – 10. https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2014.943164 Farbotko, C. & Lazarus, H. 2012, 'The first climate refugees?
Contesting global narratives of climate change inTuvalu', Global Environmental Change, vol.
22 no.
2, pp.
382-390. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.11.014 Grundmann, R. 2007, 'Climate change and knowledge politics', Environmental Politics, vol.
16, no.3, pp.
414-432. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010701251656 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01377.x https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1408-0 https://doi.org/10.1525/bio.2009.59.11.9 http://www.worldviewofglobalwarming.org/himalaya_5/index.php https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_1 https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2007.2084 https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132509340711 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00543.x https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2014.943164 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.11.014 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010701251656 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 79 Hassall, G. 2017, 'E-Government and civil society: Exploring new relationships in Pacific SIDs', in Cullen, R. and Hassall, G.
(eds.
), Achieving Sustainable E-Government in Pacific Island States, Springer, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50972-3_13 Ho-Lem, C., Zerriffi, H. and Kandlikar, M. 2011, 'Who participates in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and why: A quantitative assessment of the national representation of authors in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change', Global Environmental Change, vol 21 no.
4, pp.1308-1317.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.05.007 Hoppe, R., Wesselink, A. and Cairns, R. 2013, 'Lost in the problem: the role of boundary organizations in the governance of climate change', WIREs Climate Change, vol.
4, no.
4, pp.
283–300.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.225 Jasanoff, S. 2004, 'Science and citizenship: a new synergy', Science and Public Policy, vol.31, no.
2, pp.
90-94. https://doi.org/10.3152/147154304781780064 Jasanoff, S. 2010, 'A new climate for society', Theory, Culture and Society, vol.
27, no.
203, pp.
233-253. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409361497 Jasanoff, S. and Wynne, B.
1998, 'Science and decision making', in: Rayner S and Malone, E. (eds), Human Choice and Climate Change, Batelle Press, Columbus, OH, pp 1–87.
Jaschik, K. 2014, 'Small states and international politics: climate change, the Maldives and Tuvalu', International Politics, vol.51, no.2, pp.
272-293. https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.5 Kalafatis, S., Lemos, M.C., Lo, Y-J and Frank, K. 2015, ‘Increasing information usability for climate adaptation: The role of knowledge networks and communities of practice’, Global Environmental Change, vol.
32, pp.
30-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.007 Lauer, M. and Aswani, S. 2009, ‘Indigenous ecological knowledge as situated practices: Understanding fishers' knowledge in the Western Solomon Islands’, American Anthropologist, vol.
111, pp.
317–329.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15481433.2009.01135.x McGregor, I. and Yerbury, H. (In Press), ‘Politics of rising tides: Governments and nongovernmental organizations in Small-Island Developing States’, in Harris, P.
(ed.)
Climate Change and Ocean Governance; Politics and Policy for Threatened Seas, Cambridge University Press.
Meyer, M. and Molyneux-Hodgson, S. 2010, 'Introduction: The dynamics of epistemic communities', Sociological Research Online, vol.15, no.2.
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/15/2/14.html https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.2154 Miller, C. 2007, 'Democratization, international knowledge institutions, and global governance', Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, vol.20, no.2, pp.
325-357. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14680491.2007.00359.x Newell, P. 2000, Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse, Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511529436 Oltmann, S. 2009, ‘Information access: Toward a more robust conceptualization, Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, vol.
46, no.
1, pp.
1-17. https://doi.org/10.1002/meet.2009.1450460274 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50972-3_13 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.225 https://doi.org/10.3152/147154304781780064 https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409361497 https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.5 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2009.01135.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2009.01135.x http://www.socresonline.org.uk/15/2/14.html https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.2154 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00359.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00359.x https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511529436 https://doi.org/10.1002/meet.2009.1450460274 80 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.10, No.3, 2018 Risse-Kappen, T. 1995, ‘Bringing transnational relations back in: Introduction’, in RisseKappen, T.
(ed.)
Bringing transnational relations back in; Non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions, Cambridge University Press, pp.
3-36. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598760.002 Resture, A.
2009, 'Utilising indigenous knowledge for building disaster resilience in Tuvalu', in Shaw, R., Sharma, A. and Takeuchi, Y.
(eds.
), Indigenous Knowledge and Disaster Risk Reduction: From Practice to Policy, Nova, New York, pp.
255-270.
Rudiak-Gould, P. 2012, 'Promiscuous corroboration and climate change translation: A case study from the Marshall Islands', Global Environmental Change, vol.
22, pp.
46-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.011 Schäfer, M. 2012, 'Online communication on climate change and climate politics: a literature review', WIREs Climate Change, vol.
3, pp.
527-543. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.191 Szarka, J.
2014, 'Non-governmental organisations and citizen action on climate change: strategies, rationales and practices', Open Political Science Journal, vol.7, pp.1-8.
https://doi.org/10.2174/1874949601407010001 Tadele, F, and Manyena, S.B.
2009, ‘building disaster resilience through capacity building in Ethiopia’, Disaster Prevention and Management, vol.
18, no.
3, pp.
317–326.
https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560910965664 UNEP 2015, Sourcebook of opportunities for enhancing cooperation among the Biodiversityrelated Conventions at national and regional levels.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi, Kenya.
wcmc.io/Sourcebook Van House, N. 2004, 'Epistemic machineries of environmental online communication', in Sharl, A.
(ed.
), Environmental Online Communication, Springer, Cham, p. 199-208.
Weichselgartner, J. and Kasperson, R., 2010, 'Barriers in the science-policy-practice interface: Toward a knowledge-action-system in global environmental change research', Global Environmental Change, vol 20, no.
2, pp.266-277.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.006 Weiss, T. and Burke, M. 2001, 'Legitimacy, identity and climate change: moving from international to world society', Third World Quarterly, vol.32, no.6, pp.
1057-1072. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.584721 Welp, M., de la Vega-Leinert, A., Stoll-Kleemann, S. and Jaeger, C., 2006, 'Science-based stakeholder dialogues: Theories and tools', Global Environmental Change, vol 16, no.
2, pp.170-181.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2005.12.002 Xu, J. and Grumbine, R.E.
2014, 'Integrating local hybrid knowledge and state support for climate change adaptation in the Asian Highlands', Climatic Change, vol.
124, pp.
93104. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1090-7 Yin, R.K. 1994, Case study research: Design and methods, (2nd ed.
), Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598760.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.011 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.191 https://doi.org/10.2174/1874949601407010001 https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560910965664 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.006 https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.584721 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2005.12.002 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1090-7 6019 MCGREGOR ET AL2.pdf 6019McGregor Yerbury Shahid.pdf 6019McGregor Yerbury Shahid 6019-Article Text-29208-1-10-20181125.pdf Keywords NGOs; Climate Change; Climate Vulnerable Forum; Knowledge creation Introduction Setting the Scene NGOs and information-based roles Discussion Conclusion References
Agricultural and Food Science, Vol 20 (2011): 3-14 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
3 © Agricultural and Food Science Manuscript received January 2010 Pests and diseases in a changing climate: a major challenge for Finnish crop production Kaija Hakala, Asko O. Hannukkala, Erja Huusela-Veistola, Marja Jalli and Pirjo Peltonen-Sainio MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Plant Production Research, FI-31600 Jokioinen, Finland, email: kaija.hakala@mtt.fi A longer growing season and higher accumulated effective temperature sum (ETS) will improve crop production potential in Finland.
The production potential of new or at present underutilised crops (e.g.
maize (Zea mays L.), oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.), lucerne (Medicago sativa L.)) will improve and it will be possible to grow more productive varieties of the currently grown crops (spring wheat (Triticum aestivum L.), barley (Hordeum vulgare L.), oats (Avena sativa L.)).
Also cultivation of autumn sown crops could increase if winters become milder and shorter, promoting overwintering success.
Climatic conditions may on the other hand become restrictive in many ways.
For example, early season droughts could intensify because of higher temperatures and consequent higher evaporation rates.
Current low winter temperatures and short growing season help restrict the development and spread of pests and pathogens, but this could change in the future.
Longer growing seasons, warmer autumns and milder winters may initiate new problems with higher occurrences of weeds, pests and pathogens, including new types of viruses and virus vectors.
Anoxia of overwintering crops caused by ice encasement, and physical damage caused by freezing and melting of water over the fields may also increase.
In this study we identify the most likely changes in crop species and varieties in Finland and the pest and pathogen species that are most likely to create production problems as a result of climate change during this century.
Key-words: climate change, crop, overwintering, pathogen, pest, virus, vector, winter A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 4 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
5 Introduction Finland lies between latitudes 60º and 70ºN, but despite its northern location supports active agriculture on about 2.3 million hectares of arable land almost throughout the country, even beyond the Arctic Circle.
This makes Finland the northernmost country in the world with successful agriculture.
However, short, cool growing seasons, a low effective temperature sum (ETS, base temperature +5 ºC for crops commonly cultivated in Finland) and long, harsh winters with thick snow cover limit effective production of most crops (Mela 1996) and yields per unit area remain significantly lower than in Sweden and Denmark (FAO 2010).
Moreover, frosts disrupt the growing season till mid June and from mid August (Mela 1996), affecting frost sensitive crops such as maize (Zea mays L.).
Because of the limiting conditions, climate warming with higher ETS, a longer growing season and milder winters is expected to have beneficial effects on Finnish agriculture (Mela 1996), in contrast to more southern countries such as those around the Mediterranean that may face serious drought problems as a consequence of climate change (IPCC 2007b).
While crop production is generally expected to benefit from climate change in Finland (PeltonenSainio et al.
2009b), problems with weeds, pests and pathogens, including new types of viruses and virus vectors, are expected to increase (Tiilikkala et al.
2010).
Extra investment in plant protection measures, as well as the possible yield losses caused by the higher pest and pathogen pressure in the future, could reduce the net profit that Finnish farmers are expected to gain as a consequence of beneficial changes in climate.
This review focuses on both the prospects for agriculture and the problems that Finnish agriculture is already experiencing and will continue to experience in the future in a changed climate.
Climate change in the northern latitudes The average annual global temperature has increased 0.76ºC during the past century (IPCC 2007a).
During the most recent decades and especially in the 2000s the increase has accelerated, the period 1995–2006 being the warmest ever recorded (IPCC 2007a).
In Fennoscandia, the growing season has become one to three weeks longer during 1890–1997, with the lengthening taking place both at the start and at the end of the growing season (Carter 1998).
At the same time, the ETS has increased, though without affecting the growing season intensity (average temperature during growth season).
In Fennoscandia in general, the lengthening has been most noticeable at the end of the growing season, but in Finland it has taken place more at the beginning (Carter 1998).
On average, since the 1960s there has been a trend of the growing season starting 2.1 days earlier per decade in the east and north of Finland, and 2.8 days earlier per decade in the west, with the pace of the development accelerating since the 1980s (Kaukoranta and Hakala 2008).
The increase in annual temperatures has been predicted to continue, with a greater increase at higher than at lower latitudes (IPCC 2007a).
Temperatures are also predicted to increase more in winter than in summer (IPCC 2007a).
Thus, in winter the temperatures would increase (compared with the period 1961–1990 and depending on scenario) 1.2–5.0 ºC by the 30 year period centred on 2025, 2.0–7.8 ºC by the 30 year period centred on 2055 and 3.7–10.9 ºC by the 30 year period centred on 2085 (later, 2025, 2055 and 2085, respectively) (Jylhä et al.
2004).
In summer the corresponding increase would be 0.6–1.6, 1.1–3.9 and 1.6–5.5 ºC by 2025, 2055 and 2085.
In the spring and in the autumn the predicted changes in average temperatures would be intermediate between the winter and summer figures.
Furthermore, with increasing temperatures the length of the growing season and the ETS accumulated during the growing season will continue to increase.
In general the growing season is expected to become 39–47 days longer by 2085 in northern Europe, compared with a baseline period of 1961–1990, with a stronger effect at the end than at the start of the growing season (Fronzek and Carter 2007).
In Jokioinen, in southern Finland (60º 49’N, 23º29’E), among one of the best crop production regions in Finland, the thermal growing season is expected to lengthen A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 4 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
5 from 169 days at present (1971–2000) to 181 days in 2025, 196 days in 2055 and 219 days in 2085.
The ETS will increase from about 1200 degree days (ºCd) at present to about 1370 ºCd in 2025, 1580 ºCd in 2055 and 1860 ºCd in 2085 (PeltonenSainio et al.
2009c).
At the same time the beginning of the growing season would be 5, 9 and 22 days earlier and the end of growing season 6, 16 and 27 days later in 2025, 2055 and 2085 respectively than at present, according to the A2 scenario of the IPCC (Nakicenovic et al.
2000, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009c).
Over the same time, extreme climatic events such as heat waves and heavy rains are predicted to increase (IPCC 2007a).
Climate change will lengthen the growing season and increase the ETS of the growing season markedly.
However, when much of the increase in the growing season length will take place in the autumn, the plants that are dependent on radiation to produce biomass will benefit only partly from the warmer conditions.
Also autumn rains could hamper field work to an even greater extent in the future than at present (Jylhä et al.
2004).
Thus when crop production potential is evaluated on the basis of ETS and growing season length, adverse climatic conditions in the autumn have to be taken into account.
However, while these conditions limit crop production, they do not necessarily limit pest and pathogen proliferation, which can continue in wet conditions and low light levels.
In the spring, again, neither radiation levels nor temperatures, according to the present scenarios, will be limiting crop production starting from the beginning of April (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009c).
Then, however, the remaining snow cover and excess field moisture could hamper field work (Carter 1998, PeltonenSainio et al.
2009b).
On average, the period from 15 April to 30 September would most probably represent the technically feasible crop growing season in Finland in the future (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b, 2009c), while pests and pathogens would most probably thrive over a longer period, at least for the period that the calculated growing season with an ETS above 5ºC might suggest (Carter et al.
1996).
A new era for northern crop production According to Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009b), the ETS of the technically feasible crop growth period would increase by about 160 ºCd by 2025, 320–340 ºCd by 2055 and by 550 ºCd by 2085, if emissions continue as described by the IPCC scenario A2 (Nakicenovic et al.
2000).
This would mean, among other things, that new crops such as forage maize, lupin (Lupinus angustifolius L.) (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b) and oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.) (Peltonen-Saino et al.
2009a), which demand high ETS to mature, and have up to now been cultivated on very limited areas in Finland, could be cultivated successfully on larger areas.
Also some promising minor crops such as flax (Linum usitatissimum L.), buckwheat (Fagopyrum esculentum Mill.
), faba bean (Vicia faba L.) and sunflower (Helianthus annuus L.) might be taken into more extensive cultivation (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
In addition to this, the longer growing season would mean that more productive varieties of the presently cultivated common crops, barley (Hordeum vulgare L.), oats (Avena sativa L.) and wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) could be taken into use and the cultivated area of these crops would increase (Table 1).
Areas and importance of autumn sown cereals and perennials will increase Autumn sown cereals In the future cultivation of most spring sown crops will not be limited by ETS in Finland, even at the borders in Lapland.
At the same time, however, drought problems are likely to get more serious during the spring and early summer despite the slight increase in precipitation expected with climate change (Jylhä et al.
2004, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2011b).
Therefore there will be increasing need for autumn sown crops in the southern and central parts of Finland.
For overwintered crops with well established root systems, increased precipitation in A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 6 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
7 the winter (Jylhä et al.
2004) would secure sufficient soil moisture for early growth in spring and early summer.
Currently overwintering crops are sown only in the south of Finland.
Increase in temperatures, especially during the winter, is expected to gradually improve conditions for autumn sown crops to overwinter, thus facilitating a change from spring sown to autumn sown crops (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
For example, winter wheat, which is currently restricted to southern Finland up to about 61 ºN, could be grown successfully up to 64 ºN in 2025, and by 2055 up to 66 ºN.
Winter rye (Secale cereale L.) is currently grown almost throughout Finland, but the yield levels drop dramatically north of 64 ºN.
By 2025 the area for winter rye cultivation could expand to include all Finland (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
Even though overwintering problems will not be overcome soon, despite increases in winter temperatures (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2011a), the number of winter days (days with average temperatures below 0 ºC) will gradually decrease.
There is likely to be fewer than 100 winter days in southern Finland by 2055, and, depending on the climate change scenario, fewer than 100 winter days up to 66 ºN (scenario A2) or up to 62 ºN (B1 scenario) by 2085 (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
By 2085, if climate warming occurs according to scenario A2 (Nakicenovic et al.
2000), southern Finland Table 1.
Novel or minor spring sown crops currently grown (1971–2000, centred on 1985) or promising crops for Finland following climate change according to a 30 year period centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 (adapted from Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
ETS, effective temperature sum with threshold temperature 5 ºC, except for maize, 10 ºC.
Buckwheat needs 10 ºC for emergence (Montonen and Kontturi 1997).
Southern Finland (South), up to 62 ºN, central Finland (Central), up to 64 ºN, northern Finland (North), up to 66 ºN, Lapland, up to 68 ºN, north Lapland (Lapland N), up to 70 ºN.
South+, coastal area at about 60 ºN.
Crop ETS required Suitable in 1985 up to Suitable in 2025 up to Suitable in 2055 up to Suitable in 2085 up to Spring barley Hordeum vulgare L. 890 North North Lapland Lapland N Spring oats Avena sativa L. 960 Central North Lapland Lapland N Spring wheat Triticum aestivum L. 990 Central North Lapland Lapland N Spring turnip rape Brassica rapa L. 1010 Central North Lapland Lapland N Spring oilseed rape Brassica napus L. 1090 South Central North Lapland Buckwheat Fagopyrum esculentum Mill.
900 North Lapland Lapland Lapland N Field pea Pisum sativum L. 930–980 Central-North Lapland Lapland Lapland N Faba bean Vicia faba L. 1060 South Central North Lapland Flax Linum usitatissimum L. 1040 Central North Lapland Lapland N Hemp Cannabis sativa L. 1150 South Central North Lapland Forage Maize Zea mays L. 700–850 Not suitable South + South Central Sunflower Helianthus annuus L. 1100 South Central North Lapland N A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 6 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
7 might have winter conditions that resemble those of today’s Denmark (1961–1990, Tveito et al.
2001, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b, 2009c).
However, the overwintering problems will not all be solved by then, as frost periods with intermittent warm spells are still expected to occur in Finland up to the end of the 21st century even according to the relatively high IPCC emission scenario A2 (Jylhä et al.
2008).
Such conditions could be especially damaging for autumn sown crops, as when temperatures fluctuate around zero, snow melts and ice forms on the fields.
This will cause ice encasement problems, such as anoxia, ice scorch and heaving, and maybe even frost damage if there is no protecting snow cover despite temperatures being well below zero (Hömmö 1994, Bélanger et al.
2002, Jylhä et al.
2008).
For sensitive varieties of overwintering crops warm spells in mid-winter might also lead to decreased cold hardiness and increased susceptibility to frost damage (Bélanger et al.
2002).
Increased physiological activity too early in the spring could lead to loss of reserve carbohydrates through respiration.
This could result in reduced resistance against pathogens and weakened growth early in the season, when reserve carbohydrates are required for growth and maintenance of the photosynthesising leaves (Hakala and Pahkala 2003).
Long and warm autumns could also lead to reduced cold hardening (Bélanger et al.
2002) and too dense canopies that favour pathogens (Serenius et al.
2005).
Perennial grasses and forage legumes In experiments with simulated future conditions in Jokioinen, Finland, meadow fescue (Festuca pratensis L.) produced significantly higher yield when the growing season started earlier and finished later in a simulated warmer climate in the greenhouse (Hakala and Mela 1996).
Furthermore, elevation of CO2 levels had a more marked effect on yield under the warmer conditions with a prolonged growing season (Hakala and Mela 1996).
In addition to the lengthening of the growing season, overwintering conditions for perennial grasses and legumes could become better with climate change, when the snow cover during the winter thins and stays for a shorter period (Jylhä et al.
2008).
Under the present climatic conditions, deep and long lasting snow cover often favours low temperature fungi that damage the canopy and reduce the yield of crops in the following growing season (Ylimäki 1969, Nissinen 1996, Yli-Mattila et al.
2010).
On the other hand, without snow cover, perennial grasses and legumes can face the same problems as autumn sown cereals; ice encasement, ice scorch and heaving injury (Hömmö 1994), often followed by disease attacks (Ylimäki 1967).
It is possible that before mild winters typical of regions such as Denmark and southern Sweden have reached Finland, cultivation of grasses and legumes may face new and severe problems due to unstable autumn and winter conditions.
The importance of perennial legumes in forage leys and as bioenergy crops is currently increasing and will probably continue to grow.
Legumes fix atmospheric nitrogen and reduce the need for chemical nitrogen fertilisation, thereby helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that would otherwise result from the manufacture of the fertiliser.
In addition, forage production and especially the production of perennial bioenergy crops, requires sustainable and cheap production technology because of the low price of the product.
Leguminous crops could add nitrogen to the system in an efficient and economical way.
The most common perennial legume forage grown in Finland is red clover (Trifolium pratense L.) (Evira 2009).
Some alsike clover (Trifolium hybridum L.) is also grown and some white clover (Trifolium repens L.) is a component of pastures (Evira 2009).
According to Halling et al.
(2004), both annual accumulation of degree days, especially during the regrowth period, and average daily temperatures during the growth period, are generally positively correlated with both red clover and white clover yield.
This suggests that in the future longer and warmer growing seasons in Finland will promote clover yields.
In northern European areas south of Finland, lucerne (Medicago sativa L.) is an important forage legume.
It produces high yields and is very persistent in a ley (Halling et al.
2004).
If growing conditions improve, lucerne might become a major forage crop also in Finland, but red A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 8 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
9 clover will probably remain in cultivation because of its stable and nutritionally superior yield (Bertilsson and Murphy 2003, Dewhurst et al.
2003).
Pest and pathogen problems in a changed climate with warmer and milder winters and autumns and with new crop forms and species The classic disease triangle emphasises that virulent pathogens cannot induce disease on a highly susceptible host if weather conditions are not favourable.
In addition, the environment can influence host-pathogen interactions through growth and susceptibility of the host plant and reproduction, dispersal, survival, and activity of the pathogen.
The impacts of environmental change on plant diseases can be positive, negative or neutral and the effects are highly localised (Ghini et al.
2008).
Carter et al.
(1996) showed that in the future pests and pathogens will exploit the longer growing season and milder winters at least as efficiently as the crops.
Pests and pathogens are not as dependent on radiation as crops, thus their growth could exploit a much longer period of the year than the effective growing season for plants at average daily temperatures above 5 ºC.
With longer growing seasons and higher temperatures, development of pests is faster and the annual generations of multivoltine species could increase (Bale et al.
2002).
With a longer growing season plant pathogens will thrive.
For example, studies based on simulation models indicate that an increase of 1°C in mean temperature in southern Finland extends the period when potato late blight (Phytophthora infestans (Mont.)
de Bary) control is necessary by 10 – 20 days, which means 1 – 2 more fungicide applications per season (Kaukoranta 1996).
The need for plant protection measures for potato late blight control has already increased following climate change, and the epidemiology of the pathogen has also changed substantially (Hannukkala et al.
2007).
As new crops are taken into active cultivation, their pests and diseases will gradually enter Finland.
Climate change will also affect the winter survival of overwintering plants such as grasses and autumn sown cereals.
For example, red clover currently becomes less persistent the further north and east (continental) it is grown (Halling et al.
2004).
The extent of this could be determined by the thickness and persistence of snow cover, which increase towards the north and inland (east).
The pathogens that infect red clover, clover rot (Sclerotinia trifoliorum Erikss.)
and root rot (several Fusariumspecies) thrive best under thick snow cover, and especially when snow cover stays for a long period (Ylimäki 1967, 1969, Willets and Wong 1980, Yli-Mattila et al.
2010).
With milder winters and thinning of the snow cover red clover, as well as other perennial grasses and legumes, might survive better in Finnish leys, which will prolong the profitable period of yield production and thus reduce the cultivation costs.
Examples of possible increased plant disease risks The shift towards autumn sown cereals will change the prevailing pathogen spectrum and increase the need for plant disease control during autumn.
Eyespot (Oculimacula yallundae (Wallwork & Spooner) Crous & W. Gams and Oculimacula acuformis (Boerema, R. Pieters & Hamers) Crous & W. Gams, anamorf Pseudocercosporella herpothrichoides (Fron) Deighton) is a severe disease of winter wheat (Fitt et al.
1988), rye and perennial grasses (Cunningham 1981) in temperate regions, causing up to 50% yield losses (Fitt et al.
1988).
In Finland this disease was frequently found in spring wheat throughout the country in 1946 – 1953 (Hårdh 1953).
Eyespot was commonly found in some years in the 1960s, but was practically absent in 1975 – 1978 (Mäkelä and Parikka 1980).
In surveys carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s eyespot was rare and it is not currently regarded as an important cereal disease in Finland (Hannukkala unpublished).
Eyespot has, however, great potential to become a major stem base disease in a changed climate, as it already is in Denmark (Sindberg et al.
1994) A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 8 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
9 and other countries with moist autumns (Fitt et al.
1988).
The anamorphic spores of the pathogen infect hosts in the moist autumn conditions when the temperature is 8 – 21 °C.
The apothecia of the fungus are produced on the bases and culms in straw stubble two months after harvest and mature ascospores spread during winter and early spring in the British climate (Dyer et al.
1994).
Ascospores represent important source of infectious inoculum as well as a source of genetic variation for build up of fungicide resistance (Daniels et al.
1995).
Predictions for future autumn conditions in Finland suggest that eyespot may have improved possibilities for proliferation in Finland.
Changing climate will also favour powdery mildew (Blumeria graminis (DC.)
Speer) infections of winter wheat and barley (Gregory et al.
2009).
The dynamics of barley powdery mildew epidemics will change, particularly when autumn sown barley is incorporated into production.
Currently barley powdery mildew cannot overwinter in Finland as suitable hosts do not exist.
In Denmark and southern Sweden, where winter barley is grown, powdery mildew is one of the most serious diseases (Bousset et al.
2002).
Chemical control is frequently needed and rapid development of new races of both wheat and barley mildews will challenge resistance breeders in the future (Limpert et.
al 1999).
Also rusts, especially brown rust (Puccinia recondita Dietel & Holw), could become an increasing problem.
Winter cereals can be attacked already in autumn, which can have detrimental effects for overwintering of crops (Serenius et al.
2005).
Climate warming can also have indirect effects by changing rust and powdery mildew resistance gene expression.
Genes active against diseases at low (10 °C) temperatures can be turned off at high (25 °C) temperatures (Gregory et al.
2009).
Increase in production of autumn sown cruciferous oil seed crops will give rise to new disease problems that are currently negligible for spring sown cultivars.
In the1950s, when autumn sown oil seed crops were grown in Finland, Typhula setipes (Grev.)
Berthier, among other low temperature fungi, caused serious winter damage (Jamalainen 1954).
Wilt caused by Verticillium longisporum (C. Stark) Karapapa, Bainbr.
& Heale is a very serious problem for autumn sown oil seed crops in Denmark and southern Sweden (Johansson et al.
2006), but is currently very rare in Finland in spring sown oil seed crops (Hannukkala unpublished).
However, in the future Finland may face a similar problem because the Finnish climate at the end of this century could resemble that of current day Denmark and southern Sweden (PeltonenSainio et al.
2009b).
In addition to the problems arising from increasing possibilities for cultivating overwintering crops, new possibilities for spring crop rotations may also cause problems with pathogens that have not been recorded in Finland.
For example, introduction of maize into crop rotations with wheat could increase the importance of particular mycotoxin-producing Fusarium species, especially Fusarium graminearum Schwabe, as recorded elsewhere (Osborne and Stein 2007).
F. graminearum under certain conditions produces the mycotoxin deoxynivalenol (DON) among other toxins (Birzele et al.
2002).
F. graminearum is already present in Finland but other Fusarium species predominate (Uhlig et al.
2007).
A warming climate and modified host range might also substantially change the propagation biology of the pathogen by favouring its sexual stage (Gibberella zeae (Schwein.)
Petch) and increasing intra-population genetic diversity (Xu 2003).
Intensive agricultural systems encourage rapid evolution of plant pathogens.
The plasticity of some agricultural systems could help to minimise negative impacts of climate change, for example, through new adapted cultivars (Chakraborty et al.
2000).
Disease management strategies are designed with reference to the environment and could be affected by climate change.
Fungicide residue dynamics could be affected by changes in temperature and precipitation, and changes in plant morphology or physiology resulting from climate change can influence the efficacy of fungicide action (Ghini et al.
2008).
There is also evidence that some forms of disease resistance might be overcome more rapidly following changes in levels of CO2, ozone and UV-B.
The greatest concern over the durability of host resistance is accelerated pathogen evolution (Chakraborty et al.
2000).
Understanding the hostA G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 10 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
11 pathogen biology is the first step toward minimising the risks represented by novel plant diseases.
Durable, race non-specific resistance incorporated into high yielding genotypes is the main method for managing obligate parasites of cereals.
In addition to disease resistance, improved crop management methods, including crop rotation, will be necessary (Duveiller et al.
2007).
Examples of possible increased pest risks Climate change will have a number of effects on developmental rate and phenology of crop plants that will alter the proliferation of associated pest species.
The degree of damage suffered by a crop will depend on the synchrony between pest abundance and the most susceptible developmental stage of the crop (Van Emden and Way 1973).
Direct climate change or changes in cropping practices, e.g.
a shift in sowing time, could result in crops suffering variable levels of pest attack at vulnerable seedling stages (Huusela-Veistola et al.
2006).
During warmer autumns damage by frit fly (Oscinella frit L.) and Hessian fly (Mayetiola destructor Say) in winter cereals will probably increase (Tiittanen 1959, Huusela-Veistola et al.
2006).
Longer and warmer periods in autumn also enable extended flights of plant virus vectors such as Rhopalosiphum padi L. and Psammotettix alienus Dahlb.
(Huusela-Veistola and Lemmetty 2005, Ewaldz et al.
2007).
Therefore, the risk of BYDV (Barley Yellow Dwarf Virus) and WDV (Wheat Dwarf Virus) developing in winter cereals is likely to increase in the future (Harrington 2007, Huusela-Veistola 2007).
However, viruses, vectors, host plants and abiotic factors are continuously changing and their interactions are complex and challenging to predict or manage (Harrington 2007, Canto et al.
2009).
Changes in crop production systems are likely to alter the composition of pest complexes.
New crops represent new host plants and habitats and therefore pest problems are likely to increase as a new crop becomes widely grown.
Climate change may increase the importance of some existing pests or enable colonisation by new pests previously restricted by unfavourable low temperatures or shortage of suitable host plants.
For example, the European corn borer, Ostrinia nubilalis Hübner, which nowadays feeds on alternative host plants in southern Finland, is likely to become a pest of maize as its cropping range expands northwards (Tiilikkala et al.
2010).
Furthermore, frit fly and aphids, which are common insect pests of cereals in Finland, can also damage maize.
In addition, the abundance of Rhopalosiphum maidis Fitch, which is vector of the RMV strain of BYDV, could increase in tandem with increased maize cropping and climate warming (Harrington 2007).
Increased cropping of winter oilseed crops could change the status and phenology of pests of cruciferous crops.
For example, cabbage seed weevil (Cheutorrhynchus assimilis Payk) is phenologically synchronized with winter oilseed rape (Kevväi et al.
2006), whereas pollen beetles (Meligethes aeneus Fab.)
are more problematic in spring oilseeds (Veromann et al.
2006).
At present the number of important pest species of oilseed rape is higher in Denmark than in other Nordic countries (Menzler-Hokkanen et al.
2006).
It is likely that pest problems and the need for insecticides in oilseed cropping will increase with climate change also in Finland.
That will be problematic because pollen beetles resistant to insecticides (pyrethroids) have already been recorded in Sweden (Ekbom and Kuusk 2001) and in Denmark (Hansen 2003), and insecticide resistance is likely to develop also in Finland (Tiilikainen and Hokkanen 2008).
Overall, selection of available insecticides is narrow.
Pyrethroids are commonly used against pests of all field crops, which increases risk of pesticide resistance for other pest insects as well.
In the long run, climate change, especially warming of winters, could enable survival of year-round parthenogenetically reproducing anholocyclic forms of Rhopalosiphum padi, which are nowadays common in the UK (Tatchell et al.
1988) and France (Dedryver and Gellé 1982, Simon et al.1991) and have recently also been recorded in Poland (Ruszkowska 2007).
Anholocyclic clones are important vectors of BYDV in winter cereals (Harrington 2002).
Increased capacity for long-range migration and rapid rate of population A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 10 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
11 increase make aphids effective colonists and important pests (Van Emden and Harrington 2007) that will have to be monitored more carefully in the future.
On general, climate change will increase risk of entry and establishment of invasive alien pest species in Finland (Vänninen et al.
2011) Frequency and amplitude of pest and pathogen outbreaks vary considerably in time and space.
Climate change could increase variation among species, populations/strains of the same species, different seasons and localities, and therefore complicate forecasting of plant protection problems.
Climate change will not only affect the distribution and abundance of pest populations, but also those of their host plants, competitors and natural enemies.
Due to varying conditions and time scales definitive effects of these interactions will be difficult to predict (Thomson et al.
2009).
Climate change in conjunction with changed crop composition could indirectly affect plant protection.
For example, in UK, winter oilseed rape provides a suitable overwintering habitat for anholocyclic peach aphid, Myzus persicae Sulz.
(Cocu et al.
2005), which is the most important vector of potato virus Y (PVY) (Radcliffeand Ragsdale 2002).
In Nordic countries, many other aphid species, such as Rhopalosiphum padi, Aphis fabae Scopoli, A. frangulae Kalt., A. nasturtii Kalt., Brachycaudus helichrysi Kalt., Acyrthosiphon pisum Harris, Phorodon humili Schrank, Metopolophium dirhodum Walker and Cryptomyzus galeopsidis Kalt.
are more important PVY vectors at the moment (Kurppa and Rajala 1986, Sigvald 1989, Kirchner et al.
2009) but comparable vicarious effects as in the case of peach aphid in UK are possible and unforeseeable when crop assortment and weather conditions alter.
Moreover, although forage grasses and legumes incur minor pest damage they can act as a reservoir for slugs, aphids and BYDV, which can cause problems in neighbouring winter cereals.
Overall expansion of winter oilseed crops, winter cereals, perennial grasslands and different winter vegetation management, such as undersown catch crops, could create “green bridges” for pests and pathogens.
In parallel, the peak of chemical control is likely to change from early summer to autumn, which can increase leaching of pesticide residues.
Increased need of chemical control with climate change in tandem with risk of pesticide resistance and restrictions of pesticide use create more challenges for plant protection.
Therefore, integrated pest management methods and alarm systems that support decision making in plant protection, as well as resistant cultivars and adequate crop rotations should be used to minimize the problems caused by increased need for plant protection.
Conclusions While the predicted climate change generally improves crop production possibilities in Finland, the accompanying threats represented by pests and pathogens have to be taken into account when making predictions and developing adaptation practices for Finnish crop production.
Because of the huge range of interactions and outcomes associated with a changing climate and different cropping systems it is important to avoid drawing overly simplistic conclusions (Morecroft et al.
2009).
However, an increased use of overwintering crops in particular poses substantial challenges for Finnish crop production.
E.g.
emphasis of chemical control is likely to change from early summer to autumn, which can increase leaching of pesticide residues, especially as winter temperatures and precipitation are predicted to increase.
In addition to environmental problems, increased need of chemical control in tandem with risk of pesticide resistance and restrictions of pesticide use are likely to create more challenges for plant protection.
Therefore, integrated pest management methods and alarm systems that support decision making in plant protection measures have to be used efficiently in order to realise the benefits of improved crop growth conditions in the future.
Resistant cultivars, adequate crop rotations and sustainable control methods are crop management practices that can be used to minimize plant protection problems and adverse effects of the protection measures to the environment.
A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 12 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
13 References Bale, J.S., Masters, G.J., Hodkinson, I.D., Awmack, C., Bezemer, T.M., Brown, V.K., Butterfield, J., Buse, A., Coulson, J.C., Farrar, J., Good, J.E.G., Harrington, R., Hareley, S., Jones, T.H., Lindroth, R.L., Press, M.C., Symrnioudis, I., Watt, A.D. & Whittaker, J.B. 2002.
Herbivory in global climate change research: direct effects of rising temperature on insect herbivores.
Global Change Biology 8: 1–16.
Bélanger, G., Rochette, P., Castonguay, Y., Bootsma, A., Mongrain, D. & Ryan, D.A.J.
2002.
Climate change and winter survival of perennial forage crops in eastern Canada.
Agronomy Journal 94: 1120–1130.
Bertilsson, J.
& Murphy, M. 2003.
Effects of feeding clover silages on feed intake, milk production and digestion in dairy cows.
Grass and Forage Science 58: 309–322.
Birzele, B., Meier, A., Hindorf, H., Krämer, J.
& Dehne, H.W. 2002.
Epidemiology of Fusarium infection and deoxynivalenol in winter wheat in the Rhineland, Germany.
European Journal of Plant Pathology 108: 667–663.
Bousset, L., Hovmøller, M.S., Caffier, V., de VallaviellePope, C. & Østergård, H. 2002.
Observed and predicted changes over eight years in frequency of barley powdery mildew avirulent to spring barley in France and Denmark.
Plant Pathology 51: 33–44.
Canto, T., Aranda, M.A.
& Fereres, A.
2009.
Climate change effects on physiology and population processes of hosts and vectors that influence the spread of hemipteran-borne plant viruses.
Global Change Biology 15: 1884–1894.
Carter, T.R.
1998.
Changes in the thermal growing season in Nordic countries during the past century and prospects for the future.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 7: 161–179.
Carter, T.R., Saarikko, R.A. & Niemi, K.J.
1996.
Assessing the risks and uncertainties of regional crop potential under a changing climate in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 329–350.
Chakraborty, S., Tiedemann, A.V.
& Teng, P.S.
2000.
Climate change: potential impact on plant diseases.
Environmental Pollution 108: 317–326.
Cocu, N., Harrington, R., Rounsevell, D.A., Worner, S.P., Hulle, M. & The EXAMINE project participants 2005.
Geographical location, climate and land use influence on the phenology and numbers of the aphid, Myzus persicae, in Europe.
Journal of Biogeography 32: 615–632.
Cunningham, P.C.
1981.
Occurrence, role and pathogenic traits of a distinct pathotype of Pseudocercosporella herpothrichoides.
Transactions of the British Mycological Society 76: 3–15.
Daniels, A., Papaikonomou, M, Dyer, P.S.
& Lucas, J.A.
1995.
Infection of wheat seedlings by ascospores of Tapesia yallundae morphology of the infection process and evidence for recombination.
Phytopathology 85: 918–927 Dedryver, C.A.
& Gelle, A.
1982.
Biologie des puceronsdes céréales dans l’ouest de Ia France.
IV.
Etude de l’hivernation des populations anholocycliques de Rhopalosiphum padi L., Metopolophium dirhodum Wik et Sitobion avenae F. sur repousses de céréales dans trois stations de Bretagne et du Bassin parisien.
Acta Oecologica Applicata 3: 321–342.
Dewhurst, R.J., Fisher, W.J., Tweed, J.K.S.
& Wilkins, R.J. 2003.
Comparison of grass and legume silages for milk production.
1.
Production responses with different levels of concentrate.
Journal of Dairy Science 86: 2598–2611.
Duveiller, E., Singh, R.P.
& Nicol, J. M. 2007.
The challenges of maintaining wheat productivity: pests, diseases, and potential epidemics.
Euphytica 157: 417–430.
Dyer, P.S., Bateman, G.L., Lucas, J.A.
& Peberdy, J. F. 1994.
Seasonal development of apothecia of the cereal eyespot pathogen Tapesia yallundae on straw stubble in the UK.
Annals of Applied Biology 125: 489–500.
Ekbom, B.
& Kuusk, A-K. 2001.
Pollen beetles (Meligethes aeneus) and resistance against pyrethroids.
Växskyddsnotiser 65: 39–42.
Ewaldz, T., Sigvald, R., Berg, G. & Larsson, H. 2007.
Barley Yellow Dwarf Virus on winter cereals in Sweden.
In: NJF Seminar 402: Virus vector management in a changing climate, preliminary report, Kristianstad, Sweden, 9–11 October 2007. p. 67–69.
Evira 2009.
Finnish Food Safety Authority.
Available on the internet: www.evira.fi.
Cited on 1 December 2009.
FAO 2010.
Homepage of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Available on the internet: http://faostat.fao.org.
Cited on 4 January 2010.
Fitt, B.D.L, Goulds, A.
& Polley, R.W.
1988.
Eyespot (Pseudocercosporella herpothrichoides) epidemiology in relation to prediction of disease severity and yield loss in winter wheat – a review.
Plant Pathology 37: 311–328.
Fronzek, S. & Carter, T.R.
2007.
Assessing uncertainties in climate change impacts on resource potential for Europe based on projections from RCMs and GCMs.
Climatic Change 81: 357–371.
Ghini, R., Hamada, E. & Bettiol, W. 2008.
Climate change and plant diseases.
Scientia Agricola 65: 98–107.
Gregory, P.J., Johnson, S.N., Newton.
A.C. & Ingram, J.S.I.
2009.
Integrating pests and pathogens into the climate change/food security debate.
Journal of Experimental Botany 60: 2827–2838.
Hakala, K. & Mela, T. 1996.
The effects of prolonged exposure to elevated temperatures and elevated CO2 levels on the growth, yield and dry matter partitioning of fieldsown meadow fescue (Festuca pratensis, cv.
Kalevi).
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 285–298.
Hakala, K. & Pahkala, K. 2003.
Comparison of central and northern European winter rye cultivars grown at high latitudes.
Journal of Agricultural Science 141: 169–178.
Halling, M.A., Topp, C.F.E.
& Doyle, C.J.
2004.
Aspects of the productivity of forage legumes in Northern Europe.
Grass and Forage Science 59: 331–344.
Hannukkala, A., Kaukoranta, T., Lehtinen, A.
& Rahkonen, A.
2007.
Late-blight epidemics on potato in Finland, 1933–2002; increased and earlier occurrence of epidemics associated with climate change and lack of rotation.
Plant Pathology 56: 167–176.
Hansen, L.M.
2003.
Insecticide-resistant pollen beetles (Meligethes aeneus F.) found in Danish oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.) fields.
Pest Management Science 59: 1057–1059.
Hårdh, J.E.
1953.
Kevätvehnän kahutähkäisyydestä sekä sen syistä Suomessa [English summary: On the shrivelheads of spring wheat and their causes in Finland].
PubliA G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 12 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
20(2011): 3–14.
13 cations of the Finnish State Agricultural Research Board 140, Helsinki.
152 p. Harrington, R. 2002.
BYDV: The heat is on.
In: Henry, M. & McNab, A.
(eds), Barley Yellow Dwarf Disease: Recent Advances and Future Strategies.
CIMMYT, Mexico, D.F.
p. 34–39.
Harrington, R. 2007.
Viruses, vectors, host plants and environment: From complexity to control.
In: NJF Seminar 402: Virus vector management in a changing climate, preliminary report, Kristianstad, Sweden, 9–11 October 2007. p. 9–11.
Hömmö, L.M.
1994.
Resistance of winter cereals to various winter stress factors – interand intraspecific variation and the role of cold acclimation.
Agricultural Science in Finland 3, Suppl.
1 (PhD Thesis, Agricultural Research Centre of Finland).
Huusela-Veistola, E. 2007.
Overview of vectors of cereal viruses in Finland.
In: NJF Seminar 402: Virus vector management in a changing climate, preliminary report, Kristianstad, Sweden, 9–11 October 2007. p. 43–44.
Huusela-Veistola, E.& Lemmetty, A.
2005.
Viirukaskaan levittämää vehnän kääpiökasvuvirusta Suomessa.
Kasvinsuojelulehti 38 (1): 8–10.
(In Finnish.)
Huusela-Veistola, E., Jalli, H., Salonen, J., Pahkala, K. & Laine, A.
2006.
Sowing time affects the abundance of pests and weeds in winter rye.
Agricultural and Food Science 15: 43–60 IPCC 2007a.
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B.
Averyt, M. Tignor & H.L.
Miller (eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 18 p. IPCC 2007b.
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L.
Parry, O.F.
Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J.
van der Linden and C.E.
Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 16 p. Jamalainen, E.E., 1954.
Overwintering of cultivated plants under snow.
FAO Plant Protection Bulletin 11: 102–105.
Johansson, A., Goud, J-K.C.
& Dixelius, C. 2006.
Plant host range of Verticillium longisporium and microsclerotia density in Swedish soils.
European Journal of Plant Pathology 114: 139–149.
Jylhä, K., Tuomenvirta, H. & Ruosteenoja, K. 2004.
Climate change projections for Finland during the 21st century.
Boreal Environment Research 9: 127–152.
Jylhä, K., Fronzek, S., Tuomenvirta, H., Carter, T.R.
& Ruosteenoja, K. 2008.
Changes in frost, snow and Baltic sea ice by the end of the twenty-first century based on climate model projections for Europe.
Climatic Change 86: 441–462.
Kaukoranta, T. 1996.
Impact of global warming on potato late blight: risk, yield loss and control.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 311–327.
Kaukoranta, T. & Hakala, K. 2008.
Impact of spring warming on sowing times of cereal, potato and sugar beet in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 17: 165–176.
Kevväi, R., Veromann, E., Luik, A.
& Saarniit, M. 2006.
Cabbage seed weevil (Ceutorrhynchus assimilis Payk.)
and its parasitoids in oil seed rape crops in Estonia.
Agronomy Research 4 (special issue): 227–230.
Kirchner, S. M., Hiltunen, L., Virtanen, E., Döring, T. F. & Valkonen, J. P. T. 2009.
Potato virus Y transmitting aphids in a Finnish seed potato area.
In: 8th International symposium on aphids: programme and abstracts, Catania (Italy) 8–12 June 2009. p. 167.
Kurppa, S. & Rajala, P. 1986.
Occurrence of winged aphids in potato plants and pressure for Potato virus Y transmission in Finland.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 25: 199–214 Limpert, E., Godet, F. & Müller, K. 1999.
Dispersal of cereal mildews across Europe.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 97: 293–308.
Mäkelä, K. & Parikka, P. 1980.
Root and foot rot diseases of cereals in Southern Finland in 1975 – 1978.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 19: 223–253.
Mela, T. 1996.
Northern agriculture: constraints and responses to global climate change.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 229–234.
Menzler-Hokkanen, I., Hokkanen, H.M.T., Buchs, W., Klukowski, Z., Luik, A., Nilsson, C, Ulber, B.
& Williams, I.H.
2006.
Insect problems in European oilseed rape cultivation, and how to deal with them: The OSR farmers’ perspective.
IOBC/wprs Bulletin 29: 91–94 Montonen, R. & Kontturi, M. 1997.
Tattarin viljelytekniikka.
Maatalouden tutkimuskeskuksen julkaisuja.
Sarja A 14.
51 p. (In Finnish, summary in English).
Morecroft, M.D., Bealey, C.E, Beaumont, D.A, Benham, S., Brooks, D.R., Burt, T.P, Critchley, C.N.R; Dick, J., Littlewood, N.A., Monteith, D.T., Scott, W.A., Smith, R.I., Walmsley, C. & Watson, H. 2009.
The UK Environmental Change Network: Emerging trends in the composition of plant and animal communities and the physical environment.
Biological Conservation 142: 2814–2832.
Nakicenovic N., Alcamo J., Davis G., de Vries B., Fenhann J., Gaffin S., Gregory K., Grübler A., Jung T.Y., Kram T., La Rovere E.L., Michaelis L., Mori S., Morita T., Pepper W., Pitcher H., Price L., Raihi K., Roehrl A., Rogner H.-H., Sankovski A., Schlesinger M., Shukla P., Smith S., Swart R., van Rooijen S., Victor N. & Dadi, Z.
2000.
Emissions Scenarios.
A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press.
599 p. Nissinen, O.
1996.
Analysis of climatic factors affecting snow mold injury in first-year timothy (Phleum pratence L.) with special reference to Sclerotinia borealis.
Acta Universitatis Ouluensis.
Scientia Rerum Naturalium A 289.
PhD Thesis of University of Oulu.
115 p. Osborne, L.E.
& Stein, J.M.
2007.
Epidemiology of Fusarium head blight on small-grain cereals.
International Journal of Food Microbiology 119: 103–108.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Hakala, K. & Jauhiainen, L. 2011a.
Climate-induced overwintering challenges for wheat and rye in northern agriculture.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica Section B Soil and Plant Science 61: 75–83.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Hakala, K., Jauhiainen, L. & Ruosteenoja, K. 2009a.
Comparing regional risks in producing turnip rape and oilseed rape Impacts of climate change and breeding.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica Section B – Soil and Plant Science 59: 129–138.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L., Hakala, K. & Ojanen, A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Hakala, K. et al.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate 14 H. 2009b.
Climate change and prolongation of growing season: changes in regional potential for field crop production in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 18: 171–190.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L., Hakala, K. & Ruosteenoja, K. 2011b.
Growth duration and phasing, distribution of precipitation and yielding capacity of spring cereals and rapeseed in changing climate at high latitudes.
Field Crops Research, submitted.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rajala, A., Känkänen, H. & Hakala, K. 2009c.
Improving farming systems in northern European conditions.
In: Sadras, V.O.
& Calderini, D.F.
(eds), Crop Physiology.
Applications for Genetic Improvement and Agronomy.
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
p. 71–97.
Radcliffe, E.B.
& Ragsdale, D.W. 2002.
Aphid-transmitted potato viruses: The importance of understanding vector biology.
American Journal of Potato Research 79: 353–386.
Ruszkowska, M. 2007.
Across the transformation life cycle of Rhopalosiphum padi (L.) (Homoptera: Aphidoidea): Coevolution with temperature.
Rozpravy Naukowe.
Institute Ochrony Roslin Zeszyt 15.
60 p. Serenius, M., Huusela-Veistola, E., Avikainen, H., Pahkala, K. & Laine, A.
2005.
Effects of sowing time on pink snow mould, leaf rust and winter damage in winter rye varieties in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 14: 362–376.
Sigvald, R. 1989.
Relationship between aphid occurrence and spread of potato virus Yo (PVY) in field experiments in southern Sweden.
Journal of Applied Entomology 108: 35–43.
Simon, J. C., Blackman, R. L. & Le Gallic, J. F. 1991.
Local variability in the life cycle of the bird cherry-oat aphid, Rhopalosiphum padi (Homoptera: Aphididae) in western France.
Bulletin of Entomological Research 81: 315–322.
Sindberg, S., Munk, L., & Schulz, H. 1994.
Tapesia yallundae, the teleomorph of Pseudocercosporella herpotrichoides observed for the first time in Denmark.
Zeitschrift für Pflanzenkrankheiten und Pflanzenschutz 101: 316–320.
Tatchell, O. M., Plumb, R. T. & Carter, N. 1988.
Migration of alate morphs of the bird cherry aphid (Rhopalosiphum padi) and implications for the epidemiology of the barley yellow dwarf virus.
Annals of Applied Biology 112: 1–11.
Thomson, L.J., Macfadyen, S. & Hoffmann, A.A. 2009.
Predicting the effects of climate change on natural enemies of agricultural pests.
Biological control 52: 296–306.
Tiilikainen, T.M.
& Hokkanen, H.T.M.
2008.
Pyrethroid resistance of Finnish pollen beetle (Meligethes aeneus) populations – is it around the corner?
EPPO Bulletin 38: 99–103.
Tiilikkala, K., Hannukkala, A., Salonen, J., Huusela-Veistola, E., Laitinen, P., Ojanen, H. & Ooperi, S. 2010.
Lisääntyvät kasvinsuojeluriskit ja niiden hallinta ilmaston muuttuessa.
Maataloustieteen Päivät 2010.
Available on the internet: http://www.smts.fi/jul2010/esite2010/002.
pdf.
(In Finnish.)
Cited on 27 July 2010.
Tiittanen, K. 1959.
Kahukärpäsen viljakasveissa aiheuttamat tuhot Suomessa vuosina 1948–1958.
Schäden durch die Fritfliege (Oscinella frit L., Dipt.)
bei Getreide in Finnland in den Jahren 1948–1958.
Valtion maatalouskoetoiminnan julkaisuja (Die Staatliche Landwirtschaftliche Versuchstätigkeit Veröffentlichung) 178: 110– 125.
(In Finnish, partly in German.)
Tveito, O.E., Forland, E.J., Alexandersson, H., Drebs, A., Jónsson, T., Tuomenvirta, H. & Vaarby Laursen, E. 2001.
Nordic climate maps.
KLIMA report 6/2001.
Uhlig, S., Jestoi, S. & Parikka, P. 2007.
Fusarium avenaceum – The North European situation.
International Journal of Food Microbiology 119:17–24.
Van Emden, H.F. & Way, M.J. 1973.
Host plants in the population dynamics of insects.
In: van Emden, H.F (ed.
), Insect/Plant relationships.
Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, UK.
p. 181–199.
Van Emden, H.F. & Harrington, R. 2007.
Aphids as crop pests.
CAB International, London, UK, 717 p. Vänninen, I., Huusela-Veistola, E, Worner, S., Tuovinen, T., Nissinen, A.
& Saikkonen, K. 2010.
Recorded and potential alien invertebrate pests in Finnish agriculture and horticulture.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 96–114.
Veromann, E. Luik, A.
& Kevväi, R. 2006.
Oilseed rape pests and their parasitoids in Estonia.
Bulletin IOBC 29: 167–174.
Willetts, H.J.
& Wong, J.A-L. 1980.
The biology of Sclerotinia aclerotiorum, S. trifoliorum and S. minor with emphasis on specific nomenclature.
The Botanical Review 46: 101–165.
Xu, X.
2003.
Effects of environmental conditions on the development of Fusarium ear blight.
European Journal of Plant Pathology 109: 683–689.
Ylimäki, A.
1967.
Root rot as a cause of red clover decline in leys in Finland.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 6: 1–59.
Ylimäki, A.
1969.
Apilamätä apilan talvehtimisen heikentäjänä Suomessa (Clover rot as a cause of poor overwintering of clover in Finland).
Journal of the Scientific Agricultural Society of Finland 41: 222–242.
(In Finnish, partly in English.)
Yli-Mattila, T., Kalko, G., Hannukkala, A., Paavanen-Huhtala, S. & Hakala, K. 2010.
Prevalence, species composition, genetic variation and pathogenicity of clover rot (Sclerotinia trifoliorum) and Fusarium spp.
in red clover in Finland.
European Journal of Plant Pathology 126: 13–27.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate: a major challenge for Finnish crop production Introduction Climate change in the northern latitudes A new era for northern crop production Areas and importance of autumn sown cereals and perennials will increase Autumn sown cereals Perennial grasses and forage legumes Pest and pathogen problems in a changed climate with warmer and milder winters and autumns and with new crop forms and species Examples of possible increased plant disease risks Examples of possible increased pest risks Conclusions References
37 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017 Journal of Mountain Area Research POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON PLANT DIVERSITY OF HILLY AREAS OF AZAD KASHMIR AND THEIR MITIGATION: A REVIEW K. F. Akbar* Department of Botany, University of Lahore, Sargodha Campus, Sargodha.
ABSTRACT Azad Kashmir has variety of mountain ecosystems which are rich in floral and faunal diversity.
These ecosystems are fragile and are under stress due to various natural and anthropogenic pressures.
Mountain ecosystems of Azad Kashmir are more vulnerable to global warming and are expected to show its impacts rapidly.
Climate change may cause major changes in distribution ranges of different vegetation types.
As a result of climate change, the area of three vegetation groups (alpine, grassland/arid woodlands and deserts) is expected to decrease and the areas of five types (cold conifer/mixed woodland, cold conifer/mixed forests, temperate conifer/mixed forests, warm conifer/mixed forests, and steppe/arid shrub lands) are expected to increase.
Climate change is going to affect conservation of plant species and ecosystems by causing direct loss of plant species and intensify the effects of existing threats such as habitat degradation, deforestation and over-harvesting of plants by local communities, pollution and invasive species.
These stresses, acting individually and collectively on species, communities and ecosystems, are depleting and will continue to deplete biodiversity.
The negative impacts of climate change are multi-dimensional and wide-ranging.
Their mitigation requires an integrated and coordinated policy response for conservation of plant resources.
These measures include a regular monitoring and observation system, restoration of degraded habitats and forests, identifying new solutions involving cross-sectoral linkages to conserve biological diversity of Azad Kashmir by supporting the intricate and complex responses of species and ecosystems to climate change.
KEY WORDS: Azad Kashmir, floral diversity, climate change, conservation *Corresponding author: (Email: kakbar5813@gmail.com) 1.
INTRODUCTION Today, climate change is considered as one of the most challenging global environmental issues facing humanity.
It has been reported to cause the death of 0.4 million people and global economic losses of more than US$1.2 trillion each year [1].
Climate change is the result of human-induced accumulation of Green House gases (CO2, CH4, N2O) in the atmosphere and resultantly, increase in global atmospheric temperatures.
In the past, the global atmospheric concentration has increased from 280 ppm in 1753 (after the dawn of industrial era) to 400 ppm in 2013.
Along with increase in CO2 levels, the global mean temperature has increased by 0.740C [2].
The recent studies show that earth’s climate is changing unabated and global atmospheric concentration of CO2 may go up to 1250 ppm and temperature can increase by 7oC by 2100 as compared to1750 [3].
The global warming is not an isolated phenomenon and it may cause changes in other climatic parameters (precipitation change, snow cover, humidity, sea level etc.).
Vol.
2, 2017 http://journal.kiu.edu.pk/index.php/JMAR Full length article mailto:kakbar5813@gmail.com Akbar et al., J. mt.
area res.
02 (2017) 37-44 38 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017 These climatic variations may impact global ecosystems by causing variation in different activities in symbiotic, bio-geo-chemical, parasitic and mutualistic relationships between different organisms and communities [3].
Climate change is a multidimensional global phenomenon with implications for nearly every sphere of human life.
Today it has emerged as a critical scientific, development and economic global challenge due to its potential impacts on all kinds of living organisms, integrity of ecosystems and national and global economies [5, 6].
It is particularly so for Pakistan because Pakistan is highly susceptible to negative impacts of climate change, with a low capability to compete it by adopting necessary measures.
Global warming is posing a serious danger to its water resources, agricultural production, biological diversity and energy security [7].
The adverse effects of climate change on Pakistan are expected to increase further in future as the world’s mean temperature, which increased by 0.6 °C in the 20th century, is going to increase further by 1.1 to 6.4 °C by the last decades of the 21th century [8].
The state of Azad Jammu & Kashmir lies in the north of Pakistan.
Pakistan including Azad Kashmir is projected to undergo warming at a rate higher than global average.
During the 20th century, in Pakistan, average annual temperature increased by 0.6 °C, similar to temperature increase on the global level.
However, at local level, the northern part of Pakistan including AJ&K experienced temperature increase higher (0.8 °C) than its southern part (0.5°C) indicating higher susceptibility of its mountainous regions to adverse effects of climate change [8].
According to another study, the temperature in Himalayan region has risen by 1oC since 1970s [9].
The studies based on different simulation models predict that Pakistan will face a temperature increase up to 1.3 -1.5 °C by 2020s, 2.5 -2.8 °C by 2050s, and 3.9-4.4 °C by 2080s, in line with an increase in average global surface temperature of 2.8-3.4 °C by the end of this century [10].
This paper examines the possible impacts of climate change on plant diversity of the state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and more specifically the impacts of climate change on plants of its hilly areas and approaches needed for their conservation.
2.
MAJOR CLIMATE CHANGE RELATED ISSUES FOR PAKISTAN AND AJ&K The major threats to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan from climate change are mentioned as:  Change in dynamics of monsoon;  Rapid reduction in size of Hindu KushKarakoram-Himalayan (HKH) glaciers leading to reduced water in flows into the Indus River System (IRS) [11]; There are however, conflicting reports about the impact of global warming on the glaciers of Himalayas increasing uncertainty.
Some workers claim that these glaciers are increasing in size due to increase in precipitation [12] whereas other claim that these glaciers are not affected by climatic changes and exhibit no significant change in size in the recent past [13].
 The water-storing capacity of natural reservoirs will decrease due to glacier melt and rise in snow line;  Higher risks of natural disasters such as floods and droughts;  The water storing capacity of major dams will decrease due to increased silting;  The frequent occurrence of extreme water-stressed and heat-stressed incidents having negative impacts on crop yields in dry regions [14];  Increase in upstream movement of ocean water in the Indus delta, having adverse impacts on the ecology and production of coastal areas; and  Increased threats of sea level rise and cyclones to the human settlements along the sea coast including Karachi due to higher sea surface temperatures [15].
From these potential dangers, it is evident that climate change poses serious dangers to regional and global biodiversity by altering the Akbar et al., J. mt.
area res.
02 (2017) 37-44 39 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017 patterns of seasonal temperature and precipitation.
Furthermore, synergistic effects between global warming and other anthropogenic phenomenon such as pollution, habitat loss and fragmentation, over-exploitation of natural resources will make worse climate-induced changes for biodiversity [15].
3.
GENERAL PROFILE OF AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR The state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir lies between longitude 73o – 75o and latitude 33o – 36o and its total geographical area is 13,297 km2.
AJK falls within the Himalayan orogenic belt with hilly and mountainous topography characterized by deep ravines, rugged, and undulating terrain.
The State can be divided into two geographical regions, the northern mountainous region (Neelum, Muzaffarabad, Hattian, Bagh, Haveli, Poonch, and Sudhnoti districts) and southern plain region (Kotli, Mirpur, and Bhimber districts).
Main rivers are Jhelum, Neelum and Poonch.
The altitude varies from 360 m asl to 6325 m asl in the north.
Despite its small size, AJK has a variety of climate types; from sub-humid sub-tropical, to moist temperate, dry cold temperate, very cold temperate to snow deserts in extreme north.
The mean annual rain fall ranges from 800 mm to 1600 mm.
The snowline in winter is 1,200 meter above sea level, while in summer it rises to 3,300 meters.
The mean minimum and maximum temperature are 2oC and 40oC respectively with significant variations between different regions [16].
AJ&K has 224 glaciers with ice reserves of about 4.9 cubic km mainly inNeelum valley.
Total area of glaciers is 109 km with average thickness of 24 meters.
Major glaciers are Saranwali, Shonthar, Parbat, Dewarian, Rati Gali and Mianwitch.
These glaciers and glacial lakes are present above 4000 4500 m altitude.
There are 76 glacial lakes with total area of 545 ha [17].
AJ&K has a population of 4.3 million in 2013 with a population density of 320 persons per km.
A major part of the AJ&K population lives in rural areas and their main professions are forestry, livestock and agriculture.
Major crops are maize, wheat, rice while minor crops are grams, red beans, vegetables and oil seeds.
Major fruits are apple, pears, apricot and walnuts.
Along with farming, livestock rearing is a common practice.
Agriculture and livestock income ranges between 30-40% of household earnings.
The remaining share comes from other sources including employment, businesses and remittances received by the families of AJ&K living abroad.
4.
PLANT RESOURCES OF AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR Azad Kashmir is blessed with rich diversity of forest and other plant resources.
Forests cover 42.6% of the total area of the state [18].
The forest types include alpine, sub alpine, temperate conifer, sub-tropical and scrub (Table.1) [19].
Due to hilly terrains, the vegetation of Azad Kashmir exhibits an altitudinal zonation of plant communities.
4.1 Alpine zone The areas between the elevation of 3600m and 4000 m include alpine grasses and shrubs and are called alpine pastures.
These areas experience very cold climatic conditions during greater part of the year.
The growing season starts from May and ends in September.
The alpine pastures include grasses such as Poa spp, Bistorta affinis, Saxifraga sibrica and herbs like Draba trinervis and Euphorbia kanaorica.
At high altitudes of the Himalayan mountains in the state, due to low temperatures, some dwarf varieties of birch and junipers are found making a shrubby appearance.
The common species are Betula utilis, Rhododendron hypenantbum and Juniperus communis.
Sub-alpine forests have open canopies including evergreen conifers and broadleaved trees.
Betula utilis and Abies spectabilis are the characteristic trees.
Other common species are Viburnum, Salix, and dwarf junipers.
Table1.
Types and area of forests in AJ&K Forest Type/area Main Plant Species Akbar et al., J. mt.
area res.
02 (2017) 37-44 40 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017 (000 acres) Alpine/ Juniperuscommunis, sub-alpine/370.2 Betulautilis Abiesspectabilis Temperate conifer forest/717.3 Blue pine (Pinuswallichiana), Fir (Abiespindrow) and Spruce (Piceasmithiana), Deodar (Cedrusdeodara) with broadleaved associates of Maple, Poplar, Horse Chestnut, Birds Cherry, Walnut, Oak and Birch Sub-tropical pine/290.2 Chir pine (Pinusroxburghii), with broad leaved associate of Oak Scrub forest/23.0 Olea cuspidata, Acacia modesta, Pistaciakhinjuk, Dodonaeaviscosa, 4.2 Temperate Forests The areas between 1500 to 3000 m are occupied by Himalayan temperate forests.
The vegetation of these forests includes dominant species such as Abies pindrow, Aesculus indica, Pinus wallichiana, Salix denticulata, Cedrus deodara, Taxus fuana, Viburnum foetans, Sarcococca saligna, Lonicera quinquelocularis, Achillea millefolium and Buxsus papilosa.
On the lower elevations, plants such as Quercus incana, Pinus roxburghii, Pyrus pashia, Cithara xylumspinosa, Diospyrus lotus are found abundantly.
In the plains of the valleys, deciduous trees such as poplar, maple and vir (willow) are commonly found.
These forests are main source of timber, fuel wood, charcoal and provide wood for construction of houses.
4.3 Subtropical Forests The subtropical forests are abundant on the foot of the hills (below 1500 m) and their vegetation includes Pinus roxburghii as the only dominant pine tree with many broadleaved trees.
The common plants of these forests are Morus alba, Melia azedarach, Dalbergia sissoo, Acacia modesta, Berberis lycium, Punica granatum, Ziziphus nummularia, Viola biflora, Taraxacum officinale and Cynodon dactylon.
These forests exhibit great diversity of plants owing to soil types and weather patterns.
In addition to trees, other groups of plants such as xerophytic bushes, shrubs, wines, ferns and tall grasses are also found commonly [20].
4.4 Herbaceous Flora In addition to trees, Azad Kashmir is rich in herbaceous plants and these have great medicinal values.
There have been some extensive studies on ethnobotany of medicinal plants of different regions of Azad Kashmir and hundreds of medicinal plants have been reported in these studies [2126].
5.
IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON VEGETATION IN AZAD KASHMIR All ecosystems are dependent on climatic factors for their survival and distribution.
The studies of fossils [27] of extinct species and present times [28] prove that climatic variations can have significant effects on the survival and distribution of plant communities [29].
The projected climate change is going to affect the composition and distribution of plant communities [30].
The climatic changes related to the global warming (e.g., higher levels of atmospheric CO2, increased temperatures of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, changes in precipitation, increase in temperatures on regional levels)will have adverse effects on the timing of reproduction of plants, the duration of the growing season, species distributions and population sizes, and the incidence of pest and disease outbreaks.
Mountainous regions in Azad Kashmir, are more prone to negative impacts of climate change and are expected to show its impacts rapidly.
The climate change may impact vegetation of hilly regions by shrinkage of cooler zones at higher altitudes and shifting of tree line to upper elevations [31, 32].
These increases in temperature may bring changes in composition of mountain plant communities by favouring the spread of thermophilous species and decline in the populations of current low-temperature, dominant plant species [33].
Akbar et al., J. mt.
area res.
02 (2017) 37-44 41 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017 Azad Kashmir, being a part of Himalayas is expected to experience a relatively higher rate of temperature increase than the global average (34).
During 1961-2000, in the coniferous forests of Pakistan including AJ&K, a mean temperature increase of 0.56°C to 0.78°C was recorded with a greater increase in minimum temperature over maximum temperature.
The highest increase in temperature was observed during winter and autumn.
Greater increase in minimum temperature and warming of autumn and in sequence the winter may lead to early start and lengthening of growing season of plants [35].
These changes are going to affect the composition of plant assemblages and conservation of plants.
According to a study carried out in the Indian occupied Kashmir, it was found that 35-40% of vegetation types will undergo shifting of their areas in future because of increase in temperature [36].
Out of different forest types, sub-tropical deciduous forests are expected to shift at a higher rate (42-47%) than moist evergreen forests (15%).
Another study investigating the effects of global warming on different biomes of Pakistan, found that three biomes (alpine, grassland/arid woodlands and deserts) will decrease in their area and five biomes (cold conifer/mixed woodland, cold conifer/mixed forests, temperate conifer/mixed forests, warm conifer/mixed forests, and steppe/arid shrub lands) are expected to increase [37].
Due to climate change, grasslands and tropical deciduous forests in the region would be affected on large scale.
Shrubs, temperate evergreen broadleaf forest, and mixed forest types would shift to higher altitudes currently under the snowy mountains regions.
In addition, large tracts of land, presently under the permanent snow and ice cover, would disappear by the end of the century which might reduce stream flows, decrease agriculture productivity and biodiversity in the region [36].
The climate change will also affect the hydrology of the region by enhancing rate of glacial melting.
Initially, increased melting will lead to increased flooding but will deplete the water resources rapidly.
After 2-3 decades, this region may face decreased river flows as glaciers recede in size.
The depletion of fresh water resources will lead to loss of vegetation, crop productivity and loss of biodiversity.
Warm temperatures and shortage of fresh water will also affect the biodiversity of the region by favouring growth of pests, insects and weeds, and invasion of alien species (e. g; Partheniumhysterophorus is found spreading along roads in Azad Kashmir[38].
In summary, the main threats of global warming to plant communities of Azad Kashmir are:  Reduction in productivity of the plant communities,  Changes in floristic composition favouring thermophilous species,  Extinction of species with narrow ecological amplitude,  Increase in pathogens and pest of plants,  Reduction in areas of forests and  Loss of biodiversity including loss of phytoversity [39].
6.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  There is general consensus that climate change will have adverse impacts on conservation of species and ecosystems, at first by causing loss of biodiversity by its direct impacts and secondly, by amplifying the impacts of other anthropogenic activities such as habitat loss, over-exploitation of plant resources, environmental pollution and spread of invasive species.
These factors, acting separately and collectively on flora, fauna and ecosystems, are depleting and will continue to deplete biodiversity.
 Azad Kashmir has very rich floral diversity and valuable forest resources which must be monitored, managed and protected.
 These resources are threatened by direct (effects on the distribution, lifecycles, habitat use, physiology and extinction rates of individual species, effects on the structure and composition of ecosystems and communities)and indirect (increased forest fires, diseases, reduced water flows in rivers, ground water levels, floods)impacts of climate change.
Akbar et al., J. mt.
area res.
02 (2017) 37-44 42 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017  The hilly forests and ecosystems of Azad Kashmir are threatened by climate change because of ever-increasing anthropogenic pressures and their dependence on climaterelated water resources (rain, snowfall).
But these effects will vary between its different regions and are difficult to generalize.
 The current status of the programs and institutions dealing with climate change studies and their management is unsatisfactory.
It needs to be enhancedto deal specifically with current known issues (water availability, weeds, pests) to develop adaptive management strategies.
It should also help in making reliable predictions about future climate change challenges and provide effective solutions for the protection of the floral and vegetation resources of AJ&K.
 Pakistan and Azad Kashmir harbor nearly 6,000 vascular plant species.
Its plant resources will continue to be of vital importance in supporting Azad Kashmir’s sustainable future development by securing its food security and socio-economic stability.
Furthermore, these resources are crucial as a source of medicinal substances and conservation of biodiversity under changing climatic conditions.
 The negative impacts of climate change are multi-dimensional and wide-ranging.
Their mitigation therefore calls for an integrated and coordinated policy response for conservation of plant resources.
These responses will need a complex, and multidimensional approach to save plant diversity from potential threats of climate change.
Since there is a lot of uncertainty in projecting the impacts of climate change, the strategies to formulate adaptation and mitigation responses to climate change will remain unclear.
It shows that conservation of plant diversity in changing climate scenario may Conservation of plant resources of Azad Kashmir therefore, requires new perspectives to traditional conservation practices.
 Due to lack of reliable information and data on the scale of climate change and its impacts, a regular monitoring and observation system should be developed to record and evaluate climatic changes and their potential impacts on biodiversity.
 The plants and their associated ecosystems that are under immediate threat from effects of climate change may be assessed through integrated research to identify characteristics, traits and processes contributing to their vulnerability.
 The forests should be conserved by controlling deforestation and promoting afforestation due to their potential role as carbon sinks.
These forests will also provide renewable and cheap fuel for domestic needs of neighbouring human settlements.
 The paradigm of natural resource management should be shifted from merely conserving current biological resources to managing and supporting the intricate and complex responses of species and ecosystems to climate change; and  Identify potential win-win solutions and encourage cross sectoral knowledge and information sharing and transfer.
References [1] M. McKinnon.
Climate Vulnerability Monitor, 2nd Edition: A Guide to the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet, Estudios Gráfcos Europeos, S.A, Spain, (2012), pp.
331.
[2] H.R.
Gautam, M. L. Bhardwaj, R. Kumar.
Climate change and its impact on plant diseases.
Current Science, 2 (2013) 1685-1691.
[3] IPCC Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
In: Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner GK, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, Xia Y, Bex V, Midgley PM (eds) Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, p. 1535.
(2013) [4] Cramer W-AlberteBondeau, F. Ian Woodward, I. Colin Prentice, Richard A. Betts, Victor Brovkin, Peter M. Cox.
Global response of terrestrial ecosystem structure and function to CO2 and climate change: Results from six dynamic global vegetation models.
Global Change Biology 7 (2001) 357–374.
[5] M. Dickinson, I.C.
Prentice, G.M.
Mace.
Climate change and challenges for conservation.
Grantham Institute Briefing paper No 13.
Imperial College, London.
p.20.
(2015).
[6] P.E.
Hulme.
Adapting to Climate Change: Is There Scope for Ecological Management in the Akbar et al., J. mt.
area res.
02 (2017) 37-44 43 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017 Face of a Global Threat?
J Appl.
Ecol 42 (2005) 784-794.
[7] M. Madzwamuze.
Climate Governance in Africa: Adaptation Strategies and Institutions (A Synthesis Report).
Heinrich Boll Stiftung.
2010 [8] M. Akhtar, N. Ahmad, M.J. Booij.
The impact of climate change on the water resources of Hindukush–Karakorum–Himalaya region under different glacier coverage scenarios.
J. Hydrol, 355(1) (2008) 148-163.
[9] Govt.
of Pakistan (GOP).
Final Report: National Task force on climate change.
(2010) [10] IRGSSA.
Jammu & Kashmir state action plan on climate change.
(2013) [11] Govt.
of Pakistan.
Draft National climate change policy.
Ministry of climate change, Islamabad.
(2011) [12] A.B.Farooqi, A. H. Khan, H. Mir.
Climate change perspective in Pakistan.
Pak.
J. Meteorology 2:3 (2005)11-21.
[13] United Nations Information Centre (UNIC).
Climate Summit Pakistan: Concept Note.
(2014) [14] Chakraborty, S. and Newton, A. C., Climate change, plant diseases and food security: an overview.
Plant Pathol.
60 (2011) 2-14.
[15] S. Pappas.Why Asia's glaciers are mysteriously expanding, not melting.
Live Science Contributor, October 12, 2014.
[16] M. Bahuguna, B. P. Rathore, R. Brahmbhatt, M. Sharma, S.Dhar,S.
S. Randhawa, K. Kumar, S.Romshoo, R. D. Shah, R. K. Ganjo, I.Ajai, Are the Himalayan glaciers retreating?
Current Science, 10 (2014) 1008 6: 7.
[17] A. Ashraf, R.Naz, R. Roohi.
Monitoring and estimation of glacial resource of Azad Jammu and Kashmir using remote sensing and GIS techniques.
Pak.
J. Metorol, 8(16): (2012) 31-41.
[18] P&D, Govt.
of AJ&K.
Azad Jammu & Kashmir at a glance.
(2013) p.109.
[19] S.B.
Bukhari, G.A.
Bajwa.
Climate change trends over coniferous forests of Pakistan.
Pak.
J.
For.
61(2): (2011) 1-14.
[20] M.S.
Mughal, M. Muslim.
Rapid Appraisal vegetation survey ofBhimber District of Azad Jammu &Kashmir.
Pak.
J. Forestry.
60(2): (2010).
23-30.
[21] R.A. Qureshi, M.A.
Ghufran, S.A. Gilani, K. Sultana, M. Ashraf.
Ethnobotanical studies of selected medicinal Plants of Sudhangali and Ganga chotti hills, District Bagh, Azad Kashmir.
Pak.
J. Bot.39:7 (2007) 2275-2283.
[22] M. Muslim.
S. Sikander.
Ethnobotany of medicinal plants of Leepa Valley (Azad Kashmir).Pak.
J. Forestry.
60(2) (2010) 21-30.
[23] A. Mahmood, R.A. Malik, Z.K.
Shinwari, A. Mahmood.
.
Ethnobotanical survey of plants from Neelum Azad Jammu &kashmir.
Pak.
J. Bot, 43 (2011)105-110.
[24] M.A.
Khan, M.A.
Khan, G. Mujtaba, M. Hussain.
Ethnobotanical study about medicinal plants of Poonch Valley Azad Kashmir.
J.Anim.Plant.Scin, 22(2) (2012) 493-500.
[25] A. Bano, M. Ayub, S. Rashid, S. Sultana, H. Sadia.
Ethnobotany and conservation status of floral diversity of Himalayan range of Azad Jammu and Kashmir – Pakistan.
Pak.
J. Bot.
45 (SI), (2013): 243-251.
[26] M. Ajaib, M.Z.
Khan, A. Zikeria.
Ethnobotanical survey of some important herbaceous plants of District Kotli, Azad Jammu &Kashmir.
BIOLOGIA (PAKISTAN), 60 (1) (2014):11-22.
[27] R.J. Morley.
Cretaceous and tertiary climate change and the past distribution of megathermal rainforests.
In Tropical rainforest responses to climatic change.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, p1-34.
(2011).
[28] L. Hughes.
Biological consequences of global warming: is the signal already apparent?
Trends Ecol Evol.
15 (2000):56–61.
[29] A. Suárez, R.T. Watson, D.J.
Dokken.
Climate change and biodiversity.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva p. 34.
(2002).
[30] C. Parmesan, G. Yohe.
A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural systems.
Nature 421 (2003):37–42.
[31] R. Engler, C.F.
Randinw, W.
Thuiller.)
21st century climate change threatens mountain Flora unequally across Europe.
Glob.Chang.
Biol.
17 (2011):2330–2341.
[32] M. GottfriedM, H. Pauli, A. Futschik.
Continentwide response of mountain vegetation to climate change.
Nat Clim Chang, 2(2) (2012):111–115.
[33] S.M.
McMahon, S.P.
Harrison, W.S.
Armbruster.
Improving assessment and modelling of climate changeimpacts on global terrestrial biodiversity.
Trends Ecol Evol 26(5) (2011):249– 259.
[34] M.R.
Bhutiyani, V.S.
Kale, N.J. Pawar.
Long-term trends in maximum, minimum and mean annual air temperatures across the Northwestern Himalaya during the twentieth century.
Clim Chang.
85 (2007) 159–177.
[35] S.B.
Bukhari, G.A.
Bajwa.
Climate change trends over coniferous forests of Pakistan.
Pak.
J.
For.
61(2)(2011).1-14.
[36] I. Rashid, S.A. Romshoo, R.K Chaturvedi, N.H. Ravindranath, R. Sukumar, M. Jayaraman, T.V.
Lakshmi, J. Sharma J.
Projected climate change impacts on vegetation distribution Akbar et al., J. mt.
area res.
02 (2017) 37-44 44 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
2, 2017 over Kashmir Himalayas.
Climate Change.
132, (4)(2015):601-613.
[37] K.M.
Siddiqui, I. Mohammad, M. Ayaz.
Forest ecosystem climate change impact assessment and adaptation strategies for Pakistan.
Climate Research.
12 (1999):195-203.
[38] A. Shabbir, R. Bajwa.
Parthenium weed: An emerging threat to agriculture Parthenium News 2 (2007):1-4.
[39] R.A. Qureshi, M.A.
Ghufran, S.A. Gilani, K. Sultana, M. Ashraf.
Ethnobotanical studies of selected medicinal Plants of Sudhangali and Ganga chotti hills, District Bagh, Azad Kashmir.
Pak.
J.
Bot., 39(7)(2007):2275-2283.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?
The International Indigenous Policy Journal Volume 9 Issue 3 Special Issue: Indigenous Peoples, Climate Change, and Environmental Stewardship Article 6 July 2018 What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?
John G. Hansen University of Saskatchewan, john.hansen@usask.ca Rose Antsanen University of Saskatchewan, roa353@campus.usask.ca Recommended Citation Hansen, J. G. , Antsanen, R. (2018).
What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 9(3).
DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?
Abstract Many Indigenous communities living on traditional lands have not contributed significantly to harmful climate change.
Yet, they are the most likely to be impacted by climate change.
This article discusses environmental stewardship in relation to Indigenous experiences and worldviews.
Indigenous knowledge teaches us about environmental stewardship.
It speaks of reducing the severity of climate change and of continued sustainable development.
The methodology that directs this research is premised on the notion that the wisdom of the Elders holds much significance for addressing the harmful impacts of climate change in the present day.
This article's fundamental assumption is that Indigenous knowledge offers practical and theoretical recommendations to current approaches to human activity and environmental issues.
We share findings from interviews with Cree Elders who discussed their worldviews and knowledge systems.
Findings revealed that Indigenous knowledge offers a philosophy and practice that serve to reduce the severity of climate change.
Keywords Indigenous knowledge, Elders, traditional teachings, land-based education, climate change, environmental stewardship Acknowledgments To the Elders of the Swampy Cree Territory of Northern Manitoba.
Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?
Many people around the world have become materialistic and money orientated.
However, a Cree worldview teaches us that the resources of the world are gifts from Manitou (The Creator) and that we must respect these gifts (Antsanen & Hansen, 2012; Champagne, 2015; Ermine, 1995; Hansen & Calihoo, 2014; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada [TRC], 2015).
Indigenous knowledge has sustained Indigenous lands for thousands of years, and it promotes values that compel people to have a reciprocal relationship with the environment.
Such a reciprocal relationship with the natural world challenges the prevailing overexploitation of resources.
The purpose of the article is to discuss the knowledge of Cree Elders indigenous to Northern Manitoba as it relates to climate change.
More specifically, we will discuss the worldview of Cree Elders from Northern Manitoba in order to avoid presenting a homogenous Indigenous worldview.
The major postulation of this study is that Indigenous Peoples have crucial traditional knowledge, important values, and culture, which provide a model for environmental stewardship that can serve to reduce the severity of climate change.
Relevant Literature The literature on climate change and Indigenous people is both cultural and traditional.
Indigenous people are perceived as the "stewards of the land."
The West colonizes, develops, progresses, modernizes.
The Indigenous world resists colonization and assimilation.
Instead of embracing colonization, some Indigenous communities attempted to retain their social and cultural way of life (Adams, 2000; Antsanen, 2014; Blaut, 1993; Champagne, 2015; Hansen & Antsanen, 2015).
Many Elders have stressed the importance of maintaining Indigenous culture and knowledge, and they advocate for the reproduction of Indigenous culture and values.
This resistance to colonialism has been a major factor in the preservation of traditional Indigenous knowledge and culture (Antsanen, 2014; Champagne, 2015; Hall et al., 2015; Hansen, 2015; Michell & Akienhead, 2008).
Harmful climate change has become a crucial issue.
With the increased intensity of storms and natural disasters, and in the midst of intensified droughts, the Indigenous world is now actively inserting itself very firmly in climate change consciousness (Hansen, 2015; Ishaya & Abaje, 2008; Michell & Akienhead, 2008).
Indigenous knowledge, in its relation to an Indigenous worldview, provides us with a model for environmental stewardship in order to reduce the severity of climate change.
Ishaya and Abaje (2008) observe that Indigenous Peoples “are vital and active parts of many ecosystems may help to enhance the resilience of these ecosystems.
Their livelihoods depend on natural resources that are directly affected by climate change” (pp.
137-138).
Indigenous knowledge is considered a major factor in challenging climate change even though some parts of Indigenous knowledge have been eroded or lost through colonization.
However, its most basic tenets remain in existence, and so the knowledge as a whole has not been wiped out or destroyed by colonization.
Although there are many distinctions between Indigenous nations and their epistemological systems, there are also significant similarities such as the respect for the Elders and the land (Antsanen, 2014; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Cajete, 1994; Charlton & Hansen, 2016; Charlton & Hansen, 2017; Ermine, 1995; Hansen, 2009).
Indigenous communities and their cultures recognize that the Elders are knowledge keepers (Champagne, 2015; Hansen & Antsanen, 2015; TRC, 2015).
The old Cree people 1 Hansen and Antsanen: Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Stewardship Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 teach the importance of environmental stewardship through respect for the land, water, animals, and plants.
Articulate How and Why Indigenous Knowledge and Culture Can Address Climate Change Indigenous knowledge has much to offer for changing human activity and promoting environmental stewardship.
Yet, the approach often used by government and industry is to compensate Indigenous Peoples for damage to their lands and resources as a result of economic activity.
Compensating, in part for the exploitation of the natural world, is counter to Indigenous culture, values, and ideas, consisting of traditional teachings, reciprocity, relationships with nature, spirituality, and so on.
It could be argued that nothing could completely compensate Indigenous Peoples for damage to lands and resources, so the exploitation of the Indigenous world should not be excused.
As Furgal and Seguin (2006) noted, “all over the world, including across Canada, Indigenous and local peoples have noted recent changes in weather patterns and have observed their effects on species’ life cycles, productivity and interrelationships” (p.180).
Such changes in weather patterns are noticed by Indigenous communities, which have also experienced a disproportionate amount of hazardous dumping in or near the communities they live; it is, in other words, environmental racism, “the idea that non-whites are disproportionately exposed to pollution” (Pulido, 2000, p. 532).
Champagne (2015) concurred that during “the 1960s many environmental activists and scholars became aware that a disproportionate amount of waste, poor water and bad air were found in minority and poor communities” (p.100).
These environmental hazards have harmed Indigenous communities.
As Wright and White (2012) advised, “the development of oil and gas resources can also lead to economic inequality, inflation, social upheaval, displacement, housing shortages, social tensions, loss of traditional lifestyles, and significant environmental damage” (p. 1).
However, Indigenous knowledge holds hope and optimism for coping with loss and may even be much needed in the struggle to reduce the severity of climate change.
The response of Indigenous Peoples to the harmful effects of climate change is perhaps the primary display of Indigenous people’s connection with the environment.
Ishaya and Abaje (2008) noted that Indigenous Peoples tend to “interpret and react to climate change impacts in creative ways, drawing on traditional knowledge as well as new technologies to find solutions, which may help society at large to cope with the impending changes” (pp.137-138).
Although Indigenous societies did not contribute much to climate change, they are impacted by it immensely (Green & Raygorodetsky, 2010; Wright & White, 2012).
According to Green and Raygorodetsky (2010), “Indigenous people living on their traditional lands bear little responsibility for current and future projected consequences of a changing climate.
Despite this, they are likely to suffer the most from direct and indirect climate change due to their close connection to the natural world and their reduced social–ecological resilience—consequence of centuries of oppressive policies imposed on them by dominant non-Indigenous societies” (p. 239).
Although Indigenous people have been exploited in many parts of the world, they must be credited for adapting to forced changes brought on by colonization and using these adaptations to develop resiliency against harmful and destructive climate change.
2 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
6 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/6 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 Worldview In colonial societies, the West exploited the Indigenous world: Indigenous people, their lands and resources.
However, Indigenous knowledge is now receiving significant attention as a result of climate change, and, in this context, they are receiving recognition as stewards of the land (Champagne, 2015; Ermine, 1995; Hansen & Antsanen, 2016).
Yet, even when a peoples’ culture and worldviews are oppressed, there are still other ways of interpreting the world.
Champagne (2015) noted that the “worldview of Indigenous peoples includes relations with plants, animals, and cosmic powers of the universe” (p. 127).
Such worldviews compel people to respect human and non-human life, including the land, plants, and water.
Champagne (2015) wrote: “Traditional worldviews do not see tribal governments or nations of humans as the central force or beings of the universe, but as beings who share the universe with other powers and nations of human and non-human beings” (p. 127).
Therefore, Indigenous worldviews teach that humans are not above nature.
Instead, they see themselves (humankind) as a humble part of nature.
Indigenous languages are significant to Indigenous knowledges because they embody crucial understanding of worldviews, cultures, and identities.
Cajete (1994) has discussed the connection between language and spirituality: Language is an expression of the spirit because it contains the power to move people and to express human thought and feeling.
It is also the breath along with water and thought that connects all living things in direct relationship.
(p.42).
In the language of the Cree, Ininew was the original name for the people, but that name was changed to “Cree” by the colonizers.
Smith (1999) observed that reclaiming language and naming the world in accordance with Indigenous languages is important for decolonization.
Naming “is about retaining as much control over meanings as possible .
.
.
[by naming the world] .
.
.
people name their realities” (p. 30).
Smith (1999) has discussed the significance of decolonization as it relates to recovering Indigenous interpretations of the past and centering Indigenous worldviews.
She wrote, “part of this exercise is about recovering our own stories of the past .
.
.
centering our concerns and worldviews and then coming to know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own purposes” (p. 39).
Ermine (1995) has discussed the Cree worldview as a basis for holism; he noted that for the Cree, the “fundamental insight was that existence was all connected and that the whole enmeshed the being in its inclusiveness” (p. 103).
Ermine further explained that negative effects occur when we fail to look at things holistically: “We see the wretchedness and world despair that Western science has produced based on this fragmentary worldview” (pp.
102-103).
Herman (2015) concurs that colonization has functioned to reduce Indigenous ways of knowing to caricatures and gross distortions.
Spiritual ceremonies long considered the main avenues for developing and reinforcing our worldview and passing on our Indigenous knowledge systems, were legally banned in Canada .
.
.
Early colonizers and priests often made a mockery of Indigenous ways of knowing and being which led people to begin questioning their own healers and spiritual leaders (Michell, 2015, p. 90).
However, in terms of reconnecting with traditional teachings, Cajete (1994) noted that the idea of “breath—consciously formed and activated through language, thought, prayer, chanting, ritual, dance, 3 Hansen and Antsanen: Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Stewardship Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 sport, work, story, play, and art—comprised the parameters of communication in Tribal education” (p. 43).
We would have to see that Indigenous people valued the spiritual power of spoken words in the sense that words can help one heal.
An important concept that Elders often emphasize is the value of reciprocity.
It is important to be reciprocal in our relationships with the land and the natural world.
As Cajete (1994) advised, “thinking the highest thought means thinking of one’s self, one’s community, and one’s environment richly” (p. 46).
Thinking the highest thought also includes thinking of the environment because without a healthy environment there cannot be a healthy community.
For Indigenous people the land is paramount, and this cultural significance is reflected in the notion of Indigenous people’s deep-rooted connection to the land (Antsanen, 2014; Cajete, 1994; Champagne, 2015; Ermine, 1995; Wotherspoon & Hansen, 2013).
What these cultures have done, however, is to forge through time and ritual a relationship to the earth that is based not only of deep attachment to the land but also on far more subtle intuition—the idea that the land itself is breathed into being by human consciousness.
Mountain, rivers, and forest are not only perceived as being inanimate, as mere props on a stage upon which the human drama unfolds.
For these societies, the land is alive, dynamic force to be embraced and transformed by the human imagination (Davis, 2009, pp.
123-124).
The old people teach us that the land is alive, and that it is important to respect the land that sustains us.
As Michell (2005) noted, “it is often said the earth feels the pull of her hair when plants are picked.
Strict protocols are used to ensure ethical conduct and reforestation of balance” (p. 6).
Therefore, Indigenous environmental stewardship is holistically interrelated with cultural, environmental, and social ways of life.
The Elders The search for knowledge in the Indigenous world necessitates visiting the old people and listening to their words.
How were Elders selected?
The Elders were selected due to the development of a relationship between the researcher and the Elders that spanned many years.
These Elders had been instrumental in teaching the researcher valuable lessons about life; in particular, Sylvia Hansen who is the first teacher and mother of the researcher (John Hansen).
We wish to express deep thanks to the Elders: Stella Neff, Sylvia Hansen, John Martin, William G. Lathlin, Dennis Thorne, and Jack (pseudonym) for participating in this study.
Since the researcher developed a personal relationship with the Elders while living in the North, they were selected to participate in this study.
Method This study applies qualitative research methods.
Creswell (1998) instructed that qualitative research is appropriate when the research question asks how (p. 17).
In this research, the Elders were asked how they see the world.
As Creswell (1998) goes on to say, in qualitative research, “the researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting” (p. 15).
This study also utilized Indigenous research methodologies.
As with many other Indigenous cultures, the Cree have a custom to respect the Elders and often turn to them in the 4 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
6 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/6 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 search for knowledge (Ermine, 1995; Hansen, 2013).
In this study to ensure the interviews were culturally appropriate and followed Indigenous protocols, the Elders were offered tobacco, sweetgrass, coffee, and a meal.
These offerings acknowledge the Elders for sharing their knowledge and is a reflection of the cultural value of reciprocity.
Data Collection and Analysis Data was collected through open-ended interviewing, field notes, and general observations.
The aim of the research was explained to the Elders before they were interviewed.
The interviews were done at a time and place chosen by the Elders, which enabled the Elders to express their perspectives and knowledge.
The interviews were audio recorded.
The researcher (the first author) transcribed the interviews in order to develop a solid understanding of the data.
The collected data were analyzed for themes from which we drew conclusions.
This study was approved by the Research and Ethics Board at the University of Regina.
The Elders Views of the World When asked, “In your view, are there differences in your way of life and the way you see the world as compared to mainstream Canada?,” John replied: Yes, we know that the way we see ourselves as a Native person or an Aboriginal person is that there are two laws, the law of nature with the creator and the law of manmade.
Anything that has to do with nature we know we have to be careful in how we conduct ourselves, how we treat people, anything like that in how we treat it .
.
.
You see in life, in our way, which we are as a person, I am a Cree they say, but for me the word Cree doesn’t mean anything to me.
Being Inninew, I am a four directions person.
That’s what it means, Inninew it means four, I have my mind, my body, and also I have a spiritual being, I have feelings.
(John) This response by John illustrates the way he perceives himself and understands the world is reflected in the language of the Inninew (Cree people).
The word for a Cree person, Inninew, connotes much deeper understanding than the Anglo term Aboriginal.
In conceptualizing his Cree identity, John defines the term Inninew, as “a four directions person.” The language of the Omushkegowuk1 people, therefore, provides valuable conceptualizations into our worldview.
Inninew is, in other words, an interpretation of holism and identity from an Indigenous point of view.
Much like John, Stella responded to the opening question in accordance with a worldview difference.
She states: 1 The Omushkegowuk are known as the Swampy Cree (Omushkegowuk means “people of the muskeg”).
They are the section of the Cree people who live in swampy areas throughout northern Ontario and northern Manitoba (along James Bay and Hudson’s Bay).
They speak the n-dialect of the Cree language and the Omushkegowuk people are also called Inninew, which means “the people.” The study took place on Opaskwayak territory, which is an Omushkegowuk, Swampy Cree community some 600 highway kilometers northwest of Winnipeg near the Saskatchewan border.
5 Hansen and Antsanen: Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Stewardship Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Yes there are definite differences in my way of life especially in my past way of life and the way I look at the place where I lived which was Mosakahiken Grand Rapids very different in the way I was raised because up until my teenage years there was no highway into Grand Rapids, there was no hydro damn and there was no RCMP and no nursing station.
People relied on their own systems for nursing and for justice and also for living because there was only one little store that had the supplies.
As soon as Manitoba Hydro brought in the road they built the beer parlor and brought liquor into the community.
And as soon as the beer parlor came in, the police came in, and the nursing station was built and that was the beginning of the sickness of the people in Grand Rapids and also the destruction of the way of life that the people had.
We had no electricity but life was better, we had no plumbing, but life was better, and we had no TV, no radio, but we still, I still say that life was better for us as Cree people because we didn’t rely on the stores that we do now and the TV for entertainment and all the other things that Manitoba Hydro brought into the community .
.
.
I see my world especially Grand Rapids my land differently.
When people think of housing they think this is my house.
Well I think of all the trapping areas, the sacred areas, all the areas that are sacred to me just like it is part of my house, and I look after it because that’s the way it is supposed to be for us to look after the land because it has sustained us for thousands of years .
.
.
I look at my land at our land differently compared to the people that moved in there and just think about logging and cutting down trees and flooding.
They have flooded the rest of the area and now they are coming in and just totally cutting down all the trees and just destroying the land destroying the wildlife and I feel very protective of the land and yet I feel so very helpless.
(Stella) Stella indicates that the land holds sacred purpose and meaning, but that the exploitation of the natural world brings sickness to the people.
Certain places where the land and wildlife were destroyed are no longer in existence.
Stella feels very protective of the land, which shows respect for the gifts.
For Stella, life was better before modernization, and the exploitation of the land is very much connected to emotional attachment.
Stella states, “I feel so very helpless,” which is indication of Indigenous people’s marginalization.
However, Sylvia’s response to the question is seemingly indirect probably because she interpreted the question in the context of differences in the Western education system in the past and the present.
Sylvia states: Well, when I was in the boarding school those schools were so different than compared to the schools now.
It was pretty strict but, at the same time the kids were more behaved, there behavior was much better than the ones I see now .
.
.
[pause] .
.
.
But that was the same thing in the day schools, on the reserve they were the same kind, like my father he had a teacher her name was Mrs. Macmillan, at the Big Eddy day school.
And that teacher would go to church and if she sees that one of the children was not there she would ask them the next day on Monday why they were not there in church.
That’s how; I guess she was a very strict that way.
(Sylvia) Sylvia’s response demonstrates the ways in which Indigenous worldviews were colonized by the Church and government run residential schools.
Sylvia state later that: 6 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
6 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/6 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 .
.
.
there used to be lots of old people who would talk to young people and tell them to .
.
.
They used to advise kids about things .
.
.
A lot of the old people at that time used to tell the girls to watch for themselves at that time so that they don’t get in trouble like to go and get pregnant.
Those people used to tell that to the kids.
But that’s the same thing with the boys, they were told to behave.
(Sylvia) Sylvia’s statement reflects the culture of the Cree in the sense that the Elders’ guided younger people into the realm of knowledge and passed on the values and traditional teachings.
Similarly, William responded to the question by stating: There are many differences in my language, the food that I eat the preparation of my food and those have an impact on my health right now because I sort of changed my ways.
Rather than preparing my own food I buy it at the store.
In the old way, to me, it was the best way to prepare the food.
Those kinds of things and also the home life are kind of different too.
Like before there were harmony and peace and all of that growing up as a child and now there is not that with my kids.
I don’t have the communication that’s supposed to be there with my children because I lost that somewhere.
And that’s one of the basic teachings of our people is to be able to communicate with yourself and your surroundings and everything in your environment actually.
And that I guess is the way of life that is our culture.
To me, culture is the way you live it’s not just your language, your music, food and all that, it’s the way you live.
And that’s something that has slowly been eroded by what’s been going on in today’s society.
The education system and I guess the colonial things that came with it.
When they said that our language was no good, and what we did and the way we speak was no good, and the English language was the best.
And that’s something that I’ve found to be in conflict with me as a person.
(William) William expresses his worldview in which one must show respect for the gift of resources from the environment, particularly the food it provides, and he speaks of environmental stewardship: gather your food, prepare it, know it, and appreciate it.
Similarly, Dennis tell us that environmental stewardship is part of the teachings from the Creator: .
.
.
When the Creator first put the Indigenous people on this Earth no matter what nation or what country they were given laws to live by.
According to the Cree and the First Nations in Canada they were given a way of life they were given instructions on how to live they were given responsibilities on how to look after the land, the animals, and the water.
You may hear some Elders say that they were stewards of the land.
What they mean is they made an agreement with the animals a long time ago.
In the time when they could communicate with the animals they spoke the same language and the animals said that they would give their lives to us to eat if we respected them and looked after them.
To give something back, the first hunt the first kill, whether it was animals or fish, the four legged to give something back in order to respect the life that they gave.
(Dennis) This statement by Dennis refers to environmental stewardship: "they were given laws to live by" is a reference to taking care of the land, the animals, and the environment.
Dennis points out the responsibility to "look after the land, the animals, and the water," and he also illustrates the value of reciprocity.
As Dennis explains, the animals “give their lives to us to eat if we respected them and looked 7 Hansen and Antsanen: Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Stewardship Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 after them.” For Dennis, the animal offers itself so that the people can live, and that humans must respect and nurture the gift.
Dennis states later: Today is a big issue about environment.
There wasn’t from our thinking that the environment turned out the way it did.
It was from another way of looking at life and other worldview that is not ours so today we all have to suffer.
And if we take another look at our laws I think we can help them understand that our laws are not based on greed .
.
.
Ours is based on good health, help, understanding and happiness.
Our laws are for those four things only, for the survival of the people, for the survival of medicines, the survival of animals, the winged ones.
So these laws are not only to protect the Earth, but all humans all life.
(Dennis) Within the context of environmental stewardship, Dennis explains that we must continue to respect the gifts of the Creator.
If we do not respect the gifts, as Dennis puts it, "we all have to suffer."
Therefore, respect for the land is a theme that emerges in their conceptions of worldview.
Dennis states: Natural laws travel in a circle or a cycle.
When you put out something it’s gonna come back whether it’s positive or negative.
You put out a positive that’s what will come back, you put out a negative that’s what will come back, either to you, your family or intergenerational, the effect will come back.
It will keep going unless you restore it to balance and harmony in a good way.
We had ceremonies to put an end to a negative cycle whether it was grieving or conflict, whether it was between families, individuals, between communities or between nations.
We had a way of restoring balance and harmony and the pipe was used to restore peace and harmony.
(Dennis) Dennis expresses that the cycles and patterns in nature function in harmony with environmental stewardship.
You should not exploit the land because it is negative and, by instilling negative relations, it comes back as negative effects, which can be interpreted as harmful climate change as a result of negative human activity that does not respect the gifts.
When asked, “Is there a connection to the land in terms of peacemaking methods?” John responded: Well that's part of it.
They say the natural law is how you understand my culture, land, and language.
And our young people, having their own minds developing and to develop the mind, we need to know this is the way we have to do it.
And we have to use our own ways, our mind that comes from the spirit, the spirit world, the Creator, the clans, the four directions, that’s the way we have to develop that understanding.
(John) This passage illustrates that John draws a connection between culture and language, and between the mind and the spirit.
The connection is holism.
Such a connection reflects the importance of Indigenous spirituality.
Thus, there is a spiritual connection to the land and harmonizes with environmental stewardship.
In her response to the same question, Stella explains: When you’re so dependent on the land like we were then the land had to be a part of every decision because that’s what sustained us, so protecting the land and protecting the hunting areas, the trapping areas, and all of the water areas, it had to be above all protected from any damage.
So I think that if there was any conflict in these areas it was considered very serious, especially if there was any kind of environmental damage done by the wrongdoer and I am 8 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
6 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/6 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 specifically thinking about setting fire or things like that could destroy so much land and sometimes they talk about it where they are just as some people on an island my brother went there for three or four days on an island because he was drinking too much and so my father just dropped them off there.
So that was something he could think about for a few days later but he never forgot that experience, he never forgets it because he saw himself there when you start getting hungry and when you start seeing visions and when you start seeing himself he became scared and so that’s one lesson we used to go and see visions.
(Stella) In Stella’s answer, it is interesting to observe the spiritual connection to the land, which is reflected in Cree traditional practices that sought the vision quest, which helps us find purpose and meaning in life.
Thus, the land was used for teaching values for life.
In his response to the question, William stresses the connection to the land and feelings of peace.
There has to be that connection because if there isn’t, to me, then it’s all hostile.
There is no peace, if you go out into the bush by yourself it is so peaceful, and you can hear the bugs on the floor or on the grass and the trees.
(William) William’s response emphasizes the importance of the land and as the traditional way of life upon which our society was structured.
It appears to me that the Elders demonstrate the significance of maintaining a reciprocal relationship with the land.
Summary of the Elders’ Worldview In the context of worldview, the Elders identified factors that promote Indigenous knowledge as well as factors that obstruct Indigenous knowledge (Table 1).
The themes are summarized in Table 2.
Table 1.
Factors Affecting Indigenous Knowledge by Participant Participant Promote Indigenous Knowledge Obstruct Indigenous Knowledge Stella Neff Elders teachings, ceremonies, vision quest, connection to the land, stories, counseling from the old people Disconnection from the land, residential school experience Sylvia Hansen Elders teachings, spirituality Residential school experience John Martin Language, spirituality, connection to the land, ceremonies, sweat lodge, healing circles, vision quest, the old people, Mainstream justice system, exclusion of spirituality in the courts, exclusion of community in the justice process William Lathlin Elders, connection to the land, language, ceremonies Disconnection from the land Dennis Thorne Traditional teachings, ceremonies, sweat lodge Erosion or loss of traditional knowledge 9 Hansen and Antsanen: Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Stewardship Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Table 2.
Identifying the Themes in the Worldview Factors That Promote Indigenous Knowledge Factors That Obstruct Indigenous Knowledge Traditional teachings Ceremonies (sweat lodge, vision quests) Spiritual connection to the land Disconnection from the land Residential school experience Discussion Contextualize the Interviews with the Elders What Does Climate Change Look Like From Their Personal, Cultural, and Geographic Perspective?
The Elders had a consciousness rooted in traditional knowledge that harmonizes with efforts to challenge harmful climate change.
The Elders said that the traditional teachings they have experienced or witnessed in their time are primarily concerned with respecting the environment and teaching appropriate conduct in order to promote respect for the natural world.
However, the Elders expressed that Western colonialism had changed relationships in their communities and with the natural world.
The Elders expressed that colonial education, that is, residential schools, were instrumental in shaping negative perceptions of Indigenous identity and culture that weakened the people.
The Old One’s expressed that restoring Indigenous knowledge would play an important role in healing the people from colonialism.
The thematic healing factors identified by the participants were, traditional teachings, Indigenous knowledge, the value of reciprocity and a spiritual connection to the land.
The Elders tend to think holistically in terms of their worldviews on environmental stewardship.
The notion that Indigenous worldviews are holistic is reflected in the Elders responses including the need to perpetuate Indigenous knowledge.
In the problem that concerns us most, that of reducing the severity of climate change, the teachings put forward by the Elders are in harmony with Indigenous knowledge reflecting the stewards of the land theory.
We have discussed some of the cultural reasons why Elders remain committed to reproducing Indigenous knowledge as valuable teachings for protecting the environment.
Conclusions This study discussed Indigenous knowledge as a model that can teach lessons for environmental stewardship in a Cree context.
In recent years, there has been an outpouring of research that strongly encourage changing our approach to human activity in order to reduce the severity of climate change.
Upholding the Indigenous stewards of the land theory in the Cree context, we have discussed the Elders’ worldviews as it relates to the environment, the effects of colonialism, and the importance of Indigenous knowledge to the well-being of people and the environment.
New stories (or revised forms of old 10 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
6 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/6 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 stories) are put forward about the reasons for or significance of traditional Indigenous knowledge and there are discussed in relation to environmental stewardship.
The Cree Elders provided teachings that promote respect for the environment.
Recommendations This study recommends enhancing and supporting Indigenous knowledge in the public schools, community colleges, and universities in Canada and in other countries around the world.
Integrating Indigenous knowledge into schools will contribute to conscious awareness of the reality that Indigenous knowledge supports sustainable development, with the implication that the land is to be protected and preserved for future generations.
Therefore, it is our hope that integrating Indigenous knowledge into schools and teaching the issue of climate change and environmental stewardship in schools will serve to improve environmental practices in Canada and other parts of the world.
Indigenous knowledge needs to be incorporated into training programs related to disaster planning, land-use development, environmental preservation, and strategies for sustainable development.
Indigenous knowledge holders are dedicated to raising awareness about climate change because without social change harmful climate effects will continue to develop to the detriment of all people throughout the world.
11 Hansen and Antsanen: Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Stewardship Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 References Adams, H. (2000).
Challenging Eurocentric history.
In R. Laliberte, P. Setteee, J. Waldram, R. Innes, B. Macdougall, L. McBain, & F. L. Barron (Eds.
), Expressions in Canadian Native studies (pp.
4053).
Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Press.
Aikenhead, G. S., & Michell, H. (2011).
Bridging cultures: Indigenous and scientific ways of knowing nature.
Toronto: Pearson Education Canada.
Antsanen, R. (2014).
A Dene manifestation of education for social justice.
In J. G. Hansen (Ed.
), Exploring Indigenous social justice (Chapter 6).
Vernon: J. Charlton Publishing Ltd. Antsanen, R., & Hansen, J. G. (2012).
Stories of culture and justice in the North.
In S. Matheson & J. Butler (Eds.
), The fictional North: Ten discussions of stereotypes and icons above the 53rd parallel (pp.
7-16).
Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Blaut, J. M. (1993).
The colonizer's model of the world: Geographical diffusionism and Eurocentric history.
New York: The Guilford Press.
Cajete, G. (1994).
Look to the mountain: An ecology of Indigenous education.
Colorado: Kivaki Press.
Champagne, D. (2015).
Indigenous nations within modern nation states.
Vernon, BC: J Charlton Publishing Ltd. Charlton, J., & Hansen, J. G. (2016) Visualizing Indigenous perspectives of how the Saskatoon Community Arts Program (SCYAP) addresses social exclusion.
The Annual Review of Interdisciplinary Justice Research, 5, 394-421.
Charlton, J. E. & Hansen, J. G. (2017).
How does Indigenous knowledge enhance alcohol and substance abuse recovery programs.
The Quint: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly from the North, 9(4), 208256.
Creswell, J. W. (1998).
Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions.
Newbery Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Davis, W. (2009).
The wayfinders: Why ancient wisdom matters in the modern world.
Toronto: Anansi Press.
Ermine, W. (1995).
Aboriginal epistemology.
In M. Battiste & J. Barman (Eds.
), First Nations education in Canada: The circle unfolds.
Vancouver: UBC Press Furgal, C., & Seguin, J.
(2006).
Climate change, health, and vulnerability in Canadian northern Aboriginal communities.
Environmental Health Perspectives, 114(12), 1964. doi: https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.8433 Green, D., & Raygorodetsky, G. (2010).
Indigenous knowledge of a changing climate.
Climatic Change, 100(2), 239-242. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9804-y 12 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
6 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/6 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 Hall, L., Dell, C. A., Fornssler, B., Hopkins, C., Mushquash, C., & Rowan, M. (2015).
Research as cultural renewal: Applying two-eyed seeing in a research project about cultural interventions in First Nations addictions treatment.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 6(2).
doi: https://doi.org/10.18584/iipj.2015.6.2.4 Hansen, J. G (2009).
Cree restorative justice: From the ancient to the present.
Vernon: J Charlton Publishing.
Hansen, J. G. (2013).
Swampy Cree justice: Researching the ways of the people (2nd ed.).
Vernon: J Charlton Publishing.
Hansen, J. G. (2015).
Decolonizing Indigenous histories and justice.
Nationalisms Across the Globe, 16, 15-30.
Hansen, J. G., & Antsanen, R. (2015).
Urban Indigenous people: Stories of healing in the city.
Vernon: J Charlton Publishing.
Hansen, J. G., & Antsanen, R. (2016).
Elders' teachings about resilience and its implications for education in Dene and Cree communities.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 7(1).
doi: https://doi.org/10.18584/iipj.2016.7.1.2 Hansen J. G., & Calihoo, N. (2014).
How the urban Aboriginal community members and clients of the Friendship Centre in Saskatoon understand addictions recovery.
Aboriginal Policy Studies, 3(12), 88-111. doi: https://doi.org/10.5663/aps.v3i1-2.21702 Ishaya, S., & Abaje, I.
B.
(2008).
Indigenous People's perception on climate change and adaptation strategies in Jema'a local government area of Kaduna State, Nigeria.
Journal of Geography and Regional Planning, 1(8), 138-143.
Michell, H. (2005).
Nehithawak of Reindeer Lake, Canada: Worldview, epistemology and relationship with the natural world.
The Australian Journal of Indigenous Education, 34, 33-43. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/s132601110000394x Michell, H. (2015).
Shattered spirits in the land of the little sticks: Contextualizing the impact of residential school among the Woodland Cree.
Vernon, BC: Charlton Publishing.
Michell, H., & Akienhead, G. (2008).
Bridging cultures: Indigenous-based science perspective in Saskatchewan First Nation and Métis community context.
University of Saskatchewan: Aboriginal Research Centre.
Pulido, L. (2000).
Rethinking environmental racism: White privilege and urban development in Southern California.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 90(1), 12-40. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/0004-5608.00182 Smith, L. T. (1999).
Decolonizing methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples.
New York: New Zed.
13 Hansen and Antsanen: Indigenous Knowledge and Environmental Stewardship Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC).
(2015).
Honouring the truth, reconciling for the future.
Summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada.
Retrieved from http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Honouring_the_ Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_July_23_2015.pdf Wotherspoon, T., & Hansen, J. G. (2013).
The "Idle No More" movement: Paradoxes of First Nations inclusion in the Canadian context.
Social Inclusion, 1(1), 21–36.
doi: https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v1i1.107 Wright, L., & White, J. P. (2012).
Developing oil and gas resources on or near Indigenous lands in Canada: An overview of laws, treaties, regulations and agreements.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 3(2).
doi: https://doi.org/10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.5 14 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
6 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/6 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.6 The International Indigenous Policy Journal July 2018 What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?
John G. Hansen Rose Antsanen Recommended Citation What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?
Abstract Keywords Acknowledgments Creative Commons License What Can Traditional Indigenous Knowledge Teach Us About Changing Our Approach to Human Activity and Environmental Stewardship in Order to Reduce the Severity of Climate Change?
O LEGADO DE PAULO FREIRE PARA AS POLÍTICAS DE CURRÍCULO E PARA O TRABALHO DOCENTE, NO BRASIL TO CITE THIS ARTICLE PLEASE INCLUDE ALL OF THE FOLLOWING DETAILS: Cole, Peter (2016).
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices.
Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci <access date> Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices1 Peter Cole University of British Columbia, Canada2 Before the triumph of modernity – sealed in Western Europe of the seventeenth century by the advent of the scientific revolution – people lived in constant interaction with a host of beings, powers, spirits who tricked us, protected us, quarreled with us, guided us, taught us, punished us, and conversed with us.
We were wealthy in our human and other-than-human communities.
(Apffel-Marglin, 2011) The only kinds of knowledge that are taken seriously by the Euro-American academy are those that conform to its own particular formats of writing, citation, and history.
(Jazeel & McFarlane, 2007) prologue —please note that I have written this article in a narrative format without following punctuation or other conventional grammatical syntactic orthographic and linguistic standards of western academic prose this is how I reflect the orality of my St’át’imc culture and how I think feel speak write as an Indigenous scholar I have written the majority of my academic work using this format _____________________ what are the tasks of curriculum scholars for the 21st century?
this was the theme posed for the 5th IAACS (International Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies) Triennial Conference held in Ottawa Canada in May 2015 I pause and ask what are our tasks and responsibilities as curriculum scholars in addressing the ecological crisis facing life on the planet?
is there any possibility for post-imperialist post-development post-progress education in the prevailing schooling systems that are grounded in Euro-centric anthropocentric neoliberal knowledge systems?
how might traditional ecological knowings of Indigenous Peoples worldwide contribute to holistic education that values human non-human and more-than-human intelligences and agencies?
I consider these questions with my partner and research collaborator pat o'riley with my St’át’imc relatives and research partners from the interior plateau of British Columbia (BC) Canada with my ancestors and those-to-come we push our canoe into the muddied effluence of the progress narrative of schooling and its associated modern postmodern and other post-xxx curriculum theorizing we enter the curriculum conversation back eddies and whitewater at the outside bend in the river of mindbodyheartspirit traverse the Cartesian-Newtonian turbulence that privileges reason we sing laugh cry paddle paddle paddle whoooosh Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 4 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci there is a growing realization that addressing the global ecological crisis requires widening the circle of knowledges by bringing the rational knowledge of scientific empiricism together with other knowledge systems including Indigenous traditional ecological knowledges (Apffel-Marglin, 2011) Wade Davis (2009) discusses the critical importance of the vast archive of Indigenous wisdom in addressing current ecological challenges while the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2104) recognizes the value of Indigenous knowledges for the mitigation of climate change meanwhile Indigenous Peoples struggle to have their rights and lands protected to regenerate their traditional ecological knowledges that have been disappearing since the introduction of compulsory Eurocentric schooling and to have their voices heard (WIPC, 2014) Indigenous knowledges are sophisticated complex and based on millennia of observation and lived experience they are holistic landbased ceremonial and ritualistic practices that bring together the interdependencies of human non-human and more-than-human (spiritual) intelligences and agencies for two decades we have been conducting research with the St’át’imc in the regeneration of traditional languages knowledges and practices while participating in the Ucwalmicwts language class in 1996 our Elders spoke of the urgency of recording our ancestral knowledges and practices renewing them for the next generations and sharing them with the larger society thereby contributing to the narratives needed for what Gerald Vizenor (2008) refers to as “survivance” – survival and continuance of the diversity of lifeforms on Earth we refer to our research as tcwusems ti ucwalmicwas ti cwil’enas to amas gvlgvls nt’ak’men (the People looking forward working together on the return of our strong healthy culture) regeneration is cyclic renewal making pastpresentfuture affiliations with the diversity of human and morethan-human entitities as Apffel-Marglin (2011) writes “[t]here are continuities and some perennial facets … but these continuities are incessantly remade, in flux, regenerated” (p. 40) for the next phase of the research we have joined hands with the KichwaLamista of the High Amazon of Peru we met the Kichwa-Lamista communities in 2011 through a colleague and friend who has worked with the communities for two decades the Kichwa-Lamista elders invited us to bring our university students to the High Amazon so that they might share with the students how climate change and resource extraction are affecting their way of life and for the students to learn about their cosmology and the thousands of years of land-based Kichwa-Lamista cultural knowings and practices so that they might bring these teachings back to their universities and communities we have since offered two immersion learning summer institutes with the Kichwa-Lamista communities and are planning a third the Kichwa-Lamista expressed an interest in working in solidarity with the St’át’imc to explore strategies for regenerating their respective traditional ecological knowledges including ceremonial ritual practices that evoke human non-human and more-than-human interdependences entanglements of humans and other lifeforms and lifeways for walking lightly on the earth and re-learning together how to “dance a new world into existence” (Simpson, 2012, p. 149) the focus of the research project is to examine the ongoing regeneration of St’át’imc and Kichwa-Lamista human and morethan-human (spiritual) interdependencies that inform and enhance St’át’imc and Kichwa-Lamista cultural and ecological sustainability the communities hope to contribute to a widening knowledge-base of ecological sustainability by sharing cosmologies epistemologies and practices with each other as well as other Indigenous communities the academy and the general public Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 5 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci the St’át’imc and Kichwa-Lamista have had very different historical encounters with colonization and global economics for millennia the former have relied on fishing hunting and gathering the latter have been agriculture-based each has different cosmologies and traditional ecological knowings each is situated in different histories geographies languages and socio-political contexts as they work to regain their cultural economic and ecological sustainability each community faces different struggles in regenerating their language ancestral knowings and practices while protecting their lands from expropriation and resource extraction that have wreaked havoc with their lives ravaged their lands and polluted their waters meanwhile Indigenous Peoples struggle to protect their rights and lands ironically and tragically Indigenous Peoples are the most affected by climate change with minimal participation in the industrial activity that is causing it “greenwashing” and “faux-conservation” efforts by corporations governments and NGOs deny Indigenous Peoples access to their lands (Dickens, 2015) each of the Indigenous communities has its own complex interrelationships with the more-than-human including syncretism of ritual practices and settler religions although there is an official policy in Peru of bilingual bicultural education at the primary education levels there is a lack of implementation there are few ‘qualified’ teachers from the communities who know the culture and speak Quechua (Cachique, 2015; Sangama, 2015) what is offered as bilingual and bicultural education is predominantly Western education in the Spanish language an Elder periodically shares stories in Quechua with the children in school education for the St’át’imc is similar to that of the Kichwa-Lamista there is The First Peoples principles of learning by the Ministry of Education (n.d.) however the curriculum is Western-centric with St’át’imc knowledges as add-ons there are few Ucwalmicwts speakers left in the St’át’imc communities the Kichwa-Lamista say that some of the difficulties regenerating Indigenous knowings languages and practices come from the communities themselves because they see assimilation as the only way for their children to succeed and have economic opportunities (Cueto, Guerrero, León, Seguin & Muñoz, 2009) as we paddle pat and I speak of the myriad voices needed for nonanthropocentric learning and teaching including non-human and more-than-human voices pat nearly capsizes the canoe as she gestures to feminist posthumanist and poststructural theorists sitting on the shore with their deconstructed laptops I recover with a sculling stroke wave to quantum mechanics trying to repair their fishfinder we strain to hear the voices of the powers and spirits and beings of our ancestors and those to come who are with us on this journey the sun is setting as we pull our canoe up to the shore near Lima set up our camp light a fire and make tea in anticipation of a multi-day trek across the desert and the Andes to the KichwaLamista communities after arriving in the High Amazon and getting settled in our tambo we put on our sunhats cover ourselves with mosquito repellant and join in the preparation of the evening meal made over a wood fire – corn beans rice fried bananas and chicha that the women have made especially for our visit we look out at the nearby Cordillera Escalera range knowing they have been demarcated for resource extraction agreements between the Peruvian government and Canadian mining companies that threaten to destroy the way of life for the KichwaLamista and the habitat for the animals who depend on and the forests and rivers back homethe St’át’imc territories have been carved into tiny parcels by generations of settler governments and decimated by logging mining and hydro generation projects Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 6 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci sounds of children’s laughter coming from the soccer field we talk together about the current historical-geological epoch the “anthropocene” (Whitehead, 2014) marked by anthropogenic pollution mass extinction and climate change the apus [community leaders] raise concerns about the disruption in their communities created not only by national economic policies and international mining and oil and gas extraction on their lands but also by the mandated colonial education they worry about their children’s disengagement from the land schooling teaches them that those who grow food on the chacras are uneducated and that the wisdom of their parents grandparents and ancestors is immaterial to their ‘success’ in the global economy that their cultural knowings are of little or no value outside of their local communities I share how the national (Peru) and provincial (BC) curricula are increasingly influenced by lobbyists to benefit the 0.1% how institutionalized education is primarily for creating job-ready students to fit into the production line perpetuating the unequal valuing of labour and being/becoming in BC the Ministry of Education has teamed up with the Ministry of Jobs, Tourism and Skills Training to create B.C’s Skills for jobs blueprint: Re-engineering education and training (WorkBC, 2014) to train and funnel high school students into jobs in the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) industry rural and Indigenous students in northern BC communities are particularly targeted by this curriculum along similar lines in his historical analysis of Peru’s education system Myers (2014) points out that foreign corporations have had a heavy influence in Peru’s curriculum development targeting rural and Indigenous students this is made more complex with the large population of Quechua and Aymara speakers in rural communities the dearth of teachers fluent in local Indigenous languages (UNESCO, 2010) under-funding of the IBE (intercultural bilingual education) program (Garcia, 2010) and mistrust by the Indigenous communities of the IBE agenda (Garcia, 2005) we watch the film Schooling the world: The white man’s last burden (Black, 2010) and see across the screen the words “If you wanted to change a culture in a generation, how would you do it?
You would change the way it educates its children” the film “questions our very definitions of wealth and poverty – and of knowledge and ignorance – as it uncovers the role of schools and schooling in the destruction of traditional sustainable agricultural and ecological knowledge, in the breakup of extended families and communities, and in the devaluation of elders and ancient spiritual traditions” (STW, 2010, p. 5) I share the story of a recent PhD oral defense in Ethiopia for which I was the external examiner the doctoral candidate and professors were Ethiopian but most of the theory was Western the references too yet we were located in the bosom of humankind's earliest ancestors according to Western science across the street is a 3.2 million-year old skeleton of our elder sister nicknamed Lucy and her much older sisters millennia of millenia of knowings of the human beings of that place dismissed as not worthy of attention in favour of the near-sighted vision of Western knowledge Kichwa-Lamista community members wonder if prevailing curriculum discourses can be transformed considering the huge historical asymmetry over 500 hundred years of Western “epistemic hegemony” (Mignolo, 2014) the assumption that non-Western land-based knowledges are primitive and inferior while Western education is advanced and superior is a notion brokered by reason and analysis Santos (2014) referring specifically to the Global South writes of “epistemicide” – epistemological blindness that dismisses or silences Indigenous voices drowning them out to the Euro-American articulations of what counts as knowledge devaluing Indigenous knowledges is cognitive injustice that underpins social and ecological Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 7 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci injustice de Sousa (2012) writes that for all the academic talk of multi-cultural and inter-cultural understandings it is Indigenous and Other/ed peoples who have had to become multi-cultural and inter-cultural while mainstream culture carries on its monocultural curriculum and pedagogy as the campesinos in the PRATEC (Proyecto Andino de Tecnologias Campesinas) film say Andean children need to know both Andean and Western knowledges (Salas, 2010) we discuss how “the World Bank has probably been the most important contributor around the globe in education over the past 50 years….rooted in the postwar reconstruction (and development) of the capitalist economies according to the dominant Western/Eurocentric paradigms of scientific knowledge” (de Siqueira, 2012, p. 73) the guiding assumptions of the World Bank include dominance over nature endless linear growth and belief in Western educational discourses as education ‘for all’ we talk of how recent strata of colonialism manifest as the internationalization of Western education the myth that this will lift everyone up has already been refuted climate change is telling us that the ‘progress narrative’ is in its terminal phase (Hedges, 2014) and that there needs to be a broader deeper intellectual conversation current curriculum theorizing including at the IAACS Ottawa conference has included the reemerging conversation on “cosmopolitanism” that dates back to fourth century BC (Appiah, 2006) Braidotti (2012) has given much critical thought to the discourse on cosmopolitanism and suggests that there needs to be a de-centring of anthropocentrism and a “recognition of trans-species awareness of ‘our’ being in this together, that is to say environmentally-based, -embodied and -embedded and in symbiosis with each other” (p. 20) Santos (2007) suggests that cosmopolitanism needs to be bottom-up emanating from the people of the land rather than the academy taking this further in his discussion on itinerant curriculum theory Paraskeva (2011) raises concerns that the curriculum internationalization project has been largely articulated in Western academic institutions Anwaruddin (2013) drawing on the work of Santos and Paraskeva troubles the English linguistic imperialism and the geopolitics of academic writing as well as Western academic capitalism and commodification of knowledge in education’s internationalization project when we are presenters at conferences we preface our conference presentations with “I wish to acknowledge the xxxx Indigenous Peoples on whose traditional occupied unceded territory we are speaking” but how do I/we do this in practice?
Black (2014) suggests that we need to “[e]xplore the thousand other ways of learning that still exist all over the planet” “[e]very ecosystem in the world at one time had a people who knew it with the knowledge that only comes with thousands of years of living in place ….
It’s a human intelligence honed over millennia, through unimaginably vast numbers of individual observations, experiments, reflections, intuitions, refinements of art and experience and communication” (Black, 2012) there is a growing call from academics citizens around the world Indigenous Peoples and international civil society and ecojustice organizations (e.g.
Klein, 2014; IPCC, 2014; Shiva, 2008; UNESCO, n.d; WCIP, 2014) for compelling new narratives to reshape the progress narrative of modernity that privileges mind over body heart and spirit as well as human over non-human and more-than-human there is increasing awareness that dismissing Indigenous knowledges and practices has created an imbalance a vacuum that impacts the ethnosphere and the biosphere with the loss of Indigenous knowledges comes the loss of “ten thousand different voices” (Davis, 2009) a diversity of ecological knowledges and practices for dealing with the challenges facing life on (and with) earth Indigenous traditional Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 8 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci ecological knowledges are dynamic and holistic often involving ceremony and ritual practices that bring together human non-human and more-than-human intelligences and agencies mutual reciprocating conversations with the environment de la Cadena (2010) writes that more-than-human entities are viewed as contentious in modernist thinking because their presence disrupts the nature/culture separation that is a key pillar of post-Enlightenment thinking acting and being solutions for dealing with climate change by governments and industry have been largely addressed by creating technological fixes however the “optimism in technology” often ignores “the high consumption levels in so-called developed countries or the epistemological basis for the global architecture of education” (Breidlid, 2013) Goleman (2009) suggests that what is needed is to fix our “ecological intelligence” by becoming whole again reconnecting mindbodyheartspirit proactive proposals have been put forward such as no-growth economies (Victor, 2008) economies that live within the Earth’s budget of energy and resources (Heinberg, 2010) walking lightly carefully and gracefully on the Earth (McKibben, 2010) there has been a growing “economics of localization” movement a shift from global economics to more human economies of scale that emulate how Indigenous Peoples have lived since time immemorial (de Souza, 2012; Norberg-Hodge, 2011; Schumacher, 2011) Indigenous Peoples have long known the value of traditional ecological knowledges for environmental stewardship (McGregor, 2004) environmental justice (Agyeman, Cole, Haluza de Lay & O’Riley, 2009) and biodiversity (LaDuke, 2008) an emerging convergence is taking place between ecological and social justice and Indigenous movements worldwide concerned over the loss of diversity of the world’s wisdom and biodiversity they are multistoried “minorizing of the majority discourse” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) pushing against the “abyssal thinking” (Santos, 2007) of the thinking-as-knowing paradigm in which ‘Other/ed’ cosmologies and knowledge systems are dismissed they deterritorialize the missing terrain people and signs “The geography and the people are not missing, except in the majority language” (O’Riley, 2003, p. 31) this resonates with Grillo’s (1998) notion of “equivalency of epistemologies” that recognizes the role of non-Western non-human and more-than human intelligences and agencies in maintaining ecological harmony and balance it is important to note that advancing Indigenous ecological wisdom and practices as “equivalent” is not about transplanting Indigenous knowledge systems into Western systems rather it is companion planting cultivars with wild types regenerating more complex possibilities for the global ecological sustainability conversation that includes more-than-human intelligences and agencies for the St’át’imc and Kichwa-Lamista the anthropocentric worldview is not valid because we are members of one Earth community as Kumar (2013) says “We need to take care of the soul, as we take care of the soil.
But we can only take care of the soul when we slow down.
Take time for ourselves.
Meditate on the fact that you represent the totality of the universe.
There is nothing in the universe that is not in you, and there is nothing in you that is not in the universe.
The universe is the macrocosm and you are the microcosm.
You are earth, air, fire, water, imagination, creativity, consciousness, time and space – you have all this in your soul, in your genes and in your cells.
You are billions of years old”.
we turn our discussion to the re-awakening of human spirituality and ecological interdependencies in mainstream literature and the responses to the externalized values of materiality and consumerism that drown out intuition and connections to the land the sacred and more-than-human worlds ritual practice has been common to humanity Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 9 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci throughout history in Buddhism Christianity Hinduism Islam Judaism as well as Druidism shamanism songlines we talk about different articulations of ecologyspirituality interfaces such as those enacted through aesthetics sensuality religion spiritual ecology ecofeminism posthuman discourses and human-animal bonds I share how in the early 20th century the groundwork for quantum physics thinking led to radical revisioning of classical notions of physics and other sciences Niels Bohr’s principle of “complementarity” (1937/1958) put forward the revolutionary theory that a quantum of energy cannot be separated from the apparatus and system in other words all of life is connected for evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin (1993) organism and environment create each other pat shares how Karen Barad’s “agential realism” (2003, 2007) grounded in Bohr’s work as well as Haraway’s “posthumanist performativity” (1991) acknowledges the interdependent entanglements of mindbody/heartspirit knowing and being/becoming without borders we discuss the next steps in our exploration of “non-anthropocentric collective actions … bring[ing] about not just a common world, but a livable common world” for all (Apffel-Marglin, 2011, p. 162) our research teams comprised of community research assistants and university research assistants have started to document the interactive Kichwa-Lamista stories and film the peanut planting ceremony that is an enactment of performed intra-actions between human and more-than-humans weaving each other into continuous regeneration of the world the ceremonies and rituals being documented are in the context of their everyday activities such as living with the forests and rivers in good ways (St’át’imc) and re-creating terra preta (Amazonian dark earth) to replenish degraded agricultural lands (Kichwa-Lamista) an ancient technology that helped to create large parts of the Amazon rainforest (Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Mann, 2007) interested youth work in apprenticeship role with elders apus and other knowledge keepers encouraging an intergenerational flow of knowledge that supports self-esteem self-empowerment and cultural sustainability within the research team we have much to learn from our Kichwa-Lamista partners including about buen viver (good living) that is rooted in their worldview and centred on community cultural sustainability and ecological sustainability buen vivir resonates with what the St’at’imc refer to as n’t’ákmen buen vivir has become the basis of the revised constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia it offers constructive critique of Western development theory and alternatives emerging from Indigenous traditions in particular the Aymara Quechua and Kichwa “The richness of the term is difficult to translate into English.
It includes the classical ideas of quality of life, but with the specific idea that well-being is only possible within a community.
Furthermore, in most approaches the community concept is understood in an expanded sense, to include Nature.” (Gudynas, 2011, p. 441) my partner and I stuff our laptops and gortex raingear into our backpacks unfold our map as we anticipate possible chartings for the next steps on our journey we see challenges and incredible opportunities and wonder if it is possible to re-learn the sounds and rhythms of our bodies our spirits within the “cognitive Manifest Destiny” of Eurocentric schooling “that assumes that one way of thinking, of learning, of being in the world is destined to overwhelm and replace all others?” (Black, 2014) moving forward sideways crossand extra-territorially would mean genuine curriculum provocation requiring a rhizomatic/radical reshaping to include Indigenous knowledges beyond today's prevalent tokenism having mindbodyheartspirit as integral to creating culturally inclusive and meaningful curriculum theorizing and educational practices might provoke the uni-versity toward becoming pluri-versities and multi-versities Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 10 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci Noel Gough (2012) asks “What would educational policy, curriculum innovation and global education look like if we assumed that ‘the people’ meant ‘everybody/ humanity’?” (p. 182) we add that regenerating collective curriculum visions would need to include “not merely those ‘visible’ because their differences are seen as minor in relation to the dominant centre” (de Souza, 2012, p. 81) but also non-human and more-than-human entities intelligences and agencies “theory isn’t just for academics; it’s for everyone ….
Theory…is generated from the ground up and its power stems from its living resonance with individuals and collectives” (Simpson, 2014, p. 7) at this time of climate change and intensifying global social and ecological inequities a conversation of ten thousand voices is already underway across the Global South and Global North “giant whispers” (Reinsborough, 2010) working to “slow down reason” (Stengers, 2005) in the “performance of survivance” (Vizenor, 2008) and re-imagining a more equitable compassionate just and ecologically sustainable future for all working multi-directionally with a diversity of worlds and views including the sentient more-than-human education might be able to say something very different Notes 1 A version of this paper was approved and presented at the 5th IAACS (International Association for the Advancement of Curriculum Studies) Triennial Conference held in Ottawa, Canada, in May 2015.
2 coyoteandraven@mac.com References Agyeman, J., Cole, P., Haluza-DeLay, R. & O’Riley, P.
(Eds.).
(2010).
Speaking for ourselves: Environmental justice in Canada.
Vancouver BC: UBC Press.
Apffel-Marglin, F. (2011).
Subversive spiritualties: How rituals enact the world.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Anwaruddin, S. (2013).
Can an itinerant curriculum theory travel?
Transnational Curriculum Inquiry, 10(1), 52-66.
Appiah, K. W. (2005).
Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers.
New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. Barad, K. (2007).
Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Barad, K. (2003).
Posthumanist performativity: Toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter.
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(3), 801831.
Black, C. (2014).
A thousand rivers: What the modern world has forgotten about learning and children.
Schooling the World.
Retrieved from http://schoolingtheworld.org/a-thousand-rivers/ Black, C. (2012).
Occupy your brain: On power, knowledge, and the re-occupation of common sense.
Films for Action.
Retrieved from http://www.filmsforaction.org/news/occupy_your_brain_on_power_knowledge _and_the_reoccupation_of_common_sense/ Black, C. (2010) (Director).
Schooling the world: The white man’s last burden.
[Film].
Telluride, CO: Lost People Films.
mailto:coyoteandraven@mac.com http://schoolingtheworld.org/a-thousand-rivers/ http://www.filmsforaction.org/news/occupy_your_brain_on_power_knowledge_and_the_reoccupation_of_common_sense/ http://www.filmsforaction.org/news/occupy_your_brain_on_power_knowledge_and_the_reoccupation_of_common_sense/ Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 11 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci Braidotti, R. (2012).
Becoming-world.
In R. Braidotti, P. Hanafin & B. Blaagaard (Eds.
), After cosmopolitanism (pp.
9-27).
New York, NY: Routledge.
Breidlid, A.
(2013).
Education, Indigenous knowledges, and development in the Global South: Contesting knowledges for a sustainable future.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Bohr, N. (1958).
Atomic physics and human knowledge.
New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Cachique, L. T. (2015).
Personal communication.
Cueto, S., Guerrero, G., León, J., Seguin, E., & Muñoz, I.
(2009).
Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2010, Reaching the marginalized, explaining and overcoming marginalization in education: A focus on ethnic/language minorities in Peru.
Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001865/186589e.pdf Davis, W. (2009).
The wayfinders: Why ancient wisdom matters in the modern world (CBC Massey Lecture).
Toronto, ON: House of Anansi Press.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987).
A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia (B. Massumi, Trans.).
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Original work published 1980).
De la Cadena, M. (2010).
Indigenous cosmpolitics in the Andes: Conceptual reflections on politics.
Cultural Anthropology, 25(2), 334-370.
De Siqueira, A. C. (2012).
The 2020 World Bank education strategy: Nothing new, or the same old gospel.
In S. J. Klees, J. Samoff, J., & N. P. Stromquist (Eds.
), The World Bank and Education: Critiques and alternatives (pp.
69-81).
Rotterdam, NL: Sense.
De Souza, L. M. T. (2012).
Engaging the global by resituating the local.
(Dis) locating the literate global subject and his view from nowhere.
In V. Andreotti & L. M. T. de Souza (Eds.
), Postcolonial perspectives on global citizenship (pp.
68-83).
New York, NY: Routledge.
Dickens, A.
(2015).
Indigenous peoples bear the brunt of global greenwash.
Ecologist.
Retrieved from http://www.theecologist.org/campaigning/2985426/indigenous_peoples_bear_t he_brunt_of_global_greenwash.html Garcia, M. E. (2010).
Rethinking bilingual education in Peru: Intercultural politics, state policy and Indigenous Rights.
International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 7(5), 348-367.
Garcia.
M. E. (2005).
Making Indigenous citizens: Identities, education, and multicultural development in Peru.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Goleman, D. (2009).
Ecological intelligence: How knowing the hidden impacts of what we buy can change everything.
New York, NY: Broadway Books.
Gough, N. (2012).
Generating curriculum visions for global citizenship: Collective stories and creative imagination.
Alternation, 19(2), 162-189.
Grillo, E. F. (1998).
Development or decolonization in the Andes?
In F. Apffel-Marglin (Ed.
), The spirit of regeneration: Andean culture confronting western notions of development (pp.
193-243).
London, UK: Zed Books.
Gudynas, E. (2011).
Buen viver: Today’s tomorrow.
Development, 54(4), 441-447.
Haraway, D. (1991).
Simians, cyborgs and women: The reinvention of nature.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Hedges, C. (2013).
Days of destruction, days of revolt.
Toronto, ON: Vintage Canada.
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001865/186589e.pdf http://www.theecologist.org/campaigning/2985426/indigenous_peoples_bear_the_brunt_of_global_greenwash.html http://www.theecologist.org/campaigning/2985426/indigenous_peoples_bear_the_brunt_of_global_greenwash.html Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 12 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci Heinberg.
R. (2011).
The end of growth: Adapting to our new economic reality.
Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers.
IPCC.
(2014).
Climate change 2014: Mitigation of climate change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jazeel, T., & McFarlane, C. (2007).
Responsible learning: Cultures of knowledge production and the North-South divide.
Antipode, 39(5), 781-789.
Klein, N. (2014).
This changes everything: Capitalism vs. the climate.
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Kumar, S. (2013).
Satish Kumar: The link between soil, soul and society.
The Guardian.
Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/satish-kumar-soil-soul-society LaDuke, W. (2008).
All our relations: Struggles for land and life.
New York, NY: South End Press.
Lewontin, R. (1993).
Biology as ideology: The Doctrine of DNA.
New York, NY: HarperPerennial.
Mann, C. C. (2005).
1491: New revelations of the Americas before Columbus.
New York, NY: Vintage Books.
McGregor, D. (2004).
Coming full circle: Indigenous knowledge, environment, and our future.
The American Indian Quarterly, 28(3 & 4), 385-410.
McKibben, B.
(2010).
Eaarth: Making a life on a tough new planet.
Toronto, ON: Alfred A. Knopf Canada.
Myers, R. G. (2014).
Peruvian educational development.
In D. A.
Sharp (Ed.
), U.S. foreign policy and Peru (pp.
350-391).
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Mignolo, W. D. (2014).
Spirit out of bounds returns to the East: The closing of social sciences and the opening of independent thoughts.
Current Sociology, 62(4), 584-602.
Mignolo, W. D. (2007).
The de-colonial option and the meaning of identity IN politics.
Anales Nuevo Epoca (Instituto Iberoamericano Universidad de Goteborg), 9(10), 43-72.
Retrieved from https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/4500/2/anales_9-10_mignolo.pdf Ministry of Education.
(n.d.).
The First Peoples principles of education.
Province of British Columbia.
Retrieved from https://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/abed/ Norberg-Hodge, H. (Producer).
(2011).
The economics of happiness.
[Film].
Berkley, CA: International Society for Ecology & Culture.
O’Riley, P. (2003).
Technology, culture and socioeconomics: A rhizoanalysis of educational discourses.
New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Paraskeva, J. M. (2011).
Conflicts in curriculum theory: Challenging hegemonic epistemologies.
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Reinsborough, P. (2010).
Giant whispers: Narrative power, radical imagination and a future worth fighting for … Affinities: Journal of Radical Theory, Culture, Action, 4(2), 67-78.
Retrieved from http://journals.sfu.ca/affinities/index.php/affinities/article/view/68/207 Salas, M. T. (2005) (Director).
Iskay yachay: Two kinds of knowledge.
[Film].
PRATEC (Proyecto Andino de Tecnologias Campesinas.
TV Multiversity.
Retrieved from https://vimeo.com/12829709 Sangama, R. S. (2015).
Personal communication.
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/satish-kumar-soil-soul-society http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/satish-kumar-soil-soul-society https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/4500/2/anales_9-10_mignolo.pdf https://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/abed/ http://journals.sfu.ca/affinities/index.php/affinities/article/view/68/207 https://vimeo.com/12829709 Cole.
Education in an Era of Climate Change: Conversing with Ten Thousand Voices 13 Transnational Curriculum Inquiry 13 (1) 2016 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci Santos, B. S. (2014).
Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Santos, B. S. (2007).
Beyond abyssal thinking: From global lines to ecologies of knowledges.
Review, XXX(1), 45-89.
Schumacher, E. F. (2010).
Small is beautiful: Economics as if people mattered.
Scarborough, ON: Harper Perennial.
Shiva, V. (2008).
Soil not oil: Environmental justice in an age of climate crisis.
New York, NY: South End Press.
Simpson, L. (2011).
Dancing on our turtle’s back: Stories of Nishnaabeg re-creation, resurgence and new emergence.
Winnipeg, MB: Arbeiter Ring.
Stengers, I.
(2005).
The cosmopolitical proposal.
In B. Latour & P. Weibel (Eds.
), Making things public: Atmospheres of democracy (pp.
994-1004).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
STW.
(2010).
Schooling the world: The white man’s last burden.
A discussion guide and companion to the film.
Retrieved from http://schoolingtheworld.org UNESCO.
(2009).
Explaining and overcoming marginalization in education: A focus on ethnic/language minorities in Peru.
Background paper for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010.
Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001865/186589e.pdf UNESCO.
(n.d.).
Linking biological and cultural diversity.
UNESCO-SCBC Programme.
Retrieved from http://www.cbd.int/lbcd/ Victor, P. (2008).
Managing without growth: Slower by design, not disaster.
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Vizenor.
G. (2008).
Survivance: Narratives of Native presence.
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Whitehead, M. (2014).
Environmental transformations: A geography of the Anthropocene.
New York, NY: Routledge.
WorkBC.
(2014).
B.C’s Skills for jobs blueprint: Re-engineering education and training.
Victoria, BC: Province of British Columbia.
WCIP.
(2014).
World Conference on Indigenous Peoples: A High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly.
New York, NY: Indigenous Global Coordinating Group.
Submitted: February, 17th, 2016 Approved: June, 15th, 2016 http://schoolingtheworld.org/ http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001865/186589e.pdf http://www.cbd.int/lbcd/
Microsoft Word 15 Pillay et al.docx Td The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 7(2) December 2011, pp.
351 – 366.
Perspectives on climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries P LALTHAPERSAD-PILLAY AND AG OOSTHUIZEN1 Abstract Most studies concur that climate change could seriously affect the sustainability and well-being of developing countries as they depend directly on climate-sensitive natural resources for their livelihood endeavours.
This could primarily occur through reduced agricultural productivity, a higher incidence of diseases, the displacement of people, loss of livelihood and food price increases, all of which could contribute to food insecurity, malnourishment and escalating poverty.
Although developing countries have contributed the least to Green house Gas (GHG) emissions, they stand to lose the most and it is likely that many of the development gains that have been made thus far will be reversed.
To ensure that poverty reduction and economic growth do not become elusive goals for developing countries, it will be necessary to provide funds for potential adaptation measures to prevent these countries slipping further down the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking.
In this paper, we will use Africa as a reference and look at the funds required for adaptation, the possible sources of funds and the conflict that may occur in prioritizing development objectives.
Keywords: Climate change, sustainability, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, porverty reduction, Human Development Index (HDI) Disciplines: Economics, Environmental Studies, Sustainability Studies, African Studies.
1.
Introduction The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC 2007) predicts that even under a modest temperature rise of 1-2.50 C, a host of eventualities such as diminished crop yields, a higher risk of hunger, greater exposure to malaria, extinction of almost 20-30 per cent of all plant and animal species, and a greater proportion of people facing water stress would be exacerbated.
Floods, droughts and tropical cyclones are predicted to increase in frequency, threatening livelihoods and making them more fragile.
Sea level rise is a significant risk to 1 .
Prof. P Lalthapersad-Pillay and Prof. AG Oosthuizen are members of staff in the Department of Economics, University of South Africa.
Contact details: P Lalthapersad-Pillay: (lalthp@unisa.ac.za), and AG Oosthuizen: (tootuiz@unisa.ac.za).
Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 368 coastal communities (UNEP 2007).
Developing countries are most exposed to the negative consequences of climate change perils as they have fewer resources to adapt in terms of social, technological and financial resources.
Climate change could undermine the sustainable development of developing countries and their ability to meet their Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets (UNFCCC 2007).
In this paper, we start by highlighting the ramifications of climate change for developing countries and the African continent in particular.
This is followed by a discussion of adaptation and estimates of the funding required for adaptation.
An analysis of some of the shortcomings in funding arrangements and policy recommendations are also briefly touched on.
2.
Climate change in the context of developing countries The 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007) has reaffirmed many realities about climate change.
There is general agreement that warming of the climate system is a certainty and that global warming stems directly from man-made emissions of greenhouse gases (mostly CO2).
The atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide rose from a pre-industrial value of 278 parts per million o 379 parts per million in 2005 and the average global temperature rose by 0.74o C. This level is deemed as both the “largest and fastest warming trend in the history of the Earth (UNFCCC 2007:8).
A greater part of the warming occurred in the last 25 years.
Despite efforts to slowdown greenhouse gas emissions, the Earth will continue warm (UNFCCC 2007).
The consequences of global warming may not be confined to a few isolated effects.
Global warming could affect the type, the incidence and magnitude of extreme events such as tropical cyclones, floods, droughts and heavy precipitation events which are possible even with small increases in temperature (Meehl et al.
2007).
Although the impact of climate change will have serious implications for all countries, it is the developing countries that will bear the greatest brunt given that they rely primarily on natural resources for their economic activity (AU Commission et al.
2010).
Developing countries are not a homogenous group as each one has a unique set of circumstances and the impact of climate change at a country-specific level will depend on the climate it experiences, its geographical location and its social, economic and political contexts.
Therefore, countries’ adaptation strategies will be largely determined by its specific circumstances.
But there are some commonalities that apply to all countries and regions although in different degrees.
The key sectors that will be affected are agriculture, water resources, human health, ecosystems, biodiversity and coastal zones (UNFCCC 2007).
Climate change is likely to affect the natural resource base, livelihood patterns, income generation and the sustainability of the wider economy in developing countries.
Developing countries’ vulnerability stems from a host of factors such as low economic growth rates, high levels of poverty, low levels of education, subdued health status, and an absence of financial, institutional and human resources to adapt to the adversities that climate change will pose (AU Commission et al.
2010).
It is most possible that developing countries in future may have to content with food and water shortage, and an outbreak of diseases that may prove to be catastrophic to billions of people (UNFCCC 2007).
At a macro level climate change in developing countries threatens to restrict economic growth and slowdown development initiatives, which will push large numbers of people into poverty due to the loss of livelihood (UNECA 2010).
Worse still it could weaken the ability of developing countries to meet their MDG targets, which may indirectly imply the loss of many previously attained development gains (UNDP 2006) Climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries Td, 7(2), December 2011, pp.
351366.
369 The fact that developing countries would find their development endeavours offset by the effects of climate change makes it crucial that international assistance and support for countries’ national planning efforts, capacity-building ventures and the provision of technology and funding are put in place.
With regard to adaptation, the UNFCCC (2007) has urged that adaptation serve the dual purposes of meeting the needs of developing countries and allaying fears.
The UNFCCC (2007) warns that the pace at which climate change is likely to unfold means that it is vital that the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change is contained and their capacity to adapt bolstered and national adaptation plans is put into practice.
The vulnerability that developing countries are likely to experience in future is not only tied to climate change but also to the development strategies they adopt.
This makes it crucial that adaptation be handled in the context of national and global development endeavours.
2.1.
The impact on Africa Whilst climate change and climate variability will most likely be consequential for all countries, African countries could experience its reverberations even though they are least responsible for the problem.
Although Africa is responsible for less than 4 per cent of Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, climate adversities such as higher temperatures, variations in rainfall patterns, rising sea levels, floods, and droughts are expected to become the norm (UNECA 2010; Few et al.
2004; Christensen et al.
2007).
It is predicted that climate change may precipitate a great number of climatic shocks and disasters which may reduce agricultural output and diminish food security in African countries (AU Commission et al.
2010; Boko et al.
2007).
Africa’s vulnerability to climate change is confounded on many fronts, that is, its dependency on natural resources, its geographical position, its current health and socioeconomic status, plus its shortages of resources on the financial, institutional and labour fronts.
It is argued that these realities could undermine Africa’s ability to initiate adaptation strategies (UNECA 2010).
Harmful climate change effects in concert with other human actions will heighten Africa’s exposure given its low ability to adapt (AU Commission, et al.
2010).
Climate-change will impact greatest on the poor as they are least resilient and their livelihood is tied to climate-sensitive resources such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry and other natural resources (UNECA 2010; Christensen et al.
2007; FAO 2003).
Furthermore, their places of settlement are most likely to be affected by climate extremes, thus compromising their fragile existence, causing a loss of assets, savings and bringing hardship and suffering.
Africa’s vulnerability to climate change is evident in the climate stresses that many parts of Africa are currently undergoing.
Many areas in Africa are deemed to have climates that have been dubbed as the most variable in the world when viewed over seasonal spans or over decades.
Africa’s erratic climate is evidenced by flood and drought activity that occur in the same area within months of each other.
It is estimated that at least one-third of African people already live in drought-prone areas and 220 million people are exposed to drought each year (UNFCCC 2007).
The joint presence of other situational factors together with current climatic variability is likely to compound Africa’s ability to cope with climate change.
Current development backlogs that beset these countries are responsible for their negligible adaptive ability Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 370 (UNFCCC 2007) The 3rd Assessment Report of the IPCC highlighted a number of negative effects stemming from climate change pertaining to low grain yields, water runoff and water availability in the Mediterranean and southern African countries, becoming urgent issues, increased drought activity and certain plant and animal species becoming extinct.
All these factors have a direct bearing on livelihoods and are more acute due to a low adaptive capacity (IPCC 2007).
In the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC, the combination of climate change and other factors that drive change in Africa are acknowledged as being “multiple stresses” that increase vulnerability to climate change (IPCC 2007).
The predictions for temperature for Africa are that the entire continent is likely to experience higher warming on season-wide basis.
Even the drier subtropical regions are likely to get warmer (UNFCCC 2007).
In its 4th Assessment Report, the IPCC raised seven areas of concern specific to the African continent: 1.
Africa is especially prone to the adversity posed by climate change and its situation is worsened by the presence of “multiple stresses” and a diminished ability to adapt (IPCC 2007).
The economic base of many African economies is climate-sensitive ecological resources, for example, fisheries, agriculture, forestry, other natural resources and tourism (UNECA 2010).
Thus, the economic effects from climate change could be large.
This situation is complicated by other factors such as poor economic growth rates, high levels of poverty, financial and institutional shortcomings, inadequate human resources, capacity constraints, degradation of the ecosystem, internal strife and conflict.
These are some of the factors that are responsible for the current weak adaptive capacity in Africa (IPCC 2007).
2.
Despite adaptation measures being implemented in farming communities in some African countries, the long term viability and protection against future climate events of these communities has been questioned (IPCC 2007).
3.
In most African countries agricultural output and food security (and even access to food) could suffer enormously from climate variability.
Agricultural production could be negatively affected by the loss of land, reduced growing seasons, and uncertainty in cultivation practices in terms of what to plant and when to plant (UNFCCC 2007).
Agriculture in Africa contributes approximately 50 percent of a country’s total exports and 21 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The proportion of the land that can be used for rain-fed and crop production is also expected to fall by 2080.
Tied to this is the number of undernourished people that is projected to rise by about 50 million in the absence of any policy interventions (UNECA 2010).
Those African countries that are currently saddled with semi-arid conditions will find that achieving the necessary agricultural output will become even more difficult.
It is projected that by 2080 the proportion of semi-arid land in Africa could rise by 5-8 per cent.
It is possible that production in so-called marginal lands could be eliminated all together.
In terms of precipitation, lower annual rainfall in large parts of Mediterranean Africa and northern Sahara is expected.
Southern Africa, especially the winter rainfall region and western parts could also experience lower levels of rainfall (UNFCCC 2007).
The revenue from the sale of crops is predicted to fall by almost 90 per cent in 2020, a situation that will be borne mainly by small-scale farmers.
Yields from rain-fed agriculture are projected to fall by 50 per cent in many African countries.
This situation would contribute to the worsening food security in the African region (IPCC 2007; Fischer et al.
2002).
Climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries Td, 7(2), December 2011, pp.
351366.
371 4.
Climate change could exacerbate water stress that some countries currently endure, while other unaffected countries could find themselves exposed to increasing water stress.
The availability of water, access to water and demand for water are likely to be affected by climate change.
About 25 per cent of Africa’s population (200 million) presently have to cope with water stress (IPCC 2007; Ashton 2002).
Climate change is expected to expose almost 250 million people in Africa to increased water stress by 2020 and the figure is likely to rise sharply to between 250 600 million by the 2050s, primarily in North and Southern Africa (UNECA 2010; De Wit & Jacek 2006).
This water stress will have feedback effects on agriculture and industrialization.
Flood and drought activity will become both more recurrent and severe.
It is projected that by 2080, North Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa will be three of the world’s five regions that will be most at risk of flooding (IPCC 2007).
Reduced volumes of water to hydropower dams and the scarcity of biomass energy will impact on the availability of energy and have a negative effect on industrialization in Africa.
Climate change will not only thwart socio-economic well-being, it will have profound repercussions for human security.
Climate could spark off migration and cause conflict over access to and control of water resources.
Geographically, all major African rivers cross national boundaries and the likelihood of conflict over water resources is highly probable.
A recent study has shown that failure to address climate change in a timely manner could increase the probability of civil conflict in Africa by 54 per cent over the next two decades (UNECA 2010).
5.
Many changes in ecosystems are apparent in Southern Africa.
There have been changes in grasslands and marine ecosystems.
Low levels of fish stocks could be further diminished by rising water temperatures (UNFCCC 2007).
There could be drying and desertification in many areas of the Sahel and southern Africa.
Forest ecosystems are threatened by deforestation and forest fires even though two-thirds of the people in sub-Saharan Africa depend on forest products (UNECA 2010).
Grasslands could be ruined.
In terms of biodiversity, it is estimated that by 2085, certain specie habitats could be lost altogether and almost 80 to 90 per cent of these habitats could be reduced in size or be located elsewhere.
Climate change could also affect tourism through its effect on ecosystems and one study argues that between 25 – 40 per cent of mammal species in national parks in sub-Saharan Africa would dwindle (IPCC 2007).
6.
Climate change could see low-lying areas being flooded with devastating impacts on coastal settlements.
Rising sea levels will damage mangroves and coral reefs, wipe out infrastructure, fisheries and tourism and cause job losses.
Rising sea levels could cause floods especially in the East African coastal area and make coastal cities very vulnerable in their socio-economic statures.
The cost of adaptation to sea-level rise is projected to be in the region of 5-10 per cent of GDP (IPCC 2007; Sheppard 2003).
7.
Climate change could add to Africa’s health burden, which is the highest in the world.
Malaria is the major cause of loss of human life in Africa.
Climate change has been predicted to alter the ecology of some disease vectors in Africa and thereby the spread of diseases such as malaria and dengue fever (IPCC 2007; Guernier et al.
2004; WHO 2004; McMichael et al.
2004).
The spread of malaria in southern Africa and East Africa could become more widespread.
It is expected that 90 million more people in Africa will be at risk of contacting malaria (UNECA 2010).
Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 372 3.
Mitigation and adaptation The total economic burden of climate change basically consists of three elements, namely: • The costs of mitigation (reducing the extent of climate change); • The costs of adaptation (reducing the impact of the change); and • The residual costs.
Residual costs are the sum of the costs of inaction, minus the benefits from both mitigation and adaptation (EEA 2007; Parry et al.
2009).
Adaptation differs from mitigation in two key respects.
Firstly, it is predicted that adaptation will provide in most cases local benefits.
Secondly, these benefits could be realised without long lead time (Stern 2006).
Adaptation may, however, require large scale investment which is likely to be episodic and staggered and will probably only be triggered by extreme events that raise the consciousness of climate change within policymakers, hence giving legitimacy to government action (Adger et al.
2005).
This may be influenced by the views of scientists and economists.
Many scientists view climate change as a dire and urgent threat requiring immediate large-scale action, while many economists favour a slow approach with careful cost calculations in order to avoid doing too much (Stanton & Ackerman 2009).
This may imply that private institutions will have to start adapting on their own without the active intervention of policy.
There are, however, many barriers to effective private adaptation, such as the presence of poverty, market failures, incomplete information, which makes government intervention and support critical (Stern 2006).
4.
Nature of adaptation Adaptation can be defined “as an adjustment in natural and human systems in response to actual or expected changes in climatic stimuli and their impacts in order to alleviate adverse impacts of changes or to exploit new opportunities” (Adger et al.
2005:77).
The definition is, however, not clear–cut and in international funding circles where different criteria are applied, it makes the costs of adaptation uncertain (Parry et al.
2009).
Adaptation is considered to be the most feasible option for dealing with climate change, but in Africa, it is constrained by a limited adaptive capacity, as described above (Nkomo et al.
2006).
Therefore, the adaptation process should involve both the building of adaptive capacity to increase the ability of individuals, groups and organizations to adopt changes (develop human capital), and the implementation of adaptation decisions that transform the capacity into action (Adger et al.
2005).
This approach is also supported by the World Bank.
In its Synthesis Report it states that the focus of adaptation strategies should be investment in human capital and the development of competent and flexible institutions to focus on weather resilience and adaptive capacity, as well as addressing the root causes of poverty.
It also states that although economic development should be a central element of adaptation, it cannot be business as usual (World Bank 2010).
Some adaptations are purposeful and directed and can clearly be identified as being triggered by climate change, such as the United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme.
Adaptations can, however, also arise as a result of other non-climatic related social or economic changes, for example, when a house-owner leaves a flood-area for economic reasons (Adger et al.
2005).
Climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries Td, 7(2), December 2011, pp.
351366.
373 Irrespective of motivation, adaptation can generate benefits as well as costs when wider issues or longer timeframes are considered and it must be borne in mind that in some situations, adaptation to climate change may create new problems (Adger et al.
2005).
5.
Adaptation costs A study by Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) found that beyond coastal protection, our knowledge of adaptation costs is still fairly limited.
Adaptation costs mostly emerge from studies at country level where cost estimates form a part of a broader planning exercise.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) used a series of adaptation studies for the most vulnerable countries in the world, namely the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) to identify and cost priority adaptations.
NAPAs are, however, a poor indication of the ultimate adaptation costs as they predominantly cover preparatory measures and capacity building in agriculture and water (UNFCCC 2007).
Stern (2006) argues that adaptation to climate change will substantially raise the costs of some investments in developing countries, and that new investments in new areas may be required.
This will put pressure on already scarce public resources while the attainment of the MDGs already requires international assistance.
Apart from the requirement for new adaptations, there is an adaptation deficit in developing countries – referring to the existing lack of adaptation to the current climate.
Poor people and poor countries are less well-prepared to deal with current climate variability than rich people and rich countries.
It is clear that low rankings in terms of development indicators (for example, per capita income, literacy and institutional capacity) are related to climate vulnerability (Noy, 2009).
Most cost estimates deliberately ignore the link between development and cost of adaptation and prefer to focus on incremental adaptation over and above a baseline that supposedly includes climate-relevant development programmes (Parry et al.
2009).
The Bali Action Plan (BAP) underscored the severity of Africa’s case by adding that “finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building are crucial if Africa is to adequately adapt to climate change impacts” (UNECA 2010:13).
Specifically, the Bali Plan of Action cautioned that: • For Africa, adaptation is the main concern; • Since Africa has contributed the least to global GHG emissions, yet is the most exposed to climate change, it must be supported in its endeavours to adapt to climate change; and • Developed countries have committed themselves to extending financial, technological and capacity-building initiatives to developing countries given that climate change is likely to undermine sustainable development and the achievement of the MDGs.
Thus, assistance from developed countries for funding, technology and capacity-building undertakings, is a crucial component of Africa’s adaptation process.
Given in Table 1 are various estimates on the cost of adaptation undertaken since 2006 which reveal a certain degree on convergence.
The Parry report argues that these figures are misleading due to the fact that the studies were not independent as there was a sharing of information and that none of them have been peer-reviewed in the scientific and economic Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 374 literature (Parry et al.
2009).
Table 1: Comparison of adaptation cost estimates in developing countries SOURCE US $ BILLION p.a.
COMMENTS World Bank (2006) 9-41 (by 2015) Cost of climate-proofing FDI, GDI and ODA flows Stern Report (2006) 4-37 (at present) Update, with slight modification of World Bank (2006) Oxfam (2007) > 50 (at present) Bases on World Bank, plus extrapolation of costs from NAPAs and NGO projects UNDP (2007) 86-109 (by 2015) World Bank, plus costing of PRSP targets, better disaster response UNFCCC (2007) 27-66 (by 2030) Agriculture:7 Water: 9 Human health:5 Coastal zones: 4 Infrastructure: 2-41 The costs over and above what need to be invested to renew capital stock and accommodate income and population growth: also excluding estimate for ecosystem adaptation Source: Adapted from Parry et al.
2009.
All these studies used the same method as initially developed in 2006 by the World Bank by merely applying a ‘mark-up’ to the fraction of the current investment that is climate-sensitive to reflect the cost of ‘climate-proofing’.
A reassessment of the UNFCCC 2007 estimates for 2030 indicates that they are likely to be substantially under-estimated due to the following reasons: (i) some sectors have not been included, such as ecosystems, energy, manufacturing, retailing and tourism; (ii) some other sectors have only been partially covered; and (iii) the additional costs of adaptation have sometimes been calculated as ‘climate mark-ups’ against low levels of assumed investment (Parry et al.
2009).
The Parry report argues that the UNFCCC probably under-estimated investment needs for the included sectors by a factor of between 2 and 3.
If other sectors are considered it could be much more.
For coastal protection the factor of under-estimation could be 2 to 3.
For infrastructure it may be several times higher.
For health the ‘intervention sets’ that were costed relate to a disease burden that is approximately 30-50% of the anticipated total burden in lowand middle-income countries (and do not include interventions in high-income countries).
By including protection of ecosystems it could add a further US$65-US$300 billion per year in costs.
Also, estimates are not made for mining and manufacturing, energy, the retail and financial sectors and tourism (Parry et al.
2009).
These shortcomings explain why the investment levels proposed by the UNFCCC appear so small (roughly equal to the annual cost of running two or three Olympic Games) which would require a doubling of current Official Development Assistance (ODA).
According to Parry et al.
( 2009), most adaptation cost estimates are, therefore, preliminary, incomplete and subject to caution due to the following gaps: • The scope of the analysis doesn’t cover all impacts and countries (implies severe underestimation of costs); Climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries Td, 7(2), December 2011, pp.
351366.
375 • The depth of the analysis as all relevant adaptation options and needs for may given country and impact are not considered (may imply under –or overestimation of costs); • The costing of measures does not include all relevant costs (may imply underestimation of costs); and • The treatment of uncertainty and how future changes may affect costs (implication on costs also uncertain) (Parry et al.
2009).
During 2009 the World Bank upped their estimated cost of adaptation in poor countries to $75-100 billion annually if global warming stayed at 20C (Oxfam International, 2010).
In its Briefing Note of 31 May 2010, Oxfam estimates that poor countries will need at least $100 billion per year by 2020 over and above funding for existing development targets in terms of the MDGs, for adaptation.
This is a significant increase from their previous estimates made in 2006.
The World Bank based its new estimates on a series of studies conducted globally and regionally.
It found that the cost of developing countries to adapt between 2010 and 2050 will probably be US$70-100 billion per year at 2005 prices.
This is approximately 0.2% of the projected GDP of all developed countries or 80% of total disbursement ODA (World Bank, 2010).
From an African perspective, the Chairperson of the African Union has cautioned that Africa will require the amount of $67 billion annually to deal with adaptation (Business Green 2009).
6.
Responsibilities in terms of the funding requirements The literature on climate change leaves no doubt about the need for international collective action.
Climate finance should, however, not be seen as aid because it is not an act of charity but an obligation under the UNFCCC (Oxfam International 2010).
To meet this obligation, countries cannot use money that would otherwise have been used for health and education in poor countries.
To do this it would reverse the development gains from recent years.
New funding must, therefore, be pledged.
The question of who should pay is a matter of ethics: who should bear more or less responsibility for the problem and who can best afford to contribute (Stanton & Ackerman 2009).
As there is no supranational authority to provide coercive sanctions, nations will need to perceive sufficient benefits that will make them willing to participate in international treaties (Stern 2006).
During the past thirty to forty years, there have been several international treaties and responses to the threat of climate change.
Stern (2006) points out that although most of these were to discuss mitigation, it also affected the funding arrangements for adaptation: • In 1988 the IPCC was created.
It issued its first report in 1990 that warned that climate change could become a pressing issue; • At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 189 countries (including all major developed and developing countries) ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
It spelt out both the commitments in terms of mitigation by developed countries and the assistance pledged to developing countries; • The Kyoto Protocol in 1997 set out the approach for binding international action with specific commitments till the 2012 being put in place; Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 376 • The World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 in South Africa also addressed the issue of climate change; • Climate change is s regular agenda item at G8 Summits.
Decisions are not binding but provide strong direction to other international bodies: • Evian Summit 2003 – statement on co-operation in science and technology • Gleneagles 2005Action Plan for Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development • St Petersburg 2006 – explored links between climate change and energy security • The Copenhagen Accord in December which established the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund and secured a commitment from rich countries to mobilise $100 billion a year by 2020 (Oxfam International 2010).
Unfortunately, the interaction of climate and development seems to create a paradox: economic development may accelerate climate change, which in turn could block further development, locking the world into existing patterns of inequality as the natural environment deteriorates (Stanton & Ackerman 2009).
The World Bank also refer to this issue in its 2010 report but firmly states that development is imperative as the impact of climate change will actually decrease as development takes place (World Bank 2010).
The pattern and type of development should, however, not simply be business as usual.
Adaptation requires a different type of development where breeding crops become more drought and flood tolerant, infrastructure is climate-proof, and so forth.
(i) Funding through Development Assistance If adaptation is only defined in terms of climate change, it ignores the widely accepted role of development in contributing to the building of resilience.
Sustainable development reduces vulnerability to climate change.
Meeting the MDGs will all improve the livelihoods of vulnerable communities and, therefore, increase their ability to engage in adaptive action (Ayers & Huq 2008).
Increasing development assistance is thus essential.
Figure 1: Scale of ODA and donor commitments Source: OECD (2005) as cited in Stern (2006).
Climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries Td, 7(2), December 2011, pp.
351366.
377 Developed countries committed themselves to increase overall ODA at Monterrey in 2002.
This pledge was strengthened at Gleneagles in 2005.
The donor countries pledged to increase aid by US$50 billion a year by 2010, of which US$25 billion was pledged for Africa.
They also pledged to cancel debt worth another US$50 billion.
ODA from DAC donors alone could double by 2015 if the commitments and EU targets for 0.7% GDP in ODA are met.
This is shown in Figure 1.
But only five donors met the target by 2006 while five others announced timetables to meet the targets (Stern 2006).
These commitments were made for development assistance in terms of meeting the MDGs, and should not be confused with the funding requirements for adaptation to climate change.
(ii) International funding for adaptation It is difficult to separate funding for adaptation and for mitigation purposes.
Funding provision that fall outside the jurisdiction of the UNFCCC’s ambit is quite substantial and are targeting both adaptation and mitigation (African Partnership Forum 2006).
However, under the auspices of the UNFCCC a range of different funds have been set up to develop and integrate approaches to adaptation.
It includes mainly donor contributions to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) which is a special fund for adaptation, the Adaptation Fund, and ODA and concessional lending of which mush less than 1% is focused on adaptation (Stern 2006).
GEF resources include: • Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) caters for the immediate adaptation needs of least developed countries and supports the preparation of the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs).
Pledges and contributions to this fund amounted to $89 million by 2006.
In 2007 commitments stood at only $163 million and only $67 million was actually delivered (Oxfam 2007).
• Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) to address the special needs of developing countries in long-term adaptation, especially in the areas of health, agriculture, water and vulnerable ecosystems.
By 2006 $45 million had been pledged.
The Adaptation Fund will probably generate funding in the region of US$100-US$500 million by 2012 when a 2% levy on most Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) transactions in terms of the Kyoto Protocol comes into force (Stern 2006).
The CDM gives developing countries an important source of carbon finance to assist in funding sustainable development projects.
However, in 2007 only a small portion of emission reduction projects were located in Africa with only 30 out of a total 1 600 projects worldwide being in Africa.
But in April 2009, 23 African countries submitted a total of 102 projects.
This is an encouraging trend since it puts African countries in a better position to get resources for adaptation (Africa Partnership Forum 2009).
These funds have, however, been heavily criticised for being both fiscally and technically inadequate.
By March 2008 the total resources pledged to the various UNFCCC Funds amounted to only US$290 million.
Donors furthermore tend to delay on meeting their pledged commitments which means that the actual funds received were only US$201.7 million (Ayers & Huq 2008).
Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 378 Although the World Bank estimated in August 2010 that the cost of adaptation in developing countries may be between US$70-100 billion per year, the contributions to dedicated adaptation funds are projected to be only between US$150-US$300 million per year (World Bank, 2010).
Therefore, the World Bank recently had to recognise the essential role of the International Financial Institutions in funding adaptation to climate change (Stern 2006).
At the Financing for Development Conference on Climate Change during 2009, additional amounts were pledge that fall outside of the UNFCCC funding, as indicated in Table 2.
Table 2: Climate Change Funding Initiatives outside the UNFCCC FUND PLEDGED AMOUNT PLEDGOR Climate Investment Fund (CIF) (includes Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) and Clean Technology Fund (CTF) US$6.3 billion World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) US$165 million World Bank Carbon Partnership Facility (CPF) US$470 million World Bank Congo Basin Forest Fund US$200 million AFDB Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) US$50 million GEF UN-REDD Programme US$35 million UNDP MDG Achievement Fund – Environment and Climate Change window (MDG) US$90 million UNDP EUGlobal Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) US$30 million EU Cool Earth Initiative US$10 billion Japan Environmental Transformation Fund US$1.2 billion UK International Climate Initiative US$170 million Germany International Forest Carbon Initiative US$180 million Australia TOTAL US$19.16 billion Source: Africa Partnership Forum 2009.
7.
Conclusion Climate change may have irreparable effects on the development prospects of developing countries, Africa in particular.
Africa suffers both from and adaptation deficit, as well as from a lack of sufficient human and financial capital to adapt to the looming crisis.
It is evident that adaptation effects are already riddled with problems, such as reliable cost estimates, the honouring of pledges and the disbursement of funds.
As long as developed countries and development agencies procrastinate on the issues, it is the developing countries that will feel the detriment of climate variability hardest.
An analysis of the various sources of adaptation funds, combined with the pledged ODA funding, indicates clearly that expected cost and expected funding do not match.
Adaptation costs have been underestimated by at least 50 per cent and it means that separating adaptation funding from development funding will become even more complicated.
The MDGs relating to poverty reduction, increased primary school enrolment, maternal health Climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries Td, 7(2), December 2011, pp.
351366.
379 and environmental protection are all indirectly affected by the outcome of climate change and will likely see Africa sliding down the scale of development indicators.
The following policy changes are, therefore, recommended: • Funding for adaptation in developing countries must be “sufficient and sustained” (UNFCCC 2007:6).
An important aspect of funding is that despite the shortfalls, it is also very cumbersome and lengthy for developing countries to access these funds.
It is crucial that funding for adaptation be both uninterrupted and adequate (UNFCCC 2007).
• The estimated costs of adaptation must be separated from the other costs required for development (UN 2010).
The huge deficit in funding for adaptation in developing countries means that financing is a key issue in climate negotiations (Africa Partnership Forum 2009).
• In the Bali Action Plan (BAP) the possibility of obtaining new avenues of funding was suggested.
New sources of finances from the international arena are needed to cater for climate change in Africa (Africa Partnership Forum 2009).
• Since a major part of funding resources is outside the UNFCCC framework, in the short term, it would be a challenge to bring it under the UNFCCC which is what developing countries want (Africa Partnership Forum 2009).
• Developed countries need to ensure that they provide sufficient funds/resources in line with the stipulations of the BAP.
Ensure a just allocation of international adaptation funding so that the African countries stand to meet the challenges of climate change (Africa Partnership Forum 2009).
Bibliography Adger, W., Arnell, N. & Tompkins.
E. 2005.
“Successful Adaptation to Climate Change Across Scales.”Global Environmental Change (15):88-86.
Africa Partnership Forum (AFP).
2009.
Financial Resources and Investment for Climate Change.
Special Session on Climate Change, 3 September 2009, Ethiopia.
African Union (AU) Commission, United Nations Economic and Social Council & Economic Commission for Africa.
2010.
Climate Change and Development in Africa.
Meeting of the Committee of Exports of the 3rd Joint Annual Meetings of the AU Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance and ECA Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 25-28 March 2010, Malawi.
Agrawla, S. & Fankhauser, S. 2008.
Economic Aspects of Adaptation to Climate Change: Costs, Benefits and Policy Instruments.
OECD.
Paris.
Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 380 Ashton, P. J.
2002.
“Avoiding Conflicts Over Africa’s Water Resources.” Ambio 31(3):236242.
Ayers, J.
& Huq, S. 2008.
“Supporting Adaptation to Climate Change: What Role for Official Development Assistance?” Annual Conference 2008: Development’s Invisible Hands: Development Futures in a Changing Climate.
8 November 2008. International Institute for Environment and Development: London.
Boko, M., Niang, I., Nyong, A., Vogel, C., Githeko, A., Medany, M., Osman-Elasha, B., Tabo, R. & Yanda, P. 2007.
“Africa.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.” Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Parry, M.L., Cnziani, O.F., Palutikof, J. P., van der Linden, P. J.
& Hanson, C.E.
(eds).
Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge UK, 433-467.
BusinessGreen.
2009.
“African Union to call for $67 bn a year in climate funding.” Http://www.BusinessGreen.com Christensen, J.H., Hewitson, B., Busuioc, A., Chen, A., Gao, X., Held, I., Jones, R., Kolli, R.K., Kwon, W-T., Laprise, R., Magana Rueda, V., Mearns, L., Menendez, C.G., Raisanen, J., Rinke, A., Sarr, A.
& Whetton, P. 2007.
“Regional Climate Projections.” Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Soloman, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K.B., Tognor, M., & Miller, H.L.
(eds).
Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge.
De Wit.
M. & Jacek, S. 2006.
“Changes in Surface Water Supply Across Africa with Predicted Climate Change.” Africa Earth Observatory Network (AEON), University of Cape Town.
South Africa.
European Environment Agency (EEA).
2007.
Climate change: the Cost of Inaction and the Cost of Adaptation.
Technical Report no 13.
EEA.
Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. & Kovats, S. 2004.
Floods, health and climate change: a strategic review.
Working Paper No.63, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research.
Fischer, G., Mahendra, S. & van Velthuizen, H. 2002.
Climate Change and Agricultural Variability.
A special report on Climate Change and Agricultural Vulnerability, Contribution to the World Summit on Sustainable Development.
Johannesburg 2002.
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
2003.
World Agriculture: Towards 2015/2030An FAO Perspective.
FAO.
Rome.
Guernier, V., Hochberg, M., & Guergan, J-F. 2004.
“Ecology drives the worldwide distribution of human disease.” Plos Biology, 2(6):740-746.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2007.
Fourth Assessment Report: A Report of working Group I of the IPCC.
http://www.ipcc.ch McMichael, A.J., Campbell-Lendrum, D., Kovats, R.S., Edwards, S., Wilkinson, P., Edmonds, N., Nicholls, N., Hale, S., Tanser, F.C., Le Suefur, D., Schilesinger, M., Andronove, N.2004.
“Climate Change in Comparative Quantification Health Risks: Global and Regional Burden of Disease due to Selected Major Risk Factors”.
Ezzati, Climate change and adaptation funding in developing countries Td, 7(2), December 2011, pp.
351366.
381 M., Lopez, A.D. Rodgers, A.
& Murray, C.J.
(eds).
Ch 20:1543-1649.
World Health Organization.
Geneva.
Meehl, G.A., Stocker, T.F., Collins, W.D., Fredlingstein, P., Gaye, A.T., Gregory, J.M., Kitoh, A., Knutti, R., Murphy, J.M., Noda, A., Raper, S.C.B., Waterson, I.G., Weaver, A. J.& Zhao, Z-C. 2007.
“Global Climate Projections.
In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.” Contribution of the Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K.B., Tignor, M. & Miller, H.L.
(eds).
Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge.
Nicholls, R.J. 2004.
Coastal flooding and wetland loss in the 21st century: changes under the SRES climate and socio-economic scenarios.
Global Environmental Change.
14:69-86.
Nkomo, J., Nyong, A.
& Kulindwa, K. 2006.
“The Impacts of Climate Change in Africa”.
Final Report submitted to the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk...Chapter Noy, I.
2009.
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Disaster.” Journal of Development Economics (88):221-231.
O’Brien, K. 2006.
“The Economics of Adaptation”.
Stern Review Workshop .http… Oxfam International.
2007.
“Briefing Note 4 December 2007: Financing Adaptation .
Why the UN’s Bali Climate Conference must mandate the search for new funds.” http://www.oxfam.org _____________ 2010.
“Briefing note 31 May 2010: Climate Finance Post-Copenhagen.
The S100 bn questions.” http://www.oxfam.org Parry, M., Arnell, N., Berry, P., Dodman, D., Frankhauser, S. & Hope, C. 2009.
Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of the UNFCCC and Other Recent Estimates.
International Institute for Environment and Development and Grantham Institute for Climate Change: London.
Sheppard, C.R.C.
2003.
Predicted recurrences of mass coral mortality in the Indian Ocean.
Nature.
425:294-297.
Stanton, E. & Ackerman, F. 2009.
“Climate and Development Economics: Balancing Science, Politics and Equity”.
Natural Resources Forum 33:262-273.
Stern, N. 2006.
The Stern Review on the Economic Effects of Climate Change.
CUP: Cambridge.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
2004.
Adaptation to Climate Change: Doing Development Differently.
UNDP.
http://www.undp.org ___________________ 2006.
Human Development Report 2006.
Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis.
UNDP.
http://www.undp.org/hrd2006/report.cfm United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).
2010.
Economic Report on Africa 2010.
Promoting high-level sustainable growth to reduce unemployment in Africa.
www.uneca,org United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP).
2007.Global outlook for ice and snow.
Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen 382 http://www.unep.org/geo/geo_ice/> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
2007.
Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation in Developing Countries.
UN Office.
Geneva.
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/sbi/eng/02.pdf World Bank.
2010.
The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change.
A Synthesis Report.
World Bank: Washington.
World Health Organization (WHO) 2004.
The World Health Report 2003 – Shaping the Future.
WHO.
Geneva.
http://www.who.int
42 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 Research on World Agricultural Economy https://ojs.nassg.org/index.php/rwae Copyright © 2022 by the author(s).
Published by NanYang Academy of Sciences Pte.
Ltd.
This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) License.
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
*Corresponding Author: Ajay Kumar Singh, School of Liberal Arts and Management, DIT University, Dehradun, Uttarakhand, 248009, India; Email: a.k.seeku@gmail.com; kumar.ajay_3@yahoo.com.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.36956/rwae.v3i1.498 Received: 28 February 2022; Received in revised form: 25 March 2022; Accepted: 28 March 2022; Published: 31 March 2022 Citation: Singh, A.K., Kumar, S., Ashraf, S.N., et al., 2022.
Implications of Farmer’s Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change in Agricultural Sector of Gujarat: Experience from Farm Level Data.
Research on World Agricultural Economy.
3(1), 498. http://dx.doi.org/10.36956/rwae.v3i1.498 1.
Introduction Climate change has been increased the high uncertainty in production and vulnerability in the agricultural sector world-wide [1-3].
Recently, climate change has been observed in terms of rising minimum and maximum temperature, and change in rainfall pattern and precipitation [1,2,4,5].
High fluctuation in floods, droughts and natural disasters clearly show that climatic factors are changing due to anthropogenic and natural activities at global level [5,6].
It is likely to be expected that the impact of climate change will be more on socio-economic development and production activities of the agricultural sector in most developing RESEARCH ARTICLE Implications of Farmer’s Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change in Agricultural Sector of Gujarat: Experience from Farm Level Data Ajay Kumar Singh1*● Sanjeev Kumar1● Shah Nawaz Ashraf2● Bhim Jyoti3● 1.
School of Liberal Arts and Management, DIT University, Dehradun, Uttarakhand, 248009, India 2.
Entrepreneurship Development Institute of India Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India 3.
V.C.S.G., UUHF, College of Forestry, Ranichauri, Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand, India Abstract: This study examined the farmer’s perception on climate change and adaptation strategies to mitigate the adverse effect of climate change in the agricultural sector of Gujarat.
It used farm level information of 400 farmers who were purposely selected from 8 districts.
Thereupon, linear, non-linear and log-linear production function models were used to examine the impact of climate change, farmer’s adaptation strategies and technological change on agricultural production in Gujarat.
The descriptive and empirical results specify that adaptation strategies (i.e., change in showing time of crops, mixed cropping pattern, irrigation facilities, application of green and organic fertilizer, hybrid varieties of seeds, dampening of seed before planting, climate tolerate crops, organic farming and technology) have a positive impact on agricultural production.
Thus, farmer’s adaptation strategies are useful to mitigate the negative impact of climate change in the agricultural sector.
Maximum temperature and minimum temperature, precipitation and rainfall have a negative impact on agricultural production.
However, the impact of these factors seemed positive in the agricultural sector when farmers apply aforementioned adaptation strategies in cultivation.
Family size, education level of farmers, annual income of farmers, arable land, irrigated area, cost of technology, appropriate technology and financial support from government have a positive contribution to increase agricultural production in Gujarat.
Keywords: Adaptation strategies; Agricultural sector; Technology; Climate change; Gujarat; India; Mitigation approach mailto:kumar.ajay_3@yahoo.com http://dx.doi.org/10.36956/rwae.v3i1.498 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0660-6743 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0429-0925 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0660-6743 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2074-1071 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0660-6743 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5410-5404 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0660-6743 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6960-5097 43 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 counties including India.
Climate change would be caused to increase the vulnerability of 60% of the population who depend upon the agricultural sector in India [2,5].
There are many reasons which would increase high vulnerability for agricultural sector due to large dependency of population on agricultural sector; large dependency of sugarcane, oilseed and textile industries on agricultural sector in India [5].
India is located at low latitude and it has small size of land holdings with low economic capacity of farmers who are unable to maintain their income due to climate change.
There exists high illiteracy of farmers, ineffective mechanism of government policies towards climate change, low technological upgradation of farmers and ineffective supports from agricultural extension services in India [5,7,8].
Subsequently, climate change will create several obstacles to increase sustainability in production and yield, food and health security, farmers’ income and trust in farming, price stability, rural development, and socio-economic development of farming and nonfarming communities in India [2,9,10].
Also, poverty, income inequality, food insecurity, nutritional insecurity and hunger may increase due to climate change in India [2,9,10].
Therefore, it would be a major challenge for agronomists, agricultural scientists and policy makers to implement an effective plan to increase agricultural sustainability in the presence of climate change and changing socio-economic activities of the people in India [10,11].
Agriculture sector is useful to ensure food security, nutritional security and poverty alleviation in India [5,8].
It is useful to generate employment for a large segment of society [5].
Agriculture sector also provides the raw material for several agriculture industries.
Thus, it is useful to increase industrial growth and economic development.
It also provides fodder for livestock which meet the requirement of milk and raw material for dairy based industries in India.
Moreover, the agricultural sector is useful to produce surplus labour for the industries, provide the raw material for the agriculture industries, generate revenue for the government as a tax and foreign currency, create capital assets and develop rural infrastructure.
Most specifically, in India, agricultural sector is useful to: meet the food requirement of present and growing population; provide jobs to large segment of society and increase the exports of many products such as tea, sugar, jute, coffee, etc.
[5,12].
India is also a main producer of several crops in the world.
For example, it is the largest producer of milk, jute; second largest in wheat, rice, groundnut, vegetables, fruits, sugar cane, and potatoes, onion; third in tea, rapeseed and tobacco production in the world.
Agriculture and allied sectors are the mainstay of the Indian economy.
This sector also creates the demand for many industrial products such as fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural instruments and machines.
India has a first position in total pulses, jute, buffaloes and milk production in the world.
India also has a 2nd position in arable land, total cultivated land and participation of economic active population in agriculture.
India is a major producer of wheat, rice, groundnut, vegetables & melons, fruits (excluding melons), potatoes, onion (dry), sugarcane, cotton, cattle, and goats in the world.
India has a 3rd position in many agricultural products such as total cereals, rapeseed, tea, tobacco leaves, sheep, and eggs production.
India has a 5th position in chicken which meets the nutritional security of most of the population.
India also has a 7th position in coffee (green) production in the world.
It is also the 2nd largest producer of flowers after China.
It is also a leading producer, consumer and exporter for spices and plantation crops like tea and coffee at global level.
In India, the agricultural sector has a significant contribution to increasing sustainable livelihood security of farming and non-farming communities.
However, climate change is causing a high vulnerability for the Indian agricultural sector.
In this regard, existing studies estimated the impact of climate change in the Indian agricultural sector in several ways.
Most studies have focused to examine the climate change impact on production and yield of food-grain and commercial crops in India [1,5,8,11-30].
Other studies also assessed the influence of climatic and non-climatic factors on productivity and performance of agricultural sector in India [31-38].
Few studies examined the association of climate vulnerability with farmer’s suicides; climate change and human health; and agricultural practices and ecosystem services in India [2,9,39].
Some studies have also assessed the role of organic farming in the agricultural sector [40,41].
Existing researchers also observed the farmer’s perception and natural disaster, and mitigation approach in the Indian agricultural sector [42-45].
Some studies have examined the importance of organic farming and credit facilities in Indian agricultural sector [46-51].
Descriptive and empirical findings of aforesaid studies concluded that production and yield of food-grain and cash crops, agricultural productivity are expected to decline due to climate change in India.
Therefore, it is necessary to apply technological advancement which can be effective to mitigate the negative impact of climate change in the agricultural sector [6].
Also, more practises of agricultural technology will work as an effective adaptation strategy toward climate change in Indian farming.
Technological applications such as biotechnological tools and heat tolerance crops will be also useful to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change in farming.
Previous studies have used different proxy variables to capture the influence of technological change in agricultural sector using time series, panel data and cross-sec44 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 tional data [1,5,7,8,12,19,27,30,52].
However, limited studies could examine the impact of technological change on Indian agriculture using farm level data.
Furthermore, there are many socio-economic variables which may have a positive impact on agricultural production.
These variables may be used as adaptation strategies to mitigate the climate change impact in the agricultural sector of India and other economies [1,3,6,53-55].
Few studies assessed the role of social-economic factors and climatic factors in agricultural sustainability in Indian states [10].
As previous studies have been argued that technology and specific characteristics of farmers can be considered as adaptation strategies to climate change in the agricultural sector.
Though, limited studies could assess the significance of technology and farmer’s socio-economic variables in the Indian agricultural sector [42-44,52].
Hence, this study has a significant contribution to the existing literature which examines the impact of climate change and farmer’s socio-economic profile on agricultural production in Gujarat using a farm level data of 400 farmers.
Accordingly, this study assessed the answers on the following research questions: • What is the farmer’s perception towards climate change and adaptation strategies in the agricultural sector?
• What is the influence of climatic factors and farmer’s adaptation strategies on agricultural production of Gujarat?
• How farmer’s adaptation strategies may be used to mitigate the negative impact of climate change in the agricultural sector of Gujarat?
• What may be the role of technology to mitigate the adverse impact of climate change in the agricultural sector of Gujarat?
• What may be the policy initiatives to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change in the agricultural sector of Gujarat?
With regards to aforesaid research questions, this study achieved following objectives: • To examine the farmers’ perception on climate change and adaptation strategies in context of agricultural sector of Gujarat.
• To assess the impact of climate change, farmer’s adaptation strategies and technological change on agricultural production in Gujarat.
• To provide the practical approaches to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change in agricultural sector of Gujarat.
2.
Research Methods and Materials 2.1 Study Area and Sources of Data This study comprises the farm level information which was composed through personal interviews of 400 farmers from 8 districts (i.e., Anand, Banas Kantha, Bhavnagar, Junagadh, Kheda, Surat and Vadodara) of Gujarat.
These districts were selected based on their percentage share in agricultural labourers, agricultural district domestic product, gross cropped area and net sown area in Gujarat.
These districts also occupied more than 30% cropped area and production of wheat, rice, jowar, bajra, arhar, rapeseed & mustard, sugarcane and potato crops in Gujarat.
Two blocks from each district were selected randomly and one village from each block was chosen purposively.
Thus, 16 villages were considered in this study.
Thereafter, 25 farmers from each village were identified randomly for a personal interview.
Total 400 farmers were interviewed, however, only 240 respondents could provide the completed information.
A structural questionnaire was used to collect the relevant information from the farmers.
The interview of farmers was conducted from 01 October 2019 to 31 December 2019.
Information of climatic factors was derived from the India Meteorological Department (IMD), Ministry of Earth Sciences (Government of India (GoI)) and website of International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).
Farm harvest price of each crop was taken from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture and Famers Welfare (GoI).
2.2 Formulation of Empirical Model Existing studied have been used different variables like production and yield of individual crop, aggregate production of food-grain and cash crops, agricultural production and productivity (monetary value) as dependent variables to examine their association with climatic and non-climatic variables in India [13,15-18,21-23,26,28,30,35,36].
Thus, agricultural production (in monetary terms) of all crops was used as a dependent variable in this study.
Monetary value of production of each crop (that was cultivated by farmers during survey year) was estimated based on farm harvest prices.
Agricultural production is significantly associated with several climatic factors such as rainfall, wind speed, CO2 concentration, precipitation, maximum and minimum temperature, actual evapotranspiration, solar radiation, solar intensity, water availability, soil moisture and relative humidity [4,14-17,20,21,24,26,28,31,33-35,56].
Hence, coefficient variation in actual annual evapotranspiration, annual average maximum temperature, annual average minimum temperature and annual average precipitation during 1991-2015 were used as climatic factors in this study.
Kumar et al.
[12] also used coefficient variation in maximum temperature, minimum temperature and rainfall in empirical models.
45 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 Age, family members, education level, annual income of farmer, agricultural land, irrigated area, agricultural labour, application of fertilizer, gender of farmers and main occupation of farmers have significant contribution in the agricultural sector [6,12,19,27,32,34,36,57,58].
Accordingly, these variables also can be used as adaptation strategies to mitigate the climate change impact in the agricultural sector [53-55,59].
Financial support for farmers from the government to buy new technology or inputs was also used to examine the impact of government policies on agricultural production.
Therefore, aforesaid variables were used as agricultural inputs in this study.
A technology has several usages in the agricultural sector.
Therefore, it is difficult to examine the impact of technology on the agricultural sector.
Previous studies have used different variables such as irrigated area, fertilizers and others to capture the impact of technological change in the agricultural sector.
Furthermore, few studies also used time trend factors to examine the influence of technological change in the agricultural sector [5,7,8,12,27].
Hence, in this study the cost of technology was used to capture the impact of technological change in agricultural production.
While, it measures as an aggregate cost of technology which was used by farmers to grow various crops.
Also, farmer’s perception on appropriate technology was included to capture the influence of technological change in agricultural sector.
Thus, cost of technology and appropriate technology was considered as independent variables in this study.
Moreover, farmers were used several adaptation strategies (e.g., late sowing of crops, more irrigation, high yielding of seed, mixed cropping pattern, wetting of seed before planting, use of green fertilizer, used of climate tolerate crops, increasing intensity of inputs, and use of technology, etc.)
to mitigate the negative impact of climate change in cultivation.
Thus, this variable was also used an independent variable in the empirical models.
Linear, log-linear and non-linear production function models were used to examine the regression coefficients of aforementioned explanatory variables with agricultural production in this study.
Several studies have also used similar regression models to examine the influence of climatic and non-climatic factors on agricultural production in India [5,8,12,19,25,30,36].
Thus, in this study, linear production function model was used in following form: (ap)i =α0 +α1 (cvaaea)i +α2 (cvaamaxt)i +α3 (cvaamint)i +α4 (cvaapre)i +α5 (cvaarf)i +α6 (agre)i +α7 ( fame)i +α8 (edlere)i +α9 (aninfa)i +α10 (toagla)i, +α11 (irar)i +α12 (usagla)i +α13 (usfe)i +α14 (cote)i + α15 (gere)i +α16 (maocre)i +α17 (apte)i +α18 (fisugo)i +α19 (adstfa)i +µi (1) Here, α0 is constant term; α1, α2, …, α19 are the regression coefficient of corresponding explanatory variables; µi is the error-term; and i is the cross-sectional farmers (1 to 240) in Equation (1).
The explanation of remaining variables is given in Table 1.
Non-linear production function model was useful to identify the long-term association of independent variables with agricultural production [30].
Also, it measures that up to what extent a specific variable has a positive or negative impact on output.
Hence, a non-linear production function model was also applied to examine the longTable 1.
Summary of the variables Variables Symbol Unit Agricultural production ap Rs.
Coefficient variation in annual average evapotranspiration cvaaea mm Coefficient variation in annual average maximum temperature cvaamaxt 0C Coefficient variation in annual average minimum temperature cvaamint 0C Coefficient variation in annual average precipitation cvaapre mm Coefficient variation in annual actual rainfall cvaarf mm Age of respondents agre Years Family members fame Number Education level of respondent edlere Number Annual income of the family aninfa Rs.
Total agricultural land toagla Ha.
Irrigated area irar Ha.
Use of agricultural labour per Ha.
usagla Number Use of fertilizer usfe Kg.
Cost of technology per hectare cote Rs./Ha.
Gender of respondents [1= male; 0 = female] gere Number Main occupation of respondents [1= agriculture; 0= non-agriculture] maocre Number Appropriateness of the technologies [1= Appropriate; 0= Inappropriate] apte Number Financial support from government to buy new technology or inputs [1 = yes; 0 = No] fisugo Number Adaptation strategy of farmers (1=yes; 0 =No) adstfa Number Source: Authors’ compilation.
46 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 term association of explanatory variables with agricultural production in this study.
For this, the original and square terms of independent variables were included in nonlinear production function model in the following form: (ap)i = γ0 +γ1 (cvaaea)i +γ2 (Sq.
cvaaea)i +γ3 (cvaamaxt)i +γ4 (Sq.
cvaamaxt)i +γ5 (cvaamint)i +γ6 (Sq.
cvaamint)i +γ7 (cvaapre)i +γ8 (Sq.
cvaapre)i +γ9 (cvaarf)i +γ10 (Sq.
cvaarf )i +γ11 (agre)i +γ12 (Sq.
agre)i +γ13 ( fame)i +γ14 (Sq.
fame)i +γ15 (edlere)i +γ16 (Sq.
edlere)i +γ17 (aninfa)i +γ18 (Sq.
aninfa)i +γ19 (toagla)i +γ20 (Sq.
toagla)i +α21 (irar)i +γ22 (Sq.
irar)i +γ23 (usagla)i +γ24 (Sq.
usagla)i +γ25 (usfe)i +γ26 (Sq.
usfe)i +γ27 (cote)i +γ28 (Sq.
cote)i +γ29 (gere)i +γ30 (maocre)i +γ31 (apte)i +γ32 (fisugo)i +γ33 (adstfa)i +¥i (2) Here, γ0 is constant term; Sq.
is the square term of corresponding variables; γ1, γ2, …, γ23 are the regression coefficients of corresponding explanatory variables; ¥i is the error-term in Equation (2).
Natural log of all quantitative variables was also considered for the log-linear production function model in this study.
The log-linear production function model was used in following form: log (ap)i = β0 +β1 log (cvaaea)i +β2 log (cvaamaxt)i +β3 log (cvaamint)i +β4 log (cvaapre)i +β5 log (cvaarf)i +β6 log (agre)i +β7 log ( fame)i +β8 log (edlere)i +β9 log (aninfa)i +β10 log (toagla)i +β11 log (irar)i +β12 log (usagla)i +β13 log (usfe)i +β14 log (cote)i +β15 (gere)i +β16 (maocre)i +β17 (apte)i +β18 (fisugo)i +β19 (adstfa)i +λi (3) Here, β0 is the constant term; Sq.
is the square term of corresponding variables; β1, β2, …, β19 are the regression coefficients of corresponding explanatory variables; λi is the error-term in Equation (3).
2.3 Selection of Appropriate Model This study collects the primary data from the selected farmers.
Hence, it was essential to check the validity of data.
Previous studies have used Cronbach’s Alpha Test to estimate reliability of primary data [60-62].
If the statistical value of Cronbach’s Alpha Test is greater than 0.70 for an individual variable, then it has validity.
Therefore, statistical values of Cronbach’s Alpha Test were estimated for all variables.
Thereafter, statistical values of skewness and kurtosis were also estimated for each variable to check the normality.
Previous studies have argued that if the statistical values of kurtosis and skewness for a particular variable lie between –1 to +1, then it can be observed that it is in a normal form.
Multi-correlation measures the exact linear relationship among the explanatory variables [61].
It may be caused to increase misleading in the regression coefficients.
Thus, variance inflation factor (VIF) was estimated to identify the existence of multi-correlation among the independent variables.
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was used to identify the presence of heteroskedasticity in the cross-sectional data [63].
As this study used linear, log-linear and non-linear production function models to estimate the regression coefficients of independent variables, thus, Ramsey RESET test was used to identify the appropriate function form of the proposed empirical model (8).
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) tests were applied to check the consistency of regression coefficients in proposed empirical models [8].
3.
Descriptive Results 3.1 Social-economic Profile of the Respondents Sample size of 240 farmers had the significant diversity in term of gender, age, family size, education level, main occupation, annual income, total agricultural land, irrigated area, use of agricultural labour per hectare, fertilizer application per hectare and cost of technology per hectare (Table 2).
The sample included 97.50% males, age of 34.17% respondents were between 30-39 years, 51.67% respondents had the family’s size between 4-5 members, 29.58% respondents were graduate, 26.67% respondents were engaged in farming and livestock rearing sector, 32.50% farmers had annual income between INR550001700000, 50.83% respondents had 0-5 hectare irrigated area and 60.42% respondents used 51-60 agricultural labour per hectare.
Around 64.2%, 89.2%, 63.3% and 46.67% respondents have understanding on economic viability, social viability, environmental viability and appropriate technology, respectively.
Also, 43.75% respondents received financial support from government and banking sector for cultivation.
Only 46.25% respondents were applying practices of adaptation strategies to mitigate the climate change impact in the agricultural sector.
3.2 Explanation of Farmers’ Perception on Climate Change and Technology Based on descriptive results, it was reported that most farmers accepted that agricultural production has declined due to climate change.
It was also observed that farmers were applying several adaptation strategies such as change in showing time of crops, more irrigation, application of additional fertilizer, hybrid varieties of seed, wetting of seed before planting, mixed cropping pattern, use of high yielding varieties of seeds, use of green and organic fertilizer, use of technology, use of climate tolerate crop, planting date adjustment, and increasing intensity of inputs in cultivation to mitigate the negative impact of climate change in this sector.
Furthermore, as per the farmer’s view, application of technology has a crucial contribution to mitigate the negative impact of climate change in the 47 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 Table 2.
Sample distribution based on characteristics of farmers Variables Characteristics Frequency % Gender Male 234 97.50 Female 6 2.50 Age (Years) 20 29 44 18.33 30 39 82 34.17 40 49 65 27.08 50 59 35 14.58 60 and above 14 5.83 Family size (Number) 0 3 18 7.50 45 124 51.67 6 8 79 32.92 9 10 12 5.00 11 and above 7 2.92 Education level 8th Passed 43 17.92 10th Passed 41 17.08 12th Passed 46 19.17 Graduate 71 29.58 Post graduate 39 16.25 Main occupation Only farming 157 65.42 Farming and livestock rearing 64 26.67 Farming and milk production 12 5.00 Farming and dairy farming 7 2.92 Annual income of the family (in Rs.)
140000 250000 12 5.00 250001 -350000 22 9.17 350001 -450000 40 16.67 450001 -550000 55 22.92 550001 -700000 78 32.50 710001 -912000 33 13.75 Total agricultural land (in Ha.)
0 6 98 40.83 7 12 68 28.33 13 18 30 12.50 19 25 25 10.42 26 30 19 7.92 Irrigated area (in Ha.)
0 5 122 50.83 6 10 69 28.75 11 15 25 10.42 16 20 15 6.25 21 25 9 3.75 Use of agricultural labour per hectare (Number) 40 50 60 25.00 51 60 145 60.42 61 78 35 14.58 Fertilizer application per hectare (Kg./Ha) 100 150 136 56.67 151 200 168 70.00 200 250 26 10.83 Cost of technology per hectare (Rs./Ha.)
1500 2000 18 7.5 2001 2500 84 35 2501 3000 138 57.5 Economic viability Yes 154 64.2 No 86 35.8 Social viability Yes 214 89.2 No 26 10.8 Environmental viability Yes 152 63.3 No 88 36.7 Appropriate of technologies Yes 112 46.67 No 128 53.33 Financial support from government and banking sector Yes 105 43.75 No 135 56.25 Farmer’s adaptation strategy to climate change Yes 111 46.25 No 129 53.75 Source: Author’s estimation based on farm level information.
48 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 agricultural sector.
Change in showing date and use of more technology in the agricultural sector work as a better adaptation strategy to mitigate the climate change impact in cultivation [1].
Mixed cropping patterns, soil conservation practices and crop rotation may be better adaptation strategies to cope with climate change in the agricultural sector of Lebanon [3].
Furthermore, technology was effective to increase water conservation, environmental sustainability, farmer’s income, social equity and agricultural productivity.
It was also found that poor and small-land holders were unable to use technology in cultivation due to small size of land holdings, low economic capacity of farmers to bear the high cost of technology, low skills of farmers, inappropriate financial support from government and banking sector, low association of farmers with various stakeholders (i.e., agricultural entrepreneurs, agricultural universities, agricultural extension offices, agriculture cooperative societies), and insignificant skill and technical support from sellers or agricultural technology creator industries.
3.3 Validity of the Variables The validity and consistency of individual variables are checked through Cronbach’s Alpha test.
This test is highly effective to examine the internal consistency of a specific variable or set of variables.
The statistical values of Cronbach’s Alpha test all variables are given in Table 3.
As per the estimated values of Cronbach’s Alpha test, the variables can be segregated in six categories i.e., excellent if the value is greater than 0.90; good if the value lie between 0.80 to 0.89; acceptable if the value lie between 0.70 to 0.79; questionable if the value lie between 0.60 to 0.69; poor if the value lie between 0.50 to 0.59; and acceptable if the value is less than 0.49.
As per the estimated value of Test Scale is 0.85 and Alpha values for all variables were found more than 0.80 [60-62].
Thus, the estimates show that the selected set of variables have consistency and rationality for considering undertaken indicators in statistical and empirical investigations.
The statistical summary (i.e., minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) of the variables is given in Table 4.
As per the estimated values of standard deviation, it was perceived that most variables (except agricultural production, age of respondents, annual income of farmers, use of fertilizer, cost of technology) do not have high leverages.
Furthermore, most variables (except, agricultural production, use of fertilizer, cost of technology, and gender of respondents) have the skewness values between –1 to +1.
Thus, these variables were in normal form.
However, values of kurtosis were not between –1 to +1 for all variables.
Thus, the natural logarithm of all variables were used to convert them in a normal form.
3.4 Correlation Coefficients among the Variables The correlation coefficients of agricultural production with explanatory variables are given in Table 5.
The correlation coefficients of coefficient variation in annual Table 3.
Scale reliability coefficient of variables Variables Sign Item-test correlation Item-rest correlation Average interitem correlation Alpha ap + 0.49 0.41 0.23 0.85 cvaaea + 0.76 0.71 0.21 0.84 cvaamaxt + 0.86 0.83 0.21 0.83 cvaamint + 0.86 0.83 0.21 0.83 cvaapre + 0.85 0.82 0.21 0.83 cvaarf + 0.86 0.83 0.21 0.83 agre – 0.34 0.25 0.24 0.86 fame – 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.86 edlere + 0.54 0.46 0.23 0.85 aninfa + 0.46 0.38 0.23 0.85 toagla + 0.86 0.83 0.21 0.83 irar + 0.83 0.79 0.21 0.83 usagla – 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.87 usfe + 0.61 0.54 0.22 0.84 cote – 0.16 0.06 0.25 0.86 gere + 0.06 -0.04 0.26 0.87 maocre – 0.25 0.15 0.24 0.86 apte + 0.51 0.43 0.23 0.85 fisugo + 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.86 adstfa + 0.52 0.44 0.23 0.85 Test Scale 0.2276 0.85 Source: Estimated by authors.
49 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 average evapotranspiration, coefficient variation in annual average maximum temperature, coefficient variation in annual average minimum temperature, coefficient variation in annual average precipitation, coefficient variation in annual actual rainfall, education level of farmers, annual income of the farmers, total agricultural land, irrigated area and use of fertilizer with agricultural production were seemed positive and statistically significant.
Hence, the estimates indicate that aforesaid variables have a positive contribution in the agricultural sector.
The correlation coefficients of other variables with agricultural production seemed statistically insignificant.
Table 4.
Statistical Summary of the Variables Variables Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis ap 12324 1789244 129299.9 170837 6.91 59.60 cvaaea 0.14 5.02 1.31 0.93 1.06 3.68 cvaamaxt 0.01 0.27 0.10 0.06 0.69 2.64 cvaamint 0.02 0.46 0.17 0.10 0.71 2.78 cvaapre 0.29 8.20 2.71 1.67 0.81 3.09 cvaarf 0.36 9.20 3.51 2.17 0.67 2.51 agre 22.00 65.00 39.98 10.64 0.33 2.19 fame 2.00 12.00 5.83 1.83 0.80 3.75 edlere 7.00 17.00 12.59 3.09 –0.11 1.69 aninfa 140000 912000 531692 159320 –0.02 2.55 toagla 1.00 25.00 9.27 5.57 0.67 2.67 irar 0.50 20.00 6.16 4.12 0.88 3.15 usagla 51.00 86.00 65.47 5.48 0.38 4.07 usfe 143 22452 1897 2398 4.56 32.50 cote 165 2986 2528 325 –2.02 13.57 gere 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.14 –6.71 46.02 maocre 0.00 1.00 0.65 0.48 –0.65 1.42 apte 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.30 –0.51 1.91 fisugo 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.25 1.06 adstfa 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.15 1.02 Source: Estimated by authors.
Table 5.
Correlation coefficients of the variables Variables ap cvaaea cvaamaxt cvaamint cvaapre cvaarf agre fame edlere aninfa ap 1 0.435** 0.454** 0.446** 0.433** 0.453** –0.069 –0.019 0.124* 0.201** cvaaea 0.435** 1 0.858** 0.818** 0.893** 0.864** –0.105 –0.001 0.093 0.200** cvaamaxt 0.454** 0.858** 1 0.995** 0.957** 0.991** –0.112* –0.028 0.180** 0.345** cvaamint 0.446** 0.818** 0.995** 1 0.945** 0.984** –0.116* –0.019 0.185** 0.360** cvaapre 0.433** 0.893** 0.957** 0.945** 1 0.954** –0.115* –0.01 0.173** 0.334** cvaarf 0.453** 0.864** 0.991** 0.984** 0.954** 1 –0.119* –0.024 0.170** 0.348** agre –0.069 –0.105 –0.112* –0.116* –0.115* –0.119* 1 0.252** –0.469** –0.165** fame –0.019 –0.001 –0.028 –0.019 –0.01 –0.024 0.252** 1 –0.448** –0.070 edlere 0.124* 0.093 0.180** 0.185** 0.173** 0.170** –0.469** –0.448** 1 0.322** aninfa 0.201** 0.200** 0.345** 0.360** 0.334** 0.348** –0.165** –0.07 0.322** 1 toagla 0.441** 0.822** 0.977** 0.984** 0.963** 0.978** –0.128* –0.003 0.183** 0.377** irar 0.430** 0.782** 0.927** 0.936** 0.924** 0.924** –0.118* 0.012 0.162** 0.395** usagla –0.030 –0.041 –0.004 0.004 –0.032 –0.012 0.079 0.068 0.091 0.021 usfe 0.228** 0.549** 0.620** 0.619** 0.614** 0.625** –0.118* 0.008 0.115* 0.198** cote –0.049 –0.076 –0.030 –0.018 –0.010 –0.034 0.076 0.081 –0.091 0.147* gere 0.030 0.065 0.023 0.015 0.041 0.030 0.159** 0.162** –0.152** 0.045 maocre –0.030 0.021 –0.067 –0.087 –0.058 –0.053 0.000 0.095 –0.239** –0.035 apte 0.085 0.135* 0.190** 0.190** 0.174** 0.178** –0.369** –0.297** 0.801** 0.262** fisugo 0.051 –0.032 –0.024 –0.011 –0.011 –0.023 0.069 –0.193** 0.144* 0.000 adstfa 0.103 0.127* 0.166** 0.167** 0.152** 0.152** –0.342** –0.352** 0.886** 0.270** 50 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 4.
Discussion on Empirical Results Two regression models were run simultaneously to get a better understanding of the impact of climatic factors and other inputs on agricultural production in this study.
In the 1st empirical model, climatic and non-climatic factors (Table 6), and 2nd empirical model only climatic factors were included (Table 7).
The regression coefficients of explanatory variables with agricultural production were estimated through linear, non-linear and log-linear production function models.
The statistical values of Ramsey RESET test for all models appeared statistically insignificant.
Thus, the estimates show that functional forms of aforementioned production function models were seemed correctly-well-defined.
The Chi2 values under BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test were also found statistically insignificant, thus it infers that cross-sectional data do not have heteroskedasticity.
Log-linear production function model has lower values of AIC and BIC as compared to linear and non-linear production function models.
Hence, the log-linear production function model produces consistent results which were used to provide statistical inferences.
The regression coefficient of annual average maximum temperature with agricultural production was found positive.
Thus, it indicates that agricultural production may be improved as increased in maximum temperature.
The estimate is not consistent with previous studies which have reported negative impact of maximum temperature on agricultural production and yield at state-level estimation in India [25,34].
The regression coefficient of annual average minimum temperature with agricultural production seemed negative.
Hence, it is suggested that agricultural production is expected to be declined due to increase in minimum temperature.
Annual average precipitation and annual actual rainfall also showed a negative impact on agricultural production.
Hence, the aforesaid estimates show that agricultural production declines due to climate change in Gujarat.
The R-squared value was found 0.8298, thus, the estimate shows that 83% variation in agricultural production can be explained by undertaken explanatory variables.
Furthermore, the regression coefficient of family members with agricultural production appeared positive and statistically significant.
Thus, estimates show that agricultural production increases as an increase in family size of farmers.
Literate farmers have more understanding of Table 5 continued Variables toagla irar usagla usfe cote gere maocre apte fisugo adstfa ap 0.441** 0.430** –0.030 0.228** –0.049 0.03 –0.03 0.085 0.051 0.103 cvaaea 0.822** 0.782** –0.041 0.549** –0.076 0.065 0.021 0.135* –0.032 0.127* cvaamaxt 0.977** 0.927** –0.004 0.620** –0.03 0.023 –0.067 0.190** –0.024 0.166** cvaamint 0.984** 0.936** 0.004 0.619** –0.018 0.015 –0.087 0.190** –0.011 0.167** cvaapre 0.963** 0.924** –0.032 0.614** –0.010 0.041 –0.058 0.174** –0.011 0.152** cvaarf 0.978** 0.924** –0.012 0.625** –0.034 0.030 –0.053 0.178** –0.023 0.152** agre –0.128* –0.118* 0.079 –0.118* 0.076 0.159** 0.000 –0.369** 0.069 –0.342** fame –0.003 0.012 0.068 0.008 0.081 0.162** 0.095 –0.297** –0.193** –0.352** edlere 0.183** 0.162** 0.091 0.115* –0.091 –0.152** –0.239** 0.801** 0.144* 0.886** aninfa 0.377** 0.395** 0.021 0.198** 0.147* 0.045 –0.035 0.262** 0.000 0.270** toagla 1 0.953** –0.012 0.627** –0.010 0.028 –0.085 0.174** 0.005 0.159** irar 0.953** 1 –0.006 0.585** 0.008 0.052 –0.076 0.155** 0.005 0.135* usagla –0.012 –0.006 1 –0.025 0.059 –0.004 –0.013 0.084 0.058 0.068 usfe 0.627** 0.585** –0.025 1 –0.058 0.049 –0.072 0.154** –0.110* 0.109* cote –0.010 0.008 0.059 –0.058 1 –0.014 –0.04 –0.118* 0.033 –0.123* gere 0.028 0.052 –0.004 0.049 –0.014 1 0.017 –0.138* 0.011 –0.157** maocre –0.085 –0.076 –0.013 –0.072 –0.040 0.017 1 –0.250** –0.206** –0.274** apte 0.174** 0.155** 0.084 0.154** –0.118* –0.138* –0.250** 1 0.081 0.875** fisugo 0.005 0.005 0.058 –0.110* 0.033 0.011 –0.206** 0.081 1 0.176** adstfa 0.159** 0.135* 0.068 0.109* –0.123* –0.157** –0.274** 0.875** 0.176** 1 Source: Author’s estimation.
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
51 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 Table 6.
Regression coefficient of explanatory variables with agricultural production Regression Models Linear Regression Log-linear Non-linear Number of obs.
240 240 240 F Value 3.71 62.34 2.4 Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.0001 R-squared 0.2429 0.8434 0.2778 Adj.
R-squared 0.1775 0.8298 0.1621 Mean VIF 186.80 294.90 1310.21 Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity [Chi2] 290.47 21.76 493.00 Ramsey RESET test for (DV) [F Value] 1.2 2.13 7.39 Ramsey RESET test for (IV) [F Value] 0.63 0.86 0.85 AIC 6436.572 148.3235 6453.247 BIC 6506.185 217.9363 6571.589 Agricultural production (DV) Reg.
Coef.
Std.
Err.
Reg.
Coef.
Std.
Err.
Reg.
Coef.
Std.
Err.
cvaaea 45841.330 36568.700 0.131 0.104 43998.180 101364.50 (cvaaea)^2 –188.481 23056.750 cvaamaxt 8349013.00 6354368.00 1.896 1.473 8609792.0 17800000.0 (cvaamaxt)^2 –5930011.0 51100000.0 cvaamint –4133836.0 3593001.00 –1.652 1.332 –3689721.0 9909242.00 (cvaamint)^2 1175084.00 17800000.0 cvaapre –88990.100 50729.710 –0.702 0.385 –96476.60 149641.000 (cvaapre)^2 2331.052 13373.450 cvaarf –57433.330 59383.210 –0.543 0.484 –262033.80 177406.400 (cvaarf)2 19506.410 14756.020 agre 121.410 1160.805 –0.034 0.093 –1991.738 8151.804 (agre)^2 24.954 96.138 fame 5123.179 6571.116 0.035 0.077 23979.730 31353.820 (fame)^2 –1362.207 2335.016 edlere 11316.060 8522.278 0.137 0.188 42173.560 39270.030 (edlere)^2 –1490.799 1596.023 aninfa 0.066 0.075 0.030 0.071 –0.139 0.385 (aninfa)^2 0.0001 0.0001 toagla 35396.390 31083.000 1.982 0.656 111783.000 86435.090 (toagla)^2 -2809.722 2860.114 irar 4671.183 8331.863 0.001 0.094 –1657.953 20596.440 (irar)^2 262.135 976.602 usagla –1141.709 1902.503 –0.054 0.256 13779.570 28239.620 (usagla)^2 –111.729 211.720 usfe –5.202 5.503 –0.093 0.057 –17.356 17.709 (usfe)^2 0.001 0.001 cote –16.201 32.478 0.018 0.101 193.371 157.366 (cote)^2 –0.047 0.035 gere –5438.471 73695.370 0.085 0.153 1662.428 77573.580 maocre –8411.764 23138.330 0.006 0.047 –15066.40 24561.350 apte –33323.750 74370.400 0.059 0.152 –21031.70 78118.480 fisugo 24488.180 22326.880 0.053 0.045 20175.710 23500.990 adstfa –38325.670 59798.980 0.046 0.112 –4510.820 65286.770 Con.
Coef.
–45654.170 189386.200 10.213 1.931 –905897.0 1011192.00 Source: Author’s estimation.
52 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 technology and various inputs and their usages in cultivation [5,6].
Subsequently, the education level of farmers showed a positive impact on agricultural production.
Furthermore, educated farmers have more skills as compared to uneducated farmers.
Annual income of the farmers has a positive impact on agricultural production.
Cultivation is not possible without arable land [12].
Therefore, it is a most significant input for cultivation.
The estimate also exhibited the positive impact of total agricultural land on agricultural production.
Irrigated area is a crucial input for farming.
Subsequently, agricultural production will increase as an increase in irrigated area.
The regression coefficient of irrigated area with agricultural production was also observed positive in this study.
A group of researchers have claimed that irrigated area produce has high yield in cultivation [7,5,8,12,18,21].
The regression coefficient of use of fertilizer per hectare land with agricultural production was found positive.
Hence, recommended application of fertilizer in cultivation may be effective to increase yield of crops and agricultural production [5].
Otherwise, it may be caused to reduce crop yield due to decline in soil fertility and quality in log-run.
The cost of technology per hectare of land has a positive impact on agricultural production.
The estimate can be justified that technological advancement would be useful to increase agricultural production.
Previous literature have also observed positive influence of technology on agricultural production [64,65].
Subsequently, agricultural production increases as use of appropriate technology in cultivation increase.
The regression coefficient of gender of respondents with agricultural production was found positive.
Thus, the estimate provides evidence that male farmers have a more contribution in agricultural production activities as compared to females.
Occupation of farmers has a significant impact on agricultural production.
Age of farmers has a negative impact on agricultural production.
It may happen due to decrease in the contribution of farmers when their age increases.
The regression coefficient of financial support for farmers from the government with agricultural production appeared positive.
It can be useful to increase the economic capacity of the farmers to buy new technology, seeds, fertilizer and other inputs for farming.
Therefore, it is obvious that financial support for farmers from the government and banking sector will be useful to increase agricultural production [46].
The descriptive results also specify that the farmers were applying different adaptation strategies to mitigate the negative climate change impact in farming.
Therefore, this study also assessed the influence of farmer’s adaptation strategies on agricultural production.
The regression coefficient of adaptation strategies with agricultural production was observed positive.
Thus, the estimate implies that adaptation strategies are found useful to mitigate the negative consequences to climate change in the agricultural sector [10,42-44].
Human resources play a crucial role in farming.
Therefore, the use of agricultural labor per hectare land has a positive impact on agricultural production.
The regression results based on non-linear production function, showed that climatic and non-climatic variables have a non-linear relationship with agricultural production.
This study found U-shaped and hilly association of explanatory variables with agricultural production as per the sign of the regression coefficients of original and square terms of respective variables.
Evapotranspiration, maximum temperature, family members, education level of farmers, arable land, use of agricultural labour and cost of technology have an U-shaped relationship with agricultural production.
While, minimum temperature, precipitation, rainfall, age of farmers, annual income of farmers, irrigated area and use of fertilizer have a hilly-shaped association with agricultural production.
The regression coefficients of climatic factors with agricultural production are given in Table 7.
The R-squared value was observed 0.8312.
Thus, 83% variation in agricultural production depends upon undertaken climatic factors.
The regression coefficient of coefficient variation in maximum temperature with agricultural production was appeared negative and statistically significant.
The estimate indicates that agricultural production is expected to decline by 1.85% due to 1% increase in maximum temperature.
Precipitation, minimum temperature and actual rainfall have a positive impact on agricultural production.
The estimates demonstrate that agricultural production is expected to be increased by 1.78%, 0.30% and 0.67% as an increase 1% increase in annual average minimum temperature, annual average precipitation and annual actual rainfall, respectively.
As ground water increases due to increase in annual actual rainfall.
Subsequently, annual rainfall may be useful to meet the water requirement for farming activities and it would be useful to increase the productivity and production of food-grain and cash crops.
The regression results based on non-linear production function model, showed that agricultural production has a non-linear association with climatic factors.
Evapotranspiration, minimum temperature and precipitation have an U-shaped relationship with agricultural production.
Agricultural production has a hilly-shaped association with maximum temperature and rainfall.
Prior studies have also reported non-linear association of climatic factors with crop production and productivity in India [8,19,30].
53 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 5.
Conclusions and Policy Implications The main objective of this study was to detect the farmer’s perspective on adaptation strategies to climate change in cultivation.
Thereupon, it examined the impact of climate change, technology, adaptation strategies and socio-economic profile of farmers on agricultural production using linear, non-linear and log-linear production function models.
Farm level data were used, while it was collected through personal interviews of 400 farmers from purposely selected eight districts of Gujarat.
However, only 240 farmers could provide the complete information.
This study, therefore, provides the statistical inference of descriptive and empirical results based on this sample size of 240 respondents.
Descriptive results imply that most farmers were conscious about climate change and its negative implications in agricultural sector.
Therefore, farmers were adopting several methods such as change in showing time of crops, irrigation facilities, application of fertilizer, and use of hybrid varieties of seeds, wetting of seed before planting in soil, climate tolerant crops, improving intensity of inputs and use of various technologies to cope with climate change in agricultural sector.
Few farmers have adopted organic and green fertilizer to increase soil fertility for mitigation the adverse impact of climate change in the agricultural sector.
The empirical result also clearly enforces that adaptation strategies have a positive impact on agricultural production.
Hence, aforesaid practices can be considered as adaptation strategies to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change in the agricultural sector.
Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that maximum and minimum temperature, precipitation, and rainfall have a negative impact on agricultural production in the study area.
The impact of maximum temperature, minimum temperature and rainfall were seemed positive on agricultural production when farmers were applied different adaptation strategies such as change in showing time of crops, improve irrigation facilities, application of Table 7.
Regression coefficients of climatic factor with agricultural production Regression Models Linear Regression Log-linear Non-linear Number of obs.
240 240 240 F Value 12.66 230.39 6.79 Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 R-squared 0.2129 0.8312 0.2287 Adj.
R-squared 0.1961 0.8276 0.195 Mean VIF 119.84 219.7 889.51 Ramsey RESET test for (DV) [F Value] 0.07 1.22 1.66 Ramsey RESET test for (IV) [F Value] 0.76 1.09 0.79 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity [Chi2] 167.54 9.16 251.74 Cameron & Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test 16.17 8.01 26.28 AIC 6417.886 138.3228 6423.039 BIC 6438.77 159.2066 6461.326 ap Reg.
Coef.
Std.
Err.
Reg.
Coef.
Std.
Err.
Reg.
Coef.
Std.
Err.
cvaaea 47557.66 32340.14 0.1052 0.098 35902.21 87774.03 (cvaaea)^2 –56.79336 18539.55 cvaamaxt 538533.9 2790006 –1.8505 0.712 –8889458 8703948 (cvaamaxt)^2 2.79E+07 2.43E+07 cvaamint 309695.4 1373392 1.7888 0.577 6303996 4414759 (cvaamint)^2 –1.10E+07 7475095 cvaapre –22618.4 23565.76 0.3006 0.178 74503.26 82422.12 (cvaapre)^2 –8941.018 7729.299 cvaarf 4389.973 34330.14 0.6657 0.265 –67738.63 94526.53 (cvaarf)2 6003.597 8127.961 Con.
Coef.
5370.183 19154.23 9.4601 1.087 –18326.24 32917.95 Source: Author’s estimation.
54 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 fertilizer, hybrid varieties of seeds, wetting of seed before planting in soil, climate tolerate crops, and maintain intensity of inputs in farming.
The empirical results also showed that family size, education level of farmers, annual income of farmers, arable land, irrigated area, cost of technology, appropriate technology, financial support for farmers from government and farmer’s adaptation strategies have a positive and significant contribution to increase agricultural production in Gujarat.
The estimate also indicates that agricultural production is expected to be declined by 1.85% due to 1% increase in maximum temperature.
Precipitation, minimum temperature and actual rainfall have a positive impact on agricultural production.
The estimates demonstrate that agricultural production is expected to be improved by 1.78%, 0.30% and 0.67% as an increase of 1% increase in annual average minimum temperature, annual average precipitation and annual actual rainfall, respectively.
It was also observed that climatic factors have a non-linear association with agricultural production.
This study provides several policy suggestions which might be helpful for farmers and policy makers to mitigate the negative impact of climate change on agricultural production in Gujarat.
Application of technology is useful to increase farmer’s income, water sustainability, soil quality and fertility, land productivity, and efficiency of agricultural inputs in farming.
Policy makers should implement water conservation and management plans to meet the irrigation requirement in cultivation and to maintain the agricultural sustainability.
Furthermore, small and medium land holding farmers were unable to use technology in cultivation due to their low economic capacity, low literacy and skills, weak understanding on technology, and high cost of technology.
Thus, the government should provide credit to the small and marginal farmers to increase their economic capacity to bear the high cost of technology and other inputs.
Agriculture entrepreneurs, agricultural universities, agricultural extension offices and agricultural cooperative societies should provide the training and technical supports to the farmers to increase their understanding on new technology and climate change related issues.
Collaboration of agriculture industries with farmers would be effective for farmers to cultivate a specific crop which provides them better return.
Farmers should grow commercial crops as per the needs of agriculture industries to maintain their profitability in the long-term.
There is also a requirement to develop appropriate marketing of agricultural products to increase the farmer’s trust in agricultural production activities.
This study develops the conceptual framework to assess the influence of climate change, technological change and other variables on agricultural production using farm level information in Gujarat.
Also, it provides several policy proposals to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change in farming based on empirical findings.
Hence, the present study is a significant contribution in existing literature.
Though, the empirical finding of this study is based on eight districts of Gujarat.
Despite that, the estimates of this study are crucial to develop climate action plans and agricultural development policies in Gujarat.
Further research can be replicated in other districts of Gujarat to check the consistency of this study.
Conflict of Interest There is no conflict of interest.
References [1] Singh, S., Awais, M., 2019.
Climate variability and rice production in North India: A review.
Economic Affairs.
64(2), 425-429.
[2] Gummadi, S., Jyotishi, A., Jagadeesh, G., 2021.
Juxtaposing farmer’s suicide and climate change vulnerability: An empirical analysis of Indian states.
Space and Culture, India.
9(1), 66-79.
[3] Dirani, A.A., Abebe, G.K., Bahn, R.A, et al., 2021.
Exploring climate change adaptation practices and household food security in the Middle Eastern context: A case of small family farmers in Central Bakaa, Lebanon.
Food Security.
13(1), 1029-2047.
[4] Kapur, D., Khosla, R., Mehta, P.B., 2009.
Climate change: India’s options.
Environment & Public Works.
36(1), 34-42.
[5] Kumar, A., Sharma, P., Joshi, S., 2016.
Assessing the impacts of climate change on land productivity in Indian crop agriculture: An evidence from panel data analysis.
Journal of Agricultural Science and Technology.
18(1), 1-13.
[6] Fierros-González, I., López-Feldman, A., 2021.
Farmers’ perception of climate change: A review of the literature for Latin America.
Frontiers in Environmental Science.
9(672399), 1-7.
[7] Ashraf, S.N., Singh, A.K., 2021.
Impact of technological change on growth and agricultural sector in Gujarat state of India: A time series data study.
ADPR, 9(3), 144-160.
[8] Jyoti, B., Singh, A.K., 2020.
Projected sugarcane yield in different climate change scenarios across Indian states: A state-wise panel data exploration.
International Journal of Food and Agricultural Economics.
8(4), 343-365.
[9] Singh, A.K., Singh, B.J., 2020.
Assessing the infec55 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 tious diseases of students in different weather seasons in DIT University Dehradun, Uttarakhand (India).
African Journal of Microbiology Research.
9(3), 3448.
[10] Singh, A.K., Kumar, S., Jyoti, B., 2022.
Influence of climate change on agricultural sustainability in India: A state-wise panel data analysis.
Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development.
6(1), 15-27.
[11] Todmal, R.S., 2021.
Future climate change scenario over Maharashtra, Western India: Implications of the regional climate model (REMO-2009) for the understanding of agricultural vulnerability.
Pure and Applied Geophysics.
178(1), 155-168.
[12] Kumar, A., Sharma, P., Ambrammal, S.K., 2015.
Climatic effects on sugarcane productivity in India: A stochastic production function application.
International Journal of Business and Economics Research.
10(2), 179-203.
[13] Attri, S.D., Rathore, L.S., 2003.
Simulation of impact of projected climate change on wheat in India.
International Journal of Climatology.
23(1), 693-705.
[14] Hundal, S.S., Prabhjyot-kaur, 2007.
Climatic variability and its impact on cereal productivity in Indian Punjab.
Current Science.
92(4), 506-512.
[15] Kalra, N., Chakraborty, D., Sharma, A., et al., 2008.
Effect of increasing temperature on yield of some winter crops in northwest India.
Current Science.
94(1), 82-88.
[16] Haris, A.A., Sandeep, B., Chhabra, V., 2010.
Climate change impacts on productivity of rice (Oryza Sativa) in Bihar.
Indian Journal of Agronomy.
55(4), 295-298.
[17] Jha, B., Tripathi, A., 2011.
Isn’t climate change affecting wheat productivity in India?.
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics.
66(3), 353-364.
[18] Birthal, P.S., Khan, Md.T., Negi, D.S., et al., 2014.
Impact of climate change on yields of major food crops in India: Implications for food security.
Agricultural Economic Research Review.
27(2), 145-155.
[19] Kumar, A., Sharma, P., 2014.
Climate change and sugarcane productivity in India: An empirical analysis.
Journal of Social & Development Sciences.
5(2), 111-122.
[20] Mondal, P., Jain, M., Robertson, A., et al., 2014.
Winter crop sensitivity to inter-annual climate variability in central India.
Climate Change.
126(1), 6176.
[21] Mondal, P., Jain, M., DeFries, R.S., et al., 2015.
Sensitivity of crop cover to climate variability: Insights from two Indian agro-ecoregions.
Journal of Environmental Management.
148(1), 21-30.
[22] Abeysingha, N.S., Singh, M., Islam, A., et al., 2016.
Climate change impacts on irrigated rice and wheat production in Gomti River basin of India: A case study.
Springer Plus.
5(125), 1-20.
[23] Shukla, S.K., Yadav, S.K., 2017.
Sustainability of smallholder sugarcane growers under changing climatic scenarios.
Current Advances in Agricultural Sciences.
9(2), 197-203.
[24] Dubey, S.K., Gavil, A.S., Yadav, S.K., et al., 2018.
Remote sensing-based yield forecasting for sugarcane (Saccharum-officinarum L.) crop in India.
Journal of the Indian Society of Remote Sensing.
46(1), 1823-1833.
[25] Singh, A.K., Sharma, P., 2018.
Measuring the productivity of food-grain crops in different climate change scenarios in India: An evidence from time series investigation.
Climate Change.
4(16), 661-673.
[26] Guntukula, R., 2019.
Assessing the impact of climate change on Indian agriculture: Evidence from major crop yields.
Journal of Public Affairs.
20(1), 1-7.
[27] Singh, A.K., Narayanan, K.G.S., Sharma, P., 2019.
Measurement of technical efficiency of climatic and non-climatic factors in sugarcane farming in Indian states: Use of stochastic frontier production.
Climate Change.
5(19), 150-166.
[28] Kelkar, S.M., Kulkarni, A., Rao, K.K., 2020.
Impact of climate variability and change on crop productivity in Maharashtra, India.
Current Science.
118(8), 1235-1245.
[29] Singh, S. 2020.
Assessment of climate change impact on wheat yield in western dry region: A district level analysis.
Indian Journal of Ecology.
47(2), 1-9.
[30] Singh, A.K., Jyoti, B., 2021.
Projected food-grain production and yield in India: An evidence from state-wise panel data investigation during 1977-2014.
Journal of Agricultural Sciences – Sri Lanka.
16(1), 108-125.
[31] Kumar, K.S.K., Parikh, J., 2001.
Socio-economic impacts of climate change on Indian agriculture.
International Review of Environmental Strategies.
2(1), 277-293.
[32] Kumar, K.K., Kumar, K.R., Ashrit, R.G., et al., 2004.
Climate impact of Indian agriculture.
International Journal Of Climatology.
24(1), 1375-1393.
[33] Nandhini, U.S., Alagumani, T., Shibi, S., 2006.
Economic analysis of agriculture in southern parts of coastal India.
Agricultura Tropica Et Subtropica.
39(1), 279-284.
[34] Kumar, K.S.K., 2011.
Climate sensitivity of Indian agriculture do spatial effects matter?.
Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society.
(1), 1-15.
56 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 [35] Asha, L.K.V., Gopinath, M., Bhat, A.R.S., 2012.
Impact of climate change on rainfed agriculture in India.
International Journal of Environmental Science and Development.
3(1), 368-371.
[36] Kumar, A., Sharma, P., 2013.
Impact of climate variability on land productivity in India: A panel data analysis.
Journal of Earth Science & Climatic Change.
4(4), 81.
[37] Forster, D., Andres, C., Verma, R., et al., 2013.
Yield and economic performance of organic and conventional cotton-based farming systems-Results from a field trial in India.
PLOS ONE.
8(12), 1-15.
[38] Singh, S., Nayak, S., 2014.
Climate change and agriculture production in India.
European Academic Research.
2(6), 8398-8415.
[39] Davari, M.R., Ram, M., Tewari, J.C., et al., 2010.
Impact of agricultural practices on ecosystem services.
International Journal of Agronomy & Plant Production.
1(1), 11-23.
[40] Suresh, R.B., 2010.
Organic farming: Status, issues and prospects-A review.
Agricultural Economic Review.
23(2), 343-358.
[41] Ram, M., Davari, M.R., Sharma, S.N., 2011.
Effect of organic manures and biofertilizers on basmati rice (Oryza sativa L.) under organic farming of ricewheat cropping system.
International Journal of Advanced Computing Sciences.
3(3), 76-84.
[42] Gupta, A.K., Tyagi, P., Sehgal, V.K., 2011.
Drought disaster challenges and mitigation in India: Strategic appraisal.
Current Science.
100(12), 1795-1806.
[43] Udmale, P., Ichikwa, Y., Manadhar, S., et al., 2014.
Farmers’ perception of drought impacts, local adaptation and administrative mitigation measures in Maharashtra state, India.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction.
10(1), 250-269.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.09.011 [44] Singh, S., Singh, A., 2019.
Farmer’s perception of climate change and livelihood vulnerability in rainfed regions of India: A gender-environment perspective.
International Journal of Environment & Climate Change.
9(12), 878-889.
[45] Syan, A.S., Kumar, V., Sandhu, V., et al., 2019.
Empirical analysis of farmers’ intention to adopt sustainable agricultural practices.
Asia-Pacific Journal of Management Research and Innovation.
15(1-2), 3952.
[46] Das, A., Senapati, M., Johan, J., 2009.
Impact of agricultural credit on agriculture production: An empirical analysis in India.
RBIOP, 30(2), 1-33.
[47] Hazarika, S., Kumar, M., Thakuria, D., et al., 2013.
Organic farming: Reality and concern.
Indian Journal of Hill Farming.
26(2), 88-97.
[48] Yadav, S.K., Babu, S., Yadav, M.K., et al., 2013.
A review of organic farming for sustainable agriculture in Northern India.
International Journal of Agronomy.
(1), 1-8.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/718145 [49] Patil, S., Reidsma, P., Shah, P., et al., 2014.
Comparing conventional and organic agriculture in Karnataka, India: Where and when can organic farming be sustainable?.
Land Use Policy.
37(1), 40-51.
[50] Aher, S.B., Lakaria, B.L., Kaleshananda, S., et al., 2015.
Effect of organic farming practices on soil and performance of soybean (Glycine max) under semi-arid tropical conditions in Central India.
Journal of Applied & Natural Science.
7(1), 1-13.
[51] Eyhorn, F., van den Berg, M., Decock, C., et al., 2018.
Does organic farming provide a viable alternative for smallholder rice farmers in India?.
Sustainability.
10(1), 1-15.
[52] Shabbir, M.M., Yaqoob, N., 2019.
The impact of technological advancement on total factor productivity of cotton: A comparative analysis between Pakistan and India.
Journal of Economic Structures.
4(1), 1-24.
[53] Luu, A.T., Hguyen, A.T., Trinh, Q.A., et al., 2019.
Farmers’ intention to climate change adaptation in agriculture in the red river Delta Biosphere Reserve (Vietnam): A combination of structural equation modelling (SEM) and protection motivation theory (PMT).
Sustainability.
11(2993), 1-17.
[54] Pakmehr, S., Yazdanpanah, M., Baradaran, M., 2020.
Explaining farmers’ response to climate change-induced water stress through cognitive theory of stress: an Iranian perspective.
Environment, Development and Sustainability.
23(1), 5776-5793.
[55] Angom, J., Viswanathan, P.K., Ramesh, M.V., 2021.
The dynamics of climate change adaptation in India: A review of climate smart agricultural practices among smallholder farmers in Aravali District, Gujarat, India.
Current Research Environmental Sustainability.
3(100039), 1-11.
[56] Khatian, M.A., Peerzado, M.B., Kaleri, A.A., et al., 2017.
Impact of climate change on sugarcane and wheat crops in district Hyderabad Sindh, Pakistan.
Journal of Basic & Applied Science.
13(1), 404-407.
[57] Asrat, P., Simane, B., 2018.
Farmers’ perception of climate change and adaptation strategies in the Dabus watershed, North-West Ethiopia.
Ecological Processes.
7(7), 1-13.
[58] Diallo, A., Donkor, E., Owusu, V., 2020.
Climate change adaptation strategies, productivity and susDOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.09.011 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/718145 57 Research on World Agricultural Economy | Volume 03 | Issue 01 | March 2022 tainable food security in southern Mali.
Climate Change.
159(1), 309-327.
[59] Falco, S.D., Veronesi, M., 2013.
How can African agriculture adapt to climate change?
A counterfactual analysis from Ethiopia.
Land Economics.
89(4), 743766.
[60] Maciel, E.S., Savay-Da-Silva, L.K., Vasconcelos, J.S., et al., 2013.
Application of exploratory factor analysis to assess fish consumption in a university community.
Food Science and Technology (Campinas).
33(1), 99-106.
[61] Avelar-Sosa, L., García-Alcaraz, J.L., Maldonado-Macías, A.A., et al., 2018.
Application of structural equation modelling to analyse the impact of logistics services on risk perception, agility and customer service level.
Advances in Production Engineering & Management.
13(2), 179-192.
[62] Taber, K.S., 2018.
The use of Cronbach’s Alpha when developing and reporting research instruments in science education.
Research in Science Education.
48(1), 1273-1296.
[63] Astivia, O.L., Zumbo, B.D., 2019.
Heteroskedasticity in multiple regression analysis: What it is, how to detect it and how to solve it with applications in R and SPSS.
Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation.
24(1), 1-16.
[64] Abdullahi, H.S., Mahieddine, F., Sheriff, R.E., 2015.
Technology impact on agricultural productivity: A review of precision agriculture using unmanned Aerial vehicles.
In: Pillai P., Hu Y., Otung I., Giambene G. (eds) Wireless and Satellite Systems, WiSATS 2015, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering.
154(1), 388-400.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25479-1_29 [65] Pingali, P., Aiyar, A., Abraham, M., et al., 2019.
Agricultural technology for increasing competitiveness of small holders.
Transforming Food Systems for a Rising India, Palgrave Studies in Agricultural Economics and Food Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
pp.
215-240. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-14409-8_9.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25479-1_29
Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts on the Geographic Distribution of Fritillaria imperialis L. (Liliaceae) (Turkey) Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae Article ID: 919 DOI: 10.5586/asbp.919 Publication History Received: 2021-08-28 Accepted: 2022-04-27 Published: 2022-09-14 Handling Editor Zygmunt Dajdok; University of Wrocław, Poland; https://orcid.org/0000-00028386-5426 Authors’ Contributions AD studied the climatic conditions of F. imperialis, determined the plant temperature and precipitation requirements, and contributed to the introduction of this paper; FAK developed the database and plant climate suitability model, carried out all the spatial/statistical analyses of the current conditions and future projections related to F. imperialis climatic suitability, undertook Geographic Information Systems (GIS) implementations, mapped the results of the study (Terrset and ArcGIS Pro software), and provided help from a proofreading service; all authors discussed the results Funding The research was conducted at the authors’ own expense.
Competing Interests No competing interests have been declared.
Copyright Notice © The Author(s) 2022.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits redistribution, commercial and noncommercial, provided that the article is properly cited.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH PAPER in TAXONOMY AND PHYTOGEOGRAPHY Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts on the Geographic Distribution of Fritillaria imperialis L. (Liliaceae) (Turkey) Aynur Demir 1*, Fulya Aydin-Kandemir 2 1Department of Urbanization and Environmental Pollution, Aksaray University, 68100 Aksaray, Turkey 2Ege University Solar Energy Institute, 35100 İzmir, Turkey * To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Email: aynurdemir_1@hotmail.com Abstract Fritillaria imperialis is a bulbous plant that has increased commercial value and contributes to rural development in Turkey.
It is widely utilized in traditional medicine and pharmacy, and has great potential for use in modern pharmaceuticals in the future.
As the effects of climate change on this plant have not been documented, this study aimed to understand how climate change might affect F. imperialis.
e methodology of the study was divided into three steps: (i) database development, including the current distribution zones of F. imperialis and climatic parameters such as temperature and precipitation data; (ii) determination of the plant’s temperature and precipitation requirements; and (iii) Ecocrop’s plant climate suitability modeling (PCSM).
As a result of the study, it was determined that climatic suitability would decrease below 20% in the plant’s current distribution area between 2,000 m and 3,000 m altitude.
For the zones between 500–1,000 m altitude, the climatic suitability will be as high as 100%.
Although there are zones where climatic suitability will increase by 2070, the general trend shows that suitability will decrease.
is change in the plant ecosystem is explained by the decreased winter precipitation and snowfall but increased temperature and evaporation at higher altitudes.
Fritillaria imperialis is expected to shi its geographic distribution to lower altitudes because of climate change.
Keywords Ecocrop; plant climate suitability; geographic information systems 1.
Introduction Fritillaria imperialis L. (crown imperial and imperial fritillary) is a crucial bulbous plant belonging to Liliaceae.
It has a wide natural spread over large geographical areas, including Anatolia, Pakistan, the Kashmir region, Iran, northern Iraq, and Afghanistan (Tekşen & Aytaç, 2014).
e genus Fritillaria has a global total of 167 species, 43 of which grow in Anatolia and 19 of which are endemic (Zeylanov et al., 2012).
Fritillaria imperialis, popularly known as “inverted tulip, crying bride,” is generally grown in the cities of Adıyaman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Elazığ, Gaziantep, Hakkari, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Malatya, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van in Anatolia.
is plant grows on bushes and rocky slopes from 1,000 m to 2,500 m. In Anatolia, it is used as a decorative plant, especially in the Van region, for mystical purposes (Alp et al., 2009).
Fritillaria imperialis is widely used in traditional medicine (for rheumatism, bronchitis, asthma, cough, diuretics) and pharmacies because of its steroidal alkaloids, such as impericine (Al-Snafi, 2019).
Previous research has demonstrated that it has great potential as the main active ingredient or additive ingredient for modern pharmaceuticals owing to its primary and secondary metalloids (Al-Snafi, 2019).
Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 1 https://doi.org/10.5586/asbp.919 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8386-5426 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8386-5426 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7856-2789 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5101-6406 mailto:aynurdemir_1@hotmail.com Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis Fritillaria imperialis has a stem length of up to 1 m. Two-thirds of the stem has plenty of leaves, while 1/3 of the stem is leafless.
ere is a leaf bunch at its apex, consisting of thin lanceolate leaves above the flowers.
e mouth is directed downward, bell-shaped at the top of the stem, and comprises five–nine units.
It blooms from April to May.
It is a prevalent and preferred bulbous plant because of the beauty of its flowers, which range in color from yellow to orange.
However, the most characteristic feature of the plant is its unpleasant odor (Demir, 2019).
e bases of the flower petals are white, with pearl-like glands that secrete nectar.
e fruit is capsule type, 2 cm in diameter, with three parts, and winged.
e seeds are flat and tightly stacked in the fruit compartments.
e bulbs of this species have an average diameter of 8 cm.
It consists of two-layered, fleshy, and scale-shaped leaves, with an outline of the stem in the middle.
Protective bulbus skin is thin and sensitive to damage and water loss (Alp, 2006).
As a perennial bulbous plant, the vegetation period of the plant is approximately 4–5 years.
e plant begins the “dormancy period” in late June and early July and remains in this period for a minimum of 3 years.
At the end of these three years, marked by fall (September to December), the roots are formed first (Khodorova & Boitel-Conti, 2013).
is period can be referred to as the “growing and development” period.
e body slowly develops underground and remains in this state during the winter (Alp, 2006; Zafarian et al., 2019).
During this period, the plant is affected by precipitation and is preparing for the flowering period.
Precipitation during this period affects the transition time of the plants to flowering.
If the plant receives a low amount of rainfall during this period, the beginning of the flowering period may be delayed (i.e., 1 year).
e “flowering period” begins in February.
e flowering period is the process when the plant blossoms and creates seeds.
It is dependent on altitude, region, and climate conditions, which vary from March to May (Alp, 2006; Zafarian et al., 2019).
During this period, precipitation, especially temperature, affects plant flowers.
e maximum temperature that the plant experienced during this period was the highest temperature to bloom.
e plants move to the seeding stage aer blossoming, and the leaves begin to produce storage nutrients required for seeds through photosynthesis.
is period is called “fruit binding/seed form,” and it continues from mid-May to the end of June (Zafarian et al., 2019).
Fritillaria imperialis is ecologically and economically valuable.
As with many bulbous plants, F. imperialis populations are resistant to various stress conditions and can easily adapt to harsh habitats (high mountain peaks, rocky areas, etc.)
(Atay, 1996).
However, there are no data on how populations of this species react to changing climatic conditions.
From this point on, it was thought that this species could be an indicator of climate change in bulbous plants owing to its wide geographical distribution in Anatolia.
erefore, this study investigated the effects of climate change on the geographical distribution of F. imperialis.
is study aimed to determine how F. imperialis would be affected by climate change and forecast its future spatial distribution through climate projections.
It is also within the scope of this research to compare the current spatial plant distribution with the results of this study, and comment on the causes of possible spatial suitability changes.
In order to assess future climatic suitability, this study utilized Ecocrop-based plant climate suitability modeling (Eitzinger et al., 2014).
Ecocrop is a database developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 1992 that is primarily used to determine the suitability of a crop for a specified environment.
is tool can be used for crops in any region by adjusting the required climatic parameters as it already contains a library of the environmental requirements for numerous crops and species.
Although this database has been inactive (offline) for several months, the entire dataset of these ecological requirements libraries was archived by the authors 2 years ago.
Readers can access these libraries using the R-tool (ecocrop: Ecocrop Model, 2022).
An assessment of a crop’s climatic adaptability could aid in the development of climate change adaptation strategies (Kim et al., 2018).
e plant climate suitability modeling (PCSM) utilizes FAO’s Ecocrop database of the environmental requirements of a long list of plant species, which can aid in evaluating possible crops to grow in a specific environment.
e mapping and spatial assessment of the Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 2 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis agro-ecological suitability of specific crops can be performed using this model.
Ecocrop modules in soware such as DIVA-GIS and TerrSet (PCSM model integrated) are used to estimate the adjustment of a specific crop considering the temperature and rainfall thresholds over a geographic region.
e model processes the suitability index for temperature and precipitation differently and finally obtains the final suitability score by combining temperature and precipitation suitability scores (Pawar-Patil & Mali, 2015).
Turkey is in an important position in terms of geographic potential because of its location at the intersection of three different gene centers (Iran-Turano, Siberia, and Mediterranean).
erefore, the results of this study will be an essential step in providing an idea of how other geophyte species may be affected by climate change.
Furthermore, this study contributes to future studies using plant climate suitability models for the sustainable use of gene resources.
2.
Material andMethods 2.1.
General Description of the Methodology is study aimed to assess the climate suitability changes in the current plant distribution of F. imperialis under future temperature and precipitation changes.
e methodology is summarized in three steps: • Spatial and environmental database development; • Determination of plant temperature and precipitation requirements; • Ecocrop plant climate suitability modeling (PCSM).
All of these steps are explained in further subsections in detail.
In this study, Terrset soware (Eastman, 2016) was used for PCSM; ArcGIS Pro v2.8 of Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) (Environmental Systems Research Institute, 2022) was used to map the results.
2.2.
Spatial and Environmental Database Development e study area was selected based on the distribution zones of plants in Turkey.
e plant distribution zones indicated by Davis (1964–1985) were digitized for this study (plant distribution zones in Figure 1).
In this study, digital elevation model (DEM) data were obtained to understand the altitudinal range of the plant.
e ASTER DEM images from 2015 were retrieved from https://lpdaac.usgs.gov, produced by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) of Japan (METI) in raster format with 30 m spatial resolution (Earthdata Search, 2022, search term: “ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model”).
e plant distribution zones are also shown in the DEM images in Figure 1.
Two types of climate data were used in the study: • Weather station data – Turkish State Meteorological Service (TSMS) (https://mgm.gov.tr/eng/about.aspx): It was used to determine the temperature and precipitation demands of F. imperialis species.
• Grid climate data – WorldClim (https://www.worldclim.org/): To determine how F. imperialis will be affected by future temperature and precipitation changes, this grid dataset has been integrated into PCSM as a current and future climate dataset.
Weather station data – TSMS: In the determination of temperature and precipitation requirements of the plant, the data of the (i) monthly average minimum temperature (°C), Tmin; (ii) monthly average maximum temperature (°C), Tmax; and (iii) monthly total precipitation (mm) Ptot for 12 months were obtained from the meteorological stations of the TSMS for the natural distribution area of the plant between 1950 and 2019 (https://mgm.gov.tr/eng/about.aspx).
Grid climate data – WorldClim: Temperature and precipitation data were obtained from the WorldClim database climatic data collection (Hijmans et al., 2005).
e downloaded data had a 1-km spatial resolution, which can be used for Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 3 https://lpdaac.usgs.gov https://mgm.gov.tr/eng/about.aspx https://www.worldclim.org/ https://mgm.gov.tr/eng/about.aspx Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis Figure 1 e locator map of the study area with hypsometric properties.
e plant distribution zones indicated by Davis (1964–1985) were digitized for this study.
regional studies.
WorldClim has average monthly climate data for minimum, mean, and maximum temperatures and precipitation for current and future conditions.
RCP 8.5 was selected in this study as the representative concentration pathway (RCP), the concentration pathways used in IPCC AR5 (Met Office, 2018).
RCP 8.5 will aid in determining what kind of resistance F. imperialis will have under extreme future climate conditions with the increased greenhouse effect.
e temperature and precipitation parameters for current conditions (interpolations of observed data, representative of 1960–1990) and future conditions (HADGEM2-ES RCP 8.5, 2070 as an average for 2061–2080) used in this study included: (i) monthly average minimum temperature (°C), Tmin; (ii) monthly average maximum temperature (°C), Tmax; and (iii) monthly total precipitation (mm), Ptot for 12 months of the year.
2.3.
Determination of the Plant’s Temperature and Precipitation Requirements In this study, the plant temperature and precipitation requirements were determined based on the vegetation period of the plant.
In Figure 2, the vegetation period of this species is given in detail.
Figure 2 Vegetation period of Fritillaria imperialis [created based on Atay (1996) and Alp (2006)].
Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 4 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis In the study, the station data of temperature and precipitation obtained from TSMS over 4 years (2014–2018) were used to determine this species’ temperature and precipitation requirements.
In the vegetation period, the months of the aboveground period of this plant were taken as the basis.
TSMS data analysis was used for the Ecocrop database’s plant ecological requirements for temperature [Tmin (absolute minimum temperature average), Topmin (optimal minimum temperature average), Topmax (optimal maximum temperature average), and Tmax (absolute maximum temperature average)]; and precipitation [Pmin (absolute minimum precipitation average), Popmin (optimum minimum precipitation average), Popmax (optimum maximum precipitation average), and Pmax (absolute precipitation average)] (see Results).
2.4.
Ecocrop’s Plant Climate Suitability Modeling (PCSM) In this study, the required input data for Ecocrop PCSM includes: • Plant ecological requirements including Tmin (absolute minimum temperature average), Topmin (optimal minimum temperature average), Topmax (optimal maximum temperature average), and Tmax (absolute maximum temperature average); Pmin (absolute minimum precipitation average), Popmin (optimum minimum precipitation average), Popmax (optimum maximum precipitation average), Pmax (absolute precipitation average), and Tkill (killing temperature; mentioned above) (Aydın, 2015; Aydın & Sarptaş, 2018).
• WorldClim climate datasets include the monthly average minimum temperature (°C) Tmin, monthly average maximum temperature (°C) Tmax, and monthly total precipitation (mm) Ptot for 12 months of the year (for both current climate conditions and future climate projections) (Aydın & Sarptaş, 2018).
In this study, the temperature and precipitation requirements of F. imperialis (Tmin, Topmin, Topmax, Tmax, Pmin, Popmin, Popmax, and Pmax) were determined using TSMS data (see Results) and were integrated into the plant climate suitability model.
Consequently, spatial climatic suitability was determined for current conditions (interpolations of observed data, representative of 1960–1990) and future conditions (2070 as the average for 2061–2080).
e model diagram is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 e methodological frame of the “future” plant climate suitability model.
Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 5 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis Table 1 Determined temperature and precipitation requirements of Fritillaria imperialis based on the years between 2014 and 2018.
Season Stage Temperature (°C) Tmin 0 Average minimum temperature of March months between 2014–2018 Flowering Topmin 8 Average maximum temperature of March months between 2014–2018 Flowering Topmax 20 Average maximum temperature of May months between 2014–2018 Flowering Tmax 25 Average maximum temp.
of June months between 2014–2018 Fruit binding/seed form Precipitation (mm) Pmin 225 Total precipitation of September months between 2014–2018 Growing and development Popmin 570 Total precipitation of January–February–March months between 2014–2018 Growing and development – Flowering Popmax 1210 Total precipitation (flowering season excluded) between 2014–2018 Growth cycle (flowering excluded) Pmax 2117 Total precipitation between 2014–2018 Whole vegetation period e model integrations are Tmax, Tmean, and Ptot data obtained from the WorldClim database that represents current (interpolations of observed data, representative of 1960–1990) and HADGEM2-ES RCP 8.5’s future conditions (2070 as the average for 2061–2080).
e model also includes plant temperature and precipitation requirements in Table 1 (plant ecologic requirements) (Aydın, 2015; Aydın & Sarptaş, 2018).
e model was examined for current distribution zones in the study area.
Current and future climate suitability were compared with the current distribution zones of F. imperialis.
Additionally, the temporal change in spatial climate suitability in the current plant distribution zones was evaluated based on changes in altitude.
Hence, ASTER DEM data were utilized (Figure 1) for the study area.
3.
Results 3.1.
Results of the Temperature and Precipitation Requirements Assessment e calculated temperature and precipitation requirements of F. imperialis are listed in Table 1.
For example, the months of March and June were used to find temperature parameters as seen in Table 1.
Here, Tmin is calculated based on the 4-year average of the minimum temperature in March, which is the first month of the “flowering” period above the ground.
Topmin was determined from the average maximum temperature in March (2014–2018) and Topmax from the average maximum temperature in May (2014–2018).
Tmax was calculated as the 4-year average of the maximum temperatures in June before the “dormancy” period.
ese calculations were also performed for precipitation.
Pmin was determined based on the total precipitation in September (2014–2018), which is at the beginning of the “growing and development” period.
is is because this period occurs before flowering, and precipitation is a directly effective parameter.
Popmin was calculated by averaging the total precipitation during January–February–March within the “growing and development” and “flowering” periods.
Popmax is the total precipitation during the entire growing season (excluding the flowering period) and is considered to be the optimum maximum precipitation that the plant can withstand during the “flowering” period.
Pmax is the sum of the total precipitation over the entire vegetation period.
Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 6 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis In these calculations, the purpose of the data from the last four years was to determine the plant’s recent temperature and precipitation requirements.
Since Tmean and soil temperature (Tsoil) are higher than Tkill (−34 °C for the plant) (Zafarian et al., 2019) for the “dormancy” and “growing and development” stages (plant under the soil), the “flowering” stage was assessed to determine the temperature inputs.
Plants are primarily affected by atmospheric temperature during the 3rd stage of flowering.
e lowest temperature during this period was Tmin, and the highest temperature was Tmax.
During the “flowering” period, if the Tmean is below the Tmin, the plant cannot ripen and does not proceed to have a healthy flowering period.
If the Tmean is greater than Tmax, the flowers cannot survive.
erefore, it can be concluded that this species is cold-tolerant.
3.2.
Results of the PCSM Analysis e PCSM outputs are given in Figure 4 as the current climatic suitability and in Figure 5 as the future climatic suitability for 2070.
Here, suitability is equally classified as • 0–0.25: low suitability • 0.25–0.50: moderate suitability • 0.50–0.75: good suitability and • 0.75–1: high suitability.
e current climatic suitability of the plant is entirely compatible with the locations of the current distribution zones (Figure 4).
Climatic compatibility was zero in the thirteenth and fourteenth zones in Malatya and the fieenth zone in Adıyaman.
e altitudes of these zones were 1,061, 1,487, and 1,028 m, respectively.
In the tenth zone, at an altitude of 1,417 m in Elazığ, the suitability was 12%.
In the eighth zone of Şırnak and ninth zone of Siirt, the suitability was 45% and 50%, respectively.
ese zones have the lowest altitudes (869 m and 610 m, respectively) among the zones.
e climatic suitability of the other zones exceeded 70%.
In particular, the climatic suitability of zones higher than 2,000 m was between 90% and 100%.
According to future conditions, the spatial climatic suitability of F. imperialis has decreased in many zones (Figure 5).
e suitability of the natural distribution zones shied dramatically from high to low altitudes.
e suitability of zones higher than 2,000 m decreased from 100% to almost 0%.
e first, second, third, and fourth zones, respectively, in Hakkari are among the highest zones where climatic suitability may decrease to zero by 2070.
In the fih zone of Van Province, which is at the highest altitude among the zones, we expected the suitability to decrease to 19% in 2070, while it was 71% under the current conditions.
In the ninth zone in Siirt, Figure 4 Climatic suitability of Fritillaria imperialis for current conditions (interpolations of observed data, representative of 1960–1990).
Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 7 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis Figure 5 Climatic suitability of Fritillaria imperialis for future conditions (HADGEM2-ES RCP 8.5 outputs – 2070 as an average for 2061–2080).
Figure 6 e climatic suitability for current and future conditions (A), and the climatic suitability change based on altitude (B).
where the altitude is the least, the suitability increases from 50% to 90%.
e climatic suitability for current and future conditions and the suitability change based on elevation are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6A shows how the climatic suitability of the plant’s natural distribution zones changes according to future conditions.
It was determined that the suitability of Zones 8, 9, 10, 13, and 15 is projected to increase by 2070.
ese zones are in Şırnak, Siirt, Elazığ, and Adıyaman.
According to Figure 6B, suitability will decrease below 20% in 2070, especially in the current distribution zones between 2,000 m and 3,000 m altitudes.
In the zones between altitudes of 500 m and 1,000 m, the suitability approached 100%.
Although there are zones where climatic suitability will increase by 2070, the general trend line shows that suitability will decrease (Figure 6B).
4.
Discussion Plants, which are the leading producers in ecosystems, are among the groups most affected by the harmful effects of climate change (Lane & Jarvis, 2007).
In particular, the risk of a 10% reduction in plant species as a result of variable and difficult-to-predict climate patterns, extreme weather events (Erlat et al., 2021), high temperature, and drought (Aydin et al., 2020), etc., increasing the vulnerability of plants and is a severe threat to living things (Aydın & Sarptaş, 2018; Haşlak, 2007; Lane & Jarvis, 2007).
e reaction of species to climate change, and consequently deteriorating climate parameters, such as precipitation and temperature at different levels, will lead to Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 8 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis deterioration of the structure, productivity, and geographical disintegration of ecosystems (Aydın & Sarptaş, 2018; Öztürk, 2002).
However, these conditions allow some plants to adapt; that is, some may succumb to competition or migrate due to climate change (Aydın & Sarptaş, 2018; Demir, 2009; Denhez, 2007; Erlat, 2014; Turkeş, 2016; Turkeş et al., 2000).
erefore, analysis of the impacts of climate change on plants helps to develop strategic system models and tactical models for future action plans (Eppich et al., 2009).
In this study, F. imperialis was examined using PCSM to evaluate its future climate suitability.
Based on the results of this study, it was expected that there might be significant losses at higher altitudes.
Climatic suitability is projected to increase at lower altitudes, and the current distribution zones at lower altitudes may be the most suitable zones for the year 2070.
e results indicated that climate suitability significantly changed with the altitude gradient of the plant.
e study results may also be explained by the effect of climate change on temperature and precipitation, particularly on snowfall.
Dense snow cover significantly affects soil permeability, moisture, and heat (Asar et al., 2008).
It is directly associated with the active growth and developmental periods of bulbous plants.
In addition, snow cover is of great importance for plants that grow at high elevations, and the timing of spring snowmelt affects the length of the growing season (Dahlman, 2018).
For F. imperialis, spring snow cover is essential for the flowering period, because snow provides moisture to the soil and plants.
ere are fewer temperature fluctuations in winter due to the smaller amount of sun rays, insulation by snow-covered surfaces, and the tendency to stabilize the soil temperature (Asar et al., 2008).
erefore, the heat required by Fritillaria bulbs to grow was similar to that required by the soil in the growth area.
Dense snow cover and lower temperature fluctuations protect Fritillaria bulbs from freezing (Alp, 2006).
Additionally, snow melts more slowly at higher altitudes because the density of snow cover increases the water retention capacity of the soil.
is is how snow cover stores the water required later by the plant and helps the plant to intake it naturally (Dahlman, 2018).
However, records from the last five decades show that, on average, spring snow disappeared earlier in the year than it did in the past, with the most rapid decline in snow-covered area occurring in June (Dahlman, 2018).
Across the Northern Hemisphere, the total area covered by snow during March and April has shrunk over time (Dahlman, 2018).
In addition, the “growth and development” stages of F. imperialis are controlled by seasonal thermoperiodism (heat, cold, and heat).
Lower temperatures (0–8 °C) maintained bulb growth and leaf activity for longer.
When bulb size is regarded as one of the most significant flower quality parameters, Fritillaria fancies low-temperature conditions during aboveground growth (Khodorova & Boitel-Conti, 2013).
As a result, it encourages larger underground organs and flower production the following spring.
erefore, it can be stated that Fritillaria imperialis starts its growth in certain ecological conditions, such as slightly lower air and soil temperatures and high isolations (Khodorova & Boitel-Conti, 2013).
e base temperature of mountainous plants is relatively low when the snow starts to melt.
According to a previous study (Alp, 2006), snow melting is a determinant factor of primary flowering time of mountainous plants (Zafarian et al., 2019).
Plants that blossom in winter and early spring and the ecological chain where they are located are negatively affected by a decrease in winter precipitation and an increase in winter temperature (Demir, 2009).
akur and Chawla (2019) indicated that global warming severely affects species distributions and is believed to be a significant driver of species extinction due to species range shis (Braunisch et al., 2016; Franklin et al., 2016; Hof, 2010).
If a species is also rare and endemic, the extinction risk is higher (Işik, 2011; Mouillot et al., 2013; akur & Chawla, 2019).
As a high-altitude plant, F. imperialis is endemic to this region.
us, future temperature and precipitation changes due to climate change will affect the current natural plant distribution.
Previous studies have shown that climate change affects plant habitats at high altitudes.
It may also cause plant migration because lower altitudes could represent the future temperature range for plants at higher altitudes Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 9 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis (Alexander et al., 2011).
In addition to immigration, Bemmels and Anderson (2019) indicated that for high-altitude plants (i.e., forb Boechera stricta in the Rocky Mountains), the plant’s adaptation rate can be increased by the timing of flowering.
However, this rate can also decrease the duration of flowering.
It shows that, in any case, high-altitude plants will be affected by future climate change.
In Central Scotland, Trivedi et al.
(2007) indicated that snow cover at higher altitudes appears to be more sensitive to climate change, with potentially significant impacts on habitats of high conservation interest.
Alp (2006) stated that bulb growth relies primarily on soil temperature.
Sudden temperature fluctuations in the soil directly affect plant growth and development.
ese microclimate conditions limit the spread of bulbous plants in higher regions as they feed on winter precipitation thus causing them to migrate to lower altitudes where soil moisture is higher and evaporation is lower (Khodorova & Boitel-Conti, 2013).
e projection for the year 2070 supports the thesis that lower-altitude regions such as the Siirt, Şırnak, Elazığ, and Adıyaman would be more suitable habitats for and pose better ecological conditions for the spread of F. imperialis.
erefore, it may be concluded that the plant protects itself from the negative effects of climate change by migrating.
is study showed that the current natural distribution zones of F. imperialis change along an elevational gradient.
In particular, lower altitudes would be more suitable for plants in the future.
However, plant migration and adaptation may be complicated because plants may fail to migrate to future suitable zones resulting in local extinction.
e plant may also lose its ability to combat other species living in the same habitat.
Changes in the habitat or habitat conditions of a species can negatively affect its adaptation process.
is leads to the disruption of species-dependent ecosystem services and service flow.
5.
Summary and Conclusions Fritillaria imperialis is endemic to this region.
Consequently, the current natural plant distribution will be affected by future temperature, precipitation, and snowfall changes due to climate change.
According to this study, severe losses can occur at higher altitudes.
Lower altitudes are expected to have increased climatic compatibility, and existing distribution zones at lower altitudes may be the most appropriate zones for 2070.
e study findings revealed that the climate adaptability of a plant varies greatly depending on its altitude gradient.
On the other hand, plant migration and adaptation may be problematic because plants may fail to migrate to appropriate future zones and become extinct locally.
It is also likely that the plant will lose its ability to challenge other species that share the same habitat.
Changes in a species’ environment or habitat conditions can harm the adaptation process of the species.
is results in the disruption of ecosystem services and fluxes that are species-dependent.
Acknowledgments We thank Dr. Şevket Alp for his support with the ecology and habitat characteristics of Fritillaria spp.
We are also grateful to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their assistance with this study.
References Alexander, J. M., Kueffer, C., Daehler, C. C., Edwards, P. J., Pauchard, A., & Seipel, T. (2011).
Assembly of nonnative floras along elevational gradients explained by directional ecological filtering.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108, 656–661.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1013136108 Alp, Ş.
(2006).
Ters Lale Üreticileri Için El Kitabı [e handbook for tulip growers].
Doğal Çiçek Soğanları Derneği.
Alp, Ş., Arslan, N., & Koyuncu, M. (2009).
Established forms of Fritillaria imperialis L. – A naturally growing species in Turkey.
Pakistan Journal of Botany, 41(4), 1573–1576.
Al-Snafi, A. E. (2019).
Fritillaria imperialis – A review.
IOSR Journal of Pharmacy, 9(3), 47–51.
Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 10 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1013136108 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis Asar, M., Yalçın, S., Yücel, G., Nadaroğlu, Y., & Erciyas, H. (2008).
Zirai meteroloji [Agrometeorology].
T. C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı Devlet Meteoroloji İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü.
https://www.mgm.gov.tr/FILES/genel/kitaplar/zirai-meteoroloji.pdf Atay, S. (1996).
Soğanlı Bitkiler, Türkiye’den İhracatı Yapılan Türlerin Tanıtım ve Üretim Rehberi [Bulbous plants, promotion and production guide of species exported from Turkey].
Doğal Hayatı Koruma Derneği.
Aydın, F. (2015).
Enerji bitkisi yetiştirilebilecek alanların Coğrafi Bilgi Sistemleri, uzaktan algılama ve Analitik Hiyerarşi Prosesi desteği ile tespiti [Geographic information systems (GIS), remote sensing and analytic hierarchy process (AHP)-based determination of suitable sites for energy crop cultivation] [Master’s thesis, Ege University].
CoHE esis Center.
https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp Aydin, F., Erlat, E., & Türkeş, M. (2020).
Impact of climate variability on the surface of Lake Tuz (Turkey), 1985–2016.
Regional Environmental Change, 20, Article 68. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-020-01656-z Aydın, F., & Sarptaş, H. (2018).
İklim değişikliğinin bitki yetiştiriciliğine etkisi: model bitkiler ile Türkiye durumu [e impact of the climate change to crop cultivation: e case study with model crops for Turkey].
Pamukkale University Journal of Engineering Sciences, 24(3), 512–521.
https://doi.org/10.5505/pajes.2017.37880 Bemmels, J. G., & Anderson, J. T. (2019).
Climate change shis natural selection and the adaptive potential of the perennial forb Boechera stricta in the Rocky Mountains.
Evolution, 73(11), 2247–2262.
https://doi.org/10.1111/evo.13854 Braunisch, V., Patthey, P., & Arlettaz, R. (2016).
Where to combat shrub encroachment in alpine timberline ecosystems: Combining remotely-sensed vegetation information with species habitat modelling.
PLoS ONE, 11, Article e0164318.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0164318 Dahlman, L. (2018, September 21).
Climate change: Spring snow cover.
https://snowbrains.com/staging/noaa-spring-snow-disappearing-earlier/ Davis, P. H.
(Ed.).
(1964–1985).
Flora of Turkey and the East Aegean Islands (Vols.
1–9).
Edinburgh University Press.
Demir, A.
(2009).
Küresel İklim Değişikliğinin Biyolojik Çeşitlilik ve Ekosistem Kaynakları Üzerine Etkisi [e effects of global climate change on biodiversity and ecosystems resources].
Ankara Üniversitesi Çevrebilimleri Dergisi, 1(2), 37–54.
https://doi.org/10.1501/Csaum_0000000013 Demir, A.
(2019).
Türkiye’de Fritillaria imperialis’ in Ekonomik Değer Analizi [Economic value analysis of Fritillaria imperialis in Turkey].
Biological Diversity and Conservation, 12(3), 103–110.
https://doi.org/10.5505/biodicon.2019.50820 Denhez, F. (2007).
Küresel Isınma Atlası [Global warming atlas].
NTV Yayınları.
Earthdata Search.
(2022).
Earthdata.
Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://search.earthdata.nasa.gov/ Eastman, J. R. (2016).
Terrset manual.
Clark University.
ecocrop: Ecocrop model.
(2022).
RDocumentation.
https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/dismo/versions/1.3-3/topics/ecocrop Eitzinger, A., Giang, L., Lefroy, R., Laderach, P., & Carmona, S. (2014).
Overview of climate variability and likely climate change impacts on agriculture across the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) [PowerPoint slides].
SlideShare.
Retrieved August 28, 2022, from https://www.slideshare.net/ciatdapa/workshop-crop-suitability-modeling-gms Environmental Systems Research Institute.
(2022).
ArcGIS pro [Computer soware].
Retrieved on June 15, 2021, from https://www.arcgis.com/ Eppich, B., Dede, L., Ferenczy, A., Garamvölgyi, Á., Horváth, L., Isépy, I., Priszter, S., & Hufnagel, L. (2009).
Climatic effects on the phenology of geophytes.
Applied Ecology and Environmental Research, 7(3), 253–266.
https://doi.org/10.15666/aeer/0703_253266 Erlat, E. (2014).
İklim Sistemi ve İklim Değişmeleri [Climate system and climate changes] (5th ed.).
Ege Üniversitesi Yayınları.
Erlat, E., Türkeş, M., & Aydin-Kandemir, F. (2021).
Observed changes and trends in heatwave characteristics in Turkey since 1950.
eoretical and Applied Climatology, 145(1), 137–157.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-021-03620-1 Fitzpatrick, S. (1994).
Nectar-feeding by suburban blue tits: Contribution to the diet in spring.
Bird Study, 41(2), 136–145.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00063659409477210 Franklin, J., Serra-Diaz, J. M., Syphard, A. D., & Regan, H. M. (2016).
Global change and terrestrial plant community dynamics.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 113, 3725–3734.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1519911113 Haşlak, O.
(2007).
Küresel ısınmanın toprak ve bitkiler üzerine etkileri [Effects of global warming on soil and plants].
In S. Gören (Ed.
), Üniversite Öğrencileri 2.
Çevre Sorunları Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 11 https://www.mgm.gov.tr/FILES/genel/kitaplar/zirai-meteoroloji.pdf https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-020-01656-z https://doi.org/10.5505/pajes.2017.37880 https://doi.org/10.1111/evo.13854 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0164318 https://snowbrains.com/staging/noaa-spring-snow-disappearing-earlier/ https://doi.org/10.1501/Csaum_0000000013 https://doi.org/10.5505/biodicon.2019.50820 https://search.earthdata.nasa.gov/ https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/dismo/versions/1.3-3/topics/ecocrop https://www.slideshare.net/ciatdapa/workshop-crop-suitability-modeling-gms https://www.arcgis.com/ https://doi.org/10.15666/aeer/0703_253266 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-021-03620-1 https://doi.org/10.1080/00063659409477210 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1519911113 Demir and Aydin-Kandemir / Climate Change and Fritillaria imperialis Kongresi 16–18 Mayıs 2007 [2nd Environmental Problems Congress, May 16–18, 2007] (pp.
33–38).
Fatih Üniversitesi.
Hijmans, R. J., Cameron, S. E., Parra, J. L., Jones, P. G., & Jarvis, A.
(2005).
Very high resolution interpolated climate surfaces for global land areas.
International Journal of Climatology, 25, 1965–1978.
https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.1276 Hof, C. (2010).
Species distributions and climate change: Current patterns and future scenarios for biodiversity.
Museum Tusculanum.
Işik, K. (2011).
Rare and endemic species: Why are they prone to extinction?
Turkish Journal of Botany, 35, 411–417.
https://doi.org/10.3906/bot-1012-90 Khodorova, V. N., & Boitel-Conti, M. (2013).
e role of temperature in the growth and flowering of geophytes.
Plants, 2, 699–711.
https://doi.org/10.3390/plants2040699 Kim, H., Hyun, S. W., Hoogenboom, G., Porter, C. H., & Kim, K. S. (2018).
Fuzzy union to assess climate suitability of annual ryegrass (Lolium multiflorum), Alfalfa (Medicago sativa) and sorghum (Sorghum bicolor).
Scientific Reports, 8, Article 10220. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-28291-3 Lane, A., & Jarvis, A.
(2007).
Changes in climate will modify the geography of crop suitability: Agricultural biodiversity can help with adaptation.
SAT eJournal, 4(1), 1–12.
Met Office.
(2018).
UKCP18 guidance: Representative concentration pathways.
https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/binaries/content/assets/metofficegovuk/pdf/research/ ukcp/ukcp18-guidance---representative-concentration-pathways.pdf Mouillot, D., Bellwood, D. R., Baraloto, C., Chave, J., Galzin, R., Harmelin-Vivien, M., Kulbicki, M., Lavergne, S., Lavorel, S., Monquet, N., Paine, C. E., Renaud, J., & uiller, W. (2013).
Rare species support vulnerable functions in high-diversity ecosystems.
PLoS Biology, 11(5), Article e1001569.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001569 Öztürk, K. (2002).
Küresel iklim değişikliği ve Türkiye’ye olası etkileri [Global climate change and its possible effects on Turkey].
G. Ü. Gazi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi, 22(1), 47–65.
Pawar-Patil, V., & Mali, S. P. (2015).
Ecocrop model approach for agro-climatic sugarcane crop suitability in Bhogawati River basin of Kolhapur District, Maharashtra, India.
Universal Journal of Environmental Research and Technology, 5(5), 259–264.
Tekşen, M., & Aytaç, Z.
(2011).
e revision of Fritillaria L. (Liliaceae) genus in the Mediterranean region (Turkey).
Turkish Journal of Botany, 35, 447–478.
https://doi.org/10.3906/bot-0812-9 Tekşen, M., & Aytaç, Z.
(2014).
e revision of Fritillaria L. (Liliaceae) genus in the regions in Turkey, except the Mediterranean region.
International Research Journal of Biological Sciences, 9, 34–51.
akur, D., & Chawla, A.
(2019).
Functional diversity along elevational gradients in the high altitude vegetation of the western Himalaya.
Biodiversity Conservation, 28, 1977–1996.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-019-01728-5 Trivedi, M. R., Browne, M. K., Berry, P. M., Dawson, T. P., & Morecro, M. D. (2007).
Projecting climate change impacts on mountain snow cover in Central Scotland from historical patterns.
Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine Research, 39(3), 488–499.
https://doi.org/csq6hx Türkeş, M. (2016).
Genel Klimatoloji: Atmosfer, Hava ve İklimin Temelleri [General climatology: Fundamentals of atmosphere, weather, and climate].
Kriter.
Türkeş, M., Sümer, U. M., & Çetiner, G. (2000).
Küresel iklim değişikliği ve olası etkileri [Global climate change and its possible effects].
Çevre Bakanlığı.
Zafarian, E., Ebrahimi, A., Boroujeni, A. E., & Surki, A.
A.
(2019).
Required growing degree-days (GDDs) for each phenological stage of Fritillaria imperialis.
Journal of Rangeland Science, 9(1), 62–72.
Zeylanov, Y., Kumlay, M. A., Koç, A., & Gökçek, B.
(2012).
Ters lale (Fritillaria) türlerinin Gaziantep Büyükşehir Belediyesi botanik bahçesine introdüksiyonu [Types of reverse tulip introduced to Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality Botanical Garden].
Azerbeycan Milli Elmlar Akademiyası Merkezi Nebatat Bağının Eserleri, 10, 86–95.
Acta Societatis Botanicorum Poloniae / 2022 / Volume 91 / Article 919 Publisher: Polish Botanical Society 12 https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.1276 https://doi.org/10.3906/bot-1012-90 https://doi.org/10.3390/plants2040699 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-28291-3 https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/binaries/content/assets/metofficegovuk/pdf/research/ukcp/ukcp18-guidance---representative-concentration-pathways.pdf https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/binaries/content/assets/metofficegovuk/pdf/research/ukcp/ukcp18-guidance---representative-concentration-pathways.pdf https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001569 https://doi.org/10.3906/bot-0812-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-019-01728-5 https://doi.org/csq6hx Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts on the Geographic Distribution of Fritillaria imperialis L. (Liliaceae) (Turkey) 1 Introduction 2 Material and Methods 2.1 General Description of the Methodology 2.2 Spatial and Environmental Database Development Figure 1 2.3 Determination of the Plant's Temperature and Precipitation Requirements Figure 2 2.4 Ecocrop's Plant Climate Suitability Modeling (PCSM) Figure 3 Table 1 3 Results 3.1 Results of the Temperature and Precipitation Requirements Assessment 3.2 Results of the PCSM Analysis Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 4 Discussion 5 Summary and Conclusions Acknowledgments References
38 Abstract Policy innovation in unitary states relies heavily on the proclivity of local governments to identify and respond to emerging policy challenges.
The article contributes by applying a framework for policy innovation normally used in federal systems to a comparative analysis of two unitary states – Poland and Norway.
The analysis serves to highlight how the effectiveness of horizontal, non-coercive diffusion mechanisms relies on established norms and traditions for local political self-rule.
A key finding is that the prospects of success for ‘soft’ central government steering seem to rely not least on the resourcefulness of the local units.
The study furthermore highlights the importance of historical trajectories for internal as well as external determinants for policy innovation.
Keywords: climate change, multilevel governance, local government, comparative policy analysis, policy innovation, Poland, Norway.
THE RABBIT AND THE TORTOISE.
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY DEVELOPMENT ON THE LOCAL LEVEL IN NORWAY AND POLAND*1 Jan Erling KLAUSEN Katarzyna SZMIGIEL-RAWSKA Jan Erling KLAUSEN Associate professor, Ph.D., Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway E-mail: j.e.klausen@stv.uio.no Katarzyna SZMIGIEL-RAWSKA (corresponding author) Assistant professor, Ph.D., Department of Local Development and Policy, Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland Tel.
: 0048-22-552.06.50 E-mail: k.szmigiel@uw.edu.pl * The empirical data is taken from the project POLCITCLIM (Organizing for Resilience.
A Comparative Study on Institutional Capacity, Governance, and Climate Change Adaptation in Poland and Norway) funded by Norway Grants in the Polish-Norwegian Research Programme and conducted by researchers from the University of Warsaw and the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research.
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, No.
52 E/2017, pp.
38-58 DOI:10.24193/tras.52E.3 Published First Online: 2017/10/31 39 1.
Introduction In modern societies, public policy is to a great extent executed in systems of multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010).
The scope for centrist political control is commonly seen to be delimited by a growing dispersion of authority upwards to supranational institutions as well as downwards to regional and local governments (Marks and Hooghe, 2004, p. 15).
A common observation is that the governing role played by central government institutions and actors has been diminished (Bartolini, 2011, p. 3).
As a consequence, there is a growing interest in non-centralized mechanisms for policy development, subsumed under headings such as policy innovation (Berry and Berry, 2014), policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996), institutional design (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001) and lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993).
The underlying assumption of these and other related concepts is that policy change and dispersion of new policies among lower-level tiers of government are not necessarily or even primarily results of hierarchical central government steering.
Rather, the focus is on how new policies are invented and spread across jurisdictions horizontally, through voluntary mechanisms (Stone, 2012).
Such mechanisms of horizontal policy innovation have primarily been studied in the context of international relations or in federal systems (Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2013), including notably among US states (Walker, 1969; Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel, 2004), among EU member countries (Bulmer, 2007) or on the regional level in European federal states (Benz, 2007).
Less attention has been paid to decentralized, non-coercive mechanisms for policy change in unitary states.
One of the reasons for this bias is probably that lower-level tiers of government are on the whole more autonomous in federal systems than in unitary states (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 51).
The legislative and budgetary powers retained by central governments in unitary states, leave more leeway for centrist control and less for local policy development than what is the case in federations (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann, 2016, p. 8).
But unitary states should not be seen as a homogenous group.
The scope of decentralization and autonomy varies widely between countries (Sellers and Lidström, 2007).
Lower-level tiers in unitary states in many cases enjoy considerable ‘jurisdictional integrity’ (Skelcher, 2005).
Furthermore, public spending on the local level tends to be higher in unitary states than in federations (Bertrana and Henielt, 2011, p. 309).
Local governments in unitary states should, as a consequence, be seen as more than just implementers of central government policies.
Central government controls are not always authoritative, and rely sometimes more on ‘prayers’ than on ‘muscle’ (Gormley, 1989).
This calls for increased focus in comparative studies about how lower-level tiers of government in unitary states contribute to policy development through horizontal, non-coercive diffusion mechanisms.
This article seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding about non-centralized policy invention and diffusion in the multi-level governance systems in unitary states.
Specifically, it contributes by showing that approaches to policy innovation that originate from the study of federal and multinational governance can be applied 40 to the comparative study of unitary states, and under which circumstances.
In order to highlight non-coercive diffusion mechanisms, the analysis deals with an emerging policy issue that has not, as of yet, been transformed into binding central government regulations.
This design choice is in line with Schneider and Ingram’s (1990, p. 524) perspective on changes in the use of policy tools as a given policy area matures.
On a general level, these authors expect newer policies to rely on learning tools, inducements and capacity building.
Climate change adaptation policy in local governments in Poland and Norway is a pertinent empirical case of policy innovation in unitary states.
Climate change adaptation can be defined as adjustment of social and economic practices to match (inevitable and irresistible) shifts in underlying climate conditions (Howlett, 2014).
The need for policy measures to enhance the capacity of societies to cope with the effects of climate change is increasingly being recognized (Keskitalo, 2010), and subnational governments across the globe have taken up the challenge (Jones, 2014).
Local and regional governments are often seen as key actors due not least to their responsibilities related to planning, infrastructure, water and sewage and other relevant services (IPCC, 2014).
Although such policies are promoted by the EU and to varying extent by national governments, adaptation policy has not (as yet) been transposed into legally binding requirements for local and regional governments in the two countries.
As a consequence, the pattern of policy adoption has been found to vary a lot, domestically and between countries (O’Brien and Selboe, 2015).
The absence of coercive measures for adoption of specific policies, as well as the recognized need for developing policies that take local and regional contingencies into account, means that this policy area is highly illustrative for a comparative study of non-centralized policy invention and diffusion.
In unitary states, and in the absence of coercive centrist control, policy innovation and diffusion relies heavily on the proclivity of local governments to identify and respond to emerging policy challenges.
The comparison of Poland and Norway serves to illuminate how such capacities are shaped by historical trajectories.
While the present-day system of democratic local governments in Poland was established in 1990 following the fall of the Iron curtain, Norway’s current system is to a great extent a continuation of the system that was established as early as in 1837.
Local self-rule has been an integral part of Norway’s system of government for almost two centuries; however, corresponding value sets have not had the same amount of time to take root in Poland.
A key point in the analysis will be to what extent the effectiveness of horizontal, non-coercive diffusion mechanisms relies on established norms and traditions for local political self-rule.
The article is structured as follows.
In the section ‘Policy innovation in systems of multi-level governance’ key theoretical considerations to do with non-centralized policy invention and diffusion in unitary states are elaborated upon, and the analytical model is presented.
The section on data and methods presents a survey questionnaire distributed to local governments in the two countries, as well as other data 41 sources.
The results section presents the operationalization of the model, and the empirical results of the regression analysis.
The discussion section draws implications of the results for the understanding of policy innovation mechanisms in multi-level governance systems in unitary states.
The conclusions section maps out key findings on the preconditions for use of ‘soft’ steering mechanisms in multi-level governance processes in unitary states.
2.
Policy innovation in systems of multi-level governance A reasonable starting point for a discussion about policy innovation is the term’s underlying assumptions about ‘newness’ – perhaps the most intuitively obvious element of the term innovation, and a recurring issue in the debate.
From early stages on, it has more or less been agreed upon that innovation does not by necessity equate invention.
In his seminal study of diffusion of policy among US states, Jack L. Walker (1969) defined innovation as ‘a program or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted it’ (p. 881).
A similar approach was taken in early studies of organizational innovation (Mohr, 1969, p. 112).
Later contributions have upheld this position.
In a recent study, policy innovation is defined so as to include not just invention of new policies, but also diffusion to new units, and the identification of new effects of existing policies (Jordan and Huitema, 2014, pp.
389-390).
This broadly inclusive definition seems helpful not least from an empirical perspective, because the initial ‘first mover’ may be hard to identify.
Invention of policies that are ‘novel to the world’ (Sørensen and Torfing, 2011, p. 850) are probably rare in a networked and integrated society.
Indeed, it has been argued that the flow of policy images and ideas in society is such that one would be hard pressed to trace the origins of emerging policies at all: ‘The impetus for the spread of ideas does not lie with the persuasiveness of the originator of the idea (…) all ideas are in the air all the time and are implemented depending on the purpose at hand’ (Weick and Quinn, 1999, p. 376).
But to regard diffusion as a form of invention is not to say that adoption of a policy that pre-existed in other jurisdictions removes the element of ‘newness’ from the term innovation.
As noted by Diane Stone in a recent review article (2012), a burgeoning literature ‘query and contest assumptions of undiluted dichotomous diffusion or unmediated ‘import’ of transferred ideas’ (p. 488).
By speaking of ‘lesson drawing’, Rose (1993) emphasized the creative processes involved in voluntary and smart uptake of ideas from a jurisdiction’s environment, and the resulting scope for adaptation of broadly diffused policies to local contingencies.
The term ‘policy transfer’ is used as a headline for various approaches to the analysis of policy innovation in such a perspective.
In a multi-level context, the scope for local adjustments and ‘translation’ of diffused policies (Prince, 2010) may however be highly variant.
As noted in an earlier review article, transfer of policy between jurisdictions is not necessarily voluntary (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).
Direct and indirect coercion are alternative transfer mechanisms.
42 The former scenario occurs when one government forces another to adopt a policy; the latter emphasizes how various forms of interdependency may cause pressure to adopt a policy that is already in place in another jurisdiction (pp.
347-349).
This distinction between voluntary and coercive forms of policy innovation has later been conceptualized in the context of EU policy diffusion as a trichotomy of transfer types, based on the type of governance that gave rise to the new policy (Bulmer and Padgett, 2005).
While hierarchical governance gives rise to coercive policy transfer, agreements reached by consent or majority are often associated with transfer by negotiation.
A third category of transfer is facilitated unilateralism, which signifies voluntary adaptation in policy areas where member states retain national sovereignty.
A number of voluntary mechanisms for diffusion of new policies have been suggested.
In some cases, policies aimed at giving one government economic advantage are adopted by other governments in order to even the score (Berry and Berry, 2014, p. 312).
Governments tend to imitate practices in governments that seem similar to themselves, for instance in terms of resources and ideologies (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 353).
A variation of this mechanism is emulation of best practice, where governments adopt solutions that are generally seen as successful, regardless of similarity or geographical proximity with the exporting government.
Mimetic strategies can be interpreted as an economical approach to policy development in light of uncertain knowledge about the relative merits of different policies, in other words a boundedly rational strategy (Simon, 1957).
But emulation of best practice may also be interpreted as manipulation of symbols; a strategy for gaining legitimation by giving an appearance of modernity, regardless of the actual merits of the policy in question (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
A more tangible mechanism for diffusion with roots in the early literature (Hägerstrand, 1967; Hudson, 1969) is geographical proximity (Karch, 2007, pp.
57-59) – learning from neighbors.
Spatial diffusion processes are seen as ‘contagious’ or ‘hierarchical’.
Whereas contagious diffusion denotes diffusion among neighbors, hierarchical diffusion refers to the spread of new policies first adopted by the largest cities and locations highest in the urban hierarchy.
However, these types of diffusion often coexist in the same space and time.
A powerful mechanism for policy diffusion is the extensive participation of local governments in intergovernmental networks (Rhodes, 1991, p. 205).
Because such networks may include members from a wide geographical area, they can potentially mitigate the importance of geographical proximity for policy diffusion.
Extensive participation in intergovernmental networks may heighten the importance of the individuals who represent their local government in the network arenas as agents of diffusion.
But the literature provides scant evidence for making assumptions about the relative importance of such ‘personalized’ diffusion mechanisms as compared to other mechanisms.
An alternative strategy for studying policy innovation is to investigate internal determinants for adoption of new policies; in other words, to look for characteristics that may explain why some governments appear to be more innovative than others (Berry and Berry, 1990; 2014).
The internal determinants and the diffusion effects 43 should be seen as complementary.
A focus on internal determinants does not presume that governments innovate in isolation.
Rather, the question is one of why some governments are quicker than others in terms of picking up ideas that float about, and transform these into working policies.
Berry and Berry (2014) suggest that three classes of internal determinants deserve particular attention.
The first of these is related to problem perception and motivation for innovation.
The assumption is that a government will be highly motivated to innovate if a policy problem is perceived as severe.
This class of internal determinants also includes the character of public opinion and electoral competition, as well as other ad hoc motivation factors that can push a new policy higher on the agenda (Berry and Berry, 2014, p. 326).
The second class of internal determinants relates to ‘obstacles to innovation and the resources available to overcome them’ (Berry and Berry, 2014, p. 324).
Organizational capacity, financial resources, economic development in the jurisdiction and the availability of slack resources are some of the main determinants mentioned.
With reference to mainstream policy analysis theory, they note that the existence of policy entrepreneurs and policy windows (Kingdon, 1984) or strong advocacy coalitions (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) may be key factors for inducing change.
The third class of internal determinants relates to other policies.
This determinant is based on the assumption of ‘innovation interrelationships’ developed by Mahajan and Peterson (1985, pp.
39-40 apud Berry and Berry, 2014, p. 329).
The gist of this is that the probability of adoption of policy B will increase provided that the two policies are complementary (A creates precedence for B) or contingent (B depends on the prior implementation of A).
If the two policies are substitutable however, adoption of A will inversely affect the probability for adopting policy B. Berry and Berry’s Unified Model of Government Innovation (Berry and Berry, 2014) combines these internal determinants for policy innovation with external determinants, in other words diffusion effects such as the ones briefly discussed above.
The basic model is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Unified Model of Government Innovation Source: Berry and Berry, 2014.
44 The generic nature of this model necessitates contextual operationalization for empirical analysis.
This is presented in the results section.
The following section presents the empirical basis for the analysis, the method used and specifics about the national context in the two countries.
3.
Data and methods 3.1.
Survey questionnaire to local governments The empirical research in Poland and Norway was carried out separately by the two project member institutions in 2014, based on a shared approach.
The research included a survey questionnaire to local governments, as well as case-studies in selected cities.
In Norway, the survey was conducted by means of the web survey program Beetrieve.
An invitation to participate in the survey was issued to the public email address of all of Norway’s 428 local governments.
The email message asked for the invitation to be passed on to the person responsible for climate change adaptation.
If this responsibility was not allotted to a specific person or position, the email was to be sent to the head of the planning department.
The invitation was repeated three times.
A total of 218 municipalities completed the entire, or parts of, questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 50.93%.
In light of previous studies to the same group of respondents, this is a satisfactory result.
The municipalities that responded to the survey were compared with the universe of municipalities in order to assess potential bias in the data.
The participating municipalities were on average larger (17,417 inhabitants) than those that did not participate (7,220 inhabitants).
The geographical spread is satisfactory, although local governments in northern Norway are somewhat underrepresented.
The participating municipalities were fairly similar to the universe in terms of income level and level of education in the population.1 Because the analysis will contain a variable to assess the effect of municipal size, the bias in the composition of the data material is controlled for in the analysis.
In Poland, the survey was conducted by means of internet questionnaire, but the form could also be returned by land mail.
All of Poland’s 2,479 municipalities received an invitation to participate via their public email addresses.
The invitation was to be passed on to the person responsible for climate change adaptation.
If the responsibility was not allotted to a specific person or position, the invitation was to be sent to the mayor or someone who is on the top level of the municipality’s management.
The invitation was repeated two times.
A total of 1,311 questionnaires were completed entirely or partly, resulting in a response rate of 52.9%.
In light of previous studies to the same group of respondents, this is a satisfactory result.
The municipalities that responded to the survey were compared with the universe of municipalities in order to assess potential bias in the 1 The authors will supply data on the distribution of the sample upon request.
45 data and the set of answers can be considered as representative in relation to types of municipalities and in relation to spatial distribution.
3.2.
Method Empirical studies of policy innovation are commonly carried out by means of event history analysis (Berry and Berry, 1990; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997; Allison, 2014) or other methods that accommodate the use of pooled time series data.
Event history analysis provides estimates of the ‘hazard rate’ for implementation of a new policy by jurisdiction i in year t, by constructing a data set in which each unit denotes one jurisdiction/year.
Each unit is allocated the value 0 on the dependent variable until the policy in question is implemented, in which case the value changes to 1.
Logistic regression is commonly used for estimating the effects of internal and external innovation drivers for the probability of value = 1 on the dependent variable (Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel, 2004).
Event history analysis enables the researcher to analyze varying rates of policy innovation through a set period.
The purpose of the analysis in this article is to test the effects of internal and external drivers for policy innovation based on cross-sectional data for one single year.
This approach has definite disadvantages in terms of analytical leverage as compared to event history analysis.
Our analysis cannot capture differences between early adopters and latecomers, nor can it identify changing patterns in the rate of policy innovation over time.
The key advantage of our approach is economical, in the sense that it allows analysis of policy innovation in cases where pooled time series data are unavailable – not an uncommon occurrence in political science.
The analytical model takes the following general form: ADOPTi,t = f(MOTIVATIONi,t, RESOURCESi,t, OTHERPOLICIESi,t, EXTERNALi,t, e).
In this model, policy innovation (defined as adoption of a new policy in jurisdiction i in one given year t) is a function of four variables that affect jurisdiction i’s motivation to adopt, available resources to innovate, the presence or absence of other policies that may affect jurisdiction i’s probability to adopt, and diffusion effects due to the pattern of adoption in other jurisdictions.
The specification of the variables is described in the results section.
3.3.
The national context Norway and Poland are both highly decentralized unitary states.
According to Swianiewicz’ (2013) categorization, Poland along with Hungary and Slovakia is a ‘type 1’ country, termed ‘champions of decentralization’ (p. 303).
This category has a lot in common with the established ‘Northern European’ model of local governments in the comparative literature (Hesse and Sharpe, 1991; Page and Goldsmith, 1987), which includes Norway.
In this sense, Norway-Poland is probably as far as one can get in terms of conducting a most similar case design (Gerring, 2007) for comparative 46 study of an established western democracy and a country with far shorter traditions for local self-rule.
Norway has a three-tier system of government.
There are 428 local governments and 19 county governments including the capital.
Local governments are spatial planning authorities as well as local environmental authorities.
They are in charge of technical services including water and sewage, local infrastructure including roads and parks, environmental issues in addition to a wide range of welfare services (Fiva, Sørensen and Hagen, 2014).
The Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Norwegian Environment Agency are in charge of climate change adaptation policy at the central level.
Currently, information and capacity building measures (Schneider and Ingram, 1990) directed towards local governments comprise the main thrust of national adaptation policy (MoCE, 2013).
Poland has a four-tier system of government.
Each of the 2,479 municipalities has directly elected mayors and councils.
The 380 counties and 16 regions all have directly elected councils.
Municipalities were introduced by law in 1990 and the counties, and the regions in 1999.
The basics of local government are also defined in the Polish Constitution of 1997.
All municipalities have the same functions and are responsible for the provision of public services in areas such as education, culture, healthcare, transportation, water and sewage systems, waste collection and environmental protection.
The largest 66 Polish cities have county rights, and are in charge of functions normally carried out by municipalities and counties.
In Poland, climate change policy is not listed as a mandatory task of local governments.
Nevertheless, local governments are responsible for implementing measures to protect the environment and the health of residents.
4.
Results 4.1.
Operationalization The relevant parameters for operationalization of the analytical model were identified from a review of previous research on factors that enable or constrain adaptation to climate change.
This review was conducted by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in the 5th assessment report of the IPCC (Klein et al., 2014).
It includes a number of variables that align well with explanatory variables used in the general literature on policy innovation.
In addition to the data gathered by means of the survey questionnaires in Norway and Poland, data on some indicators were gathered from other sources.
See Appendix A for specifics on the measurement of variables.
Dependent variable: In the analysis, policy innovation (adaptation of new policy) is operationalized by means of an index variable – Climate Change Adaptation Propensity (CCAP).
The variable is based on survey data, and is composed by a selection of variables that indicate how far each individual local government has progressed in terms of developing adaptation strategies and measures.
Adaptation is an emerging 47 issue not least in Poland, and local governments in Poland and Norway vary a lot in terms of such propensity.
In order to capture adaptation policy innovation in an earlier stage, a number of indicators were included even though they fall short of actual policy implementation.
The purpose is to capture the relative degree of attention to adaptation in the policy development phase – hence the term ‘propensity’.
In the Poland analysis, the CCAP index was computed as the non-weighted sum of four binary variables taken from the survey.
The respondents were asked to identify activities conducted by the municipality related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
They were also asked if the municipality had produced a strategy, plan or other document entirely or partially devoted to responding to climate change.
Accordingly, the CCAP is coded with values ranging from 0 to 4, representing an increasing propensity for climate change adaptation policy development.
In the Norway analysis, the CCAP index is constructed as a non-weighted additive index based on ten binary variables taken from the survey.
Respondents were asked whether or not climate change adaptation has been addressed in five specific planning documents.
They were also asked to indicate whether or not five specific measures related to climate change adaptation had been implemented; flood protection, landslide protection, building restrictions, erosion prevention and surface water management.
The Norway CCAP is coded with values from 0 to 10, denoting increasing propensity to address climate change adaptation issues.
Motivation: The theoretical assumption is that risk perception will encourage policy innovation.
According to the IPCC, risk perception is positively associated with the probability of implementing climate change adaptation measures (Klein et al., 2014, p. 911).
In the Poland analysis, this assumption is tested by the inclusion of data from the Polish Ministry of Finance.
The indicator used is budgetary expenditure of municipalities on dealing with the effects of natural disasters 2008-2013 (PLN per capita).2 In the Norway analysis, the motivation assumption is tested by the inclusion of data on compensations from the Norwegian National Fund for Natural Damage Assistance.
This scheme provides compensation for damages to private property caused by natural disasters including floods, landslides and storm surges, to the extent that these cannot be covered by private insurance schemes.3 This data set comprises of the number and monetary value of annual compensations in each municipality.4 154 2 During this six-year period, 83% of the municipalities that answered to the questionnaire received direct grants from the central government for repairing damages to local infrastructure caused by natural disasters.
A total of PLN 246 million (EUR 56 mill.)
were allocated.
For most of the municipalities (95%) the sum per head was less than PLN 1,000 (EUR 230).
3 The scheme is managed by The Norwegian Agriculture Agency (NAA), pursuant to the Natural damages act of 1994.
Data on compensations in the period 2008-2013 have been made available by courtesy of the NAA.
4 During this six-year period, 9,250 reparations were made in all, for a total of NOK 876 million (EUR 94 mill.).
48 of the 178 municipalities who responded to the survey questionnaire received payments during this period.
For Poland as well as for Norway, the assumption is that a relative high rate of damages will be associated with a corresponding awareness of climate-related risk, and so enhance the motivation for adaptation policy innovation.
Resources and obstacles to innovation: Berry and Berry (2014, p. 326) suggests that the jurisdiction’s level of economic development, the professionalism of its legislature and ‘factors indicating the presence (and skills) of interested policy entrepreneurs or the strength of advocacy coalitions in the jurisdiction’ are relevant variables for this determinant.
According to the IPCC, economic and financial constraints affect adaptation inversely (Klein et al., 2014, pp.
914-915).
Smaller local governments have been found to be slow adopters of new policies, due to capacity limitations (Shipan and Volden, 2008; Krause, 2011).
Conversely, local governments with larger political-administrative capacities are expected to be more innovative because they are more resourceful and therefore able to absorb emerging policy signals and adopt new policies than smaller local governments.
Accordingly, a variable denoting the number of inhabitants in each local government (transformed) was included in the analysis for both countries.
Furthermore, it was assumed that the degree of interest in climate change adaptation issues by local NGOs, the local press and the citizens is a resource for policy innovation.
Accordingly, the analysis included the variable interest, denoting the respondent’s assessment of the degree of interest in climate change adaptation issues by local NGOs (both countries), the local press and the citizens (Poland).
Other policies: This determinant is based on the assumption of ‘innovation interrelationships’ developed by Mahajan and Peterson (1985, pp.
39-40 apud Berry and Berry, 2014, p. 329).
IPCC findings suggest that a more general prioritization of environmental management is often seen in conjunction with stronger emphasis on adaptation policy (Klein et al., 2014, p. 916).
The Poland analysis included an indicator of the respondent’s assessment of the frequency with which the different issues were debated in recent years in the municipality at the council sessions or meetings with inhabitants of municipality’s authority.
The ensuing variable, polact, is a sum of three values describing activity undertaken in waste management, water pollution and extreme weather occurrences policies, which can be identified as complementary policies.
The Norway analysis includes the variable RWA which indicates whether or not the municipality has considered climate change hazards in their riskand vulnerability assessment.
Such assessments include a broader scale of risks than climate change-related ones.
Data has been made available courtesy of the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection.
Diffusion effects: The assumption about diffusion of policies between neighboring jurisdictions is a staple element in the policy innovation literature (Karch, 2006).
In studies of policy diffusion between US states for instance, a common operationalization is to include data on states with common borders (Berry and Berry, 1990, p. 404).
Similar approaches are less practical in local government systems with numerous individual units.
Instead, we apply a procedure inspired by Knutsen (2014) whereby 49 each local government’s score on the dependent variable is subtracted from the mean value on the dependent variable for all local government in the same county (excluding the local government in question).
This procedure creates a unique value for each unit on the geographical diffusion variable.
The variable denotes the degree of climate policy innovation in neighboring local governments, and is expected to co-vary positively with the dependent variable.
In addition to the geographical diffusion variable, a personal diffusion variable was included.
This variable denotes policy diffusion through participation in seminars and networks by local officials, based on a question from the survey.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix B.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: The results of the analysis Model Indicators Poland b (Std.
error) Norway b (Std.
error) Motivation Natural damages 0.46 (0.00) 0.19# (0.12) Resources and obstacles Size 0.16** (0.00) 0.54** (0.17) Local interest 0.16** (0.03) 0.14* (0.06) Other policies Polact/RVA 0.14** (0.12) 1.04 (0.72) Diffusion effects Spatial diffusion 0.07* (0.11) -0.03 (0.21) Personal diffusion 0.10* (0.05) 1.21** (0.47) Constant -0.14 (0.20) -4.09 (2.21) Adj.
R2 0.121 0.245 Significance: ** = 0.01, * = 0.05, # = 0,1.
The model explains a modest amount of the variation observed on the dependent variable (adj.
R2 = 0.121 and 0.245 for Poland and Norway, respectively).
The results indicate that Berry and Berry’s (1990; 2014) integrated approach is appropriate, in the sense that internal as well as external determinants are found to co-vary significantly with the dependent variable.
Motivation, the first internal determinant, gave rise to the expectation that previous experience with climate-related damages would increase risk perception and, as a consequence, motivate local governments to take up climate change adaptation measures.
Due to the low N in the Norway study, a significant result at the 10% level is reported.
This estimate indicates that previous experience with climate-related damages can stimulate local innovation in the field of climate change adaptation.
In the Poland analysis, compensation for damages incurred by natural disasters also correlates positively with the dependent variable.
However, the results are not sufficiently robust to reject the null hypothesis within established requirements for statistical significance.
Both indicators for the second internal determinant, resources and obstacles, were found to co-vary in the expected direction for both countries.
These results are statistically significant.
In Poland as well as in Norway, larger local governments are found to have higher innovation propensity than smaller ones.
Local interest in the policy 50 issue at hand, however, is also found to be a significant internal determinant.
This indicates that internal determinants should be observed both within the local political-administrative system and in its surroundings.
As noted, the third internal determinant, other policies, is included to analyze how policy innovation in one specific field is affected by previous implementation of complementary or contingent policies.
The results from the Poland analysis indicates that the degree of political attention to issues related to waste management, water pollution and extreme weather occurrences positively affect the propensity for addressing the issue of climate change adaptation.
The Norway analysis, however, did not identify any significant correlation between including climate change in a preceding risk assessment analysis, and the dependent variable.
The results of the analysis of the external determinant in the analytical model, diffusion, reveal interesting patterns.
The effect of geographical proximity is only significant in the Poland analysis, but the findings on ‘personal’ diffusion mechanisms are consistent in both country studies.
5.
Discussion The context for the study is an emerging policy area of increasing political salience that has not, at present, been transformed into statutory central government requirements.
The study indicates that in such a context, the mechanisms that drive local level policy innovation in the multi-level governance systems of unitary states are quite similar to the mechanisms that have been found to be at work in federations and multinational systems in previous studies (Bulmer, 2007; Benz, 2007).
If so, the absence of coercive, hierarchical diffusion mechanisms tends to nullify the differences between these classes of systems, in terms of their potential for local level policy innovation.
This is an important finding, because it demonstrates that it makes sense to apply analytical models developed in the context of federations and multinational systems to the study of unitary states, within certain constraints.
These constraints are posed mainly by variations in the availability of catalytic, hortatory and coercive central government controls respectively (Gormley, 1989).
The availability of these classes of tools may vary greatly between different classes of multi-level systems, notably between federations and unitary states.
Central governments in unitary states generally speaking tend to hold more extensive powers over sub-national tiers of government than do their counterpart in federations.
A prerequisite for applying similar models for analysis of policy innovation and diffusion in both classes of multi-level systems is clearly to determine the scope for centrist control and local level discretion prior to the analysis of the diffusion mechanisms at play.
Because both cases included in this study are unitary states, however, our main analytical interest is about identifying systematic differences between different types of unitary MLGs.
The analysis indicates that internal as well as external drivers are relevant for explaining policy innovation in multi-level governance systems of unitary states.
However, the comparative analysis highlights interesting differences be51 tween the two countries included in the study.
These differences may provide the basis for developing more differentiated theories about policy innovation.
As noted, motivation based on previous experiences of natural disasters as a determinant for policy innovation did not yield significant results in the Poland analysis, but a positive and significant effect was reported in the Norway analysis.
This indicates that compared to their Polish counterparts, local governments in Norway have more highly developed capabilities in terms of acting upon risk perception – identifying emerging challenges and transforming these into items on the policy agenda.
This finding may be attributed to the key difference between the two countries in the most similar cases design used in this study, namely, the highly variant institutional histories of the two local government systems.
Norway’s long-standing traditions for local self-rule have apparently provided its local governments with greater propensities for acting autonomously upon own risk perceptions.
In both countries, larger local governments were found to be more innovative than smaller ones.
Population size is an important determinant for the local tax base as well as for central government grants.
Relative resourcefulness translates into increased potential for administrative specialization and tackling of emerging issues.
Due to capacity differences, larger local governments are in a better position than smaller ones for developing specialized administrative competencies, as well as for processing a wider range of issues politically.
It is noteworthy that this effect is not affected by the different institutional histories of the two local government systems.
One feasible implication is that highly fragmented local government systems, with many small units, may not be optimal for non-centralized policy invention and diffusion.
The results indicate that local interest plays an important role in terms of pushing emerging policy issues higher on the political agenda, regardless of differences in the institutional history of local government systems.
This finding is interesting not least in light of the different results on the motivational variable noted above.
Apparently, administrative capacity and civic awareness provide a boost for policy innovation that is more significant and consistent than risk perception due to previous experience.
One possible explanation for this is that climate change policy is based on rather complex knowledge that does not lend itself easily to policy development.
As shown by previous research (Pearce, 2014), the process of transforming quantitative, science-based climate change data to implementable policies is quite demanding.
The level of local government engagement in climate change policy has been found to be affected by the degree of citizens’ participation and engagement due to the high financial and developmental costs of this policy (Kwon, Jang and Feiock, 2014).
Thus, the resourcefulness of local administrations as well as the engagement of local specialized NGOs creates innovators’ advantages that may be more important than actual experience of climate risk.
Interestingly, the ‘neighboring effect’ – a staple element in policy diffusion studies – was not identified in the Norway analysis, but in the Poland analysis it yielded the 52 expected, positive results.
A ‘personalized’ diffusion mechanism however was identified in both countries.
In other words, diffusion has become de-spatialized in the Norwegian context to an extent not observed in Poland.
This can be taken as an indication of a more highly developed system of supra-local networks in the Norwegian local government system.
While differences in available resources probably allow local officials in Norway to travel more extensively than their Polish counterparts, it is also relevant to assume that the long-standing institutional history of Norway’s local government system to a great extent has been a history of network-building.
This line of argument suits well with findings from previous research on transnational municipal networks namely, that activity in climate change policy networks is characteristic of pioneers – the most active and strongest political actors (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009).
6.
Conclusions The overall conclusion of the study is that the viability of non-coercive mechanisms for promoting new policies among lower level governments in multi-level governance systems varies between unitary states.
The prospects of success for ‘soft’ central government steering seem to rely not least on the resourcefulness of the local units – in terms of building specialized administrative competencies, managing to transform complex knowledge into policy, participating in non-local networks and engaging with civil society groups.
As a consequence, soft steering in multi-level governance systems need to include capacity building measures (Schneider and Ingram, 1990), not least in order to bridge the gap between the larger and more innovative units, and the smaller ones with less capacity.
The study furthermore highlights the importance of historical trajectories for internal as well as external determinants for policy innovation.
Long-standing traditions for local autonomy probably enhances the local units’ propensity for transforming emerging problems into policies even in the absence of coercive central government controls – possibly because the capacity for autonomous action depends on attitudes and role conceptions that need time to develop.
Furthermore, the study indicates that patterns of policy diffusion may change from a purely local ‘neighborhood’ effect to a more non-local, network-based pattern as local government systems mature.
The implication is that central governments may need to support efforts to develop and utilize non-local networks in settings where these have not had the time to reach maturity.
Acknowledgements: This research received support from Norway Grants in the Polish-Norwegian Research Programme under the project titled POLCITCLIM – Organizing for Resilience.
A Comparative Study on Institutional Capacity, Governance, and Climate Change Adaptation in Poland and Norway.
The project was conducted by researchers from the University of Warsaw and the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research.
The research team consisted of Paweł Swianiewicz (Principal Investigator), Jørn Holm-Hansen, Gro Sandkjær Hanssen, Adam Gendźwiłł, Jan Erling Klausen, Joanna Krukowska, Marta Lackowska, Katarzyna Szmigiel-Rawska, 53 Marte Marte Winsvold.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the founder.
References: 1.
Allen, M.D., Pettus, C. and Haider-Markel, D.P., ‘Making the National Local: Specifying the Conditions for National Government Influence on State Policymaking’, 2004, State Politics & Policy Quarterly, vol.
4, no.
3, pp.
318-344.
2.
Allison, P.D., Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences: Event History and Survival Analysis, 2nd edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2014.
3.
Bache, I. and Flinders, M., Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
4.
Bartolini, S., ‘New Modes of European Governance.
An introduction’, in Hértier, A. and Rhodes.
M.
(eds.
), New Modes of Governance in Europe.
Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2011, pp.
1-18.
5.
Benz, A., ‘Inter-Regional Competition in Co-operative Federalism: New Modes of Multi-level Governance in Germany’, 2007, Regional & Federal Studies, vol.
17, no.
4, pp.
421-436.
6.
Berry, F.S.
and Berry, W.D., ‘State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations – An Event History Analysis’, 1990, American Political Science Review, vol.
84, no.
2, pp.
395-415.
7.
Berry, F.S.
and Berry, W.D., ‘Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research’, in Sabatier, P.A.
and Weible, C.M.
(eds.
), Theories of the Policy Process, 3rd edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 2014, pp.
307-359.
8.
Bertrana, X. and Henielt, H., ‘Conclusion’, in Heinelt, H. and Bertrana, X.
(eds.
), The Second Tier of Local Government in Europe, London: Routledge, 2011, pp.
308-336.
9.
Bouckaert, G. and Kuhlmann, S., ‘Introduction: Comparing Local Public Sector Reforms: Institutional Politics in Context’, in Kuhlmann, S. and Bouckaert, G.
(eds.
), Local Public Sector Reforms in Times of Crisis, London: Palgrave, 2016, pp.
1-20.
10.
Box-Steffensmeier, J.M.
and Jones, B.S., ‘Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science’, 1997, American Journal of Political Science, vol.
41, no.
4, pp.
14141461.
11.
Bulmer, S., Policy Transfer in European Union Governance: Regulating the Utilities, London: Routledge, 2007.
12.
Bulmer, S. and Padgett, S., ‘Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective’, 2005, British Journal of Political Science, vol.
35, no.
1, pp.
103-126.
13.
DiMaggio, P.J.
and Powell, W.W., ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality’, in DiMaggio, P.J.
and Powell, W.W.
(eds.
), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp.
63-81.
14.
Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D., ‘Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature’, 1996, Political Studies, vol.
44, no.
2, pp.
343-357.
15.
Fiva, J.H., Sørensen, R.J. and Hagen, T.P., Kommunal organisering: effektivitet, styring og demokrati (Municipal Organization: Efficiency, Governance and Democracy), Oslo: Universitetsforl, 2014.
54 16.
Gerring, J., Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
17.
Gormley, W.T., Taming the Bureaucracy: Muscles, Prayers, and Other Strategies, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.
18.
Graham, E.R., Shipan, C.R.
and Volden, C., ‘The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science’, 2013, British Journal of Political Science, vol.
43, no.
3, pp.
673-701.
19.
Hesse, J.J. and Sharpe, L.J., ‘Local Government in International Perspective: Some Comparative Conclusions’, in Hesse, J.J.
(ed.
), Local Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991, pp.
603-621.
20.
Howlett, M., ‘Why Are Policy Innovations Rare and So Often Negative?
Blame Avoidance and Problem Denial in Climate Change Policy-making’, 2014, Global Environmental Change, vol.
29, pp.
395-403.
21.
Hudson, J.C., ‘Diffusion in a Central Place System’, 1969, Geographical Analysis, vol.
1, no.
1, pp.
45-58.
22.
Hägerstrand, T., Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967.
23.
IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
24.
Jenkins-Smith, H.C., Nohrstedt, D., Weible, C.M.
and Sabatier, P.A., ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Foundations, Evolution, and Ongoing Research’, in Sabatier, P.A.
and Weible, C.M.
(eds.),.
Theories of the Policy Process, 3rd edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 2014, pp.
225-266.
25.
Jones, S., ‘Flirting with Climate Change: A Comparative Policy Analysis of Subnational Governments in Canada and Australia’, 2014, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, vol.
16, no.
5, pp.
424-440.
26.
Jordan, A. and Huitema, D., ‘Policy Innovation in a Changing Climate: Sources, Patterns and Effects’, 2014, Global Environmental Change, vol.
29, pp.
387-394.
27.
Karch, A., ‘National Intervention and the Diffusion of Policy Innovations’, 2006, American Politics Research, vol.
34, no.
4, pp.
403-426.
28.
Karch, A., ‘Emerging Issues and Future Directions in State Policy Diffusion Research’, 2007, State Politics & Policy Quarterly, vol.
7, no.
1, pp.
54-80.
29.
Kern, K. and Bulkeley, H., ‘Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Networks’, 2009, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.
47, no.
2, pp.
309-332.
30.
Keskitalo, E.C.H., Developing Adaptation Policy and Practice in Europe: Multi-level Governance of Climate Change, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010.
31.
Kingdon, J.W., Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984.
32.
Klein, R.T.J., Midgley, G.F., Preston, B.L., Alam, M., Berkhout, F.G.H., Dow, K. and Shaw, M.R., ‘Adaptation Opportunities, Constraints, and Limits’, in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014, pp.
899-943.
55 33.
Knutsen, C.H., ‘Income Growth and Revolutions’, Social Science Quarterly, 2014, vol.
95, no.
4, pp.
920-937.
34.
Krause, R.M., ‘Policy Innovation, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Adoption of Climate Protection Initiatives by U.S. Cities.
(Report)’, 2011, Journal of Urban Affairs, vol.
33, no.
1, pp.
45-60.
35.
Kwon, M., Jang, H.S.
and Feiock, R.C., ‘Climate Protection and Energy Sustainability Policy in California Cities: What Have We Learned?’, 2014, Journal of Urban Affairs, vol.
36, no.
5, pp.
905-924.
36.
Lowndes, V. and Wilson, D., ‘Social Capital and Local Governance: Exploring the Institutional Design Variable’, 2001, Political Studies, vol.
49, no.
4, pp.
629-647.
37.
Marks, G. and Hooghe, L., ‘Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance’, in Bache, I. and Flinders, M.
(eds.
), Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.
15-30.
38.
MoCE, ‘Meld.
St. 33 (2012-2013) Klimatilpasning i Norge (Climate Adaptation in Norway)’, Oslo: Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2013.
39.
Mohr, L.B., ‘Determinants of Innovation in Organizations’, 1969, The American Political Science Review, vol.
63, no.
1, pp.
111-126.
40.
O’Brien, K. and Selboe, E., The Adaptive Challenge of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
41.
Page, E.C.
and Goldsmith, M.J., Central and Local Government Relations: A Comparative Analysis of West European Unitary States, London: Sage, 1987.
42.
Pearce, W., ‘Scientific Data and Its Limits: Rethinking the Use of Evidence in Local Climate Change Policy’, 2014, Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice, vol.
10, no.
2, pp.
187-203.
43.
Piattoni, S., The Theory of Multi-level Governance: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
44.
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G., Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis – New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
45.
Prince, R., ‘Policy Transfer as Policy Assemblage: Making Policy for the Creative Industries in New Zealand’, 2010, Enviornment and Planning A, vol.
42, no.
1, pp.
169-186.
46.
Rhodes, R.A.W., ‘Policy Networks and Sub-Central Government’, in Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R. and Mittchell, J.
(eds.
), Markets, Hierarchies and Networks.
The Coordination of Social Life, London: Sage, 1991, pp.
203-214.
47.
Rose, R., Lesson-drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space, Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1993.
48.
Schneider, A. and Ingram, H., ‘Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools’, 1990, Journal of Politics, vol.
52, no.
2, pp.
510-529.
49.
Sellers, J.M.
and Lidström, A., ‘Decentralization, Local Government, and the Welfare State’, 2007, Governance, vol.
20, no.
4, pp.
609-632.
50.
Shipan, C.R.
and Volden, C., ‘The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion’, 2008, American Journal of Political Science, vol.
52, no.
4, pp.
840-857.
51.
Simon, H.A., Models of Man: Social and Rational-Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting, New York: Wiley, 1957.
56 52.
Skelcher, C., ‘Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance’, 2005, Governance, vol.
18, no.
1, pp.
89-110.
53.
Stone, D., ‘Transfer and Translation of Policy’, 2012, Policy Studies, vol.
33, no.
6, pp.
483-499.
54.
Swianiewicz, P., ‘An Empirical Typology of Local Government Systems in Eastern Europe’, 2013, Local Government Studies, vol.
40, no.
2, pp.
292-311.
55.
Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J., ‘Enhancing Collaborative Innovation in the Public Sector’, 2011, Administration & Society, vol.
43, no.
8, pp.
842-868.
56.
Walker, J., ‘The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States’, 1969, American Political Science Review, vol.
63, no.
3, pp.
880-899.
57.
Weick, K.E.
and Quinn, R.E., ‘Organizational Change and Development’, 1999, Annual Review of Psychology, vol.
50, pp.
361-386.
57 A pp en di x A : T he m ea su re m en t o f v ar ia bl es Va ria bl es M ea su re m en t, No rw ay + M ea su re m en t, Po la nd + CC AP (C lim at e Ch an ge Ad ap ta tio n Pr op en sit y) in de x (d ep en de nt v ar ia bl e) Ar e cli m at e ch an ge c on ce rn s in te gr at ed in to (1 ) m un ici pa l p la nn in g st ra te gy (2 ) m un ici pa l s oc ie ta l p la n (3 ) s pa tia l p la n (4 ) p ar tia l p la n/ th em at ic pl an (5 ) d et ai le d re gu la tio ns ?
Ha s th e m un ici pa lity im pl em en te d an y of th e fo llo wi ng m ea su re s fo r c lim at e ch an ge a da pt at io n?
(1 ) fl oo d pr ot ec tio n (2 ) l an ds lid e pr ev en tio n (3 ) bu ild in g re st ric tio ns in e xp os ed lo ca tio ns (4 ) e ro sio n pr ev en tio n (5 ) s ur fa ce w at er m an ag em en t1 So ur ce : S ur ve y (1 ) H as th e m un ici pa lity ta ke n on a ny a ct ivi tie s in re ce nt y ea rs , w ith th e ai m o f m itig at in g ad ve rs e im pa ct s of h um an a ct ivi ty o n th e cli m at e?
(2 ) Ha s th e m un ici pa lity ta ke n on a ny a ct ivi tie s in re ce nt y ea rs , w ith th e ai m of a da pt in g to c lim at e ch an ge ?
Do es th e m un ici pa lity h av e a do cu m en t ( st ra te gy , p la n, p ro gr am , s tu dy ) th at d ire ct ly co nc er ns th e re sp on se to cl im at e ch an ge ?
(3 ) Y es , t he m un icip al ity h as a d oc um en t d ev ot ed e nt ire ly to th e re sp on se to cl im at e ch an ge .
(4 ) Y es , t he m un ici pa lity h as a d oc um en t t ha t c on ta in s a se ct io n on re sp on se s to c lim at e ch an ge .1 So ur ce : S ur ve y M ot iva tio n/ Na tu ra l d am ag es Co m pe ns at io ns f or n at ur al d am ag es .
Su m o f an nu al c om pe ns at io ns (N O K, n om in al v al ue s) p ai d in 2 00 820 13 (t ra ns fo rm ed ).
So ur ce : N or w egi an N at io na l F un d fo r N at ur al D am ag e As si st an ce Bu dg et ar y ex pe nd itu re f or c om pe ns at in g fo r co ns eq ue nc es o f na tu ra l di sa st er s 20 08 -2 01 3 (P LN p er c ap ita ).
So ur ce : P ol is h M in is try o f F ina nc e: B ud ge ta ry re po rts o f l oc al g ov er nm en ts Re so ur ce s an d ob st ac le s/ Si ze Nu m be r o f i nh ab ita nt s pr .
m un ici pa lity (t ra ns fo rm ed ), 20 14 .
S ou rc e: S ta tis tic s No rw ay Nu m be r o f i nh ab ita nt s pr .
m un ici pa lity (t ra ns fo rm ed ), 20 14 .
So ur ce : S ta tis tic s Po la nd Re so ur ce s an d ob st ac le s/ Lo ca l in te re st To w ha t e xt en t i s th e fo llo wi ng c on ce rn ed a bo ut c lim at e ch an ge a da pt atio n in th e m un ici pa lity ?
Lo ca l p re ss .2 So ur ce : S ur ve y To w ha t e xt en t i s th e fo llo wi ng c on ce rn ed a bo ut c lim at e ch an ge a da pta tio n in th e m un ici pa lity ?
Lo ca l N G O ’s, lo ca l p re ss , c itiz en s2 .
S ou rc e: Su rv ey O th er p ol ici es Ar e th e fo llo wi ng fa ct or s as se ss ed in th e m un ici pa lity ’s Ri sk a nd v ul ne ra bi lity a na lys is?
In clu de s as se ss m en t o f f ut ur e ris ks a nd v ul ne ra bi liti es d ue to c lim at e ch an ge ?3 S ou rc e: S ur ve y (2 01 5, N =3 35 /7 8, 3% ) c on du ct ed by N or w eg ia n Di re ct or at e fo r C iv il Pr ot ec tio n W ith w ha t f re qu en cy th es e iss ue s a re d isc us se d in re ce nt ye ar s i n th e m uni cip al ity d ur in g: c ou nc il se ss io ns o r a ut ho rit ie s’ m ee tin gs w ith c itiz en s?
Ex tre m e we at he r e ve nt s, w as te m an ag em en t, wa te r p ol lu tio n4 .
S ou rc e: Su rv ey Di ffu sio n ef fe ct s/ Sp at ia l Ca lcu la tio n ba se d on C CA P (d ep en de nt v ar ia bl e) .5 So ur ce : S ur ve y Ca lcu la tio n ba se d on C CA P (d ep en de nt v ar ia bl e) .5 So ur ce : S ur ve y Di ffu sio n ef fe ct s/ Pe rs on al Du rin g th e la st th re e ye ar s, h av e yo u or a ny on e el se in th e m un ici pa lity pa rti cip at ed in a c on fe re nc e, s em in ar , w or ks ho p or o th er m ee tin g ab ou t cli m at e ch an ge ?6 S ou rc e: S ur ve y Du rin g th e la st th re e ye ar s, h av e yo u or a ny on e el se in th e m un ici pa lity pa rti cip at ed in a c on fe re nc e, s em in ar , w or ks ho p or o th er m ee tin g ab ou t cli m at e ch an ge ?6 S ou rc e: S ur ve y No te s: + S ur ve y co nd uc te d in N or we gi an a nd P ol ish , t ra ns la te d by th e au th or s. 1 : V al ue s fo r a ll v ar ia bl es in n on -w ei gh te d ad di tiv e in de x: n o= 0, y es =1 , d on ’t kn ow =s ys te m m iss in g. 2: It em m ea su re d on a 1 -5 s ca le (1 =w ho lly u ni nt er es te d, 5 = ve ry in te re st ed , 6 d on ’t kn ow =s ys te m m iss in g) a nd v ar ia bl e is a su m o f r at es v al ue s. 3 : N o= 0, y es =1 , n ot s ur e: S ys te m m iss in g. 4 : I te m m ea su re d on a 0 -4 s ca le (0 =n ev er , 1 =v er y ra re ly, 4 =v er y of te n) .
5 : C CA P is ca lcu la te d us in g th e fo llo wi ng fo rm ul a: (( Co un ty m ea n CC AP * nu m be r o f m un ici pa liti es in c ou nt y) – C CA P) / (n um be r o f m un ici pa liti es in c ou nt y – 1) .
6 : M e= 1, o th er s/ no o ne /d on ’t kn ow =s ys te m m iss in g. 58 Appendix B: Descriptive statistics Variables Norway (N=178) Poland (N=1311) Mean S.D.
Min.
Max.
Mean S.D.
Min.
Max.
CCAP (Climate Change Adaptation Propensity) index (dependent variable) 5.61 2.57 0.00 10.00 1.06 0.52 0 3 Motivation/ Natural damages 13.52 1.79 9.11 17.91 187.31 554.24 0 9,511.39 Resources and obstacles/ Size+ 18,396.53 55,500.24 211 634,463 15,822.86 40,801.52 1,351 758,992 Resources and obstacles/ Local interest 6.72 3.81 0.00 15.00 1.44 1.26 0 5 Other policies 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 7.20 1.75 0 12 Diffusion effects/ Spatial 5.61 1.08 1.60 7.67 1.05 0.62 0 4 Diffusion effects/ Personal 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.66 0 2 Notes: + Nominal data on population size (before transformation) refer to municipalities that responded to the survey.
1 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Journal of Mountain Area Research Full length article MAPPING APPLE TREES FUTURE LAND USE POTENTIAL AS A MEANS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN EAST-MEDITERRANEAN MOUNTAINS: MOUNT-LEBANON Charbel Mahfoud1, * and Jocelyne Adjizian-Gerard1 1Centre de Recherche en Environnement Espace Méditerranée Orientale (CREEMO), Department of Geography, Saint Joseph University, Human Sciences Campus (CSH), Rue de Damas, B.P.
17-5208, Mar Michael, Beirut, Lebanon.
ABSTRACT Agricultural zonal migrations and altitudinal shifts of high chill requirements fruit trees such as apple trees is considered a way of adaptation to climate change in mountain agriculture.
This study examines near and far future options (2050-2070) of this local adaptation method in four village clusters in Mount-Lebanon, involving the expansion of agricultural lands to suitable regions under different degrees of climate change scenarios of temperature increase and precipitations regime fluctuation.
A Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping calculation model was established for agricultural land evaluation which aims to locate spaces where the agriculture development indicators such as soil type, slope, future temperatures, and future precipitations will be suitable for cultivation under different climate change scenarios and models.
The model does not seek the exact delineation of plots as much as the location of areas with a trend of agricultural relevance in the next 30 to 50 years.
This classification is a tool to help Mount-Lebanon farmers and apple growers in adapting locally to climate change by choosing the best future spots to migrate their crops to.
Results showed that most lands in which agricultural development is viable, are already in use for apple production (mainly) in the 4 clusters, leaving small parcels of land with variable agro-potentials to be developed in the future under favorable climate conditions.
The agriculture potential of plots of altitude exceeding 2000 meters is to be validated in the studied area, especially since the climatic and irrigation conditions of there can present serious challenges.
KEYWORDS: Mountain Agriculture, Climate Change, Development of Agricultural Land, Local Adaptation, GIS, Mount-Lebanon.
*Corresponding author: charbel.mahfoud@net.usj.edu.lb 1.
INTRODUCTION In agriculture, a climate intimate sector, continual adaptation is an unavoidable path.
Agriculture adaptation strategies are not only affected by natural factors such as temperature, water, location etc.
but also by social, economic, and political readiness of the concerned locality [1, 2].
The main categories of adaptation in agriculture involve planning for climate change and variability, use and management of water resources, soil management, crop management, farming systems, capacity building with organization of stakeholders and financial management [3].
The possibility of movements towards higher altitudes is a natural behavior in plants biodiversity and can be an adaptation method in agriculture too.
It is an adjustment of agriculture to climate change, that normally takes hundreds of years and which man is applying during a short time On the coastlines and at low altitudes near the sea level, temperature conditions may become inconvenient for some crops with climate change.
In mountainous regions, where agriculture is already heavily exposed to extreme climatic conditions, the altitudinal shift may also be a way of adaptation, but not without risks, mainly of extreme weather conditions, soil and water availability [4].
Lately, moving to both higher altitudes and latitudes to maintain a certain amount of agricultural productivity and quality has Vol.
7, 2022 https://doi.org/10.53874/jmar.v7i0.145 mailto:charbel.mahfoud@net.usj.edu.lb Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 2 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 become more frequent in different parts of the world.
For example, in Europe, wine producers are shifting their vineyards towards higher latitudes [4,5].
However, the choice of higher altitude shift of crops is not always ideal due to many limitations such as the extreme weather conditions, the availability of favorable soils for agriculture, the socio-economic considerations as well as the difficulty of accessing water resources for irrigation [6].
Therefore, expanding the agriculture surface in mountainous areas by finding the suitable parcels of land with convenient conditions and at the right altitude remains a challenge for farmers.
The main two objectives of this study are: i) defining the land plots of the study area of Mount-Lebanon with the highest potential of use under the current climatic conditions for agricultural purposes of fruit tree growing mainly apples; and ii) determining under future climatic conditions of 2 RCPs (4.5 and 8.5) new possible lands that can serve for agriculture purposes in the years 2050 and 2070 relatively to temperature and precipitations.
2.
OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1.
Agricultural land development in mountains In mountain areas, the harsh restrictions of the existing natural environment and climate have led agro-pastoral communities to carry out strict land use planning for centuries, where the persistence of these organizational features of the past landscape such as terracing and hill lakes seems common, especially in the Mediterranean region, and continues to influence the general land use dynamics [7].
In Mount-Lebanon, a Mediterranean mountainous area, ancient agriculture systems dating from the time of the Phoenicians, evolved slowly until the mid-20th century, shaping the landscapes and land uses of the hills.
In the second half of the 20th century, significant changes in mountain land use have occurred due to rural depopulation and unvalorization of agriculture.
Remoteness and physical disadvantages have continuously limited the structural and technical adaptation of mountain agro-systems in this area.
The terraced cultivation is the main agricultural exploitation system of these mountainous environments with aggressive climate (extreme temperatures, winds, hail, snow).
Terraces can be found on steep terrains whereas parcels are present on weak slops, where small areas of agriculture exist.
The number of cultivation terraces in MountLebanon decreased during the last century due to demographic, economic and environmental changes.
For instance, as landholdings are divided into smaller plots with each generation, apples are now produced on increasingly fragmented plots with new generations inheriting the property.
In consequence, agriculture parcels in the study area became fragmented into small plots due to the steepness of the hills and the lack of large adequate areas and limited accessibility.
More easily accessed parcels are already invested and managed.
Exploring and establishing new plots is not of an easy task especially with the impacts which current land use transformations and climate change are imposing.
2.2.
Apples: a climate vulnerable tree Apple trees, such as most mountain deciduous fruit trees, have a specific affinity to low winter temperatures to initiate buds flowering.
These trees accumulate during the cold season a certain amount of coldness calculated in chill units which help begin bud break.
This is called the chilling requirement [8].
If winter chill is below the amount required (generally for quality apples between 1000 to 1500 hours below 7°C), bud break is delayed and flowering will occur over a longer period, leading to lesser production as well as extended harvesting date [9].
On the other hand, high summer temperatures can cause direct damages to the apple fruits leaving brownish traces on burnt fruits[10].
Apple cultivation is ranked third in terms of production area in Lebanon with approximately 14,000 ha planted and a total annual production of 153,000 tons (23% of total Lebanese fruit production) reaching 3 to 6% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, depending on the quantity and quality of the production.
Geographical location and climate suitability have direct influence on the quantity and quality of the apples produced.
Therefore, due to the tree climatic requirements, apple growers Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 3 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 in Mount Lebanon tend to be present in the mountainous regions which altitudes are above 1000 m. At the same time, and due to the winter high chilling requirements requested for a quality production, vulnerability of apple trees to climate change is very high, perhaps one of the highest in Lebanese agriculture.
As a result, climate change is forcing a shift of apple growers from their “comfort zone” to a dynamic status that involves more climate awareness, readiness, and willingness to take good and planned adaptations decisions at the right time [11].
2.3.
Mountain agriculture shift in altitudes and latitudes With the increase of mean temperatures around the globe, chilling requirements of specific varieties of fruit trees such as apples can be compromised, leading to a decrease in production and quality.
In this situation, increasing the altitude of crops turns out to be a nature-based adaptation option that is worth investigating [5].
For example, in India, apple growing conditions are generally available at an elevation of 1,500 –2,700 m above sea level in the Himalaya ranges.
Researchers showed that the total cumulative chill units of the coldest months have dropped during the last 20 years by 9.1 to 19.0 units per year in Himachal Pradesh, an Indian state in the Himalayas, thus directly affecting apple productivity.
It is expected that the temperature rise will promote the apple orchards to be grown in higher altitude, above 2,300 m from sea level in this area [12,13].
While it may present a way of maintaining good quality apples, shifting up agriculture land parcels in altitudes is not an option without risks especially with limited soil and water resources.
Some suitable agricultural conditions, such as chilling requirements, may be met at higher altitudes but the high frequency of severe weather conditions is not to be dismissed such as extreme winter cold and intensive summer solar radiations [14].
2.4.
Local adaptation and agriculture Nowadays, climate change poses an additional substantial adaptation challenge for agriculture, which will likely stimulate further transformations and changes in production locations, techniques, management and research requirements [15–17].
What can be applicable and appropriate in terms of climatic adaptation policies at the global or national level is not necessarily applicable at the local level and vice versa.
In fact, climate change impacts vary from a place to another, imposing variations on adaptation strategies and policies depending on the scale of their application [18].
There are several typologies and classifications of adaptation in agriculture, summarized by Smit and Skinner according to their purpose, their mode of execution or the institutional form they take [16,17,18].
Exploring and developing new agricultural land potential is a nature-based option which can increase the biodiversity of marginalized areas and help enlarging their ecosystems [22].
The current study aims to present its findings as a local agro-adaptation on an ecosystem-based approach for helping producers adapt to climate change in a nature-friendly way[20,21].
3.
METHODOLOGY The following section describes the methodology used in this study starting from the geoclimatic features of the 4 clusters of the study area, to the climatic data sources, GIS data treatment and applied calculation criteria and models.
3.1.
Study area Lebanon is a small Mediterranean country on the east coast, reputed for its mountain range.
Mount-Lebanon stretches on 169 km and peaks on an altitude over 3000 meters towards its northern part (Qornet el Sawda 3088m).
The presence of numerous corridors and valleys generates several microclimate zones in this Mediterranean mountain range, imprinting it with the nearly all bioclimatic zones of the Mediterranean vegetation making Lebanon the highest biodiverse country in the east Mediterranean region [25].
With climate change, Lebanon is expected to witness a rise in average temperatures at the end of the 21st century up to 2 to 4°C (according to the different scenarios) compared to the 90’s of the 20th century and a disturb in the rainfall regime [26].
The study area consists of 4 village clusters in Mount-Lebanon, grouping a total of 24 villages of different sizes, forming roughly the biggest region of apple orchard surface and production of the mountain chain of Lebanon.
Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 4 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Agricultural lands which are dedicated for apple production are distributed between 1200 and 1750 m in these clusters.
The most northern is Bcharreh zone (cluster B) which includes 6 villages, then Aqoura zone (cluster A) which includes 11 villages, then Mayrouba zone (cluster M) grouping 4 villages and finally the most southerly zone is Jouar el Hoz zone (cluster J) grouping 3 villages (Figure 1).
Figure1: Extent of the study areas comprising the 4 clusters of villages (B, A, M and J), each belonging to a unique river watershed.
In the study area, an increase in temperature has already begun and is expected to range between 16% and 25% of the actual mean temperatures in 2070 (Table 1).
This will induce the search for cooler lands to grow fruit trees of high chilling requirements.
Altitudinal shifting is possible to a certain extent in 3 of the 4 studied clusters (A, B and M).
In one cluster (J), apple orchards are already on the highest altitude of the region, limiting the altitudinal shift as shown on Figure 2.
3.2.
Climatic data Due to the complexity of climate models, we focused in this study on 2 climate indicators for future forecasts: the average annual temperature and precipitation.
Future projections were downloaded and retrieved from the WorldClim platform [27] which provides gridded climate data for the entire world for the 2050s and 2070s and for the 4 most common RCPs (2.6 – 4.5 – 6.0 – 8.5).
Figure 2: Elevation profile of Mount-Lebanon western chain from the NE to SW following the highest point peaks near the studied clusters.
Apple trees plantation of the 4 studied clusters are marked by colored circles.
WorldClim offers future projections based on small-scale data from the CMIP5 Global Climate Model / Global Circulation Model (GCM).
The climatic conditions simulated by these models depend in part on the assumed atmospheric concentration of GHGs.
Among the 19 models WorldClim 2.0 offers, 3 different models were selected: CNRM-CM5, MIROC5 and NorESM1-M.
According to several comparative studies [28], these 3 models ranked well among the available global models.
The data extracted allowed to determine the level of potential future temperature and precipitation changes due to climate change in the study areas of this research.
They are presented in Table 1 according to two scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5) for the years 2050 and 2070.
3.3.
Geographical and climatic data treatment and calculation models The geographical data treatment was performed in ArcMap 10 for the current and forecasted mean temperatures and precipitations parameters for the 2050s and 2070s.
Models CNRM-CM5, MIROC5 and NorESM1-M were used based on the 2 scenarios RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.
The current temperatures and precipitation were extracted from WorldClim and from the Lebanese National Center for Scientific Research (NCSR).
The current study encompasses two complementary phases; the first phase targets the mapping of new unexploited areas with agricultural potential (Phase1) and the second phase determining whether these areas will Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 5 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 have suitable climatic conditions in the future for fruit trees growing (Phases2).
Table 1: Precipitation and temperature variations in the study area Precipitation (mm) Actual 2050 2070 Cluster RCP4.5 RCP8.5 RCP4.5 RCP8.5 A 1157 1099 1090 1059 1016 B 1007 935 927 902 865 J 1102 1070 1060 1026 987 M 1179 1172 1167 1136 1092 Temperature (°C) Actual 2050 2070 Cluster RCP4.5 RCP8.5 RCP4.5 RCP8.5 A 13 14.5 15 15 16 B 12 13.7 14 14 15 J 13 15 15.5 15.5 16.5 M 13 14 15 15 16 3.4.
Phase 1: mapping agricultural potential of unexploited lands In this phase a model of layer filtering and score calculation is applied to the 4 clusters of villages included in the study zone, involving geographical, land use and soil parameters.
The model is based on selected criteria for agricultural land development, applied by the Green Plan, a governmental institution assisting the development and planning of agricultural parcels and hill lakes on the nation level.
The criteria used during this phase are the occupancy of the land or land cover, the slope, and the soil stoniness.
Land cover Pre-existing agricultural lands were excluded from the model by land cover cartographic filtering performed on the national land use map [29].
The map was used to exclude any existing agricultural land, bare rocks, built environments, and any other land not suitable for agriculture such as natural reserves or water bodies.
Only plots with herbaceous or shrubby vegetation were retained.
The classification of land cover was made on 3 classes, each assigned by a coefficient (0 to 2).
Slope The slope percentage is used to describe a terrain by expressing the ratio between the difference in level and the horizontal distance.
For example, a slope of 10% corresponds to a drop of 10 m over a horizontal distance of 100 m. The lower the slope, the less work the plot will require for landscaping and will have easy access and work for heavy machinery.
According to the development criteria for new agricultural lands of the Green Plan, the slope of the land is preferable to be less than 40% to be adequate for agriculture.
In this study the slope range is pushed to the 50% since agricultural land based on plots of similar slopes have been identified during site visits to the study area.
The slopes of the terrain of the 4 clusters were calculated on ArcMap from the contour lines map (10 m) provided by the Green Plan.
The slopes were classified into 6 classes, each assigned a coefficient (0 to 5).
Soil stoniness The stoniness of a soil is determined by the quantity of coarse elements in that soil.
Even at high coarse elements, reaching 80%, the soil remains satisfactory for agricultural development according to the criteria of the Green Plan and this soil stoniness limit was adopted by our study.
The lower this percentage is, the easier the manual work in the field will be and will take less time.
The stoniness was calculated from the soil map of Lebanon at 1:50 000, extracted from the “Soil Map of Lebanon” [30].
The classification of soil pity was made on 5 classes, each assigned a coefficient (0 to 4).
The classes of land cover, slopes and stoniness of the model are presented in Table 2.
3.1.
Phase 2: mapping the identified new lands under future climate change conditions The purpose of Phase 2 of the model is to identify the clusters, among those already potentiated in Phase 1, which have the enabling characteristics or elements to offer favorable climatic conditions (temperature or precipitation) in the 30 and 50 years to come, presenting a possible means of adaptation by migration towards new grounds [31].
To the above methodology, phase 2 of the model incorporates future temperature and precipitation parameters from WorldClim each separately into the outcomes of the first phase.
Scores of the classes of parameters were multiplied using the tools of the Raster Calculator in ArcMap.
Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 6 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Scores varying between 0 and 120 are obtained for each parameter (Figure 3).
Table 2: Classification criteria and score ranges for the various land characteristics, future temperatures and future precipitation considered in both phases of the model (Herbaceous Vegetation = Herb.
Veg.).
Slope (%) 0-15% 15-22% 22-31% 31-40% 4050% 50% Slope classes 5 4 3 2 1 0 Stoniness (%) 0-5% Very low 5-15% Low 15-40% Medium 40-80% Strong 80% Very Strong Stoniness Classes 4 3 2 1 0 Land cover Herbaceous Vegetation Shrub Vegetation other Land cover classes 2 1 0 Scores Phase 1 – Agropotential 31 – 40 Very high 20 – 30 High 8 – 19 Medium 1– 7 Low Very Low 0 Null Future Temp.
classes 3 (6-12 °C) 2 (13-18 °C) 1 (18-26 °C) Future Precipitation classes 3 (850 mm) 2 (600-850 mm) 1 (600 mm) Scores Phase 2 – future suitability 101-120 Very strong 81-100 Strong 51-80 Medium 26-50 Low 1-25 Very Low 0 Null Figure 3: Illustrative examples of Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the model; product of the Stoniness x Slope x Land cover factors and those of future temperatures or future precipitations.
The future temperatures of the CNRMCM5, MIROC5 and NorESM1-M circulation models were merged to obtain an average value for the 4 climate change scenarios RCP4.5-2050, RCP 8.5-2050, RCP4.5-2070 and RCP8.52070 and that for the 4 cluster zones.
Likewise for precipitation, the data of the three models were merged and the values of the above scenarios calculated.
The product of the second phase of the model is a raster format where each pixel has a value according to the products of the factors shown in the example of Figure 3.
The result is a score varying between 0 and 120 indicating areas with agricultural potential where temperature and precipitation conditions could be suitable for agriculture in the future 30 and 50 years (2050 and 2070), according to the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios.
In the classification of the scores of the second phase, scores close to "0" indicate a null potential for the development of the plot for agricultural uses in the future, whereas “120" indicate a very high potential, even with the extreme scenarios of climate change.
4.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4.1.
Results of Phase1 The outcomes of phase 1 show different results from one cluster to another.
Thus, the areas of future potential agricultural land in relation to the study area differed greatly between cluster A which had the highest relative percentage (relative to the existing agricultural lands) of 27% and cluster J with the lowest percentage of 9%.
Clusters B and M scored 19% and 16% respectively of land with non-zero agricultural potential.
These ratios indicate the fraction of land produced by the model and whose score varies between 1 and 40 compared to the total area of the cluster.
The above results can be observed on the maps of Figure 5, by comparing the density of the different colored squares or dots on the map of each cluster.
White areas on the map are parcels with score “0”.
In fact, almost all spaces which have any type of potential are relatively small due to the prior occupation of the land by agricultural land or hill lakes.
The limited availability of agriculture land in high mountains is well reflected in the results.
Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 7 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Although being relatively low (18% of the land with potential) the "very high" potential is most prominent in cluster B considering the very high altitudes which can exceed 2000 m. While cluster J does not have any fraction of its land with “very high” potential (0%).
On another hand, cluster A includes 7% of future land with “very high” agricultural potential, cluster M has only 2% of the future land which may be of “very high” potential.
The land with “high” potential varies for the 4 clusters between 18 and 32%, cluster J having the highest fraction.
Cluster M contains the largest relative percentage of “low” potential land with 50% and cluster B contains the smallest fraction in this category with 12%.
In all areas, land with “Medium” potential formed around 40%.
The cartographic analysis shows that for the 3 clusters A, J and M, most of the non-zero score regions generated by the model are located below 2000 m while cluster B has most of the potential terrains at higher altitudes (>2000 m).
According to site visits, multiple areas of cluster B, currently are attempting to develop agricultural lands at higher than usual elevations.
This model affirms the suitability of these observations.
Being the most northernly among the studied clusters, this area has the greatest potential for high-altitude migration of agricultural land.
While in cluster J the potential for altitudinal migration is nearly zero.
Regarding the future agricultural potential scores of the generated maps, the strongest general trend of potential land for all 4 clusters presents a score of “Medium” potential for development (1.66 / 4) followed by the “Low” potential (1.11 / 4) followed by the “High” potential (0.95 / 4) and finally the “Very high” potential (0.27 / 4).
In addition, the combination of “Low” and “Medium” potentials is dominant over the “High” and “Very high” one.
Thus, the study area’s agricultural potential lands which can be explored in the future and be suitable for growing crops, will require big mechanical efforts and financial investments in most lands Figure 6.
Figure 4: Current precipitations and temperature values in (mm/year) and (°C) for the models CNRMCM5, MIROC5 and NorESM1-M for 2050 RCP4.5 and 2070 RCP8.5 in the clusters A and B. Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 8 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Figure 5: Results for Phase 1 of the model Current mapping of agricultural potential of unexploited lands.
Regions above 2000 m Generally, at altitudes above 2000 m, agriculture becomes difficult for the considered Mediterranean region as water resources become very limited and root temperatures unsuitable.
The highest elevation where agricultural land was spotted was in Cluster B at around 2060 m above sea level.
The current model did take into consideration terrains with an altitude above 2000 m, mainly in clusters A and B.
For clusters J and M the maximum altitude does not reach the 2000 m. Indeed, and according to the criteria of the model, sites with “very high” potential have been identified at an altitude of 2130 m in cluster A and 2920 m in cluster B.
In these plots which belong to the Cenomanian plateau, the potential water supply appears to be limited to precipitation, runoff, and snowmelt.
In fact, the area greater than 2000 m is upstream of watercourses and springs and there are no sources or watercourses higher in altitude and sufficiently close to supply the plots.
Electrical water pumps from the nearest continuous source or water cisterns are the only expensive means of irrigation at these altitudes.
Despite having great agricultural potential, these very high-altitude lands may never be used as actual agricultural lands.
In brief, the lands which agricultural development is easy and economically viable have already been taken in the 4 clusters, leaving a small margin of lands with varying agro-potential to be developed in the future.
Clusters J and M have less potential land than clusters A and B, given the factor of altitude and the greater surface area of the latter.
The potential of land in altitude exceeding 2000 meters can be questionable in terms of agriculture, especially since the climatic and irrigation conditions of these plots can present serious challenges.
Figure 6: Ratio of land with future potential / land with non-zero potential grouped by score and by cluster.
4.2.
Results of Phase 2 The importance of temperature and precipitation parameters on agriculture and 0.41 0.37 0.19 0.02 0.26 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.12 0.45 0.26 0.18 0.32 0.43 0.18 0.07 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 V e ry l o w M e d iu m H ig h V e ry h ig h A g ri cu lt u re P o te n ti a l cluster A cluster B cluster J cluster M 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.19 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.12 0.26 0.41 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 A B J M C lu st e rs Very low Medium High Very high Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 9 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 their synergy can be dissimilar depending on the apple variety.
For this reason, the model scores of these two parameters were kept separated to be evaluated according to the requested need of the cultivation and the producer.
This phase revealed the trend of future temperatures in the studied clusters where it is clearly rising and can reach +27% compared to current temperatures while the model trend of future precipitation is in decrease reaching -14% relatively to current precipitations quantities and regime.
Types of land superposition obtained Despite the difference in resolution between the potentials' map and that of the scores, (climate scenario maps were coarser than land use maps) it was remarkable that the superposition of the potential lands and their score for future temperature and precipitation formed 4 types: Type 1 Superposition of “Very high” to “High” potential land with high scores of temperatures or precipitations.
These are the “super terrains” of the future.
However, land greater than 2000 m even with the highest scores will be subject to future investigations for apple trees viability and water resources.
Type 2 Superposition of “Very high” to “High” potential land with medium to low scores of temperatures or precipitations.
These lands are easy to develop from an agricultural point of view, but future climatic conditions may be unfavorable for certain varieties which require low average temperatures.
Type 3 Superposition of “Medium” to “Very low” potential land with high scores of temperatures or precipitations.
These are the areas that will be suitable from a climatic point of view for crops that require low average temperatures.
But the agricultural development of these lands poses challenges from a technical and economic point of view.
Type 4 Superposition of “Medium” to “Very low” potential land with medium to low scores of temperatures or precipitations.
These are the areas to be avoided due to their low agriculture potential as well as the unfavorable climatic conditions for apple trees requiring a great need for low chilling temperatures.
In each cluster, the type of superposition can change between temperatures and precipitations scores for the same squares, depending on the scenario considered.
For instance, areas with a good temperature score may not have a good precipitation score and vice versa.
Future temperatures The comparison between the 3 GCM models for the same cluster, shows that the temperature curves differ from one model to another, but the general trend of isotherms calculated from WorldClim 2.0 data is the same: the trend is an increase in temperatures in the 4 clusters ranging from 7.7% to 19.2% for the year 2050 and 15.4% to 26.9% for the year 2070 for RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 respectively.
According to the 3 models CNRM-CM5, MIROC5 and NorESM1-M, the trend of annual temperature averages is increasing because of the increase in temperatures of the warmer months and those of the colder months.
The changes in seasonal thermal averages affect mountain agriculture directly and in ways distinctly in winter than in summer.
The general results show a rise in temperatures (isotherms) towards higher altitudinal stages, thus changing the conditions currently existing and which may be limiting for some crops that require cold winter temperatures such as apple trees and cherries.
Thermal changes are different from area to area.
They are most pronounced in cluster J with +15.4% and +19.2% change for RCP4.5 in 2050 and 2070 and +19.2% and +26.9% for RCP8.5 for the years 2050 and 2070, respectively.
The changes are less pronounced in cluster B by 1.9% compared to cluster J while clusters A and M are both at -3.8% compared to cluster J.
Cluster A affected with future temperatures: According to the lands score maps and with the consideration of temperatures for the RCP4.5 scenario in 2050, the northwestern regions of cluster A, between Laqlouq and Aaqoura, have great potential in the future given several overlaps of Type 1, as well as their suitable altitude (1720-1870m).
There is also an area to the west (Mazraeet el Siyad) whose altitude is 1600m and which also carries a good potential.
Other Type 1 areas are not always viable areas for agriculture.
For advanced warming scenario (RCP8.5 2070), this western area which was Type 1 is transformed into a Type 2 area, where climatological conditions will not be ideal for some crops in this region (Figure 7).
Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 10 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Cluster B affected with future temperatures: For the RCP8.5 2070 scenario, cluster B presents small Type 1 plots at altitudes below 2000m.
Type 1 lands exist towards the east of the area at altitudes of 2840 to 2990 m (Cenomanian plateau), where agriculture is almost impossible.
The only areas to be considered will be those located to the south of the area, at the boundary of Bcharré Beqaa Kafra, located at altitudes of 2300 m. Cluster J affected with future temperatures: This area is the poorest in terms of altitude, land with agricultural potential and future temperatures when compared to the 3 other clusters.
For the RCP8.5 2070 scenario, there is only one Type 2 plot at the limit of Tarchich at an altitude of 1710 – 1820 m. Cluster M affected with future temperatures: The plots with potential are very limited in cluster M as the best plots have already been agriculturally developed.
The high potential lands do not have good scores for future temperatures thus resulting towards the centers of the cluster of plots of Type 2 for the RCP8.5 2070 scenario.
Future precipitations The rainfall trend is in general regressive in the study area for RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 in the 2050s and 2070s.
The isohyets of the future scenarios of the 3 models are presented in Figure 5.
Similarly, and although minor, differences exist between the models but the trend of change in precipitation is the same: a decrease in precipitation in the 2050s and 2070s ranging from -0.6% to -14.1%.
Table 1 shows the rate of change in precipitation by area, RCP and year.
Phase 2 revealed that in the 2050s and 2070s (medium to long term) the change rate will be almost doubled for temperature compared to precipitation.
Thus, for the same cluster (for example cluster A) the temperatures could increase by 23% while the precipitations could decrease by 12%.
In addition, and according to the classifications of the proposed model, precipitation reductions of up to -14% compared to the current rate do not change much in the square score in the future.
While for 27% of change (the case of temperatures), the scores have significantly changed and even the plots have moved from one category to another.
Cluster A affected with future precipitation: Concerning the rainfall of the RCP8.5 2070 scenario, very low are the Type 1 terrains in cluster A.
Most of the Type 1 is found at low altitudes (1500 m in Lassa and 1700 m in Mazraeet el Siyad).
Figure 7: Sample result from cluster A showing the change in the type of plot according to the scores of future temperatures, agricultural potentials, RCP and years.
Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 11 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Cluster B affected with future precipitation: From a precipitation perspective, the areas with the highest scores are at elevations not viable for agriculture.
Areas with good potential are also rare in cluster B under the RCP8.5 2070 scenario.
Cluster J affected with future precipitation: A single Type 1 plot in cluster J could be explored from the precipitations point of view in 2070 for the RCP8.5 radiative forcing scenario.
Cluster M affected with future precipitation: cluster M presents in its central part (Mayrouba village) Type 3 lands, considered suitable in their future precipitations as per the model.
A Type 2 area is located to the east on Hrajel village side, offering plots that are easy to develop but where rainfall conditions will not be favorable in 2070.
For some areas, the type of superposition does not change for the parameter considered between the different RCPs and years.
This does not mean that no change will take place in terms of temperatures and precipitations in these places, but it is due to the margins of the Phase 2 scores of the concerned plots which are not exceeded by the category limits for the scenario and year considered.
The complete mapping results of the potential overlays with the future temperature and precipitation scores can be found in the annex of this article.
CONCLUSION In Mediterranean mountains, adaptation of agriculture to climate change has become inevitable.
Where possible, land expansion and migration can be applied as a way of adaptation of the sector to the harsh expected conditions of climate change.
In brief, the lands in which agricultural development is easy and economically viable have already been in use for agriculture production of apples (mainly) in the 4 clusters, leaving a small margin of lands with variable agro-potentials to be developed in the future.
Clusters J and M have less potential land than clusters A and B, given the factor of altitude and the greater surface area of the latter.
The agriculture potential of land in altitude exceeding 2000 meters can be questionable, especially since the climatic and irrigation conditions of these plots can present serious challenges.
The impacts of changing temperature and precipitation parameters on agriculture and their synergy can be dissimilar depending on the cultivated apple variety.
Thus, the presented model scores of these two parameters were kept separated in this study, to be evaluated according to the requested need of the cultivation and the producer.
Taking crop migration decision as an adaptation option on the local level does not come without risks.
Getting irrigation water to reach high altitudes at acceptable prices and low energy consumption is a challenge that needs to be tackled in case altitudinal shift adaptation are opted for with altitudes higher than the water sources.
Research on increasing the productivity of apple trees on their existing agriculture lands under future climate change scenario is also a challenge to be addressed due to the low quantities of potential lands suitable for a good production especially in areas where altitudinal migration is not possible.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Authors would like to thank Dr. Elise Abou Najem for providing language assistance help, Dr. Antoine El Samrani and Eng.
Georges Chemaly for their valuable contribution to make this article.
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
DECLARATIONS Conflicts of interest/Competing interests: The authors reported no potential conflicts of interest.
Authors’ contributions: Mahfoud: Concept, Methodology, GIS Software and Writing Adjizian-Gerard: Supervision, Reviewing, Editing and Validation.
REFERENCES [1] D. Hillel and C. Rosenzweig, Handbook of climate change and agro-ecosystems : Impacts, adaptation and mitigation, Imperial College Press (2011).
[2] S. Tao, Y. Xu, K. Liu, J. Pan and S. Gou, Research Progress in Agricultural Vulnerability to Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 12 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 Climate Change, Adv.
Clim.
Chang.
Res.
2 (2011), pp.
203–210.
[3] J.D.
Ford, L. Berrang-Ford, A. Lesnikowski, M. Barrera and S. Jody Heymann, How to track adaptation to climate change: A typology of approaches for national-level application, Ecol.
Soc.
18 (2013).
[4] Y. Vitasse, S. Ursenbacher, G. Klein, T. Bohnenstengel, Y. Chittaro, A. Delestrade et al., Phenological and elevational shifts of plants, animals and fungi under climate change in the European Alps , Biol.
Rev.
(2021).
[5] M. King, D. Altdorff, P. Li, L. Galagedara, J. Holden and A. Unc, Northward shift of the agricultural climate zone under 21st-century global climate change, Sci.
Rep. 8 (2018), pp.
7904.
[6] B. Pandeya, High altitude agriculture – The challenges of adapting to the changing water supply in the Himalayas, (2015), pp.
1–6.
[7] A. Mottet, S. Ladet, N. Coqué and A. Gibon, Agricultural land-use change and its drivers in mountain landscapes: A case study in the Pyrenees, Agric.
Ecosyst.
Environ.
114 (2006), pp.
296–310.
[8] E. Luedeling, J. Gebauer and A. Buerkert, Climate change effects on winter chill for tree crops with chilling requirements on the Arabian Peninsula, Clim.
Change 96 (2009), pp.
219–237.
[9] E. Luedeling and P.H.
Brown, A global analysis of the comparability of winter chill models for fruit and nut trees, Int.
J. Biometeorol.
55 (2011), pp.
411–421.
[10] D.C. Ferree and I.J.
Warrington, Apples: Botany, Production and Uses, Vol.
39, CABI, (2019).
[11] I. Funes, X. Aranda, C. Biel, J. Carbó, F. Camps, A.J.
Molina et al., Future climate change impacts on apple flowering date in a Mediterranean subbasin, Agric.
Water Manag.
164 (2016), pp.
19–27.
[12] N. Vedwan, Culture, Climate and the Environment: Local Knowledge and Perception of Climate Change among Apple Growers in Northwestern India, J. Ecol.
Anthropol.
10 (2006), pp.
4–18.
[13] Q.L.
You, G.Y.
Ren, Y.Q.
Zhang, Y.Y.
Ren, X.B.
Sun, Y.J.
Zhan et al., An overview of studies of observed climate change in the Hindu Kush Himalayan (HKH) region, Adv.
Clim.
Chang.
Res.
8 (2017), pp.
141–147.
[14] A.K.
Singh, J.C. Dagar, A. Arunachalam, G. R and K.N.
Shelat, Climate Change Modelling, Planning and Policy for Agriculture, Springer, (2015).
[15] C.T.
Hoanh, R. Johnston and V. Smakhtin, Climate Change and Agricultural Water Management in Developing Countries, CABI Climate Change Series, (2016).
[16] V.K.
Sehgal, M.R.
Singh, A. Chaudhary, N. Jain and H. Pathak, Vulnerability of Agriculture to Climate Change, (2013).
[17] J.E.M.
Watson, M. Rao, A.L.
Kang and Y. Xie, Climate Change Adaptation Planning for Biodiversity Conservation: A Review, Adv.
Clim.
Chang.
Res.
3 (2012), pp.
1–11.
[18] J. Frankel-Reed, N. Brooks, P. Kurukulasuriya and B. Lim, A Framework for Evaluating Adaptation to Climate Change, (2010).
[19] B. Smit and M.W.
Skinner, Adaptation options in agriculture to climate change: A typology, Mitig.
Adapt.
Glob.
Chang.
7 (2002), pp.
85–114.
[20] A. Wreford, D. Moran and N. Adger, Climate Change and Agriculture: Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation, Vol.
54, OECD, (2010).
[21] B. Smit and M.W.
Skinner, Adaptation options in agriculture to climate change: A typology, Mitig.
Adapt.
Glob.
Chang.
7 (2002), pp.
85–114.
[22] E. Jensen, European Environment Agency, Nature-based solutions in Europe: Policy, knowledge and practice for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, (2021).
[23] M.A.
Altieri, C.I.
Nicholls, A. Henao and M.A.
Lana, Agroecology and the design of climate change-resilient farming systems, Agron.
Sustain.
Dev.
2015 353 35 (2015), pp.
869–890.
[24] R. Clements, J. Haggar, A. Quezada and J. Torres, Technologies for Climate Change Adaptation – Agriculture Sector, (2011).
[25] É. Verdeil, G. Faour and S. Velut, Atlas Du Liban.
Territoires et Société.
Beyrouth, Institut Français Du Proche-Orient/CNRS Liban, Vol.
53, (2009).
Mahfoud and Adjizian-Gerard, J. mt.
area res.
07 (2022) 1-13 13 J. mt.
area res., Vol.
7, 2022 [26] N. Khairallah, AgriCAL, Linkages between Disaster Risk Reducton and Climate Change Adaptation in the Agriculture Sector, IFAD, MOA, Adaptation Fund/Beirut, Lebanon, (2019).
[27] S.E.
Fick and R.J. Hijmans, WorldClim: 1-km spatial resolution climate surfaces for global land areas, Int.
J. Climatol.
37 (2017), pp.
4302– 4315.
[28] S. Kamworapan and C. Surussavadee, Evaluation of CMIP5 global climate models for simulating climatological temperature and precipitation for southeast Asia, Adv.
Meteorol.
(2019).
[29] E. Verdeil, G. Faour and M. Hamze, Atlas du Liban: Les Nouveaux Defis, Press de l’Ifpo CNRS Liban, (2016).
[30] T. Darwish, P. Zdruli, R. Saliba, M. Awad, A. Shaban and G. Faour, Vulnerability to Desertification in Lebanon Based on Geoinformation and Socioeconomic Conditions, J. Environ.
Sci.
Eng.
B (2012), pp.
851–864.
[31] C. Mahfoud and J. Adjizian-Gerard, Local adaptive capacity to climate change in mountainous agricultural areas in the eastern Mediterranean (Lebanon), Clim.
Risk Manag.
33 (2021), pp.
100345.
Received: 29 Nov. 2021.
Revised/Accepted: 08 Feb. 2022.
Vol.
511996): 351-365.
The application of agricultural land rating and crop models to C0 2 and climate change issues in Northern regions: the Mackenzie Basin case study Michael Brklacich, Patrick Curran and Douglas Brunt Department of Geography, Carleton University, 1125Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario KIS 586, Canada The Mackenzie Basin in northwestern Canada covers approximately 1.8 million km2 and extends from 52“ N to 70°N.
Much of the Basin is currently too cool and remote from markets to support a viable agricultural sector, but the southern portion of the Basin has the physical potential to support commercial agriculture.
This case study employed agricultural land rating and crop models to estimate the degree to which a C0 2 -induced global warming might alter the physical potential for commercial agriculture throughout the Basin.
The two climate change scenarios considered in this analysis would relax the current constraints imposed by a short and cool frost-free season, but without adaptive measures, drier conditions and accelerated crop development rates were estimated to offset potential gains stemming from elevated C02 levels and warmer temperatures.
In addition to striving for a better understanding of the extent to which physical constraints on agriculture might be modified by climate change, there is a need to expand the research context and to consider the capacity of agriculture to adapt to altered climates.
Key words: agricultural land suitability, wheat yields, Northern Canada Introduction Research into the potential impacts of global climate change on human activities has flourished over the last decade, and the relationships between agriculture and climate change have received considerable attention.
(For reviews of the effects ofglobal climate change on world agriculture see Reilly et al.
1996, and Parry 1990.
Studies on the sensitivity of Canadian agriculture to climate change are presented in Arthur 1988, Bootsma et al.
1984,Brklacich and Stewart 1995, Singh and Stewart 1991, Smit et al.
1989, Williams et al.
1988).
In retrospect, agriculture was well-positioned to respond to the challenges that might accompany global climate change for at least three reasons.
First, weather is an important input to agricultural production on an annual basis and long-term climate trends exert considerable influence over the location of agriculture.
These indisputable linkages underpin the sensitivity of food production systems to a global climate change and have become part of the rationale for investigating the potential bio© Agricultural and Food Science in Finland Manuscript received February 1996 351 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Brklacich, M. et al: Applying land rating and crop models to climate change physical impacts of climate change on agriculture.
Second, many of the climate change scenarios that were advanced throughout the 1980 s and early 1990 s suggested a less favourable climate for agricultural production (eg: drier conditions, greater variability) (IPCC 1990) and often contributed to a general conclusion that climate change would result in a less secure global food supply.
This potential decline in food security in combination with other concerns regarding the long-term potential for meeting planetary food requirements led to a reframing ofglobal climate change concerns, and contributed to an explicit recognition of the economic, social and political dimensions of climate change impacts research (Brown et al.
1989, World Resources Institute 1990).
Third, agricultural research has investigated the relationships among food production, weather and climate for many decades, and as a result addressing the agricultural impacts of climate change did not hinge upon the development of new scientific methods.
Existing agricultural research frameworks and methods were able to incorporate climate change scenarios, and agriculture became one of the first sectors to examine impacts which might stem from global climate change.
Overall, agriculture and agricultural research were and continue to be well-positioned to investigate the physical, biological, economic and social impacts stemming from global climate change.
Much of this research into the agricultural impacts of climate change has, to a large extent, evolved from conventional agricultural research and it embraces the assumptions and context which underpin agricultural research in the major food producing regions.
For example, agricultural research often draws upon reliable soils and weather data, well-documented crop trials, and high quality farm management data.
However, reliable and complete biophysical and socio-economic databases do not exist for many regions which are near or beyond the current climate margin for commercial agriculture.
As a result conventional approaches for gauging the agricultural impacts of rising C02 levels and global climate change can be difficult to implement in northern regions.
This paper focuses on assessing the impacts of a potential global climate change on agricultural opportunities in northern regions.
It draws upon a case study in the Mackenzie Basin, Canada, and examines issues relating to: model applications near and beyond the current climate frontier for commercial agriculture, sparse data coverage, and linking biophysical and socio-economic assessments.
The Mackenzie Basin context An overview of the Mackenzie Basin The Mackenzie Basin (Figure 1) is the world’s twelfth largest watershed with a drainage area of about 1.8 million km 2 .
The main trunk of the Mackenzie River is the dominant feature, and theLiard, Athabasca and Peace River watersheds represent significant areas in the southern half of the Basin.
The Basin extends from 52°N to 70°N, and includes portions of the Arctic, Boreal and Grasslands ecoclimate regions (Statistics Canada 1986).
Much of the Basin is currently too cool and remote from markets to support a viable agricultural sector, but the southern portion of the Basin has the physical potential to support commercial agriculture.
Commercial agricultural production occurs primarily in the Peace River region.
Wheat and barley are the key cash crops, but canola (rapeseed) has become increasingly important in the last 10 years.
During the 1980s an average of 335 800 ha of barley and 383 100 ha of wheat were seeded in the Peace River region.
Forage production and pasture are the other main agricultural land uses.
About 1.2 million ha of land in the Peace River region is currently used for commercial agricultural production (Agriculture Canada 1986, 1990).
352 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 351-365.
The Mackenzie Basin case study With the Mackenzie Basin covering a vast area, much of which is beyond the current climate boundary for agriculture, it should not be surprising that existing data bases impose constraints on the opportunity to assess the agricultural impacts of climate change.
For example, detailed, high resolution soils maps have been compiled for only a limited number of sites within the Basin, and do not provide a foundation for exploring the Basin’s agricultural prospects.
Basin-wide coverage of basic soils data is not available below the scale of 1:1 million.
At this scale, the smallest recognizable land parcel is about 4000 ha and provides a foundation for reconnaissance level assessments.
There were 567 weather stations operating in the Mackenzie Basin between 1951 and 1980.
Since the study presented in this paper represents one component of a multi-sector assessment ofclimate change impacts on the Mackenzie Basin (Cohen 1992), for consistency, all sectoral studies contributing to the Mackenzie Basin project utilize the 1951-80 climate base line.
For many of the weather stations, the record has Fig.
1.
The Mackenzie Basin.
353 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Brklacich, M. et al.
: Applying land rating and crop models to climate change been compiled for a relatively short period (i.e.
less than a decade), and lengthy gaps in the record and/or observation of a limited number of weather properties limit their utility.
A comparison of the data requirements of the current generation of crop models to the observed weather records revealed that the datarequired to implement these models could be satisfied at less than 20 sites throughout the Basin.
Given this level of coverage, it is feasible to conduct assessments of crop yield sensitivities to climate change for selected indicator sites, but clearly it is not possible to extrapolate from these selected assessments and draw conclusions about the Basin in general.
Crop trials supported by detailed weather, soils and management data are required to calibrate crop models to local conditions.
Data from crop trials are available for limited areas, and all are within the southern reaches of the Basin.
Under these restrictions, full calibration of crop models is simply not feasible.
The research framework developed for the Mackenzie Basin study recognized the limitations imposed by the available information base, and was designed to make the best use of the available information.
The assessment began with a Basin-wide assessment of the extent to which possible changes in long-term climate averages mightalter agroclimate constraints and land suitability for commercial production of spring-seeded cereal grains.
Regions identified as having a physical potential to support commercial agriculture under this initial assessment were targeted for more intensive investigations into the effects ofa C02-induced climate change on annual spring wheat yields.
An agricultural resource potential perspective Resource rating scheme overview The primary analytical tool used to estimate the climate change impacts on agricultural land potential was the Land Suitability Rating System for Spring-Seeded Small Grains (LSRS) (Agronomic Interpretations Working Group 1992).
This rating scheme was selected for two reasons.
Firstly, climate properties are considered explicitly by the rating scheme and therefore it could be applied to climate change issues.
Secondly, implementation of the LSRS requires routinely collected soils, climate and landscape data and therefore it can be applied to broad regions.
The LSRS is based on rating the extent to which soil, climate and landscape represent limitations for the production of common springseeded grains (e.g.
wheat, oats, barley).
Each of the components is rated separately and assigned an initial value of 100.
Then the extent to which a range of factors (e.g.
effective growing degree days, drainage class, topography) impair crop production is determined and points are deducted to reflect the severity of the limitation.The overall land suitability rating ranges from 0 to 100, and is based on the most limiting component.
An overview of the analytical units upon which the land suitability assessments are founded and a brief description of each component and the data used to implement each component follows.
Units of analysis The polygons defined for the Soil Carbon Data Base (Soil Carbon Base Working Group 1992) are compiled at a 1:1 million scale and represent the analytical units used in this assessment.
These polygons are not necessarily homogeneous and can include a Dominant Soil which exceeds 40% of the polygon’s surface area, and a Subdominant Soil accounting for between 10% and 40% of the polygon area.
About 1800 polygons containing mineral soils were extracted for further analysis and account for about 57% of the Basin’s land area.
Climate component The climate component considered the extent to which accumulated heat and moisture limit 354 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND spring-seeded cereal growth and development.
Growing degree days above 5°C was the prime indicator of heat accumulation during the frostfree season.
The May through September moisture supply, estimated as the difference between accumulated precipitation and potential evapotranspiration, was used to calculate the seasonal moisture supply.
The LSRS can consider the impacts of earlier than average fall frosts on land suitability for commercial crop production, but insufficient data prohibited the use of this component of the rating scheme.
Details on point deductions associated with each of the climate parameters are described in Agronomic Interpretations Working Group (1992).
The 10 km by 10 km baseline (1951-1980) of monthly mean temperatures and total precipitation compiled by Environment Canada (Smith and Cohen 1993) was augmented with monthly normals for minimum and maximum temperatures.
Many of the land units (i.e.
Soil Carbon Data Base polygons) used in this analysis follow natural drainage systems and therefore are delineated as relatively long narrow polygons.
Several 10 km x 10 km climate grid cells intersect partially with these land units.
The development of climate profiles for these land units based on an averaging ofclimate grid cells would have regularly included substantial areas of land outside the soil polygon and thereby contributed to unreliable estimates.
To minimize the occurrence of this error source, baseline temperature and precipitation data for the land units of analysis used in this assessment were estimated as the climate associated with the 10 km by 10 km grid cell closest to the centroid of each soil polygon.
The moisture supply was calculated using monthly data for the following climate properties: precipitation, maximum and minimum temperature, solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere.
Solar radiation estimates at the top of the atmosphere were obtained from Russelo et.
al.
(1974).
The Brooks (1943) method was employed to estimate daily mean temperatures from monthly climate normals, and these daily estimates were used to calculate the accumulation of growing degree days.
Scenarios for long-term climate change were derived from the application of the Canadian Climate Centre (CCC) and Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) GCMs to 2 x CO, atmosphere experiments (Boer et al.
1984 and Manabe and Wetherald 1987,respectively, as reported in Smith and Cohen 1993).
Scenarios were generated by applying differencesbetween 2 x C02 and I x CO, GCM model runs to the 1951-80 monthly temperature and precipitation means.
Warmer temperatures were estimated for the entire Mackenzie Basin and for all seasons under the CCC scenario, but the greatest temperature deviations were estimated for the winter months and in the northerly portions of the Basin (Fig.
2).
The regional climate change scenario derived from the GFDL GCM was considerably different from the CCC scenario.
Estimates under the GFDL scenario of summer temperature increases for the southern half of the Mackenzie Basin were in the 4°C to 6°C range whereas the CCC scenario estimates ranged from I°C to 3°C.
Estimated summer temperature increases for the northern half of the Mackenzie Basin were similar under the two scenarios.
The estimated changes in winter temperature also varied.
The CCC-derived winter temperature increases tended to be in excess of 4°C for most of theBasin.
Estimated increases under the GFDL scenario were considerably less, and in general did not exceed 3°C.
Changes in precipitation patterns were also considerably different between the two scenarios (Fig.
3).
Precipitation estimates under the CCC scenario for all seasons were in the +25% range over most of the Basin.
Estimated deviations from the current under the GFDL scenario were more severe, especially during the summer for which estimatedprecipitation changes ranged from decreases of up 25% to increases in excess of 100%.
Soils component The rating of mineral soils was based on the extent to which moisture supply capacity, surface 355 Vol.
5 (1996): 351-365.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND 5 Brklacich, M. et al: Applying landrating and crop models to climate change factors, subsurface factors and drainage impose limitations on crop production.
Limitations were estimated as a function of depth of top soil, texture, drainage, soil structure and consistency, organic carbon content, pH, depth to an impeding layer, and bulk density.
The required data were either extracted directly from the Soil Carbon Data Base or information from the Data Fig.
2.
Temperature changes estimated under the Canadian Climate Centre (CCC) and Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) model-based 2 x CO, scenarios.
356 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 351-365.
GFDL Scenario Base was used to infer the required data.
Point deductions for soil factors are presented in Agronomic Interpretations Working Group (1992).
Landscape component The landscape component considered slope and slope length, stone removal requirement and Figure 3.
Precipitation changes estimated under the Canadian Climate Centre (CCC) and Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) model-based 2 x C0 2 scenarios.
357 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Brklacich, M. etal: Applying land rating and crop models to climate change coarse fragment content.
Lack of reliable information prohibited the use of the flooding factor in this analysis.
The data required to rate the landscape component were taken from the Soil Carbon Data Base, and were either used directly or used as proxy data.
Details on the implementation of this component are found in Agronomic Interpretations Working Group (1992).
Interpreting the overall rating The lowest or most limiting score of the three components becomes the basis of determining the overall land suitability ranking for springseeded cereal crops, while the other two components are included as subfactors influencing agricultural potential.
This approach provides a preliminary estimate of the combined effects of soil, climate and landscape factors on agricultural land potential.
To assist with interpretation the overall score can be grouped into three broad categories (Agronomic Interpretations Working Group, 1992).
Lands with a rating ranging from 60 to 100points are considered highly suitable for sustained crop production.
Ratings from 30 to 60 points represent lands which are moderately suitable for agriculture, and scores less than 30 points designate lands which are unsuitable for commercial agriculture.
Climate change impacts on agro-climate potential The current average frost-free period for the Basin of 132 days (Figure 4) represents a substantial constraint to the commercial production of crops.
Each of the climate change scenarios implies a considerable extension of the frost-free period, with the greatest estimated increase of 29 days occurring under the GFDL scenario.
With the longer frost-free period and higher temperatures associated with the climate change scenarios, it was estimated that there would be substantial increases in effective growing degree Fig.
4.
Impacts of climate change on selected agroclimate properties in the Mackenzie Basin.
358 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 351-365. days (GDD) over the duration of the frost-free period.
The current Basin-wide average falls short of 1000 GDD, and represents a moderate to severe constraint to the production of springseeded cereals.
Spring-seeded cereals typically require about 1600 GDD.
and this threshold is reached on average under both ofclimate change scenarios considered in this study.
The estimated seasonal moisture supply, defined as the differencebetween precipitation and potential evaporation, was also sensitive to the climate change scenarios.
Substantial precipitation increases estimated under the GFDL scenario are offset by anticipated potential evaporation increases, resulting in only minor adjustments to the estimated seasonal moisture supply.
However, the CCC scenario assumes only a modest precipitation increase, and this was more than offset by the estimated potential evaporation increase.
As a result, the estimated seasonal moisture supply decreased under the CCC climate change scenario.
Climate change impacts on agricultural land suitability Figure 5 illustrates the estimated impacts of the CCC and GFDLclimate change scenarios on the agricultural land suitability throughout the Mackenzie Basin.
Under current conditions, it is estimated that nearly 6 million ha of mineral soils throughout the Mackenzie Basin are physically suitable for the production of spring-seeded small cereals.
Moderately suitability agricultural lands account for nearly 36 million ha, while the remaining 62 million ha of mineral soils are estimated to be unsuitable for spring-seeded cereals.
The largest adjustments in land suitability for agriculture stemming from global climate change are estimated under the GFDL scenario.
A 41% increase in the total area of land which is either highly or moderately suitable for cereals is estimated under this scenario, and this includes an estimated 64% increase in highly suitable land.
Fig.
5.
Climate change impacts on agricultural land suitability.
359 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Brklacich, M. et al: Applying land rating and crop models to climate change Under the CCC scenario, the total area of lands highly and moderately suitable for springseeded cereals is estimated to increase by 31%.
This aggregation of highly and moderately suitable lands however masks an estimated 29% decline in land which is highly suitable for agriculture.
Under the CCC scenario, the estimated temperature increases relax constraints associated with the current short, cool frost-free season, but this potential benefit is offset by estimated increases in moisture deficits.
As a result there was an estimated decrease in the land area with the highest potential for crop production.
A crop yield perspective CERES-WHEAT overview The primary analytical tool used in this component of the study was the CERES-WHEAT crop growth and productivity model.
This crop model was selected as it is one of only a few models which can consider the combined effects of CO, and climate changes on crop yields, and the model has been applied elsewhere at higher latitudes (Brklacich and Stewart 1995).
The version of the model used in this research is described in Ritchie and Otter (1985) and Godwin et al.
(1989).
CERES-WHEAT predicts crop growth and yields for individual wheat varieties, and the model employs simplified functions which advance on a daily time step to estimate crop growth and yield as a function of plant genetics, daily weather (solar radiation, maximum and minimum temperature, precipitation), soil conditions, and management factors.
Modelledprocesses include phenological development, growth of vegetative and reproductive parts, biomass production and partitioning among plant parts, and root system dynamics.
The model also tracks moisture inputs and withdrawals, and estimates the impacts of soil-water deficits on photosynthesis and partitioning.
For this analysis, seeding date (SD) was estimated as the first day of the frost-free season and soil moisture conditions at seeding reflected the extent to which soil moisture reserves were recharged over the winter period.
The intensive data requirements of the CERES-WHEAT crop model limited the application of the model to 16 sites scattered throughout the Mackenzie Basin.
The remainder of this section summarizes the input data used in the crop yield assessment and presents selected findings for two sites.
Beaverlodge at 55°N is in the Peace River region and within the area of the Basin which presently supports commercial agriculture.
Hay River at 61°N is beyond the current climate frontier for agriculture (Fig.
I).
This analysis focuses on isolating the sensitivity of spring wheat yields to climate change, and changes in production practices.
The use of alternative crop varieties and other adaptive measures are beyond the study’s scope.
Model performance Crop development aspects of the model track well with observed conditions, and differences between the estimated and observed times from sowing to maturity are minimal (Brklacich and Stewart 1995).This indicates that the model replicates crop development processes reasonably well and therefore can be applied in climate change studies.
Model estimates of crop yields however often exceed observed yields, and the models provide little insight into the effects of poor weather on crop quality.
Overall, this suggests the model can be used to provide insight into the relative rather than absolute impacts of climate change on wheat yields.
Atmospheric C0 2 data The current level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is assumed to be 360 ppm.
Future levels are set at 555 ppm and are based upon an “equivalent of a 2 x CO,” atmosphere.
This approach has been used elsewhere in climate im360 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 351-365. pact assessments (Rosenzweig and Parry 1994) and recognizes that increases in the atmospheric concentrations of other trace gases will result in a radiative forcing of the atmosphere equivalent to that due to a doubling of C02 but occurring prior to actual C02 doubling.
Climate data Baseline climate data for the period 1951 to 1980 were derived from the observed weather record at each site.
Recorded daily values for maximum and minimum temperature and precipitation were employed.
Solar radiation data are not collected on a routine basis and therefore the deJong and Stewart (1993) method was used to estimate daily solar radiation values from temperature and precipitation data.
Scenarios for long-term climate change (Figs 2 and 3) were derived from the application of the CCC and GFDL GCMs to 2 x CO, atmosphere experiments (Smith and Cohen 1993).
These climate change estimates were then superimposed onto the daily baseline climate data.
Soils data Soil data were obtained from the Canada Soil Information System (CanSIS).
The latitude-longitude position of each weather station was used to locate the corresponding CanSIS soil polygon, and the following soils data for the dominant soil in the polygon were utilized in the analysis: texture, bulk density, organic carbon, pH, coarse fractions, layer thickness, and soil classification.
Management data Though many wheat varieties are grown in the Peace River region, this study is based upon cv.
Manitou.
Many oftoday’s wheat varieties have been derived from cv.
Manitou and it has been used as a representative variety in previous studies (Brklacich and Stewart 1995).
The application of fertilizer, particularly nitrogen, on commercial crops is considered very important for most agricultural regions in the Basin.
The findings presented in this paper are based on 36 kg/ha N, which is consistent with recommended fertilizer application levels for wheat.
Climate change impacts on seeding date for wheat The frost-free season in the Mackenzie Basin is relatively short and cool, and therefore the estimated seeding date (SD) for spring-seeded crops was assumed to be the first day of the frost-free period.
At Beaverlodge, which is situated in the Peace River region, the estimated mean SD occurs in the last week of April (Figure 6), but can vary from mid-April to mid-May.
The estimated mean spring wheat SD for Hay River, which is located beyond the current climate frontier for agriculture, was about one week later than the mean SD at Beaverlodge but the range in SDs is similar at both sites.
An earliest possible SD of mid-May represents a relatively late start to the crop season.
It is rare under current climate conditions that the estimated SD at Beaverlodge occurs after this threshold, thereby reducing the risk associated with farming in a climateally marginal region.
Spring conditions at Hay River are considerably more risky,.and the estimated SD occurs after mid-May about 25% of the time.
Both climate change scenarios imply an earlier SD, however the magnitude of the estimated impacts are not uniform.
Mean SD is advanced to a greater extent under the CCC scenario than under the GFDL scenario.
A comparison of the two climate change scenarios suggests that larger precipitation increases and less pronounced temperature increases for the winter and spring seasons under the GFDL scenario would result in wetter and cooler soil conditions in the early spring, thereby limiting the impacts on seeding dates.
It shouldbe noted, however, that both scenarios lead to a decline in production risk at Hay 361 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Brklacich, M. et al: Applying land rating and crop models to climate change River.
The estimated SD occurs after mid-May about 25% of the time under current climate conditions, however therisk associated with this relatively late SD is removed under the CCC scenario and reduced to about 10% of the years under the GFDL scenario.
Climate change impacts on wheat yields The short, cool frost-free seasons and the potential for crop failures at Hay River tend to suppress crop development and yields.
Estimated current mean wheat yields at Hay River are about 50% of the mean yield estimated for Beaverlodge (Figure 7).
The estimated impact of the equivalent of a 2 x C02 atmosphere in isolation (i.e.
C0 2 increases without climate change) was an increase in wheat yields of about 30%.
The potential benefits of increases in atmospheric C02 tended to be offset by the climate changes specified under the CCC and GFDL scenarios.
The warmer temperatures, especially during the later phases of crop development, shortened the time available for grain filling and therefore the climate change scenarios do not necessarily imply more favourable conditions for cereal crops.
At Hay River, it is estimated under both scenarios that the combined effects of C0 2 increases and climate change would result in mean wheat yields that are similar to yields estimated under the current Fig.
6.
Climate change impacts on estimated spring wheat seeding dates.
Fig.
7.
Climate change impacts on estimated spring wheat yields.
362 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 351-365. climate.
For Beaverlodge, this estimated trend also applies for the GFDL scenario, but it is estimated that the expected increases in crop moisture stress associated with the CCC scenario would further reduce mean wheat yields to about 75% of the current estimated mean.
Expanding the research context The research framework used in this study was initiated by specifying scenarios for climate change, and then the implications of these possible changes were estimatedfor agricultural resource potential and wheat yields in the Mackenzie Basin.
This approach has been instrumental in isolating the sensitivity of particular attributes of agricultural systems to a pre-specified climate perturbation.
While the spatial displacement of conditions which are physically suitable for the production ofa particular agricultural activity will undoubtedly have considerable impact on the future of agriculture, this sort of information does not directly address the vulnerability of agricultural systems to changing conditionsand the capacity of agriculture to adapt to change (Carter et al.
1994; HDP 1994; Smit 1993).
In order to investigate the adaptive capacity of agricultural systems to potential changes in climate and other conditions which influence agriculture, there is a need to expand the conventional research framework employed in this analysis and also consider: Do farmers perceive a change (in climate and/ or other conditions)?
What role does climate play in agricultural decision-making relative to other influences including other environmental, economic, political and socio-cultural factors?
• Is the farm vulnerable to the changing conditions?
• If the farm is vulnerable, what is the perceived range of adaptive responses?
Which of these adaptive responses could be implemented?
Which of the feasible adaptive responses comes closest to meeting the goals for farming?
Conclusions This study provided preliminary insights into the potential effects of global climate change on agricultural prospects in the Mackenzie Basin.
The relatively short and cool frost-free periods characterizing the current climate impose considerable constraints on spring-seeded cereal production in this region.
The two climate change scenarios considered in this analysis would relax these constraints, but it is important to note that, the magnitude and the geographical distribution of the estimated impacts are not uniform across the region.
Furthermore, it was estimated that without adaptive measures, accelerated crop growth rates and drier conditions associated with the climate change scenarios could offset potential gains associated with elevated C02 levels and expanded frost-free seasons.
Improving upon these preliminary assessments hinges upon advances in at least two areas.
Incomplete data is clearly a substantial limitation.The available data on weather, soils, crop trials and farm management are sufficient to support reconnaissance level assessments.
Creative methods for supplementing the existing data bases are required.
This assessment considered the physical potential for commercial production of cereals.
Logical extensions of this research would involve considering the role of climate relative to other biophyscial and socio-economic factors which influence agricultural systems, and addressing the capacity of agricultural systems to adapt to climate change.
Acknowledgements.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the Atmospheric Environment Service, Environment Canada, and the Centre for Land and Biological Resources Research, Agriculture Canada.
The paper has benefitted from the constructive reviews by two anonymous reviewers.
363 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Brklacich, M. et al.
: Applying land rating and crop models to climate change References Agriculture Canada 1986.
Tests on cereal and oilseed crops in the Peace River region: 1985.
Research Branch, Beaverlodge.
48 p. 1990.
Tests on cereal and oilseed crops in the Peace River region: 1989.
Research Branch, Beaverlodge.
50 p. Agronomic InterpretationsWorking Group 1992.
Land suitability rating system for springseeded small grains.
Centre for Land and Biological Resources Research, Agriculture Canada.
Ottawa, Canada.
108 p. Arthur, L. 1988.
The implication of climate change for agriculture in the prairie provinces.
CCD 88-01, Atmospheric Environment Service, Environment Canada, Downsview.
12 p. Boer, G., McFarlane, N., Laprise, R., Henderson, J.
& Blanchet, J.
1984.The Canadian Climate Centre spectral atmospheric general circulation model.
AtmosphereOcean 22: 397-429.
Bootsma, A., Blackburn, W., Stewart, R., Muma, R. & Dumanski, J.
1984.
Possible effects of climate change on estimated crop yields in Canada.
LRRI Contribution No.
83-64, Research Branch, Agriculture Canada, Ottawa.
26 p. Brklacich, M. & Stewart, R. 1995.
Impacts of climate change on wheat yields in the Canadian prairies.
In: Rosenzweig, C. et al.
(eds.)
Climate change and agriculture: Analysis of potential international impacts.
ASA Special Publication No.
59.
American Society of Agronomy, Madison, p. 147-162.
Brooks, C. 1943.
Interpolation tables for daily values of meterological elements.
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 69: 160-162.
Brown, L., Flavin, C. & Postel, S. 1989.
A world at risk.
In: Brown, L.
(ed.).
State of the World 1989.
W. W. Norton, New York.
p. 3-20, Carter,T., Parry, M., Harasawa, H. & Nishioka, S. 1994.
IPCC technical guidelines for assessing climate change impacts and adaptations.
Department of Geography, University College, London and Centre for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan.
59 p. Cohen, S. 1992.
Impacts of global warming in an arctic watershed.
Canadian Water Resources Journal 17: 5562. deJong, R & Stewart, D. 1993.
Estimating global solar radiation from common meteorological observations.
Canadian Journalof Plant Science 73: 509-518.
Godwin, D. Ritchie, J. Singh, U.
& Hunt, L. 1989.
A user’s guide to CERES Wheat V2.10.
International Fertilizer Development Centre, Muscle Shoals.
86 p. HDP 1994.
Human dimensions of global environmental change programme work plan 1994-1995.
Occasional Paper Number 6. International Social Science Council, Geneva.
45 p. IPCC 1990.Climate change:The IPCC scientific assessment.
Report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Houghton, J.T.
et al.
(eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
365 p. Manabe, S. & Weatherald, R. 1987.
Large scale changes in soil wetness induced by an increase in carbon dioxide.
Journal of Atmospheric Science 44; 1211-1235.
Parry, M. 1990.
Climate change and world agriculture.
Earthscan Publications, London.
157 p. Reilly, J. and 22 others 1996.
Agriculture in a changing climate: impacts and adaptation.
In: Watson, R. et al.
(eds.).
Climate Change 1995: Impacts, adaptation and mitigation options: Scientific-technical analysis.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 427467.
Ritchie, J.
& Otter, S. 1985.
Description and performance of CERES-WHEAT: A user-oriented wheat yield model.
In: Willis, W (ed,).
ARS wheat yield project.
USDA, ARS Pub.
No.
38.
Washington, D.C. p. 159-175.
Rosenzweig, C. & Parry, M. 1994.
Potential impact of climate change on world food supply.
Nature 367: 133138.
Russelo, D., Edey, S. & Godfrey, J.
1974.
Selected tables & conversions used in agrometeorology & related fields.
Publication 1922.
Agriculture Canada, Ottawa.
275 p. Singh, B.
& Stewart, R. 1991.
Potential impacts of a C02 -induced climate changeusing the GISS scenario on agriculture in Quebec, Canada.
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Agriculture 35: 327-347.
Smit, B.
(ed.).
1993.
Adaptation to climate variability and change.
Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Guelph.
53 p. -, Brklacich, M., Stewart, R., Mcßride, R., Brown, M. & Bond, D. 1989.
Sensitivity of crop yields and land resource potential to climate change in Ontario, Canada.
Climate Change 14(2): 153-174.
Smith, J.
& Cohen, S. 1993.
Methodology for development of climate change scenarios.
In: Cohen, S. J.
(ed.).
Mackenzie basin impact study; Interim report #l. Canadian Climate Centre, Environment Canada, Downsview, Canada, p. 112-130.
Soil Carbon Data Base Working Group 1992.
Soil carbon data for Canadian soils.
Centre for Land and Biological Resources Research, Agriculture Canada, Ottawa, Canada.
137 p. Statistics Canada 1986.
Human activity and the environment: A statistical compendium.
Catalogue 11509E.
Structural Analysis Division, Analytical Studies Branch, Ottawa.
374 p. Williams, G., Fautley, R., Jones, H., Stewart, R. & Wheaton, E. 1988.
Estimating effects of climatic change on agriculture in Saskatchewan, Canada.
In: Parry, M. et al.
(eds.).
The impact of climatic variations on agriculture.
Volume 1.
Assessments in cool temperate and cold regions.
Kluwer, Dordrecht, p. 221-379.
World Resources Institute 1990.
World resources 1990-91.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 11-31.
364 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND SELOSTUS Viljelyvyöhykkeiden ja kasvumallien soveltaminen ilmastonmuutoksen tutkimisessa: Mackenzien jokialue, Kanada Michael Brklacich, Patrick Curran ja Douglas Brunt Carleton University, Kanada Mackenzien jokialue sijaitsee Kanadan luoteisosassa ja on laajuudeltaan noin 1,8 miljoonaa km2.
Tällä hetkellä alue on liian viileä ja etäisyydet ovat liian pitkiä, jotta maataloutta kannattaisi harjoittaa merkittävässä määrin.
Jokialueen eteläosien luonnonolot ovat kuitenkin sellaiset, että taloudellisesti kannattavalle maataloudelle on edellytyksiä.
Tutkimuksessa selvitettin, miten ilmastonmuutoksesta aiheutuva maailmanlaajuisen lämpötilan nousu vaikuttaa Mackenzien jokialueen luonnonoloihin.
Tutkimuksessa sovellettiin maatalousmaan luokitusta ja kasvumalleja, joiden avulla arvioitiin alueen potentiaalista maataloustuotantoa muuttuneissa olosuhteissa.
Analyysissä käytetyt kaksi ilmastonmuutosta kuvaavaa skenaariota viittaavat siihen, että lämpötilan nousu lyhentää nykyisin hyvin pitkää routajaksoa.
Samanaikaisesti kuitenkin kuivuus ja viljan nopeutunut kasvu vähentävät hyötyä, joka maataloustuotannolle koituu lisääntyneestä hiilidioksidista ja kohonneesta lämpötilasta.
365 Vol.
5 (1996): 351-365.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND
IJPP ISSN: 2239-267X IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 42 Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change Marcello Magoni Coordinator of Climate Change, Risk and Resilience Laboratory , Department of Architecture and Urban Studies, Politecnico di Milano Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, Milano, marcello.magoni@polimi.it Rachele Radaelli Member of Climate Change, Risk and Resilience Laboratory , Department of Architecture and Urban Studies, Politecnico di Milano Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, Milano, rachele.radaelli@polimi.it KEYWORDS: Glossary, Territorial risk, Climate change, Risk reduction capabilities, Responses for risk management ABSTRACT The dynamics of demographic, industrial and economic growth that have occurred on a global scale since the industrial revolution have over time resulted in an increase in the frequency and intensity of hazards and in the levels of vulnerability of the exposed resources at local level.
The need to counteract these phenomena has led to substantial international development of territorial risk management techniques with contributions from experts in different disciplines and which, to facilitate communication and exchange of information between professionals, has led to the construction of very similar methodological approaches and specialised glossaries.
This article was produced to contribute to meeting the need, which emerged during an ERASMUS+ European research project called CARE Empowering Climate Resilience, in which numerous European and Latin American universities took part, to overcome the existing terminological differences between the different schools of thought in managing risk due to climate change, a European one, mainly oriented to spatial planning, and a Latin-American one, mainly based on social science.
This contribution consists of proposing a set of clear and consistent definitions of the main words used for the territorial risk management due to climate change.
As this glossary refers to the management of risks due to climate change, it has mainly been developed on the basis of the definitions indicated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
mailto:marcello.magoni@polimi.it mailto:rachele.radaelli@polimi.it Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 43 1.
WHY A SHARED GLOSSARY FOR TERRITORIAL RISK MANAGEMENT DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE The management of territorial risks is a global issue that has amplified its importance due to various phenomena that have increasingly affected human settlements since the industrial revolution and especially since the end of the Second World War.
These phenomena consist mainly of demographic, industrial and economic developments which have caused a marked expansion of settlements and territorial infrastructures, with consequent increase in exposure to territorial risks of population, assets and activities (Bobrowsky, 2013; GFDRR, 2016).
For about 30 years, the effects of climate change have been added to those processes, which are causing an increase in the type, frequency and intensity of the hazards and vulnerability of the exposed resources.
The management of territorial risks due to climate change constitutes the main reference of this glossary, even if it can be used for the management of any type of territorial risk (IPCC, 2018a, 2019).
Territorial risk management requires the contribution of experts from different disciplines who must find a common methodological approach and language, to favour an effective integration of the relative knowledge, skills and practices and to achieve efficient communication in the development and implementation of policies, strategies and actions (GFDRR, 2014; UNDRR, 2019).
Among the experts who deal with territorial risks there are also the urban and territorial planners, since risk prevention policies and the results of emergency interventions have a significant impact on the transformations of increasingly large parts of the territory.
Furthermore, these issues are central factors in the construction of sustainable and resilient cities and territories, so they must be considered in ordinary planning practice.
In fact, with climate change and pandemic phenomena, the issue of territorial risks is no longer a niche topic as it relates to some circumscribed phenomena and processes and affects ordinary urban and territorial planning.
Territorial risk analysis, which is the tool that underlies the techniques of risk management, has built up a rigorous and internationally agreed approach to the problem and language over time, even if for some terms there are slight differences (UNISDR, 2009; Menoni et al., 2012).
Although it is a secondary aspect of territorial risk management compared to the development and implementation of contrast and adaptation strategies, actions and interventions, the possibility of sharing a broad and detailed terminology favours a more effective use of information and analysis and evaluation results of the cases dealt with.
This article has been prepared to contribute to meeting the need, which emerged during the development of a European project financed by ERASMUS+ funds and called CARE Empowering Climate Resilience (https://www.erasmus-care.eu), in which numerous European and Latin American universities took part, to promote the https://www.erasmus-care.eu/ Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 44 interdisciplinary skills of HEI staff and students by developing innovative educational approaches to planning and to shape climate change resilient policies.
Right from the design phase of the training modules the work group tried to overcome the problem of different terminology and, more widely, different approaches in risk management due to climate change among the different university disciplinary sectors: urban and territorial planning (Politecnico di Milano Italy, Universiteit Twente Netherlands, UC and UDEC Chile), social sciences and territorial studies (UFPA and UFABC – Brazil, UDELAR Uruguay), geography (UPO – Spain), environmental sciences and forestal/agronomic engineering (UNIBAGUE and UT – Colombia, UTE and UTEQ – Ecuador), Decision Support System and urban governance (POLIEDRA Politecnico di Milano Italy and UNAL Colombia) and community empowerment (UIM Unión Iberoamericana de Municipalistas – Spain and CRIC Centro Regionale d'Intervento per la Cooperazione Onlus – Italy).
Two main schools of thought have emerged, one mainly oriented to spatial planning, predominant among European universities, which aimed at the reduction of risk impacts starting from the prediction and prevention of its components of hazard, exposure and vulnerability and from the enhancement of adaptive capacities (SchmidtThomé, 2007; Menoni, 2011; Bobrowsky, 2013) and the second one based on the Social Theory of Risk (Giddens, 1990; Barrenechea et al., 2003), prominent in the Latin American academic context, which mainly focuses on the social component of vulnerability and considers risk as an outcome of the social perception and responsibility for decisions.
A great effort was made to integrate these cultural approaches, selecting a basic and restricted set of concepts and terms related to risk management and agreeing on a first shared definition, while for other terms it was not possible.
Starting from this preliminary exploration, it is intended to contribute to the improvement of a glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change by proposing definitions of those terms that are still discordant or that have not yet been explored, trying to take a step forward from the glossaries relating to climate change.
We have proceeded on the basis of the most widely shared definitions on fighting climate change, such as those indicated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014a, 2018b), integrating them with the indications of the glossaries prepared by the UNDRR (UNDRR, 2016, 2019), the Armonia EU funded project (Schmidt-Thomé, 2007), the ENSURE EU funded project (Menoni, 2011) and the Encyclopedia of natural hazards (Bobrowsky, 2013).
For the development of this glossary a "risk-thinking" approach was adopted, which focused attention on the analysis, assessment, action for territorial risk management, reassessment, and response, acknowledging uncertainty and achieving management objectives through a structured feedback process that includes stakeholder Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 45 participation (IPCC, 2014b, 2019), and the two terms that characterise it, that is, those of risk and territory were defined first.
Risk: The term risk is meant as “the potential for adverse consequences where something of value is at stake and where the occurrence and degree of an outcome is uncertain.
In the context of the assessment of climate impacts, the term risk is often used to refer to the potential for adverse consequences of a climate-related hazard, or of adaptation or mitigation responses to such a hazard, on lives, livelihoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, economic, social and cultural assets, services (including ecosystem services), and infrastructure.
Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability (of the affected system), its exposure over time (to the hazard), as well as the (climate-related) hazard and the likelihood of its occurrence” (IPCC, 2018b).
Therefore, the term risk refers to adverse consequences of both shock events, such as natural disasters and other sudden and extreme events, and stress pressures, such as continuous and incremental changes to temperature and rainfall (Chambers and Conway, 1991; Jones et al., 2010).
Territory: The term territory means a complex system consisting of the totality of the elements and their relationships located on a defined portion of terrestrial space, which can be of an urban, rural and / or natural type.
In particular, it consists of the set of resources, material and intangible, of a social, economic, cultural, environmental, organisational nature, the set of relationships and interactions that take place between the subjects (public and private, individual and collective, local and supra-local) present in it, the set of cognitive and material interactions undertaken by the subjects with the resources, the set of relationships between local and supra-local subjects and organisations (Dematteis, 1985; Magnaghi, 2010; Bonesio, 2011; Caroli, 2006).
The glossary has been compiled in four sections according to the main logical elements of the analysis and management of territorial risks, which are the components of risk, the phases of the risk cycle, the capabilities to reduce the risk, the responses for risk management.
To make the definitions given more understandable, illustrative purposes related to two of the phenomena that most characterise climate change have been given, heat waves and floods.
2.
THE COMPONENTS OF RISK There are three main components of territorial risk and they are hazard, exposure, and vulnerability.
These in turn are divided into further components that describe their characteristics more in detail.
The term hazard is defined as “the potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems, and environmental resources” (IPCC, 2018b).
The hazards could be Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 46 referred to climate-related physical events or trends (shocks and stresses) or their physical impacts (IPCC, 2014a).
The hazards due to climate change are socionatural because they are associated with a combination of natural and anthropogenic factors.
The term hazard indicates an event or phenomenon that can occur individually or in conjunction with others, therefore combined or sequential in their origin and effects, the severity of which depends on the probability with which it can occur, its intensity, its frequency and the extent of the affected area.
Its occurrence can generate negative impacts on the territory, depending on the severity of the hazard itself and the degree of exposure and vulnerability of the affected area.
The term exposure is defined as “the presence of people, livelihoods, species or ecosystems, environmental functions, services, and resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected” (IPCC, 2018b).
Exposure therefore constitutes the total value of people, livelihoods, infrastructures, animal and plant species, ecosystems and environmental, economic, social, and cultural services-goods-resources potentially affected by a hazard, because of their location in or connected to hazard-prone areas.
It depends on the quantity and value of the exposed elements that could be negatively impacted at the same time by one or more hazards on their structures, functions, and responsiveness.
The term vulnerability is defined as “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.
Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt” (IPCC, 2018b).
Vulnerability constitutes the propensity or predisposition of a territory to be negatively impacted by a hazard and therefore to suffer losses and damage when it is exposed to a hazard.
The vulnerability of a territory depends on socio-economic, environmental and institutional factors and on the characteristics of the built environment, the uses of resources and the activities that take place there and can be divided into two types of interconnected factors, namely sensitivity and systemic vulnerability, which both express the resistance capability of a territory to hazard, and the capability for protection, recovery, reconstruction and preparation, which constitute the capabilities that are most recognised in the concept of resilience (IPCC, 2012; Menoni et al., 2011).
Sensitivity is the predisposition of a territory to suffer direct negative impacts due to a hazard according to its intrinsic characteristics of human beings, infrastructure, environmental elements and their content.
This word is mainly used in studies on climate change, while in studies on natural hazards the words ‘susceptibility’ or ‘fragility’ or ‘physical vulnerability’ are mainly used.
An example of a person's sensitivity factor to heat waves is his or her physical condition which influences the physiological thermoregulation capacity as the environmental temperature varies, Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 47 while a sensitivity factor of a settlement to floods is given by the levels of material and structural stability of embankments and buildings.
Systemic vulnerability expresses the difficulty of a territory in guaranteeing its functionality when it is affected by the consequences of the direct impacts of a hazard, that are defined as indirect impacts, such as the worsening of the functioning of critical infrastructures or a significant increase in the demand for resources and services (Menoni et al., 2011).
It depends on the balance between the resources available in the emergency phase following the occurrence of a hazard and the need for these resources by the community involved in the hazardous event.
Systemic vulnerability also considers the negative effects of a functional type that physical losses and damage, occurring on a local scale, cause at the higher scales and therefore it increases its importance as time passes after the hazardous event.
It depends on the level of resources and services useful in the event of an emergency and on the degree of dependence of the territory on damaged critical infrastructures.
For example, systemic vulnerability to heat waves depends on the relationship between the provision of services and resources needed by vulnerable subjects such as usable health (hospitals, first aid, ...) and social (institutions, associations, solidarity networks, ...) services, the delivery services of water, food and home equipment, the activation of cooling systems, ... and the number of people who are in critical conditions during these events.
Systemic vulnerability to floods is instead given by the interruption of the road connections essential to reach the rescue facilities (hospitals, firefighters, civil protection, ...).
The systemic vulnerability to floods, on the other hand, depends on the possibility that the road connections essential to reach the rescue facilities (hospitals, firefighters, civil protection, ...) can be interrupted.
Critical infrastructure means a system or parts of it which are essential to maintain the health, safety and economic and social well-being of citizens and the vital functions of society and whose damage or destruction, even partial or temporary, can have a weakening impact, also due to possible domino effects, of the whole territory (Directive 2008/114/EC).
Critical infrastructures are the networks for the extraction, production, transmission and distribution of energy, telecommunications and telematic networks, networks for the water supply and wastewater management, health facilities (clinics, hospitals, service networks, ...), air, sea, rail and road transport and the distribution of basic necessities, the production of foodstuffs, banks and financial services, organisations and structures for security and civil protection (law enforcement, armed forces, urban surveillance and civil protection, ...) and the central and local government structures.
The impact is a “consequence of realised risks on natural and human systems, where risks result from the interactions of (…) hazards (…), exposure, and vulnerability” (IPCC, 2018b).
In fact, impacts are caused by hazards and their magnitude and extend Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 48 depend on both the severity of hazard and the degree of exposure and vulnerability of impacted natural and human systems.
“Impacts generally refer to effects on lives, livelihoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, economic, social, and cultural assets, services (including ecosystem services) and infrastructure.
Impacts may be referred to as consequences or outcomes and can be adverse or beneficial” (IPCC, 2018b).
The impact can be a qualitative-quantitative modification of available and potential assets, activities and natural and anthropogenic resources, material and intangible, and the health conditions of the people involved.
An impact can be direct or indirect.The modification, mostly of a physical and material nature, caused by a hazard which occurs in close spatial-temporal concomitance with it, such as the collapse of a building or a pylon of the electricity grid due to an earthquake is a direct impact.
An indirect impact is the modification that occurs subsequently, even over a long period of time, due to a direct impact, such as the interruption of the electricity supply due to the damage to a pylon following an earthquake.
Impacts, when negative, can be expressed in terms of losses and / or damage.
As some authors specify, losses and damage have been taken to refer both to impacts and risk, considering in the first case observed harm from impacts and, in the second case, projected harm from risks (Mechler et al., 2018).
The damage is the result of a negative (observed) impact or a (projected) risk due to the elimination or quantitative and functional reduction of a non-unique asset or of any other element that has an economic, emotional and moral value, see for example the destruction or putting out of use of an infrastructure, the loss of functionality of services, the increase in diseases, the degradation of ecosystems.
The loss is the result of a negative (observed) impact or a (projected) risk that cannot be assessed in monetary terms because it affects people, such as their death or the loss of basic physical or mental faculties, or goods of a unique nature, such as animal and plant species and monuments of inestimable value.
3.
THE PHASES OF THE TERRITORIAL RISK CYCLE The territorial risk cycle is a process that does not end with the complete recovery of the conditions prior to a hazardous event but continues when, if such condition should occur, there are no more known or predictable hazards that constitute problems, or when unpredictable shocks and stresses because of unavoidable uncertainty conditions should occur.
The phases that characterise the risk cycle are of two types, the first type concerns the phases that envisage actions of contrast, adaptation and reconstruction and are the pre-event, impact, emergency, and post-emergency phases while the second type concerns the period of ordinary management of a territory, when a new hazardous Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 49 event is not expected or not predictable and at the same time the reconstruction of what has been suffered from previous hazardous events has been completed.
In this regard, different parts and areas of a territory that has suffered a hazard may be in different phases over time, so that, for example, in some areas it may still be in a situation of reconstruction while in other areas this situation has been finished.
The pre-event phase is the one that precedes a potential impact, in which precursor or premonitory events of a hazard occur, for which a community is alerted and prepared to face it to reduce its consequences.
The effectiveness of this phase depends on the preparation capability of the vulnerable exposed area.
For example, in the pre-event phase of a heat wave, the temporary transfer of the most sensitive individuals to their own or third party homes located in cooler places, where available, is promoted, while in that of a flood, the flood wave upstream of the considered area is monitored and the population alert tools are activated.
The impact phase is the one in which one or more hazards occur that can generate direct impacts on people and assets according to their exposure, sensitivity and selfprotection capability.
Direct impacts on critical infrastructures can trigger indirect impacts on the territory depending on the systemic vulnerability of the territory itself.
Sensitivity and systemic vulnerability influence the resistance capability of the system (Menoni et al., 2011, 2012; IPCC, 2012).
For example, in the impact phase, a heat wave can cause illness (direct impact) to elderly people or with thermoregulation problems (high sensitivity) and / or whose mobility problems do not allow them to drink or independently change their clothing (low self-protection capability), thus causing an increase in the demand for rescue services (high systemic vulnerability).
In the impact phase, a flood can lead to the collapse (direct impact) of a road section with low structural stability (high sensitivity) where no elements for the construction of water barriers (low self-protection capability) are available thus causing the interruption of essential road connections (high systemic vulnerability).
The emergency phase follows the impact phase when, as a result of the direct and indirect impacts suffered, problems arise in the performance of the activities of a territory, in particular for critical infrastructures, and there is a strong increase in the demand for resources and services.
This phase is characterised by the implementation of interventions to restore or upgrade critical infrastructures and those of rescue, shelter and safety of people and assets damaged due to poor resistance and selfprotection.
The effectiveness during the emergency phase depends on the recovery and protection capabilities of the territory itself.
For example, in the emergency phase of a heat wave, elderly people with mobility difficulties can be given social and health care at home (high protective capability) to hydrate and cool their homes.
In the event of floods, any damage to the electricity network can be subject to immediate repairs while residents who have unusable homes can find accommodation in temporary Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 50 homes (high recovery capability).
The post-emergency phase, or reconstruction phase, begins when the critical infrastructures have been repaired and the emergency requests are permanently met, while the restoration, recovery and reconstruction of the remaining damage must be completed, and the resumption of economic, productive and service activities supported.
The effectiveness in the post-emergency phase depends on the reconstruction capability of the territory itself.
For example, after a heat wave, when sick people have been rescued, damaged trees must be recovered or replaced, while after a flood it is often necessary to provide definitive housing solutions for the displaced (high reconstruction capability).
The ordinary phase, so called with respect to a territorial planning approach, since the term peace phase is more widespread in the field of Natural Hazards, occurs when the impact on the territory of a hazardous event has been completely absorbed and there is no prediction of imminent occurrence of a new one or when unpredictable shocks and stresses because of unavoidable uncertainty conditions could happen.
In this phase, the territory is in a normal state and can therefore implement effective risk reduction, prevention and adaptation strategies and actions by acting on hazard, exposure and vulnerability, with appropriate attention to temporal and spatial dynamics that characterise the three risk components, and, where shocks and stresses are unpredictable because of unavoidable uncertainty conditions, by focusing on system vulnerability.
More than in the other phases, in this phase a co-evolutionary resilient vision of the interventions can be adopted and the system can seek not only to manage the risk conditions but think about the evolution of the territorial system in the long term.
4.
RISK REDUCTION CAPABILITIES Risks reduction capabilities are a set of complementary capabilities that need to be integrated as much as possible to increase their systemic effectiveness and whose overall effects lead to a reduction in intensity and / or modification of the characteristics of the impacts due to a hazard.
Those capabilities are obtained through interventions on hazard, exposure and vulnerability factors related to both known and unpredictable risks.
They are the capabilities of resistance, protection, recovery, reconstruction and preparation (Wisner et al., 2004, Schmidt-Thomé, 2007).
Resistance capability is the ability of a territory to counteract the generation of direct and indirect negative impacts and therefore to preserve its structural and functional integrity after the occurrence of a hazardous event.
It depends on sensitivity to direct impacts and systemic vulnerability to indirect ones.
For example, the ability to withstand the illnesses of a heat wave is greater in healthy and young people than in the elderly or sick with thermoregulation problems (sensitivity), while in the event of Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 51 a flood the resistance capability to ensure a good supply water (systemic vulnerability) is lower where the related critical infrastructures have problems of structural and / or functional stability (sensitivity).
Protection capability is the ability of a territory to use defence devices and / or behaviours to cushion the direct impacts of a hazardous event, both with autonomous actions (self-protection), and with external help (care, rescue, safety, ...).
These capabilities are influenced by personal conditions of a psychological / cognitive, mobility, socio-economic, cultural nature, which can facilitate or hinder the implementation of protective behaviours, and by external factors of a technological, localization and organizational nature, which can favour the use of protections for people and assets in critical situations.
For example, the self-protect capability with respect to illness due to a heat wave is lower in people whose mobility difficulties do not allow them to drink or change their clothing independently.
The protection capability is greater where there is a social and health care service at home to support the hydration of people and the cooling of the rooms.
On the other hand, in the event of a flood, the self-protection capability is low where the inhabitants of an area that is about to be reached by a flood wave are not equipped with elements capable of forming water barriers, while it is high where the exposed critical points of an electricity network are promptly secured by the competent entities.
Recovery capability is the ability of a territory damaged by a hazardous event to promptly recover a satisfactory operating condition and, pending or unable to complete the restoration of critical infrastructures, to activate responses, even temporary ones, to ordinary and extraordinary requests for resources and services for the rescue, recovery, shelter and safety of people and assets.
It depends on the ability to carry out the necessary interventions in a timely manner to repair the damage and the ability to know, organise and mobilise the resources of the territory to respond to unforeseen situations.
For example, the recovery capability from a heat wave is greater where it is possible to activate rescue and care services for people who suffer from the heat or have suffered from illness.
The recovery capability from a flood is greater where dedicated financial resources are available for carrying out repairs to damaged critical infrastructures.
Reconstruction capability is the ability of a territory to return to a normal condition after the occurrence of a calamitous event through the completion of the restoration and development interventions of what has been damaged or interrupted, including economic and productive activities and services.
It depends on the ability to repair all the damage suffered and the ability to know, organise and mobilise the resources of the territory to effectively support reconstruction.
For example, the reconstruction capability of agricultural activities affected by droughts is greater where farms are covered by insurance policies against natural disasters, while the reconstruction Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 52 capability after a flood is greater where there are sufficient financial and economic resources to repair or rebuild damaged buildings.
Preparation capability is the ability of a community to foresee and prepare the actions to be activated during and after the occurrence of a hazardous event, in order to cushion its negative impacts as much as possible.
It depends on the knowledge of the characteristics of the potential risk and the organisation of behaviours and actions that can directly and indirectly influence risk components (hazard, but most of all exposure and vulnerability).
For example, the preparation capability for a heat wave is greater where exposed subjects are sensitised on good hydration rules to follow in the hottest periods of the year, while the preparation capability for a flood is greater where the communication methods of the organisational aspects to the subjects involved in the management of the emergency are well defined.
5.
THE RESPONSES FOR RISK MANAGEMENT The term responses indicates the policies, regulations, strategies, actions and interventions with which a community and the delegated institutions face territorial risks to reduce and, if possible, eliminate them and, when risks are unpredictable, to reduce the system vulnerability enhancing risks reduction capabilities.
Therefore, this purpose can be achieved by acting in an integrated way on the causes and effects of risks through the reduction and elimination of situations and factors of hazard, exposure and vulnerability and also through the improvement of the capabilities of resistance, protection, recovery, reconstruction and preparedness of the involved territories.
Hazard reduction involves decreasing its frequency, duration and / or intensity.
For example, the hazard of heat waves can be reduced by acting on the shape (height, roughness, density) of the buildings, in order not to hinder air flows, on the optical and chromatic characteristics of their surfaces, to increase reflecting power, on the vegetation cover and the permeability of the soils, to favour the evapotranspiration processes.
The flood hazard can be reduced instead through the construction of river accommodation works, much better if based on nature-based solutions, for the reduction of the flow rate (rolling tanks), for the control of the solid transport (restraining bridles), for the defence against erosion (banks of support).
Exposure reduction involves the reduction or elimination of the presence (permanent, prolonged or short) of goods, people and activities in the areas affected by a hazard, starting from the subjects who remain there for longer to reside or work.
For example, exposure to heat waves can be reduced through the transfer of elderly and children to cool places for their vacations during the hot period of the summer season or through their temporary movement during emergency phases in air-conditioned spaces (commercial centres, cooled public areas, ...).
Flood exposure can be reduced through Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 53 the evacuation of exposed people to safe collection areas, the temporary transfer of people and goods to safe temporary homes and spaces, the permanent relocation of people, goods and activities to non-exposed areas to hazard.
Vulnerability reduction involves the reduction or elimination of the vulnerabilities and factors of vulnerability of potentially exposed assets and people, aiming to reduce damage and losses.
A first form of vulnerability reduction concerns the actions to increase the resistance capability of a territory to a hazard, decreasing its sensitivity with respect to the relative direct impacts and its systemic vulnerability to the indirect consequences of the damage suffered.
The decrease in sensitivity can be obtained by improving the intrinsic characteristics of a territory.
The decrease in systemic vulnerability can be achieved by increasing the supply of resources and services useful in the event of an emergency and reducing the degree of dependence of a territory on critical infrastructures that can potentially be damaged after a hazardous event.
Possible responses to increase the resistance capabilities to heat waves are the improvement, through medical treatment, of the thermoregulatory capacity of heart patients (sensitivity), the increase in the availability of food to meet the dietary needs in case of subsistence crop loss (systemic vulnerability) and improvement of the efficiency of irrigation systems to be able to irrigate agricultural crops even in dry periods (systemic vulnerability).
Responses that increase the resistance capabilities to floods are those that improve the structural stability of bridges, homes and other territorial infrastructures (sensitivity) and increase the availability of secure infrastructure connections to reach the rescue points (systemic vulnerability).
A second way of reducing vulnerability is obtained with actions that increase, where a territory is not resistant enough, the capability for protection, recovery, reconstruction and preparation.
The increase of the protective capability can be obtained by improving the psycho / cognitive, mobility, socio-economic and cultural conditions in the population that facilitate the execution of self-protective behaviours and by strengthening the technical, localisation and organisational conditions necessary to activate the protections in case of hazardous.
For example, some possible responses to increase the protective capability of a territory against heat waves are the technical solutions that facilitate the elderly with mobility difficulties to quench their thirst and activate the cooling in their homes rather than the strengthening of irrigation systems for being able to supply water even in dry periods.
Responses that increase the protective capability to floods are instead those that provide the inhabitants located in sensitive areas with devices for the construction of temporary barriers or those that activate a defence for the maintenance of critical infrastructures exposed to a hazard.
The enhancement of the recovery capability can be achieved by improving the Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 54 technical, urban, environmental, economic-financial factors, which affect the feasibility of repairs and construction interventions of damaged essential services, especially relating to critical infrastructures, and by enriching knowledge, skills, organisation, and management of existing or potential resources of a territory for rescue and safety operations.
In this regard, it is necessary to consider the higher decision-making levels since the resources necessary to restore local conditions come from the different levels of government and also depend on the type and strength of the relationships between the affected places and the wider concerned region (Menoni et al., 2011).
For example, a response that increases the recovery capability in the event of heat waves is the strengthening of the interconnection of electricity dispatching networks to ensure its availability in case of a shortage of water flows.
A response that increases the recovery capability in the event of floods is the sharing of knowledge and skills of institutional and non-institutional subjects who carry out rescue operations in the emergency phase (Civil Protection, associations of health volunteers, ...).
The increase in reconstruction capability can be obtained by improving the technical, urban, environmental, economic-financial factors that affect the feasibility of repairs and reconstruction of damaged infrastructures and by enhancing knowledge, skills, organisation and management of existing and potential resources in the area to support the resumption of interrupted economic-productive activities and services.
Reconstruction capability can be improved by considering the weaknesses that a territory has revealed during a past event and by seizing, in reconstruction, the opportunities to build a better and safer place to live (Rose, 2004).
For example, a response that increases the reconstruction capability in the event of heat waves is the spread of insurance protections by farms to compensate for damage suffered due to droughts, while a response that increases the reconstruction capability in the event of floods is the improvement of design and technical solutions for the consolidation and reconstruction of damaged buildings.
The increase in preparedness capability is achieved by improving the knowledge of risk conditions, through more precise forecasting systems, with appropriate attention to temporal and spatial dynamics that characterise risk, and, especially when shocks and stresses are unpredictable because of unavoidable uncertainty conditions, by focusing on system vulnerability and enhancing the awareness of the involved subjects, the promotion of appropriate behaviours to mitigate the impacts and the planning of emergency procedures.
For example, an increase in the preparedness capability for heat waves is obtained through an arising awareness of the hydration rules of vulnerable subjects, while the increase of the preparedness capability in case of floods is obtained through the development of emergency plans to organise communication and emergency operations during the weather alert.
Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 55 6.
FINAL REMARKS Sharing a glossary constitutes, in various scientific and disciplinary fields, one of the first problems that experts who have different scientific-cultural approaches must face when they must carry out a common task.
Over the last 3 decades, this type of problem has taken on different connotations with the ever-increasing internationalisation of research and professional works and editorial products.
In fact, on the one hand more and more international research groups and scientific associations have shared their approaches and terminologies, thus converging towards the drafting of common glossaries; on the other hand, more and more new networks have been created which connect different realities and which therefore require a comparison of existing glossaries to develop new ones.
In research activities it is often not possible to share a common glossary and, when this happens, most of the time it is shared at the end of the work.
This is because sharing a glossary is not a simple terminological issue but also requires sharing the approach and foundations of the research or professional activity to be carried out.
This article was written to respond to a need that the authors strongly felt during the research CARE Empowering Climate Resilience, a need that began to arise about 15 years earlier during the research INTERREG–MEDOCC QUATER Qualité dans le territoire and in some subsequent research of national interest on these issues.
Thus, during the CARE project, what was a shared approach between European partners, due to a reference framework that was built up over years of scientific activity at European level and which has been enriched with numerous neologisms to take into account the increasingly articulated, in-depth and innovative policies and strategies that have been developed and implemented over time, was compared with a different approach proposed by some of the Latin American partners.
In drafting this glossary, the main aspects that should characterise the plans, strategies and actions aimed at managing the territorial risks associated with climate change have been considered.
First of all, a co-evolutionary resilient vision of the interventions to be implemented was taken as a reference, which requires thinking about them within an ever-evolving process that seeks to transform crises into development opportunities (Davoudi et al., 2013; Holling, 1973).
This type of vision does not only involve the achievement of a high resilience from natural and / or anthropic disasters and shocks, but also considers the evolution of the territorial system in the long term.
This characteristic of resilience requires citizens to share not only the objectives of the change but also the usefulness of the change itself and therefore the predisposition to act on potential shocks and stresses by anticipating changes.
Secondly, the search for a profitable and efficient relationship of actions related to risk prevention and postdisaster recovery both in the emergency phase and in the subsequent phases was Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 56 considered as an indispensable strategic objective.
In particular, the ability to intervene in the reconstruction phase with actions that reduce risk levels is a factor of considerable efficiency in the use of resources.
Finally, the involvement of the population in decision-making and implementation aspects in all phases of the risk cycle was considered as a very important factor in achieving a strong capacity for intervention.
In this regard, the construction of a high capacity to intervene on potential risks makes it possible to acquire a greater ability to deal with uncertainty and therefore to recover from the possible occurrence of unexpected phenomena.
The terminological differences that were addressed mainly concerned the implementation of territorial risk management actions, which are strongly connected with the planning processes.
This glossary proposal is therefore a particularly useful tool for urban and territorial planning experts.
REFERENCES Barrenechea, J.; Gentile, E.; González, S., & Natenzon, C. (2003).
Una propuesta metodológica para el estudio de la vulnerabilidad social en el marco de la teoría social del riesgo.
In Lago Martínez, S., Gómez Rojas, G., & Mauro, M.
(Eds.
), En torno de las metodologías: abordajes cualitativos y cuantitativos (pp.
179-196).
Buenos Aires, Proa XXI.
ISBN: 987-1111-1-9.
Bonesio, L. (2011).
Documento preliminare per la commissione epistemologica.
Società dei territorialisti.
http://www.societadeiterritorialisti.it/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/110901_lbonesio_docu_preliminare_commissione_epistem ologica.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Bobrowsky, P.T.
(2013).
Encyclopedia of natural hazards.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-4399-4.
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-14020-4399-4.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Caroli, M.G.
(2006).
Il marketing territoriale.
Strategie per la competitività sostenibile del territorio.
Milano, Italia: FrancoAngeli.
ISBN: 8846478614.
Chambers, R., & Conway, G. (1991).
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century.
Discussion Paper 296.
Brighton: IDS.
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/775/Dp296.pdf?
sequence=1.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Davoudi, S., Brooks, E., & Mehmood, A.
(2013).
Evolutionary Resilience and Strategies for Climate Adaptation.
Planning Practice & Research, 28, 307-322.
Doi: 10.1080/02697459.2013.787695.
http://www.societadeiterritorialisti.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/110901_lbonesio_docu_preliminare_commissione_epistemologica.pdf http://www.societadeiterritorialisti.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/110901_lbonesio_docu_preliminare_commissione_epistemologica.pdf http://www.societadeiterritorialisti.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/110901_lbonesio_docu_preliminare_commissione_epistemologica.pdf https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-1-4020-4399-4 https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-1-4020-4399-4 https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/775/Dp296.pdf?sequence=1 https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/775/Dp296.pdf?sequence=1 Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 57 Dematteis, G. (1985).
Le metafore della terra.
La geografia umana fra mito e scienza.
Milano, Italia: Feltrinelli.
ISBN: 8807100452.
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.
(2014).
Understanding Risk in an Evolving World.
Emerging Best Practices in Natural Disaster Risk Assessment.
Washington, DC: The Word Bank.
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.
(2016).
The making of a riskier future: How our decisions are shaping future disaster risk.
Washington, DC: The Word Bank.
https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Riskier%20Future.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Giddens A.
(1990).
The Consequences of Modernity.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
ISBN: 978-0-7456-6644-0.
Holling, C.S.
(1973).
Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems.
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 4, 1-23.
Doi: 10.1146/annurev.es.04.110173.000245.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2012).
Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Dokken, D.J., Ebi, K.L., Mastrandrea, M.D., Mach, K.J., Plattner, G.K., Allen, S.K., Tignor, M., & Midgley, P.M.
(Eds.).
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation.
A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SREX_Full_Report-1.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2014a).
Agard, J., Schipper, E.L.F., Birkmann, J., Campos, M., Dubeux, C., Nojiri, Y., Olsson, L., Elasha, B.O., Pelling, M., Prather, M.J., Rivera-Ferre, M.G., Ruppel, O.C., Sallenger, A., Smith, K.R., & St. Clair, A.L.
(Eds.).
Annex II Glossary.
In Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., Chatterjee, M., Ebi, K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, A.N., MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R., & White, L.L.
(Eds.)
Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp.
1757-1776).
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-AnnexII_FINAL.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2014b).
Jones, R.N., Patwardhan, A., Cohen, S.J., Dessai, S., Lammel, A., Lempert, R.J., Mirza, M.M.Q., & von Storch, H.
(Eds.).
Foundations for decision making.
In Field, C.B., Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Riskier%20Future.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SREX_Full_Report-1.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-AnnexII_FINAL.pdf Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 58 Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., Chatterjee, M., Ebi, K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, A.N., MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R., & White, L.L.
(Eds.
), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp.
195-228).
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap2_FINAL.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2018a).
Summary for Policymakers.
In Masson-Delmotte, V., Zhai, P., Pörtner, H.-O., Roberts, D., Skea, J., Shukla, P.R., Pirani, A., Moufouma-Okia, W., Péan, C., Pidcock, R., Connors, S., Matthews, J.B.R., Chen, Y., Zhou, X., Gomis, M.I., Lonnoy, E., Maycock, T., Tignor, M., & Waterfield, T.
(Eds.
), Global Warming f 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_ LR.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2018b).
Matthews, J.B.R.
(Ed.)
Annex I: Glossary.
In Masson-Delmotte, V., Zhai, P., Pörtner, H.-O., Roberts, D., Skea, J., Shukla, P.R., Pirani, A., Moufouma-Okia, W., Péan, C., Pidcock, R., Connors, S., Matthews, J.B.R., Chen, Y., Zhou, X., Gomis, M.I., Lonnoy, E., Maycock, T., Tignor, M., & Waterfield, T.
(Eds.
), Global Warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_AnnexI_Glossary.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2019).
Hurlbert, M., Krishnaswamy, J., Davin, E., Johnson, F.X., Mena, C.F., Morton, J., Myeong, S., Viner, D., Warner, K., Wreford, A., Zakieldeen, S., & Zommers, Z.
(Eds.).
Risk Management and Decision making in Relation to Sustainable Development.
In Shukla, P.R., Skea, J., Calvo Buendia, E., Masson-Delmotte, V., Pörtner, H.-O., Roberts, D.C., Zhai, P., Slade, R., Connors, S., van Diemen, R., Ferrat, M., Haughey, E., Luz, S., Neogi, S., Pathak, M., Petzold, J., Portugal Pereira, J., Vyas, P., Huntley, E., Kissick, K., Belkacemi, M., & Malley, J.
(Eds.
), Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems.
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap2_FINAL.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_AnnexI_Glossary.pdf Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 59 https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/11/10_Chapter-7.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Magnaghi, A.
(2010).
Il progetto locale.
Verso la coscienza di luogo.
Torino, Italia: Bollati Boringhieri.
ISBN: 9788833921501.
Mechler, R., Bouwer, L.M., Schinko, T., Surminski, S., & Linnerooth-Bayer, J.
(Eds.)
(2018).
Loss and Damage from climate change.
Concepts, methods and policy options.
Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-72026-5.
Menoni, S., Costa, L., Galderisi, A., Margottini, C., Belvaux, M., Benenson, I., Karymbalis, E., Kidron, G., Kundak, S., Minucci, G., Parker, D.J., Sapountzaki, K., & Tapsell, S.M.
(2011).
Methodological framework for an integrated multi-scale vulnerability and resilience assessment.
ENSURE Enhancing resilience of communities and territories facing natural and na-tech hazards.
Project FP7 20082011.
Deliverable 4.1.
European Commission.
https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/16261/1/ENSURE_Del_WP4_110919%5B1%5D.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Menoni, S., Molinari, D., Parker, D., Ballio, F., & Tapsell, S. (2012).
Assessing multifaceted vulnerability and resilience in order to design risk-mitigation strategies.
Natural Hazards, 64(3), 2057–2082.
Doi: 10.1007/s11069-012-0134-4.
Jones, L., Jaspars, S., Pavanello, S., Ludi, E., Slater, R., Arnall, A., Gristi, N., & Mtisi, S. (2010).
Responding to a changing climate.
Exploring how disaster risk reduction, social protection and livelihoods approaches promote features of adaptive capacity.
Working Paper 319 Results of ODI research presented in preliminary form for discussion and critical comment.
London: Overseas Development Institute.
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/submissions/15234_RespondingtoaChangingCli mate.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Rose, A.
(2004).
Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters.
Disaster Prevention and Management, 13(4), 307-314.
Doi: 10.1108/09653560410556528.
Schmidt-Thomé, P., Klein, J., Aumo, R., & Hurstinen, J.
(2007).
Report: Technical Glossary of a Multi Hazard Related Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Language.
ARMONIA Applied multi-risk mapping of natural hazards for impact assessment.
Project FP6 Deliverable 4.1.2. https://forum.eionet.europa.eu/nrc-airclimate/library/public/2010_citiesproject/interchange/armonia_project/armonia_pro ject_7/download/en/1/ARMONIA_PROJECT_Deliverable%204.1.2.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.
(2009).
2009 UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction.
Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR.
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/11/10_Chapter-7.pdf https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/16261/1/ENSURE_Del_WP4_110919%5B1%5D.pdf https://www.preventionweb.net/files/submissions/15234_RespondingtoaChangingClimate.pdf https://www.preventionweb.net/files/submissions/15234_RespondingtoaChangingClimate.pdf https://forum.eionet.europa.eu/nrc-air-climate/library/public/2010_citiesproject/interchange/armonia_project/armonia_project_7/download/en/1/ARMONIA_PROJECT_Deliverable%204.1.2.pdf https://forum.eionet.europa.eu/nrc-air-climate/library/public/2010_citiesproject/interchange/armonia_project/armonia_project_7/download/en/1/ARMONIA_PROJECT_Deliverable%204.1.2.pdf https://forum.eionet.europa.eu/nrc-air-climate/library/public/2010_citiesproject/interchange/armonia_project/armonia_project_7/download/en/1/ARMONIA_PROJECT_Deliverable%204.1.2.pdf Magoni, Radaelli – Toward a shared glossary for territorial risk management due to climate change IJPP – Italian Journal of Planning Practice Vol.
XI, issue 1 2021 60 https://www.preventionweb.net/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
(2016).
Terminology: Online Glossary.
https://www.undrr.org/terminology#A.
Accessed 30 Apr 2021.
UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
(2019).
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction.
GAR Distilled.
Geneva, Switzerland: UNDRR.
https://gar.undrr.org/sites/default/files/gar19distilled.pdf.
Accessed 8 Jun 2021.
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., & Davis, I.
(2004).
At risk: natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters.
London: Routledge.
ISBN 9780415252164.
SHORT AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY: Marcello Magoni is an urban and environmental planner and Coordinator of Climate Change, Risk and Resilience Laboratory (Department of Architecture and Urban Studies – Politecnico di Milano).
He has written about 100 papers in national and international journals and written and edited some monographs.
Rachele Radaelli is an urban and environmental planner and Member of Climate Change, Risk and Resilience Laboratory (Department of Architecture and Urban Studies – Politecnico di Milano).
She carries out research and training activities in the fields of climate change mitigation and adaptation in the context of spatial planning.
https://www.preventionweb.net/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf https://www.undrr.org/terminology#A https://gar.undrr.org/sites/default/files/gar19distilled.pdf
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 7 Climate Justice at the Local Level: The Case of Turkey Beyza Sarıkoç Yıldırım DOI: https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.45.1 Beyza Sarıkoç Yıldırım, from İstanbul (Turkey), is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University.
She received her Bachelor’s degree in “Political Science and Public Administration” at Middle East Technical University in 2012.
In 2015, she got her master’s degree in Local Governments and Urban Politics at Marmara University with her thesis entitled “Urban Climate Justice in the Local Climate Change Policies: The Cases of Bursa, Izmir, Nilüfer and Karşıyaka.” Her research interests fall under Comparative Politics and International Relations, specifically environmental politics, climate change, local politics, social justice and climate justice.
Currently, she is working as a research assistant in the Department of Local Government at Marmara University.
E-mail: beyza.sarikoc@marmara.edu.tr; beyzasarikoc@gmail.com.
Abstract Climate change is an issue of social justice, as it affects different social groups in the urban space differently.
Yet, while formulating climate action plans, local governments often disregard the relationship between climate change and justice.
By using content analysis, this article explores climate change action plans of Turkish municipalities from the perspective of climate justice.
It concludes that action plans of Turkish municipalities do not consider climate change as a problem of justice despite the emerging or exacerbated inequalities in the urban space caused by climate change.
Keywords Climate Change; Climate Justice; Local Governments; Municipalities; Urban Climate Justice https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.45.1 mailto:beyza.sarikoc@marmara.edu.tr mailto:beyzasarikoc@gmail.com POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 8 Introduction1 Climate change, as one of the most significant global environmental problems, has several consequences at the local level.
Cities and climate change have a symbiotic relationship with each other, as the former contribute to the rising levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to the high concentration of production and consumption within specific areas.
According to UN-Habitat (2011), cities are responsible for 60% to 70% of total GHG emissions.
Moreover, urban population is projected to reach 66% of the world population by 2050 (United Nations 2014), causing a further increase in GHG emissions in urban areas if our consumption and production habits do not change.
At the same time, cities are the most vulnerable to severe outcomes of climate change such as extreme weather events, drought and sea-level rise, which have impacts on human health, food security, housing, employment and cultures (Revi et al.
2014).
As such, climate change has significant effects on the socio-economic structures of urban areas and increases the vulnerability of cities.
Vulnerability may vary according to two main and interconnected factors.
The first factor is the structure of cities, such as the level of development, quality of infrastructure services, and institutional capacity at the local level.
The second factor is the socio-economic conditions of city dwellers, including distribution of income, poverty rates, gender inequality and adequate health services for people with disabilities and the elderly.
Hence, climate change is an issue that has the potential to deepen social inequalities within and between urban areas.
As a result, climate injustices that emerge in urban areas have been framed as “urban climate justice” in the literature (Steele et al.
2015; Bulkeley et al.
2013).
In order to counteract climate change, local governments have pursued actions in the two main policy areas of climate change, namely mitigation and adaptation.
While the objective of mitigation policies is to reduce GHG emissions, adaptation policies endeavour to adapt to the changing conditions caused by climate change.
Through mitigation and adaptation plans, local governments have taken measures against the effects of climate change since the 1990s.
International climate change negotiations, such as the Paris Agreement and COP21 Decisions, also underline the importance of actions of local and subnational governments (ICLEI 2016).
By using content analysis, this article explores the climate change action plans of Turkish municipalities from the perspective of climate justice and aims to fill the gap in the existing literature on climate justice.
It concludes that although 1 An earlier draft “Urban Climate Justice in the Local Climate Change Policies: The Case of Turkey” was submitted as a working paper to the IAPSS World Congress 2019 and this article is developed from my master thesis entitled “Urban Climate Justice in the Local Climate Change Policies: The Cases of Bursa, Izmir, Karşıyaka and Nilu ̈fer” which was supervised by Semra Cerit Mazlum in Marmara University, Turkey.
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 9 climate change has caused or exacerbated inequalities in urban areas in Turkey, action plans of Turkish municipalities do not perceive climate change as a problem of social justice.
In the first part of the article, I present a literature review of existing research on inequalities caused by climate change in urban areas and the theories of urban climate justice.
In the second part, I examine the documents that delegate power and responsibilities to local governments by the central government in Turkey, in order to understand the context in which municipalities implement climate change policies.
Finally, I assess the mitigation and adaptation policies to demonstrate the differences between them with an emphasis on climate justice.
Inequality of climate change in urban areas Urban climate justice is a concept describing the emerging or exacerbated inequalities in urban areas caused by climate change.
Coincidentally, those who contribute the least to climate change are generally most affected by its negative consequences both at local and global levels.
There are a few studies investigating the relationship between vulnerable groups and climate policies in cities.
A recent study conducted in twenty U.S. cities shows that areas populated by the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups are the most affected by the urban heat island effect (Mitchell 2017) which means that the average temperature of cities is higher than its surroundings due to the changes in the land use in urban areas (Stone and Rodgers 2001).
In New Orleans, increased invoices due to rising electricity prices adversely affected the low-income groups (Stein 2018).
Another study uncovers how in Birmingham, fuel poverty could not be overcome by adaptation policies, and building affordable housing in Vancouver brought about the displacement of low and middle-income groups because of structural factors (McKendry 2015).
Overall, many studies indicate that climate changerelated adaptation and mitigation policies can have unintended consequences on different groups and reproduce societal inequalities.
Therefore, these repercussions must be considered in the process of policymaking and implementation.
The difference in vulnerability to climate change between lowand high-income groups is insignificant in urban areas where health and safety standards are provided, land use planning is done considering the risks in the region and where infrastructure and services are centrally regulated.
However, low-income groups living in lowand middle-income countries are vulnerable to climate change as a result of inadequate infrastructure, health services and secure housing (IPCC 2012; Revi et al.
2014).
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 10 Vulnerability to climate change is not only related to the income level.
Another factor that increases this vulnerability is the gender roles in society.
Beyond income level, gender also has an impact on vulnerability to climate change.
For example, women living in rural areas are more vulnerable to climate change because they are directly dependent on natural resources of the land they work on.
Moreover, due to their gender roles as care-givers, women living in urban areas are disproportionately forced to cope with adverse health conditions exacerbated by the negative effects of climate change, such as vector infectious diseases and malaria caused by the urban heat island effect and water shortages in droughtaffected areas (Terry 2009, 2-3).
According to Hardoy and Pandiella (2009), some questions should be raised to understand vulnerability to climate change in urban areas.
The options for low-income groups for housing remain quite limited in the absence of affordable housing in the cities.
Therefore, it is important to ask the question: which residential areas are more exposed to climate change impacts?
Subsequently, low-income groups are forced into residential areas where the effects of extreme weather events are more destructive.
Therefore, ‘who lives in areas where the direct and indirect effects of climate change are more hazardous?’ should be the second question.
Third, who lacks the knowledge, capacity and opportunity to take measures against the impacts of climate change?
The answer of the third question emphasizes not only the lack of capacity of the population, but also the inadequate guidance from local governments (Hardoy and Pandiella 2009).
These questions help to identify disadvantaged groups who are vulnerable to climate change, such as low-income groups, children, elderly people, women and people with disabilities.
Theoretical framework The main objective of this section is to define urban climate justice through the main theoretical approaches.
Yet, it is important to highlight that while there has been an increasing number of studies on global climate justice since the beginning of 1990s, they are still relatively few in number (Bulkeley et al.
2014).
Using the prevailing theories on justice of notable scholars such as Rawls (1971), Sen (1999), Young (1990) and Lefebvre (2015), we can identify six approaches to urban climate justice in the existing literature, namely distributive and procedural justice, the capabilities approach, procedural justice in local climate adaptation, justice as recognition, spatial justice, and the eco-cultural political approach.
Adger et al.
(2006) explain climate justice through both procedural and distributive justice, using the theory of John Rawls as the foundation of their approach.
Accordingly, POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 11 adaptation to climate change requires both procedural justice, meaning the road to justice, and justice in distribution.
While procedural justice is necessary for participation in the policy-making processes, distribution of burdens and benefits of climate change requires distributive justice.
As such, procedural and distributive justice are interdependent on climate change policies (Adger et al.
2006).
Therefore, at the local level, the elements of both procedural and distributive justice are important for the development of climate-just cities.
Adopting the capabilities approach, Sen (2009, 18-19) argues that policies that increase basic capacities and opportunities for social justice are more egalitarian than others.
Using Sen’s approach to justice, Moser and Satterhwaite (2008) have developed a “pro-poor adaptation to climate change”.
They also note the fact that the population density is higher in lowand middle-income countries.
Moreover, the vast majority of the population in low and middle-income countries lives in coastal areas that are vulnerable to the impacts of sea level rise and extreme weather events.
Furthermore, lowand middle-income countries lack the capacity to adequately adapt to climate change because of deficiencies in infrastructure and constraints on public administration.
Therefore, the capacities of lowand middleincome societies should be increased to reduce their vulnerabilities in urban areas.
Dodman and Satterthwaite (2009) argue that local and subnational governments can increase the adaptation capacity of urban areas by improving their administrative system and by providing housing and basic infrastructure services for vulnerable groups.
Bringing together the distributive justice and capabilities approach, Holland (2017) recommends adopting the procedural justice approach in local climate adaptation.
He argues that the reasons for vulnerability can be understood through the analysis of the political power of vulnerable groups who are most exposed to climate change, as well as examination of the policy-making process of climate change.
Only through such an analysis can vulnerabilities be understood.
There are two obstacles to decreasing the vulnerabilities of certain groups to climate change.
The first one is the influence of experts in decision-making processes because technical experts evaluate climate change as solely a technical issue, disregarding the justice dimension.
The second obstacle is the conflict of interest arising from financial loss of certain stakeholders, such as polluting companies, due to climate change policies.
By acting on these two fundamental barriers, the influence of vulnerable groups on the policy-making process can be increased (Holland, 2017).
Bulkeley et al.
(2014) add the dimension of recognition to the distributive and procedural justice in urban climate justice.
Climate justice on the international level is often discussed from the perspective of the distributive and procedural justice.
However, the POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 12 question of rights and responsibilities in relation to climate change cannot be debated from the perspective of distributive and procedural justice only, given the socio-economic and structural characteristics of urban areas that vary within themselves and between the nation states.
Therefore, there is a necessity to analyse urban climate justice separately from climate justice at the international level.
For this reason, Bulkeley et al.
(2014) argue that the approach of traditional international politics to climate justice, which is based on distribution and procedures, should be amplified at the local level with the notion of justice as recognition.
The implementation of climate change policies requires a deliberative analysis because of the unequal distribution of burden and benefits of climate change across urban areas.
In other words, in climate change policies at the local level, the cultural injustices that have already existed in cities should be taken into account in order to ensure the rights of oppressed groups such as the working class, women and ethnic minorities (Bulkeley et al.
2014).
Another approach to urban climate justice is the spatial justice approach based on the claim of Lefebvre’s ‘the right to city’ (2015).
According to this approach, adaptation to climate change is essentially spatial.
This means that, as opposed to the capitalist understanding of justice, resources such as jobs, income, political power, social services and healthy environment should be equally distributed in urban areas.
However, these resources are currently concentrated among the urban elites and the unequal access to resources is reproduced through the structure of production processes.
Research on environmental justice shows that pollutants and hazardous facilities are often established in areas inhabited by low-income families and/or ethnic minorities (Shi et al.
2016).
In addition, urban planning policies in lowand middle-income countries cannot be implemented due to rapid population growth and the needs of the expanding urban area cannot be met due to lack of financial resources (Reckien et al.
2018).
Therefore, while eco-friendly urban planning – which is essential in the face of climate change – in many cases cannot be adequately implemented in lowand middle-income countries, in high-income countries, refurbishing houses to make them more energy-efficient and reduce emissions is increasing housing prices, thereby causing ‘eco-gentrification' (Reckien et al.
2018).
As such, the effects of climate change and climate policies are not equally distributed in urban areas.
For this reason, urban climate justice is the right to the city (Cohen 2018).
Accordingly, inclusion of the citizen in both the policy-making processes and the policy implementation processes are necessary for overcoming injustices.
Likewise, in order to bring equality and justice, the environmental justice movement has been focusing on vulnerable groups who suffer the POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 13 most from the effects of climate change, yet do not often have a voice in the policy-making processes in urban areas (Taylor 2000).
Overall, climate change, as a global problem, increases existing inequalities both between the North and the South and between social groups living in cities.
Policy areas of local governments such as infrastructure, transportation and energy determine the level of vulnerability of citizens to the impacts of climate change.
Such policies are likely to create socio-economic and socio-spatial inequalities if the unequal distribution of burdens and benefits of environmental processes are not addressed and the lack of participation of vulnerable groups in the policy-making processes persist.
For these reasons, multi-layer and participatory policy-making processes that include all groups in the society and includes different institutions of state/private sector/non-governmental organizations/communities are necessary to achieve urban climate justice.
Methodology By examining whether Turkish municipalities consider the justice dimension of climate change in their policies, I analyze their climate/sustainable energy action plans.
I argue that the municipalities in Turkey disregard the justice dimension in their action plans, as they mostly aim to develop mitigation policies.
My hypothesis is that although climate change has created or exacerbated inequalities in urban areas, the action plans of municipalities in Turkey do not frame climate change as a problem of social/climate justice.
After developing the conceptual framework of the study and analyzing the powers and responsibilities of local governments in Turkey, I conducted content analysis of municipal climate action plans, which unpacks the framework of policies since content analysis enables to go beyond merely counting the number of times specific words appear in the text (Hsieh and Shannon 2005).
The study covered all municipalities in Turkey with climate/sustainable energy action plans.
At the time of the research, the number of municipalities with action plans was fifteen.
I selected official and announced plans, as they represent the unified actions of municipalities to climate change.
As such, other activities of municipalities on climate change are excluded from the scope of the study.
I examined action plans by manual coding with the keywords employed from the conceptual framework of urban climate justice which I have delved into in the theoretical framework part of the study.
Then, I explored the words within their contexts and tried to examine thoroughly whether the words are related to urban climate justice.
Accordingly, I used content analysis as a qualitative method.
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 14 The words chosen for the content analysis are divided into two categories.
The first category is “concepts directly related to climate justice” in which I search for the following words: ‘justice’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘equality’, ‘inequality’ and ‘human rights’.
The second category is “subcategories related to climate justice” containing the words ‘participation’, ‘woman’, ‘child’, ‘elderly’, ‘disabled’, ‘unimpeded’, ‘disadvantaged’, ‘poor’, ‘poverty’, ‘low income’ and ‘level of income’.
I prefer to use subcategories because some municipalities do not use explicitly the words related to climate justice, but their policies nevertheless aim to overcome inequalities in society.
Due to time constraints, I was not able to conduct interviews with administrators and elected officials in local governments.
This is the main limitation of this study, as I will not be able to analyze the details of policymaking and policy implementation processes, which are crucial for climate justice.
The case of Turkey Local governments implement climate policies in accordance with their powers and responsibilities established by the legal system.
Municipalities in Turkey operationalize their powers and responsibilities such as waste management, transportation and zoning to implement climate change policies (Republic of Turkey 2005; Republic of Turkey, 2004: 8902-8905).
In addition, metropolitan municipalities in Turkey are required by law to protect the environment for sustainable development (Republic of Turkey 2004, 8902-8905).
For these reasons, the main agents of environmental management in Turkey are the municipalities (Orhan 2013, 601-616).
However, the laws pertaining to climate change make no direct reference to the powers and responsibilities of local governments.
Therefore, municipalities in Turkey use their discretion and voluntarily attempt to decrease the effects of climate change through the initiative of bureaucrats working in the environmental protection departments, stretching their powers and responsibilities to introduce adaptation and mitigation policies.
Municipalities in Turkey are the latecomers in action against climate change compared to the local governments in the United States and the European Union, for example, the Covenant of Mayors launched in 2008 by the European Commission for local climate action (Covenant of Mayors n.d.).
Their hesitation to implement climate policies stem from the policies of the central government (Turhan et al.
2016) that I will elaborate later.
There are a number of studies revealing the importance of the guidance of local governments by the central government.
For instance, a study conducted in Sweden (Storbjörk 2007) uncovers how local government officials are unclear about the extent of their power and POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 15 responsibilities in combating climate change.
According to this study, the municipalities are in need of information provided by the central government on the effects of climate change.
Therefore, guidance by central governments helps local governments to take substantial action on climate change (Storbjörk 2007).
However, the policy documents of the central government in Turkey are limited to the delegation of power and responsibility directly to local governments in relation to climate change.
The roadmap to combat climate change for cities and municipalities in Turkey are drawn in the Development Plans (Republic of Turkey 2000; Republic of Turkey 2006; Republic of Turkey 2013), the Strategy of Climate Change 2010-2020 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization 2012a), the Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization 2012b) and the Urban Development Strategy and Action Plan 2010-2023 (2010).
These documents do not precisely define the role of local governments and lack measurable and observable indicators.
This may indicate that the central government disregards the power and responsibility of local governments in climate action.
The central government’s negligence is also evident in the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of Turkey (INDC).
Turkey's actions identified in the INDC are classified under the sectors of energy, transport, buildings and urban transformation, agriculture, waste and forestry (Republic of Turkey 2015).
Although many of the contributions require action at the local level, the INDC does not empower or include the municipalities.
The limited role given to local governments can be explained by two factors.
The first factor is Turkey’s position in the global climate change policies.
Turkey has demanded to be removed from the Annex I Countries which are industrialized countries in 1992 and “countries with economic transition” (UNFCCC, n.d.) on the grounds that it was not as industrialized as the other Annex I Countries in 1990 and its historical responsibility was the lowest (Cerit Mazlum 2009, 56).
Furthermore, the special circumstances of Turkey have affected its national climate politics.
For example, according to Turkey’s INDC, Turkey pledged to cut GHG emissions by up to 21% by 2030 compared to a business-as-usual scenario (Republic of Turkey 2015).
In other words, Turkey does not have an absolute reduction target.
Moreover, in Turkey there is yet no national-level climate change legislation in place.
As such, local governments do not set ambitious reduction targets in the absence of regulations giving them power and responsibility on climate change.
The second factor contributing to the limited role given to local governments in Turkey is the centralization of metropolitan municipalities because of amendments to local POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 16 government legislation.
As a result, power and responsibility has been concentrated in the hands of 30 metropolitan municipalities while the power and responsibility of 519 metropolitan district municipalities has been limited (Arıkboğa 2018).
This type of centralization within local governance, focusing on metropolitan municipalities only, was carried out in the name of decentralization.
In line with the amendments, in the 2019 budget for Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, it is stated, “In order to enhance the capacity of local governments to combat climate change, the Ministry has initiated the preparation of local climate action plans in 30 metropolitan municipalities” (Ministry of Environment 2018, 12).
The statement of the Ministry uncovers the concentration of power in the metropolitan municipalities and it opposes the principle of subsidiarity.
Yet, at the time of this research, none of the metropolitan municipalities have prepared climate action plans with the direction of the Ministry.
Therefore, the limited role of local governments on climate change in Turkey can be explained by the country’s national climate change politics and its tendency towards centralization.
The central government’s negligence of local governments causes a crucial problem: the lack of capacity, both in terms of human and financial resources.
Preparing and implementing action plans is in fact a burden on the budgets of municipalities.
Therefore, instead of using their own human resources, the municipalities in Turkey tend to receive consultancy on the action plans as the laws enable them to spend their budget on consultancy (Republic of Turkey 2004, 8912; Republic of Turkey 2005, 9490-1).
However, the limited number of consultancy firms that prepare action plans for local governments in Turkey creates a serious problem.
As a matter of course, the inventories should be prepared specific to each action.
Nonetheless, when read closely, one can observe that the guiding principles and actions are copied and pasted between documents.
Although the main mitigation and adaptation policies are generally common, it would not be possible to overcome emerging and exacerbated inequalities unless the policies are constructed with due consideration for each city’s unique problems and socio-economic structure.
Such observations suggest that municipalities in Turkey do not consider climate change as a problem of justice.
However, it is worth noting that climate change policy is a learning process and the municipalities often tend to revise their documents.
For this reason, such problems can be overcome in time with the development of new regulations that empower municipalities in the policy area of climate change.
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 17 Action plans and urban climate justice Municipalities play an important role in combating the effects of climate change.
Therefore, the reflection of environmental justice, climate justice and urban climate justice in the action plans developed by municipalities is an indication of whether climate change is recognized as a justice problem.
The elements that are indicative of climate change being considered as a justice issue in the action plans include recognition and inclusion of different groups in the policy-making and policy implementation processes, equal distribution of the burdens and benefits of climate change policies to society and direct reference to justice and equality as a principle.
In the case of Turkey, the indicative elements vary between the adaptation and mitigation plans.
Therefore, I studied the mitigation and action plans separately.
Action plans for climate change mitigation Fifteen municipalities in Turkey have climate or sustainable action plans and sixteen municipalities have signed the Covenant of Mayors initiated by the European Commission This is an initiative to implement climate-related objectives of European Union at the local level (Covenant of Mayors, n.d.).
Only three municipalities have not signed the Covenant of Mayors, despite aiming to reduce emissions through an action plan.
Therefore, there is a tendency to implement climate change policies in Turkey by affiliation with a transnational network.
In addition, the municipalities in Turkey tend to implement mitigation policies in order to reduce emissions.
Only four of them have adaptation action plans.
The action plans prepared to reduce emissions resemble other action plans submitted to the Covenant of Mayors.
Table 1 (see Appendix), which is inspired by the table named “common mitigation measures in climate action plans” in the Evaluation Report of IPCC (2014, 92), demonstrates the mitigation policies of local governments in Turkey.
Accordingly, the municipalities use their power and have responsibilities mainly in eight sectors: a) buildings and built environment, b) transportation, c) waste, d) energy supply, e) awareness campaigns and trainings, f) urban land use, g) industry, and h) agriculture animal husbandry and forestry.
In different countries, local governments carry out different kinds of policy tools related to climate change within the framework of their powers and responsibilities.
These tools are classified under different categories in the literature.
According to the classification by Bulkeley and Kern (2006), there are four main policy tools in local climate change policies, namely self-governing, by provision, by authority and through enabling.
The municipalities in Turkey implement climate change policies using all of the four tools.
Through selfPOLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 18 governing, they aim to reduce their own emissions with policies such as energy efficient planning in the municipal buildings and replacement of municipal vehicles by electric vehicles.
By using the tool of ‘by provision’, municipalities reduce emissions arising from services that are under their control such as transportation and waste management.
The third tool ‘by authority’ helps municipalities to implement climate change policies through their traditional form of authorization, i.e.
regulatory instruments.
Finally, with the awareness campaigns and trainings, they guide citizens, civil society, private sector and other public institutions.
Table 2 (see Appendix) shows the frequency of the words related to climate justice in the mitigation plans of municipalities.
As it can be seen from the Table 2, the word ‘justice’ was not used in any of the documents, and other concepts directly related to climate justice, i.e.
‘vulnerability’, ‘equality’, ‘inequality’ and ‘human rights’, are rarely used in the action plans.
Only one municipality uses the word ‘equality’ as it is a general principle to guide policies and four municipalities use the word ‘resilient’ to mention the role of local governments in making the city resilient to climate change.
Other words were used neither in the context of urban climate justice nor as a guiding principle.
However, the words under the subcategories related to climate justice are mentioned at least once in the action plans.
As shown in Table 2, ‘participation’ is the most commonly used word in the mitigation plans of the municipalities in Turkey.
All municipalities either held meetings or organized workshops with the participation of stakeholders before preparing their action plans.
However, participants of the meetings and workshops came mostly from other public institutions, municipalities, trade associations, universities and civil society organizations.
The participation of individual citizens who are not directly affiliated with any institutions, such as women, people with disabilities, low-income families and children, and the participation of members of the municipal council is low.
Moreover, in all of the action plans, the sectors and the subject matters discussed for the action plans were determined by the administrators in municipalities and by consultancy firms.
For these reasons, although the most commonly used word in the action plans is ‘participation’, it can be concluded that most Turkish municipalities currently do not have inclusive policy-making processes.
While the term ‘poor’ is used ten times in the action plans of four municipalities in total and it is mentioned in the context of urban climate justice in three of them, the municipalities using the word ‘poverty’ do not contextualize it as a guiding principle or an action.
The three municipality underline the inequalities exacerbated by climate change but only one out of three takes substantial action against it, aiming to overcome inequalities POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 19 resulting from fuel poverty (Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality 2016).
In relation to the words ‘poor’ and ‘poverty’, the term ‘low-income’ is used in the same context by the same municipalities.
The municipalities use the words ‘woman’, ‘child’, ‘elderly’, ‘disabled’ and ‘unimpeded’ as targeted groups for raising awareness about climate change or increasing resilience to climate change.
In general, it is clear that the action plans do not mention the concepts of environmental justice, climate justice or urban climate justice and the aim of overcoming injustices resulting from climate change in the action plans is not defined explicitly in the action plans.
Only a few of the mitigation plans such as by Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality (2011), Nilüfer Municipality (2016), Çankaya Municipality (2017) and Antalya Metropolitan Municipality (2014) use the words related to climate justice.
It can be argued that, although the action plans of municipalities do not explicitly integrate the idea of climate justice, they aim to include the dimension of procedural justice of urban climate justice through workshops and meetings.
Action plans for adaptation to climate change There are only four municipalities in Turkey with both mitigation and adaptation action plans (Bursa Metropolitan Municipality 2017; İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality 2018; Kadıköy Municipality 2018; Karşıyaka Municipality 2018).
These municipalities are focusing mostly on the urban heat island effect, public health, biodiversity, green zones and raising resilience in energy, waste management, transportation, infrastructure, buildings and industry in their adaptation plans.
In addition, two of them aim to raise institutional capacity for an integrated action plan expanding all the departments of the municipality.
Although there is no direct reference to environmental justice and climate justice in the adaptation plans of the municipalities, as can be seen in Table 3 (see Appendix), the number of words related to urban climate justice is higher than the numbers in the mitigation plans.
Furthermore, the relationship between climate change and its unequal effects on society has been established directly and it is clearly accepted that the consequences of climate change have not been affecting every individual in society at the same level.
It is a result of the fact that the aim of the action plans for adaptation to climate change is making cities resilient to climate change.
For example, the action plan of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality remarks that there is a need for agreements that try to overcome environmental injustices (2017, 70).
POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 20 Amongst the terms directly related to climate justice, ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’ are used at least once by all of these four municipalities.
Except for the action plan of Karşıyaka Municipality (2018), the main strategy of the three municipalities is to make the cities resilient.
For instance, the motto of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality is “to be a livable, healthy and resilient city” (2017: 105).
However, the only municipality that inserts this main strategy into its actions by mentioning it explicitly is the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (2018).
Although Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (2018) is also the one that uses the term ‘vulnerability’ the most in its action plan (65 times), the context in which the term is used in the document doesn’t differ from the other municipalities.
Therefore, The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s action plan includes more detailed actions and policy areas and sectors compared to other municipalities.
All four municipalities highlight that climate change causes vulnerabilities in society, and they all aim to reduce them.
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to consider the definition of vulnerable groups in the action plans.
All municipalities define children, elderly people and patients as vulnerable groups, and Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and Kadiköy Municipality define the poor as vulnerable (2018).
Karşıyaka Municipality (2018) and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (2018) also include pregnant women in their classification.
The only municipality categorizing women and people with disabilities as a vulnerable group is the Karşıyaka Municipality (2018).
However, this municipality does not envision climate changerelated actions that are directly related to women.
Therefore, the action plans of the municipalities remain gender-blind and they do not take into account the effects of climate change on women.
Many local and subnational governments in the United States, Europe and Latin America directly mention environmental justice and climate justice in their action plans, including Minneapolis (Minneapolis City Coordinator 2013), New York (City of New York 2015), Athens (City of Athens 2017) and Mexico City (Mexico City 2014).
For example, the action plan prepared by the government of New York entitled “One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City” (City of New York 2015) emphasizes equality and justice stating that environment and justice cannot be considered separately (City of New York 2015, 164).
Athens has plans to combat inequalities exacerbated by climate change, such as providing employment and housing for vulnerable groups (City of Athens 2017).
In the case of Turkey, according to their plans for adaptation to climate change, the municipalities do seem to consider the consequences of climate change as an issue of justice.
However, they do not explicitly mention climate justice in these action plans.
The attempts to reduce vulnerabilities POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 21 is a common feature of all adaptation plans in the case of Turkey.
However, it will be challenging to introduce the concept of urban climate justice in the near future, given the municipalities’ pre-established subject matters and exclusionary workshops.
Conclusion Urban climate justice and discussions on inequalities caused by climate change at the local level require a multidimensional analysis.
Beyond the emphasis on distributive justice, urban climate justice has been elaborated from different perspectives in policy debates and literature to reflect the various effects of climate change in cities.
It must be considered at the local level how to distribute the burdens and benefits of climate change policies equally, how the decision-making processes are structured, and who is involved and recognized in these processes.
The most prominent actor of climate change policies in urban areas is the local government.
The local governments are crucial actors in the global climate action, as they implement decisions made in international negotiations.
In order to overcome climate injustices, preparation and implementation processes are important in taking substantial action against climate change.
It is necessary to determine the capacities and needs of vulnerable groups in climate actions and include their experiences and opinions in the development and implementation of such actions.
Therefore, action plans and policies initiated by local governments that include these aspects can pave the way for climate-just cities.
The case of Turkey shows that, although the municipalities do not explicitly consider climate change as a social justice issue, their action plans for mitigation and adaptation to climate change differ in terms of emphasis on inequalities and vulnerabilities exacerbated by climate change.
As for the mitigation plans, although a few municipalities mention the effects of climate change on different income groups and sectors, they are not translated into practical actions.
Adaptation to climate change requires consideration of vulnerabilities to climate change and the evaluation of climate-related injustices in the adaptation plans.
This tendency is seen in the action plans for adaptation to climate change of the municipalities in Turkey: they all make vulnerability assessments by defining vulnerable groups and plan to take action to build up their resilience.
However, there is no direct reference to overcome injustices exacerbated by climate change.
Lastly, climate action requires distinct policies depending on the social, economic and geographic structure of the cities.
For this reason, local action is crucial for overcoming POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 22 climate injustices.
However, given the legal constraints and scarce human and financial resources, Turkish municipalities tend to outsource the preparation of the action plans to consultancy firms, which are very few in number in Turkey.
As a result, the action plans of municipalities are almost identical to each other, and even certain numerical targets are the same between municipalities with different socio-economic structures, geographical characteristics and populations.
However, climate change policy is a gradual learning process and there is a tendency among municipalities to renew their action plans.
Through raising awareness and increasing the power and responsibilities of local governments delegated by the central government, it can be predicted that the action plans by Turkish municipalities will be developed with due consideration for each city’s unique problems and socioeconomic structures.
References Adger, W. Neil.
et al.
2006.
“Toward Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change.” In Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, edited by W. Neil Adger et al., 1–19.
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2957.001.0001.
Antalya Metropolitan Municipality.
2014.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı [Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
Istanbul: Demir Enerji.
http://mycovenant.eumayors.eu/docs/seap/5376_1399535086.pdf (9 December 2019).
Arıkboğa, Erbay 2018.
“Yerinden Yönetim ve Merkezileşmiş Büyükşehir Sisteminde Yetkilerin Dağıtılması.” Marmara University Journal of Political Science 6, no.
1: 1-34. https://doi.org/10.14782/marusbd.412624.
Bornova Municipality.
2013.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
February.
https://mycovenant.eumayors.eu/docs/seap/2847_1360071053.pdf (9 December 2019).
Bulkeley, Harriet et al.
2013.
“Climate Justice and Global Cities: Mapping the Emerging Discourses.” Global Environmental Change 23, no.
5: 914-925. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.010.
Bulkeley, Harriet and Kristine Kern.
2006.
“Local Government and the Governing of Climate Change in Germany and the UK.” Urban Studies 43, no.
12: 2237-2259. https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00420980600936491.
Bulkeley, Harriet et al.
2014.
“Contesting Climate Justice in the City: Examining Politics and Practice in Urban Climate Change Experiments.” Global Environmental Change 25: 3140. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.009.
Bursa Metropolitan Municipality.
2017.
İklim Değişikliği Eylem Planı.
[Climate Change Action Plan].
November.
Bursa.
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2957.001.0001 http://mycovenant.eumayors.eu/docs/seap/5376_1399535086.pdf https://doi.org/10.14782/marusbd.412624 https://mycovenant.eumayors.eu/docs/seap/2847_1360071053.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.010 https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00420980600936491 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.009 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 23 https://www.bursa.bel.tr/dosyalar/BBB_IDEP_Kasım2015.pdf (9 December 2019) Çankaya Municipality.
2017.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
http://www.cankaya.bel.tr/uploads/files/ÇANKAYA%20BELEDİYESİ%20SÜR DÜRÜLEBİLİR%20EYLEM%20PLANI%20SEEP(2015-2020).pdf (9 December 2019).
Cerit, Mazlum S. 2009.
Post-2012 Climate Change.
Negotiations Guidebook.
Turkey.
Ankara: Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
http://www.dsi.gov.tr/docs/iklimdegisikligi/post_2012_climate_change_negotiations_guidebook_turkey.pdf?sfv (10 December 2019).
City of Athens.
2017.
Redefining the City: Athens Resilience Strategy for 2030.
Athens: City of Athens.
https://www.100resilientcities.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/Athens_Resilience_Strategy__Reduced_PDF.compressed.pdf (11 December 2019).
City of New York.
2015.
One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City.
New York: City of New York.
http://www.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/pdf/publications/OneNYC.pdf (11 December 2019).
Cohen, Daniel Aldana.
2018.
Climate Justice and the Right to the City.
Philadelphia, PA: Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, Penn Institute for Urban Research, and Perry World House.
February.
http://penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Cohen.pdf (4 April 2019).
Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy.
n.d. Flashback: The origins of the Covenant of Mayors.
https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/about/covenant-initiative/origins-anddevelopment.html (13 February 2020).
Dodman, David and David Satterthwaite.
2009.
“Institutional Capacity, Climate Change Adaptation and the Urban Poor.” IDS Bulletin 39, no.
4: 67-74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2008.tb00478.x.
Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality.
2016.
İklim Değişikliği Eylem Planı Yönetici Özeti.
[Executive Summary of Climate Change Action Plan].
Gaziantep Municipality.
https://gaziantep.bel.tr/Gaziantep-CCAP-TR-final-20111102.pdf (9 December 2019).
Hardoy, Jorgelina and Gustavo Pandiella.
2009.
“Urban Poverty and Vulnerability to Climate Change in Latin America.” Environment and Urbanization 21, no.
1: 203-224. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0956247809103019.
Holland, Breena.
2017.
“Procedural Justice in Local Climate Adaptation: Political Capabilities and Transformational Change.” Environmental Politics 26, no.
3: 391-421. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1287625.
https://www.bursa.bel.tr/dosyalar/BBB_IDEP_Kasım2015.pdf http://www.cankaya.bel.tr/uploads/files/ÇANKAYA%20BELEDİYESİ%20SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR%20EYLEM%20PLANI%20SEEP(2015-2020).pdf http://www.cankaya.bel.tr/uploads/files/ÇANKAYA%20BELEDİYESİ%20SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR%20EYLEM%20PLANI%20SEEP(2015-2020).pdf http://www.dsi.gov.tr/docs/iklim-degisikligi/post_2012_climate_change_negotiations_guidebook_turkey.pdf?sfv http://www.dsi.gov.tr/docs/iklim-degisikligi/post_2012_climate_change_negotiations_guidebook_turkey.pdf?sfv https://www.100resilientcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Athens_Resilience_Strategy_-_Reduced_PDF.compressed.pdf https://www.100resilientcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Athens_Resilience_Strategy_-_Reduced_PDF.compressed.pdf https://www.100resilientcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Athens_Resilience_Strategy_-_Reduced_PDF.compressed.pdf http://www.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/pdf/publications/OneNYC.pdf http://penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Cohen.pdf https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/about/covenant-initiative/origins-and-development.html https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/about/covenant-initiative/origins-and-development.html https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2008.tb00478.x https://gaziantep.bel.tr/Gaziantep-CCAP-TR-final-20111102.pdf https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0956247809103019 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1287625 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 24 Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah H. Shannon.
2005.
“Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis.” Qualitative Health Research 15, no.
9: 1277-1288. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1049732305276687.
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives.
2016.
The Paris Climate Package: A Basic Guide for Local and Subnational Governments.
http://e-lib.iclei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/COP21-Report-web.pdf (9 December 2019).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2012.
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2014.
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415416.
İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality.
2018.
İklim Değişikliği Eylem Planı Final Raporu 2018. https://www.iklim.istanbul/wp-content/uploads/FinalRaporu.pdf (1 May 2019).
İzmir Metropolitan Municipality.
2016.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
March.
http://www.skb.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Izmir-Buyuksehir-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-EnerjiEylem-Plani.pdf (11 December 2019).
Kadıköy Municipality.
2018.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
Rapor 1.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan.
Report 1].
http://iklim.kadikoy.bel.tr/Content/Images/KadikoySEEP.pdf (1 May 2019).
Kahramanmaraş Metropolitan Municipality.
2017.
İklim Değişikliği Eylem Planı.
[Climate Change Action Plan].
Istanbul: Demir Enerji.
October.
http://www.skb.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Kahramanmaras-Iklim-Degisikligi-Eylem-Plani.pdf (1 May 2019).
Karşıyaka Municipality.
2018.
Sera Gazı Envanteri ve İklim Değişikliği Yol Haritası.
[Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Climate Change Roadmap] http://www.skb.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Karsiyaka-Belediyesi-Sera-Gazi-Envanteri-ve-IklimDegisikligi-Yol-Haritasi.pdf (1 May 2019).
Lefebvre, Henri.
2015.
Şehir Hakkı [Right to the City].
(Ergüden, I.
Çev.).
İstanbul: Sel Yayıncılık.
Maltepe Municipality.
2016.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
Istanbul: Demir Enerji.
https://mycovenant.eumayors.eu/docs/seap/20775_1467656288.pdf (9 December 2019).
McKendry, Corina.
2015.
“Cities and the Challenge of Multiscalar Climate Justice: Climate Governance and Social Equity in Chicago, Birmingham, and Vancouver.” Local Environment 21, no.
11: 1354-1371. https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2015.1116064.
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1049732305276687 http://e-lib.iclei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/COP21-Report-web.pdf http://e-lib.iclei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/COP21-Report-web.pdf https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415416 https://www.iklim.istanbul/wp-content/uploads/FinalRaporu.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Izmir-Buyuksehir-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Izmir-Buyuksehir-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Izmir-Buyuksehir-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://iklim.kadikoy.bel.tr/Content/Images/KadikoySEEP.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Kahramanmaras-Iklim-Degisikligi-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Kahramanmaras-Iklim-Degisikligi-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Karsiyaka-Belediyesi-Sera-Gazi-Envanteri-ve-Iklim-Degisikligi-Yol-Haritasi.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Karsiyaka-Belediyesi-Sera-Gazi-Envanteri-ve-Iklim-Degisikligi-Yol-Haritasi.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Karsiyaka-Belediyesi-Sera-Gazi-Envanteri-ve-Iklim-Degisikligi-Yol-Haritasi.pdf https://mycovenant.eumayors.eu/docs/seap/20775_1467656288.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2015.1116064 POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 25 Mexico City.
2014.
Climate Action Program Mexico City’s 2014-2020 Executive Summary.
http://mce2.org/wmogurme/images/reports/CDMX_CAP.pdf (11 December 2019).
Minneapolis City Coordinator.
2013.
Minneapolis Climate Action Plan.
A roadmap to reducing citywide greenhouse-gas emissions.
Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis City Coordinator.
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@citycoordinator/docume nts/webcontent/wcms1p-113598.pdf (11 December 2019).
Ministry of Environment.
2018.
2019 Yılı Bütçe Sunuçu.
[Budget Presentation for the Year 2019].
https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/turkce/faaliyetler/csb_butce20181121095425.pdf (2 May 2019).
Mitchell, Bruce Coffyn.
2017.
“A Landscape of Thermal Inequity: Social Vulnerability to Urban Heat in U.S. Cities.” PhD diss., South Florida University.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8103&context=etd (11 December 2019).
Moser, Caroline, and David Satterthwaite.
2008.
Towards Pro-Poor Adaptation to Climate Change in the Urban Centers of Lowand Middle-Income Countries.
London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10564IIED.pdf (1 June 2018).
Muğla Metropolitan Municipality.
2013.
2013 Yılı Sera Gazı Envanteri ve Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Year 2013.
Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Mugla-BuyuksehirBelediyesi-2013-Yili-Sera-Gazi-Envanteri-ve-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf (1 February 2019).
Nilüfer Municipality.
2016.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
http://www.nilufer.bel.tr/dosya_yoneticisi/enerjieylem.pdf (9 December 2019).
Orhan, Gökhan.
2013.
Yerel Yönetimler ve Küresel İklim Değişiklig ̆i.
Kuramdan Uygulamaya Yerel Yönetimler ve Kentsel Politikalar (Local Government and Global Climate Change.
Local Government and Urban Policies from Theory to Practice).
Ankara: Pegem Akademi.
Rawls, John.
1971.
A Theory of Justice.
Cambridge, MA.
: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reckien, Diana et al.
2018.
“Equity, Environmental Justice, and Urban Climate Change.” In Climate Change and Cities: Second Assessment Report of the Urban Climate Change Research Network, edited by Cynthia Rosenzweig et al.
173–224.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316563878 Republic of Turkey.
2000.
Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı İklim Değişikliği Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu.
[Eighth Five-Year Development Plan Climate Change Specialization Commission Report].
Ankara.
http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/08_%C4%B0klimDegisikligi.pdf (10 December 2019).
http://mce2.org/wmogurme/images/reports/CDMX_CAP.pdf http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@citycoordinator/documents/webcontent/wcms1p-113598.pdf http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@citycoordinator/documents/webcontent/wcms1p-113598.pdf https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/turkce/faaliyetler/csb_butce-20181121095425.pdf https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/turkce/faaliyetler/csb_butce-20181121095425.pdf https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8103&context=etd http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10564IIED.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Mugla-Buyuksehir-Belediyesi-2013-Yili-Sera-Gazi-Envanteri-ve-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Mugla-Buyuksehir-Belediyesi-2013-Yili-Sera-Gazi-Envanteri-ve-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.nilufer.bel.tr/dosya_yoneticisi/enerjieylem.pdf https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316563878 http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/08_%C4%B0klimDegisikligi.pdf http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/08_%C4%B0klimDegisikligi.pdf POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 26 Republic of Turkey.
2004.
Belediye Kanunu (Municipality Law).
T.C.
Resmi Gazete 25874.
13.07.2015. https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5393.pdf (10 December 2019).
Republic of Turkey.
2005.
Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kanunu (Metropolitan Municipality Law).
T.C.
Resmi Gazete 25531. https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5216.pdf (10.
December 2019).
Republic of Turkey.
2006.
Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı (2007-2013).
[Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013].
http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DokuzuncuKalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-2007-2013%E2%80%8B.pdf (10 December 2019).
Republic of Turkey.
2013.
Onuncu Kalkınma Planı (2014-2018).
[Tenth Development Plan (2014-2018)].
Ankara: Ministry of Development.
http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Onuncu-Kalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-20142018.pdf (10 December 2019).
Republic of Turkey.
2015.
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution.
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Turkey/1 /The_INDC_of_TURKEY_v.15.19.30.pdf (28 April 2019).
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.
2010.
Bütünleşik Kentsel Gelişme Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı 2010-2023.
[Integrated Urban Development Strategy and Action Plan 2010-2023].
https://www.kuzka.gov.tr/Icerik/Dosya/www.kuzka.gov.tr_7_SF3K52CO_butunl esik_kentesel_gelisme_stratejisi_ve_eylem_plani_2010-2023.pdf (11 December 2019).
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.
2012.
Türkiye İklim Değişikliği Stratejisi 2010-2020.
[2012.
Turkey’s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan 2010-2020].
http://iklim.cob.gov.tr/iklim/Files/Stratejiler/strateji%20kitapcik_turkce_pdf (11 December 2019).
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.
2012.
Türkiye’nin İklim Değişikliği Uyum Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı 2011-2023.
[2012.
Turkey’s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2023].
https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/iklim/editordosya/uyum_stratejisi_eylem_plani_ TR.pdf (11 December 2019).
Revi, Aromar et al.
2014.
“Urban areas.” In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by Christopher B.
Field et al., 535-612.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Seferihisar Municipality.
2013.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Tepebasi-BelediyesiSurdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf (9 December 2019).
Sen, Amartya.
1999.
Development as Freedom.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5393.pdf https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5216.pdf http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Dokuzuncu-Kalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-2007-2013%E2%80%8B.pdf http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Dokuzuncu-Kalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-2007-2013%E2%80%8B.pdf http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Onuncu-Kalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-2014-2018.pdf http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Onuncu-Kalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-2014-2018.pdf http://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Onuncu-Kalk%C4%B1nma-Plan%C4%B1-2014-2018.pdf http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Turkey/1/The_INDC_of_TURKEY_v.15.19.30.pdf http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Turkey/1/The_INDC_of_TURKEY_v.15.19.30.pdf https://www.kuzka.gov.tr/Icerik/Dosya/www.kuzka.gov.tr_7_SF3K52CO_butunlesik_kentesel_gelisme_stratejisi_ve_eylem_plani_2010-2023.pdf https://www.kuzka.gov.tr/Icerik/Dosya/www.kuzka.gov.tr_7_SF3K52CO_butunlesik_kentesel_gelisme_stratejisi_ve_eylem_plani_2010-2023.pdf http://iklim.cob.gov.tr/iklim/Files/Stratejiler/strateji%20kitapcik_turkce_pdf https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/iklim/editordosya/uyum_stratejisi_eylem_plani_TR.pdf https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/iklim/editordosya/uyum_stratejisi_eylem_plani_TR.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Tepebasi-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Tepebasi-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 27 Sen, Amartya.
2009.
The Idea of Justice.
London: Allen Lane.
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrv7n.
Shi, Linda et al.
2016.
“Roadmap Towards Justice in Urban Climate Adaptation Research.” Nature Climate Change 6, no.
2: 131-137. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2841.
Steele, Wendy et al.
2015.
“Urban Climate Justice: Creating Sustainable Pathways for Humans and Other Species.” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 14: 121126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2015.05.004.
Stein, Michael Isaac.
2018.
“Energy Efficiency is Leaving Low-Income Americans Behind.” Grist, February 21, 2018. https://grist.org/article/energy-efficiency-is-leaving-lowincome-americansbehind/?utm_content=buffere05c7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.co m&utm_campaign=buffer (20 April 2019).
Stone, Brian, Jr. and Michael O Rodgers.
2001.
“Urban Form and Thermal Efficiency: How the Design of Cities Influences the Urban Heat Island Effect.” Journal of the American Planning Association 67, no.
2: 186-198. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360108976228.
Storbjörk, Sofie.
2007.
‘Governing Climate Adaptation in the Local Arena: Challenges of Risk Management and Planning in Sweden.” Local Environment 12, no.
5: 457-469. https://doi.org/10.1080/13549830701656960.
Taylor, Dorceta E. 2000.
“The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm.” American Behavioral Scientist 43, no.
4: 508-580. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0002764200043004003.
Tepebaşı Municipality.
2014.
Sürdürülebilir Enerji Eylem Planı.
[Sustainable Energy Action Plan].
http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Tepebasi-BelediyesiSurdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf (01 May 2019).
Terry, Geraldine.
2009.
“Introduction”.
In Climate Change and Gender Justice, edited by Geraldine Terry, 2-3.
Oxford: Oxfam GB.
https://doi.org/10.3362/9781780440088.
Turhan, Ethemcan et al.
2016.
“Beyond Special Circumstances: Climate Change Policy in Turkey 1992–2015.” WIREs Climate Change 7, no.
3: 448-460. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.390.
UNFCCC.
n.d. Parties & Observers.
https://unfccc.int/parties-observers (February 2020).
UN-Habitat.
2011.
Global Report on Human Settlements 2011.
Cities and Climate Change.
London/Washington, DC: Earthscan.
https://unhabitat.org/global-report-onhuman-settlements-2011-cities-and-climate-change (16 April 2018).
United Nations.
2014.
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision.
Highlights.
New York: United Nations.
https://population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014Highlights.pdf (16 March 2018).
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrv7n https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2841 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2015.05.004 https://grist.org/article/energy-efficiency-is-leaving-low-income-americans-behind/?utm_content=buffere05c7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer https://grist.org/article/energy-efficiency-is-leaving-low-income-americans-behind/?utm_content=buffere05c7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer https://grist.org/article/energy-efficiency-is-leaving-low-income-americans-behind/?utm_content=buffere05c7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer https://grist.org/article/energy-efficiency-is-leaving-low-income-americans-behind/?utm_content=buffere05c7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360108976228 https://doi.org/10.1080/13549830701656960 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0002764200043004003 http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Tepebasi-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf http://www.skb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Tepebasi-Belediyesi-Surdurulebilir-Enerji-Eylem-Plani.pdf https://doi.org/10.3362/9781780440088 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.390 https://unfccc.int/parties-observers https://unhabitat.org/global-report-on-human-settlements-2011-cities-and-climate-change https://unhabitat.org/global-report-on-human-settlements-2011-cities-and-climate-change https://population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf https://population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 28 Young, Iris Marion.
1990.
Justice and the Politics of Difference.
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Appendix Table 1: Mitigation policies of local governments in Turkey This table was prepared using the action plans of Antalya Metropolitan Municipality (2014), Bornova Municipality (2013), Çankaya Municipality (2017), İzmir Metropolitan Municipality (2016), Kahramanmaraş Metropolitan Municipality (2017), Maltepe Municipality (2016), 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Energy Efficient Planning in New Settlements Energy Efficient Urban Renewal Measures for the Energy Efficiency in Existing Buildings Sustainable Planning Financing for the readjustments Energy Efficient Street Lightening Fuel Transition or Central Heating Systems Transportation Increasing the use of public transport Increasing pedestrian and the use of bicycle in transportation Energy Efficient Arrangements and Vehicle Renewals in Public Transportation Promoting the Usage of Electr ic Vehicles Smart Traffic Management Waste Improvement/Renovation of Solid Waste Storage Areas Improvement/Renovation of Wastewater Treatment Facilities Energy Production from Waste Energy Supply Renewable Energy Investments Encouragement of Renewable Energy Investments Energy Cooperatives Awareness Campaigns and Trainings Training and Awareness Campaigns Urban Land Use Reforestation and Protection of Urban Forests Urban Agriculture Creating Ecoregions Industry Cooperation with Industry and Encouragement of Industry Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Forestry Sustainable Agriculture Practices Metropolitan Municipalities Other Municipal ities POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 29 Muğla Metropolitan Municipality (2013), Nilüfer Municipaltiy (2016), Seferihisar Municipality (2013), Tepebaşı Municipality (2014).
Table 2: The frequency of the words related to climate justice in the mitigation plans of municipalities.
This table was prepared using the action plans of Antalya Metropolitan Municipality (2014), Bornova Municipality (2013) Çankaya Municipality (2017), İzmir Metropolitan Municipality (2016), Kahramanmaraş Metropolitan Municipality (2017), Maltepe Municipality (2016), Muğla Metropolita Municipality (2013), Nilüfer Municipaltiy (2016), Seferihisar Municipality (2013), Tepebaşı Municipality (2014).
0 0 2 1 2 4 121 8 3 1 1 2 1 10 1 1 1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 Justice Vulnerability Equality Inequality Human Rights Resilient Participation Woman Child Elderly Disabled Unimpeded Disadvantaged Poor Poverty Low Income Level of Income C o n c e p ts D ir e c tl y R e la te d t o C li m at e J u st ic e S u b c at e g o ri es R e la te d t o C li m at e J u st ic e POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science Vol 45 (June 2020) 30 Table 3: The frequency of the words related to climate justice in the adaptation plans of municipalities.
This table was prepared using the action plans of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality (2017), Kadıköy Municipality (2018), Karşıyaka Municipality (2018), İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality (2018).
0 88 1 1 0 45 139 1 29 13 9 5 3 3 1 7 2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 Justice Vulnerability Equality Inequality Human Rights Resilient Participation Woman Child Elderly Disabled Unimpeded Disadvantaged Poor Poverty Low Income Level of Income C o n c ep ts D ir ec tl y R e la te d t o J u st ic e S u b c at e g o ri es R el at ed t o J u st ic e Climate Justice at the Local Level: The Case of Turkey Introduction Inequality of climate change in urban areas Theoretical framework Methodology The case of Turkey Action plans and urban climate justice Action plans for climate change mitigation Action plans for adaptation to climate change Conclusion References Appendix
Bio-based and Applied Economics 7(2): 97-116, 2018 ISSN 2280-6180 (print) © Firenze University Press ISSN 2280-6172 (online) www.fupress.com/bae Full Research Article DOI: 10.13128/bae-7670 Climate change and variations in mountain pasture values in the central-eastern Italian Alps in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Marco avanzini1, isabella salvador2,1, GereMia Gios2,* 1 MUSE Museo delle Scienze, C.so del Lavoro e della Scienza 3, I-38123, Trento, Italy 2 University of Trento, Department of Economics and Management, Via Inama 5, I-38122 Trento, Italy Date of submission: 2017, 26th, January; accepted 2018, 18th, June Abstract.
This study investigates variations in pasture lease rents during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in a sector of the Italian Alps and how these correlate with climate changes.
Analysis of the rents in the three data sets clearly demonstrates a sharp increase over the period considered, which can generally be ascribed to increased human pressure following population growth during the same period.
Oscillations in the values obtained for fifty-year periods between the last half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth suggest a strong connection with environmental and climatic factors.
Increases or decreases in temperature seem to have a less marked and less direct effect on the values of grazing lands close to the upper limit of vegetation, while socio-economic and infrastructural signals impinge significantly on climate signals on the grazing lands at lower altitudes.
Keywords.
Grazing lands, climate changes, Italian Alps.
JEL codes.
Q54, Q15, Q51.
1.
Introduction 1.1 Climate change and mountain agriculture The consequences of ongoing climate change are the subject of an increasing number of scientific studies (IPCC, 2014).
In particular, the interaction among climatic factors, agro-forestry systems and ecosystem productivity is currently being investigated using a variety of tools (Baglioni et al., 2009; Bosello and Zhang, 2005; Roson, 2003; Solomon, 2007).
The aim is generally to obtain an economic assessment of variations in well-being due to changes in the environments where agriculture is practiced (e.g., Palatnik and Nunes, 2010).
*Corresponding author: geremia.gios@unitn.it 98 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios In fact, in the Alps: a) climate imposes very clear limitations on soil productivity1; b) the history of locations bears clear evidence of variations in climate2; c) for many centuries the development of communities has been strongly conditioned by agricultural productivity, which in turn is correlated with climate evolution (Mathieu, 2000, p.127).
In the southern Alps in particular, the traditional organisational structures of communities were such that private property was located near the villages and common pastures and meadows in the mountains (Raffaelli, 2005).
This type of organisation reflected the fact that development of the local communities was to a large extent dependent on resources that could be generated locally.
Unlike the fields close to the villages, pastures and woodlands could be exploited with low fixed investments and represented a reserve of resources that could be adjusted relatively quickly in the case of rapid increases or reductions in anthropic pressure.
From this perspective, the Alps are an ideal testing ground for measuring the economic consequences of climate change (Dearing 2006; Fraser 2009; Pfister and Brazdil 2006; Theurillat and Guisan, 2001).
Alpine pastures represent one of the most complex and interesting study cases.
Forage productivity and quality in areas given over to pasture are closely linked to environmental factors, such as soil temperature, fertility and moisture (Baglioni, et al.
2009; Bosello and Zhang, 2005; Menzel and Fabian, 1999; Roson, 2003).
Alpine pastures are characterized by a rapid growth in productivity in spring and summer followed by a period of gradual decline and decreasing quality.
There is now an extensive body of scientific literature on the effects of temperature on productivity trends in Alpine pastures (Cavallero et al.
1992; Gusmeroli et al., 2005; Orlandi et al., 2004; Ziliotto and Scotton, 1993;), although there has not always been general consensus on the nature of the variability (Orlandi and Clementel, 2007).
All of the studies agree, however, that pasture productivity is closely related to natural constraints and particularly to temperature variation, which, in the mountains more than anywhere else, has a direct effect on the vegetative cycle and the productivity of herbaceous vegetation.
In other words, it seems to be clear that the productivity of mountain land varies over time in response to trends in temperature, with consequent fluctuations in its economic value.
In the Alps, spring temperature appears to be particularly important for total grass production.
Indeed, it is well known that the growth of grass depends on accumulated temperature (day degrees); as a consequence, the spring temperature determines whether herds are taken up to the mountain pastures earlier or later (Gusmeroli et al, 2005).
Summer temperature, on the other hand, appears to be less important in the Alps, so that the end of the grazing season, unlike the beginning, is traditionally set for a fixed date (20 September), at least in the area examined here (Bussolon, Martini, 2007).
As far as precipitation is concerned, the climate regime in the entire Alpine area has a winter 1 For example, the upper limit of tree growth (treeline) and the limit of cereal cultivation are usually defined by altitude.
This is because, with the exception of specific local situations, average temperature and length of the growing season vary as a function of height above sea level.
2 For example, toponomy still reflects situations arising as a consequence of the climate in the near or distant past.
(Bussolon and Martini, 2007) 99Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values minimum (under the influence of the Russo-Siberian anticyclone in the cold months) followed by a maximum between spring and autumn.
The study area in particular has a preAlpine type of climate regime with an autumnal maximum slightly higher than the spring maximum.
Areas with a pre-Alpine climate are more influenced than others by their geographical proximity to the Po plain, which places few obstacles in the way of humid air masses.
Spring precipitation in these areas is always abundant and, unlike in south-central Italy, no significant fluctuations are evident in the available historical series (Buffoni et al., 2003).
As a result, the precipitation regime has had less influence on the modifications in the seasonal productivity of pastures in these regions.
The mountains of the Italian pre-Alps studied here have been exploited at least since the sixteenth century.
The pastures are part of a system based on vertical transhumance whereby livestock spend the summer on higher Alpine pastures (Salvador and Avanzini 2014).
Against this background, the aim of this study is to investigate variations in pasture lease rents during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and how these correlate with climate changes.
In analysing the relationship between climate variation and the value attributed to the pasture areas, account has been taken of natural and socio-economic factors, which may be summarised as follows: a) climate changes and, in particular, variations in spring temperatures; b) population evolution in pastoral communities.
Regarding the former issue, given that climate variability influences pasture productivity, as will be described later in greater detail, it may be considered a proxy for the potential volume of grass that the pastures produce.
Regarding the latter issue, population evolution in an economic system that is closely dependent on local natural resources may be considered a proxy for anthropic pressure on the environment and hence for the demand for pasture with possible repercussions on the attributed value.
1.2 Climate and social well-being As mountain areas have developed economically, especially in the periods prior to the industrial revolution and extensive migration, the link between resource availability and climate change has been crucial (Malanima, 2006), even though, as in other historical processes, altitude and environmental factors play a variable role (Mathieu, 2000, p.127).
An increase or decrease in temperature of even a few tenths of a degree may result in an increase or decrease in resources, thereby contributing to capital gain or loss.
Climate deterioration may lead to a shorter growing season with a consequent decrease in the value of pastures and radical changes in the exploitation of mountain areas, even over short periods of time (Bozhong, 1999).
A decrease in temperature may give rise to a 10% reduction in calories per square centimetre of land, a shortening of the field pasture and forest vegetation growth period by three weeks, increased rainfall, changes in microbial activity in the soil and consequently its level of fertility, and a lowering by 150-200 metres of the altitude limit for growing cereals (Anfodillo, 2007).
According to some authors (e.g.
Pfister, 2005), that contraction of pastureland in the European mountains at the height of the Little Ice Age (LIA from the fourteenth to the late nineteenth century), restricted the prospects for pasturing animals.
Lower forage yields also affected the quality and quantity of the milk produced.
During the LIA weather and climate conditions were different from those prevailing in the preceding ‘Medieval 100 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios Warm Period’ (from about 900 to the fourteenth century) and in the ‘warm twentieth century’.
The LIA was a simultaneous, world-wide phenomenon, although there were considerable regional and local variations.
That epoch was the longest period of glacial expansion in the Alps for at least 3000 years.
However, it should be stressed that the six centuries between 1300 and 1900 were not continuously cold.
The cold phases were repeatedly interrupted by phases of ‘average climate’.
In some periods, e.g.
from 1718 to 1730, the summer half-year was even somewhat warmer than the ‘warm twentieth century’.
It is in this context that Heinz Wanner coined the expression “Little Ice Age type events” (LIATE) to designate the three extensive advances known.
Many historians assume that the productivity of agriculture in the medieval and early modern periods depended only on the relative scarcity of two prime production factors: land and labour.
The fundamental fact that agricultural output also depends on weather and climate has simply been ruled out.
The most difficult study regards impacts and consequences.
Having reconstructed past climate in the area of concern, biophysical impact studies may be carried out to identify the direct effect of climate anomalies on plants, domestic animals and disease vectors through study of their sensitivity to climate.
Social impact assessment studies can then examine how biophysical impacts i.e.
the effects of climate anomalies on biota propagate into the social and political system.
This type of integrated approach, which would include the potential of people to adapt and adjust to climatic stress, reflects historical reality far better than a simple impact model and raises more fruitful research questions.
Pfister (2005) developed a climate impact model tailored to food production in the agrarian economies within the mixed economies of southern central Europe, where grain was the staple crop cultivated according to a three-field system in combination with dairy or wine production.
It was found that a given set of specific sequences of weather spells over the agricultural year was likely to affect all sources of food, at the same time leaving little margin for substitution.
This yielded a model of worst-case crop failure and, conversely, a year of plenty.
Livestock in traditional agriculture did not serve only the currently exclusive purpose of providing animal protein for human nutrition; instead, its vital role consisted in the multiple function of providing muscular power, manure and milk.
Livestock provided large part of the required labour and enabled the active management of plant nutrients.
The milk yields of cows and goats depended on the amount of the daily food ration available per animal and its nutrient content, mainly raw proteins.
The amount of the feed ration varied according to the duration of the winter snow cover and autumn and spring temperatures.
In a frosty spring, the animals ran out of feed, as happened in 1688 in the example provided by Einsiedeln (Pfister, 2007).
The longer the famine lasted, the longer it took for the animals to recover and resume their usual level of milk production.
A long wet spell during the hay harvest in July and early August could reduce the raw protein content of the hay by as much as two-thirds, causing the cows to cease producing milk during the subsequent winter.
Most importantly, the simultaneous occurrence of rainy autumns, cold springs and wet mid-summers in successive years had a cumulative impact on agricultural production.
This combination of seasonal patterns contributed largely to triggering extensive advances 101Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values of the glaciers.
Chilly springs and rainy mid-summers have been shown to be the most common climatic elements during the Little Ice Age, even though they were not causally related.
This economically adverse combination of climatic patterns is labelled “Little Ice Agetype Impacts” (LIATIMP).
The biophysical climate’s impacts in terms of the duration of cold spells and wetness in particular phases of the year may be relatively similar without being fully identical.
Human responses to such impacts, on the other hand, often differ over time; and these differences may form the basis of in-depth studies on changing vulnerabilities.
At the same time, complex interactions with environmental changes compounded by socio-economic factors may eventually lead to a loss or decrease in the value of the asset (Gellrich et al., 2007; Irwin and Geoghegan, 2001; Paavola and Fraser, 2011) and the associated rental fee.
An example found throughout the southern Trentino region in the Italian Alps is the contrast between changes in the value of privately-owned agricultural land over time and the large tracts of forest and pasture assets managed by local communities.
The former were subject to extensive fragmentation with a gradual reduction and dispersion of agricultural land; but the latter, because they had a fixed land area (the pastures in particular), made long-term management of the resources possible.
2.
Materials and methods 2.1 The study area The pastures studied for this paper are located on the Pasubio massif and its surrounding areas (Fig.
1).
The Pasubio is an extensive plateau in the southeast of the Trentino region (northern Italy) at a height of between 1500 m and 2000 m and confined by two deep valleys.
The summit area is a wide plateau from which radiate a series of small valleys cutting deep into the slopes.
The geological structure of the massif has given rise to the development of surface karst landforms where water drains deep into the mountain, leaving the summit land arid and feeding large springs at lower altitudes.
In phytoclimatic terms the area is classifiable as pre-Alpine moist temperate.
2.2 Temperature variability in the Alps Very few quantitative reconstructions of climate variability in the Alps over the last millennium have been made.
High-resolution reconstructions for the pre-instrumental period are based on documentary reports (Behringer, 2013; Lutherbacher et al., 2004; Pflister, 2005, 2007), geochemical data (stable oxygen isotopes), physical data (annual growth rate of stalagmite laminae; Frisia et al., 2007; Mangini et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2006), and temperature profiles measured along deep perforations (Pasquale et al., 2003).
Representative results can be expected from trees at the Alpine timberline, where the temperature during the short vegetative period controls the growth rate.
Utilizing ringwidth series measured with string instruments, several authors have developed a consistent, spatially-resolvable network of summer temperature-sensitive chronologies for high elevations in Central Europe for at least the last 500 years (Wilson et al., 2005).
A com102 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios mon temperature signal across the Alps has allowed regional reconstructions to be made of mean April–September temperatures (1650–1987) from ring-width (RW) and density (MXD) records using nested principal component regression models (Wilson et al.
2005).
Calibration of paleo-climatic series with instrumental series is based on the assumption that the climate in the last millennium was characterized by modes of variability similar to those in the instrumental period.
While this assumption may not be entirely correct, we can be reassured by the fact that all of the series now available display comparable low and high frequency variations.
In fact, a comparison of temperature proxy reconstructions for the Alpine region highlights periods of synchronous warm and cold periods in the records (Mann et al.
2000; Pauling et al.
2003; Luterbacher et al.
2004, Wilson et al.
2004).
These variations can be adjusted to local contexts where the micro-climate or altimetric conditions diverge from the Alpine reference conditions.
2.3 The climate in the Pasubio massif in the last thousand years Located at an altitude of 1025 m in the central Pasubio, the Cogola di Giazzera is a large cave with concretions that have been the subject of recent palaeo-climatic studies (Frisia et al., 2007).
Analysis of a stalagmite in this cave using the U/Th dating technique, micro-crystal analysis, and oxygen and carbon stable isotope ratios (284 samples) has made it possible to reconstruct the curve of local thermal anomaly over the last 4500 years.
Figure 1.
The Pasubio area is in southern Trentino (Italy).
The mountain pastures studied, higlighted in grey, occupy the central part of the Pasubio massif and the southermost part of the Vallarsa valley.
(1 Campogrosso; 2 Pra; 3 Monte di Mezzo; 4 Pian delle Fugazze; 5 Pozze; 6 Campobiso; 7 Cosmagnon; 8 Pasubio).
103Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values The isotopic series derived from the stalagmite’s most recent concretions (U1), dated from 1060 ± 70 AD to today, had an average resolution of seven years.
The isotopic series was synchronised with the Milan series (1750-1998) (Maugeri and Nanni, 1998) and with reconstruction of temperatures in Europe and the Alps from dendrocronological, instrumental and historical data (Mann and Jones, 2003; Lutherbacher et al., 2004; Bohm et al 2001; Briffa et al 1998) (Fig.
2).
The coefficient of correlation between the Giazzera and Luterbacher reconstructions of temperature anomalies was good (r2 = 0.77).
For the purposes of the research reported in this article, we needed to be able to correlate the average temperature of the reference periods with those used to determine the rents for Alpine pastures in the study area.
Because the leases were renewable every five years and the rent was correlated with this time frame, it was necessary to have temperature data on a scale of at least five years.
The Giazzera dataset has a resolution of seven years, and Lutherbacher’s (2004) series, having a resolution on an annual and seasonal scale, perfectly suited with the purposes of our analysis.
Therefore, having confirmed the positive correlation between the temperature anomaly series reconstructed for the Pasubio and those available for Europe and the Alps (Frisia, 2007; Frisia et al., 2007), Lutherbacher et al.’s (2004) annual thermometric data were adopted in the analysis.
2.4 Historical data 2.4.1 The social context: public good and private good Except for the brief period of Napoleonic rule, from the second decade of the sixteenth century onwards few alterations were made to the political administration of the area, which was part of the Habsburgs’ Tyrolean domains.
With the demise of the feudal system in the eighteenth century, local communities gained possession of most of the mountain land and managed them by leasing pastures to local and non-local breeders (Salvador and Avanzini, 2014).
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, grazing land was the property of the comFigure 2.
Comparison of reconstructed temperature anomalies for the Pasubio (GZ1) (from Miorandi et al., 2007) and for the Alps (from Lutherbacher et al., 2004) over the past 500 years.
104 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios munity (now the district council) of Vallarsa, which every five years leased them by public auction to the highest bidder.
The rental contracts contained clauses that remained substantially unchanged over time and were the same for all pastures in the same period.
In this respect, changes in the rent values assigned to Alpine pastures are good indicators of climate changes.
The fact that the extent of land3 and its ownership do not change in part removes several socio-economic variables from the diachronic evaluation of their values.4 During the period considered, the population of the area increased in line with that of the entire Alpine region (Bussolon, Martini, 2007).
In the area examined, between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the number of inhabitants grew, albeit more slowly than in the nearby plain.
In order to increase food resources to feed the larger population there was a rise in the number of livestock raised and therefore an increased demand for pastures, with a consequent linear increase in their average value.
2.4.2 Source of economic data The historical archives5 of the administrative districts of the area under study contain the ‘Auction Deeds’ and the corresponding ‘Auction Tenders’ for grazing lands since the seventeenth century.
They record the conditions on which the district council leased each grazing pasture, the price the tenant had to pay annually to the district council and any additional sums due, which in the eighteenth century would become a fixed fee for maintenance of the pastureland.
From the eighteenth century onwards (the first rental agreement examined here is dated 1719) the Vallarsa district council kept specific records of mountain leases with documentation of the costs and auction conditions.
In the eighteenth century, the grazing lands were allocated in the autumn of the year preceding the start of grazing, although the auction for the five-year period 1774-1778 took place in the autumn two years previously (October 1772) and became the rule for successive decades.
This gave the tenant who had won the auction sufficient time to procure cattle, hire a cheese maker and shepherds, procure all the cheese making equipment, ensure that the buildings (farmhouse and cheesemaking outbuilding) and infrastructures (roads, watering holes) were in good condition and, if necessary, carry out repairs.
From 1810, the auction deed also specified the reserve price (usually the rent from the previous five years) and by how much each bidder was willing to raise the starting price.
When the reserve price was considered too high for that year, the auction was cancelled and another took place with a lower starting price.
The year of the auction, regardless of whether it took place one or two years prior to the start of the lease, was therefore taken into consideration in analysing the comparison with the standard thermometric series.
The price from 1719 to 1773 is given in trons, and after that in florins (1 florin = 5 3 The actual extent of the pasturelands may well have varied as a result of tree clearance, or, in other periods, tree encroachment.
However, while it is true that the areas cannot be measured with any certainty, it is also true that these changes to the grazing lands have no significant bearing on the analysis that follows.
4 The Alpine pastures are not privately owned but are instead the property of the district council, which means no variables associated with land division and change of ownership need be considered.
(Bussolon and Martini, 2007).
5 The Trento State Archive, the Rovereto District Archive and the Vallarsa District Archive were consulted.
105Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values trons).
In the nineteenth century, the price was given in various currencies: Tyrolean florins, Imperial florins and common florins (100 Viennese florins = 105 Tyrolean florins = 120 Imperial florins = 125 common florins).
To overcome currency conversion problems, prices have been converted to silver equivalents, i.e.
the actual amount of silver (in grams) contained in the coins in every year under study.
Information regarding the various currencies is taken from Pribram (1938).6 It has been necessary to use silver as the numeric value because it is practically impossible to reconstruct a historical series of the prices of the products of livestock raising to which the analysis refers.
The chosen indicator allows at least reduced instability, which happens to be rather substantial in some of the periods under study.
A similar solution has already been adopted by other scholars (Allen, 2001).
It goes without saying that such an indicator does not resolve the issue of silver’s actual purchasing power.
Nonetheless, no significant variation in silver’s actual purchasing power has been recorded in the area under study (Bonoldi et al.
2018).
2.5 Analysis 2.5.1 Rents for pastures from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries and the relationship with changes in climate.
Until the mid-twentieth century, land values and pasture rents were directly related to the productivity of the mountain.
Therefore, to investigate the relationships between them, we compared the values of the pastures with environmental drivers in the study area.
This analysis took account only of those grazing lands for which there is a sufficient continuity of information on rents for the period 1719-1880.
We also selected pastures used mainly for grazing cattle and which were not subject to any change of use during the period considered.7 In addition, periods of evident socio-economic and/or political instability (such as the Napoleonic rule from 1800 to 1815) were excluded from the comparison, and any sums due in addition to the rents as a result of improvements to and work carried out on the buildings or pastures during the period under investigation were removed.
The grazing lands examined fell into three groups: a) Campogrosso/Monte di Mezzo/ Pra, average altitude 1350-1400 m (low altitude); b) Pozze/Campobiso/Pian delle Fugazze, average altitude 1550-1600 m8 (medium altitude); and c) Cosmagnon/Pasubio, average altitude 1900 m (high altitude).
6 Given the length of the period considered, use of a deflector in order to express the variables considered in terms of purchasing power would be desirable.
Unfortunately, the available statistics do not allow even approximate estimates of this indicator to be made.
7 Because of the scarcity of hay fields from the beginning of the twentieth century and the need for hay to feed livestock during winter, several pastures neighbouring Vallarsa were leased for haymaking and were only partly utilised for grazing.
These were allocated directly (without public auction), although the contract was still for five years and the price in some cases did not change for as much as 30-35 years.
8 We also had to consider the grazing lands at Passo Pian delle Fugazze (altitude 1100 m to 1300 m) as they were often leased together with those of Pozze/Campobiso.
However, as they comprised only less than one fifth of the total area leased, these grazing lands should not greatly impinge on the following analysis.
The Pozze/Campobiso pastures cover around 250 ha, those of Passo Pian delle Fugazze around 30 ha.
The relationship between the sizes of the two areas remained more or less constant throughout the period considered.
106 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios Preliminary analysis of the variations in rent values (with all prices converted to florins) shows that they gradually increased over the course of the period studied as a consequence of the increase in demographic pressure, as can be seen from the following graph (Fig.
3).
Furthermore, comparison with the climate curve (Fig.
2) is highly consistent with the trend of rising average temperatures and hence with the presumed improvement in mountain weather conditions following the negative peak of the 1740s.
From the beginning of the period analysed, higher values were assigned to the grazing lands below 1500 metres, these being rich pastures at lower altitudes with relatively easy access, a reasonably assured supply of water and relatively speedy connections to the towns in the valley.9 The grazing lands located at higher altitudes (group c) have poorer pastures and structural conditions that remained unchanged over time, and their rent values do not significantly increase.
At the turn of 1740, there was a drop in the value of the pastures for which data are available (a and b), possibly as a result of the marked fall in average temperatures over this 9 A new road was constructed in 1823 giving better access to the area where all the grazing lands are located, which may have something to do with the greater value assigned to them between 1825 and 1839.
Figure 3.
Variations in rent values of the three groups of grazing lands between 1715 and 1850 normalised and expessed in silver grams.
107Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values period (Fig.
2).
A second, clear drop in the rent values of all the grazing lands (a, b and c) occurs between 1820 and 1845, followed by a marked rise in the next three five-year periods.
This appears to coincide with the cold phase documented in the Alps between 1820 and 1840 (Büntgen et al., 2006; Leonelli et al., 2012; Rea et al.
2003), followed by a rapid rise in average temperatures from the 1850s onwards.
Differences in rent according to temperature and altitude may be understood in light of the differential rent concept defined by Ricardo (1821) and reinterpreted by, among others, Quadrio Curzio (1998).10 Temperature and altitude are, in fact, the original natural factors influencing rents and therefore income.
In the case of grazing, as with many agricultural crops, productivity depends on natural factors and on permanent or temporary improvements resulting from human activities.
During the period considered, characterized by few technological innovations, temporary improvements linked to the use of production aids, such as fertilizers, seeds, etc., were almost non-existent.
Even management organizational models remained more or less the same, as evidenced by the invariance of the conditions that applied to the tenant.
However, permanent improvements were effective, resulting in deforestation and clearing of the land occupied by the less steep woodlands.
As a result of the increasing need for pastures, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Salvador and Avanzini, 2014) woods located at increasingly lower altitudes were ceded to grazing areas.
The initial investment in deforestation increased, the lower the altitude.11 These deforestation activities can be treated as investments and are considered fully amortized, given the period examined in this study.
Soils at lower altitudes are more productive and can be more easily associated with permanent housing.
In this framework, the annuity of a pasture in the period examined (i.e., in the absence of technological innovations and in an essentially closed market) will necessarily tend to increase in the presence of increasing human pressure.
This will lead, as Ricardian theory suggests, to less fertile lands being cultivated and to an increase in the income from those already in use.12 2.5.2 Econometric analysis To examine the available data in detail, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to identify the types of links between the variables that we considered important: the dependent variable being pastures’ rent value13 and the independent variables being temperature and population.14 As already mentioned, to overcome problems resulting from the use of different currencies, we used silver equivalents of their values.15 10 The best-known reference is P. Sraffa (1925), but Keynes (1936) also worked on the problem.
11 At lower altitudes, the forests are bushier with trees of larger diameter.
12 Some pastures utilized in the nineteenth century were abandoned in a later period due to low fertility.
13 During the period under examination the pastures’ rent value in Campogrosso, Prà and Monte di Mezzo (Group a) varied between 25.258 and 8490.830 silver grams; pastures in Pozze, Campobiso, Pian delle Fugazze (Group b) yielded a rent between 24.175 and 3561.084 silver grams; Pasubio and Cosmagnon (Group c) between 7.998 and 1587.12 silver grams.
14 In the period under study, population varied between 1394 and 3206 inhabitants.
15 Other explanatory variables might be of some interest, e.g.
the overall economic trend and farms’ structure, 108 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios Population pressure was examined by taking information on the population residing in the Vallarsa district as a proxy.16 Regarding temperature, we decided to employ average values17 for the spring immediately preceding the auction.
As reported in the introduction, the spring/early summer temperature is crucial for grass growth and hence for determining the productivity of an Alpine pasture (Cavallero et al., 1992).
The nutrients contained in the soil are the most critical factors influencing the level of grass output and growth, although this also depends to some extent on precipitation patterns: too much precipitation, particularly during autumn and winter, reduces the content of calcium, phosphates and nitrogen in the soil.
Sequences of wet years had a cumulative impact, although temperature, according to results obtained by agronomists, has far more to do with mobilizing nitrogen from the soil than was previously believed (Bengston, 2004).
Since temperature trends are spatially far more uniform than rainfall patterns, we may conclude that yields tend to react in a similar way within large regions.
Detailed analysis of the temperatures reconstructed by Lutherbacher et al.
(2004) also reveals a high correlation between average spring temperature and average annual temperature (correlation coefficient 0.61) (Fig.
4).
Furthermore, the use of constructed variables, such as moving averages and weighted moving averages of spring temperatures for the three years preceding the year of the auction, did not produce results significantly different to those obtained using simple average spring temperatures (c.c.
0.64 for moving averages, c.c.
0.82 for weighted moving averages).
The results of the preliminary analysis suggested using the average spring temperature of the year of auction, which has a greater influence than the average temperature of the previous years on the amount of grass in the pastures in the year of auction and ultimately on the bidding.
3.
Results 3.1 Data elaboration.
An initial analysis was performed treating all the available information (59) as panel data (Greene, 2008).
As the panel regression did not involve a significant increase in the explanatory capacity of the model, we estimated an ordinary least square regression on the entire set of available data.
In this case, we used a double-log functional form of the following type18: but statistical information is not available to add such dimensions in the model.
Given the specific situation we can nonetheless suggest that the effect of economic growth is to a certain extent captured by the population variable.
In a closed economy, population growth is only possible when a larger amount of resources becomes available (Malthus 1798).
The farms’ structure does not change significantly in the period under examination (Bussolon and Martini, 2007).
Given this specific context, we believe that, altogether, the lack of availability of further variables does not invalidate the main conclusions of the study.
16 Missing observations for the years of interest were interpolated using linear regression.
17 During the period under study, the average spring temperature was between 5.895 and 8.133 degrees Celsius (°C).
18 We used a log-log formula to reduce the influence of the different rent values of the grazing lands.
This functional form smooths the rent value differences.
109Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values LN(AR)19 = f (LN(Pop), LN(S_temp), D1, D2 The estimated results are presented in Table 1.
We can note that all the estimates are significantly different from zero at least at the 0.05 value.
Estimated coefficients confirm that average spring temperature and population positively affect the rent values of the grazing lands.
Moreover, the lower the altitude of the grazing land, the higher is its rent value.
Given this relevant effect of altitude, we deemed useful to estimate separated functions for the three different groups of mountain pastures.
Despite the small number of observations for each area examined, this exercise allows highlighting the role of population and temperature as a function of altitude.
In this case, it seems appropriate to introduce a new dummy variable for the grazing 19 LN(AR) = logarithm of annual rent expressed in silver, LN(Pop) = logarithm of population, LN (S_temp) = logartihm of average spring temperature, D1 Dummy variable for grazing lands at medium altitude, D2 Dummy variable for grazing lands at lower altitude.
Figure 4.
Average annual temperature versus average spring temperature in the period analysed (from Lutherbacher et al.
2004).
Table 1.
Estimated results for all the mountain pastures Panel estimation Population +8.461 *** Average spring temperature (degrees centigrade) +2.783 ** Dummy variable for grazing lands at medium altitude +1.634 *** Dummy variable for grazing lands at lower altitude +1.759 *** Constant -66.731 *** r2 0.896 adr2 0.889 Number of observations 59 * Significant at 10% significance level, ** significant at 5% significance level, *** significant at 1% significance level.
110 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios lands located on the border with the nearby Veneto region (group a, c), assuming a value of zero up to 1752 and one over the following years.
This is to account for the fact that the borders were definitively fixed in 1752, thus putting an end to a series of incursions and acts of intimidation that had made the mountain unsafe for use in previous years.20 The estimated equations using the least squares method were as follows21: AR22 = f(Pop, S_temp, D) Most estimates are significantly different from zero at least at the 0.10 value, except for average spring temperature for group (b).
Estimated coefficients confirm a strong effect of human pressure due to population growth on rent values for each group of grazing lands.
Interestingly, this effect is decreasing as moving from grazing lands at lower altitude towards grazing lands at higher altitudes, confirming the Ricardian assumptions.
The same trend emerges for average spring temperature, which exerts the greatest effect on rent values for grazing land at lower altitudes, while for group (b) and group (c) the effect is lower.
In order to highlight the different sensitivity of rents to variations in spring temperature and changes in the size of the population we can calculate elasticities.
The elasticity of rent to population indicates the average amount by which the rent varies as a response to a change in the population.
The elasticity of rent with respect to temperature indicates the average amount by which the rent varies as a response to change of 1 degree Celsius in spring temperature.
The elasticities of rent are presented in Table 3.
Calculating these elasticities on regression results of Table 1 (all the grazing lands considered together) we obtain 0.70 for the elasticity with respect to population and 7.73 for the elasticity with 20 The Campogrosso/Prà/Monte di Mezzo and Cosmagnon/Pasubio pastures are located on the border with the Veneto region.
Until 1752 this border was not clearly defined and as a result animals might be found grazing in a neighbouring property, thus provoking punitive raids which included the animals’ seizure, the burning of farmhouses and so on, and the beginning of lengthy controversies.
With the Rovereto treaty (1752) the borders were precisely drawn and guarded, and there was a considerable increase in the rent values as a consequence of the greater security.
21 Since there were no structural differences (e.g.
in altitude) within the three groups identified for mountain pastures and their rents, we preferred to use a linear functional form.
22 AR = annual rent Table 2.
Estimation results for three different groups of mountain pastures.
Group (a) (low altitude) Group (b) (medium altitude) Group (c) (high altitude) Population +4.34 *** +1.87 *** +1.22 *** Average spring temperature (degrees centigrade) +798.21 ** +309.31 +199.43 * Dummy variable for years after 1752 +1746.42 ** +418.86 ** Constant -14554.24 *** -5296.81 ** -4187.87 *** r2 0.80 0.77 0.82 adr2 0.77 0.74 0.77 Number of observations 23 18 18 111Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values respect to temperature.
This indicates that rents are inelastic with respect to an increase in population but are very elastic in response to an increase in average spring temperature.
The elasticities calculated for the three different groups confirm a different sensitivity of rents according to altitude.
It appears as evident that changes in temperature have a much stronger impact on the amount of rent charged than changes in population.
The elasticity of rents with respect to population is high (3.118) for grazing lands located at low altitude but is inelastic for grazing land at medium (0.830) and higher altitude (0.236).
We can therefore draw the conclusion that a change in human pressure has graver consequences for the grazing lands at low altitude than for those at higher altitudes.
This is explained by the fact that it makes sense to make the best possible use of the lower grazing lands in the area under study given that they are, on the one hand, closer to the towns and villages and, on the other hand, adjacent to the tree line and can be “extended” by encroaching on the woods and forests.
In contrast, there is no possibility of extending the pastures at the highest grazing lands, which in all probability are affected by the situation in the pastures at lower altitudes.23 The sensitivity of rent values to changes in spring temperature follows a similar pattern, even with a different order of magnitude.24 The elasticity to spring temperature is very high for grazing lands at low altitude while it is lower for grazing lands at medium altitude and even lower for land located at higher altitude.
This can be explained in part by the fact that even small increases in spring temperatures can give rise to longer pasturing periods in the low grazing lands, while the grazing period in the high pastures is much more constant.
4.
Concluding remarks Research conducted on the values of mountain pastures in the Pasubio estimated from the rents charged for them over a two-hundred-year period show that variations in these values are related to natural and anthropogenic drivers to varying extents depending on historical period and altitude.
23 It should also be remembered that only pastures located above the tree line were at first utilised, and it was only later that pastures were created at lower altitudes by clearing the less steep woodland areas.
24 The different ranges of variation of the two variables (low for temperature, high for population), rather than their different orders of magnitude should be taken into account when interpreting the high values for elasticity.
Table 3.
Estimated rental price elasticities.
Elasticity with respect to population Elasticity with respect to temperaturea Overall elasticity 0.70 7.73 Group (a) (Campogrosso, Prà, Monte di Mezzo) 3.118 187.493 Group (b) (Pozze, Campobiso, Pian delle Fugazze) 0.830 36.735 Group (c) (Pasubio, Cosmagnon) 0.236 14.213 a In thousandths of a degree Celsius.
112 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios Oscillations in the values for 5-year periods between the last half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century suggest a strong connection with environmental and climatic factors.
Increases or decreases in temperature appear to have a less marked and less direct effect on the values of grazing lands close to the upper limit of vegetation, while, in addition to the climate signal, socio-economic and infrastructural signals impinge significantly on the grazing lands at lower altitudes.
If we consider that the value of the rent is an estimate of income and therefore of the utility of the “land productive factor” within the production process, we may draw some general considerations from this survey.
In particular, an interesting observation is that increasing population and temperature have the same influence in increasing the yield, independently of altitude.
For both the variables, the values of the rents for land located at a lower altitude generally more fertile have an elasticity approximately 13 times greater than that of land at a higher altitude.
This means that human pressure and more favourable climatic conditions lead to significantly intensified pastoral activity in the fertile areas, while the income of marginal land is less affected by these changes.
This finding is counterintuitive because people are generally inclined to believe that higher temperatures should favour pastures at high altitude because they should supposedly become more fertile.
This apparent contradiction can nonetheless be explained with reference to the ricardian theory of rent.
Our research supports what David Ricardo, at the dawn of economic science, had guessed.
This contribution to the validity of the ricardian theory of rent is even more interesting given the long time interval considered and the relative small number of situations where this theory can actually be tested.
Within agricultural production, only pastures have undergone no significant technological transformation over time.
The analysis partly suffers from the lack of consistent statistical data: given the length of the period under study, the elaboration could not always be conducted on homogeneous information.
More precisely, the absence of a reliable indicator to convert the rent value into actual purchasing power can lead to a distortion in the estimates provided.
Nonetheless, the elaboration carried out, if confirmed by other surveys, can provide a solid basis for appropriate measures of agricultural policy and land management adapted to ongoing climate changes.
5.
Funding This study is part of the Project ARMO Archeologia del paesaggio montano: reti insediative e paleoambienti nelle Prealpi trentine” funded by MUSE Science Museum (Trento) and the Department of Economics and Management of Trento University.
6.
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
113Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values 7.
References Allen, R.C.
(2001).
The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War.
Exploration in Economic History 38: 411-447 Anfodillo, T. (2007).
Cambiamenti Climatici e Dinamica di Popolazione al Limite Superiore del Bosco: Importanza delle Ricerche di Lungo Termine.
Forest@ 4: 3-5.
Baglioni, M., Macagno, G., Nunes, P. and Travisi, C. (2009).
Natura 2000 Network, Agricultural Pressures and Biodiversity Conservation: an Italian outlook: Analysing the potential of the Natura 2000 database in describing the linkages between agricultural pressures and biodiversity.
Report of the EXIOPOL, Deliverable.II.3.b.1.
part 2, Milan; Italy.
Behringer, W. (2013).
Storia culturale del clima.
Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.
Bonoldi A., Novi Inverardi P.L.
and Salvador I.
(2018).
The Cereal Market in an Alpine Region at the End of the Ancient Regime: Tyrol (1761-1817).
Working Paper, ESSHC Belfast.
Bosello, F. and Zhang, J.
(2005).
Assessing Climate Change Impacts: Agriculture.
FEEM Working Paper, 94.
Bovolenta, S., Pasut, D. and Dovier, S. (2008).
L’allevamento in Montagna: Sistemi Tradizionali e Tendenze Attuali.
Quaderni SoZooAlp.
5: 22-29.
Bozhong, L. (1998).
Changes in Climate, Land, and Human Efforts.
The Production of Wetfield Rice in Jiangnan during the Ming and Qing Dynasties.
In Elvin, M. and Ts’ui-jung, L.
(eds.
), Sediments of Time.
Environment and Society in Chinese History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 447-487.
Bohm, R., Auer, I., Brunetti, M., Maugeri, M., Nanni, T. and Schoner, W. (2001).
Regional Temperature Variability in the European Alps 1760–1998 from Homogenized Instrumental Time Series.
International Journal of Climatology 21: 1779–1801.
Briffa, K. R., Jones, P.D.
and Schweingruber, F.H.
(1988).
Summer Temperature Patterns over Europe: a Reconstruction from 1750 A.D. Based on Maximum Latewood Density Indices of Conifers.
Quaternary Research 30: 36–52.
Buffoni, L., Brunetti, M., Mangianti, F., Maugeri, M., Monti, F. and Nanni, T. (2003).
Ricostruzione del Clima Italiano negli Ultimi 130 anni e Scenari per il XXI Secolo.
Atti workshop “Climagri cambiamenti climatici e agricoltura”.
Cagliari, 16-17 January 2003.
Bussolon, R. and Martini, A.
(2007).
La Vallarsa attraverso la Storia.
Dalle origini alla Prima Guerra Mondiale.
Mori (TN): La Grafica edizioni.
Büntgen, U., Frank, D.C., Nievergelt, D. and Esper, J.
(2006).
Summer temperature variations in the European Alps, A.D. 755-2004.
Journal of Climate 19: 5606-5623.
Cavallero, A., Talamucci, P., Grignani, C., Reyneri, A., Ziliotto, U., Scotton, M. and Acutis, M. (1992).
Caratterizzazione della Dinamica Produttiva di Pascoli Naturali Italiani.
Rivista di Agronomia 26 (3): 325-343.
Dearing J.A.
(2006).
Climate – Human – Environment Interactions: Resolving Our Past.
Climate of the Past 2: 187-203.
Fraser, E.D.G.
(2009).
Economic Crises, Land Use Vulnerabilities, Climate Variability, Food Security and Population Declines: Will History Repeat Itself or Will Our Society Adapt to Climate Change?
In: Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working paper No.
1, Leeds and London, UK.
114 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios Frisia, S. (2007).
Sintesi delle Conoscenze sulla Variabilità Climatica nelle Alpi negli Ultimi 1000 Anni.
Studi Trent.
Sci.
Nat., Acta Geol.
82: 65-69.
Frisia, S., Borsato, A., Richards, D.A., Miorandi, R. and Davanzo, S. (2007).
Variazioni Climatiche ed Eventi Sismici negli Ultimi 4500 Anni nel Trentino Meridionale da una Stalagmite della Cogola Grande di Giazzera.
Studi Trent.
Sci.
Nat., Acta Geol.
82: 205-223.
Gellrich, M., Baura, P., Koch, B. and Zimmermann, N.E.
(2007).
Agricultural Land Abandonment and Natural Forest Re-Growth in the Swiss Mountains: A Spatially Explicit Economic Analysis.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 118: Issues 1–4: 93–108.
Gelman, A. and Hill.
J.
(2007).
Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Greene, W.H.
(2008).
Econometric Analysis.
Prentice Hall.
Gusmeroli, F., Corti, M., Orlandi, D., Pasut, D. and Bassignana, M. (2005).
Produzione e Prerogative Qualitative dei Pascoli Alpini: Riflessi sul Comportamento al Pascolo e l’Ingestione.
Quaderni SoZooAlp.
2: 7-27.
IPCC (2014).
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Field, C.B., V.R.
Barros, D.J.
Dokken, K.J.
Mach, M.D.
Mastrandrea, T.E.
Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L.
Ebi, Y.O.
Estrada, R.C.
Genova, B. Girma, E.S.
Kissel, A.N.
Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R.
Mastrandrea, and L.L.
White (eds.).
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1-32.
Irwin, E.G.
and Geoghegan, J.
(2001).
Theory, Data, Methods: Developing Spatially Explicit Economic Models of Land Use Change.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 85: 7-24.
Keynes, J.M.
(1991).
Note Conclusive nella Filosofia Sociale Verso la quale La Teoria Generale Potrebbe Condurre.
In: La Fine del Laissez-Faire e Altri Scritti.
Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.
Leonelli, G., Coppola, A., Pelfini M., Salvatore, M.C., Cremaschi, M. and Baroni, C. (2012).
Il Segnale Climatico e le sue Variazioni negli Anelli di Accrescimento degli Alberi da Siti Estremi al Contorno della Regione Mediterranea.
Rendiconti Online Società Geologica Italiana 18: 24-28.
Lutherbacher, J., Dietrich, D., Xoplaki, E., Grosejan, M. and Wanner, H. (2004).
European Seasonal and Annual Temperature Variability, Trends and Extremes since 1500.
Science 3013: 1499-1503.
Malanima, P. (2006).
Energy Crisis and Growth 1650-1850: The European Deviation in a Comparative Perspective.
Journal of Global History 1: 101-121.
Mangini A., Spötl C. and Verdes P. (2005).
Reconstruction of Temperature in the Central Alps During the Past 2000 Years from a δ18O Stalagmite Record.
Earth Plan.
Sci.
Lett.
235: 741-751.
Mathieu, J.
(2000).
Storia delle Alpi 1500-1900: Ambiente, Sviluppo e Società (Vol.
4).
Casagrande.
Malthus T.R.
(1798).
An Essay on the Principle of Population.
London: J. Johnson.
Menzel, A. and Fabian, P. (1999).
Growing Season Extended in Europe.
Nature 39: 659661.
115Climate change and historical variations in mountain pasture values Maugeri, M. and Nanni, T. (1998).
Surface Air Temperature Variations in Italy.
Recent Trends and Update to 1993.
Theor.
Appl.
Climatol.
(1998): 191-196.
Orlandi, D. and Clementel, F. (2007).
Caratterizzazione Produttiva dei Pascoli Alpini.
http://www.pianteofficinali.org/main/Alpicoltura/Alpicoltura.htm.
Accessed 10 January 2017.
Orlandi, D., Clementel, F., Bovolenta, S. and Dovier, S. (2004).
Caratterizzazione Chimica e Nutrizionale Delle Principali Specie Pascolive Alpine.
Quaderni SoZooAlp.
1: 171180.
Paavola J. and Fraser E. (2011).
Ecological Economics and Environmental History.
Ecological Economics 70: 1266-1268.
Palatnik, R. and Nunes, P. (2010).
Valutazione delle Relazioni tra Cambiamenti Climatici, Biodiversità e Produttività dei Sistemi Agro-Forestali in Europa.
Agriregionieuropa Special Issue on Climate Change and Agriculture: Adaptation, Mitigation and Food Security 6(21).
Pasquale V., Verdojya M., Chiozzi P. and Safanda J.
(2000).
Evidence of Climate Warming from Underground Temperatures in NW Italy.
Global Planetary Change 25: 215-225.
Pfister, C (1995).
Monthly Temperature and Precipitation in Central Europe from 1525– 1979: Quantifying Documentary Evidence on Weather and Its Effects.
In Bradley, R.S.
and Jones, P.D.
(eds.
), Climate Since AD 1500, London: Routledge, 118–142.
Pfister, C. (2005).
Weeping in the Snow.
The Second Period of Little Ice Age-type Impacts, 1570-1630.
In Behringer, W.
(ed.
), Kulturelle Konsequenzen der ‘Kleinen Eiszeit’, Göttingen, 31-86.
Pfister, C. (2007).
Climatic Extremes, Recurrent Crises and Witch Hunts: Strategies of European Societies in Coping with Exogenous Shocks in the Late Sixteenth And Early Seventeenth Centuries.
The Medieval History Journal 10, 1-2: 33–73 Pfister, C. and Bradzil R. (2006).
Social Vulnerability to Climate in the “Little Ice Age”: An Example from Central Europe in the Early 1770s.
Climate of the Past Discussions 2: 123-155.
Pribram, A. F. (1938).
Materialien zur Geschichte der Preise und Löhne in Österreich 1 (= Veröffentlichungen des Internationalen wiss.
Komitees f. die Geschichte d. Preise u. Löhne 1), Wien, Ueberreuter.
Quadrio Curzio, A.
(1998), Rendita.
In Enciclopedia delle scienze sociali, Roma: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiano.
Raffaelli, R. (2005).
Sostenibilità e Multifunzionalità dell’Agricoltura di Montagna.
Istituto Nazionale della Montagna, Bononia University Press.
Rea, R., Rampanelli, G. and Zardi, D. (2003).
The Temperature Series of Trento: 18162002.
Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Alpine Meteorology and MAP-Meeting 2003, Vol.
A. Brig, 483-486.
Ricardo, D. (1821).
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
3rd edition, London: John Murray.
Roson, R. (2003).
Modelling the Economic Impact of Climate Change, EEE Programme Working Papers Series.
Salvador, I. and Avanzini, M. (2014).
Costruire il Paesaggio.
L’Alpeggio dal Tardo Medioevo alle Soglie della Grande Guerra in un Settore del Trentino Meridionale.
Studi Trentini.
Storia 93: 79-114.
116 Marco Avanzini, Isabella Salvador, Geremia Gios Smith, C.L., Baker, A., Fairchild, I.J.
and Frisia S. (2006).
Reconstructing Regional Climates from Multiple Stalagmite Records.
Int.
Journal of Climatology 26: 1417-1424.
Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K.B., Tignor, M. and Miller, H.L.
(eds) (2007).
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Theurillat, J.P. and Guisan, A.
(2001).
Potential Impact of Climate Change on Vegetation in the European Alps: A Review.
Climatic change 50 (1-2): 77-109.
Wilson, R., Frank, D., Topham, J., Nicolussi, K. and Esper, J.
(2005).
Spatial Reconstruction of Summer Temperatures in Central Europe for the Last 500 Years Using Annually Resolved Proxy Records: Problems and Opportunities.
Boreas 34 (November): 490–497.
Ziliotto, U. and Scotton, M. (1993).
Metodi di Rilevamento della Produttività dei Pascoli Alpini.
Comunicazioni di ricerca ISAFA (TN), 93/1, 33-42.
Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Bio -based and A ppl ied Economics BAE Copyright: © 2021 R. Zucaro, V. Manganiello, R. Lorenzetti, M. Ferrigno.
Open access, article published by Firenze University Press under CC-BY-4.0 License.
Firenze University Press | www.fupress.com/bae Citation: R. Zucaro, V. Manganiello, R. Lorenzetti, M. Ferrigno (2021).
Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context.
Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122. doi: 10.36253/bae-9545 Received: July 30, 2020 Accepted: June 23, 2021 Published: October 28, 2021 Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest.
Editor: Meri Raggi, Fabio Bartolini.
ORCID RZ: 0000-0001-9386-7612 VM: 0000-0003-0348-6600 RL: 0000-0003-3346-0874 MF: 0000-0002-5347-0984 Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Raffaella Zucaro, Veronica Manganiello, Romina Lorenzetti*, Marianna Ferrigno Council for Agricultural Research and Economics Research Centre for Agricultural Policies and Bioeconomy (CREA-PB), Via Po 14, 00198 Roma, RM, Italy.
E-mail: raffaella.zucaro@crea.gov.it, veronica.manganiello@crea.gov.it, romina.lorenzetti@crea.gov.it, marianna.ferrigno@crea.gov.it.
*Corresponding Author: romina.lorenzetti@crea.gov.it Abstract.
In the context of climate change, one of the EU’s major political efforts focus on water management.
Public investment is carried out considering several drivers, from economic development to demographics, climate, and pollutants.
Meanwhile, the need for evaluation methods is also increasing, so their development has grown in recent years.
Among these, Multi-Criteria Analysis methodologies (MCA) have taken on great importance.
This work aims to demonstrate the usefulness of MCA in addressing crucial environmental issues, such as the use of water resources for agricultural and food production.
The document presents an application of MCA for the ranking and selection of projects to be financed under the Italian National Plan on Water Resources.
The Plan is part of the national initiatives planned for the adaptation of the agricultural sector to climate change.
The selection criteria have been identified following a participatory approach, and to respond to both the challenge of climate change and the limited availability of funds.
MCA is used to select the best projects to be financed with the available amount.
The Italian experience confirms the effectiveness of MCA and highlights how the involvement of both decision makers and stakeholders is necessary for a successful application of MCA to environmental issues.
Keywords: drought risk, water management, investment database, reservoirs, climate change.
1.
INTRODUCTION In recent decades, climate change has caused worrying drought events across Europe, even in Countries where past meteorological drought had been rare.
This situation has led EU Member States to monitor the availability of and need for water, to provide timely alerts in the event of drought and identify possible actions to undertake in the event of a crisis.
Recent studies carried out on the Italian territory have shown a growing climate heterogeneity due to climate change (Zucaro, 2017; ISPRA, 2018).
In the past, drought events http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode 110 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Raffaella Zucaro et al.
were mainly concentrated in the Southern Regions and Islands, while, in the last 20 years, Central and Northern Italy have also suffered from recurrent droughts.
The agricultural sector is the most exposed to the effects of climate change (Mahato, 2014), there is therefore a need for targeted investments increasing the preparedness to face extreme events.
As f loods and droughts affect both the quantity and quality of water, they contribute to environmental degradation and loss of ecosystem services.
Thus, all Member States (MSs), including Italy, are implementing adaptation and mitigation measures.
International institutions, and in particular the European Union (EU) are steering their policies and economies towards long-term sustainability.
In recent years, there has been a crescendo in the political narrative aimed at promoting climate change adaptation and mitigation.
Several actions have been proposed to implement these policies, namely: enhancing knowledge in the field of climate change adaptation and mitigation policies (EU Adaptation Strategy, European Commission, 2013); managing water risks and disasters; ensuring good water governance and sustainable investment for water services (OECD, 2015, ODEC 2016); encouraging the sustainable use of water for agriculture and the introduction of priority actions for the adaptation of agriculture to climate change (FAO – WASAG Global Framework for Action to Cope with Water Scarcity in Agriculture); taking account of climate adaptation in public and private investments (European Green Deal, European Commission, 2019).
Several measures, singly or in combination, can be taken to cope with drought risk in agriculture, climate change adaptation, and sustainable water management.
These include regulatory measures, risk management measures, water governance, research and innovation, and structural measures.
There is no single decisive action, but the most effective one or a combination of them should be taken.
Public investment in water distribution infrastructure allows for greater and more constant availability of water for irrigation and greater efficiency in water use, by reducing water abstractions, introducing instruments for water metering, and increasing the use of non-conventional water.
These investments can also contribute to achieving the objectives of the Water Framework Directive (WFD, 2000/60/ EC) of ensuring the availability of quality water for the needs of people and the environment.
This is possible through the improvement of the ecological quality of water bodies and the conservation and restoration of areas of naturalistic interest (e.g.
Nature 2000 sites).
At the European level, specific funds have been allocated to finance irrigation investments as a response to the water crises of 2003 and 2007.
These investments aimed to increase water storage and irrigation efficiency, through the modernization of existing assets, the building of new reservoirs, and the recovery and improvement of existing ones.
To decrease the dependency on conventional sources and reduce withdrawals from natural water bodies, the promotion of the reuse of treated wastewater for irrigation purpose is also pursued.
In Italy, with the aim of ensuring the integrated management of water resources, a steering committee has been set up to coordinate the various administrations responsible for water: the Steering Committee addressing investments in cross-sectoral investments, responding to the recommendations of the European Commission communication “Addressing the challenge of water scarcity and drought in the European Union” (COM, 2007) 414 final).
Following this strategy, in 2017 the Italian Government financed the “National Plan of interventions in the Water Sector” (Budget Law 2018, December 27, 2017, No.
205).
The National Plan was finalized to modernize and complete the national water distribution network (including the irrigation network) and to build new reservoirs.
The National Plan also foresaw the adoption of an Extraordinary Plan, consisting in the implementation of urgent interventions against drought, with a focus on multipurpose reservoirs.
At the River Basin scale, reservoirs are considered as effective climate change adaptation measures, especially where natural water availability is highly variable throughout the year.
In fact, they retain water to be released during periods of scarcity, thus sustaining irrigated agriculture and increasing the availability of water for irrigation (Biemans, 2011).
In addition, reservoirs have ecological and recreational functions, ranging from the conservation of protected migratory species (Mascara, 2010) and biodiversity (Deacon, 2018, Croce, 2015), to cultural and recreational purposes.
That is why some of them are now defined as natural conservation areas.
The case study shows the procedure followed by the Council for Agricultural Research and Economics (CREA), on behalf of the Italian Ministry of Agriculture (Mipaaf), in selecting interventions to help the agricultural sector adapt to climate change.
The interventions were selected according to the objectives of the Extraordinary Plan applying a Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA).
MCA is a non-monetary method of ranking and prioritizing the characteristics of the projects submitted for funding.
The paper aims to present the feasibility and usefulness of MCA in identifying the most effective project proposals in the field of water, stating that this method 111Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 can allow the inclusion of different disciplines in a single evaluation frame.
In addition, MSs need appropriate methods to assess ex ante effectiveness of investment projects, including their potential impacts on natural resource protection.
The Italian experience can therefore be extended to other countries.
2.
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 2.1 Multi-Criteria Analysis Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) was selected as a method for classifying and selecting projects, as it allowed consideration of the different priority elements according to the requirements by the funder, and the needs in term of adaptation to climate.
MCA was considered the appropriate method as it allowed several specific agricultural and environmental conditions to be applied (Figueira et al., 2005).
This facilitates the achievement of increased efficiency and sustainability in the use of natural resources in line with the EU guidelines.
Several papers have been published over the last 30 years on the empirical applications of MCA to a range of nature conservation topics, including: conservation priority and planning; management and zoning of protected areas; forest management and restoration; mapping of biodiversity, naturalness, and wilderness.
Many references can be found in several reviews, such as: Mendoza et al.
(1986); Romero and Rehman (1987); Tarp and Helles (1995); Hayashi (2000); Kangas et al.
(2001); Steiguer et al.
(2003); Mendoza and Martins (2006).
A recent and extensive review of the applications of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis was carried out by Adem Esmail and Geneletti, (2017), based on 86 papers and dealing with empirical applications in nature and biodiversity conservation.
Decision-making in environmental management requires more and more comparison alternatives to achieve multiple and competing goals.
Indeed, many of the following objectives must often be considered: ensuring a sufficient quantity of water for both people’s needs and the environment (Water Framework Directive – implementation of the Water Framework Directive), economic development, addressing the challenges posed by demographic change, climate change, and emerging pollutants.
The public administrations responsible for determining and evaluating strategic choices need systems and/or selection criteria that are as objective as possible and not influenced by endogenous factors.
This problem is particularly acute when it comes to public funding.
In this context, Multi-Criteria Methodologies have become important because they provide valuable help in choosing between alternatives, especially since the classic economic and monetary surveys do not represent the plurality of aspects that these problems present (Skonieczny et al, 2005).
Compared to monetary methods based on welfare economy principles (CostBenefit Analysis, CBA), non-monetary methods that also consider natural resources and are based on decision theory are an alternative when assessing the effectiveness of the interventions.
While CBA is mainly applied to project evaluation to improve a specific environmental service, non-monetary methods such as MCA are used for issues related to territorial and environmental assessment and planning, as they can also evaluate qualitative information.
Currently, several books deal with Multi-Criteria methodologies as applied to natural resources management (e.g.
Zeleny, 1984; Yoon and Hwang, 1995; Malczewski, 1999; Belton and Stewart, 2002).
Basically, MCA is applied with the following typical steps: 1.
Structuring of the problem and the decision-making network.
2.
Data acquisition and processing.
3.
Normalization (linear normalizations or Value and Utility functions).
4.
Criteria and weight allocation.
5.
Calculation and sorting of alternatives (e.g.
with outranking methods; graphic methods; scoring methods).
6.
Results.
7.
Sensitivity analysis (optional).
The next paragraph describes how these steps were applied to the case study.
2.2.
Applied methodology In this study, the listed steps of the Multi-Criteria Analysis were slightly reformulated, as follows.
1.
Structuring of the problem and the decision-making network.
There are many MCA approaches that differ in terms of computational complexity, level of stakeholder engagement and time and data requirements.
To protect the agricultural sector against drought events, policymakers identified structural measures, concerning infrastructure interventions on multipurpose reservoirs for water collection during rain periods and water saving interventions.
A specific fund has been set up to these objectives, governed by specific rules.
Water management operates within an interdisciplinary framework that seeks to ensure the protection of resources (Cugusi and Plaisant, 2019; Dir.
2000/60/EC; Dlgs 152/1999; Autonomous Region of Sardinia, 2005), and requires the integration of ecological, economic, 112 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Raffaella Zucaro et al.
and socio-political elements of different territorial scales.
Therefore, all the institutions responsible for water management (Ministries of Agriculture, Environment, Infrastructure, Regions and River Basin District Authorities (RBDAs)), Local Agencies for irrigation Water Management (LAWMs), and stakeholders were involved in the decision-making network of this case study.
The involvement of the stakeholders was a selling point in the methodology adopted by the CREA.
2.
Data acquisition and processing.
For the collection of data useful for the analysis, the CREA, Mipaaf, and Regions with the support of the LAWMs, identified the infrastructure priorities to be financed through national and EU resources.
All information was stored and managed by DANIA, the National Database of Investments for Irrigation and the Environment (http://dania.crea.
gov.it/).
It was implemented by the CREA for Mipaaf, for the collection of structural and financial information on financed and programmed projects.
Information about investments were provided by Regions and by SIGRIAN, the National Information System for Water Resources Management in Agriculture (https://sigrian.crea.gov.it) managed by the CREA (Mipaaf, 2015).
SIGRIAN contains data from the Italian national irrigation system and is the national reference database for the collection of data on water used for irrigation on a national scale.
In this work, SIGRIAN was used to collect information on the use of water resources and the extent of the irrigated area affected by the projects for the estimation of the catchment area.
Starting from DANIA information, MCA was applied to identify a series of projects to be financed up to the amount of 80 million euros, allocated by the Extraordinary Plan.
3 4.
Criteria and weight allocation and normalization.
The criteria and their weights, as well as related attributes and scores were defined in compliance with the requirements and objectives of the financing instrument, by a technical committee of experts through focus group discussions.
The focus group involved representatives of the aforementioned institutions, in the application of a participatory approach.
Through debates between the actors of the technical committee, shared choices were developed.
The participatory approach minimized decision makers’ subjectivity in weight and score allocation, which is a very important and delicate step.
Indeed, it can influence the final order of alternatives and, therefore, significant involvement is appropriate.
Within the Technical Committee, the criteria were defined in accordance with the objective and priority of the Fund.
Once the criteria were decided, several possible attributes for each criterion were defined.
At first, the normalization step was bypassed in this case study.
Since the main aim of normalization in MCA is to make quantities comparable, this was achieved by using nominal attribute quantities, to which scores must then be assigned.
The different attributes of the criteria were sorted according to their compliance with the selection aims.
The weight of the criteria and the score of the attributes were assigned at the same time.
Applying a monotonically linear utility function, a discrete scoring scale was adopted, with a step of 1, in all the criteria.
In a descending way, a maximum score was assigned to its best attribute and a lower score was assigned to the other attributes, according to the preferences of the technical committee, and with reference to the selection goals.
In this way, the weight of a given criterion coincides with the highest score assumed by its best attribute.
Attribute scores ranged from 0-1 to 0-4, while the weights assigned to the criteria ranged from 1 to 4.
With this operative choice, the discretions and uncertainties implied in weights were shifted to the definition of scores.
For this reason, the technical committee verified that the highest score of each attribute truly represented the weight that the individual criterion should have had compared to the others.
5.
6.
Calculation and sorting of alternatives and examination of results.
The ranking of alternatives, namely the projects, was achieved by applying a scoring method as a type of aggregation.
The scoring method classified the alternatives by assigning a numerical evaluation for each of the attributes considered; the scores obtained for each criterion were summarized in a “summary indicator” which aimed to represent the effectiveness of the proposal in achieving the objectives of the Fund.
The number of projects financed was the maximum obtainable on the basis of the defined budget allocated by the Budget law.
The direct assignation of a value to the attribute and the use of a linear aggregation method with scores simply added together, have made the method used for the evaluation of the proposal clearer to the potential beneficiary.
Consequently, even the selfassessment required in the submission phase of the projects was more feasible.
Self-assessment was introduced because the RBDA was called upon to prioritise proposals, mainly based on the declared information.
7.
Sensitivity analysis.
The shared approach gave a certain degree of robustness, as the steps of criteria and weight allocation were based on the expert judgment of the technical committee.
The order of importance of criteria and attributes was considered clear and objective, as it was shared among all the stakeholders.
Nevertheless, in this study sensitivity analysis was carried out to verify the stability of the results, testing some changes in the weight of criteria (Skonieczny G. et al.
2005).
New 113Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 weights were allocated to the criteria in compliance with the aims and rules of the Fund and without upsetting the priorities established by the technical committee.
To perform sensitivity analysis, as first step, the attribute scores were normalized to the maximum value that each attribute could assume (maximum row normalization), so that all the attribute scores are between 1 and 0.
Then, Weighted Linear Combination (WLC) was used (Malczewski and Rinner, 2015) for the aggregation.
Following equation 1, the normalized value of attribute score (xi) was multiplied for the tested weights (wi), and the new summary indicators (S) were returned for each alternative.
(1) The new rankings of the alternatives, given from the different tested weight assignments, were compared with the original ranking by means of the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, that is a non-parametric measure of rank correlation, following equation 2 (Clef, 2013): (2) where i = paired score, x and y are the ranks, and x-bar and y-bar are the mean ranks.
The analysis of the results was carried out taking into account that the Spearman correlation between two variables is high when observations have a similar rank, up to a correlation of 1 for identical ranks.
3.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION This section describes the detailed application and results of each step described above.
3.1 Structuring of the problem and of the decision-making network The case study concerned the application of MCA when selecting infrastructure interventions to facilitate adaptation of the agricultural sector to climate change.
The financial instrument identified was the Extraordinary Plan as part of National Plan of interventions in the water sector.
It was introduced by the Budget Law 2018 to finance urgent interventions concerning: preferentially executive projects (the final phase of the project was also accepted); multipurpose reservoirs; water saving in agricultural and household use.
The decision-making network identified included the competent Ministries of Infrastructure (MIT), Environment (MATTM) and Agriculture (Mipaaf), the 7 RBDAs, the 21 Regions and Autonomous Provinces, and the LAWMs.
According to Italian legislation, the Regions are responsible for irrigation water management and reclamation, while the LAWMs, reclamation and irrigation consortia, and land improvement consortia are territorial authorities and actuators of the interventions.
3.2 Data acquisition and processing the Database At the time of the study, DANIA included 894 irrigation infrastructure projects, representing almost 6 billion euros.
Information was collected in the database for each project for their evaluation, in accordance with the established criteria.
The stored data were acquired in collaboration with Regions and processed with identification data (title, actuators, etc.
), technical features of projects (project objective and type, project stage, etc.
), intervention cost, vulnerability of the intervention area to drought and hydrogeological risk, regional priority of intervention (1-high, 2-medium, and 3-low).
Starting with the stored projects, a first selection was made before applying the MCA according to the following eligibility criteria, in line with the Budget Law objectives and in the framework of financing fund rules: • project stage = executive (because quickly implementable); • type of intervention = interventions on multipurpose reservoirs and water saving interventions in agriculture; • regional priority of intervention = level 1 (urgent interventions).
A dataset of 55 projects was identified on the entire national territory, representing a total amount of almost 360 million euros.
The RBDAs were asked to give priority to projects in this dataset, to which MCA was applied.
3.3 Criteria and their attributes Some of the adopted criteria related to technical elements and aims of projects, while others referred to effectiveness, in compliance with the aim and priority of the Fund, as established in Law 205/2017.
As mentioned, the Extraordinary Plan dealt with multipurpose reservoir (irrigation and household) and the priority water saving objectives.
More in detail, the Plan includes a) completion of interventions concerning large existing dams or unfinished dams; b) recovery and expansion of the reservoir capacity, waterproofing of large dams and safety of the main water derivations for significant river basins in seismic areas classified in 114 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Raffaella Zucaro et al.
zones 1 and 2 and at high hydrogeological risk.
As a result, the following project criteria were identified: • Water resource use.
Multiple uses were favoured over exclusive ones.
• Site sensitivity in terms of seismicity and hydrogeological instability.
Great importance was given to the presence of these hazards.
One of the priority objectives was identified as safety in seismic areas (classified in zones 1 and 2) and in areas of high hydrogeological risk.
The technical committee decided to assign more importance to areas at seismic risk than to the landslide.
Therefore, the same value was associated with the presence of hydrogeological risk and the presence of the lower class of seismic risk (fourth class).
Increasing importance was given to other seismic classes, because of the growing risk.
• Catchment area in Equivalent Inhabitants – EI (given 40 Equivalent Inhabitants –per irrigated hectare).
This criterion intended to indicate the impact of the project on the territory in term of users of financing (population or agricultural areas).
Three classes were created for this continuous variable (EI > 500,000; 300,000 ≤ EI ≤ 500,000; EI < 300,000), both based on expert assessment, and on assessments based on the DANIA dataset.
In addition, it was necessary to provide a unique criterion for household, irrigation, and multiple interventions.
Thus, the irrigated area was returned to the EI, with a conversion criterion of 40 EI per hectare of irrigated surface.
• Project stage.
The attributes represented the possible status of the project.
The Extraordinary Plan focused on the final and executive level.
• Project objectives.
This criterion aimed to select projects compliant with fund objectives.
So, completion of existing dams and the recovery or extension of the reservoir capacity were among the priority objectives.
In addition to these, a third class was created for projects aimed at the improvement of the derivation efficiency.
• Project type.
This criterion integrated the technical information agreed in the previous one, detailing the specific type of intervention.
The following attributes were identified: Securing; Extraordinary maintenance; Completion; New intervention.
• Co-financing.
This was considered a reward element by the Technical Committee to promote Public-Private partnership.
• Possibility of subdivision into lots.
This was considered a reward element by the Technical Committee, since it made it possible to assess the multiple financing of a project, even with different funding sources at different times.
In addition, three effectiveness criteria were identified, as follows.
• Project effectiveness (ratio of the intervention cost to the number of equivalent inhabitants corresponding to the irrigated area covered by the project: project cost (€)/EI).
The criterion was described in 3 classes, namely < 25€/EI, >=25 €/EI <50 €/EI, >=50€/EI.
They were created according to the evaluation by experts, also through the DANIA.
• Territorial effectiveness.
This reflected a classification of the Italian Regions in relation to the percentage of their regional territory under risk of desertification; according to the scientific reference available for the national scale (Ceccarelli et al., 2006), 3 classes were adopted, namely: >40% very sensitive danger (Basilicata, Marche, Molise, Puglia, Sicily and Sardinia); > 40% moderately sensitive danger (Abruzzo, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Piedmont, Tuscany, Umbria and Veneto); little sensitive (other Regions).
• District priority.
This was the assessment provided by the RBDA on the effectiveness of the project, in the context of the specific River Basin Management Plans.
This criterion was considered by the Technical Committee to be the most important of the effectiveness criteria, as it was evaluated through expert assessment by each RBDA and summarised several environmental aspects.
In particular, each RBDA established their priority based on the information listed above and considering the objectives of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the main issues in the National Plan.
For the estimation of District priority, the factors considered were: consistency with another District Plans; criticality of the intervention area, such as the hydraulic risk level; hydro-morphological aspects; environmental pressures; expected benefits in terms of pressure reduction on water bodies; expected benefits in terms of improving the water balance at river basin level.
The level of effectiveness dealing with the strategic environmental feature, was described with four attributes: Strategic, Relevant, Important, Required.
3.4 Weight and score allocation The weights assigned to the criteria are shown in Table 1.
The criteria with the highest weight were: district priority, seismicity degree, project type, and project stage (weight 4).
They were of equal importance and were followed by water resource use, project objective, 115Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 catchment area, and project effectiveness, each with a weight of 3.
For an easier understanding of the order of the criteria, a matrix was developed (Table 2).
The attributes assigned to each criterion and their scores are shown in Table 3.
The normalization of the score is also reported because it was used to perform sensitivity analysis.
Although the Project stage was used to enter the selection, it was included in the MCA criteria.
The criterion cannot affect the MCA result in any way since each alternative evaluated had the same score.
However, it was decided to keep it in the process because the same method was adopted by the MIT, on another group of projects to be financed with the same Fund.
Unlike Mipaaf, the MIT did not choose to focus only on executive projects.
Therefore, it was necessary to maintain the criterion in order to make the results of the two selection processes comparable.
3.5 Calculation and sorting of alternatives and selection of the projects The summary indicator returned from the sum of the scores obtained from each project.
It represented the effectiveness of the intervention proposal to meet the objective of the Fund.
Based on the defined budget allocated by the Budget law, 10 projects were financed in the amount of almost 80 million euros (fig.
1 and table 4), all with a summary indicator of 22 to 26.
The 10 projects financed were in 7 Regions (Veneto, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Abruzzo, Sicily, and Sardinia) and were implemented by 8 LAWMs.
Figure 1 shows the location of the LAWM which received funding.
Table 1.
Criteria and their assigned weights .
Criterion Weight ID Name Project criteria 1 Water resource use 3 2.1 Site sensitivity seismicity 4 2.2 Site sensitivity hydrogeological instability 1 3 Project objectives 3 4 Catchment area 3 5 Co-financing 1 6 Project type 4 7 Possibility subdivision in lots 1 8 Project stage 4 Effectiveness criteria 9 Project effectiveness (ratio cost/ equivalent inhabitants) 3 10 Territorial effectiveness 2 11 District priority 4 TOTAL 12   33 Table 2.
Criteria order: Score matrix.
Criteria Si te s en si tiv ity hy dr og eo lo gi ca l in st ab ili ty C ofin an ci ng Po ss ib ili ty su bd iv is io n in lo ts Te rr ito ri al eff ec tiv en es s Pr oj ec t e ffe ct iv en es s W at er r es ou rc e us e Pr oj ec t o bj ec tiv es B as in u se rs D is tr ic t p ri or ity Si te s en si tiv ity se is m ic ity Pr oj ec t t yp e Pr oj ec t s ta ge Site sensitivity hydrogeological instability 1 1 1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 Co-financing 1 1 1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 Possibility subdivision in lots 1 1 1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 Territorial effectiveness 2 2 2 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Project effectiveness 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 Water resource use 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 Project objectives 3 3 3 4 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 Basin users 3 3 3 5 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 District priority 4 4 4 6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1 1 1 1 Site sensitivity seismicity 4 4 4 7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1 1 1 1 Project type 4 4 4 8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1 1 1 1 Project stage 4 4 4 9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1 1 1 1 116 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Raffaella Zucaro et al.
Among the financed projects, 2 of them concerned the increase in storage capacity to improve the availability of water for agriculture; the remaining projects concerned improving the efficiency of the main irrigation supply networks in order to achieve better efficiency in water use and water saving in agriculture.
Under the same Plan, other projects were selected by the Ministry of Infrastructure using the same methodology for a total of 30 projects for about 250 million euros.
Table 3.
Attributes and their scores.
Row max normalization refers to normalization carried out before sensitivity analysis.
Criterion Attribute Row max normalizationID Name Name Score 1 Water resource use Irrigation and household 3 1.00 Household 2 0.67 Irrigation 1 0.33 2.1 Site sensitivity seismicity Seismic zone 1 4 1.00 Seismic zone 2 3 0.75 Seismic zone 3 2 0.50 Seismic zone 4 1 0.25 2.2 Site sensitivity hydrogeological instability Yes 1 1.00 No 0 0.00 3 Project objectives Completing of existing dams or unfinished dams 3 1.00 Recovery or extension of the reservoir’ capacity 2 0.70 Improvement of the derivation’ efficiency 1 0.30 4 Catchment area EI > 500.000 3 1.00 300.000 ≤ EI ≤ 500.000 2 0.70 EI < 300.000 1 0.30 5 Co-financing Yes 1 1.00 No 0 0.00 6 Project type Securing 4 1.00 Extraordinary maintenance 3 0.75 Completion 2 0.50 New intervention 1 0.25 7 Possibility of subdivision in lots Yes 1 1.00 No 0 0.00 8 Project stage Executive project 4 1.00 Final authorizing project 3 0.75 Definitive technical project 2 0.50 Feasibility project 0 0.25 9 Project effectiveness < 25€/EI 3 1.00 >=25 €/EI <50 €/EI 2 0.70 >=50€/EI 1 0.30 10 Territorial effectiveness > 40% very sensitive danger (Basilicata, Marche, Molise, Puglia, Sicily, and Sardinia) 2 1.00 > 40% moderately sensitive danger (Abruzzo, Campania, EmiliaRomagna, Lazio, Piedmont, Tuscany, Umbria, and Veneto) 1 0.50 little sensitive (other Regions) 0 0.00 11 District priority Strategic 4 1.00 Relevant 3 0.75 Important 2 0.50 Required 1 0.25 117Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 3.6 Sensitivity analysis Two other assumptions of weight allocation to the criteria were tested to apply sensitivity analyses within this study.
Both were designed to follow the aims and rules of the Fund, but by making changes in the order of criteria However, the new assignations were made without a profound distortion of the priorities expressed by the Technical Committee.
In these new assignations, the correlation between the priorities expressed in the relevant law and the criteria that best represented them was considered.
The decision of the Technical Committee was amended to stress the weight of the criteria in two ways.
Firstly, the importance was increased for criteria providing for the effects on the environment and community (e.g.
number of people involved, mitigation of desertification, District priority, etc.
), and the importance was decreased for criteria providing for the feasibility properties of the project (such as cost-efficiency ratio, possibility subdivision in lots, etc.)
(R2).
Then, the opposite point of view was applied (R3).
In R2, the most important criteria were established to be the District priority, the basin users, the seismicity of the site, the territorial effectiveness, and the project stage (weight 4), followed by the project objectives and project type (weight 3).
They all described some aspect of the effect of the intervention, except for the project stage.
The latter criterion had no effect on the final ranking of alternatives, but it could not be deleted or modified, as explained above (see paragraph 3.3).
The lower Table 4.
List of scores awarded to selected projects for each criterion: evaluation matrix.
Project Criteria su m m ar y In di ca to r Po si tio n W at er r es ou rc e us e Pr oj ec t ob je ct iv es C at ch m en t a re a C ofin an ci ng Pr oj ec t t yp e. Po ss ib ili ty su bd iv is io n in lo ts Pr oj ec t s ta ge Pr oj ec t eff ec tiv en es s Si te s en si tiv ity se is m ic ity Si te s en si tiv ity hy dr og eo lo gi ca l in st ab ili ty Te rr ito ri al eff ec tiv en es s D is tr ic t p ri or ity 1 3 1 3 0 4 1 4 3 2 1 1 3 26 2 3 2 1 0 4 1 4 3 1 1 1 3 24 3 3 2 1 0 4 0 4 3 1 1 1 3 23 4 1 1 3 0 3 1 4 3 1 0 2 4 23 5 1 1 3 0 3 1 4 3 1 0 2 4 23 6 3 1 1 0 3 1 4 1 3 1 1 4 23 7 1 1 3 0 3 1 4 3 2 0 1 3 22 8 3 1 3 0 3 1 4 3 1 0 0 3 22 9 1 1 1 0 4 0 4 3 3 0 1 4 22 10 1 1 1 0 3 1 4 1 3 1 2 4 22 Figure 1.
Maps of the Italian LAWMs.
The blue polygons indicate the LAWMs that had their projects funded under the Extraordinary Plans from Mipaaf (author’s extrapolation of SIGRIAN data).
118 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Raffaella Zucaro et al.
weights were for project properties, such as co-financing, the possibility of subdivision in lots (weight 0.5), water resource use (weight 1), project effectiveness, project type, and hydrogeological instability of the site (weight 2).
The Technical Committee associated with the latter criterion the same weight as class 4 in seismic risk.
In this way, seismic risk was emphasized more than hydrogeological risk, compared to the priorities expressed by the legislation, where priority was given to interventions in seismic area 1 or 2 and those affected by hydrogeological risk.
In R2, the same trend was maintained but the presence of hydrogeological instability was associated with the same weight as the seismic risk class 3, shortening the distances between the two criteria.
On the contrary, in R3, the most important criteria were established as project effectiveness, project type, and project stage (weight 4), followed by water resource use, and the criteria on the effects (project objectives, basin users, site seismicity, District priority) (weight 3).
The burden of co-financing and of the possibility of subdivision in lots were increased to 2.
The lowest weights were placed on hydrogeological instability of the site and territorial effectiveness (weight 1).
Table 5 and Figure 2 summarize the weights adopted in the two tests in relation to those chosen by the Technical Committee (R1).
New summary indicators resulting for each alternative were obtained by multiplying the tested weights of the criteria by the normalized attributes score (see table 4).
Then, as result of the aggregation with the scoring method, the alternatives were sorted according to R2 and R3.
Table 6 shows the comparison of these alternative rankings for the first 10 projects.
In both of the cases examined, two of the projects selected by the Technical Committee were not included in the top 10 ranking.
Nevertheless, the comparison of the results for all 55 cases, by Spearman test (fig.
3), showed that there was a significant and strong correlation between the ranking performed based on R2 and R3 and the ranking performed on the basis of the assignment of the original weights (R1) (respectively 0.920 and 0.940, p-level<0,001, n=55).
The results still showed a significant correlation when the Spearman test was calculated only on the top ten positions (respectively 0.641 and 0.681, p-level<0,05, n=10).
3.7 Discussions Looking at the adopted approach, the involvement of all stakeholders was a strength in the methodology.
Firstly, it ensured competence in all the involved disciplinary areas.
In particular, the involvement of the RBDAs was very important as they are key players in water management and protection.
Secondly, it ensured a high level of objectivity in the definition of criteria and weights.
Indeed, the multidisciplinary Technical Committee allowed for setting criteria, attributes, and scores, including the objectives and constraints imposed by the financial instrument, and shared weight distribution between decision-makers was achieved.
Finally, this approach facilitated the acceptance of results obtained by the stakeholders embodied by the Regions.
The absence of traditional normalization and the assignment of a predefined score to attributes represented Table 5.
Weights of the criteria according to the two tests (*criteria mostly linked to the definitions given in the reference law), compared to those assigned by the Technical Committee.
Main semantic area Criteria R1 Weight in tested hypothesis R2 R3 Project properties *Water resource use 3 2 3 Project properties Co-financing 1 0.5 2 Project properties Possibility subdivision in lots 1 0.5 2 Project properties *Project stage 4 4 4 Project properties Project effectiveness 3 2 4 Project properties / effects Project type 4 3 4 Effects / Project properties *Project objectives 3 3 3 Effects *Basin users 3 4 3 Effects *Site sensitivity seismicity 4 4 3 Effects *Site sensitivity hydrogeological instability 1 2 1 Effects Territorial effectiveness 2 4 1 Effects *District priority 4 4 3 Total weight 33 33 33 119Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 a practical advantage: the method was easy for all parties involved to understand, making them even more confident in the results of the application.
This was important for the self-assessment that stakeholders had to carry out when submitting their project, and for the RBDAs, which had to express their priority mainly based on the information included in the self-assessment.
In addition, two elements could make the methodology suitable for financing projects by means of a call for proposals.
The first one consists of the direct assignment of the score to the attributes to facilitate the self-assessment.
The second is the production of a definitive ranking of the proposals, without comparison with other test rankings, coming from sensitivity analysis (e.g.
Skonieczny et al.
2005).
In fact, sensitivity analysis is not suitable for funding guided by calls for proposals, because in these cases the scores of the attributes and/or weights of the criteria must necessarily be unequivocal, defined, and published a priori.
However, sensitivity analysis was applied to this study to verify the stability of the results when the weights of the criteria were changed.
The results showed a good correlation between the ranking made on the two test hypotheses and that applied by the Technical Committee.
The differences between the rankings were not significant.
However, the small variations imposed on the weights of the test criteria during sensitivity analysis are worth noting.
Surely this choice influenced the results of the sensitivity analysis, overestimating the quality of the results.
On the other hand, if there were a profound variation in weight assignations, this would have resulted in choices that overturned the very strict and detailed rules and priorities of the Fund.
Overall, the study seemed to confirm that the allocation of the weights through a technical committee and the involvement of stakeholders achieved adequate solidity of the results.
The analysis of the results also suggests that this solidity is higher when the regulation behind 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 *D es ign le ve l Pr oje ct typ e Pr oje ct eff ec tiv en es s *W at er re so ur ce s u se Co -fin an cin g Po ssi bil ity of lo ts *P ro jec t o bje cti ve s *B as in us er s *S ite Se ism ici ty *S ite hy dr og eo log ica l… Te rri to ria l e ffe cti ve ne ss *D ist ric t p r io ri t y W EI G H T O F CR IT ER IO N R1 R2 R3 Figure 2.
Graphic representation of the different weights of the criteria between the two tests and the assignment of the Technical Committee (*criteria mostly linked to the definitions reported in the reference law).
Table 6.
The first 10 alternatives sorted by the summary indicator, obtained for R1 (the choices of the Technical Committee), R2, and R3 (the letters of the alphabet symbolize the alternatives, i.e.
the projects).
Ranking of the alternatives (first 10 positions) by R1 adoption (technical committee) by R2 adoption by R3 adoption A A A B D B C E H D L D E B E F F C G C G H Q F I G N L R O 120 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Raffaella Zucaro et al.
the selection gives precise and detailed rules.
This should reduce the discretion exercised by the Technical Committee.
4.
MAIN CONCLUSIONS Public infrastructure investments in water distribution networks are part of a broader framework of possible interventions (regulatory, risk management, investments, etc.)
to cope with and adapt to climate change.
Recently, the European Green Deal Strategy also highlighted how climate change will continue to create significant stress in Europe despite mitigation efforts.
Hence, the consideration of climate adaptation in public and private investments is an essential topic.
The MCA method proved to be a very useful tool for choosing between different investment alternatives.
When it is well-designed, it allows for the inclusion of different quantitative and qualitative criteria that can be measured in a single evaluation process.
This has also made it possible to weight these criteria according to the priorities assigned by decision makers.
However, the MCA procedure is articulated and complex, due to the need to develop an approach that represents the multiplicity of objectives.
There is a risk that the results achieved will be strongly influenced by subjective choices made at some of the various stages.
This can be a critical point.
That is why sensitivity analysis should be applied.
However, in some cases like those presented, a profound change in weight allocation for testing robustness is limited by the need to respect the priorities and constraints imposed by the related regulation.
That is why decision maker and stakeholder involvement are even more necessary to achieve realistic and acceptable results.
During the application of the methodology described, certain strengths and weaknesses came to light.
One of the main strengths was the participatory approach used to identify the decision-making network (Ministries and RBDAs) and stakeholders (Regions and LAWMs).
The main weakness lies in the fact that the weights adopted can only be controlled ex-post, shifting the variation to weights to compare the results obtained.
The methodology applied has the advantage of being applicable in the future also in the case of funding based on calls for proposals, for which the scores of the attributes and/or the weights of the criteria must be defined and published a priori.
The ex-post sensitivity analysis, carried out by modifying the weights with due regard for the priorities and limitations of the Fund, confirmed the solidity of the classification on the total number of cases.
This solidity seems to be favoured precisely by the presence of accurate rules and priorities of the fund, which reduce the margin of discretion entrusted to the technical committee.
MCA is a useful informative support for policy decisions, but it is important to keep in mind that it is not an “automatic” method for land management.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The authors would like to thank Luca Adolfo Folino and Adriano Battilani for their help and cooperation in revising the English.
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 su m m ar y in di ca to r ALTERNATIVE ORDINATION BY TECHNICAL COMMITTEE R1 R 2 R 3 Figure 3.
Graphic representation, for each alternative axis (X axis) of the summary indicator (Y axis) performed on the basis of R2 and R3 with those obtained from the assignment of the criteria of the Technical Committee.
121Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 REFERENCES Adem Esmail, B., Geneletti, D. (2018).
Multi‐criteria decision analysis for nature conservation: A review of 20 years of applications.
Methods in Ecology and Evolution,  9(1), 42-53.
(DOI:  https://doi.
org/10.1111/2041-210X.12899) Belton, S., Stewart, T.S., 2002.
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis.
An Integrated Approach.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Massachusetts.
Budget Law 2018.
Law December 27, 2017, No.
205.
(https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/ https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/ 17G00222/sg17G00222/sg) Ceccarelli, T., Giordano, F., Luise, A., Perini, L., Salvati, L. (2006).
La vulnerabilità alla desertificazione in Italia: raccolta, analisi, confronto e verifica delle procedure cartografiche di mappatura e degli indicatori a scala nazionale e locale.
APAT, CRA, CNLSD, Manuali e linee guida, 40(2006), 1-128.
Clef, T. (2013).
Exploratory Data Analysis in Business and Economics: An Introduction Using SPSS, Stata, and Excel.
Springer Science and Business Media.
Croce, A.
(2015).
Vascular flora of eight water reservoir areas in southern Italy.
Check List,  11(2), 1593 (DOI: https://doi.org/10.15560/11.2.1593).
Cugusi, V., Plaisant, A.
(2019).
Integrated management of water resources.
Federico II Open Access University Press (DOI: 10.6093/978-88-6887-054-6).
Deacon, C., Samways, M. J., Pryke, J. S. (2018).
Artificial reservoirs complement natural ponds to improve pondscape resilience in conservation corridors in a biodiversity hotspot.
PloS one,  13(9) (https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204148).
European Parliament, (2000).
Dir.
2000/60/CE.
Water Framework Directive (2000/60/CE) (http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX: 32000L0060).
European Commission, (2007).
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union.
Brussels, 18.07.07, COM(2007)414 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0414:FIN:EN :PDF) European Commission, (2013).
Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013DC0216).
European Commission, (2019).
Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The European Green Deal (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:640:FIN) Figueira, J., Greco, S., Ehrgott, M. (2005).
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis: State of the Art Surveys.
Springer, New York, NY, (doi:10.5937/ekonhor1802189K).
Hayashi, K., (2000).
Multi-criteria analysis for agricultural resource management:a critical survey and future perspectives.
Eur.
J. Oper.
Res.
122, 486–500.
Kangas, J., Kangas, A., Leskinen, P., Pyka¨la¨inen, J., (2001).
MCDM methods in strategic planning of forestry on state-owned lands in Finland: applications and experiences.
J. Multi-Criteria Decis.
Anal.
10, 257–271 ISPRA, (2018).
14th report «Gli Indicatori del Clima in Italia nel 2018», ISPRA (ISBN: 978-88-448-0955-3).
Malczewski, J., (1999).
GIS and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis.
John Wiley &Sons, Inc., New York.
Malczewski, J.; Rinner, C. (2015).
Multicriteria decision analysis in geographic information science.
New York: Springer, pp.
331 Mascara, R. (2010).
2.2 Fauna vertebrata.
CASPUR-CIBER Publishing, 2010, 29-43.
(http://archiveciberpublishing.cineca.it/article/viewFile/9887/9208).
Mahato, A.
(2014).
Climate change and its impact on agriculture.
International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 4(4), 1-6.
Mendoza, G.A., Campbell, G.E., Rolfe, G.L., (1986).
Multiple objective programming: an approach to planning and evaluation of agroforestry systems.
Part 1.
Model description and development.
Agric.
Syst.
22, 243–253.
Mendoza, G. A., Martins, H. (2006).
Multi-criteria decision analysis in natural resource management: A critical review of methods and new modelling paradigms.
Forest ecology and management,  230(1-3), 1-22.
OECD, (2015).
OECD Principles on Water Governance.
OECD, Paris, France,.
Available online: www.oecd.
org/governance/oecd-principles-on-water-governance.htm.
OECD, (2016).
OECD Council Recommendation on Water.
(http://www.oecd.org/water/recommendation/).
Romero, C., Rehman, T., (1987).
Natural resources management and the use of multiple-criteria decision making techniques: a review.
Eur.
Rev.
Agric.
Econ.
14 (1), 6–89.
Skonieczny, G. T. B., Torrisi, B., Cappellano, D. (2005).
L’analisi Multi Criterio Per La Valutazione Di Progetti https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/ https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/17G00222/sg17G00222/sg https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/ https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/17G00222/sg17G00222/sg https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/ https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2017/12/29/17G00222/sg17G00222/sg http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 122 Bio-based and Applied Economics 10(2): 109-122, 2021 | e-ISSN 2280-6172 | DOI: 10.36253/bae-9545 Raffaella Zucaro et al.
Pubblici: Il Software e Un’analisi Empirica.
Statistica Applicata Vol.
17, n. 3, 2005 (http://sa-ijas.stat.unipd.
it/sites/sa-ijas.stat.unipd.it/files/451-468.pdf) Steiguer, J.E., Liberti, L., Schuler, A., Hansen, B., 2003.
Multi-criteria decision models for forestry and natural resources management: an annotated bibliography.
General Technical Report NE-307.
U.S.D.A.
Forest Service, Northeastern Research Station, Newton Square, PA. Tarp, P., Helles, F., (1995).
Multi-criteria decision making in forest management planning—an overview.
J. Forest Econ.
1 (3), 273–306.
Yoon, K. P., & Hwang, C. L. (1995).
Multiple attribute decision making: an introduction (Vol.
104).
Sage publications.
Zeleny, M., 1984.
MCDM: Past Decade and Future Trends: A Source Book of Multiple Criteria Decision Making.
JAI Press, Greenwich.
Zucaro R., Antinoro C., Giannerini G. (2017).
Characterization of drought in Italy applying the Reconnaissance Drought Index”.
In: European Water 60: 313318 (ISSN 1105-7580) https://sigrian.crea.gov.it http://dania.crea.gov.it/ Volume 10, Issue 2 2021 Firenze University Press Mediterranean agriculture facing climate change: Challenges and policies Filippo Arfini The long-term fortunes of territories as a route for agri-food policies: evidence from Geographical Indications Cristina Vaquero-Piñeiro Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis selecting the most effective Climate change adaptation measures and investments in the Italian context Raffaella Zucaro, Veronica Manganiello, Romina Lorenzetti*, Marianna Ferrigno Climate changes and new productive dynamics in the global wine sector Emilia Lamonaca*, Fabio Gaetano Santeramo, Antonio Seccia A systematic review of attributes used in choice experiments for agri-environmental contracts Nidhi Raina*, Matteo Zavalloni, Stefano Targetti, Riccardo D’Alberto, Meri Raggi, Davide Viaggi The effect of farmer attitudes on openness to land transactions: evidence for Ireland Cathal Geoghegan*, Anne Kinsella, Cathal O’Donoghue
Microsoft Word PORTALBrinkmannGarrenSpecialIssueFINAL PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
Special issue details: Global Climate Change Policy: Post-Copenhagen Discord Special Issue, guest edited by Chris Riedy and Ian McGregor.
ISSN: 1449-2490; http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal PORTAL is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia.
Synthesis of Climate Change Policy in Judicial, Executive, and Legislative Branches of US Government Robert Brinkmann, Hofstra University, and Sandra Jo Garren, University of South Florida Introduction Developing a comprehensive global warming and greenhouse gas policy has been difficult for the USA.
While many other developed countries have implemented greenhouse gas initiatives, the USA became mired in the debate over the actual existence of global warming (McCright & Dunlap 2003), the prudence of developing policy in the perceived lack of scientific information in support of global warming (Leiserowitz 2006), and the ways to go about reducing greenhouse gas emissions (McCarl & Schnieder 2000; Rose & Oladosu 2002).
Indeed, while global warming was largely accepted by the scientific community by the early 1990s (IPCC 1992) throughout much of the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations (IPCC 1995, 2001; IPCC 2007a, 2007b), no serious efforts to develop national greenhouse gas policies emerged.
Several US leaders, including leaders in the executive and legislative branches of the government, doubted the existence of global warming and used evidence outside mainstream scientific inquiry to justify their position (Armitage 2005).
Thus, the approach taken by the USA, until the election of President Obama, was largely one of debate with little policy development.
During this period, the absence of leadership at the national level led to a number of innovative initiatives by individuals, state and local governments, non-profit Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
2 organizations, and private businesses.
For example, Governor Schwarzenegger supported strong controls of emissions in California (Cayan et al.
2008), the US Council of Mayors developed goals for greenhouse gas reductions in cities (Schreurs 2008), the US Green Building Council began enhancing procedures for certifying green homes (Yudelson & Fedrizzi 2008), the American college and university presidents developed strategies for reducing the impact on their campuses (Rowe 2007), the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) organized a mechanism for carbon trading (Labatt & White 2007), Walmart developed aggressive green business practices (Freidman 2005), and businesses participated in voluntary greenhouse gas reporting and reduction programs (for example, the US EPA’s Climate Leaders Program and the US DOE’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program) and made a legally binding emission reduction commitment in the CCX (Carpenter 2001).
However, while each of these actions is important for a number of reasons, none of them has the impact of an allencompassing national policy on greenhouse gas emissions.
Therefore, much of what developed in recent years through local governments, non-profits, and businesses did not have a major impact on overall greenhouse gas outputs at the national scale.
Within this context, there have been several court challenges to the US government inaction as well as lawsuits against state governments and private organizations and individuals.
These lawsuits have focused on a variety of policies including statutory issues such as The Clean Air Act, challenges to individual projects, state vehicle emissions standards, and common law claims.
Although only a handful of these cases have been successful, they have resulted in a variety of interesting outcomes that have a direct impact on US greenhouse gas policy.
At the same time, the US EPA, under the direction of the Obama administration, recently took significant actions to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, and the US Congress developed legislation that would have had far-reaching impacts for the future of greenhouse gas policy.
This paper reviews and synthesizes actions taken in the three branches of government, including some of the key national lawsuits that have impacted current US policy; it assesses pertinent actions to regulate greenhouse gases from the current presidential administration and the US EPA; and it summarizes the current congressional stalemate by reviewing the proposed climate legislation that passed the House of Representatives and was considered in the Senate prior to the 2010 elections.
The paper adds to the Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
3 current literature in that it summarizes key actions taken within the national policy framework and synthesizes climate policy options within the US government system.
Greenhouse gas litigation (judicial branch) Many cases have been brought before the courts that attempted to address problems associated with greenhouse gas litigation (Gerrard 2007).
They can be divided into categories of law: federal statutory law; challenges to individual projects using federal and state statutory law; vehicle emissions standards; common law claims with injunctive relief; and common law claims with financial relief (Arnold & Porter LLP 2011).
Each category will be discussed briefly to highlight the major cases and their outcome.
Federal statutory law Lawsuits have been brought forward that utilize the provisions of The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Global Change Research Act, the Alternative Motor Fuels Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Energy Policy Act to test current practices of the US government actions within the courts.
Perhaps the most tested aspect of federal statutory law is the failure of government to regulate greenhouse gases.
Many of the proceedings have sought to compel the government to use its statutory power to reduce or prevent injury from climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions.
Bringing such a claim to court is difficult in that the litigant must demonstrate legal standing to bring the case (that is, they must experience direct damages) and they must be able to demonstrate the link between inaction by the government and resultant damage.
The most successful of these cases is Massachusetts et al.
v. US EPA et al.
(United States Supreme Court 2006).
In this case, the state of Massachusetts and other petitioners brought forward a lawsuit to require the US EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from tailpipe emissions to eliminate future damages.
The case challenged US EPA’s contention that it did not have congressional mandate to regulate greenhouse gases.
In addition, the US EPA’s stated policy was that even if it was decided that they had regulatory authority over greenhouse gas regulation, they would opt not to regulate the gases due to the unique nature of the pollution.
They also stated that the scientific link between greenhouse gases and global warming was not clear.
Eventually, the case was heard in the US Supreme Court where it was decided by a 5 to 4 majority that US EPA was required to regulate greenhouse gases.
Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
4 There were several key points to this case.
First, the court decided that Massachusetts and the other petitioners have standing to bring the case.
This has proven difficult (as discussed further in the analysis of Kivalina v Exxon et al.
below) in greenhouse gas cases.
In this case, the State of Massachusetts was held to have standing due to direct or imminent threats to its territory due to the impact of global warming.
Another important aspect of the case is the court’s recognition that global warming brought on by greenhouse gases is a real and recognized threat to property.
This countered the US EPA, which at the time stated that the links between greenhouse gases and the effects of global warming were not clear.
In addition, the court also asserted that US EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases contributed to the injury experienced by the State of Massachusetts and that the US EPA had a duty to attempt to slow or reduce greenhouse gases by regulating emissions.
The result of the Supreme Court decision is that the US EPA must consider greenhouse gases as regulated pollutants.
This decision, prior to the 2008 Presidential election, caused the US EPA to develop a policy in the midst of significant political change in which the new Obama administration was likely to work toward a comprehensive national greenhouse gas policy.
In response to this ruling, the US EPA has initiated a flurry of regulatory initiatives and rulemaking activities to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from not only tailpipes, but from other sources of greenhouse gas emissions (see below for more details).
In addition to the regulation, the US EPA signed the Endangerment Finding and Cause or Contribute Finding for Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act in December 2009, widely known as the Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding.
In these findings, the US EPA concluded that six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride threaten the public health and welfare.
In addition, the US EPA noted that carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons emitted from vehicle exhaust contribute to climate change and must be regulated.
The more conservative congress elected in 2010 has made attempts to reverse the US EPA’s actions via legislation, and ten Petitions for Reconsideration, including petitions from the Chamber of Commerce and the State of Texas, were submitted to the US EPA for evaluation.
To date, these attempts and petitions have failed and the US EPA has held steadfast in upholding the findings.
Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
5 The Endangered Species Act is another law that was tested through litigation to attempt to force the federal government to address global climate change.
Perhaps the most well-known case involved the Center for Biological Diversity’s case against the Department of the Interior and other defendants for a lack of protection for the polar bear (United States District Court for the Northern District of California 2007a, 2007b).
Polar areas are at great risk from global warming as subtle changes in temperature can melt sea ice and greatly alter ocean conditions.
The polar bear, which is partly dependent on sea ice as a habitat, is particularly vulnerable to global climate change.
In 2007, the Center for Biological Diversity sued the federal government to take action.
While the Bush and Obama administrations have not supported the use of the Endangered Species Act to address climate change, the Bush administration did settle the lawsuit by designating 200,000 acres of land, sea, and ice as critical habitat for the polar bears.
Another Center for Biological Diversity groundbreaking lawsuit associated with global warming involved the use of the Clean Water Act in trying to regulate ocean acidification off the shores of the United States (Craig 2009).
A substantial proportion of the carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere from human activities is absorbed in the oceans and this is causing a process known as ocean acidification throughout the world’s oceans (Hoegh-Guldberg et al.
2007).
Among other things, ocean acidification leads to decreased shell and skeleton production by many species of marine life which depend upon calcium carbonate (Hays, Richardson, & Robinson 2005).
In 2007, the Center for Biological Diversity commenced a lawsuit contending that the oceans off a portion of Washington State were being impaired due to ocean acidification.
They noted that the US EPA did not list the waters impacted by the pH change as impaired in their listing of impaired water bodies in Washington.
Designated impaired water bodies require particular action.
Thus, the Center for Biological Diversity contended that the US EPA’s decision not to list the water bodies had a direct negative impact on the nearshore water quality.
Indeed, the lawsuit notes that pH declined 0.2 points on the pH scale since 2000, which violates Washington’s water quality standards.
Not surprisingly, there is great concern for the future of Washington’s fisheries.
In early 2009, the US EPA wrote to the Center for Biological Diversity stating that they would initiate a comprehensive examination of ocean acidification in order to arrive at a better assessment of water quality attainment in marine waters (United States Environmental Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
6 Protection Agency 2009).
To that end, the US EPA sought has sought data, public comment, and other information in an effort to understand ocean acidification better (Federal Register 2009).
The public comment period ended in May 2010 and a memorandum was issued in November 2010, which requires states to list waters as impaired if there is evidence for pH decreases beginning in 2012 (US Environmental Protection Agency 2010).
Another area of litigation has gone in the direction of requiring the federal government to release documents and follow existing law to assess greenhouse gas impacts.
For example, the Global Change Research Act required the US government to develop regular reports on the current state of greenhouse gas research in the United States.
In addition, the reports were to assess implications for the environment in order to guide national and world climate policy.
The government did not complete the report in a timely fashion under the G. W. Bush Administration.
Thus, the government was taken to court and compelled to complete the work as per a court order (United States District Court for the Northern District of California 2007a).
Likewise, the Freedom of Information Act was used in a successful lawsuit brought forward by the Center for Biological Diversity and Others against the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that asked the courts to require the OMB to release documents associated with the development of fuel economy standards for US vehicles without a fee (United States District Court for the Northern District of California 2008).
In a similar lawsuit using the US Energy Policy Act of 1992, the Center for Biological Diversity once again sued the Federal Government for not complying with the reporting requirement of the US Energy Policy Act (United States Department of Energy Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy 2010).
Because the US Government was not publishing the required reports, it was difficult to ascertain whether it was complying with the requirements of the Act, which, among other things required the government to develop a fleet of alternative fuel vehicles.
The Center for Biological Diversity largely won the case and the government was required to comply with the strict reporting requirements.
While this may seem like a small victory, the suite of lawsuits discussed here demonstrated the lack of transparency in government.
Indeed, there was a perception that the federal government was hostile to the issue of climate change and preferred to work on other areas of environmental policy.
In the face of limited or no Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
7 progress in implementing national policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions, environmental non-governmental organizations have felt obliged to pursue numerous cases concerning document access and compliance with reporting requirements.
Challenges to individual projects Another form of greenhouse gas litigation is in the form of challenges to individual projects.
Most of these cases have challenged the construction of coal-fired power plants.
These cases are challenging for applicants in that they must demonstrate direct injury to an individual or property owner due to global warming, and they must prove that the power plant would be responsible, in part, for climate change.
The political context for these lawsuits is often brought into question by respondents.
Defendants have argued that within the present political situation, when there is no guidance from the US government on greenhouse gas issues, they should not be regulated by the courts.
Indeed, in one decision handed down by the Supreme Court of South Dakota upholding the right of the Otter Tail Power Company to proceed with construction of a new power plant, the court noted that ‘As members of the judiciary, we refrain from settling policy questions more properly left for the Governor, the Legislature, and Congress.
No matter how grave our concerns on global warming, we cannot allow personal views to impair our role under the Constitution’ (Supreme Court of South Dakota 2008).
Nevertheless, several lawsuits have impacted the nature of power plant construction in various locations around the country.
Perhaps the most interesting of several power plant lawsuits and challenges occurred in Georgia where Longleaf Energy Associates wished to construct a 1,200 megawatt coalburning power plant in Early County, Georgia.
Challenging the construction in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, the Friends of the Chattahoochee and the Sierra Club sued Longleaf Energy Associates for failure to conduct appropriate analysis and modeling on air pollution (Superior Court of Fulton County 2008).
One of their key arguments was that they did not conduct any analysis of carbon dioxide emissions.
They claimed that after the Supreme Court Decision of Massachusetts v. US EPA requiring the US EPA to regulate carbon dioxide, those constructing a power plant must conduct a best available control technology (BACT) analysis to determine how best to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power plant.
Longleaf Energy argued that the US EPA had not yet published guidelines and that they should not be held responsible for Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
8 BACT analysis since there was not yet any clear federal guidance on the issue.
However, the court sided with the Friends of the Chattahoochee and the Sierra Club in noting that the Clean Air Act specifically defines an air pollutant as any pollutant subject to regulation.
The court argued that since the publication of Massachusetts v. US EPA carbon dioxide was defined as a pollutant subject to regulation and thus must be addressed in any BACT analysis.
Thus, the court ruled that the project could not proceed until a BACT analysis that included carbon dioxide was completed.
While many cases challenging the construction of power plants have been dismissed due to the lack of regulatory guidelines on greenhouse gas emissions, this case brought forward the possibility of greater regulation of carbon dioxide at sources as a result of Massachusetts v. US EPA.
A case from 2006 foreshadowed US EPA v. Massachusetts and the Longleaf Power Plant case.
Owens Corning Corporation, while constructing a polystyrene foam insulation facility in Gresham, Oregon, was challenged by the Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the Oregon Center for Environmental Health, and the Sierra Club (United States District Court for the District of Oregon 2006).
The plaintiffs argued that the site was not permitted correctly since it was going to emit more than 100 tons per year of a regulated pollutant.
In addition, they argued that the gases emitted, particularly 1-chloro-1, 1-difluoroethane (HCFC-142b), were greenhouse gases and ozone depleting substances that could prove harmful to residents in the community in a variety of ways.
Owens Corning argued, in part, to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have standing and that there was no injury caused by global warming to the litigants.
Interestingly, the court noted that even though greenhouse gases from various sources are mixed in the atmosphere, local sources do contribute to local impacts.
Thus, the emissions of one particular plant, combined with all other emissions around the world can impact local conditions such as sea level or snow pack.
Therefore, the individual source should be regulated to reduce local impacts, even though there are multiple sources.
State vehicle emissions standards Another branch of greenhouse gas law focuses on controlling emissions standards of vehicles.
In recent years, there has been much focus on federal corporate average fuel emissions (CAFE) standards for auto emission requirements for auto manufacturers Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
9 (Austin & Dinan 2005).
The US EPA is the organization that sets CAFE standards.
However, because California was involved with fuel economy standards prior to the passage of the Clean Air Act, the state was given special status and can apply for waivers to the US CAFE standards for stricter rules.
Such waivers were granted many times since 1968.
However, in 2005 and 2006, the California Air Resources Board sought permission from US EPA to increase fuel efficiency once again.
This time, in 2007, the request was denied and lawsuits followed.
Many US states are interested in tightening federal guidelines (Lutsey & Sperling 2005).
However, when California attempted to implement its new standards, several lawsuits were filed.
In these lawsuits, various players in the automobile industry questioned California’s right to develop CAFE standards.
Manufacturers and dealers also argued that the development of multiple emissions standards would be a hardship on the US auto industry since multiple standards would require multiple designs and thus drive up the costs of production.
While the courts have been mixed in their reviews of this branch of law, for example, Central Valley Chrysler Jeep and others sued the California Air Resources Board over emissions standards (United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 2008), the Bush administration did not support California’s new guidelines.
However, with new Presidents come new policy approaches.
In 2009, President Obama supported California-like standards for different states, but required that they be managed by the US EPA and not the states.
New flexible standards that allow trading was approved in 2009.Thus, the lawsuits had a distinct effect on the development of a new approach to manufacturing fuel-efficient cars.
Yet, when the City of New York sought to require that all taxis be hybrid vehicles, the Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade sued on the grounds that the city did not have the right to set CAFE standards (Grynbaum 2011).
The case ended up in the US Supreme Court that essentially confirmed that the Federal Government was the only organization that can set CAFE standards.
Thus, New York City was not allowed to enact a hybrid-only rule for cabs.
Common law claims with injunctive relief Another avenue for greenhouse gas litigation is the use of common law claims, in some cases involving a request for injunctive relief.
Injunctive relief may be sought by a litigant in order to stop a person or organization from doing something that they Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
10 perceive as harmful.
In some environmental cases, injunctive relief has stopped emissions of a pollutant or caused the development of environmental policy.
For example, in 2005, Connecticut and several other states sued American Electric Power and several other power companies in attempts to force greenhouse gas emission reductions from their power plants (United States Supreme Court for the Southern District of New York 2005).
The plaintiffs asked the court to cap emissions from the power plant and to develop a schedule of reductions for emissions due to greenhouse gas pollution.
The nature of these types of cases makes it difficult for courts because they do not like to adjudicate cases that are political in nature.
If there are large policy issues at stake, courts prefer that the issues be addressed at the legislative or executive branches of government.
In the Connecticut v. American Power case, this is exactly what the court decided.
The issue was too big for the courts to manage effectively and the case was won by the defendants in district court.
Interestingly, the case was overturned at the Circuit Court in September of 2009 when the court ruled that the case was judiciable under the political question doctrine (The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2005).
This turnabout, similar to that provided by Comer et al.
v. Murphy Oil USA et al (United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2009), provides opportunities for individuals and organizations to bring greenhouse gas emission nuisance claims forward in the court.
In a similar case, Korsinsky v. the US EPA et al.
(United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 2005), the plaintiff petitioned the court to require US EPA to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to address health threats from global warming.
However, the court found that the plaintiff’s injuries were not enough to grant him standing to bring this suit.
Common law claims with financial relief One of the most controversial areas of greenhouse gas litigation has been the seeking of damages due to the result of greenhouse gas emissions.
There is growing evidence that some communities have been deleteriously impacted due to global warming (Patz et al.
2005).
According to an abundance of national and international law (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 1992), a polluter is responsible for damages caused as a direct result of the pollution.
However, greenhouse gas emissions and concomitant global warming are dispersed across the planet from multiple sources in all Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
11 countries of the world.
Thus, the challenge is to show the direct link between global warming and associated damages.
Nevertheless, some cases have tested the courts to seek damage claims against producers of petroleum products.
The line of reasoning for this argument is similar to that used in the tobacco lawsuits, which claimed that tobacco companies continued to produce a product that they knew was harmful to human health.
Therefore, a key aspect in any lawsuit of this type is that the litigant must demonstrate that the petroleum companies knew of damages they were inflicting on the environment through the burning of their product.
Perhaps the best-known case that tested this area of law is Kivalina v Exxon et al.
(United States District Court for the Northern District of California 2009).
Kivalina was a small native Alaskan village that existed on a small spit of land offshore of Alaska.
The community was a traditional fishing village with less than one hundred households.
In the last decade, the ice surrounding the village began to disappear, leaving the shore susceptible to wave erosion, particularly during fall and spring storms when sea ice, which normally would be present, was absent.
The village sued a number of petroleum producers and energy producing companies for the costs associated with moving the village, arguing that they were partly responsible for past and ongoing contributions to global warming and that the defendants were responsible for perpetuating a conspiracy to suppress the knowledge of a link between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.
As noted, the lawsuit had several political hurdles, and it was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
The court decided this case on two grounds.
First, the court argued that the case dealt with matters that have not been decided politically.
The court concluded that the legislative and executive branches of government were the best avenues for developing policy on greenhouse gases.
In addition, the court noted that everyone on the planet is in some way responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and that it is difficult to develop sound policy under such circumstances.
In addition, the court ruled that the village did not have standing to bring the case since the pollution could not be ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendants.
In other words, the court felt that there must be more direct proof that the emissions put out by the defendants had a direct link to the coastal erosion that caused the damage to the village.
The court felt that the links were too weak to make the defendants responsible Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
12 for the damages to Kivalina.
The plaintiff in this case has appealed the decision.
It seems apparent that the village was destroyed as a result of changing temperatures in the Arctic region.
The question is whether the courts will assert a link between emissions and global warming and assign damage recovery.
The implications of this type of lawsuit are significant.
If won, it would set a precedent for financial recovery caused by greenhouse gas emissions and an onslaught of court cases would be filed that could potentially harm the energy industry and its linked economies.
Presidential action and the US EPA (executive branch) As introduced in the previous section, the Supreme Court ruling from Massachusetts v. US EPA resulted in authorizing the US EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from tailpipe emissions.
While the case was decided in 2007, no change in policy occurred until recently.
As already discussed, this inaction was mostly a function of a lack of leadership in former Presidential administrations.
However, a shift occurred when Barrack Obama pledged in his Presidential campaign to ‘fight climate change, invest in clean, renewable energy, and chart a new energy future’ (Organizing for America 2009).
To date, the President has made great strides in following through on his commitment.
For example, in October 2009, the President issued an Executive Order to ‘lead by example’ by committing all Federal agencies to set greenhouse gas reduction targets within 90 days as well as a number of other sustainability goals (Council on Environmental Quality 2009).
Additionally, President Obama made several key appointments (for example, Steven Chu in the Department of Energy and Lisa Jackson in the US EPA) to agencies and has directed these agencies to take significant action to transition to clean energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions (The Office of the President Elect 2008).
Chu and Jackson have led their organizations to develop the President’s agenda to move the country towards addressing climate change.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided over US$800 billion in stimulus funds, much of which was intended to facilitate the USA’s transition towards clean energy while at the same time jump starting the economy.
Additionally, the President signed a memorandum to improve energy efficiency of appliances.
Lastly, the President signaled to Congress that he would sign into law legislation with significant greenhouse gas reduction targets of 17 percent of 2005 levels by 2017 and 83 percent by 2050.
Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
13 The greenhouse gas reduction targets were announced just prior to the post-Kyoto meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009, which along with the House of Representative’s-passed climate bill the summer 2009 (see discussion below), showed some progress on federal climate change in the USA.
However, since the climate bill had yet to pass the Senate prior to Copenhagen, the Obama administration was limited in becoming a powerful negotiator at the meetings (Samuelsohn 2009).
Regardless, one outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations is that the USA, along with Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, signed the Copenhagen Accord (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2009).
By signing the Accord, delegates pledged to emission target reductions, agreed that climate change is ‘one of the greatest challenges of our time,’ and concurred that deep cuts are needed to avert a dangerous increase in temperatures.
It is unknown what the impact of the USA signing of the Copenhagen Accord will be since the Accord is non-binding and the USA’s reduction targets have not been legislated through Congress.
However, by signing the Accord, the President sent the message to the international community that the USA is serious about addressing climate change, and participation was thought to have improved the President’s chances for swaying the Senate in passing climate policy (Samuelsohn 2009).
In Durban, the USA reported progress towards the reduction target and highlighted two recent actions from the Obama administration (i.e., increase in the fuel economy standard and investments in clean energy technology through the stimulus bill) (Sheppard 2010).
Under the direction of Administrator Lisa Jackson and the backing of the Obama Administration, the US EPA has taken significant regulatory action to address climate change under the Clean Air Act (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2009).
First, rulemaking to regulate emissions from stationary sources began by setting thresholds for greenhouse gas emissions and permitting requirements for new and existing industrial facilities (known as the Tailoring Rule).
The ruling will cover approximately 70 percent of industrial facilities (i.e., electricity providers, refineries, and other high energy users).
Second, the US EPA finalized a mandatory ruling whereby facilities in selected sectors that emit more than 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (mtCO2e) must publicly monitor and report greenhouse gas emissions annually beginning in 2010.
A carbon dioxide equivalent is a standardized term used to account for all non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases in the reporting of Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
14 emissions in a regulatory scheme.
Non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases are converted to equivalents by multiplying by its respective global warming potential (IPCC 2007a, 2007b).
This ruling will cover about 85 percent of greenhouse gas emission sources.
Third, a final ruling was announced in April 2010 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from new cars and light trucks.
Finally, a number of voluntary programs have been continued and proposed to aid other organizations in measuring and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The Obama Administration’s agenda and strong actions taken at the US EPA are thought to have spurred Congress into drafting comprehensive energy and climate policy (see discussion below).
While the US EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions using traditional ‘command and control’ regulatory methods, many think this method is inadequate to effectively address the complexity of climate change.
Additionally, US EPA regulation does not provide incentives and mandates to transition the USA away from fossil fuels and towards clean energy or for adaptation planning.
Additionally, the US EPA is not equipped to address higher consumer costs of electricity and fuels or the potential loss of industry to developing countries.
According to a recent study, a consensus (that is, 91.6 percent) among economic experts is that market-based mechanisms such as a carbon tax or cap and trade program is the ‘preferred or strongly preferred’ approach over traditional regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and that significant risks to specific sectors in the USA and abroad exists if emissions are not reduced (Holladay, Jonathan, & Swchwarz 2009).
It appears that neither the Presidential Administration nor any one Federal Agency (for example, the US EPA or the US DOE) is fully equipped to implement a market-based system.
This approach, or a carbon tax, are more suited to be legislated through congressional action.
Therefore, greenhouse gas litigation, Presidential action, and US EPA action have effectively moved Congress to move beyond debate and begin to take action to enact legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Congressional national climate policy (legislative branch) While a national climate policy was introduced in former Congresses prior to the Obama administration, these bills have not progressed in any significant manner.
However, due to actions taken by the courts, President Obama’s initiatives, a democratdominated Congress, and new US EPA regulations, the 111th Congress had initiated Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
15 significant action.
In the summer of 2009, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (referred to as the Waxman-Markey bill) narrowly passed the US House of Representatives with a vote of 219–212 (Congressmen Waxman and Markey 2009).
Following the passage of the Waxman-Markey bill, a similar bill was advanced in the Senate, titled Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (referred to as the KerryBoxer bill) and passed the Environmental and Public Works committee on November 5, 2009 (Senators Kerry and Boxer 2009).
The senate bill initially showed promise of reaching the Senate floor and ultimately being sent to the President for ratification; however, the bill stalled.
Additional bills were brought forth later in the 111th Congress.
However, at the close of the Congressional section, no Senate bill was passed leaving the passage of federal climate policy up to the incoming 112th Congress.
The shift to GOP leadership in 112th Congress has not only ceased the possibility of enacting a federal climate bill, but has resulted in the reverse, namely threats to delay or outright repeal the US EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act (Koch 2011).
The bill with the most momentum is The Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011 (also known as the Upton bill), which would not only remove the US EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases, but would also repeal the endangerment finding (Upton 2011).
The Upton bill, with 46 co-sponsors most of which are Republican, passed the House subcommittee on March 11, 2011 and is scheduled for debate in the full House Energy and Commerce Committee in March 2011 (Koch 2011).
US EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson testified to the subcommittee on March 11, 2011 that the Upton bill would ‘overrule the scientific community on the scientific finding that carbon pollution endangers Americans’ health and well being’ (Jackson 2011).
The bill passed the House on April 7, 2011 and was referred to the Senate the next day where it was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
If the Senate passes this bill, this legislation would stop regulatory initiatives in progress at the US EPA and would likely be sent back to the courts for further hearings.
While neither the Waxman-Markey nor the Kerry-Boxer bills were ultimately ratified, it is worthwhile to evaluate the provisions contained in the bills as they provide a framework for federal climate policy.
In addition, these bills will likely provide the foundation for the next climate bill submitted in the next Congress.
Both the WaxmanMarkey and Kerry-Boxer bills were strikingly similar and both have the same stated Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
16 purpose, which is, ‘to create clean energy jobs, achieve energy independence, reduce global warming pollution, and transition to a clean energy economy.’ It is important to note that the Waxman-Markey Bill is 1,498 pages in length, and the Kerry-Boxer bill that passed the Environment and Public Works Committee totals 821 pages; therefore, a comprehensive analysis of both bills is limited in this article and the reader should refer to the original bills for more detail (Senators Kerry & Boxer 2009; Congressmen Waxman & Markey 2009).
The remainder of this section provides a summary of both bills and is organized by the four major titles of the Waxman Markey bill, namely clean energy, energy efficiency, global warming reduction (cap and trade program), and the clean energy transition plan.
Each section contains a summary table of the major provisions followed by a discussion of key provisions from Waxman-Markey.
Where different, the Kerry-Boxer bill provisions are also discussed.
Clean energy (Title I) Since consumption of fossil fuel energy represents the majority of greenhouse gas emission sources in the United States, transitioning to clean energy sources would significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Both the Waxman-Markey and KerryBoxer bills include policies and programs designed to promote the development and rapid deployment of clean energy.
Table 1 provides a summary of the key clean energy provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill: Key Provisions o Establishes a nationwide Combined Efficiency and Renewable Electricity Standard (CERES) o Establishes the supply targets (6% supply in 2012 and is gradually increased to 20% in 2039) o Establishes the breakdown of supply (¾ from renewable energy and ¼ supply from energy efficiency) o Establishes a Federal Renewable Energy Credit (REC) program o Spurs R&D and the rapid commercialization of carbon capture and storage (CCS) from the combustion of coal o Incentivizes the transition to the large-scale electrification of vehicles o Establishes state accounts to distribute emission allowances to be used to fund energy projects o Improves the distribution of clean energy with Smart Grid technology and transmission planning o Establishes and funds research, education, and training facilities (i.e., Energy Innovation Hubs and Centers for Energy and Environmental Knowledge and Outreach) o Establishes revolving loans to fund research of advanced technologies as well as nuclear o Requires miscellaneous studies, determinations, and new agency development Table 1.
Clean Energy (Title I) Key Provisions in the Waxman-Markey bill Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
17 Notably, the Waxman-Markey bill specifies a nationwide Combined Efficiency and Renewable Electricity Standard (CERES)—this is also referred to as a national renewable portfolio standard (RPS).
The Kerry-Boxer bill differs in that it does not designate a national standard, but rather provides incentives to states that have adopted an RPS.
A national standard would create uniform goals across the nation.
Currently, 33 states have voluntary or binding RPS programs in place and the targets differ significantly (US Department of Energy Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy 2010).
While the Senate version would encourage more states to develop an RPS, a nationwide system would be a more comprehensive approach and would require that all states participate, thus creating equitable solutions in transitioning towards clean energy in the country.
Both bills are full of provisions to improve our current electricity production in this country, particularly coal.
For example, both bills will require coal-fired power plants to meet performance standards with targets of 65 percent greenhouse gas reduction for plants permitted after 2020.
The bills also provide for significant research to advance carbon capture and sequestration technology.
Both bills have provisions to increase electrical capacity, including the large-scale electrification of vehicles, Smart Grid, and Transmission Technology.
The Waxman-Markey bill only briefly mentions nuclear energy under the heading of ‘Advanced Technology,’ while the Kerry-Boxer bill included more provisions for the nuclear industry, including additional training for the nuclear workforce and research and development for nuclear facilities.
Energy efficiency (Title II) Both bills provide for policies whose goals are to improve energy efficiency in the built environment as well as to improve transportation efficiencies.
Table 2 provides a summary of the key provisions contained in Title II of the Waxman-Markey bill.
As stated in Table 2, the Waxman-Markey bill stipulates an initial 30 percent improvement of energy efficiency in buildings with an ultimate goal of achieving ‘zero-net-energy’ consumption.
The bill proposes to achieve these goals through the development of stringent building standards and incentives.
The Kerry-Boxer bill differs in that it does not specify energy efficiency targets, but rather assigns that responsibility to the US EPA administrator to establish beginning in the year 2014.
The Waxman-Markey bill is far more aggressive with immediate targets and an ultimate goal of zero energy Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
18 consumption.
In addition, the Waxman-Markey bill contains a national energy efficiency goal that stipulates an overall 2.5 percent improvement by 2012, a provision that is absent in the Kerry-Boxer bill.
Key Provisions o Establishes building energy efficiency programs o Sets an average energy efficiency reduction targets for residential and commercial buildings (30% initially with ultimate goal of zero-net-energy building) o Establishes a national energy efficiency building code for new buildings o Establishes and funds a Retrofit for Energy and Environmental Performance (REEP) program o Establishes standards and programs to improve energy efficiency in lighting and appliances o Improves transportation efficiencies o Sets greenhouse gas emission standards for new heavy-duty and non-road engines and vehicles o Promulgates national greenhouse gas reduction targets for surface transportation sources o Requires state transportation plans to set greenhouse gas reduction targets o Spurs innovation in industrial manufacturing processes with programs and incentives o Improves energy savings performance contracting o Establishes a low-income community energy efficiency program and research on consumer behaviors o Includes various miscellaneous provisions o Establishes a national energy efficiency goal beginning with 2.5% improvement in 2012 o Calls for a national products disclosure study o Establishes numerous policies to provide green resources for energy efficiency neighborhoods o Sets new energy efficiency standards for HUD, rural, and federally-covered properties o Includes numerous incentives, grants, demonstration/pilot projects, finance mechanisms, and requirements Table 2.
Energy Efficiency (Title II) Key Provisions in the Waxman-Markey bill The Waxman-Markey bill would require that greenhouse gas emissions standards be set for new heavy-duty and off-road engines and vehicles within three model years commencing four years after bill enactment, a provision that is absent in the KerryBoxer bill.
However, both bills will require that national transportation greenhouse gas reduction goals be established within 18 months of enactment of the bill.
Lastly, both bills contain a number of other incentive programs as well as investment in research, technology advancement, and education.
Reducing global warming pollution (Titles III and V) The third title establishes a national Cap and Trade Program that includes greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and flexible compliance mechanisms for covered entities.
Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
19 Title V addresses carbon offset projects related to forestry and agriculture and has been included in this section because offsets are one of the flexible mechanisms included in the Cap and Trade Program.
Table 3 provides a summary of the key provisions contained in Titles III and V of the Waxman-Markey bill.
Key Provisions o Creates a cap and trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions o Establishes global warming pollution reduction goals and targets o Establishes cap and trade program rules, including carbon offset and supplemental reductions from reduced deforestation o Describes the distribution and allowable uses of emission allowances o Establishes greenhouse gas standards for uncovered sectors; exempts certain pollutants from the cap and trade program (e.g., criteria air pollutants and certain HFCs); and other miscellaneous provisions o Provides assurances for the regulation and enforcement of the allowance market and establishes a carbon derivatives market o Establishes the USDA as having authority of offset credit program from domestic agricultural and forestry Table 3.
Cap and Trade (Titles III and V) Key Provisions in the Waxman-Markey bill For both bills, the greenhouse gas reduction target begins at 3 percent of 2005 levels by 2012 and then is ratcheted up to 83 percent by 2050.
The Kerry-Boxer bill has the same beginning and end targets, but has different interim targets.
Both bills allow two billion carbon offsets to meet the overall reduction target; however, Waxman-Markey allows for one billion carbon offsets originating from international projects whilst Kerry-Boxer limits offsets to one-half billion.
Both bills lay out detailed rules for the implementation of a cap and trade program including how allowances will be distributed and how the program and markets will be regulated and enforced.
An important provision in both bills dictates how revenue generated from the sale or distribution of emission allowances must be passed through to the consumer to offset the higher cost of energy.
This provision will help alleviate hardship to those that are most affected by higher electricity costs, specifically low-income residential consumers.
Standards and rules will be promulgated to regulate greenhouse gases in non-covered sectors, which would include greenhouse gas sources that fall below the threshold and sectors that have the potential to enhance carbon sequestration, such as forestry and agriculture.
Both bills outline how the cap and trade program will be strictly monitored to ensure real and additional greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Additionally, significant portions of generated funds from the program will be directed to various incentive programs, adaptation programs, research, and education.
Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
20 Clean energy transition plan (Title IV) Title IV outlines a transition plan that would move America towards a clean energy economy.
Table 4 provides a summary of the key provisions contained in Titles IV of the Waxman-Markey bill: Key Provisions o Ensures real greenhouse gas reductions in industrial emissions by providing rebates to eligible industries o Establishes funding to develop green jobs and assists workers affected by the transition to clean energy o Establishes an energy refund program to provide relief from higher electricity costs to eligible low-income consumers o Provides assistance to developing countries to transition to clean energy o Provides resources to adapt to already committed climate change o Domestically, calls for a number of studies; establishes a national climate service office/program; requires States to develop a Climate Adaptation Plan; and calls for national strategic plans to be developed to address public health issues and conservation of natural resources as a result of climate change o Internationally, establishes a climate change adaptation program to assist developing countries address climate change o Clarifies that programs will be deficit neutral and funds can only be used for intended purposes Table 4.
Transition Plan (Title IV) Key Provisions in the Waxman-Markey bill The Waxman-Markey bill contains rebates to American industry to ensure that they remain competitive in the global markets and that industry ‘leakage’ does not occur (that is, industry is not exported overseas).
In addition to standard rebates for all consumers dictated in Title III, additional energy refunds will be given to low-income residents and specific industries that will be the hardest hit from increased energy costs.
Both bills establish programs to train workers to enter the green workforce and help workers that might lose their jobs as a result of the transition.
The bill also provides assistance to developing countries to facilitate the transition to clean energy.
Lastly, both bills have significant provisions to prepare for domestic and international adaptation that require state plans that not only address the direct impacts from climate change, but also address public health and natural resources.
Discussion and conclusions The use of the court systems to attempt to change environmental policy is not new.
Until recently, the lack of leadership in the executive and legislative bodies in solving the problems associated with climate change left little recourse but the courts for those Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
21 concerned with the impact of global warming.
Several court cases, particularly Massachusetts v US EPA, forced the government to address climate change within the executive branch through US EPA regulation.
The legislative branch has been slower to act.
The 111th Congress acted largely due to the pressures from the executive branch and the outcome of judicial court cases, while the 112th Congress is acting to uses its regulatory power to attempt to repeal both executive and judicial action.
Clearly, the fate of national climate legislation is unclear at best.
‘Institutional gridlock’ appears to be the roadblock that may thwart federal legislative action on climate change (Byrne et al.
2007).
In short, it is usually easier to prevent legislation than it is to pass it.
In the 111th Congress, this gridlock, along with the untimely loss of the democratic super-majority (from the replacement of Senator Kennedy’s seat), a troubled economy, and an exhaustive healthcare debate very likely prevented legislative action from occurring.
And now, the GOP-led 112th Congress is using the economy as a major argument to pass legislation to stop regulation of greenhouse gases altogether (Koch 2011).
Yet, the national climate change policy passed in the House of Representatives (Waxman-Markey bill) and proposed in the Senate (Kerry-Boxer bill) provides a comprehensive approach to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve energy efficiency, provide incentives to develop clean energy, and plan for the transition to a clean energy economy.
This national climate policy includes clear greenhouse gas reduction targets with a timeline and provides for flexible compliance mechanisms for covered sectors to comply with the proposed legislation.
Economists nearly all agree that a national climate policy that utilizes cap and trade is the lowest-cost approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States (Chettiar & Schwartz 2009).
Cap and trade programs for other pollutants (for example, acid rain) have been shown to be an effective and fair approach to address the problem.
Additionally, cap and trade programs can be implemented at relatively lower costs than traditional ‘command and control’ regulations because covered sectors can select the most cost effective solution to meet its compliance target.
However, some economists favor a carbon tax because they believe that a carbon tax would be simpler and quicker to implement (Avi-Yonah & Ulmann 2009).
Regardless of the approach, neither market-based policy instruments are anywhere near implementation through legislative means, and neither approach is Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
22 being considered by the US EPA under the current Clean Air Act initiatives.
As discussed above, the President has issued Executive Orders to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within federal agencies.
He could exercise the same power to set greenhouse gas reduction targets that are within the jurisdiction of the executive branch.
Past presidents have often used this power to enact policy and strengthen their administrative powers (Mayer 1999).
However, the authority to implement such a comprehensive policy would be limited to the executive branch and would likely be challenged for its constitutionality and statutory authority in the courts.
Neither the courts nor the President have the ability or clear authority to implement a comprehensive cap and trade program that includes incentives for clean energy and a plan to transition American toward a carbon constrained economy that congressional legislation outlined in its bills.
In the absence of such legislation, the US EPA has set into motion significant and binding regulation of greenhouse gases.
Since legislation was not enacted, the US EPA regulation is the only real US greenhouse gas policy and is in danger of being stopped in its tracks if the GOP is successful with legislation (i.e., if the Upton Bill passes in the Senate).
While the legislative and executive branches are the best places to resolve political national issues like management of greenhouse gases and associated climate change, the courts have as of late been one way to influence greenhouse gas policy.
Massachusetts et al.
v. US EPA directly resulted in the development of the Endangerment Finding and the pending regulations of greenhouse gas emissions by the US EPA.
The lack of a clear legislative greenhouse gas policy weakens the US EPA’s regulatory authority and puts many issues such as transitioning to clean energy and implementing a cap and trade program in limbo, particularly given the recent congressional effort to limit EPA’s authority over greenhouse gas emissions.
Even in light of the conclusion that greenhouse gases may be regulated regardless of Congressional action, detractors of any national climate policy remain focused on continuing the debate on whether climate change is real thereby attempting to delay meaningful national policy.
For example, a recent controversy, referred to as ‘ClimateGate,’ whereby a set of emails and files that apparently point out flaws in a small set of climate-change research has been used by advocates of climate policy to cast doubt with the US public (Fahrenthold & Eilperin 2009), even though US government scientists and the rest of the climate community say that the emails/files do nothing to negate the Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
23 overwhelming conclusion that global climate change is real.
Hopefully, the US public and Congressional policymakers can move beyond this debate and if nothing else understand that time is not a luxury that we can afford and that the window of opportunity to mitigate climate change in a cost-effective manner may be closing (Holladay et al.
2009).
Reference List Armitage, K. C. 2005, ‘The United States and the Politics of Global Warming,’ Globalization, vol.
2, no.
3, 417–427.
Arnold & Porter, LLP 2011, Climate Change Litigation in the US.
Online, available: http://www.climatecasechart.com [Accessed 11 March 2011].
Austin, D., & Dinan, T. 2005, ‘Clearing the Air: The Costs and Consequences of Higher CAFE Standards and Increased Gasoline Taxes,’ Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.
50, no.
3, 562–582.
Avi-Yonah, R. S., & Ulmann, D. M. 2009, ‘Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade,’ Stanford Environmental Law Journal, vol.
28, no.
3:1–49.
Byrne, J., Hughes, K., Rickerson, W., & Kurdgelashvili, L. 2007, ‘American Policy Conflict in the Greenhouse: Divergent Trends in Federal, Regional, State, and Local Green Energy and Climate Change Policy,’ Energy Policy, vol.
35, no.
9, 4555–4573.
Carpenter, C. 2001, ‘Business, Green Groups and the Media: The Role of NonGovernmental Organizations in the Climate Change Debate,’ International Affairs, vol.
77, no.
2, 313–328.
Cayan, D. R., Luers, A. L., Franco, G., Hanemann, M., Croes, B., & Vine, E. 2008, ‘Overview of the California Climate Change Scenarios Project,’ Climate Change, no.
87, Suppl.
1, S1–S6.
Chettiar, I. M., & Schwartz, J.
A.
2009, The Road Ahead: EPA’s Options and Obligations for Regulating Greenhouse Gases, Report No.
3.
Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law, New York.
Congressmen Waxman & Markey 2009, American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House).
Online, available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.2454.EH: [Accessed 9 Dec. 2009].
Council on Environmental Quality 2009, President Obama signs an Executive Order Focused on Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, Press Release.
Online, available: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-signs-anExecutive-Order-Focused-on-Federal-Leadership-in-Environmental-Energyand-Economic-Performance [Accessed 5 Dec. 2009].
Craig, R. K. 2009, ‘The Clean Water Act on the Cutting Edge: Climate Change and Water Quality Regulation,’ Natural Resources and the Environment, vol.
24, no.
2, 14.
Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
24 Fahrenthold, D. A., & Eilperin, J.
2009.
‘In E-mails, Science of Warming is Hot Debate: Stolen files of “Climate-gate” Suggest some Viewpoints on Change are Disregarded.’ The Washington Post, December 5 Federal Register 2009, Ocean Acidification and Marine pH Water Quality Criteria, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-HQ-OW-2009-0224; FRL-8892-5, vol.74, no.
71, April 15, 2009, Notices.
Freidman, T. L. 2005, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century.
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York.
Gerrard, M. B.
2007, Global Climate Change and US Law.
American Bar Association, Chicago.
Grynbaum, M. M. 2011.
‘Supreme Court Halts Mayor’s Push for Hybrid Taxis.’ The New York Times, March 13.
Hays, G. C., Richardson, A. J., & Robinson, C. 2005, ‘Climate Change and Marine Plankton,’ Trends in Ecology and Evolution, vol.
20, no.
6, 337–344.
Hoegh-Guldberg, O. H., Mumby, P. J., Hooten, A. J., Steneck, R. S., P., G., Gomez, E., Harvell, C. D., Sale, P. F., Edwards, A. J., Caldeira, K., Knowlton, N., Eakin, C. M., Iglesias-Prieto, R., Muthiga, N., Bradbury, R. H., Dubi, A., & Hatziolos, M. E. 2007, ‘Coral Reefs Under Rapid Climate Change and Ocean Acidification,’ Science, vol.
318, no.
5857, 1737–1742.
Holladay, J. S., Jonathan, H., & Swchwarz, J.
A.
2009, Economists and Climate Change: Consensus and Open Questions, Policy Brief No.
5.
Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law, New York.
IPCC 1992, Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment, (eds) Houghton, J. T., and the Core Writing Team, B.
A. Callander & S. K. Varney.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York.
——— 1995, IPPC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical Information Relevant to Interpreting Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: Cambridge Univesity Press, Cambridge & New York.
——— 2001, Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report.
A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (eds) R. T. Watson.
and the Core Writing Team.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York.
——— 2007a, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, (eds) A. Allali, R. Bojariu, S. Diaz, I. Elgizouli, D. Griggs, D. Hawkins, O. Hohmeyer, B. Pateh, L. KajifexBogataj, N. Leary, H. Lee & D. Wratt.
IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.
——— 2007b, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
Contributions of the Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Core Writing Team, R. K. Pachauri and G. Reisinger.
IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland.
Jackson, L. 2011, Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, Testimony Before the US House Subcommittees on Energy and Power and Environment and Economy.
US EPA News Releases, 11 March.
Koch, W. 2011, GOP House Moves to Stop EPA Climate Rules.
USA Today, 11 March.
Labatt, S., & White, R. R. 2007, Carbon Finance: The Financial Implications of Climate Change.
John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ.
Leiserowitz, A.
2006, ‘Climate Change Risk Perspective and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values,’ Climate Change, vol.
77, no.
1, 45–72.
Lutsey, N., & Sperling, D. 2005, ‘Energy Efficiency, Fuel Economy, and Policy Implications,’ Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, no.
1941, 8–17.
Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
25 Mayer, K. R. 1999, ‘Executive Orders and Presidential Power,’ The Journal of Politics, vol.
61, no.
2, 445–466.
McCarl, B.
A., & Schnieder, U.
A.
2000, ‘U.S.
Agriculture’s Role in a Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation World: An Economic Perspective,’ Review of Agricultural Economics, vol.
22, no.
1, 134–159.
McCright, A. M., & Dunlap, R. E. 2003, ‘Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement’s Impact on US Climate Change Policy,’ Social Problems, vol.
50, no.
3, 348–373.
Office of the President Elect 2008, President-elect Barack Obama Announces Key Members of Energy and Environment Team Press Release.
Online, available: <http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_announces_ key_members_of_energy_and_environmen/> [Accessed 5 Dec. 2009].
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 1992, The Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Analysis and Recommendations.
Online, available: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE /GD(92)81&docLanguage=En [Accessed 10 March 2011].
Organizing for America 2009, Organizing on the Issues, Energy and Environment.
Online, available: http://www.barackobama.com/issues/newenergy/index.php [Accessed 7 Dec. 2009].
Patz, J.
A., Campbell-Lendrum, D., Holloway, T., & Foley, J.
A.
2005, ‘Impact of Regional Climate Change on Human Health,’ Nature, vol.
438, 310–317.
Rose, A., & Oladosu, G. 2002, ‘Greenhouse Gas Reduction Policy in the United States: Identifying Winners and Losers,’ The Energy Journal 23:1–18.
Rowe, D. 2007, ‘Education for a Sustainable Future,’ Science, vol.
317, no.
5836, 323– 324.
Samuelsohn, D. 2009, ‘Obama Negotiates “Copenhagen Accord” With Senate Climate Fight in Mind.’ The New York Times, 21 December.
Schreurs, M. A.
2008, ‘From the Bottom Up: Local and Subnational Climate Change Politics,’ The Journal of Environmental and Development, vol.
17, no.
4, 343– 355.
Senators Kerry & Boxer 2009, Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (Introduced in Senate September 30).
Online, available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c111:S.1733: [Accessed 7 Dec. 2009].
Sheppard K. 2012, ‘Can the US Live up to Its Climate Pledge,’ Mother Jones, 7 December.
Online, available: http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/12/canus-live-its-climate-pledge [Accessed 7 Dec. 2012].
Superior Court of Fulton County, G. 2008, Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. and Sierra Club v. Dr. Carol Couch and Longleaf Energy Associates, No.
2008 CV146398.
Supreme Court of South Dakota 2008, In the Matter of Otter Tail Power Company on Behalf of Big Stone II Co-Owners for an Energy Conversion Facility Permit for the Construction of the Big Stone II Project, #24485.
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2005, State of Connecticut, et.
al.
v. American Electric Power Company Inc., et.
al, 05-5104-cv, 05-5119-cv.
US Department of Energy Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy 2010, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards.
Online, available: http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm.
[Accessed 10 March 2011].
US Environmental Protection Agency 2010, Integrated Reporting and Listing Decisions Related to Ocean Acidification.
Online, available: Brinkmann and Garren Synthesis of Climate Change Policy PORTAL, vol.
8, no.
3, September 2011.
26 http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/upload/oa_memo_nov201 0.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2011].
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2009, Copenhagen Accord, Draft Decision -/CP.15.
Online, available: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf [Accessed 25 Jan. 2009].
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2009, Ned Comer, et al.
v. Murphy Oil USA, et al., No.
07-60756.
United States Department of Energy Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy 2010, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards.
Online, available: http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm [Accessed 12 Dec. 2009].
United States District Court for the District of Oregon 2006, Northwest Envinmental Defense Center et al.
v. Owens Corning, Civil No.
04-1727-JE.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 2008, Central Valley Chrysler Jeep, Inc. et al.
v. Goldstene, No.
CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO.
United States District Court for the Northern District of California 2007a, Center for Biological Diversity et al.
v. Dirk Kepthorne, Secretary of the Interior et al.
No.
C-07-0894-EDL.
——— 2007b, Center for Biological Diversity, et al.
v. Dr. William Brennan et al., Oakland Division, No.
C-06-7062 SBA.
——— 2008, Center for Biological Diversity, et al.
v. Office of Management and Budget, No.
C 07-04997 MHP.
——— 2009, Native Village of Kivalina and City of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corporation et al., San Francisco Division, No.
08-CV-1138.
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 2005, Korsinksy v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No.
05 Civ.
859 (NRB).
United States Environmental Protection Agency 2009, Climate Change Regulatory Initiatives.
Online, available: http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/initiatives/index.html [Accessed 16 Dec. 2009].
——— 2009, Letter to Ms. Miyoka Sakashita, Attorney, Center for Biological Diversity, dated January 16, 2009.
United States Supreme Court 2006, Massachusetts et al.
v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.
at 1459-63.
United States Supreme Court for the Southern District of New York 2005, State of Connecticut et al.
v. American Power Company, Inc. et al., No.
04-Civ.
5669 (LAP), 04 Civ.
5670 (LAP).
Upton, F. 2011, Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, H.R.
910, House of Representatives.
Yudelson, J., & Fedrizzi, S. R. 2008, The Green Building Revolution.
Island Press, Washington, DC.
Rankinen.indd AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 342 Climate change adaptation in arable land use, and impact on nitrogen load at catchment scale in northern agriculture Katri Rankinen1*, Pirjo Peltonen-Sainio2, Kirsti Granlund1, Hannu Ojanen2, Mikko Laapas3, Kaija Hakala2, Kalle Sippel1, Juha Helenius4 and Martin Forsius1 1Finnish Environment Institute, P.O.
Box 140, FI-00251 Helsinki, Finland 2MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Plant Production Research, FI-31600 Jokioinen, Finland, 3Finnish Meteorological Institute, P.O.
Box 503, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland 4Department of Agricultural Sciences, P.O.
Box 27, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland *e-mail: katri.rankinen@ymparisto.fi, Prolongation of the growing season due to a warming climate could represent new opportunities for northern agriculture.
Climatic and biotic constraints may, however, together with increasing risk for higher nutrient loads, challenge future crop production.
The objective of this study was to speculate how a range of arable land use patterns, resulting from various policy driven choices, could be introduced into a farming system, and how they would affect the risks associated with nutrient leaching.
The case study area included 720 ha of arable fields in southern Finland.
Climate change scenarios were calculated using averages of 19 climate models and emission scenarios B1, A1B and A2.
Four crop choice and allocation storylines were developed according to policy objectives: increased protein self-sufficiency, increased winter cover for reducing nutrient loading, diversification, and monoculture for cereal production.
Grasslands and leys were not included in any of the production scenarios.
Impacts of these land uses on sediment loading and nitrogen leaching were simulated using WSFS and INCA modelling.
We found that while adaptation to climate change must include consideration of crop choices, there are conflicts associated with allocations and rotations for various market and policy situations.
The expected increase in nutrient loading in the simulations caused by climate change was moderate.
The increase can partly be compensated for by changes in farmland use, more in the shorter term than in the longer term to mid-century.
To reduce suspended sediment load in the changed climate, vegetation cover in winter was important.
For nitrogen leaching, adjusting the N balance at parcel level was more important than vegetation cover.
In the future, adaptation at cropping system level is potentially an efficient way to manage nutrient load risks.
Key words: adaptation, cereals, climate change, crop, diversity, environment, incentives, legumes, minor crops, monoculture, nitrogen leaching, policy, protein self-sufficiency, rapeseed, soil cover Introduction Climate change is projected to have profound effects on Finnish agriculture within the coming decades (PeltonenSainio et al.
2009a).
As the short growing season is the dominant factor contributing to modest yields, high yield variability and limited availability of (mainly spring sown) crops in Finland (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b, 2009c, 2011a, 2011b), prolongation of the growing season induced by climate warming could represent new opportunities for agriculture.
Thermal winter will shorten more rapidly than thermal summer will lengthen, especially in southern Finland (Ruosteenoja et al.
2011).
Compared with the current conditions during the winter months, warming will result in more thaw days, less frequent and shorter periods of severe frost and a rise in the extreme minimum temperatures (Laapas et al.
2012).
Climatic and biotic constraints may, however, together with increasing risks for nutrient loads, challenge crop production in the future (Kallio et al.
1997, Puustinen et al.
2007, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a, Hakala et al.
2011, Trnka et al.
2011).
Therefore, prompt adaptation measures, including plant breeding and development of technologies and management systems, as well as policy incentives that support and/or direct farmers’ decision making, are needed to enable sustainable intensification of northern agroecosystems in the future (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2011, Olesen et al.
2011).
Projected prolongation of the growing season, together with elevated mean temperatures, may open up new opportunities for diversification in northern cropping systems.
Currently cereal monocultures dominate the southern parts of Finland while grasslands are especially common in dairy areas in the north.
Climate change requires Manuscript received January 2013 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 343 adaptation and creates opportunities in land use.
However, it is not the sole driver of change in farming.
Changes in demand for, and prices of crop products, novel needs for crop products, such as non-food raw materials, as well as incentives and restrictions imposed by agricultural policies, will shape future rural landscapes.
Nutrient loading is a sensitive issue in agriculture.
An agri-environmental subsidy programme (EEC 1992) states that water protection is one of its main objectives and has operated in Finland since 1995.
The programme is the main tool within the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) to control nutrient loads from agricultural areas.
The main goals of the WFD are to achieve good ecological and chemical status for all inland and coastal surface waters by 2015 (WFD 2000).
Moreover, the Finnish Government has approved a set of national Water Protection Policy Outlines to 2015 as a decision-in-principle that also defines measures needed to improve water quality.
The key objective is that nutrient loads entering water bodies from agriculture should be reduced by a third by 2015 compared to their levels over the period 2001–2005, and halved over a longer timescale (The Finnish Government 2006).
Policy can attempt to influence agricultural practices such as crop choice, set aside, fertilizer application rates, tillage system, and the adoption of water protection measures.
More recently, the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) negotiated the Baltic Sea Action Plan, which by 2016 aims at cutting phosphorus (P) and nitrogen (N) inputs to the Baltic Sea by 42% and 18%, respectively, from the average loads of 1997–2003.
Furthermore, the former Prime Minister set a national target for nutrient recycling in Finland (Baltic Sea Action Summit 2010), recognising the problem that energy and nutrients are resources that should not be wasted.
Additionally, the target of the EU Nitrate Directive (EEC 1991) is to keep nitrate concentration of surface and groundwaters below a boundary level of 50 mg l-1.
Risks for surface and groundwater quality are seen in Finland’s National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change (Marttila et al.
2005).
For Finland, global climate change scenarios predict increases in both precipitation and mean annual temperature (Jylhä et al.
2009).
The high discharge periods and floods in particular will shift towards the winter months (Veijalainen et al.
2010).
Higher suspended sediment transport from fields has been recorded in mild winters than in cold ones (Rekolainen et al.
1997, Puustinen et al.
2007).
Kallio et al.
(1997) predicted acceleration of organic matter mineralization and increased water flow through the soil, increasing the risk of increased nitrogen losses.
Thus effective water protection measures on and outside fields are needed to reduce the risk of nutrient leaching and sediment transport.
Realization of the nutrient loading risks will depend on future arable land use, including choices of crop plant species and agronomic practices.
According to the Finnish agri-environmental programme (MAVI 2011) and WFD river basin plans (Mäenpää and Tolonen 2011), the suggested water protection measures include wintertime arable vegetation cover.
Winter cereals and leys serve this purpose, but even cereal stubble and reduced tillage are included in the schemes.
Increasing risks of loading may result in further tightening of limits set on application of fertilizers, and implementation of specific novel methods to prevent loading.
Different scenario analysis techniques can serve as links between science and policy.
The principle of scenario analysis is to explore alternative future developments with the aim of evaluating strategies to respond such developments (Alcamo 2008).
For example, the IPCC describes scenarios as images of the future, or alternative futures that are neither projections nor forecasts.
According to Alcamo (2011), a scenario describes how the future may unfold and typically consists of a representation of an initial situation and a description of the key driving forces and changes that lead to a particular future state.
The main objective of this study was to detail how a range of arable land use patterns resulting from various policy driven choices (such as emphasis on production of feed protein, soil and water conservation, or diversification) could be implemented, and how they would affect nutrient leaching risk.
We used inquiry-driven scenario analysis as a research tool for assessing the future state of the environment (Alcamo 2011) to establish mitigation measures/policies.
For immediate policy relevance, the timescales were set to the near future, and to two generations ahead, and the aim was to illustrate the situation at the local scale in a catchment in southern Finland dominated by agriculture.
Climate change scenarios were calculated as averages of 19 climate models and emission scenarios B1, A1B and A2 (Nakicemovic et al.
2000).
We created narrative storylines for future crop production based on two potential drivers: climate change and agricultural policy.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 344 Materials and methods Hydrology and climate change scenarios in the Lepsämänjoki catchment The Lepsämänjoki catchment (214 km2, 30−95 m.a.s.l.)
is a sub-basin of the Vantaanjoki river basin (Fig.
1) in southern Finland.
The river Vantaanjoki discharges into the Gulf of Finland outside Helsinki.
The river Lepsämänjoki is divided into two branches.
The main river is meandering slowly in the middle of the fields while the tributary collects waters from forested upland area with lake percentage up to 13%.
The mean discharge of the river Lepsämänjoki was 2.2 m3 s-1 in the 2000s.
The average annual precipitation in the area is 650 mm, and annual average temperature is 4 ◦C.
· Vantaanjoki river basin Lepsämänjoki river basin 0 8 164 km © Karttakeskus Oy, Lupa L4659 Fig.
1.
Location of the Lepsämänjoki catchment.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 345 Climate change scenarios were calculated as averages of 19 climate models and emission scenarios B1, A1B and A2 (Nakicemovic et al.
2000).
By interpolation from the surrounding network of meteorological stations, climate scenarios were projected for the study area for 30-year periods centred on 2025 and 2055.
In 2055 the annual average temperature is predicted to increase by 2.5 degrees above the average for 1971−2000.
During mid-winters the temperatures may still drop below 0 ◦C (Fig.
2), and some frost and snow cover may remain.
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec T [o C] 1971-2000 p5 p50 p95 Current land use and storylines for future crop production The Lepsämänjoki catchment is characterised by clay and rocky soils.
Fields cover 25% of the total catchment area, the rest being mainly forest.
Agricultural fields are located primarily on clay soils in the upper reaches of the catchment where field percentage reaches 38% (study area).
Main production line in the catchment is crop production, and the main crops are spring cereals, but at the upper reaches of the catchment there is also some cabbage cultivation (about 3% of the area).
Farmers in the area are interested in different environmentally sound cultivation methods, such as catch crops, crop rotation and maintaining soil structure.
Storylines for future crop production were based on two potential drivers causing changes to cropping systems: climate change and agricultural policy.
For assessing the crop plant species and land use allocations, the “worstcase” IPCC SRES (Nakicenovic et al.
2000) scenario, namely A2 (i.e., no marked international mitigation measures have been put to action or impacts have not been registered) was used.
The worst-case scenario was used in order to be able to demonstrate major changes in cropping systems within the coming decades, and thereby to provide a useful test-bed for risk assessment of nutrient loading.
In the case of scenario B1, which is based on the hypothesis that mitigation measures have been thoroughly and successfully put into action, the field-use storylines for A2 scenario for 2055 would approximately correspond to changes following the B1 scenario by the end of this century (2085) (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a).
Nevertheless, none of the SRES scenarios differ by 2025.
Climate change effects on prolongation of the growing season were based on 19 climatic models that were run for 30 year periods centred on either 2025 or 2055.
These data were provided by the Finnish Meteorological Institute.
Thereby, according to these 19 climatic models, in the Lepsämäjoki catchment, the potential for the novel crops to be introduced into cultivation depended on prolongation of the growing season caused by climate warming.
More details were provided by Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009a) and Ruosteenoja et al.
(2011).
After estimating general availability of alternative crops, and their winter types when appropriate, four major production storylines were characterized based on policy drivers that may direct farmer decision-making in the future.
The storylines were generated for a study area that included 720 ha of arable land.
The study did not include any considerations of current or future farm structure, in terms of farm size or land tenure.
Fig.
2.
Monthly mean temperatures at Lepsämänjoki catchment in the baseline period 1971-2000 and in 2055, based on interpolated projections for the study area from climate change scenarios, calculated as averages of 19 climate models and emission scenarios B1, A1B and A2 (Nakicemovic et al.
2000).
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 346 Storyline 1 was based on the concept that protein crop production is substantially promoted in order to increase current alarmingly low protein self-sufficiency, and thereby to decrease dependency on imported soybean (Glycine max [L.] Merr.).
This is targeted according to the national strategy for improving protein self-sufficiency.
In this storyline, protein crops that are well adapted to northernmost European conditions were favoured, but their rotation requirements limited expansion of their cultivation (as characterized by Peltonen-Sainio and Niemi 2012).
Storyline 2 was based on the concept that future policies heavily promote cultivation of winter crops that provide sufficient soil cover during winter to protect against erosion, sediment and nutrient transport, especially in forthcoming decades.
This is in line with current environmental policy emphasis on protecting the surface waters from eutrophication in Finland (Prime Minister’s Office 2011) and the current agri-environmental programme (MAVI 2011).
Environmental subsidies may be directed to promote water protection as winter precipitation is projected to markedly increase at the same time as winter temperatures rise (Räisänen and Eklund 2011).
Storyline 3 postulates a business as usual situation.
No substantial policy incentives are used to promote changes in crop production.
This may result in domination of cereal monocultures (as currently), and in ignore the opportunities and adaptation needs in the changing climate.
Grasslands and leys were not included in any of the production scenarios.
It was assumed that the present regional structure of agriculture is maintained.
The study area is in an agricultural region dominated by farms specialized in crop production, while mixed farming and associated grass production are concentrated in other regions.
When future field use was planned in each storyline, we took into consideration, for example, that the major crop species dominated the most appropriate fields for their cultivation.
On the other hand, reed canary grass or naturally managed areas were confined to small, misshapen and/or distant fields, often nearby the main drains or watercourses, and sloping fields with clay and coarse soil types were used for autumn-sown crops.
Assessment of nutrient transport risks according to the future climate scenarios and crop production storylines Changes in discharge and nutrient transport were modelled using the Watershed Simulation and Forecasting System (WSFS; Bergström 1976, Vehviläinen et al.
2005) and the Integrated Nutrients in Catchments (INCA; Wade et al.
2002, Whitehead et al.
1998) models.
The INCA model was calibrated against observed discharge at the outlet of the river.
Inorganic nitrogen and suspended sediment time series were available also in the middle of the catchment.
The WSFS is a conceptual hydrological model, used in Finland for operational flood forecasting and for research purposes.
The system is based on a watershed model, which has a HVB -hydrological model structure (Bergström 1976) and simulates the hydrological cycle using standard meteorological data.
The inputs of the model are precipitation and temperature and optionally potential evaporation.
In climate change simulations the potential evaporation is calculated using an empirical equation from temperature, precipitation and time of year, which in turn is used to indicate the amount available of shortwave radiation (Vehviläinen and Huttunen 1997).
Actual evapotranspiration is calculated from potential evaporation using simulated soil moisture.
The simulated components of the hydrological cycle are snow accumulation and melt, soil moisture, evaporation, groundwater, runoff and discharges and water levels of major rivers and lakes.
The dynamic INCA models integrate hydrology and nutrient processes (Wade et al.
2002, Whitehead et al.,1998).
The models are semi-distributed in that the land surface is not described in detail, but rather by land-use classes in sub-basins.
Hydrologically effective rainfall (HER) is used to drive nutrients through the catchment system.
HER is defined as that part of total incident precipitation that reaches stream channels as runoff and it is given as a daily input time series, which can be calculated by a hydrological model.
Hydrology within the sub-catchments is modelled using a three-box approach, with reservoirs of water in a reactive soil zone and in the deeper groundwater zone and surface runoff.
In the INCA-N model sources of N include atmospheric deposition, fertilizers, leaching from the terrestrial environment and direct discharges.
Terrestrial N fluxes are calculated in up to six user-defined land use classes.
The mass balance equations for NO 3 -N and NH 4 -N in the soil and groundwater zones are solved simultaneously with the flow equations.
The key N processes that are solved in the soil water zone are nitrification, denitrification, mineralizaAGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 347 tion, immobilisation, N fixation and plant uptake of inorganic N. No biochemical reactions are assumed to occur in the groundwater zone.
In the river, the key N processes are nitrification and denitrification.
In the INCA-SED model, the main river channel is divided into a series of reaches and the land area that drains into each of these reaches is defined as a sub-catchment.
The basic modelling unit of soil erosion processes is then a land use class in the sub-catchment.
In addition, the model incorporates environmental data on hydrometeorology, land use, erodibility and catchment and channel morphology.
Available sediment is generated on the catchment slopes by raindrop impact for each sub-catchment.
Given sufficient direct runoff, this material is transported from the land to the in-stream phase of the model.
Direct runoff can also further erode sediment from the soil surface.
Suspended sediment concentration increases with stream power in the river.
With decreasing stream power the sediment in suspension will settle and be deposited on the streambed.
The Lepsämänjoki river basin was divided into five sub basins based on predominant land use and crop, and location of discharge and water quality measurement stations.
Three sub basins at the upper reaches (34.4 km2, 22.5 km2 and 26.2 km2) represent agricultural areas and two lower sub basins (90 km2 and 36.7 km2) more forested areas where field percentage was around 15%.
Six land uses were simulated: forest, fallow, grass, winter cereals, spring cereals and cabbage.
Calibration of processes in different land use types was based on information about current agricultural practices (e.g.
fertilizer and manure application, yield rates) of different crops (Mattila et al.
2007).
These land uses were calibrated to produce same annual inorganic nitrogen and suspended sediment fluxes as measured in field trials (e.g.
Turtola 1999, Ekholm et al.
2005, Salo and Turtola 2006, Puustinen et al.
2010).
The sub catchments and land uses were the same for nitrogen and suspended sediment modelling.
The model was calibrated against daily measurements of discharge, and point measurements of suspended sediment, nitrate and ammonia nitrogen concentration at two national measurement stations.
The focus of calibrating agricultural losses was on three upper reaches discharging to the water quality monitoring station in the middle of the Lepsämänjoki catchment where 3−16 samples were taken annually.
A the outlet of the catchment there were more extensive water quality sampling of 17−30 samples taken annually.
Further, in the uppermost reach there were four periods of automatic daily measurements of discharge and suspended sediments in 2008−2009.
The calibration period was 2003−2009, which provided the best continuous observation time series.
Results and discussion Discharge and nutrient leaching for current land use Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency (used to assess the predictive power of the hydrological model, Nash and Sutcliffe 1970) was 0.699 for discharge at the outlet of the catchment.
For nitrate, R2 was 0.404 at the outlet and 0.392 in the middle of the catchment.
The values of R2 for suspended sediments were 0.552 and 0.199.
The baseline scenario and validation was run using the data for 1971−2000.
The R2 value was 0.495 for nitrate and for suspended sediments it was 0.184 in the middle of the catchment.
Data from the outlet of the catchment were not available for this period.
Both INCA-N and INCA-SED models have been applied successfully to several catchments in Finland (Rankinen et al.
2009, Rankinen et al.
2010).
INCA-N has been earlier shown to be sensitive especially to temperature dependency of different N processes and soil and river hydrology (Rankinen et al.
2006, Rankinen et al.
2013).
Measured values of NO 3 -N concentrations were very well inside simulated 5 to 95 % confidence limits.
The only systematic model errors occured during low flow periods, when concentrations were either overor underestimated.
The effect of low flow periods on nutrient export from catchments was small.
The simulation of suspended sediment concentration peaks in river by INCA-Sed proved to be sensitive to discharge velocity and in stream processes in clay areas (unpublished data).
This is assumed not to influence the total suspended sediment export from the catchment.
Thus we based our results on calculating changes in annual fluxes as average of 30 years.− Mean annual discharge increases by 3% for the period centred on 2025 and by 2055 it increases by 8%.
There is a gradual change towards higher discharges in winter, so that current peak due snow melting in April will disappear.
Already in 2025 there will be a clear decrease in the snow-melt peak in April and an increase in discharge in autumn is evident (Fig.
3).
On the other hand, no change is apparent in discharges during summer and early autumn.
Snow cover does not totally disappear, but is lower and starts to melt earlier.
Veijalainen et al.
(2010) assessed climate change impacts on flooding on a national scale in Finland.
They also reported a significant shift in AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 348 the seasonality of runoff and floods, with increasing floods during autumn and winter, and diminishing floods in spring, especially in southern and central Finland.
Soil types in the Lepsämänjoki catchment are vulnerable to erosion.
Thus suspended sediment load from the catchment would increase by 12% by the period 2040−2069, but inorganic nitrogen load by about 6%, if the field use remained the same as currently.
By the period 2070−2099 inorganic nitrogen load would increase by 8% and suspended sediment load by 18%.
By the period 2011−2036 the increase would be only a few percentage points.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec M Q [m 3 s1 ] 1971-2000 2011-2039 2040-2069 Future use of arable land In Storyline 1 (Fig.
4 protein crop production is strengthened according to future strategies (Rehustrategia 2010, Peltonen-Sainio and Niemi 2012).
Therefore, oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.), turnip rape (B. rapa L.), faba bean (Vicia faba L.), field pea (Pisum sativum L.) and also lupins (Lupinus spp. )
are expected to gain area, at the expense of spring-sown cereals by 2055.
Spring wheat (Triticum aestivum L.), barley (Hordeum vulgare L.), oat (Avena sativa L.) and winter wheat remain in the crop selection by 2055.
In storyline 1, small and impractically located and managed patches of fields become conservation fallows or naturally managed fields for enhancement of biological diversity.
Pure stands of grain legumes are concentrated on parcels that are not next to waterways to attempt to lower risks for surface runoff and erosion-induced leaching of fixed nitrogen in autumn and winter (Geijersstam and Martensson 2006).
On the other hand, oilseed rape and/or turnip rape are allocated to the largest parcels.
In Storyline 2 (Fig.
5), following the projections of Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009a), winter cereals, winter wheat, rye (Secale cereale L.) and triticale (X Triticosecale Wittmack), are expected to gain in area, the latter being a novel crop, currently with only negligible areas under cultivation.
Winter cereals are concentrated, when possible, in banked fields to avoid flooding and ice encasement, as is currently practised to avoid overwintering problems.
Their expanded production is likely in the future, not only due to providing a means (soil crop cover) to reduce erosion and nutrient leaching risks, but also due to their higher yield potentials (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a, Askegaard et al.
2011).
In Storyline 3 (Fig.
6) cereals are favoured by the farmers, and only negligible areas are devoted to spring oilseed rape.
By the mid-century, to gain from high genetic yield potential of winter types compared to spring cereals, winter wheat, rye and triticale (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a) are expected to be grown on 50 % of the total area.
Otherwise, farmers are considered to be very conservative and risk-averse regarding their crop selection (Peltonen-Sainio and Niemi 2012) and therefore, expected to favour cereal monocultures.
Fig.
3.
Changes in mean monthly discharge into the Lepsämänjoki catchment in 30-year periods from present to 2055.
Simulation results from Watershed Simulation and Forecasting System (WSFS, Bergström 1976).
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 349 Area 46 Enhanced protein self-sufficiency 2025 Crops Spring oilseed rape Spring turnip rape Faba bean Field pea Spring wheat Spring barley Spring oat nature management field Base map © Maanmittauslaitos 53/MML/11  0 0,5 10,25 km Area 46 Enhanced protein self-sufficiency 2055 Crops Spring oilseed rape Faba bean Field pea Lupins Spring wheat Spring barley Spring oat Winter wheat nature management field Base map © Maanmittauslaitos 53/MML/11  0 0,5 10,25 km Fig.
4.
Hypothetical field use in Storyline 1 (“protein crops”) in the future changed climate in Lepsämäjoki catchment in Nurmijärvi, Finland in 2025 (a) and in 2055 (b) In this storyline, production of crops for protein food and feed is markedly enhanced, in order to improve crop-derived protein self-sufficiency.
Estimations of field crops to be grown are based on climate change SRES scenario A2 (i.e., no marked mitigation achievements) of IPCC and 19 climatic models that were run for 30-year periods centred on either 2025 or 2055 (data provided by Finnish Meteorological Institute).
For further details see Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009a).
a b AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 350 Fig.
5.
Hypothetical field use in Storyline 2 (“winter cover”) in the future changed climate in 2025 (a) and in 2055 (b).
In this storyline, crop cover for winter is markedly enhanced in order to reduce erosion and nutrient leaching risks.
For further details see caption of Fig.
4.
Area 46 Enhanced crop cover for winters 2025 Crops Spring oilseed rape Spring barley Winter triticale Winter wheat Winter rye Reed canary grass Base map © Maanmittauslaitos 53/MML/11  0 0,5 10,25 km a Area 46 Enhanced crop cover for winters 2055 Crops Spring oilseed rape Faba bean Winter turnip rape Winter triticale Winter wheat Winter barley Winter rye Reed canary grass Base map © Maanmittauslaitos 53/MML/11  0 0,5 10,25 km b AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 351 Area 46 Cereal monoculture 2025 Crops Spring oilseed rape Spring wheat Spring barley Spring oat Winter wheat Winter rye Base map © Maanmittauslaitos 53/MML/11  0 0,5 10,25 km Fig.
6.
Hypothetical field use in Storyline 3 (“monoculture”) in the future changed climate in 2025 (a) and in 2055 (b).
In this storyline, cereal monocultures continue to dominate.
For further details see caption of Fig.
4.
Area 46 Cereal monoculture 2055 Crops Spring oilseed rape Spring wheat Spring barley Spring oat Winter triticale Winter wheat Winter rye Base map © Maanmittauslaitos 53/MML/11  0 0,5 10,25 km a b AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 352 Nutrient leaching risk in future land use In the simulations of leaching risk in the future climate, and for each of the crop production storylines, the main focus is on 2025 and 2055.
According to all the three storylines, the area of winter cereals will increase.
This keeps soil covered and thus helps decrease erosion and suspended sediment transport.
The effect is best seen in simulation results of suspended sediment loads (Fig.
7).
In Storyline 2 (“winter cover”) suspended sediment load slightly decreases in 2025, but then starts to increase by 8% in 2055, compared with the load during baseline conditions.
Storyline 1 (“protein crops”) will also provide a smaller increase in suspended sediment load than current vegetation cover (12% increase by the period 2055), probably due to larger area of green fallow.
In Storyline 3 (“monoculture”) the increase in sediment load is higher than in Storylines 1 and 2.
-5 0 5 10 15 20 Protein crops Winter cover Monoculture % 25; 2011-2039 55; 2040-2069 In 2025 changes in inorganic N loading (Fig.
8) are relatively small for all the alternative uses of the farmland.
In 2055 the changes will become more apparent.
Surprisingly, the “monoculture” seems to provide the lowest inorganic nitrogen loading, so that the increase is only 3% by the 2055 period, and it compensates partly for the increase caused by current land use in a changing climate (6% in 2055).
On the other hand, in this storyline the average field balance of nitrogen decreases to 38 kg ha-1 from the current value 42 kg ha-1.
In general, the fertilization level of spring cereals is lower than that of winter cereals, and we did not assume any changes in cropspecific fertilization volumes.
Increase in wintertime vegetation cover did not seem to compensate for increase in inorganic N leaching.
The higher average plant uptake of winter cereals is met by a higher fertilization level than that of spring cereals, so that average field N balance remains 42 kg ha-1.
The highest leaching risk is associated with the “protein crops”, which actually increase N loading more than climate change alone (Fig.
8).
Even though average field N balance decreases to 33 kg ha-1, the leaching from outside the growing season increases.
Thus, it looks like leaching losses from cultivation based on mineral fertilizers only are smaller as the fertilization rates can be adjusted for crop uptake.
On the other hand, nitrate concentrations do not approach 50 mg l-1, the boundary value of the Nitrate Directive.
Fig.
7.
Simulated changes in suspended sediment transport in the Lepsämänjoki study area, in three different storylines for future land use (see snapshot illustrations of land use in Figures 4, 5 and 7), compared with loads under baseline conditions.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 353 -5 0 5 10 15 20 Protein crops Winter Cover Monoculture % 25; 2011-2039 55; 2040-2069 Conclusions Climate change in Finland requires adaptation of agriculture.
Opportunities may appear for introduction of crops new to the country or expanded cultivation of current minor or underutilized crops.
Without adaptive changes in cropping systems, farming is especially vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change.
Adaptation include consideration of crop plant choices, allocations and rotations.
In our simulated storylines of agricultural land use in changed climatic conditions in the Lepsämänjoki case study area, the expected increase in inorganic nitrogen and suspended sediment loading was projected to be moderate.
The increase can partly be compensated for by changes in farmland use; more in the short term than in the longer term to the mid-century, when more effective water protection measures are needed.
To reduce suspended sediment load in the changed climate, vegetation cover in winter is important.
For inorganic nitrogen leaching, adjusting the N balance of crops seems to be more important than vegetation cover.
Adaptation in cropping system and field use patterns is an efficient way to manage nutrient loading risks if it is feasible and/or enhanced by policy measures.
Not all management options are synergistic in terms of their effects on nitrogen leaching and on suspended sediment loading.
Therefore careful targeting is needed.
Grasslands and leys were not included in any of the production scenarios.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank coordinators of VACCIA Action 7 Kati Komulainen and Torsti Schulz, as well as the project coordinators and the many colleagues in the project.
The work was partly financed by EU Life+ project Vulnerability assessment of ecosystem services for climate change impacts and adaptation (VACCIA) Action 7, Assessment of impacts and adaptation measures for agricultural production (EU LIFE+ programme, project LIFE07/ENV/ FIN/000141, 2009-2011).
We thank Kirsti Jylhä for generating the localized climate change scenarios and Irmeli Ahtela for information on current water protection measures.
References Alcamo, J.
2008.
Environmental Futures: The Practice of Environmental Scenario Analysis.
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
224 p. Askegaard, M., Olesen, J.E., Rasmussen, I.A.
& Kristensen, K. 2011.
Nitrate leaching from organic arable crop rotations is mostly determined by autumn field management.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 142: p.149–160.
Fig.
8.
Changes in inorganic N loading in the Lepsämänjoki study area, in three different storylines for future land use (see snapshot illustrations of land use in Figures 4, 5 and 7), compared with loads in baseline conditions.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 354 Bergström, S. 1976.
Development and application of a conceptual runoff model for Scandinavian catchments.
SMHI.
Nr RH7.
Norrköping.
134 p. EEC 1991.
Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.
Official Journal L 375 p. 1–8.
EEC 1992.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 of 30 June 1992 on agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements of the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the countryside.
Official Journal of the European Communities No L215 p. 85–90.
Ekholm, P., Turtola, E., Grönroos, J., Seuri, P. & Ylivainio, K. 2005.
Phosphorus loss from different farming systems estimated from soil surface phosphorus balance.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 110: p.: 266−278.
Finnish Government 2006.
Vesiensuojelun suuntaviivat vuoteen 2015, ValtioneuvostonperiaatepäätösIn Finnish..
Available on the Internet: http://valtioneuvosto.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/fi.jsp?oid=175373.
In Finnish.
Geijersstam, L.A. & Martensson, A.
2006.
Nitrogen fixation and residual effects of field pea intercropped with oats.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica B-S P 56: p. 186–196.
Hakala, K., Hannukkala, A., Huusela-Veistola, E., Jalli, M. & Peltonen-Sainio, P., 2011.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate: a major challenge for Finnish crop production.
Agriculture and Food Science.
20: p. 3–14.
Jylhä, K., Ruosteenoja, K., Räisänen, J., Venäläinen, A., Tuomenvirta, H., Ruokolainen, L., Saku, S. & Seitola, T. 2009.
Arvioita Suomen muuttuvasta ilmastosta sopeutumistutkimuksia varten.
ACCLIM-hankkeen raportti 2009 RAPORTTEJA RAPPORTER REPORTS 2009:4.
114 p. Kallio, K., Huttunen, M., Vehviläinen, B., Ekholm, P. & Laine, Y.
1997.
Effect of climate change on nutrient transport from an agricultural basin.
In: J. Roos (ed.).
The Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change.
Final report.
Publications of the Academy of Finland 4/96.
Laapas, M., Jylhä, K. & Tuomenvirta H. 2012.
Climate change and future overwintering conditions of horticultural woody-plants in Finland.
Boreal Environment Research.
17: p. 31–45.
Marttila, V., Granholm, H., Laanikari, J., Yrjölä, T., Aalto.
A., Heikinheimo, P., Honkatukia, J., Järvinen, H., Liski, J., Merivirta, R. & Paunio, M. 2005.
Finland’s national strategy for adaptation to climate change.
Publications of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1/2005.
276 p. In Finnish with English abstract.
Mattila, P., Rankinen, K., Grönroos, J., Siimes, K., Karhu, E., Laitinen, P., Granlund, K., Ekholm & P. Antikainen, R. 2007.
Viljelytoimenpiteet ja vesistökuormitus ympäristötukitiloilla vuosina 2003-2005.
Suomen ympäristö 40.
In Finnish with English abstract.
MAVI 2011.
Agri-environmental support scheme in Finland.
Agency for Rural Affairs.
Available on the Internet: http://www.mavi.
fi/fi/index/viljelijatuet/oppaatjaohjeet/ymparistotuenjaluonnonhaittakorvauksensitoumusehdot/ymparistotuensitoumusehdot.
html.
Visited 2.12.2011.
Iin Finnish.
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2011.
Action plan for the adaptation to climate change of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2011–2015 – Security of supply, sustainable competitiveness and risk management.
Memorandum, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
In:http://www.mmm.fi/attachments/mmm/julkaisut/muutjulkaisut/5yZhPxNpC/MMM_n_ilmastonmuutoksen_sopeutumisen_toimintaohjelma.pdf.
In Finnish with English abstract.
Mäenpää, M. & Tolonen, S. 2011.
Kooste vesienhoitoalueiden vesienhoitosuunnitelmista vuoteen 2015.
Suomen ympäristö 23.
122 p. In Finnish.
Nash, J.E., Sutcliffe, J.V.
1970.
River flow forecasting through conceptional models.
1.
A discussion of principles.
Journal of Hydrology 10 p.: 282–290 Nakicenovic, N., Alcamo, J., Davis, G., de Vries, B., Fenhann, J., Gaffin, S., Gregory, K., Grübler, A., Jung, T.Y., Kram, T., La Rovere, E.L., Michaelis, L., Mori, S., Morita, T., Pepper, W., Pitcher, H., Price, L., Raihi, K., Roehrl, A., Rogner, H.-H., Sankovski, A., Schlesinger, M., Shukla, P., Smith, S., Swart, R., van Rooijen, S., Victor, N. & Dadi, Z., 2000.
Emissions Scenarios.
A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge.Paikka?
: Cambridge University Press.
599 p. Olesen, J.E., Trnka, M., Kersebaum, K.C., Skjelvåg, A.O., Seguin, B., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rossi, F., Kozyra, J.
& Micale, F. 2011.
Impacts and adaptation of European crop production systems to climate change.
European Journal of Agronomy.
34 :p. 96–112.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Hakala, K., Jauhiainen, L., Ruosteenoja, K., 2009d.
Comparing regional risks in producing turnip rape and oilseed rape Impacts of climate change and breeding.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, B Soil and Plant Science 59: 129–138.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Hannukkala, A., Huusela-Veistola, E., Voutila, L., Valaja, J., Niemi, J., Jauhiainen, L., Hakala, K., 2013.
Potential and realities of enhancing rapeseed and grain legume based protein production in a northern climate.
Journal of Agricultural Science 151: 303-321.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L. & Hakala, K. 2009b.
Are there indications of climate change induced increases in variability of major field crops in the northernmost European conditions?
Agricultural and Food Science 18: p. 206–226.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L.&, Hakala, K., 2011b.
Crop responses to temperature and precipitation according to long-term multi-location trials at high-latitude conditions.
Journal of Agricultural Science 149: p.: 49–62.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L., Hakala, K. &, Ojanen, H., 2009a.
Climate change and prolongation of growing season: changes in regional potential for field crop production in Finland.
Agricultural and Food ScienceAgr.
Food Sci.
18: p.: 171–190.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L. &, Sadras, V.O., 2011a.
Phenotypic plasticity of yield and agronomic traits in spring cereals and rapeseed at high latitudes.
Field Crops Research 124: p.: 261–269.
Peltonen-Sainio, P. &, Niemi, J., 2012.
Protein crop production at the northern margin of farming: To boost, or not to boost, that is the question.
Agricultural and Food ScienceAgr.
Food Sci.
21: p.: 370-383.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Rankinen et al.
(2013) 22: 342–355 355 Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rajala, A., Känkänen, H. & Hakala, K. 2009c.
Improving farming systems in northern European conditions.
In: Sadras, V.O.
& Calderini.
D.
(eds.).
Crop Physiology: Applications for Genetic Improvement and Agronomy.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.
p. 71–97.
Prime Minister’s Office 2011.
Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Government Programme.
Helsinki.In Finnish.
Puustinen, M., Tattari, S., Koskiaho, J.
& Linjama, J.
2007.
Influence of seasonal and annual hydrological variations on erosion and phosphorus transport from arable areas in Finland.
Soil and Tillage Research.
93: p. 44–55.
Puustinen, M., Turtola, E., Kukkonen, M., Koskiaho, J., Linjama, J., Niinioja, R. & Tattari, S. 2010 VIHMA-A tool for allocation of measures to control erosion and nutrient loading from Finnish agricultural catchments.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 138: p. 306-317.
Rankinen, K., Granlund, K., Futter, M.N., Butterfield, D., Wade, A., Skeffington, R., Arvola, L., Veijalainen, N., Huttunen, I.
& Lepistö, A.
2013 Controls on inorganic nitrogen leaching from Finnish catchments assessed using a sensitivity and uncertainty analysis of the INCA-N model.
Boreal Environment.
Research.
18: p. 373-386.
In press.
Rankinen, K., Karvonen, T. & Butterfield, D. 2006.
An application of the GLUE methodology for estimating the parameters of the INCA-N model.
Science of the Total Environment.
365: p.123-139.
Rankinen, K., Valpasvuo-Jaatinen, P., Karhunen, A., Kenttämies, K., Nenonen, S. & Bärlund, I.
2009.
Simulated nitrogen leaching patterns and adaptation to climate change in two Finnish river basins with contrasting land use and climatic conditions.
Hydrology Research.
40: p. 177-186.
Rankinen, K., Thouvenot-Korppoo, M., Lazar, A., Lawrence, D.S.L., Butterfield, D. & Lepistö, A.
2010.
Application of catchment scale erosion and sediment delivery model INCA-Sed to four small study catchments in Finland.
CATENA.
83: p. 64-75.
Rehustrategia 2010.
Rehustrategiatyöryhmän raportti.
Työryhmämuistio mmm 2010:9.
81 p. In Finnish.. Rekolainen, S., Ekholm, P., Ulén, B.
& Gustafson, A.
1997.
Phosphorus losses from agriculture to surface waters in the Nordic countries.
In: Tunney, H., Carton, O. T., Brookes, P. C. & Johnston, A. E.
(eds.).
Phosphorus loss from soil to water.
CAB International., p. 77–93.
Ruosteenoja, K., Räisänen, J.
& Pirinen, P. 2011.
Projected changes in thermal seasons and the growing season in Finland.
International Journal of Climatology.
31: p.1473–1487.
Räisänen, J.& Eklund, J., 2011.
21st Century changes in snow climate in Northern Europe: a high-resolution view from ENSEMBLES regional climate models.
Climate Dynamics.
DOI 10.1007/s00382–011–1076–3 Salo, T. & Turtola, E. 2006.
Nitrogen balance as an indicator of nitrogen leaching in Finland.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 113: p. 98-107.
Trnka, M., Olesen, J.E., Kersebaum, K.C., Skjelvåg, A.O., Eitzinger, J., Seguin, B., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Iglesias, A., Orlandini, S., Dubrovský, M., Hlavinka, P., Balek, J., Eckersten, H., Cloppet, E., Calanca, P., Rötter, R., Gobin, A., Vucetic V., Nejedlik, P., Kumar, S., Lalic, B., Mestre, A., Rossi, F., Kozyra, J., Semerádová, D. & Zalud, Z.
2011.
Agroclimatic conditions in Europe under climate change.
Global Change Biology 17: p. 2298–2318.
Turtola, E. 1999.
Phosphorus in surface runoff and drainage water affected by cultivation practices.
Agricultural Research Centre of Finland.
Veijalainen, N., Lotsari, E., Alho, P., Vehviläinen, B.
& Käyhkö, J.
2010.
National scale assessment of climate change impacts on flooding in Finland.
Journal of Hydrology 391: p. 333–350.
Vehviläinen, B.
& Huttunen, M. 1997 Climate change and water resources in Finland.
Boreal Environmet Research 2: p. 3-18.
Vehviläinen, B., Huttunen, M. & Huttunen, I.
2005.
Hydrological forecasting and real time monitoring in Finland: the watershed simulation and forecasting system (WSFS).
In: Innovation, Advances and Implementation of Flood Forecasting Technology, Conference Papers, Tromsø, Norway, 17–19 October 2005.
Wade, A. Durand, P., Beaujoan, V., Wessels, W., Raat, K., Whitehead, P. G., Butterfield, D., Rankinen K. & Lepistö A.
2002.
Towards a generic nitrogen model of European ecosystems: New model structure and equations.
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 6: p. 559–582.
WFD 2000.
Water Framework Directive.
Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for community action in the field of water policy.
Official Journal of European Community, L 327 p. 1–73.
Whitehead, P.G., Wilson, E.J.
& Butterfield, D. 1998.
A semi-distributed Integrated Nitrogen model for multiple source assessment in Catchments (INCA): Part I-model structure and process equations.
Science of the Total Environment.
210/211: p. 547–558.
erappe Typewritten Text erappe Typewritten Text Climate change adaptation in arable land use, and impact onnitrogen load at catchment scale in northern agriculture Introduction Materials and methods Hydrology and climate change scenarios in the Lepsämänjoki catchment Current land use and storylines for future crop production Assessment of nutrient transport risks according to the future climate scenarios andcrop production storylines Results and discussion Discharge and nutrient leaching for current land use Future use of arable land Nutrient leaching risk in future land use Conclusions Acknowledgements References
www.policyschool.ca PUBLICATIONSPUBLICATIONS SPP Briefing PaperSPP Briefing Paper Volume 12:31 September 2019 http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v12i0.68112 CLIMATE CHANGE SOLUTIONS – SENSIBLE OR MISGUIDED?
* Eddy Isaacs SUMMARY The landmark Paris Agreement to address climate change officially entered into force in November 2016 and has now been ratified by 185 of 197 parties to the convention.
The agreement sets a course for all countries to limit global temperature rise to below 2°C and preferably to below 1.5°C.
The latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns that global warming is becoming irreversible and that the societal impacts of climate change are calamitous.
The IPCC report also carries a positive message that it is still possible to limit global warming to a 1.5°C increase and describes various mitigation pathways that countries could use to reduce their emissions.
But are these mitigation pathways well-founded and coherent?
Do they have a possibility of achieving the desired net zero emissions by 2050?
Are countries developing the right strategies and taking immediate action to address the decarbonization of their energy systems?
What are the policy-relevant indicators on how fast and by how much emissions can be reduced?
Are there monumental changes in the energy system driven by technology, competitiveness and social innovation that will fundamentally impact climate policy?
To address the above questions, this study will review the history of climate change agreements and will examine the IPCC’s illustrative strategies to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C.
Discussion will also centre on emerging technologies for displacing fossil fuels, including nuclear energy, renewable energy (non-biomass), bioenergy, natural gas as a bridge fuel, carbon capture utilization and storage, and CO 2 retention and negative emissions.
It will be shown that despite enthusiastic support for climate mitigation, there are many serious policy and engineering obstacles to greenhouse gas reductions by mid-century.
* This research was financially supported by the Government of Canada via a partnership with Western Economic Diversification.
We argue that emissions from bioenergy should be treated in the same way as emissions from fossil fuels and this leaves many developed countries in a deep hole for reducing emissions.
Based on the analysis in this study, we recommend that Canada pursue strategic policy directions and the design of unique and rational innovation programs.
www.policyschool.ca PUBLICATIONSPUBLICATIONS SPP Briefing PaperSPP Briefing Paper Volume 12:31 September 2019 http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v12i0.68112 SOLUTIONS AU CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE : CHOIX ÉCLAIRÉS OU ERRONÉS?
* Eddy Isaacs RÉSUMÉ L’Accord de Paris pour lutter contre le changement climatique entrait officiellement en vigueur en novembre 2016 et a depuis été ratifié par 185 des 197 États présents à la Conférence.
L’Accord détermine, pour tous les pays, un parcours afin de contenir le réchauffement climatique en dessous de 2 °C et de préférence en dessous de 1,5 °C.
Le dernier rapport du Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat (GIEC) prévient que le réchauffement climatique devient irréversible et que ses impacts sociétaux sont désastreux.
Le rapport du GIEC véhicule également un message positif, à savoir qu’il est encore possible de contenir le réchauffement planétaire en dessous de 1,5 °C et propose divers moyens d’atténuation pour permettre aux pays de réduire leurs émissions.
Mais ces moyens d’atténuation sont-ils fondés et cohérents?
Permettrontils d’atteindre la carboneutralité souhaitée d’ici 2050?
Les pays élaborent-ils les bonnes stratégies et prennent-ils des mesures immédiates pour favoriser la décarbonisation des systèmes énergétiques?
Quels sont les indicateurs pertinents pour déterminer à quelle vitesse et dans quelle mesure les émissions peuvent être réduites?
La technologie, la compétitivité et l’innovation sociale ont-elles un impact fondamental sur les politiques climatiques qui permettent d’apporter des changements fondamentaux dans les systèmes énergétiques?
Pour répondre à ces questions, la présente étude passe en revue l’historique des accords sur le changement climatique et examine les stratégies proposées par le GIEC pour contenir l’augmentation de la température en dessous de 1,5 °C.
La discussion porte également sur les technologies émergentes pour remplacer * Cette recherche a été soutenue financièrement en partie par le gouvernement du Canada via Diversification de l'économie de l'Ouest Canada.
les combustibles fossiles, notamment l’énergie nucléaire, les énergies renouvelables (non issues de la biomasse), la bioénergie, le gaz naturel comme combustible de transition, l’utilisation et le stockage du carbone, la rétention de CO 2 et les émissions négatives.
Nous montrons qu’en dépit d’un fort soutien envers les mesures d’atténuation du changement climatique, la réduction des gaz à effet de serre d’ici le milieu du siècle se heurte à de sérieux obstacles d’ordre politique et technique.
Nous soutenons que les émissions provenant de la bioénergie devraient recevoir le même traitement que les émissions des combustibles fossiles, ce qui laisse de nombreux pays développés dans une impasse.
Sur la base de l’analyse de cette étude, nous recommandons que le Canada adopte des orientations stratégiques et élabore des programmes novateurs et rationnels.
1 1.0 INTRODUCTION Governments around the world are under considerable pressure from their citizens to undertake urgent and bolder actions to get the world on the right track to achieve the Paris Agreement’s climate change goals and reduce the risks of global warming.
These governments are making multibillion-dollar bets to fund technology and adopt regulations that have broad implications for industrial strategy and development.
Industries – from the processing of raw materials to the manufacturing of goods – are also making multibillion-dollar choices on how best to position themselves in a lowcarbon economy.
It is therefore critical that the decisions being made are effective at the scale required and that the selected technological options have as great a chance as possible to reduce global warming’s impact.
It is equally important that there be no mismatch between the emissions accounting system and the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that actually end up in the atmosphere, based on the best science available.
A timely analysis to provide a better understanding of the technological solutions that can be deployed to reduce dependence on GHG-emitting fuels is critical to ensuring that policy and technological decisions are as effective as possible in reducing atmospheric GHG emissions.
2.0  INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 2.1 THE IPCC The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) came into existence in 1988 with the objective of providing policy-makers with scientific assessments on climate change, the risks of human-induced climate change, and to propose options for mitigation and adaptation.
Since 1990, the IPCC has produced a series of regular assessment reports.
The fifth report was published in 2014 and the sixth report will be finalized in 2022.
2.2 THE UNFCCC At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, countries1 adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the agreement came into force two years later with 195 countries signing on.
The countries meet annually at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to negotiate multilateral responses to limit global temperature increases and climate change, and to cope with their impacts.
In effect, the UNFCCC handles two related agreements – the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
2.3 KYOTO PROTOCOL In 1997 under the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC signatories introduced legally binding emission reduction targets for developed countries only.
The first commitment period to reach the targets ended in 2013.
A second commitment period was agreed to in the Doha Amendment, in which countries were to set binding targets to 2020.
The United States never signed on to the Kyoto Protocol and Canada pulled out before the end of the first 1 For simplicity, the term “countries” is used in lieu of the more general term “parties” used by the UNFCCC.
2 commitment period.
Russia, Japan and New Zealand are not taking part in the second commitment period.
The protocol now applies to only around 14 per cent of the world’s emissions (Council of the European Union 2018).
2.4 PARIS AGREEMENT AND SUCCEEDING COP MEETING In December 2015, countries reached a new global agreement on climate change, known as the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement entered into force in November 2016 after the conditions for ratification by at least 55 countries, accounting for at least 55 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, were met.
Currently, of 197 countries of the UNFCCC, 185 countries have ratified the Paris Agreement (United Nations 2019).
The essential elements of the Paris Agreement (United Nations 2015) include: 1.
Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and aiming to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C to significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change; 2.
Reaching global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible and undertaking rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with the best available science; 3.
Increasing the capacity to adapt to the existing impacts of climate change; and 4.
Mobilizing funds from developed countries to support climate mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.
Before and during the Paris conference, countries submitted comprehensive national climate action plans (INDCs) that if successfully implemented, will cause projected temperatures to rise 3.20C by 2100 (United Nations 2018), far beyond the desired 1.50C limit.
At COP21 in Paris, Canada committed to a 30-per-cent reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, relative to emissions in 2005.
At COP 22 in Marrakech in 2016, Canada further committed to a 70to 90-per-cent emissions reduction by 2050, relative to 2005.
COP 24, the latest meeting, was held in Katowice, Poland where the countries welcomed “the timely completion of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C” (see below) and put forward the rulebook to implement the Paris Agreement.
3.0 THE IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON MEETING 1.50C At COP 21 in Paris, the UNFCCC invited the IPCC to provide a special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and provide global GHG mitigation pathways for limiting the increase to 1.5°C.
The IPCC Special Report (2018b) was submitted in October 2018 along with the summary report for policy-makers (IPCC 2018a), ahead of COP 24 in Katowice.
The report provided the evidence that GHG emissions are harming the biosphere and human life in alarming ways that may soon become irreversible.
Average global temperatures have already risen by about 10C above pre-industrial levels.
They are on 3 pace to increase to 1.50C as early as 2030 and 20C by 2050 and will continue to climb after that.
The consequences are potentially disastrous, including record-breaking sea-level rise, flooding, wildfires, extreme weather events, famines and wildlife habitat destruction.
Warming is not uniform, and some regions are warming at a faster rate than others; for example, Canada is warming at twice the rate of the rest of the world and Northern Canada is warming at nearly three times the average global rate (Government of Canada 2019).
The economic impacts of climate change for individual countries could be dire.
Models of economic loss due to climate change estimate that unmitigated warming is expected to reduce average global incomes roughly 23 per cent by 2100 while widening global income inequality (Burke et al.
2015).
The Fourth National Climate Assessment Report (U.S.
Global Change Research Program 2018) included a 10 per cent economic contraction for the United States by 2100 and decreased agricultural production.
Other countries that will incur large social costs of carbon2 include India, China and Saudi Arabia (Ricke et al.
2018).
The clear and consistent message from climate scientists is that the body of evidence supporting anthropogenic global warming is very strong and long-term temperature increases provide substantiation of a warming planet (NASA 2019).
Moreover, there is compelling evidence that changes in the Earth’s climate have already happened, including increasing frequency of weather extremes causing heat waves, droughts, floods, fires and storms.
These climate hazards are affecting food security, human health, water supply, infrastructure and natural ecosystems.
Without immediate action to limit temperature increases, the impact of global warming could be destructive for humanity.
The IPCC report points to a significant difference between stabilizing the average global temperature at 1.50C compared to 20C in terms of substantially higher risks and irreversibility, such as the loss of coral reefs and ecosystems, and the potential for the uncontrolled release of methane hydrates.3 4.0  IPCC SCENARIO MODELLING TO LIMIT THE INCREASE TO 1.50C Scenarios from climate models can provide insights into relevant policies; for example, on how fast countries must decarbonize and when the peak of global emissions is reached.
Included in these assessments are the need for behavioural change, indicated by a decrease in global energy consumption, and the rate of transitioning to both available and immature low-carbon technologies.
The recent IPCC summary report for policy-makers (2018a, 14) provided scenarios for constraining global warming to 1.50C.
Table 1 summarizes 2 The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a commonly employed metric of the expected economic damages from carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions.
3 Methane hydrates are the world’s largest natural gas resource, currently trapped beneath permafrost and ocean sediments.
They could have a devastating impact on the climate and cause temperatures to rise far above what has been predicted, given that the comparative impact of methane on climate change is more than 20 times greater than carbon dioxide over a 100-year period.
4 the four scenarios showing the expansion of low-carbon energy sources in displacing fossil fuel combustion, that are required to limit the increase to 1.50C by 2050, based on a range from lower energy to higher energy demand.4 The overall target is for global emissions to be net zero by 2050.
This is consistent with the latest modelling study which shows the need to phase out the use of fossil fuels almost immediately (Smith et al.
2019).
TABLE 1 FOUR ILLUSTRATIVE MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND THEIR PATHWAYS TO LIMIT GLOBAL WARMING TO 1.50C.5 Source: IPCC (2018a, 14).
Reproduced from the report to show achievement of the net emissions reduction by 2050.
According to these results, CO 2 emissions must decrease by over 90 per cent in 2050 in all scenarios (the decrease ranges from 91 per cent to 97 per cent).
The faster the decrease happens (e.g., scenario P1) the less the need to resort to the use of immature and controversial carbon removal technologies such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, and direct air capture of CO 2 .
However, a 32-per-cent decrease in energy 4 The referenced report also includes strategies and pathways from now to 2030, in between those of 2050.
For simplicity, these strategies have not been included; nor are the insights from the 2050 modelling more relevant.
5 The pathways displacing fossil fuels are based on assumption of energy demand ranging from lower to higher than the demand in 2010 and the concomitant GHG reductions required to hold the increase to 1.50C.
For simplicity, land area for needed bioenergy crops is not shown.
5 demand by 2050 relative to 2010 (scenario P1) still requires a 150-per-cent increase in nuclear energy and a more than 800-per-cent increase in non-biomass renewables such as solar, wind and hydro by 2050.
This decrease in energy demand and the 93-percent GHG emission reduction by 2050 relative to 2010 is highly unlikely.
According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) New Policies Scenario (2018a), the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Reference Case (Capuano 2018, 6) and a recent Resources for the Future Report (Newell et al.
2019), the dominance of fossil fuels in the energy mix will continue to increase to 2040 and likely beyond.
This is driven by population increase and greater access to energy in developing countries, especially in Asia.
It is also driven by an increase in oil and gas reserves due to new technology (shale revolution) and by countries that have fossil fuel reserves and rely heavily on export revenues to support their national development.
In scenarios P3 and P4, the increase in energy demand continues to 2050, and this is highly probable given the above discussion.
To respond to an increase in energy demand by 2050 relative to 2010 (P3 and P4 scenarios) and still limit the increase to 1.50C, nuclear energy must increase between 468 to 501 per cent.
Also, renewables should provide greater than 60 per cent of global electricity.
Accordingly, non-biomass renewables must increase between 878 to 1,137 per cent and biomass renewables should increase between 121 to 418 per cent, with cumulative CCS (including BECCS) between 283 to 724 Gt CO 2 captured by 2100.
This massive scale-up of several low-carbon technologies to displace fossil fuels in a relatively short period is unprecedented.
If one considers that each of the mitigation pathways is far-fetched, then together they are especially unlikely.
The rate and extent of the low carbon-emitting technologies to displace fossil fuels will be discussed in some detail in section 5.0 below.
5.0  POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY PATHWAYS TO DISPLACE FOSSIL FUELS 5.1 NUCLEAR ENERGY Arguments for and against nuclear energy have many dimensions.
Nuclear energy’s major advantage is its reliability, with near zero GHG emissions.
As well, the high-energy density of its uranium fuel makes it far less land intensive than, for example, renewable energy and bioenergy.
The challenges for building new nuclear plants have become formidable, including high capital costs in relation to natural gas plants and renewable energy, regulatory delays, technical hurdles associated with disposal of nuclear wastes, use of copious amounts of water for cooling, and political and societal concerns.
Between 1996 and 2015, 80 new nuclear units came on line, mainly in developing countries, and these have been balanced by 75 plant retirements, mainly from developed countries (World Nuclear Association 2019).
Currently, there are about 450 reactors operating worldwide, supplying 11 per cent of the world’s electricity.
While modest growth in nuclear energy is to be expected in developing countries, it is difficult to believe that there will be more than 2,000 reactors in operation by 2050.
This is equivalent to building about one reactor every week between 2020 and 2050.
6 The development of small modular nuclear reactors and fusion energy shows promise as emerging and future forms of power that would generate electricity by using heat from nuclear fission and/or nuclear fusion reactions.
The time to commercialization of these future energy sources, the likely cost of commercial plants and the scale required suggest that they will have little impact on displacing fossil fuel plants in the 2050 timeframe.
5.2 RENEWABLE ENERGY (NON-BIOMASS) Wind and solar energy technologies have advanced rapidly and the costs of generating renewable electricity have fallen sharply in the last number of years.
Along with hydroelectric power, they form most of the non-biomass renewable energy and include to a much lesser extent geothermal and ocean resources.
As shown in Figure 1 (IEA 2018b), these combined sources of low-carbon electricity still account for only about five per cent of global energy on a million-tonnes-of-oil-equivalent basis (Mtoe) in 2017.
FIGURE 1 TOTAL GLOBAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN 2017 Source: IEA (2018b).
In units of million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe).
Assuming growth in the combined hydro and non-biomass renewables of about 800 per cent of 2017 figures by 2050 (P1 to P4 scenarios increase the range from 833 per cent to 1,327 per cent relative to 2010), this sector would exceed the current global total energy from oil.
Although transformation of the global electricity sector is happening rapidly and there are excellent opportunities for increasing the portion of low-carbon renewable energy, it is questionable if the increase in renewables that meets IPCC targets can be achieved in the next 30 years.
The main challenge with wind and solar is their inherently unreliable intermittent nature, requiring the rapid ramp-up of back-up power such as natural gas, hydro or batteries.
They also require large amounts of land, which is unfavourable and potentially expensive at the scale required.
7 5.3 BIOENERGY Bioenergy is considered a renewable energy resource derived from biomass that is sourced from forestry, agriculture and aquaculture operations.
Woody biomass from forestry operations is by far the most common biomass available in Canada and worldwide.
In Canada, bioenergy currently accounts for six per cent of total energy supply (Natural Resources Canada 2018).
Ever since global warming became an issue, there has been a concerted global effort to increase supply from bioenergy, especially in countries that are concerned about energy security (i.e., bioethanol production in Brazil and the U.S.) and in those with considerable forestry resources (i.e., Nordic countries) that have traditionally used it for heat and power.
In the European Union (EU) countries, the renewable energy total of 211 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) represented about 13 per cent of total energy production in 2015, of which biomass and waste generated about 65 per cent, as shown in Figure 2 (European Commission 2017, 43).
FIGURE 2 GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE 28 EU COUNTRIES IN 2015 Source: European Commission (2017).
In units of million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe).
The consumption of biomass in the EU countries has increased by 65 per cent in the past 10 years (Eurostat 2019).
The U.K. more than tripled its consumption between 2005 and 2015, primarily due to the conversion of coal plants to biomass-fired power generation.
Figure 3 shows the top EU countries in relation to the consumption of biomass and renewable waste in 2015.
8 FIGURE 3 GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION OF BIOMASS AND RENEWABLE WASTE IN THE TOP EU COUNTRIES IN 2015 Source: Eurostat (2019) Global bioenergy production has also increased dramatically, more than doubling between 2007 and 2017.
As shown in Figure 4, the U.S. produces over half of the world’s ethanol and, together with Brazil, the two countries produce 85 per cent of the world’s ethanol (Alternative Fuels Data Center 2018).
The vast majority of U.S. ethanol is produced from corn, while Brazil primarily uses sugar cane.
Canada produces about two per cent of global ethanol.
Biodiesel from oil crops and hydrogenated vegetable oil has seen an average growth of around 2.5 per cent per year to reach 83 Mtoe (143 billion litres) in 2017, representing some eight per cent of all biofuels output (IEA 2019a).
The demand for biofuels for use in vehicles and as a substitute for jet fuel is growing worldwide.
This is due to policies primarily in the EU, U.S., China, India and Latin America that support sustainable development goals, and as a way of increasing shares of renewable energy.
9 FIGURE 4 WORLD ETHANOL PRODUCTION BY COUNTRY AND REGION IN 2017 Source: AFDC (2018).
Units of million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) per annum.
The main case for renewable energy – when woody biomass is used for heat and electricity and biofuels are burned for transportation fuels – is that the CO 2 released is offset or partially offset by the CO 2 captured when trees are grown, or when feedstock crops are used to produce biofuels.
Life cycle analyses used to rationalize these arguments maintain that even when considering the land-use change (such as deforestation and soil carbon changes) on the climate system, in general there is a reduction of GHG emissions when biofeedstocks are used compared to fossil fuels.
Others have disputed these claims and have estimated that emissions due to land-use change for crop biofuels result in GHG emissions greater than those of fossil fuels except in the case of bio-waste products (Searchinger et al.
2008).
In the IPCC guidelines, direct CO 2 emissions from the combustion of biomass are recorded as zero in the energy sector and instead are reported in the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector of the inventory for the country where the biomass is produced (IPCC 2019).
The IPCC does not consider biomass use carbon neutral and requires that estimates be made of emissions due to harvesting and regrowth, land-use changes caused by biomass production, use of fertilizers, processing of the feedstock, transportation of the fuel, and direct methane and nitrous oxide emissions from combustion reported in the energy sector.
In our view, the IPCC accounting for biomass emissions is complex and impractical in that reported emissions by countries are nearly impossible to validate.
The IEA database of CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion excludes biomass fuels.
The argument used is that there may not be net emissions if the biomass is sustainably produced and in situations where the rate of combustion is faster than annual regrowth.
10 Then, the net CO 2 emissions will appear as a loss of biomass stocks in the land-use change module.
Until a few years ago, the EU’s CO 2 emissions from burning biomass or biofuels were counted as zero.
This assumed that the biomass emissions were saved during the growth phase and accounted for in the land-use sector.
The EU now acknowledges that this assumption is wrong and estimates that biomass emissions contributed an additional 90 to 150 million tonnes of CO 2 e in 2013 to the EU emissions trading system (Bannon 2015).
Many scientists have concluded that policies which seek to replace fossil fuels with biomass energy systems appear to be misguided and risk making matters worse (Isaacs 2018).
For example, a recent MIT-led study demonstrated that use of woody biomass in lieu of coal in power generation will worsen climate change impacts (Sterman et al.
2018).
This is because of the time lag between the instantaneous CO 2 release from combustion of wood and the decades of regrowth required; the carbon debt was estimated to range between 44 and 104 years.
In addition, there is a loss of future carbon sequestration from the growing trees that are cut down, a loss of soil carbon because of the disturbance, and a difference in carbon emissions due to the processing efficiency of biomass being less than that of coal.
It is our view that greenhouse gas emissions from all hydrocarbon sources, including biomass and biofuels, should be counted directly as emissions that contribute to exhausting the carbon budget6 because global warming depends on the accumulated CO 2 emissions over the decades that they remain in the atmosphere.
Accordingly, the scientifically allowable quantity of GHG emissions that can be emitted in total over a specified time to keep global warming at the desired temperature increase is dependent on the combustion step from all fuel sources and the concomitant atmospheric accumulation.
Land-use change in the case of emissions from bioenergy is of much less importance.
The IPCC guidelines for bioenergy do not count the emissions going into the atmosphere.
This contradicts the science that the emissions have a decades-long lifespan in the atmosphere regardless of the source of CO 2 .
Policies that have encouraged an upsurge in biomass and biofuel use as substitutes for fossil fuels are damaging to the global effort to reduce GHG emissions and to meeting obligations under the Paris Agreement.
In reality, the emissions of many countries are at a significantly higher level than they have reported.
The IPCC should take the biomass/biofuel pathway off the table and countries that have been the major devotees to this illusionary method for climate change mitigation should phase it out.
The benefits of biomass in contributing to carbon retention in, for example, forest growth and soil absorption should be positively considered in accounting for agriculture, forestry and land-use change (see section 5.6 below).
6 Carbon budgets are a way to measure the additional GHG emissions that can enter the atmosphere and still limit global warming to the desired levels.
In the latest IPCC report (2018a,12), the remaining carbon budget was estimated at 420 GtCO 2 or about 10 years of current emissions with a 66-per-cent chance of avoiding a 1.50C increase.
11 5.4 NATURAL GAS AS A BRIDGE FUEL The global use of natural gas has grown significantly in the past decade and now makes up about a quarter of electric power generation (IEA 2019b).
The growth is linked to its versatility as a clean burning fuel – a substitute for coal having about half of the GHG emissions of coal – and because natural gas generators can be ramped up and down quickly to support the integration of intermittent renewables.
Natural gas growth has been especially strong in the United States and China.
Growth in the U.S. is a result of natural gas being readily available and the low prices relative to the cost of generating electricity from coal (Logan et al.
2017).
In China, burning natural gas instead of coal has helped reduce air pollution, thus providing public health benefits.
With the advent of liquefied natural gas (LNG) – where natural gas is transported in liquid form in specially designed ships – natural gas is increasingly becoming a global commodity much like oil.
In the IPCC’s scenarios P3 and P4 (Table 1), global natural gas demand increases by 21 per cent and 37 per cent respectively.
This is consistent with the EIA’s projection of a 40-percent increase by 2040 in their reference scenario (Capuano 2018).
While the environmental case for natural gas is strong, fugitive emissions due to leaks in the extraction, processing and transportation systems, and intentional venting are serious shortcomings.
The climate benefits of switching from coal to natural gas supplies are negated at a leakage rate7 of four per cent and higher, as shown in Figure 5 (Farquharson et al.
2016).
The study compared the life cycle of coal and natural gas-based electricity and considered the 20 times higher warming potential of methane (the main component of natural gas) relative to CO 2 .
Estimates of a leakage rate from natural gas systems vary widely, but most studies suggest it ranges between one and five per cent and tends to the lower number (Farquharson et al.
2016, 858).
7 Leakage rate is defined as the volumetric percentage of natural gas that is lost as methane through the entire natural gas system.
12 FIGURE 5 THE BREAK-EVEN METHANE LEAKAGE FOR A NATURAL GAS COMBINED CYCLE PLANT IN COMPARISON TO PULVERIZED COAL AND ULTRA SUPERCRITICAL COAL PLANT Source: The figure was plotted from data provided by Farquharson et al.
(2016).
There is now a strong effort in many countries to eliminate methane leaks from equipment, pneumatic devices, compressors, well completions and venting.
For example, the Canadian government’s regulations require a 40to 45-per-cent methane reduction by 2025 to 2012 levels (Environment and Natural Resources Canada 2018).
5.5 CARBON CAPTURE UTILIZATION AND STORAGE (CCUS) In three of the four scenarios (P2, P3 and P4), carbon capture and storage (CCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) feature prominently as necessary ways to limit temperature increase.
The possibility of capturing and safely storing CO 2 geologically offers an important way to decouple fossil fuel and biofuel use from greenhouse gas emissions.
An overview of the CCS technologies and the status of CCS projects are available in the literature (Leung et al.
2014; Global CCS Institute 2018).
CCS technologies have been in commercial use for natural gas processing since the 1920s and for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) since the 1970s.
Using CCS for EOR is considered to negate any climate mitigation benefits due to the recovery of additional oil that would otherwise not be available.
More recently, there have been commercial-scale projects where the captured CO 2 is stored in underground saline aquifers (Global CCS Institute 2019); for example: • Sleipner in Norway is the world’s first commercial CO 2 storage project.
It has been operating since 1996, capturing the CO 2 from natural gas with a storage of about 0.9 Mt of CO 2 per annum; • Shell Quest in Canada captures CO 2 from a steam methane reforming operation and stores about 1.2 CO 2 per annum; and 13 • Snohvit in Norway captures CO 2 from an LNG plant with storage of about 0.7 Mt of CO 2 per annum, also in saline formations.
The commercialization of CCS has proven much more difficult and slower than originally envisioned.
In its monitoring of progress on ambitious clean energy goals, the IEA (2019c) shows that CCS is seriously off track.
This is in part due to the parasitic consumption8 contributing to the relatively high cost of CO 2 capture, the lack of infrastructure such as pipelines, uncertainty in the subsurface to prevent leakage, the sufficiency of storage space, legal and regulatory issues and, for bioenergy, the availability of land and feedstock at the scale required.
The scale of CCS required to achieve global warming goals is massive.
For example, Shell (2018) scenarios for meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement envisage the building of some 10,000 large carbon capture and storage facilities by 2070.
This is consistent with the above IPCC scenarios where the cumulative CO 2 that needs to be captured and stored to the year 2100 is between 348 and 1,191 Gt.
It is important to appreciate that one Gt is equivalent to some 830 storage sites like Shell Quest and the displacing of some 320 coal-fired plants (500 MW) by zero-emissions electricity.
In the long run, CCS has a critical role to play in achieving the needed emission reductions, not only in fossil and biofuel combustion but also in the industrial sector where there are limited options for fuel switching.
In recent years, increasing attention has turned to using captured CO 2 as feedstock for valuable products such as concrete, plastics, fuels, carbon fibre and other useful materials.
These CCUS technologies have the potential to reduce GHG emissions and generate positive economic returns.
However, the CCUS industry is still young, and venture funding has only recently begun to come together.
While many CCUS companies are at an active stage of research, some, like CarbonCure, a Canadian company that makes low-carbon concrete and whose products are used by over 100 concrete producers across North America, are commercial.
5.6 CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND NEGATIVE EMISSIONS Technologies that produce energy from fossil fuels and/or biomass, while capturing and storing the resulting CO 2 emissions, have been discussed in terms of their readiness to proceed to numerous applications.
Other mitigation options considered by the IPCC deploy negative emission technologies which remove CO 2 from the atmosphere and sequester it.
These include direct air capture of CO 2 , afforestation and reforestation,9 and soil carbon retention.
Direct Air Capture (DAC): Refers to chemical processes that capture the CO 2 from ambient air and concentrate it, so that it can be injected into a storage reservoir or used to produce fuels.
There are several DAC projects worldwide with most at an early stage 8 The power and efficiency losses of energy input that is used to run the carbon capture unit.
The typical level of parasitic consumption is estimated to range from 20 to 25 per cent.
9 Afforestation is the process of establishing forests in areas that have never been forested, while reforestation is the restoration of forests in areas where they were removed or destroyed.
14 of development or being tested at a demonstration scale.
Because the concentration of CO 2 in the atmosphere is very low (about 410 PPM), considerably more energy is required than carbon capture from flue gas (CO 2 concentration of about five to 10 per cent or 50,000 to 100,000 PPM).
Ranjan, Herzog and Meldon (2010) calculated that the energy cost of direct air capture, not including capital costs, would be in the range of $420-$630/tonnes of CO 2, considering the minimum thermodynamic work required.
This is in alignment with costs of $600/tonne of CO 2 reported by Climeworks, a leading DAC company (Evans 2017).
A more recent study concluded that it would cost between $104 and $256 per tonne ($94 and $232 per ton) of captured CO 2 if existing technologies were implemented on a commercial scale (Keith et al.
2018).
Nevertheless, the high carbonfree energy requirements will constrain the global growth of DAC and it is unlikely to have a large effect on CO 2 mitigation.
Afforestation and Reforestation: Planting trees is a powerful weapon for combating climate change.
One estimate holds that it is possible to plant an additional 1.2 trillion trees in the world’s parks, forests and abandoned land to compensate for 10 years of the global emissions of CO 2 (ETH Zurich 2019).
The Shell (2018, 5) scenarios also emphasize the need to reforest an area the size of Brazil while achieving a net-zero deforestation.
It appears that tree planting and much-reduced deforestation are effective ways of reducing atmospheric CO 2 emissions and need more attention from the IPCC.
These methods should start to figure prominently in many countries’ climate change strategies.
Another form of mitigation is to sequester the carbon in long-lived forestry products, such as replacing steel and concrete with wood products or engineered wood products potentially containing nano-materials.
Soil Carbon Retention: Methods that involve using biological processes to increase carbon stocks in soils, forests and wetlands can remove CO 2 from the atmosphere.
On a large scale, they can improve soil quality, local food security and biodiversity.
Management practices such as reduced or no tillage, erosion control, use of cover crops and addition of organic amendments can significantly reduce carbon loss and increase carbon sequestration in the soil.
The carbon sink capacity of soils is substantial, on the order of tens of gigatonnes of CO 2 (Lal 2004).
The IPCC should quantify and promote soil carbon retention methods.
Developed economies must advance the implementation of these methods while transferring the lessons and providing resources to developing countries.
6.0 CLIMATE MITIGATION STRATEGIES BY COUNTRIES Global investment in energy infrastructure is a key indicator of the alignment with the Paris Agreement since investments made today will affect emissions for several decades.
Between 2010 and 2018, global investment in renewable power was 40 per cent of total investment in the power sector (IEA 2019b).
Global investment in upstream oil and gas infrastructure was about the same as the entire power sector.
The U.S. and China represented over 50 per cent of the total global energy investment in 2018; their combined investment in renewable power significantly exceeded that of thermal power.
However, the total combined investment of the U.S. and China in fossil fuel-based infrastructure (oil and gas and thermal power) exceeded the investment in renewable 15 power by a margin of more than two to one.
In Europe, total fossil fuel investment was about equal to that of renewable power.
These current trends, alongside the analysis provided in Section 5.0, are an indication of the glaring mismatch with the paths required to meet the Paris Agreement in the next few decades.
A growing number of countries plan to ban the future sale of vehicles powered by fossil fuels, primarily gasoline and diesel (Worldatlas 2018).
These include several EU countries, China, India and Japan.
Like the shift to greater electrification of energy end uses in space and water heating, electrifying transportation will herald the potential for immense changes in the energy system driven by technology improvements and competitiveness.
This indicates that many countries are aiming their policies at the changing energy market dynamics.
Some countries’ carbon policies are designed to regulate specific industries such as transportation by banning fossil fuel-powered vehicles or power generation by shutting down coal-fired plants.
Other countries are imposing a more encompassing carbon tax or cap-and-trade system to control emissions.
The Canadian government has chosen to phase out coal-fired power generation by 2030 and levy a nation-wide carbon price on fuel combustion that does not include bioenergy fuels.
The charge began at $20 in 2019 and will rise to $50 per tonne of CO 2 by 2022.
Provinces could create their own systems of carbon pricing based on their needs.
For provinces that did not create their own plans, the federal government imposed the tax to be redistributed to the provinces in a revenue-neutral manner.
Dobson, Winter and Boyd (2019) give more details on how pricing coverage is applied across the economy, including exemptions to energyintensive, trade-exposed industries.
In our view, carbon pricing should not be focused on revenue recycling; instead, the revenue should be invested in creative infrastructure solutions such as an east-to-west modern electric grid that would allow all provinces to develop more wind and solar opportunities.
This could be a first step to the development of the proposed northern corridor as a means of enhancing and facilitating commerce, internal trade and a lower carbon footprint (Fellows and Tombe 2018).
A key conclusion from the analysis provided in this study is that the decarbonization pathways promoted by the IPCC and pursued by many developed countries are inadequate and mostly ineffective from the perspective of the scale required, the GHG emissions accounting system used and the accepted scientific basis for global warming.
When it comes to biofuel energy policies, the accounting system is misguided.
Many developed countries continue to use renewables as a cover for not properly accounting for combustion emissions from all fuels.
As Le Quéré et al.
(2019) report, policy-driven efforts in many countries to reduce emissions can be effective but need to be more stringent in line with the Paris Agreement.
At the same time, there is a critical need to be wary of current policies that will increase emissions.
The world may or may not honour its pledge to keep temperatures below a certain level, but unless attention is paid to the GHG emissions that end up in the atmosphere, it will not matter if countries are developing the right strategies.
16 7.0 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Through effective and innovative policies, Canada must manage the risks of global warming that bring on a wide range of costs due to forest fires, severe flooding and threats to infrastructure.
Such policies need to consider that global GHG emissions continue to accumulate in the atmosphere and no significant reversal of this trend is indicated for the near future.
The implication is that temperatures will continue to increase, if not accelerate, during this century.
It is important that Canada build on its competitive advantage and pursue a distinct strategy from that of other countries in addressing climate change, including policies that: • Direct10 the IPCC to provide a more credible assessment to policy-makers on how fast and by how much emissions can be reduced and the degree of confidence in the solutions to global warming.
Canada should stress the need for proper accounting for GHG emissions, especially in the case of bioenergy.
This is required to ensure that the Paris Agreement is not jeopardized by unrealistic and unhelpful conjecture; • Establish Canada as the first country in the world to extend carbon pricing to include direct emissions from bioenergy fuels.
This will emphasize that the world should take seriously the need to curtail all GHG emissions based on scientific evidence and that all sectors of the economy must be treated alike; • Take a more pro-active approach to adaptation and significantly increase investments in infrastructure to protect communities from the threat of sea-level rise and also those at risk from extreme weather events.
Canada has little control over global emissions increasing in the atmosphere and the analysis in this paper suggests that temperatures in Canada will continue to rise.
It is therefore prudent for Canada to focus resources on climate change initiatives that it can control.
This is consistent with the recent report from the Council of Canadian Academies (Leggat, Beale and Gosselin 2019) that identified the climate change risks Canada should adapt to, and avoid major losses, damages and disruptions; • Increase afforestation, reforestation and soil carbon enhancement while restricting land clearance to reduce heat-trapping emissions that cause global warming.
Direct investments into non-combustion uses of biomass and fossil resources.
As this analysis indicates, forest ecosystems and agricultural land can have a significant impact on climate change.
For Canada, this would be part of a national strategy for a new non-combustion resource economy that includes a focus on research into innovative manufactured products such as carbon fibre and other low-carbon materials.
10 Canada is a major financial contributor to the IPCC, as evidenced by the following quote from Environment and Climate Change Canada’s website: “Canada also provides consistent financial support to the IPCC ($300,000/year) and ranks among the top 10 contributors to the IPCC’s Trust Fund.” Available at https:// www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/ intergovernmental-climate-change-panel.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/intergovernmental-climate-change-panel.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/intergovernmental-climate-change-panel.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/intergovernmental-climate-change-panel.html 17 REFERENCES11 Alternative Fuels Data Center.
2018.
“World Fuel Ethanol Production by Country or Region.” U.S. Department of Energy.
Worksheet available at www.afdc.energy.gov/data/.
Bannon, Eoin.
2015.
“Reasons to Change the Zero-Rated Criteria for Biomass in the EU ETS.” European Environmental Bureau, and Transport & Environment.
Available at https://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/reasons-change-zero-ratedcriteria-biomass-eu-ets.
Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel.
2015.
“Global Non-Linear Effect of Temperature on Economic Production.” Nature, vol.
527: 235-239.
Accessed July 8, 2019.
Available at https://web.stanford.edu/~mburke/climate/.
Capuano, Linda.
2018. International Energy Outlook 2018.
U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Presentation to Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Available at https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/capuano_07242018.pdf.
Council of the European Union.
2018.
“International Agreements on Climate Action.” Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/ international-agreements-climate-action/.
Dobson, Sarah, Jennifer Winter, and Brendan Boyd.
2019.
“The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Coverage of Carbon Pricing Instruments for Canadian Provinces.” University of Calgary, the School of Public Policy Publications, SPP Research Paper, vol.
12:6.
Accessed April 12, 2019.
Available at https://www.policyschool.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/Carbon-Pricing-Dobson-Winter-Boyd-final2.pdf.
Environment and Natural Resources Canada.
2018.
“Canada’s Methane Regulations for the Upstream Oil and Gas Sector.”Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/ environment-climate-change/services/canadian-environmental-protection-actregistry/proposed-methane-regulations-additional-information.html.
ETH Zurich.
2019.
“Predicting Climate Change: Understanding Carbon Cycle Feedbacks to Predict Climate Change at Large Scale.” EurekAlert.
American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Available at https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_ releases/2019-02/ez-pcc021119.php.
European Commission.
2017.
“E.U.
Energy in Figures.
Statistical Pocketbook 2017.” Available at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/pocketbook_ energy_2017_web.pdf.
Eurostat.
2019.
“Environmental Data Centre on Natural Resources, Energy Resources from Biomass.”Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/environmental-data-centreon-natural-resources/natural-resources/energy-resources/energy-from-biomass.
Evans, Simon.
2017.
“The Swiss Company Hoping to Capture 1% of Global CO 2 Emissions by 2025.” Carbonbrief.
Available at https://www.carbonbrief.org/swiss-companyhoping-capture-1-global-co2-emissions-2025.
11 Online material was accessed between Feb. 20 and March 31, 2019, unless indicated otherwise.
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/data/ https://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/reasons-change-zero-rated-criteria-biomass-eu-ets https://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/reasons-change-zero-rated-criteria-biomass-eu-ets https://web.stanford.edu/~mburke/climate/ https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/capuano_07242018.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/international-agreements-climate-action/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/international-agreements-climate-action/ https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Carbon-Pricing-Dobson-Winter-Boyd-final2.pdf https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Carbon-Pricing-Dobson-Winter-Boyd-final2.pdf https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/canadian-environmental-protection-act-registry/proposed-methane-regulations-additional-information.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/canadian-environmental-protection-act-registry/proposed-methane-regulations-additional-information.html https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/canadian-environmental-protection-act-registry/proposed-methane-regulations-additional-information.html https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-02/ez-pcc021119.php https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-02/ez-pcc021119.php https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/pocketbook_energy_2017_web.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/pocketbook_energy_2017_web.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/environmental-data-centre-on-natural-resources/natural-resources/energy-resources/energy-from-biomass https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/environmental-data-centre-on-natural-resources/natural-resources/energy-resources/energy-from-biomass https://www.carbonbrief.org/swiss-company-hoping-capture-1-global-co2-emissions-2025 https://www.carbonbrief.org/swiss-company-hoping-capture-1-global-co2-emissions-2025 18 Farquharson, DeVynne, Paulina Jaramillo, Greg Schivley, Kelly Klima, Derrick Carlson, and Constantine Samaras.
2016.
“Beyond Global Warming Potential: A Comparative Application of Climate Impact Metrics for the Life Cycle Assessment of Coal and Natural Gas-Based Electricity.” Journal of Industrial Ecology, vol.
21, no.
4: 857-873.
Available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ jiec.12475#accessDenialLayout.
Fellows, G. Kent, and Trevor Tombe.
2018.
“Gains from Trade for Canada’s North: The Case for a Northern Infrastructure Corridor.” University of Calgary, the School of Public Policy Publications, SPP Communiqué, vol.
10:2.
Available at https://www.
policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Trade-Gains-Canadas-North-FellowsTombe-final4.pdf.
Global CCS Institute.
2018.
“The Global Status of CCS Report 2018.” Accessed July 5, 2019.
Available at https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-statusreport/.
Global CCS Institute.
2019.
“CO 2 RE’s CCS Database, Facility Data.” Accessed July 5, 2019.
Available at https://co2re.co/FacilityData.
Government of Canada.
2019.
“Canada’s Changing Climate Report.” E. Bush and D.S.
Lemmen, eds.
Accessed April 9, 2019.
Available at https://changingclimate.ca/ CCCR2019.
International Energy Agency (IEA).
2018a.
“World Energy Outlook 2018.
Executive Summary.” Available at https://webstore.iea.org/download/summary/190?fileName =English-WEO-2018-ES.pdf.
———.
2018b.
“World Energy Outlook.
The Gold Standard of Energy Analysis.” Available at https://www.iea.org/weo/.
———.
2019a.
“Biofuels for Transport – Tracking Clean Energy Progress.” Available at https://www.iea.org/tcep/transport/biofuels/.
———.
2019b.
“World Energy Investment 2019.” Accessed July 8, 2019.
Available at https://www.iea.org/wei2019/.
———.
2019c.
“Tracking Clean Energy Progress, Informing Energy Sector Transformations, 2019.” Available at https://www.iea.org/tcep/.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2018a.
“Summary for Policymakers.” Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_ version_report_LR.pdf.
———.
2018b.
“About.” Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/about/.
———.
2019.
“Task Force on National Gas Inventories – Frequently Asked Questions.” Available at https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/faq/faq.html.
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Trade-Gains-Canadas-North-Fellows-Tombe-final4.pdf https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Trade-Gains-Canadas-North-Fellows-Tombe-final4.pdf https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Trade-Gains-Canadas-North-Fellows-Tombe-final4.pdf https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-status-report/ https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-status-report/ https://co2re.co/FacilityData https://changingclimate.ca/CCCR2019 https://changingclimate.ca/CCCR2019 https://webstore.iea.org/download/summary/190?fileName=English-WEO-2018-ES.pdf https://webstore.iea.org/download/summary/190?fileName=English-WEO-2018-ES.pdf https://www.iea.org/weo/ https://www.iea.org/tcep/transport/biofuels/ https://www.iea.org/wei2019/ https://www.iea.org/tcep/ https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/about/ https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/faq/faq.html 19 Isaacs, Eddy.
2018.
“Bioenergy the Turning Tide: Biomass Emissions Are Not Carbon Neutral – We Need to Change How We Account for Them.” Blog.
School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
Available at https://www.policyschool.ca/bioenergythe-turning-tide-biomass-emissions-are-not-carbon-neutral-we-need-to-changehow-we-account-for-them/.
Keith, David W., Geoffrey Holmes, David St. Angelo, and Kenton Heidel.
2018.
“A Process for Capturing CO2 from the Atmosphere.” Joule.
1573-1594.
Available at https://www.cell.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2542-4351%2818%2930225-3.
Lal, R. 2004.
“Soil Carbon Sequestration Impacts on Global Climate Change and Food Security.” Science, vol.
304.
Available at https://www.c-agg.org/wp-content/ uploads/1623.pdf.
Le Quéré, Corinne, Jan-Ivar Korsbakken, Charlie Wilson, Jale Tosun, Robbie Andrew, Robert J. Andres, Josep G. Canadell, Andrew Jordan, Glen P. Peters, and Detlef P. van Vuuren.
2019.
“Drivers of Declining CO2 Emissions in 18 Developed Economies.” Nature Climate Change, vol.
9: 213-217.
Available at https://www.nature.com/articles/ s41558-019-0419-7.
Leggat, L.J., Elizabeth Beale, and Pierre Gosselin.
2019.
“Canada’s Top Climate Change Risks: The Expert Panel on Climate Change Risks and Adaptation Potential.” Council of Canadian Academies.
Report.
Accessed July 7, 2019.
Available at https://cca-reports.ca/reports/prioritizing-climate-change-risks/.
Leung, Dennis Y.C., Giorgio Caramanna, and Mercedes M. Maroto-Valerb.
2014.
“An Overview of Current Status of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Technologies.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol.
39: 426-443.
Available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032114005450.
Logan, Jeffrey, Cara Marcy, James McCall, Francisco Flores-Espino, Aaron Bloom, Jørn Aabakken, Wesley Cole, Thomas Jenkin, Gian Porro, Chang Liu, Francesco Ganda, Richard Boardman, Thomas Tarka, John Brewer, and Travis Schultz.
2017.
“Electricity Generation Baseline Report.” National Energy Technology Laboratory.
U.S. Department of Energy.
Accessed July 5, 2019.
Available at https://www.nrel.gov/ docs/fy17osti/67645.pdf.
NASA.
2019.
“Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming.” Global Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet.
Accessed July 5, 2019.
Available at https://climate.nasa.gov/ scientific-consensus/.
Natural Resources Canada.
2018.
“Bioenergy Systems.” Available at https://www.nrcan.
gc.ca/energy/renewable-electricity/bioenergy-systems/7311.
Newell, Richard G., Daniel Raimi, and Gloria Aldana.
2019.
“Global Energy Outlook 2019: The Next Generation of Energy.” Resources for the Future.
Report 19-06.
July 2019.
Accessed July 8, 2019.
Available at https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/globalenergy-outlook-2019/.
https://www.policyschool.ca/bioenergy-the-turning-tide-biomass-emissions-are-not-carbon-neutral-we-need-to-change-how-we-account-for-them/ https://www.policyschool.ca/bioenergy-the-turning-tide-biomass-emissions-are-not-carbon-neutral-we-need-to-change-how-we-account-for-them/ https://www.policyschool.ca/bioenergy-the-turning-tide-biomass-emissions-are-not-carbon-neutral-we-need-to-change-how-we-account-for-them/ https://www.cell.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2542-4351%2818%2930225-3 https://www.c-agg.org/wp-content/uploads/1623.pdf https://www.c-agg.org/wp-content/uploads/1623.pdf https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0419-7 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0419-7 https://cca-reports.ca/reports/prioritizing-climate-change-risks/ https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032114005450 https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67645.pdf https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67645.pdf https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/renewable-electricity/bioenergy-systems/7311 https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/renewable-electricity/bioenergy-systems/7311 https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/global-energy-outlook-2019/ https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/global-energy-outlook-2019/ 20 Ranjan, Manya, Howard Herzog, and Jerry Meldon.
2010.
“The Feasibility of Air Capture.” Carbon Capture and Sequestration Technologies at MIT.
Available at http://sequestration.mit.edu/research/aircapture.html Ricke, Katharine, Laurent Drouet, Ken Caldeira, and Massimo Tavoni.
2018.
“CountryLevel Social Cost of Carbon.” Nature Climate Change, vol.
8: 895-900.
Available at https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1038%2Fs41558-018-0282-y.
Searchinger, Timothy, Ralph Heimlich, R.A. Houghton, Fengxia Dong, Amani Elobeid, Jacinto Fabiosa, Simla Tokgoz, Dermot Hayes, and Tun-Hsiang Yu.
2008.
“Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases through Emissions from LandUse Change.” Science 319: 1238-1240.
Available at http://www.energyjustice.net/ files/ethanol/ghg/2008-Searchinger-Science-1238-40.pdf.
Shell.
2018.
“Meeting the Goals of the Paris Agreement.” Shell Scenarios Sky.
Available at https://www.shell.com/promos/meeting-the-goals-of-the-paris-agreement/_jcr_ content.stream/1530643931055/eca19f7fc0d20adbe830d3b0b27bcc9ef72198f5/ shell-scenario-sky.pdf.
Smith, Christopher J., Piers M. Forster, Myles Allen, Jan Fuglestvedt, Richard J. Millar, Joeri Rogelj, and Kirsten Zickfeld.
2019.
“Current Fossil Fuel Infrastructure Does Not Yet Commit us to 1.5°C Warming.” Nature Communications 10:101.
Available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07999-w. Sterman, John D., Lori Siegel, and Juliette N. Rooney-Varga.
2018.
“Does Replacing Coal with Wood Lower CO 2 Emissions?
Dynamic Lifecycle Analysis of Wood Bioenergy.” Environment Research Letters.
IOP Science.
13-1.
Available at https://iopscience.iop.
org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aaa512.
United Nations.
2015.
Paris Agreement, Article 2.1a: 3.
Available at https://unfccc.int/sites/ default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.
———.
2018.
“Emissions Gap Report 2018.” Available at https://content.yudu.com/ web/2y3n2/0A2y3n3/EGR2018/html/index.html?page=2&origin=reader.
———.
2019.
“Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification.” Available at https://unfccc.int/ process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification.
U.S.
Global Change Research Program.
2018.
“Fourth National Climate Assessment,” vols.
I and II.
Available at https://www.globalchange.gov/nca4.
World Nuclear Association.
2019.
“Plans for New Reactors Worldwide.
Updated February 2019.” Available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-andfuture-generation/plans-for-new-reactors-worldwide.aspx.
Worldatlas.
2018.
“Countries that will Ban Gasoline Cars.” Accessed April 12, 2019.
Available at http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-that-will-ban-gasolinecars.html.
http://sequestration.mit.edu/people/hjherzog/index.html http://ase.tufts.edu/faculty-guide/fac/jmeldon.chemeng.htm http://sequestration.mit.edu/research/aircapture.html https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1038%2Fs41558-018-0282-y http://www.energyjustice.net/files/ethanol/ghg/2008-Searchinger-Science-1238-40.pdf http://www.energyjustice.net/files/ethanol/ghg/2008-Searchinger-Science-1238-40.pdf https://www.shell.com/promos/meeting-the-goals-of-the-paris-agreement/_jcr_content.stream/1530643931055/eca19f7fc0d20adbe830d3b0b27bcc9ef72198f5/shell-scenario-sky.pdf https://www.shell.com/promos/meeting-the-goals-of-the-paris-agreement/_jcr_content.stream/1530643931055/eca19f7fc0d20adbe830d3b0b27bcc9ef72198f5/shell-scenario-sky.pdf https://www.shell.com/promos/meeting-the-goals-of-the-paris-agreement/_jcr_content.stream/1530643931055/eca19f7fc0d20adbe830d3b0b27bcc9ef72198f5/shell-scenario-sky.pdf https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07999-w https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aaa512 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aaa512 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf https://content.yudu.com/web/2y3n2/0A2y3n3/EGR2018/html/index.html?page=2&origin=reader https://content.yudu.com/web/2y3n2/0A2y3n3/EGR2018/html/index.html?page=2&origin=reader https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification https://www.globalchange.gov/nca4 http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/plans-for-new-reactors-worldwide.aspx http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/plans-for-new-reactors-worldwide.aspx http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-that-will-ban-gasoline-cars.html http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-that-will-ban-gasoline-cars.html 21 About the Author Eddy Isaacs is the former CEO of Alberta Innovates – Energy & Environment Solutions.
Currently, he is the President of Eddy Isaacs Inc. and an Executive Fellow at The School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary.
He also serves as President of the Canadian Academy of Engineering.
Eddy has spent his career promoting innovation in energy and environment across Canada and in forging partnerships between industry, government and academia.
In 2014, he received the ASTECH Foundation’s award for his outstanding contribution to the Alberta science and technology community.
Eddy has served as co-Chair of the Energy Technology Working Group of the Canadian Council of Energy Ministers.
He is regularly called upon to provide expert opinion and insight into Alberta’s future in energy and environment.
Eddy holds a PhD from the University of Alberta and a BSc from McGill University.
He has over 80 publications and six patents in the energy field.
He serves as a Board Member of: the Council of Canadian Academies; the Scientific Advisory Committee for the NRG-COSIA X-Prize; and the External Advisors’ Panel of the Auditor General of Alberta.
22 ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY The School of Public Policy has become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada.
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance for the betterment of our families, communities and country.
We do this by: • Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree programs, giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital interests both here and abroad; • Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures; • Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
The School of Public Policy relies on industry experts and practitioners, as well as academics, to conduct research in their areas of expertise.
Using experts and practitioners is what makes our research especially relevant and applicable.
Authors may produce research in an area which they have a personal or professional stake.
That is why The School subjects all Research Papers to a double anonymous peer review.
Then, once reviewers comments have been reflected, the work is reviewed again by one of our Scientific Directors to ensure the accuracy and validity of analysis and data.
The School of Public Policy University of Calgary, Downtown Campus 906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9 Phone: 403 210 3802 DISTRIBUTION Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors' alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT Copyright © Isaacs 2019.
This is an open-access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons license CC BY-NC 4.0, which allows non-commercial sharing and redistribution so long as the original author and publisher are credited.
ISSN ISSN 2560-8312 The School of Public Policy Publications (Print) ISSN 2560-8320 The School of Public Policy Publications (Online) DATE OF ISSUE September 2019 MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-220-2540.
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The School's events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT For information about contributing to The School of Public Policy, please contact Catherine Scheers by telephone at 403-210-6213 or by e-mail at catherine.scheers@ucalgary.ca.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 23 RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX ON THE ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES OF THE CANADIAN PROVINCES https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Canada-CIT-Dahlby-Ferede.pdf Ergete Ferede and Bev Dahlby | September 2019 SIMULATING THE GROWTH EFFECTS OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE CUTS IN ALBERTA https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Alberta-CIT-Dahlby-Ferede.pdf Ergete Ferede and Bev Dahlby | September 2019 THE ROLE OF STORAGE IN ALBERTA’S ELECTRICITY MARKET: SUMMARY OF A SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY ROUNDTABLE EVENT https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AB-Electricity-Shaffer.pdf Blake Shaffer | September 2019 NURTURING GLOBAL GROWTH COMPANIES: TIME FOR A NEW POLICY TOOLKIT https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Global-Growth-Companies-Lortie.pdf Pierre Lortie | September 2019 THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IN THE FACE OF THE RUSSIAN (DIS)INFORMATION MACHINE: WHERE DOES CANADA STAND?
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Final-Version_Western-Alliance-Sukhankin.pdf Sergey Sukhankin | September 2019 ALTERING THE TAX MIX IN ALBERTA https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Tax-Mix-Alberta-McKenzie-final-version.pdf Kenneth McKenzie | September 2019 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: CANADA AND U.S.
FERTILITY RATES, 1920-2018 https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Social-Policy-Trends-Birth-Rates-August-2019.pdf Ronald Kneebone | August 2019 SLOW, SUBJECTIVE AND STRESSFUL: A GUIDE TO CANADA’S ASYLUM SYSTEM https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Asylum-System-Falconer-Final.pdf Robert Falconer | August 2019 REGULATING FINTECH IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: COMPARISON, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Fintech-Clements-final.pdf Ryan Clements | August 2019 UNDERSTANDING CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Indigenous-Consultation-Boyd-Lorefice-final2.pdf Brendan Boyd and Sophie Lorefice | August 2019 WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE CANADIAN OIL AND GAS COMPANIES?
2017 https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Where-in-the-World-2017-Larson.pdf Braeden Larson | July 2019 TRADE POLICY TRENDS: BREXIT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA-UK TRADE https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Trade-Policy-Trends-Brexit-final.pdf Dylan Klemen and Eugene Beaulieu | July 2019 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Financial-Supports-for-Refugees-and-Asylum-Seekers-FINAL-version.pdf Robert Falconer | July 2019
Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 ISSN: 2073-9524 eISSN: 2310-8746 118 Farmers’ Perception of Climate Variability and Adaptation Strategies in Akoko Southwest Local Government Area, Ondo State, Nigeria Oluwatoyin Olatunde Olagunju 1 , Oreoluwa Adesewa Alomaja 2 , Isah Shehu Nabara 3 , Oluwaseun Adetarami 4 , Oluwafolakemi Ayo Olaniyan 5 , Adeyose Emmanuel Akinbola 6 1,2 Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Nigeria.
3 Department of Agricultural science education, Niger State College of Education, Minna, Nigeria.
4 Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Nigeria.
5 Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Nigeria.
6 Department of Agricultural Economics, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Nigeria.
1 Corresponding author: oluwatoyin.olagunju@aaua.edu.ng Article history: Received: 16 September 2022 Accepted: 27 October 2022 Published: 30 December 2022 Abstract The research assessed farmers of arable crops in Akoko southwest local government area of Ondo State, Nigeria on their adaptation strategies to perceived climatic unpredictability.
Using a multistage sampling, cross-sectional data were collected from 150 farmers in rural areas of all the local governments using a standardized questionnaire.
Descriptive and inferential statistics including chi-square, Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC), and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) were utilized to analyses the study's data.
The study revealed a significant relationship between household size (χ2=179.3, p<0.05), farm size (χ2=136.4, p<0.05) and adaptation strategies.
Also, there was a significant influence of gender (t=3.001), access to credit (t=2.459), and other sources of income (t=2.384) on adaptation strategies to be adopted by farmers at p<0.05.
The findings indicate that the farmers are severely constrained by a lack of suitable irrigation infrastructure and insufficient government support, which has decreased production and may result in lower profits and more poverty.
According to the results, farmers' perceptions of climatic unpredictability have a significant impact on their adaptation techniques.
A better understanding of climatic variability would help farmers develop better adaptation strategies, which will enhance their livelihoods and lower poverty levels in rural regions.
The government should launch awareness and sensitization programmers at all levels to create a community where farmers are well-versed in the causes and impacts of climatic variability.
Keywords: Arable crop, Climate variability, Constraints, Farmers, Socio-economic.
https://dx.doi.org/10.52951/dasj.22140211 This article is open-access under the CC BY 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction Agriculture is an important human activity because it provides food, raw materials, shelter, clothing, fiber, and other byproducts (Tandzi and Mutengwa, 2020).
It is thus impossible to overstate the significance of its connection with the environment because the climate is the main driver of agricultural output.
Because of this, both farmers and the government have been gravely concerned about the possible consequences of climatic variability on agricultural productivity (Thompson and Oparinde, 2015).
Climate variability-related pressures affect mailto:oluwatoyin.olagunju@aaua.edu.ng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9472-4004 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3299-886X https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0253-7568 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0651-470X https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8341-7535 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4588-4220 Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 119 subsistence farmers in a variety of ways, including changes in rainfall, average temperature, and exposure to extreme climate variability events and circumstances, which have a significant influence on soil erosion (droughts, dry spells), changes in the growing season, and changes in sea level (Praveen and Sharma, 2019).
Given that most rural populations still rely heavily on agricultural output for their food and income, climate change conditions like rising temperatures, decreasing rainfall, and increasing rainfall unpredictability are a serious threat to food security, crop productivity, and the fight against poverty (Gezie and Tegba, 2019).
To maintain and enhance farmers' livelihoods and assure food security, it is crucial to adapt the agricultural industry to the negative consequences of climatic variability (Ayanlade et al., 2018).
Beyond specific weather events, climate variability is the variance in the average condition and other statistics of the climate on all temporal and geographical dimensions (Ukhurebor and Siloko, 2020).
When compared to long-term data for the same calendar time, the phrase "climate variability" is frequently used to describe deviations in climatic statistics during a specific period (e.g., month, season, or year).
These deviations, which are typically referred to as anomalies, may be caused by either natural internal processes within the climate system (internal variability) or by fluctuations in natural or manmade external variables (external variability) (Rathoure and Patel, 2020; Zadawa and Omran, 2020).
Due to its potential to adversely influence components of several systems and sectors that endanger human health, climate variability has become a global issue (Somboonsuke et al., 2018).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's fifth assessment report offered convincing proof that human activity is changing the climate (IPCC, 2013).
Recent climate variability has clearly affected agriculture in several parts of Nigeria, especially in Ondo State, which includes Akoko Southwest.
In order to create adaptation methods to deal with the challenges and risks of climate variability in the agricultural sector, farmers' awareness of climate variability is essential (Aryal et al., 2021).
Such knowledge is essential in Nigeria since the key predictor of how well agriculture can be carried out is climate, and changes in climate have significant effects not just on the agricultural sector but also on other sectors (Mashizha, 2019).
Studies have revealed that the agricultural industry, food security, community health, natural resources, biodiversity, and water supply are all greatly threatened by climate variability and extreme weather events (Dube et al., 2016; Muluneh, 2021).
The implications of climatic variability would be stronger on socioeconomic development and agriculture, which play considerably more significant roles in food production in Africa, according to projections from the intergovernmental panels on climate change (IPCC, 2013).
Long-term adaptation actions have been outlined in Nigeria's national statements to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, along with several other African nations.
In their National Adaptation Programme of Actions (NAPAs), which emphasize agriculture, food security, and water resource management, several of these nations have specified emergency adaptation measures (Ayanlade et al., 2018).
Many of the measures have not yet been completely implemented, keeping many farmers in the dark about the difficulties that climatic unpredictability presents for agricultural productivity (Yohannes, 2016).
This indicates that because of their abilities to adapt to climate change or fluctuation, African nations are likely to be more severely affected.
However, it is clear from the research that farmers' comprehension of and adaptability to climatic fluctuation are essential to Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 120 ensuring food security and preserving the poor's means of subsistence (Ajilogba and Walker, 2020).
In agriculture, factors such as culture, traditions, market, water availability, climate, soil quality, plot size, and distance from home affect what can be produced and how it can be produced (Akpenpuun and Busari, 2017).
Given the aforementioned, it is clear that one of the key elements affecting agricultural yield and production is the climate.
Given that agricultural yield and production are crucial to the economics and way of life of Nigerian farmers, the fluctuation of rainfall, temperature, and relative humidity has been a pressing concern in a sustainable environment (Olubanjo and Alade, 2018).
For example, a substantial portion of the rural population depends on rain for agricultural operations, therefore farmers keep deeper relationships with nature and their natural resources serve as the foundation from which their fundamental needs are obtained (Amare et al., 2018).
Methods for coping with or adapting to the ongoing series of adaptations in response to climate variability are known as "climate variability adaptation methods," since they are anticipated to provide increased risk, novel combinations of hazards, and possibly serious consequences as a result of current climate change (Amusa et al., 2015).
The negative impact of climatic variability on agricultural production has therefore been documented, and adaptation has been highlighted as a policy tool to minimize it (Ige et al., 2020).
When it comes to agriculture, adaptation enables farmers to meet their goals for securing their food, income, and livelihood despite deteriorating socioeconomic and climatic situations like floods and droughts (Muzamhindo et al., 2015).
According to farm-level study, when adaptation is completely adopted, there might be a significant decrease in the negative effects of climatic variability (Liu and Basso, 2020).
Farmers may modify their agricultural output by using effective environmental resource management techniques include planting early-maturing crops, mulching, small-scale irrigation, choosing hardy types of crops, planting trees, and staking to prevent heat burns (Gweyi-Onyango et al., 2021).
The lack of knowledge about suitable adaptation choices, difficult market access, and a lack of farm labour were all identified as hurdles to adaptation by Mu et al.
(2020).
As a result, it can be claimed that knowledge, awareness, labour, and capital are key adaptation elements, and that their absence, along with the inability to select effective adaptation strategies, poses a serious threat to agricultural productivity.
Furthermore, due to its direct effects on agricultural output, climatic variability is likely the greatest environmental danger to Nigeria's efforts to combat hunger, malnutrition, illness, and poverty (Abdulkadir et al., 2017).
The research now available indicates that climatic variability is worldwide, as are its effects; however, the most detrimental effects will mostly be felt by poor nations, notably those in Africa like Nigeria, due to their low level of coping mechanisms or adaption techniques (Karienye and Macharia, 2020).
In Nigeria, more than 70% of the food consumed is produced by the country's rural population, which is made up of 74 million people who are disproportionately impoverished, vulnerable to disease and hunger, and unable to satisfy their basic food demands (Matemilola and Elegbede, 2017).
The farmers also take a long time to change traditional farming methods, such as bush burning, deforestation, and rain-fed agriculture, and they lack the training, education, and knowledge required to adjust to climatic unpredictability, which is a developing issue (Anabaraonye et al., 2019).
Destruction to farmlands, livelihoods, and biodiversity are some of the negative effects of climatic variability that have an irreparable impact on food Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 121 production in poor nations like Nigeria that have a limited ability to deal with and adapt to these difficulties (Okon et al., 2021).
There haven't been many researches done in Ondo State, Nigeria, to look at the influence of temperature, relative humidity, rainfall, and other factors on the yield of cassava, yam, pepper, and tomatoes.
However, historical data indicates that relatively few of them have thoroughly investigated the connections between climatic variability and adaptation techniques appropriate for arable crops (Olubanjo and Alade, 2018).
Recent research confirms that Africa is one of the continents with the lowest capacity for adaptation to climatic unpredictability and change (Fadina and Barjolle, 2018).
There has been some adaptation to the current climatic fluctuation, but this may not be enough to prepare for future climate changes (Muller, 2021).
However, it has been noted that the uncertainty brought on by climatic fluctuation discourages investment in and use of agricultural technology and market potential (Autio et al., 2021).
Climate variability is a developing issue that poses a danger to smallholder farmers, sustainable economic growth, and the entirety of human life (Adeagbo et al., 2021).
It is against this context that the study was carried out to examine farmers’ perceptions of variations in climate and adaptation strategies in Akoko southwest local government area of Ondo State, Nigeria.
The study objectives are to: 1.
Describe the socio-economic characteristics of arable crop farmers in the study area.
2.
Ascertain farmers’ perception of climate variability on crop production.
3.
Examine the adaptation strategies adopted by arable crop farmers in the study area.
4.
Ascertain the factors that influence farmers’ choice of adaptation strategies 5.
Identify constraints to the adoption of adaptation strategies by arable crop farmers.
Hypotheses 1.
There is no significant relationship between socio-economic characteristics and farmers’ adaptation strategies 2.
There is no significant relationship between farmers’ perception of climate variability and the adaptation strategies adopted by the farmers.
Materials and Methods Area of study: The study was carried out in Akoko South West Local Government Area of Ondo State, Nigeria.
Akoko Southwest was created in 1996 (Ondo State Bureau of Statistics) with nine (9) communities and its headquarters area in the town of Oka Akoko.
It is situated in the deciduous rainforest of southwestern Nigeria with a land area of 340.1 (km) square and a total population of 228,383 (NPC, 2006).
The local government is bounded to the north by Akoko north-east local government area, to the south by Ose and Owo local government area, and to the west by Ekiti state.
The climate of the study area is equatorial with two peaks of rainfall.
The first peak comes up between April and July while the second peak falls between late August and October.
These two peaks are marked by heavy rainfall with a mean annual rainfall of 1500mm-2000mm.
It has a relative humidity of 75-95% which results in severe cold conditions with a mean annual temperature of 23˚c-26˚c (Olabode, 2014).
The study area lies between the latitude 7.23' 51.6˚ north and longitude 5˚41' 40.7˚ east.
This shows that the state lies in the rainforest and guinea savannah vegetation which is characterised by different plants and trees with a height of 5m and even more.
The major form of occupation in the study area is agriculture, which is mainly of smallholder with the production of crops such as maize, yam, cassava, cocoa, cashew, rice, oil palm, Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 122 timber, citrus, plantain, soya beans, cowpea, kola nut, and vegetables.
It provides income and employment for over 75% of the population in the State.
It also contributes over 70% of the State’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Rotowa et al., 2019).
Study population: The population of the study consists of arable crop farmers in the Akoko Southwest local government area of Ondo State.
Sampling procedure and sample size: Multi-stage sampling techniques were used to select the total number of respondents for the study.
In the first stage a purposive selection of five (5) communities under Akoko Southwest namely; Oke-Oka Akoko, Akungba Akoko, Supare Akoko, Ikun Akoko, and Oba Akoko.
The second stage involved a simple random selection of two (2) wards from each community.
The last stage consisted of a random selection of 15 farmers from each of the selected wards who are into arable crop farming, giving a total of one hundred and fifty (150) respondents.
Data collection and analysis: Data collection was carried out using primary and secondary sources.
The primary data was collected through the use of a questionnaire consisting of well-structured open and close-ended questions supported by the interview schedule while the secondary data were collected from available literature.
The questionnaire was distributed to 15 selected arable crop farmers from each of the wards selected based on the list collected from the Extension agents of the Agricultural Development Programme (ADP) in the study area.
To test the stated hypotheses, the data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics like Chi-Square, Correlation analysis, and Ordinary least square regression.
The socio-economic characteristics of the respondents were presented using frequency counts, percentages, and means.
A five-point Likert scale was used to elicit information on the adaptation strategies to climate variability among the respondents.
The regression function postulated to isolate factors influencing adaptation strategies in the study was implicitly represented by the equation; Y = f (X₁, X₂, X₃, X₄, X₅, X₆, X₇, X₈, X₉, ₑ) Y = Adaptation Strategies X₁ = Sex X₂ = Age X₃ = Farm Size X₄ = Level of education X₅ = Extension agent visit X₆ = Experience in farming X7 = Income of farmers X8 = Other sources of income X9 = Access to credit The functional forms are as follows; Y₁=a + b₁X₁ + b₂X₂ + b₃X₃ + b₄X₄ + b₅X₅ + μᵢ a’s and b’s were parameters estimated while e represents the error term associated with data collected from the arable crop farmers.
The error term was assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean value and constant variance.
The essence of this regression analysis is to determine factors that influence adaptation strategies.
The research hypothesis was tested using inferential statistics such as the Chi-square test and Pearson product-moment correlation analysis.
Results and Discussion Socio-economic characteristics of respondents According to Table 1, the average age of respondents in the research region is 48 years, with nearly half (42.0%) falling between the ages of 46 and 65 and 39.3% falling between the ages of 26 and 45.
Only 16.0% and 2.7%, respectively, of them were Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 123 66 to 85 and 86 to 95 years old.
This suggests that as people get older, their capacity to adapt to climate variability declines.
Consequently, agricultural households with younger members tend to adapt to climate variability more so than farming households with older members.
Only 37.3% of farmers were women, whereas more over half (62.7%) were men.
This finding shows a greater proportion of males than females, which is in line with the research area's more heavily weighted male labour force in terms of agricultural output.
Although, the higher percentage of male to female farmers is insignificant to climate variability as the gender-based perceptions of climate variability will have weight on both male and female farmers’ but women’s capacity to adapt to climate variability risk is also lower than men due to lack of access to financial services.
According to Table1, a sizable portion of respondents have big households of 4–7 members (62.0%), with a mean household size of 5.1.
If they are employed as farm labour, this may be advantageous.
This is consistent with Awoyemi and Olajide (2020) and Adeagbo et al.
(2021), who claimed that utilizing households with bigger sizes gives inexpensive labour to the families, increases the size of their farms, enhances agricultural productivity, and permits the adoption of various methods which can reduce the effects of climatic variability when compared to households with smaller family sizes.
Table 1 also reveals that the typical farmer earned N101,000 ($242.9) during a farming season, with half of them (50.0%) making more than N81,000 ($194.8) over the same period.
This suggests that farmers' use of adaptation methods, interest in alternative adaptation strategies, and willingness to pay for access to such adaptation strategies are all strongly influenced by their income levels.
The survey also discovered that farmers had 25.5 years of experience on average.
The experience ranged from 1 to 10 years and 21 to 30 years for more than half (60.0%) of them, respectively.
This shows that with more farm experience, there is a higher possibility of diversifying portfolios (adopting new crops or crop types, or employing mixed farming methods), altering planting dates, and altering the quantity of land in production.
Furthermore, just 22.0% of farmers have completed basic school, 14.7% have no formal education, and 38.7% of farmers have completed secondary education.
While only 24.6% of respondents had a bachelor's degree or less, this indicates a respectable level of literacy in western education, as seen in Table 1.
Because educated individuals are better able to access information, they play a crucial role in raising awareness in rural areas.
According to Eneji et al.
(2020), education, regardless of its format, fosters the development of the proper awareness, knowledge, attitude, and capacity to alter the perception of farmers toward participating in various activities that can prevent or mitigate climate variability in extreme situations or circumstances.
The average size of the farms the respondents operated was 2.2 acres, which means that more than half (68%) of the farmers operated smaller farms, making them more susceptible to the negative effects of climatic variability and less equipped to handle them.
This outcome supports the research of DansoAbbeam et al.
(2021) and Adekunmi (2022), who discovered that families with bigger plots of land set aside for farming are more likely to apply a range of adaptation techniques.
Table 1 further demonstrates that the majority of farmers (70.0%) have access to extension agents, whereas 30.0% do not.
This suggests that farmers' access to knowledge on production activities and the implementation of innovations depends on their interaction with extension agents, whose advice and demonstrations may affect how well farmers are able to adjust to changing weather conditions.
Eta et al.
Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 124 (2022) and Jha and Gupta (2021), found that information obtained through extension service delivery is beneficial to farmers in that it can help them create coping mechanisms for the effects of bad weather on their crops, livestock, and even themselves.
Table 1.
Distribution of respondents based on their socio-economic characteristics Source: Field Survey (2021).
Socio-economic Variable Frequency (n= 150) Percentage Mean Gender Male 94 62.7 Female 56 37.3 Age 26-45 59 39.3 46-65 63 42.0 66-85 24 16.0 86-95 4 2.7 48.0 Household Size 1-3 39 26.0 4-7 93 62.0 8-11 14 9.3 12-14 4 2.7 5.1 Income on Farming 10000-40000 26 17.3 41000-80000 49 32.6 Above 81000 75 50.0 101000 Other source of income No other sources 59 39.3 10000-40000 40 26.6 41000-80000 32 21.4 Above 81000 19 12.6 35015 Level of education No formal education 22 14.7 Primary education 33 22.0 Secondary Education 58 38.7 NCE/OND 20 13.3 HND/B.Sc.
17 11.3 Farm size Less than 1 Acre 34 22.7 1-2.5 68 45.3 2.5-4.0 32 21.3 4.1-6.0 16 10.7 2.2 Access to extension Yes 45 30.0 No 105 70.0 Farm experience 1-10 45 30.0 11-20 31 20.7 21-30 45 30.0 Above 31 29 19.3 25.5 Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 125 Farmers’ perception of climate variability on crop production The distribution of responses regarding farmers' perceptions of climatic variability is shown in Table 2.
Farmers stated that rainfall does not begin and stop at the typical times of the year owing to climate changes, which has contributed to crop failure over time (mean=4.1), and that they saw a decline in crop yields as a consequence of the influence of climate variability (mean=4.3).
Farmers said that a combination of temperature rise and drought had reduced soil fertility, which had an impact on crop output (mean=4.0).
The Table also reveals that more than half of the farmers (52.0%) fully agreed that excessive rainfall rarely promotes agricultural output (mean=3.9) and that 50.0% said that recent extreme temperatures had impacted crop productivity (mean=3.8).
The implication is that the majority of respondents had strong opinions on how climatic variability affects crop productivity in the research area, which may be because they have extensive agricultural experience.
As they make decisions about agricultural planning and management, their perceptions of climatic unpredictability are crucial for adaptation.
The findings are in line with those of Fadina and Barjolle (2018), who found that education level and farming experience had a favorable impact on adaption choices made while planning and managing their agricultural operations.
Table 2.
Farmers’ perception of climate variability on crop production Farmers’ perception of climate variability SA A UD D SD M RK F (%) F (%) F (%) F (%) F (%) Temperature is not normal in recent time 75 (50.0) 27 (18.0) 14 (9.3) 23 (15.3) 11 (7.3) 3.8 9 th Temperature is not normal in recent time 75 (50.0) 27 (18.0) 14 (9.3) 23 (15.3) 11 (7.3) 3.8 9 th Rainfall does not start and end at the normal period 84 (56.0) 28 (18.7) 17 (11.3) 11 (7.3) 10 (6.7) 4.1 2 nd There is an increase in temperature and drought 80 (53.3) 30 (20.0) 18 (12.0) 12 (8.0) 10 (6.7) 4.0 4 th There has been an increase in the intensity and frequency of weather events 59 (39.3) 43 (28.7) 29 (19.3) 6 (4.0) 13 (8.7) 3.8 9 th There has been noticeable drying of streams and river 72 (48.0) 33 (22.0) 23 (15.3) 9 (6.0) 13 (8.7) 3.9 7 th All your crops have been failing due to the variations in climates 81 (54.0) 39 (26.0) 17 (11.3) 4 (2.7) 9 (6.0) 4.1 2 nd Vegetation has been dried 71 (47.3) 40 (26.7) 20 (13.3) 10 (6.7) 9 (6.0) 4.0 4 th There has been decrease in crop yields 96 (64.0) 30 (20.0) 8 (5.3) 6 (4.0) 10 (6.7) 4.3 1st There has been noticeable land degradation in the community 44 (29.3) 64 (42.7) 27 (18.0) 8 (5.3) 7 (4.7) 3.8 9 th There has been reduced soil fertility 77 (51.3) 33 (22.0) 15 (10.0) 14 (9.3) 11 (7.3) 4.0 4 th Excessive rain hardly supports crops production 78 (52.0) 38 (25.3) 7 (4.7) 8 (5.3) 19 (12.7) 3.9 7 th SA=Strongly Agreed, A=Agreed, UD=Undecided, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree, M=Mean, RK=Rank Source: Field survey (2021).
Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 126 Hypotheses testing The results presented in Table 4 clearly made known that there was no significant relationship between gender (χ2=46.5, p>0.05), age (χ2=199.5, p>0.05), education (χ2=247.6, p>0.05) and experience (χ2=299.4, p>0.05).
There was, however, a significant relationship between household size (χ2=179.3, p<0.05), farm size (χ2=136.4, p<0.05), and farmers’ adaptation strategies.
The implication is that the rural farmers with larger households have a potentially higher labour force and are more likely to implement adaptation strategies.
This is in line with the findings of Ikuemonisan and Ajibefun (2021), who contend that bigger households are a good predictor of household agricultural income and may increase their capacity to adjust to changes in climatic circumstances.
A big farm size gives farmers room to use more adaptation techniques, according to the association between farm size and adaptation strategies that were projected (Chete, 2019).
Nor Diana et al.
(2022) confirmed the significance of farm size in affecting farmers' adaptation strategies in a comparable research.
According to the findings in Table 5, there is a substantial correlation between farmers' perceptions of climatic unpredictability and their techniques for adapting to it (r=0.591, p<0.05).
The research demonstrates that farmers' perceptions are crucial to the effective use of adaptation methods to lessen the effects of climate variability on agricultural activities (Gedefaw et al., 2018).
The outcome supported the results of Asrat and Simane (2018), who noted that any farmers who lack perception will suffer a serious setback by having to deal with serious difficulties for failing to adjust to climatic unpredictability.
Table 4.
Chi-Square analysis of the relationship between selected socio-economic characteristics of respondents and the adaptation strategies *significant: p<0.05; χ²: Chi-square value; p-value: asymptotic significance value.
Table 5.
Pearson Product Moment Correlation showing the relationship between perception of climate variability and adaptation strategies by the respondents Variable r-value p-value Decision Remark Perception of climate variability 0.591 0.000* Significant Ho rejected *Significant: p < 0.05 Factors influencing farmer’s choice of adaptation strategies The factors impacting farmers' decisions about their adaptation techniques to climatic variability are shown in Table 6.
The ordinary least square regression model was significant at a 5% level, indicating that certain socio-economic factors may have impacted the farmers' decision about their adaption strategy.
Gender (t=3.001, p<0.05), credit availability (t=2.459, p<0.05), and other income sources (t=2.384, p<0.05) all had a favourable impact on the farmers' decision to adopt a particular adaptation strategy to the climatic variability in the research area The conclusion is that because of gender barriers and differences in decision-making Socio-economic characteristics χ² P-value Decision Gender 46.5 0.161 Not Significant Age 199.5 0.913 Not Significant Household size 179.3 0.034** Significant Farm size 136.4 0.020** Significant Level of education 247.6 .117 Not Significant Years of experience 299.4 .563 Not Significant Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 127 between men and women, adaptation is not gender neutral in the sense that there are no differences in gender climate adaptation (Adzawla et al., 2019).
Additionally, it has been discovered that having access to finance increases farmers' income and increases the possibility that a household may choose to grow a variety of crops as a climate adaptation measure (Mwinkom et al., 2021).
Furthermore, Danso-Abbeam et al.
(2021) found that farmers with other sources of income, such as non-farm income, had greater adaptive skills than farmers without additional sources of income.
The R-square for the regression analysis performed in this study was.442.
These results suggest that gender, loan availability, and other income sources account for around 44.2% of the variation in the factors influencing farmers' adaptation strategy selection.
The following Table 4 lists the significant variables.
The p-value is less than 0.05, indicating a strong correlation between gender, loan availability, other income sources, and adaptability options.
Table 6.
Regression estimation of socio-economic factors that influence farmers’ adaptation strategies Variables Co-efficient t-value p-value Gender 3.630 3.001 0.003* Age 0.058 0.127 0.899 Farm size -0.987 -1.295 0.197 Level of education -0.293 -0.766 0.445 Extension agent visit 0.497 0.387 0.700 Experience in farming 0.190 0.554 0.580 Income of farmers -0.106 -0.252 0.802 Access to credit 10.196 2.459 0.015* Other sources of income 0.732 2.384 0.018* *significant: p<0.05; R-square=0.442; Adjusted R 2 =0.402; F-ratio=11.029.
Constraints to adoption of adaptation strategies According to Table 7, the absence of proper irrigation facilities affects 64.0% of countries negatively and 10.0% negatively.
Only 7.3% of respondents consider the insufficient government support to be a minor limitation, despite the fact that it was a severe burden (74.7%).
This suggests that the farmers experienced issues with the availability of irrigation systems and government assistance.
When these are unavailable or insufficient, crops wither and die, limiting output, which might result in a decrease in the amount of money that can be made and an increase in poverty (Zwane, 2019).
Farmers were faced with 10.0% of negligible constraints and 64.0% of severe constraints due to lack of adequate irrigation facilities.
Also, farmers were faced with 10.7% of negligible constraints and 56.0% of severe constraints due to insufficient extension officers.
Farmers faced a substantial limitation of 8.0%, while the lack of credit and lending services was severe (54.0%).
Despite being a substantial limitation for certain farmers (9.3%), the scarcity and high cost of farm inputs were a severe constraint (50.7%).
This view is supported by Osei (2017) and Fagariba et al.
(2018), whose investigation experimentally demonstrated that insufficient extension officers, a dearth of credit and loan services, a scarcity of agricultural supplies, and the high cost of those inputs might adversely influence farmers' capacity to adapt to climate change when faced with problems that required rapid attention.
Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 128 Table 7.
Constraints to adoption of adaptation strategies Constraints SVC MJC MDC MNC IFC M RK F (%) F (%) F (%) F (%) F (%) Lack of adequate irrigation facilities 96 (64.0) 25 (16.7) 6 (4.0) 8 (5.3) 15 (10.0) 1.8 9 th Lack of own land 21 (14.0) 15 (10.0) 23 (15.3) 18 (12.0) 73 (48.7) 3.7 1 st Unpredictable weather condition 72 (48.0) 42 (28.0) 15 (10.0) 8 (5.3) 13 (8.7) 1.9 8 th Lack of credit and loan services 78 (52.0) 28 (18.7) 22 (14.7) 10 (6.7) 12 (8.0) 2.0 6 th Lack of market access 66 (44.0) 34 (22.7) 23 (15.3) 9 (6.0) 18 (12.0) 2.9 2 nd Lack of information about potential climate variability 69 (46.0) 26 (17.3) 23 (15.3) 11 (7.3) 21 (14.0) 2.3 3 rd Lack of knowledge on appropriate adaptation strategies 66 (44.0) 32 (21.3) 23 (23) 8 (5.3) 21 (14.0) 2.2 4 th Shortage and high cost of acquired farm inputs 76 (50.7) 22 (14.7) 21 (14.0) 17 (11.3) 14 (9.3) 2.1 5 th Inadequate extension officers 84 (56.0) 21 (14.0) 14 (9.3) 15 (10.0) 16 (10.7) 2.0 6 th Inadequate government support 112 (74.7) 14 (9.3) 7 (4.7) 6 (4.0) 11 (7.3) 1.6 10 th SVC=Severe Constraint, MJC=Major Constraint, MDC=Moderate Constraint, MNC=Minor Constraint, IFC=Insignificant Constraint, M=Mean, RK=Rank Source: Field survey (2021).
Conclusion It is possible to conclude that farmers' perceptions of climatic variability have a significant impact on their adaption strategies.
Based on the study's findings, we could have inferred that a better understanding of climate variability will help farmers develop better adaptation strategies, which will increase the value of their products, prevent the destruction of crops and farmland, and generally improve the farmers' quality of life, give them more power, have a positive impact on productivity, and lower the level of poverty in rural areas.
Additionally, the results have demonstrated how farmers' productivity has been significantly impacted by the severe constraints they face, including inadequate irrigation facilities, a lack of own land, a lack of credit and loan services, a lack of market access, and a lack of knowledge about effective adaptation strategies.
Based on the study's findings, the following recommendations are made; * Community where the farmers are adeptly aware of the causes and impacts of climatic variability, climate variability awareness and sensitization should be put in place at the local, state, and federal government levels.
Once in place, such understanding ought to alter how people currently perceive climate change and spur the development of beneficial adaptation strategies that are fit for the unique arable crops found in the study area.
* Awareness, knowledge, and insight on appropriate and affordable adaptation strategies that are suitable and relevant to their situation and circumstances Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 129 should be increased; farmers should be exposed to more training and visits from extension agents and all other relevant organizations and personnel.
* Farmers in the area should also be informed about new and innovative adaption strategies from research centers that have been shown via study to be successful for arable crops.
* In order to effectively communicate knowledge to farmers, extension agents must also be provided with knowledge and skills in adaptation and coping mechanisms through frequent training programmes.
* Federal, state, and local governments in Nigeria should make every effort to ease the difficulties faced by farmers by offering loans, irrigation systems, and more extension agents on the ground.
Conflict of interests The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgments We sincerely appreciate the efforts of Miss.
Oreoluwa Adesewa Alomaja who assisted during the fieldwork and data processing.
Also, special appreciation goes to the arable crop farmers in the study area for their positive response during questionnaire administration.
References Abdulkadir, A., Maryam, L.A and Muhammad, T.I, (2017).
Climate Change and Its Implications on Human Existence in Nigeria: A Review.
Bayero Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences, 10(2), 152-158. https://doi.org/10.4314/bajopas.v10i2.
26 Adeagbo, O.
A., Ojo, T. O., and Adetoro, A.
A.
(2021).
Understanding the determinants of climate change adaptation strategies among smallholder maize farmers in Southwest, Nigeria.
Heliyon, 7(2021), 1-10.
Adekunmi, A. O.
(2022).
Rice Farmers’ Awareness and Perception of Climate Change in Ondo State, Nigeria.
European Journal of Agriculture and Food Sciences, 4(1), 81-85.
Adzawla, W., Azumah, S. B., Anani, P. Y., and Donkoh, S. A.
(2019).
Gender perspectives of climate change adaptation in two selected districts of Ghana.
Heliyon, 5(11), 1-6.
Ajilogba, C. F., and Walker, S. (2020).
Climate Change Adaptation: Implications for Food Security and Nutrition.
African Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation, 1-20.
Akpenpuun, T.D and Busari, R. (2018).
Impacts of Climate on the Yield of Major Tuber Crops in Kwara State, Nigeria.
Global Journal of Agricultural Sciences, 16(1), 59-63. https://doi.org/10.4314/gjass.v16i1.8 Amare, M., Jensen, N. D., Shiferaw, B., and Cissé, J. D. (2018).
Rainfall shocks and agricultural productivity: Implication for rural household consumption.
Agricultural systems, 166, 79-89.
Amusa, T., Okoye, C., and Enete, A.A, (2015).
Determinants of Climate Change Adaptation Among Farm Households in Southwest Nigeria: A Heckman Double Stage Selection Approach.
Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 18(2), 03-11. https://dx.doi.org/10.15414/raae.2015.
18.02.03-11 Anabaraonye, B., Okafor, J. C., and Hope, J.
(2019).
Educating farmers in rural areas on climate change adaptation for sustainability in Nigeria.
International Journal of scientific and Engineering Research, 10(4), 1391-1398.
Aryal, J. P., Sapkota, T. B., Rahut, D. B., Marenya, P., and Stirling, C. M. https://doi.org/10.4314/bajopas.v10i2.26 https://doi.org/10.4314/bajopas.v10i2.26 https://doi.org/10.4314/gjass.v16i1.8 https://dx.doi.org/10.15414/raae.2015.18.02.03-11 https://dx.doi.org/10.15414/raae.2015.18.02.03-11 Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 130 (2021).
Climate risks and adaptation strategies of farmers in East Africa and South Asia.
Scientific reports, 11(1), 1-14.
Asrat, P., and Simane, B.
(2018).
Farmers’ perception of climate change and adaptation strategies in the Dabus watershed, North-West Ethiopia.
Ecological processes, 7(1), 1-13.
Autio, A., Johansson, T., Motaroki, L., Minoia, P., and Pellikka, P. (2021).
Constraints for adopting climate-smart agricultural practices among smallholder farmers in Southeast Kenya.
Agricultural Systems, 194, (2021), 1-13.
Awoyemi, A. E., and Olajide, O.
A.
(2020).
Assessment of the Degree of Households’ Vulnerability to Climate Variability in Nigeria.
BT-Handbook of Climate Change Resilience; Leal Filho, W., Ed.
749-764.
Ayanlade, A., Radeny, M., and AkinOnigbinde, A. I.
(2018).
Climate variability/change and attitude to adaptation technologies: a pilot study among selected rural farmers’ communities in Nigeria.
GeoJournal, 83(2), 319-331.
Chete, O.
B.
(2019).
Factors influencing adaptation to climate change among smallholder farming communities in Nigeria.
African Crop Science Journal, 27(1), 45-57.
Danso-Abbeam, G., Ojo, T. O., Baiyegunhi, L. J., and Ogundeji, A.
A.
(2021).
Climate change adaptation strategies by smallholder farmers in Nigeria: does non-farm employment play any role?.
Heliyon, 7(6), 1-10.
Dube, T., Moyo, P., Ncube, M., and Nyathi, D. (2016).
The Impact of Climate Change on Agro-Ecological Based Livelihoods in Africa: A Review.
Journal of Sustainable Development, 9(1).
http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v9n1p25 6 Eneji, C. V. O., Onnoghen, N. U., Acha, J. O., and Diwa, J.
B.
(2020).
Climate change awareness, environmental education and gender role burdens among rural farmers of Northern Cross River State, Nigeria.
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 13(4/5), 397-415.
Eta, H. C., Yekinni, O. T., and Elemi, G. F. (2022).
Perceived capacities of public extension personnel for climate information dissemination to farmers in Cross River State, Nigeria.
Journal of Agricultural Extension, 26(2), 4452.
Fadina, A. M. R., and Barjolle, D. (2018).
Farmers’ adaptation strategies to climate change and their implications in the Zou Department of South Benin.
Environments, 5(1), 1-17.
Fagariba, C. J., Song, S., and Soule Baoro, S. K. G. (2018).
Climate change adaptation strategies and constraints in Northern Ghana: Evidence of farmers in Sissala West District.
Sustainability, 10(5), 1-18.
Field Survey, (2021).
Survey on Climate Smart Small Ruminants Production in Kwara State, Nigeria.
Gedefaw M, Girma A, Denghua Y, Hao W, Agitew G (2018) Farmer's Perceptions and Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change, Its Determinants and Impacts in Ethiopia: Evidence from Qwara District.
J Earth Sci Clim Change 9(7), 2-8. http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/21577617.1000481 Gezie, M. and Tegba, M., (2019).
Farmers’ Response to Climate Change and http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v9n1p256 http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v9n1p256 http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2157-7617.1000481 http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2157-7617.1000481 http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2157-7617.1000481 Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 131 Variability in Ethiopia: A Review.
Cogent Food and Agriculture, 5(1), 1613770. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.201 9.1613770 Gweyi-Onyango, J. P., Sakha, M. A., and Jefwa, J.
(2021).
Agricultural Interventions to Enhance Climate Change Adaptation of Underutilized Root and Tuber Crops.
African Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation, 1-26.
Ige, G. O., Akinnagbe, O. M., Odefadehan, O. O., and Ogunbusuyi, O. P. (2020).
Constraints to Farmers’ Choice of Climate Change Adaptation Strategies in Ondo State of Nigeria.
African Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation, 1-15.
Ikuemonisan, E. S., and Ajibefun, I.
A.
(2021).
Economic Implications of Smallholders’ Collaborative Groupings on Household Income and Adaptability to Climate Change in Nigeria.
Sustainability, 13(24), 1-22.
IPCC, (2013).
Climate Change 2013.
The Physical Science Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.K., Tignor, M., Allen, S.K, Boschung, J., and Midgley, P.M].
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535pp.
Jha, C. K., and Gupta, V. (2021).
Do better agricultural extension and climate information sources enhance adaptive capacity?
A micro-level assessment of farm households in rural India.
Ecofeminism and Climate Change, 2(2), 83-102.
Karienye, D., and Macharia, J.
(2020).
Adaptive Capacity to Mitigate Climate Variability and Food Insecurity of Rural Communities Along River Tana Basin, Kenya.
African Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation, 1-12.
Liu, L., and Basso, B.
(2020).
Impacts of climate variability and adaptation strategies on crop yields and soil organic carbon in the US Midwest.
PloS one, 15(1), e0225433.
Mashizha, T.M.
(2019).
Adapting to Climate Change: Reflections of Peasant farmers in Mashonaland West Province of Zimbabwe.
Jamba: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies 11(1).
https://doi.org/10.4102%2Fjamba.v11i 1.571 Matemilola, S, and Elegbede, I.
(2017).
The Challenges of Food Security in Nigeria.
Open Access Library Journal, 4(e4185), 1-22.
Minwuye, B.
(2017).
Farmers’ Perception and Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change: The Case of Woreillu District of Amhara Region, Northeastern Ethiopia (No.
634-2020-166).
Mu, L., Fang, L., Liu, Y., and Wang, C. (2020).
Identifying Barriers and Enablers for Climate Change Adaptation of Farmers in Semi-Arid North-Western China.
Sustainability, 12(18), 1-21.
Muluneh, M. G. (2021).
Impact of climate change on biodiversity and food security: a global perspective—a review article.
Agriculture and Food Security, 10(1), 1-25.
Muller, M. (2021).
Managing Current Climate Variability Can Ensure Water Security Under Climate Change.
In African Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation (pp.
2311-2337).
Springer, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.2019.1613770 https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.2019.1613770 https://doi.org/10.4102%2Fjamba.v11i1.571 https://doi.org/10.4102%2Fjamba.v11i1.571 Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 132 Muzamhindo, N., Mtabheni, S., Jiri, O., Mwakiwa, E., and Hanyani-Mlambo.
(2015).
Factors Influencing Smallholder Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change and Variability in Chiredzi Districts of Zimbabwe.
Journal of economics and Sustainable Development.
6(9), 1-9.
Mwinkom, F. X., Damnyag, L., Abugre, S., and Alhassan, S. I.
(2021).
Factors influencing climate change adaptation strategies in North-Western Ghana: evidence of farmers in the Black Volta Basin in Upper West region.
SN Applied Sciences, 3(5), 1-20.
National Population Commission (NPC) (2006) Nigeria National Census: Population Distribution by Sex, State, LGAs and Senatorial District: 2006 Census Priority Tables (Vol.
3).
Nor Diana, M. I., Zulkepli, N. A., Siwar, C., and Zainol, M. R. (2022).
Farmers’ Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Systematic Literature Review.
Sustainability, 14(6), 3639.
Nyawo, S. (2017).
Are prayers a Panacea for climate uncertainties?
: an African traditional perspective from Swaziland.
The Ecumenical Review, 69(3), 362-374.
Okon, E. M., Falana, B. M., Solaja, S. O., Yakubu, S. O., Alabi, O. O., Okikiola, B. T., Awe, T. E, Adesina, B. T, Tokula, B. E, Kipchumba, A. K, and Edeme, A.
B.
(2021).
Systematic review of climate change impact research in Nigeria: implication for sustainable development.
Heliyon, 7(9), 1-21.
Olabode, A. D. (2014).
Awareness of climatic variation through indigenous knowledge in Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria.
J Earth Sci Climat Change S, 11, 2.
Olubanjo, O.O and Alade, A.E, (2018).
Effect of Climate variability on the yield of Crops in Ondo State, Nigeria.
International journal of Water Resources and Environmental Engineering, 10(5), 54-63. https://doi.org/10.5897/IJWREE2018.
0783 Osei, S. (2017).
Climate Change Adaptation Constraints among Smallholder Farmers in Rural Households of Central Region of Ghana.
West African Journal of Applied Ecology, 25(2), 31-48.
Praveen, B., and Sharma, P. (2019).
A review of literature on climate change and its impacts on agriculture productivity.
Journal of Public Affairs, 19(4), e1960.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2016 Rotowa, O. J., Adekunle, E. A., Adeagbo, A.
A., Nwanze, O. L., and Fasiku, O. O.
(2019).
Economic analysis of agriculture, forestry and fisheries to the economic development of Nigeria.
International Journal of Web Engineering and Technology, 6, 1-14.
Rathoure, A.K and Pater, U.R.
(2020).
Climate Conditions and Impacts of Climate Change on Biodiversity Decline: Impact of Climate Change on Biodiversity, pp.79-94.
IGI Global.
Schuman, S., Dokken, J. V., Van Niekerk, D., and Loubser, R. A.
(2018).
Religious beliefs and climate change adaptation: A study of three rural South African communities.
Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 10(1), 1-12.
Somboonsuke, B., Phitthayaphinant, P., Sdoodee, S., and Kongmanee, C. (2018).
Farmers' perceptions of impacts of climate variability on agriculture and adaptation strategies in Songkhla Lake basin.
Kasetsart https://doi.org/10.5897/IJWREE2018.0783 https://doi.org/10.5897/IJWREE2018.0783 https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2016 Diyala Agricultural Sciences Journal 2022, Vol (14) No 2: 118-133 133 Journal of Social Sciences, 39(2), 277283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2018.05.
006 Tandzi, N.L and Mutengwa, S. C. (2020).
Factors Affecting Yield of Crops.
Intech Open.
https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.906 72.
Pub.1129440935 Thompson, O.A and Oparinde, L.O.
(2015).
Farmers’ Perception of Climate Change in Ondo State, Nigeria.
Published Thesis Submitted to the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, the Federal University of Technology, Akure, Ondo State, Nigeria.
Ukhurebor, K. E., and Siloko, I. U.
(2020).
Temperature and rainfall variability studies within South-South region of Nigeria.
AU eJournal of Interdisciplinary Research (ISSN: 2408-1906), 5(2).
Yohannes, H. (2016).
A review on relationship between climate change and agriculture.
Journal of Earth Science and Climatic Change, 7(2).
Zadawa, A.N and Omran, A., (2020).
Rural Development in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities.
In: Sustaining our Environment, for Better Future, pp.3342.
Springer, Singapore.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-137158-5-3 Zwane, E. M. (2019).
Impact of climate change on primary agriculture, water sources and food security in Western Cape, South Africa.
Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 11(1), 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2018.05.006 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2018.05.006 https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90672.%20Pub.1129440935 https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90672.%20Pub.1129440935 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7158-5-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7158-5-3
Reviewed Article 146 TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 2015: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE NETWORK OF UNIVERSITIES LEGAL AID INSTITUTIONS (NULAI) NIGERIA Ngozi Chinwa Ole and Onyekachi Eni* 1.
Introduction Clearly, climate change is the most debilitating global environmental problem of all times.1 ‘From shifting weather patterns that threaten food production, to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic flooding, the impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented in scale…’2 For Nigeria, the negative impacts of climate change are felt in the major sectors of the economy.
Persistent flooding, droughts, and severe prolonged dry weather conditions have stifled agricultural friendly seasons into non-existence.3 The implication of the latter is low agricultural productivity and, the attendant risk of hunger in Nigeria.4 What is more, severe *Ngozi Chinwa Ole is a Lecturer in Law at Redeemers University, Nigeria and Onyekachi Eni is a Lecturer at Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Nigeria.
1 Jon Naustdalslid, ‘Climate Change-The Challenge of Translating Scientific Knowledge into Action’ (2011) 18(3) International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology 243.
2 United Nations, ‘Climate Change’ (2020) <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climatechange/> accessed 7th January, 2020.
3 Ann Ogbo and others, ‘Risk Management and, the Challenges of Climate Change’ (2013) 41(3) J Hum Ecol 221, 223.
See Pao Odjugo, ‘General Overview of Climate Change Impacts in Nigeria’ (2010) 29(1) J Hum Ecol 47,55.
4 Osuafor A M and others, ‘The Impact of Climate Change on Food Security in Nigeria’ (2014) 3(1) International Journal of Science and Technology 209, 212-216.
See also Emeka E Obioha, ‘Climate Reviewed Article 147 weather conditions occasioned by climate change is exacerbating increased infectious diseases, injury and psychological disorder.5 The negative impact of climate change also undermines the supply and availability of electricity in Nigeria.6 Scientific data posits that the emission of carbon dioxide is the primary contributor to the global problem of climate change.7 The bulk of the emissions arise from the global electricity sector.8 In Nigeria, the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from unsustainable practises in land use and through the generation of electricity from fossil fuel sources contributes the most to the global problem of climate change.9 Thus, mitigating climate change entails a paradigm shift from fossil fuel-based electricity to cleaner electricity such as renewable energy-based electricity.10 Also, mitigating climate change will not be complete without emission reduction strategies in the agriculture and land sector.11 Variability, Environment Change and Food Security Nexus in Nigeria’(2009) 26 (2) Journal of Human Ecology 107.
5 Rasak Bamidele, ‘Conceptualizing the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Health in Nigeria’ in Panoply of Readings in Social Sciences; Lesson for and from Nigeria (Covenant University Press 2013) 5.
6 Akinyemi Opeyemi and others, ‘Energy Supply and Climate Change in Nigeria’ (2012) 7 <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55820/1/MPRA_paper_55820.pdf> accessed 7th January 2020.
7 Lamiaa Abdallah and Tarek El-Shennawy, ‘Reducing Carbon Dioxide from the Electricity Sector using Smart Electricity Grid’ (2013) Journal of Engineering 1, 4.
8 Ibid.
9 Stephen Oyedele Adewale and others, ‘ Electricity Sector’s Contribution to Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (2017) 28(6) Management of Environmental Quality An International Journal 917, 926.
See A I Achike And A O Onoja, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emission Determinants in Nigeria: Implications for Trade, Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Policies’ (2014) 4(1) British Journal of Environment and Climate Change 83, 87.
10 Steven Ferrey, ‘The Failure of International Global Warming Regulation to Promote Needed Renewable Energy’ (2010) 37(1) Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 68 11 Sarah J Scherr and Sajal Sthapit, Mitigating Climate Change through Food and Land Use (World Watch Institute 2009) 5-38.
Reviewed Article 148 The Paris Climate Change Agreement (Paris Agreement) 201512 is the current international instrument that coordinates global responses to the problem of climate change.13 It stipulates ‘long-term global climate goals and short-term procedural steps that outline how these goals should be achieved’.14 The long term mitigation goal is to ‘strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change .
.
.
holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2◦ C above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5◦ C above pre-industrial levels ... ’ 15 Consequently, member states are under obligation to prepare, communicate and implement successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to achieve the mentioned objective.16 It is expected that such communicated NDCs should contain low greenhouse gas emission strategies for mitigating climate change.17 12 The Paris Climate Change International Agreement 2015 (adopted 12 December 2015, entry into force date is 4 November 2016).
It is a treaty within the Context of the Vienna Law of Treaties 1969, Article 2(1).
See also Antto Vihma, ‘Climate of Consensus: Managing Decision Making in the UN Climate Change Negotiations’ (2015) 24 (1) RECIEL 57, 60; Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 2 RECIEL 142, 143.
13 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992 was the first international treaty for addressing the problem of climate change.
It is the umbrella agreement that gave birth to the Kyoto Protocol 1997 and, subsequently the Paris Climate Change Agreement 2015.
See the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994), FCCC/INFORMAL/84(UNFCCC); David Freestone, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Kyoto Mechanisms’, in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work (Oxford University Press, 2008) 4.
14 Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and others, Entry into Force and Then?
The Paris Agreement and State Accountability’ (2018) 18 (5) Climate Policy 593.
15 The Paris Climate Change Agreement 2015 (n 12) Art 2 (1).
16 Ibid, Art 4 (2).
17 Ibid, Art 4 (19).
The use of the word ‘should’ implies that member states are expected rather than mandated to include the low greenhouse gas emission strategies as part of their n their NDCs.
See Rajamani writes that the use of the word ‘should’ in the above provision denotes the expectation of performance rather than the creation of a legal obligation.
See Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Reviewed Article 149 The Nigerian government is a signatory to the Paris Agreement 2015.18 As such, it has communicated core actions that will precipitate the reduction of GHGs emission in the electricity, agriculture and land-use sector by 2030.19 While the measures provided for in the Nigerian NDCs are commendable, its efficacy in mitigating climate change is contingent on its actual implementation.
The Nigerian government submitted its biennial update in 2018, which shows that little has been done in implementing the proposed measures in Nigerian NDCs.20 On the face of the biennial update, some commentators are pessimistic that the Nigerian NDCs may not be achieved by 2030.21 It is fitting to mention that the Paris Agreement does not expressly provide for a punitive enforcement mechanism.22 However, its provisions give rise to some political and legal tools which some authors posit will secure the successful Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and NonObligations’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 331, 343.
18 UNFCCC, ‘Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification’ (2020) <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27> accessed 3rd July 2020.
See also ‘Nigeria is set to implement the Paris Agreement with the Launch of Green Bonds’ (January 17th 2017) Ventures Africa; Abuja .
19UNFCCC, ‘Nigeria NDC’ (2015) <www.unfccc.int/submissions/NDC/Published%20Documents/Nigeria/1/ Approved%20Nigeria's%20INDC_271115.pdf > accessed 23 February 2020.
20 UNFCCC, ‘Nigeria: First Biennial Update Report’ (2018) <www4.unfccc.int/sites/Submissions Staging/Nati onalReports/Documents/218354_Nigeria-BUR1-1-Nigeria%20BUR1_Final%20(2).pdf> accessed 11th March 2020.
21 Priscilla Offiong, ‘Nigeria’s Biannual Update Report and Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report Provide Useful Information on the Country’s Emission Levels’ (2020) < www.climatescorecard.org/2019/06/nigerias-biannual-update-report-and-greenhouse-gas-inventoryreport-provide-useful-information-on-the-countrys-emission-level s/> accessed 22nd March 2020.
22 Richard Falk, ‘Voluntary International Law and, the Paris Agreement’ (2016) < https://richardfalk.word press.
com/2016/01/16/voluntary-international-law-and-the-parisagreement/> accessed 12th February 2020. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27 https://search.proquest.com/pubidlinkhandler/sng/pubtitle/Ventures+Africa/$N/2040504/DocView/1859912464/fulltext/61FCE45CF2A84857PQ/1?accountid=8155 http://www.unfccc.int/submissions https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/Submissions%20Stag%20ing/NationalReports/Documents/218354_Nigeria-BUR1-1-Nigeria%20BUR1_Final%20(2).pdf https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/Submissions%20Stag%20ing/NationalReports/Documents/218354_Nigeria-BUR1-1-Nigeria%20BUR1_Final%20(2).pdf https://www.climatescorecard.org/2019/06/nigerias-biannual-update-report-and-greenhouse-gas-inventory-report-provide-useful-information-on-the-countrys-emission-levels/ https://www.climatescorecard.org/2019/06/nigerias-biannual-update-report-and-greenhouse-gas-inventory-report-provide-useful-information-on-the-countrys-emission-levels/ Reviewed Article 150 implementation of the NDCs of member states including Nigeria’s.23 The tools are; a global stocktake by the conference of the parties24, a compliance mechanism and, a transparency framework which will generate peer pressure from appropriate quarters including civil societies.25 While the global stocktake and compliance mechanism are powerful in their strength, the transparency framework is reputed to be ‘the backbone of the Paris Agreement’.26 The Paris Agreement provides for the establishment of a transparency framework to promote the effective implementation of its provisions.27 A purpose of the framework is to provide an avenue for member states to share such information, necessary to track progress made in the implementation of the NDCs.28 It is anticipated that the information provided in the transparency framework will provide the required arsenal for non-party stakeholders to propel more ambitious 23 Daniel Gross, ‘The Paris Agreement is the Shove the World Needs’ (14 December, 2015) <http://www.slate.
com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/12/the_paris_agreement_won_t_punish_countries_that_fall_sh ort_but_it_s_still.html> accessed 12th February 2020.
24 The Paris Agreement 2015 (n 12) Art.
7 (14).
See also Daniel l Klein and others (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press 2017) 79.
25 Romain Weikmans and others, ‘Transparency Requirements under the Paris Agreement and their (un)likely impact on Strengthening the Ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)’ (2019) Climate Policy 2-3.
26Yamide Dagnet and others, ‘Staying on Track from Paris: Advancing the Key Elements of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) World Resources Institute Working Paper 25 <www.wri.org/ontrackfromparis> (accessed 26 February 2020).
27 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 13 (1).
See also Harald Winkler and others, ‘Transparency of Action and Support in the Paris Agreement’ (2017) 7 (17) Climate Policy 853.
28 The information is typically shared in the NDC Registry in the UNFCCC website.
See UNFCCC, ‘Nationally Determined Contribution’ <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-parisagreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs#eq-5> accessed 14th February 2020.
Reviewed Article 151 actions from member states for the implementation of NDCs.29 Notably, the Paris Decision 201530 was the very apparatus used to birth the Paris Agreement and, it contains a detailing of some of its provisions.31 It spells out additional roles for nonparty stakeholders, including collaborative actions with member states in the mitigation of climate change.32 They are also expected to scale up their actions in addressing the problem of climate change.33 The term ‘non-party stakeholders’ was not defined in the Paris Agreement or the Paris Decision.34 However, the Paris Decision gave examples of ‘non-party stakeholders’ to include ‘civil society (non-governmental organisation (NGO)35)’.36 The Network of University Legal Aid Institutions (NULAI) Nigeria is a ‘nongovernmental, non-profit and non-political organisation committed to promoting clinical legal education, legal education reform, legal aid and access to justice’.37 29 Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and others, ‘Entry into Force and then?
The Paris Agreement and State Accountability’ (n 14) 595.
30 The Paris Climate Change Decision, UNFCCC/CP/2015/10/Ad.1.
See also Ngozi Chinwa Ole and Ruth Akinbola, ‘Addressing the Capacity Deficiency in the Nigerian Off-grid Renewable Electricity: The Place of the International Climate Change Regime’ (2019) 2 Redeemer’s University Law Journal 35, 51.
31 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope’ (2016) 110 (2) The American Journal of International Law 288 32 The Paris Climate Change Decision (n 30) para 117-118.
33 Ibid.
34 The Paris Agreement (n 12); The Paris Climate Change Decision (n 30) para 117-118.
35 C K Vandyck, Concept and Definition of Civil Society Sustainability (Washington DC CFSIS 2017) 1.
See also David Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’ (2013) 9(3) Journal of Civil Society 327.
36 Ibid, Preamble.
37 NULAI, ‘About us’ (2020) < https://nulai.org/who-we-are/> accessed 16th February 2020. https://nulai.org/who-we-are/ Reviewed Article 152 Going by this definition, NULAI readily fits into the meaning of non-party stakeholder under the Paris Decision.
In the light of the above, this paper examines the role that NULAI can play in the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement 2015 in Nigeria, having regard to the recognised role of civil societies in this context.
It will be argued that NULAI can use the instruments of litigation, engagement with relevant stakeholders and adoption of mitigation measures to catalyse the successful implementation of the Agreement in Nigeria.
On the one hand, there are possible limitations to the role of NULAI in this context.
One of such limitations is the absence of any justiciable right emanating solely from the Paris Agreement 2015 and, Nigerian NDCs.
Another limitation is the low level of awareness of the needed climate change law among student law clinicians and staff of Nigerian universities.
Thus, the paper will conclude by making recommendations on how to surmount the identified problems.
One such recommendation will be the use of human right-based approached litigation to secure the enforcement of the provisions of the Paris Agreement and, the Nigerian NDCs.
In the light of the above, the paper is sub-divided into four sections.
Section one is the introduction.
Section two contains a summarised analysis of the provisions of the Paris Agreement 2015 and its implementation tools.
Section three contains an analysis of the role of civil societies in the implementation of the Agreement.
Section Reviewed Article 153 four contains an analysis of the possible roles and challenges that NULAI can play in the light of the analysed role of civil societies in the Agreement.
2.
The Paris Agreement 2015: Measures and Implementation Tools The Paris Agreement 2015 was made under the umbrella of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992.38 The later was the first international instrument that coordinates the global responses to the problem of climate change.39 Regrettably, the UNFCCC 1992 did not garner the needed responses for the mitigation of climate change.40 Under the UNFCCC 1992, the Nigerian government did not commit to any meaningful action for the mitigation of climate change.41 It was on the later basis among others, that the Paris Agreement was adopted as a part of the Paris Legal Outcome.42 The Paris Legal Outcome is a conglomerate of the Paris Agreement and, the Paris Decision.43 The Paris Decision was the resolution of member states of the UNFCCC 1992, which birthed the Paris Agreement.44 While the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the context of the Vienna Law of Treaties 1969 with its provisions being fully binding, the Paris Decision is 38 Michele Stua, From the Paris Agreement to a Low-Carbon Bretton Woods: Rationale for the Establishment of a Mitigation Alliance (Springer 2017) 10,11.
39 Eike Albrecht and others, Implementing Adaptation Strategies by Legal, Economic and Planning Instruments on Climate Change (Springer 2014) 56.
40 The failure of the UNFCCC 1992 has been a subject to various commentaries.
See Doaa Abdel Motaal, ‘Durban: A Success and a Failure’ (2012) 42(2) Environmental Policy 85.
41 Ngozi Chinwa Ole, ‘The Paris Agreement as Primer for Developing the Nigerian Off-grid Solar Electricity’ (2018) 26(3) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 426, 430.
42 Susana B. Adamo, ‘About Mitigation, Adaptation and the UNFCCC’s 21st Conference of the Parties’ (2015) 32 (3) R. bras.
Est.
Pop.
(Rio de Janeiro) 609.
43 Ibid.
44 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (n 12) 143.
Reviewed Article 154 not.45 Regardless, recourse can be validly made to its provisions for a detailing of the Paris Agreement.46 The Paris Agreement mandates member states to prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions which will contain mitigation measures in the context of the objective of the Treaty.47 It is expected that all member parties should have communicated their NDCs by 2020.48 Subsequent NDCs which must represent a progression of previous efforts to mitigate climate change should be communicated at least every five years.49 Consequent upon this, the Nigerian government communicated its NDCs in 2015.50 The NDCs stipulate several actions for the mitigation of climate change in the relevant sector, particularly in land use (agriculture) and electricity.51 First, it provides for the replacement of orthodox gas electricity technologies with modern gas electricity 45 The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaty 1969 (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), Article 2(1).
See also Antto Vihma, ‘Climate of Consensus: Managing Decision Making in the UN Climate Change Negotiations’ (2015) 24 (1) RECIEL 57, 60.
46 Ibid, Art 31.The mentioned Article, provides that a treaty can be interpreted in the context of any instrument made by two or more of the parties in connection to the treaty.
See also Yves le Bouthhiller, ‘Vienna Convention of 1969’ in Olivier Corten and others (eds), The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties: A Commentary 1 (Oxford University Press 2011) 846.
47 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 4(1) and (2).
48 The Paris Decision (n 30).
49 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 4(3) and (9).
50 The NDC was previously communicated as Intended-NDC in 2015 but it became NDC in 2017 following the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the Nigerian Government.
See Olumide Idowu, ‘Nigeria Develops Third Paris Agreement National Communication’ (2018) <www.climatescorecard.org/2018/09/nigeria-develops-third-paris-agreement-nationalcommunication/> accessed 19th February 2020.
51 J Akinbunmi and C Akinbunmi, ‘Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Studies in Nigerian Universities: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects’ in Walter Lee Filho (eds) Climate Change Research at Universities: Addressing the Mitigation and Adaptation Gaps (Springer 2017) 139. http://www.climatescorecard.org/2018/09/nigeria-develops-third-paris-agreement-national-communication/ http://www.climatescorecard.org/2018/09/nigeria-develops-third-paris-agreement-national-communication/ Reviewed Article 155 technologies.52 Secondly, it proposes that cost-efficient renewable energy solutions will drive rural electrification.53 In furtherance to the latter, the government aims to develop Off-grid solar photovoltaic electricity options to drive rural electrification.54 Thirdly, energy efficiency measures should be adopted widely, including in the electricity sector, to mitigate 179 million tonnes of GHGs.
Additionally, the government proposes to end the flaring of GHGs through the generation of electricity from gas sources.55 It is proposed that the government will promote smart and sustainable agricultural practises to the extent that will mitigate the emission of 74 million tonnes of GHGs.56 The actions are summarised in the table below: 52 Ibid, 3.
This is to the extent that will reduce greenhouse gas emission by 102 million tonnes.
53 Ibid, 2.
The proposed solar photovoltaic will be to the extent that will reduce the emission of GHGs in the electricity sector by 31 million tonnes.
54 Ibid.
For more commentaries on Nigeria’s NDC, see Emem C Onyejelam, ‘Building an Effective Implementation Process to Nigeria’s Climate Change Policies and Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC)’ (2016) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2843279> assessed 11th February 2020.
55 Ibid.
See Philip Antwi-Agyei, ‘Alignment between National Determined Contributions and the Sustainable Development Goals for West Africa’ (2018) 18 Climate Policy 1296.
56 Ibid.
Reviewed Article 156 Table 1: Mitigation Measures in Nigerian NDC57 Mitigation Measures Potential GHGs Emission Reduction (Million Tonnes Per Year up till 2030) 1.
Develop Efficient Gas Electricity Strategies 102 2.
Energy Efficiency Strategies 179 3.
End Gas Flaring 64 4.
Climate Smart Agriculture 74 5.
Reduce Transmission Losses 26 6.
Develop Renewable Energy 31 As earlier stated, the provisions of the Paris Agreement yield some political and social tools which commentators are optimistic would facilitate the enforcement of the NDCs, including Nigeria’s.58 These tools are; global stocktake, compliance mechanism and transparency framework.59 While the global stocktake and 57 The Nigerian NDC (n 19) 3.
58 Ngozi Chinwa Ole, ‘The Paris Agreement 2015 as a Primer for Developing Nigerian Off-grid Solar Electricity’ (n 41) 432.
See also Daniel Gross, ‘The Paris Agreement Is the Shove the World Needs’ (14 December 2015), <www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/12/the_paris_agreement_won_t_punish _countries_that_fall_short_but_it_s_still.html> accessed 12 February 2020.
59 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and NonObligations’ (n 17) 331 Reviewed Article 157 compliance mechanism is not within the purview of this article, it will be summarily discussed in the light of its role in securing the enforcement of the Nigerian NDCs.
The Paris Agreement provides for the global stocktake by vesting on the conference of member states (COP), the mandate to periodically review the collective progress made in the implementation of their individual NDCs.60 The first stocktake is scheduled to be held by 2023 and subsequently every five years.61 There is a ‘good faith expectation that Nigeria should be influenced by the outcome of such stocktake to voluntarily scale up efforts to develop the targeted off-grid solar electricity’ and other mitigation measures.62 The latter is especially in the context where the stocktake shows that collective efforts of member states are inadequate in the expectation of mitigating the temperature to well below 2 0 C.63 However, the effect of the global stocktake in facilitating the enforcement of Nigeria’s NDCs is whittled down by some other factors which have been discussed by the author in another publication.64 One of such is that it is ‘authorised to consider “collective” progress, thus insulating individual nations from any assessments of adequacy in relation to their actions’.65 60 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art.
14 (2).
61 Ibid.
62 Ngozi Chinwa Ole, ‘The Paris Agreement as Primer for Developing the Nigerian Off-grid Solar Electricity’ (n 41) 441.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Rajamani Lavanya, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 493, 504.
Reviewed Article 158 A compliance mechanism comprising of 12 members is also established by the Agreement.66 It provides that the mechanism shall be ‘expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and nonpunitive.’67 Where a member state like Nigeria is not implementing all or some part of its NDCs as proposed, the mechanism may indicate it in its overall report to the COP.68 It is argued that in the event of such report, the other member states in the COP might exert peer pressure on the defaulting state to the extent that will nudge them to do the needful to implement their NDCs.69 However, the strength of the compliance mechanism is whittled down by the general absence of an express provision in the Paris Agreement mandating member states to implement their NDCs.70 Consequently, there is no legal footing for such peer pressure from other member states to generate a strong force that will compel a recalcitrant Nigerian government, for example, to implement its NDCs.71 The final tool of implementation created by the provisions of the Paris Agreement is transparency.
The Paris Agreement establishes the transparency framework to 66 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 15(1).
67 The Paris Decision (n 30) Article 15(2).
See Christina Voigt, ‘The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 (2) RECIEL 161.
68 Achala Abeysinghe and Subhi Barakati, The Paris Agreement: Options for an Effective Compliance and Implementation Mechanism (IIED Press 2016) 92.
69 Sebastian Oberthur, ‘Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement’ (2014) 1–2 Climate Law 34 and 42.
70 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and NonObligations’ (n 17) 337, 354.
71 Alexander Zahar, ‘Why the Paris Agreement Does Not Need a Compliance Mechanism’ (September 2016) <https://poseidon01.ssrn.
com/delivery.php?ID=876127020083071028117022119087028098.pdf> accessed 20 Feb. 2020.
Reviewed Article 159 enhance the effective implementation of its provisions.72 The detailed guidelines for transparency will be adopted in 2020.73 Under the transparency framework, Nigeria is expected to provide all the necessary information to enable the tracking of progress for the implementation of the NDCs on a biennial basis.74 Such information include the GHGs emission by sources and removals, all such progress recorded in implementing the measures outlined in the NDCs, and the flow of support from external sources.75 Nigeria submitted its first biennial update on the implementation of the NDCs in 2018.76 The biennial updates, including the one submitted by Nigeria is displayed in the UNFCCC public registry.77 The updates will also inform the collective assessment of progress made in the implementation of the global stocktake.78 More importantly, the information on progress will galvanise the activities of nonparty stakeholders’ particularly civil societies for the implementation of its provisions.79 The global stocktake has already been discussed in this section.
Given the focus of this paper, some of the provisions on transparency will be discussed in detail alongside the role of civil societies in the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
72 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 13 (1).
73 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 13 (13).
See UNFCCC, ‘Transparency of Support under the Paris Agreement’ (2020) < https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/transparency-of-supportex-post/transparency-of-support-under-the-paris-agreement> accessed 3rd March 2020.
74 Ibid, Art 13 (5).
75 Ibid, Art 13 (7).
76 UNFCCC, ‘Nigeria: First Biennial Update Report’ (n 20).
77 Ibid, Art 4 (9), and Art 4 (12).
78 Ibid, Art 13 (6).
79 Arunabha Ghosh and Sumit S Prasad, ‘Shining the Light on Climate Action: The Role of Non-party Institutions’ (2017) Fixing Climate Governance Series Paper No.
6 <www.cigionline.org /publications/shining-light-climate-action-role-non-party-institutions> accessed 22nd February 2020. https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/transparency-of-support-ex-post/transparency-of-support-under-the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/transparency-of-support-ex-post/transparency-of-support-under-the-paris-agreement Reviewed Article 160 3.
The Role of Civil Societies in the Implementation of the Paris Agreement The point that non-party stakeholders have a role to play in the implementation of the Paris Agreement in Nigeria has previously been made.
The term ‘non-party stakeholders’ was defined in the Paris Decision to include civil societies.80 The role of civil societies in the implementation of the Paris Agreement is tripartite.
In the first instance, civil societies can use various political and legal tools to nudge a member state like Nigeria to vigorously deploy measures for the implementation of their NDCs81.
Additionally, civil societies can also push for the adoption of more ambitious measures for the mitigation of climate change in a member state like Nigeria in subsequent NDCs.82 Importantly, they are encouraged to adopt measures, independently, for the mitigation of climate change.83 These will be discussed accordingly.
The bedrock of transparency is that member states including Nigeria, will make available sufficient information on progress made concerning the implementation of their NDCs in the UNFCCC public register.84 On the strength of such publication, commentators posit that civil societies and other non-party actors can propel member states like Nigeria to adopt more ambitious actions for the implementation 80 The Paris Decision (n 30) preamble, para 15.
81 Harro van Asselt, ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance under the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 91, 107.
82 Thomas Hale, The Role of Sub-State and Non-State Actors in International Climate Processes (Chatham House 2018) 3-5.
83 The Paris Decision (n 30) para 117.
84 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 13 (7).
Reviewed Article 161 of their NDCs.85 While the latter position was not expressly provided for in the Paris Agreement, it can be gleaned from its provisions which is that the transparency framework shall be built on the past experiences from the implementation of the UNFCCC.86 A core attribute of the transparency framework under the UNFCCC regime was the active role of civil societies in stimulating member states to do more in the area of the implementation of their NDCs.87 The tool at the disposal of civil societies includes litigation, lobbying, and engagement with relevant stakeholders etc.88 Another role of civil societies is to nudge member states to scale up mitigation measures in subsequent NDCs.
The Paris Agreement provides that member states shall submit subsequent NDCs which will be a progression of the first NDC and shall represent their highest possible ambition.89 It is argued that civil societies can use tools such as lobbying and litigation to harness the highest possible measures for climate change mitigation from member states in subsequent NDCs.90 The latter is already the case in some advanced climes.
In the case of Urgenda Foundation and 886 85 Thomas Bernauer and others, ‘Could more Civil Society involvement increase Public Support for Climate Policy-Making?
Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China’ (2016) 40 Global Environmental Change 10.
86 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 13 (3) and (4).
87 Steinar Andresen and Lars H. Gulbrandsen, ‘The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance’ in Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (Earthscan, 2005) 178– 181; Eric Dannenmaier, ‘The Role of Non-state Actors in Climate Compliance’, in Olav Schram Stokke et al., Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
88 Ngozi Chinwa Ole, ‘The Paris Agreement 2015 as a Primer for Developing Nigerian Off-grid Solar Electricity’ (n 41) 445-447.
89 The Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 4(2) and (3).
90 Harro van Asselt, ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance under the Paris Agreement’ (n 81) 107.
Reviewed Article 162 Citizens v. The State of The Netherlands91 (Urgenda Foundation), a civil society succeeded in getting a court declaration to the effect that the Dutch government was liable to keep their emissions to below 25% by 2020, a level that will reflect what is expected of developed countries in international climate science.92 In Nigeria, some civil societies are already involved in engaging with relevant government stakeholders to push for more ambitious mitigation measures.
For example the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) is currently engaging relevant stakeholders to facilitate the adoption of laws on climate change mitigation.93 Finally, the Paris Decision encourages civil societies to adopt measures for the mitigation of climate change.
It provides that the member party ‘welcomes the efforts of non-party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions…’94 and encourages member states to ‘work closely with non-party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to strengthen mitigation…actions’.95 The last arm of this provision is to ensure that the activities of non-party stakeholders including civil societies are coordinated 91 [2015] C/09/456689/ha za 13-1396.
See the judgment available at <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien document?
id=ecli:nl:rbdha:2015:7196a> accessed 4th March 2020.
The possibility of this strategy has been considered in light of the Paris Agreement; see Sara Stefanini, ‘Next Stop for Paris Climate Deal: The Courts’ (2016) Politico, 11 <http://www.politico.eu/article/parisclimate-urgenda-courts-lawsuits-cop21/> (accessed 4 February 2020).
92 Ibid.
See also K. J. Graaf and J. H. Jans, ‘The Urgenda Decision: Netherlands Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate Change’ (2015) 25 Journal of African Law 517.
93 Like the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) is currently involved in engaging relevant stakeholders to facilitate laws on environmental protection and conservation which includes climate change.
See CISLAC, ‘About Us’ (2020) < https://cislacnigeria.net/page/2/> accessed 4th March 2020.
94 The Paris Decision (n 30) para 117.
95 Ibid, para 118. https://cislacnigeria.net/page/2/ Reviewed Article 163 and counts in the overall implementation of the NDCs.96 Thus, civil societies can initiate and implement measures for the mitigation of climate change.
Interestingly, the Paris Decision established some form of transparency mechanism called ‘NonState Actor Zone for Climate Action (NSAZCA)’97.
In the latter platform, civil societies are expected to register major climate change mitigation projects initiated and implemented at the national level.98 Thus, the activities of civil societies and other non-party stakeholders can be aggregated and monitored in the light of the overall mitigation target of holding the global temperature to well below 2 0 C.99 The NSAZCA indicates that three civil societies are already implementing climate change mitigation measures in Nigeria.100 The three civil societies are Center for Initiative and Development (CID), Nma Eunice Owenson Foundation and, Sanitation and Hygiene Education.101 In the light of the analysed roles of non-party stakeholders, the next section contains an analysis of challenges and opportunities that the discussed roles present for NULAI.
96 Harro Van Asselt and Thomas Hale, ‘Maximizing the Potential of the Paris Agreement: Effective Review in a Hybrid Regime’ (2016) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02776> accessed 4th March 2020.
97 The Paris Decision (n 30) para 117.
See UNFCCC, ‘Global Climate Action’ (2020) <https://climateaction.
unfccc.int/#NG> accessed 4th March 2020.
98 Ibid.
See Sander Chan and Wanja Amling, ‘Does Orchestration in the Global Climate Action Agenda Effectively Prioritize and Mobilize Transnational Climate Adaptation Action?’ (2019) 19 Int Environ Agreements 429, 435.
99 Ibid.
See the Paris Agreement (n 12) Art 2.
100 UNFCCC, ‘Global Climate Action’ <https://climateaction.unfccc.
int/#NG> accessed 4th of March 2020.
101 Ibid.
Reviewed Article 164 4.
NULAI: Opportunities and Challenges The Network of University Legal Aid Institution (NULAI) is a civil society and, a conglomerate of law clinics of Nigerian Universities committed to the promotion of clinical legal education, legal aid and access to justice.102 The term clinical legal education has been by Ojukwu as ‘an experiential method of learning that enables law students to learn practice skills while in the same learning process providing legal assistance in circumstances where justice so demands’.103 On the other hand, law clinics refer to the service hub or physical facilities that affords law students the opportunities to demonstrate and imbibe core law attributes while aiding access to justice.104 There are currently about 43 law clinics domiciled in forty-three universities105 and registered with NULAI.106 The law clinics usually are managed internally by a set of student clinicians under the supervision of law teachers within the university where it is domiciled.107 The recurrent focal points of most law clinics are prisoners/pre-trial detainee rights; child rights; human rights; freedom of information community 102 NULAI, ‘About us’ (n 42).
103 Ernest Ojukwu and others, Clinical Legal Education: Curriculum, Lessons and Materials (NULAI 2013) 7-8.
104 Sam Erugo, ‘Legal Assistance by Clinical Law Students: A Nigerian Experience in Increasing Access to Justice for the Unrepresented’ (2016) 3(2) Asian Journal of Legal Education 165.
105 The institutions of Higher Learning include thirty seven universities and, six campuses of the Nigerian Law School.
See NULAI, ‘Reform of Legal Education in Nigeria’ (2020) <http://nulai.org> accessed 6th March 2020.
106 Ibid.
107 Olanike S. Adelakun-Odewale, ‘Role of Clinical Legal Education in Social Justice in Nigeria’ (2017) 5(1) Asian Journal of Legal Education 88-98.
Reviewed Article 165 education and support.108 The law clinic is compartmentalised into several units according to the focal points of the law clinic in question.109 Each of the units is headed by a student clinician.110 The heads of departments are responsive to the central executives, namely an appointed president, a vice president and a secretary.111 In turn, the activities of the central executives and, the law clinic are overseen by qualified legal practitioners who are law teachers.112 As earlier mentioned, NULAI is a civil society that focuses on different spectrum of access to justice, including environmental and climatic justice.
The role of NULAI in promoting access to justice is one with statutory flavour as provided for in the Legal Aid Act.113 Access to justice is said to cover a series of activities for the promotion, enforcement and, protection of the right to a healthy environment including from anthropogenic activities that exacerbate global warming.
114 It is therefore not surprising that NULAI also covers the promotion of climatic justice as part of access 108 Ernest Ojukwu, Compenduim of Campus Based Law Clinics (NULAI 2014).
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Peters Ifeoma, ‘Role of Law Clinics in Bridging the Gap between the Less Privileged and Access to Justice in Nigeria – Uwais Abdulrahman’ (2017) < https://dnllegalandstyle.com/2017/role-law-clinicsbridging-gap-less-privileged-access-justice-nigeria-uwais-abdulrahman/> accessed 3rd July 2020.
112 Ibid.
113 Section 17 of the Legal Aid Act 2011 provides that the Legal Aid Council shall maintain a register of law clinics and may partner with them in the performance of any of their functions under the Act.
See the Legal Aid Act 2011.
114 Niguel Crawhall and Allison Crawhall, ‘Access to Justice and the Right to Sustain’ (2016) IUCN Working Paper <https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/atj_.pdf> accessed 6th March 2020. https://dnllegalandstyle.com/2017/role-law-clinics-bridging-gap-less-privileged-access-justice-nigeria-uwais-abdulrahman/ https://dnllegalandstyle.com/2017/role-law-clinics-bridging-gap-less-privileged-access-justice-nigeria-uwais-abdulrahman/ Reviewed Article 166 to justice.115 Given its focus and mandate, NULAI can play crucial roles in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, including the Nigerian NDCs.
In the first instance, NULAI can get the Nigerian government to adopt more measures than they ordinarily would for the implementation of the NDCs.
As indicated, the Nigerian government has submitted and published their biennial updates on progress made in the implementation of the UNFCCC in 2018.116 The update shows that while the GHGs emission level is still increasing, little has been done in the area of the implementation of the mitigation proposed in the Nigerian NDCs.117 An instrument used by individual law clinics to achieve access to justice in some contexts is engaging with relevant stakeholders.118 For instance, law clinics undertaking prison projects pay advocacy visits to the Chief Judge and Director of Public Prosecution of the state where they are domiciled to secure the release of prison detainees.119 Thus, NULAI can visit and engage with relevant stakeholders like members of the State and National Assembly120 both at the national and state level to extrapolate more measures for the implementation of Nigerian NDCs.
115 NULAI, ‘NULAI Law Clinic Global Day of Action for Climate Justice’ (2020) <https://www.change.org/p/students-climate-justice-is-social-justice-join-the-nulai-freshaircampaign?use_rea ct=false> accessed 6th March 2020.
116 UNFCCC, ‘Nigeria: First Biennial Update Report’ (n 20).
117 Ibid, 146148.
118 NULAI, ‘Law Clinics and Pretrial Detainees’ <http://www.nulai.org/index.php/blog/82-improvingaccess-to-justice-for-pre-trial-detainees-in-nigeria-project> accessed 9th March 2020.
119 Taiye Joshua Omidoyin and Omolade Oniyinde, ‘Law Clinics and Access to Justice for Pretrial Detainees in Nigeria’ (2019) 10 (9) NAUJILJ 103.
120 The relevant stakeholders include members of the State and National Assembly, Staff of the Ministry of Environment and the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA).
See Mandyen Brenda Anzaki, ‘Climate Change: the Legal Framework’ <www.thelawyerschronicle.com/climate-change-the-legal-framework/> accessed 9th March 2020. http://www.thelawyerschronicle.com/climate-change-the-legal-framework/ Reviewed Article 167 However, the limit to which they can engage with relevant stakeholders is constrained by the low level of awareness of climate change issues among university students.
The point that NULAI is a conglomerate of university law clinics in Nigeria which embeds facilitating of access to justice with the training of law students has already been made.121 Law students operate a law clinic under the guidance of qualified law teachers and, in partnership with licensed law firms.122 A study conducted in 2019 confirms that there is low awareness of climate change issues among university students in Nigeria.123 As such, it is not surprising that there is little awareness of climate change policies and law among law faculties.124 Thus, some law clinics will not be sufficiently informed about climatic justice and policies in Nigeria to the extent that will birth a meaningful interaction with stakeholders in the light of securing more proactive measures for the implementation of the NDCs.
However, the latter problem of a low level of awareness may be addressed by the creation of climate-focused law clinics.
The general focus of most law clinics in Nigeria is on issues that have a direct bearing on the realisation of human rights.125 Thus, it might be difficult to get existing law clinics to familiarise themselves with 121 Rafatu Ohiare, ‘The Role of Law Clinics in Advancing Pretrial Justice Reform in Nigeria’ (2019) 4 African Journal of Clinical Legal Education and Access to Justice 33.
122 Ibid.
123 Mark M Akrofi and others, ‘Students in Climate Action: A Study of Some Influential Factors and Implications of Knowledge Gaps in Africa’ (2019) 6 Environments 12.
124 Ibid.
See Emeka Daniel Otuonye, ‘An Assessment of the Level of Awareness of the Effects of Climate Change among Students of Tertiary Institutions in Jalingo Metropolis, Taraba State Nigeria’ (2011) 4 (9) J. Geogr.
Reg.
Plann.
514.
125 One of such popular area of focus is the realisation of the right to personnel liberty and dignity through prison decongestion projects.
See Odinakaonye Lagi and others, Campus-Based Law Clinics in Criminal Justice Administration in Nigeria (NULAI 2019).
Reviewed Article 168 climate change policies to the degree that will inform a meaningful interaction with law clinics.
As such, a panacea to the low level of awareness is the creation of climate justice focused law clinics, stimulated by NULAI.
For instance, in 2013, NULAI initiated a project where they mainstreamed Freedom of Information Community Education as a focal point for law clinics across Nigeria.126 In practise, NULAI can stimulate law clinics registering with them to adopt climate justice as a sole or one of their focal points.
Such a unique creation will enable the galvanisation of needed knowledge that will foster meaningful interaction with stakeholders.
What is more, the low level of awareness can also be addressed by the adoption of a top-down approach.
Some members of the Board of Trustees of NULAI have already carved a niche for themselves as climate change law experts.127 There are also some members of NULAI, who are well-grounded in the area of climate change law.128 Thus, NULAI can leverage the expertise of its members to design a uniform guidance for meaningful engagement with the relevant stakeholders.
The uniform program will be distributed across specific law clinics in Nigeria to facilitate such engagement with stakeholders.
126 Sam Erugo and Charles O Adekoya, Lawyering with Integrity: Essays in Honour of Ernest Ojukwu SAN (Lulu Press 2017) 19-20.
See also Ernest Ojukwu and others, Street Law: Freedom of Information Manual (NULAI 2016).
127 Two of the Seven Board Members of NULAI are experts in climate change law.
See NULAI, NULAI Nigeria Profile (NULAI 2018) 4.
128 The first author of this article was among the pioneer clinicians and, a product of the first phase of law clinics in Nigeria.
Dr. Ngozi Chinwa Ole is a member of NULAI and, an expert in climate change law.
See <https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-ngozi-chinwa-ole-9885858b/?originalSubdomain=uk.> accessed 27th March 2020. https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-ngozi-chinwa-ole-9885858b/?originalSubdomain=uk Reviewed Article 169 On another note, NULAI could also use the instrument of litigation to extract more ambitious actions from the Nigerian government for the implementation of the NDCs.
The point that very little has been done in the implementation of the Nigerian NDCs in view of 2030 has been made.129 It has been established that one of the tools used by civil societies for extracting proactive actions for the mitigation of climate change is litigation.130 Some campus-based law clinics in advanced climes like Canada have employed such tools.
In Nadege Dorzema et al.
v. the Dominican Republic (Guayabin Massacre Case)131, a campus-based law clinic at the University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada successfully used the instrument of litigation to enforce the right to life and human dignity of 30 Haitian migrants against the Dominican government as contained in the American Convention on Human Rights.132 Thus, NULAI can institute and pursue public interest litigation to extrapolate more actions for the mitigation of climate change in Nigeria.
Such litigation by NULAI just like the Urgenda foundation’s case can arguably come under the law of tortuous liability, particularly negligence.
Given that NULAI is rudimentarily powered by student law clinicians, they can partner with other NGOs 129 Priscilla Offiong, ‘Nigeria’s Biannual Update Report and Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report Provide Useful Information on the Country’s Emission Levels’ (2019) < https://www.climatescorecard.org/2019/06/nigerias-biannual-update-report-and-greenhouse-gasinventory-report-provide-useful-information-on-the-countrys-emission-levels/> accessed 11th March 2020 130 The case of Urgenda Foundation and 886 Citizens v. The State of The Netherlands (n 91) is an example in this context.
131 (2012) Ser.C No 251 (Dom).
132 The case of William Andrews v United States (1997) IACHR, Case 11.139, Report N 0 57/96 is also another example where the law clinic of American University Washington College of Law instituted a public interest litigation for inmates on death row for the enforcement of their right to dignity.
Reviewed Article 170 or affiliated law firms to institute such an action.133 There are three elements that must establish concurrently for one to succeed in an action for Negligence in Nigeria.134 The elements are: that there was a duty of care owed, that there was a breach of duty of care and, that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.135 The duty of care must be founded in common law or statute.136 It is such duty of care that will give a litigant the legal right to be heard in a court of law.137 Thus, NULAI must at least cross the first hurdle of getting the right of audience in a court of law by showing that there is a duty of care on the state to protect the environment.
Regrettably, the non-justiciability of the state’s duty to guarantee a safe environment will puncture the chances of NULAI getting a right of audience in a court of law under the tort of negligence.
The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides for the duty of a state to protect and improve the environment.138 Thus, this section would ordinarily give rise to a duty of care on the state for the purpose of giving a litigant, the right of audience in a court of law in Nigeria.139 Regrettably, the duty of care imposed on the state to protect and improve the environment is non-justiciable.140 133 Law clinics generally have the antecedent of partnering with law firms and NGOs particularly to enable them use the instrument of litigation in attaining access to justice.
See Bernand Duhaime & Ismene Nicole Zarifis, ‘Using Public Interest Litigation and Advocacy as a Tool for Social Change: Clinical Experiences in the Americas and Africa’ (2013) African Journal of Clinical Legal Education and Access to Justice 118, 128-129.
134 Ese Malemi, Law of Tort (Princeton 2017) 287.
135 MTN (Nig Coms Ltd) v Sadiku (2014) 17 NWLR 386.
136 A O N Ezeani and R U Ezeani, Law of Torts (With Cases and Materials) (Odade Publishers 2014) 295.
137 This is encapsulated in the legal maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium which means where there is a legal right, there is a remedy.
See Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 669, at 686.
138 The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (NG) s. 20 (1).
139 Ibid.
See MTN (Nig Coms Ltd) v Sadiku (2014) 17 NWLR 386.
140 Ibid, s. 20.
See Epiphany Azinge and Bolaji Owasanoye (eds), Justiciability and Constitutionality: An Epiphany of the Law (Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Press, 2010) 151.
Reviewed Article 171 The latter provision automatically takes away the right of a litigant to be heard in a court of law in this context.141 Thus, NULAI will not have the legal right to sue under the tort of negligence to extract more ambitious actions from the Nigerian government for the implementation of its NDCs.
However, a panacea to the lack of a legal right to sue under the law of negligence might be the use of a rights-based approach.
The 1999 Constitution provides for the fundamental right to life in Nigeria, which shall be enforceable against any party including the state.142 The Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Order 2009 provides that: The court shall encourage and welcome public interest litigations in the human rights field and no human rights case may be dismissed or struck out for want of locus standi.
In particular, human rights activists, advocates, or groups as well as any non-governmental organisations, may institute human rights application on behalf of any potential applicant.143 The implication of the latter provision is that civil societies like NULAI have a right of audience in court for the enforcement of any of the fundamental human rights 141 Archbishop Anthony Okogie v. AG Lagos State [1981] 2 NCLR 337, 350.
142 The 1999 Constitution (NG) s. 33.
143 The Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Order 2009 (NG), Preamble, s. 3 (e).
Reviewed Article 172 provided for in the constitution.144 In Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Companies and Another145 , the court held that the right to life includes the right to a healthy environment including one devoid of the adverse effects of climate change.
Thus, one can anticipate a higher possibility of success of a suit by NULAI for the implementation of the NDCs if it is pursued from a right-based approach.
A rightbased approach will accommodate the position that the refusal to fully implement the measures proposed in the NDCs is likely undermine an individual’s right to life.146 The latter is permissible in the light of the provisions of the Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Order 2009 to the effect that a person can sue to enforce his fundamental human rights where an action or omission may likely infringe it.147 Another role that NULAI can play in this context is the adoption of measures for the mitigation of climate change.
As noted, the Paris Decision encourages civil societies to adopt measures for the mitigation of climate change.148 Thus, NULAI can adopt measures either individually or collectively for the mitigation of climate change.
Some law clinics have already started initiating climate change mitigation projects 144 Abiola Sanni, ‘Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a Tool for the Enforcement of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria: The Need for Farreaching Reform’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 512.
145 Suit No.
FHC/B/CS/53/05; (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC 2005).
146Franziska Knur, ‘ The United Nations Human Rights Approach to Climate ChangeIntroducing a Human Dimension to International Climate Law’ in Sabine von Schorlemer and Sylvia Maus (eds), Climate Change as a Threat to Peace: Impacts on Cultural Heritage and Cultural Diversity (Peter LangAG 2014) 37-60.
147 The Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Order 2009 (NG) Order II (1).
148 The Paris Decision (n 30) para 117.
Reviewed Article 173 like tree planting in Nigeria.149 However, there is still room for more ambitious measures by NULAI.
Notably, such mitigation measures should be made known to relevant stakeholders at the national and international level.
Mitigation measures adopted by NULAI should be communicated to the Department of Climate Change, Federal Ministry of Environment.150 The latter would enable them to factor it in the preparation of Nigeria’s Biennial Updates.
In the same vein, such mitigation action needs to be registered in NSAZCA so that it can be counted at the global stocktake as part of collective measures for climate change mitigation.151 Registering with the NSAZCA means that NULAI can also have a stronger footing to partner with other civil societies globally for the adoption of climate change mitigation initiatives.
5.
Conclusion This paper contains an analysis of the opportunities and challenges that the Paris Agreement 2015 provide for NULAI in the context of mitigating climate change in Nigeria.
It was argued that the definition of non-party stakeholders to include civil societies provides a platform for NULAI to play dual role in the implementation of 149 For instance the Ebonyi State University Law Clinic, Nigeria has an annual ritual of tree planting to mitigate climate change in Nigeria.
Amari Omaka Chukwu, ‘Going Green and Clean: The Ebsu Law Clinic Role in Combating Climate Change for Health’ (2019) A Paper presented at the ENCLE-IJCLE Conference 2019 Comenuis University, Bratislava, Slovakia 3-5th July 2019.
150 Department of Climate Change, ‘What we do’ (2020) <https://climatechange.gov.ng/what-we-do/> accessed 26th March 2020.
151 UNFCCC, ‘Global Climate Action NSAZCA: About’ < https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/ about.html > accessed 26th March 2020. https://climatechange.gov.ng/what-we-do/ https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/%20about.html https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/%20about.html Reviewed Article 174 the Agreement.
In the first instance, NULAI can help in facilitating the implementation of Nigerian NDCs.
The latter would be through interaction with stakeholders and, the instrument of litigation.
Additionally, they can adopt and implement mitigation measures in Nigeria.
It was argued that the provisions of the Paris Agreement and, the Decision allows for NULAI to interact with relevant stakeholders to galvanise more ambitious actions to achieve the implementation of the NNDCs by 2030.
However, the low level of awareness of climate change policies among law faculties, including law clinicians reduces the chances of a meaningful engagement with stakeholders in this context.
The establishment of climate change-focused law clinics and, the adoption of a top-down strategy were recommended as ways to surmount the problem of low awareness.
The Paris Agreement provides the foundation for NULAI to use litigation as a tool to secure the enforcement of the NDCs by 2030, possibly under the tort of negligence.
Regrettably, the possibility of such litigation is eroded by the absence of an enforceable right to a healthy environment in Nigeria.
Thus, NULAI will not have a right of audience in a court of law for this purpose.
On the other hand, it was argued that the use of a right-based approach might provide an appropriate avenue for NULAI to secure the implementation of Nigeria’s NDCs.
Finally, it was identified that the provisions of the Paris Agreement as detailed in the Decision allows for the adoption of mitigation measures by civil societies such as Reviewed Article 175 NULAI.
Some law clinics are already involved in projects that are mitigating climate change in Nigeria.
However, the latter efforts are few in comparison to what is needed and more measures are needed.
It was recommended that NULAI should communicate such measures to the Department of Climate Change, Ministry of Environment, Nigeria and NASZCA to enable it count in the overall national and global efforts for the mitigation of climate change.
Climate change is a recurrent topic in various discourses at governmental and non-governmental fora because of its direct and indirect ramifications, all of which stall the realisation of the sustainable development goals in Nigeria.152 Given the unprecedented scale of its negative ramifications, the Government of Nigeria has indicated that it is welcoming the actions of civil societies towards the mitigation and adaptation of climate change in Nigeria.153 This paper has outlined the various ways NULAI can help in the implementation of the Paris Agreement in Nigeria.
The paper was presented in the 2nd African Colloquim on Clinical Education 2020 organised by NULAI154 and, it is anticipated that the analysis and recommendations in this paper will be fully implemented.
152 Mohamed Yahya, ‘Nigeria must lead on Climate Change’ (2019) <www.undp.org/content/undp/en /home/blog/2019/nigeria-must-lead-on-climate-change.html > accessed 30th March 2020.
153 María Yetano Roche and others, ‘Achieving Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria’s Power Sector: Assessment of Transition Pathways’ (2019) Climate Policy 15.
154 NULAI, ‘NULAI 2nd African Clinical Legal Education Colloquim’ (2019) <https://nulai.org/nulaiafrica-clinical-legal-education-colloquium/> accessed 30th March 2020. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en%20/home/blog/2019/nigeria-must-lead-on-climate-change.html https://nulai.org/nulai-africa-clinical-legal-education-colloquium/ https://nulai.org/nulai-africa-clinical-legal-education-colloquium/ 1.
Introduction 2.
The Paris Agreement 2015: Measures and Implementation Tools 3.
The Role of Civil Societies in the Implementation of the Paris Agreement 4.
NULAI: Opportunities and Challenges 5.
Conclusion
PUBLICATIONS SPP Research Paper VOLUME 15:27 | SEPTEMBER 2022 CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR SPECIAL SERIES FOSTERING RESILIENCE AND ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN NORTH — IMPLICATIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE PROPOSED CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR S. JEFF BIRCHALL, SARAH KEHLER AND NICOLE BONNETT http://dx.doi.org/DOI-10.11575/sppp.v15i1.74463 ii FOREWORD THE CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR RESEARCH PROGRAM PAPER SERIES This paper is part of a special series in The School of Public Policy Publications, investigating a concept that would connect the nation’s southern infrastructure to a new series of corridors across middle and northern Canada.
This paper is an output of the Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program.
The Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program at The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, is the leading platform for information and analysis on the feasibility, desirability, and acceptability of a connected series of infrastructure corridors throughout Canada.
Endorsed by the Senate of Canada, this work responds to the Council of the Federation’s July 2019 call for informed discussion of pan-Canadian economic corridors as a key input to strengthening growth across Canada and “a strong, sustainable and environmentally responsible economy.” This Research Program will benefit all Canadians, providing recommendations to advance the infrastructure planning and development process in Canada.
All publications can be found at https://www.canadiancorridor.ca/the-researchprogram/research-publications/.
Dr. Jennifer Winter Program Director, Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program https://www.canadiancorridor.ca/the-research-program/research-publications/ https://www.canadiancorridor.ca/the-research-program/research-publications/ 1 FOSTERING RESILIENCE AND ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE  CANADIAN NORTH — IMPLICATIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE PROPOSED CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR S. Jeff Birchall, Sarah Kehler and Nicole Bonnett KEY MESSAGES The key findings and recommendations of this review are: • Resilience of northern infrastructure is dependent on adaptation being done in an equitable way.
This means balancing environmental risk reduction through infrastructure measures and vulnerability reduction through socioeconomic stressor support.
• Northern Canada is warming at double the global rate, which is already causing significant challenges for northern infrastructure.
The feasibility of expanding northern infrastructure is drastically reduced without capitalizing on the ability of adaptation and resilience planning to mitigate increased risks due to climate change.
• Northern Canadian communities are considerably vulnerable to climate change.
Physical vulnerability due to remoteness, amplified warming and ecological fragility is compounded by systemic socioeconomic stressors, economic vulnerability and overwhelming adaptation and maintenance costs.
• Climate change adaptation is projected to be exceedingly costly and increasingly necessary.
There is an urgent need to prepare communities for the worst, without putting them at an economic disadvantage or hindering their ability to function and thrive.
• Misconceptions about the opportunities climate change will bring to northern Canada hinder effective adaptation.
Underestimating the severity and complexity of climate change and its effects can have unintended consequences, and therefore, the potential to drastically reduce the feasibility of expanding northern infrastructure.
2 • Hard infrastructure adaptation measures are capital intensive, costly to maintain and carry a high risk of failure.
The costs and effectiveness of adaptation measures have limits in the face of unrestricted climate change and are constrained by sociopolitical factors that define a community’s capacity to adapt.
• Effective adaptation is integral to the sustainability of any proposed northern expansion.
Smart adaptation measures focused on reducing vulnerability through a place-based approach can be identified through public consultation and fostered through the respectful integration of non-Western knowledge systems.
Intergovernmental co-operation is critical to facilitate implementation of low-risk, high-benefit policy.
SUMMARY The Canadian Northern Corridor (CNC) has been proposed to overcome gaps in the northern transportation system that limit social and economic development in the Canadian North (Fellows et al.
2020).
Intended to be a multimodal transportation rightof-way through Canada’s North, the CNC seeks to capitalize on shifting global markets and increased access to northern resources (Pearce et al.
2020; Fellows et al.
2020).
However, transportation infrastructure has remained constrained across northern Canada.
Significant challenges exist for northern infrastructure due to isolation, restricted access and extraordinary environmental conditions — all of which climate change is projected to radically intensify (Palko and Lemmen 2017; Pearce et al.
2020).
Climate change drastically reduces the feasibility of expanding northern infrastructure.
Significant increases in environmental risk threaten existing infrastructure and magnify maintenance costs.
Adaptation in remote northern locations can be exceedingly difficult and costly (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
Additional Arctic warming is guaranteed to have systemic effects and pose significant challenges for northern infrastructure: temperature and precipitation will continue to increase; permafrost thaw will be amplified through changes in seasonal snow cover and land ice; ice loss of mountain and polar glaciers is virtually certain; coastal impacts such as erosion and storm surges will be magnified by increasing sea level and extreme volatility; and Arctic sea ice extent will decline to the point of likely being practically ice free in September before 2050 (IPCC 2021).
Determining how to facilitate long-term, effective climate change adaptation is critical to overcome these challenges.
Adaptation planning seeks to anticipate and mitigate the risks that result from climate change.
This is done through two methods: hard and soft adaptation.
Hard adaptations provide a physical barrier to the source of risk, such as a sea wall.
In contrast, soft adaptations reduce risk by adjusting human behaviour through a variety of methods, including regulating development out of high-risk areas through land use bylaws or development permits, and fostering environmental stewardship to bolster ecosystem services, such as wetland preservation to reduce flooding (Bonnett and Birchall 3 2020).
However, common misunderstandings about which adaptation initiatives are effective often disable adaptation planning (Kehler and Birchall 2021).
This often results in maladaptation — when adaptation measures result in unintended negative consequences that further increase risks.
Hard infrastructure adaptations intended to reduce physical risk, despite typically being used as the foundation of adaptation planning, magnify the risk of maladaptation when used alone (Bonnett and Birchall 2020).
Due to the capital-intensive nature of hard measures, both upfront and in longterm maintenance, and their predisposition to environmental degradation, the need to go beyond hard measures to address vulnerability is well understood (Bonnett and Birchall 2020; Kehler and Birchall 2021; Naylor et al.
2020).
Adapting infrastructure to climate change in the Canadian North presents a formidable challenge.
Limits and constraints to effective adaptation, such as lagging implementation, isolation, low population and limited tax base to fund local-level adaptation and infrastructure maintenance, result in significant challenges and limited capacity to overcome them (Bonnett and Birchall 2020; Birchall and Bonnett 2020; Birchall et al.
2021; Ford et al.
2015).
While climate change is perceived to have the potential to increase access to the North — allowing trade, tourism and transport of much-needed goods and services to northern communities — in reality, existing and new construction will be progressively vulnerable to unprecedented climatic effects and the resulting infrastructure maintenance will grow increasingly costly.
This increase in vulnerability and costs is likely to restrict the anticipated socioeconomic boons of expanded connectivity and resource development, potentially straining already vulnerable communities and Indigenous Peoples.
Considerable uncertainty requires a planning approach to infrastructure adaptation that focuses on mitigating risks of climate change while also bolstering community resilience.
Infrastructure expansion such as the CNC necessitates adaptation planning that includes fostering economic diversity and infrastructure resilience.
Increased disaster risk due to climate change could push communities already overwhelmed by maintenance and adaptation to being unable to cope, resulting in vulnerabilities across northern Canada.
Balancing hard adaptations with other forms of policy, such as soft adaptations intended to increase adaptive capacity and adaptation readiness, is critical to avoid maladaptation of infrastructure.
Regardless of cost or feasibility, for infrastructure adaptation to be effective it must coincide with a reduction of socioeconomic stressors, and all decision making must be done through a localized, participatory and equitable process (IPCC 2014).
Addressing adaptation and resilience for northern infrastructure requires exploring what is necessary to foster resilience, examining what avenues for adaptation are most effective and then maximizing the benefits of limited funding allocated toward these strategies.
Effective adaptation strategies focus on the reduction of vulnerability through placeand context-specific approaches, using low-risk, high-benefit policy measures that are supported through significant intergovernmental co-operation, public engagement and 4 integration of non-Western knowledge systems.
By further understanding the pathways to achieve resilience, and through a holistic approach to adaptation, it is possible to balance the increased environmental risks of climate change with socioeconomic impacts, and to do so in a way that is economically sustainable long into the future.
1.
INTRODUCTION Canada is rich in natural resources; much of its history has been shaped by resource extraction and export, with many permanent settlements forming around dense resource stockpiles (Van Assche et al.
2016).
However, transportation infrastructure across the Canadian North remains limited due to extraordinary environmental conditions and remote geography (Pearce et al.
2020), rendering considerable resource wealth inaccessible and limiting social and economic development in the Canadian North (Fellows et al.
2020).
The expansion of northern infrastructure has been proposed in response to these challenges.
The Canadian Northern Corridor (CNC) — a proposed multimodal transportation right-of-way through Canada’s North — aims to capitalize on shifting global markets and increased access to resources in the North due to accelerated polar warming, while seeking to include northern Canada in the south’s prosperity (Pearce et al.
2020; Fellows et al.
2020).
However, as the Canadian North warms due to climate change (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2019), transportation infrastructure faces significant challenges (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
In particular, thawing permafrost, flooding and wildfires threaten the stability and efficiency of northern transportation systems, rendering it critical to build infrastructure with these risks in mind (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
As climate change impacts are worsening, there is growing urgency to assess the magnitude of risk to infrastructure in the Canadian North and identify adaptation strategies to increase the resilience of northern infrastructure.
Climate change impacts are the result of changing environmental processes interacting with human systems — manifesting through vulnerability due to lack of preparedness and exposure to increasing risk.
Across the globe, as climate change effects threaten communities, there is a significant need to address the following question: How can communities, and the Figure 1: A possible route of the Canadian Northern Corridor proposed by the University of Calgary School of Public Policy (Pearce et al.
2020; Sulzenko and Fellows 2016).
5 infrastructure that supports them, withstand the dramatic changes that are occurring in the warming climate?
To answer this question, the field of urban and regional planning has undertaken an approach that bolsters community adaptation and resilience in the face of increasing environmental variability and extremes.
Adaptation to climate change is defined as the adjustment of human systems in order to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities posed by climate change, while resilience to climate change refers to the capacity of these systems to cope with and adjust to hazardous events or stressors that result from a warming world (IPCC 2014).
Climate change poses numerous challenges for the CNC, many of which would require extensive adaptation and have significant implications, both positive and negative, for the resilience of northern communities.
An urban and regional planning approach to infrastructure adaptation reveals several crucial considerations for the planning of northern transportation infrastructure.
Climate change is a momentous threat to the livelihoods and critical infrastructure of isolated and vulnerable northern communities.
Resilience is inherently complex, and vulnerability to climate change even more so.
While adaptation seeks to reduce vulnerability and mitigate exposure to risk, to do so effectively goes beyond hard infrastructure measures alone and requires balancing the many interconnections between communities and the environment around them.
In the Canadian North, this balance is substantially more precarious.
To successfully adapt requires consciously balancing unique northern environmental considerations, such as increasing disaster risk and ecosystem fragility with ever-increasing adaptation costs and the needs of isolated vulnerable communities.
Poor planning of adaptation initiatives could lead to unintended consequences that further degrade the resilience of northern communities.
The complexity of climate change vulnerability and the uncertainty of its effects leave a significant margin for error.
Maladaptation refers to adaptation strategies that fail in the face of this complexity, resulting in wasting limited funds while worsening the situation and further perpetuating vulnerability.
Consequently, the CNC’s impacts on the resilience and capacity for northern communities to adapt to climate change will need to be carefully considered when determining project feasibility.
1.1 PURPOSE AND METHODS This paper is part of the Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program, which seeks to develop the information base, analysis and evaluation necessary to assess the feasibility and desirability of establishing permissible corridors across northern Canada.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the proposed CNC on the resilience of northern infrastructure vulnerable to climate change.
It has been conducted through a review of relevant literature and, most importantly, takes an urban and regional planning approach to climate adaptation and resilience.
In general, a planning approach is interdisciplinary, works within many spatial scales from urban to rural to regional, and is primarily concerned with optimizing how the varying elements within a given space — such as the local culture, economy and 6 transportation infrastructure — all work together.
As a result, this approach offers a broader perspective of resilience that enables adaptation methods which recognize and leverage the value that each unique local context brings to the larger regional system.
This approach is critical to understanding the complexity of the project itself and the implications it would have for the Canadian North.
Increasingly, northern communities are relying on transportation infrastructure for delivery of basic necessities, yet there remain significant gaps throughout the northern transportation system (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
A planning approach allows for analysis of the potential implications of expanding infrastructure on the resilience of northern communities and provides critical considerations for infrastructure adaptation to climate change.
Consequently, this paper uses an urban and regional planning approach to review existing literature and explore the following questions: 1.
What are current challenges and opportunities for northern Canadian infrastructure caused by climate change?
2.
What are some of the strategies currently pursued to adapt to the impact of climate change on infrastructure?
3.
Considering the impact of climate change on infrastructure, how can the Canadian Northern Corridor support the development of resilient infrastructure in the Canadian North?
First, this paper will summarize urban and regional planning, followed by an introduction of what it means to plan for climate change.
Once this general understanding is reached, the implications of climate change in the Canadian North are reviewed, leading to an examination of the challenges facing northern adaptation planning.
Following this context is a section devoted to exploring obstacles and unintended consequences in adaptation, supplemented by several case studies, which is intended to facilitate an understanding of the complexity of climate change in the Canadian North.
Last, further considerations are recommended for the adaptation of northern infrastructure and the CNC, focusing on a holistic and dynamic approach that reinforces resilience.
These strategies include hard and soft infrastructure adaptation measures to mitigate environmental risk, in addition to vulnerability reduction measures by addressing socioeconomic stressors and increasing the adaptive capacity of northern communities.
7 2.
URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING Urban and regional planners provide strategic recommendations to policy-makers to guide the effective use of land, resources, facilities and services within communities and across regions.
As members of an accredited technical profession governed by a strict code of ethics, Canadian planners are first and foremost responsible to the public interest (Canadian Institute of Planners 2016).
This responsibility demands planners act in good faith to secure the physical safety, economic efficiency and social wellbeing of the communities they serve.
With awareness of each community’s unique needs, planners are positioned to ensure impacts on social stressors are considered when implementing technical recommendations.
In many ways, planning functions as a liaison between technical experts, community members and elected officials.
2.1 COMMUNITY PLANNING AND THE DESIGN OF LAND USE Planning is largely a discipline of dynamic balance; planners must work to first determine the current needs of their local community, then forecast future needs and attempt to meet them, all while simultaneously considering the far-reaching implications of decisions.
To do so successfully, planning relies heavily on participatory processes to determine the public interest, technical assessments to determine feasibility and makes recommendations to decision-makers such as elected officials/ city council.
Through these processes, planning makes both localand regional-scale recommendations through master plans and long-term strategic policies covering land use such as infrastructure placement and design.
This has broad implications for the network of transportation connections within and between cities.
While planning is a technical accredited profession, planners are often interdisciplinary; rather than specializing in any one area, they are trained to grasp and analyze the intricacies of how all the parts of a city or region work together, then communicate the importance of these interconnections with other technical disciplines.
On the local scale, planning makes recommendations about municipal infrastructure through community plans such as area redevelopment plans, municipal development plans and transportation master plans.
These plans are built off the foundation of public participation.
Through meaningful consultation with all community members affected by a decision, planners work to uphold democratic principles by facilitating an ongoing and inclusive dialogue throughout the decision-making process.
Different levels of plans guide development and land use design; for example, master plans cover growth and redevelopment across an entire municipality, while area redevelopment plans consider redevelopment at a smaller, local community level.
The recommendations set out in these official plans are then implemented through legislation such as bylaws and zoning codes that define, for example, use type, density, design or setbacks.
However, planning is more than just zoning — planners are involved in the efficient and sustainable transportation of goods and services, the distribution of basic necessities such as housing and economic growth, and the development and maintenance of public infrastructure.
8 Finance is a key aspect of planning, particularly for infrastructure.
Large infrastructure projects, like the CNC, usually derive their capital budget from a variety of highlevel sources such as the federal government.
Once completed, responsibility for the projects’ maintenance costs shifts to lower levels of government.
Municipallevel planning and maintenance of public infrastructure, such as transportation infrastructure, is funded primarily through property taxes; once a municipality has determined its yearly budget, this cost is distributed across all city properties as a percentage of property value dependent on use type.
When property tax alone is inadequate for operation, these excess costs, if the maintenance is deemed critical, are funded through federal or provincial contributions.
In contrast, on a regional level, provinces and territories receive revenue to fund infrastructure from a variety of sources, including income taxes, investments, non-renewable resource revenue and transfers from the federal government.
As a result, a municipality has less diversity in sources of income compared to higher levels of government.
Because the capacity for a municipality to pay for infrastructure maintenance is largely dependent on its property values, infrastructure development and maintenance are vulnerable to local economic fluctuations.
So, while revenue for regional maintenance is obtained from a variety of sources and therefore less vulnerable, the municipal connections in between are vulnerable, despite being a vital part of the regional infrastructure system.
This is critical when considering the cost of maintaining vital transportation connections between and within cities — infrastructure connections which define how basic necessities are distributed and facilitate economic growth.
While the intricacies of planning remain outside of the scope of this paper, this basic overview will facilitate the understanding of subsequent concepts.
2.2 PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE Anthropogenic climate change is unequivocal (IPCC 2021).
The consequent severe environmental changes continue to pose significant risks to vulnerable communities across the globe (Naylor et al.
2020; Pandey et al.
2017; Siders 2019).
Consequently, adaptation and resilience planning continue to gain momentum among planners and policy-makers (Birchall and Bonnett 2021; Ford and King 2013; Siders 2019; Williams et al.
2020).
Despite this increase in planning for climate change, the relationships between vulnerable communities and the infrastructure that supports them remain staggeringly complex (Eriksen et al.
2020; Meerow and Newell 2016; Naylor et al.
2020).
It is well understood that adaptation to climate change is likely to be one of the costliest endeavours facing communities in the next century, rendering it essential to determine what adaptation strategies will remain effective and financially viable in the long term (IPCC 2014; OECD 2015; Suter et al.
2019).
Planning for climate change strives to reduce the current and future vulnerabilities that arise from a warming world.
These efforts rely heavily on two concepts: adaptation and resilience.
Adaptation and resilience do not exist separate from one another, but rather are complex and interconnected.
On one hand, adaptation seeks to adjust human systems to climate change, while on the other, resilience facilitates flexibility 9 within these systems (IPCC 2014).
Understanding the history and current planning theory behind these two concepts is critical to truly grasp the ways in which effective adaptation of infrastructure in the Canadian North can be achieved.
Both concepts will be introduced individually here, while subsequent sections will explore how they interrelate.
2.2.1 ADAPTATION Climate change is no longer avoidable.
Unless drastic actions are taken, limiting warming to the 1.5°C agreed upon in the Paris Agreement is extremely unlikely (IPCC 2021).
The need for adaptation planning is thus increasingly critical (Birchall and Bonnett 2021; Ford and King 2013; Williams et al.
2020).
Climate change is likely to be one of the greatest economic disasters humanity will face (Andrew 2008; OECD 2015; Singh and Birchall 2019).
While the upfront costs of addressing climate change are substantial, the long-term consequences loom much larger (Kehler and Birchall 2021; OECD 2015).
Planners, when considering the future of communities, need to anticipate local risks that may occur due to climate change and plan for them accordingly.
This adjustment can consist of hard adaptations such as seawalls that provide a physical barrier, or soft adaptations such as altered land use or wetland preservation (Bonnett and Birchall 2020).
Both hard and soft adaptations are critical to a community’s overall resilience and come with benefits and drawbacks.
The goal of any adaptation is to reduce risk by limiting exposure and vulnerability to climate extremes.
Despite the threat of climate change, adaptation planning remains in its infancy, with its effectiveness often disabled by common misunderstandings.
Adaptation policy, across all levels of government, frequently focuses solely on hard measures which rely on engineering to modify infrastructure to mitigate disaster risk, or on the economic opportunities that a warmer climate will bring (Birchall and Bonnett 2020).
Hard infrastructure adaptations, which are heavily relied on to reduce vulnerabilities, come with considerable drawbacks and carry a high risk of maladaptation: these measures are capital intensive, costly to maintain and often further degrade the northern environment (Bonnett and Birchall 2020).
This high cost poses a considerable fiscal challenge and increasingly, the costs of adaptation and maintenance are downloaded from national governments to regional and local governments with limited financial capacity to adapt (Down and Birchall 2019; Singh and Birchall 2019).
Because hard infrastructure adaptations provide a visible sense of security and are relatively quick to install, they give the illusion of protection.
Yet, the potential for maladaptation is high; hard measures tend to be too costly in the long term and lack the flexibility necessary to provide adequate protection as climate change worsens (Bonnett and Birchall 2020).
Consequently, the need to go beyond hard measures alone is well understood (Bonnett and Birchall 2020, Kehler and Birchall 2021; Naylor et al.
2020).
10 Given the risk of maladaptation due to an over-reliance on hard measures, soft adaptations intended to increase adaptive capacity and adaptation readiness are equally as critical.
The adaptive capacity, or the potential of systems to adapt, defines the efficacy of any adaptation initiative — something which planners, through a holistic approach, can play a key role in strengthening (Birchall and Bonnett 2021; Dale et al.
2020; Ford and King 2013; Runhaar et al.
2018; Siders 2019; Williams et al.
2020).
Adaptive capacity is scale-dependent and goes beyond hard adaptation measures to consider the available economic resources, technology, information and skills, infrastructure and social institutions (Adger and Vincent 2005; Fitton et al.
2021; Ford and King 2013).
Furthermore, adaptive capacity is a function of social structures such as the values and ethics of the local community and culture (Adger and Barnett 2009).
Increasingly, the value of non-Western knowledge systems in adaptation is being recognized.
Indigenous perspectives offer greater understanding of climatic changes and impacts, and increased flexibility and innovation in adaptation initiatives (Lede et al.
2021; Pearce et al.
2015; Tran et al 2021).
It is therefore critical to understand the local context and integrate place-based knowledge into adaptation planning (Ramsey et al.
2019; Williams et al.
2020).
The significance of localized adaptation approaches becomes particularly relevant as adaptive readiness — the willingness for governments to implement adaptation — is often constrained by governance processes and lack of implementation in decisionmaking (Ford and King 2013; Ojwang et al.
2017).
The interconnections between adaptive capacity and readiness further demonstrate the challenge faced when planning for climate change in northern communities: “Short-term economic and political priorities become meaningless when long-term climate impacts dismantle infrastructure systems” (Birchall, MacDonald and Slater 2021, 8).
On one hand, climate policy often comes from higher levels of governance, yet remains ineffective at a local level; on the other, local governments are often best suited to address adaptation, yet face significant challenges in prioritizing adaptation while facing more immediate economic or political concerns (Birchall, MacDonald and Slater 2021).
Collaboration and communication between levels of government on adaptation planning is critical in facing these challenges, facilitating proactive adaptation and helping to balance immediate interests with increasing risks due to climate change.
Considering the novel and unpredictable nature of climate change, the ability to plan for beneficial outcomes and possible risks has been drastically misunderstood (Dawson et al.
2018; Field 2018).
As costs of adaptation mount and beneficial opportunities provided by climate change have proven extremely rare, both public and private organizations remain confounded as to who is responsible for this incredible expense (OECD 2015).
Anticipatory planning that prioritizes incremental infrastructure upgrades can greatly facilitate cost-effective adaptation of infrastructure, while planning policy intended to increase adaptive capacity can ensure communities have the resources necessary to adapt.
11 Regardless of significant challenges, urban and regional planning allows for greater understanding of how to achieve adaptation through a wider lens that considers the unique context of each community, whether that be by mitigating disaster risk through incremental adaptation, or by increasing adaptive capacity through economic diversification and addressing socioeconomic inequities.
2.2.2 RESILIENT COMMUNITIES Despite ongoing debate among academics about its true meaning, resilience continues to be adopted as a goal within adaptation plans (Davoudi et al.
2013; Meerow and Newell 2016).
Consequently, for policy-makers and planners alike, resilience remains a necessary term for policy.
Yet, what is resilience?
The IPCC (2014) defines resilience as the capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event, trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining their capacity for adaptation, learning and transformation.
Our understanding of resilience has changed substantially over time, particularly as climate change has forced researchers to revisit the concept and reframe it in a constantly changing world.
As the effects of climate change become more severe, the importance of resilience to strategic planning is also becoming more apparent.
In essence, resilience is simply the propensity of a system to be flexible in the face of adversity and began as a concept used predominantly within engineering and ecology.
Static engineering resilience refers to a system’s ability to bounce back to its previous state, while dynamic ecological resilience focuses on a system maintaining key functions when perturbed (Holling 1996).
These perspectives of resilience have had significant impact on how infrastructure resilience is thought of today.
Soft adaptation initiatives address the physical impacts of disaster and facilitate effective recovery through design and land use decisions founded on the following key concepts: diversity, modularity, redundancy and connectivity (Allan and Bryant 2011).
Infrastructure resilience requires a diversity of infrastructure that functions as a network with high modularity across all scales — this facilitates reorganization in the event of a failure in one aspect of the system (Allan and Bryant 2014; French et al.
2019).
Resilient networks require alternative connections should one fail, which is only possible in a system deliberately planned to have high connectivity with adequate redundancy built in (French et al.
2019).
These earlier perspectives of resilience, however, rely on the notion of the system returning to a stable equilibrium — an equilibrium which cannot be defined for complex human systems within an unpredictably changing climate (Davoudi et al.
2013).
To overcome this discrepancy, a new conceptual framework was developed called evolutionary resilience, which defines a community’s capacity for resilience as a function of both socioeconomic stressors and environmental risk (Davoudi et al.
2013; IPCC 2014).
This perspective of resilience acknowledges the complexity of adaptation and vulnerability to climate change, while underscoring the importance of strategic 12 planning for resilience (Davoudi et al.
2013).
Planning is uniquely situated to increase communities’ evolutionary resilience; its participatory methods and place-based theories offer a perspective of communities and their environment as a unique and interconnected socio-ecological system, enabling an approach to adaptation planning that considers both physical and social sources of vulnerability.
Tyler and Moench (2012) offer a framework through which urban planning can foster evolutionary resilience.
By moving beyond a focus on only climate impacts, this framework seeks to integrate ecological, infrastructure, social and institutional factors to create a holistic perspective of resilience (Tyler and Moench 2012).
Through this approach, planners can foster resilience by leveraging the benefits of shared learning and planning processes to build adaptive capacity, co-create knowledge and effectively prepare for climate change (Kehler and Birchall 2021; Tyler and Moench 2012).
While resilience concepts such as connectivity or diversity are imperative to infrastructure resilience, the perspective of evolutionary resilience is critical in order to avoid maladaptation of critical infrastructure — infrastructure systems do not exist in isolation from the people and communities that use them (Tyler and Moench 2012).
Adaptation plans focused solely on infrastructure resilience carry a high risk of failure as the dangers associated with only addressing hard measures are momentous (Birchall and Bonnett 2021; Osborne 2013; Siders 2019; Stoett and Omrow 2020).
Focusing on resilience holistically ensures that adaptation is effective and that limited funds are not needlessly exhausted; to do so effectively requires deliberate consultation with communities and deliberate fostering of resilience through policy measures (Kehler and Birchall 2021).
While it is largely the participatory planning processes that facilitate effective adaptation, when it comes to resilience the steps are less intuitive.
In fact, a lack of resilience greatly hinders the planning process, and as successful adaptation measures rely on increased co-operation between governments and communities vulnerable to climate change, it becomes clear that adaptation planning can only occur effectively in a resilient community (IPCC 2014; Johnson et al.
2015; Kehler and Birchall 2021).
This further highlights the need to address both aspects of resilience — socioeconomic and environmental risk — through policy.
Planning is uniquely situated to grasp the complexities of resilience, from both a general and an evolutionary perspective.
By focusing on the complex relationships between infrastructure and communities, it is possible to effectively plan for climate change.
13 3.
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN NORTH The CNC project has significant unknowns.
While each unknown continues to be analyzed by researchers through the Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program, the implications of climate change for such an extensive infrastructure project could render the project unattainable.
In the face of such a complex issue as climate change, adaptation of infrastructure is simultaneously essential, uncertain and exceedingly costly (Suter et al.
2019; Val et al.
2019).
Understanding the impact of adaptation on this project requires the following: first, a general grasp of climate change in the Canadian North and its consequences for the CNC, and second, an understanding of adaptation of critical northern infrastructure.
3.1 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHERN CANADA Climate change is projected to bring significant changes across the globe.
Northern Canada is warming at more than double the global rate — a trend that is expected to increase significantly in the next several decades (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2019; IPCC 2021).
While climatic effects across the Arctic have been studied time and again (Wan et al.
2019), the seriousness of such change has been highlighted most recently by the IPCC (2021).
As northern Canada spans several biomes, a multitude of climate effects are expected to occur (Pearce et al.
2020), making it critical that adaptation measures reflect the diversity of Canada’s northern landscapes.
While the CNC research program has published the physical science implications of climate change for the northern corridor (Pearce et al.
2020), the relationship between the severity and unpredictability of these effects and adaptation considerations cannot be overstated.
Therefore, the results are summarized below.
Pearce et al.
(2020) found that climate change is already impacting northern infrastructure and that these impacts can be expected to intensify, putting both existing infrastructure and new projects at significant risk of damage.
Since roughly 1950 the annual average temperature across northern Canada increased approximately 2.3°C, coinciding with a 20 per cent increase in precipitation (Pearce et al.
2020).
Warmer temperatures continue to threaten northern systems through a multitude of interconnected pathways.
As temperature and precipitation increase, the risks of disasters such as flooding and fires do, too (Pearce et al.
2020).
Shifting precipitation patterns often result in heavy rainfall over short periods of time, causing overland flooding.
Simultaneously, increases in temperatures result in more days with ideal conditions for high-intensity fires (Kirchmeier-Young et al.
2017).
In northern Canada, permafrost further compounds the impacts of increases in temperature and precipitation.
Losses in snow cover and land ice due to warmer temperatures expedite melting in what was once permanently frozen ground, while increased frequency and severity of fires further warms the active layer, decreasing the bearing capacity of permafrost throughout the year (Pearce et al.
2020).
Coastlines historically protected by sea ice and permafrost are now facing significant erosion due to sea level rise, increased wave intensity and extreme water levels and temperatures (Pearce et al.
2020).
14 Construction and maintenance of northern transportation infrastructure are likely to be dramatically affected: construction of new projects will require integration of climate change projections for both overall feasibility and civil engineering adaptations, while maintenance will need to be significantly more robust, responsive and well funded to prevent adverse impacts to or hindering of northern transportation (Pearce et al.
2020).
The infrastructure adaptations necessary for “dynamic and increasingly extreme conditions” would carry increased costs, while, due to the unpredictable nature of warming effects, effects of intensifying risks would magnify beyond the corridor itself and into communities (Pearce et al.
2020).
3.2 PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORTH While dramatic climate change effects are virtually certain to occur somewhere across the Arctic regions, the exact location or severity is difficult to identify (IPCC 2021; Suter et al.
2019).
This uncertainty, paired with the complexity of the global climate system, underscores the urgency to prepare communities for the worst, without putting them at an economic disadvantage or hindering their ability to function and thrive.
Despite this urgency, adaptation of northern communities presents a significant planning challenge.
The capacity of adaptation to mitigate risk to the complex web of northern infrastructure is limited by remoteness and amplified climate change effects.
Simultaneously, sociopolitical factors hinder adaptation initiatives — mindset barriers, lack of contextual understanding and lagging implementation, combined with exorbitant construction and maintenance costs perpetuate ineffective planning.
Acute climate impacts have already pushed some northern communities to begin deliberately planning for climate change.
In Yukon, for example, Dawson City, Mayo and Whitehorse partnered with the Northern Climate Exchange (Yukon University, then Yukon College) to develop climate change adaptation plans (Hennessey et al.
2011, 2012; Hennessey and Streicker 2011).
These plans intended to assess impacts and vulnerability, recommend adaptation actions and increase resilience in the long term.
However, since being published in 2011, a lack of accountability and cohesiveness necessary to facilitate action have hindered the plans’ implementation.
While adaptation planning in general frequently faces significant barriers, adaptation in the Canadian North remains constrained by exceptional circumstances.
With amplified warming effects across the North, adaptation of the CNC is integral to the sustainability of the project; however, the cost and effectiveness of adaptation measures have limits in the face of unrestricted climate change and are constrained by sociopolitical factors that define a community’s capacity to adapt (Adger and Barnett 2009; IPCC 2015).
15 3.2.1 LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR ADAPTATION IN THE CANADIAN NORTH Adaptation measures in the Canadian North face significant limits and constraints.
Lagging implementation, isolation and low population, and limited tax base to fund local-level adaptation, coupled with amplified warming, result in significant challenges and limited capacity to overcome them (Birchall and Bonnett 2021, 2020).
To overcome these constraints requires planning that deliberately employs strategies to increase adaptive capacity and reduce the risk of maladaptation.
However, substantial resources are required to facilitate adaptation.
Isolation and remoteness of northern communities can result in restricted financial capacity and inadequate technical knowledge required to undertake anticipatory adaptation (Birchall and Bonnett 2020; Singh and Birchall 2019).
Adaptation needs and costs, particularly in remote northern locations, can be significant (Field 2018; Palko and Lemmen 2017; Suter et al.
2019).
Local governments are responsible for local-level adaptation, yet their ability to do so is often constrained by a lack of financial support due to their limited tax base and inadequate levels of external support, resources or expertise (Birchall and Bonnett 2020; McNamara et al.
2017).
How is it then that local governments are expected to adapt to climate change without adequate resources?
Despite the critical need for external support, mindset barriers, conflict and lack of willingness to enact adaptation within multi-level governments all hinder critical northern adaptation planning (Birchall and Bonnett 2020; Ford and King 2013).
Without multi-level governmental co-operation, top-down decision-making can render adaptation ineffective — political and economic priorities are misplaced due to misunderstandings about vulnerability and risk, consequently overshadowing the severity and urgency of climate change (Eriksen et al.
2021; Kehler and Birchall 2021; Mayer et al.
2017).
For policy-makers who are undereducated about the reality of climate change, its complex nature leads to considerable misconceptions about the opportunities that a warmer climate will bring to the North (Dawson et al.
2018; Birchall and Bonnett 2020; Palko and Lemmen 2017).
As a result, adaptation planning for northern communities is rife with maladaptation: scarcity of resources, over-reliance on hard measures and poor land use decisions result in decreased resilience, and as the climate changes communities are overwhelmed by reactionary measures, causing lagging adaptation implementation and further hindering their ability to anticipate and plan (Birchall and Bonnett 2020).
While the severity of climate change across northern communities continues to increase unabated and local governments are already overwhelmed, implementation of anticipatory adaptation is still possible.
An effective adaptation plan is preceded by a deliberate effort to overcome constraining factors by building adaptive capacity and reducing vulnerability (IPCC 2014).
Particularly within the northern context of the CNC — where accelerated climate change and dramatic vulnerability of infrastructure are compounded by limited adaptive capacity — addressing these barriers is urgent (Ford et al.
2015; MacDonald and Birchall 2019).
For example, despite facing significant environmental risks, Lede et al.
(2021) found that individuals living in northern communities felt that social stressors, such as housing shortages, food insecurity and overcrowding, far over-shadowed the physical impacts of climate change in their 16 daily lives.
Such significant social stressors substantially limit resilience and adaptive capacity, yet are feasible to address (Kehler and Birchall 2021).
Adaptation planning can foster resilience by improving maladapted infrastructure and addressing the lack of resources that limit adaptive capacity (Ford and King 2013; Ramsey et al.
2019; Williams et al.
2020).
Because local governments are best suited to provide context-based adaptation, yet do not have the necessary financial resources to achieve it, multi-level government collaboration and resource sharing are essential (Birchall, MacDonald and Slater 2021).
Furthermore, when facing scarce or limited resources, resources available for adaptation should be used strategically to foster resilience through policy that meets socioeconomic needs and generates additional benefits through increased adaptive capacity (Birchall, MacDonald and Slater 2021; IPCC 2014).
Strategic planning holds significant potential to foster resilience to climate change provided incremental adaptive measures are mainstreamed and agreed upon through a bottom-up participatory process (Kehler and Birchall 2021; MacDonald and Birchall 2019).
To do so requires resources to be allocated equitably through multi-level government collaboration with local governments being given autonomy for effective place-based adaptation planning (Birchall, MacDonald and Slater 2021).
The importance of this approach cannot be overstated: decisions about adaptation priorities must be made by those who experience impacts first-hand, fostering resilience through place-based planning, culturally appropriate methods and shared knowledge (Tran et al.
2021).
Resilience is a key aspect of northern infrastructure adaptation in the face of climate change; however, significant barriers persist.
Infrastructure expansion has a high potential for maladaptation: Canada’s massive scale and varying socioeconomic and environmental constraints increase the difficulty of identifying adaptation actions to foster resilience.
Consequently, the effect of new infrastructure such as the CNC on wider resilience depends on the approach to adaptation and its risk of maladaptation.
Poorly planned, such projects have the potential to increase the severity of socioeconomic stressors within northern communities and worsen the environmental risk.
To address adaptation and resilience across the entire CNC project would require significant research into each local context, deliberate consideration of existing adaptation plans, a more robust economic analysis from a climate change perspective and intentional dialogue with affected communities to determine feasibility.
17 4.
BALANCING THE CNC: OBSTACLES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN NORTHERN INFRASTRUCTURE Despite the best intentions, planning decisions are often rife with unintended consequences (Adger and Vincent 2005; Axon and Morrissey 2020; Ramsey et al.
2019; Sandercock 1998).
Given the complex relationships between socioeconomic factors and climate change vulnerabilities (Kehler and Birchall 2021; Naylor et al.
2020), adaptation of the CNC will need to consider the effects of expanded transportation networks on individual communities.
Planning, through its interdisciplinary and holistic perspective, offers unique insights into how the increasing need for adaptation will be challenged by the exceptional obstacles northern communities already face.
The following exploration of case studies intends to exemplify some of the barriers to adaptation northern Canadian communities face, as well as unintended maladaptation resulting from planning decisions.
4.1 RESOURCE-BASED TOWNS Canadian towns, particularly in northern Canada with its abundance of natural resources, tend to be reliant on one or two resources at a time (Van Assche et al.
2016).
The CNC, which aims to expand the transportation network in order to facilitate the movement of natural resources and increase Canada’s ability to compete in the international market (Fellows et al.
2020), is likely to encourage significant economic growth in natural resource extraction in communities along the corridor.
While at first glance this seems beneficial, the reality is that in order to adapt to climate change, the resilience of the communities affected is critical, and unfortunately, relying heavily on one or two resources increases vulnerability to any change.
Communities in any location will feel the effects of economic fluctuations; however, for resource-based towns the effects of boom-and-bust cycles can be dramatic, even potentially resulting in communities being abandoned (Van Assche et al.
2016).
Economic diversification is a key aspect of effective adaptation; by relying on a variety of local economic activities, communities can facilitate resilience.
There is robust evidence and high agreement that by supporting economic diversification, protecting vulnerable groups and providing financial support, governments can co-ordinate effective adaptation to climate change and mitigate the momentous financial burden of acting on adaptation too late (IPCC 2014).
Without conscious economic diversification, any affected community along the corridor would be at significant risk; however, this vulnerability intensifies as either (or both) the global market for emissions-producing resources decreases in response to the Paris Agreement or as the effects of climate change become increasingly severe.
The long-term sustainability of the CNC project and the communities along it is dependent on economic diversification as an adaptation to climate change.
For the CNC to be a low-risk endeavour, it should include local support for diversifying the economies of affected communities.
18 Case Study: Dawson City Dawson City is arguably one of Canada’s most iconic northern communities.
To this day, the Klondike Gold Rush is a favourite legend among Canadians, despite the rush itself only lasting three years in the late 1800s (Clark 2011).
However, is not commonly understood that the rush to resource extraction itself was a response to a financial recession in the United States, a global gold shortage and significant unemployment (Berton 2001; Morse 2003) — setting the stage for a long history of economic vulnerability for Dawson City and demonstrating the risks of northern development.
As a result of boom-and-bust cycles, Dawson’s population, and therefore the necessary infrastructure, fluctuated immensely.
At the height of the rush, it is likely the town boasted nearly 100,000 people; however, once much of the gold had been extracted the population fell to 5,000 (Coates 1991).
This had significant effects on community infrastructure.
By 1914, abandoned homes, collapsing businesses and overgrown city lots were common (Morrison and Coates 1989).
By 1952, the town was still struggling and attempted to branch out into tourism with the creation of the Klondike Tourist Bureau, which was largely unsuccessful at the time (Commonwealth Historic Resource Management Limited 2008).
The expansion of Dawson’s economy beyond gold really intensified as a response to flooding in 1979 (Benkert et al.
2015).
Floodwaters reached nearly two metres deep and put much of the town’s unique heritage infrastructure at significant risk, and in response, investment into heritage preservation soared and tourism quickly became the primary industry (Government of Yukon 2018).
This transition diversified the local economy into a mix of gold mining, tourism, arts and culture, fostering resilience to fluctuations in the global economy.
Dawson City in many ways is a northern resilience success story.
Unfortunately, not all communities are able to weather economic vulnerability and expand their economies successfully.
Despite Dawson’s economic diversification and the subsequent increase in resilience, climate change, coupled with a lack of multi-level governmental co-operation, threatens this achievement.
Climate change is already affecting Dawson in many ways: river flows are increasingly variable, forest fires are increasing in frequency and, most notably, permafrost slumping rates are increasing, causing major issues for infrastructure (Benkert et al.
2015).
As most of the townsite sits on a discontinuous permafrost zone, increased surface temperatures due to climate change lead to variation in snow cover depth, active-layer hydrology variations and infrastructure effects, posing upkeep challenges for building owners and the municipal government (Benkert et al.
2015).
Heritage buildings, vital to Dawson’s tourism industry, are particularly vulnerable to climate change effects.
These historic sites have posed significant challenges for the municipality, as their upkeep is essential to the town’s long-term economic sustainability (Parks Canada 2021).
In the 1950s, Parks Canada began acquiring heritage properties and artifacts; the federal government now owns and operates many historic properties in the Dawson City area (Parks Canada 2018).
Unfortunately, a significant portion of Dawson’s historic downtown remains undeveloped and in disrepair due to disagreements between the federal government and the municipality about how to best adapt the city’s historic buildings to the challenges posed by the changing northern climate, particularly permafrost thaw (City of Dawson 2018).
This case study illustrates the extreme challenges faced by northern communities and the need for a localized, holistic approach.
While Dawson’s diversified economy increases its adaptive capacity in the face of climate change, the city’s resilience remains limited by inaction resulting from a lack of multi-level governmental co-operation.
19 4.2 RESILIENCE AND INCREASING DISASTER RISK The consequences of unmitigated climate change are guaranteed to be severe (IPCC 2021).
All communities and the natural systems on which they rely will have significant impacts as the frequency, intensity and duration of weather extremes intensify due to climate change (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2019).
Canadians are already feeling the impacts of climate change; Canada is warming at double the global rate and its northern regions are warming at triple the global rate (Canada 2021).
Canada is already seeing extreme effects: drought, flooding, cold extremes, heat waves and wildfires have become commonplace (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2019).
Such events are costly, disrupt transportation, hinder economic growth and put communities at risk.
Northern communities, such as those that the CNC would impact, are in a difficult place.
On one hand, such communities are resource-based, and the CNC would likely increase access to transportation and facilitate expansion and diversification of these industries; on the other hand, climate change will significantly increase disaster risk and result in increased adaptation costs.
The potential economic prosperity granted by the CNC would be vulnerable to disasters, requiring significant consideration of how, or if, transportation infrastructure can be planned in a way that facilitates resilience as disaster risk increases.
Expanded transportation connections can have significant implications for disaster risk resilience.
Increased disaster risk for northern Canadian communities due to climate change is nearly guaranteed and has the potential to render any hard adaptation measures ineffective.
By encouraging development in a high-risk area without adequate modularity and redundancy of infrastructure, resilience of the local community is substantially hindered.
However, if land use and transportation connections are considered from a holistic perspective of resilience, it may be possible to reduce maladaptation and complacency, ensuring that risk is lessened in the event of a disaster.
20 Case Study: Fort McMurray Fort McMurray, a northern Alberta community, sits in the centre of the Athabasca oilsands.
As the epicentre of oil and gas development in Canada, the local economy relies heavily on extraction and production of petroleum (Van Assche et al.
2016).
Despite volatile global oil prices, Fort McMurray’s population has remained quite stable and has consistently been growing since 2000 (Statistics Canada 2016).
Despite this relative stability, in recent years Fort McMurray has experienced several natural disasters, the most notable being the 2016 wildfire which burned almost 600,000 ha, displaced over 80,000 people (Government of Alberta 2016) and caused $3.5 billion in losses (IBC 2016).
While there can be no direct correlation between climate change and the Fort McMurray fire, research has shown that climate change increases the likelihood of such events, and that in the future, as warming becomes more severe, this trend will continue.
This increase in risk is due to longer fire seasons, increased fuel availability and more days with conditions suitable for spreading high-intensity fires (Kirchmeier-Young et al.
2017).
While the Fort McMurray fire demonstrates the impacts of increasing disaster risk, what is most notable is the way the case highlights the extreme value of resilience in transportation infrastructure.
The community is connected north and south by a single highway; from an emergency management perspective, this lack of redundancy and connectivity significantly reduces the community’s resilience to a disaster.
This was unfortunately demonstrated during the 2016 fire.
On May 3, 2016, the wildfire cut off evacuees’ route south, costing two people their lives (Public Safety Canada 2021).
This highlights the importance of considering emergency management while planning infrastructure expansion.
Resilient community planning must account for increased disaster risk due to climate change.
For Fort McMurray, the CNC could potentially facilitate more efficient east and west connections across Canada, likely increasing connectivity and positively impacting the community’s resilience.
However, increasing road connections alone do not guarantee the avoidance of complacency and maladaptation.
To reduce this risk further, other soft adaptations for emergency management such as early warnings or evacuation schemes would need to go hand in hand with transportation infrastructure expansion.
4.3 MALADAPTATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS As climate change worsens and adaptation costs continue to increase, many infrastructure-related projects become unsustainable from a fiscal perspective.
Climate change continues to threaten federal efforts to expand transportation infrastructure in the Canadian North, resulting in significant maladaptation — such as infrastructure failure due to melting permafrost and erosion, or food insecurity due to decreased operating windows and load capacities of winter roads — leading to significant vulnerabilities in the northern transportation system (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
This is a particularly challenging issue for northern communities as infrastructure maintenance and, increasingly, incremental adaptation costs are being downloaded onto lower levels of government which lack the funds to pay for them.
For northern communities, remote geographic locations and limited access restrict connectivity to southern Canada (Palko and Lemmen 2017), and this isolated nature perpetuates infrastructure vulnerability to climate change (Ford et al.
2015).
While increasing connectivity is critical to resilience in the North, the momentous cost of maladapted infrastructure and subsequent disaster-related failures demand to be considered.
The lack of multi-level governmental collaboration combined with misunderstandings about the opportunities and harsh realities of climate change in the Canadian North could lead to rampant 21 maladaptation along the proposed CNC.
Due to permafrost thaw, sea level rise, wildfires and fragile ecosystems, climate change in the Arctic is complex and uncertain (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2019).
The costs and risks associated with conglomerating infrastructure on frozen ground in a location that is warming at three times the global rate could be massive.
Permafrost thaw will necessitate increased maintenance and monitoring for all-weather roads that carry significant heavy traffic, while increasingly frequent forest fires will further destabilize permafrost (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
Permafrost is inherently unstable and extremely sensitive to disruption.
As warming increases the depth of the active layer that thaws during the summer, infrastructure constructed directly on the ground is more likely to thaw the permafrost beneath it.
Additionally, in relation to transportation infrastructure, thawing is exacerbated by removal of continuous low vegetation and large construction vehicles can rupture protective vegetation, potentially causing water-filled linear depressions that further accelerate melting and can last for decades (Skinner et al.
1999).
While the CNC’s potential route across Canada makes sense for moving goods to and from ports, much of the corridor’s southern portion sits on sporadic permafrost — ground that is both challenging and extremely costly to build upon (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
The impacts of climate change on the life-cycle replacement costs of Arctic infrastructure will be substantial: by 2059, due to environmental stressors, these costs are projected to increase by over 40 per cent for transportation infrastructure (Suter et al.
2019).
The costs are already mounting; for example, in 2018, Russia spent six per cent of its total government budget on the infrastructure impacts of permafrost thaw alone (Suter et al.
2019).
Regions of northern Canada are projected to require at least an additional one per cent of annual gross regional product to support existing infrastructure on permafrost due to the loss of load-bearing capacity and thaw subsidence (Suter et al.
2019).
These compounding maintenance costs would fall to local governments, which are often poorly positioned to fund this responsibility due to isolation and economic vulnerability.
Northern communities are already overwhelmed by infrastructure maintenance because of climate change, and increased disaster risks could further undermine their efforts (Birchall and Bonnett 2020).
While bottlenecks in the Trans-Canada corridor have been cited as a motivator for the CNC, northern infrastructure faces amplified risks for bottlenecks as a result of infrastructure failure and inefficiencies due to climate change (Fellows et al.
2020; Pearce et al.
2020).
A single hazardous event can have significant cascading effects for vulnerable communities on isolated fringes of expanded transportation infrastructure.
Consequently, it is likely that any minor disaster could disrupt transportation with significant effects; for example, without alternate routes in place, fires and floods along critical infrastructure on destabilized permafrost can be catastrophic.
Without adequate planning for economic diversity and infrastructure resilience through redundancy and connectivity, increased disaster risk due to climate change could push communities from being overwhelmed by maintenance and adaptation to being unable to cope, resulting in vulnerabilities all along the CNC.
From a planning perspective it would be strongly recommended to 22 create contingencies for the considerable maintenance costs and risks of disasterrelated bottlenecks along the CNC.
Increases in repairs and maintenance that result from climate change are a significant burden for any transportation infrastructure built in the Canadian North (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
The cost-prohibitive nature of maladaptation and unpredictability of climate change could create costly inefficiencies along the corridor.
4.4 INFRASTRUCTURE AND VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES Northern communities are considerably vulnerable to climate change.
Isolation, amplified warming, infrastructure sensitivity and limited adaptive capacity compound and perpetuate socioeconomic stressors and environmental risk, leading to decreased resilience (Birchall and Bonnett 2020; Ford et al.
2017; Davoudi et al.
2013; IPCC 2014).
While environmental risk can be largely mitigated through adaptation infrastructure, socioeconomic stressors need to be addressed through other forms of policy.
Consequently, successful adaptation of the CNC will remain contingent on balancing the risks and benefits of infrastructure expansion, and the implications this may have on the resilience of vulnerable communities.
Adaptation to climate change seeks to reduce the costs and risks associated with a warming world and understanding vulnerability to climate change is a critical aspect of our ability to reduce any negative consequences (IPCC 2014).
However, the complexity of vulnerability continues to hinder infrastructure adaptation in the Canadian North; because both resilience and vulnerability to climate change are social and physical, an approach to adaptation that balances both aspects of vulnerability is necessary (Kehler and Birchall 2021; Naylor et al.
2020).
Despite the dire need to understand it, exactly how to assess infrastructure vulnerability in northern Canada remains unclear, and the resulting gaps in understanding continue to prevent successful adaptation (Ford et al.
2015).
Due to several considerable challenges, decision-making around adaptation for vulnerable communities is contentious: there are few collaborative efforts between social and technical disciplines to assess vulnerability to climate change and adequately inform decision-makers (Ford et al.
2015); ineffective stakeholder consultation results in decisions that perpetuate vulnerability (Johnson et al.
2015; MacDonald and Birchall 2019); inaccessibility of climate science hinders understanding for community members (Benevolenza and DeRigne 2018); and political and mindset barriers restrict the ability of climate adaptation to succeed (Birchall and Bonnett 2021).
Such challenges present significant obstacles for new infrastructure such as the CNC.
Effective adaptation plans require a clear understanding of what vulnerabilities will be perturbed, created or diminished.
In the face of such complex vulnerability, infrastructure expansion can have both benefits and unintended costs.
While some costs for vulnerable communities are physical or economic, many are social, and the consequential reduction in resilience has the potential to destabilize any effort for adaptation.
Socioeconomic stressors remain a critical, although under-represented aspect of adaptation: “If a community does not have the skills or resources to recover from or overcome the stresses of climate change, 23 then regardless of existing policies they will continue to be perpetually vulnerable” (Kehler and Birchall 2021, 472).
Reduction of such stressors is best done through increasing access to public services such as education, housing, health services, sanitation or other basic needs (Kehler and Birchall 2021).
However, in northern Canada, issues explored in the previous sections compound and reduce resilience substantially: economic vulnerability due to reliance on a single resource can cause systemic socioeconomic stressors in response to market fluctuations; warming continues to increase environmental risk; and the downloading of costly maintenance and adaptation to local governments further depletes resources needed for addressing ongoing issues and bolstering local resilience.
Sulzenko and Fellows (2016) identified that there would be a difficult transition period in which communities along the corridor would struggle to provide public services in response to the expected economic activity and population growth; however, due to climate change, the resolution of this transition period is not guaranteed.
Infrastructure adaptation is impossible if communities are not resilient, and resilience only occurs when there is adequate provision of public services to reduce socioeconomic stressors (IPCC 2014), making this transition period inherently vulnerable to market fluctuations or climate-related disasters.
While the CNC itself has the potential to better connect northern communities and increase Canada’s play in the global economy, due to the complex vulnerability of northern communities to climate change, without adequate planning the project could just as likely have the opposite effect, burdening them with the costs of maladaptation and maintenance, or further isolating vulnerable communities due to disaster-related infrastructure failure.
Approaching resilience of the CNC from a holistic and dynamic perspective, considering both environmental and socioeconomic risks and taking an interdisciplinary approach to vulnerability assessments could reduce these risks.
24 Case Study: Churchill, Manitoba Churchill, Manitoba, a small town at the mouth of the Churchill River along the shoreline of Hudson Bay, provides unique insight into the significant risks of resource speculation, expanding infrastructure in the North and the cascading effects of high-risk economic endeavours.
The town was initially a result of federal and provincial interest in a port city that could facilitate international trade routes in the 1930s.
Still to this day, the town is connected to the rest of Canada by only one overland train route (Montsion 2015).
Despite the difficulty of economic diversification for resource-based towns, Churchill was able to expand into eco-tourism, transportation and health-care services (Montsion 2015).
However, climate change continues to threaten the town in several ways.
For instance, receding Arctic sea ice has endangered belugas living in Hudson Bay and increased dangerous encounters with polar bears, to the detriment of the town’s tourism industry and public safety (Wilder 2017; Smith et al.
2017).
Most prominently, permafrost thaw has significantly impacted the community by causing disruptions to its overland rail connection.
The federal government completed the Hudson Bay Railway connecting Churchill to the south in 1929.
CN Railway operated the lines until 1997, before being sold to privately owned OmniTRAX (Montsion 2015).
Over time, due to increasing temperatures and subsequent permafrost thaw, maintenance grew increasingly costly, and in spring 2017 two unseasonably late winter storms resulted in flooding that washed out the rail line in more than 10 places (Porter 2017).
The economic impacts to the town were substantial due to the disruption of tourism and access to supplies, resulting in a steep rise in the cost of living and an inability to provide critical health care to surrounding communities (Hoye 2017).
Shockingly, despite the town’s reliance on the rail line, significant cost meant that no public or private entity was willing to restore the line — both the federal government and OmniTRAX denied any responsibility for repairs and filed lawsuits against one another (CBC News 2018).
After more than a year without rail service, through a publicprivate partnership spearheaded by First Nations groups and local governments, the line was purchased, repaired and finally resumed service in early December 2018 (Geary 2018).
Churchill illustrates the complexity of vulnerability that results as climate change increases risks.
Churchill is vulnerable in a combination of ways: physically, due to permafrost thaw and other environmental risks; economically, as climate change threatens the diversity of its economy; socially, due to a minoritized population and high costs of living; and politically, due to the lack of collaboration and communication between levels of government.
Regardless, Churchill is clearly resilient in other ways too, as demonstrated by its capacity to persevere and collaborate even in the face of the isolation caused by the rail line’s failure.
Not all vulnerable communities lack resilience, and fostering resilience through unconventional means, such as supporting strong social cohesion and internal networks, can help vulnerable communities adapt to climate change (Usamah et al.
2014).
25 5.
ADAPTATION CONSIDERATIONS: RESILIENCE THROUGH A DYNAMIC APPROACH Resilience in the Canadian North is complex.
Resource-based economies, remote towns, marginalized populations and an unforgiving landscape amplify vulnerability to climate change and magnify the risks of costly maladaptation.
Approaching adaptation of northern transportation infrastructure requires planning for the uncertainty and complexity of climate change by respecting the extraordinary circumstances northern communities face.
Planning for adaptation and resilience in the Canadian North faces hard limits and ample constraints.
However, effective planning can facilitate flexibility.
Adaptation is, first and foremost, local (Barnett et al.
2008; IPCC 2014; Siders 2019; Williams et al.
2020).
The previous section highlighted the need for adaptation strategies to be context specific — meaning that, regardless of a similarity in risks or hazards, effective adaptation in any two communities will vary depending on local culture, values or socioeconomic processes — something that is even more relevant in northern communities (Tran et al.
2021; Van Assche, Birchall and Gruezmacher 2022).
Van Assche, Birchall and Gruezmacher (2022) find that effective resilience planning for northern communities means having a vision of the future — founded through an inclusive process that values non-Western knowledge — a realistic and deliberate plan to achieve it, and the necessary governance tools to incite action.
This approach relies on substantial co-operation across levels and domains of governance, local autonomy to implement detailed policy and an appreciation of local contexts (Bonnett and Birchall 2022; Van Assche, Birchall and Gruezmacher 2022).
The federal government has already commissioned hard adaptation practices focusing on engineering resilience for projects like the CNC (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
However, limiting adaptation to hard measures alone would likely be ineffective.
The IPCC (2014) identifies the following principles for effective adaptation: placeand context-specific approaches; significant intergovernmental co-operation; reduction of vulnerability; public engagement and integration of non-Western knowledge systems; and focus on low-risk, high-benefit policy measures that provide co-benefits for both adaptation and mitigation.
In this case, an urban and regional planning approach can enable effective adaptation through policy directed toward increasing evolutionary resilience within communities by focusing on addressing vulnerability through environmental risk reduction and increasing adaptive capacity.
26 5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL RISK REDUCTION: INFRASTRUCTURE ADAPTATION Reduction of environmental risk is a vital aspect of adaptation (Davoudi et al.
2013; Field 2018).
This can be achieved through two complementary planning methods: hard infrastructure adaptations and non-structural, resilience-focused soft infrastructure adaptations.
Currently, Canada’s northern transportation system is ineffective due to gaps in connectivity (Palko and Lemmen 2017), leading to many isolated and vulnerable northern communities without reliable access to essential services.
While expanding infrastructure can facilitate connectivity, as stated previously, the potential for maladaptation is high.
Hard adaptation measures have limits, and in the face of unmitigated climate change these limits are sure to be exceeded.
Soft adaptations, such as altered land use, diminish the risks of infrastructure failure associated with climate change.
Engineering of structural, hard adaptation measures are not the typical realm of adaptation planners.
Given the complexity of adaptation for northern communities, in order to avoid maladaptation, a basic understanding of the physical challenges of Arctic infrastructure design is necessary.
Climate Risks and Adaptation Practices — For the Canadian Transportation Sector details construction techniques and technologies for the adaptation of transportation infrastructure (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
This includes permafrost-melt adaptation for all-season roads such as embankment thickening, geotextiles or thermosyphons, or for rail transportation, stone embankments or sun sheds.
However, Palko and Lemmen (2017) stress that barriers such as costs, isolation and short construction seasons are likely to restrict adaptation initiatives across the North.
Moreover, while opportunities due to climate change are often touted, in reality this is not the case for northern Canada.
Climatic changes that are opening northern marine waters are also causing significant challenges for overland transportation: changes in operating windows and load capacities of winter roads are reducing access; permafrost degradation poses immediate and future risks to transportation infrastructure; and adaptation techniques are cost-prohibitive and rely on specialized equipment and materials (Palko and Lemmen 2017).
While hard adaptation alone has the potential to provide some benefit, it cannot be overstated that long-term effective adaptation also requires soft adaptation measures that focus on resilient community design (Van Assche, Birchall, and Gruezmacher 2022).
Such measures focus on adjusting human behaviour and fostering resilience through planning (Bonnett and Birchall 2020).
For northern communities, this may include planned relocation, altered land use and building controls, increased setbacks or effective emergency management (Bonnett and Birchall 2020).
Building resilience into community design is critical for emergency management.
Transportation networks that include redundancy, are well connected and have a high degree of modularity are able to facilitate recovery after a disaster (Allan and Bryant 2011; French et al.
2019).
27 5.2 SOCIOECONOMIC STRESSOR SUPPORT: SMART ADAPTATION AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY The reduction of socioeconomic stressors is simultaneously the most crucial and undervalued adaptation to climate change (Kehler and Birchall 2021); underestimating the complexity of adaptation as a social process can lead to misunderstandings about infrastructure adaptation (IPCC 2014).
Smart adaptation uses policy to reduce vulnerability to climate change by addressing socioeconomic stressors and consists of low-risk policy choices that provide multiple benefits, such as reductions in GHG emissions and economic growth (Field 2018; IPCC 2014).
Simultaneously, a community’s adaptive capacity can be similarly supported by addressing local socioeconomic constraints stemming from limited economic resources, equity or access to technology or information (Adger and Barnett 2009; Ford and King 2013).
Clearly, a place-based approach that considers socioeconomic stressors is critical to the feasibility of the CNC; yet this is threatened by governments’ willingness to implement any adaptation at all, as short-term economic and political priorities consistently take precedence over necessary long-term resilience and adaptation goals (Birchall, MacDonald and Slater 2021; Ford and King 2013; Ojwang et al.
2017).
Successful adaptation of the CNC, and likely the Canadian North in general, hinges on overcoming political barriers to effective adaptation and implementing the strategies outlined here.
When it comes to adaptation, priority should be given to reducing vulnerability and exposure to risk (IPCC 2014).
While exposure to risk is generally reduced by infrastructure adaptation, vulnerability to climate change is significantly more complex and therefore requires a dynamic and flexible approach (Benevolenza and DeRigne 2018; Ford et al.
2015; Kehler and Birchall 2021; Naylor et al.
2020; Pandey et al.
2017).
Smart adaptation seeks to mitigate risk through measures that are win-win, decreasing disaster vulnerability while also facilitating economic growth (Field 2018).
These policy decisions include investments of public funds in strategies that are low economic risk and high adaptation benefit, such as poverty reduction, transportation networks or public health (IPCC 2015).
Addressing socioeconomic stressors is increasingly recognized as a crucial element for adaptation to climate change to be economically sustainable (Kehler and Birchall 2021; OECD 2015).
This approach reduces vulnerability in many ways while remaining flexible and effective over the long term by using low-risk policy measures that are established through a process grounded in public engagement and integration of non-Western knowledge systems (Field 2018; IPCC 2014).
Long-term vulnerability reduction strategies should include co-benefits for other objectives; this way, regardless of what climate change brings, funds and resources are not wasted.
Smart adaptation strategies have significant potential to increase resilience of northern communities.
Smart adaptation policy could increase local municipalities’ ability to cope with maintenance costs, while boosting efficiency and reducing potential gaps in northern transportation infrastructure perpetuated by climate change.
Because short-term outcomes tend to be the focus of policy decisions (Birchall, MacDonald and Slater 2021; Ford et al.
2017; IPCC 2014), in respect to the CNC, it will be critical to investigate the long-term opportunities and constraints of 28 infrastructure expansion.
From this perspective, it is easy to see the value of multi-level governmental co-operation.
Without support across all levels of government, such a complex approach is likely to fail.
For the CNC to avoid maladaptation and increases in vulnerability, considerable analysis is required to determine what policy measures are necessary to address the significant socioeconomic stressors present across northern Canada.
Pearce et al.
(2020) urge engaging local and Indigenous communities early and often to identify if a corridor is desirable and relevant to them; research here echoes this sentiment: in order for adaptation policy to be effective there must be sufficient public participation (IPCC 2014; Johnson et al.
2015; Kehler and Birchall 2021; Williams et al.
2020; MacDonald and Birchall 2019).
However, if a community is not resilient, then participation in collaborative planning with decision-makers is impractical due to a fragmentation of perspectives (Johnson et al.
2015), further highlighting the critical need for smart adaptation policy that first and foremost reduces socioeconomic stressors preventing resilience.
Furthermore, the IPCC (2014) identified that there is high confidence that Indigenous, local and traditional knowledge systems are a crucial resource to effective adaptation.
Despite this knowledge, and to their detriment, adaptation initiatives across the Arctic consistently discount any integration of non-Western knowledge systems, despite offers of support from Canadian Indigenous leaders (Dene Nahjo et al.
2018; Tran et al.
2021).
Limited adaptive capacity, often due to a lack of smart adaptation policies and abundance of systemic socioeconomic stressors, significantly restricts the ability of northern communities to successfully adapt to climate change.
Consequently, bolstering a community’s adaptive capacity requires taking smart adaptation approaches built upon effective and equitable public participation.
Reframing the value of public participation is critical to the CNC and adaptation of infrastructure to climate change in general.
Northern communities cannot effectively participate in decisionmaking while plagued by socioeconomic stressors in a system that doesn’t recognize the significant value of non-Western knowledge systems to adaptation.
Rectifying these shortcomings is a crucial aspect of effective adaptation to climate change in the Canadian North.
29 6.
CONCLUSION This paper explores considerations for climate change adaptation of vulnerable northern infrastructure.
By using an urban and regional planning approach to delve into the complex interrelations between adaptation and resilience, the potential implications of expanding northern transportation infrastructure are uncovered.
In doing so, this paper highlights the need for a holistic and dynamic approach to adaptation and resilience and explores the consequences of failing to do so.
The extent to which the CNC could enhance resilience of northern infrastructure remains unclear; however, due to the unpredictable and drastic effects of climate change, the potential for maladaptation and its resulting systemic repercussions remains significant.
Resilience in northern Canada is a function of both environmental risk and the severity of socioeconomic stressors.
Consequently, adequate consultation of local and Indigenous communities coupled with a critical analysis of the ways in which the project increases or decreases the severity of socioeconomic stressors and environmental risk remains at the forefront of adaptation for the corridor.
The feasibility of the CNC is drastically reduced due to climate change, as significant increases in environmental risk threaten existing infrastructure, magnify maintenance costs and push the limits of adaptation measures.
To overcome these barriers would require a reimagining of Canada’s northern transportation system.
While the CNC offers the potential to reduce gaps in the transportation system and thereby improve access to essential services for isolated northern communities, the expansion of traditional transportation infrastructure does not necessarily incite long-term resilience in the face of climate change.
For northern communities, existing systemic socioeconomic stressors reduce adaptive capacity and perpetuate physical vulnerability: resourcebased economies result in economic vulnerability; overwhelming adaptation costs threaten the efficiency of critical infrastructure; ecological fragility and infrastructure sensitivity enlarge climatic impacts; and increasing disaster risk restricts access to basic goods and services.
The proposed CNC, if approached equitably, provides many opportunities for building resilience in the Canadian North and addressing systemic constraints in northern adaptation.
Planning for resilience requires a community-oriented approach built on a foundation of sustainable theories and equitable methods.
Sustainable planning theories include those such as smart growth, transit-oriented development or biophilic cities.
However, these approaches are not always applicable or even possible for every community, particularly for small rural or northern locations.
Determining what approaches can foster community resilience requires equitable planning methods, which strive to use public participation to investigate the needs and wants of community members and collaborate to co-produce adaptation plans.
Unfortunately, participatory methods of adaptation planning continue to be a challenge across the globe.
Social systems, power structures and resource hoarding limit equitable access to participation and can hinder the resilience of the entire community.
Policy can address these challenges; examples include policy intended to foster sustainable local food networks, enhance basic services and infrastructure, bolster access to health systems or build accessible social safety nets.
Constraints in northern adaptation, such 30 as lagging implementation, limited intergovernmental co-operation and increasing maladaptation risks, can be addressed through this approach to policy.
Further study would require significant research into each local context, deliberate consideration of existing adaptation plans across all levels of government, a more robust economic analysis from a climate change perspective and intentional dialogue with affected local and Indigenous communities to determine desirability and feasibility.
Crucially, significant consideration will have to be given to the long-term, systemic effects of expanded transportation networks on individual communities and the resulting maintenance and adaptation costs, economic vulnerability and disaster risks.
For the Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program, future research directions on resilience and adaptation should include further academic review, empirical investigation and applied research: 1) Research best practices to engage with northern and Indigenous communities on infrastructure expansion while fostering equitable decision-making through collaboration across all levels of government, agency of local community members and integration of non-Western knowledge systems.
2) Robust economic analysis of increased capital and maintenance costs of the proposed infrastructure due to the effects of climate change, such as permafrost thaw, wildfire or overland flooding.
3) Further analysis, through empirical investigation, to identify existing gaps and barriers to adaptation in northern communities, such as limited intergovernmental co-operation, as well as best practices for addressing them.
4) Investigation of how to support sustainable and desirable economic diversification in northern communities through a community-based approach.
5) Review of specific soft adaptations to foster resilience in transportation infrastructure, such as land use decisions focused on diversity, connectivity, modularity and redundancy.
6) Capitalizing on the uncertainty of climate change and global decarbonization as an opportunity for Canada to spearhead the reimagination of northern transportation to means that are sustainable and flexible.
For the CNC to remain dynamic and durable in a warming climate, it is critical that the project is built upon a foundation of effective adaptation principles and good planning.
This approach is grounded in the reduction of vulnerability through placeand contextspecific approaches, with a foundation of public engagement and integration of nonWestern knowledge systems.
This requires significant intergovernmental co-operation, and a focus on low-risk, high-benefit policy measures that provide co-benefits for both adaptation and mitigation in the long term.
In this way, the CNC may be a unique opportunity to spearhead reimagination of transportation infrastructure, foster collaboration across all levels of government, enable equity and reconciliation and promote resilience for all Canadians.
31 REFERENCES Adger, W. Neil, and Jon Barnett.
2009.
“Four Reasons for Concern about Adaptation to Climate Change.” Environment and Planning A 41 (12): 2800–2805.
https://doi.org/10.1068/a42244.
Adger, W. Neil, and Katharine Vincent.
2005.
“Uncertainty in Adaptive Capacity.” Comptes Rendus.
Geoscience 337 (4): 399–410.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
crte.2004.11.004.
Allan, Penelope, and M. Bryant.
2011.
“Resilience as a Framework for Urbanism and Recovery.” Journal of Landscape Architecture 6 (2): 34–45.
https://doi.org/10.1080/18626033.2011.9723453.
———.
2014.
“The Attributes of Resilience: A Tool in the Evaluation and Design of Earthquake-Prone Cities.” International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment 5 (2): 109–29.
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJDRBE-05-2012-0013.
Andrew, Brian.
2008.
“Market Failure, Government Failure and Externalities in Climate Change Mitigation: The Case for a Carbon Tax.” Public Administration and Development 28 (5): 393–401.
Axon, Stephen, and John Morrissey.
2020.
“Just Energy Transitions?
Social Inequities, Vulnerabilities and Unintended Consequences.” Buildings and Cities 1 (1).
https://doi.org/10.5334/bc.14.
Barnett, Jon, Simon Lambert, and Ian Fry.
2008.
“The Hazards of Indicators: Insights from the Environmental Vulnerability Index.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 98 (1): 102.
Benevolenza, Mia A., and LeaAnne DeRigne.
2018.
“The Impact of Climate Change and Natural Disasters on Vulnerable Populations: A Systematic Review of Literature.” Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 29 (2): 266–81.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2018.1527739.
Benkert, E. 2015.
“Dawson City Landscape Hazards: Geoscience Mapping for Climate Change Adaptation Planning”.
Northern Climate ExChange, Yukon Research Centre, Yukon College.
Berton, P. 2001.
Klondike: The Last Great Gold Rush 1896–1899.
Toronto: Anchor Canada.
Birchall, S. Jeff, and Nicole Bonnett.
2020.
“Thinning Sea Ice and Thawing Permafrost: Climate Change Adaptation Planning in Nome, Alaska.” Environmental Hazards 19 (2): 152–70.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2019.1637331.
———.
2021.
“Climate Change Adaptation Policy and Practice: The Role of Agents, Institutions and Systems.” Cities 108: 103001. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.103001.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2018.1527739 32 Birchall, S. Jeff, Seghan MacDonald, and Tara Slater.
2021.
“Anticipatory Planning: Finding Balance in Climate Change Adaptation Governance.” Urban Climate 37: 100859. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.uclim.2021.100859.
Bonnett, Nicole, and S. Jeff Birchall.
2020.
“Coastal Communities in the Circumpolar North and the Need for Sustainable Climate Adaptation Approaches.” Marine Policy 121: 104175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104175.
———.
2022.
“The Influence of Regional Strategic Policy on Municipal Climate Adaptation Planning.” Regional Studies, 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.20 22.2049224.
Canadian Institute of Planners.
2016.
CIP Code of Professional Conduct.
Retrieved from https://cip-icu.ca/Files/Provincial-Codes-of-Conduct/CIP-CODE-OFPROFESSIONAL-CONDUCT.aspx.
City of Dawson.
2018.
“2018 Official Community Plan By-law, City of Dawson,” Retrieved from https://www.cityofdawson.ca/Home/DownloadDocument?docId=c91ec0428cb2-4889-ab81-6640424e25b0.
Coates, Ken, and William R. Morrison.
1991.
“The American Rampant: Reflections on the Impact of United States Troops in Allied Countries During World War II.” Journal of World History 2, no.
2: 201–221.
Commonwealth Historic Resource Management Limited.
2008.
“Dawson City Heritage Management Plan.” Retrieved from https://www.cityofdawson.ca/Home/ DownloadDocument?docId=8f49bb2e-5bf2-4641-8562-511fa6dceb0a.
Dale, Ann, John Robinson, Leslie King, Sarah Burch, Rob Newell, and Alison Shaw.
2020.
“Meeting the Climate Change Challenge: Local Government Climate Action in British Columbia, Canada.” Climate Policy 20 (7): 866–80.
Davoudi, Simin, Elizabeth Brooks, and Abid Mehmood.
2013.
“Evolutionary Resilience and Strategies for Climate Adaptation.” Planning Practice and Research 28 (3): 307–22.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02697459.2013.787695.
Dawson, David A., Alistair Hunt, Jon Shaw, and W. Roland Gehrels.
2018.
“The Economic Value of Climate Information in Adaptation Decisions: Learning in the Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Infrastructure Context.” Ecological Economics 150.
August: 1–10.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.027.
Dene Nahjo, Qanak, and Our Voices.
2018.
“We Are One Mind: Perspectives from Emerging Indigenous Leaders on the Arctic Policy Framework | Legislative Assembly of The Northwest Territories.” The Gordon Foundation.
https://www.ntassembly.ca/tabled-documents/we-are-one-mind-perspectivesemerging-indigenous-leaders-arctic-policy-framework.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104175 https://www.cityofdawson.ca/Home/DownloadDocument?docId=8f49bb2e-5bf2-4641-8562-511fa6dceb0a https://www.cityofdawson.ca/Home/DownloadDocument?docId=8f49bb2e-5bf2-4641-8562-511fa6dceb0a 33 Down, Chris, and S. Jeff Birchall.
2019.
“Climate Change Planning: Understanding Policy Frameworks and Financial Mechanisms for Disaster Relief.” In Good Health and Well-Being, edited by Walter Leal Filho, Tony Wall, Ulisses Azeiteiro, Anabela Marisa Azul, Luciana Brandli, and Pinar Gökcin Özuyar, 1–9.
Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Cham: Springer International Publishing.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71063-1_80-1.
Environment and Climate Change Canada.
2019.
Canada’s Changing Climate Report.
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-368-2019-eng.pdf.
Eriksen, Christine, Gregory L. Simon, Florian Roth, Shefali Juneja Lakhina, Ben Wisner, Carolina Adler, Frank Thomalla, et al.
2020.
“Rethinking the Interplay between Affluence and Vulnerability to Aid Climate Change Adaptive Capacity.” Climatic Change 162 (1): 25–39.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02819-x.
Eriksen, Siri, E. Lisa F. Schipper, Morgan Scoville-Simonds, Katharine Vincent, Hans Nicolai Adam, Nick Brooks, Brian Harding, et al.
2021.
“Adaptation Interventions and Their Effect on Vulnerability in Developing Countries: Help, Hindrance or Irrelevance?” World Development 141 (May): 105383. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105383.
Fellows, G. Kent, Katharina Koch, Alaz Munzur, Robert Mansell, and Pierre-Gerlier Forest.
2020.
“The Canadian Northern Corridor: Planning for National Prosperity.” The School of Public Policy Publications, December, Vol.
13. https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V13I0.71388.
Field, Christopher B.
2018.
“Smart Adaptation in an Era of Rising Climate Risks.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74 (2): 73–80.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436806.
Fitton, James M., Kwasi Appeaning Addo, Philip-Neri Jayson-Quashigah, Gustavo J. Nagy, Ofelia Gutiérrez, Daniel Panario, Inti Carro, et al.
2021.
“Challenges to Climate Change Adaptation in Coastal Small Towns: Examples from Ghana, Uruguay, Finland, Denmark, and Alaska.” Ocean and Coastal Management 212: 105787. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2021.105787.
Ford, James, Clara Champalle, Pamela Tudge, Rudy Riedlsperger, Trevor Bell, and Erik Sparling.
2015.
“Evaluating Climate Change Vulnerability Assessments: A Case Study of Research Focusing on the Built Environment in Northern Canada.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 20 (8): 1267–88.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-014-9543-x.
Ford, James, and Diana King.
2013.
“A Framework for Examining Adaptation Readiness.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 20 (4): 505–26.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-013-9505-8.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02819-x https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V13I0.71388 https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V13I0.71388 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2021.105787 34 Ford, James, Jolène Labbé, Melanie Flynn, Malcolm Araos, and IHACC Research Team.
2017.
“Readiness for Climate Change Adaptation in the Arctic: A Case Study from Nunavut, Canada.” Climatic Change: An Interdisciplinary, International Journal Devoted to the Description, Causes and Implications of Climatic Change, 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2071-4.
French, Emily L., S. Jeff Birchall, Karen Landman, and Robert D. Brown.
2019.
“Designing Public Open Space to Support Seismic Resilience: A Systematic Review.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 34.
March: 1–10.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.11.001.
Geary, A.
2018.
“Freight Services Back Between Churchill and Thompson, Man.” CBC News.
November 19. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/churchill-railfreight-services-1.4912042.
Government of Alberta.
2016.
“Final Update 39: 2016 Wildfires.” Retrieved from https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=41701e7ECBE35-AD48-57931642c499FF0DE4CF.
Hennessey, R., S. Jones, S. Swales, and F. Duerden.
2011.
Dawson Climate Change Adaptation Plan, Revised Edition.
Northern Climate ExChange, Yukon Research Centre, Yukon College, Whitehorse, YT.
Hennessey, R., and J. Streicker.
2011.
Whitehorse Climate Change Adaptation Plan.
Northern Climate ExChange, Yukon Research Centre, Yukon College, Whitehorse, YT.
Hennessey, R., S. Stuart, and F. Duerden.
2012.
Mayo Region Climate Change Adaptation Plan.
Northern Climate ExChange, Yukon Research Centre, Yukon College, Whitehorse, YT.Holling, Crawford Stanley.
1996.
“Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience.” Engineering Within Ecological Constraints 31, no.
32.
Hoye B.
2017.
“With Ice Road Complete, 1st Haul of Goods Set to Arrive in Churchill Before Christmas.” CBC News.
December 15. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ manitoba/churchill-ice-road-1.4451279.
Insurance Bureau of Canada.
2016.
“Northern Alberta Wildfire Costliest Insured Natural Disaster in Canadian History – Estimate of Insured Losses: $3.58 Billion.” http://www.ibc.ca/bc/resources/media-centre/media-releases/northern-albertawildfire-costliest-insured-natural-disaster-in-canadian-history.
IPCC.
2014.
“WG II – Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability – Summary for Policymakers.” no.
Generic.
———.
2015.
Summary for Policymakers.
Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107415416.005.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.11.001 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/churchill-rail-freight-services-1.4912042 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/churchill-rail-freight-services-1.4912042 https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=41701e7ECBE35-AD48-5793-1642c499FF0DE4CF https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=41701e7ECBE35-AD48-5793-1642c499FF0DE4CF http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/churchill-ice-road-1.4451279 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/churchill-ice-road-1.4451279 http://www.ibc.ca/bc/resources/media-centre/media-releases/northern-alberta-wildfire-costliest-insured-natural-disaster-in-canadian-history http://www.ibc.ca/bc/resources/media-centre/media-releases/northern-alberta-wildfire-costliest-insured-natural-disaster-in-canadian-history 35 ———.
2021.
“Summary for Policymakers.” In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, Bonnie J., Holly T. Goerdel, Nicholas P. Lovrich, and John C. Pierce.
2015.
“Social Capital and Emergency Management Planning.” American Review of Public Administration 45 (4): 476–93.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074013504127.
Kehler, Sarah, and S. Jeff Birchall.
2021.
“Social Vulnerability and Climate Change Adaptation: The Critical Importance of Moving beyond Technocratic Policy Approaches.” Environmental Science and Policy 124.
October: 471–77.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2021.07.025.
Kirchmeier-Young, Megan, Francis Zwiers, Nathan Gillett, and Alex Cannon.
2017.
“Attributing Extreme Fire Risk in Western Canada to Human Emissions.” Climatic  Change 144 (2): 365–79.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2030-0.
Lede, Eric, Tristan Pearce, Chris Furgal, Melanie Wolki, Graham Ashford, and James D. Ford.
2021.
“The Role of Multiple Stressors in Adaptation to Climate Change in the Canadian Arctic.” Regional Environmental Change 21 (2).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-021-01769-z.
MacDonald, Seghan, and S. Jeff Birchall.
2019.
“Climate Change Resilience in the Canadian Arctic: The Need for Collaboration in the Face of a Changing Landscape.” Canadian Geographer 1–5.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cag.12591.
McNamara, Karen E., Ross Westoby, and Scott G. Smithers.
2017.
“Identification of Limits and Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation: Case Study of Two Islands in Torres Strait, Australia.” Geographical Research 55 (4): 438–55.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-5871.12242.
Meerow, Sara, and Joshua P. Newell.
2016.
“Urban Resilience for Whom, What, When, Where, and Why?” Urban Geography 40 (3): 309–29.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2016.1206395.
Montsion, J. M. 2015.
“Churchill, Manitoba and the Arctic Gateway: A Historical Contextualization.” The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien, 59(3), 304–316.
Morrison, M. W. and K. Coates.
1989.
“The Yukon at War.” Canada’s Great War Album.
Morse, K. T. 2003.
The Nature of Gold: An Environmental History of the Klondike Gold Rush.
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Naylor, Angus, James Ford, Tristan Pearce, and James Van Alstine.
2020.
“Conceptualizing Climate Vulnerability in Complex Adaptive Systems.” One Earth 2 (5): 444–54.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.04.011.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-2030-0 https://doi.org/10.1111/cag.12591 https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2016.1206395 36 OECD.
2015.
Climate Change Risks and Adaptation: Linking Policy and Economics.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/[SITE_ID]/detail.action?docID=3564444.
Ojwang, L., D. Obura, S. Rosendo, L. Celliers, A. Muiti, J. Kamula, and M. Mwangi.
2017.
“Assessment of Coastal Governance for Climate Change Adaptation in Kenya.” Earth’s Future 5 (11): 1119–32.
https://doi.org/10.1002/2017EF000595.
Osborne, Natalie.
2013.
“Intersectionality and Kyriarchy: A Framework for Approaching Power and Social Justice in Planning and Climate Change Adaptation.” Planning Theory.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095213516443.
Palko, K., and D. S. Lemmen.
2017.
Climate Risks and Adaptation Practices for the Canadian Transportation Sector 2016.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Pandey, Rajiv, Shashidhar Kumar Jha, Juha M. Alatalo, Kelli M. Archie, and Ajay K. Gupta.
2017.
“Sustainable Livelihood Framework-Based Indicators for Assessing Climate Change Vulnerability and Adaptation for Himalayan Communities.” Ecological Indicators 79: 338–46.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2017.03.047.
Parks Canada.
2018.
“Klondike National Historic Sites of Canada Management Plan.” Retrieved from https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/lhn-nhs/yt/klondike/gestionmanagement/gestion-management-2018.
———.
2021.
“Dawson Historical Complex National Historic Site of Canada.” Retrieved from https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/lhn-nhs/yt/klondike/culture/~/media/ F960B576109045F8A42407 986112A3FE.ashx.
Pearce, Tristan, James Ford, Ashlee Cunsolo Willox, and Barry Smit.
2015.
“Inuit Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), Subsistence Hunting and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Canadian Arctic.” Arctic 68 (2): 233–45.
Pearce, Tristan, James Ford, and David Fawcett.
2020.
“Climate Change and the Proposed Canadian Northern Corridor.” The School of Public Policy Publications, November.
Vol.
13. https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V13I0.69570.
Porter, C. 2017.
“Canadian Town, Isolated After Losing Rail Link, ‘Feels Held Hostage.’” The New York Times.
August 30. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/world/ canada/canada-climate-change-arctic.html.
Public Safety Canada.
2021.
“Canadian Disaster Database: Fort McMurray Wildfire.” Retrieved from https://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/dtprnt-eng.aspx?cultureCode=en-Ca andeventTypes=%27WF%27andnormalizedCostYear=1anddynamic=falseandeventId =1135andprnt=both.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2017.03.047 https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V13I0.69570 https://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/dtprnt-eng.aspx?cultureCode=en-Ca&eventTypes=%27WF%27&normalizedCostYear=1&dynamic=false&eventId=1135&prnt=both https://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/dtprnt-eng.aspx?cultureCode=en-Ca&eventTypes=%27WF%27&normalizedCostYear=1&dynamic=false&eventId=1135&prnt=both https://cdd.publicsafety.gc.ca/dtprnt-eng.aspx?cultureCode=en-Ca&eventTypes=%27WF%27&normalizedCostYear=1&dynamic=false&eventId=1135&prnt=both 37 Ramsey, Molly M., Tischa A. Muñoz-Erickson, Elvia Mélendez-Ackerman, Christopher J. Nytch, Benjamin L. Branoff, and David Carrasquillo-Medrano.
2019.
“Overcoming Barriers to Knowledge Integration for Urban Resilience: A Knowledge Systems Analysis of Two-Flood Prone Communities in San Juan, Puerto Rico.” Environmental Science and Policy 99: 48–57.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.04.013.
Runhaar, Hens, Bettina Wilk, Åsa Persson, Caroline Uittenbroek, and Christine Wamsler.
2018.
“Mainstreaming Climate Adaptation: Taking Stock about ‘What Works’ from Empirical Research Worldwide.” Regional Environmental Change 18 (4): 1201. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1259-5.
Sandercock, Leonie.
1998.
Making the Invisible Visible : A Multicultural Planning History.
California Studies in Critical Human Geography: 2.
University of California Press.
https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.
com/login.aspx?direct=trueanddb=cat03710aandAN=alb.2150389andsite=edsliveandscope=site.
Shrubsole, Guy.
2015.
“All that is Solid Melts into Air: Climate Change and Neoliberalism.” Soundings 59.
April.
https://doi.org/10.3898/136266215814890486.
Siders, A. R. 2019.
“Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change: A Synthesis of Concepts, Methods, and Findings in a Fragmented Field.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, no.
3. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.573.
Singh, Amrita, and S. Jeff Birchall.
2019.
“Financial Market Services: Finance Flows for Climate Change Adaptation.” In: W. Leal Filho, U. Azeiteiro, A. Azul, L. Brandli, P. Özuyar, and T. Wall, eds.
Climate Action.
Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Springer, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71063-1_84-1.
Skinner, Brian J., Stephen C. Porter, and Daniel B. Botkin.
1999.
The Blue Planet: An Introduction to Earth System Science.
2nd ed.
New York: J. Wiley.
Smith, Alexander J., Jeff W. Higdon, Pierre Richard, Jack Orr, Warren Bernhardt, and Steven H. Ferguson.
2017.
“Beluga Whale Summer Habitat Associations in the Nelson River Estuary, Western Hudson Bay, Canada.” PLoS One 12, no.
8: e0181045.
Statistics Canada.
2016.
Census Profile, 2016 Census – Fort McMurray, Alberta.
Retrieved from https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/ prof/details/page.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.573 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71063-1_84-1 38 About the Authors Jeff Birchall is an Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning in the Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Alberta, where he serves as Director of the Climate Adaptation and Resilience Lab.
Jeff has broad research and teaching experience in environmental change, how climate impacts influence infrastructure and the built form, and the decision dynamics around adaptation planning and resilience at the local scale.
Jeff is a registered professional planner (RPP, MCIP) with education in geography, environmental studies and planning, climate change and sustainability.
Sarah Kehler is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Alberta; her general area of study is Urban and Regional Planning.
She is currently a research assistant with the Climate Adaptation and Resilience Lab, focusing on barriers to achieving equitable and effective policy for adaptation and resilience to climate change.
She holds a MSc in Earth and Atmospheric Sciences and a BA with a double major in Human Geography and Design.
Recently her work has focused on the influence of governance structure in provision of policy and planning, and the importance of social vulnerability within climate change adaptation policy.
Nicole Bonnett is a PhD candidate in the School of Urban and Regional Planning, Dept.
of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Alberta.
Situated in the Climate Adaptation and Resilience Lab, Nicole’s research explores local-scale climate change impacts and adaptations, with a focus on policy/ action implementation.
39 ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY The School of Public Policy has become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada.
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance for the betterment of our families, communities and country.
We do this by: • Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree programs, giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital interests both here and abroad; • Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures; • Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
The School of Public Policy relies on industry experts and practitioners, as well as academics, to conduct research in their areas of expertise.
Using experts and practitioners is what makes our research especially relevant and applicable.
Authors may produce research in an area which they have a personal or professional stake.
That is why The School subjects all Research Papers to a double anonymous peer review.
Then, once reviewers comments have been reflected, the work is reviewed again by one of our Scientific Directors to ensure the accuracy and validity of analysis and data.
The School of Public Policy University of Calgary, Downtown Campus 906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9 Phone: 403 210 3802 DISTRIBUTION Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors' alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT Copyright © Birchall, Kehler, Bonnett 2022.
This is an open-access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons license CC BY-NC 4.0, which allows non-commercial sharing and redistribution so long as the original author and publisher are credited.
ISSN ISSN 2560-8312 The School of Public Policy Publications (Print) ISSN 2560-8320 The School of Public Policy Publications (Online) DATE OF ISSUE September 2022 MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION For media inquiries, please contact Dana Fenech at 403-210-6508.
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The School's events, publications, and staff.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Research Article A Comparative Analysis of Climate Change Risk Response Perception Paths between Northern and Southern Shaanxi Siwen Xue1,3,*, , Zhou Qi1,2,3 1School of Geography and Environment, Baoji University of Arts and Sciences, Baoji 721013, China 2Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Disasters Monitoring and Mechanism Simulation, Baoji University of Arts and Sciences, Baoji 721013, China 3Shaan’xi Provincial Key Research Center for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Baoji Base), Baoji 721013, China 1.
INTRODUCTION The fifth report of the IPCC pointed out that extreme weather and climate events have changed since 1950, and extreme climates have also occurred frequently [1].
In the context of global climate change [2], meteorological disasters occur frequently and the risks of climate change are increasing.
It is thus necessary to step up efforts to address the risks of climate change.
Currently, there are three main ways to deal with climate change risks: mitigation, adaptation and avoidance [3].
The adaptation challenge grows with the magnitude and the rate of climate change.
Even the most effective climate change mitigation through reduction of Greenhouse Gas emissions or enhanced removal of these gases from the atmosphere (through carbon sinks) would not prevent further climate change impacts [4], making the need for adaptation unavoidable [5].
Climate change mitigation consists of actions to limit the magnitude or rate of global warming and its related effects [6].
The main challenge is move away from coal, oil and gas and replace these fossil fuels with clean energy sources [7].
As for avoiding dangerous climate change, a study published in 2018 points at a threshold at which temperatures could rise to 4° or 5° through self-reinforcing feedbacks in the climate system, suggesting it is below the 2° temperature target [8].
Therefore, different climate change risk response methods have certain challenges and shortcomings.
And in the interaction between people and the environment, the perception of environment is the main basis for human decision-making behavior [9].
Therefore, it is necessary to explore the formation mechanism of people’s climate change risk response perception, so as to overcome the difficulties and shortcomings in climate change risk response.
Most scholars believed that behaviors influencing people’s response to climate change risks are diverse.
In many instances, there are many factors that cam enhance people’s ability to cope with climate change.
These factors can include resources, education and information, gender, poverty, wealth, infrastructure, institutional efficiency as well as local indigenous practices, knowledge, and experiences [10,11].
Therefore, factors that influence climate change risk response are diverse.
Owing to the interaction between behavior and perception.
It is believed that the factors that impact climate change risk response perception are also diverse.
This shows that structural equation model is suitable to deal with multiple factors affecting climate change risk response perception simultaneously.
In this regard, some scholars have done extensive research.
Momtaz et al.
investigated the factors affecting perception and adaptation behavior of farmers in response to climatic changes in Hamedan.
The findings indicated that knowledge, perception, and A RT I C L E I N F O Article History Received 23 December 2020 Accepted 11 March 2021 Keywords Northern Shaanxi southern Shaanxi climate change risk perception structural equation modeling A B S T R AC T The public’s awareness of climate change risks is the basis for their choice of adaptation action.
A good understanding of the key factors that affect the public’s perception of climate change risk is critical to climate change risk management.
In this paper, a path model was constructed to analyze the path of climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi based on 1660 public survey data in northern Shaanxi, which was compared with that of southern Shaanxi.
The results showed that (1) there are three causal paths in northern Shaanxi, that is, the public’s awareness of climate change issues, awareness of ecological stability, and awareness of climate change causes, to affect response status; there are nine causal paths in southern Shaanxi.
(2) There are four related routes in northern Shaanxi and 19 in southern Shaanxi.
In short, compared with southern Shaanxi, there are fewer perception paths and simpler models for climate change risk response in northern Shaanxi.
(3) The degree of concern for climate change issues and the perception of the causes of climate change influence the establishment of the causal path of climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi.
The major factors that influence climate change risk response perception in southern Shaanxi are climate change risk reason perception, industrial structure adjustment perception, and energy conservation, and emission reduction perception.
(4) The response perception path in northern Shaanxi is simpler than that in southern Shaanxi, and there are fewer causal and related paths that impact climate change risk response perception.
(5) Finally, through the comparative analysis of the path of climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi and southern Shaanxi, this paper provides a reference for coping with climate change risks in northern and southern Shaanxi.
© 2021 The Authors.
Published by Atlantis Press B.V.
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
*Corresponding author.
Email: 1213268775@qq.com Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
11(1); April (2021), pp.
26–35 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.210312.001; ISSN 2210-8491; eISSN 2210-8505 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0809-5185 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ mailto:1213268775%40qq.com?subject= https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.210312.001 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 27 belief had the maximum impact on the adaptation behavior, with path coefficients of, respectively, 0.53, 0.32, and 0.18, whereas belief and knowledge had the maximum impact on perception, with path coefficients of 0.56 and 0.35 respectively [12].
Xue et al.
[13] pointed out In exploring new ecological paradigms and coping with climate change in China, highly educated respondents showed a significantly stronger path between risk perception and behavior than less educated respondents.
Eriksson examined appraisals of threat (cognitive and emotional), personal resources (cost and self-efficacy), and strategies (response-efficacy) as predictors of proactive management responses (past behavior and future intention) among forest owners in Sweden by means of a questionnaire (n = 1482), and found that threat appraisals and response-efficacy are direct predictors of past risk management behavior and the intention to respond in the future [14].
Brown et al.
studied the impact of Cyclone Evan in December 2012 on Fijian households’ risk attitudes and subjective expectations about the likelihood and severity of natural disasters over the next 20 years, and pointed out the main factors that influence the perception of climate change risk response.
Their results showed that extreme event substantially changes individuals’ risk perceptions as well as their beliefs about the frequency and magnitude of future shocks [15].
In summary, most scholars believed that education, knowledge, experience and concepts are important in the perception path of climate change risk response.
However, few have incorporated environmental and experiences factors into the climate change risk response perception path model at the same time.
In fact, some have conducted research on the factors that influence climate change risk response perception from the perspectives of environment or experience.
Marlon et al.
analyzed a representative statewide survey of Floridians and compared their risk perceptions of 5-year trends in climate change with local weather station data from the 5 years preceding the survey.
Their research compared to local experience, risk perceptions of climate change were more strongly predicted by subjective experiences of environmental change, personal beliefs about climate change, and political ideology [16].
Retchless used an interactive map of sea level rise in Sarasota, Florida and an accompanying online survey, it considers how college students from nearby and far away from Sarasota, and with different views about climate change, vary in their risk perceptions.
The results showed that, consistent with spatial optimism bias, risk perceptions increased more from preto post-map for respondents far away from Sarasota than for those nearby [17].
Nowadays, although domestic and foreign studies have achieved certain progress in the public’s climate change risk perception and its influencing factors, there are still the following shortcomings.
First, most of the research subjects focused on investigating the single relationship between environment or experience and response perception, but failed to combine the two to systematically reflect the interaction between various factors and the impact mechanism of climate change risk response perception.
Moreover, the research was mostly conducted based on the opinions of peasants.
Northern Shaanxi and southern Shaanxi are important geographic regions in China, with relatively frequent meteorological disasters.
Comparing the research results of northern Shaanxi with southern Shaanxi can further highlight the perception path of climate change risk response in northern Shaanxi, and provide a typical reference case for risk management and response.
Therefore, based on the structural equation model, this paper explored the path of climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi and conducted a comparative analysis with southern Shaanxi.
This paper attempted to find the answers to the following questions: (1) How many paths are there to respond to climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi and southern Shaanxi?
How does it impact on people’s climate change risk response perceptions?
(2) What reference can this regular pattern provide for people in northern and southern Shaanxi to deal with the risk of climate change?
2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 2.1.
Study Area Northern Shaanxi is located in the northern part of Shaanxi Province, between 107°28¢ and 111°15¢ east longitude, and between 35°21¢ and 39°34¢ north latitude (Figure 1).
The loess hilly and gully area of northern Shaanxi is in the middle reaches of the Yellow River and the northern part of the Loess Plateau [18].
It borders Gansu Province and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in the west.
It is adjacent to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in the north and Fu county, Luochuan and Yichuan counties in Yan’an City in the south, covering 12 counties (districts) including Yuyang District and Dingbian County in Yulin City, and Pagoda District, Ansai County, Zichang County, Yanchuan County, Yanchang County, Ganquan County, Zhidan County, and Wuqi County in Yan’an [19].
Northern Shaanxi consists of two regions, Yan’an and Yulin.
The former is a typical dry farming area, and the latter belongs to the agro-pastoral zone in the northern area of China.
There are many meteorological disasters in the whole northern Shaanxi region.
Drought, frost, rainstorm, gale, hail of varying degrees occur almost every year, among which drought, hail and frost are particularly serious [20].
The south of Shaanxi is close to the Qinling Mountains in the north, and the Bashan Mountain in the south, with Han River flowing from its west to east.
The natural conditions of Hanzhong and Ankang in southern Shaanxi have typical characteristics of the southern region.
They are located at 105°30¢–110°01¢E and between 31°42¢ and 34°24¢N, as shown in Figure 1.
They have a humid climate in the northern subtropical zone, and most of mountains have a warm temperate humid climate.
The shallow valleys in southern Shaanxi are the warmest areas in the province, with temperatures mostly Figure 1 | Topography and geomorphology of the study area.
28 S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 ranging from 14 to 15°C.
The average temperature in January, the coldest month, is 0–3°C, and the average temperature of July, the hottest month, is 24–27.5°C.
The annual precipitation is 700–900 mm.
There are many flood disasters in southern Shaanxi, and the rainy season is in the autumn, which generally lasts from early and late to mid-early September.
The main meteorological disasters there are summer drought, heavy rain, continuous rain, hail, frost, strong wind, cold wave etc.
[20].
2.2.
Data Sources The questionnaire data came from a random sampling of public in northern Shaanxi.
A total of 1660 valid questionnaires were received, and the response rate was 80%.
Among the respondents, 829 were male, accounting for 49% of the total, and 831 were female, accounting for 51% 412 were at the age of 20 or below, accounting for 24.8% of the total; 629 aged 21–30, accounting for 37.9%, and 248 aged 31–40, accounting for 14.9% [21].
There were 186 respondents aged 41–50, accounting for 11.2% [21], 168 aged 51–70, accounting for 10.1%, and 24 aged over 70, accounting for 1.4%.
In this survey, the data of the Shaanxi Provincial.
Statistical Yearbook (2018) were used in the design of the population structure of the respondents, and appropriate adjustments were made based on the status of Yan’an and Yulin and large sample requirements.
It is for us to consider the representativeness and validity of the sample as much as possible.
Table 1 shows other basic characteristics of the surveyed public [22].
The correlation coefficients between the perception of environment beauty and the living environment and risk concepts in northern Shaanxi are 0.435 and 0.238 respectively, which are both significant at the level of 0.01.
The correlation coefficient between risk perception and perception of environmental stability is 0.174.
The correlation coefficients of the degree of concern for climate change issues with the perception of response situations and the perception of climate change causes are 0.245 and 0.149 respectively (Table 2), both significant at the level of 0.01.
Therefore, the questionnaire indicators selected in northern Shaanxi have a relatively significant correlation, which indicates that the public’s perception of climate change risks and response paths, and the content validity is high [24].
2.3.
Research Methods 2.3.1.
Construction of structural equation model Based on the field survey in northern Shaanxi and the analysis of the validity of the questionnaire [25], this paper proposes the following hypotheses, and constructs a path model of the role of risk concepts, living environment, and climate change information mastery on public climate change risk perception (Figure 2).
Hypothesis H1: The public’s perception of climate change issues, perception of environmental stability, and perception of the causes of climate change affect the response status [26].
Hypothesis H2: Risk perceptions are positively correlated with the perception of living environment and environment beauty perception.
Hypothesis H3: The living environment and the perception of environment beauty perception are positively correlated.
Hypothesis H4: The degree of concern for climate change issues is positively correlated with the perception of the causes of climate change [27] (Table 3).
Table 1 | Basic characteristics of the surveyed public [22] Survey item Category Frequency Ratio (%) Education Elementary school or below [23] 408 29.30 Junior high school [23] 284 17.10 High school [23]/Technical secondary school 60 3.60 Undergraduate/Junior college [23] 278 16.70 Postgraduate and above 553 33.30 Monthly income 500 and below 870 52.40 500–1000 292 17.50 1001–2000 205 12.30 2001–3000 179 10.70 3001–5000 114 6.90 Profession Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 229 13.70 Production and transportation 53 3.1 Business services 177 10.1 Government institutions 28 1.6 Expertise 173 10.4 Doctors 135 8.5 Teachers 557 33.5 Soldiers 132 7.9 Self-employed people 99 5.9 Students 33 1.9 Table 2 | KMO value and Bartlett test in northern Shaanxi Kaiser– Meyer–Olkin measures sampling suitability KMO value and Bartlett test in northern Shaanxi Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measures sampling suitability Bartlett’s sphere test 0.678 Approximately chi-square 1272.646 df 406 Significance 0.000 Figure 2 | The impact mechanism model of public climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi (hypothetical model).
S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 29 2.3.2.
Variable selection and descriptive statistics Table 4 is the descriptive statistics of independent variables and dependent variables of structural equation model.
In addition, it also includes specific questionnaire items corresponding to different indicators.
2.3.3.
Path analysis In order to identify the key factors that affect the perception of climate change risk in southern Shaanxi and the path of these factors, this paper uses path analysis to construct a path map and calculates the effect value (including overall effect, direct effect and indirect effect) in the AMOS26.0 environment [28].
In the structural equation model, the structural model between latent variables with only one observation variable is called path analysis.
It is used to test the accuracy and reliability of the hypothetical causal model, the strength of the causal relationship between the measured variables, and it can accommodate the multi-link causal structure and use a path diagram to express it [29].
The basic expression is: h h x z= + +B Γ where x is the exogenous variable matrix [30], h is the endogenous variable matrix [30], B is the structural coefficient matrix that represents the influence between the constituent factors of the endogenous variable matrix h, Γ is the structural coefficient matrix [31], which represents the influence of the exogenous variable matrix x on the endogenous variable matrix h [31], and z is the residual matrix which represents the unexplained part [31].
3.
RESULT ANALYSIS 3.1.
Model Fit Test In AMOS 26.0 environment, path model framework is established and calculated, original path is debugged according to model correction prompts, and the final model of northern Shaanxi is determined (Figure 3).
When response path model freedom degree in northern Shaanxi is 9, its Chi-square value is about 9.312.
The corresponding significance Figure 3 | The impact mechanism model of public climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi (standard model).
Table 3 | Correlation coefficient matrix of climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi Index Understanding the reasons of climate change Coping situation Scenic beauty perception Environmental stability awareness Living environment −0.035 0.07 0.435** 0.062 Risk concept 0.01 0.075 0.238** 0.174** Concern about climate change 0.149** 0.245** 0.069 0.076 **represents significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 4 | Description of explanatory variables in northern Shaanxi Variables Measurement standard Assignment Mean Standard deviation Living environment Regional climate comfort C72 Strongly agree = 1; agree = 2; uncertain = 3; disagree = 4 2.98 1.078 Severe surrounding pollution C73 strongly disagree = 5; strongly agree = 1; agree = 2; uncertain = 3; disagree = 4; strongly disagree = 5 2.694 1.16 Regional environmental livability C74 Strongly agree = 1; agree = 2; uncertain = 3; disagree = 4; strongly disagree = 5 2.665 0.983 Risk concept Risk perception B1 Strongly agree = 1; agree = 2; uncertain = 3; disagree = 4; strongly disagree = 5 3.2 1.86 Risk option B3 There is 80% chance of getting 4000 yuan, 20% chance of getting nothing = 1, 100% chance of getting 3000 yuan = 2 1.611 0.569 Understanding the causes of climate change Evaluation of causes of climate change C91 Natural reasons humanistic reasons = 1–7 4.925 2.073 Understanding the causes of climate change C81, C82, C83 Very well understanding = 1; relatively understanding = 2; general = 3; not very understanding = 4; not at all = 6 2.291 0.861 Concern about climate change issues Degree of concern for climate change issues D1 Very concerned = 1; more concerned = 2; general = 3; not very concerned = 4; very unconcerned = 5 2.134 0.876 Coping situation awareness Climate change event participation status D6 Very willing = 1; more willing = 2; unclear = 3; reluctant = 4; very unwilling = 5 1.958 0.967 Daily coping behavior D7 Always = 1; sometimes = 2; not sure = 3; rarely = 4; never = 5 1.99 1.042 Scenic beauty perception Scenic beauty recognition C71 Strongly agree = 1; agree = 2; unsure = 3; disagree = 4; strongly disagree = 6 3.112 1.142 Environmental stability awareness Environmental stability awareness B2 The natural world is fragile, even a small change can cause catastrophic consequences = 2 2.982 0.919 The natural world is very stable, even if it is greatly disturbed, it can be restored to its original state = 4 30 S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 probability p = 0.811 > 0.05, which does not reach the significance level of 0.05.
In addition, the ratio of chi-square freedom degree (CMIN/DF) is 0.665 < 2; RMSEA value is 0.000 < 0.050; the GFI, AGFI, IFI, TLI, CFI values are 0.993, 0.985, 1.050, 1.081, and 1.000 respectively, all of which are over 0.900, complying with the standard.
The preset model’s AIC, BCC, BIC, CAIC, ECVI values are all smaller than those of independent model and saturation model, indicating that the hypothetical model fits well with actual data (Table 5).
3.2.
Analysis of Results in Northern Shaanxi Test results show that the overall effect of climate change reason perception, climate change problems concern degree, public’s environmental stability perception and public response status perception is 0.217, 0.200, and −0.18 respectively.
Furthermore, the direct effects are 0.217, 0.200, and −0.18, respectively.
The direct effects of the degree of concern for climate issues and the perception of the causes of climate change on the situation are significant at the 0.01 level (Figure 3).
This shows that the environmental stability perception, climate change reasons perception, and concern degree for climate change issues have a significant positive impact on climate change response perception [32].
It is believed that hypothesis of H1 is valid.
In contrast, climate change issues concern degree has a greater impact than the above two (Table 6) [33].
As for correlation path in northern Shaanxi, risk concern is positively correlated with living environment and environment beauty perception, with covariances of 0.137 and 0.203, respectively, assuming H2 holds.
Among them, the covariance of risk concepts and living environment, beautiful scenery perception is significant at the level of 0.01, which is inferred to be related to the fragile geographical environment in northern Shaanxi.
Further covariance analysis of living environment and scenic beauty perception is 0.362, among which relationship with scenic beauty perception is significant at the level of 0.01, assuming H3 holds.
Moreover, the covariance between concern degree of climate change issues and perception of climate change reasons is 0.121, significant at the level of 0.05.
Therefore, H4 is confirmed.
This shows that the better the living environment in northern Shaanxi, the stronger risk concept and environmental beauty perception.
The higher the concern degree of climate change issues, the better the perception of climate change reasons [34] (Table 7).
3.3.
Comparative Analysis The path model of public climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi was constructed based on risk concepts, living environment, and concern for climate change issues.
The climate change risk response path model in southern Shaanxi was constructed based on risk concepts, human and land concepts, cultural level, living environment, and concern degree for climate change issues, and they have all passed test.
It is inferred that in northern Shaanxi region, due to the relatively harsh environment, conservative ideological concepts, serious soil erosion, and frequent disasters, education degree has a smaller impact on climate change risk response perception [35].
Instead, concern degree for climate change issues and climate change reason perception influence the causal path of climate change risk perception [36].
In southern Shaanxi, the mountains and rivers are beautiful, so it is less hit by natural disasters.
Therefore, climate change result perception, human and land concepts, risk concepts, educational level, and concern degree for climate change issues impact the establishment of climate change risk perception’s causal path in southern Shaanxi.
In addition, northern Shaanxi is dominated by the secondary industry, whereas southern Shaanxi is dominated by the primary and tertiary industries (Figure 4).
According to research by relevant scholars, the tertiary industry can break through Hu Huanyong line [37], so industrial structure adjustment perception in southern Shaanxi has a significant impact on climate change response perception [26].
From Figures 3 and 4, it can Table 5 | Index parameters of model adaptation in northern Shaanxi Evaluation index Preset model Saturation model Independent model CMIN/DF (Relative chi-square) 0.665 5.12 RMSEA 0 0.107 GFI 0.993 1 0.915 AGFI 0.985 0.887 IFI 1.05 1 0 CFI 1 1 0 TLI 1.081 0 AIC 37.312 56 121.511 BCC 37.947 57.269 121.829 BIC 91.795 164.966 148.753 CAIC 105.795 192.966 155.753 ECVI 0.103 0.155 0.337 Table 6 | Overall effect, direct effect, and indirect effect among variables Reason variable Result variable Overall effect Direct effect Indirect effect Climate change reason perception Coping situation perception 0.217 0.217 0 Concern degree for climate change problems 0.200 0.200 0 Environmental stability perception −0.108 −0.108 0 Table 7 | Climate change risk perception covariance matrix Variables Index Estimate SE CR p Living environment← → Risk concept 0.137 0.032 4.319 *** Living environment← → Scenic beauty perception 0.363 0.049 7.424 *** Scenic beauty perception← → Cimate change reason perception 0.121 0.043 2.787 0.005 Risk concept← → Scenic beauty perception 0.203 0.050 4.096 * *, ***represents significant at the 0.05 and 0.001 level.
S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 31 Figure 4 | The impact mechanism model of public climate change risk perception in southern Shaanxi (standard model).
Table 8 | Linear regression analysis results (n = 24) Constant Nonstandardized coefficient Standard error Normalized coefficient T p VIF R2 Adjusted R2 F –0.243 – 0.104 – –2.334 0.030* – 0.864 0.843 (3,20) = 42.217, p = 0.000 Longitude 0.28 0.173 0.171 1.615 0.122 1.643 Latitude 0.813 0.203 0.613 4.002 0.001** 3.444 Altitude 0.42 0.188 0.314 2.24 0.037* 2.887 Dependent variable: MMS_ganzhi.
D-W (Durbin-Watsonstatistic) value: 1.248.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. be seen that there are three causal paths in northern Shaanxi: public’s of climate change issues concern degree, environmental stability perception, and climate change reason perception influence climate change response perception.
There are nine causal paths in southern Shaanxi, namely, climate change consequences perception, human and land concept [38], cultural level for climate change issues concern degree and industrial structure adjustment perception impact on climate change response status perception; Public human-land and risk concept influence climate change response perception via impact on of climate change reasons perception; human-land and risk concept influence climate change reason perception.
As for related routes, there are four in northern Shaanxi and 19 in southern [39].
In short, compared with southern Shaanxi, there are fewer perception paths and simpler models of climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi.
3.4.
Analysis of Influencing Factors In order to explore the factors influencing climate change risk response perception in different counties and regions, and to reveal the mechanism of differences in climate change risk response perception path in northern and southern Shaanxi, latitude, longitude and average altitude of each county were taken as independent variables, and climate change risk response perception intensity of each county as dependent variable for linear regression analysis.
As shown in Table 8, linear regression model R squared is 0.864, indicating a high fitting degree of model.
Further analysis of data in Table 8 shows that latitude and altitude are the most influential factors on climate change risk response perception, with regression coefficients of 0.203 and 0.188 respectively, significant at the levels of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively.
This result demonstrates that the greater the differences in terrain and latitude, the greater the difference of climate change risk response perception intensity, which probably leads to difference in paths (Table 8).
4.
DISCUSSION Domestic and foreign studies have also confirmed that the environment and people’s experience will influence perception of climate change risk response [40].
For example, Bradley et al.
believed that antecedent psychological and socio-demographic variables predict climate change risk perceptions, which lead to enhancing levels of response efficacy and psychological adaptation in relation to climate change, and ultimately to environmentally-relevant behaviors [41].
The study found that: Risk perception (hot), response (both hot and direct) and psychological adaptation (directly) predicted behavior [41].
Smith provided some ground-breaking work on human behavior as it relates to perception and response to risks associated with climate change and climatic variability in the rural communities of Sandy Bay and Fancy.
The study examined households’ knowledge and perception of the climate change phenomenon and their responses to climate-related events.
The results showed that an investigation of responses or the decision to respond to some of the impacts that they have experienced as a result of climate change and climatic variability leads to the development of different types of perceptions, including religious, ill informed, experienced-based, and knowledge-based perceptions.
It is argued here that these forms of perception may result in non-adaptive, proactive or reactive adaptive behavior [42].
After studying farmers’ response to and perception of climate change risks, Wang et al.
[43] believed that extreme climate changes such as rising temperature, decreased precipitation and increased frequency of drought would affect farmers’ perception and response to climate change.
In the hutt valley, New Zealand et al., through a family survey, as well as seminar and interviews with local government officials, found that flood experience can influence flood risk perceptions, and that flood experience can stimulate increased risk reduction and adaptation actions where climate change risks are likely to occur.
It is argued here that these forms of perception may result in nonadaptive or reactive adaptive behavior.
These studies have confirmed the rationality of using the two major variables of environment and concept to design the climate change risk response pathway model in northern Shaanxi and southern Shaanxi [44].
To verify the reliability of results of this paper, the climate change risk response perception path model of various cities in northern Shaanxi (Figure 5) and southern Shaanxi (ensure RMSE = 0) is calculated.
It is found that climate change risk response perception path of Yulin and Yan’an in northern Shaanxi is much simpler than that in southern Shaanxi (Figure 6).
The climate change risk 32 S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 response path in northern Shaanxi has four factors included in the model, while southern Shaanxi has at least five.
Finally, geographic detectors are utilized to investigate the factors affecting the perception of climate change risk response in northern Shaanxi and southern Shaanxi respectively.
It is found that in northern Shaanxi, the explanatory power of each factor on the perception of climate change risk response is: education level > risk concepts > climate change reason perception > living environment > environmental stability perception > industrial structure adjustment perception > scenic beauty perception = climate change problems perception = energy saving and emission reduction perception, as shown in Figure 7).
This shows that impact of industrial structure adjustment, energy conservation and emission reduction perception on climate change risk response perception is not much different from that of environmental stability and grace perception.
Thus, the above factors can be substituted for each other, but they cannot be incorporated into the model of climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi.
This shows that climate change risk response perception path in northern Shaanxi is not a complete mediation model, which is more consistent with the conclusions drawn by Song and Shi [45].
As for the climate change risk response perception paths in southern Shaanxi, most of them are fully intermediary or partial intermediary models, and there is no non-intermediary model (Figure 6).
Figure 7 shows the explanatory power of climate change risk response perception factors from small to large.
It can be found that energy conservation, emission reduction perception, and industrial structure adjustment in southern Shaanxi have greater explanatory power to climate change risk response perception than environmental stability or beautiful scenery perception.
Therefore, it is believed that energy conservation and emission reduction in southern Shaanxi, climate change reasons, and industrial structure adjustment perception are three important intermediary variables that influence their perception of climate change risk response.
The view that climate change risk perception path model in southern Shaanxi is more complicated can be empirically proved by Zhou, who demonstrated that public in Hanzhong area influences their perception and response to climate change risks through their perceptions of reasons, knowledge, facts and consequences, which in turn influence their behavior and willingness to climate change risks response [46].
The above discussions indicate that the path of climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi is simpler than that in southern Shaanxi, and corresponding influencing factors are also less.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above discussions.
First, the main influencing factors of climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi [47] are climate change reason perception and climate change issues concern degree.
Second, Figure 5 | A perceived path model for climate change risk response of all cities in northern Shaanxi.
Figure 6 | A perceived path model for climate change risk response of all cities in southern Shaanxi.
S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 33 northern Shaanxi region should increase basic network platforms construction to strengthen publicity of climate change risk information.
Third, regarding complex perception path in southern Shaanxi to deal with climate change risks [48], people’s path of climate change risks response perception is diverse.
For this reason, a well understanding of the intermediary variables in climate change risk response perception path model is necessary.
Fourth, because industrial structure adjustment, climate change reason perception and climate change problems concern degree are important variables in the climate change risk response perception path model, it is necessary to vigorously promote development of tertiary industry in southern Shaanxi and understanding of climate change risk information and reasons.
In terms of demographic factors, education level, monthly income and age in northern Shaanxi have greater explanatory power for climate change risk response perception, and can be considered for inclusion in model in the future.
In addition to education level in southern Shaanxi, age also has a greater influence on climate change risk response perception.
Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen exploration of age on climate change risk response perception to reduce systematic errors induced by the model.
The reasons for the difference in climate change risk response perception path in northern and southern Shaanxi have been well explained in Subsection 3.4.
The facts that vertical difference in topography in southern Shaanxi is more significant than in northern Shaanxi, and that they are located in the southern and northern parts of the Qinling Mountains respectively, further confirm that climate change risk response perception in northern Shaanxi is simpler than southern.
The contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in the flowing aspects.
First, this paper combines the environment and public experience to explore factors influencing the risk perception of climate change.
In addition, the public’s perception and experience of risk is divided into two measuring dimensions, which is more innovative than the previous psychology measurement paradigm.
Second, this paper, by comparing the two regions of northern Shaanxi and southern Shaanxi, provides a more typical case for public climate change risk management.
Finally, most scholars tend to study on people’s climate change risk response behavior, whereas this paper directly investigates the path and factors of climate change risk response perception [49], with a better design of the research plan.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that this research has a small problem in the selection of indicators for the perception of climate change risk response.
That is, the indicator of the living environment needs further improvement although it can replace the objective environment where people live.
For example, temperature and precipitation can be used to replace the indicator of the living environment.
There are less paths in northern Shaanxi than in southern Shaanxi.
Previous studies have shown that in the Hanzhong City in southern Shaanxi, age, occupation, education level, income level and public perceptions of climate change knowledge, facts, and reasons perception, perception of consequences, willingness to respond, and response behavior have varying degrees of influence [50].
Therefore, the paths that affect the perception of climate change risk in southern Shaanxi are diverse.
Some scholars analyzed the adaptation behaviors and influencing factors of peasants in the hilly loess regions of northern Shaanxi and concluded that peasants’ adaptation behaviors are affected by the perception of climate change (Figure 7).
In addition [51], family socioeconomic attributes have a significant impact on the probability of peasants’ adaptation behaviors, while other attributes such as age and education level are independent of the probability of farmers adopting adaptive behaviors [52] (Figure 8).
Figure 8 | The explanatory power of demographic factors in Shaanxi.
Figure 7 | Detection of impact factors in Shaanxi.
34 S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 5.
CONCLUSION Based on the research purpose proposed in the introduction part and the results of the discussion part, the following conclusions can be drawn.
Firstly, there are three causal paths in northern Shaanxi, that is, the public’s awareness of climate change issues, awareness of ecological stability, and awareness of climate change causes, to affect response status.
There are nine causal paths in southern Shaanxi.
Secondly, there are four related routes in northern Shaanxi and 19 in southern Shaanxi.
In short, compared with southern Shaanxi, there are fewer perception paths and simpler models for climate change risk response in northern Shaanxi.
Thirdly, the degree of concern to climate change issues and the perception of climate change causes affect the establishment of the causal path of climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi.
Fourthly, the related paths of climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi can be summarized into the following two: the better the living environment, the stronger the risk perception of places; the higher the degree of concern for climate change issues, the better the perception of the causes of climate change.
Finally, according to the above conclusions, we put forward the following suggestions for northern and southern Shaanxi to deal with the risks of climate change.
Northern Shaanxi and southern Shaanxi should be different in managing climate change risk.
Northern Shaanxi should strengthen advocacy on the causes of climate change, and southern Shaanxi should strengthen publicity on the effects of climate change risk response and increase adjustment of industrial structure, and at the same time, actively carry out energy conservation and emission reduction activities to promote climate change risk response.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China “Regional Climate Change Risk Perception and Response” (41771215).
The authors appreciate the time and effort of the editors and reviewers in providing constructive comments which have helped to improve the manuscript.
REFERENCES [1] Shen YP, Wang GY.
Key findings and assessment results of IPCC WGI fifth assessment report.
J Glaciol Geocryol 2013;35:1068–76.
[2] Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Marquis M, Averyt KB, Tignor M, et al.
Climate change 2007: the physical science basis.
Working group I contribution to the fourth assessment report of the IPCC.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2007, pp.
3–53.
[3] Grüneis H, Penker M, Höferl KM.
The full spectrum of climate change adaptation: testing an analytical framework in Tyrolean mountain agriculture (Austria).
Springerplus 2016;5:1848.
[4] Fu S, Zou J, Zhang X, Qi Y.
Review on the latest conclusions of working group III contribution to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Chin J Urban Environ Stud 2015;3:1550005.
[5] Mackay A.
Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
J Environ Qual 2008;37:2407.
[6] Somorin OA, Visseren-Hamakers IJ, Arts B, Tiani AM, Sonwa DJ.
Integration through interaction?
Synergy between adaptation and mitigation (REDD+) in Cameroon.
Environ Plan C: Politics Space 2016;34:415–32.
[7] Salvia M, Reckien D, Pietrapertosa F, Eckersley P, Spyridaki NA, Krook-Riekkola A, et al.
Will climate mitigation ambitions lead to carbon neutrality?
An analysis of the local-level plans of 327 cities in the EU.
Renew Sustain Energy Rev 2021; 135:110253.
[8] Feng Q, Yang L, Deo RC, AghaKouchak A, Adamowski JF, Stone R, et al.
Domino effect of climate change over two millennia in ancient China’s Hexi Corridor.
Nat Sustain 2019;2:957–61.
[9] Walmsley DJ, Lewis GJ, et al.
Introduction to behavioral geography [Xingzhong W, Guoqiang Z, Guicai L, Trans].
Xi’an: Shaanxi People’s Publishing House; 1988.
[10] Nkya K, Mbowe A, Makoi JHJR.
Low cost irrigation technology, in the context of sustainable land management and adaptation to climate change in the Kilimanjaro region.
J Environ Earth Sci 2015;5:45–56.
[11] Onofri L, Nunes PALD.
Economic valuation for policy support in the context of ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change: an indicator, integrated based approach.
Heliyon 2020;6:e04650.
[12] Mahmoodi Momtaz A, Choobchian S, Farhadian H. Factors affecting farmers’ perception and adaptation behavior in response to climate change in Hamedan province, Iran.
J Agric Sci Technol 2020;22:905–17.
[13] Xue W, Marks ADG, Hine DW, Phillips WJ, Zhao S. The new ecological paradigm and responses to climate change in China.
J Risk Res 2018;21:323–39.
[14] Eriksson L. The importance of threat, strategy, and resource appraisals for long-term proactive risk management among forest owners in Sweden.
J Risk Res 2016;20:868–86.
[15] Brown P, Daigneault AJ, Tjernström E, Zou W. Natural disasters, social protection, and risk perceptions.
World Dev 2018;104:310–25.
[16] Marlon JR, van der Linden S, Howe PD, Leiserowitz A, Lucia Woo SH, Broad K. Detecting local environmental change: the role of experience in shaping risk judgments about global warming.
J Risk Res 2019;22:936–50.
[17] Retchless DP.
Understanding local sea level rise risk perceptions and the power of maps to change them: the effects of distance and doubt.
Environ Behav 2018;50:483–511.
[18] Yang L, Xie GD, Zhen L, Leng YF, Guo GM.
Spatio-temporal changes of land use in jinghe watershed.
Resour Sci 2005;27: 26–32 (in Chinese).
[19] Zhao J, Li C, Yang T, Tang Y, Yin Y, Luan X, et al.
Estimation of high spatiotemporal resolution actual evapotranspiration by combining the SWH model with the METRIC model.
J Hydrol 2020;586:124883.
[20] Changyan W, Yaochuang Y.
Research on the temporal and spatial changes of climate change perception by people in southern Shaanxi.
Chin Agric Sci Bull 2015;31:244–51.
[21] Orczyk M, Firlik B.
The assessment of vibroacoustic comfort in trams on the basis of experimental studies and surveys.
In: Suchanek M, editor.
New research trends in transport sustainability and innovation.
Springer: Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics; 2018, pp.
46–55.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3542-1 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3542-1 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3542-1 https://doi.org/10.1142/S2345748115500050 https://doi.org/10.1142/S2345748115500050 https://doi.org/10.1142/S2345748115500050 https://doi.org/10.1142/S2345748115500050 https://doi.org/10.2134/jeq2008.0015br https://doi.org/10.2134/jeq2008.0015br https://doi.org/10.2134/jeq2008.0015br https://doi.org/10.2134/jeq2008.0015br https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X16645341 https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X16645341 https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X16645341 https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X16645341 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110253 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110253 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110253 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110253 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110253 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0397-9 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0397-9 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0397-9 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e04650 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e04650 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e04650 http://jast.modares.ac.ir/article-23-30786-en.html http://jast.modares.ac.ir/article-23-30786-en.html http://jast.modares.ac.ir/article-23-30786-en.html http://jast.modares.ac.ir/article-23-30786-en.html https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1200655 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1200655 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1200655 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2015.1121905 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2015.1121905 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2015.1121905 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.12.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.12.002 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1430051 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1430051 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1430051 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1430051 https://doi.org/10.1177/0013916517709043 https://doi.org/10.1177/0013916517709043 https://doi.org/10.1177/0013916517709043 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2020.124883 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2020.124883 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2020.124883 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2020.124883 S. Xue and Z. Qi / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 26–35 35 [22] Temelová J, Novák J, Jíchová J.
Safe life in the suburbs?
Crime and perceptions of safety in new residential developments in Prague’s hinterland, Czech Republic.
Eur Urban Region Stud 2016;23:677–96.
[23] Ke X, Zhang L, Li Z, Tang W. Inequality in health service utilization among migrant and local children: a cross-sectional survey of children aged 0–14 years in Shenzhen, China.
BMC Pub Health 2020;20:1668.
[24] Damert M, Feng Y, Zhu Q, Baumgartner RJ.
Motivating lowcarbon initiatives among suppliers: the role of risk and opportunity perception.
Resour Conserv Recycl 2018;136:276–86.
[25] Feng S, Yin J.
The study on villa price volatility of Shanghai with structural equation.
2012 International Conference on Management Science & Engineering 19th Annual Conference Proceedings.
Dallas, TX, USA: IEEE; 2012, pp.
1819–25.
[26] Azócar G, Billi M, Calvo R, Huneeus N, Lagos M, Sapiains R, et al.
Climate change perception, vulnerability, and readiness: inter-country variability and emerging patterns in Latin America.
J Environ Stud Sci 2021;11:23–36.
[27] Joyce RE, Hunt CL.
Philippine nurses and the brain drain.
Soc Sci Med 1982;16:1223–33.
[28] Kim S, Lee JE, Kim D. Searching for the next new energy in energy transition: comparing the impacts of economic incentives on local acceptance of fossil fuels, renewable, and nuclear energies.
Sustainability 2019;11:2037.
[29] Minglong WU.
Structural equation model-AMOS operation and application.
Chongqing: Chongqing University Press; 2009.
[30] Li W, Wei XP, Zhu RX, Guo KQ.
Study on factors affecting the agricultural mechanization level in china based on structural equation modeling.
Sustainability 2019;11:1–16.
[31] Sun H, Fan Z, Zhou Y, Shi Y. Empirical research on competitiveness factors: analysis of real estate industry of Beijing and Tianjin.
Eng Constr Architect Manage 2010;17:240–51.
[32] Kwon SA, Kim S, Lee JE.
Analyzing the determinants of individual action on climate change by specifying the roles of six values in South Korea.
Sustainability 2019;11:1834.
[33] Zahran S, Brody SD, Grover H, Vedlitz A.
Climate change vulnerability and policy support.
Soc Nat Resour 2006;19:771–89.
[34] Lata S, Nunn P. Misperceptions of climate-change risk as barriers to climate-change adaptation: a case study from the Rewa Delta, Fiji.
Climatic Change 2012;110:169–86.
[35] You M, Ju Y. Interaction of individual framing and political orientation in guiding climate change risk perception.
J Risk Res 2019;22:865–77.
[36] Cutler MJ, Marlon JR, Howe PD, Leiserowitz A.
The influence of political ideology and socioeconomic vulnerability on perceived health risks of heat waves in the context of climate change.
Weather Climate Soc 2018;10:731–46.
[37] Li L, Xueyan Z, Yaru W, Qin Z, Bing X.
Research on farmers’ perception of climate change in ecologically fragile Alpine region based on structural equation model-a case study of Gannan plateau.
Acta Ecol Sin 2017;37:3274–85.
[38] Chengchao W, Yusheng Y, Wen Z, Jing H, Jianbin X.
Research on the perception and adaptation of domestic and foreign farmers to climate change/variation.
Geogr Sci 2017;37:938–43.
[39] Yudong Z, Qi Z, Rong H, Kepeng G. Research on the relationship between public perception and response to climate change based on structural equation—a case study of Hanzhong City, Shaanxi Province.
Henan Sci 2019;37:429–38.
[40] Liu Y.
Chapter 6 logistics development in Shaanxi Province.
Springer Science and Business Media LLC; 2014.
[41] Bradley GL, Babutsidze Z, Chai A, Reser JP.
The role of climate change risk perception, response efficacy, and psychological adaptation in pro-environmental behavior: a two nation study.
J Environ Psychol 2020;68:101410.
[42] Smith RA.
Risk perception and adaptive responses to climate change and climatic variability in northeastern St. Vincent.
J Environ Stud Sci 2018;8:73–85.
[43] Wang J, Kim S. Analysis of the impact of values and perception on climate change skepticism and its implication for public policy.
Climate 2018;6:99.
[44] Lawrence J, Quade D, Becker J.
Integrating the effects of flood experience on risk perception with responses to changing climate risk.
Nat Hazards 2014;74:1773–94.
[45] Zhen S, Xingmin S. Farmers’ adaptation behaviors to climate change and path analysis of influencing factors in rain-fed agricultural areas.
Adv Geogr Sci 2020;39:461–73.
[46] Yudong Z, Qi Z, Rong H, Kepeng G. Research on the relationship between public perception and response to climate change based on structural equations: taking Hanzhong City, Shaanxi Province as an example.
Henan Sci 2019;37:429–38.
[47] Becerra MJ, Pimentel MA, De Souza EB, Tovar GI.
Geospatiality of climate change perceptions on coastal regions: a systematic bibliometric analysis.
Geogr Sustain 2020;1:209–19.
[48] Theory and practice of climate adaptation.
Springer Science and Business Media LLC; 2018.
[49] Elshirbiny H, Abrahamse W. Public risk perception of climate change in Egypt: a mixed methods study of predictors and implications.
J Environ Stud Sci 2020;10:242–54.
[50] Echavarren JM, Balžekienė A, Telešienė A. Multilevel analysis of climate change risk perception in Europe: natural hazards, political contexts and mediating individual effects.
Saf Sci 2019; 120:813–23.
[51] Terorotua H, Duvat VKE, Maspataud A, Ouriqua J. Assessing perception of climate change by representatives of public authorities and designing coastal climate services: lessons learnt from French Polynesia.
Front Mar Sci 2020;7:160.
[52] Lu W, Xingmin S, Lifan S. The adaptation behavior and influencing factors of farm households in the loess hilly and gully area of northern Shaanxi.
Progr Climate Change Res 2017;13:61–8.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776414534254 https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776414534254 https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776414534254 https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776414534254 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-09781-4 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-09781-4 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-09781-4 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-09781-4 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.05.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.05.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.05.002 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMSE.2012.6414419 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMSE.2012.6414419 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMSE.2012.6414419 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMSE.2012.6414419 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00639-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00639-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00639-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00639-0 https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(82)90147-2 https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(82)90147-2 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11072037 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11072037 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11072037 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11072037 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11010051 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11010051 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11010051 https://doi.org/10.1108/09699981011038042 https://doi.org/10.1108/09699981011038042 https://doi.org/10.1108/09699981011038042 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11071834 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11071834 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11071834 https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920600835528 https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920600835528 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0062-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0062-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0062-4 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2017.1422785 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2017.1422785 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2017.1422785 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-17-0105.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-17-0105.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-17-0105.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-17-0105.1 https://doi.org/10.5846/stxb201603090415 https://doi.org/10.5846/stxb201603090415 https://doi.org/10.5846/stxb201603090415 https://doi.org/10.5846/stxb201603090415 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101410 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101410 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101410 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101410 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-017-0456-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-017-0456-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-017-0456-3 https://doi.org/10.3390/cli6040099 https://doi.org/10.3390/cli6040099 https://doi.org/10.3390/cli6040099 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-014-1288-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-014-1288-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-014-1288-z https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geosus.2020.09.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geosus.2020.09.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geosus.2020.09.002 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00617-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00617-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-020-00617-6 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.08.024 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.08.024 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.08.024 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.08.024 https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.00160 https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.00160 https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.00160 https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.00160 https://doi.org/10.12006/j.issn.1673-1719.2016.075 https://doi.org/10.12006/j.issn.1673-1719.2016.075 https://doi.org/10.12006/j.issn.1673-1719.2016.075
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 98 Climate change and its effects on agricultural production in Finland – research efforts during the past 50 years Kaija Hakala Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke), Planta, Tietotie 4, FI-31600 Jokioinen, Finland e-mail: kaija.hakala@luke.fi Climate change has concerned the scientific community since the 1970´s, stimulating research into its impacts, adaptation and mitigation.
In 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established to coordinate the research.
The first scientific publications on the effects of climate change on agriculture and forestry in Finland appeared in the early 1980´s.
After the launch of the Finnish Research Program on Climate Change (SILMU) in 1990, the number of climate-related projects and publications, and the input of Finnish researchers in the work of the IPCC started to increase.
During the subsequent programs, the initial optimism about future crop production conditions changed into an awareness of the threats represented by climate change.
Diversity of production and breeding of heat and flooding tolerant, disease resistant and nutrient-use efficient crop varieties were identified as being crucial for adaptation of agriculture.
Efficient water management, measures to limit nutrient leaching and timely control of pests and pathogens are also crucial adaptation measures.
Carbon storage in soils and biomass and reduced use of organic fields are suggested to be mitigation measures.
By 2019, the awareness of the threats of climate change prompted citizens worldwide to demand action, and government programs have begun to include policies addressing reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Key words: carbon dioxide, emissions, greenhouse gases, GHG, IPCC, agriculture Introduction Atmospheric gases, including water vapor and CO 2 , allow most solar radiation to penetrate the earth’s surface and warm it.
On the other hand, such so-termed greenhouse gases (GHG) prevent a major part of the thermal long wave radiation emitted by the earth from escaping into the space, thus maintaining suitable temperatures for life in our planet.
This property of the atmosphere, the greenhouse effect, was introduced to science by the French mathematician Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier almost 200 years ago (Bolin 2007).
Later Arrhenius (1896) pointed out that CO 2 plays a crucial role in the greenhouse effect.
The anthropogenic emissions of CO 2 and other GHGs, and their effects on the global climate, became a serious topic of discussion in the 1930s.
Callendar (1938) stated that during the 50 years between the 1890s and 1930s there had been 150000 million tons of CO 2 emitted into the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels, and that three quarters of this remained in the atmosphere.
He estimated that these emissions increased global temperatures by 0.005 °C annually during the 50 years, with the largest increases taking place in the northern high-latitude areas.
Accordingly, he estimated that an atmospheric CO 2 concentration of 400 ppm would result in about 0.7 °C higher temperatures than those in the 1930s, when the CO 2 concentration was about 300 ppm (Fig.
1).
What he could not see was the rate of increase in the CO 2 concentrations: he estimated the concentrations to be about 330 ppm in the 21st century and 360 in the 22nd century.
In 2019 the CO 2 concentration measured in Mauna Loa Observatory was about 410 ppm (https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/).
The concern of the effects of the increasing atmospheric CO 2 concentration increased gradually in the 1950´s.
Initiatives for measuring the GHG concentrations and the anthropogenic impact of their increase, as well as research into the effects of GHGs on the climate, have been taken from the beginning of the 1950’s.
In 1954, a series of weather stations for monitoring the atmospheric CO 2 concentrations was established in Scandinavia.
The average concentration of CO 2 measured at the stations was 329 ppm in 1955, ranging between 319 and 347 ppm (Fonselius et al.
1956).
Although the CO 2 concentrations were still low in 1955, their increase was already regarded as a possible problem.
Callendar (1958) proposed a direct relationship between the use of fossil fuels and increase in CO 2 concentrations.
From a basic average level of 290 ppm in 1900, he reported a 30–40 ppm increase in CO 2 concentrations by 1955.
Knowledge of the effects of GHG on climate has increased ever since, but has resulted in concrete mitigation measures only in the 21st century.
Manuscript received June 2019 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 99 This review presents a short history of the research in climate change and launch of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), with special emphasis on the research into the effects of climate change on agricultural production in Finland.
The description of the history and current status of the IPCC is based on the IPCC website information (www.ipcc.ch) and on the reviews by Bolin (2007) and Porter et al.
(2019).
The information on climate change-related research programs in Finland is based on the climate change information website chapter “Adaptation Research supports climate change adaptation” of the Finnish Meteorological Institute (https://ilmastoopas.fi/en/) and the websites and reports of the individual programs.
Beginning of climate change science and foundation of the IPCC Interest in anthropogenic GHG emissions and their role in climate change had been increasing since the 1950’s, with research projects launched and articles published worldwide.
At the request of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in the early 1970’s, a synthesis report on the knowledge gathered about climate change was compiled and the text approved in 1976 by the WMO executive committee (WMO 1976).
At the same time, an effort was initiated to coordinate climate change studies internationally.
Dr. William W. Kellogg was asked to prepare a report on “the influence of human activities on climate” (Kellogg 1977).
He pointed out that while it is difficult to predict natural changes in climate, it is possible to create scenarios for the course of changes due to anthropogenic influence.
This time not only CO 2 , but also other GHGs, including nitrous oxides, were taken into account.
The best estimate at that time was that the anthropogenic influence on the global temperature would be 1 °C by 2000 and, if emissions of the GHGs were not restricted, about 3 °C by 2050, with a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 from the level in 1977.
The report warned about the effects of climate change, especially extreme events, on human beings, societies, the economy, and food production, especially regarding increasing world population (Kellogg 1977).
The Kellogg (1977) report called for international co-operation of scientists in research, to share data and information about past climatic changes, their effects on different fields of society, predictions about future effects and recommendations for actions to prevent serious consequences of climate change.
In 1988 the coordination of these activities was allocated to IPCC, founded by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the WMO.
The goal was to “provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts” (https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/ipcc-30th-anniversary/).
The work was arranged in three working groups (WGs), the tasks of which were 1) to assess the science (the physical basis) of climate change (WG1), 2) to assess the environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change (WG2) and 3) to formulate response strategies (mitigation) to climate change (WG3) (Bolin 2007).
The First IPCC Assessment Report (AR1) was prepared by WG1 (IPCC 1990a).
In the same year reports from the other two WGs were also published (IPCC 1990b, 1990c).
The total number of pages of the three AR1 reports was 995, shared quite evenly among the WGs.
Fig.
1.
The effect of atmospheric CO 2 concentrations on global temperatures (Callendar 1938).
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 100 The IPCC’s work has continued with increasingly elaborate and bulky ARs prepared at about 5–7 year intervals: AR2 in 1996, AR3 in 2001, AR4 in 2007 and AR5 in 2013–2014 (https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/).
The total number of pages in the latest report, AR5, was 4102, with 1535 pages in the WG1 report (IPCC 2013), 1132 in the WG2 report (IPCC 2014a) and 1435 in the WG3 report (IPCC 2014b).
The sixth assessment report, AR6, is to be published in 2021–2022 (https://www.ipcc.ch/news/).
The work for AR6 started soon after the publication of the AR5, with the call for nominations of contributors arranged between September and October 2017.
The preparation of AR6 thus began 4–5 years before its planned publication.
In addition to the ARs, IPCC produces several other reports and publications.
The latest special report, “Global warming of 1.5 °C” (IPCC 2018), received considerable attention and even prompted mitigation actions internationally.
The scientific interest in climate change, its effects and mitigation challenges, has been growing, especially since the establishment of IPCC.
The number of scientific publications concerning the issue has grown from year to year, to a level impossible to cover by any individual specialist.
Here the IPCC work is especially valuable, as its goal is to gather and interpret periodically all published scientific information about climate change.
The interest in climate change and the resulting research funding and increased availability of reports on the effects of climate change now allow a detailed and flexible basis for estimating the effects of climate change in most areas of society.
The increasingly high number of studies and publications has enabled development of complex models that can take into account relationships among different variables (e.g., grid-based regional assessments, yield variability, nutrient status of yields, etc.
; Porter et al.
2019).
However, reports on the effects of climate change are limited to a restricted number of crop species.
In addition, few reports are published on animal husbandry and several limiting factors for crop production, such as weeds, pests and pathogens.
This reduces the modeling strength of climate change impacts on food production (Porter et al.
2019).
The fact that large areas affected by climate change, yet crucial for food production, are largely unaccounted for, still 30 years since the foundation of IPCC, points to the difficulty of the IPCC to have an impact on research in climate change in acting as a global coordinating, but not financing organization.
While reporting quite efficiently the published research (in English), IPCC lacks the means to guide governments in concerted actions to investigate all aspects of climate change.
The input of expert and government reviews of the ARs is crucial in forming a balanced overview of the status of climate change, its impacts and mitigation options.
It is highly recommendable that the lead authors of the ARs take into account the input of the reviewers, also when the reviewers disagree with the authors.
The reviewers may have access to sources of information on currently inadequately reported issues, such as animal husbandry or crop growth limitations.
Climate change-induced crop production research in Finland Studies on the impacts of climate change on agriculture and forestry started to appear in Finnish scientific literature in the early 1980’s.
One of the first researchers to evaluate the impacts was Pekka Kauppi from the University of Helsinki (Kauppi 1982, Kauppi and Posch 1985, Kauppi 1989).
In late 1970’s and 1980’s, professor Jaakko Mukula and researcher Olli Rantanen of MTTK (Agricultural Research Centre, then Agrifood Research Finland, MTT, since 2015 Natural Resources Institute Finland, Luke) published a series of articles about the connections between crop production and climate in Finland, with some references to impacts of climate change (Mukula et al.
1978, Mukula and Rantanen 1987, 1989a-e).
In 1988, a book about the effects of climate change on global agriculture and forestry was published by Parry et al.
(1988).
Chapter IV (The Effects of Climatic Variations on Agriculture in Finland) summarized knowledge about the possible effects of climate change (climate warming and increased CO 2 concentrations) on agricultural production and effects on its profitability in Finland.
The authors of the chapter were Lauri Kettunen, Jaakko Mukula, Veli Pohjonen, Olli Rantanen and Uuno Varjo.
The authors, together with one of the editors of the book, Tim Carter, laid the foundation for later studies about the effects of climate and climate change on agricultural production in Finland.
Professor Timo Mela from MTT took the lead in this research in the early 1990’s as a part of the large SILMU program of the Academy of Finland.
The first climate change program in Finland, SILMU The Finnish Research Program on Climate Change, SILMU (1990–1995) (https://www.aka.fi/globalassets/awanhat/documents/tiedostot/asiakirjat/silmu.pdf) was the first serious and well-financed program concentrating on climate change in Finland.
The goals of SILMU were to increase knowledge about climate change in general, strengthen research, promote international contacts of Finnish researchers in the field and disseminate information about climate change in Finland.
The total funding was 87 million marks (about 14.5 million euros).
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 101 The funding was divided into five thematic groups: Atmosphere, Waters, Terrestrial ecosystems (forestry, agriculture), Human dimensions and Integration.
The key research areas were 1) quantification of the greenhouse effect and climate change, 2) assessing the effects of climate change on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and 3) developing strategies for mitigation of climate change.
About two hundred scientists from seven Finnish universities and eleven research institutions took part in the program.
The effects of climate change on agriculture were studied in MTT and the University of Helsinki.
Scientific experiments with agricultural and horticultural crops were performed in laboratories, growth chambers and open top chambers (OTC).
The OTCs were installed in Jokioinen (southern Finland) and Rovaniemi (Lapland).
The crops were sown directly in the field soil.
The experimental fields were covered with plastic structures to allow simulations for ambient conditions, ambient temperatures with increased CO 2 and elevated temperatures with or without increased CO 2 (Hakala et al.
1996) (Fig.
2).
The results of the work were disseminated in popular newspaper articles, seminars and scientific articles.
Experiments were also used for validating models aimed at predicting the effects of climate change on crop production in the future (Carter et al.
1996, Kaukoranta 1996, Kleemola and Karvonen 1996, Laurila 1995, 2001).
At the beginning of the SILMU program, the expectations for the future regarding climate change were still quite optimistic.
Yields of all crops were expected to increase as a result of higher temperature sums, longer growing seasons and increased CO 2 concentrations.
The SILMU experiments confirmed some of the expectations, but cast doubt on the overly positive expectation of significant increases in yields of cereal crops (Kimball 1983, Hakala and Mela 1996, Hakala 1998).
According to the climate and growth models, the introduction of new crops Fig.
2. a) OTCs in an automatic climate simulation system in MTT Jokioinen in 1993, b) OTCs were placed over fields with canopies of wheat and meadow fescue.
Photos: Jari Poikulainen a) b) AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 102 such as maize (Zea mays L.) and more productive varieties of the current crops would gradually be possible in Finland,resulting in better yields and higher farmer income.
However, risks and income losses caused by variations in climate and increased pressure by pests and pathogens were noted as possible threats already then (Carter et al.
1996, Kaukoranta 1996, Kettunen 1996).
At present, threats by climate change are increasingly emphasized in the published literature (e.g., Hakala et al.
2011, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2016).
FIGARE and FINADAPT, programs for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change Knowing the reasons for and the effects of climate change, the need arose to find ways to adapt to the inevitable changes and mitigate the climate change as much as possible.
The first research program in Finland charged with these goals was FIGARE (Academy of Finland, 1999–2002), with 36 research projects arranged in 18 consortia (Kuusisto and Käyhkö 2004).
FIGARE tackled a wide variety of climate change related subjects, including carbon cycling in boreal lakes, global policies and energy markets, carbon storage in forest soils, land use change in Central America, effects of solar UV-B radiation, and the effects of global change on tropical, subarctic and arctic ecosystems (Kuusisto and Käyhkö 2004).
The consortium working with agricultural questions was AGROGAS (Agricultural soils as sinks and sources for greenhouse gases in Finland).
The five projects of AGROGAS were set to evaluate the GHG emissions from different agricultural soils under various crops and find ways to lower them, thus mitigating climate change.
It was found that the emissions of N 2 O, an important GHG, were significantly higher from peat soils than from mineral soils, and that high soil humidity increased the emissions (Regina et al.
2004).
The emissions were higher in southern than in northern Finland because there were no wintertime thaw periods in the north.
In the south, the emissions were highest during winter and spring thaw periods, especially at temperatures around zero.
Emissions of CO 2 were also higher on peat soils than on mineral soils (Lohila et al.
2003).
The data provided by AGROGAS could be used to fine-tune the IPCC calculations of GHG emissions from the soil.
A major finding was the role of organic soils as major GHG emitters.
This finding could be used by the decisionmakers when developing guidelines and subsidy policies concerning land use in Finland.
Half of the seven million euro funding of FIGARE was covered by the Academy of Finland, and the rest by different smaller financers, including five ministries and the innovation financing institute TEKES (now Business Finland, https://www.businessfinland.fi/en).
The universities and institutes discharged their responsibility as providers of research platforms and qualified personnel for the research.
Nevertheless, the program received just about half of the financing of the first climate change program SILMU.
Although FIGARE was in many ways successful, cuts in funding were partly responsible for it not fulfilling all the tasks well enough.
The most serious problems were lack of interand intra -project collaboration and inefficient dissemination of results (Figare 2003).
The research continued in the FINADAPT program (2004–2005), financed by the Ministries of the Environment, Agriculture and Forestry, Transport and Communications, as well as TEKES and several universities and research institutions (Carter and Kankaanpää 2007).
The program concentrated on finding ways to adapt different fields of society to climate change.
In co-operation with 11 research institutions, FINADAPT published a series of 15 working papers on agriculture, forestry, water resources, biodiversity of natural environment, traffic, human health, built environment, energy infrastructure, tourism and urban planning (Annex).
Researchers of MTT and the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) prepared the working paper on adaptation to climate change in agriculture (Hildén et al.
2005).
The paper points out that the effects of climate change on agricultural production in Finland have to be considered in connection with changes in domestic and global economy.
The increase in yields attributable to climate change may lead to little net advantage for the Finnish agriculture, unless the market for Finnish products grows.
Major changes in, for example, Asian food consumption could increase demand and product prices to a level where their export becomes profitable.
To cope with climate change in the future, special attention and support should be given to adaptation measures that are not spontaneous: water and nutrient management, investment in infrastructure and technology, focused long-term breeding, monitoring systems of pests and pathogens, cropping system diversity and agricultural policies (Hildén et al.
2005).
The largest benefit brought about by FINADAPT was the bringing together researchers involved in climate change research.
On the basis of the work and researchers in SILMU, FIGARE and FINADAPT, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Finland published the first in EU National Adaptation Strategy to climate change (MMM 2005, Biesbroek et al.
2010).
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 103 ISTO program to implement climate change strategy To implement the National Adaptation Strategy, a new large five year research program ISTO (National Climate Change Adaptation Program) was launched in 2006.
ISTO was mainly financed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Environment, Foreign Office and Ministry of Transport and Communications.
With its 30 research projects, ISTO tackled the most challenging effects of climate change, such as extreme events, and offered concrete measures to adapt to them in agriculture, forestry, fishery and the built environment.
Also biodiversity and social effects were treated within the projects (http://www.finessi.info/ISTO/?lang=en&page=overview).
The scientific activity around the ISTO program promoted publishing of an array of scientific reports, domestic adaptation plans and guidelines for adaptation and mitigation measures.
The majority of the scientific articles concerning climate change effects on agriculture in Finland were published by the research projects ILMASOPU (Adaptation of Finnish agro-food sector to climate change) led by Pirjo Peltonen-Sainio, ADACAPA (Enhancement of adaptive capacity of Finnish agricultural and food sector) led by Helena Kahiluoto and TUPOLEV (Alien pest species in agriculture and horticulture in Finland) led by Terho Hyvönen.
An attempt to integrate the findings of ISTO into straightforward instructions for different stakeholders was taken in the final report of the program (Ruuhela 2012).
Agriculture was addressed in the report by Hakala et al.
(2012a).
The results of different agriculture-related projects in ISTO pointed to the need to prepare Finnish agriculture for new opportunities for production (ILMASOPU: Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b, 2016), but also for new pests, pathogens and weeds (TUPOLEV: Latvala-Kilby et al.
2009, Lehtinen et al.
2009, Hakala et al.
2011, Hannukkala 2011, Heikkilä 2011, Hyvönen 2011, Hyvönen and Jalli 2011, Hyvönen et al.
2011, Jalli et al.
2011, Lemmetty et al.
2011, Lilja et al.
2011, Vänninen et al.
2011, Hyvönen et al.
2012, Hyvönen and Ramula 2014).
A need for a new level of resilience of farms, crops and cropping systems to meet the increasing frequency of extreme events, such as long periods of hot weather or heavy rains, was identified (ADACAPA: Hakala et al.
2012b, Kahiluoto et al.
2014, Trnka et al.
2014).
Breeding of disease resistant and flooding and heat tolerant varieties of crops, monitoring and predicting invasions of pests and pathogens and developing farm buildings and technology for the future conditions were identified as measures to adapt to climate change (Hakala et al.
2012a).
With higher temperatures, animal welfare could be threatened, and also new animal diseases could enter Finland.
The changes require measures to improve the hygiene of both production and storage of the products (Hakala et al.
2012a).
While climate change would in general improve the crop production conditions, diversity of production was identified as a crucial measure to maintain high production potential and increase resilience of the systems (Hakala et al.
2012b, Himanen et al.
2013a, 2013b, Kahiluoto et al.
2014).
Life after ISTO After and during ISTO, the VACCIA project of the EU Life program (2009–2011) was set to estimate the vulnerability of ecosystem services and livelihoods in changing climate (https://www.syke.fi/projects/vaccia).
Contributors were SYKE, the Finnish Meteorological Institute and the universities of Helsinki, Jyväskylä and Oulu.
Agriculture was addressed in co-operation with MTT.
VACCIA focused not only in the growth of future crop production potential, but also on its possible drawbacks caused by the extreme events and failure of overwintering of the winter crops in the milder and more variable winter conditions.
The environmental risks represented by future conditions, especially increasing risk of nutrient leaching, were treated extensively within the project.
Higher crop and management diversity and better planning of crop rotations and land use were suggested as the main adaptation measures to cope with climate change (Rankinen et al.
2013).
The next extensive research program FICCA (2011–2014) of the Finnish Academy was launched to support multidisciplinary research on the risks and vulnerability of societies, agriculture and natural environments in the changing climate (https://www.aka.fi/en/research-and-science-policy/academy-programmes/completed-programmes/ ficca/).
The project concerning agriculture, A-LA-CARTE (Assessing limits of adaptation to climate change and opportunities for resilience to be enhanced) was led by Tim Carter (SYKE).
Researchers from SYKE, MTT and the universities of Helsinki, Jyväskylä and Eastern Finland took part in the research.
The goals of the project were to assess the sensitivity and adaptive capacity of the sector, and to assess the likely impacts of climate change and the resilience of the system to the impacts.
The project identified the need to increase the diversity of crops and/ or their cultivars and to breed new, more tolerant cultivars of crops to increase the resilience of the system.
In the worst case, cereal yields would decrease despite the measures taken.
Change of cereal crops, for example, into more suitable grass crops was identified as a measure to cope with extreme climate change.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 104 The work of the Finnish climate change research programs has initiated a flow of high-profile, frequently referenced scientific articles, mostly in co-operation with international researchers (e.g., Olesen et al.
2011, Rötter et al.
2011, Saikkonen et al.
2012, Asseng et al.
2013, Trnka et al.
2014, Kahiluoto et al.
2019).
The active publishing of Finnish researchers in high quality journals and the participation of Finnish researchers in preparing and reviewing the IPCC reports (e.g., Tim Carter as an author in most IPCC ARs and Kaija Hakala as a reviewer in AR3 and AR4 and as a review editor in AR5, WG 2) have contributed to the understanding of climate change as a phenomenon and increased the awareness of its effects and the possibilities of its mitigation and adaptation.
At present, climate change is a vital part of discussions in most topics concerning agriculture, forestry, fisheries, building, transport, as well as society and environment in general.
For example, in the ongoing EU Rural Development Program 2014–2020 (https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rural-development-2014-2020_en), adaptation to and mitigation of climate change are among the main topics.
The support of the program for climate change related advisory activities has generated abundant activity in the form of information transfer projects directed to farmers in Finland (e.g., ilmase.fi).
Concluding remarks Large research programs such as SILMU are becoming increasingly rare in Finland.
On the other hand, the smaller individual projects may cover a larger number of topics and perhaps involve researchers and stakeholders from more diverse fields of the society.
Heated discussions are ongoing in science and among different interest groups about the role of nutrition, bioenergy, organic farming and carbon sequestration in the soils and forests in mitigation of climate change (e.g., Lal 2004, Tuomisto et al.
2012, Hakala et al.
2016, Minasny et al.
2017, Parodi et al.
2018).
Climate change has become a matter of common knowledge.
Even in the Finnish parliament elections in 2019, and the following EU parliament elections the same year, the leaders of different parties from left to right agreed on the severity of climate change and the need to take actions to mitigate it.
A special wake-up call was the alarming report of the IPCC about the need for imminent actions to avoid the serious consequences if the global temperature rise exceeded 1.5 °C (IPCC 2018).
At the same time, GHG emissions have been decreasing in Europe, being 23.6% lower in EU and 21.4% lower in Finland in 2017 compared with the baseline emissions in 1990 (https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/approximated-eu-ghg-inventory-proxy) (Fig.
3).
Thus the EU is reaching the goals set in the Kyoto agreement in 1997 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol).
This is good news, but emissions should decrease worldwide to mitigate the effects of the changing climate.
The global GHG emissions, having increased substantially until 2012, have lately leveled off (Janssens-Maenhout et al.
2017).
China was the leading country in the increase of GHG, and it has had a major role also in the leveling off of the emissions since 2012.
This has probably been due to increased energy efficiency and use of nuclear and renewable energy in place of coal in China (Janssens-Maenhout et al.
2017).
Finland should not give up its mitigating efforts yet, as the per capita emissions in Finland are still higher than in China and most EU countries, and at the same level as in Russia.
However, the ambitious goals of the new government in Finland for the election period 2019–2023 may elevate Finland to the first row of GHG emission reducers.
Fig.
3.
Development of Finnish GHG emissions (Statistics Finland 2018) AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 105 What next?
Throughout history, the scientific community has been responsible for many developments leading to improvements in the living conditions of people.
Unexpected, unpleasant and even threatening side effects have often followed.
When confronted with problems, science has shown its capacity to initiate corrective measures.
In the future we can still trust in improvements brought about by science, but the responsibility for accepting and taking into use the new developments rests on the shoulders of every citizen of the world.
With all the abundant knowledge gathered there is no excuse to continue destructive life styles that rob the future from the generations to come.
References Arrhenius, S. 1896.
On the influence of carbonic acid in the air upon the temperature of the ground.
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, Series 5 41: 237–276.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14786449608620846 Asseng, S., Ewert, F., Rosenzweig, C., Jones, J.W., Hatfield, J.L., Ruane, A.C., Boote, K.J., Thorburn, P.J., Rötter, R.P., Cammarano, D., Brisson, N., Basso, B., Martre, P., Aggarwal, P.K., Angulo, C., Bertuzzi, P., Biernath, C., Challinor, A.J., Doltra, J., Gayler, S., Goldberg, R., Grant, R., Heng, L., Hooker, J., Hunt, L.A., Ingwersen, J., Izaurralde, R.C., Kersebaum, K.C., Müller, C., Naresh Kumar, S., Nendel, C., O’Leary, G., Olesen, J.E., Osborne, T.M., Palosuo, T., Priesack, E., Ripoche, D., Semenov, M.A., Shcherbak, I., Steduto, P., Stöckle, C., Stratonovitch, P., Streck, T., Supit, I., Tao, F., Travasso, M., Waha, K., Wallach, D., White, J.W., Williams, J.R. & Wolf, J.
2013.
Uncertainty in simulating wheat yields under climate change.
Nature Climate Change 3: 827–832.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1916 Biesbroek, G.R., Swart, R.J., Carter, T.R., Cowan, C., Henrichs, T., Mela, H., Morecroft, M.D.
& Rey, D. 2010.
Europe adapts to climate change: Comparing National Adaptation Strategies.
Global Environmental Change 20: 440–450.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2010.03.005 Bolin, B.
2007.
A history of the science and politics of climate change.
The role of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, UK.
292 p. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511721731 Callendar, G.S.
1938.
The artificial production of carbon dioxide and its influence on temperature.
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 64: 223–237.
https://doi.org/10.1002/qj.49706427503 Callendar, G.S.
1958.
On the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Tellus 10: 243–248.
https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusa.v10i2.9231 Carter, T. & Kankaanpää, S. 2007.
Assessing the adaptive capacity of the Finnish environment and society under a changing climate: FINADAPT.
Summary for policy makers.
Finnish Environment 1/2007.
Cited 31 October 2019. https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/38397 Carter, T.R., Saarikko, R.A. & Niemi, K.J.
1996.
Assessing the risks and uncertainties of regional crop potential under a changing climate in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 329–350.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.72750 Figare 2003.
Finnish Global Change Research Programme (FIGARE).
Evaluation report.
Publications of the Academy of Finland 7/03.
35 p. Cited 6 June 2019. https://www.aka.fi/globalassets/awanhat/documents/tiedostot/ficca/figare-evaluation.pdf.
Fonselius, S., Koroleff, F. & Wärme, K.-E. 1956.
Carbon dioxide variations in the atmosphere.
Tellus 8: 176–183.
https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusa.v8i2.8967 Hakala, K. 1998.
Growth and yield potential of spring wheat in a simulated changed climate with increased CO 2 and higher temperature.
European Journal of Agronomy 9: 41–52.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1161-0301(98)00025-2 Hakala, K., Hannukkala, A.O., Huusela-Veistola, E., Jalli, M. & Peltonen-Sainio, P. 2011.
Pests and diseases in a changing climate: a major challenge for Finnish crop production.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 3–14.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163042 Hakala, K., Heikkinen, J., Sinkko, T. & Pahkala, K. 2016.
Field trial results of straw yield with different harvesting methods, and modelled effects on soil organic carbon.
A case study from Southern Finland.
Biomass and Bioenergy 95: 8–18.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2016.08.021 Hakala, K., Himanen, S., Hyvönen, T., Kahiluoto, H., Laitila, A., Molarius, R., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Pilli-Sihvola, K. & Saikkonen, K. 2012a.
Ilmastonmuutokseen sopeutuminen maaja elintarviketaloudessa.
In: Ruuhela, R.
(ed.)
Miten väistämättömään ilmastonmuutokseen voidaan varautua?
Yhteenveto suomalaisesta sopeutumistutkimuksesta eri toimialoilla.
Publications of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Finland (MMM) 6/2011: 28–37.
Hakala, K., Jauhiainen, L., Himanen, S.J., Rötter, R., Salo, T. & Kahiluoto, H. 2012b.
Sensitivity of barley varieties to weather in Finland.
The Journal of Agricultural Science (Cambridge) 150: 145–160.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021859611000694 Hakala, K., Kaukoranta, T., Mela, T. & Laurila, H. 1996.
Arrangement of experiments for simulating the effects of elevated temperatures and elevated CO 2 levels on field-sown crops in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 25–47.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.72728 Hakala, K. & Mela, T. 1996.
The effects of prolonged exposure to elevated temperatures and elevated CO2 levels on the growth, yield and dry matter partitioning of field-sown meadow fescue (Festuca pratensis, cv.
Kalevi).
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 285–298.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.72747 Hannukkala, A.O.
2011.
Examples of alien pathogens in Finnish potato production their introduction, establishment and consequences.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 42–61.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163024 Heikkilä, J.
2011.
A review of risk prioritisation schemes of pathogens, pests and weeds: principles and practices.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 15–28.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163088 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 106 Hildén, M., Lehtonen, H., Bärlund, I., Hakala, K., Kaukoranta, T. & Tattari, S. 2005.
The practice and process of adaptation in Finnish agriculture.
FINADAPT Working Paper 5, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 335, Helsinki.
28 p. Himanen, S.J., Hakala, K. & Kahiluoto, H. 2013a.
Crop responses to climate and socioeconomic change in northern regions.
Regional Environmental Change 13: 17–32.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-012-0308-3 Himanen, S.J., Ketoja, E., Hakala, K., Rötter, R., Salo, T. & Kahiluoto, H. 2013b.
Cultivar diversity has great potential to increase yield of feed barley.
Agronomy for Sustainable Development 33: 519–530.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13593-012-0120-y Hyvönen, T. 2011.
Impact of temperature and germination time on the success of a C4 weed in a C3 crop: Amaranthus retroflexus and spring barley.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 183–189.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611797215664 Hyvönen, T., Glemnitz, M., Radics, L. & Hoffmann, J.
2011.
Impact of climate and land use type on the distribution of Finnish casual arable weeds in Europe.
Weed Research 51: 201–208.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-3180.2010.00826.x Hyvönen, T. & Jalli, H. 2011.
Alien species in the Finnish weed flora.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 86–95.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163079 Hyvönen, T., Luoto, M. & Uotila, P. 2012.
Assessment of weed establishment risk in a changing European climate.
Agricultural and Food Science 21: 348–360.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.6321 Hyvönen, T. & Ramula, S. 2014.
Crop-weed competition rather than temperature limits the population establishment of two annual C4 weeds at the edge of their northern range.
Weed Research 54: 245–255.
https://doi.org/10.1111/wre.12075 IPCC 1990a.
Climate change.
The IPCC scientific assessment.
Report Prepared for IPCC by Working Group I. Houghton, J.T., Jenkins, G.J.
&Ephraums, J.J.
(eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
367 p. Cited 20 May 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ipcc_far_wg_I_full_report.pdf IPCC 1990b.
Climate Change.
The IPCC impacts assessment.
Report prepared for IPCC by Working Group II.
McG.
Tegart, W.J., Sheldon, G.W.
& Griffiths,D.C.
(eds.).
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, Australia.
296 p. Cited 22 May 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ipcc_far_wg_II_full_report.pdf IPCC 1990c.
Climate change.
The IPCC response strategies.
Formulation of response strategies by Working Group III.
Coordinator F.M.
Bernthal.
Washington, DC: US National Science Foundation.
332 p. Cited 22 May 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ipcc_far_wg_III_full_report.pdf IPCC 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K.
Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex & P.M. Midgley (eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
1535 p. Cited 6 June 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/ IPCC 2014a: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability.
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chang.
Field, C.B., V.R.
Barros, D.J.
Dokken, K.J.
Mach, M.D.
Mastrandrea, T.E.
Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L.
Ebi, Y.O.
Estrada, R.C.
Genova, B. Girma, E.S.
Kissel, A.N.
Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R.
Mastrandrea & L.L.
White (eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
1132 p. Cited 6 June 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/ IPCC 2014b: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K., Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel & J.C. Minx (eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
1435 p. Cited 6 June 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/ IPCC 2018.
Global warming of 1.5°C.
An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O.
Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R.
Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R.
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I.
Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor & T. Waterfield (eds.).
Cited 20 May 2019. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ Jalli, M., Laitinen, P. & Latvala, S. 2011.
The emergence of cereal fungal diseases and the incidence of leaf spot diseases in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 62–73.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163015 Janssens-Maenhout, G., Crippa, M., Guizzardi, D., Muntean, M., Schaaf, E., Olivier, J.G.J., Peters, J.A.H.W.
& Schure, K.M.
2017.
Fossil CO 2 and GHG emissions of all world countries.
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2017, ISBN 978-9279-73207-2, doi:10.2760/709792, JRC107877.
Cited 4 June 2019. https://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/booklet2017/CO2_and_GHG_ emissions_of_all_world_countries_booklet_online.pdf Kahiluoto, H., Kaseva, J., Balek, J., Olesen, J.E., Ruiz-Ramos, M., Gobing, A., Kersebaum, K.C., Takáĉ, J., Ruget, F., Ferrise, R., Bezak, P., Capellades, G., Dibari, C., Mäkinen, H., Nendel, C., Ventrella, D., Rodríguez, A., Bindi, M. & Trnka, M. 2019.
Decline in climate resilience of European wheat.
PNAS 116: 123–128.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804387115 Kahiluoto, H., Kaseva, J., Hakala, K., Himanen, S.J., Jauhiainen, L., Rötter, R.P., Salo, T. & Trnka, M. 2014.
Cultivating resilience by empirically revealing response diversity.
Global Environmental Change 25: 186–193.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.02.002 Kaukoranta, T. 1996.
Impact of global warming on potato late blight: risk, yield loss and control.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 311–327.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.72749 Kauppi, P.E.
1982.
Field crops in a CO 2 -enriched atmosphere.
Working paper 82-43 of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria.
32 p. Kauppi, P.E.
1989.
Boreal Forests and the Global Carbon Cycle.
Science 243: 1535–1536.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.243.4898.1535-c Kauppi, P.E.
& Posch, M. 1985.
Sensitivity of boreal forests to possible climatic warming.
Climatic Change 7: 45–54.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139440 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 107 Kellogg, W.W. 1977.
Effects of human activities on global climate.
Technical note N:o 156, WMO N:o 486.
Geneva, Switzerland.
Cited 17 May 2019. https://library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/wmo_486.pdf.
Kettunen, L. 1996.
Potential economic effects of climate change on Finnish agriculture.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 377–385.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.72742 Kimball, B.A.
1983.
Carbon dioxide and agricultural yield: An assemblage and analysis of 430 prior observations.
Agronomy Journal 75: 779–788.
https://doi.org/10.2134/agronj1983.00021962007500050014x Kleemola, J.
& Karvonen, T. 1996.
Modelling growth and nitrogen balance of barley under ambient and future conditions.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 299–310.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.72748 Kuusisto, E. & Käyhkö, J.
2004.
Globaalimuutos Suomen Akatemian FIGARE-ohjelma.
Otava, Keuruu.
169 p. Lal, R. 2004.
Soil carbon sequestration to mitigate climate change.
Geoderma 123: 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoderma.2004.01.032 Latvala-Kilby, S., Aura, J., Pupola, N., Hannukkala, A.
& Valkonen, J.
2009.
Detection of potato mop-top virus in potato tubers and sprouts: Combinations of RNA2 and RNA3 variants and incidence of symptomless infections.
Phytopathology 99: 519–531.
https://doi.org/10.1094/PHYTO-99-5-0519 Laurila, H. 1995.
Modeling the effects of elevated CO 2 and temperature on Swedish and German spring wheat varieties with CERESwheat and AFRC-wheat crop models.
Journal of Biogeography 22: 591–595.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2845959 Laurila, H.A.
2001.
Simulation of spring wheat responses to elevated CO 2 and temperature by using CERES-wheat crop model.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 10: 175–196.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.5692 Lehtinen, A., Andersson, B., Le, V., Naerstad, R., Rastas, M., Ketoja, E., Hannukkala, A., Hermansen, A., Nielsen, B., Hansen, J.
& Yuen, J.
2009.
Aggressiveness of Phytophthora infestans on detached potato leaflets in four Nordic countries.
Plant pathology 58: 690–702.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-3059.2009.02038.x Lemmetty, A., Laamanen, J.
& Soukainen, M. 2011.
Emerging virus and viroid pathogen species identified for the first time in horticultural plants in Finland in 1997-2010.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 29–41.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163060 Lilja, A., Rytkönen, A., Hantula, J., Mȕller, M., Parikka, P. & Kurkela, T. 2011.
Introduced pathogens found on ornamentals, strawberry and trees in Finland over the past 20 years.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 74–85.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163051 Lohila, A., Aurela, M., Regina, K. & Laurila, T. 2003.
Soil and total ecosystem respiration in agricultural fields: effect of soil and crop type.
Plant and Soil 251: 303–317.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023004205844 Minasny, B., Malone, B.P., McBratney, A.B., Angers, D.A., Arrouays, D., Chambers, A., Chaplot, V., Chen, Z-S., Cheng, K., Das, B.S., Field, D.J., Gimona, A., Hedley, C.B., Hong, S.Y., Mandal, B., Marchant, B.P., Martin, M., McConkey, B.G., Mulder, V.L., O’Rourke, S., Richer-de-Forges, A.C., Odeh, I., Padarian, J., Paustian, K., Pan, G., Poggio, L., Savin, I., Stolbovoy, V., Stockmann, U., Sulaeman, Y., Tsui, C.-C., Vågen, T.-G., van Wesemael, B.
& Winowiecki, L. 2017.
Soil carbon 4 per mille.
Geoderma 292: 59–86.
MMM 2005.
Ilmastonmuutoksen kansallinen sopeutumisstrategia (Finland’s National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change).
Publications of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Helsinki, Finland.
MMM 1/2005.
272 p. Cited 28 May 2019. http://urn.
fi/URN:ISBN:952-453-200-X.
(in Finnish).
Mukula, J.
& Rantanen, O.
1987.
Climatic risks to the yield and quality of field crops in Finland.
I Basic facts about Finnish field crops production.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 26: 1–18.
Mukula, J.
& Rantanen, O.
1989a.
Climatic risks to the yield and quality of field crops in Finland.
III Winter rye 1969-1986.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 28: 3–11.
Mukula, J.
& Rantanen, O.
1989b.
Climatic risks to the yield and quality of field crops in Finland.
IV Winter wheat 1969-1986.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 28: 13–19.
Mukula, J.
& Rantanen, O.
1989c.
Climatic risks to the yield and quality of field crops in Finland.
V Spring wheat 1969-1986.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 28: 21–28.
Mukula, J.
& Rantanen, O.
1989d.
Climatic risks to the yield and quality of field crops in Finland.
VI Barley 1969-1986.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 28: 29–36.
Mukula, J.
& Rantanen, O.
1989e.
Climatic risks to the yield and quality of field crops in Finland.
VII Oats 1969-1986.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 28: 37–43.
Mukula, J., Rantanen, O.
& Lallukka, U.
1978.
Crop certainty of oats in Finland 1950-1976.
Report No.
10, Agricultural Research Centre, Department of Plant Husbandry, Jokioinen.
(in Finnish).
Olesen, J.E., Trnka, M., Kersebaum, K.C., Skjelvåg, A.O., Seguin, B., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rossi, F., Kozyra, J.
& Micale, F. 2011.
Impacts and adaptation of European crop production systems to climate change.
European Journal of Agronomy 34: 96–112.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eja.2010.11.003 Parodi, A., Leip, A., De Boer, I.J.M., Slegers, P.M., Ziegler, F., Temme, E.H.M., Herrero, M., Tuomisto, H., Valin, H., Van Middelaar, C.E., Van Loon, J.J.A.
& Van Zanten, H.H.E.
2018.
The potential of future foods for sustainable and healthy diets.
Nature Sustainability 1: 782–789 (correction in March 2019 in Nature Sustainability 2: 342–347).
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0268-4 Parry, M.T., Carter, T.R.
& Konijn, N.T.
1988.
The Impact of Climatic Variations on Agriculture.
Volume l. Assessment in cool temperate and cold regions.
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, United Nations Environment Program.
Kluwer academic publications, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
876 p. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2965-4 Peltonen-Sainio, P., Hakala, K. & Jauhiainen, L. 2011a.
Climate-induced overwintering challenges for wheat and rye in northern agriculture.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica Section B Soil and Plant Science 61: 75–83.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09064710903535977 Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L. & Hakala, K. 2009a.
Are there indications of climate change induced increases in variability of major field crops in the northernmost European conditions?
Agricultural and Food Science 18: 206–226.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960609790059424 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 108 Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L. & Hakala, K. 2011b.
Crop responses to temperature and precipitation according to long-term multi-location trials at high-latitude conditions.
The Journal of Agricultural Science (Cambridge) 149: 49–62.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021859610000791 Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L., Hakala, K. & Ojanen, H. 2009b.
Climate change and prolongation of growing season: changes in regional potential for field crop production in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 18: 171–190.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960609790059479 Peltonen-Sainio, P., Venäläinen, A., Mäkelä, H.M., Pirinen, P., Laapas, M., Jauhiainen, L., Kaseva, J., Ojanen, H., Korhonen, P., Huusela-Veistola, E., Jalli, M., Hakala, K., Kaukoranta, T. & Virkajärvi, P. 2016.
Harmfulness of weather events and the adaptive capacity of farmers at high latitudes of Europe.
Climate Research 67: 221–240.
https://doi.org/10.3354/cr01378 Porter, J.R., Challinor, A.J., Henriksen, C.B., Howden, S.M., Martre, P. & Smith, P. 2019.
Invited review: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, agriculture, and food-A case of shifting cultivation and history.
Global Change Biology 25: 2518–2529.
https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.14700 Rankinen, K., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Granlund, K., Ojanen, H., Laapas, M., Hakala, K., Sippel, K., Helenius, J.
& Forsius, M. 2013.
Climate change adaptation in arable land use, and impact on nitrogen load at catchment scale in northern agriculture.
Agricultural and Food Science 22: 342–355.
https://doi.org/10.23986/afsci.7500 Regina, K., Syväsalo, E., Hannukkala, A.
& Esala, M. 2004.
Fluxes of N 2 O from farmed peat soils in Finland.
European Journal of Soil Science 55: 591–599.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2389.2004.00622.x Ruuhela, R. 2012.
Miten väistämättömään ilmastonmuutokseen voidaan varautua?
-Yhteenveto suomalaisesta sopeutumistutkimuksesta eri toimialoilla.
Publications of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Finland (MMM) 6/2011.
177 p. Cited 31 May 2019. https://mmm.fi/documents/1410837/1721026/MMM_julkaisu_2012_6.pdf/.
(in Finnish).
Rötter, R.P., Carter, T.R., Olesen, J.E.
& Porter, J.R. 2011.
Crop-climate models need an overhaul.
Nature Climate Change 1: 175– 177. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1152 Saikkonen, K., Taulavuori, K., Hyvönen, T., Gundel, P.E., Hamilton, C.E., Vänninen, I., Nissinen, A.
& Helander, M. 2012.
Climate change-driven species’ range shifts filtered by photoperiodism.
Nature Climate Change 2: 239–242.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1430 Statistics Finland 2018.
Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Energy supply and consumption [e-publication].
ISSN=1799-7976.
4th quarter 2018, Appendix figure 23.
Finland’s greenhouse gas emissions 1990-2018*.
Helsinki: Statistics Finland.
Cited 22.10.2019. http://www.stat.fi/til/ehk/2018/04/ehk_2018_04_2019-03-28_kuv_023_en Trnka, M., Rötter, R.P., Ruiz-Ramos, M., Kersebaum, K.C., Olesen, J.E., Žalud, Z.
& Semenov, M.A.
2014.
Adverse weather conditions for European wheat production will become more frequent with climate change.
Nature Climate Change 4: 637–643.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2242 Tuomisto, H.L., Hodge, I.D., Riordan, P. & Macdonald, D.W. 2012.
Does organic farming reduce environmental impacts?
A meta-analysis of European research.
Journal of Environmental Management 112: 309–320.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.08.018 Vänninen, I., Worner, S., Huusela-Veistola, E., Tuovinen, T., Nissinen, A.
& Saikkonen, K. 2011.
Recorded and potential alien invertebrate pests in Finnish agriculture and horticulture.
Agricultural and Food Science 20: 96–114.
https://doi.org/10.2137/145960611795163033 WMO 1976.
Twenty-eighth session of the Executive Committee: abridged report with resolutions.
WMO Executive Council Reports 445.
Secretariat of the World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Cited 17 May 2019. https://library.wmo.
int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=8475#.XTBR2PkzaUk Annex FINADAPT working papers Carter, T.R.
& Kankaanpää, S. 2004.
Adapting to Climate Change in Finland: Research Priorities.
Proceedings of the FINADAPT seminar, Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Helsinki, 14 November 2003.
FINADAPT Working Paper 1, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 318, Helsinki.
42 p. Carter, T.R., Jylhä, K., Perrels, A., Fronzek, S. & Kankaanpää, S. 2005.
FINADAPT scenarios for the 21st century: alternative futures for considering adaptation to climate change in Finland.
FINADAPT Working Paper 2, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 332, Helsinki.
42 p. Pöyry, J.
& Toivonen, H. 2005.
Climate change adaptation and biological diversity.
FINADAPT Working Paper 3, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 333, Helsinki.
46 p. Kellomäki, S., Strandman, H., Nuutinen, T., Peltola, H., Korhonen, K.T.
& Väisänen, H. 2005.
Adaptation of forest ecosystems, forests and forestry to climate change.
FINADAPT Working Paper 4, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 334, Helsinki.
44 p. Hildén, M., Lehtonen, H., Bärlund, I., Hakala, K., Kaukoranta, T. & Tattari, S. 2005.
The practice and process of adaptation in Finnish agriculture.
FINADAPT Working Paper 5, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 335, Helsinki.
28 p. Silander, J., Vehviläinen, B., Niemi, J, Arosilta, A., Dubrovin, T., Jormola, J., Keskisarja, V., Keto, A., Lepistö, A., Mäkinen, R, Ollila, M., Pajula, H., Pitkänen, H., Sammalkorpi, I., Suomalainen, M. & Veijalainen, N. 2006.
Climate change adaptation for hydrology and water resources.
FINADAPT Working Paper 6, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 336, Helsinki.
52 p. Hassi, J.
& Rytkönen, M. 2005.
Climate warming and health adaptation in Finland.
FINADAPT Working Paper 7, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 337, Helsinki.
22 p. Saarelainen, S. 2006.
Adaptation to climate change in the transport sector.
FINADAPT Working Paper 8, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 338, Helsinki.
19 p. AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE K. Hakala (2020) 29: 98–109 109 Saarelainen, S. 2006.
Climate change and risks to the built environment.
FINADAPT Working Paper 9, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 339, Helsinki.
22 p. Kirkinen, J., Martikainen, A., Holttinen, H., Savolainen, I., Auvinen, O.
& Syri, S. 2005.
Impacts on the energy sector and adaptation of the electricity network business under a changing climate in Finland.
FINADAPT Working Paper 10, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 340, Helsinki.
36 p. Sievänen, T., Tervo, K., Neuvonen, M., Pouta, E., Saarinen, J.
& Peltonen, A.
2005.
Nature-based tourism, outdoor recreation and adaptation to climate change.
FINADAPT Working Paper 11, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 341, Helsinki.
46 p. Perrels, A., Rajala, R. & Honkatukia, J.
2005.
Appraising the socio-economic impacts of climate change for Finland.
FINADAPT Working Paper 12, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 342, Helsinki.
30 p. Peltonen, L., Haanpää, S. & Lehtonen, S. 2005.
The challenge of climate change adaptation in urban planning.
FINADAPT Working Paper 13, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 343, Helsinki.
44 p. Kankaanpää, S., Carter, T.R.
& Liski, J.
2005.
Stakeholder perceptions of climate change and the need to adapt.
FINADAPT Working Paper 14, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 344, Helsinki.
36 p. Ruosteenoja, K., Jylhä, K. & Tuomenvirta, H. 2005.
Climate scenarios for FINADAPT studies of climate change adaptation.
FINADAPT Working Paper 15, Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 345, Helsinki.
32 p. Climate change and its effects on agricultural production inFinland – research efforts during the past 50 years Introduction Beginning of climate change science and foundation of the IPCC Climate change-induced crop production research in Finland The first climate change program in Finland, SILMU FIGARE and FINADAPT, programs for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change ISTO program to implement climate change strategy Life after ISTO Concluding remarks What next?
References
Northern agriculture: constraints and responses to global climate change Timo J.N.
Mela Agricultural Research Centre ofFinland, Institute of Crop and Soil Science, FIN-31600 Jokioinen, Finland In the northern circumpolar zone, the area between the 600°Cd and 1200°Cd isopleths of effective temperature sum above 5°C, the annual receipt of solar energy is limitedby the low angle of radiation arriving at the earth’s surface.
This is the primary cause of the climatic constraints observed in the zone, such as low temperatures, a short growing season, frosts during the growing season, long and cold winters and thick snow cover.
In Finland, the length of the growing season varies from 180 days in the south (60°N) to 120 days in the north (70°N).
Consequently, the growing time for crops from sowing to ripening is also short, which limits their ability to produce high yields.
The most advanced forms of farming in the high-latitude zone are encountered towards the south in Northern Europe, central Siberia and the prairies of Canada, i.e.
mainly in the phytogeographical hemiboreal zone where the effective temperature sum is higher than 1200°Cd.
Conditions for agriculture then deteriorate gradually further north with the cooling of the climate, and this is reflected as an increase in cattle rearing at the expense of grain cultivation.
In northern Europe farming is practised as far north as to the Arctic Circle, at about 66°N latitude.
In North America, fields extend to about 55°N, In Asia, there are few fields north of 60°N.
Finland is the most northern agricultural country in the world, with all its field area, about 2.5 million hectares, located north of latitude 60°N.
Changes in the climate and atmospheric C0 2 predicted for the future are likely to have a strong influence, either beneficial or disadvantageous, on the conditions for growth in northern areas where the annual mean temperature is 5°C or less.
Key words: Finland, circumpolar zone, crop production, growth conditions, growing season, solar radiation, temperature sum, winter damage Introduction The northern circumpolar zone, defined by climatic and vegetational criteria, delimits a highlatitude zone which comprises about one sixth of the world’s land area.
In these marginal areas adjacent to the polar region, man and nature approach the limits of their adaptability and the area is very thinly inhabited.
The zone is not uniform with regard to conditions for living organisms, as can be seen, for © Agricultural and Food Science in Finland Manuscript received March 1996 229 Voi 511996): 229-234.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Mela, T.J.N.
: Northern agriculture: constraints and responses to global climate change instance, in the structure ofagriculture.
It is thus often divided into subzones on a biogeographical basis (Hämet-Ahti 1981).
The circumboreal zone, characterized by dominance of coniferous forests, coincides to a great extent with the area between the 600 °Cd and 1200 °Cd isopleths of accumulated temperature above a base temperature of 5°C (effective temperature sum, ETS).
Considerable differences withrespect to agriculture, forestry, reindeer herding, and other activities are to be found within this zone both between northern and southern areas and in an east-west direction.
The most advanced forms of farming in the high-latitude zone (Fig.
1) are encountered towards the south, in northern Europe, central Siberia and the prairies of Canada, i.e.
mainly in the phytogeographical hemiboreal zone where the effective temperature sum is higher than 1200°Cd (Varjo 1984).
Conditions for agriculture then gradually deteriorate towards north with the cooling of the climate, and this is reflected as an increase in cattle rearing at the expense of grain cultivation until, at effective temperature sums of around 900 °Cd, farming gradually gives way to forestry as the predominant form of economic activity.
In northern Europe farming is practised as far north as the Arctic Circle, at about latitude 66 °N.
In North America, fields extend to about 55°N.
In Asia, there are few fields north of 60°N.
In Finland, agriculture is concentrated south of the 1000°Cd isopleth.
The largest field areas, up to 50% of the total land area, are predominantly located south of the 1200°Cd isopleth.
North of the !000°Cd isopleth fields are rare; they cover less than 5% of the total land area.
In the neighbouring countries agriculture is more southern than in Finland, in Sweden 90% and in Norway 50% of cereals are grown south of60°N, as in Finland the total field area, about 2,5 million hectares, is located north of latitude 60°N.
Fig.
I.
The circumboreal zone and its transcontinental subzones.
(1) Northern boreal, (2) middle boreal, (3) southern boreal, (4) hemiboreal and (5) arctic and complex, mountain areas (Hämet-Ahti 1981).
230 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Climatic constraints In the circumpolar zone, the annual receipt of solar energy is limited by the low angle of radiation arriving at the earth’s surface.
This is the primary cause of the climatic constraints observed in this zone, such as low temperatures, a short growing season, frosts during the growing season, long and cold winters and thick snow cover.
Only in the middle of the summer, when days are at their longest (between 18 and 24 hours) does the daily incoming radiation correspond to that of the middle and low latitudes.
At this time, the gross C0 2 assimilation rate of plants is correspondingly high.
The growing season in the circumpolar zone is short.
In Finland, the length of the growing season (defined as the period with daily mean temperature exceeding 5°C) varies from 180 days in the south (60°N) to 120 days in the north (70°N) (Mukula and Rantanen 1987).
Consequently, the growing time for crops from sowing to ripening is also short, which limits their ability to produce high yields.
Compared with countries in central Europe, the growing season in Finland is significantly shorter.
For example, in Germany the season is one to three months longer than in southern Finland.
The long winters exert a considerable stress on winterannual and perennial plants.
An ample storage of reserve carbohydrates is necessary to maintain vital functions through six to nine cold months.
Low temperatures and winter diseases (Microdochium nivale Fr., Samu & Hall, Typhula ishicariensis Imai, Myriosclerotinia borealis Bub.
& Vleug, Sclerotinia trifoliorum Erikss.)
often damage and kill wintering plants.
Winter diseases thrive in high temperatures under thick snow cover in the central and northern parts of Finland and they are the main reason for winter damage of perennial grasses and winter cereals.
In the western coastal region, hard ice cover often suffocates wintering cereals and grasses.
Other climatic hazard factors include night frosts in the early summer or early autumn, which occur annually in some regions (Fig.
2, Solantie 1980).
The average number of night frosts varies from three to four in the agricultural area in June and from 1.5 to 2.5 in August.
In a weather observatory 100 km north of the southern coast (Jokioinen 60°49’N, 23°30’E), every second year the last spring frost has occurred, on average, after 17 June and the last hard spring frost (under -3°C) after 1 June.
Every fourth year there has been a hard spring frost on 8 June or later.
The dates for the corresponding first frosts in autumn are 20 August, 9 September and 28 August, respectively.
The average duration of the period without hard frosts is 100 to 114 days at inland locations away from lakes and one month longer at sites adjacent to lakes, which are safe areas for growing crops sensitive to frosts.
Another typical characteristic of the Finnish climate is a precipitation shortfall at the beginning of the summer.
It is especially harmful for spring sown crops and grass grown for pasture and silage.
Losses from drought are greatest in the coastal area on clay and silt soils.
There is a high variability in climate from year to year, and cool, rainy summers occur a couple of times in a decade causing yield and quality losses.
VariaFig.
2.
Number of night frosts in June-July (Seläntie 1980) 231 Vol.
5 (1996): 229-234.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Mela, T.J.N.
: Northern agriculture: constraints and responses to global climate change tions of yields are large (Mela and Suvanto 1987).
The number of crops which can be grown during the short growing season in the circumpolar zone is small, and they are mainly annual.
In Finland, autumn-sown winter wheat and winter rye as well as spring-sown spring wheat for bread, spring turnip rape for oil and protein for feed, and sugar beet are grown in the southern parts of the country.
The most common cereals in Finland, spring-sown barley and oats, are mainly grown for feed and are more widely distributed northwards.
Commercial potato production, some for export, is practised in the north because under the northern conditions the number of aphids which transmit virus diseases is low.
Perennial grasses and red clover are grown for forage as far north as the Arctic Circle and beyond.
Under northern conditions yields ofall agricultural crops are low compared to those in middle latitudes.
In central Europe, winter forms of wheat and barley as well as winter rape are predominantly grown and their yields are inherently higher than yields of spring cereals and spring turnip rape suitable for the Finnish conditions today.
Growth of sugarbeet is regularly cut short by autumn frosts in Finland.
However, yields of field crops have doubled in the past 30 years in Finland due to increased fertilization, higher yielding varieties and improved crop husbandry.
This trend is continuing and may even accelerate as a result of climate change.
Changes in climate Predicted changes in climate as a result of the increasing content of so-called greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide (C02 ), methane (CH4 ), nitrous oxide (N,O), tropospheric ozone (O,) and halocarbons could have an important influence on the conditions for growth in northern areas.The most important greenhouse gas, C0 2 , which alone is thought to be responsible for about half of the anticipated global temperature increase up to the middle of the next century, also has a direct influence on plant growth.
Recent scenarios predict a doubling of C0 2 in the atmosphere over pre-industrial levels approximately between 2060 and 2070 for a “business-as-usual” scenario, with no changes to present policy (IPCC 1995).
An increase of mean global temperature in the range I.5°C to 4.5°C is predicted as the equilibrium response to greenhouse gas forcing equivalent to a of CO, (IPCC 1992).
For the polar regions the increase is higher than the global means.
Recent scenarios for the next century in Finland anticipate an increase in mean annual temperature of between 0.1 °C and 0.6 °C per decade with a central estimate of O.4°C per decade (Carter 1996).
The central estimate of a 4°C warming by the end of the next century is of a similar magnitude as the warming between the end of the last Ice Ages 10 000 years ago and the present day at northern latitudes.
Under this scenario, in a hundred years the growing season in southern Finland would be prolonged by 6-7 weeks, from 160-180 days to 200-230 days, which corresponds to the growing season in northern Germany today.
The resultant shift of climatic zones in Finland would be about 500 to 650 km northwards (Carter et al.
1996).
Effects on agriculture A change in mean temperature of the magnitude envisaged must have a significant effect on agriculture in the northern latitudes during the next few decades.
The impact may be beneficial or disadvantageous.
In Finland, increasing temperature is likely to enhance the growth of springsown cereals, especially in northern parts of the country.
However, low temperature is not the only growth-limiting factor for some crops.
For example, in southern Finland, lack of moisture during the early summer can be more harmful 232 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND for the growth of spring barley (Kettunen et al.
1988).
Moreover, a change in climate may benefit northern agriculture in several other ways than through temperature alone: An increase in carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere combined with a rise in temperature may increase the growth and yield ofcrops.
However, increased water deficit in the soil caused by increased evapotranspiration under elevated temperature can disrupt the growth of crops.
The period of snow cover is likely to become shorter and the overwintering risk to crops may diminish.
Cultivation of high-yielding autumn sown crops can be expected to increase.
A longer growing season may enable cultivation of higher yielding cultivars.
The zones of suitability for crop species will expand northwards, including zones of crops not currently grown in Finland, which may move into southern Finland.
The growing period for grass will be prolonged and yields will increase.
Cultivars which have a long period ofgrowth benefit from a long growing season and develop slowly to increase the number of tillers, leafarea and root size, their apparatus for subsequent production of a high yield.
When the growing season extends earlier in the spring and crops form green leaves earlier, they can take advantage of the long, often sunny days in May.
This benefit, however, depends on a favourable frequency and timing of future spring frosts.
Furthermore, the rapid shortening of days in the autumn may curtail the growth of crops in spite of continuing warm weather.
On the other hand, climate change may have disadvantages, including: Existing pests, diseases and weeds are likely to become more abundant.
Exotic pests and diseases may appear.
The need for plant protection will grow and, unless biological methods can be developed, the use of pesticides and fungicides, with related environmental problems, may increase.
A reduction in soil frost, prolongation of the frost-free season and possible increases in precipitation may increase the risk of nutrient leaching.
A warmer and longer growing season will accelerate the breakdown of soil organic matter, increasing problems of maintaining good soil structure.
On balance, however, the overall impact of a changing climate on crop yields in the circumboreal zone can be expected to be beneficial.
The expansion ofclimatic zones northwards will lead to an increase in the agricultural potential of northern latitudes.
Nevereless, the possibilities of the northern latitudes to respond to the increasing need of food in the world are limited because of the unsuitable soil and topographical conditions in many regions.
References Carter,!.
R. 1996.
Developing scenarios of atmosphere, weather and climate for northern regions.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 235-249 (this issue).
, Saarikko, R. A.
& Niemi, K. J.
1996.
Assessing the risks and uncertainties of regional crop potential under a changing climate in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 329-350 (this issue).
Hämet-Ahti, L. 1981.
The boreal zone and its biotic subdivision.
Fennia 159: 69-75, IPCC 1992.
Climate change 1992.
The supplementary Report to the IPCC scientific assessment.
Houghton, J.T.
et al.
(eds.).
Cambridge University Press.
200 p. 1995.
Climate change 1994.
Radiative forcing of climate change and an evaluation of the IPCC 1992 emission scenarios.
Houghton, J.T.
el al.
(eds.).
Cambridge University Press.
339 p. Kettunen, L., Mukula, J., Pohjonen, V., Rantanen, O.
& Varjo, U.
1988.
The effects of climatic variations on 233 Vol.
5 (1996): 229-234.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Mela, T.J.N.
: Northern agriculture: constraints and responses to global climate change agriculture in Finland.
In: Parry, M. et al.
(eds.).
The impact of climatic variations on agriculture.
Volume 1: Assessments in cool temperate and cold regions.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, p. 511-614.
Mela, T. & Suvanto, T. 1987.
Peltokasvien satoennuste vuoteen 2000.
Peltokasvien satojen ja niihin vaikuttavien tekijöiden kehitys vuoteen 2000 mennessä.
(Prediction of the development of yields of field crops to the year 2000).
Helsingin yliopiston kasvinviljelytieteen laitos.
Julkaisuja N:o 14.
201 p. Mukula, J.
& Rantanen, O.
1987.
Climatic risks to the yield and quality of field crops in Finland.
I.
Basic facts about Finnish field crops production.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 26: 1-18.
Solantie, R. 1980.
Kesän yölämpötilojen ja hallojen alueellisuudesta Suomessa.
Maataloushallituksen Aikakauskirja 1980, 4: 18-24.
Varjo, U.
1984.
The high-latitude zone: delimitation and characteristics, Nordia 18, 2: 93-104.
SELOSTUS Maatalous pohjoisilla äärialueilla: ilmastolliset rajoitukset ja ilmaston muutosten vaikutukset viljelyyn Timo J.N.
Mela Maatalouden tutkimuskeskus Pohjoisella havumetsävyöhykkeellä auringon säteilyenergian vuotuinen määrä jää vähäiseksi säteilyn pienen saapumiskulman takia.
Maataloutta harjoitetaan tällä alueella äärirajoillaan, sillä ilmaston kylmyys (matalat lämpötilat, lyhyt kasvukausi, hallat kasvukauden aikana, pitkät ja kylmät talvet sekä paksu lumipeite) rajoittavat viljelyä.
Suomessa kasvukauden pituus vaihtelee etelän 180 päivästä pohjoisen 120 päivään.
Tämän vuoksi viljelykasvien kasvuajan on oltava lyhyt, mikä rajoittaa niiden kykyä tuottaa suuria satoja.
Maatalous on edistyneintä alueen eteläosissa Pohjois-Euroopassa, Keski-Siperiassa ja Kanadan preerioilla ns.
hemiboreaalisella kasvimaantieteellisellä alueella, missä kasvukauden tehoisan lämpötilan summa on korkeampi kuin 1200 °C.
Viljelyolosuhteet heikkenevät pohjoiseen päin ilmaston kylmetessä, ja viljan viljely muuttuu karjataloudeksi.
PohjoisEuroopassa maata viljellään aina napapiirille (66°N) saakka.
Pohjois-Amerikassa pellot ulottuvat suunnilleen leveysasteelle 55°N, Aasiassa muutamin paikoin leveysasteelle 60°N.
Suomi on maailman pohjoisin maa, jossa koko peltoala, 2,5 miljoonaa hehtaaria, sijaitsee leveysasteen 60°N pohjoispuolella.
Ilmaston ja ilmakehän hiilidioksidipitoisuuden ennustettu muutos vaikuttavat todennäköisesti voimakkaasti kasvuoloihin näillä pohjoisilla alueilla, missä vuotuinen keskilämpötila on 5 °C tai vähemmän.
Vaikutukset ovat joko edullisia tai epäedullisia.
234 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND
226 © Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/as Zakiyyah Vawda Ms Zakiyyah Vawda, FYIAfrica Architecture, 26 Michelson Rd, Westwood AH, Boksburg, 1477, South Africa.
Phone: +27 61 786 4200, email: zakiyyah@fyiafricarch.
com, ORCID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0001-5744-409X Jan Hugo Dr Jan Hugo, Architecture, University of Pretoria, Private Bag X20, Pretoria, 0028, South Africa.
Phone: +27 (0)12 420 2578, email: jan.hugo@ up.ac.za, ORCID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0003-4840-2642 ISSN: 1023-0564 ▪ e-ISSN: 2415-0487 Received: September 2021 Reviewed and revised: FebruaryApril 2022 Published: December 2022 KEYWORDS: Climate change, netzero carbon building, social housing, environmental sustainability, climate change mitigation HOW TO CITE: Vawda, Z.
& Hugo, J.
2022.
Evaluating the energy performance of social housing as a catalyst towards net-zero carbon building in the mitigation of climate change in South Africa.
Acta Structilia, 29(2) pp.
226-259.
SOCIAL HOUSING AS A CATALYST TOWARDS NETZERO CARBON BUILDING IN THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA REVIEW ARTICLE1 DOI: https://doi.org/10.18820/24150487/as29i2.8 ABSTRACT Since low-income and social housing are among the most vulnerable built environments to climate change, this article evaluates the energy performance of social housing in the context of enabling net-zero carbon social housing in South Africa (SA).
It seeks to investigate how improved and conscious energy-efficient design in the context of social housing contributes toward a climate change mitigation response in SA.
The article analyses energy use and indoor comfort, based on ASHRAE 55-2004 Standard, of two social housing case studies to review the potential of the social housing sector to contribute to the national climate mitigating agenda.
The findings highlight that the housing provision itself is not an adequate response, but that bio-climatic design solutions with appropriate spatial and material choices, along with efficient envelope articulation, play a critical role in lowering energy use and improving user comfort.
There is, however, a need to challenge the growing advent of (energy-) inefficient and carbon-intensive social housing in SA and simultaneously address the parallel crisis of homelessness, to enable a sustainable future for the built environment.
1 DECLARATION: The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Acta Structilia 2022 29(2): 226-259 http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/as Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 227 ABSTRAK Aangesien inwoners van lae-inkomste en maatskaplike behuising onder die mees kwesbare geboue-omgewings vir klimaatsverandering is, evalueer hierdie artikel die energieprestasie van maatskaplike behuising in die konteks om netto-nulkoolstof maatskaplike behuising in Suid-Afrika (SA) moontlik te maak.
Dit poog om te ondersoek hoe verbeterde en bewuste energiedoeltreffende ontwerp in die konteks van maatskaplike behuising bydra tot ’n reaksie op klimaatverandering in SA.
Die artikel ontleed die energieverbruik en binnenshuise gerief, gebaseer op ASHRAE 55-2004 Standaard, van twee maatskaplike behuisingsgevallestudies om die potensiaal van die maatskaplike behuisingsektor te hersien om by te dra tot die nasionale klimaatversagtende agenda.
Die bevindinge beklemtoon dat die voorsiening van behuising self nie ’n voldoende reaksie is nie, maar dat bio-klimaatontwerpoplossings met toepaslike ruimtelike en materiaalkeuses tesame met doeltreffende omhulselartikulasie ’n kritieke rol speel in die verlaging van energieverbruik en die verbetering van gebruikersgerief.
Daar is egter ’n behoefte om die groeiende koms van (energie-) ondoeltreffende en koolstofintensiewe maatskaplike behuising in SA uit te daag en terselfdertyd die parallelle krisis van haweloosheid aan te spreek, alles om ’n volhoubare toekomstige geboude omgewing moontlik te maak.
1.
INTRODUCTION “The climate imperative is clear: we must act now and with an ambition to decarbonize human activities to meet global climate goals” (UNEP, 2017: 11).
The earth’s climate is changing as a consequence of various anthropogenic endeavours, primarily through the release of greenhouse gases (GHGs), causing the earth to heat up by the intensification of the greenhouse effect (IPCC, 2014; Zalasiewicz & Williams, 2009; Howard, Rowe & Tchobanoglous, 1985).
The most recent climate predictions by leading international scientific organisations disclose that the window to avert threatening global climate change is rapidly closing, as the global carbon budget diminishes further every year (UNEP, 2017).
According to the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) (2018: 2), the construction industry accounts for approximately 40% of worldwide energy usage and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, out consuming both the industrial and transportation sectors and contributing significantly to climate change.
Furthermore, housing is the single largest subsector of the construction industry and a substantial contributor to environmental degradation, with high levels of energy consumption and GHG emissions.
Access to housing is, however, also a basic human right protected within the Constitution of SA (SA, 1996: 5).
Moreover, its demand is substantial, making it a sector with considerable potential to mitigate the negative influence of the construction industry on climate change.
The urgency to address the substantial growth of inefficient buildings has been widely recognised (UNFCC, 2016, in GBCSA, 2018), particularly in the South African context, where an energy-intensive building will mean a very carbon-intensive building, due to our coal-powered electricity grid.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 228 Internationally supported climate change mitigation strategies, in the form of renewable energy and energy-efficient projects implemented in developing countries between 2005 and 2016, are projected to reduce GHG emissions by 0.6 GtCO2e in 2020 (UNEP, 2017: 7).
Likewise, SA’s National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 aspires to progressively reinforce the energy-efficiency requirements within the South African building legislation to realise a net-zero carbon building standard by the year 2030 (SA, 2012).
Spatial planning represents perhaps the most entrenched legacy of the apartheid era: the construction of a built environment characterised by both segregation and a concomitant absence of diversity (Low, 2005).
Since the fall of apartheid in 1994, social housing delivery interventions in SA have continued to perpetuate the high carbon footprint of the apartheid urban form.
Consequently, the formation of vast ‘dormitory settlements’ of mostly mass-produced, low-cost, and replicated houses located at the urban periphery ensued (Ramovha, 2017: 9).
Their typically remote location limits economic opportunity and has resource-intense transport access (SA, 2006).
The infamous Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing landscape was subsequently born: A housing model guilty of extending the sprawling spatial form of the pre-democratic regime.
Urban sprawl not only reduces biodiversity and causes the degradation of the natural environment (DEA, 2011), but it is also more energy-intense and the high emission of GHGs of the local energy supply constraints climate change mitigation.
The South African “Comprehensive Housing Plan for the Development of Integrated Sustainable Human Settlements”, commonly known as the “Breaking New Ground Policy” (BNG) of 2004 aspires to, among other objectives, eliminate informal settlements within SA as soon as possible (SA, 2004).
In response to the prevailing housing provision mode, this plan leaves behind the RDP commoditised focus on housing delivery and takes on a more responsive approach, focusing rather on the multifaceted requirements of sustainable human settlements.
Accordingly, social housing (medium density2) has been identified as a suitable mechanism for this approach in the BNG policy (SA, 2004: 2).
The policy further states, in ‘Section 3.7 Enhancing the Housing Product’ (SA, 2004: 17), that there is a need for enhanced settlement and housing unit design and quality, which includes traditional and indigenous knowledge as well as alternative and innovative technologies and design, to alter the face of the stereotypical RDP house.
2 According to the Social Housing Act (SA 2008), medium-density housing is defined as 40-100 dwelling units per hectare (du/ha) (gross).
The dwelling types are semi-detached housing, row housing, and three-storey walk-up flats (Tonkin, 2008: 2).
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 229 Net-zero carbon social housing could realise this goal by providing energyefficient homes and environments in proximity to services, transport routes, clinics, schools, and economic opportunities, ensuring a more carbon-efficient solution.
Hence, medium-density social housing has been identified as a sustainable housing strategy with significant climate change mitigation and adaptation potential, and a departure from the “40x40x40 housing paradigm: 40sqm house, 40km outside the city, where 40% of income is spent on transportation to work” (Fieuw, 2014: 2).
Furthermore, the World Green Building Council (WGBC)’s ‘Advancing Net Zero Projects’ initiative’s goal is to ensure that the global building stock is net-zero carbon by the year 2050 and that all new buildings’ operational carbon emissions are net-zero by 2030 (GBCSA, 2018).
Locally, the GBCSA’s (2018) response to climate change and the Paris Agreement comes in the form of their latest certification scheme, the Net Zero/Net Positive Certification Scheme.
Net-zero carbon housing has been recognised as a crucial component for the justifiable transition to a low-carbon future in the implementation of the UN’s SDGs (UN, 2019).
Net-zero carbon housing encompasses more than simply reducing carbon emissions and encouraging renewable energy; it also has broader social and economic advantages such as the reduction of energy poverty and the improvement of human well-being for low-income communities.
Despite the obvious benefits of net-zero carbon social housing, currently, limited net-zero social housing has been developed in SA.
As a result, an important opportunity for enabling a low-carbon future is lost (Gibberd, 2018).
There is a significant gap between the impact of social housing on the environment and the development of green or net-zero carbon social housing, particularly where the climate change mitigation of a building is the primary concern (Brewis, 2012).
Furthermore, the literature on net-zero carbon or green architecture within SA focuses almost entirely on technological developments, often for a green-building certification in the high-end building sector, with the rare inclusion of low-cost net-zero carbon development (ASSAF 2011; Harris et al., 2012).
This study consequently evaluates the impact potential of net-zero carbon social housing in SA as a climate change mitigation strategy.
It seeks to investigate how the design solution and the materiality of the social housing case studies affect the cases’ simulated energy use and carbon emissions, in order to determine how housing provision and its energy performance in the context of net-zero carbon can contribute toward a climate change mitigation response in SA.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 230 2.
LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Climate change “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.
The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen” (IPCC, 2014: 2).
The best available evidence indicates that climate change is already taking place and that it will continue throughout this century as a consequence of anthropogenic GHG emissions (Bolin, 1980; Heywood, 1995; Pearman, 2005; IPCC, 2014; NASA, 2019).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2015: 7) defines climate change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable periods”.
Hence, the UNFCCC and Heywood (1995: 1255) differentiate between “human activities”-induced climate change and “climate variability due to natural causes” (IPCC 2014: 120).
SA lines itself with a similar distinction.
Research suggests that recent climate change is due to human actions related to industrialisation, characteristic of human consumption and global domestic product (GDP) growth, and overwhelming anthropogenically induced environmental impacts (DEA 2011; Van Wyk, 2012; Dechezleprêtre, Martin & Bassi, 2016).
In the period from the Industrial Revolution to 2018, the global average temperature anomaly reached 0.9°C, with the year 2016 ranking as the warmest on record (NASA, 2019).
According to the Stern Review (Stern, 2006), if the most detrimental impacts of climate change are to be evaded, the increase in the global mean temperature should be kept below 2°C of the pre-industrial levels.
This has been reiterated across the literature spectrum (IPCC, 2014; Ampofo-Anti, Dumani & Van Wyk, 2015; UNFCCC, 2015; GBCSA, 2018).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014) conveyed, through their Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), that the global average temperature increase could be in the range of 3.7°C and 4.8°C by the year 2100 with the current “business-as-usual pathway” (UNEP, 2017: 11).
This degree of warming would be catastrophic for everyone (Pearman, 2005).
In the Paris Climate Agreement, an agreement by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regarding the release of GHGs, climate change mitigation and adaptation as well as an investment came into effect in the year 2020.
The Paris Agreement aims to establish a global commitment to “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 231 efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015: 3).
SA is also a signatory to this Agreement.
To meet the Paris Agreement’s climate change goal, global emissions are required to have peaked by 2020 and would thereafter promptly decline to reach zero emissions by the year 2050 (UNEP, 2017).
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report (2017: xvii) affirms that “for the 2°C goal, this shortfall could be 11 to 13.5 Gt CO2e; for the ambitious 1.5°C goal, it could be as much as 16 to 19 Gt CO2e”.
Thus, immediate and progressive climate change mitigation action is needed globally.
SA’s response to climate change, as stated in the National Climate Change Response White Paper (SA, 2011a: 5), primarily aims to effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts and make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise GHG concentrations.
In addition, it aims to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system within a time frame that enables economic, social, and environmental development to proceed sustainably (SA, 2011a: 5).
Global temperatures are anticipated to persistently rise, although the degree to which they are kept below 2°C, as recommended by the IPCC and stipulated by the Paris Agreement, may depend on the quantity of GHGs that the building sector continues to emit into the atmosphere (Ampofo-Anti et al., 2015).
The distressing incidences of recent extreme weather events intensify the urgency of immediate climate change action.
These events highlight the importance of incorporating the Paris Agreement within the built environment now (UNEP, 2017).
2.2 Climate change and the built environment Substantial cuts in GHG emissions in buildings could reduce the negative impacts of climate change, by reducing the amount of GHG in the atmosphere.
It is also the sector with the most cost-effective climate change mitigation potential, as shown in Figure 1 (IPCC, 2014; Gibberd, 2017).
Reduced emissions in the built environment would also improve opportunities for effective adaptation, reduce the costs and challenges of mitigation, and enable climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development.
Inertia in the built environment, especially concerning socioeconomic aspects, impedes adaptation and mitigation opportunities, whereas innovation and investments in green and net-zero carbon building can decrease GHG emissions and improve climate change resilience (IPCC, 2014: 26; Blok, Afanador & Van Vuuren, 2017: 37).
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 232 Figure 1: The economic climate change mitigation potential by sector by the year 2030 Source: WRI, 2016: 17 The SA National Climate Change Response White Paper is yet to translate into legislation and policies that enable mitigation action in common practices and ongoing planning across all spheres of government, including the built environment.
The South African National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) was, however, promulgated in 2020 and supports the country’s ability to meet its obligations in terms of the Paris Agreement.
The strategy defines SA’s vulnerabilities to climate change, its plans and required resources to reduce these vulnerabilities, whilst determining advancements in climate change adaptation.
A significant analysis of this review finds that the mitigation strategies detailed in the White Paper have typically not yet been implemented and that extensive challenges are delaying their realisation (Trollip & Boulle, 2017).
However, emergent adaptation and mitigation responses are present in some industries.
Critical urban-scale and policy‐based actions have, to some extent, been implemented, although industry challenges persevere.
Furthermore, Stern (2006) suggests that a diverse range of economic studies have shown that the costs of delay and inaction far outweigh the costs of early action.
This notion is reciprocated by the SA climate change White Paper: “Vulnerable low-income households and the marginalised unemployed will face the most severe impacts unless urgent steps are taken to reduce SA’s vulnerability to climate and economic shocks” (DEA, 2011: 32).
Thus, mitigation action in the low-income housing industry will have both environmental and social benefits.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 233 The intersection between the built environment and climate change is a relatively new but rapidly expanding field of research (Knieling & Klindworth, 2016 in Taylor, 2017; Gibberd, 2017), but the many gaps in literature relate to low-cost applications.
Evidence, however, recognises that climate change presents growing threats to sustainable development within the built environment as a threat multiplier (IPPC, 2014).
It exacerbates existing threats to social and natural systems, placing additional burdens, particularly on the poor, and constraining possible developmental paths for all.
Action should be pursued now that will move towards low and zerocarbon pathways for sustainable development, parallel to the facilitating of the betterment of social, economic, and environmental well-being.
This leads to the suggestive gap in the literature on the interrelationship between climate change and social housing globally and particularly in SA.
More so since “enhancing the capacity of low-income groups and vulnerable communities” is recognised as an effective and complementary urban climate adaptation and mitigation strategy (IPCC, 2014: 97).
2.3 Climate change and social housing in SA Homelessness and the need for housing for the indigent have posed a serious challenge for the vast majority of cities in the global south, especially in Africa.
Over half of these cities’ populations reside in substandard housing or informal settlements (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2014; Van Horen, 2000).
On the other hand, social housing can address these communities’ increased vulnerability to the expected impacts of climate change.
Thus, the role that the government and other leaders in the social housing sector have to play in addressing climate change, as well as the housing backlog, can be realised through a climate change responsive social housing approach within SA.
The NE51/9 housing model, produced and replicated for non-Europeans in the 1950s-1970s in SA, reinforced the spatial agenda of the apartheid regime, creating poorly situated and impoverished living environments (Low, 2005).
Despite a more neo-liberal regime prevailing since 1994, the housing delivery in SA still promoted a “1-house-1-site” approach similar to that of the NE51/9 housing model illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
The result has been the fragmentation and compartmentalisation of a reductive design and delivery process, which has resulted in large energy-intensive human settlements (Low, 2005: 1).
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 234 Figure 2: Perspective and plan of the NE 51/9 housing model Source: Chipkin, 1998: 172 Figure 3: Plan and elevation of a typical 40m2 RDP house Source: EcoSun, [n.d.]: 3 The delivery of sustainable and affordable housing is a global concern, especially in developing countries such as SA, where the severity of the crisis is relative to the rapidly developing urban sector, in which over a million people are born in or migrate to cities in the global South weekly (UN-Habitat, 2015: 1).
Furthermore, over one billion people, equivalent to 23.5% of the world’s urban population, are housed in informal settlements (UN, 2019: 44).
The UN (2019) predicts that, if no significant progress is made, an estimated 3 billion people will require adequate and affordable housing by 2030.
The UN-Habitat (2015) further suggests that responses to housing should be holistic, interdisciplinary, and multi-level, and should be in response to local economic, environmental, social, and legislative aspects, including climate change.
There is a need to unearth sustainable social housing solutions that not only counteract the rising carbon footprint of the building industry, but also do not increase the number of households that incur an unsustainable level of carbon emissions in terms of embodied and operational energy and the implied costs (UN-Habitat, 2015).
Instead, solutions need to be established to address the crisis of inadequate housing, which also recognises the global crisis of climate change.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 235 Social housing in SA can be a potential solution to these problems and is defined as “a rental or co-operative housing option for lowto mediumincome households at a level of scale and built form which requires institutionalised management, and which is provided by social housing institutions or other delivery agents in approved projects in designated restructuring zones with the benefit of public funding” (SA, 2008: 2).
The objective of social housing is to also play a role in the national priority of restructuring South African cities and communities to address environmental, economic, social, and spatial dysfunctionalities.
The Minister of Human Settlements, Mfeketo (2018: 3), in her 2018/2019 Budget Speech, reiterates the significance of creating integrated social housing to undo apartheid spatial planning in prime areas located close to economic opportunities, thus contributing to the SA government’s vision of Sustainable Human Settlements (SHRA, 2020: 22).
This is an integral part of a climate-responsive SA.
The IPCC (2014) and UN Habitat (2015) share the stance that housing development has the greatest potential for climate change mitigation without significant additional initial costs in the future.
Combrinck (2015) and Harvey (2012) argue that there is hardly any focus on the fact that cities can do well economically, while its people, apart from the privileged few, and the environment are persistently marginalised and degraded.
Correspondingly, Low (2005) suggests that the simplification of design to a quantitative pursuit typical of the mass production of the previous RDP developments conflicted with the inherent requirements of sustainable development, and thus climate change response.
The outcome of poorly designed, low-density, and isolated RDP settlements (Findley & Ogbu, 2011: 2) only further marginalises the population it was meant to serve.
2.4 Net-zero carbon building for social housing in SA According to the GBCSA, a net zero-carbon building is a highly energyefficient building, “and the remaining energy use is from renewable energy, preferably on-site but also off-site where necessary so that there are zero net carbon emissions on an annual basis” (GBCSA, 2018: 2).
This definition is reciprocated by the World Green Building Council (WGBC) (Laski & Burrows, 2017: 8).
The Paris Agreement of 2015 was hailed in the green building industry as a milestone in the plight against climate change (WGBC, 2018).
It signified the setting of a timeline for how urgently the world needs to reform its carbonintensive path to enable all main business sectors to be operational with net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.
Likewise, since the built environment is responsible for a major portion of global energy consumption and the associated carbon emissions, it can play a significant role in achieving the Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 236 goals of the Paris Agreement.
In the report, ‘From thousands to billions: Coordinated action towards 100% net zero carbon buildings by 2050’, the WGBC (2018) calls for an ambitious transformation towards a wholly zerocarbon global building stock through the objectives of their Advancing Net Zero Programme (Laski & Burrows, 2017: 7): • All new buildings must operate at net-zero carbon from 2030: Netzero carbon buildings must become a standard business practice as soon as possible, so we build right from the start, avoid the need for future major retrofits, and prevent the lock-in of carbon-emitting systems for decades to come.
• 100% of buildings must operate at net-zero carbon by 2050: Existing buildings require not only an acceleration of current renovation rates, but these renovations must be completed to a net-zero carbon standard so that all buildings are net-zero carbon in operation by 2050.
In accomplishing these goals, the built environment may markedly assist in ensuring that the worst of climate change is avoided and simultaneously generate social and economic co-benefits (Laski & Burrows, 2017).
Consequently, highly energy-efficient buildings that satisfy their energy demands from renewable sources, whether on-site and/or off-site (i.e., net-zero carbon buildings), are recognised as a more feasible goal for the scale needed to realise the Paris Agreement’s target of GHGs emission reductions (WGBC, 2018).
The two primary components of net-zero carbon buildings are energy efficiency and renewable energy.
However, other zero-carbon strategies should also be considered when designing net-zero carbon buildings.
For example, passive solar design can eradicate the need for carbon-intensive air conditioning and heating, while good daylighting can address artificial lighting energy demands (Hughes, Yordi & Besco, 2020).
Transformations in how buildings are constructed and designed should be led by the government for the required scale and impact, by leading in the implementation of energy-efficient buildings to propel the movement towards net-zero carbon (Gardner, 2020).
The social housing sector is one where significant social and economic benefits, apart from the environmental and climate change mitigation implications, can be derived from incorporating net-zero carbon buildings.
The concerted action of the private sector, government, and NGOs is essential to achieve the potential carbon emissions reduction possible in the social housing sector.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 237 2.5 GBCSA’s Net Zero/Net Positive Certification Scheme The GBCSA is among the 24 green building councils contributing to the WGBC’s Advancing Net Zero programme, in the attempt to enable a 100% net-zero carbon global building stock by the year 2050 (WGBC, 2018).
The GBCSA has subsequently established its Net Zero Certification Scheme in response to climate change and to achieving the goals set out in the Paris Agreement (GBCSA, 2019).
The GBCSA certification takes it further, by recognising buildings for net-zero (entirely neutralising) and net-positive (positively restoring) environmental effects within four categories: carbon, water, waste, and ecology.
Within the GBCSA’s Net-Zero Carbon Certification Scheme, new buildings can achieve “Level 1 Net Zero certifications and Level 2 Net Zero/Net Positive certifications”.
Existing buildings can only attain “Level 2 Net Zero/ Net Positive certifications”.
The certification is valid for 3 years.
The Net Zero Carbon – Level 1: Building Emissions accreditation would require the non-tenant “Base Building Emissions (BEs)”, when modelled over one year, to be equal to zero.
This is meant to be the Regulated Emissions from the building’s fixed services (GBCSA, 2019: 13).
The “Net Zero/Net Positive Carbon – Level 2: Occupant Emissions” accreditation takes into account the measured or modelled operational energy emissions of the building and the tenant for one year and represents the Unregulated Emissions, which is the energy usage by the building and its occupants, including electrical loads (“Base Building Emissions + Occupant Emissions”) (GBCSA, 2019: 13).
3.
RESEARCH METHOD This study followed the mixed-methods (qualitative and quantitative) research approach (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017) to describe, evaluate, and interpret the energy performance of social housing as a catalyst toward net-zero carbon building in the mitigation of climate change in South Africa.
The research employed multiple case studies, complemented with secondary data analysis and simulation modelling.
Case studies are the preferred research method when conveying an understanding of a multifaceted question; when the investigator has hardly any control over the subject matter, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin, 1984: 13; Hofstee, 2006).
The number of factors that are possible to consider is often substantial, relative to the number of case studies and opportunities available, which may produce limited sampling instants in the identification of statistical interaction.
This study was delineated from the outset to examine carbon emissions contributing to climate change in the use phase of the cases only.
Data were triangulated through secondary data, structured observation, and Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 238 primary data from the simulation modelling IESVE software, which was also used in the analysis of the cases.
3.1 Case studies The two case studies analysed in this study are K206, Alexandra, Johannesburg, and Sandbag Houses, Cape Town.
The case study selection was based on the following criteria: • Time frame: Post-2004 (the year in which the BNG policy came into effect [DHS, 2010]).
• Geographic area: Urban areas of the Republic of SA.
• Type of case: Social (medium-density) housing project.
• Projects that have been recognised as sustainable initiatives, and at minimum exhibit climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies since there is currently no net-zero carbon social housing project.
Both case studies are recognised as innovative projects with numerous publications discussing them.
K206 and Sandbag Housing unit plans (Figures 4 and 5) were used to develop the geometry in the IES VE simulation software.
Figure 4: K206 Housing unit first-floor plans Source: Adapted from Osman & Davey, 2011: 7 Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 239 Figure 5: A 10X10 Sandbag House floor plans Source: Adapted from Johnson, 2014: online 3.1.1 Simulation and statistical modelling The study followed a simulation method “to capture the essence of a process by identifying key variables and then creating a representation of it” (Hofstee, 2006: 129).
However, the prospect of over-simplification of reality presents a limitation, since the difficulty in capturing reality may get complicated on close observation.
Therefore, the case studies were carefully limited to addressing issues of energy and carbon emissions.
Residential buildings also tend to be problematic to model, due to broadly varying occupancy profiles and regularities, and the unpredictable precise use of the building (Skelhorn, Levermore & Lindley, 2016).
The same predefined occupancy use profile was thus assigned to both case studies.
3.1.2 Integrated Environmental Solutions Virtual Environment (IES VE) 2017 Software A building performance software, Integrated Environmental Solutions (IES) VE program was used to model the case studies and to analyse them in terms of energy use and interior comfort.
IES VE has been extensively used to achieve net-zero carbon buildings, by enabling more effective design approaches in favour of others to achieve a net-zero building (Smith, 2016).
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 240 The case studies were first modelled in the ModelIT application of IES, based on the data gathered through secondary data analysis and structured observations.
ModelIT is the IES VE module that is used to create the geometry and orientation of the projects.
The Weather file closest to the case study site was selected within the program (within a maximum of 50km from the site, as required by Greenstar).
Thereafter, the Solar Shading Analysis application, SunCast, was run to include solar exposure and energy in the simulation.
The relevant construction and thermal data, user profiles, and lighting were recorded in the Apache tool, after which a dynamic simulation of the model was run, and the results were viewed within the VistaPro tool in the software suite.
The case studies’ energy and carbon are then calculated, by processing a dynamic simulation in the “VE-Gaia Building Energy Navigator” (IES, 2018: 36).
The simulation generates the estimated annual energy use, including a breakdown thereof, as well as peak heating, cooling, and humidification loads, including internal thermal gains (IES, 2018).
This was used in the analysis of the case studies.
3.2 Data The data consulted both secondary and primary sources and constituted a combination of textual and numeric data.
Secondary data regarding climate change, carbon emissions, and energy was sourced from notable sources such as the UNEP, IPCC, StatsSA, WRI, Sabinet, as well as local, national, and provincial departments.
GIS data, including site information, location, accessibility, and nearby amenities, were sourced from sites such as Google Earth, Maps and Streetview, and AfriGIS, as well as previous studies on the social housing projects involved.
The primary data regarding the case studies were gathered from the IES VE software and the structured observation of the case studies, to ensure further data triangulation.
3.3 Technical data used to inform the modelling 3.3.1 The GBCSA Net-Zero Carbon Certification Scheme The GBCSA Net-Zero Carbon Certification Scheme was used as a guide to inform the modelling of the study.
It entails the buildings to be modelled with the actual building’s data and analysed for energy use following specific parameters and with GBCSA-approved software.
The IES VE program used in this study is among the approved software.
The goal intended by the energy calculator is to decrease the quantity of GHGs produced through energy usage.
Accordingly, the generated energy usage figures are converted to their respective CO2 emissions for Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 241 evaluation within the energy calculator.
Table 1 presents the kgCO2/kWh conversions used in the energy calculator.
Renewable energy sources, not including biomass, are to be considered carbon emissions-free.
The calculator produces an estimate of the GHG emissions in kgCO2/m²/year.
Table 1: CO2 emission of energy sources Energy sources kgCO2 /kWh Mains electricity 1.2 Diesel 0.267 LPG 0.227 Natural gas 0.202 Coal 0.354 Biogas 0.025 Town gas (coal) 0.160 Source: GBCSA, 2019: 3 The energy modelling protocol required only one instance of each dwelling type to be modelled, as outlined in the GSSA MURT (GBCSA, 2011a).
The specific modelling parameters used for the simulation are as follows: • Weather data: A Test Reference Year (TRY), where the building location is within 50km of a TRY location (GBCSA, 2011b: 8).
• Space types: The correct space types and areas (GBCSA, 2011b: 8).
• Geometry: The actual geometry of the building, including building form, shading, overshadowing, and orientation (GBCSA, 2011b: 9).
• Building fabric: The construction make-up of walls, ceilings, and floors, as well as insulation.
• Glazing properties: The windows and doors are modelled using the actual solar transmission, internal and external solar reflectance and emissivity, as well as the correct sizes and modulating types (GBCSA 2011b: 11) • Air exchanges: Infiltration: 0.5 L/s·m2 (GBCSA, 2011b: 12).
Operable window: 2 L/s·m2 (SA, 2011b: 22).
Non-operable window: 0.31 L/s·m2 (SANS 204, 2011: 22).
Door: 5 L/s·m2 (SANS 204, 2011: 22).
• Lighting: 4 W/m² or as the actual design.
• Equipment loads: 4 W/m² or as the actual design.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 242 • Kitchen loads: 150 W/occupant sensible and 90W/occupant latent (GBCSA, 2011b: 13).
• Fresh air rate: Actual design rate.
• Occupancy: Dwelling occupants = no.
of bedrooms + 1 or actual occupancy (GBCSA, 2011b: 13).
• Internal thermal gains and energy loads: Table 2: Internal thermal gains and energy loads for the case studies Room CODE Internal gain Use profile Count Energy load (Watt) Total (kW) All People Social Housing 4 60 0,24 Bedroom 1 Cell phone charger SH equipment 2 10 0,01 Bedroom 1 Radio alarm Constant on 1 5 0,005 Bedroom 2 Radio/alarm Constant on 1 5 0,005 Bedroom 3 Cell phone charger SH equipment 1 10 0,01 Kitchen Stove SH cooking 1 3000 3 Kitchen Kettle SH cooking 1 1500 1,5 Kitchen Fridge Constant on 1 250 0,25 Kitchen Microwave SH cooking 1 700 0,7 Living area Iron SH equipment 1 500 0,5 Living area Television 32 SH equipment 1 148 0,148 All Lighting Social housing 8 40 0,32 Source: IES VE, 2018 Since the case studies are passive buildings, the simulation modelling was further used to analyse whether the case study model complies with the GBCSA’s Thermal Comfort (IEQ-9).
The operative internal temperatures for bedroom and habitable areas must be within the ASHRAE Standard 55-2004 80% Acceptability Limits, in line with the Green Star SA Multi-Unit Residential v1 DTS and Energy Modelling Protocol Guide (GBCSA, 2011b).
This translates to ASHRAE recommending an indoor air temperature range of 19°C-28°C for thermal comfort purposes.
3.3.2 Construction data Tables 3 and 4 provide the construction material and its thermal conductivity and resistance thereof of each building component of the case studies.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 243 Table 3: Construction components of the K206 housing units Component Construction materials Thermal conductivity U-Value (W/m.K) Thermal resistance R-Value (K.m2/W) External wall 220mm fly-ash concrete brick wall 0.856 (BEE 2017) 0.2570 Groundfloor Slab 85mm cast in-situ concrete floor slab 0.4 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.2125 First floor slab 170mm cast in-situ concrete floor slab 0.4 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.4250 Roof 0.47mm corrugated steel roof sheeting 20 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.0001 Ceiling None Interior wall 220mm fly-ash concrete brick wall 0.856 (BEE 2017) 0.2570 Door Steel framed 40mm timber door 0.13 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.3077 Windows Steel framed 6mm single pane window 0.96 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.1559 (U-value: 7.9) Source: Osman & Davey, 2011: 1-4 Table 4: Construction components of the Sandbag housing units Component Construction materials Thermal conductivity U-Value (W/m.K) Thermal resistance R-Value (K.m2/W) External wall 270mm sandbag wall; plastered 0.135 (ecoBuild 2009) 2 Groundfloor slab 100mm sandbag and screed floor 0.135 (ecoBuild 2009) 0.74 First floor slab 170mm cast in-situ concrete floor slab 0.4 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.4250 Roof 0.47mm corrugated steel roof sheeting 20 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.0001 Ceiling 12.5mm gypsum ceiling and 100mm insulation 0.03 (Isotherm 2019) 3.6 Interior wall 90mm dry-walling 0.17 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.59 Door Steel framed 40mm timber door 0.13 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.31 Windows Steel framed 6mm single pane window 0.96 (Eng.
ToolBox 2003) 0.16 / U-value:7.9 Source: Mpahlwa, 2011:1 Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 244 3.3.3 Model assumptions and inputs The TRY weather file used in the K206 Housing Simulation is the JohannesburgIWEC.fwt.
The weather file is based at the Johannesburg International Airport and is within 50km of the site (GBCSA, 2011b).
It is located 13.25km away (Google Earth, 2015a).
The TRY weather file used in the Sandbag Houses Simulation is the CapeTownDOE2.epw.
The weather file is based at the Cape Town International Airport and is within 50km of the site (GBCSA, 2011b: guideline).
It is located 10.4km away (Google Earth, 2015b).
The thermal template used in the IES VE, designated ‘Social Housing’, has the parameters set as shown below: • Orientation: Actual observed on site.
• Use profile: SH Residential: 4 People occupancy (the higher of the two: the design occupancy of Sandbag Houses and occupancy in line with the GBCSA (2011b: 13) energy modelling protocol, which estimates occupant numbers as follows: Dwelling occupants = no.
of bedrooms + 1).
See Figure 8.
The cooling and heating setpoints are calculated as per the ASHRAE-55 (2004) Adaptive Comfort 80% Acceptability Limits: • Cooling setpoint: K206: 26.279°C.
Sandbag: 26.345°C.
• Cooling system: Natural ventilation.
• Heating setpoint: K206: 19.279°C.
Sandbag: 19.345°C.
• Heating equipment: 800W electric resistance heater.
3.4 Analysis Inductive analysis of the case studies was undertaken based on first examining the context of each project, then conducting an architectural design analysis focusing on the project’s materiality and design in terms of environmental sustainability, energy efficiency and carbon footprint, utilising primary observational data as well as secondary data.
Lastly, an analysis of the building operation-related carbon emissions of both case studies and its simulated energy loads and carbon emissions, to determine the potential of the net-zero carbon building in the social housing context as a climate change mitigation response.
The project’s compliance with the GreenStar IEQ-9: Thermal Comfort requirement was also determined with the IES VE software and analysed.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 245 W EE KD A Y SC H ED U LE TI M E: 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00 % O C C U PI ED 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 50% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 75% 75% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% W EE KE N D S C H ED U LE TI M E: 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00 % O C C U PI ED 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 75% 75% 100% 100% 100% 50% 50% 50% 100% 100% 100% Fi gu re 8 : Ty pi ca l S H u se p ro fil e ba se d on 4 o cc up an ts u se d w ith in th e IE S V E S ou rc e: A ut ho rs Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 246 3.5 Limitations While the results may be useful in other developing country contexts, the researcher limited the study geographically to urban SA, and projects incepted since 2004.
4.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 4.1 Evaluation and comparison of the case studies The two social housing projects, the K206 and Sandbag Houses, are explored to determine their energy performance in facilitating social housing to contribute to the overall SA climate change mitigation initiative.
This is done by attempting to evaluate the cases by modelling the energy and carbon emission loads of the projects to understand how a net-zero carbon social housing landscape can be achieved in SA.
Table 5 represents the observational data collected on the researcher’s site visits to each of the case study projects.
Tables 6 and 7 represent the simulated energy loads of the case studies.
The K206 housing unit’s total electricity per annum is calculated to be 8.9642 MWh per 84 m2 unit, 106.71 kWh/m2/annum and 128.06 kgCO2/m 2/ annum; the Sandbag houses’ total electricity per annum is calculated to be 2.9692 MWh per 54 m2 unit, is 54.98 kWh/m2/annum and 57.3 kgCO2/m 2/ annum.
The K206 housing unit’s energy (Case study 1) consumption, as shown in Table 6, reveals that the space heating load is substantial and higher than any other electrical use type (3.7681MWh/annum – 42% of the total energy use).
However, the housing unit does not satisfy the Thermal Comfort IEQ-9 ASHRAE 55-2004 80% Acceptability Limits for 85% of the year.
The lighting (K206 – 17.5%; Sandbag – 39%) and cooking electric resistance loads (K206 – 13%; Sandbag – 38%) in both projects are also high and could be minimised by better day-lighting strategies and alternative renewable energy sources.
While the Sandbag housing unit (Case study 2) almost satisfies the IEQ-9 Thermal Comfort requirement (only the living room falls short and is within the comfort temperature range 75.8% of the time), this could be easily achieved through passive heating measures such as a shaded north-facing window.
The use of an innovative and alternate building material with a high R-value (2 K.m2/W), together with adequate roof insulation, has enabled the Sandbag Houses to have a more comfortable thermal interior.
The observational study revealed that natural lighting is inadequate in both projects, as electrical lighting is often used even during the daytime.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 247 Table 5: Building data collected or verified through the observational study Building component K206 housing project Sandbag houses Building exterior finish Fly-ash face brick walls; plastered and painted in some instances.
Plastered and painted; portions of ship-lapped timber cladding that are painted.
Roofing and overhang Steel channel rafters and corrugated roof sheeting; approximately 200mm overhang.
No gutters or downpipes.
Eco beam rafters and corrugated roof sheeting; approximately 600mm and 300mm overhangs.
Gutters and downpipes are present.
Window treatment Steel window frames; operable: side-hung.
Steel window frames; operable: top-hung.
Natural ventilation No cross ventilation or other ventilation initiatives are present in units.
Windows are located along the same or adjacent walls, except for the first-floor room (Osman & Davey, 2011).
All habitable rooms have sufficient operable window area, i.e.
minimum 5% of floor area as per SANS 10400-O (SA, 2011b).
Cross ventilation is present in units.
Windows are located along adjacent and opposite walls.
All habitable rooms have sufficient operable window area, i.e.
minimum 5% of floor area as per SANS 10400-O (SA, 2011b).
HVAC None.
None.
Solar water heaters Solar water heaters are present.
Solar water heaters are present.
Renewable energy None.
None.
Space heating Electric plug-in heaters (assumed).
Electric plug-in heaters (assumed).
Lighting One light and electrical outlet per habitable room.
High mast security street lighting for residential purposes as per the minimum level of service for new housing projects within the Department of Human Settlements (PMG, 2013).
One light and electrical outlet per habitable room.
High mast security street lighting for residential purposes as per the minimum level of service for new housing projects within the Department of Human Settlements (PMG, 2013).
Natural lighting Low natural daylighting; electrical lighting is used during the daytime.
Low natural daylighting; electrical lighting is used during the daytime.
Cooking appliances Electric stove, plug-in microwave, and kettle.
Electric stove, plug-in microwave, and kettle.
Energyefficient appliances Fridge (assumed).
Fridge (assumed).
Noise level High noise levels due to the adjacent main road (London Rd).
Low noise level.
Interior wall finish None; some units have been plastered and painted or painted internally by the owner (Osman & Davey, 2011).
Plasterboard and painted (Mpahlwa, 2011).
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 248 Building component K206 housing project Sandbag houses Floor finish Screed floor (Osman & Davey, 2011).
Screed floor; some units have been finished by the owner/ tenant (Mpahlwa, 2011).
Ceiling and insulation None.
100mm isotherm insulation and gypsum board ceiling (Mpahlwa, 2011).
Private outdoor space Semi-private communal courtyard space is provided; some units have added yard walls or fences, creating private outdoor space (Google Earth, 2015a, Osman & Davey, 2011).
Private back garden space is provided; some units have added yard walls or fences in front, creating additional private outdoor space (Google Earth, 2015b).
Renovations/ Additions Backyard shacks were added in some instances.
Additional rooms have been added to the back garden on 6 of the 10 houses.
None of the balconies has been converted into an additional bedroom, as was the intention of the design (Mpahlwa, 2012).
Source: Authors The total energy consumption of the K206 housing unit is simulated to be 8.9642 MWh/year, of which 3.7681 MWh/year is owed to space heating, whereas the Sandbag houses’ energy consumption amounted to 2.9692 MWh/year, almost a quarter of the K206 housing unit’s consumption.
The case studies have similar mean annual temperatures (IES, 2108), thus the heating and cooling requirements are comparable.
The K206 housing projects also do not comply with the later Energy Usage in Buildings regulations, the SANS 10400-XA (SA, 2011b), and would require insulated roofs and hot-water pipes to comply, whereas the later Sandbag houses do comply.
The positive communal nature of the medium-density K206 housing units employing shared walls and courtyard space (Osman & Davey, 2011) addresses the negative impacts of urban sprawl and lowers the total mass of materials used and thus the carbon footprint of the project.
The later incorporation of solar water heaters contributes to the energy efficiency of the project, a pathway to net-zero carbon building.
However, the inefficient design, the lack of any insulation, cross-ventilation, adequate daylighting, and renewable energy initiatives are attributed to the high-energy intensity of the project.
The incorporation of the ecoBuild Sandbag system in the construction of the Sandbag houses provided superior thermal stability and thus a more energy-efficient and lower carbon footprint project.
The support of unskilled labour and the use of sandbags in building taps into indigenous construction techniques well-suited for the South African context and sandy areas Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 249 Ta bl e 6: K 20 6 en er gy c on su m pt io n an d C O 2 e m is si on le ve ls K2 06 c a se s tu d y Pr o je c t F ile : k 20 6. m it Si m F ile : K 20 6. a p s 04 /O c t/ 20 19 W e a th e r F ile : J o ha nn e sb ur g IW EC .fw t D a te To ta l e le c tr ic ity (M W h) In te rio r lig ht in g (M W h) C o o ki ng (M W h) Re fri g e ra tio n (M W h) O th e r p ro c e ss (M W h) Sp a c e he a tin g (M W h) Sp a c e c o o lin g (M W h) El e c tr ic ity C E (k g C O 2) Ja n 01 -3 1 0.
61 38 0.
13 89 0.
10 23 0.
01 86 0.
02 51 0.
16 16 0.
00 00 73 6 Fe b 0 128 0.
60 17 0.
12 54 0.
09 24 0.
01 68 0.
02 26 0.
19 33 0.
00 00 72 2 M a r 0 131 0.
73 93 0.
13 89 0.
10 23 0.
01 86 0.
02 51 0.
28 70 0.
00 00 88 7 A p r 0 130 0.
79 81 0.
13 44 0.
09 90 0.
01 80 0.
02 43 0.
36 04 0.
00 00 95 8 M a y 01 -3 1 0.
86 02 0.
13 89 0.
10 23 0.
01 86 0.
02 51 0.
40 79 0.
00 00 10 32 Ju n 01 -3 0 0.
85 70 0.
13 44 0.
09 90 0.
01 80 0.
02 43 0.
41 94 0.
00 00 10 28 Ju l 0 131 0.
88 75 0.
13 89 0.
10 23 0.
01 86 0.
02 51 0.
43 52 0.
00 00 10 65 A ug 0 131 0.
86 60 0.
13 89 0.
10 23 0.
01 86 0.
02 51 0.
41 37 0.
00 00 10 39 Se p 0 130 0.
78 55 0.
13 44 0.
09 90 0.
01 80 0.
02 43 0.
34 78 0.
00 00 94 3 O c t 01 -3 1 0.
76 95 0.
13 89 0.
10 23 0.
01 86 0.
02 51 0.
31 73 0.
00 00 92 3 N o v 01 -3 0 0.
71 30 0.
13 44 0.
09 90 0.
01 80 0.
02 43 0.
27 54 0.
00 00 85 5 D e c 0 131 0.
47 26 0.
07 17 0.
05 28 0.
01 86 0.
01 29 0.
14 92 0.
00 00 56 7 Su m m e d to ta l 8.
96 42 1.
56 80 1.
15 50 0.
19 00 0.
28 30 3.
76 81 0.
00 00 10 75 7 S ou rc e: A ut ho rs Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 250 Ta bl e 7: S an db ag H ou se s en er gy c on su m pt io n an d C O 2 e m is si on le ve ls Sa nd b a g H o us e s c a se s tu d y Pr o je c t F ile : S a nd b a g H o us e .m it Si m F ile : S a nd b a g H o us e .a p s 11 /O c t/ 20 19 W e a th e r F ile : C a p e To w nD O E2 .e p w D a te To ta l e ne rg y (M W h) El e c tr ic ity (M W h) In te rio r lig ht in g (M W h) C o o ki ng (M W h) Re fri g e ra tio n (M W h) O th e r p ro c e ss (M W h) Sp a c e he a tin g (M W h) Sp a c e c o o lin g (M W h) El e c tr ic ity C E (k g C O 2) Ja n 01 -3 1 0.
25 02 0.
25 02 0.
09 92 0.
10 23 0.
00 01 0.
02 48 0.
02 38 0.
00 00 26 1 Fe b 0 128 0.
22 64 0.
22 64 0.
08 96 0.
09 24 0.
00 01 0.
02 24 0.
02 18 0.
00 00 23 6 M a r 0 131 0.
25 59 0.
25 59 0.
09 92 0.
10 23 0.
00 01 0.
02 48 0.
02 94 0.
00 00 26 7 A p r 0 130 0.
25 56 0.
25 56 0.
09 60 0.
09 90 0.
00 01 0.
02 40 0.
03 64 0.
00 00 26 6 M a y 01 -3 1 0.
26 78 0.
26 78 0.
09 92 0.
10 23 0.
00 01 0.
02 48 0.
04 13 0.
00 00 27 9 Ju n 01 -3 0 0.
26 08 0.
26 08 0.
09 60 0.
09 90 0.
00 01 0.
02 40 0.
04 16 0.
00 00 27 2 Ju l 0 131 0.
26 88 0.
26 88 0.
09 92 0.
10 23 0.
00 01 0.
02 48 0.
04 23 0.
00 00 28 0 A ug 0 131 0.
26 92 0.
26 92 0.
09 92 0.
10 23 0.
00 01 0.
02 48 0.
04 27 0.
00 00 28 0 Se p 0 130 0.
26 00 0.
26 00 0.
09 60 0.
09 90 0.
00 01 0.
02 40 0.
04 08 0.
00 00 27 1 O c t 01 -3 1 0.
26 61 0.
26 61 0.
09 92 0.
10 23 0.
00 01 0.
02 48 0.
03 96 0.
00 00 27 7 N o v 01 -3 0 0.
25 42 0.
25 42 0.
09 60 0.
09 90 0.
00 01 0.
02 40 0.
03 50 0.
00 00 26 5 D e c 0 131 0.
13 42 0.
13 42 0.
05 12 0.
05 28 0.
00 01 0.
01 28 0.
01 72 0.
00 00 14 0 Su m m e d to ta l 2.
96 92 2.
96 92 1.
12 00 1.
15 50 0.
00 18 0.
28 04 0.
41 21 0.
00 00 30 94 S ou rc e: A ut ho rs Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 251 such as the project’s site (Thompson-Smeddle, 2009).
The integration of community involvement and education in the construction phase, and the decision to build up and increase the density of the houses improved its overall pathway to a net-zero carbon building.
A net-zero carbon building could be achieved in the case of the Sandbag house if the building is improved through more energy-efficient appliances and lighting, adequate daylighting and solar gain, and a low-cost renewable energy system (Gibberd, 2017).
Winter solar gain through shaded glazed openings on the north can reduce the projects’ heating and lighting load and improve daylighting.
A solar PV cell with a backup battery or fed into the electrical grid could bring the Sandbag housing project to net-zero carbon, thereby contributing to the overall SA climate change mitigation initiative.
The purpose of net-zero carbon building is to decrease the amount of GHGs emitted through energy usage and address the fast-growing, inefficient, and carbon-intensive buildings, particularly within developing country contexts such as SA.
Furthermore, the 2050 WGBC’s international Advancing Net Zero project endeavours to ensure that all buildings are to be net-zero carbon by the year 2050, and to support the development of net-zero pilot projects within SA (GBCSA, 2019).
However, to warrant that all buildings are net-zero carbon by 2050, the net-zero carbon initiative developed to achieve this goal needs to include all building types, including low-cost and social housing.
Social housing projects in SA have a considerable energy load, as shown in the K206 project.
Considering the energy poverty present in the recipients of social housing and the high energy footprints of poorly designed housing, a specific focus on developing efficient and bio-climatically appropriate design responses must be undertaken.
5.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Although there is an increasing demand and a large housing backlog in SA, social housing projects in SA do not address the substantial climate change mitigation potential that they could achieve.
On the other hand, social housing projects undertaken by formal funding or governmental development initiatives can achieve mitigation objectives with immediate effect and are not dependent on factors such as social acceptance, environmental consciousness, and individuals buying into the concept.
It has significant potential to perform as a climate change mitigation strategy, and help SA achieve its NDCs, while lowering energy poverty in SA.
Unfortunately, the sectors that are most vulnerable to climate change are often the ones that have contributed the least to climate change.
They often also have hardly anything to do with the decision-making and Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 252 planning processes of the homes in which they reside.
As a result, they have hardly any control of the carbon emissions they consequently emit.
The carbon intensity of social housing projects is mostly in the hands of the decision-makers in the housing sector and can either set the precedent for a low carbon SA or further embed vulnerability to climate change for the poor.
Thus, the interrelationship between social housing policy and the implementation of net-zero carbon building has an important role to play in optimising the potential that social housing can have in mitigating climate change in SA.
Based on the case studies and social housing research in SA, the current net-zero carbon building action in SA does not address the low-cost nature of social housing projects.
The economic and technological limitations of social housing projects in SA may be a contributing factor.
The lack of action in this sector, apart from the climate change mitigation and social justice implications associated with the implementation of a net-zero carbon social housing sector, also misses the opportunity for the government to lead by example.
As a result, it does not acknowledge the significant potential this sector has in performing as a climate change mitigation strategy and contributing to local and international climate change mitigation goals.
Government and other role players could consider the following recommendations: • Low or zero-carbon housing development in SA needs affordable, adequate, and sustainable social housing solutions to respond to the local housing backlog and climate change crisis.
• A net-zero carbon social housing in SA could be achieved through the incorporation of sustainable building materials with high thermal resistance and thermal mass, adequate glazing and orientation, energy-efficient equipment, renewable energy systems, and passive solar design, among other energy-efficiency strategies.
• An appropriate combination of research into social housing government regulation, energy-efficient technologies, renewable energy, and human behaviour could significantly contribute to the development of net-zero carbon social housing in SA and consequently reduce GHG emissions from the building industry.
• Net-zero carbon building action in SA could benefit from recognising the importance and potential of the inclusion of social housing in climate change mitigation strategies and addressing the method and extensiveness in which energy use and thus carbon emissions are calculated accordingly.
• Other means or indicators to assess the carbon intensity and sustainability of low-cost projects could also be beneficial, along with the development of guidelines and government policies on building regulations on the achievement of net-zero carbon social housing in SA.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 253 REFERENCES Ampofo-Anti, N. Dumani, N. & Van Wyk, L. 2015.
Potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the South African construction sector.
DBSA Green Fund Research and Policy Development to advance a Green Economy in SA: Research report.
Pretoria: CSIR.
ASHRAE-55.
2004.
ASHRAE Standard 55-2004.
Thermal Environmental Conditions for Human Occupancy.
Atlanta: American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers.
Available at: <https://www.
ashrae.com/File%20Library/Technical%20Resources/Standards%20 and%20Guidelines/Standards%20Addenda/ad55_2004_-h.pdf> [Accessed: 3 June 2019].
ASSAF (Academy of Science of South Africa).
2011.
Towards a low carbon city: Focus on Durban.
Pretoria: ASSAF.
Blok, K. Afanador, A.
& Van Vuuren, D. 2017.
Chapter 4: Bridging the gap – sectoral greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials in 2030.
In: UN Environment Programme (UNEP), The 2017 Emissions Gap Report: pp.
27-37.
Available at: <http://www.unep.org/emissionsgap/> [Accessed: 19 April 2018].
Bolin, B.
1980.
Climatic changes and their effects on the biosphere.
Los Angeles, California: World Metereological Organization.
Brewis, C. 2012.
Quantifying the environmental dimension of sustainability for the built environment with a focus on low-cost housing in South Africa.
Unpublished MSc Eng thesis, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch.
Available at: <http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/20298> [Accessed 11 July 2019].
Chiodelli, F. & Moroni, S. 2014 The complex nexus between informality and the law: Reconsidering unauthorised settlements in light of the concept of nomotropism.
Geoforum, 51, pp.
161-168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
geoforum.2013.11.004 Chipkin, C.M.
1998.
Preparing for apartheid.
In: Le Roux, S.W.
& Fisher, R.C.
(Eds).
Architecture of the Transvaal.
Pretoria: UNISA, pp.142-172.
Combrinck, C. 2015.
A model to address marginality of the architectural profession in the South African discourse on informal settlement upgrade.
Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
DEA (Department of Environmental Affairs).
2011.
National Climate Change Response White Paper.
Pretoria: Department of Environmental Affairs.
Available at: <https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/ files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf> [Accessed: 2 March 2018].
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 254 Dechezleprêtre, A. Martin, R. & Bassi, S. 2016.
Climate change policy, innovation and growth.
Policy brief.
London: The Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
Available at: <http://www.
lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Dechezlepretreet-al-policy-brief-Jan-2016.pdf> [Accessed: 26 July 2018].
DHS (Department of Human Settlements).
2010.
National Housing Policy and Subsidy Programmes.
Pretoria: Chief Directorate Policy Development.
ecoBUILD.
2009.
Products.
Cape Town: ecoBuild Technologies.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.ecobuildtechnologies.com/products.htm#bag> [Accessed: 18 September 2018].
EcoSUN.
[n.d.] Sustainable villages.
Available at: <http://ecosun.com.
de/datei-download/lade-datei/ecosun-internet161208-pdf> [Accessed: 18 September 2018].
Eng.
ToolBox.
2003.
Thermal conductivity of common materials and gases.
Available at: <https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/thermalconductivity-d_429.html> [Accessed: 18 September 2018].
Fieuw, W. 2014.
A decade after BNG: Does UISP work?
Johannesburg: South African SDI Alliance.
Available at: <http://sasdialliance.org.za/adecade-after-bng-does-uisp-work/> [Accessed: 26 April 2018].
Findley, L. & Ogbu, L. 2011.
South Africa: From Township to Town.
After apartheid, spatial segregation remains.
placesjournal.org.
https://doi.
org/10.22269/111117 Gardner, D. 2020.
Building Consensus for Net Zero Carbon (NZC) Buildings in South African Cities.
Johannesburg: Sustainable Energy Africa.
GBCSA (Green Building Council of South Africa).
2011a.
Green Star SA – Multi-Unit Residential v1 Rating Tool Technical Manual.
Cape Town: GBCSA.
Available at: <https://gbcsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ Eligibility-Criteria-for-Multi-unit-Residential-Tool.pdf> [Accessed: 26 April 2018].
GBCSA (Green Building Council of South Africa).
2011b.
Green Star SA – Multi Unit Residential v1, DTS & Energy Modelling Protocol Guide.
Cape Town: GBCSA.
Available at: <https://gbcsa.org.za/wp-content/ uploads/2018/02/DTS-Energy-Modelling-Protocol-Guide.pdf> [Accessed: 26 April 2018].
GBCSA (Green Building Council of South Africa).
2018.
Green Building Council SA.
Available at: <https://www.gbcsa.org.za> [Accessed: 28 April 2018].
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 255 GBCSA (Green Building Council of South Africa).
2019.
Net Zero / Net Positive Certification Scheme Technical Manual V1.0.
Johannesburg: GBCSA.
Gibberd, J.
2017.
A critical evaluation of the Sustainable Building Assessment Tool (SBAT).
In: Samuel Laryea, S. & Ibem, E. (Eds).
Proceedings of the West Africa Built Environment Research WABER 2017 Conference, 16-18 August, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana, pp.
77-90.
Gibberd, J.
2018.
Climate change: Implications on South African building systems and component.
In: Green Building Handbook 11, The Essential Guide.
Cape Town: Alive 2 Green Publishers, pp.
92-103.
Google Earth 7.3.
2015a.
Alexandra 26° 06’24”S, 28°07’08”E, 1.87km.
Available at: https://earth.google.com/web/@26.10668539,28.11932765,1566.04705749a,308.25115484d,35y,0h,0t,0r [Accessed 21 August 2018].
Google Earth 7.3.
2015b.
Tafelsig 34° 03’32”S, 18°38’29”E, 1.15km.
Available at: https://earth.google.com/web/@26.10668539,28.11932765,1566.04705749a,308.25115484d,35y,0h,0t,0r [Accessed 21 August 2018].
Harris, R., Luger, S., Sutherland, C. & Tadross, M. 2012.
Potential impact of climate change on coastal flooding: A case study of the Salt River, Cape Town.
In: Cartwright, A., Parnell, S., Oelofse, G. & Ward, S. (Eds).
Climate change at the city scale: Impacts, mitigation and adaptation in Cape Town.
London: Routledge, pp.
38-72.
Harvey, D. 2012.
Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution.
London: Verso Books.
Heywood, V.H.
1995.
The global biodiversity assessment.
United Nations Environment Programme.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hofstee, E. 2006.
Constructing a good dissertation: A practical guide to finishing a Masters, MBA or PhD on schedule.
Johannesburg: EPE.
Howard, S.P., Rowe, D.R.
& Tchobanoglous, G. 1985.
Environmental engineering.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hughes, S., Yordi, S. & Besco, L. 2020.
The role of pilot projects in urban climate change policy innovation.
Policy Studies Journal, 48(2), pp.
271297. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12288 IES (Integrated Environmental Solutions).
2018.
Integrated Environmental Solutions.
Available at: <https://www.iesve.com/> [Accessed: 27 May 2018].
IPCC (Intergovernmental anel on Climate Change).
2014.
Climate change 2014: Synthesis Report.
In: Pachauri, R.K. & Meyer, L.A. (Eds).
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 256 Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Geneva: IPCC.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/ SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf> [Accessed: 27 May 2018].
Johnson, M. 2014.
Standing on sand: The sandbag house by MMA architects in Freedom Park, SA.
Living spaces.
Available at: <http:// livinspaces.blogspot.co.za/2014/09/standing-on-sand-sand-bag-house-bymma.html> [Accessed: 29 April 2018].
Laski, J.
& Burrows, V. 2017.
From thousands to billions: Coordinated action towards 100% net zero carbon buildings by 2050.
London: WGBC.
Available at: <https://www.worldgbc.org/sites/default/files/From%20 Thousands%20To%20Billions%20WorldGBC%20report_FINAL%20 issue%20310517.compressed.pdf> [Accessed: 29 April 2018].
Low, I.
2005.
Design as an instrument in transformation: Settlement as empowerment opportunity for socio-economic development.
Paper presented at the 33rd IAHS World Congress on Housing, 27-30 September, Pretoria, South Africa.
Mfeketo, N. 2018.
Human Settlements 2018/19 Budget Vote by The Minister of Human Settlements, Nomaindiya Mfeketo, at the NCOP, 7 June.
Pretoria: DHS.
Mpahlwa, L. 2011.
Housing solution.
Design indaba.
Available at: <http:// www.designindaba.com/videos/conference-talks/luyanda-mpahlwashousing-solution> [Accessed: 18 September 2019].
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration).
2019.
Climate time machine.
Available at: <https://climate.nasa.gov/interactives/climate-timemachine> [Accessed: 18 August 2019].
Osman, A.
& Davey, C. 2011.
Sustainable building transformation in the South African housing sector: CSIR case studies.
Pretoria: CSIR.
Pearman, G. 2005.
Chapter 7 Climate change.
In: Goldie, J., Douglas, B.
& Furnass, B.
(Eds).
In search of sustainability.
Collingwood: CSIRO, pp.
151-164.
PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group).
2013.
New housing norms and standards & provinical and local response: Department of Human Settlements briefing.
Available at: <https://pmg.org.za/committeemeeting/16006/> [Accessed: 3 October 2022].
Ramovha, N.T.
2017.
A Model for the Sustainable Delivery of Housing for South Africa.
Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg.
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 257 Rukmana, D. 2018.
Upgrading housing settlement for the urban poor in Indonesia: An analysis of the Kampung Deret Program.
In: Grant, B., Liu, C. & Ye, L. (Eds).
Metropolitan governance in Asia and the Pacific Rim.
Singapore: Springer Publishing, pp.
75-94. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-981-13-0206-0_5 SA (South Africa).
1996.
The Constitution of the Republic of SA, Act no.
108 of 1996.
Pretoria: Government Printer.
SA (South Africa).
2004.
The Comprehensive Housing Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements – Breaking New Ground (BNG).
Pretoria: Department of Housing.
SA (South Africa).
2006.
South African Cities Network – State of the Cities Report.
Braamfontein, South Africa: South African Cities Network.
SA (South Africa).
2008.
The Social Housing Act, Act No.16 of 2008.
Cape Town: Government Printer.
SA (South Africa).
2011a.
National Climate Change Response White Paper.
Pretoria: Government Printer.
SA (South Africa).
2011b.
SANS 10400-XA: The application of the National Building Regulations Part X: Environmental sustainability Part XA: Energy usage in buildings.
SA (South Africa).
2011c.
SANS 204: Energy efficiency in buildings.
Pretoria: SABS.
SA (South Africa).
2012.
National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make It Work.
Pretoria: National Planning Commission.
Schoonenboom, J.
& Johnson, R.B.
2017.
How to construct a mixed methods research design.
Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 69(2), pp.
107-131. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-017-0454-1 SHRA (Social Housing Regulatory Authority).
2020.
Strategic Plan 2020 2025.
Available at: <https://shra.org.za/download/strategicplan-2020-2025/> [Accessed: 3 October 2022].
Skelhorn, C., Levermore, G.J.
& Lindley, S. 2016.
Impacts on cooling energy consumption due to the UHI and vegetation changes in Manchester, UK.
Energy and Buildings, 122, pp.
150-159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enbuild.2016.01.035 Smith, M. 2016.
5 companies leading the charge on net zero building.
GreenBiz Group Inc.
Available at: <https://www.greenbiz.com/article/5companies-leading-charge-net-zero-building> [Accessed: 24 August 2019].
Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 258 Stern, N.H. 2006.
The economics of climate change: The Stern review.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/ CBO9780511817434 Taylor, A.
2017.
Urban climate adaptation as a process of organisational decision making.
Unpublished PhD dissertation.
Department of Environmental and Geographical Science, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.
Thompson-Smeddle, L. 2009.
Sustainable neighbourhood design manual: A non-technical guide.
Stellenbosch: The Sustainability Institute.
Tonkin, A.
2008.
Sustainable medium-density housing: A resource book.
Cape Town: DAG.
Trollip, H. & Boulle, M. 2017.
Challenges associated with implementing climate change mitigation policy in SA.
Energy Research Centre, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.
Available at: <http://www.erc.uct.
ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/119/Papers-2017/17-TrollipBoulleChallenges_implementing_climate_change_mitigation_policy.pdf> [Accessed: 30 August 2018].
UN (United Nations).
2019.
Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
Available at: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/ report/2019/goal-11/> [Accessed: 30 August 2018].
UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme).
2017.
The 2017 Emissions Gap Report.
Available at: <http://www.unep.org/emissionsgap/> [Accessed: 20 April 2018].
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
2015.
Adoption of the Paris Agreement.
21st Conference of the Parties, Paris: United Nations.
An Official Publication.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf> [Accessed: 18 March 2018].
UN-Habitat.
2015.
Green building interventions for social housing.
UN-Habitat and UNEP.
USGBC (United States Green Building Council).
2018.
Benefits of green building.
Available at: <https://www.usgbc.org/press/benefits-of-greenbuilding> [Accessed: 14 September 2018].
van Horen, B.
2000.
Informal settlement upgrading: Bridging the gap between the de facto and the de jure.
Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19(4), pp.389-400.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X0001900408 Vawda & Hugo 2022 Acta Structilia 29(2): 226-259 259 van Wyk, L. 2012.
Building resilient human settlements in a climate of change.
In: Green Building Handbook South Africa, Vol 4: The essential guide.
Cape Town: Alive2green, pp.
23-31.
WGBC (World Green Building Council).
2018.
What is Net Zero?
Available at: <http://www.worldgbc.org/advancing-net-zero/what-net-zero> [Accessed: 6 September 2018].
WRI (World Resources Institute).
2016.
Accelerating building efficiency: Eight actions for urban leaders.
Washington: WRI.
Available at: <https:// publications.wri.org/buildingefficiency/> [Accessed: 30 August 2018].
Yin, R.K. 1984.
Case study research: Design and methods.
Applied social research methods series.
2nd edition.
Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications.
Zalasiewicz, J.
& Williams, M. 2009.
Chapter 6 – A geological history of climate change.
In: Letcher, T.M.
(Ed.).
Climate change.
Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.
127-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53301-2.00006-3 _Hlk115792777 _Hlk115792799
Developing scenarios of atmosphere, weather and climate for northern regions Timothy R. Carter Agricultural Research Centre ofFinland, Office address: Finnish Meteorological Institute, Box 503, FIN-00101 Helsinki, Finland Future changes in atmospheric composition and consequent global and regional climate change are of increasing concern to policy makers, planners and the public.
However, predictions of these changes are uncertain.
In the absence of single, firm predictions, the next best approach is to identify sets of plausible future conditions termed scenarios.
This paper focuses on the development ofclimate change scenarios for northern high latitude regions.
Three methods of scenario development can be identified; use of analogues having conditions similar to those expected in the study region, application of general circulation model results, and composite methods that combine information from different sources.
A composite approach has been used to produce scenarios of temperature, precipitation, carbon dioxide and sea-level change for Finland up to 2100, as part of the Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change (SILMU).
Tools for applying these scenarios in impact assessment studies, including stochastic weather generators and spatial downscaling techniques, are also examined.
The SILMU scenarios attempt to capture uncertainties both in future emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols into the atmosphere and in the global climate response to these emissions.
Two types of scenario were developed: (i) simple “policy-oriented” scenarios and (ii) detailed “scientific” scenarios.
These are compared with new model estimates of future climate and recent observed changes in climate over certain high latitude regions.
Key words', climate change, temperature, precipitation, carbon dioxide, sea-level, uncertainty, baseline, Finland ntroduction One of the major constraints on agriculture in northern high latitude regions is climate.
Crop growth and production is limitedby a prolonged and often severe winter and a short growing season.
Crops are frequently grown close to their northern limits of potential, where the reliability of production is closely governed by year-toyear variations in the weather.
In historical times, periods of benign climate tended to favour the © Agricultural and Food Science in Finland Manuscript received February 1996 235 Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND clearance and colonisation of agricultural land in the high latitude zone, whilst runs of unfavourable weather contributed to crop losses, famine, farm abandonment and depopulation (e.g.
Utterström 1955,Parry 1978,Bergthörsson et al.
1988).
Given the sensitivity ofagriculture to climate in these regions, the prospect of a future global climatic warming due to anthropogenic causes could be of considerable significance.
There is an increasing body of evidence to suggest that this warming could exceed any recorded change since the end of the last glacial period 10,000 years ago (IPCC 1996).
In high latitude regions the warming may be greater than the global average.
However, there are still large uncertainties surrounding predictions of future changes.
This paper outlines some approaches used to project future climate change in northern high latitude agricultural regions.
The geographical scope of the discussion is the circumpolar boreal zone; broadly the region north of about 60°N in Europe and northern Russia, and extending south of 50°N in parts of North America and eastern Siberia (Hämet-Ahti 1981).
Its focus is on scenarios of changes in atmospheric composition and associated changes in regional climate, both of which may have important consequences for agriculture.
An example of an approach to develop scenarios for Finland is described in more detail.
These scenarios have been prepared for the Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change (SILMU), and have been applied in several SILMU studies reported in this volume to assess possible impacts of climate change on agriculture.
The changing atmosphere and its effect on climate During recent decades, measurements of the Earth’s atmosphere have indicatedrapid increases in concentration of two important types of constituent: (i) the so-called “greenhouse” gases, including carbon dioxide (C0 2 ), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N 2 0) and halocarbons, and (ii) atmospheric aerosols, especially sulphur compounds.
Increases in all of these are associated with human activities, in particular fossil fuel combustion, intensive agriculture and deforestation.
Rising concentrations of some of these constituents (e.g.
C02, tropospheric ozone (0 3 ) and sulphur dioxide (S0 2 )) can have direct effects on the surface biosphere, including agricultural plants (see, for example, Hakala and Mela 1996, Bowes et al.
1996).
Changes in all of them can affect the radiation balance of the Earth, and hence the global climate.
Greenhouse gases warm the surface and lower atmosphere by impeding the escape of terrestrial longwave radiation through the atmosphere and re-radiating some to the surface.
In contrast, aerosols usually have a cooling effect on the climate both directly, by absorbing incoming solar radiation, and indirectly, through their role in the formation of clouds which reflect solar radiation out to space.
Estimates of the relative effects of these different constituents in perturbing the radiation balance of the global climate system (“radiative forcing”) since pre-industrial times are shown in Figure 1.
These estimates are based on a comprehensive review of available evidence (IPCC 1996).
They are compared in the figure with estimates of the global forcing due to natural changes in solar irradiance since 1850.
Volcanic eruptions are another source of negative forcing, of a similar magnitude as the positive greenhouse gas forcing shown in Figure 1, but effective for only a year or two after a large eruption (IPCC 1996).
It should also be noted that the regional effects of changes in atmospheric composition on climate may differ (sometimes in sign) from the global effects.
The best tools available for evaluating the response of global climate to the radiative forcings shown in Figure 1 are numerical climate models.
These are based on physical laws, and attempt to simulate the major processes controlling the climate in the atmosphere, oceans and on land.
There is a hierarchy of climate models 236 Carter, T.R.
: Developing scenarios ofatmosphere, weather and climate AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249. ranging from simple box-models, which have only a few variables, to sophisticated coupled general circulation models (GCMs) of the atmosphere and oceans.
They are described further below.
However, none of these models are able to capture the full complexities of the climate system, and there are large uncertainties around estimates of regional climate change from GCMs.
The need for scenarios Notwithstanding the low confidence in individual model predictions, in order for actions to be taken to prevent or to slow down changes in the atmosphere, policy-makers need to be informed about the possible changes to be expected.Likewise, scientists require projections of these changes so they can examine their likely impacts.
It is also important to recognise that the uncertainties in projections are not due solely to the shortcomings of climate models.
Estimation of regional climate change can be thought of as the final step in a sequence of assumptions and uncertainties relating to: (i) future emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols into the atmosphere, depending on factors such as population growth and economic development; (ii) future atmospheric composition, affected by the quantity, mixing, reactions and residence time of different constituents; (iii) the global climate response to changing atmospheric composition; and (iv) climate changes at the regional and seasonal level.
It is at the regional level (where the uncertainty is greatest) that information is most needed in impact assessments.
Since accurate predictions of climate change are not available, an alternative approach is to develop scenarios.
These are alternative projections which are meteorologically plausible (i.e.
physically, temporally and geographically realistic) and embrace our best available estimates of the uncertainties in projections.
The main emphasis in the following sections is on scenarios of future climate, but it should be noted throughout that these scenarios need to be consistent, in time and space, with projections of other related environmental variables such as atmospheric composition and sea-level.
Fig.
1.
Estimates of the global annual mean radiative forcing (Wm 2 ) from 1850 to 1990 for a number of potential climate change mechanisms.
Column heights represent mid-range estimates of the forcing, error bars largely represent the spread of published values and the confidence levels givenat the base of the diagram are a subjective assessment of the confidence that the actual forcing lies within the error bar.
Source: IPCC (1996).
237 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Methods of developing climatic scenarios Three main approaches have been used in previous studies to construct scenarios of regional climate change, involving the use of; (i) analogues, (ii) general circulation models, and (iii) compositing.
These approaches are described briefly below, with examples mainly drawn from high latituderegions.
More extensive reviews of these approaches can be found elsewhere (e.g.
Giorgi and Mearns 1991, Pittock 1993).
Analogue scenarios Analogue scenarios are constructed by identifying recorded climatic regimes that may serve as analogues for the future climate in a given region.
These records can be obtained either from the past (temporal analogues) or from another region at the present (spatial analogues).
Temporal analogues Temporal analogues are oftwo types: those based on past instrumental observations, usually within the last century (e.g.
Lough et al.
1983), and those based on proxy data, using palaeoclimatic indicators from the more distant past such as plant or animal remains and sedimentary deposits (e.g.
Budyko 1989).
Both have been used to identify periods when the global temperature is thought to have been warmer than today.
Other features of the climate during these warm periods (e.g.
precipitation, air pressure, windspeed), if known, are then combined with the temperature pattern to define the scenario climate.
Although the spatial pattern of change sometimes bears similarities with model projections of future climate (see below) a major problem of this technique is that the physical mechanisms giving rise to the warmer climate in the past almost certainly differed from those involved in greenhouse gas induced warming.
Spatial analogues A spatial analogue involves the identification of a region today having a climate analogous to that anticipated for the study region in the future.
For example, spatial analogues for five northern case study regions are shown in Figure 2 assuming a mean annual warming of about 4°C.
The main drawback of this approach is the frequent lack of correspondence between other non-climatic features of two regions that may affect the local response of agriculture (e.g.
daylength, terrain or soils).
Given the many weaknesses of analogue scenarios, their use to represent future climate is not generally recommended (IPCC 1990), though they can contribute useful information for developing composite scenarios (see below).
Scenarios from general circulation models While simple numerical models can be used to provide quick estimates of the globally-averaged temperature response to a given forcing mechanism and require little computing power, the geographical pattern of theresponse can only be estimated with the aid of general circulation models (GCMs).
These have been reviewed thoroughly by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC Gates et al.
1992, Kattenberg et al.
1996).
GCMs represent the three-dimensional spatial distribution of atmospheric variables such as temperature, pressure, moisture and wind at regular intervals over the entire globe.
The computational requirements of such models are immense, and simulations with stateof-the-art GCMs are only possible on supercomputers.
Even then, these models are currently incapable of capturing the full complexities of the real climate system.
Some of the main weaknesses of these models are (i) a poor representation of cloud processes, (ii) an inability to resolve other sub-grid-scale features such as orographic precipitation and frontal activity, and (iii) a simplified representation of land-atmosphere and ocean-atmosphere interactions.
In spite of 238 Carter, T.R.
: Developing scenarios ofatmosphere, weather and climate AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249. recent advances in GCM development, including the coupling of dynamic ocean models to atmospheric models (Gates et al.
1992) and the simultaneous modelling of aerosol and greenhouse gas effects on climate (Kattenberg et al.
1996), regional climate predictions from GCMs remain highly uncertain.
Compositing A further methodof scenario development combines elements of the above techniques in a compositing approach.
This method can range from subjective pooling ofregional knowledge on past trends in climate, palaeoclimatic patterns and information from GCMs (e.g.
Pittock and Salinger 1982, Johannesson et al.
1995) to a more quantitative approach, such as averaging the outputs from different GCMs (e.g.
Santer et al.
1990).
A quantitative compositing method has also been adopted in developing the scenarios for Finland described in this paper.
Future climate change in Finland: The SILMU scenarios This section outlines the climatic scenarios that have been developed for the Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change (SILMU).
These scenarios were provided to scientists working in SILMU in the form of a computer program and user’s guide (Carter et al.
1995).
Only a short description is given here.
More details can be found in Carter et al.
(1996a).
Model-based estimates The scenarios were developed by combining the results from two sets of models: (i) MAGICC, a framework of simple global models and (ii) three coupled ocean-atmosphere GCMs (Figure 3).
Globalprojections from MAGICC The Model for the Assessment of GreenhouseFig.
2.
Spatial analogues for five high latitude regions under the temperature and precipitation changes simulated in the Goddard Institute for Space Studies equilibrium 2 x CO, model run (Hansen et al.
1983).
Modified from Parry and Carter (1988).
239 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND gas Impacts and Climate Change (MAGICC) is a set of linked models for estimating changes in atmospheric composition and radiative forcing under different emissions scenarios and their effect on global mean annual temperature and sea-level (Hulme et al.
1995).
It includes all the major greenhouse gases (except tropospheric ozone), fossil fuel derived SO, emissions and their effects on climate as aerosols, and the effect of halocarbon-induced stratospheric ozone depletion.
MAGICC comprises the following components: (i) a carbon cycle model for computing C02 concentrations; (ii) simple mass balance models for computing concentrations of methane, N2O and halocarbons; (iii) a sulphate aerosol model for SO, emissions from fossil sources; (iv) various schemes for converting gas and aerosol concentrations to radiative forcing; (v) an upwelling-diffusion, energy balance model to compute global mean annual temperature and the oceanic thermal expansion component of global mean sea-level rise; and (vi) ice melt models for "small" glaciers and the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.
These component models, although simple, produce results that are similar to those obtained from more complex, state-of-the-art models.
Details about individual model components and full references can be found in the MAGICC Reference Manual (Wigley 1994).
The primary inputs to MAGICC are emissions scenarios at decadal intervals between 1990 and 2100 for the following: fossil CO,, net landuse-change CO,, CH 4 , N,O, CO, NOx , VOCs, CFCII, CFCI2, HCFC22, HFCI34a and SO, (Wigley 1994).
Emissions scenarios can be selected from a list of published scenarios or can be user-specified.
The models calculate the radiative forcing due to emissions over the period 1765-2100, the global mean annual temperature response to a given forcing and the global mean sea-level effect of the temperature change.
Model parameter uncertainties are also represented in model outputs.
MAGICC was used in this application to represent two major sources of uncertainty in global estimates of temperature change.
The first is therange ofpossible future emissions, which was based on three IPCC (1592) emissions scenarios (IPCC 1992).
The second is the climate sensitivity, which is a measure of the response of global mean temperature to a given radiative forcing (conventionally a doubling of atmospheric C02 concentration).
The IPCC has specified a range of possible climate sensitivities, based on GCM simulations, of 1.5-4.5°C, with a best estimate of 2.5°C (IPCC 1992).
Three combinations of these sources of uncertainty were selected for SILMU, to represent a central, "best guess" projection and the extreme range: Combination 1: Central central emissions/ central climate sensitivity (IS92a/2.5°C) Fig.
3.
Method of developing scenarios for SILMU (schematic).
Boxes with double lines are models; boxes with single lines are model inputs and outputs; boxes with bold lines are the programs used for generating scenarios.
Arrows represent flows of information.
240 Carter, T.R.
: Developing scenarios ofatmosphere, weather and climate AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249.
Combination 2: Low low emissions/low sensitivity (IS92c/l .5°C) Combination 3: High high emissions/high sensitivity (IS92f/4.5°C).
MAGICC was run with these three combinations to give a range of C02 concentrations (based on the emissions scenarios), global mean annual temperature change estimates and sealevel rise estimates for the period 1990-2100.
The cooling effect of sulphates was also accounted for in the model runs.
The global temperature changes form the basis for the construction of regional climatic scenarios for SILMU (see below).
The CO, and sea-level rise estimates can be applied globally and are used directly in the SILMU scenarios.
Regional projections from GCMs Outputs from three general circulation models (GCMs) were used to develop regional scenarios: the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) model (Manabe et al.
1991), the United Kingdom Meteorological Office model transient run (UKTR Murphy 1995) and the Max Planck Institut fiir Meteorologie (MPI) model (also known as ECHAM-1 Cubasch et al.
1992).All three models have been used to simulate the transient response of climate to a gradual increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations for varying periods into the future.
The models represent the state of knowledge in the early 19905.
As such, the regional pattern of climate change simulated with these models was for greenhouse gas forcing only, and did not account for sulphate aerosols.
An intercomparison of the performance of these models, along with four others, in simulating the present-day regional climate has been reported by Räisänen (1995).
Each GCM produced a different large-scale pattern of climate change for a given forcing, and this varied over time.
However, the absolute timing of these changes could not be evaluated directly from the models because future simulations were only started from the present day situation.
Since there is a time lag between greenhouse gas forcing and the climate response to this forcing (typically of several decades) due to the thermal inertia of the oceans, the simulated response was unrealistically small in the first few decades of the model runs because they failed to account for the historical build-up of greenhouse gases to which the climate should already have been responding the so-called “cold start” problem (Hasselmann et al.
1993).
Combining the model outputs To overcome the cold start problem, rates ofglobal warming over 1990-2100were obtainedfrom MAGICC (which does not share the problem) for the scenario combinations described above.
Plots of global mean annual temperature change were next constructed for the three GCM simulations.
The form of the warming trend given by all three GCMs was close to linear, resembling closely the central estimate curve produced by MAGICC.
The modelled years in which the climate warming estimated by the GCMs reached the same level as that obtained from MAGICC for 2020, 2050 and 2100 were extracted from the graphs for each model.
By returning to the gridded GCM outputs, the regional changes associated with a given global mean temperature change could now be assigned a date in the future.
A period of years of modelled climate around each selected year was used for computing standard climatological statistics.
The SILMU scenarios Two sets of scenarios were developed for SILMU based on the above approach: policy-oriented and scientific scenarios.
SILMU policy scenarios The SILMU policy-oriented scenarios attempt to capture a range of uncertainties in estimating future climate over Finland.
At the same time, they are designed to be simple for scientists to apply and for policy makers to interpret.
They depict seasonal changes and are uniform over the 241 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Carter, T.R.
: Developing scenarios ofatmosphere, weatherand climate Table 1.
Rates of temperature and precipitation change under the SILMU Policy Scenarios, 1990-2100.
Period Temperature change (°C/decade) Precipitation change (%/decade) 1 (Central) 2 (Low) 3 (High) 1 (Central) 2 (Low) 3 (High) Spring (MAM) 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.125 0.75 Summer (JJA) 0.3 0.075 0.45 1.0 0.25 1.5 Autumn (SON) 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.25 1.5 Winter (DJF) 0.6 0.125 0.75 2.0 0.42 2.5 Annual 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.25 1.5 whole country.
Three “policy scenarios” have been developed: SILMU Scenario 1; Central SILMU Scenario 2: Low SILMU Scenario 3: High The scenarios were developed using the procedures described above.
The climate change estimates are GCM grid box values of temperature and precipitation change averaged over the Finnish region and averaged across the three GCMs.
They represent regional climate changes over Finland that are consistent with global mean temperature changes obtained from MAGICC for each of the three combinations of global emissions and climate sensitivity shown above.
Percentage precipitation changes for Scenarios 2 and 3 are scaled down or up from Scenario 1 estimates in proportion to the respective temperature changes.
In this way, upper, lower and central estimates of the rate of temperature and precipitation change up to 2100 are given for Finland (Table 1).
Note that while the estimates of seasonal long-term temperature change are quite similar between individual models, those of precipitation change vary considerably (sometimes in sign).
These variations are not expressed in the policy scenarios due to the averaging procedure in the compositing and because of the need to restrict the scenarios to a manageable number.
However, they are apparent in the SILMU scientific scenarios (see below).
In view of its importance for examining impacts on agricultural plants, carbon dioxide concentrations computed with MAGICC for 2020, 2050 and 2100 under each SILMU policy scenario are shown in Table 2 alongside the corresponding mean annual temperature and precipitation changes.
Also shown are estimates ofglobal sea-level rise.
Except for the largest estimates, however, sea-level rise appears likely to be compensated in Finland by the ongoing isostatic uplift of land areas following the last glaciation.
While possible changes in the wind regime over the Baltic, which also affects sea-level, complicates this prognosis, future changes in sea-level would appear to pose only a minor threat to agriculture.
Table 2.
Global mean carbon dioxide concentration (absolute), mean annual temperature and precipitation change over Finland and global meansea-level rise relative to 1990 for 2020, 2050 and 2100 under the three SILMU policy scenarios.
SILMU Policy ScenariosYear and attribute 1 (Central) 2 (Low) 3 (High) 2020 C02 concentration (ppm) 425.6 408.8 433.7 Temperaturechange (°C) 1.2 0.3 1.8 Precipitation change (%) 3.0 0.75 4.5 Sea-level rise (cm) 8.9 2.1 19.2 2050 C02 concentration (ppm) 523.0 456.1 554.8 Temperature change (°C) 2.4 0.6 3.6 Precipitation change (%) 6.0 1.5 9.0 Sea-level rise (cm) 20.8 4.6 43.3 2100 C02 concentration (ppm) 733.3 484.9 848.2 Temperature change (°C) 4.4 1.1 6.6 Precipitation change (%) 11.0 2.75 16.5 Sea-level rise (cm) 45.4 7.4 95.0 242 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249.
SILMU scientific scenarios A second set of SILMU scenarios refer to scenarios that are derived directly from GCM outputs.
They provide spatial and temporal variations that the policy scenarios do not.
This makes them more technically demanding to apply and to describe, which is why they are labelled “scientific” scenarios, to distinguish them from the simpler policy scenarios.
Three scientific scenarios have been developed, based on the three GCMs, and with the same emissions and climate sensitivity assumptions as policy Scenario 1: SILMU Scenario la: GFDL SILMU Scenario lb: UKTR SILMU Scenario 1c: MPI The scenarios reflect the pattern of climate change over the Nordic region simulated by each GCM on a monthly basis.
They reveal some of the model-to-model differences that are hidden by the compositing technique in the policy scenarios, especially in precipitation projections.
Special routines were included in the computer program supplied to SILMU researchers that linearly interpolate to individual dates and to individual locations in the Nordic region.
Alternatively, scenarios can be depicted over a finerscale 1° by 2° latitude-longitude grid covering the Baltic region, or a 10 km grid over Finland.
Examples of the regional pattern of mean summer (June-August) temperature change over Finland by 2050 for the three scenarios are shown in Figure 4, Comparisons with recent GCM simulations Since the SILMU scenarios were prepared, more realistic climate change simulations have been conducted that account for both greenhouse gas forcing and the negative regional forcing of sulphate aerosols (Taylor and Fenner 1994, Mitchell et al.
1995).
The latter of these was with a coupled ocean-atmosphere GCM run beginning Fig.
4.
Mean summer (June August) temperature change over Finland by 2050 relative to 1990 under the three SILMU scientific scenarios: (a) Scenario la (Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory model), (b) Scenario lb (United Kingdom Meteorological Office transient model run) and (c) Scenario I c (Max Planck Institut model).
243 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Table 3.
Rates of temperature change in some northern high latitude regions estimated by the Hadley Centre GCM(Mitchell et al.
1995), computed using the SILMU method, (uncertainty range in parentheses), and absolute changes observed between 1951-1980 and 1981-1990 (Folland et al.
1992).
Values are taken from maps and are approximate.
Model or W, E. FennoN. E. observations Period Alaska Canada Canada Iceland Scandia Russia Russia Hadley Centre regional aerosols Annual 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 (°C/decade ) SILMU MethodAnnual 0.15(0.05-0.25)0.4(0.1-0.6) global aerosols Winter 0.15(0.05-0.25)0.5(0.1-0.8) (°C/decade) Summer 0.15(0.05-0.25)0.3(0.05-0.45) Observed: Annual 0.75 °C 0.5 °C 0.25 °C -0.5 °C 0.25°C 0.75 °C 0.5 °C 1981-90 minus Winter >l.O °C >l.O °C 0.25 °C -0.5 °C 0.25°C >l.O °C 0.75 °C 1951-80 Summer 0.25 °C 0.5 °C 0.25 °C -0.5 °C -0.25°C 0.25 °C 0.25 °C late last century, thus avoiding the cold start problem.
The results from this model indicate a rate of increase of global mean annual temperature of about O.2°C per decade for the effects of aerosol and greenhouse gas forcing combined, compared with a rate of O.3°C per decade due to greenhouse warming alone.
This reduced rate of warming is much more in accord with the rate observed globally during the present century, enabling the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to declare recently that “the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate” (IPCC 1996).
Changes in mean annual temperature and precipitation for regions in the circumboreal zone have been extracted from mapped outputs of the Hadley Centre model runs (Mitchell et al.
1995) in Table 3.
These have been compared to scenarios prepared for Iceland and Fennoscandia using the SILMU method.
Note that the SILMU approach also accounts for aerosol forcing, using MAGICC, but this is treated at a global rather than a regional scale.
The Hadley Centre results indicate mean rates of warming at high latitudes that are above the global mean.
Over Fennoscandia these estimates are consistent with the SILMU scenarios, but over the central North Atlantic region (including Iceland), the SILMU scenario is of a reduced rate of warming, which does not show up in the Hadley Centre simulalion.
The SILMU scenario reflects a weakening of the thermohaline circulation found in the vicinity of Iceland in all three GCMs used to construct the scenario.
In fact, the Hadley Centre model, which includes regional aerosol forcing, also shows this effect but its region of influence is shifted to the west of Iceland.
Also shown are observed changes in temperature over the same region between the periods 1951-1980and 1981-1990 (expressed as absolute changes), providing a tentative comparison with the projected changes.
Over continental areas there has been a clear increase in temperature, especially during the winter, while in regions influenced by the North Atlantic recent changes have been smaller or even negative.
Thus, the observed pattern of changes, while covering only a short period, does appear to be consistent with the pattern ofchanges anticipated under greenhouse gas induced climate change.
Applying scenarios in impact assessment Several alternative methods exist for applying climate change scenarios in impact studies.
Four issues are addressed here: the baseline climate.
244 Carter, T.R.
: Developing scenarios ofatmosphere, weatherand climate AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND adjusting the baseline, downscaling, and the use of a stochastic weather generator.
The baseline climate It is important at the outset to define the baseline period against which scenarios are to be compared.
Conventionally meteorologists adopt the most recent 30-year climatological “normal” period, currently 1961-1990.
This is the period adopted in SILMU.
However, in some high latitude regions, including Canada, use of this period as a reference has been resisted, since it is thought to contain a signal of climatic warming (R. Street, personal communication, and see Table 3).
Workers in such regions may prefer to adopt an earlier normal period such as 19511980.
Adjusting the baseline climate according to a scenario Scenario changes in climate are usually expressed either as differences (temperatures are usually handled this way) or as percentages (commonly applied to precipitation).
There are two distinct methods that can be used to apply such changes as adjustments to the baseline climate: the fixed change and transient change approach.
The fixed change approach The conventional approach applies a “fixed” scenario change for a given date in the future to all years of the baseline period.
The approach is simple and quick to apply.
However, it implicitly assumes that the future climate, like the baseline climate, is stationary, whereas in reality, the future climate is likely to be undergoing continual change.
The transient change approach A method which accounts for the gradual or “transient” change in climate, adjusts the baseline according to a trend.
For example, a linear warming scenario for 2050 could be applied to the 1961-1990 baseline as a trend, with warming by 2036 used to adjust temperatures in 1961, warming by 2037 to adjust 1962 temperatures through to warming by 2065, which is used to adjust temperatures in 1990.
Note that the thirty-year statistical frequency distribution of a scenario climate adjusted according to the transient change approach exhibits greater variability than the corresponding scenario based on the fixed change approach.
This may be of some importance when assessing impacts.
Downscaling One of the main problems with using information from GCMs is their coarse spatial resolution.Even in the highest resolution GCMs, a single grid box spans an area of more than 50,000 km 2 .
The large scale climate can be greatly modified within an area of this size, by factors such as terrain, vegetation cover or water surfaces.
Simple interpolation from grid box scale to local scale, which was used in the SILMU scenarios, neglects these sub-grid-scale features which are not resolved by GCMs.
Local variations in climate can, ofcourse, have large effects on agricultural productivity or water supply.
Two alternative approaches have been developed for downscaling from GCM to local scale.
The first approach involves the establishmentof statistical relationships between large-scale climate and sub-grid-scale climate using past observations (e.g.
Wigley et al.
1990, Karl et al.
1990, Bardossy and Plate 1992).
The approach assumes that the statistical relationships between these two scales remain unchanged under a future climate.
The second downscaling approach involves the use of limited area high resolution numerical models.
These are physically-based models that can be run at sub-continental scale at a resolution of some 50 x 50 km.
They can be linked to GCMs using various nesting techniques, whereby the GCM provides information on large 245 Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Carter, T.R.
: Developing scenarios ofatmosphere, weather and climate scale flows to the limited area model, which is then run at higher resolution.
Early results from such model runs, including high latituderegions of Europe and North America, are now available for impact assessment (e.g.
Giorgi et al.
1992, Jones et al.
1995).
Use of stochastic weather generators Many impact assessments require detailed climatological data on a daily time step as input to simulation models.
Crop growth models are typical examples in agriculture.
Daily data are seldom available as outputs from GCMs, and in any case they are not readily applicable in impact studies.
An alternative is to use stochastic weather generators.
These consist of sets of parameters describing statistical properties of climatic variables observed historically at individual locations.
They can be used to generate time series of unlimited length having similar statistical properties to those observed.
The parameters of a generator can also be adjusted according to scenarios of future climate.
This offers a very flexible tool for conducting sensitivity testing of models, where changes in both the mean and variability of climate can be readily simulated (Wilks 1992, Semenov and Porter 1995).
A stochastic weather generator for Finland, CLIGEN, has been developed for SILMU (Posch 1994) and provided to researchers in conjunction with the climatic scenarios (Carter et al.
1995).
CLIGEN first simulates time series of precipitation, which is the independent variable in the procedure.
Daily temperatures and cloudiness values are then correlated with the occurrence of wet and dry days, based on the method of Richardson and Wright (1984).
Time series can be generated for any location in Finland, by interpolating the parameters of the generator from adjacent weather stations.
CLIGEN has been applied over a 10km grid across Finland, to estimate effects of SILMU scenario climates on potato late blight (Carter et al.
1996b).
One drawback of the generator revealed in that study is a tendency to underestimate the frequency and duration of persistent events like drought and warm or cold spells.
It is these episodes that oftenresult in the greatest impacts on agriculture.
Figure 5 compares the observed and generated frequencies of dry spells (< 0.1 mm) at Jokioinen.
CLIGEN significantly underestimates the frequency of dry spells of 10 days or longer.
Further work is required on the generator to correct this problem.
Fig.
5.
Frequency distribution of length of dry spells (precipitation < 0.1 mm) at Jokioinen, southern Finland, observed (1961-1990) and for five 30-year simulationswith the CLIGEN weather generator.
246 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249.
Conclusions This paper has presented some estimates of possible environmental changes in northern agricultural regions.
Carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere are expected to continue to rise globally, with probable beneficial effects for agricultural crops.
Sea-level rise as a consequence of global warming may be of minor significance for agriculture in most regions, since many high latitude land areas are still recovering following deglaciation.
Overall, warming at these latitudes (with the possible exception of the North Atlantic region) is anticipated to be larger than the global average.
Wintertime precipitation is expected to increase, while the amount and even the sign of precipitation change during the growing season are very uncertain.
The warming alone, however, could transform the potential for agricultural production in some areas.
As was illustrated in Figure 2, the climate of the late 21st century in a marginal agricultural region such as southern Finland might resemble that today in Denmark or northern Germany.
Inspection of present-day crop production statistics in Denmark reveals levels of yield twice or even three times those found in Finland today.
While Denmark may not be a perfect analogue of a future Finland (for example, there are differences in soils, farm size and structure), a substantial portion of this disparity in production potential is climatically induced.
The large uncertainties attached to scenarios of future regional climate are exemplified by the SILMU scenarios.
While there is some scope for improving model predictions, using higher resolution models which accurately account for the most important processes in the climate system, these advances are likely to be gradual and piecemeal.
Moreover, rapid improvements in the projections of future population growth, regional economic activity, greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric composition seem unlikely.
Thus, although opportunities do exist to narrow the range of scenario uncertainty, it still seems probable that scenarios will continue to play an important role in policy-making and assessment for some time to come.
Acknowledgements.
I am grateful to Heikki Tuomenvirta of the Finnish Meteorological Institute, Helsinki, who assisted in developing the SILMU scenarios and to Dr. MaximilianPosch of the National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, who developed the stochastic weather generator, CLIGEN.
Special thanks are also due to Dr. David Viner and colleagues in the Climate Impacts LINK Project, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK for supplying GCM information and to Professor Tom Wigley of the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO, USA for providing a version of MAGICC.
This work was funded by the Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change (SILMU).
References Bardossy, A.
& Plate, E.J.
1992.
Space-time model for daily rainfall using atmospheric circulation patterns.
Water Resources Research 28: 1247-1259.
Bergthörsson, P., Björnsson, H., Dyrmundsson, Ö., Gudmundsson, 8., Helgadöttir, Ä.
& Jönmundsson, J.V.
1988, The effects of climatic variations on agriculture in Iceland.
In: Parry, M L. et al.
(eds.
).The impact of climatic variations on agriculture.
Volume 1.
Assessments in cool temperate and cold regions, Kluwer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, p. 381-509.
Budyko, M.l.
1989.
Empirical estimates of imminent climatic changes.
Soviet Meteorology and Hydrology 10: 1-8.
Carter,!., Posch, M. & Tuomenvirta, H. 1995.
SILMUSCEN and CLIGEN user’s guide: Guidelines for the construction of climatic scenarios and use of a stochastic weather generator in the Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change (SILMU).
Publications of the Academy of Finland 5/95, Helsinki.
60 p. plus diskette.
—, Posch, M. & Tuomenvirta, H. 1996a.
The SILMU scenarios: specifying Finland's future climate for use in impact assessment.
Geophysica 32: (in press).
, Saarikko, R. A.
& Niemi, K. J.
1996b.
Assessing the risks and uncertainties of regional crop potential under a changing climate in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 329-350 (this issue).
Cubasch, U., Hasselmann, K., Höck, H., Maier-Reimer.
E., Mikolajewicz, U., Santer, B.D.
& Sausen, R. 1992.
Time-dependentgreenhouse warming computations with a coupled ocean-atmosphere model.
Climate Dynamics 247 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Carter, T.R.
: Developing scenarios ofatmosphere, weatherand climate 7: 55-69.
Folland, C.K., Karl, T.R., Nicholls, N., Nyenzi, 8.5., Parker, D.E.
& Vinnikov, K. Ya.
1992.
Observed climate variability and change.
In: Houghton, J.T.
et al.
(eds.).
Climate change 1992: The supplementary report to the IPCCscientific assessment.
Cambridge University Press, p. 135-170.
Gates, W.L., Mitchell, J.F.8., Boer, G.J., Cubasch, U.
& Meleshko, V.P.
1992.
Climate modelling, climate prediction and model validation.
In: Houghton, J.T.
et al.
(eds.).
Climate change 1992: The supplementary report to the IPCC scientific assessment.
Cambridge University Press, p. 97-134.
Giorgi, F. & Mearns, L.O.
1991.
Approaches to the simulation of regional climate change: a review.
Reviews of Geophysics 29: 191-216.
—, Marinucci, M.R.
& Visconti, G. 1992.
A 2 x C02 climate change scenario over Europe generated using a limited area model nested in a general circulation model.
2.
Climate change scenario.
Journal of Geophysical Research 97(D9): 10011-10028.
Hämet-Ahti, L. 1981.
The boreal zone and its subdivision.
Fennia 159: 69-75.
Hansen, J., Russell, G., Rind, D., Stone, P., Lacis, A., Lebedeff, S., Ruedy, R. & Travis, L. 1983.
Efficient three-dimensional global models for climate studies: models I and 11.
Monthly Weather Review 111: 609-662.
Hasselmann, K., Sausen, R., Maier-Reimer, E. & Voss, R. 1993.
On the cold start problem in transient simulations with coupled atmosphere-ocean models.
Climate Dynamics 9: 53-61.
IPCC 1990.
Climate change:TheIPCC scientific assessment.
Report ofWorking Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Houghton, J.T, et al.
eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
365 p. 1992, Climate change 1992.
The supplementary report to the IPCC scientific assessment (Houghton, J.T.
et al.
eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
200 p. 1996.
Climate change 1995.
The science of climate change.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Houghton, J.T.
et al.
eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
572 p. Johannesson, T., Jönsson, T., Kallen, E. & Kaas, E. 1995.
Climate change scenarios tor the Nordic countries.
Climate Research 5: 181-195.
Jones, R.G., Murphy, J.M.
& Noguer, M. 1995.
Simulation of climate change over Europe using a nested regional-climate model.
I: Assessment of control climate, including sensitivity to location of lateral boundaries.
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 121: 1413-1449.
Karl, T.R., Wang, W.-C., Schlesinger, M.E., Knight, R.W.
& Portman, D. 1990.
A method of relating general circulation model simulated climate to the observed local climate.
Part I: Seasonal statistics.
Journal of Climate 3: 1053-1079.
Kattenberg, A., Giorgi, F., Grassl, H., Meehl, G.A., Mitchell, J.F.8., Stouffer, R.J.,Tokioka,T., Weaver, AJ.
& Wigley, T.M.L.
1996.
Climate models projections of future climate.
In: Houghton, J.T.
et al.
(eds.).
Climate change 1995.The science of climate change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
p. 285-357.
Lough, J.M.,WigIey,T.M.L.
& Palutikof, J.P. 1983.
Climate and climate impact scenarios for Europe in a warmer world.
Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology 22: 1673-1684.
Manabe, S., Stouffer, R.J., Spelman, M.J. & Bryan, K. 1991.
Transient responses of a coupled ocean-atmosphere model to gradual changes of atmospheric C0.,.
Part I: Annual mean response.
Journal of Climate 4: 785-818 Mitchell, J.F.8., Johns, T.C., Gregory, J.M.
& Tett, S.F.B.
1995.
Climate response to increasing levels of greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols.
Nature 376: 501-504.
Murphy, J.M.
1995.
Transient response of the Hadley Centre coupled ocean-atmosphere model to increasing carbon dioxide.
Part I.
Control climate and flux correction.
Journal of Climate 8: 36-56.
Parry, M.L.
1978.
Climatic change, agriculture and settlement.
Dawson, Folkestone.
214 p. & Carter,T.R.
1988.
The assessment of effects of climatic variations on agriculture: aims, methods and summary of results.
In: Parry, M.L.
et al.
(eds.).
The impact of climatic variations on agriculture.
Volume 1.
Assessments in cool temperate and cold regions, Kluwer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, p. 11-95.
Pittock, A.B.
1993.
Climate scenario development.
In: Jakeman, A.J.
et al.
(eds.).
Modelling change in environmental systems.
John Wiley, Chichester, p. 481-503.
& Salinger, M.J. 1982.
Toward regional scenarios for a CCywarmed Earth.
Climatic Change 4: 23-40.
Posch, M. 1994.
Development of a weather generator for Finland 11.
In: Kanninen, M. and Heikinheimo, P.
(eds.).
The Finnish Research Programme on Climate Change Second progress report.
Publications of the Academy of Finland 1/94, Helsinki, p. 323-328.
Räisänen, J.
1995.
A comparison of the results of seven GCM experiments in northern Europe.
Geophysica 30: 3-30.
Richardson, C.W.
& Wright, D.A.
1984.
WGEN: A model for generating daily weather variables.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, ARS8.
83 p. Santer, 8.D.,Wigley.
T.M.L.. Schlesinger, M.E.
& Mitchell, J.F.B.
1990.
Developing climate scenarios from equilibrium GCM results.
Report No.
47, Max-Planck-lnstitut fur Meteorologie, Hamburg.
29 p. Semenov, M.A.
& Porter, J.R. 1995.
Climatic variability and the modelling of crop yields.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 73: 265-283.
Taylor, K.E.
& Penner, J.E.
1994.
Response of the climate system to atmospheric aerosols and greenhouse gases.
Nature 369: 734-737.
Utterström, G. 1955.
Climatic fluctuations and population problems in early modern history.
Scandinavian Economic History Review 3: 3-47.
Wigley, T.M.L.
1994.
MAGICC user's guide and scientific reference manual.
Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia, Norwich.
23 p. —, Jones, P.D., Briffa, K.R.
& Smith, G. 1990.
Obtaining sub-grid-scale information from coarse-resolution general circulation model output.
Journal of Geophysical Research 95(D2): 1943-1953.
Wilks, D.S.
1992.
Adapting stochastic weather generation algorithms tor climate change studies.
Climatic Change 22: 67-84.
248 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND Vol.
5 (1996): 235-249.
SELOSTUS Ilmakehä-, sääja ilmastoskenaarioiden kehittäminen pohjoisille alueille Timothy R. Carter Maatalouden tutkimuskeskus Tulevat ilmakehän koostumusmuutokset ja niitä seuraavat maailmanlaajuiset ja alueelliset ilmastonmuutokset huolestuttavat enenevästi poliittisia päätöksentekijöitä, suunnittelijoita ja yhteiskuntaa, Muutosennusteet ovat kuitenkin epävarmoja.
Koska luotettavaa ennustetta ei ole, paras lähestymistapa on identifioida joukko mahdollisia tulevaisuuden kehitysnäkymiä ts.
skenaarioita.
Tämä artikkeli käsittelee ilmastoskenaarioiden kehittämistä korkeiden pohjoisten leveysasteiden alueille.
Skenaarioiden laatimisessa voidaan erottaa kolme eri menetelmää: etsitään analogioita, jotka muistuttavat tulevia tutkimusalueen oloja, käytetään ilmastomallien tuloksia tai yhdistetään useiden menetelmien tuloksia.
Suomalaisen ilmakehänmuutosten tutkimusohjelmassa SILMUssa käytettiin yhdistelmämenetelmää laadittaessa vuoteen 2100 ulottuvia skenaarioita lämpötilan, sademäärän, ilman hiilidioksidipitoisuuden ja merenpinnan korkeuden muutoksista Suomen alueella.
Artikkelissa käsitellään lisäksi eri keinoja käyttää skenaarioita ilmastonmuutoksen vaikutuksia selvittävissä tutkimuksissa.
Tällaisiin keinoihin lukeutuvat stokastiset säägeneraattorit ja tilastolliset menetelmät, joilla paikalliset olot liitetään ilmastomallien suuren mittakaavan virtauksiin.
SILMU-skenaarioilla pyritään kuvaamaan epävarmuutta, joka johtuu sekä tulevista kasvihuonekaasujen ja aerosolien päästöistä että maapallon ilmaston vasteesta näihin päästöihin.
Skenaarioita laadittiin kahta eri tyyppiä: (i) yksinkertaisia perusskenaarioita ja (ii) yksityiskohtaisia tieteellisiä skenaarioita.
Skenaarioita verrataan uusimpiin tulevaisuuden ilmastosta tehtyihin malliarvioihin sekä viimeaikaisiin tietyillä korkeiden leveysasteiden alueilla havaittuihin ilmastonmuutoksiin.
249 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE IN FINLAND
Agricultural and Food Science, vol.
18 (2009): 171-190 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
171 © Agricultural and Food Science Manuscript received February 2009 Climate change and prolongation of growing season: changes in regional potential for field crop production in Finland Pirjo Peltonen-Sainio1, Lauri Jauhiainen2, Kaija Hakala1 and Hannu Ojanen2 1MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Plant Production Research, FI-31600 Jokioinen, Finland 2MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Services Unit, FI-31600 Jokioinen, Finland email: firstname.lastname@mtt.fi Climate change offers new opportunities for Finnish field crop production, which is currently limited by the short growing season.
A warmer climate will extend the thermal growing season and the physiologically effective part of it.
Winters will also become milder, enabling introduction of winter-sown crops to a greater extent than is possible today.
With this study we aim to characterise the likely regional differences in capacity to grow different seed producing crops.
Prolongation of the Finnish growing season was estimated using a 0.5º latitude × 0.5º longitude gridded dataset from the Finnish Meteorological Institute.
The dataset comprised an average estimate from 19 global climate models of the response of Finnish climate to low (B1) and high (A2) scenarios of greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions for 30-year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).
Growing season temperature sums that suit crop growth and are agronomically feasible in Finland are anticipated to increase by some 140 °Cd by 2025, 300 °Cd by 2055 and 470 °Cd by 2085 in scenario A2, when averaged over regions, and earlier sowing is expected to take place, but not later harvests.
Accordingly, the extent of cultivable areas for the commonly grown major and minor crops will increase considerably.
Due to the higher base temperature requirement for maize (Zea mays L.) growth than for temperate crops, we estimate that silage maize could become a Finnish field crop for the most favourable growing regions only at the end of this century.
Winters are getting milder, but it will take almost the whole century until winters such as those that are typical for southern Sweden and Denmark are experienced on a wide scale in Finland.
It is possible that introduction of winter-sown crops (cereals and rapeseed) will represent major risks due to fluctuating winter conditions, and this could delay their adaptation for many decades.
Such risks need to be studied in more detail to estimate timing of introduction.
Prolonged physiologically effective growing seasons would increase yielding capacities of major field crops.
Of the current minor crops, oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.), winter wheat (Triticum aestivum L.), triticale (X Triticosecale Wittmack), pea (Pisum sativum L.) and faba bean (Vicia faba L.) are particularly strong candidates to become major crops.
Moreover, they have good potential for industrial processing and are currently being bred.
Realisation of increased yield potential requires adaptation to 1) elevated daily mean temperatures that interfere with development rate of seed crops under long days, 2) relative reductions in water availability at critical phases of yield determination, 3) greater pest and disease pressure, 4) other uncertainties caused by weather extremes and 5) generally greater need for inputs such as nitrogen fertilisers for non-nitrogen fixing crops.
Key-words: Climate change, cultivation area, yield, potential, barley, oat, wheat, rye, triticale, rapeseed, pea, maize, seed crops, minor crops A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 172 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
173 Introduction On a global scale, the potential for food production is projected to increase, when local average temperatures increase only slightly (1–3 °C).
However, with higher increases in average temperatures, the global potential for food production will decrease (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC 2007a).
Average global surface temperatures have already increased by 0.76 °C during the last century, with increase in the pace of warming during the last couple of decades (IPCC 2007b).
Changes in climate have also occurred at high latitudes (Klein Tank et al.
2002, Klein Tank and Können 2003, Jylhä et al.
2004) and in the future temperatures are generally expected to rise even more in the high latitude countries than elsewhere (IPCC 2007b).
In northernmost Europe, especially in Finland, crop production occurs at higher latitudes than anywhere else.
In Sweden some 90% of field crop production occurs in more southerly regions than in Finland (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a).
According to Carter (1998) and Klein Tank et al.
(2002), the growing season has already become several days longer in Finland, which has already resulted in farmers sowing spring cereals, sugar beet (Beta vulgaris L. var.
altissima) and potato (Solanum tuberosum L.) earlier (Kaukoranta and Hakala 2008).
This is an example of a spontaneous adaptation measure in Finland.
However, spontaneous adaptation has its evident limitations and more co-ordinated, regionally tailored strategies need to be developed to cope with accelerated rates of climate change in the future (Olesen et al.
2009).
Furthermore, expected changes in climate are likely to be well outside the experience of farmers and agricultural advisers and hence, entail radical changes in crop production practices and systems.
By this means field crop production would be able to meet challenges and take opportunities brought about by changing climate, especially if weather extremes become more frequent (Klein Tank and Können 2003, Alexander et al.
2006, IPCC 2007b).
Even though climate change is likely to present challenges for agricultural and horticultural production in the northern regions, yield potential per se may increase markedly, especially due to extension of the thermal and physiologically effective growing seasons (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b and 2009c).
In the past hundred years the growing season has been extended, especially at the start, to enable earlier sowing (Carter 1998).
Even with more growth-favouring temperatures in the future, lengthening of the growing season in the autumn is not likely to support growth as efficiently as lengthening in the spring, because of low light intensity and short days (GAISMA 2009).
Moreover, increasing autumn precipitation and its effects on harvesting conditions, yield losses and yield quality (Jylhä et al.
2004, IPCC 2007b, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009d) would likely restrict any temperaturederived benefits of extending the harvesting time in grain and seed crops.
Therefore, risks related to prolonging the end of the growing season are likely much higher compared to benefits.
Furthermore, anticipated increases in autumn precipitation (Jylhä et al.
2004, IPCC 2007b) and changes in overwintering conditions (Jylhä et al.
2008) may hamper sowing winter crops at present sowing window and affect winter survival until cold winters are replaced by mild winters currently typical of north-western and southern Europe.
As the length of the growing season is the predominant factor limiting crop and cultivar selection and productivity in northern European regions, an increase in duration of the most critical growth phases and introduction of winter sown cultivars will markedly enhance the yield potential of many crops (Carter et al.
1996, Carter 1998, Olesen and Bindi 2002, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009c).
It is possible that in the future the Nordic countries play an increasingly important role in agricultural production in Europe (Olesen and Bindi 2002).
However, because of more frequent weather extremes in the future (Klein Tank and Können 2003, Alexander et al.
2006, IPCC 2007b), but also due to higher incidences of pests and diseases (Carter et al.
1996), production uncertainty increases.
Therefore, farmers may rely on the most stable crop species only, which would mean that agrobiodiversity is challenged by climate change.
Climate change impacts on crop productivity and risks differ according to crop species and culA G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 172 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
173 tivars.
Some crops will benefit from the warming climate more than others, while other crops and cultivars may face major problems and will fall out of production.
For example, only slightly elevated temperatures were shown to challenge yield potential of spring sown seed crops, but not winter sown ones (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009d), while grass crops appeared to benefit from elevated temperatures (Hakala and Mela 1996).
Root crops such as sugar beet and potato will be favoured by longer growing seasons and elevated CO2 levels (Olesen and Bindi 2002).
However, the conditions will also favour pathogens, which may cause major yield losses (Carter et al.
1996, Kaukoranta 1996, Hannukkala et al.
2007).
Thus, it is likely that adaptation requirements, both regarding breeding and development of cropping systems, are going to vary greatly from one crop type and species to another.
This creates an evident need for tailored adaptation strategies.
With this study we aim to characterise the likely regional differences in capacity to grow different crops, concentrating on seed producing crops.
This is based on climate change induced prolongation of the physiologically effective part of the thermal growing season.
This allows assessment of the possible range of increase in crop productivity resulting from extended growing time and potential improvements gained through plant breeding.
Material and methods Climate datasets and estimations of prolongation of growing season Global climate model projections described by the IPCC have been analysed to extract information on recent and future climate over the Finnish regions.
The projections comprised simulations for the period 2010 to 2100 from 19 global models assuming two different scenarios of future greenhouse gas and aerosols emissions to the atmosphere described by the B1 (low emissions) and A2 (high emissions) scenarios of the IPCC (Nakicenovic et al.
2000).
Long term mean daily temperatures for the baseline period (1971–2000) were derived from monthly means produced by the Finnish Meteorological Institute (Venäläinen et al.
2005).
To obtain monthly means for the three future 30 year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085, an average was taken of the temperature changes (future 30 year span minus the baseline period mean) simulated in 19 global climate models by Finnish Meteorological Institute (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
For all periods, a grid spacing of 0.5º latitude × 0.5º longitude was used: all subsequent estimations and calculations were based on the same grid.
Daily mean temperatures for each calendar day were derived at every grid point using a six-component Fourier expansion fitted to the annual course of monthly mean temperature (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
The beginning of the physiologically effective growing season, a potential sowing day for a recent period (1971–2000), was approximated from regional sowing dates collected by TIKE (the Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Finland).
The average sowing day fell between 15th and 21st May in spring cereals, depending on region.
This regional information was applied to other crops as well, because no explicit, long-term information was available for them, and in general, sowing window in Finland is very limited (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a).
Also according to MTT Official Variety Trials the differences in sowing times among major field crops studied here were not high enough to cause any major error to our estimated regional sowing times.
Appropriate sowing days for 30-year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 (hereon referred to as 2025, 2055 and 2085, respectively) were defined with reference to temperature conditions at sowings in 1971–2000, with projected temperatures indicating that respective sowing dates would occur approximately one, two and three weeks earlier, respectively, than in 1971– 2000.
We also noticed that in case of having further earlier sowing by e.g.
one week in each period would have resulted in only negligible increase in accumulated temperature sum.
This confirmed A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 174 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
175 that our estimated sowing dates did not underestimate the possibilities for earlier sowing windows.
Previously Carter and Saarikko (1996) and Saarikko and Carter (1996) estimated the likely future sowing time for spring wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) in Finland.
They also used technique of having mean temperature (exceeding 8 ºC) as an indicator of sowing date, but instead of regional data from TIKE, they used information on sowing time of spring wheat and local temperatures of MTT Official Variety Trials only (Carter and Saarikko 1996).
In a comparison of the two sowing data sources, Saarikko and Carter (1996), found that the sowing dates estimated by MTT variety trial data differed only by 0.4 days from the actual regional TIKE sowing data.
In our study, the daily mean air temperature at sowing times now (1971−2000) and with one, two and three weeks earlier sowings in 2025, 2055 and 2085, respectively, was 8.5−9.5 ºC, which corresponds well with the studies of Carter and Saarikko (1996).
The datasets of TIKE and MTT showed the 15th September to be the likely latest appropriate harvesting day, the end of the physiologically effective growing season, in the entire country.
We also tested the effects of having one week earlier or delayed harvest in future periods compared with the current 15th September, which is considered to be critical for success (PeltonenSainio et al.
2009b, 2009c).
By this means the effect of possible changes in time of harvest on accumulated temperature sum was estimated.
Effect of difference by one week in timing of harvest was in general marginal for our approach of estimating the likely northern border for each crop species in future periods.
Hence, we only show here the results with harvests at 15th September.
On the other hand, delaying harvest more than by one week might drastically increase the risks compared to yield benefits (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a, 2009b).
Cumulative temperature sums for the physiologically effective growing season at base temperatures of +5 and +10 °C were calculated for B1 and A2 scenarios of the IPCC.
MapInfo Vertical Mapper was the software used to interpolate values between gridpoints using the Natural Neighbour interpolating method.
The result from this interpolating was a new grid-file with 0.033° cell size.
This new grid-file was used to make coloured raster maps and contours for temperature sums and they were combined by MapInfo Professional software.
We gathered information from the literature to weight the general potential of different crop species to future conditions in Finland according to each crop’s current regional importance and basic growth requirements (Table 1).
Furthermore, for maize we used an additional approach with +10 °C as a base temperature (Martin et al.
2006, Fronzek and Carter 2007) instead of +5 °C (±1 °C) that is typically used for temperate crops (e.g.
Kontturi 1979, Kleemola 1991).
The information on general thermal requirement of crop maturation in °Cd (Kontturi 1979, Martin et al.
2006, Fronzek and Carter 2007, Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009c) was compared with projected, regional changes in accumulated °Cd and duration of the physiologically effective (but also agronomically feasible) growing season for grain and seed crops.
Estimations for winters Thermal winter is determined to be the period starting, when daily mean temperatures remain permanently below 0 °C and ending when they rise permanently above 0 °C.
We estimated the climate change effects on length of thermal winter in B1 and A2 scenarios of the IPCC by recording regional borderlines for winters with 75, 50 and 25 frost days in 2025, 2055 and 2085, respectively.
25 frost days is close to the length of the thermal winter at present (1961−1990) in Denmark (Tveito et al.
2001) and can already be considered a mild winter compared with the current Finnish cold winters.
Outcome of estimation of thermal winters according to 30-year means may differ somewhat from computation of each year first before averaging over each 30-year period.
MapInfo Vertical Mapper and MapInfo Professional were the software used as described above.
A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 174 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
175 Table 1.
Novel or current minor field crops in Finland grown elsewhere in Europe and considered in this study.
Source: Smartt and Simmonds (1995), Rousi (1997) and FAO (2009).
Field crop Included Reasoning Annuals: Cotton (Gossypium sp.)
no Potential for temperate latitudes; in Europe grown only up to 47 °N.
Faba bean (Vicia faba L.) yes Potential, temperate crop, small-scale growing and breeding in Finland.
Flax (Linum usitatissimum L.) yes Potential, temperate crop, small-scale growing and breeding in Finland.
Hemp (Cannabis sativa L.) yes Potential, temperate crop.
Commercial production of oil hempa) and experimental growing of fibre hemp in Finlandb).
Maize (Zea mays L.) yes C4-crop favouring high temperatures, some experimental growing in Finland.
Forage (silage) maize has more future potential in northern European growing conditions than grain maize.
Mustards (Sinapis spp.)
no Potential, temperate crop, small-scale growing in Finland.
Coexistence with other Brassica crops too challenging to enable largescale cultivation.
Pseudocereals no/yes Often sub-tropical and tropical species with minor and/or very regional importance in Europe.
Buckwheat (Fagopyrum esculentum Mill.)
most potential and hence, considered furtherc).
Soya bean (Glycine max L.) no Oil and protein crop favouring high temperatures.
Presently adapted to the southernmost Europe and e.g., Russia, Czech Republic and Ukraine, but not Scandinavia or Baltic countries.
Unlikely to have breakthrough in the northernmost regions of Europe within this century according A2 scenario.
Sunflower (Helianthus annuus L.) yes Potential, temperate crop, small-scale growing in Finland, largescale growing e.g.
in Russia.
Winter types or perennials: Hops (Humulus lupulus L.) no Potential, temperate crop with overwintering rootstock.
Main production areas in Central Europe.
Lupins (Lupinus spp.)
yes Potential, temperate crops, especially L. angustifolius.
Grown mainly in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Germany, Poland, Belarus, Russia) and France, small scale growing in Lithuania, experimental growing in Finlandd).
Triticale (X Triticosecale Wittmack) yes Potential, temperate crop, small-scale growing in Finland.
Grown in Europe up to Denmark.
Winter barley (Hordeum vulgare L.) yes Potential, temperate crop.
Grown in Northern and Central Europe, significantly up to Denmark.
Winter oat (Avena sativa L.) yes Potential, temperate crop.
Grown in Europe significantly in UK.
Winter oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.) yes Potential, temperate crop.
Largely grown in Europe, but not in Finland.
Winter turnip rape (B. rapa L.) yes Potential, temperate crop.
Grown in Northern Europe; in Finland in the 1950s to 1960se).
a) Callaway (2004) and Finola (2009); b) Pahkala et al.
(2008); c) Montonen and Kontturi (1997), Kontturi et al.
(2004); d) Aniszewski (1988a, 1988b), Kurlovich et al.
(2004); e) Hiivola (1966) A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 176 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
177 Estimations of changes in yielding capacity Two factors were taken into account when changes in yielding capacity were modelled: longer and warmer physiologically effective growing season and genetic yield improvement.
According to Öfversten et al.
(2004) and Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009d), annual genetic improvement is 0.64, 0.41, 1.01, 0.85 and 1.53% for barley (Hordeum vulgare L.), oat (Avena sativa L.), spring wheat, turnip rape (Brassica rapa L.) and oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.), respectively.
Data from MTT long-term field experiments conducted in 1970–2008 and the model suggested by Öfversten et al.
(2004) were used to calculate genetic improvement for winter wheat (0.64%), winter rye (Secale cereale L.) (0.97%) and pea (Pisum sativum L.) (0.40%).
The effect of CO2 increase on yields was ignored and resource limitation (water, nutrients) expected to be comparable to that in the recent period.
The increased yield potential from a prolonged growing season was analysed using two methods, one simple and one more complex.
In the simple approach all results of MTT long-term field experiments conducted in 1990–2008 were classified according to cumulative temperature sum between sowing and yellow ripening.
The classes were 700– 800, 800–900, 900–1000, 1000–1100, 1100–1200 and 1200–1300 °Cd.
The means of all yields in each class were calculated and thereby, the general association with yield and increase in temperature sum determined.
The more complex approach was based on a two-stage computation.
The two-stage computation was needed, because mutually comparable yield levels and growing times were needed as a starting point when the relationship between these was estimated.
The modern cultivars in the MTT long-term field experiments (years 2001– 2008) and the following statistical model were used in the first stage: yijkl=µ+cultivari+yearj+sitek+experimentjkl+εijkl, (1) where yijkl is the observation, µ is the intercept, and cultivari is the fixed effect of the i th cultivar.
Yearj, sitek, experimentjkl and εijkl represent random effects of the jth year, the kth site, the lth experiment and the residual.
For example, yield of oat cultivar Veli was 6236 kg ha-1 in a trial in Pälkäne (61°20’ N, 24°16’ E) in 2001.
According to the model, the estimated average yield of this cultivar was 5103 kg ha-1, environmental effects of Pälkäne in 2001 were 1165 kg ha-1 in total, and unexplained variation, residual, was −32 kg ha-1.
Estimated average effective temperature sum before maturity for Veli was 910 °Cd using the same statistical model.
The model was fitted using the SAS/MIXED procedure and the REML estimation method.
Estimates of cultivari were used to calculate average level of yield in the period of 2001–2008.
In the second stage, the following regression model was fitted using the SAS/REG procedure: yieldi = α + βtimei + εi, (2) where yieldi and timei are previously estimated yield and growing time for the ith cultivar (see Eq.
1, e.g.
5103 kg ha-1 and 910 °Cd for maturation for cultivar Veli), α is the intercept, β is the regression coefficient for growing time and εi is the residual.
Increased yield potential for a prolonged and warmer growing season of one °Cd was set to be ̂ β , i.e.
cultivars with long growing time contributed to increased yield potential and regression coefficient expressed the amount of increased potential.
This coefficient was used to predict a potential yield for the future periods with the prolonged and warmer growing seasons.
Potential yield for all grid points and for periods 1985, 2025, 2055 and 2085 was calculated using the following equation: yieldm = (χ + ̂ β *ν)*(1+λ) (m-2005), (3) where m is the period (m=1985, 2025, 2055 or 2085), χ is the average level of yield in period of 2001–2008 (see Eq.
1), ̂ β is increased yield potential of prolonged and warmer growing season (see Eq.
2), ν is change in temperature sum and λ is annual genetic improvement (Öfversten et al.
2004).
Change, ν, was calculated for B1 and A2 scenarios of the IPCC (see “estimations of prolongation of growing season”).
For example, λ could be 0.41, χ 5328 kg ha-1 and ̂ β 7.47 kg ha-1 °Cd-1 for oats.
ν is defined as A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 176 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
177 64°Cd in one grid point where accumulated effective temperature sums for oats were 1200°Cd and 1264°Cd in periods 2005 and 2025, respectively.
After this the potential yield level was 6301 kg ha-1 in period 2025.
The accumulated temperature sum was 1104°Cd and corresponding yield level 4249 kg ha-1 in period 1985.
To make presentation of the results easier, the mean of potential yields at the same latitude was calculated.
Furthermore, in order to consider the major challenges related to achieving such climate change enhanced yield potentials of field crops for Finnish growing conditions, we listed the principal adaptation measures according to the literature.
Regarding crops not presently grown on a large scale in Finland, we gathered information from the literature to estimate the actual yields at lower latitudes with a growing season similar in length to that for our future projections.
Results and discussion Prolonged growing seasons and potential growing regions for spring sown crops Finland is the world’s most northern field crop production region (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a) and anthropogenically-induced climate warming is expected to be especially high at such northern latitudes (IPCC 2007b).
Climate warming will change length and cause changes in conditions both during the growing season and during the overwintering period.
Considering the changes to the physiologically effective part of a prolonged thermal growing season that can support crop growth and development, we noted that the typical length of the growing season in Central Finland by the 2025 under both B1 and A2 scenarios is projected to resemble that currently found in southern Finland (1100–1200 °Cd).
Southern Finland already experiences growing seasons with 1300 °Cd (Fig.
1).
However, by 2055 1100–1200 °Cd growing seasons are projected for Oulu region (65 °N, 25 °E) in the B1 scenario and 1300 °Cd in the A2 scenario.
By mid-century 1400–1500 °Cd growing seasons would be typical for southern Finland, depending on the climate change scenario.
Uncertainties in climate warming projections increase towards the end of this century.
However, they indicate 1700 °Cd (A2 scenario) and 1500 °Cd (B1 scenario) for southern Finland by the end of century.
According to these projections changes would proceed rapidly at latitudes > 60 °N, even though we estimated only moderate changes in sowing times and none for harvests.
If these estimations transpire there are new prospects for Finnish agriculture.
We considered the future regional potential for production of different crops only according to the projected lengthening of the physiologically effective growing season and effective temperature sum (growing degree days), and excluded issues such as existence of fields in different regions, field sizes and distances, need for basic field repairs and other investments, soil types, distribution of precipitation and role of grasslands.
Employing this approach, we established potential for considerable expansion in production of many spring sown crops, comparing the lengths of the growing seasons (in °Cd) in the future with the basic, recorded requirements of crops when grown under long day conditions at high latitudes (Table 2).
Crops that require 1000–1100 °Cd and/ or are prone to frost [buckwheat (Fagopyrum esculentum Mill.
), faba bean (Vicia faba L.), flax (Linum usitatissimum L.), oil hemp (Cannabis sativa L.), oilseed rape, turnip rape and sunflower (Helianthus annuus L.)] are currently grown at up to 62 °N or only in the most temperature favoured regions of southern Finland.
Within the next couple of decades they might be grown at up to 65 °N along with crops like field pea and spring cereals that would not be limited by length of the growing season in regions where there is arable land (Fig.
1, Table 2).
Such anticipated changes in production regions of crops like turnip rape and oilseed rape (see Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b for more detailed discussion), as well as pea and faba bean, represent promising prospects for expanding production of protein rich crops in northern A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 178 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
179 regions that are not currently self-sufficient at all in protein crop production (Aronen 2008).
In most cases of temperate crops evaluated +5 °C was the base temperature for cumulated degrees, but maize is a C4-crop favouring higher daily mean temperatures and we therefore used +10 °C as the base temperature (Martin et al.
2006) (Fig.
2).
Even in the A2 scenario, elevation of temperatures seemed not to be sufficient to secure production of grain maize in Finland.
Grain maize has in fact only recently been introduced into Denmark due to elevated temperatures during the growing season, while forage maize has been an important crop there for a long time (Olesen et al.
2009).
According to expected warming in Finland (Fig.
2), forage maize could be introduced into southern Finland, without likely major risks resulting from too short a growing season, night frosts and cool periods, by the mid-century according to the A2 scenario, but only by the end of the century in the B1 scenario.
In a controlled condition experiment at MTT, Jokioinen, in 2008, where temperature and length of the growing season roughly resembled those expected by the end of the century in the A2 scenario for large areas of southern Finland, forage maize produced ca.
35 000 kg dry matter per hectare (Ari Rajala, MTT, personal communication 13th February 2009).
Fig.
1.
Physiologically effective and agronomically feasible growing season accumulated temperature sum (°Cd) from estimated sowing to harvest with +5 °C base temperature during recent decades (1971–2000) centered on 1985 and estimations for 30-year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 according to B1 and A2 scenarios of the IPCC and 19 climatic models (data from the Finnish Meteorological Institute).
Regional means for sowing dates (1971–2008) are from TIKE (the Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Finland); for the future the appropriate sowing times are identified to be approximately one, two and three weeks earlier for 2025, 2055 and 2085, respectively.
Harvests are expected to occur by 15th September due to potentially unfavourable growing and harvest conditions.
A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 178 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
179 From cold to mild winters and consequent estimated introduction of autumn sown crops Future growing seasons will be warmer and longer, but winters will be milder and shorter (Jylhä et al.
2008), as shown in Figure 3.
The transition from cold to mild winters is indicated as expansion of regions with fewer frost days than 100, 75, 50 and 25 compared with current winters, which have close to 100 frost days in the south and up to almost 200 if the entire current field crop production area is taken into account.
According to these projections basing on averages over 30-year periods, by 2025 the south-western archipelago will be the only region having fewer than 100 frost days for both the B1 and A2 scenarios.
However, by 2055 the 100 frost day borderline would approach not only the coastal areas but also inland southern Finland, and by 2085 it reaches Oulu in the A2 scenario (Fig.
3).
Scenarios differ markedly in how they anticipate progress of mild winters: in the A2 scenario, borderlines of 25 and 50 frost days cross that of 100 frost days for the B1 scenario.
Therefore, particularly in the case of the high-emission scenario, Finnish winters would get clearly milder during this century, and by the end of this century, but not much earlier, there would be mild winters similar to those of southern Sweden at present (1961−1990) (Tveito et al.
2001).
Winters in the south-westernmost parts of Finland would be similar to those in Denmark.
Although numerous factors affect success of overwintering capacity of field crops (Hömmö and Pulli 1993, Lindén et al.
1999, Hofgaard et al.
2003, Serenius et al.
2005, Velicka et al.
2006), considering mildness of winters only as a reduction in numbers of frost days, we can estimate the potential time-frame for introduction of currently grown autumn sown crops over a larger extent and Table 2.
Minimum accumulated temperature sums required over a base temperature for successful growth of various major and minor spring sown crops and considered as a basic prerequisite for cultivation under northern, long day growing conditions and being critical for crop introduction to new regions following climate change.
Field crop Base temperature (°C) Required physiologically effective temperature sum (°Cd) Reference Buckwheat 5–10a 900 Montonen and Kontturi (1997) Faba bean 5 1060 MTT Official Variety Trials Flax 5 1040 MTT Official Variety Trials Hemp 5 1150 Callaway (2004), Pahkala et al.
(2008)b Maize for forage 10 700–850 Carter et al.
(1991)c, Martin et al.
(2006), Fronzek and Carter (2007)c Pea 5 930–980 MTT Official Variety Trials Spring barley 5 890 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009c) Spring oat 5 960 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009c) Spring oilseed rape 5 1090 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009c) Spring turnip rape 5 1010 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009c) Spring wheat 5 990 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009c) Sunflower 5 1100 MTT Official Variety Trials a Temperature exceeding +10°C is required for seedling emergence.
b Temperature sum for oil hemp is 1150 °Cd, while fibre hemp can be harvested earlier.
cUsed for grain maize and accumulated over the whole year.
A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 180 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
181 introduction of novel overwintering crop species.
For example, cultivation of winter wheat, currently grown only in restricted areas of southern Finland where there are about 130 frost days at most, can be extended to the Oulu region by end of this century in the A2 scenario (Fig.
3).
Rye production could be successful throughout the arable regions by 2055 in the A2 scenario.
Triticale (X Triticosecale Wittmack) has occasional overwintering success under current winter conditions and could become a major field crop in Finland.
Its cultivation could probably extend a little beyond the expansion of winter wheat in the future.
In contrast to winter rye, wheat and triticale, we lack experience in cultivation of winter cultivars of barley, oat, turnip rape and oilseed rape.
Winter turnip rape areas in the 1950s tended towards 10 000 hectares (Hiivola 1966), but cultivar development has been considerable since then.
Without comprehensive data from experiments in Finland we have to rely on information from more southern regions, especially Sweden, Denmark and Estonia, and compare their current with our future conditions.
Currently winter oilseed rape is largely grown in Sweden, particularly the southern parts, (Svensk Raps 2009), and in Denmark, but not in Estonia because of poor overwintering capacity (Lääniste et al.
2008).
Comparison of our future winter conditions with those of the current Brassica production regions of Sweden and Denmark (Tveito et al.
2001, period 1961−1990) indicates that autumn sown Brassica crops could enter into cultivation in the current spring sown Brassica crop Fig.
2.
Physiologically effective and agronomically feasible growing season accumulated temperature sum (°Cd) from estimated sowing to harvest with +10 °C base temperature during recent decades (1971–2000) centered on 1985 and estimations for 30-year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 according to B1 and A2 scenarios of the IPCC and 19 climatic models (data from the Finnish Meteorological Institute).
Regional means for sowing dates (1971–2000) are from TIKE (the Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Finland); for the future the appropriate sowing times are identified to be approximately one, two and three weeks earlier for 2025, 2055 and 2085, respectively.
Harvests are expected to occur by 15th September due to potentially unfavourable growing and harvest conditions.
A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 180 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
181 region of Finland by mid-century at the earliest, or more probably by the end of this century (Fig.
3).
However, early spring frosts are particularly critical for successful overwintering of Brassica crops, not just the winter conditions and length of the thermal winter per se (Johan Biärsjö, Svensk Raps AB, personal communication 5th February 2009).
This is in agreement with earlier findings from Finland (Hiivola 1966), which showed that the main reasons for poor overwintering of winter turnip rape were frost and waterlogging.
In the future, with projected increases in winter precipitation and cycles of thawing and freezing (Jylhä et al.
2004, 2008), the risk of waterlogging generally increases.
For Brassica the apical meristem is prone to frost damage, unlike in cereals which have a well protected apical meristem close to soil surface (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009a).
Due to this major structural difference between winter cereals and Brassica crops, winter barley, as largely grown in Denmark, and winter oat, which has gradually started to dominate oat production in U.K. (Anon.
1999,Central Statistics Office Ireland 2009), can be introduced into Finnish agriculture somewhat earlier, but no later than autumn sown Brassica crops.
Even though we have concentrated on the issue of how critical overwintering conditions are regarding future expansion of crops to novel regions in Finland, it is important to stress that estimated increases in autumn precipitation could interfere with sowing of winter crops, which has to be taken into consideration in adaptation strategies.
Of the underutilised crops blue lupin (Lupinus angustifolius L.), also called narrow-leafed lupin, is grown in experiments in southern and northern Finland (Aniszewski 1988a, 1988b, Kurlovich et al.
2004).
According to Kurlovich et al.
(2004), early forms of blue lupin grow successfully in southern Finland when inoculated with Rhizobium, and even in northern Finland dry-matter yields of 1.23 to 7.38 t ha-1 were recorded when cultivars were compared (Aniszewski 1988b).
In Finland, Washington lupin (L. polyphyllus Lindl.)
is a garden escapee, which flourishes by the roadsides and indicates the general potential of lupins to adapt successfully to northern conditions (Aniszewski et al.
2001).
Lupins are also likely to benefit from climate induced changes in Finnish conditions and could represent a valuable addition to the group of nitrogen fixing protein crops in the future.
Fig.
3.
Estimated changes in thermal winter determined as a period (in days) starting when daily mean temperatures remain permanently below 0 °C and ending when they rise permanently above 0 °C.
The regional time points for winters with 75, 50 and 25 frost days, from which 25 days is close to the current length of thermal winter in Denmark, are shown for recent decades (1971–2000) centered on 1985 and estimations for 30-year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 according to B1 and A2 scenarios of the IPCC and 19 climatic models (data from the Finnish Meteorological Institute).
A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 182 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
183 Estimated changes in yield potential of major field crops currently grown in Finland Spring cereals.
For our estimations we considered that a combination of climate change and plant breeding would increase yield potential in cereals as for all crops in the future.
However, in the future growing regions would differ according to their yield potential, as shown in Table 3 for spring sown cereals.
Current barley grain yields in southernmost Finland are likely to be lower than the yield potential anticipated for 64–66 °N by 2025 regardless of scenario.
Furthermore, estimated potential yields of barley for 2055 at 60 °N would be reached at 66 °N by the end of this century, while for wheat the pace of improvements is set to be even higher.
These striking examples illustrate how strongly the short growing season limits yields under these northernmost European growing conditions.
It also reveals the substantial impact of lengthening the growing season in a warming climate on productivity.
However, to realise such potential requires adaptation measures, including sufficient input use (especially nitrogen), development of irrigation systems in cases of insufficient water availability at critical phases of crop development, and tailoring crop cultivars to future challenges of changing climate, including too high temperature responsiveness of spring cereals under long day conditions, resistance to pests and diseases and improved nutrient and water use efficiency (Table 4).
If we were to exclude any breeding effect and solely consider the effect of prolonged growing season and higher accumulated degree days per se, there would be only negligible yield increases (data not shown).
For example, for spring barley the yield difference between seasons Table 3.
Estimated means for enhanced potential yields of spring cereals in 30-year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 depending on latitude and compared with recent history (1971–2000, centered on 1985).
Anticipated potential yields (t ha-1) dependent on °Cd are shown as B1 estimate – A2 estimate.
Plant breeding achievements are included in estimations with expectation of pace of genetic yield gain being similar to 1971–2000.
Effect of elevated CO2 on yields is ignored.
At each latitude potential yields in western regions are slightly higher (ca.
8%) than in eastern regions.
At the end of this century (2085) spring forms are likely to be partly replaced by winter types in the regions with mild winters and their yield potential is estimated only for more northern latitudes.
Current record yields from Denmark and Sweden are reached and exceeded at the more southern latitudes by mid-century.
Crop Time Latitude 60 °N 61 °N 62 °N 63 °N 64 °N 65 °N 66 °N Spring barley 1985 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.3 2025 5.0–5.0 5.0–5.0 4.8–4.8 4.5–4.5 4.3–4.3 4.1–4.1 3.9–3.9 2055 6.4–6.6 6.4–6.7 6.2–6.4 5.9–6.1 5.6–5.9 5.4–5.6 5.1–5.3 2085 · · · · 7.2–8.0 6.9–7.7 6.6–7.4 Spring oat 1985 4.4 4.4 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.6 1.4 2025 6.4–6.5 6.5–6.5 5.9–6.0 5.4–5.4 4.8–4.8 4.4–4.4 3.8–3.8 2055 8.2–8.8 8.3–8.9 7.7–8.2 7.0–7.5 6.4–6.9 5.9–6.4 5.2–5.7 2085 · · · · 8.1–9.8 7.5–9.3 6.7–8.5 Spring wheat 1985 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.0 1.1 · 2025 4.9–4.9 4.9–4.9 4.7–4.7 4.4–4.4 4.2–4.2 4.0–4.0 2.7–2.7 2055 7.1–7.4 7.1–7.4 6.8–7.1 6.5–6.7 6.1–6.4 5.9–6.1 5.6–5.8 2085 · · · · · 8.4–9.5 7.9–9.1 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 182 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
183 with 800 and 1100 utilised °Cd was only 350 kg ha-1, close to 100 kg ha-1 per 100 °Cd elevation (data not shown).
This was typical for spring and winter cereals, though no comprehensive data were available for exceptionally warm growing seasons with 1300–1500 °Cd.
Such direct comparison evidently underestimates the potential changes in yields, as we recently demonstrated both a negative response of today’s cultivars to elevated temperatures under long day conditions (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2007 and 2009d) and lack of sufficient inputs to sustain yields in high productivity years (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009e).
This was also demonstrated in an earlier study of Saarikko (2000), where modelled yields were considerably higher than those observed at regional level, probably because of insufficient inputs by Finnish farmers.
According to earlier experiments and estimations of climate change effects on crop production (Hakala 1998, Saarikko 2000), the increase in growing season temperatures by climate change decreased the yield of wheat (cultivar “Polkka”), and even though yield was increased by elevated CO2, the combined effect of CO2 and temperature resulted in no significant gain but also no significant yield penalty.
These results clearly emphasise the role of plant breeding and investment in production inputs for enhancement of yield potential in prolonged and warmer growing Table 4.
The major adaptation measures needed to sustain expression of climate change increased yield potential in future field crop production.
Factor limiting expression of yield potential Crops in particular concern Adaptation measure(s) needed with reference Enhanced development rate at elevated temperatures in long days Seed and grain producing determinate crops (not pea) Plant breeding and selection for cultivars that can utilise the climate change induced prolonged growing season thoroughly without hastening too much in their development 1, 2 Water availability and distribution within the growing season Spring sown crops Development of irrigation systems and breeding for improved water use efficiency 2, 3 Increasing risk for pest and disease infestations All crops Development of chemical and biological control agents, methods and alarm systems, breeding for disease resistance 4, 5, 6 Extreme events All crops Alarm systems, development of cultivars with high yield stability, securing with sufficient farm resilience through crop diversity 7, 8 Overwintering success and fluctuation in winter conditions until cold winters become mild winters Autumn sown crops Breeding for improved overwintering capacity and avoiding introduction of cultivars not well adapted to northern conditions 9, 10 Nutrient availability All crops Changes in fertiliser practices and possible introduction of split fertiliser use; efficient crop rotations and increasing use of legumes, breeding for improved nitrogen and phosphorus use efficiency 11, 12 1 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2007); 2 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009d); 3 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009c); 4 Kaukoranta (1996); 5 Carter et al.
(1996); 6 Hannukkala et al.
(2007); 7 Alexander et al.
(2006); 8 Klein Tank and Können (2003); 9 Jylhä et al.
(2008); 10 Peltonen-Sainio et al.
(2009a); 11 Muurinen (2007); 12 Muurinen et al.
(2007) A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 184 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
185 seasons, indicating the necessity for comprehensive adaptation in order for climate change to benefit crop production.
Buckwheat is among the most potential pseudocereals, but it is very sensitive to frost and requires a minimum temperature of +10 °C for emergence (Montonen and Kontturi 1997).
The current yield range is 900–1200 kg ha-1.
When growing conditions are favourable it can yield over 2000 kg ha-1, but can fail completely under unfavourable conditions (Montonen and Kontturi 1997, Kontturi et al.
2004).
According to FAO (2009) statistics it is grown on a large-scale in Russia (in 2006 >1 million ha), Lithuania (30 000 ha) and Latvia (14 000 ha), with yields averaging in most cases 500 to 950 kg ha-1.
Winter cereals are likely to replace spring cereals when their overwintering capacity is sufficient for a particular region.
They are attractive because of their 1) higher yield potential, 2) better ability to avoid early summer drought induced yield losses (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009d), and 3) soil cover, reducing risk of erosion and nutrient leaching.
Yield potential per se for winter wheat and rye is likely to increase considerably due to breeding and changes in growing conditions, and according to our estimations, potential yields of winter wheat would exceed those of spring wheat (Table 5).
Furthermore, due to anticipated increase in severe problems with early summer drought, the gap between potential and achieved yields of winter and spring types would likely increase.
At this time wheat is the only crop with both spring and winter cultivars in Finnish agriculture.
According to averaged yield history (1985) of spring and winter wheat, shown in Tables 3 and 5, their yield potentials differ markedly; 2900–2600 kg ha-1 for spring wheat and 5200–4900 kg ha-1 for winter wheat at 60–63 °N.
Although this is the only available example based on direct comparison between winter and spring types, in general, introduction of winter types into cultivation is likely to substantially shift yield levels.
This will, however, happen in each region only when the primary limiting factor is overcome; the crop needs to successfully overwinter.
The current common winter crops, winter rye and wheat, will later be accompanied by triticale, winter barley, and probably also winter oat.
Table 5.
Estimated means for enhanced potential yields of winter wheat and rye in the case of successful overwintering and field pea in 30-year periods centred on 2025 and 2055 depending on latitude and compared with recent history (1971–2000, centered on 1985).
Anticipated potential yields (t ha-1) dependent on °Cd are shown as B1 estimate – A2 estimate.
Plant breeding achievements are included in estimations with expectation of pace of genetic yield gain being similar to 1971–2000.
Effect of elevated CO2 on yields is ignored.
At each latitude potential yields in western regions are slightly higher (ca.
3%) than in eastern regions.
Crop Time Latitude 60 °N 61 °N 62 °N 63 °N 64 °N 65 °N 66 °N Winter wheat 1985 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.9 · · · 2025 7.1–7.1 7.1–7.2 7.0–7.0 6.7–6.8 6.6–6.6 · · 2055 9.0–9.2 9.0–9.2 8.8–9.0 8.5–8.7 8.3–8.5 8.1–8.3 7.9–8.1 Winter rye 1985 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 3.9 2.2 1.2 2025 6.6–6.6 6.6–6.6 6.4–6.4 6.3–6.3 6.2–6.2 6.0–6.0 5.3–5.3 2055 9.1–9.2 9.1–9.2 8.9–9.1 8.7–8.9 8.5–8.7 8.4–8.5 8.2–8.3 Field pea 1985 4.4 4.4 4.1 3.7 2.8 1.4 · 2025 6.3–6.3 6.3–6.3 5.8–5.9 5.4–5.4 4.9–4.9 4.5–4.5 2.9–2.9 2055 7.9–8.3 7.9–8.4 7.4–7.9 6.9–7.3 6.3–6.8 5.9–6.3 5.3–5.7 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 184 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
185 Due to lack of comprehensive experimentation in Finland, productivity of such novel crops can only be estimated according to current yields in Sweden and Denmark.
In Sweden and Denmark the national record yields for triticale range from 5200 to 5400 kg ha-1 (FAO 2009), which provides an estimate of future attainable yield.
In Finnish experiments, yields of triticale exceeding 5000 kg ha-1 were recorded even at 800 to 1000 °Cd growing seasons, emphasising the high yield potential of triticale when grown under milder winter conditions than currently pertain.
On the other hand, in Denmark the yield gap between winter and spring barley was 1100, 200 and 1400 kg ha-1 during the last three years (Statistics Denmark 2009), while in UK the yield gap between winter and spring oat was 1200, 1600 and 1700 kg ha-1 in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively (Central Statistics Office Ireland 2009).
As our yield potential estimations were only possible for spring barley and oat (Table 3), a shift from spring to winter types in the latter part of this century may result in additional yield benefit, which might compare with the present difference between these two types in these more southern countries.
Turnip rape and oilseed rape yield potentials are enhanced by a prolonged growing season.
Contrary to the earlier situation where turnip rape yields exceeded those of oilseed rape, future climate warming will likely benefit oilseed rape more and hence, according to our estimations, reach turnip rape yields in the southernmost regions within the next ten years or so.
By mid-century oilseed rape is set to out-yield turnip rape throughout the country, except northernmost Finland (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2009b).
This has happened in southern Sweden and Denmark, and winter types would gradually out-compete spring forms in Finland in the future.
There has been no large-scale, modern cultivation of winter turnip rape and oilseed rape in Finland.
Spring turnip rape has traditionally predominated due to its higher production stability and quality, but during the last couple of years the area under oilseed rape has increased from 1% to 12% of total rapeseed area (Peltonen-Sainio et al.
2007 and 2009b) and the trend continues.
Contrary to the current situation in Finland, in Uppland in Sweden, at comparable latitudes to southern Finland, winter types have been successfully adapted for cultivation.
Record regional yields were produced in 2002 of over 3500 kg ha-1 for winter oilseed rape, about 2500 kg ha-1 for winter turnip rape, 2300 kg ha-1 for spring oilseed rape and only around 1500 kg ha-1 for spring turnip rape (Svensk Raps 2009).
However, in 2008 there were only 1300 hectares of spring turnip rape in Sweden and the crop seems set to vanish from cultivation within the near future.
Similarly to the Swedish situation, under future Finnish conditions spring turnip rape will likely remain an important Brassica crop only in the northernmost growing regions, and it is likely to play an important role as a pioneer crop when new regions for Brassica production are developed.
In the southernmost regions of Sweden, Skåne, the number of frost days was 50–100 and the length of the growing season up to 200 days in period 1961–1990 (Tveito et al.
2001).
Record regional yields of winter oilseed rape (in 2008) were almost 4000 kg ha-1 (Svensk Raps 2009).
This indicates potential future yields in Finland with a changing climate.
Similarly in Denmark, national oilseed rape yields approached 4000 kg ha-1 in the most favourable years of the 2000s, while yields in the Baltic countries have remained modest (FAO 2009).
Regardless of whether we anticipate our future yield of Brassica crops in Finland by comparing how conditions in the future would resemble those of southern Sweden and Denmark, or make statistical estimations (Table 6), oilseed rape is a typical “borderline crop”, but is a high potential oil and protein-rich crop of the future.
Leguminous seed producing crops, field pea and faba bean are favoured by a prolonged growing season and their yields are expected to increase under future conditions as the current low accumulated temperature sums restrict yields.
This is also evident when comparing present yields (1985) at different latitudes (Table 5).
Similarly, yield responsiveness of field pea to increased growing season degree days was more marked than for other crops: 320 kg ha-1 per 100 °Cd compared with less than 100 kg ha-1 for spring cereals (data not shown).
As a result of climate warming, it is expected that field pea yields (1985) recorded A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 186 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
187 from the southernmost production region of Finland would be reached at up to 65 °N by 2025, while by 2055 the yield potential at 66 °N would far exceed that currently reached at 60 °N.
However, today’s experimental yields at 60–62 °N are higher than the national record yields in Denmark (4000 kg ha-1) and Sweden (<3000 kg ha-1) (FAO 2009).
While our experiments are conventionally managed, national yields always include organic production, thereby skewing the comparison.
Faba bean experiments are too few to enable comprehensive comparisons of productivity between field pea and faba bean to be made.
The short growing season confers no marked yield advantage for faba bean over field pea because there have been few years with accumulated degree days higher than the critical 1100 °C limit required by faba bean (data not shown).
Nevertheless, both leguminous seed crops represent very interesting opportunities for future production systems of Finland, not least due to their nitrogen fixing capacity, but also as their expanded cultivation could contribute to improved self-sufficiency of crop-based feed protein production in the future.
Conclusions The approach used has shown that climate warming offers new opportunities for Finnish grain and seed crop production, especially regarding 1) expansion of cultivation of current minor, “borderline crops”, which are, however, valuable and attractive in rotations and for industry, such as oilseed rape, pea and faba bean, 2) expansion of current minor overwintering crops such as winter wheat and triticale, 3) introduction of novel overwintering cultivars of barley, oilseed rape and oat and, 4) considerable enhancement of yield potential of all crops currently grown in these northernmost European conditions, including our important major field crops.
It is, however, important to note that it is not only the length of the physiologically effective growing Table 6.
Estimated means for enhanced potential yields of spring turnip rape and oilseed rape in 30-year periods centred on 2025, 2055 and 2085 depending on latitude and compared with recent history (1971–2000, centered on 1985).
Anticipated potential yields (t ha-1) dependent on °Cd are shown as B1 estimate – A2 estimate.
Plant breeding achievements are included in estimations with expectation of pace of genetic yield gain being similar to 1971–2000.
Effect of elevated CO2 on yields is ignored.
At each latitude potential yields in western regions are 15–50% higher than in eastern regions.
At the end of this century (2085) spring turnip rape and oilseed rape cultivars are not likely to be grown other than at the northernmost latitudes and hence, their yield potential is estimated only for those latitudes.
Spring sown crop Time Latitude 60 °N 61 °N 62 °N 63 °N 64 °N 65 °N 66 °N Turnip rape 1985 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 · 2025 3.1–3.1 3.1–3.1 2.7–2.7 2.3–2.3 1.9–1.9 1.6–1.6 0.9–0.9 2055 4.7–5.2 4.8–5.3 4.3–4.8 3.8–4.2 3.3–3.7 2.8–3.2 2.3–2.7 2085 · · · · · 4.4–6.1 3.6–5.4 Oilseed rape 1985 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 · · · 2025 2.9–2.9 2.9–3.0 2.5–2.5 2.0–2.0 1.6–1.6 1.0–1.0 0.4–0.4 2055 5.7–6.3 5.8–6.5 5.1–5.7 4.3–4.9 3.6–4.2 3.0–3.6 1.8–2.8 2085 · · · · · 6.0–8.9 4.7–7.7 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 186 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
187 season that determines the regional suitability and yield potentials of common and novel crops.
Realisation of anticipated, greatly increased yield potentials requires successful adaptation to the most critical production risks (Table 4).
This approach only covered potential seed and grains crops, and forage maize, but there is potential for increased crop diversity in Finland.
However, the predicted increased variability of growing conditions, more frequent weather extremes and outbreaks of pests and diseases, are likely to increase production risks and uncertainty.
These might reduce farmer interest in growing new crops adapted to the world’s northernmost growing conditions.
It is also likely that even though there are likely to be marked differences among crops in their responses to climate induced changes in growing conditions, as well as in their adaptation processes and general success and potential, changes in global markets will drive farmer decision making and determine climate change adaptation strategies.
Acknowledgements.
The authors are grateful to the numerous partners who participated in organising the MTT Official Cultivar Trials since 1970 and to the Finnish Meteorological Institute for climate change datasets provided for use in the ILMASOPU-project.
The work was financed by the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, MTT Agrifood Research Finland and Raisio Ltd. as a part of an on-going consortium project entitled Adaptation of Finnish Agro-food Sector to Climate Change (ILMASOPU) for 2006–2009, which belongs to the National Climate Change Adaptation Program, ISTO.
References Alexander, L.V., Zhang, X., Peterson, T.C., Caesar, J., Gleason, B., Klein Tank, A.M.G., Haylock, M., Collins, D., Trewin, B., Rahimzadeh, F., Tagipour, A., Rupa Kumar, K., Revadekar, J., Griffiths, G., Vincent, L., Stephenson, D.B., Burn, J., Aguilar, E., Brunet, M., Taylor, M., New, M., Zhai, P., Rusticucci, M. & Vazquez-Aguirre, J.L.
2006.
Global observed changes in daily climate extremes of temperature and precipitation.
Journal of Geophysical Research 111, D05109, 22 p. Aniszewski, T. 1988a.
Initial development of three blue lupin (Lupinus angustifolius L.) varieties in northern Finland.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 27: 141–151.
Aniszewski, T. 1988b.
Environment, phenological development and dry matter formation of the blue lupin (Lupinus angustifolius L.) varieties in northern Finland.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica 38: 303–316.
Aniszewski, T., Kupari, M.H.
& Leinonen, A.J.
2001.
Seed number, seed size and seed diversity in Washington lupin (Lupinus polyphyllus Lindl.).
Annals of Botany 87: 77–82.
Anon.
1999.
Oats in a New Era.
Semundo Limited, Cambridge, UK.
88 p. Aronen, I.
2008.
Sensitive phases in production and delivery processes and their impacts.
In: Partanen, K. & Niemeläinen, O. NJF Seminar 410: Risk Assessment of Global Agrifood Production Chains NJF’s 90 Year Jubilee Symposium, Helsinki, Finland.
NJF Report 4, 7: 12–16.
Callaway, J.C. 2004.
Hemp seed production in Finland.
Journal of Industrial Hemp 9: 97–103.
Carter, T.R.
1998.
Changes in the thermal growing season in Nordic countries during the past century and prospects for the future.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 7: 161–179.
Carter, T.R.
& Saarikko, R.A. 1996.
Estimating regional crop potential in Finland under a changing climate.
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 79: 301–313.
Carter, T.R., Parry, M.L.
& Porter, J.H.
1991.
Climatic change and future agroclimatic potential in Europe.
International Journal of Climatology 11: 251–2–69.
Carter, T.R., Saarikko, R.A. & Niemi, K.J.
1996.
Assessing the risks and uncertainties of regional crop potential under a changing climate in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 329–350.
Central Statistics Office Ireland 2009.
Homepage of Central Statistics Office Ireland.
Cited on 6th July 2009.
Update on 15th September 2009.
Available on the internet: http://www.cso.ie.
FAO 2009.
Homepage of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Cited on 6th July 2009.
Update on 23rd June 2009.
Available on the internet: http:// faostat.fao.org.
Finola 2009.
Homepage of Finola® distributed by Elixi Oil Oy.
Cited on 6th July 2009.
Update on 14th July 2009.
Available on the internet: www.finola.com.
Fronzek, S. & Carter, T.R.
2007.
Assessing uncertainties in climate change impacts on resource potential for Europe based on projections from RCMs and GCMs.
Climatic Change 81: 357–371.
GAISMA 2009.
Cited on 6th July 2009.
Available on the internet: http://www.gaisma.com.
Hakala, K. 1998.
Growth and yield potential of spring wheat in a simulated changed climate with increased CO2 and higher temperature.
European Journal of Agronomy 9: 41–52.
Hakala, K. & Mela, T. 1996.
The effects of prolonged exposure to elevated temperatures and elevated CO2 levels on the growth, yield and dry matter partitioning of fieldsown meadow fescue (Festuca pratensis, cv.
Kalevi).
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 285–298.
Hannukkala, A., Kaukoranta, T., Lehtinen, A.
& Rahkonen, A.
2007.
Late-blight epidemics on potato in Finland, 1933–2002; increased and earlier occurrence of epidemics associated with climate change and lack of rotation.
Plant Pathology 56: 167–176.
A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 188 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
189 Hiivola, S.-L. 1966.
Öljykasvitutkimukset kasvinjalostuslaitoksella 1942–1963.
In: August Jäntti (ed.).
Professori Otto Vallen juhlajulkaisu.
Suomen Maataloustieteellisen Seuran Julkaisuja 107: 90–102.
(In Finnish, summary in English).
Hofgaard, I.S., Vollsnes, A.V., Marum, P., Larsen, A.
& Tronsmo, A.M. 2003.
Variation in resistance to different winter stress factors within a full-sib family of perennial ryegrass.
Euphytica 134: 61–75.
Hömmö, L. & Pulli, S. 1993.
Winterhardiness of some winter wheat (Triticum aestivum), rye (Secale cereale), triticale (X Triticosecale) and winter barley (Hordeum vulgare) cultivars tested at six locations in Finland.
Agricultural Science in Finland 2: 311–327.
IPCC 2007a.
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L.
Parry, O.F.
Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J.
van der Linden and C.E.
Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 16 p. IPCC 2007b.
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B.
Averyt, M. Tignor & H.L.
Miller (eds.).
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 18 p. Jylhä, K., Tuomenvirta, H. & Ruosteenoja, K. 2004.
Climate change projections for Finland during the 21st century.
Boreal Environment Research 9: 127–152.
Jylhä, K., Fronzek, S., Tuomenvirta, H., Carter, T.R.
& Ruosteenoja, K. 2008.
Changes in frost, snow and Baltic sea ice by the end of the twenty-first century based on climate model projections for Europe.
Climatic Change 86: 441–462.
Kaukoranta, T. 1996.
Impact of global warming on potato late blight: risk, yield loss and control.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 5: 311–326 Kaukoranta, T. & Hakala, K. 2008.
Impact of spring warming on sowing times of cereal, potato and sugar beet in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 17: 165–176.
Kleemola, J.
1991.
Effect of temperature on phasic development of spring wheat in northern growing conditions.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica 41: 275–283.
Klein Tank, A.M.G.
& Wijngaard, J.B., et al., 2002.
Daily dataset of 20th-century surface air temperature and precipitation series for the European Climate Assessment.
International Journal of Climatology 22: 1441–1453.
Klein Tank, A.M.G.
& Können, G.P.
2003.
Trends in indices of daily temperature and precipitation extremes in Europe, 1946–1999.
Journal of Climate 16: 3665–3680.
Kontturi, M. 1979.
The effect of weather on yield and development of spring wheat in Finland.
Annales Agriculturae Fenniae 18: 263–274.
Kontturi, M., Keskitalo, M. & Ketoja, E. 2004.
Buckwheat cultivars in the North.
In: Eds.
Iva Faberová et al., Advances in buckwheat research: proceedings of the 9th International symposium on buckwheat held at the, Prague, Czech Republic.
p 496–498.
Kurlovich, B. S., Hovinen, S., Hyovela, M., Heinanen, J.
& Kulakov, N. 2004.
Possibility of selection and cultivation of narrow-leafed lupin in Finland.
In: Wild and cultivated lupins from the Tropics to the Poles.
Proceedings of the 10th International Lupin Conference, Laugarvatn, Iceland.
p 56–58.
Lääniste, P., Joudu, J., Eremeev, V. & Mäeorg, E. 2008.
Effect of sowing date and increasing sowing rates on plant density and yield of winter oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.) under Nordic climate conditions.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica Section B – Soil and Plant Science 58: 330–335.
Lindén, L., Palonen, P. & Seppänen, M. 1999.
Cold hardiness research on agricultural and horticultural crops in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland 8: 459–477.
Martin, J.H., Waldren, R.P.
& Stamp, D.L.
2006.
Principles of field crop production, 4th edition.
Pearson Education, Inc. New Jersey, USA.
954 p. Montonen, R. & Kontturi, M. 1997.
Tattarin viljelytekniikka.
Maatalouden tutkimuskeskuksen julkaisuja.
Sarja A 14: 51 p. (in Finnish, summary in English).
Muurinen, S. 2007.
Nitrogen dynamics and nitrogen use efficiency of spring cereals under Finnish growing conditions.
University of Helsinki, Department of Applied Biology, Section of Crop Husbandry 29: 38 p.
Diss.
: Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 2007.
Muurinen, S., Kleemola, J.
& Peltonen-Sainio, P. 2007.
Accumulation and translocation of N in spring cereal cultivars differing in NUE.
Agronomy Journal 99: 441–449.
Nakicenovic N., Alcamo J., Davis G., de Vries B., Fenhann J., Gaffin S., Gregory K., Grübler A., Jung T.Y., Kram T., La Rovere E.L., Michaelis L., Mori S., Morita T., Pepper W., Pitcher H., Price L., Raihi K., Roehrl A., Rogner H.-H., Sankovski A., Schlesinger M., Shukla P., Smith S., Swart R., van Rooijen S., Victor N. & Dadi Z., 2000.
Emissions Scenarios.
A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, 599 p. Öfversten, J., Jauhiainen, L. & Kangas, A.
2004.
Contribution of new varieties to cereal yields in Finland between 1973 and 2003.
The Journal of Agricultural Science 142: 281–287.
Olesen, J.E.
& Bindi, M. 2002.
Consequences of climate change for European agricultural productivity, land use and policy.
European Journal of Agronomy 16: 239– 262.
Olesen, J.E., Trnka, M., Kersebaum, K.C., Skjelvåg, A.O., Seguin, B., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rossi, F., Kozyra, J.
& Micale, F. 2009.
Impacts and adaptation of European crop production systems to climate change.
European Journal of Agronomy, under revision.
Pahkala, K., Pahkala, E. & Syrjälä, H. 2008.
Northern limits to fiber hemp production in Europe.
Journal of Industrial Hemp 13: 104–116.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L. & Hannukkala, A.
2007.
Declining rapeseed yields in Finland: how, why and what next?
The Journal of Agricultural Science 145: 587–598.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rajala, A., Känkänen, H. & Hakala, K. 2009a.
Improving farming systems in northern European conditions.
In: V. O. Sadras and D. F. Calderini (eds.)
Crop Physiology.
Applications for Genetic Improvement and Agronomy.
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
pp.
71-97.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Hakala, K., Jauhiainen, L. & RuosA G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 188 A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Vol.
18 (2009): 171–190.
189 teenoja, K. 2009b.
Comparing regional risks in producing turnip rape and oilseed rape Impacts of climate change and breeding.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica Section B – Soil and Plant Science 59: 129–138.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L., Hakala, K. & Ruosteenoja, K. 2009c.
Growth duration and phasing, distribution of precipitation and yielding capacity of spring cereals and rapeseed in chancing climate at high latitudes.
Field Crops Research, submitted.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L. & Hakala, K. 2009d.
Crop responses to precipitation and elevated temperatures in cool growing conditions at high latitudes according to long-term multi-location trials.
Manuscript submitted.
Peltonen-Sainio, P., Jauhiainen, L. & Laurila, I.P.
2009e.
Cereal yield trends in northern European conditions: Changes in yield potential and its realisation.
Field Crops Research 110: 85–90.
Rousi, A.
1997.
Auringonkukasta viiniköynnökseen.
Ravintokasvit.
WSOY, Porvoo, Finland.
390 p. ISBN 951– 0–21295–4 (in Finnish).
Saarikko, R.A. 2000.
Applying a site based crop model to estimate regional yields under current and changed climates.
Ecological Modelling 131: 191-206.
Saarikko, R.A. & Carter, T.R.
1996.
Estimating the development and regional thermal suitability of spring wheat in Finland under climatic warming.
Climate Research 7: 243–252.
Serenius, M., Huusela-Veistola, E., Avikainen, H., Pahkala, K. & Laine, A.
2005.
Effects of sowing time on pink snow mold, leaf rust and winter damage in winter rye varieties in Finland.
Agricultural and Food Science 14: 362–376.
Smartt, J.
& Simmonds, N.W.
1995.
Evolution of Crop Plants.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, USA.
531 p. ISBN 0–582–08643–4 Statistics Denmark 2009.
Homepage of Statistics Denmark.
Cited on 6th July 2009.
Update on 17th December 2008.
Available on the internet: http://www.dst.dk/ HomeUK/Statistics.
Svensk Raps 2009.
Homepage of Svensk Raps.
Cited on 6th July 2009.
Update on 16th September 2009.
Available on the internet: http://www.svenskraps.se.
Tveito, O.E., Forland, E.J., Alexandersson, H., Drebs, A., Jónsson, T., Tuomenvirta, H. & Vaarby Laursen, E. 2001.
Nordic climate maps.
KLIMA report 6/2001.
Velicka R., Marcinkeviciene, A., Raudonius, S. & Rimkeviciene, M. 2006.
Integrated evaluation of rape readiness for overwintering.
Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica Section B – Soil and Plant Science 56: 110–116.
Venäläinen, A, Tuomenvirta, H., Pirinen, P. & Drebs, A.
2005.
A basic Finnish climate data set 1961–2000 Description and illustrations.
Reports 2005:5.
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Helsinki, Finland.
SELOSTUS Kasvukauden pitenemisen vaikutukset alueellisiin viljelymahdollisuuksiin ja tuotantokykyyn Suomessa ilmaston lämmetessä Pirjo Peltonen-Sainio, Lauri Jauhiainen, Kaija Hakala ja Hannu Ojanen MTT Kasvintuotannon tutkimus ja Palveluyksikkö Ilmaston muutos tuo mukanaan uusia mahdollisuuksia mutta myös haasteita suomalaiselle kasvinviljelylle.
Ilmaston lämpenemisen myötä kasvien hyödynnettävissä oleva kasvukausi pitenee ja talvien leudontuessa edellytykset syysmuotojen viljelyyn paranevat.
Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena oli arvioida kahden eri päästöskenaarion perusteella (IPCC SRES: A2 ei hillintätoimia, B1 kaikki hillintätoimet käyttöön), millä aikajänteellä nykyisten viljelykasvien viljelyalueet voivat laajentua, miten aivan uudet tai meillä vielä vähän viljellyt, mutta lähialueillamme tärkeät, kasvit voivat yleistyä.
Lisäksi tavoitteena oli arvioida eri viljelykasvien satopotentiaalissa tapahtuvia muutoksia ottamalla huomioon kasvukauden pitenemisen sekä ennakoiden kasvien satoisuusjalostuksen mahdollisuuksia.
Laskelmat tehtiin A2ja B1-skenaarioissa ja ne perustuivat Ilmatieteen laitoksen osana ILMASOPUhanketta tuottaman 19 ilmastomallin konsensusennusteeseen lämpötilojen muutoksista talvella ja kasvukaudella kolmessa tulevaisuuden ajankohdassa: 2025, 2055 ja 2085 (±15 vuotta).
Muutoksia peilattiin lähimenneisyyteen (1971–2000).
Eri viljelykasvien alueellisen viljeltävyyden arvioinnissa kiinnitettiin huomioita siihen, mikä osa termisestä kasvukaudesta voidaan hyödyntää viljelyssä (lähtien kylvöistä ja päätyen korjuuseen) sekä A G R I C U L T U R A L A N D F O O D S C I E N C E Peltonen-Sainio et al.
Climate change and Finnish field crop production 190 minkä suuruinen termisen talven kestossa tapahtuva muutos tulee todennäköisesti olemaan.
Tutkimus keskittyi siemensatokasveihin.
Tutkimuksen mukaan ilmaston lämpenemisen myötä nykyisiä päätuotantokasveja on mahdollista viljellä yhä pohjoisempana ja myös niiden pohjoisen viljelyn satopotentiaalit kasvavat merkittävästi.
Tutkimuksen tuloksena arvioitiin, että parin vuosikymmenen kuluttua esimerkiksi nykyisiä Etelä-Suomelle tyypillisiä ohrasatoja voidaan tuottaa jopa Oulua myöten.
Lisäksi vielä nykyään vähän viljeltyjen kasvilajien, kuten rapsin, herneen ja härkäpavun, tuotanto voi muuttua Suomessa laajamittaiseksi.
Kasvilajien menestymisedellytysten paranemisen lisäksi niiden laajempaa viljelyä tukee niiden lisääntyvä sadontuottokyky, hyödyllisyys viljelykierroissa sekä erityisesti palkoviljojen typpiomavaraisuus.
Näillä tuotantokasveilla tulee olemaan merkittävä rooli kotimaisen rehuvalkuaisen omavaraisuuden parantamisessa.
Joidenkin tuotantokasvilajien viljelyn laajentaminen edellyttää kuitenkin myös teollisuuden valmiutta käyttää niitä prosesseissaan ja jalosteissaan.
Myös käynnissä olevat tai helposti aktivoitavat jalostusohjelmat luovat osaltaan edellytyksiä uusien tai nykyään harvinaisten kasvilajien viljelylle.
Lähivuosikymmenien aikana talvien leudontuessa, nykyisin vähän viljellyistä tuotantokasveista syysvehnä ja ruisvehnä yleistyvät todennäköisesti ensimmäisinä.
Niiden kilpailuetu paranee merkittävästi johtuen niiden hyvästä sadontuottokyvystä.
Viljelykasvien syysmuodot ovat tulevaisuudessa tärkeitä myös talviaikaisen kasvipeitteisyyden ansiosta, sillä tulevaisuudessa eroosioja huuhtoumariskit kasvavat syysja talvisateiden yleistyessä ja talvien leudontuessa.
Kun Suomen kylmät talvet leudontuvat pysyvästi ja alkavat muistuttaa Etelä-Ruotsin, Tanskan ja Skotlannin nykyisiä talvia – ehkä noin kuluvan vuosisadan jälkipuoliskolla, näillä alueilla laajasti viljellyt syysrapsi, -ohra ja -kaura todennäköisesti yleistyvät myös Suomessa.
Kuluvalla vuosikymmenellä syysmuodot ovat edellä mainituilla alueilla tuottaneet tyypillisesti 1000 kg ha-1 enemmän satoa kuin vastaavat kevätmuodot.
Myös muiden nykyviljelyssämme alihyödynnettyjen lajien, kuten tattarin, pellavan, hampun, auringonkukan ja lupiinin viljelyedellytykset paranevat kasvukauden pidetessä.
Uusista lajeista säilörehuksi kasvatettavan maissin viljely onnistuu tulevaisuudessa laajoilla alueilla Etelä-Suomea, vaikkakin kohtuullisin riskein vasta vuosisadan loppupuolella − jyvämaissin ei ilmeisesti vielä silloinkaan.
Tehty katsaus perustuu viljelykasvien kasvupotentiaalin arviointiin.
On kuitenkin huomattava, että peltoviljelykasviemme tuotantokyvyn merkittävä parantuminen edellyttää ilmastonmuutoksen vahvistamien, tuotantoa rajoittavien keskeisimpien haasteiden ratkaisemista sekä näihin tähtäävien ennakoivien sopeutumisstrategioiden suunnittelua ja toimeenpanoa.
Tekemämme viljelykasvien tulevaisuuden menestymisedellytysarvioinnin perusteella peltojemme viljelykasvilajisto voi tulevaisuudessa olla merkittävästi nykyistä monimuotoisempi.
Monien tuotantokasvien viljelyn laajenemismahdollisuus ja satoisuuden oletettu merkittäväkin lisääntyminen eivät kuitenkaan yksinään ratkaise sitä, miltä peltoviljelymme tulee tällä vuosisadalla näyttämään.
Maataloustuotteiden markkinoilla, hinnoilla ja maataloutta koskevilla poliittisilla päätöksillä on myös jatkossa erittäin suuri vaikutus viljelijän tekemiin viljelykasvivalintoihin.
Introduction Material and methods Results and discussion Conclusions References SELOSTUS
A Study of the impact on soybean potential under climate change Received 31 July 2016 Accepted 25 March 2016 通讯作者：樊冬丽 ，女，1976 年出生，山西太原人，讲师，博士，主要从事科学研究。通讯地址：201418，上海市奉贤区海泉路 100 号， 上海应用技术学院，E-mail：fandongli2002@163.com。 A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change Qiuying Ding1, Zhan Tian1,2, Dongli Fan1, Laixiang Sun2,3, Guenther Fischer4 1Shanghai institute of technology, Shanghai 21400, China 2Shanghai climate center, Shanghai meteorological bureau, Shanghai 21400, 20030, China 3Department of Geographic Sciences, University of Maryland, College Park 20742, USA 4International Institute of Applied System Analysis, Laxenburg 2361, Austria Abstract Soybean is one of the important oil crops in China.
However the supply and demand of soybean is at stake currently.
The demand keeps increasing and the self-sufficient keeps decreasing.
More seriously, climate change will bring obvious impact on the growth and development, planting pattern, planting area, potential production of soybean, etc.
Therefore, assessment of the impact of soybean production under climate change is quite essential for improving the self-sufficient and guaranteeing the safety of oil crops.
This study will extend and improve the parameters of soybean in agricultural ecology zone (AEZ) based on the 22 soybean observation stations in the major planting area from 1981-2011 to achieve China-AEZ.
And then simulate the impact of climate change on soybean.
The results show that: the simulation of China-AEZ has been improved a lot.
In 2050s, the total soybean potential will increased by 7123 thousand tons.
The total suitable planting area will increased by 3589 thousand hectare.
But the average potential will decreased by 55 kg/ha.
From the spatial scale, the soybean potential will increase in Northeast China and Northwest China.
Soybean potential will decrease in the other area of China under climate change.
Keywords: Soybean, Climate change, AEZ, Production potential 气候变化对我国大豆生产潜力的影响研究 丁秋莹 1, 田展 1,2, 樊冬丽 1, 孙来祥 2,3, Guenther Fischer4 1 上海应用技术学院，上海 21400，中国 2 上海气象局上海市气候中心，上海 20030,中国 3 马里兰大学帕克分校地理科学系，大学公园市 20742，马里兰州，美国 4 国际应用系统研究所，拉克森堡 2361，奥地利 摘 要：大豆是我国主要的油料作物之一。然而，目前我国大豆供给形势不容乐观。一方面需求增加，自给 率较低；另一方面，气候变化将会影响我国大豆生长发育、种植模式、种植布局、生产潜力等，因此客观 准确地评价气候变化对我国大豆生产的影响为提高我国大豆自给率、保障油料安全具有重大意义。本研究 基于 1981-2011 年我国大豆主产区的 22 个农业气象站点观测数据，扩充并改进 AEZ(Agricultural Ecology Zone) 大豆的品种库参数，利用 AEZ 模型模拟了未来气候变化对我国大豆生产潜力的影响。结果显示：调整改进 后的 China-AEZ 模型对我国大豆主产区的区域模拟能力得到了较大的提高。总体来看，气候变化影响下，到 2050s 我国大豆总生产潜力将会比 1990s 增加 7123 千吨，约为 4.15%。大豆总适宜面积增加 3589 千公顷， 约为 6.15%。平均单产生产潜力减少 55kg/ha，约为 1.89%。区域上来看，气候变化将会引起东北以及西北 地区大豆生产潜力增加，但其他区域均小幅减产。 关键词：大豆；气候变化；AEZ；生产潜力 添加：国家自然基金（41371110，4167113 和 41601049）和中国气象局气候变化专项（CCSF2011330、 CCSF201110）资助。 Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, Vol.
6, No.
2 (July 2016), 95-102 Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 95 Q. Ding et al.
/ A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change 我国油脂资源短缺，食用油供给形势严峻，油 料长期存在着严重的供需矛盾。其中大豆是一种很 有价值的油料作物，是重要的畜饲料，生物燃料， 蛋白质等来源 [1] ，随着过去几十年间我国经济发展以 及人们生活水平的改善，大豆需求量显著增加，并 且预计这种增长趋势在未来还会持续 [2] 。然而多年来 我国油料作物生产潜力徘徊不前，大豆生产潜力也 连续走低 [3] 。2003年开始，我国进口大豆数量首次超 过国产大豆。未来气候变化将会严重影响我国大豆 生产，进一步加大大豆生产的不稳定性，供需矛盾 还将进一步加剧。因此明确气候变化对大豆生产的 影响，对保障国家食用油供给安全具有实际的重要 意义。 过去短时期内全球气候发生了迅速变暖，我国 年平均地表大气温度在过去50年内升高了1.1℃[4]， 这一增幅要高于全球地表平均温度变化。全国平均 降水总量变化不显著，年代际波动较大，降水趋于 集中，全国平均暴雨和极端强降水事件的频率和强 度都有所增长 [5,6] 。并且气候变暖会增加蒸散 [7] ，干 旱发生的频率和强度都会加强 [8] 。此外，随着全球变 暖，异常偏冷性事件减少减轻；而异常偏暖性极端 事件增多增强；气候暖干化趋势会加重病害的发生 [9] 。近年来极端气候事件发生的形式也更加多样性 [10] 。气候变化势必会给农业生产带来严重影响。干 旱、极端天气等增加了农业生产的风险，也将加大 大豆生产潜力的波动性。气候变暖影响下，东北地 区作物生育期延长，作物种植边界北扩，能够促进 大豆的种植边界北移，有利于扩大高纬度地区大豆 的种植面积 [11] 。 从目前相关研究来看，作物模拟模型是一种较 为系统综合的分析方法，能够综合评估农业系统与 土壤、气候等因子之间的相互作用。随着科学技术 的发展进步和消费需求的增加，作物模型无论在研 究深度还是应用广度上都取得了显著的成就。AEZ 模型是一种空间尺度的土地生产潜力评估模型，该 模型在模拟作物生产潜力时，采用的自动匹配算法 能够依据气候资源数据和LUT（土地利用单元）属性 数据逐格点尝试所有可能性，因此模型能够自动筛 选出最优的作物种植品种、种植模式等，这使得AEZ 模型在区域作物潜在生产力评估中具有明显优势。 本研究基于我国多年大豆观测数据通过改进模型的 品种库参数以及算法，建立适合我国大豆评估的 AEZ-China模型，评估1990s（1981-2010）baseline条 件下与2050s(2041-2070)未来气候变化下大豆生产潜 力。 1.
研究资料与方法 1.1.
研究资料 土壤数据是从 HWSD（Harmonized World Soil Database）土壤数据库中提取而来，该数据库提供全 球范围内 1km×1km 分辨率格网水平的土壤信息， 土壤数据分为顶层（0-30cm）和下层（30-100cm）， 土壤属性包括排水速率、土壤深度、容积密度、有 机碳有机质含量、土壤 PH 以及阳离子交换量等数据 信息，可以供模型直接提取使用。 基准条件下的逐日气候观测数据来自国家气候 中心，全国共设有 743 个气象站点，主要的气象要 素包括逐日最低气温、最高气温、降水、日照时数、 相对湿度以及风速，本研究选用 1981-2010 的气候数 据作为基准时段。未来气候变化数据是对未来温室 气体排放的不同情景进行的假设，已有研究表明 IPCC AR4 气候模式结果对东亚和中国的气候变化具 有较好的模拟能力 [12] ，设计了多种排放情景，对比 研究表明，近年来温室气体增长率与 SRES A1B 情景 下的温室气体排放水平最为接近，能够一定程度上 代表未来气候发展的方向，因此本研究中采用 A1B 排放情景作为未来气候变化的趋势。 表 1 的大豆观测数据来自中国气象局信息中心 多年观测整理所得，涵盖了全国主要大豆种植省份。 根据站点记录数据的完整性以及地理位置分布，从 中国气象局提供的数据中挑选 22 个大豆站点，数据 年份包括 1981-2011 年，数据内容包括：站点基本信 息（站点名称、经纬度、海拔高度），栽培信息（种 植品种、熟性、耕作方式等），生长发育的详细信 息（播种、出苗、开花、成熟等），生产潜力及相 关信息（种植密度、粒重、总生产潜力、茎秆重等） 以及主要的管理措施（施肥、灌溉、收获等）。该 表中的生产潜力是根据站点历年的纪录数据，剔除 个别存在病虫草害的年份以及奇高的产量，奇高生 Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 96 Q. Ding et al.
/ A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change 表 1.
大豆观测站点基本信息 省份 站点 经度 纬度 生产潜力（kg/ha） 生育期（天） 黑龙江 德都 127.35 46.08 4959 134 黑龙江 巴彦 126.15 48.47 5448 137 黑龙江 嫩江 125.23 49.17 4234 145 辽宁 阜新 121.72 42.08 3243 134 辽宁 盖州 122.35 40.42 4216 131 辽宁 海城 122.72 40.88 4124 135 吉林 辽源 125.08 42.92 4067 143 内蒙古 扎兰屯 122.73 48.00 4946 135 陕西 绥德 110.22 37.50 2499 166 陕西 延安 109.50 36.60 4088 154 新疆 莎车 77.10 38.43 3711 143 河北 黄骅 117.35 38.37 4692 95 河南 国营 114.40 33.75 4071 117 山东 莒县 118.83 35.58 3015 89 江苏 丰县 116.58 34.68 3729 103 江苏 盱眙 118.02 33.00 3445 106 安徽 蒙城 116.53 33.28 4132 100 安徽 寿县 116.78 32.55 2345 103 江西 龙南 114.82 24.92 3009 102 江西 南康 114.75 25.67 2872 96 江西 泰和 114.92 26.80 3045 95 湖南 怀化 107.97 27.55 2820 101 产潜力可能是存在记录误差，个别年份的记录生产 潜力在 8000kg/ha，根据查阅到的大豆最高生产潜力 在 6000 kg/ha 左右。然后从剩余观测年份中挑选中值 作为每个站点大豆观测生产潜力。从观测数据来看， 东北地区特别是黑龙江省大豆产量较高，在 4000kg/ha 以上，而南方大部分地区包括江苏、安徽、 江西的大部分观测站点大豆产量较低，在 3000kg/ha 左右。生育期长度呈现北长南短的分布规律。在灌 溉方式上，观测数据中扎兰屯、蒙城、莎车站点有 灌溉纪录，其他多数站点为雨养种植模式。 1.2.
研究方法 AEZ模型同时考虑光、温、水、土、投入水平等 影响生物生产潜力形成的因素及指标。该模型能够 进行土地适宜性以及土地生产潜力评价，能够得到 农业生态区划图、土地适宜性评价图以及农作物生 产潜力等信息，为气候变化、土地承载力等研究提 供了依据。根据假定的投入水平、灌溉供给以及管 Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 97 Q. Ding et al.
/ A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change 理条件，定义特定作物在气候、土壤、地形以及海 拔因素引起的限制因子，以此计算得到作物的最大 生产潜力和生产潜力。以土地利用单元（LUT）作为 计算潜在生产力的基本单位，每一种土地利用单元 包含的信息有：收货系数、最大叶面积指数、最大 光合速率等，耕作方式和投入需求，作物残茬和作 物副产品系数。采用的自动匹配算法会依据气候资 源数据和LUT属性数据逐格点尝试所有可能性，因此 模型能够自动筛选出最优的作物种植品种、种植模 式等，这使得AEZ模型在区域作物潜在生产力评估中 具有明显优势，主要步骤是： （1）通过气候和土地资源的清查，建立起研究 区域内逐格点中每个评价单元的气候（温度、降水、 风速、日照时数、相对湿度）、土壤、地形等资源 数据库，同时定量评估区域内农业气候资源，包括 积温、湿润指数等； （2）根据已有资源数据库及其他LUT属性信息， 进行作物与环境匹配，计算所有作物每个LUT的光温 生产潜力，以及在土壤、地形、水分、管理水平等 限制条件下的作物最高生产潜力； （3）计算由于其它限制因子导致的作物生产潜 力损失，如干旱、霜冻、作物病虫害等，并进一步 考虑土壤与地形因素对作物最终潜在生产潜力的影 响。在模拟我国小麦生产潜力中已得到应用 [13] 。但 该模型对农作物生长过程的机理性解释相对而言较 为粗略，作物生长的微观基础比较薄弱。 2.
AEZ 模型的验证 根据大豆观测数据扩充 AEZ 模型的大豆品种 库，同时结合大豆的观测数据进行对比，调整大品 种系数。此外根据大豆的观测数据的空间分布，基 于生态系统类型调整 AEZ 模型的算法，形成适应于 我国大豆生产的 AEZ 模型版本。以此建立跨尺度模 拟的中国大豆评估模型 China-AEZ[14]，综合评估未 来气候变化影响下我国大豆生产潜力的变化。 （1）AEZ 模型验证 在 AEZ 模型中，生育期长度是品种的一个关键 属性，首先对比原 AEZ 模型得到的生育期分布图与 实际观测值进行比较，验证原始 AEZ 模型对我国大 豆的模拟能力。在 AEZ 模型中，生育期作为 LUT 的 一个重要属性，根据大豆普遍生育期长度，以 15 天 间隔分成几个代表性生育期。为更明显的比较观测 值与 AEZ 模型模拟的结果，将观测站点的品种生育 期长度根据 AEZ 模型的品种库分为 4 类。从图 1 生 育期长度的对比中，我们可以看到两个主要的不同 点： 1）观测站点中存在 150 天生育期的品种，而在 原始 AEZ 模型的品种库中仅有其他三种类型（105 天，120 天，135 天）的生育期长度的品种；2）原 始 AEZ 模型模拟的结果显示在南方、华北大部分地 区选择生育期较长的品种，而在东北地区则选择了 生育期较短的品种，呈现为南长北短的趋势，而实 际观测结果与 AEZ 模型模拟的结果相反，呈现南短 图 1.
1990s 下原大豆生育期长度分布实际情况（左）以及 AEZ 模型模拟情况（右） Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 98 Q. Ding et al.
/ A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change 北长的趋势，这主要是因为 AEZ 模型是采用的自动 算法，所考虑的因素主要是气候、土壤等客观因素 的影响，没有考虑区域内复种指数、作物的轮作等 种植者决定的主观因素，而在我国大部分地区，大 豆并不是一种主作物，农民会优先种植小麦、水稻 等收益较大的作物，从而导致大豆可种植的生育期 就会缩短。 （2）AEZ 模型的调试 针对原始 AEZ 模型的不足，通过不断试验模拟， 与观测值进行比较验证。本研究中我们做了两点主 要的改进：1)在 AEZ 模型的品种库中增加生育期为 150 天的品种，并根据观测数据补充和改进 AEZ 模 型的其他相关品种参数，包括收货系数、最大叶面 积指数、积温等，使之与我国大豆种植生长发育情 况更为吻合。从表 2 中改进的品种参数结果来看， 原有品种收货系数和最大叶面积指数整体上增加， 可增加模拟的生产潜力；适宜最低积温降低、适宜 最高积温提高，扩大大豆生长发育对温度的要求范 围，使之适宜于我国南方热量资源丰富的地区。 AEZ 模型能够根据气候、土壤资源生成八种不 同的耕作系统类型，通过比较观测值与耕作系统的 关系，发现大豆生育期长度与耕作系统分布之间存 在一定的相关性，即在单作区内大豆观测生育期长 度较长而在多熟区内大豆生育期较短。基于作物耕 作系统调整 AEZ 模型的自动算法，使其在一个耕作 系统内根据限制品种的选择，一种作物耕作系统内 选择特定的品种，代替原有的完全最优自动算法。 根据表 3 进行品种选择：其中单作区内大豆生 表 2.
AEZ 模型中大豆品种及主要品种参数变化对比（原：原 AEZ 模型；改：改进后的 AEZ 模型） 品种 生育期长 度 收获 系数 最大叶面 积指数 适宜生育期 最低积温 次适宜生育 期最低积温 适宜生育期 最高积温 次适宜生育 期最高积温 温带和亚热带大 豆 1（原） 105 0.3 4.0 2200 1850 2600 3150 温带和亚热带大 豆 1（改） 105 0.38 4.0 2100 1850 2800 3150 温带和亚热带大 豆 2（原） 120 0.35 2.5 2400 2000 3000 3600 温带和亚热带大 豆 2（改） 120 0.37 4.2 2300 2000 3150 3500 温带和亚热带大 豆 3（原） 135 0.35 3.0 2600 2150 3400 4050 温带和亚热带大 豆 3（改） 135 0.36 4.5 2500 2150 3450 3800 温带和亚热带大 豆 4（增） 150 0.35 4.5 2700 2300 3750 4100 表 3.
AEZ 模型不同耕作系统品种的选择 耕作系统类型 生育期长度类型的选择 No cropping 从四种类型中选择最优生育期 Single cropping Limited cropping Double cropping 从 105 天或 120 天选择较优生育期 Double cropping with rice Double rice cropping 选择 105 天生育期长度 Triple cropping Triple rice cropping Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 99 Q. Ding et al.
/ A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change 育期长度的选择不受限制，模型根据大豆最大生产 潜力选择品种类型，一般情况下，在气候资源丰富 的条件下，作物生产潜力与生育期长度之间有一定 的相关性，优先选择生育期长的品种；在两熟区， 大豆生育期长度的选择受轮作影响，限定在 105 天 和 120 天之间选择；在三熟区，大豆生育期的选择 更短，仅限定在 105 天。 3.
结果分析 3.1.
大豆生产潜力模拟评估 我国大豆种植方式以雨养为主，因此本研究主 要评估雨养条件下大豆生产潜力和适宜区划。基准 气候条件下，AEZ 模拟得到的我国大豆主产区集中 在东北平原、华北平原、长江中下游平原以及四川 盆地等地势较为平坦的地区。模型模拟的结果与我 国大豆主产区有很好的一致性，历史相关资料表明 我国大豆主产区包括北方春大豆（包括东北地区、 黄土高原、西北地区）、黄淮海夏大豆（包括晋冀 中部、黄淮海流域）、长江流域春夏大豆（包括长 江流域、云贵高原）、东南春夏秋大豆（浙江、福 建、江西、台湾、湖南、广东、广西大部）以及华 南四季大豆（广东、广西、云南和福建南部）。图 2 模拟 1990s 大豆生产潜力分布：其中大豆生产潜力最 大的区域位于东北省境内，很多区域在 4000kg/ha 以 上，这与该区属于一熟制，大豆生育期较长有关， 模拟的大豆生产潜力与观测的大豆生产潜力较为相 近，特别是黑龙江省的德都、巴彦站点附近区域大 豆生产潜力处于极高水平；华北平原的山东、河北、 河南部分区域大豆生产潜力接近 4000kg/ha，而实际 观测中河北的黄骅、河南的国营大豆生产潜力也高 于 4000kg/ha；虽然南方水热资源丰富，但改进后的 AEZ 模型对品种的选择受区域内熟制分布的限制， 考虑多熟制轮作的影响，因而不能充分利用气候资 源，大豆生产潜力不如东北地区高，在 3000kg/ha 左 右，与观测的站点（安徽的蒙城、寿县，江西的龙 南、南康、泰和以及湖北的怀化）的大豆生产潜力 相近。以上结果表明改进后的 AEZ 模型模拟得到的 大豆生产潜力空间分布能够较好的反映我国观测种 植大豆生产潜力情况，AEZ 对我国大豆生产具有较 好的模拟能力。 图 3 结果表明：到 2050s 未来气候变化下，在使 用最优播期和限制性的适宜品种的情况下，总体上 气候变化对大豆生产的影响呈现北增南减的趋势， 东北以及华北部分地区受全球变暖的影响，冻害、 大雪等低温灾害发生频率减少，有相当一部分地区 大豆增产 500kg/ha 以上，且黑龙江、内蒙古以及河 北省部分地区增产幅度在 1000kg/ha，仅有黑龙江西 部以及辽宁中部地区有小幅减产，均少于 250 kg/ha； 华北、华中南部以及南方大部分地区呈现减产趋势， 主要原因是华北地区处于熟制交界地带，气候变暖 下该区熟制增加，缩短了大豆适宜生育期长度的选 择，导致大豆减产；而华中南部以及南方地区可能 是由于该区热量资源本身较为丰富，加上气候变暖， 高温热浪的灾害增加，不利于作物生长，导致大豆 生育期缩短，从而导致大豆减产，但是大部分地区 减产幅度较小，均低于 500 kg/ha；山东、河北、河 南以及安徽、江苏北部等处于熟制过度地带，大豆 生育期长度变化较大，大豆减产趋势较为明显，高 于 500 kg/ha。 3.2.
大豆适应种植区域分析 表 4 结果显示，气候变化影响下，我国大豆适 宜种植面积增加 3589 千公顷，总产量增加 7123 千 吨，但是大豆单位面积产量减少 55kg/ha。 AEZ 模型将我国分为华北、东北、华东、华中、 东南、西南、西藏高原、西北八个区域统计分析， 其中华北地区包括北京市、天津市、河北省、山西 省、山东省、河南省和湖北省，东北地区包括辽宁 省、吉林省和黑龙江省，华东地区包括上海市、江 苏省、浙江省和安徽省，华中地区包括江西省和湖 南省，东南地区包括福建省、广东省、广西省和海 南省，西南地区包括重庆市、四川省、贵州省和云 南省，高原地区包括西藏自治区和青海省，西北地 区包括新疆自治区、内蒙古自治区、陕西省、甘肃 省和宁夏自治区。 在使用了最优播期和最优限制性品种选择计算 得到的大豆生产潜力中，表 5 统计结果显示，雨养 条件下，大豆主产区集中在华北、东北、西南和西 北地区，1990s 以上地区大豆产量占大豆总产的 Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 100 Q. Ding et al.
/ A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change 表 4.
大豆生产总体统计结果 时间 适宜面积（千公顷） 总产（千吨） 单产（kg/ha） 1990s 58332 171616 2942 2050s 61921 178739 2887 表 5.
大豆生产分区域统计结果 区域 适宜面积（千公顷） 总产（千吨） 单产（kg/ha） 1990s 2050s 1990s 2050s 1990s 2050s 华北 12645 13029 35337 33984 3105 2898 东北 15461 15538 57274 63526 4116 4543 华东 4250 4271 11981 10335 3133 2689 华中 2253 2253 6146 5556 3031 2739 华南 4074 4138 9628 8615 2626 2313 西南 11253 12260 29646 28687 2927 2600 青藏高 原 40 125 93 278 2561 2472 西北 8356 10307 21511 27758 2860 2993 71.2%。1990s 下，华北和东北地区是大豆总生产潜 力最高的地区，占总生产潜力的 52.3%，气候变化影 响下大豆总产有小幅增加，为 7123 千吨，除西北和 东北两个地区，其他地区大豆总生产潜力均有减少。 适宜面积增加 3589 千公顷，增加明显的地区为华北、 西南和西北地区，该区位于高纬度地区和山区，主 要驱动因素可能是气候变暖影响下，该区热量资源 增加。从平均生产潜力来看，1990s 下大豆均产最高 的地区位于东北，平均生产潜力高于 4000kg/ha, 其 他地区在 3000kg/ha 左右，气候变化下大豆总体平均 生产潜力降低 55 kg/ha，除东北和西北地区大豆均产 有增加外，其他地区大豆均有小幅减产。 4.
结论及讨论 本研究基于大豆观测值对 AEZ 模型的大豆品种 库参数进行有效的扩充和改进，改进后的 AEZ 模型 能够更为准确地模拟我国大豆生产潜力及种植区 划。未来气候变化下，总体来看气候变化有利于东 北、西北以及华北北部地区大豆生产，但不利于华 北大部、南方大部分大豆生产。统计结果显示大豆 总产和总适宜 面积增加，平均生产潜力减少。区域上来看，气候 变化下带来的热量资源增加有利于东北及西北地区 大豆生产，华北以及南方大部分地区均有小幅减产。 虽然本研究中 AEZ 模型对大豆遗传参数进行了 调整改进，但对适宜播期的模拟仍然是采用最优播 期，并未考虑多熟制内其他主作物对大豆种植播期 的限制，今后还需进一步探讨多熟制内的作物轮作 模式，以期得到更为准确的结果。 参考文献 [1]Masuda T, Goldsmith P D. World Soybean Demand: An Elasticity Analysis and Long-Term Projections.
National Soybean Research Laboratory University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 2009.
[2]Masuda T, Goldsmith P D. World soybean production: area harvested, yield, and long-term projections.
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 2009, 12(4): 143-162.
图 2.
1990s 大豆生产潜力模拟 图 3.
2050s 大豆生产潜力的变化（kg/ha）.
Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 101 Q. Ding et al.
/ A Study of the Impact on Soybean Potential under Climate Change [3]李秀娟, 刘喜元, 李晓伟, 等.2009年呼伦贝尔市岭东地 区大豆生产的气象条件分析 .
现代农业科技 , 2010, (20):297, 299.
[4]DING Y H, REN G Y, ZHAO Z, et al.
Detection, causes and projection of climate change over China: An overview of recent progress.
Advances in Atmospheric Sciences, 2007, 24(6):954-971.
[5]任国玉, 封国林, 严中伟.
中国极端气候变化观测研究 回顾与展望.
气候与环境研究, 2010, 15(4):337-353.
[6]王会军, 孙建奇, 祝亚丽.
中国极端气候及东亚地区能 量和水分循环研究的若干近期进展.
自然杂志, 2012, 34(1):10-17.
[7]左德鹏, 徐宗学, 李景玉, 等.
气候变化情景下渭河流 域潜在蒸散量时空变化特征 .
水科学进展 , 2011, 22(4):455-461.
[8]Gamble D W, Campbell D, Allen T L, et al.
Climate Change, Drought, and Jamaican Agriculture: Local Knowledge and the Climate Record.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 2010, 100(4):880-893.
[9]王丽, 霍治国, 张蕾, 等.
气候变化对中国农作物病害 发生的影响[J].
生态学杂志, 2012, 31(7):1673-1684.
[10]Chen H, Zhang H, Xue C. Chinese Extreme Climate Events and Agricultural Meteorological Services.
Challenges and Opportunities in Agrometeorology.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011:435-459.
[11]田展, 丁秋莹, 梁卓然,等.
气候变化对中国油料作物 的影响研究进展.
中国农学通报, 2014, (15):1-6.
[12]施小英, 徐祥德, 徐影.
中国 600 个站气温和 IPCC 模 式产品气温的比较.
气象, 2005, 31(7):49-53.
[13]田展,钟洪麟,施润和,等.
Estimating potential yield of wheat production in China based on cross-scale data-model fusion.
Frontiers of Earth Science, 2012, 6(4): 364-372.
[14]Fan D, Ding Q, Tian Z, et al.
Simulating the adaptive measures of soybean production to climate change in China: Based on cross-scale model coupling.
Emerging Economies, Risk and Development, and Intelligent Technology: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, June 1-3, 2015, Tangier, Morocco.
CRC Press, 2015: 143.
Published by Atlantis Press Copyright: the authors 102 http://link.springer.com/search?facet-author=%22Chen+Huailiang%22 http://link.springer.com/search?facet-author=%22Zhang+Hongwei%22 http://link.springer.com/search?facet-author=%22Xue+Changying%22 1.
研究资料与方法 2.
AEZ模型的验证 3.
结果分析 4.
结论及讨论 << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S.
Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments true /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Apply /UCRandBGInfo /Preserve /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 300 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile () /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /CreateJDFFile false /Description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> /CHS <FEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065876863900275284e8e9ad88d2891cf76845370524d53705237300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002> /CHT <FEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef69069752865bc9ad854c18cea76845370524d5370523786557406300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002> /CZE <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> /DAN <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> /DEU <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> /ESP <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> /ETI <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> /FRA <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> /GRE <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a stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke.
Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 5.0 i kasnijim verzijama.)
/HUN <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> /ITA <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> /JPN <FEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002> /KOR <FEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /LTH <FEFF004e006100750064006f006b0069007400650020016100690075006f007300200070006100720061006d006500740072007500730020006e006f0072011700640061006d00690020006b0075007200740069002000410064006f00620065002000500044004600200064006f006b0075006d0065006e007400750073002c0020006b00750072006900650020006c0061006200690061007500730069006100690020007000720069007400610069006b007900740069002000610075006b01610074006f00730020006b006f006b007900620117007300200070006100720065006e006700740069006e00690061006d00200073007000610075007300640069006e0069006d00750069002e0020002000530075006b0075007200740069002000500044004600200064006f006b0075006d0065006e007400610069002000670061006c006900200062016b007400690020006100740069006400610072006f006d00690020004100630072006f006200610074002000690072002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002000610072002000760117006c00650073006e0117006d00690073002000760065007200730069006a006f006d00690073002e> /LVI <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> /NOR <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> /POL <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> /PTB <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> /RUM <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> /RUS <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> /SKY <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> /SLV <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> /SUO <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> /SVE <FEFF0041006e007600e4006e00640020006400650020006800e4007200200069006e0073007400e4006c006c006e0069006e006700610072006e00610020006f006d002000640075002000760069006c006c00200073006b006100700061002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e007400200073006f006d002000e400720020006c00e4006d0070006c0069006700610020006600f60072002000700072006500700072006500730073002d007500740073006b00720069006600740020006d006500640020006800f600670020006b00760061006c0069007400650074002e002000200053006b006100700061006400650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740020006b0061006e002000f600700070006e00610073002000690020004100630072006f0062006100740020006f00630068002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020006f00630068002000730065006e006100720065002e> /TUR <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> /UKR <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> /ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing.
Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 5.0 and later.)
/NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit.
De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
>> /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ << /AsReaderSpreads false /CropImagesToFrames true /ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue /FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false /IncludeGuidesGrids false /IncludeNonPrinting false /IncludeSlug false /Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (4.0) ] /OmitPlacedBitmaps false /OmitPlacedEPS false /OmitPlacedPDF false /SimulateOverprint /Legacy >> << /AddBleedMarks false /AddColorBars false /AddCropMarks false /AddPageInfo false /AddRegMarks false /ConvertColors /ConvertToCMYK /DestinationProfileName () /DestinationProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /Downsample16BitImages true /FlattenerPreset << /PresetSelector /MediumResolution >> /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [2400 2400] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice
Research Article Evaluation of Climate Change Risk Perception in Baoji City Based on AHP-Bayesian Network Siwen Xue1,3, , Qi Zhou1,2,3,*, Shuo lin Geng1,2,3 1School of Geography and Environment, Baoji University of Arts and Sciences, Baoji 721013, China 2Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Disasters Monitoring and Mechanism Simulation, Baoji University of Arts and Sciences, Baoji, China 3Shaan’xi Provincial Key Research Center for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Baoji Base) 1.
INTRODUCTION The most widespread source of the term “risk” comes from fishermen going out to sea to fish [1].
With the rapid development of modern technology and industrial economy, the concept of “risk” has gradually developed to involve the theoretical explanations of “uncertainty” and “probability”, as well as “loss” and “income” [2].
“Perception” is the combination of sensation and perception.
It is the direct reflection of objective things in human brain through sensory organs and a perceptual cognitive process [3].
In a broad sense, perception refers to the functional performance of any organism’s physiological characteristics, whereas in the narrow sense, it refers to the cognitive process of information processing in the human brain [4].
“Risk perception” is also equivalent to “risk” to a certain extent [2].
The concept of “risk perception” was initially an exploratory analysis of consumers’ purchasing behavior and expected psychology [5], and then gradually extended to the fields of financial risk, social risk, internet consumption, and natural disasters [5].
Due to different perspectives in different fields, the methods of defining risk perception also differ greatly.
As an important field of risk perception, climate change risk perception is the direct cause of risk response and behavior.
It is of great practical significance to study individuals’ perception of climate change risk [5].
For example, James W. Stoutenborough and others compared the general assessment of climate change risk perception with its specific assessment.
Two of the three sub-fields of public health, namely economic development and environment, were general risk assessment predictors [6].
Aishath Shakeela and others used the social amplified risk framework to assess the climate change risk perception of tourism leaders in coastal scenic spots.
The study provided specific references for policy formulation.
Lowrisk conflicts could attract jobs, tourism investment, and tourists.
Risks should also be urgently emphasized in order to attract professional talents and financial supports so that the policy could be implemented smoothly [7].
Saki and others evaluated the climate change risk perception of farmers and herdsmen in Nevada and found that climate change-related beliefs and political orientations were the most significant determinants of climate change risk perception.
Besides, gender played an important role in the formation of risk perception, while vulnerability and age had no significant effect on climate change risk perception [8].
Harlan and others assessed the perception of flood hazard risk among urban residents in the United States.
The results showed that there was a significant correlation between flood risk perception and the vulnerability A RT I C L E I N F O Article History Received 14 August 2020 Accepted 10 November 2020 Keywords Climate change risk perception Bayesian network AHP Baoji area A B S T R AC T To analyze the gap between the Baoji population’s climate change risk perception and the scientifically measured intensity, danger degree, vulnerability, and exposure of climate change risk based on the basic elements of risk assessment, this paper combines analytic hierarchy process and the Bayesian network to evaluate the climate change risk perception intensity in Baoji City, aiming at simulating climate change risk scenarios and improving the objectivity of assessment results.
Specifically, the simulation of climate change risk scenarios is carried out through the measurement of such basic elements as risk, vulnerability, and exposure perceptions, and an objective evaluation of the public climate change risk perception intensity in Baoji City is made, thereby systematically assessing local people’s perception of climate change risk.
The model weights the indices of risk perception, vulnerability perception, and exposure perception by analytic hierarchy process, constructs the Bayesian network according to the causal relationship among the risk perception assessment elements, and calculates the risk perception probability at each level by combining the Bayesian network to get the system perception intensity.
The perceived intensity of climate change risk was 0.497, being at a medium level.
The result has different reference value in terms of the response to and management of different climate change risk categories, so it needs to be adjusted according to the actual situation of Baoji City.
The main factors that affect the risk perception intensity in Baoji City are gender, climate change perception trend, ecological environment deterioration degree, and disaster severity degree.
Therefore, the decision-makers can make risk management plans accordingly, which plays an important role in regulating and narrowing the gap between people’s perception of climate change risk and the results of scientific measurement.
© 2020 The Authors.
Published by Atlantis Press B.V.
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
*Corresponding author.
Email: cbozhou@163.com Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
10(4); December (2020), pp.
147–159 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.201214.001; ISSN 2210-8491; eISSN 2210-8505 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0809-5185 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ mailto:cbozhou%40163.com?subject= https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.201214.001 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr 148 S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 of urban residents, and the residents’ potential exposure to flood disaster significantly enhanced their perception of flood disaster risk [9].
Michal and others evaluated forest planners’ adaptation to climate change based on the framework of uncertainty theory.
The results suggested that planners might only take action against such risks as pests and droughts that would threaten forests, without giving high priority to other risks arising from climate change [10].
Zhao Xinyi and others integrated the climate risk index and land vulnerability coefficient from 1961 to 2007 in the middle part of the farming-pastoral ecozone in Northern China (including Hebei Province, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Liaoning Province) to obtain the ecological risk index, so as to delimit the ecological risk grades and evaluate ecological risks in the northern farming-pastoral zone [11].
Pan Genxing and others assessed the reduction risk of meteorological yield resulted from climate change by using three evaluation indicators of yield reduction rate, variable yield reduction rate, and high-risk probability, as well as other comprehensive indices [12].
Zhou Qian and others, taking the knowledge-attitudinal practice model as the theoretical framework, constructed the assessment index system for residents’ flood risk perception in China from the three aspects of knowledge, attitude, and behavior [13].
Wang Xiaofeng and others took tourists of the Nangong Mountain scenic zone as research subjects, and constructed a three-level index system for rainstorm disaster risk perception evaluation through principal component analysis from the four aspects of disaster knowledge, attitude, behavior, and bounded rationality [14].
Wang Xiaofeng used Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and exponential model to quantitatively calculate the risk perception index, and the tourists’ risk perception ability and individual differences were finally evaluated [15].
In order to effectively reduce the negative effects of climate change, Chang Cheng and others employed the multiple linear regression to identify factors influencing farmers’ perceived vulnerability and measure the climate risk faced by farmers’ apple production in the Loess highland [16].
Yekenalem and others used GIS applications and Bayesian belief network models, which could quantify the uncertainty and capture the accidental connections between the influencing factors of flooding, to assess the vulnerability of cities to small floods.
The authors believed that assessing the vulnerability of urban areas to floods was a critical step toward mitigating risks and making adaptation plans [17].
Similarly, Lawrence and others used Bayesian network methods to analyze the vulnerability of suppliers to severe weather risks.
The study investigated the main causal relationships and causes of risk spread and disruption in the US drug supply chain after the occurrence of Hurricane Maria.
For intermediate events, a causal Bayesian model was established to describe the connection between risk events and quantify the associated cumulative risk [18].
At present, although domestic and foreign scholars have achieved certain outcomes in the study of climate change risk perception assessment, there are still deficiencies.
Firstly, the research topics were mostly about influencing factors of climate change risk perception, agricultural production, adaptation methods, regional division, and measurement of climate change risk.
Secondly, the research objects were mainly farmers, tourists, urban residents, and decision makers.
Thirdly, most of the studies were not in-depth enough to investigate the public’s risk perception of climate change, which makes it impossible to standardize and strengthen risk response based on specific measurement results.
Fourthly, while evaluating the level of climate change risk perception, most of the research employed regression analysis which is less compatible with related uncertain events.
Although some scholars have used Bayesian networks to assess people’s perception of climate change vulnerability, there were few papers on systematic evaluation of climate change risk perception.
Furthermore, previous studies had not compare people’s perception level of climate change risk with scientific evaluation results, thus failing to obtain corresponding reference standards to help people improve their perception of and response to climate change risk.
Therefore, this paper starts from the nature of climate change risk perception and the possible loss caused by future climate change risk.
In specific, the intensity or level of climate change risk perception is measured by the intensity of exposure perception, risk perception and vulnerability perception, and the AHP-Bayesian network model is used to evaluate people’s perception of climate change risk.
In addition, a brief discussion is conducted on the gap between the public’s climate change risk perception intensity and the climate change risk intensity obtained based on scientific calculation.
This will lay a foundation for the public to grasp the severity and harm of future climate change risk, so that they can make effective management and response in the face of emergencies.
The problems to be solved in this paper are as follows: (1) What is the level of the public’s climate change risk perception in Baoji City?
Is this result different from the climate change risk as assessed by scientists?
(2) What are the main factors that affect people’s perception of climate change risk in Baoji City?
Can these factors be used to bridge the gap between the public’s perception of climate change risk and scientists’ assessment of climate change risk?
(3) In view of the above gap, what risk management measures should the public take?
2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 2.1.
Study Area Baoji City is located in the west of Guanzhong region, Shaanxi Province, between longitude 106°18¢–108°03¢ and latitude 33°35¢–35°06¢, with its east adjacent to Xianyang and Yangling Demonstration Area, south adjacent to Hanzhong, and northwest adjacent to Tianshui and Pingliang in Gansu Province.
The Qinling Mountains in the south make its barrier.
Weishui flows through its middle, and the northern Weishui is a fertile plain [19,20].
The city has a permanent population of 3.781 million and a total area of 18,117 km2.
It belongs to the warm temperate zone, enjoying semi-humid continental monsoon climate, with an average annual temperature ranging from 7.9°C to 13.2°C, an average annual rainfall from 578 to 737 mm.
Baoji has four distinct seasons.
It is dry and cold in winter, while the climate in spring is changeable.
In summer, hot arid weather and heavy rain alternately appear.
In autumn, the temperature drops quickly and it is cloudy and rainy [21].
Baoji City is surrounded by mountains in the south, the west, and the north.
Its middle part is relatively low and flat, and the eastern part is spacious and wide.
With the Weihe River as the axis, it is in a shape of sharp-angled open trough.
The landforms are classified into three types, namely mountains, rivers, and plateaus, among which mountains are the main landforms, accounting for 56% of the total area.
Rivers account for 27%, and plateaus account S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 149 for 17%.
According to its topography and natural conditions, Baoji City can be roughly divided into the central plateau area, the southern mountainous area, and the western and northern shallow hilly areas.
Due to its intricate nature, the city shows diverse climate types and obvious vertical differences, with frequent weather disasters.
The extreme weather events have brought great inconvenience and loss to people’s lives [22–24].
In addition, with the accelerated urbanization and industrialization as well as the growing residential energy demand, the future impact of climate change on Baoji City will be greater [25].
Therefore, conducting a social survey in Baoji area to study the public’s perception of climate change risk and the formation mechanism is of vital significance for relevant policy formulation and people’s effective response (see Figure 1).
2.2.
Data Sources and Questionnaire Contents According to the social survey conducted by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the researchers visited three districts and nine counties in Baoji City from August 2018 to September 2020, mainly conducting random field surveys in urban and rural areas with large flow of people.
This random survey method not only allowed us to obtain answers to the questionnaire questions, but also enabled the investigators to communicate with and interview the respondents on relevant scientific issues without inducing them to make choices.
For survey respondents who were older or less educated, the investigators used question-style interviews to maximally facilitate their understanding of the questions to ensure the validity of the questionnaire.
This method also ensured the authenticity and reliability of the data, thus laying a foundation for the follow-up research.
A total of 1600 questionnaires were circulated and received, of which 1547 were valid, reaching an effective rate of 96.7% [26].
The distribution of the data survey samples was shown in Figure 1.
The questionnaire was mainly composed of 37 questions, each with corresponding sub-questions.
The basic information of the samples was shown in Table 1.
As climate change is a long-term process, most of the respondents were over 30 years old, and their age structure was similar to that of the overall Baoji residents.
The number of male and female respondents was similar, and the gender ratio was the same as that of the total population.
The individual characteristics were similar to those of the total population structure [25], and thus the samples were highly representative.
The questionnaire consisted of four parts.
First, the basic demographic characteristics of the respondents, such as gender, age, residence, education level, and occupation, were mainly used to understand their basic information, so as to facilitate the exploration of the relationship between demographic characteristics and various potential variables in the future.
The second part examined people’s economic conditions and their resilience to the risks posed by global climate change, including the income level of personal economic expenditure, family income and expenditure level, other income and expenditure sources, economic income status of family members, basic medical insurance expenses of individuals and other family members, and total expenditure and income sources.
Then came the measurement of the subjective perception of the risks posed by global climate change, which included the perception of environmental risk, exposure level, and vulnerability.
Among them, the perception of risk was measured by investigating Figure 1 | Overview of the study area.
150 S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 Table 1 | Basic characteristics of the survey respondents Survey item Category Frequency Proportion (%) Survey item Category Frequency Proportion (%) Education level Annual per capita household income Primary school or below Junior high school-bachelor High school or Technical secondary school Undergraduate or junior college Post-graduate 500 and below 500–1000 1001–2000 2001–3000 3001–5000 More than 5000 Under the age of 18 18–28 29–38 39–48 49–58 59–68 69 or more 487 282 390 188 200 255 377 25 32 660 306 237 182 99 31 31.50 18.20 25.20 12.10 12.90 11.10 16.40 19.20 24.40 27.15 1.61 21.00 42.60 19.80 15.30 11.80 64.00 Occupation Animal Husbandry and Fishery 283 18.30 Production and transportation work 27 18.00 Service industry or business 198 12.80 Government institution 7 5.00 Technician 195 12.60 Medical staff 148 9.60 Mentor 402 26.00 Soldier 163 10.50 Self-employed worker 75 4.80 Others 49 3.20 Age Gender Male Female 742 805 47.90 52.10 21.00 Table 2 | KMO and Bartlett tests KMO value 0.897 Bartlett’s sphericity test Approximate chi-square 19056.193 df 325 p-value 0 the local people’s perception of the extreme impact of extreme dangerous climate change events in different places and their changing trends; the perception of risk exposure was mainly measured using the latest psychological distance prediction method proposed in geography, and the specific methods including temporal distance, spatial distance, social distance, and probability distance; vulnerability perception was based on Chinese people’s sensitivity to global climate change and the two dimensions of resilience or recoverability.
It was an in-depth measurement of the overall vulnerability level of people in Baoji City.
Finally, the public’s attitude toward the risk of climate change and their perception level of the state characteristics of the natural environment were surveyed.
As for the risks of climate change, this questionnaire mainly involved a number of instances, such as rainstorm, flood, drought, hail, diseases and pests in corps, thunder and lightning, sandstorm, infectious disease, high temperature, and haze.
These choices were in line with the climate feature of Baoji City.
The above four parts together constituted the climate change risk perception questionnaire, which provided data sources and supports for the investigation and research.
All items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (some questions were 4-point and 7-point respectively), thereby enabling uniform allocation of index options and ensuring the simplicity of the questionnaire (see Table 1).
2.3.
Questionnaire Reliability and Validity Test After the obtained questionnaire data was input into SPSS25.0, reliability analysis of the questionnaire was required to ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire.
Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of measurement results, as well as the degree of consistency of results obtained by researchers when they make different measurements (in different forms or at different times) for the same or similar phenomena (or groups) [27,28].
The Cronbach coefficient of the questionnaire was tested as 0.644, with acceptable reliability.
This indicated that the internal consistency of the questionnaire was relatively good, and the overall correlation between each question and the scale was relatively high, so further analysis could be continued.
Questionnaire validity refers to the extent to which the questionnaire results achieve the expected purpose of the survey.
The validity is mainly analyzed via exploratory factor analysis method, which takes each question in the questionnaire as a variable, conducts factor analysis on all questions based on the score of the survey results, extracts relatively significant factors, and classifies and summarizes the questions through the load value of each question on each factor.
Noteworthily, before carrying out the factor analysis, it is necessary to ensure that the KMO value is greater than 0.5, which indicates a well-designed questionnaire structure.
It was found that the KMO value in the present study was 0.897, revealing that the questionnaire had good structural validity and that the analysis of influencing factors of climate change risk perception could be continued (see Table 2).
3.
INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL 3.1.
Bayesian Network Model The Bayesian network is a language of systems to elaborate the relationship between variables.
It was designed by researchers for long-term research in order to deduce the probability of many uncertainties, and such network has been applied to various fields.
S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 151 It is a directed acyclic graph, consisting of nodes that represent variables and combinations that connect those nodes mutually, wherein the directed edges indicate the relation between nodes [29].
Bayesian network mainly evaluates uncertain events.
In this paper, not only did the perception of climate change risk have certain subjectivity and randomness, but also the dissemination of climate change risk information was uncertain.
Therefore, Bayesian network model served as a proper choice for the present study.
A comparison between multiple linear regression and Bayesian networks was made in a later section of the paper for readers’ reference.
The risk perception samples of climate change were obtained through the AHP method.
Firstly, results from the independent study of the Bayesian network were utilized to divide indicators of climate change risk perception into high, medium, and low levels.
Expectation–Maximization (EM) algorithm was then used to optimize parameters of the nodes and to get the Conditional Probability distribution of the Bayesian network.
Besides, the medium probability of occurrence for the risk perception was set as 100% to diagnose the factors affecting risk perception of system.
Risk control suggestions were proposed based on such results to enhance the risk perception of the public against the extreme climate change.
The sensitivity analysis was used to study the effect of uncertainties of the model parameters, and to determine the factors that had the greatest influence on the nodes of the climate change risk perception (see Figure 2) [30].
3.2.
AHP-Bayesian Network Model of Climate Change Risk Perception The model was established according to the following steps.
Firstly, an assessment index system for the risk perception of climate change was built.
Secondly, the range standardization method was used to process the data, which effectively solved the influence of the dimensions between participating indices, reduced the interference of human factors on index values, and enhanced the objectivity of the result [31].
Thirdly, the analytic hierarchy process was used to obtain the weights of different indicators.
Furthermore, a reasonable Bayesian network model was built based on the interrelation among exposure perception, danger perception, vulnerability perception, and risk perception levels, and probability of occurrence of each node was attained via the machine learning of Bayesian network [29].
Finally, the intensity of the climate change risk perception was calculated and a certain intensity of perception was set to simulate the risk scenarios [32].
3.3.
Establishment and Grading of Index System for Climate Change Risk Perception The paper took Baoji City as the research area to verify the feasibility of the climate change risk perception assessment.
The assessment index system for climate change risk perception was set up according to the assessment procedure of the climate change risk perception, as shown in Figure 3.
The Bayesian network result was achieved in accordance with the interrelation among danger, vulnerability, and exposure in the index system [32] in Figure 2 and by referring to the relative opinions of experts, as shown in Figure 4.
Next, the pre-treated samples of the AHP-Bayesian network were graded in the paper.
Table 3 displayed the criteria for grading the risk perception indices of the climate change in Baoji.
The method of Nature Breaks was used in grading, and indices in each category included three levels.
Specifically, the criteria for the vulnerability index was selected according to the abovementioned introduction and questionnaire contents [7].
The exposure was measured via probability distance Figure 2 | AHP-Bayesian network model of climate change risk perception assessment.
152 S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 Figure 3 | Index system for climate change risk perception assessment.
Figure 4 | Schematic diagram of climate change risk perception structure of Bayesian network.
Table 3 | Grading table of risk perception indices of climate change in Baoji Index/grade Gender Age Education level Annual household revenue Property loss severity* Influence degree on health* Deterioration of ecological environment* Low Male = 0 3–27 1–3 (Primary school or junior high school) 1–3 (500–2000) 1–2 1–2 1–2 Medium Female = 1 27–54 4–6 (High schoolbachelor) 4-6 (2001–8000) 3–4 3–4 3–4 High 54–86 7–8 (Postgraduate) 7–9 (8001–15001) 5 5 5 Index/grade Influence degree on work and life* Severity of disaster* Climate change tendency* Intensity of perception Vulnerability Danger level Exposure Low 1–2 1–2 1–2 0.000–0.330 0.00–0.30 0.00–0.38 0.00–0.39 Medium 3–4 3–4 3–4 0.340–0.660 0.31–0.60 0.39–0.78 0.40–0.79 High 5 5 5 0.670–0.860 0.61–0.90 0.79–1.00 0.80–1.00 *The Likert scale was applied to the score of 1–5, respectively.
S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 153 Table 4 | Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of climate change risk perception intensity Climate change risk concern Closeness of individuals to climate change risk Average 2.389392 Average 4.029754 Standard error 0.026517 Standard error 0.02797 Standard deviation 1.042646 Standard deviation 1.099759 Variance 1.087111 Variance 1.20947 Kurtosis 9.172399 Kurtosis −0.00364 Skewness 1.345191 Skewness −0.94468 Table 5 | AHP hierarchical analysis judgment matrix Average value Item Vulnerability Degree of danger Exposure 1.92 Vulnerability 1.000 0.727 1.103 2.64 Degree of danger 1.375 1.000 1.517 1.74 Exposure 0.906 0.659 1.000 Table 6 | Judgment matrix of vulnerability via AHP hierarchy analysis Average value Item Education level Influence degree on work and life Annual household revenue Gender 2.100 Education level 1.000 0.882 4.221 4.773 2.380 Influence degree on work and life 1.133 1.000 4.784 5.409 0.497 Annual household revenue 0.237 0.209 1.000 1.131 0.440 Gender 0.210 0.185 0.884 1.000 since the paper mainly studied the uncertainty about the public’s risk perception.
The danger perception index was measured mainly based on the local public’s perception of the serious influence degree and change tendency of extreme climate change in different places (see Table 3).
3.4.
Calculation of Climate Change Risk Perception Intensity R P T QWl l i i i=å ( ) (1) where R indicated the intensity of climate change risk perception; P(Tl) represented probability at the corresponding level of exposure, danger, and vulnerability in the AHP-Bayesian network model, indicating the level (low, medium, and high) of risk perception; Qi denoted the average perception intensity of exposure, danger, and vulnerability at each level via AHP method; Wi indicated the perception weight of exposure, danger, and vulnerability at each level calculated via AHP method; and i represented the intensity level of exposure, danger, and vulnerability perception of climate change risk.
V Q P V E Q P E D Q P Dvl l l el l l dl l l= = =å å å( ); ( ); ( ) (2) where V was the intensity of vulnerability; E was the intensity of exposure; D and Q were the intensity of danger level and climate change risk perception respectively, the values of which were within 0–1, consistent with Formula (7); P(Vl), P(El), and P(Dl) represented the probability values of the perception of exposure, danger, and vulnerability at corresponding level; Qvl, Qel, Qdl represented respectively the intensity of exposure, danger, and vulnerability according to the AHP analytical method.
3.5.
Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Climate Change Risk Perception Intensity Firstly, the dependent variables of the climate change risk perception intensity (including the degree of public concern about climate change and the closeness of individuals to climate change risk) were averaged.
The average value was then positively normalized to obtain the intensity of climate change risk perception.
Finally, the obtained climate change risk perception intensity and the dependent variables shown in Table 2 were used for multiple linear regression analysis.
The obtained results were compared with those of the Bayesian network model, which further verified the rationality of using the Bayesian network for climate change risk perception evaluation.
The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable were as shown in Table 4.
3.6.
AHP-Bayesian Network Model Data pre-Processing For the top-level decision objective of “climate change risk perception”, the lower-level materiality matrix was shown in Table 5.
For the decision objective for level 2, exposure, danger, and vulnerability, the lower-level significance matrixes were shown in Tables 6–8.
The weight of each index of climate change risk perception in Baoji City was obtained using AHP method (see Table 9).
The EM algorithm was used to calculate the probability of occurrence of the elements represented by each node in the Bayesian network, as shown in Figure 5.
According to the probability of climate change risk perception intensity and risk perception level in Table 9, the decision goal of “climate change risk perception” was calculated by Formula (1).
The climate change vulnerability, danger degree, and exposure degree optimized by the Bayesian network were 0.436, 0.540, and 154 S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 Table 9 | Weight of climate change risk perception indices based on AHP Exposure (27.619%) Danger level (41.905%) Vulnerability (30.476%) CI = 0 Property loss severity (22.171%) Severity of disaster (52.729%) Education level (38.763%) RI = 0.415 Influence degree on health (25.635%) Influence degree on work and life (43.932%) Deterioration of ecological environment (24.711%) Climate change tendency (47.271%) Annual household revenue (9.183%) Influence degree on work and life (27.483%) Gender (8.122%) λmax= 3, CI = 0, RI = 0.52, CR = 0 λmax= 2, CI = 0, RI = 0 λmax= 4, CI = 0, RI = 0.89, CR = 0 CR = 0 % represents the weight of each index.
Figure 5 | Probability table of Bayesian network.
Table 7 | Judgment matrix of risk via AHP level analysis Average value Item Severity of disaster Climate change tendency 0.503 Severity of disaster 1.000 1.115 0.451 Climate change tendency 0.897 1.000 Table 8 | Judgment matrix of risk via AHP level analysis Average value Item Property loss severity Influence degree on health Deterioration of ecological environment Influence degree on work and life 1.92 Property loss severity 1 0.865 0.897 0.807 2.22 Influence degree on health 1.156 1 1.037 0.933 2.14 Deterioration of ecological environment 1.115 0.964 1 0.899 2.38 Influence degree on work and life 1.24 1.072 1.112 1 0.501 respectively.
Further calculations showed that the intensity of climate change risk perception was 0.497.
According to Table 2, people in Baoji showed a moderate level of climate change risk perception, which was consistent with the conclusion obtained through the Bayesian network.
Comparing the probability obtained by the AHP-Bayesian network model classification with that of the corresponding samples obtained based on actual investigation, the maximum likelihood probability of the AHP-Bayesian network model was 74.2%.
This indicated that the algorithm not only reduced the calculation error of the climate change risk perception intensity, but an overall assessment of the level of climate change risk perception in Baoji had also been undertaken, thus avoiding the risk perception bottleneck associated with the grade of intensity.
4.
RESULT ANALYSIS 4.1.
Synthesis of Risk Perception Results The most important function of the Bayesian network is that it can use Bayes formula to deduce the probability according to the network structure.
In this model, the posterior probability of one or more variables could be obtained under the given state of some variables (that is, prior knowledge or prior probability), and then the risk could be predicted.
In this paper, a Priori probability was introduced into the Bayesian network model, and a Posteriori probability was obtained through probability reasoning to measure the probability of future climate change risk perception in Baoji.
This was achieved through Netica software, which is widely used for Bayesian network.
S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 155 Figure 6 | Posterior probability diagram of climate change risk perception.
Table 10 | Average perceived intensity of each index in Baoji City based on AHP Index/ Level Vulnerability perception Exposure perception Risk perception Climate change risk perception Low 0.229 0.242 0.285 0.273 Medium 0.471 0.588 0.579 0.507 High 0.717 0.908 0.863 0.729 4.1.1.
Perceived sensitivity to climate change risk and posterior analysis Judging from the calculations in Subsection 3.1 and the probabilities shown in Figure 5, it is clear that the climate change risk perception system was at a moderate level, being 0.497.
Moreover, the results of Bayesian network showed that 75% of the residents in Baoji City had moderate climate change risk perception, thus implying that the overall perception level of Baoji City was moderate.
By adjusting the probability of climate change risk perception at the medium level to 100%, it was found that the probability of other indicators at the high level had increased (see Figure 6).
The biggest change in risk was the climate change trend rate (3.2%), and the disaster severity was also large (2.9%); the biggest change in exposure was the degree of ecological environment deterioration (2.0%); and the biggest change in vulnerability was gender (5.1%) (see Figure 6).
Therefore, in order to improve people’s climate change risk perception level, it is necessary to widely publicize climate change trends, emphasize the deterioration degree of ecological environment, pay attention to the climate change risk perception status of different genders, and release corresponding information timely to predict the disaster severity of climate change.
The mutual information between climate change risk perception node and its parent node was obtained by sensitivity analysis [32] (see Table 10).
Mutual information refers to the amount of information shared between two variables, which is a measure of the interdependence degree of variables.
The greater the amount of mutual information, the smaller the degree of information entropy reduction, and the stronger the correlation between nodes [32].
Table 11 showed high correlations between disaster severity, climate change trend, property damage severity, ecological degradation, annual household revenue, gender, and climate change risk perception.
In order to scientifically compare the factors that showed the greatest impact on the perception of climate change risk, the cumulative percentage of mutual information and cumulative percentage of probability change rate were used as horizontal and vertical axes respectively.
The results demonstrated that the cumulative curve of probability change rate was above the absolute fair curve, thereby indicating that the probability change rate could better reflect the influence factors of climate change risk perception than mutual information (see Table 12 and Figure 7).
Table 11 | Mutual information between climate change risk perception and parent node Node Mutual information Percentage Gender 0.04410 4.610 Disaster severity 0.03676 3.840 Climate change trend 0.02861 2.990 Deterioration degree of ecological environment 0.01503 1.570 Severity of property damage 0.01437 1.500 Annual family income 0.01522 1.590 Impact on work and life 0.01135 1.190 Health impact 0.01169 1.220 Education level 0.00566 0.592 Age 0.00141 0.148 Table 12 | Statistics table of probability change comparison curve Index Cumulative percentage of mutual information Cumulative percentage of probability change rate Age 1 19 Education level 4 24 Health impact 10 30 Impact on work and life 16 36 Annual family income 24 43 Severity of property damage 32 50 Deterioration degree of ecological environment 41 59 Climate change trend 56 70 Disaster severity 76 81 Gender 100 100 156 S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 Figure 7 | Comparison curve of probability change rate.
Table 14 | Multiple linear regression coefficient table Independent variables Independent variables Independent variables Independent variables Independent variables Constant term 0.543839 0.018591 29.25278 7.4E−150 Gender 0.002604 0.007989 0.325971 0.744491 Age −0.01261 0.026086 −0.48345 0.628844 Education level 0.006516 0.016942 0.384608 0.700581 Family income −0.00798 0.016748 −0.47646 0.633814 Severity of property damage −0.02675 0.018094 −1.47857 0.13946 Health impact 0.012994 0.021054 0.617159 0.537222 Deterioration of ecological environment −0.03171 0.021546 −1.47191 0.14125 Impact on work and life 0.004319 0.019665 0.219624 0.826193 Severity of disaster 0.100144 0.021499 4.658171 3.47E−06 Climate change trend −0.04857 0.021747 −2.23328 0.025674 Table 13 | Statistics results of regression R 0.1303 R-squared 0.0169780 Adjusted R 0.01057 Standard error 0.152813 4.1.2.
Multiple regression analysis of climate change risk perception From the above Tables 12 and 13, it could be found that the model matching degree of using multiple linear regression to explore the factors affecting climate change risk perception was low.
In particular, R2 was only 0.017 < 0.6, and the goodness of fit was also very low.
According to the test results of the respective variables T, only the severity of property loss, the deterioration degree of ecological environment, the severity of disasters, and climate change trend were found to be very significant, and other significant levels were <0.5, revealing poor accuracy.
Therefore, compared with the multiple linear regression model, the Bayesian network model (fitting accuracy of 74.2%) was more suitable for assessing the level of climate change risk perception and exploring its influencing factors (Table 14).
5.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION In general, the uncertainties of Bayesian networks lie in structural uncertainty, input data uncertainty, and parameter uncertainty [31].
This paper has selected some indicators to evaluate the risk perception of climate change in Baoji City.
However, there are many factors influencing climate change risk perception [33], such as climate change risk outcome perception and cause perception.
In the future, more influencing factors should be incorporated into the network to reduce structural uncertainty caused by incomplete understanding of the process of climate change risk perception, so that the research results could have more practical significance.
The perception of climate change risk cause, which mainly involves the public’s perception of the factors affecting climate change risk, is also a part of climate change risk perception.
The limitation resulted from expert scoring of the AHP method could be transcended by combing AHP with the Bayesian network model to assess the risk perception of climate change in Baoji City as a whole.
In so doing, the poor fitting results in the process of multiple linear regression analysis could also be improved, so that the connection between indicators could be consistent with the actual scenarios to the largest extent.
However, this paper used the AHP method to determine the weights of secondary indicators to calculate the strength of risk perception, and the ANP method could be used for future weight calculation improvements.
During the simulation of risk scenarios, the medium-level intensity of Baoji City’s climate change risk perception was adjusted to 100%.
The sensitivity analysis method was used to further verify that the factors influencing the risk perception intensity of Baoji were mainly gender, climate change perception trends, deterioration degree of ecological environment, and disaster severity.
In the future, the commissioning of different perception scenarios can be used to find the threshold of climate change risk perception.
Besides, the present study found that 75% of the people’s climate change risk perception level was moderate.
This is consistent with the climate change risk perception index of the majority of the public in Baoji calculated by Hong Juan based on the risk view [25], indicating that the calculation results in this paper were more reasonable.
The climate change risk perception intensity of 0.497 was at a medium level, which is more consistent with the survey results of related scholars.
For example, 54.9% of the public in Baoji City had a correct understanding of the uncertainty of risk, while 43.6% of the public believed that the danger degree of risk was small [27].
These findings were not much different from the research results of the present paper, thus revealing that our use of AHP-Bayes model to measure the intensity of climate change risk perception was more reasonable.
In addition, some researchers have suggested that Baoji had the most extensive flood hazard low-risk area, followed by medium-low risk area [34], indicating a certain gap between people’s flood risk perception and scientific calculation result.
To be specific, the hailstorm risk index in Longxian County was the largest, and the urban center and the southern high mountain area were mainly low-risk areas [35].
S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 157 It indicated that the calculated Baoji’s climate change risk perception intensity slightly differed from the scientifically measured result of hail disaster risk in the overall judgment.
By regulating people’s perception of hail disaster risks in different areas of Baoji City, they could be encouraged to better deal with this kind of risks.
For example, people in Longxian County need to raise the awareness of the hail disaster risk and take precautions in advance, while the residents in the urban central area and the southern high mountain area can appropriately reduce their risk response level to avoid unnecessary panic.
It can be clearly inferred that the results of this paper have different reference value in terms of the response to and management of different climate change risk categories, so different adjustments need to be made in accordance with the actual situation of Baoji City.
In addition, since Baoji City has frequent meteorological disasters and it is more sensitive to climate change, the assessment of the local people’s climate change risk perception also has certain reference value for the whole country.
For example, given a small gap between people’s perception of climate change risk and the scientific result, it is suggested to further publicize the severity of disasters and the deterioration of the ecological environment, and pay attention to the status of climate change risk perception of different genders to prevent the loss caused by climate change risk.
On the other hand, when people’s perception of climate change risk is higher than the results of scientific calculations, it is necessary to appropriately reduce the publicity of information on climate change trends in order to reduce the panic caused by climate change risk.
Noteworthily, the limitation of this paper lies in that it failed to explore the gap between Baoji City’s climate change risk perception and its overall climate change risk intensity.
The innovation of this paper is reflected in the following two aspects.
Firstly, the research content shows a certain degree of innovation in terms of the assessment of climate change risk perception.
Most previous studies have been based on the three aspects of climate change risk management, mitigation, and adaptation.
Among them, Climate Risk Management (CRM) is a term used to represent a large and growing body of work, connecting such aspects as the Climate Change Adaptation (CCA), disaster management and development sectors.
The approach aims to promote sustainable development by reducing vulnerabilities related to climate risks.
CRM involves strategies aiming at maximizing positive and minimizing negative outcomes for communities in fields such as agriculture, food security, water resources, and health [36].
Climate change mitigation consists of actions to limit the magnitude or rate of global warming and its related effects [37].
The current trajectory of global greenhouse gas emissions appears to be inconsistent with limiting global warming to below 1.5°C or 2°C [38–40].
However, globally, the benefits of keeping warming under 2°C exceed the costs.
Moreover, CCA is a response to global warming also known as “climate change” [41].
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines CCA as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects [42].
In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.
In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects” [43].
In general, the above research has only focused on the simple assessment of climate change risk perception.
By comparison, the present paper has not only systematically evaluated the public’s climate change risk perception by considering hazard, vulnerability, and exposure at the same time, but also comprehensively verified the influencing factors of climate change risk perception.
Besides, the content of this research are more in-depth and solid.
Secondly, this paper has compared the climate change risk perception level of the people in Baoji City with the results of scientific assessment, and provided a reference standard for the people in terms of climate change risk management and response.
This is of certain practical value, and reflects again the originality of the present study.
As for the research methods, this paper has additionally conducted the regression analysis commonly used in previous literature for comparison, and found that the AHP-Bayesian network method is more effective.
In short, this paper has evaluated the risk perception of climate change in Baoji City by combing the AHP analysis and the Bayesian network.
It has also combined the posterior and sensitivity analysis to diagnose the factors affecting climate change risk perception.
The conclusions are as follows.
First, AHP-Bayesian network model is more suitable for the assessment of climate change risk perception than multiple linear regression.
Second, the climate change risk perception intensity is 0.497, being at a medium level.
Comparing this result with the scientific assessment of climate change risk, it is found that there is a certain gap between the assessment results of climate change risk in different regions or different categories in Baoji City and the public perception.
Third, judging from the calculation results of the Bayesian network, 75.0% of the people have a moderate level of risk perception of climate change, 21.5% have a higher level of perception, and about 3.5% have a lower level of perception.
It further confirms that the majority of Baoji’s population have a moderate level of climate change risk perception.
Moreover, the main factors that influence the risk perception intensity of Baoji City are gender, climate change perception trend, deterioration degree of ecological environment, and disaster severity.
At the meanwhile, compared with previous studies, this paper has systematically evaluated the people’s climate change risk perception and comprehensively verified the main factors affecting climate change risk perception.
The research content is more in-depth and solid.
Furthermore, in order to improve the public’s ability to perceive climate change risk, it is necessary to strengthen the publicity of climate change trends and the severity of property loss, and pay attention to the status of different genders’ perceptions of climate change risk in a timely manner.
In the process of risk management, more attention should be paid to the information on climate change disaster severity, and the prevention and control of disasters should be enhanced to reduce property loss and minimize the climate change risk’s impact on people’s work and life.
Nonetheless, when the gap between people’s perception of climate change risk and the scientifically assessed result is small, it is suggested to further publicize the severity of disasters and the deterioration of the ecological environment, and pay attention to different genders’ status of the climate change risk perception to prevent loss caused by climate change risk.
However, when people’s perception of climate change risk is higher than the scientific results, it is necessary for the public to appropriately reduce their attention to climate change trend information, so as to decrease the panic caused by climate change risk.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest.
158 S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China “Regional Climate Change Risk Perception and Response” (41771215).
The authors appreciate the time and effort of the editors and reviewers in providing constructive comments which have helped to improve the manuscript.
REFERENCES [1] Wang S. Research on the Financial Risks of Zhongzhuang Construction Company.
Qingdao Technological University, 2018.
[2] Fang M. Theoretical progress and paradigm changes of interdisciplinary research on risk perception: an interpretation based on the psychological perspective.
Foreign Theor Trends 2017;117–27.
[3] Wang D, et al.
Research on perceptual video fingerprint algorithm.
Shanghai Jiaotong University; 2012.
[4] Jiang H. The rise and development path of cognitive science.
Acad Exchange 2009;28–30.
[5] Su F, He C, Huang J, Guo Z.
Current status and trend of research on disaster risk perception.
J Catastr Sci 2016;31:146–51.
[6] Stoutenborough JW, Vedlitz A, Xing X.
Are all risk perceptions created equal?
Comparing general risk assessments and specific risk assessments associated with climate change.
Human Ecol Risk Assess 2016;22:50–70.
[7] Shakeela A, Becken S. Understanding tourism leaders’ perceptions of risks from climate change: an assessment of policy-making processes in the Maldives using the social amplification of risk framework (SARF).
J Sustain Tour 2015;23:65–84.
[8] Safi AS, Smith WJ, Liu Z.
Rural Nevada and climate change: vulnerability, beliefs, and risk perception.
Risk Anal 2012;32:1041–59.
[9] Sharon LH, Mariana JS, Elizabeth AM, Timothy AS.
A survey-based assessment of perceived flood risk in urban areas of the United States.
Anthropocene 2019;28:100217.
[10] Petr M, Boerboom L, Ray D, van der Veen A.
An uncertainty assessment framework for forest planning adaptation to climate change.
Forest Policy Econ 2014;41:1–11.
[11] Sun X, Zhao X. Ecological risk assessment of the ecotone between agriculture and animal husbandry in northern my country under the background of climate change.
J Peking Univ (Nat Sci Ed) 2009;45:713–20.
[12] Cheng K, Pan G, Li L, Liu X, Cui L. Risk assessment of meteorological yield reduction in rice and dry farming production in China.
J Agric Environ Sci 2011;30:1764–71.
[13] Zhou Q, Liu D. Evaluation of residents’ perception of flood risk based on the knowledge-believing model.
People Yangtze River 2019;50:28–34.
[14] Zhao C, Wang X, Huang X. Tourists’ perception evaluation of rainstorm disaster risk from the perspective of bounded reason— taking Nangong mountain scenic area as an example.
Regional Res Dev 2018;37:120–4.
[15] Lu J, Wang X, Guo J. AHP-based evaluation of rainstorm disaster risk perception of tourists in Jinsixia scenic spot.
Henan Sci 2017;35:1708–15.
[16] Chang C, Huai J.
Assessment of perceived vulnerability of apple farmers’ climate risks on the Loess Plateau.
Northern Horticult 2018;200–5.
[17] Abebe Y, Kabir G, Tesfamariam S. Assessing urban areas vulnerability to pluvial flooding using GIS applications and Bayesian belief network model.
J Clean Prod 2018;174:1629–41.
[18] Lawrence JM, Hossain NUI, Jaradat R, Hamilton M. Leveraging a Bayesian network approach to model and analyze supplier vulnerability to severe weather risk: a case study of the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain following Hurricane Maria.
Int J Disaster Risk Reduct 2020;49:101607.
[19] Shi H, Luo G, Zheng H, Chen C, Bai J, Liu T. Water use analysis of the Syr Darya basin based on the causality of the “waterenergy-food-ecology” link and the Bayesian network.
Acta Geogr Sin 2020;75:1036–52.
[20] Löfstedt RE.
Climate change perceptions and energy-use decisions in Northern Sweden, Global Environ Change 1991;1:321–4.
[21] Xu Y, Wang H. Dynamic changes and forecast of cultivated land resources in western industrial cities—taking Baoji City of Shaanxi Province as an example.
Henan Sci 2012;30:1353–8.
[22] Zhou Q.
Correspondence analysis of agricultural drought and flood disasters in Baoji area and national cold and warm in the past 1500.
Arid Zone Res 2003;20:123–6.
[23] Liu Y. Meteorological and climate disasters and countermeasures.
Beijing: China Environmental Science Press; 2005, p. 206.
[24] Wan H. Flood disasters and its impacts in Baoji area during the past 1400 years.
J Arid Land Resour Environ 2014;28:79–82.
[25] Huang R. Research on the Construction Mode of Urban Water Saving Society in Baoji City.
Xi’an University of Technology; 2010.
[26] Hong J. People’s perception and response to climate change based on risk concept.
Northeast Normal University; 2015.
[27] Zhang H, Tian M. Application of reliability analysis in questionnaire design.
Stat Decision Making 2007;25–7.
[28] Zong X. J Yangzhou Univ 2012;16:70–3.
[29] Zhan D, Zhang W, Yu J, Meng B, Dang Y.
The influence mechanism of livability satisfaction of Beijing residents based on geographic detectors.
Prog Geogr 2015;34:966–75.
[30] Liu J, Zhao G, Zheng Y. AHP-bayesian network-based information security risk situation analysis model.
J Beijing Inform Sci Technol Univ (Nat Sci Ed) 2015;30:68–74.
[31] Jiang M, Lu J, Wang S. Influencing factors of pirate attacks based on Bayesian network.
China Navigation 2019;42:87–92.
[32] Ren Y, Guo W, Chen W, Ma Y.
Research on construction land saving and intensive benefit based on AHP—taking Shangqiu City as an example.
Chin Agric Sci Bull 2016;32:87–91.
[33] Zeng L, Li J, Li T, Yang X, Wang Y. Optimization of spatial pattern of water conservation services based on Bayesian network.
Acta Geogr Sin 2018;73:1809–22.
[34] Bai Z, Xue L. GIS-based weighted comprehensive evaluation of flood disaster risk in Baoji City.
Henan Sci 2019;37:642–7.
[35] Cao R, Chen H. Research on hail disaster risk Zoning in Baoji City.
J Nat Dis 2019;28:145–52.
[36] Hellmuth ME, Moorhead A, Thomson MC, Williams J.
Climate risk management in Africa: learning from practice.
Columbia University, NY, USA: International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI); 2007.
[37] Fisher B, Nakicenovic N, Alfsen K, Corfee-Morlot J, Riahi K. Ch.
3: issues related to mitigation in the long-term context.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10807039.2015.1054924 https://doi.org/10.1080/10807039.2015.1054924 https://doi.org/10.1080/10807039.2015.1054924 https://doi.org/10.1080/10807039.2015.1054924 https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2014.918135 https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2014.918135 https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2014.918135 https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2014.918135 https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2014.918135 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22583075/ https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22583075/ https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22583075/ https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ancene.2019.100217 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ancene.2019.100217 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ancene.2019.100217 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.12.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.12.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.12.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.11.066 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.11.066 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.11.066 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101607 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101607 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101607 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101607 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101607 https://doi.org/10.1016/0959-3780(91)90058-2 https://doi.org/10.1016/0959-3780(91)90058-2 S. Xue et al.
/ Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 10(4) 147–159 159 Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007.
[38] Harvey F. UN calls for push to cut greenhouse gas levels to avoid climate chaos.
The Guardian (Retrieved 27 November 2019).
[39] Cut Global Emissions by 7.6 Percent Every Year for Next Decade to Meet 1.5°C Paris Target UN Report.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
United Nations (Retrieved 27 November 2019).
[40] Victor D, et al.
Executive summary, in: Chapter 1: introductory chapter, IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 4 (archived 3 July 2014).
[41] Grüneis H, Penker M, Höferl KM.
The full spectrum of climate change adaptation: testing an analytical framework in Tyrolean mountain agriculture (Austria).
Springerplus 2016;5:1848.
[42] Campbell BM, Hansen J, Rioux J, Stirling CM, Twomlow S, Wollenberg E. Urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (SDG 13): transforming agriculture and food systems Curr Opinion Environ Sus 2018;34:13–20.
[43] IPCC.
Glossary (PDF).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2014. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3542-1 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3542-1 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3542-1 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-3542-1 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2018.06.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2018.06.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2018.06.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2018.06.005
Olwoch_45-72.indd INTRODUCTION The realization that species distributions are significantly influenced by climate has placed considerable emphasis on the need to acquire information concerning the ways in which the present distributions of organisms will be affected by climate change.
In response to this challenge, the issue of vector dis tribution has recently received much attention.
Nu merous studies (Sutherst & Maywald 1985; Nix 1986; Perry, Lessard, Norval, Kundert & Kruska 1990; Norval, Perry & Young 1992; Rogers & Randolph 1993; Sutherst, Maywald & Skarratt 1995; Randolph & Rogers 1997; Estrada-Peña 1999; Rogers & Randolph 2000; Randolph 2001, 2002; Erasmus, Kshatriya, Mansell, Chown & Van Jaarsveld 2000; Erasmus, Van Jaarsveld, Chown, Kshatriya & Wessels 2002; Olwoch, Rautenbach, Erasmus, Engelbrecht & Van Jaarsveld 2003; Van Staden, Erasmus, Roux, Wingfield & Van Jaarsveld 2004; Thomas, Cameron, Green, Bakkenes, Beaumont, Collingham, Erasmus, Ferrierra, Grainger, Hannah, Hughes, Huntley, Van Jaarsveld, Midgley, Miles, Ortega-Huerta, Peterson, 45 Onderstepoort Journal of Veterinary Research, 74:45–72 (2007) Climate change and the genus Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa J.M.
OLWOCH1*, A.S. VAN JAARSVELD2, C.H.
SCHOLTZ3 and I.G.
HORAK4 ABSTRACT OLWOCH, J.M., VAN JAARSVELD, A.S., SCHOLTZ, C.H.
& HORAK, I.G.
2007.
Climate change and the genus Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa.
Onderstepoort Journal of Veterinary Research, 74:45–72 The suitability of present and future climates for 30 Rhipicephalus species in Africa are predicted using a simple climate envelope model as well as a Division of Atmospheric Research Limited-Area Model (DARLAM).
DARLAM’s predictions are compared with the mean outcome from two global circulation models.
East Africa and South Africa are considered the most vulnerable regions on the continent to climate-induced changes in tick distributions and tick-borne diseases.
More than 50 % of the species examined show potential range expansion and more than 70 % of this range expansion is found in economically important tick species.
More than 20 % of the species experienced range shifts of between 50 and 100 %.
There is also an increase in tick species richness in the south-western regions of the sub-continent.
Actual range alterations due to climate change may be even greater since factors like land degradation and human population increase have not been included in this modelling process.
However, these predictions are also subject to the effect that climate change may have on the hosts of the ticks, particularly those that favour a restricted range of hosts.
Where possible, the anticipated biological implications of the predicted changes are explored.
Keywords: Climate change, Rhipicephalus species, sub-Saharan Africa, tick-borne disease * Author to whom correspondence is to be directed.
E-mail: jane.olwoch@up.ac.za 1 Department of Geography, Geo-informatics and Meteorology, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 0002 South Africa.
2 CIB, Department of Botany and Zoology, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, 7160 South Africa 3 Scarab Research Group, Department of Zoology and Entomology, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 0002 South Africa 4 Department of Veterinary Tropical Diseases, Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Pretoria, Onderstepoort, 0110 South Africa and Department of Zoology and Entomology, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 9300 South Africa Accepted for publication 28 September 2006—Editor 46 Climate change and Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa Philips & Williams 2004) have attempted to predict the distribution of species based on the major environmental factors that would influence this.
This approach neither disregards the need for further detailed and comprehensive eco-physiological studies nor does it pretend to predict the future.
What it does is define the role of climate as a factor in determining the potential for future vector establishment when all other elements are excluded (Sutherst 2003).
This paper also accents the necessity of acquiring more detailed information concerning the biology and environmental sensitivities of each species in the light of likely climate change.
In the absence of such information, relatively straightforward statistical methods that seek correlations between environmental factors and the presence of animals or plants are likely to remain the best pragmatic approach for exploring the expected future distributions of large numbers of species.
This study focuses on climate induced changes likely to occur in the dis tribution of some species of an economically important African arthropod, namely the tick genus Rhipi cephalus.
The intimate relationship between climate and the requirements of ticks for survival is well documented (Tukahirwa 1976; Rechav 1981, 1982; Short & Norval 1981; Minshull & Norval 1982; Norval, Walker & Colborne 1982; Dipeolu 1989; Perry et al.
1990; Norval et al.
1992; Okello-Onen, Tukahirwa, Perry, Rowlands, Nagda, Musisi, Heinonen, Mwayi & OpudaAsibo 1999).
This has led to several studies using climate as a means of predicting the distributions of African ticks (Rogers & Randolph 1993; Randolph 1993, 2001; Randolph & Rogers 1997; Norval, Sutherst, Kurki, Kerr & Gibson 1997; Cumming 2000a, b; Estrada-Peña 2001; Olwoch et al.
2003).
Collectively the results obtained from these works, some of which used data garnered mainly from interpolated climate databases at 25 km resolution (Perry et al.
1990) or 6 x 6 km resolutions (Cumming 2000b), suggest that accurate predictions of tick distributions at different temporal and spatial scales should be feasible.
This approach would be especially useful for predicting the distribution of species in poorly sampled species in poorly sampled regions of Africa.
The genus Rhipicephalus is the fourth largest in the Family Ixodidae (Walker, Keirans & Horak 2000), and there are 74 species currently recognized.
It is essentially an African genus with approximately 63 species recorded only in the Afro-tropical region and ten species outside the region.
One species, Rhipicephalus evertsi evertsi Dönitz, 1910, whose distribution was originally confined to the Afro-tropical region has now gained a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula and its distribution is expected to spread even further (Walker et al.
2000).
Only 30 species are included in this paper.
They are those whose ecological, life history strategies and climatic requirements are relatively well known and, as two distribution data sets have been used, the current distribution of these ticks are relatively well plotted.
The way in which these distributions will be influenced by climate change is poorly documented and forms the essence of this paper.
The use of climate-matching models to predict tick distributions One of the earliest climate matching approaches was CLIMEX, which calculates the climatic suitability of geographic regions for species using a temperature-dependent growth index moderated by four growth indices: hot, cold, dry and wet (Sutherst & Maywald 1985).
The use of CLIMEX in northern Australia was considered a great success for predicting the distribution of the tick Boophilus microplus (Canestrini, 1887), and it was anticipated that this initial success could be translated into predicting distributions of African tick species.
However, early studies tended to over-estimate the distribution of B. microplus across Africa, and the predicted high incidence of Rhipicephalus appendiculatus Neumann, 1901 in West Africa was at complete variance with the tick’s absence in this region.
Moreover, when the distributions of Amblyomma spp.
in Africa were modelled using CLIMEX, these were found to be dissimilar to their known distributions.
These conflicting results led Norval, Perry, Melt zer, Kruska & Boothroyd (1994) to conclude that the predicted climatic suitability of regions for Amblyomma hebraeum Koch and Amblyomma variegatum Fabricius, 1794, is almost the opposite of the actual distribution of these ticks, both in Zim ba bwe and in the rest of Africa (Norval, Perry, Gebreab & Lessard 1991; Norval et al.
1992).
BIOCLIM was the second climate-based approach employed to model tick distributions (Nix 1986; Norval et al.
1992).
BIOCLIM generates 24 climatic attributes from which annual and seasonal mean conditions, extreme values and intra-year seasonality are derived, for each of a selection of geographic points throughout the distribution range of a tick species.
Computer-selected thresholds and limits for each of the indices are matched across a geographical grid to predict potential species distribution.
This model generally provided a better fit between the predicted and known distributions of R. 47 J.M.
OLWOCH et al.
appendiculatus, although at a finer scale the match in some areas of the East African highlands was unsatisfactory (Norval et al.
1992).
The climate database used was interpolated at an increased resolution (8 km), and this factor alone may explain the improved accuracy when compared to the earlier CLIMEX-based attempts.
A subsequent logistic regression approach (Cumming 2000c), based on inter polated climate and elevation data for Africa with a resolution of 25 km (Hutchinson, Nix, MacMahon & Ord 1996) achieved even better accuracy.
Such an approach, however, normally requires the existence of a training data set that includes presence and absence information (Estrada-Peña 2003).
While it is relatively easy to ascertain where ticks have been collected, it is more difficult to confirm the reliability of surveys in which a tick species is cited as not present.
Consequently the assumption that non-presence always implies absence may limit the application of this modelling approach (EstradaPeña 2003).
The use of an Advanced Very High-Resolution Radio meter (AVHRR) mounted on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) meteorological satellites was given preference in the 1990s.
This instrument allowed the direct detection of environmental factors at an 8 km resolution (Lessard et al.
1990).
The main predictor in this procedure is the satellite-derived maximum mean monthly Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI).
However, this technique was reportedly very complicated when used to predict the distribution of R. appendiculatus (Kruska & Perry 1991).
There are, however, initiatives to revive confidence in the NDVI approach as a predictive tool in research (Randolph 2002).
The present study used a single species distribution modelling procedure (Erasmus et al.
2000), originally developed by Jeffree & Jeffree (1994, 1996), for predicting species distribution patterns and for evaluating the relative performance of predicted future climate data sets.
This model was subsequently modified to accept multivariate inputs to yield probability of presence maps for species (Erasmus et al.
2000).
When used to predict the contemporary potential distribution of African ticks (Olwoch et al.
2003) the model achieved positive predictions of more than 70 % for the four tick species tested.
Climate data used for predicting African tick distributions The principal sources of climate data for predictive distribution modelling are climate surfaces, generated by interpolating data sampled at varying intensities across a region.
Consequently, differences between these climate surfaces can usually be attributed to spatial and temporal evenness of the data used for interpolation.
Most modern interpolation techniques are pattern based and statistically incorporate horizontal as well as vertical (altitudinal) adjustments (Hutchinson 1989, 1991; Hutchinson & Gessler 1994).
These climate surfaces are, how ever, relatively smooth because of extensive interpolation between low-resolution point observations.
Another source of climate data is Global Circulation Models (GCMs).
These are coupled ocean-atmosphere models that provide three-dimensional simulations of the atmosphere.
To date GCMs have produced climate data at a horizontal resolution that is generally too coarse for use in predictive species modelling (> 100 x 100 km grid point resolution), especially for species that are habitat specialists or that are influenced by fine-scale environmental gradients.
Computational requirements usually preclude GCMs being run at meso-scale grid resolutions (10–100 km).
The present study used a Division of Atmospheric Research Limited Area Model (DARLAM) as the main climate data set.
DARLAM is a potential alternative source of high-resolution climate data that involves the nesting of a high-resolution limited area model within a GCM over the area of interest (for review see McGregor 1997).
The GCM supplies the limited area model with initial and boundary conditions.
With a grid resolution of 10–100 km, the limited area model is able to simulate some of the meso-scale properties of the circulation model.
This technique provides a viable fine scale alternative to the use of observed or interpolated climate surfaces or very coarse scale GCMs climate surfaces.
The resolution attained by this dynamic modelling process is essentially limited by the computing power available to the modellers.
The implication of using these datasets for predicting current tick distributions has been assessed by Olwoch et al.
(2003).
In this study, DARLAM’s future predictions are compared with those obtained by using mean climates from two GCMs (CGCM and Centre for Climate System Research/National Institute for Environ mental Studies [CCSR/NIES]).
MATERIALS AND METHODS Study area The study area covers sub-Saharan Africa (Fig.
1) and was divided into 3 000 grids cells of 60 x 60 km 48 Climate change and Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa resolution.
This resolution was determined by the DARLAM climate data.
Tick data Point localities of tick recoveries were obtained from Cumming (1999), who compiled the data that he used from various collections of ticks, and from recent collections made by one of us (I.G.H.).
Combining data sets from different sources frequently compounds identification and distribution errors and for this reason data congruence with Walker et al.
(2000), who provide well-illustrated distributions of Rhipicephalus species, was used to assess data quality in the final compiled dataset.
Synonyms provided by the latter authors also solve the common dataset problem of referring to one species, but using different names, or referring to a group of species as a single species.
The tick species selected for this study belong to the ixodid genus Rhipi cephalus.
Species point localities were assigned to particular 60 km x 60 km grid cells by means of a spatial intersect in ArcView GIS.
A conservative estimate of the accuracy of these point localities is 0.2 ° (G.S.
Cumming, personal communication 2003) and consequently this approximation is considered reasonable.
The Rhipicephalus species selected are those whose distribution and life history strategies are rela tively well known and it is our hope that these results will provide a baseline model for future modelling of other tick species.
Predictive species modelling A simple climate envelope model was used to predict the future distribution of the focal species (Erasmus et al.
2000, 2002).
The input data comprised 3 000 grid cells of 60 x 60 km size populated with climate variables covering sub-Saharan Africa.
Reliable presence records of the selected tick species and the present climate values at these locations were used to construct a climate envelope, using a principal components-type approach.
This climate envelope represents the range of climates within which a particular tick is known to occur, and can be interpreted as the realized niche, as defined solely by climate.
To arrive at a predicted distribution in a climate change scenario, the existing climate envelope is applied to a climate surface representing future climates, and a new geographical interpretation of distribution is derived [see Erasmus et al.
(2000, 2002) and Olwoch et al.
(2003) for a more detailed explanation].
This approach was used as a standardized base for evaluating the relative performances of the DARLAM and the mean GCM climate data sets, and allows the creation of a probability surface of climate suitability for each species modelled.
FIG.
1 Study area National boundaries km 49 J.M.
OLWOCH et al.
DARLAM present and future climate data The Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) developed the high-resolution limited-area model DARLAM for use in both short-term meso-scale atmospheric studies and longer-term climate simulation experiments (Walsh & McGregor 1995).
In the present study ten separate 30-day simulations were performed for both January and July for separate 10-year periods.
The periods selected are the 1990s and 2020.
The simulations were performed at a horizontal grid resolution of 60 x 60 km using a domain of 100 x 100 grid points that cover sub-Saharan Africa.
The month ly average of the ten simulations constitutes the model climatology for the month.
The CSIRO Mark 2 GCM was used to force DARLAM at its lateral boundaries.
The GCM was integrated for the period 1960– 2100, with greenhouse gas forcing corresponding to the A2 SRES (Special Report on Emission Scenario, issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) scenario.
Engelbrecht, Rautenbach, MacGregor & Katzfey (2002) illustrated that DARLAM is capable of simulating the regional characteristics of atmospheric variables such as near-surface temperature, lowlevel wind patterns and rainfall over sub-Saharan Africa with considerable detail.
The model does, however, tend to overestimate total rainfall over regions with a steep topography.
The DARLAM simulations were performed at the Laboratory for Research in Atmospheric Modelling (LRAM) at the University of Pretoria on a Pentium III workstation with two 550 MHz processors.
GCM future climate data The GCM climate data used in this study were downloaded from the IPCC/DDC website.
Through various stages in ArcView GIS, the original GCM data were processed to fit the 60 x 60 km resolution of DARLAM.
The Canadian Global Coupled Model (CGCM2) was the first GCM climate used in this study.
It is based on the earlier CGCM1, but with some improvements aimed at addressing shortcomings identified in the first version.
In particular, the ocean mixing parameterization has been changed (Gent & McWilliams 1990), and following Flato & Hibler (1992) sea-ice dynamics has been included.
The version of GCM2 used for control and doubled CO2 experiments has ten vertical levels with the lowest prognostic level located at approximately 200 m above the surface.
A description of CGCM2 and a comparison, relative to CGCM1, of its response to increasing greenhouse-gas forcing can be found in Flato & Boer (2001).
The climate change projections used in this study are those from the newer IPCC SRES A2 scenario.
The second GCM model used was developed by the Center for Climate System Research/National Institute for Environmental Studies, (Japan) (CCSR/ NIES) CGCM (Nozawa, Emori, Numaguti, Tsushima, Takemura, Nakajima, Abe-Ouchi & Kimoto 2001).
This model is also based on Emission Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
It is a Transient Coupled OceanAtmosphere Model, which was developed to investigate the direct and indirect climate impacts of the anthropogenic sulphate and carbonaceous aerosols in future projections of climate change.
The data used here are from the A2 scenarios.
Direct radiative forcing of the carbonaceous aerosols nearly nullifies that of the sulphate aerosols for all scenarios.
Estimated total indirect radiative forcing is about –1.3 Wm-2 for the A1, B1, and B2 scenarios, and is about –2.0 Wm-2 for the A2 scenario in the latter half of the 21st Century.
Global and annual averages of the surface air temperature increase for all scenarios because of the dominance of the radiative forcing of the increased CO2.
Global warming is decelerated with an increase in the anthropogenic sulphate and carbonaceous aerosols, because indirect forcing due to the aerosols has a significant cooling effect.
Geographical distribution of the surface warming does not depend much on the scenarios.
Cloud feedback becomes dominant in the latter half of the 21st Century, and this introduces further warm ing at the surface.
Predicting current and future distribution of Rhipicephalus species The predicted current distributions were initially obtained using current climate predicted by DARLAM.
This represents a useful comparison between predicted distributions and known records (see Olwoch et al.
2003).
To obtain predicted future distributions the grid cells are populated with future climate variables.
The predicted current distributions were obtained using the predictive species model (Erasmus et al.
2000) and six climate variables of current and future mean maximum temperature, mean minimum temperature and mean rainfall of January and July provided by DARLAM.
The predicted future distributions were obtained by using both DARLAM and the mean GCM climates.
The predictive modelling was executed in S-Plus (S-Plus 2000), while maps of the results were drawn in ArcView GIS.
The resultant potential distribution maps represent the probability values of their suitability for ticks based on climate.
50 Climate change and Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa Analysis of predicted tick range changes A number of analyses were performed to compare the predicted current and future distributions of ticks.
These included: (i) Analysis of species range expansion (ii) An analysis of range contraction (iii) Change in species richness pattern (iv) Species range shifts (v) An assessment of overlap between DARLAM and GCM predicted future distributions.
These range changes were initially analysed for the whole study area and subsequently, in some cases, on a regional basis.
In the second analysis, ticks were grouped into the following regions depend ing on their principal regional distribution, namely East Africa, Central Africa and southern Africa, and a fourth group of ticks that were termed “general” ticks.
The East African tick species include Rhipicephalus aquatilis Walker, Keirans & Pegram, 1993, Rhipi cephalus armatus Pocock, 1900, Rhipicephalus bequaer ti Zumpt, 1949, Rhipicephalus carnivoralis Walker, 1966, Rhipicephalus humeralis Rondelli, 1926, Rhipicephalus kochi Dönitz, 1905, Rhipicephalus ma culatus Neumann, 1901, Rhipicephalus muehlensi Zumpt, 1943, Rhipicephalus planus Neumann, 1907 and Rhipicephalus pulchellus Gerstäcker, 1873.
The Central African species include Rhipicephalus complanatus Neumann, 1911, Rhipicephalus compositus Neumann, 1897, Rhipicephalus dux Dönitz, 1910, Rhipicephalus longus Neumann, 1907, Rhipicephalus lunulatus Neumann, 1907, Rhipicephalus masseyi Nuttall & Warburton, 1908, Rhipicephalus punctatus Warburton, 1912, Rhipicephalus senegalensis Koch, 1844, Rhipicephalus supertritus Neumann, 1907 and Rhipicephalus ziemanni Neumann, 1904.
The southern African species include ticks of the Rhipicephalus capensis group (Rhipicephalus capensis Koch, 1844; Rhipicephalus follis Dönitz, 1910 and Rhipicephalus gertrudae Feldman-Muhsam, 1960), Rhipicephalus distinctus Bedford, 1932, Rhipicephalus exopthalmos Keirans & Walker, 1993, Rhipicephalus oculatus Neumann, 1901, Rhipi cephalus zambeziensis Walker, Norval & Corwin, 1981 and the subspecies Rhipicephalus evertsi mimeticus Dönitz, 1910.
There are also species that have wide ranging distributions that overlap in various regions of Africa.
These species, termed “general” ticks include R. appendiculatus, R. evertsi evertsi Neumann, 1897, Rhipicephalus pravus Dönitz, 1910 and Rhipi cephalus simus Koch, 1844.
The above groupings are presented to facilitate interpretation of the current findings and do not imply that the ticks placed in particular geographical regions are restricted to these areas, but rather localise their distribution with extensions into neighbouring regions.
Range expansion and contraction In order to obtain range changes in terms of contractions or expansions, predicted current or future distributions were first obtained.
The predicted current or future distributions were taken as the number of grid cells in which the probability of occurrence is equal to or greater than 50 %.
The difference in the number of grid cells between the predicted present distribution (DP) and predicted future distribution (DF) constitutes distribution range change (DC).
These range changes may either represent contractions or expansions.
We initially performed this analysis on a sub-Saharan scale and later on a regional scale in order to establish which regions in Africa would experience greater changes in predicted tick distribution ranges (current and future) and therefore appear more vulnerable to climate change.
We analysed the differences between the predicted distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff two-sample test.
Furthermore, we divided the ticks into economically important and unimportant species.
A com parison of range changes between the current and future predictions was performed on this latter grouping to assess which of the two groups is more vulnerable to climate change.
In all the above analyses we assessed the proportion of species that experienced expanded or contracted range changes and the degree of the predicted expansion/contraction.
Analysis of change in species richness pattern and degree of range shifts Species richness patterns were calculated as the number of species in the predicted current or future distribution per grid cell following Erasmus et al.
(2002).
This analysis was performed for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.
Range shifts were calculated as the number of additional grid cells in the predicted future distribution as a proportion of the current predicted distribution.
We used the current predicted distribution instead of current known records because most regions in Africa are poorly sampled.
51 J.M.
OLWOCH et al.
Comparing predicted future distributions of ticks based on climates simulated by DARLAM and GCM The accuracy of any climate model is as good as the initial conditions that are used to configure it.
Since there is no climate model that provides an accurate projection of the future, it seemed prudent to use the results from more than one climate model in this study.
A comparison was therefore made to assess the differences between the predicted future climate suitability for tick species using a regional climate provided by DARLAM and a mean of two GCMs described above.
The analysis was performed on a sub-Saharan scale and also on a regional scale.
We assessed the degree of proportional overlap between the predicted current distribution and the predicted future distribution (DARLAM and GCM) by means of the proportional overlap method (Prendergast, Quinn, Lawton, Eversham & Gibbons 1993; Reyers, Van Jaarsveld & Krüger 2000).
In this case the proportional overlap was calculated as Nc/Ns where Nc is the number of common grid cells between a pair of areas under comparison and Ns is the number of grid cells containing data for both groups or the maximum number of overlapping grid cells possible.
RESULTS Model Validation was not performed in this study because the same climate envelope model had previously been subjected to rigorous evaluation using presence-absence data re sulting from a coordinated and systematic survey effort.
Erasmus et al.
(2002) used the distribution records of 34 bird species and tested performance of the model using receiver operator characteristic analyses (Fielding & Bell 1997).
The model performed sig nificantly better than a random model with no discriminatory ability.
It also accurately predicted the complete known distributions for 24 of the 34 bird species, using a 20 % sub-sample of the known rec ords (Erasmus et al.
2002).
This satisfactory documented performance of the model and the relatively good predictions that were obtained when it was used to predict the current distributions of four Afri can ticks (Olwoch et al.
2003) are sufficient reasons to consider the model adequate for the present study.
Future climate—DARLAM The climatological anomalies for the 2020s vs the 1990s as predicted by DARLAM are depicted in Fig.
2.
January minimum and maximum temperatures are simulated to increase by more than 2 °C over certain regions of sub-Saharan Africa.
Many of the eastern regions are expected to become drier with an associated pattern of higher sea-level pressure, whilst the western subcontinent is expected to beMaximum temperature (°C) Minimum temperature (°C) Mean sea-level pressure (hPa) Rainfall (mm/day) FIG.
2 DARLAM’s climatological anomalies for the 2020s v. 1990s 52 Climate change and Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa come wetter.
An interesting feature of the July anomaly fields is that parts of the central subcontinent are simulated to become cooler and wetter.
Species distribution changes Broad scale range changes (Fig.
3A, B) The predicted current and future distributions of the selected Rhipicephalus spp.
using DARLAM are provided in figures 10–39.
On a sub-Saharan scale, the ranges of 46 % of the tick species, namely R. appendiculatus, R. capensis group, R. distinctus, R. humeralis, R. kochi, R. longus, R. masseyi, R. oculatus, R. planus, R. punctatus, R. senegalensis, R. simus, R. zambeziensis and R. ziemanni are predicted to contract.
The ranges of 54 % of the species, namely R. aquatilis, R. armatus, R. bequaerti, R. carnivoralis, R. complanatus, R. compositus, R. dux, R. evertsi evertsi, R. evertsi mimeticus, R. exopthalmos, R. lunulatus, R. maculatus, R. muehlensi, R. pravus, R. pulchellus and R. supertritus are predicted to expand over the same period (Fig.
3A, B).
These results translate into an area expansion of 3 502 800 km2 (12 %) in total tick range with a total reduction of 640 800 km2 (2 %).
Central African species (Fig.
4A, B, 16,17, 19, 25, 26, 28, 34, 35 and 39) Fifty-five percent of species in central Africa are predicted to show range reductions (R. longus, R. masseyi, R. punctatus, R. senegalensis and R. zie manni) while 45 % (R. complanatus, R. compositus, R. dux and R. lunulatus) are predicted to show range expansions.
Although the ranges of the majority of tick species are predicted to contract, the total area of contraction is only 19 %, while the total area of expansion by the remaining species is 81 %.
The tick species predicted to expand its range most in this region is R. lunulatus with a total expansion of 252 000 km2.
East African species (Fig.
5A, B, 11, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 27, 29, 31 and 33) In East Africa 30 % of the species (R. humeralis, R. kochi and R. planus) are predicted to show range contractions, while 70 % (R. aquatilis, R. armatus, R. bequaerti, R. carnivoralis R. maculatus, R. muehlensi and R. pulchellus) are predicted to show range expansions.
This translates into a total expansion of 1 760 400 km2 (91 %) with a mere 169 200 km2 (9 %) reduction in total area.
The predicted greater expansions are mainly attributable to R. bequaerti which � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � �� ��� �� � �� ��� � � � �� ��� �� ��� � �� ��� �� � �� ��� � � �� �� � � �� �� ��� ��� � �� ��� � � �� ��� � � � �� � � � �� �� � �� � � �� �� ��� �� �� �� � �� ��� �� � � ������� �������� ����� ����� ��������������������� �� ����� ����� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � �� ��� �� � ��� �� � � ��� �� �� ��� ��� ��� � � ��� �� �� �� � � ��� �� � � �� ��� � ��� �� �� �� � � ��� �� �� � � � ��� �� � ��� �� �� ��� �� � � ��� �� �� ��� �� � � �� ��� �� �� �� �� � ��� �� ��� � ��� �� �� �� � ��� �� �� �� � ��� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ���� ��� � �� � �� � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � �������� ����� ����� ������������������� �� ����� ����� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � ������� ������� ������ � ����� ������� ���������� ����� ����� ������������������� �� ������� ����� ������� ���������� ����� ����� ��������������������� �� ������� �� ��� � � �� �� � � �� �� ��� � � � �� � � � �� �� � �� ��� �� � � � ����� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � ��� �� �� �� � � ��� �� �� � � � ��� �� � ��� �� ��� � ������� ������ FIG.
3 Rhipicephalus species in sub-Saharan Africa that are predicted to show (A) range size contraction and (B) range size expansion FIG.
4 Rhipicephalus species in Central Africa that are predicted to show (A) range size contraction and (B) range size expansion 53 J.M.
OLWOCH et al.
more than doubles its present range and R. pulchellus, which is predicted to expand its range by some 921 600 km2 (49 %).
Southern African species (Fig.
6A, B, 14, 18, 21, 22, 30 and 38) In southern Africa some 66 % (R. capensis group, R. distinctus, R. oculatus and R. zambeziensis) of the tick species are predicted to contract their ranges.
Although only 33 % (R. evertsi mimeticus and R. exopthalmos) of the ticks are predicted to expand their current ranges, the total range expansion is 439 200 km2 (23 %) while the total range reduction is only 64 800 km2 (1 %).
Most of the expansion in this region is attributable to R. evertsi mimeticus.
“General” tick species (Fig.
7A, B, 10, 20, 32 and 36) The “general” ticks are those Rhipicephalus species that are widely distributed with current distributions overlapping within various geographical regions of the subcontinent.
This does not necessarily mean that these species are not specialists with regard to their ecological requirements, e.g.
R. appen diculatus is confined to parts of eastern, central and southeastern Africa (Walker et al.
2000).
It is a species of significant economic importance in Africa because it transmits Theileria parva, the cause of East Coast fever (ECF), which is a major cause of cattle mortality and also causes considerable production losses in cattle in most African countries (Okello-Onen et al.
1999).
The only tick species predicted to contract its range in this group is R. appendiculatus, which is predicted to contract its range by 212 400 km2 (5 %).
The ranges of 75 % of the ticks in this category, namely R. evertsi evertsi, R. pravus and R. simus are predicted to expand.
The total range expansion in this region is equivalent to 864 000 km2 (7 %).
This expansion is mainly associated with R. simus, which is predicted to expand its range by 601 200 km2 (70 %).
Changes in species richness patterns and range shifts The future climate predicted by DARLAM will alter the species richness distribution pattern of African Rhipicephalus.
Compared to the current pattern (Fig.
8A) the predicted pattern is spatially different and broader (Fig.
8B) with encroachment of ticks into new regions.
These regions, which include AnFIG.
5 Rhipicephalus species in East Africa that are predicted to show (A) range size contraction and (B) range size expansion FIG.
6 Rhipicephalus species in southern Africa that are predicted to show (A) range size contraction and (B) range size expansion ������� �������� ���������� ����� ����� ��������������������� �� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � ��� ��� ��� �� ��� ��� �� ��� ��� � � ������� �������� ���������� ����� ����� ������������������� �� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � ��� ��� ����� ��� ��� �� ��� �� ��� ��� ��� ��� � ��� ��� � � ��� ��� ��� � � ��� �� ��� � � ��� �� ��� � � ������� ������ ������� ���� ������ ���������� ����� ����� ��������������������� �� ��� ��� ��� ��� � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � ���� ��� � ���� � � � � ���� ��� ���� � � ���� ���� � ������� ���� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���� ������ ���������� ����� ����� ������������������� �� ��� ��� ��� � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � � ���� ��� ��� �� ������� ������ 54 Climate change and Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa gola, Namibia, Botswana and the Northern Cape Province of South Africa, are forecast to experience a more than 50 % increase in tick species richness (Fig.
8C).
This could be related to increased rainfall in these regions, rendering the south-western regions of sub-Saharan Africa more suitable for ticks.
The general west-east shift in species ranges reported by Erasmus et al.
(2002) is not supported in this study on ticks, in which varying degrees of shift in different directions appears to be the emergent pattern for this taxon.
Analysis of range shifts further indicates that 80 % of species show less than a 50 % range shift, while 20 % of species show a range displacement of more than a 100 %.
The latter species are mainly those that populate the western arid regions of Africa (Fig.
8).
Species range changes and tick-borne disease implications Thirty percent of the ticks included in this study are classified as economically important because they are vectors of diseases of domestic livestock or other animals (Table 1).
Although R. appendiculatus, the principal Rhipicephalus vector of disease in Afri ca shows range contraction, the remaining vectors are responsible for 52 % of the predicted range expansion under future climate conditions.
The non-vector species are responsible for 48 % of future tick range expansions.
Predicted future distributions using DARLAM and GCM climate data The predictions of future climate suitability for ticks when DARLAM is used are generally more extensive than those generated when using the combined GCM climates.
With the exception of four species (R. compositus, R. evertsi mimeticus, R. exopthalmos and R. oculatus), and the R. capensis group, DARLAM predicts wider ranges of climatic suitability than the combined GCM climate surfaces.
DARLAM’s total predictions are 31 % broader than the GCMs.
The average difference in the range sizes predicted for DARLAM and GCM is 511 200 km2.
Stat is tically there is no significant difference between the predictions by DARLAM and GCM using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (P > 0.1, n = 30).
However, when the climate data simulated by DARLAM and GCM are analysed for statistical significance, there FIG.
7 Rhipicephalus species in the “General” ticks that are predicted to show (A) range size contraction and (B) range expansion ������� !
"���� �#��������� ����� ����� ������������������� �� ����� ����� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � �� ��� �� �� �� �� � �� ��� �� � �� � � �� � ������� ������ ������� !
"���� �#��������� ����� ����� ��������������������� �� ����� ����� ��� � �� �� ��� �� � �� � �� � ������� ������ � � FIG.
8 Species richness pattern of Rhipicephalus species in subSaharan Africa: (A) current; (B) future; and (C) areas with more than 50 % increase 0–4 5–8 9–12 13–16 17–21 National boundaries B A C More than 50 % increase in species richness 55 J.M.
OLWOCH et al.
TABLE 1 Rhipicephalus spp.
and the diseases with which they or the toxins they produce are associated Disease and causal agents Animal affected Vectors East Coast fever (Theileria parva) Cattle R. appendiculatus R. zambeziensis Tick toxicosis Cattle R. appendiculatus Corridor disease or Buffalo disease (Theileria parva) Cattle, buffalo R. appendiculatus R. zambeziensis Gall sickness (Anaplasma marginale) Cattle R. evertsi evertsi R. simus Equine biliary fever or equine piloplasmosis (Babesia caballi, Theileria equi) Horses, mules, donkeys R. evertsi evertsi Spring lamb paralysis Lambs, calves R. evertsi evertsi Canine biliary fever or canine tick fever (Babesia canis), rickettsiosis (Ehlichia canis) Dogs R. sanguineus Paralysis Sheep, lambs, calves R. lunulatus Nairobi sheep disease (Bunyaviridae) Sheep R. pulchellus TABLE 2 Proportional overlaps between pairs of grid cells between the predicted ranges from DARLAM and the ranges predicted using mean values for two GCMs “General” tick species DARLAM 2030 GCM 2030 Common grids Proportional overlap value (%) R. appendiculatus R. evertsi evertsi R. pravus R. simus 969 1 220 1 300 1 209 858 945 868 858 476 611 621 597 55 65 29 60 East Africa R. aquatilis R. armatus R. bequaerti R. carnivoralis R. humeralis R. kochi R. maculatus R. muehlensi R. planus R. pulchellus 33 153 215 205 79 797 425 699 719 841 17 116 40 111 33 491 173 678 413 217 5 29 11 67 12 326 98 315 278 179 29 25 28 60 55 29 56 67 55 25 Central Africa R. complanatus R. compositus R. dux R. longus R. lunulatus R. masseyi R. punctatus R. senegalensis R. ziemanni 626 699 201 1 020 897 450 458 803 611 595 737* 192 990 518 338 440 622 558 400 443 77 642 308 202 262 415 352 67 60 40 25 28 60 28 56 72 South Africa R. capensis group R. distinctus R. evertsi mimeticus R. exopthalmos R. oculatus R. zambeziensis 485 707 423 212 386 299 547* 352 577* 236* 434* 226 309 254 49 116 293 169 56 72 49 15 49 60 Bold* = GCM predictions wider than those of DARLAM 56 Climate change and Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa FIG.
9 Box plots based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that compared climate predicted by DARLAM and a combined GCM ���������� �� �� �� $� $� $� $� $� �� �� �� �� �� �� �� �� � � � �� � $� �% �� �% �� % � &% &�� ���������� �� �� � �� �� � �� $% $� �% �� �% �� % � ���������� �� �� � � � �� � ����� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� � &��� � � �� �� ���������� �� �� ���������� �� �� $� �� �� �� �� �� �� �� �� �� �� � � � � � �� �� � ���������� �� �� ����� '�� ��� (�� ��� %�� ��� $�� ��� ��� � &��� � � �� �� �%&(%�) *��* �*��� � 57 J.M.
OLWOCH et al.
FIG.
10 R. appendiculatus FIG.
11 R. aquatilis FIG.
10–39 Predicted probability distribution of Rhipicephalus species using DARLAM and GCM future climates: (A) DARLAM; (B) GCM 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability A B 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability A B A B 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability A B 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability FIG.
12 R. armatus FIG.
13 R. bequaerti 58 Climate change and Rhipicephalus (Acari: Ixodidae) in Africa FIG.
14 R. capensis group FIG.
15 R. carnivoralis 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability A B 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability A B A B 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability A B 0.748–1.000 0.499–0.748 0.249–0.499 0.000–0.249 National boundaries Probability FIG.
16 R. complanatus FIG.
17 R. compositus FIG.
10–39 Continued
Research Article Research on Information Channel of Climate Change Risk Perception of Shaanxi People Si Wen Xue1,3,*, , Qi Zhou1,2,3 1College of Geography and Environment, Baoji College of Arts and Sciences, Baoji 721013, China 2Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Disaster Monitoring and Mechanism Simulation, Baoji College of Arts and Sciences, Baoji 721013, China 3Key Research Center of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics of Shaanxi Province (Baoji Base), Baoji 721013, China 1.
INTRODUCTION In the context of global climate change, major natural disasters happen frequently, and risks of climate change has further increased.
The public are not only the most extensive and direct disaster bearers of climate change risk events, but also the most specific executors of disaster prevention and mitigation policies [1,2].
People’s ability to perceive climate change risks greatly influences their response ability.
In other words, perception determines action [3].
An in-depth study of public climate change risk perception is an effective way to improve the public’s ability to cope with climate change risks and reduce their vulnerability [4,5].
It also has certain practical significance for the research on national climate change risk perception and response.
As scholars continue to deepen their research on climate change risk perception [6], climate change that attracts worldwide concern has gradually transformed into a scientific topic concerning the public.
In this process, due to differences in climate change risk perception and knowledge between scientists and the public, the dissemination of climate change information has become an important platform for communication between scientists and the public, which directly influences whether the public can achieve favorable communication with governments and scientists.
The dissemination channels and sources of climate change risk information determine whether people can accurately recognize climate change as a macro-abstract natural phenomenon, thereby influencing their attitudes and behaviors toward climate change risks.
Smith [7] held that media culture, technology and practice create the opportunity to enhance public’s understanding and identification of climate change risks.
Studies, such as by Maria Carmen Lemos, indicated that there is a gap between useful information understood by scientists and useful information recognized by users [8].
Hmielowski [9] also found through several studies that trust in scientists influences the use of news media, which in turn influences the understanding of global warming.
Lack of information was repeatedly identified by Archie [10], among others, as an obstacle to climate change adaptation planning and implementation.
Lynch [11], among others, suggested that the multiple utilization of communication tools will facilitate climate change science, as well as mitigation and adaptation policy formulation.
Carmichael and Brulle [12] using structural equation models showed that although media reports play an important role, they are largely the result of elite suggestion and economic factors [12].
Julia et al.
[13] noted that similar to six inter-American studies of global warming, different attitudes (the five Germanys of global warming) result in differences in understanding climate change, media use, and communication behavior.
John Wiley & Sons believed that key aspects of the communication process (including the purpose and scope of communication, the audience, the framework, the message, the messenger, the means and channels of communication, as well as the evaluation of the results and effectiveness of communication) influence climate change risk communication [14].
Moser and Dilling [15] found in their study that the lack of information and understanding explains the lack of public participation, so more information and explanations are needed to A RT I C L E I N F O Article History Received 26 December 2020 Accepted 29 March 2021 Keywords Shaanxi Province ANN neural network model CART decision tree model information channel of climate change risk perception A B S T R AC T We take Shaanxi Province as the research area, aiming at exploring the information channel or path of climate change risk perception of Shaanxi people.
It is desirable for us to carry out information channel or path classification of climate change risk perception based on survey data involving 5493 people in Shaanxi Province.
Firstly, we use a Back Propagation (BP) neural network method to fit the information path of climate change risk perception.
Secondly, a decision tree model is adopted to classify information channels of climate change risk perception.
The results show that 300 neurons are needed in the information channel of climate change risk perception of Shaanxi people.
The first path which influences climate change risk perception of Shaanxi people is as follows: indirect perception–direct perception–indirect perception–conductive perception.
The second path is indirect perception–conductive perception.
The third path is as below: indirect perception–direct perception–conductive perception, which also impacts climate change risk perception.
According to varying information channels or paths of climate change risk perception, the public can formulate different risk management strategies to improve the level of climate change risk perception.
© 2021 The Authors.
Published by Atlantis Press B.V.
This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
*Corresponding author.
Email: 1213268775@qq.com Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response Vol.
11(1); April (2021), pp.
36–44 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.210331.001; ISSN 2210-8491; eISSN 2210-8505 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0809-5185 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ mailto:1213268775%40qq.com?subject= https://doi.org/10.2991/jracr.k.210331.001 https://www.atlantis-press.com/journals/jracr S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 37 motivate people to take action.
Lazrus and et al.
[16] investigated in Florida how people express their vulnerability or activity in receiving, interpreting, and responding to hurricane risk information.
There are many types of researches on climate change policy influencing factors supported in the United States, but relatively few researches on individual climate change policy support.
For illustration, Dan M. Kahan et al.
[17] conducted studies in two countries (USA, n = 1500; United Kingdom, n = 1500) to test the potential value of a unique two-channel science communication strategy that combines information content (“Channel 1”) with cultural significance (“Channel 2”) and is chosen to promote open assessment of information from different communities.
Contrary to this hypothesis, we believed that subjects exposed to geoengineering information were concerned more about climate change risks than control conditions [17].
Xie et al.
[18] used recent climate change risk perception models to predict risk perception and willingness of Australians to engage in mitigation behavior (n = 921), and highlighted the influence of information emotion, cognition, and sociocultural factors on climate change risk perception.
Researches based on disaster event network data by Lin et al.
[19] not only explored the spread of disaster information in time and space, but also investigated in detail the public natural disaster perception.
Science and Technology Daily Reporter Hepeng [20] argued that compared with a large number of international counterparts, Chinese scholars paid little attention to the spread of climate change in the theme of communication.
Therefore, the spread of climate change is worth an urgent and serious study in China.
At present, research on climate change risk perception channels at home and abroad has achieved certain results, but in general the most urgent concern to domestic and foreign scholars is a specific report on climate change itself: namely an in-depth analysis of how media under the joint influence of social sciences and local governments rebuild a theoretical framework and a report of China’s climate change.
A few scholars have analyzed the dissemination channels of global climate change risk information from the public perspective by investigating climate change perception data, thereby proposing specific information dissemination types and formulating corresponding climate change risk management strategies [21].
According to research methods, structural equation model is the widely used one, and Artificial Neural Network (ANN) neural network is frequently adopted to fight climate change risk sensing channel.
The ANN neural network is a complex network structure formed by a large number of processing units.
It is an information processing system established by imitating the function of brain neural network structure, and composed of sensor units with a single-layer structure [22,23].
The unit can not only make most of the calculation and complete linear function, but also simulate the signal process of human brain nerve cells based on nonlinear expression ability according to nonlinear functions.
This method is close to the perception process of climate change risk information in this paper, can better simulate the human brain’s perception process of climate change risk information, and is more suitable for the study of the information channel of climate change risk perception.
Besides, the Classification And Regression Trees (CART) decision tree algorithm is a binomial tree model algorithm, which has the advantages of high precision and fast operation speed.
It supports discrete and continuous data and can be applied to classification and regression [24].
At the same time, the CART decision tree model is suitable to classify information channels of climate change risk perception and to locate factors influencing climate change risk perception.
On the other hand, Shaanxi Province suffers repeated meteorological disasters, including drought and frost, and a rainstorm to varying degrees will occur almost every year [25].
As a result, Shaanxi people are more sensitive to climate change risks and have conducted certain research [26].
Therefore, this paper will focus on the information channel of climate change risk perception, which is innovative in the field of climate communication.
This paper will mainly use the ANN neural network model to simulate the information channel of climate change risk perception in Shaanxi Province, and then use the CART decision tree model to study the major information channels that influence climate change risk perception of Shaanxi people.
Hopefully, the information channel classification of climate change risk perception will provide references for climate change risk management.
Meanwhile, with the information channel of climate change risk perception as a breakthrough point, different policy strategies will be proposed for different information channels.
2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 2.1.
Overview of the Research Area Shaanxi Province is located in the inland central part of China, with a total area of 205,600 km2 and a population of about 36 million.
There are various landforms, which can be divided into three types: the Loess Plateau in northern Shaanxi, the Guanzhong Plain and the mountains in southern Shaanxi [21].
It belongs to continental monsoon climate in general, and covers three climatic zones from south to north.
Specifically speaking, northern Shaanxi, Guanzhong and southern Shaanxi belong to the temperate zone, warm temperate zone and north subtropical zone respectively.
The annual precipitation is 275–1274 mm, increasing gradually from north to south with obvious precipitation differences.
The natural climates of the three landforms vary greatly.
With global warming ongoing, hydrothermal conditions are enhanced, and temperature and precipitation in Shaanxi are also enhanced.
Local heavy precipitation is frequent in summer and autumn.
Due to unique topographic and geomorphic conditions, the frequency and intensity of geological disasters are increased.
Especially in the Loess Plateau of northern Shaanxi and Qinba mountainous area of southern Shaanxi, mud-rock flows, wildfires and landslides occur frequently, causing huge loss of personnel and property.
Worse still, increased rainfall and rising temperature have also led to varying degrees of drought (Figure 1).
2.2.
Data Source and the Questionnaire Content From July 2018 to October 2020, and based on social survey of National Natural Science Foundation of China, the public in 10 prefecture-level cities in Shaanxi Province were visited and surveyed successively.
The field survey was mainly conducted in urban areas with large population increases and in rural households.
The interviewees were interviewed face to face by the random survey (Figure 1).
No guiding answers were given to the interviewees during the interview.
In the presence of older or less educated 38 S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 respondents, the interview was conducted with full explanation of the topic.
This investigation method also ensured authenticity and reliability of the data and laid a foundation for the follow-up research work.
To make the analysis results of the questionnaire truthful and reliable, after manually screening sample data from collected questionnaires, questionable questionnaires were screened out, such as blank questionnaires and questionnaires with inconsistent answers.
Then, we entered the sample data based on the remaining questionnaires.
First, we entered the sample data on the questionnaire into the excel table, and then imported data into SPSS25.0 for subsequent investigation and analysis.
Before analyzing data and results of the input questionnaire sample, first of all, options and results of questionnaire sample data were assigned.
Meanwhile, some missing values and outliers in answers of questionnaire sample were checked and modified or discarded to avoid possible errors in the experimental results.
After the initial manual screening, 277 questionnaires were discarded due to too many blank questions or abnormal answers.
Finally, investigators got 5493 valid questionnaires, and the recovery rate of valid sample questionnaires reached 91.1%.
According to previous methods and experience from other experts and scholars, sample size statistics should be about 10 times of the total number of variable samples in the multi-sample size statistics and analysis of the survey.
In this paper, 35 samples of final statistical indicators and 5493 valid samples were selected, which fully met the basic requirements for experience accumulation and judgment.
The statistical results of the basic characteristics of survey samples were listed in Table 1.
The main content of the questionnaire was based on the personal and family demographic characteristics of respondents, which could be divided into four parts.
The first consisted of basic demographic characteristics of respondents, including sex, age, living environment, educational level and occupation, mainly used to grasp the basic information on respondents, and to facilitate exploration of the relationship between demographic characteristics and various potential variables in the future.
The second was to examine people’s capacity to adapt to global climate change risks and economic conditions.
The third was the subjective perception of global climate change risks, including climate change disaster perception, exposure degree perception and vulnerability perception.
The fourth was composed of the public’s willingness to deal with climate change risks, knowledge of climate change risks, channels to obtain information about climate change risks, and daily behaviors to cope with climate change risks.
This paper mainly studied the information channels for people to deal with climate change risks.
All questionnaire options followed Likert’s five-level quantitative design (with some questions at four or seven levels).
In this way, index options could be uniformly assigned, and the simplicity of questionnaire could also be ensured to reduce troubles.
Figure 1 | Topographic map of Shaanxi Province.
Table 1 | Basic characteristics of the people surveyed Survey item Category Frequency Proportion (%) Educational level Primary school or below 650 11.83 Junior high school-bachelor 1174 21.37 High school or Technical secondary school 1359 24.74 Undergraduate or junior college 2124 38.67 Post-graduate 186 3.39 Monthly income 500 and below 2997 54.56 500–1000 1107 20.15 1001–2000 946 17.22 2001–3000 662 12.05 3001–5000 400 7.28 More than 5000 67 1.22 Sex Man 2631 47.90 Woman 2862 52.10 Occupation Animal husbandry and fishery 300 5.46 Production transportation work 383 6.46 Service industry or business 520 9.47 Government institution 580 10.56 Professional skill work 473 8.61 Medical staff 350 6.37 Teacher 557 10.14 Soldier 332 6.04 Self-employed worker 390 11.47 Student 630 6.01 Others 978 17.80 Age 15–25 1928 35.10 26–36 1384 25.20 37–47 1095 19.93 48–58 679 12.36 59–69 307 5.59 70–80 90 1.64 81–87 10 0.18 S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 39 2.3.
Research Methods 2.3.1.
Calculation of climate change risk perception index G W fi i i n =å (1) where G was the perception index; Wi was the weight coefficient of each factor obtained by entropy method (Table 2); i = 1, 2, 3; fi was the corresponding degree of information acquisition; the value range of fn was 1–10, and n = 1, 2, 3, ..., 5493.
2.3.2.
ANN neural network model and CART decision tree model The ANN neural network model consisted of input, hidden and output layers.
The number of neurons in the input layer depended on the number of independent variables.
It was believed that people’s information acquisition ways of climate change risks mainly were school education, radio and television, information from elders, friends and relatives, information from local governments, the Internet and mobile phones, previous personal experience, change of direct natural experience, popular science books and scientists, community emergency drill, and public welfare activities.
Therefore, the test data on these 10 variables were used as ANN input parameters of the constitutive model (Table 3).
The number of neurons in the output layer depended on the number of dependent variables, so the climate change risk perception index was chosen as an output parameter, and the number of hidden layers and neurons in each layer could be adjusted.
The aim was to reduce inefficiency in the learning process and to maintain convergence rate.
The CART classification tree model consisted of the root node, intermediate node and end node.
The average of classified variables in final node was a predicted value [27,28].
This paper mainly used the CART decision tree model to transform black box model of the ANN neural network into a white box model, revealing main information channels that influenced climate change risk perception.
3.
RESULT ANALYSIS 3.1.
Fitting Results of ANN Neural Network Model The ANN neural network model was used to fit public’s information channels of climate change risk perception in Shaanxi Province for many times.
When the number of hidden neurons was set as 100 and 200 respectively, the fitting degree R of the model was smaller than 0.5 in both cases.
When the number of hidden neurons was set as 300, R was about 0.61, with the highest accuracy of about 53.7% (Figures 2 and 3), and the error rate was about 0.42 < 0.5 (Figure 4), indicating that this model had a high degree Table 2 | Summary of weight calculation results by entropy method Item Information entropy Information utility value Weight coefficient (%) B1: Are you concerned about climate change risks?
0.9900 0.0100 46.53 B2: Do you think climate change risks are closely related to you?
0.9940 0.0050 26.83 B3: How do you think climate change risks will influence your region?
0.9940 0.0057 26.64 Table 3 | Statistical values of influencing factors and target variables in Shaanxi Item School education (1) Radio and television (2) Elders, relatives and friends (3) Local governments (4) Internet and mobile phones (5) Previous personal experience (6) Experience nature changes (7) Popular Science Books and Scientists (8) Community emergency drill (9) Public environmental welfare activities (10) Climate change risk perception index Average 4.564 4.914 4.267 4.883 4.701 4.421 4.217 4.333 3.92 3.905 2.101 The standard deviation 1.696 1.538 1.528 1.717 1.581 1.913 1.66 1.732 1.711 1.727 2.383 Standard error 0.022 0.02 0.02 0.022 0.02 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.03 Figure 2 | Fitting results of ANN neural network.
40 S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 of fitting and could better reflect the public’s climate change risk perception mechanism.
This meant that when 10 pieces of climate change risk perception information worked as input, 300 neurons would be called to perceive climate change risks.
There were many information channels affecting public perception of climate change risks, which needed to be analyzed in depth.
However, the ANN neural network could only roughly simulate information paths of climate change risk perception, but failed to reflect detailed information channels of climate change risk perception.
Therefore, to make this black-box model transparent, the CART decision tree model would be used next to calculate the information channel that influenced public’s climate change risk perception.
3.2.
Research on Information Channels of Climate Change Risk Perception First, taking the climate change risk perception index in Formula 1 as a dependent variable and the climate change risk information acquisition mode in Table 3 as an independent variable, 2874 training samples were selected and CART decision tree model was adopted for training.
As shown by the clustering results, information channels that affected public’s climate change risk perception could be divided into seven categories (Figure 5), and the classified AUC value was 0.54 > 0.5 (Figure 6), indicating that this model had a small error and could better reflect the information channels that affected public’s climate change risk perception.
Second, combining the clustering results of climate change risk perception information channels and the content of the questionnaire, the information channels of climate change risk perception could be summarized as follows (Table 4): indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception; indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception–local government information– conductive perception; indirect perception–conductive perception– scientific perception–local government notification; indirect perception–direct perception–third party notification–conductive perception; indirect perception–direct perception; indirect perception–conductive  perception–government notification; and indirect Figure 4 | Error rate of ANN neural network.
Figure 3 | Fitting degree of ANN neural network.
Figure 5 | Path classification results of climate change risk perception.
S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 41 perception–conductive perception.
Third, as shown in Table 4, indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception; indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception– local government information–conductive perception; indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception–local government notification; indirect perception–direct perception–third party notification–conductive perception; indirect perception– direct perception; indirect perception–conductive perception– government notification; and indirect perception–conductive perception paths accounted for 5.981%, 10.420%, 1.276%, 39.022%, 10.260%, 4.625% and 28.416% respectively.
This indicated that the information channel that most affected climate change risk perception was indirect perception–direct perception–third party notification–conductive perception, accounting for 39.022%; the second was indirect perception–conductive perception, taking up 28.416%; and the third was indirect perception–conductive perception– scientific perception–local government information–conductive perception, accounting for 10.420% (Figure 7).
This suggested that real knowledge came from practice, and that the channel of conductive perception was an important part of the process of people’s climate change risk perception.
Only by continuously personally experiencing or practicing climate change risk information, such as third-party notification, scientist notification, government notification could people’s climate change risk perception be enhanced.
Based on the above three typical information channels of climate change risk perception in Shaanxi Province, the public could make the following adjustments in managing climate change risks.
As for the indirect perception–direct perception–third party notification– conductive perception path, we had better strengthen the accuracy of radio and television notification and scientific nature of popular science books.
For indirect perception–conductive perception path, we should accumulate more practical experience and increase the number of direct experiences.
For indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception–local government information– conductive perception path, the public could organize more risk emergency drills to improve people’s conductive perception level, and then improve people’s climate change risk perception.
Also, we were supposed to ensure the accuracy of people’s second notification or information acquisition, to avoid interruption of communication, thus reducing people’s perception of climate change risks.
Finally, it was necessary to avoid perception bias and to achieve the accuracy of terminal recovery or the intermediate information conduction by reducing the interference of third-party notification.
4.
DISCUSSION The ANN neural network method could be used to promptly determine the number of information channels of people’s climate Figure 6 | ROC curve.
Table 4 | Classification of information channels of climate change risk perception Path Category of information channel 1 and 2 Indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception (5.981%) 3 Indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception–local government notification–conductive perception (10.420%) 4 Indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception–local government notification (1.276%) 5 and 6 Indirect perception–direct perception–third party notification–conductive perception (39.022%) 7 Indirect perception–direct perception (10.260%) 8 Indirect perception–conductive perception–government notification (4.625%) 9 Indirect perception–conductive perception (28.416%) 42 S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 change risk perception, because it was more objective than the traditional structural equation model in reflecting brain’s processing of climate change risk information.
The finding was consistent with the principle established by Guoru et al.
[29], who constructed a multi-layer perception model to analyze the factors that affected farmers’ climate change risk perception, when minimizing the prediction error of the target variable.
On the basis of the ANN neural network method, it was concluded that when the maximum fitting degree of ANN neural network model was 0.53, there were 300 hidden neurons in the risk perception process of climate change in Shaanxi Province, which was similar to the research results obtained by related scholars.
However, the ANN neural network method was a black-box model, and the intermediate path was not clear.
Therefore, we used the CART decision tree model to explore the main information channels that influenced public’s climate change risk perception in Shaanxi Province.
There were seven main information channels of climate change risk perception.
This may be related to the brain’s self-protection mechanism that processed up to seven pieces of information to protect the body from harm, which agreed with the conclusion by relevant scholars that there were five information channels of climate change risk perception [30].
The training accuracy of the CART decision tree model reached 54%, and the indirect perception–direct perception– third party notification–conductive perception path (39.022%) had the greatest influence on perception of climate change risks.
The second followed the indirect perception–conductive perception path (28.416%).
Finally, the indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception-local government notification– conductive perception path also had a major impact on climate change risk perception (10.420%).
In short, the conductive perception link was at the end of the climate change risk perception information channel, which was consistent with related studies believing that the conductive perception of community emergency drills had the greatest impact on the climate change risk perception index [31].
However, the first-end of climate change risk perception information channels was the indirect perception method Figure 7 | Information channels of climate change risk perception.
S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 43 in most cases.
This showed that mass media and communication exerted a greater impact on climate change risk perception, which was similar to the research results by some scholars [32–36].
These references confirmed the above conclusions in terms of mass media information, daily climate change risk events and agricultural activities, and the public’s trust in information sources.
The innovations of this paper were mainly reflected in the following three aspects.
First, based on the CART decision tree model, the paper not only located the main information channels influencing climate change risk perception, but also clearly classified information channels of climate change risk perception into seven categories.
Second, on the one hand, we created more innovative methods than the traditional weighting method or linear regression [37]; on the other hand, we made a breakthrough in content.
Ofoegbu and New [38] believed that information flow and exchange through organizational collaboration networks had a limited effect on improving farmers’ knowledge about climate risks, impacts and available risk response options.
Ponce de Leon [39] studied the effect of information on the evacuation of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, and found that according to the media and researchers, people did not have enough information about the storm, or did not understand the information given to them, and therefore did not evacuate, and that participants from different locations in the same municipality understood warning information differently.
Kalafatis et al.
[40] provided five sources of climate change information, leading interviewees to reflect on their experiences and to gain new knowledge from them; each interviewee described a reflection system, and increased attention to these tailored reflection systems offered a path to understanding how experiential learning could most effectively enhance climate change decision support.
The above-mentioned researches on the information paths of climate change risk perception have focused on the influence of information on climate change risk perception and on the theoretical level of climate change risk perception channel, but there are few researches on the internal mechanism and specific path or information channel of climate change risk perception.
Therefore, the study of the information channel simulation of climate change risk perception and internal mechanism in this paper was innovative to a certain extent, and could reasonably reveal the principle of climate change risk perception.
In other words, most scholars have failed to comprehensively consider factors that affect climate change risk perception from the perspective of the dissemination channels of climate change risk information.
And it was indicated that only through repeated practice and exercise could we enhance the climate change risk perception.
Third, the above conclusions had certain practical significance and application value.
People could take different measures to deal with climate change risks, according to different information channels of climate change risk perception in varied regions.
5.
CONCLUSION (1) There were 300 hidden neurons in the risk perception process of climate change in Shaanxi Province, showing that a lot of information channels affected climate change risk perception in Shaanxi Province.
(2) The indirect perception–direct perception–third party notification–conductive perception path (39.022%) had the greatest influence on the perception of climate change risks.
The second followed the indirect perception–conductive perception path (28.416%).
Finally, the indirect perception–conductive perception–scientific perception–local government notification– conductive perception path also had a huge impact on climate change risk perception (10.420%).
(3) We could formulate different strategies aimed at different information channels of climate change risk perception to improve people’s climate change risk perception level.
As for the indirect perception–direct perception–third party notification– conductive perception path, it was necessary to strengthen the accuracy of radio and television notification and popular science books.
For the indirect perception–conductive perception path, it was desirable to accumulate more direct experiences.
For the indirect perception–conductive perception– scientific perception–local government notification–conductive perception path, the public should participate in risk emergency drills actively and frequently.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest.
AUTHORS’ CONTRIBUTION SWX wrote all the contents of the manuscript and paid for the retouches.
QZ was responsible for only searching some references of the manuscript.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China for “Regional Climate Change Risk Perception and Response” (41771215).
The authors appreciate the time and effort spent by the editors and reviewers in providing constructive comments which have helped to improve the manuscript.
REFERENCES [1] Yifan J.
Differences in people’s cognition and response to earthquake disasters in Tibetan areas.
Qinghai province, China: Qinghai Normal University; 2015.
[2] Guiwu S, Zongjin M, Ruojia W, Yue W, Boyang D, Shuwei Z, et al.
The characteristics of people’s cognition and response to earthquake disaster in Wenchuan earthquake areas and the significance of publicity and education on disaster reduction — a case study of Deyang City, Sichuan Province.
Seismogeology 2008;30:877–94.
[3] Yifan J, Benyong W, Guiwu S, Haifeng Z, Lei S, Yang W. Preliminary analysis on the cognitive characteristics of earthquake disaster for government officials in Yushu, Qinghai.
Disaster Sci 2015;30:229–34.
[4] Wei D. Research on disaster risk perception of residents in Guangzhou.
Lanzhou city, China: Lanzhou University; 2014.
[5] Koresawa A. Government’s response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.
J Disaster Res 2012;7:517–27.
44 S.W.
Xui and Q. Zhou / Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 11(1) 36–44 [6] Yushuang W. Research on the coupling relationship between public perception of climate change and adaptation behavior in northern Shaanxi.
Northeast Normal University; 2015.
[7] Smith J.
Dangerous news: media decision making about climate change risk.
Risk Anal 2005;25:1471–82.
[8] Lemos MC, Kirchhoff CJ, Ramprasad V. Narrowing the climate information usability gap.
Nature Clim Change 2012;2:789–94.
[9] Hmielowski JD, Feldman L, Myers TA, Leiserowitz A, Maibach E. An attack on science?
Media use, trust in scientists, and perceptions of global warming.
Public Underst Sci 2014;23:866–83.
[10] Archie KM, Dilling L, Milford JB, Pampel FC.
Unpacking the ‘information barrier’: comparing perspectives on information as a barrier to climate change adaptation in the interior mountain West.
J Environ Manage 2014;133:397–410.
[11] Lynch AH, Tryhorn L, Abramson R. Working at the boundary: facilitating interdisciplinarity in climate change adaptation research.
Bull Am Meteorol Soc 2008;89:169–79.
[12] Carmichael JT, Brulle RJ.
Elite cues, media coverage, and public concern: an integrated path analysis of public opinion on climate change, 2001–2013.
Environ Polit 2017;26:232–52.
[13] Metag J, Füchslin T, Schäfer MS.
Global warming’s five Germanys: a typology of Germans’ views on climate change and patterns of media use and information.
Public Underst Sci 2017;26:434–51.
[14] Moser SC.
Communicating climate change: history, challenges, process and future directions.
WIREs Clim Change 2010;1:31–53.
[15] Bolton RE.
Americans and climate change: closing the gap between science and action.
J Plan Edu Res 2006;26:123–5.
[16] Lazrus H, Morrow BH, Morss RE, Lazo JK.
Vulnerability beyond stereotypes: context and agency in hurricane risk communication.
Weather Clim Soc 2012;4:103–9.
[17] Kahan DM, Jenkins-Smith H, Tarantola T, Silva CL, Braman D. Geoengineering and climate change polarization: testing a two-channel model of science communication.
Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 2015;658:192–222.
[18] Xie B, Brewer MB, Hayes BK, McDonald RI, Newell BR.
Predicting climate change risk perception and willingness to act.
J Environ Psychol 2019;65:101331.
[19] Lin GS, Qi Z, Mingjie L, Yanjun W, Sharecropper S, Guannan C, et al.
Spatio-temporal differentiation and influencing factors of new media users’ disaster cognition and response — a case study of Shouguang flood in Shandong.
Sci Disasters 2020;35:210–16.
[20] Hepeng J.
Global warming, science communication and public participation — analysis of the communication of climate change technology in China.
Popul Sci Res 2007;39–45.
[21] Yujie L. Information source, channel and content — research on climate communication strategies of Chinese people based on investigation.
Int Media 2013;35:67–83.
[22] Gardner MW, Dorling SR.
Artificial neural networks (the multilayer perceptron)—a review of applications in the atmospheric sciences.
Atmos Environ 1998;32:2627–36.
[23] Rosenblatt F. The perceptron: a probabilistic model for information storage and organization in the brain.
Psychol Rev 1958;65:386–408.
[24] Tao L. Analysis of enterprise communication activity based on CART decision tree.
Netw Secur Technol Appl 2020;53–4.
[25] Kegang W. China meteorological disasters of Shaanxi Province.
China: Meteorological Press; 2005.
[26] Yo-chuang Y, Qi Z, Chang-yan W. Temporal and spatial variation of people’s climate change perception in northern Shaanxi.
J Northwest Univ (Nat Sci Ed) 2011;41:134–8.
[27] Yuan-hui R, Wen G, Wei-qiang C, Yue-hong M. Research on economical and intensive benefits of construction land based on analytic hierarchy process — taking Shangqiu City as an example.
Chinese Agric Sci Bull 2016;32:87–91.
[28] Chunxin L, Tianwei L. Decision support and analysis technique for CART algorithm based on decision tree.
Comput Sci 2004;31:44–6.
[29] Guoru W, Xingmin S, Lifan S, Lu W, Huanjuan L. The diversity of farmers’ perception and adaptation behaviors of climate change in dry farming areas.
J Shaanxi Norm Univ (Nat Sci Ed) 2020;48: 116–24.
[30] Siwen X, Qi Z.
Research on the information channel of climate change risk perception in northern Shaanxi based on CART decision tree.
Henan Sci 2020;38:1641–9.
[31] Bigl B.
Stop the frack!
Exploring the media’s portrayal of the social representation of an anti-fracking protest at the Baltic Sea.
Environ Commun 2020;14:271–86.
[32] Bo C. Research on the impact of climate change media information framework on public risk perception and behavior will.
Nanjing City, China: Nanjing University; 2019.
[33] Lingyun W. The impact of media sources and information balance on climate change risk perception: research based on experiments.
Zhejiang University; 2018.
[34] Fleming K, Abad J, Booth L, Schueller L, Baills A, Scolobig A, et al.
The use of serious games in engaging stakeholders for disaster risk reduction, management and climate change adaption information elicitation.
Int J Disaster Risk Reduction 2020;49: 101669.
[35] Hesam M, Roshan G, Grab SW, Shabahrami AR.
Comparative assessment of farmers’ perceptions on drought impacts: the case of a coastal lowland versus adjoining mountain foreland region of northern Iran.
Theor Appl Climatol 2021;143:489–503.
[36] Vainio A, Paloniemi R, Varho V. Weighing the risks of nuclear energy and climate change: trust in different information sources, perceived risks, and willingness to pay for alternatives to nuclear power.
Risk Anal 2017;37:557–69.
[37] Xingmin S. Research progress on public perception and adaptation to climate change.
Water Soil Conserv Bull 2016;36:25.
[38] Ofoegbu C, New M. The role of farmers and organizational networks in climate information communication: the case of Ghana.
Int J Clim Change Strat Manage 2021;13:19–34.
[39] Ponce de Leon IZ.
Of warnings and waiting: an examination of the path of information for two communities hit by Typhoon Haiyan.
J Risk Res 2020;23:598–612.
[40] Kalafatis SE, Neosh J, Libarkin JC, Whyte KP, Caldwell C. Experiential learning processes informing climate change decision support.
Weather Clim Soc 2019;11:681–94.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00693.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00693.x https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1614 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1614 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662513480091 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662513480091 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662513480091 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.12.015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.12.015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.12.015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.12.015 https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-89-2-169 https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-89-2-169 https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-89-2-169 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2016.1263433 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2016.1263433 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2016.1263433 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662515592558 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662515592558 https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662515592558 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.11 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.11 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.11 https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456x06292375 https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456x06292375 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-12-00015.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-12-00015.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-12-00015.1 https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214559002 https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214559002 https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214559002 https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214559002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2019.101331 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2019.101331 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2019.101331 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1352-2310(97)00447-0 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1352-2310(97)00447-0 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1352-2310(97)00447-0 https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042519 https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042519 https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042519 https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2019.1651367 https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2019.1651367 https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2019.1651367 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101669 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101669 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101669 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101669 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101669 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-020-03432-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-020-03432-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-020-03432-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-020-03432-9 https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12640 https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12640 https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12640 https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12640 https://doi.org/10.1108/ijccsm-04-2020-0030 https://doi.org/10.1108/ijccsm-04-2020-0030 https://doi.org/10.1108/ijccsm-04-2020-0030 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2019.1592212 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2019.1592212 https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2019.1592212 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-19-0002.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-19-0002.1 https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-19-0002.1
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 110 Climate change mitigation and agriculture: measures, costs and policies – A literature review Lankoski Jussi1, Lötjönen Sanna2 and Ollikainen Markku2 1OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate, Agricultural and Resource Policies Division, 2 rue Andre Pascal, 75116 Paris, France 2Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, P.O.
Box 27, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland e-mail: markku.ollikainen@helsinki.fi We review the literature on climate change mitigation in agriculture with a focus on the use of climate policy instruments to incentivize the adoption of greenhouse gas mitigation measures.
We develop an economic model characterizing the production decisions in animal and crop production farms and link our discussion on policy instruments to them.
We review mitigation measures and their cost-effectiveness in reducing emissions.
Given the multiple sources of agricultural emissions, the literature finds carbon taxes and emissions trading to perform best.
The challenges involved in measuring and verifying changes in emissions make the implementation of policies targeting all sources of emissions difficult.
Second-best policies addressing a subset of emissions, such as those from ruminants or mineral fertilizers, are more feasible but less efficient.
Carbon sequestration in arable soils, while technically promising, faces the problems of heterogeneity in sequestration capacity, measurement, verification and permanence of sequestration.
The variation of estimates on emissions reduction, abatement costs and differences in model simulations is large.
A better basis for policy designs is needed.
Key words: GHG emissions, carbon sinks, enteric fermentation, carbon tax, emissions trading, abatement subsidy Introduction Agriculture as a sector contributes substantially to climate change.
Annual direct emissions from agriculture were approximately 5.0–5.8 GtCO 2 eq (carbon dioxide equivalent) during the period 2000–2010, representing 11% of the global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which amount to 49 GtCO 2 eq (Smith et al.
2014).
Land use and land use change are responsible for an additional 4.3–5.5 GtCO 2 eq of annual emissions during this period, much of which stems from agriculture (Smith et al.
2014).
The total annual contribution of the agriculture, forestry and land use (AFOLU) sector to global emissions is 10–12 GtCO 2 eq, representing 24% of global emissions.
The main direct agricultural GHG emissions are nitrous oxide (N 2 O) emissions from soils, fertilizers, and manure from grazing animals and methane (CH 4 ) emissions stemming from ruminants and paddy rice cultivation.
Both GHGs have a significantly higher global warming potential than carbon dioxide (CO 2 ).
Of all agricultural direct nonCO 2 emissions, 80% are from livestock, with ruminants accounting for more than 80% of the total livestock emissions (Havlik et al.
2014).
Given that poultry and swine husbandry play a minor role in GHG emissions compared to livestock, in this review, we focus solely on ruminants and crop production.
The global human population is projected to increase by 2 billion by 2050, most of which will occur in developing countries with relatively high income elasticities for food demand.
As a consequence, food demand could increase by more than 70%, even under the assumption of moderately high income growth (Blandford and Hassapoyannes 2018).
The demand for emissions-intensive livestock products is projected to rise more rapidly than the demand for crop products.
This could increase the share of animal products in human diets and livestock and crop production by 80% and 48%, respectively, by 2050.
Estimates suggest that this development will increase agricultural non-CO 2 emissions by 76% relative to 1995 levels (Havlík et al.
2014, Bennetzen et al.
2016).
GHG mitigation potential in the agriculture sector can generally be decomposed into technical, economic, and socially and politically constrained potential (OECD 2019).
The technical potential is defined as the maximum mitigation possible with the full implementation of all available mitigation options and ignoring all barriers to adoption.
The economic potential indicates the costs and benefits of different mitigation measures showing mitigation potential for a given carbon price.
Political and social barriers restrict the use of mitigation measures and are related to possible adverse distributional impacts of policy options (Wreford et al.
2017, OECD 2019).
Manuscript received October 2019 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 111 The global technical mitigation potential of the agriculture sector in 2030 is estimated to be 5500–6000 MtCO 2 eq yr-1, with a 95% confidence interval around this mean value of 300–11400 MtCO 2 eq yr-1 (Smith 2012).
This estimate is based on the maximum use of available emissions reduction and soil carbon sequestration measures.
Regarding the global economic potential, the Assessment Report of the IPCC, drawing on results from a number of studies (Smith et al.
2008, Golub et al.
2009, McKinsey and Company 2009, Rose et al.
2012), found that emission reductions for agriculture of 0.03–2.6 GtCO 2 eq are possible at USD 50 per ton of CO 2 eq and reductions of 0.2–4.6 GtCO 2 eq at USD 100 per ton of CO 2 eq in 2030 (Smith et al.
2014).
A recent partial equilibrium assessment by Frank et al.
(2018) calculated the non-CO 2 mitigation potential in 2030 as 1 GtCO 2 eq at USD 25 per ton of CO 2 eq and as 2.6 GtCO 2 eq in 2050 at USD 100 per ton of CO 2 eq.
The global potential for soil carbon sequestration is estimated to be high but exhibits considerable uncertainty.
Smith (2016) reports the mean global potential for carbon sequestration in agricultural soils as 1.5 GtCO 2 yr-1 and 2.6 GtCO 2 yr-1, at carbon prices of USD 20 per ton of CO 2 eq and USD 100 per ton of CO 2 eq, respectively.
Barriers to the uptake of all technical and economic GHG mitigation potential in the agriculture sector are plentiful.
Wreford et al.
(2017) identify as a farm-level barrier the actual or perceived lack of financial benefits from the adoption of mitigation measures and as a national-level barrier the actual or perceived effects of mitigation measures on production.
Additionally, insufficient information and education, transaction costs, and social and cultural factors may turn out to be significant barriers to the adoption of mitigation practices (Wreford et al.
2017).
Using interviews and workshops, Kipling et al.
(2019) identified the following barriers and challenge categories for Welsh livestock production: practical limitations, knowledge limitations, interests and cognitive limitations.
Climate policy is now entering agriculture at a larger scale.
This change raises the key question of how to create proper incentives and overcome barriers to the adoption of abatement measures.
Defining the most effective measures and their costs is crucial for choosing economic instruments to promote the reduction of emissions and to increase agricultural carbon sinks.
The marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) approach has been widely used to compile information on the costs and mitigation potential of GHG mitigation measures.
Eory et al.
(2018) review the current state and future projections of using GHG MACCs in agriculture and identify the key limitations or challenges related to their use: how to set system boundaries, choose measures, find data, and define the baseline and possible co-benefits and tradeoffs of the selected measures.
They also suggest the use of different incentives depending on the chosen measures ranging from providing knowledge to cost-negative measures to financial support for high-cost measures and mandatory requirements.
The abovementioned reviews do not, however, specifically focus on the use of climate policy instruments.
Additionally, Jones et al.
(2013), who review bioenergy, conservation programs and R&D as means to mitigate GHG emissions from agriculture in the US, focus on policy programs, not on policy instruments.
Thus, an extensive review on the use of climate policy instruments is missing.
The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature.
Our survey is on the use and impacts of climate policy instruments in agriculture.
We believe that this discussion is missing from the literature.
The earlier review-type papers (e.g., Gonzales-Ramirez et al.
2012, Jones et al.
2013, MacLeod et al.
2015, Eory et al.
2018) focus more on measures and costs but discuss policy instruments in a more passive or narrow way.
We discuss measures and their efficiency in reducing GHG emissions.
We pay special attention to how they affect crop and animal production, as they are sources of different GHGs requiring the use of different mitigation measures.
We outline a heuristic economic model characterizing the production decisions in animal and crop production farms and show how the use of alternative climate policy instruments would enter a private farmer’s profit function.
Furthermore, we link our discussion of mitigation measures and policy instruments to the production lines and interactions between them.
While our discussion of climate policy instruments is general, we mostly rely on data from boreal and temperate agriculture.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section two presents the heuristic economic model for guiding our review and discussion of mitigation measures and policy instruments.
Section three focuses on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of potential mitigation measures in crop and animal production.
The fourth section discusses policy instruments to promote the adoption of mitigation measures and challenges related to the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of GHG emissions reductions.
A final section summarizes our findings.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 112 Mitigation from an economic and policy angle: a framework The main production lines of agriculture are, in broad terms, crop production and livestock production, which includes milk and beef production.
In crop production, the management unit is a land parcel, and the key choices comprise the allocation of land to cultivated crops, the choice of a tillage method, and fertilizer use.
Livestock production differs from crop production in many ways: 1) the primary production unit is the production animal, with arable farmland mostly playing a supporting role of providing animal feed, and 2) the production and use of manure.
Manure is a costly byproduct and, at the same time, a valuable source of fertilizer for crops.
The high cost of manure transportation affects decisions on its use.
In mixed crop and livestock farms, manure is used as a fertilizer in the fields, and it is possibly augmented by mineral fertilizers.
Provided that nutrient content in manure can be impacted by changing animal diet, manure creates a link between decisions concerning livestock and cultivation.
Once this link is missing, livestock production and cultivation become entirely separate production lines (see Lötjönen et al.
2020 for the proof).
Our focus here is on linking agricultural decision-making in crop and livestock production to GHG emissions and showing how private farmers can be impacted by climate policies.
We adopt our approach from Lötjönen et al.
(2020).
Model setup Key sources of GHG emissions from livestock are enteric fermentation and manure management, both emitting CH 4 (Gerber et al.
2013).
Manure storage and spreading cause N 2 O emissions.
Additionally, during manure storage and spreading, some nitrogen (N) evaporates as ammonia (NH 3 ), which is not a GHG, but part of the NH 3 transforms into indirect N 2 O emissions.
Volatilized N reduces manure N content and thus affects cultivation decisions.
Additionally, spreading technology and diet slightly impact GHG emissions.
From the cultivation side, feed production causes significant amounts of emissions (Gerber et al.
2013).
GHG sources from crop production include soil emissions (CO 2 and N 2 O), emissions from mineral fertilizer production and application, and the use of machinery.
We outline our framework in a simple way with the help of Figure 1, which focuses on milk and beef production and shows the links between crop and livestock production and the key points of decision-making.
In the absence of climate policies, private farmers neglect the climate impacts of production.
These decisions are illustrated in Figure 1 by rectangles covering diet, output and manure management.
Diet consists of concentrate feed and silage.
Manure is stored and spread on fields (and if needed, mineral fertilizer is also bought).
Ovals indicate how GHG impacts relate to private production decisions, as explained above.
We now take a step forward and provide a heuristic analytical framework to facilitate our discussion of measures and especially economic instruments.
This framework is a shortened and simplified version of the full livestock model developed by Lötjönen et al.
(2020).
Let H denote the number of livestock and ΩH the net revenue from selling livestock products (milk or beef), while i(H) denotes investment and other costs from barn, manure management and other facilities.
Denote revenue from silage and cereal cultivation by Πs and Πc, respectively.
To keep the discussion general, we omit a more detailed description of cultivation.
The private revenue from livestock production is given by Fig.
1.
Livestock production and GHG emissions.
Modified from: Lötjönen et al.
(2020).
CH4+ N2O fermentation CH4 enteric Beef or milk yield (NH3), manure management Diet Manure storage N2O + CO2 soil and Silage cultivation cultivation practices Barley cultivation CO2, fertilizer manufacture Mineral fertilizer Manure spreading Exported manure Concentrate feed Manure excretion AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 113 (1a) The first bracket denotes the net revenue from animal production, and the second bracket denotes profits from crop production (s denotes silage and c cereal crops).
The net revenue per animal is a function of concentrate feed intake v, which determines the diet.
Revenue from cultivation is a function of applied nitrogen, N [its source being either manure, m(r), or mineral fertilizer, l(r)] application at distance r, and the critical radius, that is, the outer limit from the farm center for silage cultivation rs.
Fertilization, land allocation, and diet with herd size H constitute the decision variables in the model.
We next develop the social perspective on private farmers’ decisions.
Let E denote the GHG emissions from enteric fermentation and manure storage per animal unit and es and ec denote GHG emissions from crop production, silage and cereals, respectively (including emissions related to soil and fertilization with both manure and mineral fertilizers).
We postulate a (constant) marginal valuation of climate damage from GHG emissions and denote it by d .
Then, we can express social welfare from livestock production as shown in equation (1b).
(1b) Equation (1b) provides the key points on which climate policy instruments should be levied: GHG emissions from enteric fermentation and manure, soil emissions and emissions from the use of mineral fertilizers.
In the next two sections, we provide the optimality conditions for the maximization of private profits (1a) and social welfare (1b).
A comparison of private and social optima indicates the potential entry points for climate policy instruments.
In the fourth section concerning policy instruments, we discuss in detail through which channels the alternative instruments work.
Decisions in animal production Decisions in animal production entail the choice of herd size and associated investments in barns and manure storage and the choice of diet.
Production also involves some choices of technologies, such as manure storage (covered with different materials or uncovered).
Unlike other decisions, these are discrete choices.
The socially and privately optimal herd sizes, derived from equations (1a) and (1b), are determined by the equality of marginal revenues and marginal costs, as equations (2a) for society and (2b) for private farmers suggest: (2a) (2b) .
As society accounts for the climate impacts from enteric fermentation and manure storage and application, the socially optimal herd size is smaller than the private one.
The implication of equations (2a)–(2b) for the use of policy instruments is clear: in the absence of abatement possibilities, instruments should reduce herd size.
Inventing abatement technologies to reduce CH 4 emissions would allow for higher animal numbers.
The optimal diet is determined by the choice of concentrate feed, v, which in turn determines the (possibly) required silage use through the properties of the intake function (not discussed here).
Additionally, diet affects the nutrient content and amount of manure excreted, and this connects the optimal choices in diet and cultivation.
The optimality conditions for the social (3a) and private (3b) choices are as follows (subscripts denote derivatives): (3a) (3b) Interestingly, the choice of concentrate feed impacts at the margin not only animal production and associated feeding costs but also drives both silage and manure stocks (see Lötjönen et al.
2020 for details).
This marginally affects the profits from silage and cereal cultivation.
Equation (3a) illustrates how complicated optimal climate policy in the agriculture sector could actually be.
Ideally, policy instruments should impact diet, as it impacts GHG emissions both directly and indirectly via land allocation and fertilization decisions.
Assessment of the magnitude (𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + [Π𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + Π𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐] = 0, 𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + [Π𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + Π𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐] = 0.
𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0, 𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) = 0.
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = [𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)] + [Π𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)) + Π𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟))].
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 = [𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻)] + [Π𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)) − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + Π𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)) − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐] AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 114 of the diet’s impact on enteric fermentation, land allocation and fertilization plays a crucial role in defining the need to control diet with policy instruments.
If the impact of concentrate feed on manure nutrients is absent (or very small), the cultivation decisions are separate from animal production decisions.
Now, equation (3a) for society and (3b) for private farmers reduce to (4a) (4b) This illustrates the case where crop production and animal production are separable and both are optimized separately with one condition – that there must be enough silage for the herd.
However, again, the choice of diet should be part of ideal climate policy, as it affects methane emissions from enteric fermentation.
Decisions in crop production Typical decisions in crop production entail the choice of crops, fertilization, land allocation and tillage methods.
The tillage method is a discrete technology choice, while the others are continuous.
The optimal fertilizer application in each location entails the choice between mineral and manure fertilizers and their optimal rate of application.
For society, the latter is determined by the equality of the value of the marginal product to the marginal social costs of the fertilizer comprising the input costs and the sum of the marginal climate damages.
Mineral fertilizer has a constant unit cost (price) with a slightly increasing application cost with distance, while for manure, the transport cost clearly increases with distance.
The critical radius for manure application, rm, defines the optimal distance at which the farmer shifts from manure to mineral fertilizer application.
The determination of the switching point requires some calculation (see Lötjönen et al.
2020), but it can be formulated rather simply for both society (5a) and private farmers (5b): (5a) (5b) where a denotes manure transportation and application costs, C the cost of exporting manure from the farm, ei (with i = s,c) cultivation-related emissions from silage and cereal cultivation, pl the mineral fertilizer price, and θN and εN represent the manure and mineral fertilizer N contents, respectively.
As manure and mineral fertilizer are perfect substitutes in crop production, they are not used jointly; the lowest-cost fertilizer is always chosen.
On field parcels close to the farm center, manure is applied exclusively until the switching point, where mineral fertilizer becomes less costly.
Beyond this, mineral fertilizer is applied exclusively, while the optimal N application rate is equal for both fertilizers at the critical radius.
As a result, the N application rate is always higher on parcels under manure fertilization, except at the point of indifference.
This holds true for both private and social solutions.
In any case, climate policy should account for the GHG emissions from fertilization giving grounds, for instance, for taxing nitrogen applications, as we shall see in the fourth section discussing policy instruments.
Finally, land is allocated over the gradient from the farm center between the crops according to their profitability.
Silage is more profitable closer to the farm center due to its increasing transport cost, but there is a distance at which cereal crops become equally profitable according to equation (6a) for society and (6b) for private farmers: (6a) (6b) Given that the net GHG emissions from soils are higher for cereal production due to the lack of soil cover, the social optimum (6a) entails a larger land area allocated to silage than the private optimum (6b).
(𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0, 𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0. 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶+𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙+𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝛱𝛱𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛱𝛱𝛱𝛱𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 𝛱𝛱𝛱𝛱𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛱𝛱𝛱𝛱𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 115 First-best policy for animal and crop production Equations (1a) – (6b) demonstrate that the privately and socially optimal decisions in both livestock and crop production differ.
Society accounts for climate impacts, whereas private farmers neglect them in the absence of policies.
This is reflected in larger herd size, higher use of concentrates, higher fertilizer intensity and land allocation and calls for climate policies that should change private decisions in livestock and crop production towards the social optimum.
In general, the optimal first-best climate policy for agriculture entails a uniform carbon tax, t, equal to the marginal climate damage, levied on all sources of GHG emissions, as shown by equation (7): (7) Under this tax, private farmers have incentives to reduce all GHG emissions – provided that all emissions can be measured and decisions can be monitored.
In practice, this may be difficult due to incomplete and asymmetric information.
Therefore, much of the literature focuses on second-best policies targeting one or some sources of GHG emissions.
Equation (7) and the above analysis have identified a number of entry points at which policy instruments should impact farmers’ behavior: herd size and the means of abating CH 4 emissions, the choice of diet, and the use of manure and mineral fertilizers.
These choices impact the land allocation between crops and thereby soil emissions.
The second-best instruments levied on herd size, diet or fertilization will impact land allocation only indirectly.
To tailor second-best policies, society needs to have an understanding of the mitigation measures available for farming and their costs and possible co-benefits.
Drawing on this information, policies may relate to inputs, production animals or (discrete) technologies.
We first focus on measures and their impacts on emissions and associated costs and then turn to policy instruments.
Measures to mitigate climate impacts of crop and livestock production Many GHG mitigation options are readily available for crop and livestock production, including reducing nitrogen fertilizer use, adopting reduced or no-till methods, the conversion of arable land to grassland, changing livestock diet and adopting manure management technologies that reduce GHG emissions (MacLeod et al.
2015).
However, only a few of these options belong to the so-called win-win solutions, meaning that they increase farm profits while reducing GHG emissions.
Thus, the adoption of climate measures typically requires policy instruments or markets that incentivize and accelerate their uptake, which we will discuss separately later in this paper.
Mitigation measures By adopting mitigation measures, a private farmer can reduce agricultural emissions and climate damage and, for instance, avoid carbon taxes in equation (7).
Starting with livestock, a reduction in herd size is an extreme measure that impacts emissions directly by lowering CH 4 emissions from enteric fermentation and indirectly by affecting emissions related to feed production and manure management.
Altering the share of concentrates in the diet may increase or decrease emissions from enteric fermentation depending on the starting point.
Increasing concentrate intake from the privately optimal value of 16.09 kgDM day-1 reduces CH 4 emissions in Lötjönen et al.
(2020; calculated based on Statistics Finland 2016).
Adding fats to the diet decreases CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation; a 1% increase in fat intake reduces CH 4 emissions by approximately 4% (MacLeod et al.
2015).
Covering manure storage decreases CH 4 emissions but increases direct N 2 O emissions; however, the overall effect is a slight reduction in CO 2 eq emissions (based on IPCC 2006, Grönroos 2014, Statistics Finland 2016).
Injection technology for manure application clearly reduces the amount of N evaporated as NH 3 relative to broadcast spreading (40% of manure N evaporates as NH 3 with broadcast spreading, while only 9% of manure N evaporates with injection; Grönroos 2014).
The impacts on N 2 O emissions between application measures are mixed, although it seems that injection spreading increases N 2 O emissions (Webb et al.
2010, Duncan et al.
2017).
The importance of spreading technology stems mostly from water protection, as injection reduces P runoff by approximately 80% compared to broadcast spreading (Uusi-Kämppä and Heinonen-Tanski 2008).
Additionally, the lower NH 3 volatilization with injection spreading may provide economic incentives for the farmer to use the technology.
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 = [𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺)] + [Π𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + Π𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐].
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 116 A measure that goes beyond agriculture towards energy production is manure, which, with other organic materials, can be converted into biogas with anaerobic digestion.
This technology reduces CH 4 emissions from manure storage by capturing most of the emissions and transforming them into CO 2 (MacLeod et al.
2015).
Additional indirect emission savings stem from replacing fossil-based energy with renewable biogas, for instance, in road transport, but only if this substitution actually takes place.
The volume of emissions saved is largely dependent on, for example, manure storage technology and temperature.
In crop production, reducing mineral fertilization decreases both emissions from fertilizer manufacturing and soil N 2 O emissions due to fertilization.
Fertilization increases yields, which creates more crop residues and potentially increases soil carbon, but this effect does not outweigh emissions from manufacturing and soil N 2 O.
Precision application of fertilizers decreases N 2 O emissions from soils through the reduction of N fertilizer overapplication (ICF 2013).
Buffer strips and wider buffer zones sequester carbon in the roots of the perennial plants and reduce land for cultivation; thus, cultivation-related emissions are avoided provided the lost land area is not cleared somewhere else (Lal 2004, Ervola et al.
2012).
Buffer strips additionally reduce N from runoff water, which indirectly reduces N 2 O from leaching.
Leguminous crops and legumes in crop rotations reduce the need for fertilization, both in the current and the following cultivation period, as legumes fix nitrogen biologically from the air (Dequiedt and Moran 2015).
Thus, emissions from fertilizer manufacture and fertilization-related soil emissions are reduced.
Additionally, soil emissions from legume cultivation are estimated to be lower than, for example, those in cereal cultivation (Lötjönen and Ollikainen 2017; based on Heikkinen et al.
2013 and Regina et al.
2013).
A cover crop is a fast-growing crop cultivated at the same time as, or between plantings of, a main crop.
Catch crops are a special type of cover crop cultivated for utilizing surplus nitrogen remaining after harvest of the main crop, and thus, they reduce N losses from the soil.
Cover crops mitigate GHG emissions mainly by increasing the soil organic carbon (SOC) content (MacLeod et al.
2015).
Catch crops have a marked potential to reduce indirect N 2 O emissions from N leaching, as they can reduce leaching by as much as 50% (Valkama et al.
2015).
Conventional tillage is a tillage method that includes multiple soil disturbances, such as plowing and harrowing.
Under no-till, the crops are directly sown without plowing.
The effect of the tillage method varies across climate regions and soil types and across soil depths.
In temperate regions, GHGs are estimated to decrease with minimum tillage and no-till (Meurer et al.
2018), but for example, in boreal regions, conventional tillage reduces GHGs in clay and loam soils (Ervola et al.
2012).
However, several studies argue that the sequestration potential of notill is often overestimated (see, e.g., Powlson et al.
2014, Meurer et al.
2018, Ogle et al.
2019).
In a review covering temperate and continental climates, Meurer et al.
(2018) find that the effect of reduced tillage practices on SOC was limited to topsoil and that many studies neglect deeper soil layers.
Powlson et al.
(2014) remark that the increased C in topsoil may result from redistribution of C from deeper soil layers.
They also stated that even periodic tillage would largely reduce the benefits gained from prior application of no-till.
We conclude that the literature offers support to the argument that no-till promotes carbon sequestration in temperate and continental climates, but this support is tepid at best.
In a boreal climate, the effect is the opposite.
Nitrification inhibitors reduce soil N 2 O emissions by slowing the conversion rate of nitrogen fertilizer ammonium to nitrate (Moran et al.
2008).
As a result, the rate of conversion of nitrate to nitrous oxide decreases, and emissions of nitrous oxide decrease.
Possible tradeoffs with nitrification inhibitors include an increase in NH 3 emissions (Kim et al.
2012) and the contamination of products (Chen et al.
2014).
Residue management refers to the incorporation of straw into the soil.
In temperate regions, this increases soil organic matter and positively affects both nutrient cycling and carbon sequestration to the soil (McVittie et al.
2014).
Green fallowing reduces soil emissions, and cultivation-related emissions are avoided (Ervola et al.
2012).
Table 1 condenses the impacts of these measures on the three main GHGs in boreal agriculture.
Note that we include direct impacts of the measures only (e.g., reduction in herd size reduces manure excretion, but we do not account for reduced land area for feed production).
In Table 1, “0” means no impact, a plus an increase, and a minus a decrease in emissions.
Not surprisingly, most measures in livestock management impact CH4, while crop production impacts show up in CO 2 and N 2 O.
The next question is how costly the adoption of these measures actually is and by what instruments adoption can be achieved.
We discuss these issues next.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 117 Cost-effectiveness of climate measures A single measure or a combination of measures can be used to mitigate GHG emissions.
Given that each of them is costly, it is important to define how much private costs increase with a higher emissions reduction, i.e., with a higher abatement level.
The answer to this question is given by marginal abatement cost functions, which have received considerable attention in the literature.
The literature has derived marginal abatement cost curves by employing multiple methods, including bottom-up cost engineering, microeconomic modeling with exogenous prices, and equilibrium models with endogenous prices (MacLeod et al.
2015).
The choice of methodology affects the cost estimates of mitigation measures.
Vermont and de Cara (2010) use a meta-analysis to show that the GHG mitigation costs provided by equilibrium models are consistently lower than those of supply-side microeconomic models.
This is partly explained by the high degree of flexibility in resource allocation that the equilibrium models provide.
However, price effects from markets may increase the opportunity costs of mitigation and thereby also the abatement cost estimates provided by equilibrium models.
Moreover, at low emission prices (EUR 10 tCO2eq-1), the abatement rates of supply-side microeconomic models are 60% lower than those given by cost engineering approaches.
This difference declines with higher emission prices and implies that the most abatement potential reported in engineering approaches comes from practices with low or even negative costs.
We now review the cost-effectiveness figures of the agricultural mitigation measures found in the literature.
For abatement measures in dairy production, we report the reduction in GHG emissions per livestock unit (LU), and for crop production, we report the reduction per hectare and then divide these by the associated cost.
Technically, this gives the unit cost of abatement and allows for a comparison of the cost-effectiveness of measures.
We focus our discussion on boreal agriculture but collect figures from temperate regions to allow for comparison.
In dairy production, the cost-effectiveness estimates of abatement measures vary greatly within and between measures.
Decrease of dairy herd size, that is, reducing dairy cow numbers would provide a large reduction in GHG emissions stemming from enteric fermentation and manure management, but the costs would also be high due to the reduced milk yield (Lötjönen et al.
2020).
Among possible abatement measures, for fat supplementation, + = GHGs increased; – = GHGs decreased; 0 = GHGs are not affected by the measure; ?= the result is not clear; CO 2 = carbon dioxide; N 2 O = nitrous oxide; CH4 = methane 1Based on Lötjönen et al.
(2020), Ervola et al.
(2012, 2018), Valkama et al.
(2015), Lötjönen and Ollikainen (2017), MacLeod et al.
(2015), and McVittie et al.
(2014).2Estimates for temperate regions show a reduction in GHGs from a shift to minimum tillage or no-till (McVittie et al.
2014) Table 1.
Mitigation measures directly affecting GHGs and the direction of change in clay soil for each pollutant in boreal agriculture Dairy management CO 2 N 2 O CH 4 Herd size (reduction) – – – Diet (increasing the share of concentrates from a private optimum) 0 0 – Diet (fat supplementation) 0 0 – Manure storage (shift from no to floating cover) 0 + – Manure spreading (shift from broadcast to injection) 0 ?
0 Anaerobic digestion 0 0 – Crop production Fertilization (reduction) – – 0 Precision nutrient application 0 – 0 Buffer strips (increasing width) – 0 0 Legumes in crop rotations – – 0 Catch crops – – 0 Cover crops – – 0 Tillage method (shift from conventional to no-till)2 + + 0 Nitrification inhibitors 0 – 0 Residue management (straw incorporation) – – 0 Green fallow – – – AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 118 the cost estimates vary from approximately EUR 137 to 335 tCO2eq-1 (Bates et al.
2009, Pellerin et al.
2013).
Covering open manure storage with a floating cover reduces GHG emissions modestly at a relatively high cost (Lötjönen et al.
2020).
The cost-effectiveness of anaerobic digestion is dependent on the type of digester.
With a centralized digester, the costs of a 90% reduction in GHG emissions vary from negative numbers to more than EUR 100 tCO2eq-1 (Bates et al.
2009).
Table 2 collects the cost-effectiveness estimates in dairy production.
Turning to crop production, reduction rates and unit costs differ considerably, with leguminous crops being quite attractive at a cost below EUR 20 tCO 2 eq-1 (Pellerin et al.
2013).
Even more attractive is winter wheat with minimum tillage, which according to the literature entails negative costs (McVittie et al.
2014), that is, an increase in farm profit but with a modest abatement rate.
This result is, however, indirectly challenged by finding that no-till causes high unit costs (McVittie et al.
2014).
The literature provides mixed results concerning the cost of cover crops.
They vary from approximately EUR 50 to 180 tCO 2 eq-1 (Schulte et al.
2012, Pellerin et al.
2013, Posthumus et al.
2013, McVittie et al.
2014).
Table 3 collects the cost-effectiveness estimates for selected abatement measures that can be adopted in crop production to mitigate GHG emissions.
Here, the number of measures is larger than in the case of livestock production.
Furthermore, the costs of reducing GHG emissions are lower than in livestock farming, and we even observe negative costs here.
Interestingly, Povellato et al.
(2007) review the cost-effectiveness of different GHG mitigation measures in European agriculture and find that measures related to CH 4 abatement are more cost-effective than changing management practices in crop cultivation (see also Lötjönen and Ollikainen 2019).
Table 3 reveals an interesting difference between no-till and minimum tillage in favor of the latter.
The reason is that minimum tillage reduces costs associated with machinery.
Another notable feature is that the costs of cover crops differ considerably, being generally higher than those of many other measures.
In general, the wide range of estimates may reflect geographic differences, variation in modeling choices or uncertainty in the determination of costs.
Table 2.
Cost-effectiveness of measures related to dairy production Abatement measure Abatement rate, tCO2eq LU-1 yr-1 Cost-effectiveness, EUR tCO2eq-1 Source Location Decrease of dairy cow herd size 2.6 (yearly within a 3-year lactation period) 519 (yearly within a 3-year lactation period) Lötjönen et al.
(2020) Finland Fat supplementation/ dietary lipids 1% fat increase in ration reduces 4% of the CH4 emissions 137–262 Bates et al.
(2009) EU27 223–335 Pellerin et al.
(2013) France Covered manure storage (floating cover) 0.6 670 Lötjönen et al.
(2020) Finland Anaerobic digestion 90% abatement rate –48–130 (centralized digester) Bates et al.
(2009) EU27 Table 3.
Cost-effectiveness of measures related to crop production Abatement measure Abatement rate, tCO2eq ha-1 yr-1 Cost-effectiveness, EUR tCO2eq-1 Source Location Precision nutrient application 15–34% 0–39 for farms 400 ha 6–332 for farms 100-200 ha ICF (2013) USA Leguminous crops 1.02 18–19 Pellerin et al.
(2013) France Cover crops 0.874 +/–0.393 160 Pellerin et al.
(2013) France 1.0 50 Schulte et al.
(2012) Ireland 1.75 178 Posthumus et al.
(2013) UK 0.88 124 McVittie et al.
(2014) Denmark Minimum tillage – Winter wheat 0.15 –56 McVittie et al.
(2014) Denmark 0.15 –117 McVittie et al.
(2014) Scotland No-till – Winter wheat 0.70 165 McVittie et al.
(2014) Scotland Nitrification inhibitors 0.3 107-202 Moran et al.
(2008) UK 61 Pellerin et al.
(2013) France Residue (straw) management – Winter wheat 2.29 125 McVittie et al.
(2014) Scotland 2.29 48 McVittie et al.
(2014) Denmark AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 119 Environmental co-impacts of GHG abatement measures Most of the GHG mitigation measures have environmental co-impacts, in most cases co-benefits but in some cases tradeoffs with negative impacts.
For example, cover crops improve water quality via reduced nutrient runoff (Schulte et al.
2012, Kirk et al.
2012, Wiltshire et al.
2014).
Precision nutrient application contributes to improved water quality by increasing nutrient use efficiency and thus reducing nutrient surpluses and potential nutrient leaching and runoff.
The use of nitrification inhibitors contributes to reduced nitrogen leaching and thus improved water quality (Schulte et al.
2012).
Leguminous crops contribute to improved water quality through reduced leaching of nitrate (Nemecek et al.
2008) and may also have a positive impact on biodiversity (Legume Futures 2014, Bues et al.
2013).
The adoption of no-till and reduced/minimum tillage usually reduces soil erosion, nitrogen runoff, and particulate phosphorus runoff, but it may increase dissolved phosphorus runoff and herbicide runoff (Lankoski et al.
2006).
Conversion of cropland to perennial grasses to sequester soil carbon may improve wildlife habitats and water quality.
Greenhalgh and Sauer (2003) and Pattanayak et al.
(2004) both find that the water quality benefit of carbon sequestration practices is very significant.
Pattanayak et al.
(2004) analyze the water quality co-benefits of GHG mitigation practices by linking a national-level water quality model to a national-level agriculture sector model.
Payments of USD 25 and USD 50 tCO 2 eq-1 induce the conversion of agricultural land into forestland, changes in tillage practices and crop mixes on remaining agricultural land, and changes in livestock management.
These responses will mitigate 60–70 million tCO 2 eq and improve aggregate national water quality by 2%.
Moreover, these practices will reduce annual nitrogen loadings into the Gulf of Mexico by up to half of the reduction goals established by the national Watershed Nutrient Task Force for addressing the hypoxia problem (Pattanayak et al.
2004).
McCarl and Schneider (2001) found that an increase in carbon prices will reduce sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus runoff.
Feng et al.
(2007) used the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model to assess carbon sequestration, erosion reduction, and nutrient runoff reduction benefits of different targeting mechanisms of Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) funds in the Upper Mississippi River Basin.
For the whole area, the annual average rate of carbon sequestration of adopting CRP practices was 0.487 tons per acre.
Their analysis shows that if the CRP had been targeted at carbon specifically, carbon sequestration benefits would have been four times larger, erosion reduction 69% lower, and nitrogen runoff reduction 26% higher than in the case of the actual CRP allocation.
If the CRP had been targeted at erosion specifically, almost three times more erosion benefit would have been achieved.
Their analysis also shows that different regions benefit from the program depending on which environmental issue is targeted.
Feng et al.
(2007) assessed the co-benefits from carbon sequestration policy in a large agricultural region in the U.S. and found that the co-benefits are likely to be sizable in absolute magnitude, highly variable across subregions, and dependent on policy design.
Thus, if society values these co-benefits, a carbon market or carbon sequestration policy that does not address these co-benefits will not maximize social welfare.
Hence, policy design issues related to co-benefits are important for the efficient design of GHG mitigation policies in the agriculture sector.
Policy instruments promoting mitigation in agriculture In contrast to studies on technical mitigation measures, the literature on policy instruments targeting GHG emissions is scarce (Bakam et al.
2012, De Cara et al.
2005, Pérez Domínguez and Britz 2003).
Nevertheless, it has focused on multiple instruments targeting either livestock production or crop production.
Some of the literature develops a full Pigouvian set of policy instruments addressing both climate and water quality damage (Lötjönen et al.
2020, Ervola et al.
2018).
Most of the literature focuses solely on GHG emissions and policy instruments addressing GHG emissions or emission drivers such as fertilizer inputs and ruminant heads.
Very few of the studies also consider transaction costs related to different policy instruments (notable exceptions are Pérez Domínguez and Britz 2003, Bakam et al.
2012, De Cara et al.
2018, Ervola et al.
2018, OECD 2019).
As shown above, the possible options to reduce GHG emissions from livestock are rather limited, and most impacts can be obtained from mixed crop-dairy farms via cultivation choices.
Nevertheless, the literature (see, e.g., Lengers and Britz 2012, OECD 2019, Lötjönen et al.
2020) has identified at least four policy instruments that can target emissions from livestock production.
They are a GHG tax – or abatement subsidy or emissions trading – levied on actual or estimated emissions, an animal (ruminant) tax, regulatory requirements on manure storage, AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 120 and subsidies for a low GHG emission diet for ruminants.
Furthermore, there always exists a possibility of reducing meat consumption through a meat tax (see, e.g., Wirsenius et al.
2011, Säll and Gren 2015).
Although this instrument targets agriculture only indirectly, we briefly comment on it as well.
Regarding crop production, the most often examined instruments are a GHG tax, an abatement subsidy, GHG emissions trading and input taxes (e.g., Ervola et al.
2018, OECD 2019, Bakam et al.
2010).
In addition, new policy instruments have been developed to promote farmers’ adoption of soil carbon sequestration practices, which provide positive externalities for society.
Government payments for soil carbon sequestration or farmers’ voluntary participation in carbon offset markets serve as examples of these mitigation policy instruments (e.g., Gonzales-Ramirez et al.
2012).
GHG emission tax, GHG abatement subsidy and GHG emissions trading A GHG tax (carbon tax) and emissions trading impose a price on GHG emissions, while a GHG abatement subsidy provides a reward for a unit of abatement – also providing an efficient price for emissions.
Recall equation (7), where the carbon tax t (also interpreted as an emission allowance price) replaces the climate damage function d. Thus, the carbon price enters the private optimality conditions (2a) – (6a) and adjusts all choices of the private farmers towards the social optimum.
Under a uniform carbon price, all farmers face the same price for emissions, and they adjust their use of inputs and land allocation to reduce emissions in a way that equalizes their marginal abatement costs, which is a requirement for minimizing the economic cost of abatement.
An abatement subsidy works similarly at the margin, but unlike the emission tax, the subsidy increases private profits.
This becomes visible once we rewrite the private profit function (equation 7) in terms of the subsidy.
Let ϐ denote the uniform subsidy rate and , z j , j = H, s, c denote the GHG emission baselines from cows, silage and crops, respectively, reflecting private choice before climate policy is introduced.
(8) When choosing herd size, diet, fertilization and land allocation, a farmer would face similar optimality conditions as under the GHG tax.
However, now, the difference between the baseline and the new emissions would bring revenue and counteract the reduction in profitability and possibly incentivize the entry of new farmers or more land use to agriculture sector.
Therefore, a GHG tax and GHG abatement subsidies differ with respect to total GHG emissions, farm profits, and government budgets.
The quantitative impacts of these policy instruments can be examined in either partial or general equilibrium frameworks.
Lengers and Britz (2012) and Lötjönen et al.
(2020) provide examples of partial analysis of carbon instruments at the farm level.
Lengers and Britz analyze mitigation measures with a detailed biodynamic DAIRYDYN model and recommend indicators as a basis for climate policies instead of actual emissions.
Lötjönen et al.
(2020) in turn use a farm model and recommend levying carbon tax on either all or the main emission sources.
OECD (2019) employs a general equilibrium analysis to investigate the performance of the above market-based instruments in agriculture at the global level.
This work is based on the Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET), which is a multisector, multiregion computable general equilibrium model that covers the global economy.
The analysis reveals that the mitigation effectiveness of the global abatement subsidy is only half of the emissions reductions of the global GHG tax.
The reason is that the cost and price increases from the tax cause a contraction in the supply of and demand for agricultural products in aggregate, particularly for GHG emissionsintensive products.
The two instruments also differ with respect to their impact on agricultural income, competitiveness, food consumption and government budgets.
Although a global GHG tax is more effective in mitigation, global abatement subsidies provide considerable emission reductions without causing economic losses to agricultural producers or food consumers, which reduces the potential political and social barriers to implementing this policy option (OECD 2019).
The cost-effectiveness of these instruments has been examined in many studies.
OECD (2019) provides a farmlevel analysis for selected EU countries.
It shows that all three policy instruments provide exactly the same marginal incentives for emission reduction and result in the same marginal abatement costs (EUR 50.2 tCO 2 eq-1) at the 10% emission reduction level when transaction costs are not considered.
Including transaction costs improves the relative performance of the GHG tax and abatement subsidy over GHG emissions trading.
A comparison of emissions trading with uniform emission constraints shows, on average, 17% cost-effectiveness gains for emissions trading.
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 = [𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺) − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺)] + [Π𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) + Π𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)].
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 121 Pérez Domínguez and Britz (2003) find similar gains (23%) from emissions trading relative to uniform emissions constraints for the EU27.
De Cara et al.
(2005) compare the GHG emissions tax with uniform emission constraints and show that meeting an 8% GHG abatement target is more than twice as expensive under the uniform emission constraint as it is under the emission tax.
Bakam et al.
(2012) obtain similar results for GHG emission trading over an input tax for GHG emission reduction targets over 29%.
The results from these studies suggest that market-based instruments provide the most cost-effective options for GHG mitigation in agriculture.
They also indicate that it pays to target GHG emissions broadly, just as equations (6) and (7) demonstrate.
There are two reservations that may weaken the feasibility of these results.
First, a broad tax base requires the authorities to be able to efficiently monitor the actual choices within farms.
OECD (2019) finds that every euro spent on better monitoring, reporting and verification, which increases transaction costs, brings EUR 1.3 through improved cost-effectiveness.
How to improve monitoring and how costly it actually is, however, is a highly debatable issue.
The second issue concerns the abatement subsidy.
It has a high cost impact on the government’s budget, unlike the emission tax, which increases budget revenue.
This feature decreases the desirability of the subsidy unless the government only shifts some of the existing farm income support to the abatement subsidy outlays in a budget-neutral manner (we will discuss this later).
Input taxes: ruminant tax and fertilizer tax An animal tax (ruminant tax) refers to a tax that is levied on the productive animal.
The motivation for the tax is as follows.
The main source of GHG emissions from dairy and cattle farming is enteric fermentation.
Given that the privately optimal herd size is always higher than the socially optimal one (as shown in equations 2a and 2b), reducing the number of heads is the quickest and most certain way of reducing GHG emissions.
Moreover, taxing emission-intensive inputs (ruminant animals or nitrogen fertilizer) circumvents the substantial challenge of measuring and monitoring all emissions from mixed dairy-crop farms, which is the case for GHG emissions taxes that address all emissions from farms.
Taxing emission-intensive inputs instead of emissions allows some savings on transaction costs related to measurement and monitoring.
The drawback is that resorting to the second-best taxation reduces economic efficiency since it fails to incentivize the adoption of mitigation practices that reduce the emission intensity of production.
Drawing on this line of thinking, it has been suggested that a tax on the number of animals (ruminant heads) may be the most easily implemented climate instrument for dairy and cattle livestock farming (see, e.g., OECD 2019).
The animal tax rate may reflect the average emissions from enteric fermentation with a certain feeding regime per year multiplied by climate damage (see, e.g., Lötjönen et al.
2020), or alternatively, it can additionally reflect emissions from manure storage and application.
Equation (9) demonstrates how the ruminant tax (denoted by τ) enters a private farmer’s profit function, (9) Thus, the ruminant tax is levied on the emissions from animals.
In the absence of means to reduce per animal GHG emissions, this tax is simply a unit tax on ruminant animals.
The only way a farmer may respond to the tax is to reduce the number of animals.
A reduction in the number of animals, however, also has effects on fertilization and land allocation.
The reduced amount of manure increases the use of mineral fertilizer and reduces the amount of land allocated to silage – both changes tend to increase GHG emissions.
If the farmer could adjust diet or manure storage and application technologies to reduce emissions, the tax burden could be reduced.
However, due to measurement and monitoring problems, the most realistic option to implement a ruminant tax is a constant uniform tax based on the average type of feeding regime and manure management.
No country has implemented a ruminant tax, which is perceived as a very strong instrument.
However, there are simulations examining the implications of a ruminant tax.
OECD (2019) suggests that a global GHG tax leads to a much larger emissions reduction than a global tax on ruminants, 1595 MtCO 2 eq by 2050, while for a ruminant tax, the emission reduction is 301 MtCO 2 eq by 2050.
Lötjönen et al.
(2020) provide a farm-level analysis and find that the ruminant tax leads to an approximately 24% lower reduction in emissions relative to a general GHG tax on a mixed crop-dairy farm.
A farm-level analysis by OECD (2019) shows that the cost-effectiveness of a ruminant tax is relatively good: EUR 50.2 tCO 2 eq-1 for an emission tax and EUR 53.6 tCO 2 eq-1 for a ruminant tax.
Although transaction costs improve the relative performance of a ruminant tax, an emission tax is still the most cost-effective policy instrument (with transaction costs EUR 53.7 tCO 2 eq-1 for an emission tax and EUR 55.6 tCO 2 eq-1 for a ruminant tax).
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 = [𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 − 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺)] + [Π𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + Π𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐].
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 122 The introduction of a national ruminant tax may lead to carbon leakage, challenging the adoption of a unilateral national tax policy.
An alternative is to focus on consumers.
Increased information on healthy diets could decrease the demand for meat (see, e.g., Rickertsen et al.
2003).
The literature has also suggested using another instrument to target ruminants: a meat tax levied on consumers instead of producers (Wirsenius et al.
2011).
In the EU, Wirsenius et al.
(2011) found that a tax of EUR 60 tCO 2 eq on animal food products would reduce GHG emissions by 32 million tons (with the main effect stemming from ruminant meat).
Drawbacks of the meat tax include reduced profits from the products and the lack of incentives it provides producers to reduce GHG emissions within the production stage (Wirsenius et al.
2011).
We next turn to another input tax, a tax on nitrogen fertilizers, as a means of reducing GHG emissions.
The motivation for a nitrogen tax as a climate instrument is as follows.
The manufacture of mineral fertilizers causes GHG emissions, and mineral nitrogen is a source of N 2 O emissions from soils.
When a nitrogen tax (t) is used, the private farmer’s profit function is (10) Equation (10) shows that the nitrogen tax impacts the profits from crop production (silage and crops).
A look at the first-order conditions in equations (5b) and (6b) helps to reveal the two main impacts of the tax.
By equation (5b), the tax increases its RHS, implying an increase in the use of manure.
Equation (6b) in turn shows that the RHS profits decrease and more land is allocated to silage due to its improved profitability.
Unfortunately, in a mixed dairy-crop production farm, the size of the herd may even increase, tending to increase methane emissions.
This is, again, an indication of how complicated climate policy in agriculture can be.
Ervola et al.
(2018) employ data from Finland and focus on water quality and GHG emissions damage from crop production.
Their analysis simultaneously includes a socially optimal fertilizer tax, a soil emissions tax and a subsidy for soil carbon sequestration (for green set-aside and afforestation).
Simulations for Finnish agriculture show that the optimal fertilizer tax rate is uniform (19%) when GHG emission damage is internalized (but is differentiated when water quality damage is accounted for).
The optimal fertilizer taxes vary from 19% to 58% and depend on soil type (mineral, clay or organic soil), soil productivity and tillage method (conventional moldboard plow tillage or no-till).
The optimal tax on soil emissions varies from EUR 15 ha-1 in clay soils to EUR 231 ha-1 in organic soils.
Different policy scenarios (water quality policy, climate policy, or combined water quality and climate policy) have differential fiscal effects.
Voluntary carbon contracts and offset mechanisms Recent initiatives towards carbon farming offer new directions for policy development.
Carbon farming refers to farming practices that increase the carbon content in soils, mostly via photosynthesis.
France’s initiative aimed at sequestering 4‰ annually in soils has spurred carbon farming (Minasny et al.
2017).
Carbon offset programs have played a part in GHG policies in the international arena, but recently, the question has become whether farmers could benefit nationally from carbon farming beyond increased agricultural productivity, as sequestering carbon in soil reduces CO 2 content in the atmosphere, providing a positive climate externality.
There are alternative ways of promoting carbon farming: either using the abovementioned carbon tax-subsidy combination (Ervola et al.
2018) or relying on voluntary mechanisms, such as carbon contracts and offsets (Lewandrovski et al.
2004, Antle et al.
2007, Gonzalez-Ramirez et al.
2012).
Carbon offsetting is a market mechanism in which companies buy carbon offsets (credits) from agriculture to compensate for their emissions.
For them to be sustainable from a climate perspective, the literature emphasizes that carbon offsets must fulfill the requirements of strict additionality, permanence and verifiability.
Governments must provide a sound basis for offsetting (Gonzalez-Ramirez et al.
2012).
Niles et al.
(2019) propose an umbrella protocol to ease the application of offset schemes across regions, crops, and practices.
Traditionally, offset protocol development has involved creating a new protocol for each combination of practice, crop and region, which is time consuming.
The protocol development and approval process can be accelerated through the development of an umbrella protocol that encompasses one particular type of GHG or management practice, which can then be expanded to different crops, regions and practices.
Such protocols are expected to reduce workload and time for policy development.
Most of the studies that have analyzed soil carbon sequestration show that some sequestration is economically feasible at a relatively low C price, i.e., in the range of USD 10 tC-1, but the rate of participation in C contracts 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 = [𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺)] + [Π𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + Π𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)].
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 123 responds significantly to the C price.
However, at low C prices, the amount of soil C that is sequestered is far below the technical potential, and the technical potential is approached only at prices in the range of USD 100 to USD 200 tC-1.
These studies also show that the technical potential and economic feasibility of carbon sequestration vary substantially by region and type of practice (Lewandrovski et al.
2004, Antle et al.
2007).
Lewandrovski et al.
(2004) analyzed the performance of alternative incentive designs and payment levels if farmers were paid to adopt land use and management practices that raise soil carbon levels.
At payment levels below USD 10 per ton for permanently sequestered carbon, their analysis suggests that farmers would adopt changes in rotation and tillage practices, while at higher payment levels, afforestation dominates.
Their analysis shows that the most cost-effective payment design adjusts payment levels to account both for the length of the contract and for the net sequestration.
Manley et al.
(2005) studied offsets from no-till practices in the US with two meta-analyses.
They found that the cost-effectiveness of no-till in increasing carbon accumulation in soil varies heavily with, for example, region, crop and soil carbon measurement depth.
Efforts to use no-till to produce carbon offset credits should thus target farmland where a switch from conventional tillage to no-till provides net sequestration at relatively low cost.
The most typical approaches for designing voluntary carbon contracts are per-ton (or per-hectare) contracts, output-based-offset (OBO) contracts, a principal-agent-contract approach, and a dynamic abatement cost model approach (Gonzalez-Ramirez et al.
2012).
Antle et al.
(2003) examined the per-ton and per-hectare contracts for soil C sequestration.
The per-hectare contract provides incentive payments to producers for each hectare of land that is switched from a production system associated with a relatively low equilibrium level of soil C to a system associated with a higher equilibrium level of soil C. The key feature of the per-hectare contract is that the payment per hectare is the same for all land under the contract that uses a specified technology, regardless of the amount of C that is actually sequestered as a result.
The per-ton contract pays farmers a specified price for each ton of C that is accumulated and maintained in the soil for the duration of the contract, regardless of what management practices are used.
To implement per-ton contracts, it is necessary to quantify the amount of C added to the soil over the duration of the contract; hence, it is necessary to establish the baseline amount of C in the soil at the beginning of the contract and the time path of soil C over the duration of the contract.
In their analysis of the marginal cost of soil C sequestration, Antle et al.
(2003) find that a per-hectare payment scheme is as much as four times more costly than the per-ton payment mechanism, and this inefficiency loss is much larger than the transaction costs of implementing the more efficient contract.
Murray and Baker (2011) focus on an output-based offset contract, which is based on a baseline for crop yields and GHG emissions.
The output-based offset approach establishes projected emissions and yields and establishes the baseline emission intensity, defined as a ratio between the projected GHG emissions and the projected yields.
When signing the contract, a farmer agrees to reduce emissions intensity.
Given the ratio, the farmer can attain a reduction either by reducing net emissions or by increasing yields.
Credits are calculated as the product of the actual yield and the realized difference in the emission intensities.
Technically more complicated approaches by Mason and Plantinga (2011) and Fell et al.
(2010) are more general and less rooted in agriculture.
Mason and Plantinga (2011) propose a principal-agent framework for carbon offset contracts to ensure that policy makers do not pay for farmers who would supply carbon offsets even without the payment; thus, the aim is to ensure true additionality of contracts.
Fell et al.
(2010) suggest the use of a dynamic stochastic abatement cost model for the offset market.
Other policy options Regulation of manure management Manure-related GHG emissions can be reduced slightly by employing the right technological choices.
A form of direct regulation would be to require the use of covered manure storage.
Increasing importance can be given to the regulation of nutrients in manure.
Nutrient separation, that is, separation of manure into phosphorusand nitrogen-dominant fractions using technological solutions, in livestock farms focuses more on water quality policies than climate policies (see Ollikainen et al.
2019 for a more general discussion).
It has a connection to climate policies via biogas production, as discussed below.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 124 Support for biogas production Using manure and biomass, such as grass, in a fermentation process produces biogas that can be used to replace fossil fuels either in transport or electricity production.
The key issue economically is what type of subsidy works best.
A well-known tradeoff exists between investment support and production support.
Investment subsidies may induce investment, but production may turn out to be unprofitable.
Production subsidies in turn may help plants that have received investment but may not trigger investments.
Very much depends on technological development and local conditions but perhaps even more on carbon prices in energy production and transport.
Additional issues in biogas production relate to the possible requirement that nutrients be separated after biogas production.
This regulatory instrument stems more from water quality policies.
The instrument combination of biogas subsidies and nutrient separation requirements appears ideal from an environmental point of view.
Economically, this policy would increase the costs of biogas production on the one hand but provide possibilities to sell manure nutrients to crop production farms on the other hand.
Biogas production is promoted in some countries, such as Denmark and Finland.
The typical instrument has been an investment subsidy.
Subsidy for fat supplementation in livestock diet Subsidizing fat supplements in livestock diets is an interesting theoretical option.
Society could subsidize using oil as a part of the diet to reduce CH 4 emissions from enteric fermentation (Bates et al.
2009, MacLeod et al.
2015).
While studies of economic incentives on this subject are lacking, we must, however, note that this instrument is subject to moral hazard; livestock farmers might take the subsidy but not use the costly oil in the diet, as authorities have no means to monitor the actual choice of the diet.
Thus, an alternative would be a regulation relating to manufacturers of concentrate feeds to increase oil supplementation in all products.
Whether the cost increase should be compensated to farmers, would be up to national decisions.
Theoretically, there is no obligation for compensation, as the measure reduces negative externalities.
Re-instrumentation of agricultural support policies Agricultural support policies, such as market price supports, payments based on output, and payments based on inputs, increase the use of inputs, shift land towards the supported crops and increase the entry of land into the agriculture sector.
The overall effect is an increase in GHG emissions from the agriculture sector relative to a case in which no support measures are provided, as shown by Henderson and Lankoski (2019) for a number of countries.
They also demonstrate that fully decoupled support payments do not increase GHG emissions from the sector.
Regarding climate mitigation policy, their results suggest as a necessary first step reforming agricultural support policies: reduce and eventually remove those support policies that increase GHG emissions (remove the policy failure) before implementing specific mitigation policies to address remaining emissions (addressing the environmental market failure).
Barriers to the implementation of climate policies Aside from social acceptability, the greatest potential barriers to ambitious climate policy in agriculture relate to the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of GHG emissions reductions.
Given that the agriculture sector consists of a large number of heterogeneous (in terms of both productivity and environmental sensitivity) production units with mostly nonpoint source types of emission sources, the MRV challenges are remarkable and imply high transaction costs.
Furthermore, some emissions sources and sinks, such as N 2 O emissions from soil or soil carbon sequestration, are likely to be more uncertain and difficult to measure, which results in stronger tradeoffs between transaction costs and MRV accuracy (Grosjean et al.
2016).
However, given that a high share of MRV-related costs are fixed costs, which are invariant to farm size, it may be possible to decrease these costs by aggregating farms into larger units for MRV purposes (Bellassen et al.
2015, OECD 2019).
Additionally, the existing institutional capacity created for other policies (e.g., EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or EU environmental directives) can reduce the costs of MRV since various MRV tools may already exist (Grosjean et al.
2016).
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 125 Conclusions Climate policy is more relevant to the agriculture sector than before.
There is a need to identify the best available GHG abatement measures and develop new ones.
Even more important is to design effective incentives for reducing GHG emissions from agriculture in a way that also promotes new and innovative solutions.
We now briefly discuss both aspects.
For the most polluting part of agriculture, ruminant livestock production, the reviewed estimates show high abatement costs for most measures, many exceeding by 10 times the allowance prices in the EU ETS (where the average price in 2019 was slightly over EUR 20 ton-1).
In contrast, abatement costs are much lower (sometimes even negative) in crop production.
This indicates that with the exception of GHG emissions from enteric fermentation, agriculture has many measures to reduce GHG emissions.
The relevant policy questions are as follows: what is the willingness of governments to require emissions reductions in agriculture, and how can emissions reductions be efficiently achieved?
Answering the first question is beyond the scope of this study, but our review provides answers to the second question.
First, market-based instruments, levied on all sources of GHG emissions, perform best according to simulations.
Second, accounting for the heterogeneity and challenges in monitoring may be avoided by employing process-based models to estimate emissions with a given type of feeding regime, manure management technology, soil type, tillage method and other main aspects.
Third, if heterogeneity presents an unsolvable problem, emission proxies, such as default emission factors for ruminant animals, can be used instead of directly measuring emissions, but their effectiveness is clearly lower than that of emissions-based policies.
Fourth, a first step towards more effective climate policies is to reform the current agricultural support policies by decoupling support from production decisions.
Our review produces some interesting findings concerning the state of the art in the research relating to climate policy.
Current data on emission reductions from alternative measures exhibit a wide range, creating uncertainty on the performance of measures.
The source of these differences lies partly in the chosen approaches (measurement on site versus various modeling possibilities) and partly in vastly heterogeneous production conditions and site productivity of soil carbon sequestration.
We definitely need a better, consistent data basis for climate policy design and implementation.
Second, the choice of model matters considerably for the simulation results of alternative GHG policy instruments.
Farm models provide information on farmers’ choices under the chosen behavioral assumptions.
However, by keeping prices unchanged, they promise much stronger reductions in GHG emissions than partial equilibrium (sector) and general equilibrium models, which let prices vary, creating interactions between livestock and crop production lines.
Sharpening the analysis with the help of econometric and other studies focusing on actual behavior is hardly feasible, as no country has implemented strong, ambitious climate policy in the agriculture sector.
Finally, innovations seem to play a minor role in the current literature, even though there is an enormous need for them.
There is no doubt that agriculture needs innovations.
Globally, the most challenging area of agriculture relates to animal production, which is a significant source of methane emissions, and globally, 26% of the ice-free land area is used for livestock grazing, while an additional one-third of cropland is used to produce feed for livestock (FAO 2012).
Therefore, the direction of innovation should be towards a lower amount of required livestock herds and the release of land back to nature and to biodiversity maintenance.
Restricting the analysis solely within traditional agriculture as a source of food is no longer sufficient.
The new developments relating to the use of synthetic biology and renewable energy producing proteins from microbes in industrial plants may be crucial both in producing enough food for the increasing population and in reducing GHG emissions (e.g., Post 2012).
Innovation policy for climate purposes is needed for both the food industry and primary agriculture, for instance, animal breeding to increase productivity that allows a decrease in herd sizes.
Acknowledgments This work is a part of research consortium “Multi-benefit solutions to climate-smart agriculture” (MULTA), funded by the Strategic Research Council of Academy of Finland (Contract No.
327342).
We thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the OECD or of its member countries.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 126 References Antle, J.M., Capalbo, S.M., Mooney, S., Elliott, E.T.
& Paustian, K.H.
2003.
Spatial Heterogeneity, Contract Design, and the Efficiency of C Sequestration Policies for Agriculture.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46: 231–250.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00038-4 Antle, J.M., Capalbo, S.M., Paustian, K.H.
& Ali, M.K.
2007.
Estimating the Economic Potential for Agricultural Soil C Sequestration in the Central United States Using an Aggregate Econometric-Process Simulation Model.
Climatic Change 80:145–171.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9176-5 Bakam, I., Balana, B.
& Matthews, R. 2012.
Cost-effectiveness analysis of policy instruments for greenhouse gas emission mitigation in the agricultural sector.
Journal of Environmental Management 112: 33–44.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.07.001 Bates, J., Brophy, N., Harfoot, M. & Webb, J.
2009.
Agriculture: methane and nitrous oxide.
In: Sectoral Emission Reduction Potentials and Economic Costs for Climate Change (SERPEC-CC), Ecofys, AEA Energy and Environment, Didcot, UK.
Bellassen, V., Stephan, N., Afriat, M., Alberola, E., Barker, A., Chang, J.P., Chiquet, C., Cochran, I., Deheza, M., Dimopoulos, C. & Foucherot, C. 2015.
Monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions in the climate economy.
Nature Climate Change 5: 319–328.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2544.
Bennetzen, E., Smith, P. & Porter, J.
2016.
Agricultural production and greenhouse gas emissions from world regions—The major trends over 40 years.
Global Environmental Change 37: 43–55.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.12.004 Blandford, D. & Hassapoyannes, K. 2018.
The role of agriculture in global GHG mitigation.
OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No.
112, OECD Publishing, Paris.
https://doi.org/10.1787/da017ae2-en Bues, A., Preissel, S., Reckling, M., Zander, P., Kuhlman, T., Topp, K., Watson, C., Lindström, K., Stoddard, F.L.
& Murphy-Bokern, D. 2013.
The environmental role of protein crops in the new common agricultural policy.
The European Parliament, Brussels.
http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93370 Chen, X.H., Zhou, L.X., Zhao, Y.G., Pan, S.D.
& Jin, M.C.
2014.
Application of nanoring amino-functionalized magnetic polymer dispersive micro-solid-phase extraction and ultra fast liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry in dicyandiamide residue analysis of powdered milk.
Talanta 119:187–192.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.talanta.2013.10.003 De Cara, S., Houzé, M. & Jayet P. 2005.
Methane and Nitrous Oxide Emissions from Agriculture in the EU: A Spatial Assessment of Sources and Abatement Costs.
Environmental and Resource Economics 32: 551–583.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-0071-8 De Cara, S., Henry, L. & Jayet, P. 2018.
Optimal coverage of an emission tax in the presence of monitoring, reporting, and verification costs.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 89: 71–93.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.03.001.
Dequiedt, B.
& Moran, D. 2015.
The cost of emission mitigation by legume crops in French agriculture.
Ecological Economics 110: 51–60.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.12.006 Duncan, E.W., Dell, C.J., Kleinman, P.J.A.
& Beegle, D.B.
2017.
Nitrous oxide and ammonia emissions from injected and broadcast-applied dairy slurry.
Journal of Environmental Quality 46: 36–44.
https://doi.org/10.2134/jeq2016.05.0171 Eory, V., Pellerin, S., Garcia, G.C., Lehtonen, H., Licite, I., Mattila, H., Lund-Sørensen, T., Muldowney, J., Popluga, D., Strandmark, L. & Schulte, R. 2018.
Marginal abatement cost curves for agricultural climate policy: state-of-the art, lessons learnt and future potential.
Journal of Cleaner Production 182: 705–716.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.01.252 Ervola, A., Lankoski, J., Ollikainen, M. & Mikkola, H.J.
2012.
Agriculture and climate change: The socially optimal production, land use, and GHG emissions.
Food Economics 9: 10–24.https://doi.org/10.1080/16507541.2012.695120 Ervola A., Lankoski, J.
& Ollikainen, M. 2018.
Climate and Water Quality Policy Design for Agriculture with Environmental CoBenefits.
Modern Concepts & Developments in Agronomy 3: 1–17.
https://doi.org/10.31031/MCDA.2018.03.000552 FAO 2012.
Livestock and landscapes.
Sustainability pathways.
http://www.fao.org/3/ar591e/ar591e.pdf.
Accessed 23 March 2020.
Fell, H., Burtraw, D., Morgenstern, R. & Palmer, K. 2010.
Climate policy design with correlated uncertainties in offset supply and abatement costs, Discuss.
Pap.
DP-10-01 Resources for the Future, Washington DC.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1552176 Feng, H., Kurkalova, L.A., Kling, C.L.
& Gassman, P.W.
2007.
Transfers and environmental cobenefits of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils: retiring agricultural land in the Upper Mississippi River Basin.
Climatic Change 80: 91–107.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9143-1 Frank, S., Beach, R., Havlík, P., Valin, H., Herrero, M., Mosnier, A., Hasegawa, T., Creason, J., Ragnauth, S. & Obersteiner, M. 2018.
Structural change as a key component for agricultural non-CO2 mitigation efforts.
Nature Communications 9: 1–8.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-03489-1 Gerber, P.J., Steinfeld, H., Henderson, B., Mottet, A., Opio, C., Dijkman, J., Falcucci, A.
& Tempio, G. 2013.
Tackling climate change through livestock: a global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Rome.
Golub, A., Hertel, T., Lee, H.L., Rose, S. & Sohngen, B.
2009.
The opportunity cost of land use and the global potential for greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture and forestry.
Resource and Energy Economics 31: 299–319.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2009.04.007.
Gonzales-Ramirez, J., Kling, C. & Valcu, A.
2012.
An Overview of Carbon Offsets from Agriculture.
Annual Review of Resource Economics 4: 45–84.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-083110-120016 Greenhalgh, S. & Sauer, A.
2003.
Awakening the Dead Zone: An Investment for Agriculture, Water Quality and Climate Change.
Issue Brief, World Resources Institute.
Grosjean, G., Fuss, S., Koch, N., Bodirsky, B.L., De Cara, S. & Acworth, W. 2016.
Options to overcome the barriers to pricing European agricultural emissions.
Climate Policy 18: 151–169.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1258630 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 127 Grönroos, J.
2014.
Maatalouden ammoniakkipäästöjen vähentämismahdollisuudet ja -kustannukset.
Reports of the Ministry of the Environment 26.
(in Finnish).
Havlik P., Valin, H., Herrero, M., Obersteiner, M., Schmid, E., Rufino, M.C., Mosnier, A., Thornton, P.K., Bottcher, H., Conant, R.T., Frank, S., Fritz., S., Fuss, S., Kraxner, F. & Notenbaert, A.
2014.
Climate change mitigation through livestock system transitions.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111: 3709–3714.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1308044111 Heikkinen, J., Ketoja, E., Nuutinen, V. & Regina, K. 2013.
Declining trend of carbon in Finnish cropland soils in 1974-2009.
Global Change Biology 19: 1456–1469.
https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.12137 Henderson, B.
& Lankoski, J.
2019.
Evaluating the environmental impact of agricultural policies.
OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No.
130, OECD Publishing, Paris.
ICF International 2013.
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Options and Costs for Agricultural Land and Animal Production within the United States.
Report prepared for USDA, Climate Change Program Office.
ICF International,Washington, DC.
IPCC 2006.
2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Prepared by the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme.
In: Eggleston H.S., Buendia L., Miwa K., Ngara T. & Tanabe K. (eds).
IGES, Japan.
Jones, C.A., Nickerson, C.J.
& Heisey, P.W.
2013.
New uses of old tools?
Greenhouse gas mitigation with agriculture sector policies.
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 35: 398–434.
https://doi.org/10.1093/aepp/ppt020 Kim, D.G., Saggar, S. & Roudier, P. 2012.
The effect of nitrification inhibitors on soil ammonia emissions in nitrogen managed soils: a meta-analysis.
Nutrient Cycling in Agroecosystems 93: 51–64.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10705-012-9498-9 Kipling, R.P., Taft, H.E., Chadwick, D.R., Styles, D. & Moorby, J.
2019.
Challenges in implementing greenhouse gas mitigation measures in livestock agriculture: A conceptual framework for policymakers.
Environmental Science and Policy 92: 107–115.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.11.013 Kirk, G., Bellamy, P., Burgess, P., Coleman, K., Whitmore, A.
& Newell-Price, P. 2012.
Quantification of the potential changes in soil carbon in England from soil protection measures within the Soil Protection Review 2010.
Final report to Defra Sub-Project SP1106: Soil carbon studies to explore greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation, Defra, London.
Lal, R. 2004.
Soil carbon sequestration to mitigate climate change.
Geoderma 123: 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoderma.2004.01.032 Lankoski, J., Ollikainen, M. & Uusitalo, P. 2006.
No-till technology: benefits to farmers and the environment?
Theoretical analysis and application to Finnish agriculture.
European Review of Agricultural Economics 33: 193–221.https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbl003 Legume Futures 2014.
Legume Futures Final Report 2014.
SRUC, Edinburgh.
www.legumefutures.de.
Lengers, B.
& Britz, W. 2012.
The choice of emission indicators in environmental policy design: an analysis of GHG abatement in different dairy farms based on a bio-economic model approach.
Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies 93:117–144.
Lewandrowski, J., Peters, M., Jones, C., House, R., Sperow, M., Eve, M. & Paustian, K. 2004.
Economics of Sequestering Carbon in the U.S.
Agricultural Sector.
Technical Bulletin No.
(TB1909).
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
Lötjönen, S. & Ollikainen, M. 2017.
Does Crop Rotation with Legumes Provide an Efficient Means to Reduce Nutrient Loads and GHG Emissions?
Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies 98: 283–312.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41130-018-0063-z Lötjönen, S. & Ollikainen, M. 2019.
Multiple-pollutant cost-efficiency: Coherent water and climate policy for agriculture.
Ambio 48: 1304–1313.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-019-01257-z Lötjönen, S., Temmes, E. & Ollikainen, M. 2020.
Dairy farm management when nutrient runoff and climate emissions count.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ajae.12003 MacLeod, M., Eory, V., Gruère, G. & Lankoski, J.
2015.
Cost-Effectiveness of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Measures for Agriculture: A Literature Review.
OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No.
89, OECD Publishing, Paris.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrvvkq900vj-en.
Manley, J., van Kooten, G.C., Moeltner, K. & Johnson, D.W. 2005.
Creating carbon offsets in agriculture through no-till cultivation: a meta-analysis of costs and carbon offsets.
Climatic Change 68: 41–65.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-005-6010-4 Mason, C.F.
& Plantinga, A.J.
2011.
Contracting for impure public goods: carbon offsets and additionality.
Working Paper 564.
Eni Enrico Mattei.
https://doi.org/10.3386/w16963 McCarl, B.A.
& Schneider, U.A.
2001.
Greenhouse gas mitigation in U.S. agriculture and forestry.
Science 294: 2481–82.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1064193 McKinsey & Company 2009.
Pathways to a low-carbon economy: Version 2 of the Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve, McKinsey & Company, London.
McVittie, A., Ghaley, B.
B., Molnar, A., Dibari, C., Karaczun, Z.
& Sanchez, B.
2014.
Report on the cost-effectiveness of SOC measures.
Edinburgh, Scotland; 2014.
Meurer, K.H.E., Haddaway, N.R., Bolinder, M.A.
& Kätterer, T. 2018.
Tillage intensity affects total SOC stocks in boreo-temperate regions only in the topsoil A systematic review usind ESM approach.
Earth-Science Reviews 177: 613–622.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.earscirev.2017.12.015 Minasny, B., Malone, B.P., McBratney, A.B., Angers, D.A., Arrouays, D., Chambers, A., Chaplot, V., Chen, Z.-S.,Cheng, K., Dash, B.S., Field, D.J., Gimona, A., Hedley, C.B., Hong, S.Y., Mandal, B., Marchant, B.P., Martin, M., McConkey, B.G., Mulder, V.L., O’Rourke, S., Richer-de-Forges, A.C., Odeh, I., Padarian, J., Paustian, K., Pang, G., Poggio, L., Savin, I., Stolbovoy, V., Stockmann, U., Sulaeman, Y., Tsui, C.-C., Vågen, T.-G., Basvan Wesemael, B.
& Winowiecki, L. 2017.
Soil carbon 4 per mille.
Geoderma 292: 59–86.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoderma.2017.01.002 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 128 Montserrat, A.
& Sohngen, B.
2009.
How big is leakage from forestry carbon credits?
Estimates from a global model.
IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 6: 052011. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1307/6/5/052011 Moran, D., MacLeod, M., Wall, E., Eory, V., Pajot, G., Matthews, R., McVittie, A., Barnes, A., Rees, B., Moxey, A.
& Williams, A.
2008.
UK marginal abatement cost curves for the agriculture and land use, land-use change and forestry sectors out to 2022, with qualitative analysis of options to 2050.
Final Report.
UK Committee on Climate Change, London, UK.
https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1307/6/24/242002 Murray, B.C.
& Baker, J.S.
2011.
An output-based intensity approach for crediting greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture: explanation and policy implications.
Greenhouse gas Measurement and Management 1: 27–36.
https://doi.org/10.3763/ghgmm.2010.0004 Nemecek, T., von Richthofen, J.S., Dubois, G., Casta, P., Charles, R. & Pahl, H. 2008.
Environmental impacts of introducing grain legumes into European crop rotations.
European Journal of Agronomy 28: 380–393.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eja.2007.11.004 Niles, M.T., Waterhouse, H., Parkhurst, R., McLellan, E.L. & Kroopf, S. 2019.
Policy options to streamline the carbon market for agricultural nitrous oxide emissions.
Climate Policy 19: 893–907.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1599802 OECD 2019.
Enhancing Climate Change Mitigation through Agriculture, OECD Publishing, Paris.
https://doi.org/10.1787/e9a79226-en Ogle, S.M., Alsaker, C., Baldock, J., Bernoux, M., Breidt, F.J., McConkey, B., Regina, K. & Vazquez-Amabile, G.G.
2019.
Climate and soil characteristics determine where no-till management can store carbon in soils and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
Scientific Reports 9: 11665. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-47861-7 Ollikainen, M., Hasler, B., Elofsson, K., Iho, A., Andersen, H., Czajkowski, M. &Peterson, K. 2019.
Toward the Baltic Sea Socioeconomic Action Plan.
Ambio 48: 1377–1388.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-019-01264-0 Pattanayak, S.K., McCarl, B.A., Sommer, A.J., Murray, B.C., Bondelid, T., Gillig, D. & Deangelo, B.
2004.
Water quality co-effects of greenhouse gas mitigation in U.S. agriculture.
Climatic Change 71: 341–372.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-005-5925-0 Pellerin, S., Bamiere, L., Angers, D., Béline, F., Benoit, M., Butault, J.P., Chenu, C., Colnenne-David, C., De Cara, S., Delame, N. & Doreau, M. 2013.
How can French agriculture contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions?
Abatement potential and cost of ten technical measures.
Synopsis of the study report, INRA (France).
Perez Dominguez, I.
& Britz, W. 2003.
Reduction of global warming emissions in European agriculture through a tradable permit system: An analysis with the regional agricultural model CAPRI.
Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsund Sozialwissenshaften des Landbaus e. 39: 283–290.
Post, M. 2012.
Cultured meat from stem cells: Challenges and prospects.
Meat Science 92: 297–301.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.meatsci.2012.04.008 Posthumus, H., Deeks, L.K., Rickson, R.J. & Quinton, J.N.
2013.
Costs and benefits of erosion control measures in the UK.
Soil Use and Management 31: 16–33.
https://doi.org/10.1111/sum.12057.
Povellato, A., Bosello, F. & Giupponi, C. 2007.
Cost-effectiveness of greenhouse gas mitigation measures in the European agroforestry sector: a literature survey.
Environmental Science & Policy 10: 474–490.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2007.02.005 Powlson, D.S., Stirling, C.M., Jat, M.L., Gerard, B.G., Palm, C.A., Sanchez, P.A.
& Cassman, K.G.
2014.
Limited potential of no-till agriculture for climate change mitigation.
Nature Climate Change 4: 678–683.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2292 Regina, K., Kaseva, J.
& Esala, M. 2013.
Emissions of nitrous oxide from boreal agricultural mineral soils -statistical models based on measurements.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 164: 131–136.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agee.2012.09.013 Rickertsen, K., Kristofersson, D. & Lothe, S. 2003.
Effects of health information on Nordic meat and fish demand.
Empirical Economics 28: 249–273.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001810200129 Rose, S.K., Ahammad, H., Eickhout, B., Fisher, B., Kurosawa, A., Rao, S., Riahi, K. & van Vuuren, D.P.
2012.
Land-based mitigation in climate stabilization.
Energy Economics 34: 365–380.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.06.004 Säll, S. & Gren, I.-M. 2015.
Effects of an environmental tax on meat and dairy consumption in Sweden.
Food Policy 55: 41–53.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2015.05.008 Schulte, R., Crosson, P., Donnellan, T., Farrelly, N., Finnan, J., Lalor, S., Lanigan, G., O’Brien, D., Shalloo, L., Thorne, F., Boland, A., Caslin, B., Fealy, R., Foley, M., Gibson, M., Humphreys, J., Hanrahan, K., Hyde, T., Kelly, P., Maher, P., Murphy, P., NiFhlatharta, N., O’Donoghue, C., O’Kiely, P., Richards, K., Spink, J.
& O’Mara, F. 2012.
A Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for Irish Agriculture.
In: Schulte, R. & Donnellan, T.
(eds.)
Teagasc submission to the National Climate Policy Development Consultation.
Teagasc, Dublin, Ireland.
91 p. Smith, P., Martino, D., Cai, Z., Gwary, D., Janzen, H., Kumar, P., McCarl, B., Ogle, S., O’Mara, F., Rice, C. & Scholes, B.
2008.
Greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363: 789–813.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2184 Smith, P., Bustamante, M., Ahammad, H., Clark.
H., Dong, H., Elsiddig, E.A., Haberl, H., Harper, R., House, J., Jafari.
M., Masera, O., Mbow, C., Ravindranath, N.H., Rice, C.W., Abad, C. R., Romanovskaya, A., Sperling, F. & Tubiello, F. 2014.
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU).
In: Edenhofer, O., Pichs-Madruga, R., Sokona, Y., Farmhand, E., Kadner, S., Seyboth, K., Adler, A., Baum, I., Brunner, S., Eickemeier, P., Kriemann, B., Savolainen, J., Schlömer.
S., von Stechow, C., Zwickel, T. & Minx, J.C.
(eds.)
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeI.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.
Smith, P. 2012.
Agricultural greenhouse gas mitigation potential globally, in Europe and in the UK: what have we learnt in the last 20 years?
Global Change Biology 18: 35–43.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2486.2011.02517.x Smith, P. 2016.
Soil carbon sequestration and biochar as negative emission technologies.
Global Change Biology 22: 1315–1324.
https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.13178 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SCIENCE J. Lankoski et al.
(2020) 29: 110–129 129 Statistics Finland 2016.
Greenhouse gas emissions in Finland 1990-2014.
National inventory report under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol, 15 June 2016.
Statistics Finland.
Valkama, E., Lemola, R., Känkänen, H. & Turtola, E. 2015.
Meta-analysis of the effects of undersown catch crops on nitrogen leaching loss and grain yields in the Nordic countries.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 203: 93–101.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agee.2015.01.023 Vermont, B.
& De Cara, S. 2010.
How costly is mitigation of non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture?
: A meta-analysis.
Ecological Economics 69: 1373–1386.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.02.020 Webb J., Pain, B., Bittman, S. & Morgan, J.
2010.
The impacts of manure application methods on emissions of ammonia, nitrous oxide and on crop response A review.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 137:39–46.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agee.2010.01.001 Wiltshire.
J. et al.
2014.
Assessment of the Effectiveness, Impact and Cost of Measures to Protect Soils: Report for Defra.
Ricardo-AEA Ltd, Didcot, UK.
Wirsenius, S., Hedenus, F. & Mohlin, K. 2011.
Greenhouse gas taxes on animal food products: rationale, tax scheme and climate mitigation effects.
Climatic Change 108: 159–184.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9971-x Wreford, A., Ignaciuk, A.
& Gruère, G. 2017.
Overcoming barriers to the adoption of climate friendly practices in agriculture.
OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No.
101, OECD Publishing, Paris.
https://doi.org/10.1787/97767de8-en Climate change mitigation and agriculture: measures, costs andpolicies – A literature review Introduction Mitigation from an economic and policy angle: a framework Model setup Decisions in animal production Decisions in crop production First-best policy for animal and crop production Measures to mitigate climate impacts of crop and livestock production Mitigation measures Cost-effectiveness of climate measures Environmental co-impacts of GHG abatement measures Policy instruments promoting mitigation in agriculture GHG emission tax, GHG abatement subsidy and GHG emissions trading Input taxes: ruminant tax and fertilizer tax Voluntary carbon contracts and offset mechanisms Other policy options Regulation of manure management Support for biogas production Subsidy for fat supplementation in livestock diet Re-instrumentation of agricultural support policies Barriers to the implementation of climate policies Conclusions Acknowledgments References
Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water: A White Paper Assessment of the Past, Present and Future and Recommendations for Action texaswaterjournal.org An online, peer-reviewed journal published in cooperation with the Texas Water Resources Institute Volume 1, Number 1September 2010 TEXAS WATER JOURNAL Inaugural Issue Desalination and Long-Haul Water Transfer as a Water Supply for Dallas, Texas Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Condensing Water Availability Models https://www.texaswaterjournal.org Editor-in-Chief Todd H. Votteler, Ph.D. Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority Editorial Board Kathy A. Alexander Todd H. Votteler, Ph.D. Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority Ralph A. Wurbs, Ph.D. Texas Water Resources Institute TEXAS WATER JOURNAL Volume 1, Number 1 Inaugural Issue September 2010 texaswaterjournal.org tTHE TEXAS WATER JOURNAL is an online, peer-reviewed journal devoted to the timely consideration of Texas water resources management and policy issues.
The journal provides in-depth analysis of Texas water resources management and policies from a multidisciplinary perspective that integrates science, engineering, law, planning, and other disciplines.
It also provides updates on key state legislation and policy changes by Texas administrative agencies.
For more information on TWJ as well as TWJ policies and submission guidelines, please visit texaswaterjournal.org The Texas Water Journal is published in cooperation with the Texas Water Resources Institute, part of Texas AgriLife Research, the Texas AgriLife Extension Service and the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at Texas A&M University.
Managing Editor Kathy Wythe Texas Water Resources Institute Layout Editor Leslie Lee Texas Water Resources Institute Website Editor Jaclyn Tech Texas Water Resources Institute Cover photo: © Lynn McBride https://www.texaswaterjournal.org https://www.texaswaterjournal.org 1 Texas Water Resources Institute Texas Water Journal Volume 1, Number 1, Pages 1-19, September 2010 Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water: A White Paper Assessment of the Past, Present and Future and Recommendations for Action Jay L. Banner1*, Charles S. Jackson1, Zong-Liang Yang1, Katharine Hayhoe2, Connie Woodhouse3, Lindsey Gulden1, Kathy Jacobs4, Gerald North5, Ruby Leung6, Warren Washington7, Xiaoyan Jiang1, and Richard Casteel1 Abstract: Texas comprises the eastern portion of the Southwest region, where the convergence of climatological and geopolitical forces has the potential to put extreme stress on water resources.
Geologic records indicate that Texas experienced large climate changes on millennial time scales in the past, and over the last thousand years, tree-ring records indicate that there were significant periods of drought in Texas.
These droughts were of longer duration than the 1950s “drought of record” that is commonly used in planning, and they occurred independently of human-induced global climate change.
Although there has been a negligible net temperature increase in Texas over the past century, temperatures have increased more significantly over the past three decades.
Under essentially all climate model projections, Texas is susceptible to significant climate change in the future.
Most projections for the 21st century show that with increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, there will be an increase in temperatures across Texas and a shift to a more arid average climate.
Studies agree that Texas will likely become significantly warmer and drier, yet the magnitude, timing, and regional distribution of these changes are uncertain.
There is a large uncertainty in the projected changes in precipitation for Texas for the 21st century.
In contrast, the more robust projected increase in temperature with its effect on evaporation, which is a dominant component in the region’s hydrologic cycle, is consistent with model projections of frequent and extended droughts throughout the state.
For these reasons, we recommend that Texas invest resources to investigate and anticipate the impacts of climate change on Texas’ water resources, with the goal of providing data to inform resource planning.
This investment should support development of 1) research programs that provide policy-relevant science; 2) education programs to engage future researchers and policymakers; and 3) connections between policy-makers, scientists, water resource managers, and other stakeholders.
It is proposed that these goals may be achieved through the establishment of a Texas Climate Consortium, consisting of representatives from academia, industry, government agencies, water authorities, and other stakeholders.
The mission of this consortium would be to develop the capacity to provide decision makers with the information needed to develop adaptation strategies in the face of future climate change and uncertainty.
Keywords: climate change, drought, paleoclimate 1.Jackson School of Geosciences, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712 2.Department of Geosciences, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, 3.
4.
TX 79409-1053 Department of Geography & Regional Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0076 Department of Soil, Water and Environmental Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 5.Department of Atmospheric Sciences and Department of Oceanography, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-3148 6.Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA 99352 7.National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO 80307-3000 *Corresponding author: banner@mail.utexas.edu Citation: Banner JL, Jackson CS, Yang ZL, Hayhoe K, Woodhouse C, Gulden L, Jacobs K, North G, Leung R, Washington W, Jiang X, Casteel R. 2010.
Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water: A white paper assessment of the past, present and future and recommendations for action.
Texas Water Journal.
1(1):1-19.
Available from: https://doi.org/10.21423/twj.v1i1.1043.
© 2010 Jay L. Banner; Charles S. Jackson; Zong-Liang Yang; Katharine Hayhoe; Connie Wroodhoouse; Lindsey Gulden; Kathy Jacobs; Gerald North; Ruby Leung; Warren Washington; Xiaoyyan Jiang; Richard Castel.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 or the TWJ website.
Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://twj-ojs-tdl.tdl.org/twj/index.php/twj/about#licensing https://doi.org/10.21423/twj.v1i1.1043 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 2 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 FOREWORD “Observational records and climate projections provide abundant evidence that freshwater resources are vulnerable and have the potential to be strongly impacted by climate change, with wide-ranging consequences for human societies and ecosystems.” These words, from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Technical Paper VI: Climate Change and Water (Bates et al.
2008), sound a sufficiently sobering call for more research, more deliberation, and more informed actions in efforts to mitigate predicted climate change impacts on Texas’ water resources.
And now, bolstering the vital importance of serious and timely attention to these matters, a report issued in December 2008 by the U.S.
Climate Change Science Program suggests that earlier projections may have underestimated the climatic changes that could take place by 2100 and that the United States faces the possibility of much more rapid climate change by the end of the century than previous studies have suggested (Clark and Weaver 2008).
“Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water,” produced by the Environmental Science Institute and the Jackson School of Geosciences at the University of Texas at Austin, focuses on the impacts and uncertainties of climate change on Texas and its water resources.
Understanding climate change impacts on water resources is critical because of the implications of these impacts for many other important sectors, including agriculture, energy, ecosystems, and public health.
The paper provides an excellent presentation of potential global climate change effects on Texas’ water resources; identifies future scientific research efforts deemed necessary to develop more reliable climate projections; and proposes recommendations designed to enhance further collaborations between research scientists, regional and state water managers, policy-makers, consultants, and the public.
If implemented, these recommendations can lead to potential policy changes and resource management decisions that may help prepare Texas for climate change impacts on its water resources.
Almost all climate model projections show that Texas is extremely susceptible to significant future climate variability and has the strong potential of extreme stress on its water resources.
This fact, coupled with a rapid and concurrent population growth, will likely push water supply and demand issues in the state, especially in the urban areas, to the “breaking point.” Texas has one of the world’s most robust economies, but if sound, scientifically based water infrastructure and water management strategies are not implemented, Texas could face serious social, economic, and environmental consequences.
Given the possibilities that perfectly legitimate, science-based scenarios present or imply, Texas must act now to develop and implement feasible and effective measures to mitigate climate change impacts on its water resources.
Texas has the world’s greatest concentration of experts in energy research, finance, law, science, engineering, and business development.
All this knowledge and all these skills can be applied to make Texas a world leader in addressing climate change and its predictable impacts.
Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water is an excellent example of the application of such knowledge and expertise.
Larry R. Soward, Former Commissioner Texas Commission on Environmental Quality SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS Based on our study, we find that climate change may have significant impact on the future of Texas’ water resources and that large uncertainties exist regarding the nature and extent of the changes and impacts.
Understanding the changes in climate, the impacts, and the uncertainties will require new initiatives to conduct policy-relevant scientific research.
As a guide to this research process, we make the following series of recommendations: Establish a Texas Climate Consortium (TCC), con-1.
sisting of representatives from academia, industry, federal, state and local agencies, water resource managers, and other stakeholders.
The proposed TCC will be administered by the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB).
The proposed mission of the consortium includes: a) to serve as a state-level equivalent to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to bring together experts and stakeholders to investigate and report on the latest climate science to help inform policy and management, b) to identify highpriority science and policy topics related to Texas’ climate change and water resources, and c) to identify resources needed for research and education.
Incorporate large droughts of the past into water plan-2.
ning.
Whereas the current use of the 1950s drought as the drought of record has provided a baseline for water resource planning, paleoclimate studies indicate that longer-term “megadroughts” occurred in the past.
An investment in research to improve the temporal and spatial resolution and accuracy of proxies for paleoclimate reconstructions will provide a more extended and accurate drought history for Texas.
This research can be used to determine whether droughts that better represent the extremes documented in the 13th and 16th century should be considered in water planning.
Develop a statewide, real-time monitoring network of3.
climate and hydrologic variability so that the response of water resources to extreme climate events can be determined.
Improve the applicability of climate models for the Tex-4.
as region by supporting research to improve methods Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 3 to use global climate model results for “downscaling” to model projections for regions in Texas and assess the sources of uncertainty in climate model projections to determine how well models can simulate observed climate variability at diurnal to decadal time scales and how well they can replicate processes that control Texas climate (e.g., generation of tropical storms, winter cold fronts).
Continue to advance the use of adaptive management5.
strategies for Texas’ water resources.
Determine the impacts and calculate the costs of pro-6.
jected climate change to the state’s economy, including the long-term costs of not planning for changes in water availability due to climate change.
Advance research on the relationship between Texas’7.
water supply and energy use and incorporate the findings into water planning.
Encourage and support development of K-12 and8.
university-level education programs on the science and policy of climate change and water resources to inform and inspire future researchers, policy-makers, and citizens.
INTRODUCTION In April 2008, the conference Forecast: Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water 2008 was held at the State Capitol in Austin, Texas.
It was cosponsored by the Environmental Science Institute and the Jackson School of Geosciences at The University of Texas at Austin, the River Systems Institute at Texas State University, and the Texas Water Resources Institute at Texas A&M University.
The conference focused on what we know and what we need to gain knowledge about regarding the effect of climate change on Texas’ water availability and on the Texas communities and ecosystems that depend on reliable sources of water.
The conference featured presentations by scientists who study climate change and who investigate how climate change may affect Texas and our water resources.
The future of Texas’ water supplies is difficult to predict with confidence because of the large number of factors that influence precipitation and water storage.
At the same time, state-of-the-art research is currently available to help inform policy decisions, but more research is needed to fully address policy and planning needs.
This white paper first reviews what is known about how global climate change may affect Texas’ water resources.
We then outline research steps necessary to build more reliable regional climate projections.
We conclude by providing a set of recommendations for research that may be useful for guiding potential policy changes and resource management decisions.
Our intention in writing this white paper is to further interactions between research scientists, regional and state water managers, policy-makers, consultants, and the public, as they pertain to assessing the impacts of climate change on Texas’ water resources.
The goal of the recommendations is to help the state build resilience in the face of an uncertain future, a future where the only certainty is that future climate conditions in Texas will not resemble those experienced over the past century.
By acknowledging this uncertainty and developing robust, relevant tools capable of quantifying future uncertainty, we believe it is possible to prepare the state of Texas for successful adaptation to future climate change and its impacts on water resources.
We recognize that the problems associated with climate change impacts on Texas’ water resources go beyond the subjects considered in this white paper.
For example, steps to mitigate climate change, such as energy conservation, developing alternative energy and carbon sequestration, and efforts to increase water conservation, are only generally treated here.
These are all considered in detail in other available and wellreferenced reports (e.g., IPCC 2007c; US EPA 2008; Bates et al.
2008).
The focus of this white paper is the impacts of climate change in Texas on the state’s water resources.
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON WATER RESOURCES Water resources around the world are already stressed by rapid population increases, rising demand, and limited supply.
In many regions, climate change will exacerbate existing stresses, leading to increased competition for water resources and raising the specter of water shortages.
Exactly how climate change will affect a specific region’s water resources is dependent on physical and social characteristics unique to each region.
The Southwest has been characterized as one of seven geopolitical “danger zones” in the world, due to both vulnerability to significant future climate change and rapidly growing populations and cities (Sachs 2008).
Using Seager et al.’s (2007) definition, the “Southwest” is all land between 125°W and 95°W and 25°N and 40°N.
This includes most of Texas.
Here we summarize the current understanding of principal climate change impacts on water at the global and national scale.
We then build on this discussion to provide a more detailed discussion of Texas-specific impacts.
General impacts of climate change on water resources The potential impacts of climate change on water resources at the global and national scale have been described in recent Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 4 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the U.S.
Global Change Research Program (IPCC 2007b; Bates et al.
2008; USGCRP 2009).
At the global scale, a number of projected impacts of climate change on freshwater resources include (Bates et al.
2008): Changes in the availability of drinking water, resulting• from shifting patterns of precipitation and evaporation, rapidly shrinking glaciers and snowpack that provide water to over half of the world’s population, and changing water demands More frequent and intense extreme events, including• floods and droughts Increased risk to coastal areas due to rising sea level,• storm surge floods, and increasing ocean temperatures Increases in water pollution and shifts in aquatic biol-• ogy resulting from increased water temperatures Both growth and shrinkage in water boundaries result-• ing from rising sea level, changing precipitation patterns, and changing flow to lakes and streams Climate change impacts specific to Texas water: Past, present, and future Texas climate Texas is located in climate zones that transition from the humid Southeast United States to the arid Southwest United States.
The state’s climate is characterized by a north-south gradient in minimum annual temperature and a strong east-towest moisture gradient, from 145 cm of rainfall per year (57 inches/yr) in the east to less than 25 cm/yr (10 inches/yr) in the west (Fig.
1).
The climate of Texas is influenced by a complex range of atmospheric processes, physiographic features, and moisture sources (Fig.
2).
The North American Cordillera funnels cold air southward into Texas, whereas the Gulf of Mexico serves as Texas’ main moisture source and a moderating influence on temperature on the land surface (NielsenGammon 2010).
The Pacific Ocean is a less frequent moisture source for the region.
Along the region’s coast to the southeast, tropical storms and hurricanes are infrequent but important weather systems.
Texas experiences great extremes in rainfall, and large rainfall events may be triggered by a variety of mechanisms, including synoptic-scale and coastal fronts, topography, and large-scale ascent (Nielsen-Gammon et al.
2005).
This range of sources and interacting processes produces significant variability in the intraand interannual patterns of rainfall in Texas, making the prediction of recharge to aquifers and runoff to streams challenging.
Texas spans 26 to 37 oN latitude, and as a result, the state’s climate is influenced by the descending limb of the Hadley atmospheric circulation cell.
This is one of several factors that produce semi-arid conditions in the western part of the state (Griffiths and Ainsworth 1981; Bomar 1995).
In addition to these regional factors, Texas’ climate is also influenced by more remote connections with other regions such as the tropical Pacific Ocean, where sea surface temperatures control El Niño-Southern Oscillation climate phenomena that influence rainfall and temperature in Texas.
El Niño episodes typically bring higher than average rainfall to Texas, whereas La Niña episodes typically bring below average rainfall.
Among the factors that make Texas susceptible to drought are the aridity caused by high pressure associated with Hadley circulation, variations in the strength and position of the Bermuda High, and the influence of La Niña events (Fig.
1).
Failure of the Southwest Monsoon, which brings warm moist air in July and August from the Pacific Ocean to northwest Mexico, Arizona, and New Mexico, can also result in drought in Far West Texas (Nielsen-Gammon 2010).
Past climate change in Texas Climate change that is driven by natural processes occurs over many time scales.
According to the IPCC (2007a), atmospheric warming over the 20th and 21st centuries is “unequivocal,” and is “very likely” (greater than 90% probability) to have been driven by a combination of natural and anthropogenic processes.
To place this warming into a broader context, geologic materials are analyzed that preserve information about past climate and can thus serve as “proxies” for time periods prior to instrumental measurement of temperature and rainfall.
These paleoclimate proxies indicate that Texas experienced large changes in the past, on millennial time scales that in some cases follow global-scale glacial to interglacial cycles.
These inferred changes are based on the analysis of sedimentary deposits, fossils, cave mineral formations, and other proxies (Toomey et al.
1993; Musgrove et al.
2001; Cooke et al.
2003).
These studies produce a consistent reconstruction of central Texas as a much wetter and cooler region, covered by thicker soils, during the late Pleistocene time period, between approximately 25,000 and 15,000 years before present.
Instrumental records document variations in climate and hydrology based on observations, using devices such as thermometers and rain gauges.
These records are generally limited to little more than a century and have formed a basis for water resource management and planning.
The 1950s drought is commonly used as the worst-case-scenario for drought planning.
Climate records have been extended further back in time using proxies such as tree rings, which can track annual variations in climate, and have been used to reconstruct precipitation, drought, and streamflow for past centuries to several millennia.
These proxy records, which have been generated for many areas of the United States including Texas, place the 20th century events, such as the 1950s drought, into a long-term Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 5 years of below-average flows (Woodhouse and Lukas 2006).
Central and west Texas tree-ring reconstructions provide evidence for the occurrence of droughts that rivaled or exceeded the drought of the 1950s in this region.
The most severe of these droughts occurred in west Texas during much of the 13th century (Fig.
3A), and in central Texas during the last half of the 16th century and at the turn of the 18th century (Cleaveland 2006).
The 16th century included a period of “megadrought” that was nearly continental in scale (Stahle et al.
2000; Cleaveland 2006).
Climate reconstructions in combination with climate model results suggest cool sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean as a driving mechanism for these megadroughts (Cook et al.
2008).
An observational and model analysis of the major North American droughts in the Great Plains of the 20th century indicates that there is a regional sensitivity in the apparent driving mechanisms for these droughts (Hoerling et al.
2009).
20th century drought severity in the southern portion of the Great Plains (i.e., Texas) is strongly linked to Pacific equatorial SSTs, whereas drought severity in the northern portion is not.
These climate observations and proxy records indicate that significant variability in water availability has occurred even in the absence of anthropogenic climate change.
In addition to multiyear droughts, the reconstructions of past climate discussed above also document slow, multidecadal variations in climate.
This low-frequency variability is a challenge for water management approaches that consider climate as relatively stationary.
Superimposed over the natural lowfrequency variability will be trends in climate due to anthrocontext.
It can be concluded from these studies that the 20th century contains only a subset of the climatic variability that is evident over past centuries.
The magnitude of the 1950s drought is not unprecedented, and reconstructions show that more severe and sustained droughts occurred prior to the 20th century.
For example, a reconstruction of Rio Grande headwaters flow using tree rings documents a drought in the late 1800s with 11 consecutive Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water -7 to -4 -3 to -1 0 to 2 2 to 5 6 to 12 Average annual minimum temperature (Celsius) 22 to 27 28 to 31 31 to 33 33 to 35 36 to 39 Average annual maximum temperature (Celsius) Average annual precipitation (cm) 23-28 28-38 38-48 48-58 114-124 124-135 135-145 145-160 58-74 74-84 84-99 99-114 Texas Pacific Ocean West winds Bermuda High Atlantic Ocean Arctic fronts Tropical storm path Jet S tream Gulf air Gulf of Mexico ENSO Fig.
1.
A.
Average annual minimum temperature; B.
Average annual maximum temperature; C. Average annual rainfall (cm) for Texas.
Data are from USDA National Resources Conservation Service for the time period 1971 to 2000 (USDA NRCS 2006).
A.
B. C. Fig.
2.
Atmospheric processes in North America that influence the variability of Texas climate.
Red ‘ENSO’ region schematically represents the northeast extent of the El Nino–Southern Oscillation climate phenomenon, which drives changes in sea-surface temperature in the tropical Pacific Ocean and which can influence rainfall and temperature variability in Texas.
Modified from TWDB (2007).
Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 6 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 pogenic influences that are expected to contribute to future changes in Texas’ climate (Fig.
3).
We therefore recommend that planning take into account a broader range of scenarios by considering both the natural variability of the extended records of paleoclimate data, along with 20th century records and 21st century projections.
This recommendation necessitates reassessment of the use of the most severe drought in the instrumental record, which is the 1950s drought for most of Texas, as the worst-case scenario.
Research collaboration among scientists, planners, and decision makers should be conducted to determine how best to incorporate the information from the paleoclimatic data into future planning.
Such research should assess the need for improving the temporal and spatial resolution, temporal extent, and accuracy of proxies for paleoclimate reconstruction.
More accurately determining such paleoclimate information from such proxies will allow the development of a more comprehensive climate history for Texas.
Recent temperature trends During the last 130 years, measurements of observed surface temperatures of the Earth have shown warming globally and regionally, with increases in global mean temperature of almost one degree C (almost 2 oF).
This warming is less than the 4–7 oC warming that occurred since the Last Glacial Maximum (around 21,000 years before present) to the pre-industrial era, but it has occurred at a rate that is ten times faster (IPCC 2007a, Chap.
6).
The IPCC supported its 2007 announcement that global warming was unequivocal by showing that stateClimate Change Impacts on Texas Water 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100 −5 0 5 Tree Ring and Climate Model Projected PDSI year PD SI 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 −5 0 5 Tree Ring PDSI year PD SI 900 950 1000 1050 1100 1150 1200 1250 1300 −5 0 5 Tree Ring PDSI year PD SI Fig.
3A.
Drought history for the time period 900-1970 (red time series, based on tree-ring data), and one possible drought projection for the 21st century (green time series, based on climate model results) for west Texas.
The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is a measure of drought that incorporates rainfall and temperature information (Palmer 1965; Wells et al.
2004).
The utility of the PDSI and other indices for drought is evaluated by the IPCC (2007a, Chap.
3).
The PDSI tree-ring reconstruction is from the North American Drought Atlas (Cook and Krusic, 2004).
Climate model data are from the World Climate Research Programme’s Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 multi-model dataset.
The model data are from downscaled regional climate projections from coarser-scale global climate model results, as described in Maurer et al.
(2007).
The featured projection is for IPCC emissions scenario A2, using the Canadian Global Climate Model (CGCM) projections of monthly mean temperature and precipitation and converted to PDSI using the self-calibrating algorithm of Wells et al.
(2004).
The red and green curves are 4-year running means of the PDSI index given in dark blue.
The IPCC emissions scenarios involve a range of projected rates of economic growth, population growth, and balances between fossil and alternative fuels, as described in IPCC (2000).
The A2 group of scenarios involves high-population growth and slow technological change in terms of energy use, and is also referred to as the “business as usual” group of scenarios.
Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 7Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 −5 0 5 10 American Model (CCSM) P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 −5 0 5 10 Canadian Model (CGCM) ensemble member 1 P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 −5 0 5 10 Canadian Model (CGCM) P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 −5 0 5 10 Canadian Model (CGCM) ensemble member 2 P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 −5 0 5 10 German Model (ECHAM) Year P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 −5 0 5 10 Canadian Model (CGCM) ensemble member 3 Year P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 0 10 Central Texas P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 0 10 East Texas P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 0 10 Panhandle P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 0 10 South Texas P D S I 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 −10 0 10 West Texas Year P D S I Fig.
3C.
Climate model projections of the PDSI, based on the Canadian CGCM model for each of five regions in Texas.
Fig.
3B.
Climate model projections of the PDSI for west Texas over the next 100 years under emissions scenario A2 for three different climate models: the American CCSM model (top left), Canadian CGCM model (middle left), and German ECHAM model (bottom left); and for three different runs of the Canadian model for different initial conditions (three panels in right column).
There is uncertainty in the severity of the drying as indicated by the spread in predictions among the American, Canadian, and German models.
It is important to note that climate models do not provide information about the precise timing of particular drought or flooding events.
This is illustrated by the right column, which presents three ensemble members (a kind of repeat experiment) from the Canadian model that were initialized with different starting conditions.
Taking into account the range of uncertainties associated with the different models, the results indicate that west Texas has the potential to become much drier than it is at present.
Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 8 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water of-the-art climate models were able to reproduce the observed temperature trends only when they included natural solar and volcanic forcings together with the anthropogenic increase of greenhouse gases (Fig.
4).
This inability of the models that lack anthropogenic forcings to reproduce observed temperature trends is largest over the past three decades.
Although the average change in surface temperature has been only 1oC, the warming across the globe has not been evenly distributed.
Larger warming is concentrated at the poles and over the continents, so that local climate change may be significantly different from the global average change.
Similarly, surface temperature is projected to increase unevenly, with larger changes over land than over the ocean.
In Texas, there has been relatively rapid warming over the past three decades, yet over the past century, there has been a negligible temperature change (Fig.
5, TWDB 2007).
Warming similar to the global average has occurred over the past century in the subtropical, southern part of the state (Yu et al.
2006).
Climate change projections Global and regional climate models are improving rapidly, both in terms of geographic resolution and in terms of representing the physical processes of climate.
A larger number of model simulations produced for different scenarios exist than in the past, which gives us a greater basis for estimation and assessment of probable future climate conditions.
Model projections for the coming century for the interior west of the United States, including west Texas, project up to four times the global average warming that occurred over the 20th century (NRC 2007).
Results of climate models from the IPCC (2007a) project that average surface air temperature for Texas will increase by 2-5 oC over the 21st century (Fig.
5).
Another manifestation of the projected warming is the larger number of days per year that a given region of Texas will experience temperatures over 100 oF.
While in the recent past, approximately 10-20 days per year have been above 100 oF in some regions in Texas, climate models project more than 100 such 100 oF days per year by the end of the century under a high emissions scenario (Fig.
6).
The projected temperatures for Texas are dependent on which emissions scenario is ultimately achieved by our society, as illustrated by the range in temperature produced using the A2, A1B, and B1 scenarios (Fig.
5).
The IPCC concluded in 2007 that the Southwest is likely to experience reduced precipitation in addition to higher temperatures.
This conclusion is consistent with projected changes in the large-scale circulation, including an expansion and strengthening of the subtropical high and the associated subsiding motion and retreat of the jet stream and winter storm tracks toward the poles.
Observations over the last three decades, as well as climate model simulations, indicate that the descending branch of the Hadley cell has expanded northward.
This expansion of Earth’s tropics is hypothesized to continue with global warming, which would lead to increased aridity in the Southwest (Hu and Fu 2007; Lu et al.
2007; Frierson et al.
2007; Seidel et al.
2008).
Based on an analysis of a series of global climate modeling studies, Texas has been identified as one of three significant climate “hot spots” in North America, in terms of the region’s susceptibility to projected changes (Koster et al.
2004; Diffenbaugh et al.
2008).
Several global analyses of climate model results provide projected temperature, precipitation, and runoff information for the Southwest region, which as defined here includes Texas at its eastern end.
The analyses compare model results for periods in the 21st century with observations for the 20th century.
These include the following: An analysis comparing modeled precipitation minus 1. evaporation for the period 2021–2040 with observations of precipitation minus evaporation for the period 1950–2000 projects pronounced drying of the Southwest (Seager et al.
2007).
An analysis comparing modeled runoff for the peri-2.
od 2041–2060 with observed runoff for the period 1900–1970 projects pronounced drying of Southwest, with west Texas experiencing more drying than east Texas (Milly et al.
2005).
This study also demonstrated stronger agreement among the different models for the projected results for the western portion of the Southwest than the eastern portion.
An analysis comparing modeled temperature and pre-3.
cipitation for the period 2080–2099 relative to observations for the period 1980–1999 projects warmer Fig.
4.
Twentieth century temperature trend for North America.
The black line is the observational trend, the blue band encompasses the range of climate model results that use only natural forcings, and the pink band is the range of model results that use both natural and anthropogenic forcings (Fig.
SPM4, IPCC 2007a).
Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 9 21st century differences across the state in terms of the extent of decreasing precipitation and runoff.
We further focus here on constraining future aridity in Texas by considering projections for the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for different climate models and for five different parts of the state (Fig.
3).
Future aridity in Texas appears to be significant and comparable to the megadroughts of the past.
For example, model projections for west Texas show that nearly every decade from 2040 to 2100 includes a drought of similar or longer duration than the drought of the 1950s (Fig.s 3A, 3B).
There are considerable uncertainties in the timing and magnitude of the model projections, illustrated by the differences in results among different climate modeling research groups, and among repeat model runs with different starting conditions within the same research group (Fig.
3B).
Climate models are not capable of predicting timing and magnitude of individual drought events.
Given these limitations in the models and the differences in their results, some notable similarities among all of the model results exist for the projected increases in aridity (Fig.
3B).
While some parts of the state may receive more annual precipitation (Jiang and Yang subtemperatures for the Southwest, with strong agreement across different model simulations (Meehl et al.
2007a).
For the same periods and model comparisons, precipitation is projected to be lower in the Southwest.
These models do not project a pronounced west-east gradient in drying across Texas, and there is more agreement among different model simulations for the result of lower winter precipitation in the western portion of the Southwest than for the result of lower winter precipitation in the eastern portion.
Agreement among the different model simulations is significantly weaker for precipitation than for temperature (Meehl et al.
2007a).
In summary, the implications for Texas of these global climate model and observation analyses are that 1) compared with the 20th century, Texas is projected to be warmer and drier for the three different 21st century time periods investigated: 2021–2040, 2041–2060, and 2080–2099; 2) there is stronger agreement among the models regarding the predictions of increasing temperature than for the predictions of decreasing precipitation; and 3) there is not strong consensus regarding Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Fig.
5.
Observed and modeled surface temperature anomalies for Texas.
The observed anomalies are yearly observed departures from the 30-year observed mean climatology from 1971 to 2000.
Modeled changes in annual mean surface temperature are averaged over ensemble members for each of the 16 models (and 39 total simulations) that participated in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007a).
The future climate projections are based on three different emissions scenarios, A2, A1B, and B1.
For the A1B scenario (balanced energy use) the gray trend represents all model results and the black trend denotes the average.
For the B1 (purple trend, rapid economic change and clean and resource efficient technology) and A2 (red trend, business as usual scenario as described in Fig.
3) only the averages are shown.
Emissions scenarios described in IPCC (2000).
Anomalies for each model are shown relative to that model’s mean climatology from 1971–2000.
The model data are from downscaled regional outputs from models that participated in the World Climate Research Programme as described in Fig.
3.
The source of the observations is the National Climatic Data Center dataset (Guttman and Quayle 1996).
From Jiang and Yang (submitted).
Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 10 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water mitted), the net result of projected increased temperatures is proposed to be drier conditions moving eastward relative to today (Yu et al.
2006).
A projected increase in aridity through the 21st century is common to the model results for all regions in Texas (Fig.
3C).
It is proposed that on the time scale of years to decades the normal climate of the Southwest may resemble that of the drought of the 1950s (Seager et al.
2007).
The high variability and uncertainty in the precipitation forecasts for Texas over the 21st century (Tebaldi et al.
2006; Meehl et al.
2007a; Jiang and Yang submitted) suggest that climate change impacts on water availability would be difficult to project.
Two factors, however, indicate that evaporation may be a more important and more predictable determinant in projections of water availability in Texas.
First, there is much stronger agreement between model forecasts of temperature increase and less variability in the forecasted temperature increases (Fig.
5) compared with precipitation projections (Tebaldi et al.
2006; Meehl et al.
2007a).
Second, evaporation plays a large role in Texas’ hydrologic cycle, as evidenced by Nexrad estimates of precipitation and streamflow data that indicate that nine out of every 10 drops of rain that fall on Texas leave Texas as evaporation rather than as runoff to streams (C. David and others, UT Austin, personal communication).
This is based on the assumption that submarine discharge of fresh groundwater is minor relative to streamflow and evaporation, and this assumption is in agreement with global-scale estimates (Burnett et al.
2003).
These two factors are consistent with evaporation dominating over precipitation in governing future dryness indices such as expressed by the PDSI.
Different mechanisms are attributed to the proposed future and recorded past droughts in the Southwest.
The projected future drying in this region is consistent with the expansion of the Hadley circulation and a poleward shift of the westerlies and storm tracks driven by greenhouse gas forcing (Hu and Fu 2007; Frierson et al.
2007; Lu et al.
2007; Seidel et al.
2008, Cook et al.
2008).
The droughts of the past, in contrast, appear to be associated with changes in SSTs in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean associated with La Niña episodes and solar forcing (Cook et al.
2007, 2008; Hoerling et al.
2009).
As such, the paleorecord is not an ideal analog for future droughts.
As noted by Cook et al.
(2008), “It is thus disquieting to consider the possibility that drought-inducing La Niña-like conditions may become more frequent and persistent in the future as greenhouse warming increases.” Thus, key research areas include improved coverage of regional and temporal variability of past droughts in Texas, downscaled model projections for regional climate change, and an improved understanding of the driving mechanisms of both past and potential future droughts.
Research is also needed regarding the changes in soil moisFig.
6.
Recent (1961-1979) and projected future (2080-2099) temperature changes in the US for two emissions scenarios (B1 and A1).
Temperature changes expressed as the number of days per year with temperatures above 100 °F.
In the higher emissions scenario A1, some regions of Texas will shift from 10-20 days in the recent past to more than 100 days per year in which the temperature exceeds 100 °F.
From U.S.
Global Change Research Program (2009), following approach of Hayhoe et al.
(2004, 2008).
Emissions scenarios described in IPCC (2000).
Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 11 ture and runoff that will accompany these climatic changes.
The relatively few studies that have been conducted on the projected impacts of climate change on Texas water resources have significant uncertainties associated with the projections (Muttiah and Wurbs 2002; Wurbs et al.
2005; CH2M HILL 2008).
These studies provide estimates of the impacts of changes in temperature and precipitation on the San Jacinto, Brazos, and Colorado River drainage basins.
Each estimate is based on assumptions that need to be validated concerning the use of climate-model information on the long-term mean and variability in changes in precipitation and temperature and resulting impacts on streamflows.
The San Jacinto River Basin evaluation was the only study to find an increase in streamflow.
A 20% increase in flow and 30% increase in variability in a 50-year model projection come from increased flood flows in spring and fall (Muttiah and Wurbs 2002).
For the Brazos River Basin, a 50-year model projection finds reduced streamflow and a 5% reduction in reliability of this resource (Wurbs et al.
2005).
Multiple climate model projections for 2050 for the Colorado River Basin yield estimates of significantly decreased runoff in the basin in central Texas, with estimates of future streamflow to the Colorado River to decrease by 13% to 34% (CH2M HILL 2008).
Water-demand projections for 2100 for Travis, Hays, and Williamson counties in central Texas are 170% to 400% larger than for 2010 (LCRA 2010).
Combining the impacts of increased demand on water due to population growth and projections in climate change by 2050, first-order water budget calculations indicate that, under drought conditions, Texas’ surface water supply will fail to meet the state’s water-use demands (Ward 2010).
SIGNIFICANT UNKNOWNS REGARDING CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON TEXAS WATER In this section we consider the main impacts and uncertainties regarding climate change in Texas, with particular emphasis on water resources and more general consideration of impacts on public health and the state’s economy.
The following are the principal areas of uncertainty regarding the scientific community’s understanding of climate change impacts on Texas water resources.
Climate models are better at predicting mean climate1.
than climate variability and climate extremes.
Climate change projections are based on global circulation models that are best at replicating and projecting global scale climate.
Although projections of future temperature are relatively robust in that there is good agreement between different climate models for most regions of the world, projections for precipitation at regional scales contain a higher degree of uncertainty (Meehl et al.
2007a; Deng et al.
2007).
The applicability of such projections will be enhanced by an improved understanding of the sources of uncertainty through evaluation of the ability of different models to reproduce observed (e.g., 20th century) climate.
Understanding how well physical and dynamic processes are represented and understanding climate feedbacks (i.e., links between processes that can enhance or diminish effects) are important, especially for the regions that influence climate in Texas (Tebaldi and Knutti 2007).
In general, there is less confidence in regional scale2.
predictions than those at larger scales.
For Texas relative to other regions, there is little agreement on the magnitude of changes in precipitation in the 21st century (Nielsen-Gammon 2010), although pronounced drying trends characterize most model results for the Southwest (Fig.
3; Milly et al.
2005; Seager et al.
2007; Meehl et al.
2007a).
Whereas there are uncertainties and approximations in hydrologic models used for watershed management in Texas, larger uncertainties for such management lie in the use of global climate models for predicting regional climate change (Wurbs et al.
2005).
Texas is affected by short-term climate phenomena3.
driven by changes in tropical SSTs, such as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO).
El Niño and its counterpart, La Niña, are not well predicted by global climate models, but they do have a strong correlation to specific climate patterns across the Southwest and in Texas (Wurbs et al.
2005; Kurtzman and Scanlon 2007; Cook et al.
2007; Meehl et al.
2007b; Hoerling et al.
2009).
The Pacific Decadal Oscillation is another periodic climate phenomenon associated with the Pacific Ocean and ENSO (Newman et al.
2003) that also shows some correlation with Texas climate patterns, but to a lesser degree than ENSO (Kurtzman and Scanlon 2007).
Texas’ vulnerability to severe weather from tropical4.
storms and hurricanes is well established, yet there is only limited knowledge for predicting the impact of future climate change on the intensity and frequency of such events for Texas (Deng et al.
2007), as well as the response of water resources to such events.
An increase in the frequency of such storms may serve to increase recharge to aquifers and runoff to streams.
Negative consequences of such storm activity include damage to water resource infrastructure from flooding and winds, soil erosion, and contamination of aquifers from runoff and coastal storm surges.
Although there have been recent advances in our understanding Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 12 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 of the relationship between global warming and tropical storm intensity and frequency, the specifics of this relationship and its potential impact on water resources have large uncertainties associated with them (e.g., Emanuel 2005; Webster et al.
2005; Knutson and Tuleya 2004; Pielke et al.
2005; Emanuel et al.
2008).
Local factors such as land-use change can significantly5.
affect local climate, yet the role of these factors in climate change in Texas has not been examined in detail (Yang 2004; Scanlon et al.
2005).
Feedbacks between climate change and land-use change in this region may be significant, as indicated by analysis of the 1950s and 21st century droughts in Mexico (Stahle et al.
2009).
Unique aspects of Texas water resources and unknowns regarding impacts of climate change Unique aspects of Texas’ groundwater and surface water resources add to the uncertainty associated with the impact of climate change on Texas water.
Climate change will likely intensify a number of existing stresses on water supplies in the state.
Across the state, highly variable conditions exist for rates of recharge and storage, and flow regimes.
All rivers cross Texas from west to east, discharging in the Gulf of Mexico, and most are not snow-fed.
At a state level, Texas precipitation is relatively unique in the strong east-to-west decrease in rainfall (Fig.
1C).
Consequently, water supply needs in west Texas are strikingly different from those in east Texas.
At one extreme, arid regions in north Texas receive little rainfall and are highly dependent upon groundwater supplies via aquifers that recharge through playa lakes.
For example, much of the recharge to the regionally extensive Ogallala Aquifer likely occurred during the last ice age, creating a challenge to this resource’s sustainability in the face of increasing usage, changing climate, and slow, persistent decreases in availability over time (Scanlon et al.
2005).
At the other extreme, the Edwards Aquifer is recharged by more frequent rainfall with runoff to small rivers, such as Barton Creek, and a fast-moving groundwater system.
The resultant conditions of water resource availability can fluctuate rapidly in the Edwards, with the potential to exhibit very low flow and then shift quickly to normal levels (Mahler and Massei 2007).
Such karst aquifers that recharge rapidly, as well as shallow, highly permeable clastic aquifers that are responsive to precipitation and drought (such as the Seymour and Lipan-Kickapoo aquifers) will be more susceptible to the impacts of climate change (Mace and Wade 2008; Chen et al.
2001).
Competition for resources, particularly water resources, is aggravated by the growth of the state’s population.
While population growth alone increases water resource needs, the basic services provided to support the burgeoning populations can compound the overall level of demand.
For example, many Texans get electric power from traditional forms of energy generation, which are often water-intensive when compared to emerging energy generation technologies.
Climate change is likely to exacerbate a number of existing stresses in the state.
Detailed projections of the impacts of climate change on south Texas agriculture, ecosystems, air quality, and water supply are provided in Norwine and John (2008).
The implications of climate change for Texas’ unique water resource conditions include the following: With projected warming of Texas’ climate, rivers and1.
reservoirs will lose increasing amounts of water to evaporation.
The Rio Grande and other rivers are essential for irri-2.
gation but could experience a drastic reduction in streamflow or dry up if, as the balance of evidence indicates, droughts become more common.
Significantly decreased river flow will damage agriculture, aquatic ecosystems, and the estuaries that depend on fresh–salt water balances for cash crops such as shrimp.
A global analysis using observational and model results3.
suggests that more intense rainfall events are associated with global warming (IPCC 2007a, Chap.
3).
For the period 2080–2099 relative to 1980–1999, the Southwest is projected to experience both an increase in precipitation intensity (with relatively weak agreement among models) and longer dry periods in between rain events and more heat waves (with relatively strong model agreement; Tebaldi et al.
2006).
Implications of such projections for Texas include the potential to increase runoff and lessen the amount of water that infiltrates into the ground and recharges aquifers.
Both increased runoff of rainfall and decreased infiltration of rain into soil have the potential to exacerbate water quality problems.
Agricultural productivity, already water-limited in4.
much of the state, is vulnerable to an increased frequency of drought and to potential shifts in the locations of optimal growing zones for typical crops.
Landuse change driven by agriculture in the High Plains of Texas has been shown to impact recharge and groundwater quality (Scanlon et al.
2005).
Groundwaterirrigated agriculture may also be affected by dropping aquifer levels and rising electricity costs for pumping water.
Many forms of traditional energy generation require5.
water that, due to climate-induced and other stresses, will be under demand in other sectors.
Cooling water for coal-fired, natural gas, and nuclear power plants, for example, represents 40% of freshwater extraction Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 13 in the United States (King et al.
2008).
The interdependence of energy and water is also evident in the significant amounts of energy expended for purifying and pumping freshwater.
Severe drought could cause water-intensive energy generation to shut down, with cascading effects on the economy and health if brownouts or blackouts follow.
Population growth in Texas Under any of several likely projections, Texas will have a population that is at least twice as large (at 35.8 million projected for 2040) as in 1990 (when it was 17.0 million) and may be more than three times as large, at 51.7 million (OSD 2006).
Another projection has the state’s population more than doubling between 2000 and 2060 from 20.9 to 45.6 million people, whereby 297 Texas cities are expected to more than double their population during this period (TWDB 2007).
A rural-to-urban population shift is projected, with greatest growth in regions encompassing the Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and McAllen areas.
Such rapid population changes concurrent with climate change would exacerbate water demand and supply problems, particularly in urban areas.
Potential economic and human health impacts of climate change in Texas Given the projections for warmer temperatures, more extremes (duration, time between occurrences, and intensity) in drought and rainfall, and rising sea level, there are potential economic and human health impacts for Texas.
If temperatures rise as projected, human health will likely be affected by more heat-related illnesses, water quality impacts, and the northward spread of tropical diseases and pests.
Rising temperatures also suggest that more regions in Texas will not attain EPA ground-level ozone standards (US EPA 2009).
Many human health impacts of global climate change are also projected to occur via climate change impacts on water (Shea et al.
2007; Frumkin et al.
2008).
Projected climate changes also have the potential to negatively affect Texas’ economy.
The state’s economy and land-use patterns will likely shift to adjust from traditional energy and agriculture to renewable sources and dryland agriculture (Norwood and Dumler 2002).
Under a scenario of increasing aridity, Texas’ second largest industry, agriculture, would be significantly impacted and the state’s ability to meet electric power demands would be challenged.
Rising sea level and changes in stream discharge into Gulf of Mexico estuaries would threaten coastal freshwater aquifers, and the coast’s $2.5 billion economic benefit derived from tourism, recreation, and fishing (TWDB 2007).
The Texas coast has experienced among the greatest sea level rises in the United States over the past 50 years, and is projected by the end of the century to experience among the greatest rises, including a projected 3.5-foot rise in Galveston (USGCRP 2009).
The protection provided by barrier islands and coastal wetlands against storm surges would be significantly reduced or lost.
Costs of replacement or replenishment of beaches, bays, and marshes and coastal development and infrastructure will likely be staggering.
Developing a funding plan for the anticipated costs of water development and conservation efforts is another significant challenge (Texas Comptroller 2009).
As noted by the TWDB (TWDB 2007): “Not only is Texas’ population rapidly growing, but it also has one of the world’s most robust economies.
If Texas were an independent nation, its economy would rank eighth in the world when measured by gross national product.
Rapid growth, combined with Texas’ susceptibility to severe drought, makes water supply a crucial issue.
If water infrastructure and water management strategies are not implemented, Texas could face serious social, economic, and environmental consequences.” The state of Texas already has a significant stake in, and could further benefit economically from, an expansion of climatemitigating efforts, including the development of renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar power; underground sequestration of carbon dioxide from coal fired power plants; and energy trading systems.
A significant unknown involves determining what the cost to the state will be if no action is taken.
If no further climate mitigation efforts are undertaken, if major research programs into the climate change impacts on Texas water resources are not developed, and if no policy changes based on such research are enacted, what will the economic costs to Texas be in 10, 20, or 50 years?
There have been few attempts at determining the economic costs of climate change.
A comprehensive analysis of the global economic costs of global climate change was undertaken by the United Kingdom (Stern 2006).
This analysis includes costs of “business as usual” (i.e., assuming no mitigation actions are taken) and mitigation scenarios, and it applies the following three methods: 1) a consideration of the physical impacts of climate change on the economy, human life, and the environment; 2) application of integrated assessment models to estimate economic costs of climate change, and macro-economic models to estimate economic costs of the transition to lowemission energy systems; and 3) a comparison of the costs of social impacts of increased emissions with the costs of achieving emissions reductions.
The costs of climate change impacts under a business as usual scenario are a reduction in global consumption per head (the value of goods and services bought by people) in the upper part of the range of 5% to 20%, whereas the costs of emissions mitigation are on the order of Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 14 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 1% of global GDP.
The consensus conclusion based on the range of analytical methods is that the benefits of significant and early action will considerably outweigh the costs of no action (Stern 2006).
On a national scale, from 1980 to 2003, there were ten droughts estimated to have cost more than $1 billion dollars each (Ross and Lott 2003, Cook et al.
2007).
The TWDB estimates the costs to Texas businesses and workers of a future water shortage similar to the drought of the 1950s, with no change in supply infrastructure or management strategies, to be $9.1 billion in 2010 and $98.4 billion by 2060 (TWDB 2007).
Associated lost business taxes are $466 million in 2010 and $5.4 billion in 2060.
Given our analysis that the proxy records and model projections indicate that the 1950s drought is not an appropriate worst-case scenario, these estimated costs should be taken as minima.
Incorporation of the Stern approach into the TWDB economic models is an important next step in weighing the economic costs of no action for Texas.
Integration of expertise from the communities of climate change, hydrology and hydrogeology, land-use change, water resource engineering, and socioeconomics will be essential for a comprehensive understanding of the future of global water resources in general (Vorosmarty et al.
2000) and Texas’ water future in particular.
RECOMMENDATIONS Based on our analysis of the current state of knowledge regarding global climate change, Texas climate change, and the sensitivity of the state’s water resources to these changes, we make the following series of recommendations.
Establish a Texas Climate Consortium (TCC).
1.
This proposed consortium will periodically bring together scientists, engineers, policy-makers, and consultants from industry, academia, and government agencies to assess current knowledge of climate change impacts on Texas water.
Proposed missions for the TCC are to serve as a state-level IPCC-like resource for investigating and reporting state-of-the-art climate science to help inform policy and management; identify the highest priority science topics and make recommendations for essential research needed, and identify resources needed for research and education.
The proposed TCC would be implemented by and report its findings to the TWDB.
There are similar organizations in other regions of the United States, such as National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (http://www.climate.noaa.gov/cpo_pa/risa/), but there is no such organization with a focus on Texas.
The proposed TCC will develop the means to engage the science research community with the communities of regional water management, state agencies, industry, and other stakeholders on issues of climate change impacts on Texas water resources.
It is proposed that an overarching consortium such as a TCC can best direct progress on the key recommendations below.
Incorporate large droughts of the past into water2.
planning.
Given the evidence for more intense and extended droughts in proxy records of Texas climate relative to the drought of the 1950s, research should be advanced to improve the accuracy, temporal range, and geographic coverage of such proxy records, as well as to improve our understanding of the driving mechanisms of such phenomena.
Through improved paleoclimate reconstructions, a more comprehensive drought history can be developed and applied in Texas water planning.
Although the climate of the past will not be an exact analogue for the future, natural variability as preserved in paleoclimatic data can be used to help plan for the future, as it will underlie anthropogenic trends.
In particular, an understanding of natural, low-frequency climatic variability is essential for future water resource planning.
Establish a statewide, real-time monitoring network3.
of climate and hydrologic variability.
Extensive observations of Texas climate and water will allow scientists and planners to better apply leading-edge scientific understanding to Texas’ needs.
An extensive network that includes and advances present monitoring systems will allow researchers to better understand the detailed response of hydrologic systems to the onset and nature of extreme climate events.
Such a network would be similar to those proposed by The Consortium of Universities for the Advancement of Hydrologic Science (http://www.cuahsi.org/) and The National Ecological Observatory Network (http://www.neoninc.org/).
Improve the applicability of climate models for the4.
Texas region.
This recommendation can be achieved by supporting research in developing methods for using results from global climate models to make predictions for different parts of Texas; and determining how well such models a) simulate the observed variability of Texas climate across time scales (hourly to decadal); b) replicate climate processes that control Texas climate (e.g., tropical storms, winter cold fronts), and c) translate the interactions of the climate system with land surface to produce resultant streamflow, which is a key variable used in water resource planning.
Such assessments and improvements are necessary if projections of future climate are to be useful for Texas planners Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 15 and policy-makers.
An unmet basic research need is to learn which of the many global climate models used are most accurate at representing Texas climate and its variability, and to determine the optimal approach to downscaling from global to regional climate modeling.
We must also identify what is most uncertain about current climate predictions for Texas so that resources can be invested toward minimizing that uncertainty.
Paleoclimate records should also be improved as means to assess climate models for future projections.
Continue to advance the use of adaptive manage-5.
ment strategies for Texas’ water resources.
Although many scientific uncertainties remain regarding the details of the extent and rate of climate change and its impact on Texas water resources, we have enough knowledge to act now.
The TWDB’s adaptive water planning framework is well positioned to incorporate adjustments to respond to climate change.
Adaptive management needs include improved, strategic monitoring of climate in operational real-time.
Water quality changes resulting from climate change impacts should be anticipated, including the impacts of increased water temperatures, reduced base flows, more intense storms, fire, dust, and sediment.
With regard to water quantity, adaptive strategies must maximize options, such as conservation, that have double benefits—from both an energy and water perspective—and fewer environmental impacts.
The complexity of climate change processes in Texas and the resulting impacts indicate that the development of effective adaptive strategies would require resource managers and decision makers to work closely with scientists from across many disciplines.
Determine the impact and calculate the costs of pro-6.
jected climate change to the state’s economy, including the costs of taking no action.
If we continue with a business as usual approach, and do not develop new research and management programs regarding the climate change impacts described in this white paper, what are the potential costs to Texas’ economy?
Potential costs of water shortage impacts for Texas include those to businesses and workers estimated to be $9.1 billion in 2010 and $98.4 billion by 2060.
Following the approach of the United Kingdom (i.e., Stern 2006) and the TWDB (2007), an integrated assessment should be undertaken to determine costs of no action if water shortages on the order of the most significant historical and projected droughts occur (Fig.
3).
Advance research on the connection of water sup-7.
ply and energy use.
There is a continuing need for connecting water and energy in a water management context.
Significant volumes of water are required to generate energy by most conventional means, mostly for cooling, as well as by many alternative means, such as biofuels.
Additionally, energy is required to pump, treat, and deliver water, and to treat and reuse wastewater.
In fact, water and wastewater management are two of the largest users of energy in most states (approximately 30% of the total energy produced by power plants in California).
Impacts on the available freshwater supply have immediate bearing on our ability to generate electricity from hydropower, coal, nuclear, and gas.
Many water supply options being discussed as technology fixes for the future are energyintensive, including interbasin transfers, desalination, cloud seeding, dry cooling, and expanded groundwater pumping.
The large potential for solar power in the Southwest will be maximized by developing technologies that do not require significant amounts of water for cooling (King and Webber 2010).
Therefore, capital (infrastructure) and water rights decisions need to be evaluated regarding shortand long-term energy and emissions impacts.
Texas should continue to be a leader in pursuing alternative energy sources such as wind and solar, as well as improving existing energy technologies, to gain the multiple benefits of conserving water and reducing emissions.
Encourage and support development of K-12 and 8. university-level education programs.
Innovative educational programs focused on the science and policy of climate change and water resources are needed to train and inspire future researchers and policy-makers.
In a comparison among 17 nations of the percentage of 24-year-olds who earn degrees in natural sciences or engineering vs. other majors, the United States ranks 16th (NA 2007).
This nationwide trend of fewer students choosing careers in science, combined with the need for new interdisciplinary approaches to training future water resource scientists, managers, and policymakers, indicates that new and innovative educational efforts are essential.
New interdisciplinary degree programs are needed to integrate traditional disciplinary strengths of Texas universities in climate science, water science and engineering, and public policy (Banner and Guda 2004).
Scholarships for university students and engaging K-12 curricula on these topics would provide incentives for young learners to follow such programs.
The investments that we make today in such recommendations to anticipate and adapt to these impacts of climate changes may not be visible in our lifetimes, but they will improve the lives of our children and grandchildren.
Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 16 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the following people for their reviews and input to this study: Todd Votteler, Robert Mace, Barney Austin, Malcolm Cleaveland, Suzanne Pierce, Laura Sanders, and two anonymous reviewers.
The staffs at The University of Texas at Austin’s Environmental Science Institute, Texas State University’s River Systems Institute, and The Texas A&M University System’s Texas Water Resources Institute developed the Texas Climate Change Impacts on Water conference.
The white paper session was sponsored by the Environmental Science Institute and the Jackson School of Geosciences, UT Austin.
Support was provided by grant ATM-0823665 from NSF’s P2C2 Program, the Geology Foundation of UT Austin, and a grant from the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority.
REFERENCES Banner JL, Guda N. 2004 Nov 8.
Reforming universities to save the environment.
Austin-American Statesman; Sect A:11.
Bates BC, Kundzewicz ZW, Wu S, Palutikof JP, editors.
2008.
Climate change and water.
Technical Paper of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Geneva (CH): IPCC Secretariat.
210 p. Bomar GW.
1995.
Texas weather.
2nd ed.
Austin: University of Texas Press.
275 p. Burnett WC, Bokuniewicz H, Huettel M, Moore WS, and Taniguchi M. 2003.
Groundwater and pore water inputs to the coastal zone.
Biogeochemistry 66(1-2):3-33.
CH2M HILL.
2008.
Climate change study: report on evaluation methods and climate scenarios.
Prepared for Lower Colorado River Authority and San Antonio Water System Water Project.
103 p. WBS 3.3.3.1.CH2M.14.82690.
Chen C, Gillig D, McCarl BA.
2001.
Effects of climatic change on a water dependent regional economy: a study of the Texas Edwards Aquifer.
Climatic Change 49:397409.
Clark PU, Weaver AJ.
2008.
Abrupt climate change: a report by the U.S.
Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.4.
Reston (VA): U.S. Geological Survey.
459 p. Cleaveland MK.
2006.
Extended chronology of drought in the San Antonio area.
Revised report to the GuadalupeBlanco River Authority.
29 p. Cook ER, Bartlein PJ, Diffenbaugh N, Seager R, Shuman BN, Webb RS, Williams JW, Woodhouse C. 2008.
Chapter 3: Hydrological variability and change.
In: Clark PU, Weaver AJ.
[CCSP] Climate Change Science Program 2008: Abrupt climate change: a report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.4.
Reston (VA): U.S. Geological Survey.
p. 143-257.
Cook ER, Krusic PJ.
2004.
North American summer PDSI reconstructions.
IGBP PAGES/World Data Center for Paleoclimatology Data Contribution Series No.
2004045.
Boulder (CO): NOAA/NGDC Paleoclimatology Program.
24 p. Cook ER, Seager R, Cane MA, Stahle DW.
2007.
North American drought: reconstructions, causes, and consequences.
Earth-Science Reviews 81(1-2):93-134.
Cooke MJ, Stern LA, Banner JL, Mack LE, Stafford T, Toomey RS.
2003.
Precise timing and rate of massive late Quaternary soil denudation.
Geology 31(10):853-856.
Deng Y, Bowman KP, Jackson CS.
2007.
Differences in rain rate intensities between TRMM observations and the community atmosphere model simulations.
Geophysical Research Letters 34:L01808.
Diffenbaugh N, Giorgi F, Pal JS.
2008.
Climate change hotspots in the United States.
Geophysical Research Letters 35(16):L16709.
Emanuel K. 2005.
Increasing destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years.
Nature 436(7051):686688.
Emanuel K, Sundararajan R, Williams J.
2008.
Hurricanes and global warming: results from downscaling IPCC AR4 simulations.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 89(3):347-367.
Frierson DMW, Lu J, Chen G. 2007.
Width of the Hadley cell in simple and comprehensive general circulation models.
Geophysical Research Letters 34:L18804.
Frumkin H, Hess J, Luber G, Malilay J, McGeehin M. 2008.
Climate change: the public health response.
American Journal of Public Health 98(3):435-445.
Griffiths JF, Ainsworth G. 1981.
One hundred years of Texas weather: 1880-1979.
Office of the State Climatologist.
College Station: Texas A&M University.
205 p. Guttman NB, Quayle RG.
1996.
A historical perspective of U.S. climate divisions.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 77(2):293-303.
Hayhoe K, Cayan D, Field CB, Frumhoff PC, Maurer EP, Miller NL, Moser SC, Schneider SH, Cahill KN, Cleland EE, and others.
2004.
Emission pathways, climate change, and impacts on California.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 101(34):12422-12427.
Hayhoe K, Wake C, Anderson B, Liang X-Z, Maurer E, Zhu J, Bradbury J, DeGaetano A, Stoner AM, Wuebbles D. 2008.
Regional climate change projections for the Northeast USA.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for GlobClimate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 17 al Change 13(5-6):425-436.
Hoerling M, Quan X-W, Eischeid J.
2009.
Distinct causes for two principal US droughts of the 20th century.
Geophysical Research Letters 36(19):L19708.
Hu Y, Fu Q.
2007.
Observed poleward expansion of the Hadley circulation since 1979.
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discussions 7(4):9367-9384.
[IPCC] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
2000.
Summary for policymakers: emissions scenarios.
A special report of Working Group III of the IPCC.
27 p. [IPCC] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007a.
Climate change 2007: The physical science basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis M, Averyt KB, Tignor M, and Miller HL, editors.
Cambridge (UK) and New York (NY): Cambridge University Press.
996 p. [IPCC] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007b.
Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof PJ, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE, editors.
Cambridge (UK) and New York (NY): Cambridge University Press.
976 p. [IPCC] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007c.
Climate change 2007: mitigation of climate change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Mertz B, Davidson OR, Bosch PR, Dave R, Meyer LA, editors.
Cambridge (UK) and New York (NY): Cambridge University Press.
851 p. Jiang X, Yang, Z-L.
Submitted.
Assessing projected changes of temperature and precipitation in Texas from downscaled global climate models.
Climatic Change.
King CW, Holman AS, Webber ME.
2008.
Thirst for energy.
Nature Geoscience 1(5):283-286.
King CW, Webber ME.
2010.
Water vs. energy: how solar power can help.
Solar Today 2010 Jan-Feb:24-27.
Knutson TR, Tuleya RE.
2004.
Impact of CO2-induced warming on simulated hurricane intensity and precipitation: sensitivity to the choice of climate model and convective parameterization.
Journal of Climate 17(18):3477.
Koster RD, Dirmeyer PA, Guo Z, Bonan G, Chan E, Cox P, Gordon CT, Kanae S, Kowalczyk E, Lawrence D, Liu P, and others.
2004.
Regions of strong coupling between soil moisture and precipitation.
Science 305(2):1138-1140.
Kurtzman D, Scanlon BR.
2007.
El Niño–Southern Oscillation and Pacific Decadal Oscillation impacts on precipitation in the southern and central United States: evaluation of spatial distribution and predictions.
Water Resources Research 43(10):W10427.
[LCRA] Lower Colorado River Authority (TX).
2010.
2010 Water Resource Plan [Internet].
Austin: Lower Colorado River Authority [cited 2010 June 22].
45 p. Available from: http://www.lcra.org/watersupply/index.html Lu J, Vecchi GA, Reichler T. 2007.
Expansion of the Hadley cell under global warming.
Geophysical Research Letters 34(6):L06805.
Mace RE, Wade SC.
2008.
In hot water?
How climate change may (or may not) affect the groundwater resources of Texas.
Gulf Coast Association of Geological Societies Transactions 58:655-668.
Mahler BJ, Massei N. 2007.
Anthropogenic contaminants as tracers in an urbanizing karst aquifer.
Journal of Contaminant Hydrology 91(1-2):81-106.
Maurer EP, Brekke L, Pruitt T, Duffy PB.
2007.
Fine-resolution climate projections enhance regional climate change impact studies.
Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union.
88(47):504.
Meehl GA, Stocker TF, Collins WD, Friedlingstein P, Gaye AT, Gregory JM, Kitoh A, Knutti R, Murphy JM, Noda A, and others.
2007a: Global climate projections.
In: Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis M, Averyt KB, Tignor M, Miller HL, editors.
Climate change 2007: the physical basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].
Cambridge (UK) and New York (NY): Cambridge University Press.
p. 747-845.
Meehl GA, Tebaldi C, Teng H, Peterson TC.
2007b.
Current and future U.S. weather extremes and El Niño.
Geophysical Research Letters 34:L20704.
Milly PCD, Dunne KA, Vecchia AV.
2005.
Global patterns of trends in streamflow and water availability in a changing climate.
Nature 438(7066):347-350.
Musgrove M, Banner JL, Mack LE, Combs DM, James EW, Cheng H, Edwards RL.
2001.
Geochronology of Late Pleistocene to Holocene speleothems from central Texas: implications for regional paleoclimate.
Geological Society of America Bulletin 113(12):1532-1543.
Muttiah RS, Wurbs RA.
2002.
Modeling the impacts of climate change on water supply reliabilities.
Water International 27(3):407-419.
[NA] National Academies (US), Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century: An Agenda for American Science and Technology.
2007.
Rising above the gathering storm: energizing and employing America for a brighter economic future.
Washington DC: The National Academies Press.
592 p. [NRC] National Research Council (US), Committee on the Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 18 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Scientific Bases of Colorado River Water Management.
2007.
Colorado River Basin water management: evaluating and adjusting to hydroclimatic variability.
Washington DC: The National Academies Press.
222 p. Newman M, Compo GP, Alexander MA.
2003.
ENSO forced variability of the Pacific decadal oscillation.
Journal of Climate 16(23):3853-3857.
Nielsen-Gammon JW.
2010.
The changing climate of Texas.
In: North GR, Schmandt J, Clarkson J, editors.
The impact of global warming on Texas.
Austin: University of Texas Press [In press].
Nielsen-Gammon JW, Zhang F, Odins AM, Myoung B.
2005.
Extreme rainfall in Texas: patterns and predictability.
Physical Geography 26(5):340-364.
Norwine J, John K, editors.
2007.
The changing climate of South Texas 1900-2100: problems and prospects, impacts and implications [Internet].
Kingsville (TX): Texas A&M University-Kingsville, Center for Research Excellence in Science & TechnologyResearch on Environmental Sustainability of Semi-Arid Coastal Areas; [cited 2010 June 23].
Available from: http://www.texasclimate.org/Home/ BookChangingClimateofSouthTexas/tabid/485/Default.
aspx Norwood CA, Dumler TJ.
2002.
Transition to dryland agriculture: limited irrigation vs. dryland corn.
Agronomy Journal 94(2):310-320.
[OSD] Office of the State Demographer.
[Internet].
2006.
San Antonio: Texas State Data Center and Office of the State Demographer, Institute for Demographic and Socioeconomic Research, The University of Texas at San Antonio.
New Texas State Data Center Population Projections from the University of Texas at San Antonio; [cited 2010 June 23].
Available from: http://txsdc.utsa.edu/ tpepp/2006projections/summary/ Palmer WC.
1965.
Meteorological drought.
Washington DC: Department of Commerce Weather Bureau.
Research Paper No.
45.
Piekle Jr R, Landsea C, Mayfield M, Laver I, Pasch R. 2005.
Hurricanes and global warming.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 86(11):1571-1575.
Ross T, Lott N. 2003.
A climatology of 1980–2003 extreme weather and climate events.
Asheville (NC): NOAA/NESDIS.
National Climatic Data Center.
National Climatic Data Center Technical Report No.
2003-01.
Sachs J.
2008.
Common Wealth: Economics for a crowded planet.
New York: The Penguin Press.
Scanlon BR, Reedy RC, Stonestrom DA, Prudic DE, Dennehy KF.
2005.
Impact of land use and land cover change on groundwater recharge and quality in the southwestern US.
Global Change Biology 11(10):1577-1593.
Seager R, Ting M, Held I, Kushnir Y, Lu J, Vecchi G, Huang H-P, Harnik N, Leetmaa A, Lau N-C, and others.
2007.
Model projections of an imminent transition to a more arid climate in southwestern North America.
Science 316(5828):1181-1184.
Seidel DJ, Fu Q, Randel WJ, Reichler TJ.
2008.
Widening of the tropical belt in a changing climate.
Nature Geoscience 1(1):21-24.
Shea KM, Committee on Environmental Health.
2007.
Global Climate Change and Children’s Health.
Pediatrics 120(5):1359-1367.
Stahle DW, Cook ER, Cleaveland MK, Therrell MD, Meko DM, Grissino-Mayer HD, Watson E, Luckman BH.
2000.
Tree-ring data document 16th century megadrought over North America.
Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union 81(12):121-125.
Stahle DW, Cook ER, Diaz JV, Fye FK, Burnette DJ, Griffin RD, Soto RA, Seager R, Heim RR.
2009.
Early 21stcentury drought in Mexico.
Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union 90(11):9089-9090.
Stern N. 2006.
The economics of climate change: the Stern review.
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
692 p. Tebaldi C, Hayhoe K, Arblaster JM, Meehl GA. 2006.
Going to the extremes: an intercomparison of model-simulated historical and future changes in extreme events.
Climatic Change 79(3-4):185-211.
Tebaldi C, Knutti R. 2007.
The use of the multimodel ensemble in probabilistic climate projections.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 365(1857):20532075.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.
2009.
Liquid assets: the state of Texas’ water resources [Internet].
Austin: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts Publication #96-1360, 2009 Jan; [cited 2010 June 23].
73 p. Available from: http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/water/ [TWDB] Texas Water Development Board.
2007.
Water for Texas: 2007 State Water Plan [Internet].
Austin: Texas Water Development Board; Chapter 5: Climate of Texas, p. 129-136 Chapter 9: Water supply needs, p. 245-253; Chapter 12: Challenges and uncertainties in water supply planning.
p. 291-308 [cited 2010 June 23].
Available from: http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/wrpi/swp/swp.htm Toomey RS, Blum MD, Valastro Jr. S. 1993.
Late Quaternary climates and environments of the Edwards Plateau, Texas.
Global and Planetary Change 7(4):299-320.
[USDA NRCS] U.S. Department of Agriculture National Resources Conservation Service.
[Internet].
Portland (OR): Water and Climate Center of the Natural Resources Conservation Service.
2006 June 12 PRISM; [cited 2010 June 22].
Available from: http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/ climate/prism.html [US EPA] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
2008.
Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 Texas Water Journal, Volume 1, Number 1 19 National water program strategy: response to climate change [Internet].
2008 Sept. Washington DC: U.S. EPA Office of Water (4101M); [cited 2010 June 24].
EPA 800-R-08-001.
114 p. Available from: http://water.epa.
gov/scitech/climatechange/strategy.cfm [US EPA] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
2009.
Assessment of the impacts of global change on regional U.S. air quality: a synthesis of climate change impacts on ground-level ozone (An Interim Report of the U.S. EPA Global Change Research Program).
Washington DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
EPA/600/R-07/094F.
[USGCRP] U.S.
Global Change Research Program.
2009.
Global climate change impacts in the United States.
Karl TR, Melillo JM, Peterson TC, editors.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
196 p. Vorosmarty CJ, Green P, Salisbury J, Lammers RB.
2000.
Global water resources: vulnerability from climate change and population growth.
Science 289(5477):284-288.
Ward G. 2010.
Water resources and water supply.
In: North GR, Schmandt J, Clarkson J, editors.
The impact of global warming on Texas.
Austin: University of Texas Press [in press].
Webster PJ, Holland GJ, Curry JA, Chang H-R. 2005.
Changes in tropical cyclone number, duration, and intensity in a warming environment.
Science 309(5742):1844-1846.
Wells N, Goddard S, Hayes MJ.
2004.
A self-calibrating Palmer Drought Severity Index.
Journal of Climate 17(12):2335-2351.
Woodhouse CA, Lukas JJ.
2006.
Drought, tree rings, and water resource management.
Canadian Water Resources Journal 31(4):297-310.
Wurbs RA, Muttiah RS, Felden F. 2005.
Incorporation of climate change in water availability modeling.
Journal of Hydrologic Engineering 10(5):375-385.
Yang Z-L. 2004.
Modeling land surface processes in shortterm weather and climate studies.
In: Zhu X, editor.
Observations, theory, and modeling of atmospheric variability.
World Scientific Series on Meteorology of East Asia 3.
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Corporation.
p. 288-313.
Yu J, Norwine J, Bingham R, Tebaldi C. 2006.
Potential climatic deterioration in semiarid subtropical South Texas.
Geography Online [Internet].
6(2).
Available from: http:// www.siue.edu/GEOGRAPHY/ONLINE/gov6n2.html Climate Change Impacts on Texas Water Banner et al.
2010 Vol.
1 No.
1.pdf 2010 Vol1Num1COVER final 2010 Vol1Num1 Climate Change FINAL 2010 Vol1Num1 Climate Change FINAL
VOLUME 13:26 | NOVEMBER 2020 PUBLICATIONS SPP Research Paper CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR SPECIAL SERIES CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR TRISTAN PEARCE, JAMES D. FORD AND DAVID FAWCETT http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v13i0.69570 FOREWORD THE CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR RESEARCH PROGRAM PAPER SERIES This paper is part of a special series in The School of Public Policy Publications, examining the potential for economic corridors in Canada.
This paper is an output of the Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program.
The Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program at The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary is the leading platform for providing information and analysis necessary to establish the feasibility and desirability of a network of multi-modal rights-of-way across middle and northern Canada.
Endorsed by the Senate of Canada, this work responds to the Council of the Federation’s July 2019 call for informed discussion of pan-Canadian economic corridors as a key input to strengthening growth across Canada and “a strong, sustainable and environmentally responsible economy.” This Research Program will help all Canadians benefit from improved infrastructure development in Canada.
This paper “Climate Change and the Implications for the Proposed Canadian Northern Corridor” falls under the Environmental Impacts theme of the program’s eight research themes: • Strategic and Trade Dimensions • Funding and Financing Dimensions • Legal and Regulatory Dimensions • Organization and Governance • Geography and Engineering • Economic Outcomes • Social Benefits and Costs • Environmental Impacts All publications can be found at https://www.canadiancorridor.ca/the-researchprogram/research-publications/.
Dr. Jennifer Winter Program Director, Canadian Northern Corridor Research Program https://www.canadiancorridor.ca/the-research-program/research-publications/ https://www.canadiancorridor.ca/the-research-program/research-publications/ 1 CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR* Tristan Pearce, James D. Ford and David Fawcett KEY MESSAGES The key findings and recommendations of this review are: Climate change is already impacting Northern Canada and infrastructure in the region.
This includes infrastructure that is similar to what would exist in the proposed Canadian Northern Corridor, or other infrastructure that is a part of industries that drive the demand for expanded transportation through a corridor.
Based on future climate change projections, current impacts are expected to continue and intensify in the future.
This means that existing and new infrastructure in Northern Canada will be at greater risk of damage.
Climate change impacts are likely to affect the construction of transportation infrastructure in the corridor.
Future climate change projections must be integrated into regulations, codes and standards, design and route planning.
Maintenance of infrastructure in the corridor would need to be more robust to mitigate expected climate change impacts.
This will likely increase the costs of maintenance, and maintenance procedures will need to be responsive to dynamic conditions over time.
Climate change could adversely impact and even halt the continuous operation of the corridor.
Climate change could accelerate the deterioration of, and in some instances severely damage, corridor infrastructure.
How changing climate conditions could affect “chokepoints” within the corridor system will be an important consideration.
The corridor will need to be responsive to the political economy of climate change.
This includes the global movement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implications for the global economy that the movement of resources through the corridor depends on.
Local communities and Indigenous Peoples must be meaningfully consulted early and often.
Early and ongoing communication is necessary to identify if a corridor is desirable and relevant and how it might be impacted by climate change.
* This research was financially supported by the Government of Canada via a partnership with Western Economic Diversification 2 RÉPERCUSSIONS DU CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE SUR LE PROJET DE CORRIDOR NORDIQUE CANADIEN* Tristan Pearce, James D. Ford et David Fawcett MESSAGES CLÉS Voici les principales conclusions et recommandations tirées de cet examen : L’impact des changements climatiques se fait déjà sentir dans le Nord canadien et sur les infrastructures de la région.
Cela concerne notamment des infrastructures semblables à celles proposées pour le corridor nordique canadien ou toute autre infrastructure utile aux industries qui poussent la demande de transport le long d’un corridor.
Sur la base des projections du changement climatique, l’impact actuel devrait s’intensifier à l’avenir.
Cela veut dire que l’infrastructure en place ou prévue dans le Nord canadien sera davantage exposée aux dommages.
L’impact du changement climatique affectera probablement la construction de l’infrastructure de transport dans le corridor.
La réglementation, les codes et normes de pratique, la conception et le tracé du corridor doivent tous tenir compte des projections du changement climatique.
L’entretien des infrastructures dans le corridor devrait être plus rigoureux afin d’atténuer les effets attendus du changement climatique.
Cela augmentera probablement les coûts de maintenance, dont les procédures devront être adaptées à des conditions dynamiques au fil du temps.
Le changement climatique pourrait avoir un impact négatif et même interrompre l’exploitation continue du corridor.
Le changement climatique pourrait accélérer la détérioration et, dans certains cas, endommager gravement l’infrastructure du corridor.
Il est important de comprendre les effets du changement climatique sur les « goulots d’étranglement » dans le corridor.
Le concept du corridor doit tenir compte de l’économie politique du changement climatique.
Cela comprend le mouvement mondial en faveur d’une réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre ainsi que ses répercussions sur l’économie mondiale qui influence le mouvement des ressources dans le corridor.
Cette recherche a été soutenue financièrement en partie par le gouvernement du Canada via Diversification de l'économie de l'Ouest Canada.
* 3 Les communautés locales et les peuples autochtones doivent être dûment consultés, et ce, dès le début et souvent au cours du développement du projet.
Une communication précoce et continue est nécessaire pour déterminer si un corridor est souhaitable et pertinent et pour savoir de quelle façon il serait affecté par le changement climatique.
4 SUMMARY The Canadian Northern Corridor (CNC) has been proposed as a potential solution to the challenges presented by limited transportation infrastructure in Northern Canada (Sulzenko and Fellows 2016).
Building, operating and maintaining infrastructure in a northern corridor would be inherently challenging due to issues of remoteness and climate change.
This paper reviews scientific evidence about the documented and potential impacts of climate change in Northern Canada and examines what the implications are for future CNC development.
Between 1948 and 2016, the annual average temperature across Northern Canada increased approximately 2.3 C, including a 4.3 C increase during winter months (Vincent et al.
2018).
There is “virtual certainty” that this trend will continue, with the magnitude of increase dependent on future atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions (Zhang et al.
2019).
Over a similar period, Canada experienced a 20-percent increase in precipitation, with Northern Canada experiencing the largest proportional increase (Vincent et al.
2018).
Precipitation increases are expected to continue and be more concentrated at northern latitudes.
This is expected to result in more snowfall in northern regions, turning into more rainfall and extreme precipitation throughout the century (Zhang et al.
2019).
As temperature and precipitation patterns have changed, the cryosphere has been impacted.
Sea-ice extent and thickness have decreased in Northern Canada (Derksen et al.
2018).
Under all emissions scenarios, reductions to sea-ice cover is expected to continue (Mudryk et al.
2018).
Snow cover and accumulation, particularly in the fall and spring, have decreased across Canada, particularly in Northern Canada, and this trend is “virtually certain” to continue (Derksen et al.
2018).
Permafrost temperatures have increased as well, resulting in permafrost thaw in some areas (Romanovsky et al.
2017).
Under all emissions scenarios, air temperatures over permafrost areas are expected to increase, which is expected to result in the continued warming of permafrost across Northern Canada and the thawing of large areas by mid-century (Derksen et al.
2018).
Glaciers and ice caps are losing mass at an accelerating rate, which is expected to continue and, along with reduced snow accumulation, begin to impact streamflow and water resources in some northern areas (Clarke et al.
2015).
Changes to meltwater and precipitation have shifted streamflow towards earlier peaks and higher flows in the winter and spring (Bonsal et al.
2019).
Streamflow is projected to continue towards earlier onset of freshet and peaks in the winter and spring (Burn and Whitfield 2016; Burn et al.
2016).
River and lake-ice-cover duration has also declined, a trend that is expected to continue (Cooley and Pavelsky 2016).
Coastal areas in Northern Canada are particularly vulnerable to climate change.
Wave height and energy have increased, and the loss of sea-ice has exposed coastal areas and infrastructure to wave impacts (Greenan et al.
2018).
This has increased erosion in some locations, especially those that have experienced permafrost thaw.
These changes and impacts are compounded by warmer ocean 5 water temperatures that promote further permafrost thaw and thermal erosion (Derksen et al.
2018).
Projected relative sea-level change at coastal locations and the progression of these conditions are expected to adversely affect coastal areas and infrastructure in the future (Greenan et al.
2018).
Climate change is also impacting the occurrence of extreme events and ecosystems.
Changing climate conditions can increase the probability or intensity of extreme events, such as forest fires or floods (Zhang et al.
2019).
Across Canada, shifts in the distribution of species and range expansion and contraction have also been documented and attributed to climate change (Nantel et al.
2014).
These documented and projected future climate change impacts threaten the construction, maintenance and operation of infrastructure within the corridor.
Climate change impacts are likely to affect the feasibility and costs of some infrastructure and create ongoing challenges to operations.
Climate change impacts are highly localized, and a disturbance at one chokepoint in the corridor could compromise the operation of the whole corridor.
More research is needed to examine climate change impacts at local scales to understand the characteristics of the physical environment and how it is changing, as well as how existing human activities overlap with the proposed corridor.
Efforts are needed to engage relevant local communities and Indigenous Peoples early in corridor discussions to identify if a corridor is desirable and relevant to them and, if so, whether it can be developed in a manner that sustains livelihoods, culture, health and well-being.
Canada’s commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., the Paris agreement), the responses of the global economy to climate change, and the existence (or lack thereof) of a social licence for the development of infrastructure that contributes to greenhouse gas emissions all need to be considered in the visioning of the corridor.
Will a Canadian Northern Corridor be relevant in an economy that is moving away from fossil fuel dependency and towards renewable energy?
If so, will building, operating and maintaining the infrastructure within a corridor be feasible under changing climatic conditions, such as those outlined in this report?
6 RÉSUMÉ Le corridor nordique canadien (CNC) est proposé comme solution potentielle aux défis posés par le manque d’infrastructure de transport dans le Nord canadien (Sulzenko et Fellows 2016).
La construction, l’exploitation et l’entretien de l’infrastructure du corridor nordique sont intrinsèquement difficiles en raison des problèmes de l’éloignement et du changement climatique.
Cet article passe en revue les données scientifiques sur l’impact documenté et potentiel du changement climatique dans le Nord canadien et en examine les répercussions pour le développement éventuel du CNC.
Entre 1948 et 2016, la température moyenne annuelle dans le Nord canadien a augmenté d’environ 2,3 °C, notamment une augmentation de 4,3 °C pendant les mois d’hiver (Vincent et al.
2018).
Il existe une « quasi certitude » que cette tendance se poursuivra; l’ampleur de l’augmentation dépendra des futures émissions de gaz à effet de serre dans l’atmosphère (Zhang et al.
2019).
Au cours de la même période, environ, le Canada a connu une augmentation de 20 % des précipitations.
L’augmentation la plus forte, toute proportion gardée, est enregistrée dans le Nord canadien (Vincent et al.
2018).
On prévoit que l’augmentation des précipitations s’intensifie dans les latitudes nordiques.
Cela devrait entraîner davantage de chutes de neige, lesquelles se transformeront de plus en plus en pluie ou en précipitations extrêmes au cours du siècle (Zhang et al.
2019).
La cryosphère est touchée par le changement des modèles de température et de précipitations.
L’étendue et l’épaisseur de la glace de mer ont diminué dans le Nord canadien (Derksen et al.
2018).
Tous les scénarios d’émissions prévoient une réduction continue de la couverture de glace de mer (Mudryk et al.
2018).
La couverture et l’accumulation de neige, en particulier à l’automne et au printemps, ont diminué partout au Canada, en particulier dans le Nord, et il est « quasi certain » que cette tendance se poursuivra (Derksen et al.
2018).
La température du pergélisol a aussi augmentée, ce qui entraîne un dégel dans certaines régions (Romanovsky et al.
2017).
Tous les scénarios d’émissions prévoient une augmentation de la température de l’air au-dessus des zones de pergélisol, ce qui devrait entraîner un réchauffement continu du pergélisol dans le Nord canadien ainsi que le dégel de vastes zones d’ici le milieu du siècle (Derksen et al.
2018).
Les glaciers et les calottes glaciaires perdent de la masse à un rythme accéléré; tendance qui devrait se poursuivre et, avec la réduction de l’accumulation de neige, aura un impact sur le débit et les ressources en eau dans certaines régions nordiques (Clarke et al.
2015).
Les changements en matière de précipitations et d’eau de fonte influencent l’écoulement fluvial, qui connaît des débits de pointe précoces et plus élevés en hiver et au printemps (Bonsal et al.
2019).
On prévoit des débuts de crue printanière plus précoces ainsi que des débits de pointe en hiver et au printemps (Burn et Whitfield 2016; Burn et al.
2016).
La période de couverture de glace sur les rivières et les lacs a également diminué, une tendance qui devrait aussi se poursuivre (Cooley et Pavelsky 2016).
7 Les zones côtières du Nord canadien sont particulièrement vulnérables aux changements climatiques.
La hauteur et l’énergie des vagues ont augmenté, et la perte de glace de mer expose l’infrastructure et les zones côtières à l’impact des vagues (Greenan et al.
2018).
Cela accroît l’érosion à certains endroits, en particulier là où il y a dégel du pergélisol.
Les températures océaniques plus chaudes viennent aggraver la situation en favorisant le dégel du pergélisol et l’érosion thermique (Derksen et al.
2018).
L’élévation projetée du niveau de la mer dans les zones côtières ainsi que l’aggravement des conditions devraient avoir des effets négatifs sur les côtes et sur l’infrastructure (Greenan et al.
2018).
Le changement climatique a également un impact sur la survenue d’événements et d’écosystèmes extrêmes.
Les conditions climatiques peuvent accroître la probabilité ou l’intensité d’événements extrêmes, tels que les incendies de forêt ou les inondations (Zhang et al.
2019).
Partout au Canada, des changements dans la répartition des espèces ainsi que l’expansion ou la contraction des aires de répartition sont bien documentés et attribués aux changements climatiques (Nantel et al.
2014).
L’impact du changement climatique documenté ou projeté met à risque la construction, l’entretien et l’exploitation des infrastructures du corridor.
Le changement climatique affectera possiblement la faisabilité et le coût de certaines infrastructures, en plus de poser des défis constants pour leur exploitation.
Les impacts du changement climatique sont très localisés, et la perturbation d’un seul goulot d’étranglement peut compromettre l’exploitation de l’ensemble du corridor.
Des recherches supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour examiner l’impact du changement climatique à l’échelle locale afin de mieux comprendre les caractéristiques de l’environnement physique et son évolution, ainsi que la façon dont les activités humaines actuellement en place se chevauchent au corridor proposé.
Des efforts seront nécessaires dès le début pour favoriser la participation des communautés locales et des peuples autochtones aux discussions, et ce, afin de déterminer si un corridor est souhaitable et pertinent pour eux et, le cas échéant, s’il peut être développé de manière à soutenir les moyens de subsistance, la culture, la santé et le bien-être.
L’engagement du Canada à réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre (p.
ex., l’Accord de Paris), la réaction de l’économie mondiale face aux changements climatiques et l’existence (ou l’absence) d’acceptabilité sociale quant au développement d’infrastructures qui contribuent aux émissions de gaz à effet de serre doivent tous être pris en compte dans la vision du corridor.
Un corridor nordique canadien est-il pertinent dans une économie qui s’éloigne de la dépendance aux combustibles fossiles et qui se tourne vers les énergies renouvelables?
Dans l’affirmative, la construction, l’exploitation et l’entretien de l’infrastructure du corridor seront-ils réalisables dans le contexte du changement climatique tel que décrit dans ce rapport?
8 1.
INTRODUCTION Transportation infrastructure is limited in most of Canada’s northern regions, challenged by remoteness, geography, environmental conditions and underinvestment.
This has implications for the competitiveness, growth, diversification and prosperity of these regions (Pendakur 2017).
Furthermore, existing infrastructure in the south is experiencing east-west bottlenecks that are restricting access to international markets through export shipping (Transport Canada 2017; Fellows and Tombe 2018).
One response that has been proposed to these challenges is the development of a Canadian Northern Corridor (CNC) (Sulzenko and Fellows 2016).
The CNC proposal would involve the development of a multimodal right-of-way (ROW) stretching across Northern Canada.
As proposed by the University of Calgary School of Public Policy (SPP) (Sulzenko and Fellows 2016), the CNC would be between one and 10 kilometres in width and approximately 7,000 kilometres in length (Figure 1).
This ROW would facilitate the development of multiple modes of transportation and infrastructure, such as road, rail, pipelines, telecommunications, electricity transmission and others (e.g., increased shipping) that would increase Canada’s export capacity and could improve development and reduce the cost of living in remote northern areas (Sulzenko and Fellows 2016).
The development of the corridor would be a joint effort between public and private sectors and would make the construction and operation of critical infrastructure for both more efficient, and open-up possibilities for private investment in Northern Canada (Sulzenko and Fellows 2016).
Figure 1: A possible route of the Canadian Northern Corridor proposed by the University of Calgary School of Public Policy (Sulzenko and Fellows 2016).
The development of the corridor concept will, of course, be a significant undertaking and require extensive research and effort in multiple areas, such as defining governance and funding structures, ensuring appropriate consultation with 9 local communities and Indigenous Peoples, and understanding infrastructural and environmental opportunities and risks.
The potential impacts of climate change will also be an area of importance.
Building, operating and maintaining infrastructure in Northern Canada is already inherently challenging, due to issues of remoteness and climate.
Climate change is being experienced in this context, exacerbating existing risks and creating new challenges and opportunities for built infrastructure (Ford, Bell and Couture 2016; Palko and Lemmen 2017).
Current climate change impacts have been recorded at rates greater than what climate models projected and are expected to continue, and in some instances worsen, in the future (ECCC 2016; Bush and Lemmen 2019).
As such, past climate can no longer be considered a reliable guide in planning future infrastructure (Suter, Streletskiy and Shiklomanov 2019).
The construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure within a northern corridor would have to be undertaken with a clear understanding of expected future climate impacts.
This paper is a part of a larger program that explores multiple issues related to the potential development of the CNC, such as climate impacts, corridor governance, defining meaningful consultation and potential funding approaches for the establishment, governance and regulatory oversight of the corridor.
This paper specifically reviews scientific evidence about the potential impacts1 of climate change in Northern Canada and examines the implications for future corridor development.
Our review is based on an analysis of existing knowledge, drawing upon international and national climate change assessments, including Canada’s Changing Climate Report, released by Natural Resources Canada (Bush and Lemmen 2019), and other peer-reviewed and grey literature.
This paper begins by presenting the results of the review of potential impacts of climate change in Northern Canada.
Documented and projected future climate change impacts are described for a selection of relevant environmental attributes.
The implications of these impacts for future corridor development are then discussed and knowledge gaps and future research needs are identified.
The paper draws upon studies that use climate models and greenhouse gas (GHG)2 emissions scenarios to identify potential future climate change impacts.
Projections are developed using computer earth-system models to simulate how the climate will respond to different levels of climate-forcing inputs (e.g., GHG) and how these changes could interact with other physical and biogeochemical processes.
Because future GHG emissions are unknown, climate models use different low-, mediumand high-emissions scenarios based on socio-economic and policy modelling, 1 “Impacts” include the effects of climate change on natural and human systems (e.g., livelihoods, ecosystem, culture, infrastructure, etc.)
(IPCC 2014).
In this report, “impacts” primarily refers to the interaction of climate change and related events with the biophysical environment and the outcomes or consequences of those.
2 Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are gases found in the atmosphere, both naturally and due to human activity, such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and water vapour.
These gases absorb and emit heat radiated from the Earth and other parts of the atmosphere.
For the purpose of this paper, GHG emissions are primarily referring to GHGs emitted from human activities, which have been the main driver of climate warming during the industrial era (IPCC 2014; Lemmen and Bush 2019).
10 known as the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs).
Studies often use different RCPs in constructing projections to manage uncertainty, but some degree of uncertainty is inevitable.
The projections of current climate models are consistent across the next 10 to 30 years, but then start to diverge, reflecting uncertainty based on future GHG emissions and the complexity of the affected systems at smaller scales.
Because of this, when climate models are used to understand future climate change at the regional level, variability and uncertainty grow.
There are two methods to downscale model projections — statistical downscaling and dynamic downscaling — both of which have benefits and weaknesses and have been applied in Canada at large resolutions (e.g., 15-50 kilometre pixels).
The future climate change impacts discussed in this paper are primarily derived from climate projections for low-, mediumand high-emissions scenarios synthesized by Natural Resources Canada (Flato et al.
2019).
In some cases, we reference specific models that were included in the overall climate projections.
We have drawn projections most heavily from high-GHG-emissions scenarios because they are represented as “business as usual” within much of the literature (e.g., Cohen et al.
2019), but it is worth noting that high-emissions scenarios may be more accurately read as the “worst-case scenario” (Hausfather and Peters 2020).
Finally, for consistency throughout the paper we have used the term “Northern Canada” in lieu of “Canadian North,” “northern regions of Canada” and “proposed corridor route.” Northern Canada is often defined as the region north of 60 degrees latitude.
However, because of the geographic scope of the proposed corridor and its prominence in Northern Canada — including marine areas that represent potential ports and shipping lanes — as well as for clarity, we have used “Northern Canada” as a catch-all term for areas including and north of the proposed corridor route (Figure 1).
2.
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN NORTHERN CANADA 2.1.
TEMPERATURE Between 1948 and 2016, the annual average temperature across Canada increased approximately 1.7 C and it is a “virtual certainty” that this trend will continue based on current atmospheric GHG and emissions levels (Zhang et al.
2019).
Changes in temperature have been more heavily concentrated in the winter and in Northern Canada, the Prairies and northern British Columbia (Cohen et al.
2019; Wan, Zhang and Zwiers 2019).
For example, between 1948 and 2016, Northern Canada experienced an annual average temperature increase of 2.3 C, including a 4.3 C increase in the winter and 1.6 C increase in the summer, compared to 1.7 C, 3.3 C and 1.5 C increases across Canada as a whole (Figure 2) (Vincent et al.
2015, Vincent et al.
2018).
This has been accompanied by an increase in the lowest daily minimum temperatures, days with “very warm temperatures” and freeze-thaw cycles, and has reduced frost days, consecutive frost days and ice days (Vincent et al.
2018).
11 Figure 2: The observed change in seasonal mean temperature across Canada for the period of 1948–2016 (from Bush and Lemmen 2019, updated from Figure 3 of Vincent et al.
2015).
Further temperature increases are projected across Canada under all GHGemissions scenarios, displaying variability depending on the scenario.
Projections in Northern Canada show the largest increase in annual average temperature: 1.8 C for a low-emissions scenario and 2.7 C for a high-emissions scenario by 2031–2050; and 2.1 C and 7.8 C for lowand high-emissions scenarios by 2081–2100 (based on 1986–2005 mean values) (Cohen et al.
2019).
These changes are expected to be concentrated in the winter and to result in longer growing seasons, fewer heating degree days and more cooling degree days,3 as well as more extreme high temperatures and fewer low extremes (Jeong et al.
2016; Vincent et al.
2018).
2.2.
PRECIPITATION From 1948 to 2012, changes to precipitation in Canada were less spatially consistent than changes to temperature, but Canada did experience an increase in precipitation of approximately 20 per cent (Vincent et al.
2018).
The annual average 3 Heating degree days are the annual sum of days with a temperature below 18 C and cooling degree days are the annual sum of days with a temperature above 18 C (Zhang et al.
2019).
These measures are important in energy planning, as they quantify energy demand (or potential energy demand) based on the need for heating or air conditioning, respectively.
For example, as heating degree days decrease and cooling degree days increase, energy demand will increasingly shift from heating to air conditioning.
12 number of days with rainfall (at least one millimetre) experienced a statistically significant increase, while the annual average number of days with snowfall (at least one millimetre) was more regionally varied, with the western provinces and Atlantic region experiencing decreases in most locations, and eastern and Northern Canada experiencing relative increases in most locations (Mekis et al.
2015; Vincent et al.
2018).
Southern Canada experienced larger actual increases in precipitation, but Northern Canada experienced the largest proportional increase in precipitation relative to normal levels, including more snowfall (for example, an additional 7.3 days per year with snowfall and an additional 2.3 days per year with heavy snowfall) (Vincent et al.
2018).
A change in the form and frequency of precipitation (e.g., snow to rain) was experienced in many areas (Vincent et al.
2015).
Across Canada, there was a lack of statistically significant change in the number of extreme precipitation events (for instance, the highest-precipitation day, annually) (Mekis et al.
2015).
Precipitation changes in the future are expected to be proportionally more concentrated to the higher latitudes in Canada, and the greatest changes will be experienced in the winter (Flato et al.
2019).
Limited changes to precipitation patterns in Northern Canada (e.g., a 10-per-cent increase) are projected between 2031–2050; however, under high-emissions scenarios, the changes will be much larger by 2081–2100 and could increase by as much as 30 per cent in the Canadian Arctic (Zhang et al.
2019).
Precipitation increases across Northern Canada are expected to begin as an increase in snowfall, eventually leading to more rain and rain-on-snow events as temperatures increase over time (Jeong and Sushama 2017).
Extreme precipitation events are also expected to increase in frequency and magnitude (Zhang et al.
2019).
2.3.
SEA ICE Sea-ice extent in Arctic and Atlantic Canada and multi-year ice in the Arctic have both decreased at an accelerating rate since 2008 (Figure 3) (Derksen et al.
2018; Cohen et al.
2019).
Multi-year sea ice (MYI) — ice that has survived at least one melt season — is becoming more mobile (Howell and Brady 2019) and is being replaced by seasonal first-year ice (FYI), the new ice growth of a single season (Comiso 2012; Babb et al.
2019).
These changes can be problematic for two reasons: 1) FYI drifts more and melts quicker than MYI (Tandon et al.
2018), which could lead to a quicker loss of sea-ice extent (Derksen et al.
2018) and presents more hazards to communities that rely on sea-ice for travel and livelihoods (Ford et al.
2019); and 2) MYI has started to drift from the central Arctic Ocean into the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (CAA) and from the CAA to the Maritimes, creating significant shipping hazards (Barber et al.
2018; Howell and Brady 2019).
Sea-ice thickness in the Arctic has also been observed to be decreasing, along with more ice-free open water in the summer (Parkinson 2014).
These changes are extending the shipping season in the Arctic Ocean and opening up new routes, and ship traffic has nearly tripled in the Canadian Arctic over the last decade, bringing both opportunities and challenges to communities (Dawson et al.
2020).
At the same time, sea-ice 13 is important for a whole web of unmaintained seasonal trails that are used by communities to access culturally important locations for hunting, fishing, heritage sites and other communities.
Evidence from numerous regions in Northern Canada indicates that the period at which such trails are able to be used is decreasing, along with the safety of using such trails (Durkalec et al.
2015; Clark et al.
2016; Ford et al.
2019).
Figure 3: The trends in sea-ice concentration and terrestrial snow cover for the period of 1985–2015 (from Bush and Lemmen 2019, reproduced from Mudryk et al.
2018).
Arctic sea-ice extent has an inverse correlation with global temperatures and GHG emissions (Notz and Stroeve 2016).
As a result, sea-ice extent across the Arctic is projected to decline under all emissions scenarios (IPCC 2019).
Climate projections using low-, mediumand high-emissions scenarios all project significant reductions in sea-ice extent in the Canadian Arctic: under high-emission scenarios, there is a projected 50-per-cent probability that extensive areas could be ice-free (five-percent ice cover or less) at the end of summer 2050 (Mudryk et al.
2018).
Hudson Bay has a high probability of being ice-free for four consecutive months by midcentury, a two-month increase over the present day (Mudryk et al.
2018).
Climate projections for Atlantic Canada for 2040–2070 indicate that ice-formation and ice-out dates in the St. Lawrence estuary and gulf will be 10 to 20 days later and 20 to 30 days earlier, respectively (Senneville et al.
2014).
Under high-emissions scenario projections, the Atlantic coast will also be ice-free during the winter by 14 mid-century (Loder, van der Baaren and Yashayaev 2015).
This would lead to longer open-water periods in many regions and more drifting ice in areas such as the Northwest Passage and Atlantic Canada (Haas and Howell 2015; Loder et al.
2015).
Herein, the Arctic Ocean is rapidly transforming into a navigable ocean, significantly reducing sailing distance between Europe and Asia, yet modelling studies suggest that a combination of legal, infrastructural, technological, climatic and economic challenges, and cheaper alternative options (e.g., transit via the Suez Canal or Trans-Siberian Railway), are likely to constrain the development of circumpolar shipping routes (Li, Ringsberg and Rita 2020; Zeng et al.
2020).
2.4.
SNOW COVER Snow cover and the accumulation of snow have decreased across most areas of Canada (Figure 3) (Derksen et al.
2018).
Increasing temperatures in the shoulder seasons — fall and spring — result in less build up, earlier melt and more snow falling as rain (Bonsal et al.
2019).
This has led to a shift towards later onset of snow cover, less duration of snow and earlier snowmelt in the spring, and less snowpack storage (Mudryk et al.
2015; Vincent et al.
2015; DeBeer et al.
2016).
In Northern Canada, snow-cover extent has been significantly reduced during the spring months (April through June) and fall months (October through December) (Brown et al.
2017; Mudryk et al.
2018), and community members in many remote and Indigenous communities have observed less snowfall, wetter snow and overall less snow cover throughout the year (Ford et al.
2016).
Based on climate projections, the decrease in snow cover and accumulation across most areas of Canada are “virtually certain” to continue over the next century under all scenarios (Derksen et al.
2018).
Between 2020 and 2050, the most significant loss of snow cover across Canada is expected to occur during the shoulder seasons (Thackeray et al.
2016) and climate models project an increase in precipitation falling as rain and rain-on-snow events (Jeong and Sushama 2017).
In Northern Canada, a shortened snow-accumulation period due to rising temperatures is expected to offset an increase in snowfall in winter months (Derksen et al.
2018; Cohen et al.
2019).
2.5.
PERMAFROST Across Northern Canada, permafrost temperatures have increased, which has led to increases in the thickness of the active layer4 during the summer seasons and the thawing of ground ice (Ednie and Smith 2015; Romanovsky et al.
2017; Smith et al.
2017).
Specific changes are localized; over the last three to four decades, the central Mackenzie River valley has seen increases in permafrost temperatures of approximately 0.1 C per decade and the High Arctic has seen increases at a rate of approximately 0.3–0.5 C per decade (Romanovsky et al.
2017), while Nunavik has seen increases of approximately 0.5–0.9 C since 2000 (Allard, Sarrazin and 4 The soil layer above permafrost that freezes and melts each year (Derksen et al.
2018).
15 Hérault 2015).
This has led to the formation of thermokarst5 landforms across much of Northern Canada, including observations of lake formation and collapse, loss of permafrost mounds and increases in the size of permafrost ponds (Beck et al.
2015; Olefeldt et al.
2016; Jolivel and Allard 2017; Mamet et al.
2017).
Similar changes to permafrost in Russia due to climate change have led to a decrease the bearing capacity6 of permafrost (Streletskiy and Shiklomanov 2016).
Permafrost can be influenced by a number of other climate change impacts, such as more intense rainfall and changes to vegetation and snow accumulation (Kokelj et al.
2015), which makes projecting climate-related impacts to permafrost complicated (Derksen et al.
2018).
Under all GHG-emissions scenarios, air temperatures over permafrost areas are expected to increase, which is expected to result in the continued warming of permafrost across Northern Canada and the thawing of large areas by mid-century (Derksen et al.
2018).
Models using lowand mediumemissions scenarios have projected that the area underlain by deep permafrost in Canada will decrease approximately 16 to 20 per cent by 2090 relative to 1990, and some models even project permafrost thaw through the late-21st century under an emissions scenario that stabilizes temperature change by mid-century (Zhang, Chen and Riseborough 2008a; Zhang, Chen and Riseborough 2008b).
These changes are expected to have wide-ranging impacts on infrastructure.
Permafrost regions in Russia, for example, are expected to lose approximately 50 per cent of their bearing capacity by 2059 under a high-emissions scenario (Streletskiy et al.
2019).
Modelling work by Suter and others (2019), using a highemissions scenario applied across the Arctic, identifies Northern Canada as a region projected to be particularly affected, with lifecycle replacement costs increasing by 33.6 per cent by mid-century due to climate impacts, putting 19 per cent of infrastructure at risk.
In dollar terms, they estimate the increase cost to exceed $4 billion (Canadian dollars).
In all the Arctic, the mean annual costs to address increased lifecycle replacement costs and direct damages due to climate change are highest in the Yukon and Northwest Territories, as a percentage of gross regional product (Suter et al.
2019).
2.6.
GLACIERS AND ICE CAPS There has been an accelerated mass loss of glaciers and ice caps across Canada due to the warming climate.
For example, in the CAA, the loss of glacier and icecap mass has accelerated over the last 15 years (Derksen et al.
2018), increasing from 22 gigatonnes of mass loss per year between 1995 and 2000 (Abdalati et al.
2004) to approximately 67 gigatonnes per year between 2003 and 2010 (Jacob et al.
2012), and further acceleration up to 2015 (Harig and Simons 2016).
Glaciers in the Columbia Icefield in the Rocky Mountains lost 22.5 per cent (an average of 5 Thermokarst is a process in which the thaw of ice-rich permafrost and ground ice create characteristic landforms (IPCC 2013).
6 The ability of permafrost to support a structural load (Streletskiy et al.
2019).
16 approximately 1.1 kilometre) of their total area between 1919 and 2009 (Tennant and Menounos 2013), and glaciers and icefields in the Yukon lost approximately 22 per cent of their area from 1957 to 2007 (Barrand and Sharp 2010).
The mass loss of glaciers and ice caps is projected to continue; based on climate models using a medium-emissions scenario, many glaciers in the Canadian Western Cordillera will lose 74 to 96 per cent of their volume by 2081 (Clarke et al.
2015) and glaciers in the CAA are projected to lose 18 per cent of their ice mass by 2100 (Radić et al.
2014).
This will have an impact on the regional stream flows and water resources in Western Canada, particularly by the mid-to-late century (Clarke et al.
2015; Fyfe et al.
2017).
2.7.
COASTAL IMPACTS Coastal areas will be subject to numerous climate-related impacts, each of which will interact.
This includes: sea-level change, permafrost thaw and the loss of sea ice, larger waves, increasing water temperatures, an increase in the frequency of extreme water levels and an increase in erosion as coasts are exposed to harsher conditions.
2.7.1.
Sea-level rise and extreme water levels Local sea-level rise is relative to the level of vertical land motion,7 such as local land uplift or subsidence.
Different coastal areas in Canada have experienced different relative-sea-level8 changes.
For example, relative sea level has risen along the Beaufort Sea coastline more quickly than the global average due to land subsidence, while the eastern Arctic and Hudson Bay have actually experienced a decline in relative sea level (Cohen et al.
2019).
Global sea level is expected to continue to rise over the next century under all GHG-emissions scenarios (IPCC 2019) and the Canadian coastline will continue to experience localized impacts based on vertical land motion.
Based on the median projection of models using a low-emissions scenario, Tuktoyaktuk is projected to see 41.4 centimetres in sea-level rise by 2100; Churchill is projected to experience -81.9 centimetres of relative sea level rise (81.9 centimetres of sea-level drop), given high rates of post-glacial land emergence; Prince Rupert is projected to experience 43.5 centimetres of rise; and Sept-Îles is expected to experience little relative change to current sea level (James et al.
2014).
Regardless of the emissions scenario, sea level is projected to rise or drop significantly in three of the five potential CNC ports over the course of the 21st century (Table 1).
This could impact the feasibility of shipping or the operation of shipping infrastructure at 7 The uplift (rise) or subsidence (drop) of the ground surface at a location due to processes such as glacial isostatic adjustment (e.g., the surface underneath large glaciers or ice sheets will subside under the mass of the ice and rise after the glacial mass has decreased or disappeared) (James et al.
2014).
8 Relative sea level is current sea level, or changes or projections to sea level, at a specific location, and is primarily influenced by global sea level change and vertical land motion at that location (IPCC 2013).
17 these locations.
At the ports that are projected to experience significant relative sea-level rise, sea-level rise will combine with other factors (see below) to increase the frequency of extreme-water-level events.
Under a high-emissions scenario, a one-in-25 year event in Tuktoyaktuk could become one-in-four year event, and a 10-year event could increase from a 1.1-metre storm surge to 2.1-metre storm surge (Lamoureux et al.
2015).
Even with adaptation efforts (such as coastalprotection measures), the IPCC estimates that low-lying Arctic communities, such as Tuktoyaktuk, will experience moderate to high risk relative to today, even in a low-emission pathway by mid-century (Oppenheimer et al.
2019).
Table 1: Projected relative sea-level change at 2100 (relative to 1986–2005) for five potential port communities based on the conceptual CNC route (data from James et al.
2014).
Potential port Low emissions Medium emissions High emissions Prince Rupert, B.C.
43.5 cm 46.4 cm 57.7 cm Tuktoyaktuk, N.W.T.
41.4 cm 48.2 cm 67.9 cm Churchill, Man.
-81.9 cm -74.8 cm -58.8 cm Sept-Îles, Que.
-0.2 cm 10.0 cm 30.9 cm Goose Bay, N.L.
-13.5 cm -5.9 cm 10.9 cm 2.7.2.
Waves As sea-ice-extent decreases (see section 4.7.3), wave energy and wave height have the potential to increase due to greater fetch9 (Thomson and Rogers 2014).
Shoreline orientation, wind direction and shoreline bathymetry10 will dictate the size and impacts of wave activity (Serafin et al.
2019).
Wave height, energy increases and increased wave-season duration have already been observed in the Canadian Arctic, particularly in the Beaufort Sea region (Thomson et al.
2016; Greenan et al.
2018).
As sea-ice extent decreases, wave height, energy and seasons are projected to experience significant increases in the future along most northern coastal regions (Aksenov et al.
2017; Casas-Prat, Wang and Swart 2018).
This is expected to have the largest impacts on the north-facing coasts in the Canadian Arctic due to the mean wave direction being southward (Greenan et al.
2018).
2.7.3.
Storm surge Sea-level rise, natural tides and stronger waves will combine to produce an increased chance of flooding and storm surges (Khon et al.
2014).
In the Canadian Arctic there has been an observed positive correlation between open water, air 9 The open water distance between two bodies (e.g., land and sea ice).
Larger fetch correlates to larger waves and increased wave energy (Lemmen, Warren and Mercer Clarke 2016).
10 A deficiency in oxygen available in a water body (e.g., the ocean) (IPCC 2013).
18 temperature and storm intensity and occurrence (Perrie et al.
2012; Vermaire et al.
2013).
Models project that areas of greater relative sea-level rise will experience a greater frequency and magnitude of storm surges that produce extreme water levels (Greenan et al.
2018).
2.7.4.
Erosion Rising sea level, increasing ocean water temperatures and decreasing sea-ice extent and thawing of permafrost have increased erosion and thermal erosion in some areas, particularly in Northern Canada (Obu et al.
2017; Derksen et al.
2018; Irrgang et al.
2018).
The Gulf of St. Lawrence and areas of the northern coast are particularly sensitive to erosion, because they are low-lying, consist of softer materials and have high ground-ice or permafrost content.
The loss of sea ice and increased wave weight and energy have exposed these areas to erosion and thermal erosion from stronger wave action and warmer ocean water (Ford et al.
2016; Savard, van Proosdij and O’Carroll 2016; Derksen et al.
2018).
Coastal areas in the Beaufort Sea region (high ground-ice content) have averaged coastline loss between 0.5 and 1.5 metres a year (Konopczak, Manson and Couture 2014) and erosion has reached as high as 22.5 metres a year in some locations during some periods (Figure 4) (Solomon 2005).
Coastal-erosion processes are expected to increase under all emissions scenarios, particularly in areas of less sea ice and more relative sea-level rise (Greenan et al.
2018).
The exception to these projections is areas that receive eroded material that is redistributed as a part of the coastal sediment balance (Overeem et al.
2011).
Figure 4: Coastal areas in the western Canadian Arctic are changing rapidly due to the impacts of climate change.
The large pinnacles in this photo were eroded out to sea several days after this photo was taken (photo credit: Weronika Murray, published by the Government of Canada, 2019).
19 2.8.
HYDROLOGY Climate change will have numerous impacts on hydrological processes across Canada.
The scientific literature focuses on the impacts of climate change on two key areas of hydrology: (1) water levels and streamflow; and (2) lake and river ice.
2.8.1.
Water levels and streamflow The impacts of climate change on water levels and streamflow exhibit a lot of variation based on location, streamflow regime11 (e.g., rainfall-dependent or meltdependent watersheds) and other factors (e.g., river-channel shape).
Actual annual streamflow volume has shown variable or no significant trends in various basins across Canada (Nalley, Adamowski and Khalil 2012; Déry et al.
2016; HernándezHenríquez, Sharma and Déry 2017; Rood et al.
2017).
Streamflow, however, has shifted towards earlier peaks and higher flows in winter and spring and lower summer flows, and there has been an overall decrease in high-flow events and increase in low-flow events (Bonsal et al.
2019).
Water levels are also impacted in a variable manner based on local conditions.
In particular, some lakes in Northern Canada have experienced rapid drainage as surrounding permafrost thaws (Hinzman, et al.
2005; Smith et al.
2005; Fortier, Allard and Shur 2007).
Streamflow is projected to continue towards: earlier onset of freshet12 and peaks in the winter and spring; smaller snowmelt events; and a shift from nival (snowmelt) regimes to pluvial (rainfall), or mixed nival-pluvial regimes (Burn and Whitfield 2016; Burn, Whitfield and Sharif 2016).
Similar to current trends in actual annual flow, future trends are expected to vary.
In northern watersheds, where flow regimes are nival or mixed nival-pluvial, there are projected shifts to more pluvial flow regimes, with higher annual flows due to increasing precipitation trends at high latitudes (Poitras et al.
2011; Thorne 2011; Vetter et al.
2017).
Water levels are expected to be affected variably.
For example, the thawing of permafrost is expected to accelerate, which could result in rapid shrinking or drainage of lakes and water levels in some locations across Northern Canada (Bonsal et al.
2019).
2.8.2.
River and lake ice Across Canada, seasonal lake-ice-cover duration has declined since the 1960s, due to later freeze-up in the fall and earlier break-up in the spring (Derksen et al.
2018).
Even Canada’s northernmost lake, Ward Hunt Lake, which had previously remained perennially frozen, melted completely in 2011 and 2012 (Paquette et al.
2015).
There is also evidence of the earlier breakup of river ice, relative to baseline breakup times in most locations (Prowse 2012).
11 Streamflow in Canadian basins is typically defined as nival (dominated by snowmelt), glacial (dominated by glacial melt), pluvial (dominated by rainfall), or a mix of multiple (Bonsal et al.
2019).
12 Increased streamflow as a result of snow and ice melt in the spring (Derksen et al.
2018).
20 Reductions in ice-cover duration are expected to continue.
Spring lake-ice breakup is projected to be 10 to 25 days earlier by 2050 (compared to 1961–1990) and freeze-up during the fall is projected to be five to 15 days later (Brown and Duguay 2011; Dibike et al.
2012).
Increasing temperatures, combined with changes to ice strength and stream-flow peak periods, are also projected to influence earlier river-ice breakup in the spring in northern regions (Cooley and Pavelsky 2016).
How changes to river ice will combine with flow changes to impact ice jams and floods is not completely understood (Beltaos and Prowse 2009).
Frozen rivers and lakes are important for seasonal transportation in Northern Canada, including accessing remote mines, while warming and changing ice regimes compromise the operating period and safety of winter roads constructed on the frozen water.
These temporary, maintained roads provide low-cost transport to communities, resource development sites and construction projects (Pearce et al.
2010; Hori et al.
2012; Hori et al.
2018).
Northern Canada is expected to see a decrease of 14 per cent (approximately 400,000 square kilometres) in the amount of land area that is accessible by winter roads by mid-century, based on a 2000 to 2014 baseline and medium-emissions scenario (Stephenson, Smith and Agnew 2011).
2.9.
EXTREME EVENTS Climate change can influence the probability or intensity of extreme events such as forest fires or floods (Zhang et al.
2019).
Changing temperature, precipitation and wind patterns have increased the likelihood and severity of droughts and wildfires, with the largest changes being experienced on the Prairies (Wang et al.
2015; Flannigan et al.
2016).
This increased fire and drought risk contributed to the extreme wildfire conditions that produced the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire (Kirchmeier-Young et al.
2017).
The increasing magnitude and frequency of extreme wildfire and drought conditions is expected to continue (Wotton, Flannigan and Marshall 2017; Kharin et al.
2018).
Flooding events are also projected to increase across Canada, although in some locations floods may eventually become smaller.
There is a lack of detectable change in extreme precipitation events that have led to flooding thus far, but projected increases in extreme precipitation events are expected to increase inland flooding potential, particularly in urban areas (Bonsal et al.
2019).
Changing hydrological patterns due to temperature changes is projected to produce changes to flood patterns as well (e.g., shift to pluvial regimes) (Burn and Whitfield 2016), with implications for water and food security in vulnerable locations (Golden, Audet and Smith 2015; Sohns et al.
2019).
2.10.
ECOSYSTEMS The impacts of climate change on ecosystems are numerous and variable (Post et al.
2013; Post et al.
2019).
Across Northern Canada, shifts in the distribution of species have been documented and attributed to climate change (Nantel et al.
2014).
There has been a loss of habitat or disruption of balances and food webs due 21 to climate-related conditions such as sea-ice loss, forest fires, thawing permafrost and increased hypoxia13 extent (Hutchings et al.
2012; Steiner et al.
2015; Greenan et al.
2018).
These changes and disruptions have the potential to decrease species and ecosystem productivity, lead to species extinction, and create potential for the introduction of new diseases and invasive species, but could also result in increasing productivity and richness in some instances (Nantel et al.
2014).
For instance, there is potential for the increased northern movement of several commercial fish species and associated fishing activity, although significant uncertainties remain in how fish will be affected by climate change, especially for small-scale fisheries common in Northern Canada (Galappaththi et al.
2019; Falardeau and Bennett 2020).
Declining access and availability of wildlife species have been observed to be compromising food security, especially for Indigenous populations whose food systems are closely linked to traditional foods (e.g., Wesche et al.
2010; Hlimi et al.
2012; Skinner et al.
2013; Kenny et al.
2018; Lam et al.
2019).
Based on climate projections, it is expected that species and ecosystem ranges will continue to shift, expand, contract or even fragment (Nantel et al.
2014).
How different ecosystems and species respond will depend on specific species and how interconnected species respond, as well as the local geography.
Some species, such as certain trees, may not be able to keep up with the rate of adaptation and shift required, depending on the rate of climate change, or may not encounter the conditions necessary (e.g., soil in the northern latitudes) required for migration (Drobyshev et al.
2013).
Other existing species or new species could thrive or migrate into the spaces left behind.
Projections have difficulty accounting for the cumulative impacts on ecosystems; stresses such as ecosystem fragmentation and pollution will need to be considered, in addition to potential climate-related changes, to fully understand the effects and potential effects of climate change on ecosystems (Nantel et al.
2014; Falardeau and Bennett 2020).
The expansion of the mountain pine beetle in Western Canada, as a result of changing temperatures and historical management practices, is a good example of how cumulative impacts, including climate change, can alter ecosystems and result in impacts on ecosystems and the human communities who depend on them for their livelihoods (Mitton and Ferrenberg 2012).
3.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CANADIAN NORTHERN CORRIDOR The documented and projected future climate change impacts identified above have implications for future corridor development in Northern Canada.
Transportation infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to permafrost thaw and freeze-thaw processes, ice loss and reduced snow cover, climate-related coastal impacts and extreme events.
Some climate change impacts on northern transportation infrastructure have already been documented and include coastal erosion affecting built infrastructure in the Beaufort Sea region (Radosavljevic et 13 A deficiency in oxygen available in a water body (e.g., the ocean) (IPCC 2013).
22 al.
2016) and permafrost thaw affecting airport infrastructure at multiple airports across Nunavik (Boucher and Guimond 2012).
In a recent study, climate change was projected to increase the lifecycle costs of infrastructure in Northern Canada by $4.33 billion by 2059 (Suter et al.
2019).
This illustrates the scale and magnitude of the potential impacts of climate change on a northern corridor.
In this section, we focus on the implications of climate change impacts for the construction, operation and maintenance of a corridor and the infrastructure within it.
We also discuss the implications of global climate change politics for future corridor development.
3.1.
CONSTRUCTION Climate change impacts are likely to affect the construction of transportation infrastructure in a corridor in terms of regulations and design, route planning and potential impacts during construction.
Climate change adds layers of complexity to an already complex task of designing and planning large infrastructure developments in Northern Canada.
Current and expected changes to the biophysical environment have implications for how and where infrastructure is built, including codes, standards, land-use planning, zoning and other similar instruments (Steenhof and Sparling 2011; Champalle et al.
2013).
Ensuring that development within a corridor follows a set of codes and standards that are adapted to current and future climate conditions and adaptable to unexpected change will be critical (ECCC 2016).
The example of how one-in-25-year floods are now projected to become one-in-four-year floods in Tuktoyaktuk (Lamoureux et al.
2015) highlights how infrastructure will need to be built for dynamic and increasingly extreme conditions.
Current codes, standards and other instruments will need to be evaluated based on location, conditions and type of infrastructure, and may even need to be innovated as a part of corridor development (Steenhof and Sparling 2011).
To be effective for adaptation, codes and standards must include future climate change projections, but this is often constrained by the absence of downscaled climate data (Ford et al.
2015).
When planning the corridor route, considerations will need to be made to avoid areas that are highly susceptible to climate change impacts and those with human occupancy.
An example of what this could entail is provided by the Arctic Corridors and Northern Voices (ACNV) project that was established to ensure that perspectives and recommendations from 13 communities across the Canadian Arctic were included in the development of the Low Impact Shipping Corridors through the region (Dawson et al.
2020).
Through the ACNV, communities along potential corridors provided recommendations on preferred corridors, areas to avoid, seasonal restrictions, areas where vessel modification would be necessary and areas where additional charting was necessary.
Climate change also has the potential to increase the cost of construction and to create risks to equipment and workers.
For example, changing climate is affecting the conditions and access needed to construct winter roads in parts of Northern Canada, such as to First Nations in northern Ontario (Hori et al.
2018a).
Construction 23 has the potential to add to cumulative impacts and magnify the environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change.
These factors will also need to be considered at finer scales in the development of the corridor concept.
3.2.
OPERATION Climate change impacts could accelerate the deterioration of, and in some instances could severely damage, corridor infrastructure.
For example, permafrost degradation can pose a significant threat to natural and built infrastructure (Pendakur 2017; Suter et al.
2019), extreme temperatures can affect the efficiency of electrical lines or pipelines, and can damage railways over time (Dzikowski, Donovan and Happychuk 2017), and extreme events such as forest fires (Figure 5) can completely shut down areas with infrastructure or even key infrastructure hubs, grinding industrial systems to a halt.
Emergency monitoring and response have already been recognized as a priority for improvement in the context of climate change and ongoing infrastructure projects in Canada (ECCC 2018) and, in some cases, a lack of capacity to monitor and respond to emergencies has affected the progress of projects.
Pipeline and tanker-spill response has been a major concern in the cases of the Northern Gateway and Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain expansion (TMX) pipeline projects.
This will be a challenge for the CNC given its multi-jurisdictional geographic expanse and remoteness.
Limited search and rescue capability, minimal bathymetric data for shipping charts and the remoteness of Arctic Canada present particular challenges to shipping and other forms of transport (Ford and Clark 2019; Olson et al.
2019; Dawson et al.
2020).
Oil and other hazardous materials that are likely to be transported through the corridor are more difficult to clean up in icy conditions, and natural cleaning processes are impeded by cold water and air temperatures (Crepin, Karcher and Gascard 2017).
The characteristics of spill-response and clean-up risks have been examined in areas of Northern Canada (Nudds et al.
2013), but have not comprehensively been examined across the proposed CNC route.
24 Figure 5: Extreme events that are influenced by climate change could threaten infrastructure in a corridor and create a chokepoint.
For example, the remnants of a wildfire show how close the fire came to threatening an electrical transmission corridor through central B.C.
(photo credit: David Fawcett) Climate change impacts could create “chokepoints”14 in the corridor.
Given the remoteness of northern Canadian and the absence of alternative modes of transportation, potential choke points could effectively shut down the corridor.
For example, coastal impacts and sea-ice uncertainty could delay or limit shipping capacity at certain times of the year, damage coastal infrastructure or limit route accessibility, especially in the Canadian Arctic (Dawson 2019).
Because ports represent key links and chokepoints in supply chains, they are an excellent example of how increasing climate-related impacts could create backlogs throughout the rest of the corridor system.
For example, the port of Churchill, Man.
is the only deep-water port on Canada’s northern coast, making it a key strategic export location.
The port is expected to experience increased potential for growth as the open-water season increases with sea-ice loss, but use and maintenance problems on the railbed that supplies the port due to permafrost thaw could create a chokepoint for goods to be transported to the port for export (Ford et al.
2016).
3.3.
MAINTENANCE Climate change will likely increase the costs of maintenance and change maintenance procedures.
Maintenance is important to general upkeep and to prevent environmental impacts, to reduce failure during acute climate events and to detect and mitigate failure or impacts from longer-term climate changes (ECCC 2018).
It is also an important part of evaluating the performance of climate change adaptations built into infrastructure (Dore et al.
2014).
For example, 14 Chokepoints are key junctures in transportation and infrastructure systems that are vulnerable to obstruction due to a variety of factors, often geographic or political (Bailey and Wellesley 2017; Ford et al.
2019).
25 maintenance would be important to monitor and mitigate against the impacts of freeze-thaw cycles (Andrey and Palko 2017) and the handling of extreme water levels and erosion (Dzikowski et al.
2017).
As noted earlier, the replacement costs of infrastructure in Northern Canada is expected to increase by $4.33 billion by 2059 due to climate change; under a high-emissions scenario, replacements costs jump from $12.87 billion (baseline) to $17.19 billion, due to changes caused by climate forcing (Suter et al.
2019).
The increasing replacement costs of infrastructure due to climate change represent an increase in the costs related to addressing general wear and tear and hazards, and can include both maintenance or total replacement (Suter et al.
2019).
Maintenance is, however, difficult and costly to track, especially over a large geographic area where accessibility may be an issue (ECCC 2018).
3.4.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CNC FEASIBILITY The politics of climate change are likely to have implications for CNC development.
Canada is a signatory of the 2015 Paris agreement, which was ratified in Parliament in October 2016.
As a part of the Paris agreement, the Canadian government has agreed to work towards the goal of limiting global temperature increase to less than 2.0 C above pre-industrial levels (Government of Canada 2016).
If the CNC will contribute to expanding Canada’s GHG emissions, it may contradict Canada’s commitment to reducing GHG emissions as outlined in the Paris agreement.
Furthermore, in light of the global climate change movement, acquiring the social licence15 across the entire country that would be necessary for the development of a corridor that is potentially linked to energy production that increases GHG emissions could also be a challenge (see the example of the Kinder Morgan pipeline).
Fluctuations in the price of resources like oil and natural gas that would likely be transported through the corridor will also have implications for future corridor development and need to be examined further.
3.5.
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS This review highlights some important future research needs.
First, improved downscaled models of climate change impacts along the proposed corridor route are needed to understand the potential severity of change for individual areas.
This would allow for analyses of potential climate change impacts for particular types of infrastructure along the corridor route and insight into the planning of the corridor route.
Second, research is needed to identify how the proposed corridor could affect existing land-use practices, including by local communities and Indigenous Peoples.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples emphasizes the need for free, prior and informed consent from Indigenous Peoples for a development such as the CNC, especially in light of climate change impacts.
It will be important to work with communities to understand current and 15 More formally known as “social licence to operate” within peer-reviewed literature.
Social licence is the acceptance, approval or even acclamation of economic activities (that will typically have some kind of social and/or environmental impact) by various levels of society, including local communities and Indigenous Peoples, as well as broader society (e.g., Canadian society) (Demuijnck and Fasterling 2016).
26 potential future climate change impacts in their areas as well as implications for future corridor development, drawing on local and traditional knowledge16 and the best available science.
Local communities and Indigenous Peoples need to be involved to discuss if the proposed corridor is desirable and, if so, how it could be constructed to have the least impact on existing human activities and use of the environment, as well as the greatest benefits for local people.
Third, the economic viability of the corridor needs to be studied in the context of climate change impacts, GHG-emission-reduction commitments and changes in global market demands for resources that would likely be transported in the corridor (e.g., oil and natural gas).
This includes estimating construction, operation and maintenance costs for the corridor under future climatic conditions and the potential costs that climate change politics could have on the corridor.
Key questions could include: how could changing societal perspectives and associated consumption trends at the national and global levels due to concerns about climate change impact the economic sustainability of the CNC if the transportation of oil and gas are key components of its development?
Could the corridor and infrastructure within it be adapted to accommodate new forms of energy?
How the national and global economies will respond to climate change is uncertain, but it is unlikely to be static (Challinor, Adger and Benton 2017).
Therefore, understanding how these factors could affect the corridor may help guide the visioning and design of the CNC and, ultimately, its adaptability to and innovation in response to the impacts of climate change.
This research need may present the CNC development with an opportunity for climate mitigation and adaptation innovations that can be exported to other energy-corridor developments.
4.0.
CONCLUSIONS This paper reviews scientific evidence about the potential impacts of climate change in Northern Canada and examines implications for the future development of the CNC, a proposed multimodal transmission corridor.
Permafrost thaw, seaice loss, extreme weather events and changes in coastal processes (e.g., sea-level rise, erosion), among other impacts, are increasingly being observed in Northern Canada.
These impacts threaten the feasibility, construction, operation and maintenance of the proposed corridor and the infrastructure within it.
Even under a scenario in which future atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions are low, many of these impacts would persist and could worsen into the foreseeable future.
Moving forward, further research into the socio-economic impacts of climate change at local, regional, national and international scales is recommended, to understand how economic shifts in response to climate change could impact the feasibility of the CNC concept.
Significant effort will also be required to examine all aspects of climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability across scales.
This will include 16 A dynamic set of knowledge, skills and practices of local and Indigenous communities grounded in history and constantly updated based on experiences and cultural and environmental changes.
Traditional knowledge is generally transmitted between generations orally (IPCC 2014).
27 working closely with local communities and Indigenous Peoples along the proposed corridor route, to understand if a corridor is desirable and relevant to them and, if so, whether it can be developed in a manner that sustains livelihoods, culture, health and well-being in a changing climate.
28 REFERENCE LIST Abdalati, W., W. Krabill, E. Frederick, S. Manizade, C. Martin, J. Sonntag, R. Swift, R. Thomas, J. Yungel and R. Koerner (2004).
“Elevation changes of ice caps in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Earth Surface 109 (F4).
Aksenov, Y., E.E.
Popova, A. Yool, A.J.G.
Nurser, T.D.
Williams, L. Bertino and J. Bergh (2017).
“On the future navigability of Arctic sea routes: High-resolution projections of the Arctic Ocean and sea ice.” Marine Policy 75: 300-317.
Allard, M., D. Sarrazin and E. L’Hérault (2015).
“Borehole and near-surface ground temperatures in northeastern Canada, v. 1.3 (1988-2014).” Nordicana D8.
Andrey, J. and K. Palko (2017).
“Introduction.” In Climate risks and adaptation practices for the Canadian transportation sector 2016, edited by K. Palko and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Babb, D.G., J.C. Landy, D.G.
Barber and R.J. Galley (2019).
“Winter Sea Ice Export From the Beaufort Sea as a Preconditioning Mechanism for Enhanced Summer Melt: A Case Study of 2016.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans 124 (9): 6575-6600.
Bailey, R. and L. Wellesley (2017).
Chokepoints and vulnerabilities in global food trade.
London, U.K.: Chatham House.
Barrand, N. E. and M. J.
Sharp (2010).
“Sustained rapid shrinkage of Yukon glaciers since the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year.” Geophysical Research Letters 37 (7).
Beck, I., R. Ludwig, M. Bernier, E. Lévesque and J. Boike (2015).
“Assessing Permafrost Degradation and Land Cover Changes (1986–2009) using Remote Sensing Data over Umiujaq, Sub-Arctic Québec.” Permafrost and Periglacial Processes 26 (2): 129-141.
Beltaos, S. and T. Prowse (2009).
“River-ice hydrology in a shrinking cryosphere.” Hydrological Processes 23 (1): 122-144.
Bonsal, B. R., D. L. Peters, F. Seglenieks, A. Rivera and A. Berg (2019).
“Changes in freshwater availability across Canada.” In Canada’s Changing Climate Report, edited by E. Bush and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Brown, L. and C. Duguay (2011).
“The fate of lake ice in the North American Arctic.” The Cryosphere 5: 869-892.
29 Brown, R., D. Schuler, O. Bulygina, C. Derksen, K. Luojus, L. Mudryk, L. Wang and D. Yang (2017).
“Arctic terrestrial snow; in Snow Water Ice and Permafrost.” In Snow Water Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) 2017.
Oslo, Norway: Assessment, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.
Burn, D. H. and P. H. Whitfield (2016).
“Changes in floods and flood regimes in Canada.” Canadian Water Resources Journal / Revue canadienne des ressources hydriques 41 (1-2): 139-150.
Burn, D. H., P. H. Whitfield and M. Sharif (2016).
“Identification of changes in floods and flood regimes in Canada using a peaks over threshold approach.” Hydrological Processes 30 (18): 3303-3314.
Bush, E. and D. S. Lemmen (2019).
Canada’s Changing Climate Report.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Casas-Prat, M., X. L. Wang and N. Swart (2018).
“CMIP5-based global wave climate projections including the entire Arctic Ocean.” Ocean Modelling 123: 66-85.
Challinor, A. J., W. N. Adger and T. G. Benton (2017).
“Climate risks across borders and scales.” Nature Climate Change 7 (9): 621-623.
Champalle, C., P. Tudge, E. Sparling, R. Riedlsperger, J. Ford and T. Bell (2013).
“Adapting the built environment in a changing northern climate: A systematic review of climate hazard-related mapping and vulnerability assessments of the built environment in Canada’s North to inform climate change adaptation.” Ottawa: Natural Resources Canada.
Clark, D.G., J. D. Ford, T. Pearce and L. Berrang-Ford (2016).
“Vulnerability to unintentional injuries associated with land-use activities and search and rescue in Nunavut, Canada.” Social Science & Medicine 169: 18-26.
Clarke, G. K. C., A. H. Jarosch, F. S. Anslow, V. Radić and B. Menounos (2015).
“Projected deglaciation of western Canada in the twenty-first century.” Nature Geoscience 8 (5): 372-377.
Cohen, S., E. Bush, X. Zhang, N. Gillett, B. Bonsal, C. Derksen, G. Flato, B. Greenan and E. Watson (2019).
“Synthesis of Findings for Canada’s Regions.” In Canada’s Changing Climate Report edited by E. Bush and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Comiso, J. C. (2012).
“Large Decadal Decline of the Arctic Multiyear Ice Cover.” Journal of Climate 25 (4): 1176-1193.
Cooley, S. W. and T. M. Pavelsky (2016).
“Spatial and temporal patterns in Arctic river ice breakup revealed by automated ice detection from MODIS imagery.” Remote Sensing of Environment 175: 310-322.
30 Crepin, A. S., M. Karcher and J. C. Gascard (2017).
“Arctic Climate Change, Economy and Society (ACCESS): Integrated perspectives.” Ambio 46: 341-354.
Dawson, J., N. Carter, N. van Luijk, C. Parker, M. Weber, A. Cook, K. Grey and J. Provencher (2020).
“Infusing Inuit and local knowledge into the Low Impact Shipping Corridors: An adaptation to increased shipping activity and climate change in Arctic Canada.” Environmental Science & Policy 105: 19-36.
Dawson, J.
(2019).
“Arctic Shipping: Future Prospects and Ocean Governance.” In Arctic Shipping: Future Prospects and Ocean Governance.
Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Nijhoff.
DeBeer, C. M., H. S. Wheater, S. K. Carey and K. P. Chun (2016).
“Recent climatic, cryospheric, and hydrological changes over the interior of western Canada: a review and synthesis.” Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
20 (4): 1573-1598.
Derksen, C., D. Burgess, C. Duguay, S. Howell, L. Mudryk, S. Smith, C. Thackeray and M. Kirchmeier-Young (2018).
“Changes in snow, ice, and permafrost across Canada.” In Canada’s Changing Climate Report edited by E. Bush and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Déry, S. J., T. A. Stadnyk, M. K. MacDonald and B. Gauli-Sharma (2016).
“Recent trends and variability in river discharge across northern Canada.” Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
20 (12): 4801-4818.
Dibike, Y., T. Prowse, B. Bonsal, L. de Rham and T. Saloranta (2012).
“Simulation of North American lake-ice cover characteristics under contemporary and future climate conditions;.” International Journal of Climatology 32: 695-709.
Dore, G., J.-P. Bilodeau, P. Masseck Thiam and F. Perron Drolet (2014).
“Impact des changements climatiques sur les chaussées des réseaux routiers québécois.” Quebec City, Quebec: Ouranos.
Drobyshev, I., S. Gewehr, F. Berninger and Y. Bergeron (2013).
“Species specific growth responses of black spruce and trembling aspen may enhance resilience of boreal forest the climate change.” Journal of Ecology 101: 231-242.
A. Durkalec, C. Furgal, M. W. Skinner and T. Sheldon (2015).
“Climate change influences on environment as a determinant of Indigenous health: Relationships to place, sea ice, and health in an Inuit community.” Social Science & Medicine 136: 17-26.
Dzikowski, P., H. Donovan and N. Happychuk (2017).
“The Prairies.” In Climate risks and adaptation practices for the Canadian transportation sector 2016, edited by K. Palko and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
31 Ednie, M. and S. Smith (2015).
“Permafrost temperature data 2008–2014 from community-based monitoring sites in Nunavut” Ottawa: Geological Survey of Canada.
Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) (2018).
Measuring Progress on Adaptation and Climate Resilience: Recommendations to the Government of Canada.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) (2016).
Working Group on Adaptation and Climate Resilience: Final Report.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Falardeau, M. and E. M. Bennett (2020).
“Towards integrated knowledge of climate change in Arctic marine systems: a systematic literature review of multidisciplinary research.” Arctic Science 6: 1-23 (2020).
Fellows, G. K. and T. Tombe (2018).
“Opening Canada’s North: A Study of Trade Costs in the Territories.” The School of Public Policy Publications 11 (17).
Flannigan, M. D., B. M. Wotton, G. A. Marshall, W. J. de Groot, J. Johnston, N. Jurko and A. S. Cantin (2016).
“Fuel moisture sensitivity to temperature and precipitation: climate change implications.” Climatic Change 134: 59-71.
Flato, G., N. Gillett, V. Arora, A. Cannon and J. Anstey (2019).
“Modelling Future Climate Change.” In Canada’s Changing Climate Report edited by E. Bush and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Ford, J. and D. Clark (2019).
“Preparing for the impacts of climate change along Canada’s Arctic coast: The importance of search and rescue.” Marine Policy 108: 103662.
Ford, J. D., D. Clark, T. Pearce, L. Berrang-Ford, L. Copland, J. Dawson, M. New and S. L. Harper (2019).
“Changing access to ice, land and water in Arctic communities.” Nature Climate Change 9 (4): 335-339.
Ford, J. D., T. Bell and N. J. Couture (2016).
“Perspectives on Canada’s North Coast region.” In Canada’s Marine Coasts in a Changing Climate edited by D. S. Lemmen, F. J. Warren, T. S. James and C. S. L. Mercer Clarke.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Ford, J.D., C. Champalle, P. Tudge, R. Riedlsperger, T. Bell and E. Sparling (2015).
“Evaluating climate change vulnerability assessments: a case study of research focusing on the built environment in northern Canada.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 20: 1267-1288.
32 Fortier, D., M. Allard and Y. Shur (2007).
“Observation of rapid drainage system development by thermal erosion of ice wedges on Bylot Island, Canadian Arctic Archipelago.” Permafrost and Periglacial Processes 18 (3): 229-243.
Fyfe, J. C., C. Derksen, L. Mudryk, G. M. Flato, B. D. Santer, N. C. Swart, N. P. Molotch, X. Zhang, H. Wan, V. K. Arora, J. Scinocca and Y. Jiao (2017).
“Large near-term projected snowpack loss over the western United States.” Nature Communications 8 (1): 14996.
E. K. Galappaththi, J. D. Ford, E. M. Bennett, F. Berkes (2019).
“Climate change and community fisheries in the arctic: A case study from Pangnirtung, Canada.” Journal of Environmental Management 250.
Golden, D.M., C. Audet and M. A. Smith (2015).
“’Blue-ice’: framing climate change and reframing climate change adaptation from the indigenous peoples’ perspective in the northern boreal forest of Ontario, Canada.” Climate and Development 7: 401-413.
Government of Canada (2016).
“The Paris Agreement.” Accessed on November 26, 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/ climate-change/paris-agreement.html.
Greenan, B. J. W., T. S. James, J. W. Loder, P. Pepin, K. Azetsu-Scott, D. Ianson, R. C. Hamme, D. Gilbert, J.-E. Tremblay, X. L. Wang and W. Perrie (2018).
“Changes in oceans surrounding Canada.
: In Canada’s Changing Climate Report edited by E. Bush and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Haas, C. and S. E. L. Howell (2015).
“Ice thickness in the Northwest Passage.” Geophysical Research Letters 42 (18): 7673-7680.
Harig, C. and F. J. Simons (2016).
“Ice mass loss in Greenland, the Gulf of Alaska, and the Canadian Archipelago: Seasonal cycles and decadal trends.” Geophysical Research Letters 43 (7): 3150-3159.
Hausfather, Z. and G.P.
Peters (2020).
“Emissions the ‘business as usual’ story is misleading.” Nature 577: 618-620.
Hernández-Henríquez, M. A., A. R. Sharma and S. J. Déry (2017).
“Variability and trends in runoff in the rivers of British Columbia’s Coast and Insular Mountains.” Hydrological Processes 31 (18): 3269-3282.
33 Hinzman, L. D., N. D. Bettez, W. R. Bolton, F. S. Chapin, M. B. Dyurgerov, C. L. Fastie, B. Griffith, R. D. Hollister, A.
Hope, H. P. Huntington, A. M. Jensen, G. J. Jia, T. Jorgenson, D. L. Kane, D. R. Klein, G. Kofinas, A. H. Lynch, A. H. Lloyd, A. D. McGuire, F. E. Nelson, W. C. Oechel, T. E. Osterkamp, C. H. Racine, V. E. Romanovsky, R. S. Stone, D. A. Stow, M. Sturm, C. E. Tweedie, G. L. Vourlitis, M. D. Walker, D. A. Walker, P. J. Webber, J. M. Welker, K. S. Winker and K. Yoshikawa (2005).
“Evidence and Implications of Recent Climate Change in Northern Alaska and Other Arctic Regions.” Climatic Change 72 (3): 251-298.
Hlimi, T., K. Skinner, R. Hanning, I. Martin and L. S. Tsuji (2012).
“Traditional food consumption behaviour and concern with environmental contaminants among Cree schoolchildren of the Mushkegowuk territory.” International Journal of Circumpolar Health 71 (1): 17344.
Hori, Y., V. Y. S. Cheng, W. A. Gough, J. Y. Jien and L. J. S. Tsuji (2018a).
“Implications of projected climate change on winter road systems in Ontario’s Far North, Canada.” Climatic Change 148 (1): 109-122.
Hori, Y., W. A. Gough, B. Tam, and L. J. S. Tsuji (2018b).
“Community vulnerability to changes in the winter road viability and longevity in the western James Bay region of Ontario’s Far North.” Regional Environmental Change 18, 1753-1763.
Hori, Y., B. Tam, W.A.
Gough, E. Ho-Foong, J.D.
Karagatzides, E.N.
Liberda, and L.J.S.
Tsuji (2012).
“Use of traditional environmental knowledge to assess the impact of climate change on subsistence fishing in the James Bay Region of Northern Ontario, Canada.” Rural and Remote Health 12 (16).
Hutchings, J.
A., I. M. Côté, J. J. Dodson, I.
A. Fleming, S. Jennings, N. J. Mantua, R. M. Peterman, B. E. Riddell, A. J. Weaver and D. L. VanderZwaag (2012).
“Sustaining Canadian marine biodiversity: responding to the challenges posed by climate change, fisheries, and aquaculture.” Ottawa: Royal Society of Canada: Academies of Arts, Humanities and Sciences.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2019).
“Summary for Policymakers.
Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate” edited by H.-O.
Pörtner, D. C. Roberts, V. Masson-Delmotte et al.
In press.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014).
“Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, part B: regional aspects.” In Contribution of working group II to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
34 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013).
“Climate Change 2013: The physical science basis.” Contribution of working group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change edited by T. F. Stocker, D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner et al.
Cambridge, U.K. and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Irrgang, A. M., H. Lantuit, G. K. Manson, F. Günther, G. Grosse and P. P. Overduin (2018).
“Variability in Rates of Coastal Change Along the Yukon Coast, 1951 to 2015.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Earth Surface 123 (4): 779-800.
Jacob, T., J. Wahr, W. T. Pfeffer and S. Swenson (2012).
“Recent contributions of glaciers and ice caps to sea level rise.” Nature 482 (7386): 514-518.
James, T. S., J.
A. Henton, L. J. Leonard, A. Darlington, D. L. Forbes and M. Craymer (2014).
“Relative sea level rise projections for Canada and the adjacent mainland United States.” Ottawa: Geological Survey of Canada.
Jeong, D. I. and L. Sushama (2017).
“Rain-on-snow events over North America based on two Canadian regional climate models.” Climate Dynamics 50: 303-316.
Jeong, D. I., L. Sushama, G. T. Diro, M. N. Khaliq, H. Beltrami and D. Caya (2016).
“Projected changes to high temperature events for Canada based on a regional climate model ensemble.” Climate Dynamics 46: 3163-3180.
Jolivel, M. and M. Allard (2017).
“Impact of permafrost thaw on the turbidity regime of a subarctic river: the Sheldrake River, Nunavik, Quebec.” Arctic Science 3(2): 451-474.
T. A. Kenny, M. Fillion, S. Simpkin, S. D. Wesche, H. M. Chan, Caribou (Rangifer tarandus) and Inuit Nutrition Security in Canada.
Ecohealth 15, 590-607 (2018).
Kharin, V. V., G. M. Flato, X. Zhang, N. P. Gillett, F. Zwiers and K. J. Anderson (2018).
“Risks from Climate Extremes Change Differently from 1.5°C to 2.0°C Depending on Rarity.” Earth’s Future 6(5): 704-715.
Khon, V. C., I. I. Mokhov, F. A. Pogarskiy, A. Babanin, K. Dethloff, A. Rinke and H. Matthes (2014).
“Wave heights in the 21st century Arctic Ocean simulated with a regional climate model.” Geophysical Research Letters 41 (8): 2956-2961.
Kirchmeier-Young, M. C., F. W. Zwiers, N. P. Gillett and A. J. Cannon (2017).
“Attributing extreme fire risk in Western Canada to human emissions.” Climatic Change 144 (2): 365-379.
35 Kokelj, S. V., J. Tunnicliffe, D. Lacelle, T. C. Lantz, K. S. Chin and R. Fraser (2015).
“Increased precipitation drives mega slump development and destabilization of ice-rich permafrost terrain, northwestern Canada.” Global and Planetary Change 129: 56-68.
Konopczak, A. M., G. Manson and N. J. Couture (2014).
“Cariability of coastal change along the western Yukon coast.” Ottawa, Geological Survey of Canada.
Lam, S., W. Dodd, K. Skinner, A. Papadopoulos, C. Zivot, J.D.
Ford, P.A.
Garcia, IHACC Research Team and S.L.
Harper (2019).
“Community-based monitoring of Indigenous food security in a changing climate: global trends and future directions.” Environmental Research Letters 14 (7).
Lamoureux, S., D. Forbes, T. Bell and G. Manson (2015).
The impact of climate change on infrastructure in the western and central Canadian Arctic.
In Science to Policy in the Western and Central Canadian Arctic: An Integrated Regional Impact Study (IRIS) of climate change and modernization edited by G. A. Stern and A. Gaden.
Quebec City, Quebec:ArcticNet.
Lemmen, D. S., F. J. Warren and C. S. L. Mercer Clarke (2016).
“Canada’s Marine Coasts in a Changing Climate.” Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Li, Z.Y., J. W. Ringsberg and F. Rita (2020).
“A voyage planning tool for ships sailing between Europe and Asia via the Arctic.” Ships and Offshore Structures.
Loder, J. W., A. van der Baaren and I. Yashayaev (2015).
“Climate Comparisons and Change Projections for the Northwest Atlantic from Six CMIP5 Models.” Atmosphere-Ocean 53 (5): 529-555.
Mamet, S. D., K. P. Chun, G. G. L. Kershaw, M. M. Loranty and G. Peter Kershaw (2017).
“Recent Increases in Permafrost Thaw Rates and Areal Loss of Palsas in the Western Northwest Territories, Canada.” Permafrost and Periglacial Processes 28 (4): 619-633.
Mekis, E., L. A. Vincent, M. W. Shephard and X. Zhang (2015).
“Observed trends in severe weather conditions based on humidex, wind chill, and heavy rainfall events in Canada for 1953–2012.” Atmosphere-Ocean 53(4): 383-397.
Mitton, J.
B. and S. M. Ferrenberg (2012).
“Mountain Pine Beetle Develops an Unprecedented Summer Generation in Response to Climate Warming.” The American Naturalist 179(5): E163-E171.
Mudryk, L. R., C. Derksen, S. Howell, F. Laliberté, C. Thackeray, R. Sospedra-Alfonso, V. Vionnet, P. J. Kushner and R. Brown (2018).
“Canadian snow and sea ice: historical trends and projections.” The Cryosphere 12(4): 1157-1176.
36 Mudryk, L., C. Derksen, P. J. Kushner and R. Brown (2015).
“Characterization of Northern Hemisphere Snow Water Equivalent Datasets, 1981–2010.” Journal of Climate 28(20): 8037-8051.
Nalley, D., J. Adamowski and B. Khalil (2012).
“Using discrete wavelet transforms to analyze trends in streamflow and precipitation in Quebec and Ontario (1954– 2008).” Journal of Hydrology 475: 204-228.
Nantel, P., M. G. Pellat, K. Keenleyside and P. A.
Gray (2014).
“Biodiversity and Protected Areas.” In Canada in a Changing Climate: Sector Perspecives on Impacts and Adaptation edited by F. J. Warren and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Notz, D. and J. C. Stroeve (2016).
“Observed Arctic sea-ice loss directly follows anthropogenic CO2 emission.” Science 354 (6313): 747-750.
Obu, J., H. Lantuit, G. Grosse, F. Günther, T. Sachs, V. Helm and M. Fritz (2017).
“Coastal erosion and mass wasting along the Canadian Beaufort Sea based on annual airborne LiDAR elevation data.” Geomorphology 293: 331-346.
Olefeldt, D., S. Goswami, G. Grosse, D. Hayes, G. Hugelius, P. Kuhry, A. D. McGuire, V. E. Romanovsky, A.
B. K. Sannel, E. A. G. Schuur and M. R. Turetsky (2016).
“Circumpolar distribution and carbon storage of thermokarst landscapes.” Nature Communications 7 (1): 13043.
Oppenheimer, M., B.C.
Glavovic, J. Hinkel, R. van de Wal, A.K.
Magnan, A. AbdElgawad, R. Cai, M. Cifuentes-Jara, R.M.
DeConto, T. Ghosh, J. Hay, F. Isla, B. Marzeion, B. Meyssignac, and Z. Sebesvari (2019).
“Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low-Lying Islands, Coasts and Communities.” In IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, edited by Pörtner,H.-O., D.C. Roberts, V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, M. Tignor, E. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Nicolai, A. Okem, J. Petzold, B. Rama, N.M. Weyer.
In press.
Overeem, I., R. S. Anderson, C. W. Wobus, G. D. Clow, F. E. Urban and N. Matell (2011).
“Sea ice loss enhances wave action at the Arctic coast.” Geophysical Research Letters 38 (17).
Palko, K. and D. S. Lemmen (2017).
“Climate Risks and Adaptation Practices for the Canadian Transportation Sector 2016.” Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Paquette, M., D. Fortier, D. R. Mueller, D. Sarrazin and W. F. Vincent (2015).
“Rapid disappearance of perennial ice on Canada’s most northern lake.” Geophysical Research Letters 42 (5): 1433-1440.
Parkinson, C. L. (2014).
“Spatially mapped reductions in the length of the Arctic sea ice season.” Geophysical Research Letters 41 (12): 4316-4322.
37 Pearce, T., J.D.
Ford, J. Prno, F. Duerden, J. Pittman, M. Beaumier, L. Berrang-Ford and B. Smit (2010).
“Climate change and mining in Canada.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 16: 347-368.
Pendakur, K. (2017).
“Northern Territories.” In Climate risks and adaptation practices for the Canadian transportation sector 2016 edited by K. Palko and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Perrie, W., Z.
Long, H. Hung, A. Cole, A. Steffen, A. Dastoor, D. Durnford, J. Ma, J. W. Bottenheim, S. Netcheva, R. Staebler, J. R. Drummond and N. T. O’Neill (2012).
“Selected topics in arctic atmosphere and climate.” Climatic Change 115 (1): 35-58.
Poitras, V., L. Sushama, F. Seglenieks, M. N. Khaliq and E. Soulis (2011).
“Projected Changes to Streamflow Characteristics over Western Canada as Simulated by the Canadian RCM.” Journal of Hydrometeorology 12 (6): 1395-1413. teaching/energy-and-environment/canadiannortherncorridor/.
Post, E., R.B.
Alley, T.R.
Christensen, M. Marcias-Fauria, B.C.
Forbes, M.N.
Gooseff, A. Iler, J.T.
Kerby, K.L.
Laidre, M.E.
Mann, J. Olofsson, J.C. Stroeve, F. Ulmer, R.A. Virgina and M. Wang (2019).
“The polar regions in a 2 degrees C warmer world.” Science Advances 5 (12).
Post, E. U.S. Bhatt, C.M.
Bitz, J.F.
Brodie, T.L.
Fulton, M. Hebblewhite, J. Kerby, S. Kutz, I. Stirling and D.A.
Walker (2013).
“Ecological Consequences of Sea-Ice Decline.” Science 341: 519-524.
Prowse, T. (2012).
“Lake and River ice in Canada.” In Changing Cold Environments: A Canadian Perspective edited by French, H. and O. Slaymaker.
John Wiley & Sons.
Radić, V., A. Bliss, A. C. Beedlow, R. Hock, E. Miles and J. G. Cogley (2014).
“Regional and global projections of twenty-first century glacier mass changes in response to climate scenarios from global climate models.” Climate Dynamics 42 (1): 37-58.
Radosavljevic, B., H. Lantuit, W. Pollard, P. P. Overduin, N. J. Couture, T. Sachs, V. Helm and M. Fritz (2016).
“Erosion and Flooding—Threats to Coastal Infrastructure in the Arctic: A Case Study from Herschel Island, Yukon Territory, Canada.” Estuaries and Coasts 39 (4): 900-915.
Romanovsky, V., K. Isaksen, D. Drozdov, O. Anisimov, A. Instanes, M. Leibman, A. McGuire, N. Shiklomanov, S. Smith and D. Walker (2017).
“Changing permafrost and its impacts.” In Snow Water Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) 2017.
Oslo, Norway: Assessment, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.
38 Rood, S. B., S. Kaluthota, L. J. Philipsen, N. J. Rood and K. P. Zanewich (2017).
“Increasing discharge from the Mackenzie River system to the Arctic Ocean.” Hydrological Processes 31 (1): 150-160.
Savard, J.-P., D. van Proosdij and S. O’Carroll (2016).
“Perspectives on Canada’s East Coast region.” In Canada’s Marine Coasts in a Changing Climate edited by D. S. Lemmen, F. J. Warren, T. S. James and C. S. L. Mercer Clarke.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Senneville, S., S. St-Onge Drouin, D. Dumont, A. C. Bihan-Poudec, Z. Belemaalem, M. Corriveau, P. Bernatchez, S. Bélanger, S. Tolszczuk-Leclerc and R. Villeneuve (2014).
“Rapport final: Modélisation des glaces dans l’estuaire et le golfe du Saint-Laurent dans la perspective des changements climatiques.” Rapport final présenté au ministère des Transports du Québec, ISMER-UQAR.
Serafin, K. A., P. Ruggiero, P. L. Barnard and H. F. Stockdon (2019).
“The influence of shelf bathymetry and beach topography on extreme total water levels: Linking large-scale changes of the wave climate to local coastal hazards.” Coastal Engineering 150: 1-17.
Skinner, K., R. M. Hanning, E. Desjardins and L. J. S. Tsuji (2013).
“Giving voice to food insecurity in a remote indigenous community in subarctic Ontario, Canada: traditional ways, ways to cope, ways forward.” BMC Public Health 13 (1): 427.
Smith, L. C., Y. Sheng, G. M. MacDonald and L. D. Hinzman (2005).
“Disappearing Arctic Lakes.” Science 308 (5727): 1429-1429.
Smith, S., J. Chartrand, C. Duchesne and M. Ednie (2017).
“Report on 2016 field activities and collection of ground thermal and active layer data in the Mackenzie Corridor, Northwest Territories.” Ottawa: Geological Survey of Canada.
Sohns, A., J. D. Ford, M. Riva, B. Robinson and J. Adamowski (2019).
“Water Vulnerability in Arctic Households: A Literature-based Analysis.” Arctic 72: 300-316.
Solomon, S. M. (2005).
“Spatial and temporal variability of shoreline change in the Beaufort-Mackenzie region, Northwest Territories, Canada;.” Geo-Marine Latters 25: 127-137.
Steenhof, P. and E. Sparling (2011).
“The Role of Codes, Standards, and Related Instruments in Facilitating Adaptation to Climate Change.” In Climate Change Adaptation in Developed Nations: From Theory to Practice edited by J. D. Ford and L. Berrang-Ford.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
39 Steiner, N., K. Azetsu-Scott, J. Hamilton, K. Hedges, X. Hu, M. Y. Janjua, D. Lavoie, J. W. Loder, H. Melling, A. Merzouk, W. Perrie, I. Peterson, M. Scarratt, T. Sou and R. Tallmann (2015).
“Observed trends and climate projections affecting marine ecosystems in the Canadian Arctic.” Environmental Reviews 23 (2): 191-239.
Stephenson, S.R., L.C.
Smith and J.A.
Agnew (2011).
“Divergent long-term trajectories of human access to the Arctic.
Nature Climate Change 1: 156-160.
Streletskiy, D. and N. Shiklomanov (2016).
“Russian arctic cities through the prism of permafrost” in Sustaining Russia’s Arctic Cities: Resource Politics, Migration, and Climate Change edited by R. Orttung.
New York: Berghahn Press.
Streletskiy, D.A., L.J.
Suter, N.I.
Shiklomanov, B.N.
Porfiriev and D.O.
Eliseev (2019).
“Assessment of climate change impacts on buildings, structures and infrastructure in the Russian regions on permafrost.” Environmental Research Letters 14 (2).
Sulzenko, A. and G. K. Fellows (2016).
“Planning for Infrastructure to Realize Canada’s Potential: The Corridor Concept.” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Papers 9 (22).
Suter, L. D. Streletskiy and N. Shiklomanov (2019).
“Assessment of the cost of climate change impacts on critical infrastructure in the circumpolar Arctic.” Polar Geography 42: 267-286.
Tandon, N. F., P. J. Kushner, D. Docquier, J. J. Wettstein and C. Li (2018).
“Reassessing Sea Ice Drift and Its Relationship to Long-Term Arctic Sea Ice Loss in Coupled Climate Models.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans 123 (6): 4338-4359.
Tennant, C. and B. Menounos (2013).
“Glacier change of the Columbia Icefield, Canadian Rocky Mountains, 1919–2009.” Journal of Glaciology 59 (216): 671-686.
Thackeray, C., C. Fletcher, L. Mudryk and C. Derksen (2016).
“Quantifying the uncertainty in historical and future simulations of Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover.” Journal of Climate 29 (8647-8663).
Thomson, J., Y.
Fan, S. Stammerjohn, J. Stopa, W. E. Rogers, F. Girard-Ardhuin, F. Ardhuin, H. Shen, W. Perrie, H. Shen, S. Ackley, A. Babanin, Q. Liu, P. Guest, T. Maksym, P. Wadhams, C. Fairall, O. Persson, M. Doble, H. Graber, B. Lund, V. Squire, J. Gemmrich, S. Lehner, B. Holt, M. Meylan, J. Brozena and J.-R. Bidlot (2016).
“Emerging trends in the sea state of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.” Ocean Modelling 105: 1-12.
40 Thomson, J. and W. E. Rogers (2014).
“Swell and sea in the emerging Arctic Ocean.” Geophysical Research Letters 41 (9): 3136-3140.
Thorne, R. (2011).
“Uncertainty in the impacts of projected climate change on the hydrology of a subarctic environment: Liard River Basin.” Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
15(5): 1483-1492.
Transport Canada (2017).
“Transportation in Canada 2016.” Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Vermaire, J. C., M. F. J. Pisaric, J. R. Thienpont, C. J. Courtney Mustaphi, S. V. Kokelj and J. P. Smol (2013).
“Arctic climate warming and sea ice declines lead to increased storm surge activity.” Geophysical Research Letters 40 (7): 1386-1390.
Vetter, T., J. Reinhardt, M. Flörke, A. van Griensven, F. Hattermann, S. Huang, H. Koch, I. G. Pechlivanidis, S. Plötner, O. Seidou, B. Su, R. W. Vervoort and V. Krysanova (2017).
“Evaluation of sources of uncertainty in projected hydrological changes under climate change in 12 large-scale river basins.” Climatic Change 141 (3): 419-433.
Vincent, L. A., X. Zhang, R. D. Brown, Y. Feng, E. Mekis, E. J. Milewska, H. Wan and X. L. Wang (2015).
“Observed Trends in Canada’s Climate and Influence of LowFrequency Variability Modes.” Journal of Climate 28: 4545-4560.
Vincent, L. A., X. Zhang, E. Mekis, H. Wan and E. J. Bush (2018).
“Changes in Canada’s Climate: Trends in Indices Based on Daily Temperature and Precipitation Data.” Atmosphere-Ocean 56 (5): 332-349.
Wan, H., X. Zhang and F. Zwiers (2019).
“Human influence on Canadian temperatures.” Climate Dynamics 52: 479-494.
Wang, X., D. K. Thompson, G. A. Marshall, C. Tymstra, R. Carr and M. D. Flannigan (2015).
“Increasing frequency of extreme fire weather in Canada with climate change.” Climatic Change 130 (4): 573-586.
Wesche S.D.
and H.M. Chan (2010).
“Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change on Food Security among Inuit in the Western Canadian Arctic.” Ecohealth 7.
Wotton, B. M., M. D. Flannigan and G. A. Marshall (2017).
“Potential climate change impacts on fire intensity and key wildfire suppression thresholds in Canada.” Environmental Research Letters 12.
Zeng, Q.C., T.Y.
Lu, K.C.
Lin, K.F.
Yuen, K.X.
Li (2020).
The competitiveness of Arctic shipping over Suez Canal and China-Europe railway.
Transport Policy 86: 34-43.
41 Zhang, X., G. Flato, M. Kirchmeier-Young, L. Vincent, H. Wan, X. Wang, R. Rong, J. Fyfe, G. Li and V. V. Kharin (2019).
“Changes in Temperature and Precipitation Across Canada.” In Canada’s Changing Climate Report edited by E. Bush and D. S. Lemmen.
Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Zhang, Y., W. Chen and D. W. Riseborough (2008a).
“Disequilibrium response of permafrost thaw to climate warming in Canada over 1850–2100.” Geophysical Research Letters 35 (2).
Zhang, Y., W. Chen and D. W. Riseborough (2008b).
“Transient projections of permafrost distribution in Canada during the 21st century under scenarios of climate change.” Global and Planetary Change 60 (3): 443-456.
42 About the Authors Dr. Tristan Pearce is an Associate Professor in the Global & International Studies Program and Canada Research Chair in the Cumulative Impacts of Environmental Change at the University of Northern British Columbia.
His research and teaching interests focus on climate change vulnerability and adaptation with a strong focus on traditional knowledge systems.
Dr. James Ford is a Chair in Climate Change Adaptation at the Priestley International Centre for Climate at the University of Leeds.
His research takes place at the interface between climate and society, and he is particularly interested in climate change vulnerability and adaptation.
He is the editor-in-chief at the journal Regional Environmental Change and has been a lead author on national and international climate assessments including the IPCCs SR on 1.5C of warming.
David Fawcett is a Research Associate at the University of Northern British Columbia.
His research focuses on climate change vulnerability and adaptation in the Arctic.
David holds a Masters in Geography from the University of Guelph.
43 ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY The School of Public Policy has become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada.
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance for the betterment of our families, communities and country.
We do this by: • Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree programs, giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital interests both here and abroad; • Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures; • Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
The School of Public Policy relies on industry experts and practitioners, as well as academics, to conduct research in their areas of expertise.
Using experts and practitioners is what makes our research especially relevant and applicable.
Authors may produce research in an area which they have a personal or professional stake.
That is why The School subjects all Research Papers to a double anonymous peer review.
Then, once reviewers comments have been reflected, the work is reviewed again by one of our Scientific Directors to ensure the accuracy and validity of analysis and data.
The School of Public Policy University of Calgary, Downtown Campus 906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9 Phone: 403 210 3802 DISTRIBUTION Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors' alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT Copyright © Pearce, Ford and Fawcett 2020.
This is an open-access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons license CC BY-NC 4.0, which allows non-commercial sharing and redistribution so long as the original author and publisher are credited.
ISSN ISSN 2560-8312 The School of Public Policy Publications (Print) ISSN 2560-8320 The School of Public Policy Publications (Online) DATE OF ISSUE November 2020 MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-220-2540.
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The School's events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT For information about contributing to The School of Public Policy, please contact Catherine Scheers by telephone at 403-210-6213 or by e-mail at catherine.scheers@ucalgary.ca.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 44 RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY CROSS-CANADA INFRASTRUCTURE CORRIDOR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ‘MEANINGFUL CONSULTATION’ https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/CNC-Indigenous-Wright-final.pdf David V. Wright | October 2020 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: INCOME INEQUALITY AND LOW BIRTH WEIGHTS, 1979-2017 https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/v2-Social-Policy-Trends-Birth-Weights.pdf Ron Kneebone | October 2020 CANADIAN KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES ABOUT DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Report-Survey-on-Civil-Military-Relations.pdf October 2020 ECONOMIC POLICY TRENDS: THE GENDERED IMPLICATIONS OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOCUSED RECOVERY: ISSUES AND POLICY THOUGHTS https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/EPT-Gender-Implications-2.pdf Anna Cameron, Vanessa Morin and Lindsay Tedds | October 2020 TAX POLICY TRENDS: IMPLICATIONS OF A BIDEN WIN FOR U.S. CORPORATE TAX POLICY AND COMPETITIVENESS – U.S. COMPETITIVENESS TO DECLINE https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/final-Tax-Trends-US-Corporate-Tax-Mintz-Bazel.pdf Jack Mintz and Philip Bazel | September 2020 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: UNDER PRESSURE: THE ADEQUACY OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INCOME https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FINAL-SPT-Sept-Kneebone.pdf Ron Kneebone | September 2020 COMPREHENSIVE DENTAL CARE IN CANADA: THE CHOICE BETWEEN DENTICAID AND DENTICARE https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Final_Comprehensive-Dental-Care-Lange.pdf Thomas Christopher Lange | September 2020 STARTING FROM SCRATCH: A MICRO-COSTING ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DENTAL CARE IN CANADA https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Micro-Costing-Dental-Care-Lange.pdf Thomas Christopher Lange | September 2020 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: EMERGENCY HOMELESS SHELTER BEDS AND THE COST OF HOUSING IN 50 CANADIAN CITIES https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Social-Policy-Trends-Shelter-Beds-vs-Rent-Ratios-August-2020.pdf Margarita Wilkins and Ron Kneebone | August 2020 FAMILY FARMERS TO FOREIGN FIELDHANDS: CONSOLIDATION OF CANADIAN AGRICULTURE AND THE TEMPORARY FOREIGN WORKER PROGRAM https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Family-Farmers-Falconer.pdf Robert Falconer | August 2020 MANDATORY MASK BYLAWS: CONSIDERATION BEYOND EXEMPTION FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Mask-Bylaws-Kohek-Seth-Edwards-Zwicker.pdf Jessica Kohek, Ash Seth, Meaghan Edwards and Jennifer D. Zwicker | August 2020 CANADA’S HISTORICAL SEARCH FOR TRADE MARKETS https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Canadian-Trade-Markets-Bercuson.pdf David J. Bercuson | August 2020 SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: COVID-19 AND REFUGEES IN UGANDA https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Social-Policy-Trends-Uganda-July-2020.pdf Anthony Byamukama | July 2020
I Could Turn You to Stone: Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change The International Indigenous Policy Journal Volume 9 Issue 3 Special Issue: Indigenous Peoples, Climate Change, and Environmental Stewardship Article 7 July 2018 I Could Turn You to Stone: Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change Patrick C. Canning Vancouver Island University / private practice lawyer, patrick.c.canning@gmail.com Recommended Citation Canning, P. C. (2018).
I Could Turn You to Stone: Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 9(3).
DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 I Could Turn You to Stone: Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change Abstract Indigenous Peoples in Canada and around the world have, for years, used blockades and direct action when alternative means of asserting their rights have failed.
The Secwépemc First Nation of British Columbia, Canada, has a myth where a character, Sk’elép, encounters strangers who try to “transform” him, but fail.
He tells them he could turn them to stone, but he will not.
This myth is used as a lens to reflect, from a settler perspective, on the potential for future Indigenous-led blockades, which could reach the point of mass economic shutdowns, in response to a lack of action on both Indigenous rights and climate change.
Up until now, the policy of most colonial nations has been to deal with Indigenous blockades by force or at best with localised solutions.
This policy will not work regarding climate change.
This article proposes that the Western world faces a stark choice: truly embrace “free, prior, and informed consent” (FPIC), or else face the possibility of large scale shutdowns from a growing alliance of Indigenous Peoples, environmentalists, and concerned citizens.
Keywords Indigenous blockades, Aboriginal protests, pipeline protests, climate change, climate movement, resurgence, free prior and informed consent, policy recommendations Acknowledgments Thank you to the reviewers who took the time to give very thoughtful and helpful feedback.
To Emery Hartley and Greg Blanchette for last minute reviews.
To Claire, Marion, and Iona for moral support and inspiration.
And to Joe David for essential teachings.
Disclaimer This article is intended for general information purposes only and does not convey legal advice.
Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ “I Could Turn You to Stone”—Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change In a 2010 document memorializing a letter sent in 1910 the Secwépemc First Nation (also known as the Shuswap) in the interior of British Columbia, the story of Sk’elép, a Coyote or trickster figure from their mythology is retold.
As the story goes, in the ancient past visitors came to Secwépemc territory and tried to transform Sk’elép.
They were unable to.
As they tried, he sat looking at them and finally said, You are making the world right—so am I.
Why try to punish me when I have done you no harm?
This is my country.
Why do you come here and interfere with my work?
If I wished, I could turn you into stone, but as you have likely been sent into the world, like myself, to do good, I will allow you to pass, but you must leave this country as quickly as you can.
We should be friends, but must not interfere with each others’ work.
(Shuswap Nation Tribal Council, 2010, p. 2) The Secwépemc have occupied south-central British Columbia for at least 10,000 years (Ignace & Ignace, 2017).
This article does not purport to speak to what the story means to the Secwépemc First Nation, but rather reflects upon it from the perspective of settlers in a post-colonial context.
Sk’elep is a prominent figure to the Secwépemc, who is featured in many stories and lessons as the giver of laws and customs, and the story reflects on the initial settler–Indigenous relationship.
In its way of reflecting on the relational nature of the meeting of cultures, it is similar to the Two-Row Wampum story of central and Eastern Canada (Seck, 2017).
This story was chosen because it was used in the 1910 memorial to reflect the settler–Indigenous relationship, and also for the particular motif of “I could turn you into stone.” The phrase is being used here as a metaphor for the possibility that Indigenous Peoples could paralyse the Western economy, or part of it, through the use of blockades.
That is particularly so if climate change is not addressed and Indigenous Peoples are not empowered to address it.
The Sk’elep story relays the principle that “each nation collectively holds its respective homeland and its resources at the exclusion of outsiders” (Shuswap Nation Tribal Council, 2010, p. 1).
In that sense, it reflects the connection with land and the responsibility to protect it, which often undergirds actions relating to unwanted resource-use decisions.
Some examples of this are the 1984 Meares Island confrontation over old-growth logging (Morrow, 2014); the 1990 “Oka Crisis” in Oka, Ontario (Hedican, 2012; Ladner, 2010); the 2013 Elsipogtog fracking conflict in New Brunswick (Simpson, 2013); and in 2016 at Standing Rock in North Dakota where the blockaders and protesters were called “water protectors” (Rivas, 2017, pp.
66-67).
Europeans came and tried to transform Indigenous Peoples, and some would say they were successful (Vanslyke, 2013; Wahlquist, 2016).
However, despite the cultural genocide in which the British-colonial and then Canadian governments engaged, Indigenous Peoples and cultures remain.
Not only are Indigenous Peoples still here, but they are experiencing a resurgence with profound implications for Canada and the entire world (Saul, 2014).
This resurgence has been expressed in growing political weight, legal victories, a growing population, increasing levels of education, increased participation in the business world, and increased cultural notice (Manuel, 2017; Nagel, 1996; Saul, 2014).
1 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Throughout colonial history, but particularly and increasingly as part of this resurgence, Indigenous Peoples the world over have used blockades and direct action to get results when all else fails.
This is a strategy that one could say Western governments have encouraged by ensuring that all else generally does fail (Borrows, 2016; Hedican, 2012; Manuel, 2017).
The Indigenous resurgence is arguably one of the two biggest phenomena currently shaping our future for generations to come.
The other is climate change.
The trapping of heat in our atmosphere due to increased greenhouse gases is already transforming our weather and our world (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018).
The section on climate change will discuss these impacts generally and the impacts on Indigenous Peoples specifically.
It will invite the reader to imagine what those impacts will mean to Indigenous Peoples, why it is a life or death issue for many Indigenous Peoples, and how it therefore could push Indigenous Peoples to desperate acts.
Climate change has disproportionate effects on Indigenous Peoples who live in the most directly impacted areas, as they tend to be more connected to the land and already marginalized (RamosCastillo, Castellanos, & McLean, 2017; Wilkes, 2006).
That is additionally unfair when you consider that Indigenous Peoples have had only a minor role in causing climate change.
Climate change is a problem that cannot be solved without meaningful and widespread change.
This article argues that the Western world faces a stark choice: Embrace the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), as embodied in Article 32 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007), or face the possibility of largescale shutdowns from a growing alliance of Indigenous Peoples, environmentalists, and people from all walks of life simply concerned about their futures.
UNDRIP was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007.
Article 32 of UNDRIP is the most controversial, as it embraces the principle free, prior and informed consent for states, vis-à-vis Indigenous Peoples.
That was the main reason for Canada’s original refusal to sign, although they subsequently have done so (Borrows, 2016; Manuel, 2017; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada [TRC], 2015).
The precise meaning of the term, and whether it creates a further duty to consult or a right to veto has led to considerable academic, public, and political discussion, with no clear resolution in sight.
In Canada, it will likely be resolved in the courts (Imai, 2017).
As we will examine, many authors have for years pointed out the possibility of large-scale blockades by Indigenous Peoples, such as those in relation to the Oka Crisis in 1990, Idle No More in 2012, Elsipogtog in 2013, and North Dakota in 2016 (Manuel, 2017).
The threat or possibility of large-scale blockades, direct action, or shutdowns has loomed in these past events and others, but never reached the point of paralysing the economy or being a mass shutdown.
It is proposed here that a failure to deal with climate change, particularly as it affects Indigenous Peoples, and any failure to empower Indigenous Peoples to protect themselves from climate change, could be a tipping point leading to drastic mass action.
To any post-colonial settler looking at this story through the lens of climate change and Indigenous actions, it should be a sobering reflection on the settler– Indigenous relationship.
The threat of being “turned to stone” highlights one potentially disastrous path—that of mass blockades and shutdowns by an Indigenous–environmentalist–citizen alliance.
2 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 This article is not advising the use of blockades, but rather is intended to draw attention to the increasing likelihood of them, based on various courses of action, and also suggests how to avoid that eventuality.
This article will be laid out as follows: The first step will be to briefly give some background, review the related history of colonialism, and then discuss the Indigenous resurgence.
After those foundational matters are dealt with, the four theses will be discussed: a.
That the current and longstanding conflict over Indigenous land rights and decisionmaking is bringing these two forces inevitably to a point of conflict; b.
That the policy thus far in most colonial nations has been to ignore land rights issues, and to let the police, or at times the military, deal with them as conflicts arise (Hedican, 2012); c. That because of the nature of climate change as both a global and a life-or-death issue, especially for Indigenous people, the aforementioned policy will not work and will only lead to spiralling conflict; and d. That there is a better way: Granting the veto power envisioned by UNDRIP, ensuring its meaning is completely clear to all parties, and empowering Indigenous Peoples to develop their own governance and decision-making systems that are as free from the bounds of colonialism as possible.
This article uses Canada as a lens, but the issue is international and global in scope and will also be discussed on those levels.
Background The struggle over oil and gas development is merely the latest in a myriad of other issues in the struggle for Indigenous sovereignty and recognition.
The difference between oil and gas as an issue and past resource struggles involving Indigenous Peoples is that the threat of oil and gas development is not just local through spills, etc., but global, through climate change.
The spectre of climate change has been looming for decades and now, with increasing storms, floods, and fires, is becoming a stark reality (Gabbatiss, 2017).
This battle against pipelines and runaway climate change squares Indigenous Peoples and environmentalists against the oil industry and the governments that promote it.
The most recent front may have been in Burnaby, against the Trans Mountain pipeline, but there have been many other recent incarnations, among them: North Dakota’s Standing Rock protests against the Keystone XL and Northern Gateway pipelines, in Ecuador, the Peruvian Amazon, Nigeria, Kenya, among the Inuit in the North, and too many others to list (Boos, 2015; Cultural Survival, 2017; Finer, Jenkins, Pimm, Keane, & Ross, 2008; Lobe, 2002; Manuel 2017; Orta-Martínez & Finer, 2010; Raygorodetsky, 2017; Suzuki & Moola, 2016).
In Peru, in 2009, Indigenous Peoples resisted the exploitation of Amazonian oil reserves with peaceful protest for months.
However, after the police were ordered to remove blockades by force, 50 Indigenous People were killed, hundreds more wounded or arrested, and nine police officers were also killed (Vidal, 2009).
As this article is being written, Indigenous and non-Indigenous protestors are being arrested in Burnaby, a suburb of Vancouver, British Columbia, over the Trans Mountain pipeline (Trans Mountain).
The Trans Mountain pipeline runs from the Alberta tar sands to Burnaby, BC, just outside of Vancouver.
It 3 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 was built in the 1950s and, in 2013, then owner Kinder Morgan applied to twin the pipeline and nearly triple its capacity (Canadian Press, 2018b; “Trans Mountain Pipeline,” n.d.b).
There were early protests in 2014 over Trans Mountain, and the public review process was criticised as being undemocratic and even “fraudulent.” Nonetheless, the federal government approved the application in November 2016, with the new BC New Democratic Party (NDP) government opposed to it and the Alberta NDP government in favour, resulting in threatened and initiated (although incomplete) Constitutional litigation.
In that context, serious protests began in March 2018 and ended in August, with over 200 people being arrested for contempt of court and other charges (Canadian Press, 2018b; Trans Mountain Pipeline, n.d.a).
On April 7, 2018, in Burnaby, the Grand Chief of the BC First Nations organization, the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC), along with key executives and such notables as author Naomi Klein, blockaded the Trans Mountain facility (then owned by Kinder Morgan), stopping work.
Unlike previous blockades, Kinder Morgan did not ask the RCMP to remove the protesters, but instead shut down operations for the day (Canadian Press, 2018a; Ward, Smart, Bennett, Rabson, & Smith, 2018).
On the following day, Kinder Morgan announced they were suspending all non-essential work on the pipeline, partly due to the intensity of the opposition, and expressed concerns about the wise use of shareholder resources.
In the face of massive opposition and numerous lawsuits, largely from Indigenous Peoples, some speculated that the project is not viable, and this action was just a way to pressure the government to push their pipeline through or to get paid for having it fail (S. Klein, 2018).
Around that time, the Chiefs of Ontario signed on to the North America-wide Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion, adding a further 133 First Nations to the 150 Nations that had already signed (Meyer, 2018a; Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion, 2018b), reflecting the growing power and leveraging of solidarity (Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion, 2018a).
Since that time, in a number of steps (or missteps, depending on one’s point of view), the Government of Canada became the new owner of the proposed Trans Mountain pipeline.
When Kinder Morgan shut down work in April, they gave Canada a one-month ultimatum—ensure their pipeline would get built, or they would pull out.
Canada instead offered to buy the pipeline for $4.5 billion, with a projected real cost of over $15 billion (Allan, 2018).
On August 30, 2018, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal rendered its decision on the 12 legal challenges to the proposed pipeline’s approvals, striking them down for not having taken into account the negative impacts of increased marine traffic and for having failed to properly consult Indigenous Peoples (C. Smith, 2018;Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018).
The case was initiated directly in the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, in 12 separate challenges to the November 29, 2016, federal approval on the basis of insufficient consultation, and not taking marine shipping into account.
Those cases were filed by a number of First Nations, municipalities, and environmental groups, including Chief Ron Ignace on his own and on behalf of the Stk’emluosemc te Secwépemc of the Secwépemc Nation.
Again, to remind the reader—the Secwépemc are the nation that tells the story of Sk’elép, who said, “I could turn you to stone” (Shuswap Nation Tribal Council, 2010, p. 2).
The next day, Kinder Morgan shareholders voted to accept Canada’s $4.5 billion-dollar offer, and Canada become the owner of the project (Clancy, 2018).
On September 21, 2018, Canada announced a 4 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 new, 22-week consultation process, with a longer and as of now uncertain timeline for consulting Indigenous Peoples (Meyer, 2018b; Wyld, 2018).
The above story simply reflects a policy that this article proposes exists: that of ignoring Indigenous concerns, rights, and land claims, and instead pushing projects forward and then resolving issues through conflict.
It also clearly reflects the need for a reminder that there is a better way.
At the same time, the story may reflect some progress.
Compared to earlier incidents, to be discussed later in this article (such as the Oka Crisis of 1990), the Canadian government could be said to have used restraint in their application of force, in that the military was not used.
The broad presence of non-Indigenous protestors could have been a factor in the greater restraint, it is impossible to know.
Perhaps most importantly, the story reflects another powerful tool that the Secwépemc, who tell the story, and all Indigenous Peoples have to turn unjustified projects to stone—the law.
This would also be a useful point to note that Robert Lovelace, in his short work “Notes from Prison,” openly describes the four-prong strategy he used in fighting uranium mining in Ontario and advises other Indigenous Peoples to do the same.
The prongs are: research, community education, legal action, and direct action (Lovelace, 2009).
It would appear that the Secwépemc may have used this strategy to powerful effect in their fight against the Trans Mountain pipeline (Canadian Press, 2018b; Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018).
A History of Trying to Transform Indigenous Peoples The colonial project started in 1492, with Christopher Columbus’s arrival in the New World (often referred to as his “discovery” of it).
It was enabled by Papal Bulls, or announcements made by the Pope, in 1493 that laid the groundwork for the “Doctrine of Discovery,” the principle that European powers used to justify colonization of the Americas, Australia, and other places around the world (TRC, 2015, p. 46).
In 1497, John Cabot arrived in Newfoundland and, throughout the 1500s, European powers moved out into the world to conquer and claim at will, on the basis of religious and philosophical justifications (Polack, 2018; TRC, 2015).
That said, colonialism did not really begin for Indigenous Peoples in western North America, and other places, until much later.
The Secwépemc did not encounter White people until the arrival of Alexander Mackenzie in 1793, and not in numbers until much later.
The newcomers brought smallpox, which, between 1862 and 1863, wiped out two-thirds of the Secwépemc population.
This allowed wholesale takeover of Secwépemc lands as settlers moved in to claim the country for themselves (Ignace & Ignace, 2017).
The colonial process in North America can be described by a set of deliberate policies, actions, and events.
A key event was the introduction of diseases that wiped out tens of millions of Indigenous people (Sellars, 2016).
The first recorded epidemic in North America occurred in New England in 1616; it wiped out so many Indigenous people that when settlers arrived a few years later all they found were bones, skulls, and abandoned villages and corn fields (Reo & Parker, 2013).
An early policy, which was critical to the colonial project on the Great Plains, was the intentional destruction of food sources, such as bison (often referred to at the time as buffalo; Phippen, 2016).
The early and ongoing cultural invasion of missionaries was a key part of breaking down Indigenous spirituality, family relationships, and cultural practices.
It was state-sanctioned and integral to the colonial project whose key aim was the acquisition of land and resources (TRC, 2015).
Some other colonial tools included offering bounties for killing Indigenous people (Paul, 2000), and signing but not honouring treaties (TRC, 2015).
5 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 After Confederation, unifying a number of provinces into the nation of Canada, assimilation became the central policy regarding Indigenous Peoples.
One of the key methods of assimilation was the residential school system.
Within that system, Indigenous children experienced unprecedented levels of abuse, including harsh discipline, malnutrition, beatings, torture, sexual abuse and exploitation, medical malpractice and experimentation, and death (Saul, 2014; Sellars, 2016; TRC, 2015).
They were stripped of their language and culture, all for the purpose of answering the question of who owned the land.
The thought was that if Indigenous people were assimilated into mainstream society there would no longer be an issue (Saul, 2014; TRC, 2015).
Other elements of the post-confederation assimilation project were: the creation of Indian hospitals where medical experiments were conducted, the banning of potlatches, banning Indigenous Peoples from hiring lawyers, disenfranchisement, and the pass system (Saul, 2014; Sterritt & Dufresne, 2018; TRC, 2015).
Mainstream Canadian society has been fairly criticized for misrepresenting or understating the impacts of the colonial process and their depth.
For that reason, it may be helpful to explore how colonialism is defined by Indigenous Canadians.
Umeek (E. Richard Atleo), hereditary Chief of the Nuu-chah-nulth, professor, and author, described colonialism by referencing the subtitle of Darwin’s major work, On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.
Umeek points out, “the identity of the ‘favoured races’ and the identity of those not favoured translates into the coercive and hegemonic rule of the colonizer over the colonized” (Umeek, 2011, p. 168).
Bev Sellars, grandmother, former Chief of the Xatśūll First Nation (Soda Creek Indian Band, part of the broader Secwepemc First Nation), Indigenous historian, author, and activist, quotes Malcolm X to describe how settler society views Indigenous Peoples even today: “I have no respect for a society that will crush a man and then criticize him for not being able to stand up under the weight” (cited in Sellars, 2016, p. 185).
Sellars points out that the worst traumas foisted upon European society—the great plagues—had breaks of at least 40 years where people could recover and repopulate, but that the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas have had no such breaks from disease and the weight of colonialism, for hundreds of years (Sellars, 2016).
Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC, 2015) has described colonialism as “cultural genocide,” as has Canada’s current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
Others do not use the qualifier “cultural” and simply term Canadian history regarding Indigenous Peoples as genocide (Woolford, 2009).
Disadvantages have been stacked on the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas and the world in the form of colonialism.
Key parts of that colonialism extend to the present day as government failures to deal with land issues and treaties, to honour treaties, and to resolve disputes over resources (Hedican, 2013; Umeek, 2011; Wilkes, 2006).
More recently, there has been the gross overrepresentation of Indigenous Peoples in prisons throughout the post-colonial world (TRC, 2015; Wilkes, 2006).
In Australia, Aboriginal people make up 2.5% of the population, but 26% of the adult prison population, as of 2014 (Weatherburn, 2014).
The numbers are similar in Canada, where Indigenous Peoples make up 4% of the population, yet 27% of the males and 43% of females in sentenced custody, with numbers in some provinces and territories as high as 71%, 78%, and up to 100% in Nunavut (Johnson, 2014; McIntosh & McKeen, 2018).
The comparable numbers in Australia and Canada are due to their shared roots in colonialism (Wahlquist, 2016).
6 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 In 2009, Robert Lovelace, an Algonquin spiritual leader, wrote an apt description of the colonial process while in a maximum-security prison in Kingston, Ontario.
He was there for the crime of contempt of court, for blockading uranium exploration in his traditional territory.
He wrote that colonialism is “the process by which a group having exhausted its sustainability options dispossesses another group of its” (Lovelace, 2009, p. ix).
Further reflecting on the colonial process, and the various means employed within it, Robert Lovelace (2009) wrote: Using seduction or force, a dominant group undermines the power of multiple others.
This is the principle mechanism that separates much of humanity from the sacred relationships with the earth and has become normalized in the governance of nations.
(p. ix).
A key part of the colonialist project has been the attempt to sever the connection between land and person.
This has been done both overtly (Manuel, 2017; Saul, 2014; Sellars, 2016; TRC, 2015) and covertly (Gill & Zwibel, 2017; Manuel, 2017; Wilkes 2006).
Overtly, a key purpose of the purpose of the residential school system, which ran for over 150 years in Canada, ending in 1996, was to break the cultural connection with the land in order to enable settlement (TRC, 2015).
Both overt and covert methods were used in the FBI takedown of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in 1972 in South Dakota (Churchill, 2003), and covert methods in spying on Idle No More organisers in Canada in 2012 (Gill & Zwibel, 2017).
The history of colonialism in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and throughout the world, up to today, is an ugly one because of the acts that were committed against Indigenous Peoples.
It is made even uglier when the reasons are considered—the acquisition of wealth in the form of land and resources.
The Policy of Dealing with Land Issues Through Discrete Conflicts Indigenous Peoples are the most disadvantaged group in Canada, and government policies that fail to deal with land claims and resource issues have led to conflict, over and over again (Hedican, 2012, 2013).
When other routes have failed or been exhausted, “Indigenous Peoples in Canada have used direct action as an important means of achieving social and political justice when more conventional routes have been blocked” (Wilkes, Corrigall-Brown, & Myers, 2010, p. 328; see also Blomley, 1996; Borrows, 2016).
Indigenous Peoples have had to use marches and blockades to draw attention to issues and protect land and rights.
Road blockades and other tactics can be an efficient way to get attention without having the numbers of people available that could be drawn on in areas with a larger population base, and their use continues to increase (Hedican, 2012; Wilkes, 2006).
Blockades also turn the norm on its head, by restricting settler access to land, where normally and historically it is Indigenous Peoples whose movements are or have been restricted (Borrows, 2016; Blomley, 1996).
Blomley (1996) gave a thorough analysis of Indigenous blockades in British Columbia from 1984 to 1995, noting that there were 30 in the summer of 1990 alone.
As blockades evolved as a tool, “many were now placed on public routes, including major roads and rail lines,” and that at one high point 7 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Vancouver newspapers “even began publishing traffic advisories for travelers, detailing Interior blockades” (Blomley, 1996, p. 9).
The spike in blockades in British Columbia in 1990 was at least partly caused by solidarity and support blockades, which sprung up all across Canada in support of the Mohawks at Khanesatake, in the conflict known as the Oka Crisis (Blomley, 1996).
The whole world watched the Oka Crisis: The Canadian military was called in, a policeman was killed, an Indigenous Elder died, and a 14-year-old Indigenous girl was stabbed in the chest by a soldier with a bayonet on his rifle (Horn-Millar, 2014; York & Pindera, 1991).
The conflict was over the municipality’s attempt to bulldoze a sacred burial ground to expand a golf course.
Oka triggered a number of solidarity blockades in support of those under siege; one of which, at the Mercier Bridge in Montreal, in addition to blockades of Highways 132, 138, and 207, ground traffic to a halt over a broad area of Montreal (Borrows, 2016).
Oka is described as “a defining moment for both Indigenous Peoples and settler society separately, and collectively” (Ladner, 2010), and comparisons are already being drawn to Trans Mountain protests in Burnaby, British Columbia (Philip & Simon, 2018).
Oka is an important lens for this article because another view of this topic is that it is about “the big one”—not an earthquake, but rather the everpresent, dreaded possibility of mass blockades by Indigenous Peoples, with a serious, widespread shutdown of economy and society.
In the process of reflecting on some of the more serious conflicts and blockades in Canada over the period of 1990 to 2007, Hedican (2012) asked and reflected on some very reasonable questions: The wider question in these protest cases is: Why are there not adequate means of conflict resolution that would avert such violent confrontations, which endanger people’s lives?
The political leaders of this country, both at the provincial and federal levels, appear reticent about becoming involved, at least until the confrontation goes too far and results in property damage and personal injury.
Why, also, are the officers of the various police forces placed in harm’s way without adequate guidelines as to their appropriate conduct in such incidents?
Certainly, Aboriginal protests pose an ambiguous situation for the police who are apt to feel uncomfortable with the idea that they are forced to act as mediators between First Nations people and government officials in what are, in many cases, land claims negotiations that are essentially matters of civil litigation.
(p. 3) In other words, if matters can be resolved with money, buy-outs, compensation, or in court, why are those avenues not pursued before violence arises instead of after?
Doesn’t this approach encourage violence?
Where resource or development disputes between Indigenous Peoples and the government start out as disputes with local settlers, state enforcement often steps in and uses force in suppressing dissent.
Take for example the 1995 occupation of Ipperwash Provincial Park in Ontario by the Stoney Point Ojibway First Nation, which lead to a conflict in which police shot and killed an unarmed man, Dudley George.
The Ojibway occupied the park as a last resort to push the government to deal with their claim that the park, formerly reserve land that was appropriated under the War Measures Act, be returned to them (Hedican, 2012).
The resulting inquiry was known as the Ipperwash Inquiry.
It found, relying in part on the work of Indigenous legal scholar John Borrows that “land and treaties are central sources for 8 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 these conflicts,” and that there are three main catalysts for conflict: unresolved land claims, natural resources regulatory regimes, and actual or potential desecration of sacred Aboriginal sites or burial grounds (cited in Commissioner of the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007, p. 21).
In their submissions to the Ipperwash Inquiry, the Chiefs of Ontario (2006) stated, Until the fundamental issues that give rise to conflict are resolved, future protests are a certainty.
How then do we each work together to avoid future tragedies?
The Chiefs of Ontario submit that all levels of government would be wise to learn from past mistakes.
The province of Ontario (and Canada) has been slow to resolve the underlying issues regarding First Nations’ access to lands and resources.
Unless and until these issues are addressed to the satisfaction of all parties, future conflict is inevitable.
(paras.
107-108) In Burnt Church, New Brunswick, in 2000, a violent dispute erupted over fishing rights.
It was initially between local fishers and Mi’kmaq fishers, with violence initiated by locals.
However, when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) stepped in, they essentially took over the role of the local fishers involved by taking up their cause (Borrows, 2016).
The RCMP and DFO used extreme force against largely unarmed civilian Mi’kmaq fishers, running over their boats with larger boats and then beating and pepper spraying them once in the water (Obomsawin, 2002).
Those unarmed Mi’kmaq fishers were later charged with assaulting a peace officer and resisting arrest.
In September 2001, the terrorist attacks known as 9/11 occurred and, in the aftermath, the consequences of violent action increased, and the pressure on Indigenous activists to be peaceful activists increased along with it (Horn-Millar, 2014).
Since 9/11, the use of covert measures such as spying have increased.
Manuel (2017) described how both overt and covert methods have been used against Indigenous activists: .
.
.
the RCMP and national security officers have infiltrated our organisations and will use these infiltrators for information to convict us and, very often, as agents provocateurs who try to incite violence which they can use to isolate us and give the green light to the RCMP, provincial police or army to violently oppress us.
Violence is the game of our oppressor.
Our response is nonviolent resistance.
(pp.
233-234) Proulx (2014) argued that state surveillance is part of the ongoing colonial project.
Gill and Zwibel (2017) documented how the Canadian government has monitored Indigenous activists and advocates.
They tell the story of how Dr. Cindy Blackstock, a children’s rights advocate who was fighting the government to provide equal funding for Indigenous children, was monitored: .
.
.
between 2009 and 2011, Dr. Blackstock was subject to extensive monitoring by Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC)— the government department responsible for Indigenous issues—and the Department of Justice.
Officials monitored her personal and professional activities on Facebook and attended between 75 and 100 of her public speaking engagements, taking detailed notes and widely distributing reports on her activities.
(Gill & Zwibel, 2017, “Surveillance of Indigenous Leaders” section, para.
1) 9 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Although Canada’s Privacy Commissioner found that Canada had violated Dr. Blackstock’s right to privacy, it has been reported that the practice continues (Bronskill, 2018).
The spectre of mass blockades was raised again with Idle No More in 2012 and 2013.
In 2012, a rather authoritarian Conservative federal government passed legislation severely rolling back environmental laws in Canada.
Though many opposed the move, it was Indigenous Peoples who really took to the streets under the Idle No More banner.
Some said the reason was that they had nothing to lose, but it was also seen as a “sign of growing power and self-confidence” and that Indigenous Peoples had taken a leadership position (Saul, 2014).
In the words of Indigenous scholar Pamela Palmater (2014), it was: .
.
.
a coordinated, strategic movement, not led by any elected politician, national chief, or paid executive director.
It is a movement originally led by indigenous women and has been joined by grassroots First Nations leaders, Canadians, and now the world.
(p. 39).
The Idle No More movement was not successful in blocking the legislation at issue.
However, it again served to remind Canadians of the presence and power of Indigenous Peoples, and that the unhealthy relationship between resource extraction and the Earth is of critical importance to many Indigenous Peoples (D. Turner, 2014).
Then in 2013, in Elsipogtog, New Brunswick, 13 years after the events at nearby Burnt Church, another resource dispute erupted involving the Mi’kmaq.
This dispute was over proposed drilling for fracked gas, an issue that was opposed by 69% of the New Brunswick population.
The protest, composed of unarmed Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, was peaceful.
Nonetheless, tactical forces were deployed with snipers, dogs, and a full array of paramilitary police equipment.
Although no one was seriously injured, tension was high.
In the end, the Mi’kmaq were victorious in shutting down the project (N. Klein, 2014; J. Simpson, 2017; L. Simpson, 2013).
There are many more examples than can be cited here, but the above are some of the key ones.
In order to reflect on Indigenous Peoples’ refusal to give up in the face of force and resistance, the words of Indigenous author Ryan McMahon (2014), in discussing Idle No More, are apt: Without the land I am not Anishinaabe.
So, if you take away the land (literally or figuratively) from my people—what are we left with?
Being “Canadian?” Being “like everyone else?” Is that not genocidal?
(p. 141) Post-Colonial Indigenous Resurgence In the words of Rueben George, manager of the Tsleil-Waututh Nation Sacred Trust Initiative, “There is an Indigenous spiritual rising after the attempted genocide of our Peoples.
They tried to bury us.
But what they didn't know is that we’re seeds and we’re growing” (Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion, 2018a, Slider bar above Events section).
An Indigenous resurgence is happening all over the post-colonial world (Alfred, 2005; Corntassel, 2012).
In Canada, resurgence includes court victories, growing influence over lands and resources, a rapidly growing population, and growing business and political influence (Saul, 2014).
It is unclear exactly when decline turned into new ascent.
Canadian intellectual John Ralston Saul traces it to the early twentieth century (Saul, 2014).
Wilkes et al.
(2010) traced this collective resistance through the 1800s and found that the current phase started in 1969: 10 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 .
.
.
when Indigenous people successfully used mass mobilization to block the passage of the White Paper, which was federal legislation aimed at eliminating “Indian Status” and the special rights this status entails (Ramos 2008a, 2008b; Sanders 1985; York 1989).
In the decades to follow, the annual number of events began to rise such that by the mid-1980s and 1990s, they were a standard feature of the Canadian national political landscape, drawing much-needed public, and political attention to long-standing grievances with deep roots in colonial history (Ramos 2006; Wilkes 2006).
They have involved active and courageous struggles for change at considerable personal risk.
(p. 330).
Reflecting what was certainly a change in direction and tactics, there have been several hundred direct action events or confrontations since the 1980s (Wilkes et al., 2010).
Joane Nagel (1996) attributed the Indigenous resurgence in America to the Red Power movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which “put forth an image of American Indians as victorious rather than victimized” (p. 140).
Kiera Ladner (2010), an Indigenous professor, referenced a song about a strike and an eight-year-long standoff by the Gurinjii stockmen of Australia.
The song is called From Little Things Big Things Grow, and Ladner uses it as a motif for how “the echoes of such resistance continue to inspire future generations” and how resistance has fed a sense of pride and possibility (pp.
299-300).
Ladner then describes many other moments of resistance that may have seemed small or isolated at the time, but that continue to grow in ripple effect.
One of those key moments was the Oka Crisis.
Ladner described it as “a ‘public announcement’ of sorts, warning of the cost of action and inaction” (p. 302).
It is the cost of inaction, or following the status quo, that can be seen as the subject of this article.
Ladner’s (2010) use of the term “action and inaction” is wise, as what seems like inaction—following the status quo of colonialism and dispossession of Indigenous Peoples from their lands, rights, and decision making—is in fact an action.
It is simply a deliberate choice to maintain direction, regardless of where events might be heading.
Near-Future Climate Change Impacts MacMillan Bloedel v. Mullin (1985) was a case in which the Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousaht First Nations in Clayoquot Sound, BC, blockaded Meares Island, an island sacred to them, in order to prevent logging there.
They were supported by locals and environmentalists.
The logging company, MacMillan Bloedel, then sued for an injunction against the Indigenous blockaders, and the Indigenous people responded with a suit of their own seeking an injunction against MacMillan Bloedel.
The court granted both injunctions: forbidding the blockading, but also the logging.
The reason was that both parties had serious interests at stake.
In granting the injunction preventing logging of an area claimed by the Indigenous Peoples, Chief Justice Seaton said, “The proposal is to clearcut the area.
Almost nothing will be left.
I cannot think of any native right that could be exercised on lands that have recently been logged” (MacMillan Bloedel v. Mullin, 1985, para.
17).
Is it possible to imagine any Indigenous right that could be exercised on lands that have been recently and permanently inundated by the sea?
Or burned in wildfires?
To what degree can specific rights or practices be exercised on lands that have been irrevocably altered by weather patterns and never return to “normal” in our lifetimes?
11 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 MacMillan Bloedel v. Mullin (1985) is arguably one of the most intellectually honest cases on Indigenous law in Canada, and also one of the most conveniently ignored.
Canada made significant amendments to the Constitution in 1982, with a new Constitution Act.
Section 35 of that new Constitution reads, “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed” (Constitution Act, 1982).
However, although the blockade of Meares Island happened in 1984, the court did not make its decision based on Section 35 of the Constitution.
Rather, it was a rare case where the court acknowledged the simple reality that the Indigenous people at issue had never surrendered title, and therefore had a legitimate claim to the land.
About the Tla-o-quiaht and Ahousaht First Nations claim to have rights to the land, BC Chief Justice Seaton said, “The Indians have pressed their land claims in various ways for generations.
The claims have not been dealt with and found invalid.
They have not been dealt with at all” (MacMillan Bloedel v. Mullin, 1985, para.
56).
The claims of the Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousaht First Nations have still not been dealt with to this day, as is the case for the majority of Indigenous Peoples’ land claims worldwide.
Their rights to land are outstanding and unresolved, and meanwhile climate change impacts are already being felt around the world, often with the greatest impacts to Indigenous Peoples.
The reason Indigenous Peoples tend to face more serious impacts is that they tend to live in the most extreme environments, often in poverty and in ways that rely on the natural world for sustenance, having been pushed to extremes by colonial processes, which claimed the best land for settlers (Nakashima et al., 2012; Raygorodetsky, 2017; N. J. Turner, 2009; Watt-Cloutier, 2015).
Secret briefings to the Canadian federal government, that were made in 2016 but only recently exposed in the media, affirmed that Indigenous communities suffer more intense impacts from climate-change induced extreme weather in the North (M-D. Smith, 2016).
Sheila Watt-Cloutier (2007), an Inuit leader, described, in her testimony to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, how Inuit hunters have been injured and died on ice that is melting out of season or impossible to judge the safety of.
Specifically, she said, Many hunters have been killed or seriously injured after falling through ice that was traditionally known to be safe.
Thinner ice also means much shorter hunting seasons as the ice forms up later and melts sooner.
In turn, some ice dependent species such as ringed seals, walrus and polar bears are experiencing impacts and the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment projects that these species will likely be pushed to extinction by the end of this century.
Inuit have relied on ringed seal for food and clothing for millennia.
The lack of ice also has profound impacts on our communities.
As the land fast ice and pack ice disappears, the coastline, where most Inuit live, is exposed to fierce storms—whole communities, such as Shishmaref in Alaska, are having to move altogether, because the storms are eroding the land out from under them.
These impacts are destroying our rights to life, health, property and means of subsistence.
States that do not recognize these impacts and take action violate our human rights.
(p. 2) Additional impacts to the Inuit include houses falling into the sea as shores erode due to rising sea levels, or houses shifting as permafrost melts.
Summer storage of food in permafrost cellars becomes impossible, and food itself is scarcer.
Travel on ice is more challenging and dangerous, cutting people off from communities and hunting grounds (Nakashima et al., 2012; Mercer, 2018).
12 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 The Xat’sūll First Nation, also known as the Soda Creek First Nation and part of the Secwépemc, or Shuswap people (who tell the Sk’elép story referenced herein), conducted two climate change adaptation workshops in 2012.
The purpose was to develop a case study for how interior-BC First Nations could incorporate climate adaptation into planning.
The resulting document, the BC Regional Adaptation Collaborative Climate Change Adaptation Case Study, listed many negative impacts of climate change.
Key among those were decreased water supply, both in quality and quantity; loss of traditional dates for harvesting and planting, with a lack of clarity about appropriate dates for such; increased fire bans that restrict the ability to conduct sweat lodges and dry meat and fish; warming of creeks, causing a diminished ability for food fish to reproduce (e.g., salmon and trout); and a decline in quality and quantity of wild berries, fruits, and roots (Xat’sūll First Nation, 2012).
The impacts on some small island developing states (SIDS) and their Indigenous populations can range from complete inundation, loss of land and property, dislocation of people, and saltwater intrusion into freshwater resources, to coastline erosion.
The initial impacts of rising seas can lead to a lack of drinking water and inability to irrigate crops.
The increased frequency and severity of storms can also be devastating for Indigenous Peoples and the crops and ecosystems they rely on (Tsosie, 2007).
The same is true in Australia, where sea level rise and increasing cyclones may force Aboriginal people to move inland (Zander, Petheram, & Garnett, 2013).
In Hawai‘i, climate change will bring risks to freshwater supplies that will impact businesses and communities.
Food security will be threatened through impacts to agriculture and fisheries due to changes in ocean, mountain, and forest temperatures, and weather patterns.
Coastal flooding and erosion, loss of habitat for endangered species, coral bleaching, and higher incidences diseases such as avian malaria will also impact already stressed, fractured, and threatened native plants, animals, and ecosystems.
Indigenous Hawaiians still rely on native plants for many items that are part of their traditional culture such as specific woods to make calabashes for food storage, hula implements, and plant medicines (Sproat, 2016).
A distinct decrease in rainfall since 1980, combined with sea level rise and concomitant salinisation of groundwater have impacted traditional agriculture in Hawai‘i.
Outright drought will devastate many traditional practices such as kalo cultivation.
This could threaten the very ability to live in Hawai‘i; for Native Hawaiians, leaving is not considered an option.
This puts their very identity as Indigenous Peoples at risk (Sproat, 2016).
More generally, there will also be considerable impacts to Indigenous Peoples through forests and water.
Some of the key impacts to forests will be drought, changed weather patterns, an increasing rate and severity of forest fires, and invasive pests, which no longer face temperature barriers and find stressed forests easier prey.
This will impact culturally important resources such as food, landmarks, and cultural practices related to fire (Vogesser, Lynn, Daigle, Lake & Ranco, 2013).
Further impacts to and through water will include changes to precipitation regimes, air and water temperatures, and increases in the frequency of extreme weather events.
These will lead to permafrost thawing, earlier snow-melt, changes in regional hydrology, habitat loss, and nutrient cycling.
There will also be impacts to plant and animal food species (Cozzetto et al., 2013).
Seen more broadly, the sad reality of climate change is that so far the direr scientific predictions, as far as pace and severity of change, are turning out to be closest to reality (Gabbatiss, 2017), and we have just crossed the 410-ppm milestone for CO2 last year (Kahn, 2017).
13 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 In a recent report, the world’s top climate scientists found that the threshold for catastrophic climate change is much lower than previously believed: A 2-degree Celsius rise would lead to an increase in storms, heatwaves, droughts, and food shortages that would trigger mass migrations (Gatehouse, 2018).
On October 8, 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2018) released a special report, titled Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty.
There was considerable discussion about the Report in the news on the day it was released and subsequently.
The Guardian published a piece titled, “We Have 12 Years to Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns UN” (Watts, 2018).
In it, the author discusses the many dangers of failing to keep warming below 1.5-degrees Celsius, noting that “even half a degree will significantly worsen the risks of drought, floods, extreme heat and poverty for hundreds of millions of people” (Watts, 2018, para.
1).
However, Watts qualifies the threat and implies that in fact the Report is understated: Bob Ward, of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, said the final document was “incredibly conservative” because it did not mention the likely rise in climate-driven refugees or the danger of tipping points that could push the world on to an irreversible path of extreme warming.
(Watts, 2018, para.
20) Watts also noted that, at the current level committed to under the Paris Agreement, the world is heading towards 3-degrees Celsius of warming, and it is not clear that countries will even meet their Paris targets (Watts, 2018).
The Report addresses just that, meeting Paris targets, as it is also the first informal assessment of countries’ climate pledges and opportunity for discussion during the next United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP24) in November 2018, in Katowice, Poland (IPCC, 2018).
As part of the Talanoa Dialogue, the assessment “will be a crucial step for revising upwards national climate action plans needed to step up pre-2020 ambition and meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement” (Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change [CMCC], 2018, para.
7).
Climate change is not only happening, it is happening faster than predicted, and the window to act is closing (Leahy, 2018; Spratt & Dunlop, 2018).
It is a threat to Indigenous Peoples (and all peoples) in many ways—cultural, land, rights, and life itself.
A Perfect Storm, A Policy Train Wreck Global warming will have a unifying effect on those who struggle against it because it is bigger than any one cause, including Indigenous rights.
It is about keeping the planet livable for all of humanity (Manuel, 2017).
Solidarity, reciprocal, and sympathetic blockades are a phenomenon in Indigenous blockades that has smouldered threateningly for years.
There is still smoke.
As recently as 2016 and 2017, many Indigenous Peoples from around the world stood in solidarity at Standing Rock.
Standing Rock was a pipeline conflict that was most heated for a number of months through summer 2016 and into the winter of 2017.
It happened on the traditional territory of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, where Energy Transfer Partners, owners of the Dakota Access Pipeline, tried to push the pipeline through without Indigenous consent (Worland, 2016).
The resistance was unsuccessful, and the pipeline has been built, but the conflict generated unprecedented levels of 14 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 solidarity and has been described as having “turned into a mammoth indigenous-led spiritual mission and awakening” (Archer, 2018, para.
4).
Standing Rock will be discussed further in the next section.
It is important to note that, although Indigenous blockades may seem outwardly similar to other blockades, there is often a key difference: Many roads and rail lines pass through reserve lands and, therefore, a blockade can be seen as “a legitimate denial of trespass onto First Nations lands” (Woolford, 2002, p. 104; see also Blomley, 1996).
Perhaps the extremity of state responses to Indigenous blockades is because they raise, at least unconsciously, the uncomfortable question of who is really trespassing (Borrows, 2016).
Hedican (2013) referenced a quote by George Erasmus, co-chair of the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), a report commissioned as a result of the Oka conflict.
Erasmus said, “if the reality is that once more [Aboriginal] peoples’ hopes have been dashed, and that this is all for nothing, then what we say is that the people will resort to other things.” Hedican commented on that by saying, “Erasmus did not elaborate on what these ‘other things’ might be, but we could use our imagination” (p. 30).
Indeed, we can.
If climate change is not dealt with, and Indigenous rights to land and to govern the land are not dealt with, Indigenous Peoples, having exhausted other reasonable options, could paralyze the Western world.
In the words of John Ralston Saul (2014): By a simple decision not to cooperate, they could bring the Canadian economy in good part to a halt.
This is true.
And this has been threatened by some.
(p. 82) Converging Issues and Solidarity Blockades The Ipperwash Inquiry into the 1995 murder by police of Indigenous occupier Dudley George noted the potential for “converging issues” in relation to the pervasiveness of the root causes, and the possible convergence of environmentalists and others in future blockades as a “sobering realization” (Commissioner of the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007, p. 32).
Arthur Manuel (2017), Secwépemc leader and author, a powerful voice for Indigenous resurgence, noted that, in 2013, in New Brunswick, Canada, many locals had come to support a Mi’kmaq-led blockade against fracking on unceded land.
They were concerned about the impacts of fracking on their environment and wanted to stand with the Indigenous people.
There were also solidarity blockades in relation to Elsipogtog as far afield as Montreal, New York, and Winnipeg (“Editorial: First Nations,” 2017).
Naomi Klein uses the term “blockadia” to indicate interconnected pockets of resistance and draws attention to the growing alliance of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples in the fight against climate change.
She quoted a non-Indigenous protestor at Elsipogtog who said, “we are united in what is most important” (N. Klein, 2014, pp.
373).
Regarding the now-failed (but possibly revived) Keystone XL pipeline, Indigenous activist Dallas Goldtooth of the Indigenous Environmental Network said that the Rosebud Sioux would also blockade in support of other nations.
He summed up the reasons: .
.
.
what we see are fellow native people that are suffering because of [a] continued colonial process of extracting minerals and resources from our communities without our consent, .
.
.
And so we really want to stand in solidarity, across no matter what border may be, with our indigenous brothers and sisters (cited in Boos, 2015, para.
14).
15 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 The Keystone XL pipeline also generated an unlikely alliance of what was termed “cowboys and Indians,” as ranchers and Indigenous People stood together in opposition to the project, under the banner of “Reject and Protect” (Moe, 2014).
In 2016, at the Oceti Sakowin camp at Standing Rock, blocking construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline: .
.
.
thousands of tribal nation members and allies gathered in peaceful prayer and created a powerful movement.
They labeled themselves the Water Protectors, an idea rooted in the fact that we are more connected to water than we think.
(Rivas, 2017, p. 65).
Standing Rock, in 2016 and 2017, reflected growing and unprecedented levels of solidarity.
Protestors in Manitoba shut down a major intersection in Winnipeg during rush hour (CBC, 2016), and climate activists shut off a pipeline in solidarity (Lewis & Cryderman, 2016).
On November 15, 2016, there were hundreds of actions worldwide in solidarity with Standing Rock, including Europe, India, and Japan (Milton, 2016).
Manuel (2017) also described a number of these cross-connections, including how the Secwépemc flag was flying when he arrived at Standing Rock, in 2017.
He also noted how many people there committed to come to his home in British Columbia to fight the Trans Mountain pipeline, in return.
On the day Manuel arrived at Standing Rock, a group of American military veterans also showed up, offering support and protection from unwarranted violence that had been perpetrated against the protestors by law enforcement and private security (Osborne, 2017).
Other American tribes made a 23-tribe formal declaration of solidarity (Standing with Standing Rock), a move that may have inspired the now over 200 nation-members of the Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion, allied against the Trans Mountain pipeline (Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion, 2018).
Some examples of the myriad further support for Standing Rock were a crowdfunding campaign that raised over a million dollars; actors who donated solar panels; benefit concerts; hundreds of thousands “checking in” on Facebook; and a Māori contingent who shot a video of a Utaina haka, symbolizing “working together for the greater good.” The Māori noted that the Māori and Sioux have been fighting the same fight since colonization (Hirschlag, 2016).
There was also support for Standing Rock from Mennonites (Amstutz, 2016), unions, and Indigenous Peoples from around the world (Cultural Survival, 2017).
Afterward, Standing Rock was described as the struggle that “drew together leaders and activists from Tribal communities into a powerful network of resistance that is only beginning to make its power felt” (Kennedy-Howard, 2017, para.
1).
Even Canada’s security agency, CSIS, noted, “there is strong Canadian Aboriginal support for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe as many see similarities to their own struggles against proposed pipeline construction in Canada (Northern Gateway, Pacific Trails, Energy East, etc.
)” (cited in Gill & Zwibel, 2017, “Sharing and Using the Fruits of Surveillance” section, para.
4).
Although this may more rightly be the subject of a different article, with the climate necessity defence for blockading oil industry projects and the increasing urgency of the situation, it is unclear for how long police and government prosecutors can even hope to continue pursuing legal action against those who defy injunctions that support and protect the oil industry (Buncombe, 2018; Long & Hamilton, 2017; Quirke, 2016,).
Unifying arguments are also taking shape in legal and academic circles, which may well lead to greater cohesion among groups opposed to fossil fuel development.
Analogies are being made more frequently to critical moral 16 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 and legal struggles of the past.
Legal scholar Maxine Burkett (2016) saw analogies in the 1960s civil rights movement, as well as in the abolition of slavery.
As climate narratives evolve in the public sphere, the legal and moral arguments for activism will become more persuasive (Nosek, 2017).
Burkett (2016) proposed unifying theories centered on shared core values through a grassroots environmental justice frame and drawing on the analogies of anti-slavery and civil rights.
Others propose a new way of organizing the “common concern” approach used in UNFCCC negotiations, “drawing on the practices of a global movement against fossil fuel extraction and in defence of land” (Dehm, 2016, p. 160).
The overlap between the arguments of Manuel, Burkett, Nosek, and Dehm have the potential to weave a new tapestry of unifying moral, ethical, and legal justifications for broad-based climate action at all levels.
Arthur Manuel (2017), in discussing the Dakota and Keystone battles against pipelines, wrote, Indigenous peoples from north of the border have shown their active support.
In the future this can be a powerful alliance in defending Indigenous lands from state and industry incursions throughout Turtle Island.
That is where we are today.
I cannot emphasize too often that in our struggle, we must show the same intensity as American blacks did in the 1960s.
They had to march in cities across America and they filled up the jails.
(p. 228) He went on, saying of the “land defenders”: Our battle must be as intense as the fight against racism in the American south, and against apartheid in South Africa .
.
.
But finally, it will come from the grassroots, when we give our people the tools they need to make the change they need.
They will block environmental disasters like the Red Chris Mine from destroying our lands, and pipelines from carrying the oil and bitumen that is destroying our climate, as they are doing today.
They will stand their ground on their own land and send out their message for solidarity to the world.
(Manuel, 2017, p. 229) The Need for a New Policy Like all of us here on Earth, Indigenous Peoples have nowhere else to go.
On top of that, Indigenous Peoples have made it clear that they have, generally, been pushed far enough.
As many authors have pointed out, Indigenous blockades stem from having tried everything else (Blomley, 1996; Borrows, 2016; Hedican, 2012; Wilkes et al., 2010).
Regarding climate change, Indigenous Peoples have tried everything else.
The current policy of the Canadian government, and colonial Western governments generally, is one of refusing necessary change, and therefore of allowing, or mandating by policy, the resulting chaos.
National policies must change regarding Indigenous Peoples and the coming impacts of climate change.
It is only just and fair that Indigenous Peoples have an equal voice in that which endangers their lives equally, if not more so.
To be clear — this article is not advocating blockades, solidarity blockades, or anything of that nature.
John Borrows (2016) wisely pointed out that blockades are not always the solution, and sometimes cause more harm than good, especially to those who put them up.
Indigenous legal scholar Val 17 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Napoleon (2010) also discussed the huge personal cost that many people face for standing on a blockade, both for themselves and for future generations.
For instance, the conflict at Oka in 1990 left the community scarred and divided.
The Pines were not turned into a golf course, a success, but their ownership is still unresolved (Ladner, 2010; York & Pindera, 1991).
In 1995, at Ipperwash Park in Ontario, Dudley George lost his life (Commissioner of the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007; Hedican, 2012).
Burnt Church, in 2000, was similar.
The battle over fishing rights started years before, and the Mi’kmaq people had gone to great lengths to earn their right to fish in court.
In 1999, after a long and expensive legal battle, the Supreme Court of Canada released what was known as the Marshall decision, granting the right to a commercial fishery to the Mi’kmaq.
After that, the Mi’kmaq went fishing and promptly met violent resistance from local non-Indigenous fishers.
That resistance led to the conflict with the state over fishing rights (Borrows, 2016).
The dispute was successful in some ways, but it did not achieve the larger goal of Indigenous control over the lobster fishery and left the community divided (Borrows, 2016).
On the other hand, the blockades of fracking at Elsipogtog, which united Indigenous people and environmental activists, on an issue with majority support from the public, was successful in stopping fracking and unified the community (N. Klein, 2014; Manuel, 2017; J. Simpson, 2017; L. Simpson, 2013).
In the US, Standing Rock united Indigenous people and environmental activists, who were willing to pay enormous costs in terms of personal safety, were ultimately unsuccessful in stopping that pipeline (Archer, 2018; Worland, 2016).
In the Trans Mountain dispute, the concerned Indigenous Peoples initially sought to be part of the environmental review and consultation processes and, when that failed, took their battle to court.
The company continued construction of the pipeline while the matter was before the courts, so Indigenous and non-Indigenous people blockaded and protested (“Trans Mountain Pipeline,” n.d.b).
Through 2017 and 2018, construction on the Trans Mountain was slowed by blockades, then stopped by the court, and now the Canadian federal government has bought it with a political promise to see it through (Clancy, 2018; Meyer, 2018b; S. Klein, 2018).
It could be described as a success in stopping the pipeline, not through blockades, but by litigation.
A qualified success that may yet evaporate.
It can fairly be predicted that if the federal government goes through a review process and then approves the project, again without Indigenous consent, there will be further blockades, protests, and conflict.
All of the above reflects the uncertain, risky, and desperate nature of blockades.
The costs can be steep, in lives, scars, and divisions that can last lifetimes.
Yet, blockades and direct action become unavoidable, and inevitable, when people who are negatively affected by something are denied the power to change it.
What is the solution?
Brugnach, Craps, and Dewulf found that there is a need for “collaborative governance frameworks,” in order to realize the potential inherent in Indigenous decisionmaking regarding climate change mitigation (p. 20).
That could involve using Indigenous and local knowledge, collaborating with Western scientists, and decentralising decision-making (Brugnach et al., 2017).
Another, and potentially overlapping, approach is to truly implement UNDRIP.
Tsosie (2007) stated that UNDRIP “articulates a basis for recognizing a right of environmental selfdetermination that preserves the relationship between indigenous peoples and their traditional lands” (p. 1664).
UNDRIP 18 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 also represents a long and drawn out struggle by Indigenous Peoples to be recognised in international law (Manuel, 2017; Seck, 2017).
The Preamble to UNDRIP states that the signatories are: Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, nondiscrimination and good faith.
(UNDRIP, 2007, p. 6) However, the facts so far suggest otherwise.
In ongoing and recent battles, states have aligned with the oil and gas industry against Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples concerned about land rights, the environment, and the climate, as discussed in previous sections.
What is the alternative to chaos?
While there are probably many, this article is not going to propose any new schemes.
As stated above, there is already one present, “hanging in front of our faces,” as it were — that of free, prior, and informed consent.
Known as FPIC and enshrined in s. 32(2) of UNDRIP (2007), FPIC mandates that Indigenous Peoples be consulted fully and then have the right to say yes or no to development that impacts their territory.
Canada was slow to sign UNDRIP, and then had reservations, but under the new Trudeau-led Liberal government has withdrawn any reservations.
However, Canada has not adopted it into Canadian law and is instead moving toward a “Canadian version,” where FPIC is redefined to mean less than a veto (Manuel, 2017; TRC, 2015).
And yet, despite the slowness in implementing UNDRIP, some progress is being made.
In British Columbia, the provincial government is giving Indigenous Peoples consent over fish farms in their territory, although not for 4 years (Hunter, 2018).
Nonetheless, is the current Canadian national model enough?
Or will a grant of “consent,” which is vague or unclear as to whether or not it means a veto, simply lead to more conflict, in court and in the streets?
It is difficult to imagine how anything else could result.
Indigenous leaders, academics, judges, law firms, and environmentalists have called for the implementation of FPIC (Iaccobucci, 2016; Manuel, 2018; Orta-Martínez & Finer, 2010).
Jerome Lewis (2012) gave a short and useful eight-step process for implementing FPIC that starts with strengthening institutional capacities and ends with maintaining relationships after consent is given or refused.
Sasha Boutilier (2017) gave a more in-depth study of steps to implement FPIC in Canadian law, which highlights some of the difficulties around the question of whether consent and a veto are the same thing.
Settler Canada has a duty to raise the alarm: If we continue to treat Indigenous Peoples as we have— leaving them ignored; sidelined; bought off; belittled; not at the table; consulted, but ultimately with projects going ahead regardless of their views—we may well be “turned to stone.” If all that FPIC means is a heightened level of consultation that will not solve the problem, which inevitably leads to conflict.
It is not enough to say to Indigenous Peoples that they will be granted the right to give or deny consent.
Nor is it enough for Indigenous Peoples to be marginally or artificially included, as the Canadian government has done regarding Trans Mountain, by saying there would be a rigorous consultation process, but then secretly telling top bureaucrats to push the approval process through as quickly as possible (De Souza, 2018).
As Shrubsole (2011) pointed out, it never works to make decisions for Indigenous Peoples: 19 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 [The] overwhelming consensus is that indigenous voices, perspectives and frameworks need to be brought into the legal and political structures that dictate a significant portion of indigenous lives.
(p. 14) If government and industry want certainty regarding projects, the only way to get that is to have complete clarity on all sides as to what consent or a veto means.
The core policy proposal of this article is that FPIC, as stated within UNDRIP, must be adopted into national laws, and there must be clarity that it means a veto.
That Indigenous Peoples must be equipped to make such choices in an informed and capable manner and that in order to give legitimacy to any consent, or veto, Indigenous Peoples must be empowered to develop their own governance and decision-making structures as free from the bounds of colonialism as possible.
Not only is bringing Indigenous Peoples into the decision-making framework just and fair, it is necessary.
Indigenous Peoples have demonstrated resilience and knowledge systems related to the land and environment, which will be needed for human survival in a warming world (Nakashima et al., 2012; Raygorodetsky, 2017).
Indigenous Peoples have some degree of control or management over a considerable portion on the Earth’s surface (this article argues they should have a higher degree of control).
According to Ramos-Castillo et al.
(2017): Indigenous peoples and their traditional knowledge have an important role to play in responding to climate change.
Indigenous peoples form approximately 5% of the world’s population, manage 11% of the world’s forest lands and customarily own, occupy or use somewhere between 22 and 65% of the world’s land surface.
(p. 2; see also UNDP, 2011).
Raygorodetsky (2017) and others (Davis, 2009; Umeek, 2011) also argue that while Indigenous Peoples are often on the front lines of climate change, and the most impacted, they are also critical to dealing with climate change because they have, as a generalization, preserved the connection with the Earth that will be required to move forward in a changing world.
On top of resilience, control over or management of, and connection with the land, Indigenous Peoples have also demonstrated a marked ability to win in court.
Whether winning title to significant portions of land or to stopping pipelines, First Nations and Indigenous Peoples around the world are rapidly becoming a legal force to be reckoned with, and already exercise some degree of control over whether projects go ahead (Pasternak, 2014; Saul, 20014; C. Smith, 2018).
In most federal states, there are already two levels of government that have the capacity to give or refuse consent regarding any given major project, according to their own processes.
In Canada, although the details are often hotly disputed, both levels of government have jurisdiction over projects in different ways—as do Indigenous Peoples, although their jurisdiction is largely undefined (Gilchrist, 2018).
Grand Chief Sheila North of Manitoba Keewatinowi Okimakanak echoed the voices of Indigenous Peoples all over the world when she said, “I do believe that the people that live off the land and come from the land should have a veto on rights to the resources where they come from” (cited in Meyer, 2018a).
To move forward, FPIC will need to be brought into decision-making structures and to do that Indigenous Peoples must be allowed to develop their own systems to make informed choices about 20 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 giving consent to, or using a veto regarding, projects that impact their land and rights.
It must be clear that FPIC means a veto, as heightened consultation will only be a policy of continuing to resolve land and rights issues through conflict.
Indigenous Peoples must also be supported in appropriate ways and be empowered to develop their own governance and decision-making structures free from the bounds of colonialism.
Previous problems have been resolved, for better or worse, through the policy of discrete conflict.
But that will not work for climate change.
If Indigenous Peoples are not given a voice over their fate, the rest of the world should expect desperate acts from Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples alike.
Conclusion Like Sk’elép, who said, “I could turn you to stone” but instead allowed the strangers to pass, Indigenous Peoples have been kind to their colonizers.
Patient.
Yet, the colonizers have continued to try to transform them.
And, when that failed, the colonizers have punished them.
From residential schools, the White Paper, Indigenous overrepresentation in prisons, fighting for the rights of oil companies, to pillaging Indigenous People’s land—the process has continued through to today.
But because of the pervasive, continuing, and escalating nature of climate change, it is an issue that does not readily lend itself to easy buy-offs or settlements.
It must be resolved justly, or not at all.
Without a change in course regarding climate change and Indigenous Peoples, the post-colonial world may well find itself paralyzed by allied, mutually supportive, interrelated, Indigenous–environmentalist–citizen blockades worldwide.
All other responses are precluded by current policy.
A better way has already been mapped out: that of free, prior, and informed consent under UNDRIP (2007).
The sooner governments give a true veto to Indigenous Peoples and empower them to make informed choices regarding projects and developments that affect them, through their own governance and decision-making structures, and as free from the bounds of colonialism as possible, the more social and climate outcomes will improve.
The sooner governments embrace the profound changes needed to address the climate crisis, the less likely extreme Indigenous and citizen action becomes.
As Led Zeppelin said, “There are two paths you can go by, but in the long run, there’s still time to change the road you’re on” (Page & Plant, 1971).
21 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 References Alfred, T. (2005).
Wasáse: Indigenous pathways of action and freedom.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press.
Allan, R. (2018, May 29).
Kinder Morgan bailout to cost north of $15 billion.
National Observer.
Retrieved from https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/05/29/analysis/kinder-morganbailout-cost-north-15-billion Amstutz, A.
(2016, November 4).
Statement from the Mennonite Doctrine of Discovery Coalition.
The Mennonite.
Retrieved from https://themennonite.org/opinion/groups-callsolidaritystanding-rock-movement/ Archer, G. (2018, April 25).
Standing Rock: 10 things everyone needs to know now.
Medium.
Retrieved from https://medium.com/@Greg_Archer/standing-rock-10-things-everyoneneeds-to-knownow-d60db96d5e8e Blomley, N. (1996).
“Shut the province down”: First Nations blockades in British Columbia, 19841995.
BC Studies, 111, 535.
Retrieved from http://ojs.library.ubc.ca.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/index.php/bcstudies Boos, R. (2015).
Native American tribes unite to fight the Keystone pipeline and government ‘disrespect.’ PRI.
Retrieved from https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-02-19/nativeamericantribes-unite-fight-keystone-pipeline-and-government-disrespect Borrows, J.
(2016).
Freedom and Indigenous constitutionalism.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Boutilier, S. (2017).
Free, prior, and informed consent and reconciliation in Canada: Proposals to implement Articles 19 and 32 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Western Journal of Legal Studies, 7(1).
Retrieved from https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/uwojls/vol7/iss1/4/ Bronskill, J.
(2018, November 6).
Spy service says federal pipeline purchase seen as ‘betrayal’ by many opponents.
Times Colonist.
Retrieved from https://www.timescolonist.com/spyservice-saysfederal-pipeline-purchase-seen-as-betrayal-by-many-opponents-1.23488210 Buncombe, A.
(2018, March 27).
Anti-pipeline campaigners found not guilty by judge because ‘protest against climate change crisis’ was legal ‘necessity.’ Independent.
Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/pipeline-protesters-boston-protestnot-guilty-climate-change-karenna-gore-mary-ann-driscoll-a8276851.html Burkett, M. (2016).
Climate disobedience.
Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, 27, 1-50.
Retrieved from https://delpf.law.duke.edu/article/climate-disobedience-burkett-vol27-iss1/ 22 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 Brugnach, M., Craps, M., & Dewulf, A.
(2017).
Including Indigenous Peoples in climate change mitigation: Addressing issues of scale, knowledge and power.
Climatic Change,140, 19-32. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1280-3 Canadian Press.
(2018a, April 7).
Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, Naomi Klein join Kinder Morgan protests.
CBC.
Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/stewartphillip-naomi-klein-kinder-morgan-1.4609973 Canadian Press.
(2018b, May 29).
Timeline: Key dates in the history of the Trans Mountain pipeline.
The Calgary Herald.
Retrieved from https://calgaryherald.com/business/energy/timeline-keydates-in-the-history-of-the-transmountain-pipeline CBC.
(2016, November 15).
Manitoba protesters stand in solidarity with Standing Rock.
CBC.
Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/winnipeg-solidarity-standingrock-1.3852656 Chiefs of Ontario.
(2006).
Chiefs of Ontario final submission to the Ipperwash Inquiry Part II.
Retrieved from https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/closing_submissions/pdf/Chi efsOfOntario_ClosingSubmissions-II.pdf Churchill, W. (2003).
“Agents of repression”: Withstanding the test of time.
Social Justice, 30(2(92)), 44-50.
Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768184 Clancy, C. (2018, August 31).
'It is a crisis': Alberta premier withdraws support for federal climate plan after Trans Mountain approval quashed.
Edmonton Journal.
Retrieved from https://edmontonjournal.com/business/energy/landmark-federal-court-decision-expectedon-trans-mountain-pipeline Commissioner of the Ipperwash Inquiry B. S. Linden.
(2007).
Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry: Vol.
2.
Policy analysis.
Retrieved from https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/report/vol_2/index.html Constitution Act, 1982 enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
Corntassel, J.
(2012).
Re-envisioning resurgence: Indigenous pathways to decolonization and sustainable self-determination.
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 86-101.
Cozzetto, K., Chief, K., Dittmer, K., Brubaker, M., Gough, R., Souza, K., .
.
.
Chavan, P. (2013).
Climate change impacts on the water resources of American Indians and Alaska Natives in the U.S. Climatic Change, 120(1-2), 569–584.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0852-y Cultural Survival.
(2017, January 27).
African Samburu tribe in solidarity with Standing Rock.
Cultural Survival.
Retrieved from https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/africansamburu-tribesolidarity-standing-rock 23 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Davis, W. (2009).
The wayfinders: Why ancient wisdom matters in the modern world.
Toronto: House of Anansi Press.
Dehm, J.
(2016) Carbon colonialism or climate justice?
Interrogating the international climate regime from a TWAIL perspective.
Windsor Year Book Access to Justice, 33 (3).
doi:https://doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v33i3.4893 De Sousa, M. (2018, May 3).
Trudeau government's 'highly unusual’ Kinder Morgan secrets could scuttle Trans Mountain, says court motion.
National Observer.
Retrieved from https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/05/03/news/trudeau-governments-highlyunusualkinder-morgan-secrets-could-scuttle-trans Editorial: First Nations shale-gas standoff in N.B.
sparks solidarity protests across Canada [Editorial].
(2017, June 19).
Globe and Mail.
Retrieved from: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/demonstrations-acrosscontinent-decryviolence-at-new-brunswick-anti-fracking-protest/article14918339/ Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC).
(2018, January 17).
Draft IPCC special report on global warming of 1.5°C.
Retrieved from https://www.cmcc.it/article/ipcc-specialreport-on-global-warming-of-1-5c Finer, M., Jenkins, C. N., Pimm, S. L., Keane, B., & Ross, C. (2008).
Oil and gas projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to wilderness, biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples.
PLoS ONE, 3(8), e2932.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0002932 Gabbatiss, J.
(2017, December 6).
Worst-case global warming predictions are the most accurate, say climate experts.
Independent.
Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/global-warming-temperature-rise-climatechange-end-century-science-a8095591.html Gatehouse, J.
(2018, April 2).
Paris goal too little to avoid worst effects of climate change, scientists say.
CBC.
Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/thenational/the-nationaltoday-newsletterclimate-change-homicide-rate-syria-rebels-1.4592951 Gilchrist, E. (2018, April 13).
‘They’re not getting how the constitution works’: Why Trudeau, Notley can’t steamroll B.C.
on Kinder Morgan Pipeline.
Desmog Canada.
Retrieved from https://www.desmog.ca/2018/04/13/they-re-not-getting-how-constitution-workswhytrudeau-notley-can-t-steamroll-b-c-kinder-morgan-pipeline Gill, L., & Zwibel, C. (2017, December 6).
Why does Canada spy on its own Indigenous communities?
Retrieved from https://www.opendemocracy.net/protest/surveillanceindigenous-groupscanada Hedican, E. J.
(2012).
Policing Aboriginal protests and confrontations: Some policy recommendations.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 3(2), 1-17. doi:https://doi.org/10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.1 24 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 Hedican, E. J.
(2013).
Ipperwash: The tragic failure of Canada's Aboriginal policy.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Hirschlag, A.
(2016, November 3).
The Māori just took Standing Rock solidarity up a notch with their viral war dance.
Upworthy.
Retrieved from http://www.upworthy.com/the-maori-just-tookstanding-rock-solidarity-up-a-notch-withtheir-viral-war-dance Horn-Millar, W. (2014) Revolutionary acts of non-violence disempowers opposition.
In the Kino-ndaniimi Collective (Eds.
), The winter we danced: Voices from the past, the future, and the Idle No More movement (pp.
118-119).
Winnipeg: ARP Books.
Hunter, J.
(2018, June 19).
B.C.
fish farms will require Indigenous consent.
Globe and Mail.
Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/british-columbia/article-bc-fish-farms-willrequire-indigenous-consent/ Iaccobucci, F. (July 14, 2016).
The path to reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples starts with consent.
Globe and Mail.
Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-path-toreconciliation-with-indigenouspeoples-starts-with-consent/article30888197/ Ignace, M., & Ignace, R. I.
(2017).
Secwépemc people, land, and laws.
Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press.
Imai, S. (2017).
Consult, consent, and veto: International norms and Canadian treaties.
In J. Borrows & M. Coyle (Eds.
), The right relationship: Reimagining the implementation of historical treaties (pp.
370-408).
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
(2018).
Global warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty: Summary for policymakers.
Retrieved from http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf Johnson, S. (2014).
Developing First Nations courts in Canada: Elders as foundational to Indigenous therapeutic jurisprudence +.
Journal of Indigenous Social Development, 3(2).
Retrieved from https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/34473/v3i202johnson.pdf?sequence=1 Kahn, B.
(2017, April 21).
We just breached the 410 PPM threshold for CO2.
Scientific American.
Retrieved from https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/we-just-breachedthe-410-ppmthreshold-for-co2/ Kennedy-Howard, N. (2017, July 21).
Native solidarity after Standing Rock: A reclamation of independence.
Sierra Club.
Retrieved from https://www.sierraclub.org/planet/2017/07/native-solidarity-after-standing-rockreclamation-independence 25 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Klein, N. (2014).
This changes everything: Capitalism vs. the climate.
New York: Simon & Schuster.
Klein, S. (2018, April 17).
Don’t take the bait: Kinder Morgan is playing Canada.
The Tyee.
Retrieved from https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2018/04/17/Kinder-Morgan-Is-PlayingCanada/ Ladner, K. L. (2010).
From Little Things.
.
.
In L. B. Simpson & K. L. Ladner (Eds.
), This is an honour song: Twenty years since the blockades (pp.
299-314).
Winnipeg: ARP Books.
Leahy, S. (2018, August 6).
Planet at risk of heading towards apocalyptic, irreversible ‘hothouse Earth’ state.
Motherboard.
Retrieved from https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8xbdnk/planet-at-risk-of-heading-towardshothouse-earth?utm_source=motherboardfbcaads Lewis, J.
(2012).
How to implement free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).
Participatory Learning and Action, 65, 175-178.
Retrieved from http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G03410.pdf Lewis, J., & Cryderman, K. (2016, October 12).
Climate activists force pipelines to shutdown: Group says it is acting in solidarity with the protesters at the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation.
Globe and Mail.
Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industrynews/energy-and-resources/activist-group-claims-shutting-of-five-canada-us-oilpipelines/article32319319/ Lobe, J.
(2002, July 1).
People versus Big Oil: Rights of Nigerian Indigenous people recognized.
Foreign Policy in Focus.
Retrieved from http://fpif.org/people_versus_big_oil_rights_of_nigerian_indigenous_people_recognized/ Long, L. N., & Hamilton, T. (2017).
Case comment, Washington v. Brockway: One small step closer to climate necessity.
McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law (MJSDL), 13(1), 151-179.
Lovelace, R. (2009).
Notes from prison: Protecting Algonquin lands from uranium mining.
In J. Agyeman, P. Cole, R. Haluza-DeLay, & P. O’Riley (Eds.
), Speaking for ourselves: Environmental justice in Canada (pp.
ix – xix).
Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin.
1985 CanLII 154 (BC CA).
Retrieved from http://canlii.ca/t/1p6pb Manuel, A.
(2017).
Reconciliation manifesto: Recovering the land, rebuilding the economy.
Toronto: James Lorimer and Company Limited.
McIntosh, E., & McKeen, A.
(2018, June 19).
Overrepresentation of Indigenous people in Canada’s prisons persists amid drop in overall incarceration.
The Star.
Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/06/19/overrepresentation-of-indigenouspeople-in-canadas-prisons-persists-amid-drop-in-overall-incarceration.html McMahon, R. (2014).
Everything you do is political, you’re Anishinaabe.
Or, what Idle No More is to me.
In the Kino-nda-niimi Collective (Eds.
), The winter we danced: Voices from the past, the future, and the Idle No More movement (pp.
138-141).
Winnipeg: ARP Books.
26 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 Mercer, G. (2018, May 30).
‘Sea, ice, snow .
.
.
it’s all changing’: Inuit struggle with warming world.
The Guardian.
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/30/canada-inuitsclimate-change-impactglobal-warming-melting-ice Meyer, C. (2018a, May 2).
Chiefs from 133 First Nations join fight against Kinder Morgan pipeline and oilsands expansion.
National Observer.
Retrieved from https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/05/02/news/chiefs-133-first-nations-join-fightagainst-kinder-morgan-pipeline-and-oilsands Meyer, C. (2018b, September 21).
Breaking: Trudeau government asks NEB to redo Trans Mountain decision.
National Observer.
Retrieved from https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/09/21/news/breaking-trudeau-government-asksneb-redo-trans-mountain-decision Milton, J.
(2016, November 20).
Train blockade in solidarity with Standing Rock.
Earthfirst!
Journal.
Retrieved from https://earthfirstjournal.org/newswire/2016/11/20/train-blockade-insolidarity-withstanding-rock/ Moe, K. (2014, April 22).
Cowboys and Indians stand together against Keystone XL.
[Blog post].
Retrieved from National Geographic website: https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2014/05/14/cowboys-and-indians-stand-togetheragainst-keystone-xl/ Morrow, S. (2014, April 25).
Chief councillor remembers the first days of a long battle on Meares.
HaShilth-Sa.
Retrieved from https://hashilthsa.com/news/2014-04-25/chiefcouncillorremembers-first-days-long-battle-meares Nagel, J.
(1996).
American Indian ethnic renewal: Red power and the resurgence of identity and culture.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Nakashima, D. J., Galloway McLean, K., Thulstrup, H. D., Ramos Castillo, A., & Rubis, J. T. (2012).
Weathering uncertainty: Traditional knowledge for climate change assessment and adaptation.
Retrieved from https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000216613 Napoleon, V. (2010).
Behind the blockades.
Indigenous Law Journal, 9(1).
Retrieved from https://ilj.law.utoronto.ca/sites/ilj.law.utoronto.ca/files/media/Napoleon_E_0.pdf Nosek, G. (2017).
Climate change litigation and narrative: How to use litigation to tell compelling climate stories (Unpublished master’s thesis).
Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
Obomsawin, A.
(Producer and Director).
(2002).
Is the Crown at war with us [Documentary film]?
Canada: National Film Board.
Orta-Martinez, M., & Finer, M. (2010).
Oil frontiers and Indigenous resistance in the Peruvian Amazon.
Ecological Economics, 70, 207–218.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.04.022 27 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Osborne, S. (2017, February 12).
US veterans return to Standing Rock to form human shield to protect Dakota Access Pipeline protesters.
Independent.
Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-army-veteranshumanshield-dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-a7576291.html Page, J., & Plant, R. (1971).
Stairway to heaven [Recorded by Led Zeppelin].
On Led Zeppelin IV [Medium of recording: Vinyl].
New York: Atlantic Records.
Palmater, P. (2014).
Why are we Idle No More?
In the Kino-nda-niimi Collective (Eds.
), The winter we danced: Voices from the past, the future, and the Idle No More movement (pp.
37-39).
Winnipeg: ARP Books.
Pasternak, S. (2014, April 10).
First Nations’ remarkable legal winning streak.
The Tyee.
Retrieved from https://thetyee.ca/Books/2014/04/10/Resource-Rulers/ Paul, D. (2000).
We were not the savages.
Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Company.
Phillip, S., & Simon, S. (2018, April 12).
If Ottawa rams through Trans Mountain, it could set up an Oka-like crisis.
Globe and Mail.
Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-if-ottawa-rams-through-transmountain-itcould-set-up-an-oka-like/ Phippen, J. W. (2016, May 13).
‘Kill every buffalo you can!
Every buffalo dead is an Indian gone.’ The Atlantic.
Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/05/the-buffalokillers/482349/ Polack, F. (2018).
Tracing ochre: Changing perspectives on the Beothuk.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Quirke, S. (2016, January 28).
Delta 5 defendants acquitted of major charges.
Earth Island Journal.
Retrieved from http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/delta_5_defendants_acquitt ed_of_major_charges/ Ramos-Castillo, A., Castellanos, E. J., & McLean K. G. (2017).
Indigenous Peoples, local communities and climate change mitigation.
Climate Change, 140, 1-4. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584016-1873-0 Raygorodetsky, G. (2017).
The archipelago of hope: Wisdom and resilience from the edge of climate change.
New York: Pegasus Books Ltd. Reo, N. J., & Parker, A. K. (2013).
Re-thinking colonialism to prepare for the impacts of rapid environmental change.
Climatic Change, 120, 671–682.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584013-0783-7 28 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 Rivas, J.
(2017).
Solidarity in Standing Rock.
World Policy Journal, 34(4), 62-75. doi:https://doi.org/10.1215/07402775-4373238 Saul, J. R. (2014).
The comeback.
Toronto: Penguin.
Seck, S. L. (2017).
Treaties and the emancipator potential of international law.
In J. Borrows & M. Coyle (Eds.
), The right relationship: Reimagining the implementation of historical treaties (pp.
344369).
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Sellars, B.
(2016).
Price paid: The fight for First Nations survival.
Vancouver: Talonbooks.
Shrubsole, N. D. (2011).
The Sun Dance and the Gustafsen Lake standoff: Healing through resistance and the danger of dismissing religion.
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 2(4).
doi:https://doi.org/10.18584/iipj.2011.2.4.3 Shuswap Nation Tribal Council.
(2010).
The memorial to Sir Wilfred Laurier: Commemorating the 100th anniversary 1910-2010.
Retrieved from http://www.kanakabarband.ca/downloads/memorial-to-sirwilfred-laurier.pdf Simpson, J.
(2017, November 16).
What to do when wrong is right: Civil disobedience by Aboriginal Peoples and the role of the courts [Blog post].
Retrieved from http://www.juniperlaw.ca/blogin-law/what-to-do-when-wrong-is-right-civildisobedience-by-aboriginal-peoples-and-the-roleof-the-courts Simpson, L. B.
(2013).
Elsipogtog everywhere [Blog post].
Retrieved from https://www.leannesimpson.ca/writings/2013/10/20/elsipogtog-everywhere Smith, C. (2018, August 30).
Federal Court of Appeal rules in favour of First Nations' challenge against Kinder Morgan pipeline approval.
The Georgia Straight.
Retrieved from https://www.straight.com/news/1127031/federal-court-appeal-rules-favour-first-nationschallenge-against-kinder-morgan Smith, M-D. (2016, June 2).
First Nations communities suffering ‘more intense’ impact of climate change, secret briefings say.
National Post.
Retrieved from https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/first-nations-communities-suffering-more-intenseimpact-of-climate-change-secret-briefings-say Spratt, D., & Dunlop, I.
(2018, August 20).
Take unprecedented action or bear the consequences, says eminent scientist and advisor.
Renew Economy.
Retrieved from https://reneweconomy.com.au/take-unprecedented-action-or-bear-the-consequences-sayseminent-scientist-and-advisor-45081/ 29 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Sproat, D. K. (2016).
An Indigenous people’s right to environmental self-determination: Native Hawaiians and the struggle against climate change devastation.
Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 35(2), 157-220.
Sterritt, A., & Dufresne, M. (2018, February 1).
‘Canadians would be shocked’: Survivors, lawyers describe treatment at Nanaimo Indian Hospital.
CBC News.
Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/canadians-would-be-shockedsurvivorslawyers-describe-treatment-at-nanaimo-indian-hospital-1.4513476 Suzuki, D., & Moola, F. (2016, August 17).
An Inuit community's David-and-Goliath battle with Big Oil.
The Star.
Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/08/17/aninuit-communitys-davidand-goliath-battle-with-big-oil.html Trans Mountain Pipeline.
(n.d.a).
The Narwhal.
Retrieved from https://thenarwhal.ca/topics/transmountain-pipeline/ Trans Mountain Pipeline.
(n.d.b).
Vancouver Observer.
Retrieved from https://www.vancouverobserver.com/trans-mountain-pipeline Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC).
(2015).
Honouring the truth, reconciling the future: Summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada.
Toronto: James Lorimer & Co. Ltd. Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion.
(2018a).
Home/about page.
Retrieved from http://www.treatyalliance.org/ Treaty Alliance Against Tar Sands Expansion.
(2018b).
List of signatories.
Retrieved from http://www.treatyalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TAATSE-SignatoryNationsEN-R12-20180430-OL.pdf Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General).
2018.
2018 FCA 153 (FCA).
Retrieved from https://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/343511/index.do Tsosie, R. (2007).
Indigenous people and environmental justice: The impact of climate change.
University of Colorado Law Review, 78, 1625-1677.
Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1399659 Turner, D. (2014).
The White Paper and the Idle No More movement.
In Kino-nda-niimi Collective (Eds.
), The winter we danced: Voices from the past, the future, and the Idle No More movement (pp.
120-126).
Winnipeg: ARP Books.
Turner, N. J.
(2009).
‘‘It’s so different today’’: Climate change and Indigenous lifeways in British Columbia, Canada.
Global Environmental Change, 19, 180–190.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.01.005 30 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 Umeek/ Atleo, E. R. (2011).
Principles of tsawalk: An Indigenous approach to global crisis.
Vancouver: UBC Press.
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
(2007).
Retrieved from https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wpcontent/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
(2011).
Human development report 2011: Sustainability and equity—A better future for all.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vanslyke, C. (2013, January 14).
Letter to the editor.
National Post.
Retrieved from https://nationalpost.com/opinion/letters/todays-letters-ideas-for-solving-the-native-issue Vidal, J.
(2009, June 13).
‘We are fighting for our lives and our dignity.’ The Guardian.
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/jun/13/forests-environment-oilcompanies Voggesser, G., Lynn, K., Daigle, J., Lake, F. K., & Ranco, D. (2013).
Cultural impacts to tribes from climate change influences on forests.
Climatic Change, 120, 615–626.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0733-4 Wahlquist, C. (2016, February 24).
‘It's the same story’: How Australia and Canada are twinning on bad outcomes for Indigenous people.
The Guardian.
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/indigenous-australians-and-canadiansdestroyed-by-same-colonialism Ward, K., Smart, A., Bennett, D., Rabson, M. & Smith, J.
(2018, April 9).
Trans Mountain Pipeline on hold as pressure mounts on B.C.
to drop opposition.
Financial Post.
Retrieved from http://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/cp-newsalert-transmountain-pipelinework-suspended-by-kinder-morgan Watt-Cloutier, S. (2007).
Testimony to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, March 1, 2007.
Retrieved from https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/legal_docs/testimony-before-iachr-onglobal-warming-human-rights-by-sheila-watt-cloutier.pdf Watt-Cloutier, S. (2015).
The right to be cold: One woman’s story of protecting her culture, the Arctic, and the whole planet.
Toronto: Penguin.
Watts, J.
(2018, October 8).
We have 12 years to limit climate change catastrophe, warns UN.
The Guardian.
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/globalwarming-must-notexceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report Weatherburn, D. (2014).
Arresting incarceration: Pathways out of Indigenous imprisonment.
Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press.
31 Canning: I Could Turn You to Stone Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018 Wilkes, R. (2006).
The protest actions of Indigenous Peoples: A Canadian–U.S.
comparison of social movement emergence.
American Behavioral Scientist, 50(4), 510-525. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764206294059 Wilkes, R., Corrigall-Brown, C., & Myers, D. J.
(2010).
“Packaging protest: Media coverage of Indigenous people’s collective action.” Canadian Review of Sociology, 47, 349-379. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-618X.2010.01243.x Woolford, A. J.
(2002).
Between justice and certainty: Treaty making in modern-day British Columbia (Doctoral dissertation).
Retrieved from https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/831/items/1.0090699 Woolford, A. J.
(2009).
Ontological destruction: Genocide and Canadian Aboriginal Peoples.
Genocide Studies and Prevention, 4(1), 81-97. doi:https://doi.org/10.1353/gsp.0.0010.
Worland, J.
(2016, October 28).
What to know about the Dakota Access Pipeline protests.
Time.
Retrieved from http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux/ Wyld, A.
(2018, November 5).
Minister already met with 22 bands in Trans Mountain consultation redo.
Vancouver Sun.
Retrieved from https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/ministeralready-met-with-22-bands-in-transmountain-consultation-redo Xat’sūll First Nation.
(2012).
BC regional adaptation collaborative climate change adaptation case study.
Retrieved from https://www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/_Library/CCAQ_BCRAC/bcrac_fbc_cs_xatsull.pdf York, G., & Pindera, L. (1991).
People of the Pines.
Toronto.
Little Brown & Company (Canada) Ltd. Zander, K. K., Petheram, L., & Garnett, S. T. (2013).
Stay or leave?
Potential climate change adaptation strategies among Aboriginal people in coastal communities in northern Australia.
Natural Hazards, 67, 591–609.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-013-0591-4 32 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol.
9, Iss.
3 [2018], Art.
7 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol9/iss3/7 DOI: 10.18584/iipj.2018.9.3.7 The International Indigenous Policy Journal July 2018 I Could Turn You to Stone: Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change Patrick C. Canning Recommended Citation I Could Turn You to Stone: Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change Abstract Keywords Acknowledgments Disclaimer Creative Commons License I Could Turn You to Stone: Indigenous Blockades in an Age of Climate Change
http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/refameResearch article Vulnerability to climate change of smallholder cocoa producers in the province of Manabí, Ecuador Vulnerabilidad al cambio climático de pequeños productores de cacao en la provincia de Manabí, Ecuador ABSTRACT doi: 10.15446/rfnam.v72n1.72564 Keywords: Coverage Deforestation Extreme weather events Rainfall Temperature Theobroma cacao L RESUMEN Palabras clave: Cobertura Deforestación Eventos climáticos extremos Precipitaciones Temperatura Theobroma cacao L 1 Facultad de Ciencias Zootécnicas.
Universidad Técnica de Manabí.
Avenida Jose Maria Urbina, Portoviejo, Ecuador.
2 Facultad de Ciencias Agropecuarias.
Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
AA 237, Palmira, Colombia.
3 Facultad de Ingeniería Agrícola.
Universidad Técnica de Manabí.
Avenida Jose Maria Urbina, Portoviejo, Ecuador.
* Corresponding author: <jrmaciasb@unal.edu.co> Received: May 30, 2018; Accepted: November 1, 2018 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 ISSN 0304-2847 / e-ISSN 2248-7026 The consequences of climate change in the agricultural sector worldwide expose the need to understand the scope of their impact in order to develop mitigation and adaptation strategies for them.
Therefore, this research evaluated the alterations in the environmental conditions and their relation with the vulnerability of smallholder cocoa (Theobroma cacao L.) producers to climate change in the province of Manabí.
A non-probabilistic sampling of 1,060 small farmers was made in five cantons of Manabí.
The vulnerability was determined through indicators such as the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI), deforestation data from 1990 to 2016, models of the changes in climate and extreme weather events, satellite images, records from the National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology (INAMHI by its initials in Spanish), and numerical outputs of mathematical models calibrated for Ecuador climatic and environmental data.
Each indicator was calculated in conventional units and then categorized into vulnerability levels: low, medium, high and very high.
For the indicators’ superposition, algebraic tools of the Geographic Information Systems’ (GIS) maps were used.
The results showed a very high incidence of extreme events, deforestation higher than 6,000 ha year-1, an increase of 0.8 °C in temperature between 1960 and 2006, an increase in rainfall on the coastal zone close to 90% and a decrease of it of more than 20% on the agricultural area.
Furthermore, coverage showed the following distribution of the determined vulnerability levels: low (13.30%), medium (34.74%), high (45.53%), and very high (6.43%).
Ricardo Macías Barberán1*, Gerardo Cuenca Nevárez1, Frank Intriago Flor1, Creucí María Caetano2, Juan Carlos Menjivar Flores2 and Henry Antonio Pacheco Gil3 Las consecuencias del cambio climático en el sector agrícola a nivel mundial dejan expuesta la necesidad de entender los alcances de su impacto para así desarrollar estrategias de mitigación y adaptación para las mismas.
Por lo tanto, esta investigación evaluó las alteraciones en las condiciones ambientales y su relación con la vulnerabilidad que tienen los pequeños productores de cacao (Theobroma cacao L.) al cambio climático en la provincia de Manabí.
Se hizo un muestreo no probabilístico de 1.060 pequeños agricultores en cinco cantones de Manabí.
La vulnerabilidad se determinó mediante indicadores como el índice de vegetación de diferencia normalizada (NDVI por sus siglas en inglés), datos de deforestación de 1990 a 2016, modelos de los cambios en el clima y eventos climáticos extremos, imágenes de satélite, registros del Instituto Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología (INAMHI) y salidas numéricas de modelos matemáticos calibrados para datos climáticos y ambientales del Ecuador.
Cada indicador se calculó en unidades convencionales y luego se categorizó en niveles de vulnerabilidad: baja, media, alta y muy alta.
Para la superposición de los indicadores se usó herramientas algebraicas de los mapas del Sistema de Información Geográfica (SIG).
Los resultados muestran una incidencia muy alta de eventos extremos, deforestación superior a 6.000 ha año-1, un incremento de la temperatura en 0,8 °C de 1960 a 2006, un aumento en las precipitaciones en la zona costera cercano al 90% y una disminución en las mismas superior al 20% en la zona agrícola.
Además, la cobertura arrojo la siguiente distribución en los niveles de vulnerabilidad: baja (13,30%), media (34,74%), alta (45,53%), y muy alta (6,43%).
8708 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Macías R, Cuenca G, Intriago F, Caetano CM, Menjivar JC, Pacheco HA According to the IPCC (2014), the temperature of the planet's surface has increased by approximately 0.2 °C per decade since the 1980s; however, this phenomenon has been accelerating since the end of 1990.
Likewise, the projections of mathematical climate models show increases to 2 °C in 2050 and up to 3 °C at the end of the century.
The studies of the International Center for the Investigation of the El Niño Phenomenon CIIFEN (2014), and Thieelen et al.
(2015), have determined that the changes will be gradual and will be accompanied by an increase in climatic variability and extreme events, which will generate more frequent episodes of droughts and floods, as well as an increase in the intensity of rainfall.
In Ecuador, future scenarios show increases in temperature in the coastal region and reductions in the precipitation in the northern center of the Manabí province where precisely much of the agricultural activity takes place, and water sources play an important role because they are mainly used for irrigation, human consumption, and hydroelectric energy generation (Muñoz, 2010).
According to Vergara et al.
(2014), climate change has strong effects on agricultural activities.
Considering that cocoa crops are susceptible to changes in environmental conditions, the occurrence of this variation has adverse effects on it.
These extreme phenomena could cause an alteration in the development stages and rates of pests and diseases related to cocoa, a decrease in the incubation periods and development of harmful organisms, and high ease of introduction of invasive species as well as changes in their geographical distribution (Schroth et al., 2016).
Cocoa crops’ productivity and all the socioeconomic variable related to it can be severely affected if those prone evens happen; therefore, it is possible that 580,000 ha dedicated to the production of cocoa (Theobroma cacao L.) in Ecuador will be at risk.
Approximately 60% of that agricultural area correspond to smallholder producers that have less than 3.5 ha each, and whose total cocoa production generate 820 million dollars of earnings to the country which equivalent to 0.6% of GDP (ANECACAO, 2015).
Recent research found tremendous effects on cocoa cultivation due to drought events, reporting losses in production yields between 10 and 46% in Indonesia (Schwendenmann et al., 2010).
Gateau-Rey et al.
(2018) found in farms, chosen randomly in Brazil, a high mortality of cocoa trees (15%) and a severe decrease in cocoa yield (89%), as well as an increase in the rate of infection of the chronic fungal disease Moniliophthora perniciosa after the environmental conditions imposed by the Niño phenomenon between 2015 and 2016,.
These findings, in the opinion of the authors, demonstrate that cocoa producers are at risk, and the increasing frequency of strong weather events will likely cause a decline in cocoa yields in the coming decades.
Besides, cocoa and other crops can be the warning of the next important effects of the climate change on the natural and semi-natural vegetation.
Regarding the Ecuadorian outlook, the MAGAP (2015) reported that yields in cocoa production systematically had been increasing since 2002.
Going from a national average of 0.17 to 0.60 t ha-1.
Only a shrinkage has been reported in 2012 that registered a 40% decrease in the total production (133 t) compared to 2011 (230 t), which undoubtedly is related to the occurrence of the La Niña Phenomenon in the South American coast between 2010 and 2011, generating strong droughts with a devastating effect on agricultural activities.
Although there are reports about annual cocoa yields, there are no studies that show the relationship between climate change and the alteration in the environmental conditions with the production of cocoa (T. cacao L.).
Therefore, this research evaluated the alterations in the environmental conditions and their relation with the vulnerability of smallholder cocoa (Theobroma cacao L.) producers to climate change in the cantons of Chone, Tosagua, Bolívar, Junín, and Portoviejo in the province of Manabí.
The vulnerability was determined based on the indicators such as the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI), deforestation data from 1990 to 2016, models of the changes in climate and extreme events, satellite images, records from the National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology (INAMHI by its initials in Spanish), and numerical outputs of mathematical models calibrated for Ecuador climatic and environmental data.
Each indicator was calculated in conventional units and then categorized into vulnerability levels: low, medium, high and very high.
8709 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Vulnerability to climate change of smallholder cocoa producers in the province of Manabí, Ecuador MATERIALS AND METHODS The study was carried in a total area of 2,134.50 ha in the cocoa agricultural regions of Chone (0°37’59.5”S, 79°55’17.7”W), Bolívar (0°50’31”S, 80°09’43”W), Tosagua (0°47’02.2”S, 80°14’06.8”W), Junin (01°01’20.2792”S, 080°27’38.5844”W), and Portoviejo (1°01’20.3”S, 80°27’38.6”W) in the province of Manabí, Ecuador.
A non-probabilistic sample of 1,060 smallholder farmers was used, these cocoa producers were selected because they have territory extensions of less than 5 ha and are certified as organic cocoa producers.
Unstructured surveys and interviews were carried out to verify the information; the collected data was complemented with the direct observation on the premises and interviews of technicians of governmental institutions and advisers of rural producers.
For the chosen cocoa agricultural areas, their vulnerability to climate change was determined through several climatic and environmental indicators such as the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), the deforestation coverage, the occurrence of extreme weather events, the models of climate changes as well as the superposition of the digital information of the same.
Besides, the vulnerability was classified into four levels: very high, high, medium and low.
Generation of indicators based on satellite data The satellite information and its geometric corrections were made according to the methodology proposed by Montilla Pachecho and Pacheco Gil (2017) in order to process the image of the Landsat 8 sensor, LC80110612016332LGN00, from November 2016.
The objective of this procedure is to orient the pixel positions regarding Ecuador’s cartographic reference system through control points (GCP).
Radiometric corrections The methods that tend to eliminate dispersion by subtraction were applied in order to approximate the response received by the sensor with the real object observed on the earth’s surface.
The method used in this phase was the minimum histogram.
According to Hum et al.
(2014), it is limited to subtract in each band the minimum value observed since it assumes that in a scene there can be some pixels in total shadow, which in the absence of atmosphere would and should not reflect any solar energy.
With these procedures, more accurate data were obtained than previous versions of Landsat, incorporating substantial improvements in geometrical and radiometric aspects, according to the studies of Mishra et al.
(2016), Sousa and Small (2017), and Roy et al.
(2016).
Calculation of the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) This index was determined according to the approaches of Baihua and Burgher (2015), to determine the characteristics of the vegetation in semi-arid zones in ecological conditions similar to those present in the studied places.
The NDVI is obtained with the equation: Where: NIR: Near-infrared band.
VISR: Red band With the application of the above equation, an image with normalized magnitudes between -1 and 1 was generated, where the negative values and close to 0 indicate zones devoid of vegetation, and those leading to 1 indicate areas with very dense cover vegetation.
This coverage was reclassified into four vulnerability levels through a spatial distribution analysis (Table 1).
Coverage of deforestation The historical deforestation information of the MAE (2017) was used for the periods 1990-2000, 20002008, 2008-2014, and 2014-2016.
With the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) the four coverages (bare soil, dry forest, transition forest, and humid forest) were united in a single map, which was reclassified in a Boolean image with low and very high vulnerability levels for the zones without deforestation and with deforestation, respectively.
Extreme weather events and models of climate changes The historical data of the INAMHI were used to define the affectation due to extreme weather events, considering as extreme the cases above the last quartile and below the first one of the series of data for the period 1970-2016.
On the other hand, the proposal of ( ) ( ) N IR V IS R N D V I N IR V IS R − = + 8710 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Macías R, Cuenca G, Intriago F, Caetano CM, Menjivar JC, Pacheco HA Schroth et al.
(2016) was considered for the models of climate changes, processing the numerical outputs generated by the MAE (2017) and INAMHI (2017) with the ETA and TL959 models, these models presented the best correlations with the historical records for precipitation and temperature, respectively.
Shapefiles were constructed with the information obtained from these models, with the coverage of changes in precipitation and temperature for the province of Manabí; categorizing the vulnerability into four levels according to the climate elements in very high, high, medium and low.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) reported values ranging from -0.278 to 0.549, with an average of 0.212.
Coverage of transition and dry forest comprised about 70.35% of the territory studied and had a medium and high vulnerability, respectively (Table 1).
Although the humid forest presented a low vulnerability when the experiment was carried out, it is an area that must be monitored since it could be potentially used for agriculture expansions to sow cocoa and other crops.
It is notable that this area represented more than 25% of the studied zone.
Table 1.
Categorization of vulnerability according to the normalized difference vegetation index.
NDVI Surface Vulnerability level Type of coverage(km2) (%) 0.00-0.10 99.24 3.25 Very high Bare soil 0.10-0.18 904.09 29.58 High Dry forest 0.18-0.27 1,246.23 40.77 Medium Transition forest >0.27 779.175 25.49 Low Humid forest <0.00 279.504 0.91 Null Water bodies The search for new sites suitable for producing cocoa could trigger the clearing of forests and natural protected areas, which are important for flora and fauna habitats (Ruf et al., 2015).
In this sense, Turbay et al.
(2014) recommend adequate shade management in crops, renewal with disease-resistant varieties, crop association, plant cover, stepped sowing, and reforestation as strategies to reduce vulnerability to climate change.
As Figure 1 shows, the vulnerability levels very high and high are mostly located in areas close to the coast, where dry forest coverage predominated; while low vulnerability was distributed in the central western mountainous area with predominance of the humid forest coverage.
Figure 1.
Spatial distribution of vulnerability in response to the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI).
560000 590000 620000 9 87 00 00 99 00 00 9 93 00 00 560000 5900000 620000 9 87 00 00 99 00 00 9 93 00 00 NDVI Null Very High High Medium Low 0 5 10 20 30 40 Km N EW S 8711 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Vulnerability to climate change of smallholder cocoa producers in the province of Manabí, Ecuador Deforestation Table 2 and Figure 2 show the concentration of the deforested areas in the northern part of the studied zone which belong to Chone and Bolívar cities, encompassing a total deforested area of 392.06 km2 (12.8% of the studied area) between 1990 and 2016, with a deforestation rate higher than 1,500 ha year-1.
High deforestation is attributed to changes in land use, generally for agricultural activities such as mainly extensive cattle-breeding and short-cycle crops.
The practice of these activities with technologies that are not friendly to the environment increases vulnerability to climate change because it favors the emission of greenhouse gases and the loss of forest and soil Table 2.
Deforestation during the period 1990-2016.
Deforestation Period (1990-2016) Surface Vulnerability Level(km2) % Forested area 2,661.18 87.16 Low Deforested area 392.06 12.84 Very high 9 87 00 00 9 90 00 0 99 30 00 0 560000 590000 620000 560000 590000 620000 0 5 10 20 30 40 Km S E N W Deforested areas 1990-2016 Figure 2.
Spatial distribution of deforestation due to agricultural activities between 1990 and 2016. resources (MAE, 2017).
This information is consistent with studies conducted in West Africa, reported by Ruf et al.
(2015), where cocoa cultivation is indicated as an important deforestation driver.
On-site detection for replanting old plantations, farmers usually migrated to the forest borders to establish new cocoa farms in order to find more humid areas to sow it.
Deforestation has a direct relation to climate change.
Forest degradation leads to the loss of carbon dioxide repositories.
The carbon storage compartments in trees are aerial biomass, mainly in the trunks of woody plants and leaves; there is also underground biomass that stores it in the root tree network.
The carbon accumulated by trees, and hence by the forest, can move and be stored in the soil due to the necromass and plant litter.
The main tool to prepare agricultural land is the burning of green areas and forest; this practice leads to increase deforestation.
Besides, scorched vegetation releases CO 2 , CH 4 , N 2 O, ozone precursors, and aerosols (including black carbon) to the atmosphere.
The vegetation that develops after a fire is going to absorb and consume 9 87 00 00 9 90 00 0 99 30 00 0 8712 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Macías R, Cuenca G, Intriago F, Caetano CM, Menjivar JC, Pacheco HA atmospheric CO 2 and nitrogen.
Anthropogenic land management or land transformation through fire leads to an increase in the levels of disturbance or permanent clearance of forest.
This action results in net emissions to the atmosphere over time.
Satellite detection of fire occurrence and persistence has been used to estimate fire emissions.
However, it is hard to separate the source of fire as natural or anthropogenic.
These conditions are intensified in the studied area due to an average of 400 kg of nitrogen fertilizer is used per extension and livestock is produced with a loading capacity of only 1 head ha-1, wherewith the great influence of deforestation on the land of smallholder cocoa producers in the Province of Manabí was determined.
Fieldwork carried out in the studied area, and the use of dated satellite images interception updated how is the processes of continuous deforestation with current trends – an estimation of 4,000 ha year-1 in the rural territory, which represents approximately 20.00 km2.
However, these data do not represent facts.
The Ecuadorian government ratified the commitments made in the Paris agreement and presented a zero deforestation goal for the year 2025.
Public policies and citizen training must be implemented to achieve the objectives, which imply significant changes in the current technologies production and incorporation of sustainable mechanisms economically and environmentally speaking.
Extreme weather events The thermal and rainfall regimes in the central region of the Manabí province are characterized by a high seasonality, related to the seasonal warming of the equatorial Pacific and the displacement of the intertropical convergence zone (Thielen et al., 2015).
During this seasonality, anomalies with a high incidence of extreme weather events such as La Niña and El Niño phenomenon occur.
These phenomena produce two extreme conditions such as intense periods of drought or rainfall, the occurrence of one of them of depending on the geographical zone that they occur.
Therefore, cocoa crops are susceptible to these both weather extreme event (Ojo and Sadiq, 2010).
The analysis of climate data shows that the frequency of positive and negative thermal anomalies (El Niño and La Niña), which generate extraordinary rainfall and drought is very high in the equatorial Pacific.
Therefore, the entire coastal area of Ecuador has a very high vulnerability to extreme events of this type (Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Thermal anomalies in the sea surface temperature of the Equatorial Pacific Ocean between 2002 and 2012.
A no m al y [d eg C ] 2 1 0 -1 -2 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 01 07 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 During 2015, 2016, and 2017 the extraordinary rains, related to the anomalous warming of the sea surface in the equatorial Pacific coast, altered the historical averages in the precipitations, the solar brightness, and the environmental temperature causing severe impacts in the flowering, the ears’ development, and the growth of the cacao trees (MAGAP, 2015).
The rainfall in the Ecuadorian coastal area has exceeded, in some cases, more than 500% of the historical averages (INAMHI, 2017).
Regarding the incidence of these climatic alterations in cocoa cultivation, Schrot et al.
(2016) report that the cocoa fruit does not develop completely during the droughts, and very intense rains diminish the flowering and the fruit set; hence, both events reduce cocoa productivity.
On the other hand, in response to the increase in temperature, the cacao trees restrict the development of pods to get the most water for growth.
MAGAP reported the increasing incidence of the monk because of the El Niño phenomenon in 2017.
It is known this pest occurs in rainy seasons, where the temperature and humidity conditions are favorable for the growth of the fungus Moniliophthora roreri which causes watery cocoa rot (INIAP, 2015).
8713 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Vulnerability to climate change of smallholder cocoa producers in the province of Manabí, Ecuador Considering environmental conditions for the criteria the normal development of cocoa cultivation occur at temperatures between 18 and 34 °C and precipitations per cycle from 1200 to 3000 mm are required (INIAP, 2015).
The average monthly precipitation range required for cocoa cultivation is 125 mm.
When rainfall does not cover water needs, farmers must use irrigation (in areas with water availability) to compensate the deficit and avoid production losses.
The entire province was categorized in a very high vulnerability to cocoa cultivation considering the high frequency in the occurrence of extreme events.
Gateau-Rey et al.
(2018) reported severe decreases in the soil’s water content, because of the extreme weather events caused by the El Niño phenomenon in Brazil from 2015 to 2016.
The water deficit of the soil has a great influence on the yield decrease of the cocoa crop.
Model of the climate changes The decrease in precipitation is located precisely in the mountainous zones recognized as water-producing areas (Figure 4); therefore, this decrease has a direct effect on the availability of water for future irrigation systems in cocoa areas since the monthly rainfall average in them barely exceeds the amount required by the crop (125 mm year-1).
On the other hand, the increase in temperature would affect the availability of water due to the increase in evapotranspiration although it would not surpass the optimal temperature limits of cocoa crops (Muñoz, 2010).
The effects related to extreme events in the climate could generate great consequences for the global production of cocoa, not only because of the physiology of the plant but also because of the increase of diseases and pests (Ruf et al., 2015).
The categorization of vulnerability due to climatic events showed that 34.69% of the studied area has a high vulnerability to temperature variations, with increases of up to 0.8 °C (Table 3).
On the other hand, 54.51% of the territory is highly vulnerable to the decrease in rainfall levels, with negative values between 40 and 50% of the total annual rainfall; that variation means that the crop Figure 4.
Vulnerability according to A.
Decrease in rainfall; B.
Temperature increase.
560000 590000 620000 560000 590000 620000 560000 59000 620000 560000 590000 620000 9 87 00 00 99 00 00 9 93 00 00 98 70 00 0 9 90 00 00 9 93 00 00 9 87 00 00 9 90 00 0 99 30 00 0 98 70 00 0 9 90 00 0 99 30 00 0 9 87 00 00 99 00 00 9 93 00 00 Vulnerability decrease in rainfall Low Medium High Very high Vulnerability temperature increase Medium High 0 5 10 20 30 40 S Km EW N 0 5 10 20 30 40 Km N W E S A B could be affected since the lack of water affects the floral development.
The results of the model of climate changes suggest the loss of environmental capacity for the cocoa cultivation in the coast, the increase of the temperature would displace the crop areas to higher altitudes.
This situation is contrary to the results found by the CIAT (2014) for Ecuador’s Andean region, where cocoa crops move to lower areas.
As a strategy to face the problem, it is necessary to update the information with research on irrigation 8714 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Macías R, Cuenca G, Intriago F, Caetano CM, Menjivar JC, Pacheco HA systems suitable for cultivation.
Parallel to it, there should be formulated government policies to help farmers and the cocoa industry to prepare for facing and adapting to climate change.
Table 3.
Vulnerability categorization according to thermal and rainfall anomalies.
Thermal elevation (ºC) Surface Decrease in rainfall (%) Surface Vulnerability level (km2) (%) (km2) (%) >0.8 0 0 >50 724.24 23.81 Very high 0.4-0.8 1,058.6 34.69 40-50 1,658.26 54.51 High 0.2-0.4 1,994.1 65.31 30-40 627.78 20.64 Medium <0.2 0 0 <30 31.63 1.04 Low Vulnerability summary The overlapping of the indicators reflects the total vulnerability in four levels (Table 4), where most of the areas evaluated are categorized into a high and very high vulnerability, they together account for more than 50% of the territory.
This result implies urgent needs to implement mitigation and adaptation measures to climate change.
Table 4.
Categorization of the total vulnerability.
Surface Vulnerability level (km2) (%) 190.53 6.43 Very high 1,349.29 45.53 High 1,029.64 34.74 Medium 394.05 13.30 Low 560000 590000 620000 560000 590000 620000 9 87 00 00 9 90 00 0 99 30 00 0 9 87 00 00 9 90 00 0 9 93 00 00 0 5 10 20 30 40 Km Total Vulnerability Low Medium High Very high W S E N Figure 5.
Spatial distribution of the total vulnerability.
8715 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Vulnerability to climate change of smallholder cocoa producers in the province of Manabí, Ecuador This study also specified the particularly vulnerable areas (Figure 5) to lead decision making by cocoa producers in these areas.
They need to implement strategies for the adaptation and mitigation to bear the climate change, which will allow them to enrich or maintain the productivity of the cocoa crops.
Apply those measures is not possible if they do not possess the knowledge, the tools, and the support of governmental and institutional entities.
Nowadays, several alternatives can be implemented such as agro-tourism, the integration of family labor, community and union associations, day labor, and marketing strategies; the latter alternative encompasses fair markets and product certifications that help to improve sales prices and withstand the moments of crisis.
These strategies can be adapted to the cultivation of cocoa in the studied area.
CONCLUSIONS The indicators analyzed yielded that the normalized vegetation difference index groups 34% of the studied territory into high and very high vulnerability to climate change.
Besides, 12% of the territory presents deforestation, going from forest cover to agricultural mosaic, due to unsustainable agricultural practices regarding the climate effects.
The province of Manabí is exposed to frequent extreme weather events such as droughts and floods which is evidenced by the anomalies of the sea surface temperature; actually, 77% of its territory presented high and very high vulnerability to the models of the climate changes.
The combined action of all the studied indicators generates high and very high vulnerability in 52% of the territory analyzed.
These results suggest the need to consider scenarios for the implementation of adaptation and mitigation measures that increase the resilience of populations and ecosystems to the effects of climate change.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The present work is born from a worldview of the environment, for the authors thank God, nature, their family, and their friends.
REFERENCES ANECACAO.
2015.
Exportaciones de Cacao del Ecuador.
In: Asociación Nacional de Exportadores de Cacao, http://www.anecacao.
com/index.php/es/inicio.html.
6 p.; accessed: January 2018.
Baihua F and Burgher I.
2015.
Riparian vegetation NDVI dynamics and its relationship with climate, surface water and groundwater.
Journal of Arid Environments 113: 59-68. doi: 10.1016/j.jaridenv.2014.09.010.
CIIFEN.
2014.
Estrategia Provincial de Cambio Climático: Fase I: Diagnóstico.
Implementación de un sistema de información de vulnerabilidad sectorial de la provincia del Guayas frente al cambio y la variabilidad climática.
In: Centro Internacional para la Investigación del Fenómeno de El Niño, http://www.ciifen.org/.
95 p.; accessed: February 2018.
Ojo AD and Sadiq I.
2010.
Effect of climate change on cocoa yield: a case of cocoa research institute (CRIN) farm, Oluyole local government Ibadan Oyo State.
Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 12(1): 350-358.
Gateau-Rey L, Tanner EVJ, Rapidel B, Marelli JP and Royaert S. 2018.
Climate change could threaten cocoa production: Effects of 2015-16 El Niño-related drought on cocoa agroforests in Bahia, Brazil.
Plos One 13(7): e0200454.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0200454 Hum YC, Lai KW and Mohamad Salim MI.
2014.
Multiobjectives bihistogram equalization for image contrast enhancement.
Complexity 20(2): 22-36. doi: 10.1002/cplx.21499 INAMHI.
2017.
Anuario Meteorológico N° 53-2013.
First Edition.
Dirección ejecutiva del INAMHI, Quito.
144 p. INIAP.
2015.
Informe anual 2015.
In: Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agropecuarias, http://repositorio.iniap.gob.ec/ handle/41000/4094 104 p.; accessed: February 2018.
CIAT.
2014.
Evaluación de la vulnerabilidad al cambio climático de la agricultura en la región Andina de Ecuador.
In: Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical, http://dapa.ciat.cgiar.org/wpcontent/uploads/AboutUs/PolicyBriefs/policy-brief-15-evaluacionvulnerabilidad-cambio-climatico-ecuador.pdf.
6 p.; accessed: January 2018.
IPCC 2014.
Quinto Informe de Evaluación del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático.
In: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, https://www.ipcc.ch/.
27 p.; accessed: November 2017.
MAE.
2017.
Mapa histórico de la deforestación del Ecuador continental.
In: Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador, https:// docplayer.es/13530720-Mapa-historico-de-deforestacion-delecuador-continental.html 46 p.; accessed: December 2017 MAGAP 2015.
Boletín situacional de Cacao 2014.
In: Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, https://www.agricultura.gob.ec/.
7 p.; accessed: September 2017.
Mishra N, Helder D, Barsi J and MarKham B.
2016.
Continuous calibration improvement in solar reflective bands: Landsat 5 through Landsat 8.
Remote Sensing of Environment 185: 7-15. doi: 10.1016/j.
rse.2016.07.032 Montilla Pacheco A and Pacheco Gil HA.
2017.
Comportamiento temporal y espacial del bosque ribereño en el curso bajo del río Portoviejo y la quebrada Chilán, provincia de Manabí, Ecuador.
Revista Internacional de Contaminación Ambiental 33(1): 21-35. doi: 10.20937/rica.2017.33.01.02.
Muñoz AG.
2010.
Validación y análisis de consenso de modelos de escenarios de cambio climático para Ecuador.
Proyecto inamhimae-scn-praa-pacc.
Centro de Modelado Científico (CMC) de La Universidad del Zulia, Maracaibo.
129 p. Roy DP, Kovalsky V, Zhang HK, Vermote EF, Yan L, Kumar SS and Egorov A.
2016.
Characterization of Landsat-7 to Landsat-8 reflective wavelength and normalized difference vegetation index 8716 Rev.
Fac.
Nac.
Agron.
Medellín 72(1): 8707-8716.
2019 Macías R, Cuenca G, Intriago F, Caetano CM, Menjivar JC, Pacheco HA continuity.
Remote Sensing of Environment 185: 57-70. doi: 10.1016/j.rse.2015.12.024 Ruf F, Schroth G and Doffangui K. 2015.
Climate change, cocoa migrations and deforestation in West Africa: What does the past tell us about the future?.
Sustainability Science 10(1): 101–111.
doi: 10.1007/s11625-014-0282-4 Sousa D and Small C. 2017.
Global cross-calibration of Landsat spectral mixture models.
Remote Sensing of Environment 192: 139149. doi: 10.1016/j.rse.2017.01.033 Schroth G, Läderach P, Martinez-Valle AI, Bunn C and Jassogne L. 2016.
Vulnerability to climate change of cocoa in West Africa: Patterns, opportunities and limits to adaptation.
Science of The Total Environment 556: 231-241. doi: 10.1016/j.
scitotenv.2016.03.024 Schwendenmann L, Veldkamp E, Moser G, Hölscher D, Köhler M, Clough Y, Anas I, Djajakirana G, Erasmi S, Hertel D, Leither D, Leuschner C, Michalzik B, Propastin P, Tjoa A, Tscharntke T and van Straaten O.
2010.
Effects of an experimental drought on the functioning of a cacao agroforestry system, Sulawesi, Indonesia.
Global Change Biology 16(5): 1515–1530.
doi: 10.1111/j.13652486.2009.02034.x Thielen D, Cevallos J, Erazo T, Zurita I, Figueroa J, Quintero J, Matute N, Velásquez G and Puche M. 2015.
Dinámica de eventos climáticos extremos en la cuenca del río Portoviejo, Manabí.
Revista La Técnica 14: 80-91.
Turbay S, Nates B, Jaramillo F, Vélez JJ and Ocampo OL.
2014.
Adaptación a la variabilidad climática entre los caficultores de las cuencas de los ríos Porce y Chinchiná, Colombia.
Investigaciones Geográficas, Boletín del Instituto de Geografía 2014(85): 95-112. doi: 10.14350/rig.42298 Vergara W, Ríos AR, Trapido P and Malarín H. 2014.
Agricultura y Clima Futuro en América Latina y el Caribe: Impactos Sistémicos y Posibles Respuestas.
In: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, https://publications.iadb.org/en/publication/16673/agriculture-andfuture-climate-latin-america-and-caribbean-systemic-impacts-and 15 p.; accessed: February 2018.
..... 184 The CARIBSAVE Partnership: Climate Change Impacts & Tourism Anna Agosta G’meiner Anna Agosta G'meiner is a fourth year student double majoring in Environmental Policy & Practice and Physical Geography at the University of Toronto.
Her areas of interest include the impacts of climate change in the Caribbean region, paleoreconstruction of sea level changes, and effective policy implementation in SIDS.
At the University of Toronto, she has done research on Red Spruce distribution in the Appalachian Mountains, and more recently on paleo sea level changes in the Caribbean region during the Quaternary period.
Anna also completed a summer internship at The CARIBSAVE Partnership in Barbados where she provided research assistance to the CARIBSAVE's Climate Change Risk Atlas Project.
This project, as well as her previous research, will be used to further her studies at the Masters level, focusing on developing a greater understanding of the social, economic and physical capacity and constraints that the Caribbean region faces in adapting to climate change.
Introduction The purpose of this paper is to introduce a work placement opportunity which was undertaken in Barbados, in the summer of 2011, through the Centre for the Environment ENV440H Professional Work Experience Course at the University of Toronto.
This course is an opportunity for students with interests in the Caribbean region, climate change research, and the intersection of tourism, livelihoods and the environment to gain greater knowledge and understandings in these fields.
I will be discussing my personal experience during this work placement, as the first intern to complete a placement with The CARIBSAVE Partnership.
I will also briefly discuss issues relevant to climate change impacts and tourism.
Introduction to the CARIBSAVE Partnership I conducted my summer work placement at The CARIBSAVE Partnership (CaribSave), a not for profit nongovernmental organization (NGO), created in 2008 as a partnership between the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (5Cs) and Oxford University, with the regional office and headquarters ANA AGOSTA G’MEINER | THE CARIBSAVE PARTNERSHIP 185 located in Hastings, Barbados since June 2010 (CaribSave 2011).
CaribSave was created to address several environmental issues.
As it is defined within its goals and mission statement, CaribSave seeks to address the challenges surrounding climate change, tourism, the environment, economic development, and community livelihoods across the Caribbean Basin (CaribSave 2011).
Their research focuses on the climate change impacts on the tourism industry and its adaptive capacity, since tourism is the major economic activity in the region (Hillman and D’Agostino 2009).
CaribSave seeks to build adaptive capacity in Caribbean countries, primarily by providing invaluable information in several key sectors (such as disaster management, gender equality, and biodiversity) affected by climate change to policy makers (Agosta G’meiner 2011, CaribSave 2011).
CaribSave addresses several gaps including: primary research on sea-level rise and livelihoods, poverty & gender, making updated information and knowledge available to regional governments, building technical and human resources in the region, and implementation of recommendations at the community level (Agosta G’meiner 2011, CaribSave 2011).
The organizational structure of CaribSave is complex since it is a multi-locational organization.
The headquarters are in Barbados, with a staff comprising of the regional coordinator and regional administrator, along with 5 to 7 staff members (depending on the project), which make up the regional technical team.
An office is also located in Kent, United Kingdom (UK), where the human resources department is, and where most of the administrative tasks take place.
The CEO and several head research scientists are also in the UK, at Oxford University.
Several research assistants and project officers can be found in Trinidad, Jamaica, Belize, Canada, Germany and Switzerland (CaribSave 2011).
The staff is passionate about their work, and there is a laid back but highly productive atmosphere in the regional headquarters.
CaribSave is funded completely through international donors, international funding agencies, and development partners, mainly solicited through proposal applications.
Previous funders include CCCCC, Oxford University, DfID, AusAID, IDB, UNEP, and ACS (CaribSave 2011).
Placement Activities The nature of my placement activities was to provide research, writing and technical support to the CaribSave Climate Change Risk Atlas (CCCRA) project, as well as writing funding proposals for small CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2012 186 projects.
The main project I worked on was the Phase I of the CCCRA, which has an expected completion date of March 2012.
My main task consisted of writing a draft report for the Belize Water Sector, which included doing extensive secondary research.
I also helped project managers with various tasks when needed, and had the opportunity to take part in a Livelihoods, Gender, Poverty, and Development (LGPD) Mission to St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
These missions were undertaken by CaribSave staff in fifteen Caribbean countries associated with the CCCRA project in order to collect primary research on the impacts of climate change to LGPD.
Regional Setting The Caribbean region consists of hundreds of islands and cays belonging to approximately 34 country groupings, as well as 12 continental countries with Caribbean coastlines and islands (CARICOM 2011).
These islands vary considerably in size and are made up of mainly the upper parts of a submerged chain of volcanic mountains, as well as some coral islands that have been tectonically uplifted (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).
There are several geological formations found throughout the region.
These include igneous and metamorphic rocks, karst, coastal sedimentary plains, and fossilized coral formations (Ibid).
These formations result in the varying landscapes that can be found in the region; high rugged mountains often covered with dense evergreen rain forests, hilly countryside and high plateaus from sloping mountains, karst terrain and corral terraces, and coastal plains usually on the southern or western sides of mountains (Ibid).
Rugged coastlines can be found with many inlets containing white or dark sands (Fig.
1).
There are also active volcanoes in the region, most notably on the island of Dominica.
Fig.
1: White sand beach in Barbados and Grape Vine trees in the foreground.
Source: author’s collection 2010.
ANA AGOSTA G’MEINER | THE CARIBSAVE PARTNERSHIP 187 Tourism in the Caribbean Context and Climate Vulnerabilities Tourism resources in the Caribbean region, the main example being the climate itself, are all sensitive to climatic changes.
The region has done so well as a tourist destination because it has pristine beaches, a balmy 30 degrees Celsius average annual temperature, and thriving marine and terrestrial ecosystems.
These systems often have a very slow response time, and thus any damage to them brought on by hydro-meteorological events (such as hurricanes, tropical storms, tropical waves, flooding, and windstorms) or changes in sea level or sea temperature are severe and lasting (Fig.
2 and Fig.
3) (Hillman and D’Agostino 2009; Pulwarty et al.
2010).
Fig.
2: Bottom Bay Beach in Barbados, June 2010.
Fig.
3: Bottom Bay Beach in Barbados, after the passage of Hurricane Tomas in October 2010.
Source author’s collection 2010 and 2011 respectively.
Of importance, as mentioned above, is the high vulnerability of the Caribbean region to changes in sea level.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) lists various ways in which changes in sea levels could adversely affect small island states such as those found in the Caribbean region.
These include, but are not limited to: intrusion of saltwater into freshwater aquifers, degradation of coastal areas, beach sand erosion, and an increase in large storm surges from increased sea surface temperatures.
All are possibilities which could lead to coastal degradation.
The importance of coastal degradation is further put into perspective when applying this to the economy of the region.
Tourism is the driving economic force in many Caribbean countries (Mimura et al.
2007; Hillman and D’Agostino 2009).
In most CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2012 188 Caribbean islands, tourism accounts for 20 to 70 percent of total employment (the higher percentages often found on the smaller islands), and can generate upward of 50 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the smaller islands (Hillman and D’Agostino 2009).
Any sea level change would cause massive destruction of coastal environments such as sand beaches, corals, mangroves, and waterfront establishments which would negatively impact the economy.
Of importance to note is that tourism is also the main contributor of carbon related emissions in the region, particularly due to air conditioning systems and transportation (air, land, and water) (Clayton 2009).
For this reason, many initiatives have been undertaken, or are underway, in order to green this dominant sector of the economy.
There have been noted successes, particularly in Costa Rica and Belize, although many other Caribbean islands have been lauded for their contributions to greening the tourism sector, particularly Jamaica, Barbados, and Dominica (CTO 2011).
The highest number of Green Globe certifications in the Americas can be found in the Caribbean region, with over 150 hotels and attractions carrying the Green Globe international standard for sustainability stamp (Green Globe 2011).
Although there have been noted successes, there are still thousands of hotels, attractions and transportation systems which have not achieved high levels of sustainability.
The hopes of Caribbean economies increasingly rest on a strong and resilient tourism economy, however many countries and companies in the region do not have the means to create a sustainable tourism sector.
Conclusion It is due to these complex and inter-related issues that CaribSave has dedicated itself to addressing the challenges surrounding climate change, tourism, the environment, economic development, and community livelihoods across the Caribbean Basin.
These are important issues which require extensive research in order to comprehend their interconnectedness.
This understanding is also important so as to develop and implement policies that provide adaptive capacities to climate change, as well as allowing un-obstructed participation in the decision making process at all levels, particularly those of affected local communities.
CaribSave is well adapted to succeed in its environment.
ANA AGOSTA G’MEINER | THE CARIBSAVE PARTNERSHIP 189 Works Cited Agosta G’meiner, A.
2011.
Personal notes from summer placement at The CARIBSAVE Partnership.
Hastings, Barbados.
Annual Report for CaribSave.
2010.
Annual Report 2010 (not published).
PDF File.
Caribbean Community Secretariat (CARICOM), 2011.
CARICOM Regional statistics [online].
Available at www.caricom.org [Last accessed 08 April 2011] Clayton, A.
2009.
Climate change and tourism: the implications for the Caribbean.
In Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes, Vol.
1(3), pg.
212-230.
Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO).
2011.
The official tourism business website of the CTO [online].
Available at: http://www.onecaribbean.org/ [Last accessed 09 January 2012] Green Globe.
2011.
The International Standard for Sustainability – Home page and Members page [online].
Available at: http://greenglobe.com/ [Last Accessed 09 January 2012] Hillman, R.S., and T.J. D’Agostino.
2009.
Understanding the contemporary Caribbean (2nd eds.).
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. IPCC.
2007.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Parry, M. L., O. F. Canziani, J. P. Palutikof, P. J. van der Linden and C. E. Hanson, (eds.
), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp.
7-22.
Meditz, S.W., Hanratty, D.M.
(Eds), 1987.
Caribbean Islands: A Country Study.
Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress [online].
Available at http://countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/ [Last accessed 08 April 2011] Mimura, N., Nurse, L, McLean, R.F., Agard, J., Briguglio, L., Lefale, P., Payet, R., Sem, G., 2007: Small islands.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group http://www.caricom.org/ http://www.onecaribbean.org/ http://greenglobe.com/ http://countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/ CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2012 190 II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L.
Parry, O.F.
Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J.
van der Linden and C.E.
Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 687-716.
Pulwarty, R.S, Nurse, L.A. and U.O.
Trotz.
2010.
Caribbean Islands in a Changing Climate.
In Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, Vol.
52(6), pg.
16-27.
The CARIBSAVE Partnership (CaribSave).
2011.
Official website [online].
Available at http://www.caribsave.org/ [Last accessed 10 December 2011] http://www.caribsave.org/
por_035.fm 96 Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author FROM THE CONFERENCE MELT ING ICE—A HOT TOPIC?
Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic—Nordic perspectives Philip A. Wookey School of Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK.
E-mail: philip.wookey@stir.ac.uk This paper is based upon a presentation given on United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) World Environment Day, 5 June 2007, as part of the Nordic Perspectives session of the climate change conference Melting Ice—A Hot Topic?
The broad aims of this paper are to define biodiversity and ecosystem services, to set the biodiversity of the Arctic terrestrial realm into its global context, and, through the use of case studies, to illustrate how environmental change can influence biodiversity and ecosystems, and to explore what the implications of these changes might be.
A comprehensive treatment of the topic is well beyond the scope of both the presentation and this paper, but the reader is directed to the CAFF (2001) and ACIA (2005) reports for reviews and synthesis.
Biodiversity and ecosystem services Biodiversity is defined as The variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia , terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are a part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.
(Article 2, Convention on Biological Diversity 1992) This presentation focuses upon terrestrial biodiversity, but a key point to emphasize in the definition is that biodiversity includes “diversity within species” and “of ecosystems”.
So biodiversity cannot be used interchangeably with “species richness” (numbers of species).
In the Arctic the diversity within species can be very great, and CAFF (2001: 49) notes that “genetic, morphological and behavioural diversity may be especially significant components of biodiversity”; this assumes even greater significance in the Arctic, where species richness is often low compared with communities and ecosystems from temperate and tropical environments.
Biodiversity is fundamental to the provision of “ecosystem services”, and these are defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as The conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfil human life.
Examples include provision of clean water, maintenance of liveable climates (carbon sequestration), pollination of crops and native vegetation, and fulfilment of people’s cultural, spiritual, intellectual needs.
(FAO 2005) Note that the term “ecosystem services” is anthropocentric, and refers to services to Humankind.
So, in essence, when we talk of ecosystem services this is a utilitarian view of life on Earth, but it does provide a basic foundation for an assessment of the value of biodiversity to people, and as such has some worth.
In the context of the Arctic terrestrial realm, ecosystem services that are straightforward to recognize include (i) the provision of food and fodder (e.g., for reindeer herders and their animals in the Nordic and Russian contexts), (ii) fuel and fibre (the latter including animal and plant products), (iii) a sense of cultural and spiritual identity, (iv) the maintenance of fundamental ecosystem services (such as photosynthesis, decomposition and nutrient recycling), (v) a clear link to the global climate system and biogeochemical cycles, (vi) the provision of genetic resources and (vii) a clear link with service industries such as the tourism sector.
In relation to (v), the Arctic is profoundly important in the global energy budget (with snow cover, and the forest– tundra ecotone, assuming great importance in terms of albedo and surface roughness effects).
In terms of genetic resources (vi), cold-adapted organisms (particularly micro-organisms) are likely to have major potential for development of therapeutic or pharmaceutical products, and soils and sediments undoubtedly represent major reservoirs of genetic diversity in the Arctic terrestrial realm (as indicated by the work of Torsvik et al.
2002).
doi:10.1111/j.1751-8369.2007.00035.x P. A. Wookey Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author 97 Arctic terrestrial biodiversity in context Set against this background of the role of biodiversity for ecosystem services in the Arctic, and emphasizing the point that biodiversity includes within-species and among-ecosystem diversity, a tacit generalization can be made that biodiversity is low in the Arctic (at least among higher plants and vertebrates: see Table 1).
The results of Rannie (1986), Chernov (1989, 1995) and Matveyeva & Chernov (2000) show a clear inverse relationship, for example, between mean July temperature and the biodiversity of vascular plant species, nesting birds, ground beetles and day butterflies across transects in Canada and Russia.
The logical conclusion from this is that warming should increase biodiversity (at least in the long term).
But this is likely to be a gross oversimplification, particularly bearing in mind the predicted rapid rates of climate change (especially for the Arctic landmasses), and the other drivers of change superimposed upon climate; this is an issue that will be raised again in due course.
Some specialist “Arctic” species may, however, be lost (e.g., of the plants, some “euarctic” components, currently widespread in the northern part of the Arctic tundra zone, and hyperarctic species of the northern tundra, polar deserts and semi-deserts, may be especially vulnerable; see Callaghan et al.
2005).
This partly reflects the likely northern shift in life zones, and an overall contraction of the tundra biome.
Plants, animals and microorganisms are also likely to respond differentially to change (because of contrasting life histories, generation times and dispersal mechanisms), resulting in the advent of “novel” communities for which there are no contemporary analogues.
Although interspecific diversity is generally low in the Arctic, some taxa are proportionally well-represented in the Arctic terrestrial biota (Table 1), in particular in the cryptogams (spore-producing plants; specifically the algae, lichens and mosses) and soil invertebrates such as the collembola (springtails) (CAFF 2001; ACIA 2005).
The diversity of soil microorganisms in Norwegian tundra and Arctic desert (Svalbard) soils also compares favourably with arable and pasture soils (Torsvik et al.
2002).
Indeed for Arctic terrestrial ecosystems the soil is undoubtedly the largest reservoir of biodiversity and genetic capital, although this situation is unlikely to be unique among terrestrial ecosystems.
Soil biodiversity is, in ecosystem terms, as important as plant biodiversity, and in terms of energy flows and material recycling there are internal recycling processes (where Fig.
1 A general model of a terrestrial ecosystem.
The three component subsystems (plant, herbivore and decomposer) are shown, together with their component parts.
The major transfers of material are denoted by arrows, whereas organic matter pools are shown within rectangles, and inorganic pools are shown within “clouds”.
Note, in particular, that a key raw material for photosynthesis (carbon dioxide [CO 2 ]) is returned to the atmosphere principally by the decomposer organisms (this is certainly the case in the Arctic), and that “mineral” nutrients are also made available to plants by the decomposers (although there is growing evidence that plants may “bypass” this process and take up amino acids, for example, directly from the soil, or via mycorrhizas).
Note, also, the internal recycling within the decomposition subsystem: this is an aspect of internal biocomplexity that is not matched directly within the plant and herbivore subsystems.
Furthermore, we know very little indeed of soil biodiversity in most Arctic terrestrial ecosystems, in spite of the significance of the decomposition subsystem to ecosystem processes and properties (including carbon sequestration in soil organic matter and permafrost).
Figure redrawn from Swift et al.
(1979).
Carnivore 2Carnivore 1Herbivore Detritus Decomposers CO2 Inorganic nutrients Plant subsystem Herbivore subsystem Decomposition subsystem Recycling Table 1 Biodiversity estimates in terms of species richness (numbers of species) within selected groups for the Arctic terrestrial realm north of the latitudinal treeline, and their percentage of the terrestrial total globally.
Modified from CAFF (2001) and ACIA (2005).
“Other groups” includes amphibians and reptiles (seven species), centipedes (10 species), terrestrial molluscs (three species), oligochaetes (earthworms and enchytraeid worms; 70 species) and nematodes (ca.
500 species).
Group Arctic species numbers Arctic % of total Insects 3300 0.4 Mites 700 1.9 Springtails 400 6.0 Spiders 300 1.7 Birds 240 2.9 Mammals 75 1.7 Other groups 600 – Fungi 2500 2.3 Lichens 2000 11.0 Flowering plants 1735 0.7 Algae 1200 3.3 Mosses 600 4.1 Liverworts 250 2.5 Ferns 62 0.6 Conifers 12 1.6 98 Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic P. A. Wookey Fig.
2 Schematic diagram of the annual pattern of environmental variables and net photosynthesis at Barrow, Alaska.
Barrow has a climate classified as just within the High Arctic zone.
The period of net photosynthesis is highlighted by the dashed box.
Notice how snow cover lasts through until June, at a time when solar radiation inputs are at a peak and are soon to decline.
Earlier snowmelt is likely to increase phytomass and accelerate plant reproductive phenology.
Later senescence may result from later autumn freeze-up, although light may be limiting, and senescence may be triggered by changes in light quality (From Chapin and Shaver, 1985 reprinted with permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers and from the author.)
Fig.
3 A schematic diagram showing a mesotopographic gradient for the Arctic that includes five habitats: dry, mesic (zonal), wetland, snowbed and streamside vegetation.
The landscape heterogeneity here, associated with the presence of a snowbed, increases habitat diversity and thus biodiversity.
Asynchronous melting of snowbeds through the thaw period maintains the availability of newly-emerged high-quality food for herbivores over space and time.
Earlier thawing of snowbeds has the potential to reduce habitat diversity.
Redrawn from Walker (2000).
2 2 1 4a 3 4b 55 Late-melting Snow drift Prevailing wind 1.
Dry exposed ridges 2.
Mesic zonal sites 3.
Wet meadows 4.
Snowbeds a. well-drained, early -melting b. poorly -drained, late-melting 5.
Streamside sites decomposer organisms themselves die, and are decomposed in turn by others) which confer a complexity to the decomposer subsystem that is frequently overlooked in discussions of biodiversity and environmental change (Fig.
1).
Environmental change in the Arctic is multifaceted Environmental change in the Arctic is multifaceted, and organisms respond both directly and indirectly to these changes.
Climate change is just one of several environmental change “drivers”, alongside the ongoing changes in atmospheric composition themselves (e.g., increasing CO 2 concentrations; increasing deposition of airborne Nand S-containing contaminants; and stratospheric ozone depletion resulting in greater UVB fluxes at the surface), and direct anthropogenic disturbance (e.g., for transport infrastructure, fossil fuel and mineral extraction, forestry, tourism and hydropower generation).
Because environmental changes of contrasting rate, magnitude and geographical extent are all occurring simultaneously in the Arctic, and organisms will respond differentially to these changes, there are serious challenges involved in attempting to predict how biodiversity, communities and ecosystems will respond to change.
And we cannot always rely with confidence on the lessons of history (“the past as a key to the future”; see Adams & Woodward 1992) because changes are occurring for which there are no analogues in the palaeoenvironmental or palaeoecological records.
P. A. Wookey Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author 99 But what are the effects of warming?
However, setting this issue aside, even in the case of climate warming it is by no means straightforward to predict the impacts on terrestrial ecosystems.
In an Arctic context, landscape heterogeneity and the role of the cryosphere are potentially significant “modifiers” of the effects of warming on ecosystems.
Figure 2, for example, shows the potential for earlier snowmelt in tundra regions to have a major impact on plant phenology and photosynthesis resulting from the availability of substantial fluxes of photosynthetically active radiation (PAR) around the summer solstice (when solar elevations are high).
Later autumn freeze-up may also result in delayed plant senescence.
But earlier snowmelt may also have negative, or counterintuitive, consequences.
In complex landscapes, where snow is redistributed from wind-exposed areas to hollows and depressions, early snowmelt may cause a reduction of habitat heterogeneity caused by the loss of snowbeds.
Snowbed “specialists” (e.g., the moss Kiaeria starkei ) may not be able to survive the change in physical environmental conditions, or increased competition.
Furthermore, earlier melting of snowbeds may also have negative consequences for herbivores if it means that the availability of high-quality forage (associated with new growth) is temporally “compressed” earlier into the summer; in this respect, complex landscapes, with a mosaic of vegetation communities and late-melting snowbeds, might offer newly-emerged high-quality food for herbivores throughout a growing season (Fig.
3) (Björk & Molau 2007).
The effects of experimental warming on both Arctic and alpine tundra ecosystems has been investigated by the team of scientists from ITEX (the International Tundra Experiment).
This experiment was launched, in concept, in 1990, and soon after was established at 28 sites in the tundra biome.
The broad geographical coverage and international participation were seen as important components of the original set-up, in recognition that plants in contrasting parts of their geographical range might respond differently to the same change in temperature (Fig.
4).
Initially, ITEX focused upon the phenological and growth responses of a set of broadly circumpolar Arctic and alpine vascular plant species (see e.g., Fig.
5) to experimental warming (achieved by using small hexagonal open-topped chambers [OTCs]), designed to simulate the greenhouse effect.
The OTCs generally produced a near-surface warming of around 1–3 ° C above the ambient temperatures for control (unwarmed) plots.
After several years (up to four) of the experiment, the data from 13 of the sites was subjected to meta-analysis to test whether any generalizations could be made regarding geographical contrasts in responses to warming, as well as contrasts relating to plant functional type (e.g., deciduous vs. evergreen dwarf shrubs, forbs and graminoids).
This meta-analysis (Arft et al.
1999) demonstrated the sensitivity of tundra plants to warming, and identified differential responses among contrasting growth forms and among contrasting regions (High Arctic; Low Arctic; alpine).
With regards to the current presentation, however, the subsequent ITEX work on community (as opposed to individual plant) responses to warming (Walker et al.
2006) provides data to suggest that some plant growth forms (specifically lichens and bryophytes) do badly in warmer conditions (Figs.
6, 7).
This may be the result of shading by plant functional types that respond particularly vigorously to warming (e.g., deciduous dwarf shrubs such as the dwarf birch [ Betula nana ]), or to competition for nutrients, or to factors such as surface drying (a possible artefact of the OTCs).
Diversity and evenness indices all decreased significantly with Fig.
4 This schematic diagram illustrates the performance of a plant species (in terms of net primary productivity [NPP]) across a gradient of temperature (which could be expressed as mean temperatures over a growing season, or as some other metric of thermal energy availability, e.g., growing degree days, or in the case of tundra plants thawing degree days, representing accumulated “thermal time”).
Increasing temperature in tundra ecosystems will co-vary with other abiotic factors (e.g., precipitation or depth of the active layer) and also with biotic factors, such as intensity of competition or herbivory.
Intensity of competition (e.g., for light or soil nutrients) is likely to increase from the extreme polar deserts and alpine fellfields to the more closed tundras of the Low Arctic and midto low alpine (perhaps leading to a skewed NPP curve, with values dropping more steeply at the warmer end of the distribution as a result of competition interactions).
Note that, according to this scheme, a given temperature increase ( ∆ T ) could produce quite different outcomes depending on where in the species’ range the warming occurs.
Thus, warming at the colder end of the distribution could markedly improve plant performance, whereas towards the warmer end of the distribution increased respiratory demands, or intensity of competition, could reduce NPP to the extent that the species dies out, or is forced out, of the community.
Temperature/position in range P ro ce ss r a te North South NPP Intensity of competition/ Influence of ‘invasive’ species 100 Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic P. A. Wookey Fig.
5 Some of the vascular plant species studied as part of ITEX (Arft et al.
1999; Walker et al.
2006).
(a) Saxifraga oppositifolia (purple saxifrage), (b) Silene acaulis (moss campion), (c) Dryas octopetala ssp.
octopetala (mountain aven) and (d) Cassiope tetragona (Arctic bell heather).
(d) (c) (a) (b) Fig.
7 Response of tundra plant community variables to experimental warming in ITEX.
The symbols represent the mean effect size based on the meta-statistic “Hedges D ” (the normalized difference between experimental and control means adjusted for sample size), and the lines give 95% confidence intervals.
The effect sizes for canopy height, ordination scores and diversity indices were all considered “moderate” by meta-analysis convention.
Note the general increase in height of vascular plants (triangles), the significant increases in shrubs, deciduous shrubs and litter cover, and the decreases in both lichen and bryophyte cover (circles) and diversity indices (diamonds).
(From Walker et al.
2006; reprinted with permission from the authors, copyright 2006 National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.) Fig.
6 ITEX sites contributing to the Walker et al.
(2006) meta-analysis of plant community responses to experimental warming.
(From Walker et al.
2006; reprinted with permission from the authors, copyright 2006 National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.) P. A. Wookey Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author 101 Fig.
8 Environs of the Agricultural Research Institute research station near Akureyri, north Iceland, with ice-layer formation in the foreground.
Damage to perennial grasses resulting from anoxia beneath the ice cover can be very severe during “mild” winters.
(Photograph by permission of Bjarni E. Gu leifsson.
)ð warming, and the results strongly suggest that biodiversity might decrease (at least in the short term) in response to warming.
The other notable results were that tundra plant communities exhibited detectable responses to warming over time periods of only three to four years, and the significant “winners” were the deciduous shrubs, with increases both in percentage cover and in height (Fig.
7) (see also Sturm, Racine & Tape (2001).
The observation that lichens are adversely affected by experimental manipulations simulating climate change impacts (including the addition of mineral nutrients to simulate more rapid decomposition processes) has also been observed by Cornelissen et al.
(2001), so this result seems robust and consistent.
So, the effects of climate warming on tundra ecosystems are by no means straightforward to predict, and a criticism that has been levelled at programmes such as ITEX is that it might have placed too much weight on summer warming effects (whereas the general circulation models of the Earth’s climate suggest that winter warming will be of much greater magnitude in the polar regions).
Warmer winters in a cold environment might be expected to be beneficial for the biota, but again there are data from the Arctic suggesting the converse.
Aanes et al.
(2000) and Yoccoz & Imms (1999) have data from Svalbard showing that both Svalbard reindeer ( Rangifer tarandus platyrhynchus ) and sibling voles ( Microtus rossiaemeridionalis ) have undergone population crashes during winters with freezing rain.
This is likely to result from the formation of ice layers in the snowpack (which reindeer cannot penetrate for foraging), or the collapse of the subnivean space beneath the snowpack.
Such examples are not restricted to Svalbard.
Indeed in the Nordic context, milder winters with increased incidence of freezing and thawing cycles may have serious implications for summer pasture systems with perennial grasses (Fig.
8), as well as for natural ecosystems (see, for example, Robinson et al.
1998).
The Arctic is not isolated In contrast to the views of many people living in industrialized regions to the south, the Arctic is not isolated neither, biologically, climatically nor socio-economically.
Migratory animals provide clear examples of the linkages between the Arctic and lower latitudes, and strong climatic teleconnections (e.g., between the North Atlantic Oscillation, Arctic Oscillation and the El Niño–Southern Oscillation) are evident, as are their biological consequences (e.g., Aanes et al.
2002; Post & Forchhammer 2004; Forchhammer et al.
2005).
Events and policy outside the Arctic often have a clear impact within the Arctic, even if this was unintentional.
The European Union FRAGILE project (Fragility of Arctic goose habitat: impacts of land use, conservation, and elevated temperature) highlights this, as does the example of snow geese in North America.
The numbers of several species of goose that breed in Svalbard in the summer, but that migrate to western Europe to overwinter, have increased dramatically in the last 40 years (with a 30-fold increase in barnacle geese [ Branta leucopsis ] and a fourfold increase in pink-footed geese [ Anser brachyrhynchus ]).
Changes in land use and hunting practice in the overwintering areas (both linked with socio-economic and/or political decisions) have resulted in rapid increases in winter survivorship, whereas earlier melt-out in the breeding areas may be responsible for increased breeding success (Cooper et al.
2004).
Research to determine the impacts of the increased grazing intensity and climate change on the vegetation communities and ecosystem processes of the breeding areas in Svalbard is ongoing.
This interplay between climate change drivers and socio-economic/ political drivers of change demonstrates clearly the linkages between climate, wildlife and society, and these linkages extend across thousands of kilometres.
Conclusions • The Arctic biota has been subject to dramatic environmental change during the last 2.5 million years, but ongoing and predicted change is rapid and very different.
• Conventional wisdom suggests that biodiversity should increase with warming in the medium to long term, but the tundra biome is increasingly “compressed” between the Boreal zone and the Arctic Ocean.
102 Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic P. A. Wookey • Many species and habitats in the Arctic are potentially highly vulnerable to change.
• Rates of change are so rapid that “novel” assemblages of organisms will develop, and we know very little of how these will function, or of the possible role of “invasive” species.
• Like it or not, the Arctic and its organisms and communities are set to provide an early detection system of the impacts of environmental change on planet Earth.
Acknowledgements Many thanks to the Norwegian Polar Institute, the Nordic Council of Ministers and the United Nations Environment Programme for the opportunity to speak on World Environment Day.
I would also like to thank my colleagues in the International Tundra Experiment (ITEX) and the Circum-Arctic Terrestrial Biodiversity Initiative (CAT-B; supported by the International Arctic Science Committee) for their insights, enthusiasm and support over the years.
References Aanes R., Sæther B.-E. & Øritsland N.A.
2000.
Fluctuations of an introduced population of Svalbard reindeer: the effects of density dependence and climatic variation.
Ecography 23 , 437–443.
Aanes R., Sæther B.-E., Smith F.M., Cooper E.J., Wookey P.A.
& Øritsland N.A.
2002.
The Arctic Oscillation predicts effects of climate change in two trophic levels in a High-Arctic ecosystem.
Ecology Letters 5 , 445–453.
ACIA (Arctic Impact Climate Assessment) 2005.
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment—scientific report .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Adams J.M.
& Woodward F.I.
1992.
The past as a key to the future—the use of paleoenvironmental understanding to predict the effects of man on the biosphere.
Advances in Ecological Research 22 , 257–314.
Arft A.M., Walker M.D., Gurevitch J., Alatalo J.M., Bret-Harte M.S., Dale M., Diemer M., Gugerli F., Henry G.H.R., Jones M.H., Hollister R.D., Jónsdóttir I.S., Laine K., Lévesque R., Marion G.M., Molau U., Mølgaard P., Nordenhäll U., Raszhivin V., Robinson C.H., Starr G., Stenström A., Stenström M., Totland Ø., Turner P.L., Walker L.J., Webber P.J., Welker J.M.
& Wookey P.A.
1999.
Responses of tundra plants to experimental warming: Meta-analysis of the International Tundra Experiment.
Ecological Monographs 69 , 491– 511.
Björk R.G.
& Molau U.
2007.
Ecology of alpine snowbeds and the impact of global change.
Arctic, Antarctic and Alpine Research 39 , 34–43.
CAFF (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna) 2001.
Arctic flora and fauna: status and conservation .
Helsinki: Edita.
Callaghan T.V., Björn L.O., Chapin F.S.
III, Chernov Y., Christensen T.R., Huntley B., Ims R., Johansson M., Riedlinger D.J., Jonasson S., Matveyeva N., Oechel W., Panikov N. & Shaver G. 2005.
Arctic tundra and polar desert ecosystems.
In ACIA (C. Symon et al.
[eds.
]): Arctic Climate Impact Assessment—scientific report .
Pp 243–352.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapin III F.S.
& Shaver G.R.
1985.
Arctic.
In B.F. Chabot & H.A.
Mooney (eds.
): Physiological Ecology of North American Plant Communities .
Pp 16–40.
New York: Chapman and Hall.
Chernov Y.I.
1989.
Heat conditions and Arctic biora.
Ekologiya 2 , 49–57 (in Russian).
Chernov Y.I.
1995.
Diversity of the Arctic terrestrial fauna.
In F.S.
Chapin III & C. Körner (eds.).
Arctic and Alpine Biodiversity: Patterns, Causes and Ecosystem Consequences.
Ecological Studies 113 , 81–95.
Convention on Biological Diversity 1992.
Accessed on the internet at http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.
shtml on 25 June 2007. Cooper E., Jónsdóttir I.S., Chaput D., Kuijper D., Loonen M., Pahud A., Sjögersten S., Ubels R., van der Wal R., Woodin S. & Huiskes A.
2004.
Climate change and goose grazing on Svalbard’s tundra.
ACIA International Symposium on Climate Change in the Arctic.
9–12 November, Reykjavik, Iceland.
Cornelissen J.H.C., Callaghan T.V., Alatalo J.M., Michelsen A., Graglia E., Hartley A.E., Hik D.S., Hobbie S.E., Press M.C., Robinson C.H., Henry G.H.R., Shaver G.R., Phoenix G.K., Jones D.G., Jonasson S., Chapin F.S., Molau U., Neill C., Lee J.A., Melillo J.M., Sveinbjörnsson B.
& Aerts R. 2001.
Global change and Arctic ecosystems: is lichen decline a function of increases in vascular plant biomass?
Journal of Ecology 89 , 984–994.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) 2005.
Ecosystem services.
Accessed on the internet at http://www.fao.org/ag/ wfe2005/glossary_en.htm on 25 June 2007.
Forchhammer M.C., Post E., Berg T.B.G., Hoye T.T.
& Schmidt N.M. 2005.
Local-scale and short-term herbivore–plant spatial dynamics reflect influences of large-scale climate.
Ecology 86 , 2644–2651.
Matveyeva N. & Chernov Y.
2000.
Biodiversity of terrestrial ecosystems.
In M. Nutall & T.V.
Callaghan (eds.
): The Arctic: Environment, People, Policy .
Pp 233–274.
Hardwood Academic Publishers.
Post E. & Forchhammer M.C.
2004.
Spatial synchrony of local populations has increased in association with the recent Northern Hemisphere climate trend.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) 101 , 9286–9290.
Rannie W.F.
1986.
Summer air-temperature and number of vascular species in Arctic Canada.
Arctic 39 , 133–137.
Robinson C.H., Wookey P.A., Lee J.A., Callaghan T.V.
& Press M.C.
1998.
Plant community responses to simulated environmental change at a High Arctic polar semi-desert.
Ecology 79 , 856–866.
Sturm M., Racine C. & Tape K. 2001.
Increasing shrub abundance in the Arctic.
Nature 411 , 546–547.
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention http://www.fao.org/ag/ P. A. Wookey Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic Polar Research 26 2007 96–103 © 2007 The Author 103 Swift M.J., Heal O.W.
& Anderson J.M.
1979.
Decomposition in terrestrial ecosystems .
Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Torsvik V.L., Øvreås L. & Frede Thingstad T. 2002.
Prokaryotic diversity—magnitude, dynamics and controlling factors.
Science 296 , 1064–1066.
Walker D.A.
2000.
Hierarchical subdivision of Arctic tundra based on vegetation response to climate, parent material and topography.
Global Change Biology 6 , 19–34.
Walker M.D., Wahren C.H., Hollister R.D., Henry G.H.R., Ahlquist L.E., Alatalo J.M., Bret-Harte M.S., Calef M.P., Callaghan T.V., Carroll A.B., Epstein H.E., Jónsdóttir I.S., Klein J.A., Magnússon B., Molau U., Oberbauer S.F., Rewa S.P., Robinson C.H., Shaver G.R., Suding K.N., Thompson C.C., Tolvanen A., Totland Ø., Turner P.L., Tweedie C.E., Webber P.J.
& Wookey P.A.
2006.
Plant community responses to experimental warming across the tundra biome.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) 103 , 1342–1346.
Yoccoz N.G.
& Imms R.A. 1999.
Demography of small mammals in cold regions: the importance of environmental variability.
In A. Hofgaard et al.
(eds.
): Animal responses to global change in the North .
Ecological Bulletin 47 , 137–144.
KEY EVENTS On November 26, 2021, Ms. Carol Dumaine, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council, presented Adapting to New Security Realities in a ClimateDisrupted World at the 2021 CASIS West Coast Security Conference.
The primary concepts of Ms. Dumaine’s presentation centered on how climate change and the global pandemic are becoming significant issues of national security, and how it is vital that our concept of national security be reframed to understand and address climate change as a security issue.
The presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives.
NATURE OF DISCUSSION Presentation Ms. Dumaine’s presentation focused on how the climate crisis poses new security realities that challenge traditional concepts of national security and how national security organizations need to look at the climate change challenge through broader frames.
A particular focus was how the climate crisis disproportionately affects the most vulnerable populations that are already impacted by economic inequality, conflict, and food insecurity.
Ms. Dumaine also discussed how the methods for addressing the climate change problem have centered on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) but stressed that their initiatives were not as successful as expected.
After highlighting the disadvantages of traditional frameworks to address climate change, Ms. Dumaine outlined alternative solutions to improve such frameworks.
ADAPTING TO NEW SECURITY REALITIES IN A CLIMATE-DISRUPTED WORLD Date: November 26, 2021 Disclaimer: This briefing note contains the encapsulation of views presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies.
Carol Dumaine 99 The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 4, Issue 3 Question Period The question period highlighted the issues posed by the lack of consensus on ‘security’ in the context of climate change and how climate change security conditions have changed.
The participation of younger generations in the climate debate was also discussed.
Breakout Room Discussion The breakout room discussion focused on the need to amend international refugee policy to account for the new climate challenges being faced around the world, as well as the need to develop an international forum to bring parties together to specifically look at climate acts.
The level of responsibility of the developed world to fight climate change was also discussed.
BACKGROUND Presentation Ms. Dumaine’s presentation began by highlighting how disasters such as the recent wildfires, heat waves, and flooding in British Columbia can have ripple effects across the globe and increase insecurity all over the world due to interconnected systems of public health, biodiversity, finances, and transportation, among others.
Although many people refer to the climate crisis and global pandemic as separate issues, Ms. Dumaine clarified that they are, in fact, related.
The rise in global temperature increases the likelihood of disease outbreaks and pandemics.
As can be seen with COVID-19, pandemics can exacerbate security related vulnerabilities, which weakens society’s capacity for resilience in the face of climate change.
For example, we are now seeing global economic contraction; millions of people’s education and work prospects derailed; hundreds of millions of people thrown into extreme poverty; reversal of international development gains; untold future public health effects and costs; greater vulnerabilities for women in low-income areas; and a widening wealth inequality.
These impacts are happening everywhere, but they are particularly afflicting the most vulnerable populations already impacted by economic inequality, conflict, and food insecurity.
The effects of climate change in the future are expected to be unimaginably worse.
Carol Dumaine 100 The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 4, Issue 3 At this point in the presentation, Ms. Dumaine emphasized the need for a new paradigm of global security cooperation that spans intergenerational needs, boundaries, and disciplines.
She stressed that this paradigm needs to recognize that we are already in an uncharted world of rapid environmental changes.
Moreover, she described climate change as a “threat multiplier,” in that climate change has amplified hardships all around the world.
However, national security is more focused on the consequences of the climate crisis and the need to respond, as opposed to the root causes.
Historically, national security has been viewed as state-centric threats and threats emanating outside of national boundaries; however, Ms. Dumaine argued that this concept is poorly suited to assess and confront a world of accelerating societally novel disruptions.
Failing to take a comprehensive view of the impacts of climate change on security is leading to underestimations of risk.
For instance, sea level rise, the impact on the global food chain and spread of invasive species, and the rise of heat related disease and deaths will increasingly impact the stability of the economies of individual nations and the global economy.
To get a good handle on what is needed for the future, we need to look into the Earth’s distant past to gain some insight.
Unfortunately, there remains a poorly understood temporal aspect regarding climate change impacts.
As a result, we fail to see the immediate threat of seemingly gradual change when, in fact, greenhouse gas emissions have occurred on an unprecedentedly rapid timeline.
Traditional security thinking may also fail to see the irreversibility of climate changes once certain tipping points are crossed.
Scientists warn that a 1.5degree Celsius rise in global temperature is the greatest threat to global public health, which will be impossible to reverse.
Ms. Dumaine noted that the current method for addressing these problems have centred around the UNFCCC, but global carbon dioxide emissions are now about 60% higher than they were when the UNFCCC started.
Research by climate scientists has found that a key impediment to successful climate mitigation over the last three decades is the pervasive failure to question many of the core tenets of modern industrialized societies.
Traditional national security doctrine, priorities, and operations have not evolved to meet this kind of challenge.
Ms. Dumaine emphasized that the traditional geopolitical framing is so narrow that it will miss most security-related implications of climate change, including its immediacy as a threat.
However, some of the potential frameworks that Carol Dumaine 101 The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 4, Issue 3 could help anticipate the security-related consequences of climate change would encompass ecological security, global public health, intergenerational security, Indigenous knowledge cultures, and palaeoclimatology.
Such reframing compels us to ask: whose security protection gets priority over others’ security protection and why?
What does national security seek to protect and defend in a climate change-disrupted age?
And who decides what “security” means in these unprecedented times?
To conclude, Ms. Dumaine stressed that we require a better understanding of the root causes, effects, and influences of this crisis.
Disinformation that hinders public awareness and climate crisis readiness has security-related implications that must be made explicit in a reframing of national security.
Necessary adaptations include educational initiatives to emphasize Earth systems science and climate literacy in traditional security; public safety and public health analysis and planning; and methods for more anticipatory assessment capabilities, which would use prehistoric geological epochs as baselines and employ systems and transdisciplinary thinking.
In addition, new security thinking would emphasize public transparency on the new security realities posed by pandemics and climate change in our globally interconnected world.
Question Period During the question and answer period, the audience highlighted that there is a lack of consensus on security in the context of climate change and asked what issues have been posed by this lack of consensus.
Ms. Dumaine stressed that there are many issues that are impacted by this lack of consensus, and we are long overdue to start considering these effects.
When pursuing climate change as a national security issue through a more traditional geopolitical lens, taking initiative or planning to ameliorate the circumstances of people caught in the midst of climate crises is often neglected.
There are many “spill-over” effects like this that exacerbate security as a whole but are often missed due to the narrow focus of the national security framework.
In order to better address the issue, this global level of analysis needs to coalesce outside the traditional security organizations.
Younger generations, along with the Global South and indigenous communities, need to engage the public by having a conversation that would shift views on whose security we are trying to defend.
Ms. Dumaine referred to the recent devastation caused by natural disasters in the Greater Vancouver area, noting that it is hard to imagine a foreign adversary causing such damage.
This draws attention to the clear Carol Dumaine 102 The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 4, Issue 3 security ramifications caused when a city or port is cut off from the rest of the country as a direct result of the climate crisis.
Ms. Dumaine also noted that human induced climate change is threatening the viability of human society and the diversity that makes the human economy possible, so now there is a much higher urgency to address it.
Over the past several decades, leading scientists from around the world have joined to provide a consensus opinion on climate change; however, the resulting opinion is too conservative compared to what is occurring empirically.
Additionally, because climate change has been so politicized, the focus on these issues in the security community has tended to wax and wane depending on the politics of the situation.
Breakout Room Discussion During the breakout session, a particular interest was placed on climate migrants and the failure of international law to recognize those displaced by climate as refugees.
Ms. Dumaine asserted that it is necessary to reimagine international refugee policies to account for the new challenges we are facing.
Current policies date back to World War II and pertain to those fleeing from persecution.
At this point in the discussion, the audience inquired whether there were other avenues that could be pursued to achieve a more global framework to tackle the climate crisis.
Ms. Dumaine opined that there would be a substantial benefit to creating a forum that brings parties together to specifically look at humancaused climate changes and the human rights of those who are most affected.
Ms. Dumaine reminded the audience that even though we are not at the 1.5degree tipping point yet, so many people around the globe have already been severely affected by climate change.
To conclude the breakout session, Ms. Dumaine was asked her opinion on whether developed nations should have more responsibilities towards global warming and should be subjected to stricter standards.
In response, Ms. Dumaine noted that the developed world has known that carbon emissions would have this effect for at least 5 decades.
In fact, in the 60s and 70s, scientists from developed countries were able to accurately project the effects greenhouse gases would have on global warming up to the present date.
In short, Ms. Dumaine agreed that there certainly has to be more responsibility taken by developed countries.
We have a collective security and social responsibility to prevent harm and keep each other safe.
Carol Dumaine 103 The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 4, Issue 3 KEY POINTS OF DISCUSSION Presentation • The COVID-19 pandemic is a harbinger of a new epoch of globalized security vulnerabilities that traditional national security frameworks are poorly suited to address.
• Disasters such as the unprecedented flooding in British Columbia are symptomatic of the increased vulnerability and insecurity of people all over the world in the face of the impacts of environmental degradation, especially climate change.
• A more thorough understanding of the root causes, effects, and influences of the climate change crisis is critical to better address it.
• A traditional geopolitical framing is so narrow that it will miss most security-related implications of climate change, including its immediacy as a threat.
• National security organizations need to look at the climate change challenge through broader frames, such as ecological and intergenerational security, and institute necessary adaptations including emphasizing Earth systems science and climate literacy.
Question Period • When pursuing climate change as a national security issue through a more traditional geopolitical lens, we start to lose sight of the peripheral effects.
As such, a new paradigm of global security cooperation is needed that spans intergenerational needs, boundaries, disciplines and the so-called Global North and Global South.
• Human induced climate change is threatening the viability of human society, as well as the diversity that makes the human economy possible.
• The best science in the world is proving to be too conservative and lacking behind empirical reality so there is an urgency that we have never had before.
Breakout Room Discussion • It is necessary to reimagine international refugee policy to account for the new challenges we are facing regarding climate migrants.
Carol Dumaine 104 The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare Volume 4, Issue 3 • One possibility to achieve a more global framework could be to establish a forum that brings parties together to specifically look at human-caused climate changes and the human rights of those who are most affected.
• We have a collective security and social responsibility to prevent harm and keep each other safe, which should involve a higher level of responsibility placed on those in developed worlds.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
© (CAROL DUMAINE, 2022) Published by the Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare and Simon Fraser University Available from: https://jicw.org/
Food Sovereignty: A Framework for Assessing Agrarian Responses to Climate Change in the Philippines Amber Heckelman & Hannah Wittman ► Heckelman, A., & Wittman, H. (2015).
Food Sovereignty: A framework for assessing agrarian responses to climate change in the Philippines.
ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 8(1), 87-94.
INTRODUCTION The Philippines is one of the foremost countries affected by climate change, with increasing incidence of super typhoons, droughts, floods, and changing rain patterns — all of which exacerbate existing food insecurity, poverty, and ecological degradation (United Nations University & Alliance Development Works, 2014; Yumal et al., 2011).
In response to these challenges, the development and diffusion of adaptation and mitigation strategies are necessary to enhance agrarian resiliency.
Our ongoing research involves the assessment of food sovereignty pathways in Ecuador, Brazil, Canada, and the Philippines.
Here, we report on our progress in using food sovereignty principles to develop an assessment framework for climate resiliency and food security among a network of smallholder agrarian systems in the Philippines.
The objective of this research project is to analyze how and to what extent these smallholder farmers are enhancing their livelihoods; responding to loss and damage incurred due to climate change; and serving as catalysts for climate change adaptation, mitigation, and overall resiliency through farmer-led agricultural development initiatives.
The Magsasaka at Siyentipiko para sa Pag-Unlad ng Agrikultura (Farmer-Scientist Partnership for Agricultural Development, MASIPAG) is a national Filipino farmer-led network engaging in agroecological strategies to promote the sustainable use and management of biodiversity through farmers’ control of genetic and biological resources, agricultural production, and associated knowledge (Medina, 2009).
Since MASIPAG’s establishment in the 1980s, the network has grown from 50 farmers to an estimated 35,000 farmers today.
Our team is working with MASIPAG to assess the degree and scope of their effectiveness in facilitating livelihood resilience, especially in the context of climate change.
The challenge with this research lies in capturing the range of complex and interrelated dimensions encompassed in agrarian systems.
Another challenge is developing new methodological approaches to empirically measure the outcomes of dynamic agroecological strategies and their overall impact on climate resiliency and food security.
In response, we propose a systems-based approach built on the principles of ‘food sovereignty’ as a framework for investigating these dynamics and assessing their impact on both food security and climate resiliency.
Forschungswerkstatt  Research Workshop w w w .s ea s. at d o i 10 .1 47 64 /1 0.
A SE A S20 15 .1 -6 88 Amber Heckelman & Hannah Wittman  ASEAS 8(1) In the Philippines, an estimated 17 percent (16.4 million) of Filipinos do not meet their nutritional requirements and basic needs (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012).
A quarter of the population (24.2 million) lives in poverty (World Bank Group, 2012) and poverty is most severe and widespread among indigenous peoples and small-scale farmers (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2009).
Contributors to poverty and food insecurity include land reform policies dating back to 1988 that have been ineffective at breaking up and redistributing privately owned lands acquired during Spanish colonialism (Bello, 2001); multinational agricultural companies that are expanding industrial palm oil, banana, and pineapple plantations (Franco & Borras, 2007); and large-scale gold and copper mining operations that are destroying landscapes and watersheds (CEC-Philippines, 2012).
These factors perpetuate a cycle of landlessness and poverty among farmers and contribute to the ongoing concentration of wealth and power in the Philippines (Ballesteros & de la Cruz, 2006; Borras, 2007).
Major reports (De Schutter, 2010; McIntyre et al., 2009; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013), high profile case studies (Altieri & Koohafkan, 2008; Bachmann, Cruzada, & Wright, 2009; Holt-Giménez, 2002), and reviews (Altieri, Funes-Monzote, & Petersen, 2012; Lin et al., 2011) suggest that in order to address worsening inequalities, limited resources, and degrading ecological conditions while improving climate resiliency, agrarian systems should facilitate effective social processes for community empowerment as well as exhibit high levels of diversity, synergy, recycling, and integration.
These studies credit the smallholder farmer sector for enhancing resiliency by effectively adapting to and mitigating climate change through increased use of local varieties, water harvesting, diversified and intercropping agroforestry, soil conservation practices, farmer-breeding practices, and a series of other traditional techniques.
However, little empirical assessment has been made of the potential of diversified and small-scale agrarian systems to achieve food security and sustainable livelihoods through climate change adaptation and mitigation (CCAM) strategies, and there is a lack of consensus on how to assess and measure the effectiveness of such strategies.
SYSTEMS-BASED ASSESSMENT BUILT ON FOOD SOVEREIGNTY Assessments that only measure crop yield fail to account for important social, political, economic, environmental, and health outputs of an agrarian system.
The development of comprehensive assessments that also consider inequality, poverty, hunger/malnutrition, market instability, and ecological degradation that characterize much of the agrarian experience are urgently needed.
All of these dimensions and realities necessitate a move toward a more ‘systems-based approach’ derived from systems dynamics, a methodology for studying and managing complex systems that change over time (Ford, 2010; Meadows, 1972).
The principles of food sovereignty provide a framework for developing a systemsbased approach that can assess food security and climate resiliency among agrarian communities.
Since its articulation by La Via Campesina in 1996 as the right of local people to control their own regional and national food systems, food sovereignty has emerged as a significant topic in the discourse surrounding climate change.
Advo89Food Sovereignty in the Philippines cates suggest that food sovereignty initiatives have the potential to create alternative agricultural and food policy models that are better equipped with addressing food insecurity in the face of climate change (Altieri, 2009; Altieri, Nicholls, & Funes, 2012; Chappell et al., 2013; Wittman, 2011).
This is because the principles of food sovereignty promote practices that are consistent with resilient agrarian systems like the preservation of genetic and biological diversity to enhance ecosystem service functions, reduced reliance on costly energy intensive inputs, and the linkage of farmer knowledge with political mobilization (Vandermeer & Perfecto, 2012).
The basic principles of food sovereignty provide a starting point in the effort to transcribe this concept into a methodological tool for assessing agrarian systems.
The principles in brief are (Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty, 2007): 1. the perception of food as a human right versus a commodity; 2. the value placed on equity and empowerment for all food providers; 3. the emphasis on the social and ecological benefits of localizing food systems; 4. the call for local control over resources and knowledge; 5. the support for local knowledge and protection of community intellectual property rights; and 6. the significance placed on agroecological practices.
A review of these principles reveals the different scales (household to global), factors (policies to local organizations), and dimensions (equity to sustainability) that food sovereignty engages with.
Another feature of the framework is that it facilitates an investigation of phenomena affecting management decisions within agrarian communities, such as citizenship, social justice, and nutritional health (Alkon & Mares, 2012; Chappell et al., 2013; Vandermeer & Perfecto, 2012; Weiler et al., 2014; Wittman, 2009).
As such, a systems-based assessment built around these principles has the capacity to capture the various dimensions and phenomena that affect the ability of agrarian communities to effectively respond to climate change.
As such, our systems-based approach (see Figure 1) aims to address the growing critiques and concerns with assessments that focus primarily on crop production and the biophysical aspects of an agrarian system (Gregory, Ingram, & Brklacich, 2005; Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007).
ASSESSING CONVENTIONAL AND AGROECOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CLIMATE RESILIENT FOOD SECURITY IN THE PHILIPPINES CCAM strategies are developed and deployed from a range of agricultural models (Holt-Giménez & Altieri, 2013; Kaur, Kohli, & Jaswal, 2013; Loos et al., 2014).
For example, the ‘conventional’ model led by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and its national version, the Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice), challenges scientists to develop technologies including high yielding and/or genetically engineered varieties (HYV) capable of withstanding climate induced ecological disturbances such as floods, droughts, and salinization (Fedoroff et al., 2010; Ismail et al., 2013).
The process of developing and locally testing HYV varieties, and making them available to farmers via commercialization, can take several years.
This process is 90 Amber Heckelman & Hannah Wittman  ASEAS 8(1) Figure 1: a ‘food sovereignty' approach to assessing agrarian systems (own compilation).
costly, both in terms of the investment required for developing and producing new crop varieties and in terms of their subsequent affordability and accessibility to resource-poor farmers (Perfecto, Vandermeer, & Wright, 2009).
There are also significant environmental and health costs associated with applying the chemical inputs required to grow these HYV (Frossard, 2002; Kaur, Kohli, & Jaswal, 2013; Perfecto et al., 2009).
MASIPAG advocates an alternative ‘agroecological’ model for agricultural development (Bachmann, Cruzada, & Wright, 2009).
To enhance climate resiliency, this network of farmers, scientists, and NGOs works in concert to collect indigenous (or heirloom) seed varieties and engages in farmer-breeding initiatives to develop crops that are locally adapted to climate-induced conditions such as floods, droughts, and salinization (see Figure 1).
These seed varieties are then shared among other farmers in the network via seed exchanges or planned distribution efforts.
The network also provides mechanisms for farmers to share agricultural practices and community initiatives, such as intercropping strategies and livestock exchanges to promote genetic diversity (see Figure 2).
Diversified livestock and intercropping systems improve soil quality and carbon sequestration as well as provide farmers, along with their families and community, with access to diverse and nutrient-rich diets.
However, the productive capacity of agroecological and smallholder systems has been questioned in terms of their ability to feed growing urban populations, in particular because of reduced access to agricultural inputs, limited labor availability for low-input systems, and other resource constraints.
Other challenges include the limited access of smallholder Environment Economic Health Political Sociocultural Agrarian SystemFoodSecurity Climate Resiliency Availability Access Sustainability Utility Vulnerability Resistance Adaptation Mitigation Nutritional/Caloric Intake Illness/Ailments Healthcare Access Tradition/Religion Community Development Knowledge/Tech Biodiversity Soil Quality Pollution Policy Farmer Empowerment Autonomy Market/Exchange Debt/Profit Labor/Capital Intensity Figure 1: An illustration of (a) the dimensions of an agrarian system and the capacity for (b) food sovereignty to define this systems-based framework to facilitate an investigation of two particular outcomes of an agrarian system: (c) food security and (d) climate resiliency.
(a) (b) (c) (d) 91Food Sovereignty in the Philippines Figure 2: Over 375 rice varieties bred by a single MASIPAG farmer (Photo by Amber Heckelman).
Figure 3: MASIPAG farmer preparing an organic pesticide and fertilizer (Photo by Amber Heckelman).
92 Amber Heckelman & Hannah Wittman  ASEAS 8(1) systems to agricultural infrastructure and consolidated distribution networks (Connor, 2008; International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2013; Seufert, Ramankutty, & Foley, 2012).
Both IRRI and MASIPAG initiatives demonstrate the different ways in which the Philippine agrarian sector aims to improve its capacity to adapt to and mitigate climate change while simultaneously ensuring food security.
This illustrates, again, the need to move beyond yield-centered assessments so as to comprehensively account for the range of activities and adequately assess their effect on food security and climate resiliency.
MOVING FORWARD At present, we are in the first of two phases in the effort to develop our systemsbased food sovereignty assessment tool.
The first phase involves designing and drafting the assessment tool (survey questionnaire), which involves soliciting feedback from participating agrarian communities and pilot testing the assessment tool in collaboration with MASIPAG.
The second phase will utilize the questionnaire to collect data in three agrarian communities comprised of both conventional and MASIPAG farmers, and located in regions susceptible to climate change induced disturbances.
As part of an ongoing multiand transdisciplinary and multi-country collaborative research project, this paper highlights the challenges of adequately assessing climate resiliency and food security in the Philippines, and proposes a systems-based approach built on food sovereignty principles as a framework for carrying out such assessments.
Ultimately, our intention is to increase our understanding of the connection between food security and climate change in the Philippines and to lay the groundwork for identifying pathways to resilient agrarian systems.
 REFERENCES Alkon, A. H., & Mares, T. M. (2012).
Food sovereignty in US food movements: Radical visions and neoliberal constraints.
Agriculture and Human Values, 29(3), 347–359.
Altieri, M. A., & Koohafkan, P. (2008).
Enduring farms: Climate change, smallholders and traditional farming communities.
Environment and Development Series 6.
Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network.
Altieri, M. A.
(2009).
Agroecology, small farms, and food sovereignty.
Monthly Review, 61(3), 102–113.
Altieri, M. A., Funes-Monzote, F. R., & Petersen, P. (2012).
Agroecologically efficient agricultural systems for smallholder farmers: Contributions to food sovereignty.
Agronomy for Sustainable Development, 32(1), 1–13.
Altieri, M. A., Nicholls, C., & Funes, F. (2012).
The scaling up of agroecology: Spreading the hope for food sovereignty and resiliency.
Sociedad Cientifica Latinoamericana De Agroecologia.
Bachmann, L., Cruzada, E., & Wright, S. (2009).
Food security and farmer empowerment: A study of the impacts of farmer-led sustainable agriculture in the Philippines.
Los Baños, Philippines: MASIPAG.
Ballesteros, M., & de la Cruz, A.
(2006).
Land reform and changes in land ownership concentration: Evidence from rice-growing villages in the Philippines.
Discussion Paper Series No.
2006-21.
Makati, Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
Bello, W. (2001).
The future in the balance: Essays on globalization and resistance.
Oakland, CA: Food First.
93Food Sovereignty in the Philippines Borras, S. M. (2007).
‘Free market’, export-led development strategy and its impact on rural livelihoods, poverty and inequality: The Philippine experience seen from a Southeast Asian perspective.
Review of International Political Economy, 14(1), 143–175.
CEC-Philippines.
(2012).
2012 Philippine mining situation: Intensified plunder, intensified struggles.
Quezon City, Philippines: The Center for Environmental Concerns – Philippines.
Chappell, M. J., Wittman, H., Bacon, C. M., Ferguson, B. G., Barrios, L. G., Barrios, R. G., … Perfecto, I.
(2013).
Food sovereignty: An alternative paradigm for poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation in Latin America.
F1000Research, 2, 1–17.
Connor, D. J.
(2008).
Organic agriculture cannot feed the world.
Field Crops Research, 106, 187–190.
De Schutter, O.
(2010).
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food.
Report on the right to food.
United Nations General Assembly.
Fedoroff, N. V., Battisti, D. S., Beachy, R. N., Cooper, P. J. M., Fischhoff, D. A., Hodges, C. N., … Zhu, J. K. (2010).
Radically rethinking agriculture for the 21st century.
Science, 327(5967), 833–834.
Franco, J. C., & Borras, S. M. (2007).
Stuggles over land resources in the Philippines.
Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 19(1), 67–75.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
(2012).
Country Profiles: Philippines.
FAOSTAT database.
Retrieved from http://faostat.fao.org/CountryProfiles/Country_Profile/Direct.
aspx?lang=en&area=171 Ford, A.
(2010).
Modeling the environment (2nd ed.).
Washington, DC: Island Press.
Frossard, D. (2002).
How farmer-scientist cooperation is devalued and revalued: A Philippine example.
In D. A. Cleveland & D. Soleri (Eds.
), Farmers, scientists and plant breeding.
Integrating knowledge and practice (pp.
137–159).
New York, NY: CABI Publishing.
Gregory, P. J., Ingram, J. S. I., & Brklacich, M. (2005).
Climate change and food security.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 360, 2139–2148.
Holt-Giménez, E. (2002).
Measuring farmers’ agroecological resistance after Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua: A case study in participatory, sustainable land management impact monitoring.
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 93, 87–105.
Holt-Giménez, E., & Altieri, M. (2013).
Agroecology, food sovereignty, and the new green revolution.
Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems, 37(1), 90–102.
International Fund for Agricultural Development.
(2009).
Region & Country: Philippines Overview and Statistics.
Rural Poverty Portal.
Retrieved from http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/ philippines Ismail, A. M., Singh, U. S., Singh, S., Dar, M. H., & Mackill, D. J.
(2013).
The contribution of submergencetolerant (Sub1) rice varieties to food security in flood-prone rainfed lowland areas in Asia.
Field Crops Research, 152, 83–93.
Kaur, A., Kohli, R. K., & Jaswal, P. S. (2013).
Genetically modified crops and climate change linkages: An Indian perspective.
Agricultural Sciences, 4(10), 541–548.
Lin, B., Chappell, J., Vandermeer, J., Smith, G., Quintero, E., Bezner-Kerr, R., & Perfecto, I.
(2011).
Effects of industrial agriculture on climate change and the mitigation potential of small-scale agro-ecological farms.
CAB Reviews: Perspectives in Agriculture, Veterinary Science, Nutrition and Natural Resources, 6(20), 1–18.
Loos, J., Abson, D. J., Chappell, M. A., Hanspach, J., Mikulcak, F., Tichit, M., & Fischer, J.
(2014).
Putting meaning back into “sustainable intensification”.
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 12(6), 356–361.
McIntyre, B. D., Herren, H. R., Wakhungu, J., & Watson, R. T. (2009).
Agriculture at a crossroads.
International assessment of agricultural knowledge, science and technology for development (IAASTD).
Global report.
Washington, DC: Island Press.
Meadows, D. H. (1972).
The limits to growth.
New York, NY: Universe Books.
Medina, C. (2009).
Empowering small rice farmers: The MASIPAG approach.
PANAP Rice Sheets.
Retrieved from http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefnews/Medina_2009_Masipag_Empowering_SamallFarmers.pdf 94 Amber Heckelman & Hannah Wittman  ASEAS 8(1) Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty.
(2007).
Declaration of Nyéléni.
Retrieved from http://nyeleni.org/ IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf.
Perfecto, I., Vandermeer, J., & Wright, A.
(2009).
Nature’s matrix: Linking agriculture conservation and food sovereignty.
London, UK: Earthscan.
Schmidhuber, J., & Tubiello, F. (2007).
Global food security under climate change.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(50), 19703–19708.
Seufert, V., Ramankutty, N., & Foley, J.
A.
(2012).
Comparing the yields of organic and conventional agriculture.
Nature, 485(7397), 229–232.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
(2013).
Trade and environment review 2013.
Wake up before it is too late: Make agriculture truly sustainable now for food security in a changing climate.
Retrieved from http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/ditcted2012d3_en.pdf United Nations University, & Alliance Development Works.
(2014).
World Risk Report 2014.
Retrieved from http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/11895.pdf Vandermeer, J., & Perfecto, I.
(2012).
Complex traditions: Intersecting theoretical frameworks in agroecological research.
Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, 37(1), 76–89.
Weiler, A. M., Hergesheimer, C., Brisbois, B., Wittman, H., Yassi, A., & Spiegel, J. M. (2014).
Food sovereignty, food security and health equity: A meta-narrative mapping exercise.
Health Policy and Planning, 1–15.
Wittman, H. (2009).
Reworking the metabolic rift: La Vía Campesina, agrarian citizenship, and food sovereignty.
Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(4), 805–826.
Wittman, H. (2011).
Food Sovereignty: A new rights framework for food and nature?
Environment and Society: Advances in Research, 2(1), 87–105.
World Bank Group (2012).
World Development Indicators: Philippines.
World DataBank.
Retrieved from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx Yumal, G., Cruz, N., Servando, N., & Dimalanta, C. (2011).
Extreme weather events and related disasters in the Philippines, 2004-08: A sign of what climate change will mean?
Disasters, 35(2), 362–382.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS Amber Heckelman is a PhD student in Integrated Studies in Land & Food Systems at the University of British Columbia, a Liu Scholar at the Institute for Global Issues, and a Bullitt Environmental Fellow.
Her research is centered on food security, food sovereignty, and climate change resilience in the Philippines.
► Contact: amber.heckelman@gmail.com Hannah Wittman is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Land and Food Systems and the Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability at the University of British Columbia, Canada.
She works on food sovereignty, agrarian resilience, and health equity in the Americas.
► Contact: hannah.wittman@ubc.ca
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL GEOGRAPHY Journal of Environmental Geography 6 (1–2), 21–27.
DOI: 10.2478/v10326-012-0003-3 ISSN: 2060-467X MODELING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON PHYTOGEOGRAPHICAL UNITS.
A CASE STUDY OF THE MOESZ LINE Ákos Bede-Fazekas Department of Garden and Open Space Design, Faculty of Landscape Architecture, Corvinus University of Budapest, Villányi út 29-43, H-1118 Budapest, Hungary e-mail: bfakos@gmail.com Research article, received 29 January 2013, published online 15 April 2013 Abstract Regional climate models (RCMs) provide reliable climatic predictions for the next 90 years with high horizontal and temporal resolution.
In the 21st century northward latitudinal and upward altitudinal shift of the distribution of plant species and phytogeographical units is expected.
It is discussed how the modeling of phytogeographical unit can be reduced to modeling plant distributions.
Predicted shift of the Moesz line is studied as case study (with three different modeling approaches) using 36 parameters of REMO regional climate dataset, ArcGIS geographic information software, and periods of 1961-1990 (reference period), 2011-2040, and 2041-2070.
The disadvantages of this relatively simple climate envelope modeling (CEM) approach are then discussed and several ways of model improvement are suggested.
Some statistical and artificial intelligence (AI) methods (logistic regression, cluster analysis and other clustering methods, decision tree, evolutionary algorithm, artificial neural network) are able to provide development of the model.
Among them artificial neural networks (ANN) seems to be the most suitable algorithm for this purpose, which provides a black box method for distribution modeling.
Keywords: climate change, REMO, Climate envelope model, phytogeography, Moesz line, model improvement INTRODUCTION The latest regional climate models (RCMs) have high horizontal resolution and good reliability.
They provide projections for the Carpathian Basin that are related to botany (Czúcz, 2010), landscape architecture (BedeFazekas, 2012a), and forestry (Mátyás et al., 2010; Führer et al., 2010; Czúcz et al., 2011).
Our future climate, which is likely to be warmer, dryer in summer, and have more extreme precipitations in the colder half-year term (Bartholy et al., 2007; Bartholy and Pongrácz, 2008), will enforce changes in the composition of the natural and the planted vegetation.
The landscape architecture can have a significant role on the mitigation.
We should note, however, the importance of adaptation, since climate change cannot be compensated by the intensive garden maintenance (Bede-Fazekas, 2011).
One of the most important tools from the adaptation toolkit of landscapes architecture is the reconsideration of the ornamental plant assortment.
There are some papers dealing with this issue (Schmidt, 2006; Szabó and Bede-Fazekas, 2012).
Geographical visualization can be produced with GIS (Geographic Information System) software based on the large amount of tabulated data of the different climate models, which might be interpretable not only by experts.
They are able to visualize the direction and the volume of climate change also for non-professionals (Czinkócky and Bede-Fazekas, 2012).
This is true in case of different modeling themes, such as the distribution area of the Mediterranean plant species; the distribution area of the plant species migrating northwards from the Carpathian Basin; and the phytogeographical units and borders that may shift from or shift to the Carpathian Basin.
Phytogeography, a branch of biogeography, is concerned with the distribution area of plant species, communities and floras.
This paper summarizes the experiences gained by the model run on the Moesz line as a case study and highlights the possible improvements of the model, including the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms.
There are really few models that have studied the assortment of plants able to spread through or be introduced in the Carpathian Basin in the 21 st century.
There are, however, numerous researches that have connection with these modeling approaches.
The research of Horváth (2008a) about finding the territories having similar climate nowadays to the future climate of Hungary has high importance.
He has found that these 22 Bede-Fazekas (2013) spatially analogue territories are, for the next 60 years, the following: South Rumania, North Bulgaria, Serbia, and North Greece (Horváth, 2008b).
By studying the vegetation and ornamental plant assortment of the analogue territories we can estimate the future vegetation and the possibilities of ornamental plant usage in the future in Hungary.
Among forestry species the distribution of beech (Fagus sylvatica L.) has been modeled (Führer, 2008).
The impacts of climate change on the natural vegetation and habitats were studied by Kovács-Láng et al.
(2008) and Czúcz (2010).
Artificial neural network, is one of the artificial intelligence methods described further as a recommended improvement of the model, was used for modeling the inland excess water by Van Leeuwen and Tobak (2008).
Apart from Hungary, there can several researches be found using similar methods to that ones I suggest in the Discussion.
One of the most significant is the work of Arundel (2005), which is about finding the climate envelope of five warm-demanding species of North America by significance analysis.
Modeling was, however, not carried out by him.
Berry et al.
(2002) modeled the distribution of 54 species and the composition of 15 habitats of Ireland and Great Britain.
Harrison et al.
(2010) studied the potential composition change of the vegetation of Oregon.
The distribution of 134 North American tree species was modeled by Iverson et al.
(2008) with the use of regression trees.
Stankowski and Parker (2010) found that regardless of distributional and environmental data, there is not any algorithm which could maximize model performance for all species; thus different species demand different models.
Guisan and Zimmermann (2000) give full review of the methods that can be used for ecological modeling.
METHODS OF MODELING The approach of modeling the shift of phytogeographical units can be reduced to modeling the potential distribution area of fictive or real species bound to the phytogeographical unit.
The inputs of the model are the current distribution of the plant species, the climate date for the reference period, and the climate data for the future period(s).
There are three main steps: 1) querying the climate demands/tolerance of the species; 2) validating the model (modeling the reference period); 3) predicting (modeling for the future period).
The climate requirements of the species can be filtered based on the distribution and the climate data of the reference period, since the extremes of a certain climate parameter indicate the tolerance boundaries of the species.
The selection of climate parameters, however, is subjective.
Note that the model can fail if not enough or too much Fig.
1 Observed distribution, modeled potential distribution for the reference period, and predicted potential distribution for the future periods of cork oak (Quercus suber) Modeling the impacts of climate change on phytogeographical units.
A case study of the Moesz line 23 climate parameters are selected (Bede-Fazekas, 2012a).
The result of this phase is a list of climatic limits (a zeroorder logical formula in mathematical terms) per species, therefore the climate requirements of the species are written as equations.
This is the mathematical basis of the prediction that used in the next phase.
Based on the knowledge of the climate requirements, the territories providing suitable climatic environment for the plant can be filtered according to the climate data of the reference period.
The sum of these territories is the potential distribution area.
Modeling the potential distribution for the reference period is seemingly unnecessary and negligible, and it does not influence the result.
This medial phase of modeling is, however, not to be omitted, since the result of this phase provides for the possibility of validating.
The reliability of the future predictions (model results) can be concluded by comparing the observed distribution to the modeled potential distribution.
In case of much greater area of distribution the model results are not to be reckoned as reliable results, irrespective from the known influence of anthropogenic, edaphic and competitive effects on the real distribution.
Therefore, the similarity of the observed and modeled distribution can guarantee that the model is reliable enough.
Based on the climate demands of a certain plant species and the climate data, the suitable territories can be filtered not just for the reference period but also for the future periods.
This third phase is the modeling/prediction approach in the strictest sense; this is about finding the future potential distribution (Fig.
1).
The method of modeling the future shift of Moesz line (also called as grape line) is going to be reviewed, which is appropriate example of modeling a phytogeographical unit based on modeling the distribution of separate species.
Moesz (1911) observed that the northern borders of 12 plant species are highly correlated with each other, and this line is also the northern border of the vine cultivation area.
This phytogeographical line, which is situated near the southern foot of the Western Carpathians, was later named after Moesz.
There is hardly any international literature about the Moesz line, since it is of local importance.
Note, that elongation of the grape line to the west and to the east results in an extended phytogeographical line which still correlate with the northern border of some species originally bound to the Moesz line (eg.
Muscari botryoides – Somlyay, 2003).
The extended line characterizes not only the flora and ornamental plant assortment of the Carpathian Basin, therefore modeling the Moesz line can have importance for entire continent.
There are several approaches of modeling a phytogeographical line.
Three different methods (called line modeling, distribution modeling, and isotherm modeling) are going to be discussed.
The models were run by the Spatial Analyst module of the GIS software ESRI ArcGIS.
All of them were based on the regional climate model REMO, which has a grid resolution of 25 km.
Although the entire European Continent is within the domain of REMO, we used only a part (25724 of the 32300 points; Fig.
2) of the grid.
The reference period was 1961-1990, while the future predictions were applied for the periods 2011–2040 and 2041–2070 based on the IPCC SPES scenario called A1B.
Isotherm modeling among the three methods is the easiest to apply.
It is based on finding that winter minimum temperature isotherm that correlates with the phytogeographical line most of all.
The predicted shift of the isotherm probably indicates the shift of the Fig.
2 The domain of regional climate model REMO (grid) and its part used in the study (within the rectangle) 24 Bede-Fazekas (2013) phytogeographical line.
The main disadvantage of this method is that the existence of this isotherm cannot be guaranteed in case of all phytogeographical borders (in case of the Moesz line the appropriate isotherm was found).
Only one or a few climatic parameters are considered by this method, thus it is a rather inaccurate and not so reliable method.
Moreover it can yield to a result that is hard to interpret (similar to the case of isotherm modeling of Moesz line).
Nevertheless, it is a very fast method and does not require digitizing distribution areas.
Line modeling is a somewhat complicated method.
It is based on modeling the shift of the distribution area of a fictive species, whose northern distribution borders coincide with the phytogeographical line (the southern border is irrelevant).
It is a slow but somewhat more accurate method.
The most complicated method is called Distribution modeling, which is also the slowest one.
The model is run on the distribution of numerous plant species bound to the phytogeographical line separately.
Then the northern borders of the predicted potential distributions are merged.
The method provides detailed result, but drawing the final line (the prediction) is still subjective.
Detailed comparison of the three aforementioned modeling methods is published by Bede-Fazekas (2012b).
Distribution modeling is, in methodical terms, similar to multiple Line modeling.
Line modeling is a kind of Climate Envelope Modeling (CEM) which is about predicting responses of species to climate change by drawing an envelope around the domain of climatic variables where the given species has been recently found and then identifying areas predicted to fall within that domain in the future (Ibáñez et al., 2006, Hijmans and Graham, 2006).
It assumes that (present and future) distributions are dependent basically on the climatic variables (Czúcz, 2010) which is somewhat dubious (Skov and Svenning, 2004).
36 climatic variables were used for the modeling: monthly mean temperature (°C), monthly minimum temperature (°C), and monthly summarized precipitation (mm).
All the climatic data were averaged in the periods of thirty years.
RESULTS OF LINE MODELING The results of Line modeling is shown in Fig.
3.
The method was visually validated (by the correlation of the Moesz line and the modeled line for the reference period).
Some measurements are also known for model evaluating, eg.
Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) and ROC/AUC (Hanley and Mcneil, 1982), they are, however, based on measuring areas instead of coincidence of curves.
The observed precision is good enough despite of the relatively low horizontal resolution of the climate data.
The modeled distribution of the Fig.
3 Observed distribution, modeled potential distribution for the reference period, and predicted potential distribution for the future periods of the fictive plant species bound to the Moesz line in case of the Line modeling method Modeling the impacts of climate change on phytogeographical units.
A case study of the Moesz line 25 fictive species shows a northern border from Southern France, through the southern and eastern foot of the Alps, the southern foot of Western Carpathians, the western foot of the Eastern Carpathians, the southern and eastern foot of the Southern Carpathians, to Southern Ukraine.
The prediction for the period 2011–2040 shows not such a great shift in the Carpathians as it was expected.
Remarkable shift can be seen in France and to the east of the Eastern Carpathians.
For the far future period (2041–70) the model provides results that correspond with our preliminary expectations.
The predicted line displays in three segments separately: 1) the Moesz line may shift upwards (and northwards) to the Carpathians; 2) in Poland, a new Moesz line may appear, which indicates the northern border of the distribution of species that can be established in Poland; 3) and a southern border of the Polish territories of optimal climate (so called ‘anti-Moesz-line’) may appear in the northern side of the Carpathians.
Besides the expansion in France, discrete territories in England, Belgium, Germany and Bohemia are also predicted for the far future period.
Fig.
3. also points out that the Carpathians (and subordinately the Alps) will obstruct (as phytogeographical barrier) the expansion of the plant species bound to the Moesz line.
DISCUSSION OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF MODEL WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ALGORITHMS As the model results show, two of the three aforementioned modeling methods provide maps good enough (in terms of comparison of the observed and modeled distributions in the reference period) to display the impact of the climate change.
Since only a few climatic parameters were applied, the accuracy and reliability of the model can be improved by using some other climatic parameters (eg.
sum of heat, length of vegetation period, length of the period endangered by frost) and edaphic parameters (eg.
alkalinity, quantity of lime).
Although, more detailed and accurate inputs (eg.
distribution maps, climate grid) could strengthen the model, it should also be noted, that the real improvement of the model can be reached only by the development of the modeling method.
The cumulative distribution function should be calculated by statistical software to leave some percentiles from the minimum and maximum values of a certain climatic parameter.
Hence, only the climatic values that are bound exactly to the studied distribution area will be considered, since climatic extremes are mainly found near the distribution border will be left.
Further improvement of the abovementioned Line model can be applied by using statistical or artificial intelligence (AI) methods to select the appropriate parameters from the infinite combination of the numerous climate parameters objectively.
Various ways can be used to determine the climate envelope, including simple regression, distance-based methods, genetic algorithms for rule-set prediction, and neural nets (Ibáñez et al., 2006).
To reduce subjectivity of parameters’ choice, logistic regression can be applied, which specifies the linear combination of climate parameters that determines the likelihood of distribution.
Another appropriate statistic method is cluster analysis, which explains the vector of climate parameters as points of a multidimensional space, and searches for a lower dimension which separates the distribution apart its surroundings.
Other clustering methods can be used, too.
In comparison to statistical methods, applying artificial intelligence algorithms may results in much more improvement of the model.
Note, that some of them are black box methods, which can only answer the question what?/where?/when?, but not the question why?/how?.
Several artificial intelligence methods can be used for modeling the distribution of plant species or phytogeographical units, such as decision tree, evolutionary algorithm, and artificial neural net (ANN).
Hilbert and Ostendorf (2001) studied different forest types with ANN, and the research of Carpenter et al.
(1999), Özesmi and Özesmi (1999), Hilbert and Van Den Muyzenberg (1999), Özesmi et al.
(2006), Harrison et al.
(2010), and Ogawa-Onishi et al.
(2010) should be mentioned, since they modeled the distribution of species or communities with ANN.
Evolutionary algorithm (which matches the climatic parameters with alleles and provides a process similar to natural selection with finite length) could conclude which parameters (and which extrema of them) are able to express the climate tolerance most of all.
The result is therefore similar to the equations used in this research.
This does not hold for ANN, since a complicated neural net cannot be reduced to linear mathematical expressions.
ANN is similar to a real neural net densely furnished with axons, where the neurons are organized in layers.
The algorithm has two main phases.
Learning phase is the first, when the program builds up and balances the internal structure of the net in such a way, that it is adjusted to the distribution of the plant.
After the learning phase the model could determine the likelihood of presence at all the points of Europe (for the reference period and the future periods, too).
In contrary to ANN, the aforementioned statistical and AI methods are not able to result in a map showing the potential distribution area (which is still the aim of modeling).
On the other hand ANN is the only method among them which is not able to separate the filtering of climate demands of species apart from the prediction.
The essence of the learning phase is that based on the distribution and climate data the program forms a multilayered structure and it calculates the so called weights of every axon, iteratively.
In the course of the timeconsuming, but finite learning phase the weights are continuously changed based on remodeling and error evaluation.
A well parameterized ANN with appropriate topology could model the future potential distribution area in a much more reliable way.
The feedforward neural network (with multilayer perceptron model) seems to be the most suitable for distribution modeling.
An ANN with Backporpagation training method is now under development in Python programming language for 26 Bede-Fazekas (2013) ArcGIS software.
Input layer is connected to the climatic parameters (the number of neurons is determined by the number of parameters).
The output layer has only one neuron which is able to predict a presence/absence data (1/0) or the likelihood of the absence (%).
The training set is the part of the prediction set; the latter is the grid of the climate model (with more than 20,000 points).
CONCLUSION The modeling approaches of the distribution of plant species and phytogeographical units were studied and the conspicuous deficiencies of them were discussed.
Note, that in absence of AI supported modeling method, the used three simple models could provide spectacular results.
Modeling the Moesz line yielded remarkable results, which are not perfectly the same as it was expected.
It can be concluded that the Northern Carpathians will provide significant barrier for the plant species bound to the Moesz line.
In harmony to the studies of Kovács-Láng et al.
(2008) – who stated that the speed of ecological processes is not synchronous with the speed of the climate change and therefore the mountains with latitudinal direction may become natural barriers – we should note that without human aid some of these species will not be able to get as far as Poland.
Hence there is a risk that the predicted shift of the Moesz line may be a prediction of the shift of only a virtual line.
Acknowledgement The author would like to express his gratitude to the two anonymous peer-reviewers for their advices.
Special thanks to Levente Horváth (Corvinus University of Budapest), Levente Hufnagel (Corvinus University of Budapest), Anna Czinkóczky (Corvinus University of Budapest), Villő Csiszár (Eötvös Loránd University), and Tibor Gregorics (Eötvös Loránd University) for their selfless assistance.
The research was supported by the project TÁMOP-4.2.1/B-09/1/KMR-2010-0005.
The ENSEMBLES data used in this work was funded by the EU FP6 Integrated Project ENSEMBLES (Contract number 505539) whose support is gratefully acknowledged.
References Arundel, S.T.
2005.
Using spatial models to establish climatic limiters of plant species’ distributions.
Ecological Modelling 182 (2), 159–181.
Bartholy, J., Pongrácz, R. 2008.
Regionális éghajlatváltozás elemzése a Kárpát-medence térségére (Analysis of regional climate change in the region of the Carpathian Basin).
In: Harnos, Zs., Csete, L. Klímaváltozás: környezet – kockázat – társadalom.
Szaktudás Kiadó Ház, Budapest (in Hungarian) Bartholy, J., Pongrácz, R., Gelybó, Gy.
2007.
A 21. század végén várható éghajlatváltozás Magyarországon (The predicted climate change in the end of 21 st century in Hungary).
Földrajzi Értesítő 56 (3-4), 147–168.
(in Hungarian) Bede-Fazekas, Á.
2011.
Impression of the global climate change on the ornamental plant usage in Hungary.
Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Agriculture and Environment 3 (1), 211–220.
Bede-Fazekas, Á.
2012a.
Melegigényes díszfák telepíthetőségi területének előrejelzése a 21. századra (Prediction of the area of introduction of ornamental trees for the 21 st century).
Thesis.
Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest (in Hungarian) Bede-Fazekas, Á.
2012b.
Methods of modeling the future shift of the so called Moesz-line.
Applied Ecology and Environmental Research 10 (2), 141–156.
Berry, P.M., Dawson, T.P., Harrison, P.A., Pearson, R.G.
2002.
Modelling potential impacts of climate change on the bioclimatic envelope of species in Britain and Ireland.
Global Ecology and Biogeography 11 (6), 453–462.
Carpenter, G.A., Gopal, S., Macomber, S., Martens, S., Woodcock, C.E., Franklin, J.
1999.
A Neural Network Method for Efficient Vegetation Mapping.
Remote Sensing of Environment 70 (3), 326–338.
Cohen, J.
1960.
A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales.
Educational and Psychological Measurement 20 (1), 37– 46.
Czinkóczky, A., Bede-Fazekas, Á.
2012.
Visualization of the climate change with the shift of the so called Moesz-line.
In: Buhmann, E., Ervin, S., Pietsch, M. Peer Reviewed Proceedings of Digital Landscape Architecture 2012 at Anhalt University of Applied Sciences.
Herbert Wichmann Verlag, Berlin Czúcz, B.
2010.
Az éghajlatváltozás hazai természetközeli élőhelyekre gyakorolt hatásainak modellezése (Modelling the impact of climate change on natural habitats in Hungary).
Dissertation, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest (in Hungarian) Czúcz, B., Gálhidy, L., Mátyás, Cs.
2011.
Present and forecasted xeric climatic limits of beech and sessile oak distribution at low altitudes in Central Europe.
Annals of Forest Science 68 (1), 99–108.
Führer, E. 2008.
Erdőgazdaság (Forestry).
In: Harnos, Zs., Gaál, M., Hufnagel, L. Klímaváltozásról mindenkinek.
Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, Kertészettudományi Kar, Matematikai és Informatikai Tanszék, Budapest (in Hungarian) Führer, E., Rasztovits, E., Csóka, Gy., Lakatos, F., Bordács, S., Nagy, L., Mátyás, Cs.
2010.
Current status of European beech (Fagus sylvatica L.) genetic resources in Hungary.
Communicationes Instituti Forestalis Bohemicae 25 (1), 152–163.
Guisan, A., Zimmermann, N.E.
2000.
Predictive habitat distribution models in ecology.
Ecological Modelling 135 (2-3), 147–186.
Hanley, J.A., McNeil, B.J.
1982.
The meaning and use of area under a receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve.
Radiology 143 (1), 29–36.
Harrison, S., Damschen, E.I., Grace, J.B. 2010.
Ecological contingency in the effects of climatic warming on forest herb communities.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107 (45), 19362-19367.
Hijmans, R.J., Graham, C.H.
2006.
The ability of climate envelope models to predict the effect of climate change on species distributions.
Global Change Biology 12, 2272-2281.
Hilbert, D.W., Ostendorf, B.
2001.
The utility of artificial neural networks for modelling the distribution of vegetation in past, present and future climates.
Ecological Modelling 146 (1-3), 311–327.
Hilbert, D.W., Van Den Muyzenberg, J.
1999.
Using an artificial neural network to characterize the relative suitability of environments for forest types in a complex Modeling the impacts of climate change on phytogeographical units.
A case study of the Moesz line 27 tropical vegetation mosaic.
Diversity and Distributions 5 (6), 263–274.
Horváth, L. 2008a.
A földrajzi analógia alkalmazása klímaszcenáriók vizsgálatában (Use of spatial analogy for studying climate scenarios).
In: Harnos, Zs., Csete, L. Klímaváltozás: környezet – kockázat – társadalom.
Szaktudás Kiadó Ház, Budapest (in Hungarian) Horváth, L. 2008b.
Földrajzi analógia alkalmazása klímaszcenáriók elemzésében és értékelésében (Use of spatial analogy in analysis and valuation of climate scenarios).
Dissertation, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest (in Hungarian) Ibáñez, I., Clark, J.S., Dietze, M.C., Feeley, K., Hersh, M., Ladeau, S., Mcbride, A., Welch, N.E., Wolosin, M.S.
2006.
Predicting Biodiversity Change: Outside the Climate Envelope, beyond the Species-Area Curve.
Ecology 87 (8), 1896–1906.
Iverson, L.R., Prasad, A.M., Matthews, S.N., Peters, M. 2008.
Estimating potential habitat for 134 eastern US tree species under six climate scenarios.
Forest Ecology and Management 254 (3), 390–406.
Kovács-Láng, E., Kröel-Dulay, Gy., Czúcz, B.
2008.
The impacts of climate change on the wildlife and our protecting and researching tasks [Az éghajlatváltozás hatásai a természetes élővilágra és teendőink a megőrzés és kutatás területén].
Természetvédelmi Közlemények 14 (1), 5–39.
(in Hungarian) Mátyás, Cs., Berki, I., Czúcz, B., Gálos, B., Móricz, N., Rasztovits, E. 2010.
Future of beech in Southeast Europe from the perspective of evolutionary ecology.
Acta Silv.
Lign.
Hung.
6 (1), 91–110.
Moesz, G. 1911.
Adatok Bars vármegye flórájához (Supplementary data of Bars county).
Botanikai Közlemények 10 (5-6), 171–185.
(in Hungarian) Ogawa-Onishi, Y., Berry, P.M., Tanaka, N. 2010.
Assessing the potential impacts of climate change and their conservation implications in Japan: A case study of conifers.
Biological Conservation 143 (7), 1728–1736.
Özesmi, S.L., Özesmi, U.
1999.
An artificial neural network approach to spatial habitat modelling with interspecific interaction.
Ecological Modelling 116 (1), 15–31.
Özesmi, S.L., Tan, C.O., Özesmi, U.
2006, Methodological issues in building, training, and testing artificial neural networks in ecological applications.
Ecological Modelling 195 (1-2), 83–93.
Schmidt, G. 2006.
Klímaés időjárás-változás és a fás szárú dísznövények (Climate and weather change and the ornamental ligneous plants)] In: Csete, L., Nyéki, J. Klímaváltozás és a magyarországi kertgazdaság.
„AGRO21” Kutatási Programiroda, Budapest (in Hungarian) Skov, F., Svenning, J.C. 2004.
Potential impact of climatic change on the distribution of forest herbs in Europe.
Ecography 27 (3), 366–380.
Somlyay, L. 2003.
A Muscari botryoides (L.) Mill.
hazai alakkörének rendszertani-chorológiai vizsgálata (Taxonomic and chorological study of the Muscari botryoides (L.) Mill.
complex in Hungary).
Dissertation, Corvinus University of Debrecen, Debrecen (in Hungarian) Stankowski, P.A., Parker, W.H.
2010.
Species distribution modelling: Does one size fit all?
A phytogeographic analysis of Salix in Ontario.
Ecological Modelling 221 (13-14), 1655–1664.
Szabó, K., Bede-Fazekas, Á.
2012.
A forgalomban lévő fásszárú dísznövénytaxonok szárazságtűrésének értékelése a klímaváltozás tükrében (Evaluation of the impact of climate change on current drought-tolerant woody plants).
Kertgazdaság 44 (4), 62–73.
(in Hungarian) Van Leeuwen, B., Tobak, Z.
2008.
GIS Solutions for Belvíz monitoring: A case study in Csongrád county, Hungary.
XII.
Symposium on Geomathematics, I. CroatianHungarian Geomathematical Conference, Mórahalom
Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 223 The Impact of Post-Covid-19 Economic Recession on Public Perception of Climate Change and Environmental Behavior in Pakistan Shariq Waheed a, Husnain Waheed b, Ra’ana Malik c, Abdul Ghaffar d a Postgraduate Scholar, Department of Gender Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
Email: Shariqwaheed2@gmail.com b Department of Economics and Finance, Foundation University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
Email: Husnainwaheedd@gmail.com c Professor and Chairperson, Department of Gender Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
Email: Raana.malik@yahoo.com d PhD Scholar, School of Statistics, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China & Lecturer, Government Dayal Singh Graduate College Lahore Email: abdulghaffar884@gmail.com ARTICLE DETAILS ABSTRACT History: Accepted 25 July 2022 Available Online September 2022 The interconnection between economic development, fervid crossovers in the frame of contagious diseases, and environmental problems, in particular, have, until now, seen less scrutiny from environmental economists.
Empirical evidence suggests that great economic recessions have proven to affect the prioritization of environmental and climate protection.
The current study surveys the perception of the residents of Lahore, Pakistan regarding their environmental perception and awareness of climate change issues at the time of post-COVID-19 economic recession.
Furthermore, the present study investigates several economic factors including the impact of economic recession influencing the environmental behavior of mainstream society.
A cross-sectional quantitative research design was utilized to gather data from 343 respondents belonging to a public university in Pakistan.
To statistically analyze the date, chi square test and multinomial logistic regression was utilized to examine significant economic factors associated with environmental behaviors.
The findings reveal that climate change is viewed as one of the main ecological problems in Lahore, Pakistan.
Furthermore, significant association was found between individual’s socioeconomic background and impact of economic recession with their prioritization of climate action.
The present research has several implications as identifying rising challenges of economic and climaterelated threats can aid in adopting a more dynamic approach to strategic and structural investments.
The current paper suggests robust policy interventions against financial instability to ensure collective as well as individual effort against climate change for a stable and sustainable future.
© 2022 The authors.
Published by SPCRD Global Publishing.
This is an open access article under the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 Keywords: Economic Recession, Climate Change, Covid-19, Environmental Economics JEL Classification: F15, DOI: 10.47067/reads.v8i3.459 Corresponding author’s email address: Shariqwaheed2@gmail.com Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 224 1.
Introduction Climate change is one of the formidable obstacles faced by humanity in present times.
However, its direct consequences on wellbeing of humans are not generally coherent making it difficult for individuals to envisage the sources of climate change and its potential impact on their lives (Mochizuki & Bryan, 2015).
However, it does not suggest that the reverberations of climate change do not bother human beings.
(Carolyn, 2010).
Numerous researches have endeavored to measure the public discernments and perspectives regarding the dilemma of climate change on both national and international level.
Most of residents in developed nations appear to be sensitized with the outcomes of climate change.
(Skoufias, 2011; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006), despite the fact that they do not clearly know the contrivance through which anthropocentricism has an impact on it (Pihkala, 2018).
The era of Covid-19 was followed by a period of economic turmoil.
Empirical evidence suggests that during Covid-19, a decline of 26.4% in GDP of Pakistan was reported from march to June as compared to pre-Covid-19 setting.
Industry took a loss of 6.7%, services took a loss of 17.6%, agriculture on the other hand remained relatively unhurt and only declined by 2.1% (Moeen et al., 2021).
All households saw a decrease in income, yet high-income groups seemed to bear loss more as compared to low-income ones.
It has been seen that the expansion in unemployment in Pakistan converted into three times increase in poverty.
(Moeen et al., 2020).
In an economic crisis scenario, individuals with low income tend to be more perturbed regarding climate change as they do not have the necessities to overcome the adverse effect of climate change or other ecological catastrophes.
Contrary to that, high-income individuals are relatively less concerned about climate change, firstly because they have the resources to overcome the effects of climate and secondly they may perceive that they will have to pay higher taxes to fight climate change.
(Lo, 2014) Economic Recession is one of the main factors, which drives popular opinion on climate change.
The Covid-19 pandemic lead to labor shortage, supply chain disruptions, and chaos in the energy market, which eventually lead to recession.
During recession, the focus of general public may shift from the greater good to personal benefit.
(Shum, 2012).
This model portrays the European Union where a single among two residents perceive climate change to be a serious issue during 2013, positioning it as the third most serious issue (European Commission, 2008).
This trend was altered compared with 2008 which was marked by economic crisis, where 62% of European citizens considered climate threat as the second most difficult issue faced by the planet (European Commission, 2013).
A European country like Greece, which was hit by an economic crisis between 2009 and 2015, affected how citizens of Greece perceived the solemnity of climate change.
In 2008, 90% of the Greek citizens contemplated climate change to be absolute global issue and recession to be 4th most serious issue.
A trend reversal was seen in 2013 when recession was segregated as 2nd most serious issue and climate change was segregated as 3rd most serious issue.
(Papoulis et al., 2015).
Several evidences have indicated the impact of income background and Economic Recession on the Prioritization of climate change in general public.
However, these studies were framed in western setups, which resulted in a scarcity of economic-disaggregated data related to environmental concerns from Asian countries especially from Pakistan.
Moreover, the interconnection between economic development, fervid crossovers in the frame of contagious diseases, and environmental problems, in particular, have, until now, seen less scrutiny from environmental economists.
In this context, the current study surveys the perception of the youth of Lahore, Pakistan regarding their environmental perception and attitude related to climate change issues during post-COVID-19 economic crises.
Furthermore, the present study investigates several economic factors influencing the environmental Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 225 behaviour of mainstream society.
2.
Research Hypothesis The current study intends to explore the perception of university students regarding climate change.
The study also seeks to decipher the association between variables including climate change perception, socio economic background, climate action prioritization and post-Covid-19 economic recession.
The study aims to test the following hypothesis: H1: Socioeconomic background would be significantly associated with subjective perception of climate change.
H2: Socioeconomic background would be significantly associated with the prioritization of climate action.
H3: Impact of post-Covid-19 economic recession would be significantly associated with prioritization of climate action.
3.
Methodology The purpose of the research was to investigate the perception of university youth about climate change during period of post-Covid-19 economic recession along with exploring the association between variables that affect environmental behaviour through a self-reflective quantitative survey.
3.1 Study Design, Population and Procedure The research team initiated the recruitment of participants on 15th April 2022 through a cross sectional quantitative research design.
The participants were contacted directly and data collection was done face to face via a pencil, paper-type test where survey questionnaire were dispersed among respondents and were collected back on spot.
The study population comprised of 343 university students (both males and females) aged 17 to 30 years enrolled in undergraduate and postgraduate programs.
Respondents were allocated in current study from University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan using non-probability convenience sampling method.
Study utilized non-probability convenience sampling because of on hand and easy access to large population (Lehdonvirta et al., 2021; Stratton, 2021).
The participation in this study was voluntary.
Simple and inclusive language was used in the survey questionnaire for easy understanding of participants.
In the current study, SPSS (version 20) was employed with the statistical significance set as 0.05.
Total 356 questionnaires were received after survey completion, of which 13 incomplete responses were excluded.
Finally, 343 responses were eligible for analysis.
Of the respondents 178 were male and 165 were female.
The descriptive statistics of the participants are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Participants (n=343) Demographic Information Frequency Percentage Gender Male 178 52 Female 165 48 Education level Undergraduate Students 187 54.5 Postgraduate Students 156 45.5 Marital Status Single 271 79 Married 71 21 Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 226 3.2 Measures The survey questionnaire used for collecting data in this study was segmented into 4 categories: respondent’s socio-demographic, socio economic status, climate change perception, prioritization of climate change and economic recession.
The socio-demographic segment of the questionnaire included characteristic information including gender, age, education, income and marital status.
Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEP) developed by Dunlap et al., 2000 was employed to measure respondent’s perception of climate change by measuring agreement with different statements regarding the relationship between the climate and human beings (sample item: If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.)
For present study, NEP scale was modified to focus on the main subject of the research i.e.
climate change.
Consisting of 15 items, responses were rated on a 5-point Likert type scale (1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree).
The even items were scored reversed; the positive, high perception was indicated by the agreement with odd numbers while agreement with even number indicated low climate perception.
The revised new ecological paradigm scale has repeatedly showed high internal consistency (Claudio et al,.
2022; Derdowski, 2020; Barradas & Ghilardi 2020).
In current study, the reliability of NEP Scale was satisfactory (α=6.16) The socio-economic background of the respondents was measured by averaging the responses about monthly income and education level.
Respondent’s prioritization of climate change was measured by the question: ‘Here are some issues now being discussed in The Parliament.
Do you think each of these issues should be a low, medium or high priority for the current government?
(Mildenberger & Leiserowitz, 2017)’ Respondents indicated their priority for the ‘climate change’ item using a threepoint scale ranging from ‘Low’ to ‘High’.
Finally, participant self-reports were utilized to establish measures of economic recession impact.
The economic recession variable was measured by question: ‘How much has the economic downturn in this country since Covid-19 personally hurt you and your family?
(Mildenberger & Leiserowitz, 2017)’.
Participants indicated the extent of being impacted by the economic recession using two options either ‘Some’ or ‘Á lot’.
3.3 Ethical Considerations APA 7th version ethical guidelines were adhered to in the design and execution of this research.
Before the initiation of the study, formal approval and ethical clearance was taken from respondents to carry out the research.
Moreover, participants’ identities were promised to be kept confidential and anonymous.
Furthermore, the study was formally approved by Internal Review Board of University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
3.4 Data Analysis The analysis of data was carried out employing descriptive and inferential statistics.
The testing of proposed hypothesis was carried out utilizing inferential statistics.
The comparison and association between variables was tested using Chi-square test.
Multinomial logistic regression analyses was then utilized to examine economic factors influencing individual environmental prioritization and behaviors.
The reference category for regression in current study was High prioritization of climate action.
Findings from multinomial logistic regression analyses are given as odds ratios.
Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 227 4.
Findings and Discussion The present study investigated the perception of respondents related to climate change during post Covid-19 economic recession along with surveying the association between several factors influencing the environmental behaviour including socio economic background, perception of climate change, prioritization of climate action and economic recession.
In current study the age of respondents ranged from 17 to 30 years.
The current study constituted 178 (52%) male and 165 (48%) female respondents.
There were 72 (21%) married participants and 271 (79%) single participants.
A majority of respondents 187 (54.5%) were enrolled in an undergraduate program while 156 (45.5%) were enrolled in a post graduate program.
The association between different variable including climate change perception, socio economic background, climate change prioritization and post-Covid-19 economic perception were measured using Chi-square statistics.
Table 2: Frequencies and Chi-Square Results for Climate Change Perception and Socio-Economic Background (N=343) Low Moderate High X2(1) P Source n % n % n % Low 31 27 34 25.5 27 28.4 .210 Moderate 75 65.2 94 70.8 57 60 5.85 High 9 7.8 5 3.7 11 11.6 Table 2 reveals that chi-square test of independence showed no significant association between socioeconomic background and climate change perception with X(1,N=343)= 5.85, p=.210, φ=.13.
Hence hypothesis 1 was rejected.
The findings report no significant differences among different socioeconomic backgrounds, where the perception of all the socioeconomic backgrounds regarding climate change is high.
This suggests that most of respondents were aware of climate change and its adverse effect on the living conditions of humanity and that respondent’s level of information is good regarding climate change.
(Akerlof et al., 2013).
Moreover, people need to be better informed on the issue, in order to gain knowledge of every possible action they can undertake to mitigate the potential impact.
(Moser, 2009) Table 3: Frequencies and Chi-Square Results for Climate Action Prioritization and Socio-Economic Background (N=343) Low Moderate High X2(1) p Source n % n % n % Low 8 7 16 12 36 37.8 0.000 Moderate 27 23.4 87 65.5 38 40 101.7 High 80 69.6 30 22.5 21 22.2 Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 228 Table 3 reveals that chi-square test of independence showed significant association between socioeconomic background and climate action prioritization with X(1,N=343)= 101.7, p=.000, φ=.54.
Hence hypothesis 2 was accepted.
Results revealed climate action prioritization to be high in respondents with medium (40%) and low (37.8%) socio economic backgrounds.
Table 4: Frequencies and Chi-Square Results for Climate Action Prioritization and Post-Covid-19 Economic Recession (N=343) Some A lot X2(1) P Source n % n % Low 3 1.25 57 55.3 .000 Moderate 115 47.9 37 35.9 156.3 High 122 50.8 9 8.8 Table 4 reveals that chi-square test of independence showed significant association between Post-Covid-19 Economic Recession and climate action prioritization with X(1,N=343)= 156.3, p=.000, φ=.67.
Hence, hypothesis 3 was accepted.
Results revealed climate action prioritization to be low in respondents mostly affected by post-Covid-19 economic recession (55.3%) and high in respondents least affected by post-Covid-19 economic recession (50.8%).
Table 5 Factors Prioritization of Climate Action Low Medium Exp β 95% CI Exp β 95% CI Socio Economic Status Low .058*** .024-.144 .187* .094-.371 Moderate .311* .138-.700 1.603 .816-3.149 High (RC) 0.00 0.00 Impact of Economic Recession Some .123* .062-.246 *.277 .160-.482 A lot 0.00 0.00 Results from a multinomial logistic regression analysis for Socio economic status and Impact of Economic Recession affecting prioritization of climate action (Low, Medium, High) RC= Reference Category, ***p value =0.000, **p value =0.001 , *p value = <0.05 Table 5 shows the findings from multinomial regression analysis.
The model explained 27% variation in the relationship between socio economic status of the individuals and their prioritization of climate action.
The results suggest that low socioeconomic status was a significant determinant of low as well as medium climate action prioritization.
The results also reveal that individuals with moderate socio-economic status have lower odds (69%) of having low prioritization of climate action than the individuals having high socio-economic status.
Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 229 In this study there is a significant association between socioeconomic backgrounds and prioritization of climate change.
Where most of the respondents with low and moderate socioeconomic backgrounds responded with high prioritization of climate action.
The outcomes suggest that the reason behind high prioritization of climate change among low and moderate socioeconomic background is their lack of resources to tackle climate change, they believe that they will be most affected by rising temperatures, extreme weather events, floods, droughts and reduction of farmland.
While on the other hand respondents with low climate change prioritization belong to high socioeconomic background and the outcome suggests that the reason behind their low prioritization of climate change is firstly excess of resources to handle the effects of climate change and secondly, they believe that in order to oppose climate change government would impose high taxes on respondents with high socioeconomic background.
Table 5 further shows the effect of the impact of economic recession on Climate action prioritization.
The model explained 13% variation in the relationship between impact of economic recession on the individuals and their prioritization of climate action.
The relevance of impact of economic recession on individuals is evident in it being a significant predictor of individual’s prioritization of climate action.
Compared to individuals greatly affected by economic recession, those who are relatively less impacted by economic recession are 88% less likely to have low prioritization of climate action and 73% less likely to have medium prioritization of climate action.
The findings of this study suggests that the respondents most affected by Post Covid-19 Economic Recession have low climate action prioritization.
In the wake of rising Covid-19 cases government limited transportation and construction, weak domestic consumption lead to delay in commercial investments (Alam et al., 2021) and increase in unemployment was linked with plummeting household incomes and rising poverty during and after the lockdown (Moeen et al., 2021).
The study suggests that respondents most affected by recession wanted the government institutes to focus on revival of economy instead of climate action.
Respondents most affected by post covid-19 economic recession were struggling with their basic needs so ultimately their top priority was their basic needs and revival of economy instead of climate action prioritization.
The findings of this study also suggests that respondent’s least affected by post covid-19 economic recession had high climate action prioritization.
The outcome suggests that these individuals belonged to the sectors which were least affected by post Covid-19 recession which means that they had enough resources to fulfill their basic needs and these individuals wanted government institutes to focus more on climate action.
A limitation of present study is that the population of current research were mainly university students who are not at the forefront of being severely impacted by economic recession comparatively to other working groups of mainstream society.
The future study should seek to test the hypothesis of current research in other societal groups too, in order to decipher other dimensions of economicenvironmental behavior.
Furthermore, there has been no work done in similar domain, particularly in Asia or Pakistan before the Covid-19 economic recession, which delimits the present research to explore and compare trends regarding climate change perception and prioritization in phases of economic growth, and recession.
In this context, present search constitutes the base for futures studies on economic situation-climate change nexus.
5.
Conclusion The findings show medium to high level of perception related to climate change during post-Covid-19 economic recession in the mainstream public.
The study also reveals significant association between variables like socio economic background and prioritization of climate action, Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 230 also impact of post-Covid-19 economic recession and climate change prioritization.
The present research has several implications as identifying rising challenges of economic and climate-related threats can aid in adopting a more dynamic approach to strategic and structural investments.
The current paper suggests immediate action against the present extensive financial challenges to turn away the drawn-out impacts of climate change.
Moreover, the study also suggests robust policy interventions against financial instability to ensure collective as well as individual action against climate change for a stable and sustainable future.
References Alam, M. M., Wei, H., & Wahid, A. N. (2021).
COVID‐19 outbreak and sectoral performance of the Australian stock market: An event study analysis.
Australian economic papers, 60(3), 482-495.
Akerlof, K., Maibach, E. W., Fitzgerald, D., Cedeno, A. Y., & Neuman, A.
(2013).
Do people “personally experience” global warming, and if so how, and does it matter?.
Global environmental change, 23(1), 81-91.
Barradas, J. I., & Ghilardi-Lopes, N. P. (2020).
A case study using the New Ecological Paradigm scale to evaluate coastal and marine environmental perception in the Greater São Paulo (Brazil).
Ocean & Coastal Management, 191, 105177.
Carolan, M. (2010).
Sociological ambivalence and climate change.
Local environment, 15(4), 309-321.
Claudio D. Rosa, Silvia Collado & Lincoln R. Larson (2022) The utility and limitations of the New Ecological Paradigm scale for children, The Journal of Environmental Education, DOI: 10.1080/00958964.2022.2044281 Derdowski, L.A.; Grahn, Å.H.
; Hansen, H.; Skeiseid, H. The New Ecological Paradigm, ProEnvironmental Behaviour, and the Moderating Effects of Locus of Control and SelfConstrual.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 7728. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12187728 European Commission.
(2008).
Europeans’ Attitudes towards Climate Change, Special Eurobarometer 300/Wave 69.2; European Commission: Brussels, Belgium, 2008.
European Commission.
(2013).
Climate Change, Special Eurobarometer 409/Wave EB80.2; European Commission: Brussels, Belgium.
Lehdonvirta, V., Oksanen, A., Räsänen, P., & Blank, G. (2021).
Social media, web, and panel surveys: using non‐probability samples in social and policy research.
Policy & internet, 13(1), 134-155.
Lo, A. Y.
(2014).
Negative income effect on perception of long-term environmental risk.
Ecological Economics, 107, 51-58.
Lorenzoni, I., & Pidgeon, N. F. (2006).
Public views on climate change: European and USA perspectives.
Climatic change, 77(1), 73-95.
Matto Mildenberger & Anthony Leiserowitz (2017): Public opinion on climate change: Is there an economy–environment tradeoff?, Environmental Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1322275 Mochizuki, Y., & Bryan, A.
(2015).
Climate change education in the context of education for sustainable development: Rationale and principles.
Journal of Education for Sustainable Development, 9(1), 4-26.
Moeen, Muhammad Saad; Haider, Zeeshan; Shikoh, Sania Haider; Rizwan, Noormah; Davies, Stephen; and Rana, Abdul Wajid.
2020.
COVID-19: Estimating impact on the economy and poverty in Pakistan: Using SAM Multiplier Model.
PACE Policy Working Paper December 2020.
Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
Moeen, M. S., Haider, Z., Shikoh, S. H., Rizwan, N., Davies, S., & Rana, A. W. (2021).
COVID-19: Estimating impact on the economy and poverty in Pakistan: Using SAM Multiplier Model.
Intl Food Policy Res Inst.
Moeen, M. S., Haider, Z., Shikoh, S. H., Rizwan, N., Davies, S., & Rana, A. W. (2021).
COVID-19: Estimating impact on the economy and poverty in Pakistan: Using SAM Multiplier Model.
Intl https://doi.org/10.1080/00958964.2022.2044281 https://doi.org/10.3390/su12187728 Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
8 (3) 2022, 223 231 231 Food Policy Res Inst.
Moser, S. C. (2009).
Costly knowledge–unaffordable denial: The politics of public understanding and engagement on climate change.
The Politics of Climate Change: A Survey, 1, 293-302.
Papoulis, D., Kaika, D., Bampatsou, C., & Zervas, E. (2015).
Public perception of climate change in a period of economic crisis.
Climate, 3(3), 715-726.
Pihkala, P. (2018).
ECO‐ANXIETY, TRAGEDY, AND HOPE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: with Karl E. Peters,“Living with the Wicked Problem of Climate Change”; Paul H. Carr,“What Is Climate Change Doing to Us and for Us?”; James Clement van Pelt,“Climate Change in Context: Stress, Shock, and the Crucible of Livingkind”; Robert S. Pickart,“Climate Change at High Latitudes: An Illuminating Example”; Emily E. Austin,“Soil Carbon Transformations”; David A. Larrabee,“Climate Change and Conflicting Future .... Zygon®, 53(2), 545-569.
Shum, R. Y.
(2012).
Effects of economic recession and local weather on climate change attitudes.
Climate Policy, 12(1), 38-49.
Skoufias, E., Rabassa, M., & Olivieri, S. (2011).
The poverty impacts of climate change: a review of the evidence.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (5622).
Stratton, S. J.
(2021).
Population research: convenience sampling strategies.
Prehospital and disaster Medicine, 36(4), 373-374.
1 © Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp Town and Regional Planning 2022 (81):1-6 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: Adeleye, O.I.
& Ajobiewe, T.O.
2022.
Climate change, Covid-19 and war: Triad Litmus Test questioning the conscientiousness for collective action.
Town and Regional Planning, no.
81, pp.
1-6.
Mr Oluwaseyi Adeleye, Urban Policy Planning & Local Government Department, Middle East Technical University, Üniversiteler Mahallesi, Dumlupınar Bulvarı No:1, 06800 Çankaya/Ankara, Turkey, email: adeleyeoluwaseyi917@gmail.com, ORCID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0003-10819653 Mr Tolulope Ajobiewe, Urban Policy Planning & Local Government Department, Middle East Technical University, Üniversiteler Mahallesi, Dumlupınar Bulvarı No:1, 06800 Çankaya/Ankara, Turkey, email: toluodigwe@yahoo.com, ORCID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0002-8802-0641 Climate change, COVID-19 and war: Triad Litmus Test questioning the conscientiousness for collective action Commentary by Oluwaseyi Adeleye & Tolulope Ajobiewe, 1 August 2022 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.1 1.
INTRODUCTION The social processes of industrialisation, modernisation and globalisation create drastic and threatening interventions in human living conditions, particularly in terms of the development of productive forces, market integration, and the relationships that exist between property and power.
These social processes continue to prod societies and nation states into the cycle of ‘what ifs’ and ‘maybe’.
But again, due to unintended maybes, such pursuit of quantum growth over the years by scientists or science and technology, policymakers, sovereigns, and so on has resulted in errors and deceptions under the guise of acceptable maximum regulation of composition uncovered through proof of causality, coupled with practical experiences of side effects by people in societies.
To achieve sustainable development, there is a need to pioneer and/or contribute to debates, queries, and enquiries confronting [in]actions, policies, initiatives, and interventions instituted – or not – to maintain the environment at a life-sustaining level with the attendant economic development.
Therefore, the begging question: Are clamours for sustainability merely rhetoric, echoed and re-echoed only when convenient, or are they conscientiously adhered to while pursuing economic prosperity?
In other words, can an efficiency-based cost-benefit analysis yield realistic solutions to the implications of global warming?
Underlying the triad of climate change, COVID-19, and the Russia-Ukraine war as litmus tests, the focus, in this instance, is to criticise posturing deputising effective actions instituted so far in the wake of a global call for sustainable practices, while striving to realise prosperous economic well-being.
More precisely, the merits of the adopted actions, which are considered both superficial and outcomes of ‘what ifs’ and ‘maybes’ somewhat more concerned with economic growth and less with sustainable development and dodgy in the petition for holistic approaches to sustainability, are underscored.
Accordingly, this commentary scrutinises the adulteration of solutions through policy options; COVID-19 emission scenario as a litmus test of shared commitment, and the hypocrisy on display from the Ukraine-Russia War, where economic prosperity seems to trump climate-change efforts.
2.
GLOBAL ONTOGENY OF CLIMATE CHANGE – THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION During the 20th century, human activities from anthropogenic processes have contributed considerably to climate change (Rahman, 2012: 3; IPCC, 2018), by increasing carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and other heatretention gases such as nitrous oxide (N2O) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), collectively called greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere.
Gupta (2014: 3) referred to it as a post-industrialisation problem caused by net emission of GHGs.
The recognition that climate change and its mementos is a global crisis necessitates a concerted effort to mitigate and adapt.
Global governance entrenched in sustainable development to curb GHGs emission started with the 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm, where the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was established.
Of particular importance are United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol (Gupta et al., 2007), and the Paris Agreement (Schellnhuber, Rahmstorf & Winkelmann, 2016).
Apropos most of the empirical studies, the burning of fossil fuel for energy demands forms the bulk from which GHGs are emitted (Kumar et al., 2021: 2), and economies globally thrive on fossil fuel usage.
This is why Lenz and Fajdetić (2021: 14) not only pointed out that the impact of globalisation on the environment has often been evaluated as negative, http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:adeleyeoluwaseyi917@gmail.com https://orcid.
org/0000-0003-1081-9653 https://orcid.
org/0000-0003-1081-9653 mailto:toluodigwe@yahoo.com https://orcid.
org/0000-0002-8802-0641 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp81i1.1 2 Adeleye & Ajobiewe 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):1-6 but also validated conclusions of empirical studies by, among others, Rahman (2013), Akin (2014), Zhang, Liu and Bae (2017), Kalaycı and Hayaloğlu (2019), that increase in globalisation and international trade cause a direct proportional increase in GHG emissions and an indirect increase in environmental and climate degradation.
The conundrum whether to uphold environmental sustenance to the detriment of economic growth or darn climate change and its associated impacts, to pursue aggressively, economic prosperity heralded clean development mechanism (CDM), joint investment (JI), emission trading (ET),1 and nationally determined contributions (NDCs)2 as mechanisms capable of promoting emission reduction and economic advancement simultaneously.
These mechanisms, whether fraught with tremendous benefits (environmental and economic) or not, have endured wide criticisms ranging from their tendencies as a recipe for economic war (referring to direct carbon tax) to their propensity to place carbon emission crisis in abeyance.
For example, McLean et al.
(2018) argued that the intended nationally determined contributions, mostly submitted by key countries in the periods leading to conference of the parties (COP21),3 were insufficient in terms of medium-term emissions reductions.
Others are concerned that most of the proposed solutions to mitigate GHG emission will in all likelihood be costly and ineffective (Rebecca et al., 2018).
Compatible with emission reduction goal-setting theories, which Rahman (2013: 5) and Leonardi (2017: 65) credited to leading scientific authorities on climate change Hamza et al.
(2020), it seems improbable to significantly reduce the risk of global climate change, since everyone benefits from anthropogenic activities leading to GHG emission while demanding that specific countries, firms, and individuals must bear the cost.
Besides, while some businesses 1 See IPCC (2018) 2 See IPCC (2018) 3 The 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference and countries perceive climate change as a serious threat to their industries (Rebecca et al., 2018), others, however, recognise in it advantages to promote green energy innovation and technologies robust with potentials to mitigate the risk of climate change, by reducing the atmospheric concentration of GHGs provided in CDM, JI, ET, and NDCs.
But have they?
Or are the mechanisms outcomes of series of ‘what ifs’ and ‘maybes’ with an expectation of a favourable result, while adhering to the principles of neoliberalism: ‘no market, no future’.
3.
ADULTERATION OF SOLUTIONS: ENTERS POLICY OPTIONS FROM ‘WHAT IFS’ AND ‘MAYBES’ CUTTING CORNERS GHG emissions reduction across all sectors demands a portfolio of bespoke policies to meet national circumstances (Gupta et al., 2007: 747).
It is worth mentioning that there is often the plausibility that voted mechanisms responsible to accomplish all identified policies can be poorly or well designed, loosely or strictly enforced, or even politically resistible or irresistible.
Gupta et al.
(2007: 747) subsumed under four themes the predominant criteria policymakers use for designing, monitoring, and evaluating policies – environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional effects (including equity), and institutional feasibility.
Mindful of this, it is fitting to present a rough and ready evaluation of the emission-reductions mechanisms adopted on-set the Kyoto Protocol, to resonate, albeit banal, the intrinsic fallacy of CDM, JI, ET and NDCs to reduce GHGs emission.
It is the contention of this commentary that, more than likely, these instruments do more to expand it.
Baudry, Faure and Quemin (2021 and characterize situations where the trading costs depress or raise permit prices relative to frictionless market conditions.
We calibrate our model to annual transaction data in Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012: 2), in an attempt at historical retell, intimated to the readers that the theory of Emission Trading (ET) led off from the seminal works of Coase (1960), Crocker (1966), and Dales (1968) and the subsequent formalisation by Montgomery (1972).
Since then, and according to them, ET has become crucial in the climate-change mitigation regulatory toolbox.
For instance, in the United States, trading of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) dates back to the 1990s (Hepburn, 2007: 376).
Still, there is a systematic difference between the practice preand post-Kyoto Protocol; a manifestation evinced in the sheer scale of current enterprise based on climate governance.
Emissions trading systems (ETS) is now a widely used climate and energy policy instrument (Quemin & Trotignon, 2021: 1).
In theory, Reyes and Gilbertson (2012: 69) argued that ET provides a cost-effective and efficient means to limit GHG reductions within an ever-tightening cap, albeit in practice, it rewards major polluters with profits, while subverting attempts to lessen pollution and attain a more sustainable economy.4 How so?
The cap-and-trade approach, for example, is a market-oriented environmental policy which puts limits on emission, while also proving a price for further emissions.
It is implemented by a market in compliance credits (Cheng, Engel & Wellman, 2019).
As such, entities obtain permits (also called allowances) – bought or sold at prices determined by a recognised trading system such as the EU ETS, which covers whatever they emit after attaining their limit.
Simply put, state governments or inter-governmental bodies give out licenses, likewise called carbon permits, to major industries to pollute the environment.
Like the cap-and-trade, carbon offsetting is another approach in ET mechanism.
Carbon offset programmes present organisations and individuals with an opportunity to compensate for generating emissions through the financial support of actions or projects that remove CO2 4 In an earlier article, Hepburn (2007: 378-379) recounts words of scholars detailing the duplicitous trait of ET.
Adeleye & Ajobiewe 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):1-6 3 from the atmosphere (Naus et al., 2020).
Governments, companies, institutions, individuals, among others, fund projects certified by the United Nations (UN) as ‘emissionssaving’, outside capped area, thereby granting the project sponsors a right to emit GHGs in their area.
While critiquing the acclaimed reduction mechanism, McAfee (2022: 171)universities, and businesses of all sorts have pledged to achieve “net zero” greenhouse gas emissions partly or entirely through offsetting projects, many of which rely on so-called nature-based solutions (NBSs argued that offsets are meant to compensate for damage caused by emissions from one site, by absorbing or preventing the release of an equivalent amount of GHGs elsewhere.
Carbon offsetting simply transfers emission reduction through projects under the framework of CDM or JI to places cheapest to make reductions.
In most instances, from countries of the Global North to those in the Global South.
The foregoing ingeminates Leonardi’s (2017: 71) question: “Why are policymakers so reliant on carbon markets when empirical evidence suggests that they do not work?” 4.
COVID-19 EMISSION SCENARIO – A LITMUS TEST OF SHARED COMMITMENT Granted, there is yet to be an all-encompassing up-to-date report concerning the impact of COVID-19 (scientifically referred to as the severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 or SARS-CoV-2) on GHG emission along with an assessment on CO2 emissions, global economy, energy influence, and sustainable policies for a better future (Kumar et al., 2021: 2).
Still, a growing number of studies on COVID-19 and GHG emission prove that, during the initial lockdown period, restrictions on almost all aspects of the economy substantially reduced the emissions of CO2.
The unannounced entrance of COVID-19 on 30 December 2019 and its subsequent declaration by World Health Organization (WHO) as a public health emergency of international concern on 30 January 2020 ( Zanke, Thenge and Adhao, 2021: 49) and a pandemic on 11 March 2020 (Forster et al., 2020: 913) compelled instantaneous government actions for basic safety measures in limiting the virus or inactions (considering the early days of scepticisms).
Consequently, the world was meted with COVID-19 global restrictions such as wearing facial masks and social distancing (Koonin et al., 2020).
In a scholarship by Kumar et al.
(2021: 2) on COVID-19 and emission, leveraging empirical studies, the authors posited that the strict COVID-19 measures adopted to abate the spread of the virus significantly decelerated economic activities globally.
This, in turn, imparted the environment positively, by lowering GHG emissions, especially atmospheric CO2 levels.
Their position validate studies such as Forster et al.
(2020), Smith, Tarui and Yamagata (2021), among others, on the noteworthy and yet unprecedented influence the pandemic has had on global energy consumption and GHG emissions.
Liu et al.
(2020) analysed emissions data for six economic regions across 69 countries.
Results from the study showed that a total of 17% of reduction in daily CO2 emissions was observed by April 2020 as against the mean level of the preceding year.
Similarly, Forster et al.
(2020), using national mobility data to estimate global emission reductions for ten species between February and June 2020, discovered that NOx emissions decreased by 30% in April, thus adding to a short-term cooling since the start of 2020.
In addition, due to the decreased fossil fuels consumption during the first quarter of 2020 compared to the first quarter of 2019, global CO2 emissions declined by 7.8%.
As per estimation for the whole of 2020, data for CO2 emissions revealed that there was a decline in CO2 emissions compared to 2019; 7% according to reports from International Energy Agency (IEA) (2020) and 8%, based on Enerdata 2020 reports (UNEP, 2020).
Further estimates from The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2021) projections are that, by 2025, COVID-19 and associated prevention measures would lead to a regional decrease in GHG emissions in virtually all countries.
Empirical evidence for now (until otherwise empirically refuted) shows that the limitations posed by COVID-19 on mobility to reduce transmission of the virus substantially influenced the emission levels globally.
As threatening to human health as COVID-19 is, it affected global GHG emissions in the early period of its emergence (Bai et al., 2020).
For lack of control over the COVID-19 scenarios, stricter measures even though inconvenient were adopted to limit mobilities, thus leading to reduced emission.
A juxtaposition of the two scenarios from ET (pre-COVID-19) and during the early days of COVID-19 paints an obvious picture of the level of conscientiousness global leaders devote to climate change.
Ironically, the adverse effect of GHGs emission continues to be felt to date but, because negative effects lack the capacity to halt the activities of economies globally, temporary and superficial solutions still enjoy patronage from parties’ concern with climate negotiation, compared to COVID-19, when a drastic rate of infection and subsequent death necessitated radical policies, even if economies took a hit.
5.
UKRAINE-RUSSIA WAR: THE HYPOCRISY ON DISPLAY – ECONOMIC OVER CLIMATE CHANGE The war between Ukraine and Russia puts on display the duplicitous commitment to reduce GHG emission, especially by European countries who, over time, have commissioned mechanisms and instituted ambitious policies to reduce emission.
According to the UN, between the night of 23 and dawn of 24 February 2022, Russia launched a military offensive in violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine in conflict with the principles of the Charter 4 Adeleye & Ajobiewe 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):1-6 of the United Nations (UN Report, 2022).
As Russia rains bombs on Ukraine, oil and gas from Russia continues to flow through networks of pipes crisscrossing international borders to Western nations.
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upset geopolitical and markets energy, forcing the price of oil and gas to reach their highest in almost a decade (Politico, 2022).
This situation has resulted in many countries re-evaluating their energy supplies sources.
On this note, it not only becomes necessary but also informative to highlight, through reportage, the sheer dependency on Russia’s oil, simultaneously putting on display the convenient pursuit of GHGs emission reduction.
In an article for CNBC, on Monday 20 June 2020, Meredith (2022) wrote: “The situation is serious”: Germany plans to fire up coal plants as Russia throttles gas supplies.
Reporting for CNBC, Meredith credited the statement, “the situation is going to be ‘really tight in winter’ without precautionary measures to prevent a supply shortage, in light of that, Germany will seek to compensate for a cut in Russian gas supplies by increasing the burning of coal”, to Robert Habeck, the current Economy Minister of Germany.
Splashed as a headline by The Economic Times, 23 June 2022, is “European countries turn back to coal as sanctions on Russian energy backfire.” A disturbing development in the fight against climate change was mentioned in the body of the article.
It read: “Germany, Austria, Poland, The Netherlands, and Greece are among the first European nations to reopen coal plants or take measures to support coal power.” In an article in CBC News, published on 25 June 2022, Singh, Bernstien and Hopton (2022) wrote: “Europe turns back to coal: A ‘temporary’ measure in response to Russian gas cut.” Ironically, the article noted that European leaders claim that the turn to coal is temporary and that the European Union’s (EU) climate plan is still on track.
Global Times captured rather well the severity of the war situation between Russia and Ukraine on climate change in their article – “Europe’s restart of coalfired generators to worsen climate change” – published on 21 June 2022 (Weijia, 2022).
On 30 July 2022, POLITICO featured an article titled, “Russia’s war is a short-term win for coal.” The article added further that the EU is seeking both brown and green energy solutions, and as of that moment, coal is definitely an option.
In a statement attributed to Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin of Poland, POLITOCO quotes it as: “We want coal energy to function in Poland in a much longer perspective than until 2049.” 6.
CONCLUSION This commentary is intended to form a single argument on how the trio are, in a manner of speaking, the monsters created by human civilisation.
In this commentary, the observers set in a wider context the overarching research question: If the clamours for sustainability are only rhetoric, echoed and re-echoed at times of convenience, or are they rhetoric conscientiously adhered to, whilst pursing economic prosperity?, as the article tried to argue, by juxtaposing the two scenarios from ET (pre-COVID-19) and during the early days of COVID-19.
On the canvas upon which the arguments were sketched, the level of conscientiousness global leaders devote to climate change becomes very clearly visible.
Not to mention the duplicitous commitment to reduce GHG emissions, especially by European countries who, over time, have commissioned mechanisms and instituted ambitious policies to reduce GHGs emission.
If anything, the Russia-Ukraine war puts on display the hypocrisy that has surrounded the reduction of GHG emission over time.
This is more often than not characteristic of the ‘what ifs’ and ‘maybe’ schemes such as those which ET fondly adopted only when suitable.
REFERENCES AKIN, C.S.
2014.
The impact of foreign trade, energy consumption and income on CO2 emissions.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 4(3), pp.
465-475.
BAI, Y., YAO, L., WEI ,T., TIAN, F. & JIN, D.Y.
et al.
2020.
Presumed asymptomatic carrier transmission of COVID-19.
Jama, 323(14), pp.
1406-1407.
DOI: 10.1001/ jama.2020.2565 BAUDRY, M., FAURE, A.
& QUEMIN, S. 2021.
Emissions trading with transaction costs.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 108, article number 102468.
DOI: 10.1016/j.
jeem.2021.102468 CHENG, F., ENGEL, Y.
& WELLMAN, M.P.
2019.
Cap-and-trade emissions regulation: A strategic analysis.
In: Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence IJCAI, 10-16 August, Macao, China, pp.
187-193.
DOI: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/27 FORSTER, P., FORSTER, H., EVANS, M., GIDDEN, M., JONES, C. et al.
2020.
Current and future global climate impacts resulting from COVID-19.
Nature Climate Change, 10(10), pp.
913-919.
DOI: 10.1038/ s41558-020-0883-0 GUPTA, J.
2014.
The history of global climate governance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9781139629072 GUPTA, S., TIRPAK, D.A., BURGER, N., GUPTA, J., HÖHNE, N. et al.
2007.
Policies, instruments and co-operative agreements.
In: Climate Change Working Group III: Mitigation of Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
745-808.
HAMZA, Y., AMETA, S., TUKUR, A.
& USMAN, A.
2020.
Overview on evidence and reality of climate change.
IOSR Journal of Environmental Science, Toxicology and Food Technology, 14(7), pp.
17-26.
DOI: 10.9790/2402-1407021726 HEPBURN, C. 2007.
Carbon trading: A review of the Kyoto mechanisms.
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 32, pp.
375-393.
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.
energy.32.053006.141203 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139629072 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139629072 Adeleye & Ajobiewe 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):1-6 5 IEA (INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY).
2020.
World Energy Outlook.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.iea.org/reports/world-energyoutlook-2020> [Accessed: 18 July 2022].
IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2018.
Global warming of 1.5◦C.
An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming.
Summary for policymakers.
IPCC, Switzerland.
[Online].
Available at: <http://report.
ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf> [Accessed: 18 July 2022].
https://doi.
org/10.1017/9781009157940 KALAYCI, C. & HAYALOĞLU, P. 2019.
The impact of economic globalization on CO2 emissions: The case of NAFTA countries.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 9(1), pp.
356-360.
DOI: 10.32479/ijeep.7233 KOONIN, L.M.
et al.
2020.
Trends in the use of telehealth during the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic – United States, January-March 2020.
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 69(43), pp.
1595-1599. https://doi.
org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6943a3 KUMAR, A., SINGH, P., RAIZADA, A.
& HUSSAIN, C.M.
2021.
Impact of COVID-19 on greenhouse gases emissions: A critical review.
Science of The Total Environment, 806(1), article number 150349. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.150349 LENZ, N.V. & FAJDETIĆ, B.
2021.
Globalization and GHG emissions in the EU: Do we need a new development paradigm?
Sustainability, 13(17), article number 9936.
DOI: 10.3390/su13179936 LEONARDI, E. 2017.
Carbon trading dogma: Theoretical assumptions and practical implications of global carbon markets.
Ephemera : Theory and Politics in Organization, 17(1), pp.
61-87.
LIU, Z. et al.
2020.
COVID-19 causes record decline in global CO2 emissions.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.13614 [Preprint].
MEREDITH, S. 2020.
The situation is serious: Germany plans to fire up coal plants as Russia throttles gas supplies.
CNBC, 20 June.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/20/ ukraine-war-germany-turns-to-coalas-russia-throttles-gas-supplies.html> [Accessed: 19 July 2022].
MCAFEE, K. 2022.
Shall the American Association of Geographers endorse carbon offsets?
Absolutely not!
Professional Geographer, 74(1), pp.
171-177.
DOI: 10.1080/00330124.2021.1934879 MCLEAN, L., GEORGE, S., IERODIACONOU, D., KIRKWOOD, R. & ARNOULD, J.
2018.
Impact of rising sea levels on Australian fur seals.
PeerJ, 6, article number 5786.
DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5786 NAUS, M., RADMAN, P., ZHENG, V., GAMMERI, C. & SALMAN, A.
2020.
Travel emissions, carbon offsetting and the climate crisis: Questions, dilemmas and suggestions.
Good Travel Guide, pp.1-10.
[Online].
Available at: <https://goodtravel.guide/ wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GTGTravel-Impact-Article-final-Dec-2020.
pdf> [Accessed: 1 August 2022].
https:// doi.org/10.1515/9780822382041-002 OECD (ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT).
2021.
The long-term environmental implications of COVID-19.
[Online].
Available at: <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.
org/view/?ref=1095_1095163jpelnkdei2&title=The-long-termenvironmental-implications-ofCOVID-19> [Accessed: 20 July 2022].
POLITICO.
2022.
Russia’s war is a short-term win for coal.
POLITICO, 30 July.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.politico.eu/article/russias-war-isa-short-term-win-for-coal/> [Accessed: 1 August 2022].
QUEMIN, S. & TROTIGNON, R. 2021.
Emissions trading with rolling horizons.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 125, article number 104099.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104099 RAHMAN, M.I.
2012.
Climate change: A theoretical review.
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 11(1), pp.
1-13.
DOI: 10.7906/indecs.11.1.1 RAHMAN, M.Z.
2013.
Relationship between trade openness and carbon emission: A case of Bangladesh.
Journal of Empirical Economics, 1(4), pp.
126-134.
REBECCA, M.M., SOPHUS, A.R., DEKHTYAR, P. & MIGDAL, A.
2018.
Climate change in 2018: Implication for business.
Havard Business School.
9-317-032.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.hbs.edu/environment/ Documents/climate-change-2018.pdf> [Accessed: 1 August 2022].
REYES, O.
& GILBERTSON, T. 2012.
Carbon trading: How it works and why it fails.
Soundings, 45(45), pp.
89-100.
DOI: 10.3898/136266210792307050 SCHELLNHUBER, H.J., RAHMSTORF, S. & WINKELMANN, R. 2016.
Why the right climate target was agreed in Paris.
Nature Climate Change, 6(7), pp.
649-653.
DOI: 10.1038/ nclimate3013 SMITH, L.V., TARUI, N. & YAMAGATA, T. 2021.
Assessing the impact of COVID-19 on global fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.
Energy Economics, 97, article number 105170.
DOI: 10.1016/j.
eneco.2021.105170 SINGH, I., BERNSTIEN, J.
& HOPTON, A.
2022.
Europe’s turn back to coal a ‘temporary’ measure in response to Russian gas cuts.
CBC News, 25 June.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// www.cbc.ca/news/science/germanycoal-renewable-energy-climaterussia-1.6500354> [Accessed: 1 August 2022].
THE ECONOMIC TIMES.
2022.
European countries turn back to coal as sanctions on Russian energy backfire.
The Economic Times, 23 June.
[Online].
Available at: <https://energy.
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ coal/european-countries-turn-backto-coal-as-sanctions-on-russianenergy-backfire/92399244?redirect=1> [Accessed: 20 July 2022].
UNEP (UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME).
2020.
Emissions gap report 2020.
UN Environment Programme.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.unep.org/ resources/emissions-gap-report-2021> [Accessed: 1 August 2022].
https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2020 https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2020 https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2020 http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157940 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157940 https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6943a3 https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6943a3 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.150349 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.150349 https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/20/ukraine-war-germany-turns-to-coal-as-russia-throttles-gas-supplies.html https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/20/ukraine-war-germany-turns-to-coal-as-russia-throttles-gas-supplies.html https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/20/ukraine-war-germany-turns-to-coal-as-russia-throttles-gas-supplies.html https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57204283744 https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57213788532 https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6506897990 https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=7005920347 https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=7005920347 https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=7007039027 https://goodtravel.guide/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GTG-Travel-Impact-Article-final-Dec-2020.pdf https://goodtravel.guide/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GTG-Travel-Impact-Article-final-Dec-2020.pdf https://goodtravel.guide/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GTG-Travel-Impact-Article-final-Dec-2020.pdf https://goodtravel.guide/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GTG-Travel-Impact-Article-final-Dec-2020.pdf https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822382041-002 https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822382041-002 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=1095_1095163-jpelnkdei2&title=The-long-term-environmental-implications-of-COVID-19 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=1095_1095163-jpelnkdei2&title=The-long-term-environmental-implications-of-COVID-19 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=1095_1095163-jpelnkdei2&title=The-long-term-environmental-implications-of-COVID-19 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=1095_1095163-jpelnkdei2&title=The-long-term-environmental-implications-of-COVID-19 https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=1095_1095163-jpelnkdei2&title=The-long-term-environmental-implications-of-COVID-19 https://www.politico.eu/article/russias-war-is-a-short-term-win-for-coal/ https://www.politico.eu/article/russias-war-is-a-short-term-win-for-coal/ https://www.politico.eu/article/russias-war-is-a-short-term-win-for-coal/ https://www.hbs.edu/environment/Documents/climate-change-2018.pdf https://www.hbs.edu/environment/Documents/climate-change-2018.pdf https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/germany-coal-renewable-energy-climate-russia-1.6500354 https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/germany-coal-renewable-energy-climate-russia-1.6500354 https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/germany-coal-renewable-energy-climate-russia-1.6500354 https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/germany-coal-renewable-energy-climate-russia-1.6500354 https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/coal/european-countries-turn-back-to-coal-as-sanctions-on-russian-energy-backfire/92399244?redirect=1 https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/coal/european-countries-turn-back-to-coal-as-sanctions-on-russian-energy-backfire/92399244?redirect=1 https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/coal/european-countries-turn-back-to-coal-as-sanctions-on-russian-energy-backfire/92399244?redirect=1 https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/coal/european-countries-turn-back-to-coal-as-sanctions-on-russian-energy-backfire/92399244?redirect=1 https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/coal/european-countries-turn-back-to-coal-as-sanctions-on-russian-energy-backfire/92399244?redirect=1 https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2021 6 Adeleye & Ajobiewe 2022 Town and Regional Planning (81):1-6 UNITED NATIONS REPORT.
2022.
The UN and the war in Ukraine: Key information.
[Online].
Available at: <https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-thewar-in-ukraine-key-information/> [Accessed: 1 August 2022].
WEIJIA, H. 2022.
Europe’s restart of coal-fired generators to worsen climate change.
Global Times, 21 June.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.
globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1268691.
shtml> [Accessed: 23 July 2022].
ZANKE, A.A., THENGE, R.R.
& ADHAO, V.S.
2021.
A pandemic declared by World Health Organization: COVID-19.
Technological Innovation in Pharmaceutical Research, 11, pp.
47-61.
DOI: 10.9734/bpi/tipr/ v11/3766f ZHANG, S., LIU, X.
& BAE, J.
2017.
Does trade openness affect CO2 emissions: Evidence from ten newly industrialized countries?
Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 24(21), pp.
17616-17625. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11356-017-9392-8 https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-the-war-in-ukraine-key-information/ https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-the-war-in-ukraine-key-information/ https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1268691.shtml https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1268691.shtml https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1268691.shtml https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-017-9392-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-017-9392-8
Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 277 Climate Change and Emergence of violent Conflicts Quratull ain Abbas a , Ahsan Riaz b a Lecturer, Government and Public Policy Department, National Defense University Islamabad, Pakistan Phd Scholar, Political Science Department, Bahaudin Zakariya University Multan, Pakistan Email: aniabbas@hotmail.com b Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, Pakistan ARTICLE DETAILS ABSTRACT History: Accepted 25 May 2021 Available Online June 2021 Climate change, also called global warming, refers to the rise in the average surface temperature on Earth.
Over the past century, earth's average temperature has risen by 1.5°F, and is projected to rise 0.5 to 8.6°F over the next hundred years.
These changes in the average temperature of the earth may lead to potentially dangerous shifts in climate and weather.
Increased rainfall, decreased precipitation, augmented temperature, frequent heat waves, droughts and floods have likely to pose challenges for economic, social and geo-political security of states.
Present study is an effort to understand the impacts produced by changing climate in social, economic and political spheres and its link with the emergence of violent conflicts.
It further aims to investigate the relationship between National Security and Conflict however the main focus will be the domestic societies of under-developing countries.
In order to address the objectives of this study, descriptive research approach has been applied.
The validity of concept has been tested by qualitative analysis of the climatic variations on economic, social and geo-political spheres.
The study finds out that climate change and economic stability are inextricably linked.
The data of this study also suggested that the impacts of climate change are expected to act as a ''Threat Multiplier '' as a whole and can be more disastrous for the unstable regions thus resulting in shortage of food, water and other resources.
It is thus concluded that scenario may lead to increased risks of conflicts among nations for control over the natural resources though climate change is unlikely to be a primary cause of conflict however it will remain an important factor in the emergence of conflict and it may also amplify the existing conflicts due to scarcity of resources.
© 2021 The authors.
Published by SPCRD Global Publishing.
This is an open access article under the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 Keywords: Threat Multiplier, Temperature, Climate, States, Conflict JEL Classification: K32, Q51 DOI: Corresponding author’s email address: aniabbas@hotmail.com 1.
Introduction The changing patterns of weather related phenomena have given rise to global warming that has resulted in an overall change in climate.
The growing economic and industrial growth has resulted in an Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 278 increase in greenhouse gases that has consequently resulted in an enormous increase in the intensity of CO2 in the atmosphere.
This amplification has further led to an overall increase in the global temperatures thus resulting in further extreme patterns of weather.
The rudiments of this prevailing outlandish are starvation, eruption of diseases, riots as well as violence and war.
Droughts, storms, long persisting heat waves, wild fires, migrations, diseases, conflicts and extinction of various species have redefined the concept of national security for states.
(Boon, K., Lovelace, 2012) The protection of the nations as well as its citizens from all kinds of internal and external terrorization either by the use of military or any other diplomatic mean is known as national security however; with the transforming global scenario has redefined the concept.
The episodes of 1973 oil crisis and 9/11 era has further transformed the concept of national security.
This new notion of national security not only includes the defense of the physical borders but also encompasses the economic, political, social, environmental and other transnational threats like drug trafficking, epidemics, transgression or social prejudice.
Currently, nations are striving hard to adopt such policies that can protect them from transnational threats specifically climate change.
2.
Literature Review In the past decade much research has focused on climate change impacts.
According to research conducted by Yadigar Sekerci and Sergei Petrovskii, in the "Mathematical Modeling of Plankton-Oxygen Dynamics under the Climate Change", the increasing ocean temperatures could result in the Earth's oxygen levels to fall radically this could result in killing a huge number of humans and animals.
Increasing temperatures will also impact the hydrological cycle by speeding it up thus leading to more evaporation and rain.
(Sekerci, Y., & Petrovskii, S. 2015) As reviewed by Robert Scribbler globally famines and droughts have already made half billion people to suffer and the rising temperatures shall further intensify the situation.
(Hobday, A. J., & Matear, R. J.
2020) A similar study has been conducted by EU commission; the report claimed that around 240 million people are suffering from the food shortages.
In another study presented by Green Peace it is claimed that water shortages and famine has affected 330 million people alone in India.
Likewise, rising temperature has led to the melting glaciers that have raised the sea levels, the phenomena is further explained by James Hansen an XNASA researcher in July 2015 that sea levels are expected to rise 10 times more rapidly than predicted in the past.
These impacts of climate changes are creating threats to the national security and it can be a cause of conflict as rightly pointed out by researchers.
Internationally, the most persuasive work showing link between varying climate and conflict came from, Y. Burke he claims that there exists a link between rising temperatures and eruption of civil war.
He thus concluded that frequency of civil war is directly proportional to the mounting temperature.
According to him, in Africa increasing surface temperatures will produce a negative impact on agricultural output and economic performance, thus fuelling up the frequency of civil instability and up to some extent conflicts.
Likewise, Hendrix and Glaser are of the view, that climate acts as a trigger and may give rise to conflicts at different level.
The emerging connection between the conflict and climate has been well pointed out by the Security-Planning department as well as the US Center for Naval analysis, they claim climate change as a "Threat Multiplier" referring to the fact that it can not only produce impact but can also worsen the existing domestic, global as well as regional tensions and conflicts.
Additionally, it has been predicted in Pentagon Quadrennial Defense Review that changing climate can act as an "Accelerant of instability or conflict".
A similar vision has been cited by UK Defense review 2010 (US Department of Defense 2010), the emerging climatic changes can act as a nascent challenge for militaries as well as policy makers.
In spite of a series of well structured researches on climate verification and its linkages with national security and conflict some questions still remain unanswered.
Although, the ability of the https://robertscribbler.com/2016/04/27/climate-change-drives-half-a-billion-people-to-suffer-hunger-water-shortages-as-droughts-and-heatwaves-wreck-crops-across-the-globe/ Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 279 changing climate to fuel up clashes or intensification of existing shakiness in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions is now acknowledged in circles of national security even in the United States and many other nations of the world but research gaps still exists in many areas.
For example, how Climate Change influence on economic, political and social spheres of nations and results in the emergence of conflicts, likewise how these spheres are interlinked in aggravating the origin of the ethnic conflicts at domestic level.
Present study is an effort to understand the impacts produced by changing climate in social, economic and political spheres and its link with the emergence of violent conflicts.
It further aims to investigate the relationship between National Security and Conflict however the main focus shall be the domestic societies of under-developing countries.
3.
Research Design and theoretical Frame Work In contemplation to reach the ambition of the study the descriptive research has been followed as it aimed at casting light on current climate change issues and meant to find out its relation with national security and conflict.
Qualitative and interpretative research methods have been used to find out answers how climate changes constitutes threat to national security and how these changes can be a cause of conflict.
The soundness of concept is tested by scrutiny of data by implementing the political economy of climate change approach, the approach deals with analysis of climate change in perspective of political economy.
Analysis of the study from perspective of political economy will help examine the relation between various stake holders like states as well as different interest groups at domestic level and global level.
The approach also helps to find the grass root causes of the emergence of conflict at various levels.
For this purpose primary and secondary data collection techniques have been used.
Books, scholarly articles, archival data and other internet resources along with the reports published by different related institutions have been used.
Interviews of relevant personals of various Public and private institutes, like Pakistan Meteorological Department, Pakistan Agricultural Associations and Farmers.
4.
Analysis and Discussion The global order is not static, it is dynamic and with the passing time new changes can be seen in the economic, social and political spheres around the globe.
Every great event around the globe has led to many new concepts and transformations in the world.
Today, defending the sovereignty of government, political system, protection of society from both domestic and foreign aggressors, protection of economic and financial resources along with the market insecurities, preservation of energy and natural resources, protection of domestic affairs from recently emerging transnational threats, securing nations from cyber-crimes and many more are considered more important than typical military security.
Consequently broadly speaking the concept of national security has broadened together with economic security, social security, political safety, human protection and environmental security.
Environmental security is a concept with multiple meanings, environmental problems such as shortage of water, disruptions in energy supply or ruthless changes in climate has been regarded as transnational threats and can be a basis of conflict amongst states in near future.
Previously, changing climate was seldom regarded as a threat to national security or a contributing factor to the emergence of conflict, but in recent years with the changing concept of security, presupposition is changing as the dogma of ''climate change '' and ''global warming'' adheres to the national security.
In other words, climate change is directly linked with the national interest, Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 280 when the national interest is in danger it will pose threats to national security and when national security is in danger, it may indulge nations into conflict.
In short, climate change is considered as an important trans-national factor behind existing and many upcoming conflicts amongst nations.
(Author’s own compilation) According to a research titled “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict” published in The American involvement for the Advancement of Science, 2013, there exists a statistical connection between emergence of conflicts and changing climate (Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M., & Miguel, E. 2013).
According to the research, increasing temperature and precipitation are interrelated with higher risks of social chaos, as well as individual violence.
The changing climate may lead to three main categories of conflict influencing three major sectors of any nation, "personal level or individual violent behavior and transgression," which includes killings, physical attack, rape and family aggression thus producing negative influence sociologically putting the society towards more negativity ; "intergroup violence and political instability," such as domestic hostilities, riots, racial aggression as well as territory invasions thus leading to a threat full environment politically even leading to crash of governments in severe cases ; and "institutional breakdowns or state level conflicts," such violence and conflicts may lead to strives over resources amongst nations thus creating hazards economically for a nation.
(Addison, T. 2012) The impacts of climate change at these levels are felt equally in both developed and developing nations even the analysis of data from different developed and developing states like Brazil, Somalia, China or the United States, has shown clearly that the climate seems to be a vital factor in destruction of security and peace across societies thus these multiple vectors of climate change can result in a serious threat to the national security in economic, political and social aspects of state.
Climate Change Endanger National Interest Threats to National Security National or International conflicts http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2013/07/31/science.1235367 Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 281 Three level of Conflicts as a consequence of Climatic Change (Author’s own compilation) An XWorld Bank leading economist Lord Stern has analyzed the expenses and opportunities of global climate change in a report known as "The Stern Review".
It has been concluded in the report that early strategies to control GHG emissions may outlay only 2 % of the GDP however; the report projected a warning that any delay in devising strategies may elevate the economic costs up to 20% of the GDP.
It will influence nations various economic sectors like agriculture, mining, forestry, fishing, infrastructure and energy security, consequently upsetting their economic system.
Climate change is about to produce the most profound influence in the field of agriculture (both arable and pastoral farming), in this respect agri-based economies will be more vulnerable as compared to economies having industry as their base, for instance African countries are more susceptible to various stresses of climate change, as it is estimated that around 250 million people (El-Hinnawi, E, 2011) are expected to go through water as well as food insecurities.
A similar case can be seen in Pakistan whose major export is cotton, any disruption in cotton crop yield may directly affect the market economy of the country thus leading to less foreign exchange earnings and depressing balance of payment thus making country's economic security under further distress.
Various climatic factors like increasing temperature and precipitation can prevent crop growth for example, in 2010 and 2012 high temperature at night affected corn crop across US.
Similarly premature budding due to warm winters led to $220 million losses of cherries in Michigan in 2012.
( Zhang, D. D., Jim, C. Y., Lin, G. C., He, Y. Q., Wang, J. J., & Lee, H. F, 2006) Likewise, high temperature may lead to more aridity in the atmosphere thus causing soil more drier, although irrigation has been used in many areas to overcome this issue but in most cases it has led to desertification of land .This situation makes less land available for agriculture thus causing a struggle amongst local communities for pastures and water, particularly in case of nomads.
Likewise a similar anxiety has been highlighted by Suhrke in Sudan according to him, such expansions of desert does not be evident in a vacuum, but to a certain extent in a socioecological system, he explains by exemplifying nomadic pastoralists, who are gradually becoming restricted in their search for pastures and water.
It has been exposed, that armed violence has been Personel level transgression Inter-group violence and political instability Institutional breakdowns or state level conflicts Different levels of Conflicts Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 282 increased amongst pastoralist groups and farmer's communities, and one reason might be the increasing infringement of Pastoralists towards irrigational fields for water as well as pasture.
(Suhrke, A, 1997) This study is analogous to safer world’s view of northern Kenya and the perception presented by Walker on the Senegal's dry stretches, where disputes amongst pastoralist and farmers have given rise to brutal clashes.
(Schneider, G., Gleditsch, N. P., & Carey, S. C, 2010) Moreover, changed precipitation pattern i.e., high or less rainfall then requirement results in surface agricultural pollution , heavy rainfall may wipe away manure and fertilizers off of the farms and into nearby water body thus making water more polluted and less production of crop yields .A similar damage can be seen in case of pastoral farming , rising temperature, drought and desertification leads to threaten pastures and food supplies along with increased vulnerability to diseases , reduced fertility and less milk and meat production thus giving a setback to those nations whose major exports are live stock products or agri based products as in case of Pakistan.
In short, low food production, desertification, droughts will eventually leads to resource depletion that can be cause of conflict at all levels.
Studies have shown that few climatic factors are found responsible for civil unrest in Syria as observed in a report titled, “Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest,” published in March 2012, from the "Center for Climate and Security".
According to the report, the existing conflict in Syria has been associated to climate change up to some extent.
According to the study presented by these authors, climate change has resulted in an internal displacement, rural disconnection and political instability that eventually contributed to the situation of civil war seen today in Syria.
This study cites shortages of water, famine, crop-failures and displacement as the main contributing factors to Syria’s civil war, furthermore farmlands of Syria has collapsed due to climate change.
( Femia, F., & Werrell, C, 2012) Another catastrophic climatic impact on economy will be the destruction of the infrastructure , rising coastal levels, floods , cyclones, tsunamis and many more has led to destruction of infrastructure in both developing and developed nations for instance , when the River Koshi which flows through the Eastern side of Terai region of Nepal flooded in summer 2008, it resulted in displacement of more than 60,000 people, the national highway was damaged, and crops were shattered badly.
South Asia is the most vulnerable region; in fact most affected by the floods intricate ecological, humanitarian and security challenges.
(Theisen, O. M., Holtermann, H., & Buhaug, H, 2010) In this respect the most acute impact of climate change is in particular is felt by India and Bangladesh.
In September 2012 floods displaced 1.5 million natives in the north eastern state of Assam, while in 2009; Cyclone Aila displaced 2.3 million inhabitants in India and approximately 850,000 in Bangladesh.
Moreover, the sectors of Fishing , forestry, and tourism are badly affected due to such changes specifically those countries whose major exports are fishing and whose major foreign exchange earnings is through tourism, such economies are more vulnerable to climate change impacts.
(Lapper, R, 2006) Economically, it has another influencing impact on the nations, since last few decades nations are trying to shift their energy usage from oil to other alternative sources like renewable sources of energy but all these alternative sources are exposed to the climate change.
Moreover with the conditions of WTO it is becoming nearly impossible for struggling economies to compete the market under above mentioned situations.
This scenario has endangered the nation's national security directly or indirectly and forced them towards a more conflict prone scenario.
Socially, ''Migration'' is the worst impact of Climate change specifically in the third world states like Bangladesh.
It has been revealed that in 2008 agriculture has been main the occupation of around http://climateandsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria-climate-change-drought-and-social-unrest/ Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 283 1.4 billion population in third world countries however due to changing climatic influence, like increased food shortages and the reduction of employment opportunities and diminished farm-based activities has led to rapid outward migration.
Although, Migration in itself is not the only destabilizing factor; it often payback to both the migrants and the states where they migrate however, accepting these migrants later becomes an issue for the states as these new comers are usually seen as a redundant burden.
Such influx can result in ethnic sentimental clash within community, as in case of Assam and Bangladesh, the country is going through summer droughts, flooding and salination of the rivers at the coast.
Consequently, about half a million inhabitants have been displaced within Bangladesh to the hill tracts of Chittagong and millions have migrated to India.
Both the communities in Chittagong(Bangladesh) as well as the north-east Indian region, the region has faced social frictions and violent conflicts due to migration of people across the borders.
In order to avoid such and other social havocs India has erected 2500 metres long barrier at the border.
In other words buildup of climatic problems and issues in Bangladesh will in return influence India too.
Added stressors of climate change and shifting migration patterns could be a security distress in areas of conflict in South Asia.
Moreover, increased migration may lead to religious extremism as in case of Assam-Bengal.
Moreover, such social movements amplify the assaults, rapes and murders leading to conflicts and wars amongst different ethnic groups.
As a result of these rising insecurities, many psychological disorders may arise amongst the general public.
Likewise when migration put pressure on land it results in competition over resources causing the origin of conflict amongst rural urban population secondly, it may give rise to social insecurities thus widening gap between rich and poor.
As a consequence of overall changing climate there seems an increase in domestic violence in India, Australia, US.
Studies have shown that Tanzania has witnessed augmentation in assaults, rapes and murders particularly all throughout heat waves.
There exists a correlation between increasing temperatures and larger conflicts, as higher temperatures make people more prone to aggression, racial clashes in Europe and South Asia as well as African civil wars are best examples.
Politically, it has direct impact on the institutions of the government as the individual level conflicts and civil war as a result of changing climate may leads to institutional inefficiency, even in some cases may lead to complete collapse of the system, changing climate may leads towards deteriorated relations amongst the states thus leading to failure of regionalization and regional interdependence.
Pakistan and India are facing multiple conflicts but one of the most important is over water resource.
With the passing time, changing climate is leading the region towards water scarcity thus giving rise to conflict over water.
The main source of economic development either industry or agriculture is water and it is currently under severe influence of climate change.
Globally this change of climate presents risks for South and South -East Asia and the main area for concern will be accessibility to the resources.
Glaciers will be specifically under influence The glaciers will be under influence of the climate change as their excessive melting before time will result in excessive water in some of the major rivers across the globe.
In the Himalayan Basin, the increased rate of melting of the glacial areas will eventually result in an increase in the flow of water during spring season while on the other hand a low flow will be seen during the remaining seasons – especially the summers.
According to an estimate, the mass of the glaciers located in Himalayas has reduced to 1,628 sq km in 2007; while it was around 2,077 sq km in 1962 with a decline of around 21percent.
(Gleditsch, N. P, 2011) This amplified rate in melting of glacier can produce two fold impacts like it may increase the run-off of the rivers similarly it may mount the avalanches outburst floods (GLOFs) at elevation.
This situation will cause threat not only for the projects and dams at these rivers but it may also be a threat for future hydro projects in the area.
If the present drift continued, water Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 284 bodies in Himalayan belt will soon go through amplification in the flood frequency.
It may also lead to reduced flow during summer.
Some chief rivers in Asia will specifically be under influence of climate change, like "The Ganges Basin (Nepal, India and Bangladesh); the Indus Basin (India and Pakistan); and the Mekong River (China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam)".
In case of Indus Basin, water is one of the foremost reasons of conflict amongst India and Pakistan.
Although growing water insufficiency in the region have forced both states to sign a treaty in 1960, The Indus Water Treaty however an internal dissatisfaction prevails amongst both states.
On the other hand Upper riparian state China requires a huge amount of water to sustain its rapidly increasing economic growth.
A similar concern may be seen in case of Africa, due to increasing population growth and growing economies, and above all changing climate, riparian countries are taking one-sided actions to make water safe, while on the other hand they are not only potentially damaging the water bodies but it is also producing a negative impact on the relations among riparian states.
In short it will not be wrong to quote that climate change is an important component of nontraditional security challenges, after terrorism it is on nation's top agenda to be tackled as in case of South Asia.
These changes are going to produce intense impacts on economic social and political spheres of nations, these spheres are interrelated, in other words impacts produced on one will be felt by all others for example, if agricultural production decreases it may lead to food shortages, directly affecting exports of an agri-based economy thus leading to economic backwardness on the other hand a sharp decline in food production will result in increased migration that will eventually produce social instability.
This social instability may lead to conflicts at domestic level thus making the institutional failure and affecting the nations politically.
The consequences produced as a result of instability are subsequently severe and can rightly be called as a "security problem".
These security problems are considered as grave challenge to the existence of nations and considered as a matter of national security and in severe cases may lead to conflict.
In order to cope up with these challenges, nations need to use both military and non-military tools .The link of national security , origin of conflict and climate change is well explained by the following flow chart , (Author’s own compilation) Climate Change Economic Political Social Impacts Economic,Political and Social Instability and Insecurity Threat to National Security Conflict Indviual level State level Civil War Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 285 5.
Conclusion Researches and studies over time have shown a connection between conflict and climate.
Climate change not only fuel up the flames of social tension but it also contributes in the origin of conflict.
The link between conflict and climatic events is general and that its impact has been felt everywhere across history of humans, different regions of the globe, various kinds of conflicts and across all skeptical scales.
Although it not true that all types of climatic events are the cause of all forms of conflicts but it can be strongly quoted it is one of the many factors that contribute to conflict.
In this scenario the conflict will be at all levels affecting all regions but the severity of impacts shall vary region to region for instance, poorer countries will be more vulnerable as compared to developed nations.
Weak governance, poor infrastructure planning social chaos and corruption may lead the poor states to be the harsh target of climate change.
Though this scenario will not be the sole cause of the conflict but it will surely aggravate the existing conflicts as in case of India and Pakistan in other words as mentioned earlier it will multiply the factors for current conflicts not only at international level but also at social levels.
Today climate change must be on top agenda of states as if timely steps would not be taken it may be disastrous for nation's especially underdeveloped and developing nations.
In order to resolve this issue, nations must move hand in hands to deal with this global issue specifically third world for example issues related to water basins in South Asia and Africa has already been resolved with international cooperation.
Secondly, developing countries must improve their institutional structures and must undergo progress in their governance process.
Thirdly, nations must think over an economic shift as in case of India and China , they are gradually focusing on a shift from agriculture to industrial sector as industry consumes much less water and other natural inputs as compared to agriculture , this shift might be helpful for Asian countries whose main source of income is agri-based economy.
Fourthly, states must possess better technological strengths and more capability in finances to overcome these climatic changes.
sFinally negotiation process must be at its fastest pace by both developed and third world countries as this is a havoc that needs cooperation at all level.
References Addison, T. (2012).
Human security report 2009/2010: The causes of peace and the shrinking costs of war.
Boon, K., Lovelace, D., & Huq, A.
(2012).
Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents Index IV (Vol.
101).
Oxford University Press, USA.
El-Hinnawi, E. (2011).
The intergovernmental panel on climate change and developing countries.
The Environmentalist, 31(3), 197-199.
Femia, F., & Werrell, C. (2012).
Syria: Climate change, drought and social unrest.
The Center for Climate and Security, 29.
Gleditsch, N. P. (2011, January).
Regional conflict and climate change.
In Workshop on Research on Climate Change Impacts and Associated Economic Damages.
Hendrix, C. S., & Glaser, S. M. (2007).
Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Political geography, 26(6), 695-715.
Hobday, A. J., & Matear, R. J.
(2020).
The impact of climate change on oceans: physical, chemical and biological responses.
In Research Handbook on Climate Change, Oceans and Coasts.
Review of Economics and Development Studies, Vol.
7 (2) 2021, 277 -286 286 Edward Elgar Publishing.
Hobday, A. J., & Matear, R. J.
(2020).
The impact of climate change on oceans: physical, chemical and biological responses.
In Research Handbook on Climate Change, Oceans and Coasts.
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M., & Miguel, E. (2013).
Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict.
Science, 341(6151), 1235367.
Lapper, R. (2006).
Living with Hugo: US Policy Toward Hugo Chávez's Venezuela (No.
20).
Council on Foreign Relations Press.
Schneider, G., Gleditsch, N. P., & Carey, S. C. (2010).
Exploring the past, anticipating the future: A symposium.
International Studies Review, 12(1), 1-7.
Sekerci, Y., & Petrovskii, S. (2015).
Mathematical modelling of spatiotemporal dynamics of oxygen in a plankton system.
Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena, 10(2), 96-114.
Suhrke, A.
(1997).
Environmental degradation, migration, and the potential for violent conflict.
In Conflict and the Environment (pp.
255-272).
Springer, Dordrecht.
Theisen, O. M., Holtermann, H., & Buhaug, H. (2010).
Drought, political exclusion, and civil war.
Int Secur, 36, 79-106.
US department of Defense , Quadrennial Defense Review Pentagon 2010. https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/QDR Zhang, D. D., Jim, C. Y., Lin, G. C., He, Y. Q., Wang, J. J., & Lee, H. F. (2006).
Climatic change, wars and dynastic cycles in China over the last millennium.
Climatic Change, 76(3-4), 459-477.
No Job Name Is climate change causing the increasing narwhal (Monodon monoceros) catches in Smith Sound, Greenland?por_106 238..245 Martin Reinhardt Nielsen Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen, Bülowsvej 17, DK-1870 Frederiksberg C, Denmark Abstract This paper evaluates recent changes in narwhal (Monodon monoceros) catches in Siorapaluk, the northernmost community in Greenland, in consideration of the effects of changing climate and uncertainty of stock delineation.
The catch statistics show a significant increase in narwhal catches by hunters in Siorapaluk after 2002, which does not appear to be a result of increased effort.
Hunters attribute the increase to changed sea-ice conditions providing access by boat to Smith Sound as early as June and July.
This indicates that climate change is likely to have a considerable impact on narwhal hunting in northern Greenland.
Traditional ecological knowledge and scientific surveys suggest that narwhal in Smith Sound constitute an independent stock.
The absence of scientific recommendations for this stock has been seen as an opportunity to increase quotas in West Greenland.
Scientific management recommendations are urgently needed to allow the authorities to assign sustainable quotas for this stock.
The development of collaborative management agreements and locally based monitoring are recommended to ensure local acceptance of regulations, and to allow rapid responses to climate change.
Keywords Climate change; Greenland; Monodon monoceros; Narwhal; whale management; whaling.
Correspondence Martin Reinhardt Nielsen, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen, Bülowsvej 17, DK-1870 Frederiksberg C, Denmark.
E-mail: nielsenmr@gmail.com doi:10.1111/j.1751-8369.2009.00106.x Three independent stocks of narwhal (Monodon monoceros) are currently recognized in Greenland waters (HeideJørgensen & Laidre 2006).
The summer stock at Inglefield Bredning, in Qaanaaq municipality, is considered to be the same stock that is caught in autumn and winter in Uummannaq municipality and the Disko Bay area (HeideJørgensen et al.
2005), with individuals straying only rarely as far south as Maniitsoq.
This stock is referred to as the West Greenland stock.
The summer stock in Melville Bay is caught by hunters from Upernavik municipality and from Savisivik in Qaanaaq municipality.
This stock spends the winter in the central part of Baffin Bay (Dietz & Heide-Jørgensen 1995).
Narwhal in East Greenland are genetically distinct from stocks in West Greenland (Palsbøll et al.
1997), and are considered to comprise one stock, largely because of a lack of information (Nielsen, unpubl.
ms.).
Surveys reveal that the narwhal summer stock in Inglefield Bredning halved over the course of 20 years (Heide-Jørgensen et al.
2002).
The West Greenland winter population has also been reduced, and the latest population assessment predicts local extinction of this stock in less than 30 years if current harvest levels continue (JCNB/ NAMMCO 2004).
No reliable population estimates are available for the Melville Bay stock.
Quotas were introduced by the Greenland Home Rule Government through an executive order on protection and hunting of beluga and narwhal in 2004.
Management advice is provided by the Canada–Greenland Joint Commission on Conservation and Management of Narwhal and Beluga (JCNB).
The JCNB receives scientific recommendations on harvest sustainability by a Joint Working Group (JWG) comprising the JCNB Scientific Working Group and a working group from the Scientific Committee of the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO).
The JWG recommends a maximum catch of 135 narwhal from the West Greenland stock (Witting 2005).
However, uncertainty surrounds the stock delineation of narwhal populations in Baffin Bay and the northern strait between Greenland and Canada, the so-called Smith Sound, which in the winter constitutes part of the North Water Polynya (Heide-Jørgensen et al.
2005).
Unclear stock delineation and the lack of reliable population estimates prevent the assignment of population-specific quotas to the relevant Greenlandic municipalities, where isolated communities depend on narwhals as a source of nourishment and income (Stevenson et al.
1997; Freeman et al.
1998).
The urgency to solve this problem increases as the Greenland Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author238 mailto:nielsenmr@gmail.com Home Rule Government repeatedly exceeds quota allocations proposed by its Department of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture (DFFL).
It is important to ensure that information on sustainable harvest levels is available for all stocks, so that the lack of information cannot be used as an argument for increasing quotas that would otherwise have been gradually reduced in accordance with scientific advice.
The potential effects of climate change on narwhal populations also remain uncertain.
Generally, declining Arctic sea-ice trends are expected as a result of climate change (Symon et al.
2005; Solomon et al.
2007).
Remotely sensed sea-ice concentrations in the period 1979–2001, however, indicate a decreasing fraction of open water and increasing interannual variability in narwhal wintering grounds in central Baffin Bay (Laidre & Heide-Jørgensen 2005).
These wintering grounds are critically important for narwhal energy intake and overall fitness, suggesting that recent changes entail an increased risk of ice entrapment and vulnerability (Laidre & HeideJørgensen 2005).
This result extends to Jones Sound in the North Water Polynya for the month of March (Heide-Jørgensen & Laidre 2004).
However, as sea-ice concentrations are primarily driven by wind and current patterns as well as by temperature (Heide-Jørgensen et al.
2007), trends may vary according to local conditions, and may result in less sea ice locally.
The potential effects of reduced sea-ice cover on marine mammal stocks include nutritional stress resulting from the redistribution of prey, changes in survivorship or fecundity, and altered migration routes or timing caused by changing ice patterns (Simmonds & Isaac 2007).
The effects on higher tropic levels are, however, particularly difficult to investigate, because they involve relationships that may be nontrivial, non-linear and affected by time lags (Lusseau et al.
2004; Leaper et al.
2006).
Furthermore, few studies have considered the impact of changing hunter behaviour as a result of climate change (but see Stirling & Parkinson 2006).
The aim of this paper is therefore to evaluate the recent changes in narwhal catches in Siorapaluk, in consideration of the effects of changing climate as well as the uncertainty of stock delineation.
Study area Siorapaluk (77°47′N, 70°43′E) is the northernmost community in Greenland and the one nearest to Smith Sound (Fig.
1).
The community has a church, school, a general store and electricity, but no running water.
There are approximately 60 inhabitants, of which 16 held an occupational hunter’s license and seven held a part-time hunter’s license in 2004.
Almost all households depend on hunting and fishing for subsistence and income.
Halibut, seal, narwhal, walrus, polar bear, reindeer, muskoxen and various birds are caught.
Sealskin and halibut are produced for the national market, but only in small quantities on account of limited local freezer capacity, and because the products have to be transported to Qaanaaq to be sold.
Particularly valuable catches such as narwhal, which may bring in the equivalent of approximately 5800 USD for an adult (Nygård & Topp-Jørgensen 2007), are also occasionally transported for marketing in Qaanaaq.
However, often narwhal is not traded because it is considered to be of high cultural value, and important for the upkeep of social relationships through traditional sharing practices (Sejersen 2001).
Hunting and fishing is carried out exclusively using dog sledges on the sea ice and from small dinghies.
In accordance with Qaanaaq municipality by-laws, narwhal are hunted with handheld harpoons with attached floats, and from kayaks, which are transported to the hunting area by dinghies: sometimes dinghies are dragged over long stretches of sea ice.
The actual kill is undertaken with a rifle once the narwhal has been secured with several floats.
Methods Siorapaluk was selected as the focal research community as it had been identified as a location of a considerable increase in narwhal catches.
The evaluation is based on quantitative and qualitative inquiry, including catch statistics, information on the number of hunters and focus group discussions.
The Siorapaluk catch statistics were extracted from the national catch database, Piniarneq, for the period 1993–2004.
All hunters record catches per month, and report their annual catch to the DFFL, which maintains the database.
Reported catches were verified during meetings or subsequently by telephone.
Prior to 2004, narwhal hunting was permitted for both occupational and part-time hunters.
Information on the number of active hunters in the period 1993–2004 was extracted from the national hunting license register.
Sufficiently detailed and reliable data are not available for Siorapaluk prior to the establishment of Piniarneq (see HeideJørgensen 1994).
Statistical tests were conducted with SAS software.
Correlations were tested with the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.
Significant differences in the means were tested with the Mann– Whitney U-test.
Semi-structured focus group discussions (Bryman 2004; Lloyd-Evans 2006) on narwhal hunting, hunting methods and the impacts of climate change were conducted in Greenlandic, with the aid of a local interpreter, with 12 members from the local hunting organization, KNAPK, and four members of the village board, on 30 November and 1 December 2006, respectively.
All Is climate change increasing narwhal catches?M.R.
Nielsen Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author 239 hunters in the community were invited for the discussion, and as more than half of the hunters and the village board participated in the discussion the results are considered to be representative for these groups.
A meeting was also conducted with four members of the board of KNAPK in Qaanaaq on 3 December 2006.
This approach was selected so that information could be collected from the primary stakeholders, including individual hunters, local hunting organizations and local authorities.
Semistructured focus group discussions were selected instead Fig.
1 Map of (a) Greenland, with insets (b) and (c) of the study area.
Is climate change increasing narwhal catches?
M.R.
Nielsen Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author240 of more open-ended or structured methods, to ensure the collection of the required information while retaining a measure of flexibility (Bryman 2004; Lloyd-Evans 2006).
The key points raised were reviewed with the local interpreter immediately after the focus group discussions, and after the completion of the fieldwork a summary report was forwarded to the local KNAPK and the village board for verification and validation, and to allow for the consideration and inclusion of further comments.
The consensus results of the discussions are reported unless otherwise stated.
Names of participants and respondents have been kept confidential to protect their privacy.
Results The results (Fig.
2) illustrate a significant increase in narwhal catches by hunters in Siorapaluk after 1998, compared with previous data (U6.6 = 0; P < 0.05).
No significant correlation was found between the size of the catch and the total number of hunters (r12 = 0.42, P > 0.05), or the number of occupational hunters (r12 = 0.49, P > 0.05), suggesting that the increased catch is not a result of increased effort, assuming that hunting technology and the narwhal distribution have remained relatively stable throughout the period.
These assumptions may not be valid, and will be considered in the discussion.
Hunters in Siorapaluk attribute the increased catch to the changing sea-ice conditions in Smith Sound.
Previously, narwhal populations in Smith Sound were only accessible by dog sledge on the sea ice, and, according to the hunters, no one travelled there to hunt narwhal.
One hunter from Siorapaluk recalled traveling to Smith Sound by dog sledge in May 1976 on a polar bear hunt, and seeing large pods of narwhal.
According to the hunters, the formation of the ice is occurring later, the ice is thinner, it breaks up earlier, and, since 1998, Smith Sound can therefore be accessed by boat as early as June or July.
This is supported by a substantial change in the distribution of the catch, with the bulk of the catch caught in June and July after 1998 (Fig.
3).
A more detailed look at the catch statistics, breaking it down into three periods, indicates a close connection between the catch and the number of hunters in the period 1993–98 (see Fig.
2), although no significant correlation was found (r6 = 0.48, P > 0.05).
The increasing number of hunters from 1999 to 2001 may explain the increasing catch in this period.
However, from 2002 the number of hunters has remained stable, whereas the catch has almost tripled.
This suggests that that effect of changing ice conditions on narwhal hunting, as emphasized by the hunters, cannot be disentangled from the effects of increased effort, until 2002.
From July 2004 quotas were introduced on narwhal hunting in West Greenland.
Unfortunately, remotely sensed sea-ice data are not readily available at sufficient spatial and temporal resolution for Smith Sound to enable correlation tests with the catch from 1993 to 2004 (Laidre, pers.
comm.).
Similarly, the air-temperature records available from Qaannaq and the Carey Islands are of dubious utility in this context, because of the distance from Smith Sound, and because local sea-ice concentrations are determined by wind and current patterns, as well as by temperature (Heide-Jørgensen et al.
2007).
Assessing the correlations reported here with measures of climate change is thus beyond the scope of this study.
Documentation of similar changes in sea-ice cover is, however, abundant from other locations in the Arctic, and will be considered in the discussion.
Hunters in Siorapaluk consider the narwhal in Smith Sound to be a separate population that either migrates between Canada (Ellesmere Island and Humbolt Brink) and Greenland, or remains in Smith Sound all year round.
According to local knowledge, the winter population is very variable.
Narwhal hunting in Smith Sound is primarily carried out by hunters from Siorapaluk, but hunters from Qaanaaq and perhaps Moriusaq are 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Catch Hunters Fig.
2 Narwhal catch by hunters from Siorapaluk and total number of hunters in the period 1993–2004.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Ja nu ar y Fe br ua ry M ar ch Ap ril M ay Ju ne Ju ly Au gu st Se pt em be r O ct ob er N ov em be r D ec em be r 1993-1998 1999-2004 Fig.
3 Percentage of accumulated narwhal catches by hunters in Siorapaluk per month, before and after 1998.
Is climate change increasing narwhal catches?M.R.
Nielsen Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author 241 increasingly targeting this area as well.
This means that the increase in the catch in Smith Sound may be higher than Fig.
2 indicates.
According to the KNAPK in Qaanaaq, approximately three boats from Qaanaaq hunt narwhal in Smith Sound, and annually return with between one and three narwhal each.
It was also rumoured that unlicensed hunting is on the increase.
The window of opportunity is, however, decreasing: according to the hunters, the break-up of the ice occurs earlier and earlier, causing the narwhal to disperse and head to the fjords.
Discussion and recommendations The hunters’ observations of changes in sea ice correspond to scientifically documented changes in sea-ice cover, ice thickness, and dates of freeze and break-up in the Arctic (Johannessen et al.
1999; Maslanik et al.
1999; Parkinson et al.
1999; Rothrock et al.
1999; Copley 2000; Rigor et al.
2002; Rothrock et al.
2003; Serreze et al.
2003; Comiso & Parkinson 2004; Fowler et al.
2004; Gough, Cornwell et al.
2004, Gough, Gagon et al.
2004; Gagon & Gough 2005; Lindsay & Zhang 2005; Rothrock & Zhang 2005; Stroeve et al.
2005; Stirling & Parkinson 2006).
They also correspond to changes observed by Inuit in other parts of the Arctic (see review in Laidler 2006).
These changes are considered to be the result of anthropogenic climate change (Solomon et al.
2007).
The results indicate that climate change is likely to have been making a considerable impact on narwhal hunting in Smith Sound since 2002, and potentially since 1999.
This conclusion is based on the assumption that hunting technology and narwhal distribution and stock size have remained stable.
All vessels used by occupational hunters must be registered in the Greenland vessel register managed by the Greenland Fisheries License Office (GFLK).
GFLK has, however, only received three reports from Qaanaaq municipality.
The reports mention one vessel in 1992, two more in 1993 and another two in 1999, bringing the total to five dinghies in Siorapaluk, all below 4 gross metric tonnes.
The Danish Maritime Authority registered one vessel in Siorapaluk in a survey in 2000, and none in 2007.
However, in the period 2000–02, about 13 600 USD was allotted to support the purchase of three 19-foot/115-horsepower dinghies by occupational hunters in Siorapaluk, from the Home Rule Government’s fund for development of the hunting sector.
No information is available on vessels owned by part-time hunters.
Because of the incomplete information about vessels in use, it cannot be ruled out that improvement in technology has had an effect on narwhal hunting by hunters from Siorapaluk.
Based on the available information and observations of vessels, and the lack of snowmobiles in Siorapaluk, it is, however, considered unlikely that improved technology is the main reason for the increase in catch from an average of two whales per year from 1993 to 1998 (95%; CI [confidence interval] � 0.05), to 30 whales per year from 1999 to 2004 (95%; CI � 0.37).
Aerial surveys conducted in June recorded narwhals in Smith Sound at the same time as pods were observed at Inglefield Bredning (Koski & David 1994).
This indicates that the Smith Sound pods belong to an independent population, which also accords with local knowledge.
In combination with the reduction of narwhal stocks at Inglefield Bredning (Heide-Jørgensen et al.
2002), primarily attributed to unsustainable exploitation, this indicates that the increased catch is not caused by a change in the narwhal distribution.
However, it cannot be excluded that a potential increase in stock size has contributed to the increased catch by hunters in Siorapaluk, although this is unlikely given the general declining trend in narwhal stocks in Greenland for the period (Born et al.
1994; Heide-Jørgensen et al.
2002; Heide-Jørgensen & Acquarone 2002; Heide-Jørgensen 2004; JCNB/ NAMMCO 2004).
As no abundance estimates exist for Smith Sound, no information is available on sustainable catch levels for this stock.
The optimal sustainable use of all Greenlandic narwhal populations is imperative, in consideration of the cultural and economic importance of narwhal hunting (Sejersen 2001).
With the introduction of quotas from July 2004, catches have been reduced drastically, and hunters struggle to find alternative incomegenerating activities.
Hunting is a central part of Greenlandic culture and identity, and the Greenlandic hunter’s organization, KNAPK, has strong political support.
The existence of a population of narwhal in Smith Sound for which scientific recommendations are lacking has been seen as an opportunity to increase narwhal quotas in West Greenland.
Coupled with the effects of climate change, which appear to be accelerating and leading to changes in sea-ice cover earlier than expected (Holland et al.
2006; Stroeve et al.
2007; Serreze et al.
2007), this could have serious detrimental implications for narwhal stocks.
The DFFL have been attempting to reduce quotas gradually to the scientifically recommended sustainable levels in order to give narwhal hunter’s time to adapt and develop alternative income options.
However, in the quota year 2005–06, the Home Rule Government added 50 extra narwhal to the quota of 260 whales recommended by the DFFL for West Greenland, a number that already greatly exceeded the recommended harvest of 135 whales from the West Greenland stock (no recommendation is available for the Melville Bay stock).
In Is climate change increasing narwhal catches?
M.R.
Nielsen Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author242 December 2006 an additional 100 animals were allotted to the 2006–07 quota of 285 whales.
In July 2007, an initial quota of 300 whales was allocated for the quota year 2007–08.
The Home Rule Government simultaneously pledged in a press release to develop a plan to reduce quotas to levels in accordance with scientific advice by April 2008.
However, the quota for the year 2008–09 was again set at 300 animals, and by December 2008 a plan had not yet been produced.
Instead, 90 animals had been allocated in addition to the initial quota.
In a press release by the Home Rule Government this was justified on the basis of the fact that the hunters had applied for additional whales.
On a more positive note, a preliminary analysis of new data indicates a higher abundance of narwhal than has previously been assumed (NAMMCO 2008).
Scientific recommendations are urgently needed to allow authorities to assign sustainable quotas for the Smith Sound population of narwhals.
To prevent untimely interference by politicians in quota allocation, and to ensure compliance and optimal adaptation to local circumstances, collaborative management agreements should be developed with local hunter organizations.
This could ensure local acceptance of regulations, and thus prevent the inclination for politicians to allot extra quotas to show their support for the hunters and gain local popularity and votes.
Collaborative management could also include a jointly developed monitoring strategy (Huntington 2000; Russel et al.
2000; Harwood et al.
2002).
This should, in addition to scientific population counts, use the large and costefficient data potential of systematically recorded quantitative observations from the hunters (Kofinas et al.
2001; Moller et al.
2004; see also Danielsen et al.
2000), who regularly traverse Smith Sound and other narwhal areas.
This would give hunters a valid basis for their arguments in discussions on quota allocations, and could provide biologists with an indirect measure of population trends and other information in the periods between scientific counts (Fernandez-Gimenez et al.
2006), and would therefore permit rapid management responses to changing circumstances, occurring as a result of climate change for instance.
Although not unproblematic (Richard & Pike 1993; Collings 1997; Kruse et al.
1998; Klein et al.
1999; Kaplan & McCay 2004; Tyrrell 2007; Fernandez-Gimenez et al.
2008), co-management initiatives could ease a strained relationship between biologists and hunters, who have been in strong opposition since the introduction of quotas in Greenland (Sejersen 2003).
Recently, a collaboration agreement was signed between KNAPK and the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources.
Hopefully this can help ensure that the common goals of large viable populations, and compliance with international agreements that Greenland has adopted, are achieved.
Acknowledgements I want to thank the people of Siorapaluk for their hospitality, and the hunter’s organizations and local administration in Siorapaluk and Qaanaaq for providing information for this study.
Thanks also to the Hunting Division of the Directorate for Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture for access to catch statistics and other information, and to Kristine Laidre, Mads Peter Heide-Jørgensen, Elmer Topp-Jørgensen, Erik W. Born, Fernando Ugarte and Natasja Kingod for useful information and comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
References Born E.W., Heide-Jørgensen M.P., Larsen.
F. & Martin A.R.
1994.
Abundance and stock composition in Inglefield Bredning (NW Greenland).
Meddelelser om Grønland.
Bioscience 39, 51–68.
Bryman A.
2004.
Social research methods.
Second edn.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Collings P. 1997.
Subsistence hunting and wildlife management in the central Canadian Arctic.
Arctic Anthropology 34, 41–56.
Comiso J.C. & Parkinson C.L.
2004.
Satellite-observed changes in the Arctic.
Physics Today 57(8), 38–44.
Copley J.
2000.
The great ice mystery.
Nature 408, 634–636.
Danielsen F., Balete D.S., Poulsen M.K., Enghoff M., Nozawa C.M.
& Jensen A.E.
2000.
A simple system for monitoring biodiversity in protected areas of a developing country.
Biodiversity and Conservation 9, 1671–1705.
Dietz R. & Heide-Jørgensen M.P.
1995.
Movements and swimming speed of narwhals (Monodon monoceros) instrumented with satellite transmitters in Melville Bay, northwest Greenland.
Canadian Journal of Zoology 73, 2106–2119.
Fernandez-Gimenez M.E., Huntington H.P.
& Frost K.J.
2006.
Interaction or co-optation?
Traditional knowledge and science in the Alaska Beluga Whale Committee.
Environmental Conservation 33, 306–315.
Fernandez-Gimenez M.E., Hays J.U., Huntington H.P., Andrew R. & Goodwin W. 2008.
Ambivalence towards formalizing customary resource management norms among Alaska Native beluga whale hunters and Tohono O’odham livestock owners.
Human Organization 67, 137–150.
Freeman M.M.R., Bogoslovskaya L., Caulfield R.A., Egede I., Krupnik I.I.
& Stevenson M.G.
1998.
Inuit, whaling and sustainability.
Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
Fowler C., Emery W.J.
& Maslanik J.
2004.
Satellite-derived evolution of Arctic sea ice age: October 1978 to March 2003.
IEEE Geosciences Remote Sensing Letters 1, 71–74.
Is climate change increasing narwhal catches?M.R.
Nielsen Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author 243 Gagnon A.S. & Gough W.A.
2005.
Climate change scenarios for the Hudson Bay region: an intermodel comparison.
Climatic Change 69, 269–297.
Gough W.A., Cornwell A.R.
& Tsuji L.J.S.
2004.
Trends in seasonal sea ice duration in southwestern Hudson Bay.Arctic 57, 299–305.
Gough W.A., Gagon A.S. & Lau H.P.
2004.
Interannual variability of Hudson Bay ice thickness.
Polar Geography 28, 222–238.
Harwood L.A., Norton P., Day B.
& Hall P.A.
2002.
The harvest of beluga whales in Canada’s western Arctic: hunter-based monitoring of size and composition of the catch.
Arctic 55, 10–20.
Heide-Jørgensen M.P.
1994.
Distribution, exploitation and population status of white whales (Delphinapterus leucas) and narwhals (Monodon monoceros) in West Greenland.
Meddelelser fra Grønland.
Bioscience 39, 135–149.
Heide-Jørgensen M.P.
2004.
Aerial digital photographic surveys of narwhal, Monodon monoceros, in West Greenland.
Marine Mammal Science 20, 246–261.
Heide-Jørgensen M.P.
& Acquarone M. 2002.
Size and trends of the bowhead whale, beluga and narwhal stocks wintering off West Greenland.
NAMMCO Scientific Publications 4, 191–210.
Heide-Jørgensen M.P., Dietz R. & Laidre K. 2005.
Metapopulation structure and hunt allocation of narwhals in Baffin Bay.
In: NAMMCO Annual Report.
Pp.
221–223.
Tromsø: North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.
Heide-Jørgensen M.-P., Hemmeken N. & Hollebeek P. 2002.
Optælling af Narhvaler i Qaanaaq Kommune i august 2001.
(Census of narwhal in Qaanaaq municipality in August 2001.)
Teknisk Rapport 50.
Nuuk: Institute of Natural Resources.
Heide-Jørgensen M.P.
& Laidre K.L.
2004.
Declining extent of open water refugia for top predators in Baffin Bay and adjacent waters.
Ambio 33, 488–495.
Heide-Jørgensen M.P.
& Laidre K. 2006.
Greenland’s winter whales: beluga, narwhal and bowhead whale.
Nuuk: Ilinniusiorfik Undervisningsmiddelforlag.
Heide-Jørgensen M.P., Stern H. & Laidre K.L.
2007.
Dynamics of the sea ice edge in Davis Strait.
Journal of Marine Systems 67, 170–178.
Holland M.M., Blitz C.M.
& Tremblay B.
2006.
Future abrupt reductions in the summer Arctic sea ice.
Geophysical Research Letters 33, article no.
L23503.
Huntington H.P.
2000.
Using traditional ecological knowledge in science: methods and applications.
Ecological Applications 10, 1270–1274.
JCNB (Canada–Greenland Joint Commission on Conservation and Management of Narwhal and Beluga)/ NAMMCO (North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission) 2004.
Joint Meeting of the NAMMCO Scientific Committee Working Group on the Population Status of Narwhal and Beluga in the North Atlantic and the Canada/Greenland Joint Commission on Conservation and Management of Narwhal and Beluga Scientific Working Group.
3–6 February 2004.
Tromsø, Norway: North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.
Johannessen O.M., Shalina E.V.
& Miles M.W.
1999.
Satellite evidence for an Arctic sea ice cover in transformation.
Science 286, 1937–1939.
Kaplan I.M.
& McCay B.J.
2004.
Cooperative research, co-management and the social dimension of fisheries science and management.
Marine Policy 28, 257–258.
Klein D.R., Moorehead L., Kruse J.
& Braund S.R.
1999.
Contrasts in use and perceptions of biological data for caribou management.
Wildlife Society Bulletin 27, 488–498.
Kofinas G., Lyver P., Russell D., White R., Nielson A.
& Flanders N. 2001.
Towards a protocol for community monitoring of caribou body condition.
Rangifer 14, 43–52.
Koski W.R. & David R.A. 1994.
Distribution and numbers of narwhals (Monodon monoceros) in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.
Meddelelser om Grønland.
Bioscience 39, 15–40.
Kruse J., Klein D., Braund S., Moorehead L. & Simeon B.
1998.
Co-management of natural resources: a comparison of two caribou management systems.
Human Organization 57, 447–458.
Laidler G.J.
2006.
Inuit and scientific perspectives on the relationship between sea ice and climate change: the ideal complement?
Climate Change 78, 407–444.
Laidre K.L.
& Heide-Jørgensen.
M.P.
2005.
Arctic sea ice trends and narwhal vulnerability.
Biological Conservation 121, 509–517.
Leaper R., Cooke J., Trathan P., Reid K., Rowntree V. & Payne R. 2006.
Global climate drives southern right whale (Eubalaena australis) population dynamics.
Biology Letters 2, 289–292.
Lindsay R.W.
& Zhang J.
2005.
The thinning of Arctic sea ice, 1988-2003: have we passed a tipping point?
Journal of Climate 18, 4879–4894.
Lloyd-Evans S. 2006.
Focus groups.
In V. Desai & D. Potter (eds.
): Doing development research.
Pp.
153–163.
London: Sage Publications.
Lusseau D., Williams R., Wilson B., Grellier K., Barton T.R., Hammond P.S.
& Thompson P.M. 2004.
Parallel influences of climate on the behavior of Pacific killer whales and Atlantic bottlenose dolphins.
Ecology Letters 7, 1068– 1076.
Maslanik J.M., Serreze M.C.
& Agnew T. 1999.
On the record reduction in the western Arctic sea ice cover in 1998.
Geophysical Research Letters 26, 1905–1908.
Moller H., Berkes F., Lyver P.O.
& Kislaioglu M. 2004.
Combining science and traditional ecological knowledge: monitoring populations for co-management.
Ecology and Society 9(3), article no.
2.
NAMMCO (North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission) 2008.
Scientific Committee.
Report of the fifteenth meeting.
Qeqertarsuaq, Greenland.
11–14 April 2008.
Tromsø, Norway: North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.
Nygård L.A. & Topp-Jørgensen J.E.
2007.
Paper on significant trade review: beluga whale, narwhal, Atlantic walrus and polar bear.
Nuuk: Hunting Department, Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture.
Palsbøll P.J., Heide-Jørgensen M.P.
& Dietz R. 1997.
Population structure and seasonal movements of narwhals, Is climate change increasing narwhal catches?
M.R.
Nielsen Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author244 Monodon monoceros, determined from mtDNA analysis.
Heredity 78, 284–292.
Parkinson C.L., Cavalieri D.J., Gloersen P., Zwally H.J.
& Comiso C.J.
1999.
Arctic sea ice extents, areas and trends, 1978–1996.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 104, 20 837–20 856.
Richard P.R.
& Pike D.G.
1993.
Small whale co-management in the eastern Canadian Arctic: a case history and analysis.
Arctic 46, 138–143.
Rigor I.G., Wallace J.M.
& Colony R.L.
2002.
Response of sea ice to the Arctic oscillation.
Journal of Climate 15, 2648–2663.
Rothrock D.A., Yu Y.
& Maykut G.A.
1999.
Thinning of the Arctic sea ice cover.
Geophysical Research Letters 26, 3469–3472.
Rothrock D.A., Zhang J.
& Yu Y.
2003.
The Arctic sea ice anomaly of the 1990s: a consistent view from observations and models.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 108, article no.
3083.
Rothrock D.A.
& Zhang J.
2005.
Arctic Ocean sea ice volume: what explains its recent depletion?
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 110, article no.
C01002.
Russel D., Kofinas G. & Griffith B.
2000.
Need and opportunity for a North American caribou knowledge cooperative.
Polar Research 19, 117–130.
Sejersen F. 2001.
Hunting and management of beluga whales (Delphinapterus leucas) in Greenland: changing strategies to cope with new national and local interests.
Arctic 54, 431–443.
Sejersen F. 2003.
Grønlands naturforvaltning: ressourcer og fangstrettigheder.
(Greenland’s nature management: resources and hunting rights.)
Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.
Serreze M.C., Holland M.M.
& Stroeve J.
2007.
Perspectives on the Arctic’s shrinking sea-ice cover.
Science 315, 1533–1536.
Serreze M.C., Maslanik J.A., Scambos T.A., Fetterer F., Stroeve J., Knowles K., Fowler C., Drobot S., Barry R.G.
& Haran T.M.
2003.
A record minimum Arctic sea ice extent and area in 2002.
Geophysical Research Letters 30, article no.
1110.
Simmonds M.P.
& Isaac S.J.
2007.
The impacts of climate change on marine mammals: early signs of significant problems.
Oryx 41, 19–26.
Solomon S., Qin D., Manning M., Chen Z., Marquis M., Averyt K., Tignor M.M.B.
& Miller H. L. Jr.
(eds.)
2007.
Climate change 2007.
The physical science basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stevenson M.G., Madsen A.
& Maloney E. 1997.
The anthropology of community-based whaling in Greenland.
Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute, University of Alberta.
Stirling I.
& Parkinson C.L.
2006.
Possible effects of climate warming on selected populations of polar bears (Ursus maritimus) in the Canadian Arctic.
Arctic 59, 261–275.
Stroeve J.C., Serreze M.C., Fetterer F., Arbetter T., Meier W., Maslanik J.
& Knowles K. 2005.
Tracking the Arctic’s shrinking ice cover: another extreme September minimum in 2004.
Geophysical Research Letters 32, L04501, doi: 10.1029/2004GL021810.
Stroeve J., Holland M.M., Meier,W., Scambos T. & Serreze M. 2007.
Arctic sea ice decline: faster than forecast?
Geophysical Research Letters 34, article no.
L09501.
Tyrrell M. 2007.
Sentient beings and wildlife resources: Inuit, beluga whales and management regimes in the Canadian Arctic.
Human Ecology 35, 575–586.
Symon C., Arris L. & Heal B.
2005.
Arctic climate impact assessment.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Witting L. 2005.
A model selection based assessment for West Greenland narwhals with uncertain stock structure.
In: Final report.
Joint Meeting of the NAMMCO Scientific Committee Working Group on the Population Status of Narwhal and Beluga in the North Atlantic and the Canada/Greenland Joint Commission on Conservation and Management of Narwhal and Beluga Scientific Working Group.
13–16 October 2005.
Nuuk, Greenland, October 2005.
Pp.
15–16.
Tromsø, Norway: North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.
Is climate change increasing narwhal catches?M.R.
Nielsen Polar Research 28 2009 238–245 © 2009 The Author 245
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL GEOGRAPHY Journal of Environmental Geography 7 (1–2), 49 – 56.
DOI: 10.2478/jengeo-2014-0006 ISSN: 2060-467X EFFECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE HYDROLOGICAL CHARACTER OF RIVER MAROS, HUNGARY-ROMANIA György Sipos * , Viktória Blanka, Gábor Mezősi, Tímea Kiss, Boudewijn van Leeuwen Department of Physical Geography and Geoinformatics, University of Szeged, Egyetem u.
2-6, H-6722 Szeged, Hungary *Corresponding author, e-mail: siposgy@geo.u-szeged.hu Research article, received 28 February 2014, accepted 13 March 2014 Abstract It is highly probable that the precipitation and temperature changes induced by global warming projected for the 21st century will affect the regime of Carpathian Basin rivers, e.g.
that of River Maros.
As the river is an exceptionally important natural resource both in Hungary and Romania it is necessary to outline future processes and tendencies concerning its high and low water hydrology in order to carry out sustainable cross-border river management.
The analyses were based on regional climate models (ALADIN and REMO) using the SRES A1B scenario.
The modelled data had a daily temporal resolution and a 25 km spatial resolution, therefore beside catchment scale annual changes it was also possible to assess seasonal and spatial patterns for the modelled intervals (20212050 and 2071-2010).
Those periods of the year are studied in more detail which have a significant role in the regime of the river.
The study emphasizes a decrease in winter snow reserves and an earlier start of the melting period, which suggest decreasing spring flood levels, but also a temporally more extensive flood season.
Changes in early summer precipitation are ambiguous, and therefore no or only slight changes in runoff can be expected for this period.
Nevertheless, it seems highly probable that during the summer and especially the early autumn period a steadily intensifying water shortage can be expected.
The regime of the river is also greatly affected by human structures (dams and reservoirs) which make future, more detailed modelling a challenge.
Keywords: River Maros, catchment hydrology, climate change, RCMs INTRODUCTION River Maros has always been an important natural resource on the Southern Great Plains of the Carpathian Basin.
The amount of water it drains annually equals to the total water consumption of Hungary.
Although only part of this water is utilised, the river is by far the most significant water resource for irrigation and industrial activity in the region.
Besides, it also feeds a thriving riparian ecosystem and has a unique geomorphological character.
The availability and quality of its resources are endangered by several factors.
From among these the short and long term effects of human interventions and that of climate change have to be emphasized.
The future of River Maros and adjacent territories is determined basically by the amount of water drained by the river.
Previous research has demonstrated that the Late Pleistocene and Holocene evolution of the river has primarily been affected by climatic variations (Kiss et al., 2013).
The fluvial system is still very active and it is highly sensitive to external forcing factors (Kiss and Sipos, 2007), from which recent climate change is getting to be more and more pronounced.
In the near future climate change will supposedly alter the duration and pattern of both flood and low water discharges and the intensity of channel development.
Large number of investigations have demonstrated that the actual changes of the temperature and precipitation will have significant effects on all factors of the environment, and can also alter the rate of geomorphologic, and especially fluvial processes (Dikau and Schrott, 1999).
The possible causes of climate change concerning river hydrology and fluvial activity has been addressed by several studies recently.
These apply for the simulations climate models to predict future deviations in temperature and precipitation.
For concluding general trends on large catchments global climate models (GCM) are applied by several studies (e.g.
Boyer et al., 2010; Chung and Jung, 2010; Zeng et al., 2012), however, differences in the topography and hydrology of subcatchments would call for the downscaling of global models (Dobler et al., 2012), or the application of regional climate models (RCM) at best (Veijalainen et al., 2010).
Studies agree, however that the application of several models and emission scenarios can increase the reliability of results (Kay et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2013).
However, moderate analyses usually apply the A1B SRES scenario for calculations.
One of the most important problems addressed by hydrologists is the expectable change in flood frequency and flood height.
In this respect variations in snow/precipitation ratio and seasonal rainfall distribution are key parameters (Boyer et al., 2010; Bell et al., 2012).
As a consequence of these flood hazard can increase even if total annual runoff is expected to decrease (Kay et al., 2006; Zeng et al., 2012).
Furthermore, in several 50 Sipos et al.
(2014) cases the elongation of the flood season, can result a lower predictability concerning flood timing in the future (Dobler et al., 2012).
On the other end water shortage may pose serious problems for water managers (Lorenzo-Lacruz et al., 2010; Koutroulis et al., 2013).
Beside well known consequences, such as future limitations in water use and related agricultural, economic and social conflicts, even accelerated geomorphological change can be expected at certain catchments (Smith et al., 2013).
Concerning low stage periods predictability of river hydrology is highly limited by human interventions (e.g.
water retention, irrigation), which is a problem on most of engineered rivers (Kiss and Blanka, 2012).
Among these circumstances adaptation will be a key issue.
In this study a conceptual framework was set up for the trends in catchment scale hydrological changes concerning River Maros.
The major questions were: (1) What changes can be expected in temperature and precipitation on the watershed of the river in the 21st century?
How these changes can affect the regime of the river and the total annual volume of water drained?
The tendencies of future changes were explored by using regional climate models.
The study aims to provide base for future hydrological modelling and runoff calculations.
STUDY AREA The catchment of River Maros is located in the southeastern part of the Carpathian Basin.
92% of its total area (30 000 km2) belongs to Romania, the remaining 8% to Hungary (Fig.1).
River Maros and its tributaries are mostly fed by precipitation and overland flow.
Due to the geology of the catchment (overwhelmingly volcanic and crystalline rocks) and the high proportion of very steep slopes floods rise relatively quickly, and last for only a short time.
Two major floods may develop annually on the river.
The first is due to snowmelt in early spring, the second is caused by early summer rainfall usually in June (Fig.
2).
Following the April-June floods the rest of the year is characterized by low stages, which last for approximately 10 months from June till March, with a minimum water delivery at October (Boga and Nováky 1986).
Fig.
1 The location of the Maros catchment within the Carpathian Basin The mean annual discharge of the river is 160 m 3 /s.
Peak and minimum discharges are around 20002500 m 3 /s and 30-50 m 3 /s, respectively.
The area is dominated by westerly winds, though from time to time the effect Eastern-European and Mediterranean air masses are also significant (Csoma 1975).
The annual mean temperature on the catchment is between 4–11 °C, though there is a great territorial variation, determined primarily by the topography.
As a general rule the value of the mean annual temperature is increasing continuously in an east-west direction.
In the Giurgeu Mountains the mean annual temperature in the 20th c. has been 4–6 °C, in the Transylvanian Basin 8–9 °C, west of the Arad–Oradea line it has been just above 10 °C, while southwest of the Nadlac–Szeged line it has been above 11 °C (Csoma, 1975; Andó, 2002).
70–80% of the water drained by the river is originating from precipitation (Andó, 1993, 2002).
Still, there is no close relation between floods and the temporal distribution of precipitation (Andó, 2002), as the greatest floods are initiated by the melting of snow, accumulating in the winter period.
The spatial distribution of precipitation shows a great variation (Fig.
3).
At the source of the river annual values are around 600 mm, going downstream this amount can double on the western slopes of the Gurghiu Mountains,but reaching the closed Transylvanina basin it falls back to 600 mm again.
It increases again in the region of the Sebeş and Retezat Mountains.
West of Lipova precipitation decreases continuously (Csoma, 1975).
Fig.
2 An average hydrological year based on 50 year mean values (1950-2000) Climate model simulations for the 21 st century predict a continuous, but uneven temperature rise, with the most intense increase occurring in the summer months in the Carpathian Basin.
The change in total annual precipitation in the models is not significant; however, the temporal distribution is expected to become more uneven: decreasing summer and increasing winter precipitation (Bartholy et al.
, 2008, Szabó et al., 2011; Csorba et al., 2012).
Climate simulations do also emphasize that extreme weather events may occur more frequently in the next century.
This will be especially true for drought periods which will be longer and more severe than before (Szépszó et al., 2008).
Effect of climate change on the hydrological character of River Maros, Hungary – Romania 51 METHODS Climatic changes concerning the entire Earth are best predicted by global numerical models.
These incorporate the most important processes and relationships acting in and between the major elements of the Earth system (atmosphere, oceans, continents, ice sheets, biosphere, society).
The horizontal resolution of global models, however, is only around 100 km, which does not provide adequate information for performing smaller scale, regional analyses (Szépszó and Zsebeházi, 2011).
For the investigation of smaller areas, such as the drainage basin of a river, regional climate models can be applied.
The resolution of these is much better than that of global models, since input data are more detailed and smaller scale relationships can be considered.
As a consequence, atmospheric processes and surface changes can be predicted more precisely for a given area (van der Linden and Mitchell, 2009; Szabo et al., 2011).
Large, Earth scale models, however determine the possible end values of the regional forecast (Giorgi and Bates, 1989; Giorgi 1990).
The projection of climate processes to the future includes several uncertainties.
These are caused by the natural oscillation of the climatic system, the complicated relationships between environmental elements, the limitations concerning the resolution of input data and the hardly predictable social-economic processes (Cubasch et al., 2001; Hawkins and Sutton, 2009).
From among the factors above mankind can affect mostly social-economic processes, and most of all, these factors can significantly determine the rate of climate change.
Several regional climate models comprise the territory of the Carpathian Basin, these are the ALADIN, the REMO, the PRECS and the RegCM (Szépszó et al., 2008).
For the purposes of estimating future climatic processes on the Maros catchment, the change of climatic parameters was calculated on the basis of the ALADIN (www.cnrm.meteo.fr/aladin) and the REMO (www.remo-rcm.de) models, since these are based on the SRES A1B scenario.
These models assume a moderate increase in the emission of greenhouse gases and an average degree of global warming.
Concerning population numbers the A1B scenario assumes an increase till the middle of the century and a decrease later, besides, it foresees a fast economic growth, the quick spread of new and more efficient technologies and a balance between the use of fossil and renewable energy sources (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000; IPCC 2007).
The horizontal resolution of the applied model data is 0.22° (approximately 25 km).
The climate projections were generated by the Numerical Modelling and Climate Dynamics Division of the Hungarian Meteorological Service.
For making comparisons, temperature and precipitation data were investigated.
Expected changes were examined for those periods of the year which are the most important in terms of floods and low water periods.
The models provide daily temperature and precipitation data for the 2021–2050 and the 2071–2100 periods.
Results are given as the difference from the daily average values of the 1961–1990 reference period in mm for precipitation and in °C for temperature.
From the daily data series average values were calculated for the two future periods (2021-2050 and 2071-2100) for those months which are important in terms of the hydrology of River Maros.
Values were calculated for the grid points, interpolation between points was made by using kriging.
At present our aim was to demonstrate the tendency of changes, but later on the basis of these data further models can be generated in terms of runoff and water balance.
Fig.
3 Yearly mean precipitation (1901-1940) on the Maros catchment (Csoma, 1975) 52 Sipos et al.
(2014) RESULTS Compared to the reference values both models predict an average 1.3–1.4 °C temperature increase for the 2021– 2050 period in the winter months (Fig.
4).
However, in a longer perspective the models forecast somehow different values.
According to the REMO the rise of mean temperature can be as much as 3.9 °C for 2071–2100, which is a substantial increase.
The ALADIN predicts a little lower increase, being around 2.1 °C (Fig.
4, Table 1).
However, even if we take the more optimistic version a significant warming can be expected on the entire catchment.
If we take a look at Fig.
4, in the first modelling period temperature rise seems to be uniform on the catchment.
However, later the Eastern Carpathian tributaries and the lowland section of the river can be more affected.
Concerning the entire catchment, average precipitation values calculated by the two models are very different.
According to the ALADIN, practically no change can be expected, while the REMO predicts a 22 mm increase for 2021–2050 and 34 mm for 2071–2100 (Fig.
5, Table 2).
Average values though hide some regional differences.
Both models agree that there can be a notable increase in precipitation on the eastern mountainous part of the catchment (Giurgeu Mountains), while only a slight increase (REMO) or even a substantial decrease (ALADIN) can be expected in the west (Fig.
5).
Based on the above, it seems well supported that due to general warming the average snow reserve will decrease on most of the sub-catchments.
Although, at higher altitudes in the Eastern Carpathians the snow/precipitation ratio might be higher as a matter of precipitation increase.
The severity of flooding on these sub-catchments will mostly be determined by the intensity of snowmelt.
Table 1 Average temperature change (°C) on the Maros catchment REMO ALADIN 20212050 20712100 20212050 20712100 DecemberFebruary 1.4 3.9 1.3 2.1 May-June 1.1 2.4 1.5 3.1 July-August 1.4 5.0 3.0 5.5 SeptemberOctober 2.2 4.8 2.5 4.6 Annual 1.4 3.8 2.02 3.55 March and April temperature has a significant effect on the start and intensity of snow melt and therefore the development of floods.
Based on the models, a general temperature increase can be expected (Fig.
Fig.
4 Model predictions of temperature change compared to the reference period Effect of climate change on the hydrological character of River Maros, Hungary – Romania 53 4, Table 1).
For the first period (2021–2050) an average 1.1–1.5 °C growth is suggested.
By the second period (2071–2010) this value can be as much as 2.4 °C (REMO) or 3.1 °C (ALADIN).
Warming up can be more intensive in the Transylvanian Basin and on the lowlands, however the Eastern catchment can also face an approximately 1.0 °C later a 2.0 °C temperature increase in the spring period during the 21st century (Fig.
4, Table 1).
These changes suggest that in an average year early spring snowmelt can be faster in the upland catchment.
This does not necessarily mean greater floods, because we have seen the total snow reserve can be slightly lower.
Nevertheless, the period of flood development will extend, and in years of higher winter precipitation the chance of the development of extreme floods can increase.
Based on previous observations, the second potential flood of the year can occur as a consequence of May and June rainfalls (Andó, 2002).
Model predictions are ambiguous in this respect (Fig.
5, Table 2).
According to average data calculated for the entire catchment, REMO forecasts an insignificant change in early summer rainfall for the 2021–2050 period, and a substantial 50 mm decrease for 2071– 2100.
On the other hand ALADIN predicts an approximately 30 mm increase for the first period and just a minor increase for the second (Fig.
5, Table 2).
The pattern of change is also different.
According to the ALADIN model, the most significant increase can be expected in the middle of the catchment.
On the contrary REMO heralds the most significant decrease also to this area (Fig.
5).
Therefore, the direction of change in this case is highly uncertain.
Consequently, it is hard to tell whether the significance of early summer rain-fed floods will increase or decrease.
If we take the average of the two models rather insignificant changes can be expected.
Table 2 Average precipitation change (mm) on the Maros catchment REMO ALADIN 20212050 20712100 20212050 20712100 DecemberFebruary 22.38 34 0.12 -5.5 May-June -3.5 -50.1 32.6 35.4 July-August -0.3 -55.3 -21.5 -55.6 SeptemberOctober 2.2 8.3 -2.8 -17.4 Annual 2 -53 44 -20 As it was mentioned earlier, the low water period starts in July (Boga and Nováky, 1986).
From August discharges can be as low as 50 m 3 /s.
The Fig.
5 Model predictions of precipitation change compared to the reference period 54 Sipos et al.
(2014) volume of water arriving to the lowland sections is greatly determined by the intensity of evaporation on the catchment.
Of course, human interventions, such as water storage, can also be of great significance.
In this respect July–August temperatures are very important.
Both models forecast an increase, being between 1.4 °C (REMO) and 3.0 °C (ALADIN), for the first modelling period (2021–2050).
Concerning the second period (2071–2100) the increase can be even more significant, reaching 5.0 °C (REMO) or 5.5 °C (ALADIN) (Fig.
4, Table 1).
The expected temperature growth is fairly uniform on the catchment, however, according to ALADIN, warming will mostly affect the Gurghiu Mountains and the lowland areas, while REMO predicts the most intensive increase on the middle part of the catchment.
Therefore, the spatial pattern for warming cannot be unambiguously determined.
In the meantime, there is a high chance for the decrease of summer precipitation.
Regarding the average values for the entire catchment the ALADIN model forecasts a 20 mm decrease for 2021–2050, while according to the REMO, catchment averages may not change.
However, both models agree that by 2071–2100 precipitation loss can be around 55 mm (Table 2), affecting mostly the middle part of the drainage basin.
The decrease can be less intensive in the western slopes of the Hargitha, Giurgeu and Gurghiu Mountains (Fig.
5).
Concerning the summer period, therefore, increasing evaporation and decreasing precipitation can be forecasted.
This can lead to a significant reduction in average discharges, which may result an increasing water shortage during the low water per iod starting from July–August.
Based on previous observations (Konecsny and Bálint, 2007), usually the September–October period brings the lowest discharges on River Maros (sometimes only 30–40 m 3 /s).
If catchment scale average temperature change is considered the two models are in good agreement.
For 2021–2050 both models forecast a temperature increase, being around 2–3 °C, while between 2071–2100 average warming can be as much as 4–5 °C (Fig.
4, Table 1).
Concerning the spatial distribution of temperatures, warming might affect less the slopes of the Apuseni Mountains and the Gurghiu Mountains, but in the Transylvanian Basin and the Tarnava Tableland temperature rise can be dramatic (Fig.
4).
Precipitation change is less obvious on the basis of the models, and catchment scale averages seem to stay more or less the same as the 1961–1990 reference values (Table 2).
The calculated few mm changes are insignificant and they are within the error of the prediction.
The high correspondence of the two models suggests that there is going to be a significant warming in the early autumn period.
In the meantime average precipitation values will hardly change, which can finally result a more intensive water loss through evaporation.
This can lead to the development of long drought periods along River Maros.
DISCUSSION Although we have seen that in certain cases the two models do not reinforce each other, there are some clearly recognisable tendencies in terms of future climate.
Warming will be general both in spatial and temporal terms.
However, lower lying closed areas, such as the Transylvanian Basin, can be more severely affected.
It seems also clear that temperature rise will be the most significant in the summer–autumn period, though the REMO model forecasts significantly warmer winters as well.
In the meantime, changes in precipitation are harder to predict.
What seems obvious though is that the late summer period will face a significant precipitation decrease on the basis of average values.
Changes in other seasons are less unambiguous (Table 3).
Table 3 Precipitation change (%) compared to the reference period on the mountain section of the catchment REMO ALADIN 20212050 20712100 20212050 20712100 DecemberFebruary 21% 31% 0% -8% May-June -2% -26% 16% 17% July-August 0% -32% -12% -32% SeptemberOctober 2% 8% -3% -17% Annual 0% -7% 6% -3% If annual mean values are considered, a significant 1.4 °C (REMO) and 2.0 °C (ALADIN) temperature increase can be predicted already for 2021–2050.
Moreover, by 2071–2100 overall warming can be 3.6 °C (ALADIN) and 3.8 °C (REMO) compared to the values of the 1961–1990 reference period.
Interestingly, annual precipitation values show a slight increase for 2021–2050 in case of the ALADIN model, but for the 2071–2100 period both models forecast a significant, 20–50 mm decrease.
Taking into consideration that the average precipitation is between 600– 1000 mm on the catchment, this means a 5–10% reduction in annual runoff.
The decrease can be even more significant if increasing evaporation is accounted, but further modelling is necessary to explore these relationships.
Concerning the hydrological regime of the river we can expect a more uniform runoff during the winter, however, early spring snow melt can be more intensive.
In the meantime early summer floods might be less significant (Table 3).
Therefore, the frequency and average magnitude of floods will slightly decrease, however, if conditions are suitable (high winter precipitation and fast snowmelt) extreme floods can of course occur.
Although several climate-related studies emphasize the relevance of high-precipitation extremes (Szépszó et al., 2008), these will be characteristic mostly on the western half of the Carpathian Basin (Horányi et al., 2009).
Consequently, from a Effect of climate change on the hydrological character of River Maros, Hungary – Romania 55 climatic aspect the hazards and conflicts related to floods and flood protection will not increase significantly along the Maros/Mureş in the near future.
On the other hand, results show that summer and autumn low water extremes may be more frequent, and severe water shortage may occur along the lower section of the river from time to time (Table 3).
Moreover, as we have seen, total annual runoff will certainly decrease in the long run.
According to Konecsny (2010), there are already periods with significant water deficit, meaning that the discharge is lower than the statistically determined average low water value.
Thus, the main problems and conflicts related to the changing regime of the river will be related primarily to low water events.
CONCLUSIONS Calculations concerning the future climate of the Maros/Mureş catchment were outlined, and the tendency of expectable changes was assessed in this study concerning the hydrological regime of the river.
Due to increasing temperatures at winter the average snow reserve can decrease on several subcatchments.
Nevertheless, at higher altitudes greater reserves may develop, since models herald a slight increase in winter precipitation.
Spring snowmelt can be faster in the upland catchment, thus in years when winter precipitation is high the probability of extreme floods can increase.
In general, however, the magnitude of floods is expected to decrease.
Based on the models, considerable changes in the volume of early summer rainfed floods are not expected.
For the summer and early autumn period dramatically increasing temperature and decreasing precipitation can be forecasted.
This can lead to a significant reduction in average discharges.
On a catchment scale mean annual temperature is expected to increase by 1.4-2.0 °C and 3.6-3.8 °C in average by 2021–2050 and 2071–2100, respectively.
Mean annual precipitation presumably will only slightly change by the first modelling period, however, for 2071–2100 the models forecast a significant, 20–50 mm decrease.
Considering the above a 5–10% reduction can be expected in annual runoff, and the severity of droughts will certainly increase.
Consequently, the main problems and conflicts of the future will be related primarily to low water events.
Industrial, agricultural, ecological and recreational demands need to be harmonised as each of these will grow during the increasingly hot and dry summer period.
All these problems call for a unified water management strategy with a sustainable share of resources between the upstream and lowland sections of the river and also between the two neighbouring countries.
Acknowledgements The research was supported by the HURO/0901/266/2.2.2, HUSRB/1203/121/130 cross-border projects, and the Hungarian Research Fund (OTKA 100761).
References Andó, M. 1993.
The geography of the Mures River.
Acta Geographica Szegediensis 31, 1–9.
Andó, M. 2002.
A Tisza vízrendszer hidrogeográfiája.
SZTE Természeti Földrajzi Tanszék, Szeged.
Bartholy, J., Pongrácz, R., Gelybó, Gy., Szabó P. 2008.
Analysis of expected climate change in the Carpathian Basin using the PRUDENCE results.
Időjárás Quarterly Journal of the Hungarian Meteorological Service 112, 249–264.
Bell, V.A., Kay, A.L., Cole, S.J., Jones, R.G., Moore, R.J., Reynard, N.S.
2012.
How might climate change affect river flows across the Thames Basin?
An area-wide analysis using the UKCP09 Regional Climate Model ensemble.
Journal of Hydrology 442– 443, 89–104.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2012.04.001 Boga, L., Nováky, B.
1986.
Magyarország vizeinek műszakihidrológiai jellemzése: Maros.
Vízgazdálkodási Intézet, Budapest.
Boyer, C., Chaumont, D., Chartier, I., Roy, A.G. 2010.
Impact of climate change on the hydrology of St. Lawrence tributaries.
Journal of Hydrology 384, 65–83.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2010.01.011 Chang, H., Jung, I.W.
2010.
Spatial and temporal changes in runoff caused by climate change in a complex large river basin in Oregon.
Journal of Hydrology 388 (3–4), 186–207.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2010.04.040 Cubasch, U., Meehl, G., Boer, G., Stouffer, R. , Dix, M., Noda, A., Senior, C., Raper, S., Yap, K. 2001.
Projections of Future Climate Change.
In.
Houghton, J.T., Ding, Y., Griggs, D.J., Noguer, M., Van der Linden, P.J., Dai, X., Maskell, K., Johnson, C.A.
(eds.).
Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
525– 582.
Csoma, J.
1975.
A Maros hidrográfiája.
In.
Vízrajzi Atlasz Sorozat 19 Maros.VITUKI, Budapest.
7–12.
Csorba, P., Blanka, V., Vass, R., Nagy, R.,Mezősi, G. 2012.
Hazai tájak működésének veszélyeztetettsége új klímaváltozási előrejelzés alapján.
Földrajzi Közlemények 136(3), 237–253.
Dikau, R., Schrott, L. 1999.
The temporal stability and activity of landslides in Europe with respect to climatic change (TESLEC): main objectives and results.Geomorphology 30, 1–12.
DOI: 10.1016/S0169-555X(99)00040-9 Dobler, C., Bürger, G., Stötter, J.
2012.
Assessment of climate change impacts on flood hazard potential in the Alpine Lech watershed.
Journal of Hydrology 460–461, 29–39.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2012.06.027 Giorgi, F. 1990.
Simulation of regional climate using a limited area model nested in a general circulation model.
Journal of Climatology 3, 941–963.
DOI : 10.1175/15200442(1990)003<0941:SORCUA>2.0.CO;2 Giorgi, F., Bates, G., 1989.
The Climatological Skill of a Regional Model over Complex Terrain.
Monthly Weather Review 117, 2325–2347.
DOI :10.1175/15200493(1989)117<2325:TCSOAR>2.0.CO;2 Hawkins, E., Sutton, R., 2009.
The potential to narrow uncertainty in regional climate predictions.
Bulletin of American Meteorological Society 90, 1095–1107.
DOI : 10.1175/2009BAMS2607.1 Horányi, A., Csima, G., Szabó, P., Szépszó, G. 2009.
Regionális klímamodellezés az Országos Meteorológiai Szolgálatnál.
MTA előadás 2009.09.15.
(http://www.met.hu/doc/tevekenyseg/klimamodellezes/MTA2009.09.15.pdf) IPCC 2007.
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Working Group I Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC.
Edited by S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning,Z.
Chen, M. Marquis, K.B.
Averyt, M. Tignor, H.L.
Miller.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 996 (http://www.ipcc.ch) Kay, A.L., Jones, R.G., Reynard, N.S.
2006.
RCM rainfall for UK flood frequency estimation.
II.
Climate change results.
Journal of Hydrology 318, 163–172.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2005.06.013 56 Sipos et al.
(2014) Kiss, T., Blanka V. 2012.
River channel response to climateand human-induced hydrological changes: case study on the meandering Hernád River, Hungary.
Geomorphology 175–176, 115–125.
DOI: 10.1016/j.geomorph.2012.07.003 Kiss, T, Sipos, Gy.
2007.
Braid-scale geometry changes in a sandbedded river: Significance of low stages.
Geomorphology 84, 209–221.
DOI: 10.1016/j.geomorph.2006.01.041 Kiss, T, Sümeghy, B., Sipos, Gy.
2013.
Late Quaternary paleodrainage reconstruction of the Maros River alluvial fan.
Geomorphology 204, 49–60.
DOI: 10.1016/j.geomorph.2013.07.028 Konecsny, K. 2010: A kisvizek főbb statisztikai jellemzői a Maros folyó alsó szakaszán.
Hidrológiai Közlöny 90(1), 45–55.
Konecsny, K., Bálint, G. 2010.
Low water related hydrological hazards along the lower Mureş/Maros river.
In Riscuri şi catastrofe, Universitatea „Babeş-Bolyai”.
Facultatea de Geografie.
Laboratorul de riscuri şi hazarde.
Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă.
ClujNapoca 8/6 van der Linden P., Mitchell J.F.B.
(eds.)
2009.
ENSEMBLES: Climate Change and its Impacts: Summary of research and results from the ENSEMBLES project.
Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter, UK.
(http://ensembles-eu.metoffice.com/ docs/Ensembles_final_report_Nov09.pdf) Koutroulis, A.G., Tsanis, I.K., Daliakopoulos, I.N., Jacob, D. 2013.
Impact of climate change on water resources status: A case study for Crete Island, Greece.
Journal of Hydrology 479, 146– 158.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2012.11.055 Lorenzo-Lacruz, J., López-Moreno, J.I., Beguería, S., García-Ruiz, J.M., Cuadrat, J.M.
2010.
The impact of droughts and water management on various hydrological systems in the headwaters of the Tagus River (central Spain).
Journal of Hydrology 386 (1–4), 13–26.
Nakicenovic, N., Swart, R. 2000: Emissions Scenarios.
A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
570p.
Smith, V.B., David, C.H., Cardenas, M.B., Yang Z.L.
2013.
Climate, river network, and vegetation cover relationships across a climate gradient and their potential for predicting effects of decadal-scale climate change.
Journal of Hydrology 488, 101– 109.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2013.02.050 Szabó, P., Horányi, A., Kruzselyi, I., Szepszó, G. 2011.
Az Országos Meteorológiai Szolgálat regionális klímamodellezési tevékenysége: ALADIN-Climate és REMO.
36.
Meteorológiai Tudományos Napok beszámolókötete.
Budapest, 87–101.
Szepszó, G., Zsebeházi, G. 2011.
Az ENSEMBLES projekt regionális modelleredményeinek alkalmazhatósága Magyarország éghajlatának jellemzésére.
36.
Meteorológiai Tudományos Napok beszámolókötete.
Budapest, 59–75.
Szepszó, G., Bartholy, J., Csima, G., Horányi, A., Hunyady, A., Pieczka, I., Pongrácz, R., Torma, Cs.
2008.
Validation of different regional climate models over the Carpathian Basin.
EMS8/ECAC7 Abstracts 5, EMS2008–A–00645.
Veijalainen, N., Lotsari, E., Alho, P., Vehviläinen, B., Käyhkö, J.
2010.
National scale assessment of climate change impacts on flooding in Finland.
Journal of Hydrology 391 (3–4), 323–350.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhydrol.2010.07.035 Zeng, X., Kundzewicz, Z. W., Zhou, J., Su, B.
2012.
Discharge projection in the Yangtze River basin under different emission scenarios based on the artificial neural networks.
Journal of Hydrology 282, 113–121.
DOI: 10.1016/j.quaint.2011.06.009
1 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 TEACHING CLIMATE CHANGE TO ECON 101 STUDENTS Junaid B. Jahangir1 Abstract There is a growing recognition that ECON 101 does not adequately prepare students to address the pressing issues of our times including climate change.
However, options such as the CORE text are unsuitable because of information overload and the use of advanced technical concepts and techniques.
The objective in this paper is to introduce climate change to ECON 101 students in a way that minimizes student confusion, instructor workload, and upholds Mankiw’s approach of clarity before nuance.
A new approach is delineated based on popular books, magazine articles, a YouTube video, and simple exercises.
This five-part approach consists of emphasizing the urgency of climate change, thinking outside the box through geoengineering, the limits of individual actions like buying local or going vegan, the comparative outlook on various policy tools with a simple equation solving exercise, and game theory to broach the issue of international collaboration.
Keywords: ECON 101, CORE, teaching economics, climate change JEL Classification: A22, Q54 Introduction There is a growing recognition that ECON 101 does not adequately prepare students to address the pressing issues of our times including climate change, economic inequality, and the future of work with automation (Bowles and Carlin, 2020).
Among all these issues, climate change stands out, as Krugman warns that if greenhouse gas emissions are not limited then none of the other issues of healthcare spending, budget deficits, and inequality will matter (Krugman, 2020, p. 327).
Yet, ECON 101 students are trained more to solve for equilibrium, calculate elasticities, and determine the profit maximizing solution, than addressing contemporary issues.
For instance, I use the Mankiw, Kneebone, and McKenzie (2020a) textbook to teach ECON 101, where economic inequality does not appear until Chapter 20 and climate change is subsumed in a section on externalities that is briefly covered towards the end of term.
The objective in this paper is to explore how best to introduce climate change to ECON 101 students in a way that causes the least disruption for both instructors and students who are engaged with the mainstream neoclassical paradigm.
To this end, the motivation for this paper is offered through a brief review of a few recent papers on teaching climate change and economics in Section 2.
This is followed by a critical evaluation of three alternatives to the Mankiw, Kneebone, and McKenzie textbook in Section 3.
Having delineated the concerns with these substitutes, a new way of introducing climate change to ECON 101 students through a video, articles, and exercises from other books is presented through a five-part approach in Section 4.
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
1 Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Anthropology, Economics, and Political Science, MacEwan University, 7-368, 10700 104 Ave, Edmonton, Alberta, T5J 4S2, Canada 2 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 Motivation In their review of teaching climate change and ECON 101, Liu, Bauman, and Chuang (2019) indicate that for most textbooks, climate change is subsumed in the chapters on externalities or environmental economics.
Therefore, they suggest addressing the topic more broadly beyond the externality framework.
They are concerned that the way climate change is presented may lead students to think of it as a “minor aberration” and allow instructors to skip the topic altogether due to its location in the textbook.
Additionally, they mention that despite the consensus position among climate scientists that human beings are largely responsible for global warming, some textbooks eschew that scientific consensus.
Finally, they state that while all textbooks emphasize the key message that incentive-based mechanisms are better than command-and-control regulations, most textbooks do not delve into a preference between a capand-trade program and carbon taxes.
Lewis and Wichman (2021) indicate that instructors are increasingly teaching climate change content because of demand from economics students.
Based on their survey of various courses, they mention that while externalities are usually taught in depth, topics like tipping points and geoengineering are now being included in some courses.
Gonzales-Ramirez, CavigliaHarris, and Whitehead (2021) confirm that the most common topic is how incentive-based approaches (permits and taxes) to addressing externalities are more efficient than command-andcontrol policies (standards).
They survey the literature to showcase a multitude of games that have been designed for pedagogical purposes.
Several of these games are quite time intensive, with a few being semester long with weekly discussions.
These games include Corrigan (2011), which delves into illustrating the relative strengths of various market-based approaches to addressing externalities, as textbooks don’t generally address this comparison.
However, this game assumes prior economic knowledge on marginal analysis and externalities.
Duke and Sassoon (2017) also present a game but mention that the literature indicates that while students recall more of the acquired knowledge, the evidence of improved learning through such activities is modest.
Even in the game designed by CavigliaHarris and Melstrom (2015) where prior economic knowledge on marginal analysis and externalities is not required and which only takes 20 minutes of class time, there are concerns.
The issues include excessive time and preparation required of instructors for seemingly low level of improved learning results.
Other concerns are about relatively weaker students getting embroiled with the logistics of games or failing to act rationally and getting results contrary to what the instructor expected to show.
Thus, such a situation could lead to both student confusion and instructor frustration despite spending so much time and effort.
Just as there are concerns with using games as pedagogical tools, there are issues with including extra reading material to teaching climate change.
Basu (2021) opines that while it is important to remain updated with material beyond the textbook, instructors must be mindful of assigning additional reading that yield diminishing returns if students find them overwhelming and too much work.
Likewise, with large class sizes and without proper help on grading, instructors may find their workload burdensome as well.
Similarly, innovations in teaching pedagogy like Decker (2020), which uses isoquants and isocosts to compare emission taxes and subsidies, are not necessarily suitable for ECON 101 students who get lost in technical logistics instead of learning the basic results.
All such innovations in teaching climate change, take us back to Mankiw, who argues that the capacity of students to absorb information does not expand just because economic knowledge does (Mankiw, 2020b), that we must avoid information 3 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 overload and that less is more (Mankiw, 2020c).
In short, Mankiw remains a proponent of clarity before nuance.
To recapitulate, the brief literature review shows that it is increasingly important to teach climate change and emphasize that human beings have been responsible for global warming.
It underscores topics like tipping points, geoengineering, and the comparative outlook on policy tools.
However, it shows the limits in using innovations in teaching pedagogy like games, advanced tools like isoquants, or extraneous readings, as students may get confused by logistical details and instructors may get frustrated with increased workload only to achieve modest improved learning results.
Therefore, it is important that before we start piling up ECON 101 with more detail, we ensure clarity and avoid information overload.
It is this principle of clarity before nuance that should guide our initiatives on teaching climate change to ECON 101 students.
Alternatives While Mankiw highlights the principle of clarity before nuance, it is also true that the treatment of climate change in his textbook is inadequate.
This is because climate change is subsumed in a section on externalities and is not presented as an urgent issue to be discussed.
Additionally, topics including tipping points, geoengineering, individual actions, and international collaboration are starkly missing.
The various policy tools on climate change are also not adequately compared.
This necessitates investigating alternatives to the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie textbook to find the most effective way of teaching climate change to ECON 101 students.
Three disparate options including the CORE text for introduction to economics, the microeconomics principles textbook by Ragan (2020), and the chapter on climate change in the Tietenberg and Lewis (2015) textbook on environmental and resource economics are reviewed below.
CORE: The Economy The first option is the CORE text, which has recently been promoted by Bowles and Carlin (2020) in the Journal of Economic Literature.
They mention that the CORE text emphasizes feasible sets, indifference curves and Nash equilibrium, and concede that on the complexity of language, the CORE text is “somewhat more complex than Mankiw’s.” The CORE textbook is freely available online and blends both micro and macro topics in the same chapters.
While it introduces the issue of the environment early on, it is only in the capstone Chapter 20 that it delves into details on the economics of the environment.
Divided into ten sections, this chapter makes use of intermediate microeconomics concepts like the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate of substitution, to offer a technical discussion with the use of graphs on the environment-consumption frontier and indifference curves.
This allows to capture the trade-off and citizen preferences between the environment and consumption.
Section 5 of the chapter provides the more conventional graph on marginal abatement costs and highlights the problems of the cap-and-trade approach including oversupply of permits and falling prices, which reduce the incentives to abate emissions.
However, Section 7 returns to intermediate microeconomics concepts of income and substitution effects in the context of an environment tax.
Section 8 illustrates a tipping point as an unstable equilibrium at which environmental degradation is irreversible.
Any uncertainty on the tipping point substantiates the use of prudential policy like a cap-and-trade program, as opposed to a tax, for it can guarantee 4 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 the emission level.
Finally, Section 9 focuses on why addressing climate change is difficult by alluding to the difficulty in international collaboration through the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Overall, it seems that in trying to do too much, the CORE text disrupts the sequential introduction of economic concepts in favour of an eclectic approach.
It links to various extraneous reports and articles and uses exercises involving present value calculations and scatter plots.
As such, the problem of information overload becomes overwhelming.
Moreover, it zigzags between intermediate and principles level concepts, and adequately addresses the topic far later in Chapter 20.
Thus, the use of advanced technical concepts and the late location of the topic do not facilitate using the CORE text as a viable alternative to the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie textbook to teach climate change to ECON 101 students.
The Ragan Textbook While the CORE text offers an unorthodox approach, the Ragan (2020) textbook provides a more conventional approach to the topic of climate change that is suitable for ECON 101 students.
While it also introduces the topic later in Chapter 17, it does offer more detail than the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie textbook.
Ragan expressly states the consensus amongst scientists that human beings are contributing to climate change through greenhouse gas emissions.
He confirms climate change as the mother of all externalities and alludes to the consequences of the loss of fresh water supplies, displacement of people with rising sea levels, extinction of some species, destruction of wildlife habitat, reduced food yields, and increased intensity of storms and volatility of weather.
Ragan emphasizes that some environmental damage is inevitable with the production of goods and services.
Although, he also states that several European countries have achieved emission reductions along with continued growth in GDP.
Focusing on pollution abatement, he confirms the main point that market-based policies (taxes and permits) are more efficient than command-and-control regulation because they are cost effective and incentivize innovation.
Moreover, in underscoring the problems with both emission taxes and cap-and-trade systems, he chiefly emphasizes the issue of measuring pollution with accuracy.
Similarly, on renewable energy, he mentions the issues of scarcity of sites for hydro energy, safe storage for nuclear energy, and capital costs for solar and wind energy.
Finally, he emphasizes that significant reduction in emissions will not result from individual small actions in our daily lives.
Overall, while simpler than the CORE text, Ragan (2020) offers more detail and presses the urgency of climate change compared to the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie textbook.
However, it has several issues of its own.
First, it does not consider topics like tipping points and geoengineering.
Second, the comparison of various policies on abatement is effectively lost in the wordy text.
Third, students may find the graphical presentation confusing as the letter Q is used to denote both quantities of goods and pollution abatement.
Fourth, the graphical analysis does not use the marginal abatement and marginal damage framework, which is usually used in environmental economics courses.
Finally, climate change is a small section of the chapter, which is situated late in the book.
This necessitates looking at another option to the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie textbook to teach climate change to ECON 101 students.
The Tietenberg and Lewis Chapter The benefit of considering a chapter from the Tietenberg and Lewis (2015) textbook on environmental and resource economics is that it directly focuses on climate change instead of embedding the topic in a chapter on externalities.
The authors state outrightly that it is extremely 5 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 likely that human beings have been the dominant cause of global warming and that we need to act now despite limited information to avoid acting under future emergency conditions.
They briefly mention geoengineering and indicate how game theory helps explain the difficulties in international collaboration.
While they mention the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain lack of collaboration and showcase how cooperation can be achieved by linking climate change with other issues like international debt, trade agreements or sharing R&D, they do not illustrate these ideas with specific games.
Similarly, in addressing carbon taxes and emission trading systems (ETS), they do not use the graphical model with marginal abatement costs and marginal damages.
The authors indicate that carbon taxes and emission trading are more effective at reducing emissions than renewable resource subsidies and regulation.
However, they express concerns with both taxes and permits.
Specifically, they state that emission trading markets are susceptible to market power and price manipulation and that there have been issues of over allocation of permits in the EU ETS.
Likewise, they mention that countries like Norway have had reported increases in emission because of extensive exemptions on the carbon tax.
Overall, the benefit of using the chapter from Tietenberg and Lewis (2015) is that it directly addresses climate change instead of a sub-topic under externalities, and that the material comes from a course in environmental and resource economics.
However, the treatment of topics like geoengineering and tipping points are inadequate.
Similarly, the use of visual illustrations through graphs and games is starkly lacking.
Moreover, it does not offer a thorough comparative discussion on taxes and permits.
Therefore, this chapter is inadequate as a supplementary resource to the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie textbook to teach climate change to ECON 101 students.
To recapitulate, while the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie textbook does not present climate change as a pressing issue to be effectively addressed, each of the alternatives are not suitable either.
The CORE text has been recently promoted in the Journal of Economic Literature, as a call to change the way we teach Economics.
However, it is fraught with information overload and advanced technical concepts and techniques.
The Ragan textbook offers more detail through a conventional approach, but it seems wordy and offers graphical analysis that is not consistent with the approach usually used in environmental economics courses.
Similarly, borrowing a chapter from the Tietenberg and Lewis textbook is inadequate as it is bereft of graphical analysis despite addressing climate change directly.
This necessitates charting a new approach to teaching climate change to ECON 101 students.
Presenting Climate Change to ECON 101 Students In developing an effective way to teach climate change to ECON 101 students, it is important to avoid information overload and ensure that any pedagogical tools like games, assigned readings, and exercises are sequentially introduced at a level that ECON 101 students can connect with without being overwhelmed by workload and logistical details.
To this end, I have compiled material from the Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2018) intermediate microeconomics textbook, the Field and Olewiler (2011) environmental economics textbook, popular books Super Freakonomics (2009) and When to Rob a Bank (2015) by Levitt and Dubner, a couple of articles from the magazine Alberta Views, and a video from Dhruv Rathee’s educational channel on YouTube.
Both the textbooks utilize much easier games and graphical analysis than those presented in the educational literature and the CORE text.
The chapters from Super 6 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 Freakonomics and How to Rob a Bank help instructors retain student interest.
The Alberta Views articles advance student understanding through the currency of issues.
Rathee’s video in Hindi but subtitled in English is structured, succinct, and shows the point that people outside the western world are also deeply concerned about climate change.
Finally, keeping in mind Mankiw’s point on clarity before nuance, these supplementary resources are introduced systematically through a five-part approach, which consists of emphasizing the urgency of climate change, thinking outside the box through geoengineering, the limits of individual actions like buying local or going vegan, the comparative outlook on various policy tools with a simple equation solving exercise, and game theory to broach the issue of international collaboration.
The idea in the following presentation is not to reinvent the wheel on various concepts but to showcase how the five topics can be broached through a simple and engaged manner with supplementary resources.
The Urgency of Climate Change ECON 101 textbooks usually focus on addressing externalities and view climate change as just another issue for discussion.
They usually do not address tipping points.
On the other hand, the CORE text illustrates a tipping point using an “S” shaped graph that shows an unstable equilibrium at which environmental degradation becomes irreversible.
However, instead of delving into the details of this graph, the key point is to simply emphasize the implication that we need to act prudently now before it is too late to rectify irreversible damage to the environment.
This is because if we reach the tipping point, then additional efforts to curb climate change would not amount to much, as global warming is related to the stock (as opposed to the flow) of carbon emissions in the atmosphere.
In this regard, Dhruv Rathee’s video “Extreme heat wave in Canada” is helpful as it allows students to visually understand the urgency of the issue (Figure 1).
The video indicates that 50 degrees Celsius observed in July 2021 in Lytton, British Columbia is a temperature that is not even expected in places like New Delhi, India.
It shows that some places like Canada are experiencing global warming more than average and highlights the danger of even 35 degrees Celsius at much higher humidity levels.
With heat wave related fatalities, the video emphasizes that individual solutions of keeping the thermostat lower or biking instead of driving may not be enough to arrest this change and that governments will have to take a strong stand on ending fossil fuel subsidies and imposing a carbon tax.
The video can also engender a discussion on which government policies (regulation, taxes, and permits) would be most effective against climate change.
7 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 Figure 1: Dhruv Rathee’s Video “Extreme Heat Wave in Canada” Image Source: https://i.ytimg.com/vi/o-TMOeCDeus/maxresdefault.jpg Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-TMOeCDeus Thinking Outside the Box: Geoengineering Another topic that is usually not considered in ECON 101 is that of geoengineering, which offers a more hopeful outlook based on human ingenuity and innovation.
Thus, the pessimism evoked by tipping points can be balanced by the optimism created by geoengineering.
In this regard, Chapter 5 from Super Freakonomics by Levitt and Dubner (2009) and the Alberta Views magazine article “Can Climate Change Be Reversed?” by Kopecky (2019) are suitable.
These resources are more suitable for ECON 101 students than the more formal reports referred to in the CORE text.
The chapter from Levitt and Dubner (2009) offers a controversial picture of geoengineering but one that is important to consider in the worst-case scenario of catastrophic outcomes with global warming.
The authors refer to a U.S. private company, Intellectual Ventures, according to which global warming solutions including conservation efforts, alternative energy like wind power, and cap-and-trade programs are too little, too late, and too optimistic (p. 186-187).
Intellectual Ventures supports a Budyko’s blanket, which is about injecting SO2 to the stratosphere that would wrap the planet in a protective layer, reduce global temperature and possibly reverse global warming (p. 193-197).
However, a Budyko’s blanket could make people complacent and increase the incentive to pollute (p. 197).
In a similar vein, Kopecky (2019) states that climate risk remains even if we stop all carbon emissions today and that it is impossible to achieve a 1.5 degrees Celsius warming target without negative emissions technology.
In this regard, he mentions Direct Air Capture (DAC), which is about taking more CO2 from the atmosphere than we release to it, and Air to Fuels (ATF), which is about adding hydrogen to CO2 to create carbon neutral synthetic fuels to replace fossil fuels.
However, he cautions that such carbon engineering should be carefully considered due to side effects.
Similarly, Tietenberg and Lewis (2015) state that generally such approaches https://i.ytimg.com/vi/o-TMOeCDeus/maxresdefault.jpg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-TMOeCDeus 8 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 are fraught with uncertainties and may have possible adverse effects.
This opens room for discussion with students on topics of risk and unintended consequences associated with geoengineering, as a colder Earth would be more hostile to life than a warmer Earth.2 Nonetheless, including geoengineering as a discussion topic helps students think outside the box (the usual standards, taxes, and permits) to address climate change.
The Limits of Individual Small Actions As mentioned earlier, Ragan (2020) emphasizes that significant reduction in emissions will not result from individual small actions in our daily lives.
This point can be substantiated through Chapter 7 from When to Rob a Bank by Levitt and Dubner (2015).
The authors provide a very interesting observation that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from walking 1.5 miles and replacing those calories by drinking milk are equivalent to those from simply driving the same distance (p. 167).
The reason is that GHG emissions are connected to milk, as methane, which is a more potent GHG than CO2, is released due to cow farts in a dairy farm.
Therefore, the authors suggest that instead of jumping on the “buy local” bandwagon, turning to a vegan diet would be more effective in tackling climate change (p. 179).
However, Van Tighem (2020) states in his Alberta Views magazine article, “An Environmentalist’s Case for Beef” that big corporations that promote “beyond meat” products profit by mass producing plant commodities.
This is problematic, as genetically modified crops are grown on depleted soil that is supplemented by chemical fertilizers and pesticides, which kill native vegetation, destroy wildlife habitat, imperil biodiversity of wildlife and fish, and facilitate more emissions, as carbon cannot be safely stored in depleted soil.
Therefore, instead of a vegan diet, he suggests grass fed beef, as it sustains biodiversity and living soil, which effectively stores carbon.
Thus, introducing ECON 101 students to the ideas propounded by Levitt and Dubner (2015) and Van Tighem (2020) helps them understand that arresting climate change is not as simple as walking, buying local, or going vegan.
On the other hand, individual small actions contribute to the overall public morality on climate change.
This is important, as civic virtue facilitates the implementation of effective government policies on climate change (Field and Olewiler, 2011, p. 176).
Comparative Analysis of Policy Tools Since individual efforts are not sufficient, governments will have to take a strong stand on climate change through policy tools that include standards, carbon taxes, and cap-and-trade programs.
In contrast to the topics on tipping points, geoengineering, and individual small actions, much of this discussion is already contained in ECON 101 textbooks in the chapters on externalities or the economics of the environment.
However, as noted earlier, Liu, Bauman, and Chuang (2019) indicate that while all textbooks emphasize that market-based mechanisms (taxes, permits) are better than standards, most textbooks do not delve into a preference between a capand-trade program and carbon taxes.
In this regard, material from various chapters of Field and Olewiler (2011) can be stitched together to evaluate the policies comparatively.
Additionally, in contrast to the more advanced tools used in the CORE text, this textbook also facilitates a simple numerical exercise that helps with the comparative evaluation of policies.
Table 1, which is based on material from Chapters 11, 12, and 13 of Field and Olewiler (2011), offers a comparative outlook on standards, taxes, and permits by showcasing the issues pertaining to each of the policy tools.
This is a more effective way of presenting detailed 2 I am grateful to the anonymous referee for this point.
9 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 information than wordy text.
Additionally, this tabulated information is more comprehensive than that presented in each of the three alternatives discussed in Section 3.
Table 1: Comparison of Policy Tools Theme Standards Carbon Tax Emission Trading Technological Incentives No incentive to do better than achieving the emission standard Incentivizes investment in new technologies to limit tax payment Incentivizes R&D to reduce emissions to sell permits Cost effectiveness Technology standards take away flexibility to abate emissions at lower costs Tax is cost-effective even if the regulator does not know about the marginal abatement costs (MACs) Like a carbon tax, MACs are equalized Firm behaviour Firms engage in lobbying and delay compliance Firms with market power may pass the tax cost to consumers Firms can exercise market power and price manipulation Government Behaviour Governments avoid imposing stringent penalties to avoid economic dislocation Governments may provide tax exemptions, especially considering international competitiveness Governments may end up offering too many permits Enforcement issues Firms may install technology but ignore equipment maintenance and training of personnel Regulator faces issues in setting the tax rate, monitoring performance, and collecting tax bills Regulator has to monitor polluters to check if emissions are consistent with the number of permits Government Revenues No revenues are associated with emission or technology standards Governments can use revenues to offer rebates to low-income households, and reduce distortionary taxes Governments can make revenues if permits are auctioned instead of freely allocated Political feasibility Firms only have to worry about abatement costs instead of taxes or buying permits in addition to abatement costs Citizens are usually wary of additional taxes Politically easier to justify permits than taxes Design Issues Information requirement is high for cost-effective individual standards The regulator may have to iterate to get the right tax rate If permits are freely allocated, firms may increase emissions to get more permits The policy tools can also be comparatively evaluated based on their cost effectiveness through the help of a numerical exercise for advanced student cohorts that are more well prepared mathematically.
Chapter 14 of Field and Olewiler (2011) offers a problem that can be simplified and adapted for ECON 101 students (p. 229).
This approach, which rests on solving simple equations, is consistent with the equilibrium solving exercise in the Mankiw, Kneebone and MacKenzie textbook.
While calculator intensive, this exercise is familiar for students, who are already prepared to solve simultaneous equations and determine areas on graphs.
This contrasts with the advanced graphical analysis in the CORE text that rests on intermediate level concepts of indifference curves, income and substitution effects, present value calculations, and scatter plot diagrams.
In what follows a simple problem of comparing the firms’ compliance costs under a uniform standard, emission tax, and tradable emission permits are compared.
The basic idea is 10 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 that the cost-effective solution arises when the marginal abatement cost (MAC), which is the cost of abating one more unit of emission, is equalized across the firms.
In this regard, consider two firms H and L with high and low MACs that are based on emissions EH and EL respectively.
Assume that the total emissions are limited to a total of 80 units.
MACH = 100 – EH MACL = 50 – EL EH + EL = 80 Figure 2: Analyzing uniform standard, emission tax, and tradable emission permits Note: Pictures are not drawn to scale.
Figure 2 indicates three graphs that showcase the impact of a uniform standard, emission tax, and tradable emission permits respectively.
In the absence of any market-based or command-and-control regulation, firms H and L would not abate any emission, which would mean EH = 100 and EL = 50.
A uniform standard would impose a limit of EH = EL = 40 units of emissions for each of the firms, which would necessitate firms H and L to abate 60 and 10 units of emissions respectively.
This would yield MACH = 60 and MACL = 10.
Total abatement costs (TACs) are TACH = ½ (60)(60) = 1800 (blue area) and TACL = ½ (10)(10) = 50 (black area) with a grand total TAC = 1850.
An emission tax would be set through the principle that MACH = MACL, which would yield the tax rate that provides the cost-effective solution.
Thus, using the equation MACH = MACL along with the condition EH + EL = 80 would allow to solve for cost-effective emission levels of EH = 65 and EL = 15, and MACH = MACL = 35, which is also the tax rate.
It becomes clear that firms H and L would have to abate 35 units of emissions each.
Total abatement costs are TACH = TACL = ½ (35)(35) = 612.5 each (blue and black triangle areas) with a grand total TAC = 1225.
While firm H pays a tax on 65 units and firm L pays a tax on 15 units, which yield (65)(35) = 2275 (blue rectangle area) and (15)(35) = 525 (black rectangle area) respectively with a total of 2800, this amount is transferred to the government.
The tax cost of the firm is offset by 11 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 the revenue benefit of the government.
Overall, the cost is 1225, which is lower than the 1850 with a uniform standard.
Thus, an emission tax yields the cost-effective solution.
For simplification purposes, emission permits can be allocated equally.
Therefore, EH = EL = 40, which yields MACH = 60 and MACL = 10.
This means that firm H values the permit at 60 and firm L at 10.
A mutually beneficial trade can occur between them where firm L sells permits, and firm H buys them.
The way the price is set is through the same principle of MACH = MACL.
This condition along with the stipulation EH + EL = 80 yields the same permit price as the tax rate of 35.
At a permit price of 35, firm H emits 65 units and buys (65-40 = 25) permits.
Similarly, firm L emits 15 units and sells (40-15 = 25) permits.
The cost and revenue of permits (25*35 = 875) (green rectangle and dotted pink rectangle area) offset each other.
This leaves the total abatement costs as TACH = TACL = ½ (35)(35) = 612.5 each (blue and black triangle areas) with a grand total TAC = 1225.
Thus, both permits and taxes as policy tools yield the costeffective solution compared to uniform standards.
Table 2 indicate these mathematical results in a concise form.
Table 2: Analyzing uniform standard, emission tax, and tradable emission permits Uniform Standard Emission Tax Tradable Emission permits Standard imposed: EH = EL = 40 Amount abated: H: 100 – 40 = 60 L: 50 – 40 = 10 MACH = 100 – EH = 60 MACL = 50 – EL = 10 TACH = ½ (60)(60) = 1800 TACL = ½ (10)(10) = 50 TAC = TACH + TACL = 1850 Solving for tax rate: 1) EH + EL = 80 2) MACH = MACL 100 – EH = 50 – EL Solving 1 and 2: EH = 65 EL = 15 MACH = MACL = Tax = 35 Amount abated: H: 100 – 65 = 35 L: 50 – 15 = 35 TACH = ½ (35)(35) = 612.5 TACL = ½ (35)(35) = 612.5 TAC = TACH + TACL = 1225 Tax paid: H: (65)(35) = 2275 L: (15)(35) = 525 Total tax paid = 2800 offset by government revenue Permits allocated: EH = EL = 40 Value of the permits: MACH = 100 – EH = 60 MACL = 50 – EL = 10 Solving for permit price: 1) EH + EL = 80 2) MACH = MACL 100 – EH = 50 – EL Solving 1 and 2: EH = 65 EL = 15 MACH = MACL = price = 35 Amount abated: H: 100 – 65 = 35 L: 50 – 15 = 35 TACH = ½ (35)(35) = 612.5 TACL = ½ (35)(35) = 612.5 TAC = TACH + TACL = 1225 Permits needed: H: 65 – 40 = 25 (buys) L: 15 – 40 = -25 (sells) H: cost = 25*35 = 875 L: revenue = 25*35 = 875 offset each other 12 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 International Collaboration with Game Theory Having considered topics that underscore the urgency of climate change, thinking outside the box, the limits of individual actions, and the issues of various policy tools, it is also important to highlight concerns on international collaboration.
This is because addressing climate change requires concerted international action.
Tietenberg and Lewis (2015) allude to the free rider problem, that is, that countries incur the marginal costs of abating emissions but receive only a fraction of the marginal benefits of their actions, which incentivizes them to free ride on the efforts of others.
Additionally, according to Ragan (2020), there are concerns that developed countries want equal participation, as they don’t want developing countries free riding.
However, developing countries indicate that the primary responsibility should fall on the developed countries that are responsible for the bulk of the GHG emissions stock, and that developed countries can help by making large financial contributions to them (Ragan, 2020, p. 425).
Such issues lead to problems in international collaboration on climate change.
However, Tietenberg and Lewis (2015) mention the strategy of issue linkage through which cooperation of climate change can be achieved by linking climate change agreements with economic agreements like forgiving international debt, signing free trade agreement, or sharing R&D.
While they mention the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain lack of collaboration and highlight the strategy of issue linkage in game theory, they do not visually illustrate these ideas with specific games.
Since ECON 101 students are introduced to the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the strategy of issue linkage is a minor addition through a bargaining strategy game, pay off matrices for these games can be constructed by borrowing and adapting from Chapter 13 of the Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2018) textbook (p. 500-501).
This approach is much simpler than those in the literature reviewed in Section 2 that are time intensive, require too much preparation, and where relatively weaker students get confused with the logistics of games.
The simple Prisoner’s Dilemma and the bargaining strategy game with the respective pay-off matrices are illustrated in Table 3.
Matrix A showcases the Prisoner’s Dilemma game to indicate that the dominant strategy for both countries is to emit.
It shows that a country incurs abatement costs which makes it less competitive compared to others who remain competitive and obtain benefit from the other country’s abatement.
Thus, it shows that while both countries can be better off by abating (10, 5), the incentive to free ride on the efforts of others leads them to the inferior solution (-5, -5).
13 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 Table 3: Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Bargaining strategy games A Country 1 Country 2 Abate Emit Abate 10, 5 -10, 15 Emit 15, -10 -5, -5 B Developing Countries Developed Countries Collaborate Don’t collaborate Business as usual 10, 5 10, 10 Take responsibility 15, 8 5, 15 C Developing Countries Developed Countries No treaty Trade agreement No treaty 5, 5 5, 10 Trade agreement 10, 5 20, 20 Matrix B shows that the dominant strategy for developing countries is to not collaborate.
This leads to the Nash equilibrium (10,10) where there is no international collaboration, and it is business as usual.
Developed countries would prefer that developing countries collaborate for them to justify taking equal responsibility on climate change.
Thus, while the outcome is (10, 10), developed countries would prefer (15, 8).
This can be achieved by issue linkage.
Therefore, consider Matrix C, which presents another game that shows that the dominant strategy for both developed and developing countries is to enter into free trade agreements, which yields the Nash equilibrium (20, 20).
It is here, developed countries could bargain by withholding free trade agreements, which yields the outcome (5, 10), unless the developing countries collaborated on climate change actions in Matrix B.
If developing countries collaborate, developed countries would enter into a free trade agreement, which would yield a total outcome of 20 + 8 = 28 for developing countries.
If developing countries don’t collaborate, developed countries would withhold the free trade agreement, which would yield a total outcome of 10 + 10 = 20 for developing countries.
Since 28 > 20, issue linkage through this bargaining strategy would facilitate international collaboration on climate change.
Thus, ECON 101 students can learn about issues of international collaboration through game theory in a simpler way than semester long time-consuming games and excessive assigned readings.
Concluding Remarks The objective in this paper was to explore how to introduce climate change to ECON 101 students in a way that causes the least disruption for both instructors and students who are engaged with the mainstream neoclassical paradigm.
This is because of the growing recognition that ECON 101 textbooks do not prepare students to address pressing contemporary issues and because of the challenge posed by Bowles and Carlin (2020), who have promoted the CORE text as a viable alternative to conventional textbooks like Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie (2020a).
To this end, a review of the literature on teaching climate change and economics and three principal options to either replace or supplement the Mankiw, Kneebone, and MacKenzie 14 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 textbook was undertaken.
The objective was to minimize student confusion and instructor workload and to uphold Mankiw’s approach of clarity before nuance.
The literature review showcased games and additional readings that were time intensive, increased instructor workload for modest improved learning results, and which could overwhelm students by embroiling them in the logistics of techniques instead of learning the basic ideas.
The issue of information overload was also highlighted in the case of the CORE text, which was found to be fraught with advanced technical concepts and techniques that are not suitable for introducing climate change to ECON 101 students.
Similarly, other options were not found to be adequate either due to the wordy text or lack of visual illustrations.
Thus, a new approach was delineated based on material that comprised of popular books, magazine articles, a YouTube video, and exercises suitable for ECON 101 students based on other textbooks.
The five-part approach consisted of emphasizing the urgency of climate change, thinking outside the box through geoengineering, the limits of individual actions like buying local or going vegan, the comparative outlook on various policy tools with a simple equation solving exercise, and simple game theory to broach the issue of international collaboration.
These five topics are usually missing or inadequately presented in textbooks.
Other instructors can make use of this approach based on material specific to their respective jurisdictions.
They can consider it in its entirety or focus more on some aspects based on the background and preparation level of their student cohort.
In essence, this five-part approach offers a renewed approach to introducing climate change to ECON 101 students.
References Basu, S. 2021.
“Teaching economics of climate change and sustainability as an introductory interdisciplinary elective using critical reading of supplementary sources.” The Journal of Economic Education, 52(4): 353-362.
Bowles, S. and W. Carlin.
2020.
“What students learn in Economics 101: Time for a change.” Journal of Economic Literature, 58(1): 176-214.
Caviglia-Harris, J.L.
and R.T. Melstrom.
2015.
“Airing your dirty laundry: A quick marketable pollution permits game for the classroom.” The Journal of Economic Education, 46(4): 412-419.
CORE: The Economy.
<https://www.core-econ.org/project/core-the-economy/> Accessed 14 February 2022.
Corrigan, J.R. 2011.
“The pollution game: A classroom game demonstrating the relative effectiveness of emissions taxes and tradable permits.” The Journal of Economic Education, 42(1): 70-78.
Decker, C.S.
2020.
“Illustrating the difference between emissions fees and abatement subsidies using isoquant and isocost geometry.” Journal of Economics Teaching, 5(1): 37-50.
Duke, J.M.
and D.M Sassoon.
2017.
“A classroom game on a negative externality correcting tax: Revenue return, regressivity, and the double dividend.” The Journal of Economic Education, 48(2): 65-73.
Field, B.C.
and N.D. Olewiler.
2011.
Environmental Economics.
3rd Canadian ed., McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Canada.
Gonzalez-Ramirez, J., J. Caviglia-Harris, and J. C. Whitehead.
2021.
“Teaching environmental and natural resource economics: A review of the economic education literature.” International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 15(3): 235-369.
Kopecky, A.
2019.
“Can climate change be reversed?” Alberta Views, July 1. https://www.core-econ.org/project/core-the-economy/ 15 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 22(2), 2022 <https://albertaviews.ca/can-climate-change-reversed/> Accessed 14 February 2022.
Krugman, P. 2020.
Arguing with Zombies.
New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Levitt, S.D.
and S.J.
Dubner.
2009.
Super Freakonomics.
New York: William Morrow.
Levitt, S.D.
and S.J.
Dubner.
2015.
When to Rob a Bank.
New York: William Morrow.
Lewis, L.Y.
and C.J.
Wichman.
2021.
“What should we be teaching students about the economics of climate change: Is there a consensus?” International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 15(3): 203-233.
Liu, J., Y. Bauman, and Y. Chuang.
2019.
“Climate change and Economics 101: Teaching the greatest market failure.” Sustainability, 11(5): 1340.
Mankiw, N.G., R.D.
Kneebone, and K.J McKenzie.
2020a.
Principles of Microeconomics, 8th Canadian ed., Nelson, Canada.
Mankiw, N.G.
2020b.
“The past and future of ECON 101.
The John R. Commons Award lecture.” The American Economist, 66(1): 9-17.
Mankiw, N.G.
2020c.
“Reflections of a textbook author.” Journal of Economic Literature, 58(1): 215-228.
Pindyck, R. and D. Rubinfeld.
2018.
Microeconomics, 9th ed.
Pearson, Canada.
Ragan, C. 2020.
Microeconomics, 16th Canadian ed., Pearson, Canada.
Rathee, D. 2021.
“Extreme heat wave in Canada.” Dhruv Rathee YouTube Channel, July 4.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-TMOeCDeus> Accessed 14 February 2022.
Tietenberg, T. and L. Lewis.
2015.
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics.
10th ed., Pearson, U.S. Van Tighem, K. 2020.
“An environmentalist’s case for beef.” Alberta Views, July 1. https://albertaviews.ca/can-climate-change-reversed/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-TMOeCDeus
Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 1 AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN AID MOTIVATION FOR TUVALU IN EFFORTS TO COPE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 2015 2020 Farah Diba Hallatu, Irma Indrayani International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Nasional, Jakarta Indonesia farahhallatu@gmail.com Abstract; Tuvalu is a country located in the Pacific Region which only has an area of about 26 square kilometers with an average height of only 1.83 meters which makes this country very vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, especially sea level rise.
Tuvalu is quite dependent on foreign aid from donor countries.
Australia is one of the most disaster-responsive countries and continues to assist Tuvalu in its efforts to deal with the impacts of climate change.
In trying to understand Australia's background in providing assistance, the approach used is a qualitative method through literature study.
The theories used to answer this phenomenon are the theory of foreign aid, the theory of soft power, and green political theory.
Based on the data analysis, it was concluded that Australia has a low commitment to climate change and has not taken the right steps to achieve climate targets, so that the foreign assistance provided by Australia is one of Australia's soft power strategies to maintain its dominance and influence in the Pacific Region.
Australia can form a defense and security mapping to protect its national interests.
Although the countries in the Pacific Region are relatively small and of little significance, Australia is taking advantage of the situation by making living fences as far as possible.
Keywords: Foreign Aid, Australia, Tuvalu, Climate Change, Soft Power, Pacific Region Submission : Nov, 09th 2021 Revision : Des 08th 2021 Publication : Feb 28th 2022 INTRODUCTION Tuvalu is an island nation in the Pacific Ocean which was formerly known as the Ellice Islands.
Tuvalu is a country with its maritime beauty.
However, this country seems to be sinking slowly.
Rising sea levels pose a major threat to the country.
Tuvalu is living proof of the effects of climate change and global warming (Tyas, 2020).
Tuvalu is a country in the west-central Pacific Ocean.
This country has nine mailto:farahhallatu@gmail.com Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 2 small coral islands that are scattered and stretch from northwest to southeast with a distance of about 676 km.
The country does not have rivers and rainwater catchments, so wells are the only places that provide fresh water.
The native people of Tuvalu are Polynesians, their language is Tuvaluan, while English is taught in schools and widely spoken there.
One-third of the population of Tuvalu live in Funafuti, the capital city of Tuvalu, where the center of government and commerce is located.
Tuvalu is very dependent on foreign aid.
They import most of the food, fuel and manufactured goods.
The country's trading partners include Fiji, Australia, New Zealand and Japan (Macdonald, n.d).
Tuvalu's geographical location and poor land conditions are limitations to its economy.
Fishery resources are the livelihood of the people in Tuvalu.
Although the Tuvaluan fishery has a very high and varied productivity level, it still depends on seasonal conditions.
Another important asset of Tuvalu is the Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF) which was established in 1987 primarily by foreign donors to contribute to Tuvalu's long-term financial sustainability by providing additional sources of income.
Tuvalu is a country with free foreign debt, this indicates Tuvalu is a country that is able to avoid living beyond its means.
Tuvalu relies heavily on foreign aid.
Tuvalu received a variety of assistance.
Government development spending in Tuvalu is largely a reflection of foreign aid from other countries (Tisdell, 2000).
Tuvaluans have weak access to finance.
The limited number of savers, and the unavailability of ATM (Automated Teller Machine) and credit card services as well as a weak credit culture encourage financial institutions to adopt a conservative approach in their lending business (ADB, 2019).
The Australian Agency for International Development Cooperation, also known as Australian Aid, is a foreign aid program financed by the Australian Government through the Federal Government for programs to reduce poverty in developing countries.
The Australian Aid program is an inter-Governmental (G to G) program.
Australia's aid program aims to support Australia's national interest in reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development.
At the 2019 Pacific Islands Forum, Australia pledged to spend $500 million over five years (2020-2025) to strengthen climate change and disaster resilience in the Pacific Region.
Australia is committed to working in partnership with the Government of Tuvalu to meet the needs and aspirations of its people in order to build resilience to the adverse impacts of climate change as well as disasters.
Australia is working with the Government of Tuvalu to ensure that social infrastructure is critical to withstand increasingly strong winds and can serve as a shelter in times of disaster.
Tuvaluan soil supports only a small number of plants.
As climate change impacts intensify, Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 3 Tuvalu will need external support to implement priority adaptation actions such as protecting coastal zones and maintaining water supplies.
Australia helps build the capacity of the Government of Tuvalu to access and effectively leverage global climate change finance.
Australia is helping Tuvalu prepare for a more hazard-prone future by supporting the integration of climate change and resilience building into the country's policy and planning agenda, including the National Constitution.
Australia has provided approximately $3.2 million in bilateral climate change and disaster resilience assistance to Tuvalu since 2016.
This support is built into many programmes, including in the infrastructure, education and government sectors (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australian Government, n.d).
Foreign aid is considered a key weapon in expanding alliances with other countries.
Foreign aid in the realist view is a country's policy to pursue power and supremacy.
Foreign Aid is defined as any kind of assistance provided by a donor country or international donor agency (White, 1974).
Foreign aid is not only in the form of materials or funds but can be in the form of services.
In a broad sense K.J.
Holsti in his book "International Politics: Framework of Analysis" says that foreign aid is a transfer of money or technology or consultation in the form of technical advice to recipient countries from aid donor countries or donor countries (Holsti, 1972).
Research on Australian Foreign Aid Motivation for Tuvalu in Efforts to Cope with Climate Change is relevant to using qualitative research methods, descriptive qualitative with the aim of describing a phenomenon in order to test or prove a theory because it fulfills the characteristic elements of qualitative research in terms of disclosing more in-depth data through literature studies.
From the phenomena described above, the foreign aid provided by Australia to Tuvalu is indeed in the field of climate change, but the relationship between the two countries cannot be seen only on the surface.
In international politics, the relationship between two countries must be analyzed in depth what the motivation behind it.
Why care about climate change that is happening, because all humans live on the same planet, namely earth.
If one country feels the real impact of climate change, sooner or later other countries will also feel it.
Based on the data analysis, it was concluded that Australia has a low commitment to climate change and has not taken the right steps to achieve climate targets, so that the foreign assistance provided by Australia is one of Australia's soft power strategies to maintain its dominance and influence in the Pacific Region.
Australia can form a defense and security mapping to protect its national interests.
Although the countries in the Pacific Region are relatively small and of little significance, Australia is taking advantage of the situation by making living fences as far as possible.
Based on the phenomena described above, the writer poses the Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 4 following research questions: “Why does Australia provide foreign aid to Tuvalu to address climate change?” LITERATURE REVIEW To improve the data in this paper, several previous studies that are relevant to the research conducted are used: A.
The first research used was from Yusuf Rifaldy, entitled “Melihat Latar Belakang Australia dalam Memberikan Bantuan Luar Negeri Ke Kawasan Pasifik”.
The results of this study explain the importance of providing foreign aid to encourage the achievement of the donor country's national interest in addition to the humanitarian aspect.
Based on the geographical location of Australia, it is close to the Pacific Region so that through foreign assistance Australia can maintain its national interests which are supported by stability and security in the region, especially in the Pacific Region.
Through Australia's foreign aid provided to countries in the Pacific Region and other countries, the aim is to spread its influence, both regionally and internationally.
So that the foreign aid provided by Australia, known as Australian Aid can be an asset to spread their influence and build their soft power internationally.
The similarity of the above research with this research lies in the discussion of the objectives behind Australia in providing foreign aid, especially to the Pacific Region.
While the difference between this research and this research is in the object of research where the research above discusses Australian foreign aid to the Pacific Region (more than one country) while this study only focuses on Australian foreign aid to Tuvalu (one of the countries in the Pacific Region).
B.
The second research used is from Peter Brown, entitled “Australian Influence in the South Pacific”.
The results of this study explain the South Pacific which is seen by Australia as part of Australia's natural sphere of influence.
Australia is considered to have longstanding strategic interests in the South Pacific and has sought to influence Pacific island nations through various emphases that have changed over time such as Australian intervention and bilateral relations through aid and trade.
The South Pacific is seen as continuing to play an important role in Australia's security policy, with a stable environment likely to be seen as important to Australia's broader strategic interests.
In support of this objective, the Australian Government's policy for the Pacific region emphasizes the aspects of security, economic development and aid provision, etc.
The similarity of the above research with this research is to find out and understand what motivates Australia in issuing its foreign policy, especially for Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 5 countries in the Pacific Region, either through bilateral relations, trade and aid provision or through intervention.
As for the difference, the research above discusses the influence of Australia which is carried out through various foreign policies, while this research only focuses on the influence of Australia through foreign aid provided to Tuvalu, one of the countries in the Pacific Region.
C. The third research used is from Charles Hawksley, entitled “Australia's aid diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: change and continuity in middle power foreign policy”.
The results of this study explain Australia's diplomatic relations with countries in the Pacific Region and other countries.
In the Pacific Region Australia is effectively a major force influencing events through foreign aid.
Australia is the largest and richest state in the Pacific Region so it can be said as a regional 'hegemon'.
Australia's foreign aid in various forms is a cornerstone of Australia's engagement with the Pacific Islands.
Australia has the view that it has a special responsibility for the Pacific Region.
The Australian Government makes strategies and policies to survive in the Pacific Region.
The Australian Government has adopted a multi-pronged strategy to contain Australia's declining influence through greater and more diplomatic efforts to provide assistance to address climate change, rising sea levels, as well as institutional development and poverty alleviation in the Pacific Island nation.
The similarity of the above research with this research lies in the discussion of foreign aid provided by Australia to countries in the Pacific Region for development, poverty alleviation, and overcoming climate and sea level changes that occur in almost all Pacific Island countries.
Meanwhile, the difference between this research and this research lies in the object of research where this research only focuses on Australian foreign aid to overcome climate change in Tuvalu.
Foreign Aid Theory According to Hans Morgenthau in his book entitled "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid" that foreign aid has become something of a controversy because on the one hand foreign aid is seen as the fulfillment of obligations that must be carried out by rich countries to poor countries.
But on the other hand, foreign aid is considered as an instrument of a country's policy to the recipient country through foreign aid.
Foreign aid is the provision of money, goods, or services from a donor country to a recipient country (Morgenthau, 1962).
Foreign aid is one of the real innovations introduced in modern times like today into the practice of foreign policy.
According to Carol Lancaster in her work entitled "Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics", foreign aid is the provision of resources from one Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 6 government to another (or to international organizations or non-governmental organizations) that is large and sustainable from time to time.
Period with the important objective of helping to improve the human condition in aid recipient countries.
Foreign aid is not only given to promote growth and poverty alleviation in donor recipient countries, but there are various purposes behind the assistance provided.
Scholars of international relations who view relations between states through a realist perspective assume that states operate in an anarchic environment.
Power, security, and survival are the main things, so basically foreign aid is a diplomatic tool as a way to increase the security of donor countries such as reducing the temptation of communism and terrorism.
George Liska, a professor of international relations, argues that foreign aid is a tool to increase national strength and security, and articulates the view that foreign aid today will remain an instrument of political power.
Several qualitative scientific studies explain the motivations of interest in foreign aid programs in each country.
Most studies agree with the realist prediction that bilateral aid donors have been driven by donor country interests (Lancaster, 2007).
Foreign Aid Theory which is used to find out Australia's policy in providing foreign aid to Tuvalu.
Soft Power Theory According to Joseph Nye, there are two types of power.
Hard power is the ability of others to act in a way that goes against their preferences and initial strategies, this ability is used to coerce through threats as well as inducements (“sticks” and “carrots”).
While soft power is the ability to make other people do something with the desired result, this ability is achieved not by coercion but by interest.
Soft power does not always serve a good purpose, such as propaganda.
The concept of soft power is very close to the liberal tradition, but there is no contradiction between realism and soft power.
To fight hard power, soft power emphasizes the aspect of cooperation, not using military force but through the power of ideas.
Countries that have adequate economic resources tend to put pressure on and change the behavior of other countries that are economically weaker.
A country's economic resources can produce soft power as well as hard power because these resources can be used to attract or coerce.
Nye emphasized that institutions can increase the soft power of a country because they tend to promote the values, ideas, policies of a country, both with fellow member countries of the organization and with other countries outside the organization.
Problems such as global warming, outer space, and cyberspace are Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 7 more likely to be solved by means of soft power, while the use of military force is considered inefficient or insufficient.
Soft power is not a zero-sum game where one country's gain is another's loss, because soft power can benefit everyone (Gomichon, 2013).
As stated by Nye, countries that are more attractive in international relations are countries that can frame issues through culture and ideas that are closer to prevailing international norms and have credibility in other countries that are supported by values.
and their policies (Melissen, 2005).
Soft Power theory is used to see Australia's motivation in providing foreign aid.
Green Political Theory Green political theory briefly explains the basic principles of ecocentrism and also growth restrictions.
An ecocentric view is a view that focuses on nature.
Green theory sees the global structure and capitalism as one of the common threads for environmental problems that have occurred so far because a country tends to prioritize the interests of its country's development and ignores the environment.
Green political theory is an alternative perspective in international relations that criticizes traditional perspectives in dealing with specific issues such as environmental issues.
The cosmopolitan issues raised by alternative perspectives such as green political theory are something that violates sovereignty that traditionalist views have never addressed and paid attention to.
The essence of this theory is that humans have a moral obligation to nature.
This obligation does not originate from human obligations to others, but originates and is based on the consideration that life is something of value, both for human life and for the life of other species.
In terms of growth, green politics has the view that there are certain limits for humans in carrying out development and growth.
Green political theory focuses on creating justice.
Justice is meant by paying attention to the environmental crisis that is happening unequally in the world.
By exposing areas that do not have sufficient resource requirements to meet their needs and is expected to be able to make people aware that there is still an imbalance of resources for other communities (Burchill and Linklater, 1996).
Green Political Theory is used to understand Australia's role in overcoming climate change in the Pacific Region, especially Tuvalu.
METHODS This research uses a qualitative research approach with a literature study method.
Qualitative research approach is a process of research and understanding that examines social phenomena.
In this method, a phenomenon or object of research is Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 8 examined in a complex manner, both through details of words, details of reports and views of respondents by researchers.
This research uses descriptive qualitative with the aim of describing a phenomenon in order to test or prove a theory.
(Harrison, 2009).
Literature study can be defined as a series of activities related to the methods of collecting library data, reading, taking notes, and processing research materials.
This method can be done by answering questions in the problem formulation using a theory that is considered suitable for analyzing the issue being raised.
The issues raised are analyzed using the theory that has been selected, and then elaborated so that the final answer and the congruent hypothesis are found (Zed, 2003).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Australian Policy on Climate Change Only a small part of the international community knows about the country of Tuvalu, including where they come from.
The people of Tuvalu are ethnically Polynesian and communicate using the Polynesian language as a way of identifying their culture.
Although oral tradition and archaeological evidence point to their different origins, it appears that the people of Tuvalu shared a culture and lifestyle with the Polynesians.
October 1, 1978 is Tuvalu's Independenceday.
The British referred to Tuvalu as the Elise Islands during World War II and made it a major air base during the war against Japan.
Upon achieving independence in 1978, the islands were renamed Tuvalu.
Contemporary Tuvalu consists of nine small islands and atolls namely Nanumea, Niutao, Nanumaga, Nui, Vaitupu, Nukufetau, Funafuti, Nukulaelae and Niulakita which are historically uninhabited.
It is not uncommon for Tuvalu to experience the effects of El Nino and La Nina caused by changes in seawater temperatures located at the equator and the central Pacific.
The country of Tuvalu is astronomically located between latitudes 5o – 10o South Latitude and longitudes 176o – 180o, to the west of the International Date Line.
Tuvalu only has an area of about 26 sq km and ranks the country as the fourth smallest country in the world after the Vatican, Monaco and Nauru.
Tuvalu is a volcanic country with one of its largest atolls named Funafuti and also as the capital city of Tuvalu.
Funafuti has many small islands that lie around the central lagoon with a distance of 25.1 km from north to south, and 18.4 km from east to west and makes Funafuti its largest city (Murphy, 2017).
Tuvalu has an average elevation of only 1.83 meters which makes the country highly vulnerable to rising sea levels as well as to intensive tropical storms exacerbated by climate change.
According to the Pacific Climate Change Science Program study, since 1993 sea level around Tuvalu has increased by about 5 millimeters per year.
Under the high Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 9 emission scenario the increase is predicted to be 7 to 18 centimeters by 2030.
It is possible that large parts of the country will sink and become uninhabitable.
The people of Tuvalu were forced to be relocated.
Disasters related to the impact of climate change are considered a major threat to the lives of people in Tuvalu.
These disasters include hurricanes, droughts, and floods (UNDP, 2017).
Aid can be defined as money or support provided by either individuals or governments to help poor countries through long-term programs with the aim of ending poverty or sudden humanitarian disasters.
Aid provided by Australia has contributed to helping thousands of communities to access clean water, have a place to live, get food, medical care and also sustainable livelihoods.
This assistance is provided not only to those in need but is also provided with the aim of strengthening Australia's identity as a compassionate nation by reflecting the sense of justice and compassion that are at the core of the country's collective well-being.
Australians believe they are part of a global family and a shared humanity and so they need to act in solidarity with the international community they already consider to be their own brothers and sisters (Caritas Australia, n.d).
Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said that the integration of AusAID with DFAT would strengthen economic diplomacy as central to Australia's engagement on the international scene.
Australia provided humanitarian assistance to Tuvalu after the country was hit by tropical cyclone Pam in March 2015.
The cyclone caused serious damage to homes, health centers and other important buildings.
Australia, New Zealand and the Red Cross provide medical assistance and water supplies and deploy Australian humanitarian experts to support logistics, water and sanitation needs (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australian Government, 2015).
Australia's support to Tuvalu is a fulfillment of its international commitments and to access international climate finance by helping build capacity in the country's Climate Change and Disaster Coordination Unit of $0.73 million from 2016 to 2020.
Australia's support is intended to help ensure the Unit can effectively meet its objectives.
and supports Tuvalu's climate policy goals.
Australia also provided more than $4.7 million in climate change support to Tuvalu from 2015 2016 to 2017 2018 in a bilateral program between Australia and Tuvalu.
The Australian Aid Investment Plan (2016 2021) is committed to supporting the Government of Tuvalu in strengthening its action on climate change impacts and to improving disaster risk preparedness, including in education and governance.
Australia undertook a $4.1 million Classroom Development Project in Funafuti during 2015 – 2017.
The project aims to build school facilities that can withstand Category 5 hurricanes as well as provide shelter in an emergency.
In addition, technical assistance was also provided to the Prime Minister's Office to support Tuvalu in fulfilling its commitments.
Australia also supports capacities and Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 10 mechanisms to make it easier for Tuvalu to access global climate finance through the Green Climate Fund.
Australia has also responded to Tuvalu's request for assistance in the constitutional review to integrate climate change into the national constitution for $0.5 million during 2016 – 2019.
Australia provided Tuvalu with many benefits on its regional climate change program totaling more than $50 million from 2015 2016 until 2017 – 2018 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australian Government, n.d).In the theory of foreign aid put forward by Hans Morgenthau, foreign aid is something that is controversial because on the one hand, foreign aid is seen as fulfilling obligations that rich countries have to do to poor countries as well as the aid provided by Australia to Tuvalu.
On the other hand, the foreign aid provided is considered an instrument of a country's policy to the recipient country.
Because foreign aid has been centered and cannot be separated from the international political interests of donor countries, such as in aspects of defense, political influence, and others.
Australia's foreign aid is also the result of policies determined through its domestic domestic political process.
At a meeting of representatives of the Pacific Region countries in Tuvalu in 2019, Australia was urged to stop clearing new land for coal mining in order to reduce emissions and the impact of climate change.
Foreign aid from Australia that is given to countries in the Pacific Region is considered not a concrete solution to overcome the impacts of climate change because Australia still wants to maintain its coal mining industry which produces high emissions and is very environmentally unfriendly.
However, the Australian government has made it clear that the country will not shut down coal mining because the Australian economy depends on the industry (Anthoni, 2019).
It is the attitude of Australia that considers its coal industry important as the green political theory.
Because in this theory the global structure and capitalism are one of the common threads for the environmental problems that have occurred so far, because Australia is considered to tend to prioritize the interests of its country's economic development rather than fulfilling the emission reduction commitments that have been determined.
DISCUSSION Australia’s Motivation in Providing Foreign Aid to Tavalu Australia's commitment to climate change, which is rated low by member countries of the Pacific Islands Forum, leaves questions about Australia's motivation in providing assistance to Tuvalu in dealing with the impacts of climate change.
Australia is committed to reducing emissions, while Australia maintains its coal industry.
The Australian government's attitude is seen as a strategy to maintain its influence in the Pacific Region as well as an effort to prevent China's influence from Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 11 providing foreign aid as a way to get closer to countries in the Pacific Region (Nursalikah, 2019).
According to the Australian Government, they have witnessed China's growing power in the Pacific Region which they have seen as their country's backyard, for more than a decade.
By offering billions of dollars in aid in the form of long-term loans and grants, Australia aims to gain influence among its neighbors and also strengthen Australia's position (BBC News, 2018).
Australia has a longstanding strategic interest in the Pacific Region and has sought to influence Pacific island nations, with emphasis changing over time.
Australia was able to exert influence on Pacific island nations to adopt a more 'moderate' approach, one example being the 'South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone' under the Rarotonga Treaty in 1985.
Between the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11, neither there is a perceived threat from the region, or even through the region.
Here Australia plays its soft power to get other countries to do things with the desired results through persuasion and attraction, not by coercion, conflict or competition.
Soft power that is run by Australia emphasizes aspects of cooperation such as the provision of foreign aid provided, not using military force.
Problems such as climate change and global warming are more likely to be solved by means of soft power.
Because in international relations, countries that can frame issues through culture and ideas that are closer to applicable international norms and have credibility in other countries that are supported by their values and policies are attractive countries in the eyes of the international community.
Currently Australia's focus on the region is to strengthen themes that support democracy, 'good governance' and enable sustainable economic development.
In addition, Australia's new focus is to address the risk of countries in the Pacific Region being weaker or failing to govern their territories, so Australia is concerned that the country could create a power vacuum in which terrorist organizations or organized crime could step in, and pose a security threat to the Australia's doorstep (Brown, 2012).
Responses to climate change will be an important influence on international policy as well as the Australian economy.
Australia has the resources and renewable products, capabilities and services in low emission technologies to benefit from the global economic transition to a low emission growth model.
At the same time, the Indo-Pacific's demand for coal, high-quality LNG and uranium exports is relatively high.
Australia predicts that the challenges posed by climate change will continue to increase over the next 10 years and countries need to include climate change on the list of long-term planning and investments, including its implications for national and regional security.
Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 12 Changes in environmental conditions that are increasingly real, such as rising temperatures and sea levels as well as weather phenomena that are increasingly frequent and severe and lead to natural disasters.
This will eventually lead to economic, environmental, security risks and in Australia itself these risks extend to beaches, agriculture, water resources and fisheries.
Climate change is sometimes seen as a barrier to economic development, encouraging additional movements of people that if left unchecked will add to global pressures on food and water supplies.
Australia has a strong desire to make an effective global transition to a lowemissions economy while still supporting growth and affordable energy.
In addition to the low-emissions economic transition that has been announced by Australia, Pacific Region countries continue to demand Australia to ban coal mining activities and also urge Australia to stop opening new coal mining areas in order to reduce emissions.
However, in reality Australia still gave approval to Adani, an Indian company, to start coal mining after years of delays in getting approval from environmental aspects.
The Australian government gave the green light after the state government also approved the mining project located in the Galilee Basin, Queensland.
The 28 thousand hectare mine is estimated to be able to be used for 60 years and this mine is also estimated to contribute more than 450 trillion rupiah to the Australian economy and make it the largest coal mine in Australia (BBC News, 2019).
Australia is one of the countries with the largest coal resources in the world.
According to Australia's Clean Energy Regulator, Australia as a developed country in the Pacific region is declared the largest contributor to climate pollution with a total of 322 million tons of carbon dioxide contributed in 2015 with an increase of 3.2% from the previous year.
The Australian Conservation Foundation report also states that Australia is one of the biggest contributors to climate pollution because it has increased its emissions in recent periods.
The Australian government is targeting to reach 5% below the 2000 level in emitting gas which has become a climate change policy and Australia has promised the UN to reduce gas emissions by 5% to 25% by 2020.
The number of emissions reported by regulators is 60% emissions have been generated by Australia from companies that produce more than a certain amount of emissions or more than a certain amount of energy, and these figures do not include calculations from the agricultural sector, residential property or private vehicles.
In addition, a report from the Wilderness Society reveals that there will be a greater increase in carbon dioxide emissions over the next three years due to land clearing in Queensland.
According to data released by the Australian Government in 2018, Australia has not taken the right steps to achieve the 2030 climate target set by Paris.
In contrast, Australia's emission production has continued to increase in the last four years.
The Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 13 Department of Environment and Energy said its latest carbon emission projections predict that Australia will reduce its carbon emissions by only 7% well below its target by 2030.
Environment Minister Melissa Price insists the Government will continue to strive to meet Paris commitments (Dalzell, 2018).
Although Australia can build a good image in the region through the foreign assistance they provide, Australia can enhance this good image by participating in fulfilling climate change commitments to reduce emissions that have been targeted not only through the provision of assistance in the form of money, advice or programs that given to Tuvalu to deal with the impacts of climate change.
If there is no technical solution that Australia can provide to solve the problem of climate change other than providing assistance.
In the view of green political theory, human behavior is what is needed in creating these technical solutions to provide opportunities for political innovation or even transformative change in global politics, in this case the main thing is Australia's policy regarding its coal mining.
CONCLUSION Australia is one of the most disaster-responsive countries and continues to assist Tuvalu in its efforts to deal with the impacts of climate change.
Australian Aid is an Australian aid program integrated into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).
The foreign assistance provided by Australia to Tuvalu is quite varied, such as funding for bilateral aid programs to build resilience to disasters and climate change, and increasing country capacity to respond to disaster events, and Australia is helping Tuvalu to access international climate finance through the Green Climate Fund, Australia also has responded to Tuvalu's request for assistance in a constitutional review to integrate climate change into the national constitution.
The foreign assistance provided by Australia to Tuvalu is not only to overcome the impact of climate change that is felt by Tuvalu, but there is another purpose in providing this assistance, namely to strengthen Australia's identity in the Pacific Region.
The foreign assistance provided by Australia to Tuvalu is not a concrete solution to mitigate the impacts of climate change if in fact Australia still wants to maintain its coal mining industry which produces high emissions and can exacerbate climate change.
Because one of the threats of climate change is caused by the burning of fossil fuels, one of which is coal.
Australia itself is one of the countries that has the largest coal resources in the world.
The Australian government insists that its country will not shut down coal mining because the Australian economy depends on the industry.
Australia also considers the coal industry important to create local jobs and to meet energy needs.
Australia has not taken the right steps to achieve the 2030 climate targets set by the Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 14 Paris Agreement and on the other hand, Australia's emission production has continued to increase in the last four years.
Australia has a low commitment to climate change so that the assistance provided by Australia to Tuvalu in efforts to deal with climate change is considered a strategy to maintain Australia's dominance and influence in the Pacific Region as one of the preventive measures taken to counter the influence of China which is starting to approach countries in the Pacific.
Pacific region by providing foreign aid.
Australia has witnessed the growth of China's power in the Pacific Region which they have considered as their country's backyard so that the assistance provided by Australia has the aim of strengthening its country's relations with countries in the Pacific Region, especially Tuvalu and also making the Pacific a "front and center" in policy.
overseas Australia.
Australia also intends to continue to gain influence among its neighbors as well as to strengthen its position in the Region.
Australia has a focus on the Pacific Region to strengthen values that underpin democracy, good governance, sustainable economic development.
In addition, Australia is focused on addressing the risk that countries in the Pacific Region could create a power vacuum in which terrorist organizations or organized crime can step in, and place security threats at Australia's doorstep.
By becoming dominant in the Pacific Region, Australia can form a defense and security mapping to protect its national interests.
Although the countries in the Pacific Region are relatively small and of little significance, Australia is taking advantage of the situation by making living fences as far as possible.
In the theory of foreign aid put forward by Hans Morgenthau, foreign aid is something that is controversial because on the one hand, foreign aid is seen as fulfilling obligations that rich countries have to do to poor countries as well as the aid provided by Australia to Tuvalu.
On the other hand, the foreign aid provided is considered as an instrument of a country's policy to the recipient country.
Because foreign aid has been centered and cannot be separated from the international political interests of donor countries, such as in aspects of defense, political influence, and others.
Australia's foreign aid is also the result of policies determined through its domestic political process.
Australia plays its soft power to get other countries to do things with the desired results through persuasion and attraction, not by coercion, conflict or competition.
Soft power that is run by Australia emphasizes aspects of cooperation such as providing foreign aid, not using military force.
Problems such as climate change and global warming are more likely to be solved by means of soft power.
Because in international relations, countries that can frame issues through culture and ideas that are closer to applicable international norms and have credibility in other Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 15 countries that are supported by their values and policies are attractive countries in the eyes of the international community.
Likewise with Australia's foreign aid provided to countries in the Pacific Region to deal with climate change, especially to Tuvalu.
Where the assistance is inseparable from one of Australia's forms of soft power to build a positive image as a rich country in the region.
So that the assistance provided can also add to Australia's image as a country that is responsible for what is being experienced by its neighbors in the Pacific Region.
Regarding Australia's low commitment to climate change, green political theory has a critique of the state, where this theory assumes that the state is part of the dynamics of modern society that causes environmental crises such as the impact of climate change being experienced today.
Climate change is the dominant environmental problem at this time, caused by human dependence on fossil fuels, where Australia is one of the largest coal-fired fossil fuel producers in the world and Australia does not want to stop its coal mining.
REFERENCES ADB.
(2019, July).
Pacific Economic Monitor.
Retrieved from Asian Development Bank: https://www.adb.org/publications/pacific-economic-monitor-july-201 Anthoni, M. (2019, August 13).
Negara di Pasifik desak Australia berhenti menambang batu bara.
Retrieved November 29, 2021, from Antara News: https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1008812/negara-di-pasifik-desakaustralia-berhenti-menambang-batu-bara Australia, C. (n.d).
Increase Humanitarian Aid.
Retrieved Dec 6, 2021, from Caritas Organization: https://www.caritas.org.au/act/increase-humanitarianaid/?utm_campaign=AO_Grant_2022&utm_medium=cpc_grant&utm_source =g&utm_kw=foreign%20aid%20australia&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIi9znlcGm9 QIVTQQrCh0I7A8DEAAY BBC.
(2019, Jun 13).
Australia setujui proyek tambang batu bara kontroversial ke perusahaan India, Adani.
Retrieved Jan 10, 2022, from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-48622504 Brown, P. (2012).
Australian Influence in the South Pacific.
Australian Defence Force Journal(189), 66-75.
Burchill, S., & Linklater, A.
(1996).
Teori-teori Hubungan Internasional.
(M.Sobirin, Trans.)
Bandung: Nusa Media.
Dalzell, S. (2018, Feb 21).
Australia Diperkirakan Tak Penuhi Target Pengurangan Emisi.
Retrieved Jan 5, 2022, from ABC: https://www.abc.net.au/indonesian/2018-12-21/australia-diperkirakantak-penuhi-target-pengurangan-emisi/10654198 Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 16 Gomichon, M. (2013, Mar 8).
Joseph Nye on Soft Power.
Retrieved May 27, 2021, from https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/ Government, D. o.
(2015, Mar 10).
Australia helps Tuvalu Recover from Cyclone Pam.
Retrieved Dec 10, 2021, from https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/australia-helps-tuvalurecover-from-cyclone-pam Government, D. o.
(n.d).
Australia's Commitment to Climate Change Action in Tuvalu.
Retrieved Dec 15, 2021, from https://www.dfat.gov.au/aboutus/publications/Pages/australias-commitment-to-climate-change-actionin-tuvalu Government, D. o.
(n.d).
Tuvalu – Australia’s Commitment to Strengthening Climate and Disaster Resilience in the Pacific.
Retrieved May 22, 2021, from https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/tuvalu-australiasHarrison, L. (2007).
Political Researh: An Introduction.
(T. Wibowo, Trans.)
London: Routledge.
Holsti, K. J.
(1972).
International Politics: Framework of Analysis.
Englewood Cliiffs: Prentice Hall.
Macdonald, B. K. (n.d).
Tuvalu.
Retrieved May 20, 2021, from Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/place/Tuvalu Mellissen, J.
(2005).
The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relation.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Morgenthau, H. (1962).
A Political Theory of Foreign Aid.
The American Political Science Review, 56(2), 301-306.
Murphy, J.
(2017).
Tuvalu : History, Culture, Tradition, Travel and Tourism.
California: CreateSpace Independent Publishing.
News, B.
(2018, Nov 9).
Demi menangkal pengaruh Cina, pemerintah Australia akan danai negara-negara Pasifik.
Retrieved Jan 10, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-46147683 Nursalikah, A.
(2015, Sep 09).
Australia Terancam Didepal dari Forum Negara Pasifik.
Retrieved Nov 29, 2021, from Republika: https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nuebli366/australia-terancamdidepak-dari-forum-negara-pasifik Tisdell, C. A.
(2000).
Poverty in the Pacific Islands.
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 20(11/12/2000), 85-86.
Tyas, R. (2020, Sep 24).
Tuvalu, Pulau Indah yang Terancam Tenggelam.
Retrieved May 20, 2021, from Tribun News: https://travel.tribunnews.com/2020/09/24/tuvalu-pulau-indah-yangterancam-tenggelam?page=4 Journal of Social Political Sciences JSPS Vol.
3, No.
1, Feb, 2022 ISSN: 2715-7539 (Online) 17 UNDP.
(2017, Jul 11).
Government of Tuvalu launches new coastal protection project to bolster resilience to climate change.
Retrieved Dec 24, 2021, from https://reliefweb.int/report/tuvalu/government-tuvalu-launches-newcoastal-protection-project-bolster-resilience-climate White, J. D. (1974).
The Politics of Foreign Aid.
London: The Bodley Head.
Zed, M. (2003).
Metode Penelitian Kepustakaan.
Jakkarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.
89 International Peer Reviewed Journal The Initiatives of Local Government Units (LGUs) in Batangas on Climate Change JENNIFER G. MANALO http://orcid.org0000-0003-1585-0051 mielmarga1408@gmail.com Batangas State University Rizal Avenue, Batangas City, Philippines Originality: 100% • Grammar Check: 99% • Plagiarism: 0% ABSTRACT The local government units in the Philippines are at the forefront of disaster management including responding to the impacts of climate change.
With the necessity to address this problem, this study aimed to determine the initiatives of the local government units (LGUs) in Batangas on climate change.
The study made use of descriptive research which involved quantitative and qualitative methods in gathering data.
Research triangulation was used.
The subjects of the study were the Disaster Risk Reduction Management and planning officers of three component cities and twenty-seven municipalities of Batangas.
Frequency counts, percentages, and average weighted mean were used in the statistical analysis of data.
Results of the study revealed that LGUs in Batangas comply with the provisions of Republic Act No.
10121, otherwise known as Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010.
LGUs to organize disaster risk reduction and management councils at the local level.
Likewise, cities and municipalities of Batangas implement policies through local ordinances to adopt and strengthen RA 9003.
They are implementing initiatives that encourage businesses to promote climate-smart services and practices.
Assessment of farming Vol.
34 · October 2018 DOI: https://doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v34i1.631 Print ISSN 2012-3981 Online ISSN 2244-0445 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
http://orcid.org mailto:mielmarga1408@gmail.com https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 90 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research practices, extension services and linkages with GOs, NGOs and other agencies in the implementation of climate change initiatives needs to be improved.
Keywords Social Science, climate change, triangular approach, Batangas City, Philippines INTRODUCTION Climate change is a crucial issue that must be addressed within the global and local context.
It is a serious (Jiang et al., 2014), urgent global priority (Papa, 2015), and is one of the most difficult challenges facing the world caused by human activities on earth (Yahaya & Nwabuogo, 2016).
The atmosphere’s surface temperature (Merchant et al.
(2013) environmental conditions in the Arctic region have changed rapidly (Zábori et al., 2013) and the ocean is becoming increasingly warmer, and the sea level has risen (Hughes, 2014), and the amount of ice on the earth is decreasing over the oceans Binti Sa’adin, Kaewunruen, & Jaroszweski, (2016).
The earth warming was due to the increasing concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere (Sa’adin, 2016), which destroys the environment and makes it unhealthy for living beings (Yahaya & Nwabuogo, (2016).
Large areas of cooling have been observed in the Southern Ocean during the past few decades, whereas West Antarctica and several sub-Antarctic islands have warmed more rapidly than other parts of this continent (Chambers et al.
2013).
Its impact worsens and contributes to food shortage, infrastructure damage and degradation of the natural resources upon which livelihoods are based.
The Philippines like any other developing countries in the world is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change because it is located in the Pacific typhoon belt thus, exposed to climate-related risks such as tropical cyclones, drought, flood and climate variability (Yumul, Cruz, Servando, & Dimalanta, (2011).
According to the study of the United Nations University’s Institute for Environment and Human Security and the German Alliance Development Works, Philippines ranks third in the list of countries most vulnerable to climate change with 24.32 percent disaster risk.
Typhoon Sendong (Washi) in 2011 and Yolanda (Haiyan) in 2013 which landed in the Philippines caused tremendous damage to infrastructure and loss of lives mainly due to the storm surge and strong winds (Lapidez, Tablazon, Dasallas, Gonzalo , Cabacaba, Ramos , Suarez , Santiago , Lagmay, and Malano, 2018) and left Tacloban City and other 91 International Peer Reviewed Journal municipalities in the region entirely devastated.
Vietnam’s surface heat is predicted to rise between 1 °C and 2 °C by 2050 because of climate change (Akpalu, Arndt, & Matshe, 2015).
Extreme weather has affected railway operations and safety, including fatalities, injuries and property damage in Malaysia (Sa’adin, 2016).
On 19 May 2016 temperatures exceeded 50 ◦C in a region on the India–Pakistan border.
Excessive temperature can injure human health, resulting in heat cramps, exhaustion, and severe heat strokes (Oldenborgh et al., 2018).
By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa are projected to be exposed to greater water quantity challenges due to the effects of climate change (Ojomo, Elliott, Amjad, & Bartram, 2015).
These were the grave indication of how extreme weather conditions have become more frequent and more intense due to climate change.
Some programs and policies have been made and implemented, and yet property losses and casualties are increasing.
Efforts to avoid substantial losses are unsuccessful and could not cope with the intensifying climate change impacts.
The local government units in the Philippines are at the forefront of disaster management including responding to the impacts of climate change in their respective localities.
However, many of the local government units are not aware of the climate change phenomenon and can’t assist and respond to the affected communities on the actual event.
Their knowledge and awareness of impending disasters, their impacts, their mitigation, preparedness, and adaptation is lacking (Piracha, Tariq, 2015).
Adaptation strategies and alternative policy options that have been recommended to the LGU’s have not yet been institutionalized.
The local leaders are critical actors in drafting, implementing, and evaluating development programs that address adverse problems of climate change both strategic and short-term considerations of local government units.
However, their perceptions of necessity and urgency are grounded in how much they know about the issue and concern.
It is crucial that current and future decision makers are knowledgeable about climate change and its effects to achieve effective adaptation and mitigation (Ojomo, Elliott, Amjad, & Bartram, 2015).
Much has been written on climate change but there is still limited literature and investigation on the initiatives of the local government units to combat the problems on climate change.
This study would be beneficial to other locality to enlighten them formulate and adopt their climate change initiatives applicable to their community thereby enhance local climate change adaptation and improve safety and well-being among the population.
92 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY The study determines the initiatives of the local government units (LGUs) in Batangas on climate change specifically along policy framework, knowledge and capacity development, health and social protection and agriculture and fisheries.
It further investigates the problems encountered by the LGUs in the implementation of identified initiatives with the end view of proposing development initiatives on climate change for LGUs in Batangas.
FRAMEWORK Climate change adaptation requires reshaping and redesigning of developing social and economic practices to respond effectively to anticipate environmental changes.
Likewise, disaster risk reduction seeks to influence development decisionmaking and protect development aspirations from envisioned environment relate to risk.
This research work was anchored on the National Framework Strategy on Climate Change (2010-2022) and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).
The study was focused on climate change initiatives relative to the policy framework, knowledge and capacity development, health and social protection and agriculture and fisheries.
The researcher believes that these are vital components for the local government units in dealing with problems of climate change.
The national framework strategy on climate change envisions a climate risk-resilient Philippines with healthy, safety and self-reliant communities.
It recognizes the roles of agencies and their respective mandates as provided by the law as well as the local governments as front-liners in addressing climate change.
The framework also recognizes the value of forming multi-stakeholder participation and partnership in climate change initiatives including the civil society, private sector, and local governments, especially with indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups most vulnerable to climate change impacts.
The national framework was formulated within the context of the country’s sustainable development goals/institutional factors that affect the country’s ability to respond to climate change.
As climate change has myriad impacts in all sectors of the society and the economy adaptation measures will require resources and the cooperation of all sectors.
Further, it was focused on cross-cutting strategies: capacity development; knowledge management; IEC and advocacy; gender mainstreaming, research and development and technology transfer.
93 International Peer Reviewed Journal The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction was the first major agreement of the post-2015 development agenda and an international document which was adopted by UN in March 2015 at the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai, Japan and was endorsed by the UN Assembly in June 2015.
The Sendai Framework is a fifteen-year voluntary, non-binding agreement which offers four priorities for activities such as understanding the risk; strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience, and enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response.
In achieving the goal of the framework, several targets have been identified: substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, reduce the number of affected globally, reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product, reduces damages in infrastructure and disruption of basic services, health and educational facilities and increase availability and access to multi-hazard system and enhance international cooperation.
These two frameworks serve as the inspiration of the researcher to the present study since they are both focused on taking proactive measures towards reducing risks and adapting instead of simply responding to the events.
They both aimed at reducing people’s vulnerability to hazards by improving methods to anticipate, resist, cope with, and recover from their impact and seek to rebuild resilience in the context of sustainable development.
With similar aims and mutual benefits, the researcher recommended development initiatives for LGUs in Batangas to enhance climate change resilience and reduce the risks; thus, cooperation and collaboration of all the stakeholders in the community is needed to make it fully realized.
METHODOLOGY Research Design This study made use of the descriptive research which involved quantitative and qualitative methods for gathering data.
Research triangulation was used.
The use of triangulation as a method facilitate the integration of qualitative and quantitative findings, help researchers to clarify their theoretical propositions and the basis of their results thus offer a better understanding and empirical findings (Östlund, Kidd, Wengström, & Rowa-Dewar, 2011).
Data were made available through a survey questionnaire, documentary analysis and interview.
Questionnaires were answered according to the priority of concern by using pre-determined sets of questions with pre-defined ranges of answers as to avoid 94 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research conflicting series of response.
Informed consent was sought during the conduct of research.
Further, the respondents of the study were assured of the strictest confidentiality of the data provided and that it will only be used for the purpose of conducting the study.
Participants The subjects of the study were the heads of the city and local Disaster Risk Reduction Management Office and Planning Officer of the three component cities and twenty-seven municipalities of Batangas.
Frequency counts, percentages, and average weighted mean were used in the statistical analysis of the data.
Instrumentation The survey questionnaire was the major instrument used in gathering necessary data.
It composed of two parts.
The first part covered the climate change initiatives of the local government units along policy framework, knowledge and capacity development, health and social protection and agriculture and fisheries.
The last part delved on the problems encountered by LGUs in the implementation of climate change initiatives.
The survey questionnaire was presented to experts for validation; the dry run was administered to test the validity of the instrument.
The questionnaire was set for reliability testing using Cronbach alpha Test.
The result revealed that it contained high internal efficiency level of 0.871 which was interpreted as reliable and the options are appropriate for utilization.
An interview was also conducted to substantiate the discussion and to validate the data gathered from the questionnaire.
Accomplishment reports, plan of activities, policies, and ordinances relative to climate change initiatives were also analyzed.
The responses were tallied, scored and tabulated for statistical treatment.
The following continuum was employed to describe the weighted mean verbally: Options Range Verbal Description 4 3.50 – 4.49 Very Highly Evident/Very Serious 3 2.50 – 3.39 Highly Evident/ Serious 2 1.50 – 2.49 Moderately Evident/Moderately Serious 1 1.00 – 1.49 Not Evident/Not Serious 95 International Peer Reviewed Journal RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Initiatives of Local Government Units in Batangas on Climate Along Policy Framework The Planning and Development Officers and Disaster Risk Reduction Management Officers revealed that it was highly evident that the LGUs in Batangas implemented policies and local ordinances to adopt RA 9729 otherwise known as Climate Change Act of 2009 with a weighted mean of 3.35.
The LGUs conducted activities which include tree planting, mangrove rehabilitation, use of solar panels and other energy saving devices among government offices and bring your bayong (BYOB) campaign which aimed to reduce the use of plastic.
Mangroves provide important ecosystem services.
This affirmed by the study of Abbas, S., Qamer, Hussain, Saleem, & Nitin, (2011) who stressed that mangroves provide nursery habitat for marine fish including coastal stabilization.
On the other hand, entering into Memorandum of Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding with GOs and NGOs for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction rated as moderately evident with the lowest weighted mean of 2.43.
Uneke, Ezeoha, Uro-Chukwu, Ezeonu, Igboji (2018) in their study suggested that there is a need to strengthen institutions and mechanisms that can more systematically promote interactions between researchers, policy-makers and other stakeholders and recognize the value of coming together for a symbiotic relationship.
To help farmers increase their agricultural production in times of drought and flood caused by extreme weather conditions, policies on the provision of drought and flood resistant seeds and fertilizer rated very highly evident with a weighted mean of 3.59.
Agricultural crop productions are vulnerable to climate change.
Most of the time, crops are being damaged by the strong typhoon and during drought.
This was reinforced by the study of De-Graft, & Kweku, (2012) who stressed that climate change tends to have negative effects on crop yield through its influence on crop production.
Meanwhile, policies establishing linkages and networking to conduct research studies on agricultural technologies that are climate change resilient rated moderately evident with the weighted mean of 2.33.
The respondents indicated that it was moderately evident that the LGUs formulated and implemented ordinances creating the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction with a weighted mean of 2.47.
The LGUs created an appropriations act for budget 96 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research allocation for the activities, programs and projects for climate change adaptation in all barangays obtained the lowest weighted mean of 2.25.
Climate Change Act of 2009 provides for the mainstreaming of climate change into government policy formulation and the establishment of a framework strategy and programs on climate change.
The Planning and Development and DRRM officers disclosed that it was very highly evident that the LGUs implemented NO smoking policy in government offices and public places which garnered a weighted mean of 3.83.
On the other hand, policies on the construction of the green building and climate-smart practices shown in weighted wean of 2.33 interpreted as moderately evident.
The respondents revealed that it was very highly evident that the LUGs in Batangas comply with the provisions of the Republic Act No.
10121, otherwise known as Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 requiring local government units to organize disaster risk reduction and management councils at the local level with a weighted mean of 3.85.
The conduct of training and educating the different committee on pre-disaster phase and during disaster phase to respond and reduce disaster risks obtained the lowest weighted mean of 2.32.
Along Knowledge and Capacity Development Results of the study showed that regarding knowledge and capacity development the LGUs initiatives were rated by the respondents moderately evident as reflected in the average weighted mean of 2.43.
As assessed by the disaster risk reduction officers and planning development officers in reference to conducting comprehensive strategies for broadest education of all sectors in the community, collaboration with the schools in the integration of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction in elementary, secondary and tertiary curriculum rated moderately evident as expressed in average weighted mean of 2.47.
Distribution of pamphlets and brochures on climate change and disaster risk reduction were also conducted.
On the other hand, collaboration with local media for publication of articles, discussion and education on climate change and disaster risk reduction were perceived to be the least implemented development with the lowest weighted mean of 2.35.
Effective risk management depends on the informed participation of all stakeholders.
This was supported by the study of Almario-Desoloc (2014) who stressed that mobilization of people through seminars and training raised the awareness of action during and after a calamity.
To educate the vulnerable community on the impact of climate change, 97 International Peer Reviewed Journal the conduct of training, seminars, and workshops rated by the respondents moderately evident as expressed in a weighted mean of 2.28.
Educating the about climate change is very important not only to raise their awareness but to enable them to respond to the disasters brought by climate change.
This was in congruence with the study of Vicerra, Salvador, & Capili, (2018) who said that knowledge on disaster preparedness boosts confidence and preparedness, but it also conditions people on how to act and what to do if ever such an unfortunate event strikes.
The respondents confirmed that disaster preparedness and training program such as earthquake flood, tsunami and landslide evacuation drills were rated moderately evident among the initiatives of LGUs with the second highest weighted mean of 2.25.
However, the conduct of climate change awareness month and slogan, poster, and essay making contest were rated 2.32 interpreted as moderately evident.
Results of the study revealed that the LGUs in Batangas are exploring different avenues to educate people about climate change.
On the other hand, of the different development initiatives implemented by the LGUs in Batangas on the provision of early warning devices in vulnerable areas, installation of rain gauge and storm signal alert were rated highly evident as observed in a weighted mean of 3.47.
It has to be noted that this equipment is being installed within the nation by the Department of Science and Technology as one of their projects.
On the other hand, the conduct of orientation and workshop on family disaster preparedness obtained the lowest initiatives implemented by the LGUs with the weighted mean of 2.37 interpreted as moderately evident.
Climate change is a complex issue that needs to be cascaded and understood down to the community level.
Public awareness, active community participation, and strong political will of the local leaders can create enhanced resilience of the stakeholders and reduced cost and magnitude of climate change impacts to especially those in vulnerable sectors.
The LGU disclosed it was highly evident that LGUs in Batangas have formulated GIS mapping on flood-prone areas, landslide-prone areas and tsunami and sea level rise prone areas, shown in the weighted mean of 3.46.
Provision of GIS mapping on landslide-prone areas, flood-prone areas and tsunami and sea level rise prone areas is essential to reduce possible casualties during the occurrence of strong typhoons that may cause flood, landslide or sea level rise.
Along with Health and Social Protections To promote health and social protection of the vulnerable sectors to climate change sensitive diseases, the respondents remarkably revealed that the conduct of 98 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research medical missions and consultations was very highly evident among the initiatives of the LGUs with a weighted mean of 3.72.
However, provision of health care card and medical assistance was rated highly evident among the initiatives of the LGUs which obtained a weighted mean of 3.48.
Climate change is adversely affecting human health.
Frequent extreme weather events mean more potential deaths and injuries for those in the vulnerable sectors.
This was supported by the study of Swaminathan, Lucas, Harley, & McMichael, (2014) who emphasized that climate change sensitive exposures and conditions will subtly impair aspects of the human immune response, thereby altering the distribution of vulnerability within populations—particularly for children—to infection and disease.
To provide social protection to the communities located in the hazard-prone areas the planning development officers revealed that provision of contingency planning was highly evident with a weighted mean of 3.48.
This is to ensure the safety of the people affected by the calamities.
On the other hand, they gave the lowest rating that LGUs built evacuation centers shown in a weighted mean of 2.43 described as moderately evident.
The respondents indicated that it was highly evident that the LGUs conducted clean-up drive activities to safeguard the health and lives of the people in vulnerable communities to climate change with a weighted mean of 3.48.
This includes “Linis Kanal at Ilog” campaign and coastal clean-up.
It has to be noted that canals are the breeding ground of mosquitoes and other disease-causing organisms.
Maintaining the cleanliness of the canal could prevent the spread of diseases such as dengue, leptospirosis and the like.
This was affirmed by the study of De Vries, Visser, Nagel, Goris, Hartskeerl, & Grobusch, (2014) who asserted that leptospirosis is one of the health problems affecting Filipinos especially during the rainy season that causes death if not properly treated.
However, the respondent gave the lowest rating that the LGUs conducted feeding programs and medical missions as shown in the weighted mean of 3.41 which is interpreted as highly evident.
In general, the initiatives of the LGUs in Batangas along health and social protection was rated highly evident with a composite mean of 3.33.
Along Agriculture and Fisheries The respondents indicated that it was very highly evident the LGUs provided livelihood program to farmers and fishers which are climate change resilient which obtained in a composite mean of 3.53.
Agriculture remains to be an important activity of the population in Batangas.
Palay, coffee, sugar cane, pepper, banana, corn, coconut and vegetables were the main crops in the province.
Climate 99 International Peer Reviewed Journal change may worsen its impact (Thomson, Alderman, Tuck, & Hobday, (2015) on agricultural production.
The farmers feel the above impacts because those can lead to a decrease in production which was affirmed by Sumastuti, (2015) who claimed that climate change and the global warming like changes in the pattern and distribution of the rainfall could lead to a decrease in production even in the crop failure.
Remarkably noted by the respondents, that it was highly evident that the LGUs conducted training and seminars to local farmers and fishers on sustainable livelihood programs with a weighted mean of 3.83.
On the other hand, the respondents gave the lowest rating on collaboration with the various institutions to conduct research and climate change technologies on agriculture and fisheries with a weighted mean of 2.41.
Problems Encountered by the Local Government Units in the Implementation of Initiatives on Climate Change Results of the study show that the local government officials encountered serious problems in the implementation of the development initiatives on climate change.
This was shown by the overall weighted mean value of 3.32.
Inadequate knowledge of the community on how to cope with climate change adaptation and disaster risk management was the most serious problem encountered by the government officials followed by the limited participation of the community on climate change adaptation and mitigation programs and activities.
Average weighted mean values of 3.49 and 3.47 were computed respectively, descriptively rated as serious problems.
Poor extension services, limited information dissemination and campaign material on climate change, and limited training and seminars conducted relative to climate change were also found a serious problem in the implementation of climate change development initiatives by the government officials.
Lack of local policies and ordinances relative to climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction was also a serious problem encountered by government officials.
Likewise, limited partnerships to government and non-government institutions for the implementation of climate change development initiatives was also a serious problem encountered by the government officials in the implementation of climate change development initiatives.
On the other hand, lack of budget allocation and support from the government was a moderately serious problem.
Results of the study show that there is a need to improve extension services and linkages or partnership with GOs, NGOs and other agencies officials in 100 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research the implementation of climate change development initiatives.
Likewise, local legislatures should formulate laws and ordinances on climate change to implement the different enacted laws on climate change.
Development Initiatives for Local Government Units (LGUs) in Batangas on Climate Change The development initiatives are proposed to respond to the challenges that humanity is facing nowadays brought by massive climate change.
This development initiative will help address the problems and impacts of climate change which may contribute to food shortages, infrastructure damage and the degradation of natural resources upon which livelihoods are based.
Education, Information, and Communication (EIC).
Education, information, and communication (IEC) action can lead to better-informed decision sand enlightened choices concerning climate change.
Information, education, and communication (EIC) combine strategies, approaches, and methods that enable individuals, families, groups, organizations and, communities to play active roles in climate change adaptation.
Embodied in EIC is the process of learning that empowers people to make decisions, elucidate perceptions of climate change held by the general public and create an understanding of the factors responsible for climate change to promote behavioral change at the individual/household level.
Channels might include interpersonal communication (such as individual discussions, or group discussions and community meetings) or mass media communication (such as radio, television and other forms of one-way communication, such as brochures, leaflets and posters, visual and audiovisual presentations and some forms of electronic communication).
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Risk Mapping Another proposed addition to the EIC is the Comprehensive Land Use Planning and Risk Mapping.
CLUP is the long-term physical plan that allocates land to specific uses taking into account the best use of land after analysis of competing uses, locational strengths, and environmental constraints.
The Comprehensive land use planning is an integral instrument for local government units to effectively address existing risks, and avoid the creation of new risks to people, assets, and economic activities by rationalizing distribution and development of settlements, and the utilization and management of natural resources.
101 International Peer Reviewed Journal Collaboration and Networking Collaboration and linkages to strengthen efforts to combat climate change are necessary.
Linkages and collaboration with other agencies should be strengthened not only in the conduct of activities promoting risk reduction and climate change mitigation but also in the conduct of researches.
This would bring local leaders, researchers, academicians, industry representatives and other GO, and NGOs to advance and mainstream climate change adaptation.
This could be done through the MOA and MOU.
The researcher strongly believes that collaboration and networking is one of the best ways to share best practices, raise finances and develop technologies solve problems relative to climate change.
Organization of Disaster Risk Reduction Management Team and Rescue Squad Alongside with the developed plan and framework, there is a need for the local leaders to organize disaster risk reduction management team and rescue squad.
The team shall facilitate and oversee the implementation of the climate change initiatives and DRRM activities in their community specifically on preparedness and response.
Active participation and involvement of various stakeholders could safeguard lives in vulnerable areas and avoid damages to properties and infrastructures.
CONCLUSIONS Climate change impact on the environment can lead to severe damage to agriculture, destruction of property and infrastructure and loss of lives.
It is a global phenomenon which calls for everybody’s attention and collaboration from various agencies around the globe and the local government as they are the critical actors in responding to the impact of climate change and natural disasters.
The LGUs in Batangas implemented various initiatives to combat its adverse impact along policy framework, knowledge and capacity development, health and social protection and agriculture and fisheries.
The initiative among local leaders specifically in Batangas on climate change is a good indication that they are extremely aware of its adverse effects.
There is growing evidence that the community could benefit from the creation and implementation of localized climate change policies and indigenous activities.
Institutionalizing and localizing climate change policies and activities could increase the knowledge of the 102 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research community, encourage the involvement of all stakeholders, reinforce agriculture and business and improve human health.
Addressing their encountered serious problems in the implementation of climate change initiatives would give way in developing more better guidelines and legal frameworks.
This study has provided a substantial contribution to the local government units to mitigate the problems of climate change.
Putting an end to human activity contributing to the climate change will need a strong political will thus, employing a variety of significant measures like the formulation of policies, strictly monitoring and implementation of the law, education of the community, and support from various agencies are needed.
This could serve as valuable input the local planners and policymakers in enhancing environmental program policies based on the current strategies adopted by the government to mitigate the impacts of climate change.
It is, therefore, important for all local government units to institutionalized various environmental policies and strictly implement the same to address the issues and problems encountered on climate change.
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH The findings of this study could be translated through journal article for international publications, brochures, manuals, leaflets, newsletters, social media and other information devices for education and information diffusion to enable revisit the local government policies and programs on climate change.
This could be further translated by authorities into comprehensive policies and ordinances to provide better elucidations and long-term programs to address problems on climate change.
LITERATURE CITED Abbas, S., Qamer, F. M., Hussain, N., Saleem, R., & Nitin, K. T. (2011, September).
National level assessment of mangrove forest cover in Pakistan.
In Workshop Proceedings: Earth Observation for Terrestrial Ecosystem (pp.
187192).
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/TeZmrr Akpalu, W., Arndt, C., & Matshe, I.
(2015).
Introduction to the special issue on the economics of climate change impacts on developing countries: Selected studies on Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia.
Retrieved from doi:10.3390/su70912122 https://goo.gl/TeZmrr http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su70912122 103 International Peer Reviewed Journal Almario-Desoloc, M. S. (2014).
Women empowerment and climate change adaptation in Northern Quezon.
Asia Pacific Journal of Multidisciplinary Research| Vol, 2(4).
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/stvZcS Binti Sa’adin, S. L., Kaewunruen, S., & Jaroszweski, D. (2016).
Risks of climate change with respect to the Singapore-Malaysia high speed rail system.
Climate,  4(4), 65.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3390/ cli4040065 Chambers, L. E., Altwegg, R., Barbraud, C., Barnard, P., Beaumont, L. J., Crawford, R. J., ... & Morellato, P. C. (2013).
Phenological changes in the southern hemisphere.
PloS one, 8(10), e75514.
Retrieved from https://goo.
gl/1kPo31 De Vries, S. G., Visser, B. J., Nagel, I. M., Goris, M. G., Hartskeerl, R. A., & Grobusch, M. P. (2014).
Leptospirosis in Sub-Saharan Africa: a systematic review.
International Journal of Infectious Diseases, 28, 47-64.
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/fB8TPt De-Graft, A. H., & Kweku, K. C. (2012).
The effects of climatic variables and crop area on maize yield and variability in Ghana.
Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, 10(10).
Retrieved from https://goo.
gl/CWeWVb Hughes, S. (2013).
Justice in urban climate change adaptation: criteria and application to Delhi.
Ecology and society, 18(4).
Retrieved from https://goo.
gl/U7gW6p Jiang, Q. O., Tang, C., Ma, E., Yuan, Y., & Zhang, W. (2014).
Variations of near surface energy balance caused by land cover changes in the semiarid grassland area of China.
Advances in Meteorology, 2014.
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.
org/10.1155/2014/894147 Lapidez, J.P., Tablazon, J.,Dasallas, L., Gonzalo, L.A., Cabacaba, K.M.A., Ramos, M.M.A., Suarez, J.K., Santiago, J.,Lagmay, F., and Malano, V. (2015).
Identification of storm surge vulnerable areas in the Philippines through the simulation of Typhoon Haiyan-induced storm surge levels over historical https://goo.gl/stvZcS https://doi.org/10.3390/cli4040065 https://doi.org/10.3390/cli4040065 https://goo.gl/1kPo31 https://goo.gl/1kPo31 https://goo.gl/fB8TPt https://goo.gl/CWeWVb https://goo.gl/CWeWVb https://goo.gl/U7gW6p https://goo.gl/U7gW6p http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/894147 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/894147 104 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research storm tracks.
Nat.
Hazards Earth Syst.
Sci., 15, 1473–1481.
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/AsCXuK Merchant, C. J., Matthiesen, S., Rayner, N. A., Remedios, J. J., Jones, P. D., Olesen, F., ... & Guillevic, P. C. (2013).
The surface temperatures of Earth: steps towards integrated understanding of variability and change.
Geoscientific Instrumentation, Methods and Data Systems, 2(2), 305-321.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.5194/gi-2-305-2013 Ojomo, E., Elliott, M., Amjad, U., & Bartram, J.
(2015).
Climate Change Preparedness: A Knowledge and Attitudes Study in Southern Nigeria.
2(4), 435-448.
Retrieved from doi:10.3390/environments2040435 Oldenborgh, G. J. V., Philip, S., Kew, S., Weele, M. V., Uhe, P., Otto, F., ... & AchutaRao, K. (2018).
Extreme heat in India and anthropogenic climate change.
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 18(1), 365-381.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-18-365-2018 Östlund, U., Kidd, L., Wengström, Y., & Rowa-Dewar, N. (2011).
Combining qualitative and quantitative research within mixed method research designs: a methodological review.
International journal of nursing studies, 48(3), 369383.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2010.10.005 Papa, R. (2015).
Editorial Preface.
Cities, Energy and Climate Change. Tema.
Journal of Land Use, Mobility and Environment, 8(1), 3-4.
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/JZGe74 Piracha, A., & Chaudhary, M. T. (2015).
Better awareness for better natural hazards preparedness in Pakistan.
International Journal of Built Environment and Sustainability,  2(4).
Retrieved from DOI:  https://doi.org/10.11113/ ijbes.v2.n4.92 Sumastuti, E. (2015 Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan: Kajian Masalah Ekonomi dan Pembangunan,  16(2), 131-145.
Retrieved from DOI:  https://doi.
org/10.23917/jep.v16i2.1458 https://doi.org/10.5194/gi-2-305-2013 https://dx.doi.org/10.3390/environments2040435 https://doi.org/10.5194/nhess-18-365-2018 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2010.10.005 https://goo.gl/JZGe74 https://doi.org/10.11113/ijbes.v2.n4.92 https://doi.org/10.11113/ijbes.v2.n4.92 https://doi.org/10.23917/jep.v16i2.1458 https://doi.org/10.23917/jep.v16i2.1458 105 International Peer Reviewed Journal Swaminathan, A., Lucas, R. M., Harley, D., & McMichael, A. J.
(2014).
Will Global Climate Change Alter Fundamental Human Immune Reactivity: Implications for Child Health?.
Children,  1(3), 403-423.
Retrieved from doi:10.3390/children1030403 Thomson, R. B., Alderman, R. L., Tuck, G. N., & Hobday, A. J.
(2015).
Effects of climate change and fisheries bycatch on shy albatross (Thalassarche cauta) in southern Australia.
PloS one, 10(6), e0127006.
Retrieved from https:// doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0127006 Uneke CJ, Ezeoha AE, Uro-Chukwu HC, Ezeonu CT, Igbojif J.
(2018).
Promoting researchers and Policymaker’s collaboration in evidenceinformed policy-making in Nigeria: outcome of a two-way secondment model between university and health ministry.
Int J Health Policy Manag.7 (6):522–531.
Retrieved from doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2017.123 Vicerra, P. M. M., Salvador, J. M. G., & Capili, Y. M. V. (2018).
Disaster Preparedness Knowledge and Action: Population Development Perspective.
Asia Pacific Journal of Multidisciplinary Research, 6(1).
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/k93rRk Yahaya, O., & Nwabuogo, O. E. (2016).
Renewable Energy Deployment as Climate Change Mitigation in Nigeria.
Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research.
Retrieved from https://goo.gl/sJcpEM Yumul, Jr, G. P., Cruz, N. A., Servando, N. T., & Dimalanta, C. B.
(2011).
Extreme weather events and related disasters in the Philippines, 2004–08: a sign of what climate change will mean?
Disasters, 35(2), 362-382.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01216.x Zábori, J., Krejci, R., Ström, J., Vaattovaara, P., Ekman, A. M. L., Salter, M. E. ... & Nilsson, E. D. (2013).
Comparison between summertime and wintertime Arctic Ocean primary marine aerosol properties.
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 13(9), 4783-4799. https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-13-4783-2013 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/children1030403 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0127006 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0127006 https://goo.gl/k93rRk https://goo.gl/sJcpEM https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01216.x https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-13-4783-2013
42 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Knowledge Building on Climate Change among Women in Flood-Prone Communities in Cotabato City ESTELITA S. GAYAK http://orcid.org0000-0001-7037-9755 esgayak@gmail.com Notre Dame University Cotabato City, Philippines Originality: 99% • Grammar Check: 99% • Plagiarism: 1% ABSTRACT According to the United Nations (UN), disaster situations such as flooding in South and East Asia are increasingly linked to climate change, and the greater vulnerability of women is most striking.
Women typically outnumber men by 14 to 1 among those dying from natural disaster.
Due to the scarcity of studies which document knowledge building on climate change among women particularly in flood-prone communities in Cotabato City prompted the researcher to conduct this study.
Using an exploratory research design, 289 respondents were interviewed using questionnaires.
Mean, frequency, and percentage were also utilized.
Findings revealed that six out of seven women had heard about climate change and all have experienced its serious effects.
Women had moderate knowledge on climate change.
There was a significant difference in women’s knowledge when grouped according to age, educational attainment, and length of stay in the community.
Women have some correct understanding of the issue yet they have misconceptions about the scientific causes and effects of climate change.
Hence, the DepEd and CHED must ensure the integration of Vol.
33 · July 2018 DOI: https://doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v33i1.604 Print ISSN 2012-3981 Online ISSN 2244-0445 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
http://orcid.org 43 International Peer Reviewed Journal climate change and its full implementation in the basic education and the new tertiary general education curricula.
This mechanism will ensure the building of knowledge and capacity of the youth on climate change.
Keywords — Climate change, flood-prone community, knowledge building, exploratory research design, Cotabato, Philippines INTRODUCTION Climate change demands global attention for it brings various exigencies (Rodrigues, da Silva, de Oliveira, Gabriel Filho, & Putti, 2018) most especially in developing countries (PAGASA, 2011).
The poorest will experience the worst consequences of climate change while at the same time having a reduced coping capacity (Preet, Nilsson, Schumann, & Evengård, 2010).
Global warming induced by human activities such as charcoal harvesting in South Somalia (Ogallo, Mwangi, Omondi, Ouma, & Wayumba, 2018) are directly accelerating atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane and nitrous oxide, and some chemically manufactured greenhouse gases (Lifshits, Spektor, Kershengolts, & Spektor, 2018) has been causing increasing environmental, economic, and sociopolitical crises (Bose & Navera, 2017).
Variability of precipitation, frequency, and intensity of typhoons, sea level rise, and the risk of more droughts, floods, and heat waves (Bhuyan, Islam, & Bhuiyan 2018) invokes land cover dynamics within the river basins which include mangrove, forest, beach, tidal areas, lagoon, river, settlements, barren salt areas (Paz-Alberto, de Dios, Alberto, & De Guzman, 2018) and on ecosystems, food and water security, health, infrastructure, and human security is already occurring around the world (Australian Academy of Science, 2015).
The Philippines is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts (Paz-Alberto, de Dios, Alberto, & De Guzman 2018), with an average of 20 typhoons hitting the country every year (Maceda, 2015).
Climate change amplifies the different socio-economic burdens already shouldered by Filipino families are increasingly putting the urban and rural poor at risk (Santos, 2012).
The country’s vulnerability to severe weather worsens the existing disparity in living standards between the rich and the poor and gender-related inequalities (PAGASA, 2011).
Women in developing countries are particularly vulnerable (UNDP, 2011) and even worse than those living in the low lying communities.
In Bangladesh, girls are considered as the burden of the society and being dominated by a patriarchal kinship system which mainly reflects their subordination and unequal status in the society 44 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research (Akter, 2018).
Women suffer a disproportionate amount of impacts due to the systemic inequality between men and women in society (Dube, Intauno, Moyo, & Phiri 2017).
Climate-related shortages force women to perform additional unpaid works (Owusu-Agyeman, Fourie-Malherbe, & Frick, 2018 & Gonda, 2016).
Harvested works of literature reveal that women are less able to cope and adapt to the effects of climate change.
To date, gender equality is given minimal attention, and the degree of difference in the impact of climate on women and men has been overlooked.
The literature on the mechanisms for building knowledge of women most especially in vulnerable communities is minimal.
To address this gap, this research on knowledge building on the causes and effects of climate change is imperative to provide timely and more proactive responses for women living in most vulnerable communities such as Cotabato City.
Investigating the knowledge building activities of women on climate change could lead and guide the local leaders in addressing the gaps and issues that hinder compliance to international and national mandates specifically RA 9729 or the Climate Change Act of 2009 and the effective implementation of local Climate Change Adaptation Plan for the different barangays in Cotabato City, Philippines.
FRAMEWORK Some theories have been utilized to study the status of women and their plight with the effects of global warming.
Kaijser and Kronsell (2013) employed an intersectional analysis of climate change which illuminates how different individuals and groups relate differently to climate change.
Intersection sketches out a pathway that stays clear of traps of essentialism, enabling solidarity and agency across and beyond social categories.
It illustrates how power structures and categorizations may be reinforced, but also challenged and renegotiated, in the realities of climate change.
The study of Dube et al.
(2017) investigated how livelihood-related household labor requirements are shifting as a result of climate change which used an adapted version of the Harvard Analytical Framework.
On the other hand, Gonda (2016) utilized discursive and cultural constructions of hegemonic masculinities and femininities in reasoning that women are likely not only to suffer more from the consequences of climate change, but they will also be more eager to implement actions that alleviate their increasingly heavy duties.
https://www.tandfonline.com/author/Kaijser%2C+Anna https://www.tandfonline.com/author/Kronsell%2C+Annica 45 International Peer Reviewed Journal This study which focused on knowledge building on climate change was anchored on Adult Learning Theory or Andragogy of Malcolm Knowles.
Knowles made five assumptions about the characteristics of adult learners (andragogy) that are different from the assumptions about child learners (pedagogy).
As people mature, their self-concept moves from one of being a dependent personality toward one of being a self-directed human being; they accumulate a growing reservoir of experience that becomes an increasing resource for learning, and their readiness to learn becomes oriented increasingly to the developmental tasks of his/her social roles.
Their orientation to learning changes from one of postponed application of knowledge to immediacy of application, and their orientation toward learning shifts from one of the subjectcenteredness to one of the problem centeredness and the motivation to learn is intrinsic (Knowles, Holton, & Swanson, 2012).
Moore (2010) elaborated that adult learning is a unique process that requires supporting processes to make it successful.
Two of the processes that co-exist with adult learning are critical thinking and decision-making.
The ultimate goal of adult learning is to make the educational experience as valuable to the learner as possible and to create a desire to expand the learning.
On the other hand “mentoring” uses transformational theory through the critical reflection in a nonjudgmental manner and addresses the principle of andragogy that experience is the most abundant source of adult learning (Klinge, 2015).
Anchored on the theory of Andragogy, this study explored that the experiences of women living in flood-prone barangays for the past years exposed them to acquire knowledge and understanding about the causes and effects of climate change.
To fully understand the mechanisms employed in building knowledge of women, personal and social factors were explored.
The relationships of the independent variables such as women’s age; some children; educational attainment; employment status; source of income; and monthly income and the dependent variables regarding women’s knowledge were examined to identify contributing factors.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY The study determined the knowledge building on climate change among women in flood-prone communities in Cotabato City.
Specifically, it aimed to describe the (1) profile characteristics of women in terms of a) age; b) number of children; c) educational attainment; d) employment status; e) source of income; 46 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research f ) monthly income; g) length of stay in the barangay; (2) women experience about the effects of climate change for the past three years and how serious are the effects; (3) women’s knowledge about the causes and effects of climate change; (4) mechanisms employed in building women’s knowledge; and (5) significant difference on women’s knowledge on climate change when grouped according to their profile characteristics.
METHODOLOGY Research Design This research which employed an exploratory design aimed to capture the experiences of women in building their knowledge of climate change.
The techniques used were a survey and key informant interview.
Research Site The study was conducted in the three flood-prone barangays in Cotabato City under the province of Maguindanao in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
The sample barangays namely: Poblacion1, Poblacion 2, and Rosary Heights 3 were located along Rio Grande de Mindanao, Matampay, Kakar, and Pulangi rivers.
Participants The main participants of the study were married women and residents in the barangay for at least three (3) years.
The Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay and the barangay health worker serving the community were the secondary respondents.
Purposive sampling was applied in identifying the sample barangays.
Stratified systematic sampling was employed in selecting the households where a total of 283 households were proportionately distributed; Poblacion 1 was represented by 66 households, Poblacion 2 with 88 households while 129 households from Rosary Heights 3.
For each sample barangay, two key informants were selected purposively.
Hence, a total of 289 respondents were involved in the study.
The researcher hired and trained enumerators who assisted her in surveying the three barangays.
The enumerators were already familiar with the communities because of their previous engagement with the project of the University Research and Publication Center.
They were oriented to the content of the questionnaire and the attached cover letter which introduced the main goal of the study, and 47 International Peer Reviewed Journal the participation of the respondent was voluntary.
They secured the consent of the participant before proceeding to the interview.
During the actual survey, the enumerators were grouped into two (2).
With the Barangay Hall as the point of origin, one group took the houses in the right direction while the other group surveyed those houses on the left side.
Both groups moved towards the direction of the houses along the river bank following the 5-house interval.
Instrumentation The first instrument was the interview questionnaire which was based on UN and PAGASA (2011) pieces of literature regarding the causes, effects, and mechanism in building knowledge on climate change.
Section I asked for the profile; Section II on the experiences and seriousness of climate change; Section III on knowledge on causes and effects; and Section IV on mechanisms in building knowledge.
The survey questionnaire subjected to content validity of the two (2) experts in climate change yielded the rating of 4.625 in the scale of 5.
The second instrument was the interview guide questions which focused on the key informants’ knowledge of women’s experiences, knowledge of climate change, and the mechanisms employed by the barangay in building their knowledge.
Procedure After the approval and endorsement of the research proposal for implementation, the researcher communicated to the office of the local government to carry out the objectives of the study.
First, the approval and endorsement of the City Mayor were sought, and the approved letter together with the survey questionnaire was brought to the Barangay Chairmen of Poblacion 1, Poblacion 2, and Rosary Heights 3 as the locale of the study.
Second, the Barangay Chairman approved and endorsed the request for data gathering in the barangay, and finally, the researcher together with the trained enumerators conducted the house-tohouse visit to gather the data using the survey questionnaire which commenced on October 28, 2016, until November 5, 2016.
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 20 was employed in processing the data.
The quantitative data in the profile and knowledge of climate change was summarized using mean, frequency, and percentage.
ANOVA was used in finding the data for a differential problem.
For the qualitative data such as the participants’ mechanisms employed, themes were constructed as a guide.
48 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The mean age of the women is 36 years old, indicating that they are in their early adulthood.
On average, they have four children and have been staying in their barangay for about 19 years.
This implies that majority of the women are familiar with the community, people, and events such as the effects of climate change.
While all women have been into formal education, most are high school graduates and have not finished a degree.
More than half of the women are unemployed while others are self-employed and few are employed in service, government, and private organizations.
However, the working women are just earning meager monthly income which is below the minimum wage.
Unemployment engages women in multiple tasks and responsibilities.
As full-time housekeepers, women perform both maternal and domestic roles and are dependent on men for the livelihood of the family (UNDP, 2011).
These are due to factors such as women’s economic disadvantage, social and cultural norms and the discrimination they face in the access to and control over productive resources and their limited decision power (Jost et al., 2015 &UN).
The unequal relationship between men and women gave rise to higher rates of poverty and more severe experience of poverty by women than men (Kaijser & Kronsell, 2013 and Dube, Intauno, Moyo, & Phiri, 2017).
Out of 283 participants, only 249 (88 percent) have heard about climate change.
About 9 out of 10 women are aware of the climate change phenomenon, but all of them have experienced the effects of climate change over the past three years.
Increased water level, flooding, heavy rainfall, and high temperature are the worst effects.
Heavy rains often result in high water level in the low lying communities.
This is expected for the majority of the barangays in Cotabato City are flood-prone since it lies within the Mindanao River basin and 70%of the city’s total land area lies below sea level.
Drought, flash flood, typhoon, and storm surge have no severe effect on women.
Despite viewing other events as not having serious effects, generally, climate change is quite a severe situation for the women living in the flood-prone barangays.
According to UN, disaster situations such as flooding in South and East Asia are increasingly linked to climate change, and the greater vulnerability of women is most striking.
Women typically outnumber men by 14 to 1 among those dying from natural disaster.
For example, women and girls were recorded as comprising up to 80 percent of those who lost their lives in the 2007 Asian Tsunami (UN).
Women in the South were more affected by climate change https://www.tandfonline.com/author/Kaijser%2C+Anna https://www.tandfonline.com/author/Kronsell%2C+Annica 49 International Peer Reviewed Journal (Arora-Jonsson, 2011) and gendered social norms and roles inhibit women’s adaptive capacity (Jost et al., 2015).
Most women have correctly identified the causes of climate change such as smoke from a vehicle (96%); burning of plastic and other garbage (95%); and pollution from factories (90%).
Also, the women are right in saying that volcanic eruptions warm the environment (77%) and it is a consequence of modern life (76%).
However, they have incorrectly identified that climate change is caused by nature (84%); overuse of aerosol or hairspray decreases greenhouse gases (83%); accumulation of gases in the atmosphere cool the earth (81%); cutting and burning of trees (77%); and God’s punishment to human abuses on the environment (76%).
While most women have beliefs that are contrary to the scientific causes of climate change, they view the environment as a sacred and God-given gift.
They (people) are God’s stewards of the natural resources.
Women have a healthy body of knowledge that can be used in climate mitigation, disaster reduction, and adaptation strategies (Gonda, 2016).
Their knowledge is honed by their interaction with nature and emerges from participation in nature rather than separation from it (UNDP, 2011).
The misconception on climate change is critical if not corrected.
If women continue to believe in what they know, their knowledge will be handed down to their children.
This is a serious matter that is needing attention from local leaders.
Proper education for mothers and women must be pursued at the barangay level.
Since mothers are the first teachers of their children, they need support so they can educate their children and others correctly.
This concern could be addressed by way of foreground gender mainstreaming (Dube, Intauno, Moyo, & Phiri, 2017).
The government should incorporate gender perspectives in the national policies, actions plans, and other measures in climate change (UNDP, 2011).
In this light, consultation and participation of women in climate change initiatives must be ensured.
Those responsible for teaching adults must take on the responsibility of creating a learning environment that facilitates critical thinking and ensures learners see the vital connection between adult learning, critical thinking, and decision-making (Moore, 2010).
On the effects of climate change, the result reveals that women know that all populations will be affected (96%); occurrence of drought (94%); contamination of freshwater supply (93%); destroys homes (86%); brings malaria (83%); contributes to deaths from cardiovascular disease (80%); affects the supply of fresh water (78%); and extreme heat can trigger asthma (72%).
50 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Women have already known from experience that everyone is affected by climate change.
Since they live in flood-prone barangay, they know the risks of climate change to their life and property.
Women’s responsibilities in households and communities, as stewards of household resources, security and safety of their children and family position them well to adapt to changing the climate.
Notably, women misconceive that climate change lessens the risk of waterborne diseases (82%).
They need to understand more on the effects of high temperature, flooding, and the like on health.
They need to know that dengue, malaria, and skin diseases are not only caused by flooding but even caused by warm temperatures (PAGASA, 2011).
Moreover, women misconstrue that rising temperatures and variable precipitation are likely to increase the production of staple foods (74%).
This misconception implies that they lack full knowledge of the effects of climate change on food production and supply.
As city dwellers, they are not exposed to farming and agriculture and so, they are not aware that the changing climate endangers food supply.
This misconception of most women needs to be corrected for them to understand the dangerous effects of climate change fully so that they can respond and act responsibly considering that the impoverished and flood-prone communities are at higher risks (PAGASA, 2011).In the US, contrary to expectations from scientific literacy research, women convey greater assessed scientific knowledge of and concern about climate change than men do (McCright, 2010).
Most women identify training and seminar/workshops as mechanisms in establishing their knowledge.
Their membership in Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) or cash transfer has exposed them to the discussion on climate change.
During their Family Development Sessions (FDS), they learned about dengue and malaria prevention, clean environment, and gardening.
Women have learned climate change from TV and radio programs.
These media are the most common source of information available to them, and they find them useful in disseminating information.
However, there are possible problems with these mechanisms considering the one-way flow of information to the audience.
Incomplete and unclear information about climate change may happen with the limitation of these media.
On the other hand, the least they heard it from the newspaper and internet.
These imply that women have limited or lack of access to these media.
The use of technology is never genderneutral.
Like the Philippines, the access of girls and women to information and communication technology is restricted by social and cultural bias, inadequate 51 International Peer Reviewed Journal technological infrastructure in rural areas, the fear of or lack of interest in technology, women’s lack of disposable income to purchase technology services and low level of education limits women’s ability to understand and adapt to the impacts of climate change (UN).
Furthermore, the women learned climate change from their local leaders.
The barangay leaders conducted house-to-house visits to inform the residents about their campaign for garbage-free barangay.
This shows that local leaders mentor their constituents.
Mentoring is traditionally a process in which an experienced guides another person in the development of her or his ideas, learning, and personal/professional competence (Klinge, 2015).
The workers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and barangay officials are the most effective groups in building knowledge of women, indicating that women trusted these groups.
Women’s participation in community clean-up drive is an indication that they have succeeded in teaching them and enhanced consciousness of their obligation as residents in the community.
To strengthen this mechanism, climate change policy must be interdisciplinary which ensures building bridges between extreme events and societal impacts (Bogardi & Fekete, 2018).
Significant differences on women’s knowledge on climate change are found when they are grouped based on their age (the F-value is 1.755 with a p-value of .045) and the highest educational attainment where the F-value is 2.023 and a p-value of .016.
On the other hand, there are no significant differences in women’s knowledge of climate change when grouped according to the number of children (F-value= 249 with a p-value of .240), length of stay in the barangay (F-value= 1.018 with a p-value of .436), employment status (F-value=1.447 with a p-value of .131), source of livelihood, (F-value= 1.048 with a p-value of .346), and monthly income (F-value= 1.095 with a p-value of .362).
Since the p-values are less than .05 between the women’s knowledge on climate change and their age and highest educational attainment, the hypothesis which states that there is no significant difference in the knowledge on climate change is rejected.
Therefore, older and more educated women have better knowledge than their counterparts.
The other variables such as some children, length of stay in the barangay, employment status, source of livelihood and monthly income do not matter in knowledge building.
It can be gleaned from this study that knowledge building among women on climate change supports the principles of Adult Learning theory or Andragogy of Malcolm Knowles.
Adults are motivated to learn based on experience and 52 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research personal interests.
They need to know why they should learn to know something before undertaking to learn it.
While adults are responsive to external motivators, the strongest motivation is internal pressures to learn (Knowles, Holton, & Swanson, 2012 & Moore, 2010) and learn better in situations where they are comfortable both physically and psychologically (Klinge, 2015).
In this study, the women who have learned several lessons from repeated experiences of rising water level, high temperature, and flooding in the barangay have gained some knowledge on the causes and effects of climate change and acquired skills as forms of response mechanisms.
These are indications that the experiences of women have motivated them to know more to become resilient to the effects of climate change.
Although education constrains them, they have grasped information from seminar/training, TV and radio programs and house visits the dangers posed by climate change.
The women in this study hold critical knowledge on climate change adaptation and their local beliefs and traditions produce a wealth of traditional knowledge that is priceless.
The understanding of women on the seriousness of climate change has motivated them to participate and cooperate in the barangay clean-up drive indicating that they recognize the importance of the activity for the broader community rather than self-interest.
The internal pressure for collective action as evidenced by their compliance to barangay ordinances on proper waste disposal and protection of the rivers, streams and the like goes with personal will and conviction for social accountability and responsibility.
Similar findings are found in the study of Whyte (2014) among indigenous women that the responsibilities they assume in their communities expose them to harm stemming from climate change impacts and other environmental changes.
At the same time, their commitment to these responsibilities motivates them to take on leadership positions in efforts at climate change adaptation and mitigation.
CONCLUSIONS Knowledge building on climate change among women employs mechanisms that are responsive to their needs as women and mothers.
Local culture involving group dynamics and interaction, inputs, mentoring, and sharing of stories and best practices have been useful in acquiring information on climate change.
Knowledge gained from these mechanisms and the direct exposure and repeated experiences of flooding and high-water level have provided the women a critical space in addressing the worsening effects of global warming.
53 International Peer Reviewed Journal Women have acquired some correct understanding of climate change, but misconceptions on the topic prevail.
They have incorrect beliefs on the scientific causes and effects of climate change and the processes involved in the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
This is critical since all information including wrong ones when transmitted to the young are construed as correct and proper which could aggravate further the vulnerabilities and risks of climate change when left unrectified.
Despite prevailing limitations, knowledge of climate change has led women to become resilient with the effects of global warming.
The government agencies and barangay leaders who played key roles in building their knowledge have guided them to become resilient and conscious of their obligation in the protection of the environment.
Better knowledge of climate change is found among older and more educated women.
Better education, more maturity, and analytical processes are needed in understanding the scientific causes and effects of changing the climate.
The younger generation of uneducated women needs literacy in these aspects not only to cope successfully with the dangers of climate change but for them to protect their generation and future generations to come.
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH The findings of this study could be translated through a journal article for international publication, newsletter, television and radio, social media, and other forms of information dissemination for the international and national institutions on climate change.
The result of the study may provide feedback to global advocates on the status and challenges in the attainment of goals relative to strategic priorities to address the impacts of global warming, vis-à-vis knowledge and capacity development of women.
It is hoped that the findings will be translated into a collective action among government leaders and stakeholders around the world which addresses gender inequality and, thus elevates the position of women in the society in order to equip them with knowledge and capacity to fight the global impact of climate change for themselves, children, family, and to their own community.
54 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research LITERATURE CITED Australian Academy of Science, (2015).
The science of climate change.
Retrieved from www.science.org.au/climatechange Akter, M. (2018).
Socio-Economic Barriers against Women Equal Right in the Society (a Case of Bangladesh).
Open Journal of Social Sciences, 6(07), 156.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.4236/jss.2018.67012 Bhuyan, M. D. I., Islam, M. M., &Bhuiyan, M. E. K. (2018).
A Trend Analysis of Temperature and Rainfall to Predict Climate Change for Northwestern Region of Bangladesh.
American Journal of Climate Change,  7(02), 115.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.4236/ajcc.2018.72009 Bogardi, J. J., & Fekete, A.
(2018).
Disaster-Related Resilience as Ability and Process: A Concept Guiding the Analysis of Response Behavior before, during and after Extreme Events.
American Journal of Climate Change, 7(01), 54.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.4236/ajcc.2018.71006 Bose, I., & Navera, U. K. (2017).
Flood Maps and Bank Shifting of Dharla River in Bangladesh.
Journal of Geoscience and Environment Protection, 5(09), 109.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.4236/gep.2017.59008  Dube, T., Intauno, S., Moyo, P., &Phiri, K. (2017).
The Gender-differentiated Impacts of Climate Change on Rural Livelihoods Labour Requirements in Southern Zimbabwe.
Journal of Human Ecology, 58(1-2), 48-56.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2017.1316958 Gonda, N. (2016).
Climate change,“technology” and gender:“Adapting women” to climate change with cooking stoves and water reservoirs.
Gender, Technology, and Development, 20(2), 149-168.
Retrieved from https://doi.
org/10.1177/0971852416639786 Arora-Jonsson, S. (2011).
Virtue and vulnerability: Discourses on women, gender, and climate change.
Global Environmental Change, 21(2), 744-751.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.01.005 http://www.science.org.au/climatechange https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2018.67012 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2018.72009 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2018.71006 https://doi.org/10.4236/gep.2017.59008 https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2017.1316958 https://doi.org/10.1177/0971852416639786 https://doi.org/10.1177/0971852416639786 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.01.005 55 International Peer Reviewed Journal Jost, C., Kyazze, F., Naab, J., Neelormi, S., Kinyangi, J., Zougmore, R., & Nelson, S. (2016).
Understanding gender dimensions of agriculture and climate change in smallholder farming communities.
Climate and Development, 8(2), 133-144.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2 015.1050978 Kaijser, A., and Kronsell, A.
(2014).
Climate change through the lens of intersectionality.
Environmental politics, 23(3), 417-433. https://doi.org/10.1080/0 9644016.2013.835203 Klinge, C. M. (2015).
A conceptual framework for mentoring in a learning organization.
Adult learning,  26(4), 160-166.
Retrieved from https://doi.
org/10.1177/1045159515594154 Knowles, M. S., Holton III, E. F., & Swanson, R. A.
(2012).
The adult learner.
Routledge.
Retrieved from https://scholar.google.com.ph/scholar?hl=en&as_ sdt=0%2C5&q=Knowles%2C+M.+Holton%2C+E+%26+Swanson%2C+ R.+%282012%29.+The+Adult+Learner%3A+The+Definitive+Classic+in+ Adult+Education+and+Human+Resource+Development+%287th+edition %29.+New+York%2C+USA%3A+Routledge.++https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
amazon.com%2FMalcolm-S-Knowles%2Fe%2FB001IGHJAE%2Fref%3 Ddp_byline_cont_ebooks_1&btnG=#d=gs_cit&p=&u=%2Fscholar%3Fq %3Dinfo%3ASZFYeA55GRsJ%3Ascholar.google.com%2F%26output%3 Dcite%26scirp%3D0%26hl%3Den Lifshits, S. K., Spektor, V. B., Kershengolts, B. M., &Spektor, V. V. (2018).
The Role of Methane and Methane Hydrates in the Evolution of Global Climate.
American Journal of Climate Change, 7(02), 236.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.4236/ajcc.2018.72016   Maceda, L. (2015).
Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (CCA-DRR) Policies and Programs in the Philippines Department.
Retrieved from http://www.asiapacificadapt.net/sites/default/files/2015/octworkshop/15%20D1_S3b_P2_3%20Philippines%20[Maceda].pdf McCright, A. M. (2010).
The effects of gender on climate change knowledge and concern in the American public.
Population and Environment, 32(1), 66-87.
Retrieved from DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-010-0113-1 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2015.1050978 https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2015.1050978 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.835203 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.835203 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1045159515594154 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1045159515594154 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2018.72016 56 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Moore, K. (2010).
The three-part harmony of adult learning, critical thinking, and decision-making.
Journal of Adult Education,  39(1), 1-10.
Retrieved from https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ917394 Ogallo, L. A., Mwangi, K., Omondi, P., Ouma, G., & Wayumba, G. (2018).
Land Cover Changes in Lower Jubba Somalia.
American Journal of Climate Change, 7(03), 367.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.4236/ajcc.2018.73022 Owusu-Agyeman, Y., Fourie-Malherbe, M., & Frick, L. (2018).
Exploring the educational needs of adult learners: A study of three universities in Ghana.
Journal of Adult and Continuing Education, 1477971418782997.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/1477971418782997 Paz-Alberto, A. M., de Dios, M. J. J., Alberto, R. P., & De Guzman, C. H. E. A.
(2018).
Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability Assessment of Selected Municipalities and Agroecosystems to Support Development of Resilient Communities and Livelihoods in Nueva Ecija, Philippines.
American Journal of Climate Change,  7(02), 295.
Retrieved from DOI:  10.4236/ ajcc.2018.72019 Preet, R., Nilsson, M., Schumann, B., & Evengård, B.
(2010).
The gender perspective on climate change and global health.
Global Health Action, 3(1), 5720.
Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.3402/gha.
v3i0.5720@zgha20.2010.3.issue-s3 Rodrigues, G. S., da Silva, A. C., de Oliveira, A. S., Gabriel Filho, L. R. A., & Putti, F. F. (2018).
Climate Characterization of the Machado-Mg Region through Geotechnology Techniques and Tools.
American Journal of Climate Change, 7(01), 79.
Retrieved from DOI: 10.4236/ajcc.2018.71007 Santos, K. (2012).
PHILIPPINES: Women Weather Climate Change.
Inter Press Service News Agency.
Retrieved from http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/03/philippineswomen-weather-climate-change/ UNDP Asia-Pacific Human Development Report, (2011).United Nations Development Program Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/ en/home/librarypage/hdr/human_developmentreport2011.html https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2018.73022 https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1477971418782997 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2018.72019 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2018.72019 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2018.71007 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human_developmentreport2011.html http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/human_developmentreport2011.html 57 International Peer Reviewed Journal UN Women Watch (2009).
Women, Gender Equality and Climate Change.
Retrieved from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/ Whyte, K. P. (2014).
Indigenous women, climate change impacts, and collective action.
Hypatia, 29(3), 599-616.
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/ hypa.12089   https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12089 https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12089
Review of Living in a Dangerous Climate: Climate Change and Human Evolution 42  Book Review  catalyst to spur human migration.
As might be expected from an author in the Americas, there is a whole chapter dedicated to the peopling of the Americas, again engagingly woven with recent archaeological findings.
The next chapter deals ably, but briefly, with the emergence of agriculture and animal domestication, with an excellent table that gives the timing and location of the first domestication of various important plant and animal species, which will certainly make a useful reference.
Here climate is given the lion’s share of credit for the emergence of stable societies and farming, rather than social factors.
Again, the focus switches back to the Americas for a whole (if short) chapter, specifically the Maya, who are described as having tried to adapt to climate change but unsuccessfully.
Here, an opportunity to expand on some of the other civilisations whose collapses have been, partially or wholly, attributed to climate change is missed, such as the Mycenaeans, the Khmer empire, the Tang dynasty, the Egyptian New Kingdom, or, within the Americas, the Moche and the Tiwanaku.
The summary of human evolution and migration and the emergence of agriculture at this point gives way to the real meat of the book, which diverges into a more polemical essay.
Hetherington characterizes the Social Darwinian concept of “survival of the fittest”, which is incorporated into many western value systems, as being detrimental to the future of humanity.
She is keen to emphasise that dominant species can cease to be dominant, and that there is a paradox at the heart of modern humanity: although we have successfully adapted to climate change in the past, we are now so sheltered from nature that our adaptability is compromised.
In the decade that atmospheric levels of CO2 passed 400 parts per million (ppm) for the first time since the Pliocene, interest in how past human (and hominin) societies adapted to environmental change seems greater than ever.
Recent books like Miller et al.
(2011), Sheets and Cooper (2012), and van der Noort (2013) set the tone, providing sustainability lessons from archaeological examples.
This book follows on from a previous work, Hetherington and Reid (2010), essentially distilling parts of that book to make them more easily accessible for a wider audience.
After an initial chapter that sets out the book’s central arguments, we are taken on a whistle-stop tour of human evolution.
As an accessible summary, it works very well, with helpful illustrations and tables.
Recent findings about Homo floresiensis are deftly integrated, making this a valuable resource for public engagement, although it is only a brief summary – those looking for an accessible account of human evolution with more detail may wish to look at Roberts (2010) or Stringer (2012).
Hetherington takes the opportunity to make some serious points in a fun way: chapter 3, ‘The Neanderthal Enigma’, begins with a vivid description of the depiction of Neanderthals as simple savages that will be familiar to many, before casting that story in the light of history written by the triumphant (i.e., Homo sapiens), presenting archaeological evidence that Neanderthals were far from simple.
Two chapters on how climate may have influenced human migration follow, describing how the spread of H. sapiens coincided with the onset of a cold stage and the ensuing advancement of desert into southern and eastern Africa.
All is not environmentally determined, however: Hetherington does note that population increases or disease may have been the Living in a Dangerous Climate: Climate Change and Human Evolu on Renee Hetherington. 2012. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pp.256, 14 illustra ons. $95.00 (hardcover).
ISBN 978‐1107694736.
Reviewed by Ma  Law  Reviewer address: School of Society, Enterprise and Environment, Bath Spa University, Cardiff, UK  m.law@bathspa.ac.uk   Volume 5:42‐43 Received: February 28, 2014  Published: April 7, 2014  © 2014 Society of Ethnobiology  mailto:m.law@bathspa.ac.uk� 43  Book Review  At times, this part of the book, particularly the start of the chapter “Darwin the Selector”, are deeply personal, giving us small flashes of autobiography that are affecting and admirable in their candour, but it is not always explicit how they are relevant.
There are also chapters on two scientists whose work fell afoul of neo-Darwinists, Paul Kammerer and Richard Benedict Goldschmidt, which are illuminating and engagingly written, but again questionably relevant.
There is an important argument being made, however, with essential points about the need to stop seeing ourselves as detached from nature, and to embrace the diversity of worldviews that humanity encompasses.
Despite the excellent and clear writing, this is very much a book of two halves, and it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the two.
The first half feels more like an introductory course book, the second will have more value to scholars as a political argument alongside the likes of Giddens (2012).
Ethnobiologists, especially those concerned with the role of environmental interactions in the history of human evolution and the development of farming, will find this book useful.
In particular, the synthesis of recent research is especially enjoyable, and supported by an extensive bibliography and informative endnotes.
The book also stands as an important example of how palaeoanthropological and ethnobiological perspectives can be brought to bear on the question of what to do about surviving climate change.
References cited Giddens, A.
2012.
The Politics of Climate Change.
Second Edition.
Polity, Cambridge.
Hetherington, R. and R. Reid.
2010.
The Climate Connection: Climate Change and Modern Human Evolution.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Miller, N. F., K.M.
Moore and K. Ryan, eds.
2011.
Sustainable Lifeways: Cultural Persistence in an EverChanging Environment.
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
Roberts, A.
2010.
The Incredible Human Journey.
BBC: London.
Sheets, P. and J. Cooper.
2012.
Surviving Sudden Environmental Change: Answers From Archaeology.
University of Colorado Press, Boulder.
Stringer, C. 2013.
The Origin of Our Species.
Penguin, London.
Van der Noort, R. 2013.
Climate Change Archaeology: Building Resilience from Research in the World’s Coastal Wetlands.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
<< /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S.
Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /CMYK /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments true /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Apply /UCRandBGInfo /Preserve /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 300 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile () /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /CreateJDFFile false /Description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> /CHS <FEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe5b9a521b5efa7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065876863900275284e8e9ad88d2891cf76845370524d53705237300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c676562535f00521b5efa768400200050004400460020658768633002> /CHT <FEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d7f6e5efa7acb7684002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002065874ef69069752865bc9ad854c18cea76845370524d5370523786557406300260a853ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee553ca66f49ad87248672c4f86958b555f5df25efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef63002> /CZE <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> /DAN <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> /DEU <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> /ESP <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> /ETI <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> /FRA <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> /GRE <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a stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke.
Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 5.0 i kasnijim verzijama.)
/HUN <FEFF004b0069007600e1006c00f30020006d0069006e0151007300e9006701710020006e0079006f006d00640061006900200065006c0151006b00e90073007a00ed007401510020006e0079006f006d00740061007400e100730068006f007a0020006c006500670069006e006b00e1006200620020006d0065006700660065006c0065006c0151002000410064006f00620065002000500044004600200064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740075006d006f006b0061007400200065007a0065006b006b0065006c0020006100200062006500e1006c006c00ed007400e10073006f006b006b0061006c0020006b00e90073007a00ed0074006800650074002e0020002000410020006c00e90074007200650068006f007a006f00740074002000500044004600200064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740075006d006f006b00200061007a0020004100630072006f006200610074002000e9007300200061007a002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002c0020007600610067007900200061007a002000610074007400f3006c0020006b00e9007301510062006200690020007600650072007a006900f3006b006b0061006c0020006e00790069007400680061007400f3006b0020006d00650067002e> /ITA <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> /JPN <FEFF9ad854c18cea306a30d730ea30d730ec30b951fa529b7528002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020658766f8306e4f5c6210306b4f7f75283057307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103055308c305f0020005000440046002030d530a130a430eb306f3001004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d3067958b304f30533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a306b306f30d530a930f330c8306e57cb30818fbc307f304c5fc59808306730593002> /KOR <FEFFc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020ace0d488c9c80020c2dcd5d80020c778c1c4c5d00020ac00c7a50020c801d569d55c002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /LTH <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> /LVI <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> /NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit.
De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
/NOR <FEFF004200720075006b00200064006900730073006500200069006e006e007300740069006c006c0069006e00670065006e0065002000740069006c002000e50020006f0070007000720065007400740065002000410064006f006200650020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740065007200200073006f006d00200065007200200062006500730074002000650067006e0065007400200066006f00720020006600f80072007400720079006b006b0073007500740073006b00720069006600740020006100760020006800f800790020006b00760061006c0069007400650074002e0020005000440046002d0064006f006b0075006d0065006e00740065006e00650020006b0061006e002000e50070006e00650073002000690020004100630072006f00620061007400200065006c006c00650072002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000200065006c006c00650072002000730065006e006500720065002e> /POL <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> /PTB <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> /RUM <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> /RUS <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> /SKY <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> /SLV <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> /SUO <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> /SVE <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> /TUR <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> /UKR <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> /ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing.
Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 5.0 and later.)
>> /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ << /AsReaderSpreads false /CropImagesToFrames true /ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue /FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false /IncludeGuidesGrids false /IncludeNonPrinting false /IncludeSlug false /Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (4.0) ] /OmitPlacedBitmaps false /OmitPlacedEPS false /OmitPlacedPDF false /SimulateOverprint /Legacy >> << /AddBleedMarks false /AddColorBars false /AddCropMarks false /AddPageInfo false /AddRegMarks false /ConvertColors /ConvertToCMYK /DestinationProfileName () /DestinationProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /Downsample16BitImages true /FlattenerPreset << /PresetSelector /MediumResolution >> /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [2400 2400] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice
Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 ISSN: 2614-0535, E-ISSN: 2655-1330 Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s Impact on the Nile Affects Egypt-Ethiopia Conflict Rafsyanjani Mohammad Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia Email: rafsyanjani.mohammad-2019@fisip.unair.ac.id Abstract This article aims to explain the influence of climate change on the international conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia.
The climate change phenomenon was already felt in various parts of the world, but its impact will be more significant if it hits hotspot areas such as the Nile.
Therefore, the author will first describe a literature review of relations between climate change and international conflict.
Second, the article will explain how the climate change phenomenon in the Nile is resulting in some security risks, especially toward Egypt.
This research concludes that the climate change phenomenon in the Nile can exacerbate the conflict escalation between Egypt and Ethiopia and security threats in Egyptian water, food, and the economy due to climate change.
However, many who doubt the possibility of armed conflict, Nile’s condition as one of the hotspots of climate change and the absence of comprehensive international river management make all options still counted and must be undertaken cautiously.
Keywords: climate change, international conflict, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nile Abstrak Artikel ini bertujuan untuk memahami dan menjelaskan pengaruh perubahan iklim terhadap konflik internasional yang terjadi antara Mesir dan Ethiopia.
Fenomena perubahan iklim sudah dapat dirasakan di berbagai belahan dunia namun dampaknya akan semakin signifikan apabila melanda daerahdaerah hotspot seperti kawasan Nil.
Oleh karena itu, pertama, penulis akan memaparkan tinjauan literatur mengenai hubungan antara perubahan iklim 212 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 dengan konflik internasional.
Kedua, artikel ini akan menjelaskan bagaimana perubahan iklim di Sungai Nil menghadirkan berbagai bentuk ancaman keamanan khususnya terhadap Mesir.
Penulis kemudian berargumen bahwa fenomena perubahan iklim di Sungai Nil dapat mendorong terjadinya eskalasi konflik antara Mesir dan Ethiopia seiring dengan keberadaan ancaman di sektor air, pangan dan ekonomi Mesir sebagai akibat dari perubahan iklim.
Meskipun banyak pihak meragukan terjadinya perang, namun melihat realita yang ada di mana daerah merupakan salah satu hotspot perubahan iklim dan ditambah dengan ketiadaan manajemen sungai internasional yang komprehensif, maka segala kemungkinan yang ada pun masih dapat terjadi dan harus diperhatikan dengan seksama.
Kata Kunci: perubahan iklim, konflik internasional, Mesir, Ethiopia, Nil INTRODUCTION Current trends in global climate change still seem to indicate distressing conditions.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) released a special report that estimates that global warming will reach 1.5°C in 2030-2052 if the trend continues at its current speed.
However, it is predicted that it will not reach 2°C soon.
Global warming at 1.5°C is still considered significant damage to natural and human systems than current conditions.
United Nations Climate Change Secretariat (2019) explains that climate change will escalate climate risks and hazards, especially extreme weather, flooding, changes in precipitation rate, drought, increasing temperatures, and rising sea levels.
The increasing frequency of climate hazards above has resulted in various vulnerabilities, especially in water, agriculture, and health sectors threatening the sustainability of future human socio-economic conditions.
In addition to threatening socio-economic conditions, climate change is also suspected of having relations with the security situation, especially in its capacity as a driving force of conflict.
Although it is not a direct causal factor, climate change can still affect security conditions in various ways, such as influencing resource availability, affecting how humans access these resources, regulating population movements, changing economic conditions and Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 213 determining power relations (Levine et al., 2014)the goal of so many concerned about crises, poverty, climate change and conflict, is often presented as a technical challenge – that is, technical interventions, ranging from stronger schools and higher dams to more irrigation and drought-resistant seeds, are often presented as the ‘solution’ to the resilience ‘problem’.
The increasing consensus that climate change is a threat to the development of poorer nations and a cause of humanitarian crises has ensured that climate change concerns are at the centre of recent discussions on resilience.
This has also contributed to the belief that supporting resilience requires a broad, multi-disciplinary approach, and that resilience may even provide a conceptual umbrella under which experts from different disciplines can find a common language (e.g.
Davies et al., 2013.
The whole situation can trigger the acceleration of tension, riots, and conflicts at local, national, or even international levels.
One of the regions affected famously by climate change is the Nile in Africa.
The Nile is a vital river for countries located along the basins, especially for downstream areas such as Egypt, where 97 percent of its national water needs come from the Nile (Newman, 2019).
Climate change is predicted to cause Nile’s water flow patterns challenging to predict, and even in the future, it can reduce the river’s capacity by as much as 25 percent (Schlanger, 2019).
The geographical position of the Nile as an international river potentially brings up potential dimensions of conflict between countries amid the threatened capacity of the river due to climate change effects.
Indeed, international disputes related to the Nile’s management have long occurred before the river is affected by current climate change.
However, the effects of climate change on the Nile must also be considered a factor in the regional security constellation between Nile basin countries.
This paper will focus on a research question about how climate change factors affect international conflict circumstances among the Nile basin countries?
To answer this question, the author will limit the research’s focus on the only conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia without marginalizing the potential for broader conflict outside the two countries.
The author’s initial statement affirmed the impact of climate change on the Nile ecosystem in one way or another had 214 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 influenced international conflicts circumstance, especially between Egypt and Ethiopia.
LITERATURE REVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT Initially, the International Relations (IR) study looks at the environment only as one of the components that constitute the national power.
However, along with the increasing environmental degradation due to climate change, IR scholars began to expand the studies’ scope on environmental issues, including in security studies.
Homer-Dixon (in Vogler, 2014) states the link between environment (climate change) and conflict (security) issues is mainly caused by the expansion and deepening of traditional security concepts that have begun to accommodate human-centered security rather than merely ends at traditional military-oriented security.
Tyler H. Lippert states in his dissertation NATO, Climate Change, and International Security that one of the critical aspects of climate security is the cross-border and global dimensions of climate change threats.
This argument is based on the “global” nature of the climate system.
The socio-environmental impacts of climate change in one region can lead to the cross-border consequences endured by other parts elsewhere (Lippert, 2016) I apply the International Risk Governance Council’s (IRGC.
The “international” nature of climate change’s security impacts is also featured in Thomas H. Karas’s writing Global Climate Change and International Security.
He explains the effects of environmental degradation from climate change are closely related to states’ ability and intention to protect themselves from threats coming from abroad.
This attitude of “self-defense” can lead to conflict or even escalate to armed hostilities and war.
He also points out that increasingly intense competition for natural resources affected by climate change effects could exacerbate existing conflicts or even start new ones (Karas, 2003) bringing together a variety of external experts with Sandia personnel to discuss “The Implications of Global Climate Change for International Security.” Whatever the future of the current global warming trend, paleoclimatic history shows that climate change happens, sometimes abruptly.
These changes can severely impact human water supplies, agriculture, migration patterns, infrastructure, financial flows, Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 215 disease prevalence, and economic activity.
Those impacts, in turn, can lead to national or international security problems stemming from aggravation of internal conflicts, increased poverty and inequality, exacerbation of existing international conflicts, diversion of national and international resources from international security programs (military or non-military.
The reality of modern international security structure influenced by climate change was also noted in The Warming War: How Climate Change is Creating Threats to International Peace and Security by Kirsten Davies and Thomas Riddell.
They introduced the term “Warming War” as the word they used to describe the reality in which the effects of climate change have endangered global security stability.
They explain that climate change can directly or indirectly impact the security vulnerability, especially in developing countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (Davies & Riddell, 2017).
After understanding the impact of climate change can potentially cause cross-border/international conflict, what form of security threats that the impact of climate change generates?
A report from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council Climate Change and International Security explained at least seven potential threats presented by the impacts of climate change: “(1) conflict over resources, (2) economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure, (3) loss of territory and border dispute, (4) environmentally-induced migration, (5) situations of fragility and radicalization, (6) tension over energy supply and (7) pressure on international governance” (Council of the European Union & European Commission, 2008).
The report also emphasized the primary role of climate change as an agent of “threat multiplier” in which climate change gives a more indirect causal dimension to security threats (Council of the European Union & European Commission, 2008).
This argument focused on the role of climate change, which is preferred to be seen as encouraging the acceleration of pre-existing instability.
Furthermore, the threats posed by climate change are humanitarian (human security) aspects and inter-state political and military security risks.
216 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 Besides, an article wrote by Jurgen Scheffran on Climate Change and Security also describes fourdimensional factors of security threats arisen from the impacts of climate change; (1) degradation of water sources, (2) food insecurity, (3) natural disasters, and (4) environmental migration (Scheffran, 2008).
In addition to emphasizing the potential of climate change as a “threat multiplier of instability,” this article also includes a historical explanation of the relations between climate change (or temperature) and conflict.
According to this paper, temperature changes are always followed by decreasing agricultural production and intensifying warfare’s frequency resulting in the collapse of various forms of ancient civilization and modern political revolutions (Scheffran, 2008).
Based on this literature review, several propositions regarding relations are between climate change impacts on international conflict.
First, these propositions are the global nature of the impacts of climate change that has resulted in cross-border/international dimensions of conflict and the accompanying security instability.
Therefore, climate change impacts can lead to tensions and conflicts between countries.
Second, the effect of climate change does not directly result in security disturbances but instead must be translated into a series of threats, which generally include; (1) natural resources, (2) agriculture, (3) natural disasters, (4) migration flows and population movements, and (5) territorial existence.
Third, the impact of climate change can be a threat multiplier agent that will encourage the escalation of potential vulnerabilities and preexisting conflicts.
DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS Climate Change in the Nile A report in 2007 stated that many rivers and lakes in Africa are hotspots of climate change, where these water sources are particularly vulnerable to the possible impacts caused by changing climate patterns (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007).
Due to the Nile’s geographical location and crucial role for the surrounding population, climate change generates more impact on the river.
Indicators of climate change generally seen in the Nile case include temperature, precipitation, and evapotranspiration.
Current climate change trends have shown a significant Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 217 temperature rise in Egypt.
The data show a 0.5°C increase in the average annual temperature per decade during 1983-2013.
Moreover, the daily minimum temperature in Egypt has also continued to rise since 1960.
Future trend predictions indicate a 2-3°C rise in mean annual temperature in 2050, with a drastic increase will hit during the summer and in the barren southern area (United States Agency for International Development, 2018).
This trend also occurs in Ethiopia as a place where headwaters of the Nile (Nile Blue), Lake Tana, are located.
Furthermore, as happened in Egypt, the average temperature in Ethiopia (including Lake Tana) has also increased due to the climate change process.
The report shows a 0.1°C increase in the minimum temperature per decade and a 0.250.37 in the maximum temperature per decade.
The mean annual temperature across Ethiopia also experiences a rise of 0.28°C per decade (Zeleke & Damtie, 2017) regression and wavelet analyses were used to investigate the trend, frequency and intra-annual variability of climate over the Abay (Blue Nile.
Another indicator of the climate change process is precipitation.
Current climate change trends have shown the decreasing precipitation rate has reached 2.76 mm per month since 1960 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2018).
Future projections even show Egypt in 2050 will experience a growing decrease in rainfall, with coastal areas predicted to decrease by 7% and the central to southern regions by 9% (World Bank, n.d.-a).
The precipitation rate is also an essential factor in Ethiopia because the primary water source in Lake Tana comes from rain.
The average annual rainfall in Lake Tana can reach 1280 mm (Abebe et al., 2017)regression and wavelet analyses were used to investigate the trend, frequency and intra-annual variability of climate over the Abay (Blue Nile.
However, along with the growing process of climate change, the variability of the rain cycle in Lake Tana is challenging to predict due to El-Nino and La Nina’s presence caused by the Pacific Ocean’s warming temperatures.
The rising temperatures along the Nile River basin due to climate change have increased evaporation and evapotranspiration.
The rising of surface temperature along the Nile has increased evapotranspiration, which is expected to reach 9% by 2050.
Studies suggest an increase 218 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 in evapotranspiration by 4% could lead to an 8% potential reduction in Blue Nile’s water flow and 11% at Lake Victoria (United Nations Environment Programme, 2013).
Evapotranspiration will severely hit water supplies in Nile’s huge headwaters, such as the African Great Lakes and Lake Tana and arid regions generally found in Egypt and Sudan.
The presence of various key indicators of climate change (temperature, precipitation, and evapotranspiration) is predicted to affect water availability in the Nile River.
Statistical data predicts that there will be a significant decrease in annual water flow in the Blue Nile River after 2050.
The decline is maximally predicted to reach -50% (United Nations Environment Programme, 2013).
The reduced water flow in the Blue Nile will positively impact decreasing Nile River water’s quantity in downstream areas such as Egypt and Sudan.
In addition to reducing the amount of water, climate change can also increase interannual variability.
Nile water flow will experience extreme fluctuations characterized by the growing number of “extreme years” in floods and prolonged drought (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2018).
Security Threats of Climate Change in the Nile The increase in capacity reduction and inter-annual variability flow in the Nile because of the climate change process potentially creates various security threats, especially for downstream countries that have been very dependent on the river.
Changing the flow pattern will significantly affect the emergence of Egypt’s risks, which mainly includes water security, food availability, and national economic stability issues.
Rising temperatures and reduced rainfall in Egypt can increase the Egyptian population’s water demand toward the Nile River.
However, the river is already affected by climate change in which future projections show that there will be a significant decrease in its water capacity.
The extended demand without an increase in supply will harm the water balance and endanger Egypt’s water security.
Damage to Egyptian water balance will significantly affect the agricultural sector, where it consumes at least 80% of the national freshwater resources (United States Agency for International Development, 2018).
Current Egypt’s agricultural conditions also exacerbate the threat to water availability for the agriculture sector.
The main crops, Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 219 such as cotton, wheat, rice, corn, and berseem, contribute 80% of the total land area and around 60% of the total water consumption in Egypt’s agricultural sector.
Rice plantation in Egypt alone already absorbs 15% of total water consumption in the agricultural sector (Zeidan, 2013).
Given the diminishing availability of Nile water, water-hungry plants such as rice in the Egyptian population’s cereal structure will threaten national food availability.
Moreover, Egyptian food availability will also be significantly affected by the current traditional method in domestic agriculture.
The potential impact of climate change on the Nile will also affect the Egyptian economy’s stability, which depends on agricultural production.
The agriculture sector contributes 11.7% of GDP and absorbs 25.8% of the national workforce (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.).
In addition to reducing Nile water flow, climate change is also predicted to reduce the fertile land area in Egypt, which is indeed located in the basins and delta of the Nile.
The reduced flow of the Nile and the depletion of fertile land will lead to a decline in agricultural yields that can hurt domestic economic conditions.
Besides, the reduced availability of Nile water can affect the textile industry’s production, which generally requires an abundant water supply.
The decline in the textile industry’s production output due to water availability issues will significantly impact the Egyptian economy, where the industry contributes to a quarter of Egypt’s non-oil and gas exports and absorbs a large amount of labor.
Vulnerability factors also exacerbate Egypt’s security threats mentioned above; 1) increasing population and 2) extensive poverty.
These two vulnerability factors are not only found in Egypt (internal vulnerability) but can also be found in Ethiopia (external vulnerability).
First, Egypt experienced a steady population growth of around 2% per year, which made Egypt’s population growth in 1980-2008 reached 41%.
The 2017 data stated that Egypt’s population reached 97.55 million people and is also the country with the largest North Africa population (World Bank, n.d.-b).
Ethiopia also showed steady growth, but even at a tremendous rate of 2.5%-3% per year.
This substantial growth rate has made Ethiopia’s population have surpassed Egypt since 2005, and in 2017, it reached 105 million people or the largest between Nile basin countries (World Bank, n.d.-b).
220 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 Second, Egypt’s poverty rate is still tremendous which 2016 data indicated that there are still 27.8% of Egypt’s population (or around 26.6 million people) living below the poverty line (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.).
This poverty issue also happens in Ethiopia.
Although Ethiopia shows rapid economic growth (around 10%), this figure becomes difficult to translate when population growth increases significantly.
Data from 2015 show 23.5% of the population below the national poverty line and 30.8% of the people below the global poverty standard (World Bank, n.d.-b).
The presence of these two vulnerability factors will potentially increase the threat of climate change security in the Nile, where these two factors will require the availability and demand of large amounts of water in the form of irrigation and energy supply.
Climate Change as a “Threat Multiplier” of the Egypt-Ethiopia Conflict In the end, all the security threats derive from the impacts of climate change are translated under the role of climate change as a threat multiplier or as an agent of reinforcing/escalating existing security conflicts.
In the Nile case, the actual conflict had long occurred between basin countries related to river flow management.
This conflict’s historical origin originated from two international treaties, which became the fundamental basis of the Nile flow’s current management, the 1929 Agreement and the 1959 Agreement.
The 1929 Agreement or officially known as the Exchange of Notes Regarding the Use of Waters of the Nile for Irrigation Purposes, was an agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom (at that time represented its colonial state, Sudan) which gave Egypt and Sudan the right to receive 48 and 4 bcm from the flow of the Nile annually.
Besides, this agreement also gave Egypt exclusive rights to oversee the Nile’s flow upstream and to veto any construction projects along the Nile, threatening their interests (Zeidan, 2013).
After Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the 1929 Agreement began to be reviewed.
After various bargaining and negotiation processes, two countries approve the 1959 Agreement or “Agreement on Full Utilization of the Nile Waters between Egypt and Sudan.” This agreement determines that the annual quantity capacity of the Nile is set at 84 bcm in which all will be allocated to Egypt and Sudan as much as 55.8 and 18.5 Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 221 bcm respectively, leaving only ten bcm for the potential of water lost through evaporation and other natural factors (Carles, 2006).
These two agreements ensure the dominance of downstream countries, especially Egypt, in maintaining its hydro-hegemony over the Nile River.
The pattern of power relations between the Nile basin states was always regulated to benefit Egypt and harm the upstream countries’ interests, especially in this case, Ethiopia.
The source of Egyptian power in maintaining this “imbalance” of power relations comes from its structural capability, bargaining power, and ideology influence (Carles, 2006).
As Ethiopia became increasingly concerned about the economic potential of the Nile (and followed by its growing economic capability), the country began to dare “to revise” Egypt’s status quo in the Nile management.
Ethiopia (with other upstream countries) started to emphasize their utility rights, ask for more equitable distribution and oppose Egypt’s natural and historical claims to the Nile.
The latest and “hardest” Ethiopian resistance is constructing the Great Renaissance Ethiopian Dam (GERD) project at 500km southwest of Addis Ababa and close to the Ethiopian-Sudan border.
Ethiopia’s economic development ambitions are driven by the GERD project to meet domestic electricity needs while exporting more to neighboring countries.
With GERD’s existence, Ethiopia wants to become a significant electricity exporter, especially in the Horn of Africa.
The GERD construction project officially began in 2011 and is planned to be the largest dam in Africa, with 1800m in length and 170m in height.
Inside the dam, there will be a 150km2 reservoir with 67 bcm water capacity.
Two power stations will be installed on both sides of the river with electricity capacity reaching 6000 MW, or it can produce around 15000 GW per hour per year (Harb, 2019).
The ambition of Ethiopia’s economic development through GERD is what has heightened tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt.
Egypt is worried that the GERD project will threaten their historical rights and eventually lead to its survival affairs as Egypt relies heavily on the Nile flow.
The main short-term problem lies in the time of the first reservoir filling, in which Egypt (and Sudan) will be very vulnerable to experiencing water shortages during this period.
Initially, Ethiopia planned the time to be around three years, drastically 222 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 reducing the Nile water supply to Egypt.
The Egyptian side sharply criticized this plan, and they countered with a new proposal citing minimum time to be around seven years.
However, at the time of writing in 2019, there was still no clarity regarding the agreed time of first reservoir filling and the negotiation deadlock between the two parties (Shay, 2018).
Egypt is in the long-term worried about the decline in water capacity they receive from the Nile along with the construction of GERD.
The decline potentially threatens Egypt’s water security in which they describe as a matter of national security (Swain, 1997).
Therefore, Egypt is trying hard to keep the GERD project from threatening the status quo they have enjoyed so far.
To fulfill this goal, the first path taken is through diplomatic negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia.
However, talks seem to be still running in place or even deadlocked, along with the opinion incompatibility on underlying issues such as the appointment of independent consulting agency and other parties such as the World Bank (Shay, 2018).
Both parties even blame each other for being the ones who slow down the negotiation process.
The deadlock of diplomatic negotiations can lead to escalating conflicts and more dangerous security tensions.
It happens because the Nile water is a sensitive issue involving Egypt’s national security problems.
When viewed from the historical context, there has long been a bitter conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia concerning the Nile.
These cold conflicts generally include official verbal expressions (both light and stiff), diplomaticeconomic feuds, and even politicalmilitary hostilities (Carles, 2006).
Although there are various forms of conflict, there have not been any small or large-scale military operations between the two.
However, the tension between the two can potentially escalate along with the Ethiopian insistence on GERD construction.
Several recent military showcase actions from the Egyptian military, such as forming the new South Fleet in the Red Sea in 2017, reinforced their most sophisticated warships, “Gamal Abd al-Nasir” and “Ahmad Fadil”.
The Egyptian Navy Commander explained that this fleet is employed when “regional dynamics developments” leading to the threat of “Egypt’s national security”.
This military showcase was even exploited as Egypt’s basis for Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 223 bargaining so that Ethiopia would resume their negotiations (Lawson, 2017).
Besides, Egypt also has closer cooperation with Ethiopia’s neighboring rival countries such as Uganda, South Sudan, and Eritrea.
Egypt is claimed to have helped these countries to launch armed conflict operations with Ethiopia (Eritrea) and Sudan (South Sudan), which supports Ethiopia (Lawson, 2017).
Therefore, it can be observed here that the conflict over the management of Nile potentially grows towards an armed conflict that not only involves the two but also includes other regional players, which will automatically threaten regional security stability.
How does climate change play a role as a threat multiplier of existing conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia?
The previous explanation has shown that climate change has brought rising temperatures, declining precipitation, and increasing evapotranspiration, which led to decreasing water capacity and inter-annual variability in the Nile.
The reduced water supply of the Nile will make Egypt enhance attention to efforts that can reduce their water supply from the Nile, with the GERD project stands as their present biggest threat.
Egypt’s focus will also develop massively as the population grows, and poverty rates are still high.
The more considerable attention of Egypt can result in Egypt’s earnest desire to maintain its water security even to the extent that many people fear the outbreak of the Water War.
Although many people oppose this argument but seeing the reality that the Nile is one of the hotspots of climate change and coupled with the absence of comprehensive international water management, all possibilities are still counted and must be undertaken cautiously.
The following concept map can help explain the various idea connections in this paper.
Existing Conflict Egypt-Ethiopia (Historical hostilities, GERD construction) Security Risk (water security, food availability, economy development) Climate Change (temperature, precipitation, evapotranspiration) Vulnerabilities (population, poverty) Resulting Exacerbating Diagram 1.
Relations Between Climate Change and Security in Nile River 224 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 CONCLUSION One of the climate change hotspots is the Nile River and its surrounding region.
Climate change in the Nile can be seen from the rise in temperature, a decrease in rainfall, and an increase in evapotranspiration.
Coupled with vulnerability factors (population and poverty), the phenomenon of climate change can result in various forms of security threats that involve water security, food availability, and economic development.
Therefore, the diminished water flow in the Nile as an impact of climate change will lead to growing Egypt’s awareness of projects that can decrease their water supply from the Nile with the GERD remains as their current most significant risk.
An enormous Egypt’s attention can result in the country’s earnest desire to maintain its water security, leading to the instability of security relations between Egypt and Ethiopia and even escalates to other regions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY Abebe, W. B., G/Michael, T., Leggesse, E. S., Beyene, B. S., & Nigate, F. (2017).
Climate of Lake Tana Basin.
In K. Stave, G. G. Yemer, & S. Aynalem (Eds.
), Social and Ecological System: Dynamics Characteristics, Trends, and Integration in the Lake Tana Basin, Ethiopia (1st ed., pp.
51–58).
Springer International Publishing.
https://l ink.springer.com/ book/10.1007/978-3-31945755-0 Carles, A.
(2006).
Power Asymmetry and Conflict over Water Resources in the Nile River Basin: the Egyptian Hydro-hegemony.
King’s College London.
Central Intelligence Agency.
(n.d.).
The World Factbook: Egypt.
Retrieved December 11, 2019, from https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/eg.html Council of the European Union, & European Commission.
(2008).
Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council.
https:// doi.org/10.2860/50106 Davies, K., & Riddell, T. (2017).
The Warming War: How Climate Change is Creating Threats to International Peace and Security.
The Georgetown Environmental Law Review, 30(1), 47–74.
https://www.law.georgetown.
e d u / e nv i ro n m e nt a l l aw review/wp-content/uploads/ Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 225 sites/18/2018/05/30-1-TheWarming-War-How-ClimateChange-is-Creating-Threatsto-International-Peace-andSecurity.pdf Harb, I. K. (2019).
River of the Dammed.
Foreign Policy.
h t t p s : / / f o r e i g n p o l i c y .
com/2019/11/15/river-of-thedammed/ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2007).
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (M. Parry, O. Canziani, J. Palutikof, P. van der Linden, & C. Hanson (eds.
); 1st ed.).
Cambridge University Press.
https:// doi.org/10.1177/108602661 1419862 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2018).
Summary for Policymakers of Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report (V. MassonDelmotte, P. Zhai, H. O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P. R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. MoufoumaOkia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.
B. .
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M. I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, & T. Waterfield (eds.)).
https:// report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_ spm_final.pdf%0Ahttp://www.
ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ Karas, T. H. (2003).
Global Climate Change and International Security.
https://prod-ng.
sandia.gov/techlib-noauth /access-control .cg i /2003/ 034114.pdf Lawson, F. H. (2017).
Egypt versus Ethiopia: The Conflict over the Nile Metastasizes.
The International Spectator, 52(4), 129–144.
https://doi.org/10.10 80/03932729.2017.1333272 Levine, S., Peters, K., & Fan, L. (2014).
Conflict, Climate Change and Politics: Why a Techno-centric Approach Fails the Resilience Challenge (Issue February 2014).
https:// www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/ files/odi-assets/publicationsopinion-files/8825.pdf Lippert, T. H. (2016).
NATO, Climate Change, and International Security: A Risk Governance Approach [Pardee RAND Graduate School].
https://doi.
org/10.7249/rgsd387 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
(2018).
Climate Change Profile: Egypt.
www.
government.nl/foreign-policyevaluations Newman, N. (2019).
How climate change could impact the Nile.
Eniday.
https://www.eniday.
226 Islamic World and Politics Vol.
4, No.
2, December 2020 com/en/human_en/climatechange-impact-nile/ Scheffran, J.
(2008).
Climate Change and Security.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 64(2), 19–25.
https://doi.
org/10.2968/064002007 Schlanger, Z.
(2019).
250 million people rely on the Nile for water that may not exist by 2080.
Quartz.
https:// qz .com/1709757/cl imatechange-threatens-the-nilescritical-water-supply/ Shay, S. (2018).
The “Renaissance Dam” Crisis.
Herzliya Conference Papers.
https://www.idc.ac.il / e n / r e s e a r c h / i p s / 2 0 1 8 /documents/shaulshayrenais sance damen22.4.2018a.pdf Swain, A.
(1997).
Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River dispute.
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35(4), 675– 694. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0022278X97002577 United Nations Climate Change Secretariat.
(2019).
Climate Action and Support Trends 2019. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/ files/resource/Climate_Action_ Support_Trends_2019.pdf United Nations Environment Programme.
(2013).
Adaptation to Climate-change Induced Water Stress in the Nile Basin: A Vulnerability Assessment Report.
https://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/ publications/Nile_Basin.pdf United States Agency for International Development.
(2018) .
Climate Ri sk Profile: Egypt.
https://www.
climatelinks.org/sites/default/ files/asset/document/2018_ U S A I D AT L A S P r o j e c t _ Climate-Risk-Profile-Egypt.pdf Vogler, J.
(2014).
Environmental Issues.
In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens (Eds.
), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (6th ed., pp.
341–356).
Oxford University Press.
World Bank.
(n.d.-a).
World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Egypt.
Retrieved December 10, 2019, from https:// c l i matek now l e d ge p or t a l .
worldbank.org/country/egypt World Bank.
(n.d.-b).
World Bank Open Data.
Retrieved December 16, 2019, from https://data.worldbank.org Zeidan, B.
A.
(2013).
Water Conflicts in the Nile River Basin : Impacts on Egypt Water Resources Management and Road Map.
https : / /doi .org/10.13140/ RG.2.1.4414.3849 Rafsyanjani Mohammad Climate Change and International Conflict: How Climate Change’s ... 227 Zeleke, T. T., & Damtie, B.
(2017).
Temporal and Spatial Climate Variability and Trends Over Abay (Blue Nile) River Basin.
In K. Stave, G. G. Yemer, & S. Aynalem (Eds.
), Social and Ecological System: Dynamics Characteristics, Trends, and Integration in the Lake Tana Basin, Ethiopia (1st ed., pp.
59–75).
Springer International Publishing.
https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-31945755-0_6
2 (mitologi yunani) &Journal of GovernmentCivil Society JGCS ISSN 2579-4396 E-ISSN 2579-440X Journal of Government and Civil Society Volume 5 No.
1 Pages 1 144 April 2021 ISSN 2579-4396 1 30 The Application of Social Movement as a Form of Digital Advocacy: Case of #TolakRUUPermusikan Muhammad Ananda Alifiarry1, Bevaola Kusumasari1 (1 Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia) 31 50 Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia Ihyani Malik1, Andi Luhur Prianto2, Abdillah Abdillah2, Zaldi Rusnaedy3, Andi Annisa Amalia4 (1 Department of Public Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia) (2 Department of Government Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia) (3 Department of Government Studies, Universitas Pancasakti Makassar, Indonesia) (4 Department of Architecture, Faculty of Engineering, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia) 51 62 Collaboration Governance in The Development of Natural Based Tourism Destinations Muchamad Zaenuri11, Yusrim Musa1, Muhammad Iqbal2 (1 Department of Government Affairs and Administration Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia) (2 Department of Political Science National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan, Province of China) 63 78 Analysis of Mind Patterns and Work Culture in Government of West Pasaman District Sri Andri Yani1, Etika Khairina1, Suswanta1, Mochammad Iqbal Fadhlurrohman1 (1 Governmental Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia) 79 90 The Influence of Social Media (Instagram) of Bantul’s General Election Commissions on Voters Participation in the 2019 Elections Agus Priyanto1, Eko Priyo Purnomo1,2, Mochammad Iqbal Fadhlurrohman1, Herry Fahamsyah1, Etika Khairina1 Journal of Government Civil Society Daftar Isi (Table of Content) (1 Departement of Government Affairs and Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia) (2 Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia) 91 106 Model Implementation Trap of Policy New Student Acceptance Zoning System in Makassar City Nuryanti Mustari1, Rudi Hardi1, Amir Muhiddin1 (1 Department of Government Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia) 107 126 Collaborative Urban Governance Model in Environmental Management of Industrial Area Tri Sulistyaningsih1, Saiman1, Nofianda Fatimah Azzahra1, Nanda Adityawan2, Mohammad Jafar Loilatu3 (1 Department of Government Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang Indonesia) (2 Civil Engineering, Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology, Surabaya, Indonesia) (3 Government Affairs and Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia) 127 144 Towards an Integration of Immigration and Customs Agency in Indonesia: A Step-by-Step Process Ridwan Arifin1, Intan Nurkumalawati1 (1 Diploma Program of Immigration Administration, Polytechnic of Immigration, Indonesia) 31 Citation : Malik, I., Prianto, A. L., Abdillah, Rusnaedy, Z., & Amalia, A.
A.
(2021).
Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia.
Journal of Government and Civil Society, 5(1), 31–50.
Journal of Government and Civil Society Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021, pp.
31-50 DOI: 10.31000/jgcs.v5i1.3884 Received 27 December 2020  Revised 19 March 2021  Accepted 21 March 2021 Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia Ihyani Malik1, Andi Luhur Prianto2*, Abdillah Abdillah2, Zaldi Rusnaedy3, Andi Annisa Amalia4 1 Department of Public Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia 2 Department of Government Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia 3 Department of Government Studies, Universitas Pancasakti Makassar, Indonesia 4 Department of Architecture, Faculty of Engineering, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia *Email Correspondence: luhur@unismuh.ac.id ABSTRACT Urban resilience strategies need to be encouraged to support a broader, planned and integrated development process.
Therefore, this paper aims to look at the actualization conditions of urban policies in climate change governance in Makassar City, Indonesia.
The research method used is an explorative-qualitative method with a narrative-phenomenological approach where the data sources are primary and secondary data.
Data collection through field studies and document studies.
The data analysis used is an interactive model.
City strategy resilience development model in climate change governance in Makassar City.
The results showed that for the first time, the actual condition of Makassar City was under threat of climate change, both biophysically and socio-economically.
Second, multilevel governance (MLG) as an ideal model in developing urban resilience, where the principle used is collaborative impact governance, namely building collaboration in policy making to tackle climate change.
Third, decentralization as a strategy for implementing resilience, such as national conservation, which begins with the reservation of parks and protected areas.
The dominant natural character is controlled under the control of the local government.
The number and extent of protected areas are indicators of conservation-based programs implemented by the Makassar City Government.
Keywords: Urban resilience; climate change governance; decentralization ABSTRAK Strategi ketahanan perkotaan perlu didorong untuk mendukung proses pembangunan yang lebih luas, terencana dan terintegrasi.
Oleh karena itu, tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui kondisi aktual strategi ketahanan perkotaan dalam tata kelola perubahan iklim di kota Makassar, Indonesia.
Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode eksploratif-kualitatif dengan pendekatan naratiffenomenologi dimana sumber datanya adalah data primer dan sekunder.
Pengumpulan data melalui studi lapangan dan studi dokumen.
Analisis data yang digunakan adalah model interaktif.
Model pengembangan kapasitas strategi ketahanan kota dalam tata kelola perubahan iklim di Kota Makassar.
Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pertama, kondisi aktual Kota Makassar dalam ancaman perubahan iklim baik secara biofisik maupun sosial ekonomi.
Kedua, multilevel governance (MLG) sebagai model ideal dalam pengembangan kapasitas ketahanan kota, di mana prinsip yang digunakan adalah tata kelola kolaboratif yaitu membangun kolaborasi dalam pembuatan kebijakan untuk menanggulangi dampak perubahan iklim.
Ketiga, desentralisasi sebagai strategi penerapan kapasitas ketahanan, seperti adanya gerakan konservasi modern yang dimulai dengan pembentukan taman nasional dan kawasan lindung.
Karakter alami yang dominan ditempatkan di bawah kendali Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 32 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia pemerintah daerah.
Jumlah dan luas kawasan lindung merupakan indikator keberhasilan program berbasis konservasi yang dilaksanakan oleh Pemerintah Kota Makassar.
Kata Kunci: Kota tangguh; tata kelola perubahan iklim; desentralisasi INTRODUCTION Indonesia’s development continues, and the capacity to develop urban resilience at the local government level is limited.
Most development interventions are not designed for environmental change but require people to adapt to development.
(McCarthy & Zen2010).
Adaptation of cities needs to be improved by identifying development needs and allocating resources to increase adaptive governance capabilities to support a broader comprehensive development process.
There is an urgent need to develop urban adaptive capacity for government programs or policies that are vulnerable to climate change to succeed.
The findings of Aylett (2015) show that local governments’ ability to mainstream climate change into cities is very low.
This is in line with the findings of Cahyadi et al.
(2010).
As far as Semarang City is concerned, although the Regional Development Planning Agency has coordinated it, it has not fully understood the implementation of the climate change plan in all existing Local Government Agencies.
On the other hand, the impacts of climate change occur in several sectors.
This situation requires the development of the adaptive capacity to accelerate the implementation of climate change adaptation programs, an integral part of national and regional development policies.
This study uses a multi-level governance model and a decentralization strategy Major cities in Indonesia, including Makassar have realized the impact of climate change.
Although this level of awareness has not been translated into proportional institutional commitment (Taylor, 2013; Faisah & Prianto, 2015), from an institutional perspective, the Civil Society Coalition to Save Indonesian Forests and the Global Climate (2015) notes the readiness of local governments that cannot yet immediately respond to rapid institutional changes at the central level.
The strategy to carry out adaptive capacity development is very important in the Makassar city government by looking at its feasibility in strategic areas that are the priority in the Revision of the Makassar City Medium-Term Development Plan (Regional Medium-Term Development Plans) 2019-2020.
This is to understand the actual conditions regarding the City’s resilience capacity at the level of climate change governance in Makassar City.
Then some questions are formulated: What is the ideal model for city resilience capacity development, and what is the strategy for implementing the urban resilience capacity development model on climate change governance in Makassar City.
P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 33Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia RESEARCH METHOD The research was conducted with a phenomenological narrative approach.
Data were collected through literature study and empirical observations.
Documentation studies were carried out regarding historical data on the actual condition of Makassar City in terms of climate change and governance in the last two years, 2018 and 2019, which were obtained from the Makassar City Central Statistics Agency in 2020 as well as previous research results.
Data analysis techniques are explorative-qualitative, by analyzing multi-level models of governance and decentralization strategies.
The qualitative analysis carried out was supported by quantitative data.
In particular, the development of climate change conditions in the city of Makassar in the last two years.
RESULTS, DISCUSSION, AND ANALYSIS Existing Condition of Urban Resilience Capacity in Makassar City Based on geographic conditions, the coastal city of Makassar in South Sulawesi Province is sensitive to various threats to climate change.
According to the climate change model prepared by the Australian Commonwealth of Australia’s Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) in 2012, the level of rainfall in Makassar will remain constant.
However, rainfall will be concentrated in a relatively short time.
In other words, the dry season will be longer, but the average rainfall pattern is not expected to change.
The increase in temperature will simultaneously affect the rate of evaporation and sealevel rise.
Tidal floods and storm surges pose a threat to coastal communities and intrusion of seawater into coastal aquifers.
The Makassar city government is increasingly aware of the current scope of climate change and its estimated impact.
There are many ways to define vulnerability, such as from a climate change perspective, vulnerability is “the extent to which a system is vulnerable or unable to cope with the adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extreme weather conditions.” To understand vulnerability, it is important to know its three main components: exposure, sensitivity, and adaptability (Taylor, 2013).
Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 34 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia Table 1.
Different Indicators Can be Used to Show Levels of Exposure, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity Source: Taylor, 2013 In conducting a vulnerability assessment, the following formula can be used, which is described in terms of three components.
According to the United Nation formula: Vulnerability = (Exposure x Sensitivity) Adaptive Capacity Exposure indicates trends in future climate change and associated potential threats based on climate change models and, in some cases, recorded meteorological patterns, where sensitivity indicates which urban systems which societies are in and which areas are more adversely affected by climate hazards certain.
Based on current climate impacts and forecasts, the two most relevant impact scenarios for Makassar City are sea-level rise (including heavy rains, tidal flooding, rising salt in coastal aquifers) and flooding (including major floods and flash floods).
Adaptation refers to the individual or collective actions taken by families, communities, organizations, or institutions to minimize the potential impacts of the threat of climate change.
Climate Trends in Makassar City Based on current climate impacts and forecasts, the two most relevant impact scenarios for Makassar City are sea-level rise (including heavy rains, tidal flooding, rising salt in coastal aquifers) and flooding (including major floods and flash floods).
Adaptation refers to the individual or collective actions taken by families, communities, organizations, or institutions to minimize the potential impacts of the threat of climate change.
P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 35Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia Table 2.
Observations of Climate Elements by Moon in Makassar City, 2019 Source: Makassar in Figures, BPS (2020) Makassar has a warm and tropical climate with a difference in the rainy season (November-May) and the dry season (June-October) and is characterized by high humidity, and an average temperature of around 27.8 ° C. There is very little change in temperature throughout the year, ranging from 26.8 ° C for the minimum temperature and 29.4 ° C for the maximum temperature.
Rainfall in January is 642 mm, and December rainfall is in the range of 281 mm; this figure has fluctuated over the last twenty years, indicating a slight increase in annual rainfall during this period.
According to the Meteorology and Climatology Agency (BMKG), during the El Nino year, the rainy season in Makassar is generally delayed by about 10 to 30 days.
Meanwhile, the dry season rainfall decreased by between 51-80%.
Historical records show that El Nino occurs every 3 to 7 years and often alternates with La Niña Events (CSIRO, 2012).
Estimates from the IPCC show that the sea level rise in the 20th century was around 0.17 ms. Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 36 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia Figure 1.
Rainfall in Makassar City Fluctuates with a constant average Source: Maritime Meteorology Paotere Station, 2013 The annual rainfall in Makassar is estimated to increase only slightly, but the rain’s intensity will be heavier during the shorter rainy season.
Most models project the rainy season’s onset to remain unchanged but will reverse 12 days earlier, indicating the concentration of rainfall intensity during the rainy season.
In the dry season, the average rainfall decreases by about 36%.
In the dry season, the average rainfall decreases by about 36%.
This trend is projected to continue (Maritime Meteorological Station, Paotore, 2013).
From 1993 to 2002, sea-level rise in the Makassar Strait increased by 7.5 cm.
Based on simulations, it is estimated that sea-level rise in Makassar will reach 88.16 m in 2025, 1.14m in 2050, and 1.44m in 2100 (BPPT, 2008).
Strong winds along the coast can reach 50-60 km/hr.
The next most serious climate threat is strong winds.
Between 2003 and 2012, 21 reports of strong winds causing 180 deaths and damage to 384 homes.
Strong winds have affected coastal communities, especially those living in houses made of poor-quality materials, most of which are considered vulnerable.
Other threats recorded were drought, fire, disease outbreaks, and accidents related to industrial activities.
Although climate threats are not new to Makassar City, the increase in intensity and unexpected events (such as the unexpected floods earlier this year) remind Makassar City to understand and improve.
Overcoming vulnerability, the severity of the climate threat in Makassar City (Prianto, 2019).
The rainy season is shorter but more intense: higher rainfall causes flooding.
The most open city areas are the three rivers that flow along with the city, namely the Jeneberang River, the Tallo River, and the Maros River.
Currently, it is a sub-urban community and a community with a poor drainage system or not connected to the existing drainage network, especially in empty areas.
The worst affected areas are: Tamalanrea, Panakkukang, Rappocini and Manggala.
P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 37Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia Increasing temperatures and increasing drought increasing temperatures will affect areas with bad wind direction, such as densely populated areas in the center of cities.
Sea level rise: The area most vulnerable to sea-level rise are the coastal lowlands and offshore island communities.
This area includes Tallo, Biringkanaya, Mariso, Tamalanrea and Wajo.
Strong winds and coastal erosion: The city’s southern and western areas are particularly vulnerable to strong winds and large waves.
The sub-regions are: Tamalate, Manggala, Panakukukang, Tallo, and Biringkanaya.
Strong winds and coastal erosion can damage homes, infrastructure, and property.
Although the climate threats mentioned above may have a greater impact in these areas than other areas of the city, certain communities and urban systems are also more vulnerable to these threats than in other areas.
For example, where the urban poor in coastal areas are located, they are more vulnerable to strong winds, sea-level rise, and coastal erosion.
The next section will explore the scope of this influence, but here is a list of urban systems and people exposed to urban climate threats: An open urban system: drainage system, clean water distribution, coastal barrier, roads, major infrastructure (Rusnaedy & Haris, 2021).
Exposure to urban population: poor urban communities in coastal areas, people were living in new residential areas, commercial and industrial activities in coastal areas, and commercial activities that rely on open infrastructure.
Makassar City concentrates its goods, services and services, population, infrastructure, and economic activities in a relatively dense urban area (76.8 people/ha) to be increasingly sensitive to disturbances due to climatic threats.
The next section on climate change sensitivity will begin to understand how systems will be affected by climate threats and study what factors make them vulnerable.
Climate Change Sensitivity Sensitivity is defined as the degree to which a system is affected by climate change’s biophysical effects.
It considers the socio-economic background of the system being assessed and other non-climatic stressors that can affect the city’s vulnerability, such as the economy, development planning, administrative management, and ecosystem management.
The exposure analysis determined that the greatest climate threat in Makassar was the sea-level rise, increased rainfall/flooding, strong winds and waves, high temperatures, and drought.
These hazards will affect different parts of the city in different ways, so understanding the primary and secondary consequences is important to find ways to reduce vulnerability.
The table below lists the various effects of each climate hazard.
Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 38 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia Table 3.
Primary and Secondary Impacts of Four Climate Change Threats Faced in Makassar City P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 39Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia Sensitivity and Vision of Makassar City Climate models predict that climate change will increase rainfall intensity and significantly increase sea levels.
Simultaneously, the city’s situation experienced difficulties due to prolonged flooding, damage from strong winds, and damage to beaches.
However, even though they recognize the importance of climate change on the future of cities, there is still a mismatch between the current vision of city governments on “world cities” and the vulnerability and disasters associated with climate threats.
The city government has taken the right steps to increase funding to support environmental policies and improve water management.
This shows that the issue of climate change is a top priority.
The government has made great efforts to allocate more funds for environmental protection, conservation, and the creation of green open spaces.
In the last REGIONAL MEDIUM-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLANS, the spatial and environmental development budget increased from 21% to 37%.
Also, support is needed Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 40 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia to improve the management and distribution of clean water.
The budget allocation for improved management and clean water allocation has increased by 85% compared to the two previous regional sanitation management plans.
The budget for clean water projects has also increased from Rp 8 billion to Rp 33 billion.
However, in the face of rapid urbanization in the suburbs, there is no clear planning direction, such as an overall drainage plan or an increase in per capita spending on the city’s outskirts.
Each institution must be marked but not displayed as part of the REGIONAL MEDIUM-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLANS.
Also, there are no plans to manage metropolitan issues related to environmental management, such as watershed (DAS) management, linkages between roads and metropolitan areas, and no vision for a “world city,” which focuses on cities rather than public and private investment.
In most areas.
As a result, the current vision plan for Makassar does not match the resources needed to transfer development trends to the downtown area.
Not following the reality of development trends and not following the needs and services of facilities and infrastructure.
This trend could further increase Makassar’s vulnerability to future climate threats.
Those who suffer the most are those who live in large areas on the outskirts of cities, without government investment, and of course, the poor.
The following subsections provide examples of urban resilience.
This example shows what actions are being taken to reduce vulnerability to climate threats and increase urban resilience.
The examples are grouped into various levels according to how they work.
P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 41Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia Table 4.
Actions to Reduce Vulnerability to The Threat of Climate Change and Increase City Resilience Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 42 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 43Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia Multilevel Governance (MLG) Model in Resilience Capacity Development The Multilevel Governmental Model (MLG) is a governance approach introduced by the European Union government system in the early 1990s (Janicke, 2017: 110; Hooghe & Marks, 2001).
An important keyword of MLG theory and approach is collaboration.
Bache and Flinders (2004) use the MLG concept to understand the dynamic relationship between different government levels and between governments (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009).
Although the concept of multilevel governance was first proposed around the European Union, many of its forms have already been applied to other areas of research, such as federal states in comparative politics.
McCormick believes that “multilevel governance is a cousin of the two old concepts of federalism and alliance” (Jänicke, Schreurs, & Töpfer, 2015).MLG can also be understood as a multi-central government system, namely a government system where each part does not see it as a challenge but as a support for innovation in policy tools, learning processes, and technology combinations (Sovacool, 2011).
The MLG research perspective has emerged as a ‘useful middle-class framework for analyzing socio-technical transitions to sustainability.
A multilevel climate governance system understood in ‘socio-technical terms refers to a specific group of technologies low-carbon technologies and the policies and institutions that support them.
This is a necessary specification regarding this particular technology group (Janicke, 2017; Geels, 2011).
In global climate governance, the MLG concept is indispensable.
This can be explained as follows: Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 44 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia Table 5.
Global Climate Governance as a City Resilience System Source: Janicke, 2017: 110-111 There are two types of MLG (Hooghe & Marks, 2002).
The first type is a hierarchical approach, focusing on how powers and powers are divided between different government levels.
The second type is a multi-center model in which several overlapping and interconnected areas of horizontal authority participate in adjusting a particular problem.
As an environmental management system, MLG is very important for several reasons, including: (1) It is comprehensive from global to local; (2) The role of each level from global to local is very specific; (3) Vertical interactions provide additional potential for MLG as a system; (4) Multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder (Jänicke, 2017).
Global governance requires national and local governments to be part of the global political system.
The roles at each level, from global to local, are very specific.
Governments have their responsibilities, challenges, and opportunities and have specific horizontal dynamics: learning, competition, and cooperation between institutions.
Horizontal networks of cities and provinces/states have become global players in climate governance.
Vertical interactions offer MLG more potential as a system: enhancing best practices through higher-level strategy and lower-level strategy support.
MLG’s vertical and horizontal interactions have always been at the center of highly interactive learning and the rapid spread of technological and political innovations.
This is an innovative multiP-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 45Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia impulsive system related to climate change.
This makes MLG a model that can solve all scale problems in global climate governance and solve the problems of all relevant interest groups.
This is illustrated as follows: Table 6.
The Role of Each Actor in The MLG Governance System According to Janicke (2017) A climate vulnerability study in Makassar City from UN-Habitat & UNDP Indonesia in 2020 shows how sensitive climate change impacts climate change in Makassar city.
Makassar is defined based on its geographical location and the various systems, economies, and communities that make it a city.
Therefore, it considers the socio-economic context of the system deemed necessary and other non-climatic pressure factors that may affect the vulnerability of cities, such as the economy, development plans, administrative and ecosystem management.
The impact of climate change in Makassar City identifies that the greatest climate threat to Makassar City is sea level rise, increased rainfall/flooding, strong winds, waves, heat, and drought.
These hazards will impact different parts of the city and in different ways.
Understanding the various consequences, both primary and secondary impacts, is important to find ways to reduce vulnerability to communities.
Because it’s a Multilevel Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 46 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia model Governance (MLG) approach as an ideal model in developing cities’ resilience capacity, using collaborative principles of governance.
Decentralization as a Strategy for Implementing The Resilience Capacity Development Model for The City of Makassar Decentralization can be understood as the transfer of political, financial, and administrative authority from the central government to local governments (Nurmandi, et al., 2015).
Many factors support the success of a decentralized system, including: (1) institutions and human resources that are qualified to implement plans in the decentralized system; (2) infrastructure, technology, access to information, human resources, capacity for institutional planning, and the appropriate distribution of benefits from natural resources (Colfer & Capistrano, 2006).
The concept of decentralization has become a strategy for countries to protect the environment following the spirit of democracy, pluralism, and equal rights and to safeguard the allocation of resources and power at the social level (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001).
Previous research has shown that decentralization hinders the development of climate change policies because, among other things:(1) Bureaucratic relations between all levels of government in a complex decentralized system and field studies show that this slows down the progress of regional and national climate change policies (Steurer & Clar, 2014); (2) The politics of climate change will be influenced by the politics of the federal government, therefore, even if the public supports issues like the United States, without support from the federal government and the political parties behind it, climate change will easily fail (Koski & Siulagi, 2016).
For example, the Double experience is an example of ineffective governance of climate change, leading to its climate policy plans’ failure.
For more than a decade, the central government has regulated the many roles that local governments must play, such as: (i) appointing and rewarding regional heads, (ii) eliminating sources of revenue at the regional level, and (iii) allocating small budgets for the non-government sector.
Produce.
This puts the region at the acceptance stage without making a decision.
Also, they have established a “patron-customer relationship” between the central government and regional heads and are unable to hold officials accountable (Ampaire et al., 2017).
Indonesia’s experience showed that several important issues from the decentralized practice of Indonesia’s forest management department.
This study found several main problems in various government departments, such as (1) bureaucracy at the center, (2) statutory regulations, (3) local government/community.
According to this study, with an understanding of the spirit of autonomy, the implementation of forestry decentralization should not be trapped in the power issue between the center and the regions (Siswanto & Wardojo, 2006).
For example, at the provincial and district levels, the public sector’s P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 47Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia hierarchical status often restricts lower-level civil servants from coordinating or directing the heads of other high-level institutions (McCharty & Zen, 2009).
However, it must be in the spirit of building social welfare for the community and realizing sustainable forest management (Siswanto & Wardojo, 2006).
In the study of local government system governance, it is believed that these two dimensions can be achieved through the same coordination and unity of vision between the center and the regions (Abdillah, 2020).
Administrative boundaries should not be a barrier to forest sector management.
On the other hand, the government, the private sector, and the community must work together to get social benefits from these forest products through sustainable programs to build urban resilience due to the impact of climate change in Makassar City.
The failure of the forestry decentralization political system in Indonesia can be seen from the sluggishness of the forestry sector bureaucracy, the emergence of conflicts between various parties, such as the complexity of field problems and errors in explaining forest management models, and forest degradation (Siswanto & Wardojo, 2006).
Some of the obstacles of the decentralized political system to the management of the forestry sector in Indonesia can be seen in the following table: Table 7.
Barriers of a Decentralized Political System to The Forestry Sector in Various Countries Source: Processed by Researchers from Janicke, 2017: 112-114, 2020 Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 48 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia The political strategy of decentralization as the development of resilience capacity in Makassar City aims at sustainable development based on a green environment to increase the resilience of Makassar City due to the frequent impacts of climate change.
The modern conservation movement began with the establishment of national park areas and similar protected areas, in which the prominent natural character is placed under permanent state control.
The removal of important natural areas from local control and their designation as state-controlled protected areas is a generally accepted paradigm.
The number and extent of protected areas are often the main criteria for the conservation programs’ success pursued in Makassar City.
CONCLUSION Local governments can reduce vulnerability to climate change by influencing the sensitivity and adaptive capacity of urban communities.
This can be done both through physical actions (such as improving natural and artificial systems and climate-resilient infrastructure) and actions of a non-physical nature (such as capacity building and public service administration, supporting local community organizations improving institutional coordination).
Various studies have tried to explain why countries fail to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation plans at the international level.
One element of research is the governance aspect, and this aspect shows that the decentralized system tends to hinder the implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation plans.
Model The Multilevel Governance (MLG) Approach as an Ideal Model for City Resilience Capacity Development in Makassar where the principle used is the collaborative principle of governance, namely building stakeholder actor collaboration to build urban resilience due to the dangerous impacts of climate change.
For several reasons: at its heart is an international plan, like climate change.
For Indonesia itself, climate change becomes important when the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include climate change as one of the SDGs’ strategic issues in developing countries in 2015.
This legitimizes the issue of climate change as an important agenda in Indonesia’s RPJM to Makassar City.
This has been reflected in the governance of climate change in many European states.
Decentralization has created other factors which prove to be problematic for the success of climate governance in Indonesia.
One example is the implementation of climate policy in North Sumatra.
These constraints can be seen from several aspects, including: (1) Although many climate change activities in this area require special funds and are different from other regions, the decentralization system does not support funding that is not following central government policies; (2) Decentralization of electricity creates a more complex situation, making coordination between various powers and centers of power more difficult.
This will also affect coordination and consistency of plans; (3) Because the P-ISSN 2579-4396, E-ISSN 2579-440X 49Urban Resilience Strategy in the Climate Change Governance in Makassar City, Indonesia characteristics of the division of responsibilities have not been accompanied by technical improvements in local communities’ capacity, nor have they been accompanied by a greater distribution of power at the local level.
Increase the appropriate technical skills to perform the required tasks, such as recording greenhouse gas emissions.
Right.
It is hoped that by 2021, Makassar City will apply the same implementation strategy model.
So far, climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies have become important strategies to reduce the risk of disasters due to climate change in various vulnerable areas.
REFERENCES Abdillah, A., Deliarnoor, N. A., Yuningsih, N. Y., & Fatmawati, F. (2020).
The Position of Auxiliary Organ in Government System of West Java Provincial Government.
Journal of Contemporary Governance and Public Policy, 1(2), 67-81. doi:10.46507/jcgpp.v1i2.11.
Agrawal, A., & Ostrom, E. (2001).
Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal.
Politics & Society, 29(4), 485–514.
doi:10.1177/ 0032329201029004002.
Aylett, Alexander (2015), “Institutionalizing The Urban Governance of Climate Change Adaptation: Results Of An International Survey”, dalam Urban Climate Vol.
14 (2015), hal 4–16 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.uclim.2015.06.005 BMG Kota Makassar (2013).
Prakiraan Musim Kemarau Tahun 2013 di Indoensia.
Dokumen : Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika, Makassar.
BPS Kota Makassar.
(2020).
Kota Makassar Dalam Angka 2020.
Dokumen: Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Makassar.
Cahyadi, Rusli (2010),”Adaptasi Pemerintah Daerah Terhadap Dampak Perubahan Iklim : Peluang dan Tantangan”, Laporan Penelitian, Bappaeda Kota Semarang.
Carol J.
Pierce Colfer dan Doris Capistrano.
2006.
Politik Desentralisasi Hutan, Kekuasaan dan Rakyat Pengalaman di berbagai Negara, (Bogor: Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)), hal 178-179 Faisah, N. & Prianto, A.L.
(2015) Good Environmental Governance (Studi Kasus Pengelolaan Taman Macan di Kota Makassar), Otoritas (Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan).
9 (1): hal.
2841. https://doi.org/10.26618/ojip.v5i2.122 Geels FW.
2011.
The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: responses to seven criticisms.
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1(1): 24–40.
DOI:10.1016/j.eist.2011.02.002.
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. N. (2002).
Types of Multi-Level Governance.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 4-6. doi:10.2139/ssrn.302786.
Jänicke, M. (2017).
The Multi-level System of Global Climate Governance the Model and its Current State.
Environmental Policy and Governance, 27(2), 108–121.
doi:10.1002/ eet.1747.
Journal of Government and Civil Society, Vol.
5, No.
1, April 2021 50 Ihyani Malik, Andi L. Prianto, Abdillah, Zaldi Rusnaedy, and Andi A. Amalia Kern, K., & Bulkeley, H. (2009).
Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Networks.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), 309–332.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.00806.x.
Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Penyelamatan Hutan Indonesia dan Iklim Global, (2015).
“Perkuat Agenda Perubahan Iklim dan Komitmen Indonesia Melindungi Hutan”, Briefing Paper, Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Penyelamatan Hutan Indonesia dan Iklim Global.
M. Jänicke, M, M. Schreurs, & K. Töpfer.
2015.
The Potential of Multi-Level Global Climate Governance.
IASS POTSDAM, hlm 1-12 https://goo.gl/XLiz8v.
McCarthy, J., & Zen, Z.
(2010).
Regulating the Oil Palm Boom: Assessing the Effectiveness of Environmental Governance Approaches to Agro-industrial Pollution in Indonesia.
Law & Policy, Vol.
32 (1) hal.153-179 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2009.00312.x Nurmandi, A., Purnomo, E. P., Prianto, A. L., & Jaenuri, M. (2015).
The current practice of citizen participation in Indonesia netizen and selected cases of local democracy in Indonesia.
Citizen Participation, 21.
Prianto, A. L. & Amalia, A.
A.
(2019).
“Combatting Slums, Suistaining Proverty: Dynamic Urban Governance in Makassar, Indonesia”.
Otoritas (Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan).
5(2): hal.
174-188. https://doi.org/10.26618/ojip.v9i1.2008 Sovacool, B. K. (2011).
An international comparison of four polycentric approaches to climate and energy governance.
Energy Policy, 39(6), 3832–3844.
doi:10.1016/ j.enpol.2011.04.014.
Steurer, R., & Clar, C. (2014).
Is decentralisation always good for climate change mitigation?
How federalism has complicated the greening of building policies in Austria.
Policy Sciences, 48(1), 85–107.
doi:10.1007/s11077-014-9206-5.
Taylor, J.
(2013).
Kajian Kerentanan Iklim di Kota Makassar.
Makassar: UN-Habitat & UNDP Indonesia Siswanto, W., & Wardojo, W. (2006).
Desentralisasi Sektor Kehutanan: Pengalaman Indonesia.
Politik Desentralisasi Hutan, Kekuasaan dan Rakyat: Pengalaman di berbagai Negara, 175-185.
Rusnaedy, Z., & Haris, A.
(2021).
Advocacy Coalition in The Arrangement of The Coastal Slum Area of Untia in Makassar.
Journal of Governance and PublicP o l i c y , 8(1).
00.pdf cover dalam.pdf 1: tampak penuh
89 International Peer Reviewed JournalVol.
28 · March 2017 Print ISSN 2012-3981 • Online ISSN 2244-0445 DOI: https://doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v28i1.503 Journal Impact: H Index = 3 from Publish or Perish JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research is produced by PAIR, an ISO 9001:2008 QMS certified by AJA Registrars, Inc. ABSTRACT Knowing the current status of Southern Leyte as a “Provincial Beauty in the Philippines that’s Travel Worthy” and vulnerable to hazards and risks; it is also expected to be on top in championing actions towards climate change adaptation and embracing sustainability.
The study focuses on the viability of selected hospitality industry establishments in Southern Leyte towards climate change adaptation.
Data collection utilized researcher-made survey questionnaire.
Using descriptive-correlational method, managers and owners of 13 Department of Tourism (DOT) identified hospitality industry establishments along the coastlines of Maasin City and Saint Bernard Southern Leyte were surveyed through purposive sampling.
The simple percentage, weighted mean, and chisquare were among the statistical tools utilized throughout the study.
Most of the provinces in Eastern Visayas were in little risk to geophysical disasters except Southern Leyte and Northern Samar.
The establishments were implementing some of the green practices on solid waste management and energy conservation Climate Change Adaptation of the Hospitality Establishments in Southern Leyte, Philippines EDILYN GUTIEREZ LOPEZ http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9402-9781 sseayp42.edz@gmail.com University of Cebu-Banilad JUDY ANN ONG FERRATER-GIMENA http://orcid.org 0000-001-5352-8253 judygimena@gmail.com University of Cebu 90 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research under the international agreements and national laws.
Economically and environmentally, majority of the establishments partially complied with the IEMSD program.
Regarding the sustainability of the institutions based on the IEMSD, economically and ecologically, the facilities were slightly sustainable.
It indicates that majority of the services calls for more actions to be durable and be able to adapt to climate change.
Keywords — Climate change, hospitality industry, sustainability correlation, Southern Leyte INTRODUCTION Tourism and environment closely linked for without an attractive environment, tourism cannot succeed and, in some cases, without tourism, environmental conservation is at risk (Connell & Page, 2009).
The Philippines has come a long way since the great gathering of nations to establish the agenda for action on sustainable development during the 1992 Earth Summit.
There were promulgations of various policies and programs that adhere to the principles of sustainable development and climate change.
These legislations were the Integrated Environmental Management for Sustainable Development (IEMSD), Republic Act 9003 (Solid Waste Management Act of 2000), Republic Act 9729 (Climate Change Act of 2009), Republic Act 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010) and other action plans towards sustainable development.
Super Typhoon Haiyan hardly hit Region VII during the last quarter of 2013.
In Eastern Visayas, there were constant incidents of calamities, like the tragic mudslide in the community of Guinsaugon, Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte in 2006.
As a result, a state of disaster was declared in almost every part the country due to torrential rains that devastated agriculture, livestock, and properties (Garcia, 2013).
According to Department of Environment and Natural Resources (2011), Southern Leyte is one of the provinces that found to be naturally vulnerable to environmental disasters and one of the provinces that exerted efforts towards sustainable development and climate change adaptation.
Since Southern Leyte is prone to hazards of environmental disasters, the study was undertaken to assess whether or not the selected hospitality industry establishments in these areas are compliant with the provisions of the laws on 91 International Peer Reviewed Journal environmental protection.
The findings were the basis for the development of guidelines for climate-smart services for hospitality industry establishments along the coastal areas.
FRAMEWORK The study was anchored on the Four Capital Model of Sustainability.
As shown in Figure 1, this model put all the four capitals alongside each other and discusses the reality that practical society is impractical to work without keeping up the adjust among these four assets and support of their manageability.
There are four different sorts of capital in every general public.
They are specific human capital, money related capital, natural capital, and fabricated capital.
In consideration with the end goal to make and keep up the supportability in the general public, adjustment of those resources in that society is a necessity.
For instance, an excessive amount of consideration regarding human or fabricated capital may influence the natural maintainability.
These assets cannot be considered as complementary, i.e.
increasing the level of focus on one particular resource does not necessarily contribute to the improvement of other capitals.
Nevertheless, there are some crossovers amongst capitals that might have positive implications regarding increasing the effectiveness of efforts focused towards sustainable development.
Note that improvement can be marked as supportable if assets don’t decrease over the time, or in a perfect world, they increment over the time (Siebert, 2008).
Figure 1.
The Four Capital Model The changes in the climate is usually exemplified in the over sub-continental regions, the extent at which global climate models replicate well the pattern of observed temperature of the earth’s surface.
Climate change has some effect on 92 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research natural resource sectors such as agriculture, forestry, ecosystems, water resources and fisheries, and on human activities and infrastructure.
Climate change adaptation is gauged in terms of the society’s ability to adjust to the potential impacts of climate change (Barros & Field, 2014).
Tourism is not a new phenomenon.
Tourism as per the World Tourism Organization (WTO), is the demonstration of go with the end goal of amusement and business, and the arrangement of administrations for this demo.
The tourism industry is a composite of ventures and elements, both private and open, required in the arranging, improvement, advertising, deals, operation and assessment of goals, items and administrations that take into account the necessities of the explorers, both remote and residential (Goeldner & Ritchie, 2006).
In the Philippines, the operation of the tour products is primarily the role of the private sectors, while the delivery of tourism services is a joint function of both the government and the private sectors (Claravall, 2000).
The landscape of the Philippine Tourism Industry composed of two areas: public and private sectors.
The public sector includes Department of Tourism, Tourism Promotions Board, Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Authority, Local Government Units and other national government units who are indirectly helping the industry.
The private sector, on the other hand, is composed of the transportation industry, hospitality industry, travel trade, entertainment industry and other private sector entities.
Hospitality Industry consists of hotels, restaurants, resorts, bars and other establishments that offer accommodation, food, and beverages.
Operationally, reasonable advancement is an improvement of financially stable, politically engaging, socially just and fair, profoundly freeing, sex touchy, given all encompassing and integrative science, innovatively suitable, expands upon desirable Filipino qualities, history, culture and greatness and rests upon substantial institutional establishments.
Securing the privilege of each Filipino to the great life will require a sound and suitable economy, social union, mindful administration, proper efficiency, and biological trustworthiness (Curran, 2004).
For Heinberg and Lerch (2010), sustainability is the people’s obligation to continue in a way that will maintain the life that will permit the kids, grandchildren and extraordinary grandchildren to live serenely in a friendly, clean, and sound world.
In this manner, individuals can take the assumption of the liability for life in every one of its structures and additionally regard human work and goals.
Dimpas, Sy and Gimena (2015) conducted a study to identify the environmentally directed organizational citizenship deeds observed and practiced 93 International Peer Reviewed Journal by fifteen selected municipalities in Cebu, Philippines.
The results revealed that OCBE deeds relative to environmental concerns, organizational commitment, supervisory support for environmental efforts and perceived social performance of the local government units were the most common behaviors exhibited by the local officials and their staff and that the identified OCBE deeds were demonstrated by the municipal government officials and staff to a very great extent.
The IPCC (2014) confirmed by scientific studies that there is an increase in global average of air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising of global mean sea level.
With these, it is already evident that there is a significant change in the world’s climate system, known as climate change.
Climate change is a fundamental threat to sustainable development and the fight against poverty.
It has been known for some time now that developing countries will be affected the most by the climate change.
Reasons shift from lacking assets to adapt and are contrasted with created countries.
There is also massive neediness and districts that many building nations are happened to be the ones where extreme climate will hit the most, little island countries zone officially observing ocean level rising, among others.
German Watch distributed the rundown of countries that would be influenced the most by the environmental change in light of extreme climate, for example, storms and surges.
Between 1991 and 2010, these were the most affected nations: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Korea, and the Philippines (Huddleston, 2012).
With the news on climate change, there were global responses towards climate change adaptation and sustainability.
The figure 1 below shows the Map of the Philippines with Combined Risk to Geophysical Disasters.
Most of the provinces in Eastern Visayas were in a little risk to geophysical disasters except Southern Leyte and Northern Samar.
Northern Samar was in average risk regarding geophysical hazards while Southern Leyte’s status is very high which means the Southern Leyte is very prone to geophysical catastrophes.
94 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Figure 1.
Map of the Philippines with Combined Risk to Geophysical Disasters According to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the Philippines is very vulnerable to typhoons because this country belongs to the Pacific typhoon belt area.
The country is also highly susceptible to ground movements and flooding and inundations (DENR Geohazard Mapping and Assessment Program, 2014).
Also, the location of the Eastern Visayas is in warmer latitudes in which according to the United Nations, vulnerability to climate change will be greater in developing countries, located in hotter zones.
The Philippines faces natural hazard to environmental disasters (United Nations Environmental Programme Climate Change Report, 2009).
It is very evident that the effects of extreme weather conditions in Southern Leyte were very alarming.
Given the fact that from 1985-2010, the estimated monetary losses in infrastructure and agriculture associated with natural hazardinduced disasters reached P316.3 billion.
There were 157.94 million people that 95 International Peer Reviewed Journal were affected by natural hazard-induced disasters from 1985 to 2011—with typhoons accounting for the greatest share—of which 57, 227 people were killed, injured, or missing.
Additionally, the two different natural hazard-induced disasters: the Typhoon Haiyan and the 7.2 Magnitude earthquake that hit various parts of Visayas caused lots of damages, where 222 died, 976 injured and eight were missing.
A total of 671, 103 families were in 6 provinces in Regions VI and VII.
The cost of damages was Php 2,257,337,182.90.
The super typhoon Haiyan that hit the country last November 8, 201 had an estimated total cost of damages of Php 22,659,851,383.76.
The following world climate change conferences are United Nations Environmental Programmes, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Agenda 21, and UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw.
The Philippines being one of the nations that will be influenced by environmental change likewise started the accompanying activities towards environmental change adjustment and sustainable improvement.
The aforementioned legal act includes; the 1987 Philippine Constitution proviso; Presidential Decree No.
1151 or Philippine Environmental Policy; Presidential Decree 1152 or Philippine Environmental Code; Philippine Agenda 21, the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System, Integrated Environmental Management on Sustainable Development, Republic Act No.
9003 or Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, Republic Act No.
9729 of Climate Change Act of 2009, Republic Act 10121 or Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, Republic Act No.
9593 or Tourism Act of 2009, National Framework Strategy on Climate Change 2010-2022, National Climate Change Action Plan, and Batas Pambansa Bilang 73.
The areas 16 of Article II and Section 1 of Article XIII are the two critical parts of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines that backs the different activities towards economic improvement.
The law states that it should secure and propel the privilege of the general population to an adjusted and empowering environment as per the musicality and amicability of nature, and the Congress should give the most noteworthy need to the sanctioning of measures that ensure and upgrade the privilege of the general population to human pride separately (De Leon, 2002).
The three necessary actions highlighted in the study are the Republic Act No.
9003 or Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, Batas Pambansa Bilang 73 and the creation of Integrated Environmental Management on 96 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Sustainable Development.
Republic Act No.
9003 or otherwise known as the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 provides for the ecological solid waste management program, creates the necessary institutional mechanisms and incentives, declares certain acts prohibited and providing penalties, appropriating funds and other purposes.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 73 further promoted energy conservation and for other uses.
The Integrated Environmental Management on Sustainable Development was implemented to support efforts in the integration of the environment in decision-making, proper pricing of natural resources, and strengthening of people’s participation and constituency-building for environmental policy advocacy.
The IEMSD has six (6) sub-programmes, namely: a) Environment and Natural Resources Accounting (ENRA); b) Integration of Environmental and Socio-Economic Development Policies (SEI); c) Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); d) Sustainable Development Models (SDM); e) Environment and Natural Resource (ENR) Database (DBAS); and f ) Programme Management Support System (PMSS).
Under the IEMSD Programme, the following major activities have been undertaken: a) development of a comprehensive operational framework for the Philippine System of Economic and Environmental Accounts; b) formulation of sustainable development indicators; c) incorporation of environmental concerns in the project evaluation process; d) development of an action impact matrix which identifies priority areas of study on environment-economy integration; e) strengthening of the EIA system; f ) reformulation of guidelines for the implementation of the Environmental Guarantee Fund; g) preparation of an EIA Procedural Handbook; h) development of environmental risk assessment software; and i) documentation of sustainable development projects (Supetran, 2013).
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY The study looked into the sustainability of hospitality industry establishments in Southern Leyte, Philippines that were accredited by the Department of Tourism (DOT).
Specifically, this study described the profile of the facility in terms of its classification, years of operation, and location.
The study further assessed the green practices implemented by the institutions in terms of solid waste management and energy conservation; extent of compliance of the establishments to IEMSD; and the sustainability of the facilities based on the IEMSD indicators such as environmental anD economic Indicators.
97 International Peer Reviewed Journal The investigation further measured the significant difference between the sustainability of the hospitality establishments according to its location.
Lastly, based on the findings of the study, guidelines for climate-smart services for hospitality industry establishments along the coastal areas were developed.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY To assess the sustainability of the DOT-accredited hospitality industry establishments in Southern Leyte towards climate change adaptation, it utilized the descriptive-correlational method using a researcher-designed survey tool that was accomplished by the owners and managers of the hotels and resorts in Southern Leyte.
Research Environment The Southern Leyte is one of the six provinces of Region VIII.
Maasin City is the capital of Southern Leyte.
There were thirteen (13) hospitality industry establishments identified and accredited by the DOT in Southern Leyte, comprising of seven from Saint Bernard and six from Maasin City.
Research Respondents The respondents consist mainly of the owners or general managers from selected hospitality industry establishments along the coastlines of Maasin City and Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte.
The selection of the facilities applied the purposive sampling technique.
The criteria in choosing facilities were the following: establishment should be accredited by the Department of Tourism (DOT) of the Local Government Unit, and situated along the coastlines of the Municipality of Saint Bernard and Maasin City.
The DOT has identified about seven hospitality industry establishments along the coastlines in Saint Bernard and six institutions in Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
Research Instrument This study utilized a researcher-made questionnaire based on the provisions of the following: Integrated Environmental Management for Sustainable Development, Republic Act 9003 and Batas Pambansa Bilang 73.
The questionnaire consists of four parts: profile of the establishment; the green practices implementation specifically on solid waste management and energy conservation; the extent of compliance of IEMSD program; the last part contains 98 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research the questions regarding the assessment of the sustainability of establishments based on the IEMSD indicators.
The tool was also reviewed by experts in the field.
A dry-run procedure was also conducted to test the reliability of the selfmade tool.
The incidence of non-response was noted before it was finalized for administration to the respondents in the actual survey.
Research Procedure Before the undertaking of the study, the researcher sought permission to conduct the study from the Municipal Mayor through the tourism officers.
After the grant of the approval, the proponent conducted the study.
The researcher assisted the respondents in answering the questions through elucidating the items stated in the questionnaire.
After retrieval, results were tallied, analyzed and interpreted in the light of the theory.
Statistical Treatment Simple percentage determines the profile of establishment and the green practices implemented; weighted mean utilized to determine the extent of compliance of IEMSD programs, and to establish the sustainability of facilities based on the IEMSD indicators.
Finally, chi-square was employed to create the significant difference between the viability of the establishments according to location.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION This section reveals the data on the profile of the facility as to classification; years of operation; and location; the vulnerability to hazards and risks of Eastern Visayas; the green practices implemented by the institutions in terms of solid waste management and energy conservation; effects of the extreme weather conditions in Southern Leyte; extent of compliance of the establishments to IEMSD; and sustainability of the facilities based on the IEMSD indicators such as environmental Indicators an economic Indicators.
99 International Peer Reviewed Journal Table 1.
Profile of the Facility (n=13) Classification of Hospitality Industry Establishment F % Hotel 6 46 Restaurant 3 23 Resort 4 31 Years/s of Operations 13 -16 2 15 9 -12 3 23 5 – 8 4 31 1 – 4 3 23 Less than a year 1 8 Location Saint Bernard 7 54 Maasin City 6 46 Table 1 displays the profile of the facility, based on the information given by the representative of the establishment.
Of the thirteen (13) establishments being covered in this study, 46% were hotels; 23% were resorts; and 31 % were restaurants.
Moreover, most of the hospitality establishments had been in the business for 5-8 years already.
Lastly, the establishments were located along the coastlines of Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte and are recognized by the DOT Office.
Greening the organizations is not only limited to the formulation of formal management systems in the organization.
Those people who manifest concern towards the environment exhibits extra efforts beyond the call of duty who focus on undertaking green initiatives within the organization set up (Daily, Bishop & Govindarajulu, 2009).
Green Practices Implemented by the Selected Hospitality Establishments Table 2 shows the green practices of the hospitality establishments.
Regarding Solid Waste Management, the establishments in Southern Leyte were active in the implementation of the provision of the Republic Act 9003.
All offices completely actualizing the following activities such as: guarantee the cleanliness 100 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research of the foundation and five (5) meters from the closest mass of the foundation, keep up the sterile state of all repositories at all circumstances, utilization of legitimate sort of waste repository or holder, guarantee the correct stockpiling and treatment of intense squanders, and ultimately, ensure the best possible isolation and transfer of active wastes.
Table 2.
The Green Practices Implemented by the Selected Establishments in Terms of Solid Waste Management Rank Green Practices Yes (f ) % No (f ) % 1 Ensure the cleanliness of the establishment and five (5) meters from the nearest wall of the establishment.
13 100 0 0 2 Maintain the sanitary condition of all receptacles at all times.
13 100 0 0 3 Use of proper type of waste receptacle or container.
13 100 0 0 4 Ensure the proper storage and treatment of solid wastes.
13 100 0 0 5 Ensure the proper segregation and disposal of solid wastes.
13 100 0 0 6 Coordinate with the public service managers for the wastes to be regularly collected and properly disposed.
12 92 1 8 7 Pay the garbage fee properly.
12 92 1 8 8 Prohibition of spitting, urinating and defecating on sidewalks, pathways, park and any other public places.
12 92 1 8 9 Provision of Material Recovery Facility (MRF) 12 92 1 8 10 Provision of separate receptacle or trash can for each type of waste from all sources.
10 78 3 23 11  All receptacles are placed in a location that is easily accessible but not obtrusive to the pedestrians.
10 78 3 23 12 Use of appropriate size of receptacle or container to prevent spillages.
10 78 3 23 13 Encourage resource conservation and recovery through re-use and recovery of wastes.
9 69 4 31 14 Faithfully and religiously participate in the regular schedule of garbage collection in your zone 8 62 5 38 15 Set guidelines and targets for solid waste volume reduction through composting, recycling and others.
4 31 9 69 Then again, the institutions ought to fortify their usage of the three less executed green practices as far as reliable waste administration such as setting of rules and focus on the substantial waste volume decrease through treating the soil, reusing and others, dependable and religiously take an interest in the 101 International Peer Reviewed Journal consistent timetable of rubbish accumulation in your zone, and energize asset protection and recuperation through recycling and recuperation of squanders.
These apparent compliance of the hospitality firms in Southern Leyte indicates the commitment of these establishments to exhibit discretionary contribution to be sustainable in the context of mitigiting environmental damage and hazards of climate change.
In relation to the study of Heinberg & Lerch, (2010) most of the facilities were implementing a majority of the green practices concerning solid waste management.
These data denote that the establishments take the responsibility to proceed in a way that will sustain life that will allow people to live comfortably in a friendly, clean, and healthy world.
Green Practices Implemented by the Selected Restaurants regarding Energy Conservation Table 3 shows the green practices implemented by the establishments regarding energy conservation.
The results reveal that most of the establishments were not that active in implementing the green practices.
The single green practice on energy conservation by all entities relates to the lack of adequate knowledge and resources of the owners and staff of the establishments on energy conservation.
Table 3.
The Green Practices Implemented by the Selected Restaurants concerning Energy Conservation (n=13) Rank Indicator Yes (f ) % No (f ) % 1 Regulate the use of air-conditioners in the establishment, including but not limited to using and setting of thermostat to certain temperatures that will conserve energy but still assure reasonable convenience to the users thereof.
13 100 0 0 2 Set standards and proper monitoring of energy consumption for oil-powered or electric-driven machinery, equipment, appliances, devices, and vehicles.
12 92 1 8 3 Stagger the number of working days per week in your establishment for the purpose of conserving energy and relieving traffic congestion: Provided, however, That no diminution in the pay of the employees or workers affect shall result thereby.
10 78 3 23 4 Set standards in accordance with accepted engineering principles and practices in the use of building materials and the designs for facilities, which will promote the ends of energy conservation.
10 78 3 23 102 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research 5 Use of energy efficient technologies or green technologies.
10 78 3 23 6 Prohibition of the use of neon lights and electric lights for commercial advertising earlier than 6:00 o’clock PM.
and beyond 9:00 o’clock PM.
9 69 4 31 7 Prohibition of the deliberate use of unnecessary and excessive lighting in your establishment.
9 69 4 31 8 Conduct energy management education program/ seminar in your establishment.
6 46 7 54 9 Regulate the use of motor vehicles so as to conserve fuel and relieve traffic congestion or adopt the use of environmentally sustainable transportation vehicles.
5 38 8 62 10 Limit and fix the operating hours of your establishment.
3 23 10 78 All of the institutions regulate the use of air-conditioners, including but not limited to using and setting of thermostat to certain temperatures that will conserve energy but still assure reasonable convenience to the users.
Unfortunately, a majority of the establishments did not limit and fix the operating hours of their facilities and can be inferred that they do not contribute to energy conservation.
Evidently, the establishments did not practice energy conservation.
The implication of these data reflects inability of the firm to conserve the energy would have a direct impact on environmental degradation and would contribute towards rapid climate change due to human’s excessive emission of hazardous elements.
Environmental sustainability (ES) has increasingly become important to business research and practice over the past decade as a response to a rapid depletion of natural resources by developed countries and corporate social responsibility (Dao, Langella & Carbo, 2011).
The Extent of Compliance to IEMSD Program In terms of the extent of compliance of the establishments with IEMSD Program, the findings show that in the aspect of economic and environmental indicators, the establishments partially complied with the IEMSD program.
Environmentally, the majority of the establishments partially met with the Integrated Environmental Management for Sustainable Development program.
This result indicates that there is a need for more efforts to constrain the hotels, resorts and restaurants in Southern Leyte to be highly compliant with the provisions of IEMSD.
This is one of the means in which these firms will be able to 103 International Peer Reviewed Journal contribute towards the universal plea for climate change adaptation, considering that these establishments would be mostly damaged if there are calamities.
Table 4.
The Extent of Compliance to IEMSD Program (n=13) Indicators Mean Description Economic Indicators 1 Facilities that supply services 2.38 Fully Complied 2 Employment opportunities to locals 2.23 Partially Complied 3 Economic gains 2.23 Partially Complied 4 Fishing industry 2.31 Partially Complied Grand Mean 2.29 Partially Complied Environmental Indicators 5 Environmental mechanisms that reduce air pollution 2.15 Partially Complied 6 Environmental mechanisms that control water pollution 2.46 Fully Complied 7 Areas and ecosystems most vulnerable to natural hazard 2.23 Partially Complied 8 Marine cover 2.38 Fully Complied 9 Waste disposal facilities 2.31 Partially Complied 10 Facilities protecting and preserving species 2.15 Partially Complied 11 Vegetation cover 2.08 Partially Complied 12 Renewable and alternative energy resources 2.15 Partially Complied 13 Water facilities 2.15 Partially Complied Grand Mean 2.231 Partially Complied The emergent literature that concentrates the significance of voluntary and unrewarded green initiatives, its contribution to the greening process are often ignored.
Describing the precise nature of these initiatives and its impact on the firm’s environmental performance had rarely been explored.
The initiatives of the people play significant role in improving the efficacy and efficiency of the environmental practices within the firm (Asis-Dimpas, Sy, & Ferrater, Gimena, 2015).
Sustainability of Selected Hospitality Industry Establishments based on the IEMSD Indicators Table 5 exhibits the sustainability of the hospitality entity based on IEMSD indicators.
Economically and environmentally, the establishments were slightly 104 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research sustainable.
The result denotes that majority of the hospitality entities should be transformed to be viable and be able to adapt the hazards of climate change.
These data support the Four Capital Model of Sustainability wherein it emphasizes that sustainable society is impractical to work without keeping up with the needed adjustments in the four capitals and upkeep of their supportability (Siebert, 2008).
Table 5.
Sustainability of Selected Hospitality Industry Establishments based on the IEMSD Indicators (n=13)   Indicators Mean Description   Economic Indicators     1 Provision of facilities that supply services.
2.23 Slightly Sustainable 2 Provision of sustainable employment opportunities to locals.
2.23 Slightly Sustainable 3 Sustained increase of economic profitability.
1.92 Slightly Sustainable 4 Protection and safeguarding of fishing industry.
2.15 Slightly Sustainable    Grand Mean 2.13 Slightly Sustainable   Environmental Indicators     5 Implement environmental mechanisms that reduce air pollution.
2.15 Slightly Sustainable 6 Implement environmental mechanisms that control water pollution.
2.23 Slightly Sustainable 7 Determine areas and ecosystems most vulnerable to natural hazards and establish protection measures to those areas and ecosystems.
2.23 Slightly Sustainable 8 Protection and preservation of marine cover.
2.08 Slightly Sustainable 9 Provision of waste disposal facilities.
2.31 Slightly Sustainable 10 Upgrade facilities to protect species and to anticipate changes in weather.
2.00 Slightly Sustainable 11 Expand vegetation cover.
2.08 Slightly Sustainable 12 Accelerate the use of renewable and alternative energy resources.
2.08 Slightly Sustainable 13 Provision of sustainable water facilities.
2.00 Slightly Sustainable    Grand Mean 2.13 Slightly Sustainable These data on the slight sustainability of the hospitality establishments signify that the establishments had not addressed the main issue on practices and actions that would mitigate environmental damage and climatic hazards.
105 International Peer Reviewed Journal Table 6.
Results of the Test of Significant Difference between the Sustainability of the Hospitality Establishments According to Location Variables Computed Chi P value Level of Significance Decision Interpretation Sustainability and Location 0.1238 0.724939 5% Accept Ho Not significant Sustainability of the establishments in Saint Bernard and Maasin City, Southern Leyte shows no significant difference between the viability of the hospitality facilities when grouped according to location.
The actions that lead towards the sustainability of the hospitality establishments in Southern Leyte should be geared to strengthen the implementation of the various legal initiatives and policies and adaptation of the climate change.
Climate change is a worldwide dilemma for the international leader.
Thereby, they should initiate appropriate action to prevent catastrophe that would be brought by this circumstance (Garcia, 2013).
There had been different endeavors on researching the motivation behind why the organizations react to the ecological issues, regardless of whether consolidating natural practices into their business exercises can prompt to expanded execution, and assuming this is the case, what procedures are expected to accomplish the objectives (Melville, 2010).
CONCLUSION Regarding the sustainability of the establishments based on the Integrated Environmental Management for Sustainable Development (IEMSD), economically and environmentally, the facilities were slightly sustainable.
The current condition on the slight sustainability of the establishments in the context of engaging actions that alleviate havoc to the environment clearly indicates that it necessitates more intensified efforts to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of the laws and legal initiatives so that the firms that are located to hazard prone areas to natural-induced calamities would be forced to follow.
Although, these establishments had undertaken some efforts in mitigating the hazardous effect of climate change by adopting and complying the provisions of the various legislative requirements that aimed to conserve and protect the Mother Nature but not to the highest and desirable extent.
106 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS Consistent with the international agreements and the Philippines’ national laws, the Local Government Units, the Department of Tourism in Southern Leyte and owners should spearhead in realizing the following guidelines for climatesmart services for the hospitality industry establishments along the coastal areas: 1.
Southern Leyte should have Vulnerability Assessment (VA) toolkit that gives a quick assessment of various parts of the beach front framework to different potential effects brought by changing the atmosphere.
By enhancing their ability to evaluate their range’s helplessness to environmental change, nearby governments will have the capacity to arrange and refine existing administration intercessions, improve comprehension of environmental change issues, and enhance their groups’ versatility to environmental change.
2.
Joining in all accommodation industry foundations’ Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), marketable strategies and arrangements the advancement of atmosphere brilliant businesses and administrations which are atmosphere versatile, eco-proficient and environment-accommodating ventures and management created, advanced and managed.
3.
Creation of green jobs or sustainable and decent employment in the hospitality industry for locals which help in the protection of the environment, ensure a shift to a low carbon development and adapt to the effects of climate change.
4.
Conduct of capacity building programs and knowledge for promoting climate-smart industries and services.
5.
Climate-proofing of infrastructures including emergency facilities and equipment such as lifeboats, life jackets, and emergency kit.
6.
There is full implementation of Republic Act 9003 and Batas Pambansa Bilang 73.
7.
Provide free seminars, workshops, and resources on reducing the wastes and lessen down the energy use of the establishments.
8.
Department of Tourism should develop a monitoring and reporting system for hospitality industry establishments.
9.
Recognize and give incentives (tax holidays, plaques, etc.)
to those hospitality industry establishments who will be able to implement successfully and live with the green practices.
107 International Peer Reviewed Journal LITERATURE CITED Asis-Dimpas, G., Sy, M.V.U, &.
Ferrater-Gimena, J.A.
O.
(2015).
Environmentally-directed organizational citizenship behavior of the municipal government officials in Cebu.
IAMURE International Journal of Ecology & Conservation; Jul 2015, Vol.
15, p266.
Retrieved from goo.gl/ uMVnMz.
Barros, V.R., & Field, C. (2014).
Climate change 2014 impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability, Part B: Regional aspects, Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
New York: New York.
Cambridge University Press.
Retrieved from goo.gl/dPxQDi.
Claraval, B.
(2000).
Travel agency and tour operations in the Philippines.
Binondo, Manila: Tourism Enterprise Inc. Retrieved from goo.gl/2o57tL Connell, J., & Page, S. (2009).
Tourism, a modern synthesi.
,(3rd Ed.)
United Kingdom: Cengage Learning EMEA.
Retrieved from goo.gl/4PbHW5 Curran, S., (2004).
Sustainable development v sustainable management: The interface between the local government act and the resource management act.
New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 8, 267 – 294.
Retrieved from goo.gl/dac74w.
Daily, B. F., Bishop, J. W., & Govindarajulu, N. (2009).
A conceptual model for organizational citizenship behavior directed toward the environment.
Business & Society, 48(2), 243-256.
Retrieved from http://goo.gl/GVPH3z Dao, V., Langella, I., & Carbo, J.
(2011).
From green to sustainability: Information technology and an integrated sustainability framework.
The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 20(1), 63–79.
Retrieved from goo.
gl/Ujcnon De Leon, H. (2002).
The Philippine constitution.
Manila, Philippines: Rex Book Store 108 JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
(2011).
Philippines: Combined risk to geophysical disasters.
(2011).
Retrieved from http://www.
maps.nfo.ph/philippines-combined-risk-to-geophysical-disasters/ DENR Geohazard mapping and Assessment Program.
(2014).
Retrieved from http://www.denr.gov.ph/priority-programs/geo-hazard-mapping-andassessment-program.html.
Garcia, G. ( 2013).
Climate change awareness of the community officials in the municipality of Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte: Gear towards vulnerability and adaption.
JPAIR Multidisciplinary, Volume 12, March 2013.
Dohttp:// dx.doi.org/10.7719/jpair.v12i1.217 Goeldner, C. R., & Ritchie, J.
B.
(2006).
Tourism: Principles, practices, philosophies.
John Wiley & Sons.
Retrieved from goo.gl/WLRnTm Heinberg, R., & Lerch, D. (Eds).
(2010).
The post carbon reader: Managing 21st century’s sustainability crises.
England: Watershed Media.
Retrieved from goo.
gl/wzF19N Huddleston, N. (2012).
Climate change evidence, impacts and choices.
United States of America: National Research Council.
Retrieved from goo.gl/fzd7WC Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change.
(2014).
Retrieved from http:// www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.Ur5wF9IW0kQ.
Melville, N. P. (2010).
Information systems innovation for environmental sustainability.
MIS Quarterly, 34(1), 1–21.
Retrieved from goo.gl/CRDDQL.
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council Report on Typhoon Yolanda damages per province.
(2013).
Retrieved from http://www.gov.
ph/2013/11/10/ndrrmc-data-report-per-province-november-10-2013/ Siebert, H. (2008).
Economics of the environment: Theory and policy.
New York: Springer Publications.
Retrieved from http://www.springer.com/gp/ book/9783662115947 109 International Peer Reviewed Journal Supetran, A.
(2013, June) The Philippine EIS system: In the womb of time.
Paper Presented at the First National Convention on Philippine EIS System, Manila.
Retrieved from http://119.92.161.2/portal/Portals/21/eia%20convention/ Inception%20and%20History.pdf United Nations Environmental Programme Climate Change Report.
(2009).
Retrieved from http://www.unep.org/climatechange/Introduction.aspx
Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 2 “On what terms can we speak?” Refusal, resurgence and climate justice Tony Birch Victoria University Anthony.Birch@vu.edu.au Copyright©2018 Tony Birch.
This text may be archived and redistributed both in electronic form and in hard copy, provided that the author and journal are properly cited and no fee is charged, in accordance with our Creative Commons Licence.
Abstract: Australia, along with nations and communities across the globe, faces the difficult task of formulating genuine responses to climate change.
Indigenous people in Australia are at the forefront of the issue, both as communities majorly impacted on by climate change, and the custodians of knowledge, scientific and philosophical, able to assist other communities in working towards the health and protection of country.
Indigenous communities also have historical relationships with mining companies responsible for the mining of fossil fuels, and face a decision of allowing or refusing mining on traditional land, which may result in a material loss for these communities, while producing a long-term benefit on behalf of the planet.
Future relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in Australia will determine the success of initiatives in combating climate change.
For this to occur, productive and equitable relationships will need to move beyond the symbolic gesture, beyond a form of recognition that does little more than maintain existing colonial relationships.
In recent years, Indigenous scholars, particularly from North America, have articulated ‘the politics of refusal’ as a strategy of empowering Indigenous people and protecting country.
In doing so, important questions arise: Can we afford to refuse acts of engagement with ‘outsiders’ that may benefit country?
Or is the act of refusal a necessary step that may confront colonial society with the reality that it is colonialism itself that refuses change?
Keywords: recognition; refusal, protection of country Introduction: “Unite with us to fight this fight” In June 2017, the prominent Indigenous intellectual and academic, Professor Marcia Langton, delivered a keynote address to Australian mining industry leaders.
During her speech, Langton was critical of those she described as “cashed-up green groups” and their mailto:Anthony.Birch@vu.edu.au Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 3 supporters who oppose the proposed Adani coal mine planned for central Queensland.
(For a detailed summary of the size and scope of the proposed mine and its potential impact on Indigenous land owners, the Wangan and Jagalingou Group, see Lyons, Brigg and Quiggin, 2017.)
According to Langton, opposition to what would be one of the world’s largest fossil fuel mines, one that would have a dramatic impact on carbon levels released into the atmosphere, was a clear example of the “environmental industry hijacking our [Indigenous peoples] most serious concerns, and in their own way trying to return us to the pre-1992 era of terra nullius” (Langton, quoted in Murphy, 2017).
Several weeks earlier, Warren Mundine, a former representative on the Commonwealth’s Indigenous reference group, also criticised unnamed environmental activists who he claimed had repeatedly “attacked mining and infrastructure projects” to the disadvantage of Indigenous people (Mundine, 2017).
Neither Langton’s or Mundine’s criticisms would have surprised anyone with a passing interest in the interactions between Indigenous communities, mining companies and environmental groups.
The historic relationship has sometimes been a tense one, with conflict and division well documented.
In a recent collection of essays discussing this history, key researchers in the area, Eve Vincent and Timothy Neale, while recognising such tensions, astutely examine the complexity of ‘Green/Black’ relationships in a thoughtful and informed manner, moving beyond a discussion of environmentalists being “crudely characterised” and “lampooned” by opponents, as Langton and Mundine had done (Vincent and Neale, 2016, p. 3).
During Langton’s lecture, she referred to Indigenous communities in Australia as the “collateral damage” of environmental activism, with opposition to the proposed Adani mine her focus.
Her provocative stance was immediately countered by Tony McAvoy SC, a legal representative the Wangan and Jagalingou people.
(McAvoy is himself a member of the Wangan and Jagalingou community.)
In a retort to Langton’s remarks, he commented that “to suggest that the Greens are puppet masters pulling the strings and we’re somehow puppets was wildly off the mark and disrespectful to the many families opposing the mine” (McAvoy, quoted in Robertson, 2017).
He concluded that Langton was “very poorly informed” about the Adani mine dispute, and supported the formal position of the Wangan and Jagalingou, who have repeatedly stated, in opposition to the mine, that they “have never consented to Adani’s mine being constructed on our land” (Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council, 2017).
The Wangan and Jagalingou have also refused to sign an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) with the Queensland government and the Adani corporation.
Without their written consent the mine cannot proceed, unless the Queensland government is willing to suspend the Native Title Act, which for some within the state Labor Party creates a political, if not an ethical dilemma.
The traditional owners, who do not regard themselves as the “puppets” of any outside group, green or otherwise, have actively sought the support of environmental groups, in addition to calling for the assistance of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people across Australia willing to commit themselves to protect the health of both country and the planet.
Adrian Burragubba, a senior Wangan and Jagalingou man, has led the call for collective action: I’m going to convince all of our people to stand together as one people, one voice.
And then we’re going to ask all Australian people and people from all Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 4 over the world to stand with us, unite with us to fight this fight.
(Burragubba, 2015) Just a voice Invitations by Indigenous land owners to support the protection of country is occurring during a political and social climate that will determine future relationships with country and each other.
This is a major issue, not only for Australia, but with consideration of the extent of the climate change challenges we face, the manner in which we engage with species, both human and non-human on a global scale.
Within Australia, environmental challenges coincide with a shift in political, legal and social relationships between Indigenous people and the Australian nation.
Over recent years the Commonwealth government, with the general bi-partisan support of the Labor Opposition, the Greens party and Independents within the parliament (with a few notable exceptions, including Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party), has led an initiative directed towards holding a future referendum that may deliver formal recognition of Indigenous people within the Commonwealth constitution (for details, see http://www.recognise.org.au/about ).
While the formal wording of any proposed statement within the constitution, and any subsequent legal implications, remain to be determined, in 2015 the Commonwealth embarked on an expensive branding and education program in an effort to facilitate the success of a future “Yes” vote amongst the wider population, in addition to attempting to gather support within Indigenous communities.
The second task remained a difficult one throughout the campaign, with many people within Indigenous communities sceptical of the proposal due to its limited symbolic value.
The view of many was summarised by the artist and theatre director Rachel Maza: I liken the Recognise campaign and the push to make mention of Indigenous and Torres Strait Islander people in the constitution to the scenario of someone moving into your house, taking over, and kicking you out into the yard in the shed.
After many years, maybe even several generations, they come out to the yard holding the contract that states their rights to the house that was once yours, and suggest that it’s only fair to include a sentence that says: ‘We acknowledge that you once lived there.
There you go!
Now you’re recognised,’ they say, and they go back into your house and you go back to the shed (Maza, quoted in Kelly, 2017).
The Referendum Council, established by the Commonwealth, comprising both Indigenous and non-Indigenous members, travelled the country, meeting with communities and holding information forums to promote the initiative; a program since regarded as flawed from the outset: Few bothered to ask why Indigenous people would want symbolic recognition in what many regard as the founding document of the settler state—as opposed to the many practical measures, sadly lacking, that might actually improve Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander human outcomes.
If such a document was to acknowledge Indigenous people, they were saying, it would http://www.recognise.org.au/about Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 5 have to do so in a way that would amplify—rather than merely note—the black voice.
(Daley, 2017) The Recognise campaign culminated in a gathering of Indigenous representatives from across Australia at Uluru in May 2017 (Walhquist, 2017).
The meeting produced the statement “From The Heart” addressing the possible wording of constitutional recognition, limited Indigenous parliamentary representation and the concept of a treaty, discussed at a broad level (see Kelly, 2017, for a summary).
Several delegates at the gathering were critical of the final wording of what also became known as “The Uluru Statement” as they believed it did not provide a legitimate and authoritative role for Indigenous people in parliament, nor address the demands for a treaty in a concrete and specific manner.
Nevertheless, the request for the establishment of a representative Indigenous advisory group to the parliament and the noting of future discussions of a treaty, were enough to unsettle a government suddenly blindsided, having not foreseen or welcomed a conversation either about a treaty or limited parliamentary representation.
(Although a prominent member of the Referendum Council Noel Pearson has subsequently stated that he had discussed the prospect of parliamentary representation on several occasions with members of the government, including the Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.
For details, see Pearson, 2017.)
Soon after the Uluru meeting, the formal recognition campaign came to a quiet and unheralded end in August 2017, absent of the fanfare accompanying its launch.
The Commonwealth subsequently rejected the advice provided to it by the very group it had established (the Referendum Council) to engage in a dialogue with Indigenous communities to gauge how to best grant recognition.
Senior ministers within the government quickly dismissed the idea of limited representation to the parliament (rather than in it) as a “radical proposal” that the Commonwealth could not support (Viellaris, 2017).
And while the government decision was received with apparent ‘shock’ by members of the Referendum Council, it did not surprise others versed in the limitations of what amounted to yet another symbolic colonial gesture: I’ve written previously about how ‘Recognise’—for all the tens of millions of dollars spent on it by successive governments—was a white political construct, dreamed up by John Howard (never a friend of Indigenous Australia) in an attempt to slither out of a political jam, that attached itself to successive governments.
(Daley, 2017) While ‘giving voice’ to Indigenous people in the parliament might not seem such a radical proposal to some, opposition to idea by the Commonwealth highlights an enduring inability of Australian governments to engage with Indigenous people beyond the symbolic, with governments preferring to maintain relationships limiting the rights and autonomy of Indigenous people.
Noel Pearson was a key member of the Referendum Council.
In a recent essay, both a highly charged critique of the failed journey of the Recognise campaign and an appraised self-reflection, Pearson states that he is “astounded at the pragmatism and discipline I mustered in giving voice and life” to what he has repeatedly referred to as “the radical centre” (Pearson, 2017a, p. 28).
According to Pearson’s own analysis, it was a strategy of failure: “reaching out to the political leadership of the right availed us nothing in the end.
This is the bitter truth I learned in the past 17 years” (Pearson, 2017a, p. 34).
The flaws in Pearson’s strategy and Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 6 conclusions are numerous, chiefly the belief and rhetoric that the political centre is radical.
Within Australian political culture, such a strategy relies on a benign centre, with both the parliament and the political constituency across the country.
It is where symbolism flourishes, where genuine challenges to the political and cultural status quo are not welcome.
Following the Commonwealth’s decision to reject the Council’s key recommendation, he (along with others) repeated the statement of the Indigenous “elder statesman,” Patrick Dodson, that the government’s decision was a “kick in the guts for Aboriginal Australians” (Pearson, 2017b).
While he claimed the Uluru statement rejected “mere symbolism,” Pearson’s own analysis of the structure of an “Indigenous voice to the parliament” appears to be, if not symbolic, severely limited in what it could achieve.
The Referendum Council, having adopted a strategic approach of soft recognition were subsequently outmanoeuvred by more conservative forces in government, regardless of Referendum Council members, including Pearson himself, attempting to highlight the limitations of their own definition of recognition: The proposal is for an Indigenous advisory body, constitutionally mandated but legislatively implemented, to give Indigenous people a non-binding say in our affairs.
Not a veto.
Just a voice … it would empower parliament to define the body, fully respecting parliamentary supremacy (Pearson, 2017b, my italics).
Following the collapse of the Recognise campaign and the body charged with delivering constitutional reform, the Commonwealth, state and territory governments must now contend with more overtly self-determining strategies being adopted by Indigenous groups, most particularly a proactive treaty campaign framed and led by Victorian Indigenous communities, initiated in 2016, running a counter political and legal narrative to the Recognise discourse (see Victorian Traditional Owner Land Justice Group, 2016, for a detailed summary of the planned Treaty process).
It was an outcome of the success of the Victorian grassroots campaign and a willingness of the Victorian state government to begin negotiations on the form of treaty (for details, see Victorian State Government, 2017) that shifted the focus of national Indigenous responses to the Recognise campaign, to the surprise and disappointment of both the Commonwealth government and the Referendum Council.
During the formal life of recognition, direct activist campaigns were also being organised within Indigenous communities, gathering widespread support, particularly amongst younger people.
Bypassing symbolic gestures, younger Indigenous people were voicing their concerns about issues such as climate justice, the impact of climate change on the ability to protection of country, and the struggle for a genuine recognition of Indigenous sovereignty in the form of Land Rights.
The Climate Justice campaign was led by the climate justice group, SEED Indigenous Youth Climate Network (see http://www.seedmob.org.au/ for details of the organisation and its programs).
Warriors of Aboriginal Resistance (WAR), inspired by the history of direct activism employed by Indigenous groups in Australia, and the more recent Occupy and Idle No More campaigns of North America (see https://www.facebook.com/WARcollective/) reject the concept of recognition, with their activities contingent on the politically guiding statement, “sovereignty has never been ceded.” Not surprisingly, one of WAR’s strategies, the http://www.seedmob.org.au/ https://www.facebook.com/WARcollective/) Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 7 temporary shutting down of whole streets and blocks within major Australian cities, has limited appeal for those in the wider non-Indigenous community unable to countenance the true principle of self-determination.
WAR’s direct-action strategy is a challenge to those within Australian society more concerned with image than substance.
WAR also challenged the central tenet of the recognition campaign.
It not only opposed the Recognise charter.
WAR also refused to be recognised.
Refusal and reciprocity The language of recognition within Australia has coincided with a global critique of the colonial baggage and psyche framing both the term and its supporting narrative.
In a recent special issue of the academic journal Postcolonial Studies, the editors introduced the collection of essays with the statement that “Recognition has emerged in recent decades as an almost universally valued moral and political horizon in intercultural contexts” (Balaton-Chrimes and Stead, 2017, p. 1).
While the genesis of the language and critique of recognition can be traced to the work such scholars as Charles Taylor in the 1990s, via Franz Fanon’s seminal Black Skin, White Mask, published in 1967, contemporary critiques have been led by Indigenous scholars from North America, such as Audra Simpson (her work appears in the same Postcolonial Studies issue) and Glen Sean Coulthard, whose book Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition appears to be compulsory reading on the subject (Coulthard, 2014).
In a provocative analysis of the politics or recognition recognisable to Indigenous people in Australia, Audra Simpson positions contemporary notions of recognition offered by settler-colonial governments as integrally linked to past “colonial contexts [that] enforced Indigenous dispossession and then, granted freedom through the legal tricks of consent and citizenship” (Simpson, 2017, p. 20).
Equally familiar to Indigenous people in Australia is the analysis provided by Lara Fullenwieder (in the same edition of the journal), commentating on a comparable situation in Canada.
Fullenwieder argues that having positioned “recognition as a policy strategy for governing settler/Indigenous relations,” the Canadian national government, led by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, is attempting to “evade central contestations regarding land, autonomy, and Indigenous sovereignty,” preferring an orchestrated and benign shift “beyond the violence of the frontier” (Fullenwieder, 2017, p. 37), absent of the need for responsibility for ongoing impacts of colonisation on First Nations people.
Glen Coulthard’s demand for a concerted refusal of colonial/governmental recognition is not simply a negative or static example of the act of refusing.
He is concerned with the potential and political revitalisation contained within what he defines as First Nations “resurgence,” being the outcome of what he refers to as “the politics of the act [of refusal]”; an act of necessity in order to restore knowledge eroded through the ongoing settler-colonial project of “undermining Indigenous intellectual development through cultural assimilation and the violent separation of Indigenous peoples from our sources of knowledge and strength—the land” (Wildcat, McDonald, Irlbacher-Fox and Coulthard, 2014, p. i).
Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 8 In an interview following the publication of Red Skin, White Masks, Coulthard explained the politics of refusal as “enacting Indigenous alternatives [that] on the ground will bring us into productive confrontation with the colonial structures of exploitation and domination” (Coulthard, quoted in interview with Gardner and Clancy, 2017, my italics).
For Coulthard, and for many Indigenous people globally, this productive confrontation is necessary if we are to overcome the stubborn adherence to a continuation of colonial domination, embedded in the ideology of recognition itself: Instead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the ideal of reciprocity or mutual recognition, the politics of recognition in its contemporary liberal form promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend.
(Coulthard, 2014, p. 3, original italics) Land as pedagogy We know that climate change poses a grave threat to the livelihood and health of country.
It is a crisis impacting severely on global Indigenous nations and poorer communities more generally.
To face the global crisis of climate change we require collective, collaborative, and equitable strategies of achievement.
We desperately need people to work productively together.
Therefore, is the politics of refusal a strategy we can afford?
Sarah Hunt, discussing the act of Indigenous refusal in relation to both the value of knowledge exchange and the pragmatism that may be required by Indigenous communities and individuals negotiating change with colonial power, addresses the pragmatism of refusal: It does not seem that outright rejection of all forms of recognition are politically viable … if Indigenous sovereignty can only be attained through self-affirmation, how do we reconcile the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge, and ourselves as Indigenous people, in these dominant institutions?
(Hunt, 2014, p. 29) While Hunt’s point is vital in considerations of contemporary and future relations with the colonial state, Coulthard’s analysis of the potential of Indigenous resurgence as an outcome of the act of refusal does not begin and end with self-affirmation.
In relation to climate change and the collective challenges we face, Coulthard’s view is key to the mature and ethical and shift required to both recognise the role exercised by colonialism in the destruction of people and country historically, and a need to begin the restorative processes required to protect country and facilitate climate justice.
He articulates the persuasive argument that through the refusal of the offer of repeated gestures of symbolism, absent of a genuine tangible change in Indigenous/settler-colonial relationships, an opportunity arises, focusing our attention where it is most needed: The theory and practice of anticolonialism … is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around the question of land—a struggle not only for land in a material sense, but also deeply informed by Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 9 land as a system of reciprocal relations and obligations.
(Coulthard, 2014, p. 13, original italics) Absent of this focus, as far as Coulthard is concerned, the hollow colonial gesture will continue to prevail.
With the climate crisis in mind, it is a gesture we can no longer afford.
Jason W. Moore offers a model of ethical engagement similar to that presented by Coulthard.
Moore, responsible for the term “Capitalocene” as a means of countering the dominant Anthropocene thesis, regards capitalism, and its rise from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (see Malm, 2016, for a discussion of this history) as a major contributor to the current climate change crisis.
As a direct result of climate injustices, he has argued for a fundamental shift in relations between Indigenous nations, the colonial state and global corporations based on a concept of “reparations ecology,” which Moore regards as “fundamental to remembering the violence and inequality of modernity … the question of justice and sustainability are deeper than interlinked, they are intimate” (Moore, interview with Velednitsky, 2017).
With Moore’s and Coulthard’s provocations in mind, we need to address the concept of justice and reparations within Australia, commencing with developing equitable and respectful relationships between Indigenous people and non-Indigenous Australia.
The protection of country will become a precarious venture if we do not do this.
While researchers and policy makers agree that Indigenous communities will be severely impacted upon by climate change, until recently Indigenous people have not been duly considered, either as the victims of climatic disasters, such as extreme and unpredictable weather events, or, based on traditional knowledge and experience, the providers of insights in how the challenges of climate change may be met (see Birch, 2016, for details).
For the exchange of knowledge around ecological maintenance to be rendered equitable, dialogues and communities of trust must be developed.
We require fresh and meaningful approaches to Indigenous/non-Indigenous relationships that bypass the symbolic gesture in favour of the tangible and grounded, embedded in country, articulated no more pointedly than in Leanne Betasamosake Simpson’s comment “the land must again become the pedagogy” (Simpson, 2014, p. 14, original italics).
For Simpson, as with Coulthard, the recognition of land itself as our teacher is a key stepping-stone towards Indigenous resurgence: A resurgence of Indigenous political cultures, governances and nationbuilding requires generations of Indigenous peoples to grow up intimately and strongly connected to our homelands, immersed in our languages and spiritualties.
(Simpson, 2014, p. 1) Whose bones do we walk on?
The potential for enriched connections, producing outcomes of common good—being the protection of country—remain hamstrung by both our colonial past and the contemporary failure to attend to the potential of equitable recognition.
We may rightly question whether it is possible for a colonial society such as Australia, one that applies symbolic gestures as a masking agent, to engage with Indigenous people and country in a substantive way.
Zoe Todd, an Indigenous scholar from Canada, believes that in order to Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 10 address the global environmental situation we face, whether it be a world increasingly impacted on by chaotic weather events, or a realisation that we are witnessing the birth of a “new epoch,” the Anthropocene (contested or not), “there are other stories that could be told” beyond those of the dominant culture (Todd, 2015, p. 244).
And yet Todd remains cautious about the sharing of Indigenous knowledge, through narrative, with a society yet to fully comprehend storytelling as a form of sovereign knowledge; a society yet to address the fundamental question, “whose bones are ground into the earth we walk on” (Cree legal scholar, Tracey Lindberg, quoted in Todd, 2017).
Many Indigenous thinkers and protectors of country, while valuing the strength of stories that sustain our engagement with country, remain equally concerned about the issue of sharing knowledge and its abuse.
Alexis Wright, the Indigenous intellectual and writer, discussing both the misappropriation of Indigenous stories by the colonial nation and the production of fictitious counter narratives constructed to damage Indigenous people and country both, has recently asked, “what happens when you tell someone else’s story” and what happens when you are silenced by a society that both covets your own story and invents others to advance its own power?
We do not get much of a chance to say what is right or wrong about the stories told on our behalf—which stories are told or how they are told.
It just happens, and we try to deal with the fallout (Wright, 2016).
The potential for what Deborah Bird Rose discusses as an equitable relationship or “dialogue” (as opposed to integration) between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people (Rose, 2015) is repeatedly hampered by the realities of the unfinished business of colonial history and its contemporary manifestations.
And yet, if there is cause for optimism, it may be located in the spirit of generosity offered by Indigenous people inviting others to join with them in valuing and caring for country through cultural practice and exchange.
In accordance with the strategy adopted by the Wangan and Jagalingou efforts to halt the proposed Adani mine, other Indigenous communities and individuals across Australia actively seek a more productive relationship with ‘outsiders’ with regard to both the protection of land and knowledge of country more generally.
Teila Watson, a Birra Gubba and Kungalu woman, writes that for country to be adequately cared for and protected, “White Australia” must invest in a “black future” that formally recognises Indigenous culture and law (Watson, 2017).
In parts of Australia, innovative relationships are being forged along such lines; connections that move beyond the short-term and strategic to the more sustained, long-term and philosophical.
MiriamRose Ungunmerr-Baumann, a traditional woman living outside of Alice Springs, regularly invites non-Indigenous Australians to begin an engagement of country invested in patience, meditation and what she refers to as “deep listening” to the land, or “Dadirri,” an “Indigenous practice her people use to find out who they really are, their purpose and where they are going” (Kohn, 2016.
n.pag.).
The concept of Dadirri requires a ‘deeper’ understanding of country by non-Indigenous people.
The generosity of Ungunmerr-Baumann’s offer to participate in learning from country cannot be underestimated.
Hers is a bold gesture within a socio/political climate of friction, suspicion and occasionally, open hostility.
Similarly, Darren Perry, the chair of the Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations, working alongside Indigenous Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 11 and non-Indigenous groups in an effort to protect the health of waterways of country across regional New South Wales, seeks wide-ranging partnerships with people willing to recognise the knowledge of country and deep history held within the forty-six Indigenous groups his organisation represents: We’re sovereign first nations and we’ve been managers of water resources within our traditional country for many thousands of generations, so it goes without saying we should be partners not stakeholders in water management in this country.
(Darren Perry, quoted in Winter, 2015) The invitations offered by Indigenous people to participate in the protection of country could not be happening at a more vital time.
Country is suffering on a global scale as a result of past colonial land management practices and a contemporary reliance on those practices within both mining and agricultural industries.
And while climate change itself might not be best described as a colonial event, it is clearly a phenomenon created to some extent by the combined forces of colonial expansion, the Industrial Revolution and an increased reliance on the burning of fossil fuels (Malm, 2016).
Zoe Todd recently commented that in her “short lifetime” she has seen “the waterways of my home province deteriorate as intense oil and gas activity, urban development, agricultural demands, and climate change tighten” (Todd, 2017).
She concludes that new and innovative formations between people and communities are necessary, not only due to the catastrophic environmental changes she has witnessed, but with the knowledge that the manner in which we now proceed as a global community will be judged by those who have gone before us.
Todd’s telling statement, that “the ancestors [will] bear witness to our deliberations,” provides us with both a warning and an opportunity to rectify our relationship to country and each other (Todd, 2017).
The balance we require when confronting the environmental challenges of our times must combine aspects of the spiritual and intellectual practices of Indigenous thinkers and land protectors such as Miriam-Rose Ungunmerr-Baumann, alongside a transformative self-critique of colonial institutions and practices at odds with our duty to revive the health of the planet: Using, respecting, and making space for Indigenous Knowledge constitutes a fundamental challenge to power relations in whatever context it operates.
Indigenous Knowledge has transformative potential with respect to confronting settler colonial norms within institutions in which it is used.
(Irlbacher-Fox, 2014, p. 148) A great deal is at stake for Indigenous peoples considering entering into new relationships with colonial society.
Our collective first steps are generally understandably tentative but potentially invaluable.
Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox makes an instructive point that strategic and mutually beneficial relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people— in the opposition of a fossil fuel mine, for instance—need not be overburdened with the objective of establishing “permanence” or the immediate “decolonizing of the [colonial] self.” She reminds us that “often alliances are transitory, cemented by mutual selfinterest” (Irlbacher-Fox, 2014, p. 151).
She argues that any new relationship can work more productively with the realisation of its limitations in mind.
Relationships initially structured to be temporal and strategic in nature do offer the potential of evolution, a more Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 12 binding relationship that may occur at an unspecified future date.
Simone Bignall raises this idea in a discussion on activism and political collaboration between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.
Hers is a deliberately fluid and speculative notion, but one that nonetheless presents us with an opportunity for a valued and sustained shift: I introduce the term ‘excolonial’ (‘exit-from-colonialism’) to designate an ideally decolonised form of future community that is (perpetually) ‘yet to come’ … I would use ‘ex’ to describe a former relationship, which remains indelible and shaping part of my history but with which I am no longer entangled in a defining manner.
(Bignall, 2014, p. 241) Conclusion: The Ecological Imagination So, how might we “exit” from colonialism and refuse the limitations of recognition while not turning away from each other at a time in our history when we can least afford to do so?
Dwayne Donald, an Indigenous scholar from Canada has been dealing with this question for some years.
With regard to the potential for conversations and connections that might lead to productive change, he believes that “we’re frequently missing each other,” making fruitful dialogue hardly possible.
The cause of what he refers to as “disconnection” is clear: “I see colonialism as an extended process of denying relationships” (Donald, 2011).
Interestingly, for Donald, a politics of refusal is embedded within the history of colonialism itself.
His challenge to us is that we refuse colonialism’s stubborn and arrogant act of refusing its own dismantlement, and rather, begin the important archaeological work of “excavating the colonial terrain:” Decolonisation can only occur when we face each other across these historic divides … when we deconstruct the past we share, and begin to imagine a different relationship, ethical and respectful.
(Donald, 2011) The “different relationship” that might be achieved, for Donald, may be located in modes of thought and action that he refers to as “ethical relationality,” addressing the reflection “who you are, where you come from,” and secondly, engaging in the “enactment of ecological imagination” that helps determine and answer the “who” and “where:” Paying attention to the webs and relationships that you’re enmeshed in—depending on where you live … all those things that give us life, all the things that we depend on, as well as the entities that we relate to … we depend on those relationships for survival.
(Donald, 2011) Zoe Todd calls for a relationship to country similar to Donald’s (as many Indigenous intellectuals do).
She asks that we “speak about Indigenous people’s relationships to land, water, law, language, history, and futures” (Todd, 2017).
Our relationships, therefore, to non-human species, including plants, raises ethical questions for all involved in issues of Indigenous rights, climate justice and environmental protection.
For instance, who speaks for and on behalf of non-human species?
Or rather, how do we speak with the non-human?
Does the act of refusal of the colonial gesture by humans, impact negatively on nonhuman species?
Or does refusal, enacted with the level of cultural and political Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 13 sophistication with which Glen Coulthard articulates it, hold the potential for deeper, more permanent and equitable relationships for all, forged of action rather than symbolism?
The question cannot be answered here.
And perhaps it is not a question to be answered at all, but rather serve as a reminder of the challenging work to be done that will both protect country and dismantle the framework of global colonisation.
It is worth closing with a story of North America’s Pawnee nation, retold by the First Nations scholar and activist, Winona LaDuke.
The Pawnee had been driven from sections of their own land, which had been incorporated into the state of Nebraska.
The Pawnee were forced to move to Oklahoma.
They took many of their sacred vegetables seeds with them.
The seeds failed to adapt to the soils in Oklahoma, on what was for the Pawnee and the seeds both, foreign land.
Their precious seed bank dwindled.
Many years later, settlercolonial communities back in Nebraska heard about what happened to the seeds.
Contact was made and the Pawnee were asked if they wanted to return some seeds to home soil for planting.
After some discussion, and seemingly some anguish (according to LaDuke), the seeds were sent home, where they flourished.
Vegetables grew and the seed bank itself was replenished.
LaDuke’s own response to the Pawnee story is both provocative, in a generous manner, and instructive.
It is also helpful when considering the type of relationships that will help us move forward and protect country.
She concludes that the exchange of the seeds and the valuable outcome resulted from the exchange was an act of both “apology and redemption” on the part of the settler community, based on their actions above and beyond symbolism.
It is only through such actions that forgiveness, subsequently offered by the Pawnee, was possible.
LaDuke concludes the story with a remarkable comment, which is as challenging as it is exhilarating.
Her reasoning for the healthy outcome of the planting of seeds is that “the seeds remembered the land they came from … corn is more than a food.
It is a history” (LaDuke, 2011).
Corn does not carry a history.
It is a history.
LaDuke also believes that “corn in itself, needs relationships to humans” in order to survive.
To become truly invested in the protection of country, therefore, we must become responsible for the health and survival of the non-human.
While we could sensibly argue that our own survival ultimately depends on accepting this view, as both Indigenous knowledge and the science of ecology realise, we should think beyond or rather before survival as a primary motivation for acceptance of this realisation.
We must also understand the act of reciprocity as not one that exists only between human societies.
Reciprocity, in its fullest sense entails “systems of creating and maintaining useful knowledge of how humans can be good stewards of the earth” (Chief, Daigle, Lynn and Whyte, 2014, p. 163).
Therefore, what we choose to truly recognise or refuse is a difficult, necessary and powerful choice.
References Balaton-Chrimes, S., and Stead, V.
(Eds.).
(2017).
Postcolonial Studies, Special Issue: Beyond Recognition, vol.
20, (1).
Birch, T. (2016).
“Climate Change, Mining and Traditional Indigenous Knowledge in Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 14 Australia.” Social Inclusion, vol.
4, (1), n.pag.
Doi: 10.17645/si.v4i1.
Bignall, S. (2014).
“The Collaborative Struggle for Excolonialism’.
Settler Colonial Studies, vol.
4, (4), pp.
340-354.
Doi: 10.1080/2201473X.2014.911651.
Burragubba, A.
(2015).
“Stop Adani Destroying Our Land And Culture.” Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZB2JC6yKy_E.
Chief, K., Daigle, J.J., Lynn, K., and Whyte, K.P.
(2014).
“Indigenous Experiences in the U.S. with Climate Change and Environmental Stewardship in the Anthropocene.” In: Sample, V.A., and Bixler, R.P.
(Eds.).
Forest Conservation and Management in the Anthropocene: Conference proceedings.
Proceedings.
RMRS-P-71.
Fort Collins, CO: US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, pp.
161-176.
Coulthard, G.S.
(2014).
Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Daley, P. (2017).
“The Whole Recognise Process has Deep Colonial Resonance.” The Guardian, 27 October.
Donald, D. (2011).
“On What Terms Can We Speak.” University of Lethbridge, Canada.
https://vimeo.com/15264558.
Fullenwieder, L. (2017).
“Framing Indigenous Self-Recognition: The Visual and Cultural Work of the Politics of Recognition.” Balaton-Chrimes, S., and Stead, V.
(Eds.).
Postcolonial Studies, Special Issue: Beyond Recognition, vol.
20, (1), pp.
34-50.
Doi: 10.1080/13688790.2017.1357219.
Gardner, K., and Clancy, D. (2017).
“From Recognition to Decolonization: An Interview with Glen Coulthard.” Upping The Anti, no.
19, September 2017, retrieved from http://uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/19-from-recogntion-to-decolonization/, n.pag.
Hunt, S. (2014).
“Ontologies of Indigeneity: The Politics of Embodying a Concept.” Cultural Geographies, vol.
21, (1), pp.
27-32.
Doi: 10.1177/1474474013500226.
Irlbacher-Fox, S. (2014).
“Traditional Knowledge, Co-Existence and Co-Resistance.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, vol.
3, (3), pp.
145-158.
Kelly, S. (2017).
“The Uluru Statement from the Heart: In the Words of Indigenous Australians.” The Monthly, 29 May.
Retrieved from https://www.themonthly.com.au/today/seankelly/2017/29/2017/1496039300/uluru-statement-heart.
Kohn, R. (2016).
“Elder Invites All Australians to Embrace Tradition of Deep Listening.” The Spirit of Things, Australian Broadcasting Commission.
LaDuke, W. (2014).
“Winona LaDuke on Redemption.” Sacred Land Film Project, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfD5WaHM04E.
Lyons, K., Brigg, M., and Quiggin, J.
(2017).
Unfinished Business: Adani, the State, and the Indigenous Rights Struggle of the Wangan and Jangalingou Traditional Owners Council.
Brisbane: University of Queensland.
Malm, A.
(2016).
Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming.
London: Verso.
Mundine, W. (2017).
“Activists are Like Colonial Oppressors in Opposing Native Rights.” The Australian, 17 April.
Murphy, K. (2017).
“Indigenous People Victims of ‘Green’ Fight Against Adani Mine, says Marcia Langton.” The Guardian, 7 June.
Pearson, N. (2017a).
“Betrayal: The Turnbull Government has Burned the Bridge of Bipartisanship.” The Monthly, December 2017–January 2018, pp.
24-34.
---.
(2017b).
“Prime Minister’s Rejection is a Kick in the Guts for Aboriginal Australian.” https://vimeo.com/15264558 http://uppingtheanti.org/journal/article/19-from-recogntion-to-decolonization/ https://www.themonthly.com.au/today/sean-kelly/2017/29/2017/1496039300/uluru-statement-heart https://www.themonthly.com.au/today/sean-kelly/2017/29/2017/1496039300/uluru-statement-heart https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfD5WaHM04E Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 15 The Australian, 28-29 October.
Robertson, J.
(2017).
“Leading Indigenous lawyer hits back at Marcia Langton over Adani.” The Guardian, 9 June.
Rose, D.B.
(2015) “Dialogue.” In: Gibson, K., Rose, D.B., and Fincher, R. (Eds).
Manifesto for Living in the Anthropocene.
Brooklyn, New York: Punctum Books, 2015, pp.
127-131.
Salick, J., and Byg, A.
(2007).
Indigenous People and Climate Change.
Oxford: Tyndall Centre.
Simpson, A.
(2017).
“The Ruse of Consent and the Autonomy of ‘Refusal:’ Cases from Indigenous North America and Australia.” Balaton-Chrimes, S., and Stead, V.
(Eds.).
Postcolonial Studies, Special Issue: Beyond Recognition, vol.
20.
(1), pp.
18-33.
Doi: 10.1080/13688790.2017.1334283.
Simpson, L.B.
(2014).
“Land as Pedagogy: Nishnaabeg Intelligence and Rebellious Transformation.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, vol.
3, (3.
), pp.
1-25.
Todd, Z.
(2015).
“Indigenizing the Anthropocene.” In: Davis, H., and Turpin, E.
(Eds.).
Art in the Anthropocene: Encounters Among Aesthetics, Politics, Environment and Epistemology.
Open Humanities Press, pp.
241-254.
---.
(2017).
“Relationships.” Cultural Anthropology.
Retrieved from https://culanth.org/pages/contributing-editors.
Velednitsky, S. (2017).
“The Case for Ecological Reparations: a Conversation with Jason W. Moore.” Edge Effects, 31 October.
Retrieved from http://edgeeffects.net/jasonw-moore/.
Victorian State Government.
(2017).
Aboriginal Community Consultations on the Design of a Representative Body: Aboriginal Treaty Interim Working Group.
Melbourne: Aboriginal Affairs Victoria.
Victorian Traditional Owner Land Justice Group.
(2016).
Sovereign First Nations Treaty Commission: The Treaty Negotiator and Representative Body.
Viellaris, R. (2017).
“Malcolm Turnbull Risks War with Labor and Indigenous Groups after Rejecting Referendum Council’s ‘Radical’ Blueprint.” The Courier-Mail, 26 October.
Vincent, E., and Neale, T. (2016).
Unstable Relations: Indigenous People and Environmentalism in Contemporary Australia.
Crawley: UWAP Scholarly.
Wahlquist, C. “‘Go Light a Fire in the Nation:’ Uluru Gathering Aims to Map Path to Recognition’, The Guardian, 24 May.
Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council.
(2017).
“Adani ‘Investment’ Decision Meaningless Without Indigenous Consent.” Retrieved from http://wanganjanjalingou.com.au/adani-investment-decision-meaningless-withoutindigenous-consent/.
Watson, T. (2017).
“Indigenous Knowledge Systems can Help Solve the Problems of Climate Change’.
The Guardian, 2 June.
Wildcat, M., McDonald, M., Irlbacher-Fox, S., and Coulthard, G. (2014).
“Learning from the Land: Indigenous Land Based Pedagogy and Decolonization”.
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, vol.
3, (3), pp.
i-xv.
Winter, C. (2015).
“Indigenous Groups Call for a New Water Partnership with Government on the Murray-Darling Basin System.” SA Country Hour.
Australian Broadcasting Commission.
https://culanth.org/pages/contributing-editors http://wanganjanjalingou.com.au/adani-investment-decision-meaningless-without-indigenous-consent/ http://wanganjanjalingou.com.au/adani-investment-decision-meaningless-without-indigenous-consent/ Coolabah, No.24&25, 2018, ISSN 1988-5946, Observatori: Centre d’Estudis Australians i Transnacionals / Observatory: Australian and Transnational Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona 16 Wright, A.
(2016).
“What Happens When You Tell Someone Else’s Story?” Meanjin, Summer, retrieved from https://meanjin.com.au/essays/what-happens-when-youtell-somebody-elses-story/.
Tony Birch is a professorial research fellow in the Moondani Balluk Academic Centre at Victoria University in Melbourne.
His research is centrally concerned with climate justice, protection of country and Indigenous ecological knowledge.
Birch publishes academic research in the areas of Indigenous history, current debates on climate change and environmental activism.
He is also a widely published fiction writer.
His short story collections and novels have won numerous awards, including the Victorian Premier’s Literary Award in 2017, and the Patrick White Literary Prize in the same year.
https://meanjin.com.au/essays/what-happens-when-you-tell-somebody-elses-story/ https://meanjin.com.au/essays/what-happens-when-you-tell-somebody-elses-story/
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 395 Economic Valuation of Increased Malaria due to Climate Change: A South African Case Study RandaU Spalding-Fecber!
Energy and Development Research Centre.
University of Cape Town Sbomentbree Moodley Minerals and Energy Policy Centre, Johannesburg ABSTRACT Malaria is one of the world's most serious and complex health problems.
It is also one of the diseases identified as most likely to be affected by climate change, because transmission is sensitive to temperature and rainfall.
The objective of this paper is to provide an initial economic valuation of the increased incidence of malaria due to projected changes in climate in South Africa, excluding costs and benefits of prevention and adaptation.
We use market based economic valuation tools for morbidity, including cost of treatment and lost short term productivity, and report lost disability adjusted life years from malaria mortality due to climate change.
We also discuss how human capital and willingness to pay approaches could be used for mortality valuation.
The results show that the opportunity cost of increased morbidity from malaria would be between R277 million and R466 million in 2010, while the lost disability adjusted life years from increased mortality would be from 11 800 to 18 300 years in that year.
JELQOO 1 INTRODUCTION Malaria is one of the world's most serious and complex health problems.
More than 40 per cent of the world's population is at risk of malaria, with over 270 million cases per year and more than 1 million deaths (Murray & Lopez, 1997; WHO, 1998).
The impacts of malaria, however, go well beyond the immediate effects of the illness to affect economic growth and development.
Controlling for factors such as geography, colonial history and isolation, countries with severe malaria had income levels in 1995 two thirds less than countries without malaria (Gallup & Sachs, 1998).
R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
396 SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 Malaria is also one of the diseases identified as most likely to be impacted by climate change, because transmission is sensitive to temperature and rainfall (Kovats, Menne, McMichael, Corvalan & Bertollini, 2000).
The burden on Africa, where the vast majority of deaths occur, is likely to be greatest.
While some analysis is available in South Africa on the increased risk of malaria from climate change, and the current illness costs of malaria, these two disciplines have not been brought together.
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the climate and malaria risk modelling in the South Africa Climate Change Country Study Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment and the economic valuation of malaria in South Africa.
Our purpose, therefore, is not to apply new valuation techniques through primary data collection, but to apply the valuation literature to this climate change risk.
We present a first order estimate of the cost of malaria from climate change, before adaptation has occurred.
We use a three step methodology to estimate the economic impacts of increased malaria due to climate change: Estimate the number of excess cases of malaria due to climate change, based on: increased population at risk of contracting malaria because of climate change; and the share of population at risk that is likely to contract malaria (i.e.
incidence ratios).
Estimate the economic cost of malaria morbidity due to climate change, based on: The direct cost of treating the additional cases; and Short term productivity losses from patients or their caregivers being unable to work.
Estimate the economic cost of malaria mortality due to climate change, based on: .
Lost work years due to premature death from malaria; and Willingness to pay for reduced risk of death, adapted from the international literature.
It is important to emphasise at the outset, however, that the uncertainties in each step of this process are quite significant.
Even understanding the future population at risk depends on complex models of how climatic conditions impact malaria parasite and mosquito survival, how to translate very coarse global climate model results into higher resolution predictions for rural South Africa, and how popUlation distribution will change as a result of increasing urbanisation.
Each of these modelling processes adds another level of complexity and uncertainty.
We have tried, therefore, where possible to express our assumptions and results in terms of ranges and to discuss where R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 397 uncertainties are greatest.
The second major challenge of this work is how to realistically describe an impact "before adaptation has occurred" because, in reality, adaptation to malaria risks has already occurred in South Africa.
Given that control programmes are already in place in South Africa, and have reduced the population at risk from much higher historical levels, these controls would still be expected to be present in the future.
When we say 'before adaptation has occurred', then, we really mean before additional measures have been put in place, such as dramatically expanding existing programmes.
The next two sections introduce the relationship between malaria and climate change and the background of malaria in South Africa.
Section 4 presents our analysis of increased malaria morbidity and mortality.
Sections 5 and 6 present our estimates of the economic impacts of morbidity and mortality, respectively, followed by a short summary and conclusion.
This paper also forms part of a larger study on economic valuation of climate change impacts on South Africa (Turpie, Winkler, Spalding-Fecher & Midgley, 2001).
2 MALARIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE LINKS Malaria risk is governed by a large number of environmental factors, many of which are seasonal, that affect the intensity of transmission and duration of the high risk season.
Of all factors, climate is considered the most important limiting factor (Craig & Sharp, 2000).
Temperature, rainfall and humidity all playa role in determining survival of the vector the anopheles mosquito and the parasite itself.
Of course, the actual risk of malaria will be affected by adaptation measures, including eradication programmes and public health interventions.
Some of these are already in place to combat existing malaria risk.
The purpose of this analysis, however, is to make a first order estimate of the increased cost of malaria from climate change, before additional adaptation has occurred.
Recent modelling of the impact of climate change on malaria distribution suggests that an additional 260 to 320 million people could be at risk by 2080 because of climate change (Martens, Kovats & Nijhof, 1999).
The areas where this change will be most dramatic are those where malaria transmission is currently marginal because of low temperature or insufficient rainfall, among other factors.
This means that, while tropical African countries, where malaria risk is already very high, will not see increased risk due to climate change, highland areas in Eastern and Southern Africa, or areas with currently R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
398 SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 insufficient rainfall, could see significant increases in populations at risk (Kovats et al., 2000).
3 MALARIA IN soum AFRICA Malaria was intensely endemic to large areas of South Africa before the 194Os, including in major urban areas such as Pretoria and Durban, with more than 22 000 people dying in an epidemic in KwaZulu-Natal in 1932 (Sharp, Craig, Curtis, Mnzava, Maharaj & Kleinschmidt, 2000).
Systematic control measures in the following decades, including indoor insecticide spraying and active treatment of the disease, reduced the areas of risks for the disease to the northeastern borders of the country (Craig & Sharp, 2000).
Current high risk areas include 24 rural districts in the easternmost parts of Northern Province, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu Natal (Sharp et al., 2000).
Through the early 1970s, cases had dropped to less than 500 per year with almost no fatalities.
This trend, however, has reversed since the 1970s, with exponential growth in incidence of malaria for the last fifteen years.
The number of cases jumped from 4 693 in 1991, to 27 035 in 1996, to 61 253 in 2000 (DOH, 2000).
Malaria experts point out that this increase is not due to changes in climate (e.g.
excessively warm and wet years), however, but to increasing drug resistance, an influx of migrants from neighbouring countries where malaria is not controlled, and reduced spraying with insecticides such as DDT (Craig & Sharp, 2000; Sharp et al., 2000).
4 IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON MALARIA INCIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA The first step in assessing the economic costs of increased malaria due to climate change is to estimate how many more people will get malaria, and how many more will die from it.
This is based on both the increased population that it as risk due to future climatic changes in South Africa, as well as the likelihood that people in high risk areas will contract malaria or die from it.
4.1 Increased population at risk The South African Country Study for Climate Change (SACSCC) Vulnerability and Adaptation (V&A) Assessment included a chapter on malaria (Craig & Sharp, 2000).
In this analysis, researchers from the Medical Research Council applied a model that linked temperature (both average and minimum winter) and rainfall to climatic suitability for malaria transmission (Craig, Snow & R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 399 leSueur, 1999), This model was checked against historical data for a number of African countries to verify that it gave a reasonable estimate of the area in which malaria is endemic (i.e, stable transmission every year).
The science of climate change involves the use of sophisticated models of the global atmosphere, oceans and landmasses that link changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.
The models at a global scale are called 'global circulation models', and give fairly coarse resolution predictions in other words, they can only identify the change in rainfall, temperature, etc.
for a fairly large unit area.
To get consistent results, the various studies within the V&A assessment (e.g.
health, agriculture, forestry) all used the same future climate scenarios the Hadley Centre global circulation models (see Met Office, 2000), In addition, the Hadley models used present two scenarios of future climate one that includes the effect of sulphates on climate change and one that does not.
Contrary to greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane, sulphates actually exert a local or regional cooling effect on the atmosphere.
However, sulphates only stay in the atmosphere for a short time, so in the context of tighter sulphur emissions standards in South Africa (RSA, 2001), they are unlikely to be an important influence over the climate in coming decades.
For this reason, we use the results from the V &A study that exclude the impact ofsulphates (Midgley, 2001), As we mentioned before, one difficulty with these global circulation models is that their resolution is quite coarse.
Predictions of current average temperature in South Africa from the Hadley models, when compared to more detailed local climate models (Hutchinson, Nix, McMahan & Ord, 1995; Schultze, 1997), for example, vary by 2 to 4 degrees Celsius in many areas (Craig & Sharp, 2000).
As Craig and Sharp (2000) note in the V &A study on health impacts, "the difference between the present [Hadley] models and actual climate are therefore much greater than the difference between the present and future [Hadley] scenarios," An additional challenge is that the population growth projections for 1996 to 2010 in the V &A Assessment are based on 1990 to 1995 actual growth rates, Most of the current research on demographics in South Africa, however, suggests that deaths due to HIV/AIDS will significantly slow population growth rates in the coming decades (SSA, 2000).
For example, national population grew at 2.2 per cent per year from 1991 to 1999 (SSA, 1998, 2000), but for 2000 to 2010, HIV/AIDS deaths could reduce projected population growth from 2.3 per cent to 1.5 per cent (ABSA Group Economic Research, 200 I).
The United Nations projects population growth rates of under I per cent in 2000~2005, falling to 0.2 per cent in 2010-2015 (UN Population Division, 2000).
On the other hand, as the share of the population that is immuno-compromised due to HIV I AIDS increases, so will the susceptibility to R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
400 SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 contracting illnesses such as malaria.
The predicted populations at risk from the Craig and Sharp (2000) study should therefore be seen as an upper bound.
The projected populations at risk based on the local climate models and the Hadley model with and without climate change are presented below in Table 1 below.
Table 1 1995 1996 2000 2005 2010 Estimated populations at risk based on different climate models and climate scenarios Present climate I Hadley model no sulphates Hutchinson Schultze Present Future Increase cHmate cHmate 9,101,875 7,854,638 5,049,654 8,603,783 7,819266 4.912.228 10,662,127 9,241 847 5,977,839 10622,127 10,966,172 7,174,761 30637,710 23,462949 15133,780 13,211,391 8,703,941 36,300,636 27,596,695 Source: (Craig & ShaIp, 2000) Note: The first two columns 'Present climate' are from detailed models of the current SA climate (Hutchinson et al., 1995; Schultze, 1997), with growth in population at risk only due to growth in population.
'Hadley model no sulphates' are projections based on the climate outputs (e.g.
temperature and rainfall) from the Hadley climate models in each year.
The 'future climate' column is based on Hadley model projections of climate outputs in the future given continue climate change.
All of the climate models, including those based on local data such as Hutchinson and Schultze, overestimate the current population at risk, because of the adaptation measures already in place, as mentioned earlier.
A more detailed assessment suggests that only about 3 million people live in districts where the malaria cases are greater than 1 per 1000 people per year (Sharp et al., 2000).
To try to reflect what prevention measures are already in place, we use the percentage change in population at risk in the climate models, rather than the absolute numbers.
The Hadley models predict that climate change will increase the population at risk of malaria by 417 per cent in 2010 primarily because the malaria risk area in the future includes the heavily populated Witswatersrand area.
Note that, compared to the Hutchinson and Schultze data, the Hadley model underestimates the present population at risk although the Hadley model estimates are closer to more detailed studies mentioned above (Sharp et al., R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 401 2000; Tren, 2001).
We have conservatively assumed almost no net population growth overall between 2000 and 2010 (UN Population Division, 2000), and applied the 417 per cent increase to the 3 million based on the detailed analysis of population at risk in 1999, for a total population at risk in 2010 of 12.6 million.
In other words, climate change by 2010 would put an additional 9.6 million people at risk of contracting malaria.
4.2 Increased morbidity and mortality 4.2.1 Methodology A wide variety of socio-economic, environmental and health factors influence the share of the population at risk that will actually contract malaria.
As many studies of climate change and disease point out, the spread of vector borne diseases could spur new efforts to control or eradicate these diseases.
In this study, however, we have explicitly not considered adaptation beyond what is already happening although this is clearly an important area for future work.
For this reason, our best reference point for malaria incidence ratios is to look at current cases of malaria relative to populations at risk.
As described in the previous section, however, establishing the size of population at risk is not a simple matter.
Based on the detailed estimates by Sharp et al.
(2000), 3 million people were in high risk areas in 1999.
Given 51 535 cases of malaria in 1999 (DOH, 2001), this means an incidence ratio of 17.1 per 1000 persons at risk.
Note that this is not a general incidence ratio for South Africa, but only for those relatively small areas with high risk.
For comparison, the incidence ratio in high risk areas (defmed as areas where climatic suitability is > 0.5) in Southern Africa is 11 cases per 1000 (Snow, Craig, Deichmann & Marsh, 1999).
Under the climate scenarios explained earlier, the future change in climate would, in theory, make some major metropolitan areas in South Africa climatically suitable for stable malaria transmission.
In practice, however, the incidence ratios in these areas even without significant new prevention programmes will be much lower than in poorer rural areas.
To be conservative, we have used a range of incidence ratios, which are 25 per cent to 50 per cent lower than the current incidence in rural areas.
For mortality estimates, we used the average share of malaria cases resulting in death in the last three years in South Africa, or 0.7 per cent of cases (DOH, 2000).
The Southern African average is 1 per cent (Snow et al., 1999).
R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
402 SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 4.2.2 Results The projected incidence ratio for 2010 is between 8.6 and 12.8 cases per 1000.
Applied to a population at risk of 12.6 million, this means 107000 to 161 000 cases.
Only the cases due to the increased area of climatic suitability, however, can be attributed to climate change.
Applying these ratios to the 9.6 million who are at risk due to climate change, therefore, we have 82 000 to 126000 additional cases of malaria due to climate change.
Out of these additional cases, we would expect 600 to 900 deaths per year, given current mortality rates.
5 VALUATION OF INCREASED MORBIDITY To place an economic value on increased morbidity, we have used two tools: the cost of treatment and the opportunity cost of lost work days.
The treatment cost is the full costs of treating a particular illness with one or more treatment regimens.
Treatment cost if often used as an input to cost effectiveness analysis, where the input costs of two alternative treatment regimens are compared with their health outcomes in other words, how much it costs to avoid illness, death, or further medical treatment (Zweifel & Breyer, 1997).
The opportunity cost of being ill can be measured in terms of lost income from being unable to work.
Treatment cost is often called the 'direct' cost of an illness, while lost productivity or opportunity cost is referred to as the 'indirect' cost.
What these two methods do not address, however, is the actual physical and emotional pain and suffering that accompanies illness, or the impacts this has on quality oflife and society more broadly.
These measures, therefore, can only serve as a lower bound for the economic value of morbidity.
5.1 Treatment costs 5.1.1 Methodology Weare interested in the direct and indirect costs of medical treatment for patients contracting malaria.
We must assume that the costs of treating the additional future patients due to climate change will be similar to the cost of treating patients today in real terms.
The most detailed recent study on the costs of treating malaria in clinics and hospitals in South Africa is work by Justin Wilkins at Univ~sity of Cape Town (Wilkins, 1999).
This study looked at the costs of medic3Ipersonnel, drugs, and all hospital costs associated with alternative therapies for first line malaria treatment.
Building on this work, Richard Tren of the UK lnstitute of Economic Affairs analysed the costs of malaria treatment in South Africa, R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 403 including the costs of the Malaria Control Programme (Tren, 2001).
The Malaria Control Programme sends health care workers into the field to identifY, test and treat malaria cases in rural areas, as well as provide preventive measures such as insecticide spraying.
At least part of the costs of this programme should also be included in treatment costs for malaria, since much of the treatment occurs in the field.
It was not possible to identifY the share of personnel expenditure (the largest item in the programme budget) that was devoted to treatment.
Expenditure for insecticides was subtracted, however, since this is clearly a preventive measure.
5.1.2 Results Table 2 shows the cost per patient of treatment in hospital and in the field.
The malaria control programme is an order of magnitude greater that hospital costsbut this is to be expected because 42 per cent of cases are diagnosed and treated in the field, while another 32 per cent are treated as outpatients at clinics and hospitals (Tren, 2001).
A more detailed allocation of the Malaria Control Programme costs to treatment versus prevention would improve this estimate.
Table 2 Treatment costs per malaria patient (Rands) 1996 1997 1998 Cost of treating and hospitalising 300 276 260 Ipatients Malaria Control Programme 2301 2925 3016 less preventive expenditures 190 242 249 Total (current year R) 2410 2959 3026 Total (2000 R) 3097 3502 3352 Source: (Tren, 2001), own analysis The average cost per patient ranges from R3 097 to R3 502.
Table 3 shows the results for the direct costs of treatment, ranging for R253 to R429 million.
Note that this is only the costs of the treating the excess cases due to climate change.
Table 3 Treatment costs of excess malaria cases due to climate change, 2010 Low Hie:h Cost per patient (R2000) 3097 3502 Number of cases 81 700 122500 Total cost (R2000 million) 253 429 R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
404 SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 5.2 Lost short term productivity 5.2.1 Methodology Lost productivity due to illness depends both on wages and days out of work.
For wages, Tren (200 I) analysed the average wage of employed persons in districts in the three provinces with endemic malaria.
Weighted average wages for those employed were Rl93 per day in 1997, which is equivalent to R224 per day in 2000 (SARB, 2001).
Only 47 per cent of the population of these districts, however, had formal employment, while a further 12 per cent were employed in the informal sector.
As Tren correctly points out, even people who are not formally employed in rural areas would contribute to subsistence agriculture, so it is reasonable to use an agricultural wage (R36 per day adjusted to 2000 wages) for the unemployed and informally employed as a proxy for their lost productivity.
For the 11 per cent of malaria cases that occur in children under 5, a caregiver will need to take time away from work during the illness.
Even for those in the 5 to 15 age group (30 per cent of reported cases), it is likely that either a caregiver will have to take time away or that some of these youth would have been involved in supporting subsistence activities.
For these reasons, we assume that all malaria cases will result in lost productivity.
Days of lost work depends on the severity of the case and treatment regimen, which are also affected by the age of the patient.
Children under 5, for example, are always hospitalised for 4 days treatment, so all of these cases will result in at least 4 lost productive days.
For children ages 6 to 15, we assume that a caregiver will need to take part of the time off work for an average of 2 days.
For cases ages 16 and up, the days lost depends on severity.
Cases identified actively (i.e.
through field workers in the Malaria Control Programme) will by defmition not be as severe, with only one day lost.
For those that come to a clinic or hospital, 55 per cent are assumed to be treated as outpatients with oral medication and 40 per cent will be hospitalised and given oral medication both of these groups lose 4 days productive time.
For the 5 per cent ofhospitaI cases that require intravenous quinine, 7 days of productive time will be lost (Tren, 2001).
For each of these groups, we apply the share of employed, unemployed, and informally employed to match wages to days of lost productivity .
5.2.2 Results Table 4 below shows the lost productivity per case, depending on how the case is treated and the employment status or wage of the patient.
Using this table R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 405 and the share of cases falling into the different categories within the matrix, we calculate a weighted average productivity loss of R299 per case.
This implies a total lost productivity of R24 to 37 million from malaria cases due to climate change.
Table 4 Lost productivity per case, based on case type and employment status (R2000) Types of malaria case Employed I UnemInformally I ployed employed Age <5 years* ~ 142 Age 5-15 years* 71 71 Age> 15 years identified by fieldworkers; oral 224 36 36 treatment given in the field Oral treatment as outpatients or in 897 142 142 hospital Intra-venous treatment in hospital 1570 i 249 249 *thlS value captures the lost productivity of the person canng for the sick child 6 VALUATION OF INCREASED MORTALITY Valuation of the loss of life is one of the most difficult areas of environmental and health economics.
Whether it is appropriate to equate a life, or the prolonging of life, with money, is an important ethical and moral question.
The critical issue, however, is that every public decision on spending related to health (or any private expenditure) does implicitly place a value on statistical lives or, more precisely, on the statistical risk of reduced length of life.
This is particularly true with decisions on public expenditure to reduce health risks: policy makers need some kind of metric to help weigh decisions about what type of investments to make and how their benefits may outweigh their costs.
There are two broad approaches to dealing with valuation of reduced life expectancy_ The frrst is based on assessing individuals' willingness to pay to avoid risks, or willingness to accept compensation for taking on risks.
This is based on basic principles in economics that individual preferences are the most important source of value, and that welfare, as perceived by the individual, is the appropriate metric (Zweifel & Breyer, 1997).
If we know what all individuals in society are willing to pay to avoid a certain risk, we then know exactly how much society should spend on avoidance investments.
The difficulty, however, is how to elicit these preferences accurately_ The most R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
406 SAJEMS NS VolS (2002) No 2 direct approach is the contingent valuation method (CVM), where survey respondents are asked hypothetical questions about their willingness to pay for reduced risks (or accept compensation for those risks) (Klose, 1999).
The practical challenges in designing these studies, and the cost of executing them, has meant that relatively few studies have been conducted in developing countries.
The only way to utilise this approach in many developing countries, therefore, is to use values from industrialised countries and somehow adjust them for local conditions (discussed in more detail below).
This limits our ability to choose between alternative approaches, such as willingness-to-pay versus willingness-to-accept.
The second method is called the 'human capital approach', and equates the value of the lost statistical life with the net present value of lost future contribution to Gross National Product (Zweifel & Breyer 1997).
In other words, when society loses this person, they lose the value added (e.g.
wages less personal consumption) that the person would have contributed to the economy for the remainder of their natural life.
There are obvious problems with this approach, most importantly that, from an ethical standpoint, there is no reason that an individual's value (to themselves or to others) should be related to their economic output (Zweifel & Breyer, 1997; Fankhauser, Tol & Pearce, 1998).
The possibility that the life of a pensioner or someone who is disabled could be zero (or negative) goes against other social values although if we use average GDP per capita for the whole population, we can avoid this problem within a given country.
Worse yet, GNP is not necessarily an appropriate measure of social welfare in any case (Daly & Cobb, 1989).
At best, the human capital approach should only provide an absolute minimum estimate of economic costs (Dixon, Scura, Carpenter & Sherman.
1994).
Despite these serious theoretical drawbacks, the practical reality facing researchers and policy makers in developing countries is that willingness to pay studies simply are not available.
The human capital approach is relatively simple to implement, and so it still used in many developing countries (Parikh, Parikh, Muralidharan & Hadker, 1994).
Moreover, it avoids some of the serious problems with transferring willingness to pay values across countries (discussed in more detail below).
Because of the ethical issues related to this type of analysis, many health economists use measures such as 'Disability Adjusted Life Years' (DAL Ys) lost.
This is a standard health care analytical tool that combines years of life lost and years of life disabled, measured relative to incidence of the illness.
Although we present the economic analysis below to illustrate how use to the two major types of valuation tools, we have also chosen to limit our final results to DAL Ys lost because of the ethical issues surrounding mortality valuation.
R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 407 6.1 Human capital: lost productive years of life 6.1.1 Methodology We use two approaches to estimating human capital.
The first is to estimate the average years of life lost in South Africa and the contribution to economic output that the average individual would have made over those years based on GDP per capita.
This gives a direct estimate of years of productive life lost.
The second possibility is to use the measure of DAL Ys lost per case and GDP per capita to then place a value on those DAL Ys.
While there are no DALY values for malaria in South Africa, the Global Burden of Disease study estimates that, for sub-saharan Africa, DAL Ys for malaria are 0.145 per incidence of illness (Murray & Lopez 1997).
This takes into account the age at death, years lost, and a discount rate of 3 per cent for future years lost.
6.1.2 Results For lost work years, age at death is based on Tren's (2001) reporting of deaths from malaria in Mpumalanga in 1997 and 1998, where the average age at death was 22.9 years.
According to the UNDP's Human Development Report, life expectancy in South Africa is 54.7 years (UNDP, 1999), so this means a loss of 32 years of economically active life.
If the mortality rate for malaria is 0.7 per cent, then the DAL Ys lost per incidence of malaria is 0.1492 (using a 3 per cent discount rate for future years as in Murray & Lopez, 1997).
Because we are evaluating the impacts of deaths in 2010, we should use per capita GDP in 2010, which is estimated by ABSA Group Economic Research (2000) as R22 360 (in 2000 Rands).
Table 5 summarises the range of DAL Y s lost per incidence of malaria, and the economic valuation using GDP per capita.
Table 5 DALYs lost and economic valuation for malaria mortality using GDP per capita, 2010 Low High DAL Ys lost per case 0.145 0.149 Total DALYs lost 11800 18300 Lost economic output (R2000 million) 265 408 R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
408 SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 6.2 Willingness to pay and benefits transfer 6.2.1 Methodology As discussed above, using contingent valuation to determine willingness to pay relies on large scale surveys on individual to ask them to evaluate what they would pay to avoid a certain additional risk.
or what they would accept as compensation for that risk.
Where primary research is not available in a given country, as is the case for many developing countries, we can adapt these values using the concept of 'benefits transfer'.
With benefits transfer, we use the relative GDP per capita of the two countries to adjust the valuations.
In other words, if we want to apply a WTP value to a country with one tenth the per capita income, then would should divide the WTP value by 10.
The problem with this approach is that, if we use it to place a value on the mortality risk, it appears that we are again setting people's value equal to their economic output.
This would mean that people in poor countries are worth less than those in rich countries (Ekins, 1995).
This has provide particularly problematic in global valuation exercises such as those for the potential damages from climate change (Fankhauser, Tol & Pearce, 1997).
While economists have proposed ways to address this problem (Fankhauser et ai., 1997), this study does not have to tackle the international dimension of the problem because it looks only at domestic health impacts.
We present the below for illustrative purposes only.
6.2.2 Results A survey of economic valuations of health risks by Zweifel and Breyer (1997: 40) found that the value of a statistical life can vary greatly, in part because "considerable risk reductions of about 1: 1 03 do not call forth a substantially larger willingness to pay then reductions of around I: 105 to 1: 106.,.
For studies that looked a higher risks (1:103), values for two studies were between 120 and 300 000 US dollars (2000 dollars)(cited in Zweifel & Breyer, 1997).
This is much lower than studies done for lower risks, where values of $1 million or more were common.
In the case of malaria, however, the risk of dying is on the order of I: 105 for those in endemic areas.
Zweifel and Breyer also look at valuation studies based on observed consumer behaviour for example, how much additional wages people are willing to accept to compensate for more dangerous work and how much consumers will spend on purchases like smoke detectors, homes in areas with better air quality, or choices they make about driving speed and use of seat belts.
Values from the wage risk studies may exceed $1 million, and different studies often differ by several orders of magnitude.
Values from consumer behaviour studies tend to range from $300 000 to $900 000 per statistical life.
R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 409 Our conclusion is that, given the lack of study in South Africa (or Africa) on these issues and the uncertainties in how comparable the overseas studies are, it is difficult to apply these results to the present analysis.
For illustrative purposes, we could assume a range of $300 000 to $1 million.
When adjusted for 2000 exchange rates (SARB, 2001) and relative GDP per capita between the US and South Africa (World Bank, 2000), this means a total valuation of mortality from malaria due to climate change of R360 million to RI 700 million.
7 CONCLUSIONS Table 6 below summarises the direct and indirect economic costs of increased risk of malaria due to climate change, but only provides a valuation for morbidity.
Based on the assumptions and analysis described in this study, the opportunity cost of increased morbidity from malaria would be between R277 million and R466 million in 2010.
Because we are using market values for both morbidity in other words, direct opportunity costs of lost time, treabnent costs, and lost future productivity and have not included a monetary measure of the increased mortality, these figures should be seen as an absolute minimum estimate of damages.
Table 6 Summary of opportunity costs of increased malaria due to climate change in 2010 (2000 Rands) Cateeory Dama2es Low Hi2h Opportunity cost of excess morbidity Cost of treabnent (R million) 253 429 Productivity losses (R million) 24 37 Total 277 466 Mortality impact Disability adjusted life years lost (DAL Ys) 11800 18300 One of the most important conclusions from this work is the need to understand both the costs and effectiveness of prevention measures as a subcategory of what are referred to in the climate change literature as adaptation measures.
As Craig and Sharp (2000) point out, for malaria to become endemic in Pretoria again would require an almost complete breakdown of the public health system and malaria control measures.
There will clearly be some adaptation and increased need for preventive measures.
On the other hand, the exponential growth of malaria cases in the last decade clearly indicates the challenge facing R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
410 SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 costing study, that clearly identifies the potential effectiveness of increased malaria control measures over lager parts of the country, as well as their cost, is the essential next step for policy development for malaria and climate change.
ENDNOTES This research was supported by USAID and administered by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Inc. under a subcontract agreement from Nathan Associates Inc.
Comments and inputs from Marlies Craig, Jane Turpie, Harald Winkler, Mampiti Matete, James Blignaut, and Jan van Rensburg are greatly appreciated.
All errors remain solely the responsibility of the authors.
2 This also includes the weighted average of 2.7 days of disability lost per case, adjusted by 60 per cent.
REFERENCES ABSA GROUP ECONOMIC RESEARCH (2001) "Long-Term Prospects for the South African Economy: 2001-2015", Johannesburg, ABSA.
2 CRAIG, M.H.
& SHARP, B.L.
(2000) "Health Section.
Part 1: Malaria.
South African Country Study on Climate Change VUlnerability & Adaptation Assessment", Pretoria, Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism.
3 CRAIG, M.H., SNOW, R.W.
& LESUEUR, D. (1999) "A Climate-Based Distribution Model of Malaria Transmissions in sub-Saharan Africa", Parasitology Today, 15: 105-111.
4 DALY, H.E.
& COBB, J.B., JR. (1989) For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Towards Community, The Environment and a Sustainable Future, Boston, Beacon Press.
5 DIXON, JA, SCURA, L.F., CARPENTER, RA.
& SHERMAN, P.B.
(1994) Economic Analysis o/Environmental Impacts.
London, Earthscan.
6 DOH (Department of Health) (2000) Statistical Notes, 2( 17), Pretoria.
7 DOH (Department of Health) (2001) Malaria Cases per Month (1999200 I), Pretoria.
8 EKINS, P. (1995) Rethinking the Costs Related to Global Warming.
A Survey of the Issues.
Environmental and Resource Economics 5: 1-47.
9 FANKHAUSER, S., TOL, RS.J.
& PEARCE, D. (1997) "The Aggregation of Climate Change Damages: A Welfare Theoretic Approach", Environment and Resource EconomiCS, 10: 249-266. to FANKHAUSER, S., TOL, RS.J.
& PEARCE, D. (1998) "Extensions and Alternatives to Climate Change Impact Valuation: On the Critique of R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
SAJEMS NS Vol 5 (2002) No 2 411 !PCC Working Group Ill's Impact Estimates" Environment and Development Economics: 59-81.
II GALLUP, J.L.
& SACHS, J.D.
(1998) The Economic Burden of Malaria, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Center for International Development at Harvard.
12 HUTCHINSON, M.F., NIX, H.A., MCMAHAN, J.P. & ORD, K.D.
(1995) Africa a Topographic and Climatic Database, CD-ROM.
13 KLOSE, T. (1999) "The Contingent Value Method in Health Care: Review", Health Policy 47: 97-123.
14 KOVATS, R.S., MENNE, B., MCMICHAEL, A.J., CORVALAN, C. & BERTOLLINI, R. (2000) Climate Change and Huma,!
Health: Impacts and Adaptation, Geneva, World Health Organisation.
15 MARTENS, P., KOVATS, R.S.
& NIJHOF, S. (1999) "Climate Change and Future Populations at risk of Malaria" Global Environmental Change 9: S89-SI07.
16 MET OFFICE (2000) "Climate Change: An Update of Recent Research from the Hadley Centre.
Bracknell, Met Office, Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research.
17 MIDGLEY, G.F. (2001) Biophysical Impacts of Climate Change in South Africa, Cape Town, National Botanical Institute.
18 MURRAY, C.J.
& LOPEZ, A.D. (1997) "Mortality by Cause for Eight Regions of the World: Global Burden of Disease Study", Lancet 349: 1269-76.
19 PARIKH, K., PARIKH, J., MURALIDHARAN, T. & HADKER, N. (1994) "Valuing Air Pollution in Bombay", Bombay, Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research.
20 RSA (Republic of South Africa) (2001) "Technical Background Document for the Development of a National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Sulphur Dioxide", Government Gazette, Vol 432, No.
22134, I June 200 I. Pretoria, Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism.
21 SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK (2001) Quarterly Bulletin, Pretoria, SARB.
22 SCHULTZE, R.E.
(1997) South African Atlas of Agrohydrology and Climatology, Pretoria, Water Research Commission.
23 SHARP, B.L., CRAIG, M., CURTIS, B., MNZA VA, A., MAHARAJ, R. & KLEINSCHMIDT, I.
(2000) "Chapter 18.
Malaria.
Health Systems Trust" South African Health Review 2000, Durban, The Press-Gang.
24 SNOW, R.W., CRAIG, M.H., DEICHMANN, U.
& MARSH, K. (1999) "Estimating Mortality, Morbidity and Disability Due to Malaria among Africa's Non-Pregnant Population", Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, 77 (8): 624-40.
25 STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (1998) Statistical Release P0302.
Pretoria, Statistics South Africa.
R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
412 SAJEMS NS Vo15 (2002) No 2 26 STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (2000) Statistical Release P0302, Pretoria, Statistics South Africa.
27 TREN, R. (2001) "The Economic Costs of Malaria in South Africa: Malaria Control and the DDT Issue", Anopholes.com.
28 TURPIE, J., WINKLER, H., SPALDING-FECHER, R. & MIDGLEY, G.F. (2001) "Economic Impacts of Climate Change in South Africa: A PreliminSIy Analysis of Unmitigated Damage Costs", Cape Town, Southern Waters Ecological Research & Consulting & Energy and Development Research Centre.
29 UN POPULATION DMSION (2000) "World Population Prospects 2000 Revision" Microsoft excel tables (ESAlPIWP.l65).
30 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (1999) Human Development Report 1999, New York, UNDP.
31 WILKINS, J.
(1999) "A Cost Analysis of the Treatment of First-Line Uncomplicated Malaria in the Tonga District of Mpumalanga", Department of Pharmacology.
Faculty of Health Sciences.
Cape Town, University of Cape Town.
32 WORLD BANK (2000) World Development Report 200012001, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
33 ZWEIFEL, P. & BREYER, F. (1997) Health Economics, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
R ep ro du ce d by S ab in et G at ew ay u nd er li ce nc e gr an te d by th e P ub lis he r (d at ed 2 00 9) .
32 Climate Change and Caribbean Coral Reefs *** Anastasia, a student at the University of Toronto, St. George, is pursuing a Bachelor of Science Double Major in Physics and Caribbean Studies and a Minor in Mathematics.
She is a pianist, plays the guitar and steelpan and spends her free time arranging music.
Her love for soca music and steelpan in no way takes away from her passion for classical piano and physics.
As a person of the Trinidadian Diaspora with many interests, Ana has decided to look at the Caribbean from a different perspective by combining her love for science and the region.
THIS PAPER IS A SYNOPSIS OF THE ORIGINAL *** Along with its remarkable history and exciting topography, the Caribbean has a complicated political flavour which adds to recent challenges of climate change.
Studies provide evidence of dramatic world weather patterns, with temperatures reaching all-time lows, irregular rain fall, hotter summers and terrifying hurricane seasons which appear to be worsening.
These changes in climate are directly Introduction This paper explores the extent to which climate change is affecting the Caribbean region.
In the first part, the importance of coral reefs to the Caribbean will be shown.
In the second part, the sensitivity of coral reefs to environmental changes will be examined.
Since human activity plays a major role in climate change, the third part will explore several anthropogenic (manmade) forces that affect climate change, with spin off effects that threaten the existence of coral reefs and beaches in the region.
The paper concludes with suggested strategies and policies to counteract the effects of climate change in the Caribbean.
CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 33 affecting the Caribbean region.
The region’s economy, largely dependent on “sun, sea and sand” is gradually being destroyed.
More importantly, the livelihood of many who survive on tourism and fishing is being dramatically affected.
Increasing carbon dioxide levels have resulted in rising earth temperatures with concomitant high levels of coral reef bleaching.
Increases in storm and hurricane activity have caused destruction of coastal systems.
Increased rainfall and tremendous flooding have brought havoc to the fishing industry.
In short, Caribbean progress is being stifled by changes in climate.
Coral reefs are among the world's most amazing ecosystems in terms of biodiversity, far surpassing rain forests and other land ecosystems Importance of Coral Reefs to the Caribbean 1 Coral reefs are really marine systems created from the secretion of calcium carbonate from corals .
One merely has to take a trip to Tobago's Buccoo Reef to experience this wonder of nature.
There, the opportunity presents itself to enjoy one of the most stunning sites in the world while sitting in a comfortable glass bottom boat in the scorching sun.
Millions of organisms live in this coral reef which is also home for hundreds of thousands of varieties of fish.
2.
Corals live in colonies, which grow on the surface of the reef3.
They extract limestone from the water and with the help of zooxanthellae, secrete calcium carbonate to make the hard shells of protection that are left behind when the coral dies, resulting in the formation of coral reefs4.
Zooxanthellae are single celled plants that live inside larger organisms, mostly corals5.
They have a mutual relationship with corals and coral reefs6.
Corals provide protection for zooxanthellae, which in turn provide food and nutrients for the coral via photosynthesis, enabling the secretion of the calcium carbonate needed for the reef7 1 (Birkeland) page 4 2 (Schluter) page 3 3 Ibid 4 ibid 5 (Baker) 6 ibid 7 Ibid .
Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 34 Photosynthesis of zooxanthellae is very important for corals and for the calcification (formation of calcium carbonate) of coral reefs.
Both processes, i.e.
photosynthesis and calcification, take place side by side in these ecosystems.
Photosynthesis is the chemical reaction of carbon dioxide and water to produce glucose (a carbohydrate), which is one of the main sources of food for the corals8.
At the same time that zooxanthellae are carrying out processes of photosynthesis, the coral itself is carrying out processes of respiration (reverse photosynthesis), which produces carbon dioxide that zooxanthellae use9 Coral reefs are important to the Caribbean for three (3) main reasons .
While scientists recognize the importance of these organisms to each other and tourists no doubt visit to enjoy the beauty of the reefs, a more significant aspect of coral reefs is that they present a source of livelihood for many in these countries.
10 (1) They provide a substantial amount of food for humans including "gastropods (e.g.
queen conch), bivalves (e.g.
giant clams, rock oysters, and pearl oysters), octopus, squid, cuttlefish, lobsters, prawns and sea cucumbers" .
11.
Aquamarine organisms in coral reefs are an important source of food for coastal communities, entire countries and a wide-range of pelagic or inshore pelagic fishes12 (2) They are major contributors to tourism.
They are a huge source of income for tropical countries, especially those in the Caribbean, through scuba diving, jewelry, curios and souvenirs from black corals, gorgonaceans, seashells, giant clams and dried fishes .
13 (3) They are vital to the aquamarine trade.
In the region, there are over 60,000 small scale fishing operations.
In Jamaica alone, over 95,000 tons of fish are harvested for food and business annually .
14 8 (Jean-Pierre Gattuso) page 4 9 Ibid page 4 10 (Birkeland) page 13 11 Ibid page 56 12 Ibid page 15 13 Ibid page 46 14 Ibid page 46 .
Fish from coral reefs and surrounding seas are CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 35 exported to all corners of the earth, bringing in income to local businesses.
Almost all the countries of the region have at least one coral reef.
They range in size and diversity.
In this section, five (5) reefs will be looked at.
These are to be found in the Dominican Republic, Belize, Tobago, St. Lucia, and Cuba.
They are all major income sources in their respective countries.
In the Dominican Republic, 37% of the country’s income comes from the tourism industry with over 500,000 Dominicans employed in the tourism sector15.
The Parque Jaragua in the Dominican Republic houses coral reefs, mangroves, sea grass beds and beaches16.
The reefs produce a great deal of the sand for beaches, which are part of the Dominican Republic's Biosphere Reserve.
The Reserve brings in over $100 million US dollars from park fees, lodging, gas stations and small businesses17 The coral reef off the coast of Belize also contributes to hefty revenue from the tourism industry.
Approximately US$175 million to US$262 million in 2007 flowed from coral reef and mangrove associated tourism .
18.
According to the World Resources Institute, reef associated tourism and fishing associated with the reef is part of their cultural tradition and provides a safety net for the livelihood of Belizeans19.
Sport fishing and diving off the coast of Belize alone contributed approximately US$ 30 US$37 million in 200720.
This can be compared to the gross US$11.2 million that Belize collects from the 1.2 million pounds of fish sold in one year21.
Reef and mangrove associated fishing off the coast of Belize amount to over US$15 million per year for the Belizean economy22 Research pertaining to the economic advantages of coral reefs in Tobago and St. Lucia estimate income from visitors’ spending money on reef related recreation, accommodation and other activities, to US$43.5 million in Tobago and US$91.6 million in St. Lucia, all in the .
15 (Jeffrey Wielgus) page 2 16 Ibid page 5 17 Ibid page 5 18 (Emily Cooper) page 2, 4 19 Ibid page 2 20 Ibid page 4 21 Ibid page 4 22 Ibid page 4 Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 36 year 200623.
The resulting combined income from direct and indirectly related reef associated tourism amount to over US$101 million for Trinidad’s economy and over US$160 million for St. Lucia’s24.
In these two countries, coral reef fishing has a much smaller economic impact when compared with Belize, ranging from US$0.7 million in Tobago and US$0.4 million in St. Lucia.
Coral reef fishing is essential in providing jobs, adding cultural value and a social safety net in both locations25.
The World Resources Institute (WRI) recognizes the value of coral reefs to the Caribbean and its people in areas of food and public sector jobs.
They are also valued as a source of fuel, providing air quality maintenance, climate and water regulation, erosion control, storm protection, cultural diversity, spiritual and religious values, cultural heritage values (e.g.
Lucia), recreation, ecotourism and other goods and services for the people of the region26 Cuba can be singled out as having one of the largest reefs in the Caribbean, surrounding the island on all four coasts .
27.
These reefs stretch virtually along the entire Cuban coastline and for the most part, resemble barrier reefs28.
Coral reef fishing also plays an important part in the Cuban economy as both a food source and an income generator.29.
The Cuban fishing industry catches and exports many different marine species from the lane snapper from the Gulf of Batabanó, to the Nassau grouper, the queen conch and shrimp off the southern shelf of the Cuban coast30.
Chuck Adams explains that despite the fact that economic conditions have not been ideal in Cuba since the “Special Period” (referring to the period of economic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990’s) exports of fish continue to be high for the country31.
Most recent figures quoted by Adams showed that annual seafood exports in the 1990’s were averaging US $107 million, with an increased export value of US $125.4 million in 199632 23 (Lauretta Burke) page3-4 24 Ibid page 4 25 Ibid page 4 26 (Institute)page 3 27 (Institute, Cuba) 28 (UNEP) page 135 29 Ibid page 136 30 Ibid page 136 31 (Chuck Adams) page 6 32 Ibid page 6 .
CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 37 With these figures in mind, there can be no doubt about the importance of corals and coral reefs to the Caribbean region.
(1) Rising sea levels is one external factor that may affect coral reefs Sensitivity of Coral Reefs to Environmental Changes Corals are highly sensitive organisms that are affected by changes in their environment.
They require very strict environmental conditions in order to survive, grow and revive themselves after natural processes.
33.
At different times of the year there are natural changes in sea levels due to the movement of the sun and earth in relation to one another34.
These changes in sea levels affect the life and death of corals since reefs that live closer to the sea surface are alternatively exposed or flooded in relation to the sea level35.
This natural rise and fall of sea levels is exacerbated by global warming and climate change.
This results in sea levels remaining elevated, which in turn causes serious flooding problems for coral reefs36 (2) Coral reefs are also affected by the changes in sea temperatures.
Corals can survive in seas temperatures ranging from 18 Û&� WR���Û C, but prefer ideal conditions of 26 Û&�WR��� Û& .
37.
Sea temperatures determine the rate of growth of corals and drastic changes in these temperatures outside the regular range could cause total destruction of reefs38 (3) Corals are affected by the salinity levels of the water.
Corals grow ideally in seas where the salinity levels are between 3.3 to 3.6 % .
39.
Salinity levels change due to the dumping of large amounts of fresh water when glaciers melt40.
Salinity levels are also subject to change due to precipitation, storm activity, fresh water runoff and severe droughts41 33 (Birkeland) page 46 34 Ibid page 46 35 Ibid page 47 36 Ibid page 5 37 (Birkeland) page 50 38 Ibid page 50 39 Ibid page 52 40 (Lee Hayes Byron) page 1 41 Ibid page 1 .
Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 38 (4) Light intensity also affects the growth of corals.
As depth increases, light intensity decreases exponentially42.
As a result, photosynthesis and calcium carbonate levels decrease43 (5) The upwelling of nutrients could have a number of different effects on coral life .
44.
Upwelling is the process by which warm, nutrient rich water rushes in to replace cool, nutrient depleted water45.
It brings in warm water from closer to the coasts, due mostly to the winds blowing over the sea46 .
While coral reefs are a large source of economic assistance to developing states, especially in the Caribbean, their environmental advantages are equally important.
Marine ecosystems such as coral reefs and mangroves protect island coastlines from added erosion and destruction from storms and natural breakwaters41.
Reefs not only protect the beaches and coastlines from storms and waves but also provide the sand for beaches47.
Clearly, the destruction of beaches and the coastal systems of developing states is a major concern in light of climate change and rising sea levels.
Climate change is not only affecting the earth’s surface temperatures, but is also affecting sea temperatures, sea levels and the intensity and frequency of weather systems, such as storms and hurricanes.
The next section of the paper will explore existing evidence of destruction of coral reefs in the region.
It will be seen that together with changing weather patterns in the region, specifically hurricanes in the past few years, there has been severe beach erosion which presents challenges to the tourism economy of the Caribbean.
Coral reefs in the Caribbean are being slowly destroyed, and it will be shown that a primary reason for this destruction is Destruction of Coral Reefs, Intensification of Hurricanes and Effects on Beaches 42 (Birkeland) page 56 43 Ibid page 56 44 Ibid page 56 45 (Wikipedia) 46 Ibid 47 (UNEP) page 55 CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 39 anthropogenic (manmade)48.
While human activity is not the only reason for the depletion of coral reefs, over the last few years such activity has only exacerbated the situation.
Human impact on reefs can be separated into 4 categories: pollution; sedimentation; over fishing and climate change49 (1) Pollution in the form of nutrient upwelling is a type of reef pollution and is linked very closely to human waste and agricultural runoff .
50 (2) Sedimentation has been linked to coastal development such as dredging, land reclamation, deforestation and poor agricultural practices throughout the islands .
51 (3) Unsustainable fishing is more so related to marine life in the reefs rather than the physical reef itself.
Over fishing is extracting marine life from the system at a rate which is faster than it could be naturally replenished .
52 (4) Human activity causes climate change.
Industrialization increases levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere which in turn increases global temperature.
Increases in temperature cause sea levels to rise due to melting glaciers and polar ice caps.
Increased sea temperatures cause coral bleaching .
53.
Coral reefs in the Caribbean prefer to grow in the upper levels of the temperature range of 18°C to 36°C.
Coral bleaching is the loss of color by coral polyps due to them expelling their zooxanthellae or by the zooxanthellae expelling their chlorophyll which is used in photosynthesis54.
Temperature increases of 1-2° C above the maximum temperature range for just a few weeks are enough to cause mass coral bleaching and the destruction of reefs55.
Coral bleaching events have increased since 1979 and has been correlated to occurrences of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO)56 (explained later).
48 (Hance) 49 (UNEP) page 56 50 Ibid page 57 51Ibid page57; (Nicholls) page319 52 Ibid page 58 53 Ibid page 59 54 Ibid page 59 55 Ibid page 59 56 Ibid page 62 Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 40 The World Resources Institute confirms that reefs are being greatly affected by human activity and have faced serious depletion over the years.
As much as 80% of the coral reefs in the Dominican Republic are at threat from over fishing and sedimentation due to increased unemployment and coastal development57.
The coral reefs around the coasts of Trinidad and Tobago are all under threat from over fishing and coastal development since fishing is very important for coastal villages58.
85% of the reefs are at threat of destruction from water pollution from poorly treated sewage, agricultural runoff, fertilizers, pesticides and chemicals59.
Despite the fact that the Buccoo Reef in Tobago has been declared a restricted area, coastal development and the tourism industry has done very little to preserve this ecosystem60.
90 sq km of the coral reefs surrounding the St. Lucian coast are being threatened by coastal development and over fishing, but the main source of damage to the reef has been from regional hurricanes and storms61.
In Belize, 63% of the reef is directly affected by over fishing, coastal development, and agricultural runoff from sugar and banana plantations and from natural weather systems62.
For the first time in 1995, severe coral bleaching occurred off the coast of Belize although it had already occurred in different reefs in the region63.
In Cuba, 70% of the country’s reefs are being affected by over fishing, pollution and hurricane activity64 Climate change is put forward as the greatest anthropogenic (man-made) contributor to adversity facing coral reefs in the Caribbean.
Reefs are being damaged due to rising sea levels, rising sea temperatures and by increased weather phenomenon associated with occurrences of ENSO and increased and intensified hurricane activity .
65 57 (Institute, Dominican Republic) 58 (Institute, Trinidad and Tobago) 59 Ibid 60 Ibid 61 (Institute, St. Lucia) 62 (Institute, Belize) 63 Ibid 64 (Institute, Cuba) 65 (Mimura) .
The El Niño is the five month period when the mean sea surface temperature anomaly in the region of the central equatorial Pacific Ocean exceeds a threshold value of 0.5° C for a minimum of six months CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 41 including October, November and December.
A cold phase or La Niña occurs when sea surface temperatures in the region are less than -0.5°C for the same six month time period66.
The Southern Oscillation is the atmospheric counterpart to the El Niño.
It is described as the oscillation of the air pressure between the tropical eastern and western Pacific Ocean waters67 FIG.
2 – Characteristics of an ENSO event under normal conditions and .
Waters on the west of the Pacific Ocean tend to be warmer, resulting in cooler temperatures on the coast of Peru (east Pacific Ocean).
during an El Niño68 El Niño and the Southern Oscillation work hand in hand to give the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) which affects the entire world in some way.
ENSO can occur in different phases; the warm phase or El Niño; the neutral phase (neither defined as warm nor cold) and the cold phase or La Niña .
Under normal climate conditions, there are only warm sea temperature conditions off the coast of South America and there is upwelling of the cool water (thermocline) from below that contributes to the success of the fishing industry off the Peruvian coast.
During an El Niño, the warm water spreads across the equator and warm weather conditions are experienced across the equator.
When this happens, there is a reduction in the upwelling of the thermocline which affects the fishing industry.
69 66 (WMO); (Tartaglione) 67 Ibid 68 (Rhode Island) 69 (Tartaglione) .
According to Tartaglione et al., during warm ENSOs (El Niño) when there is a decrease in atmospheric pressure, Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 42 there is a decrease in hurricane activity in the Caribbean and a decrease in the probability of a hurricane hitting land70.
It is during the La Niña phase of an ENSO that there is increased hurricane activity in the region71.
In the last 20 years, there have been many major El Niño events in 1991-92, 1994-95, 1997-98, 2002-03, 2004-05 and 2009-1072 .
All of these occurrences were synonymous with decreased hurricane activity.
Table 1 – Table showing the number Table 2 – Table showing the number of tropical storms/ hurricanes during of tropical storms/hurricanes during an El Niño phase in the Caribbean a La Niña phase in the Caribbean It is during the La Niña years that hurricane activity increases and research has shown that since 1995 the occurrence of hurricanes reaching category 3 has almost doubled73 Looking at the results in the previous tables, we see that with time there was a general trend of decreased hurricane activity over the (Table 1).
70 Ibid 71 Ibid 72 (T. F. Wikipedia) 73 (Centre) Year Tropical Storm/ Hurricanes 1992 – 1993 5 1995 – 1996 21 1998 – 1999 14 2003 – 2004 21 2005 – 2006 31 2010-2011 21 Year Tropical Storm/ Hurricanes 1991 – 1992 7 1994 – 1995 7 1997 – 1998 8 2002 – 2003 14 2004 – 2005 16 2009 – 2010 11 CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 43 last 20 years compared to the average hurricane activity of 10–15 tropical storms/ hurricanes during normal conditions.
After every El Niño event, there is a La Niña phase which is categorized by increased hurricane activity, seen in Table 2.
It can also be seen that over the last 20 years there has been increased hurricane activity over time, in correlation with the strength of the previous year’s El Niño.
For example in 2005, one of the strongest El Niño’s occurred, seeing very little tropical storms reaching hurricane status even though there were a greater number of storms on the whole.
After this El Niño, one of the strongest La Niña’s occurred with a record of 31 tropical storms/ hurricanes that year.
During an El Niño (warm phase) there is an increase in sea surface temperatures and a decrease in the strength of westward blowing trade winds74.
There is also an increase in vertical wind shear (change in wind speed with height) and El Niño’s tend to dry out and warm the atmospheric temperature above the sea75.
Wind shears cause tropical storms to tilt.
Therefore, when there is an increase in vertical wind shear, tropical storms tilt and this is what causes a reduction in hurricane activity during an El Niño.
During a La Niña there is a cooling of the sea surface temperatures and an intensification of westward blowing trade winds76.
There is a decrease in vertical wind shear and cooler atmospheric temperatures77 With climate change being very apparent in the past few decades, it has become very obvious that the atmosphere and oceans have risen in temperature.
ENSO events have increased and intensified and have caused tremendous coral bleaching whenever they occurred .
This decrease in vertical wind shear does not force tropical storms to tilt and does not prevent their formation.
78 74 (Rhode Island) 75 Ibid 76 Ibid 77 Ibid 78 (Buddemeier, Kleypas and Aronson) .
Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 44 FIG.
4 – Effects of wind shear to hurricanes during an El Niño79 During the 1991-92 ENSO events, the Caribbean saw tremendous coral bleaching in countries such as Jamaica and the Bahamas80.
For the first time in the 1990’s Belize experienced coral bleaching81.
During the 1997-98 ENSO events, high levels of coral bleaching were recorded throughout the world, including the Caribbean82.
After a major bleaching event in 1997-98, there were also recorded bleaching events across the Caribbean in 2005, due to higher than normal sea surface temperature, with the occurrence of an ENSO during that time period.
The thermal stress caused by this event resulted in mass coral bleaching across the entire Caribbean Sea from Panama to Nicaragua, the Bahamas, the Lesser Antilles, Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico and the Windward and Leeward islands83.
Scientists studying Virgin Island coral reefs predicted similar levels of coral bleaching in 2010 as in 2005 where the territory lost about 60% of its reefs84 The rise in sea temperatures over the last few decades has caused high levels of coral bleaching in the region.
However, the rise in sea surface temperatures has not been the only cause for the destruction of reefs in the region.
Coral bleaching by high sea temperatures has only exacerbated the damage caused by natural weather phenomenon such as storms and hurricanes.
There is one thing to keep in mind however, that with climate change becoming an issue, hurricane activity .
79 (Byrnes) 80 (Brown) page 1 81 Ibid page 1 82 (UNEP) page 59 83 (Eakin, Morgan and Heron) 84 (lisaparavisini) CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 45 has increased over the last few decades, as mentioned earlier with an average of 10 15 tropical storms/ hurricanes during non-El Niño years.
With sea temperatures increasing, waters become more favorable for the formation of hurricanes and an increase in frequency and intensity of hurricane activity in the region is expected85 The table below shows an average of over 50% of tropical storms becoming hurricanes over the last 20 years.
It is very clear that not only has the frequency of hurricane activity been increasing in the region, but the intensity of hurricanes is sky-rocketing beyond belief.
An example is the damage caused by Category 2 Hurricane Tomas to St. Lucia .
This can be seen in hurricane data collected by the National Hurricane Centre over the past few decades.
86 Table 3 – Table showing percentages of tropical storms that became hurricanes during La Niña phases in the last 20 years .
Compared with other hurricanes at that stage, Hurricane Tomas caused tremendous damage.
Thus, it is evident that increased hurricane intensity is a cause for great concern.
87 Year # of Tropical Storms # Hurricanes % 1996 13 8 61.5 1998 14 10 71.4 2004 16 8 50 2005 31 15 48 2010 17 8 47 The nexus between hurricane frequency and intensity due to climate change and damage to coral reefs will now be examined.
In a research paper done on the effects of hurricanes on reefs in the region, 85 (Reid) 86 Ibid 87 (Centre) Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 46 the results showed that after major hurricanes over the last 20 years, there was a 17% decrease in coral cover across the region, with no sign of re-growth or recovery up to 8 years after88 Following 15 hurricanes and 15 tropical storms that passed through the Caribbean region in 2005, scientists recorded that coral bleaching in the region was never higher.
Coral reefs in the US Virgin Islands decreased by over 50% in that year and the same thing happened in Puerto Rico, the Cayman Islands, St. Marteen, Saba, St. Eustatius, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Barbados, Jamaica and Cuba .
The research indicates, the more intense the hurricane, the more coral reef loss is expected.
The paper concluded that with increased hurricane intensity and no reef recovery after a hurricane, the effects on reef mortality in the region was devastating.
This research was carried out for hurricanes up until 2001.
Subsequently, the next major hurricanes occurred in 2005.
89.
Coral mortality in the Lesser Antilles was just as severe, with 73% damage to certain coral species in Trinidad Tobago90.
The hurricanes of 2005 caused tremendous damage to coral reefs in the region causing mass flooding, bringing in muddy water and sediments from land run off, and increased wave activity91 It is important to be reminded of the importance of reefs in protecting the coastlines and beaches of Caribbean islands.
With the major decline of reefs and the loss of protection to coasts, hurricanes have caused more damage than imaginable.
In 1995, Tropical Storm Iris and Hurricanes Luis and Marilyn devastated the coastlines of Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Nevis, Montserrat and Dominica causing severe coastal erosion .
92.
The distance of coastline retreat in the islands varied from 2.5 m in Dominica to up to 17.5 m in Barbuda (coastal retreat refers to the average retreat of land from its original location)93.
This coastal retreat brought with it damage to infrastructure and coastal vegetation94 88 (Gardner, Cote and Gill) page 8 89 (Wilkinson and Souter) page 1 90 Ibid 91 Ibid 92 (Cambers) 93 Ibid 94 Ibid .
CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 47 FIG.
5 – Barnes Bay, Antigua before and after Hurricane Luis95 FIG.
6 – Coconut Beach, Dominica before and after the 1995 hurricane season96 Regular monitoring of Caribbean beaches over the years has shown that coastlines have been retreating and eroding at a rate of 0.3 m per year 97.
In 1998, beach erosion caused by storms and hurricanes resulted in Cuba having to refill its beaches with over 1million m3 of sand after the effects of Hurricane Lili98.
In 2001 after Hurricane Michelle, there was a net loss of over 140 million m3 of sand from just one of Cuba’s beaches99.
In 2004, when Hurricane Ivan passed over the Cayman Islands, there was serious damage to the coastline beaches, especially to the Seven Mile Beach on the western peninsula.
Although no quantitative data was given for the amount of damage caused, the reason suggested for such damage was the lack of reef protection along that part of the coast along with very strong wave surges.100.
In Jamaica, damage to beach and housing has also occurred due to hurricanes and storms undermining housing foundations along coastlines of St. Margaret’s Bay and Orange Bay101 95 Ibid 96 Ibid 97 (Cambers, Impact of Climate Change on the Beaches of the Caribbean) 98 (UNEP/GPA) page 56 99 Ibid page 57 100 (Young) page 48 101 (Robinson, Rowe and Khan) .
Hurricane forces have also caused Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 48 breaking and erosion of limestone cliffs in Jamaica.
This occurred with Hurricane Wilma102.
Clearly, damage to coral reefs by hurricanes and storms is being aggravated by the anthropogenic factors of pollution, sedimentation, overfishing and climate change.
Reduction of coral reefs in the Caribbean portends even further damage to land and coasts of Caribbean islands.
Dr. Ulric Trotz defines mitigation as “anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies & Policies for the Region 103” He refers to adaptation as the “adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment.104” In relation to climate change and global warming, adaptation refers to the adjustment of natural and human systems105 (1) Early action to avoid the more disastrous effects of climate change, such as setting effective carbon prices .
In this context, mitigation and adaptation strategies are looked at in an effort to alleviate the strain on the environment being caused by climate change.
Different strategies need to be adopted for each Caribbean island depending on levels of damage and the economic and political climate.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) advocate mitigation (through reduction of carbon emissions) and adaptation strategies, in relation to the Caribbean and other Small Island Developing States (the latter are low-lying coastal countries that have small, growing populations, limited resources, susceptibility to natural disasters and dependence on international trade).
Some broad adaptation strategies that are plausible are: 106 (2) Increasing government funding for research, development and demonstration of carbon-free energy sources 107 102 Ibid 103 (Trotz) page 3 104 Ibid page 2 105 Ibid page 2 106 Ibid page 11 107 Ibid page 11 CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 49 (3) Preventing development close to coasts108 (4) Modification of land use and building codes 109 (5) Defence structures such as dikes, levees, sea walls, flood gates and tidal barriers 110 (6) Afforestation measures along with wetland recreation 111 A few mitigation strategies include: (1) Finding more efficient ways of using fossil fuels112 (2) Suppression of greenhouse gases, e.g.
suppression of carbon dioxide from oil and gas wells 113 (3) Switching to renewable sources of energy like biomass, wind energy or solar energy 114 (4) Waste minimization –reuse, reduce, recycle 115 Strategies and policies are not easy to put in place without cooperation from all sectors in the respective states.
The Caribbean islands have dynamic governmental structures, with varying policy goals and economic priorities.
For example, the Haitian government when it takes up office may prioritize the rebuilding of its infrastructure and a steady supply of food and provision for its people.
On the other hand, Trinidad and Tobago has no immediate concern with rebuilding infrastructure and can therefore utilize brain and manpower to implement sustainable policies.
The ultimate success for implementation of these policies and strategies rests in the hands of the local population and the government, with the help of the private sector.
The adaptation strategies outlined above are very wide ranging but require a great deal of deliberation and funding from governmental and private enterprises.
The reason for specifying private enterprise is because the economic situation in some countries of the region is so dire that they would not be able to fully 108 (IPCC) page 313 109 Ibid page 313 110 Ibid page 313 111 Ibid page 313 112 Ibid page 591 113 Ibid page 597 114 Ibid pages 603 614 115 (Bogner) Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 50 fund these projects, like intensive research into energy sources.
The Caribbean is a region with a lot of potential for other energy sources, but the economies of the individual islands cannot meet the demand of these projects.
This is where integration should play a larger role, with each country helping each other for the betterment of the entire region.
Smaller scale adaptation strategies could be adopted as outlined above, such as the modification of land use and building codes and the construction of defense structures.
These are steps that could be taken even though they are small.
These small changes do add up and can have big effects.
The simple construction of defense structures could help eradicate much of the beach erosion along the coasts of our islands.
The simple modification of land, better agricultural practices, drainage modifications and afforestation (replanting of forests) could prevent top soil erosion on land during hurricanes and storms.
Improved strategies and policies need to be taken on by the governments of the region.
However, smaller projects like construction of defense structures and everyday practices of recycling are the people’s responsibility.
The Caribbean region’s delicate ecosystems are clearly vulnerable to continuing changing climate.
To combat the problem, the region’s massive potential for utilizing other energy sources must be tapped into.
Although some islands are hugely dependent on the importation of fossil fuels and gas, an immediate and concerted shift to other sources of renewable, sustainable energy is imperative.
Solar, biomass, wind and hydropower are undemanding and natural modifications for islands surrounded by water.
Further research into these energy sources and their application to the region must be encouraged and funded both by individual islands and regional alliances.
Caribbean governments must band together for effective mitigation and adaptation strategies.
The main focus must be the prevention of further damage to the region from the effects of climate change.
Immediate reduction of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere will enormously impact rising sea and earth temperatures.
Ultimate success in implementation must begin with the local population Conclusion CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 51 working side by side with the government and the private sector.
Private sector resources can greatly assist with the funding of projects like intensive research into alternative energy sources.
Meanwhile, interim measures such as the construction of simple defense structures can help eradicate beach erosion along the island coasts.
The 3R`s – reuse, reduce, and recycle – should be adopted by every household in the Caribbean to help reduce the effects of climate change on their own country.
Individual concern such as careful recycling practices will demonstrate that we are all becoming aware of our environment at this most crucial juncture in global development.
Bibliography Baker, Dr. Andrew.
Coral Reefs: A Reef Resilience Toolkit Module.
2007.
20 11 2010 <http://www.reefresilience.org/Toolkit_Coral/C2a1_Zooxanthellae.html>.
Birkeland, Charles.
"Life and Death of Coral Reefs."
Birkeland, Charles.
New York: Chapman and Hall, 1997.
Bogner, J., M. Abdelrafie Ahmed, C. Diaz, A. Faaij, Q. Gao, S. Hashimoto, K. Mareckova, R. Pipatti, T. Zhang.
Waste Management, In Climate Change 2007: Mitigation.
United Kingdom and New York: University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
Brown, B.E.
"Coral Bleaching: causes and consequences."
Coral Reefs (1996): 129 138.
Buddemeier, Robert W., Joan A. Kleypas and Richard B. Aronson.
"Coral Reefs."
02 2004.
PEW Centre on Global Climate Change.
28 11 2010 <http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Coral_Reefs.pdf>.
Byrnes, Kristen.
"Facts and Fictions of Al Gore’s "An Inconvenient Truth"."
13 06 2007.
Global Warming Hoax.
10 12 2010 <http://www.globalwarminghoax.com/news.php?extend.11>.
Cambers, Gillian.
Hurricane Impact on Beaches in the Easter Caribbean Islands 1989-1995.
12 2996.
28 11 2010 <http://www.unesco.org/csi/act/cosalc/hur1.htm>.
—.
"Impact of Climate Change on the Beaches of the Caribbean."
Commonwealth Association of Planners Regional Conference, 24-27 06 2007.
Centre, National Hurricane.
Archives.
n.d. 27 11 2010 <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastall.shtml>.
Chuck Adams, Placido Sanchez Vega, Anicia Garcia Alvarez.
An Overview of the Cuban Commercial Fishing Industry and Recent Changes in Management Structure and Objectives.
Gainseville, 2000.
Anastasia Deonarinesingh – CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CARIBBEAN 52 Diaz, Henry F., and Markgraf Vera.
El Nino and the Southern Oscillation: Multiscale Variability and Global and Regional Impacts.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Eakin, C.M., et al.
"Caribbean Corals in Crisis: Record Thermal Stress, Bleaching,and Mortality in 2005."
PLoS ONE (2010): 1 9.
Emily Cooper, Lauretta Burke, Nadia Bood.
"World Resources Institute."
November 2008.
World Resources Institute.
20 11 2010 <http://pdf.wri.org/coastal_capital_belize_brochure.pdf>.
Gardner, Toby A., et al.
"Hurricanes and Caribbean Coral Reefs: Impact, Recovery Patterns, and Role in Long-Term Decline."
Ecology (2005): 174 184.
Hance, Jeremy.
Human activity is killing coral reefs in the Caribbean.
8 1 2008.
27 11 2010 <http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0108-hance_coral.html>.
Institute, World Resources.
Belize.
n.d. 27 11 2010 <http://www.wri.org/publication/content/7877>.
—.
Cuba.
n.d. 27 11 2010 <http://www.wri.org/publication/content/7883>.
—.
Dominican Republic.
n.d. 27 11 2010 <http://www.wri.org/publication/content/7885>.
—.
St. Lucia.
n.d. 27 11 2010 <http://www.wri.org/publication/content/7901>.
—.
Trinidad and Tobago.
n.d. 27 11 2010 <http://www.wri.org/publication/content/7903 >.
—.
"World Resources Institute."
20 September 2006.
World Resources Institute.
20 11 2010 <http://pdf.wri.org/methodology_with_appendix_jul06.pdf>.
IPCC.
Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-Technical Analysis.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Jean-Pierre Gattuso, Denis Allemand and Michel Frankignoulle.
"Photosynthesis and Calcification at Cellular, Organismal and Community Levels in Coral Reefs."
American Zoology (1999): 160 183.
Jeffrey Wielgus, Emily Cooper, Ruben Torres, and Lauretta Burke.
"World Resources Institute."
Aprile 2010.
World Resources Institute.
20 11 2010 <http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/coastal_capital_dominican_republic_summary.pdf>.
Lauretta Burke, Suzie Greenhalgh, Daniel Prager, Emily Cooper.
"World Resources Institute."
June 2008.
World Resources Institute.
20 11 2010 <http://pdf.wri.org/coastal_capital_summary.pdf>.
Lee Hayes Byron, July Kunz, Chrisitina Shumate.
Sea Level Rise & Ocean Warming.
n.d. 20 11 2010 <http://www.biology.duke.edu/bio217/2001/sealevel/index.html>.
lisaparavisini.
Repeating Island.
20 09 2010.
28 11 2010 <http://repeatingislands.com/2010/09/20/scientistswatching-v-i-coral-bleaching/>.
Lohmann, Kyger C. "The Reef Environment and Biological Constituents ."
Course Outline.
Michigan: Department of Geological Sciences, University of Michigan, 8 7 2001.
Mimura, N., L. Nurse, R.F.
McLean, J. Agard, L. Briguglio, P. Lefale, R. Payet and G. Sem.
Small islands.
Climate Change 2007 Nicholls, R.J., P.P.
Wong, V.R.
Burkett, J.O.
Codignotto, J.E.
Hay, R.F.
McLean, S. Ragoonaden and C.D.
Woodroffe.
.
Research.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Coastal systems and low-lying areas.
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation CARIBBEAN QUILT | 2011 53 and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Research.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Reid, Sean.
"Climate Change in the Caribbean..." 01 2010.
CMMB.
28 11 2010 <http://www.mycmmb.com/docs/EMW/2010/EMW2%20%20Climate%20Change%20in%20the%20Caribbean.pdf>.
Rhode Island, University of.
"Variability of Hurricane Activity."
2010.
Hurricanes: Science and Society.
10 12 2010 <http://www.hurricanescience.org/science/science/activity/>.
Robinson, Edward, Deborah-Ann C. Rowe and Shakira A. Khan.
"Beach Erosion: A response to rising sea level."
Newspaper article.
Kingston: The Gleaner, 27 01 2006.
Schluter, Lorelle.
"Great Barrier Reef and Marine Park Authority."
2006.
Australian Government: Great Barrier Reef and Marine Park Authority.
15 10 2010 <http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/12437/Reef-Facts-01.pdf>.
Stacey Combes, Micheal L. Prentice, Lara Hansen, Lynn Rosentrater.
Going, going, gone!
Climate Change and Global Glacier Decline.
Berlin, 1996.
Tartaglione, C.A., et.
al.
"ENSO Impact on Hurricane Landfall Probabilities for the Caribbean."
America Meteorological Society (2003): 2925-2931.
Trotz, Dr. Ulric.
"Building Climate Resilient Economies."
Lecture.
11 2010.
UNEP, WCMC.
World Atlas of Coral Reefs.
Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 2001.
UNEP/GPA.
"Diagnosis of the Erosion Processes in the Caribbean Sandy Beaches."
Environmental Agency, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, Government of Cuba, 03 2003.
Unknown.
"Buccoo Reef Trust."
01 March 2010.
Buccoo Reef Trust: research education conservation.
28 11 2010 < 2. http://www.buccooreeftrust.org/multimedia/wallpapers/picture/wallpapers/5buccooreefaerial1024>.
Wikipedia.
Surface runoff.
6 11 2010.
20 11 2010 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_runoff>.
—.
Upwelling.
3 11 2010.
20 11 2010 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upwelling>.
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia.
El Niño-Southern Oscillation.
09 12 2010.
27 11 2010 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Ni%C3%B1o-Southern_Oscillation#Recent_occurrences>.
Wilkinson, Clive and David Souter.
"State of Caribbean Coral Reefs after Bleaching and Hurricanes in 2005."
n.d. WMO, UNESCO, UNEP, ICSU.
The 1997 1998 El Nino Event: A Scientific And Technical Retrospective.
London: World Meteorological Organization, 1999.
Young, Dr. Simon R. "Impact of Hurricane Ivan in Grand Cayman."
Grand Turk: UK Department of International Development, 21 12 2004.
1.
Introduction In 2019, the United Nations (UN) declared that the world was to end the warmest decade (2010– 2019) ever recorded.
The UN stressed that the levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere had increased to new records.
On September 25–27, 2015, a UN Summit, including 193 member states, adopted Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015).
The Agenda came into effect in 2016, contextualized by the Paris Climate Agreement (COP21), the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (Karlsson & Silander, 2020).
The 2030 Agenda included 17 sustainable development goals (United Nations, 2015).
Goal 13 focuses on climate action and its impact on humanity.
It stresses how an increasing global temperature erupts in wildfires, hurricanes, droughts, rising sea levels and floods affecting countries all over the world and foremost developing societies.
It also acknowledges how climate change may promote conflict.
“Already, we are seeing how climate change can exacerbate storms and disasters, and threats such as food and water scarcity, which can lead to conflict.” (UN Goal 13, 2015, p. 1).
This article discusses climate change addressed in Goal 13 in relation to Goal 16 in the UN agenda on just, Journal of Geography, Politics and Society 2021, 11(2), 34–43 https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.2.04 The UN AGeNdA 2030 ANd The ClImATe-SeCUrITy NexUS IN AfrICA Daniel Silander Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University, SE-35105 Vaxjo, Sweden e-mail: daniel.silander@lnu.se Citation Silander D., 2021, The UN Agenda 2030 and the Climate-Security Nexus in Africa, Journal of Geography, Politics and Society, 11(2), 34–43.
Abstract There is a growing bulk of studies on global climate changes and conflicts.
It has been argued that climate change may be a triggering factor to conflicts and wars, especially in societies with poor governance.
This study explores the climate-security nexus in Africa.
It is argued that the global climate change provides profound state and human security challenges to African governments and people.
Scarcity of vital resources in food, water, sanitation and health has challenged political and economic structures, infrastructure and integration.
This has also been due to poorly governed states with authoritarianism, corruption, ethnic divisions and fragile, dysfunctional institutions.
The war in Darfur is a tragic, but illustrative example of the climate change-security nexus of our time.
Key words climate change, security, poor governance, Africa.
received: 08 March 2021 Accepted: 01 May 2021 Published: 30 June 2021 The UN Agenda 2030 and the Climate-Security Nexus in Africa 35 peaceful and inclusive societies by highlighting the urgent climate-security nexus in Africa.
Africa is the lowest carbon emitter in the world (The World Bank, 2016), but the continent is extremely vulnerable to climate changes.
Although less than 3 percent of the global emissions of greenhouse gases come from Africa (Hope, 2010), many African states are among the top 10 states most affected by climate change.
Climate change has an extremely negative impact on states and societies, including socioeconomic despair in societies with political instability and poor governance.
Therefore, climate change may cause severe stress on African societies that have limited capacities to protect state and human security (Mohamoud et al., 2014; Hausler, McCorquodale, 2011).
Climate change challenges the African continent in many ways: with a rise of temperature, escalation of droughts, storms, rising sea levels and floods, with climate hot spots, and foremost the desertification of the Sahara and Sahel regions, but also with the rapid and massive melting of snow on Mt.
Kenya and Mt.
Kilimanjaro.
Such changes are causing social tensions over natural resources in many African societies, such as Kenya, the northern parts of Nigeria, Sudan, etc.
Also, for decades, political tension, conflicts and wars have had serious consequences for African security, both state and human.
A growing bulk of studies has indicated different explanations for wartorn African states in colonial legacies, limited economic development, fragile political institutions, corruption, ethnic tension and poverty.
In addition, a growing number of scholarly studies have also pointed out global climate change as a driving engine or triggering factor for conflicts.
Global climate change may be seen as one factor adding stress to societies and state governments already in political crisis (Scheffran et al.
(eds.
), 2012; Scheffran, Battaglini, 2011).
This study explores the climate-security nexus in the most challenged African states and sets out links between climate change, insecurity and fragile and weakened states in Sub-Saharan Africa.
It is argued how climate change and political fragility is a dangerous combination for state and human security, which is highlighted by a case-study analysis on the developments in Darfur.
2.
Global Climate Change in Africa There is a growing bulk of scholarly studies on climate change using environmental, economic, social, and political perspectives (Canter (ed.
), 2016; Birnbacher, Thorseth (eds.
), 2015).
In politics, there seem to exist a growing consensus among most state leaders and international and non-governmental organizations pointing out how climate change embeds aggravating conditions for life and safety around the world.
At the same time, there has been disagreement, foremost between the developed and less developed states, on how to approach climate change regarding mitigation and adjusting to climate change consequences (Hickmann, 2016; Urry, 2015).
Different geographical regions around the world face different levels of vulnerability due to climate change.
In addition, state governments have different levels of capacities to mitigate such challenges.
Africa is a large continent with states that pursue different levels of capacities to approach climate change (Roessler, 2016; Busby et al., 2014).
Overall, however, Africa is under severe climate change challenges; this is due to high exposure to climate change and low level of capacities to mitigate climate challenges.
Although many African societies have seen substantial development over recent decades, some African states are facing socioeconomic and political challenges.
The limited political capacities include continual lack of democracy and good governance, rule of law, counter-corruption measures, democratic legacy and ethnic and political unity (see Freedom House, 2020).
The limited economic capacities refer to a recent stalemate of economic growth and an increasing population throughout the continent (Rodrik, 2016; The World Bank, 2016).
This has led to a greater need for resources, such as food, water, energy and infrastructure as well as policies on poverty reduction, education and healthcare.
The importance of promoting development and politically initiated policies to favor prosperity and wealth in African societies have led to further pressure on the environment.
Developing African states are increasing energy consumption, including fossil fuels, to favor the economies, which have resulted in negative consequences on the climate.
However, a political halt to decrease carbon emissions could result in limited economic development, social tension, poverty, and eventually growing political instability.
The alternative way, to promote a transformation from fossil resources to low-carbon energy sources, would come with immediate transitional costs for most African economies (Silander, 2020).
Despite the fact that many African states have acknowledged global climate change and politically declared the importance of new policies on mitigation and adaption in order to protect and promote state and human security, the overall reactions to climate change have been late and rather unstructured.
Most political activities on climate change 36 Daniel Silander have been institutionalized within the Group of 77 and China (G77/China), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Least Developed Countries (LDC-Group) (Roger, Belliethathan, 2016; OPEC, 2016; LDC, 2013).
The first step for African political collaboration on climate change happened in 1991 at the First Regional African Ministerial Preparatory Conference of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Egypt.
The political talks ended up in a coherent African stand on development and environmental concerns.
Preparatory negotiations for the Earth Summit in 1992 were another strategic step on the climate challenge.
These talks concerned unifying African interests and speaking with one voice on environmental issues.
The third step was the eighth African Union (AU) Summit meeting in 2007, where it was decided that the AU would become a strategic political platform for approaching climate change challenges.
In addition, the establishment of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) in the early 1990s also institutionalized the idea of “One Continent, One Voice”.
The AGN identified that a common proactive political stand and presence at negotiations with one African voice was crucial in order to become influential on the international scene.
However, despite such acknowledgement, a common African stand on addressing climate change has continued to be challenged by traditional political notions of state sovereignty and national economic and political self-interests (Silander, 2018, pp.
88–89; see also Chin-Yee, 2016; CAP, 2015).
African societies are challenged by climate change in many different ways.
First, climate change has led to food and water scarcity.
Volatile weather conditions, mainly major changes in rainfall and temperature, have resulted in pressure on the productive landscape in African societies (Hope (ed.
), 2017; Wheeler, von Braum, 2013).
The majority of African people make their living through agriculture and fisheries.
Agriculture and fisheries comprise about 40 percent of all exports and over 30 percent of the GDP in sub-Saharan Africa (Hope, 2010), but are very vulnerable to climate change.
Food shortages and scarcity of fresh water are major concerns for security for the people in many African societies (Nagothu (ed.
), 2015).
Scarcity of water includes both the lack of drinking water and water for hygiene and sanitation, and about 33% of the African population faces water-stress (Reig et al., 2013).
Scarcity of water also leads to desertification and land degradation resulting in challenges to the production of food leaving African societies with food shortages.
Many African states, such as Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, have occasionally faced food shortages due to reduced production of cereal and crops (Hope, 2010).
In addition, scientific studies have predicted an increase in the average temperature in Africa by 2050 of about 1.5–3°C, leading to a decrease in annual rainfall and further stress on food production (IPCC, 2007).
Both Malawi and Uganda, among other African states, have faced less rain over time, jeopardizing farmers’ capacities to survive leading to further malnutrition, poverty, and diseases (Magrath, 2010).
The scarcity of food is further alarming with the overall trend in Africa of increasing populations.
For example, Burkina-Faso and Ghana have seen growing populations, while being heavily dependent on agriculture.
Studies set out how the African continent’s population of 1.1 billion in 2013 will increase to about 2.4 billion in 2050 (Population Reference Bureau, 2013; Mohamoud et al., 2014).
Population growth demands greater need to cultivate arable land, but estimations from the 1950s and forward show how about 65% of the agricultural land in Africa has faced soil degradation.
In addition, about two-thirds of Africa is arid or desert and about 35–40% of African land will soon become useless for cultivation due to climate change (Mohamoud et al., 2014; UN Convention to Combat Desertification, 2017).
Second, climate change has also resulted in forced migration and displaced people.
One major explanation to migration and displaced people is desertification and deforestation (Manou et al.
(eds.
), 2017).
The scarcity of farmland has forced farmers to migrate often resulting in socioeconomic despair among this group of citizens, competition and tension among farmers for farmland, but also political instability caused by increased populations in cities and tension between urban and rural areas (Mohamoud et al., 2014; Mcadam, 2012).
The fast trend of African urbanization has led to urban poverty as a new and increasing problem in states such as Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Zambia with the poverty rate at over 50 percent (Hope, 2010).
Often migrating farmers also have too limited educational background leaving them without chances of finding jobs in companies and factories, resulting in a livelihood in poverty and slums outside city centers.
Forced migration has also been a result of rising sea levels in many coastal areas in Africa forcing people into inland areas and creating social tension.
Migration into inland areas creates competition for food, water and farmland, but may also result in tension, conflict and violence when such migration crosses borders and contributes to preexisting tensions based on ethnic and political divisions.
The UN Agenda 2030 and the Climate-Security Nexus in Africa 37 Cross-border migration has led to political tension and inter-state conflicts in for example Chad-Sudan, Uganda-Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo-Central African Republic, Rwanda-Burundi and Rwanda-Democratic Republic of Congo leaving fragile states further weakened (Messer, 2010; Mazo, 2009a, 2009b).
3.
Climate Change in dysfunctional African States There is growing scholarly interest in the climatesecurity nexus (Bretthauer, 2016; Hentz (ed.
), 2014).
The scholarly debate on climate change and security began in early 2000.
The IPCC report in 2007 declared serious human security concerns with climate change.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) also stated the climate-security nexus and the SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon argued how climate change could be a serious risk comparable to war (Scheffran, Battaglini, 2011).
Over the last decade, there has been a growing bulk of academic work on the potential climate-security nexus.
Research has shown how climate change may be a triggering factor for violence and conflicts.
The dominating scholarly perspective on climate change and security seems to be that although there is no empirical evidence demonstrating a causal relationship, climate change may be a triggering factor for conflict and violence and especially so in states in political and socioeconomic instability.
In such states, climate change may become a serious burden for societies already under stress and without greater capacity to act.
This is what the UN General Assembly has conceptualized as “risk-multiplier” (Salehyan, 2008; UN General Assembly, 2009) or as stated by the UN Development Programme.
“Weak responses further reinforce climate vulnerability, and if governments or institutions cannot meet the needs of communities as climate impacts occur, this may exacerbate grievances, undermine government legitimacy, and aggravate intercommunal tensions between affected groups, particularly over access to natural capital.
Hence an indirect impact of climate change is an increased risk of tensions and insecurity, particularly in areas where there are already concerns about government and institutional capacity or a perceived lack of institutional legitimacy” (UNDP, 2020, p. 3).
Since many African states’ economies are dependent on agriculture and about 95% of Africa’s farming is rain-fed, climate change may be an important driver toward conflict.
While some groups of people may feel deprived of resources, other groups may be in control of key resources creating societal tension.
Social tension and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers have occurred in many African states, but especially so in southern Ethiopia, in northern Nigeria, in Chad and Mali as well as in southern Sudan.
In these areas, climate change has led to scarcity of resources and has, in the long run, provided social tension and political instability.
It must, however, be stated that global climate change does not always result in conflicts and wars, but could be a possible driver of violence and conflict due to the negative impact climate change has on the living conditions for people (Bretthauer, 2016; Hentz (ed.
), 2014).
A dominant perspective in academic studies on global climate change and security has stated a nexus between the two, but studies have also, surprisingly, stated that competition over scarcity of resources may favor cooperation to promote common security (Bretthauer, 2016).
State institutions, seeking technological innovations and financial instruments, have launched such cooperation and social policies to adapt to climate change impact, but also through bottom-up initiatives taken by local authorities or civil society organizations seeking common solutions to common challenges.
More recently, there has been an interest in exploring the role of political institutions to handle global climate change and conflicts (Bulkeley, Newell, 2015; Azim, 2013).
Poor governance has been associated with a scarcity of resources and measures to be used to mitigate climate change.
The many studies on weakened and failing states have shed light on states with poor governance and limited state capacities to promote societal functions vital to wealth, health, and development (Scheffran, Battaglini, 2011).
While scholars have argued that climate change is a root cause of violent conflicts, most scholars would rather stress that climate change could be a driving engine depending on the functionality of the state.
As a consequence, climate change and poor governance may both be important explanatory factors to violent conflicts and the combination of the two is often seen in African states.
As argued, “Conflict and state failure make adaption to and mitigation of climate change more difficult, as state institutions become less able to implement adaption measures…” (Mazo, 2009c, p. 104).
Many African states are politically fragile with limited resources to mitigate climate change (Harbeson, Rothchild, 2016).
This has resulted in added pressure on African societies as political institutions have had limited capacities to protect citizens from human insecurity.
While scholars on climate change have stressed the importance of good governance in Africa to mitigate climate change consequences on state and human security, scholars on security 38 Daniel Silander studies have identified a high number of weak, fragile African states deeply vulnerable to climate change (Harbeson, Rothchild, 2016; The World Bank, 2007; Rotberg (ed.
), 2003).
Based on the Fragile State Index (The Fund for Peace, 2020), consisting of annual measurements on the level of weakness among 178 states in the world, the African continent includes weakened and failed states.
The Fragile State Index assesses the vulnerability of states to collapse based on 12 conflict risk indicators within the areas of Cohesion, Economic, Political and Social.
The indicators used are cohesion indicators: 1.
Security Apparatus (SA); 2.
Factionalized Elites (FE); 3.
Group Grievance (GG); economic indicators: 1.
Economic Decline (EC); 2.
Uneven Economic Development (UD); 3.
Human Flight and Brain Drain (HF); political indicators: 1.
State Legitimacy (SL); 2.
Public Services (PS); 3.
Human Rights and Rule of Law (HR) and social indicators: 1.
Demographic Pressures (DP); 2.
Refugees and Internally Displaced People (RD); 3.
External Intervention (EX).
Based on the wide range of indicators on vulnerability, the Fragile State Index sets out numerous African states at the top of the risk analysis.
Among the most vulnerable and fragile states in the world, we may find Somalia, South Sudan, Congo Democratic Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Cameroon and Nigeria (The Fund for Peace, 2020).
In addition, using the Freedom House Index, measuring the range of political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world, it is shown how the on-going global decline in democratic governance and respect of human rights embeds sub-Saharan Africa that is overall backsliding.
In 2020, the Freedom House Index showed how 22 African states saw declining scores.
Although many African states also saw progress in rights and liberties, 15 states, sub-Saharan Africa had seven states among twelve that saw the most serious setbacks in freedom scores (Temin, 2020).
The most obvious cases of setbacks in 2020 on the African continent was Benin, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Uganda (Freedom House, 2020).
Corruption, lack of transparency, concentration of power, limited freedom of expression and association, deficient civil society and military influence are some of the major challenges in many African states.
This has left many African societies and populations with very weak political institutions and poor relations between those who govern and those who are governed (Freedom House, 2020; The Fund for Peace, 2016).
4. darfur, Climate Change and State and human Insecurity The combination of malfunctioning governance and climate change challenges is a contemporary and Tab.
1.
Top-Ranked Fragile States in 2020 Country Rank Cohesion (max 30) Economic (max 30) Political (mx 30) Social (max 30) Total (120) SA FE GG EC UD HF SL PS HR DP RD EX Yemen 1st 112.4 9.7 10.0 9.7 9.4 7.8 7.0 9.9 9.5 10.0 9.8 9.7 10.0 Somalia 2nd 110.9 9.8 10.0 8.6 9.1 9.4 8.9 8.9 9.1 9.0 10.0 9.1 9.0 South Sudan 3rd 110.8 9.4 9.7 9.1 9.5 9.2 6.8 9.9 9.5 9.0 9.5 9.7 9.5 Syria 4th 110.7 9.9 9.9 10.0 8.7 7.2 8.4 10.0 9.1 10.0 7.6 10.0 10.0 Congo Democratic Republic 5th 109.4 8.5 9.8 9.7 8.0 8.6 6.9 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.4 Central African Republic 6th 107.5 8.3 9.7 8.0 8.4 9.9 6.8 8.9 10.0 9.2 8.8 10.0 9.5 Chad 7th 106.4 9.2 9.5 8.3 8.5 8.9 8.4 9.3 9.4 8.5 9.6 9.2 7.7 Sudan 8th 104.8 8.4 9.4 9.4 8.1 8.0 8.0 9.3 8.3 8.9 9.1 9.3 8.6 Afghanistan 9th 102.9 9.9 8.9 7.5 8.3 7.7 7.5 9.0 9.5 7.6 9.0 9.3 8.6 Zimbabwe 10th 99.2 8.5 10.0 6.4 8.6 7.6 7.0 9.1 8.7 8.3 9.3 8.5 7.2 Burundi 11th 97.9 8.2 9.3 8.6 6.8 7.7 7.6 8.9 8.3 7.8 8.8 8.6 7.3 Cameroon 11th 97.9 8.3 7.9 7.6 8.5 7.3 5.9 9.1 7.9 9.1 9.2 8.5 8.5 Haiti 13th 97.7 6.9 9.6 5.6 8.5 9.1 8.1 9.1 9.3 6.9 8.2 7.1 9.3 Nigeria 14th 97.3 8.7 9.9 9.1 7.9 7.8 6.6 8.1 8.9 8.4 9.3 6.9 5.7 Source: The Fund for Peace, 2020.
The UN Agenda 2030 and the Climate-Security Nexus in Africa 39 highly dangerous reality in many African societies.
The UN has addressed the climate change-security nexus pointing out how climate change may become a serious security challenge in fragile states.
“Climate change worsens existing social, economic and environmental risks that can fuel unrest and potentially result in conflict.
Security concerns aggravated by climate change include impacts on food and water supply, increased competition over natural resources, loss of livelihoods, climaterelated disasters, migration and displacement.
Crisis-affected countries are more susceptible to being overwhelmed by the security risks posed by climate change.
Stabilization efforts often do not consider the impacts of climate change.
At the same time, state fragility hinders climate change adaptation efforts, particularly among the most vulnerable communities” (UNEP, p. 1).
Sub-Saharan Africa and especially the Sahel region has the dangerous combination of fragile states and high vulnerability to climate change (Mazo, 2010).
Sudan is one of the most fragile states in the world.
Based on the above-mentioned Fragile State Index, Sudan is assessed as number 8 in the world and South-Sudan as number 3.
In addition, since its independence in 1955, Sudan has systematically faced minor and major conflicts and been ruled by an economically, politically and militarily dominated small elite.
Although in 2019 Sudan saw how the 30year dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) ended after popular unrest and call for political change, the Freedom House Index sets out Sudan and South-Sudan as Not Free and with very limited rights and liberties for the people.
The transitional government is to be replaced through elections in 2022, but serious challenges remains to be handled to see a transition to democracy (Freedom House, 2020).
Geographically, Sudan constitutes one of the largest African states.
Darfur is a region within western Sudan, consisting of about 6 million people.
In February 2003, a brutal civil war started in Darfur.
It began when para-military groups, in the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), based on non-Arab Muslim Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit ethnic groups, criticized the government of conducting political and economic repression of non-Arabs in Darfur.
In a short period, both para-military groups and government forces engaged in violence, and government forces initiated a systematic ethnic cleansing of non-Arabs in the region, ending up in several hundreds of thousands of civilians killed, including casualties in combat and by war-related starvation and diseases.
The escalation of warfare in Darfur resulted in forced migration of over 2 million people both within and across Sudanese borders.
The aggressiveness from the government forces with support by militias, foremost against three ethnic tribes, led to a massive humanitarian catastrophe by many defined as genocide (Mazo, 2010; Ki-moon, 2007).
The escalation of violence and cruelty received international attention.
In late 2003, the Sudanese government and rebel forces signed a peace agreement after international pressure and diplomatic mediated talks with representatives from Norway, Italy, the UK and the US.
However, the peace agreement was soon undermined, foremost by international interferences and interests over existing oil resources in Darfur.
In a short period, the peace agreement turned into further violence between rebel forces from the western Darfur and government forces.
In mid-2004, the UNSC supported the African Union (AU) in its efforts to monitor the new ceasefire and to protect civilians from further harm.
As a result, in 2006, a new peace agreement was signed based on new UNSC resolutions now monitoring the peace accord in addition to allowing peacekeeping forces and using the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute war crimes.
The Peace Agreement was the result of many diplomatic talks in Nigeria, but as previously, the new agreement was soon challenged when only one rebel group was interested to sign the agreement.
The remaining rebel groups questioned the agreement that they saw missed assuring progress for Darfur regarding compensation for victims, protection of displaced people and political representation.
While the Sudanese government was willing to sign the agreement, many rebel groups and international observers questioned the government’s interest to implement the peace agreements (Dagne, 2010; Mohamed, 2009).
In a few years of civil war, the situation in Darfur turned even worse with armed conflicts between the central government and rebel forces, between different opposition factions and between the government and Arab groups dissatisfied with the central authority’s inability to protect their safety.
In late 2008, President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir initiated peace talks, but was challenged by rebel factions that accused him of using systematic violence against civilians.
In 2010, the Sudan government signed numerous peace agreements with different opposition forces, but without creating any signs of de-escalation of violence or increased stability.
In 2011, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur was decided on by the government and the umbrella organization, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), but as in previous years, many rebel forces continued to refuse to participate and sign any 40 Daniel Silander treaty.
Instead, in early 2011, South Sudan voted in a referendum for its independence from Sudan leading to a new sovereign state in the Republic of South Sudan.
However, in 2013–2015, another civil war began resulting in about 2.2 million displaced people jeopardizing both the state and region to such an extent that Sudan and South-Sudan were under threat of collapse (BBC, 2018).
While the conflict faded from the international and media spotlight, the civil war continued with growing number of displaced, injured and killed people.
The state and human security situation deteriorated with millions displaced, hundreds of thousands living as refugees and millions in need of food and other vital aid.
In addition, the discovery of gold in Darfur resulted in further violence and displacement with an escalating conflict.
Today, in 2021, Darfur continues to be challenged by insecurity and violence although there are UN/AU (Unamid) peacekeeping forces in the region.
There are minor signs of improvements in the recent arrest of the former dictator in Omar alBashir and the Sudanese militia leader Ali Kushayb and his extradition to the ICC in the city of Hague in the Netherlands.
Bashir is also wanted by the ICC accused of conducting war crimes and atrocities in Darfur (Beaumont, 2019, 2020).
Many scholarly studies have explored the root causes to the many problems in Darfur (Akasha, 2014).
In 2007, the UN Secretary, General Ban Kimoon declared the civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan to be the first climate change conflict in the world.
He pointed out climate change as an important explanatory factor.
On June 16th, 2007, Kimoon stated: “Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change” (Ki-moon, 2007, p. 1).
Since the civil war began, Darfur and Sudan have become an illustrative case on the climate change-security nexus.
Although climate change should not be seen as the only factor or perhaps even not one of the most important ones to the conflict, climate change did provide for growing state and human insecurity in scarcity of water and food triggering for tension and conflict.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has stated how decreasing rainfalls for decades resulted in sincere desertification and an expanded Sahara, leading to growing tensions between farmers and herders in Sudan (UNEP, 2007).
The drier weather put severe stress on settled farmers in the region and led to increased social tension between local farmers and migrating Arab nomadic herders over farmland and water (Ki-moon, 2007).
As in many African regions, Darfur’s economy is based on agriculture with crop farming as the dominant activity.
Due to long-term droughts, farming has become very problematic, with scarcity of food and water as well as competition over fertile land and land ownership.
With climate change continuing, many local farmers changed their activities from harvesting crops to raising animals, creating a situation of social tension over access to grazing land between pastoralists and farmers.
One of the important causes of the Darfur war could be argued to be declining rainfall in southern Sudan leading to escalation of tension and at the end violence among societal groups.
Overall, studies have identified how summer rains, particularly in western and southern Sudan, have declined by about 10–20% since the mid-1970s challenging Sudan’s food production at the same time as a rapidly population growth has been identified.
In 2010, about 8 million people faced food insecurity in northern and southern Sudan and with declining levels of rainfall, the number of people challenged by food insecurity will dramatically increase as the crop production, foremost in the south-eastern areas of Sudan, will decrease.
South Darfur has seen the largest decline of rainfall; estimations of about 20% lower throughout the 20th century at the same time as the air temperature has increased by more than 1°C throughout central and southern areas of Sudan and towards Darfur.
Focusing on the Darfur region and southern Sudan, “Since 1980, decreasing rainfall has been accompanied by rapid increases in air temperature on the order of more than 1°C.
This warming, which is two and a half times greater than global warming, is reducing evapotranspiration and making normal years effectively drier, especially in the extended Darfur and southern Sudan regions” (USGS, 2011, 4).
Another important factor in the armed conflicts, besides climate change, was poor governance of the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum, for supporting Arab networks in Darfur by arming paramilitary groups (Baltrop, 2010).
Based on an Arab-dominated government since the late 1980s, non-Arab citizens and farmers felt increasingly socioeconomically and politically marginalized from societal support and resources.
The government policies were perceived as strongly supporting Arabs and separating non-Arabs from Arabs and other non-Arab tribes.
Therefore, in the early 2000s, the Fur and Zaghawa tribes armed themselves and formed the JEM and the SLA, leading to the ensuing civil war in Darfur.
Poor governance contributed to years of conflicts and war, both between Arabs and non-Arab tribes in Darfur as well as between former government-supported paramilitary groups and the government.
Poor governance in Sudan also resulted in ongoing competition over resources such as farmland and water, but also over The UN Agenda 2030 and the Climate-Security Nexus in Africa 41 oil reserves where international interests have been involved, all together destabilizing Sudan and Darfur to become further weakened.
To sum up, there have been many identified explanatory factors to the Darfur conflict; poor governance, militarization, ethnic tension and climate change are some of the most important ones.
It is important to acknowledge how climate change has been a threat multiplier in Darfur as an exacerbating factor that adds stress on an already weakened society due to political, economic, and social factors.
As argued, “The current Darfur conflict is a product of an explosive combination of environmental, political, and economic factors.
It is well known that environmental degradation and competition over shrinking resources have played, and continue to play, a critical role in communal conflicts in the Sahelian countries, such as Mali, Niger, and Chad.
In this regard, Darfur is no exception” (Sikainga, 2009, p. 1).
5.
Conclusion The growing bulk of studies on global climate change and conflicts has provided mixed results on explanatory factors to violence in African societies.
While some scholars have stressed that climate change has been the most important explanatory factor for war, other scholars have rather argued that political and economic challenges are primary reasons for political instability and conflicts.
An intermediate perspective has set out how both climate change and poor governance are drivers of conflicts.
This study has explored how global climate change provides serious state and human security challenges to African governments and people.
Climate change has resulted in scarcity of vital resources in food, water, sanitation, and health and come to undermine political and economic structures, infrastructure and integration.
Scarcity of food and water has also forced people to migrate resulting in further marginalization and without essential resources to survive.
In addition, climate change challenges have been met with very limited mitigation efforts in most African societies.
Poorly governed states with major challenges in authoritarianism, corruption, ethnic divisions and fragile, dysfunctional institutions has left state institutions without capacity to find counter-measures to climate change consequences.
Undemocratic and dysfunctional governments are a major challenge for Africa to provide for state and human security.
Africa is the most vulnerable geographical area in the world due to climate change consequences and with a combination of limited state capacities to address the effects.
The civil war in Darfur, Sudan has been a long-term humanitarian catastrophe and an illustrative example of the climate change-security nexus of our time.
references Akasha M.O., 2014, Darfur – A tragedy of climate change, Anchor Academic Publishing, Hamburg.
Azim Z., 2013, Post-Kyoto climate governance: Confronting the politics of scale ideology and knowledge, Routledge, New York-London.
Barltrop R., 2010, Darfur and the international community: The challenges of conflict resolution in Sudan, I.B.
Tauris, London-New York.
BBC, 2018, South Sudan country profile, BBC News, 6 August 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082 (accessed 04 March 2017).
Beaumont P., 2019, Ex-Sudan leader Omar al-Bashir sentenced to two years for corruption, The Guardian, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/14/sudanesecourt-sentences-omar-al-bashir-to-2-years-in-prison (accessed 10 February, 2020).
Beaumont P., 2020, Notorious Sudanese militia chief in Darfur conflict arrested in CAR, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/09/notorious-sudanesemilitia-chief-in-darfur-conflict-arrested-in-car (accessed 06 April 2019).
Birnbacher D. Thorseth M.
(eds.
), 2015, The politics of sustainability: Philosophical perspectives, Routledge, New York.
Bretthauer J., 2016, Climate change and resource conflict: The role of scarcity, Routledge, London-Alexander.
Bulkeley H., Newell P., 2015, Governing climate change, Routledge, New York-London.
Busby J.W., Smith T.G., Krishnan N., 2014, Climate security vulnerability in Africa mapping 3.0, Political Geography, 43, 51–67.
doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.10.005 Canter D.
(ed.
), 2016, Social science perspectives on climate change, Routledge, New York.
CAP, 2015, Draft African Union strategy on climate change, Common African Position, http://cap.africa-platform.org/ resources/draft-african-union-strategy-climate-change (accessed 23 July 2017).
Chin-Yee S., 2016, African and the Paris Climate Change Agreement, African Affairs, 115(459), 359–368.
doi: 10.1093/afraf/adw005 Dagne T., 2010, Sudan – The Crisis in Darfur and the status of the north-south agreement, CRS Report for Congress, Washington.
Freedom House, 2020, Freedom in the world, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy (accessed 12 February, 2020).
Gleick P.H., 2014, Water, drought, climate change, and conflict in Syria, Weather, Climate and Society, 6(3), 331–340.
doi: 10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 Harbeson J.W., Rothchild D.
(eds.
), 2016, Africa in world politics: Constructing political and economic order, Wrestview Press, Bouldon.
42 Daniel Silander Hausler K., McCorquodale R., 2011, Climate change and its impact on security and survival, Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 37(4), 617–627.
doi: 10.1080/03050718.2011.621270 Hentz J.J.
(ed.
), 2014, Routledge handbook of African security, Routledge, New York.
Hickmann T., 2016, Rethinking authority in global climate governance: How transnational climate initiatives relate to the international climate regime, Routledge, New York.
Hope E.T.
(ed.
), 2017, Climate change and food security: Africa and the Caribbean, Routledge, New York.
Hope Sr. R.K., 2010, Climate change and poverty in Africa, International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 16(6), 451–461.
doi: 10.1080/13504500903354424 IPCC, 2007, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
IPCC, Geneva.
Karlsson, C. Silander, D.
(eds.
), 2020.
Implementing Sustainable Development Goals in Europe – The Role of Political Entrepreneurship.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Ki-moon B., 2007, A climate culprit in Darfur, The Washington Post, 19 June 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.
html (accessed 13 September 2016).
LDC, 2013, LDC Group at UN climate change negotiations, Least Developed Countries, https://ldcclimate.wordpress.
com/2013/11/11/developing-countries-unanimouslycall-for-loss-and-damage-mechanism-at-warsaw-climate-conference-as-tragedy-of-super-typhoon-haiyanunfolds/ (accessed 23 July 2017).
Magrath, J., 2010, The injustice of climate change: Voices from Africa, Local Environment, 15(9–10), 891–901.
doi: 10.1080/13549839.2010.511642 Manou D., Baldwin A., Cubie D., Mihr A., Thorp T.
(eds.
), 2017, Climate change, migration and human rights: Law and policy perspectives, Routledge, New York.
Mazo J., 2009a, Chapter five: Climate change and security, The Adelphi Papers, 49(409), 119–136.
doi: 10.1080/19445571003755561 Mazo J., 2009b, Chapter one: Global warning and climate change, The Adelphi Papers, 49(409), 15–42.
doi: 10.1080/19445571003755413 Mazo J., 2009c, Chapter four: Conflict, instability and state failure: The climate factor, The Adelphi Papers, 49(409), 87–118.
doi: 10.1080/19445571003755553 Mazo J., 2010, Climate conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, Routledge, Abingdon.
Mcadam J., 2012, Climate change, forced migration and international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Messer E., 2010, Climate change and violent conflict: A critical literature review, Oxfam America, https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/climate-change-and-violent-conflict.pdf (accessed 08 September 2016).
Mohamed A.A., 2009, Evaluating the Darfur peace agreement: a call for an alternative approach to crisis management, Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University, Uppsala.
Mohamoud A., Kaloga A., Kreft S., 2014, Climate change, development, and migration: an African Diaspora perspective, African Diaspora Policy Centre, Germanwatch, Bonn.
Nagothu U.S.
(ed.
), 2015, Food security and development: Country case studies, Routledge, New York.
OPEC, 2016, OPEC embraces adoption of historic Paris Agreement on climate change.
http://www.opec.org/opec_ web/en/press_room/3432.htm (accessed 24 July 2017).
Population Reference Bureau, 2013, World Population Data Sheet 2013, http://www.prb.org/pdf13/2013-populationdata-sheet_eng.pdf (accessed 27 August 2016).
Reig P., Maddocks A., Gassert F. 2013, World’s 36 most waterstressed countries, World Resources Institute, http://www.
wri.org/blog/2013/12/world%E2%80%99s-36-most-water-stressed-countries (accessed 24 July 2017).
Rodrik D., 2016, An African growth miracle?, Journal of African Economy, 25(4), 1–18.
doi: 10.1093/jae/ejw027 Roessler P., 2016, Ethnic politics and state power: The logic of the coup-civil war trap, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Roger Ch., Belliethathan S., 2016, Africa in the global climate change negotiations, International Environment Agreements, 16, 91–108.
doi: 10.1007/s10784-014-9244-7 Rotberg R.I.
(ed.
), 2003, When states fail: Causes and consequences, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Salehyan I., 2008, From climate change to conflict?
No consensus yet, Journal of Peace Research, 45(3), 417–434.
doi: 10.1177/0022343308088812 Scheffran J., Battaglini A., 2011, Climate and conflicts: the security risks of global warming, Regional Environmental Change, 11(Suppl.
1), S27–S39.
doi: 10.1007/s10113-0100175-8 Scheffran J., Brzoska M., Brauch H.G., Link P.M., Schilling J.
(eds.
), 2012, Climate change, human security and violent conflict: Challenges for societal stability, Springer Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg.
Sikainga A., 2009, ´The world’s worst humanitarian crisis’: Understanding the Darfur conflict, ORIGINS, http://origins.
osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict (aaccessed 02 September 2016).
Silander, D., 2018, Geography of GCC – The climate-security nexus in Africa, [in:] D. Wallace, D. Silander (eds.
), Climate Change, Policy and Security – State and Human Impacts, Routledge, Abingdon-New York, 86–105.
Temin J., 2020, Democratic trends in Africa in four charts: The continent ed the world in both positive and negative changes last year, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/ article/democratic-trends-africa-four-charts (accessed 05 February 2021).
The Fund for Peace, 2016, Fragile States Index 2016, http://fsi.
fundforpeace.org/ (accessed 09 September 2020).
The Fund for Peace, 2020, Fragile States Index 2020, http://fsi.
fundforpeace.org/ (accessed 02 February 2021).
The World Bank, 2007, The World Bank world development report 2008: agriculture for development, The World Bank, Washington.
The World Bank, 2016, Overview, http://www.worldbank.org/ en/region/afr/overview (accessed 26 August 2016).
The UN Agenda 2030 and the Climate-Security Nexus in Africa 43 UN Convention to Combat Desertification, 2017, 2017 World day to Combat Desertification: Addressing desertification, land degradation and drought in Africa, United Nations Convention to combat Desertification, http://www.unccd.int/en/regional-access/Africa/Pages/alltext.aspx (accessed 24 July 2017).
UNEP, n.d., Climate change and security.
Strengthening resilience to climate-fragility risks, https://postconflict.unep.
ch/publications/ClimateChange_Security_twopager.pdf (accessed 12 February 2021).
UN Goal 13, 2015, Climate action – Why it matters?, https:// www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/13_Why-It-Matters-2020.pdf (accessed 10 February 2021).
UNDP, 2020, Policy Brief – The climate security nexus and the prevention of violent extremism: Working at the intersection of major development challenges, https://reliefweb.int/ sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNDP-Climate-Security-Nexus-and-Prevention-of-violent-extremism.pdf (accessed 13 February 2021).
UNEP, 2007, Sudan: post-conflict environmental assessment, UN Environmental Programme, Nairobi.
United Nations General Assembly, 2009, Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/350), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/sg%20report%202009.pdf (accessed 16 February 2021).
United Nations, 2015, Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, United Nations, New York.
Urry J., 2015, Climate Change and Society, [in:] J. Michie, C.L.
Cooper (eds.
), Why the Social Sciences Matter, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 45–59.
USGS, 2011, A Climate Trend Analysis of Sudan, Famine Early Warning Systems Network.
U.S. Department of the Interior / U.S. Geological Survey.
Fact Sheet 2011–3072 June 2011.
Wheeler T., von Braum J., 2013, Climate change impacts on global food security, Science, 341(6145), 508–513.
doi: 10.1126/science.1239402
TX_1~AT/TX_2~AT International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022332 International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy ISSN: 2146-4553 available at http: www.econjournals.com International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2022, 12(5), 332-341.
Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria Evelyn Nwamaka Ogbeide-Osaretin1*, Bright Orhewere2, Oseremen Ebhote3, Sadiq Oshoke Akhor4, Israel O. Imide5 1Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts, Mgt.
a Social Sciences, Edo State University Uzairue, Edo State, Nigeria, 2Department of Economics, Western Delta University, Oghara, Delta State, Nigeria, 3Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Arts, Mgt.
a Social Sciences, Edo State University Uzairue, Edo State, Nigeria, 4Department of Accounting, Faculty of Arts, Mgt.
& Social Sciences, Edo State University Uzairue, Edo State, Nigeria, 5Department of Economics, University of Delta, Agbor, Delta State Nigeria.
*Email: osaretin.evelyn@edouniversity.edu.ng Received: 02 July 2022 Accepted: 05 September 2022 DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.13556 ABSTRACT There seems to be a vicious cycle between climate change and income inequality.
Hence, this study examined the existence of a feedback relationship between climate change and income inequality in Nigeria.
The study employed an annual data series for the period from 1980 to 2020 which was estimated with the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square.
Income inequality was measured by Gini while climate change was captured by temperature.
The upshot of the study revealed that there is a feedback substantial connectivity between climate change and income inequality.
The impact of climate change on income inequality conformed to the U-shaped hypothesis.
Other factors of climate change were population growth, economic development, and emission of carbon dioxide.
Hence, the study pertinently advocates and recommends effective population control, reduction of income inequality through the provision of employment and education, and the supply of modern and efficient energy in the purse of economic growth and development.
Keywords: Climatic Change, Economic Development, Gini Coefficient, Poverty; Nigeria JEL Classifications: C32, I32, O15, Q0 1.
INTRODUCTION In the last decades, the growth in global output has increased the welfare of many, lifting millions out of poverty.
However, this drive is being threatened by global and regional poverty, and inequality beginning to rise again.
An understanding of the causes of these is crucial for effective policy implications and achieving global equitable economic development.
Suspected among these causes is climate change.
World Bank reported that about 132 million people will transition into poverty by 2030 due to the rising climate change (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2018; World Bank, 2020).
This is also expected to increase the inequality between and within countries.
In a report by United Nations, an estimate of US$ 383 million/day was recorded for global economic loss resulting from the disaster of climate change between 2010 and 2019 which is almost seven times the record of 1970-1979, US$ 49 million (World Meteorological Organization, 2021).
It is of recent decades becoming clear that climate change, poverty, and income are inextricably linked and not independent.
Unmitigated climate change is suspected to exacerbate the existing inequality between and within countries’ inequalities and poverty rates.
Higher temperatures reduce productivity, income, and health.
Hurricanes from climate change also destroy homes and hamper employment opportunities, making the economic situation of the poor more precarious.
On the other hand, poor people and countries do not have enough resources to meet up with the requirement of clean energy to mitigate climate change hence, contributing This Journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022 333 to rising climate change (Albu and Albu, 2020).
It has been suggested that the total damages from natural disasters and higher temperatures are higher in developing countries.
As confirmed by Sarkodie and Strezov (2019) in a study on 192 United Nations, Africa has been noted to be among the most venerable to climate change.
For instance, near-surface air temperature in 2020 was between 0.5°C and 0.88°C more than what was recorded between 1981 and 2010, and Africa was found to be warmer than the global average temperature in the combination of overland and Ocean (World Meteorological Organization, 2020).
For the period 2015-2019, each year was warmer than all the years before 2014 (World Meteorological Organization, 2020).
Sub-Saharan Africa has also been found to be among the regions with the highest level of poverty and inequality.
About 41% of the population is still living below the $1.90 poverty line, while it was estimated that about 87% of the world’s poor will be in SSA by 2030.
Africa is also the second most unequal continent in the world (Seery et al., 2019).
Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa has been of particular interest in terms of the level of climate change, poverty, and inequality.
Temperature as a measure of climate change was found by data to have risen from 26.85°C to in 1970 to 27.37°C in 2020.
This is an average of 0.03°C per decade and in the last 30 years, it increased by 0.19°C per decade.
Average rainfall increased from 1295 to 2018 (World Meteorological Organization, 2020).
It was estimated that about 83 million of the total population of Nigeria’s population are still absolutely poor.
Inequality measured by the Gini index was found to be 44% in 2019 which grew marginally from 43% in 2009 and is the lowest among other countries in SSA and the world.
Nigeria ranked the least of the 45 countries in Africa and had 157 positions in the global ranking on the assessment of the government’s commitment to reducing inequality (Seery et al., 2019; World Bank, 2020).
An overview of Figure 1 showed that changes in poverty and inequality seem to be moving in the same direction as climate change captured by temperature in Figure 2.
Although, the temperature seems to be more dynamic.
Thus, we may argue that climate changes are a foremost contributor to the wider inequality gap given the high negative effect on agricultural productivity, health, and income thereby increasing the poverty rate (poverty tends to be highest in the agricultural sector).
On the other hand, it may also be argued that the high level of income inequality and poverty are contributing to the effect of climate change as the unequal income distribution and poverty reduces the ability to mitigate climate change as well as engage in clean energy uses that reduces the degree of climate change.
For instance, in 2016, about 74% of the country’s population relied on firewood for cooking (Monyei et al., 2018), while only about 55.4% have access to electricity as of 2019 (World Bank, 2021).
In the same period, poverty increased from 48.2% in 2015 to 72% in 2016.
Temperature also increased from 27.32°C to 27.77°C.
Hence, climate change may be a root or a corollary of some levels of inequality and poverty.
Hence, it has become paramount to analyze this nexus concerning Nigeria and the outcome may be extended to other countries for effectiveness in the policy formulation for poverty and income inequality reduction as well as climate change mitigation.
Analysis of the impacts and causes of climate change has substantially increased over the decades with controversial findings.
Some empirical evidence concluded that countries with lower income inequality tend to contribute less to climate change, hence suggesting across countries lower inequality for the mitigation of climate change and adoption of a green economy (Albu and Albu, 2020).
Climate change has also been found to increase inequality both within counties and across countries (Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019; Hsiang et al., 2019; Dasgupta et al., 2020).
Others noted that climate change negatively impacts welfare and falls heavily on the poor increasing the poverty level (Skoufias, 2012).
In Sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular, there are very few studies (Skoufias, 2012) that found that the impact of climate change varies with the pattern of income inequality on the impact of climate change on inequality.
However, rather than just focusing solely on climate-specific policies given their impact on the global economy, inequality, and poverty, it is also imperative to ask how efforts of the global economy and developing countries to improve economic opportunity and reduce poverty and inequality can increase climate change and its vulnerability.
It is also crucial to ask if the level of poverty and income inequality is increasing the risk of climate change.
This is based on the assumption that with poverty and a wide income gap, the poor tend to carry out activities that cause harm to the climate (deforestation for wood fuel, burning of charcoal, dumping of refuse in rivers, among others).
Hence, it can be argued that while climate change can impact inequality and poverty, poverty and inequality can impact climate change.
This is a gap that has not been covered particularly in Nigeria.
Hence, the current study is out to fill this gap.
Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine if there exists a feedback impact between climate change, poverty, and inequality in Nigeria.
This study, therefore, contributes to current literature in the following ways: first, it evaluates the possibility of a feedback effect between climate change and income inequality.
Second, it made use of the efficient measures of climate change (temperature) which has not been considered in Nigeria Studies.
Third, it explored the existence of a non-linear relationship between income inequality and climate.
It is expected that there will be feedback connectivity between climate change and income inequality.
Figure 1: Trend of temperature in Nigeria Source: Authors’ chart Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022334 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE The impact of climate change on inequality and poverty is a particular area of active research and policy interest, as a result of the inconclusive outcome on the nature and causes of observed inequality.
This is a result of the relevance of climate change in achieving sustainable development.
Climate change according to Yue and Gao (2018) is the increasing patterns of temperatures and weather that bring about environmental degradation and impact economic and social lives.
Climate change is mainly caused by the emission of greenhouse gas which causes heat to be trapped by the atmosphere earth’s atmosphere resulting in global warming.
Poverty is often defined with various measures.
Defining poverty in terms of income, we have income poverty which is the lack of enough income to live up to the acceptable standard of living or pleasurable well-being.
In terms of lack of basic needs of life, we have basic needs poverty which defines a person to be poor when he/she lacks needed food, education, health care, and other necessities of life.
Poverty can also be defined in comparison to a universally acceptable income level which is absolute poverty.
One is called poor if they are living below this level called the poverty line.
Poverty can also be defined as relative poverty, chronic poverty, and transitory poverty (Todaro and Smith, 2011).
Climate change is theoretically linked with poverty and inequality through the pursuit of development and resulting in a vicious cycle.
Climate change can be exogenous to inequality or endogenous to inequality, hence suggesting a feedback relationship.
Given the existence of income inequality, this will make some people poor.
Climate change is exogenous and three ways have been identified by which climate change can affect poverty and inequality.
Poverty and inequality increase the possibility of exposure of disadvantaged groups to the adverse effect of climate change.
A major outcome of climate change is flooding.
Given that poor and disadvantaged groups can only afford to live in slums, these areas are often flooded.
Hence the flooding effect of climate change affects the poor group more.
Climate change also aggravates the susceptibility of the poor group to the effect of climate change as a result of the poor quality of life.
Finally, the poor and disadvantaged have a lower ability to manage and come out of the effect of climate change.
They do not have enough resources to protect their health status or take care of health effects, easily get a new job/start a new investment if their current job/investment is negatively affected by climate change, or afford an insurance policy to compensate for the damage from climate change.
All these aggravate the inequality gap and poverty status of the group.
Climate change is also endogenous, the poor and disadvantaged groups are forced to engage in activities that cause harm to the climate resulting in climate change.
As observed by Islam and Winkel (2017), and evidenced by studies on OECD, inequality and poverty aggregate environmental degradation contributing substantially to climate change.
Countries with higher inequality tend to have higher levels of per capita waste generation.
In line with the above, it may be expected that countries with higher inequality will tend to have higher levels of per capita GHG emissions change in climate in turn relatively affect the poor and the unequally treated group of the society.
Inequality thus aggravates climate change (Islam and Winkel, 2017).
Thus, given this possible endogeneity as presented in Figure 3a and 3b, it has become important and urgent to tackle the task of breaking the vicious cycle between climate change and inequality.
Some earlier studies have been carried out to investigate this analytical framework.
However, the outcome of these studies has been mixed results.
Analyzing the existence of a feedback relationship between climate change and income inequality, the diverse impact of income inequality was found on climate change.
Farmers are often believed to be the most vulnerable to climate change as a result of their direct and indirect dependency on climatic variables.
Hence, Alam et al.
(2017) analyzed the socioeconomic impacts of climatic changes on the farmers in Malaysia they employed a primary data analysis method on a survey of 198 paddy farmers in the Integrated Agricultural Development Area in NorthWest Selangor of Malaysia in 2009.
The outcome showed that climate change adversely affects agricultural productivity, health, and profitability thereby increasing income inequality.
Government spending through subsidies was found not to be adequate to support the farmers and reduce the effects of climate change on the farmers.
This was contrary to Boyce (2007) who found that inequality brings about a reduction in carbon emission and hence climate change.
Abaje and Oladipo (2019) investigated the impact of the recent changes in temperature and rainfall in the Kaduna State of Nigeria for the period 1971-2016.
Linear regression, secondorder polynomial, standard deviation, and Cramer’s test were employed in the analysis.
The result showed an increasing trend in temperature which was on an average of 1.03°C and a mean increase of rainfall of 303.32 mm.
This increase was found to be associated with the increase in greenhouse gases emission.
Uzar and Eyuboglu (2019) examined the effect of CO2 emissions on income distribution in Turkey for the period 1984-2014.
The Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) bound testing was employed to determine the existence of long-run connectivity among the variables.
The study found that there is a positive impact of income inequality on the emission of CO2.
Income inequality Granger causes CO2 emission using the Toda-Yamamoto causality test.
Dasgupta et al.
(2020) carried out a quantitative study on climate change’s impacts on inequality and poverty on a South African sub-national panel study.
In conformity to Alam et al.
(2017), the outcome revealed that a substantial relationship exists between inequality/poverty and mean temperature which was a measure of climate change.
Climate change was found to reduce average growth, hence increasing inequality and poverty.
In a similar study to that of Uzar and Eyuboglu (2019), Kusumawardani and Dewi (2020) investigated the effect of income inequality on climate change captured by carbon dioxide emissions in Indonesia.
They employed an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model for the period 1975-2017.
Income inequality was found to harm carbon dioxide which was found to be a function of the level of GDP per capita.
Thus, the existence of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) was confirmed in Indonesia and the relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emission was found to be an inverted “U” shape.
Urbanization and dependency were found to negatively affect CO2 emissions.
Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022 335 Albu and Albu (2020) explored the connectivity between income inequality and climate change in European Union countries.
They accounted for the consequences of the increase in carbon emissions on the increase in inequalities.
The two-stage OLS estimation method was applied to two groups of European Union countries, (15 old member states and 13 new member states).
The relationship between income inequality and carbon emission was different for the two groups.
In the analysis of the effect of income inequality, poverty, and growth on the quality of the environment captured by carbon emission rate, Yameogo, and Dauda (2020), employed the ARDL model on data for Nigeria and Burkina Faso for the period 1980-2016.
The result showed inverted U-Shaped connectivity between environmental degradation and growth of income for Nigeria while U-shaped connectivity was found for Burkina Faso.
There was a positive relationship between income inequality and environmental degradation in both countries.
Government expenditure and poverty were found to increase the level of carbon emission in Nigeria in the long run.
In the short run, income inequality was found to reduce carbon emissions in Nigeria and it had an adverse effect in Burkina Faso.
Following this is the study of Sam et al.
(2021) who adopted the micro econometric empirical analysis to analyze the effect of climate change on household welfare through the rising prices of cereal.
Data on five food groups were gathered from the 2009/2010 Swaziland Household Income Expenditure Survey and was analyzed by the Ideal Demand System (AIDS).
Also, the food price projections of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) were employed to estimate the proportional increase in income that is needed to keep the households on the required welfare level.
Results showed that an increase in food prices as a result of climate change has led to an increase in the poverty rate of about 71-75 % as compared to 63% before the increase in prices.
Hence, an income transfer of 17.5 and 25.4% of the former income level is needed to keep welfare at the level before the price increase.
Hundie (2021) explored income inequality, economic growth, and carbon dioxide emission linkage in Ethiopia.
The study made use of the ARDL bond testing and the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square method of estimation over the period 1979-2014.
The result revealed that in the long run, the emission of CO2 increases with the increase in economic growth and the square of economic growth confirming the Kuznets U curve hypothesis of environment.
Income inequality was found not to have a substantial effect on CO2and a positive relationship with it.
Population size and urbanization were other factors accounting for the increase in the emission of CO2.
Yang et al.
(2022) examined the impact of the channel between income inequality and climate change (carbon emissions) to clarify the nonlinear relationship between income inequality, and the different degrees of carbon emissions in the United States and France from 1915 to 2019.
They made use of wavelet decomposition and Quantile-on-Quantile regression and the results revealed that for France, income inequality impacts carbon emissions negatively when there is low-income inequality.
However, when income inequality increases, its impact changes from negative to positive which is amplified by the increase in the emission of carbon emissions.
On the other hand, as income inequality becomes deeper, the emission-enhancing effect is reversed gradually for the United States.
However, the impact of carbon emissions on income inequality are same for both countries.
In the short run, the income inequality and carbon emissions relationship in the two countries are randomly volatile while in the medium run, it is a three-dimensional inverted “V” shaped relationship for the US and a three-dimensional “V” shaped relationship for France.
Also, in the long run, it exhibits a “V” shaped relationship with the US.
In a more recent study by Cevik and Jalles (2022) on the linkage between climate change and income inequality, a panel of 158 countries was explored spanning the period 1955-2019.
The researchers found that the increase in climate change vulnerability leads to an increase in income inequality.
On segmentation of the sample size, it was revealed that there was no statistical impact of climate change vulnerability on income inequality for the developed countries while the reverse was the case for developing countries.
This was accounted to the weak capacity of adaptation and mitigation by the developing countries.
2.1.
Summary of Reviewed Literature and Contribution to Knowledge The analysis of connectivity between climate change and inequality has been examined by some studies.
In summary, the studies tend to conclude that climate change increases income inequality.
This was for within the countries and, across countries.
Most of the studies investigated a one-way relationship between climate change and income inequity/poverty.
The majority of the study found climate change increasing poverty rather than inequality d poverty increasing climate change.
However, needed attention has not been drawn to the fact that there is a two-way relationship between climate change and inequality/poverty.
While it is well recognized that climate change causes and aggravates inequality, it is also important to note that inequality can also aggravate climate change.
This is the major contribution of this current study to existing literature.
3.
METHODOLOGY Two major determinants of climate change are rainfall and temperature.
However, we focused only on temperature.
3.1.
Conceptual Framework The study adopted the approach of Burke et al.
(2015b), and Dasgupta et al.
(2020) to determine the non-linear relationship between climate change mean temperatures and our economic outcome variables (yit).
This current study made use of normal levels of dependent variables rather than the first difference as in Burke et al.
(2015b) and Dasgupta et al.
(2020).
A country responds to changes in temperature based on the country’s current level of temperature at a particular time, Tt.
taking the quadratic state can be given as: hTt = α1Tt + α2T 2t (1) We can then add the warming impact h(Tt) to the reference scenarios without the climate impacts of the variable yit.
We look Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022336 at the distribution within a country, and, we considered income inequality indices such as the Gini index or the Atkinson measure A(Ω) of inequality or the class of Generalized Entropy Indices.
The poverty headcount ratio P0 can also be used which measures the proportion of the population that is counted as poor Dasgupta et al.
(2020).
However, this study made use of the Gini index as a measure of income inequality as a result of its simplicity and general acceptability.
Thus, the impact of climate on income inequality can be computed and simulated using this formula; ( ) ( )( ) g GNIt 1 (1 gt h Tt h T0 | GNIt e − + + − = (2) Where eg is the growth factor including climate impacts or g is its growth rate.
The equation 2 result shows the effect of temperature on GNI in a given country at a particular time t. 3.2.
Econometric Model Based on the theoretical under pinning that there could be a feedback relationship between climate change and inequality given the poverty level, thus study adopts a two equation model.
GNIt = α1Tt + α2T 2 t + α3POV+ α4Xt +µ1 (3) Tt =β1GNIt + β2POVt+ β3Zt + µ2 (4) We control for annual temperature Tit and its squared term to capture the potential non-linear effects of climate change on income inequality.
This was to test if an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between climate change and income inequality, taking into account the possibility that these relations are not linear.
Inequality may decrease due to initial increases in temperature, but, beyond a threshold, the incremental increases in temperature may lead to increased inequality.
Thus, it is expected that for some set of coefficients of temperature, T1 < 0; T2 > 0.
In this case, the results indicate a non-linear relationship.
The term Xt and Xt are the matrix of other relevant control variables of the income inequality (unemployment rate and population growth) and relevant control variables of the climate change (carbon dioxide (metric tons per capita), Real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population growth).
From the above, equation 3 and 4, introducing the control variables is transformed to: 0 1 2 3 4 5 α α α α α α ε = + + + + + + tGINI T TSQ POV UNMPR POPG t (5) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 β β β β β β β = + + + + + + + tT GINI POV UNMPR POPG CADIOX RGDPpc ut (6) Where GINI = Gini Index a measure of income inequality T = Temperature a measure of climate change POV = National poverty level captured by headcount UNMPR = Unemployment rate POPG = Population growth rate RGDPpc = Real Gross Domestic product per capita.
This was used to captured the level of development CADIOX = Consumption of coal in a thousand short tons εt and ut are the error term for the income inequality and climate change equations respectively.
εt and ut are the error term for the income inequality and climate change equations respectively.
A Priori, 1 2 3 4 5 6 1, 2 3, 4, 5 6, , , , , 0; , 0 0α α α α α α β β β β β β> > < 3.3.
Data and Estimation Method The study employed secondary data spanning from 1980 to 2020.
The data for GINI, POV, and UNMPR were obtained from the World Bank (2021) and Sasu (2022).
Data for temperature was acquired from Climate Change Knowledge Portal (2021), while the RGDPpc, POPG, and CADIOX were obtained from the World Development Indicators (2021).
The variables were subjected to various pre-estimation tests to determine their diagnostic properties.
The ARDL bounds testing was employed to determine the presence of a long-run relationship given that the variables were stationary at orders one and zero.
From the outcome of the ARDL result, the dynamic ordinary least Square method of estimation was used in carrying out the long-run analysis.
The E-views 9 econometric package was used for the analysis.
4.
EMPIRICAL PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 4.1.
Correlation Result The intensity of multi-collinearity among the variables was determined using the correction matrix.
The result from Table 1 showed that there is no multi-collinearity among the variables used in the result.
This is proved by the correction coefficients of less than 0.8 for the variables.
However, the correlation coefficient between temperature and temperature square of 0.9999 is not surprising as the latter was derived from the former hence, they tend to move together.
The result further revealed that there is a positive correlation between inequality and temperature.
This tends to suggest that climate change leads to inequality and vice-versa.
However, the correlation does not indicate causation hence a further empirical analysis was carried out.
4.2.
Descriptive Statistics As presented in Table 2, the mean, maximum, minimum, and Jargue-Bera (J.B) of the variables showed good performance in the statistics of the variables.
The result of the skewness showed that result that all of the variables are positively skewed.
The Jargue-Bera test, on the other hand, confirmed distributional Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022 337 normality in all the variables.
This means that all of the variables are distributed regularly 4.3.
Stationarity Test To determine the level of stationary of the variables, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was employed.
As presented in Table 3 while income inequality and population growth were stationary at levels, other variables were stationary at first difference.
Hence, we proceed to run a cointegration analysis using the ARDL bound testing techniques.
4.4.
Cointegration Test From the result of the unit root where some of the variables were integrated of order one and zero.
The bound testing method was thus employed to determine the existence of cointegration between climate change and income inequality.
From the income inequality model, the result showed that there is the existence of cointegration between the variables at the lower bound only at a 5% level of significance.
This is as shown from the F sat of 2.717687 which is higher than the tabulated value of 2.62 lower bound but lower than 3.79 upper bound.
Hence, we conclude that there is cointegration between the variables (Table A1 of the appendix).
Also, from the climate change model, the existence of cointegration was also found at a lower bound of 5% significance levels.
The Fsat of 2.661207 which is more than the tabulated values of 2.45 but lower than 3.61 uppers bound respectively allowed us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the variables (Table A2 of the appendix).
4.5.
Estimation of the Models 4.5.1.
Estimation of income inequality model From the outcome of the cointegration test carried out where the null hypothesis of cointegration was rejected, we proceed to the estimation of the model using the dynamic OLS.
Table 4 shows the DOLS o the inequality model.
Examining the diagnostic statistics of the result the R2 of 0.675073 showed that about 68% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables which is not bad.
On the performance of the variables of the model, the outcome of the estimation showed that there is a negative relationship between temperature (T) and income inequality (GINI) and a positive relationship Table 3: Summary of the unit-root tests output employing the ADF Variable Levels 5% critical 1st difference 5% critical Remark GINI −3.139398 −2.936942 I (0) T −1.948335 −2.941145 −8.101568 −2.941145 I (1) T2 −1.958416 −2.941145 −8.075350 −2.941145 I (1) POV −1.712944 −2.938987 −10.99401 −2.938987 I (1) POPG −5.311883 −2.960411 I (0) RGDPpc −0.580213 −2.938987 −4.569165 −2.938987 I (1) UNMPR −0.124458 −2.938987 −7.205141 −2.938987 I (1) CADIOX −2.303747 −2.936942 −6.876319 −2.938987 I (1) GINI: Gini Index a measure of income inequality, T: Temperature a measure of climate change, POV: National poverty level captured by headcount, UNMPR: Unemployment rate, POPG: Population growth rate, RGDPpc: Real Gross Domestic product per capita, CADIOX: Consumption of coal in a thousand short tons Table 1: Correlation matrix result Variables GINI T TSQ POV POPG RGDPpc UNMPR CADIOX GINI 1.000000 T 0.077048 1.000000 TSQ 0.077078 0.999965 1.000000 POV 0.638624 0.425834 0.424772 1.000000 POPG −0.226438 0.184657 0.185821 −0.216889 1.000000 RGDPpc 0.099989 0.543493 0.543516 0.315193 0.578165 1.000000 UNMPR 0.200912 0.401293 0.401862 0.422842 0.285371 0.711676 1.000000 CADIOX −0.597379 0.080869 0.079646 −0.449570 0.448070 0.095579 0.014362 1.000000 Source: Author’s computation.
GINI: Gini Index a measure of income inequality, T: Temperature a measure of climate change, POV: National poverty level captured by headcount, UNMPR: Unemployment rate, POPG: Population growth rate, RGDPpc: Real Gross Domestic product per capita, CADIOX: Consumption of coal in a thousand short tons, TSQ: Temperature square Table 2: Descriptive statistics Statistics GINI T TSQ POV POPG RGDPpc UNMPR CADIOX Mean 43.06195 27.17659 738.6741 54.52902 2.587127 1799.386 11.43598 0.610519 Median 43.00000 27.21000 740.3841 59.30000 2.586546 1607.238 11.90000 0.610000 Maximum 56.00000 27.83000 774.5089 72.90000 2.849252 2563.900 33.28000 0.928241 Minimum 35.08000 26.32000 692.7424 35.20000 2.488785 1324.297 3.600000 0.325560 SD 4.470221 0.331577 18.00321 12.23253 0.078620 450.5880 6.328673 0.169989 Skewness 0.667670 −0.181138 −0.145911 −0.247856 0.823394 0.473706 1.021092 −0.075513 Kurtosis 3.623020 2.983925 2.954869 1.616939 4.077668 1.590788 4.690907 2.064996 Jarque-Bera 3.709285 0.224649 0.148962 3.687588 6.616846 4.925921 12.00904 1.532446 Probability 0.156509 0.893754 0.928225 0.158216 0.036574 0.085182 0.002468 0.464765 Sum 1765.540 1114.240 30285.64 2235.690 106.0722 73774.82 468.8750 25.03129 Sum square deviation 799.3150 4.397722 12964.62 5985.394 0.247245 8121182.
1602.084 1.155851 Observations 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 Source: Authors’ computation from Eviews 9.
GINI: Gini Index a measure of income inequality, T: Temperature a measure of climate change, POV: National poverty level captured by headcount, UNMPR: Unemployment rate, POPG: Population growth rate, RGDPpc: Real Gross Domestic product per capita, CADIOX: Consumption of coal in a thousand short tons, SD: Standard deviation, TSQ: Temperature square Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022338 The result also divulged that population growth and household size were found to have a positive relationship with GINI as expected which was however insignificant.
The result revealed a 1% increase in population growth by 19% in GINI in Nigeria.
This upshot is in agreement with the outcome of Onwuka (2006), and OgbeideOsaretin and Orehwereh (2020) who found that population is harmful to development and will increase the income gap.
4.5.2.
Estimation of the climate change model Following the outcome of the cointegration test which confirmed the existence of cointegration among the variables, the DOLS was employed in the estimation of the model The upshot of the DOLS estimation as presented in Table 5 revealed that in conformity to expectation, income inequality had a substantial positive impact on climate change (T).
A 1 unit increase in GINI leads to a 0.09 increase in temperature.
This is in line with some studies (Yameogo and Dauda, 2020; Hundie, 2021).
On the other hand, it was found by some other studies by Kusumawardani and Dewi (2020) that GINI has a negative relationship and impact on climate change.
Contrary to our expectations, poverty and unemployment were found to have a negative relationship with climate change.
While poverty had an insignificant impact on climate change, unemployment was found to have a significant impact on climate change.
This is also contrary to the findings of Yameogo and Dauda (2020) who found that poverty increases climate change.
The result further revealed that following some other studies, (Hundie, 2021), population growth was found to have a substantial positive impact on climate change.
Population growth was also found to have the highest magnitude in terms of its impact on climate change.
However, it is expected that population growth reduces the consumption of energy and the efficiency in the use of energy.
Hence, the release of greenhouse gasses will increase climate change and temperature will reduce.
Other important contributors to climate change are the emission of CO2 and the level of development.
The result revealed that these had substantial positive impacts on climate change at a 5% level of significance in agreement with our expectations.
1 unit increase in CADIOX and RGDPpc results in the 2.471865 and 1.89616 unit increases in temperature in Nigeria respectively.
This is in line with the findings of Kusumawardani and Dewi (2020) and Hundie (2021).
between temperature square (TSQ) and income (GINI).
This tends to confirm the existence of the non-linear relationship between climate change and income inequality which showed a U-shaped relationship.
Climate change is found to substantially impact GINI in Nigeria at a 5% level of significance.
One unit increase in T initially reduces GINI by 1279 units and later increases inequality by 23 units.
This outcome conforms with the studies of Alam et al.
(2017), Dasgupta et al.
(2020), and Sam et al.
(2021).
In line with expectations, poverty was found to have a positive substantial impact on GINI.
A 1% increment in poverty leads to a 37% increase in income inequality.
As revealed by OgbeideOsaretin et al.
(2016), poverty widens the income inequality gap.
As the poor do not often have access to quality and higher levels of education which will create room for employment or increase their income-earning ability.
The cycle continues, and the inequality gap widens unless it is broken by effective government policies such as increasing the welfare of the poor (increased access to education and health).
However, contrary to expectation, the unemployment rate (UNMPR) was found to have a negative relationship with GINI which was however not significant.
The results revealed that an increase in unemployment reduced income inequality.
Nevertheless, the unemployment rate in Nigeria is more under-employment, and in most cases, the recorded data often underestimates the unemployment rate in Nigeria.
Figure 2: Trends of inequality and poverty Source: Authors’ chart Table 4: Dynamic ordinary least square estimation of the income inequality model Dependent variable=Income inequality Method=DOLS Diagnostics: R2=0.675073 Independent variable Coefficient t-sat Probability T −1279.193 −2.519587 0.0220* TSQ 23.50179 2.504725 0.0227* POV 0.377314 4.543038 0.0003* UNMPR −0.318333 −1.556236 0.1381 POPG 19.06347 1.020289 0.3219 C 17380.76 2.525623 0.0218 *Source: Authors’ computation, **Significant at 5% and 10% level respectively.
DOLS: Dynamic ordinary least square, TSQ: Temperature square, T: Temperature a measure of climate change, POV: National poverty level captured by headcount, UNMPR: Unemployment rate, POPG: Population growth rate Table 5: Dynamic ordinary least square estimation of climate change model Dependent variable=Income inequality Method=DOLS Diagnostics: R2=0.850496 Independent variable Coefficient t-sat Probability GINI 0.093341 2.829523 0.0142* POV −0.008594 −0.955033 0.3570 POPG 2.889689 2.201680 0.0464* UNMPR −0.052672 −2.155823 0.0504* CADIOX 2.471865 3.672075 0.0028* LOG (RGDPpc) 1.896167 3.417267 0.0046* C 16.07390 5.325664 0.0001 *Source: Author’s computation, **Significant at 5% and 10% level respectively.
DOLS: Dynamic ordinary least square, GINI: Gini Index a measure of income inequality, POV: National poverty level captured by headcount, UNMPR: Unemployment rate, POPG: Population growth rate, RGDPpc: Real Gross Domestic product per capita, CADIOX: Consumption of coal in a thousand short tons Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022 339 5.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 5.1.
Policy Implications The connectivity between climate change and income inequality was examined to determine if there is a feedback relationship between them.
Time series annual data was employed where climate change was measured by temperature and income inequality by GINI.
Based on the empirical estimates, the following policy colloraries were drawn and recommendations made: 1.
Temperature was found to have a negative substantial impact on GINI while temperature square had a positive substantial impact on GINI.
This implication of the above is that at the initial level of temperature, income inequality falls as everyone tends to be on the same level with the effect of temperature as a result of climate change.
However, as temperature increases with the increases in climate change, the poor not being able to afford means of reducing the effect and are exposed more to climate change, and their sources of income are also affected thereby increasing the income inequality gap.
This study thus advocates for control measures for reducing climate change such as reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and putting in place emission fees.
2.
Income inequality was also found to have a positive significant impact on climate change.
This reveals that the increase in income gap will lead to an increase in activities that are harmful to the environment thereby increasing climate change.
Therefore, we advocate for the reduction of income inequality through a transfer of income from the rich to the poor is effective in reducing energy inequality.
Also, there is the need to, provide access to commercialized energy to households, increase access to education by the low-income group, and the availability of efficient energy infrastructures to reduce income inequality which will lead to effective climate change adaptation.
3.
Poverty was found to have a positive substantial impact on income inequality.
Thus, as poverty increases, the gap between the poor and the rich increases.
We, thus, counsel for the reduction in poverty through the provision of employment, and an increase in access to education and health.
4.
As divulged by the result, population growth negatively and significantly impacts climate change.
Hence, we recommend the zealous pursuit of a population growth reduction policy.
This can be done by employing practically fertility reduction and birth control.
5.
The emission of carbon dioxide substantially impacts climate change.
As the emission of CO2 increases, the rate of climate change increases which is often seen with the increase in temperature and rainfall.
We, therefore, advocate for the use of efficient sources and modern energy.
This will help to mitigate climate change and hence.
6.
Development captured by real GDP per capita was revealed to have a positive substantial impact on climate change.
As the quest for development increases, industrialization and household usage of energy increase which is a significant contributor to climate change.
Hence, this current study counsels that policy measures for modern sources of energy should be pursued.
5.2.
Conclusion Climate change and income inequality are current priorities for the achievement of sustainable development.
While there is a current pursuit of development by developing countries, which have increased economic growth and national income through advancements in technology, the increase in income has not been evenly distributed.
Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate the interaction between climate change and income inequality.
The upshot of the result revealed that there is a significant feedback impact between climate change and income inequality in Nigeria.
The impact of climate change on income inequality shows a U-shaped hypothesis.
Other contributors to climate change were population growth, economic development, and the emission of carbon dioxide.
Effective population control and reduction of income inequality through the provision of employment and education are pertinently recommended.
Also, efficient and modern energy uses in the purse of development are strongly recommended to reduce climate change and reduction of income inequality.
We however suggest that further studies be cried out to investigate the dynamic feedback connectivity between income inequality and climate change.
Inequality ad climate change is expected to have a spillover effect from previous years.
Hence, the spillover effect can influence the linkage between them inequality.
REFERENCES Abaje, I.B., Oladipo, E.O.
(2019), Recent changes in the temperature and rainfall conditions over Kaduna State, Nigeria.
Ghana Journal of Geography, 11(2), 127-157.
Alam, M.M., Taufique, K., Sayal, A.
(2017), Do climate changes lead Figure 3: The climate change income inequality flow Source: Adopted from Islam and Winkel (2017) Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022340 to income inequality?
Empirical study on the farming community in Malaysia.
International Journal of Environment and Sustainable Development, 16(1), 43-59.
Albu, A., Albu, L. (2020), The impact of climate change on income inequality.
Evidence from European Union Countries.
Studies in Business and Economics, 15(3), 223-235.
Boyce, J.K. (2007), Is Inequality Bad for the Environment?
Equity and the Environment.
Vol.
15.
Bingley, United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, p.267-288.
Burke, M., Hsiang, S.M., Miguel, E. (2015), Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production.
Nature, 527, 235-239.
Cevik, S., Jalles, J.T.
(2022), For Whom the Bell Tolls: Climate Change and Inequality.
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/22/103 IMF.
Climate Change Knowledge Portal.
(2021), Nigeria Current Climate.
United States: The World Bank Group.
Avialble from: https://www.
climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/nigeria/climatedata-historical Dasgupta, S., Emmerling, J. Shayegh, S (2020), Inequality and Growth Impacts from Climate Change-Insights from South Africa.
European institute of Economics and Environment, Working Paper 20-10.
Diffenbaugh, N.S., Burke, M. (2019), Global warming has increased global economic inequality.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(20), 9808-9813.
Hsiang, S., Oliva, P., Walker, R. (2019), The distribution of environmental damages.
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 13(1), 83-103.
Hundie, S.K.
(2021), Income inequality, economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions nexus: empirical evidence from Ethiopia.
Environmental Science and Pollution Research International, 28(32), 43579-43598.
Internal Displacemet Monitoring Center.
(2018), 2018 Global Report on Internal Displacement.
Geneva: Internal Displacemet Monitoring Center.
Available from: https://www.internal-displacement.org/ publications/2018-global-report-on-internal-displacement Islam, S.N., Winkel, J.
(2017), Climate Change and Social Inequality.
DESA Working Paper No.
152 ST/ESA/2017/DWP/152.
Kusumawardani, D., Dewi, A.K.
(2020), The effect of income inequality on carbon dioxide emissions: A case study of Indonesia.
Heliyon, 6(8), e04772.
Monyei, C., Adewumi, A., Obolo, M., Sajou, B.
(2018), Nigeria’s energy poverty: Insights and implications for smart policies and framework towards a smart Nigeria electricity network.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 18(1), 1582-1601.
Ogbeide-Osaretin, E.N., Orhewere, B.
(2020), Population growth, gender inequality and economic development in Nigeria.
Izvestiya Journal of Varna University of Economics, 64(1), 47-64.
Ogbeide-Osaretin, N.E., Edeme, R.K., Ifelunini, I.A.
(2016), Can income inequality reduction be used as an instrument for poverty reduction?
Dynamic evidence from Nigeria.
Journal of Academic Research in Economics, 8(2), 307-319.
Onwuka, E.C.
(2006), Another look at the impact of Nigeria’s growing population on the country’s development.
African Population Studies, 21(1), 1-18.
Sam, A.G., Abidoye, B.O., Mashaba, S. (2021), Climate change and household welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical evidence from Swaziland.
Food Security, 13(2), 439-455.
Sarkodie, S.A., Strezov, V. (2019), Effect of foreign direct investments, economic development and energy consumption on greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries.
Science of the Total Environment, 646(1), 862-871.
Sasu, D.D.
(2022), Unemployment Rate in Nigeria in Selected Quarter Between the 1st Quarter of 2015 and the 4th Quarter of 2020.
Hamburg: Statista.
Available from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1119375/ unemployment-rate-in-nigeria-by-quarter Seery, E., Okanda, J., Lawson, M. (2019), A Tale of Two Continents Fighting Inequality in Africa.
Kenya: OXFAM Briefing Paper.
Available from: https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_ attachments/bp-tale-of-two-continents-fighting-inequality-africa030919-en.pdf Skoufias, E. (2012), The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change Quantifying the Effects, Identifying the Adaptation Strategies.
Directions in Development; Poverty.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank.
Available from: https://www.openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/9384 Todaro, M.P., Smith, S.C. (2011), Economic Development.
11th ed.
Harlow: Addison-Wesley.
Uzar, U., Eyuboglu, K (2019), The Nexus between income inequality and CO2 emission in Turkey.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 227(1), 149-157.
World Bank.
(2021), Nigeria: Gini Inequality Index.
The Globaleconomy.
com.
United States: World Bank.
Available from: https://www.
theglobaleconomy.com/Nigeria/gini_inequality_index World Bank.
(2021), Access to Electricity (% of population)-Nigeria.
United States: World Bank.
Available from: https://www.data.
worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=NG World Bank.
(2020), Nigeria Releases New Report on Poverty and Inequality in the Country.
United States: World Bank: Available from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lsms/brief/nigeriareleases-new-report-on-poverty-and-inequality-in-country World Meteorological Organization.
(2020), State of the Climate in Africa 2019.
Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.
Available from: https://www.library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10421 World Meteorological Organization.
(2021), Weather-climate-water.
Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.
Available from: https://www.public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/weather-relateddisasters-increase-over-past-50-years-causing-more-damage-fewer Yameogo, C.E.W., Dauda, R.O.S.
(2020), The effect of income inequality and economic growth on environmental quality: A comparative analysis between Burkina Faso and Nigeria.
Journal of Public Affairs, 7(2), 148-163.
Yang, Z., Ren, J., Ma, S., Chen, X., Cui, S., Xiang, L. (2022), The emission inequality nexus: Empirical evidence from a wavelet-based quantile-on quantile regression approach.
Frontiers in Environment Science, 10, 871846.
Yue, X.L., Gao, Q.X.
(2018), Contributions of natural systems and human activity to greenhouse gas emissions.
Advances in Climate Change Research, 9(4), 243-252.
Ogbeide-Osaretin, et al.
: Climate Change, Poverty and Income Inequality Linkage: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 12 • Issue 5 • 2022 341 APPENDIX Table A1: Autoregressive distributed lag model bounds test for income inequality equation ARDL bounds test Date: 04/29/22 Time: 01:14 Sample: 1981 2020 Included observations: 40 Null Hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist Test statistic Value k F-statistic 2.717687 5 Critical value bounds Significance (%) I0 Bound I1 Bound 10 2.26 3.35 5 2.62 3.79 2.5 2.96 4.18 1 3.41 4.68 ARDL: Autoregressive distributed lag model Table A2: Autoregressive distributed lag model bounds test for climate change equation ARDL bounds test Date: 04/29/22 Time: 01:03 Sample: 1981 2020 Included observations: 40 Null hypothesis: No long-run relationships exist Test statistic Value k F-statistic 2.661207 6 Critical value bounds Significance (%) I0 bound I1 bound 10 2.12 3.23 5 2.45 3.61 2.5 2.75 3.99 1 3.15 4.43 ARDL: Autoregressive distributed lag model
.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 6 • 2019124 International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy ISSN: 2146-4553 available at http: www.econjournals.com International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2019, 9(6), 124-130.
Exploring the Impact of Renewable Energy on Climate Change in the GCC Countries Amira Kasem, Mohammad Alawin* Department of Economics, Kuwait University, Kuwait.
*Email: m_alawin@hotmail.com Received: 17 June 2019 Accepted: 06 September 2019 DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.8477 ABSTRACT This study provides a theoretical framework for the role of renewable energy in mitigating the climate change in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
The abundancy of renewable resources and widely accessible technology are the key drivers for the renewable energy business in the GCC.
However, lack of effective policies and regulations, along with subsidized fuel prices, are slowing down the implementation of renewable resource options.
This study will illustrate the potential, the challenges, and the barriers of implementing renewable energy technologies in the GCC region.
In addition, this research empirically examines the impact of renewable energy sources and other factors in the GCC countries in reducing the carbon dioxide emissions, using pooled ordinary least square regression analysis with fixed effect specification.
The results indicate that renewable energy consumption, GDP per capita, and electrical power consumption have a statistically significant impact on CO2 emissions.
Keywords: Renewable Energy, Electrical Power, GCC Countries JEL Classifications: Q20, Q30, Q40 1.
INTRODUCTION The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies rely overly on hydrocarbons for energy production.
Burning huge amounts of these fossil fuels domestically is not a sustainable process.
The rapid socio-economic growth, characterized by increasing population, high rates of urbanization and substantial industrialization, consumes more and more energy to fulfil basic requirements.
Demand for electricity is accelerating; it doubled during the last decade and is expected to keep growing by approximately 7-8% annually (Aloughani, 2015).
The high demand for energy in the GCC region causes excessive and inefficient hydrocarbon use that in turn is damaging the environment and human health.
Since the nineteenth century, scientists and researchers have studied the influence of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) on the atmosphere.
Recently, concerns have grown because of the global climate change issue caused by the rise of the accumulated GHGs.
Oddly, few controls and monitoring existed for one of the major GHGs, carbon dioxide.
CO2 concentration has increased to reach about 400 parts per million (ppm) of atmospheric concentration.
Climate change is considered as the most severe environmental phenomenon and the greatest threat to the world.
Daily human activities, such as transportation, farming, deforestation, industrialization, and manufacturing, produce GHGs.
Global warming and the ensuing climate change are regarded as a result of man-made GHG emissions, including water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone.
These gases accumulate in the atmospheric space, entangle the heat from the sun, and, consequently, cause climate change.
These changes have led to catastrophic events like storms, droughts, rise in sea levels, and floods (Scientific Advisory Panel, 2018).
With the burning of fossil sources of energy in the Gulf states causing CO2 emissions, global climate change will cause serious negative environmental impacts on the region.
Agriculture and water resources will be affected by the rising temperatures.
As the evaporation increases, This Journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License Kasem and Alawin: Exploring the Impact of Renewable Energy on Climate Change in the GCC Countries International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 6 • 2019 125 the demand for energy will increase.
Furthermore, the levels of the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean will rise, and the risk of desertification and salinization of soil and groundwater will become real threats.
To address climate change, GCC countries established a framework to promote clean and renewable energy solutions as a path to sustainable development, as well as to protect the environment.
Therefore, GCC countries have joined many international environmental agreements such as The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol of climate change.
The UNFCCC obligated industrialized countries and “transitioning economy” countries to achieve quantified emission reduction targets for GHG.
The Kyoto Protocol was signed by 192 parties, including the GCC countries, and it took effect on February 16, 2005 (Raouf, 2008).
Renewable energy sources (RES) comprise solar, wind, hydropower, and other sources.
RES are relatively clean, widely available, and unlimited.
In addition, RES are the only sustainable alternative to fossil fuels.
According to Besha (2011), RES currently supply about 15-20% of world energy demand.
It is evident that as renewable energy technology matures and becomes widely implemented, the cost gap between it and traditional energy sources will be minimized.
Closing this gap enables RES to become cost effective compared to conventional energy.
This paper is organized as follows.
Section (2) encompasses the relevant literature review and previous studies.
Section (3) details the theoretical framework that explains the RES phenomenon and analyzes the challenges and barriers of RES Technology in the case of the Gulf countries.
Section (4) describes the methodology and empirical work.
The interpretation of the descriptive results are in section (5); and conclusions are in section (6).
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW Many studies in renewable energy systems emphasize that renewable energy must be now a priority for all countries worldwide.
Scholars illustrate the vital role of renewable energy in mitigating climate change and study how beneficial is the utilization of the world’s renewable resources.
Some scholars pay special attention to the GCC’s energy market and RES.
Various studies have found a significant association between sustainable growth and a diversified economy.
Some countries are considered successful models in economic diversification.
GCC countries attempt to achieve the best level of growth and prosperity by diversifying the economy to avoid the instability linked to the over-reliance on oil resources (Saif-Alyousfi et al., 2018).
Poudineh et al.
(2016) shows that resource-rich MENA economies are still behind in the move towards renewable energy because of infrastructure inadequacy, insufficient institutional capacity, risks, and uncertainties.
The authors suggest a new dynamic approach consisting of a partial subsidy program and a partial fossil fuel price adjustment to balance fiscal sustainability with political stability.
This policy approach might lead to more development in the renewables markets.
Aloughani (2015) discusses the challenges of RES strategies in the GCC countries.
The author explains that because the nature of the Gulf countries is convenient for RES, these resources are considered as the new vision for future energy.
However, many challenges are associated with renewable energy technologies such as economic, technical, social, and environmental.
A cost analysis between traditional energy using oil and gas and RES energy finds that many producers accept the concept of cutting subsidies on traditional energy to promote RES.
Ley (2017) highlights the fact that decentralized renewable energy (DRE) projects contribute to climate change mitigation, e.g.
provide electricity that can reduce over-dependence on natural resources.
DRE systems are utilized for emissions reduction and poverty alleviation, but their role for climate change has yet to be analysed.
Ley’s study shows that despite the wide variety of applications of DRE systems, the applicability of these systems towards climate impacts are not considered.
Luttenberger (2015) Illustrates that Croatia with its massive renewable solar energy potential still underperforms in solar usage for electricity production and heating.
Luttenberger highlights the reasons for this by analysing Croatia’s environmental policies and subsidies, international financial institutions financing new renewable energy projects, the power of utility companies, and the social dimension of RES.
To secure reasonable renewable energy shares in Croatia’s energy supply mix, the government should act as a regulator with various instruments to enhance the renewable energy use in cooperation with local authorities.
Sasana and Putri (2018) discusses the increase of energy consumption that has become one of the world problems, especially in developing countries moving toward industrialization, like Indonesia.
Sasana and Putri analyzes the effect of fossil energy consumption, population growth, and consumption of renewable energy on carbon dioxide emission.
The result, using an ordinary least square (OLS) approach, showed that fossil energy consumption and population growth have a positive influence on carbon dioxide emissions in Indonesia.
On the other hand, the estimated renewable energy consumption (REC) has a negative effect on carbon dioxide emissions.
The study conducted by Mas’ud et al.
(2018) discusses the progress made on solar energy in the GCC countries.
They propose a plan to increase the share of RES by deploying solar energy for electrical power production and simultaneously reducing the huge dependency of GCC countries on fossil fuels.
To emphasize this approach, governments must promote relevant policies and inform their citizens about the benefits of RES.
Some of the challenges and barriers facing the GCC countries are technological knowhow, policy development, and insufficient application of RE technology integrated within the buildings.
However, many areas of improvement are evident through promotion of research and development, public/private initiatives, legislation, and regulatory framework.
Kasem and Alawin: Exploring the Impact of Renewable Energy on Climate Change in the GCC Countries International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 6 • 2019126 Gastli and Armendariz (2013) report that according to the World Economic Forum, the GCC nations will be affected by climate change, producing increased pressure on scarce water resources and rising air pollution.
The authors present the challenges of the application of renewable energy in the GCC countries.
They highlight that the Efficiency Reduction vs.
Cell Temperature is the suitable technology for the GCC and find that the performance of solar cells in the GCC region will not be similar to their counterparts operating in Europe.
The study also discussed the reasons behind the lag in the application of renewables in the GCC region.
Those reasons are: insufficient awareness among decisionmakers, low investment, the fear of shifting from conventional energy sources to renewable and clean energy sources, lack of clear regulations and policies, lack of industrial motivation and lack of expertise and specialization.
Tugcu et al.
(2012) primarily examined the long-run and causal relationships between renewable and non-REC and economic growth by using classical and augmented production functions in G7 countries (1980-2009).
The findings show that neither renewable nor non-REC are related to economic growth.
Mathiesen et al.
(2011) illustrate that the high cost of GHG mitigation strategies dominate the debate between world leaders about the costs of mitigation and the distribution of these costs between different countries.
The analysis reveals that implementing renewable energy and efficient conversion technologies have a positive socio-economic effect, create employment, and potentially lead to high earnings on externalities, such as positive health effects.
Shafiei and Salim (2014) attempt to capture the determinants of CO2 emissions, using the STIRPAT model with panel data from 1980 to 2011, for OECD countries.
The results show a positive correlation between CO2 emissions and non-REC.
Alternatively, the more consumption of RES, then the less CO2 emissions.
The results include an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) between urbanization and CO2 emissions, indicating that with higher levels of urbanization, the environmental impact decreases.
Roca et al.
(2001) studied the relationship between environmental pollution and economic growth utilizing the EKC hypothesis.
EKC shows the positive relationship between income and environmental degradation in the short run, as the economy grows, while in the long run, this relationship reverses (i.e.
U-shaped).
However, the empirical evidence to support the hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between environmental degradation and economic growth is still criticized.
The following studies also are related with energy-growth nexus the GCC countires: Al-mulali et al.
(2019), Salahuddin et al.
(2015), Salahuddin et al.
(2018), Hassine and Harrathi (2017), Saqib (2018), Sbia et al.
(2017).
3.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 3.1.
Types of RES for GCC Countries 1.
Solar: sunlight that can directly heat and light different types of buildings and plants.
Solar architecture technologies used are passive solar design and active solar air and water heating thermal power systems.
2.
Ultra Efficient Solar Cells: regular solar panels usually convert less than 20% of solar energy into electricity, but this new technique doubles the power efficiency of solar devices.
3.
Wind: the heating and cooling of the earth by winds transformed into energy.
Wind technology can be land-based and/or offshore, using wind turbines.
4.
Hydropower: energy generated from moving (falling or running) water.
Hydropower plants use a pumped storage.
5.
Biomass: energy obtained from organic matter (ultimately from photosynthesis) through burning and digestion of wastes from municipal animals, humans, industrial, and agricultural sources.
Biomass can be used to heat water, producing steam that drives turbines, as in traditional power plants.
6.
Geothermal: energy generated from hot dry rocks and high enthalpy sources.
3.2.
Renewable Energy and its Barriers in GCC Countries Many countries, especially Gulf countries, try to use renewable energy as a substitute for conventional fossil fuels.
Despite the new technology benefits and effectiveness, its application faces many challenges and obstacles.
Government policies, public awareness, poor knowledge, lack of political support, and cheap oil and gas prices are some of the structural barriers to the use of RES.
Additionally, dust, heat, and humidity comprise major environmental obstacles for such energy generating technologies.
According to Wee et al.
(2012), The Union of Concerned Scientists classified barriers to RES into four categories.
First, commercialization ses and baseless tax when comparing RES and other energy sources create a barrier.
The mbarriers exist as the new technologies compete with traditional ones.
Subsidies that display price biaarket is not reflecting the social cost, and there is insufficient information about RES.
The cost of RES is a major concern to most governments.
Fossil fuel costs influence the cost of electric power and have affected the market price and consumption of RES.
Many legislations and plans are employed to minimize the gap between the prices of fossil fuels and RES by applying certification or tax refunds.
On the other hand, even though some RES are expensive, they are more attractive when considered in the context of volatile fossil fuel prices.
3.3.
The Negative Impact of Fossil Fuels on the Environment Conventional energy sources are limited in quantity and severely harmful to the environment.
According to the US Scientific Advisory Panel (2018), the burning of fossil fuels was responsible for 79% of US GHG emissions in 2010.
Atmospheric CO2 has increased by nearly 30%, and the average global temperature has risen by 0.3 (0.6°C) in recent decades (Chakraborty et al., 2000).
Many studies, scholars, and authorities, such as the International Energy Agency, explained that the burning of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other GHGs into the atmosphere and is most hazardous to humans and the environment.
Kasem and Alawin: Exploring the Impact of Renewable Energy on Climate Change in the GCC Countries International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 6 • 2019 127 According to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report (AR6 Climate Change 2021: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability), it is evident that climate change causes many natural disturbances worldwide, such as melting ice caps and an increasing number of extreme weather events.
Furthermore, it is anticipated that 75-200 million people are at risk of flooding by coastal storm due to a mid-range climate change.
A sea level rise of 40 cm is predicted by the 2080s.
3.4.
The Negative Impact of Fossil Fuels on Human Health Many researchers and studies illustrate the effect of climate change on human health.
Mukhopadhyay and Forssell (2005) concluded that changes in the broad-scale climate system would affect human mortality and morbidity, due to extreme heat and a higher level of air pollution.
Patz et al.
(2005) found that 40-60% of acute respiratory infections are due to environmental problems.
They concluded that, as the current consumption of fossil fuels is expected to increase 120% by the year 2020, more than 6.34 million people will die per year in developing countries due to emissions concentrations of particulate air pollution.
They reported that carbon monoxide is an extremely toxic gas and the source of photochemical smoke.
Smith et al.
(1999) assert that climate change in the form of heat waves, floods, and drought can lead to sunburn and melanoma.
They add that climate change is primarily responsible for causing heat stroke, drowning, and gastrointestinal diseases.
Therefore, GHG emissions must be reduced by 60-70% to maintain the atmosphere and limit the harmful effects to the ecological system.
3.5.
GCC Countries’ Approach to Environmental Sustainability GCC countries experienced a significant growth and development of infrastructure.
In parallel, the electricity and water desalination sectors, which depend on oil and gas, face remarkable growth as well.
The consumption of electricity in GCC countries has increased by 12.4% from 2005 to 2009 with an average 3.15% annually.
The average watts per person of 1149 in 2005 in the GCC countries was already almost three times the world average of 297 watts per person (Mondal and Khalil, 2012).
Because misuse of fossil fuels to generate electricity and sea water desalinization increase GHGs, the GCC countries need to enforce progress in reducing carbon emissions.
GCC countries are among the top 25 emitters of carbon dioxide per capita, contributing 2.4% of GHG emissions per capita worldwide.
The GCC countries planned to mitigate carbon emissions and other environmental issues by signing the Kyoto Protocol treaty (United Nations, 2006).
These agreements, in alignment with the GCC environmental policies, encourage and support the usage of RES locally to limit harmful emissions and reduce the negative effects of climate change.
Therefore, the GCC governments, along with the private sector and the general public, cooperated to shift from being merely oil producers into RES producers.
They also stated the financial, technological, and ecological benefits and costs from such projects (United Nations, 2006).
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have inadequate potential (2.5-4.5 m/s) for wind power, but Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar have at least moderate opportunities (5-7 m/s).
The conditions for solar energy potential in the GCC are among the most favourable globally (Reiche, 2010).
Many activities support RES application.
For example, King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology in Saudi Arabia conducts special research on solar energy and funds projects for RES Technologies, following similar initiatives in the US and Germany.
The Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, and the Middle East Desalination Research Center are successful examples of solar cooling system installations.
The Oman government supports Omani manufacturers and industries in utilizing RE sources.
Qatar joined the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, established a link among different channels of renewable energy technologies through an international database, and encourages Qatari colleges and universities to conduct RE research.
As Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries members, the GCC countries pledged $750m (US) to fund carbon capture and research (Copenhagen summit report, 2009).
3.6.
Wind and Solar Energy Sources in the GCC The environment of the GCC countries is well-suited for RE, due to unlimited, free solar and wind resources.
The GCC countries experience a high level of solar radiation exposure during the daylight hours, and approximately 1,400 hours per year of full load of high-speed wind.
Solar radiation levels throughout the GCC are greater than levels of solar radiation in areas where there are solar photovoltaic and solar thermal technologies.
The full load of wind enables the use of wind power generation technologies (Aloughani, 2015).
The development of solar energy is possible due to the daily average of nine hours of sunshine, low levels of rainfall, low cloud cover, and spacious lands (about 98.3% empty deserts).
In terms of generating economically feasible wind energy, the average speeds across the Gulf region lands are in the range of only 4.5-5.5 m/s.
The most favourable site for wind is along the Red Sea coast to the south (Aloughani, 2015).
UAE and Qatar are the leading GCC countries in utilizing RES.
Additionally, the three wind turbines that are expected in Bahrain will help generate 15% of its energy needs (Alnaser and Alnaser, 2009).
Due to the high cost of the new RES technology, the involvement of the private sector, supported by taxes and customs exemptions, along with the involvement of public and governmental authorities is essential.
Financial supports in the form of subsidies, lands for installation, and the operation of RE generating plants are required.
3.7.
Challenges to the Implementation of RE in GCC Cost is the first challenge to implementing RE in GCC countries.
High cost differentials make RES unable to compete with conventional power generation, because water, fuel, and electricity are heavily subsidized.
At the same time, low electricity costs fail to incentivize consumers to efficiently use energy.
Moreover, scarcity in land endowments in Qatar and Bahrain increase costs for RES.
Kasem and Alawin: Exploring the Impact of Renewable Energy on Climate Change in the GCC Countries International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 6 • 2019128 Regional environmental conditions impede the implementation of RE in the GCC countries.
Direct solar radiation is reduced due to dust and weak performance of the Concentrating Solar Power system due to high humidity.
Infrastructure regulations limit RE implementation; grid-tied RES systems are not permitted in some countries yet.
In addition, most grids are not well-equipped to handle the dynamics of solar energy systems.
Two related impediments to RE implementation are public awareness and knowledge.
Lack of public awareness and understanding of climate change and its negative implications deter the implementation of RE.
Data on the actual performance of solar systems, including weather data, are limited.
Additionally, limited R&D resources to develop and adapt solar technology to the exceptional climate circumstances impede the implementation of RE.
The RES industry requires qualified expertise, technicians, and designers.
There are several research institutes in the GCC, but research outputs are slow and still ineffective.
The current legislation and regulatory framework in the GCC countries is another challenge to RE implementation.
Despite some successes in the field of RES, there are still some limitations due to national policy framework strategies and a lack of national policy strategies to promote RES.
Public/Private initiatives for RES development can drive direct foreign investment in RES to the region.
Currently, these programs are inadequate; therefore, limiting investment in RES in the GCC countries.
4.
EMPIRICAL STUDY Identifying the relationship between renewable and non-REC and emissions is worth an academic investigation.
Numerous studies have dealt with the relationship between energy consumption and pollutant emissions.
These studies have been performed in different countries, various modelling methods, and findings.
However, to the best of researchers’ knowledge, only a few studies have investigated the relationship between energy consumption and CO2 emissions.
4.1.
Methodology and Datasets This analysis is conducted to investigate the relationship between energy consumption and CO2 emissions.
In this study, an econometric model is proposed using panel data of the GCC states between 1998 and 2015.
The estimated model is carried out to examine the relationship between several independent variables and CO2 emissions using the pooled OLS procedure.
All data are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) online database.
All the variables are transformed to logarithms for the purpose of the analysis.
Many empirical works address the issue of CO2 emissions empirically across different countries using different methods, but very few researchers capture the same issue for the GCC countries.
Therefore, this paper is following the recent empirical literature of Sulaiman, et al.
(2013), using the same hypothesis from their research and expanding on it.
This framework contributed to a better understanding of the factors that could significantly affect CO2 emissions in the GCC region and allowed for measurement of the impact of REC on CO2 in GCC countries.
The main restrictions in the study are data limitations.
It is possible to test the long-run relationship between CO2 emissions, economic growth, and the rest of the variables in a linear function.
The equation is structured by a dependent variable and four independent variables, and the model is estimated through the following equation, using the pooled OLS method: Eit = β0 + β1 GDPCit + β2 RECit + β3 RFWit + β4 ELPit + εit.
(1) Where E represents CO2 emissions in metric tons per capita.
Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement.
They include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring.
(GDPC) represents real GDP per capita.
(REC) represents REC.
It is the share of renewable energy in the total final energy consumption.
(RFW) represents renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters), which refer to resources like internal river flows and groundwater from rainfall.
(ELP) represents electric power consumption in kilowatts per hour per capita.
Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses, and own use by heat and power plants.
εt is the standard error term.
Twumasi (2017) finds a positive correlation between GDP and CO2 emissions.
Therefore, we expect to have a positive effect between GDPC and CO2 emissions.
On the other hand, renewable energy leads to decreasing CO2 emissions, so the expected signs of the coefficients related to REC and RFW variables are negative.
Finally, the ELP coefficient is expected to be positive.
Initially, equation 1 is examined using the pooled OLS across the GCC countries without taking heterogeneity into account.
Then, the equation is examined using random effect model and fixed effect model.
So as to decide the more proper model, the Hausman test is conducted to determine the more proper approach.
According to the Hausman test, the fixed effect model is the best model.
4.1.
Data Descriptive The data included in this paper cover the six GCC countries and are obtained from reliable sources.
The data are obtained from the World Bank through WDI.
WDI are a collection of indicators compiled from officially recognized international sources.
The World Bank data present the most current and accurate global development data available and include national, regional and global estimates.
Data for GDP per capita is measured in current local currency.
5.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS The basic model is estimated by the pooled OLS method.
Coefficients varied in significance level, magnitude, and expected signs.
The results of that model appear in Table 1.
Kasem and Alawin: Exploring the Impact of Renewable Energy on Climate Change in the GCC Countries International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 6 • 2019 129 According to Table 1, the results show that GDPC is statistically significant at 1%, indicating that there is a correlation between GDPC and CO2 emissions.
The magnitude and positive sign suggest that for a 1% increase in GDPC, the CO2 emissions will increase by 17.2%.
Moreover, this finding is consistent with our expectations.
The estimated coefficient for REC is also statistically significant but with negative sign.
This coefficient suggests that for a 1% increase in REC, the CO2 emissions will decrease by 41.16%, leading to less GHGs.
This result is also consistent with our theoretical expectations and is consistent with Sasana and Putri’s (2018) findings for fossil energy consumption and REC.
On the other hand, renewable internal freshwater resources flow (RFW) is statistically insignificant, indicating that there is not a statistically significant relationship between RFW and CO2 emissions.
Finally, ELP is statistically significant with a positive sign.
The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that for a 1% increase in ELP, CO2 emissions will increase by 60.14%.
The result is consistent with theory.
The Hausman test is conducted to select the proper approach for this study.
It shows that the P-value is significant at 2%.
Therefore, the null hypothesis of random effect can be rejected, and the fixed effect model is used for estimations.
Table 2 shows the results of the fixed effect and the random effect models.
According to the FE model, GDPC gave the unexpected sign, that is higher economic growth causes a reduction in CO2 emissions.
This result is against the finding of Twumasi (2017).
This could be interpreted as higher income encourages governments to work towards adopting new methods that reduce CO2 emissions.
REC is statistically significant across the GCC countries and has a negative sign.
The negative sign for the REC coefficient suggests that with more renewable energy utilization in the GCC, the CO2 emissions to the atmosphere will be reduced.
On the other hand, RFW is shown insignificant, which means it has no relationship with the CO2 emissions variable.
ELP is found to be significant with a positive relationship with CO2 emissions as theoretically expected.
More electrical power consumption leads to a higher level of GHGs.
6.
CONCLUSION Renewable energy is an effective tool to mitigate climate change, and the GCC countries support efforts to address climate change and try to implement efficient policies and strategies to fight it.
This study explains that the energy sector in the GCC countries is the main contributor to CO2 emissions, which is the major component of GHGs.
This research explores the impact of multiple variables on CO2 emissions, underscoring the importance and necessity of considering reform and regulations to minimize energy consumption.
Abundant renewable resources, along with high technology adoption, will support the renewable energy business in the GCC countries.
Using pooled OLS regression analysis, this research finds that RES contribute in reducing the carbon dioxide emissions.
The results indicate that GDP per capita, REC, and electrical power consumption have a statistically significant impact on CO2 emissions in the GCC countries.
Similar results were found by the FE model, except that GDPC gave the opposite sign.
This proves this variable could possibly have different effects as explained earlier.
Further studies are crucial to determine this issue.
REFERENCES Al-Mulali, U., Tang, C.F., Tan, B.W., Ozturk, I.
(2019), The nexus of electricity consumption and economic growth in gulf cooperation council economies: Evidence from non-stationary panel data methods.
Geosystem Engineering, 22(1), 40-47.
Alnaser, W.E., Alnaser, N.W.
(2009), Solar and wind energy potential in GCC countries and some related projects.
Journal of Renewable and Sustainable Energy, 1(2), 22301.
Aloughani, M. (2015), Renewable Energies Management Strategy Challenges in the Arabian Gulf Countries.
Doctoral Dissertation.
London: Brunel University.
Besha, P. (2011), Economic Growth Plus Rural Development: An Examination of China’s Solar Power Policies.
Georgia Institute of Technology.
2011 Atlanta Conference on Science and Innovation Policy.
Chakraborty, S., Tiedemann, A., Teng, P. (2000), Climate change: Potential impact on plant diseases.
Environmental Pollution, 108(3), 317-326.
Gastli, A., Armendariz, J.
(2013), Challenges facing grid integration of renewable energy in the GCC region.
In: EU-GCC Renewable Energy Policy Experts’ Workshop.
Abu Dhabi, UAE: Gulf Research Center.
p1-20.
Hassine, M.B., Harrathi, N. (2017), The causal links between economic growth, renewable energy, financial development and foreign trade in gulf cooperation council countries.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 7(2), 76-85.
Ley, D. (2017), Sustainable development, climate change, and renewable energy in rural central America.
In: Evaluating Climate Change Action for Sustainable Development.
Cham: Springer.
p187-212.
Luttenberger, L.R.
(2015), The barriers to renewable energy use in Croatia.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 49(C), 646-654.
Mas’ud, A.A., Wirba, A.V., Alshammari, S.J., Muhammad-Sukki, F., Abdullahi, M.A., Albarracín, R., Hoq, M.Z.
(2018), Solar energy potentials and benefits in the gulf cooperation council countries: A review of substantial issues.
Energies, 11(2), 372.
Mathiesen, B.V., Lund, H., Karlsson, K. (2011), 100% Renewable energy systems, climate mitigation and economic growth.
Applied Energy, 88(2), 488-501.
Table 1: Pooled OLS regression model (N=1660) Variables Coefficients Standard Error t-statistics P-value GDPC 0.1723141 0.0044151 39.03 0.000 REC –4.116207 0.1862659 –22.1 0.000 RFW –0.0001292 0.0028706 –0.04 0.964 ELP 0.6014481 0.0103708 57.99 0.000 Constant –4.099764 0.0994582 –41.22 0.000 R-squared 0.7815 OLS: Ordinary least square Table 2: Fixed Effect Model (N=76) (5% significance level) Variables Coefficients Standard Error GDPC −0.1015606 −0.0089469 REC −5.233155 −0.3733545 RFW 0.0013493 −0.0014587 ELP 1.103242 −0.0280573 Constant −5.982706 −0.2214249 R-squared 0.5773 Kasem and Alawin: Exploring the Impact of Renewable Energy on Climate Change in the GCC Countries International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 9 • Issue 6 • 2019130 Mondal, A., Khalil, H.S.
(2012), Renewable Energy Readiness Assessment Report: The GCC Countries.
Masdar, UAE: Masdar Institute.
Mukhopadhyay, K., Forssell, O.
(2005), An empirical investigation of air pollution from fossil fuel combustion and its impact on health in India during 1973-1974 to 1996-1997.
Ecological Economics, 55(2), 235-250.
Patz, J.A., Campbell-Lendrum, D., Holloway, T., Foley, J.A.
(2005), Impact of regional climate change on human health.
Nature, 438, 310-317.
Poudineh, R., Sen, A., Fattouh, B.
(2016), Advancing Renewable Energy in Resource-Rich Economies of the MENA.
Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
Raouf, M.A.
(2008), Climate Change Threats, Opportunities, and the GCC Countries.
Vol.
12.
Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief.
p1-17.
Reiche, D. (2010), Energy policies of gulf cooperation council (GCC) countries-possibilities and limitations of ecological modernization in rentier states.
Energy Policy, 38(5), 2395-2403.
Roca, J., Padilla, E., Farre, M., Galletto, V. (2001), Economic growth and atmospheric pollution in Spain: Discussing the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis.
Ecological Economics, 39(1), 85-99.
Saif-Alyousfi, A.Y., Md-Rus, R., Mohd, K.N.T.
(2018), Oil price and banking sectors in gulf cooperation council economies before and after the global financial turmoil: Descriptive analysis.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 8(6), 89-101.
Salahuddin, M., Alam, K., Ozturk, I., Sohag, K. (2018), The effects of electricity consumption, economic growth, financial development and foreign direct investment on CO2 emissions in Kuwait.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 81, 2002-2010.
Salahuddin, M., Gow, J., Ozturk, I.
(2015), Is the long-run relationship between economic growth, electricity consumption, carbon dioxide emissions and financial development in gulf cooperation council countries robust?
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 51, 317-326.
Saqib, N. (2018), Greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption and economic growth: Empirical evidence from gulf cooperation council countries.
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 8(6), 392-400.
Sasana, H., Putri, A.E.
(2018), The Increase of Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emission in Indonesia.
Vol.
31.
EDP Sciences E3S Web of Conferences.
p01008.
Sbia, R., Shahbaz, M., Ozturk, I.
(2017), Economic growth, financial development, Urbanisation and electricity consumption nexus in UAE.
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 30(1), 527-549.
Scientific Advisory Panel.
(2018), Environmental Progress and Renewable Energy.
United States: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Shafiei, S., Salim, R.A. (2014), Non-renewable and renewable energy consumption and CO2 emissions in OECD countries: A comparative analysis.
Energy Policy, 66, 547-556.
Smith, K.R., Corvalán, C.F., Kjellstrom, T. (1999), How much global ill health is attributable to environmental factors?
EpidemiologyBaltimore, 10(5), 573-584.
Sulaiman, J., Azman, A., Saboori, B.
(2013), The potential of renewable energy: Using the environmental Kuznets curve model.
American Journal of Environmental Sciences, 9(2), 103-112.
Tugcu, C.T., Ozturk, I., Aslan, A.
(2012), Renewable and nonrenewable energy consumption and economic growth relationship revisited: Evidence from G7 countries.
Energy Economics, 34(6), 1942-1950.
Twumasi, Y.A.
(2017), Relationship between CO2 emissions and renewable energy production in the United States of America.
Archives of Current Research International, 7(1), 1-12.
United Nations.
(2006), Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Bonn, Germany: United Nations.
Wee, H.M., Yang, W.H., Chou, C.W., Padilan, M.V.
(2012), Renewable energy supply chains, performance, application barriers, and strategies for further development.
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(8), 5451-5465.
No Job Name Decrease of lichens in Arctic ecosystems: the role of wildfire, caribou, reindeer, competition and climate in north-western Alaskapor_113 433..442 Kyle Joly,1,2 Randi R. Jandt3 & David R. Klein4 1 National Park Service, Gates of the Arctic National Park and Preserve, 4175 Geist Road Fairbanks, AK 99709, USA 2 Department of Biology and Wildlife, 211 Irving 1, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Fairbanks, AK 99775, USA 3 Bureau of Land Management, Alaska Fire Service, 1541 Gaffney Road, Fort Wainwright, AK 99703, USA 4 Institute of Arctic Biology, University of Alaska Fairbanks, P.O.
Box 757000, Fairbanks, AK 99775, USA Abstract We review and present a synthesis of the existing research dealing with changing Arctic tundra ecosystems, in relation to caribou and reindeer winter ranges.
Whereas pan-Arctic studies have documented the effects on tundra vegetation from simulated climate change, we draw upon recent long-term regional studies in Alaska that have documented the actual, on-the-ground effects.
Our review reveals signs of marked change in Arctic tundra ecosystems.
Factors known to be affecting these changes include wildfire, disturbance by caribou and reindeer, differential growth responses of vascular plants and lichens, and associated competition under climate warming scenarios.
These factors are interrelated, and, we posit, unidirectional: that is, they are all implicated in the significant reduction of terricolous lichen ground cover and biomass during recent decades.
Lichens constitute the primary winter forage for large, migratory caribou and reindeer herds, which in turn are a critical subsistence resource for rural residents in Alaska.
Thus, declines in these lichens are a major concern for rural people who harvest caribou and reindeer for subsistence, as well as for sport hunters, reindeer herders, wildlife enthusiasts and land managers.
We believe a more widely distributed and better integrated research programme is warranted to quantify the magnitude and extent of the decline in lichen communities across the Arctic.
Keywords Climate warming; disturbance; fire; grazing; lichens; Rangifer tarandus.
Correspondence Kyle Joly, National Park Service, 4175 Geist Road, Fairbanks, AK 99709, USA.
E-mail: kyle_joly@nps.gov doi:10.1111/j.1751-8369.2009.00113.x Climate warming is predicted to cause unprecedented change in the future (Parry et al.
2007).
Rapid and dramatic changes in both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems were already evident throughout much of the Arctic several years ago (Symon et al.
2005).
The Arctic is now experiencing the warmest temperatures it has seen over the past 400 years, and the rate of temperature rise is predicted to increase (Hinzman et al.
2005; Symon et al.
2005).
These climatic changes will have, and indeed are already having, a dramatic effect on the flora and fauna of the Arctic.
A comprehensive review of the effects of climate change on the winter range of reindeer (Rangifer tarandus tarandus) in Norway was conducted by Heggberget et al.
(2002).
Their review focused on how climate warming could affect the quality, distribution and availability of winter forage, with lichens being of specific interest (Heggberget et al.
2002).
Terricolous (ground-dwelling) lichens are the preferred winter forage, where available, for Rangifer populations, with specific species of interest that include Cladina mitis, Cladina rangiferina, Cladina stellaris, Cladonia amaurocraea, Cladonia gracilis, Cladonia uncialis, Cetraria cucullata, Cetraria ericetorum, Cetraria islandica and Cetraria nivalis (Ahti 1959; Scotter 1967; Pegau 1968; Holleman & Luick 1977; Thomas & Hervieux 1986; Thomas & Kiliaan 1998; Brodo et al.
2001).
Heggberget et al.
(2002) also reviewed the impacts of climate warming on alternative, vascular forage, and the impacts of grazing on lichens, whereas the role of wildfire, uncommon in Norwegian reindeer ranges, was only briefly covered.
The intent with our review is to build upon past reviews, highlighting the major driving factors altering Arctic flora, while focusing on the winter ranges of Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors 433 mailto:joly@nps.gov caribou (Rangifer tarandus granti) and reindeer (Rangifer, collectively) in Alaska.
By expanding the scope of the review to include the findings of recent long-term field and experimental studies on changes in the tundra ecosystems in Alaska, we believe that the possibility of panArctic changes should be considered.
There is strong agreement in climate change models with regards to temperature changes, and the rate of climate warming in Alaska is predicted to accelerate (Chapin et al.
2005; Symon et al.
2005; Parry et al.
2007).
Wildfires, a primary ecosystem driver in the boreal forest regions of Alaska, have increased in frequency and extent in recent years (Kasischke & Turetsky 2006; Shulski & Wendler 2007).
Though more common in boreal forest ecosystems, fires do occur within the tundra winter ranges of Rangifer (Jandt et al.
2008), and are expected to continue to increase in frequency (Higuera et al.
2008).
Although there is little agreement on how the moisture regime will be affected by climate change, it plays an important role in the ecology of the Arctic (Rouse et al.
1997), especially for lichens.
The reliance of lichens on atmospheric moisture and nutrients, and their slow growth, make them vulnerable to the disturbance and environmental changes driven by climate warming and drying.
Summer warming and drying, with increased evaporative loss, would lead to decreased growth rates in lichens if there was not an increase in precipitation, be it rain, fog or dew.
Continued climate warming is expected to have a direct impact on lichens in Arctic and subArctic plant communities, and to indirectly impact them through industrial development activities (Klein & Vlasova 1991), leading to concern that declining lichen communities could lead to reduced Rangifer populations.
Rangifer populations are heavily utilized by rural residents in Alaska, and are therefore important in their subsistence-dominated economies.
Caribou are sought after by sport hunters, and are appreciated by wildlife enthusiasts: groups that are important to the broader economy of Alaska.
Because of the importance of lichens in tundra ecosystem dynamics in Alaska, investigators have used longterm monitoring studies to understand their response to disturbance factors that affect their presence and distribution within the northern landscape.
We highlight four recent long-term studies in this review.
On St. Matthew Island (Fig.
1), in the northern Bering Sea, permanent plots were originally established in 1957, in conjunction with a study of feral reindeer (Klein 1968).
On the eastern Seward Peninsula, permanent plots were established in 1981 to monitor caribou grazing pressure and changes in vegetative cover within the core winter range of the Western Arctic Herd (WAH; Fig.
1; Joly, Jandt et al.
2007).
Jandt et al.
(2008) monitored post-fire succession from 1981 to 2006 using adjacent, paired burned and unburned transects within the same region.
Holt et al.
(2008) investigated plots on the western Seward Peninsula: a region used by both caribou and reindeer.
Twenty-nine reindeer were introduced to St. Matthew Island in 1944, as an emergency source of human food for personnel at a navigational station that was abandoned only two years later (Klein 1968).
Much of the vegetated portion of the island was initially blanketed with dense lichen mats.
The herd faced no predation pressure, and in the absence of humans the reindeer population rapidly increased, reaching 6000 animals in 1963.
By that time, the herd had decimated the lichen community, and, in conjunction with severe weather, a population crash occurred during the late winter of 1964 (Klein 1968).
The population expired shortly after the crash, as no viable males survived that winter, and the island has remained free of reindeer and other large herbivores ever since.
Lichen re-growth on the island was tracked during subsequent studies (Klein 1987; Klein & Shulski 2009) The WAH, Alaska’s largest caribou herd, reached a population of nearly 500 000 in 2003 (Dau 2005a).
It occupies a total range of about 363 000 km2 in northwestern Alaska.
The centre of the herd’s wintering area lies just east of the Seward Peninsula, and is dominated by tussock tundra, but also contains extensive areas of boreal forest and alpine ecosystems.
The herd is highly migratory, and faces predation from wolves (Canis lupus), bears (primarily Ursus arctos), other carnivores and golden eagles (Aquila chrysaetos).
The WAH remains an important resource in the subsistence-dominated lifestyle of the people of the region, which emphasizes the need for an increased understanding of caribou–habitat relationships for the effective management and conservation of the herd.
In recent years there has been an increased focus on changes in plant community structure within the winter range of the herd, primarily associated with the influences of wildfire and climate change, and their effects on habitat quality for Rangifer and other herbivores (Racine et al.
1985; Racine et al.
1987; Sturm et al.
2001; Joly et al.
2007; Jandt et al.
2008).
The role of terricolous lichens, which constitute the majority (60–80%) of the diet of WAH caribou in winter (Saperstein 1996), in the ecosystem dynamics of tundra and boreal forest habitats, remains poorly understood.
Reindeer were first introduced to the Seward Peninsula in 1892 through the efforts of Sheldon Jackson, then Commissioner for Education in Alaska, for the purpose of providing a stable supply of food for the native inhabitants (Stern et al.
1980).
Reindeer herding on the Seward Peninsula was at its apex in the 1930s, when more than 100 000 animals were present, but numbers since have Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystems K. Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors434 greatly declined (Stern et al.
1980).
With the expansion of the WAH in recent decades making herding of reindeer no longer feasible over all but the westernmost portion of the peninsula, the industry has been reduced to less than 10 000 reindeer (Dau 2000).
Studies of the effects of wildfire and grazing by both Rangifer species on the Seward Peninsula have been carried out by Holt et al.
(2008).
Wildfire The role of wildfire in boreal forest succession is relatively well studied.
In Alaska, the burn area correlates strongly with increased summer temperature (Duffy et al.
2005).
The frequency and extent of wildfires in North American boreal ecosystems have increased in recent decades (Kasischke & Turetsky 2006).
Caribou forage lichens are especially vulnerable to being consumed by fire during dry summers (Auclair 1983; Dunford et al.
2006), because of their growth form and rapid loss of moisture content in response to decreases in relative humidity that proceed a fire front.
Caribou are known to avoid recently burned areas in the boreal forest: that is, areas burned within the last 50 years (Thomas et al.
1996; Thomas et al.
1998; Joly et al.
2003; Dalerum et al.
2007).
Less is known about the role of fire in Arctic tundra ecosystems.
Fires are relatively uncommon, and are of limited extent, in tundra ecosystems (Wein 1976; Payette et al.
1989), although they are somewhat more common in the Noatak River valley and the Seward Peninsula (Racine et al.
1985; Racine et al.
1987)—both are areas within the range of the WAH.
Similarly, the incidence of fires is increasing within the range of the WAH (Fig.
2; this study).
However, a corresponding trend in the acreage burned has not yet been identified, which may be because of improved firefighting capabilities.
In 2007, a Fig.
1 Total annual range of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd, shown outlined by the thick, solid black line, within which the dark-grey shaded area is the core winter range, in north-western Alaska (courtesy of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game).
Areas shaded black within the range of the herd depict recent burns (< 55 years old) in boreal forest habitats while stippled areas depict burns within tundra habitats, for the period 1950–2007 (courtesy of the Alaska Fire Service).
Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystemsK.
Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors 435 single fire burned over 100 000 ha of tundra, making it the largest fire on record north of the Arctic Circle in Alaska (the north-easternmost fire in Fig.
1; this study).
In addition to the unusual size of this tundra fire, the fact that it burned so late into the season (e.g., late September, when small lakes had already frozen) was remarkable.
This fire elicited concern from local rural residents that Arctic tundra fires may become an issue in the future.
Caribou forage lichens are also vulnerable to being consumed by wildfire in tundra habitats, and are a major component of these ecosystems.
The response of caribou to burned tundra habitat has received much less attention than in boreal ecosystems.
In fact, only one regional study of these effects has been undertaken so far.
This recent analysis using satellite telemetry data determined that caribou avoided burned tundra habitat in mid-winter for up to 55 years (Joly, Bente et al.
2007).
In complementary studies, it was shown that the lichen cover in burned tundra areas was less than 5% at 30 or 35 years post-fire (Holt et al.
2008; Jandt et al.
2008, respectively).
This level of lichen cover is not likely to be great enough for caribou to seek it out as foraging habitat (Arseneault et al.
1997; Joly, Jandt et al.
2007).
Wildfires reduce the abundance of lichens, especially the late-succession fruticose lichens that are the primary caribou forage lichens, for decades in tundra ecosystems (Morneau & Payette 1989; Arseneault et al.
1997; Racine et al.
2004; Holt et al.
2006; Holt et al.
2008; Jandt et al.
2008).
Furthermore, post-fire lichen recovery is taking longer than has been predicted (Jandt et al.
2008).
The Natural Resource Conservation Service forecasted lichen cover of >20% at 10 years post-fire, and of >30% at 20 years post-fire, on the Seward Peninsula (Swanson et al.
1985), whereas lichen cover has remained at under 5% for 20–35 years post-fire on the plots examined by Jandt et al.
(2008).
Caribou and reindeer Rangifer directly affect lichen abundance through grazing and trampling (Ahti 1959; Klein 1968, 1982, 1987; Pegau 1969; Moser et al.
1979; Helle & Aspi 1983; van der Wal et al.
2001; van der Wal 2006).
These effects can occur at local and regional levels (Moser et al.
1979; Morneau & Payette 1989; Arseneault et al.
1997).
On St. Matthew Island, Klein (1968, 1987) reported on the population increase and crash of the introduced reindeer, and their impact on the island flora.
Heavy grazing pressure exerted by reindeer on St. Matthew Island as the population increased to its peak, without the option for dispersal or movement from the island, resulted in the near total removal of lichens, with few live fragments from which forage lichen species could regenerate (Klein & Shulski 2009).
Although lichen cover and biomass recovered somewhat from 1985 to 2005, it was still below historic levels (Klein & Shulski 2009).
Lichen biomass on St. Matthew Island was just 12% of that on neighbouring Hall Island, which had not been populated by reindeer (Klein & Shulski 2009).
The WAH reached a record high population level (490 000 caribou) by 2003, causing the general public and Fig.
2 The incidence of reported fires from 1950 to 2007 occurring within the range of the Western Arctic Caribou Herd, north-western Alaska (compiled from Alaska Fire Service data).
The solid black line represents the 5-year moving average, and the dashed grey line is a best-fit trend polynomial.
Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystems K. Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors436 land managers to become concerned about the possibility of deteriorating winter ranges through heavy grazing pressure (Dau 2005a).
In fact, lichen cover had declined by more than 50% (Joly, Jandt et al.
2007) on permanent unburned transects in the winter range between 1981 and 2005, coincident with the population rise.
Joly, Jandt et al.
(2007) determined that the decline in lichen cover was significantly related to the amount of caribou utilization: 31% of the variation in the decline of lichens was explained by caribou utilization.
On the Seward Peninsula, areas that were heavily grazed by reindeer had lower lichen cover and shorter thallus heights than areas that were lightly grazed (Holt et al.
2008).
The recovery of lichen communities from heavy grazing by caribou and reindeer can take a few to many decades, depending on the intensity and duration of grazing, past history of grazing, the suite of lichen species present, characteristics of snow cover at the time of use by the caribou or reindeer, and the duration of the growth season and its favourability for lichen growth (Pegau 1969; Thing 1984; Messier et al.
1988; Henry & Gunn 1990).
Competition with vascular plants Graminoids (grasses and sedges) are known to increase under heavy grazing pressure from reindeer and caribou in lichen-dominated plant communities (Klein 1968; Thing 1984; Post & Klein 1999), and are also predicted to increase under global warming scenarios (Chapin et al.
1995; Walker et al.
2006).
These taxa rapidly increased in the WAH winter range over a 25-year period, more than doubling their percentage cover (Joly, Jandt et al.
2007).
Holt et al.
(2008) revealed a strong negative correlation between lichen and graminoid cover.
Shrub height and cover extent is also expected to increase with climate warming (Chapin et al.
1995; van Wijk et al.
2003; Walker et al.
2006), and studies using aerial photography indicate that shrub expansion is already occurring in Arctic and sub-Arctic Alaska (Sturm et al.
2001; Tape et al.
2006).
Dwarf shrub cover has increased by more than 35% in north-western Alaska over the past 25 years (Joly, Jandt et al.
2007).
Tall shrubs (e.g., Alnus spp.)
have noticeably increased within the WAH winter range, based on time-paired photos (Bureau of Land Management, unpubl.
data).
Vascular plant species compete with lichens for sunlight and available ground surface substrate.
This competition can lead to declining lichen cover in Arctic tundra ecosystems.
These vascular taxa not only directly compete with lichens, but they also alter the snow-melt patterns, which could lead to even greater shrub cover (Sturm et al.
2005).
Although the shrubs may interfere with the winter grazing of lichens by Rangifer, the smothering (by shed leaves of deciduous shrubs) and shading effects of the shrubs may be more detrimental to the lichens.
The expansion of vascular plants has also come at the expense of some mosses, which have declined by 67% in the WAH winter range (Joly, Jandt et al.
2007).
This may prove to be important regionally, as Holt et al.
(2008) determined that there was a positive correlation between lichen and moss cover.
Climate change The observed reduction in lichen cover in north-western Alaska over the past 25 years cannot be attributed solely to wildfire and the effects of Rangifer grazing.
The slow rate of the re-establishment of lichens on St. Matthew Island, and their subsequent growth, has been further retarded by pronounced climate warming in recent decades, with associated atmospheric drying (Klein & Shulski 2009).
In areas that contain high densities of Rangifer or other animal populations in summer, atmospheric drying could result in increased damage to lichen communities by trampling (Cooper et al.
2001).
Lichen cover has declined on some unburned Seward Peninsula transects that have only experienced light caribou grazing (Joly, Jandt et al.
2007).
Jandt et al.
(2008) also revealed that lichen cover dropped from 20 to 6% on unburned transects with low caribou use.
Furthermore, the recovery of lichen communities after wildfire has regressed on transects on the Seward Peninsula over the past decade (Jandt et al.
2008).
Analyses of the implications of climate change on tundra ecosystems as well as experimental warming studies predict that lichens and mosses will be negatively affected as a result of warming and drying (Chapin et al.
1995; Robinson et al.
1998; Cornelissen et al.
2001; van Wijk et al.
2003; Epstein et al.
2004; Hollister et al.
2005; Walker et al.
2006; Wiedermann et al.
2007), and we posit that recent observations from north-western Alaska augment this body of evidence.
Furthermore, decreases in lichen and moss cover have also been detected on the North Slope of northern central Alaska between 1984 and 2002 (Jorgensen & Buchholtz 2003).
Alternatively, lichens in alpine habitats may benefit from increased temperatures if there is little competition with vascular species (Molau & Alatalo 1998) and sufficient atmospheric moisture (Cooper et al.
2001).
The effects of climate change on Arctic ecosystems will not, however, be easy to predict, especially changes in the moisture regime (Rouse et al.
1997; Wookey 2007).
Snow is a critical factor in determining the accessibility of winter forage for Rangifer (Heggberget et al.
2002).
Rangifer prefer to forage in areas where the snow is less hard and shallow (Collins & Smith 1991).
Exceptionally deep snow, in conjunction with depleted lichens, was a Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystemsK.
Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors 437 factor in the crash of the reindeer herd on St. Matthew Island.
In the Arctic, warming will be especially pronounced during winter (Hinzman et al.
2005; Symon et al.
2005).
Warmer winters could be accompanied by increased rain-on-snow events that form ice crusts, or engulf vegetation, at ground level on Rangifer winter ranges.
Within the winter range of the WAH, two of these events have been documented, along with the associated caribou die-offs (Dau 2005b).
Interactions Wildfire, disturbance by Rangifer, competition with vascular plants and climate change all independently act to reduce lichen cover in Arctic tundra ecosystems.
These factors, however, are also interactive.
Wildfires consume lichens, but also facilitate rapid increases in shrub and graminoid cover through nutrient release and soil warming (Racine et al.
2004; Jandt et al.
2008).
Darker surfaces left by wildfire charring may reduce surface albedo, leading to more melting, which would give competitive advantage to vascular taxa over lichens.
Deep burns also expose suitable mineral soil seedbeds for the establishment of new shrubs: particularly willows, which have efficient wind-aided seed dispersal.
The establishment of new willows (Salix pulchra) following fire on the Seward Peninsula has been documented (Racine et al.
2004).
Greater shrub cover could also reduce the surface albedo, over that of the pre-burn tundra vegetation (Chapin et al.
2005).
Herbivory can also induce fairly rapid changes in tundra plant community structure, both directly and indirectly (Thing 1984; Arseneault et al.
1997; van der Wal 2006; Klein & Shulski 2009).
Areas heavily grazed by reindeer had 26% higher vascular plant cover than areas that were lightly grazed (Holt et al.
2008).
The reduction of lichens by grazing Rangifer may also affect the surface albedo and plant community structure, which could lead into a feedback loop with further declines in lichens.
Climate warming induces change more slowly, and is the most difficult factor to document with field studies.
However, longer growing seasons, increased photosynthetic activity and accelerated leaf tissue maturation have all been detected in tundra ecosystems (Goetz et al.
2005).
Climate warming could lead to more dwarf birch (Betula nana) across tundra ecosystems in northern Alaska (van Wijk et al.
2003), which was the primary fuel when this region had significantly more frequent fires (Higuera et al.
2008).
Thus, climate warming may induce changes in shrub species dominance and cover, which, in conjunction with warmer temperatures, could increase fire frequency (Higuera et al.
2008).
Climate warming and summer drought are correlated with more frequent and extensive wildfires in Alaska, northern Canada and Siberia (Wein 1976; Duffy et al.
2005; McCoy & Burn 2005; Soja et al.
2007), which could accelerate lichen declines and the potential disappearance of old-growth lichen tussock tundra communities in north-west Alaska (Rupp et al.
2000), thereby further degrading the caribou winter range (see Rupp et al.
2006).
The decline in lichen biomass within plant communities that previously had a major lichen component appears to result from the warmer summers of recent decades, which favour vascular plant growth.
Moreover, the associated dryer conditions at the ground surface inhibit lichen re-growth following either wildfire or moderate to heavy winter grazing by Rangifer species.
In other words, climate change may extend the lichen regeneration time lines following disturbance by either wildfire or Rangifer grazing (Gough et al.
2008; Jandt et al.
2008; Klein & Shulski 2009).
The negative effects of climate warming on the Rangifer winter range may be partially offset by the improved spring forage quality resulting from earlier snowmelt (Cebrian et al.
2008).
However, as spring forage quality and availability are temperature dependent, whereas caribou migration and calving are cued by changes in day length, a trophic mismatch may arise (Post & Forchhammer 2008).
In West Greenland, this trophic mismatch has resulted in decreased calf production and increased calf mortality (Post & Forchhammer 2008).
Conclusions Our review of the theoretical, experimental and actual outcomes of climate warming reveals a decrease in the extent and biomass of fruticose lichens over recent decades in north-western Alaska.
Our current understanding of the primary factors influencing Arctic tundra ecosystems, inclusive of wildfire, grazing by Rangifer species, competition with vascular plants and climate change, leads us to conclude that these factors are unidirectional, interrelated and most likely have led to a marked decline in lichens among plant communities at high latitudes across Alaska.
Changes in Arctic and sub-Arctic lichen communities in Alaska may be representative of changes elsewhere in the Arctic (Shaver & Jonasson 1999), with the possible exception of the Fennoscandian Arctic (Callaghan et al.
1999).
Our review, in concert with others (e.g., Heggberget et al.
2002), leads us to question if these changes may well be pan-Arctic in nature, and may foreshadow major changes in plant community structure throughout the world’s circumpolar regions.
Lichens are considered to be critical winter forage for the large, migratory herds of caribou in North America, Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystems K. Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors438 for the wild reindeer in Eurasia, as well as for the semi-domesticated reindeer throughout the Arctic, particularly for herds that face predation (White et al.
1981; Klein 1982; Syroechkovskii 1995; Heggberget et al.
2002).
Thus, the decline of lichens in Arctic and sub-Arctic plant communities should concern land managers, subsistence and sport hunters, reindeer herders and wildlife enthusiasts.
Some researchers have postulated that the transition from a lichen-rich winter diet to one dominated by graminoids may not adversely affect Rangifer populations (Bergerud 1974; Heggberget et al.
2002; van der Wal 2006).
This postulation, however, is based on ad libitum feeding trials with individual animals in captivity (Jacobsen & Skjenneberg 1975), and extrapolation from HighArctic, low-density populations of Peary caribou (Rangifer tarandus pearyi; Thomas & Edmonds 1983) and the Svalbard caribou (Rangifer tarandus platyrhynchus).
The latter, in the absence of predators, with little winter snow accumulation and with little need for efficient mobility, acquired morphological, physiological and behavioural adaptations that, unlike other caribou, equip them for winter survival through low energy expenditure, a greater capacity for fat storage, and an increased efficiency in the digestion of graminoids and mosses (Tyler 1987).
On predator-free, High-Arctic islands, low-density populations of Rangifer can survive without abundant fruticose lichens (van der Wal et al.
2001; Heggberget et al.
2002).
Lichens, as a component of the winter diet of the continental WAH, have declined during the past decade, with corresponding increases in graminoids (Joly, Cole et al.
2007).
Therefore, the WAH may serve as a test case for assessing the importance of lichens for large, migratory caribou herds that face predation.
Declining recruitment in the herd (Dau 2005a) concurrent with the decline in lichens on the landscape and in the diet, and the avoidance of recently (within 55 years) burned areas on the winter range (Joly, Bente et al.
2007), despite the quick and vigorous regrowth of graminoids (Jandt et al.
2008), appear to be initial evidence supporting the importance of climate warming and a lichen-rich winter diet for this herd.
Furthermore, the initial population estimate for the WAH in 2007 revealed a 20% decline from the population high of 490 000 in 2003 (Dau, pers.
comm.).
It has been hypothesized that Rangifer herds may become smaller, more sedentary and utilize mountainous habitat more, as a result of climate warming and declining lichen communities (Heggberget et al.
2002).
The work of Holleman et al.
(1979) also supports the theory that more mobile Rangifer utilize greater proportions of lichen in their diets.
Thus, the potential loss of dense and extensive lichen communities in the Arctic could lead to declines in herd sizes, and changes in distribution, behaviour and diet of Rangifer, rather than leading towards their extirpation.
The role of wildfire in caribou winter ecology has long been debated (Leopold & Darling 1953; Scotter 1970; Klein 1982).
However, of the four factors affecting lichen abundance, wildfire appears to be the one that land managers have the most control over, and thus garners the most attention.
We promote the idea of improving the synthesis of existing research, supporting new research projects to address knowledge gaps and using this information to develop fire management plans for the winter ranges of large, migratory Rangifer herds.
In addition, an integrated, international effort is needed to investigate the role of lichens in Arctic and sub-Arctic ecosystems, and the responses of lichens to changes in the environment: changes that have accelerated in recent decades (Symon et al.
2005).
Such an effort should encompass: climate change detection and modelling; the assessment of the long-term impacts of boreal forest and tundra wildfires, and the related soil dynamics; determining the competitive feedbacks between lichens, shrubs and graminoids in plant community structure; and impacts on caribou ecology.
Furthermore, dramatic changes in seaice dynamics, which strongly influence Arctic weather patterns, may lead to even more pronounced changes on terrestrial Arctic ecosystems.
Land managers throughout the Arctic could use such data to guide strategies for fire and resource management that fit with the changing climate.
Acknowledgements We thank all the Bureau of Land Management employees that have worked on the various projects mentioned in this paper, especially R. Meyers and J. Cole.
J. Allen, T. Chapin, K. Kielland, R. Meyers, G. Theisen, R. van der Wal and anonymous reviewers provided comments and discussions that were helpful for developing this manuscript.
References Ahti T. 1959.
Studies on the caribou lichen stands of Newfoundland.
Annales Botanici Societatis Zoologicae Botanicae Fennicae Vanamo 30.
Helsinki: Societas Zoologica Botanica Fennica Vanamo.
Arseneault D., Villeneuve N., Boismenu C., Leblanc Y.
& Deshaye J.
1997.
Estimating lichen biomass and caribou grazing on the wintering grounds of northern Quebec: an application of fire history and Landsat data.
Journal of Applied Ecology 34, 65–78.
Auclair A.N.D.
1983.
Role of fire in lichen-dominated tundra and forest–tundra.
In R.W.
Wein & D.A.
MacLean (eds.
): Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystemsK.
Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors 439 Role of fire in northern circumpolar ecosystems.
Pp.
235–256.
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Bergerud A.T. 1974.
Decline of caribou in North America following settlement.
Journal of Wildlife Management 38, 757–770.
Brodo I.M., Sharnoff S.D.
& Sharnoff S. 2001.
Lichens of North America.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Callaghan T.V., Press M.C., Lee J.A., Robinson D.L.
& Anderson C.W.
1999.
Spatial and temporal variability in the response of Arctic terrestrial ecosystems to environmental change.
Polar Research 18, 191–197.
Cebrian M.R., Kielland K. & Finstad G. 2008.
Forage quality and reindeer productivity: multiplier effects amplified by climate change.
Arctic, Antarctic and Alpine Research 40, 48–54.
Chapin F.S.
III, Shaver G.R., Giblin A.E., Nadelhoffer K.J.
& Laundre J.A.
1995.
Responses of Arctic tundra to experimental and observed changes in climate.
Ecology 76, 694–711.
Chapin F.S.
III, Sturm M., Serreze M.C., McFadden J.P., Key J.R., Lloyd A.H., McGuire A.D., Rupp T.S., Lynch A.H., Schimel J.P., Beringer J., Chapman W.L., Epstein H.E., Euskirchen E.S., Hinzman L.D., Jia G., Ping C.-L., Tape K.D., Thompson C.D.C., Walker D.A.
& Welker J.M.
2005.
Role of land-surface changes in Arctic summer warming.
Science 310, 657–660.
Collins W.B.
& Smith T.S.
1991.
Effects of wind-hardened snow on foraging by reindeer (Rangifer tarandus).
Arctic 44, 217–222.
Cooper E.J., Smith F.M.
& Wookey P.A.
2001.
Increased rainfall ameliorates the negative effect of trampling on the growth of High Arctic forage lichens.
Symbiosis 31, 153–171.
Cornelissen J.H.C., Callaghan T.V., Alatalo J.M., Michelsen A., Graglia E., Hartley A.E., Hik D.S., Hobbie S.E., Press M.C., Robinson C.H., Henry G.H.R., Shaver G.R., Phoenix G.K., Jones D.G., Jonasson S., Chapin F.S., Molau U., Neill C., Lee J.A., Melillo J.M., Sveinbjornsson B.
& Aerts R. 2001.
Global change and arctic ecosystems: is lichen decline a function of increases in vascular plant biomass?
Journal of Ecology 89, 984–994.
Dau J.
2000.
Managing reindeer and wildlife on Alaska’s Seward Peninsula.
Polar Research 19, 57–62.
Dau J.
2005a.
Western Arctic Herd.
In C. Brown (ed.
): Caribou management report of survey and inventory activities, 1 July 2002–30 June 2004.
Pp.
177–218.
Juneau: Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
Dau J.
2005b.
Two caribou mortality events in northwest Alaska: possible causes and management implications.
Rangifer Special Issue 16, 37–50.
Dalerum F., Boutin S. & Dunford J.S.
2007.
Wildfire effects on home range size and fidelity of boreal caribou in Alberta, Canada.
Canadian Journal of Zoology 85, 26–32.
Duffy P.A., Walsh J.E., Graham J.M., Mann D.H. & Rupp T.S.
2005.
Impacts of large-scale atmospheric–ocean variability on Alaskan fire season severity.
Ecological Applications 15, 1317–1330.
Dunford J., McLoughlin P., Dalerum F. & Boutin S. 2006.
Lichen abundance in the peatlands of northern Alberta: implications for boreal caribou.
Ecoscience 13, 469–474.
Epstein H.E., Calef M.P., Walker M.D.
Chapin F.S.
III & Starfield A.M. 2004.
Detecting changes in Arctic tundra plant communities in response to warming over decadal time scales.
Global Change Biology 10, 1325–1334.
Goetz S.J., Bunn A.G., Fiske G.J.
& Houghton R.A. 2005.
Satellite-observed photosynthetic trends across boreal North America associated with climate and fire disturbance.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 102, 13521–13525.
Gough L., Shrestha K., Johnson D.R.
& Moon B.
2008.
Long-term mammalian herbivory and nutrient addition alter lichen community structure in Alaskan dry heath tundra.
Arctic, Antarctic and Alpine Research 40, 65–73.
Heggberget T.M., Gaare E. & Ball J.P. 2002.
Reindeer (Rangifer tarandus) and climate change: importance of winter forage.
Rangifer 22, 13–32.
Helle T. & Aspi J.
1983.
Effects of winter grazing by reindeer on vegetation.
Oikos 40, 337–343.
Henry G.H.R.
& Gunn A.
1990.
Recovery of tundra vegetation after overgrazing by caribou in Arctic Canada.
Arctic 44, 38–42.
Higuera P.E., Brubaker L.B., Anderson P.M., Brown T.A., Kennedy A.T. & Hu F.S.
2008.
Frequent fires in ancient shrub tundra: implications of paleorecords for Arctic environmental change.
PLoS ONE 3(3), e0001744.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0001744.
Hinzman L.D., Bettez N.D., Bolton W.R., Chapin F.S.
III, Dyurgerov M.B., Fastie C.L., Griffith B., Hollister R.D., Hope A., Huntington H.P., Jensen A.M., Jia G.J., Jorgenson T., Kane D.L., Klein D.R., Kofinas G., Lynch A.H., Lloyd A.H., McGuire A.D., Nelson F.E., Oechel W.C., Osterkamp T.E., Racine C.H., Romanovsky V.E., Stone R.S., Stow D.A., Sturm M., Tweedie C.E., Vourlitis G.L., Walker M.D., Walker D.A., Webber P.J., Welker J.M., Winker K.S.
& Yoshikawa K. 2005.
Evidence and implications of recent climate change in northern Alaska and other Arctic regions.
Climate Change 72, 251–298.
Holleman D.F.
& Luick J.R. 1977.
Lichen species preference by reindeer.
Canadian Journal of Zoology 55, 1368–1369.
Holleman D.F., Luick J.R. & White R.G.
1979.
Lichen intake estimates for reindeer and caribou during winter.
Journal of Wildlife Management 43, 192–201.
Hollister R.D., Webber P.J.
& Tweedie C.E.
2005.
The response of Alaskan Arctic tundra to experimental warming: differences between shortand long-term responses.
Global Change Biology 11, 525–536.
Holt E.A., McCune B.
& Neitlich P. 2006.
Defining a successional metric for lichen communities in the Arctic tundra.
Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine Research 38, 373–377.
Holt E.A., McCune B.
& Neitlich P. 2008.
Grazing and fire impacts on macrolichen communities of the Seward Peninsula, Alaska, U.S.A.
The Bryologist 111, 68–83.
Jacobsen E. & Skjenneberg S. 1975.
Some results from feeding experiments with reindeer.
In L.R.
Luick et al.
Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystems K. Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors440 (eds.
): Proceedings of the First International Reindeer and Caribou Symposium.
Biological Papers of the University of Alaska Special Report 1.
Pp.
95–107.
Fairbanks, AK: University of Alaska.
Jandt R.R., Joly K., Meyers C.R.
& Racine C. 2008.
Slow recovery of lichen on burned caribou winter range in Alaska tundra: potential influences of climate warming and other disturbances.
Arctic, Antarctic and Alpine Research 40, 89–95.
Joly K., Bente P. & Dau J.
2007.
Response of overwintering caribou to burned habitat in northwest Alaska.
Arctic 60, 401–410.
Joly K., Cole M.J. & Jandt R.R.
2007.
Diets of overwintering caribou, Rangifer tarandus, track decadal changes in Arctic tundra vegetation.
Canadian Field-Naturalist 121, 379–383.
Joly K., Dale B.W., Collins W.B.
& Adams L.G.
2003.
Winter habitat use by female caribou in relation to wildland fires in interior Alaska.
Canadian Journal of Zoology 81, 1192–1201.
Joly K., Jandt R.R., Meyers C.R.
& Cole M.J. 2007.
Changes in vegetative cover on Western Arctic Herd winter range from 1981–2005: potential effects of grazing and climate change.
Rangifer Special Issue 17, 199–207.
Jorgensen J.C. & Buchholtz C.A.
2003.
Eighteen years of vegetation monitoring in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska.
Accessed on the internet at www.arcus.
org/SEARCH/meetings/2003/webcast.php on 19 Feburary 2009.
Kasischke E.S.
& Turetsky M.R.
2006.
Recent changes in the fire regime across the North American boreal region—spatial and temporal patterns of burning across Canada and Alaska.
Geophysical Research Letters 33, L09703, doi: 10.1029/2006GL025677.
Klein D.R.
1968.
The introduction, increase, and crash of reindeer on St. Matthew Island.
Journal of Wildlife Management 32, 350–367.
Klein D.R.
1982.
Fire, lichens, and caribou.
Journal of Range Management 35, 390–395.
Klein D.R.
1987.
Vegetation recovery patterns following overgrazing by reindeer on St. Matthew Island.
Journal of Range Management 40, 336–338.
Klein D.R.
& Shulski M. 2009.
Lichen recovery following heavy grazing by reindeer delayed by climate warming.
Ambio 38, 11–16.
Klein D.R.
& Vlasova T.J. 1991.
Lichens, a unique forage resource threatened by air pollution.
Rangifer 12, 21–27.
Leopold A.S. & Darling F.F.
1953.
Wildlife in Alaska: an ecological reconnaissance.
New York: Ronald Press.
McCoy V.M.
& Burn C.R.
2005.
Potential alteration by climate change of the forest-fire regime in the boreal forest of central Yukon Territory.
Arctic 58, 276–285.
Messier F., Huot J., Le Henaff D. & Luttich S. 1988.
Demography of the George River Caribou Herd: evidence of population regulation by forage exploitation and range expansion.
Arctic 41, 279–287.
Molau U.
& Alatalo J.M.
1998.
Responses of subarctic–alpine plant communities to simulated environmental change: biodiversity of bryophytes, lichens, and vascular plants.
Ambio 27, 322–329.
Morneau C. & Payette S. 1989.
Postfire lichen–spruce woodland recovery at the limit of boreal forest in northern Quebec.
Canadian Journal Botany 67, 2770–2782.
Moser T.J., Nash T.H.
III & Thomson J.W.
1979.
Lichens of Anaktuvuk Pass, Alaska, with emphasis on the impact of caribou grazing.
The Bryologist 82, 393–408.
Parry M.L., Canziani O.F., Palutikof J.P., van der Linden P.J.
& Hanson C.E.
(eds.).
2007.
Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Payette S., Morneau C., Sirois L. & Desponts M. 1989.
Recent fire history of the northern Quebec biomes.
Ecology 70, 656–673.
Pegau R.E.
1968.
Growth rates of important reindeer forage lichens on the Seward Peninsula, Alaska.
Arctic 21, 255–259.
Pegau R.E.
1969.
Effect of reindeer trampling and grazing on lichens.
Journal of Range Management 23, 95–97.
Post E. & Forchhammer M.C.
2008.
Climate change reduces reproductive success of an Arctic herbivore through trophic mismatch.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363, 2369–2375.
Post E. & Klein D.R.
1999.
Caribou calf production and seasonal range quality during a population decline.
Journal of Wildlife Management 63, 335–345.
Racine C.H., Patterson W.A.
III & Dennis J.G.
1985.
Tundra fire regimes in the Noatak River watershed, Alaska: 1956–1983.
Arctic 38, 194–200.
Racine C.H., Jandt R., Meyers C. & Dennis J.
2004.
Tundra fire and vegetation change along a hillslope on the Seward Peninsula, Alaska, U.S.A. Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine Research 36, 1–10.
Racine C.H., Johnson L.A. & Viereck L.A. 1987.
Patterns of vegetation recovery after tundra fires in northwestern Alaska, U.S.A. Arctic and Alpine Research 19, 461–469.
Robinson C.H., Wookey P.A., Lee J.A., Callaghan T.V.
& Press M.C.
1998.
Plant community responses to simulated environmental change at a high polar semi-desert.
Ecology 79, 856–866.
Rouse W.R., Douglas M.S.V., Hecky R.E., Hershey A.E., Kling G.W., Lesack L., Marsh P., McDonald M., Nicholson B.J., Roulet N.T.
& Smol J.P. 1997.
Effects of climate change on the freshwaters of Arctic and subarctic North America.
Hydrological Processes 11, 873–902.
Rupp T.S., Chapin F.S.
III & Starfield A.M. 2000.
Response of the subarctic vegetation to transient climatic change on the Seward Peninsula in north-west Alaska.
Global Change Biology 6, 541–555.
Rupp T.S., Olson M., Adams L.G., Dale B.W., Joly K., Henkelman J., Collins W.B.
& Starfield A.M. 2006.
Simulating the influences of various fire regimes on caribou winter habitat.
Ecological Applications 16, 1730–1743.
Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystemsK.
Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors 441 http://www.arcus Saperstein L.B.
1996.
Winter forage selection by barren-ground caribou: effects of fire and snow.
Rangifer Special Issue 9, 237–238.
Scotter G.W.
1967.
The winter diet of barren-ground caribou in northern Canada.
Canadian Field-Naturalist 81, 33–39.
Scotter G.W.
1970.
Wildfires in relation to the habitat of barren-ground caribou in the taiga of northern Canada.
Annual Proceedings Tall Timbers Conference 10, 85–106.
Shaver G.R.
& Jonasson S. 1999.
Response of Arctic ecosystems to climate change: results of long-term field experiments in Sweden and Alaska.
Polar Research 18, 245–252.
Shulski M. & Wendler G. 2007.
The climate of Alaska.
Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press.
Soja A.J., Tchebakova N.M., French N.H.F., Flannigan M.D., Shugart H.H., Stocks B.J., Sukhinin A.I., Parfenova E.I., Chapin F.S.
III & Stackhouse P.W.
2007.
Climate-induced boreal forest change: predictions versus current observations.
Global and Planetary Change 56, 274–296.
Stern R.O., Arobio E.L., Naylor L.L.
& Thomas W.C. 1980.
Eskimo, reindeer and land.
Bulletin 59.
Fairbanks: University of Alaska Fairbanks.
Sturm M., Racine C. & Tape K. 2001.
Increasing shrub abundance in the Arctic.
Nature 411, 546–547.
Sturm M., Schimel J., Michaelson G., Welker J.M., Oberbauer S.F., Liston G.E., Fahnestock J.
& Romanovsky V.E.
2005.
Winter biological processes could help convert Arctic tundra to shrubland.
Bioscience 55, 17–26.
Swanson J.D., Schuman M. & Scorup P.C.
1985.
Range survey of the Seward Peninsula reindeer ranges, Alaska.
Anchorage AK: USDA Soil Conservation Service.
Symon C., Arris L. & Heal B.
(eds.)
2005.
Arctic climate impact assessment.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Syroechkovskii E.E.
1995.
Wild reindeer.
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Libraries.
Tape K., Sturm M. & Racine C. 2006.
The evidence for shrub expansion in northern Alaska and the Pan-Arctic.
Global Change Biology 12, 686–702.
Thing H. 1984.
Feeding ecology of the West Greenland caribou (Rangifer tarandus groenlandicus) in the Sisimuit–Kangerlussuaaq Region.
Danish Review of Game Biology 12.
Copenhagen: Vildtbiologisk Station.
Thomas D.C., Barry S.J.
& Alaie G. 1996.
Fire–caribou–winter range relationships in northern Canada.
Rangifer 16, 57–67.
Thomas D.C. & Edmonds J.
1983.
Rumen contents and habitat selection of Peary caribou in winter, Canadian Arctic Archipelago.
Arctic and Alpine Research 15, 97–105.
Thomas D.C. & Hervieux D.P.
1986.
The late winter diets of barren-ground caribou in north–central Canada.
Rangifer Special Issue 1, 305–310.
Thomas D.C. & Kiliaan H.P.L.
1998.
Fire–caribou relationships: (IV) recovery of habitat after fire on winter range of the Beverly Herd.
Technical Report Series 312.
Edmonton: AB: Prairie and Northern Region, Canadian Wildlife Service.
Thomas D.C., Kiliaan H.P.L.
& Trottier T.W.P.
1998.
Fire–caribou relationships: (III) movement patterns of the Beverly Herd in relation to burns and snow.
Canadian Wildlife Service, Prairie & Northern Region Technical Report Series 311.
Edmonton: AB: Prairie and Northern Region, Canadian Wildlife Service.
Tyler N.J.C.
1987.
Body composition and energy balance of pregnant and non-pregnant Svalbard reindeer during winter.
Symposia of the Zoological Society of London 57, 203–229.
van der Wal R. 2006.
Do herbivores cause habitat degradation or vegetation state transition?
Evidence from the tundra.
Oikos 114, 177–186.
van der Wal R., Brooker R., Cooper E. & Langvatn R. 2001.
Differential effects of reindeer on High Arctic lichens.
Journal of Vegetation Science 12, 705–710.
van Wijk M.T., Clemmensen K.E., Shaver G.R., Williams M., Callaghan T.V., Chapin F.S.
III, Cornelissen J.H.C., Gough L., Hobbie S.E., Jonasson S., Lee J.A., Michelsen A., Richardson S.J.
& Rueth H. 2003.
Long-term ecosystem level experiments at Toolik Lake, Alaska, and at Abisko, northern Sweden: generalizations and differences in ecosystem and plant type responses to global change.
Global Change Biology 10, 105–123.
Walker M.D., Wahren C.H., Hollister R.D., Henry G.H.R., Ahlquist L.E., Alatalo J.M., Bret-Harte M.S., Calef M.P., Callaghan T.V., Carroll A.B., Epstein H.E., Jonsdottir I.S., Klein J.A., Magnusson B., Molau U., Oberbauer S.F., Rewa S.P., Robinson C.H., Shaver G.R., Suding K.N., Thompson C.C., Tolvanen A., Totland Ø., Turner P.L., Tweedie C.E., Webber P.J.
& Wookey P.A.
2006.
Plant community responses to experimental warming across the tundra biome.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 103, 1342–1346.
Wiedermann M.M., Nordin A., Gunnarsson U., Nilsson M.B.
& Ericson L. 2007.
Global change shifts vegetation and plant–parasite interactions in a boreal mire.
Ecology 88, 454–464.
Wein R.W.
1976.
Frequency and characteristics of Arctic tundra fires.
Arctic 29, 213–22.
White R.G., Bunnell F.L., Gaare E., Skogland T. & Hubert B.
1981.
Ungulates on Arctic ranges.
In L.C.
Bliss et al.
(eds.
): Tundra ecosystems: a comparative analysis.
Pp.
397–483.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wookey P.A.
2007.
Climate change and biodiversity in the Arctic—Nordic perspectives.
Polar Research 26, 96–103.
Loss of lichens in Arctic ecosystems K. Joly et al.
Polar Research 28 2009 433–442 © 2009 The Authors442
TX_1~AT/TX_2~AT International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy ISSN: 2146-4553 available at http: www.econjournals.com International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2018, 8(4), 259-269. International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018 259 Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria Claudia Kettner1*, Daniela Kletzan-Slamanig2 1Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Arsenal, Objekt 20, 1030 Vienna, Austria, 2Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Arsenal, Objekt 20, 1030 Vienna, Austria.
*Email: claudia.kettner@wifo.at ABSTRACT Many climate-relevant decisions are taken in other policy areas with only little regard to climate change impacts.
In order for climate policy to be successful it has to be integrated in decision-making and legislative processes in basically all policy areas and all levels of government.
We analyse the extent of climate policy integration (CPI) in Austrian policy-making via in-depth expert interviews, both on the federal level as well as on the regional level using Styria as case study.
The results show a broad range of perceptions regarding the degree of CPI in Austria.
The consideration of climate policy issues generally depends on the core competence of the respective institution.
Moreover, we found widely diverging views on whether CPI in Austria is too ambitious or too weak.
Especially, potential negative impacts of climate policy on competitiveness or employment are seen to hamper a more ambitious implementation of mitigation policies.
Keywords: Climate Policy Integration, Austria, Survey JEL Classifications: C83, Q48, Q54, Q58 1.
INTRODUCTION Climate change represents the most exigent environmental problem our societies face.
According to a special Eurobarometer survey (EC, 2017) 92% of the European population recognise climate change as a serious problem, 74% even consider it as very serious.
The rise by 5 percentage points compared to the previous survey in 2015 suggests an increasing consensus about the importance of the issue.
For Austria specifically, 68% regard climate change as a very serious problem.
When asked to name the single most serious problem facing the world, climate change ranks third (after poverty, hunger and lack of drinking water and international terrorism), with 43% of EU citizens (50% of Austrian citizens1) considering it as one of the most serious global problems.
Almost half of the Europeans (60% of Austrians) report that they have personally taken action to reduce emissions.
But four out of ten citizens state that the responsibility for tackling climate change lies mainly with national governments (43%), the EU (39%) and business and industry (38%).
Moreover, as of 2017 22% of the 1 This figure declined by three percentage points compared to 2015 results.
population state that they are personally responsible and one in five say that all actors are responsible for tackling climate change.
Somewhat divergently, Austrians see the main responsibility for tackling climate change with business and industry (49%) followed equally by the EU and the Austrian government (45% each).
In order to successfully limit climate change it has to be recognised that climate policy is a cross-cutting issue that needs to be firmly integrated into general and sector-specific policy areas that frame economic activity and societal development (Kok and de Coninck, 2007; Ahmad, 2009; Mickwitz et al., 2009; Kettner et al., 2015).
Many climate-relevant decisions are taken in conventional areas with only little regard to climate change impacts.
The main targets and the general framework for climate policy are defined at EU level.
The specific implementation and choice of instruments is, however, mainly decided at the level of member states2.
The EU aims at cutting its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to 1990 by 20% by 2020 and by 2 One exception is the EU ETS, the emission trading scheme for industry and energy supply.
Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018260 40% by 2030 respectively (COM (2008) 30; COM (2014) 15); for 2050 a reduction of 80% is envisaged (COM (2011) 112).
The corresponding short and medium term targets for Austria were defined in the effort sharing decisions (Decision 406/2009/EC, COM (2016) 482) and imply a reduction target of 16% for 2020 and a proposed reduction of 36% for 2030 compared to 2005 in sectors not included in the EU ETS.
Climate policy in Austria is characterised by a wide range of policy instruments including regulatory requirements, economic instruments (mostly subsidies) and awareness-raising campaigns targeting different groups, sectors or activities.
Given the cross-cutting nature of climate policy the institutional responsibilities are fragmented not only between various ministries (and executing agencies) but also between the federal government and the regional authorities.
The provinces (Bundesländer) play an important role in climate policy in Austria as some climate-relevant issues (e.g., spatial planning, housing subsidies and building regulations) are in their jurisdiction.
In order for climate policy to be successful, the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions or avoiding rising emissions as unintended side effects of other (non climate) policy interventions has to be integrated in decision-making and legislative processes in basically all policy areas and all levels of government, which is referred to as climate policy integration (CPI) in the literature (e.g., Mickwitz et al., 2009; Dupont and Oberthür, 2011).
The assessment of CPI is a rather new research area.
Applied studies on CPI have been conducted for the EU level as well as for the national level.
On EU level a number of studies have addressed CPI in sectoral policies, i.e., energy, water and biodiversity policies as well as in terms of the allocation of EU funds (Dupont and Oberthür, 2012; Dupont and Primova, 2011; Brouwer et al., 2013; Dupont, 2010; Hanger et al., 2013; Kettner et al., 2012).
On the national level, research on CPI so far has concentrated on Germany (Beck et al., 20093; Jacob and Kannen, 2015a; b), Finland (Kivimaa and Mickwitz, 20093; Lyytimäki, 2011), the Netherlands (Bommel and Kuindersma, 20083; van den Berg and Coenen, 2012) and Denmark (Wejs, 2014).
These analyses generally show that while climate aspects are widely integrated in – especially high-level – policy strategies at Member State level, “political commitment to climate change mitigation has a rather low impact on everyday policy-making” (Jacob and Kannen, 2015b).
Federalism generally seems to constrain the integration of climate aspects in other policy areas and coordination between the federal and the regional levels is often insufficient (e.g., Steurer and Clar, 2014a; Jacob and Kannen, 2005b).
For Austria CPI has been assessed by Steurer and Clar (2014a; b) and Niedertscheider et al.
(2018).
Steurer and Clar (2014a; b) analysed the integration of climate change mitigation issues in building policies.
They discuss the role of federalism for Austria’s mitigation performance finding that federalism 3 This study has been conducted in the PEER project, where Mickwitz et al.
(2009) analysed climate policy integration in different EU member states and policy sectors as well as in a selection of case study regions and municipalities using five criteria (inclusion, consistency, weighting, reporting and resources).
constrained CPI by adding “a vertical dimension to an already complex horizontal integration” (Steurer and Clar, 2014a).
The federal structure of Austria is, however, found to be only one of many factors constraining climate change mitigation in Austria.
Niedertscheider et al.
(2018) evaluate the level of CPI in Austria since 1990, discussing climate change mitigation measures like the introduction of relevant institutions or legislative acts against the background of other (frequently short-term) drivers of GHGemissions.
The analysis suggests that short-term socio-economic events like the financial crisis and climate events such as mild or cold winters exceeded the effects of climate policies on emissions.
Yet, the effects of policies were more difficult to detect since they happened within longer time-frames and in conjunction with indirect climate change mitigation effects.
In this paper we aim at contributing to the research on CPI on Member State level focussing on Austria.
We analyse the degree of CPI in Austrian policy-making via in-depth expert interviews.
For our survey on CPI at the federal level we contacted representatives from the federal ministries involved in climate policy-related issues or affected by climate policy decisions as well as from special interest groups and other relevant stakeholders.
For the analysis of CPI on the regional level we chose Styria as case study region and conducted interviews with relevant stakeholders and officials from the regional administration.
The objective of the in-depth interviews was to obtain an overall impression from the point of view of various stakeholders regarding the quality of administrative cooperation on climate-related issues as well as the degree of CPI in Austria’s policy-making.
The paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 the methodological approach chosen to analyse CPI in Austria and Styria is set out.
Section 3 describes the results on national and provincial level.
The final section concludes the paper.
2.
METHODS CPI can be regarded as a continuation and advancement of approaches for environmental policy integration (EPI) in the 1980s and 1990s that aimed at contributing to the reduction of environmental problems and guiding the transition to sustainable development (Adelle et al., 2009; Jordan and Lenschow, 2010).4 EPI refers to the integration of environmental aspects and policy objectives into sector policies like energy and agriculture (Adelle et al., 2009)5.
Based on the definition for EPI by Lafferty and Hovden (2003) CPI can be defined as6: • The incorporation of the aims of climate change policy objectives into all stages of policy-making in all relevant policy sectors; • Complemented by an attempt to aggregate expected consequences for climate change mitigation and adaptation 4 For a discussion of the relation of EPI and CPI see Adelle and Russel (2013).
5 However, this policy-making “principle” has not been unambiguously defined, neither in its normative sense nor in how it can be implemented in the political practice (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010).
6 This definition is also followed by Dupont and Oberthür (2011) and Mickwitz et al.
(2009).
Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018 261 into an overall evaluation of climate policy, and a commitment to minimise contradictions between climate policies and other policies.
According to this definition climate policy objectives are given priority in decisions in conventional policy areas7 and the integration should be reflected in general and sector-specific policy strategies as well as applied instruments and ideally in policy outcomes, i.e., a reduction of GHG emissions (Mickwitz et al., 2009).
Key features of policy integration are “policy coherence” and “policy coordination.” Policy coherence refers mainly to policy output and outcome8, i.e., the promotion of synergies and mutually reinforcing policy actions (win-win-solutions) such that non-conflicting, consistent incentives are provided by different policies (Mickwitz et al., 2009; Dupont and Oberthür, 2011; Kok and de Coninck, 2007).
Policy coordination in turn emphasises the policy process that brings about policy coherence, i.e., the development of policies and programmes (for climate policy and other sectoral areas) that minimise redundancy, incoherence and lacunae (Peters, 1998).
Policy integration can be analysed from different angles, i.e., within or across government levels (Figure 1).
Horizontal CPI focuses on mainstreaming climate policy objectives into other sectoral policy areas on one level of government (e.g., directorates-general on EU level, federal ministries).
Vertical CPI, in contrast, takes a topdown approach and focuses on mainstreaming throughout multiple levels of government and policy-making (e.g., from EU directives to national implementation to local or regional implementation).
In this paper we analyse the extent of CPI in Austrian policymaking via the method of expert interviews.
In a first step we identified the federal ministries with competencies that affect climate change mitigation (e.g., transport, economic affairs including energy) or are affected by climate policy decisions (e.g., consumer protection).
The material linkage between climate policy and other policy areas is inherently more pronounced in some areas such as energy policy than in others like foreign policy.
In addition, we included special interest groups (Austrian Economic Chambers, Chamber of Labour, Austrian Trade Union Federation, Federation of Austrian Industries) and other relevant stakeholders (e.g., the Austrian Environment Agency) in the group of interviewees.
The objective of the in-depth interviews was to obtain an overall impression from the point of view of various stakeholders in order to evaluate the degree of CPI in Austria’s policy-making.
Table 1 summarises the institutions that were chosen for the interviews.
7 Dupont (2010) argues that giving climate policy principles priority over other non-environmental policy areas is justified, while within environmental policy synergies and avoiding conflicts with other environmental objectives should be emphasised.
8 Policy output refers to action taken by the administration in pursuance of policy decisions, i.e., the definition of regulation like standards, marketbased incentives, etc., in order to influence the target group’s behaviour.
Policy outcomes refer to societal consequences of an implemented policy, i.e., the actual, observable change in behaviour, which, however, are less tangible and can also be influenced by other factors as well.
For the analysis of CPI on the regional level we chose Styria as case study region.
The rationale for the selection is that Styria is the region in Austria that achieved the largest emission reduction in the period 1990 to 20159.
As on the national level, the evaluation of CPI on the regional level is based on in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders and decision-makers (Table 2).
A total of 23 interviews were conducted between August and December 2017.
The distribution between federal ministries, regional administration, special interest groups and other stakeholders is shown in Figure 2.
The interviews consisted of three parts.
The first part dealt with the personnel resources dedicated to climate policy issues in each institution and the internal cooperation in this context.
The second part concerned the cooperation with other institutions (administration and stakeholders).
The third part included questions concerning CPI and the general relevance of climate policy as compared to other policy objectives.
Furthermore, questions regarded the consideration of climate effects in designing policy instruments as well as the way in which trade-offs and conflicts are dealt with, i.e., how decisions are reached in cases of 9 Latest year available.
Only three provinces achieved a reduction of CO2 emissions over this period (Styria, Lower Austria and Vienna).
In Styria emissions have been reduced most strongly in the household sector, but also in energy supply.
See UBA (2017).
Table 1: Interview partners at the federal level Federal administration BKA Federal Chancellery BMEIA Federal Ministry of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs BMLFUW Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management BMVIT Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology BMF Federal Ministry of Finance BMWFW Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy BMASK Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection Interest groups IV Federation of Austrian Industries WKO Austrian Economic Chambers AK Austrian Chamber of Labour ÖGB Austrian Trade Union Federation Relevant stakeholders EAA Environment Agency Austria AEA Austrian Energy Agency KLIEN Climate and Energy Funds Table 2: Interview partners at the regional level Regional administration A13 Department of Environment and Spatial Planning A15 Department of Energy, Housing and Technology A16 Department of Transport and Provincial Building Infrastructure Relevant stakeholders EAS Energy Agency Styria Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018262 conflicting interests.
The respective interview outlines are included in the supplementary material.
3.
RESULTS 3.1.
Austria 3.1.1.
Personnel resources Personnel resources for climate issues differ strongly between Austrian ministries; while in some cases only single persons are in charge of these issues, in other cases whole departments are responsible for climate-related issues.
Staff members working on climate policy or related issues are employed on different organisational levels (administrative staff, head of department, etc.,).
In general, however, more than one department is – at least indirectly – involved in climate policy-making.
The variations in personnel resources and the respective hierarchy level that is responsible also reflect the heterogeneous role of the topic for the particular ministries, i.e., it depends on the core responsibilities of the respective ministry – e.g., climate policy as a key area in the environment ministry versus functions only loosely related to or influenced by climate policy like consumer protection for instance.
In individual sections of the same ministry the perception regarding the importance of climate policy can differ substantially.
Also with respect to Austrian business/industry and labour organisations (social partners) pronounced differences in the personnel resources for climate policy related issues can be found.
This reflects also the diversity in the tasks the respective organisations have to fulfil, ranging from the coordination of opinions among members in the context of legislative consultation procedures to the work as think tank.
In addition, it reflects the awareness regarding the importance of climate policy as well as the institution’s perception regarding its role or influence in this issue.
3.1.2.
Cooperation 3.1.2.1.
Cooperation within ministries Internal cooperation in climate policy-related issues is differently organised in the ministries and departments, i.e., as informal exchange or in institutionalised meetings or processes (e.g., regular jour fixes etc.).
The degree of institutionalisation in climate policy cooperation varies between ministries.
Moreover, climate and energy issues often lie in the competence of different departments or sections.
Communication and cooperation within the ministries is generally perceived to be good or very good by the officials, with some exceptions (Figure 3).
3.1.2.2.
Cooperation between ministries As a cross-cutting issue, climate policy related matters are in the responsibility of various ministries, which need to cooperate, e.g., for determining the Austrian position on EU legislative proposals.
In Austria, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMFLUW) is legally responsible for climate policy issues, but climate-related issues are distributed across several ministries (energy policy, for instance, lies in the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, BMWFW)10.
The collaboration of federal ministries is partly related to concrete tasks (statements in legal consultation processes, preparation for council working groups) and informal (in informal meetings or via phone calls, emails, 10 It has to be noted that after the completion of the interviews and following the formation of a new government the allocation of responsibilities between ministries was shifted and ministries are now named differently e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management is now the Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism.
It was also assigned the responsibility for energy policy.
Following this rearrangement of competences the aggregation of climate and energy policy in one ministry offers scope for more integrated policy-making.
Source: Own illustration adapted from Kettner et al.
(2012) Figure 1: Horizontal and vertical policy integration Figure 2: Distribution of interviews by institution Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018 263 etc.,).
Partly the cooperation occurs in formalised committees (High Level Group for Energy and Climate Policy, Steering Group of the Austrian Integrated Climate and Energy Strategy (IKES), Climate Council, Coordination Panel Clean Energy in Transport) and theme-specific technical working groups.
Cooperation in climate policy issues between the ministries was generally rated as being good by the interviewees (Figure 3).
Nevertheless, the quality of inter-ministerial cooperation was judged differently in individual departments.
Interests of the ministries are diverging strongly in some areas, which is also reflected in the perceived quality of their cooperation.
In addition, some officials, lobbyists and stakeholders considered individual ministries to be strongly influenced by various lobbying interests.
Conflicting interests were frequently seen to be a source of blockades, resulting e.g., in problems in the implementation of EU directives in Austria.
Between some ministries respondents reported a high level of distrust, hampering everyday collaboration.
However, it was frequently stated that the quality of cooperation strongly depends on the persons involved, on the one hand, and that there can be large differences between informal exchanges and contacts under formal, institutionalised circumstances, on the other hand.
Potential adverse effects on competitiveness and employment are arguments frequently used against climate policy.
As regards content, the cooperation between ministries was often rated difficult due to the conflicting interests, while in many cases it was rated good on the personal level.
Especially at the technical or administrative level, the exchange is found to be strong; on the political level it depends on the individual ministers’ commitment.
One respondent felt that the flow of information was not optimal, that information was withheld or decisions were taken in his absence and without involving his ministry respectively.
However, the quality of cooperation between the individual ministries was perceived to have altered over time.
After the Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) and due to activities on EU level (climate targets, legal framework), climate policy was being increasingly perceived as important and generally moves up on the political agenda.
On ministerial level and in actual policy-making, many interviewees felt that climate policy receives only little attention.
The lack in commitment by the decision-makers was also seen to translate into a lack of overall coordination or integrated energy and climate policy strategy.
Regarding the conflicts of interest mentioned, it remains to be seen whether the formal integration of energy policy in the ministry responsible for climate policy (Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism) will also improve the integration in actual policymaking and help resolve some of the perceived barriers for climate policy implementation.
3.1.2.3.
Cooperation between ministries, social partners and other stakeholders In Austria industry and labour representatives (ILRs; mostly social partners) are involved in formal processes dealing with climate policy such as the IKES as well as in legislative consultation processes.
In addition, many ministry departments also have informal contacts and exchange with the lobbying groups.
Some stakeholders were found to be closely linked with particular ministries due to overlapping interests or more formal links11.
Conflicts of interest between climate policy issues and other goals are again most strongly perceived in the areas of competitiveness and employment, i.e., more stringent climate policy might reduce firms’ cost competitiveness and lead to carbon leakage, implying also job losses, as well as in distributional impacts.
Conflicting or synergetic objectives are reflected in the perceived quality of the cooperation, as well as in the degree of trust between the parties.
Some respondents thought of interest groups as “gatekeepers” with particular interests, noting that they are caught in their 11 The Federal Environment Agency for instance performs tasks in public interest on behalf of the Environment Ministry.
Figure 3: Perceived quality of cooperation between federal ministries, interest groups and other stakeholders Source: Own calculations.
For the evaluation of the quality of cooperation, the experts could choose between the categories very good (1), good (2), not so good (3) and poor (4) Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018264 lobbying work and would communicate only the lowest common denominator of their members, but not deliver any concrete suggestions for solutions.
3.1.2.4.
Cooperation between business/industry and labour representatives In the context of climate policy, positions of industry and labour representatives may be consistent or diverging.
In general, social partners may have similar positions regarding labour and economic growth, i.e., a coalition of social partners “under the keyword jobs” can be perceived.
Issues without a common basis are often excluded from the discussions between different interest groups and if the positions of the groups do not match, no common statements are drafted.
Cooperation is more intense between organisations representing the same interests (e.g., business and industry representatives) as compared to cooperation between employers’ and the employees’ organisations.
3.1.3.
CPI and weighting of climate targets 3.1.3.1.
Relevance of climate policy compared to other targets Most respondents thought that the general awareness in the administration for climate change has increased during the last years, also as a result of the 2015 Paris Agreement, even though one interviewee pointed out that climate policy issues today are less relevant than prior to the economic crisis.
Nevertheless, according to the officials involved directly in climate policy, the awareness in some departments or sections remains low.
It was noted that the Austrian climate and energy policy agenda to a large extent is determined by the EU; this was often seen positively as important driver for Austrian policy-making.
Some ministries, however, criticised that the EU policy framework has a stronger focus on climate issues, including quantitative targets, as compared to other policy targets such as economic growth.
There are considerable differences between the interviewees regarding the perceived relevance given to climate policy targets as compared to other policy targets in Austria ranging from too low to exaggerated: On the one hand, other objectives were regarded to be of higher priority and climate issues was considered by tendency to be subordinated to the “core issues” of the ministries.
On the other hand, it was stressed that conflicts of interest between climate policy and other policy targets have to be bridged and that all policy goals should have the same relevance without giving priority to climate issues.
Another respondent noted that generally specific goals were negotiated, without any clear priorisation and no integrated policy approach was taken.
According to the majority of officials hence there is scope to increase the weight given to climate policy compared to other policy targets (Figure 4).
All interviewees from business/industry and labour representatives reported that climate policy gained in importance in their institutions, in some it is now also dealt with at management level.
The conceived level of relevance varies, however, among the organisations.
Moreover it was noted that the organisation’s awareness depends on the current level of concern of the represented clientele.
Compared to the ministry officials and stakeholders, the interest groups, however, perceived that a higher weight is given to climate policy as compared to other policy targets.
They called for an integrated, balanced approach to climate policy taking particularly competitiveness and employment concerns into account.
The lobbying groups found both, synergies and conflicts between climate policy and other objectives.
In the short term conflicts dominate, while in the long term synergies become more relevant.
The development of public transport, thermal retrofitting as well as research, development and innovation were named as the most relevant synergetic fields, while competitiveness concerns, employment, distribution and taxes were among the conflicting areas.
Target conflicts could be solved through technical and socioeconomic innovations as well as research policy, including the promotion of applied research.
The stakeholders like the Federal Environment Agency or the Austrian Energy Agency have the most critical view on the relevance of climate policy compared to other policy targets.
They noted that so far no national targets have been developed (in addition to those derived from EU legislation), that the integrated energy and climate strategy has still not been published (thus leading to a lack of a comprehensive framework for policy or investment decisions on national level) and that the issue of climate change has no relevance at government level.
On the contrary, they stated that while climate policy in principal is embedded in the Austrian policy landscape, the importance of the issue has declined markedly since the economic and financial crisis.
3.1.3.2.
Degree of CPI in Austria The different groups of interviewees shared a quite common opinion on the degree of CPI in Austria and saw potential for improvement (Figure 4).
With respect to the perceptions of ministry officials and industry and labour representatives, however, a larger spread is observed.
In both groups, at least some of the interviewees stated that climate policy is only poorly integrated into the overall policy landscape in Austria, while some thought that the degree of CPI is neither particularly high nor notably low.
As a final question the interviewees were asked to name what in their opinion would be a prerequisite for a successful climate policy in Austria.
The answers largely fell into four categories: First, several respondents emphasised the importance of taking a comprehensive, systemic approach to climate policy, considering synergies as well as conflicts and increasing CPI.
A second line of answers regarded the institutional framework – arguing that a state secretary for climate policy or climate protection in constitutional rank would increase the weight given to this issue.
Most prominent was, however, the demand for drafting the IKES as soon as possible in order to put climate policy targets beyond question and define a comprehensive and long-term framework for national measures.
Furthermore, the discussions regarding climate policy should be more evidence-based instead of ideological and take into regard the scientific foundation.
Finally, concerning the implementation of climate policy the actual measures should ensure the achievement of targets.
Climate policy should also be understood to offer chances, especially when there is a focus on R&D and innovation.
But also fiscal instruments were regarded as essential part of the instrument mix.
Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018 265 3.2.
Case Study Styria 3.2.1.
Organisational structure of the regional administration in climate policy issues Also for the case study region Styria the interview partners were chosen from those departments and units of the public administration that are directly or indirectly involved in climate policymaking on the regional level.
Climate policy-related issues in this Austrian province are generally dealt with in two larger departments, A15 “energy, housing and technology” and A16 “transport and provincial building infrastructure.” The first department comprises competencies on energy issues, housing subsidies as well as climate policy issues in a narrow sense.
A16 in turn is responsible for transport related issues (including transport infrastructure and e-mobility) as well as the public building infrastructure in Styria.
Additional climate policy-related issues lie in the responsibility of department A13 “environment and spatial planning.” The personnel resources related to climate policy in the different departments and units vary just as at the federal level, depending on the scope of their work.
In some units and departments, only single individuals are directly involved in climate policy issues, while in other cases whole units directly work on climate policy.
Indirectly, the work of whole departments like transport and building infrastructure is of relevance in terms of climate policy.
3.2.2.
Cooperation 3.2.2.1.
Cooperation within departments Cooperation within the departments of the Styrian administration, on the one hand, arises out of particular occasions such as concrete administrative procedures or the development of regional strategies like the Integrated Styrian Energy and Climate Strategy 2017 or the development of the Styrian Adaptation Strategy 2012.
On the other hand, cooperation takes the form of recurring activities, as in case of the preparation of the provincial energy reports for monitoring the Styrian Energy Strategy 2017 or regular exchange in the form of Jour Fixes, departmental workshops, etc.
Cooperation occurs within as well as between different units, for instance when the energy-related criteria for housing subsidies are jointly determined by the unit responsible for housing subsidies and the unit responsible for energy technology.
In this context many interviewees pointed out the advantage of bundling a broad range of competencies under a single provincial secretary for cooperation (e.g., between housing and energy issues).
The quality of cooperation in the different units and departments generally rated good or even very good by the respondents.
Some interviewees, however, noted that there were only few points of contact with other units, which resulted in a lower rating (Figure 5).
3.2.2.2.
Cooperation between departments The exchange with other departments is both related to specific tasks and continuous, for instance in form of regular Jour Fixes with politicians or the Jour Fixe of the Heads of Department.
In the development of overarching strategies a broad involvement of all relevant departments and units was strived for by the lead department.
Nevertheless some of the other departments were missing integrative efforts.
The joined implementation of measures was generally seen to be consensual and rated good.
Nevertheless, the respondents that also in the field of climate policy the targets as well as the pace of the implementation of measures were determined on the political level.
3.2.2.3.
Cooperation with other provinces The officials reported many contacts with their counterparts in other provinces.
Again, these take both the form of regular meetings such as the meetings of different categories of administrative officials (e.g., meeting of provincial climate protection representatives (“Landesklimaschutzbeauftragte” or the meeting of environmental attorneys) as well as working groups on particular issues.
The quality of collaboration was generally rated as good, especially on the personal level, although it was reported that often provincial Figure 4: Perceived weight of climate policy compared to other policy targets and perceived degree of climate policy integration Source: Own calculations.
For the evaluation of the weight of climate policy compared to other policy targets, the experts could choose between the categories “more important” (1), “equally important” (2), “less important” (3) and “not important” (4).
With respect to the degree of climate policy integration in Austria experts could chose between “very good” (1), “good” (2), “not so good” (3) and “poor” (4) Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018266 officials have to represent particular political interests.
Some respondents thought that the level of cooperation has decreased due to changes in the structure of state and provincial administrations.
3.2.2.4.
Cooperation with the federal state According to the interviewees the frequency and quality of cooperation with the federal state depends strongly on the ministries involved as well as on the nature of the specific task.
The contact between the federal administration and the provinces is partly organised via those provincial departments explicitly in charge of climate policy issues that in turn seek expert opinions from other provincial departments (as for the Austrian IKES), partly the relevant departments are contacted directly (e.g., in the context of expert working groups) and partly the federal government is gathering comments on specific strategies or legislative proposals.
Some respondents noted that the federal state primarily acts independently, excluding the provinces from the debate, unless the political support of the federal states was required.
Contrarily, some ministries would increasingly try to get the provinces on board in order to improve their comparably weak position in political negotiations.
On the personal level the contact with the federal administration is, however, rated good, albeit in some cases rare.
3.2.2.5.
Cooperation with interest groups Cooperation between the Styrian administration and stakeholders and interest groups takes different forms and intensities, i.e., for some departments the contacts are limited to particular events while others try to involve a broad range of stakeholders in the development of strategies and regulations.
Often, the views of the interest groups were found to be diverging from the administration’s.
However, in cases when the interest groups pursue the same goals, cooperation was rated as good.
Overall, respondents noted that the quality of cooperation with the interest groups as a whole is difficult to rate and tends to be problematic.
3.2.2.
CPI and weighting of climate targets 3.2.2.1.
Relevance of climate policy compared to other targets The relevance of climate policy issues vis-à-vis other political targets was conceived heterogeneously by the respondents.
Nevertheless, the majority notes that the weight given to climate issues compared to other goals is a political decision and is very much contingent on the respective context.
The interviewees stressed that the relevance given to climate issues differs strongly between the other sectoral policy areas: While progress is made in agriculture (especially with respect to adaptation to climate change) and in the buildings sectors, where Austrian provinces have succeeded in defining ambitious standards, climate change is not yet recognised as an issue in tourism or economic policy in Styria.
As regards transport, the opinions of the respondents were mixed: Some noted that the ongoing extension of the road infrastructure is expected to lead to a further increase in transport volumes, that public transport infrastructure is only poorly developed in rural regions of the province, and that so far there are no public investments in battery charging infrastructure for e-mobility.
Others highlighted progress made in terms of explicit preferential treatment of public via individual motorised transport in some urban areas, implying i.a.
a reduction of parking spaces.
Conflicts were also identified with regard to the current discussion on affordable housing and the corresponding calls for lower thermal quality standards in order to reduce investment costs that would have detrimental effects on long-term energy conservation.
One interviewee, however, pointed out that the concept of life cycle analysis is slowly gaining ground.
In general, the implementation of mitigation measures, that are planned and ready to be applied, is to a certain extent seen as contingent upon the availability of financial resources.
Also with respect to air pollution, control conflicts were found and in turn the installation of biomass heating systems has been restricted in areas with high and persisting concentrations of particulate matter.
Figure 5: Perceived quality of cooperation between departments, other administrative entities and stakeholders Source: Own calculations.
For the evaluation of the quality of cooperation, the experts could choose between the categories very good (1), good (2), not so good (3) and poor (4) Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018 267 In case of target conflicts the different goals are usually weighted in long (inter-departmental) discussions.
Ultimately the decisionmaking and the balancing of interests fall in the political sphere and tend to be rather intransparent.
The division of competencies between the provincial level and the municipal level was noted as a factor constraining mitigation efforts of the province: While energy planning was introduced by the province, the respective adaptation of spatial planning lies in the competence of the municipalities, which tend to follow other interests.
Overall, the relevance of climate policy as compared to other policy issues was rated low (Figure 6) by the vast majority of respondents.
Or put differently “climate protection is not always actively pursued.” 3.2.2.2.
Degree of CPI in Styria The degree of CPI in Styria was generally considered as low.
That a single provincial representative is in charge of climate and energy issues was, however, seen as a positive factor for the integration of these policy areas.
Climate aspects also gain in importance in other policy areas such as agriculture and water management.
Yet the majority of respondents doubted that currently sufficient action is taken to tackle climate change.
It was also noted that concepts for the implementation of additional climate protection measures are available but the necessary funding is not granted.
3.2.2.3.
Degree of CPI in Austria CPI on the federal level is conceived even more critical (Figure 6).
The failure to issue the Integrated Climate and Energy Strategy (IKES) was given as an example for the lack in ambition in federal climate policy.
It was noted that only little attention is generally devoted to the topic by policymakers in Austria, not only in effective policy-making but also in the respective election campaigns.
EU legislation was seen as a pacemaker for Austrian climate policy with EU regulation getting continuously more ambitious.
The federal structure of Austria was mentioned as a factor preventing the swift implementation of EU directives.
It was noted that climate policy efforts in Austria have slowed down over the last years which was in stark contrast to the increasingly ambitious goals.
The integration of agriculture and environment into one ministry added as another explicit factor hampering CPI in Austria.
Climate policy in Austria – according to respondents’ views – consists mainly of declarations of intention, but is characterised by a substantial lack in implementation effort.
When asked for the prerequisites for a successful climate policy in Styria and Austria, also on the regional level the respondents emphasised the importance of taking a comprehensive and systemic approach to climate policy-making .
Just as at the federal level, a timely drafting of the IKES was mentioned as an important framework condition.
Moreover, many interviewees stressed that the climate policy targets should be taken seriously and put beyond question.
This also implies implementing inconvenient measures that go beyond picking the low-hanging fruit.
4.
CONCLUSIONS The key target stipulated by the Paris agreement is to limit global warming to well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels.
Mitigating climate change requires a thorough reorganisation of production and consumption patterns which basically translates into net zero emissions by mid-century.
Successful climate policy requires that the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions or avoiding rising emissions as unintended side effects of other (non-climate) policy interventions has to be integrated in decision making and legislative processes in basically all policy areas and all levels of government.
The recognition of the cross-cutting nature of climate policy and the consideration of emission impacts of other policy areas are subsumed under CPI.
Figure 6: Perceived weight of climate policy compared to other policy targets and perceived degree of climate policy integration Source: Own calculations.
For the evaluation of the weight of climate policy compared to other policy targets the experts could choose between the categories “more important” (1), “equally important” (2), “less important” (3) and “not important” (4).
With respect to the degree of CPI in Austria experts could chose between “very good” (1), “good” (2), “not so good” (3) and “poor” (4) Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018268 In order to assess the degree of CPI in Austria on the federal and regional level we conducted a survey among officials in administration as well as representatives from social partners, other special interest groups and stakeholders.
The interviews contained questions regarding the personnel resources dedicated to climate policy issues in each institution, the internal and external cooperation as well as the general relevance of climate policy as compared to other policy objectives.
The results show a broad range of perceptions regarding the degree of CPI in Austria.
On the one hand, the consideration of climate policy issues depends on the core competence of the respective institution.
On the other hand, we found widely diverging views on whether climate policy in Austria is too ambitious or too weak.
Especially, potential negative impacts of climate policy on competitiveness or employment are seen to hamper a more ambitious implementation of mitigation policies.
Cooperation is generally rated as good, especially at the personal or informal level.
However, conflicts of interest that result from the organisations’ core functions negatively impact on the perceived quality of cooperation.
In case of conflicting targets it is widely noticed that “traditional” policy objectives like employment or competitiveness are given priority compared to climate concerns.
The failure to effectively integrate climate aspects in other policy areas is reflected in the development of Austria’s greenhouse gas emissions.
After a slight decline between 2006 and 2014 emissions have been growing again.
Overall, greenhouse gas emissions amounted to 79.7 Mt CO2e in 2016 which is one Mt above the level of 1990.
Thus, at present it seems doubtful if Austria will be able to meet the 2020 emission reduction target for the Non-ETS sectors (UBA, 2018).
A stronger institutional framework for climate policy, e.g., a state secretary for climate policy or climate protection in constitutional rank, could increase the weight given to this issue.
Most importantly, the publication of an integrated long-term climate and energy policy strategy is required in order to put climate policy targets beyond question and develop a set of concrete measures that ensure the achievement of mitigation targets.
Regarding the conflicts of interest it remains to be seen whether the formal integration of energy policy in the ministry responsible for climate policy (Federal Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism) will improve the integration in actual and help resolve some of the perceived barriers for climate policy implementation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This research was funded by the Jubiläumsfonds of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), project number 16765.
We would like to thank Katharina Köberl and Susanne Markytan for excellent research assistance and Franz Sinabell for invaluable research guidance.
REFERENCES Adelle, C., Pallemaerts, M., Chiavari, J.
(2009), Climate Change and Energy Security in Europe Policy Integration and its Limits.
Stockholm.
Available from https://www.pure.uva.nl/ws/ files/785631/79271_319295.pdf.
Adelle, C., Russel, D. (2013), Climate policy integration: A case of déjà vu?
Environmental Policy and Governance, 23, 1-12.
Ahmad, A.I.
(2009), Climate Policy Integration: Towards Operationalization, Working Papers 73, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
Available from: https://www.
un.org/development/desa/publications/working-paper/climatepolicy-integration-towards-operationalization.
Beck, S., Kuhlicke, C., Görg, C. (2009), Climate Policy Integration, Coherence, and Governance in Germany, UFZ-Bericht 01/2009.
Available from https://www.wur.nl/en/show/Climate-PolicyIntegration-Coherence-and-Governance.htm.
Bommel, S., Kuindersma, W. (2008), Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance in Dutch Climate Policy.
A Multi-Level Analysis of Mitigation and Adaptation Policy, Alterra-Rapport 1799.
Available from http://www.content.alterra.wur.nl/Webdocs/PDFFiles/ Alterrarapporten/AlterraRapport1799.pdf.
Brouwer, S., Rayner, T., Huitema, D. (2013), Mainstreaming climate policy: The case of climate adaptation and the implementation of EU water policy.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 31, 134-153.
COM (2008) 30.
Communication from the Commission: 20 20 by 2020-Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity.
Available f rom ht tp : / /www.eurlex .europa.eu/ legal-content /EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0030.
COM (2011) 112.
A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050.
Available from http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0112.
COM (2014) 15 .
Communica t ion: A Pol icy Framework for Climate and Energy in the Period From 2020 to 2030.
Available from http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=COM%3A2014%3A15%3AFIN.
COM (2016) 482.
Proposal for a Regulation on Binding Annual Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 for a resilient Energy Union and to Meet Commitments Under the Paris Agreement and Amending Regulation No 525/2013 on a Mechanism for Monitoring and Reporting Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Other Information Relevant to Climate Change.
Available from http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0248.
Decision 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Effort of Member States to Reduce their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments up to 2020.
Available : from http://www.eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv: OJ.L_.2009.140.01.0136.01.
ENG.
Dupont, C. (2010), Political Commitment to Climate Policy Integration at EU Level: The Case of Biodiversity Policy.
Edinburgh Europa Paper Series 2010/05.
Dupont, C., Oberthür, S. (2011), Climate Policy Integration into EU Energy Policy: Achievements and Driving Forces Institute for European Studies, Brussels.
Available from: https://www.ies.be/files/ documents/PhD/PhD%20Claire%20Dupont%202013.pdf.
Dupont, C., Oberthür, S. (2012), Insufficient climate policy integration in EU energy policy: The importance of the long-term perspective.
J Contemporary Euro Res, 8(2), 228-247.
Available : from http:// www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/474.
Dupont, C., Primova, R. (2011), Combating Complexity: The Integration of EU Climate and Energy Policies.
European Integration Online Papers 15(1).
Available : from http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2011008.pdf.
European Commission.
(2017), Climate Change.
Special Eurobarometer Kettner and Kletzan-Slamanig: Climate Policy Integration on the National and Regional Level: A Case Study for Austria and Styria International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 4 • 2018 269 459.
Brussels: European Commission.
Available : from https://www.
ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/support/docs/report_2017_ en.pdf.
Hanger, S., Haug, C., Lung, T., Bouwer, LM.
(2013), Mainstreaming climate change in regional development policy in Europe: Five insights from the 2007-2013 programming period.
Regional Environmental Change, 15(6), 973-985.
Jacob, K., Kannen, H. (2015a), Climate Policy Integration in Federal Settings: The Case of Germany’s Building Policy, FFUReport 01-2015.
Available from https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/278672899_Climate_Policy_Integration_in_Federal_ Settings_the_Case_of_Germany%27s_Building_Policy.
Jacob, K., Kannen, H. (2015b), Integrated Strategies for Climate Policy Integration and Coherencehe Case of Germany, FFUReport 02-2015.
Available from https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/278672997_Integrated_Strategies_for_Climate_Policy_ Integration_and_Coherence_the_Case_of_Germany.
Jordan, A., Lenschow, A.
(2010), Environmental policy integration: A state of the art review.
Environmental Policy and Governance, 20(3), 147-158.
Kettner, C., Kletzan-Slamanig, D., Köppl, A.
(2012), Climate Policy Integration-Evidence on Coherence in EU policies.
Vienna: WIFO.
Available from http://www.wifo.ac.at/publikationen?detailview=yes&publikation_id=44537.
Kettner, C., Kletzan-Slamanig, D., Köppl, A.
(2015), Climate policy integration: Evidence on coherence in EU policies.
In: Kreiser, L., Milne, J., editors.
Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, Vol.
XVI.
UK: Edward Elgar.
p3-17.
Kivimaa, P., Mickwitz, P. (2009), Making the Climate Count.
Climate Policy Integration and Coherence in Finland.
The Finnish Environment 3/2009.
Available from https://www.researchgate.
net/profile/Paula_Kivimaa/publication/236219148_Making_the_ Climate_Count_Climate_Policy_Integration_and_Coherence_in_ Finland/links/543397350cf225bddcc9af43/Making-the-ClimateCount-Climate-Policy-Integration-and-Coherence-in-Finland.
pdf?origin=publication_detail.
Kok, M.T.J., de Coninck, H.C. (2007), Widening the scope of policies to address climate changeirections for mainstreaming.
Environmental Science and Policy, 10(2007), 587-599.
Lafferty, W., Hovden, E. (2003), Environmental policy integration: Towards an analytical framework.
Environmental Politics, 12(3), 1-22.
Lyytimäki, L. (2011), Mainstreaming climate policy: The role of media coverage in Finland.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 16(6), 649-661.
Mickwitz, P., Aix, F., Beck, S., Carss, D., Ferrand, N., Görg, C., Jensen, A., Kivimaa, P., Kuhlicke, C., Kuindersma, W., Máñez, M., Melanen, M., Monni, S., Pedersen, A.B., Reinert, H., van Bommel, S. (2009), Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance, PEER Report No 2, Helsinki.
Available from: http://www.library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/377942.
Niedertscheider, M., Haas, W., Görg, C. (2018), Austrian climate policies and GHG-emissions since 1990: What is the role of climate policy integration?
Environmental Science and Policy, 81, 10-17.
Peters, G. (1998), Managing horizontal government: The politics of coordination.
Public Administration: An International Quarterly, 76(2), 295-311.
Steurer, R., Clar, C. (2014b), Politikintegration in einem föderalen Staat: Klimaschutz im Gebäudesektor auf Österreichisch.
Der Moderne Staat, 7(2), 331-352.
Steurer, R., Clar, C. (2014a), Is decentralisation always good for climate change mitigation?
How federalism has complicated the greening of building policies in Austria.
Policy Sciences, 48(1), 85-107.
Umweltbundesamt (UBA).
(2017), Bundesländer Luftschadstoffinventur 1990-2015.
Regionalisierung der nationalen Emissionsdaten auf Grundlage von EU-Berichtspflichten, Wien.
Available from http:// www.umweltbundesamt.at/fileadmin/site/publikationen/REP0632.
pdf.
Umweltbundesamt (UBA).
(2018), Austria‘s Annual Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990-2016.
Submission under Regulation (EU) No 525/2013, Wien.
Available from http://www.umweltbundesamt.
at/fileadmin/site/publikationen/REP0638.pdf.
UNFCCC.
(2015), Paris Agreement, Paris: UNFCCC.
van den Berg, M., Coenen, F. (2012), Integrating climate change adaptation into Dutch local policies and the role of contextual factors.
Local Environment, 17, 441-460.
Wejs, A.
(2014), Integrating climate change into governance at the municipal scale: an institutional perspective on practices in Denmark.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 32, 1017-1035.
Available from: http://www.journals.sagepub.com/ doi/abs/10.1068/c1215.
Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change: Institutionalizing Agrometeorological Learning Through Science Field Shops in Indonesia Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change: Institutionalizing Agrometeorological Learning Through Science Field Shops in Indonesia Yunita Triwardani Winarto, Cornelis Johan (Kees) Stigter & Muki Trenggono Wicaksono ► Winarto, Y. T., Stigter, C. J., & Wicaksono, M. T. (2017).
Transdisciplinary responses to climate change: Institutionalizing agrometeorological learning through Science Field Shops in Indonesia.
Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10(1), 65-82.
Science Field Shops (SFSs) are an example of a transdisciplinary educational commitment where farmers, scientists, and extension staff exchange knowledge on agrometeorology in dialogue form to better respond to climate change.
How can scientists, farmers, and extension staff build up this transdisciplinary collaboration?
How has the agrometeorological learning environment been institutionalized in several places in Indonesia?
An interdisciplinary collaboration between agrometeorology and anthropology serves as basis for developing seven climate services that are provided in the SFSs.
Through Knowledge Transfer and Communication Technologies, farmers have become active learners, researchers, and decision makers of their own responses to the consequences of climate change.
Although such an approach proves efficient in improving the farmers’ knowledge and anticipation capability, the transdisciplinary collaboration with state authority needs to be overhauled to improve the process.
Keywords: Agrometeorology; Climate Change; Indonesia; Science Field Shops; Transdisciplinary Educational Commitment  Do not enforce farmers to only focus on achieving the target to increase productivity.
Help us with a policy of water allocation from the irrigation canals, and facilitate us in improving our understanding about climate change.1 INTRODUCTION Mobilizing efforts such as technologies and capital to improve agricultural productivity and achieve self-sufficiency in rice constitute a significant part of the Indonesian state’s objective to feed the population and to sustain economic growth.
In the course of the Green Revolution since the early 1970s, high productivity has become the state’s primary objective for agricultural development which was flanked by the introduction of new high-yielding varieties in association with chemical fertilizers and pesticides, large-scale irrigation, and new 1 This request was directed to the government by a group of rainfall observers in East Lombok led by Mastariadi in order to change the government’s policies on agricultural development (Mastariadi, 4 November 2015).
Aktuelle Südostasienforschung  Current Research on Southeast Asia w w w .s ea s. at d o i 10 .1 47 64 /1 0.
A SE A S20 17 .1 -5 66 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) technologies (Hansen, 1978; Hardjono, 1983).
From the beginning, the Green Revolution has been contested and numerous problems have been reported (Conway & Pretty, 1990; Fox, 1991; Hardjono, 1983; Schiller, 1980; Winarto, 2004a, 2013).
Summarizing the criticism, Conway (1985) argues that high productivity was achieved at the expense of agro-ecological sustainability, namely ecosystem stability and equity for local farmers.
Farmers as the main producers of food became both the target and the victims of the Green Revolution.
Even though they succeeded in increasing agricultural productivity, they have been culturally and ecologically marginalized on ‘their own fields’.
Many of them did not foresee the consequences of the top-down technology packages which increased productivity but drastically changed their habitat (Chambers, 2009; Fox, 1991; Scoones & Thompson, 2009; Winarto, 2004a, 2013).
One devastating consequence was the severe outbreak of brown planthopper (BPH) in 1985,2 just one year after Indonesia’s declaration of rice self-sufficiency.
In order to fight the negative consequences of ecosystem instability and empower farmers, a number of international and national multidisciplinary scientists collaborated with the Indonesian government to introduce programs of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) (Fox, 1991; Kenmore, 1992).
Referring to Paulo Freire’s liberal education philosophy (1972), andragogy (Knowles, 1973; Knowles & Associates, 1985), and the Farmer First paradigm (Chambers, Pacey, & Thrupp, 1989), adult education for farmers as well as people’s empowerment and participation became the hallmark of these programs.
One strategy was the introduction of Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) (Dilts & Hate, 1996; Fox, 1991; Kenmore, 1992; Pontius, Dilts, & Bartlett, 2002; Wardhana, 1992; Winarto, 2004a, 2004b).
Despite the proliferation of IPM, Indonesia faces severe environmental problems as the Green Revolution paradigm is still underlining the country’s agricultural policies (Winarto, 2009, 2011; Winarto et al., 2012a).
As a result, a devastating outbreak of BPH all over Java from 2010 to 2012 reduced rice production significantly and 1.96 million tons of rice were lost (Bortrell & Schoenly, 2012; Departemen Proteksi Tanaman, 2014; Fox, 2014; Winarto et al., 2012a; Winarto et al., 2012b).
Despite criticism and failures of the Green Revolution condensed in 20 years of the Farmer First movement (Chambers, 2009; Scoones & Thompson, 2009), the research paradigm and the transfer of top-down technology packages are still highly prevalent in the development agenda of many developing countries (Jakku & Thorburn, 2010; Luyet, Schlaepfer, Parlange, & Buttler, 2010; Sumberg, Thompson, & Woodhouse, 2013).
Farmers are still kept marginalized without sufficient knowledge to understand and foresee the risk of their agricultural practices.
This gains even more importance in the course of recent environmental and climate change (Winarto, 2013).
Farmers have always responded to climatic variability, particularly to changes in rainfall distributions and patterns, by adapting their practices throughout the season.
In the midst of ongoing climate change, however, farmers in Indonesia do not yet know that climate change is their ‘new enemy’.
High day-time temperatures 2 The brown planthopper (BPH, Nilaparvata lugens) is a miniscule fast breeding insect that lodges in the stalks of rice plants.
It feeds directly on the rice plant and in large numbers is capable of sucking the life out of extended fields of rice, causing so-called ‘hopperburn’.
The BPH is also a carrier of two destructive rice viruses: ragged stunt virus and grassy stunt virus, either of which can be as devastating to a rice crop as the direct feeding by the BPH (Fox, 2014; see also Bortrell & Schoenly, 2012).
67Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change in some tropical and subtropical rice growing regions are already close to the maximum levels.
The increase in intensity and frequency of heat waves coinciding with sensitive reproductive stages can result in serious damage of rice production (Stigter & Winarto, 2013; Thornton & Cramer, 2012).
Stigter, Winarto, and Wicaksono (2016) highlight the increased average annual temperature in Indonesia, the changes in the seasonality of precipitation (wet and dry seasons), the increased wet season rainfall in southern regions of Indonesia, and the decline of southern Indonesia rainfall up to 15% (Aldrian & Djamil, 2008; Case, Ardiansyah, & Spector, 2007).
Based on these data, farmers in Indonesia do suffer and will continue to suffer from increasing temperatures as well as from decreasing rainfall (for the strong relationship between the El-Niño Southern Oscillation [ENSO] and rainfall variability in most of Indonesia, see Boer & Suharnoto, 2012; for the changing starts of the rainy season, see Marjuki et al., 2014).
For many farmers in Indonesia, these phenomena related to climate change are relatively new (Winarto & Stigter, 2011).
Unfortunately, extension facilitation by intermediaries fails to provide farmers with knowledge and strategies (Lubis, 2013) or is not working as effectively as it should (Cahyono, 2014).
In this article, we propose the concept of Science Field Shops (SFSs) to address this missing link.
SFSs provide dialogic exchange of knowledge amongst farmers, scientists, extension staff, and policy makers, through which farmers learn agrometeorology, in order to better respond to climate change and challenge the agricultural paradigm associated with the Green Revolution.
Thereby, we propose a new approach to learning and practicing agriculture in a more sustainable way.
One important basis for developing the transdisciplinary project of SFSs is interdisciplinary collaboration across two disciplines, namely agrometeorology and anthropology.
This article aims to examine how the transdisciplinary project of SFSs has been introduced and developed in several places in Indonesia and to elaborate on the results on farmers’ capability in responding to the consequences of climate change in agriculture.
The structure of the article is organized as follows: We first discuss the transdisciplinary educational commitment which includes policy and social learning.
We then describe the establishment of SFSs through the provision of climate services and the institutionalization of agrometeorological learning in two locations in Java and Lombok (Indramayu, West Java; East Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara), following the first initiative in Gunungkidul, Yogyakarta.
Finally, we elaborate on the challenges of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary work not only within the farming communities but also regarding the effort to involve other academic institutions and government agencies.
We conclude with success factors and future challenges.
A TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH FOR POLICY AND SOCIAL LEARNING Since the late 1980s, andragogy and experiential discovery learning, which was developed in the Integrated Pest Management Farmer Field Schools (IPM FFSs), has slowly spread throughout Indonesia and became a model for the initiation of various kinds of ‘schools’, including the Climate Field Schools (CFSs).
Since 2003, government officials have carried out CFSs to provide farmers with new knowledge on weather and climate in various regions in Indonesia.
Based on our observation of the implementation of a CFS in Gunungkidul, Yogyakarta province, however, we criti68 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) cized the prevailing paradigm of simply teaching over a limited period of time instead of providing a mutual and enduring learning situation (Anantasari, Winarto, & Stigter, 2011).
Based on their observation in Indramayu, West Java province, Siregar and Crane (2011) also argue that activities in the frame of CFSs lack to identify, enhance, and build on farmers’ knowledge, capacities, and institutional processes.
A transdisciplinary educational commitment would be a necessary means to meet the needs of local farmers in the current dynamic situation of high complexity and uncertainty resulting from climate change.
Scholars increasingly ascertain the importance of transdisciplinary research in development cooperation for addressing social-environmental problems (Brutschin & Wiesmann, 2002; Christinck & Padmanabhan, 2013; Cronin, 2008; Lang et al., 2012; Pohl & Hadorn, 2008).
Cronin (2008) defines transdisciplinary research (TDR) as a practice that transcends the narrow scope of disciplinary views.
It challenges existing boundaries and ‘redraws the map’.
.
.
.
It is an approach in which researchers from a wide range of disciplines work together with stakeholders.
TDR aims to overcome the gap between knowledge production on the one hand and the demand for knowledge to contribute to the solution of social problems, on the other.
(pp.
2-3) As socio-ecological research focuses on the solution of real-world problems, the involvement of actors from outside academia in the research process is of utmost importance (Cronin, 2008; Lang et al., 2012).
Thus, “transdisciplinarity combines interdisciplinarity with a participatory approach” (Cronin, 2008, p. 4).
Transdisciplinary educational commitment then moves beyond transdisciplinary research by producing knowledge together to contribute to the solution of problems people face in their immediate environment.
The above-mentioned criticism of CFSs makes it clear that a transdisciplinary educational commitment was absent in the state’s CFSs.
The state’s CFSs ‘curricula’ were designed by agrometeorologists and delivered by agricultural officials.
Therefore, no direct relationship between scientists and farmers, which would have enabled a process of intersubjectivity, was established.
As there were no social scientists involved in CFSs, the examination of socio-cultural factors regarding the above-described contested agricultural development was also not tackled.
However, both the challenge of climate change and the need for farmers to respond to the dynamics of this change require the collaboration of scientists from different fields (in this case agrometeorology and anthropology) and the active participation of farmers on the ground.
In anthropology, such an approach is called collaborative ethnography.
Lassiter (2005) defines it as “an approach to ethnography that deliberately and explicitly emphasizes collaboration at every point in the ethnographic process, without veiling it – from project conceptualization, to fieldwork, and especially through the writing process” (p. 16).
In a later article, he advises anthropologists to use that approach in developing “community-based collaborative action” (Lassiter, 2008, p. 74-75).
In collaborative research, ethnographers move away from the investigators’ realm of definition, purpose, and authority.
In contrast, collaboration entails joint production by scientists and the community.
In SFSs, the anthropologist initiates transdisciplinary collaboration and acts as a mediator and cultural 69Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change translator between two domains of knowledge: the scientific and the local (Winarto, Stigter, Dwisatrio, Nurhaga, & Bowolaksono, 2013; Winarto & Stigter, 2013).
However, the anthropologists have to move beyond just being cultural translators as one important task is to introduce new habits to the farmers.
Thereby, interacting directly with farmers inter-subjectively becomes the main role of the anthropologists.
The establishment of SFSs was the first step to move into ‘public-anthropology’ by directly addressing issues beyond conventional anthropological concerns (Lassitter, 2005, 2008).
In this unique process, we exercise and experience immersion into the farmers’ lives in order to enable us to build up a close relationship with them.
At the same time, we detach ourselves from the intimate relationship to provide room for continuously reflecting on the transdisciplinary collaboration.
Detailed documentation of both visual and inscription data as well as analyzing and processing farmers’ rainfall data and agroecosystem observation become integral parts of our work.
Policy Learning and Social Learning Two challenges need to be addressed for the institutionalization of SFSs among farmers and policy makers, namely policy learning and social learning.
According to Albright and Crow (2015), policy learning is about “changes of beliefs, attitudes, goals, or behaviors – in response to new information” (p. 80).
Agrometeorological learning is then about such changes due to new meteorological and climatological knowledge acquired by farmers (Stigter & Winarto, 2016).
Therefore, the establishment and institutionalization of new mutual participative educational commitments, for example observation and analysis of rainfall, enable policy learning in the field of agrometeorology among farmers.
As a result, farmers are able to make decisions that enhance their capability to adapt to climate change.
In a further step, a social learning process among the rest of the community members is expected to occur.
Luks and Siebenhüner (2006, p. 419) assert that the process of social learning is highly interrelated with the generation, construction, and representation of scientific knowledge as well as with the openness and flexibility of the governance system.
One challenge is to ensure the maintenance of the social learning process.
Generally, farmers are used to and willing to share what they learn and know to their fellow farmers (Winarto, 2004a, 2004b).
For farmers who have not personally experienced the observation and analysis of rainfall patterns, it is, however, difficult to follow the outcomes and advice of the rainfall observers in the community.
For the rainfall observer, agrometeorological learning is a direct way of observing and analyzing emerging problems and opportunities related to meteorological and ecological phenomena.
Even so, for a social learning process to take place among the rest of the community members, a larger movement of scaling-up the SFSs is necessary, and this also requires support from state authorities.
One rainfall observer in Indramayu complained that “my neighbors would not listen to me (to change their farming strategies) since nobody from the government backed me up” (Condra, 5 August 2015).
Without the state’s support, the extent to which social learning could take place within and beyond the community is still a prevailing problem.
70 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) SCIENCE FIELD SHOPS IN PRACTICE: KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES In general, farmers are aware of changes to their environment due to climate change and they have strategies and knowledge as the basis for their work to enhance resilience.
Improving farmers’ knowledge and decision making to cope with climate change are the main objectives of our transdisciplinary collaboration.
This process takes place via Knowledge Transfer and Communication Technologies (KTCT) in the frame of SFSs (Winarto, Stigter, Ariefiansyah, & Prihandiani, 2016; Stigter, 2016a).
Knowledge transfer refers to the practical problem of transferring knowledge from one part of an organization to another.
Knowledge transfer seeks to organize, create, capture, or distribute knowledge and ensure its availability for future users.
Farmers have their own ways and habits of transferring knowledge among themselves using their own communication technologies (Winarto, 2004a, 2004b).
How could this knowledge be used and improved in SFSs?
We examine this process in the following sub-section.
Introducing and Establishing Science Field Shops SFSs are a new extension approach in which knowledge is exchanged or transferred for operational use by farmers.
The scientists (agrometeorologists and anthropologists) have been working collaboratively on an interdisciplinary basis to introduce seven climate services (see list below) to farmers who have become active learners and researchers throughout the establishment of the SFSs on a transdisciplinary basis.
After establishing the first SFS in a hamlet in Gunungkidul, Yogyakarta, from 2008 to 2009, we introduced agrometeorological learning processes among farmers in other regencies, namely Indramayu in West Java in 2009 and East Lombok in West Nusatenggara in late 2014.
Various donor agencies funded the SFSs and academic institutions and (inter)national agencies supported the operational costs of both scientists and farmers.
In the early stage of its establishment, the collaborative work focused on policy learning among the rainfall observers who joined the SFSs by providing the seven climate services for farmers.
Gradually, we introduced the SFSs to local and national government agencies as an alternative extension approach to assist farmers in the midst of ongoing climate change.
At a later stage, the scientists gradually addressed social learning through the informal scaling-up of SFSs among farmers and by formally establishing new satellite groups as well as inviting agricultural officials to participate.
In this transdisciplinary process of knowledge transfer and communication between farmers, scientists, and at a later stage also extension intermediaries (Winarto et al., 2016), the farmers are active learners.
They carry out their daily observations of rainfall and agroecosystems, document their findings, and analyze and discuss them together in monthly meetings.
They play an active role in analyzing the impacts of particular rainfall patterns to the ecosystem and reporting on the most vulnerable situations.
Scientists and extension workers have the role of establishing climate services which provide (new) operational knowledge in agrometeorology.
The aim is the establishment of KTCTs in Science Field Shops in order to improve farmers’ anticipation capability in decision making that enables them to 71Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change better cope with the consequences of climate change.
We have learned that what is missing in almost all extension attempts in developing countries is a mutual dialogue for knowledge transfer.
For that reason, SFSs are organized as a flexible mutual commitment between farmers, scientists, and any extension intermediary who wants to join to hold dialogues on climate problems.
Agrometeorological learning should lead to policy learning such as changes of beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and goals due to the transfer of new knowledge (see Albright & Crow, 2015).
The new knowledge is obtained through KTCTs on the basis of seven climate services (Stigter, 2016b; Winarto et al., 2016): 1.
Daily measurement of rainfall by all rainfall observers in their plots by using rain gauges The first thing all participating farmers have to learn is measuring the rainfall on their plots on a daily basis.
This quantitative data is exchanged and discussed on a monthly basis in the SFSs meeting.
Thereby, farmers understand how the rainfall varies through time and space.
Rain gauges serve as KTCTs as they are used to exchange and discuss the data gathered (see Figure 1).
Figure 1.
A farmer is measuring rainfall.
(photo by Aria S. Handoko).
72 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) 2.
Daily or weekly observation of agroecological aspects (soil, plants, water, biomass, pests, climate extremes) On pre-printed data sheets, on a daily or weekly basis, farmers fill in observations on crop stages and how their plants look, including colors due to fertilizer treatments and drought.
From the nursery stage onwards, they also record detailed observations on pests and diseases (if any) and any consequences found or suspected.
Farmers may also list soil treatments prior to sowing and include the sowing and planting methods they have used.
They list the varieties they have sown and keep records of fertilizers (organic and/or inorganic) used at specific crop phases.
Treatments involve irrigations and withholding irrigations at specific crop phases as well as the spraying of pesticides, organic and/or inorganic, at specific conditions of pest/disease infestation.
The data sheets serve as KTCTs and are the basis for exchange, discussions, and the development of strategies during SFSs (see Figure 2 and 3).
3.
Measuring of yields and analysis of the correlation to rainfall and inputs (amount & timing) Farmers focus on expected and measured yields.
Moreover, they explain differences in yields in relation to rainfall and other agroecologial inputs (amounts and timing) available, affordable and used (varieties, water, fertilizers, pesticides, labor, machinFigure 2.
A farmer is observing the agroecosystem condition of his field.
(photo by Muki T. Wicaksono).
73Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change ery, and knowledge).
Farmers communicate and discuss the procurement of yields among themselves.
Moreover, they compare yield, rainfall, and other data with those from previous seasons.
The analysis, understanding, and comparison of yields are part of KTCTs.
4.
Organization of the SFSs themselves The continuation of the SFSs among farmers needs to be entirely in the hands of the farmers.
In both Indramayu and East Lombok, we helped farmers to form a core group of rainfall observers consisting of the first batch and a number of satellite groups with new rainfall observers.
The leaders of the groups organize farmers’ meetings to exchange and discuss knowledge amongst each other or with extension intermediaries.
5.
Development and exchange of monthly updated seasonal climate predictions in the form of seasonal rainfall scenarios We send farmers monthly climate scenarios in order to provide them with new knowledge that can be combined and discussed with their gathered data.
We explained and discussed the terminology of the climate scenarios in advance so that farmers know how to interpret the data.
Figure 3.
Group of rainfall observers discussing their agrometeorological observations.
(photo by Yunita T. Winarto).
74 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) 6.
Delivering new knowledge related to the above listed points Scientists deliver new knowledge, including the provision and discussion of answers to all agricultural/climatological questions raised by participants throughout the year.
7.
Guidance on the establishment of farmer field experiments to get on-farm answers on urgent local questions Farmers are encouraged to carry out experiments on their own plots.
For example, scientists guided farmers to find out the most effective strategies for mitigating methane emissions – released from the plowing of wet biomass in an aerobic condition – while also sustaining and/or increasing yields and reducing costs.
Such reports on experiments aiming to prevent climate change and sustain or increase yields while reducing costs are an important part of KTCTs and constitute ‘win-win solutions’ for both the environment and the farmers.
Another aspect of KTCTs is the training of farmer facilitators which the farmers choose themselves.
The scientists trained these facilitators in train-the-trainer workshops to improve their climate literacy and agrometeorological learning skills and knowledge to enable them to facilitate other farmers and new members.
Other forms of KTCTs used by farmers to exchange knowledge are daily or regular informal discussions, mobile telephones, rural radio, and television.
Information is also spread through existing state agricultural extension services where farmers keep track on how the ongoing season is progressing.
The up-scaling of all these KTCTs and the reporting on the up-scaling process are also exchanged and discussed in the SFSs and therefore are part of KTCTs themselves.
In transdisciplinary research, the role of farming communities is significant.
Based on our experience, we learned that the implementation of SFSs in different places and farming cultures/systems has to address the peculiarities of each community.
Agrometeorological learning in the framework of climate change needs to include and address local socio-cultural aspects and the specific ecological landscapes.
We reflect on the gradual learning processes in the transdisciplinary setting of SFSs in the following section.
Institutionalizing Agrometeorological Learning: A Gradual Learning Process For both farmers and scientists, the most important experiences throughout their collaborative work, are the farmers’ significant changes in attitude and strategies and the scientists’ improvement in the SFSs materials and approaches.
When looking back at the starting point of the SFSs, the farmers describe significant changes they have been experiencing gradually over time.
Through ongoing intersubjectivity with the farmers in the past years and daily reflection on what was missing in farmers’ learning, the scientists improved the farmers’ new habits of measuring daily rainfall and taking notes of their agroecosystem observation over time (Prahara, Winarto, & Kristiyanto, 2011; Winarto & Stigter, 2011).
Based on farmers’ reports and evaluations, the scientists gradually improved the template for documenting these data (Winarto & Stigter, 2016).
For the farmers, quantifying rainfall and writing down the 75Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change results were new skills.
In the beginning, they produced incomplete data.
Writing down knowledge based on their observations meant simplifying very complex phenomena into a few words or short sentences (Prahara et al., 2011; Winarto & Stigter, 2016).
Thus, scientists had to repeat explanations, revise the template, and correct farmers’ mistakes from time to time.
Eventually, once the farmers understood the benefits of their data, they could do the documentation on their own initiative.
Carrying out the data collection on a daily basis, the farmers realized how significant and valuable it was.
They were able to compare rainfall patterns between years and to produce hypothetical assumptions on particular agrometeorological phenomena such as the relation between certain rainfall patterns and the infestation of particular pests/diseases.
Based on our dialogues, we collaboratively produced monthly and annual rainfall graphs (Winarto & Stigter, 2016).
These graphs (see Figure 4) can be considered a new form of KTCTs.
With the graphs, farmers can visually depict their analyses on rainfall, pest/disease populations/infestations, and the plants’ age in one graph.
The graph can be used by the farmers themselves and distributed to others in their community.
Another significant achievement by the farmers was monthly-organized evaluation meetings.
In Indramayu, these meetings have been held since 2009 by rotation principle.
Visiting places far away from their villages and discussing data became a strong communicative event, strengthening the network, and establishing friendships (Giller, 2013).
Such meetings are significant KTCTs to support the learning process.
Farmers share and exchange their data, discoveries, ideas, problems, and soluFigure 4.
Annual rainfall graph.
(photo by Muki T. Wicaksono).
76 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) tions.
Learning from one another and from the scientists is the most valuable thing that they missed in formal extension meetings.
Farmers are used to observing and interpreting phenomena in their fields, but not as detailed as in SFSs.
However, their observations also depend on what is considered significant in local settings.
In Indramayu, pest/disease infestations have always been a threat.
Thus, in the early years of the learning process, they particularly used to share and discuss ideas of how to treat a particular pest or disease.
By using various components of agrometeorology, the farmers were gradually motivated to analyze yields and the differences found between farmers, different planting seasons, and the same planting season in different years.
From 2013 onwards, farmers were stimulated to carry out simple standardized ‘win-win solution experiments’.
They had to discover the most effective strategies for mitigating methane emission that would not reduce yields but only costs.
Farmers learned that for farmer-led field experiments, they had to prepare and compare one ‘field as usual’ and one experimental field with only one variable differing from the usual field.
This is an example of how farmers gradually learn to incorporate scientific premises in their own trial-and-error activities (Winarto & Stigter, 2016).
Throughout the intersubjective relationship, it is crucial that farmers themselves sustain the objective of institutionalizing agrometeorological learning.
Yet, without a common goal to achieve, it would be difficult to reach a consensus or compromise on the diverse values, norms, and rules between the different parties (Brutschin & Wiesmann, 2002).
Therefore, it was a pleasant surprise for us and other parties that up to 2016, the SFSs in Indramayu could be carried out under the leadership of farmers, thereby highlighting the benefits of SFSs.
The rainfall observers in that region have become the source of climate scenarios for other farmers and regency authorities.
For the farmers in East Lombok, the SFSs were the first opportunity to come into contact with agrometeorological knowledge and learning that could help them to understand puzzling phenomena.
Over a relatively short time, the East Lombok farmers, just as the Indramayu farmers from 2010 onwards, gained confidence in the new learning process and started to ‘trust’ the monthly rainfall scenarios provided by the scientists.
In comparison to their own traditional cosmology (warigé), which became out of line with the recent weather and climate conditions, “the seasonal scenarios contained truth”, as the rainfall observers argued (Zulkarnaen and Mastariadi, 4 November 2015).
Gradually, other farmers in East Lombok perceived the rainfall observers as mangku hujan.3 Gaining trust, enriching knowledge, proving the advantages, having freedom to speak, and obtaining a feeling of ownership for the learning activities and outcomes are important elements for a sustainable transdisciplinary collaboration.
Yet, only through strong dedication, mutual trust, and ongoing intersubjectivity between all parties over time, can the institutionalization of SFSs as an educational commitment take place.
3 Mangku hujan was a traditional informal leader in the old social structure of the Sasak ethnic group in Lombok having the capability to define and determine local regulations and provide guidance about farming.
77Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change MOVING FORWARD: INTERAND TRANSDISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES Institutionalizing agrometeorological learning in a transdisciplinary collaboration is not possible without establishing an interdisciplinary foundation among scientists on different scales.
Without the involvement, organization, and education of scientists from local universities and/or other institutions, the materialization of such an educational commitment to assist farmers is doomed to fail.
However, breaking the ‘walls’ between different faculties, disciplines, and scales in establishing the research team is not an easy task.
The most important thing to begin with is to seek scientists from different disciplines: natural sciences (e.g., agrometeorology, agronomy) and social sciences (e.g., anthropology, sociology) who agree to cross the boundaries of their own disciplines.
In Indonesia, as elsewhere, this is not an easy task due to the traditional boundaries of faculties and the virtual absence of scientists who are interested to initiate and pursue an interand transdisciplinary research project.
Building a ‘common language’ between different disciplines needs the high motivation, stamina, patience, and passion of the scientists to learn from one another.
All parties have to set up common goals and institutionalize values, norms, and rules for establishing new habits in a collaborative process.
Without the willingness for continuous reflection and learning at every stage of the collaboration, the necessary intersubjective relationship is not possible.
Only on such an interdisciplinary basis, KTCTs can be developed in a learning arena such as the SFSs.
However, one remaining constraint is how to sustain the work, especially with regard to local universities where agrometeorologists and social scientists have not been ready to work collaboratively in providing climate services to farmers.
Although it is not easy to change farmers’ habits and culture, they are seen to internalize new habits easily through direct experiences of what is happening in the fields and gaining confidence in the advantages of their agrometeorological learning.
This stands in contrast to changing bureaucrats’ culture and perspectives.
Our experience in establishing transdisciplinary work with both farmers and local/regional authorities in the two regencies shows that it is much easier to gain the farmers’ trust and willingness to collaborate than that of government officials.
Facilitating policy learning among the farmers has been the major accomplishment of our transdisciplinary work.
The strategies developed by rainfall observers in collaboration with local village officials to avoid harvest failures due to the strong El-Niño in 2015 (which lasted up to April 2016) exemplify this accomplishment.
In a village meeting in Indramayu, the rainfall observers developed the strategy to adopt the schedule for preparing lands and nurseries by anticipating the expected short rainy season, the lack of rainfalls throughout the rainy season, the availability of irrigation water, and the population and life-cycle of white rice stemborer.
They calculated the time of making the nursery bed, the type of nursery, and the maturing age of rice variety to be cultivated.
Although they experienced severe water scarcity in the middle of the rainy season planting, the farmers could still gain their harvests by relying on the groundwater resources at the time when the paddy did not need much water.
Another benefit was their successful strategy in avoiding pest infestation.
In this case, the policy learning and the social learning took place once the local officials understood the need to appropriately define the preparatory stage of the forthcoming 78 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) planting season to avoid harvest failures.
In contrast, farmers experienced hardships and harvest failures without any timely guidance and assistance by the agricultural officials even though some rainfall observers were able to anticipate the long drought of the 2015/2016 rainy season.
Instead of working on a flexible planting scheme, the government expected farmers to keep planting rice to reach the state’s annual target of boosting up rice production (Winarto, Stigter, & Ariefiansyah, 2015).
Without any governmental support, the rest of the community members that have not experienced any agrometeorological learning would follow their previous strategies.
The long drought trapped them in a harsh situation without any water supply during the growth of rice.
This is illustrated by the complaint of a rainfall observer in Indramayu who experienced harvest failure in 2015 when planting rice in the dry season with normally sufficient irrigation water.
We are having a long drought this season [dry season of 2015], but why did the government force us to plant rice without taking into account that there would be a strong El-Niňo this season?
Now we have lost our harvest.
If the government had advised us and helped us planting another commodity, we would not have experienced this harvest failure.
(Condra, 5 August 2015) These cases highlight that the main aim is to implement a sustainable long-term educational commitment and not only a short-period training such as in the state introduced Climate Field Schools.
In this process, the biggest challenge is to stimulate a policy learning process among government officials.
Differences between the two research sites are prevalent here as the East Lombok regency authorities supported the up-scaling of the SFSs in a relatively shorter period than the Indramayu regency authorities.
Recently, the local and regency governments in Indramayu and East Lombok agreed to facilitate the establishment of the SFSs at the village and/ or district levels.
However, the top-down approach which focuses only on achieving the national rice production target has continued without any focus on educating farmers to be responsive to the uncertain consequences of climate change.
Finding an appropriate approach to invite, motivate, and involve local and regional state authorities in developing SFSs in their regions is now becoming a significant part of scientists’ responsibility.
CONCLUSION This article has shown that the collaborative work between scientists from different disciplinary backgrounds such as agrometeorology and anthropology proves to be useful in initiating, introducing, and institutionalizing a transdisciplinary collaboration with farmers.
Only by positioning farmers as main partners and active learnerresearchers and not merely as receivers of technology, Science Field Shops could be established on the basis of Knowledge Transfer and Communication Technologies.
However, changing farmers’ habits, knowledge, and practices to be rainfall observers, researchers, and responsive decision makers of their own fields takes time.
Gaining confidence, belief, and trust that the new learning and habits are beneficial for improving their anticipation capability and decision making over time constitutes a sig79Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change nificant part of the entire process of institutionalizing agrometeorological learning.
Incrementally, farmers realized that only the combined process of gathering rainfall data, understanding their field agroecosystem conditions, and receiving monthly seasonal scenarios enabled them to better anticipate future requirements.
The major challenge, however, is to initiate and establish transdisciplinary collaboration with state authorities.
Agricultural development programs in Indonesia still refer to the Green Revolution paradigm.
Therefore, high productivity is still the main objective of the state’s agricultural policy, whereas adaptation to the increasing uncertainty and consequences of climate change on agriculture has not been seriously addressed.
We propose that state representatives should be collaborative in developing new agendas and strategies in agricultural production that consider climate change and sustain the livelihood of farmers.
 REFERENCES Albright, E. A., & Crow, D. A.
(2015).
Learning processes, public and stakeholder engagement: Analyzing responses to Colorado’s extreme flood events of 2013.
Urban Climate, 14(1), 79-93.
Aldrian, E., & Djamil, Y. S. (2008).
Spatio-temporal climatic change of rainfall in East Java Indonesia.
International Journal of Climatology, 28, 435-448.
Anantasari, E., Winarto, Y. T., & Stigter, K. (2011).
Climate Field School: Learning and understanding some scientific knowledge of climate.
In Y. T. Winarto & K. Stigter (Eds.
), Agrometeorological learning: Coping better with climate change (pp.
44-85).
Saarbrücken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.
Boer, R., & Suharnoto Y.
(2012) Climate change and its impact on Indonesia’s food crop sector.
Paper presented at the Sixth Executive Forum on Natural Resource Management: Water & Food in a Changing Environment on 11-13 April, Los Baños, Philippines.
Bortrell, D. G., & Schoenly, K. G. (2012).
Resurrecting the ghost of green revolution past: The brown planthopper as a recurring threat to high-yielding rice production in tropical Asia.
Journal of Asia-Pacific Entomology, 15(1), 122-140.
Brutschin, J., & Wiesmann, U.
(2002).
Transdisciplinary research in development cooperation: Origins and paradigms.
Unity of knowledge (in transdisciplinary research sustainability, vol. 1).
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS).
Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff36/98a3b0c8ef7b90020a 3556c0be384dd79467.pdf Case, M., Ardiansyah, F., & Spector, E. (2007).
Climate change in Indonesia: Implications for humans and nature.
World Wildlife Fund.
Retrieved from http://iciar.lipi.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ClimateChange-in-Indonesia.pdf Cahyono, E. D. (2014).
Challenges facing extension agents in implementing the participatory extension approach in Indonesia: A case study of Malang Regency in the East Java Region.
Retrieved from https:// etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1404402942&disposition=attachment Chambers, R., Pacey, A., & Thrupp, L. A.
(1989).
Farmer first: Farmer innovation and agricultural research.
London: Intermediate Technology Publication.
Chambers, R. (2009).
Foreword.
In I. Scoones & J. Thompson (Eds.
), Farmer first revisited: Innovation for agricultural research and development (pp.
xix-xxx).
Rugby: Practical Action Publishing.
Christinck, A., & Padmanabhan, M.
(Eds.).
(2013).
Cultivate diversity!
A handbook on transdisciplinary approaches to agrobiodiversity research.
Weikersheim: Margraf Publishers.
Conway, G. R. (1985).
Agroecosystem analysis.
Agricultural Administration, 20, 31-55.
Conway, G. R., & Pretty, J. N. (1990).
Unwelcome harvest: Agricultural pollution.
London: Earthscan Publications.
80 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) Cronin, K. (2008).
Transdisciplinary research (TDR) and sustainability.
Overview report prepared for the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST), New Zealand.
Departemen Proteksi Tanaman, Fakultas Pertanian, Institut Pertanian Bogor.
(2014).
Jawa krisis pangan jika kita tidak mampu mengelola serangan wereng secara benar (Java experiences food crises if we cannot control brown planthopper appropriately) [Press Release].
Bogor: Institut Pertanian Bogor.
Dilts, R., & Hate, S. (1996).
IPM Farmers’ Field Schools: Changing paradigms and scaling-up.
Agricultural Research & Extension Network, 59b, 1-4.
Fox, J. J.
(1991).
Managing the ecology of rice production in Indonesia.
In J. Hardjono (Ed.
), Indonesia: Resources, ecology, and environment (pp.
63-84).
Singapore: Oxford University Press.
Fox, J. J.
(2014, March 4).
Fast breeding insect devastates Java’s rice.
East Asia Forum.
Retrieved from http:// www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/05/fast-breeding-insect-devastates-javas-rice/ Freire, P. (1972).
Pedagogy of the oppressed.
Harmondsworth: Penguin Education.
Giller, O.
(2013).
Science Field Shops: The first step in creating an improved extension service in Indonesia, centred around agrometeorological learning.
Unpublished M.Sc.
thesis, Wageningen University and Research Centre, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
Hansen, G. E. (1978).
Bureaucratic linkages and policy-making in Indonesia: BIMAS revisited.
In K. W. Jackson & L. W. Pye (Eds.
), Political power and communication in Indonesia (pp.
322-342).
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hardjono, J.
(1983).
Rural development in Indonesia: The “top-down” approach.
In D. A. M. Leam & D. P. Chaudhri (Eds.
), Rural development and the state (pp.
38-65).
London: Methuen.
Jakku, E., & Thorburn, P. J.
(2010).
A conceptual framework for guiding the participatory development of agricultural decision support systems.
Agriculture Systems, 103, 675-682.
Kenmore, P. E. (1992).
Indonesia’s IPM – a model for Asia.
In Intercountry programme for the development of integrated pest control in rice in South and Southeast Asia.
Phase III.
FAO.
Knowles, M. S. (1973).
The adult learner: A neglected species.
Houston: Gulf Publishing Company.
Knowles, M. S., & Associates (1985).
Andragogy in action: Applying modern principles of adult learning.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Lang, D. J., Wiek, A., Bergmann, M., Stauffacher, M., Martens, P., Mull, P., .
. .
Thomas, C. J.
(2012).
Transdisciplinary research in sustainability science.
Practice, principles, and challenges.
Sustainability Science, 7(Supplement 1), 25-43.
Lassiter, L. E. (2005).
Collaborative ethnography and public anthropology.
Current Anthropology, 46(1), 83106.
Lassiter, L. E. (2008).
Moving past public anthropology and doing collaborative anthropology.
NAPA Bulletin, 29, 70-86.
Lubis, D. P. (2013).
Agricultural extension in Indonesia: Current status and possible ways to meeting emerging challenges.
Bogor: Bogor Agricultural University (IPB).
Retrieved from https://www.syngentafoundation.org/file/1941/download?token=tm1eUCbo Luks, F., & Siebenhüner, B.
(2007).
Transdisciplinarity for social learning?
The contribution of the German socio-ecological research initiative to sustainability governance.
Ecological Economics, 63, 418-426.
Luyet, V., Schlaepfer, R., Parlange, M. B., & Buttler, A.
(2012).
A framework to implement stakeholder participation in environmental projects.
Journal of Environmental Management, 111, 213-219.
Marjuki, van der Schrier, G., Klein Tank, A. M. G., van den Besselaar, E. J. M., Nurhayati, & Swarinoto, Y. S. (2014).
Observed climatic trends and variability relevant for crop yields in Southeast Asia.
In Past, present and future: A display of climate science and services in South East Asia.
Workshop proceedings of the International ASEAN SACA&D Conference and Workshop 2014 (pp.
22-23).
Retrieved from http://sacad.
database.bmkg.go.id/documents/IASCW_Proceedings.pdf Pohl, C., & Hadorn, G. H. (2008).
Methodological challenges of transdisciplinary research.
Natures Sciences Societies, 16, 111-121.
Pontius, J., Dilts, R., & Bartlett, A.
(2002).
From Farmer Field School to Community IPM: Ten years of IPM training in Asia.
Bangkok: FAO Community IPM Programme.
81Transdisciplinary Responses to Climate Change Prahara, H., Winarto, Y. T., & Kristiyanto (2011).
The joint production of knowledge: Its dynamics.
In Y. T. Winarto & K. Stigter (Eds.
), Agrometeorological learning: Coping better with climate change (pp.
145-180).
Saarbrücken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.
Scoones, I., & Thompson, J.
(2009).
Farmer first revisited: Innovation for agricultural research and development.
In I. Scoones & J. Thompson (Eds.)
Farmer first revisited: Innovation for agricultural research and development (pp.
3-30).
Rugby: Practical Action Publishing.
Schiller, B. L. M. (1980).
The green revolution in Java: Ecological, socio-economic and historical perspectives.
Prisma, 18, 71-93.
Siregar, R. P., & Crane, T. A.
(2011).
Climate information and agricultural practice in adaptation to climate variability: The case of Climate Field Schools in Indramayu, Indonesia.
Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment, 33(2), 55-69.
Stigter, K. (2016a).
Improve training tools for extension agents.
In S. Simone, F. Rossi, & S. David (Eds.
), Supporting agricultural extension towards Climate-Smart Agriculture: An overview of existing tools (pp.
8083).
Rome: Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture.
Stigter, K. (2016b).
Farmers, agrometeorological learning, response farming, knowledge co-production and extension in Indonesia.
INSAM (The International Society for Agricultural Meteorology), May 2016.
Retrieved from https://www.agrometeorology.org Stigter, K., & Winarto, Y. T. (2013).
Rice and climate change: Adaptation or mitigation?
Facts for policy designs.
A choice from what recent summaries say and some critical additions for use with Indonesian farmers.
In H. Soeparno, E. Pasandaran, M. Syarwani, A. Dariah, S. M. Pasaribu, & N. S. Saad (Eds.
), Politik pembangunan pertanian menghadapi perubahan iklim [Politics of agricultural development facing climate change] (pp.
474-485).
Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pembangunan Pertanian, Kementerian Pertanian.
Stigter, K., & Winarto.
Y. T. (2016).
Science Field Shops approach.
In S. Simone, F. Rozze, & S. David (Eds.
), Supporting agricultural extension towards Climate-Smart Agriculture: An overview of existing tools (pp.
2224).
Rome: Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture.
Stigter, K., Winarto, Y. T., & Wicaksono, M. T. (2016).
Science Field Shops: An innovative agricultural extension approach for adaptation to climate change, applied with farmers in Indonesia.
In W. L. Filho, K. Adamson, & R. Dunk (Eds.
), Implementing climate change adaptation in communities, cities, countries and via outreach programmes (pp.
391-405).
Springer: Heidelberg.
Sumberg, J., Thompson, J., & Woodhouse, P. (2013).
Why agronomy in the developing world has become contentious.
Agriculture and Human Values, 30(1), 71-83.
Thornton, P., & Cramer, L.
(Eds.).
(2012).
Impacts of climate change on the agricultural and aquatic systems and natural resources within the CGIAR’s mandate.
CCAFS Working Paper 23.
Copenhagen: CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS).
Wardhana, M. A.
(1992).
Developments in IPM: The Indonesian case.
In P. A. C. Ooi, G. S. Lim, T. H. Ho, P. L. Manalo, & J. Waage (Eds.
), Integrated pest management in the Asia-Pacific Region (pp.
27-35).
Manila: CAB International, Asian Development Bank.
Winarto, Y. T. (2004a).
Seeds of knowledge.
The beginning of integrated pest management in Java.
New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies.
Winarto, Y. T. (2004b).
The evolutionary changes in rice-crop farming.
Integrated Pest Management in Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Southeast Asian Studies, 42(3), 241-272.
Winarto, Y. T. (2009).
Putting farmer first in Indonesia.
The case of Farmer Field Schools.
In I. Scoones & J. Thompson (Eds.
), Farmer first revisited.
Innovation for agricultural research and development (pp.
215-218).
Rugby: Practical Action Publishing.
Winarto, Y. T. (2011).
The ecological implications of central versus local governance.
The contest over integrated pest management in Indonesia.
In M. R. Dove, P. E. Sajise, & A.
A. Doolittle (Eds.
), Beyond the sacred forest.
Complicating conservation in Southeast Asia (pp.
276-301).
Dunham: Duke University Press.
Winarto, Y. T. (2013).
‘Memanusiakan manusia’ dalam lingkungan yang tangguh.
Mengapa ‘jauh panggang dari api’?
(‘Humanizing people’ in sustainable environment.
Why ‘is the grill far away from the fire’?)
Antropologi Indonesia, 34(1), 75-89.
82 Yunita T. Winarto, Cornelis J. Stigter & Muki T. Wicaksono  ASEAS 10(1) Winarto, Y. T., & Stigter, K.
(Eds.).
(2011).
Agrometeorological learning.
Coping better with climate change.
Saarbrücken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.
Winarto, Y. T., & Stigter, K. (2013).
Science Field Shops to reduce climate vulnerabilities.
An interand trans-disciplinary educational commitment.
Collaborative Anthropologies, 6, 419-441.
Winarto, Y. T., & Stigter, K. (2016).
Incremental learning and gradual changes: “Science Field Shops” as an educational approach in coping better with climate change.
In L. Wilson, & C. Stevenson (Eds.
), Promoting climate change awareness through environmental education (pp.
60-95).
Hersley: IGI Global.
Winarto, Y. T., Stigter, K., Ariefiansyah, R., & Prihandiani, A. F. (2016, July).
Agrometeorological learning as policy learning in a changing climate.
Would the state change its policies if the farmers change their strategies?
Paper presented at the 6th International Symposium of Journal Antropologi Indonesia, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia.
Winarto, Y. T., Fox, J. J., Stigter, K., Bowolaksono, A., Dwisatrio, B., Nurhaga, M., & Kinanti, V. (2012a).
Adaptation options of farmers to a changing climate in a vulnerable ecosystem.
Final report of international research collaboration submitted to Directorate of Research and Community Development, Universitas Indonesia, Depok.
Winarto, Y. T., Fox, J. J., Nurhaga, M., Avessina, J., Kinanti, N., & Dwisatrio, B.
(2012b).
Brownplanthopper in Klaten-Boyolali-Sukoharjo, Central Java.
Ricehoppers.net.
Retrieved from https://ricehoppers.
net/2011/05/17/brown-planthopper-in-klaten-boyolali-sukoharjo-central-java/ Winarto, Y. T., Stigter, K., & Ariefiansyah, R. (2015, December).
Interpreting the present, anticipating the future.
Continuous learning in ongoing climate change.
Paper presented in the Australian Research Council workshop on “Environmental Education in Indonesia”, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia.
Winarto, Y. T., Stigter, K., Dwisatrio, B., Nurhaga, M., & Bowolaksono, A.
(2013).
Agrometeorological learning increasing farmers’ knowledge in coping with climate change and unusual risks.
Southeast Asian Studies, 2(2), 323-349.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS Yunita Triwardani Winarto is professor at the Department of Anthropology, Universitas Indonesia, and the coordinator of the research cluster on Response Farming to Climate Change of the Center for Anthropological Studies, FISIP-UI.
► Contact: yunita.winarto@gmail.com Cornelis Johan (Kees) Stigter was an agrometeorologist from Agromet Vision in the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Africa, who collaborated with the anthropologists from Universitas Indonesia since 2008.
He passed away on 20 May 2016 after falling ill while facilitating an SFS session in Indramayu, West Java.
Muki Trenggono Wicaksono is a junior researcher at Epistema Institute in Indonesia, a research-based institution on law, society, and environmental issues.
He was a researcher at the Department of Anthropology, Universitas Indonesia from 2012 to 2015.
► Contact: muki.wicaksono@epistema.or.id
Geographical analysis of climate vulnerability at a regional scale: 129Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.66.2.3 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 2017 (2) 129–144.
Introduction Due to its serious consequences on mankind, there is a need to assess the effects of climate change in a more complex way.
The changes of climate have spatial variations and affect the various countries and regions differently (Glantz, M.H.
1995; O’Brien, K.L.
and Leichenko, R.M.
2000; Lobell, D.B.
et al.
2011), therefore, policy-makers on the subnational level need decision support tools which are able to summarize the situation of their regions in a simple and effective way (Hanger, S. et al.
2013).
One of these tools can be the usage of global climate vulnerability indices which appeared in the last decade such as the Global Climate Risk Index from Germanwatch (https://germanwatch.org 2006) or the ND-GAIN index from the University of Notre Dame (http://www.gain.org 2014).
While they have a solid scientific background, they are not suitable for supporting policy-making and other related tasks (de Sherbinin, A.
2014).
To achieve this goal, the scale of the climate vulnerability analysis must be reduced to regional, sub-regional or local level.
In recent years the modelling of climate change and its effects had a leap forward in terms of spatial resolution which enables deeper understanding of the effects from the viewpoint of the environment, economy and society (Fowler, H.J.
et al.
2007; Christensen, J.H.
et al.
2007; Mearns, L.O.
et al.
2009; Jacob, 1 Hungarian Academy of Sciences, CERS Institute for Regional Studies, 6000 Kecskemét, Rákóczi út 3.
H-6000 E-mails: farkas.jeno@krtk.mta.hu; hoyk.edit@krtk.mta.hu 2 University of Szeged, Department of Physical Geography and Geoinformatics, H-6722 Szeged, Egyetem u.
2.
E-mail: J.Rakonczai@geo.u-szeged.hu Geographical analysis of climate vulnerability at a regional scale: The case of the Southern Great Plain in Hungary Jenő Zsolt FARKAS 1, Edit HOYK 1 and János RAKONCZAI 2 Abstract This paper provides an example for regional scale analysis of climate vulnerability incorporating environmental as well as socio-economic indicators.
Researches have focused on different aspects of climate vulnerability so far, but usually there is little connection between the physical and social dimensions.
Our study provides a more complex analysis, which builds on the application of international indices which have been used on the local and regional levels very rarely.
In our research we combined physical and human geographical approaches and research techniques.
The physical geographical assessment is based on indicators referring to ground water levels and vegetation production, while the human geographical side of the analysis focuses on economic and social sensitivity, adaptation and exposure indices, combined in the so-called socio-economic climate vulnerability index.
In the analysis we tried to figure out the most sensitive areas in the Hungarian Southern Great Plain region.
The main findings of the study are „hot spots” which coincide on both analyses, therefore, the most sensitive areas under current climate change conditions could be delimited.
This study also demonstrates that the resolution of global climate change vulnerability indices is not suitable for regional scale analysis because of the significant territorial differences.
Therefore, local or regional scale assessments are needed for the preparation of strategies for the elaboration of mitigation and adaptation policies.
Keywords: vulnerability indices, climate change, climate vulnerability analysis, climate sensitivity, Hungary.
Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.130 D. et al.
2014).
While at the end of the 1990s economists only tried to identify those sectors that were the most vulnerable to any change (Dercon, S. and Krishnan, P. 1996; Scoones, I.
1998), in the last few years, due to improvements in modelling, the number of publications providing numerical analysis of economic and social impacts on regional level has been continuously increasing (Scott, D. et al.
2008; Aaheim, A. et al.
2012; Pandey, R. and Jha, S.K.
2012; Warner, K. and Geest, K. 2013).
At the same time the interest of social sciences has also turned towards this issue (Patz, J.A.
et al.
2005; Hunt, A. and Watkiss, P. 2011; IPCC 2014).
The experiences of the heatwave in Western Europe in 2003, the water scarcity in Barcelona in 2008, or the floods in South-Eastern Europe in early autumn of 2014 showed that the most vulnerable and deprived social groups have also lower adaptability to extreme weather conditions and to the challenges caused by climate change (Vincent, K. 2004).
In this paper we want to make a brief assessment of the global climate vulnerability indices and to carry out a regional-scale climate vulnerability analysis in the Southern Great Plain Region in Hungary.
In the course of research the following questions were addressed: – What does the climate vulnerability mean at different geographical scales, and how this term can be interpreted in geography?
– What are the main vulnerability factors regarding climate change in Hungary and especially in the Southern Great Plain Region?
– What types of spatial differences are to be expected regarding to the natural, economic and social systems of the Southern Great Plain at the settlement level?
– What can be the role and function of the dual nature of geography in the research of such a complex phenomenon?
The last question about the role of geography is important both in preparation of policy documents and elaboration of adaptation strategies because of the dual nature of geography, the complex methods and concepts geographers use when investigating the effects of climate change.
It is an intriguing question whether geographers succeed in “developing” appropriate synergies between the two sides of geography when responding such questions like climate change.
This dilemma arose not only in Hungarian but also in the Anglo-Saxon geography, as professional debates and scientific publications reflect (Pollard, J.S.
et al.
2008; Castree, N. 2014).
Assessment of global climate vulnerability indices and the concept behind them There are a lot of climate vulnerability indices applied by various institutions nowadays.
Kreft, S. and his colleagues (2016) created the Climate Risk Index (CRI), on the base of hazardous weather events.
Precipitation, floods and landslides were the major causes of damage in 2014.
High incidence of extreme precipitation matches with scientific expectations of accelerated hydrological cycles caused by climate warming.
Serbia, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina were identified as the most affected countries followed by the Philippines, Pakistan and Bulgaria.
Two of the three most affected countries in 2014 where hit by the heaviest rainfalls and worst floods since records began 120 years ago (Kreft, S. et al.
2016).
The index is calculated on the basis of deaths caused by natural disasters, remediation costs, loss of GDP and Human Development Index (HDI).
According to this calculation Hungary occupies the 60th position among sixty-two European countries, where aridification, droughts, or groundwater level sinking can be clearly linked with effects of climate change.
The Nature Serve organisation in the US elaborated the Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI), which identifies plant and animal species that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change (www.natureserve.org).
It can be used for the evaluation of the natural components of climate vulnerability, but the index was experimented only 131Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.
for the US, so it cannot be used for international comparisons.
Another CCVI was elaborated by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs focusing on global crises and disasters (www.reliefweb.int).
In the case of Hungary, the red mud sludge disaster in 2010 and the flood in 2013 were recorded.
In our opinion, this approach has a limited scope, and we need more indicators for climate vulnerability evaluations.
Verisk Maplecroft, which is a leading global risk research and forecasting company, made another CCVI.
It evaluates 42 social, economic and environmental factors to assess national vulnerabilities across three core areas.
These indicators include: exposure to climate-related natural disasters and sea-level rise; human sensitivity in terms of population patterns, development, natural resources, agricultural dependency and conflicts; thirdly, the index assesses future vulnerability by considering the adaptive capacity of a country’s government and infrastructure to combat climate change (www.maplecroft.com).
In this evaluation Bangladesh, India and Madagascar are the most vulnerable countries in the world.
The resolution of the CCVI map is 22 km2 and it shows distinct spatial differences only for the bigger countries for example Russia or Canada.
Wheeler, D. (2011), as member of the Centre for Global Development, created the Climate Vulnerability (CV) index, which displays country rankings for four dimensions of climate impact: Extreme Weather, Sea Level Rise, Agricultural Productivity Loss and Overall.
Based on his CV index China, India and Bangladesh are the most vulnerable countries regarding the effects of climate change.
Hungary’s climate vulnerability is low (CV = 0.025), but for example Kazakhstan’s index is lower (CV =-0.237), which shows the strong differences between sub-indices used for CVI calculations.
Indian Climate Vulnerability Index consists of household parameters of all the three dimensions of vulnerability such as Exposure, Sensitivity and Adaptive Capability.
Exposure is defined by ‘Natural disaster and Climate variability’, whereas Sensitivity by ‘Health’, ‘Food’, and ‘Water’ and Adaptive Capability by ‘Socio-demographic profile’, ‘Livelihood strategies’, and ‘Social networks’.
The CVI vulnerable status ranges from high (0) to low (1) (Pandey, R. and Jha, S.K.
2012).
This research is very similar to our approach, based on sub-indices focusing on natural and social problems.
The University of Notre Dame created the so-called ND-GAIN Country Index (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative).
It summarizes a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience (www.http://index.gain.
org/).
This index continuously monitors and analyses 45 indicators for 192 countries in order to assess climate change related vulnerabilities and readiness for improvement.
The top five countries are Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and the United Kingdom, while the last five countries are Sudan, Burundi, Eritrea, Chad and Central African Republic.
Hungary is in the middle of the list, with deteriorating tendency.
This ranking is based on a wide group of indicators; therefore, we think that ND-GAIN Country Index is more useful than other indices based on very few indicators.
All the aforementioned international investigations on climate vulnerability are based on the concept of vulnerability.
According to Pittman, J. et al.
(2011) vulnerability can be defined according to three main components: exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity.
In this respect exposure means the lack of protection against possible risks in the examined area/sector, and it can be identified with the effects (e.g.
water quantities, climatic factors, economic-social framework).
Sensitivity means the totality of the social, economic, political, institutional, cultural reactions against the effects.
Finally, adaptive capacity is an answer to exposure; how a given country, economic sector, social group is able to prevent the harmful effects.
The adaptive capacity is determined by the economic situation, the level of economic development, the information, the infrastructure, the knowledge Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.132 level and abilities of the society, the local and regional level institutional set-up, and the wider socio-economic and political processes.
Vulnerability can be examined from different aspects that are summarized by Füssel, H.M. (2007).
The most widespread approach is based on risk analysis which focuses on the elements that are particularly exposed to climate change.
The socio-economic approach of risk analysis puts emphasis on humans, highlighting the extent to which a certain social group is vulnerable and why.
The combination of natural and social approaches is the integrated approach, which has its roots in geography and human ecology.
Vulnerability can be approached also on the basis of resilience, when applying the concept of flexible adaptability borrowed from ecology to analyse the effects of the climate change and to define the extent of vulnerability (Lendvay, M. 2016).
Finally, it is also important to emphasise that the concept of vulnerability can be applied in the same way at settlement, country or continental level.
However, the selected indicators and factors for the analysis should have specific regional relevance because this has a significant influence on the results (Holsten, A. and Kropp, J.P. 2012).
In this sense global or continental scale climate vulnerability scores/rankings might be misleading at regional scale, however, there is an opportunity to identify the most relevant indicators and sectors related to a particular region which are likely to give better results than a uniformed approach.
Physical and socio-economic factors of climate vulnerability in Hungary Climate change in Hungary – regarding the climate indicators – is primarily characterized by increasing drought sensitivity.
Calculations based on the Pálfai aridity index and the assumed climate change scenarios say that the national average of aridity index may increase by 12.5 per cent in the next 25-30 years (Pálfai, I.
2007).
Damages caused by drought are closely linked with changes in the rainfall distribution.
Rainfall in Hungary will be increasingly infrequent, and will be accompanied by higher temperature, consequently, the potential evapotranspiration will increase, and this makes the groundwater reserves more important (Vig, P. 2009; Millán, M. 2014).
However, the source of water is steadily decreasing which not only increases the vulnerability of the soils but also its flora, and human activities such as agricultural production too.
Therefore, fluctuating crop yields due to the weather conditions can be used for the determination of climate vulnerability, however soil characteristics should also be taken into account (Sisák, I. et al.
2009).
The extreme occurrences of high temperatures are highlighted by the heatwaves in a tangible way.
Several studies have shown that significantly longer heatwaves with higher temperatures can be expected in the future, which can last throughout the entire summer.
On the basis of the models hottest temperature records of the 20th century may be exceeded even by 12 °C (Révész, A. and Szenteleki, K. 2007).
This demonstrates that Hungary’s climate will drastically change in the future, and the number of extreme events will increase, of which the most dangerous will be the heatwaves beside the increasing incidence of storms, the high intensity precipitation and the more frequent flash floods (Nováky, B.
2007).
Climatic changes have a direct impact on vegetation and crop production (Olesen, J.E.
et al.
2011; Wilcox, J. and Makowski, D. 2014; Ladányi, Zs.
et al.
2016).
Agriculture is one of the most vulnerable sectors regarding climate change, therefore, its adaptive capacity is a serious issue.
Responses are not the same in different countries (Vanschoenwinkel, J. et al.
2016), thus, evaluation of the adaptation of agriculture play a significant role in vulnerability assessments.
Beyond the aforementioned methods and indicators, geographical analogy can also be used for the determination of environmental vulnerability.
This method is about searching such areas where current climate condi133Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.
tions are similar to what the examined area may have in the future – so it can help to see the potential effects of the climate change (Horváth, L. 2007).
This approach is very useful in identifying new plants and techniques for agricultural production.
It is also important to monitor the changes of the natural vegetation.
The vulnerability of the climate zonal forest associations is great, particularly at higher altitudes in Hungary (Czúcz, B. et al.
2010).
At the same time in the lowland associations wetlands, salt meadows, floodplain associations are in danger due to the disappearance of water.
The effects of climate change on the society and economy occur indirectly through the natural environment.
Generally, the effects are the most serious in those sectors – from an economic point of view – which are closely linked to the natural environment, e.g.
agriculture, forestry and tourism.
Economists seek to assess the expected damages in monetary-term in order to make the impact of climate change more tangible.
In connection with the drop of GDP different calculations and assumptions have been carried out.
Starting from the double CO2 emission (compared to pre-industrial levels) the biggest drop in GDP is expected in Africa, it is followed by the Middle East, the Pacific region and Latin America (Tol, R.S.J.
1998).
Fankhauser, S. and Tol, R.S.J.
(2005) forecast on average a 5 per cent GDP decrease at 3 °C temperature increase, although with substantial differences accross countries.
At the same time other models predict 1-15 per cent decrease of GDP at 3 °C increase over the next 20–30 years (Yu, W. et al.
2013).
Agriculture is high on the list of sectors which are seriously affected by climate change.
Hungary is situated on the boundary of plant production zones and relatively minor climatic changes could significantly change the agro-ecological conditions.
Damages caused by adverse climatic conditions are significant from a financial point of view as well; e.g.
in 2007 – due to the combined effects of extreme events – there was a loss of 500 million USD in agriculture and forestry (Gaál, M. et al.
2009).
In agricultural production the horticulture is one of the most sensitive sectors, including fruit production, which is particularly vulnerable to spring frost damages, early autumn frosts, the winter lasting cold, as well as drought, excessive rain, extremely high temperatures, or hailstorms (Gonda, I.
2009).
International publications dealing with tourism also extensively address the effects of climate change, as summarized by Becken, S. (2013).
It should be noted that this sector may be less exposed in Hungary.
Adverse effects linked to the climate change may have negative effects on city tourism in particular in the case of lasting heatwaves.
Moving onto the social effects of climate change, they may be understood best through various social problems and challenges that can be linked with it.
The level of poverty, the differences in access to resources, the volume of migration from peripheral regions towards the centre may provide indicators which can help to assess and quantify the social consequences (Gasper, R. et al.
2011).
International research results indicate that big cities are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than rural areas.
The vulnerability of human settlements is strongly influenced by size, or economic functions.
Their vulnerability is expressed in lack of energy, damage in the infrastructure, industrial damages, diseases, higher mortality rates caused by the heatwaves, food shortages and water scarcity (Gasper, R. et al.
2011; Lankao, R.P.
and Quin, H. 2011).
Therefore, indicators of social vulnerability should include the economic situation of the local community, the growth rate of the population, and its age, sex and ethnic composition (Borden, K.A.
et al.
2007).
Research methods Geographical framework of the study: The Southern Great Plain The Southern Great Plain region of Hungary has a population of 1,3 million people, and Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.134 located in the South-Eastern part of Hungary.
The total area of the Southern Great Plain is 18,339 km2, which is about one fifth of the total area of Hungary.
Population density is below the national average (72 people/km2), however, urban ratio is relatively high, 67.9 per cent of the inhabitants live in cities (the largest city is Szeged with ca.
165 thousand inhabitants).
Yet, the high number of scattered farmsteads and outskirts provide the landscape of the region a rather rural character.
Administratively the region is divided into three counties: Bács-Kiskun, Csongrád and Békés (Figure 1).
The landscape of the region preserves the typical appearance of the famous Hungarian “Puszta” (steppe), featuring four major rivers (Tisza, Körös, Maros and Danube) and three national parks (Duna-Dráva NP, Kiskunság NP and Körös-Maros NP).
Southern Great Plain is typically an agricultural region; 85 per cent of its land is used for agriculture.
Crop production, horticulture and animal husbandry play a decisive role in the local economy.
In term of soils, large part of the region is covered by humus poor sandy soils, which is widely used for fruit and vegetable production.
The southern and eastern part of the region is covered by valuable chernozem soils formed on loess.
Agricultural production is the most intensive in this part of the region, the main crops are: wheat, maize, sunflower, sugar beet etc.
In addition to agriculture, food industry and light industry form the basis of the economy.
The largest foreign direct investment has been made in the region by Daimler Group in 2009 when a Mercedes-Benz factory was established in Kecskemét.
Fig.
1.
Map of the study area 135Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.
Measuring environmental aspects climate vulnerability Landscape change is a clear evidence of climate change.
Therefore, indicators that connect landscape changes with climatic factors should be considered.
Based on our earlier studies it is mainly the change of vegetation that relates to climate change, and the reasons for the change are rainwater and groundwater and – occasionally – soil change.
Figure 2. shows the process of landscape change under climate change.
To identify the spatial pattern of climate vulnerability within the region from an environmental point of view we applied the following method: (1) GIS based analysis of changes in the groundwater level of the Danube–Tisza and the Körös–Maros Interfluves.
One of the first observed consequences of the climate change was the decrease of groundwater levels in the Danube–Tisza Interfluve, which generated a serious discussion about the reasons of this phenomenon (Pálfai, I.
1994).
We have constructed a re-controlled and normalized database of groundwater levels for the interfluves.
(2) Analysis of biomass production of forests and arable lands based on remotely sensed satellite data.
We used vegetation indices (NDVI, EVI) to approximate the biomass production of 12 sample areas (Rakonczai, J. et al.
2012).
Measuring socio-economic aspects of climate vulnerability In setting up the framework of the socio-economic climate vulnerability index (later refer as CVI) we relied mainly on domestic studies based on the CIVAS3 model which was developed in the CLAVIER4 project.
We relied on the results of the document prepared by Hungarian Non-profit Ltd. for Regional Development and Town Planning entitled „Four-years Program to Prevent the Adverse Effects of Climate Change 2010–2013” (NFGM, VÁTI 2010), and the seminar entitled „Regional Assessment of the Climate Vulnerability by the Example of NCCS5” held by the National Adaptation Centre (Selmeczi, P. 2014).
Regarding the calculation method of the CVI we mainly used the work of Hahn, M.B., Riederer, A.M. and Foster, S.O.
(2009), in which a Livelihood Vulnerability Index was established in a Mozambican case study.
On the basis of these sources a settlement level climate vulnerability index was defined using indicators referring to the exposure, the socio-economic sensitivity and the adaptation capacity of the local society.
As a first step those social characteristics and economic sectors were defined, which are deemed vulnerable to climate changes, further we chose those indicators which seemed to be suitable to explore spatial differences.
The economic sensitivity sub-index components are: the ratio of the agricultural sector in employment (2011), labour income share of the small-scale agricultural sector (2011) and ratio of industry in employment (2011).
The emphasis was placed on the weight of the primary sector as the most vulnerable among the economic sectors.
It should be noted that the structure of the sector is dual in the region, since micro-regions of the nonindustrial and industrial farming are chang3 Climate Impact and Vulnerability Assessment Scheme.
4 CLAVIER: Climate Change and Variability – project focused on Central and Eastern Europe.
5 NCCS: National Climate Change Strategy.
Fig.
2.
The process of landscape change due to climate change Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.136 ing.
That’s why we applied two different indicators for this topic.
The proportion of the employees working in the industry is included in the sub-index in addition to the two agricultural indicators, since for example the construction industry or some part of the processing industry are highly exposed to the climate change due to technological reasons or because the protection of workers during heatwaves requires the suspension of the work.
It might bring a significant loss of effectiveness and lastly could entail a loss of income and profit.
Indicators of the social sensitivity sub-index are the following: patients of respiratory and cardiac distress per 1,000 inhabitants (average of 2011–2012), number of visits to a general practitioner per 1,000 inhabitants (average of 2011–2012), proportion of people aged over 65 among permanent residents (2012).
In the setup of this sub-index we focused on the social groups which are more sensitive to the climate change due to their age or health conditions.
One of the relevant indicators is the proportion of patients with respiratory diseases reflecting the growing presence of allergenic plants and prolonged allergy season.
The cardiac patients are highly sensitive to climatic affects, while the number of visits to the general practitioner basically was applied to represent general health status of the local communities.
The proportion of people aged 65 or older has been chosen as an indicator since the literature and experiences of the heatwave of 2003 in Paris showed that elderly people are highly affected by the increased length of heatwaves and heat days.
The adaptation sub-index contains the following elements: per capita income (2012), proportion of graduates within the 25+ population (2011) and the number of scientific, technicaltechnological enterprises per 1,000 inhabitants (2012).
Both in the international and national literature, the income of the local community is closely connected to the adaptation capacity of the local society.
The other two indicators in the adaptation sub-index represent the intellectual, scientific and technical potential which can be used in the adaptation process.
Finally, we have mapped the exposure to climate change of each settlement, and we tried to determine an exposure sub-index.
Diverging from the literature – and from the CIVAS model – we did not use the national climate modelling results because we thought that the factual changes can provide appropriate indication for the estimation of exposure.
The exposure sub-index contains the following indicators: change of the number of heatwave days between 1980–2010, change of average temperature between 1980–2010, change of rainwater quantity 1980–2010, volume of urban land (2011) and the quantity of communal water supplied in the settlements (2012).
To formulate this subindex, in addition to the climate indicators two further indicators were selected, which are able to reflect the effects of changes.
One of them is the volume of urban land which wishes to represent the urban heat-island effect.
It has a great importance because the consequences of the heatwave days are further enhanced by the buildings and the infrastructural objects.
The other selected indicator was the supplied water quantity in the settlements, since it is believed that its scarcity will determine the future of the Southern Great Plain basically.
We calculated the socio-economic climate vulnerability index on settlement level because we assume that there are significant spatial differences in the effects of the climate change even at the micro-geographical scale.
Also, actions against the immediate effects of climate change must be taken on local level.
The calculation of the sub-indices and the climate vulnerability index was performed according to the method defined by Hahn and his colleagues (2009).
In the case of the sub-indices the indicators (Ix) have been decoupled from the units by the Min-Max normalization, and have been transformed between ranges 0–1 (Inormx).
Inormx = Ix –Imin Imax –Imin (1) 137Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.
After that arithmetic mean was calculated from the values of the indicators (Inormx) without weighting, which gave the results of the sub-indices (SIx).
The summarized climate vulnerability index (CVI) value was defined in such way that the arithmetic mean of the indicators included in the social and economic sensitivity sub-index was deducted from the index of exposure, and the given value was multiplied by the value of the adaptation index.
Results and Discussion – climate vulnerability of the Southern Great Plain Climate vulnerability based on change of ground water level Aggregated data showing changes of ground water resources from 1961 to 2010 were used for two sub-regions: the Danube–Tisza Interfluve and the Körös–Maros Interfluve (Figure 3).
As data demonstrate the ground water level in the Körös–Maros Interfluve is more stable, and the quantity of the annual rainfall causes less variability, while in the case of Danube– Tisza Interfluve some drier or wetter years can result even 2 km3 change of the water resources.
In the last three decades the overall water scarcity exceeded 7-8 km3 by our calculation in the Southern Great Plain.
Major, P. (1994) studied the long-term reasons of the decrease and identified that there was a drier period between 1971 and 1985 when the amount of precipitation was less by 1,000 mm in the area compared to the long-term average.
The changes in precipitation of the last decades show extreme variability rather than decreasing in quantity.
There is a slight increase in annual precipitation in the Southern Great Plain in the last 55 years.
At the same time the annual mean temperature shows a 1.5 °C increase which means that the evaporation loss has significantly risen.
This means the rainfall could not be utilized by the vegetation and the soils, so it causes water scarcity even in years with higher precipitation.
Another issue related to the ground water level can be understood in hydrological aspect; since the interfluves are above their surroundings (the Danube–Tisza Interfluve by 30-50 m and the Körös–Maros Interfluve by 10-15 m) the ground water cannot be rebuilt from the surface waters (from the rivers) this is only possible from rainwater sources.
Climate vulnerability based on the analysis of biomass production In the course of our investigations of biomass we analysed the vegetation dynamics of the main forest types (black pine and black locust) mainly in the areas affected by the most significant decrease of ground water level (all sample areas can be seen on Figure 1) on the SIx = Inorm1 + Inorm2 + ...Inormx x (2) CVI = (SIexp – (SIsoc + SIeco)) ⋅ SIadapt (3) Fig.
3.
Monthly aggregated changes of ground water resources together with annual mean temperature and precipitation (1961–2010) Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.138 basis of 13 years data.
Forests have been also chosen as control areas where the decrease of the ground water level is less significant, thus, the ground water is more easily accessible for the trees.
Our results show that the areas with deeply decreased ground water level (where the more demanding tree vegetation dried out in several places) and the annual biomass quantity of the forests correlate strongly with the spring and summer precipitation.
In contrast, the control forests are rather depend on the winter period or the combination of the winter and vegetation periods.
Which means they depend on the ground water significantly, because the precipitation of the winter period is the main supply for the ground water.
It was recorded that in the areas with a significant decrease of ground water level in the Danube–Tisza Interfluve, trees are less dependent on the ground water (since its water demand is ensured from other source) and more exposed to the capricious rainfall pattern (Figure 4).
In the next phase of our research we analysed the vegetation index data of agricultural areas too.
We selected mostly arable land in 12 sample areas, however, local soils represent different types and have varied morphological status and fertility.
Determining the biomass production of our sample areas and comparing them to the Pálfai aridity index, we found especially strong correlation with dry years.
In the case of the highest biomass production we did not gain such a clear picture.
It could be expected that the rainiest year of 2010 is the most productive, but it is true only in some cases.
In almost half of the areas the year of 2004 showed the highest productivity.
This duality has straightforward reasons.
On the one hand, too much precipitation could be harmful, as there is inland water coverage at that time, on the other hand, the temporal distribution of the precipitation is very important for the crops, and in 2004 the growing period months had rains evenly, ensuring the optimal growth of plants.
In our research it was a little bit surprising that the biomass production of the arable lands (please note that this is not the quantity of the harvested crops) almost uniformly depends on the rainfall even where irrigation is available.
These results suggest that in a drying climate, irrigation does not necessarily solve the problem of crop yield stability, since the atmospheric drought has a great influence on the growth of plants.
Climate vulnerability of the local economy and society According to our socio-economic climate vulnerability index above-average sensitive settlements in the Southern Great Plain were delimited in larger groups only in BácsKiskun County, lying in the South-western direction from Kecskemét to the Serbian border.
Contrary to this in Csongrád and Békés counties only 2-3 settlements formed „hot spots”.
They are located basically on the border between Bács-Kiskun and Csongrád counties, and in the neighbouring regions of Csongrád and Békés, which can be labelled Fig.
4.
Changes in biomass production of forest sample areas related to annual Pálfai aridity index and precipitation 139Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.
as inner peripheries.
In addition to this, vulnerable areas at the micro-region scale can be found along the southern border of Hungary (outer peripheries) (Figure 5).
These results confirm that climate vulnerability is spatially highly differentiated, and it is worth investigating also the settlement size resolution.
In addition to the regional pattern we have examined climate vulnerability according to settlement size categories.
We used the following categories: 1st category: below 2,000 inhabitants (small villages), 2nd category: 2,000-10,000 inhabitants (villages and small towns), 3rd category: 10,000-50,000 inhabitants (towns); and 4th category: above 50,000 inhabitants (county seats).
Figure 6. shows that there are significant differences between these settlement categories especially related to the adaptation capacity.
Examining the differences, we can see that the settlements of the 1st and 2nd categories are only slightly different from each other.
The only exception is the adaptation capacity which means that the population size of a settlement greatly influences the ability of resilience in the economic sensitivity and in the before mentioned adaptation capacity.
These two categories can be characterised by the relative importance of agricultural sector and its dominance in local economy and employment.
This goes together with lower incomes, less educated and aging population, especially in the settlements of the 1st category.
The climate vulnerability of the 3rd category is slightly better than the previous ones, according to our results.
This is because their socio-economic conditions are more advantageous and consequently their adaptation capacity is also significantly higher and their exposure is only slightly bigger.
According to our results the towns and the county seats (3rd and 4th categories) are the least sensitive to climate change as their economies have been shifted most intensely to the service Fig.
5.
Socio-economic climate vulnerability Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.140 sector, thus, the potential effects of climate change is less pronounced in this case.
In both groups the average age of population is younger, their health status is better, the proportions of scientific, technical enterprises and the graduates are higher and the per capita income is also higher which as a whole compensate the significantly larger exposure according to our assessments.
Our findings clearly demonstrate that the larger the number of the population of a settlement is, its exposure to the effects of climate change is also larger (in line with the international literature), however, its adaptation capacity is also stronger, thus, bigger towns are less vulnerable than the smaller settlements.
It should be highlighted that certain shortages – e.g.
shortage of water – cannot be substituted by other resources.
So the instability in precipitation and the significant decrease of water flow in the Danube and Tisza rivers could raise serious issues for larger settlements.
To sum up it can be stated that our socioeconomic climate vulnerability index is not suitable for particular numerical comparison of the vulnerability of settlements, but it allows to designate those settlements in the Southern Great Plain which have to pay more attention to the possible effects of climate change due to their economic and social characteristics.
Comparison of the CVI with the results of the physical geographical findings In our research, we could not directly aggregate all aspects of sensitivity into one single vulnerability index.
While it would have been technically possible by GIS, but legal problems concerning the ownership of the various datasets prevented such an analysis.
To solve this problem, we compared only the final maps of the two analyses (Figure 7).
Circles show the areas where climate vulnerability is connected with negative climatic and/or anthropogenic effects, which means mainly water extraction for agricultural, or industrial and communal needs.
Results of our analysis further support that water scarcity is the main factor of climate vulnerability in the Southern Great Plain.
The overlaps in the environmental and socio-economic analysis are strengthening our assumption that climate vulnerability must be investigated in a complex way and with high spatial resolution because of its variability within a small area.
The examined regions should be paid more attention by the researchers and regional planners, because these can be the primary sample areas of future researches due to their vulnerability, thus, climate adaptation strategies must be prioritised in their cases.
Conclusions In this paper, a comprehensive analysis of the climate vulnerability of the Southern Great Plain Region in Hungary was provided.
To begin with we reviewed the various global climate vulnerability indices and the concepts behind them.
In general, it can be Fig.
6.
Socio-economic vulnerability by settlement types 141Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.
concluded that they focus mainly on larger geographical areas (continents and countries) and usually their output is a rank score/list which shows the vulnerability of various countries.
The problem of these rankings is that they use very different indicators and the position of a given country can shift significantly.
Another important feature of them is that they put the emphasis on the factors that affect well-being.
Thus, they tend to forget about the ecosystem which provide ecosystem-services to humans, meanwhile these direct and indirect goods and services are essential for our everyday living as our case study showed.
Also their spatial resolutions are low and show significant differences between the vulnerability of neighbouring countries.
This fact indicates that analyses with higher spatial resolution are needed.
Fig.
7.
Geographical overlap among the climatically most vulnerable settlements and the environmental “hot spots” of the Southern Great Plain Our findings show that the concept of vulnerability is applicable on regional level.
This is important because it can be used as a framework in the planning of adaptation and the related measures which must be carried out on the local level.
Nowadays, climate strategies on the county level are required in Hungary, and this activity is in progress.
Our analysis can be a methodological step forward for the elaboration of climate strategies.
Holsten, A. and Kropp, J.P. (2012) made a similar analysis in the North Rhine-Westphalia Region.
They identified spatial “hot spots” too, which will have to deal with the highest burdens and, therefore, have the highest need for adaptation.
Yet, little known about the relationship between climate impacts and adaptive capacity, therefore, we need more and more vulnerability investigations on regional/local scale.
Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.142 REFERENCES Aaheim, A., Amundsen, H., Dokken, T. and Wei, T. 2012.
Impacts and adaptation to climate change in European economies.
Global Environmental Change 22.
959–968.
Becken, S. 2013.
A review of tourism and climate change as an evolving knowledge domain.
Tourism Management Perspectives 6.
53–62.
Borden, K.A., Schmidtlein, M.C., Emrich, Ch.
T., Piegorsch, W.W. and Cutter, S.L.
2007.
Vulnerability of US Cities to Environmental Hazards.
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2.
14–27.
Castree, N. 2014.
The Anthropocene and geography I: The back story.
Geography Compass 8.
(7): 436–449.
Christensen, J. H., Carter, T. R., Rummukainen, M. and Amanatidis, G. 2007.
Evaluating the performance and utility of regional climate models: the PRUDENCE project.
Climatic Change 81.
1–6.
Czúcz, B., Molnár, Zs.
and Kröel-Dulay, Gy.
2010.
A természetes élővilág és az éghajlatváltozás – a modellezés lehetőségei (The natural wildlife and the climate change – possibilities of modelling).
In Meteorológiai Tudományos Napok: Változó éghajlat és következményei a Kárpát-medencében.
Ed.
: Lakatos, M., Budapest, Országos Meteorológiai Szolgálat, 138–146.
De Sherbinin, A.
2014.
Climate change hotspots mapping: what have we learned?
Climatic Change 123.
(1): 23–37.
Dercon, S. and Krishnan, P. 1996.
Income portfolios in rural Ethiopia and Tanzania: choices and constraints.
Journal of Development Studies 32.
(6): 850–875.
Fankhauser, S. and Tol, R.S.J.
2005.
On climate change and economic growth.
Resource and Energy Economics 1.
1–17.
Fowler, H.J., Blenkinsop, S. and Tebaldi, C. 2007.
Linking climate change modelling to impacts studies: recent advances in downscaling techniques for hydrological modelling.
International Journal of Climatology 27.
(12): 1547–1578.
Füssel, H.M. 2007.
Vulnerability: A generally applicable conceptual framework for climate change research.
Global Environmental Change 2.
155–167.
Gaál M., Ladányi M., Szenteleki K. and Hegedűs A.
2009.
A kertészeti ágazatok klimatikus kockázatainak vizsgálati-módszertani áttekintése (Overview of research methods to evaluate the climatic hazards in horticulture).
„Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás– Hatások–Válaszok 58.
72–81.
Gasper, R., Blohm, A. and Rut, M. 2011.
Social and economic impacts of climate change on urban environment.
Current Opinion in Environment Sustainability 3.
150–157.
Glantz, M.H.
1995.
Assessing the impacts of climate: the issue of winners and losers in a global climate change context.
Studies in Environmental Science 65.
41–54.
Gonda, I.
2009.
Időjárási szélsőségek okozta károk mérséklésének technikai és technológiai lehetőségei a gyümölcsösökben (Possibilities of decreasing damage caused by extreme weather conditions in fruit orchards).„Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás– Hatások–Válaszok 58.
45–51.
Hahn, M.B., Riederer, A.M. and Foster, S.O.
2009.
The Livelihood Vulnerabilioty Index: A pragmatic approach to assessing risks from climate variability and change – A case study in Mosambique.
Global Environmental Change 1.
74–88.
Hanger, S., Pfenninger, S., Dreyfus, M. and Patt, A.
2013.
Knowledge and information needs of adaptation policy-makers: an European study.
Regional Environmental Change 13.
(1): 91–101.
Holsten, A. and Kropp, J.P. 2012.
An integrated and transferable climate change vulnerability assessment for regional application.
Natural Hazards 64.
(3): 1977–1999.
Horváth, L. 2007.
Földrajzi analógia meghatározásának néhány módszere és alkalmazási lehetőségei (Methods to determine geographical analogy and possible applications).
„Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás–Hatások–Válaszok 50.
54–61.
Hunt, A. and Watkiss, P. 2011.
Climate change impacts and adaptation in cities: a review of the literature.
Climatic Change 104.
(1): 13–49.
IPCC 2014.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Regional Aspects.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Jacob, D., Petersen, J., Eggert, B., Alias, A., Christensen, O.B., Bouwer, L.M.
and Georgopoulou, E. 2014.
EURO-CORDEX: new high-resolution climate change projections for European impact research.
Regional Environmental Change 14.
(2): 563–578.
Kreft, S., Eckstein, D., Dorsch, L. and Fischer, L. 2016.
Global Climate Risk Index 2016: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events?
Weather-related Loss Events in 2014 and 1995 to 2014.
Germanwatch.
Ladányi, Zs., Blanka, V., József Deák, Á., Rakonczai, J. and Mezősi, G. 2016.
Assessment of soil and vegetation changes due to hydrologically driven desalinization process in an alkaline wetland, Hungary.
Ecological Complexity 25.
1–10.
Lankao, R.P.
and Quin, H. 2011.
Conceptualizing urban vulnerability to global climate and environmental change.
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 3.
142–149.
Lendvay, M. 2016.
Resilience in post-socialist context: The case of a watermelon producing community 143Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.
in Hungary.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65.
(3): 255–269.
Lobell, D.B., Schlenker, W. and Costa-Roberts, J.
2011.
Climate trends and global crop production since 1980.
Science 333.
(6042): 616–620.
Major, P. 1994.
Talajvízszint-süllyedések a DunaTisza közén (Groundwater depletion in the Danube-Tisza Interfluve).
In A Duna-Tisza közi hátság vízgazdálkodási problémái.
Ed.
: Pálfai, I., Békéscsaba, Nagyalföld Alapítvány, 17–24.
Mearns, L.O., Gutowski, W., Jones, R., Leung, R., McGinnis, S., Nunes, A. and Qian, Y.
2009.
A regional climate change assessment program for North America.
Eos 90.
(36): 311–311.
Millán, M. 2014.
Extreme hydrometeorological events and climate change predictions in Europe.
Journal of Hydrology 518.
Part B, 206–224.
NFGM, VÁTI 2010.
A területfejlesztés 4 éves szakmai programja klímaváltozás hatásainak mérséklésére, 2010– 2013.
(Four-years program to prevent the adverse effects of climate change 2010–2013).
http://www.
vati.hu/files/sharedUploads/docs/ttei/A_teruletfejlesztes_klimaprogramja_2010-2013_1.pdf Nováky, B.
2007.
Az ENSZ Éghajlat-változási Kormányközi Testületének jelentése az éghajlatváltozás várható következményeiről.
(Report of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change ont he expected consequences of climate change).
„Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás–Hatások–Válaszok 50.
6–11.
O’Brien, K L. and Leichenko, R.M.
2000.
Double exposure: assessing the impacts of climate change within the context of economic globalization.
Global Environmental Change 10.
(3): 221–232.
Olesen, J.E., Trnka, M., Kersebaum, K.C., Skjelvåg, A.O., Seguie, B., Peltonen-Sainio, P., Rossi, F., Kozyra, J. and Micale, F. 2011.
Impacts and adaptation of European crop production systems to climate change.
European Journal of Agronomy 34.
(2): 96–112.
Pálfai, I.
(ed.)
1994.
A Duna–Tisza közi hátság vízgazdálkodási problémái (Water management problems of the Danube-Tisza Interfluve).
Békéscsaba, Nagyalföld Alapítvány.
Pálfai, I.
2007.
Éghajlatváltozás és aszály (Climate change and drought).
„Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás–Hatások–Válaszok 49.
59–65.
Pandey, R. and Jha, S.K.
2012.
Climate vulnerability index – measure of climate change vulnerability to communities: a case of rural Lower Himalaya, India.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 17.
487–506.
Patz, J.A., Campbell-Lendrum, D., Holloway, T. and Foley, J.
A.
2005.
Impact of regional climate change on human health.
Nature 438.
(7066): 310–317.
Pittman, J., Wittrock, V., Kulshreshtha, S. and Wheaton, E. 2011.
Vulnerability to climate change in rural Saskatchewan: Case study of the Rural Municipality of Rudy No.
284.
Journal of Rural Studies 1.
83–94.
Pollard, J.S., Oldfield, J., Randalls, S. and Thornes, J.E.
2008.
Firm finances, weather derivatives and geography.
Geoforum 2.
616–624.
Rakonczai, J., Ladányi, Zs., Deák, J.Á.
and Fehér, Zs.
2012.
Indicators of climate change in the landscape: investigation of the soil-groundwater-vegetation connection system in the Great Hungarian Plain.
In Review of climate change research program at the University of Szeged (2010–2012).
Eds.
:Rakonczai, J. and Ladányi, Zs., Szeged, Institute of Geography and Geology, University of Szeged, 41–58 Révész, A. and Szenteleki, K. 2007.
A hőhullámok és a hőmérséklet sztochasztikus viselkedésének vizsgálata (Investigation of the stochastis behaviour of heat waves and temperature) „Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás–Hatások–Válaszok 51.
18–33.
Scoones, I.
1998.
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis.
IDS Working Paper 72.
Brighton, Institute of Development Studies.
Scott, D., Amelung, B., Becken, S., Ceron, J. P., Dubois, G., Gössling, S. and Simpson, M. 2008.
Climate change and tourism: Responding to global challenges.
Madrid, World Tourism Organization.
Selmeczi, P. 2014.
Az éghajlati sérülékenység a területi értékelése a NÉS példáján (Regional assessment of the climate vulnerability by the example of National Climate Strategy).
Climate-Adapt Fórum a tudomány képviselői és az ágazati döntéshozók számára a klímaalkalmazkodás kérdéseiben, VM, 26–27.
06.
2014.
Sisák, I., Máté, F., Makó, A., Szász, G. and Hausner, Cs.
2009.
A talajok klímaérzékenysége (Soil climate sensitivity).
„Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás– Hatások–Válaszok 57.: 31–42.
Tol, R.S.J.
1998.
Estimating socio-economic impacts of climate change.
Studies in Environmental Science 72.
199–221.
Vanschoenwinkel, J., Mendelsohn, R. and Van Passel, S. 2016.
Do Western and Eastern Europe have the same agricultural climate response?
Taking adaptive capacity into account.
Global Environmental Change 41.
74–87.
Vig, P. 2009.
Az inszoláció változásainak hatása az erdők vízháztartására (Effect of changing insolation on the water balance of Hungarian forests).
„Klíma-21” Füzetek.
Klímaváltozás–Hatások–Válaszok 57.
83–90.
Vincent, K. 2004.
Creating an index of social vulnerability to climate change for Africa.
East Anglia, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research.
Warner, K. and van der Gees, K. 2013.
Loss and damage from climate change: local-level evidence from nine vulnerable countries.
International Journal of Global Warming 5.
(4): 367–386.
Farkas, J.Zs.
et al.
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 66 (2017) (2) 129–144.144 Wheeler, D. 2011.
Quantifying Vulnerability to Climate Change: Implications for Adaptation Assistance.
Centre for Global Development, Working paper 240.
Wilcox, J. and Makowski, D. 2014.
A meta-analysis of the predicted effects of climate change on wheat yields using simulation studies.
Field Crops Research 156.
180–190.
Yu, W., Yang, Y.C., Savitsky, A., Alford, D., Brown, C., Wescoat, J., Debowicz, D. and Robinson, S. 2013.
The Indus Basin of Pakistan.
The Impacts of Climate Risks on Water and Agriculture.
Washington D.C., The World Bank.
http://index.gain.org/ranking/vulnerability http://reliefweb.int/map/world/world-climatechange-vulnerability-index-2015 http://www.gain.org/ http://www.natureserve.org/conservation-tools/ climate-change-vulnerability-index https://germanwatch.org/en/cri https://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi.html
http://www.press.ierek.com ISSN (Print: 2357-0849, online: 2357-0857) International Journal on: Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
48 DOI: 10.21625/essd.v6i2.837 Towards a Comprehensive Climate Adaptation Framework for India’s Port Infrastructure and Operations: Lessons from Global Best Practices Pushp Bajaj1, Chime Youdon 1 1 National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India Abstract The ever-growing impacts of climate change such as extreme heat, more frequent heavy precipitation events, intensifying tropical revolving storms, and sea level rise continue to pose major threats to India’s critical maritime infrastructure.
As the country moves towards its ambition of becoming a leading Blue Economy of the world, a wide range of initiatives have been taken by the central and state governments to expand the maritime sector with a specific focus on the transport sector.
However, there is little emphasis being paid on protecting the existing and planned seaport infrastructure against the deleterious impacts of climate change.
None of the major ports in India have a dedicated climate action strategy and climate adaptation finds no mention in the policy documents pertaining to the maritime transport sector.
In this context, this paper aims to highlight the need for a comprehensive, holistic and dynamic climate change adaptation strategy for India’s port infrastructure including support infrastructure and supply chains.
The adaptation strategy, at the individual ports’ level and the national level, must be preceded by rigorous risk assessment studies to identify and prioritise the major challenges arising from climate change at the local level.
The paper draws upon international best practices in climate risk assessments and adaptation measures to provide a way forward for Indian ports.
© 2021 The Authors.
Published by IEREK press.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of ESSD’s International Scientific Committee of Reviewers.
Keywords Climate risk; climate adaptation; resilience; maritime sector; ports; shipping.
1.
Introduction Coastal areas around the world are among the most vulnerable geographical areas to climate change.
In addition to the generic impacts such as rising temperatures, extreme heatwaves, erratic rainfall patterns, etc., that are common to all land areas, coastal areas are exposed to two more dramatic impacts of climate change: a) sea level rise and b) increasingly frequent and intense tropical revolving storms (Fuchs, 2010; Williams, 2013; Ranasingha & Jongejan, 2018; Kulp & Strauss, 2019).
They are typically also densely populated, primarily due to the myriad economic opportunities that are afforded simply by being in the vicinity of the ocean and having access to the rich marine resources.
Approximately 40 percent of the world’s population lives within 100 kilometers (km) of the coast.
Coastal zones around the world are also experiencing the fastest rates of urbanization and growth and undergoing remarkable socio-economic and environmental transformations in the process.
As a result, even more people are moving to coastal areas from the hinterland to take advantage of the growth trends.
http://www.press.ierek.com/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
49 In recent years, India, recognizing the immense potential of its maritime space, has launched a slew of measures to expand and enhance the maritime sectors of the economy and facilitate the transition from a ‘Brown Economy’ to a ‘Blue Economy’.
The latest and most comprehensive development plan, in this regard, is the Maritime India Vision 2030 (MIV-2030), launched by the Prime Minister in March 2021 on the inaugural day of the Maritime India Summit 2021 (MoPSW, 2021).
Under the aegis of the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways (MoPSW), the port-led development model outlined in the MIV-2030 is focused on building world-class greenfield ports, creating ‘smart ports’ and modernizing existing ports, reducing logistics by enhancing land-connectivity, promoting port-led industrialization and public-private partnerships.
Over 150 initiatives have been identified so far under the 10-year plan which is expected to generate over INR 3 trillion in investment and 2 million new jobs.
The plan also lays emphasis on building a sustainable and green maritime sector by increasing the use of renewable energy at ports, improving air quality at ports, reducing water consumption and improving health and safety standards.
Notably, no explicit targets for reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been defined yet.
Similarly, no mechanisms have been mentioned to calculate the life-cycle GHG emissions of the greenfield ports that will be constructed.
Nonetheless, the commitment towards improving energy efficiency and increasing renewable energy usage in the vision document denotes a significant step towards a sustainable transition.
Even though the motivation for sustainability measures such as improving efficiency and using technology may be rooted in the economics, to save on fuel costs and time, they could, in principle, be considered a part of the climate change mitigation strategy.
However, there are no plans in this port-led development model to adapt to the impacts of climate change that have already occurred or those that are projected to occur in the nearand long-term future.
Currently, while almost all Indian ports have extensive ‘Disaster Management Strategies’ for natural disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones, floods, fires, etc., these disaster management strategies do not account for the ongoing changes that are occurring in the frequency, intensity, and behavior of these disasters due to climate change.
None of the major Indian ports have a dedicated ‘Climate Change Adaptation’ strategy.
This is, in fact, a common theme across most coastal States in the world, there is little emphasis on enhancing the resilience of the ports and shipping infrastructure and the critical supply chains to the impacts of climate change compared to the emphasis given to climate change mitigation by reducing carbon emissions from ports and shipping.
As discussed in detail in the next section, everything from rising temperatures to flash floods to sea level rise and more frequent cyclones, will adversely impact port infrastructure and the personnel which could seriously hamper the ability of the ports to carry out their operations and meet their targets.
This would, at best, result in frequent localized, short-term economic losses and, at worst, lead to increasing instances of shutdowns of one or more ports for weeks or even months causing crippling damage to the country’s economy.
Currently, India has 12 major ports (see Figure 1), that are managed by the MoPSW of the central government, and 205 minor ports, that are managed by the state governments of the states in which the port is located (MoPSW, n.d.).
India’s maritime transport sector accounts for 95 percent of the country’s total trade by volume corresponding to 70 percent of total trade by value.
The absolute volume of trade is expected to continue to grow significantly under the MIV-2030, in fact, capacity augmentation for maritime trade is one of the core objectives of MIV-2030.
Of course, trade forms a significant portion of the Indian economy.
In 2020, India’s trade-to-GDP ratio was 36.47 percent; at its highest point, in 2012, the trade-to-GDP ratio was 55.79 percent (Macrotrends, n.d.).
In order to ensure the long-term security and sustainability of its maritime transport sector, India must make its ports ‘future-ready’ by making them ‘climate-resilient’.
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the steps and guidelines that need to be followed to develop an exhaustive climate adaptation strategy for seaports in India, based on a discussion of international best practices.
To set the context, Section 2.1 highlights the observed and projected impacts of climate change on Indian ports and the urgent need for an adaptation strategy.
Of course, the first essential step towards climate adaptation and building climate resilience is a robust ‘risk assessment’ which must include a study of the climate hazards to a particular region and type of infrastructure, the ways in which the region and infrastructure are exposed to those hazards, and the degree of damage that could potentially be caused by those hazards.
Section 2.2 discusses these elements and how they may be determined, through a review of risk assessment frameworks that have been utilised in recent years.
Section 3 provides an overview of the current and proposed adaptation measures by ports around the world to enhance their Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
50 resilience to the impacts of climate change.
Section 4 provides a way forward for Indian ports and analyzes how these best practices can be molded-to and utilized-in the Indian context.
Finally, the main conclusions of the paper are collated in Section 5.
Figure 1: Location of India’s 12 major seaports.
2.
Literature review 2.1.
Impact of climate change on Indian ports Before assessing the impacts of climate change on ports, it is critical to realize that the influence and interlinkages of ports extend well beyond their physical location.
The road and railway networks in the hinterland are just as important for port operations as the maritime shipping network.
Industries, small businesses, and local communities, in faraway regions in the hinterland are dependent on the efficient functioning of the ports for their own operations.
Several port infrastructure assets, including the support infrastructure and supply chains, and human personnel, are vulnerable to climate-change-induced events such as sea level rise and climate-change-altered events such as extreme precipitation, tropical revolving storms, storm surges, and heatwaves.
Flooding due to extreme precipitation or after a cyclone could cause damage to radio and radar equipment, storage facilities, and inundate inland road and rail networks resulting in delay in operations.
High speed winds during cyclones could affect loading/unloading crane operations and cause damage to communication and navigation equipment, in addition to generic damage to buildings and warehouses.
In many cases, ports halt all operations during cyclonic storms, particularly during severe cyclonic Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
51 storms, to minimize damage.
However, with more frequent and intense cyclones being predicted in the Indian Ocean due to climate change, the average annual economic loss caused by direct infrastructure damage or due to operational downtime, will likely increase in the coming decades.
Frequent and more extreme heatwaves and overall increase in high-temperature days could lead to significant increase in energy consumption of cold storage equipment and refrigerated containers, as also for air conditioning of office buildings.
Additionally, sustained periods of extreme heat could lead to damage to road and rail infrastructure and affect the health and productivity of human personnel due to harsher working conditions.
In May 2021, when Cyclone Tauktae (which made landfall as an Extremely Severe Cyclonic Storm) hit the west coast of India, it caused significant disruptions in operations at the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) in Navi Mumbai in Maharashtra.
The JNPT is one of the youngest ports and the top container port in India.
The port has a 39.54 km long main harbor channel with a draught of 14 km.
The container traffic at JNPT constitutes about 50 percent of total container traffic handled by all the Indian Major Ports (around 9 million TEUs) (JNPT, n.d.; Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture, 2018).
Following standard protocols, the port took preventive measures by evacuating most port areas before Tauktae made landfall.
Only the control rooms at the ports were kept active for monitoring purposes for three days (15 to 17 May 2021).
Many vessels which were scheduled to route through the west coast were called off from berthing.
JNPT has four dry port or dry dock sites in Wardha, Jalna, Nasik and Sangli that facilitate cargo aggregation in the hinterland away from the port; the roadblocks and cancellation of railway lines during the cyclone led to significant delays for shipping lines.
Overall, suspending all the operations at the JNPT resulted in congestion at the port and severely affected the supply chain.
Other non-major ports in the areas hit by Tauktae were affected even more badly and operations were suspended for several weeks (Shah, 2021).
This setback, of course, added to the losses incurred due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which had already caused a slow-down in port operations and disrupted supply chains due to labor shortages and force majeure during the global travel restrictions.
Additionally, more erratic and extreme monsoon rains and strong winds, due to climate change, are becoming an annual nuisance for the city of Mumbai and the state of Maharashtra, in general.
Frequent, heavy monsoonal flooding also affects port operations.
In 2020, during a record-setting monsoon season, Mumbai recorded a total rainfall of over 1,240 mm in the month of August, which was more than double the average rainfall of 585 mm for that month (Pinto, 2020).
In the same month, three high-capacity cranes deployed at the JNPT collapsed due to heavy rains and strong winds.
However, no injuries or casualties were reported since operations were already halted, and personnel evacuated due to bad weather (Nayak, 2020).
The year before that, 2019 also broke several records for monsoon rainfall in Mumbai (Gupta, 2019).
Such events are expected to become more common all along the West Coast as climate change continues unmitigated.
In October 2014, Cyclone Hudhud hit the coast near Visakhapatnam as an Extremely Severe Cyclonic Storm (ESCS) with a wind speed of 175 km/h, causing extensive damage to the city and its neighboring districts.
Hudhud was one of the two strongest tropical cyclones of 2014 within the Bay of Bengal (Cheela et al, 2014).
Over 250,000 people were affected, and the city of Visakhapatnam suffered billions in damages.
Within a few hours of hitting the coast, the cyclone caused significant impacts on the Naval Dockyard, Vizag Steel Plant, Hindustan Petroleum Limited, and other critical assets.
An estimated four hundred boats conducting fishing and related activities were damaged and seventy-two were sunk without trace; thirty-eight trains were cancelled on 12 October 2014 (PTI, 2014).
Around 2,250 km of roads were damaged, and the total loss incurred by the local industries was estimated to be around INR 100 billion.
The Indian Navy suffered economic losses of around INR 20 billion.
The estimated damages faced by the Visakhapatnam Port Trust was around INR 3 billion (Singh, 2016).
Several port services remained on hold even days after the cyclone.
The damages to the road and railway infrastructure caused significant hindrance to the movement of trucks to the port, vital internet services remained unavailable, and consequent supply-chain disruptions posed considerable delays in providing essential services.
These are just a few of the recorded examples of the ways in climate-change-related events are adversely affecting the port infrastructure and operations in India.
Unfortunately, the true extent of the damages caused by climatic events to Indian ports cannot be accurately estimated due to the lack of robust data collection, monitoring and reporting in Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
52 the public domain.
Lack of data records is, in fact, one of the major challenges in the efforts to analyse and create awareness about these impacts and the growing trends.
According to the 2020 climate change assessment report of the Ministry of Earth Sciences of the Government of India, there has been a significant increase in the number of heavy precipitation events and severe cyclonic storms over India since 1950 (Krishnan et al, 2020).
The climatemodels-based projections suggest that frequency and intensity of these events are expected to continue to increase throughout the 21st century primarily driven by the warming of the atrmosphere and the ocean which is creating favorable conditions for heavy precipitation events and rapid intensification of tropical cyclones (Sarthi et al, 2014).
2.2.
Dimensions of climate risk The first and most critical step towards any climate adaptation strategy or policy is a comprehensive ‘climate risk assessment’.
In the present context, the term ‘climate risk’ corresponds to risks or threats, arising as a result of contemporary anthropogenic climate change, to human lives, livelihoods, infrastructure and operations, and natural ecosystems and resources.
This definition becomes more and more specific as the scope is narrowed down either in terms of the stakeholders or the specific impacts of climate change or a specific timeline.
The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the UN IPCC, released in 2014, laid great emphasis on and attempted to quantify the concept of ‘risk’ which is crucial for making decisions with respect to managing the effects of climate change (IPCC, 2014).
The report described the risk posed by climate change as a combination of ‘hazard’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘exposure’.
Wherein, Hazard corresponds to a singular event or a changing trend that could have an adverse impact, Exposure corresponds to the elements (people, infrastructure, livelihoods, ecosystems, etc.)
that may be exposed to the adverse impacts of the aforementioned hazard(s), and Vulnerability corresponds to the degree to which the adverse impacts can cause damage and the lack of capacity to cope with those damages.
Almost all climate risk assessment frameworks follow essentially the same general approach to measuring risk, however, they may use different terminologies and they may have different methods to quantify hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities (Scott et al, 2013; Becker et al, 2018).
While global scientific analyses, such as those published by the UN IPCC, provide a broad overview of the major threats arising from climate change at the global scale, what are more relevant for policy-making are the national and local level manifestations of these threats.
All three of these factors and the resultant climate risk vary widely across temporal and spatial scales and depend on a wide range of social, economic, demographic, geographic, cultural, institutional, political, and environmental parameters.
These parameters are typically not easily quantifiable.
Even if they are quantifiable, they may not be recorded frequently and accurately enough to provide robust insights.
This makes rigorous, quantitative climate risk assessment an extremely challenging problem.
The task becomes even more difficult when analyzing future climate risks, several decades or even a century into the future, where the number of possible scenarios-of and uncertaintiesin climate hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities, grow exponentially (Wilby et al, 2009; Dickson et al, 2012).
Therefore, in many cases, climate risk assessments, instead, rely heavily upon the stakeholders’ ‘perceptions’ of risk that are typically recorded through a series of surveys/ interviews which are then transformed to a numerical index or to risk-categories to facilitate comparative analysis.
In the context of seaports, climate change risk assessments and adaptation planning are relatively novel areas of research.
Most of the literature in the area has come out in the last one to two decades, a majority of that has emerged from the more developed parts of the world (Becker et al, 2012).
In an attempt to fill the gaps in data and information availability for risk assessments and adaptation planning, Asariotis et al (2017), under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat, conducted a comprehensive online survey of stakeholders in the port-industry to understand the impacts of climate change and weather-related events on the ports around the world.
A total of 44 ports (73 percent of which were located in developed countries), from 29 countries, participated in the survey which comprised questions related to the profile of the port, the history of climate and weather-related events that impacts the ports, the availability of information for a vulnerability assessment, and the level of preparedness.
About 70 percent of the ports that participated reported that they had been impacted by climateor weather-related events in the past, in terms of operations and delays, and some of them also experienced physical damage to infrastructure.
A significant number of them indicated that future infrastructure investment plans would consider weather/climate-related factors, however, this result should be interpreted with the caveat that most of the Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
53 ports that were surveyed were located in developed countries which are better equipped financially and better informed than the developing and least-developed countries.
The survey also found that there is a significant lack of data availability in terms of local-level future projections of climatic changes and the port operational and infrastructure design parameters which would play a critical role in adaptation planning.
While the global-level studies/ surveys such as those conducted by UNCTAD provide critical insights into the broader issues and an international perspective, more nuanced risk assessment studies with nationaland local-level details are necessary to inform adaptation decisions for individual ports.
Nursey-Bray et al (2013), conducted a nationallevel climate vulnerability assessment of ports in Australia, through a systematic literature analysis and two stakeholder workshops.
The authors followed the IPCC-prescribed definition of ‘vulnerability’ and focused on determining “(1) real or potential [climate change] impacts on the system [the port ecosystem]; (2) the systems’ ability to cope and adapt to these impacts; and (3) the extent to which coping capacity may be constrained by environmental or societal conditions.” The participants in the workshops comprised ports managers, workers and administrators within Australia’s port-industry.
The workshops were also supported by a survey questionnaire before and after the workshop to gather the participants opinions on how climate change has and will affect the ports.
Based on the literature review, the broader impacts of climate change on ports were divided in five key areas: (1) Environmental impact, (2) Infrastructure, (3) Ports and people, (4) Occupational health and safety impacts, and (5) Supply chain impacts.
The expert surveys were then used to assess the “the ability of the systems to cope and adapt to these impacts”, and the constraints that may limit the ability to build adaptive capacity as seen by the port authorities.
As one would expect, the study found that while all ports will indeed be affected by the impacts of climate change, the vulnerability varies significantly between the different sections of port infrastructure and operations.
Importantly, the surveys revealed that most port authorities displayed high levels of confidence in their ability to adapt to the ongoing and projected changes.
The authors called for a standardized national-level framework which can be applied to individual ports to assess the climate vulnerability of Australia’s port infrastructure.
The semiquantitative yet robust methodology of the study provides a blueprint for researchers in other countries on how to break down climate vulnerability into its critical components and systematically evaluate it through perception surveys.
Port-specific case-studies have also been conducted in the recent past.
To mention a few, Stenek et al (2011), published a comprehensive climate-risk assessment report, including financial impacts estimates and suggested adaptive measures for the Terminal Maritimo Muelles el Bosque (MEB) in Colombia.
The authors categorized the impacts across a wide range of operational, financial, reputational, legal, environmental and social categories and across different future climate change scenarios.
The study was accomplished through a combination of desk-research and modelling, and discussions with the port authorities, local government and climate change experts.
The study also laid great emphasis on the interdependencies between the port operations and hinterland industrial activities and local businesses.
Following a similar methodology, Cox et al (2013), conducted a climate risk assessment for the Avatiu port in the Cook Islands.
Building upon previous studies the authors took specific steps to address the interconnectedness of port operations with the broader city infrastructure and included multiple stakeholders for a more holistic assessment.
Messner et al (2013), used the port of San Diego as a case study to understand the impacts of climate change, sea level rise in particular, on ports and provided an evaluation framework for risk and vulnerability; Chettri et al (2013), also studied the impacts of sea level rise on port infrastructure and operations using Port Kembla in New South Wales as the case-study.
All of the aforementioned vulnerability/ risk assessment studies utilize some combination of ‘desk-research’ and ‘expert interviews/ surveys’ or ‘stakeholder workshops’.
The ratio of this combination may vary significantly depending on accessibility of data and port personnel.
As discussed later in Section 5, expert interviews/ surveys become particularly relevant for developing countries, such as India, where robust, long-term data records may not be available.
It is important to remember that at the national or regional level all the ports taken together form the larger maritime transport network of a country.
By corollary, it is also true that some ports may be more critical to the broader maritime sector than the others.
Arguing for a holistic, multi-port approach to climate risk assessment and adaptation planning, McIntosh and Becker (2017) stated that “At the single port scale, decision makers such as port managers may consider the uninterrupted functioning of their port the number one priority.
But, at the multi-port (regional or Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
54 national) scale, policy-makers will need to prioritize competing port climate-adaptation needs in order to maximize the efficiency of limited physical and financial resources and maximize the resilience of marine transportation system as a whole.” Towards this end, the authors highlighted the lack of multi-port assessment studies and provided a critical review of the few indicator-based multi-port vulnerability assessments that have been published in recent years.
The ‘indicators’ used in such studies typically include quantifiable, observable quantities, for instance, projected sea level rise, storm surge level, value of port assets, port efficiency measures such as turnaround time, etc., that can collectively be used to determine the vulnerability or risk of the system.
One of the limitations of indicatorbased assessments at multi-port level is the fact that the indicators need to be generic enough that they can be applied to all ports under consideration.
While this may allow for a comparative analysis to be conducted which would generate a relative ranking of the ports according to their risk level, it limits of the scope of the indicators which may lead to an incomplete assessment of the risk.
Nonetheless, a standardized approach to multi-port assessment would be highly relevant for India, since India has 12 major and over 200 non-major ports, and more ports are being planned under the central government’s long-term development plans.
Considering the limited financial and technological capacity of the country, it would have to prioritize the more vulnerable ports in the adaptation plans which would require a comparative multi-port assessment.
3.
State-of-the-art in climate adaptation measures for seaports With growing literature and increased awareness of the ways in which climate change impacts will affect coastal regions, coastal state/ city planners are increasingly acknowledging the need for implementing adaptive measures to minimize damages to infrastructure.
However, in the port industry very few ports globally have actually taken appropriate adaptive measures (Becker et al, 2018).
Some studies have noted that this could partly be attributed to the difference in timeframes of port planning activities, which typically ranges between 5-15 years and the timeframes in which climate change impacts play out which could be over multiple decades, particularly in the case of sea level rise (Becker et al, 2012; Scott et al, 2013).
This myopic approach to infrastructure planning is, of course, a hinderance to climate adaptation planning in all sectors and at all levels of governments.
In almost all cases, the critical maritime transport infrastructure has a lifetime of many decades and therefore their planning and maintenance processes must ensure resilience to mediumand long-term threats arising from climate change.
A wide range of adaptation measures for seaports have been proposed, analyzed, and some have been implemented, in recent years.
Adaptation measures could range from ‘soft measures’ such as changes in standard operating procedures, adaptation policies, emergency preparedness exercises, generating more accurate local-level climate projections, etc., to ‘hard measures’ which include infrastructural changes such as building seawalls/ storm surge barriers, expanding the dimensions of breakwaters, upgrading drainage systems, increasing elevation of infrastructure, etc., and everything in between.
In this context, the city of Rotterdam in Netherlands provides an example of a holistic approach.
The city set up the “Rotterdam Climate Proof (RCP)” programme, as part of the broader “Rotterdam Climate Initiative” of 2008, which aims to make Rotterdam resilient to climate change by 2025 while simultaneously generating opportunities to make the city more attractive (Rotterdam Climate Proof, 2010).
The RCP is focused on five major aspectsflood management, accessibility, adaptive building, the urban water system and the urban climate.
The RCP has laid specific emphasis on knowledge sharing, creating awareness, and promoting innovation in science and technology.
The city founded the “Connecting Delta Cities” knowledge network, in 2009, as a part of its initiatives under the C40 climate leadership group.
Some of the members of the knowledge network include Tokyo, Jakarta, Hong Kong, New York, New Orleans, London, Ho Chi Minh City, Melbourne, and Copenhagen.
In 2021, the Port of Rotterdam Authority and the Municipality of Rotterdam jointly launched the “Flood Management Adaptation Strategy Programme” to protect the port and associated industries from the impacts of climate change including sea level rise, storm surges and increased likelihood of tidal flooding (Port of Rotterdam, 2021).
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) had integrated climate change mitigation and adaptation into their environmental sustainability policy in 2008 which recognized safety, resilience and environmental sustainability as its primary objectives.
In 2009, the PANYNJ Engineering Department released the Climate Resilience Design Guidelines that demand climate risk factors to be incorporated into the design and construction of Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
55 ports’ buildings and other infrastructure.
The design guidelines were further updated in 2015 and again in 2018 (PANYNJ, 2018a).
The Port Authority completed the climate risk assessment focusing on flood-related risks across all port facilities in 2020.
The follow-up multi-year programme was initiated in 2021 focusing on applying rigorous, engineering-based assessment techniques at the local level.
Notably, the PANYNJ was the first public transportation agency in the USA that promulgated carbon emissions reduction targets to align themselves with the goals of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement.
It made commitments to reduce its carbon emissions by 35 percent by 2030 and by 80 percent by 2050 (PANYNJ, 2018b).
The city of Kaohsiung in ROC (Taiwan) which hosts the Port of Kaohsiung, ROC’s largest international port, is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change including rising temperatures and frequent bouts of extreme weather events.
In response to these growing threats, a number of measures have been taken by the city to enhance the resilience of its physical and social infrastructure, including large-scale restoration of wetlands to protect its coastline, upgrades to water management and drainage systems to mitigating urban flooding, construction of energy efficient ‘green buildings’, among others (Urban Climate Adaptation, 2019; Lai, 2012).
Notably, the Port of Kaohsiung received the 2021 World Ports Sustainability Program (WPSP) award for Resilient Physical Infrastructure.
In Australia, several ports have undertaken extensive climate risk assessment studies in recent years and incorporated measures to mitigate socio-economic damages from the impacts of climate change.
For instance, the Port of Melbourne adopted corporate climate change policy in 2007, a climate change action strategy in 2009 and became a signatory to the World Ports’ Climate Declaration (Ng et al, 2013).
Other ports in Western Australia, Northern Territory and New South Wales have taken adaptive measures against flooding from cyclonic storms and sea level rise (Scott et al, 2013).
The city of Jakarta in Indonesia is one of the largest coastal megacities in the world which is also considered to be one of the most vulnerable cities to coastal flooding, large parts of the city are already below sea level.
Studies have shown that the primary cause for increasing flooding events in Jakarta is land subsidence being caused mainly by unsustainable and unmanaged extraction of groundwater for various industrial and domestic purposes (Ng et al, 2012; Chaussard et al, 2013).
The extent and frequency of coastal flooding will be worsened by accelerating sea level rise in the coming decades.
According to model-based projections, the potential flood area extent is estimated to increase by 110.5 sq km by 2050 relative to 2000 levels (Takagi et al 2016a).
The simulations also indicated that the rate of flood area expansion during the 2025-2050 would be 3.4 times faster than that in the 2000-2025 period.
The ports of Jakarta are severely affected frequently by tidal floods and storm surges.
The Sunda Kelpa port is the oldest port in Jakarta spanning 52 hectares of land area.
Some estimates suggest that the port is currently experiencing 5-10 cm of land subsidence per year, over the last two decades.
According to port authorities, around 20 percent of the annual income is spent on adaptation measures including protective dikes and raising the elevation of port infrastructure which is being done in a section-by-section manner (Esteban et al, 2020).
Similarly, the Pelabuhan Perikanan Samudera Nizam Zaham port which is the largest fishing port in Indonesia is experiencing 7-12 cm of subsidence annually.
Consequently, the port elevation was raised in 2002 and then again in 2012 by +1.4 m. The Muara Angke port was also raised three times, in 2006, 2011 and 2014, by 40-50 cm each time using sheet piles (Esteban el al, 2020).
Other studies have argued that the protective dikes that have been built are themselves vulnerable to sea level rise and increased frequency and intensity of tropical storms (Takagi et al, 2016b).
Moreover, measures such as increasing the elevation of port infrastructure are akin to “band-aid solutions”, and very expensive ones at that, which focus on short-term adaptation rather than increasing long-term resilience of the infrastructure.
4.
Molding to the Indian circumstances As alluded to before in Section 1, India has initiated a number of measures in recent years to expand its maritime transport sector and the broader Blue Economy.
There is one thing that is common across all of these initiatives, that is the overwhelming emphasis on capacity augmentation and modernization.
While that is commendable and necessary for economic growth, it is crucial to acknowledge and prepare-for current and projected threats arising from the impacts of climate change which may otherwise derail the ambitious expansion plans.
There is an urgent need for a holistic and dynamic climate change adaptation strategy to ensure the protection and continued operation of the existing and planned port infrastructure.
Clearly, this adaptation strategy will have to be based on a series of risk Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
56 assessment studies at the national-, stateand local-levels.
In this regard, the amount of literature in India is relatively sparse.
For the first time in 2020, a comprehensive ‘climate change assessment report’ for India was published by the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) (Krishnan et al, 2020).
This much-needed report highlighted the observed and future projections of temperature, precipitation, sea level, extreme weather events and the Indian monsoon system, among other parameters, over the Indian region.
In 2021, the Department of Science and Technology of the Government of India published a report entitled, “Climate Vulnerability Assessment for Adaptation Planning in India Using a Common Framework”, which mapped all-India state-level and district-level vulnerability to climate change (DST GoI, 2021).
However, the report provided an incomplete picture because it was solely focused on determining vulnerability based on an analysis of the current state of infrastructure and stateand national-level policies.
The report did not account for the current and projected evolution of climate-change related ‘hazards’ and the level of ‘exposure’ of the districts and states, which are necessary for quantifying ‘risk’.
The authors acknowledged this caveat and mentioned that additional studies will be conducted on these aspects in the future.
This lack of robust and reliable long-term data records and analyses of climate variables and local-level climate projections poses a major hurdle towards a quantitative climate risk assessment of ports in India.
As discussed in Section 3, this limitation is often remediated, at least partially, by conducting interviews and workshops with domain experts and stakeholders to collect qualitative information-on and perceptions-of risk to infrastructure and operations.
Insofar as adaptation measures are concerned, India would have to work within the national financial and technological limitations which may preclude the possibility of adopting the cost-intensive hard infrastructure solutions that have been adopted by the more developed cities/ countries, such as Rotterdam, some of which were discussed in Section 4.
Consequently, India would have to utilize a creative combination of hardand soft-measures, in other words, a combination of capacity building (that is the generation of material wherewithal) and capability enhancement (that is enhancing the human ability to manage the impacts), to build resilience against climate change.
Considering the national circumstances described above, the following interventions are recommended for policy makers in India at the nationaland state-level governments to enhance the resilience of the country’s port infrastructure: a) Conduct comprehensive climate risk assessments of India’s major and non-major brownfield ports, including assetor area-specific details, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders including climate scientists, engineers, port authorities, local government officials, industry members, local businesses, and local community members including the fisherfolk.
This could be incorporated as an actionable under the ‘portmodernisation’ goal of the Maritime India Vision 2030 (MIV-2030) to ensure security and continued functioning of existing ports.
Additionally, preemptive climate risk assessments and adaptation planning for the current and projected impacts of climate change should be mandated for all greenfield projects proposed under MIV-2030.
b) A standardised framework is needed which can be applied to all ports to produce a comparative analysis of climate risk, which could then be compiled into a national-level assessment of the broader maritime transport sector of the country.
This would allow the central and state governments, private entities, and port management authorities to identify the most vulnerable ports and the most vulnerable sections or assets within individual ports which should be prioritised for adaptation actions.
c) As discussed in Section 4, climate change adaptation measures for ports could include ‘hard measures’ or ‘soft measures’ or a combination of the two.
Due to limited financial resources in India, hard measures (which may include creation of protective infrastructure or retrofitting or relocating existing infrastructure) would require cost-benefit analyses to be conducted to identify the most viable options.
Nature-based protective solutions such as creation of coastal dunes, conservation and plantation of mangrove forests, etc., should be seriously considered, in combination with the man-made protective infrastructure, which would provide cost-effective ways to reduce the impacts of floods and storm surges.
The protection and conservation of such ecosystems would also provide additional ecological and socio-economic benefits for coastal regions.
Conservation efforts are already being pursued by some of the coastal states in India; these efforts could be integrated with port planning and development to maximise the benefits.
Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
57 d) Since ports form integral components of the city, state, and country’s economy, and are inextricably linked with hinterland activities, there is a need for greater cooperation at these levels to generate a cohesive adaptation strategy.
For instance, the resilience (or the lack of resilience) of hinterland road and railway networks, energy infrastructure, fisheries infrastructure, and other industries, against climate-changeinduced hazards would have direct consequeces for port operations and efficiency.
Therefore, city-wide or state-wide adaptation strategies that address the broader socio-economic systems would have to be developed accordingly.
The examples of New York and New Jersey in the USA and Kaohsiung City in ROC discussed in Section 4 provide insights into combined port and city climate adaptation strategies that have been attempted.
e) Importantly, the adaptation strategy must account for the dynamic nature of climate change.
The impacts of climate change are expected to continue to grow at an accelerating rate even in the more optimistic future scenarios.
Moreover, there are new phenomena that are being discovered constantly that challenge our past predictions, especially with regard to sea-level rise and the intensification of extreme weather events.
Therefore, the adaptation measures cannot be short-sighted, one-time efforts but should leave room for further changes and updates as we learn more about these natural processes and their interactions with human activities.
This is also important because protective measures that involve construction of hard-infrastructure such as seawalls, breakwaters or support structures to increase the elevation of port infrastructure are capitaland time-intensive and, therefore, require careful planning to ensure long term sustainability.
Along the same lines, it is necessary to put in place mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of the adopted measures and re-assess the risks at regular intervals, every five to ten years.
Devising and implementing a holistic and dynamic climate adaptation strategy for seaports will not only ensure a secure and sustainable maritime transport sector but also facilitate India’s ambitions of becoming a leading Blue Economy of the world.
f) Finally, it must be recognised that some regions may be beyond adaptation and would be completely inundated by sea level rise in the coming decades.
In India, this is particularly relevant for the Bay of Bengal region and the Sundarbans delta in particular which is experiencing a much faster rate of sea level rise than the global average due to a combination of geographical and anthropogenic factors.
The ports in such regions would have to be systematically decommisioned or relocated to other regions.
Therefore, planned retreat should also be considered as an adaptation action that may become increasingly necessary in the future.
5.
Conclusion As global warming continues unabated, the knock-on effects of rising atmospheric and oceanic temperatures such as more frequent and intense extreme weather events (heatwaves, heavy precipitation and tropical cyclones) and accelerating sea level rise pose major threats to coastal regions around the planet.
For the maritime trade sector, these climatic changes will have direct impacts on the port infrastructure and the ability of the ports to maintain maximum operational efficiency.
As discussed in detail in the paper, in India, more frequent extreme weather events are already affecting port operations which lead to downtime ranging from a few hours to several days.
Collectively, these operational downtimes can add-up to major economic losses for the country.
In the coming decades, climate-changeinduced sea level rise will significantly worsen the impact of cyclonic storms and tidal flooding and will emerge as an irreversible threat to the port infrastructure.
Adapting brownfield ports to sea level rise may require significant modifications to the existing infrastructure (such as raising elevation) or building protective infrastructure such as breakwaters or storm surge barriers, all of which will require long-term planning and huge financial costs.
While India has taken several measures in recent years to expand its maritime sector, there are no nationalor locallevel strategies to protect the port infrastructure and operations against the growing impacts of climate change.
A stark example of this is the lack of emphasis on climate change adaptation in the Maritime India Vision 2030 which is the guiding document from the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways for the maritime trade sector for the next decade.
In this context, this paper highlights the need for a holistic and dynamic climate change adaptation strategy for India’s port ecosystems and provides recommendations for a way forward based on a comprehensive literature review of international best practices.
The adaptation strategy must be built upon rigorous and comprehensive climate risk assessments of the ports and interdependent supply chains to determine the internal and Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
58 external vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change.
A standardized national-level risk assessment framework would be critical to conduct a comparative vulnerability analysis of India’s major and non-major ports to identify the most vulnerable ports which may require priority action from the central government (in the case of major ports) or respective state governments (in the case of non-major ports).
Moreover, considering the dependencies of the port on the broader city activities and vice versa, the adaptation strategy must take an integrated approach and incorporate the needs and limitations of all stakeholders including the city authorities, industries, local communities and businesses.
As discussed in the paper, the ideal adaptation strategy should be based on a combination of infrastructure-level and operational-level solutions which considers not only capacity-building but also capability-enhancement measures.
Devising and implementing a holistic and dynamic climate adaptation strategy for seaports will not only ensure a secure and sustainable maritime transport sector but also facilitate India’s ambitions of becoming a leading Blue Economy of the world.
Acknowledgements This research was supported by the 2021-22 Fellowship of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), Application ID 201104207.
The authors would like to thank Mr. Kevin Jose and Ms. Sakshi Savita for their contributions in analysing the impacts of climate change on India’s major ports.
References Asari/otis R, Benamara H, Mohos-Naray V. Port industry survey on climate change impacts and adaptation.
UNCTAD Research Paper No.
18, 2017.
Becker A, Inoue S, Fischer M, Schwegler B.
Climate change impacts on international seaports: Knowledge, perceptions, and planning efforts among port administrators.
Climatic Change 2012.
110(1):5-29.
Becker A, Ng AKY, McEvoy D, Mullett J.
Implications of climate change for shipping: Ports and supply chains.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 2018. e508.
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.508 Chaussard E, Amelung F, Adibin H, Hong S-H.
Sinking cities in Indonesia: ALOS PALSAR detects rapid subsidence due to groundwater and gas extraction.
Remote Sensing of Environment 2013.
128:150-161.
Cheela VRS, Ramesh RB, Raju GSSSV, Balaji KVGD.
Effect of Hudhud cyclone on the development of Visakhapatnam as smart and green cityA case study.
International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology 2014.
03 Special Issue 16:27-30.
DST GoIDepartment of Science and Technology, Government of India.
Climate vulnerability assessment for adaptation planning in India using a common framework.
New Delhi: DST, 2021.
Dickson E, Baker JL, Hoornweg D, Tiwari A.
Urban risk assessments: Understanding disaster and climate risk in cities.
Urban Development Series.
Washington DC: World Bank; 2012.
Esteban M, Takagi H, Nicholls RJ, Fatma D, Pratama MB, Kurobe S, Yi X, Ikeda I, Mikami T, Valenzuela P, Avelino E. Adapting ports to sealevel rise: Empirical lessons based on land subsidence in Indonesia and Japan.
Maritime Policy and Management 2020.
47(7):937-952.
Fuchs RJ.
Cities at risk: Asia’s coastal cities in an age of climate change.
AsiaPacific Issues 2010.
No.
96.
Gupta S. Mumbai breaks 65-year record for most rainfall in September.
NDTV News, 19 September 2019. https://www.ndtv.com/mumbainews/mumbai-rain-schools-shut-rescue-teams-on-standby-as-mumbai-braces-for-heavy-monsoon-2103482, last accessed on 29 September 2021.
JNPT.
Advantage JNPT.
Last accessed on 28 October 2021, http://www.jnport.gov.in/advantage_jnpt.
(n.d.) Kulp SA, Strauss BH.
New elevation data triple estimates of global vulnerability to sea-level rise and coastal flooding.
Nature Communications 2019.
10:4844.
Krishnan R, Sanjay J, Gnanaseelan C, Mujumdar M, Kulkarni A, Chakraborty S, editors.
Assessment of climate change over the Indian region: A report of the Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India.
Singapore: Springer Nature, 2020.
Macrotrends.
India trade to GDP ratio 1960-2021.
Last accessed on 28 October 2021, from https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/IND/india/trade-gdp-ratio.
(n.d.) McIntosh DR, Becker A. Seaport climate vulnerability assessment at the multi-port scale: A review of approaches.
In: Linkov L, Palma-Oliveira JM, editors.
Resilience and risk: Methods and application in environment, cyber and social domains.
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands; 2017. p. 205-224.
MoPSW Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways of the Government of India.
Ports Wing.
Last accessed on 28 October 2021, https://shipmin.gov.in/division/ports-wing.
(n.d.) MoPSW Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways of the Government of India.
Maritime India Vision 2030.
New Delhi: MoPSW, 2021.
Nayak BB.
Navi Mumbai: Three cranes collapse at JNPT, operation halted due to bad weather.
The Times of India, 05 August 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/navi-mumbai/navi-mumbai-three-cranes-collapse-at-jnpt-operation-halted-due-to-badweather/articleshow/77377439.cms, last accessed on 29 September 2021. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.508 https://www.ndtv.com/mumbai-news/mumbai-rain-schools-shut-rescue-teams-on-standby-as-mumbai-braces-for-heavy-monsoon-2103482 https://www.ndtv.com/mumbai-news/mumbai-rain-schools-shut-rescue-teams-on-standby-as-mumbai-braces-for-heavy-monsoon-2103482 http://www.jnport.gov.in/advantage_jnpt https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/IND/india/trade-gdp-ratio https://shipmin.gov.in/division/ports-wing https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/navi-mumbai/navi-mumbai-three-cranes-collapse-at-jnpt-operation-halted-due-to-bad-weather/articleshow/77377439.cms https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/navi-mumbai/navi-mumbai-three-cranes-collapse-at-jnpt-operation-halted-due-to-bad-weather/articleshow/77377439.cms Bajaj / Environmental Science and Sustainable Development pg.
59 Ng AH-M, Ge L, Li X, Abidin HZ, Andreas H, Zhang K. Mapping land subsidence in Jakarta, Indonesia using persistent scatterer interferometry (PSI) technique with ALOS PALSAR.
International Journal of Applied Earth Observation and Geoinformation 2012.
18:232-242.
Ng AKY, Chen SL, Cahoon S, Brooks B, Yang Z.
Climate change and the adaptation strategies of ports: The Australian experiences.
Research in Transportation Business & Management 2013.
8:186-194.
Nursey-Bray M, Blackwell B, Brooks B, Campbell ML, Goldsworthy L, Pateman H, Rodrigues I, Roome M, Wright JT, Francis J, Hewitt CL.
Vulnerabilities and adaptation of ports to climate change.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 2013.
56(7):1021-1045. https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2012.716363 PANYNJa Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Climate Resilience Design Guidelines v1.2, 2018. https://www.panynj.gov/content/dam/port-authority/about/environmental-initiatives-/clean-construction/climate-resilience.pdf, last accessed 28 October 2021.
PANYNJb Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Port Authority embraces Paris Climate Agreement, adopting aggressive measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 25 October 2018. https://www.panynj.gov/port-authority/en/press-room/press-releasearchives/2018_press_releases/port_authority_embracesparisclimateagreementadoptingaggressiveme.html, last accessed on 28 October 2021.
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture.
Two hundred sixty ninth: Cargo handling at the major ports.
New Delhi: Rajya Sabha, 2018.
Pinto DN.
August Monsoon: Mumbai receives highest rains since 1983; second highest rainfall on record for Konkan and Goa.
The Weather Channel India, 31 August 2020. https://weather.com/en-IN/india/monsoon/news/2020-08-31-august-monsoon-mumbai-highest-rains-1983konkan-goa-second-rainfall, last accessed on 29 September 2021.
Port of Rotterdam.
Port Authority and municipality united on responding to sea level rise in the port.
Port of Rotterdam Website, 16 February 2021. https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/news-and-press-releases/port-authority-and-municipality-united-responding-sea-level-rise-port, last accessed 28 October 2021.
PTI.
Damages due to cyclone runs in thousands of crores: Naidu.
The Indian Express, 14 October 2014. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/damages-due-to-cyclone-runs-in-thousands-of-crores-naidu/, last accessed on 29 September 2021.
Ranasingha R, Jongejan R. Climate change, coasts and coastal risk.
Journal of Marine Science and Engineering 2018.
6(4):141. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse6040141 Rotterdam Climate Proof.
Rotterdam Climate Initiative, 2010. http://deltacityofthefuture.com/documents/RCP_ENG_2010_def.pdf, last accessed on 28 October 2021.
Sarthi PP, Aggarwal A, Rana A.
Possible future changes in cyclonic storms in the Bay of Bengal, India under warmer climate.
International Journal of Climatology 2014; 35 (7):1267:1277.
Scott H, McEvoy D, Chettri P, Basic F, Mullet J.
Climate change adaptation guidelines for ports: Enhancing the resilience of seaports to a changing climate.
Gold Coast: National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility; 2013.
Shah S. Cyclone Tauktae: Knock-on impact on shipping and logistics industry to sustain for 2-3 weeks.
Nation News, 20 May 2021. https://nationnews.in/cyclone-tauktae-knock-on-impact-on-shipping-and-logistics-industry-to-sustain-for-2-3-weeks/, last accessed on 29 September 2021.
Singh R. Cities of the future climate risk management.
Presentation delivered at The Griha Summit, 19 February 2016. https://www.grihaindia.org/grihasummit/tgs2016/presentations/19feb/post-disaster-resettlement/Raina_Singh.pdf, last accessed on 29 September 2021.
Stenek V, Amado JC, Connell R, Palin O, Wright S, Pope B, Hunter J, McGregor J, Morgan W, Stanley B, Washington R, Liverman D, Sherwin H, Kapelus P, Andrade C, Pabón JD.
Climate risk and business: Ports.
Washington DC: International Finance Corporation; 2011.
Takagi H, Esteban M, Mikami T, Fujii D. Projection of coastal floods in 2050 Jakarta.
Urban Climate 2016a.
17:135-145.
Takagi H, Mikami T, Fujii D, Esteban M, Kurobe S. Mangrove forest against dyke-break-induced tsunami on rapidly subsiding coasts.
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 2016b.
16(7):1629-1638.
Urban Climate Adaptation.
Urban Climate Adaptation: Taiwan Megacity Kaohsiung.
Innova Ezine (5), 2019. https://www.urbanclimateadaptation.net/ezine5/ last accessed on 28 October 2021.
Wilby RL, Troni J, Biot Y, Tedd L, Hewitson BC, Smith DM, Sutton RT.
A review of climate risk information for adaptation and delevopment planning.
International Journal of Climatology 2009; 29 (9):1193-1215.
Williams SJ.
Sea-level rise implications for coastal regions.
In: Brock JC, Barras JA, Williams SJ, editors.
Understanding and predicting change in the coastal ecosystems of the Northern Gulf of Mexico.
Journal of Coastal Research 2013.
Special Issue No.
63:184-196. https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2012.716363 https://www.panynj.gov/content/dam/port-authority/about/environmental-initiatives-/clean-construction/climate-resilience.pdf https://www.panynj.gov/port-authority/en/press-room/press-release-archives/2018_press_releases/port_authority_embracesparisclimateagreementadoptingaggressiveme.html https://www.panynj.gov/port-authority/en/press-room/press-release-archives/2018_press_releases/port_authority_embracesparisclimateagreementadoptingaggressiveme.html https://weather.com/en-IN/india/monsoon/news/2020-08-31-august-monsoon-mumbai-highest-rains-1983-konkan-goa-second-rainfall https://weather.com/en-IN/india/monsoon/news/2020-08-31-august-monsoon-mumbai-highest-rains-1983-konkan-goa-second-rainfall https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/news-and-press-releases/port-authority-and-municipality-united-responding-sea-level-rise-port https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/damages-due-to-cyclone-runs-in-thousands-of-crores-naidu/ https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse6040141 http://deltacityofthefuture.com/documents/RCP_ENG_2010_def.pdf https://nationnews.in/cyclone-tauktae-knock-on-impact-on-shipping-and-logistics-industry-to-sustain-for-2-3-weeks/ https://www.grihaindia.org/grihasummit/tgs2016/presentations/19feb/post-disaster-resettlement/Raina_Singh.pdf https://www.urbanclimateadaptation.net/ezine5/
FUTURE PROJECTIONS OF WATER SCARCITY IN THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN DUE TO LAND Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
DOI: 10.2478/jengeo-2018-0010 ISSN 2060-467X FUTURE PROJECTIONS OF WATER SCARCITY IN THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN DUE TO LAND USE, WATER DEMAND AND CLIMATE CHANGE Berny Bisselink1*, Ad de Roo1, Jeroen Bernhard2, Emiliano Gelati1 1European Commission, DG Joint Research Centre, Via Enrico Fermi 2749, I-21027 Ispra (VA), Italy 2Department of Physical Geography, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, Princetonlaan 8a, 3584 CB Utrecht, The Netherlands *Corresponding author, e-mail: berny.bisselink@ec.europa.eu Research article, received 17 September 2018, accepted 31 October 2018 Abstract This paper presents a state-of-the-art integrated model assessment to estimate the impacts of the 2oC global mean temperature increase and the 2061-2090 warming period on water scarcity in the Danube River Basin under the RCP8.5 scenario.
The Water Exploitation Index Plus (WEI+) is used to calculate changes in both spatial extent and people exposed to water scarcity due to land use, water demand, population and climate change.
Despite model and data uncertainties, the combined effects of projected land use, water demand and climate change show a decrease in the number of people exposed to water scarcity during the 2oC warming period and an increase in the 2061-2090 period in the Danube River Basin.
However, the projected population change results in a decrease of exposed people in both warming periods.
Regions with population growth, in the northwestern part of the Danube River Basin experience low water scarcity or a decrease in water scarcity.
The largest number of people vulnerable to water scarcity within the Danube River Basin are living in the Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube and Romanian Danube.
There, the combined effects of land use, water demand and climate change exacerbate already existing water scarce areas during the 2oC warming period and towards the end of the century new water scarce areas are created.
Although less critical during the 2oC warming period, adjacent regions such as the Tisza, Middle Danube and Siret-Prut are susceptible to experience similar exposure to water scarcity within the 2061-2090 period.
Climate change is the most important driver for the increase in water scarcity in these regions, but the strengthening effect of water demand (energy sector) and dampening effect of land use change (urbanization) does play a role as well.
Therefore, while preparing for times of increased pressures on the water supply it would be advisable for several economic sectors to explore and implement water efficiency measures.
Keywords: Danube river basin, water scarcity, global warming, land use change, water demand change, population change INTRODUCTION Growing human water demands due to population growth in many region of the world, socio-economic developments and climate change causes pressures on our freshwater resources.
It is expected that the water supply cannot fulfil the water demands in coming decades (Vörösmarty et al., 2000; Stahl, 2001; Lehner et al., 2006; Alcamo et al., 2007; Arnell et al., 2011, 2013; Sperna Weiland et al., 2012; Gosling and Arnell, 2013; Hanasaki et al., 2013; van Vliet et al., 2013; Arnell and LloydHughes, 2014; Haddeland et al., 2014; Prudhomme et al.,2014; Schewe et al., 2014; Schlosser et al., 2014; Wada et al., 2014; Kiguchi et al., 2015), which means that water scarcity is rapidly increasing in many regions.
For Europe, water scarcity and drought events got special interest following the droughts in 2003 (ICPDR, 2015), which reflected the projected temperature extremes for future summers (Beniston, 2004).
For transboundary rivers, like the Danube River Basin (DRB), river basin management is important as sharing water resources in times of future drought and water scarcity creates interdependencies that may lead to both sectoral and regional water conflicts (Farinosi et al., 2018).
The DRB covers 10% of the territory of continental Europe with 80 million people in 19 countries (ICPDR, 2015; Malagó et al., 2017; Karabulut et al., 2016).
Therefore, it is important to find a good balance between water availability and water demand for a wide range of sectors, such as irrigation, livestock, energy and cooling, manufacturing industry, navigation, as well for domestic uses.
The water-energy-food-ecosystem (WEFE) nexus is a novel way to address these interlinked and often simultaneously water allocation strategies.
Although not top priority yet, river basin management in the DRB, coordinated by the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube (ICPDR), is expected to become more important in future climate (ICPDR, 2015).
In present climate, potential water scarcity is predominantly appearing in the Pannonian Danube, in some subbasin of the Tisza, Middle Danube and Lower Danube (Karabulut et al., 2016; ICPDR, 2013).
In addition, densed populated urban areas and areas with low natural water yield are also susceptible for localized water scarcity (Karabulut et al., 2016).
Water stress is projected to increase in the southern and eastern parts of the DRB, especially in smaller tributary rivers due to a lack of summer precipitation (ICPDR, 2013, 2018).
Although important to keep up with growing demands, human interventions, like reservoirs and water transfers, or other factors such as social, demographic, and 26 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
economic development are not considered in most of these water resources modelling studies.
Recent improved details in water use scenarios (Bernhard et al., 2018a, 2018b) and the availability of land use projections (Jacobs-Crisioni et al., 2017) open new opportunities for an integrated assessment of future climate, land use change and water consumption in relation to water resources.
The aim of this study is to provide a state-of-the-art integrated model assessment in relation to water scarcity in the DRB under global warming which is of high interest to inform and support climate policy makers for mitigation and adaptation strategies.
In addition to the integrated impacts, the isolated impacts of land use, water demand and climate change will be examined.
METHODOLOGY Hydrological model LISFLOOD is a GIS-based spatially-distributed hydrological rainfall-runoff model (De Roo et al., 2000; Van der Knijff et al., 2010; Burek et al., 2013).
Most hydrological processes in every grid-cell defined in the modelled domain are reproduced and the produced runoff is routed through the river network.
Although LISFLOOD is a regular grid-based model with a constant spatial grid more detailed sub-grid land use classes are used to simulate the main hydrological processes.
The model distinguishes for each grid the fraction open water, urban sealed area, forest area, paddy rice irrigated area, crop irrigation area and other land uses.
Specific hydrological processes (evapotranspiration, infiltration etc.)
are then calculated in a different way for these land use classes.
Moreover, sub-gridded elevation information is used to establish detailed altitude zones which are important for snow accumulation and melting processes, and to correct for surface temperature.
LISFLOOD is successfully applied for applications for flood forecasting (Thiemig et al., 2015; Bisselink et al., 2016; Alfieri et al., 2013; Emerton et al., 2018) as well for studies dealing with climate change impact assessments in terms of water resources (Bisselink et al., 2018), streamflow drought (Forzieri et al., 2014), flood risk (Alfieri et al., 2015, 2017; Dottori et al., 2017) and multi-hazard assessments (Forzieri et al., 2016).
For this work, LISFLOOD was run on the Danube domain at 5km spatial resolution and daily time step.
The results of this study are based on the Water Exploitation Index Plus (Wei+) indicator (Faergemann, 2012), which is a water scarce indicator.
The WEI+ is determined at monthly timescale and in subregions (typically subriverbasins within a country) to avoid averaging skewed results.
For uniformity, both the input and output maps presented here are area-averaged for every single subregion.
More details on the model setup can be found in Burek et al.
(2013).
Climate projections The climate scenarios used in this study were produced within the EURO-CORDEX initiative (Jacob et al., 2014).
Scenario simulations within EURO-CORDEX use the new Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) as defined in the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC (Moss et al., 2010).
RCP scenarios are based on greenhouse gas emissions and assume pathways to different target radiative forcing at the end of the 21st century.
The climate projections considered in this work are listed in Table 1 and are all based on RCP8.5 (Riahi et al., 2011).
The RCP8.5 scenario represents a situation in which emissions continue to increase rapidly (worst case scenario), and typically exceed 3oC warming before the end of the current century.
From each climate projection meteorological variables were extracted for historical and future climate scenarios and used to estimate daily evapotranspiration maps with the Penman-Monteith equation.
These maps together with bias-corrected temperature and precipitation (Dosio et al., 2012) were then used as input for LISFLOOD.
From LISFLOOD’s output we analysed the 30year periods centered on the year of exceeding the global-mean temperature of 2oC according the used Global Climate Model (GCM; Table 1) and the time window 2061-2090.
To represent the present climate scenario, simulations from the period 1981-2010 are performed and analysed as well.
Table 1 EURO-CORDEX climate projections used in this study and corresponding year of exceeding 2oC warming with the 30-year evaluation period.
Institute GCM RCM 2 oC period evaluated 1 CLMcom CNRM-CM5 CCLM4-8-17 2044 2030-2059 2 CLMcom EC-EARTH CCLM4-8-17 2041 2027-2056 3 IPSL IPSL-CM5A-MR INERIS-WRF331F 2035 2021-2050 4 SMHI HadGEM2-ES RCA4 2030 2016-2045 5 SMHI MPI-ESM-LR RCA4 2044 2030-2059 6 SMHI IPSL-CM5A-MR RCA4 2035 2021-2050 7 SMHI EC-EARTH RCA4 2041 2027-2056 8 SMHI CNRM-CM5 RCA4 2044 2030-2059 9 DMI EC-EARTH HIRHAM5 2043 2029-2058 10 KNMI EC-EARTH RACMO22E 2042 2028-2057 11 CLMcom MPI-ESM-LR CCLM4-8-17 2044 2030-2059 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
27 The DRB is approximately 802,525 km2 large and located in Central and Southeast Europe.
The ICPDR divides the DRB in 15 water management regions (Fig.
1a), mostly subbasin catchments with area ranging from approximately 13650 km2 (Delta-Liman) to 149450 km2 (Tisza).
The results of this study will be presented based on these water management regions.
The DRB explores various climate regimes due to its vast area and topographic variability and can be categorized in four climate regimes with an aridity index ranging from 0.20.5 (semi-arid), 0.5-0.65 (dry-subhumid), 0.65-0.80 (moderate humid), to > 0.80 (humid).
The aridity index is the ratio of ensemble mean of the precipitation and potential evapotranspiration from the climate projections (Table 1).
Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of climatological aridity of both present and future climate.
The derived aridity index for present climate (1981-2010) indicates that 8.6% of the total DRB area can be classified as semi-arid located in the southeastern part of the DRB surrounded by the dry-subhumid regions (22.4%) in the southeastern and middle part of the DRB with a continental climate.
The moderate humid (20.2%) and humid regions (48.8%) are located in mountainous areas or in areas influenced by the Atlantic climate.
Many studies provide climate projections with temperature, precipitation and evapotranspiration trends (Stagl and Hattermann, 2015; Jacob et al., 2014; Hlásny et al., 2016; Bartholy et al., 2014; ICPDR, 2013; Laaha et al., 2016; Pieczka et al., 2011).
In short, the air temperature is likely to increase in future with a gradient from northwest to southeast.
Overall, small precipitation changes are to be expected as the DRB is located in a north-southern transition zone between increasing (northern part of DRB) and decreasing (southern part of DRB) future precipitation.
Moreover, seasonal behavior of extreme temperature and precipitation is likely to be more pronounced with an increasing number of extreme precipitation events in winter and more dry spells in summer.
These change in precipitation and potential evapotranspiration associated with warming temperatures lead to an increasing aridity of the semi-arid regions in both the 2oC warming period (+1.4%) and 2061-2090 period (+4.5%) whereby the spatial extent is growing over time towards southwest direction (Fig.
1a) on the expense of the dry-subhumid regions which decrease in spatial extent with -3.1% and -2.3% respectively (Fig.
1b).
The spatial extent of both the moderate humid and humid regions are increasing with 1.0 % and 0.7% respectively between present climate and the 2oC warming period with the largest increase in the Pannonian Danube (Fig 1c,d), but the spatial extent of the humid and humid regions is decreasing again towards the end of the century (20612090) with respectively -0.8% and -1.3%.
From the 15 water management regions, the Austrian Danube, Morava, Vah-Hron-Ipel, Pannonian Danube, Drava, Sava and Tisza shift towards a wetter climate regime, while the Middle Danube, Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube, Romanian Danube and Siret-Prut tend to shift towards a drier climate regime under 2oC global warming.
Towards the end of the century (2061-2090), some additional regions show a tendency towards a drier regime, like the Tisza and Sava.
The Vah-Hron-Ipel and Pannonian Danube regions show an increase in spatial extent of the semi-arid areas, but also an increase in spatial extent of the humid regions.
Only the spatial extent of the Morava region continues growing towards a wetter Fig 1 Spatial distribution of a) Semi-arid, b) Dry-subhumid, c) Moderate humid, and d) Humid regions for the baseline 19812010, 2oC and 2061-2090 warming periods based on the ratio of the ensemble mean of the precipitation and evapotranspiration.
In figure 1a the 15 ICPDR water management regions are inserted: 1.
Upper Danube, 2.
Inn, 3.
Austrian Danube, 4.
Morava, 5.
Vah-Hron-Ipel, 6.
Pannonian Danube, 7.
Drava, 8.
Sava, 9.
Tisza, 10.
Middle Danube, 11.
Great Morava, 12.
Bulgarian Danube, 13.
Romanian Danube, 14.
Siret-Prut and 15.
Delta-Liman.
28 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
climate regime.
Notice that the climate regimes of the Upper Danube, Inn and Delta-Liman regions remain unchanged in time where the first two are classified as humid and the latter as semi-arid.
Land use projections The future land use projections used in this study are modelled using the JRC LUISA territorial modelling platform (Batista e Silva et al., 2013; Lavalle et al., 2011).
LUISA translates socio-economic trends and policy scenarios into processes of territorial development.
Among other things, LUISA allocates (in space and time) population, economic activities and land use patterns which are constrained by biophysical suitability, policy targets, economic criteria and many other factors.
Except from the constraints, LUISA incorporates historical trends, current state and future projections in order to capture the complex interactions between human activities and their determinants.
The mechanisms to obtain land-use demands are described in Baranzelli et al.
(2014) and Jacobs-Crisioni et al.
(2017).
Key outputs of the LUISA platform are fine resolution maps (100 m) of accessibility, population densities and land-use patterns covering all EU28 member states expanded with Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro until 2050.
CORINE land use maps (Büttner and Kosztra, 2007) are used to cover the rest of the DRB.
Although LISFLOOD normally operates on a substantially coarser resolution, the details of the LUISA output will remain for a large part due to the use of sub-grid fractions in LISFLOOD as explained in the ‘Hydrological model’ section.
For a complete description of the LUISA modelling platform and its underlying mechanics we refer to (Batista e Silva et al., 2013; Lavalle et al., 2011).
Figure 2 shows an example of projected changes of forest and urban land use classes based on the LUISA platform and used as input for LISFLOOD.
In general, an increase of the forested area is projected for the DRB (3%; Fig.
2a,c) with the most increase in the upstream regions and the Bulgarian Danube.
The only regions without change in forested area are the Middle Danube, Great Morava and the Delta-Liman region.
On average, all the selected regions show an increase in urban land use with the most pronounced increase in the Inn catchment (24%) due to the urbanization in South Germany (Fig.
2b,d).
Minor or no changes are projected for the rural areas (Fig.
2b).
Water demand projections Water demand in LISFLOOD consist of five components from which the irrigation water demand is estimated dynamically within the model as it is driven by climate conditions.
The irrigation water demand with a distinction in simulation methods for crop irrigation and paddy rice irrigation is described in Bisselink et al.
(2018).
The other four external sectoral components are (manufacturing) industrial water demand, water demand for energy and cooling, livestock water demand and domestic water demand.
In general, water use estimated for these four sectors are derived from mainly countrylevel data (EUROSTAT, AQUASTAT) with different modelling and downscaling techniques as described in Vandecasteele et al.
(2014).
Output of the LUISA Fig 2 a) Projected change (%) in a) forest fraction, and b) urban fraction between 2010 and 2050.
Barplot of area-averaged fractions (-) for c) forest and d) urban area for 2010 and 2050 for the selected regions in the DRB.
The grey numbers above the bars indicate the projected change (%) between 2010 and 2050.
Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
29 platform is used for the spatial downscaling of both present and future water use trends to ensure consistency between land use, population and water demand.
A brief description of each sectoral component is given below.
Livestock water withdrawals are estimated by combining water requirements from literature with livestock density maps for cattle, pigs, poultry, sheep and goats.
The methods are described in detail by Mubareka et al.
(2013).
For the energy and cooling demand, national water use statistics are downscaled to the locations of large power thermal power stations registered in the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register data base (EPRTR).
Subsequently, the temporal trend of energy water use is simulated based on electricity consumption projections from the POLES model (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems).
Industrial water demands are based on country-level figures from national statistics offices for the total water use by manufacturing industries, mining and construction.
Future industrial water use trends are simulated based on Gross Value Added (GVA) projections from the GEM-E3 model to represent industrial activity and an efficiency factor to represent improving water efficiency due to technical developments (Bernhard et al., 2018a).
Since the GEM-E3 model only provide projections for the EU28, industrial water use projections are assumed constant for countries outside EU28.
Water demands for the household sector are derived from a specific household water usage module (Bernhard et al., 2018b) which simulates water use per capita based on socio-economic, demographic and climate variables.
This model was based on collected data at NUTS-3 from 2000-2013 for all EU28 countries on household water use, water price, income, age distribution and number of dry days per year.
Subsequently, regression models were fitted to quantify relationships between water use, water price and the other relevant variables for four European clusters of NUTS-3 regions with similar socio-economic and climate conditions.
Socio-economic, demographic and climate projections are used to estimate future domestic water use per capita.
The future projections of both the industrial and domestic water demand are calculated every 5 years until 2050.
For the years in between the 5yr-window a linear growth is assumed.
Figure 3 shows a map of the projected change in total water demand between 2010 and 2050 for all water usages excluding (irrigated) agriculture.
The total water demand is increasing between 2010 and 2050 in the DRB (Fig.
3a) with the largest relative change in the Romanian Danube.
The largest absolute water demand change is observed in the Pannonian Danube (Fig.
3b) following the urban land use change with expanding cities like Vienna and Budapest (Fig.
2d).
The water demand for energy and cooling is the largest contributor to the water demand change.
Population projections Population projections are based on EUROSTAT and are constraints for the LUISA model (Batista e Silva et al., 2013).
In Figure 4 the population change between 2010 and 2050 is presented.
The population is increasing in urban areas in the northwestern part and decreasing in the more rural eastern and southeastern part of the DRB (Fig.
4a).
Overall, the population in the entire DRB is decreasing with 6% with the largest relative decrease in the Bulgarian Danube (Fig.
4b).
The Pannonian Danube is one of the few regions with a future population growth (14%) resulting in an increase in both urban areas (Fig.
2d) and water demand (Fig 3b).
RESULTS Changes in water scarcity To estimate future changes in water scarcity we used here the WEI+ indicator (Faergemann, 2012), which is defined as the ratio of the total water net consumption divided by the freshwater resources of a region, including upstream inflowing water.
WEI+ values have a range between 0 and 1, with values between 0-0.1 denote “low WS”, “moderate Fig 3 a) Projected change (%) of aggregated total water demand (livestock, energy production and cooling, industry, households and public sector) between 2010 and 2050, and b) barplot of area-averaged aggregated total water demand (mm/day) for 2010 and 2050 for the selected regions in the DRB.
The grey numbers above the bars indicate the projected change of the aggregated total water demand (%) between 2010 and 2050.
30 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
WS” if the ratio lies in the range 0.1-0.2, “WS” when this ratio is in the range of 0.2-0.4, and “severe WS” if the ratio exceeds the 0.4 threshold.
First we consider the spatial pattern of the change in water scarcity days in a year for the 2oC warming period relative to present climate under RCP8.5 (Fig.
5).
The DRB can be divided in three categories: 1.
Regions which shift towards less water scarcity days in a year (i.e.
increase in ‘low WS’ and decrease in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’) or remain unchanged: Upper Danube, Inn, Austrian Danube, Morava, Drava, Sava and Delta-Liman.
2.
Regions which shift towards an increase in water scarcity days (i.e.
decrease in ‘low WS’ and increase in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’): Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube and Romanian Danube.
3.
Regions including both water regions shifting towards less water scarcity days and water regions shifting towards an increase in water scarcity days (for e.g., the water region of a city): Vah-Hron-Ipel, Pannonian Danube, Tisza, Middle Danube and Siret Prut.
The most important change towards the end of the century (2061-2090) is that more regions are shifting towards an increase of water scarcity days with in the central part of the DRB (Vah-Hron-Ipel, Pannonian Danube and Sava) a shift from ‘low WS’ to ‘moderate WS’ and even a more pronounced shift in the Tisza, Middle Danube and Siret-Prut with an increase in ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’ days.
In the Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube and Romanian Danube the water scarcity days are exacerbating.
Population affected Next, we put the water scarcity projections into a societal perspective to estimate how many people will be living in areas with ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’ for at least 1 month within present climate, 2oC warming or 2061-2090 period.
Figure 6 presents barplots of the individual regions with the number of people living for at least 1 month/30yr in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’ areas.
The simulated ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’ areas are overlaid with the population of the year 2010 and the projections of 2050 to quantify the contributions of solely the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change (green dashed line) and the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change together with population change (grey bar) respectively.
The decrease or increase of the number of people living in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’ areas is not due to the population change if the grey bar and the green dashed line are at an equal population level.
Note that, the number of people living for at least 1 month/30yr in ‘low WS’ areas is 100% for all regions and therefore this category is excluded.
Moreover, the people living in the regions Upper Danube, Inn, Austrian Danube and Drava are never exposed to ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’ longer than 1 month/30yr and therefore these regions are excluded.
The projections for the 2oC warming period in the DRB (Fig.
6a) show a decrease of people living in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’ areas compared to present climate due to the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change together with population change.
In general, the result of the DRB is also representative for the regions Vah-Hron-Ipel, Pannonian Danube, Tisza, Middle Danube, Great Morava and Siret-Prut (Figs.
6c,d,f,g,h,k).
For the regions Morava, Sava and Delta-Liman (Figs 6b,e,l) the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change is the only driver for the reduction of people living in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’ areas, while the decrease of the people living in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’ areas in the Romanian and Bulgarian Danube is almost solely due to the population change (Fig.
6i,j).
Water scarcity is increasing in these regions as seen in the previous section but the people living in water scarce areas is decreasing which indicates that the areas affected by water scarcity are not growing.
The areas which already experience water scarcity are projected to become more water scarce resulting in an equal or decrease in the number of people living in water scarce areas.
Fig 4 a) Projected change (%) in population between 2010 and 2050, and b) barplot of area-averaged population for 2010 and 2050 for the selected regions in the DRB per 25 km2 grid.
The grey numbers above the bars indicate the projected change (%) between 2010 and 2050.
Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
31 For the 2061-2090 warming period, the water scarce areas in the DRB are expanding (see Fig.
5) and therefore an increase in people living in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’ areas is projected relative to the 2oC warming period (Fig.
6a).
Compared to present climate, the number of people living in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’ areas are more or less equal again when only the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change is considered but are still decreasing with the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change together with population change (Fig.
6a).
In more detail, this trend is also observed in a number of regions like: Tisza, Middle Danube, Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube, Romanian Danube and Siret-Prut (Fig.
6f,g,h,i,j,k).
All these regions are projected to become just as or more water scarce in future in comparison to present climate but due to population change less people will be exposed to ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ and ‘severe WS’.
In the Sava region (Fig.
6e) the people living in both ‘moderate WS’ and ‘WS’ areas are increasing compared to present climate and 2oC warming period due to the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change.
In the Morava, Vah-Hron-Ipel, Pannonian Danube and Delta-Liman region (Fig.
6b,c,d,l) the people living in ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’ areas remain unchanged or decreases compared to present climate due to land use, water demand and climate change only (Morava and Delta-Liman) or due to land use, water demand and climate change together with population change (Vah-Hron-Ipel, Pannonian Danube).
Fig 5 Projected change in days per year with ‘low WS’ (a,b), ‘moderate WS’ (c,d), ‘WS’ (e,f), and ‘severe WS’ (g,h) of the ensemble mean of the 2oC period (left panels) and 2061-2090 (right panels) relative to present climate (1981-2010).
Grid cells within the DRB where not all models agree in the sign of change are greyed out.
We consider the result valid if at least 7 out of 11 models agree in the sign of change (positive or negative).
32 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
Impact of land use, water demand and climate change The model simulations we performed in this study are an integrated assessment of land use, water demand and climate change (see section ‘Methodology’).
However, water resources can be considerable affected by the combined or isolated effect of land use, water demand and climate changes.
Here, we attempt to quantify both the combined and isolated impact of land use, water demand and climate changes on the June-July-August (JJA) WEI+ by performing different combinations of simulations with/without land use or water demand together with climate changes.
In Figure 7, the relative change between the JJA WEI+ of the ensemble mean of the 2oC warming period and present climate (1981-2010) is presented.
The combined effect of land use, water demand and climate changes (Fig.
7a) on the JJA WEI+ show a decrease for water regions in the Morava, Tisza and Middle Danube, and an increase in the Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube, Romanian Danube and Siret-Prut.
The most dominant impact on the JJA WEI+ change is climate change (Fig.
7b), but the land use (Fig.
7c) and water demand change (Fig.
7d) also contribute considerably in some water regions.
In general, land use change has a negative effect while the water demand change has a positive effect on the JJA WEI+ change.
For a more detailed illustration of Fig 6 Barplot of population (in millions) located within water regions which have at least 1 month in the 30 year warming periods with ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’ for the selected regions with and without taken the future population change (green dashed line) into account.
Population data for 2010 is used for reference and 2050 for future projections.
Error bars represent the ensemble standard deviation.
Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
33 this effect, the JJA WEI+ change and the isolated effect of land use, water demand and climate changes are presented in a barplot for the Tisza and the Romanian Danube (Fig.
7e).
In the Romanian Danube an increase in JJA WEI+ between present climate and the 2oC warming period is observed due to climate change amplified by water demand change, while the land use change alleviates the increase of JJA WEI+.
In contrast, in the situation where the JJA WEI+ is decreasing, like in the Tisza, the land use change is amplifying the decrease, while the water demand suppress this effect.
Uncertainties Model studies with LISFLOOD, and modelling studies in general, go hand-in-hand with uncertainties.
They are inextricable mainly caused by model structure or model parameterization due to for e.g.
different precipitation sources (Bisselink et al., 2016).
It becomes a major challenge when assessing the combined or isolated impacts of land use, water demand and climate change on water resources.
The climate projections are accompanied by large uncertainties due to varying but plausible estimates of future warming.
As the DRB is in a transition zone between a wetter and drier future climate, the models even disagree in the sign of change.
Therefore, multiple climate projections are used to give us, at least, an estimate of the uncertainty.
Unfortunately, a similar approach is not available for land use, population and water demand change.
Overall, the uncertainty in land use, population, water demand and climate projections together with hydrological model parameterizations introduces considerable variability into the resulting projections of water scarcity.
For this reason, the impact estimates of water scarcity and people exposed should be taken as an indication to which direction future scenarios evolves.
SYNTHESIS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION In this study, we performed a state-of-the-art integrated model assessment including projections of land use, water demand and climate change to assess changes in water scarcity in the DRB under global warming.
With the population projections we were able to estimate people exposed to low water scarcity (‘low WS’), ‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’.
Moreover, different combinations of simulations with and/or without land use or water demand together with climate change allowed us to isolate the effect of land use, water demand and climate change in relation to water scarcity.
Changes in precipitation and potential evapotranspiration according to the mean of 11 climate projections reveal that semi-arid regions in both the 2oC warming period (+1.4%) and 2061-2090 period (+4.5%) are increasing in the DRB due to spatial expansion in the southeast part of the catchment.
In the northwestern part Fig 7 Projected relative change (%) between the JJA WEI+ of the ensemble mean of the 2oC warming period and present climate (1981-2010) from simulations including a) climate change, land use and water demand change, b) climate change only and the isolated effect of c) land use change and d) water demand change.
Only water regions with an average WEI+ larger than 0.1 in present climate are selected e) Barplot of the contributions (%) of climate change, land use change and water demand change to the total change for present climate (1981-2010) and 2oC warming period including standard deviations for the selected regions.
34 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
we find a slight increase towards a more humid climate.
These northwest to southeast gradient is in good agreement with the recently updated report of the ICPDR (ICPDR, 2018) and, in general, with the assessment of the change in water scarcity days.
However, direct intercomparisons of projected water scarcity changes with other studies is not straightforward as, to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to integrate land use, water demand and climate change for future projections in the DRB.
People living in the DRB experience both increases and decreases in water scarcity in the future.
Overall, this results in less people exposed to water scarcity (‘moderate WS’, ‘WS’ or ‘severe WS’) at the 2oC warming period, and more people towards the end of the century (20612090) when considering solely the combined effects of land use, water demand and climate change (i.e.
population change excluded).
In the ‘real world’ including population change even less people are getting exposed to water scarcity but not evenly distributed.
The population is decreasing in the regions experiencing an increase in water scarcity while population is increasing in regions with a water scarcity decrease.
The Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube and Romanian Danube show a clear tendency towards an increase in water scarcity days between present climate and the 2oC warming period.
However, this result is not reflected in the number of people exposed to water scarcity solely due to the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change (i.e.
population change excluded).
So, although the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change may not create new water scarcity areas, it may exacerbate water scarcity.
Towards the end of the century (2061-2090), the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change is creating new water scarcity areas which is reflected in the increase of population exposed to water scarcity at an equal or higher number compared to present climate again.
Opposite patterns, where the number of people exposed to water scarcity is stable or decreasing solely due to the combined effects of land use, water demand and climate change and not by population change, are observed for the Upper Danube, Inn, Austrian Danube, Morava, Drava, Sava and Delta-Liman regions for both the 2oC warming period and 2061-2090 period.
In other regions, the projected water scarcity changes are very heterogeneous with areas with increasing and decreasing water scarcity in the same region.
In the regions of Pannonian Danube and Vah-Hron-Ipel the change in people exposed to water scarcity is decreasing between present climate and the 2oC warming period and remains rather stable towards the end of the century.
Water scarcity and the people affected in the regions Tisza, Middle Danube and Siret-Prut is decreasing due to the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change together with population change at the 2oC warming period.
At 2061-2090, the exposure to water scarcity is steeply increasing due to the combined effect of land use, water demand and climate change.
The isolated effect of land use, water demand and climate change proved that climate change is the most dominant driver for the water scarcity change.
In JuneJuly-August the water demand is also an important contributor for the change followed by the land use change.
However, in other seasons the contribution of the water demand change is probably lower compared to the land use change.
Anyhow, the growing water demand, mainly due to increase in energy use and subsequent cooling water usage, obviously puts pressure on the water supply resulting in amplifying water scarcity.
Regions with increasing water scarcity exposure could mitigate towards renewable forms of energy production (solar) which might reduce the water needed for cooling and dampens the water scarcity increase.
Changes in hydrological cycle due to land use change are both positive and negative.
Urban areas with more impervious surfaces upstream or in the water regions increase direct runoff towards the rivers, and hence the total volume of runoff in a water region resulting in tempering the water scarcity exposure, but may simultaneously decrease groundwater recharge, which is not included in the definition of the WEI+.
Although, population decrease ensures that less people are exposed to water scarcity, several sectors requiring water, such as rainfed and irrigated agriculture must adapt to reduced water availability at the risk of production loss or land degradation.
These adaptation challenges are already needed in the short term for the Great Morava, Bulgarian Danube and Romanian Danube and in the long term also in the Tisza, Middle Danube and Siret-Prut.
The results obtained in this study showed that the complex interactions between land use, water demand and climate change requires an integrated model framework especially in combination with mitigation and adaptation measures involving several economic sectors.
Further development in this direction is needed to tackle complex issues about water resources allocation and water scarcity problems.
Acknowledgments We thank the climate modelling groups of the EUROCORDEX initiative for producing and making their model output available.
Within JRC, we gratefully thank A. Dosio for the bias-adjusting of the EURO-CORDEX precipitation and temperature, and the LUISA modelling group for providing land use projections.
References Alcamo, J., Flörke, M., Märker, M. 2007.
Future long-term changes in global water resources driven by socioeconomic and climatic changes.
Hydrolog.
Sci.
J.
52, 247–275.
DOI: 10.1623/hysj.52.2.247.
Alfieri, L., Burek, P., Dutra, E., Krzeminski, B., Muraro, D., Thielen, J., and Pappenberger, F. 2013.
GloFAS – global ensemble streamflow forecasting and flood early warning, Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
17, 1161–1175.
DOI: 10.5194/hess-17-1161-2013.
Alfieri, L., Burek, P., Feyen, L., Forzieri, G. 2015.
Global warming increases the frequency of river floods in Europe.
Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
19, 2247–2260.
DOI: 10.5194/hessd-12-1119-2015.
Alfieri, L., Bisselink, B., Dottori, F., Naumann, G., de Roo, A., Salamon, P., et al.
2017.
Global projections of river flood risk in a warmer world.
Earths Future 5(2), 171–182.
DOI: 10.1002/2016ef000485 Arnell, N. W., van Vuuren, D. P., Isaac, M. 2011.
The implications of climate policy for the impacts of climate change on global water resources.
Glob.
Environ.
Change 21, 592–603.
DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.01.015 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
35 Arnell, N. W., et al.
2013.
A global assessment of the effects of climate policy on the impacts of climate change.
Nat.
Clim.
Change 3, 512–519.
DOI: 10.1038/nclimate1793 Arnell, N. W., Lloyd-Hughes, B.
2014.
The global-scale impacts of climate change on water resources and flooding under new climate and socio-economic scenarios.
Clim.
Change 122, 127– 140.
DOI: 10.1007/s10584-013-0948-4 Baranzelli, C., et al.
2014.
The reference scenario in the LUISA platform – Updated configuration 2014 towards a common baseline scenario for EC impact assessment procedures.
Report EUR 27019 EN, Luxembourg: Publications office of the EU.
Bartholy, J., Pongrácz, R., Pieczka, I.
2014.
How the climate will change in this century?
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63, 55–67.
DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.63.1.5 Batista e Silva, F., Gallego, J., Lavalle, C. 2013.
A high-resolution population grid map for Europe, J.
Maps 9, 16–28, DOI: 10.1080/17445647.2013.764830.
Beniston, M. 2004.
The 2003 heatwave in Europe: A shape of things to come?
An analysis based on Swiss climatological data and model simulations.
Geophys.
Res.
Lett.
31, 2022–2026.
DOI: 10.1029/2003gl018857 Bernhard, J., Reynaud, A., De Roo, A., Karssenberg, D., De Jong, S. 2018a.
Household water use in Europe at regional scale: analysis of trends and quantification of main drivers, Under review.
Bernhard, J., Reynaud, A., De Roo, A., Karssenberg, D., De Jong, S. 2018b.
Mapping industrial water use and water productivity levels in Europe at high sectoral and spatial detail, Under review.
Bisselink, B., Zambrano-Bigiarini, M., Burek, P., de Roo, A.
2016.
Assessing the role of uncertain precipitation estimates on the robustness of hydrological model parameters under highly variable climate conditions.
J. Hydrol.
Reg.
Stud.
8, 112–129, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejrh.2016.09.003.
Bisselink, B., Bernhard, J., Gelati, E., Adamovic, M., Jacobs, C., Mentaschi, L., Lavalle, C., De Roo, A.
2018.
Impact of a changing climate, land use, and water usage on water resources in the Danube river basin, EUR 29228 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, ISBN 978-92-79-85888-8, DOI: 10.2760/561327, JRC111817.
Burek, P., De Roo, A., van der Knijff, J.
2013.
LISFLOOD – Distributed Water Balance and Flood Simulation Model Revised User Manual.
EUR 26162 10/2013; Publications Office of the European Union.
Directorate-General Joint Research Centre, Institute for Environment and Sustainability, ISBN: 978-92-7933190-9.
Büttner G, Kosztra B.
2007.
CLC2006 Technical guidelines.
Technical Report No.
17 / 2007.
EEA.
Available from http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/technical_report_2007_17.
De Roo, A. P. J., Wesseling, C. G., Van Deursen, W.P.A.
2000.
Physically-based river basin modelling within a GIS: The LISFLOOD model.
Hydrological Processes 14, 1981–1992.
DOI:10.1002/1099-1085(20000815/30)14:11/12<1981::AIDHY P49>3.0.CO;2-F Dosio, A., Paruolo, P., Rojas, R. 2012.
Bias correction of the ENSEMBLES high resolution climate change projections for use by impact models: Analysis of the climate change signal, Journal of Geophysical Research D: Atmospheres 117(17).
DOI: 10.1029/2012JD017968.
Dottori, F., Kalas, M., Salamon, P., Bianchi, A., Alfieri, L., Feyen, L. 2017.
An operational procedure for rapid flood risk assessment in Europe.
Nat.
Hazards Earth Syst.
Sci.
17, 1111–1126.
DOI:10.5194/nhess-17-1111-2017.
Emerton, R., Zsoter, E., Arnal, L., Cloke, H. L., Muraro, D., Prudhomme, C., Stephens, E. M., Salamon, P., Pappenberger, F.2018.
Developing a global operational seasonal hydrometeorological forecasting system: GloFAS-Seasonal v1.0.
Geosci.
Model Dev.
11, 3327–3346.
DOI: 10.5194/gmd-11-33272018.
Faergemann, H. 2012.
Update on water scarcity and droughts indicator development (EEA – European Environmental Agency).
Farinosi, F., Giupponi, C., Reynaud, A., Ceccherini, G., CarmonaMoreno, C., De Roo, A., Gonzalez-Sanchez, D., Bidoglio, G. 2018.
An innovative approach to the assessment of hydropolitical risk: A spatially explicit, data driven indicator of hydropolitical issues, Global Environmental Change, 52, 286– 313.
DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.07.001.
Forzieri, G., Feyen, L., Rojas, R., et al.
2014.
Ensemble projections of future streamflow droughts in Europe.
Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
18, 85–108.
DOI: 10.5194/hess-18-85-2014.
Forzieri, G., Feyen, L., Russo, S., Vousdoukas, M., Alfieri, L., Outten, S., Migliavacca, M., Bianchi, A., Rojas, R., Cid, A.
2016.
Multihazard assessment in Europe under climate change.
Clim Change 137, 105–119.
DOI: 10.1007/s10584-016-1661-x.
Gosling, S. N., Arnell, N. W. 2013.
A global assessment of the impact of climate change on water scarcity.
Clim.
Change 1–15.
DOI: 10.1007/s10584-013-0853-x Haddeland, I., et al.
2014.
Global water resources affected by human interventions and climate change.
Proc.
Natl Acad.
Sci.
USA 111, 3251–3256.
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1222475110 Hanasaki, N., et al.
2013.
A global water scarcity assessment under shared socio-economic pathways: 2.
Water availability and scarcity.
Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
17, 2393–413.
DOI: 10.5194/hess-17-2393-2013 Hlásny, T., Trombik, J., Dobor, L., Barcza, Z., Barka, I.
2016.
Future climate of the Carpathians.
Reg.
Environ.
Change 16, 1495–1506.
DOI: 10.1007/s10113-015-0890-2 ICPDR, 2013.
ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change.
42 p. ICPDR, 2015.
The Danube River Basin District Management Plan.
Part A-Basin-wide Overview.
Update 2015.
164 p. ICPDR, 2018.
Danube River Basin Climate Change Adaptation.
Revision and Update of the Danube Study.
115 p. Jacob, D., et al.
2014.
EURO-CORDEX: new high-resolution climate change projections for European impact research.
Reg.
Environ.Change 14, 563–578.
DOI:10.1007/s10113-013-0499-2.
Jacobs-Crisioni, C., Diogo, V., Perpiña Castillo, C., Baranzelli, C., Batista e Silva, F., Rosina, K., Kavalov, B., Lavalle, C. 2017.
TheLUISA Territorial Reference Scenario 2017: A technical description, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Karabulut, A., Egoh, B. N., Lanzanova, D., Grizzetti, B., Bidoglio, G., Pagliero, L., Bouraoui, F., Aloe, A., Reynaud, A., Meas, J., Vandecasteele, I., Mubarek, S. 2016.
Mapping water provisioning services to support the ecosystem-water-food-energy nexus in the Danube River Basin.
Ecosyst.
Serv.
17, 278–292.
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.08.002 Kiguchi, M., Shen, Y., Kanae, S., Oki, T. 2015.
Reevaluation of future water stress due to socio-economic and climate factors under a warming climate.
Hydrol.
Sci.
J.
60, 14–29.
DOI: 10.1080/02626667.2014.888067 Laaha, G., Parajka, J., Viglione, A., Koffler, D., Haslinger, K., Schöner, W., Zehetgruber, J., et al.
2016.
A three-pillar approach to assessing climate impacts on low flows.
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 20, 3967.
DOI: 10.5194/hess-20-3967-2016 Lavalle, C., Baranzelli, C., Batista e Silva, F., Mubareka, S., Rocha Gomes, C., Koomen, E., Hilferink, M. 2011.
A high resolution land use/cover modelling framework for Europe.
In: ICCSA 2011, Part I, LNCS 6782, 60–75.
Lehner, B., Döll, P., Alcamo, J., Henrichs, T., Kaspar, F. 2006.
Estimating the Impact of Global Change on Flood and Drought Risks in Europe: A Continental, Integrated Analysis.
Climatic Change 75, 273–299, DOI:10.1007/s10584-006-6338-4.
Malagó, A., Bouraoui, F., Vigiak, O., Grizetti, B., Pastori, M. 2017 Modelling water and nutrient fluxes in the Danube River Basin.
Science of The Total Environment 603–604, 196–218.
DOI: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.05.242 Moss, R., et al.
2010.
The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment, Nature 463, 747–756.
DOI: 10.1038/nature08823 Mubareka, S., Maes, J., Lavalle, C., De Roo, A.
2013.
Estimation of water requirements by livestock in Europe.
Ecosyst.
Serv.
4, 139– 145.
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.03.001 Pieczka, I., Pongrácz, R., Bartholy, J.
2011.
Comparison of Simulated Trends of Regional Climate Change in the Carpathian Basin for the 21st Century Using Three Different Emission Scenarios.
Acta Silvatica et Lignaria Hungarica 7, 9–22.
Prudhomme, C., et al.
2014.
Hydrological droughts in the 21st century, hotspots and uncertainties from a global multimodel ensemble experiment.
Proc.
Natl Acad.
Sci.
USA 111, 3262–3267.
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1222473110 Riahi, K., Rao, S., Krey, V., Cho, C., Chirkov, V., Fischer, G., Kindermann, G., Nakicenovic, N., Rafai, P. 2011.
RCP 8.5—A scenario of comparatively high greenhouse gas emissions.
Climatic Change 109, 33–57, DOI:10.1007/s10584-011-0149-y.
Schewe, J., et al.
2014.
Multimodel assessment of water scarcity under climate change Proc.
Natl Acad.
Sci.
USA 111, 3245–3250.
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1222460110 36 Bisselink et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 25–36.
Schlosser, C. A., Strzepek, K., Gao, X., Fant, C., Blanc, E., Paltsev, S., Jacoby, H., Reily, J.
2014.
The future of global water stress: an integrated assessment.
Earth’s Future 2, 341–361.
DOI: 10.1002/2014ef000238 Sperna Weiland, F. C., van Beek, L. P. H., Kwadijk, J. C. J., Bierkens, M. F. P. 2012.
Global patterns of change in discharge regimes for 2100.
Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
16, 1047–1062.
DOI:10.5194/hess16-1047-2012.
Stagl, J.C., Hattermann, F.F.
2015.
Impacts of climate change on the hydrological regime of the Danube River and its tributaries using an ensemble of climate scenarios.
Water 7, 6139–6172.
DOI: 10.3390/w7116139 Stahl, K. 2001.
Hydrological Drought – a Study across Europe, PhD thesis, Freiburger Schriften zur hydrologie (No.
15), Institut fur Hydrologies, Universitat Freiburg, Freiburg.
Thiemig, V., Bisselink, B., Pappenberger, F., Thielen, J.
2015.
A panAfrican medium-range ensemble flood forecast system.
Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
19, 3365–3385.
DOI: 10.5194/hess-193365-2015.
Vandecasteele, I., Bianchi, A., Batista e Silva, F., Lavalle, C., Batelaan, O.
2014.
Mapping current and future European public water withdrawals and consumption.
Hydrol.
Earth Syst.
Sci.
18, 407– 416.
DOI:10.5194/hess-18-407-2014.
van der Knijff J.M., Younis, J., De Roo, A.P.J.
2010.
LISFLOOD: A GIS-based distributed model for river-basin scale water balance and flood simulation, International Journal of Geographical Information Science 24(2), 189–212.
DOI: 10.1080/13658810802549154 van Vliet, M. T. H., Franssen, W. H. P., Yearsley, J. R., Ludwig, F., Haddeland, I., Lettenmaier, D. P., Kabat, P. 2013.
Global river discharge and water temperature under climate change.
Glob.
Environ.
Change 23, 450–464.
DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.11.002 Vörösmarty, C. J., Green, P., Salisbury, J., Lammers, R. B.
2000.
Global Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and Population Growth.
Science 289, 284–288, DOI:10.1126/science.289.5477.284.
Wada, Y., Gleeson, T., Esnault, L. 2014.
Wedge approach to water stress.
Nat.
Geosci.
7, 615–617.
DOI: 10.1038/ngeo224 INTRODUCTION METHODOLOGY Hydrological model Climate projections Land use projections Water demand projections Population projections RESULTS Changes in water scarcity Population affected Impact of land use, water demand and climate change Uncertainties SYNTHESIS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION Acknowledgments References
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE WATER RESOURCES IN THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN AND POSSIBILITIES TO ADAPT – THE WAY TO AN ADAPTATION STRATEGY AND ITS UPDATE Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
DOI: 10.2478/jengeo-2018-0009 ISSN 2060-467X CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE WATER RESOURCES IN THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN AND POSSIBILITIES TO ADAPT – THE WAY TO AN ADAPTATION STRATEGY AND ITS UPDATE Roswitha Stolz1, Monika Prasch2, Michael Weber1*, Franziska Koch3, Ruth Weidinger1, Manuel Ebner1, Wolfram Mauser1 1Department of Geography, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU), Luisenstrasse 37, D-80333 Munich, Germany 2Central Department of Information and Knowledge Management, Bavarian State Research Center for Agriculture, Vöttinger Straße 38, 85354 Freising-Weihenstephan, Germany 3Institute of Water Management, Hydrology and Hydraulic Engineering, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Muthgasse 18, 1190 Wien, Austria *Corresponding author, e-mail: m.weber@iggf.geo.uni-muenchen.de Research article, received 14 September 2018, accepted 31 October 2018 Abstract As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in 2013, climate change will have significant impacts on all water sectors.
Since water is essential for live, culture, economy and ecosystems, climate change adaptation is crucial.
Therefore, a legal and political framework was established by the commissions of the European Union, the United Nations and on national levels.
For the Danube River Basin (DRB), the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River got the mandate to develop an adaptation strategy in 2012 and to update this strategy in 2018.
The natural science basis on which the adaptation strategy and its update are based on are two studies, conducted in 2011/2012 and updated and revised in 2017/18.
Numerous documents from actual research and development projects and studies dealing with climate change and its impacts on water related issues were analysed in detail and the results summarised.
It is agreed that temperature will increase basin-wide.
The precipitation trend shows a strong northwest-southeast gradient and significant changes in seasonality.
Runoff patterns will change and extreme weather events will intensify.
However, the magnitude of the results shows a strong spatial variability due to the heterogeneity of the DRB., It is assessed that these changes will have mostly negative impacts on all water related sectors.
Based on the scientific findings an approach for an improved basin-wide strategy on adaptation to climate change is developed.
It includes guiding principles and five categories of adaptation measures targeting different objectives.
Keywords: Climate Change, adaptation strategy, Danube River Basin, water sector INTRODUCTION Climate change will have various impacts on ecosystems and consequently on human life (IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2013).
Impacts on water will cause changes in water availability, water temperature, water quality and in extreme hydrological events like floods and droughts and accordingly trigger changes in all water related areas (IPCC, 2013).
Thus, adaptation to these changes will become one of the major challenges of the 21st century in river basins.
In order to be prepared for possible consequences of climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) asks Parties of the Kyoto Protocol to develop implement and regularly update programmes of measures for climate change adaptation on a national and regional level (United Nations, 1998).
Several European and UN directives and guidelines are explaining the necessity of adaptation to climate change and are supporting the development of strategies (EEA, 2017; EC, 2009; UNECE, 2009).
Moreover, the EU water framework directive (WFD) requires an integrated river basin management across administrative or political boundaries and demands to consider possible climate change impacts.
Nevertheless, adaptation strategies for the large river basins in Europe hardly existed until 2012.
Therefore, a programme of pilot projects and a platform for exchanging experience was established to foster the implementation of transboundary adaptation activities in river basins.
For the Danube as Europe’s second largest River basin, in December 2012 the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) adopted the Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change (ICPDR, 2013), being the first large river basin with a climate change adaptation strategy.
An update will be finished by beginning of 2019.
On the way to the ICPDR strategy and its update, one objective is to develop a comprehensive scientific knowledge base that gives an overview of future climate change and its impact in the DRB.
To achieve this, a total of 89 and 73, respectively, research and development projects, studies and scientific papers were analysed.
This revealed significant, regionally varying changes in all water related sectors.
The second objective is to compile a catalogue of adaptation measures suitable for the DRB to meet the challenges of climate change.
Basis for this catalogue was the analysis of already existing climate change adaptation strategies as well as close collaboration with stakeholders from the riverine countries, environmental organisations and water dependant industries.
Five groups of measures were identified: 14 Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
preparation measures, ecosystem based measures, behavioural and managerial measures technological measures and policy approaches.
The catalogue of measures is made available as a user friendly online tool.
The stakeholder dialogue and the analysis of adaptation activities such as National Adaptation Strategies pointed out communalities, options for cooperation and challenges among the countries of the DRB, which need to be further taken into consideration.
To make the studies comparable, the same methods (data acquisition, uncertainty assessment) were used.
The methodology of the studies and the integration of the results in the ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change and its update are content of this publication.
THE STUDY AREA: THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN The Danube is Europe’s second largest river with a length of 2,857 km from its source in south-western Germany to its delta at the Black Sea in Romania and the Ukraine and can be divided into the Upper Danube River Basin (UDRB) until the gauge Bratislava in Slovakia, the Middle Danube River basin (MDRB) until the Iron Gate at the border between Serbia and Romania, and the Lower Danube River basin (LDRB) from the Iron gate to its delta (Fig.
1).
The catchment has a total area of 801,500 km² and encompasses several mountain areas like parts of the Alps, the Carpathian Range and the Dinaric Mountains.
The climatic conditions range from temperate zones in the western parts to a continental climate with hot summers and cold winters in the central and eastern basin.
The southern and south-western parts are influenced by Mediterranean climatic conditions with warm, dry summers.
Furthermore, orographic conditions also determine the climate in the DRB.
Average temperature increases from the western parts to the eastern parts of the basin and reaches +12°C in the lowlands of the Sava River, whereas the coldest temperatures can be found on the mountain peaks in the Alps and the Carpathians.
Precipitation falls throughout the year and reaches a maximum in the summer months in almost all regions except the south-western parts with long dry periods during summer.
However, the amount of precipitation strongly varies in the basin between a minimum of 350 mm/a in the lowlands of the Black Sea and a maximum of 3,500 mm/a in the Alps.
The runoff characteristics change along the way through the riparian countries, determined by the passages through flat basins and mountain regions and the climatic conditions.
Close to its source in Western Germany, the Danube shows pluvial characteristics which are then altered by the inflow of the rivers from the Alps to a pluvio-nival runoff regime.
After the influence of the Inn, the Danube is dominated by snowmelt, changing the regime to a single-peak mountain-snow regime with a maximum in early summer.
After the inflow of rivers originating in the Carpathians with a snowmelt peak in spring, and due to the continental climatic conditions with drier summers, the runoff regime of the Danube shows a two-peak maximum from the Carpathian rivers (first) and the Alpine rivers (second), while the minimum in October is coincident.
The further inflows of Drava, Tisza and Sava result in a single maximum of the Danube in April and one minimum in October.
The regime characteristics of the Danube do not considerably change until the outflow in the Black Sea.
The mean average discharge of the Danube increases from approximately 2,000 m³/s in Bratislava, to approximately 5,500 m³/s at the Iron Gate and reaches finally approximately 6,500 m³/s at the Danube Delta, fed by the main tributaries of the rivers Inn, Drava, Tisza and Sava.
The DRB provides water resources for 83 million people in 19 countries (Fig.
1), which makes it the most international river basin in the world (ICPDR, 2014).
In this region, water is used in Fig.
1 Main regions of the Danube River Basin Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
15 various ways, ranging from agriculture to energy production and navigation.
Despite these important water use functions, the Danube River Basin is characterized by a wide range of different natural conditions, contains several highly valuable ecosystems, e.g.
the UNESCO World Heritage Site of the Danube Delta as the world’s largest wetland and provides habitats for over 2,000 plant species and 5,000 animal species (ICPDR, 2014).
DATA BASE AND ANALYSIS METHOD In the following the creation of the scientific knowledge base and the methods of assessing the regional impacts of climate change on water-related issues and adaptation activities in the Danube River Basin (DRB) are presented.
On this basis the ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change was developed.
There have been two project periods.
The initial Danube Study was conducted in 2011 and completed in 2012 (Prasch et al., 2012).
It provided a comprehensive overview on climate change impacts on the DRB and adaptation measures.
The Danube Study was revised and updated in 2018 (Stolz et al., 2018) due to significant developments in climate modelling and new scientific findings concerning the impacts on water related issues.
In this project phase only research and development projects, studies and adaptation activities which were conducted between 2012 and July 2017 were taken into account.
For means of comparability the same methodology of the analysis and zoning of the DRB were applied in both studies.
Only documents, reports and papers which have been published and are accessible through libraries or internet in English, German or French could have been taken into account.
Research and development projects In order to reach a common, basin-wide understanding of the scale and magnitude of climate change pressures and impacts on water resources, research and development projects and studies dealing with climate change in the DRB or parts of the basin were compiled by online search and participation in conferences and meetings.
For the initial Danube Study, 89 projects and studies were selected for the analysis.
A detailed list of them can be found in the Annex of the study (http://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/climatechange-adaptation).
For the update and revision of the Danube Study documents from 73 projects and studies, published between 2012 and 2017, were included (http://www.icpdr.org/main/resources/climate-changeadaptation-update-danube-study).
In a first step the spatial coverage, the present status of the project (ongoing or finalized), the studied time period and the applied methods are analysed.
Projects dealing with climate change impacts in the entire DRB were not available for the initial Danube Study, but the DRB is part of large investigation areas of 25 projects, mostly funded by the European Commission 5th, 6th and 7th framework programmes.
For the update and revision of the Danube Study only the study from Bisselink et al.
(2018) was available dealing with climate change and its impacts in the entire DRB.
Sub-regions or sub-catchments of the DRB are mainly covered by projects and regional studies which are funded either internationally by the Interreg programmes Alpine Space and CADSES (Central Adriatic Danubian South-Eastern European Space) as well as the South East Europe Transnational Cooperation Programme, several EU programmes, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), WWF (World Wildlife Fund) and the Worldbank, or nationally, in particular by Germany, Austria, Hungary and Romania.
To make statements about the impacts of climate change comparable the analysis of the used climate models and the modelling periods is of utmost importance.
In the analysed documents, mainly the time periods from 1961 to 1990 and from 1971 to 2000 were taken as reference period.
The modelled near-future periods vary significantly, but peaking for the period 2021-2050, whereas for the far-future period there is agreement to model the time span 2071-2100.
To assess the future development, models were run under scenario conditions, driven by Global and Regional Circulation Models (GCM resp.
RCM), so that the spatial resolution of the simulation results varied between 0.3 and 2° (50-150 km) (GCMs), and between 20 and 50 km (RCMs).
The IPCC SRES emission scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2 (Nakićenović and Swart, 2000) were chosen and applied as single runs, sometimes as ensemble runs.
Some studies applied different dynamical and statistical downscaling methods to analyse the impacts of climate change in a better resolution than provided by the GCMs or RCMs between 1 km and 10 km.
In the period from the initial Danube Study to its update the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (IPCC, 2013) were introduced by the IPCC to replace the SRES emission scenarios.
These RCPs were used by some studies which are analysed for the update of the Danube Study.
In a next step, the water related impact fields, which have been investigated by projects and studies were analysed.
Therefore, information on future trends of temperature and precipitation and meteorological extreme events were compiled, followed by possible effects on extreme hydrological events, on water availability and quality.
In addition, possible impacts on different types of water use and land use like water supply and demand, agriculture, irrigation, navigation, water related energy production and forestry have been considered.
And finally, impacts on biodiversity, ecosystems, soils/erosion, limnology and marine coastal zones in the field of ecology were composed.
For the analysis, the above described data are integrated in a database.
All findings were classified into statements about the entire DRB, the UDRB, the MDRB and the LDRB (Fig.
1).
Commonalities, contradictions and knowledge gaps were identified and finally, the uncertainty of future statements based on the analysed findings was assessed with a newly developed approach, which is presented and discussed in this paper.
Adaptation activities Similar to the analysis of climate change impacts on the DRB, all relevant information of ongoing, adopted and planned adaptation activities in the water sector in the DRB were compiled and integrated into the data base.
The 16 Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
national communications under the UNFCCC (5th or initial, 6th in the update of the study) and available National Adaptation Strategies provide an overview of the present and future impact of climate change and adaptation measures per country and at the EU level (UNFCCC, 2010; UNFCCC, 2014).
Additionally, conventions, directives or plans in relation to the EU WFD, relevant reports and further activities on the administrative level in relation to climate change impacts and adaptation activities are considered, i.e.
the EEA report (8/2009) “Regional Climate Change and Adaptation: The Alps facing the challenge of changing water resources” (EEA 2009) and EEA report (1/2017) ”Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016”.
A detailed list of all analysed documents can be found in the Annexes of the Danube Studies (http://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/climatechange-adaptation).
In the analysis of the adaptation activities the spatial coverage, the present status of the activity (ongoing or finalized), the possible impacts of climate change and the suggested or adopted adaptation measures are studied.
Most activities are limited to single countries.
National Communications under the UNFCCC are available for all countries of the DRB.
Almost all countries already adopted National Adaptation Strategies (NAS) or are preparing one as illustrated in Figure 2.
Conventions, declarations, guidances and programs mainly cover the entire DRB or larger parts of it.
The suggested or adopted adaptation measures of the activities are classified for different impact fields, analogously to the analysed impacts addressed in the analysed research and development projects.
Therefore, measures to adapt to changes in extreme hydrological events, water availability and quality, in different types of water use and land use like water supply and demand, agriculture with irrigation, navigation and water related energy production were considered.
Measures addressing biodiversity, ecosystems and marine coastal zones were composed in the field of ecology.
Additionally, general water related adaptation measures were also considered.
Furthermore, the suggested measures are classified into the categories preparation measures, general measures, ecosystem-based measures, behavioural/managerial measures, technological measures and policy approaches following the UNECE (2009) and the EEA (2010; 2017), despite a sharp separation between these categories is sometimes difficult.
In order to obtain the best possible overview over adaptation activities, the analysis was carried out in close collaboration with experts and stakeholders, e.g.
representatives from State Ministries for the Environment, for Hydrology and Water Management or for Regional Studies, from NGOs such as WWF, Global Water Partnership, Danube Environment Forum, and Water Research Centres and Institutes, from the DRB.
Therefore, the (preliminary) study results were discussed during meetings, workshops and conferences.
Uncertainty assessment Projections of future climate change and its impact are always associated with uncertainties (Vetter et al., 2017; Latif, 2011; Deser et al., 2010; Hodson et al., 2012).
In order to draw the right conclusions from projections of future climate change for the development of adaptation strategies, it is important to assess the uncertainty of statements from numerous studies which content different methods, areas and time periods.
No method exists how to compare the different degrees of certainty or uncertainty in statements.
A new and pragmatic approach was developed, attempting to give a reliable estimation of the certainty of a parameter encompassing all projects and studies regarding a certain impact.
Many factors are influencing the certainty of the statements about future climate change.
For almost all projects and studies, different IPCC SRES emission scenarios and RCPs are Fig.
2 Countries with National Adaptation Strategies in the DRB (as of 2018) Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
17 applied because of different assumptions about future socio-economic development and its consequences for greenhouse gas emissions.
The models applied in the studies using the SRES scenarios also have varying outcomes, because of differences in the model structure, the downscaling techniques as well as the spatial and temporal resolution.
This is the case for both, climatic and hydrological models.
Further uncertainties of the model results are related to differences in validation and analysis methods.
These influencing factors of uncertainty are enlarged when analysing several studies.
For each impact field a different number of statements/results are available.
Some issues are analysed very often, whereas for others only few statements are available.
Among the statements itself there are variations, adding further uncertainty.
Another source of uncertainty is that different documents frequently analyse different future time periods and use different reference periods.
Moreover, different indices, e.g.
when assessing floods, are used.
In order to assess the uncertainty of future climate change in this study, three variables are used.
First, the statement of certainty for the analysed parameters is taken into account.
Second, the level of agreement among the different statements is considered and third, the total number of studies providing statements to a parameter is included.
Each certainty-category was calculated by the cube root of the product of the three variables presented by eight values (Fig.
3).
If the agreement of the statements (x-axis), the certainty information (y-axis) and the number of studies analysed (diameter of circle) are large the impact is large and the overall certainty is categorized as very high, indicated with a green colour.
However, if the number of projects is high, but the agreement of the certainty statement is low, the overall certainty is medium (yellow-orange), and if all three categories are low, the overall certainty is consequently low (red).
This practical approach to provide an overall certainty category to the analysed parameters allows the consideration of the, partially little, available information about uncertainty when gathering information from several projects, which apply varying methods.
Although this approach is simple, the resulting illustration in Figure 3 enables the comparison of the certainty of the analysed parameters.
Nevertheless, this is a practical approach without a detailed statistical analysis, which is not possible because the available information from the analysed projects is mainly given in “soft” variables and not by numbers.
Figure 3 presents the revised and updated overview of certainties for projected climate change impacts of the analysed sectors in comparison to the certainties identified in the initial Danube Study.
It has to be noted that forestry, agriculture, flood, low flow and runoff are located at the same similar certainty level, which is represented by the black dot.
Although there is a different amount of publications available in the two studies, Figure 3 shows clearly that the degree of certainty increased significantly for most of the analysed water related issues.
In the updated study, the scientific statements concerning the future development of precipitation led to a differentiation between mean annual precipitation and precipitation seasonality.
It is highly certain, that seasonality changes, whereas the development of mean annual precipitation is unclear for the near future and reliable statements are only made for the far future.
Fig.
3 Uncertainties identified in the update of the Danube Study (a) in comparison to the uncertainties identified in the initial Danube Study (b) (Revision and Update of the Danube Study, Final Report 2018).
The legend of a also applies to b.
The certainty of impacts on navigation, ecosystems and biodiversity did not improve in comparison to the initial Danube study due to contradictory and vague statements.
It has to be noted that not all water sectors analysed in the initial study are analysed in the update as well.
Reasons therefore are that an insufficient amount of new finished projects and data dealing with these topics were published in the last five years.
A high level of certainty may allow the preparation of adaptation measures at an early stage and/or with more detail, whereas a low level of certainty may lead to more general types of measures (e.g.
no-regret measures or winwin solutions).
18 Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
RESULTS In this chapter, the results from the updated Danube study are presented and differences to the initial study are highlighted.
The results are solely based on the analysed studies, projects and adaptation activities that are described above.
Furthermore, other factors such as social, demographic, and economic development are crucial for future adaptation strategies to climate change.
However, they were not subject of the present study, but are indirectly considered in the analysed scenarios.
Future climate change in the DRB The trend of a future increase in annual and seasonal air temperature with a gradient from northwest to southeast which was identified in the initial Danube Study is largely confirmed by the update of the Danube Study.
This trend is highly certain and can be regarded as a hard fact.
Since climate change does not stop at boarders and effects of climate change may largely vary within country borders (due to varying physiographic properties), for the update of the ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change it was decided to show the temperature and precipitation projections of the EURO-CORDEX project.
The EUROCORDEX ensemble runs are based on the new RCPs and provide data on a resolution of 0.11 degree (~12.5km) (Jacob et al., 2014).
Thus it is possible to draw a more detailed picture of spatially distributed temperature and precipitation trends, which in turn serves as a sounder basis for the development of adaptation measures and strategies.
Results from EURO-CORDEX projections use the period 1981-2010 as reference and define 2021-2050 as near future and 2071-2100 as far future.
The range of increase of annual mean temperature for the near future period is between 1.1°C and 1.5°C and for the far future period 3.6°C and 4.7°C under RCP8.5 (Fig.
4).
These figures show pronounced warming hotspots in mountain regions and in southeast Europe.
Like in the initial Danube Study, EURO-CORDEX projections show, that the annual (Fig.
4a,b) and the summer (Fig.
4c,d) temperature increases are likely to be larger than the winter temperature increase (Fig.
4e,f).
The DRB is located in the transition zone between expected increasing (in Northern Europe) and decreasing (in Southern Europe) future precipitation.
Documents analysed in the update of the Danube study confirm this general trend of wet regions becoming wetter and dry regions becoming drier (Fig.
5).
The trend is more Fig.
4 Change of mean annual (a, b), summer (JJA) (c, d) and winter (DJF) (e, f) temperature in the Danube River Basin for 2021-2050 and 2071-2100 according to the EURO-CORDEX ensemble results under RCP8.5 Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
19 obvious in the second half of the century.
Although the mean annual precipitation in many regions will probably remain almost constant, a tendency for the next decades towards more precipitation (than in the last decades) in the northern parts of the basin and less precipitation in the southern parts is apparent (Fig.
5).
The general trend of wet regions becoming wetter and dry regions becoming drier is also reflected in the alpine region, where the already drier south-eastern part of Austria is likely to become drier.
According to the documents analysed in both Danube Studies, trends in mean annual precipitation are rather insignificant until the middle of the century and become significant until the end of the century.
However, the most significant change is projected in seasonal precipitation distribution.
The summer months are likely to become drier (up to -58%) (Fig.
6) whereas the winter months show a tendency for increasing precipitation (up to +34%) (Fig.
7).
The numbers indicate the maximum expected decrease and increase for larger regions in the Danube River Basin but numbers in particular regions may vary largely.
The figures display the precipitation change from the EUROCORDEX initiative in mm relative to the reference period 1981-2010.
The comparatively clearest trends are increasing winter precipitation in mountain regions and decreasing summer precipitation in regions already suffering from too little precipitation.
On the other hand, there are regions where summer precipitation is projected to increase due to increased frequency of thunderstorms and short heavy precipitation events.
As for temperature trends, studies that are based on the newly implemented RCPs like from Bisselink et al.
(2018) mostly confirm previous results.
Furthermore, data from the EURO-CORDEX initiative provides a more detailed picture of spatially distributed trends.
Fig.
5 Change of mean annual precipitation in the Danube River Basin for the periods 2021-2050 (a) and 2071-2100 (b) according to the EURO-CORDEX ensemble runs under RCP8.5 Fig.
6 Change of mean summer (JJA) precipitation in the Danube River Basin for the periods 2021-2050 (a) and 2071-2100 (b) according to EURO-CORDEX ensemble runs under RCP8.5 Fig.
7 Change of mean winter (DJF) precipitation in the Danube River Basin for the periods 2021-2050 and 2071-2100 according to EURO-CORDEX ensemble runs under RCP8.5 20 Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
A future increase in extreme weather events is expected for the whole DRB.
The simulations show both, a future increase in the intensity and frequency of dry spells, hot days and heat waves, as well as local and regional increases in heavy rainfall, although the latter is uncertain in spatial and temporal localisation.
For the UDRB, an increased risk of storm-related heavy precipitation with high wind speeds is assumed.
For the MDRB, it is expected that the occurrence of extreme precipitation days will be intensified in winter and reduced in summer.
Due to the warming trends for the whole basin, fewer frost days are expected in winter.
Generally, statements from the initial Danube Study are confirmed by the update.
Nevertheless, most recently analysed documents show a more pronounced trend towards seasonality in the occurrence of extreme events.
Therefore, the agreement concerning an increasing number of extreme winter precipitation events over Europe and especially in the North-East for the far future period must be emphasised.
Statements regarding extreme summer precipitation especially in Eastern Europe are inconsistent.
Climate change impacts on water related issues in the DRB The potential future climatic conditions in the DRB described above will impact the water resources and water-related issues.
In the following the expected main impacts on each water sector according to the analysis of the studies are described and compared in a qualitative way.
As for future climate conditions, the results of the updated Danube Study are presented and differences to the initial Danube study are highlighted (ICPDR, 2012; ICPDR, 2018).
(1) Water availability In contrast to the initial Danube Study, most of the documents analysed in the update expect insignificant changes in mean annual runoff until the middle of the 21st century.
However, they confirm a significant decrease in mean annual runoff until the end of the 21st century.
This is valid for the entire DRB, also for the UDRB.
Although this is the area with the highest water availability, water shortages are expected in unfavourable areas in the far future, which has not been reported in the initial study.
The most crucial aspect regarding runoff is the change in seasonality, which applies to all of the regions in the DRB.
Here, a decrease in summer runoff and an increase in winter runoff are expected due to shifts in precipitation seasonality.
Changes of runoff conditions are in turn assumed to cause a decline in groundwater storage and recharge, particularly in summer.
The already monitored decline of the past in the Hungarian Great Plain Area is likely to intensify in the future.
Lake levels might decrease in summer.
Furthermore, a decrease in soil water content is likely in the DRB, particularly in summer.
(2) Water use The described possible future changes of water availability, extreme hydrological events and water quality will influence water use.
Water demand is expected to increase in a warmer climate in agriculture, industry, energy production and general human consumption.
In the field of agriculture more water might be required for livestock and irrigation, because of drier summers and a longer growing period because of higher temperatures.
The possible shortening of the growing season due to too high temperatures in the south-eastern DRB will increase the water demand for irrigation The most remarkable difference in comparison to the initial Danube Study is that now negative impacts of climate change on agriculture are expected to exceed positive impacts in every sub region.
Positive impacts like higher yields due to a longer vegetation period are now largely limited to the short and medium term future.
In the far future the higher temperatures are affecting the vegetation period negatively.
Moreover, a higher atmospheric CO2 content is no longer mentioned as a positive factor for agriculture.
Impacts which affect both, agriculture and forestry are a shift in species, invasive species, and pests, changing species composition and damages from extreme weather.
In contrast, damages from snow and frost are assumed to be less.
A changing climate will affect power generation as well.
The reduced water availability in summer in combination with projected increasing water temperatures might become problematic for thermal electricity production, which is dependent on cooling water from rivers.
Hydroelectric power generation is likely to decrease in the DRB on average and in summer, whereas in winter an increase due to more rain than snowfall is possible.
However, hydropower generation in rivers may face problems due to flood events increasing in intensity and frequency and the resulting damages (Frik, 2018; Steininger et al., 2015).
Additionally, a seasonal shift in power generation might be triggered by changing water availability, above all in mountain regions.
The Danube is an important water way in Europe.
Hence navigation may face challenges due to climate change effects on runoff conditions.
While in winter navigation conditions might improve with less icing and higher water levels, in summer low flow conditions are likely to limit cargo loads and in worst case make the Danube impassable, just as it happened during this summer and autumn.
The update of the Danube Study shows that increasing flood conditions are expected to be problematic for navigation.
Possible consequences of this scenario are industrial production losses as well as increased difficulties in accessing water resources and higher costs for water resource use.
Also conflicts between the different water users could arise and require potential solution options as for example, a hierarchy of water supply during water scarcity periods.
An increase in air and water temperature, combined with changes in precipitation, water availability, water quality and increasing extreme events may lead to changes in ecosystems, life cycles, and biodiversity in the DRB in the midand long-term.
The habitats and ecosystems in the south-eastern region of the DRB and in the Hungarian Great Plain area are especially likely to become drier.
As consequences, a rearrangement of biotic communities and food webs, the disappearance of species and the invasion of species might occur.
Shifts and changes in aquatic and terrestrial flora and fauna, particularly in littoral communities and aquatic systems are likely.
In the marine coastal zones, a redistribution and losses of marine organisms as well as the increase of Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
21 invasive species and in toxic bloom events are possible impacts of rising sea surface temperatures.
Higher sea levels could increase the salinization of estuaries and land aquifers and change ecological conditions at the coast of the Black Sea.
Potential increasing water demand, e.g.
irrigation for agricultural purposes in the entire DRB, especially in the south-eastern parts, may also deteriorate the ecological and chemical balance of freshwater bodies and could lead to an increase of contaminated surface and groundwater bodies.
Besides climate change impacts, anthropogenic impacts, political regulations and restrictions as well as the technological development will also trigger future changes in water quantity and quality in the DRB.
Comparing the results of both studies, the developments in climate change modelling and the resulting findings, show the necessity of an update of the scientific knowledge base, which is the basis for a successful implementation of adaptation measures and strategies.
Less water availability in summer is likely to cause longer, more frequent and more intense drought and low flow situation in the DRB.
Particularly the south-eastern parts of the DRB, namely the Carpathian Area, the southern parts of Hungary and Romania, the republic of Serbia, Bulgarian and the Danube Delta region are likely to be confronted with severe droughts and water shortages.
Contrary, there is no future trend for droughts in the Alpine head watersheds.
However, a spread of affected areas to the north is expected.
Like drought and low flow events, flood events in the DRB are expected to intensify and occur more often.
The update of the Danube Study confirms statements of the initial study.
Small and mountain catchments appear to be the most affected ones.
With an increase of torrential rainfall an increase in flash floods is expected despite uncertainties.
Besides water quantity, also water quality is likely to be affected by climate change in the DRB.
Increasing air temperature might cause increasing water temperature in the DRB.
This in turn will change all temperature dependent chemical and biological processes and cause reduced water quality, especially during droughts in summer.
Adaptation measures for the water sectors of the DRB To respond to the challenges created by climate change and the water related impacts, it is of great importance to consider the consequences which today’s actions may cause as late as during the next 50 – 100 years.
This needs adaptation strategies which are more ambitious than up to now.
Nevertheless, there is consensus between the Danube countries and the European Union that adaptation to climate change is a central environmental policy issue.
Due to the transboundary character of water and its relevance for various issues and water-related sectors such as its role for biodiversity and the ecosystem, energy, transport, agriculture, floods and droughts, integrated river basin management is key for an approach to climate change adaptation.
In this section, possible adaptation measures for the impacts of climate change on the water sector of the DRB as suggested by the analysed adaptation activities are presented.
Measures with a high common agreement are selected.
This means that they have been suggested by most of the analysed documents.
Furthermore, they are valid for almost all impact fields.
Adaptation should start with a priority on win-win, no-regret and low-regret measures that are flexible enough for various conditions.
The adaptive approaches require enough flexibility so they can also be modified and adapted to local conditions.
This way of working has the benefit of increasing resilience and decreasing vulnerability for the whole Danube ecosystem.
The adaptation measures can be classified into five different categories, targeting different objectives.
Preparation and technological measures are aiming on monitoring and infrastructural issues; eco-system based measures should enhance the capacity of eco-systems to adapt, whereas behavioural and managerial measures aim to raise awareness and to encourage knowledge exchange.
Policy approaches are most important for basin-wide transboundary solutions.
Table 1 gives an overview on these measures.
They are classified in the different categories, introduced above.
The smoothly formulated measures allow various realisations and there is no sharp separation possible between the categories of the measures.
However, the measures not only have overlapping fields and linkages between the categories, but they are also linked between affected sectors and other relationships such as upstream – downstream dependencies.
Positive and negative effects among them may be possible and conflicts may occur, even though the selected measures are no-/ low-regret or win-win-options, so that they have positive effects whatever the extent of future climate is, or other social, environmental or economic benefits are also met (European Climate Adaptation Platform, 2018).
For instance, the expansion of protection areas as ecosystem based measure and policy approach could be conflicting with the construction and modification of infrastructure as technological measure, albeit environmental issues are likely to be considered in the adjustment of infrastructure and synergy effects might be found.
An increase in water retention areas can lead to higher groundwater recharge, a reduction of flood peaks and positive effects for biodiversity, so that various sectors may profit such ecology with enabling biodiversity, navigation with reduced flood peaks or water related energy production with reduced losses during a flood.
To prevent possible conflicts and to foster common goals, cross-sectoral, interdisciplinary and integral approaches and continuous communication, also among the Danube countries are necessary.
Furthermore, the time horizon of the effects of adaptation options should be taken into account.
While the long-term measures, e.g.
reforestation, affect water retention not until several decades, short-time measures, e.g.
water-saving techniques may be immediately effective.
Besides the presented measures, there are numerous options for adaptation to climate change, particularly for distinct sectors.
The spatial coverage for applying adaptation measures ranges from local to catchment wide actions.
In many cases coordination among bordering countries is of great necessity.
The principal obstacles to 22 Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
install adaptation measures documented are a lack of knowledge, trained staff, reliable data and financial resources.
For a detailed listing of adaptation measures it is referred to the Danube Study (2012) and the update of the Danube Study (2018).
To make the large number of measures better usable for stakeholders, an easy to use online toolbox is created.
The toolbox allows the user to obtain detailed information on the measures of interest, which are divided into various groups such as impact fields, relevancy to the WFD, time horizon and others.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK Climate change will affect water resources in all parts of the DRB as the analysis of existing studies and research and development projects shows.
Despite all water sectors and regions are affected, the effects of climate change vary depending on the region.
This is due to the landscape diversity as well as the huge east-west and north-south gradient in the DRB.
Therefore, adaptation measures have to be flexible enough to react to these heterogeneities.
To deal with the uncertainties that come along with projections of future climate we presented a pragmatic approach to show the related uncertainty of the future development to the analysed climate parameters and impact fields.
The update of the Danube Study confirmed the trends detected in the initial Danube Study., The improved climate models and modelling approaches (EURO-CORDEX) substantiate the results of the first Danube study.
Temperature and precipitation development can be depicted in a higher resolution and with a higher certainty.
Impacts of climate change on water related issues will be even more significant in almost all water sectors along with a stronger negative trend than in the first study.
The new certainty analysis shows a significant increase in certainty for most of the water sectors.
Temperature development and seasonality in precipitation even tend to be highly certain.
Despite all heterogeneities, climate change affects all regions and does not stop at national borders.
Water connects all riverine countries, which is why a common strategy is highly important for a successful adaptation to climate change effects.
Being a frontrunner and pioneer among transboundary river basin commissions in climate change adaptation activities, the ICPDR adopted the first ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change in the year 2012.
Basis therefor was a Table 1 Common adaptation measures to climate change impacts in the water sector in the Danube River Basin (ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change 2018 in preparation) Preparation measures Additional, intensified monitoring activities to follow and assess climate change and climate change impacts Homogenous data production, digital mapping and a centralised database for data exchange and comparability among regions and countries Identification of potential risk areas and hot spots Implementation of forecasting and warning services (e.g.
for extreme events such as floods and droughts) Development of action plans or integration of specific issues into ongoing planning activities (e.g.
to deal with water scarcity and flood situations) Further research to close knowledge gaps, determine vulnerability or reduce uncertainty Rules for water allocation in case of water scarcity under the aspect of benefit sharing Toolbox preparation measures Ecosystem based measures Taking environmental implications and the conservation of biodiversity into consideration in all other measures Sustainable management of land use practices for improving resilience, and for enhancing the capacity to adapt to climate change impacts Implementation of green infrastructure to connect bio-geographic regions and habitats Protection, restoration and expansion of water conservation and retention areas Rehabilitation of polluted water bodies Behavioural and managerial measures Support education, capacity building, awareness raising, information exchange and knowledge transfer Establishment of and support for an integrated risk management Support of a water saving behaviour Propagation of best practice examples Application of sustainable methods (e.g.
good agricultural practices) Technological measures Adjustment of (existing) infrastructure, e.g.
construction and modification of dams and reservoirs for hydropower generation, agriculture, drinking water supply, tourism, fish-farming, irrigation and navigation Development and application of water-efficient technologies Efficient wasteand sewage-water treatment and water recycling Policy approaches Support of an institutional framework to coordinate activities Harmonisation of international, basin-wide legal limits and threshold values Implementation of restrictions (e.g.
for development in flood risk areas) Expansion of protection areas (e.g.
for drinking water resources) Adaptation of policies to changing conditions Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
23 comprehensive overview about future climate change in the DRB and its impacts on the water sectors as presented in the previous sections.
Moreover, it was necessary to collect and analyse already existing adaptation strategies and actions.
In order to get the most comprehensive overview possible, experts and stakeholders were consulted additionally.
At the Danube Ministerial Meeting in February 2016 Ministers asked the ICPDR to foresee an update of its strategy.
During the development of the update of the ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change in 2018, the following points emerged as highly relevant and have to be taken greater into account.
First, the strategy needs to be developed in close collaboration with stakeholders, experts and country representatives.
This increases acceptance and fosters the implementation.
Second, the strategy is developed as a reference document that may be used by countries, regions, and organisations to develop their own individual adaptation strategy.
In this context, we developed an online toolbox, which provides a huge amount of adaptation measures.
Third, clear goals of the strategy need to be defined in order to make it more powerful.
Fourth, the strategy is considered to be a “living” document.
This means that it will be updated regularly in order to include the latest scientific results and experiences with the strategy.
The principal objective is building resilience against climate change impacts on water resources through capacity building, transboundary cooperation and encouraging basin-wide approaches as well as benefit-sharing is a key priority and objective to address climate change in the Danube River Basin.
Base is the update and revision of the Danube Study.
Despite most of the results regarding climate change and its impacts from the initial study could be confirmed, science made advances in climate modelling allowing for more detailed climate change projections.
This is particularly important for the highly heterogeneous DRB.
Along with this, uncertainties could be decreased, which is highly relevant for planning and taking adaptation measures.
Moreover, the continuous dialogue with experts, stakeholders and country representatives allowed identifying strengths and weaknesses of the existing strategy.
Strengths are that it represents the first existing overall guideline for adaptations in a large catchment and gives an overview on climate change and its impacts in the entire DRB.
In contrast to the strengths it shows no clearly addressed objectives and contains no summary for policy makers.
During the initial Danube Study as well as during the update some shortcomings had to be faced which made it quite challenging to create a comprehensive scientific database for an adaptation strategy in the DRB.
A meaningful comparison of documents about climate change or adaptation was made difficult, since documents were not available, not available in English, or did not fulfil scientific standards.
For some parts of the DRB there exist almost no studies about climate change and its effects on the water sector.
Comparability was even made more difficult by the fact that methods and data used in the analysed documents are highly diverse and standards are not met.
Moreover, international and interregional collaboration and also collaboration between institutions within one country could be expanded.
When it comes to the implementation of adaptation measures, it has to be considered, that measures in one sector may have retroactive, positive or negative effects on one or more other sectors or even other regions or countries.
To prevent possible conflicts and to foster common goals, cross-sectoral, interdisciplinary and integral approaches as well as trans-regional/national agreements are necessary.
Integral approaches also aim to enhance synergy effects which should be sought.
An example of a synergy effect is an increase in water retention areas which can lead to a higher groundwater recharge, a reduction of flood peaks and positive effects for biodiversity.
The updated ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change and the web-based toolbox provide a significant improvement.
It increases the applicability of the strategy and gives the stakeholders support for the development of regional and national adaptation solutions.
Furthermore, it underlines the necessity of transboundary and trans-sectoral collaboration and emphasizes the importance of specific adaptation measures depending on the characteristics of the subcatchments.
Acknowledgements We gratefully acknowledge the financial support by the German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) within the Danube Studies and the ICPDR for the update of the strategy.
We thank the members of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube ICPDR for fruitful cooperation and discussions within its various groups.
The participation of experts and stakeholders of the DRB in the workshops is also acknowledged References Bisselink, B., Bernhard, J., Gelati, E., Adamovic, M, Jacobs, C., Mentaschi, L., Lavalle, C., De Roo, A.
2018.
Impact of changing climate, land use, and water usage on water resources in the Danube river basin.
EUR 29228EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxemburg, 74 p. Commission of the European Communities 2009.
White Paper Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action.
COM(2009) 147, Brussels Deser, C., Adam, P., Vincent, B., Haiyan, T. 2012.
Uncertainty in climate change projections: the role of internal variability.
Climate Dynamics 38 (3-4), 527-546.
EEA (European Environment Agency), 2009.
Regional climate change and adaptation – The Alps facing the challenge of changing water resources.
EEA report No 8/2009.
Available via http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/alps-climate-change-andadaptation-2009.
Cited 20 Aug 2014 EEA (European Environment Agency), 2010.
The European Environment.
State and Outlook 2010.
Adapting to climate change SOER 2010 thematic assessment.
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg EEA (European Environment Agency), 2015.
The European environment – state and outlook.
SOER 2015: European briefings-climate change impacts and adaptation.
EEA (European Environment Agency), 2016.
Status of implementation of the WFD in the Member States.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/participation/map_mc/ma p.htm.
Cited 1 September 2018 EEA (European Environment Agency), 2017.
Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016.
EEA Report 1/2017 European Climate Adaptation Platform, 2018. https://climateadapt.eea.europa.eu/knowledge/tools/uncertaintyguidance/topic2 (cited 10 September 2018) 24 Stolz et al.
2018 / Journal of Environmental Geography 11 (3–4), 13–24.
EC (European Communities), 2009.
Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC).
Guidance document No.
24.
River Basin Management in a Changing Climate.
Technical Report – 2009 – 040 European Parliament and Council 2000.
Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.
Available via http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0060:EN:NOT.
Cited 20 Nov 2013 Frik, G. 2018.
Climate Change, Challenges for the Hydropower Sector in Austria.
ICPDR Climate Change Adaptation Workshop, Belgrade Hodson, D.L.R., Keeley, S.P.E., West, A., Ridley, J., Hawkins, E., Hewitt, H.T.
2013.
Identifying uncertainties in Arctic climate change projections.
Climate Dynamics 40 (11–12), 2849–2865.
DOI: 10.1007/s00382-012-1512-z IHP/HWRP (eds.)
2004.
Flow Regime of River Danube and its Catchment – An Update of Chapter II of the Danube Monograph.
Koblenz, Germany.
IPCC, 2007.
Climate Change 2007.
Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A.
(eds.)].
IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 104 pp.
IPCC, 2013.
Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2013.
The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K.
Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)].
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
28 pp.
IPCC, 2013.
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K.
Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)].
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pp.
ICPDR, 2010.
DANUBE DECLARATION adopted at the Ministerial Meeting, February 16, 2010.
Available via http://www.icpdr.org/main/resources/danube-declaration-2010.
Cited 20 Aug 2014 ICPDR, 2012.
Danube Study – Climate Change Adaptation.
Final Report.
https://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/climatechange-adaptation ICPDR, 2013.
ICPDR Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change.
Vienna.
Available via http://www.icpdr.org/main/climateadaptation-strategy-adopted.
Cited 20 Aug 2014 ICPDR, 2014.
The Danube River Basin.
Facts and Figures.
Available at http://www.icpdr.org/main/danube-basin/river-basin.
Cited 20 Aug 2014 ICPDR, 2018.
Revision and Update of the Danube Study.
Final Report.
https://www.icpdr.org/main/resources/climate-changeadaptation-update-danube-study Jacob, D., Petersen, J., Eggert, B., Alias, A., Christensen, O.B., Bouwer, L.M., Braun, A., Colette, A., Déqué, M., Georgievski, G., Georgopoulou, E., Gobiet, A., Menut, L., Nikulin, G., Haensler, A., Hempelmann, N., Jones, C., Keuler, K., Kovats, S., Kröner, N., Kotlarski, S., Kriegsmann, A., Martin, E., van Meijgaard, E., Moseley, C., Pfeifer, S., Preuschmann, S., Radermacher, C., Radtke, K., Rechid, D., Rounsevell, M., Samuelsson, P., Somot, S., Soussana, J.-F., Teichmann, C., Valentini, R., Vautard, R., Weber, Bj., Yiou, P.. EURO-CORDEX 2014.
New highresolution climate change projections for European impact research.
Regional Environmental Change 14 (2), 563–578.
DOI: 10.1007/s10113-013-0499-2 Latif, M. 2011.
Uncertainty in climate change projections.
Journal of Geochemical Exploration 110 (1), 1–7.
DOI: 10.1016/j.gexplo.2010.09.011 Nakićenović N., Swart R. (eds) 2000.
IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Prasch, M., Koch, F., Weidinger, R., Mauser, W. 2012.
Danube Study – Climate Change Adaptation.
Study to provide a common basinwide understanding towards the development of a Climate Change adaptation strategy in der Danube River Basin.
Final Report.
174 pp.
Available via http://www.icpdr.org/ flowpaper/viewer/default/files/Danube%20Climate%20Adaptati on%20Study_final.pdf Cited Sep 2018 Steininger, K.W., König, M., Bednar-Friedl,B-, Kranzl,L., Loibl, W., Prettentaler, F. (eds) 2015.
Economic Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts.
Springer, 499 pp.
Stolz, R., Weber, M., Ebner, M., Mauser, W. 2018.
Revision and Update of the Danube Study.
Integrating and editing new scientific results in climate change research and the resulting impacts on water availability to revise the existing adaptation strategies in the Danube River Basin.
Final Report.
115 pp.
Available via https://www.icpdr.org/main/sites/default/files/nodes/documents/cli mate_change_adaptation__update_danube_study_final_report_20180607.pdf Cited Sep 2018.
UNECE, 2009.
Guidance on water and adaptation to climate change.
Available via http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/d ocuments/Guidance_water_climate.pdf.
Cited 20 Aug 2014 UNECE, WMO 2010.
Guidance on Water Supply and Sanitation In Extreme Weather Events.
Available via http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/whmop2/WH O_Guidance_EWE_ Final_draft_web_opt.pdf.
Cited 20 Aug 2014 UNECE, 2015.
Water and climate change adaptation in transboundary basins: Lessons learned and good practices.
128 pp.
UNFCCC, 2010.
Annotated Outline for Fifth National Communications of Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC, including Reporting Elements under the Kyoto Protocol.
Available via https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/annex_i_natcom_/applic ation/pdf/nc5outline.pdf.
Cited 20 Aug 2014 United Nations, 1998.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Available via http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
Cited 14 Nov 2013 Vetter, T., Reinhardt, J., Flörke, M., van Griensven, A., Hattermann, F., Huang, S., Koch, H., Pechlivanidis, I.G., Plötner, S., Seidou,O., Su, B., Vervoort, R.W., Krysanova, V. 2017.
Evaluation of sources of uncertainty in projected hydrological changes under climate change in 12 large-scale river basins.
Climate Change 141 (3), 419–433.
DOI: 10.1007/s10584-016-1794-y http://www.icpdr.org/main/resources/danube-declaration-2010 https://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/climate-change-adaptation https://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/climate-change-adaptation http://www.icpdr.org/main/climate-adaptation-strategy-adopted http://www.icpdr.org/main/climate-adaptation-strategy-adopted http://www.icpdr.org/main/danube-basin/river-basin.%20Cited%2020%20Aug%202014 http://www.icpdr.org/main/danube-basin/river-basin.%20Cited%2020%20Aug%202014 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php INTRODUCTION THE STUDY AREA: THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN DATA BASE AND ANALYSIS METHOD Research and development projects Adaptation activities Uncertainty assessment RESULTS Future climate change in the DRB Climate change impacts on water related issues in the DRB Adaptation measures for the water sectors of the DRB CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK Acknowledgements References
9 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Climate Change Politics in Canada and the EU: From Carbon Democracy to a Green Deal?
Markus Lederer1 Technical University Darmstadt Abstract The idea of a green deal transforming industrialized societies’ climate policies in a sustainable manner has become highly popular in various countries.
This article focuses on the politics behind green deals in Canada and the EU, raising four interrelated issues.
First, on a descriptive level, it addresses what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy in both polities.
Second, at an analytical level, making use of the concept of carbon democracy, the study provides a theoretical explanation of why, until recently, progress has been slow in the EU and hardly visible in Canada.
Third, on a prescriptive level, it argues that the notion of a green deal can be transformative and can thus provide a road to progressive climate policies.
Finally, in a comparative manner, the analysis reveals Canada is still highly reluctant to enact any form of green deal, while the EU, with its notion of a ‘just transition’ and the set-up of a transition fund, has made important progress towards an effective and legitimate green deal that could eventually turn the EU into a green democracy.
1 Markus Lederer is professor of political science with a focus on international politics at Technical University Darmstadt.
10 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Introduction2 Climate politics have changed quite dramatically over the last couple of years, but the question arises as to how truly transformative these changes have been.
On the global level, the Paris Agreement of 2015 revitalized multilateral politics after the failure of the international negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009.
It has also successfully kick-started new carbon governance initiatives at other levels of government (Falkner 2016).
At the local level, various cities in both Canada (e.g., Vancouver, Montreal, and Toronto) and in Europe (e.g., London, Copenhagen, and Berlin) have been hailed as new spheres of authority, and associations like the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), the Covenant of Mayors, and the Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) have undertaken notable initiatives in the environmental area (Bulkeley 2014; Fuhr, Hickmann, and Kern 2018).
These governance experiments have been supported by transnational actors from the non-profit and for-profit camps (Roger, Hale, and Andonova 2017).
Domestic climate politics also have gained more attention on the political agenda in countries as diverse as India, Vietnam, Ethiopia, France, and the United Kingdom.
And even where official reversals have occurred, most prominently in the United States (US), but also in Brazil and China, new dynamics within society or within opposition parties have sometimes become visible.
These new progressive approaches, whether in the US, the European Union (EU), or Canada, have been labelled ‘green deals’ that aim to advance climate policy ambitions and implementation in holistic and just ways.
Green deals are thus presented as a panacea for solving or at least mitigating many of the current ecological, social, economic, and political crises human society must confront.
This article focuses on the politics behind a green deal in Canada and the EU, raising four interrelated issues.
First, on a descriptive level, it addresses what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy.
Second, at an analytical level, making use of the concept of carbon democracy, it provides a theoretical explanation of why, until recently, progress has been slow in the EU and hardly visible in Canada.
Third, on a prescriptive level, it argues that the notion of a green deal can be transformative, and can thus provide a road to progressive climate policies.
Finally, in a comparative manner, the analysis reveals Canada is still highly reluctant to enact any form of green deal, while the EU, with its notion of a ‘just transition’ and the set-up of a transition fund, has made important progress towards an effective and legitimate green deal that could eventually turn the EU into a green democracy.
But why look at Canada and the EU and compare a country with a regional entity?
First, regarding their relevance, both polities are large greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters.
Canada is the ninth largest emitter in absolute terms, and fourth largest on per capita terms, within the Club of G20 countries, with almost 19 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per capita (tCO2e/capita) per year.
The EU 28 is the third largest emitter in absolute terms, and the 15th largest in annual per capita emissions within the G20, at about 8.07 tCO2e/capita.
3 Second, both polities claim to be leaders of progressive climate change politics.
The EU has long and successfully portrayed itself as a global climate leader (Wurzel, Connelly, and Liefferink 2017), while, since 2015, the Trudeau government in Canada has tried to convince the world of the greening of its policies.
Nevertheless, in December, 2020 both polities were still evaluated by the Climate Action Tracker as “insufficient”, although some signs of deeper change are visible, particularly within the EU (Climate Action Tracker 2020).
Of course, both the EU and Canada are highly diverse polities, 2 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers as well as the editors of this special issue for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
3 Data refers to 2017 and includes land-use; for details, see Climate Transparency (2020).
11 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 and it is important to differentiate between front-runners and laggards within each (Torney 2019; Boyd and Rabe 2019).
Finally, both polities are highly decentralized and are thus perfect showcases for understanding multi-level governance.
This article is structured as follows: the first part introduces the concept of ‘carbon democracy’ which posits that the extensive use of carbon laid the foundation for establishing democratic institutions in the first place (Mitchell 2011).
Jason MacLean has already labelled Canada a carbon democracy, focusing primarily on the oil and gas industries’ ability to influence current politics even with a Liberal government in power since 2015 (2018, 54).
The second part of the article builds on these insights but goes beyond them by describing Canada’s and the EU’s emission profiles, their ambitions, and the current policy instruments deeply enmeshed in the societal and political genome of both polities.
The third part elaborates on the politics of a green deal, arguing that major distributive changes and some forms of compensation will be needed as the green deal will not always create win–win solutions, particularly not in the short run.
The analysis shows that the EU is slowly moving towards a green democracy, whereas progress is much slower in Canada.
The conclusion summarizes the argument and identifies possible future research avenues.
The Concept of Carbon Democracy Decarbonization is possible, and at least in the medium to long run it reduces private and social costs when compared to a business-as-usual scenario (Stern 2015; The New Climate Economy 2018).
Why then has progress so far been rather slow?
To answer this question, we have to look at how politics affects efforts to pursue green transformations.
The literature on climate politics has advanced various explanations including veto-players (Ike 2020), the capitalist system (Brand and Wissen 2017), domestic politics (Sprinz and Weiß 2001), national-subnational interlinkages (Balthasar, Schreurs, and Varone 2019), and, most recently, energy cultures (Stephenson, Sovacool, and Inderberg 2021).
The concept of carbon democracy nicely complements these explanations by focusing on the materiality of carbon and the repercussions its rising use has had for the development of specific political systems.
Theoretically, the argument advanced is in line with historical institutionalism with its strong focus on path-dependencies.
It also takes up elements of more recent materialist readings that have identified the strong influence of specific uses of energy on societies and politics (Morris 2015 regarding values; Smil 2018 regarding civilizations).
Timothy Mitchell’s book, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (2011), makes the simple but important point that, historically, carbon energy and democratic politics are closely interlinked, and that changes in how we made use of energy allowed and even determined the way mass politics evolved in Western Europe and North America (2011, 14).
Not only has the burning of abundant and low-cost carbon in the form of coal, oil, and gas fueled accelerated economic growth, but also the extraction, transportation, and refinement of fossil fuels have shaped sociotechnical systems that have become very influential politically.
This started with the massive extraction and use of coal that enabled large-scale manufacturing, modern cities, and those forces that pushed for democracy (2011, 8).
Hence, democratic claims had a much higher chance to be realized in countries where large parts of the workforce were involved in digging up and transporting coal, as well as providing a whole new infrastructure for its use.
Workers thus derived power from how energy extraction, transportation, and use were organized.
This could be translated into alliances, and carbon could thus “assemble political agency, by employing the 12 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 ability to slow, disrupt or cut off its supply” (2011, 19).
In short, the use of coal allowed workers to become a highly political force and this was, Mitchell argues, more important politically than class culture, ideology, or organization (2011, 27).
In the following article, the concept of carbon democracy is used as a prism to interpret the evolution of climate policy-making in Canada and the EU, and to understand why progress in moving away from fossil fuels has been rather limited.
This approach neither neglects the role of specific actors, nor denies the influence of capitalism.
Rather, it goes one step further and analyzes the strong role of the carbon centered, socio-technical systems found in both polities.
Three aspects will merit specific attention.
First, the influence that the development of large infrastructures for energy extraction, production, transportation, and consumption have had in empowering some actors, as well as practices, and not others.
Second, that these actors are represented in specific sectors or regions with consequences for policy-making and specific political structures.
And third, that the particular context of infrastructures, actors, and sectors has given rise to a carbon centered worldview that has underpinned and strengthened carbon democracy.
Carbon Democracy at Work: Comparing the Status-Quo of Climate Politics in Canada and the EU This section provides a short overview of climate politics in Canada and the EU, focusing particularly on their current emission profiles and policies.
In the second part, these developments are examined by taking the concept of carbon democracy into account.
Describing the Status Quo: Emission Profiles and Policies in Canada Canada’s climate policy-making has seen various ups and downs and has been rather inconsistent, particularly regarding its international aspirations and domestic actions (Macunias and de Lassus Saint-Geniès 2018, 2).
In the 1980s and 1990s, Canada was one of the most active countries pushing for international climate action, but divergence between its international stance and domestic climate legislation became visible after the turn of the century (Macunias and de Lassus Saint-Geniès 2018).
Starting in 2006, when Stephen Harper became prime minister, the country’s international position on climate action increasingly aligned with its domestic policies, such that on neither front much happened (2018, 6).
Canada was in no way close to fulfilling its Kyoto target of reducing its GHG emissions by six percent of 1990 levels by 2012; rather its emissions in 2008 were 24.1 percent higher than the 1990 base year.
It was thus no surprise that Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011.
After the Trudeau government won the election in 2015, Canada became an active negotiator during the climate negotiations of 2015 that generated the Paris Agreement, mirroring the position of the US (MacNeil and Paterson 2016).
For example, Environment and Climate Change Minister Catherine McKenna said after the meeting that “Canada is back” (King 2015).
In its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), Canada promised to reduce its GHG emissions by 17 percent by 2020, and 30 percent by 2030, against a 2005 base year.
However, its own projections show that it will be hard to achieve these goals (Government of Canada 2015; 2019).
Currently GHG emissions are 17 percent higher than they were in 1990, more or less at the same level as they were in 2005.
In short “despite a change in tone in Paris, Trudeau opted to keep the national GHG emission reduction targets set by the Harper government, which aligned with US targets” (Boyd 13 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 and Rabe 2019, 242).
The Canadian government has officially distanced itself from Donald Trump’s anti-Paris Agreement rhetoric, but on a per capita basis Canadian emissions are even slightly higher than those of the US (Climate Transparency 2020).
Partially thanks to fracking (which has other highly problematic environmental impacts) the build-up of renewables, and reduction in the use of coal, the US has been able reduce its emissions considerably over the last ten years.
As various authors have pointed out (Schreurs 2011; Boyd and Rabe 2019, 252f; Boyd 2019), there are significant differences between the Canadian provinces.
Alberta alone is responsible for about a third of Canada’s GHG emissions, and emissions from Alberta and Saskatchewan are still increasing.
Ontario and Quebéc, meanwhile, have managed to reduce their emissions quite substantially and are cooperating with progressive US states.
They are also adopting best practices from the US.
To fulfill its Paris Agreement obligations, the Canadian government launched the Pan-Canadian Framework (PCF) on Clean Growth and Climate Change in 2016 and the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act in 2018.
The PCF is highly flexible in allowing the provinces leeway on how to tackle climate change as long as something is happening that puts a price on carbon.
Thus, British Columbia (BC) and Alberta introduced a CO2 tax, whereas Ontario and Quebéc started to set up an emission trading system (ETS), which Ontario abandoned in 2018.
In April 2019, the federal government introduced a carbon tax on fossil fuels in four provinces (Ontario, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan) after the provincial governments did not establish legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Evaluating Canada’s 2030 pledge, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims the country’s current plan will not be sufficient.
Additionally, a recent World Bank report on carbon pricing calculated that to achieve the Paris goal, Canada’s CO2 tax would need to increase from 15 Canadian dollars per tonne of CO2 today, to between 75 and 150 Canadian dollars per tonnes in 2030 (2019, 19).
According to the dominating perception, Canada is backtracking on its Paris Agreement commitments and is “falling back on the centrality of its bilateral relationships with the United States and contending that it could only consider acting if America was moving in step” (Boyd and Rabe 2019, 254-255).
Currently, deep decarbonization is not on the federal government’s agenda.
The country has introduced some new policies but will most likely miss its own NDC target, which was not very ambitious to begin with (Kuramochi et al.
2019, 32).
Describing the Status Quo: Emission Profiles and Policies in the European Union If one compares the EU’s domestic track record with that of Canada, the EU is doing better, having built up “the world’s most advanced and comprehensive regulatory frameworks, encompassing both EU-wide policies and targets to be achieved by the member states” (Delreux and Ohler 2019, 2).
The EU has overachieved its Kyoto target of eight percent below 1990 CO2 emission levels during the first commitment period 2008–2012 by delivering a reduction of 12 percent.
The bloc has also fulfilled its pledge for 2020 (20 percent below 1990 levels).
The main reason for the EU’s success so far, besides the financial crisis and the de-industrialization of some parts of Eastern Germany, has been a tremendous increase in the use of renewable energy sources: between 2005 and 2015, there was a 71 percent increase of renewable energy capacity within the EU.
Still, some serious problems persist.
In 2017, there was a 0.6 percent increase of GHG emissions within the EU, even within those sectors covered by the EU ETS.
This was due to an increase in the use of lignite for power generation.
In 2018, there was a reduction of emissions by 2.1 percent, but this happened almost solely due to changes in the power sector, and the transport sector 14 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 witnessed a slight increase.
In 2020, the slowdown due to the various pandemic lock-downs has led to further and substantial decreases in GHG emissions, but it is questionable whether these will be permanent (for a more positive reading, see Schreurs and Schott 2020 this issue).
Of course, the EU is not a monolithic bloc.
Some countries are doing more than others; for example, Sweden and Denmark, according to the 2019 New Climate Institute’s Climate Change Performance Index, are the two global front-runners regarding their path toward the Paris Agreement’s targets (Burck et al.
2019).
Countries like Estonia, Bulgaria, and Poland, on the other hand, are doing much worse.
In the EU, the European ETS has so far been the main instrument in mitigating climate change; it covers about 40 percent of the EU’s emissions in six sectors and in about 11,000 installations.
Non-ETS sectors like agriculture, transport (except air transport), or buildings are in the domain of the member states, with each one having a specific target.
The EU ETS has been perceived as a success, as it has not only facilitated the reduction of GHG emissions, but has been more successful in those industries that are covered by the scheme than those that are not (Ellerman, Marcantonini and Zaklan 2015).
Additionally, the ETS has not reduced competitiveness of impacted companies (Joltreau and Sommerfeld 2019).
The EU ETS, which was reformed in 2018 to avoid a growing surplus of emission rights (Wettestad and Jevnaker 2019; EU 2018), will also lead to further reductions.
Its phase four, beginning in 2021, includes a yearly reduction of the cap of 2.2 percent (Oberthür 2019, 19).
Nevertheless, problems are still visible, and they have to do with the various exceptions for specific industries and the grandfathering of a still large amount of emission rights.
Furthermore, the hard nuts to crack – transport and buildings – have not yet been included, and only recently has much progress has been achieved in these sectors (Delreux and Ohler 2019, 11).
Interpreting and Comparing the Status Quo: Carbon Democracy at Work The EU and Canada have taken divergent paths and it is evident that the former has produced more progressive climate policy-making.
Nevertheless, both polities have historically featured the major characteristics of carbon democracy.
In Canada and the EU (or, more historically correctly, in its member states) broader mass participation in politics was influenced by the extensive use of first coal and later oil.
During the “great acceleration” (Steffen et al.
2015) after the end of World War II, Canada and Europe extensively relied on the socio-technological system of fossil fuels, and they partially still do.
In both polities, it was not only that economic growth depended on the burning of coal and oil, but a huge fossil fuel energy infrastructure was also formed.
This infrastructure supported and strengthened powerful fossil fuel-based sectors, primarily energy companies in Canada and the automotive sector in Europe, that came to dominate their economies and fed into the development of a worldview that entrenched the use of fossil fuels.
First, regarding energy extraction, production, transportation, and consumption, Canada and the EU have both strongly relied on the digging up and burning of coal, oil, and gas.
In both regions, infrastructures have been set up that have locked in the use of fossil fuels for the next generation.
This has been most evident in the discussions about new pipelines.
For Canada, the “pipelines for Paris” suggestion (MacLean 2018) implied that the Paris Agreement could only gain enough political support in Canada if its ratification would not lead to a shut-down of pipelines.
This might not have increased the government’s popularity, particularly in Alberta, but it certainly entrenched the power of the fossil fuel industry.
Former Alberta Premiere Alison Redford stated, “Alberta’s oil sands are the lifeblood of our economy.” Indeed, if realized, the GHG emissions of the Pacific Northwest Liquid Natural Gas project would make up about 10 percent of Canada’s remaining carbon budget if calculated on a per-capita emissions basis (2018, 52).
Even more worrisome, the upstream GHG emissions caused by the Trans Mountain pipeline, which the government purchased in 2018 and which is estimated to work over a period of 50 years, will by itself consume 15 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 about 83 percent of Canada’s share of its carbon budget if we take the Paris Agreement’s more lenient target of two degrees Celsius as a benchmark (100 percent if a 1.5°C target is taken) (2018, 58).
Bill McKibben (2020) thus claimed that “Canada, which is 0.5 percent of the planet’s population, plans to use up nearly a third of the planet’s remaining carbon budget.” Furthermore, the Canadian government is, all rhetorical claims withstanding, deeply embedded in the fossil fuel age, as demonstrated by the various direct and indirect subsidies of about 40 billion dollars to oil and gas in 2015 (Green 2019).
For the EU, Nord Stream 2 is to transport natural gas directly from Russia to Germany.
This will at first reduce Germany’s, and thus the EU’s, carbon emissions, as natural gas will primarily replace lignite.
But in the medium to long run, it will have serious environmental impacts in Russia, and will lock the EU into a new infrastructure set to deliver 55 billion cubic metres of natural gas that will produce about 106 million tonnes of CO2 – the equivalent of the annual emissions of the Czech Republic (Stoczkiewicz 2017).
Similar to Canada, though on a smaller scale overall, the EU is thus partially locking-in its dependence on natural gas.
As for coal, in the PCF Canada committed itself to a national phase out by 2030, although some leeway is provided on the provincial level (Boyd and Rabe 2019, 248).
Within the EU, Portugal, Greece, Hungary, France, Germany, and now even Poland announced the phaseout of coal.
However, the closing of all coal fired power plants will most likely not happen before 2038 when Germany and Poland have finished their respective phaseouts.
Second, Canada and the EU still have sectors that are hard to green, which has given rise to a variety of veto-players.
For Canada, this is evident in the case of utilities and energy companies, including the huge field of mining and extraction.
These sectors represent a form of “prairie capitalism” that Richards and Pratts (1979) identified as a trend for Canada in some Western provinces more than four decades ago and that Kellogg (2015) recently ‘revisited’ for the oil and bitumen industries.
The argument behind prairie capitalism is analogous to carbon democracy in that it stresses the important influence of large-scale ownership of specific extractive assets.
The claim of prairie capitalism is that it is not foreign capital that advances capitalist practices, for example in Alberta’s bitumen industry, but rather a regional bourgeoisie, and that therefore Canada should not be understood as being part of a colonial periphery but rather of the capitalist center.
Canada exported fossil fuels worth 134 billion Canadian dollars in 2019 (Government of Canada 2020) and the export-oriented agricultural sector is also highly dependent on fossil fuels.
These exports go primarily to the US market, leading to a high level of vulnerability to what happens there, but these industries are largely owned by Canadians.
A restructuring of these sectors would be very cost intensive (Boyd and Rabe 2019, 242) and would impact the social fabric of Canadian capitalism.
But it is not only the ‘bourgeoisie’ that is profiting from Canada’s carbon democracy; unions are particularly strong in the fossil fuel-dependent sectors.
Workers in these sectors often enjoy wages far above average and are reluctant to give up their privileged position (MacArthur et al.
2020, 5).
In the EU, the fossil fuel sector is less entrenched than in Canada, but industrial policy is strongly influenced by companies and unions which depend on fossil fuels; this starts with Airbus and includes the automotive sector with its strong union culture.
Furthermore, the strong welfare state in both polities, and the corporatist politics in the mentioned industries, make ambitious reforms with redistributive effects hard to implement (MacArthur et al.
2020).
Both Canada and the EU strongly rely on economic growth, and any policy that does not take this into account might face massive opposition.
In Europe, this became evident with France’s ‘yellow vest movement’ opposing President Macron’s increase of gas prices in 2019.
Also, in late 2019 the German right16 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) announced its intention to contest the financing of renewable energy and any plans to further reduce GHG emissions.
Climate thus became the third major topic of the party.
In Canada and the EU, these policies also face strong subnational/national actors that have substantially entrenched veto positions.
In both polities the ‘federal’ level has only marginal competences to actually bring change to the socio-technical infrastructure in place.
For example, Alberta in Canada and Poland in the EU can be considered spoilers of progressive climate change policies.
These actors cannot simply be sidelined.
Alberta strongly depends on revenues from the oil and gas industry which is responsible for over a third of Alberta’s emissions (Boyd 2019, 2).
Despite the fact that Alberta is a leader in installing wind power installations, with an installed wind energy capacity of 1,685 Mega Watt (CanWEA 2020), it is a “reluctant actor” that moves only when external pressure, usually from the US, is present (Boyd 2019, 2; MacDonald and VanNijnatten 2010).
Thus, within Canada’s strong federalist tradition, “Ottawa has limited capacity to control or direct Canadian climate policy” (MacNeil and Paterson 2016, 556), and it is particularly at the provincial level that more progressive action is being held back.
Poland, which depends on coal for its power sector, has emerged as the main spoiler of climate change policies in the EU.
The EU has repeatedly compromised on its policy frameworks due to Polish pressure (Skjærseth 2018).
The EU might have some leeway on climate policies but is historically lacking the power to regulate energy issues (Szarka 2016) and has only recently started to engage in regulating traffic.
The EU 2030 Framework also shows that the European Commission could not set binding energy efficiency or renewable energy targets on the member states, although it could strengthen procedural obligations of member states regarding their energy and climate plans (Oberthür 2019, 24).
Finally, Canada and the EU are carbon democracies not only in that both polities rely on energy in a material sense, but also in their worldviews (for a general debate on worldviews and climate change, particularly mobility, see Chuang, Manley, and Petersen 2020; Sovacool and Griffiths 2020).
Canadians’ and Europeans’ respective identities are to some extent shaped by a tradition of resource extraction and high mobility.
In Canada, this is part of the pioneer mentality, where nature is understood as a “hinterland” whose purpose it is to provide goods for its citizens, while European populations might perceive of nature rather as countryside that is also available for human use (Dalby 2019, 103).
In both polities, a culture of high mobility has evolved that relies on individualized transport.
In Canada and the EU, legislation has introduced higher emission standards, and both polities have started to subsidize electric mobility, fostering some discussions on smarter mobility (Barr 2018), but neither has so far started to rethink transport more fundamentally.
Transforming Carbon Democracies Through Green Deals?
Canada and the EU are carbon democracies, but could this be changed through domestic pressure, as foreseen in the Paris Agreement (Falkner 2016)?
After all, various actors within civil society are pushing for more progressive climate policies, resonating with a more general attitude within the population.
For example, in Canada, more than half of the population supports the introduction of market-based mechanisms to stop climate change and this holds true even for provinces that have historically been reluctant on mitigation actions (Pew Research Center 2017; Mildenberger and Lachapelle 2019).
Furthermore, the youth activist Fridays for Future movements are active in 17 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 both polities even though they have resonated more within the EU.
Greta Thunberg was invited by Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EU Commission, when von der Leyen presented the EU’s new climate law in March 2020.
Thunberg, nevertheless, criticized the EU’s position as a “surrender” because it failed to keep up with the 1.5 degree target of the Paris Agreement (BBC 2020).
Similar to the student protests of the 1960s which called for democratizing Western societies, the current youth movement calling for more radical climate policies might have a chance to actually make an impact (Marquardt 2020).
Fridays for Future is an indicator that climate change has become politicized in the sense that conflicts in this policy field are becoming more intense and visible (Schattschneider 1960; Hutter and Grande 2014).
This implies that climate is gaining in salience with more actors being involved, more polarization in viewpoints, and more alternatives being developed (for a discussion of these elements of politicization, see Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019; Hoeglinger 2016).
Many alternatives are currently being envisioned under the term ‘green deal’, a label which refers to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ which unleashed various public works and investment programs in the US between 1933 and 1939 to counter the effects of the Great Depression, when the unemployment rate ballooned to 25 percent.
This governmental involvement in the US economy was unprecedented, and it made the government the largest employer in the country.
Furthermore, Roosevelt’s New Deal also increased the power of the federal government in relation to the states (Patterson 1969).
The metaphor of the New Deal is today advanced by very different camps.
In academia, for example, there is a group of scholars who argue that a green deal must be radically transformative, and to be successful it will have to overcome capitalism (Pettifor 2019; Klein 2019).
Others have stressed that a green deal could be part of ecological modernization and a green economy (e.g.
Jänicke 2012; Pahle, Pachauri, and Steinbacher 2016; UNEP 2011; Rifkin 2019).
Politically, the notion of a green deal was most prominently promoted by Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the US, who became a figurehead for progressive climate policies in America in 2018.
She builds on debates that had been around, at least within the Democratic Party, since 2006 (Bang and Schreurs 2011) and that at the same time also had gained a lot of traction in some parts of the Labour Party in the UK.
In the US, the green deal offers to provide a political, as well as economic or societal, answer to the climate problem.
Although President Biden was hesitant to endorse the notion of a green deal during the campaign, his “Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice” contains many of the major economic, social, and ecological elements of what the proponents of the green deal have demanded, such as a massive roll-out of new energy infrastructures (Biden 2020).
Hence, the US example shows that climate issues are no longer just another environmental problem, but rather a challenge to how the economic system is structured.
Furthermore, proponents have a very strong focus on social justice and are trying to reach out to blue-collar workers.
How are these ideas taken up in Canada and the EU, and do they have a chance to provide an alternative to carbon democracy?
The Green Deal in Canada: A Variety of Bottom-Up Movements In Canada, the idea of a green deal has been embraced by various civil society organizations (e.g., Greenpeace, North 99) as well as by local communities and Indigenous groups who are pushing for transformative policies that would end Canada’s dependence on fossil fuels (MacArthur et al.
2020).
In 2019, many grassroots initiatives which were opposed to the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) have turned their attention to environmental issues and started to campaign for a ‘New Green Deal’ (Coalition for a Green New Deal 2019).
This campaign serves as a rallying 18 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 cry that unites various political agendas.
For example, the movement of “The Pact for a Green New Deal” was developed through town hall meetings which gathered a diverse set of demands ranging from Indigenous rights to green infrastructures.
The resulting list was labelled a “Green New Deal”.
The movement for a green deal is particularly strong in Quebéc, where a “Pacte pour le transition” was introduced and signed by more than 285,000 people in April 2020 (Shields 2019).
At the federal level, Member of Parliament Peter Julian submitted a motion for a “Green New Deal for Canada” in December 2019, a legislative initiative advocating for a green deal in Canada which stressed the notion of a just transition (Julian 2020).
What is evident is that in all statements and formulations of the broader movement, the issue of social justice is a major demand and the notions of Indigenous knowledge, as well as climate justice, are particularly stressed (The Council of Canadians 2019).
Evaluating the various attempts to bring about a green deal in Canada, Jessica Green (2019) suggests that so far it “is more aspiration than legislation.
But the momentum for decisive action on climate change is growing.” One can thus conclude that the idea of a green deal in Canada is an attempt to move beyond carbon democracy from the bottom up, building on grassroots movements and stressing justice as well as local and Indigenous forms of knowledge (see also MacArthur et al.
2020).
A new worldview is being promoted, but there is still not enough momentum for a new socio-technical infrastructure to evolve.
Neither are the existing power structures of the fossil fuel industry – particularly the energy sector – being replaced, nor are the veto positions of fossil fuel dependent provinces being challenged.
At least for the foreseeable future, it thus seems unlikely that these bottom-up processes will evolve into a game changer to Canada’s carbon democracy and prairie capitalism.
The Green Deal in the EU: Top-Down Approaches in Times of COVID-19 In Europe, the idea of a green deal has been advanced in a top-down fashion more than it has in Canada.
The concept was promoted by the EU Commission, which announced that Europe will be the first carbon-neutral continent and which promised to “transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use” (European Commission 2019, 2).
The Commission’s president, von der Leyen, announced a plan worth one trillion euros that over a period of 10 years will massively restructure Europe’s industry toward decarbonization.
The first objective was initially set to 50 percent reduction of the EU’s emissions by 2030 (taking 1990 as the base year); however, this target was increased to 55 percent in December 2020 by the European Council in order to provide new momentum to the stagnant European economy.
The green deal is also much more ambitious in its scope compared to former policy announcements, as it focuses not only on carbon pricing through the EU ETS, potentially supported by a carbon border tax to avoid leakage, but also on sustainable investment, e.g., in the fields of buildings, mobility, industrial policy, and a just transition (European Commission 2019).
In particular, the notion of a just transition fund of about 100 billion euros to compensate those regions and sectors within Europe that lose out from decarbonization and to counterbalance adverse distributional effects, potentially through compensation mechanisms, has been perceived as an innovative way to get countries like Poland on board (Claeys, Tagliapietra, and Zachmann 2019, 15f).
The EU’s green deal has been criticized for the fact that not much of the money is actually new or additional but rather represents a reshuffling of existing funds, generating only 7.5 billion euros in new commitments (Varoufakis and Adler 2020).
It is also highly questionable how green the 19 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 contributions really are, such as those regarding farm subsidies.
Furthermore, most of the money is supposed to come from private-sector investments, but the private sector is still under-investing in green technologies.
To reach the targets of the green deal, about 25 percent of all new investments will have to go into sustainable technologies, up from only 12 percent now (Geinitz 2020).
Finally, the EU reached an agreement on its future budget for 2020–2027, which includes a COVID-19 recovery fund and which foresees 30 percent of allocated resources being used to finance various aspects of the EU’s climate objectives.
However, so far in all G20 countries the money spent in the context of COVID-19 has supported high-carbon economic production, although the EU is the polity investing most in low-carbon production measures (UNEP 2020, 38).
Despite numerous challenges, the overall outlook is positive.
First, the green deal will lead to some climate mainstreaming as is already visible with the EU stability pact, where – before the COVID19 crisis and the factual cancellation of the pact – the idea was floated that climate measures would not count as fiscal deficits.
This is relevant as it allows EU member states to invest more in sustainable technologies and practices without having to fear that austerity measures from the EU Commission will follow.
The green deal also targets the common agricultural policy and infrastructure investments that so far have not been front-runners of decarbonization, thus developing a strong multi-sectoral component.
Second, the European measures might have some leverage on the member states, which is not only true for potential buy-in by Poland but also due to provisions of ambitious parameters for the frontrunners.
For example, the German energy transition might get a necessary boost through tougher European regulations (Löschel 2020).
Other players who tried to stop the Commission’s work on the green deal, like the Czech president Babis, were simply sidelined and could not stop the deal nor the recovery fund (Oroschakoff and Mathiesen 2020).
Third, the green deal is supported by the European Central Bank, and some policy-makers have brought up the idea of green bonds which would, for the first time, provide the EU with revenues independent from the member states (Taylor 2021).
Likewise, the European Investment Bank will continue to restructure its financing to make it greener.
Similarly, the green deal is going beyond the piecemeal attempts that characterized earlier European approaches (Harvey and Rankin 2020).
The green deal will be particularly important for European clean-tech companies which need to scale up within the larger European market in order to be on an equal footing with the competitors in the US and China that often underprice European companies due to having gained experiences in larger domestic markets (Claeys, Tagliapietra, and Zachmann 2019, 14).
The green deal could, therefore, evolve as a first step for the EU to move beyond the characteristics of a carbon democracy.
The EU member states’ phase out of extracting and burning coal, and the concurrent investment in renewable energies, allows the build-up of a new socio-technical infrastructure that is no longer based on fossil fuels.
Important sectors like the European car industry and even whole countries like Poland are now being pressured by the European Commission and civil society to make the changes they had long avoided (Oroschakoff and Mathiesen 2020).
A new momentum has been created that will make obstructive policy-making much harder to succeed.
Finally, with the attempt to integrate progressive climate policies across the whole spectrum, and addressing recalcitrant sectors like traffic, agriculture and building, the EU can no longer be criticized for shallow green-washing.
20 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Conclusion: From Carbon to Green Democracy?
The gist of this article can be summarized in two arguments.
First, Greta Thunberg’s warning at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2019 that “the house is on fire” came right on time.
Indeed, the science showing the negative impacts on our planet of anthropogenic climate change is extremely disturbing (IPCC 2018).
As this article has argued, contrary to official claims, neither Canada nor the EU has so far been a successful firefighter.
The socio-technical infrastructure behind the extraction, transportation, and consumption of fossil fuels is still to a large extent structuring their economies, societies, and politics in profound ways.
Carbon democracy has been deeply entrenched in both polities.
Too often policy and academic debates on how the climate problem can be solved are framing the issue as another environmental disturbance that needs a technical solution, but ignoring the deep-seated entrenchment of carbon democracy.
Second, not all hope is lost.
Fridays for Future and other civil society movements are contributing to a strong politicization of climate change.
And at least for the EU, the politicization has found a rallying cry in the idea of a European green deal.
This could lead to what Meadowcraft and others have labelled a “green state” (Bäckstrand and Kronsell 2015; Duit, Feindt, and Meadowcroft 2016; Meadowcroft 2012).
However, for Canada it is evident that much has to happen to overcome the deep-seated practices of prairie capitalism and carbon democracy.
As Canada has traditionally aligned its climate policy with that of the US, there is hope that the government may again align its policies with the new US administration that plans to engage more constructively in global climate talks and to change some elements of its fossil fuel socio-economic infrastructure.
Whether the more positive evaluation of the EU is due to the fact that the EU institutions are more insulated from public pressure, and thus can force decarbonization more strongly than can their counterparts in a country like Canada, is an open question that merits further research.
In conclusion, decarbonization and the attempt to leave the socio-technical infrastructure of our carbon democracies behind us have slowly evolved into a political and social project that could lead to the much-needed green transformation.
21 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 REFERENCES Bäckstrand, Karin, and Anika Kronsell, eds.
2015.
Rethinking the Green State: Environmental governance towards climate and sustainability transitions.
London: Routledge.
Balthasar, Andreas, Miranda A. Schreurs, and Frédéric Varone.
2019.
“Energy Transition in Europe and the United States: Policy Entrepreneurs and Veto Players in Federalist Systems.” The Journal of Environment & Development 29 (1): 3-25. doi: 10.1177/1070496519887489.
Bang, Guri and Miranda A. Schreurs, 2011.
“A Green New Deal: Framing U.S.
Climate Leadership.” In The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics, edited by Rüdiger K.W.
Wurzel and James Connelly, 235-251.
London: Routledge.
Barr, Stewart.
2018.
“Personal mobility and climate change.” WIREs Climate Change 9 (5): e542.
doi: 10.1002/wcc.542.
BBC.
2020.
“Greta Thunberg brands EU’s new climate law 'surrender'.” BBC, March 4, 2020.
Accessed April 1, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51736134.
Biden, Joe.
2020.
“The Biden Plan For A Clean Energy Revolution and Envrionmental Justice.” Accessed April 1, 2021. https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/.
Boyd, Brendan.
2019.
“A Province under Pressure: Climate Change Policy in Alberta.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 183-199. doi: 10.1017/S0008423918000410.
Boyd, Brendan, and Barry Rabe.
2019.
“Whither Canadian Climate Policy in the Trump Era?” In Canada–US Relations: Sovereignty or Shared Institutions?, edited by David Carment and Christopher Sands, 239-260.
Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Brand, Ulrich, and Markus Wissen.
2017.
Imperiale Lebensweise.
Zur Ausbeutung von Mensch und Natur im globalen Kapitalismus.
München: Okeom.
Bulkeley, Harriet.
2014.
“Climate change and urban governance: a new politics?” In Routledge International Handbook of Social and Environmental Change, edited by Stewart Lockie, David A. Sonnenfeld, and Dana R. Fisher, 157-169.
London: Routledge.
Burck, Jan, Ursula Hagen, N. Höhne, Leonardo Nascimento, and Christoph Bals.
2019.
“Climate Change Performance Index.
Results 2020.” Cologne, Bonn, Beirut: New Climate Institute, Germanwatch, CAN.
CanWEA (Canadian Wind Energy Association).
2020.
“Wind energy in Alberta.” CanWEA.
Accessed December 18, 2020. https://canwea.ca/wind-energy/alberta/.
Chuang, Frank, Ed Manley, and Arthur Petersen.
2020.
“The role of worldviews in the governance of sustainable mobility.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117 (8): 4034. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1916936117.
Claeys, Grégory, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann.
2019.
“How to make the European Green Deal work.” Bruegel Policy Contribution No.
14.
Brussels: Bruegel.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51736134 https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ https://canwea.ca/wind-energy/alberta/ 22 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Climate Action Tracker.
2020.
“Countries.” Accessed December 15, 2020. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/.
Climate Transparency.
2020.
“Countries.” Accessed December 15, 2020. https://www.climatetransparency.org/countries.
Coalition for a Green New Deal.
2019.
“What did we hear at The Pact for a Green New Deal Town Halls?” Accessed January 4, 2021. https://act.greennewdealcanada.ca/what-we-heard/.
Dalby, Simon.
2019.
“Canadian geopolitical culture: Climate change and sustainability.
The Canadian Geographer 63 (1): 100-111. doi: 10.1111/cag.12472.
Delreux, Tom, and Frauke Ohler.
2019.
“Climate Policy in European Union Politics,” edited by Oxford Research Encyclopedias.
Duit, Andreas, Peter H. Feindt, and James Meadowcroft.
2016.
“Greening Leviathan: The rise of the environmental state?” Environmental Politics 25 (1): 1-23.
Ellerman, A. Denny, Claudio Marcantonini, and Aleksandar Zaklan.
2015.
“The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting.” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 10 (1): 89-107. doi: 10.1093/reep/rev014.
European Union (EU).
2018.
“Directive (EU) 2018/ 410 of the European Parliament and of the Council.” March 14, 2018.
Brussels: European Union.
European Commission.
2019.
“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: The European Green Deal.” Brussels: European Commission.
Falkner, Robert.
2016.
“The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics.” International Affairs 92 (5): 1107-1125.
Fuhr, Harald, Thomas Hickmann, and Kristine Kern.
2018.
“The role of cities in multi-level climate governance: Local climate policies and the 1.5°C target.” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 30: 1-6. doi: 10.1016/j.cosust.2017.10.006.
Geinitz, Christian.
2020.
“Klimavorreiter scheitern am EU-Ziel.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 25, 2020. https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/wirtschaft/2020-0225/bdd240acdbc91dbf5a23905ecf9f14e6/?GEPC=s5.
Government of Canada.
2015.
“Climate change: Second biennial report.” Ottawa: Government of Canada.
Government of Canada.
2019.
“Progress towards Canada’s greenhouse gas emission reduction target.
Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators.” Ottawa: Government of Canada.
_____.
2020.
“Energy and the Economy.” Accessed January 5, 2021. https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-analysis/energyfacts/energy-and-economy/20062.
https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/ https://www.climate-transparency.org/countries.
https://www.climate-transparency.org/countries.
https://act.greennewdealcanada.ca/what-we-heard/ https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/wirtschaft/2020-02-25/bdd240acdbc91dbf5a23905ecf9f14e6/?GEPC=s5.
https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/wirtschaft/2020-02-25/bdd240acdbc91dbf5a23905ecf9f14e6/?GEPC=s5.
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-analysis/energy-facts/energy-and-economy/20062 https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science-data/data-analysis/energy-data-analysis/energy-facts/energy-and-economy/20062 23 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Grande, Edgar, Tobias Schwarzbözl, and Matthias Fatke.
2019.
“Politicizing immigration in Western Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 26 (10): 1444-1463. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1531909.
Green, Jessica.
2019.
“Why Canada needs a Green New Deal.” The Star, September 26, 2019. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/09/26/why-canada-needs-a-green-newdeal.html.
Harvey, Fiona, and Jennifer Rankin.
2020.
“What is the European Green Deal and will it really cost €1tn?” The Guardian, March 9, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/what-is-the-european-green-deal-andwill-it-really-cost-1tn?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
Hoeglinger, Dominic.
2016.
“The politicisation of European integration in domestic election campaigns.” West European Politics 39 (1): 44-63. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2015.1081509.
Hutter, Swen, and Edgar Grande.
2014.
“Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970–2010.” Journal of Common Market Studies 52 (5): 1002-1018. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12133.
Ike, Vivian.
2020.
“The Impact of Veto Players on Incremental and Drastic Policy Making: Australia's Carbon Tax Policy and Its Repeal.” Politics & Policy 48 (2): 232-264. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12346.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2018.
“Global Warming of 1.5 degree.” Summary for Policymakers.
Geneva: IPCC.
Jänicke, Martin.
2012.
“'Green Growth': From a Growing Eco-Industry to a Sustainable Economy.” Energy Policy 48: 13-21.
Joltreau, Eugénie, and Katrin Sommerfeld.
2019.
“Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms’ competitiveness?
Empirical findings from the literature.” Climate Policy 19 (4): 453-471. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2018.1502145.
Julian, Peter.
2020.
“A Green New Deal: Motion M-1,” Peter Julian, NDP.
Accessed December 18, 2020. https://www.peterjulian.ca/in-the-house-motion-m-1-green-new-deal-for-canada.
Kellogg, Paul.
2015.
“Prairie Capitalism Revisited: Canada, Bitumen, and the Resource Colony Question.” Journal of Canadian Studies 49 (3): 222-255. doi: 10.3138/jcs.49.3.222.
Kind, Ed.
2015.
“Canada says it’s `back` on climate.
But is it?” Climate Change News, November 20, 2015.
Accessed February 18, 2021. https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/29/canada-says-its-back-on-climate-but-isit/ 2015.
Klein, Naomi.
2019.
The Burning Case for a Green New Deal.
London: Allen Lane.
https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/09/26/why-canada-needs-a-green-new-deal.html.
https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/09/26/why-canada-needs-a-green-new-deal.html.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/what-is-the-european-green-deal-and-will-it-really-cost-1tn?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/what-is-the-european-green-deal-and-will-it-really-cost-1tn?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12346.
https://www.peterjulian.ca/in-the-house-motion-m-1-green-new-deal-for-canada.
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/29/canada-says-its-back-on-climate-but-is-it/%202015 https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/29/canada-says-its-back-on-climate-but-is-it/%202015 24 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Kuramochi, Takeshi, N. Nascimento, Maria Jose de Villafranca Casas, Hanna Fekete, Gustovo de Vivero, Swithin Lui, Marie Kurdziel, Mia Moisio, Paola Tanguy, Louise Jeffery, Tessa Schiefer, Masahiro Suzuki, N. Höhne, Heleen van Soest, Michel den Elzen, Kendall Esmeijer, Mark Roelfsema, Nicklas Forsell, and Mykola Gusti.
2019.
“Greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries.
Analysis of current climate policies and mitigation commitments: 2019 update.” Cologne: New Climate Institute.
Löschel, Andreas.
2020.
“European Green Deal und deutsche Energiewende zusammen denken!” Wirtschaftsdienst 100 (2): 78-79. doi: 10.1007/s10273-020-2566-x.
MacArthur, Julie L., Christina E. Hoicka, Heather Castleden, Runa Das, and Jenny Lieu.
2020.
“Canada’s Green New Deal: Forging the socio-political foundations of climate resilient infrastructure?” Energy Research & Social Science 65: 101442. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101442.
MacDonald, Douglas, and Debora VanNijnatten.
2010.
“Canadian climate policy and the North American influence.” In Borders and Bridges: Canada’s policy relations in North America, edited by G.E.
Hale and M. Gattinger, 177-193.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford Univerity Press.
MacLean, Jason.
2018.
“Paris and Pipeleines?
Canada’s Climate Policy Puzzle.” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 21 (1): 47-74.
MacNeil, Robert, and Matthew Paterson.
2016.
“This changes everything?
Canadian climate policy and the 2015 election.” Environmental Politics 25 (3): 553-557. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2016.1140280.
Macunias, Silvia, and Géraud de Lassus Saint-Geniès.
2018.
“The Evolution of Canada’s International and Domestic Climate Policy: From Divergence to Consistency?
Canada in International Law at 150 and Beyond,” Paper no.
21.
Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation.
Marquardt, Jens.
2020.
“Fridays for Future’s Disruptive Potential: An Inconvenient Youth Between Moderate and Radical Ideas.” Frontiers in Communication 5 (48): 1-18.
McKibben, Bill.
2020.
“When it comes to climate hypocrisy, Canada’s leaders have reached a new low.” The Guardian, February 5, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climatehypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
Meadowcroft, James.
2012.
“Greening the State?” In Comparative Environmental Politics.
Theory, Practice, and Prospects, edited by Paul F. Steinberg and Stacy D. VanDeveer, 6387.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mildenberger, Matto, and Erick Lachapelle.
2019.
“Canadians in every riding support climate action, new research schows.” The Conversation, September 5, 2019.
Accessed January 4, 2021. https://theconversation.com/canadians-in-every-riding-support-climate-action-newresearch-shows-122918.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101442 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climate-hypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/05/when-it-comes-to-climate-hypocrisy-canadas-leaders-have-reached-a-new-low?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
https://theconversation.com/canadians-in-every-riding-support-climate-action-new-research-shows-122918 https://theconversation.com/canadians-in-every-riding-support-climate-action-new-research-shows-122918 25 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Mitchell, Timothy.
2011.
Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil.
Brooklyn, NY: Verso.
Morris, Ian.
2015.
Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels: How Human Values Evolve.
New York, NY: Princeton University Press.
Oberthür, Sebastian.
2019.
“Hard or Soft Governance?
The EU’s Climate and Energy Policy Framework for 2030.” Politics and Governance 7 (1): 17-27. doi: 10.17645/pag.v7i1.1796.
Oroschakoff, Kalina, and Karl Mathiesen.
2020.
“How the EU’s Green Deal survived the coronavirus pandemic.” Politico, December 17, 2020.
Accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/how-eu-climate-change-promises-survived-the-coronavirusplague/.
Pahle, Michael, Shonali Pachauri, and Karoline Steinbacher.
2016.
“Can the Green Economy Deliver It All?
: Experiences of renewable energy policies with socio-economic objectives.” Applied Energy 179: 1331–1341.
doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.06.073.
Patterson, James T. 1969.
The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pettifor, Ann.
2019.
The Case for the Green New Deal.
London: Verso.
Pew Research Center.
2017.
“Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats,” Pew Research Center, August 1, 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climatechange-as-leading-security-threats/.
Richards, John, and Leon Pratt.
1979.
Prairie Capitalism: Power and influence in the new West.
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
Rifkin, Jeremy.
2019.
The Green New Deal: Why the Fossil Fuel Civilization will Collapse by 2028, and the Bold Economic Plan to Save Life on Earth.
New York, NY: MacMillan.
Roger, Charles, Thomas Hale, and Liliana Andonova.
2017.
“The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance.” International Interactions 43 (1): 1-25. doi: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1252248.
Schattschneider, E. E. 1960.
The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America.
Hinsdale, IL: The Dyden Press.
Schreurs, Miranda A.
2011.
“Federalism and the Climate: Canada and the European Union.” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 66 (1): 91-108. doi: 10.1177/002070201106600107.
Shields, Alexadre.
2019.
“Un an après le Pacte, Dominic Champagne ne désespère pas.” Le Devoir, November 8, 2019. https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/environnement/566585/unan-apres-le-pacte-de-la-transition.
https://www.politico.eu/article/how-eu-climate-change-promises-survived-the-coronavirus-plague/ https://www.politico.eu/article/how-eu-climate-change-promises-survived-the-coronavirus-plague/ https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/ https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats/ https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/environnement/566585/un-an-apres-le-pacte-de-la-transition.
https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/environnement/566585/un-an-apres-le-pacte-de-la-transition.
26 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Skjærseth, Jon Birger.
2018.
“Implementing EU climate and energy policies in Poland: Policy feedback and reform.” Environmental Politics 27 (3): 498-518. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2018.1429046.
Smil, Vaclav.
2018.
Energy and Civilization.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sovacool, Benjamin K., and Steve Griffiths.
2020.
“The cultural barriers to a low-carbon future: A review of six mobility and energy transitions across 28 countries.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 119: 109569. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.109569.
Sprinz, Detlef, and M. Weiß.
2001.
“Domestic Politics and Global Climate Policy.” In International Relations and Global Climate Change, edited by U. Luterbacher and Detlef Sprinz.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Steffen, Will, Wendy Broadgate, Lisa Deutsch, Owen Gaffney, and Cornelia Ludwig.
2015.
“The trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration.” The Anthropocene Review 2 (1): 81-98. doi: 10.1177/2053019614564785.
Stephenson, J. R., B. K. Sovacool, and T. H. J. Inderberg.
2021.
“Energy cultures and national decarbonisation pathways.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 137: 110592. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110592.
Stern, Nicholas.
2015.
Why Are We Waiting?
The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Stoczkiewicz, Marcin.
2017.
“EU should block Nord Stream 2 on climate grounds.” Climate Home News.
March 31, 2020.
Szarka, Joseph.
2016.
“Towards an Evolutionary or a Transformational Energy Transition?
: Transition Concepts and Roadmaps in European Union Policy Discourse.” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 29 (3): 222–242.
doi: 10.1080/13511610.2016.1166039.
Taylor, Kira.
2021.
“European Central Bank sets up climate team, considers green bonds.” EURACTIV, January 26, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energyenvironment/news/european-central-bank-sets-up-climate-team-considers-green-bonds/.
The Council of Canadians.
2019.
“It’s time for a Green New Deal,” August, 2019.
Accessed December 18, 2020. https://canadians.org/factsheet-greennewdeal.
The New Climate Economy.
2018.
“Unlocking the Inclusive Growth Story of the 21st Century: Accelerating Climate Action in Urgent Times.” Washington, DC: New Climate Economy.
Torney, Diarmuid.
2019.
“Follow the leader?
Conceptualising the relationship between leaders and followers in polycentric climate governance.” Environmental Politics 28 (1): 167-186. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2019.1522029.
United Nations Environment (UNEP).
2011.
“Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication.” Nairobi: UNEP.
____.
2020.
“The Emissions Gap Report 2020.” Nairobi: UNEP.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110592 https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/european-central-bank-sets-up-climate-team-considers-green-bonds/ https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/european-central-bank-sets-up-climate-team-considers-green-bonds/ https://canadians.org/factsheet-greennewdeal 27 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Varoufakis, Yanis, and David Adler.
2020.
“The EU’s green deal is a colossal exercise in greenwashing.” The Guardian, February 7, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/07/eu-green-deal-greenwashursula-von-der-leyen-climate?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
Wettestad, Jørgen, and Torbjørg Jevnaker.
2019.
“Smokescreen Politics?
Ratcheting Up EU Emissions Trading in 2017.” Review of Policy Research 36 (5): 635-659. doi: 10.1111/ropr.12345.
World Bank.
2019.
“Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Pricing and Competitiveness.” Washington, DC: World Bank.
Wurzel, Rüdiger K. W., James Connelly, and Duncan Liefferink.
2017.
The European Union in International Climate Change Politics.
Still Taking a Lead.
Abingdon: Routledge.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/07/eu-green-deal-greenwash-ursula-von-der-leyen-climate?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/07/eu-green-deal-greenwash-ursula-von-der-leyen-climate?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
28 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(2) 2020: 9-28 ISSN 2562-8429 Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index The Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies (CJERS – formerly Review of European and Russian Affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review.
Topics relate to the European Union, its Member States, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe.
The journal is published by the Centre for European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University.
CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship.
Contact: Carleton University The Centre for European Studies 1103 Dunton Tower 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Canada Tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext.
3117; E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca Creative Commons License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This Working Paper is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-CommercialNo Derivs 4.0 Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged.
No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes.
ISSN: 2562-8429 © 2019 The Author(s) https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index mailto:CJERS@carleton.ca https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
103 © Creative Commons With Attribution (CC-BY) Published by the UFS http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77):103-119 | ISSN 1012-280 | e-ISSN 2415-0495 How to cite: van Niekerk, W., Pieterse, A.
& le Roux, A.
2020.
Introducing the Green Book: A practical planning tool for adapting South African settlements to climate change.
Town and Regional Planning, no.77, pp.
103-119.
Ms Willemien (C.W.)
van Niekerk, Principal Researcher, CSIR Smart Places, P.O.
Box 395; Pretoria 0001.
Phone: 012 841 2552, email: <wvniekerk@csir.co.za>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6187-9520.
Ms Amy (A.)
Pieterse, Senior Researcher, CSIR Smart Places, P.O.
Box 395; Pretoria 0001.
Phone: 012 841 4220, email: <apieterse@csir.co.za>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8270-456X.
Ms Alize (A.)
le Roux, Principal Researcher, CSIR Smart Places, P.O.
Box 395; Pretoria 0001.
Phone: 012 841 3242, email: <aleroux1@csir.co.za>, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9214-5076.
Introducing the Green Book: A practical planning tool for adapting South African settlements to climate change Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.8 Peer reviewed and revised October 2020 Published December 2020 *The authors declared no conflict of interest for this title or article Abstract The Green Book is not a book, but a novel, practical online planning tool to support the adaptation of South African settlements to the impacts of climatic changes and severe events.
It provides evidence of current and future (2050) climate risks and vulnerability for every local municipality in South Africa (including settlements) in the form of climate-change projections, multidimensional vulnerability indicators, population-growth projections, and climate hazard and impact modelling.
Based on this evidence, the Green Book developed a menu of planning-related adaptation actions and offers support in the selection of appropriate actions from this menu to be integrated into local development strategies and plans.
The second half of this article describes the steps involved in the process of developing and structuring this menu of actions and explains how the information contained in the Green Book can be used to promote the planning of climate-resilient settlements in South Africa.
Keywords: adaptation, Green Book, online planning tool, South Africa BEKENDSTELLING VAN DIE GREEN BOOK: ’N PRAKTIESE BEPLANNINGSINSTRUMENT OM SUID-AFRIKAANSE NEDERSETTINGS AAN TE PAS VIR KLIMAATSVERANDERING Die Green Book is nie ’n boek nie, maar ’n nuwe, praktiese aanlyn beplanningsinstrument wat ondersteuning bied om Suid-Afrikaanse nedersettings vir klimaatsverandering en ernstige weersverskynsels aan te pas.
Dit verskaf bewyse van huidige en toekomstige (2050) klimaatsrisiko’s en kwesbaarheid vir elke plaaslike munisipaliteit in SuidAfrika (insluitend nedersettings) in die vorm van klimaatsveranderingprojeksies, multidimensionele kwesbaarheidaanwysers, bevolkingsgroei-projeksies, en klimaatverskynsels en impak modellering.
Gebaseer op hierdie bewyse het die Green Book ’n ‘spyskaart’ van beplanningverwante aanpassingsaksies ontwikkel, en bied ondersteuning met die keuse van toepaslike aksies om geïntegreer te word in plaaslike ontwikkelingstrategieë en planne.
Die tweede helfte van die artikel beskryf die stappe wat betrokke was in die proses om die spyskaart van aksies te ontwikkel en te struktureer, en verduidelik hoe om die inligting wat in die Green Book vervat is, te gebruik om die beplanning van veerkragtige nedersettings in Suid-Afrika te bevorder.
Sleutelwoorde: aanlynbeplanningsinstru ment, aanpassing, Green Book, Suid-Afrika PHATLALATSO EA BUKA E TALA (GREEN BOOK): SESEBELISOA SE SEBETSANG SA HO RALA LIBAKA TSA BOLULO TSA AFRIKA BOROA HO IKAMAHANTSOE LE PHETOHO EA MAEMO A LEHOLIMO Buka e tala ha se buka fela, empa ke sesebediswa sa thero a litoropo se setja, se sebetsang khokahanyong le inthanete, ho ts’ehetsa tloaetso ea libaka tsa bolulo tsa Afrika Boroa litlamorao tsa liphetoho tsa maemo a leholimo le likoluoa.
E fana ka bopaki ba likotsi tse ka tlisoang ke phetoho ea boemo ba leholimo ba hajoale le ba nakong e tlang (2050) le tlokotsi e tobaneng le masepala e mong le e mong oa lehae Afrika Boroa (ho kenyeletsoa le libaka tsa bolulo) ka sebopeho sa likhakanyo tsa phetoho ea maemo a leholimo, lits’oants’o tsa tlokotsi ka ho fapana, likhakanyo tsa kholo ea lipalopalo tsa baahi, le kotsi ea maemo a leholimo ‘moho le mehlala ea litlamorao.
Ho ipapisitse le bopaki bona, Buka e Tala e hlahisitse lethathamo la liketso tse amanang le thero ea litoropo mme e fana ka ts’ehetso ho khethoeng ha liketso tse nepahetseng ho tsoa lenaneng lena hore li kenngoe maanong le mererong ea nts’etsopele ea lehae.
Karolo ea bobeli ea sengoloa sena e hlalosa mehato e amehang molemong oa ho nts’etsapele le ho hlophisa lenane lena la liketso mme e hlalosa hore na tlhaiso-leseling e ka bukeng ena e ka sebelisoa joang ho ntšetsa pele moralo oa libaka tsa bolulo tse matlafatsang maemo a leholimo Afrika Boroa.
http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/trp mailto:wvniekerk@csir.co.za https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6187-9520 mailto:apieterse@csir.co.za https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8270-456X mailto:aleroux1@csir.co.za https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9214-5076 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/2415-0495/trp77i1.8 104 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) 1.
INTRODUCTION A 2019 study by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) projects that the total South African population will grow by an additional 19 to 24 million between 2011 and 2050, totalling between 58 and 62 million people.
The biggest population growth will be in the country’s towns and cities (Le Roux, Arnold, Makhanya & Mans, 2019a: online).
These places are already and will continue to be impacted by global climatic changes as well as local extreme weather events such as intense rainfall that causes flooding (Engelbrecht, Le Roux, Arnold & Malherbe, 2019: online).
The combination of population growth (in some towns doubling in the next three decades), an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme climate-related events, the socio-economic vulnerability of South African communities, and exposure of towns and cities to natural hazards, due to poor planning, will increase the risk for natural disasters to occur, and place tremendous pressure on local municipalities (see Figure 1).
To reduce the risk of loss of lives and livelihoods, severe injury, and damage to, or destruction of infrastructure and buildings, all at great cost to society, local municipalities need to adapt now to the current and likely future impacts of climate change.
The Green Book is not a hard copy book, but an interdisciplinary, openaccess, online tool that was developed to support local municipalities in South Africa to adapt settlements to the likely current and future impacts of climate change (CSIR, 2019: online).
It is structured into three main components: i.
A series of interactive national story maps that communicate the research methodology and key findings from the research, supported by maps, images and statistics.
ii.
A municipal Risk Profile Tool that combines scientific evidence produced from multiple domainspecific research into interactive, composite profiles covering current and future (2050) climate risks, impacts and vulnerabilities for all municipalities in South Africa and their settlements.
iii.
A municipal Adaptation Actions Tool to support adaptation planning in local municipalities by providing a range of planning and design actions for municipalities that can be integrated into existing planning instruments to adapt their settlements to the likely impacts of climate change, to climate proof their settlements, and to reduce their exposure and vulnerability to hazards and thus the risk of disaster.
This article introduces this freely available, practical, online planning support tool to the planning profession – for which it was specifically developed.
The article provides the South African context to urban climatechange risks and vulnerabilities, which is based on new research by the CSIR.
It also describes the steps involved in the process of developing and structuring a unique menu of adaptation actions to support local municipalities in South Africa, with integrating climate-change adaptation into the planning of human settlements.
Lastly, it explains how the information available in the tool can be applied to support the planning of climateresilient settlements in South Africa.
2.
URBAN CLIMATECHANGE RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA Local governments are most sensitive to climate risks and vulnerabilities and have thus a distinct role to play in adapting to climate change.
It is widely recognised that climate change is felt in cities and towns through both short-term events such as natural disasters and long-term impacts such as rise in temperature (Anguelovski, Chu & Carmin, 2014: 156-157; Chen, Doherty, Coffee, Wong & Hellmann, 2016: 403-404).
Figure 1: The combination of a hazard, exposure and vulnerability determine the number of people at risk of disaster Source: Le Roux et al., 2019a: online Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 105 2.1 The impacts of climate change on South African cities by 2050 The highest resolution (8x8 km2) climate-change projections for South Africa to date were developed by the CSIR and published online in the Green Book (Engelbrecht et al., 2019: online).
According to these and other long-standing projections, annual average temperature over the interior of South Africa is projected to rise at roughly one-and-a-half to twice the global rate.
The projections indicate that, under a low mitigation scenario (RCP 8.5), temperature increases between 1°C and 2.5°C may occur over the southern coastal regions by 2050, while more than 3°C is likely over the interior and northern parts of the country.
This will very likely instigate a drastic increase in the number of very hot days,1 heatwave days,2 and high fire-danger days.3 Projected rainfall patterns over South Africa are more uncertain than projected changes in temperature.
A general decrease in rainfall is very likely to occur over southern Africa.
More specifically, rainfall is projected to increase over the central interior and east coast of South Africa by 2050, while the western interior, north-eastern parts and winter rainfall region of the south-western Cape are projected to become generally drier.
The frequency of extreme rainfall events4 is likely to increase over most of the central interior and east coast of South Africa by 2050.
Extreme rainfall events are mostly caused by intense thunderstorms, often accompanied by lightning, hail, damaging winds, and flash floods (Engelbrecht et al., 1 Very hot days are days when the maximum temperature exceeds 35°C (Engelbrecht et al., 2019: online).
2 The World Meteorological Organization defines a heatwave as five or more consecutive days during which the daily maximum temperature surpasses the average maximum temperature by 5°C or more.
3 Fire-danger days are described as days where the McArthur fire-danger index exceeds a value of 24 (Forsyth et al., 2019: online).
4 An extreme rainfall event is defined as 20mm of rain occurring within 24 hours over an area of 64 km2 (Le Maitre et al., 2019: online).
2019: online).5 Furthermore, sea levels are expected to rise by 0.35 metres to 1 metre by 2100.
Combined with increased storm surges, erosion, urbanisation and disturbances of the environment, this will lead to flooding of low-lying coastal areas if no protective measures are in place (Lück-Vogel, Le Roux & Ludick, 2019: online).
Climate change, specifically an increase in the periods of hot, dry and windy conditions, is likely to increase the frequency of wildfires on the wildlandurban interface of South African settlements (e.g.
the Knysna fires of 2017).
The high fire-danger periods will increase, particularly in the southern and eastern parts of the country.
The projections show a southward and eastward expansion of the occurrence of more than 25 high fire-danger days per year.
The most marked shifts in the future are projected to be in the Free State, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, North West and Limpopo provinces (Forsyth, Le Maitre, Le Roux & Ludick, 2019: online).
In terms of recurring drought events, large parts of the country are projected to become drier corresponding to the increase in maximum temperature and very hot days (Beraki, Le Roux & Ludick, 2019: online).
Figures 2 to 6 show the increase in the risk of these climate-related hazards for South African settlements.
It is expected that extreme heat will increasingly be a major hazard for settlements to deal with in the future.
Dense and built-up urban spaces absorb heat and can cause heat stress for people and structures, leading to health risks, higher mortality rates, lower quality of life, higher energy use, and economic losses (Engelbrecht et al., 2019: online).
The fire danger is also likely to increase under hotter and drier conditions.
Furthermore, local municipalities will have to plan for both drought conditions, as well as extreme rainfall events and coastal storm surges that cause flooding.
Ensuring water and food security will become more urgent as the country 5 For more information on climate change projections and impacts on settlements, see the technical reports under the resources page on the Green Book website <https:// www.greenbook.co.za/resources.html>.
becomes drier, while simultaneously settlements will need more protection from flooding (Le Maitre, Kotzee, Le Roux & Ludick, 2019; Beraki et al., 2019; Forsyth et al., 2019: online).
Flooding and fires can cause huge damage to, and destruction of buildings and infrastructure, high repair and maintenance costs, disruption of services, and hamper economic growth.
2.2 The vulnerability of South African settlements to climate-related events Between 1980 and 2019, South Africa experienced over 82 hydrometeorological hazards (floods, storms, landslides, wildfires, droughts, and extreme temperatures) that have resulted in the death of 1,692 people, affected more than 21 million people, and in billions of Rands in direct and indirect losses (Le Roux, Van Huyssteen, Arnold & Ludick, 2019b: online).
It is very likely that hydrometeorological hazards will become more frequent and intense in the future.
Local government, in particular, is increasingly faced with the responsibility to address the effects of climate change as their vulnerable communities and infrastructure are affected by climate change-related events (Pieterse, Du Toit & Van Niekerk, 2020: 2; Pasquini & Shearing, 2014: 272; Van Niekerk, 2013: 2-3).
Combined with a growing urban population and many other local factors, the result is an increase in the overall levels of disaster risk in local municipalities to the extent that finances are being diverted from development planning to disaster response (Van Niekerk & Le Roux, 2017: 107).
The CSIR projects that, by 2050, 162 settlements in the country will experience extreme increases in population growth pressure (Figure 7); 263 settlements will experience high increases in population growth pressure (including five of the metropolitan cities); 520 settlements will experience medium growth pressure; 192 settlements will experience a decline in population growth, and 498 settlements will see no or hardly any change in their population growth (Le Roux et al., 2019a: online).
https://www.greenbook.co.za/resources.html https://www.greenbook.co.za/resources.html 106 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) Figure 2: The risk of heat stress for South African settlements by 2050 Source: Engelbrecht et al., 2019: online Figure 3: The risk of urban flooding in South African settlements by 2050 Source: Le Maitre et al., 2019: online Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 107 Figure 5: The risk of settlement wildfire in South Africa by 2050 Source: Forsyth et al., 2019: online Figure 4: The risk of coastal flooding in South African settlements by 2050 Source: Lück-Vogel et al., 2019: online 108 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) Population growth pressure is the pressure a local government experiences from the rate at which the population is growing and its associated challenges, for example on housing provision and service delivery, and is a combination of the actual and relative population changes between 2011 and 2050 (authors’ definition).
The importance of profiling and monitoring the vulnerability of towns and cities, so as to address the resilience of human settlements, is highlighted as an international and national priority in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Management 2015-2030, the New Urban Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals, the South African Disaster Management Amendment Act, Act No.
16 of 2015, and the National Climate Change Response Policy of 2011 (Le Roux et al., 2019b: online).
Vulnerability profiling is complex and often contentious.
In the Green Book, the CSIR made a novel attempt to develop an indicator framework that profiles the multiple dimensions of the vulnerability of neighbourhoods, settlements, and municipalities in South Africa, including the inherent vulnerability of people, infrastructure, services, economic activities, and natural resources.
To mention but two national examples.
According to the socio-economic vulnerability assessment (Figure 8), the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces have the largest number of socioeconomic vulnerable municipalities in the country (based on 2011 data).
Municipalities in the north of the North West, Northern Cape and Free State provinces are also socio-economically vulnerable (Le Roux et al., 2019b: online).
According to the economic vulnerability assessment (Figure 9), the largest number of economically vulnerable municipalities in the country is found in the North West province, followed closely by Limpopo and Mpumalanga, with the single most vulnerable municipalities located in Limpopo (Le Roux et al., 2019b: online).
This type of risk and vulnerability information is available per municipality in the Green Book.
The Green Book has the ability to dynamically and interactively generate risk and vulnerability profiles for all 213 municipalities and 1,637 settlements in South Africa.
Most of this information is quantified.
By typing in the name of a municipality in the Green Book Risk Profile Tool (Le Roux et al., 2019c: online), it interactively integrates information per municipality (and their respective settlements) on the current vulnerability, future population growth pressure, climate-change projections for temperature, rainfall, extreme rainfall and very hot days for 2050, the current and future impact of climate change on key resources such as water availability, the economy and agricultural production (also as proxy for food security), and the increase in the risk of climate-related hazards for local municipalities in 2050 (Le Roux, Van Niekerk, Arnold, Pieterse, Ludick, Forsyth, Le Maitre, Lötter, Du Plessis & Mans, 2019c: online).
Figure 6: South African settlements at risk of an increase in drought tendency by 2050 Source: Beraki et al., 2019: online Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 109 Figure 7: The population growth pressure of South African settlements Source: Le Roux et al., 2019a: online Figure 8: The socio-economic vulnerability of South African settlements based on 2011 data Source: Le Roux et al., 2019b: online 110 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) The municipal Risk Profiling Tool replaces the time-consuming and labour, data and analytically intensive way in which risk assessments were carried out previously, and is an invaluable tool in the disaster risk and vulnerability space nationally.
Many of the frameworks, concepts, indicators, tools, data sets and models that were required to accomplish the Green Book project objectives were not readily available and had to be developed and/or significantly enhanced for this purpose.
Having access to this risk and vulnerability information supports local municipalities in the planning of climate-resilient cities, by providing the evidence for climate-response strategies, spatial development frameworks, and the prioritisation of adaptation actions in other sectoral plans.
The next sections show how this information was used to develop adaptation actions relevant to the local planning function in South Africa, and how the actions can be used to adapt settlements to become more resilient to the current and likely future climatic changes and severe events.
3.
ADAPTING SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS TO BECOME CLIMATE RESILIENT 3.1 Conceptual framework To leverage the imperative as well as the opportunity to respond to the impacts of climate change on the local level, the approach to and management of risk and vulnerabilities need to change.
Urban planning, as a policy instrument that can address both the causes and the impacts of climate change, is a key component of such change (Hagen, 2016: 14).
Transformational adaptation has emerged as a concept in response to the perception that incremental adaptation does not suffice to bring about the change needed to secure a sustainable and resilient future and has been used within the climate-change adaptation research community for close to a decade (Kates, Travis & Wilbanks, 2012: 7156-7157; Lonsdale, Pringle & Turner, 2015: 10; Pelling, O’Brien & Matyas, 2015: 113-115).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) took up the term in their reporting, and defines transformational adaptation as involving new approaches to urban planning and systemic change, while incremental adaptation is only about responding and preparing for the impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2018: 7).
Pelling et al.
(2015: 114) describe transformational adaptation as the ability to adjust existing systems to follow alternative development pathways.
They argue that transformational adaptation addresses the structural causes of vulnerability as opposed to incremental adaptation that addresses the proximate causes.
The concept of transformational adaptation highlights the important link between adaptation and development, and that adaptation needs to be integrated or mainstreamed into local planning.
Integrating climate-change adaptation into planning limits policy duplications and contradictions, allows early action that is more cost effective than after-the-fact response, and facilitates transformational adaptation (Wilson, 2006: 611; Rauken, Mydske & Winsvold, 2015: 409-410; Pelling et al., 2015: 114).
The development Figure 9: The economic vulnerability of South African settlements based on 2011 data Source: Le Roux et al., 2019b: online Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 111 of the Adaptation Actions Tool in the Green Book promotes the integration of adaptation actions that would transform urban spaces.
3.2 Adaptation is a local planning issue South African municipalities are required to plan for the future, while simultaneously dealing with the day-to-day management and development of the town or city in the face of fiscal, information, and capacity constraints.
These challenges become even more daunting when threatened by the immediate and long-term impacts of climate change that give rise to the number of people affected by natural disasters.
The potential risks can be addressed through effective planning and interventions, i.e.
climatechange adaptation, that reduce the exposure and vulnerabilities of municipalities, and strengthen their ability to cope with potential hazards (Le Roux et al., 2019b: online).
Climate-change adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects.
Adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm and exploit beneficial opportunities (IPCC, 2014: 76).
As the level of governance closest to the people, local government adaptation is critical to attend to vulnerable spaces and communities (Pieterse, Van Niekerk & Du Toit, 2018: 15).
Since climate change is a cross-cutting issue, it can be most effectively addressed when adaptation is integrated with existing local spatial planning processes and instruments.
There are existing linkages and overlaps between climate-change adaptation and local planning that can potentially facilitate the creation of resilient settlements in South Africa (Pieterse et al., 2018: 21).
However, since adaptation is often one of a multitude of long-term context-dependent dilemmas that require urgent attention by the planning profession, it is often of a less immediate concern (Pieterse, Van Huyssteen, Van Niekerk, Le Roux, Napier, Ndaba & Mahlelela, 2016: 111).
Integrating climate adaptation in development plans and processes ensures that hard-won development gains are not undermined and that future interventions contribute to resilient settlements in light of a changing climate.
This approach is likely to be more successful than addressing adaptation in isolation through a sectoral climate-change policy or plan.
The potentially beneficial interrelationship between climatechange adaptation, spatial planning and land-use management practices are, first, that spatial planning and land-use management can provide strategic and implementation instruments to enable integrative and coordinated place-specific climate-change adaptation (Faling, 2010) at the most appropriate level (Biesbroek, Swart & Van der Knaap, 2009: 231).
Secondly, it is acknowledged that contemporary spatial planning focuses on ensuring sustainable development, and adaptation strategies can potentially form part of this drive.
Some adaptation measures are not necessarily novel but may be similar to existing sound planning practices that foster sustainable and resilient human settlements and urbanisation.
In the face of climate change, planning measures or land-use guidelines may need to be reiterated, reinforced, adapted or subjected to more stringent enforcement or control measures.
The Green Book project developed an adaptation planning support tool to assist role players (specifically local government) involved in the adaptation of settlements with the selection of adaptation actions to be mainstreamed into local development plans and strategies.
The ultimate goal of the tool is to raise awareness, preparedness, and resilience to extreme weather events by adapting to incremental climate change, reducing future risks, and exploiting opportunities for sustainable and transformational development (Pieterse, Davis-Reddy & Van Niekerk, 2019b: 4).
The remainder of this article describes how the content of the Adaptation Actions Tool was developed, what the tool looks like, and how it can be used to support the planning of resilient South African settlements.
3.3 Method for developing the Adaptation Actions Tool The online Adaptation Actions Tool was developed through the use of a mixed-methods research approach that utilised a qualitative, iterative and explorative research approach to develop the menu of adaptation actions into an online planning support tool.
No known technology existed that could be harnessed for utilisation; thus, the development of a new online open-access system was needed.
This was done using current, appropriate and newly established software development and website development technology.
Particular attention was paid to the users’ experience by designing a graphical user interface that captured the attention of local and municipal planners.
This article focuses on the method that was followed to develop the content of the Adaptation Actions Tool.
The Adaptation Actions Tool (Van Niekerk et al., 2019) is an interactive typology of appropriate, local, mutually supportive settlement planning and design actions.
It proposes a basket of mutually reinforcing actions that are linked to each other so that no action is loose standing, but is supported.
The tool was developed to propose adaptation actions to reduce the exposure of vulnerable people and places to the climate risks identified in the Risk Profile Tool of the Green Book.
Thus, based on the specific risk and vulnerability profile of a local municipality, explicit actions can be selected to be integrated into the planning of human settlements.
The aim of the Adaptation Actions Tool is to i. avoid or minimise the expected impacts of climate hazards; ii.
restore, maintain and transform systems to be more resilient to future changes, or 112 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) iii.
retrofit infrastructure to reduce future impact or loss (Van Niekerk, Pieterse, Davis-Reddy, Le Roux & Lötter, 2019: online).
The typology of actions is accompanied by a guideline that provides a roadmap for implementation by municipalities.
The following steps recount the process of developing the content of this planning support tool.
3.3.1 Developing a shared understanding and selection criteria Climate-change adaptation is a wide field, and cuts across numerous sectors and disciplines.
Twenty researchers and as many peer reviewers were involved in the development and review of the typology.
Experts included engineers, architects, urban planners, anthropologists, a microbiologist, environmental scientists, an integrated waste specialist, and geographers.
It was thus necessary to develop a shared understanding between all the domain-specific experts to clarify the role of the researchers, who the target audience was, climate-change adaptation and urban planning-related terminology, and which likely future climate-related hazards needed to be addressed by the adaptation actions.
It was also necessary to develop criteria for the selection of the adaptation actions, namely the range, scale, and nature of the adaptation actions that were to be considered for inclusion in the typology.
The process and parameters were tested with the research team as well as with a reference group consisting of individuals in the climate-change adaptation field.
This shared understanding entailed the following: • Task: To review adaptation literature and make recommendations as to which adaptation actions to include in this South African typology.
• Target audience: People involved in the planning of human settlements at a municipal level, including spatial planning, landuse management, infrastructure planning, settlement design, environmental planning, climate-change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and engineering services.
• Terminology: Clarification on what is meant by adaptation, adaptation actions, disaster risk reduction, mitigation, urban planning, and human settlements.
• Priority hazards: The Green Book Risk Profile Tool identified the biggest climate-related threats to South African settlements as inland flooding, drought, wildfire, and coastal flooding (Le Roux et al., 2019c: online).
Extreme heat was also identified as a climate hazard under the climate-change projections (Engelbrecht et al., 2019: online).
The selection criteria used to screen the literature were: • Adaptation actions need to be linked to the mandate of local government, as set out in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution, 1996.
• Adaptation actions have to be suitable for urban and built-up areas.
• Adaptation actions have to apply to the local planning function.
• Adaptation actions need to support good planning principles, as set out in the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, 2013.
• Adaptation actions need to support climate-change mitigation, where appropriate.
• Adaptation actions need to provide an economic, social or environmental benefit regardless of climate change.
3.3.2 Reviewing literature Once a shared understanding was reached, which took a surprisingly long time, the second step in developing the typology was to identify and review relevant journal articles, reports and adaptation plans and strategies (local and others) to identify those climate-change adaptation actions that met the parameters of the study.
For each sector or theme, various climatechange adaptation actions and measures relevant to settlement planning and design were reviewed.
Many of the themes such as gender equity and water-sensitive urban design cut across sectors and some duplication occurred, which were eliminated in the consolidation step.
For each adaptation action, a table was completed with a description of the action, including the constraints and benefits.
Each action was also associated with an urban planning function, local or international examples, one or more climate hazards, and an adaptation strategy (see definitions below).
Key end-users of adaptation plans in municipalities as well as project champions and experts in the public, private and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sectors were consulted to complement the desktop analysis.
3.3.3 Peer review The critical role of local government as well as the importance of other role players, including communitybased organisations, civil society organisations, as well as science and research organisations in adaptation planning are recognised (Parnell, 2016: 529-539).
The value of place-based governance, multistakeholder and intergovernmental collaboration (Carmona, Burgess & Badenhorst, 2009; Pieterse et al., 2016: 117) is also acknowledged in the planning and implementation of adaptation measures.
Thus, the actions were peer reviewed and refined through an iterative process and informed by expert local knowledge and examples.
3.3.4 Consolidating the range of actions In the next step, the range of adaptation actions was consolidated in one database in the form of a menu of adaptation actions.
Even though a shared understanding and selection criteria were established at the outset, the wide variety and differences in the scale and quality Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 113 of the output posed some challenges to the core adaptations team when consolidating the actions.
The biggest challenges were that many adaptation actions were not on a local municipal scale, were not related to the urban planning function, and were not complete in their descriptions.
The core adaptations team revisited the selection criteria and determined that, in order to fulfil the goal of the project, namely the adaptation of settlements, and to focus on the target audience, the following categories of actions were included, namely spatial planning, land-use management, landscape and urban design, infrastructure and engineering service provision, and environmental planning.
It was decided not to include actions at a site level, namely in the fields of housing, site design, building design, and building regulations.
The core adaptations team then applied the expanded selection criteria to select the appropriate actions.
The list of adaptation actions was then tested during a focus group with officials from the City of Cape Town.
This consultative process identified and addressed key gaps.
A final selection of adaptation actions was made, and this constituted the menu or list of 81 adaptation actions used for the Adaptation Actions Tool.
The menu of actions is relevant to town, city, neighbourhood, or precinct scale and it can even be site specific, as it relates to land use and development control and aspects with possible cumulative settlement-wide impacts.
3.3.5 Developing an online, interactive typology of actions The menu was fairly long and needed further refinement to be structured in a way that one can search and filter for actions in specific categories in an online, interactive platform.
A typology of actions was created by distinguishing between three categories, namely the local planning function, climate-change hazard and impacts, and climate-change adaptation strategy.
Thus, in the online Adaptation Actions Tool, one can search, select and filter actions in these categories, i.e.
one can search for actions that fall within the spatial planning category, address a specific hazard such as urban heat, and fall within a certain adaptation strategy such as a win-win strategy (see Figure 9).
As stated earlier, the local planning function was defined to include spatial planning, land-use management, landscape and urban design, infrastructure and engineering service provision, and environmental planning.
This category is mutually exclusive; therefore, an action will only fall into one planning function.
This classification provides support in identifying in which key plans and instruments the adaptation actions need to be integrated.
Priority climate risks were identified as wildfires, inland flooding, coastal flooding, heat stress, drought, and extreme wind speed.
Adaptation actions also speak to the impact of climate change on key resources such as groundwater and surface-water depletion, and biodiversity loss.
The attributes within this category intersect, meaning that more than one can apply to an individual adaptation action.
For example, the action of clearing invasive alien plant species responds to drought, groundwater depletion and surfacewater depletion.
Adaptation actions have costs and implications, as well as benefits and co-benefits.
The third category considered these attributes and classified the actions according to three strategies: • Win-win: Adaptive measures that minimise harmful climate impacts and also have other social, economic and environmental policy benefits, including those relating to mitigation.
• No-regrets: Adaptive measures that are justified under all plausible climate futures (including the absence of manmade climate change).
The costs of these measures are relatively low.
No-regret actions are often appropriate in the near-term.
• Low-regrets: Adaptive measures for which the associated costs are relatively low and for which the benefits, although primarily realised under projected future climate change, may be relatively large.
These measures usually require an initial investment.
These strategies allow users of the Adaptation Actions Tool to identify adaptation actions that are in line with resource and capacity availability.
In cases where a local authority has no or very limited additional resources available for climate-change adaptation, they may take into account only win-win actions and consider integrating these into existing plans and projects.
3.3.6 Linking adaptation actions From the review of literature and case studies, it seems that isolated adaptation actions are less likely to be effective.
Municipalities should ideally, in collaboration with relevant role players, develop and compile a ‘basket’ of measures that is suitable to the context, taking into consideration its capacity and finances, and the local geography, topography, and population profile.
For this reason, interrelated and mutually beneficial or supportive adaptation actions were identified and linked, using a matrix to create ‘baskets’ of actions that can be implemented together across scales, sectors, and systems.
These ‘baskets’ of different adaptation actions support sustainable and integrated interventions to adapt settlements to climate change (Pieterse, Davis-Reddy & Van Niekerk 2019a: 10-11).
3.4 Applying the Adaptation Actions Tool The Green Book does not prioritise adaptation actions per settlement.
It is the responsibility of each local municipality to select the most appropriate actions, given their local context and understanding, to be integrated into its local planning strategies and plans.
Adaptation planning needs to be tailored to local and regional conditions, current and projected future climate risks, and local capacities.
Some South African coastal cities, for example, have become industrial hubs with significant port operations that are vulnerable to the impacts of a rise in sea level and coastal storm surges, while some South African inland cities 114 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) are commercial and financial hubs, with a legacy of mining, that are vulnerable to extreme weather events such as heatwaves, floods, and storms.
South African cities also have a common socio-economic context within which vulnerable residential communities are often located in close proximity to industrial activities and other high-risk areas, thereby exacerbating risks posed by poor air quality and extreme weather events to human settlements.
The adaptation response, therefore, needs to be customised per local municipality and settlement.
Identifying and prioritising the appropriate adaptation actions for a specific settlement thus require a number of key considerations.
Figure 10 proposes a framework for mainstreaming adaptation actions into local plans and instruments.
Step 1 (Figure 11) is to understand the local climate risk and vulnerability context.
To understand what contributes to municipal and household vulnerability, one needs to study the municipal risk profile in the Risk Profile Tool (see Le Roux et al., 2019c).
For instance, whether it has a growing or declining population, what hazards it is exposed to, and how climate change will impact on local water resources, agriculture and other economic sectors in future.
It is important to understand the uncertainty associated with climate-change projections.
Figure 10: Mainstreaming climate change adaptation actions into plans Source: Pieterse et al., 2019b: 5 Figure 11: Step 1: Understand the local climate risk and vulnerability context Source: Le Roux et al., 2019c: online Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 115 Step 2 (Figure 12) is to identify priority climate risks.
From the local risk profile, one needs to identify the climate hazards and impacts that pose the greatest risk.
The hazards and impacts that pose a high and extreme risk to a municipality and its settlements are identified in the hazard risk maps.
Step 3 (Figures 13 and 14).
Step 3.1 is to identify appropriate adaptation actions according to risk.
Once the hazards and climate impacts that pose the greatest risk in a municipality have been identified, the adaptation actions that can reduce these risks can be selected in the Adaptation Actions Tool (Van Niekerk et al., 2019).
One can filter the list of adaptation actions by the identified priority hazards and climate impacts.
Step 3.2 is to assess adaptation actions strategies.
One would need to further prioritise the list of adaptation actions by assessing no-regret, low-regret and win-win actions in terms of their cost-effectiveness, the financial and human resource capacity available to implement these, and the multiple benefits or co-benefits these actions would have.
Step 3.3 is to avoid actions that limit future adaptation or undermine other actions.
Adaptation actions that limit future adaptation to changing risks need to be avoided, as these can increase vulnerability or undermine future efforts to address climate change (i.e.
maladaptation).
Municipalities should also study the qualitative costs of the identified adaptation actions (under the description of each action) to understand the potential negative impacts or implications that specific adaptation actions may have on each other.
Climate change adaptation outcomes and goals need to be weighed against one another to manage any conflict between actions.
Step 4 (Figure 14) is to create baskets of adaptation actions.
One can combine actions with others to ensure shortand long-term adaptation outcomes.
Mutually beneficial or supporting adaptation actions can be grouped together for implementation.
Rarely will implementing one action sufficiently address a single or multiple risks.
Adaptation actions need to be implemented alongside others that will support and reinforce them.
For example, to address the risk of flooding, a municipality would need to “determine flood lines”, “enforce flood lines” through land-use management, “visibly demarcate flood lines”, as well as “maintain stormwater systems”.
Step 5 is to integrate adaptation actions into local spatial and development plans.
To ensure that adaptation actions are implemented, the risk is managed, and local resilience to climate change and its impacts are increased, climatechange adaptation needs to be integrated into local plans and projects.
Climate-change adaptation actions should be included in dedicated climate-change response and disaster-management plans, but they should also form part of Integrated Development Planning (IDP), Spatial Development Framework (SDF), and Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP).
By integrating climatechange adaptation into existing planning documents, processes and budgets, climate-response outcomes can be achieved while pursuing development outcomes.
The adaptation actions in this tool have been designed to be integrated within local planning documents and processes, since they align with specific local government mandates and planning functions.
4.
CONCLUSION Local government plays a key role in climate-change adaptation, because successful responses depend on local policies, plans, and processes.
Providing evidence and information to support climatechange adaptation in cities and towns, as well as mainstreaming climate-change adaptation into local government planning instruments and processes, is essential to support shortand long-term planning for sustainable development.
The Green Book is a first of its kind in the world.
In a benchmarking exercise, no other adaptation planning support tools were found that combine adaptation actions with customised risk profiles per local municipality for the whole country.
The specific focus on settlement planning is also novel.
With the evidence and planning support provided by the Green Book, local municipalities (and those involved in local planning) are able to plan for current threats, and prioritise interventions to adapt settlements to future climatic changes through effective forward planning.
The Green Book addresses the need by municipalities (and many indirect stakeholders) to understand their current vulnerabilities, likely future climatic changes and impacts on settlements, as well as how to adapt to these potential threats, in order to climate proof their settlements, reduce the exposure of people and places to the impact of hazards, and develop sustainably.
The Green Book was conceptualised in response to these needs, to offer a resource to South African local government to better understand their risks and vulnerabilities in relation to population growth, climate change, and exposure to hazards, and the vulnerability of critical resources.
It also provides appropriate adaptation measures that can be implemented in cities and towns, enabling South African settlements to minimise the impact of climate hazards on communities and infrastructure, while also contributing to developmental goals.
More research is required on the feasibility of the adaptation actions, specifically by evaluating the long-term effectiveness, cost and relevance of the adaptation actions in practice.
The research team is also in the process of extending the adaptation actions to other city functions and linking these to specific climate-risk zones in the metropolitan cities.
116 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) Figure 12: Identify the priority climate risks Source: Le Roux et al., 2019c: online Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 117 Figure 13: Step 3: Identify appropriate adaptation actions Source: Van Niekerk et al., 2019b: online Figure 14: Step 3: Adaptation actions descriptions, including supporting actions Source: Van Niekerk et al., 2019b: online ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The work was co-funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).
REFERENCES ANGUELOVSKI, I., CHU, E. & CARMIN, J.
2014.
Variations in approaches to urban climate adaptation: Experiences and experimentation from the global South.
Global Environmental Change, vol.
27, pp.
156-167. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.05.010 BERAKI, A., LE ROUX, A.
& LUDICK, C. 2019.
Green Book: The impact of climate change on drought.
[Online].
Available at: <https://pta-gis-2-web1.
csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/ index.html?appid=42ef0ab1e90b4c 09b3f4e17cf0ab2550> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.05.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.05.010 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=42ef0ab1e90b4c09b3f4e17cf0ab2550 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=42ef0ab1e90b4c09b3f4e17cf0ab2550 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=42ef0ab1e90b4c09b3f4e17cf0ab2550 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=42ef0ab1e90b4c09b3f4e17cf0ab2550 118 SSB/TRP/MDM 2020 (77) BIESBROEK, G., SWART, R. & VAN DER KNAAP, W. 2009.
The mitigationadaptation dichotomy and the role of spatial planning.
Habitat International, 33(3), pp.
230-237. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2008.10.001 CARMONA, M., BURGESS, R. & BADENHORST, M. 2009.
Planning through projects: Moving from master planning to strategic planning: 30 cities.
Techne Press.
[Online].
Available at: <http://www.technepress.nl/ publications.php?id=31> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
CHEN, C., DOHERTY, M., COFFEE, J., WONG, T. & HELLMANN, J.
2016.
Measuring the adaptation gap: A framework for evaluating climate hazards and opportunities in urban areas.
Environmental Science & Policy, vol.
66, pp.
403-419. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.05.007 CSIR (COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH).
2019.
Green Book: Adapting South African settlements to climate change.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.greenbook.
co.za/index.html> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
ENGELBRECHT, F., LE ROUX, A., ARNOLD, K. & MALHERBE, J.
2019.
Climate change.
[Online].
Available at: <https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/ portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?a ppid=700156e0242d4d0ea833cba8d0 2a4544> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
FALING, W. 2010.
Climate change and African cities.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.africanplanningschools.
org.za/resources/curriculumresources#theme-2-climate-changeand-african-cities> [Accessed: 27 June 2020].
FORSYTH, G., LE MAITRE, D., LE ROUX, A.
& LUDICK, C. 2019.
Green Book: The impact of climate change on wildfires in South Africa.
[Online].
Available at: <https://pta-gis-2-web1.
csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/ index.html?appid=cf30c5ee571a4e 5f8509773325451cd3> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
HAGEN, B.
2016.
The role of planning in minimizing the negative impacts of global climate change.
Urban Planning, 1(3), pp.
13-24. https://doi.
org/10.17645/up.v1i3.671 IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2014.
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (p. 151).
Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9781107415416 IPCC (INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE).
2018.
Global Warming of 1.5oC.
Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ chapter/summary-for-policy-makers/> [Accessed: 4 December 2018].
KATES, R.W., TRAVIS, W.R. & WILBANKS, T.J. 2012.
Transformational adaptation when incremental adaptations to climate change are insufficient.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(19), pp.
7156-7161. https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.1115521109 LE MAITRE, D., KOTZEE, I., LE ROUX, A.
& LUDICK, C. 2019.
Green Book: The impact of climate change on flooding in South Africa.
[Online].
Available at: <https://pta-gis-2-web1.
csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/ index.html?appid=3da8eefc440e47 cfbe43796a8ba5e64a> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
LE ROUX, A., ARNOLD, K., MAKHANYA, S. & MANS, G. 2019a.
Our urban future.
[Online] Available at: <https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/ portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?a ppid=3c4901e8681244d1a7989e8ed2a ce1f9> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
LE ROUX, A., VAN HUYSSTEEN, E., ARNOLD, K. & LUDICK, C. 2019b.
Green Book: The vulnerabilities of South Africa’s settlements.
[Online].
Available at: <https://pta-gis-2-web1.
csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/ index.html?appid=cbe48f255b9543 5fb12146f382a3ec6b> [Accessed: 26 June 2020].
LE ROUX, A., VAN NIEKERK, W., ARNOLD, K., PIETERSE, A., LUDICK, C., FORSYTH, G., LE MAITRE, D., LÖTTER, D., DU PLESSIS, P. & MANS, G. 2019c.
Green Book Risk Profile Tool.
[Online].
Available at: <https://riskprofiles.greenbook.co.za/> [Accessed: 27 June 2020].
LONSDALE, K., PRINGLE, P. & TURNER, B.
2015.
Transformational adaptation: What it is, why it matters and what is needed.
UK Climate Impacts Programme, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
[Online].
Available at: <https://www.weadapt.
org/knowledge-base/transforminggovernance/transformationaladaptation> [Accessed: 5 November 2019].
LÜCK-VOGEL, M., LE ROUX, A.
& LUDICK, C. 2019.
Green Book: The impact of climate changes on coastal zones.
[Online].
Available at: <https:// pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/ GBCascade/index.html?appid=167c 6e4cdd784527b5291b642ed73531> [Accessed: 18 June 2020].
PARNELL, S. 2016.
Defining a global urban development agenda.
World Development, vol.
78, pp.
529-540. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2015.10.028 PASQUINI, L. & SHEARING, C. 2014.
Municipalities, politics, and climate change: An example of the process of institutionalizing an environmental agenda within local government.
The Journal of Environment & Development, 23(2), pp.
271-296. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1070496514525406 PELLING, M., O’BRIEN, K. & MATYAS, D. 2015.
Adaptation and transformation.
Climatic Change, 133(1), pp.
113-127. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10584-014-1303-0 PIETERSE, A., DAVIS-REDDY, C. & VAN NIEKERK, W. 2019a.
Developing a typology of climate change adaptation actions.
Pretoria: CSIR Smart Places.
PIETERSE, A., DAVIS-REDDY, C. & VAN NIEKERK, W. 2019b.
Guidelines for the selection and prioritisation of adaptation actions.
Pretoria: CSIR Smart Places.
PIETERSE, A., DU TOIT, J.
& VAN NIEKERK, W. 2020.
Climate change adaptation mainstreaming in the planning instruments of two South African local municipalities.
Development Southern Africa, https://doi.org/10.1080/037683 5X.2020.1760790 PIETERSE, A., VAN NIEKERK, W. & DU TOIT, J.
2018.
Creating resilient settlements through climate change adaptation planning.
Presented at the Planning Africa Conference, 15-17 October, Cape Town, South Africa.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2008.10.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2008.10.001 http://www.technepress.nl/publications.php?id=31 http://www.technepress.nl/publications.php?id=31 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.05.007 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.05.007 https://www.greenbook.co.za/index.html https://www.greenbook.co.za/index.html https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=700156e0242d4d0ea833cba8d02a4544 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=700156e0242d4d0ea833cba8d02a4544 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=700156e0242d4d0ea833cba8d02a4544 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=700156e0242d4d0ea833cba8d02a4544 https://www.africanplanningschools.org.za/resources/curriculum-resources%23theme-2-climate-change-and-african-cities https://www.africanplanningschools.org.za/resources/curriculum-resources%23theme-2-climate-change-and-african-cities https://www.africanplanningschools.org.za/resources/curriculum-resources%23theme-2-climate-change-and-african-cities https://www.africanplanningschools.org.za/resources/curriculum-resources%23theme-2-climate-change-and-african-cities https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cf30c5ee571a4e5f8509773325451cd3 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cf30c5ee571a4e5f8509773325451cd3 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cf30c5ee571a4e5f8509773325451cd3 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cf30c5ee571a4e5f8509773325451cd3 https://doi.org/10.17645/up.v1i3.671 https://doi.org/10.17645/up.v1i3.671 https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415416 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415416 https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/summary-for-policy-makers https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/summary-for-policy-makers https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115521109 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115521109 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3da8eefc440e47cfbe43796a8ba5e64a https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3da8eefc440e47cfbe43796a8ba5e64a https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3da8eefc440e47cfbe43796a8ba5e64a https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3da8eefc440e47cfbe43796a8ba5e64a https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3c4901e8681244d1a7989e8ed2ace1f9 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3c4901e8681244d1a7989e8ed2ace1f9 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3c4901e8681244d1a7989e8ed2ace1f9 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=3c4901e8681244d1a7989e8ed2ace1f9 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cbe48f255b95435fb12146f382a3ec6b https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cbe48f255b95435fb12146f382a3ec6b https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cbe48f255b95435fb12146f382a3ec6b https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=cbe48f255b95435fb12146f382a3ec6b https://riskprofiles.greenbook.co.za https://www.weadapt.org/knowledge-base/transforming-governance/transformational-adaptation https://www.weadapt.org/knowledge-base/transforming-governance/transformational-adaptation https://www.weadapt.org/knowledge-base/transforming-governance/transformational-adaptation https://www.weadapt.org/knowledge-base/transforming-governance/transformational-adaptation https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=167c6e4cdd784527b5291b642ed73531 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=167c6e4cdd784527b5291b642ed73531 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=167c6e4cdd784527b5291b642ed73531 https://pta-gis-2-web1.csir.co.za/portal2/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=167c6e4cdd784527b5291b642ed73531 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.028 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.028 https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496514525406 https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496514525406 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1303-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1303-0 https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2020.1760790 https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2020.1760790 Willemien van Niekerk, Amy Pieterse & Alize le Roux • Introducing the Green Book 119 PIETERSE, A., VAN HUYSSTEEN, E., VAN NIEKERK, W., LE ROUX, A., NAPIER, M., NDABA, D. & MAHLELELA, S. 2016.
Aligning and targeting spatial investment: Exploring assumptions, accomplishments and challenges.
Unpublished report.
Pretoria: CSIR Built Environment.
RAUKEN, T., MYDSKE, P.K.
& WINSVOLD, M. 2015.
Mainstreaming climate change adaptation at the local level.
Local Environment, 20(4), pp.
408-423. https://doi.org/10.1080/13549 839.2014.880412 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.
2013.
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act, 16 of 2013.
Pretoria: Government Printer.
VAN NIEKERK, W. 2013.
Translating disaster resilience into spatial planning practice in South Africa: Challenges and champions.
Jàmbá, 5(1), pp.
1-6. https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v5i1.53 VAN NIEKERK, W. & LE ROUX, A.
2017.
Human settlements.
In: DavisReddy, C.L.
& Vincent, K.
(Ed.).
Climate risk and vulnerability: A handbook for Southern Africa.
2nd edition.
Pretoria: CSIR, pp.
100-110.
VAN NIEKERK, W., PIETERSE, A., DAVIS-REDDY, C., LE ROUX, A.
& LÖTTER, D. 2019.
Green Book Adaptation Actions Tool.
[Online].
Available at: <https://adaptationactions.
greenbook.co.za/> [Accessed: 27 June 2020].
WILSON, E. 2006.
Adapting to climate change at the local level: The spatial planning response.
Local Environment, 11(6), pp.
609-625. https://doi.
org/10.1080/13549830600853635 https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2014.880412 https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2014.880412 https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v5i1.53 https://adaptationactions.greenbook.co.za https://adaptationactions.greenbook.co.za https://doi.org/10.1080/13549830600853635 https://doi.org/10.1080/13549830600853635
28571_3_Landauer.pdf Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change MIA LANDAUER, TUIJA SIEVÄNEN AND MARJO NEUVONEN Landauer, Mia, Tuija Sievänen & Marjo Neuvonen (2009).
Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change.
Fennia 187: 2, pp.
99–113.
Helsinki.
ISSN 0015-0010.
Cross-country skiing has a long history in Finland, and it is a part of the national identity of Finns.
This study on cross-country skiers’ adaptation to changing climate describes groups of cross-country skiers with reference to their motives for skiing, and their perceptions and preferences on climate change adaptation tools.
The data was collected by means of a web questionnaire contacting skiers in ski areas, mainly in southern Finland, and on the websites of ski associations.
On the basis of a cluster analysis, we found three groups of skier types, each of which has different perceptions of means for adapting their skiing behaviour to the decreasing skiing opportunities close to home.
One group of skiers, the ‘social type’ group, placed emphasis on skiing traditions and social reasons.
This group is the most liable to give up skiing if the skiing conditions close to home are poor.
The ‘outdoor type’ group, whose skiing motives were related to skiing environment qualities (nature, landscape, winter) and the ‘technical type’ group motivated by fitness objectives, were interested in behavioural adaptation, for example, travelling further away and using artificial snow tracks.
With a better understanding of skiers’ behaviour, it is possible to identify adaptation strategies that can help providers of skiing services, such as municipal agencies and the ski tourism industry, as well as skiers themselves, to prepare for climate change.
Mia Landauer, Department of Landscape, Spatial and Infrastructure Sciences – Institute of Landscape Development, Recreation and Conservation Planning, University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences (BOKU), Peter-Jordan-Strasse 82, A-1190 Vienna, Austria.
E-mail: mia.landauer@boku.ac.at.
Tuija Sievänen & Marjo Neuvonen, Finnish Forest Research Institute, PL 18, FI-01301 Vantaa, Finland.
E-mails: tuija.sievanen@metla.fi, marjo.neuvonen@ metla.fi.
MS received 02.12.2008.
Introduction Cross-country skiing has a strong tradition in Finland, and skiing is often mentioned as part of the Finnish national identity.
Outdoor recreation in general plays a very important part in the daily life of Finns.
Almost all Finnish people participate in some form of recreation during the year, and two out of three engage in outdoor recreation every week (Pouta & Sievänen 2001).
Cross-country skiing is one of the favourite outdoor recreation activities among Finns: 40% of the population go skiing 19 times during the winter season on average (Pouta & Sievänen 2001).
Cross-country skiing is an everyday sport and leisure activity, but for many it is also a popular way to spend active holidays.
Skiing is the main purpose of about 10% of tourist trips made to participate in outdoor and nature activities (Pouta & Sievänen 2001).
Finnish people learn to ski by the age of five on average (Sievänen 1995), and 94% of the Finnish adult population have cross-country skiing skills (Pouta & Sievänen 2001).
Exercise, relaxation, contact with nature, being with family or friends and spending leisure time are important motives for skiing (Sievänen 1995).
In addition, skiing is considered an excellent way of taking exercise in order to enhance one’s physical and mental health in all age groups (Wöllzenmüller & Wenger 2005).
The Nordic concept of “everyman’s right”, the traditional right of free access, allows skiing in forests, fields and on ice-covered lakes.
However, 100 FENNIA 187: 2 (2009)Mia Landauer, Tuija Sievänen and Marjo Neuvonen skiing most often takes place on prepared ski tracks in recreation areas close to the home (even in larger cities) provided by the authorities responsible for recreation administration in municipalities.
For an average Finn, a suitable ski area with prepared ski tracks is at a distance of approximately 1.5 kilometres from the place of residence (Pouta & Sievänen 2001).
Global warming and climate change are considered to be the most serious environmental problem affecting snow-based recreation and tourism (Elsasser & Bürki 2004; Willbanks et al.
2007; Scott et al.
2009), and cross-country skiing is considered to be one of the outdoor activities that is most sensitive to changing climate conditions (Scott et al.
2002; Neuvonen et al.
2005).
Winters with permanent snow cover last 4–5 months (approximately 75 to 100 days) in southern Finland and in northern Finland 7 months (200 days) on average (Finnish Meteorological Institute 2008).
Climate model projections show that winter temperatures are rising in northern Europe (Jylhä et al.
2004; Alcamo et al.
2007), and reveal a tendency towards warmer winters and reduced snow cover, particularly in southern Finland (Carter & Kankaanpää 2003).
It is predicted that snow depth will decrease by 78% in southern Finland and by 48% in northern Finland in the next 100 years (Ruosteenoja et al.
2005).
The decreasing number of days with snow cover, the lower snow depth and the rising air temperatures of winter days are expected to have direct influences on cross-country skiing, especially in southern Finland, where the majority of the Finnish population live (Neuvonen et al.
2005).
Sievänen et al.
(2005: 3) point out that outdoor recreation and nature-based tourism are dependent on climate ‘as a precondition for the activities’ and on the weather ‘for the action itself’.
This means that changing climate will have an impact on the recreational environment, and will change recreation and travel behaviour (Scott et al.
2009).
Outdoor recreation scenarios under changing climate show that in conditions of warmer winters, participation in cross-country skiing will decrease (Sievänen et al.
2005).There are differences among skiers in their sensibility to climate change impacts, depending on their demographic and socioeconomic status (Pouta et al.
2009).
A longer-term consequence may be that fewer young people will learn basic skiing skills compared with previous generations due to the lack of skiing opportunities close to home (Neuvonen et al.
2005).
There is a growing interest in studying adaptation methods and developing adaptation policies for winter tourism and recreation in conditions of warming climate, but most studies concerning skiing focus on alpine (downhill) skiing (e.g.
Wall & Badke 1994; Abegg 1996; Elsasser & Bürki 2004; Sievänen et al.
2005; Scott & McBoyle 2007; Unbehaun et al.
2008).
Neuvonen et al.
(2005) suggest that short-term adaptation strategies for crosscountry skiers when skiing conditions close to home are poor could include travelling to more distant locations, using artificial snow tracks, choosing snow-independent activities or investing in new types of recreation equipment using hightech solutions.
In the longer term, changes in winter recreation activity preferences and choices are to be expected.
A further aspect of the situation is that deterioration of skiing infrastructure may become a serious problem (Perry 2004).
Many countries have national strategies for climate change adaptation, which include the recreation and tourism sector (e.g.
Breiling & Chamranza 1999; Marttila et al.
2005; Scott & McBoyle 2007).
Moreover, climate change and winter tourism have also become an issue of concern to international policy makers and institutions such as the World Tourism Organisation (World Tourism Organization 2003; Scott et al.
2009).
There is an increasing need to monitor changes in recreational behaviour, and some trends and predictions have been presented (Cordell et al.
1999; Neuvonen et al.
2005; Sievänen et al.
2005; Scott et al.
2008; Unbehaun et al.
2008).
It is necessary to obtain more information about types of skiers, their preferences, motives and skiing patterns under conditions of climate change, in order to gain a better understanding of potential adaptation strategies and skiing behaviour.
Outdoor recreation investments often have a long time perspective, since the most important decisions concern land use and also the use of other natural resources.
Better scenarios and understanding of skiers’ reactions and changing behaviour will help ski service providers and political decision makers to choose the best adaptation strategies, and to plan and make decisions on future skiing infrastructure investments.
For crosscountry skiing tourism, short-term predictions are also useful in order to respond at an early phase to the challenges posed by climate change.
Information is needed to find ways of adapting management practices in ski areas in order to mitigate the consequences of changing conditions.
When conFENNIA 187: 2 (2009) 101Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change sidering climate change, the mitigating of effects, such as reduction of travel-related emissions, should also be a concern.
From the stand point of mitigation, travelling long distances in order to ski is controversial as an adaptation method, among other things due to the need to reduce our carbon footprint (Dubois & Ceron 2005).
In northern Finland, winter tourism already plays an important role in the tourism sector and in the region’s economic activity in general, but most tourism entrepreneurs have very little knowledge and hardly any adaptation strategies for dealing with climate change (Marttila et al.
2005; Saarinen & Tervo 2006), even though enterprises have experience of how variations in weather, and particularly weather extremes during the skiing season, impact their business (Tervo 2008).
The aim of this study is to increase our understanding of how cross-country skiers are likely to adapt their skiing behaviour to changing climate conditions.
The objective is to study cross-country skiers’ preferences and perceptions of the skiing environment, and in particular their interest and willingness to use different types of adaptation methods when skiing conditions are poor.
First, we formed skier groups according to their motives for participation in skiing and describe typical skiing patterns.
Second, we analysed skiing environment preferences and perceptions of adaptation methods in these skier groups.
Motivation-based classification (see Légaré & Haider 2008) enables us to gain a deeper insight into the preference heterogeneity among cross-country skiers.
Factors affecting the behavioural adaptation of skiers under changing climate conditions By understanding past behaviour, we gain insights that help us to predict future behaviour.
Factors that explain recreational behaviour, particularly participation in a certain leisure activity, include activity-specific variables (i.e.
skill level, past experience, access to equipment, access to recreation services and type of natural resources) in particular, and socio-economic factors such as gender, age, income and education in general (e.g.
Manning 1999; Cottrell 2002).
Further, attitudes, motivations, satisfaction, perceptions or preferences also contribute to the prediction of behaviour (e.g.
Iso-Ahola 1986; Lea 1992; Pouta 2003).
De Freitas (2001, 2003) argue that there is little knowledge about the effects of climate on human behaviour, but behaviour can be used as a measure of human sensitivity and satisfaction, and behaviour is a reliable indicator of the significance of weather conditions.
Weather conditions and the mental image of an area are salient variables in determining recreationists’ satisfaction: human response to climate is interconnected with perceptions (de Freitas 2001).
Weather preferences for a suitable ski area/skiing conditions consist of physical (e.g.
rain or snow days, amount of snow) and aesthetic aspects (e.g.
visibility, sunshine or cloud), which can be used in determining recreationists’ behavioural responses and their sensitivity to and satisfaction with weather/climate conditions (de Freitas 2001).
A study of autonomous adaptation in terms of future participation scenarios indicated that a decrease in mean snow depth and number of days with snow cover have direct influences on cross-country skiing opportunities, and that this development leads to decreased participation frequencies (Neuvonen et al.
2005).
The place of residence and its environmental qualities are factors that configure peoples’ preferences relating to their recreational environment, whereas income level or available leisure time may relate to constraints affecting individual’s choices.
None of the background factors alone, but always a set of factors, help to explain participation or non-participation in recreation activities (Sievänen et al.
2003).
In the study by Pouta et al.
(2009), sensitivity to climate change was found to differ among different population groups: an urban living environment, female gender and low social status were associated with a higher sensitivity to climate change.
Recreationists and tourists have two main types of method for adapting to climate change: behavioural and technical (de Freitas 2003; Scott et al.
2009).
In principle, recreationists have good opportunities to choose the activity, and the place and the time for their chosen leisure-time activity (i.d.
), but in practice, the choices in the close-tohome environment are limited during the free time available in everyday life.
Behavioural adaptation can be interpreted as a process where a person changes his or her previous behaviour pattern on account of changing environmental conditions or social setting.
When studying behavioural adaptation as a future option, adaptation can be seen as a hypothetical intended way of behaving in the future.
When studying the adaptation of cross-coun102 FENNIA 187: 2 (2009)Mia Landauer, Tuija Sievänen and Marjo Neuvonen try skiers, it is essential to understand and know about the skier’s past skiing behaviour.
It is important to understand how important cross-country skiing is as a leisure activity for different people, and whether they have acceptable substitutes for skiing.
Motivation for skiing is one of the relevant factors.
Personal resources and commitment to cross-country skiing in particular is an issue.
This refers, for example, to skiing skills as part of the person’s investment (‘capital’) in leisure, or as a cultural relationship, for example, where skiing is identified as part of the local and national culture.
Economic resources and the time available for outdoor recreation may act as a constraint on participation, which either upholds or hinders participation.
In our study, we first classified skiers according to their skiing motivation and described these groups according to their socio-economic characteristics and skiing behaviour.
In adaptation research, it is important to look at potential differences in people’s behaviour that may explain their reactions to changing conditions, and to explore whether some of the factors are related to management practices that can be changed in order to assist the adaptation process of individual skiers.
Basically, people are used to adjusting their behaviour to their local climatic conditions, having ‘a coping range’ (Smit & Pilifosova 2003).
There are a few studies on climate change and behavioural adaptation that focus on different aspects of behavioural explanations.
Many focus on issues of spatial, temporal and activity substitution, and others are related to the concept of adaptive capacity (Scott et al.
2009).
Adaptive capacity includes three different components: awareness (identification of weather extremes and changed climate); ability (having skiing skills, having the equipment, the distance to close-to-home skiing destinations, gender, age, income, willingness to travel in order to ski, sensitivity to weather conditions); and action (giving up skiing, willingness to travel for better skiing conditions) (e.g.
Metzger et al.
2005).
Grothmann and Patt (2005) introduced the idea of taking socio-cognitive variables into consideration in models of adaptation and adaptive capacity, and Blennov and Persson (2009) stress the role of beliefs in the process of realised adaptive capacity.
Adaptation to changed environmental conditions could also be described as a decision making process or a series of decisions.
Driver and Brown (1975) presented a social-psychological model that explains the decision making process and factors that affect a person’s decision at each stage of the decision making process.
Environmental factors are influential at several stages of the process: messages from the environment arouse interest in participation and are used to evaluate the different options before making a choice.
If the decision favours participation, experiences of actual participation subsequently either strengthen or weaken the behavioural tendency.
If the evaluation of the experience is positive, the expected benefits have been realised.
These benefits gained are then reassessed, and the result of the evaluation has an influence on the next decisions made on participation.
When considering future adaptation, a hypothetical decision making process must be imaged on the basis of previous experiences (e.g.
weather conditions and skiing) and expectations of the resources that will be available in the future.
The latter factor is often based on the current situation concerning time and money.
Indeed, interest and willingness to expend more in terms of time and money to obtain the same benefits, e.g.
positive skiing experiences, can be studied if the informant is offered information about options that will be available in the future.
A series of ‘negative’ decisions on participation may also teach a lesson: when poor skiing conditions occur often during the skiing season, a person may after some time prefer to give up the activity, or look for other adaptation tools, such as other ski areas/destinations or different types of equipment.
In the literature on recreation (i.e.
studies on recreation trends in general, such as Cordell et al.
1999) there are only a few studies that include cross-country skiing as an activity, and there are even fewer focusing on the behavioural adaptation of cross-country skiers to climate change (e.g.
Neuvonen et al.
2005).
There are several ways for people to cope or adjust their recreational behaviour in changing climatic conditions, but very little is known about the mechanisms and influential factors (e.g.
Scott et al.
2009).
A downhill skiing study by Unbehaun et al.
(2008) found out that snow-independent substitutes are accepted as a short-term compensation but not for the whole winter holiday, and it is acceptable to travel longer distances and pay more for skiing if the destination can offer suitable skiing conditions.
Landauer and Pröbstl (2008) investigated cross-country skiers’ preferences, and indicated that cross-country skiers in Austria consider that landscape and the winter experience are a fundamental part of the skiing experience.
Technical adaptation strategies, FENNIA 187: 2 (2009) 103Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change such as artificial snow or ski tunnels, are less preferred.
The skier’s motivation is here assumed to be linked with his/her preferences as regards skiing environment and skiing services, and with behavioural changes.
In our study, we first classified skiers according to their skiing motivation and described these groups according to their socio-economic characteristics and skiing behaviour.
Classification of skiers according to their motivation offers a ground for discussing preferences regarding the skiing environment and skiing services and interest in choosing different types of adaptation method if skiing conditions change as a result of climate change.
Data and methods Data The data was collected with a web questionnaire from skiers, who were contacted personally in ski areas in the Helsinki region in southern Finland in February–March 2007.
It was planned to decentralise the on-site delivery locations and dates of the data collection, but due to the extremely short winter season of 2006–2007 the possibilities for decentralisation were limited.
Skiers from southern Finland were chosen because they may have had more experience of warm winters than skiers in other regions.
In addition, skiers from recreational and skiing organisations such as Suomen Latu, Suomen Hiihtoliitto, Nesteen vaeltajat, Oulun Hiihtoseura/Tervahiihto were invited to participate by offering a link to the web questionnaire on the organisations’ website, or by delivering contact postcards containing information on how to access the web questionnaire.
Attempts were thus made to contact a large number of skiers in ski areas as well as active skiers from skiing organisations.
The web survey is an inexpensive way of achieving a large number of responses, and it is convenient for respondents to fill it out at home or otherwise in another comfort indoors rather than out of doors in winter.
Also, it is possible to create a versatile and visually pleasing questionnaire that respondents can easily access.
About 1500 contact postcards (in Finnish language) were distributed on-site in ski areas.
The card consisted of information about the web address for the survey, the project itself, contact information and information on a travel prize, which it was assumed would serve as an incentive to respond to the questionnaire.
A total of 1192 skiers visited the website, and 744 responses were completed well enough to be used for analysis.
It is not relevant to determine the accurate percentage of the response rate in the case of an online survey that was open to all interested skiers.
Specific questions were used in the questionnaire to ensure that the respondents were cross-country skiers.
The respondents in the survey were mostly Finnish and the majority of them were from southern Finland.
Our data seems to be reasonably representative when compared with what we know about skiers in general, i.e.
the skiing population in Finland.
Only 7% of respondents in our data were under 25 years old, which is comparable to the figure of 9% for cross-country skiers who are under 25 years old presented in the Finnish National Exercise Survey (Kansallinen liikuntatutkimus… 2006).
Our skiers were well educated, 61% having a university or polytechnic level degree.
In other studies, participation rates are higher among population groups with a high educational level than among those with a lower education level (Pouta & Sievänen 2001; Kansallinen liikuntatutkimus… 2006).
Variables The questionnaire consisted of 43 questions, including variables relating to skiing ability, the skiers’ activity mode, awareness of climate change and behavioural flexibility, as well as adaptation options.
The first part of the questionnaire consisted of basic questions relating to skiers’ individual skiing habits, which were intended to collect information on skiing ability (i.e.
skills, equipment and frequencies) and on skiing motives.
Actionbased adaptation measurements were used to measure skiers’ temporal and spatial behaviour flexibility (i.e.
favoured distance to ski areas, planning a skiing trip).
The second part focused on preferences regarding ski services in general.
This was followed by questions about previous climate change experiences and awareness of climate change.
When asked about perceptions of possible adaptation options, respondents were given scenarios of skiing conditions that reflect a hypothetical future situation under conditions of climate change.
The hypothetical situation was described for example as follows: ‘if there was not enough snow in your favourite skiing area’ or ‘if there were several winters with lack of snow’.
The 104 FENNIA 187: 2 (2009)Mia Landauer, Tuija Sievänen and Marjo Neuvonen variables relating to ski area preferences and adaptation options are described in Appendices 1a and 1b.
Preferences were mostly measured on the fivestep Likert scale (see Likert 1977).
Analytical methods In order to identify potential motive groups regarding skiing participation and in order to obtain detailed information on preference heterogeneity in the skier sample, a principal component analysis of skiing motives measured on a five-step Likert scale was first carried out.
Skiers were grouped according to these skiing motive components using K-Means cluster analysis, and a three-cluster solution was found to be the best.
The skiing patterns and socio-demographic backgrounds of the skier type groups were studied using cross-tabulation with Chi-square tests.
Oneway ANOVA was used to analyse potential differences between the climate change adaptation options of the skier types.
Multiple comparisons were made between the skier types using Tukey’s tests (Tukey B and Tukey HSD).
The aim was to find out which groups differ and whether the differences are statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05.
In order to test the reliability of the One-Way ANOVA, the Kruskall Wallis test for the same variables was also applied.
The results of the Kruskall Wallis test were similar to the results of the One-Way ANOVA test.
Finally, the sum variables of ski area and destination choice preferences were counted (Appendix 1a and 1b) in order to compress (Figs.
1–2) the salient information gathered from the original variables.
All the results of the relationships presented in this study are significant at p ≤ 0.05, unless otherwise stated.
Results Skier types and current skiing behaviour Skiers in this study participated in skiing activities 20–30 days in a season on average.
The typical length of one skiing trip was 11–20 km on average.
Nearly 30% of the skiers reported 11–30 km (oneway) to be an acceptable distance from home to the ski destination for a day trip.
For a holiday trip more than half of the skiers were willing to travel more than 700 km.
Skiers reported that the decision for making a day trip is typically spontaneous, but ski holidays are planned a couple of months before the holiday begins.
The classical skiing style was the most favoured way of skiing.
Skiers reported that they prefer skiing alone: approximately half of them ski alone, nearly 20% with their partners and only 6.5% with friends.
Almost all the skiers (86%) learned to ski as children, 12% at school age, and only 2% as adults.
In the case of 62% of the skiers, skiing was taught by a family member.
Other popular outdoor activities among skiers were jogging, cycling, walking and Nordic walking (including Nordic running and blading).
Over 85% of skiers had cars at their disposal.
Principal component analysis revealed three components of skiing motives relating to the skiing environment, social setting, technical skills and interest in fitness (Table 1).
The cluster analysis based on the principal component scores showed that there are actually three skier group types based on their skiing preferences (Table 2).
Group 1 was called the ‘social type’, which emphasises the importance of traditions and time spent with family and friends when skiing.
Group 2 is the ‘outdoor type’, which stresses the important qualities of the skiing environment, such as nature, landscape and winter.
Group 3 is the ‘technical type’, which considers skiing a way of keeping fit and developing skills.
The majority of skiers belonged to the outdoor and technical groups.
The smallest group was the social group.
The classification made it possible to study the socio-economic characteristics of the skier types in more detail.
All the groups were dominated by men, but relatively speaking, the most male dominated was the technical type group.
There were no statistically significant differences in age class between the groups, but the social type group had more older skiers compared to other groups, while the technical type group had the youngest skiers.
As regards skiing company, the technical skiers tended to go skiing alone more often than the others, whereas the members of the outdoor and social groups preferred skiing in company.
Technical skiers preferred the skating skiing style.
The availability of a car was highest in the technical type group, although not to an extent that was statistically significant (Table 3).
Most of the skiers in all groups went day-skiing spontaneously (more than 70% of occurrences in all groups).
There were no significant differences of opinion as to how far the skiers are willing to go/travel for skiing in the case of a day trip: the preferred distance from home was 11–30 km, although 3–5 km was preferred in the social group.
FENNIA 187: 2 (2009) 105Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change Table 1.
Principal component analysis of skiing motives.
Skiing motives Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Skiing environment Social features Technical skills and fitness Nature experience 0.855 Winter experience 0.825 Landscape 0.772 Silence and peace 0.738 Recreation 0.721 Sustaining skiing traditions 0.780 Time with family/friends 0.662 Keeping fit 0.853 Improving technique 0.735 Eigenvalues 3.55 1.38 1.03 Interpretation, % 39.45 15.37 11.49 Total variance explained, % 66.3 Table 2.
K-means cluster analysis of principal component scores.
Motive clusters and mean score Principal components Social type Outdoor type Technical type Skiing environment –0.177 0.607 –0.485 Social features 0.431 0.525 –0.739 Technical skills and fitness –1.393 0.457 0.321 Total: N=744 N=162 (21.8%) N=285 (38.3%) N=297 (39.9%) Table 3.
Group characteristics.
Social type Outdoor type Technical type Gender Male 50.6%, female 46.3% Male 51.6%, female 46.7% Male 67.3%, female 39.2% Style Classical Classical and skating Skating Length of skiing trip Shortest (6–10 km) Longest (21–30 km) Medium (11–20 km) Skiing frequency Infrequently (6–10 days/season) Frequently (more than 80 days/ season) Regularly (31–50 days/season) Skier type Mostly day skiers/ leisure type Mostly holiday skiers/ fitness type Mostly holiday skiers/ fitness type The members of the outdoor type group were ready to travel further than the members of other groups, even as far as 31–100 km, for a day trip.
Behavioural and perceptual differences between skiers under conditions of climate change In general, all the skier groups were aware of climate change and it was considered a threat to cross-country skiing.
Experiences of climate change differed between the groups: the members of the social type group had fewer experiences of climate change than the others.
If skiers had to choose an alternative for their regular ski area today because of changed skiing conditions, more than 70% of the respondents of all groups would prefer going to ski in areas with reliable snow in Finland rather than elsewhere (abroad).
106 FENNIA 187: 2 (2009)Mia Landauer, Tuija Sievänen and Marjo Neuvonen Preferences regarding the important characteristics of ski areas expressed by different skier groups differed to some extent (Fig.
1, Appendix 1a).
The most important characteristics of a ski area in general were related to ski service features, such as good track conditions, natural features such as natural snow reliability and closeness to home.
The members of the outdoor type group assessed most characteristics, such as natural features (e.g.
the size of the area) and services (e.g.
good parking places) more positively than the other groups.
In this regard, the technical type group was very similar to the outdoor type group.
The social type group differed the most from the other groups, considering natural features such as closeness to home, snow-reliability, service features such as good track conditions and technical features such as artificial snow possibilities and availability of a ski tunnel less important in a ski area.
Regarding climate change adaptation, the technical and outdoor groups would favour technical adaptation strategies if conditions for skiing were poor.
They also placed value on natural features, such as snow reliability and service features, such as good track conditions.
The technical type group did not appreciate natural features, such as backcountry skiing (i.e.
skiing without prepared tracks), landscape beauty and service features, such as public transport as much as the other groups.
Opinions on service features, such as versatile tracks, and natural features, such as silence and peace, differed among all the groups, the outdoor type group considering these options more important than the others.
Natural features in a ski area, such as silence and peace, were more important to the social type group, whereas service features, such as versatile tracks, were more important to the technical type group.
The social type group would most likely give up skiing under poor skiing conditions (Fig.
2, Appendix 1b).
Regarding the acceptance of substitute options under poor snow conditions, none of the groups would be ready to travel to the same place at the same time as usual, but they would rather choose a region with reliable snow conditions.
The outdoor and technical groups would prefer to book their holidays when they are sure of snow in the area (Fig.
2, Appendix 1b).
The social type group could be attracted by snow-independent activities as an adaptation option.
All-season activities, snow-independent activities and cultural activities as substitute options were preferred by the social and outdoor groups.
The technical type group was not attracted by these options, although indoor activities were accepted by all groups to some extent.
This study indicates that Finnish skiers are not willing to pay for skiing in general.
The majority of skiers expect some support from society for the provision of skiing services.
There were, however, some differences between the skier type groups in their perceptions of the division of financial responsibilities.
The technical type group would be ready to buy a ski card (a fee for track use).
The 1 2 3 4 5 Natural snow reliability important Appreciates natural features in a ski area Needs ski services Mean Social type Outdoor type Technical type Fig.
1.
Preferences regarding particular ski area features among skier group types (1=not important…5=very important).
FENNIA 187: 2 (2009) 107Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change 1 2 3 4 5 Accepts substitutional options Accepts technical adaptation tools and is ready to use and pay for them Gives up skiing Mean Social type Outdoor type Technical type Fig.
2.
Acceptance of adaptation options among skier group types (1=not likely…5=very likely).
social type group could imagine paying parking and service fees, but compared to the other groups, this group considered that additional financing for ski areas is not needed, and that society does not necessarily have to support skiing.
The outdoor and social type groups considered that support for services might be needed, in the form of taxes and track fees combined, in order to maintain services in ski areas.
According to the outdoor and technical type groups, artificial tracks and ski tunnels could be financed by a combination of taxes and track fees, but the social type group thought that no additional financing is needed.
Attitudes to taxes or track fees as sole forms of support were not favourable.
In the case of artificial snow and ski tunnels there were significant differences among all three skier groups as regards their attitudes to paying for these options.
The technical type group had the most positive attitudes to paying for artificial snow and ski tunnels.
Because the social type group was the least interested in artificial snow, ski tunnels and the availability of services in general, a comparison between only the outdoor and the technical type groups was made.
It revealed (although at a 0.10 significance level) that the outdoor type group preferred taxes whereas the technical type group could imagine paying track fees in order to use artificial snow or tunnels.
The outdoor type group had more positive opinions on the need to finance services than did the technical type group (Fig.
3).
Discussion and conclusions The purpose of this study was to provide information on skiers’ perceptions and preferences in changing climate conditions.
The study identified skier type groups that differ in their skiing behaviour and preferences regarding different adaptation options in a potential future situation of climate change.
In this study, the classification (clustering) of cross-country skiers made it possible to focus in more detail on the adaptation strategies and preference heterogeneity of skiers.
The clustering procedure revealed three skier type groups.
The first group was called the ‘social type’, which emphasises the importance of skiing traditions and time spent with family and friends when skiing.
The second group was the ‘outdoor type’, which stressed important qualities of the skiing environment, such as nature, landscape and winter.
The third group was the ‘technical type’, which considered skiing a way of keeping fit and developing skills.
The majority of the skiers belonged to the outdoor and technical type groups.
The smallest group was the social type group.
The members of the outdoor and technical type groups had high skiing frequencies, and they were also younger than the skiers in the social type group.
The outdoor type group was the most flexible group: they would be most likely to be able to adapt to the changes caused by climate change.
They are willing to travel longer distances than at 108 FENNIA 187: 2 (2009)Mia Landauer, Tuija Sievänen and Marjo Neuvonen present to areas with reliable snow, although rather further north in Finland than abroad.
This group accepted various substitute activities, such as snow-independent or all-season activities instead of skiing if warm winters were to cause poor skiing conditions, but they also accepted technical adaptation tools, such as artificial snow or ski tunnels.
By contrast, the technical type group was not interested in substitute activities in ski areas.
Natural snow-reliability is important, but this group also had positive attitudes to technical adaptation options, such as artificial snow and ski tunnels, and would even be ready to pay for them if necessary.
The social type group did not believe in climate change as much as the others.
They accepted substitutes, such as snow-independent activities, but they did not accept technical adaptation tools, such as artificial snow or ski tunnels.
The study by Neuvonen et al.
(2005) anticipated that some skiers might give up skiing if the conditions for skiing were to deteriorate.
In our study the social group is identified as the type of skiers that are most likely to give up skiing.
Skiing did not seem to be the main interest of the members of this group, and they would rather search for other alternative recreational activities to replace skiing.
According to Pouta et al.
(2009), female gender, lower socioeconomic status and an urban living environment are associated with a higher sensitivity to climate change.
When considering future adaptation strategies for cross-country skiing, the needs, perceptions and preferences of skiers should be taken into account.
Potential future skiers are most likely to be the skiers who have perceptions and preferences similar to those of the members of our ‘technical type’ and ‘outdoor type’ groups.
In general, skiers do not seem to be very loyal to any specific ski areas.
It can be assumed that skiers who are willing to travel to northern ski areas in the future are probably the skiers whose perceptions and preferences are close to those of the outdoor type group in our study.
Under conditions of climate change, in southern parts of the country, ski areas should concentrate more on artificial snow and ski tunnels, which attract skiers similar to the technical type group, because their attitudes towards paying for skiing possibilities are more positive and because environment-related qualities, such as landscape beauty and nature values, are less important.
The technical type of skiers are potential users of ski tunnels and artificial snow tracks also for the reason that they do not need very long skiing routes.
Adaptation research aims, by forecasting future demand and identifying preference groups, to ensure that as many people as possible benefit from adaptation procedures (see Mendelsohn 2000).
There is, on the one hand, a need to arouse interest by showing that there are possibilities, even in 0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 % Artificial tracks or ski tunnels Services Artificial tracks or ski tunnels Services Outdoor type Technical type Cannot say No additional financing needed Taxes and track fees Track fees Taxes Fig.
3.
Comparison of the outdoor and technical groups’ preferences regarding additional financing for services and technical track options at ski areas.
FENNIA 187: 2 (2009) 109Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change the case of cross-country skiing, to adapt to the consequences of climate change.
On the other hand, by identifying the development needs of ski areas and studying different ways of keeping ski areas attractive, it is easier to find and realise future adaptation strategies.
Compared to alpine skiing, cross-country skiing is more vulnerable to climate change (Scott et al.
2002; Perry 2004; Landauer & Pröbstl 2008).
Regarding suitable adaptations for cross-country skiing in a climate change situation, there are several adaptation strategy options for ski areas that skiers consider acceptable.
However, the question arises whether skiers are likely to change their behaviour and how.
Most skiers are interested in travelling further north in order to use areas with reliable snow conditions.
About 40% of Finns are used to travelling for outdoor and nature-related activities, and 10% of these trips are made to participate in crosscountry skiing (Pouta & Sievänen 2001).
Many skiers are in the habit of taking skiing holidays.
On the other hand, if a ski area faces a winter with lack of snow, snow-independent activities can be reported as alternative options for skiing in such a winter (compare, e.g., with the cross-country skiing study of Landauer & Pröbstl 2008, and downhill skiing studies of Moen & Fredman 2007 and Unbehaun et al.
2008).
The substitute activities can be used as a tool to enable ski areas to survive shorter winters and to keep the areas attractive (Unbehaun et al.
2008).
Many skiers in our study are also willing to accept technical solutions to ensure skiing conditions.
Technical adaptation is often mentioned as a suitable adaptation strategy for downhill skiing (Harrer 1996; Mohnl 1996; König 1998; Bürki 2000; Moen & Fredman 2007; Pröbstl et al.
2008; Unbehaun et al.
2008; Scott et al.
2009), but nearly all technical adaptation measures require a certain amount of financial capacity (Pröbstl 2006).
Owing to the wide spatial distribution of ski tracks it is expensive and also difficult to maintain or build an infrastructure under poor snow conditions.
Also, ecological aspects must be taken into account when planning such activities, as artificial snowmaking may cause unwanted environmental impacts (see Pröbstl 2006).
Finnish skiers expect society to provide support for skiing activities and are not in general willing to pay for opportunities to ski.
This study reveals that in order to continue skiing even under poor snow conditions, the members of the technical type group were those who could imagine paying for skiing itself, but not necessarily, for instance, for compensating activities, whereas the outdoor type group members expressed willingness to pay for alternative recreational activities in a ski area, but not necessarily for skiing itself.
Serving different skier groups according to their expectations, preferences and needs will thus present a challenge for ski tourism enterprises.
The information gathered in this study contributes to the planning and decision making processes involved in seeking suitable adaptation strategies and policies for cross-country skiing in Finland.
Because cross-country skiing is a health-supporting winter activity, from society’s point of view the local and regional supply of skiing opportunities is valuable, and it could therefore be justified to argue that society should support adaptation strategies aimed at the local and regional provision of municipality and state skiing services.
As a solution for financing these services, a ski card (i.e.
a day fee for using tracks) could be an option for areas with well-kept ski tracks or ski tunnels and artificial snow tracks in Finland, too: ski cards have long been used in many ski areas in Central Europe (e.g.
Ramsau in Austria).
It is not necessary to implement all the possible adaptation strategies in all ski areas under conditions of climate change, but rather to search for strategies that are viable in a certain area with certain conditions and resources.
Cooperation between ski areas and ski service providers can be used as a tool that will allow more possibilities to be offered to skiers and ski areas alike.
More research is needed to clarify preferences and acceptance of adaptation methods among Finnish cross-country skiers.
In this study, the sample of skiers was limited, and an improved (spatially more representative and larger) sampling of skiers could offer an even better basis for identifying different skier groups and the key elements of adaptation methods.
Cooperation with ski areas could also provide new ideas for adaptation methods to be tested.
Research on behavioural adaptation applying more general theories of human behaviour would be helpful to expand our knowledge and understanding of adaptation processes.
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) by Ajzen (1991) is one of the most common theories of human behaviour, and it has been applied, e.g.
to the study of naturerelated leisure behaviour (Ajzen & Driver 1991; Hrubes et al.
2001).
By applying more theoretical approaches, for example TPB theory, as one option for behavioural adaptation studies it would be 110 FENNIA 187: 2 (2009)Mia Landauer, Tuija Sievänen and Marjo Neuvonen possible to produce better predictions of the future demand for ski services.
This would offer significant new insights into the adaptation strategies that might be used by the ski tourism industry and public providers of ski services to ensure their survival in conditions of climate change.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was financed by the University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences BOKU, Vienna Austria, the Finnish Forest Research Institute, and European Union COST E33.
Special thanks are due to Suomen Hiihtoliitto (Kari Heikkinen), Oulun Hiihtoseura/Tervahiihto, Suomen Latu, Nesteen vaeltajat and Hotel Savisalo (Heikki and Sabine Savisalo) REFERENCES Abegg B (1996).
Klimaänderung und Tourismus.
Klimafolgenforschung am Beispiel des Wintertourismus in den Schweizer Alpen.
Schlussbericht NFP 31.
222 p. Ajzen I (1991).
The theory of planned behavior.
Organizational behavior and human decision processes 50: 2, 179–211.
Ajzen I & BL Driver (1991).
Prediction of leisure participation from behavioral, normative, and control beliefs: an application of the theory of planned behavior.
Leisure Sciences 13: 3, 185–204.
Alcamo JJM, B Moreno, M Nováky, M Bindi, R Corobov, RJN Devoy, C Giannakopoulos, E Martin, JE Olesen & A Shvidenko (2007).
Europe.
Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
In Parry ML, OF Canziani, JP Palutikof, PJ van der Linden & CE Hanson (eds).
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), 541–580.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Blennov K & J Persson (2009).
Climate change: motivation for taking measure to adapt.
Global Environmental Change 19: 1, 100–104.
Breiling M & P Chamranza (1999).
The impact of global warming on winter tourism and skiing: a regionalized model for Austrian snow conditions.
Regional Environmental Change 1: 1, 4–14.
Bürki R (2000).
Klimaänderung und Anpassungsprozesse im Wintertourismus.
Ostschweizerische Geographische Gesellschaft, Neue Folge, Heft 6.
206 p. Carter T & S Kankaanpää (2003).
A preliminary examination of adaptation to climate change in Finland.
Suomen ympäristö 640, 33–65.
Cordell KH, BL McDonald, RJ Teasley, JC Bergström, J Martin, J Bason & VR Leeworthy (1999).
Outdoor recreation participation trends.
In Cordell KH (ed).
Outdoor recreation in American life.
A national assessment of demand and supply trends, 219–321.
Sagamore publishing, Champaign.
Cottrell S (2002).
Predictive model of responsible environmental behaviour: application as a visitor monitoring tool.
In Arnberger A, C Brandenburg & A Muhar (eds).
Monitoring and management of visitor flows in recreational and protected areas, 129– 135.
Institute for Landscape Architecture and Landscape Management, University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences (BOKU), Vienna.
Driver BL & PJ Brown (1975).
A social-psychological definition of recreation demand, with implications for recreation resource planning.
In Assessing demand for outdoor recreation, 65–68.
National Academy of Sciences, Washington.
Dubois G & JP Ceron (2005).
Changes in leisure/tourism mobility patterns facing the stake of global warming, the case of France.
Belgeo 1–2, 103–121.
Elsasser H & F Bürki (2004).
Auswirkungen von Umweltänderungen auf den Tourismus – dargestellt am Beispiel der Klimaänderung im Alpenraum.
In Becker C, H Hopfinger & A Steinecke (eds).
Geographie der Freizeit und des Tourismus, 865–875.
Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, München.
Finnish Meteorological Institute (2008).
Climate statistics Finland.
Finnish Meteorological Institute.
<http://www.fmi.fi/saa/tilastot_10.html#5>.
28.03.2008. de Freitas CR (2001).
Theory, concepts and methods in tourism climate research.
In Matzarakis A & CR Freitas (eds).
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Climate, Tourism and Recreation, 3–20.
International Society of Biometeorology, Commission on Climate Tourism and Recreation, Porto Carras, Neos Marmaras, Greece.
de Freitas CR (2003).
Tourism climatology: evaluating environmental information for decision making and business planning in the recreation and tourism sector.
International Journal of Biometeorology 48: 1, 45–54.
Grothmann T & A Patt (2005).
Adaptive capacity and human cognition: the process of individual adaptation to climate change.
Global Environmental Change Part A 15: 3, 199–213.
Harrer B (1996).
Wirtschaftsgeographische Auswirkungen einer veränderten ökologischen Situation.
Konsequenzen für den Wintertourismus in Deutschland.
Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Institut für Fremdenverkehr an der Universität München, Heft 47.
München.
Hrubes D, I Ajzen & J Daigle (2001).
Predicting hunting intentions and behavior: an application of the theory of planned behavior.
Leisure Sciences 23: 3, 165–178.
Iso-Ahola SE (1986).
A theory of substitutability of leisure behaviour.
Leisure Sciences 8: 4, 367–389.
FENNIA 187: 2 (2009) 111Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change Jylhä K, H Tuomenvirta & K Ruosteenoja (2004).
Climate change projections for Finland during the 21st century.
Boreal Environment Research 9: 2, 127–152.
<http://www.borenv.net/BER/pdfs/ber9/ ber9-127.pdf>.
11.04.2007.
Kansallinen liikuntatutkimus 2005–2006 (2006).
SLU:n julkaisusarja 4/06.
<http://www.kunto.fi/@ Bin/45451/Kansallinen+liikuntatutkimus+2005_2 006+Aikuiset.pdf>.
28.03.2008.
König U (1998).
Tourism in a warmer world: implications of climate change due to enhanced greenhouse effect for the ski industry in the Australian alps.
229 p. Universität Zürich, Zürich.
Landauer M & U Pröbstl (2008).
Klimawandel, Skilanglauf und Tourismus in Österreich.
Naturschutz und Landschaftsplanung 40: 10, 336–341.
Lea S (1992).
Assessing the psychology of economic behaviour and cognition.
In Breakwell GM (ed).
Social psychology of political and economic cognition, 161–183.
Surrey University Press, London.
Légaré A-M & W Haider (2008).
Trend analysis of motivation-based clusters at the Chilkoot Trail national historic site of Canada.
Leisure Sciences 30: 2, 158–176.
Likert R (1977).
A technique for the measurement of attitudes.
In Summers GF (ed).
Attitude measurement, 149–158.
Kershaw, London.
Manning R (1999).
Studies in outdoor recreation: search and research for satisfaction.
2nd ed.
374 p. Oregon State University Press, Corvallis.
Marttila V, H Granholm, J Laanikari, T Yrjölä, A Aalto, P Heikinheimo, J Honkatuki, H Järvinen, J Liski, R Merivirta & M Paunio (2005).
Finland’s national strategy for adaptation to climate change.
Ilmastonmuutoksen kansallinen sopeutumisstrategia.
Maaja metsätalousministeriön (MMM) julkaisuja 1/2005.
276 p. <http://www.mmm.fi/attachments/ 5enfdAPe1/5kghLfz0d/Fi les /Cur rentFi le / MMMjulkaisu2005_1a.pdf>.
31.03.2008.
Mendelsohn R (2000).
Efficient adaptation to climate change.
Climatic Change 45: 3–4, 583–600.
Metzger MJ, MDA Rounsevell, L Acosta-Michlik, R Leemans & D Schröter (2005).
The vulnerability of ecosystem services to land use change.
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 114: 1, 69–85.
Moen J & P Fredman (2007).
Effects of climate change on alpine skiing in Sweden.
Journal of Sustainable Tourism 15: 4, 418–437.
Mohnl V (1996).
The fluctuation of winter sport related snow parameters of the last fifty years in the Austrian Alps.
Wetter und Leben 48, 103–113.
Neuvonen M, E Pouta & T Sievänen (2005).
Adaptation to climate change for outdoor recreation in Finland.
In Sievänen T, K Tervo, M Neuvonen, E Pouta, J Saarinen & A Peltonen (2005).
Naturebased tourism, outdoor recreation and adaptation to climate change.
FINADAPT Working paper 11.
Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 341, 21–32.
Perry A (2004).
Sports tourism and climate variability.
In Matzarakis A, CR de Freitas & D Scott (eds).
Advances in tourism climatology.
Berichte des Meteorologischen Institutes der Universität Freiburg 12, 174–179.
Pouta E (2003).
Attitude-behavior framework in contingent valuation of forest conservation.
University of Helsinki, Department of Forest Economy, publications 12.
57 p. Pouta E & T Sievänen (2001).
Outdoor recreation statistics.
In Sievänen T (ed).
Luonnon virkistyskäyttö 2000.
Luonnon virkistyskäytön valtakunnallinen inventointi LVVI-tutkimus 1997–2000 (Summary: Outdoor recreation 2000).
Metsäntutkimuslaitoksen tiedonantoja 802, 32–68.
Pouta E, M Neuvonen & T Sievänen (2009).
Participation in cross-country skiing in Finland under climate change: application of multiple hierarchy stratification perspective.
Journal of Leisure Research 41: 1, 91–108.
Pröbstl U (2006).
Kunstschnee und Umwelt.
Entwicklung und Auswirkungen der technischen Beschneiung.
232 p. Haupt Verlag, Bern.
Pröbstl U, A Prutsch, E Dallhammer, H Formayer, K Grabler, P Haas, M Jesch, C Krajasits, A Kulnig & G Stanzer (2008).
Endbericht STRATEGE.
Strategien zur nachhaltigen Raumentwicklung von Tourismusregionen unter dem Einfluss der globalen Erwärmung am Beispiel der Wintersportregion um Schladming.
Unpublished final report of the project STRATEGE.
81 p. Ruosteenoja K, K Jylhä & H Tuomenvirta (2005).
Climate scenarios for FINADAPT studies of climate change adaptation.
FINADAPT working paper 15.
Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 345.
32 p. Saarinen J & K Tervo (2006).
Perceptions and adaptation strategies of the tourism industry to climate change: the case of Finnish nature-based tourism entrepreneurs.
International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable Development 1: 3, 214–228.
Scott D, B Jones, C Lemieux, G McBoyle, B Mills, S Svenson & G Wall (2002).
The vulnerability of winter recreation to climate change in Ontario’s Lakeland’s Tourism Region.
University of Waterloo, Department of Geography Publication Series, Occasional Paper 18.
84 p. Scott D & G McBoyle (2007).
Climate change adaptation in the ski industry.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 12: 8, 1411–1431.
Scott D, J Dawson & B Jones (2008).
Climate change vulnerability of the US Northeast winter recreation – tourism sector.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 13: 5–6, 577–596.
Scott D, CR de Freitas & A Matzarakis (2009).
Chapter 8.
Adaptation in the tourism and recreation sector.
In Ebi KL, I Burton & GR McGregor (eds).
Biometeorology for adaptation to climate variability and change, 171–194.
Springer.
Sievänen T (1995).
Reittiharrastaminen Suomessa.
Metsäntutkimuslaitoksen tiedonantoja 577.
92 p. Sievänen T, M Neuvonen & E Pouta (2003).
Veneilijöiden harrastajaprofiilit.
Liikunta ja tiede 5–6, 44–51.
112 FENNIA 187: 2 (2009)Mia Landauer, Tuija Sievänen and Marjo Neuvonen Sievänen T, K Tervo, M Neuvonen, E Pouta, J Saarinen & A Peltonen (2005).
Nature-based tourism, outdoor recreation and adaptation to climate change.
FINADAPT Working paper 11.
Finnish Environment Institute Mimeographs 341.
46 p. Smit B & O Pilifosova (2003).
From adaptation to adaptive capacity and vulnerability reduction.
In Smith J, RTJ Klein & S Huq (eds).
Climate change, adaptive capacity and development, 9–28.
Imperial College Press, London.
Tervo K (2008).
The operational and regional vulnerability of winter tourism to climate variability and change: the case of the Finnish nature-based tourism entrepreneurs.
Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism 8: 4, 317–332.
Unbehaun W, W Haider & U Pröbstl (2008).
Trends in winter sport tourism: challenges for the future.
Tourism Review 63: 1, 36–47.
Wall G & C Badke (1994).
Tourism and climate change: an international perspective.
Journal of Sustainable Tourism 2: 4, 193–203.
Willbanks TJ, P Romero Lankao, M Bao, F Berkhout, S Cairncroo, JP Ceron, M Kapshe, R Muir-Wood & R Zapata-Marti (2007).
Industry, settlement and society.
Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.
In Parry ML, OF Canziani, JP Palutikof, PJ van der Linden & CE Hanson (eds).
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), 357–390.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Wöllzenmüller F & U Wenger (2005).
Richtig Nordic ski.
Cruising, Langlauf, Skating.
127 p. BLW Sportpraxis Top, München.
World Tourism Organization (2003).
Climate change and tourism.
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Climate Change and Tourism, Djerba, 9–11 April 2003.
World Tourism Organization, Tunisia.
FENNIA 187: 2 (2009) 113Adaptation of Finnish cross-country skiers to climate change Appendix 1a.
Sum variables of ski area preference attributes.
Text in italics contains original variables from the questionnaire, inserted into suitable sum variable groups.
1.
Ski services = Good public transport to the area Good parking places Services in the area Good track conditions Versatile tracks 2.
Natural features = Snow reliability Possibilities for backcountry skiing Landscape beauty Silence and peace Size of the area Closeness to home 3.
Technical adaptation tools = Artificial snow possibilities Ski tunnel in the area Appendix 1b.
Sum variables of destination choice preference attributes.
Text in italics contains original variables from the questionnaire, inserted into suitable sum variable groups.
1.
Natural snow reliability = Cooperation with snow-reliable areas I would travel to a snow-reliable region at the same time I would travel to the same place but at a different time I would book my holiday when being sure of snow in the area 2.
Acceptance of substitutes = I would travel to the same place at the same time I would choose an area with snow-independent activities I would choose an area with artificial snow or ski tunnel possibilities Artificial snow tracks Ski tunnel Offering all-season outdoor activities in addition to skiing Offering indoor activities Offering snow-independent activities Offering cultural activities 3.
Give up skiing = I would not go skiing at all in such a winter
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 3 (2): 215–218, July 2020 REPORT A Report on the INSEE-CESS International Conference on “Climate Change and Disasters: Challenges, Opportunities, and Responses” Jeena T. Srinivasan  The Tenth Biennial Conference of the Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE) on Climate Change and Disasters: Challenges, Opportunities and Responses was organized jointly with and hosted by the Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS), Hyderabad, in partnership with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ, India) and the National Institute of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj (NIRDPR).
It took place in Hyderabad during November 6–8, 2019.
In the context of the increased risk of climate-related natural disasters such as floods, heatwaves, and storms, both predicted by scientific studies and recently experienced in different parts of the world and India, the objectives of the conference were to discuss the following: What are the likely impacts of climate change on human and natural systems?
How will climate change affect different sectors and sections of society?
What are the alternative policy options to address the risks that climate change and extreme weather events pose?
The three-day conference comprised discussions on these issues across various plenary, panel, and technical sessions in addition to inaugural and valedictory sessions.
Springer Nature also organized a special session on ethical publishing.
The conference received considerable media coverage and hosted over 200 delegates, including a few from abroad.
 Centre for Economic and Social Studies, N. O.
Campus, Begumpet, Hyderabad 500016, Telangana, India; Secretary, INSEE (2018–20); Organizing Secretary, Tenth Biennial Conference of INSEE; jeena@cess.ac.in.
Copyright © Srinivasan 2020.
Released under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i2.121 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i2.121 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [216] In the inaugural address, Vinod Thomas (Former Senior Vice President, World Bank) noted that India and South and Southeast Asia are not only highly vulnerable with regards the climate crisis, but are also ill-prepared to handle it.
This was the perfect start to the conference, and it set the pace for the deliberations that followed.
Thomas opined that countries must be prepared to tackle disasters, develop and adopt measures to reduce risks and exposure, and build resilience within the next few years.
In his presidential address, K. N. Ninan (President, INSEE) gave an illuminating presentation on the growth and development of ecological economics in India, and on climate change and disasters from an Indian perspective.
The inaugural session also featured speeches by the representatives of the collaborating organizations, who reflected on climate change issues, possible solutions, information needs, decentralized approaches, and civil society initiatives aimed at mitigation and adaptation.
There was also a video message from Clóvis Cavalcanti (President, ISEE), which was played at the conference.
The conference had five illuminating keynote addresses by distinguished scholars on specific sub-themes.
Rajeev Ahal (GIZ, India) talked about the need to improve water security, climate resilience, and efficiency of water use in agriculture and industry.
He emphasized the need for cooperation between the private and public sectors to ensure the integrated climateadapted management of water.
Kirit Parikh (Integrated Research and Action for Development/IRADe, New Delhi), who spoke on the need to develop a low carbon strategy for inclusive growth, emphasized that India should focus on renewable energies and link inclusive growth requirements with factors like housing, drinking water supply, sanitation, education, healthcare, electrification, provision of cooking gas, the infant mortality rate (IMR), and fertility.
Taking a more global perspective, Thomas Sterner (University of Gothenburg, Sweden) spoke about the twin issues of climate policy efficiency and fairness/feasibility, and the policy instruments needed to prevent worsening of the environment.
In his talk on climate change, forests, and biodiversity, N. H. Ravindranath (Indian Institute of Science/IISc, Bengaluru) pointed out an increase in tree mortality, ecosystem disturbances, and the effects of climate-related extremes; he stressed that many ecosystems are more vulnerable than humans.
Madhu Verma (Indian Institute of Forest Management/IIFM, Bhopal) presented the economic value of the ecosystem services of 16 tiger reserves in India using a value plus approach, and emphasized the use of valuation to justify enhancing investments in conservation.
[217] Jeena T Srinivasan The conference had 10 engaging and thought-provoking panel discussions.
While one panel discussed the complex interlinkages of water with other critical systems such as food, energy, and the economy, and how integrated water resources management (IWRM) can contribute to climate resilience, another showed the importance of hazard vulnerability maps and planning for disaster resilient cities.
The third panel discussed how cities in countries like Nepal and Bangladesh were coping with hydro-meteorological events and floods, and the role of hard and soft interventions in mitigating such disasters.
A fourth panel discussed the efficacy of local self-governance and the climate change action plans initiated by panchayats in Kerala, India.
Another panel discussed Martin Weitzman’s contributions to environmental economics and his seminal works on climate catastrophes.
The contribution of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) to climate mitigation and adaptation in terms of carbon sequestration was the theme deliberated by the sixth panel.
The seventh panel discussed the quantitative methods used to assess climate change impacts on agriculture, and the eighth panel considered climate change and mitigation in rainfed areas.
Building climate resilience through the restoration of common lands was the theme considered by the ninth panel.
The last panel discussed the findings of a climate change vulnerability assessment in the Indian Himalayan region, which experiences frequent floods, storms, and landslides; women and children in this region are amongst the most vulnerable.
Another highlight was the outreach event organized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in partnership with INSEE.
The IPCC authors presented the Special Reports of the IPCC and the ongoing AR6 (Sixth Assessment Report).
There were presentations on the physical and scientific bases for climate systems, climate models, and projections; the impact of global warming and the importance of mitigation activities for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals; land management and the interaction of the atmosphere with land resources; and, finally, the effects of climate change on marine life and coastal livelihoods.
Further, 56 papers contributed by participants were presented in 12 technical sessions.
Some papers discussed the macroeconomic dimensions of climate change, including fiscal transfers and the political economy of disaster management.
Others discussed gender issues, food security, and the Sustainable Development Goals.
A few papers analysed the effects of floods, recovery patterns, and the effectiveness of early warning systems, and highlighted the role of the state and civil society.
Others attempted to quantify the damage caused by floods and the risks at the community level Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [218] and on the ecosystem.
There were also papers on environmental and climate justice, institutional interventions, agricultural adaptations to climate change, and the role of MGNREGA in building the adaptive capacity of rural communities, renewable energy, and infrastructure to mitigate climate change impacts.
Gopal Kadekodi (Former President, INSEE), in his valedictory address, spoke about the dynamic interlinkages between ecosystem services and their stakeholders, and the need for changes in climate strategy.
For their outstanding contributions to ecological economics, INSEE conferred the Lifetime Achievements Award on C. H. Hanumantha Rao; the title of INSEE Fellow on M. N. Murty, Ramprasad Sengupta, and Madhu Verma; and the Bina Agarwal Prize for Ecological Economics to Joan Martinez-Alier.
Public lectures by INSEE members were organized in three reputed institutions in Hyderabad as curtain-raiser events.
A pre-conference workshop on “Behavioural and Environmental Economics” and a postconference workshop in association with the South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE) on “Non-market Valuation of Environmental Goods and Services”, each attended by 35–40 participants, also took place.
Overall, the conference was rich in terms of the variety of topics covered as well as in participation.
The delegates had many opportunities to engage in academic and social interactions and to build their networks.
The cultural event showcasing Telangana folk dances and culture added colour to the conference, and the sumptuous menu included organic, millet-based ethnic food.
The conference received generous financial and in-kind support from various governmental and non-governmental organizations.
Volume 35, Number 2 1 OUTPERFORMING PEERS THROUGH A COMPREHENSIVE CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY: THE CASE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES Alexandra Schmidt Panasonic Industry Europe GmbH • Ottobrunn, Germany Anne Bergmann Technische Universitaet Dresden • Germany Julia Hillmann Technische Universitaet Dresden • Germany Edeltraud Guenther Technische Universitaet Dresden • Germany ABSTRACT Firms increasingly aim to combat climate change.
For corporate managers, the question whether a related strategy affects financial performance arises.
Since empirical research on this topic is rather sparse, this study investigates whether pursuing a corporate climate change strategy leads to better corporate financial performance.
By applying paired samples t-tests, a sample of 62 companies from the electric utilities sector matched in pairs is investigated over a five-year time span.
Results indicate that firms with a comprehensive climate change strategy predominantly perform significantly better than their competitors without such a strategy.
These findings might contribute to promoting climate change strategies in a corporate context.
Keywords: Climate change; Corporate climate change strategy; Corporate financial performance; Pairwise comparison; Matched-pair design; Paired samples t-test; Electric utilities.
INTRODUCTION Climate change is considered one of the greatest long-term challenges facing society (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014; Steffen et al., 2015).
It is a prominent and much debated ecological issue that challenges many business models, requires urgent action and, thus, is strategically relevant to organizations (Busch, 2011; Kolk & Pinkse, 2004; Whiteman, Walker, & Perego, 2013).
Impacts of climate change occur at different spatial and time levels (Hoffmann, Sprengel, Ziegler, Kolb, & Abegg, 2009) and therefore resulting risks are difficult to assess 2 Journal of Business Strategies and, in addition, may lie outside of the organization’s coping range (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2012).
Climate change induces complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change, which, in turn, requires organizations to respond proactively (Howard-Grenville, Buckle, Hoskins, & George, 2014).
To deal with climate change, a comprehensive climate change strategy, which combines the two response strategies mitigation and adaptation, is required (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014) and represents the focus of this paper.
Until now, mitigation and adaptation has been mainly investigated as two separate response strategies (Dlugolecki, 2008).
Mitigation takes an inside-out perspective and represents the companies’ efforts to reduce their impacts on the natural environment (Winn & Kirchgeorg, 2005).
Here, organizations mainly seek to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (Weinhofer & Hoffmann, 2010) or to offset them.
However, scientists have suggested that even with planned mitigation, the increase in global temperatures and other harmful impacts are irreversible (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014).
Therefore, adaptation – which takes the outside-in perspective (Winn & Kirchgeorg, 2005) – represents the second response strategy in dealing with the impacts of climate change (Winn, Kirchgeorg, Griffiths, Linnenluecke, & Guenther, 2011).
While mitigation is highly regulated by legislation (Kolk & Pinkse, 2004), climate change adaptation is only partially in the hands of single states and is not as regulated worldwide (Gasbarro, Rizzi, & Frey, 2016).
Hence, mitigation strategies are rather clear for organizations, which is not the case for adaptation.
Climate change adaptation represents a relatively new field which lacks clear signals from scientific communities, leading to confusion within organizations about the urgency and high barriers for investments in adaptation strategies (Gasbarro et al., 2016).
The agricultural industry represents one example where rising temperatures might not only negatively impact firms, but might also lead to beneficial cases (Tate, Hughes, Temple, Boothby, & Wilkinson, 2010).
However, organizations need to realize that they are facing a ‘new normal’ (Howard-Greenville et al., 2014) and, thus, a climate change strategy that only consists of mitigation is not sufficient.
Risks of climate change can only be substantially reduced when mitigation and adaptation efforts are combined (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014).
Thus, organizations should strive for comprehensive response strategies that combine actions of mitigation as well as adaptation, as this will, following Beermann (2011) and Fankhauser, Smith, and Tol (1999), be crucial for organizations that aim to develop competitive advantages and reap financial benefits in spite of climate change.
Actions to build pro-active response strategies further strengthen the strategic ability Volume 35, Number 2 3 to develop necessary organizational skills to deal with a changing environment, which is fundamental for desirable organizational resilience (Limnios, Mazzarol, Ghadouani, & Schilizzi, 2014).
After highlighting the importance of a climate change strategy that combines both mitigation and adaptation, it is rather astonishing that, until now, financial benefits of such a comprehensive climate change strategy have not yet been empirically investigated.
In order to analyze whether companies with a comprehensive climate change strategy financially outperform companies without such a comprehensive strategy, we apply a matched pair design that follows Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010).
The contribution of such an empirical analysis is twofold.
This study is the first to investigate accountingas well as market-based financial benefits of a comprehensive climate change strategy that combines mitigation and adaptation.
Second, we go beyond their analysis and offer a long-term perspective with a time lag analysis of four years.
Hence, an analysis that shows managers that companies with a comprehensive climate change strategy outperform their peers without one might be of interest and could lead those managers to opt for a more comprehensive climate change strategy.
This paper is organized as follows: We review related literature in section two and build up hypotheses in section three.
Section four presents results which are then discussed in section five.
We provide concluding remarks and avenues for future research in the last section of the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW The Link between Climate Change Strategy and Financial Performance To date, only two prior studies have investigated the link between a corporate climate change strategy and corporate financial performance, each with different foci: the mitigation perspective (Michalisin & Stinchfield, 2010) or the adaptation perspective (Stechemesser, Endrikat, Grasshoff, & Guenther, 2015).
Moreover, both studies focus on accounting-based measures for corporate financial performance and do not include measures for market-based financial performance or measures for market risk.
The study by Michalisin and Stinchfield, published in 2010, investigates the financial benefits of mitigation.
Findings of this study show that firms with a climate change strategy have higher financial returns for return on assets (ROA), return on 4 Journal of Business Strategies sales (ROS), and total asset turnover than their competitors without a mitigation strategy (Michalisin & Stinchfield, 2010).
They suggest that addressing climate change involves three strategic capability-based climate change strategies that achieve sustainable competitive advantage in a way that sustains natural resources and ecosystems: pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development (Michalisin & Stinchfield, 2010).
A meaningful aspect that should be underlined is the fact that the authors implicitly equate a so-called ‘proactive climate change strategy’ with mitigation.
At the time, adaptation was not as discussed as it is today, which explains its specific focus on the mitigation perspective of a corporate climate change strategy.
The second, more recent study by Stechemesser et al.
(2015) addresses the adaptation perspective on climate change and its relationship to financial performance.
They investigate three capabilities that are related to and a result of engaging in climate change adaptation and investigate their link to ROA.
Strategic climate change integration options include new insurance products and services, financing customer improvements, and (re-)investments in climate change solutions.
The authors find no significant support for this relationship.
However, they find that other climate change related capabilities are positively related to ROA, namely climate knowledge absorption and climate-related operational flexibility.
One of the reasons for this might be the long-term characteristics of these capabilities as some time may be needed before the integration of climate change pays off.
The authors further assume that a relationship is likely to be observed in the future due to the growing importance of climate change adaptation (Stechemesser et al., 2015).
Since literature on that specific link is sparse, we broadened the search to studies that deal with the more general topic of environmental strategies and their relation to financial performance since climate change strategies can be seen as a sub-category of environmental strategies.
Findings from this literature show that a significant number of studies predominantly state a positive link (e.g.
AragónCorrea, Hurtado-Torres, Sharma, & García-Morales, 2008; Chan, 2010; Chan, 2005; Fergusson & Langford, 2006; Sánchez-Ollero, García-Pozo, & MarchanteLara, 2012).
Some publications find a negative (Cainelli, Mazzanti, & Zoboli, 2011; Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997) or simply no significant relationship at all (CarmonaMoreno, Céspedes-Lorente, & De Burgos-Jiménez, 2004; Zaman Mir & Shiraz Rahaman, 2011; Zhang, Wang, Yin, & Su, 2012).
Overall, findings on the influence of an environmental strategy on financial performance are inconclusive.
A more recent review of Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, and Siegel (2016) has proposed that all of these strategies can be subsumed under a more general strand called Volume 35, Number 2 5 nonmarket strategies.
They emphasize that all different variations of nonmarket strategies share similar mechanisms that explain the influence on organizational performance (Mellahi et al., 2016).
However, even at this more collective level, the paper does not provide a clear conclusion on the link of nonmarket strategies to financial performance, which confirms the findings are inconclusive at best.
As an explanation, it could be argued that the implementation of an environmental strategy and its outcomes are generally difficult to measure and the strategy may reveal its effects rather in the long run than in the short run (Stechemesser et al., 2015).
Friedman (1962) argued that social activities require financial and other, e.g.
human, resources that are drained from value creating investments.
While this argument might be valid in the short run, “in the long term, social and environmental issues become financial issues.” (Sørenson, 2015, n.p.).
As winner of the 2015 Harvard Business Review competition for ‘The Best-Performing CEOs in the World’, Sørenson (2015, n.p.)
argued “Corporate social responsibility is nothing but maximizing the value of your company over a long period.” Thus, trade-offs between short-term negative financial performance and long-term positive financial performance might occur.
Moreover, financial performance of a company is also subject to many other influences related to the whole value chain and the availability of slack resources (Bergmann, Rotzek, Wetzel, & Guenther, 2017).
This means that firms with a high Corporate Financial Performance in the preceding years are more likely to invest in improved environmental performance in the following years as they have enough resources to do so (Modi & Mishra, 2011).
Due to the inconclusiveness of the results, more future research is needed, especially on the topic of climate change strategies, where a significant research gap still exists (Boiral, Henri, & Talbot, 2012; Michalisin & Stinchfield, 2010).
A Comprehensive Climate Change Strategy combines Mitigation with Adaptation While the value and necessity of climate change mitigation for companies has been studied extensively (see, for example, the review on climate change mitigation research of Glienke & Guenther, 2016), there is only a small body of literature that addresses the adaptation perspective (Stechemesser et al., 2015).
The adaptation debate started much later and gained momentum only after the publication of Rockström et al.
(2009) on the planetary boundaries that suggested that mitigation efforts might be ineffective in addressing climate change risks (e.g., Buob & Stephan, 2011; Nordhaus, 2006).
Although climate change adaptation has become a central 6 Journal of Business Strategies part of scientific debate (e.g., Berkhout, Hertin, & Gann, 2006; Busch & Hoffmann, 2009; Dlugolecki, 2008; Linnenluecke, Griffiths, & Winn, 2012; Stechemesser et al., 2015), both strategies have been mostly discussed separately.
Only recently have researchers started to examine the necessity to combine both strategies as this can create synergies (e.g., Bosello, Carraro, & De Cian, 2013; Buob & Stephan, 2011; Shalizi & Lecocq, 2009).
Although most of those studies explain these benefits on the policy level, their findings can provide fruitful insights and explanations for why combining mitigation with adaptation at the company level is needed as well.
Since mitigation concerns the reduction of emissions with the aim of minimizing the impact of climate change, the success of mitigation will determine the need for adaptation actions (Shalizi & Lecocq, 2009).
Studies repeatedly emphasized that individual countries have only limited control over total world emissions (Shalizi & Lecocq, 2009) and, thus, the success of mitigation.
Consequently, a single company has even less control, increasing the relevance of adaptation even more so.
Having said this, however, does not render mitigation fruitless, as it depends on the ability to adapt (Shalizi & Lecocq, 2009).
Clement and Rivera (2017) show that companies, especially those from sectors that heavily rely on ecosystem services for adaptation, face adaptation limits if ecosystems shift and collapse.
Therefore, mitigation is still suggested as the key to avoiding potentially catastrophic shifts.
Besides this, there are further reasons for companies to extend their climate change strategy to include adaptation.
While mitigation is highly regulated by legislation (Kolk & Pinkse, 2004), climate change adaptation is only partially in the hands of the state and is not as regulated worldwide as mitigation (Gasbarro et al., 2016), thus it is within the organizations’ realm of control.
Although there might be local policies and regulations that concern climate change adaptation, which is especially the case for firms acting in highly regulated sectors, it is the responsibility of the company to identify their exposure and vulnerability to climate change and to adapt accordingly.
Therefore, a company’s long-term success and sustained competitive advantage are as dependent on adaptation as they are on mitigation (Beermann, 2011; Fankhauser et al., 1999).
As expected, resources that are invested in mitigation cannot be invested in adaptation, but investing resources in mitigation on a global scale implies fewer resources for adaptation as it reduces the damage to which adaptation is needed (Barrett, 2008; Bosello et al., 2013; Tol, 2005).
A successful response to climate change can only be materialized if mitigation efforts are combined with adaptation (Beerman, 2011; Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2012; Winn et al., 2011), Volume 35, Number 2 7 which strengthens the strategic ability to develop necessary organizational skills to deal with a changing environment, a fundamental element for achieving desirable organizational resilience (Limnios et al., 2014).
Resilience is a “measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables” (Holling, 1973, p. 14).
In the context of organizations, it has been translated into the ability of an organization to persist and absorb disturbances resulting from climate change (impact resistance) and the ability and time to recover from those disturbances (recovery) (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010; Linnenluecke et al., 2012).
Organizations can apply different strategies to build impact resistance and recovery, i.e.
resilience (Clement & Rivera, 2017; Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010).
In the long term, companies that integrate climate change in their strategy can create resilience in terms of an increase in competitiveness through cost reduction, e.g.
costs induced by new regulatory requirements, and thus gain independence from governmental agenda setting.
Moreover, a differentiation strategy, e.g.
offering green energy options to customers, can reduce the dependence on existing technologies.
Risks can thereby be reduced and resilience of the companies enhanced.
Both strategies – mitigation and adaptation – create organizational resilience, albeit through different mechanisms.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT Since research on the linkage of corporate climate change strategy and corporate financial performance is sparse, we draw from existing research on the relationship between corporate environmental and corporate financial performance.
Within this research stream, there have been various theoretical explanations for this relationship (Guenther & Hoppe, 2014).
For the relationship where corporate environmental performance predicts corporate financial performance, there are two theoretical explanations: value creation and trade-off theory (Guenther & Hoppe, 2014).
Considering the latter, Friedman (1962) was one of the first who argued that social activities require financial or human resources that, contemporaneously, cannot be used for other value creating businesses.
Within the trade-off theory, scholars further claim that investments, such as in pollution control, negatively affect cash positions and, therefore, also lower profits.
Following Mahapatra (1984), this further leads to an increased risk for the original investment.
A contrasting viewpoint for this line of reasoning is provided by several studies and meta studies in the field.
One of the most recent meta studies includes more 8 Journal of Business Strategies than 2,200 single analyses and its findings indicate an overall positive link between environmental, social, and governance criteria and corporate financial performance (Friede, Busch, & Bassen, 2015).
Hence, from an empirical point of view, the second perspective, also known as the value creation perspective, seems to better explain the link to financial performance.
In addition to its empirical support, there are some other theoretical explanations for the value creation perspective.
Following the argumentation of Guenther and Hoppe (2014), the ‘it pays’-link is possible because a reduction in the usage of resources, emissions, or waste can be directly translated to a reduction of related costs (e.g.
Judge & Douglas, 1998; Nishitani, Kaneko, Fujii, & Komatsu, 2011).
Besides costs advantages, benefits might also stem from increased competitiveness through differentiation advantages on the product as well as on the firm level (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000).
Hence, customers might be willing to pay more as the offered product is environmentally friendly or the company can offer an enhanced environmental management system.
When it comes to climate change, the dichotomy of Friedman’s argument and the anti-Friedman crowd might wane.
At first glance, social responsibility can indeed be seen as a contradiction to a mere economic focus.
When taking a broader view, however, it is quite rational for entrepreneurs to be socially responsible towards all stakeholders that might affect their financial performance, e.g.
employees, the state, or suppliers.
Thus, the ecological environment as a stakeholder in terms of decent climatic conditions might threaten or foster their financial performance and can be actively integrated into the business model.
Considering the study’s focus on corporate climate change strategy, Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010) also favor the value creation perspective and draw on the Natural Resource Based View by Hart (1995) to explain the positive mechanisms behind a climate change strategy.
These mechanisms can be seen in the development of three strategic capabilities (pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development).
For the strategic capability of pollution prevention, they argue that reduced greenhouse gas emissions and a continuous improvement lead to lower costs which represent the basis for a sustainable competitive advantage.
Second, competitors can be preempted by product stewardship through renewable energy sources and stakeholder participation.
The third strategic capability of sustainable development requires a shared vision and leads the company to face global climate change problems (Michalisin & Stinchfield, 2010).
The reason why corporate decision makers might not see those resulting benefits from proactive environmental business in general and comprehensive climate change strategies in particular might be due to insufficient information Volume 35, Number 2 9 regarding possible profit opportunities (King & Lenox, 2002).
To sum up, the value creation perspective provides fruitful grounds for developing related hypotheses.
We follow the above-presented considerations and argue that firms can generate value through a comprehensive climate change strategy combining mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Value generation occurs in terms of financial benefits that are internal (e.g.
improved accounting-based financial performance) as well as external (e.g.
improved market-based financial performance and reduced market risk).
Accounting-based measures represent backward looking measures of a firm’s ability to use their assets efficiently and to generate value (Peloza, 2009).
For instance, climate change mitigation strives to reduce fossil fuel utilization and carbon dioxide emissions, which redirects the energy sector towards low-carbon energy technologies (International Energy Agency, 2015a).
Electric utilities, for example, can influence the supply side and increase water efficiency, reduce water use, or utilize municipal effluent for cooling (Ebinger & Vergara, 2011; International Energy Agency, 2015b).
A major aspect of this redirection is the idea that pollution prevention is related to value maximization (Lanoie, Laplante, & Roy, 1998; Porter & Van der Linde, 1995).
As several scholars, such as Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010), have already highlighted, pollution prevention leads to a reduced usage of additional resources.
This potential is at the same time an indicator for the inefficient usage of resources (Hart & Ahuja, 1996) because reduced consumption of resources includes resources that can be invested elsewhere and, ideally, create value.
Furthermore, reduced resource usage and lower emissions help to avoid fines or liability costs.
Product stewardship allows cost advantages to appear on the product level; thus, firms can sell green products for which customers are willing to pay a higher price, ultimately influencing sales outcomes such as ROS.
On the firm level, environmental leadership, for instance, leads to learning curve advantages (Michalisin & Stinchfield, 2010), which again leads to using assets more efficiently.
Adaptation measures can include investments in assets such as transmission and distribution systems (e.g., hardening and reinforcement) or specific asset design to improve impact resistance, ensuring functionality or fast recovery in the face of natural disasters (Ebinger & Vergara, 2011; International Energy Agency, 2015b).
Although costly, those measures can significantly reduce costs of restoration or outage-induced income losses.
It can be expected that companies that are aware of this have planned accordingly and have applied related measures and, therefore, experience some stability in their accounting-based measures, even if the value 10 Journal of Business Strategies creation hypothesis might not be the proper theory to explain benefits of adaptation measures.
Another possibility to adapt to climate change can be achieved at the supply side by building redundancy and flexibility in the supply chain (e.g., Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Sheffi & Rice, 2005).
This further supports impact resistance and recovery and, in turn, can ensure stability in terms of sales and income.
For example, companies that can ensure functionality or at least faster recovery avoid or reduce the need to purchase energy from competitors as they can ensure their own production.
Thus, those companies still outperform their peers, although through a different mechanism.
Moreover, self-reinforcing effects when combining adaptation and mitigation might occur (Hallegatte, 2009; International Energy Agency, 2015b).
This selfreinforcing effect in the case of companies can be seen in the stability created for the accounting-based measures in combination with potential changes in accountingbased measures through the positive effects of pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development.
This allows companies to build more slack resources, which again can be reinvested and create a small advantage that over time accumulates and becomes an even stronger competitive advantage.
We therefore expect that companies with a comprehensive climate change strategy experience positive effects for accounting-based financial performance.
Hypothesis 1: Companies pursuing a comprehensive climate change strategy financially outperform their competitors without such a strategy in terms of improved accounting-based financial performance.
Market-based financial performance measures reflect assumptions of investors about a firm’s future developments (Balabanis, Phillips, & Lyall, 1998; Endrikat, Guenther, & Hoppe, 2014; Peloza, 2009) and also include intangible assets and reputational effects (Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010).
We hypothesize that the market and investors already perceive and value a comprehensive climate change strategy today for the following reasons: Firms with a comprehensive climate change strategy take into account climate risks, prepare accordingly, and reduce their vulnerability.
They reduce vulnerability in so far as they continuously anticipate and develop plans to detect further changes and act accordingly by building resilience.
As companies cannot avoid all vulnerabilities, they develop strategies to deal with remaining vulnerabilities (e.g., Burnard & Bhamra, 2011; McManus, Seville, Brunsdon, & Vargo, 2007).
They are also able to deal with unexpected events and to adjust to external changes Volume 35, Number 2 11 without experiencing trauma (Burnard & Bhamra, 2011; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003; Linnenluecke et al., 2012).
These activities contribute to stability in terms of less scrutiny and less unsystematic market risk (Ortiz-de-Mandojana & Bansal, 2016).
This represents a clear signal to market participants as they assess firms with a comprehensive climate change strategy as being less risky and better managed.
Thus, we expect further benefits in terms of an improved market-based financial performance and a reduced market risk.
Hypothesis 2: Companies pursuing a comprehensive climate change strategy financially outperform their competitors without such a strategy in terms of improved market-based financial performance.
Hypothesis 3: Companies pursuing a comprehensive climate change strategy financially outperform their competitors without such a strategy in terms of reduced market risk.
METHOD AND MATERIAL Our chosen sample focuses on the electric utilities industry as it represents a sector with high climate vulnerability since facilities are often located in climate sensitive areas (Busch, 2011; Gasbarro et al., 2016).
Moreover, utilities need to rely on long-term assets and infrastructure resulting in high and long-term investments (Ebinger & Vergara, 2011).
Hence, as utilities cannot react in the short term regarding their assets, they have to carefully consider building climate change strategies and related resilience.
This makes them a meaningful sample for this study.
We rely on one distinct industry sector, as this is preferred when studying causality or change (Bono & McNamara, 2011).
In addition, we thereby enhance the comparability of the gained results and do not have to control for industry effects (Klassen & Whybark, 1999).
An appropriate test design to compare companies pursuing a comprehensive climate change strategy with their competitors without such a strategy is represented by the method of pairwise comparison (matched-pair design).
Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010) also decided to apply this method as it is preferable when attempting to determine if financial returns of so-called ‘proactive’ firms are significantly greater than those not considered ‘proactive’.
First, electric utilities that report to the CDP were added to the sample.
CDP provides the largest globally recognized database for information on climate 12 Journal of Business Strategies change and companies (CDP, 2016; Kolk & Pinkse, 2004).
Furthermore, it offers important data for climate change related strategy analysis (Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2014), which is, for instance, not the case for the Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini & Co. (KLD) Index.
We, thus, select all electric utilities that reported to the CDP in 2012 (reported data refers to the year 2011) in order to expand the investigated time frame as suggested by Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010).
Analyzing several years of data (2011-2015) reduces the impact exceptional events may have on a firm’s financial performance, such as buying or selling power plants.
It also allows for the consideration of the time lag between an action taken and its measured effect.
In 2012, 52 electric utilities were listed in CDP and, out of those, 49 provided reports in English.
Checking those 49 companies on whether they confirmed the integration of climate change into their business strategy reduced the sample size to 44 companies.
Second, we manually searched the Thomson Reuters Datastream database for electric utilities from the same country without an externally identifiable climate change strategy in order to match them with the CDP companies.
We searched for company information on if and how they address climate change by applying a keyword search in the company’s annual report, the corporate social responsibility report (if existent), and on the company’s website.
Besides the comparison of the country to minimize country-specific influences, for example legislation, the company size presents a decisive matching criterion.
Following Bansal and Hunter (2003) and Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010), assets were chosen as a company size indicator.
Since the ownership of power plants is a decisive feature of electric utility businesses, assets are a reasonable indicator for that industry sector.
A comparable company, as defined by country and size, could not be identified for each of the 44 companies, which ultimately reduced the sample size to 31 pairs.
These 31 pairs, i.e.
62 companies, stem from Europe (n=16), North America (n=26), South America (n=12), and Asia (n=8).
Following Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010), we then conducted a pairedsamples t-test to investigate the differences between the two pairs in terms of corporate financial performance.
In contrast to the t-test for a single sample, the paired sample t-test uses difference scores and assumes that the population mean of the difference scores is 0.
A difference score entails the difference between the paired values from the two datasets.
All difference scores are then treated as a single sample of scores during the hypothesis testing by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the difference scores in order to calculate the t-statistic (Aron, Coups, & Aron, 2011; Boslaugh, 2012).
Therefore, the paired sample t-test can be seen as Volume 35, Number 2 13 a single sample t-test on the difference scores (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2008) that basically tests for a statistical significant difference between matched pairs.
Measures of corporate financial performance stem from the Thomson Reuters Datastream.
We rely on accounting-based as well as on market-based corporate financial performance measures.
For accounting-based measures, we investigate the two profitability measures ROA and ROS as well as asset turnover as a measure for efficiency.
For market-based financial performance measures, we rely on market value.
Market risk is covered by the measures volatility and beta.
RESULTS The final dataset derived from the matching process described in the previous section is verified by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient in order to check for the correlation of the matched pairs regarding firm size (total assets values from 2011) (Michalisin & Stinchfield, 2010).
The results of this pre-test indicate that the matching process was effective since r = 0.989 (p < 0.001), which inevitably suggests a significant and very strong positive relationship.
Table 1 and Table 2 present statistics for the paired samples, including the means of each dataset, the number of companies in the dataset (N), the standard deviation, and the standard error means.
14 Journal of Business Strategies Table 1 Paired Samples Statistics for Accounting-Based Measures Volume 35, Number 2 15 Table 2 Paired Samples Statistics for Market-Based Measures Table 3 provides the detailed paired sample t-test results.
They are interpreted as follows: For example, the mean of the difference scores that is calculated from the 2011 ROA values of the CDP companies minus the 2011 ROA values of the matching pair (MP) companies is 0.036.
This difference is presumed to be not attributable to chance since p < 0.01 indicates that the ROA of CDP companies is significantly better (higher) than the ROA of MP companies, thus rejecting H0.
The same applies for the ROA values of 2012 (p < 0.05), 2013 (p < 0.1), and 2015 (p < 0.05).
16 Journal of Business Strategies Table 3 Results of Paired Samples T-Tests As the paired samples statistics in Table 1 show, the means of the CDP companies are better for ROA and ROS over the entire investigated five-year timeframe.
However, as shown in Table 3, the results are only statistically significant for four years of ROA and two years of ROS.
Therefore the findings of Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010) can be confirmed for ROA and ROS.
However, no evidence for higher asset turnover is found since the results do not suggest significant differences between the two investigated groups at all (see Table 3).
The means themselves are better (higher) for two years each (see Table 1).
Volume 35, Number 2 17 Considering the analyzed measures for market-based financial performance and market risk, namely market value, volatility, and beta, the conducted paired samples t-tests indicate significant results for all investigated years (see Table 3).
These results further suggest that a comprehensive climate change strategy leads to better corporate financial performance, particularly in terms of market value and market risk.
To sum up, the results of the paired samples t-test show that electric utilities pursuing a comprehensive climate change strategy usually perform significantly better than their peers.
DISCUSSION Since no empirical study that assesses the influence of comprehensive climate change strategies on the corporate market-based performance is known, this study presents unique findings.
In comparison to Michalisin and Stinchfield (2010), who published a static analysis (two-year average, 2005 2006), the results of this study are more comprehensive and meaningful due to the larger dataset investigated.
In summary, the results of the hypotheses testing indicate that electric utility companies pursuing a comprehensive climate change strategy predominantly outperform their comparable competitors without such a strategy in terms of corporate financial performance.
Thus, the presented results not only confirm our underlying theoretical explanation, the value creation perspective, in several ways, but they also refine it: The results regarding accounting performance measures confirm Michalisin and Stinchfield’s (2010) findings of significantly higher mean values for ROA and ROS.
However, results are not as clear for asset turnover.
Asset turnover is a measure for the company’s efficiency in terms of how well it uses its assets.
Companies with a climate change strategy build resilience which is associated with building redundancies, thus being contradictory to efficiency.
Therefore, a comprehensive climate change strategy might affect this particular financial ratio differently.
However, as mentioned in the hypothesis section, companies that build resilience are able to provide some kind of stability by, for example, avoiding long lasting outages in the case of a disturbance due to faster recovery.
Thus, there are mixed arguments for the influence of a climate change strategy on asset turnover.
On the contrary, the results for market-based measures are clearer.
Our results indicate a stronger relationship between climate change strategy and marketbased measures.
One of the reasons could be the long-term characteristic of climate strategies that find expression in the more long-term oriented market-based measures.
18 Journal of Business Strategies In contrast, accounting-based measures represent a short-term orientation.
This is in line with other publications that rely on the long-term positive influence of climate strategies (e.g., Cainelli et al., 2011; Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997; Stechemesser et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2012).
Another explanation for the strong positive relationship of climate change strategy and market-based measures is the reputational benefit proactive managers can trigger with deliberations on how to position the company with regard to future challenges (Surroca et al., 2010).
As climate change is perceived to be an important risk factor (Kreft, Eckstein, & Melchior, 2017), companies that integrate the expected risks in their company policy are perceived to be more resilient when facing future challenges like climate change.
Investors seeking possibilities to assess a company’s comprehensive climate change activity might be particularly interested in this possible positive relationship to market value and market risk and might be encouraged to consider CDP as an indicator for a better performance of companies (Guenther, Guenther, Schiemann, & Weber, 2016).
In addition, two other explanations for the differing results for marketand accounting-based measures are possible: the electric utility sector is highly regulated in many countries and the companies might have the possibility to transfer the costs for adaptation measures to customers or the state, which is, for example, the case in Germany with the German Renewable Energy Law.
For instance, costs for more resilient grids can directly be incorporated in the pricing policy; thus, the firms’ profitability is not affected.
As electricity demand is usually considered to be rather inelastic, net sales of electric utility companies may not vary much in general and may therefore not be influenced by a climate change strategy.
Finally, if we delve deeper into the observed relationships, we could seek out for drivers behind the applied measures.
A comprehensive climate change strategy can be an indicator for good corporate governance in general, increased accountingbased performance can be achieved due to increased efficiency, and increased market-based performance can be attributed to an increased awareness of the general public concerning climate change (Kock, Santaló, & Diestre, 2012).
However, it is important to keep in mind that we cannot judge what executives really think based on the analysis of CDP data.
Thus, our results and their interpretation are based on the assumption that CDP data reflects the real intention of the companies and that they actually ‘walk the talk’.
It could be argued that CDP disclosure might also be used for greenwashing (Delmas & Burbano, 2011).
In this case, the result that firms with a comprehensive climate change strategy outperform their competitors without such a strategy would mean that companies with a higher level of greenwashing perform better.
For market-based measures this result could Volume 35, Number 2 19 be explained by investors who have been misled, but for accounting-based measures this conclusion does not hold.
Thus, we interpret the accounting-based measures as robustness indicators for honest response behavior.
CONCLUSION Results of this empirical research provide evidence that electric utilities with a comprehensive climate change strategy outperform their matched peers, particularly in terms of market value and market risk.
Having analyzed financial impacts of climate change strategies within a climate sensitive industry, this conclusion will, first of all, elaborate possible questions for future research.
Results of this paper provide evidence that, indeed, strategy matters and, thus, empirical analyses on the link of climate change and financial performance should include variables for strategic performance.
In other words, future research should not only rely on mere operational data such as CO2 emissions.
Moreover, since time matters for empirical analyses, we therefore encourage future research to avoid using concurrent measures.
Considering the measures for financial performance, both accounting and market-based measures should be considered within future studies.
A final conclusion for future research can be drawn on a meta-level concerning the type of analysis: In contrast to medical research, where matched-pair tests represent a state-of-the-art method, they remain rare in economic analyses.
As the comparison of two similar firms allows for a specific focus on the differentiating item to be analyzed (in our case, climate change strategy), more studies based on this design could contribute to a better understanding of success factors.
For scholars, the mere process of matching the pairs provides deep insights into corporate practices and can even be superior to only considering confounding variables by accounting for moderators.
Besides the presented ideas for future research, this conclusion also provides possible implications for investors, top managers, and politicians.
Investors gain the knowledge that CDP is a good indicator and easy to grasp.
Moreover, investors learn that, considering the long-term perspective, climate change strategy is not a tradeoff for performance.
Top managers can use the results to learn that a comprehensive climate change strategy is a means for improving performance and reducing risk – as is also the case for the highly regulated electric utilities sector.
Hence, the value creation perspective should receive more attention from top management.
Instead of asking the question of whether a comprehensive climate change strategy pays off, they should try to influence climate change drivers for financial success.
Finally, this 20 Journal of Business Strategies research can inspire and encourage politicians to cope with climate change, either by mitigation or by adaptation, as opposed to being afraid that such measures could endanger economic growth.
REFERENCES Aragón-Correa, J.
A., Hurtado-Torres, N., Sharma, S., & García-Morales, V. J.
(2008).
Environmental strategy and performance in small firms: A resourcebased perspective.
Journal of Environmental Management, 86(1), 88–103.
doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2006.11.022 Aron, A., Coups, E. J., & Aron, E. 2011.
Statistics for the behavioral and social sciences: a brief course (5. ed).
Boston: Prentice Hall.
Balabanis, G., Phillips, H. C., & Lyall, J.
(1998).
Corporate social responsibility and economic performance in the top British companies: are they linked?
European Business Review, 98(1), 25–44.
Bansal, P., & Hunter, T. (2003).
Strategic explanations for the early adoption of ISO 14001.
Journal of Business Ethics, 46(3), 289–299.
Barrett, S. (2008).
Dikes vs. windmills: climate treatise and adaptation.
Discussion Paper, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.
Beermann, M. (2011).
Linking corporate climate adaptation strategies with resilience thinking.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 19(8), 836–842.
doi:10.1016/j.
jclepro.2010.10.017 Bergmann, A., Rotzek, J. N., Wetzel, M., & Guenther, E. (2017).
Hang the lowhanging fruit even lower Evidence that energy efficiency matters for corporate financial performance.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 147, 66–74.
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.01.074 Berkhout, F., Hertin, J., & Gann, D. (2006).
Learning to adapt: organisational adaptation to climate change impacts.
Climatic Change, 78(1), 135–156.
Boiral, O., Henri, J.-F., & Talbot, D. (2012).
Modeling the impacts of corporate commitment on climate change.
Business Strategy and the Environment, 21(8), 495–516.
doi:10.1002/bse.723 Bono, J. E., & McNamara, G. (2011).
Publishing in AMJ Part 2: Research Design.
Academy of Management Journal, 54(4), 657–660.
doi:10.5465/ AMJ.2011.64869103 Bosello, F., Carraro, C., & De Cian, E. (2013).
Adaptation can help mitigation: an integrated approach to post-2012 climate policy.
Environment and Development Economics, 18(3), 270-290. doi:10.1017/S1355770X13000132 Volume 35, Number 2 21 Boslaugh, S. 2012.
Statistics in a nutshell (2nd ed).
Farnham, Surrey, England: O’Reilly.
Buob, S., & Stephan, G. (2011).
To mitigate or to adapt: How to confront global climate change.
European Journal of Political Economy, 27(1), 1–16.
doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.05.001 Burnard, K., & Bhamra, R. (2011).
Organisational resilience: development of a conceptual framework for organisational responses.
International Journal of Production Research, 49(18), 5581–5599.
doi:10.1080/00207543.2011.563827 Busch, T. (2011).
Organizational adaptation to disruptions in the natural environment: The case of climate change.
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 27(4), 389– 404.
Busch, T., & Hoffmann, V. H. (2009).
Ecology-driven real options: an investment framework for incorporating uncertainties in the context of the natural environment.
Journal of Business Ethics, 90(2), 295–310.
doi:10.1007/s10551009-0043-y Cainelli, G., Mazzanti, M., & Zoboli, R. (2011).
Environmentally oriented innovative strategies and firm performance in services.
Micro-evidence from Italy.
International Review of Applied Economics, 25(1), 61–85.
doi:10.1080/02692170903426146 Carmona-Moreno, E., Céspedes-Lorente, J., & Burgos-Jiménez, J. de.
(2004).
Environmental strategies in Spanish hotels: contextual factors and performance.
The Service Industries Journal, 24(3), 101–130.
doi:10.1080/0264206042000247786 CDP.
(2016).
Catalyzing Business and Government Action.
Retrieved from https:// www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/About-Us.aspx Chan, R. Y. K. (2005).
Does the natural-resource-based view of the firm apply in an emerging economy?
A survey of foreign invested enterprises in China.
Journal of Management Studies, 42(3), 625–672.
Chan, R. Y.
(2010).
Corporate environmentalism pursuit by foreign firms competing in China.
Journal of World Business, 45(1), 80–92.
doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2009.04.010 Clement, V. & Rivera, J.
(2017).
From adaptation to transformation: An extended research agenda for organizational resilience to adversity in the natural environment.
Organization & Environment, 30(4), 346–365.
doi:10.1177/1086026616658333 22 Journal of Business Strategies Cordeiro, J. J., & Sarkis, J.
(1997).
Environmental proactivism and firm performance: evidence from security analyst earnings forecasts.
Business Strategy and the Environment, 6(2), 104–114.
doi:10.1002/(SICI)10990836(199705)6:2<104::AID-BSE102>3.0.CO;2-T Delmas, M.A.
& Cuerel Burbano, C. (2011).
The Drivers of Greenwashing.
California Management Review, 54(1), 64–87.
doi: 10.1525/cmr.2011.54.1.64 Dlugolecki, A.
(2008).
Climate change and the insurance sector.
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice.
33(1), 71–90.
doi: 10.1057/ palgrave.gpp.2510152 Ebinger, J. O., & Vergara, W. (2011).
Climate impacts on energy systems: Key issues for energy sector adaptation.
A World Bank study.
Washington, D.C: World Bank.
Endrikat, J., Guenther, E., & Hoppe, H. (2014).
Making sense of conflicting empirical findings: A meta-analytic review of the relationship between corporate environmental and financial performance.
European Management Journal, 32(5), 735–751.
doi:10.1016/j.emj.2013.12.004 Fankhauser, S., Smith, J.
B., & Tol, R. S. (1999).
Weathering climate change: some simple rules to guide adaptation decisions.
Ecological Economics, 30(1), 67–78.
doi:10.1016/S0921-8009(98)00117-7 Fergusson, H., & Langford, D. (2006).
Strategies for managing environmental issues in construction organizations.
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 13(2), 171–185.
doi:10.1108/09699980610659625 Friede, G., Busch, T., & Bassen, A.
(2015).
ESG and financial performance: aggregated evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies.
Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, 5(4), 210–233.
doi:10.1080/20430795.201 5.1118917 Friedman, M. (1962).
Capitalism and freedom.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gasbarro, F., Rizzi, F., & Frey, M. (2016).
Adaptation measures of energy and utility companies to cope with water scarcity induced by climate change.
Business Strategy & the Environment, 25(1), 54–72.
doi:10.1002/bse.1857 Glienke, N., & Guenther, E. (2016).
Corporate climate change mitigation: a systematic review of the existing empirical evidence.
Management Research Review, 39(1), 2-34. doi:10.1108/MRR-10-2013-0243 Guenther, E., Guenther, T., Schiemann, F., & Weber, G. (2016).
Stakeholder relevance for reporting: explanatory factors of carbon disclosure.
Business & Society, 55(3), 361–397.
doi:10.1177/0007650315575119 Volume 35, Number 2 23 Guenther, E. M., & Hoppe, H. (2014).
Merging limited perspectives.
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 18(5), 689–707.
doi:10.1111/jiec.12125 Hallegatte, S. (2009).
Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change.
Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 240–247.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.12.003 Hamel, G., & Välikangas, L. (2003).
The Quest for Resilience.
Harvard Business Review, 81(9), 52–63.
Hart, S. L. (1995).
A natural-resource-based view of the firm.
Academy of Management Review, 20(4), 986–1014.
doi:10.5465/AMR.1995.9512280033 Hart, S. L., & Ahuja, G. (1996).
Does it pay to be green?
An empirical examination of the relationship between emission reduction and firm performance.
Business Strategy and the Environment, 5(1), 30–37.
Hoffmann, V. H., Sprengel, D. C., Ziegler, A., Kolb, M., & Abegg, B.
(2009).
Determinants of corporate adaptation to climate change in winter tourism: An econometric analysis.
Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 256–264.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.12.002 Holling, C. S. (1973).
Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems.
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 4, 1–23.
Howard-Grenville, J., Buckle, S., Hoskins, B., & George, G. (2014).
From the editors: climate change and management.
Academy of Management Journal, 57(3), 615–623.
doi:10.5464/amj.2014.4003 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2014).
Climate change 2014: synthesis report.
Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.
Geneva.
International Energy Agency.
(2015a).
Energy and climate Change.
World energy outlook special report.
Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/publications/free publications/publication/WEO2015SpecialReportonEnergyandClimateChange.pdf International Energy Agency.
(2015b).
Making the energy sector more resilient to climate change.
Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/publications/ freepublications/publication/COP21_Resilience_Brochure.pdf Judge, W., & Douglas, T. (2009).
Organizational change capacity: the systematic development of a scale.
Journal of Organizational Change Management, 22(6), 635–649.
doi:10.1108/09534810910997041 Jüttner, U., & Maklan, S. (2011).
Supply chain resilience in the global financial crisis: an empirical study.
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 16(4), 246–259.
doi:10.1108/13598541111139062 24 Journal of Business Strategies King, A.
A., & Lenox, M. J.
(2000).
Industry self-regulation without sanctions: the chemical industry’s responsible care program.
Academy of Management Journal, 43(4), 698–716.
doi:10.2307/1556362 Klassen, R. D., & Whybark, D. C. (1999).
The impact of environmental technologies on manufacturing performance.
Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 599– 615. doi:10.2307/256982 Kock, C. J., Santaló, J., & Diestre, L. (2012).
Corporate governance and the environment: what type of governance creates greener companies?
Journal of Management Studies, 49(3), 492–514.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00993.x Kolk, A., & Pinkse, J.
(2004).
Market Strategies for Climate Change.
European Management Journal, 22(3), 304–314.
doi:10.1016/j.emj.2004.04.011 Kreft, S., Eckstein, D., & Melchior, I.
Global climate risk index 2017: who suffers most from extreme weather events?
Weather-related loss events in 2015 and 1996 to 2015.
Lanoie, P., Laplante, B., & Roy, M. (1998).
Can capital markets create incentives for pollution control?
Ecological Economics, 26(1), 31–41.
doi:10.1016/S09218009(97)00057-8 Lewis, B. W., Walls, J. L., & Dowell, G. W. S. (2014).
Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure.
Strategic Management Journal, 35(5), 712–722.
doi:10.1002/smj.2127 Limnios, E. A. M., Mazzarol, T., Ghadouani, A., & Schilizzi, S. G. M. (2014).
The resilience architecture framework: four organizational archetypes.
European Management Journal, 32(1), 104–116.
doi:10.1016/j.emj.2012.11.007 Linnenluecke, M. K., & Griffiths, A.
(2012).
Assessing organizational resilience to climate and weather extremes: complexities and methodological pathways.
Climatic Change, 113(3-4), 933–947.
doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0380-6 Linnenluecke, M., & Griffiths, A.
(2010).
Beyond Adaptation: Resilience for Business in Light of Climate Change and Weather Extremes.
Business & Society, 49(3), 477–511.
doi:10.1177/0007650310368814 Linnenluecke, M. K., Griffiths, A., & Winn, M. (2012).
Extreme weather events and the critical importance of anticipatory adaptation and organizational resilience in responding to impacts.
Business Strategy & the Environment, 21(1), 17–32.
doi:10.1002/bse.708 Mahapatra, S. (1984).
Investor reaction to a corporate social accounting.
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 11(1), 29–40.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.1984.
tb00054.x Volume 35, Number 2 25 McManus, S., Seville, E., Brunsdon, D., & Vargo, J.
(2007).
Resilience Management: A Framework for assessing and Improving the resilience of organisations.
Retrieved from http://www.resorgs.org.nz McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2000).
Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: correlation or misspecification?
Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 603–609.
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(200005)21:5<603::AIDSMJ101>3.0.CO;2-3 Mellahi, K., Frynas, J.G., Sun, P & Siegel, D. (2016).
A review of the nonmarket strategy literature: toward a multi-theoretical integration.
Journal of Management 42(1), 143–173.
doi:10.1177/0149206315617241 Michalisin, M. D., & Stinchfield, B. T. (2010).
Climate change strategies and firm performance: an empirical investigation of the natural resourcebased view of the firm.
Journal of Business Strategies, 27(2), 123–149.
Modi, S.B., Mishra, S., 2011.
What drives financial performance resource efficiency or resource slack?
Journal of Operations Management, 29(3), 254– 273. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2011.01.002 Nishitani, K., Kaneko, S., Fujii, H., & Komatsu, S. (2011).
Effects of the reduction of pollution emissions on the economic performance of firms: an empirical analysis focusing on demand and productivity.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 19(17-18), 1956–1964.
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.06.021 Nordhaus, W. D. (2006).
After Kyoto: Alternative mechanisms to control global warming.
American Economic Review, 96(2), 31–34.
doi:10.1257/000282806777211964 Ortiz-de-Mandojana, N., & Bansal, P. (2016).
The long-term benefits of organizational resilience through sustainable business practices.
Strategic Management Journal, 37(8), 1615–1631.
doi:10.1002/smj.2410 Peloza, J.
(2009).
The challenge of measuring financial impacts from investments in corporate social performance.
Journal of Management, 35(6), 1518–1541.
doi:10.1177/0149206309335188 Porter, M. E., & van der Linde, C. (1995).
Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 97–118.
doi:10.1257/jep.9.4.97 Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, A., Chapin III, F. S., Lambin, E. F., & et al.
(2009).
A safe operating space for humanity.
Nature, 461(7263), 472–475.
doi:10.1038/461472a 26 Journal of Business Strategies Sánchez-Ollero, J. L., García-Pozo, A., & Marchante-Lara, M. (2012).
Environment and strategic behaviour: the case of hotels in Andalusia (Spain).
International Journal of Environmental Research, 6(4), 1067–1076.
doi:10.22059/ ijer.2012.577 Shalizi, Z., & Lecocq, F. (2010).
To mitigate or to adapt: Is that the question?
Observations on an appropriate response to the climate change challenge to development strategies.
The World Bank Research Observer, 25(2), 295–321.
doi:10.1093/wbro/lkp012 Sheffi, Y., & Rice, J.
B.
(2005).
A supply chain view of the resilient enterprise.
MIT Sloan Management Review, 47(1), 41–48 Sørenson, L. R. (2015).
The best-performing CEOs in the world.
Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2015/11/the-best-performing-ceos-in-the-world%20Lars%20 S%C3%B8rensen%20(Novo%20Nordisk)%E2%80%9D Stechemesser, K., Endrikat, J., Grasshoff, N., & Guenther, E. (2015).
Insurance companies’ responses to climate change: adaptation, dynamic capabilities and competitive advantage.
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice, 40(4), 557–584.
doi:10.1057/gpp.2015.1 Steffen, W., Richardson, K., Rockstrom, J., Cornell, S. E., Fetzer, I., Bennett, E. M. et al.
(2015).
Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet.
Science, 347(6223).
1259855-1–1259855-10.
doi:10.1126/ science.1259855 Surroca, J., Tribó, J.
A., & Waddock, S. (2010).
Corporate responsibility and financial performance: the role of intangible resources.
Strategic Management Journal, 31(5), 463–490.
doi:10.1002/smj.820 Tate, G., Hughes, G., Temple, M., Boothby, D., & Wilkinson, M. (2010).
Changes to farm business management under extreme weather events: Likelihood of effects and opportunities in the UK.
Journal of Farm Management, 14(1), 67–86.
Tol, R.S.J.
(2005).
Adaptation and mitigation: trade-offs in substance and methods.
Environmental Science and Policy, 8(6), 572–578.
Weinberg, S. L., & Abramowitz, S. K. (2008).
Statistics using SPSS: an integrative approach (2nd ed).
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weinhofer, G., & Hoffmann, V. H. (2010).
Mitigating climate change – how do corporate strategies differ?.
Business Strategy and the Environment.
19(2), 77– 89. doi:10.1002/bse.618 Whiteman, G., Walker, B., & Perego, P. (2013).
Planetary boundaries: ecological foundations for corporate sustainability.
Journal of Management Studies, 50(2), 307–336.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01073.x Volume 35, Number 2 27 Winn, M. I., & Kirchgeorg, M. (2005).
The siesta is over: a rude awakening from sustainability myopia.
In S. Sharma & J. Aragón-Correa (Eds.
), Corporate Environmental Strategy and Competitive Advantage.
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Winn, M., Kirchgeorg, M., Griffiths, A., Linnenluecke, M. K., & Günther, E. (2011).
Impacts from climate change on organizations: a conceptual foundation.
Business Strategy & the Environment, 20(3), 157–173.
Zaman Mir, M., & Shiraz Rahaman, A.
(2011).
In pursuit of environmental excellence.
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24(7), 848–878.
doi:10.1108/09513571111161620 Zhang, B., Wang, Z., Yin, J., & Su, L. (2012).
CO2 emission reduction within Chinese iron & steel industry: practices, determinants and performance.
Journal of Cleaner Production, 33, 167–178.
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.04.012 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF AUTHORS Alexandra Schmidt studied at Technische Universitaet Dresden and ESC Rennes School of Business.
She received a B.Sc.
in Business and Economics and a M.Sc.
in Business Management.
Her main focus was on Environmental Management, Sustainability and Energy Economics.
Currently she is working in the electronic industry at Panasonic Industry Europe GmbH as Environment & CSR Officer specializing on Recycling, Environmental Product Compliance and Corporate Social Responsibility.
Dr. Anne Bergmann studied Industrial Engineering and Management at the Technische Universitaet Dresden and ESC Rennes School of Business.
From 2012 to 2016, she worked as a research associate at the chair of Environmental Management and Accounting, Technische Universitaet Dresden and the University of New South Wales in Sydney.
In 2017, she defended her dissertation focusing on the impacts of the natural environment, particularly climate change and resource scarcity, on corporate financial performance and on corporate responses to those impacts.
Julia Hillmann is a doctoral candidate at the Chair of Environmental Management and Accounting.
She studied Business Administration at the Technische Universitaet Dresden.
She is researching organizational resilience and was part of and held a scholarship of an interdisciplinary graduate school from the Leibniz Institute of Ecological Urban and Regional Development that consisted of doctoral candidates dealing with the concept of resilience from different perspectives.
She was also part of the research project on regional climate change adaptation (REGKLAM).
28 Journal of Business Strategies Prof. Dr. Edeltraud Guenther received her doctorate in Environmental Management Control from the Universitaet Augsburg and holds the Chair in Environmental Management and Accounting at the Technische Universitaet Dresden since 1996.
She has been visiting professor at the University of Virginia’s McIntire School of Commerce.
Most recently, Prof. Guenther has initiated PRISMA, the Centre for Sustainability Assessment and Policy www.tu-dresden.de/prisma.
401 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 Gabrielle Gomes Calado Environmental and Urban Engineer, Universidade Federal do ABC (UFABC) – Santo André (SP), Brazil.
María Cleofé Valverde Professor of the Centre of Engineering, Modeling and Applied Social Sciences, UFABC – Santo André (SP), Brazil.
Correspondence address: Gabrielle Gomes Calado – Centro de Engenharia, Modelagem e Ciências Sociais Aplicadas (CECS) da UFABC – Avenida dos Estados, 5001 Bairro Santa Terezinha – CEP: 09210-580 – Santo André (SP), Brazil – E-mail: gabrielle_calado@hotmail.com Received on: 12/24/2019 Accepted on: 05/24/2020 ABSTRACT Global climate change and extreme climate variability directly affect the hydrological cycle and rainfall variability, which highlights the importance of studying climatic conditions as a support for water resource management in regions with low water availability, such as the Upper Tietê River Basin (Bacia Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê – BHAT).
This study aims to present a diagnosis for BHAT water availability conditions in future climate scenarios, based on the high-resolution models CMCC-CM, MIROC4h, ETA-MIROC5, and ETAHADGEM2-ES, for the time slices 2020-2040, 2041-2070, and 2071-2099, in order to provide climate information for BHAT’s management.
The main results showed a clear upward trend in the average annual temperatures.
For the RCP8.5 scenario, the average annual increase was 0.5°C from 2006 to 2099.
Precipitation showed high interannual variability without a specific defined trend.
The average annual flow showed a slight positive trend in the period 2006–2099.
However, it also presented a decrease in the monthly average flow in the wet period (13%) and an increase in the dry period (9.7%), compared to the historical data simulated for the time slice 2020–2040 of the RCP8.5 scenario.
However, the annual increase in BHAT water availability at future scenarios should not be sufficient to meet the growing demand for water in the region.
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate water availability based on other high-resolution climate models, in order to evaluate uncertainties, and in other regions with different supply systems that provide water to the São Paulo Metropolitan Region, identifying alternative water supply sources.
Keywords: climate projections; CMIP5; water availability; water resources management; Upper Tietê River Basin.
RESUMO As mudanças climáticas globais e a variabilidade climática extrema impactam diretamente o ciclo hidrológico e a variabilidade de precipitação, tornando importante o estudo de condições climáticas como subsídio ao gerenciamento de recursos hídricos em regiões com baixa disponibilidade hídrica, como a Bacia Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê (BHAT).
O estudo teve por objetivo apresentar um diagnóstico das condições de disponibilidade hídrica na BHAT, utilizando cenários climáticos futuros dos modelos de alta resolução CMCC-CM, MIROC4h, ETA-MIROC5 e ETA-HADGEM2-ES, nos time slices 2020-2040, 2041-2070 e 2071-2099, de forma a fornecer informações climáticas para gestão da BHAT.
Os principais resultados mostraram uma clara tendência de aumento das temperaturas médias anuais, sendo que para o cenário RCP8.5, verificou-se um incremento médio anual de 0,5°C de 2006 até 2099.
Já a precipitação apresentou alta variabilidade interanual, sem tendência específica definida.
A vazão média anual mostrou leve tendência de aumento no período 2006–2099, porém com diminuição das vazões https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820200658 ASSESSING FUTURE SCENARIOS OF WATER AVAILABILITY USING CMPI5 HIGH RESOLUTION CLIMATE MODELS – CASE STUDY OF THE ALTO TIETÊ BASIN AVALIANDO CENÁRIOS FUTUROS DA DISPONIBILIDADE HÍDRICA UTILIZANDO MODELOS CLIMÁTICOS DE ALTA RESOLUÇÃO CMIP5 – ESTUDO DE CASO DA BACIA DO ALTO TIETÊ Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais • Brazilian Journal of Environmental Sciences http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7619-7706 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1439-5325 mailto:gabrielle_calado@hotmail.com https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820200658 Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
402 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 INTRODUCTION Climate changes are characterized based on weather variations in multiple time scales and directly affect the planet’s hydrological cycle and precipitation variability, thus being able to impact availability and scarcity of water in several regions of the globe, from local to regional scales (GESUALDO et al., 2019).
Water scarcity, in its turn, can impact other departments, such as public water supply and hydroelectric sectors (SILVEIRA et al., 2018).
In recent decades, both frequency and intensity of drought occurrences around the world have significantly raised, most likely due to the increase in the global mean temperature.
Climate conditions characterized by the occurrence of extreme events implied major impacts in South America, for example, the drought in Brazil’s northeast region from 2010 to 2016.
In addition, there was a second major drought event in Brazil’s southeast region in 2014 and 2015 (MARENGO; BERNASCONI, 2015; MARENGO et al., 2018; CALADO; VALVERDE; BAIGORRIA, 2019).
Thus, the study and dissemination of climate conditions can help to drive adaptation and impact mitigation plans and water management policies (BORK et al., 2017), if they are objective enough to be considered by the authorities involved in decision-making processes.
This information can be used, for example, for watersheds management, in order to provide benefits for the preservation of these natural resources, reducing the risks of natural disasters (CABRERA et al., 2009).
The drought of 2014–2015 in Brazil’s southeast region adversely affected the water availability of the Cantareira System, the largest water supply system in the São Paulo Metropolitan Region (SPMR).
It reflected over the current management of water resources from Upper Tietê River Basin (Bacia Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê — BHAT) and the need for risk reduction (FISCH; SANTOS; SILVA, 2017; OTTO et al., 2015; NOBRE et al., 2016; CALADO; VALVERDE; BAIGORRIA, 2019).
The BHAT covers most of SPMR’s portion, which is composed by 39 cities, and 35 of which are inserted into Alto Tietê’s region (FABHAT, 2014).
Given the importance of this river basin and the regional water availability, several researches have already been produced so far in order to provide climatic information diagnosis and projection of future scenarios, subsidizing the management of water resources.
In the study by Lira and Cardoso (2018) on the trend of river flows in the main Brazilian hydrographic basins, for the period 1931–2014, an increase in the quarterly flow in winter and spring at Tietê river basin was observed, with statistical significance, in addition to a smaller increase in annual flow, when compared to other sub-basins of Paraná River.
Pereira’s et al.
research (2008) evaluated results from the Hydrometeorological Forecast System (HFS) regarding the BHAT, including shortand immediate-term forecast obtained through numerical modeling on a local scale.
Moreover, in Calado, Valverde and Baigorria’s research (2019), teleconnection indicators were evaluated, such as the El Niño phenomenon, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and extreme events in the variability of the seasonal precipitation and flow in the Cantareira System region.
Silva and Valverde (2017) developed another study on the use of future climatic scenarios information for the management of BHAT, which evaluated the regional water availability for future scenarios based on a global climatic model from the Meteorological Research Inmédias mensais no período úmido (13%) e aumento destas no período seco (9,7%), em comparação com os dados históricos simulados no time slice 2020-2040 do cenário RCP8.5.
No entanto, o acréscimo anual na disponibilidade hídrica da BHAT nos cenários futuros não deve ser suficiente para acompanhar a crescente demanda por água na região.
Mostra-se, assim, necessária a avaliação da disponibilidade hídrica com base em outros modelos climáticos de alta resolução, a fim de avaliar as incertezas, e nas regiões dos demais sistemas de abastecimento da Região Metropolitana de São Paulo, identificando fontes alternativas de abastecimento de água.
Palavras-chave: projeções climáticas; CMIP5; disponibilidade hídrica; gestão de recursos hídricos; Bacia Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê.
Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 403 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 stitute — Japanese Meteorological Agency (MRI-JMA) for A2 emission scenario and an empirical hydrological model.
It has been verified that, for the future period comprehended between 2017 and 2039, the variability in both precipitation and temperature in BHAT will lead to an increase in the variability of the seasonal flow, which indicates the susceptibility to floods and inundations in the summer and water scarcity events in the fall and winter (SILVA; VALVERDE, 2017).
A recent study published by Gesualdo et al.
(2019) investigated the influence of climate changes on water availability in Jaguari River Basin (JRB), part of the Cantareira System, which is the main source of freshwater to nine million people in SPMR.
Making use of a conceptual hydrological model and a conjunction of future projections generated by seventeen General Circulation Models (GCM) for two Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes (IPCC) (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5), it was found that a greater interannual variability for the flow is expected, from January to March, as well as an extension of the drought season until November (currently from June to September), with a decrease of over 50% in October, indicating October and November as the most vulnerable months to water scarcity.
The use of climate models for the study of water availability is an important tool for the integrated and preventive management of water resources, in order to evaluate the resilience of a specific region to the impacts of climate changes and to increase the management potentialities aiming water security, despite the existence of uncertainties related to this sort of model to forecasting future climate scenarios (SILVA; VALVERDE, 2017).
Therefore, the importance of producing studies that generate complementary results for the use of climate models to evaluate water availability in the BHAT is highlighted, such as the application of other climate models to assess the climate variability through several future scenarios.
Thus, the objective of this study was to present a diagnosis of the water availability conditions in BHAT for future climate scenarios based on high-resolution models, for the time slices 2020–2040, 2041–2070, 2071–2099.
Therefore, it is believed that this type of study might serve as subsidy for the management of water resources in one of the most populated river basins in SPMR, where the water demand for the population’s subsistence might be affected by the extreme climate variability, in a context of global climate changes.
STUDY AREA, DATA AND METHODOLOGY The study area covers the totality of BHAT, which is located upstream from the Pirapora dam, comprehending a total draining area of 5,868 km2, until the source of Tietê River in Paraitinga River, in Salesópolis, as illustrated in Figure 1.
It counts with a total mean precipitation of 1,400 mm/year, presenting a wet period from November to March and a drought period from June to August, with contribution of important affluent rivers, such as Pinheiros River.
It consists of 34 highly urbanized cities, with a total population of around 20 million inhabitants and, therefore, a mean demographic density of 3,000 inhabitants/km2, considering the total river basin draining area.
The elevated population contingent and the expressive economic potential of industries and services make the demand for water resources in the river basin approximately twice as big as its availability.
The water demand in the region raises due to the increasing population growth, despite the low rate growth due to the high consolidation degree of the basin’s urbanization and the higher levels of consumption of the local population, classifying the basin as one of most critical in the state of São Paulo.
Eight water supply systems are responsible for supplying the basin’s population: the Cantareira System; Alto do Tietê and Rio Claro Systems; Guarapiranga-Billings, Grande and Cotia Systems (FUSP, 2009; FAHBAT, 2014).
In order to achieve this study’s goal, which is the analysis of the basin’s future scenarios of water availability, in terms of tributary flow, temperature and precipitation data were analyzed in monthly scale from two global models of high spatial resolution from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project – Phase 5 (CMIP5).
The CMIP5 is a project of the Working Group on Coupled Modeling (WGCM), from the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), with the contribution of the Analysis, Integration and Modeling of the Earth System Project (AIMES) from the International Geosphere Biosphere Programme (IGBP).
The project’s objective is to produce a high-quality set of multimodal data, available for free, in order to promote the progress in the knowledge Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
404 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 concerning climate changes and variability.
The CMIP5 high-resolution models selected for this study were the Italian CMCC-CM and the Japanese MIROC (TAYLOR; STOUFFER; MEEHL, 2012).
The application of high-resolution models is recommended for researches that need to evaluate climate conditions and to identify extreme events in small regional areas (TAYLOR; STOUFFER; MEEHL, 2009), such as the BHAT covered area.
For that reason, this study also used data from two regional climate models, both developed by the Centro de Previsão de Tempo e Estudos Climáticos do Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (CPTEC/INPE): The Eta-MIROC5 and Eta-HadGEM2-ES, which respectively use the global models MIROC5 and HadGEM2-ES from CMIP5 as boundary conditions (CHOU et al., 2014b).
The CPTEC/INPE regional models were developed within the scope of the research group PROJETA (Projections of climate change for South America which were regionalized by the ETA Model), based on the automation of the extraction process and availability of data generated by CPTEC/INPE of regionalized climate projections for Brazil.
The temperature and precipitation simulations of the Eta-MIROC5 and Eta-HadGEM2-ES models, available through PROJETA, were considered in this study for RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios (CHOU et al., 2014b; CHOU et al., 2014a; LYRA et al., 2018).
Greenhouse gas emission scenarios are used in climate studies to provide plausible future projections of global climate change, considering numerous variables, including socioeconomic and technological changes, energy and soil use, as well as quantifications of greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants.
They are used as input data in the configuration of climate models and as a basis for assessing possible climate impacts, mitigation options, and cost management.
The IPCC’s fifth report used the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP), which are a set of scenarios capable of calculating different levels of greenhouse gas emissions, considered as the radiative forces associated with climate models, including also projections of emissions and concentrations of pollutants and land use, also forcing climate change.
These concentrations Figure 1 – Study area: Upper Tietê River Basin.
Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 405 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 are used as the primary product for setting up RCP scenarios, serving as input information for climate model simulations.
RCP consider different levels of radioactive forces, being 8.5, 6, 4.5, and 2.6 W/m2, covering the period from 1850 to 2100 (VAN VUUREN et al., 2011).
Two known scenarios in this set are RCP8.5, which considers high concentrations of pollutant emission with radiative force of 8.5 W/m2, and RCP4.5, which considers radioactive force of 4.5 W/m2 and mitigation actions to control emissions (TAYLOR; STOUFFER; MEEHL, 2012).
The emission scenarios considered in this study for each model are RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 in the 20062100 period.
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the four models considered in this study.
It is worth mentioning that, for the MIROC4h model, there is no data available for the future scenario RCP8.5 and, from the year 2036, for the RCP4.5 scenario.
Therefore, when the mean data of all models for precipitation and temperature are calculated, only the missing data of this model are not considered.
The methodology used in this study to obtain data in terms of affluent flow, enabling historical analyses and future scenarios of water availability in BHAT, based on data from the models described in Table 1, is summarized in the diagram in Figure 2.
Table 1 – Main characteristics of the models considered for analysis in this study.
Model Developer Coverage Spatial Resolution (km) Parameters Available Period CMCC-CM Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC), Italia Global 82.3 × 82.5 Temperature and Precipitation Historical: 1961–2005 Future Scenarios RCPs: 2006–2100 MIROC4h Model for Interdisciplinary Research on Climate.
Version 4, High Resolution, Japan Global 61.7 × 61.8 Temperature and Precipitation Historical: 1961–2005 Future Scenarios RCP4.5: 2006–2039 ETA-MIROC5 CPTEC – SP, Brazil Regional 20 × 20 Temperature and Precipitation Historical: 1961–2005 Future Scenarios RCPs: 2006–2100 ETAHADGEM2-ES CPTEC – SP, Brazil Regional 20 × 20 Temperature and Precipitation Historical: 1961-2005 Future Scenarios RCPs: 2006–2100 Figure 2 – Methodology applied to obtain monthly and annual affluent flow data for future scenarios of climatological modeling.
Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
406 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 Firstly, historical data on precipitation and temperature of each of the models were validated to evaluate their performance in representing the seasonal cycle of precipitation and temperature in BHAT in relation to the historical data.
For the validation of the models, data from the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) were used, which were considered as historical data in the analysis (CRU, 2019).
The CRU is an institution widely recognized for its studies on natural and anthropogenic climate change, focusing on the development and updating of various data sets from weather stations around the world, widely used in climate research, including the global recording of parameters such as temperature and precipitation.
The CRU database is composed of global terrestrial data in a high-resolution grid of 0.5 × 0.5º or thinner (HARRIS et al., 2014).
The period of CRU data used in this study comprises the years 1961 to 2005, the same corresponding to the historical simulations of the models, with the spatial resolution of 50 km.
The evaluation metrics for the analysis of errors related to the models were BIAS (Equation 1), which represents the systematic error of the model, the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) (Equation 2) and the Anomaly Correlation Coefficient (AC) (Equation 3).
The definition of anomaly for the AC metric is the difference between the simulated and the observed values.
a I T FcETP        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa (1) a I T FcETP        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa (2) a I T FcETP        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa (3) In which: F = the value simulated by the model; O = the observed value; C = the climatological value.
After determining the uncertainties of the precipitation and temperature simulations of the models, the systematic error was removed using the Direct Approach technique, widely used to correct the outputs of climatic projections on a monthly scale (LENDERINK et al., 2007; OLIVEIRA et al., 2015; SILVA; VALVERDE, 2017).
This technique is expressed by the formulation presented in Equation 4. a I T FcETP        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa (4) In which: KFC = the corrected value of the climate variable in the evaluation period; KF = the value without correction of the climatic variable in the evaluation period; KC = the mean monthly climatic variable of the model in the control period; KO = the mean monthly climatic variable observed for the control period.
With the application of the Direct Approach technique, the correction factor was found, which was used in the scenarios of RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emissions to obtain the corrected monthly and annual data precipitation and temperature of each of the climatic models used.
Regarding the methods of application, the objective of the study is the evaluation of water availability for future climatic scenarios based on the behavior of the monthly flow in the basin, and climatic models do not generate flow in their simulations.
Thus, this study used a statistical hydrological model that relates precipitation, flow, and evapotranspiration built by Silva (2016) for BHAT.
This empirical model was developed based on observed data of precipitation and flow, using the fundamental equation of water balance, which includes the sum of the processes of water inputs and outputs in a basin in the form of a mathematical relationship (SILVA, 2016).
According to Vilela and Mattos (1975), the application of the general equation of water balance is conditioned to the complexity of the study of a Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 407 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 basin and some simple mathematical models are important tools for hydrological studies, once they allow establishing a relation between the variables of water balance: evapotranspiration, precipitation, and flow.
Thus, Silva (2016) constructed an empirical regression model, determining a dependent variable, in this case, flow, which changes due to independent variables, such as precipitation and evapotranspiration.
The empirical model developed for flow calculation was determined from coefficients derived from the simplified global hydrological equation of a river basin.
For this, monthly data of precipitation and potential evapotranspiration (PET) of the sub-basin area and affluent flow of the exutory of the sub-basin were used on the monthly scale.
The empirical relation, a fourth-order polynomial equation, is presented in Equation 5.
Further details on the development of the empirical model can be found in the study by Silva (2016) and Silva and Valverde (2017).
a I T FcETP        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa (5) In which: P = precipitation; PET = the potential evapotranspiration.
For the calculation of PET, this study used the corrected temperature series and the formulation of Thornthwaite (1948) in Equation 6 (apud SILVA, 2016).
a I T Fc        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa (6) In which: a I T FcETP        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa and a I T FcETP        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa In which: T = the mean monthly temperature of a given month; Fc = the correlation factor as a function of latitude and month (Table 2); I = the annual heat index; a = the function exponent of the annual index.
Thus, based on the calculation of the PET and with the corrected precipitation for future scenarios, Equation 5 was applied for the derivation of the monthly and annual flow data for the historical period and future scenarios of each model.
In the evaluation and analysis of projections in the future period for different time slices (2020-2040, 20412070, and 2071-2099), the anomalies metric (Equation 7) was used to assess the increase (excess) or decrease (deficit) of variables (precipitation, temperature, and flow) in relation to the climate simulated by a model in the present (SILVA, 2016).
a I T Fc        10 .16.
514,1 12 1 5         i T I 49239,010.7292,1.10.71,7.10.75,6 22537   IIIa (7) In which: KF = the monthly value projected by the model in the future period (times slices); K Mc = the monthly value estimated by the model for the simulated climate (1961–2005); M total = the total number of observations.
Table 2 – Thornthwaite monthly evapotranspiration correlation factor (Fc) as a function of the study area (BHAT) — Latitude 23ºS.
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Fc 1.15 1.00 1.05 0.97 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.09 1.10 1.17 Source: Tucci and Beltrame (2001) and Silva and Valverde (2017).
Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
408 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 RESULTS At first, the validation of historical data (1961–2005) of climate models (Table 1) was performed, and it was possible to evaluate their performance in representing the seasonal climatic pattern of precipitation and temperature in BHAT, compared to the historical data derived from CRU.
Figure 3 presents the results obtained from the validation, illustrating the mean seasonal cycle in the period between 1961 and 2005 for temperature and precipitation, including the metrics of errors related to each of the models.
From the errors obtained related to the models, it is possible to highlight which models presented the best performance among them in Figure 3, for each parameter and for each of the metrics used in the validation.
In green, the best results are highlighted between each metric, and in red, the worst results (high BIAS and RMSE, and low AC).
Figure 3 shows that the dry period in all models is displaced approximately 2 months in relation to the observed data (CRU).
CRU data show the wet period between November and March and the dry period between June and March, as already characterized by the literature as the normal behavior of seasonality in BHAT (FUSP, 2009; SILVA; VALVERDE, 2017).
Climate models show approximately the dry period between April and June and the wet period from November to January.
As a result, most models underestimated precipitation in summer and autumn, and overestimated it in winter and spring.
The MIROC4h model is the closest to that observed in summer, autumn and winter, which is reflected in performance metrics.
For temperature, it is observed that climate models follow the same seasonality as observed data (CRU), demonstrating hot and cold periods that coincide seasonally.
However, the MIROC4h model overestimates the mean monthly temperature by almost 0.5°C compared to the observed data, while the other models underestimate the same data, presenting mean monthly temperatures of almost 1°C below, reaching a variation of more than 2.5°C for ETA-MIROC5.
Regarding the metrics for both the RMSE and AC, the model that presented the best performance Figure 3 – Results from the validation of seasonal cycles of precipitation and temperature.
Legend: Model CMCC-CM MIROC4h ETA-MIROC5 ETA-HADGEM2-ES Metric BIAS RMSE AC BIAS RMSE AC BIAS RMSE AC BIAS RMSE AC Temp.
-0.746 1.651 0.814 0.663 1.494 0.860 -3.583 3.875 0.806 -0.832 1.930 0.749 Prec.
-14.220 104.098 0.333 10.805 91.136 0.524 1.145 97.984 0.418 -18.308 102.150 0.366 Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 409 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 for the two parameters (precipitation and temperature) was MIROC4h, since it presented values close to those observed, as described above.
Being that, only for temperature, BIAS was the one that presented the lowest value also for the MIROC4h model.
For BIAS, the ETA-MIROC5 model presented the lowest value for precipitation.
The ETA-HADGEM2-ES model presented the worst AC results for temperature and BIAS for precipitation.
Thus, it was necessary to remove systematic errors related to the models.
Therefore, the direct approach formulation was applied and the correction factor for the monthly values of each model was found.
This factor was applied month by month for the entire historical period.
The results of the corrected seasonal precipitation and temperature cycles confirm the removal of the mean monthly errors for the seasonal cycle for the 1961–2005 period, since the mean monthly values of the series coincide with the mean monthly values of the observed CRU data, both for precipitation and temperature.
The correction factors found for the historical data were applied to the data of the future scenarios of all the models evaluated, for the scenarios of RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emissions in the 2006–2100 period, thus minimizing the uncertainties related to the systematic error generated in the historical simulation and propagated to the projections of the climate models.
Figure 4 shows the annual variability of historical precipitation and temperature for the results of simulations with each model after correction, in the 1961–2005 period, and in future scenarios.
The greatest discrepancy in data variability in the future scenario is noted for the ETA-HADGEM2-ES model, which deviates from the results simulated by the other models, generally presenting lower precipitations (Figures 4A and 4B) and higher temperature (Figures 4C and 4D).
From the corrected data of precipitation and temperature for future emission scenarios, it was possible to obtain the historical values and flow projections for BHAT, according to the methodology of this study (Figure 2).
Figures 4E and 4F show the annual flow variability calculated for each simulated model in the 1961–2005 period, as well as in future scenarios.
It is observed that, for both RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios, all models present annual flow variability and most values are in the approximate range of 40 to 80 m3/s.
The CMCC-CM model stands out when presenting some mean annual flow peaks over the studied period, indicating that the occurrence of extreme flow values will be more frequent for this model.
These anomalies can be better evaluated based on the analysis of annual seasonality and identification of anomalies in the monthly flow means, presented in Figures 4E and 4F.
Table 3 presents the monthly flow anomalies expressed as a percentage for future RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios.
By separating the analysis period by time slices (2020–2040, 2041–2070, and 2071–2100), anomalies in relation to the historical period simulated by each model are more clearly observed.
It is noted that for the wet period, in the months of January, February and March, anomalies with decreased flow rates are evidenced for all models in the future scenarios of RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, with the exception of the CMMC-CM model, which presents only positive anomalies in almost every month throughout the period studied.
This behavior is mainly verified for the 2020–2040 time slice, which characterizes a short-term anomaly prediction.
For long-term time slices, both negative and positive anomalies are presented in the wet period of the study area for simulated models, however, with less marked variations than in the short term.
In the period characterized by little precipitation in the study area (also called dry period), between June, July, and August, it is inferred, based on Table 3, that there will be an increase in the mean monthly flows in all time slices of the simulated models, except for the ETA-HADGEM2ES model, which presents small negative anomalies in the dry period, only in the short term.
The results of the CMCC-CM model stand out, which presented the greatest positive anomalies in the dry period for all the time slices, reaching an increase of 61% in relation to the historical period for the mean monthly flow in June, in the 2071–2100 slice of the RCP8.5 scenario.
The results of the ETA-HADGEM2ES model are also noteworthy, showing the greatest negative anomalies in the wet period for all the time slices.
The anomalies for this model reached a decrease of 28% in relation to the historical period of the mean monthly flow in January, in the 2020–2040 time slice of the RCP4.5 scenario, which also considers the adoption of mitigation measures to control environmental impacts.
Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
410 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 Figure 4 – (A, B) Annual variability of precipitation, (C, D) temperature, (E, F) and flow rate in the historical period (1961–2005) and future scenarios (2006–2100) for each corrected model.
A B C D E F Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 411 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 The results presented for anomalies, in general, show an increase in the mean monthly flows during the dry period (Jun-Jul-Aug) in the BHAT region for the seasonal cycle of the future projections simulated by the models, as well as a decrease in the mean monthly flows in the wet period (Nov-DecJan).
This behavior shows a different pattern from the anomalies found in the study on the future scenario of water availability at BHAT carried out by Silva and Valverde (2017), who analyzed the simulations of the Japanese MRI-JMA model for the A2 emissions scenario.
The study results presented an increase in the mean monthly flows during the wet period and a decrease in the dry one.
Since the flow is strongly influenced by precipitation and indirectly by temperature, Figure 5 presents the annual climatic projections of precipitation and temperature in the BHAT for the emission scenarios RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, which were estimated by calculating the mean of the annual values of all analyzed models (CMCC-CM, MIROC4h, ETA-MIROC5, and ETA-HADGEM2-ES) from 2006 to 2100.
The trend lines by emission scenario are also presented, divided by time slice.
For precipitation (Figure 5A), it is not possible to observe a clear and unique trend along the whole period, either of increase or decrease in the future scenarios evaluated in RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.
Analyzing by periods, Table 3 – Monthly flow anomalies for the emission scenarios RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, in relation to the historical period simulated by each model (in %) Scenario Model Time Slices Monthly Anomaly [%] Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec RC P4 .5 CMCC-CM 2020-2040 4 5 16 -5 26 23 22 10 10 16 6 -1 2041-2070 5 15 0 8 21 38 12 8 7 14 14 1 2071-2100 12 20 26 19 26 60 37 24 15 21 18 -2 ETAMIROC5 2020-2040 -18 -8 -17 -12 2 12 3 3 12 29 12 0 2041-2070 -1 -1 -1 -7 18 48 4 2 20 28 26 15 2071-2100 -7 8 -10 -7 13 12 7 6 20 18 21 -1 ETAHADGEM2ES 2020-2040 -28 -18 -20 0 -12 -8 -5 8 -9 9 -14 -29 2041-2070 -1 -1 -1 -7 18 48 4 2 20 28 26 15 2071-2100 -25 -17 -5 3 11 25 14 20 5 18 -2 -19 MIROC4h 2020-2035 -4 -4 10 12 -5 2 3 1 -3 -2 3 0 RC P8 .5 CMCC-CM 2020-2040 1 -13 15 10 3 42 18 7 3 -6 5 -1 2041-2070 5 15 0 8 21 38 12 8 7 14 14 1 2071-2100 23 28 15 44 26 61 17 32 17 35 34 -3 ETAMIROC5 2020-2040 -14 -5 -15 -12 -9 -9 -2 3 2 21 0 -5 2041-2070 -1 -1 -1 -7 18 48 4 2 20 28 26 15 2071-2100 9 1 4 10 31 38 12 21 36 48 42 15 ETAHADGEM2ES 2020-2040 -27 -21 -17 5 -3 4 18 7 -6 -10 -17 -28 2041-2070 -1 -1 -1 -7 18 48 4 2 20 28 26 15 2071-2100 -10 -4 1 33 23 44 47 50 20 31 14 -1 Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
412 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 *The projections for the future scenarios in this table were estimated by averaging the annual values of all analyzed models (CMCC-CM, MIROC4h, ETA-MIROC5, and ETA-HADGEM2-ES).
Figure 5 – Annual climate projections of precipitation and temperature for BHAT obtained through the mean of the analyzed models*.
A B in the short term (time slice of the 2020–2040 period), there is a slight tendency to increase the accumulated precipitation in both emission scenarios, being this more accentuated for the RCP4.5 scenario, which considers mitigation measures to control environmental impacts.
However, in the long term (time slices in periods 2041–2070 and 2071–2100), the RCP8.5 scenario presents an inter-annual variability with the occurrence of more intense events in some periods in relation to the RCP4.5 scenario.
As for the temperature (Figure 5B), it is possible to observe a clear tendency of annual mean increase in the two future scenarios presented.
For the RCP8.5 scenario, the growth is more accentuated in all the time slices presented, with an mean annual increase of 0.5°C between the years 2006 and 2099, being the total annual mean temperature variation of 5.2°C between these two years.
In addition, the RCP8.5 scenario even showed a difference in the annual mean temperature of 3.4°C compared to the RCP4.5 scenario in the year 2080.
Figure 6 presents the annual flow climate projections for the BHAT, calculated based on the mean of the annual values obtained from each model evaluated, for the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios.
There is a slight trend of flow growth in the study area for the two scenarios, of significance proven by the p-value statistical test, considering the mean annual flows in the study area, with greater variability and intensification of anomalies in the future scenario (period from 2006 to 2099).
In Figure 7, it is possible to evaluate in more detail the differences between the mean and the variance of the results for the two simulated emission scenarios, by presenting the curve of the normal distribution of the annual mean flow values in the two simulations.
Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 413 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 This evaluation considered a sample space with a minimum flow value equivalent to the mean minus 4 standard deviations of the flow series of the future scenario, and a maximum flow value equivalent to the mean plus 4 standard deviations of the flow series.
It can be observed that there is an increase in the mean and variance of the projected annual mean flow of the emission scenario RCP8.5 in relation to RCP4.5.
Figure 8 shows the mean monthly pattern in the historical period (1964–2005) and in the future scenario (2006–2100) for CPR4.5 and CPR8.5, illustrating the mean annual seasonality in the study area for these periods.
Table 4 presents the mean monthly flow anomalies for the RCP4.5 and RCP8.4 emission scenarios, in relation to the mean historical period simulated by the four models.
Regarding seasonality conditions, as shown in Figure 8 and Table 4, once more there is an increase of mean monthly flows during the dry period (Jun-Jul-Aug) in the BHAT region.
In addition, it is possible to observe a downward trend in mean monthly flows in the wet period (Nov-Dec-Jan), and for the RCP8.5 emission scenario the decrease in flow is more accentuated in the 2020–2040 time slice, reaching a value 13% lower than the mean monthly flow in the month of January, in comparison with the simulated historical mean.
In the drought period, the increase in mean monthly flows is more pronounced both in the RCP4.5 emission scenario, reaching an increase of 48% in the mean monthly flow for June for the 2041–2070 time slice, and in the RCP8.5 emission scenario, which also shows an increase of 48% in the mean monthly flow for June, but for the 2071–2100 time slice.
Table 4 shows that for the average situation, as well as the anomalies presented for each of the models in Table 3, there are more intense negative anomalies in the short-term forecast time slices (2020–2040), while for long-term scenarios, there are less pronounced positive anomalies.
Figure 6 – Mean annual flow projections for BHAT in the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios.
Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
414 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 *P10 is the 10th percentile, P90 is the 90th percentile, and δ is the standard deviation.
Figure 7 – Normal distribution curves of the annual mean flow for the mean values calculated for the future emission scenarios RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, considering the period 2006 to 2100*.
Figure 8 – Mean monthly flow pattern in the historical period (1964–2005) and future scenario (2006–2100) for RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.
Table 4 – Mean monthly flow anomalies for the emission scenarios RCP4.5 and RCP8.4, in relation to the mean historical period simulated by the four models (in %).
Scenarios Time Slices Monthly Anomaly [%] Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec RCP4.5 2020-2040 -11 -6 -3 -1 3 8 6 5 2 13 2 -7 2041-2070 -1 -1 -1 -7 18 48 4 2 20 28 26 15 2071-2100 -6 4 4 5 17 32 19 17 13 19 12 -7 RCP8.5 2020-2040 -13 -13 -6 1 -3 12 11 6 -1 2 -4 -11 2041-2070 -11 1 7 -11 8 8 3 10 23 34 26 10 2071-2100 7 8 7 29 27 48 25 34 25 38 30 4 Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 415 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 The study by Lyra et al.
(2018) evaluated the influence of climate change on the annual seasonality of temperature and precipitation in SPMR using the ETA-HADGEM2-ES model, which was also evaluated in this study.
For spatial resolutions of 5 × 5 and 20 × 20 km, the study by Lyra et al.
(2018) reinforces that it is difficult to identify patterns in rainfall behavior in southeastern Brazil, since it underestimates the rainfall events associated with the South Atlantic Convergence Zone, and neither model captures the heaviest rainfall (above 150 mm/d).
However, the authors found that the ETA-HADGEM2-ES model shows more pronounced warming projections in the SPMR, with maximum temperatures increasing by 9°C by the end of the century in the RCP8.5 scenario.
Precipitation volume decreased and the mean annual precipitation reached a reduction of more than 50% in the state of Rio de Janeiro and between 40 and 45% in São Paulo.
In the present study, the analysis with the same model also presented reduced precipitation (Figures 4A and 4B) and accentuated temperatures (Figures 4C and 4D) throughout the evaluated future period (2006–2100).
The present study also found a reduction in precipitation volume for the BHAT region more evident in the ETA-HADGEM2-ES model projection, when compared with the other models analyzed (CMCC, ETA-MIROC5, and MIROC4h), which showed an upward trend.
For this reason, the models (Figure 4A) showed a lot of variability in their mean until 2099.
However, the analysis for smaller periods (time slices) showed a decrease in precipitation from the historical period to the beginning of the year 2020, and that there would still be an increase until 2040, to soon present a new reduction.
Previous works in the SPMR and BHAT region, such as those of Marengo et al.
(2012), Silva et al.
(2017), and Silva and Valverde (2017), which used Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) from IPCC (NAKICENOVIC et al., 2000), identified increased precipitation and flow, respectively, mainly in summer.
However, with the new RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios, and specifically for the ETA-HadGEM2-ES model, a reduction in precipitation was identified until the end of the 21st century.
This result influenced the calculated mean flow that presented a significant reduction, mainly for the near future 2020– 2040, in the summer.
Other studies that evaluated water availability for future climate scenarios in river basins that feed producing systems that supply the BHAT were developed by Gesualdo et al.
(2019) and Pontes et al.
(2019) for the JRB.
The JRB is the main tributary of the Cantareira System, which is responsible for the water supply of 4.5 million inhabitants of the SPMR.
Pontes et al.
(2019) used the SWAT hydrological model and four climate models (GFDL, HadGEM, IPSL, and MIROC) in three emission scenarios (RCP2.6, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5) to determine the tributary flow of the JRB.
The results did not show a consensus among the climate models in the simulation of rainfall until the 21st century.
While the GFDL model simulated a substantial decrease in precipitation, especially in the RCP8.5 scenario, similar to the results obtained by this study, the other models showed increasing precipitation.
Under these conditions, the calculated flow rate was reduced (maximum, mean, and minimum flow) in the case of the GFDL model, while for the other models the maximum discharges increased.
The study by Gesualdo et al.
(2019) also worked with the JRB to analyze climate change scenarios that may impact the flow.
Using the ensemble of 17 climate models from CMIP5 for the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios and a hydrological model.
The authors found that the flow rate showed greater annual variability, with significant increases between January and March and a 2-month extension of the dry hydrological season (June to September) through November.
Also, according to the model simulations, there will be a reduction of more than 35% in the flow from September to November, with a reduction of more than 50% in October.
These data portray a condition contrary to the results obtained in this study for BHAT, a region close to JRB, which verified a trend of decreasing mean monthly flows in the wet period for a characteristic that extends from November to March, and an increase in mean monthly flows in the dry period.
Although the above-mentioned studies have not been addressed for the area of BHAT, they are related to the study area of the present work, since JRB is part of the Cantareira System, one of the main water supply systems of the BHAT.
If there is a decrease or increase in water availability, as simulated by the hydrological models that used the climate model simulations, it will directly affect the water supply in the SPMR.
Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
416 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS For a successful integrated and preventive management of water resources, especially in large metropolitan regions such as the SPMR, it is necessary to prepare studies to assess the region’s resilience to the impacts of climate change, ensuring a condition of water security.
A potential tool to provide inputs for the elaboration of these studies is the use of climate models as a complement to hydrological ones for the study of water availability.
The results of this study complement the results of previous studies already elaborated for the assessment of water availability in BHAT with the use of climate models for the assessment and comparison of climate variability among several future scenarios.
It reaffirms that the water demand for the subsistence of the population in the region of the BHAT can be affected by extreme climate variability in the context of global climate change.
The main conclusions of this study show that, when the mean between the four models (ensemble) evaluated is calculated, there is a small tendency to increase the mean annual flow in the future projections analyzed in the period 2006–2100 with statistical significance, for the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 emission scenarios.
The mean and variance of the annual flow in the period analyzed, as well as the positive tendency, are slightly more accentuated for the RCP8.5 scenario, considered as the most extreme.
Another result verified through this study covers the seasonality of the mean monthly flow pattern identified in the BHAT, both calculated based on the monthly means of the future analyzed period (2006–2100) and for each time slice.
The results showed there will be a decrease in the mean monthly flows in the wet period for the study region of up to 13% in the 2020–2040 time slice, while in the dry period there is an increase in these means (9.7%) for the RCP8.5 emissions scenario, compared with the simulated historical data.
This seasonal behavior for the future scenarios differs from those already observed in studies already conducted for Tietê River Basin, such as the study by Silva and Valverde (2017), which presents a pattern of increased mean monthly flows during the wet period, and a decrease in the dry one.
In the study by Lyra et al.
(2018), for future projections in the Southeast region of Brazil using the ETA-HADGEM2-ES model, seasonal rainfall patterns similar to those verified for the seasonality of the mean monthly flows presented in this study for BHAT were verified.
It should be noted that the studies mentioned above used only one climate model for analysis, the regional ETA-HADGEM2-ES (RCP emission scenarios) (LYRA et al., 2018) and the global high-resolution MRI model (SRES scenario – A2) (SILVA; VALVERDE, 2017).
However, in analyses of climate projections of emissions scenarios, the use of more than one model is recommended in order to reflect the range of uncertainties and qualities that each of the climate models may present.
Even when working with a set of models, the mean results (ensembles) can offer better performance than any individual model (DHAKAL; KAKANI; LINDE, 2018; GLECKLER; TAYLOR; DOUTRIAUX, 2008).
For this reason, in addition to showing the individual simulation of each model, in this work, the mean of the simulations of each analyzed variable was calculated.
Regarding the mean annual temperature, there was a consensus of the models for a progressive increase until 2099, which did not occur for precipitation.
Although the temperature increase causes greater evapotranspiration, it is the change in the rainfall regime that is determinant for the water balance, especially in the flow.
Considering the critical situation of BHAT in the state of São Paulo, the importance of analyzing seasonal climatology is emphasized, and the decrease in flow during the rainy season in the near future (2020–2040) is considered as a warning that reaffirms the need for more alternative sources of water supply in the region.
The results of Gesualdo et al.
(2019), which show an 89% increase in the mean flow in the Jaguari basin in the summer, a result of the ensemble of 17 climate models (RCP4.5) for the near future (2010–2040), may seem optimistic, since this basin supplies water for the BHAT and would partially compensate for the deficit found in the results of this work.
However, Gesualdo et al.
(2019) warn in their study about the problem of the extension of the dry season until November (currently June to September) in the Jaguari basin, which completely alters the hydrological cycle of the basin, with an increased risk of floods and droughts and an extension of its critical period.
Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 417 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 Thus, it is recommended that future work be carried out to evaluate the availability of water in the BHAT region based on other high-resolution climatic models, with different resolutions and emission scenarios.
This word could reinforce whether there is a recurrent pattern for the Southeast region of Brazil, since some results of the models used by other studies presented here showed results both contrary and similar to those verified in this study.
The recommendation is to use at least two models for analyzing climate projections.
It is also important to emphasize that there are divergences between different climate models that simulate climate projections, since they depend on several factors (spatial resolution, parameterization, emission scenarios, whether it is regional or global, etc.).
For this reason, it is recommended to evaluate more than one model and to analyze the consensus in addition to uncertainties.
The simulation of a model, in the context of climate change, is not considered a forecast, but rather a projection of a potential scenario.
Moreover, it is suggested the development of water availability studies, based on simulations of future projections using global and regional models, also for other regions of the SPMR supply systems besides BHAT, such as the Cantareira System and the São Lourenço System, in order to provide subsidies for the management and operation of these systems.
This initiative could verify the need to include alternative water sources to supply the SPMR.
It is also recommended that, in future works, conceptual hydrological models be used in the methodology, including variables such as infiltration rate, base flow, recharge flow, and surface humidity in the calculations.
However, the results obtained in this work and in the other studies cited are not yet sufficient to guide public policies aimed at minimizing future risks involving variability and climate change in a context of water security in the SPMR, but they serve as subsidies to guide the development of new studies.
REFERENCES BORK, C. K.; CASTRO, A. S.; LEANDRO, D.; CORRÊA, L. B.; SIQUEIRA, T. M. Índices de precipitação extrema para os períodos atual (1961-1990) e futuro (2011-2100) na bacia do rio Taquari-Antes, RS.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais, n. 46, p. 29-45, 2017. https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820170233 CABRERA, V. E.; SOLÍS, D.; BAIGORRIA, A.; LETSON, D. Managing climate variability in agricultural analysis.
In: LONG, J.
A.; WELLS, D. S.
(orgs.).
Ocean circulation and El Niño: new research.
Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 2019. p. 163-179.
CALADO, G. G.; VALVERDE, M. C.; BAIGORRIA, G. A.
Use of teleconnection indices for water management in the Cantareira System, São Paulo, Brazil.
Environmental Processes, v. 6, p. 413-431, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40710-019-00368-9 CHOU, S. C.; LYRA, A.; MOURÃO, C.; DERECZYNSKI, C.; PILOTTO, I.; GOMES, J.; BUSTAMANTE, J.; TAVARES, P.; SILVA, A.; RODRIGUES, D.; CAMPOS, D.; CHAGAS, D.; SUEIRO, G.; SIQUEIRA, G.; MARENGO, J.
Assessment of climate change over South America under RCP4.5 and 8.5 downscaling scenarios.
American Journal of Climate Change, v. 3, n. 5, p. 512-527, 2014a.
https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2014.35043 CHOU, S. C.; LYRA, A.; MOURÃO, C.; DERECZYNSKI, C.; PILOTTO, I.; GOMES, J.; BUSTAMANTE, J.; TAVARES, P.; SILVA, A.; RODRIGUES, D.; CAMPOS, D.; CHAGAS, D.; SUEIRO, G.; SIQUEIRA, G.; NOBRE, P.; MARENGO, J.
Evaluation of the Eta simulations nested in three global climate models.
American Journal of Climate Change, v. 3, n. 5, p. 438-454, 2014b.
https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2014.35039 CLIMATIC RESEARCH UNIT (CRU).
Data.
CRU, 2019.
Available at: <http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/data>.
Accessed on: Oct. 21, 2019.
FUSP.
Plano da Bacia do Alto Tietê: Relatório Final.
Comitê da Bacia Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê.
São Paulo: FUSP, 2009.
201 p. DHAKAL, K.; KAKANI, V. G.; LINDE, E. Climate change impact onwheat production in the southern great plains of the US using downscaled climate data.
Atmospheric and Climate Sciences, v. 8, n. 2, p. 143-162, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4236/acs.2018.82011 https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820170233 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40710-019-00368-9 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2014.35043 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2014.35039 http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/data https://doi.org/10.4236/acs.2018.82011 Calado, G.G.
; Valverde, M.C.
418 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 FISCH, G.; SANTOS, T. A.; SILVA, R. C. Water security in the Vale do Paraiba’s basin: future scenarios.
Ambiente e Água, v. 12, n. 6, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4136/ambi-agua.2156 FUNDAÇÃO AGÊNCIA DA BACIA HIDROGRÁFICA DO ALTO TIETÊ (FABHAT).
Relatório de Situação dos Recursos Hídricos: Bacia Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê UGRHI 06 Ano Base 2013.
São Paulo: FABHAT, 2014.
162 p. GESUALDO, G. C.; OLIVEIRA, P. T. S.; RODRIGUES, D. B.
B.; GUPTA, H. V. Assessing Water Security in the Sao Paulo Metropolitan Region Under Projected Climate Change.
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 2019. https://doi.
org/10.5194/hess-2019-134 GLECKLER, P. J.; TAYLOR, K. E.; DOUTRIAUX, C. Performance metrics for climate models.
Journal of Geophysics Research Atmospheres, v. 113, n. D06, p. 104, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1029/2007JD008972 LENDERINK, G.; BUISHAND, A.; DEURSEN, W. Estimates of future discharges of the river Rhine using two scenario methodologies: direct versus delta approach.
Hydrology and Earth System Science, v. 11, n. 3, p. 1145-1159, 2007.
HARRIS, I.; JONES, P. D.; OSBORN, T. J.; LISTER, D. H. Updated high-resolution grids of monthly climatic observations the CRU TS3.10 Dataset.
International Journal of Climatology, v. 34, n. 3, p. 623-642, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.3711 LIRA, F. A.; CARDOSO, A. O. Estudo de tendência de vazões de rios das principais bacias hidrográficas brasileiras.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais, n. 48, p. 21-37, 2018. https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820180273 LYRA, A.; TAVARES, P.; CHOU, S. C.; SUEIRO, G.; DERECZYNSKI, C. P.; SONDERMANN, M.; SILVA, A.; MARENGO, J.; GIAROLLA, A.
Climate change projections over three metropolitan regions in Southeast Brazil using the non-hydrostatic Eta regional climate model at 5-km resolution.
Theoretical and Applied Climatology, v. 132, p. 663-682, 2018. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s00704-017-2067-z MARENGO, J.
A.; ALVES, L. N.; ALVALA, R. C. S.; CUNHA, A. P.; BRITO, S.; MORAES, O. L. L. Climatic characteristics of the 2010-2016 drought in semiarid Northeast Brazil region.
Anais da Academia Brasileira de Ciências, v. 90, n. 2, suppl.
1, p. 1973-1985, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1590/0001-3765201720170206 MARENGO, J.
A.; BERNASCONI, M. Regional differences in aridity/drought conditions over Northeast Brazil: present state and future projections.
Climate Change, v. 129, n. 1-2, p. 103-115, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10584-014-1310-1 MARENGO, J.
A.; CHOU, S. C.; KAY, G.; ALVES, L. M.; PESQUERO, J. F.; SOARES, W. R.; SANTOS, D. C.; LYRA, A.
A.; SUEIRO, G.; BETTS, R.; CHAGAS, D. J.; GOMES, J. L.; BUSTAMANTE, J. F.; TAVARES, P. Development of regional future climate change scenarios in South America using the Eta CPTEC/HadCM3 climate change projections: climatology and regional analyses for the Amazon, São Francisco, and the Paraná River basins.
Climate Dynamics, v. 38, p. 1829-1848, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-011-1155-5 NAKICENOVIC, N.; ALCAMO, J.; DAVIS, G.; DE VRIES, B.; FENHANN, J.; GAFFIN, S. Special report on emissions scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
570 p. NOBRE, C. A.; MARENGO, J.
A.; SELUCHI, M. E.; CUARTAS, L. A.; ALVES, L. M. Some characteristics and impacts of the drought and water crisis in southeastern Brazil during 2014 and 2015.
Journal of Water Resource and Protection, v. 8, n. 2, p. 252-262, 2016. https://doi.org/10.4236/jwarp.2016.82022 OLIVEIRA, G. G.; PEDROLLO, O. C.; CASTRO, N. M. R. As incertezas associadas às condições climáticas obtidas pelo modelo ETA CPTEC/HADCM3: avaliação comparativa entre os dados simulados e observados de precipitação, evapotranspiração e vazão na bacia hidrográfica do Rio Ijuí, Brasil.
Revista Brasileira de Meteorologia, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 1, p. 101-121, mar.
2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.4136/ambi-agua.2156 https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-2019-134 https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-2019-134 https://doi.org/10.1029/2007JD008972 https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.3711 https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820180273 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-017-2067-z https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-017-2067-z https://doi.org/10.1590/0001-3765201720170206 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1310-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1310-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-011-1155-5 https://doi.org/10.4236/jwarp.2016.82022 Future scenarios of water availability in the alto tietê basin 419 RBCIAMB | v.55 | n.3 | set 2020 | 401-419 ISSN 2176-9478 OTTO, F. E. L.; COELHO, C. A. S.; KING, A.; PEREZ, E. C.; WADA, Y.; OLDENBORGH, G. J. V.; HAARSMA, R.; HAUSTEIN, K.; UHE, P.; AALST, M. V.; ARAVEQUIA, J.
A.; ALMEIDA, W.; CULLEN, H. Factors other than climate change, main drivers of 2014/15 water shortage in Southeast Brazil [in Bexplaining extremes of 2014 from a climate perspective].
Bulletin of America Meteor Society, v. 96, n. 12, p. S35-S40, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-EEE_2014_ch8.1 PEREIRA, A. J.; MASSAMBANI, O.; KARAM, H. A.; HALLAK, R.; HAAS, R.; VEMADO, F. Sistema de previsão hidrometeorológica para a Bacia do Alto Tietê.
Boletim da Sociedade Brasileira de Meteorologia, v. 32, p. 42-60, 2008.
PONTES, L. M.; DOMINGUES, L. M.; FIRPO, M. A. F.; ROCHA, H. R. A Vazão do rio Jaguari no século 21 estipulada com projeções climáticas regionalizadas.
In: SIMPÓSIO BRASILEIRO DE RECURSOS HIDRÍCOS, 23., 2019.
Annals... Foz do Iguaçu: ABRH, 2019.
SILVA, M. C. O. Cenário futuro da disponibilidade hídrica na Bacia do Alto Tietê.
Dissertação (Mestrado) – Pós-Graduação em Ciência e Tecnologia Ambiental, Universidade Federal do ABC.
Santo André, p. 116.
2016.
SILVA, M. C. O.; VALVERDE, M. C. Cenário futuro da disponibilidade hídrica na Bacia do Alto Tietê.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais, n. 43, p. 114-130, 2017. http://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820170185 SILVEIRA, C. S.; SOUZA FILHO, F. A.; VASCONCELOS JUNIOR, F. C.; ARAUJO JUNIOR, L. M.; CABRAL, S. L. Mudanças climáticas e o setor hidroelétrico brasileiro: uma análise com base em modelos do IPCC-AR5.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais, n. 47, p. 46-60, 2018. https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820180210 TAYLOR, K. E.; STOUFFER, R. J.; MEEHL, G. A.
A summary of the CMIP5 experiment design.
PCDMI Report, 2009.
TAYLOR, K. E.; STOUFFER, R. J.; MEEHL, G. A.
An overview of CMIP5 and the experiment design.
Bulletin of American Meteorology Society, v. 93, n. 4, p. 485-498, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-11-00094.1 TUCCI, C. E. M.; BELTRAME, F. S. Evaporação e evapotranspiração.
Hidrologia: ciência e aplicação.
2. ed.
Porto Alegre: UFRGS, ABRH, 2001. p. 253-287.
VAN VUUREN, D. P.; EDMONDS, J.; KAINUMA, M.; RIAHI, K.; THOMSON, A.; HIBBARD, K.; HURTT, G. C.; KRAM, T.; KREY, V.; LAMARQUE, J.-F.; MASUI, T.; MEINSHAUSEN, M.; NAKICENOVIC, N.; SMITH, S. J.; ROSE, S. K. The representative concentration pathways: An overview.
Climate Change, v. 109, p. 5-31, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z VILLELA, S. M.; MATTOS, A. Hidrologia aplicada.
São Paulo: McGraw-Hill, 1975.
245p.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons license.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-EEE_2014_ch8.1 http://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820170185 https://doi.org/10.5327/Z2176-947820180210 https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-11-00094.1 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This article was first published in Globalizations, and is reproduced with permission.
This journal is published by the University Library System, University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press.
JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH FORUM ON SAMIR AMIN’S PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL OF WORKERS AND PEOPLES Climate Justice and Sustained Transnational Mobilization Paul Almeida University of California, Merced palmeida@ucmerced.edu The transition to the neoliberal form of global capitalism in the late twentieth century corresponded with a variety of novel forms of resistance at the local, national, and international levels of political life (Almeida and Chase-Dunn 2018).
Neoliberalism produces new models of unequal development (Amin 1976) between the capitalist core and periphery as well within nation states along with a host of tensions and threats motivating popular movements.
These struggles will likely intensify as we move into the third decade of the new millennium.
At the local level, collective action centers on everyday forms of resistance and grassroots struggles over racism, land grabbing, mining and mega development projects (Almeida 2019).
At the national level, opposition to neoliberalism manifests in the form of social movement campaigns against a bundle ISSN: 1076-156X | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 | jwsr.pitt.edu Samir Amin, a leading scholar and co-founder of the world-systems tradition, died on August 12, 2018.
Just before his death, he published, along with close allies, a call for ‘workers and the people’ to establish a ‘fifth international’ to coordinate support to progressive movements.
To honor Samir Amin’s invaluable contribution to world-systems scholarship, we are pleased to present our readers with a selection of essays responding to Amin’s final message for today’s anti-systemic movements.
This forum is being co-published between Globalizations, the Journal of World-Systems Research, and Pambazuka News.
Readers can find additional essays and commentary in these outlets.
The following essay has been published in Globalizations and is being reproduced here with permission.
http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.pitt.edu/ http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://www.library.pitt.edu/articles/digpubtype/index.html http://upress.pitt.edu/ http://upress.pitt.edu/ mailto:palmeida@ucmerced.edu mailto:palmeida@ucmerced.edu https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/letter-intent-inaugural-meeting-international-workers-and-peoples https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75 http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/75 https://www.pambazuka.org/ https://www.pambazuka.org/ https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Almeida jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 366 of economic liberalization policies that include austerity cuts, free trade agreements, privatization, de-regulation, and labor flexibility laws (Walton and Seddon 1994; Silva 2009).
At the transnational level, opposition to international capital is most pronounced in the global economic justice movement, the World Social Forums, and, increasingly, the movement for Climate Justice, which is the focus of this essay.
In past decades, sociologists theorized that global capitalist accumulation would create its own self-induced limits through the depletion of natural resources, pollution, and environmental destruction (Schnaiberg 1980; Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004; Rudy, forthcoming).
Amin (2018) also referred to the ecological crisis of the twenty-first century in his final essay.
James O’Connor (1988) conceptualized these processes as the “second contradiction of capitalism,” a contradiction in addition to the capitalist crisis of overproduction.
In this perspective, advanced forms of capitalist accumulation undermine the necessary material requisites for systemic reproduction by destroying the ecological bases for continuous and expanded industrial activities on a global scale, leading to a crisis of underproduction.
More recently, scholars contributing to these debates incorporate carbon emissions and global warming as an “ecological rift” caused by global capitalism (Foster, Clark, and York 2011; Moore 2015).
The most recent scientific reporting suggests that the outlook for continued global warming is dire.
Instead of a reduction in carbon emissions since 2017, there was a global increase of 1.6% in 2017 and 2.7% in 2018.
(Dennis and Mooney 2018).
Moreover, the past four years (2015-2018) have seen the warmest documented mean global temperatures on record, while the twenty warmest years on record have occurred over the past twenty-two years (World Meteorological Organization 2018).
The environmental challenge of global warming and climate change produced by neoliberal capitalism in the twenty-first century has also generated a massive transnational movement – the movement for climate justice.
Environmental justice and climate justice combine threats of environmental degradation with concerns about inequality and the larger impacts on people with fewer resources and disadvantaged populations (Bullard 2005; Pellow 2017).
Ecological threats provide a major incentive for collective action in that failure to mobilize in the present will likely lead to worsening environmental conditions (Johnson and Frickel 2011; Almeida 2018).
Earlier conservation movements (often involving more privileged social strata) organized in waves of environmentalism since the late nineteenth century against ecological threats associated with the expansion of industrial capital (Gottlieb 1993).
The movement to resist the environmental threat of climate change traces its origins back to the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In the late 1980s, climate scientists and environmental NGOs started to push international organizations and nation states to take action based on meteorological and atmospheric studies that demonstrated a clear trend in global warming and its likely negative consequences.
The United Nations established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to begin scientific discussions about how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Romm 2018).
Concurrently, a global network of environmental NGOs emerged to pressure the U.N. to propose a binding international climate accord – the Climate Action Network (CAN) (Brecher 2015).
During the United Nations Earth Summit on sustainability in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, the United Nations Framework Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Samir Amin’s New International jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 367 Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) was established as an intergovernmental forum to work on reducing global warming (Caniglia et al.
2015).
In 1995, the UNFCC forum also set up annual meetings to move toward a global climate treaty to decrease carbon emissions – the Conference of Parties (COP).
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the global climate movement to reduce greenhouse gases was concentrated in advanced capitalist countries and largely worked through the institutional channels of these U.N. bodies via the participation of environmental NGOs.
This period has been referred to as “mobilization from above” (Brecher 2015).
Beginning in the mid-2000s, the climate justice movement became more contentious, organizing rallies and marches across the globe.
The use of more non-institutionalized tactics rose in tandem with the lack of progress within the U.N. system to enforce past agreements and hold countries accountable for CO2 emissions.
Already by 2005 the mass climate justice movement could mobilize simultaneous demonstrations in cities across several continents.
The climate justice movement peaked in 2014 and 2015 by holding global days of protest in most of the world’s countries and mobilized another large campaign in September of 2018 (Almeida 2019).
The movement has gained tremendous momentum in 2019 with the rise of Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for the Future promoting hundreds of actions across the globe.
This global reach marked the transnational climate justice movement as one of the most extensive social movements on the planet.
The emphasis here is on the organizational infrastructure that has made the transnational climate justice movement so extensive and its prospects for future mobilization and lasting and effective coordination of popular organizations and movements.
I examine the role of the global economic justice movement and the anti-war movement in providing the organizational and experiential bases for planetary mobilization against climate change.
These are empirically based assessments to understand the likelihood of building a sustained international organization of progressive and subaltern forces along the lines envisioned by Amin (2018).
The Global Justice Movement The global justice movement took off in the late 1990s shortly after the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1996.
The movement quickly developed an innovative organizational template for mobilizing mass protests on a transnational level.
The coordinating template involved mobilizing a series of actions at the focal conference/summit/financial meetings while simultaneously holding dozens of solidarity actions across the globe (Almeida and Lichbach 2003).
This transnational organizing model is referred to by activists as a “global day of action” (Wood 2004).
The global justice movement was a response to the neoliberal form of global capitalism that had been taking shape since the 1980s with a heavy emphasis on free trade and deregulation of social protections.
The emerging global justice movement began to take advantage of the rise of internet communication technologies (ICTs).
Beginning with international financial meetings in Europe in the late 1990s and the 1999 WTO conference in Seattle (Smith 2001), the global organizational template was widely adopted.
Indeed, by the turn of the twenty-first century Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Almeida jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 368 the global justice movement had organized over 15 transnational campaigns per year with over 200,000 participants (Lichbach 2003).
The organizational template invented by the global justice movement involves holding a large set of protests at the site of an international event along with simultaneous solidarity protests around the world (Almeida and Lichbach 2003).
By the early 2000s, the global justice movement had expanded the simultaneous protests to every continent.
This would become the main form of transnational opposition to global capitalism in the twenty-first century (Wood 2012).
After the WTO meetings in Seattle, at least a half dozen global days of protest took place between 2000 and 2003.
These included the IMF/World Bank meetings in Prague in September 2000, the G8 conference in Genoa in 2001, the WTO ministerial in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, and the fifth WTO Ministerial in 2003 in Cancun, Mexico (Juris 2008).
The global justice movement brought a wide coalition of different groups into their global days of action campaigns—youth, labor unions, human rights, environmentalists, LGBTQ groups, indigenous activists, feminists, peace, anarchists and etc.
They united around the idea of protecting social citizenship and environmental rights that had been granted by nation-states in the twentieth century and now were under threat from neoliberal deregulation.
The global justice movement spilled over into the global anti-war movement in 2003 with demonstrations against the U.S. invasion of Iraq1 and into the climate justice movement by the mid-2000s (Fisher 2007; Hadden 2014).
At the same time, the issues and networks involved in the global justice movement continued via the World Social Forum process and ongoing mass demonstrations outside G20 meetings, as well as the global day of action in October of 2011 at the height of the Occupy Wall Street campaign.
If there is to be a sustained progressive international movement in the twenty-first century it will probably coalesce around the climate justice movement and will further develop and augment the global days of action template.
Networks of transnational activists began to piece together the first Global Days Action to reduce carbon emissions in 2005 and 2006.
These global networks came out of the alterglobalization and anti-war movements of the early 2000s to now battle climate change (Bond 2012).
They were joined by coalitions such as the Campaign against Climate Change and the transnational environmental NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (Foran 2014).
By 2009, the climate justice movement reached 92 nations in the days of global action leading up to COP 15 in Copenhagen with the assistance of more assertive coalitions such as Climate Justice Action and Climate Justice Now!
and greater representation from the Global South.2 In the 2010s, web-based NGOs such as 350.org and Avaaz took a leadership role as brokers in coordinating the large mobilizations in 2014 and 2015 leading up to the Paris Climate Agreement.
The 2014 and 2015 global days of climate action reached up to 75 percent of all countries on the planet with at 1 One of the largest protests in world history took place on February 15, 2003 against the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Nearly 800 cities in eighty countries participated against initiating a war on Iraq using the Global Days of Action template.
2 The terminology of the world-system perspective divides the Global South into the periphery and the semiperiphery.
Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Samir Amin’s New International jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 369 least 1.5 million participants.
Fridays for the Future and Extinction Rebellion are currently sustaining similar campaigns across the globe.
The increasing participation from countries across the world in the transnational climate justice actions, including from the global South, is remarkable.
This loosely coupled global infrastructure provides a basis for future rounds of progressive collective action.
The next steps for solidifying this infrastructure would be to continue to coordinate global summits and forums with representatives from the participating groups in the global days of action.
Past examples of xthis approach include the World People’s Summit on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth held in Bolivia in 2010 following the worldwide mobilizations associated with COP 15 (Smith 2014) and the World Social Forums.
The Bolivia Summit called for ecological reparations for the Global South and an immediate and drastic reduction in carbon emissions.
Perhaps most pressing would be to increase the rate of summits and forums that bring together representatives from the climate justice coalition.
The impressive scale of the transnational mobilizations over the past ten years is still limited by the vast amount of time between the launching of global days of action campaigns, even though much traditional organizing takes place on the ground in the interim periods.
To overcome the “flash activism” nature of these campaigns and to build the necessary level of solidarity among diverse groups, classes, and sectors for a longterm and capacious anti-systemic movement (Amin 1990; Ciplet, Timmons Roberts, and Khan 2015), climate justice activists will need to continue to find avenues and mechanisms for more frequent forums and mobilizations that can maintain and accelerate the momentum of a truly planetary movement.
The increasing intensity of climate change as an existential threat does create relatively more favorable conditions for international unity and avoid the sectarianism and fragmentation discussed by Amin (2018) in previous attempts at building a socialist internationale or permanent global organization of progressive sectors and groups.
The threat is imminent and global, providing urgency and aligning common interests, the basic building blocks of sustained collective action (Almeida 2019).
At the same time, a number of pre-existing social and economic divisions will need to be given heightened recognition to build enduring transnational coalitions across the lines of race, class, gender, and colonial status.
The environmental justice movement against ecological racism (Bullard 2005), the Cochabamba Climate Change conference (Bond 2012), and the current mass mobilizations fostering intersectional alliances (Luna 2016; Terriquez et al.
2018) offer some of the most promising models to incorporate within the larger global climate justice movement.
With global warming disproportionately harming billions of the world’s poor and excluded by global capital, the climate justice movement cannot continue to be directed by relatively privileged strata in the global North or South.
Chase-Dunn and Reese (2007) also demonstrate that previous progressive parties organized on a global scale were initially able to coordinate simultaneously in the global periphery and capitalist core with membership from a variety of social sectors, including peasants and the urban working-class.
The transnational climate justice alliance may also build internal cohesion by mobilizing against the xenophobia, authoritarianism, and climate change deniability of rightwing populism.
Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Almeida jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 370 About the Author: Paul Almeida is Professor and the former Chair of Sociology at the University of California, Merced.
Almeida’s research centers on the efficacy of collective action at the local, national and global levels of social and political life.
His articles have appeared in the American Journal of Sociology, Annual Review of Sociology, Social Forces, Social Problems, Mobilization, and other scholarly outlets.
Almeida’s books include: Social Movements: The Structure of Collective Mobilization (University of California Press, 2019); Mobilizing Democracy: Globalization and Citizen Protest (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Waves of Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925-2005 (University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America (co-edited with Allen Cordero, 2015); and Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization and Transnational Networks (co-edited with Hank Johnston, 2006).
He is a two-time Fulbright Fellowship Recipient and received the 2015 Distinguished Scholarship Award from the Pacific Sociological Association.
Disclosure Statement: Any conflicts of interest are reported in the acknowledgments section of the article’s text.
Otherwise, authors have indicated that they have no conflict of interests upon submission of the article to the journal.
References Almeida, Paul D. 2019.
Social Movements: The Structure of Collective Mobilization.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Almeida, Paul D. 2018.
“The Role of Threat in Collective Action.” Pp.
43-62 in D. Snow, S. Soule, H. Kriesi, and H. McCammon, eds., WileyBlackwell Companion to Social Movements.
Oxford: Blackwell.
2nd Ed.
Almeida, Paul D. and Christopher Chase-Dunn.
2018.
“Globalization and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology 44: 189-211.
Almeida, Paul D. and Mark I. Lichbach.
2003.
“To the Internet, from the Internet: Comparative Media Coverage of Transnational Protest.” Mobilization 8(3): 249-272.
Amin, Samir.
2018.
“It is imperative to reconstruct the Internationale of workers and peoples.” International Development Economic Associates (IDEAs).
July3, 2018. http://www.networkideas.org/featured-articles/2018/07/it-is-imperative-to-reconstruct-theinternationale-of-workers-and-peoples/ Amin, Samir.
1990.
"The Social Movements in the Periphery: An end to national liberation?."
Pp.
96-138 in Transforming the revolution: Social movements and the world-system, eds, S. Amin, G. Arrighi, A. Gunder Frank, and I Wallerstein.
New York: Monthly Review Press.
Amin, Samir.
1976.
Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism.
New York: Monthly Review Press.
https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520290914/social-movements https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520290914/social-movements https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520290914/social-movements https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520290914/social-movements https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/mobilizing-democracy https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/mobilizing-democracy https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/mobilizing-democracy https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/mobilizing-democracy https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/waves-of-protest https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/waves-of-protest https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/waves-of-protest https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/waves-of-protest https://www.springer.com/us/book/9789401799119 https://www.springer.com/us/book/9789401799119 https://www.amazon.com/Latin-American-Social-Movements-Democratization/dp/0742553329 https://www.amazon.com/Latin-American-Social-Movements-Democratization/dp/0742553329 https://www.amazon.com/Latin-American-Social-Movements-Democratization/dp/0742553329 https://www.amazon.com/Latin-American-Social-Movements-Democratization/dp/0742553329 http://www.networkideas.org/featured-articles/2018/07/it-is-imperative-to-reconstruct-the-internationale-of-workers-and-peoples/ http://www.networkideas.org/featured-articles/2018/07/it-is-imperative-to-reconstruct-the-internationale-of-workers-and-peoples/ http://www.networkideas.org/featured-articles/2018/07/it-is-imperative-to-reconstruct-the-internationale-of-workers-and-peoples/ http://www.networkideas.org/featured-articles/2018/07/it-is-imperative-to-reconstruct-the-internationale-of-workers-and-peoples/ Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Samir Amin’s New International jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 371 Bond, Patrick.
2012.
Politics of climate justice: Paralysis above, movement below.
Cape Town: University of Kwa Zulu Natal Press.
Brecher, Jeremy.
2015.
Climate Insurgency: A Strategy for Survival.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Bullard, Robert.
2005.
The Quest for Environmental Justice: Human Rights and the Politics of Pollution.
San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
Caniglia, Beth, Robert Brulle, and Andrew Szasz.
2015.
“Civil Society, Social Movements, and Climate Change.” In Climate Change and Society, edited by R. Dunlap and R. Brulle, 235– 68.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Ellen Reese 2007 “The World Social Forum: a global party in the making?” Pp.
53-92 in Katrina Sehm-Patomaki and Marko Ulvila (eds.)
Global Political Parties, London: Zed Press.
Ciplet, David, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan R. Khan.
2015.
Power in a warming world: The new global politics of climate change and the remaking of environmental inequality.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennis, Brady and Chris Moody.
2018.
“‘We are in trouble.’ Global carbon emissions reached a new record high in 2018.” Washington Post, December 5, 2018.
Fisher, Dana.
2007.
“Taking cover beneath the anti-Bush umbrella: cycles of protest and movement-to-movement transmission in an era of repressive politics.” Research in Political Sociology 15:27–56 Foran, John.
2014.
“Get it Done!” The Global Climate Justice Movement’s Struggle to Achieve a Radical Climate Treaty.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Santa Barbara, Dept.
of Sociology.
Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark, and Richard York.
2011.
The ecological rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth.
New York: New York University Press.
Gottlieb, Robert.
1993.
Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of The American Environmental Movement.
New York: Island Press.
Gould, Kenneth A., David N. Pellow, and Allan Schnaiberg.
2004.
"Interrogating the treadmill of production: Everything you wanted to know about the treadmill but were afraid to ask."
Organization & Environment 17(3): 296-316.
Hadden Jennifer.
2014.
“Explaining variation in transnational climate change activism: the role of inter-movement spillover.” Global Environmental Politics 14(2):7–25 Johnson, Erik W., and Scott Frickel.
2011.
"Ecological threat and the founding of US national environmental movement organizations, 1962–1998."
Social Problems 58(3): 305-329.
Juris, Jeffrey.
2008.
Networking futures: The movements against corporate globalization.
Durham: Duke University Press.
Lichbach, Mark Irving.
2003.
“The Anti-Globalization Movement: A New Kind of Protest.” In Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Eds.
Peace and Conflict 2003.
College Park, Md.
: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, pp.
39-42. https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows33/irows33.htm https://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows33/irows33.htm http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=D0E-kpwGeeYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=info:S1eJkVF_VFkJ:scholar.google.com&ots=QJqkvtR_2x&sig=Q2XCpAEQBaoBDxk9POGwky5miyk http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=D0E-kpwGeeYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=info:S1eJkVF_VFkJ:scholar.google.com&ots=QJqkvtR_2x&sig=Q2XCpAEQBaoBDxk9POGwky5miyk Journal of World-Systems Research | Vol.
25 Issue 2 | Almeida jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2019.946 372 Luna, Zakiya.
T. 2016.
“‘Truly a Women of Color Organization’: Negotiating Sameness and Difference in Pursuit of Intersectionality” Gender and Society 30(5) 769-790.
Moore, Jason W. 2015.
Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital.
London: Verso Books.
Pellow, David Naguib.
2017.
What is Critical Environmental Justice?
London Polity.
O’Connor, James.
1988.
“Capitalism, nature, socialism a theoretical introduction.” Capitalism Nature Socialism 1(1): 11-38.
Romm, Joseph.
2018.
Climate Change: What Everyone Needs to Know.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rudy, Alan.
Forthcoming.
“On Misunderstanding the Second Contradiction Thesis.” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism.
Schnaiberg, Allan.
1980.
The environment: From Surplus to Scarcity.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silva, Eduardo.
2009.
Challenges to Neoliberalism in Latin America.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Jackie.
2014.
“Counter-Hegemonic Networks and the Transformation of Global Climate Politics: Rethinking Movement-State Relations.” Global Discourse 4(2–3): 120–38.
Smith Jackie.
2001.
“Globalizing resistance: the Battle of Seattle and the future of social movements.” Mobilization 6(1):1–21 Terriquez, Veronica, Tizoc Brenes, Abdiel Lopez.
2018.
“Intersectionality as a multipurpose collective action frame: The case of the undocumented youth movement.” Ethnicities 18(2): 260-276.
Walton, John and David Seddon.
1994.
Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wood, Lesley J.
2004.
"Breaking the bank & taking to the streets: How Protesters Target Neoliberalism."
Journal of World-Systems Research 10.1: 69-89.
Wood, Lesley J.
2012.
Direct Action, Deliberation, and Diffusion: Collective Action after the WTO Protests in Seattle.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
World Meteorological Organization.
2018.
WMO Provisional statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018.
New York: United Nations.
Journal of World-Systems Research Journal of World-Systems Research Journal of World-Systems Research Forum on Samir Amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples Forum on Samir Amin’s proposal for a new international of workers and peoples Vol.
1 | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1 Vol.
1 | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.1 The Global Justice Movement The Global Justice Movement References References
124 Journal of Business Strategies Wilcoxen, 2002); and the United States' abstinence from the Kyoto Protocol will not protect it from the environmental and economic consequences of global climate change.
If atmospheric carbon dioxide doubles by 2050, it will cost the U.S. an estimated $68 billion annually and the annual global cost will be approximately $304 billion (Hoffman, 2005).
Although there has been much research examining the association between corporate environmental performance and organizational outcomes (e.g., Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Russo & Fouts; 1997; Sharma & Vrendenburg, 1998), there are no published empirical studies that specifically examine whether firms pursuing proactive climate change strategies financially outperform competitors that are less proactive.
To-date, the extant literature has focused on firm motivations for pursuing climate change strategies ( Levy & Kolk, 2002; Kolk & Pinske, 2004, 2005, 2007b; Okereke, 2007; Porter & Reinhart, 2007), corporate political lobbying strategies regarding climate change (Kolk & Pinkse, 2007a), and the degree to which global firms voluntarily commit to reducing their impact on climate change (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2006).
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between proactive climate change strategies and accounting performance.
In this paper, we describe how highly proactive firms typically engage in three broad climate-change initiatives aimed at reducing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions: (1) by developing energy substitutes for oil and coal, such as wind and solar power, (2) by developing renewable energy sources (e.g., hydrogen and other fuel cells), and (3) by working collaboratively with firms, governments, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders toward large-scale climate-change solutions.
We then show how these three climate-change initiatives are consistent with the logic embodied in the NRBV, a unique perspective of SeA based on the inter-relationship between the firm and the natural environment (Hart, 1995).
It builds on the strengths of the RBV but addresses a deficiency inherent in RBV and many other management theories that constraints imposed by the earth's natural environment will impact a firm's resource-based advantage in the long run.
As such, the theoretical section of the paper begins with an overview of the RBV, including its assumptions, prescriptions, and summary of RBV studies, followed by an overview ofthe NRBV and Hart ' s (1995) original framework (founder of the NRBV).
We use the logic embodied in Hart ' s framework in identifying three strategic capability-based climate-change strategies that can be a source of seA in a way that reduces carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions.
The linkages Volume 27, Number 2 125 between the proactive climate change initiatives, the three strategic capability-based climate-change strategies, and the source of SCA provide the foundation for the "NRBV Framework for Proactive Climate Change Organizations," shown in Table I.
The remainder of the paper describes the methodology of the study, the empirical results, the implications and limitations of the empirical findings, and possible avenues for future research.
Climate Change Initiatives Carbon Emissions and Greenhouse Gases: Fossil Fuels Climate changes have, in large part, been linked to the global economy's heavy reliance on oil as an energy source.
As a cheaper alternative energy source to oil, coal is vast and can last for generations (ETA, 2006).
However, coal-fired power plants release substantial amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (DOE & EPA, 2000) which conflicts with growing regulatory and societal pressure on countries and corporations to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions.
Even the United States, which is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, is facing increasing regulatory pressure to address climate change.
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, "greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act ' s capacious definition of air pollutant" (Greenhouse, 2007), thus, paving the way for a carbon constrained future.
In short, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that global firms will be able to escape regulatory mandates to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.
Renewable Energy and Fossil Fuel Substitutes Firms are beginning to identifY profitable market opportunities for developing technologies that assist organizations in transitioning from oil and coal to alternative energy sources.
Recent revenue projections from wind and solar power are expected to increase by a factor of five or six in the next several years and hydrogen fuel cells, which emit no greenhouse gases, are expected to increase by a factor of 15 from 2004 to 2014.
In less than a decade, the estimated market value for these three energy sources is expected to reach $100 billion (Makower, Pemick, & Wilder, 2005).
The point is that market opportunities and not just regulatory pressures will motivate firms to find innovative ways to profit from these new energy-based market opportunities.
Another substitute for oil and coal is natural gas, and although it is a fossil fuel , it emits only half as much carbon dioxide as coal (EPA, 2006a) and one third less carbon dioxide than oil (EPA, 2006b).
While these emissions are still greater 126 Journal of Business Strategies than that generated by solar and wind power, natural gas can serve as a transitional fuel (Greene, Hopson, & Li, 2006) from a high greenhouse-gas economy to a low greenhouse-gas economy.
Additionally, the world's natural gas reserves are vast and expected to last over 60 years (EIA, 2006).
Thus, regulatory pressure for firms to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions coupled with the vast geophysical availability of natural gas provides firms with a viable, lower-greenhouse gas energy substitute for oil and coal.
This presents opportunities for profit-driven entities to develop and market proactive gas-based energy solutions that reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.
Solutions-Based Coalitions Corporate efforts to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases by adopting more environmentally efficient technology, shifting from oil and coal to 'cleaner' energy sources such as solar power, making transitional shifts in energy sources from coal or oil to natural gas, and developing next generation power sources such as hydrogen fuel cells are commendable.
However, such efforts will not be sufficient to negate the increasing rate of carbon dioxide emissions and resultant increase in global temperatures.
What is needed is the collective effort of individuals, corporations, and nations working in concert to address this problem (Hendry, 2006; Starik & Rands, 1995).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes that a "portfolio or mix of strategies that includes mitigation, adaptation, technological development (to enhance both adaptation and mitigation) and research" across multiple constituencies will be invaluable in decreasing the risks of climate change posed to humankind (IPCC, 2007, p. 20).
Corporations must be highly proactive in such collaborative efforts because of the large amounts of carbon dioxide, greenhouse gases, and other toxins they emit into the Earth's atmosphere (Lovins, Lovins, & Hawken, 2007).
Indeed, a multitude of management scholars propound that corporations must change their current business practices in ways that sustain the planet's natural resources and interconnected ecological systems (Gladwin, Kennelly, & Krause, 1995; Hart, 1995; Porter & Reinhardt, 2007; Shrivastava, 1995; Starik & Rands, 1995).
Such cutting edge practices include large-scale collaboration with various constituencies (governments, NGOs, other firms, and other key stakeholders) in identifying ways to preserve planet's biosphere.
Volume 27, Number 2 127 Literature Review NRBV is an extension of the RBV but focuses on identifying strategic resources and capabilities that are sources of both competitive and environmental sustainability.
As such, we first describe the RBV, including its assumptions and prescriptions, as well as a summary of empirical tests of the RBV.
Then we discuss NRBV, its application to climate change strategies, and the hypothesis tested in the current research.
Resource-Based View of the Firm According to RBV, resources are the main determinant of firm performance, based on the logic that firms are unique bundles of valuable resources that, over time, become relatively immobile (Barney, 1991).
Barney defines resources as "all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc.
controlled by a firm that enable a firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness" (p 10 I).
Barney includes capabilities in the definition of resources; however, single resources (e.g., patents on environmental technologies, corporate reputation) and sets of resources used to perform integrated tasks, labeled capabi lities (e.g.
, environmentally-friendly manufacturing systems and organizational processes), can be sources ofSCA (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Collis & Montgomery, 1995).
Strategic assets and distinctive competencies are single resources and capabilities, respectively, that are simultaneously valuable, rare, difficult or costly to imitate, and nonsubstitutable (Barney, 1991 , 2001; Peteraf, 1993).
Strategic assets and distinctive competencies are valuable when they can be leveraged to exploit market opportunities or can thwart competitive threats.
Resources & capabilities (R&Cs) that are valuable and rare can be sources of SCA, unless competitors possess them or develop strategically equivalent substitutes (Barney & McEwing, 1996).
Resource and capability based advantages are short-lived if competitors can imitate them at a reasonable cost.
Four impediments to competitor imitation are causal ambiguity, social complexity, unique historical conditions, and path dependency (Barney, 1991 , 2001; Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
Such advantages are causally ambiguous when competitors cannot determine how resources (e.g.
, environmentally-conscious corporate culture) and/or capabilities (e.g., environmental control systems and processes) create the firm ' s SCA.
Socially complex resources, such as the inter-firm relationships among firm managers, NGOs, and environmentally128 Journal of Business Strategies oriented suppliers, are inimitable because they are based on the unique personalities and value systems of parties involved in the inter-firm relationships.
Unique historical conditions are contexts (time, location, etc.)
that determine the relative importance of a resource or capability.
Path dependent resources, such as a strong environmentalIy-oriented corporate reputation, accumulate through stocks of strategic investments (e.g., conti.
{luous inventions in green technology, eco-branding, philanthropic investments to improve the planet's ecosystems) over time that competitors cannot quickly replicate.
Acquiring the rights to path dependent resources (e.g., patented internally-developed cutting-edge green technologies) can be expensive, making it costly for the acquiring firm to reap superior financial returns.
Firms develop strategic assets and distinctive competencies by possessing the insight to identify critical environmental resources and capabilities ex ante and then limit competition for such resources and capabilities by erecting impediments to imitation (Peteraf, 1993).
Empirical tests of RBV seem to demonstrate that it is a valid theory of SCA.
Corporate-level RBV studies indicate that resources impact diversification decisions in ways that improve firm performance (e.g., Farjoun, 1994; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001), that portfolio resource-relatedness positively impacts corporate performance (e.g., Robins & Weirsema, 1995), and that R&Cs influence corporate-level strategic alliance decisions (e.g., Eisenhardt & Schoon hoven, 1996).
Business-level RBV studies show that a firm's resources and capabilities influence foreign investment decisions (e.g., Collis, 1991), that resource coordination, learning capabilities, and dynamic capabilities are positively associated with firm performance (e.g., Schroeder, Bates, & Junttila, 2002), that resource management impacts first mover advantages (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Zott, 2003), that firms reconfigure and upgrade their resources and capabilities over time as firms interact with their competitive environments (e.g., Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), that industryspecific competencies serve as isolating mechanisms in sustaining a firm 's competitive advantage (e.g., Brush & Artz, 1999), that environmental contexts impact the competitive value of a resource (e.g., Miller & Shamsie, 1996), that firm characteristics are better predictors of firm performance than industry characteristics (e.g.
, Barney & Arikan, 200 I), that constructive work relationships and social capital positively impact firm competitiveness (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 200 I), and that information technology and related competencies positively impact firm performance (Zhu & Kraemer, 2002; Zhu, 2004).
In short, these and other empirical RBV studies seem to support RBV 's main prescription and underlying assumptions.
Volume 27, Number 2 129 Natural Resource-Based View of the Firm As the earth's natural capital diminishes and the earth's ecosystems change in ways that negatively affect society, finns need to examine the natural resources they use and how they use them for their own continued viability.
Otherwise, valuable and unique environmental resources and ecological services, most lacking strategically equivalent substitutes, will become scarcer.
As finns recognize the constraints imposed by the natural environment, environmental sustainability will become an important part of the strategic management process in sustaining their resourcebased advantage(s).
NRBV builds on RBV logic in describing how finns gain a SCA in ways that sustain the earth's natural resources and ecosystems, from which these natural resources are so delicately intertwined.
Hart (1995) proposed three interconnected NRBV strategic capabilities that firms can develop to achieve that objective: pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development.
Unfortunately, limited empirical research on NRBV has been occasioned and, to our knowledge, no NRBV -based studies have been conducted that assess whether firm's proactively pursuing climate change strategies outperform firms that.
are less proactive.
While not directly testing NRBV, some studies have examined the association between corporate environmental initiatives and organizational performance.
Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) performed a meta-analysis of 52 studies linking corporate social responsibility and environmental responsibility with organizational outcomes.
Unfortunately, the findings were mixed, with some studies showing significant positive associations and others showing either significant negative associations or no significant associations.
Russo and Fouts (1997) discovered that a positive environmental-financial performance relationship was strengthened by industry growth; however, the change in explained performance variance was minimal.
Al-Tuwaijri , Christensen, and Hughes (2004) found that firms with smaller levels of toxic emissions and effluents from manufacturing facilities were more likely to have higher levels of economic perfonnance.
Similarly, Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) analyzed the association between toxic discharge at manufacturing plants and community stakeholder pressure.
They concluded that cleaner manufacturing facilities were more likely to be found in communities with greater financial and political power, which could be an indication that 'creating a shared vision' of a more sustainable future is possible but it should not be limited to only the wealthier sections of society.
In short, these studies provide some evi130 Journal of Business Strategies dence that a positive association between corporate environmental initiatives and organizational performance may exist.
Empirical research explicitly based on the NRBV has yielded similar results.
Based on case studies of three oil companies, Hastings (1999) concluded that increasing social pressures caused all three firms to modify their operations to be more environmentally oriented and that those changes may have created a competitive advantage over competing firms that did not embrace such environmental initiatives.
Chan's (2005) NRBV-based empirical examination of foreign enterprises in China that manufacture clothing and electronics suggests that such enterprises can increase their financial performance through proactive environmental strategies.
Similarly, Menguc and Ozanne (2003) found that Australian manufacturing firms that demonstrated a simultaneous commitment to entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility, and the natural environment experienced higher levels of after-tax profit and market share; however, sales growth was negatively correlated.
Overall, the empirical evidence seems to indicate that a positive association exists between environmental performance and firm performance with some exceptions.
Unfortunately, these studies do not specifically address the linkage between proactive climate change strategies and firm performance.
As such, the current research empirically tested the hypothesis that firms with proactive climate change strategies will have higher levels of accounting performance than comparable firms with less proactive climate change strategies.
This hypothesis is theoretically grounded in the NRBV, the topic of the next section.
Theoretical Development and Hypothesis The three interconnected strategies (pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development) that Hart (1995) proposed in his NRBV framework can be applied to different types of environmenta] issues, including climate change.
The requisite strategic capabilities and resources will vary depending on the environmental initiative inherent in a particular strategy.
Table 1 adapted Hart's (1995) framework in identifying the requisite strategic capabilities and resources needed for firms to proactively pursue climate change initiatives that can simultaneously achieve business and environmental sustainability.
The following subsections detail the NRBV Climate Change Framework.
Volume 27, Number 2 131 Table 1 NRBV Framework for Proactive Climate Change Organizations Proactive NRBV Climate Change Strategic Key Initiatives Capabilities Resources Reduce Carbon Emissions & Other Pollution Continuous Greenhouse Gases Prevention Improvement Renewable Energy Sources & Stakeholder Product Stakeholder Participation Stewardship Integration Solutions-based Sustainable Shared Coalitions Development Vision Adapted from Hart (1995).
*From the KLD Global Climate Change 100 Index Methodology.
Pol/ution Prevention Strategic Capabilities Basis for SCA Lower Costs Preempt Competitors Future Position KLD Selection Criteria* -Clean Technology & Efficiency -Renewable Energy Future Fuels -Climate Leader Pollution prevention strategic capabilities help firms become more operationally efficient using modified TQM principles to minimize emissions, effluents, and waste through existing pollution control equipment, material substitution, recycling, incremental process innovations, developing and deploying climate-friendly production technology, reducing compliance and liability costs, and redesigning value-chain activities to reduce pollution (Hart, 1995; Kolk & Pinske, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Porter & Reinhardt, 2007).
Low-cost advantages accrued from strategies based on pollution prevention strategic capabilities can be sustainable for several reasons.
First, the firm's value chain cim be reconfigured in unique, valuable ways beyond the requirements of ISO 14001 certification standards in effectuating activities within and across functions to further reduce waste, emissions of greenhouse gases, and other toxins (Orsata, 2006).
That, coupled with the complex vertical linkages with environmentally-conscious suppliers, customers and strategic alliance partners, would make this complex, biospheric-oriented value chain configuration difficult, if not impossible, for competitors to imitate (Porter & Reinhardt, 2007).
Second, internally developed low-emissions-based production equipment and systems are patentable, helping to protect them from imitation by competitors.
Third, learning curve advantages accrued through climate-based value chain reconfigurations, through the development of environmentally-based production systems and processes, and through other climate-change initiatives cumulate in path dependent 132 Journal of Business Strategies ways over time under unique historical conditions, making it difficult and/or costly for new entrants to easily or quickly replicate.
Fourth, being proactive in lessening the inefficient use of natural resources and in reducing or eliminating harmful emissions into the Earth's biosphere will help the firm avoid fines , liability costs, and other penalties levied by environmental regulatory bodies.
Last, an environmentallybased, cost-conscious corporate culture coupled with incentive systems that reward innovative environmental efficiencies promote continuous climate change efforts throughout the organization, helping to sustain the firm's environmentally-oriented cost-based advantage over competitors.
Product Stewardship Strategic Capabilities Product stewardship strategic capabilities help the firm gain a SCA in ways that preserve the biosphere by soliciting the participation of firm stakeholders in developing "green" products (Hart, 1995).
In addition to seeking input on product specifications, firms gather information from stakeholders that can be used in developing systems, processes, procedures, and controls in producing "green" products and environmental innovations that reduce or eliminate emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (Kolk & Pinske 2004, 2005; Orsata, 2006).
Firms employ a variety of analytic methods, such as Life Cycle Analysis and greenhouse emission tracking tools, to determine their carbon footprint as a starting point in identifying ways to reduce the amount of nonrenewable resources incorporated in their products, to utilize resources less detrimental to the atmosphere, to replenish the environment with renewable natural resources that lessen existing damage to the biosphere, to eliminate the use of toxic materials, and to recycle or reuse product parts at the end of the product's natural life, so that the firm can systematically track and manage its carbon emissions (Esty, 2007; Slater, 2007).
Because markets for climate-friendly products are still in their infancy, a firm can gain a competitive advantages in the following ways: (I) by being the first to enter viable "green" product market segments, (2) by designing green products that meet the specifications of environmentally-conscious customers, (3) by involving customers and other constituencies in designing "green" products and the requisite systems and production processes to minimize the impact on the biosphere (AragonCorrea & Sharma, 2003), (4) by differentiating the firm 's products as being climatefriendly through eco-branding based strategic marketing efforts (Esty, 2007; Hart, 1995; Orsata, 2006), (5) by gaining exclusive access to requisite climate-friendly supplies and working with suppliers to be climate conscious in designing and Volume 27, Number 2 133 producing critical supplies (Correa, 2007), (6) by becoming the standard "green" product for climate-conscious customers, (7) by minimizing the price premiums in producing products through learning-curve effects, through reconfiguring key value-chain activities, and through rigorous Life Cycle Analysis (Porter & Reinhardt, 2007), (8) by developing a reputation for being proactive in climate change initiatives through the participation of environmentally-conscious stakeholders (e.g., customers, government regulators, environmentalists) in designing and producing climate-friendly products (Kolk & Pinske, 2004, 2005; Murray & Montanari, 1986), (9) by developing alternative power sources (e.g., wind, solar, hydrogen cells) and developing technologies that increase the efficiency offossil fuels, and (10) by continuously scanning the environment for potential changes in the demands of environmental constituents, so that firm can make the requisite changes ex ante (Schwart, 2007).
Indeed, with the growing awareness of customers, industry analysts, fund managers, environmental NGOs, government agencies, and other regulator bodies about the impact of climate change on our planet and whether companies are being proactive in developing climate-friendly products and services, senior managers are becoming highly conscious of the impact on corporate reputation and resultant firm profitability of producing products that meet or exceed the environmental concerns of such constituencies (Esty, 2007; Roosevelt & Llewellyn, 2007).
Moreover, savvy stakeholders are more capable of determining the validity of environmental claims, which can negatively impact the corporate reputation of firms engaging in greenwashing (Schendler, 2007).
Product stewardship strategic capabilities can be difficult for competitors to replicate, and thus be a source of SCA, because: (I) "green" market opportunities can occur in unique times and contexts, (2) the unique personalities of the multiple constituencies involved in developing the climate-friendly products are socially complex (Barney, 1991), (3) the firm can shape environmental product standards through its proactive involvement with various government agencies (Hoffman, 2007), (4) the firm can patent new climate-friendly products and the production methods used to bring them to fruition, (5) the link between the firm's performance and its unique climate-friendly value-chain is causally ambiguous to competitors, as highly innovative firm managers, employees, and various stakeholders work collaboratively to identify new ways to reengineer the firm's value chain activities in an effort to further reduce its carbon footprint (Porter & Reinhardt, 2007), (6) the dynamic capabilities underlying the development of new climate-friendly products accrue over time, and thus can not be easily imitated by competitors, and (7) a corporate reputation for being environmentally responsible 134 Journal of Business Strategies to the planet ' s biosphere develops over long periods of time, and thus cannot be quickly replicated.
Sustainable Development Strategic Capabilities Sustainable development strategic capabilities constitute the highest level of environmental responsibility, where the firm 's overall strategy is driven by a "strong sense of social-environmental purpose," (Hart, 1995: 1002) calling for other firms (even competitors), governments (international, national, state, and local levels), environmentalists, academics, and others to work toward solving our global climate change problems.
Because such firms recognize the magnitude of the problems in the biosphere and their own internal limitations, they proactively organize research and technology consortiums to draw on the collective resources, skills, knowledge, and insights among multiple participants in deriving broad-based climate change solutions (Kolk & Pinske, 2007b).
Firms that harness these potent strategic capabilities are highly proactive (1) in assisting countries where they operate in addressing environmental problems associated with greenhouse gas emissions, (2) in working with government officials toward stricter policies on air standards, and (3) in providing support to regions impacted by natural disasters (Kolk & Pinske, 2004, 2005 ; Kolk & Pinske, 2007a; Schwart, 2007).
In essence, these multinational leaders take a long-term view about the future state of the planet in which they operate and the role they play in promoting societal well-being.
Internally, CEOs committed to sustainable development based strategies instill a shared sense of environmental responsibility among employees through oral and written communication, employee training programs, and posting mission statements throughout the company articulating the firm 's environmental commitment (Way & Rendlen, 2007; Wad dock, 2006).
The top management team crafts an organizational culture and administrative context that promotes employee innovation and participation in identifying ways to restructure the firm and the industry to more effectively address climate change issues and, in the process, potentially change the competitive rules of the game (Porter & Reinhardt, 2007).
The intensive internal and collaborative effort to produce environmentallyfriendly products encompasses the philosophies underlying both pollution prevention and product stewardship strategies.
As such, the drivers ofSCA associated with pollution prevention strategies and product stewardship strategies are embedded in sustainable development strategies (Hart, 1995).
Moreover, the strategic capabilities underlying a sustainable development strategy strengthens a firm's strategic competVolume 27, Number 2 135 itiveness in four additional ways.
First, as the firm becomes recognized as a leader in working to solve the planet's climate change problems, its reputation may help the firm attract and retain highly talented employees that share similar values and convictions about corporate environmental responsibility (Murray & Montanari, 1986; Waddock, 2006).
Second, the leading-edge competencies and insights on business and environmental sustainability gained from working collaboratively with multiple constituencies is a socially-complex and partly tacit in nature, making it difficult for competitors to easily replicate (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990).
Third, the relationships developed in these collaborative efforts may give the firm exclusive access to critical suppliers offinite natural resources, provide access to countries that allow few if any foreign competitors, help the firm increase its market share of "green" customers, and all ow the firm to gain the political acumen needed to be at the forefront in crafting new environmental legislation (Hoffman, 2007; Porter & Van der Linde, 1995).
Because relationships develop over time and are based on the unique personalities of the constituencies involved, these relationship-based advantages would be difficult to replicate, lack strategically equivalent substitutes (Barney, 1991), and thus be a source ofSCA.
Last, the learning curve effects ofinternaIly-deve1oped "green" technologies; the coIlaborate knowledge among consortium (and other partnership) members over time; a keen understanding of the language and issues associated with cap-and-trade programs, renewable energy credits, carbon-based emissions permits, renewable energy credits, verified emissions reductions, certified emissions reductions, emissions reduction units, European Union allowances, the myriad of climaterelated biIls, and the various national and international climate-related treaties and laws that can impact a multinational enterprise are complex and path dependent in nature, based on unique historical conditions across continents, and causally ambiguous to organizations seeking to replicate the.
leader' s sustainable development strategy and resultant competitive strength (Hoffman, 2007).
In sum, given that pollution prevention strategic capabilities, product stewardship strategic capabilities, and sustainable development strategic capabilities can be combined in whole or in part to create firm-level climate change strategies capable of capturing a competitive advantage, firms that are more proactive in implementing climate change strategies should outperform firms that are less proactive, as articulated in Hypothesis I .
Hypothesis 1: Firms with proactive climate change strategies will have higher levels of accounting performance than comparable firms with less proactive climate change strategies.
136 Journal of Business Strategies Methodology The sample in the current research came from the KLD Global Climate Change 100 Index, consisting of 100 global publicly-traded firms well recognized for being proactive in pursuing climate change strategies.
The index includes firms from 14 different countries, most of which are headquartered in North America, Western Europe, or Japan, and classified into nearly a dozen industries.
Since the index was created in July 2005, 16 of the original companies have been removed, thus leaving 84 firms for analysis.
Based on their industry experience and information they gathered from company web-sites, regulatory filings, trade associations, professional journals, nongovernmental organizations, corporate officers, and from various experts, KLD analysts identify companies engaged in one of three themes: (1) developing, generating, and consuming renewable energy, such as wind and solar energy (2) firms whose policies or products reduce the demand for fossil fuels through efficiency improvements, and (3) firms that are proactive leaders in 'future fuels,' such as hydrogen fuel cells, biofuels, and natural gas production and distribution.
As shown in Table I, these three themes are consistent with the three climate change strategies described in the previous section.
Since the purpose ofthe current research was to determine if firms with recognized proactive climate change strategies had higher levels of accounting performance than comparable firms with less recognized proactive climate change strategies, we used the pairwise-comparison method to determine if the accounting-based returns of the proactive firms were significantly greater than those of the less proactive firms.
This technique has been performed in other studies of firms that differed in terms of other key environmental strategies (i.e., Bansal & Hunter, 2003).
Accounting performance data on the KLD firms and their matched pairs were taken from the 2005 & 2006 "Forbes 2000 Index" ("2000" refers to the number of firms in the index, not the year of the data) so that we could evaluate differences in performance between the pairs across a two-year period.
Forbes Index also provided various firm data (such as assets, sales, profits, and market value, as well as their country of origin and main industry in which the firm competes) that proved useful in the pairing process.
We attempted to pair the remaining 84 firms from the 2005 KLD Global Climate Change 100 Index (GCIOO) with firms that were similar based on their country of origin, industry, and size (based on reported assets for 2005).
The first step was to eliminate KLD sample firms that did not appear on both the 2005 and Volume 27, Number 2 137 2006 Forbes Index, the source from which the comparison firms would be selected.
This resulted in the number of sample firms being reduced from 84 to 45 firms.
We then compared the remaining 45 KLD sample firms with firms on the Forbes Index to find comparable firms based on country of origin, industry, and size.
We could not identify comparable firms (headquartered in the same country, operating in the same industry, and of similar size) for 14 of the 45 KLD firms , thus reducing the number of pairwise comparisons to 31 .
Statistical and graphical analysis of the 31 pairs identified one outlier, resulting in 30 pairwise comparisons to test the hypothesis.
Ofthe remaining 30 pairs, the mean size (in terms of2005 assets) of the proactive climate change strategy firms is $32.2 billion and the matched pairs mean is $30.3 billion.
Inferential testing using SPSS showed there was no statisticallysignificant difference in the size of KLD firms versus their matched pairs.
In fact, the paired samples correlation (in terms of2005 assets) between the KLD firms and their matched pairs is .98, which is significant at p < .00 I.
Hence, the experimental design was effective in matching the firms in terms of their country of origin, industry, and size.
To test whether firms with greater emphasis on climate change would have higher levels of accounting performance than comparable firms with less emphasis on climate change, we tested the difference in accounting performance across the 30 pairs of firms using three performance metrics: Return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and total asset turnover (TAT = Total Revenuerrotal Assets).
ROA and ROS are common measures of accounting-based profitability while TAT measures the efficiency of asset utilization (Pugh, Jahera, & Oswald, 2005).
We measured ROA, ROS, and TAT using a two-year average (2005-2006) based on the Forbes Index data.
Results The descriptive statistics and correlations appear in Table 2.
Notice that the mean ROA, ROS, and TAT of the KLD firms are greater than those of the paired comparison firms.
Specifically, the proactive climate change firms earned an ROA 93% greater than their matched pairs (5.8% vs. 3.0%), an ROS 59% greater than their matched pairs (8.6% vs. 5.4%), and a TAT 18% greater than their matched pairs (72.4% vs. 6l.6%), thus providing preliminary evidence supporting our hypothesis.
Some of the performance variables are correlated; however, this does not violate the assumptions underlying the pairwise comparison method (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995).
138 Journal of Business Strategies Table 2 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics Variable Mean S.D.
1 KLD ROA .058 .042 2 MP ROA .030 .031 .44** 3 KLD ROS .086 .058 .71" 4 MP ROS .054 .052 .26t 5 KLDTAT .724 .344 .37* 6 MPTAT .616 .311 .26t MP = Matched Pairs (for pairwise comparisons) t p < 0.10; , P < 0.05; ., P < 0.01 2 .25t .80" .12 .18 3 .13 -.23 -.07 4 5 -.05 -.28t .65" Table 3 summarizes the pairwise comparisons between the KLD firms and their matched counterparts.
As shown, the mean difference in accounting performance (KLD performance Matched Pairs) is statistically significant across all three paired sample tests.
Specifically, the mean ROA for the KLD firms exceeds the mean ROA for their matched pairs by 0.028, which is significant at p < 0.001; the mean ROS for the KLD firms exceeds the mean ROS for their matched pairs by 0.032, which is significant at p < 0.05; and the mean TAT for the KLD firms exceeds the mean TAT for their matched pairs by 0.108, which is significant at p < 0.05.
These results support Hypothesis I.
Discussion and Conclusions The empirical results support the hypothesis that firms with greater emphasis on climate change have higher financial returns than comparable firms with less emphasis on climate change.
Specifically, the KLD firms outperformed their matched counterparts across all three performance metrics, which included measures of both firm efficiency and firm effectiveness.
This has important implications for theorists, empiricists, and practitioners.
For theorists, Hart's (1995) seminal work informs us that firms with pollution prevention strategic capabilities attempt to gain a cost-based SeA by continuous efforts to control and prevent carbon emissions and other GHGs (greenhouse gases) using improved technologies and reconfiguring value chain activities to reduce direct and indirect GHG emissions.
Firms with product stewardship strategic capabilities seek to gain first mover advantages in the use of renewable energy sources and by working closely with customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders Table 3 ~ Pairwise Comparisons E'" ~ ".
Paired Samples Tests tv .>l ~ ~ Paired Differences <:I"-".
""I 95% Confidence tv Interval of the Std.
Error Difference Mean Std.
Deviation Mean Lower Upper df Sig.
(2-tailed) Pairing: KLD ROA MP ROA .0277033 .0398106 .0072684 .0128378 .0425689 3.811 29 .001 Paired Differences 95% Confidence Interval of the Std.
Error Difference Mean Std.
Deviation Mean Lower Upper t df Sig.
(2-tailed) Pairing: KLD ROS MP ROS .0315333 .0727040 .0132739 .0043852 .0586815 2.376 29 .024 Paired Differences 95% Confidence Interval of the Std.
Error Difference Mean Std.
Deviation Mean Lower Upper t df Sig.
(2-tailed) Pairing: KLD TAT MP TAT .1077833 .2749002 .0501897 .0051339 .2104327 2.148 29 .040 MP = Matched Pairs (for paired comparisons) W <0 140 Journal of Business Strategies in the vertical value chain in developing products sought after by climate conscious customers.
Pollution prevention strategies and product stewardship strategies are consistent with contemporary thinking that understanding and measuring the firm's carbon exposure, taking steps to reduce the firm 's carbon footprint, and identifying opportunities to leverage the firm ' s climate-friendly products is essential in being competitive in an increasingly environmentally-conscious society (Esty & Winston, 2009; Hoffman & Woody, 2008).
Sustainable development-oriented firms possess pollution prevention strategic capabilities and product stewardship strategic capabilities but go further in their climate change efforts by working with other climate change leaders, government officials, legislative bodies, research consortiums, and other constituencies in solving the problems caused by climate change.
Climate change leaders can reap competitive advantages (1) by attracting highly talented employees that share similar convictions about the environmental (Murray & Montanari, 1986; Waddock, 2006), (2) by developing unique socially-complex competencies on business and environmental sustainability through collaborative work with high-level constituencies, (3) by providing them access to finite natural resources and to market segments in countries that allow few if any foreign competitors, and (4) and by providing the firm with the political acumen needed to be at the forefront in crafting new environmental legislation (Hoffman, 2007; Porter & Van der Linde, 1995).
This is also consistent with contemporary thinking that visionary leaders who have become highly recognized for their concern with the impact of climate change on the planet take steps to influence the policy-development process on climate change issues (Esty & Winston, 2009; Hoffman & Woody, 2008; Lovins, el al., 2007).
Ultimately, sustainable development oriented firms want to be part of the policy-development process for climate change so that they know what climate change issues are being addressed and what political venues (e.g., international, national, state levels) will provide the greatest impact (Hoffman & Woody, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 2006).
Clearly, setting the rules rather than having the rules set for you will (I) help to assure that your vision of requisite climate change goals and objectives become part of government policy and (2) provide you (and thus the firm) with first mover advantages from the ex ante knowledge from participation in the policy setting process.
For empiricists, NRBV is still in its developmental stages of empirical testing, and thus one contribution of this study is that it adds further support to the validity of NRBV.
Moreover, to our knowledge, there are no published NRBVbased studies that empirically examine whether firms with proactive climate change strategies have higher levels of financial (and/or accounting) performance than comVolume 27, Number 2 141 parable firms with less proactive climate change strategies.
And finally, this study contributes to the literature by testing the hypothesis using 30 pairs of firms from seven countries on three separate continents spanning 12 industries.
In other words, the results were statistically significant across all three performance metrics using a global, multi-industry paired sample of comparable firms.
However, because of the limitations discussed in the next section, readers should interpret these results with some degree of caution.
Firm executives seem to be recognizing the important linkage between environmental sustainability and business sustainability by their climate change initiatives.
For example, from a pollution prevention standpoint, Caterpillar has been using Six Sigma teams to improve heating and lighting efficiencies throughout its global operations to reduce its carbon intensity 36 percent per dollar of revenue in 2006 and 38 percent reduction in 2007, and now plans to reduce its absolute GHG emissions by 3 percent by 2015 (ClimateBiz, October 10,2008).
Walmart is reconfiguring its value chain activities in transportation and logistics and leveraging new technologies to reap cost efficiencies that reduce its GHG emissions in ways that are difficult for competitors to replicate (Porter & Reinhardt, 2007).
Masisa, a forestry and wood-manufacturing company in Chile, has taken important steps to reduce carbon emissions and other greenhouse gases by planting rapid-growth trees that capture GHG from the atmosphere, by burning biomass (saw dust and wood chips) to generate much of its energy, using combustion gases from boilers and thermal plants as fuel, and reducing the distance between equipment and work areas to reduce fuel costs (Correa, 2007).
Companies with product stewardship strategic capabilities, such as Monsanto, recognized that shrinking amounts of land to grow crops for food and for alternative fuel in the face of population growth called for creative biotechnology.
As such, Monsanto worked with its B2B stakeholders in developing genetically modified plant seeds of four crops (com, soybeans, cotton, and canola) that contain genes that kill insects and tolerate weed-killing pesticides.
Farmers pay a premium for Monsanto's seeds (versus traditional seeds) but can save twice that amount by reduced spending on chemical insecticides and herbicides and by growing substantially more crops, some of which are used to produce biodiesel fuel.
As a result, Monsanto's net income has increased almost 44% from 2002 to 2007 (Hindo, 2007).
Successful product stewardship oriented companies, such as Tesco, also understand the importance of demonstrating their ability to measure their carbon footprint, sharing such information with the stakeholders and the public at-large (via voluntary emissions reporting), and soliciting stakeholder input on requisite changes needed to preserve 142 Journal of Business Strategies and enhance their climate-friendly reputation and brand image in keeping and attracting customers (Hoffman & Woody, 2008; Esty, 2007).
And finally , companies like Starbucks, FedEx, Kinko's, and Johnson & Johnson buy 5 to 10 percent of their energy from renewable energy sources as part of their efforts to reduce GHG emissions and become less dependent on energy from fossil fuels (Esty & Winston, 2009).
In short, firms that develop product stewardship strategic capabilities engage stakeholders to find creative ways to produce desired products and services in ways that lessen GHG emissions, including the use of renewable energy resources.
Sustainable development oriented firms ' overall strategy is driven by a strong sense of environmental purpose to work with other firms (even competitors), governments, environmentalists, academics, and others in solving our climate change problems (Hart, 1995).
For example, Intel was one ofthe first companies to take the EPAs challenge to be part of its Project XL, asking Intel to be a leader in pollution prevention above and beyond legal requirements (Esty & Winston, 2009).
Working closely with the EPA and other high-level constituencies, Intel developed stringent objectives and metrics to measure such objectives, which were reviewed regularly by the EPA.
Intel's leadership won them state permits and quick environmental reviews needed for their expansion efforts.
Some of the largest companies in the U.S .
including Alcoa, Caterpillar, Duke Energy, DuPont, Dow, GE, PG&E, and Xerox formed a coalition called the U.S.
Climate Action Partnership that went to Washington D.C. in 2007 to push for a federal cap on carbon emissions, showing that business leaders across various industries see the urgency of addressing the issues impacting climate change and are taking an active role in influencing government policy (Esty & Winston, 2009).
Limitations and avenues for future research This study used a tight systematic methodology in pairing firms based on criteria such as country of origin, industry, and size, so that our analysis was based on highly comparable firms to enhance the validity of our empirical findings .
Unfortunately , this limited our analysis to 30 pairwise comparisons.
Other studies can follow similar methods using larger samples of paired firms to strengthen the generalizability of the results.
Moreover, analyzing larger datasets using various multivariate techniques can produce more robust results than those produced by pairwisecomparisons.
For instance, time-series analysis may prove useful in determining the linkage between the time it takes to implement proactive climate change strategies and resultant firm profitability.
Volume 27, Number 2 143 KLD's methodology has won various awards, which enhances the validity of the data used in this study.
Moreover, KLD's climate-based measurements match-up fairly well with the NRBV Framework of pollution prevention strategic capabilities (climate based efficiencies, climate-based efficient technologies), product stewardship strategic capabilities (use of renewable energy sources), and sustainable development strategic capabilities (identification of climate leaders and use of future fuels) developed in this manuscript.
However, KDL does not identify which strategic capability (or capabilities) the firm is utilizing in its proactive climate change strategy in achieving superior profitability.
Future research may attempt to flesh out performance impacts from pursuing different climate strategies.
This will prove challenging as the strategies are interlinked such that sustainable development based firms theoretically possess pollution prevention strategic capabilities and product stewardship strategic capabilities as well.
In that vein, other datasets using different statistical techniques may prove more effective in such empirical endeavors.
Finally, although the matched pairs were not on the KLD GCIOO index, it does not necessarily mean that these firms are not pursuing any type of climate change strategy.
Thus, we cannot measure the distance between the climate change emphasis between the KLD firms and their matched pairs.
Thus, for purposes of this study, we made the assumption that firms selected for inclusion on the KLD GCl 00 Index were more proactive in their climate change initiatives than their paired counterparts that were not selected for inclusion on the KLD GC 1 00 Index.
Future research can explore other measures that tap into the exact distance in climate change initiatives between firms in testing NRBV.
In conclusion, a plethora of opportunities for testing NRBV from a climate change perspective abound (beyond the ones noted above), including the impact of computer technologies and building designs (e.g., geothermal heating, solar panels, structural architecture) on the firm's environmental capabilities and resulting performance.
What is clear is that many firms are expending a great deal of time, energy, and resources creating and implementing strategies to address global climate change, and this preliminary study will hopefully generate additional interest in an important topic facing all of society.
End Note 1.
KLD has been recognized by third-party organizations for its social and environmental investment expertise.
(www.tbli .org) 144 Journal of Business Strategies References Al-Tuwaijri, S., Christensen, T., & Hughes, K. (2004).
The relations among environmental disclosure, environmental performance, and economic performance: A simultaneous equations approach.
Organizations & Society, 29(5/6), 447-472.
Ambec, S., & Lanoie, P. Does it pay to be green: A systematic overview.
Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(4),45-62.
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, PJ.H.
(1993).
Strategic assets and organizational rents.
Strategic Management Journal, 14(1),33-46.
Aragon-Correa, A. J., & Sharma, S. (2003).
A contingent resource-based view of proactive corporate environmental strategy.
Academy of Management Review, 28(1), 71-88.
Bansal, P. (2005).
Evolving sustainability: A longitudinal study of corporate sustainable development.
Strategic Management Journal, 26(3), 197-218.
Bansal, P. , & Hunter, T. (2003).
Strategic explanations for the early adoption of ISO 1400l.
Journal of Business Ethics, 46(3), 289-299.
Barney, J.
(1991).
Firm resource and sustained competitive advantage.
Journal of Management, 17( 1),99-120.
Barney, J.
(200 I ).
Resource-based theories of competitive advantage: A ten-year retrospective on the resource-based view.
Journal of Management, 27(6), 643-651.
Barney, J. , & Arikan, A.
(2001).
The resource-based view: Origins and implications.
Blackwell handbook of strategic management (pp.
124-188).
Barney, J., & McEwing, M. (1996).
Gaining and sustaining competitive advantage: Theory and practice.
Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
Brush, T. , & Artz, K. (1999).
Toward a contingent resource-based theory: The impact of information asymmetry on the value of capabilities in veterinary medicine.
Strategic Management Journal, 20(3), 223-250.
Chan, R. Y. K. (2005).
Does the natural-resource-based view ofthe firm apply in an emerging economy?
A survey of foreign invested enterprises in China.
Journal of Management Studies, 42(3), 625-672.
ClimateBiz Staff.
(2008, October 9).
Sun, Caterpillar, Mack Trucks and Pfizer Honored for Cutting GHGs.
ClimateBiz.
Retrieved from www.climatebiz.
com/news/200 8/ 1 0/09/ sun -caterpi II ar -mack -trucks-and -pfi zer -honored -cutti n gghgs.
Collis, D. (1991).
A resource-based analysis of global competition: The case of the bearings industry [Special Issue].
Strategic Management Journal, 12, 49-68.
Collis, D. , & Montgomery, C. (\995).
Competing on resources: Strategy in the 1990s.
Harvard Business Review, 73(4), 118-128.
Volume 27, Number 2 145 Correa, M.E.
(2007, October).
Leading change in Latin America.
Harvard Business Review, 40-42.
Department of Energy & Environmental Protection Agency (DOE & EPA).
(2000, July).
Carbon dioxide emissions from the generation of electric power in the United States (Joint report).
Dierickx, I., & Cool, K. (1989).
Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage.
Management Science, 35(12), 1504-1511.
Eisenhardt, K., & Schoonhoven, C. (1996).
Resource-based view of strategic alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms.
Organization Science, 7(2), 136-150.
Energy Information Administration (ETA).
(2006).
International energy outlook 2006 (Report #DOE/ETA-0484).
Department of Energy forecast.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
(2006a).
Electricity from natural gas.
Clean Energy.
Retrieved from www.epa.gov/cleanrgy/natgas.htm.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
(2006b).
Electricity from oil.
Clean Energy.
Retrieved from www.epa.gov/cleanrgy/oil.htm.
Esty, D. C. (2007, October).
What stakeholders demand?
Harvard Business Review, 30-34.
Esty, D. c., & Winston, A. S. (2009).
Green to gold.
Danvers, MA: John Wiley & Sons.
Farjoun, M. (1994).
Beyond industry boundaries: Human expertise, diversification and resource related industry groups.
Organization Science, 5(2), 185-199.
Gladwin, T. , Kennelly, J., & Krause, T. (1995).
Shifting sustainable development: Implications for management theory and research.
Academy of Management Review, 20(4),874-907.
Greene, D. L. , Hopson, J. L., & Li, 1.
(2006).
Have we run out of oil yet?
Oil peaking analysis from an optimist's perspective.
Energy Policy, 34(5), 515-531.
Greenhouse, L. (2007, April 2).
Justices rule against Bush administration on emissions.
The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.
com/2007 /04/02/washington/02cnd-scotus.html?ex= 1 176523200&en=428ge7 1 b5f77e689&ei=5070.
Hair, J ., Anderson, R., Tatham, R ., & Black, W. (1995).
Multivariate Data AnalYSis (4th ed.)
.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Harrison, J., Hitt, M., Hoskisson, R., & Ireland, R. (2001).
Resource complimentarity in business combinations: Extending the logic to organizational alliances.
Journal of Management, 27(6), 679-691.
146 Journal of Business Strategies Hart, S. (1995).
A natural resource-based view ofthe firm.
Academy of Management Review, 20(4), 986-1014.
Hastings, M. (1999).
A new operational paradigm for oil operations in sensitive environments: An analysis of social pressure, corporate capabilities, and competitive advantage.
Business Strategy and the Environment, 8(5), 267-280.
Henderson, R., & Cockburn, I.
(1994).
Measuring Competence?
Exploring firm effects in pharmaceutical research [Special Issue].
Strategic Management Journal, 15, 63-84.
Hendry, 1.
(2006).
Taking aim at business: What factors lead environmental nongovernmental organizations to target particular firms?
Business & Society.
45(1), 47-86.
Hindo, B.
(2007, December 17).
Monsanto: Winning the ground war.
Business Week, 35-4l.
Hitt, M. , Bierman, L., Shimizu, K., & Kochhar, R. (2001).
Direct and moderating effects of human capital on strategy and performance in professional service firms: A resource-based perspective.
Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 13-28.
Hoffman, A. J.
(2005).
Climate change strategy: The business logic behind voluntary greenhouse gas reductions.
California Management Review, 47(3), 21-46.
Hoffman, A J.
(2007, October).
If you are not at the table, you 're not on the menu.
Harvard Business Review, 34-35 .
Hoffman, A 1., & Woody, J. G. (2008).
Climate change: What's your business strategy?
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2007, April 6th).
Climate change 2007: Climate change impacts.
adaptation.
and vulnerability (Summary for policymakers ).
Kassinis, G ., & Vafeas, N. (2006).
Stakeholder pressure and environmental performance.
Academy of Management Journal, 49( 1), 145-159.
Kolk, A , & Pinkse, J.
(2004).
Market strategies for climate change.
European Management Journal, 22(3), 304-314.
Kolk, A, & Pinkse, 1.
(2005).
Business responses to climate change: Identifying emergent strategies.
California Management Review, 47(3), 6-20.
Kolk, A., & Pinkse, J.
(2007a).
Multinationals' political activities on climate change.
Business & Society, 46(1), 201-228.
Kolk, A, & Pinkse, 1.
(2007b).
Towards strategic stakeholder management?
Integrating perspectives on sustainability challenges such as corporate responses to climate change.
Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Effective Board Performance, 7(4), 370-378.
Volume 27, Number 2 147 Levy, D., & Kolk, A.
(2002).
Strategic responses to global climate change: Conflicting pressures on multinationals in the oil industry.
Business & Politics, 4(3), 275-301.
Lovins, A. , Lovins, L., & Hawken, P. (2007).
A road map for natural capitalism.
Harvard Business Review, 85(7/8), 172-183 .
Makower, J., Pemick, R. , & Wilder, C. (2005).
Clean energy trends 2005.
Clean Edge, Inc. Margolis, J., & Walsh, J.
(2003).
Misery loves companies: Rethinking social initiatives by business.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(2), 268-305.
McKibben, W. J .
& Wilcoxen, P. J.
(2002).
The role of economics in climate change policy.
Journal of Economics Perspectives, 16(2), 107-129.
Menguc, B. , Ozanne, L. K. (2005).
Challenges of the "green imperative": A natural resource-based approach to the environmental orientation-business performance relationship.
Journal of Business Research, 58(4): 430-438.
Miller, D., & Shamsie, J.
(1996).
The resource-based view of the firm in two environments: The Hollywood film studios from 1936-1965.
Academy of Management Journal, 39(3), 519-543.
Murray, K. 8. , & Montanari , J. R. (1986).
Strategic management of the socially responsible firm.
Academy of Management Review, II, 815-827.
Okereke, C. (2007).
An exploration of motivations, drivers and barriers to carbon management: The UK FTSE 100.
European Management Journal, 25(6), 475-486.
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F., & Rynes, S. (2003).
Corporate social and financial performance: A meta-analysis.
Organization Studies, 24(3), 403-441.
Orsata, R. J.
(2006).
Competitive environmental strategies: When does it pay to be green?
California Management Review, 18(2), 127-143.
Peteraf, M. A.
(1993).
The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view of the firm.
Strategic Management Journal, 14(3), 179-191.
Porter, M. E. , & Kramer, M. R. Strategy & society: The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility.
Harvard Business Review, 84( 12), 78-92.
Porter, M., & Van der Linde, C. (1995).
Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate.
Harvard Business Review, 73(5), 120-134.
Porter, M. , & Reinhardt, F. (2007, October 1).
A strategic approach to climate.
Harvard Business Review, 1-3.
Pugh, W., Jahera, J., & Oswald, S. (2005).
ESOP adoption and corporate performance: Does motive really matter?
Journal of Business & Economic Studies, 11(1),76-92.
148 Journal of Business Strategies Reed, R., & DeFillippi, R. (1990).
Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and sustainable competitive advantage.
Academy of Management Review, I5( 1), 88102.
Robins, J., & Weirsema, M. (1995).
A resource-based approach to the multibusiness firm: Empirical analysis of portfolio interrelationships and corporate financial performance.
Strategic Management Journal, 16(4),277-299.
Roosevelt, T., & Llewellyn, J.
(2007, October).
Investors hungry for clean energy.
Harvard Business Review, 38-40.
Russo, M., & Fouts, P. (1997).
A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental performance and profitability.
Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 534-560.
Schendler, A.
(2007, October).
When beirig green backfires.
Harvard Business Review, 35-38.
Schroeder, R., Bates, K., & Junttila, M. (2002).
A resource-based view of manufacturing strategy and the relationship to manufacturing performance.
Strategic Management Journal, 23(2), 105-117.
Schwart, P. (2007, October).
Investing in global security.
Harvard Business Review, 26-28.
Sharma, S. & Vrendenburg, H. (1998).
Proactive corporate strategy and the development of competitively valuable organizational capabilities.
Strategic Management Journal, 19(8), 729-754.
Shrivastava, P. (1995).
The role of the corporation in achieving ecological sustainability.
Academy of Management Review, 20(4), 936-960.
Slater, A.
(2007, October).
Global Reporting Initiative's director of strategy, on how disclosing emissions benefits companies.
Harvard Business Review, 32.
Stanwick, P., & Stanwick, S. (2006).
Reducing greenhouse emissions: A comparison of United States and Australian multi-nationals.
Problems & Perspectives in Management, 1, 48-57.
Starik, M., & Rands, G. (1995).
Weaving an integrated web: Multilevel and multisystem perspectives of ecologically sustainable organizations.
Academy of Management Review, 20(4), 908-935.
Waddock, S. (2006).
Leading corporate citizens (2nd Ed.).
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Way, M., & Rendlen, B.
(2007, October).
Walking the talk at Swisse Re.
Harvard Business Review, 42.
Zhu, K. (2004).
The complimentarity of information technology infrastructures and e-commerce capability: A resource-based assessment of their business value.
Journal of Management Information Systems, 21(1), 167-202.
Volume 27, Number 2 149 Zhu, K., & Kraemer, K. (2002).
E-commerce metrics for net-enhanced organizations: Assessing the value of e-commerce to firm performance in the manufacturing sector.
Information Systems Research, 13(3),275-295.
Zott, C. (2003).
Dynamic capabilities and the emergence of intraindustry differential firm performance: Insights from a simulation study.
Strategic Management Journal, 24(2), 97-125.
Biographical Sketches of Authors Michael D. Michalisin is professor of management and program coordinator for the business program at Penn State Worthington Scranton.
He received his Ph .D.
in Strategic Management and Macro-Organizational Theory from Kent State University.
His research, which includes corporate environmental strategies, resource-based competitiveness, supply chain management, and top management team dynamics, appears in various journals including Decision Sciences, Group & Organization Management, and the Journal of Business Research.
Bryan T. Stinchfield received his Ph.D. from Southern Illinois University where he studied strategic management and environmental policy and resources.
His research and teaching interests include corporate social and environmental responsibility, climate change, and eco-preneurship.
He currently is an assistant professor of organization studies at Franklin & Marshall College.
150 Journal of Business Strategies Climate Change Strategies and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of the Natural Resource-Based View of the Firm
Microsoft Word JorgensonFinal.docx JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH Five Points on Sociology, PEWS and Climate Change1 Andrew K. Jorgenson Boston College andrew.jorgenson@bc.edu New articles in this journal are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 United States License.
This journal is published by the University Library System, University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press.
I’d like to thank Jackie Smith for inviting me to participate in this symposium.
JWSR has a wonderful track record of publishing research on the environment, including climate change, and I’m proud that I modestly contributed to this while serving as coeditor of the journal from 2007 to 2011, and by guest coediting a special issue on globalization and the environment that appeared prior to my term as coeditor (http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/view/35).
Indeed, the ASA Section on Political Economy of the World-System (PEWS) has much to contribute to our understanding of historical (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Hornborg, McNeill, and Martinez-Alier 2007; Moore 2011) and contemporary socio-ecological relationships (Gareau 2013; Kick and McKinney 2014; Prell et al.
2014; Rice 2007).
Later this year France will host the 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC).
The stakes keep getting higher.
The science is clear that anthropogenic climate change is worsening and the world isn’t doing what needs to be done to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
In this short essay I make 1 The author thanks Brett Clark, Thomas Dietz, Riley Dunlap, and Timmons Roberts for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
ISSN: 1076-156X | Vol.
#21 No.
2 | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.18 | jwsr.org Journal of World-System Research | Vol.
#21 No.
2 | Five Points on Sociology, PEWS, Climate Change jwsr.org | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.18 270 five points concerning sociological research on climate change, with particular attention given to the ways in which the PEWS tradition helps shape portions of this scholarly work, and I make a few connections between this work and the climate justice community.
Given space constraints I must sacrifice much depth for a little breadth.
The first point I would like to make is the broader environmental sociology community has made significant contributions to our understanding of anthropogenic climate change (Dietz et al.
2015; Jorgenson and Clark 2012; Knight and Schor 2014; York 2012).
I am part of the American Sociological Association’s (ASA) Task Force on Sociology and Climate Change, which is headed by Riley Dunlap, leading scholar on sociology and climate change (and many other socio-ecological topics).
This task force has been in existence since 2010, and according to ASA it is the largest task force in the association’s history.
The participating members span the various ASA sections (in addition to the Environment and Technology Section) and intellectual traditions in the discipline, and the participating members vary in their career stages as well.
Multiple PEWS scholars are actively involved with the task force and have been from the beginning.
For those readers unfamiliar with the history of environmental sociology, it is safe to say that not so long ago it was at the margins of the discipline.
The ASA task force is in some ways an institutional recognition of the relevance of environmental sociology for the broader discipline and that we as a scholarly community have much to contribute to climate change scholarship.
A brand new book resulting from the task force, and edited by Riley Dunlap and Robert Brulle (2015), consists of a dozen or so chapters on different themes within the sociological work on climate change.
I’ve read the chapters and coauthored two of them, and the influence of the PEWS tradition on sociological work on climate change is evident throughout the book.
The ASA plans to put notable resources into promoting the volume.
The work is important and could be quite useful for civil society groups, the policy community and for various educational purposes.
It will be published in paperback and relatively affordable.
The second point that I would like to make – which probably won’t surprise anyone reading the essays in this symposium – is that the human causes, consequences, and solutions to climate change are largely grounded in structures of power and inequality, broadly defined (Derber 2010; Foster, Clark, and York 2010).
PEWS scholars were among the first sociologists to make such observations through their research (Grimes 1999; Roberts and Grimes 1999; Burns, Davis, and Kick 1997), and you can see this influence in the environmental sociology community as well as in the broader sustainability science community (Rosa and Dietz 2012).
Core nations are hugely responsible for the climate crisis, while non-core nations in general are most vulnerable to climate change (Roberts and Parks 2007).
The reasons are historically and structurally complicated and much more research is needed to unpack the complexities.
Journal of World-System Research | Vol.
#21 No.
2 | Jorgenson jwsr.org | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.18 271 My third point: without in any way discounting the injustices tied to climate change for non-core nations relative to core nations, we must remember that there are internal peripheries in the core and in the semiperiphery.
Leading PEWS scholars, such as Wilma Dunaway (1996) and Thomas Hall (1989), have described the existence and struggles of internal peripheries quite elegantly in their research.
The poor and disenfranchised of internal peripheries are very vulnerable to climate change.
Of course this is commonsense in the climate justice world.
But my experiences working at multiple universities in the US and abroad suggest that it isn’t commonsense to most others.
We need to be vocal whenever we can about the point that the human causes and consequences of climate change are tied to structures of power and inequality at multiple scales.
This is a key message of the climate justice community, and quite simply, much PEWS scholarship supports this message.
The scholarly literature on power, inequality, and climate change tends to focus on economic forms of the former two.
My fourth point: there are other social institutions and modes of power that contribute to the climate crisis, and they are often overlooked.
For example, military power and militarism in general play major roles.
PEWS scholarship, such as ChaseDunn (1998) and Kentor (2000), have shown that military power helps structure and reproduce the stratified interstate system.
Some of my recent collaborative research builds on these ideas and integrates them with newer strands of environmental inequality scholarship (Hooks and Smith 2004, 2012) to show that the world’s militaries consume enormous amounts of fossil fuels and other resources to create and maintain their vast global infrastructure (Clark, Jorgenson, and Kentor 2010; Jorgenson and Clark 2015), and military vehicles of all shapes and sizes are not energy efficient!
More broadly, nations that have larger and technologically advanced militaries are able to utilize their military power to gain disproportionate access to natural resources throughout the world, including fossil fuels.
Various civil society groups, such as Physicians for Social Responsibility (http://www.psr.org/chapters/iowa/militarism.html), recognize the importance in addressing the ways in which military power and militarization contribute to the climate crisis.
I predict this will become much more of a central issue in the climate justice movement.
My fifth and final point: recent research by environmental sociologists and scholars in related fields indicates that societies can achieve a high standard of living while consuming relatively moderate levels of fossil fuels and other resources (Dietz 2015; Dietz, Rosa, and York 2012; Lamb et al 2014).
In other words, at a certain point fossil fuel consumption and human well-being begin to “decouple”.
However, a lion’s share of the world’s nations continues to increase their energy consumption and thus carbon emissions while not proportionally enhancing their collective human well-being.
This relationship is known as the carbon intensity of human Journal of World-System Research | Vol.
#21 No.
2 | Five Points on Sociology, PEWS, Climate Change jwsr.org | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.18 272 well-being (CIWB), and measured as a ratio of carbon emissions per unit of human well-being (e.g., carbon emissions per capita / average life expectancy) (Jorgenson 2014).
Recent studies indicate that CIWB is positively associated with both economic development and domestic income inequality, and these relationships tend to increase in magnitude through time (Jorgenson 2014, 2015).
In other words, economic development does not appear to be a pathway to reducing CIWB in nations throughout the world, but reducing income inequality just might be – at least to some extent.
Further, new research is showing that particular forms of unequal exchange relationships between core and peripheral nations exacerbate CIWB for of the latter (Givens 2014).
This is a rapidly growing area of research that (1) engages fundamental principles in the PEWS tradition, and (2) that has much to offer to broader discussions of climate justice and sustainability more generally.
As I’ve noted, environmental sociology contributes greatly to our understanding of the human dimensions of climate change.
The PEWS perspective has shaped a notable amount of this research from the get-go, and this work has contributed to the further development and diversification of the PEWS tradition.
Much of the findings from this research are consistent with the fundamental arguments of the climate justice community concerning the ways in which structures of power and inequality caused the climate crisis.
This crisis is the greatest challenge facing humanity.
Solving it means solving the sorts of structural problems in the world that generations of PEWS scholars have studied for decades.
Journal of World-System Research | Vol.
#21 No.
2 | Jorgenson jwsr.org | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.18 273 References Bunker, Stephen, and Paul Ciccantell.
2005.
Globalization and the Race for Resources.
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Burns, Thomas, Byron Davis, and Ed Kick.
1997.
“Position in the World-System and National Emissions of Greenhouse Gases.” Journal of World-Systems Research 3:432-466.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher.
1998.
Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Clark, Brett, Andrew Jorgenson, and Jeffrey Kentor.
2010.
“Militarization and Energy Consumption: A Test of Treadmill of Destruction Theory in Comparative Perspective.” International Journal of Sociology 40:23-43.
Derber, Charles.
2010.
Greed to Green: Solving Global Warming and Remaking the Economy.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Dietz, Thomas.
2015.
“Prolegomenon to a Structural Human Ecology of Human Well-Being.” Sociology of Development 1:123-148.
Dietz, Thomas, Kenneth Frank, Cameron Whitley, Jennifer Kelly, and Rachel Kelly.
2015 (in press).
“Political Influences on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from US States.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (doi:10.1073/pnas.1417806112).
Dietz, Thomas, Eugene Rosa, and Richard York.
2012.
“Environmentally Efficient Well-Being: Is there a Kuznets Curve?” Applied Geography 32:21-28.
Dunaway, Wilma.
1996.
The First American Frontier: Transition to Capitalism in Southern Appalachia, 1700-1860.
Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press.
Dunlap, Riley, and Robert Brulle (eds.).
2015.
Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark, and Richard York.
2010.
The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth.
New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
Gareau, Brian.
2013.
From Precaution to Profit: Contemporary Challenges to Environmental Protection in the Montreal Protocol.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Givens, Jennifer.
2014.
Questioning Development: Global Integration and the Carbon Intensity of Well-Being.
PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Utah.
Grimes, Peter.
1999.
“The Horseman and the Killing Fields: The Final Contradiction of Capitalism.” Pages 13-42, in Ecology and the World-System, edited by Walter Goldfrank, David Goodman, and Andrew Szasz.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Hall, Thomas.
1989.
Social Change in the Southwest, 1350-1880.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Journal of World-System Research | Vol.
#21 No.
2 | Five Points on Sociology, PEWS, Climate Change jwsr.org | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.18 274 Hooks, Gregory and Chad Smith.
2004.
“The Treadmill of Destruction: National Sacrifice Areas and Native Americans.” American Sociological Review 69:558-575.
______.
2012.
“The Treadmill of Destruction Goes Global: Anticipating the Environmental Impact of Militarism in the 21st Century.” Pages 60-83 in The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism, edited by Kostas Gouliamos and Christos Kassimeris.
London: Routledge.
Hornborg, Alf, JR Mcneill, and Joan Martinez-Alier (eds.).
2007.
Rethinking Environmental History: World-System History and Global Environmental Change.
Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Jorgenson, Andrew.
2014.
“Economic Development and the Carbon Intensity of Human WellBeing.” Nature Climate Change 4:186-189.
______.
2015.
“Inequality and the Carbon Intensity of Human Well-Being.” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences (DOI: 10.1007/s13412-015-0234-z).
Jorgenson, Andrew, and Brett Clark.
2012.
“Are the Economy and the Environment Decoupling?
A Comparative International Study, 1960-2005.” American Journal of Sociology 118:144.
______.
2015.
““The Temporal Stability and Developmental Differences in the Environmental Impacts of Militarism: The Treadmill of Destruction and Consumption-Based Carbon Emissions.” Sustainability Science (DOI:10.1007/s11625-015-0309-5).
Kentor, Jeffrey.
2000.
Capital and Coercion.
New York, NY: Garland.
Kick, Edward, and Laura McKinney.
2014.
“Global Context, National Interdependencies, and the Ecological Footprint: A Structural Equation Analysis.” Sociological Perspectives 57:256-279.
Knight, Kyle and Juliet Schor.
2014.
“Economic Growth and Climate Change: A Cross-National Analysis of Territorial and Consumption-Based Carbon Emissions in High-Income Countries.” Sustainability 6:3722-3731.
Lamb William, Julia Steinberger, Alice Bows-Larkin, Glen Peters, Timmons Roberts, and Ruth Wood.
2014.
“Transitions in Pathways of Human Development and Carbon Emissions.” Environmental Research Letters 9(1):doi:10.1088/1748-9326/9/1/014011.
Moore, Jason.
2011.
“Ecology, Capital, and the Nature of our Times: Accumulation & Crisis in the Capitalist World-Ecology.” Journal of World-Systems Research 17:108-147.
Prell, Christina, Kuishuang Feng, Laixiang Sun, Martha Geores, and Klaus Hubacek.
2014.
“The Economic Gains and Environmental Losses of US Consumption: A World-Systems and Input-Output Approach.” Social Forces 93:405-428.
Rice, James.
2007.
“Ecological Unequal Exchange: International Trade and Uneven Utilization of Environmental Space in the World System.” Social Forces 85:1369-1392.
Journal of World-System Research | Vol.
#21 No.
2 | Jorgenson jwsr.org | http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2015.18 275 Roberts, Timmons, and Peter Grimes.
1999.
“Extending the World-System to the Whole System: Toward a Political Economy of the Biosphere.” Pages 59-86, in Ecology and the WorldSystem, edited by Walter Goldfrank, David Goodman, and Andrew Szasz.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Roberts, Timmons and Bradley Parks.
2007.
A Climate of Injustice.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rosa, Eugene, and Thomas Dietz.
2012.
“Human Drivers of National Greenhouse-Gas Emissions.” Nature Climate Change 2:581–586.
York, Richard.
2012.
“Asymmetric Effects of Economic Growth and Decline on CO2 Emissions.” Nature Climate Change 2:762-764.
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF RICE PLANTATIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN OTTOMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN THE 15TH AND 19TH CENTURIES AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR CLIMATE RESEARCH Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
DOI: 10.2478/jengeo-2021-0001 ISSN 2060-467X ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF RICE PLANTATIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN OTTOMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN THE 15TH AND 19TH CENTURIES AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR CLIMATE RESEARCH Özlem Sert¹* 1Department of History and Urban Studies Center, Hacettepe University Ankara, 06800 Beytepe, Ankara, Turkey Tel.
: +90 (542) 3032275 ORCiD ID: 0000-0002-5759-1089 *Corresponding author, e-mail: oezlemsert@gmail.com Research article, received 25 November 2020, accepted 15 January 2021 Abstract Historians readily discuss the effect of climate change on the 21st century, but Ottomanists rarely reference palaeoclimatology data.
This research compares palaeoclimatological data with documentary evidence from institutionalized rice plantations in the Ottoman Empire.
Between the 15th and 19th centuries, the empire employed a group of experts for the cultivation of rice in the vast region between the Tigris and the Danube.
Extensive registers exist from this period in archives that give documentary evidence about the organization of plantations, yields, prices and destructive floods.
The objective of the study, as presented in this article, is to find ricerelated phenological data in Ottoman Archive registers.
It utilizes a comparative analysis of the Old World Drought Atlas (OWDA) summer precipitation data reconstructed by Cook et al.
(2015), temperature changes, documentary evidence about seasonal extremes and archival evidence.
The comparison shows that palaeoclimatology proxies are important sources of information regarding changes in rice cultivation.
It also indicates that the Ottoman archive is a valuable source of possible phenological data.
Thus, research sources from nature and societies complement one another.
The comparison also demonstrates that climate change during the Ottoman Empire’s reign showed regional differences, and a local comparison of phenological data and palaeoclimatological data can explain more about the effects of the Little Ice Age (LIA) on the empire.
Keywords: Climate History, Environmental History, Ottoman History, Rice Farming, Phenology, Palaeoclimatology INTRODUCTION The climate extremes of the Little Ice Age were a trigger for the development of the modern state’s institutional structure (Parker, 2013).
After the so-called earlymodern gunpowder revolution of the 16 th century, anthropogenic intrusions into the environment grew significantly all over the world (Ágoston, 2009).
New institutional bodies in absolutist states enforced the large-scale displacement of plants, animals, human beings and raw materials.
Empires employed plant breeders, who experimented with new hybrid forms to increase crop yields and enhance variation.
The early modern era was a period of agronomic challenges (Murphy, 2007).
The appropriate location of plantations, using the right varieties, coordinating the workforce and ensuring sustainable production was a great institutional challenge at a time of climate change.
Cash crops such as sugar cane, rice, coffee, cacao, tea and tobacco had a substantial social and environmental impact in the regions where they were planted.
Rice was one of the products that transformed the socio-ecological landscapes in its foodway from China and India to the Middle East, Europe and the Americas.
Sugar cane and rice were among those plants diffused westwards from South Asia to the Middle East and Europe during the Arab Agricultural Revolution between the 8th and 13th centuries (Watson, 1981; Canard, 1959).
Rice, the main staple of Indian and Chinese cuisines, first entered the courts of Middle Eastern sultans on its way from Persia and the Mamluk Empire to Ottoman lands.
The demand for rice as a luxury cash crop in growing local markets rose hand in hand with the increasing specialization of production activities in Ottoman cities.
Although rice production was known in Southeast Europe before the 14th century, there was no extensive production before the Ottomans founded institutionalized rice plantations in the 14th and 15th centuries (İnalcık, 1982).
The Ottoman Empire was one of the empires that introduced agronomic challenges and experienced fundamental institutional changes in the early modern era.
Rice plantations in the Ottoman Empire have drawn the attention of many scholars for their political and economic importance (Gökbilgin, 1952; Barkan, 1963; Beldiceanu et al., 1978; İnalcık, 1982; Arıkan, 1990; Venzke, 1992; Andreev et al., 2003; Karagöz, 2004, Evered et al., 2015; Amedosky, 2017; Kul, 2017).
Promitzer (2010), Evered et al.
(2015) and Gratien (2017) introduced an environmental perspective to the study of 19th and early 20th century rice plantations.
Shopov (2020) draws attention to early modern intrusions on the landscape, deforestation and the societal effects of rice plantations in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.
However, in the above studies, climate change has mailto:oezlemsert@gmail.com 2 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
received little attention.
Amedosky (2017) relates the fluctuations in rice harvests to the environmental conditions of the Little Ice Age in the Balkans.
She refers to Tabak (2008), connecting the humid conditions of the Little Ice Age with the introduction of aquatic crops.
Andreev et al.
(2003) mention drought and revenue problems in the 17th and 18th centuries.
In these studies, neither proxy data from archives of nature (i.e., tree rings) nor speleothem or pollen analysis have been used.
The present article aims to compare palaeoclimatology data with documentary evidence about institutionalized rice plantations of the Ottoman state, thus it is a first attempt to find rice-related phenological data in Ottoman sources as potential material for the identification of climate history.
The study addresses the effect of climate variability on rice plantations.
Available phenological data is compared with regional tree ring data.
The June-July-August drought index (PDSI) reconstruction maps by Cook et al.
(2015), research on temperature changes and historical data on climate extremes are compared with available yields, prices and other historical evidence about rice plantations.
STUDY AREA Ottoman rice plantations were situated in the river valleys of the region between the Tigris and the Danube, between 30°–46° latitude and 19°–43° longitude, where temperatures were over 20 °C in the growing season and water scarcity was rare.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Ottoman rice plantations in relation to: a) May-June-July mean temperatures; and b) annual mean precipitation values.
The location of plantations has been ascertained from studying documentary evidence in decrees, cadastres, rice tax office books and the rice paddy tax registers.
The survey mainly focuses on areas where both documentary evidence and palaeoclimatology data are sufficient; therefore, it includes the region of Anatolia and the Balkans but does not cover Iraq and Egypt.
This large study area has a variety of very different climatic conditions.
The strong influence of the East Atlantic/Western Russia’s seesaw teleconnection pattern is sometimes evident between Anatolia and the Balkans (Roberts et al., 2012).
At times, while Central Anatolia is dry, Western Europe has higher precipitation rates.
Constantinidou et al.
(2019) define six climatic regions (Anatolia, Balkans, Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean, and Mesopotamia) depending on the Radiative Index of Dryness, the Fuel Dryness Index and the Waterlimited Yield of winter wheat.
However, even in this differentiated regional model, both Anatolia and the Balkans have sub-climatic regions as shown below (Fig.
2).
Anatolia While Central Anatolia is often hit by extreme drought, the Black Sea Region and the Aegean coasts of Western Anatolia are not influenced as much.
The parallel mountain chains in the east-west direction of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Region build a barrier, thus rain clouds transform humid air into rainfall on the slopes (Akkemik et al., 2005).
Whereas the mean annual rainfall in continental Central Anatolia is only about 300 mm, the western and eastern Black Sea measures 1,000 mm and the western Mediterranean coasts 800 mm (Türkeş, 1996; Akkemik et al., 2005).
Based on annual precipitation totals from 96 stations in Turkey, Türkeş et al.
(2011) have defined seven rainfall regime regions in the country: the Black Sea, Marmara Transition, the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Transition, Continental Mediterranean, Continental Central Anatolia and Continental Eastern Anatolia.
Moreover, by using spectral clustering of precipitation values, Türkeş et al.
(2011) have defined 800 mm in eight resultant subregions: the Black Sea, Northwest Turkey, the Southern Aegean and Western Mediterranean, the Mediterranean, West Continental Central Anatolia, East Continental Central Anatolia, Continental Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia.
Since the rainfall regime is very important across the breadth of this study, the simplified climate region definition derived by Türkeş et al.
(2011) is considered an appropriate categorization tool.
Fig.
1 Actual May-June-July mean temperatures [°C] (left) and annual mean precipitation [mm] (right) of the study area according to Hersbach et al.
(2020) and the location of studied Ottoman plantations Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
3 The Balkans The Köppen-Geiger climate classification for the Balkans (Peel et al., 2007) is not sufficient to show the study area’s regional climatic differences.
The Balkans also have sub-climatic regions: Popov (2018), for example, modified the Köppen-Geiger classification for the Vardar, Struma and Mesta valleys.
Similarly, using contemporary data and projections, Beck et al.
(2018) drew a new Köppen-Geiger climate classification using a 1 km resolution map for 1980–2016.
This map shows regional differences better than the Köppen map.
Beck et al.
(2018) also made another projection map for 2071– 2100.
The two maps show a great change in climate zones, which is a suitable warning against using current data for historical studies.
In this study, the entire region is called Southeastern Europe.
The comparison of documentary evidence and palaeoclimatology data focuses on seven regions: Continental Central Anatolia, the Black Sea Region, the Mediterranean, Southeastern Anatolia, Southeastern Europe and Marmara Transition.
The locations that have comparable data is restricted.
Fig.
2 shows the major rivers and the locations discussed in the results section via a colour code.
Since data that provide indications about annual yield and price variability are restricted, not all locations are discussed in the study.
DATA AND TERMINOLOGY The Ottoman government gave particular importance to the production of rice as a cash crop.
The administration of rice plantations required great organizational capacity for building canals and repairing them in case they were damaged by floods.
New plantation areas were often allocated to waqfs, Islamic charitable foundations.
In Southeastern Anatolia, the previous Mamluk system of rice growing was assimilated.
The resultant Ottoman system was a challenging system that depended on waqfs to open new land for plantations.
Waqfization also provided the cash flow that the gunpowder empire needed for its armies.
High-ranking statesmen and affluent people donated income from revenuegenerating sources to uphold the public good and simultaneously entrust their estates to family members.
After Mehmed II’s reign (1444–1446 and 1451–1481), the state employed a group of cultivation experts (çeltikçi) to implement and rehabilitate rice farming, organize the workforce and ensure sustainable production (İnalcık, 1982; Emecan, 1993).
Waqfization went hand in hand with the spread of rice plantations in the Balkans (Shopov, 2020).
The branches of the rivers were allocated to a tax farmers.
Fig.
2 Major rivers and locations discussed in the results section.
Colour coding of the locations: Continental Central Anatolia (red), the Black Sea Region (blue), the Mediterranean (burgundy), Southeastern Anatolia (orange), Southeastern Europe (navy blue) and Marmara Transition (green) 4 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
Each river and creek, which was used for rice production, were listed in registers.
The terminology in these registers gives an indication about the organizational principles that were used.
To guarantee that correct varieties were used, the administration often supplied seeds to start plantations.
Controlling the rice variety not only secured higher revenues but also prevented losses caused by planting mixed varieties.
Controlling the varities was so important, that tohum, which literally means “seed”, became a measurement unit for production lots.
Rice plantations were so highly regarded by the state that there is an immense volume of data.
The use of archival data as historical evidence requires available documents to be classified and their potential analyzed.
Decrees Important events, changes in production or changes in the organization of production were recorded in decrees called Mühimme.
The data in these decrees provide evidence of weather extremes such as floods and droughts that resulted in reduced yield.
The decrees also include information about geographical distribution.
However, they are not useful for tracing gradual changes in rice production.
Cadastres Cadastres (Tapu Tahrir and İcmal registers) are valuable because they give data about local production and the distribution of lots to tax farmers (mukataa) for 2–3 years.
However, the data is not adequate enough to compare annual yields with climate variability.
Rice Tax Office Books The Anatolian Fiscal Office kept separate registers for cash crops such as silk, tobacco, coffee and rice.
The first Rice Tax Office Book (Çeltik Rüsumu Kalemi or Vâridât-i Şikk-i Sânî Kalemi) was started in 1524 and ended in 1532 defining the annual allocation of river branches to tax farmers (BOA D.ÇRS.D.25994).
This book is valuable because it shows that the branches of the rivers were registered as early as the first half of the 16th century (Fig.
3).
Although these entries do not give data about the climate, similar register books could be beneficial for future land surveys.
The documentation of each branch of the river from the 15th to 20th centuries is vast and the registers become more elaborate from the 16 th century onwards.
The second Rice Tax Office Book dated up until 1551, which originated from Skopje (Üsküp), lists the allocation of lots (BOA D.ÇRS.D.25995).
The third book is from Plovdiv (Filibe) and Pazardzhik (Tatarpazarı) (from now on modern names will be used).
There are various entries from 1659, 1664– 1665 and 1673.
(BOA D.ÇRS.D.25996) The fourth register is also from Plovdiv and Pazardzhik for 1674 (BOA D.ÇRS.D.25997).
The fifth is also from the same region and is dated 1684–1688 (D.ÇRS.D.25998).
The sixth is from Pazardzhik and is dated up to 1780 (Karagöz, 2004; D.ÇRS.d.25999).
The last book is from Düzce dated 1829 (BOA D.ÇRS.d.26000).
The seventh Rice Tax Office Books show the allocation of river branches in Skopje on the Vardar River, Plovdiv and Pazardzhik on the Maritsa River, and Düzce on the Sakarya River in Anatolia (Fig.
2).
Rice Paddy Tax Register Documents Rice Paddy Tax Register Documents (Çeltik Rüsümu Evrakı, Fig.
4) are records about the allocation of paddy fields, the changes to tax farmers’ lots (mukataa) and their administration.
There are four books, the first dating from 1688 to 1728 (BOA D.ÇRS.1), the second from 1734 to 1761 (BOA D.ÇRS.2), the third from 1762 to 1776 (BOA D.ÇRS.3) and the fourth from 1777 to 1792 (BOA D.ÇRS.4).
All four books are related to the rice paddies in Pazardzhik and Plovdiv.
The data are almost continuous from 1688 to 1792 covering more than 100 years of changes in the allocation of paddy lots on various river branches, except for five years between 1728 and 1734.
Fig.
3 Example of a Rice Tax Office Book from the first half of the 16th century (Image courtesy of the Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archive, Istanbul, BOA D.ÇRS.D.25994) Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
5 Fig.
4 Example of a Rice Paddy Tax Register Document from the early 18th century (Image courtesy of the Ottoman Archive, Istanbul, BOA D.ÇRS1, 29.
ÇRS 1, 29) The data about the allocation of the paddy fields is not adequate to compare yield quantity with climate variability, since they do not offer annual accounts.
Despite these shortcomings, analysis of these documents may give important results about the anthropogenic intrusions on the land.
When compared with the pollen data of rice in future studies, new perspectives may be gained.
Waqf Account Books One critical type of regional document may help to provide evidence of climate variability and its effect on yield: the Waqf Account Books (Vakıf Muhasebe Defterleri) record yearly revenues from foundation budgets.
Annual changes to the quantity of yield and price fluctuations are appropriate for a comparison with climate variability.
However, the data are seldom continuous.
METHODS Climate variability is not the only controlling factor of rice yield variability.
Dry spells, changing cloud cover (and solar radiation), wind speed, seasonality and the timing of heat stress, water scarcity, pest and pathogen infestations, agronomic challenges, and economic and political or social factors can also affect yields.
Among the many factors influencing rice production, yield fluctuations caused by climate variability can only be traced in high accuracy matches.
This study offers a comparison of contemporary sources with regional climate data.
It uses only contemporary sources that enable analysis of the change in rice yield.
Since there is no one-toone matching palaeoclimatology data for each plantation location, the definition of the regions is crucial to the analysis.
The study defines regions which show similar climatic characteristics and uses the reconstruction of the June-July-August Palmer Drought Severity Index (JJA PDSI) series of the Old World Drought Atlas (OWDA) produced by Cook et al.
(2015).
Their OWDA reconstruction depends on data derived from tree rings and historical and archaeological data.
It uses the point-by-point method, and yet, for some locations, the data’s sensitivity is weak since it uses a proxy search radius of 1,000 km around each location.
All in all, for this long-term review, the single year maps and decadal mean summer precipitation values show a regional differentiation in the distribution of droughts and are useful for understanding yield decreases caused by long-term drought and consequent water scarcity in the rice growing season.
Rice grows and matures in approximately 150 to 200 days.
Seeds start to be planted as temperatures increase after April in South Anatolia, in early May in Thrace and in late May or early June in the north Balkan Peninsula.
During the first 60 days, at the vegetative stage of germination, seedling and tillering, scorching temperatures and water deficits are detrimental to growth.
The ideal temperature for germination is 20–35 °C (Maclean et al., 2013).
Water scarcity in the crop-growing season reduces yield (Altinsoy et al.
2013) and the need for water in June and July increases, thus the reduced depths of water in rice fields decreased yield (Kara et al.
2013).
Decadal droughts may cause water scarcity and lead to less water being allocated to the branch canals.
Phenological data from rice plantations in the Central Anatolian, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Southeastern Anatolian, Southeastern European and Marmara Transition regions will be compared with the reconstructed OWDA summer precipitation data (Cook et al.
2015), temperature changes and weather extremes.
Important changes to the organization of plantations from decrees and revenue changes from cadasters offer partial comparison.
Available yearly records of yield and rice price data in waqf account books provide year on year changes.
RESULTS Central Anatolia, the Black Sea Region, the Mediterranean, Southeastern Anatolia, Southeastern Europe and Marmara Transition regions show dissimilar climatic characteristics.
For each region, changes in summer PDSI values are indicated with yellow boxes and periods when the summer PDSI extremes increased with blue boxes.
6 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
Continental Central Anatolia In Continental Central Anatolia, production was located in temperate lower regions (Fig.
1a).
Three locations can be identified from archival evidence: Beypazarı, Konya and Karaman (BOA, MAD.d.10249, BOA, MAD.d.12168, BOA, MAD.d.3120; Coşkun 2010).
Although plantations in the Kızılırmak and Sakarya River valleys depended on irrigation, the annual mean precipitation values are very low and the region was vulnerable to decadal droughts.
The tree ring-based hydroclimate reconstruction of the OWDA (Cook et al., 2015) shows that there were extreme drought years and an important decrease in the mean summer PDSI values by the end of the 16 th century (Fig.
5).
The small yellow box shows a short high precipitation era in the early 16 th century.
The long yellow box shows that the region had experienced a long low precipitation period, in which the mean JJA PDSI values were under -1.
Nar Lake high-resolution data confirm that there was also a dry period between AD 1400–1950 (Jones et al., 2006).
The change in mean summer precipitation, and the length and intensity of the drought in these years may have caused water scarcity, resulting in an overall trend toward desiccation and decreased water depth in some paddy fields.
For example, in Konya and Karaman, active plantations existed before the end of the 16th century.
The Karaman pious foundations’ regional revenue book from 1483 mentions two rice grinding mills (Coşkun , 2010).
Historical evidence from Konya also shows that rice was planted there in the 16 th century (Orbay, 2012).
In both locations, the production of rice had decreased by the end of the century.
The account books of Selim II’s and Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî’s waqfs in the Konya region provide some annual comparable price data (Orbay, 2012).
According to this data, rice was listed among both the revenues and expenditures of the foundation between 1594 and 1597; however, it had disappeared from revenues by 1597.
This probably means that rice production in the lands that the foundation owned no longer returned revenues or production stopped.
Fig.
5 Reconstructed June-July-August Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) values of the OWDA (Cook et al., 2015) for Continental Central Anatolia between 1400–2000 Table 1 Rice prices in the account books of Selim II’s and Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî’s foundations (Orbay, 2012) and their comparison to reconstructed OWDA June-JulyAugust Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) values (Cook et al., 2015) for Continental Central Anatolia at Konya between 1594 and 1602.
Year Reconstructed JJA Selim II.
's Waqf Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî's Waqf PDSI 10-Year Spline Revenues Expenditures Expenditures 1594 -1,4054 -2,257 1,73 2,6 1595 -2,8337 -2,339 2,3 3,18 1596 -3,4746 -2,301 2,3 2,59 3,23 1597 -1,5316 -2,106 3,27 3,46 1598 -1,2798 -1,834 3,76 3,56 1599 -0,7683 -1,525 4,16 4,33 1600 -3,3649 -1,125 3,62 3,75 1601 0,2699 -0,545 3,42 4,33 1602 0,4688 0,112 4,79 A comparison with the reconstructed OWDA summer precipitation data (Cook et al., 2015) shows that this may be related to water scarcity.
Table 1 compares rice prices in the account books of Selim II’s and Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî’s waqfs and reconstructed OWDA June-July-August PDSI values (Cook et al., 2015) between 1594 and 1602.
Ten-year spline summer PDSI values point to water scarcity in 1594, 1595 and 1596.
The drought intensified from 1595 to 1596 and summer precipitation values fell from PDSI -2.8337 to 3.4746.
In the same years, rice prices in the revenue section of the accounting book increase from 1.73 akçes to 2.3 akçes.
After 1596, the rice revenue record was no longer in use and summer precipitation values were under zero.
Moreover, according to the Cook et al.
OWDA reconstruction (2015), an extreme drought occurred in 1600.
Rice prices listed as waqf expenses increased from 2.6 akçes in 1594 to 3.42 akçes in 1601.
Although climate stress may not have been the only factor to cause such a price increase, this partial data shows a negative correlation between summer PDSI values and rice prices in waqfs revenues.
Many other factors may have been causal in this decline and the disappearance of rice revenues, but dry June-JulyAugust conditions are one probable trigger for this decline, as suggested by the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015).
This fragmentary data from the revenue records reveals little in itself about water scarcity’s effect on rice production.
Therefore, it is highly important to find data more appropriate for comparison.
Future studies may fill in the gaps and produce continuous results.
Historical studies by Griswold (1993) and White (2011) relate peasant rebellions in Continental Central Anatolia to climate variability.
There were also extreme fluctuations in the grain yield revenues Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
7 of the region’s waqfs.
Orbay (2012) rela tes the financial difficulties of Sadreddîn-i Konevî and the Mevlevî waqf with June-July-August precipitation fluctuations in Southwestern Anatolia, as described by Touchan et al.
(2005).
More documentary evidence from the grain yield revenue registers of the account books can provide a better understanding of the effect of the Little Ice Age droughts in Central Anatolia by using palaeoclimatology data produced in the last decade.
Documentary evidence from the revenue books shows that northern parts of Central Anatolia were more active in production.
The mean precipitation rates are slightly higher in the area (Fig.
1 right).
According to an edict dating back to 1546, Beypazarı, a town northwest of Ankara, had rice fields on the Sakarya catchment (BOA, İE.ML.1/29).
In 1580, a decree ordered villagers to give their tax revenue as hulled rice to bolster the Halil Paşa Waqf’s revenue and avoid losses (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.41/1031).
A decree dating back to 26 November 1609 states that those who worked the Hasan Paşa Waqf in Beypazarı but had left their village because of bandits should not experience problems returning to Beypazarı (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.78/2104).
Two months later, another decree stated that new revenues from Bursa and Ankara should be added to the waqf’s revenues.
The decree book also mentions other security problems in the region (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.78/2104).
At present, it is not possible to analyze the specific effect of the drought on the fields; production may have stopped because of bandits or drought, or both.
In 1802, a decree ordered that rice from Beypazarı be sent to Hacı Bayram-ı Veli Order in Ankara (BOA, AE.SSLM.III/197, 11831).
Thus, although there may have been ruptures in production by the end of the 19 th century, rice production continued in areas north of Ankara.
The blue box shows the period where precipitation extremes also occurred after the mid-16th century.
Future phenological study may provide more data about the influence of these summer extremes.
According to the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015), the low mean summer precipitation period started at the end of the 16 th century and lasted until the late 20th century.
In this four-hundred-year period, the mean precipitation rates during droughts were under -1 and the region experienced a significant change in its flora.
Agricultural areas also suffered subsurface water problems and high salinization, as shown by the long yellow box in Figure 5.
Some areas are still experiencing desertification today.
Studying the early effects of droughts and previous conditions in the region makes the effect of climate change more evident.
Water scarcity will likely be the most important issue to affect the region in the future (Sen et al., 2012).
Black Sea Region There were once plantations on the Sakarya and Yeşilırmak Rivers at locations where temperatures were adequate.
Other rice plantations were cultivated in Düzce, Kastamonu, Boyabad on the Gökırmak River, a tributary of the Sakarya River, and in Amasya within the Yeşilırmak River valley (BOA, AE.SSÜL.I.2; BOA, MAD.d.141; BOA, MAD.d.9507; BOA, İE.ML.1/29; BOA, İE.DH.2/109; BOA, İE.ML.12/1035; BOA, İE.ML.24/2327; BOA, AE.SMMD.IV.56/6501; BOA, İE.ML.16/1532; BOA, AE.SMMD.IV.101/11751; Evliya II, 98).
The annual precipitation in the Black Sea Region is much higher than in other areas of Continental Central Anatolia (Fig.
1b).
Türkeş (1996) and Akkemik et al.
(2005) calculated 300 mm mean annual rainfall for Continental Central Anatolia and 1,000 mm for the Black Sea Region.
The OWDA June-July-August PDSI values (Cook et al., 2015) also show that summer droughts were less effective in the Black Sea Region than in Continental Central Anatolia.
Rice production in the Black Sea catchment of the Sakarya River continues to this day.
Historical evidence about revenue collection and security problems draws our attention to drought years and their possible impact.
For example, according to the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015), there was a drought in 1701 and subsequent problems with the collection of rice revenues, as recorded in March 1702 in Boyabad (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.112/6109).
After the drought year of 1708, as shown by the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015), another revenue collection and subsequent security problem occured (BOA, İE.ŞKRT.2/170).
However, many other factors may play a role and better analysis would require the study of yearly yield data from the waqf account books.
Mediterranean Coastline The west coasts of the Anatolian peninsula usually receive more precipitation than Continental Central Anatolia even in the scorching summers (Fig.
1 right).
Rice production existed as early as 1480 in Aydın on the Büyük Menderes River (BOA, MAD.d.7387).
The decrease in JJA PDSI after the 17 th century did not fall below zero until the end of the 20th century (Fig.
6).
As seen in the second yellow box, JJA PDSI values declined at the end of the 16 th century.
The blue box shows an increase in the extreme values and also betterment in the low precipitation that started at the end of the 16th century and continued until the mid17th century.
After this betterment of precipitation value, mean JJA PDSI in the growing season did not fall below zero.
However, as these data derive from the trees that lay higher in the mountains, they may not directly reflect the precipitation for lower agricultural regions.
Historical evidence shows that rice production was undertaken sporadically due to water scarcity.
For example, in Manisa, on some of the sultan’s plantations, certain fields were left unfarmed for 10–15 years (Emecan, 1993).
There are numerous registers, mentioning changes to tax farmer rice plantation lots.
As in other locations, rice yield data may be found in single waqf account books and historical evidence about climatic extremes and their effect on plants may be documented.
8 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
Fig.
6 June-July-August Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) from the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015) for the Mediterranean between 1400 and 2000 Southeastern Anatolia There were rice plantations in Mardin, Urfa, Samsat and Darende on the Euphrates River (BOA, TS.MA.d4391), Bitlis and Siirt on the Tigris River (BOA, MAD.d.10280; Evliya III: 95, 97) and in the region between Maraş and Ayıntab on the Aksu River (Evliya III, 100).
Registers were kept from 1519 about tax farmer changes in Darende on the Tohma River, a branch of the Euphrates (BOA, MAD.d.15450).
A decree dating back to 1595 informs about tax farmer changes in Diyarbakır (BOA, A.DVNS.MHM.d.73/33, 81).
Unfortunately, the data do not include yearly yield or price data that would allow any comparison.
Pehlivan (2020) provides documentary evidence on animal deaths, especially in the years of drought that followed extremely cold winters in the 19 th century.
JJA PDSI values are lower in years from the late 18 th century (Fig.
7).
Available proxy data show that there are two crucial decreased mean summer precipitation periods: one between the late 18th and early 19th centuries and a second that began in the early 20th century.
Moreover, the region’s summer precipitation extremes began in the middle of the 17th century, as shown within the blue box.
Future regional studies may provide more data about the fluctuations of rice harvests and other effects of climate variability.
Since proxy data from tree rings are also very rare for the region, the Cook et al.
2015 OWDA JJA PDSI mean values probably have low resolution.
All in all, phenological data for this region would be very valuable.
Southeastern Europe 15th century censuses show that the Ottomans started cultivating rice in the Osum and Seman River Deltas even when JJA PDSI values were low.
Rice tax was mentioned among the revenues of some villages near Berat, Albania, as early as 1432 in the area’s first revenue registers (İnalcık, 1987).
The Seman River Delta in present-day Albania is favorable for building rice paddies: the area’s mean May-June-July temperatures are over 20ºC (Fig.
1 left) and the yearly Fig.
7 June-July-August Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) from the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015) for Southeast Anatolia between 1400 and 2000 mean precipitation is high (Fig.
1 right).
According to Cook et al.
(2015), JJA PDSI mean summer precipitation values were also high when the Ottomans organized plantations there in the 16 th century (shown within the first yellow box in Figure 8).
Southeastern European river valleys in Macedonia, Thessaly and Thrace were also appropriate for rice farming.
Other revenue registers show that in 1516 the area between Niš and Pirot (in present-day Serbia) and northern regions like Kruševac also had rice plantations (Amedosky, 2017).
Drought data from the OWDA and historical evidence show that weather extremes started in the mid-16th century and ended in the mid-18th century.
During these extreme weather conditions, floods disrupted some rice paddies in the 17 th century.
In Lamia, floods filled the paddies with stones in 1629 and 1630 (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.85/297).
Between 1714 and 1718, very severe conditions affected the paddies in Thrace and, in 1716, floods ruined rice paddies on the Peloponnes, causing villagers to leave their homes (Amedosky, 2017).
Weather extremes are especially relevant to cash crops like rice and sugar cane since they require mills in their production process, which are operated using water energy or working animals that are both stressed by extreme levels of water.
Floods that damage mills also negatively impact rice production.
Rice production existed in Niš before the Ottomans arrived in the region, but production increased under their reign.
The crop was one item among several doubling Niš’ revenues from 1498 to 1516 (Amedosky, 2017).
Temperatures fell in the 17th century (Luterbacher et al., 2004) and weather extremes started mid-century.
By the 18 th century, some Niš plantations became meadows and were used for animal farming (Amedosky, 2017).
On 21 February 1739, a decree ordered rice to be sent from Plovdiv to Niš for the army (BOA, İE.ML.45/4373), which may indicate that production was not even enough for local use or the increased army needs in the region at the time.
Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
9 Fig.
8 June-July-August Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) from the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015) for Albania between 1400 and 2000 The effect of 18th century extremes changed crop preferences in the region.
Since rice leaches the soil and makes it suitable for other crops (Maclean et al., 2013), people often substituted rice with less labourintensive corn (Warman, 2003).
The decline in rice production may have been due to insecurity, deteriorating workforce availability, energy problems, deteriorating climate conditions and/or the incompatibility of rice varieties.
The Ottomans started plantations at Timișoara, the most northern-known plantation location.
Five decrees between 1572 and 1579 mentioned rice cultivation.
The first, from 7 April 1572, regards a request for rice plantation experts (çeltikçis) (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.16/399; BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.
16/400).
The second, from 12 September 1573, mentions a decline in revenue (BOA A.DVNSMHM.d.22/683).
On 25 June 1578, a decree ordered the administrators to check whether the region was appropriate for rice growing or not (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.35/33).
In the following year, problems in the collection of rice revenues were mentioned again (BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.36/577).
European summer temperatures decreased in the 17th century (Luterbacher et al., 2004), which might have resulted in the reduction of rice plantations at the northern limit of the natural rice cultivation zone.
Historical evidence from Franciscan monastery chronicles mentioned by Mrgić (2011) shows that weather extremes influenced the region’s agriculture in the 17th and 18th centuries.
While droughts were recorded in 1660, 1664 and from 1686 to 1687, heavy snowfall was also mentioned in 1683, 1687–1690, 1731, 1737–38, 1741, 1743, 1749–50, 1753, 1759–60, 1762, 1764–65, 1767, and 1769–70.
These extreme weather years correspond to wars (Mrgić, 2011; 2018), including the Long War (1593–1606) in the Western Balkans, followed by the Morea War (1684– 1699) in the south of the Balkan Peninsula and, finally, the War of the Holy League (1683–1699).
Weather extremes and wars decreased the workforce and caused insecurity in plantation areas.
In the Balkans, the number of çeltikçis had decreased by the beginning of the 18th century (Kul, 2017).
But, as long as the workforce was available, the canals were repaired and there were still numerous paddies producing rice throughout the century.
Evliya Çelebi mentions Serres, Thessaloniki, Crete, Lepanto and Ioannina as places where good rice was produced in the 17th century (Evliya VIII, 59, 73, 240-241, 271, 289).
The influence of weather extremes both on the production process at mills and agriculture would be a very important topic for future studies.
Marmara Transition The OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015) shows that the mean summer precipitation values in the Maritsa River catchment at Plovdiv were much higher than they are today.
The yellow boxes in Figure 9 indicate periods of change in mean summer precipitation values.
According to these values, the region experienced a two-step decrease in mean summer precipitation from the early 19 th century.
As a result of these gradual long-term decreases in precipitation and the high use of water sources for mass agricultural production, the region experiences significant water resource problems today.
In the Ottoman Plovdiv, rice paddies were registered as early as 1480 (Boykov et al., 2000).
Plovdiv and Pazardzhik produced large amounts of rice (Shopov, 2020).
This agricultural organization for large-scale production relied on the existence of large estates.
These estates that fed Istanbul belonged to the waqfs of the sultans and high statesman.
The organization of the workforce was the most critical factor for labour-intensive rice plantations.
The number of workers known as kürekçi, involved in rice production, who were responsible for the technical organization of the canals, increased from 19 in 1480 to 55 in 1570–71 (Shopov, 2020).
The OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015) shows that the mean summer precipitation values decreased by the end of the 16th century, as seen in the second yellow box in Figure 9.
Scorching summers and water stress meant harder conditions for workers and animals, and less water for the mills.
Historical evidence shows that workers sometimes fled from hard working conditions in the fields and from malaria, which was rampant in rice fields.
In 1583, a malaria outbreak was recorded (Sert, 2020a; Shopov, 2020; BOA, A.DVNSMHM.d.49/137).
Conditions became harder by the end of the 16 th century.
In 1597, some villagers could not pay their taxes and fled (BOA, AE.SMMD.III.1/31).
Commercial production continued in Eastern Europe despite reduced wages and worsening labour conditions (Wiesner, 2013); when workers left, new ones replaced them and production continued.
Migrants supplied the labourintensive workforce in the Plovdiv paddies.
After extreme droughts and extraordinarily cold winters in the Crimean Peninsula that resulted in animals and people perishing, many moved to Ottoman lands in the 15th century and later in 1560 (Veinstein, 2001).
Moreover, demographic studies (Stoianovich, 1992; Kiel, 1997) show that decreasing temperatures in the 17th century affected many people living in mountainous areas of the Balkans who moved to lower altitude settlements like Plovdiv.
10 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
Fig.
9 June-July-August Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) from the OWDA reconstruction (Cook et al., 2015) for Plovdiv between 1400 and 2000 Waqf account books published by Oruç et al.
(2014) give a snapshot from five years between 1635 and 1641 and allows a comparison of yearly yield fluctuation with June-July-August PDSI changes.
In Table 2 annual rice revenue entries of the Şahabeddin Paşa Waqf account books are compared with the JuneJuly-August PDSI values from the OWDA.
Yield amounts show a negative correlation with OWDA summer precipitation values and decadal spline values.
The approximate production amounts compared with June-July-August PDSI values show that PDSI values were -0.2539 in 1634, 0.0924 in 1635 and -0.6714 in 1636 and that production was approximately 456 kg (14 müd) in those years.
It dropped to 391 kg (12 müd) in 1637 and 1638 when June-July-August PDSI decreased to -2.436 in 1637 and -2.2904 in 1638.
There is no yield data for 1639 when the June-July-August PDSI was -1.4531.
Although the June-July-August PDSI was 0.9276 in 1640, ten-year spline values were still negative.
After the long dry years, yield dropped to 293 kg (9 müd).
In 1641, the June-July-August PDSI increased to 2.084 and yield increased to 489 kg (15 müd) (Oruç et al., 2014).
The same negative correlation was seen in Konya.
However, a long series of data is needed to fully understand the influence of climate variability.
For Plovdiv, other revenue books of the Şehabeddin Paşa Waqf are available in the Sofia Archive for 1613–1614, 1672–1673 and 1679–1680, but the series of documents does not continue.
The fluctuations of yields in other waqfs can also be a good source of information for determining climate history.
Quite a few waqfs had rice plantations in Plovdiv.
Even in low precipitation years such as in 1540 (Cook et al., 2015), the amount of rice carried by camel caravans from Plovdiv to Istanbul was around 513 tons (Shopov, 2020).
This means that data regarding the Şahabeddin Paşa Waqf indicate only a very small part of the production.
In future, the waqf account book series may show the relationship between yearly yield and precipitation changes for more extended periods.
All in all, droughts have been effective.
Andreev et al.
(2003) mention issues regarding rice revenues from 1698 to 1700 and water supply in 1708.
Table 2 Comparison of reconstructed OWDA June-JulyAugust Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) values (Cook et al., 2015) to the yield amounts according to Şahabeddin Paşa Waqf account books (Oruç et al.
2014) for the area of Plovdiv.
Reconstructed JJA Crop yield Year PDSI 10-Year Spline Production in kg müd 1634 -0,2539 -0,176 456 14 1635 0,0924 -0,622 456 14 1636 -0,6714 -0,993 456 14 1637 -2,436 -1,176 391 12 1638 -2,2904 -1,04 391 12 1639 -1,4531 -0,607 1640 0,9276 -0,085 293 9 1641 2,084 0,224 489 15 Moreover, historical evidence highlights the 1718 drought when villagers applied for a tax reduction and help to repair canals.
However, officials declined their request and instead ordered them to pay 60 akçes for each kilo of rice they failed to deliver.
People left their villages in Plovdiv and Pazarcık after this event (Andreev et al.
2003).
Andreev et al.
(2003) describe how the 1730s were even worse, whereby there was almost no rice revenue in 1735.
This coincides with accounts of Kelemen Mikes (1690–1761), the famous Hungarian essayist and political figure, who lived in exile with the Transylvanian Prince Ferenc Rákóczi in Tekirdagh.
Kelemen Mikes described extraordinarily hot temperatures in March 1735 (Sert, 2007).
As March is the germination period for rice seed and the ideal temperature for germination is 20–35ºC, scorching temperatures and water deficits would have been detrimental at this vegetative stage.
This may be a reason why there were no rice revenues.
Kelemen Mikes mentions a significantly cold spell in 1740.
That year, spring came late.
It was even cold in May.
In addition, December of the same year was extraordinarily hot.
It was as if the seasons had changed place (Sert, 2007).
There is a decree dating back to 27 March 1742 that includes the complaint that villagers did not seed their rice in March (BOA AE.SMHD.I.158/11923); since 1740’s spring was so cold and farmers lost their seed, it is possible that they were behaving cautiously.
Kelemen Mikes also mentions a devastating amount of snow, which started in October 1751 before the harvest of cotton and grapes (Sert, 2007).
According to Cook et al.
(2015), the OWDA 19th century mean summer precipitation values fell and extreme drought years were experienced in 1806, 1830, 1832–1834, 1840, 1851, 1861–1863, 1887 and 1893– 1894 (Fig.
9).
Droughts probably made working conditions harder.
In May 1844, the center sent help to rice workers (BOA, A.MKT.12/13, 01).
Before this date, all relevant records refer to the punishment of workers who fled or peasants who did not pay their Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
11 taxes.
Perhaps conditions were more demanding and the workforce had diminished to such an extent after the long Balkan Wars that state authorities realized coercion might not work this time.
This is the first mention of help being sent to workers so far identified by this study.
In the course of the 19 th century, the Ottoman Empire lost its plantations in the Balkans.
The supply of rice decreased so much that demand in the Ottoman market could only be met with imported rice (Emecan, 1993).
The state gave priority to resettling rice farmers who migrated from the Balkans to places that were convenient for rice farming in Anatolia, for example, and rice farmers from Plovdiv continued rice cultivation in Bursa.
DISCUSSION The Little Ice Age was the period in which mean temperatures declined by up to 2ºC.
Like global warming today, the change in mean temperatures meant very hot and very cold extremes, floods and extreme seasonal changes.
Its effects were divergent and showed regional differences.
While in Continental Central Anatolia, the Little Ice Age brought drought years, which reduced agricultural production, and caused migration and rebellion (White, 2011), its effects on Europe were asynchronous and diverse.
Ottoman historians have asked (Griswold, 1993; Orbay, 2007; Sert, 2007, 2020b; White, 2011; Kolovos et al., 2018; Kuru, 2018) whether or not the Little Ice Age and other climate changes influenced the Ottoman Empire.
To answer this question, institutional changes should be first mapped and then these changes should be related to the environmental and socio-economic conditions that the institutions faced.
The present study shows partial effects of climate variability on rice yields, labour relations, rice mills, the health of inhabitants and population movements.
The regional variability demonstrates the importance of using appropriate palaeoclimatology data in historical studies.
Paleoclimatogic proxy data can advance discussions about the impact of climate variability in Ottoman historiography.
Both the regional differences in climate variability and the influence of weather extremes are significant for discussions about the Little Ice Age in Ottoman history.
The Ottoman Empire experienced profound institutional changes after the second half of the 16 th century (Kunt, 1983; Tezcan, 2010).
An increase in the capacity of supplying food to cities and the capacity of intrusion into the environment draw some attention.
However, the effect of climate is an underestimated topic in this anthropocentric historiography.
The effects of the Little Ice Age have been introduced as a trigger for the decline of the Ottoman Empire (White, 2011) but have never been examined as a factor for institutional advancement even when the decline theory was rejected.
The Little Ice Age droughts, which started at the end of the 16th century and continuing into the 17th century, were destructive in Central Anatolia.
Due to the teleconnections of climate, an east-west bipolar climate seesaw operated in the Mediterranean.
While Inner Anatolia was dry, West Europe and Western Anatolia had higher precipitation rates (Roberts et al., 2012).
While in Continental Anatolia the Little Ice Age brought drought years, which decreased agricultural production and caused migration and rebellion in the 17 th century (White, 2011), the Aegean islands and southern Balkans saw an increase in the olive harvest during the very same century (Kolovos et al., 2018).
Likewise, in the coastal regions of Anatolia, where climate conditions were different, population movements and production conditions were not like those in Central Anatolia (Kuru, 2018).
Due to these conflicting conditions, Ottoman scholars have discussed whether the Little Ice Age was effective on the Ottoman Empire at all.
The present study asserts that a better acquaintance of the Ottomanist with palaeoclimatology data is vital to understand the teleconnections of climate and society.
Instead of focusing only on the destructive effects of the Little Ice Age, recognizing its institutional challenges may overcome dualistic discourse in this scholarly discussion.
Orbay (2007) shows that waqfs undertook important institutional transformations to overcome the problems caused by increased food prices (e.g., waqfs introduced cash aid to students instead of providing free food from their kitchens).
He highlights regional differences in the transportation of food from other regions, exemption of tax revenues and refutes the idea that the 17th century was a crisis era triggered by climate change that led to the empire’s decline.
Although I agree with Orbay (2007) about the importance of institutional measures and organizational changes and agree with Kolovos et al.
(2018) and Kuru (2018) that climate conditions were different in other regions, there was a regional crisis in Central Anatolia that started at the end of the 16 th century and continued during the 17 th century.
Moreover, the effects of the Little Ice Age in the Balkans still needs to be studied, especially as this study and Mrgić (2018) show that the 18 th century climate extremes influenced the region.
Moreover, the effect of 19th century droughts were more influential than the 16th century in Istanbul (Sert, 2020b).
CONCLUSION This study has introduced the importance of Ottoman rice plantations in the environmental reconstruction of the region between the Tigris and the Danube.
It has classified available archival documents about plantations and compared palaeoclimatology data with archival evidence.
This comparison shows partial historical evidence about the effects of precipitation and temperature variability and climate extremes on rice yields and the research potential of Ottoman archival documents for climate history.
Results show that decadal low summer PDSI values coincided with a decrease in rice yields or an increase in rice prices in Plovdiv and Central Anatolia.
Weather extremes such as the cold May in 1740 resulted in a fatal decrease in yield in Plovdiv.
The piecemeal information about the effects of climate 12 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
variability prove that the account books of waqfs are an important source type that can give yearly yield data.
Nature provides useful evidence to help understand the archives of societies (White et.
al, 2018).
Questions about the influence of the Little Ice Age on the Ottoman Empire will find answers in line with an increase in palaeoclimatology data.
In 2007, when Orbay (2007) was writing about grain yields and climate relation, available palaeoclimatology proxy data was limited.
Future works on account books may answer some of the questions raised here if prices and yearly revenues are compared with palaeoclimatology proxy data.
Moreover, a group of scholars in PaleoScience and History at the Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History in Jena, including Ottomanists Georgios Liakopoulus and Elias Kolovos, are working on phenological data about grain to reveal information about the relation between climate and institutional changes.
The present study aims to contribute to the debate.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to thank Onur İnal, Florian Riedler and Yavuz Köse for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article.
I want to express my gratitude to Andrea Kiss, Zeki Bora Ön, Ozan Mert Göktürk, Adam Izdebsky and Georgious Liakopoulus for their support and guidance regarding climate history.
Zeki Bora Ön, Maya Gül Sandfuchs and Haluk Zelef gave their precious time to help me develop my figures.
Elçin Arabacı shared valuable data about Bursa.
Kayhan Orbay discussed climate influence and LIA since 2007.
An Ottoman database for climate events was planned with him and Günhan Börekçi.
I thank Umut Soysal for his guidance on the diplomatic features of Rice Tax Office Books (Çeltik Rüsumu Kalemi).
I am greatful to Sarah Waring, whose thorough editing has helped me express my ideas more precisely.
I also thank Nurten Akarsu for her support.
I am grateful to two institutions: the Research Council of Hacettepe University, which supported my studies at Vienna University for three months, and the Department of Near Eastern Studies of Vienna University, which hosted my project for one year.
References Ágoston, G. 2009.
Where environmental and frontier studies meet: rivers, forests, marshes, and fortifications along the Ottoman-Hapsburg frontier in Hungary.
In: Peacock, A.
(ed.)
The frontiers of the Ottoman world Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 57–79.
Akdağ, M. 1963.
Celâlî isyanları (1550-1603).
Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, Ankara.
Altinsoy, H., Kurt, C., Kurnaz, L. 2013.
Analysis of the Effect of Climate Change on the Yield of Crops in Turkey Using a Statistical Approach.
In: Helmis C., Nastos P.
(eds.)
Advances in Meteorology, Climatology and Atmospheric Physics.
Springer Atmospheric Sciences.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 379–384.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29172-2_53 Amedosky, D. 2017.
Introduction of Rice Culture in the Central Balkans.
In: Rudic, S. and Aslantaş, S.
(ed.)
State and Society in the Balkans Before and After the Establishment of Ottoman Rule.
The Institute of History Belgrade, Belgrad, 235–255.
Andreev, S., Grozdanova, E. 2003.
Reisanbau und Reisgewinner (çeltükçi) im mittleren und östlichen Teil des Balkans (15. bis 18.Jh.).
Bulgarian Historical Review / Revue Bulgare d'Histoire III (4), 54–76.
Arıkan, Z.
1990.
XV-XVI.
Yüzyıllarda Anadolu’da Çeltik Üretimi.
In: V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi, Tebliğler (İstanbul 21-25 Ağustos 1989).
Ankara, 477–481.
Beck, H. E., Zimmermann, N. E., McVicar, T. R., Vergopolan, N., Berg, A., Wood, E. F. 2018.
Present and future KöppenGeiger climate classification maps at 1-km resolution.
Scientific data 5, 180214.
DOI: 10.1038/sdata.2018.214 Beldiceanu, N., Beldiceanu-Steinherr, I.
1978.
Riziculture dans l’Empire ottoman (XIVe-XVe siècle).
Turcica IX (2–10), 9– 28.
Barkan, Ö. L. 1963.
Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları.
İstanbul Bloschl, G., Kiss, A., Viglione, A., Barriendos, M., Bohm, O., Brázdil, R., Coeur, D. 2020.
Current European flood-rich period exceptional compared with past 500 years.
Nature 583, 560–566.
DOI: 10.1038/s41586-020-2478-3 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Hereafter BOA), A.DVNSMHM.d.16/399; 16/400; 22/683; 35/33; 36/577; 41/1031; 49/137; 73/33, 81; 78/2104; 85/297; 112/6109.
BOA A.MKT.12/13, 01.
BOA AE.SMMD.III.1/31; IV.56/6501; IV.101/11751.
BOA AE.SSLM.III/197, 11831.
BOA AE.SSÜL.I.2.
BOA, D.ÇRS.1; 2; 3; 4.
BOA, D.ÇRS.D.25994; 25995; 25996; 25997; 25998; 25999; 26000.
BOA İE.DH.2/109.
BOA İE.ML.1/29; 12/1035; 16/1532; 24/2327; 45/4373.
BOA İE.ŞKRT.2/170.
BOA MAD.d.141; 3120; 7387; 10249; 10280; 12168; 15450.
BOA TS.MA.d4391.
Boykov, G., Kiprovska, M. 2000.
The Ottoman Philippopolis (Filibe) During the Second Half of the 15th century.
Bulgarian Historical Review 3–4, 112–139.
Brázdil, R., Glaser, R., Pfister, C., Dobrovolny, P., Antoine, J.M., Barriendos Vallve, M., Camuffo, D., Deutsch, M., Enzi, S., Guidoboni, E., Kotyza, O., Sanchez, R.F.
1999.
Flood events of selected European rivers in the sixteenth century.
Climatic Change 43 (1), 239 – 285.
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005550401857 Brázdil, R., Wanner H., von Storch, H., Luterbacher, J.
2005.
Historical climatology in Europe– The state of the art.
Climatic Change 70 (3), 363–430.
DOI: 10.1007/s10584005-5924-1 Brázdil, R., Zahradniček, P., Dobrovolny, P., Kotyza, O., Valašek, H. 2008.
Historical and recent viticulture as a source of climatological knowledge in the Czech Republic.
Geografie 113 (4), 351–371.
DOI: 10.37040/geografie2008113040351 Canard, M. 1959.
Le riz dans le Proche Orient aux premiers siècles de l’Islam.
Arabica VI (2): 111–131.
DOI: 10.1163/157005859X00299 Constantinidou, K., Zittis, G., Hadjinicolaou, P. 2019.
Variations in the Simulation of Climate Change Impact Indices due to Different Land Surface Schemes over the Mediterranean, Middle East and Northern Africa.
Atmosphere 10(1), 26.
DOI: 10.3390/atmos10010026 Cook, E.R., Seager, R., Kushnir, Y., Briffa, K.R., Büntgen, U. , Frank, D., Krusic, P.J., Tegel, W., van der Schrier, G., Andreu-Hayles, L., Baillie, M., Baittinger, C., Bleicher, N., Bonde, N., Brown, D., Carrer, M., Cooper, R., Čufar, K., Dittmar, C., Esper, J., Griggs, C., Gunnarson, B., Günther, B., Gutierrez, E., Haneca, K., Helama, S., Herzig, F., Heussner, K.-U., Hofmann, J., Janda, P., Kontic, R., Köse, N., Kyncl, T., Levanič, T., Linderholm, H., Manning, S., Melvin, T. M., Miles, D., Neuwirth, B., Nicolussi, K., Nola, P., Panayotov, M., Popa, I., Rothe, A., Seftigen, K., Seim, A., Svarva, H., Svoboda, M., Thun, T., Timonen, M., Touchan, R., Trotsiuk, V., Trouet, V., Walder, F., Ważny, T., Wilson, R., Zang, C. 2015.
Old World megadroughts and pluvials during the Common Era.
Science Advances 1, e1500561.
DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.1500561 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
13 Coşkun, F. 2010.
888/1483 Tarihli Karaman Eyaleti Vakıf Tahrir Defteri.
Vakıflar Dergisi 33, 15–52.
Emecan, F.M.
1993.
Çeltik.
TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi.
Türk Diyanet Vakfı, İstanbul, 265–266.
Evered, K.T., Evered, E.Ö.
2015.
A Conquest of Rice: Agricultural Expansion, Impoverishment, and Malaria in Turkey.
Historia Agraria 68, 103–36.
Evliya Çelebi.
2006.
Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi: Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu, Dizini.
10 Vols.
In: Gökyay, O. S.
(ed.).
Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul.
Gökbilgin, T. 1952.
XV ve XVI.
Asırlarda Edirne ve Pâşâ Livası.
Istanbul.
Gratien, C. 2017.
The Ottoman Quagmire: Malaria, Swamps, and Settlement in the Late Ottoman Mediterranean.
International Journal of Middle East Studies 49 (4), 583– 604.
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743817000605 Griswold, W.J.
1993.
Climatic Change: A Possible Factor in the Social Unrest of Seventeenth-Century Anatolia.
In: Lowry, Jr.
H.W., Lowry, H.W., Quataert, D.
(eds.)
Humanist and Scholar.
Gorgias Press, Piscataway (NJ), DOI: 10.31826/9781463230081-005 Hersbach, H., Bell, B., Berrisford, P., Hirahara, S., Horányi, A., Muñoz‐Sabater, J., Nicolas, J., Peubey, C., Radu, R., Schepers, D., Simmons, A., Soci, C., Abdalla, S., Abellan, X., Balsamo, G., Bechtold, P., Biavati, G., Bidlot, J., Bonavita, M., De Chiara, G., Dahlgren, P., Dee, D., Diamantakis, M., Dragani, R., Flemming, J., Forbes, R., Fuentes, M., Geer, A., Haimberger, L., Healy, S., Hogan, R.J., Hólm, E., Janisková, M., Keeley, S., Laloyaux, P., Lopez, P., Lupu, C., Radnoti, G., de Rosnay, P., Rozum, I., Vamborg, F., Villaume, S., Thépaut, J.
2020.
The ERA5 global reanalysis.
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 146 (730), 1999–2049.
DOI: 10.1002/qj.3803 İnalcık, H. 1982.
Rice Cultivation and the Çeltükci-Re' âyâ System in the Ottoman Empire.
Turcica XIV, 69–141.
İnalcık, H. 1987.
Fatih devri üzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar.
Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara.
Jones, M.D., Roberts, C.N., Leng, M.J., Türkes, M. 2006.
A highresolution late Holocene lake isotope record from Turkey and links to North Atlantic and monsoon climate.
Geology 34, 361–364.
DOI: 10.1130/G22407.1 Kara, T., Gürel, C. 2013.
Farklı Su Derinliklerinin Çeltik Verimine Etkisi.
Anadolu Tarım Bilim Dergisi 28 (2), 82– 86.
DOI: 10.7161/anajas.2013.282.82 Karagöz, M. 2004.
1193/1779 Senesi Rüsum Defterine göre Bazarcık-Tatarpazarı’nda Pirinç Üretimi.
Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimleri Dergisi XIV (1), 275–299.
Kiel, M. 1997.
Tatar Pazarcik — The development of an Ottoman town in central Bulgaria or the story of how the Bulgarians conquered Upper Thrace without firing a shot.
In: Kreiser, K., Neumann, C.
(eds.)
Das osmanische Reich und seinen Archivalien und Chroniken, Nejat Göyünç zu Ehren.
Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 31–67.
Kolovos, Ē., Kotzageorgis, P. 2018.
Searching for the 'Little Ice Age' Effects in the Ottoman Greek Lands: The Cases of Salonica and Crete.
In: İnal, O., Köse, Y.
(eds.)
Seeds of Power: Explorations in Ottoman Environmental History.
The White Horse Press, Winwick, Cambridgeshire, 17–34.
Köse, N., Akkemik, Ü., Dalfes, H.N, Özerenc, M.S.
2011.
Treering reconstructions of May–June precipitation for western Anatolia.
Quaternary Research 75 (3), 438–450.
DOI: 10.1016/j.yqres.2010.12.005 Kul, E. 2017.
The Derbendcis, The Köprücüs and the Çeltikcis in the Province of Rumeli (in the Beginning of the 18th Century).
Гласник 1: 91–106.
Kunt, İ.M.
1983.
The sultan's servants: The transformation of Ottoman provincial government, 1550–1650.
Columbia University Press, New York.
Kuru, M. 2018.
A 'Magnificant' Climate: Demography, Land and Labour in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia.
In: İnal, O., Köse, Y.
(eds.)
Seeds of Power: Explorations in Ottoman Environmental History.
The White Horse Press, Winwick, Cambridgeshire, 35–57.
Luterbacher, J., Dietrich, D., Xoplaki, E., Grosjean, E., Wanner, H. 2004.
European Seasonal and Annual Temperature Variability, Trends, and Extremes Since 1500.
Science 303 (5663), 1499–1503.
DOI: 10.1126/science.1093877 Maclean, J., Hardy, B., Hettel, G. 2013.
Rice Almanac: Source Book for One of the Most Important Economic Activities on Earth 4th ed.
International Rice Research Institut, Los Baños, Philippines.
Mrgić, J.
2011.
Wine or Raki – The Interplay of Climate and Society in Early Modern Ottoman Bosnia.
Environment and History 17(4), 613–637.
DOI: 10.3197/096734011x13150366551652 Mrgić, J.
2018.
Intemperate weather in violent times – narratives from the Western Balkans during the Little Ice Age (17–18th centuries).
Cuadernos de Investigación Geográfica 44(1), 137–169.
DOI: 10.18172/cig.3380 Murphy, D.J.
2007.
Imperial botany and the early scientific breeders.
In: Murphy, D.J.
(ed.)
People, Plants and Genes: The Story of Crops and Humanity.
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207145.003.0015 Nesbitt, M., Simpson, J., Svanberg.
I.
2010.
History of Rice in Western and Central Asia.
In: Sharma, S.D.
(ed.)
Rice: Origin, Antiquity and History.
Science Publishers, Enfield , DOI: 10.1201/EBK1578086801-c10 Nicault, A., Alleaume, S., Brewer, S., Carrer, M., Nola, P., Guiot, J.
2008.
Mediterranean drought fluctuation during the last 500 years based on tree-ring data.
Climate Dynamics 31, 227–245.
DOI: 10.1007/s00382-007-0349-3 Orbay, K. 2007 Osmanlı Topraklarında “Küçük Buzul Çağı”nın Etkileri Hakkında Bazı Notlar.
Kebikeç Tarım Tarihi Dosyası 1.
23, 85–93.
Orbay, K. 2012.
Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries).
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 55, 74–116.
DOI: 10.1163/156852012X628509 Oruç, H., Orbay K. 2014.
Şehabettin Paşa’nın Felibe’deki Vakfına Ait Kaynaklar: Muhasebe Defterleri.
Belgeler XXXV/39, 1– 144.
Parker, G. 2013.
Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century.
Yale University Press, New Haven Peel, M.C., Finlayson, B.L., McMahon, T.A.
2007.
Updated world map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification.
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 11, 1633–1644.
DOI: 10.5194/hess-11-1633-2007 Pehlivan, Z.
2020.
El Niño and the Nomads: Global Climate, Local Environment, and the Crisis of Pastoralism in Late Ottoman Kurdistan.
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 63(3), 316–356.
DOI: 10.1163/1568520912341513 Popov, H. 2018.
Local climates of Vardar, Struma and Mesta valleys (Balkan peninsula) according to the modified Köppen climate classification.
Glasnik Srpskog geografskog drustva 98, 79–90.
DOI: 10.2298/GSGD180428005P Promitzer, C., Troumpeta, S., Turda, M. 2010.
Health, hygiene, and eugenics in southeastern Europe to 1945.
Central European University Press, Budapest.
Roberts, N., Moreno, A., Valero-Garcés, B.L., Corella, J.P., Jones, M., Allcock, S., Woodbridge, J., Morellón, M., Luterbacher, J., Xoplaki, E., Türkeş, M. 2012.
Palaeolimnological evidence for an east-west climate see-saw in the Mediterranean since AD 900.
Global and Planetary Change 84–85, 23–34.
DOI: 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2011.11.002 Sert, Ö.
2007.
Kelemen Mikes’in Mektuplarına Göre 1716-1758 Yılları Mevsim Takvimi; Osmanlı Topraklarında Küçük Buzul Çağının Etkileri Hakkında Bazı Notlar [Effects of Little Ice Age According to the Letters of Kelemen Mikes 1716-1758].
Kebikeç Tarım Tarihi Dosyası 1.
23, 79–83.
Sert, Ö.
2018.
1549, Rodosçuk’ta Bir Yıl.
(1549, A year in Rodosçuk).
Süleymanpaşa Belediyesi Yayınları.
Tekirdağ.
Sert, Ö.
2020a.
Effects of Ottoman Rice Plantations in Southeastern European Landscape: Climate Change, Hydrology and Disease.
EGU General Assembly 2020, Online, 4–8 May 2020.
EGU2020–22271, DOI: 10.5194/egusphereegu2020-22271.
Sert, Ö.
2020b.
Water, Firewood, and Disease in Nineteenth Century Istanbul.
Environment & Society Portal, Arcadia Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society.
14 Sert 2021 / Journal of Environmental Geography 14 (1–2), 1–14.
Shopov, A.
2020.
Cities of rice: risiculture and environmental change in the Early Modern Ottoman Balkans.
Levant 51(2), 169-183, DOI: 10.1080/00758914.2020.1807127 Stoianovich, T. 1992.
Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean worlds.
Studia Balcanica, Islamica et Turcica, New Rochelle, NY Tabak, F. 2008.
The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550–1870; A Geohistorical Approach.
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Tezcan, B.
2010.
The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and social transformation in the early modern world.
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Touchan R., Xoplaki E., Funkhouser G., Luterbacher, J., Hughes, M.K., Erkan, N., Akkemik, Ü., Stephan, J.
2005.
Reconstructions of spring/summer precipitation for the Eastern Mediterranean from tree-ring widths and its connection to large-scale atmospheric circulation.
Climate Dynamics 25, 75–98.
DOI: 10.1007/s00382-005-0016-5 Türkeş, M. 1996.
Meteorological Drought in Turkey: A Historical Perspective, 1930–93 (1996).
Drought Network News (1994-2001) 84.
Türkeş, M., Tatlı, M. 2011.
Use of the spectral clustering to determine coherent precipitation regions in Turkey for the period 1929–2007.
International Journal of Climatology 31, 2055–2067.
DOI: 10.1002/joc.2212 Veinstein, G. 2001.
Karadeniz’in Kuzeyinde Büyük 1560 Kuraklığı: Osmanlı Yetkililerinin Durumu Algılayışı ve Gösterdikleri Tepkiler.
In: Zachariadou, E.
(ed.)
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Doğal Afetler.
Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 297–306.
Venzke, M. L. 1992.
Rice Cultivation in the Plain of Antioch in the 16th Century: The Ottoman Fiscal Practice.
Archivum Ottomanicum 12, 175–276.
Warman, A.
2003.
Corn and Capitalism: How a botanical bastard grew to global dominance.
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill Watson, A.M. 1981.
A Medieval Green Revolution: New Crops and Farming Techniques in the Early Islamic World.
In: Udovitch, A.L.
(ed.)
The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: Studies in economic and social history (Princeton studies on the Near East).
Darwin Press, Princeton, NJ, 29–58.
Wessel, P., Luis, J.F., Uieda, L., Scharroo, R., Wobbe, F., Smith, W.H.F., Tian, D. 2019.
The Generic Mapping Tools Version 6.
Geochemistry, Geophysics, Geosystems 20, 5556–5564.
DOI: 10.1029/2019GC008515 White, S., Pfister, C., Mauelshagen, F. 2018.
The Palgrave Handbook of Climate History.
Palgrave Macmillan UK, London White, S. 2011.
The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Wiesner, M. 2013.
Early modern Europe, 1450–1789.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge INTRODUCTION STUDY AREA Anatolia The Balkans DATA AND TERMINOLOGY Decrees Cadastres Rice Tax Office Books Rice Paddy Tax Register Documents Waqf Account Books METHODS RESULTS Continental Central Anatolia Black Sea Region Mediterranean Coastline Southeastern Anatolia Southeastern Europe Marmara Transition DISCUSSION CONCLUSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENT References
96 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 RESEARCH ARTICLE Assessing The Impacts of Climate Variability on Rural Households in Agricultural Land Through The Application of Livelihood Vulnerability Index Ginjo Gitima 1 * , Abiyot Legesse 2, Dereje Biru 3 1Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Gondar, P. O.
Box 196, Gondar, Ethiopia 2Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Dilla University, P.O.
Box 419, Dilla, Ethiopia 3Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Bonga University, P. O.
Box 334, Bonga, Ethiopia Received 18 November 2020/Revised 15 April 2021/Accepted 23 April 2021/Published 30 April 2021 Abstract Climate variability adversely affects rural households in Ethiopia as they depend on rain-fed agriculture, which is highly vulnerable to climate fluctuations and severe events such as drought and pests.
In view of this, we have assessed the impacts of climate variability on rural household’s livelihoods in agricultural land in Tarchazuria district of Dawuro Zone.
A total of 270 samples of household heads were selected using a multistage sampling technique with sample size allocation procedures of the simple random sampling method.
Simple linear regression, the standard precipitation index, the coefficient of variance, and descriptive statistics were used to analyze climatic data such as rainfall and temperature.
Two livelihood vulnerability analysis approaches, such as composite index and Livelihood Vulnerability IndexIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (LVI-IPCC) approaches, were used to analyze indices for socioeconomic and biophysical indicators.
The study revealed that the variability patterns of rainfall and increasing temperatures had been detrimental effects on rural households' livelihoods.
The result showed households of overall standardized, average scores of Wara Gesa (0.60) had high livelihood vulnerability with dominant major components of natural, physical, social capital, and livelihood strategies to climate-induced natural hazards than Mela Gelda (0.56).
The LVI-IPCC analysis results also revealed that the rural households in Mela Gelda were more exposed to climate variability than Wara Gesa and slightly sensitive to climate variability, considering the health and knowledge and skills, natural capitals, and financial capitals of the households.
Therefore, interventions including road infrastructure construction, integrated with watershed management, early warning information system, providing training, livelihood diversification, and SWC measures' practices should be a better response to climate variability-induced natural hazards.
Keywords: Households; Livelihood Vulnerability Index; climate variability; Tarchazuria District qq Geosfera Indonesia Vol.
6 No.
1, April 2021, 96-126 p-ISSN 2598-9723, e-ISSN 2614-8528 https://jurnal.unej.ac.id/index.php/GEOSI DOI : 10.19184/geosi.v6i1.20718 *Corresponding author.
Email address : ginjo7205@gmail.com (Ginjo Gitima) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9438-3625 mailto:ginjo7205@gmail.com 97 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 1.
Introduction The detrimental effects of climate change and variability have become an environmental and socioeconomic problem that is rapidly causing climate-driven hazards for people around the world (Adu et al., 2018).
Globally, climate-related hazards are seen to have a huge impact on young, elderly, poor and marginalized populations such as households headed by women and people with limited access to resources (IPCC, 2014; Tanner et al., 2015; Paul et al., 2019).
Climate-related hazards have many indirect impacts on the livelihoods, health, water, agricultural production and socioeconomic welfare of systems (Gezie, 2019; Masuda et al., 2019; Endalew & Sen, 2020).
Climate variability is predicted to increase the frequency and severity of certain severe weather events (IPCC, 2018), and disasters such as floods of agricultural lands, droughts, storms, and cyclones (Ullah et al., 2018).
Also, Africa is the utmost vulnerable continent to climate variabilitywith 350–600 million Africans facing increased water stress by the 2050s (Hahn et al., 2009).
Climate change and variability are adversely affecting smallholder farming households in Africa because their activity depends on climate-regulated water resources with low adaptive capacity (Adu et al., 2019).
Similarly, dependence on agriculture, pastoralism and lack of irrigation means that African farmers are especially vulnerable to climate hazards (Hahn et al., 2009; Araro et al., 2019).
Indeed, rural households' livelihood is considered to be highly vulnerable to climate change and variability (Turpie & Visser, 2013).
This livelihood vulnerability of rural farmers in Africa is triggered by exposure to climate change and variability and by combining social, economic, and environmental factors that interact with it, including Sub-Saharan Africa (Ofoegbu et al., 2017).
The agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa is extremely susceptible to potential climate changes and variability (Turpie & Visser, 2013).
Food insecurity is one of the major drivers that determine development dynamics in East Africa, especially in Ethiopia; due to these the country faces drought and poverty in different periods due to climate changes and variability that was directly affecting the agricultural output (Few et al., 2015; Ademe et al., 2020; Ketema & Negeso, 2020).
Ethiopia is an agro-based economy where agriculture contributes 45% to the gross domestic product (GDP).
The agriculture sector is a source of livelihood for more than 80% of the population (Dendir & Simane, 2019).
In fact, rain-fed agriculture in the country is more vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate variability (Gezie, 2019) and extreme events like drought and pests (Endalew 98 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 & Sen, 2020).
Even if productivity grew, climate variability would still dramatically impact incountry (Teshome & Baye, 2018).
In addition, climate change projected in Ethiopia is expected to result in decreased precipitation variability and an increase in temperature (1.1 to 3.1°C by 2060 and 1.5 to 5.1°C by 2090) with a rise in the frequency and intensity of extreme events such as flood and drought (National Meteorological Agency, 2007).
Other studies indicate an increase of temperature in all seasons of 1.4°C to 2.9°C by the 2050s (Conway & Schipper, 2011).
Besides, rainfall and temperature patterns show large regional differences (Gezie, 2019).
Such trends of increasing temperature, the high variability of precipitation, and the rising frequency of extreme events are expected to continue in the country (Dendir & Simane, 2019).
Vulnerability assessment approaches tend to be inextricably related to the vulnerability concept and interpretation.
In line with, the outcome of vulnerability and its conceptual meanings, Dessai & Hulme (2004) highlight the different approaches that the two concepts take (without explicitly referring to them) to inform climate adaptation policy.
Physical vulnerability concepts prefer to adopt a top-down approach to assessing the strategy of climate adaptation, while vulnerability of contextual concepts focus on socio-economic vulnerability that follow a bottom-up approach (Young et al., 2009).
A top-down approach usually starts with international climate forecasts, which can then be rationalized and used to determine climate change's regional effects.An essential feature of bottom-up approaches is primarily the participation of the stakeholders and population of the scheme in classifying climate-change stresses, influences and adaptive strategies (Fellmann, 2012).
According to Neupane et al.
(2013) socioeconomic parameters such as access to essential resources like forest, land, and water should also be reflected in the vulnerability analysis.
Moreover, the importance of incorporating socioeconomic systems with biophysical systems (integrated approach) at varied spatial and social scales in the vulnerability assessment.
An integrated approach is effective and may adequately capture all possible dimensions of vulnerability when one integrates both the biophysical (sensitivity and exposure) and the socioeconomic (adaptive capacity) aspects of vulnerability (Endalew & Sen, 2020).
Studies suggest that poor households' livelihood in rural areas of Ethiopia are the most vulnerable to climate change and variability (Deressa et al., 2009).
Similarly, current climate shocks and stresses already have an overwhelming impact on the vulnerability of farmers, 99 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 particularly in rural communities (Sujakhu et al., 2019).
Likewise, climate variability vulnerability is understood to be the result of the interaction between the biophysical drivers (include climatic exposure) and the function of the system’s sensitivity and adaptive capacity.
The exposure constituents entail individuals, biological systems, ecological capacities, services, assets, infrastructure, financial, or social resources in places and settings that could be unfavorably influenced by climate change and variability (Ademe et al., 2020).
Sensitivity is the degree to which the rural household is adversely affected by exposure to climatic variables' variations (Teshome, 2017).
The adaptive capacity constituent the capacity of systems or people ability, establishments, people, and different ecosystems to conform to potential harm, exploit openings, or react to varied consequences (Amuzu et al., 2018).
Different scholars have been conducted to study the vulnerability of Ethiopian households to climate-related extreme events.
For instance, a study conducted by Dercon et al.
(2005) using panel data set.
However, most of these studies are very general and the results are aggregated at national or regional levels.
These studies have also been limited concerned about rural livelihoods vulnerability to climatic-hazards on district and context-specific nature at a local level.
In addition, aggregated national results do not capture the complex state of vulnerability at the local level, while they are important to understand development priorities (Simane et al., 2014; Narayanan & Sahu, 2016).
Moreover, the context-specific essence of risk and interventions did not examine the degree to which rural livelihoods in agricultural land are vulnerable to climatic-related extreme events (Ford et al., 2010; Azene et al., 2018).
Hence, our study focuses on livelihood vulnerability to climate variability at contextspecific nature in Tarchazuria district of Dawuro zone.
Also, Dendir & Simane (2019) suggested that stakeholders plan context-specific intervention is important than the national level to reduce rural farmers' vulnerability to climate variability and strengthen farm households' adaptive capacity.
Tarchazuria district faced climate-related natural hazards and no study has examined in our study area in local detail.
The rural farm households in the district are predominantly rain-fed and hence are prone to risks of climate variability.
Due to frequent climatic events like drought, floods, and rainfall irregularities, there are the main problems on indirect costs, crop failure, death of livestock, water shortage, and loss of biodiversity.
Moreover, climate variability has also direct and indirect impacts on the prevalence and spread of diseases and pests in the study area.
Therefore, this study aimed to assess the impacts of climate variability on rural households 100 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 in agricultural land through the application of the Livelihood Vulnerability Index in the Tarchazuria district of Dawuro Zone.
2.
Methods 2.1 Biophysical Setting of The Study Area This study was conducted at Tercha Zuria district in the Dawuro zone of Southwest Ethiopia.
Geographically, the study area located between 7°05'00" to 7°15'00"N latitude and 36°45'00'' to 37°20'00''E longitude (Figure 1).The study area is located at 510 Km in Southwest of Addis Ababa the capital city of Ethiopia.
The district shares borders in the North with Maraka and Tocha district, in the South and Southwest Gojeb river, in the East and Northeast Gena district and in the West Konta special district.
The district covers a total area of 588 square kilometers.
Figure 1.
Location of the study area The physiographic setting of the study area is a dissected and rugged landscape, having well-drained and moderately weathered brown soil (Nitisols) and Orthic Acrisols.
Thus, soil erosion and floods in the area is mainly attributed to the dissected and rugged topography.
The geology of the study area is abundant with rhyolites and trachy basalts mainly overlying in the Precambrian basement and tertiary volcanism (Bore & Bedadi, 2015; Gitima & Legesse, 2019).
101 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 The elevation ranges lie between 918 m to 2170 m above sea level.
The dominant agro-ecology in the districtis tropical (kola) and sub-tropical (Woina-dega) agro-climate.
The average annual minimum and maximum temperatures of 13 years were 14.65℃ to 16.12℃ and 26.4℃ to 29.3℃, respectively.
The 13 years (2007-2019) of mean annual rainfall was 1398.8 mm, and the mean monthly rainfall ranges between 18.6 mm and 323 mm (National Meteorological Agency, 2019).
The rainfall is a bimodal type in the study area: the short rainy season is between March and May, and the long rainy season between June and September (Bore & Bedadi, 2015).
Agriculture is mainly composed of crop production and animal husbandry and it is the main source of livelihood of the population in the district.
The dominant activities under land use pattern in the study area include the cultivation of perennial crops such as enset (Enseteventricosum), banana, coffee, mango, avocado and etc.
Whereas the annual food crops, including cereals (maize, sorghum, teff), pulses (beans, peas), (maize and teff are largest produced), and root crops like potatoes, yams, sweat potatoes and cassavas.
Generally, mixed agriculture is the major economic activity in the study area (Gitima & Legesse, 2019).
However, the watershed has ample potential for cultivations, its farm productivity is very low because farmers use traditional means of production.
Besides, crop production is mainly rain-fed coupled with poor market access makes the livelihood of farming households extremely stagnant (Abebe, 2014).
2.2 Data Sources and Collection Tools The data required for the current study is obtained from both primary and secondary sources and also these necessary data were of both qualitative and quantitative in nature.
The primary data were collected through the questionnaire, key informant interviews, FGDs, and field observations.
Questionnaire was used to collect information from the sampled rural households.
Prior to the survey, the enumerators were trained how to interview and fill the questions.
Close-ended and open-ended format questions were prepared to the selected sample rural household heads and administered through face-to-face interview to get information about the impacts of climate variability on rural household livelihoods.
Also, two focus group discussions, the discussion among a small group of six to seven members of the farmers were carried out in the district.
In addition, key informant interviews were held with respondents from different sections of the community such as three development agents, two from non-government 102 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 organizations, four model farmers, and three elderly farmers.
Moreover, secondary data were collected from published and unpublished documents.
Furthermore, time series climatic data such as temperature and rainfall were obtained from the regional meteorological agency (Hawassa) to predict the trend and variability over time.
The reference periods for the climatic data were between 2007 and 2019.
This range was chosen based on the concept of climate variability and its resulting effects on the rural livelihoods in agricultural land.
2.3 Research Design and Sampling Procedure This study employed a cross-sectional survey research design and longitudinal time series meteorological data were used records over the period of 2007-2019.
In selecting representative sample households, multistage sampling techniques were carried out to select sample household heads for the study from the district.
The first stage, Tarchazuria district, was selected using purposive sampling techniques among the ten districts of Dawuro zone because in the district rural farmers' livelihoods affected by climate variability like drought and extreme events, and climate data availability and meteorological station in the area.
Secondly, two kebeles were purposively selected using on the above district selection technique i.e., : Mela Gelda (372 household heads) and Wara Gesa (464 household heads).Finally, simple random sampling procedure was applied to select 270 representative farm household heads for the study.
2.4 Methods of Data Analysis The unit of analysis of this study focused on rural farm household heads.
Qualitative data were analyzed by using thematic analysis of categorization; the data were gathered through observation, interview and focus group discussions.
Quantitative data were analyzed by descriptive statistics such as percentage, mean, ratio, maximum, and minimum by using Microsoft Excel.
Metrological data such as rainfall was analyzed by using standardized precipitation index and coefficient of variation (CV), whereas, temperature was analyzed by means of simple linear regression and standardized temperature anomalies.
Household Exposure (HE) and household Sensitivity (HS) indices complemented with basic household information of farmers were analyzed using descriptive statistics.
103 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 2.4.1 Simple Linear Regression It is the mainly used to analyze the association between one quantitative result and a single quantitative explanatory indicator.
The method is important to detect and characterize the long-term trend and variability of temperature and rainfall values at the annual/monthly time scale.
The parametric test takes into account random variable Y on time X in a simple linear regression.
The regression line slope coefficient was interpolated that computed from the data is a coefficient of the regression or the Pearson correlation coefficient (Teshome, 2017).
It can be calculated with eq.
1: Y = α + 𝛽𝑥.
(1) Where: 𝑌 refers natural disasters (rainfall and temperature variability) during the period; α is constant of regression; 𝛽 represents slope of the regression equation; 𝑥 refers to number of years from 2007 to 2019.
2.4.2 Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) developed by the (World Meteorological Organization, 2012).
The number of cold nights and warm days per month was calculated using the monthly observation of minimum and maximum temperature, respectively.
The SPI was used to identify droughts across the years from 2007 to 2019.
It is a statistical measure indicating how unusual an event is, making it possible to determine how often droughts of certain strength are likely to occur.
The practical implication of SPI-defined drought, the deviation from the normal amount of precipitation, would vary from one year to another.
It can be calculated with eq.
2: 𝑆𝑃𝐼 = 𝑥𝑖−�̅� 𝛿 (2) where; SPI= anomaly of rainfall (irregularity) in different time period; xi is yearly rainfall in the study period; �̅�is the long-term average yearly rainfall; and 𝛿is the standard deviation of rainfall in observed time period (Teshome, 2017).
Accordingly, the drought severity classes are: extreme drought (SPI <-1.65), moderate drought (-0.84 >SPI > -1.28), severe drought (-1.28 > SPI > 1.65) and no drought (SPI >-0.84) (World Meteorological Organization, 2012).
104 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 2.5 Constructing Livelihood Vulnerability Index Vulnerability is one factor determining whether people have risks to their livelihoods in agricultural land or not (Suryanto & Rahman, 2019).
Thus, the index is used for comparison among the communities.
In addition, the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) where vulnerability context is the major determinant of sustainability of livelihood assets as it directly influences livelihood strategies, institutional process, and livelihood outcomes of the community.
The effects of climate change and variability on farmers' livelihoods have been considered under the vulnerability context of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework or SLF (Can et al., 2013).
The Livelihood Vulnerability Index calculations developed by Hahn et al.
(2009) is applied in this study, which consists of the following six main components: These are livelihood assets of Sustainable Livelihood Framework such as human, physical, social, natural and financial capital.
In addition to these, we added one main component i.e., livelihood strategies.
The sub-components have been developed as indicators under a single component.
Vulnerability to variability is determined by a complex interrelationship between multiple factors where few factors are not often directly quantifiable.
Vulnerability assessment requires a detailed contextual understanding of the relevant systems and how structural changes impact them.
The vulnerability assessment involves estimation of the vulnerability level of a community and its contributing factors through the development of indices following three steps.
The first step identifies the indicators.
Next, using the actual, minimum, and maximum sub-component indicators, the standardized index value for the sub-component indicators is calculated.
Finally, the standardized major component indices are calculated and aggregated to form an overall index (Endalew& Sen, 2020).
Therefore, the vulnerability indicators and measurements were identified, operationalized, and hypothesized in table 1.
105 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Table 1.
Vulnerability indicators and hypothesized functional relationships Explanations of specific indicators Hypothesized relationship to vulnerability Source Components Average distance to health facility/center (KM) Percent of HHs with family member with chronic illness Percent of HHs reported malaria in their locality The average distance to health facility ↑ with vulnerability The family members with chronic illness ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs reported malaria in their locality ↑ with vulnerability Adu et al.
(2018) Human capitals Years spent on education Years of farming experience index Percent of HHs family never got vocational training Percent of HHs have no information about climate variability and natural hazards Years spent on education ↑ vulnerability ↓ Years of farming experience index ↑ vulnerability ↓ HHs family never got vocational training ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs have no information about climate variability and natural hazards ↑ vulnerability ↑ Can et al.
(2013) Dependency ratio of households Percent of female headed households Average family member in a household Dependency ratio of households ↑ vulnerability ↑ Percent of female headed households ↑ vulnerability ↑ Average family member in a household ↑ vulnerability ↑ Can et al.
(2013) Percent of HHs reported high rate of soil erosion Percent of HHs having farmlands in sloppy area Percent of HHs who didn't practice SWC measures Rate of soil erosion ↑ vulnerability ↑ Farmlands in sloppy area ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs who didn't practice SWC measures ↑ vulnerability ↑ Azene et al.
(2018) Natural capitals Percent of HHs that depend on forest resources Percent of HHs reported change of tree cover.
Percent of HHs reported severe damage on common forests HHs that depend on forest resources ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs reported change of tree cover ↑ vulnerability ↑ Severe damage on common forests ↑ vulnerability ↑ Azene et al.
(2018) Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Continued 106 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Explanations of specific indicators Hypothesized relationship to vulnerability Source Percent of HHs reporting water conflict in past year Percent of HHs utilize water from unprotected sources Average number of months with water shortage per year HHs reporting water conflict in past year ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs utilize water from unprotected sources ↑vulnerability↑ Water shortage (month) ↑ vulnerability ↑ Dendir & Simane (2019) Percent of HHs dependent solely on agriculture as a source of income Average agricultural livelihood diversification index Percent of HHs unable to save crops for contingency Percent of HHs categorized themselves poor HHs dependent solely on agriculture as a source of income ↑vulnerability↑ Livelihood diversification index ↑ vulnerability ↓ HHs unable to save crops for contingency ↑vulnerability↑ HHs categorized themselves poor ↑vulnerability↑ Adu et al.
(2018); Hahn et al.
(2009) Livelihood strategies % HHs perceived the increasing trend of temperature % HHs perceived the decreasing trend of rainfall Mean STEDV of monthly maximum temperature for (2007-2019) Mean STEDV of monthly minimum temperature for (2007-2019) Mean STEDV of monthly rainfall for (20072019) Trend of temperature ↑livelihood vulnerability↑ Trend of rainfall ↓livelihood vulnerability↑ Mean STEDV of monthly maximum temperature ↑livelihood vulnerability↑ Mean STEDV of monthly minimum temperature ↑livelihood Vulnerability↑ Mean STEDV of monthly rainfall ↑livelihood vulnerability↑ Teshome (2016); Asrat & Simane, (2017).
Natural hazards & climate variability Percent of HHs who do not have off-farm employment in birr Percent of HHs don't have access to credit Percent of HHs reported tiresome credit procedures PHHs who do not have off-farm employment ↑vulnerability↑ HHs don't have access to credit ↑vulnerability↑ HHs reported tiresome credit procedures ↑vulnerability↑ Huong et al.
(2019) Financial capitals & wealth Components s Continued Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 107 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Explanations of specific indicators Hypothesized relationship to vulnerability Source Components Livestock ownership in TLU Average land hold size in ha Average yearly off-farm income in birr Livestock ownership in TLU ↑ vulnerability ↓ Average land hold size ↑ Vulnerability ↓ Average yearly off-farm income ↑ vulnerability ↓ Asrat & Simane (2017) Percent of HHs house roof made of grass Percent of HHs house located in hazard prone /slope areas Percent of HHs that with housing affected by flood in last 5 years HHs house roof made of grass ↑vulnerability↑ HHs house located in hazard prone /slope areas ↑vulnerability↑ HHs that with housing affected by flood in last 5 years ↑Vulnerability↑ Physical capitals Average time to reach market in minute Percent of HHs no transport access all the year Percent of HHs reported challenged by public road Average distance to agricultural inputs in minute Average time to reach market in minute ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs no transport access all the year ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs reported challenged by public road ↑ vulnerability ↑ Average distance to agricultural inputs in minute ↑ vulnerability↑ Huong et al.
(2019) Percentage of households not associated with any Organization/cooperatives Percent of HHs have loose ties to relatives/neighbors HHs not associated with any organization/cooperatives ↑ Vulnerability ↑ HHs have loose ties to relatives/neighbors ↑ vulnerability ↑ Panthi et al.
(2016) Social capitals Percent of HHs not member of credit & saving group Percent of HHs not member of religious groups Percent of HHs not member of other organization (idir or ikub) HHs not member of credit &saving group ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs not member of religious groups ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs not member of other organizations ↑ vulnerability ↑ Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Continued 108 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Note: HHs households, ↑ increases, ↓ decreases and idir and ikub are local/traditional institutions/organizations Explanations of specific indicators Hypothesized relationship to vulnerability Source Percent of HHs feel insecurity of farmland Percent of HHs don't encouraged by land certificate Percent of HHs have no regular information from government policies Percent of HHs not visited by DAs in a cropping season Percent of HHs unhappy by their local leaders’ decisions HHs feel insecurity of farmland ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs don't encouraged by land certificate ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs have no regular information on government policies↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs not visited by DAs in a cropping season ↑ vulnerability ↑ HHs unhappy by their local leaders’ decisions ↑ vulnerability ↑ Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Components 109 2.6 Calculating the Livelihood Vulnerability Index 2.6.1 Composite Index Approach Both equal and unequal weighting schemes are the two most common methods for combining indicators.
In the first step, each indicator is given equal weight.
In the second step, expert opinion, complex fuzzy logic, or principal component analysis are all used to assign different weights to various indicators (Hahn et al., 2009).
We used both equal and unequal weights in this study, then used an integrated method to compute composite vulnerability indices using weighting average systems.
According to Adu et al.
(2018), a single component is consisting several subcomponents (indicators), each of these indicators is calculated on a different scale, such as percentages or ratios and etc., therefore, it was necessary to the data into indices using either eq.
(3) or eq.
(4).
IndexShi = Sh−Smin Smax−Smin .
(3) IndexShi = Smax−Sh Smax−Smin .
(4) Where; Sh = observed sub-component of indicator for household and Smin and Smax are the maximum and minimum values, respectively (Adu et al., 2018).
Using eq.
(5) to obtain the index of each major component (the sub-component indicators were averaged) : Mh = ∑ IndexShi n i=1 n .
(5) where six major components (Human capital (H), Natural capital (N), Social capital (S), Physical capital (P), Financial capital (F) were calculated using Mhis and livelihood strategies (LS)) for household h, IndexShi consist of the sub-components, indexed by i.
Then, six major component were averaged with eq.
(6) to find the district-level LVI (Adu et al., 2018): LVIh = ∑ 𝑤 𝑀𝑖 𝑀ℎ𝑖 6 𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑀𝑖 𝑛 𝑖=1 .
(6) which can be also expanded as: Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 110 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 𝐿𝑉𝐼ℎ = 𝑤𝐻𝐻ℎ+𝑤𝑁𝑁ℎ+𝑤𝑆𝑆ℎ+𝑤𝑃𝑃ℎ+𝑤𝐹𝐹ℎ+𝑤𝐿𝑆𝐿𝑆ℎ 𝑤𝐻+𝑤𝑁+𝑤𝑆+𝑤𝑃+𝑤𝐹 .
(7) 2.6.2 Calculating the LVI–IPCC: IPCC Framework Approach According to Hahn et al.
(2009), suggest an alternative approach to measuring the LVI.
Table 2 explain the major components’ organization.
Table 1 (the same subcomponents outlined) were used in Eq.
(3), (4), and (5) to calculate the LVI–IPCC.
When the major components are combined, the LVI–IPCC diverges from the LVI (Hahn et al., 2009).
Table 2.
Categorization of major components into contributing factors from the IPCC IPCC contributing factors to vulnerability Major components Exposure (e) Natural disasters and climate variability Adaptive capacity (a) Socio-demographic profile Livelihood strategies Social networks Sensitivity (s) Health, knowledge and skills Natural capital Financial capital Source: Adopted from Can et al.
(2013) They are combined according to the categorization scheme in Table 2, using the following equation: 𝐶𝐹ℎ = ∑ 𝑤 𝑀𝑖 𝑀ℎ𝑖 𝑛 𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑀𝑖 𝑛 𝑖=1 .. (6) Where; CFh is an IPCC defined contributing factor (exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity) for rural households h, Mhi are main components for household h is indexed by i, 𝑤𝑀𝑖is the weight of every main component, and n is the number of main components in every factor with contribution.
When exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity were combined in calculation, the formula developed by Hahn et al.
(2009) combining the three contributing factors using: 𝐿𝑉𝐼 − 𝐼𝑃𝐶𝐶ℎ = (𝑒ℎ − 𝑎ℎ) ∗ 𝑆ℎ .
(7) where; LVI–IPCCh indicates the LVI for household h represented using the IPCC vulnerability framework, e is the households’ exposure result, a is households’ the capacity of adapative result, and s is the household’s sensitivity result (weighted mean score of the health, knowledge, skills, natural capital and financial major components) which ranged from 111 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 (-1) the least vulnerable to (+1) the most vulnerable on the LVI–IPCC scale (Adu et al., 2018).
3.
Results and Discussion 3.1 Maximum And Minimum Temperatures Over The Last 13 Years The average temperature hurts agricultural output and significantly reduces agricultural output.
A one percent increase in average temperature would reduce agricultural output by 2.5% in the long run.
The long-run elasticity of agricultural output concerning average temperature is -2.5 indicating that agricultural output is most sensitive to an average temperature increase in the long run.
A decrease in agricultural productivity is likely as a result of increased temperature variability.
This may be due to the fact that high temperatures deplete soil nutrients, making livestock and agricultural productivity difficult (Ketema & Negeso, 2020).
Climate variability causes the frequency and severity of weather events.
Accordingly, an analysis of the climate variability in the study area over the last 13 years (2007–2019) found that the maximum and minimum mean temperatures were increased over time.
In a way that simple linear regression shows about 0.66 and 0.36-degree centigrade has been increased to the mean maximum and minimum temperatures of the study area per decade, respectively.
This shows that the district had been in a warming trend for the last thirteen years (2007 to 2019).
These results also confirm the survey results in terms of the respondents' perceived increment trends of the temperature over the last 13 years.
Moreover, key informants’ interviewers indicated the increasing trends of temperature and shifting of seasonal weather phenomenon causes the spreading of tropical diseases like malaria and locust.
Furthermore, FGDs discussants claimed that rise of temperature and its adverse effects on crop production is increasingly being felt.
These show the main evidence of the impacts of climate variability on rural livelihoods in the district.
As shown in figure 2, the maximum and minimum deviations in temperature over the last thirteen years (2007 to 2019) are clearly shown.
Maximum temperature deviations decreased in 2007, and in 2008 minimum temperature increases were observed from the long average temperature.
Whereas, both maximum and minimum temperature deviations were shows to rise and fall in 2009 and 2010, respectively.
From 2011 to 2012 temperature deviations continued with fluctuation.
But from 2013 to 2015 the deviations of minimum temperatures rapidly decreased.
From 2017 until 2019 the minimum temperature deviation slightly went upwards from the study area's long-term average temperature.
112 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Figure 2.
Deviations of maximum and minimum temperatures in the study area As shown in figure 3 the least mean monthly minimum temperature was recorded from 2007 to 2019 in July (14.62 °C), August (14.7 °C), and September (14.68 °C).
Whereas, the highest minimum temperatures were recorded in the study area in January (16.3°C), February (16.8°C), and March (16.5°C) from 2007 to 2019.
The highest mean monthly maximum temperature was recorded in January (29.75 °C), February 30.46 °C) and March (30.5 °C) for the period of 2007 to 2019.
While, the least mean monthly maximum temperature was recorded in July (24.6 °C), August (25 °C), and September (25.6°C).
Similarly, the study made by Kedir & Tekalign (2016) in the pastoral community of the Karrayu people in the Oromia region reported that the mean maximum monthly temperature indicates an increasing trend except for July and August.
Figure 3.
Mean monthly minimum and maximum temperatures y = 0.095x 0.671 R² = 0.139 y = 0.023x 0.161 R² = 0.008 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 Tmax.
Tmin.
Linear (Tmax.)
Linear (Tmin.)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 T e m p .
in d e g r e e c e n ti g r a d e Maximum temprature Mean Minimum temprature 113 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 3.2 Rainfall Anomaly Over The Last 13 Years: Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) Rainfall in Ethiopia is a major input in determining output due to this the country is named as rain-fed agriculture, where rainfall play an important role (Ketema &Negeso, 2020).
As shown in figure 4 the analysis of metrological data of rainfall indicates the annual temporal variations.
The annual rainfall variability from 2007 through 2019 can be detected from the CV value.
The result showed that the study area's annual temporal CV was 19.5 percent, indicating a low variability in rainfall.
According to Asfaw et al.
(2018), CV below 20% implies less variability and hence annual rainfall experienced less variability.
However, key informant interviewers indicated that climate variability has become unpredictable and associated with erratic rainfall.
They also claimed that rainfall's erratic nature brings indescribable hardship to study communities as most of them expressed unhappiness to the current irregular, and unstable nature of rainfall currently experienced.
Similar findings have been found by Araro et al.
(2019) in Konso district of Southern Ethiopia, unexpected rain followed by heavy flood and drought.
These variations in rainfall pattern have a direct impact on crop yields, livestock production and price fluctuation from the agricultural perspective.
Also, FGDs discussants reported there is a high variability of rainfall and rainy seasons could either delay when farmers predict a fall of rains when they least expected them in the district.
Therefore, FGDs discussants suggested livelihood diversification strategies, and water harvesting methods during the rainy seasons should be the best options to adapt to existing rain variability and extreme weather events.
Likewise, Kedir & Tekalign (2016) suggested that proper use of water harvesting technology should be devised to use and manage the intense rainfall of July and August in their study in central Ethiopia.
Moreover, early warning systems and integrated watershed and environmental management measures are required to minimize/avoid disaster and design possible remedial actions.
The rainfall anomaly also witnessed for the presence of annual variability and the trends being below the long-term average.
As shown in figure 4, the SPI (rainfall anomalyvariability and irregularity) can identify and monitor droughts.
The evaluation of SPI at a certain location is based on a series of accumulated rainfall for a different monthly time scale in a year.
The rainfall series is fitted to probability distributions that are subsequently transformed into normal distributions.
It follows that the average SPI for the target location and the chosen period is zero.
Negative SPI numbers specify less than median or long-term average rainfall, whereas positive SPI values indicate greater than median rainfall (Mohammed & Scholz, 2019).
Figure 4 also clearly shows the variation of rainy years (wet) and years of drought (dry) episodic pattern.
The results of the last 13 years indicated; seven years (53.8%) received 114 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 below the long-run average rainfall whereas 6 years (46%) obtained above long-term average rainfall.
Of the major drought events, such as 2007, 2008, and 2009, have been observed in the study period.
This implies the district received below the long-term mean rainfall, but their severities were different based on SPI.
The 2007 rainfall amount emerged as the lowest record in the observation period, and according to the drought severity classes used by Azene et al.
(2018), the year 2007 marked the extreme drought year in the study area.
The result also indicated that the years 2010 to 2014 received surplus rainfall from the average mean with positive SPI values.
This identified the probability of the highest erosion and flood occurrences in the district, but its occurrence was not recorded.
Consecutive negative SPI values were observed from 2015 to 2018 followed in 2019 slightly recorded above normal average rainfall (figure 4).
Figure 4.
Standardized precipitation index (SPI) for the study area 3.3 Monthly Standard Deviations of Rainfall The result in table 3 shows that the rainfall data recorded in 2007–2019 are characterized by a significant variability of monthly rainfall in the district.
The lowest average rainfalls were recorded among the months whereby January (18.6 mm), February (24.87 mm), and November (39.5 mm) followed in March (44.3 mm).
Whereas, the highest average monthly rainfall was recorded in August (323 mm), July (299.5 mm), and September (297.4 mm), followed by May (289.7 mm) in study period between 2007 and 2013.
The standard deviation is one way of summarizing the spread of a probability distribution; it directly related with the degree of uncertainty allied thru predicting the value of a random variables.
High values indicate more uncertainty than low values (Teshome, 2016).
Accordingly, May (129.6), April (79.5), and October (77.8) had the highest standard deviation indicates more uncertainty in the district (Table 3).
While, January (18.7), 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 SPI -2.019 -0.145 -1.425 1.5271 0.8715 1.2567 0.3978 0.6899 -0.288 -0.622 -0.212 -0.179 0.147 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 S P I 115 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 November (22.84), and February (26.3) and the lowest standard deviations followed by December (43.7).
It has been observed from the study that rainfall is generally at its peak among August, July, and September, receiving more than three fourth of the amount of rainfall in these months.
Table 3.
Monthly mean rainfall, standard deviations, coefficient of variations and rainfall coefficient for 2007-2019 Month Jan. Feb. Mar Apr.
May Jun.
Jul.
Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Mean (mm) 18.6 24.87 44.3 172.8 289.7 217.6 299.5 323 297.4 128.4 39.5 47.9 STEDV 18.7 26.3 55 79.5 129.6 60.7 75 75.3 97.3 77.8 22.84 43.7 CV 1.0 1.06 1.3 0.46 0.45 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.33 0.60 0.58 0.92 Note: STEDV=Standard deviations of each month, CV=Coefficient of variation 3.4 Households' Livelihood Vulnerability Index (LVI) Practically, assessment of livelihood vulnerability is too complicated and difficult to be covered all because there are many aspects, dimensions and factors that relating to livelihood vulnerability, e.g., economic, political, demography, etc., and it was certainly mentioned in some reports (Can et al., 2013).
This study only focuses on some major components that influence rural livelihoods in agricultural lands of households due to climate variability in the Tercha District of Dawuro zone.
The results of LVI standardized average scores of all 13 indexed major components calculated from 45 subcomponents or indicators commune are presented collectively in Table 4.
The indices being relative values were compared across the two kebeles such as Wara Gesa and Mela Gelda.
Overall Wara Gesa (0.60) households had a high livelihood vulnerability index with dominant major components of natural, physical, social capital, and livelihood strategies than Mela Gelda (0.56).
An indexed major component range of (0.50) to (0.73) and (0.38) to (0.62) in Wara Gesa and Mela Gelda, respectively, showing a high degree of vulnerability to climate variability-related natural hazards.
3.4.1 Human Capital Vulnerability As indicated in table 4, the indexed capital as human capital consisted of three major components and ten indicators.
The vulnerability index of the LVI's human capital major components showed that Mela Gelda (0.59) was more vulnerable to climate variability than Wara Gesa (0.52).
A higher number of households causes the higher vulnerability on the health component index of Mela Gelda (0.70) travel high distance to health facility/center than Wara Gesa (0.67).
Mela Gelda recorded a higher percentage (44.8) of households with family member got chronic illness due to climate variability induced hazards than Wara Gesa (34.2).
Households in Mela Gelda also reported that a higher percentage (52.4) of malaria in their locality than Wara Gesa (37.3).
Mela Gelda also showed a higher vulnerability on the 116 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 knowledge and skills indexed major component (0.72) than Wara Gesa (0.63), these were caused by lower years spent on the education of household heads for Mela Gelada (0.89) than Wara Gesa (0.55), and a large percentage of household heads never got vocational training about climate adaptation strategies for Mela Gelda (62.7) than Wara Gesa (58.3).
Household heads of Mela Gelda also reported a higher percentage (85.7) had no information about climate variability and natural hazards than Wara Gesa (62.3).
The vulnerability index of the major components of the socio-demographic profile showed that Mela Gelda (0.50) was more vulnerable than Wara Gesa (0.46); these were because of a higher dependency ratio of households in Mela Gelda(0.72) than Wara Gesa (0.56).
This could be explained by the fact that the population proportions under 15 and over 65 years that were dependent were greater in Mela Gelda than in Wara Gesakebele.
And, high percentages of female-headed households were found in Mela Gelda (25.2) than Wara Gesa (15.7), and a higher average family member in Mela Gelda (0.69) than Wara Gesa (0.62).
Similarly, FGDs discussants and key informant interviewers in Mela Gelda suggested that large family size may contribute to households’ vulnerability to climate variability induced risks in the case of limited rural livelihood options.
3.4.2 Natural Capital Vulnerability Climate variability has a higher effect on agricultural land, forests, and water, which are the essential source of rural livelihood sustainability.
Climate variability's shortage of natural resources enhances resource-dependent conflict (Thakur & Bajagain, 2019).
The indexed natural capital consisted of three major components as indicated in table 4.
The results of the natural capital of LVI standardized average scores in Wara Gesa (0.73) a higher than Mela Gelda (0.62).
Land is an important natural capital and indicator of wealth.
In this study, agricultural lands found in sloppy and erosion prone areas, farmers didn’t practice structural SWC measures are considered as indicators to measure vulnerability.
The major components of land resources were found to be higher vulnerable to climate variability and natural hazards in Wara Gesa (0.69) than Mela Gelda (0.49).
When indicators reviewed the major components land resources, Wara Gesa was the most vulnerable in terms of house heads reported high percent rate of soil erosion in Wara Gesa (75) than Mela Gelda (53), having a high percent of farmlands in a sloppy area in Wara Gesa (84) than Mela Gelda (52) and a higher percentage of household heads who didn't practice physical soil and water conservation measures in Wara Gesa (49) than Mela Gelda (42).
Moreover, during FGDs the participants reported the most of farmlands situated rugged topography and sloppy area these causes a high rate of soil erosions.
117 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 In addition, when the total standardized weighted scores of the indicators of forest resources showed that Mela Gelda (0.53) was less vulnerable than Wara Gesa (0.73).
These were because of the large percentage of households depending on forest resources recorded in Wara Gesa (73) than Mela Gelda (54).
In comparison, the highest percentage of households reported that about a change of tree cover and severe damage to common forests in Mela Gelda than Wara Gesa.
The key informant interviewee realized the farmers located near the main roads and close to the market place clear forests because charcoal is their income source.Wara Gesa (0.74) showed a slightly higher vulnerability standardized score in terms of water resources than Mela Gelda (0.70) on this aggregated major component.
The indicators of water resources were more vulnerable to climate-induced natural hazards due to a high percentage of households reporting water conflict in past years and households to utilize water from unprotected sources.
3.4.3 Financial Capital Vulnerability As indicated in table 4, the indexed financial capital such as income and wealth considered as major components to measure vulnerability.
The aggregated indicators' overall standardized average score was shown to be more vulnerable in Mela Gelda (0.60) than Wara Gesa (0.55) to climate variability induced natural hazards.
Mela Gelda (0.66) showed a slightly higher vulnerability in terms of indicators of average yearly off-farm income than Wara Gesa (0.60), a large percentage of households did not have off-farm employment in Mela Gelda(34.5) than Wara Gesa (28.4).
About (46.7) percent of Mela Gelda households reported that they had no access to credit than Wara Gesa (36.2).
Results from the survey showed households' average livestock ownership in TLU of households for Mela Gelda (1.66) was less vulnerable than Wara Gesa (1.23), and the average land hold size of households for Mela Gelda (1.87) was less vulnerable than Wara Gesa (1.42).
3.4.4 Physical Capital Vulnerability As shown in table 4, the indexed physical capital consisted of two major components and seven indicators.
WaraGesa showed a slightly higher vulnerability (0.72) on the physical capital standardized score than Mela Gelda (0.69).
Results from the survey showed the percentage of households with a house roof made of grass of (35) percent for Wara Gesa and (24.5) for Mela Gelda.
Other indicators were the highest percentage of households’ crops and houses affected by flood in the last 5 years for Wara Gesa (37.4) were more vulnerable to climate variability than Mela Gelda (18.6).
About (82.7) percentage of Wara Gesa households reported their houses located in hazard-prone /slope areas and more vulnerable 118 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 than Mela Gelda (56.7).
In addition, FGDs discussants suggested most households are engaged in agricultural activities in sloppy areas, but the majority of the households have no plans to protect floods along with rugged topography.
By road infrastructure on households' vulnerability to climate variability, the results suggest that levels of vulnerability in WaraGesa (0.72) were slightly highest than WaraGesa (0.69).
The cause of the road vulnerability is that a large percentage of households had no transport access all year, and public roads challenged them.
3.4.5 Social Capital Vulnerability Social capitals such as social networks and relationships, organizational membership, policy and leadership, and service delivery are affected by extreme weather events and natural climatic hazards due to which they have to adjust their social partnership, delay the delivery of services, often make the rural households dispute with the leader due to natural disaster management.
As revealed in table 4, the indexed social capital consisted of three major components and nine specific indicators.
The vulnerability standardized average score of the social capital major components showed that Mela Gelda (0.64) was more vulnerable to climatic-induced natural hazards than Wara Gesa (0.59).
When indicators reviewed the major components networks and relationships, Wara Gesa was the most vulnerable in terms of households’ heads reported that a high percentage of household heads not associated with any organization/cooperative in Wara Gesa (75.3) than Mela Gelda (37.5), and a higher percentage of household heads had loose ties to relatives/neighbors in Wara Gesa (23) than Mela Gelda (12).
By organization affiliation on households’ vulnerability to climate variability, the results show that levels of vulnerability in WaraGesa (0.38) was highest vulnerable to climate-induced natural hazards than Mela Gelda (0.20), this was because of a high percentage of households not a member of the organization like idir and ikub, etc.
3.4.6 Livelihood Strategies Vulnerability The indexed livelihood strategies component /profile consisted of four subcomponents/indicators.
Considering the percentage of households dependent exclusively on agriculture as a source of income as an indicator a higher vulnerable in Mela Gelda (83) than Wara Gesa (62.4), and average inverse agricultural livelihood diversification index a higher vulnerable in Wara Gesa (0.685) than Mela Gelda (0.50).
Wara Gesa (54%) shows a slightly greater vulnerability to climate variability based on the percentage of households unable to save crops for contingency than Mela Gelda (52%).
Wara Gesa also showed greater 119 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 vulnerability (77.4 %) on the percentage of households categorized themselves poor than Mela Gelda (63%).
Table 4.
Summary of the LVI result for indexed major components, and capitals and profile formula Gelda and Wara Gesa Indexed major components Number of indicators Indexed capitals and profile Standardized average score Mela Gelda Wara Gesa Health 3 Human 0.59 0.52 Skills and knowledge 4 Socio-demographic profile 3 Land resources 3 Natural 0.62 0.73 Forest resources 3 Water 3 Income and wealth 6 Financial 0.61 0.56 Housing 3 Physical 0.53 0.62 Road infrastructure 4 Networks and relationships 2 Social 0.38 0.50 Organizational affiliation 3 Policy and leadership services 4 Livelihood strategies 4 Livelihood strategies 0.62 0.65 Total average LVI 0.56 0.60 Figure 5.
Spider Diagram of the indexed capitals and components of the LVI 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 Human capital Natural capital Financial capital Physical capital Social capital Livelihood strategies Mela Gelda Wara Gesa 120 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 3.4.7 LVI-IPCC Contributing Factors and Indexed Components Based on similar indicators that calculate their respective methods of the LVI-IPCC contributing factors were computed by grouping exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity into three groups (Table 5).
The LVI–IPCC contributing factors in the study area showed households for Mela Gelada (0.64) have a higher standardized average score than Wara Gesa (0.57).
According to the IPCC classification of vulnerability exposure to natural hazards caused by climate variability was a high contributing factor for rural households.
Yet, Wara Gesa households (0.55) have a greater capacity for adaptation than MelaGelda (0.47).
The sensitivity contributing factor value for Wara Gesa (0.60) is slightly lesser than that of the Mela Gelda (0.62) indicating that Mela Gelda was more sensitive than Wara Gesa.
The standardized weighted result of the overall LVI-IPCC score was for Mela Gelda (0.105) and for Wara Gesa (0.012), indicating that the showing of the incidence of great vulnerable conditions of rural households to climate variability-induced natural hazards in the district which is a similar result to that of the LVI standardized weighted scores.
Table 5.
LVI–IPCC contributing factors calculation for households (Mela Gelda & Wara Gesa) IPCC contributing factors to vulnerability Indexed major components Number of indicators Mela Gelda Wara Gesa Exposure (e) Natural hazards and climate variability 5 0.64 0.57 Adaptive capacity (a) Socio-demographic profile 3 0.47 0.55 Livelihood strategies 4 Social networks 2 Sensitivity (s) Health, knowledge and skills 7 0.62 0.60 Natural capitals 9 Financial capital& wealth 6 LVI-IPCC value 0.105 0.012 Note : LVI-IPCC= [Exposure-Adaptive capacity] × Sensitivity Figure 6 also shows the vulnerability triangle that plots scores of contributing factors for adaptive capacity, exposure, and sensitivity.
The vulnerability triangle reveals that the livelihoods in agricultural land of rural households in Wara Gesa were more vulnerable in terms of household adaptations' capacity considering the major components of the sociodemographic profile, livelihood strategies, and social networks.
The rural livelihoods in agricultural land of households in Mela Gelda were more exposed than Wara Gesa to climate variability and slightly sensitive to climate variability, taking into consideration of the health, and knowledge and skills, natural capitals, and financial capitals of the households in the study area.
121 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Figure 6.
Vulnerability triangle of LVI-IPCC contributing factors 4.
Conclusion Rural households in Mela Gelda were a higher vulnerable than those in Wara Gesa in terms of indexed major components such as health, skill, and knowledge, socio-demographic profile, income and wealth, policy and leadership services.
In comparison, farm households in Wara Gesa were more vulnerable in terms of land resources, forest resources, water resources, networks and relationships, organizational affiliation, and livelihood strategies.
The livelihoods in agricultural land of rural households in Wara Gesa were more vulnerable in terms of the capacity for household adaptations considering socio-demographic profile, livelihood strategies, and social networks.
The rural households in Mela Gelda also more exposed than Wara Gesa to climate variability and slightly sensitive to climate variability, considering the health, knowledge and skills, natural capitals, and financial capitals of the households in the study area.
Hence, interventions including road infrastructure construction, integrated with watershed management, specific area early warning information system, livelihood diversification, afforestation/reforestation, and land degradations rehabilitation should be a better response to climate variability-induced natural hazards in the study area.
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the Tercha district agricultural offices experts for their support in providing the necessary data for the study.
In addition, we have enormously benefited from the study communities, and they shared for us their knowledge and experiences with patience without the feeling of tiredness.
We also wish to thanks the 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Exposure Adaptive capacity Sensitivity Mela Gelda Wara Gesa 122 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Regional Meteorological Agency (Hawassa station) and zonal agricultural offices fortheir assistance in giving necessary data.
References Abebe, Z. T. (2014).
The potentials of local institutions for sustainable rural livelihoods: the case of farming households in Dawuro Zone, Ethiopia.
Public Policy and Administration Review, 2(2), 95–129.
Ademe, D., Ziatchik, B. F., Tesfaye, K., Simane, B., Alemayehu, G., &Adgo, E. (2020).
Climate trends and variability at adaptation scale: Patterns and perceptions in an agricultural region of the Ethiopian Highlands.
Weather and Climate Extremes, 100263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2020.100263.
Adu, D. T., Kuwornu, J. K., Anim-Somuah, H., & Sasaki, N. (2018).
Application of livelihood vulnerability index in assessing smallholder maize farming households' vulnerability to climate change in Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana.
Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences, 39(1), 22-32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2017.06.009.
Amuzu, J., Kabo-Bah, A. T., Jallow, B. P., &Yaffa, S. (2018).
Households’ Livelihood Vulnerability to Climate Change and Climate Variability: A Case Study of the Coastal Zone, The Gambia.
Journal of Environment and Earth Science, 8(1), 35-46. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.36057.42081.
Araro, K., Legesse, S. A., & Meshesha, D. T. (2020).
Climate Change and Variability Impacts on Rural Livelihoods and Adaptation Strategies in Southern Ethiopia.
Earth Systems and Environment, 4(1), 15–26.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41748-019-00134-9 Asfaw, A., Simane, B., Hassen, A., Bantider, A.
(2018).
Variability and time series trend analysis of rainfall and temperature in north Central Ethiopia: a case study in Woleka sub-basin.
Weather and Climate Extremes, 19, 29–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2017.12.002 Asrat, P., & Simane, B.
(2017).
Characterizing vulnerability of crop-based rural systems to climate change and variability: agro-ecology specific empirical evidence from the Dabus watershed, north-West Ethiopia.
American Journal of Climate Change, 6(4), 643-667.DOI: 10.4236/ajcc.2017.64033.
Azene, Y.
B., Zeleke, M. T., & Chekole, A.
B.
(2018).
Vulnerability of mountain communities to climate change and natural resources scarcity in Northwest Ethiopia: the case of Debark Woreda.
Journal of Degraded and Mining Lands Management, 6(1), 1467. https://doi.org/10.15243/JDMLM.2018.061.1467.
Teshome`, M., & Baye, A.
(2018).
Climate variability, communities’ perceptions and land management strategies in Lay Gayint Woreda, Northwest Ethiopia.
Journal of Degraded and Mining Lands Management, 5(3), 1217–1235.
https://doi.org/10.15243/jdmlm.2018.053.1217.
Bore, G., & Bedadi, B.
(2015).
Impacts of land use types on selected soil physico-chemical properties of Loma Woreda, Dawuro Zone, Southern Ethiopia.
Science, Technology and Arts Research Journal, 4(4), 40-48.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/star.v4i4.6.
http://pparnet.com/journals/ppar/Vol_2_No_2_June_2014/6.pdf http://pparnet.com/journals/ppar/Vol_2_No_2_June_2014/6.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2020.100263 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2017.06.009 https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.36057.42081 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41748-019-00134-9 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2017.12.002 https://doi.org/10.4236/ajcc.2017.64033 https://doi.org/10.15243/JDMLM.2018.061.1467 https://doi.org/10.15243/jdmlm.2018.053.1217 http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/star.v4i4.6 123 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Can, N. D., Tu, V. H., & Hoanh, C. T. (2013).
Application of livelihood vulnerability index to assess risks from flood vulnerability and climate variability: A case study in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam.
Journal of Environmental Science and Engineering, 2(8), 476-86.
Conway, D., & Schipper, E. L. F. (2011).
Adaptation to climate change in Africa: Challenges and opportunities identified from Ethiopia.
Global Environmental Change, 21(1), 227-237.doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.013.
Dendir, Z., & Simane, B.
(2019).
Livelihood vulnerability to climate variability and change in different agroecological zones of Gurage Administrative Zone, Ethiopia.
Progress in Disaster Science, 3, 100035.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2019.100035.
Dercon S. Hoddinott J. Woldehanna T. (2005).
Vulnerability and shocks in 15 Ethiopian villages, 1999-2004.
J Afr Econ, 14:559–585.
Deressa, T. T., Hassan, R. M., & Ringler, C. (2009).
Assessing household vulnerability to climate change The Case Of Farmers In The Nile Basin Of Ethiopia (Vol.
935).
Washington : Intl Food Policy Res Inst.
Deressa, T., Hassan, R. M., & Ringler, C. (2008).
Measuring Ethiopian farmers' vulnerability to climate change across regional states.
Washington : Intl Food Policy Res Inst.
Dessai, S., & Hulme, M. (2004).
Does climate adaptation policy need probabilities?
Climate Policy, 4(2), 107–128.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2004.9685515.
Echeverría, D., & Terton, A.
(2016).
Review of current and planned adaptation action in Ethiopia.
Retrieved from https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/55864.
Endalew, H. A., & Sen, S. (2020).
Effects of climate shocks on Ethiopian rural households: an integrated livelihood vulnerability approach.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 64(3), 399–431.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2020.1764840.
Fellmann, T. (2012).
The assessment of climate change-related vulnerability in the agricultural sector: reviewing conceptual frameworks.
Paper presented at FAO/OECD Workshop.
Rome , Italy.
Few, R., Satyal, P., McGahey, D., Leavy, J., Budds, J., Assen, M., ...& Bewket, W. (2015).
Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in the semi-arid regions of East Africa.
Retrieved from https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/57427.
Folke, C. (2006).
Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses.
Global Environmental Change, 16(3), 253–267.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.04.002.
Ford, J.D., Keskitalo, E.C.H., Smith, T., Pearce, T., Berrang-Ford, L., Duerden, F. and Smit, B.
(2010).
Case study and analogue methodologies in climate change vulnerability research.
Chicester, UK : John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. Gezie, M. (2019).
Farmer’s response to climate change and variability in Ethiopia: A review.
Cogent Food & Agriculture, 5(1), 1613770. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.2019.1613770.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2019.100035 https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2004.9685515 https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/55864 https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2020.1764840 https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/57427 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.04.002 https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.2019.1613770 124 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Gitima, G. & Legesse, A.
(2019).
Determinants of Farmers’ Decision to Use Improved Land Management Practice in Gindara Watershed, Southern Ethiopia.
Ethiopian Journal of Environment and Development, 2(2); 17–34.
Hahn, M. B., Riederer, A. M., & Foster, S. O.
(2009).
The Livelihood Vulnerability Index: A pragmatic approach to assessing risks from climate variability and change-A case study in Mozambique.
Global Environmental Change, 19(1), 74–88.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.11.002.
Huai, J.
(2016).
Role of livelihood capital in reducing climatic vulnerability: insights of Australian Wheat from 1990–2010.
PloS one, 11(3).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0152277.
Huong, N. T. L., Yao, S., & Fahad, S. (2019).
Assessing household livelihood vulnerability to climate change: The case of Northwest Vietnam.
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal, 25(5), 1157-1175. https://doi.org/10.1080/10807039.2018.1460801.
IPCC.
(2018).
Emissions Scenarios: Summary for Policymakers.
A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III.
Published for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Retrieved from www.ipcc.ch.
IPCC, (2014).
Summary for policy makers.
“Climate change 2013: The Physical Science Basis”, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
Kedir, H., & Tekalign, S. (2016).
Climate variability and livelihood strategies pursued by the pastoral community of the karrayu people, Oromia region, Central Ethiopia.
East African Journal of Sciences, 10(1), 61-70.
Ketema, A. M., & Negeso, K. D. (2020).
Effect of climate change on agricultural output in Ethiopia.
Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan Dan Pembangunan Daerah, 8(3), 195–208.
https://doi.org/10.22437/ppd.v8i3.9076.
Krishnamurthy, P. K., Lewis, K., & Choularton, R. J.
(2014).
A methodological framework for rapidly assessing the impacts of climate risk on national-level food security through a vulnerability index.
Global Environmental Change, 25(1), 121–132.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.004.
Marelign, A., Addisu, S., & Mekuriaw, A.
(2019).
Observed and Perceived Climate Change and Variability and Small Holder Farmers’ Vulnerability: The Case of Janamora District, Northwestern Ethiopia.
Journal of Environment and Earth Science.
https://doi.org/10.7176/JEES/9-8-04.
Masuda, Y. J., Castro, B., Aggraeni, I., Wolff, N. H., Ebi, K., Garg, T., … Spector, J.
(2019).
How are healthy, working populations affected by increasing temperatures in the tropics?
Implications for climate change adaptation policies.
Global Environmental Change, 56(C), 29–40.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.03.005.
Mekonnen, Z., woldeamanuel, T., & kassa, H. (2019).
Socio-ecological vulnerability to climate change/variability in central rift valley, Ethiopia.
Advances in Climate Change Research, 10(1), 9–20.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2019.03.002.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.11.002 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0152277 https://doi.org/10.1080/10807039.2018.1460801 http://www.ipcc.ch/ https://www.ajol.info/index.php/eajsci/article/view/157469 https://www.ajol.info/index.php/eajsci/article/view/157469 https://doi.org/10.22437/ppd.v8i3.9076 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.004 https://doi.org/10.7176/JEES/9-8-04 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.03.005 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2019.03.002 125 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Mohammed, R., & Scholz, M. (2019).
Climate Variability Impact on the Spatiotemporal Characteristics of Drought and Aridityin Arid and Semi-Arid Regions.
Water Resources Management, 33(15), 5015–5033.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-01902397-3.
National Meteorological Agency.
(2007).
Climate change national adaptation programme of action (NAPA) of Ethiopia.
Retreived from https://www.preventionweb.net/files/8522_eth01.pdf.
National Meteorological Agency.
(2019).
Weather & Climate information.
Retreived from www.ethiomet.gov.et.
Narayanan, K., & Sahu, S. K. (2016).
Effects of climate change on household economy and adaptive responses among agricultural households in eastern coast of India.
Current Science, 110(7), 1240-1250–1250.
https://doi.org/10.18520/cs/v110/i7/1240-1250.
Neupane, N., Murthy, M. S. R., Rasul, G., Wahid, S., Shrestha, A.
B., & Uddin, K. (2013).
Integrated biophysical and socioeconomic model for adaptation to climate change for agriculture and water in the Koshi Basin.
Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation; Berlin, Germany : Springer.
Ofoegbu, C., Chirwa, P., Francis, J., & Babalola, F. (2017).
Assessing vulnerability of rural communities to climate change: A review of implications for forest-based livelihoods in South Africa.
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 9(3), 374–386.
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-04-2016-0044.
Panthi, J., Aryal, S., Dahal, P., Bhandari, P., Krakauer, N. Y., & Pandey, V. P. (2016).
Livelihood vulnerability approach to assessing climate change impacts on mixed agrolivestock smallholders around the Gandaki River Basin in Nepal.
Regional Environmental Change, 16(4), 1121–1132.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0833y. Paul, A., Deka, J., Gujre, N., Rangan, L., & Mitra, S. (2019).
Does nature of livelihood regulate the urban community’s vulnerability to climate change?
Guwahati city, a case study from North East India.
Journal of Environmental Management, 251(C), 109591. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109591.
Simane, B., Zaitchik, B. F., & Foltz, J. D. (2016).
Agroecosystem specific climate vulnerability analysis: application of the livelihood vulnerability index to a tropical highland region.
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 21(1), 39– 65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-014-9568-1 Sujakhu, N. M., Ranjitkar, S., He, J., Schmidt-Vogt, D., Su, Y., & Xu, J.
(2019).
Assessing the livelihood vulnerability of rural indigenous households to climate changes in Central Nepal, Himalaya.
Sustainability, 11(10), 1–18.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su11102977.
Suryanto, S., & Rahman, A.
(2019).
Application of livelihood vulnerability index to assess risks for farmers in the Sukoharjo regency and Klaten regency, Indonesia.
Jàmbá Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 11(1), 1–9.
https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v11i1.739.
Tanner, T., Lewis, D., Wrathall, D., Bronen, R., Cradock-Henry, N., Huq, S., … Thomalla, F. (2015).
Livelihood resilience in the face of climate change.
Nature Climate Change, 5(1), 23–26.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2431.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-019-02397-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-019-02397-3 https://www.preventionweb.net/files/8522_eth01.pdf http://www.ethiomet.gov.et/ https://doi.org/10.18520/cs/v110/i7/1240-1250 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-04-2016-0044 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0833-y https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0833-y https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109591 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-014-9568-1 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11102977 https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v11i1.739 https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2431 126 Ginjo Gitima et al.
/ Geosfera Indonesia 6 (1), 2021, 96-126 Teshome, M. (2016).
Rural households’ agricultural land vulnerability to climate change in Dembia woreda, Northwest Ethiopia.
Environmental Systems Research, 5(1), 1–18.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40068-016-0064-3.
Teshome, M. (2017).
Perceived Human Health Vulnerability to Climate Change in DembiaWoreda of Tana Basin, Northwest Ethiopia.
Ethiopian Renaissance Journal of Social Sciences and the Humanities, 4(2).
Thakur, S. B., & Bajagain, A.
(2019).
Impacts of Climate Change on Livelihood and its Adaptation Needs.
Journal of Agriculture and Environment, 20, 173–185.
https://doi.org/10.3126/aej.v20i0.25067.
Turpie, J., & Visser, M. (2013).
The impact of climate change on South Africa’s rural areas.
Financial and Fiscal Commission, 14, 100-160.
Ullah, W., Nihei, T., Nafees, M., Zaman, R., & Ali, M. (2018).
Understanding climate change vulnerability, adaptation and risk perceptions at household level in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.
International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 10(3), 359–378.
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-02-2017-0038.
World Meteorological Organization (2012).
Standardized precipitation index user guide.
Retreived from http://www.wamis.org/agm/pubs/SPI/WMO_1090_EN.pdf.
Young, G., Zavala, H., Wandel, J., Smit, B., Salas, S., Jimenez, E., … Cepeda, J.
(2009).
Vulnerability and adaptation in a dryland community of the Elqui Valley, Chile.
Climatic Change, 98(1–2), 245–276.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9665-4.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40068-016-0064-3 https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=id&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Perceived+Human+Health+Vulnerability+to+Climate+Change+in+DembiaWoreda+of+Tana+Basin%2C+Northwest+Ethiopia&btnG= https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=id&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Perceived+Human+Health+Vulnerability+to+Climate+Change+in+DembiaWoreda+of+Tana+Basin%2C+Northwest+Ethiopia&btnG= https://doi.org/10.3126/aej.v20i0.25067 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-02-2017-0038 http://www.wamis.org/agm/pubs/SPI/WMO_1090_EN.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9665-4
Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 101 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 1 Odessa State University of Internal Affairs, Ukraine (corresponding author) E-mail: lvovaliza@outlook.com ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3381-3185 2 Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine E-mail: k.kozmulyak@chnu.edu.ua ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4989-3669 3 Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine E-mail: l.strutynska-struk@chnu.edu.ua ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3267-1389 DOI: https://doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2022-8-3-101-114 REDUCING CLIMATE IMPACTS ON WATER RESOURCES AS THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE EU CANDIDATE COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF UKRAINE Ielyzaveta Lvova1, Kateryna Kozmuliak2, Liudmyla Strutynska-Struk3 Abstract.
As climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, the legal and economic issues of global environmental security deserve high praise.
In the area of industrial competitiveness, where the negative effects of global climate change include floods and droughts, forest fires, and rising sea levels, climate change is highly problematic.
Climate impacts affect public and private agricultural infrastructure (including the coastal zone), resulting in lost productivity and increased costs for agriculture.
The article applies climate change on a global scale in the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to determine how the mixtures and emissions of any one entity affect other areas (e.g., individual, community, company or country emissions).
Exploring the theoretical and practical premises of climate change as a complex phenomenon, the novelty of this article is that it examines the current framework of the environmental-legal concept, not just the political implications of the legal framework.
The research aim of the article lies in two dimensions: the European Union's current climate change policy framework (the climate and energy package, a set of climate change strategies and related policies targeting EU candidate countries); recent environmental operations in Ukraine as an EU candidate country under extraordinary conditions.
This article examines recent changes in climate legislation and climate policy in EU member and candidate countries, as well as other highly developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and China.
Focusing on the impact of the EU Climate and Energy Package (2020 and 2030), this article examines the main implications of EU climate legislation regulating the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and promoting the role of renewable energy in global energy consumption and energy efficiency in general.
As a result of this study, this analysis offers multifaceted conclusions based on the interaction of a number of current administrative acts on climate change and environmental policy on a global scale.
Key words: climate change, comparative advantage, equitable and reasonable use, EU law and policy on climate change, EU climate and energy package, EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, environmental security, greenhouse gases, water resources.
JEL Classification: Q54, Q59 1.
Introduction It is common knowledge that the Earth's surface temperature is expected to rise before mid-century, at least under all available emission scenarios (Sixth assessment report (IPPS) Headline Statements from the Summary for Policymakers).
GHGs spread beyond the borders of states, and what follows is a domino scenario where pollution in one country can go viral and exacerbate the current environmental condition in another country-no matter how far apart the two countries are, it can threaten the natural environment on a global scale.
Even if one or more countries succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to zero, this will not solve the problem of climate change.
To this end, it is worth noting that efforts to prevent climate change require international action to protect the environment.
However, some states with the world's largest This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 4.0 Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 102 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 economies, notably the United States and China, have reasonable doubts about abandoning the international climate change regime.
Frequent extreme disasters such as floods and droughts affect water resources around the world.
Droughts and drier soils can be expected in West Africa and the Amazon during the June-August season, and in the Asian monsoon region during the December-February season (Soha M. Mostafa; Osama Wahed, et al., 2021).
It is particularly evident in the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region that increasing temperature is melting glaciers and reducing snowfall, impacting the flow of China’s domestic and shared rivers (Devlaeminck, 2018); besides there is more rainfall in northern Europe which will lead to an increased number of water sources in the north and in a decreased one in the south (Radu Ioan Mogos, Negescu-Oancea Mihaela Diana, et al., 2021).
Since then, 2021 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report provides that climate change is dramatically affecting the water cycle: the average rate of sea level rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1] mm yr–1 between 1901 and 1971, increasing to 1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr–1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing to 3.7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr–1 between 2006 and 2018 (high confidence) (IPCC, 2021).
Rising sea levels are already affecting coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, agriculture, food systems, aquifers, and reducing natural water supplies in ice and snow.
In addition, the UN World Water Development Report 2020 (UNESCO, UN-Water, 2020), decline that water is the "climate connector" that allows for greater collaboration and coordination across most targets for climate change, sustainable development, and disaster risk reduction.
In a recent 2021 UNICEF report on climate risks to children, some 144 million children worldwide under the age of five are stunted, 335 million children are highly exposed to river flooding, 240 million children are highly exposed to coastal flooding, and 400 million children worldwide live in areas that are highly exposed to tropical cyclones (The Climate Crisis is a Child Rights Crisis).
In July 2020, the European Council approved a 750 billion euro economic recovery plan called the Next Generation EU (NGEU), which will begin in 2021, and the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021–2027 (MFF) ( Jonatan Echebarria Fernández, 2021).
The NEGU allocates 30 percent of the total package to climate protection, contributing to the Union's new 2030 climate goals and meeting the EU's climate neutrality goal by 20501.
This interprets to more than EUR 500 billion over the next seven years (Ewa Krukowska, Laura Millan Lombrana).
2.
Interception between climate change and water cycle: international legal issues Global warming and climate change are caused by the natural presence of so-called greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbon (HFC), perfluorocarbon (PFC) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) in the atmosphere of Earth2.
These gases are used in various economic sectors and have many applications.
For example, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are used as refrigerants in refrigeration and refrigeration engineering; perfluorocarbons (PFCs) are commonly used in the electronics sector as well as in the cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries; sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) is mainly used as an insulating gas in high voltage switchgear as well as in magnesium and aluminum production3.
In the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 19924 associates the term ‘climate change’ with human activity and composition shifts in global atmosphere due.
Climate change affects the quality of water and poses challenges for beneficial uses of water resources.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2021, states face a highly uncertain future of water availability (quality and quantity) and need to adapt their transboundary water management regime to meet their needs.
Transboundary cooperation seeks to address climate impacts that cross national boundaries (e.g., droughts or flooding on transboundary rivers) to avoid de-adaptive effects from a basin perspective and to exploit the potential co-benefits of improved regional cooperation, such as reduced uncertainty through data sharing, peace and stability, expanded planning space, and shared costs and benefits (UN-Water Policy Brief on Climate Change and Water).
Currently, there are more than 260 transboundary agreements between riparian states ( Jafroudi, 2020).
However, as the UNECE study confirms, many transboundary water agreements existed before climate change adaptation entered the water management discourse, and therefore assume relatively fixed water conditions in the respective basins (Spijkers, 2019).
1 Report by the Joint Research Centre Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2020: A New Normal Beyond COVID-19.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/global-energy-and-climate-outlook-2020-new-normalbeyond-covid-19 2 Available at: https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases 3 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/f-gas_en 4 The UNFCCC was adopted on 9 May 1992, having entered into force on 21 March 1994.
Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ convkp/conveng.pdf Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 103 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 To this extent, one should mention the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (the Transboundary Water Convention), concluded in Helsinki on 17 March 1992 (entry into force on 1996)5, the Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses (the Watercourse Convention), concluded in New York on 21 May 1997 (entry into force on 2014)6.
These general rules are complemented by more specific rules relating to state responsibility in the context of the management of international watercourses.
Some compliance mechanisms can also be found in in regional water law, such as the EU Water Framework Directive of 23 October 20007 and treaties regulating the joint management of a specific international watercourse, such as the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine on 12 April 1999 (entry into force on 2002)8, The Danube River Protection Convention on 29 June 1994 (entry into force on 1998.
)9, Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework on 14 May, 201010 and so on.
Many provisions of international water law can also help adapt to climate change, such as the "equitable and reasonable use" principle, the "no significant harm" principle, and the "precautionary principle".
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of water is one of the cornerstones of international freshwater law.
This principle requires states to take into account considerations of equity in exercising their rights and fulfilling their obligations when using the freshwater resources they share with others.
As M. Jafroudi underlines, this reading of the principle of equitable and reasonable use of water comes from the notion of ‘perfect equality of states’ enshrined, inter alia, in the judgment of the PCIJ in the case relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, were court ruled out any preferential privilege of any one of the riparian states over others in using he water of the basin for navigational purposes ( Jafroudi, 2020).
Most international instruments interpret equity in the exercise of the rights of riparian states with respect to a transboundary basin as the equal right of each riparian state to benefit from the waters of such a basin.
For example, the Watercourses Convention establishes an obligation for states to "utilize" and "participate in the use, development and protection" of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner (Art.
5).
The Convention also clarifies that when using an international watercourse on its territory, a State must take all necessary measures to prevent significant harm to other watercourse States.
The Water Convention takes the same approach and requires States to "...ensure reasonable and equitable use of transboundary waters, taking into account their transboundary character, in the case of activities which cause or are likely to cause transboundary impact."
(Spijkers, 2019).
D. J. Devlaeminck emphasized that China’s water treaties reflect the reciprocal aspects of international water law, illustrating that in some way China believes in and adheres to international water law principles (Devlaeminck, 2018).
For example, China adheres to the principle of fair and reasonable use in individual treaties, expressed using mutually enforceable terms such as "equitable," "equitable," and "rational".
In addition, the obligation not to cause substantial harm often takes a broad, reciprocal approach that protects both upstream and downstream states, but some of China's treaties contain a narrow definition, focusing on types of harm that primarily affect downstream states, which is potentially more onerous for China (Devlaeminck, 2018).
An important debate regarding the interaction between climate change and water law is ongoing in the United States.
R. K. Craig argues that it is unlikely to be resolved until (1) the full implications of climate change for the water resources of the United States are better understood and assessed; and (2) patterns of voluntary human adjustments become clearer.
For example, it matters a great deal to the future of Western water law whether the average flow of the Colorado River falls by 10 percent, or by half, or whether the river runs dry-and how quickly that change occurs.
As for the second example, California would face a very different water law problem if its Silicon Valley industry, Hollywood movie studios, agriculture, and accompanying social support systems moved en masse to Michigan 5 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/ Treaties/1992/03/19920317%2005-46%20AM/Ch_XXVII_05p.pdf 6 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/ english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf 7 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 8 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine.
Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fa42cafd-30ee-4d8f94a8-bc404d0ee550/language-en 9 Convention on cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the Danube river (Danube River Protection Convention).
Available at: https://www.icpdr.org/flowpaper/app/#page=1 10 Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework.
Available at: http://www2.ecolex.org/server2neu.php/libcat/docs/TRE/ Full/En/TRE160035.pdf Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 104 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 and Wisconsin than if they remained in place (Craig, 2020).
Furthermore, the United States has a major problem with the protection of Native water rights.
Ultimately, the only way to adequately protect tribal rights and resources is to place American Indian tribes on an equal footing with the states and the federal government by recognizing tribes as equal partners in the management of water resources in their territories (Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely, Lucius K., 2020).
It is important to emphasize that climate change is a serious obstacle to the realization of the rights to water and sanitation.
Water is a key medium through which climate change affects populations and ecosystems, especially in relation to projected changes in water quality and quantity.
Unfortunately, water is not explicitly mentioned in the most important international instrument to combat climate change, the Paris Agreement, which was adopted on December 12, 2015 and entered into force on November 4, 2016 (Paris Agreement).
The Preamble makes clear that "Parties must respect, promote and accommodate their respective human rights obligations, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, the disabled and people in vulnerable situations, and the right to development, as well as gender equality, women's empowerment and intergenerational equity."
The relationship between climate, human rights, water, and sanitation is dominated by various disciplines: political, economic, natural sciences, and lawyers, in the latter case.
In May 2020, a group of Torres Strait Islanders petitioned the UN Human Rights Committee against the Australian government for not setting sufficient goals and plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and for not funding adequate measures to protect and improve shoreline resilience on islands threatened with inundation from rising sea levels11.
Petitioners claim that Australia violates their human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 6 (right to life), Article 17 (right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy, family and home) and Article 27 (right to culture).
There is another case in Canada seeking damages because of climate change.
Ontario Burgess v Ontario Minister of Natural Resources and Forestry, Court File No.
16-1325CP (Burgess v. Minister of Natural Resources and Forestry), the plaintiff sued a provincial official in Canada responsible for managing the water level in several Canadian lakes, alleging that the government failed the plan of adaptation to climate change and an obligation to prevent flooding which caused property damage to the plaintiffs' homes around the lakes.
In 2018, Burgess voluntarily discontinued the case.
Peruvian farmer Luciano Lliuya sued the German utility RWE AG (Germany’s largest electricity producer) seeking compensation for the costs of protecting the plaintiff ’s town of Huaraz (population 120,000) from melting glaciers (Case Luciano Lliuya vs RWE AG).
The case was dismissed for lack of a "linear causal chain" linking the plaintiff 's injury and RWE's emissions.
On appeal, however, the court reversed the decision and has now begun the evidentiary phase of the trial, gathering evidence on, among other things, the extent of the defendant's greenhouse gas emissions and how those emissions contribute to a warming atmosphere (United Nations Environment Programme, 2020).
As a conclusion, it should be noted that transboundary water agreements existed prior to the adaptation of the international climate change regime, and therefore such agreements are being reviewed and modified.
Thus, when developing new transboundary water and climate change cooperation agreements, states should design new transboundary agreements with flexibility in mind.
A flexible regulatory framework can accommodate the significant changes in water policy and legislation needed to account for future climate change impacts.
A flexible approach that allows for adjustments in the event that climate change makes previously adequate water quantities inadequate.
New agreements must include flexibility in water allocation schemes.
Regulations for transboundary cooperation related to water quality should include provisions stating what, how, and when to evaluate when determining climate change impacts.
To meet obligations to adapt transboundary water agreements to climate change, states can establish joint climate monitoring and forecasting programs.
If states fail to take all possible measures to allow them to adapt their transboundary water agreements to such changes, they risk failing to meet their environmental obligations and violating the rights of non-party basin states to beneficially use water, thereby committing an internationally wrongful act.
(Spijkers, 2019).
3.
Long-term EU climate policy framework The environmental and climate legislation of the EU candidate countries is mainly characterized by long-term political goals is a fertile ground for the adoption of the above-mentioned objectives (Alessandro Monti, Beatriz Martinez Romera, 2020).
11 Petition of Torres Strait Islanders to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Alleging Violations Stemming from Australia’s Inaction on Climate Change.
Available at: http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/non-us-jurisdiction/united-nationshuman-rights-committee/ Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 105 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 EU environmental policy implies a set of objectives necessary to create and maintain the well-being of the state and its society.
In terms of the EU Treaty on Climate Change, "EU climate policy" is used as a legal term referring to the European Union's policy aimed at achieving a specific EU environmental goal, namely combating climate change (Kenig-Witkowska, Krämer, Ubysz, Stoczkiewicz, 2015).
The first ECCP (2000–2004) examined a wide range of policy sectors and instruments for reducing GHG emissions: the EU emissions trading system; the Clean Energy Development Mechanism; energy supply; energy demand; energy efficiency; transport; industry; research; agriculture.
In addition, impacts on other policy areas, including co-benefits such as energy security and air quality, were examined.
The main goal was to create a rational, mediumand long-term climate policy based on the "No Bridge Burned Behind" strategy.
Under ECCP II, climate change involves some significant adjustments in our societies and economies, especially in terms of restructuring the energy system and the public transportation system.
This chapter of the paper offers a brief overview of the current EU and global legal framework.
In 2014, the European Council approved the EU 2030 Climate and Energy Framework.
In its conclusions adopted, the European Council endorsed these key important targets 2030, namely: (a) a binding EU target of at least 40% less greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, compared to 1990 (as the EU’s contribution into the Global Climate Agreement); (b) a target, binding at EU level, of at least 27% renewable energy consumption in 2030; (c) an indicative target at EU level of at least 27% improvement in energy efficiency in 2030.
Further on, the Paris Agreement in 201812 was signed and the EU Climate and Energy Policy Framework 2030 was amended.
The EU Climate and Energy Policy Framework 2030 reaffirmed the following key targets: 1) 40% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 regarding (from 1990 levels, as the EU’s contribution into the Global Climate Agreement); 2) 32% for renewable energy in the energy consumption of 2030; 3) 32.5% improvement in energy efficiency for 2030 from energy consumption projections.
Climate and Energy Policy 2030 (2018) seeks to revise the Energy Efficiency Directives, the Renewable Energy Directives (RED II), and the Emissions Trading System (ETS).
Besides, it supplemented the current framework with the two new instruments (Kati Kulovesi, Sebastian Oberthür): first, the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (the Governance Regulation) established crucial integrated structures for the planning, reporting and review of the climate and energy policy; second, the LULUCF Regulation set a key important target for the LULUCF sector to prevent any net GHG emissions and strengthen the rules on accounting for emissions and removals in the LULUCF.
On November 28, 2018, the European Commission proclaimed the EU Climate Policy 2050, which presented the European Commission's longterm strategic vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy by 2050.
The 2015 Paris Agreement introduced the principle of climate neutrality, in which EU member states agreed to limit global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels.
To achieve this overall goal, EU member states have pledged to achieve a balance between current anthropogenic emissions from sources and their removal by absorption of GHGs by 2050 in order to achieve a balance between GHG emissions and absorption (in the natural course of things).
In this respect, the path to a net-zero economy must be based on a joint action plan that is compatible with seven major strategic pillars, such as energy efficiency; renewable energy; clean, safe and networked mobility; competitive industry and circular economy; infrastructure and interconnections; biosphere carbon and clean carbon sinks; carbon capture and storage capacity to address other emissions.
The European Commission argues that the implementation of all these strategic priorities will contribute to the implementation of the concept of climate neutrality.
Notably, in December 2019, the European Commission presented to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions the Communication "The European Green Deal".
This communication proves the growth of the EU's climate ambitions for 2030 and 2050.
The European Green Deal is an ambitious package of measures that will allow European citizens and businesses to benefit from a sustainable green economy.
The European Green Deal resets the European Commission’s commitments, presented below: 1) achieving climate neutrality by 2050, boosting momentum for climate action and stepping up EU’s climate ambition 2030.
With the 2030 Climate Target Plan, the Commission proposes to raise the EU's ambition on reducing greenhouse gas emissions to at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030 (2030 Climate Target Plan); 12 The Paris Agreement was concluded on 5 October 2016, on the basis of the EU Council decision (EU) 2016/1841.
Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 106 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 2) promotion of nature-friendly solutions while protecting and restoring the current ecosystems and biodiversity (necessity to broaden the scope of the forest restoration plan in Europe); 3) implementation of the EU ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy implies the development of a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system (need for a balanced diet and further sustainable consumption in Europe); 4) elimination of all sources of pollution to resolve the water pollution problem, reduce freshwater biodiversity loss and build resilience to the climate change; 5) inclusion of finance and investment into the mainstream policy and fair transition to the dedication of 25% of the overall future EU budget to climate action; 6) setting up a new partnership between the EU institutions and EU Member States to enable the European Commission to align the Sustainable Development Goals with the EU system; 7) streamlining the EU’s role as a global pioneer (future trade agreements should set forth the binding and enforceable commitments to start a new chapter on the sustainable development, specifically, as regards to the current environmental and social legislation).
However, the European Parliament and Council Regulation setting the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 establishes a binding EU climate neutrality target by 2050 to achieve the longterm temperature goal under Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, providing the necessary framework for achieving the Global Adaptation Goal set out in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement (see Article 1 of the European Climate Law).
In this context, M. Peeters and M. Chamon argue that this contribution will address both of the above aspects in the light of primary EU law, i.e., the Commission's delegated authority to decide on the trajectory to 2050 and to assess the impact of measures taken by EU member states.
The greatest danger of this proposal is that the EU's hard lawbased approach to emissions reduction becomes too soft (Peeters, Chamon, 2020).
If the Commission considers that national measures do not correspond to the trajectory, it can make public recommendations to member states.
Under Article 288 TFEU, these would be non-binding obligations, but the Climate Act would oblige EU member states to "take into account" these recommendations.
If a member state does not follow the recommendation (or only partially follows it), it will have to explain why it does not follow the recommendation.
In essence, this mechanism does not differ much from the already well-known open coordination method: although no binding substantive obligations are imposed on EU member states, there are still attempts to change their behavior through public "branding and shaming" and imposing the obligation to state reasons (fulfill or explain).
It remains to be seen whether this soft approach will lead to sufficiently ambitious climate action on the part of EU member states.
EU ‘Green Deal: Fit for 55 Plan’ 2021 suggests amendments to over 10 regulations, i.e.,13..: 1) Revision of the EU Emissions Trading System to extend the current EU ETS to the maritime and aviation sector and create a GHG emissions trading scheme for road transport and buildings in 2026); 2) update the Effort Allocation Regulation (ESR) to meet the EU-wide GHG reduction goal of at least 40% in industrial sectors by 2030; 3) development of a carbon border adjustment mechanism as a legal tool to address current market dynamics by reducing GHG emissions in the EU and globally, as well as the modernization of the relevant sectors; 4) development of amendments to the Renewable Energy Directive to increase the overall binding target from the current 32% RES to a new level of 40% RES in the EU energy mix and to strengthen sustainability criteria in bioenergy; 5) revision of the Land Use Change and Forestry Regulation to raise the quality and quantity of the EU’s forests and other natural carbon sinks; 6) submission of amendments to the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation to ensure userfriendly infrastructure for the recharging and refuelling cleaner vehicles across the EU; 7) review of the Energy Efficiency Directive to implement the climate ambition of the new climate target 2030 to achieve 9% reduction in energy consumption by 2030, compared to the baseline projections; 8) re-dressing the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive to accelerate the pace of renovations at buildings, contributing to the energy efficiency and renewable energy targets and reduction of GHG emissions in the buildings sector; 9) update of the Energy Taxation Directive to align the minimum tax rates for heating and transport fuels with the EU climate and environmental objectives; 10) re-addressing the CO2 emission standards for the new cars and vans for further decline in GHG emissions for these vehicles, providing a clear and realistic pathway towards zero-emission mobility.
13 Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 'fit for 55': delivering the EU's 2030 Climate Target on the way to climate neutrality.
Аvailable at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/chapeau_communication.pdf Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 107 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 4.
Combating climate change as part of environmental action in the European Union 4.1.
EU climate policy as part of the environmental policy of the EU and EU candidate countries A legal analysis of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union allows three general environmental objectives to be identified: 1) high level of environmental protection to include high level of climate protection; 2) improvement of environment quality to include climate quality improvement; 3) sustainable development of Europe and the Earth to include the fight against climate change (KenigWitkowska, 2017).
Through specific reference to climate change and the strengthening of a common energy policy governing safety, efficiency, interconnectedness of supply and energy solidarity, the Treaty reinforces EU action in these crucial areas covered by environmental policy and energy policy.
Since 2007, climate protection has been partly included in EU environmental policy, emphasizing one of its stated goals in promoting appropriate safeguards at the international level to address regional or global environmental problems.
Multiannual action programs are fundamental to environmental policy, since these acts constitute the policy itself.
Action programs are drawn up in accordance with Art.
192 Par.
3 TFEU.
This provision states that the general programs of action setting the priority objectives to be achieved will be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with the general legislative procedure and after ongoing consultations with the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
The action programs, although not normative in nature, have an impact on the legislative process in the field of environmental protection.
Since 1973, the Commission has announced multiyear Environmental Action Programs (EAPs) to outline future proposals and goals for EU environmental policy.
The environmental program of the 1980s addressed the problem of climate change politically.
In the Third Environmental Action Programme (1982–1986) adopted by the Council Resolution on 7 February 1983 climate was mentioned for the first time as one of the resources to determine the quality of life14.
In the fourth Environmental Action Programme (1987–1992) adopted by the Council Resolution on 19 October 1987, climate was referenced to in the Chapter on the General Policies of the Community15.
It has been shown that fossil fuel use can pose complex problems if it turns out that the accumulation of atmospheric carbon dioxide and the greenhouse effect have a serious impact on the climate.
In 1989, the Commission presented to the Council the first Communication regarding the climate change where the Council responded quickly in its Resolution of 21 June 1989 on the greenhouse effect and the Community (Council Resolution of 21 June 1989 on the greenhouse effect and the Community (89/C 183/03)).
The climate change was addressed not earlier than in the fifth Environmental Action Programme (1993–2000) adopted by the Council in its Resolution of 1 February 1993 (European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development "Towards sustainability").
An entire section of the Programme was devoted to climate change where CO2, CFC, CH4, and H2O were determined as the major factors in climate change.
The fifth Programme was actuated by Decision No 2179/98/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 September 1998 on the review of the European Community programme of policy and action aimed at the environmental and sustainable development "Towards Sustainability" (Decision No 2179/98/EC).
According to this Programme, the Community had to ensure that sustainability is the driving force in future work towards the Biodiversity and Climate Conventions.
In 2000, the Green Paper on Trading Greenhouse Gas Emissions within the European Union was published (COM (2000) 87 Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union).
Its purpose was to initiate discussions on the suitability and possible functioning of greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union, as well as on the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions trading, other policies and actions aimed at combating climate change.
In the 6th Environmental Action Programme, which was in force from 2001 to mid-2010, halting climate change was defined as one of the four priorities where action should be taken in the field of environmental protection.
The 6th Programme was adopted by Decision No 1600/2002/EC (Decision No 1600/2002/EC) where the objective 14 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, of 7 February 1983 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1982 to 1986).
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:41983X0217 15 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 19 October 1987 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1987–1992).
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A41987X1207 Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 108 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 was set of a maximum global temperature increase of 2 Celsius over the pre-industrial levels and maintenance of CO2 concentration below 550 ppm.
The 6th Programme suggested the references to the Preamble to Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the GHG emission trading scheme within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (Decision No 1600/2002/EC).
The 7th EU Environmental Action Programme (2013–2020) was adopted pursuant to the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council No 1386/2013/EU of 20 November 2013 under the General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 "Living well, within the limits of our planet" (Decision No 1386/2013/EU).
This program identifies priority areas, one key element of which is adaptation to climate change.
This area of activity governs the EU in its efforts to transform itself into a resource-efficient and low-carbon economy, aiming to maximize the benefits of environmental legislation, improve knowledge and evidence on the environment and climate to better integrate more coherent environmental policies into action and effectively address international environmental and climate challenges.
For the period of 2021–2027 the Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) (Regulation (EU) 2021/783) was established in the EU.
The overall objective of LIFE is to contribute to the implementation, updating and development of EU environmental and climate policies and legislation by co-financing projects with European added value.
LIFE consists of four subprograms in two areas.
The Climate Action area includes subprogrammes on climate change mitigation and adaptation and on the transition to clean energy.
The LIFE Mitigation and Adaptation subprogramme promotes the transition to a sustainable, energyefficient, renewable, climate-neutral and sustainable economy, thereby contributing to sustainable development.
Climate change mitigation, adaptation to climate change, climate governance, and information are the key focus areas of this subprogram.
LIFE's Clean Energy Transition subprogramme aims to promote the transition to an energy-efficient, renewable, climate-neutral and sustainable economy by funding coordination and support for action across Europe.
4.2.
Legislation of Ukraine on environmental impact assessment in extreme conditions: recommendations The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement16 is an important impulse for Ukrainian legislation approximation to the EU law.
A great deal of attention in the Association Agreement is given to cooperation in the areas of environmental protection, in particular the promotion of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; the promotion of energy efficiency and energy conservation.
Particular attention is paid to energy-efficient and environmentally friendly technologies, development and support of renewable energy sources (Art.
338).
According to Article 365 of the Association Agreement, among other purposes of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine is specified "the development and implementation of climate change policies, in particular those specified in Annex XXXI to this Agreement."
Articles 374 and 376 provide, inter alia, that Parties will develop their scientific capacity to meet their global environmental responsibilities and obligations, including climate change, and strengthen cooperation at the regional and international levels in the context of multilateral agreements such as the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
In order to meet the requirements of the association agreement and to adapt the Ukrainian agreement, amendments were made to the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative Fuels".
The amendments are aimed at simplifying the conditions for conducting business activities in the production of biofuel: the requirements for the state register and business entities that conduct business activities in the production, storage and introduction of liquid biofuel and biogas were abolished.
The Law of Ukraine of April 25, 2019 "On amendments to some laws of Ukraine regarding the provision of competitive conditions for the production of electricity from alternative energy sources" amended the existing support system.
In 2017, the Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2035 "Security, Energy Efficiency, Competitiveness" entered into force.
To shape the structure of primary energy supplies, the document uses indicative indicators, which Ukraine must achieve in accordance with its international commitments in the areas of renewable energy development and climate change.
In addition, in order to implement the objectives of the strategy, the Ministry of Natural Resources of Ukraine was instructed to ensure the creation and operation of the trading system of greenhouse gas emissions quotas.
In 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Low-Carbon Development Strategy of Ukraine until 2050.
Ostap Semerak, former Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine, once noted: "Ukraine was one of the first in the world to develop a relevant Strategy and take responsibility for the transition of the country's economy to low-carbon development.
16 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part.
Available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 109 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 This document stipulates reduction of emissions and increase of absorption of greenhouse gases, introduction of environmentally safe production using green technologies in all sectors of the economy.
"17 The main objective of the strategy is the transition to an energy system involving the use of low-carbon energy sources, the development of clean electric and thermal energy sources, increasing energy efficiency and energy conservation in all sectors of the economy and at housing and communal infrastructure facilities, and encouraging the use of motor fuels alternative to petroleum products.
The goal is also to increase carbon sequestration and retention through the use of best practices in agriculture and forestry, adapted to climate change.
The section dedicated to the decarbonization of the energy sector of Ukraine is recognized as the key section of the Strategy18.
At the end of 2019, the Law of Ukraine "On the Basic Principles (Strategy) of the State Environmental Policy of Ukraine until 2030" was adopted.
It provides for several climate goals, such as increasing the use of renewable energy sources by 17% by 2030; reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 60% compared to 1990 levels.
Unfortunately, in Ukraine, the climate is not yet recognized as an independent object of legal protection.
The Law of Ukraine "On Environmental Protection" does not contain provisions on climate change prevention at all.
Certain regulation of activities affecting climate change is contained only in the Law of Ukraine "On Atmospheric Air Protection".
One of its articles obliges legal entities and individuals to reduce, and in the future completely stop, the production and use of chemicals that have a harmful effect on the ozone layer, as well as to work to reduce emissions of substances whose accumulation in the air could lead to negative climate change.
Some other environmental laws only mention the word "climate" without any additional legal mechanisms to combat climate change as a national security challenge.
Agree with O. Kovalova, M. Kornienko, and Yu.
Pavlyutin that "...As part of the organizational direction it is necessary: 1) enforce systematic national security reporting legislation within the purview of each of the state actors involved in national security; 2) establish a uniform standard for continuous monitoring of national security cooperation agreements and memoranda between authorities and public organizations; 3) transform the practice of consultative situational cooperation into a practice of ongoing coordination and strategic cooperation in the area of national security; 4) create a unified register of threats within the framework of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine; 5) improve the register of public organizations, in particular, organize them by areas and forms of activity, display links to the official sites of organizations and provide public access to it; 6) to introduce an effective mechanism for coordinating the participation of public organizations in ensuring national security and providing them with donor assistance by creating a unified coordination center on the participation of public organizations in ensuring national security."
(Kovalova, Korniienko, Pavliutin, 2020).
For example, the Law of Ukraine "On Environmental Impact Assessment" defines that the impact on the environment is connected with any consequences of the planned activity, including climatic ones (Article 1), and the Law of Ukraine "On Strategic Environmental Assessment" consequences for of the environment are identified as likely consequences for the climate."
(The Law of Ukraine "On Atmospheric Air Protection").
As for the transport sector, in order to decarbonize and develop electric transport, the Law of Ukraine "On amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine regarding access to the infrastructure of charging stations for electric vehicles" was adopted in 2019.
The law establishes liability for stopping or parking vehicles in places designated by appropriate road signs and/or road markings, where only vehicles equipped with electric motors are allowed to stop or park, as well as creating obstacles to stopping or parking for drivers of such vehicles.
By 2025 it is planned to gradually reduce the coefficient of the "green" tariff for electricity produced by generating facilities using alternative energy sources.
A system of auctions was introduced to distribute the support quota, i.e., to determine the business entities that acquire the right to support from the state in the production of electricity from alternative sources.
In December 2019 the Law of Ukraine "On Regulation of Business Activities with Ozone Depleting Substances and Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases" was adopted, which will come into force in June 2020.
Ozone-depleting substances and fluorinated greenhouse gases are classified as "controlled substances".
The law prohibits the production of controlled substances and defines the basic principles of their import into Ukraine.
Only persons listed in the Unified State Register of Operators of Controlled Substances have the right to conduct operations with controlled substances.
17 The Low-Carbon Development Strategy of Ukraine until 2050.
Available at: https://legalhub.online/energetyka/pryjnyato-strategiyu-nyzkovugletsevogo-rozvytku-ukrayiny-do-2050-roku/ 18 Low-Carbon Development Strategy of Ukraine until 2050.
Available at: https://mepr.gov.ua/files/docs/Proekt/LEDS_ua_last.pdf Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 110 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 These persons are obliged to take measures to reduce the consumption of controlled substances, to prevent emissions of controlled substances into the atmosphere, to ensure timely collection and storage of controlled substances in a sealed container for recycling or disposal.
Starting in June 2021, the labeling of products that contain or use controlled substances is mandatory.
An appendix to the law contains a list of controlled substances, their ozonedepleting potential and global warming potential.
In December 2019 the Law of Ukraine "On the Basis for Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of Greenhouse Gas Emissions" was adopted (entered into force on January 1, 2021).
This law defines the legal and organizational framework for monitoring, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas emissions and is aimed at fulfilling Ukraine's obligations under international agreements, including the Association Agreement, as well as the requirements of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement.
A separate block of legal regulation is devoted to energy efficiency issues.
The Law of Ukraine from June 22, 2017 "On the Energy Performance of Buildings", adopted in accordance with Directive 2010/31/EU, introduced energy performance certification of buildings.
It is conducted for construction sites and existing buildings in order to assess compliance with the established minimum energy performance requirements for buildings and to provide recommendations for improving the energy efficiency of the building.
The Energy Efficiency Fund was established in 2017 to support energy saving measures.
On October 21, 2021, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine "On Energy Efficiency".
This normative act aims to implement the acquis communautaire of the European Union in the relevant area.
It introduces mechanisms to strengthen energy security, reduce energy poverty, sustainable economic development, conservation of primary energy resources and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Considerable attention is paid to economic incentives for energy efficiency in the areas of electricity transmission and distribution, natural gas transportation and distribution, and heat supply.
The main principles of incentives for consumers to implement energy efficiency measures are formulated.
International studies note that wars, starting with the First World War, affect ecosystems more and more.
This is due to the increase in the potential of modern weapons, which cause more damage to the environment (Schillinger, Özerol, et al., 2020).
The war in Ukraine affected not only food security, but also economic and environmental research for all countries.
All more research on the significant impact of the war in Ukraine on climate change.19 As a result of the war, atmospheric air is significantly polluted.
According to the President of Ukraine, since February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation has launched about 3,500 missiles over Ukraine20.
During the detonation of missiles and shells a number of chemical compounds are formed – carbon monoxide, brown gas, nitrogen dioxide, formaldehyde, etc., which pollute the environment.
In addition, Russia shells Ukrainian oil depots and industrial enterprises that use various chemicals in their activities.
And these are also tens of thousands of tons of harmful substances released into the atmosphere (Dyachuk).
At the same time, experts note that if today energy security is one of the main global problems of the world, water security comes to the fore in conditions of climate change.
It is obvious that already now the war unleashed by Russia in Ukraine directly affects the issue of water security in our country.
The invaders are shelling water infrastructure, mining dams, and waging hostilities in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
For example, as a result of the shelling of the water treatment facilities of the Vasylkivsk water supply and drainage department, the army of the Russian Federation destroyed the building of the sewage pumping station.
"Water is essential to life and a right of every human being," said Osnat Lubrani, humanitarian coordinator for Ukraine, warning of the health risks caused by a water cut, especially for children and the elderly.
"Poor water quality can lead to diseases, including cholera, diarrhea, skin infections and other deadly infectious diseases.
People are forced to live in crowded conditions and cannot observe basic hygiene measures.
This problem needs to be addressed," Lubrani added (UNICEF).
As a result, an estimated 1.4 million people in the country currently do not have access to safe water.
Another 4.6 million people have only limited access to safe water21.
Russia's nuclear terrorism is of particular concern.
On February 24, 2022, Russian troops seized the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and other nuclear facilities in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone in an 19 This is how the conflict between Ukraine and Russia could impact climate change.
Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/03/ russia-and-ukraine-are-important-to-the-renewables-transition-here-s-what-that-means-for-the-climate; Ukraine War’s Latest Victim?
The Fight Against Climate Change Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/26/world/europe/g7-summit-ukraine-war-climate-change.html; Climate change: Ukraine war prompts fossil fuel 'gold rush' – report.
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-61723252 20 These days, if you are abroad, be there with the flag of Ukraine and spread the truth about the crimes of the occupiers – address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/news/cimi-dnyami-yaksho-vi-za-kordonom-budte-tam-iz-praporomukra-77205 21 How has the war impacted Ukraine’s environment?
Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/ukraine-war-environmental-impact/ Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 111 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 invasion and remained there until March 31.
An inventory and assessment of the damage caused by the Russian occupation in the Exclusion Zone is currently underway.
According to preliminary estimates, the damage caused by Russian troops in the exclusion zone is almost 2.5 billion hryvnias.
The occupiers destroyed almost 100 units of valuable analytical equipment, which has no analogues in Europe.22 Russia committed another act of nuclear terrorism on June 5, when a Russian cruise missile similar to the Kalibr missile flew at a critically low altitude over the South Ukraine nuclear power plant.
The Zaporizhzhia NPP continues to operate under occupation.
The Russian army uses the territory of the nuclear plant as a military base.
The presence of Russian military forces at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant prevents the operator and Ukrainian authorities from fulfilling their nuclear and radiation safety obligations under international conventions and IAEA safety standards, and also prevents the IAEA from fulfilling its safeguards mandate.
Read more about nuclear safety in this war at the link (Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy).
5.
Conclusions Since Russia's military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, there have been at least 20 separate instances of water infrastructure damage in eastern Ukraine.
The recent intensification of fighting in the Donbass and the widespread use of explosives in populated areas threatens to bring the water supply system, already damaged by the previous eight-year conflict, to the brink of total destruction.
Just three days after the latest invasion began, Russian troops destroyed a dam in Ukraine's Kherson region that was blocking water access to Russia-annexed Crimea.
In Mariupol, a city in southeastern Ukraine, Russian soldiers cut off the local water supply as part of a brutal siege of the city, leaving the trapped population without access to safe drinking water and sanitation.
In 2022, despite military aggression of Russia, Ukraine continued to improve legislation in the field of energy efficiency.
In particular, in July the adopted law23 approves the reduction of number of procedures required for implementation of energy-efficient measures implementation projects and thermal modernization of buildings, introduces the possibility of implementation of partial energy-efficiency measures implementation projects.
As a final note, it is important to emphasize that in today's legal and socioeconomic debates, principles of environmental security are grounded in the parametric features of human rights to a safe environment.
While climate change exacerbates human rights to water and sanitation, local governments must focus on the legal framework of economic impact and integrated effects on the capacity of the most fragile water-related regions.
23 The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Creation of Conditions for the Introduction of Complex Thermal Modernization of Buildings".
Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2392-20?lang=en#Text 22 Briefing on the environmental damage caused by the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (2-8 June 2022).
Available at: https://mepr.gov.ua/en/news/39274.html References: 2030 Climate Target Plan.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/european-green-deal/2030climate-target-plan_en Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework.
Available at: http://www2.ecolex.org/server2neu.
php/libcat/docs/TRE/Full/En/TRE160035.pdf Alessandro Monti, Beatriz Martinez Romera (2020).
Fifty shades of binding: Appraising the enforcement toolkit for the EU’s 2030 renewable energy targets.
Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, 29:221–231.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12330 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part.
Available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf Briefing on the environmental damage caused by the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (2-8 June 2022).
Available at: https://mepr.gov.ua/en/news/39274.html Burgess v. Minister of Natural Resources and Forestry, No.
16-1325 CP, Statement of Claim (Ont.
Sp.
Ct. Sept. 14, 2016).
Available at: http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/nonus-case-documents/2016/20160914_Court-File-No.-16-1325-CP_points-of-claim-1.pdf By Radu Ioan Mogos, Negescu–Oancea Mihaela Diana, Sorin Burlacu, Victor Adrian Troaca (2021).
Climate Change and Health Protection in European Union European Journal of Sustainable Development, 10(3):97–108.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2021.v10n3p97 Case Luciano Lliuya vs RWE AG.
Available at: https://climate-laws.org/geographies/germany/litigation_cases/ luciano-lliuya-v-rwe COM (2000) 87 Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union.
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0087&from=EN Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 112 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 'fit for 55': delivering the EU's 2030 Climate Target on the way to climate neutrality.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/chapeau_communication.pdf Convention on cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of the Danube river (Danube River Protection Convention).
Available at: https://www.icpdr.org/flowpaper/app/#page=1 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
Available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1992/03/19920317%2005-46%20AM/Ch_XXVII_05p.pdf Convention on the Protection of the Rhine.
Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/ publication/fa42cafd-30ee-4d8f-94a8-bc404d0ee550/language-en Council Resolution of 21 June 1989 on the greenhouse effect and the Community (89/C 183/03).
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31989Y0720(01)&from=LV Craig, R. K. (2020).
Water law and climate change in the United States: A review of the legal scholarship.
WIREs Water, vol.
7, issue 3/e1423.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1423 Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’.
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013D1386 Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 Laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme.
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32002D1600 Decision No 2179/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 on the review of the European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development "Towards sustainability".
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=celex%3A31998D2179 Devlaeminck, D. J.
(2018).
The Legal Principle of Reciprocity and China’s Water Treaty Practice.
Chinese Journal of Environmental Law, 2(2):195–222.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/24686042-12340032 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 Dyachuk M. Water as a source of life or the seed of war: how the theft of water by the occupiers affects the water supply of Ukraine and Crimea.
Available at: https://ecoaction.org.ua/voda-iak-dzherelo-zhyttia.html Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely, Lucius K. Caldwell (2020).
Indigenous Rights and Climate Change: The Influence of Climate Change on the Quantification of Reserved Instream Water Rights for American Indian Tribes, 2020 Utah Law Review, 3:755–793 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26054/0D-6T19-BFKE European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development "Towards sustainability" (The Fifth Programme 1993–2000).
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ environment/archives/action-programme/env-act5/pdf/5eap.pdf Ewa Krukowska, Laura Millan Lombrana.
EU Approves Biggest Green Stimulus in History With $572  Billion Plan.
Available at: https://www.bloombergquint.com/technology/eu-approves-biggest-greenstimulus-in-history-with-572-billion-plan Jonatan Echebarria Fernández (2021).
A Critical Analysis on the European Union’s Measures to Overcome the Economic Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic.
European Papers – A Journal on Law and Integration, 5(3):1399–1423.
DOI: 10.15166/2499-8249/437 How has the war impacted Ukraine’s environment?
Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/ ukraine-war-environmental-impact/ IPCC, 2021: Summary for Policymakers.
In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [MassonDelmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L.
Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I.
Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R.
Matthews, T.K.
Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)].
Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#FullReport ISBN No: 978-92-807-3835-3 Job No: DEL/2333/NA.
Available at: https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/ handle/20.500.11822/34818/GCLR.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Kati Kulovesi, Sebastian Oberthür, Assessing the EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework: Incremental change toward radical transformation?
Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12358 Kenig-Witkowska, M, Krämer, L, Ubysz, K, Stoczkiewicz, M. (2015).
Derogations from a transition.
Free EU ETS allowances for the electricity sector in Poland.
ClientEarth Poland.
s. 8.
Available at: https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2016-06-13-derogations-fromtransformation-ce-en.pdf Low-carbon development strategy of Ukraine until 2050.
Available at: https://mepr.gov.ua/files/docs/Proekt/ LEDS_ua_last.pdf Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 113 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 M. Jafroudi (2020).
A legal obligation to adapt transboundary water agreements to climate change?
Water Policy, 22(5):717–732.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2020.212 M. M. Kenig-Witkowska, Zarys polityki klimatycznej Unii Europejskiej, (w:) "Człowiek, państwo, prawo", Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Stanisławowi Leszkowi Stadniczńko, Warszawa 2017, s. 568.
New York: United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2021.
Available at: https://www.unicef.org/ media/105376/file/UNICEF-climate-crisis-child-rights-crisis.pdf Olena Kovalova, Maksym Korniienko, Yurii Pavliutin (2020).
The role of public organizations in ensuring national security of Ukraine vol.
37, Nº 65 (julio-diciembre), 136–155.
Cuestiones Políticas Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada en julio de 2020, por el Fondo Editorial Serbiluz, Universidad del Zulia.
Maracaibo-Venezuela.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3865.11 Paris Agreement.
Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf Peeters, M., & Chamon, M. (2020).
The European climate law: too much power for the Commission?
Web publication/site, Maastricht University.
Available at: https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/blog/2020/03/ european-climate-law-too-much-power-commission Petition of Torres Strait Islanders to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Alleging Violations Stemming from Australia’s Inaction on Climate Change.
Available at: http://climatecasechart.com/climatechange-litigation/non-us-jurisdiction/united-nations-human-rights-committee/ Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013.
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0783&qid= 1635435343579 Report by the Joint Research Centre Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2020: A New Normal Beyond COVID-19.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/ global-energy-and-climate-outlook-2020-new-normal-beyond-covid-19 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, of 7 February 1983 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1982 to 1986).
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:41983X0217 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 19 October 1987 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1987–1992).
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A41987X1207 Schillinger, J., Özerol, G., Güven-Griemert, Ş., & Heldeweg, M. (2020).
Water in war: Understanding the impacts of armed conflict on water resources and their management.
WIREs Water; 7:e1480.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1480 Sixth assessment report (IPPS) Headline Statements from the Summary for Policymakers (9 August 2021).
Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Headline_Statements.pdf Soha M. Mostafa, Osama Wahed, Walaa Y. El-Nashar, Samia M. El-Marsafawy, Hany F. Abd-Elhamid (2021).
Impact of climate change on water resources and crop yield in the Middle Egypt region Journal of Water Supply: Research and Technology-Aqua, 70(7):1066–1084.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2166/aqua.2021.019 Spijkers, O.
(2019).
Sustainable management of freshwater resources Linking international water law and the Sustainable Development Goals.
Gaia-Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society, vol.
28, nо.
2, pp.
135–142(8).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14512/gaia.28.2.12 The Climate Crisis is a Child Rights Crisis: Introducing the Children’s Climate Risk Index.
The Law of Ukraine "On Atmospheric Air Protection".
Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 2707-12#Text The Law of Ukraine "On Environmental Impact Assessment".
Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/en/2059-19#Text The Law of Ukraine "On Environmental Protection".
Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/ 1264-12#Text The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Creation of Conditions for the Introduction of Complex Thermal Modernization of Buildings".
Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/ laws/show/2392-20?lang=en#Text The Low-Carbon Development Strategy of Ukraine until 2050.
Available at: https://legalhub.online/energetyka/ pryjnyato-strategiyu-nyzkovugletsevogo-rozvytku-ukrayiny-do-2050-roku/ The Paris Agreement was concluded on 5 October 2016, on the basis of the EU Council decision (EU) 2016/1841.
The UNFCCC was adopted on 9 May 1992, having entered into force on 21 March 1994.
Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf These days, if you are abroad, be there with the flag of Ukraine and spread the truth about the crimes of the occupiers – address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/news/ cimi-dnyami-yaksho-vi-za-kordonom-budte-tam-iz-praporom-ukra-77205 Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 114 Vol.
8 No.
3, 2022 This is how the conflict between Ukraine and Russia could impact climate change.
Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/03/russia-and-ukraine-are-important-to-the-renewables-transitionhere-s-what-that-means-for-the-climate; Ukraine War’s Latest Victim?
The Fight Against Climate Change.
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/26/world/europe/g7-summit-ukraine-war-climate-change.
html; Climate change: Ukraine war prompts fossil fuel 'gold rush' – report.
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/ news/science-environment-61723252 Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy.
Available at: https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/ country-profiles/countries-t-z/ukraine-russia-war-and-nuclear-energy.aspx UNESCO, UN-Water, 2020: United Nations World Water Development Report 2020:Water and Climate Change, Paris, UNESCO.
Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000372985.locale=en UNICEF.
Available at: https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/14-million-people-without-running-water-acrosswar-affected-eastern-ukraine United Nations Environment Programme (2020).
Global Climate Litigation Report: 2020 Status Review.
Nairobi.
UN-Water Policy Brief on Climate Change and Water.
Available at: https://www.unwater.org/publications/ un-water-policy-brief-on-climate-change-and-water/ Received on: 1th of August, 2022 Accepted on: 16th of September, 2022 Published on: 30th of September, 2022
RBCIAMB-N16-Jun-2010-Materia02 Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 6 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 ABSTRACT A little scientific advance has been observed in how cities will deal with climate change in terms of adaptability.
Thus, it is necessary to anticipate future changes and to integrate them into local level planning, including investments and political decisions in a proactive way of adaptability promotion.
For that, supporting local governance construction may help engaging a variety of stakeholders on the search for solutions focused on facing such issues.
This investigation has as its objective proposing a Green Local Governance Model for Cubatão City/SP municipality, aiming to contribute for an increase of effectiveness in the implementation of public policies into the context of climate changes.
The objectives are: i) bibliographical updating on the research theme; ii) creating data summary on environment, social and economic dimensions for Cubatão City/SP, iii) identifying environmental management system of the municipality; iv) verifying the constraints on social participation in the decision making processes in municipal environmental management, v) proposing a Green Local Governance Framework.
The methodology to be applied is based on MEGA (Portuguese acronym) Strategic Evaluation Methodology of Sustainable Development and Environmental Public Policies implementation at Santo André Municipality.
The expected results are reports, papers on the research subject, data summary, report of the Environmental Management System of Cubatão/SP (administrative structure, legal apparatus, management tools and institutional capacity); guide to social participation, institutional improvement on climate change impacts focus.
KEYWORDS: Climate change; Public Policy, Green Governance, Cubatão City.
Maria Luiza de Moraes Leonel Padilha Agronomist Engineer, Master in Administration, PhD in Environmental Health.
Post-Doctorate on Environmental Policy Planning, in Faculdade de Saúde Pública in Universidade de São Paulo.
E-mail: malupadilha@usp.br Aline Matulja Sanitary and Environmental Engineer.
Master degree student in Environmental Health and Public Policies Program, in Faculdade de Saúde Pública in Universidade de São Paulo.
Brazilian Research Council (CNPq) Felowship.
Ana Karina Merlin do Imperio Favaro Agronomist Engineer.
Environmental Management specialist.
Master degree student in Environmental Health and Public Policies Program, in Faculdade de Saúde Pública in Universidade de São Paulo.
Brazilian Research Council (CNPq) Felowship.
Juliana Barbosa Zuquer Giaretta Biologist.
Environmental Health Management specialist.
Master degree student in Environmental Health Program, in Faculdade de Saúde Pública in Universidade de São Paulo.
National Institute of Science and Technology for Environmental Studies (INCT-EMA) Fellowship.
Juliana Pellegrini Cezare Biologist, Master of Science by Universidade de São Paulo.
Daniel Gouveia Tanigushi Biologist.
Master of Science by Universidade de São Paulo.
Student of Doctorate Environmental Health Program, in Faculdade de Saúde Pública in Universidade de São Paulo.
Antonio Carlos Rossin Professor on Environmental Policy, Planning and Management, in Faculdade de Saúde Pública in Universidade de São Paulo.
Arlindo Philippi Jr.
Professor on Environmental Policy, Planning and Management at, in Faculdade de Saúde Pública in Universidade de São Paulo and Pro-rector of Research that university.
Local Green Governance: integrating sustainability into Public Policy in light of climate changes1 1Preliminary version presented in URBENVIRON International Seminar on Environmental Planning and Management , Niterói, 2010, in theme: 1 Environmental Governance at the Local Level: Urban planning as an instrument of local governance.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 7 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 INTRODUCTION In 2010, the Southeast region of Brazil was affected by intense and frequent storms, which caused significant losses to the national economics.
A scenario with hundreds of people homeless and victims of floods and landslides, requiring reallocation of government resources and solidarity of society.
Heat waves have caused low levels of humidity comparable to African deserts (Miranda, 2010) leading to an increase in hospitalizations due to infections or respiratory complications, especially in populations with low adaptive capacity.
Besides feeling the changes of climate the company receives information from the media, as occurred during the 15th Conference of the Parties COP15, United Nations, held in Copenhagen.
This, added to extreme episodes brought the sample of cities possible effects of global climate change provided by the scientific community in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC.
Despite the uncertainties about whether they are natural or anthropogenic factors that cause the changes, the development of studies demonstrates that the changes should be taken into account by the different spheres of government and civil society (Martins, 2009).
As this author says, this issue must be faced and properly addressed seriously by the "complexity of the topic and abstract and uncertain character of many of these changes and their consequent impacts" (Martins, 2009, p. 01).
Locally, there is the search for new ways to manage problematic in view of the particularity of "scenario with geographic, cultural, social, economic and political contexts, and in some cases, conflicting" (Salles, 2000, p. 02).
Thus, the question that arises is how to prepare for this new situation encompassed by uncertainty?
When and where are these effects?
Will be the cities most affected?
This paper is part of the project (Local Government: Action Plan for Adaptation to Climate Events) submitted to FAPESP State of São Paulo Research Foundation.
The locus of the research is Cubatão-SP due to the particular characteristics in the theme social, economic, environmental, cultural and historical is more likely the effect of such climatic events.
Also, the municipality counts on the Center for Research and Training in the Environment (CEPEMA) of the Universidade de São Paulo(USP) as a support.
BACKGROUND According to Barry and Chorby (1998), the results of a study on behavior of the climate predict that over the next 100 years the increase in global temperature can vary 2 ° C and 4 º C, together with the rise of sea level of 20 cm and 60 cm.
In response to scientific evidence of climate change, the United Nations Environment Programme and World Meteorological Organization, established in 1988, the IPCC to get subsidies for the development of public policies (IPCC, 2001).
The potential effects of climate change in cities are exposed to storms, erosion, rising sea levels in coastal towns, fresh water scarcity, need for new water sources and infrastructure, increased pollution, increased incidence of diseases infectious diseases such as dengue or yellow fever with a high public health Thus the local effects of climate change are economic, social and environmental issues, most visible in developing countries by the characteristics, economic (less resources to deal with the effects of global change) and economic vulnerability and social (Samaniego, 2009; La Torre et al., 2009; Philippi Jr. et al., 2010).
Consequently, the output is the implementation of effective action in public spheres.
The economic factor is the vulnerability of populations, thus the share in poverty is more likely to suffer from food shortages and other impacts, difficulties of return and their activities tend to migrate to other locations (Cord et al.
2008; Valencio, 2008; Philippi Jr. et al., 2010, Marengo, 2010).
The data presented in reports like the World Bank, besides demonstrating the vulnerability of developing countries on climate change, bring about the need to invest in mitigation strategies and adaptation, but necessity is not recognized by the international community as noted by Sachs (2010).
It is known that the generation of knowledge about the vulnerability of countries is related to formulation and implementation of effective public policies to adapt to climate change, which will happen only when developed the mapping of hotspots in South America and the complex interrelationship of development human and climate change.
The complexity in addressing the issue of climate change as soon approached, led us to look forward to study it in an interdisciplinary approach to environmental policies in local government, included a proposal for sustainable development.
For this to make brief reference to this subject.
The reason for choosing public policies in place rests with the globalization process that transformed the world into a global village as called Ianni (1997) and the environmental issue of "global change" and created new challenges for municipal management.
Within this new reality is the need to reform the state in order to humanize and restore stability in a society where the migratory flux may be intensified from the most affected regions to less affected ones.
Such movement has influenced populations to translocate daily management to the local sphere, while government structures still work at a beginning of century way (Dowbor, 1998).
To change this panorama of centralized decision making that affects greatly the local societies of Brazil, stands out as a legal reference, the promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution, which prescribes how provision (in Chapter IV, Article 29, section X) the need to "cooperation of representative associations for the planning, pointing, therefore, guidelines for municipal management.
Moreover, the Constitutional Charter provides in Chapter II of Article 182, urban policies and the article in question is regulated by the City Statute of 2001 (Brasil, 1988; Brasil, 2001).
The Statute of the Cities (Federal Law No.
10.257 of 2001) in his article two on public policy reaffirms how it should be municipal management in item II: democratic management through Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 8 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 participation of the population and associations representing various segments of the community in formulating, implementation and monitoring of plans, programs and projects for urban development and focuses on Article 45: (...) The management bodies include mandatory and meaningful participation of people and associations representing various segments of the community, to ensure control direct its activities and the full exercise of citizenship.
There is thus explicitly the need to assess and monitor the actions of management by different societal actors (Brasil, 2001; Padilha et al., 2007).
Through instruments such as municipal councils thematic or management of public policies, citizen participation might enable the legitimacy and effectiveness by means of parity in the official media of public administration in order to be spokespersons of the community in dealing with the "common good" (Milaré, 1999; Philippi Jr. et al.
1999; Assis, 2009).
This focus on participation of different actors "in the process of articulation of demands" as cited Cardoso (1995), is essential for the municipal administrations to set priorities for action.
The demands priority should naturally be part of municipal planning.
In general, we observe the results of the project "Strategic Assessment Methodology Process for Implementation of Policy Development and Environment in the Municipality of Santo André, SP MEGA difficulties of the municipal management facing society engagement with the councils and local decision-making, especially regarding the continuity of projects.
From the experience of the MEGA project in the municipality of Santo Andre, it is believed that a proposal for sustainable development including climate change in government policy allows for the implementation of strategies to adapt to global changes in the society.
For this to happen, according to Camargo (2003) cited in Fapesp (2009) in the balance of 10 years from 1992 RIO has demonstrated the lack of governance mechanisms in order to strengthen the management capacity of both governments to increase their participation, the effectiveness of results in light of sustainable development.
It is understood, therefore, that strategies for implementing sustainable development and the new changes indicated by the IPCC should take citizen participation into account in environmental planning.
Thus, when discussing the environmental planning for the climate change of a municipality, it is imperative to assume the necessity of a representative process involving multi-stakeholder, what should be done in a transparent manner.
Such actions can result in an appropriate proposal for sustainable municipal development as envisaged in Agenda 21 (Oliveira, 2004; Agenda 21, 1994).
In this sense, the direction of public policy, from a mission and a vision of the future already defined by legal means and institutions that embody the expectations of citizens is the means by which the city administration does its job.
Thus, sustainable development, bounded by support economic, social, environmental and cultural (Fernandes et al., 2009), may become more viable and be implemented within the established and future prospects of socially desired in a given space.
Reopening the issue, the implementation of strategic planning for climate changes will depend, for their enforcement among others the orientation of public policies in line with the interests of society in line with the new scenarios in relation to emissions reduction greenhouse gases.
Apart from the possible impacts as a result of oil exploration in the Santos basin.
Thus, the proposed environmental planning must be preceded by the verification available tools to analyze the evolution of municipality management by researchers, planners and all taken as executors of public policies.
For this reason, historical, socioeconomic and environmental studies are needed, through the review of municipal regulations governing environmental planning, so that managers can rely on a feedback tool for their actions.
The key points to be taken into account involve the assessment of strategies linked to the generation of employment and income, regional disparities and interpersonal reducing, changes in patterns of production and consumption, the construction of sustainable and healthy cities, the adoption of new models and management tools (Fapesp, 2009).
According Salles (2000), municipalities have several possibilities for application of instruments required for the establishment of strategies for prevention, control and mitigation of adverse social, economic and environmental, through plans, programs and projects, always taking into consideration priorities and local and regional aspects.
This same author classifies the instruments as: Legal Organic Law, the Master Plan, Installment Land Law, Law of use and occupation and Environmental Code; Budget Municipal Environment Fund and Incentive Tax, Administrative Information System, technicaladministrative, technical and technological and Communications Environmental Education, Agenda 21, Regional Consortium.
Given that governance at local level requires a mechanism to mediate between civil society and state, providing improved capacity gestational government in formulating public policies, it becomes relevant to investigate how to structure such principles as that enables the State and civil society, increasing the degree of adaptability of the city opposite the impacts resulting from climate change.
At COP 15, Brazil announced the goal in Brazil to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and promulgation of the National Policy on Climate Change NMCP, (Federal Law No.
12,187 of December 29th, 2009), which defined the need "to implement measures to promote adaptation to climate change by 3 (three) areas of the Federation "(Brasil, 2009).
This is explained in the guidelines of the NMCP (FL12, 187/09) in paragraph V: stimulating and supporting the participation of federal, state, county and municipal as well as the productive sector, academics and civil society organizations, in the development and implementation of policies, plans, programs and actions related to climate change as well as demonstrate the necessity of involving stakeholders and the development of research among others, Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 9 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 aiming to reduce the impacts of climate change.
In Article 6 of NMCP (FL12, 187/09) between the instruments given are "measures dissemination, education and awareness" is this topic important to allow for the involvement of the most affected.
In this vision, outlined by experts in the field of the effects of climate change, whereby certain segments of the population will be most affected, there is compelling need for this new environmental concern to be included on the local agenda by means of instruments that aim to implement measures appropriate to reduce impacts and promote sustainable development.
THE CITY OF CUBATÃO The municipality of Cubatão is located in the Metropolitan Region of Baixada Santista (Santos Lowland), by the State of São Paulo coast, an area which occupies 142 km2 and situated 57 km away from the state capital, with altitudes varying from 3 m to 700 m above sea level.
Its environmental issue is centered in the complexity of mediating its economic and social conflicts, as well as the peculiarity of local ecosystems.
Territorial division for land occupation and usage was established by Complementary State Law 2.513 dated 10/ 10/1998 and today the determinations for soil usage in the municipality of Cubatão are only "for fiscal, urbanistic, and planning purposes, solely in preservation urban area and urban area" (Prefeitura de Cubatão, 1998, art.
3º).
Agriculture prevailed until the mid-Twentieth Century in the Santos lowland, which changed staring in 1960, when Cubatão began to be occupied predominantly by industries (Ferreira, 2007).
According to Young and Fusco (2006), urban and industrial occupation in a very fragmented and dispersed way caused negative impacts to the region's natural environment in the municipality, which were not limited to the implementation of the petrochemical pole alone.
Since the building of Anchieta Highway and, latter, Imigrantes Highway, Cubatão became a municipality inhabited mainly by low-income and lowqualified workers, with labor ties in civil construction and local manufacturing plants.
Better qualified workers possessing higher income and better conditions moved to neighboring municipalities in search of more adequate housing and infrastructure.
Thus, despite being rich, the municipality of Cubatão consolidated itself with a profile of a low-income population.
For that reason, pockets of poverty, which demonstrate the social vulnerability of a portion of local population, can be seen.
According to the Índice Paulista de Vulnerabilidade Social IPVS (Paulista Index of Social Vulnerability) -, 42.2% of the Cubatão population are exposed to high and very high vulnerability.
The index is comprised of, among other indicators, family income, level of education of the head of the family, and by the number of children (SEADE, 2000).
Another factor to taken into account is the location and altitude of the city which, according to forecasts of sea level elevation due to climate change, will suffer massive impact, reaching, especially, the already vulnerable population.
As a result of the building of Anchieta Highway and the consolidation of Cubatão as the Industrial Pole of the Santos Lowland, the region started receiving a large population contingent and, consequently, irregular settlements began to appear with greater expression (Young and Fusco, 2006).
Aside from this aggravating point, another factor that must be mentioned is population's exposure to contaminants liberated by the manufacturing plants.
The Cubatão community lives in the petrochemical pole and is exposed to a wide range of toxic substances, leading to public health problems.
According to Guilherme (1988) the harms to the Cubatão public health are divided into three groups: 1) those resulting from absence of sanitation and housing infrastructure poverty related harm; 2) those related to the production process occupational diseases and labor accidents; 3) those resulting from industrial pollution.
The author also reports the fire in Vila Socó due to leakage in a Petrobrás oil pipeline, as well as several physical and/or mental development congenital anomalies in newborns possibly related to pollutants.
Located in the Atlantic Forest biome, Cubatão possesses mountainous and flatland areas comprised chiefly of Dense Ombrophilous Forrest and Mangroves, which suffered with the pressure of firewood exploitation in the past and, since 1950, beginning of the industrialization process, with the installation of manufacturing plants and population settlements (Borges et al., 2002).
Thus, Cubatão possesses Conservation Units, whose main purpose is the conservation of nature and definition of boundaries.
In Cubatão, the Parque Estadual da Serra do Mar, the Parque Municipal do Perequê and the Parque Municipal CotiaPará (CIESP, 2006) stand out.
The Cubatão municipality is composed of the Núcleo Itutinga-Pilões of the Parque Estadual da Serra do Mar, responsible for approximately 80% of all the water supply of the Santos Lowland, revealing its regional importance to hydric production.
Those reservations also contribute to the improvement of air quality since it increases relative humidity and improves climate conditions in a general way, rendering an environmental service to neighboring human populations.
The forest also contributes to the formation of a natural coating of mountainsides, reducing the risk of landslides.
Regarding the matter of Cubatão's basic sanitation one finds complexities related to the municipality's socioeconomic nature.
Its main problems are associated to the non-prioritization of resources directed to the infrastructure of essential services, as well as the precarious conditions living conditions in irregularly occupied areas.
Therefore, the current situation of the municipality of Cubatão is unsatisfactory.
The deficit in services of drinking water supply and sanitation sewage to the population are in 72 and 29% respectively, according to the SNIS National System of Sanitation Information (Brasil, 2007).
The regular operation of those services is provided by SABESP Basic Sanitation Sao Paulo State Company, under a concession contract expiring in 2009.
Though this deficiency portrays the reality of most Brazilian municipalities, it figures as a real challenge to local management considering that a great part of the population lives in Permanent Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 10 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 Protection Areas, preventing the normalization of water and sewage services.
When comparing water and sewage service indexes between the years of 2004 and 2007, one finds an increase of 7% and 1% respectively in the rendering of such services (SNIS, 2004 e 2007).
It is important to point out that besides the quantitative indexes of the provision of water and sewage services the municipality of Cubatão presents demands for improvement in qualitative monitoring.
According to Agenda 21 (Prefeitura Municipal de Cubatão, 2006), the current monitoring of water quality parameters such as turbidity and the presence of heavy metals is deficient.
Besides, the same document points out the difficulty of the population to access existing information.
Both, SABESP and CETESB São Paulo State Environmental Agency operate monitoring wells.
Until the date of publication mentioned, monitoring of the quality of treated domestic effluents was nonexistent.
Regarding Solid Waste the city of Cubatão uses a Sanitary Landfill located in Santos, in adequate conditions since 2003 according to the assessment of the Landfill Quality Index (IQR) of the Environmental Company of the State of São Paulo (CETESB, 2008).
Though the collection of domestic waste is satisfactory in urban areas, according to the municipality's Agenda 21 analysis (2006) the system presents deficiencies such as insufficient collection in areas of disorganized occupation, resulting in the practice of waste dumping in bodies of water, underexplored recycling programs and absence of composting of the organic fraction.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES Considering the current context of climate change, a local governance model is necessary as opportunity to increase the effectiveness of decision making and the implementation of public policies in face of climate change, guaranteeing, thus, development on sustainable basis.
Thus, the main goal of project is to build participatory management tools in order to assist the implementation of public policies addressing climate change in Cubatão.
The specific objectives are proposed upgrade on bibliographic research theme, in order to create the database environment, social and economic study on the municipality and check the conditions for social participation in decision-making processes at the municipal environmental management, identify the Environmental Management System (EMS) in the municipality, identifying the weaknesses in the light of climate changes.
METHODOLOGIES According to Gil (2002) scientific research depends on a "set of intellectual and technical procedures" so that their goals are achieved.
For this, Mehta and Singh (2001) state that their preparation must be based on careful planning, as well as solid conceptual reflections grounded in existing knowledge.
Thus, the methodological framework described below is based on this project proposal aimed at applying the theoretical knowledge of the MEGA methodology and other of participatory nature, still arrangement phase.
The MEGA methodology Methodology for the Evaluation of Strategic Environmental Management, funded by FAPESP, was developed by SIADES Group and coordinated by the Department of Environmental Health, School of Public Health School, whose final objective was to propose a way of evaluating strategic formulation and implementation of environmental policies in the context of environmental management as mentioned in the literature review (Fapesp, 2009).
MEGA The methodology is structured in the following steps: 1.
Data collection through interviews and workshops: Search up and understand the processes of construction and implementation of public policies, since the problems that motivated them, spaces for discussion, political debate until the final formulation, implementation and review of the effectiveness of some cases.
2.
Systematization of data is on three levels of access and construction of knowledge: the raw data, dimensions and concepts of reality (Quivy and Campenhoudt, 2008).
The grouping of raw data reflects this phenomenon.
The dimensions of reality and complex classification of the phenomenon is a result of the grouping of the main features (most often in speeches either in interviews or in the workshops).
The concepts are the basis for referential analysis of public policy, especially the dimensions of sustainability and the principles of Agenda 21.
3.
Strategic analysis: from the "tool of SWOT matrix" study are four vectors of the strategy: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
This is the analysis model from which we can highlight in each of the dimensions of reality, merits and weaknesses, as well as positive or negative influence exerted in the context of the process of policy formulation.
4.
Assessment for improving learning: Based on the previous steps, appears the following circular process of evaluation of public policies: a) Decisionmaking, b) Planning and Implementation, c) Monitoring d) Evaluation.
Based on the methodologies described above, the project was structured in three stages: the first in Diagnosis, which will be built in the scope of theoretical research as well as the setting for the reality of the city.
The second of building local governance, with the community, in order to build the vision and mission of the municipality for adapting to climate events, thus, providing subsidies for the identification of appropriate management tools to that community that will structure the Plan Action to adapt to climate events, and finally the stage of validation of the action plan with the community and experts.
Such technical procedures used in making the research operational are described below: (i) Bibliographical Research of scientific publications on governance, governance indicators, climate change, local governance, environmental syndromes and participative environmental management strategic indicators, legal scope on the subject as a whole and studies (cases) performed in Cubatão-SP; to be accomplished in libraries, portals of journals, books and others, consolidating concepts and methods in supporting the proposition Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 11 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 of the Green Governance Model.
(ii) Documental Research of environmental, socio-economic, and institutional data on the municipality of Cubatão.
This is a continuous process throughout the project and is accomplished through databases of governmental and non-governmental institutions that play a role in the promotion of quality of life and sustainability, such as IBGE Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, SEADE Foundation State System Data Analysis Foundation, CETESB Environmental Sao Paulo State Agency and SNIS.
(iii) Field Research to be accomplished in two ways: through semistructured interviews with the consent of the interviewee, where participation is nonmandatory and the right of abandonment is sustained throughout, observing the ethical aspects recommended in research involving human beings (CNS Resolution 196/96).
It should be pointed out that this project will be submitted to the School's Ethical Committee during the qualification stage (second semester of 2010).
According to QUIVY and CAMPENHOUDT (2008) interviewing is a method that allows for analysis of the actors in terms of related knowledge, analysis of a specific problem, reconstructing a process of action, experience or past event, enabling for a degree of depth into the elements gathered in the analysis, allowing for the collection of statements and interpretations of the interlocutor, respecting his/her own reference frames.
The purpose of the semi-structured interview is to corroborate the evidence resulting from documental research and/or add information about the environmental management system of the studied municipality.
The interview will be performed with the administrator responsible for the municipality's environmental management (secretary, director, manager), who will be identified in the course of the research.
(iv) Workshops: scientific tool for the conceptual discussion among the members of the SIADES network indicators, by means of forums promote for the discussion with the community, both municipal and scientific, represented by the members of the SIADES group, in the course of the project.
The contributions and proposals arising out of those events will be taken into account at the closing of the many stages.
(v) Seminar: conducted to present the partial results of stage of the project to the community.
Furthermore, weekly meetings will be conducted as a way to inform the team about the latest happenings of the Project and making necessary adjustments.
Those events will take place via Skype and face to face.
Larger meetings will be scheduled via videoconference, signalizing the beginning and closing of each working stage.
It should be pointed out that the following is intended throughout the research: (i) Producing and disclosing knowledge through publications and seminars as to contribute with new public policy proposals in the context of climate change; (ii) Guiding efforts toward consolidating the network of indicators SIADES; (iii) Inserting knowledge and experience acquired throughout the research period into teaching and research activities in the São Carlos Engineering University (EESC-USP), School of Public Health (FPS-USP) and Environmental Training and Research Center (CEPEMA) As the research is performed, it becomes necessary to measure (quantitative) or analyze (qualitative) if the expected objectives of changes are being reached, translating into indicators of observable and measurable manifestations (Quivy and Campenhoudt, 2008).
The technique of thematic content analysis (GOMES, 2007), with adaptations, will be utilized for the analysis of the conducted interviews.
Initially, the recorded material will be listened to, with the objective of: (a) having an aggregated view; (b) learning the peculiarities of the set of material to be analyzed; (c) elaborating initial assumptions that will serve as landmarks for the analysis and interpretation of the material; (d) choosing initial forms of classification; (e) determining the guiding theoretical concepts for the analysis.
At a second moment, the analysis itself will be conducted, according to the following stages: (a) take down notes of excerpts, fragments, or phrases of each text for analysis, (b) distribute the parts into categories; (c) make a description of the categorization result, (d) interpret obtained results with the support of adopted theoretical grounding.
As for the identification of environmental management scenario in Cubatão-SP, through bibliographical and documental research, it will be accomplished through analysis of the adopted theoretical reference.
Analysis of quantitative data: Microsoft-Excel-developed statistical spreadsheets will be elaborated for tabulating all data, and analysis categories based on the designed theoretical reference will be created for crossing all gathered information.
Graphs will be designed later for better understanding of those results.
EXPECTED RESULTS Each of the mentioned specific objectives is linked to an expected result with a set of activities and methodologies for its achievement, as displayed in the following table.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 12 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 Table 1 Expected Results PHASES SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE ACTIVITIES EXPECTED RESULTS Diagnosis Update bibliographical collection on the following themes: Updating bibliographical research focused on the following themes: governance, governance indicators, climate change, local governance, environmental syndromes and participat ive environmental management strategic indicators, legal scope on the subject as a whole and studies (cases) performed in Cubatão-SP; to be accomplished in libraries, portals of journals, books, and consulting institutions acting in that field; Increase in contact and visits to other national and international learning institutions (like China, Australia and SIADES Group) to identify research and interests related to objectives of this project; Theoretical compendium on the subject of research Create environmental, social, and economic database on the studied municipality Gathering of data through institutions such as IBGE, SEADE, CETESB, SNIS, and others, as well as with the municipality of Cubatão Data systematization Data Summary Identifying the municipality’s Environmental Management System (EMS) Understanding of the dynamic involving municipal environmental management in the Municipality of Cubatão-SP; -Consulting documents that record activities in the Cubatão-SP municipality’s environmental management scope, along with city hall and competent entit ies on the referred subject; Interview with key administrators to be identified along the process Scenario of the Cubatão-SP (administrative structure, legal apparatus, management instruments and institutional capacity) Construction Local governance Construction of the vision and mission of the municipality Discussion of feasibility of each instrument with a focus on climate change along with key leaders, managers and specialists, both technical and academic Training of managers and local leaders Proposal of an Pilot Action Plan for climate events adaptation Construction of a Framework proposal for dealing with the main local adaptation challenges Pilot Action Plan for climate events adaptation Validation Validate the Plan of Action for Adaptation to climate events Identification of faults by means of workshops with managers, key leadership positions Adjustments Action Plan for climate events adaptation Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 13 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 Acknowledgements Acknowledgements to the National Institute of Science and Technology for Environmental Studies (INCT-EMA), Brazilian Research Council (CNPq), State of São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) and Center for Environmental Research and Training (CEPEMA-Poli-USP).
REFERENCES Barry, R. G.; Chorby, R. J.
(1998), "Climatic change", in: Barry, R. G.; Chorby, R. J., Atmosphere, Weather and Climate, Routledge, New York, NY, pp.
311-335.
Borges, W. R.; Braga JR., J. C.; Torres, F. R. (2002), O que você precisa saber sobre Cubatão, Cubatão: Design & Print, Cubatão, SP.
Brasil (1998), Constituição Federativa do Brasil 1998, Federal/Centro Gráfico, Brasília, DF.
Brasil (2001), "Lei no 10.257 de 10 de julho de 2001.
Regulamenta os artigos 182 e 183 da Constituição Federal, estabelece diretrizes gerais da política urbana e dá outras providências", available at <http// www.planalto.gov.br-L10257> (accessed 15 February 2007).
Brasil (2009), Lei nº 12187, de 29 de dezembro de 2009.
Institui a Política Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima PNMC e dá outras providências, Diário Oficial da União, Brasília, DF.
Brasil (1994) Ministério do Meio Ambiente.
Agenda 21, Capítulo 6.
Brasília.
Secretaria Executiva.
Projeto PNUD BRA/94/016.
Versão eletrônica 1.1. available at: <http:// www.mma.gov.brindex.php?ido=conteudo.
monta&idEstrutura=18&idConteudo=575>.
(accessed 14 November 2008).
Cardoso, F. H. (1995), "O mais político dos temas econômicos: desenvolvimento", Revista de Economia Política, Vol.
15, No.
4, pp.
148-155.
Companhia Ambiental do Estado de São Paulo CETESPB (2008), "Inventário Estadual de Resíduos Sólidos Domiciliares", available at: <http://www.cetesb.sp.gov.br/Solo/ publicacoes.asp> (accessed 18 January 2010).
Cord, L.; Hull, C.; Hennet, C.; Van Der Vink, G., "Climate Change and Poverty: An Integrated Strategy for Adaptation", available at: <http://www1.worldbank.org/ prem/PREMNotes/Note3_Climate_Change_ and_Poverty.pf> (accessed 20 April 2010).
Dowbor, L. (1998), "Globalização e tendências institucionais", in: Dowbor, L.; Ianni, O.; Resende, P. E. A.
(Org.
), Desafios da globalização, Vozes, Petrópolis, RJ, pp.
916.
Ferreira, L. G. (2007) A gestão ambiental do polo industrial de Cubatão a partir do programa de controle da poluição iniciado em 1983: atores, instrumentos e indicadores, Dissertação de Mestrado, Faculdade de Saúde Pública da USP, São Paulo, SP.
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo FAPESP (2009), Mega Avaliação estratégica do processo de implementação de políticas públicas de desenvolvimento e meio ambiente no município de Santo André-SP: relatório científico, São Paulo, SP.
Gil, A. C. (2002), Como elaborar projeto de pesquisa, Atlas, São Paulo, SP.
Gomes, R. (2007), "Análise e interpretação de dados de pesquisa qualitativa", in: Minayo, M. C. S. (Org).
Pesquisa Social: teoria, método e criatividade, Vozes, Petrópolis, RJ, pp.
79-108.
Guilherme, M. L. (1998), "Urbanização, saúde e meio ambiente: o caso da implantação do pólo industrial de Cubatão e seus efeitos urbanos e regionais nos setores de saúde e poluição ambiental", in: Tartaglia, J.C.; Oliveira, O.S.
(Org).
Modernização e desenvolvimento no interior de São Paulo, EDUNESP, São Paulo, SP.
Ianni, O.
(1997), Teorias da globalização, Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, RJ.
Local Governments for Sustainability ICLEI (2001), "Cambio Climático y Desarrollo Limpio: Oportunidades para Gobiernos Locales", Una Guía del ICLEI.s.d., 1 CD-ROM.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC (2001), available at: <www.ipcc.org.ch>, (accessed 28 April 2010).
La Torre, A.; Fajnzylber, H.; Nash, J.
(2009), "Desarrollo con menos carbono: respuestas latinoamericanas al desafio del cambio climatico.
sl.
:Banco Mundial", available at: <http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/ d es a r ro l l o c o n m e n o s ca r b o n o .
p d f > .
(accessed 10 September 2009).
Marengo, J.
A. O.
(2010).
Encontro Acadêmico Mudanças Climáticas e Impactos na Saúde: uma revisão.
Faculdade de Saúde Pública; Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, São Paulo, SP.
Martins, R. D'A.
(2009), "População e mudança climática: dimensões humanas das mudanças ambientais globais", Ambient.
Soc, v. 12, n.2, December, p. 399.
Available at: <http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script =sci_arttext&pid=S1414-753X20090002000 14&lng=en&nrm=iso>, (accessed 24 April 2009).
Menezes, E. M.; Si lva, E. L. (2001), "Metodologia da pesquisa e elaboração de dissertação".
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianopolis, Santa Catarina, available at: <http://projetos.inf.ufsc.br/ arquivos/Metodologia%20da%20Pesquisa% 203a%20edicao.pdf> (accessed 16 February 2009).
Milaré, E. (1999), "Instrumentos legais e econômicos aplicáveis aos municípios.
Sistema Municipal do Meio Ambiente SISMUMA/SISNAMA", in: Philippi Jr. et al.
(Eds), Municípios e meio ambiente: perspectivas para a municipalização da gestão ambiental no Brasil, Associação Nacional de Municípios e Meio Ambiente, São Paulo, SP, pp.
33-42.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Ambientais Número 16 Junho/2010 14 ISSN Impresso 1808-4524 / ISSN Eletrônico: 2176-9478 Miranda, G. (2010), "São Paulo terá o maior prejuízo absoluto", available at: <http:// w ww1.folha.uol .com.br/fspciencia/ fe0702201002.htm>, (accessed 15 August 2010).
Oliveira, D. P. R. (2004), Planejamento estratégico: conceito, metodologia e práticas, Atlas, São Paulo, SP.
Padilha, Maria Luiza.
M. L.; et al.
(2007), "Impact of textile industry on cities and its role in the Brazilian context", in Kenneweg, H; Tröger, U.
(Org.).
2nd International Congress on Environmental Planning and Management: vision, implementations and results.
Berlin, Technische Universität Berlin, pp.
307310.
Philippi Jr. et al.
(1999), "Estruturação de um sistema de gestão ambiental", in: Philippi Jr. et al.
(Eds), Municípios e meio ambiente: perspectivas para a municipalização da gestão ambiental no Brasil, Associação Nacional de Municípios e Meio Ambiente, São Paulo, SP, pp.
128-130.
Philippi Jr., A. et al.
Sindromes climáticas y pobreza en la América del Sur.
Proyecto aprobado Fundación Carolina, 2010.
Prefeitura Municipal de Cubatão (2006), "Agenda 21 Cubatão 2020: A cidade que queremos", available at: <http:// w w w. n o vo m i l e n i o .
i n f. b r / c u b at a o / agenda21.htm> (accessed 25 November 2009).
Prefeitura Municipal de Cubatão (1998), "Lei Complementar nº 2.513 de 10/09/1998", available at: <http://ceaam.net/cbt/ legislacao/>, (accessed 04 August 2009).
Quivy, R.; Campenhoudt, L. V. (2008), Manual de Investigação em Ciências Sociais, 5ª Edição,Gradiva, Lisboa, PT.
Sachs, I.
(2010).
Rumo a Cúpula da Terra de 2012 [palestra].
São Paulo: IEA/USP.
Salles, C. P. (2000).
A situação da gestão ambiental municipal no Brasil.
São Paulo, [Dissertação de Mestrado] Faculdade de Saúde Pública da USP.
Samaniego, J.
(2009), "Cambio climático y desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe: una reseña.
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe", available at: <http:// www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/5/35435/28W-232-Cambio_Climatico-WEB.pdf>, (accessed 10 September 2009).
SEADE Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados (2000).
Índice Paulista de Responsabilidade Social 2000.
São Paulo, SP.
Valencio, N. F. L. S. (2008) Economia ambiental.
[Anotações de aula] Disciplina do Curso de Pós-graduação de Ciências da Engenharia Ambiental da Escola de Engenharia de São Carlos da USP, São Carlos, SP.
<< /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /All /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S.
Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Warning /CompatibilityLevel 1.4 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJDFFile false /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /SyntheticBoldness 1.00 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments false /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Apply /UCRandBGInfo /Preserve /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName (http://www.color.org) /PDFXTrapped /Unknown /Description << /FRA <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> /ENU (Use these settings to create PDF documents with higher image resolution for improved printing quality.
The PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Reader 5.0 and later.)
/JPN <FEFF3053306e8a2d5b9a306f30019ad889e350cf5ea6753b50cf3092542b308000200050004400460020658766f830924f5c62103059308b3068304d306b4f7f75283057307e30593002537052376642306e753b8cea3092670059279650306b4fdd306430533068304c3067304d307e305930023053306e8a2d5b9a30674f5c62103057305f00200050004400460020658766f8306f0020004100630072006f0062006100740020304a30883073002000520065006100640065007200200035002e003000204ee5964d30678868793a3067304d307e30593002> /DEU <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> /PTB <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> /DAN <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> /NLD <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> /ESP <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> /SUO <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> /ITA <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> /NOR <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> /SVE <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> /KOR <FEFFd5a5c0c1b41c0020c778c1c40020d488c9c8c7440020c5bbae300020c704d5740020ace0d574c0c1b3c4c7580020c774bbf8c9c0b97c0020c0acc6a9d558c5ec00200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020b9ccb4e4b824ba740020c7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c2edc2dcc624002e0020c7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020b9ccb4e000200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /CHS <FEFF4f7f75288fd94e9b8bbe7f6e521b5efa76840020005000440046002065876863ff0c5c065305542b66f49ad8768456fe50cf52068fa87387ff0c4ee563d09ad8625353708d2891cf30028be5002000500044004600206587686353ef4ee54f7f752800200020004100630072006f00620061007400204e0e002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020548c66f49ad87248672c62535f003002> /CHT <FEFF4f7f752890194e9b8a2d5b9a5efa7acb76840020005000440046002065874ef65305542b8f039ad876845f7150cf89e367905ea6ff0c4fbf65bc63d066075217537054c18cea3002005000440046002065874ef653ef4ee54f7f75280020004100630072006f0062006100740020548c002000520065006100640065007200200035002e0030002053ca66f465b07248672c4f86958b555f3002> >> >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [2400 2400] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice
No Job Name Contrasting climate change in the two polar regionspor_128 146..164 John Turner1 & Jim Overland2 1 British Antarctic Survey, High Cross, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ET, UK 2 Pacific Marine Environment Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 7600 Sand Point Way NE, Seattle, WA 98115, USApor_128 146..164 Abstract The two polar regions have experienced remarkably different climatic changes in recent decades.
The Arctic has seen a marked reduction in sea-ice extent throughout the year, with a peak during the autumn.
A new record minimum extent occurred in 2007, which was 40% below the long-term climatological mean.
In contrast, the extent of Antarctic sea ice has increased, with the greatest growth being in the autumn.
There has been a large-scale warming across much of the Arctic, with a resultant loss of permafrost and a reduction in snow cover.
The bulk of the Antarctic has experienced little change in surface temperature over the last 50 years, although a slight cooling has been evident around the coast of East Antarctica since about 1980, and recent research has pointed to a warming across West Antarctica.
The exception is the Antarctic Peninsula, where there has been a winter (summer) season warming on the western (eastern) side.
Many of the different changes observed between the two polar regions can be attributed to topographic factors and land/sea distribution.
The location of the Arctic Ocean at high latitude, with the consequently high level of solar radiation received in summer, allows the icealbedo feedback mechanism to operate effectively.
The Antarctic ozone hole has had a profound effect on the circulations of the high latitude ocean and atmosphere, isolating the continent and increasing the westerly winds over the Southern Ocean, especially during the summer and winter.
Keywords Annular modes; Antarctic; Arctic; climate change; ozone hole.
Correspondence John Turner, British Antarctic Survey, High Cross, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ET, UK.
E-mail: J.Turner@bas.ac.uk doi:10.1111/j.1751-8369.2009.00128.x The fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicated that some of the largest climatic changes over the next century are expected to occur at high latitudes (Solomon et al.
2007).
On this time scale, if concentrations of greenhouse gases continue to rise at the present rate, we can expect a large reduction in sea-ice extent in both polar regions, broadscale warming across the Arctic and Antarctic and greater high-latitude precipitation.
However, over recent decades the changes observed in the two polar regions have been markedly different.
Whereas the extent of late summer season sea ice in the Arctic has reached record minima, the Antarctic sea ice has increased in extent by a small amount.
Near-surface air temperatures have increased in many parts of the Arctic, yet temperatures across much of the Antarctic have actually decreased, but with the Antarctic Peninsula warming at a rate as high as observed anywhere in the Southern Hemisphere.
There is increasing evidence of enhanced melting on the periphery of Greenland, yet the Antarctic ice sheet appears to be essentially in balance.
The forcing by shortwave radiation is very similar in the two polar regions, and greenhouse gas concentrations are essentially the same in both areas.
So the contrasting changes that have taken place must be a result of differences in the topography and land/sea distribution of the two regions, which result in markedly different atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, along with factors specific to each area, such as the major depletion of stratospheric ozone that has occurred above the Antarctic.
In this paper we document the climatic changes that have taken place in recent decades, and consider our current knowledge of the mechanisms responsible for the changes.
We also suggest future research needs.
Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd146 mailto:Turner@bas.ac.uk The coupled elements of the polar climate systems Although record-breaking climatic events, such as the new minimum in Arctic sea-ice extent in September 2007, and the very large increase in surface temperature on the western side of the Antarctic Peninsula over the last 50 years, receive a great deal of attention in both scientific and popular literature, they should not be considered in isolation.
Research in recent years has shown the highly coupled nature of the polar environments, with the atmosphere, ocean and cryosphere often playing a role in concert in establishing anomalous conditions.
For example, changes in the atmospheric circulation can result in anomalies in the sea-ice extent, which in turn can affect the salinity of the ocean.
Whereas atmospheric anomalies can be quite shortlived, changes to the ocean can persist for long periods, so that understanding individual events can require the consideration of changes in the whole system over an extended period.
A factor that has played a role in many of the atmospheric and oceanic changes observed at high latitudes in recent years has been shifts in the large-scale modes of variability of the climate system (Stammerjohn, Martinson, Smith, Yuan et al.
2008).
Studies of atmospheric analyses have shown that the principal modes of variability in the atmospheric circulation of the extratropics consist of oscillations of mass (as measured by surface barometric pressure) between high and mid-latitudes (Thompson & Wallace 2000).
These can be observed as anomalies of opposite sign in mean sea-level pressure (MSLP), with periods of positive (negative) anomalies at high latitudes (mid-latitudes) developing before the anomalies reverse.
These anomalies have a near-zonally symmetric or annular structure, and are known as the Southern Annular Mode (SAM; also known as the highlatitude mode or the Antarctic Oscillation) and the Northern Annular Mode (NAM, which is related to the North Atlantic Oscillation) in the south and north, respectively.
The NAM and SAM can be seen in many parameters measured at high latitudes besides surface pressure, including temperature, geopotential height and zonal wind.
When the annular modes are more positive, atmospheric pressures are lower at high latitudes and higher in mid-latitudes, which results in a strengthening of the westerly winds.
Changes in the annular modes can therefore have major implications for oceanographic conditions.
Observational and modelling studies have shown that the SAM contributes a large proportion (ca.
35%) of the Southern Hemisphere climate variability on a large range of timescales, from daily (i.e., Baldwin 2001) to decadal (Kidson 1999), and is also likely to drive the large-scale circulation of the Southern Ocean.
An index of the SAM has been constructed from the pressure difference between the latitudes 40°S and 65°S (Marshall 2003), allowing its changes since 1957 to be investigated.
The record can be extended further back using proxy data, such as the tree-ring record (Jones & Widmann 2003).
It is possible to examine much longer-term changes in the NAM as meteorological observations from around the North Atlantic are available dating back to around the middle of the 19th century.
The two polar regions are also affected by a number of different modes of variability (Simmonds 2003; Yuan & Li 2008).
Tropical atmospheric and oceanic conditions can affect high latitudes, with signals of the El Niño– Southern Oscillation (ENSO) being transferred polewards via the Pacific South American Association (PSA) (Simmonds & Jacka 1995; Yuan & Martinson 2000; Yuan 2004) and the Pacific North American Association (PNA) (Turner 2004).
These two modes are characterized by a series of alternating positive and negative mean sea-level pressure anomalies, extending from the west-central equatorial Pacific into both hemispheres.
High–low latitude links that operate on longer time scales also exist, such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) (Zhang et al.
1997).
The PDO is important in influencing the climate of Alaska, and changes in the PDO have been linked to the recent warming across the region.
It has even been shown to modulate Antarctic precipitation (Monaghan & Bromwich 2008).
The impacts from the positive and negative phases of the PNA and NAM can act independently or simultaneously in any given winter, with trends in Arctic cyclones and variations influencing sea-ice cover (Simmonds et al.
2008).
As the PNA and NAM represent less than 50% of the interannual MSLP variability, a third type of pattern can arise, such as the anomalous meridional flow into the western Arctic observed in the first part of the 21st century (Overland et al.
2008).
The PSA has a strong influence on the climate of the Antarctic Peninsula/southern South America region, whereas the PNA affects the Aleutian Low.
Conditions in the tropical Indian Ocean have also been linked to climatic change in the North Atlantic (Hoerling et al.
2001; Hoerling et al.
2004).
However, the robustness of these statistical links (teleconnections) can change over time (Fogt & Bromwich 2006), so that very similar tropical El Niño or La Niña events can give quite different extratropical responses.
There are also interactions between the SAM and ENSO that further complicate the linkages of the tropical and high-latitude climates.
However, there is still debate over links between the ENSO and the NAM (Quadrelli & Wallace 2002).
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 147 Recent changes in the polar environment Atmospheric circulation The Arctic.
In the Northern Hemisphere, we have a long record of the variations in the NAO/NAM (Fig.
1a).
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries there were fluctuations in the index, and periods of positive anomaly, such as around 1910, but no overall trend.
The most marked trend has been from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, when the index shifted from a large negative to a large positive anomaly.
This change resulted in a strengthening of the mid-latitude westerlies, and the advection of warm air from the North Atlantic into the Arctic Ocean and northern Russia.
As in the south, increasing levels of greenhouse gases can shift the NAM into its positive phase.
However, since the mid-1990s, at a time of record levels of greenhouse gases, the NAM has reverted to more neutral conditions, indicating the complex nature of climate change.
The Arctic has not experienced the level of stratospheric ozone loss that has been observed in the Antarctic, as there is more meridional heat transport in the north, and hence stratospheric temperatures are not Fig.
1 (a) The winter season North Atlantic Oscillation index based on station data.
The thick line is the 5-year running mean.
(Data from the Climate and Global Dynamics group, National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO, USA.)
(b) Monthly values of the Southern Annular Mode (SAM) index.
The thick line is a 12-month running mean.
(From http:// www.antarctica.ac.uk/met/gjma/sam.html; figure courtesy of Dr Gareth Marshall, British Antarctic Survey.)
Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd148 http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/met/gjma/sam.html http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/met/gjma/sam.html cold enough for large-scale ozone destruction.
However, there has been some ozone loss, and Volodin & Galin (1999) found a link between ozone depletion and NAM trends.
This finding has not been reproduced in other models, and simulations forced by Randel & Wu’s (1999) ozone trends did not show a significant Northern Hemisphere circulation response, suggesting that the much weaker ozone depletion observed in the Northern Hemisphere has not been an important driver of circulation changes there.
The Aleutian Low is one of the main features of atmospheric circulation in the Northern Hemisphere during winter, with a controlling influence on North Pacific Ocean circulation, Bering Strait sea-ice extent and western North American surface climate (Zhu et al.
2007).
There has been a statistically significant 20th century shift to a deeper and more poleward winter Aleutian Low, which has been attributed to anthropogenic greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols (Fyfe, pers.
comm.
2008).
The Antarctic.
The SAM and NAM change as a result of natural climate variability, and also in response to various anthropogenic forcing factors.
Since 1957 the SAM has shifted to more positive conditions (Fig.
1b), with the largest change being during the summer and autumn seasons.
Marshall et al.
(2004) demonstrated that the upward trend in the summer SAM index during recent decades is inconsistent with simulated internal variability in the Hadley Centre General Circulation Model, which suggests an external cause.
Experiments with climate models have suggested that the SAM has changed most because of the development of the Antarctic ozone hole (Sexton 2001; Gillet & Thompson 2003).
The polar vortex is most pronounced in the winter stratosphere, when the air above the continent is extremely cold.
The destruction of stratospheric ozone above the Antarctic mostly takes place during the spring (Farman et al.
1985), thereby cooling the stratosphere and strengthening the polar vortex at this level during this season.
But the loss of springtime ozone as a result of the “ozone hole” has also cooled the stratosphere through the summer months.
This in turn has resulted in a lower mean sea-level pressure in the Antarctic at this time of year, thereby shifting the SAM into its positive phase (Thompson & Solomon 2002).
The changes in the SAM have resulted in a poleward contraction, and an increase of about 20% in the strength of the circumpolar westerly winds during autumn.
In addition, the shift to a positive phase of the SAM has given weakened descent and colder temperatures over most of Antarctica, and has increased the production of coastal sea ice.
Increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases have also been shown to move the SAM into its positive phase (Fyfe et al.
1999; Kushner et al.
2001; Stone et al.
2001).
However, model experiments suggest that the increase of greenhouse gases make a smaller contribution to the change than stratospheric ozone depletion (Arblaster & Meehl 2006).
Since the late 1970s, El Niño events have become more frequent and stronger.
However, it has been difficult to find high-latitude climate changes than can be attributed to these alterations in the tropical circulation.
Around the Antarctic, a shift to more El Niño events would tend to promote a stronger PSA pattern, with more highpressure/blocking events to the west of the Antarctic Peninsula.
However, the available atmospheric analyses would suggest that there has been the reverse of this trend, with more storms in the area, again indicating the highly nonlinear links between the highand lowlatitude areas.
Pezza et al.
(2008) have recently proposed that there is an organized hemispheric cyclone pattern associated with the ENSO, the SAM, sea-ice extent and rainfall anomalies in Southern Australia.
They suggest that the SAM and sea-ice extent are interlinked as part of a complex physical system that is best understood as a coupled mechanism.
Ocean circulation and water masses The Arctic Ocean.
Detecting changes in ocean circulation and water masses is more difficult than detecting changes in the atmosphere because of the lack of in situ observations in earlier decades.
For example, no data exist from large areas of the Southern Ocean prior to the 1950s, a problem that persisted up to the advent of the satellite era in the 1970s and 1980s.
Nevertheless, some indications of change are apparent.
Some of the largest oceanic changes have been observed in the Arctic Ocean.
Here, there has been an increase in river discharge into the ocean from northern Eurasia since the mid-1930s, which has contributed to a marked freshening of the ocean (Peterson et al.
2008).
This has happened in parallel with rising air temperatures (Johannessen et al.
2004), and greater snowfall across Eurasia when the NAM was in its positive phase (Min et al.
2008).
But there has been decreasing river discharge in eastern Canada over the period 1964–2003, probably also tied to trends in the NAM (Déry et al.
2005).
But on the other side of the continent, the Mackenzie River in Western Canada shows no long-term trend (Abdul & Burn 2006).
Discharge trends are greatest in the north, where the permafrost is most extensive and is melting.
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 149 Subsurface layers within the Arctic Ocean are sensitive to the penetration of heat from Atlantic Water (AW) and Pacific Water (PW) via the Fram and Bering straits.
Expeditions during the 1990s and 2000s measured variations in the heat content of AW, indicating a peak warming near the North Pole in 1995, a minimum in 2005 and a new warming pulse thereafter (Steele & Boyd 1998; Morison et al.
2002).
During the period 1965–1995, as the NAM index rose, warming was observed from AW advection into the Barents/Kara seas, and from PW advection into the Chukchi and western Beaufort seas.
Also during this period, winter sea-ice transport away from the eastern Siberian shelves created thin ice that melted quickly during summer, leading to a longer summer open-water period, during which solar energy warmed the ocean.
Recent ocean surface warming in the Beaufort/Chukchi/East Siberian seas since 2002 seems forced more by shortwave energy absorption than by northward-flowing ocean advection, although more in situ data are needed to confirm this.
The Southern Ocean.
Over recent decades certain parts of the Southern Ocean have changed very rapidly, but the pattern and physical nature of the changes are complex, and a number of mechanisms and feedbacks are believed to be implicated.
On the large scale, the waters of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current (ACC) have warmed more rapidly than the global ocean as a whole.
Temperature records from autonomous floats drifting at depths of between 700 and 1100 m during the 1990s were collated and examined by Gille (2002), who compared these data with earlier shipbased temperature measurements from the 1950s.
She identified a large-scale warming of the ACC at this depth of around 0.2°C (Fig.
2).
This work has recently been extended to show that the warming is greatest near the surface, where it has been as large as 1°C.
The temperature rise has not been constant, with the records showing a large shift in the upper ocean during the 1960s (Gille 2008).
It was also suggested that the warming could be a result of a southwards shift of the ACC current cores, essentially reflecting a redistribution of heat rather than an overall temperature increase.
The reasons for the warming of the circumpolar Southern Ocean are not known unambiguously, and it is likely that multiple processes may have played a role.
The shift of the SAM into its positive phase (Marshall 2003), with a subsequent increase in eastward wind stress over the Southern Ocean, and a shift in the band of maximum wind stress southwards, has had a major impact on the marine environment.
It has resulted in a reduction in the efficiency of the Southern Ocean CO2 sink, associated with changes in upwelling and mixing (Le Quéré et al.
2007).
The stronger westerlies could also have led to greater ocean eddy activity, and a consequent increase in the poleward eddy heat flux (Meredith & Hogg 2006; Hogg et al.
2008).
In addition, based on climate modelling studies, it has been suggested that the stronger winds over the Southern Ocean may be leading to an acceleration of the ACC (Hall & Visbeck 2002; Fyfe & Saenko 2006).
It has been hypothesized, and supported by coarseresolution climate modelling studies, that the ACC may have moved southwards in response to the change in the SAM (Oke & England 2004; Fyfe & Saenko 2006), effectively bringing warmer water further south, and leading to an apparent warming.
This suggestion is in line with the work of Gille (2002).
There is good observational evidence that the strength of the ACC does depend on the SAM on timescales from days and weeks (Aoki 2002; Hughes et al.
2003) to years (Meredith et al.
2004), but there is currently no evidence of a sustained, long-term increase in transport.
This may result from the lack of a suitable monitoring system, but available indications do suggest that any change in transport over the past few decades have been small, and typically of the order of only a few sverdrup.
Fig.
2 Regions of warming of the Southern Ocean at depth (ca.
700– 1100 m) in °C, derived by differencing temperature records from float data collected in the 1990s, with historical data collected by ships in previous decades.
(From Gille 2003.)
Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd150 A further process that could have contributed to the warming of the Southern Ocean is increased atmosphereto-ocean heat flux associated with raised levels of radiative greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and modelling studies have indicated that the rate of Southern Ocean warming would have been even higher, but for the masking effects of volcanic and other aerosols (Fyfe 2006).
South of the ACC there are also major changes taking place.
A very significant freshening of the waters in the coastal region between the Amundsen Sea and the Adélie Coast has been noted in recent decades (Jacobs et al.
2002), which could be of a comparable magnitude to the Great Salinity Anomaly of the North Atlantic (Dickson et al.
1988).
The cause of the freshening is believed to involve the increased melt of glacial ice from adjacent regions of Antarctica (Jacobs et al.
2002), and it has been theorized that the excess heat causing this melt has come from the increasing ocean temperatures (Walker et al.
2007).
There is also evidence of a change in the hydrological cycle affecting both northern and southern branches of the global meridional overturning circulation.
The observed freshening is not confined to the upper layers, but has been identified in some active areas of Antarctic Bottom Water formation, most notably in the Ross Sea (Rintoul 2007).
Regionally there has been a very strong warming in the ocean areas to the west of the Antarctic Peninsula, where the summertime surface ocean temperatures have warmed by more than 1°C since the 1950s, with an accompanying increase in salinity (Meredith & King 2005).
These changes reflect the well-known increase in atmospheric temperature (King 1994) and reduction in sea ice at this location (Comiso & Nishio 2007).
Temperature changes The Arctic.
There is large interannual and decadal temperature variability in both polar regions, which makes detection of trends difficult, especially as the length of the climate records are shorter than those for mid-latitude areas.
However, we are fortunate in the Arctic in having 59 stations with continuous records of near-surface temperature that start around 1930–1940, with 15 that extend back to 1900 and three that even start in the middle of the 19th century.
The temperature records from these 59 stations for January are shown in Fig.
3, along with a map indicating the locations of the stations.
This figure shows the complexity of temperature changes that take place on a range of timescales.
Decades of warmer or colder conditions can be found throughout the records, followed by switches back to more average conditions.
Large anomalies often occur across a range of longitudes, but are very rarely found all the way around the Arctic.
Overall, Fig.
3 shows generally warm temperatures for the 1990s, which is consistent with the global trend, whereas over the 1930s–1950s there were more regional/ temporal episodic warm events.
The record of Arctic temperatures shows that it has warmed twice as much as the global mean warming, but the Arctic changes are neither spatially nor temporally uniform.
For the central Arctic, the largest temperature trends over 1979–1995 occurred in the spring, the next largest trends occurred in winter, and trends for summer and autumn were much smaller (Serreze et al.
2000).
With a major loss of summer sea ice in 2005–08, the anomalous autumn surface air temperatures are now 5°C above normal over much of the central Arctic.
In terms of annual mean surface temperature (Fig.
4), north-western North America and central Siberia have experienced the greatest temperature rises over the last 50 years.
The warming across Alaska and northern Canada is mainly the result of a sudden warming in the mid-1970s, when there was a shift in the nature of the PDO, which deepened the Aleutian Low, thereby giving warmer conditions across Alaska.
The Antarctic.
Many of the in situ climate records for the Antarctic start around the time of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957/58, when a number of year-round research stations were established.
The 50-year records from these stations indicate the complex temperature changes that have taken place (Turner et al.
2005) (Fig.
5a).
This figure shows a pattern of large warming in the annual mean temperature on the western and northern parts of the Antarctic Peninsula, with Vernadksy (formerly Faraday) Station having the largest statistically significant (<5% level) trend, at +0.56°C per decade from 1951 to 2000.
Rothera Station, some 300 km to the south of Vernadksy, has a larger annual warming trend, but the shortness of the record and the large interannual variability of the temperatures renders the trend statistically insignificant.
The region of marked warming extends from the southern part of the western Antarctic Peninsula north to the South Shetland Islands, but the magnitude of the warming decreases northwards, away from Vernadksy.
At Orcadas, in the South Orkney Islands, a 100-year record shows a warming trend of only +0.20°C per decade.
Most of the Antarctic research stations are located around the edge of the continent, and we have the most reliable information on temperature change at these sites.
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 151 However, a number of attempts have been made to extrapolate the trends from the locations of the stations to the data-sparse interior areas of the continent (Chapman & Walsh 2007; Monaghan, Bromwich, Chapman et al.
2008).
Figure 5b shows the linear trends in annual mean surface temperature for the period 1958–2002, as determined in the Chapman & Walsh (2007) study.
This highlights the marked contrast in temperature between the Antarctic Peninsula and the rest of the continent.
Recently, the available in situ staffed station and automatic weather station temperature observations have been used in conjunction with satellite-derived surface Fig.
3 (a) The locations of the 59 stations with long records in the Arctic.
The station names are provided in Overland et al.
(2004).
(b) Surface temperature anomaly values for the 59 Arctic weather stations for January, relative to the 1961–1990 mean for each station.
(Illustrations updated from Overland et al.
2004.)
Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd152 skin temperatures to estimate temperature trends across the interior regions of the continent, where data are sparse (Steig et al.
2009).
The study found that there had been a significant warming across much of West Antarctica, with trends exceeding 0.1°C per decade, with the greatest warming having been during the winter and spring.
On a seasonal basis, the largest changes have been a winter (summer) warming on the western (eastern) side of the Antarctic Peninsula.
At Vernadksy, the warming Fig.
4 Linear trends in the annual surface temperature for 1950–2008.
(From http:// data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/maps/; courtesy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration/Goddard Institute for Space Studies.)
Fig.
5 (a) Annual and seasonal near-surface temperature trends, 1951–2006, for Antarctic stations with long in situ records (minimum 35 years).
The trends are for the full length of each record.
The colours indicate the statistical significance of the trends.
Trends were computed for the full length of each record.
Most stations started reporting around the time of the International Geophysical Year in 1957/58.
Autocorrelation was taken into account in computing the significance levels.
(Figure courtesy of Dr Gareth Marshall, British Antarctic Survey.)
(b) Linear trends of annual mean surface air temperature (°C per decade) for the period 1958–2002.
Greens and blues denote cooling; yellows and reds denote warming.
Significant trends are indicated by hatching (95% single hatching; 99% cross-hatching).
(From Chapman & Walsh 2007.)
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 153 http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/maps http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/maps during winter has been 5°C over the last 50 years, and is consistent with the oceanic warming noted earlier.
At this location there is a high correlation between the temperature and the winter sea-ice extent over the Amundsen– Bellingshausen Sea, suggesting greater sea-ice cover in the middle of the 20th century, and a progressive reduction since this time.
The reasons for the greater sea-ice extent in the 1950s and 1960s are not known with certainty, but may have been linked to weaker/fewer storms to the west of the peninsula, and greater atmospheric blocking.
A greater frequency of blocking anticyclones would have meant weaker northerly winds to the west of the Antarctic Peninsula, allowing the sea ice to advance farther north during the winter, and giving colder temperatures on the western side of the peninsula.
At present it is not known whether the western peninsula warming is a result of natural climate variability, or whether it has an anthropogenic origin or component.
On the eastern side of the Antarctic Peninsula the largest warming has been observed during the summer months, and has been associated with the strengthening of the circumpolar westerlies as the SAM has shifted into its positive phase (Marshall et al.
2006).
Stronger winds have resulted in enhanced temperature advection and more relatively warm, maritime air masses crossing the peninsula and reaching the low-lying ice shelves.
Higher temperatures on the ice shelves will also be a result of adiabatic descent and warming of the winds crossing the Antarctic Peninsula topography.
Around the rest of the coastal region of the continent there have been few statistically significant changes in surface temperature over the last 50 years (Fig.
5a).
However, the Amundsen–Scott Station, at the South Pole, has shown a statistically significant cooling in recent decades that is thought to be a result of fewer maritime air masses penetrating into the interior of the continent.
Since the development of the Antarctic ozone hole in the early 1980s, the resultant changes in the SAM have had a major impact on Antarctic temperatures.
Figure 6 shows the December–May surface temperature trends, and the contribution of the SAM to the trends.
This shows that over the summer–autumn period, the change of the SAM has resulted in a pattern of warming across the Antarctic Peninsula and a cooling around much of the coast of East Antarctica.
van den Broeke & van Lipzig (2004) argued that the reason for the winter cooling over East Antarctica during periods of high SAM index is the greater thermal isolation of Antarctica, resulting from increased zonal flow, decreased meridional flow and an intensified temperature inversion on the ice sheet because of weaker near-surface winds.
For the period 1957–2004 the estimated change in Antarctic nearsurface temperatures in autumn caused by the upward trend in the SAM index exceeds 1.0°C at seven of 14 stations with long records.
Without the loss of stratospheric ozone over the last 30 years, Antarctic warming may well have been more extensive.
Ice core proxy reconstructions of Antarctic surface temperatures provide an extremely important means of extending the climate record back into the preinstrumental period.
Such data show that in the past few decades the temperatures have moved outside the range of variability established over the past 1200 years (Mayewski & Maasch 2006).
The Antarctic radiosonde temperature profiles collected since the IGY indicate that there has been a warming of the winter troposphere and cooling of the stratosphere over the last 30 years.
The data show that regional midtropospheric temperatures have increased most around the 500-hPa level, with statistically significant changes of 0.5–0.7°C per decade (Fig.
7), which is the largest temperature increase at this level on Earth.
The spatial pattern of the warming can be appreciated from the 500hPa temperature trends in the European Centre for Medium-range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) reanalysis fields (Turner et al.
2006), although it should be noted Fig.
6 (a) December–May linear trends in surface temperature (1969–2000) and 925-hPa wind (1979–2000).
(b) The contribution of the Southern Annular Mode to the trends.
(From Thompson & Solomon 2002.
Reprinted with permission of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)
Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd154 that the trends here are a little larger than in the radiosonde data because of a cold bias in the early part of the reanalysis data set.
Recently, the Antarctic midtropospheric warming has been identified in the satellite Microwave Sounder Unit data (Johanson & Fu 2007).
Precipitation There are many problems in measuring solid precipitation at high latitudes, and gauge undercatch is a significant problem, especially in winter.
So it is difficult to determine the changes in precipitation over recent decades.
But, overall, there does seem to have been a recent increase in precipitation at certain locations, such as central Siberia, which is consistent with the positive NAM during this period, and the greater penetration of maritime air masses into the region.
These trends are more evident from snow-depth records than from precipitation records, but are also consistent with the greater input of freshwater into the Arctic Ocean.
From a modelling point of view, all 21 IPCC fourth assessment report climate models, when run over the second half of the 20th century, have an increasing trend in ensemble mean precipitation across the Antarctic (Bracegirdle et al.
2008).
Winter trends are similar to annual means, but summer shows no systematic changes.
In the Antarctic, the switch of the SAM into more positive conditions, with the consequent strengthening of the circumpolar vortex, is thought to have given drier conditions over large parts of West Antarctica, the Ross Ice Shelf and the Lambert Glacier region, and wetter conditions elsewhere (van den Broeke & van Lipzig 2004).
However, in situ measurement of precipitation on the Antarctic continent is very difficult, and much of our knowledge of precipitation variability and change has come from ice cores, from which it can be difficult to determine seasonal change.
A major study into changes in Antarctic accumulation (Monaghan et al.
2006) concluded that there had been no statistically significant change in accumulation across the continent since the IGY, although there has been variability in the firn (Helsen et al.
2008).
However, on longer timescales, and for limited areas, there are indications of change.
For example, a new ice core from the south-west corner of the Antarctic Peninsula has shown that there has been a doubling of the accumulation in that region since about 1850 (Thomas et al.
2008).
Fig.
7 Trends in the 500-hPa temperature over the period 1979–2001 from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts 40-year reanalysis, showing tropospheric warming around the 5-km level.
The contours are in °C per decade.
(From Turner et al.
2006.
Reprinted with permission of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 155 Sea ice The Arctic.
The marked decrease of Arctic sea-ice extent in recent years has been one of the most publicized aspects of polar climate change, and has been widely reported in the popular press as well as the scientific literature.
The loss of ice has been greatest in September (Fig.
8), with a decrease of over 10% per decade for the period 1979–2006.
In September 2007 the extent of Arctic sea ice reached a new minimum of 4.1 million km2 (Fig.
9), which was 39% below climatology, and some 23% below the previous minimum in 2005.
Although a progressive decrease of Arctic sea ice had been predicted by climate models for a number of years, most scientists were surprised by the dramatic sea-ice decline in 2007.
The ice appears to have reached a minimum in 2007 because of a long chain of events stretching back to the 1990s.
The age, area and thickness of the ice had decreased in recent years as a result of the “flushing” of much of the ice out of the Arctic Basin in the early 1990s, which pre-conditioned the decline (Nghiem et al.
2007).
The NAM was particularly strong and positive from 1989 to 1995, which advected a considerable volume of multiyear ice out of the Arctic into the Atlantic, so that the Fig.
8 The annual cycle of percentage change of sea-ice extent in (a) the Arctic and (b) the Antarctic.
Based on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Bootstrap sea-ice extent retrieval algorithm.
(From Turner et al.
2009.)
Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd156 area of perennial sea ice over the Arctic Ocean decreased from over 5.6 million km2 to 2.7 million km2, as sea ice drifted away at twice its usual speed.
Sea ice may reside in the Arctic for over 5 years, but it is strongly influenced by the state of the NAM, with increased ice advection away from the Russian coast during high NAM periods, and faster export of sea ice from the pole to the Fram Strait.
During summers with high NAM (June–August), ice motion increases the concentration of sea ice, and temperature advection increases the concentration of ice in the Chukchi Sea, but decreases the concentration of ice in the Canadian Beaufort Sea.
The NAM peaked around 1989–1995, and since then a more meridional circulation pattern (southerly wind anomalies from the Pacific sector) has been present.
These NAM and meridional flows persisted for multiple years, contributing to large-scale changes in ocean and sea-ice conditions (Shimada et al.
2006; Steele et al.
2008).
Despite the switch of the NAM to more neutral conditions, the Arctic sea-ice extent has continued to decrease, suggesting that the correlation between the NAM and Arctic climate that characterized the 20th century may now be broken.
The recently observed reduction in sea-ice cover in the Arctic Ocean is not spatially uniform, but rather is disproportionately large in the Pacific sector of the Arctic Ocean.
The spatial pattern of ice reduction is similar to the spatial distribution of warm Pacific Summer Water that crosses the upper portion of the halocline in the southern Canada Basin, north of the Chukchi Sea.
In 2007 the sea-ice minimum was reached as a result of favourable synoptic conditions, with the loss of sea ice on the Pacific side resulting from an unusually persistent surface high pressure/southerly wind pattern from June through to August, which transported heat and moisture into the central Arctic, north of the Bering Strait.
The high pressure over the Beaufort Sea produced fewer clouds, but because of the albedo of existing ice cover in this region, it did not impact on the area of major sea-ice loss further to the west (Schweiger et al.
2008).
The winds also advected sea ice across the central Arctic towards the Atlantic sector (Gascard et al.
2008).
A similar pressure pattern also occurred in 1977 and 1987, with no remarkable effect on sea-ice extent.
Warm Pacific water entering the Arctic Ocean via the Chukchi Sea also appears to have been important in the 2007 sea-ice minimum.
There has been a great deal of debate as to whether the minimum of Arctic ice extent in 2007 was a result of anthropogenic factors, or whether it could have occurred because of natural climate variability.
There were warmer air temperatures across many high-latitude areas during the 1930s, but there was not a decrease of Arctic sea ice on the scale of that seen in the early years of the 21st century.
At a workshop on recent highlatitude climate change in Seattle in October 2007, the participants concluded that the dramatic Arctic sea-ice loss in 2007 was caused by a combination of temperature increases as a result of a greater concentration of greenhouse gases, fortuitous timing in the natural variability of the atmospheric general circulation and positive feedbacks associated with a reduction in sea ice.
When run through the 21st century, some of the climate models used in the production of the IPCC fourth assessment report (Solomon et al.
2007) do have sea-ice extent decreases of the magnitude observed in recent years, although all the models do this much more slowly than is observed in the real world (Stroeve et al.
2007).
Representing rather small-scale atmospheric and oceanic processes and feedbacks in a climate model is extremely challenging.
The Antarctic.
In contrast to the Arctic, the extent of Southern Hemisphere sea ice has actually increased in the period since reliable satellite data became available in 1979.
The increase has been statistically significant, and has been greatest in March (Fig.
8b) and in the Ross Sea sector of the Southern Ocean.
The change in this area had been linked to a stronger cyclonic flow over West Antarctica, giving greater southerly flow off the Ross Ice Shelf Fig.
9 The minimum Arctic sea-ice extent in October 2007 (white area), relative to climatology (purple line).
(From Fetterer 2002 [updated 2009].)
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 157 (Stammerjohn, Martinson, Smith & Iannuzzi 2008).
This change in circulation was reflected in the ECMWF 40-year reanalysis (ERA-40) and the AR4 models run through the late 20th century.
Experiments with an atmosphere-only model have pointed to the springtime decrease of stratospheric ozone as playing a major role in changing the atmospheric circulation over the Amundsen Sea (Turner et al.
2009).
The ice sheets The Greenland ice sheet.
Recent changes in the Greenland ice sheet have received a great deal of attention in the scientific literature, as well as in the popular press, but estimating the net change in the mass of ice locked into the ice sheet is very difficult.
Much of the ice sheet is at high elevations, where temperatures remain below zero throughout the year, so with regional temperatures increasing (Cappelen 2004) it is estimated that the accumulation here has increased in recent decades (Box et al.
2006).
However, at lower elevations there is evidence of greater ablation, which has been observed by airborne laser altimeters (Krabill et al.
2000).
The greater ablation is resulting in more water on the surface of the ice sheet during summer and greater run-off (Hanna et al.
2008).
Overall, this pattern of change is thought to produce a negligible trend in the total surface mass balance of the ice sheet (Box et al.
2006), but as the ice sheet rests on rock, the additional run-off will directly contribute to the rise in sea level.
How much Greenland is contributing to sea-level rise is difficult to estimate.
The sea level is rising as a result of both thermal expansion and the melting of glacier ice, with both sources contributing about half each to the observed rise.
For the period 1961–2003 the observed contribution resulting from thermal expansion was 0.42 mm per year, with total glacier melt (ice sheets, ice caps and small glaciers) adding 0.69 mm per year (Solomon et al.
2007).
In recent years the rise in sea level has accelerated, and over 1993–2003 the contribution from these two sources increased to 1.60 mm per year and 1.19 mm per year, respectively (Solomon et al.
2007).
Estimates vary slightly over how much Greenland is contributing to the current rise in sea level, but best estimates are that it accounts for 20–30% of the total sea-level rise (Meier et al.
2007).
The Antarctic ice sheet.
As discussed earlier, outside of the Antarctic Peninsula temperature changes across the continent have been rather small over the last 50 years, and since about 1980 there has even been a small cooling along the coast of East Antarctica.
Not surprisingly, when coupled with the low temperatures that are experienced on the Antarctic Plateau, there is little evidence for melting of the ice sheet across most of the continent.
Analysis of the available accumulation data also suggests that there has not been any significant change in snowfall across the continent over the last 50 years (Monaghan et al.
2006).
However, two areas have exhibited marked change in recent decades.
The rise in temperature across the Antarctic Peninsula has resulted in the disintegration of a number of floating ice shelves, including the Larsen-B ice shelf in 2002, when 3250 km2 of shelf ice on the eastern side of the peninsula disintegrated into many small fragments over a period of months, releasing 500 billion tonnes of ice into the Southern Ocean.
Of course, this ice was already floating, so there was no impact on sea level.
However, a recent study of the glaciers around the coast of the peninsula has shown that over the last 50 years 87% of the 244 glaciers studied had retreated, and that the average retreat rates have accelerated (Cook et al.
2005).
The second major area where change has been observed is in the Pine Island and Thwaites Glacier region of West Antarctica.
The Pine Island Glacier is an extremely important part of the West Antarctic ice sheet, as it discharges 75 giga tonnes per year of ice into the Southern Ocean, which is the largest discharge of any ice stream in West Antarctica.
Satellite altimeter measurements have shown a major thinning of the ice sheet in the Pine Island region (Davis et al.
2005), with satellite radar interferometry data showing that the grounding line retreated 5 km inland between 1992 and 1996 (Rignot 1998).
A recent analysis (Rignot et al.
2008) using interferometry data found that ice sheet losses from coastal West Antarctica had increased by 59% in the 10 years to 2006.
Atmospheric temperatures in the Amundsen Sea embayment rarely reach melting point, and it is very unlikely that changes in atmospheric conditions have directly played a role in the loss of ice.
Rather, it is most likely that a change in ocean circulation is responsible for the loss of ice, with relatively warm circumpolar deep water (CDW) on the continental shelf playing a role (Thoma et al.
2008).
However, changes in atmospheric circulation related to the movement of the Amundsen Sea Low may have indirectly contributed to the variability in the delivery of CDW to the Pine Island area.
Melt in this area is thought to be responsible for most of the Antarctic contribution to recent sea-level rise, which accounts for 10–20% of the total rise.
Attribution of the observed changes Formal attribution of ongoing changes in the Arctic is difficult because natural variability is large.
However, evidence of an anthropogenic influence is emerging (Gillett Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd158 et al.
2009).
Analysis of model simulations provided to the IPCC shows that the inclusion of increasing greenhouse gases is essential to realistically represent the observed Arctic temperature increases during recent decades.
This contrasts with the warm period during the 1930s that Wang et al.
(2007) argue was caused by internal climate variability.
Other evidence consists of multiple indicators, including increased temperatures, diminished sea ice, degraded permafrost, enlarged melt area on Greenland, increased water vapour, decreased snow extent, increased river discharge and the resulting ecosystem impacts.
It is difficult to attribute a single event, such as the record minimum extent of Arctic sea ice in September 2007, to anthropogenic climate change.
However, there are several lines of evidence that support this conclusion.
The 2007 ice loss greatly exceeded that in any other year in the observational record.
Control runs of global climate models with no anthropogenic forcing do not exhibit similar events, but large year-on-year decreases are simulated in some ensemble members with anthropogenic forcing.
In the Antarctic, the strengthening of the westerly winds that has taken place as a result of the shift of the SAM into its positive phase is consistent with the simulated response to external forcing from stratospheric ozone depletion and greenhouse gas increases.
It has also been shown that the resultant warming on the eastern side of the Antarctic Peninsula and the break-up of several ice shelves can be attributed, at least in part, to anthropogenic influence.
There is also increasing evidence that the broadscale warming of the Southern Ocean is a result of anthropogenic forcing, combined with natural variability (Levitus et al.
2005).
Prospects for the next century Although the two polar regions have shown many contrasting features of change over recent decades, our best estimates are that by the end of the 21st century the similarities of change will be greater than the differences.
Producing reliable predictions of how the Antarctic climate will evolve over the next century is not easy, especially as many models have great difficulty in reproducing recent changes.
For example, Monaghan, Bromwich & Schneider (2008) found that a representative sample of IPCC models predicted the Antarctic to be warming at the global rate, whereas the rate of warming is much lower in reality.
Nevertheless, the IPCC models do provide useful, broad guidance on how the climate will change in the future, although it is not possible to put much weight on regional detail.
Bracegirdle et al.
(2008) used the IPCC predictions to examine how a number of aspects of the Antarctic climate system may change in the future.
They found that temperatures across the Antarctic were expected to increase by about 0.33 � 0.1°C per decade on land and 0.26 � 0.1°C per decade in the ocean/sea-ice zone, which is approximately the same change as the mean change for the land areas of the Earth.
Where sea ice is lost around East Antarctica the warming is predicted to be about 0.5°C per decade.
Larger increases in annual mean temperature are expected across the Arctic, with values of 0.6–0.8°C per decade over the northern parts of the continents, and the largest values of 1°C per decade over the Arctic Ocean (Solomon et al.
2007).
However, it appears that the real world is on a faster trajectory of Arctic sea-ice loss than the expected value projected by IPCC models, so great care must be exercised in using model output.
It is thus important to understand that although many of the IPCC projections are based on averages of model runs, reality is but a single realization.
As Arctic sea-ice extent is declining faster than forecast by climate models, a goal has to be to develop a framework for describing climate model uncertainty in sea-ice retreat.
The IPCC’s fourth assessment report models have a very wide range of projections for sea-ice evolution over the next century, and a major target must be to reduce this uncertainty.
There has been a great deal of discussion about if and when the Arctic Ocean will become ice-free in the summer during the present century.
If the changes seen in recent years are indicative of what will happen in the future, there could be a nearly ice-free summer Arctic before 2030, as suggested by Stroeve et al.
(2008).
It should be noted that some scientists feel that even this date is too conservative.
With such large changes in Arctic sea-ice extent in recent years it is interesting to consider whether there are any possible brakes on the system.
Polar amplification of global warming may slow the poleward transport of sensible heat, but the transport of latent heat may increase.
Arctic cloud cover is increasing during winter, and decreasing during other seasons.
However, over the Arctic Ocean the “shading effect” will be small because of the low contrast between clouds and ice/snow.
Increased precipitation–evaporation may slow the thermohaline circulation, but model results imply a constant or even increasing flow of warm AW into the Arctic Ocean.
In the south, the recent increase in Antarctic sea-ice extent is expected to peak within the next decade or two as greenhouse gas levels rise and stratospheric ozone levels recover.
By the end of the century there is expected to be a reduction in the Antarctic sea-ice area of about 33%, over the year as a whole, and a 25% reduction of sea-ice extent (Bracegirdle et al.
2008).
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 159 In the Antarctic, the future recovery of stratospheric ozone concentrations will weaken the positive trend in the SAM index, and will provide less of a mask to greenhouse gas impacts on warming across the continent and the sea-ice zone, thereby promoting sea-ice loss (Perlwitz et al.
2008).
A continued increase in greenhouse gases, however, has two effects: it contributes to maintaining the positive trend in the SAM index, and also augments the surface energy balance.
Which effect will dominate the coming decades is a question of ongoing research (Keeley et al.
2007).
The states of the Arctic and Antarctic climate systems are the result of complex interactions between external forcing, large-scale nonlinear climate dynamics and regional feedbacks.
However, given the recent dramatic loss of multiyear sea ice in the north, and the projections of continued global warming, it seems nearly impossible for summer Arctic sea ice to return to its climatological extent of prior to 1980.
Over the next century models suggest an increase of snowfall across the Antarctic of 25–50%, with a switch of 10% of snowfall to rain in summer.
The winter warming of the Antarctic Peninsula is expected to continue as a result of reduced sea-ice extent, and similar warming will spread to many other coastal regions.
A widespread increase of the circumpolar westerlies is expected, leading to a decrease of coastal easterlies, particularly in summer and autumn.
The models suggest westerlies over the Southern Ocean will increase by 10–20%, but it is not expected that there will be large changes in winds over the continent.
However, most of Antarctica will remain well below freezing, so there will be no largescale melting of the ice sheet.
However, a major uncertainty is what will happen in the Amundsen Sea sector of the West Antarctic ice sheet.
Recent observations have shown that this is currently the most rapidly changing region of the entire Antarctic ice sheet, with an acceleration of flow caused by the basal melting of its ice shelf and subsequent grounding line retreat of Pine Island Glacier.
The fear is that continued melting in this sector will result in the enhanced flow of ice from the interior of the ice sheet.
Conclusions The two polar regions have experienced markedly different climatic changes in recent decades, at a time when they were subject to near identical solar forcing and increases in greenhouse gas levels.
Initially, this may seem to suggest a paradox, but they are largely consistent with the known oceanic and atmospheric dynamics acting on contrasting topography, land/sea distribution and regional environmental factors.
The recent changes at both poles, although different, are consistent with known impacts from shifts in atmospheric circulation and from thermodynamic processes that are, in turn, a consequence of anthropogenic influences on the climate system.
Changes in the annular modes have played an important role in the decadal variability for both polar regions.
The SAM has been important in driving many of the climatic changes observed across the Antarctic and Southern Ocean, such as the increase in westerly winds and isolating the interior of the continent.
The SAM has shifted into its positive phase over recent decades, as a result of the ozone hole, increasing greenhouse gases and natural factors, such as volcanic aerosols, but the ozone hole has been the most important factor, and it is now known to be responsible for the warming on the eastern side of the Antarctic Peninsula.
In the north, the NAM was responsible for much of the flushing of sea ice from the Arctic Ocean in the 1990s, which helped to precondition the region for the large losses of sea ice in the first decade of the 21st century.
However, the link between the NAM and sea-ice extent now seems to be broken, suggesting that other factors have played the largest part in the recent ice minima.
To better understand the climate changes that have taken place over recent decades, and to produce improved projections for the next century, we need better coupled atmosphere–ocean–cryosphere models.
Yet the polar climate systems involve complex interactions between the different parts of the system, and there are numerous feedbacks (e.g., ice albedo and aerosol– radiation–circulation).
Incorporating such processes into the models is a major challenge, but this must be achieved if we are to understand how the environments of the polar regions will evolve in the future, under increasing levels of greenhouse gas emission.
The fact that climate models are generally too slow in replicating the recent large losses of ice is a worrying factor in our attempts to simulate the Arctic climate system.
In recent years we have seen some remarkable changes in both polar regions.
Our understanding of the mechanisms behind these events is improving; however, the complex interactions between the atmosphere, ocean and cryosphere are difficult to unravel, and even more difficult to model.
The future, no doubt, holds more surprises, and it is essential that we obtain greater predictive capability in order to understand what will happen in these two climatically critical regions.
Changes are occurring faster than was anticipated, even a few years ago.
We need to proceed with dispatch in using all observational and modelling tools to promote the understanding of the further potential for high-latitude impacts.
Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd160 Acknowledgements This paper draws on the discussions at the Recent High Latitude Climate Change workshop, held at the Pacific Marine Environment Laboratory (PMEL), Seattle, WA, in October 2007.
We are grateful to the scientists who participated and the management of PMEL for hosting the meeting.
We would also like to thank the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, the International Arctic Science Council, the Climate and Cryosphere project of the World Climate Research Programme, the International Commission on Polar Meteorology and the NOAA Arctic Program for supporting the workshop.
References Abdul A.O.
& Burn D.H. 2006.
Trends and variability in the hydrological regime of the Mackenzie River Basin.
Journal of Hydrology 319, 282–294.
Aoki S. 2002.
Coherent sea level response to the Antarctic Oscillation.
Geophysical Research Letters 29, article no.
1950, doi: 10.1029/2002GL015733.
Arblaster J.
& Meehl G.A.
2006.
Contributions of external forcings to Southern Annular Mode trends.
Journal of Climate 19, 2896–2905.
Baldwin M.P.
2001.
Annular modes in global daily surface pressure.
Geophysical Research Letters 28, 4115–4118.
Box J.E., Bromwich D.H., Veenhuis B.A., Bai L.S., Stroeve J.C., Rogers J.C., Steffen K., Haran T. & Wang S.H.
2006.
Greenland ice sheet surface mass balance variability (1988–2004) from calibrated polar MM5 output.
Journal of Climate 19, 2783–2800.
Bracegirdle T.J., Connolley W.M.
& Turner J.
2008.
Antarctic climate change over the twenty first century.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Atmospheres 113, D03103, doi: 10.1029/2007JD008933.
Cappelen J.
2004.
Yearly mean temperature for selected meteorological stations in Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland: 1873–2003.
Technical Report 04–07.
Copenhagen: Danish Meteorological Institute.
Chapman W.L.
& Walsh J.E.
2007.
A synthesis of Antarctic temperatures.
Journal of Climate 20, 4096–4117.
Comiso J.C. & Nishio F. 2007.
Trends in the sea ice cover using enhanced and compatible AMSR-E, SSM/I and SMMR data.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 113, C02S07, doi: 10.1029/2007JC004257.
Cook A.J., Fox A.J., Vaughan D.G.
& Ferrigno J.G.
2005.
Retreating glacier fronts on the Antarctic Peninsula over the past half-century.
Science 308, 541–544.
Davis C.H., Li Y.H., McConnell J.R., Frey M.M.
& Hanna E. 2005.
Snowfall-driven growth in East Antarctic ice sheet mitigates recent sea-level rise.
Science 308, 1898–1901.
Déry S.J., Stieglitz M., McKenna E.C.
& Wood E.F. 2005.
Characteristics and trends of river discharge into Hudson, James, and Ungava bays, 1964–2000.
Journal of Climate 18, 2540–2557.
Dickson R.R., Meincke J., Malmberg S.-A.
& Lee A.J.
1988.
The ″Great Salinity Anomaly″ in the northern North Atlantic 1968–1982.
Progress in Oceanography 20, 103–151.
Farman J.C., Gardiner B.G.
& Shanklin J.D.
1985.
Large losses of total ozone in Antarctica reveal seasonal CClOx/ NOx interaction.
Nature 315, 207–210.
Fetterer F., Knowles K., Meier W. & Savoie M. 2002, updated 2009.
Sea Ice Index, 16 October 2007.
Boulder, CO: National Snow and Ice Data Center.
Digital media.
Available at http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_ seaiceminimum/images/20071017_extent.png.
Fogt R.L.
& Bromwich D.H. 2006.
Decadal variability of the ENSO teleconnection to the high latitude South Pacific governed by coupling with the Southern Annular Mode.
Journal of Climate 19, 979–997.
Fyfe J.C. 2006.
Southern Ocean warming due to human influence.
Geophysics Research Letters 33, L19701, doi: 10.1029/2006GL027247.
Fyfe J.C., Boer G.J.
& Flato G.M.
1999.
The Arctic and Antarctic oscillations and their projected changes under global warming.
Geophysics Research Letters 26, 1601–1604.
Fyfe J.C. & Saenko O.A.
2006.
Simulated changes in the extratropical Southern Hemisphere winds and currents.
Geophysics Research Letters 33, L06701, doi: 10.1029/ 2005GL025332.
Gascard J.C., Festy J., le Gogg H., Weber M., Bruemmer B., Offermann M., Doble M., Wadhams P., Forsberg R., Hanson S., Skourup H., Gerland S., Nicolaus M., Metaxin J.-P., Grangeon J., Haapala J., Rinn E., Haas C., Heygster G., Jakobson E., Palo T., Wilkinson J., Kaleschke L., Claffey K. J., Elder B.
& Bottenheim J.
2008.
Exploring Arctic transpolar drift during dramatic sea ice retreat.
EOS, Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 89, 21–28.
Gille S.T.
2002.
Warming of the Southern Ocean since the 1950s.
Science 295, 1275–1277.
Gille S.T.
2003.
Float observations of the Southern Ocean.
Part 1.
Estimating mean fields, bottom velocities and topographic steering.
Journal of Physical Oceanography 33, 1167–1181.
Gille S.T.
2008.
Decadal-scale temperature trends in the Southern Hemisphere Ocean.
Journal of Climate 21, 4749–4765.
Gillett N.P., Stone D.A., Stott P.A., Nozawa T., Karpechko A.Y., Hegerl G.C., Wehner M.F.
& Jones P.D.
2009.
Attribution of polar warming to human influence.
Nature Geoscience 1, 760–764.
Gillet N.P.
& Thompson D.W.J.
2003.
Simulation of recent Southern Hemisphere climate change.
Science 302, 273–275.
Hall A.
& Visbeck M. 2002.
Synchronous variability in the Southern Hemisphere atmosphere, sea ice, and ocean resulting from the Annular Mode.
Journal of Climate 15, 3043–3057.
Hanna E., Huybrechts P., Steffen K., Cappelen J., Huff R., Shuman C., Irvine-Fynn T., Wise S. & Griffiths M. 2008.
Increased run-off from melt from the Greenland Ice Sheet: a response to global warming.
Journal of Climate 21(2), 331–341.
Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 161 http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_ Helsen M.M., van den Broeke M.R., van de Wal R.S.W., van De Berg W.J., Van Meijgaard E., Davis C.H., Li Y.H.
& Goodwin I.
2008.
Elevation changes in Antarctica mainly determined by accumulation variability.
Science 320, 1626–1629.
Hoerling M.P., Hurrell J.W.
& Xu T. 2001.
Tropical origins for recent North Atlantic climate change.
Science 292, 90–92.
Hoerling M.P., Hurrell J.W., Xu T., Bates G.T.
& Phillips A.S. 2004.
Twentieth century North Atlantic climate change.
Part II.
Understanding the effect of Indian Ocean warming.
Climate Dynamics 23, 23 391–23 405.
Hogg A.M., Meredith M.P., Blundell J.R. & Wilson C. 2008.
Eddy heat flux in the Southern Ocean: response to variable wind forcing.
Journal of Climate 21, 608–620.
Hughes C.W., Woodworth P.L., Meredith M.P., Stepanov V., Whitworth T. & Pyne A.R.
2003.
Coherence of Antarctic sea levels, Southern Hemisphere Annular Mode, and flow through Drake Passage.
Geophysical Research Letters 30, article no.
1464, doi: 10.1029/2003GL017240.
Jacobs S.S., Giulivi C.F.
& Mele P.A.
2002.
Freshening of the Ross Sea during the late 20th century.
Science 297, 386–389.
Johannessen O.M., Bengtsson L., Miles M.W., Kuzmina S.I., Semenov V.A., Alekseev G.V., Nagurnyi A.P., Zakharov V.F., Bobylev L.P., Pettersson L.H., Hasselmann K. & Cattle H.P.
2004.
Arctic climate change: observed and modelled temperature and sea-ice variability (vol.
56A, p. 328, 2004).
Tellus Series A—Dynamic Meteorology and Oceanography 56, 328–341.
Johanson C.M.
& Fu Q.
2007.
Antarctic atmospheric temperature trend patterns from satellite observations.
Geophysics Research Letters 34, L12703, doi: 10.1029/ 2006GL029108.
Jones J.M.
& Widmann M. 2003.
Instrumentand tree-ring-based estimates of the Antarctic Oscillation.
Journal of Climate 16, 3511–3524.
Keeley S.P.E., Gillett N.P., Thompson D.W.J., Solomon S. & Forster P.M. 2007.
Is Antarctic climate most sensitive to ozone depletion in the middle or lower stratosphere?
Geophysics Research Letters 34, L22812, doi: 10.1029/ 2007GL031238.
Kidson J.W.
1999.
Principal modes of Southern Hemisphere low-frequency variability obtained from NCEP-NCAR reanalyses.
Journal of Climate 12, 2808–2830.
King J.C. 1994.
Recent climate variability in the vicinity of the Antarctic Peninsula.
International Journal of Climatology 14, 357–369.
Krabill W., Abdalati W., Frederick E., Manizade S., Martin C., Sonntag J., Swift R., Thomas R., Wright W. & Yungel J.
2000.
Greenland ice sheet: high-elevation balance and peripheral thinning.
Science 289, 428–430.
Kushner P.J., Held I.M.
& Delworth T.L.
2001.
Southern Hemisphere atmospheric circulation response to global warming.
Journal of Climate 14, 2238–2249.
Le Quéré C., Rodenbeck C., Buitenhuis E.T., Conway T.J., Langenfelds R., Gomez A., Labuschagne C., Ramonet T., Nakazawa T., Metzl N., Gillett N.P.
& Heimann M. 2007.
Saturation of the Southern Ocean CO2 sink due to recent climate change.
Science 316, 1735–1738.
Levitus S., Antonov J.
& Boyer T. 2005.
Warming of the world ocean, 1955–2003.
Geophysics Research Letters 32, L02604, doi: 10.1029/2004GL021592.
Marshall G.J.
2003.
Trends in the Southern Annular Mode from observations and reanalyses.
Journal of Climate 16, 4134–4143.
Marshall G.J., Orr A., van Lipzig N.P.M.
& King J.C. 2006.
The impact of a changing Southern Hemisphere Annular Mode on Antarctic Peninsula summer temperatures.
Journal of Climate 19, 5388–5404.
Marshall G.J., Stott P.A., Turner J., Connolley W.M., King J.C. & Lachlan-Cope T.A.
2004.
Causes of exceptional atmospheric circulation changes in the Southern Hemisphere.
Geophysics Research Letters 31, L14205, doi: 10.1029/2004GL019952.
Mayewski P.A.
& Maasch K.A.
2006.
Recent warming inconsistent with natural association between temperature and atmospheric circulation over the last 2000 years.
Climate of the Past Discussions 2, 327–355.
Meier M.F., Dyurgerov M.B., Rick U.K., O’Neel S., Pfeffer W.T., Anderson R.S., Anderson S.P.
& Glazovsky A.F.
2007.
Glaciers dominate eustatic sea-level rise in the 21st century.
Science 317, 1064–1067.
Meredith M.P.
& Hogg A.M. 2006.
Circumpolar response of Southern Ocean eddy activity to a change in the Southern Annular Mode.
Geophysics Research Letters 33, L16608, doi: 10.1029/2006GL026499.
Meredith M.P.
& King J.C. 2005.
Climate change in the ocean to the west of the Antarctic Peninsula during the second half of the 20th century.
Geophysics Research Letters 32, L19606, doi: 10.1029/2005GL024042.
Meredith M.P., Woodworth P.L., Hughes C.W.
& Stepanov V. 2004.
Changes in the ocean transport through Drake Passage during the 1980s and 1990s, forced by changes in the Southern Annular Mode.
Geophysics Research Letters 31, L21305, doi: 10.1029/2004GL021169.
Min S.K., Zhang X.B.
& Zwiers F. 2008.
Human-induced Arctic moistening.
Science 320, 518–520.
Monaghan A.J.
& Bromwich D.H. 2008.
Advances in describing recent Antarctic climate variablity.
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 89, 1295–1306.
Monaghan A.J., Bromwich D.H., Chapman W.L.
& Comiso J.C. 2008.
Recent variability and trends of Antarctic near-surface temperature.
Journal of Geophysical Research 113, D04105, doi: 10.1029/2007JD009094.
Monaghan A.J., Bromwich D.H., Fogt R.L., Wang S.-H., Mayewski P.A., Dixon D.A., Ekaykin A., Frezzotti M., Goodwin I., Isaksson E., Kaspari S.D., Morgan V.I., Oerter H., van Ommen T.D., van der Veen C.J.
& Wen J.
2006.
Insignificant change in Antarctic snowfall since the International Geophysical Year.
Science 313, 827–831.
Monaghan A.J., Bromwich D.H. & Schneider D.P.
2008.
Twentieth century Antarctic air temperature and snowfall Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd162 simulations by IPCC climate models.
Geophysics Research Letters 35, L07502, doi: 10.1029/2007GL032630.
Morison J.H., Aagaard K., Falkner K.K., Hatakeyama K., Moritz R., Overland J.E., Perovich D.K., Shimada K., Steele M., Takizawa T. & Woodgate R. 2002.
North Pole environmental observatory delivers early results.
EOS, Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 83, 357–361.
Nghiem S.V., Rigor I.G., Perovich D.K., Clemente-Colon P., Weatherly J.W.
& Neumann G. 2007.
Rapid reduction of Arctic perennial sea ice.
Geophysics Research Letters 34, L19504, doi: 10.1029/2007GL031138.
Oke P.R.
& England M.H.
2004.
Oceanic response to changes in the latitude of the Southern Hemisphere subpolar westerly winds.
Journal of Climate 17, 1040–1054.
Overland J.E., Spillane M.C., Percival D.B., Wang M. & Mofjeld H.O.
2004.
Seasonal and regional variation of pan-Arctic surface air temperature over the instrumental record.
Journal of Climate 17, 23 263–23 282.
Overland J.E., Wang M. & Salo S. 2008.
The recent Arctic warm period.
Tellus Series A—Dynamic Meteorology and Oceanography 60, 589–597.
Perlwitz J., Pawson S., Fogt R.L., Nielsen J.E.
& Neff W.D.
2008.
Impact of stratospheric ozone hole recovery on Antarctic climate.
Geophysics Research Letters 35, L08714, doi: 10.1029/2008GL033317.
Peterson B.J., Holmes R.M., McClelland J.W., Vorosmarty C.J., Lammers R.B., Shiklomanov A.I., Shiklomanov I.A.
& Rahmstorf S. 2008.
Increasing river discharge to the Arctic Ocean.
Science 298, 2171–2173.
Pezza A.B., Durrant T., Simmonds I.
& Smith I.
2008.
Southern Hemisphere synoptic behavior in extreme phases of SAM, ENSO, sea ice extent and southern Australia rainfall.
Journal of Climate 21, 5566–5584.
Quadrelli R. & Wallace J.M.
2002.
Dependence of the structure of the Northern Hemisphere annular mode on the polarity of ENSO.
Geophysical Research Letters 29, 2132–2135.
Randel W.J.
& Wu F. 1999.
Cooling of the Arctic and Antarctic polar stratospheres due to ozone depletion.
Journal of Climate 12, 1467–1479.
Rignot E.J.
1998.
Fast recession of a West Antarctic glacier.
Science 281, 549–551.
Rignot E., Bamber J.L., van den Broeke M.R., Davis C., Li Y.H., van de Berg W.J.
& van Meijgaard E. 2008.
Recent Antarctic ice mass loss from radar interferometry and regional climate modelling.
Nature Geoscience 1, 106–110.
Rintoul S.R.
2007.
Rapid freshening of Antarctic Bottom Water formed in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
Geophysics Research Letters 34, L06606, doi: 10.1029/2006GL028550.
Schweiger A., Zhang J., Lindsay R.W.
& Steele M. 2008.
Did unusually sunny skies help drive the record sea ice minimum?
Geophysics Research Letters 35, L10503, doi: 10.1029/2008GL033463.
Serreze M.C., Walsh J.E., Chapin F.S., Osterkamp T., Dyurgerov M., Romanovsky V.E., Oechel W., Morison J.
& Barry R.G.
2000.
Observational evidence of recent change in the northern high-latitude environment.
Climate Change 46, 159–207.
Sexton D.M.H.
2001.
The effect of stratospheric ozone depletion on the phase of the Antarctic Oscillation.
Geophysics Research Letters 28, 3697–3700.
Shimada K., Komashida T., Itoh M., Nishino S., Carmack E., McLaughlin F.A., Zimmermann S. & Proshutinsky A.
2006.
Pacific Ocean inflow: influence on catastrophic reduction of sea ice cover in the Arctic Ocean.
Geophysics Research Letters 33, L08605, doi: 10.1029/2005GL025624.
Simmonds I.
2003.
Modes of atmospheric variability over the Southern Ocean.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 108, article no.
8078, doi: 10.1029/2000JC000542.
Simmonds I., Burke C. & Keay K. 2008.
Arctic climate change as manifest in cyclone behavior.
Journal of Climate 21, 5777–5796.
Simmonds I.
& Jacka T.H.
1995.
Relationships between the interannual variability of Antarctic sea ice and the Southern Oscillation.
Journal of Climate 8, 637–647.
Solomon S., Qin D., Manning M., Chen Z., Marquis M., Averyt K.B., Tignor M. & Miller H.L.
Jr.
(eds.)
2007.
Climate change 2007.
The physical science basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stammerjohn S.E., Martinson D.G., Smith R.C.
& Iannuzzi R.A. 2008.
Sea ice in the western Antarctic Peninsula region: spatio-temporal variability from ecological and climate change perspectives.
Deep-Sea Research Part II 55, 2041–2058.
Stammerjohn S.E., Martinson D.G., Smith R.C., Yuan X.
& Rind D. 2008.
Trends in Antarctic annual sea ice retreat and advance and their relation to El Niño–Southern Oscillation and Southern Annular Mode variability.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 113, C03S90, doi: 10.1029/2007JC004269.
Steele M. & Boyd T. 1998.
Retreat of the cold halocline layer in the Arctic Ocean.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 103, 10 419–10 435.
Steele M., Ermold W. & Zhang J.
2008.
Arctic Ocean surface warming trends over the past 100 years.
Geophysics Research Letters 35, L02614, doi: 10.1029/2007GL031651.
Steig E.J., Schneider D.P., Rutherford S.D., Mann M.E., Comiso J.C. & Shindell D.T.
2009.
Warming of the Antarctic ice-sheet surface since the 1957 International Geophysical Year.
Nature 457, 459–462.
Stone D.A., Weaver A.J.
& Stouffer R.J. 2001.
Projection of climate change onto modes of atmospheric variability.
Journal of Climate 14, 3551–3565.
Stroeve J., Holland M.M., Meier W., Scambos T. & Serreze M.C.
2007.
Arctic sea ice decline: faster than forecast.
Geophysics Research Letters 34, L09501, doi: 10.1029/ 2007GL029703.
Stroeve J., Serreze M.C., Drobot S., Gearheard S., Holland M., Maslanik J., Meier W. & Scambos T. 2008.
Arctic sea ice extent plummets in 2007.
EOS, Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 89, 13.
Thoma M., Jenkins A., Holland D. & Jacobs S. 2008.
Modelling Circumpolar Deep Water intrusions on the Climate change in the two polar regionsJ.
Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 163 Amundsen Sea continental shelf, Antarctica.
Geophysical Research Letters 35, L18602, doi: 10.1029/2008GL034939.
Thomas E.R., Marshall G.J.
& McConnell J.R. 2008.
A doubling in snow accumulation in the western Antarctic Peninsula since 1850.
Geophysics Research Letters 35, L01706, doi: 10.1029/2007GL032529.
Thompson D.W.J.
& Solomon S. 2002.
Interpretation of recent Southern Hemisphere climate change.
Science 296, 895–899.
Thompson D.W.J.
& Wallace J.M.
2000.
Annular modes in the extratropical circulation.
Part I. Month-to-month variability.
Journal of Climate 13, 1000–1016.
Turner J.
2004.
The El Niño–Southern Oscillation and Antarctica.
International Journal of Climatology 24, 1–31.
Turner J., Colwell S.R., Marshall G.J., Lachlan-Cope T.A., Carleton A.M., Jones P.D., Lagun V., Reid P.A.
& Iagovkina S. 2005.
Antarctic climate change during the last 50 years.
International Journal of Climatology 25, 279–294.
Turner J., Comiso J.C., Marshall G.J., Lachlan-Cope T.A., Bracegirdle T.J., Maksym T., Meredith M.P., Wang Z.
& Orr A.
2009.
Non-annular atmospheric circulation change induced by stratospheric ozone depletion and its role in the recent increase of Antarctic sea ice extent.
Geophysics Research Letters 36, L08502, doi: 10.1029/2009GL037524.
Turner J., Lachlan-Cope T.A., Colwell S.R., Marshall G.J.
& Connolley W.M.
2006.
Significant warming of the Antarctic winter troposphere.
Science 311, 1914–1917.
van den Broeke M.R.
& van Lipzig N.P.M.
2004.
Changes in Antarctic temperature, wind, and precipitation in response to the Antarctic Oscillation.
Annals of Glaciology 39, 119–126.
Volodin E.M. & Galin V.Y.
1999.
Interpretation of winter warming on Northern Hemisphere continents in 1977–94.
Journal of Climate 12, 2947–2955.
Walker D.P., Brandon M.A., Jenkins A., Allen J.T., Dowdeswell J.A.
& Evans J.
2007.
Oceanic heat transport onto the Amundsen Sea shelf through a submarine glacial trough.
Geophysics Research Letters 34, L02602, doi: 10.1029/ 2006GL028154.
Wang M., Overland J.E., Kattsov V., Walsh J.E., Zhang X.
& Pavlova T. 2007.
Intrinsic versus forced variation in coupled climate model simulations over the Arctic during the 20th century.
Journal of Climate 20, 1093–1107.
Yuan X.
2004.
ENSO-related impacts on Antarctic sea ice: a synthesis of phenomenon and mechanisms.
Antarctic Science 16, 415–425.
Yuan X.
& Li C. 2008.
Climate modes in southern high latitudes and their impacts on Antarctic sea ice.
Journal of Geophysical Research—Oceans 113, C06S91, doi: 10.1029/ 2006JC004067.
Yuan X.J.
& Martinson D.G.
2000.
Antarctic sea ice extent variability and its global connectivity.
Journal of Climate 13, 1697–1717.
Zhang Y., Wallace J.M.
& Battisti D.S.
1997.
ENSO-like interdecadal variability: 1900–93.
Journal of Climate 10, 1004–1020.
Zhu X.J., Sun J.L.K., Liu Z.Y., Liu Q.Y.
& Martin J.E.
2007.
A synoptic analysis of the interannual variability of winter cyclone activity in the Aleutian low region.
Journal of Climate 20, 1523–1538.
Climate change in the two polar regions J. Turner & J. Overland Polar Research 28 2009 146–164 © 2009 the authors, journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd164
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 1 (1): 67–68, April 2018 CONVERSATIONS 1: Climate Change Editorial Note Jagdish Krishnaswamy  In 2017, too, intense rain events, especially in urban areas and the increasingly spatial and temporal variability of rainfall distribution brought into the limelight the issue of attribution of extreme weather events to climate change.
In our inaugural issue we have three perspectives on climate change from a diverse set of authors: Bob Watson, Thomas Sterner, and Nitin Desai.
Three points emerge from their conversations.
The first is that anthropogenic climate change is already transforming climate and that these changes will continue—regionally and globally.
Secondly, even if countries do not take on agreed commitments to cut emissions, fiscal measures—such as incentives, and taxes on fossil fuels— will encourage industry and societies to switch to development pathways that are less carbon-intensive.
The third is that—even if some of the historical large emitters are not making their fair share of contributions—countries that have argued for climate change justice in the past in terms of sharing the burden of reduced emissions would benefit from striving to create an economy and society that reduces anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.
However, there is still a big gap between what countries committed to in Paris and what is needed to limit the increase in global warming to 2 °C.
India made two ambitious commitments in Paris.
 Coordinator for this Conversations section.
Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, Royal Enclave Sriramapura, Jakkur Post Bangalore, India 560 064; jagdish@atree.org Copyright © Krishnaswamy 2018.
Released under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v1i1.10 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v1i1.10 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [68] One was to install by 2022 175 gigawatt (GW) of renewable energy (RE) capacity and operationalize it, and raise by 2030 the share of non-fossil fuels in total energy use to 40 per cent.
The other commitment was to sequester over 2.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) through afforestation and ecological restoration.
Backed by political will at the highest levels, remarkable progress has been made on the first target.
By August 2017, India had installed 58.3 GW of RE capacity.
This feat has drawn international attention and praise.
To achieve this target, however, the Government of India will classify hydropower projects above 25 megawatt (MW) as RE.
In the Western Ghats, biodiversity has already been negatively impacted by small hydro projects.
The reclassification is likely to tremendously increase the trade-off between ‘green’ energy and other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Trade-offs with hydrologic services, livelihoods, and biodiversity is likely to impede India’s attempts to achieve its carbon sequestration targets.
In agriculture, business as usual will seriously breach planetary boundaries, from water security to biodiversity and ecosystem services (Campbell 2017).
All countries must make a major part of discourse the need to understand the complexities and uncertainties of governing the land–climate interface at various scales—from local to global—especially between 2030 and 2050.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is preparing its Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), and IPCC scientists are working on a special report on land and climate.
The report will address the issue of managing trade-offs and synergies between SDGs and ecosystem services, on the one hand, and climate change adaptation and mitigation goals, on the other.
To achieve a low-carbon-emissions pathway, governments need to pay attention to trade-offs and synergies with other development goals and muster the political will to manage these in a socially just and participative manner.
Microsoft Word Prokic_paginirano www.gi.sanu.ac.rs, www.doiserbia.nb.rs, J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) Original scientific article UDC: 911.2:551.581"1960/2015"(497.11) DOI: https://doi.org/10.2298/IJGI1801035P CLIMATE TRENDS OF TEMPERATURE AND PRECIPITATION IN NIŠAVA RIVER VALLEY (SERBIA) FOR 1960 2015 PERIOD Marija Prokić1 1 University of Niš, Faculty of Science and Mathematics, Department of Geography, Niš, Serbia Received: June 26, 2017; Reviewed: September 18, 2017; Accepted: March 30, 2018 Abstract: Since climate plays a crucial role on our planet and is an inseparable part of all human activities, it is necessary to precisely record all parameters in order to estimate current climate conditions, climate characteristics of a certain region, as well as to try to predict and calculate further trends of climate change.
Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, air temperature and precipitation of four meteorological stations in the Nišava river valley in Southeastern Serbia (municipalities of Dimitrovgrad, Pirot, Bela Palanka and Niš) have been considered for the period 1960–2015 along with statistical methods for analysis of these parameters and prediction of their trends.
Results have shown that there is a positive trend in mean annual air temperatures and average seasonal air temperatures for the whole region which can influence natural processes and human activities.
For precipitation, it can be concluded that no significant change in mean annual precipitation for the observed period has occurred.
However, there is a great difference in the amount of precipitation between consecutive years, especially from 2000 onwards which can cause very dry years or years with floods.
Keywords: climate, temperature, precipitation, linear trend, Nišava valley Introduction There are many definitions of climate given by various authors with slight variations.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2013 glossary, climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years.
The classical period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization (Planton, 2013).
As climate greatly influences various aspects of planet Earth, natural processes on it and human activities, keeping climate data plays an essential role.
It is necessary to precisely record all parameters in order to estimate current climate Correspondence to: marijaprokic91@gmail.com J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 36 conditions, climate characteristics of certain region, as well as to try to predict and calculate further trends of climate change.
According to the most commonly used Köppen climate classification, which depends on average monthly values of temperature and precipitation, the territory of Nišava valley could belong to the Cfwax type — Danube type of moderately warm and humid climate: the winter is somewhat drier than summer which is very warm, which is a characteristic of continental climate; maximum precipitation is recorded in early summer.
Vojvodina, northern and eastern Serbia has this climate type (Dukić, 1998).
Also there are influences from climates of neighboring basins, mostly from Wallachian Plain, then Pannonian Basin, along Morava valley, and the least from Aegean basin, through Vardar and Južna Morava valley (Marković, 1967).
Rakićević (1980) has done climatic regionalization of Serbia and on the basis of that regionalization Nišava valley belongs to region II-13 and II-14.
These are Niš-Leskovac climate region and Nišava valley region.
The first one includes Niš-Aleksinac valley, Leskovac Dobrič and Toplica valley.
This is the warmest region with the lowest precipitation in Serbia.
Fogs are very rare, average cloudiness is low and the shortest duration of snow cover in Serbia is recorded.
The second one is compared to the previous more severe as we go from west to the east as elevation increases.
Some research concerning Nišava River discharge variability has already been done for this area (Ducić & Luković, 2009), but analysis of temperature and precipitation was not the main focus.
According to this paper, decrease in discharge was detected in the observed period (1961 2000) for all three profiles (Pirot, Bela Palanka and Niš), which is consistent with the allegations and the IPCC about the dominant influence of anthropogenic greenhouse effect on reducing discharge in the rivers of Serbia.
The authors concluded that in recent decades there isn’t anything dramatically happening with climate, and present changes may be related to natural cycle.
The aim of this paper is to focus on and analyze two main climate parameters – temperature and precipitation and discover their current trends and whether some significant change can be observed.
Data and methods For the analysis of climate characteristics and trends of climate parameters data from meteorological stations in Dimitrovgrad, Pirot and Niš were used for the period 1960 2015 and data from the station in Bela Palanka for the period 1991 2015.
These data were acquired from the Republic Hydrometeorological Prokić, M. — Climate trends of temperature and precipitation in Nišava river valley (Serbia) 37 Service of Serbia.
From east to west, the first meteorological station is in Dimitrovgrad which is principal meteorological station founded in 1926.
Meteorological stations in Pirot and Bela Palanka are ordinary meteorological stations while meteorological station in Niš is principal meteorological station founded in 1889 and located in the central part of the city of Niš in Niš Fortress.
Geographic coordinates of these four stations are shown in the Table 1 and their positions in the Nišava valley are represented in the Figure 1.
Table 1.
Meteorological stations from which data were used Meteorological station Type of the station Latitude Longitude Elevation (m) Dimitrovgrad Principal 43°01' N 22°45' Е 450 Pirot Ordinary 43º09' N 22º36' Е 370 Bela Palanka Ordinary 43º13' N 22º19' Е 291 Niš Principal 43°20' N 21°54' Е 202 Data used were mean monthly air temperatures and mean annual air temperature, and monthly and yearly amounts of precipitation.
Figure 1.
Position of meteorological stations in Nišava river valley For meteorological stations in Dimitrovgrad and Pirot there were no available data for the period 1986 1989, and for the station in Pirot data from year 1962 was missing as well.
Therefore, the method of linear interpolation was used to J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 38 fill in the missing data for the mean annual temperatures.
In order to calculate trends of these climate parameters, statistical methods of linear trend estimation and extrapolation were used.
Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to measure the linear correlation and Student’s t-test was used to test linear trend significance 21 2 R n Rt (1) where R is Pearson's correlation coefficient, R2 is determination coefficient and n series length.
Results and discussion Analyzing the available data (Tables 2 and 3), it turned out that out of four stations in Nišava valley Dimitrovgrad has the lowest mean annual air temperature of 10.0 °C.
Mean annual temperature in Pirot is 11.1 °C, in Bela Palanka 11.4 °C and in Niš 11.8 °C.
Table 2.
Mean annual air temperatures (°C) on the territory of Nišava valley for the period 19602015 Meteorological station Mean annual temperatures Dimitrovgrad 10.0 °C Pirot 11.1 °C Bela Palanka* 11.4 °C Niš 11.8 °C This is not the consequence of the difference in latitude since it is quite small but is more the result of the difference in elevation between these stations.
Table 3.
Mean monthly air temperatures (°C) on the territory of Nišava valley for the period 1960 2015 Meteorological station I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII Dimitrovgrad -0.9 0.9 5.0 10.0 14.8 18.1 19.8 19.6 15.4 10.7 5.7 0.9 Pirot -0.2 1.9 6.2 11.2 16.0 19.3 21.2 20.9 16.6 11.6 6.4 1.7 Bela Palanka* 0.4 1.9 6.5 11.5 16.3 19.9 21.9 21.7 16.6 11.7 6.7 1.8 Niš 0.4 2.5 6.9 12.1 16.9 20.2 22.1 22.0 17.5 12.2 6.9 2.0 When average seasonal temperatures are analyzed (Figure 2) then average spring temperatures at all stations are slightly lower than average autumn temperatures.
The difference between average spring and autumn temperatures in Niš is almost Prokić, M. — Climate trends of temperature and precipitation in Nišava river valley (Serbia) 39 insignificant (12.0 °C for springtime and 12.2 °C for autumn).
The difference between average spring and autumn temperatures in Dimitrovgrad, Pirot and Bela Palanka is a little bigger, 10.0 °C and 10.6 °C for Dimitrovgrad, 11.1 °C and 11.5 °C for Pirot and 11.4 °C and 11.7 °C, which can be the result of higher elevation of these two stations and therefore longer periods with snow cover and more amount of energy needed for melting of snow after winter.
Average summer temperatures increase as we go along the Nišava valley downstream the Nišava River, from Dimitrovgrad to Niš (Dimitrovgrad 19.2 °C, Pirot 20.5 °C, Bela Palanka 21.2 °C and Niš 21.4 °C).
In the same direction average winter temperatures also increase (Dimitrovgrad 0.3 °C, Pirot 1.1 °C, Bela Palanka 1.4 °C and Niš 1.6 °C), but they all have positive values.
This increase of average summer temperatures and decrease of average winter temperatures is most likely due to the difference in elevation between these stations as it decreases from Dimitrovgrad to Niš.
Figure 2.
Average seasonal air temperatures (°C) for the period 1960 2015 When trend of air temperature during this analyzed period is considered it can be observed that there is a significantly positive trend of moderate correlation degree at three stations (R = 0.5905, t = 5.3768, DF = 54, p 0.05 for Niš; R = 0.6437, t = 6.1813, DF =54, p 0.05 for Pirot; R = 0.4223, t = 3.4236, DF = 54, p 0.05 for Dimitrovgrad).
This means that the annual air temperatures are increasing (Figure 3).
The most distinct value of increase is in Pirot and Niš while it is more moderate in Dimitrovgrad.
If the trend of mean annual temperatures continues in the next period as well and stays unchanged then it is expected that in the year 2100 mean annual temperature will be 11.8 °C for Dimitrovgrad, 14.8 °C for Pirot and 14.8 °C for Niš.
Similar results were presented by Ristić Vakanjac, Milovanović, Vakanjac, and Čokorilo Ilić (2014) J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 40 where it was predicted that mean annual temperature would be 11.2 °C for Dimitrovgrad.
When these values are compared to the current mean annual temperatures for the observed period 1961 2015 then it is the increase of more than 3 °C, except for the station in Dimitrovgrad.
For Bela Palanka, statistically significant correlation cannot be noted (R = 0.5112, t = 0.8525, DF = 23, p > 0.05), which might be due to shorter period of observation.
Figure 3.
Linear trends of mean annual air temperatures (°C) for the period 1960–2015 Analysis of seasonal trends of air temperatures showed that at Bela Palanka meteorological station for the period 1991 2015 and all other meteorological stations for the period 1961 2015 there is a positive trend for spring, summer and winter (Figures 4a, 4b, 5, 6, 7a and 7b).
Figure 4a.
Linear trends of average seasonal air temperatures (°C) for meteorological station Niš Prokić, M. — Climate trends of temperature and precipitation in Nišava river valley (Serbia) 41 Figure 4b.
Linear trends of average seasonal air temperatures (°C) for meteorological station Niš All stations recorded the most distinct change in summer months.
Autumn months show not so sharp trend of values for meteorological stations Pirot, Bela Palanka and Niš, while station in Dimitrovgrad shows a constant, neither increasing nor decreasing trend.
According to Rakićević (1980), this region is one of the driest regions in Serbia.
If fluviometric gradients are compared, then places with same elevation and at similar latitudes get 1.11 mm less amount of rainfall on every kilometer from west to east per year.
Even though many factors influence the amount of precipitation and its distribution during a year, and the way of its occurrence, atmospheric processes and relief have the most important and decisive role, as stated by Milovanović (2010).
In the case of Nišava valley this correlation does not play a significant role since there is the difference in elevation among these four meteorological stations.
Therefore, increasing elevation is the main reason why the amount of precipitation increases upstream from Niš to Dimitrovgrad.
Also according to Milovanović (2014) in valleys where, with all directions of the movement of air masses, descending air flow prevails, precipitation is smaller, both in comparison with the surrounding mountains and gorges that connect the basins.
In Niš, mean annual precipitation is 597.3 mm for the analyzed period 1960 2015.
According to Rakićević (1976), Bela Palanka was the place with the smallest amount of mean annual precipitation (526 mm) for the period 1931 1960.
In this paper analyzed period is 1991 2015 according to which mean annual precipitation is 612.9 mm.
In Pirot, mean annual precipitation is 601.1 mm and 649.2 mm in Dimitrovgrad.
J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 42 The difference in the amount of precipitation during this observed period can be significant.
For example, minimum amount of precipitation in Niš (385 mm), Pirot (261 mm) and Dimitrovgrad (311 mm) was recorded in the year 2000, while the minimum of 320 mm of the observed period was in Bela Palanka in 2011, even though the year 2000 was also very dry here (358 mm).
In Pirot and Dimitrovgrad, this is below 50% of the mean annual average precipitation of the observed period, 43.4% and 47.9% respectively.
Maximum amount of precipitation for all four stations was recorded in 2014 (Niš 950 mm, Bela Palanka 831 mm, Pirot 914 mm, Dimitrovgrad 977 mm).
In Niš, Pirot and Dimitrovgrad it is more than 50% higher than annual average precipitation (59.1%, 52.1% and 50.5%).
Based on analyzed data it can be concluded that from the year 2000 onwards there are more occurrences of extreme dry and wet years.
Figure 5.
Linear trends of average seasonal air temperatures (°C) for meteorological station Bela Palanka Prokić, M. — Climate trends of temperature and precipitation in Nišava river valley (Serbia) 43 Figure 6.
Linear trends of average seasonal air temperatures (°C) for meteorological station Pirot Figure 7a.
Linear trends of average seasonal air temperatures (°C) for meteorological station Dimitrovgrad J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 44 Figure 7b.
Linear trends of average seasonal air temperatures (°C) for meteorological station Dimitrovgrad If mean monthly precipitation is considered (Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11), then two periods of maximum and minimum precipitation can be observed.
The first maximum is in late spring (May and June) for all stations, and the second is in autumn (November for Niš, Pirot and Dimitrovgrad and September and October for Bela Palanka).
The first minimum is in January and the second is in August for Niš, Pirot and Dimitrovgrad and in July for Bela Palanka.
It can be seen that all four stations have very similar precipitation regime.
Taking in consideration that there are two periods of maximum and minimum precipitation, while continental regime has only one maximum and minimum, it was concluded that this part of Serbia has characteristics of two precipitation regimes — continental and Mediterranean.
According to Rakićević (1976), Eastern Serbia has one transition type of precipitation regime which has characteristics of both continental and Mediterranean regimes.
To be more specific, under the influence of Mediterranean precipitation regime in Eastern Serbia, maximum rainfall occurs in autumn, and under the influence of continental precipitation regime, maximum rainfall occurs in early summer.
On the other hand, minimum rainfall in late summer is the result of Mediterranean regime influence, and minimum rainfall in winter is the result of continental.
Therefore, in the valley of the Nišava River we have specific precipitation regime with characteristics of both continental and Mediterranean regimes, even though continental regime is more pronounced if the mean annual amount of precipitation and its distribution over months is taken into consideration.
Prokić, M. — Climate trends of temperature and precipitation in Nišava river valley (Serbia) 45 Figure 8.
Mean annual precipitation and mean monthly precipitation (mm) for meteorological station Niš for period 1960 2015 Figure 9.
Mean annual precipitation and mean monthly precipitation (mm) for meteorological station Bela Palanka for period 1991 2015 Figure 10.
Mean annual precipitation and mean monthly precipitation (mm) for meteorological station Pirot for period 1960 2015 J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 46 Figure 11.
Mean annual precipitation and mean monthly precipitation (mm) for meteorological station Dimitrovgrad for period 1960 2015 Analyzing the trends of precipitation during different seasons (Figures 12a, 12b, 13, 14, 15a and 15b), an insignificant increasing trend for spring and autumn can be observed at all four meteorological stations (0.125 and 0.204 mm per year for Niš, 0.7254 and 0.1865 mm per year for Bela Palanka, 0.0683 and 0.1454 mm per year for Pirot, 0.1009 and 0.2324 mm per year for Dimitrovgrad).
Insignificant negative trend of summer and winter mean amount of precipitation can be seen at all stations (-0.0415 and -0.0303 mm per year for Niš, -0.187 and -0.0809 mm per year for Pirot, -0.1144 and -0.0636 mm per year for Dimitrovgrad), except in Bela Palanka (-0.2197 and 0.1739 mm per year).
Figure 12a.
Average seasonal precipitation (mm) in Niš for period 1960 2015 Prokić, M. — Climate trends of temperature and precipitation in Nišava river valley (Serbia) 47 Figure 12b.
Average seasonal precipitation (mm) in Niš for period 1960 2015 Figure 13.
Average seasonal precipitation (mm) in Bela Palanka for period 1991 2015 J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 48 Figure 14.
Average seasonal precipitation (mm) in Pirot for period 1960 2015 Figure 15a.
Average seasonal precipitation (mm) in Dimitrovgrad for period 1960 2015 Prokić, M. — Climate trends of temperature and precipitation in Nišava river valley (Serbia) 49 Figure 15b.
Average seasonal precipitation (mm) in Dimitrovgrad for period 1960 2015 Conclusion Based on the previously analyzed data on air temperature and precipitation and their trends in the Nišava river valley for the period 1960 2015, it can be concluded that inevitable changes in these climate parameters are happening and based on this analysis they will continue to be more prominent in the future.
When temperature is considered at all four meteorological stations along the Nišava River, there is a positive trend observed both for mean annual temperatures and average seasonal temperatures.
Increasing air temperature during winter months will lead to less snow cover and the change in winter duration.
Less snow cover can then influence underground water sources as well as ground (surface) water flows.
On the other hand, increasing trend of temperature during summer months can lead to less amount of rainfall during this time which can result in occurrence of very dry periods that can in turn cause more regular forest fires.
Increasing trend of air temperature can also have consequences in occurrence of drier periods due to increased evaporation which can influence amount of available drinking water and water resources, as well as agriculture.
If precipitation is considered for all four meteorological stations, it can be concluded that no significant change in mean annual precipitation for the observed period has occurred.
However, one important change observed is the difference in amount of precipitation between consecutive years which can be very significant, especially from the year 2000 onwards.
This, with a combination of the increase in temperatures, can cause very dry years and on the other hand more regular floods.
Consequently, water resources will be endangered, and water supply of this region will face great problems.
J. Geogr.
Inst.
Cvijic.
68(1) (35–50) 50 References Ducić, V., & Luković, J.
(2009).
Possible Causes of Contemporary Nišava River Discharge Variability (Kolebanje proticaja Nišave u sklopu globalnih klimatskih promena).
Belgrade, Serbia: Bulletin of the Serbian Geographical Society, 89(4), 255 276.
Retrieved from http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0350-3593/2009/0350-35930904255D.pdf Dukić, D. (1998).
Climatology (Klimatologija).
Belgrade: University of Belgrade, Faculty of Geography.
Marković, J.
(1967).
Geographical regions of SFR Yugoslavia (Geografske oblasti SFRJ).
Belgrade, Serbia: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika Socijalističke Republike Srbije.
Milovanović, B.
(2010).
Climate of the Stara planina Mountain (Klima Stare planine).
Belgrade: Geographical institute “Jovan Cvijić” SASA.
Retrieved from http://www.gi.sanu.ac.rs/rs/izdanja/posebna/pdf/gijc_pi_075_bosko_milovanovic_srp.pdf Milovanović, B., & Ristić Vakanjac, V. (2014).
The Climate of Pirot Valley (Klima Pirotske kotline).
Pirotski zbornik, 39, 9 20.
Retrieved from http://www.nbpi.org.rs/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Bo%C5%A1ko-Milovanovi%C4%87-i-Vesna-Risti%C4%87Vakanjac-Klima-Pirotske-kotline.pdf Milosavljević, M. (1984).
Climatology (Klimatologija).
Belgrade, Serbia: Naučna knjiga.
Planton, S.
(Ed.).
(2013).
Annex III.
Glossary: IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Retrieved from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_AnnexIII_FINAL.pdf Rakićević, T. (1976).
Climate characteristics of Eastern Serbia (Klimatske karakteristike Istočne Srbije).
Journal of the Geographical institute “Jovan Cvijić” SASA, 28, 41 67.
Retrieved from http://www.gi.sanu.ac.rs/site/media/gi/pdf/rs/zbornik/028/gijc_zr_28_004_rakicevic.pdf Rakićević, T. (1980).
Climate regionalization of SR Serbia (Klimatsko rejoniranje SR Srbije).
Journal – Faculty of Science and Mathermatics University in Belgrade.
Geographical institute (Zbornik radova – Prirodno-matematički fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Geografski institut), 27, 29 41.
Ristić Vakanjac, V., Milovanović, B., Vakanjac, B., & Čokorilo Ilić, M. (2014).
Climate characteristics and trends of climate parameters on the territory of Stara planina (Klimatske karakteristike i trendovi klimatskih parametara na teritoriji Stare planine).
Pirotski zbornik, 39, 21 38.
Retrieved from http://www.nbpi.org.rs/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/VesnaRisti%C4%87-i-sar.-Klimatske-karakteristike-i-trendovi-klimatskih-parametara-na-teritorijiStare-planine.pdf
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 6 (1): 0-0, January 2023 BOOK REVIEW Discerning Global and Local of Climate Change in Indian Context Alankar* Nagraj Adve, Global Warming in India: Science, Impacts, and Politics, Eklavya Foundation Bhopal, 2022 Nagraj Adve’s Global Warming in India: Science, Impacts, and Politics is a booklet-length effort that aims to make the complexities of climate change and global warming accessible to school and college students, teachers, and activists.
The emphasis throughout the booklet is on bridging what Adve considers to be a growing chasm in the understanding of climate change between abstract high science and people’s popular perceptions about challenges on the ground.
The first chapter, titled “Understanding the Science”, explains in a patient and accessible manner several of the technical aspects related to the * Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Ram Lal Anand College University of Delhi & Researcher, Sarai Programme Centre for the Study of Developing Societies.
alankarsy@gmail.com Copyright © Alankar 2023.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution © NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581–6152 (print); 2581–6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v6i1.890 mailto:alankarsy@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v6i1.890 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal debate on global warming—in particular, how different greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, and others, combine to produce the green-house effect.
In North India, this would be referred to as a razai effect, the equivalent of trapping heat under a thick cotton blanket, preventing it from escaping.
Such, in fact, has been the intensity of human-induced emissions, that, by 2020, we reached an alarming build-up of 412 parts per million of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere — “which is the highest it has been in 2 million years” (Adve 2022, 13).
Having equipped us with some of the relevant technical terminology, Chapter 2 unpacks the increasingly complicated politics around climate change.
Adve states that there are essentially three frameworks within which the issue of blame and responsibility for the unbridled emission of GHGs is often discussed.
The first is a discrete sector-wise measurement of GHG emissions—by industry, agriculture, infrastructure, transport, and energy.
The second framework weighs the likely differences in terms of carbon footprint between rural livelihoods and urban lifestyles.
And the third, which is also by far the most contentious, concerns deciding who the top emitter nations are.
While Adve is even-handed in how he discusses the various strengths and weaknesses of each approach, the actual emphasis of the chapter is on the thesis that “the roots of global warming lie in the inherent drivers of the world economy—maximizing profits and growth— and multiple inequalities of income and wealth” (23).
In effect, it is the underlying logics of capitalism and economic growth that need to be discerned in order to make sense of the larger picture of GHG emissions.
Chapter 3 shifts the discussion to tracking how climate change impacts affect people and ecosystems.
Erratic weather patterns in a now rapidly overheating planet affect different strata of society (and environments) differently, and Adve emphasises that such varied consequences can, and often do, further exacerbate existing political and economic inequalities within and among nations.
This chapter, in particular, offers several examples from across India to demonstrate how global warming is affecting and altering seasons, biodiversity, the monsoons, and agriculture.
Coincidentally, the author of this book review is associated with a transdisciplinary research project, TAPESTRY,1 the findings of which also correspond to the findings in the booklet under review regarding the 1 “Transformation as Praxis: Exploring Socially Just and Transdisciplinary Pathways to Sustainability in Marginal Environments (TAPESTRY).” https://t2sresearch.org/project/tapestry/.
https://t2sresearch.org/project/tapestry/ Alankar impacts of climate change on marginalized communities in different parts of India.
Chapter 4 critically evaluates the policies and actions of the Indian government vis-à-vis climate change.
Specifically, Adve focuses on the various nationaland state-level climate action plans—solar energy, water management, sustainable agriculture, energy efficiency projects, sustainable habitats, and the Green India Mission.
The government’s strategy is essentially two pronged: (a) mitigation, which refers to large-scale infrastructural and technological efforts to decarbonize energy and economic activities in general, and (b) adaptation, involving various programmes that help people cope with changing weather patterns or even harness some of the new opportunities that may arise from climatic shifts.
Interestingly, Adve points out that mitigation efforts tend to attract more support in state plans because they also happen to be financially profitable and allow for private collaboration, whereas adaptation gets short shrift because it needs government spending and is mostly meant to cushion the poor against climate change impacts.
Chapter 4 ends with a useful mapping of the larger geopolitical scenario that has been shaping climate change negotiations.
While briefly touching upon some of the main points debated during the different rounds of the Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings—from Kyoto (1997) to Paris (2015)—Adve is keen to underline that it is the industrially advanced countries of the North that are reluctant to make meaningful commitments to reduce emissions.
On the other hand, the poorer nations of the South, such as Bolivia, Cuba, and Ecuador, seem to be making genuine efforts to tackle global warming–induced ecological challenges.
The final chapter elucidates how individual and collective efforts can be mobilized to tackle climate change challenges.
While at the individual level, several consumption choices can be pursued, such as choosing to install solar panels or buying energy efficient cars, collective or people-led struggles for climate justice, on the other hand, will involve more than scaling up local efforts.
Crafting global solidarities on the theme of climate change, in fact, will greatly depend not only on how the inner logic of capitalism is challenged, but crucially also on how meaningful demands are formulated for decarbonizing the economy and enabling the transition to non–fossil fuel energy.
In sum, Global Warming in India: Science, Impacts, and Politics is a very useful contribution.
It is accessibly written, and in a compelling way, untangles many of the most complicated aspects of the climate change debate.
But Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal crucially as well, we finally have the teaching textbook on global warming that would bring the student community up to speed on the pivotal questions concerning planetary sustainability in their generation.
Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 3 (1): 155–159, January 2020 BOOK REVIEW Policy and Politics in India in the Age of Global Warming Rohit Jha  Navroz K Dubash, ed.
2019.
India in a Warming World: Integrating Climate Change and Development, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-019-949873-4, 576 pp, Rs.
1995 (Hardbound) The hell fires of 2019-20 that engulfed Australia and incinerated large swathes of the country tell us that the impacts of climate change and global warming are clearly upon us.
Small wonder then that climate change activists often describe their challenges in dystopian imagery with allusions to melting glaciers, boiling oceans, burning forests or the extinction of entire species.
Navroz Dubash‟s edited volume India in a Warming World, however, is pointedly against a turn to extreme alarm.
The collection of essays with an informed and measured introduction, instead, attempts a balance between careful research and meaningful climate activism.
At  Research Assistant on project titled „Reconceptualizing Rivers in South Asia as Histories of the Biological Pulse‟, Kyoto University; 198F, Utsav Apartment, Rohini Sec 18, New Delhi110089; rohitjha95067@gmail.com.
Copyright © Jha 2020.
Released under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.
Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.
ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.103 https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v3i1.103 Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [156] heart, consequently, is the realistic, if not pragmatic, attempt to debate and explore how development goals can be achieved without warming the planet beyond 2 degree Celsius.
The essays in the volume are broadly clubbed under two distinct, though conceptually overlapping, themes: a) reviews and b) perspectives.
The review chapters are written by scholars from various disciplines such as climate science, science and technology studies, law and sociology.
The perspective chapters, on the other hand, are drawn from a mix of climate change activists and policy makers.
Under the two broad themes, the essays are then further grouped into five sections: a) climate change impacts; b) international debates and negotiations; c) politics; d) policies; and e) climate and development.
In the first section, the readers are offered a nuanced understanding of the various climate models and the presumed impacts of climate change on flora and fauna of India.
As J. Srinivasan in his essay notes, for example, that though there is a great demand in India for credible predictions about climate change impacts, the techniques to acquire such capacity is still a „work in progress‟ (p. 30).
Through an „event attribution‟ analysis, Krishna Achuta Rao and Friederike Otto underline three case studies ─ Chennai floods (2015); heat waves in Andhra Pradesh (2015) and extreme heat in Phalodi, Rajasthan (2016) ─ two of these cases, Chennai and Phalodi, showed that counterfactual (or non-manmade changes) were the cause of climate change as opposed to factual (or anthropogenic or man-made changes).
Nagraj Adve in a meticulous study emphasizes the importance of ethnographic approaches for capturing and describing climate change impacts on the ground.
Adve argues that the inaccuracy of climate models at district levels combined with poorly informed development plans can aggravate climate change impact women, mostly from underprivileged communities, facing „the maximum burnt of unplanned development, global warming and climate change‟ (p. 75).
This section enriches our understanding of climate models, the dynamics and thermodynamics of climate change and the impact of climate change across regions and communities.
The second section takes us behind closed doors and up close into international negotiations and debates on climate change.
The writers in this section Anil Aggarwal and Sunita Narain, Tejal Kanitkar and T. Jayaram, Sandeep Sengupta, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, Shsyam Saran, Ashok Lavasa, D. Raghunandan, Lavanya Rajmani, Ajay Mathur and Anunabha Ghosh uncover for us the many political and policy interests that have thus far shaped climate change negotiations at the international level.
The writers in this section also appear to jointly share the view that most outcomes [157] Rohit Jha from climate negotiations at the international level have thus far tended to be biased in favour of the developed world.
The strategies of tackling climate change at the international level and its impact for developing countries like India is brilliantly brought out in this section.
The point of contestation is whether we as a planet should follow the equality principle based on the emission we emit in the present or should we follow that equity principle which takes the historical emissions of all the countries into account.
It‟s an interesting debate.
The readers concerned about climate change and its international politics will surely find it captivating and revealing.
The third section focuses on the politics of climate change at national level.
It discusses the role of civil society organizations, large and small business corporations, labour organizations and the media.
Pradip Swarnakar points out that civil society organizations mostly work within two strategic frameworks: the climate sustainability framework which is „apolitical‟ and the climate justice framework which is „political‟.
Swarnakar examines in considerable detail the collaborative network building activity of these two types of CSOs and their methods for enabling mass participation and mobilization.
The chapter by Shankar Venkateshwaran and Mukund Rajan, on the other hand, looks at how business organizations attempt to address climate change actions.
The relationship between profitability and sustainability, they underline, has become a key concern for several Indian businesses.
According to them, such concerns have over the years translated into more investments under Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the appointment of Chief Sustainability Officers (CSO) in several major Indian companies.
However, financially few investor communities in India are factoring sustainability into their business models compared to their global counterparts.
Ashim Roy, Benny Kuruvilla and Ankit Bharadwaj map out the debates on the „transition‟ by Indian labour, currently embedded in the carbon economy, towards a green economy.
India‟s „right to develop‟, they argue, will need to be aligned with achieving public and democratic control of energy and social infrastructure (housing, water, and sanitation).
Thus, in their opinion, the role of trade unions and public ownership of production will be vital in addition to the implementation of responsible climate action plans by Indian businesses.
The media, fourth pillar of democracy, is also important in raising awareness around all these issues.
The mainstreaming of climate change in media, as Anu Jogesh points out, has moved from merely focusing on international climate negotiations towards more keenly following up on domestic challenges and politics.
Her emphasis, however, is mainly restricted to the English media reporting from 2010 to 2017.
She Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [158] acknowledges lack of review of regional papers, which are much larger in their numbers and readership, as a limitation.
The chapters on policy suggest that the implementation of climate change plans in India tend to get entangled in the federal structure of the Indian state with notable disconnect between national and regional goals.
Koyel Kumar Mandal looks at the issue of climate finance, whereas Ambuj Sagar examines the transition to climate technology.
Both these authors draw attention to lack of clarity in the role of climate finance and the adoption of climate technologies, especially in the planning efforts.
Elizabeth Gogoi discusses the status of State Climate Change Planning through a study of State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) that was first drafted in 2009.
As of now 32 states and union territories have approved these plans and their implementation process has begun.
Gogoi looks at Assam, Bihar, Chattishgarh, Kerela, Maharasthra and Odisha that are part of the „Action on Climate Today‟ (ACT), which uses SAPCC as a starting point to support climate change planning.
All these states seem to be in the process of tailoring and adjusting the national action plan to their local conditions.
Navroz K Dubash and Anu Jogesh take the point further and highlight the intricacies of state climate plans in five states: Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Sikkim, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha.
These states provide us with a polyphonic discourse on the inner workings of climate policy.
Though some states are working towards adjusting their climate plan to local environments, there, nevertheless, seems to be an institutional lack of sorts in many states.
As an official from Odisha, in an interview said: “we are a weak institutional sector, whether environment or climate change, our strengths don‟t lie in institutional capacities” (p. 363).
This statement seems to bring out the sordid ground reality of climate institutions in India.
As Navroz Dubash and Shibani Ghosh, in the first chapter in this section, put it: “the past decade has witnessed a rise in climate institutions in India, but it has been a reactive and ad hoc process” (p. 342).
The last section is dedicated to the issues of development and climate change.
While Lele and Krishnaswamy argue for the „sequestration method‟ in the context of forests, Kumar and Vishvanathan call for the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation for the entire agriculture sector.
Rohan Arthur argues for a coordinated and planned approach to tackle rising sea levels and Veena Srinivasan warns of the consequences of increased variability with more droughts and dry days which will impact the access to water for many.
The need for district-level institutional frameworks based on community lines seems to emerge as the shared vision of the contributors of this section..
Integrating development with climate change in other words, can be the best bet to overcome a situation [159] Rohit Jha that is otherwise mired with political skirmishes, institutional weaknesses, mis-communication and lack of sectoral coordination.
Outlining pathways for the democratic control of resources and the planned implementation of credible strategies for dealing with climate change impacts, hence, is an urgent requirement.
In sum, the collection of essays provides us an up to date understanding of the climate change debate in India.
The message, in essence, is that policymakers and political decision making can be involved in a productive dialogue and need not always be seen as antagonistic and locked in zero sum games.
Though India‟s social and economic worlds are undoubtedly made up of complex and often conflicting interests, sustainability challenges can most likely be met, as India in a Warming World tells us, by informed and considered interventions rather than by alarm and knee jerk reactions.
The essays in this volume, moreover, besides being ably supported by an insightful introductory essay by Navroz Dubash, are helpfully complimented by a range of infographics, tables, facts, anecdotes and empirical data.
The reader will surely be engaged as much with the accessible style and presentation of the book as they will be with its content.
This book is highly recommended, and let‟s say even necessary, for anyone who is looking to understand climate change in India and wants to do something about it.